The world as will and presentation 9780321355782, 0321355784, 9781315507880, 1315507889

Table of contents :
PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION BY MATTHIAS KOSSLER TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung Principle of Sufficient Ground and Principium Individuationis Der Wille The Aufhebung of Will The Text Other Translations and Main Aims of the Present Selective Notes on the Translation of Some Terms Selective Bibliography Acknowledgments THE WORLD AS WILL AND PRESENTATIONVOLUME ONESchopenhauer's Table of Contents Expanded Preface to the First Edition (1818) Preface to the Second Edition (1844) Preface to the Third Edition (1859) FIRST BOOKThe World as Presentation: First ConsiderationPresentation as Subject to the Principle of SufficientGround: The Object of Experience and Science SECOND BOOKThe World as Will: First ConsiderationThe Objectification of Will THIRD BOOKThe World as Presentation: Second ConsiderationPresentation Independent of the Principle of Sufficient GroundThe Platonic Idea: The Object of Art FOURTH BOOKThe World as Will: Second ConsiderationWith the Achievement of Self-CognizanceAffirmation and Denial of the Will for Life APPENDIXCritique of Kantian PhilosophyTRANSLATOR'S APPENDIXDiagrams for Book One ENDNOTESINDEX

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DANIEL KOLAK, SERIES EDITOR

Arthur Schopenhauer The W orld as Will and Presentation

Volume One

TRANSLATED BY RICHARD E. AQUILA THE UNlVERSITY OE TENNESSEE

IN COLLABORATION WITH DAVIDCARUS

First published 2008 by Pearson Edueation, Ine. Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 ThirdAvenue, NewYork, NY, 10017, USA

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Prancis Group, an informa business Copyright © 2008 Taylor & Frands All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reprodueed or utilised in any form or by any eleetronie, meehanieal, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photoeopying and reeording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Produet or eorporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identifieation and explanation without intent to infringe. ISBN-13: 9780321355782 Cpbk) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1788-1860. [Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. English] Arthur Schopenhauer : the world as will and presentation / translated by Richard E. Aquila in collaboration with David Carus. p. cm. - (Longman library of primary sources in philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-321-35578-4 (alk. paper) 1. Philosophy.2. Will. 3. Idea (Philosophy) 4. Knowledge. Theory of. 1. Title. B3138.E5A65 2008 !93-dc 22 Library ofCongress Contro! Number: 2007001262

Contents

PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION BY MATTHIAS KOSSLER

vii

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

xi

A. Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung

xii

B. Principle of Sufficient Ground and Principium Individuationis C. Der Wille

xvi

xxiv

D. The A~ebung ofWill E. The Text

xxix

xxxix

F. The Present and Other Translations

xlvi

G. Selective Notes on Some Terms xi

H. Selective Bibliography

1. Acknowledgments

[ii

lvi

THE WORLD AS WILL AND PRESENTAnON VOLUMEONE Schopenhauer's Table ofContents Expanded Preface to the First Edition (1818)

17

Preface to the Second Edition (1844) Preface to the Third Edition (1859)

3

9 29

FIRST BOOK The W orId as Presentation: First Consideration Presentation as Subject to the Principle of Sufficient Ground: The Object of Experience and Science 31

SECONDBOOK The W orld as Will: First Consideration The Objectification ofWill 131

iii

iv

Contents

THIRDBOOK The W orld as Presentation: Second Consideration Presentation Independent of the Principle of Sufficient Ground The Platonic [dea: The Object of Art 2/1

FOURTHBOOK The World as Will: Second Consideration With the Achievement ofSelf-Cognizance Affirmation and Denial of the Will for Life 321

APPENDIX Critique ofKantian Philosophy

479

TRANSLATOR'S APPENDIX Schopenhauer' s Diagrams for Book One

§9

618

ENDNOTES

620

INDEX

656

FOR MY GRANDCHILDREN Megan Sam

Emilio

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Preface to the Translation

German editors of Schopenhauer's works are confronted with a well known "curse" that the author laid upon "everyone who in future printings of my work will modify anything of them knowingly, be it a sentence or just one word, a syllable, a letter, a punctuation mark."j With this unequivocal testimony in the background, there is a long-Iasting and, as it seems, never-ending discussion about the right approach to an edition. The introduction to the following translation alludes to this problem. Now, if even German editors are not able to follow Schopenhauer's instruction in a satisfying manner, how much more must this be the case regarding translations of the editions of his works. For as Schopenhauer explains in bis essay "On Language and Words," any translation is "necessarily defective"; "We are hardly ever able to translate from one language into another any characteristic, pregnant, and significant passage in such a way that it would produce the same effect on the reader in apreeise and complete manner."jj The reason for this lies in the fact that concepts often do not correspond with each other in different languages (so, writing this, I am aware that the concept of "concept" does not correspond exactly to the German Begriff, and neither does "idea"). Thus even "the very best translation will at most be related to the original as the transposition of a given piece of music

iDer handschriftliche Nachlass, ed. Arthur Hübscher (Frankfurt: W. Kramer, 1966-1975), IV/2, p. 33. iiparerga und Paralipomena, vol. H, Sämtliche Werke, ed. Arthur Hübscher, vol. 6, p. 602.

vii

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Preface to the Translation

into another key is to the given piece itself'; and as Schopenhauer adds, "those who understand music know what that means." According to this estimation there are two ways to proceed, both of them unsatisfying: either a translation "remains dead and its style is forced, stiff and unnatural" or "it becomes free, in other words, is content with an ci peu pres and thus is incorrect." Up to now, a translation of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung has been available to AngloAmerican scholars that comes nearer to the first alternative. Even to one who, like me, has no great competence in English, it is obvious that the translation of Eric F. J. Payne, The World as Will and Representa!ion, sounds like a German text written in English words. This might be an advantage for German readers but not to those to whom it is addressed. So much the more it is therefore to be applauded that a translation is here presented with a main aim of providing a readable English text. Such a new translation is not only able to draw more attention to one of the most important European thinkers for the AngloAmerican sphere - a11 the more appropriate inasmuch as Sehopenhauer's philosophy was first discovered and aeknowledged in England 153 years ago, even before he became known in his homeland. It also contributes to a better understanding of Sehopenhauer's philosophy by English readers. Any translation that is truly readable, and yet as accurate as a translation could be, is neeessarily the produet of the effort to fmd a path between the Scylla of an artificial, inanimate style and the Charybdis of free transposition. From some discussions with the translators in which I have margina11y participated, I know how much care has been put into the best translation of some of the main concepts, as weIl as in regard to the meaning of the words in their use in common English. One may get an impression of these discussions from the translator's introduction. It is always a difficult task to minimize the general disadvantages of translations, with their necessary give and take, not to mention the danger of mixing translation with interpretation, which is partieularly high in the case of Sehopenhauer's philosophy, because it is more in need of interpretation than some others. As to how far the present translation succeeds in this task has to be judged by the experts. In any ease I am very glad about this new translation, and ladmire the courage and the work of Richard Aquila and David Carus. The translations of Erie F. 1. Payne have been most important for the development of AngloAmeriean Sehopenhauer research. They have undeniable merits, and Payne has rightly been named an honorary president ofthe Sehopenhauer Soeiety. But now -as indicated by an inereasing number of remarks from many sides in the last years - the time has come for this new translation,

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which I welcome in the name ofthe international Schopenhauer Society. I am sure that it will contribute to a new era of occupation with Schopenhauer's philosophy, not only in the Anglo-American world, but no less in lndia, where Schopenhauer has recently been discovered, and indeed aB over the world. MATTHIAS KOSSLER

University ofMainz President, Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft

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Translator' s Introduction

In 1819 Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) published his chief work, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. i In 1844, rather than subject the original to a major revision, he supplemented it with a second volume: for the reason that the twenty-five years that have passed ... have brought such a notable alteration in my manner of exposition and in the tone of delivery that it just would not do to fuse the content of the second volume into a whole with that ofthe first. . .I therefore put forth the two works in separation, and have often changed nothing in the earlier exposition even where I would now express myself quite differently; for I wanted to guard against spoiling the work of my younger years with the carping of old age. ii The two-volume work then appeared in a third edition in 1859. The present is a translation of the frrst volume of that edition. It has been produced in collaboration with David Carus, whose translation of the second volume reflects a reciprocal division oflabor. iii

i1819 per printed publication date, but in fact December, 1818. üPreface to the second edition, p. 21. The page references in this introduction are, where relevant, to this translation. However, for the widest convenience of readers, the pagination ofthe German edition (see below), is inc1uded in the margins of this volume and utilized in the index. iiiThe main responsibility for the present volume and its introduction being mine, and at least the initial impetus behind the project and some of its initial Xl

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Translator's Introduction

A. Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung The world is a presentation to me. In this sentence, the first of the book, Schopenhauer characterizes one of the two sides of die Welt, the world, as he sees it. If there is such a thing as literal translation, the present is, at least in one respect, decidedly non-literal. Why not: the world is my (meine) presentation? On the other hand, the choice of 'presentation' as a translation of Vorstellung may seem overly literal. Etymologically, Vorstellung connotes placement in a position (Stellung) before (vor) or as present to someone; the 'pre' in 'present' and 'presentation' captures this. i In ordinary usage, however, one's Vorstellung of something is simply one's "idea" of it. And so, as we might put it: the world is my idea. ii Furthermore, although it is an overstatement, Schopenhauer says that "thorough acquaintance" with Kant is required for this book. iii At least in philosophical contexts, Kant equates Vorstellung with the Latin repraesentatio (A320/B376).iv And so, as we might also put it: the world is my representation. v I return to the notion of representation below. In any event, as suggested, the case for "presentation" goes hand in hand with the need to avoid the sense of

determinations, I frequently write in the first person, at least through the first four sections of this introduction. It is to be borne in mind, however, that without the elose collaboration in which we have engaged throughout, this would not be the translation that it iso iThe 'pre' is from the Latin prae, which, like the corresponding English, of course signifies a temporal notion in other contexts. (A few other examples of the non-temporal "before": precinct, precipice, precipitation, preface, prefer, prefix, preposition, preside, prescribe, pretend, prevail.) iiThe Warld as Will and Idea, tr. in 3 vols., R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp (London: Trubner & Co., 1883-1886); The Warld as Will and Idea, abridged, ed. David Berman, tr. li1l Berman (London: 1. M. Dent, 1995 [Everyman Library]). iiiPreface to the first edition, p. 13; second edition, p. 23. iV'Representation' and its cognates are fairly standard in translations ofKant, e.g., in the translations of the Critique a/ Pure Reason most frequently cited in the literature: Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929); Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). On the other hand, Werner Pluhar opts for 'presentation' (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1996). References to the Kritik der reinen Vernunft appear in standard AlB format, referring to the pagination of the first (1781) and second (1787) editions, typically so indicated in the margins of modern editions. vThe Warld as Will and Representatian, tr. in two vo1s. by E. F. 1. Payne (Indian Hills, Colorado: Falcon's Wing Press, 1958; repr. New York: Dover Publications, 1966).

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xiii

possession generally attaching to possessive pronouns. More positively, the point is to promote what we take to be the central intention in Schopenhauer's use of the term: not possession by, but presentation of objects to, a cognizant subject. With respect to this central sense, it mayaiso be useful to note that the term Vorstellung is commonly used to refer to theatrical presentations. Several times, Schopenhauer in fact calls the side of the world that he calls meine Vorstellung a Schauspiel, or a "show" (or "play"Y: a show that is "mine" in the sense that I am its spectator. But as it turns out, it is also mine in another sense. Just as with the corresponding English term, Vorstellung can refer either to what is presented or to the process or action of presenting it. Thus we may say that Harnlet is "our" presentation for the evening; but we may of course also speak of the evening's presentation ofthat play, and of the doings of its various characters. It is just here, however, that a decisive step is taken. For what we soon leam in Book One of this work is that what always does the ''presenting'' - what actually sets (stellt) the world as presentation before (vor) one - is just that very spectator, the cognizant subject (erkennendes Subjekt) itself. And even this falls short of fully capturing the radical character of Schopenhauer's view. For one might still suppose that, even ifwhat does the "presenting" is the cognizant subject itself, what is presented is at least normally an independently existing reality. But for Schopenhauer: ''No object without subject."ii And so, as

i § 52, p. 318; § 64, p. 417; also, at p. 524 in the Appendix ("Critique of Kantian Philosophy"), a Puppenspiel, "puppet show"; at § 60, p. 387, a "tragicomedy" of which one is the spectator. Schopenhauer also compares the sense in which, as he will argue in Book One, all the objects that one perceives in physical space are inseparable from the Vorstellung of them - and so exist only in one's "head" as their entire Schauplatz - to the sense in which one can see mountains, forests, and seas in the theater: The World as Will and Presentation, vol. 11, eh. 2 (in Arthur Hübscher's edition of the Sämtliche Werke, vol. 3, p. 26). He also uses the term Schauplatz for the "stage" or "scene" of the world as Vorstellung at § 7, p. 63; § 26, p. 177; § 62, p. 396; and vol. 11, pp. 408,651, and 667. As one may note, while a theatrical presentation has its audience, there is also a sense in which each audience has its presentation: one's presentation for the evening may be a performance of Hamlet; another's may be King Lear. (Throughout, references by page number to Hübscher's edition of Will and Presentation, vol. 11, refer to the bracketed marginal pagination in that edition, corresponding to that of the 1859 edition and on the whole identical with Hübscher's own pagination in that volume.) ii§ 7, p. 61; cf. §§ 1-2, and Appendix, p. 502.

XIV

Translator's Introduction

it turns out, a still more apt analogy would be another upon which he in fact dweIls at greater length: what gets presented to one in a dream (§

5).;

This does not mean that the spectating subject spins its show or "dream" out of nothing. The point of departure is always some particular material state that, as Schopenhauer explains in §§ 4 and 6, is always some portion of the subject's own body and, to that extent, always in some sense the subject's "immediate object"; as he also explains, however, it is thereby "presented," and as such an "object" of cognizance, in only a loose sense of these terms. (The presupposition of materiality by any sort of presentational activity, which - to the extent that we regard matter as an abject - might of course seem to conflict with the principle "No object without subject," is a point to which I return in section D.) Most crucially, in any case, Schopenhauer repeatedly draws a distinction between ordinary, individual cognizant subjects and that "one" subject which is said to be "whoie and undivided in every being that is engaged in presentation" (§ 2, p. 34), a subject that amounts to distinct individuals only by virtue of a "special relation" to distinct bodies (§ 19, p. 141; cf. § 18, p. 137). Schopenhauer describes this "subject"ii as the "world's one eye that looks out from all cognizant beings" (§ 38, p. 242; cf. § 36, p. 229; § 54, p. 334); as a subject of which individual subjects are only the "bearer," and that is itself in turn the "bearer of the world" (§ 61, p. 387); and as a subject that, unlike any individual subject, "is not in time, since time is only the more immediate form belonging to all of its presentational activity."iii I return to this point below. With their main point unchanged, a number of passages can be read with Vorstellung taken either way: referring either to what is presented (qua presented) or to the presentational activity involved. But this is of course not the case when Schopenhauer describes the warld as

iOn account of the dual role of the cognizant subject (both as that to which the world is, as its spectator, a presentation, and as that which ultimately "does" the presenting), we translate (e.g., § I, p. 31) the distinetion between Vorstellung and das Vorstellende - as one might wish to put it, between presentation and "that which does the presenting" - as a distinction between presentation and that which is "engaged in" presentation. iiIt remains to be considered whether it is not in fact misleading to call it a "subject," as opposed to "pure subjectivity" itself. As will be noted in section D., however, there is also a certain ambiguity in the latter notion. iiiist nicht in der Zeit: denn die Zeit ist erst die nähere Form alles seines Vorstellens (vol. H, eh. I, p. 18).

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Vorstellung. (In other cases, other sorts of presentations are presented, e.g., the abstract objects ofthinking andjudging (concepts, Begriffe), to which Schopenhauer gives special attention in § 9 of Book One, or those special objects that he calls Platonic Ideas (Ideen), which are central to the theory of aesthetic awareness in Book Three.) And Schopenhauer makes it sufficiently clear that, in his own usage, the primary sense of Vorstellung is precisely that of what is presented to a subject: the presented object (again, qua presented, as opposed to whatever it may be "in itself'). Thus in his essay On the Fourfold Root 0/ the Principle 0/ Sulficient Ground:

To be object for the subject and to be a presentation to us (unsere Vorstellung) are the same thing. All presentations to us are the subject's objects (Objekte des Subjekts), and all the subject's objects are presentations to us. i In Will and Presentation, Schopenhauer also equates Vorstellung both with Objekt des Subjekts (§ 24, p. 158; § 27, p. 194) - employing, again, an obviously non-possessive genitive - and with Objekt fiir ein Subjekt (§ 30, p. 211)Y As for 'represent' and 'representation,' I have not found a need for the noun here, and 1 use the verb for both vertreten and repräsentieren, never vorstellen. iii By contrast, as already noted, 'representation' has

iFourjold Root, 2nd ed., § 16. (Where, as here, a section is short enough for easy location of a passage, I do not cite a page number; I also cite exclusively from the second edition, unless otherwise noted). Cf. Will and Presentation, § 17, p. l32: "For we have no idea at all how to distinguish such an object from a presentation, but find that they are one and the same thing, since all objects always and etemally presuppose a subject and are therefore still presentations; that is why we have recognized being-an-object as belonging to presentation's most general form, which is precisely that of division into object and subject." iiSchopenhauer uses the expression "object for a subject" on other occasions as weIl (§ 32, pp. 217-18, e.g., twice), though less frequently than he does the genitive construction (e.g., § 4, p. 41; § 6, p. 50; § 7, p. 60; § 19, p. 141). For this reason, one might even prefer to say that the world is a presentation jor, rather than to, cognizant subjects. But that is undesirable on account of its suggestion of a transcendent purpose, not at all apart of Schopenhauer's thinking. iiiAt § 52, p. 315, J also translate nachbildende Musik as "representational music," although otherwise using 'copy' for nachbilden. For the verb darstellen - with exceptions not worth noting - I have generally used 'depict' or 'display,' employing the latter for reference to ways in which will is said to be displayed or "manifested." But I generally reserve 'manifestation' and 'manifest' for

xvi

Translator' s Introduction

become - but not without exception - commonplace in connection with Kant, and also familiar in translations of Schopenhauer. But in addition to failing to bring out the dual notion of that which is "set before" a cognizant subject as its object, and the presentationaJ activity of the subject therein engaged, it disguises the point by way of a misleading suggestion. Namely, it suggests that what is in question is some sort of internal item (a "representation"), internal to the state of the subject, and toward which its cognitive activity is in the first instance directed. Whether or not this leads to the additional supposition that such items function by representing something existing independently of that activity, it misdirects us from the main idea. i

B. Principle of Sufficient Ground and Principium Individuationis The first and third ofthe four Books of The Warld as Will and Presentation focus on the world as presentation. The subtitle of Book One

Manifestation and manifestieren, though on occasion also thus translating A'usserung and its verb - generally "expression" and "express" - when Ausdruck (also "expression") is in elose proximity. For the highly versatile Darstellung, I have used a variety of tenns, inc1uding of course 'depiction' and 'display.' Sometimes, for example, what is in question is simply an "account" or an "exposition" of something; with darstellen, in such contexts, I have on a few occasions also used "set forth." 'Represent' and 'representation,' and even 'present' and 'presentation,' might of course sometimes also be used, but they are not so used in the present volume. On a few occasions of non-substantive import, where it would sound pedantic otherwise, 1 have also used 'idea' for Vorstellung, fOT example, referring to a "grotesque idea" (groteske Vorstellung) at p. 587. However, T also use 'idea' otherwise, generaHy, namely, for Gedanke, but only at points where 'thought' does not seem quite right for the latter; I also use 'idea' for Einfall, sometimes modified (e.g., "a sudden witty idea" [ein witziger EinfallJ). But these are not common occurrences, and nothing of substance is connected with 'idea' in this translation - as opposed to 'Idea' (with initial capital), which translates Schopenhauer's Idee. iOf course, it is Schopenhauer's view that, with the exception of concepts (Begriffe) - which are mere abstractions - aH ofthe objects coming before our consciousness are, in their "inner essence," what he caHs "will." But it would be wrong to take it to follow from this that those objects, those Vorstellungen, are "representations" of the will in question. In any case, what Schopenhauer himself in the first instance intends is that those objects are ways in which the will in question is presented, displayed, or manifested to one.

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- titled "The World as Presentation: First Consideration" - is "Presentation as Subject to the Principle of Sufficient Ground (Vorstellung unterworfen dem Satze vom Grunde): The Object ofExperience and Science."i As it is here, the word 'sufficient' (zureichender) is often omitted. But it is standardly inserted in translations, and we follow this practice. We depart from common practice, however, in that the principle is more usually called the Principle of Sufficient Reason. I explain this point below. (Throughout, we employ initial capitals to highlight the principle's importance for Schopenhauer.) In 1813, Schopenhauer published the first edition of the work to which 1 referred in the preceding section, On the Fourfold Root ofthe Principle of Sufficient Ground (Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde)Y Referring to that work in the Preface to the first edition of The World as Will and Presentation, he calls it the latter's "introduction," and he says that "Without acquaintance with this introduction and propaedeutic, true understanding of the present work is altogether impossible." He had, in the first edition of Will and Presentation, in fact titled its preface "Preface in Place of the Introduction." At eight points, he also refers to the Fourfold Root not by title, but simply as "the introductory treatise." Nevertheless, it is something of an exaggeration to describe it as absolutely prerequisite to an understanding ofhis chiefwork. On the other hand, it will be useful to have a brief overview of the principle with which it is concemed; some further points will be added in endnotes to the translation. The Principle of Sufficient Ground bears on all of the members of what (with the need of a certain qualification) Schopenhauer calls the

i Book Three - titled "The World as Presentation: Second Consideration" - is subtitled "Presentation Independent of the Principle of Sufficient Ground. The Platonic Idea: The Object of Art." For brief comment, see section D., below. iiHereinafter referred to as "the FOUlfold Root." The first edition has only recently been translated into English for the first time: F. C. White, Schopenhauer's Early Fourfold Root: Translation and Commentary (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ud., 1997 [Avebury Series in PhilosophyD. The work was accepted by the University of Jena as Schopenhauer's doctoral dissertation in 1813. For a translation of the second edition, to which I exclusively refer, see Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fouifold Root 0/ the Principle 0/ SujJicient Reason, tr. E. F. J. Payne (La SaUe, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1974); here throughout, however, the translations are mine. (It might be noted that Payne generally translates Grund with the disjunctive "ground or reason.") The original second-edition (1847) pagination is reproduced in the margins ofHübscher's edition, contained in the first volume ofhis edition ofthe Sämtliche Werke.

xviii

Translator's lntroduction

"four classes" into which "everything can be divided that can become an object for us, thus all our presentations."i (In Will and Presentation, he simply refers to these as "objects of the first," sccond, ete., class.) Corresponding to each of these classes of objects there is a distinct "mode" (Gestalt, Gestaltung) of the Principle of Sufficient Ground. Corresponding to the latter, in turn, there are four ways in which the concept of necessity applies with respect to presentations. (1) First class of objects: phenomena (Erscheinungen),ii or objects perceptible (or imaginable) in space and time, insofar as such objects are regarded as part of "empirical reality." In § 17 of the Fouifold Root he calls these "perceptual,iii compiete, empirical presentations." Here the principie in question - in its mode as Principie of the Sufficient Ground of Becoming (des Werdens) - concems changes 0/ state with respect to objects of this c1ass. According to this principle, all such changes have a ground in antecedent changes with respect to objects ofthe same class; given the ground in question, the consequent state is necessary in accordance with causallaws. Although considerabIy expanded in the second edition of the Fouifold Root, Schopenhauer's treatment of this c1ass of objects, and of the concept of causality, occupies the largest portion of both editions of that work. Where Will and Presentation goes further is in considering this class of objects from two points of view: in Book

'§ 16, p. 26; p. 42 in Payne (tr.). The qualification relates to the special class of presentation that Schopenhauer calls ldeas (Ideen); these are the focus of Book Three. iiWe follow Payne in translating Erscheinung as "phenomenon" rather than "appearance" (except where the point is specifically to refer to the "appearing" or the "coming to appearance" ofa phenomenon). This Is in order to avoid suggesting that the "thing in itself' underlying the phenomenon is indeed some sort of "thing" that appears in various modes by virtue of being variously perceived by us, as opposed to some sort of "power" or "force" whose express ions or manifestations are perceived and thus "appear" to uSo One might also note that the same objects can in principle "appear" as mere figments of imagination, dream, or hallucination as weil. We may still regard them as Erscheinungen in such cases; but then, as noted, evcn empirical "reality" is comparable to a dream in Schopenhauer's philosophy. iiianschaulichen. We follow Payne (but are more consistent) in translating Anschauung as "perception." As Schopenhauer notes, the objects in question are "complete" in that they contain not simply what Kant had called a "formal" element - to be found in the third cl ass of objects (space and time) - "but also the material element (das Materiale) in phenomena," corresponding to the fact of their apprehension through the medium of sensation (Empfindung).

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One, as they are subject to causallaw (as well as in their relation to the second and third c1asses of objects); in Book Two, as they are "objectifications" or manifestations of"wi11." But the concept of causality is also the focus of discussion in both Books: most prominently, in Book One, § 4; in Book Two, §§ 17, 23-24, 26. (2) Second c1ass of objects: abstract objects, concepts (Begriffe). Here the principle in question - in its mode as Principle of the Sufficient Ground of Cognition (des Erkennens) - concems those judgments that can be formed by way of combinations of objects of this c1ass. According to tlIis principle, tlIe concept of tlIe trutlI of a judgment is correlated with tlIe concept of necessity with respect to its adequately grounded justijication. i In Will and Presentation, Schopenhauer focuses on objects of this sort, on that particular type of cognizance tlIat is made possible by their means, Le., knowledge and science (Wissen, Wissenschaft)/i and on tlIe distinction between tlIe faculty of reason (Vernunft), to which concepts pertain, and the faculty ofunderstanding (Verstand) or intellect (Intellekt), whose province involves a pre-conceptual (and in certain respects superior) grasp of causal relations: esp., §§ 8-10, § 12, and §§ 14-15 ofBook One. He further discusses Wissenschaft (science) at various points in Book Two, e.g., in §§ 17,24,27. In addition, at the end of § 54 in Book Four, he emphasizes the role of abstract conceptual

i"Truth is thus the reference of a judgment to something distinet from it, which is called its ground" (Fourfold Root, § 29; cf. Will and Presentation, § 15, p. 114: "truth is the referenee of a judgment to its eognitive ground." Four kinds oftruth are distinguished by Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root, §§ 30-33): (i) formal-logieal truth (grounded in a grasp of the laws oflogie, or the general "laws of thought," as they are operative in the performance of formal-logical deduetions; (ii) empirical truth, grounded in eonerete experience (and what we would eaU "inductive" logie); (iii) transcendental truth, grounded in cognizance of a priori conditions of the very possibility of experienee; (iv) metalogieal truth, grounded in eognizance of the laws expressive of the essenee of reason (Vernunft) as such, and thus underlying the possibility oftruth oftype (i). (Although Schopenhauer isn't always c1ear about the question of "neeessity" in this eontext, perhaps the best way to look at it is that, according to the sort of truth that is in question in a judgment taken to be true, there are four sorts of grounds that are necessarily adequate as grounds for taking it to be true.) "Apart from non-technical referenees to knowledge as familiarity, aequaintanee, or expertise (kennen, Kenntnis), and an oeeasional referenee to that of which one is "conseious" (bewusst), we reserve 'know' and 'knowledge' for wissen and Wissen. We translate erkennen, Erkennen, and Erkenntnis in terms, not of"knowing," but rather of"cognition," "cognizance," and (less frequently) "reeognition. "

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thought in a certain sort of "authentie" affirmation of the will for life, and again at the end of § 55, in his discussion of "acquired character." In §§ 66 and 68, on the other hand, he emphasizes the intuitive (intuitiv) and non-abstract character of the sort of cognizance that can ultimately lead to true virtue - which consists precisely in a denial of the will for life. i (3) Third class of objects: space and time as objects of a special sort of"pure perception" (reine Anschauung), characteristic ofthe mental activity of pure mathematicians, but in some way implicated in all ordinary empirical perception as well. ii Here the principle in question in its mode as Principle ofthe Sufficient Ground ofBeing (des Seins)concems relative location within the two special objects of this class. According to this principle, all such locations are themselves "determining" (bestimmende) grounds with respect to all other possible locations. Although Schopenhauer does not always put it with quite the same emphasis as Kant, what he has in mind is what Kant had put, in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the Critique 0/ Pure Reason, in terms that might incline us to speak of space and time themselves, rather than relative locations within them, as the true "grounds of being."iii Namely, as Kant emphasizes and Schopenhauer presumably also holds, locations in space and time are always apprehended precisely within aspace and time that are in their own turn holistically apprehended, in the special

i For criticism of the notion of "practical reason" as a source of morality, see also § 16 and, in the Appendix, pp. 594jJ. ii These same objects, insofar as they are perceived (wahrgenommen) as filled with perceptible matter - which Schopenhauer says may thus be called "the perceptibility oftime and space" (die Wahrnehmbarkeit von Zeit und Raum) - are said to be in some sense indistinguishable from tbe objects ofthe first dass, i.e., from ordinary objects perceptible in space and time (Fourfold Root § 35, p. 123; Payne [tr.], p. 193). On the translation of Anschauung and Wahrnehmung generally , but with important exceptions, both of them "perception" - see the notes on translation in section G., below. (Generally, in translations ofKant and sometimes in other translations of Schopenhauer, reine Anschauung is "pure intuition.") iiiAnd in Will and Presentation, Schopenhauer in fact frequently refers to space and time tbemselves (along with causality), not simply as what the Principle of Sufficient Ground, in one of its modes, is concerned with, but precisely as modes (Gestalten, Gestaltungen) ofthat Principle: e.g., § 24, p. 160; § 25, p. 168; § 35, p. 225. Perhaps most explicitly: "Thus time is nothing other than the ground of being in time, i.e., suceession; spaee is nothing other than the Prineiple ofSuffieient Ground with respect to spaee, thus loeation ... " (§ 7, p. 66).

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pure perception in question, as antecedently given with respect to any such possible determinations. i For both Kant and Schopenhauer, in any case, the pure perception in question is what grounds insight into the necessities of arithmetic and geometry. In the present work, Schopenhauer introduces this mode of the Principle of Sufficient Ground in § 3, and he focuses on its connection with mathematical knowledge in §§ 15 and24. (4) Fourth class of objects: with respect to each individual subject, that very individual itself, insofar as it is perceptible to itself through a kind of inner cognizance, not in any way directly referring to existence as a physical object in space. Here the principle in question - in its mode as Principle of the Sufficient Ground of Action (des Handeins), otherwise known as the Law of Motivation (Gesetz der Motivation) - concems willed action on the part of objects of this class. ii According to this principle, every action has a motive (a particular state of cognizance at the moment of the action) with respect to which it constitutes a necessary response, given the character ofthe subject in question. üi The role of"character" is treated in § 46 ofthe first edition ofthe Fourfold Root; the second edition only briefly alludes to it, at the end of § 43, referring the reader instead to Schopenhauer's Prize Essay on the Freedom ofthe

iI say "apprehend" in this introductory context because it sounds more natural than "perceive," but the latter is the term (anschauen) that Schopenhauer himself uses, both for the "apprehension" of pure space and time and of objects therein. In the translation itself, however, I generally reserve "apprehend" for auffassen. (For the exception, see the note on Wahrnehmung in section G.) Schopenhauer does not use auffassen for the "perception" of pure space and time, although he does regularly use it for that ofboth ordinary objects, and relations involving them, and Ideas.) iiAs Schopenhauer emphasizes, one is not in the same way cognizant of oneself - indeed strictly speaking not at all cognizant of oneself (since that would require cognizance of oneself as an object) - as a cognizant subject: Fowfold Root, § 4l. In section D., below, r comment on the question ofthe identity of the subjects of willing and cognition, and on the senses in which the cognizant subject both is and is not cognizable as an object. In the meantime it should be noted that, as an individual subject, both ofwilling and cognition, one is a physical individual existing in space, even if there is a special mode of awareness of oneself that makes no reference to this mode of existence. iiiGiven that the ground in question is astate of cognizance, it would seem wrong to regard this as a special case of the sort of causality that bears on objects of the first class. But Schopenhauer does speak of it in these terms: Fourfold Root § 20, pp. 45ff(Payne [tr.], pp. 69jj); cf Will and Presentation, § 23, pp.

154ff.

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Translator' 5 Introduction

Will. i In Will and Presentation, the relevant notions receive particular attention in §§ 20, 23, 26, and 28 of Book Three, and in § 55 of Book Four. Now Schopenhauer equates the general principle whose four modes bear on these four c1asses of objects with what is known in Latin as the principium rationis sufficientis. But apart from the fact that we are translating from German and not from Latin - and that 'ground' has the advantage not only of an etymological connection with Grund, but with a number of other terms whose translations standardly honor that connection - Schopenhauer hirnself calls attention to the !imitations of the Latin. As he emphasizes in the following passage, the word ratio threatens to conflate a distinction that is fundamental in his philosophy, namely, between the faculties of reason (Vernunft) and understanding (Verstand). In commenting on the Principle ofthe Sufficient Ground of Cognition, he first notes that, since the Grund in question "is always something by which judgments are supported, or on which they rest (darauf das Urteil sich stützt, oder beruht), the German term Grund is fittingly chosen." But then he adds: In Latin and all the languages derived from it, the term for a cognitive ground (der Name des Erkenntnisgrundes) coincides with the term for reason (mit dem der Vernunft): thus both are called ratio, la ragione, la razon, la raison, the reason. This testifies to one's recognition that cognizance ofthe grounds of judgments is the most preeminent function of reason, its business xa:r' eSOXriv Y This is of course to grant that the Principle of Sufficient Ground does indeed give expression to the preeminent business ofthe faculty of reason. But the faculty of reason, for Schopenhauer, deals only in abstractions. It deals only in the application of abstract concepts to something already pre-conceptually understood. Thus in any instance of actually applying the principle in question - and in particular therefore in applying it to that "world as presentation" whose apriori formal

i See chapter III thereof. This essay, submitted in 1838 to a competition sponsored the Norwegian Society of Sciences, received its prize the following year and was published by the Society in 1840. Schopenhauer then republished it, along with an essay on The Foundation 0/ Morality, as one ofthe two parts of his Two Fundamental Problems ofEthics (Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik). iikat' exochen (par excellence): Fourfold Root, § 29.

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structure is that of space, time, and causality - one is applying one's faculty of reason precisely to certain structures, or "forms," that belong as such to the faculty of understanding (part of what Schopenhauer calls "intellect" [Intellekt]). That to which the principle in question gives abstract expression is in the first instance a fact about these formal structures. As one might even also note, at least in the particular case of the formal structures of space and time, it is plainly unnatural to speak of locations within them (as opposed to events occurring at locations) as determining "reasons" with respect to one another, but not unnatural to speak ofthem as mutually determining "grounds." In any case, the special status of what Schopenhauer cal1s understanding or intellect consists in the particular role that this faculty plays in the very generation of the world as presentation. lt achieves the latter by accomplishing a kind ofmental "projection,,,j or "setting," of objects of perception into the space and time of the perceiver. Therein, as objects now presented to one, they are themselves merely discriminable jj portions ofthe perceiver's perceptual field. In turn, this is accomplished by way of a pre-conceptual response to sensation (Empfindung), as that which is thereby always in a certain sense part of one's body as "immediate object." Insofar as this cognitive accomplishment does not rest on the possession of concepts, it of course does not presuppose the pos session of concepts relating to relative position in, or to causallaws bearing on the occupation of, the perceiver's space and time. Nevertheless, it rests on one's cognitive faculty bringing about, with respect to one's perceptual field, what one will necessarily be ahle to conceptualize in those terms, once one's faculty of reason has gone to work upon it. In this sense, space, time, and causality - as apriori forms belonging to our cognitive faculty - playa ground-level role in the constitution of the world as presentation. But there is also a crucial distinction to be drawn among these forms. Space and time - the only space and time ofwhich we are able to conceive - concern the apriori perceptible form 0/ any perceptual field within which our faculty of understanding is able to set objects before us (i.e., is able to present them to us). Thus they are in an

iSchopenhauer uses the term projizieren in the Fourfold Rool § 21, p. 77 (Payne [tr.l, p. 119), and in Will and Presentation Il, eh. 22, p. 312. In the former passage, he refers to the latter and also to § 4 of volume I, although that paiticular term is not there employed. lIThese matters are the particular foeus of a seetion (§ 21) that was added in the second edition ofthe Fourfold Rool, and of § 4 of Will and Presentation.

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Translator' s Introduction

important respect a precondition for any causal understanding with respect to the world as presentation. i But yet beyond that, the central point of Book One is that, apart from our ability to conceive of things within an at least conceivably possible perceptual field, we have no ability so much as even to conceive of any individual thing in the first place. For this reason, Schopenhauer singles out space and time as the "principle of individuation," principium individuationis.

C. Der Wille Book Two, titled "The World as Will: First Consideration. The Objectification (Objektivation )ii of Will," tells us that der Wille is what the world is "in itself," its "inner essence." It is, as Schopenhauer also frequently puts it, the world's "essence in itself," as opposed to its being as a mere presentation, i.e., as objectified either in the phenomena projected by the faculty of understanding or in what Schopenhauer calls those Platonic Ideas (Ideen) that, apprehended by way of a quite different manner of cognizance, are apprehended as archetypes of which phenomena are mere expressions or manifestations; these ldeas, he says, are what constitute the "true" world as presentation. iii Apart from occasions where purely grammatical considerations recommend otherwise, or where Schopenhauer is referring to will in more specific terms (e.g., as the will for life [Wille zum Leben]), or referring to a specific manifestation of will (e.g., to the will of a particular individual),iV we

iSchopenhauer also emphasizes, to be sure, that all the work ofunderstanding is accomplished in terms of an understanding of causal relations. But this is arguably because of the crucial role of the actual setting of anything within the pure forms of space and time, an action that is responsive to sensation only by way of some sort of causal understanding of the latter as an effect within one's body. Thus he puts the matter quite differently in a passage from the Appendix to the present work: "only through application ofthe understanding (i.e., ofthe law ofcausality) and [my emphasis] ofspace and time as perceptual forms does our intellect transform this mere sensation into a presentation that now stands as an object in space and time" (p. 507). iiSchopenhauer also frequently uses the term Objektität, which we translate as "objectivization," reserving "objectivity" for Objektivität. iiidie eigentliche Welt als Vorstellung (§ 34, p. 223). See the next section for further discussion. It should be borne in mind that the apprehension (Auffassung) in question is a special case of Anschauung, or "perception" as we translate that term. iVln cases involving the will of an individual subject, the relevant passages might of course be read either way, given that the will in question is always an

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generally omit the artieie. There is no question, of course, with respect to the title of the book; the article is not employed there. But Schopenhauer speaks of der Wille throughout the book, and it has become commonplace to represent him as thereby speaking of something called "the" will. At least as we read Schopenhauer, this would be just as strange a procedure as if, upon being told by a philosopher, or scientist, that the inner essence of matter is die Kraft (force or power), we were to formulate this as the proposition that the inner essence of matter is "the" force or "the" power. In any case, one thing needs to be clear, and excessive talk about "the" will might tend to obscure it. Namely, the will that Schopenhauer takes to be the inner essence of the world is not any sort of "thing" that expresses itself in acts of willing; it is not any sort of "subject" of such acts, but rather the inner essence of all subjects of such acts. Willing subjects are only objectifications or manifestations ofit. When Schopenhauer says that der Wille is the inner essence of the world, he is in fact saying that something that is at least like what we think of as force or power (or energy) - as we, at least, might feel reasonably comfortable using one or more of these terms - is the inner essence of the world. (He explains his reason for choosing the term Wille over Kraft in § 22 of Book Two.) And, while he emphasizes the point more in the second than in the first volume of Will and Presentation, he also holds that all phenomena, as empirically real objects - including individual willing and cognizant subjects - are made out of various configurations of matter, of which the will in question is in turn the inner essence. i However, it would be amistake to suppose that the only limit to what is clearly some sort of Schopenhauerian "materialism"ii - the

expression of "the" will that is the inner essence of nature as a whole. iIt should be noted that this is not to say that will as such is therefore purely "physical" force or energy, in the sense that the whole of its expression might be captured in terms of concepts appropriate in the physical sciences. Much of what Schopenhauer says in fact seems to imply that its all-encompassing "direction" is simply toward whatever happens to be, given the circumstances in question, the "highest" possible level of expression in those circumstances. The notion of"levels" of expression is introduced in Book Two. iiThe suggestion that Schopenhauer is adopting a materialist point of view is stronger in the second volume and in some passages added to the first in its B and C (second and third) editions. In those passages (§ 6, p. 50, added in B; § 7, p. 59, added in C; and passages added in Band C to the Appendix, pp. 483, 487, 523), Schopenhauer attributes all cognitive activity to workings of the brain. By contrast, in some first-edition passages, cognition is only said to be

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only respect in which it is not the case that everything is "material" for Schopenhauer - lies in the fact that, while everything in the world is made out of matter, anything material in nature is an objectification of something more fundamental, namely, will. A further issue concems the status of that very cognizance in relation to which anything is an object in the first place. i A number of things that Schopenhauer says suggest that der Wille is not only supposed to be that inner essence which is expressing itself in or through all cognizant subjects, just as through any thing in nature, but, at least at a certain level of its objectification, also itself a cognizant subject, dwelling within every individual cognizant subject. In other words, der Wille would be that "one eye" which Schopenhauer describes as "looking out" from any individual cognizant subject. Whatever may be said for or against it, therefore, as a cosmic "subject" supposed to be engaged in acts of willing, to the extent that der Wille has arrived at a certain level of objectification - namely, at the level of animal life - it may seem to be at least a cosmic subject engaged in cognition, and not simply the inner essence of such a being, as of all others. For as Schopenhauer himself puts it, "the world is [the] will's self-cognizance."ii And there are a number of other passages in which he speaks of selfcognizance or self-consciousness on the part of will itself, at least at a particular level of its objectification. iii In the next seetion, I try to distinguish the senses in which it may or may not in fact be helpful to put things in these terms. Whether or not, or in whatever sense, we regard der Wille as itself either a willing or a cognizant "subject," the view just formulated seems

represented (repräsentiert) or signified (bezeichnet) by the brain, which is of course part of the world as presentation generated by cognitive activity in the first place (§ 27, p. 194; § 39, p. 248; § 60, p. 386). At § 33, pp. 219-20, Schopenhauer also emphasizes that, insofar as the brain is part of the objectification of will at a certain level, cognition is necessarily "in the service" ofwill. iSchopenhauer takes the principle "No object without subject" to render materialism "forever impossible" (§ 7, p. 61). But this is a principle turning on the notion of cognizance as such, not on that of an underlying "thing in itself," which is what der Wille is for Schopenhauer. iiSelbsterkenntnis des Willens: § 71, p. 476; emphasis added above. iii E.g, § 27, p. 194; § 29, p. 209; § 34, p. 223; § 35, p. 227; § 52, p. 318; § 53. p. 323, § 55, p. 339; § 59, p. 362; § 65, p. 426; § 71, p. 477. At § 39, p. 249, he speaks of the will becoming "anxious." At § 54, p. 327, he even speaks of human beings as nature at the highest level of its self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstsein). There are also relevant passages in the second volume.

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incoherent. Schopenhauer himself even highlights the fact. For as he emphasizes, precisely as part of the world as presentation, animal life is dependent upon presentation in the first place: [A]nimals existed before human beings, fish before terrestrial animals, plants still before these, the inorganic prior to anything organic ... a long series of alterations before the first eye could open. And nonetheless it remains ever upon the first eye that opened, may it have even belonged to an insect, that the existence of the entire world depends with respect to the necessarily mediating element of cognizance, for which and within which alone it exists and without which it is not even thinkable; for it is simply a presentation, and as such has need ofthe cognizant subject as bearer ofits existence. i The difficulty is of course not exc1usively tied to an equation of the cognizant subject with the will that is supposed to be the inner essence ofall subjects. For, however one views the cognizant subject, if it exists only as a function of animallife, and the latter in turn only as presentation in the first place, there is a problem. Furthermore, as already noted, presentational activity presupposes matter. That is, it presupposes whatever portions of matter are the relevant parts of animal bodies as "immediate" objects. But if will is the inner essence even of matter itself, then the latter would seem to be part of the world as presentation. In that case, it would presuppose, not be presupposed by, presentational activity. Quite apart from these difficulties, there is a major problem in the way of identitying der Wille - even at a particular level of its objectification - with the "one eye" of Schopenhauerian cognizance. This will be made c1ear in the next section. But first I make a further point, not altogether uncontroversial, on a matter of translation. lt concems the use of reflexive constructions involving der Wille as grammatical subject. Here, we are given a variety of ways to talk about the process whereby der Wille is made or "becomes"jj a presentation. In straightforwardly reflexive terms: der Wille expresses itself (sich aüssert, s. ausspricht, s. ausdrückt), displays itself (s. darstellt), manifests itself (s. manifestiert), objectifies itself (s. objektiviert), reveals itself (s. offenbart), shows itself (s. zeigt) in various ways. Given that der Wille

i§ 7, pp. 61-2. Schopenhauer describes the situation as an "antinomy" with respect to the question of cognition. "On this 10cution, see, e.g., § 20, p. 144; § 24, p. 159; § 32, p. 217: §54, p. 330.

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is Schopenhauer's tenn for something at least importantly like force, power, or energy, these locutions are certainly apt in most cases. Purely grammatically, on the other hand, it is not altogether out ofthe question to consider at least some of them in tenns of a "passive reflexive" construction. In that case, for example, instead of saying that der Wille "objectifies" or "displays" itself, one might simply say that it is (or "gets") objectified, or that it is (or "gets") displayed. In the case of just these two verbs, I have in fact adopted this alternative. Undeniably, der Wille gets objectified, "becomes" a presentation, only by way of cognitive activity in which it is itself crucially involved. i Still more strongly, it is, just as it is of all beings in nature, the inner essence of any cognizant subject. As already suggested, however, there is a major problem in the way of that further step which would consist in actually identiry-ing, even at a particular level of its objectification, der Wille with the cognizant subject. But this is what seems to be entailed when one speaks of der Wille as objectifying, or making an object, of itselfii To be sure, this rnight simply be a way of expressing the fact that will is somehow essentially involved in all cognitive activity, or that it is indeed the inner essence of any cognizant subjecL lt need not be taken, in any further sense, to entail its equation with the cognizant subject. In particular, it need not be taken to entail its equation with the "one eye" of Schopenhauerian cognizance. In order to avoid facilitating the latter suggestion, however, and yet without thereby excluding it, I take Schopenhauer to be speaking, in these particular passages, simply of will being objectified. In the next section, I then attempt to say something in response to the question: what is doing the objectiry-ing? (In tenns of the passive reflexive construction, I adopt the same approach, but for a different reason, with respect to the verb darstellen. Quite apart from the fact - relevant in Gennan but avoidable in translation - of its association with vorstellen, iii I do tbis simply to

iAs I shall argue, the notion of "will-less" cognition, to be discussed in the next section, will simply require the distinction between two very different modes of such "involvement." iiSchopenhauer also speaks ofldeas (Ideen: § 27, p. 184; § 34, p. 223; § 52, p. 307), Art (§ 52, pp. 307, 316), and the body (§ 62, p. 390) as "objectifying" der Wille. But I take this to be secondary with respect to the central notion of "objectification" in Schopenhauer, namely, where the latter consists in a cognitive action whereby something becomes an object for, i.e., a presentation to, a sul>ject. IIISchopenhauer does not, at least to my knowledge, ever use sich vorstellen with der Wille as grammatical subjecL

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avoid any suggestion of intention or purpose, which may have a tendency to attach to talk about "self-display."Y Most crucially, der Wille is also self-affirming and - in special circumstances - self-denying. I discuss the crucial notion of self-denial in the next section. Whatever this might be supposed to involve, it includes at least some sort of self-relation that would be unduly obscured by a passive reflexive construction. Nevertheless, the reader is urged to continue to bear in mind that when der Wille is so described, this is not to be regarded as tantamount to reference to any sort of action on the part of a willing subject as such. For again, the will in question is the inner essence 0/ any willing subject, not itself one. In any case, in particular connection with the notion ofwill's self-denial, we now need to consider the notion of some sOrt of total "nullification" or "elimination" (Aufhebung) ofthe will ofan individual subject.

D. The Auflebung of Will To whatever extent der Wille might or might not be, at least on a certain level of its objectification, a cosmically cognizant subject, all of our ordinary cognitive processes are in some manner in its service. ii Schopenhauer compares this relationship to that between a strong blind man and a sighted invalid whom he carries about on his shoulders to find his way.iii In more standard scholastic terms: Will, as the thing in itself, constitutes the inner, true, and indestructible essence of aperson; yet in itself it is without consciousness. For consciousness is determined by intellect, and the latter is a mere accident with respect to our essence ... we fmd will as the enduring substance, the intellect by contrast, conditioned by its organ [brain], the variable accident. iv

iSehopenhauer also sometimes uses darstellen in reflexive eonstruetions where it would be plainly odd to read it as a straightforward reflexive: speaking, for example, of the eonditions relevant to matter and bodies "being displayed" - displaying themselves? - in pereeption. ii"Entering in as a tool (Hilfsmittel), f.lTJxavrl' on a partieular level of that will's objeetifieation - "for maintenanee of the individual and propagation of the speeies" (§ 27, p. 194) - eognition is "determined to the will's service," as a means toward aehievement of its now more complieated aims at the level in question (§ 33, p. 219; cf. § 55, p. 345). iiiWill and Presentation, vol.ll, eh. 19, p. 233. iVlbid., p. 224, and eh. 20, p. 279.

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Yet equally central is the possibility of a certain sort of Aufhebung of will. Although Schopenhauer uses the term Aufhebung more in connection with issues discussed in Book Four, it is introdueed in Book Three. Like the first Book, the third focuses on the world as presentation. Its title: "The World as Presentation: Second Consideration. Presentation Independent of the Principle of Sufficient Ground. The Platonic ldea (Idee): The Object of Art." Book FOllT focuses on the world as will. Thus it eomplements Book Two's foeus on will as that which is objeetified in the world as presentation in general. But it does so with more foeus on the will for life (der Wille zum Leben), and on various forms ofthe latter's affirmation and denial (Bejahung and Verneinung): "With the Achievement of Self-Cognizance: Affirmation and Denial of the Will for Life." The Aufhebung of will in question in Book Three is at the heart of our eapacity for apprehension of that partieular sort of presentation that particular sort of objectification or objeetivizationi ofwill - which Schopenhauer calls an Idea. Ideas are in one way like abstract concepts: they are not either actual or possible spatiotemporal realities; rather, they are the sort of thing that spatiotemporal realities can be regarded as instantiating, exemplifying, or expressing. ii But Ideas differ from concepts in that their apprehension is nonetheless perceptual (anschaulich).iii In Book Three, Schopenhauer argues that the apprehension of

iRespectively: Objektivation, Objektität. In fact, however, rather than speaking of Ideas as objectifications or objectivizations of will, Schopenhauer tends rather to speak of them as levels (Stufen) or degrees (Graden) thereof. iiSchopenhuaer equates Ideas with the "particular species, or original unvarying forms and properties of aIl natural bodies, both inorganic and organic, as weIl as general forces that reveal themse1ves in accordance with naturallaws" (§ 30, p. 211). This is no doubt why he says that they constitute the "true world as presentation" (§ 34, p. 223). A question, however, that does not seem to me conc1usively answerable in Schopenhauer: Schopenhauer seems to hold that one can apprehend as ldeas what one might also apprehend in purely abstract, conceptual terms. But how could that be, ifpresentations are what they are only relative to one's apprehension ofthem? iiiTheir further difference from concepts, made evident in Book Two's discussion of the relationship between natural forces and phenomena, also grounds the use of terms for the relation between Ideas and phenomena that are not normally applied to the mere instantiation of concepts, e.g., displaying, revealing, manifesting, etc. It should also be borne in mind that the fact that a certain sort of apprehension is perceptual does not exclude, indeed is equivalent to, its

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Ideas, as afforded by works of art, is, with the exception of the art of music, what constitutes the properly aesthetic element in the appreciation of art. i Inasmuch as ldeas are not apprehended as occupying spatiotemporal locations, and yet are apprehended in an immediately perceptual way (and not merely, like concepts, as abstract presentations of aspects of spatiotemporal reality), Schopenhauer regards their apprehension as at least for a time removing the perceiver from the domain of the principles of sufficient ground and individuation. For, as he claims, "this can only occur with the nullification (Aufhebung) of individuality in the cognizant subject."ii In such astate, the individual is "at the same time no longer an individual - for the individual has lost itself precisely in this perception - but is pure, will-less, painless, timeless, subject of cognition."ili Insofar as the cognizant subject is wholly absorbed in the object in such a case, Schopenhauer also describes the state in question as one ofpure "objectivity." The Aufhebung of will depicted in Book Four goes further than this. iv Here it alters one's life as a whole, and involves an alteration in the perception of one's world as a whole. For its expression is the life of the ascetic saint, the fuHest embodiment of removal from the will for life, even beyond the act of suicide. v Schopenhauer emphasizes the

being "intelleetual" in eharaeter. Thus unlike, for example, Kant, Schopenhauer does not equate funetions ofthe intellect (Intellekt) or understanding (Verstand) with conceptual functions. iThe properly aesthetic element in musie, treated in § 52, and then more extensively in vol. II, eh. 39 ("On the Metaphysies ofMusic"), is said to lie in a still more direet apprehension ofthe will, not in the apprehension ofldeas. ii§30, p. 212. Payne translates "by abolishing," and frequently elsewhere speaks of"elimination." iii§ 34, p. 222. Cf vol. H, eh. 30: the state in question is attained through "an alteration in us that one eould also regard as an aet of self-renunciation (ßelbstverleugnung), insofar as it consists in the fact that cognizance completely turns away from one's own will" (p. 417); "What renders this state difficult and makes it rare is that in it the aecident (the intellect) overpowers (bemeistert) and nullifies [Payne, p. 369: "eliminates"] the substance (the will), even if only for a short while" (p. 420). Schopenhauer also speaks ofthe loss of individuality in question as entailing a "nullifieation of that manner of cognizance which follows the Principle ofSuffieient Ground" (§ 38, p. 242). IVTo see the fuller breadth of topics covered in Book Four, the reader may want to look at the "expanded" table of contents, below. vOn suicide, see § 54, pp. 332-3 (cf § 60, p. 379); § 65, pp. 425-6; § 69, pp. 462.ff]. See also, but going less deep, Schopenhauer's essay "On Suicide" in

xxxii

Translator's Introduction

dependence of this removal from will on the attainment of a cognitive state that, like the apprehension of Ideas, is not a case of abstract knowledge. He even characterizes it as a kind of extension of the apprehension ofIdeas. For a person in such astate, namely, "one's entire cognizance of the essence of the world that mirrors the will, having grown out of apprehension of ldeas, becomes a quieter of the will, and so the will freely nullifies itself (frei sich selbst aufhebt)."i As suggested, it remains a question how to translate aufheben. In some contexts, it may be appropriate to use such terms as "eIiminate" or "abolish." Shortly, I explain why 1 think it is preferable to speak, in the case of the Aufhebung of will, only of a kind of "nulIification." Either way, a problem is bound to occur to the reader. Subservience to will, for Schopenhauer, is at least the original state of any cognizant and willing individual. So how is it even possible for such subservience to be nullified? The following might occur to one. One might suppose that any ordinary willing subject is really a complex of two distinct subjects, a willing one and a cognizant one, originally conjoined or intertwined in such a way that the latter is subservient to the former; but in certain special cases, the cognizant subject can get the better of the wi1ling one. But Schopenhauer emphatically rejects this sort of dualism: Every individual is on the one hand the subject of cognition ... and on the other hand an individual phenomenon ofwill, of the same will that is objectified in every thing. But this double-sided character of our essence does not rest in a selfsubsistent unity.ii And in any case he speaks, in the passage quoted earlier, precisely of will nullifYing itself. Of course, the problem is only exacerbated if we regard the cognizant subject as will, at least on a certain level of the latter's objectification. Now we earlier noted Schopenhauer's distinction between cognizant individuals and some sort of single cognizant "subject," which he

Parerga and Paralipomena, vol. I. i§ 54, p. 337; cf. § 48, p. 280. The fact that will nullifies itself, yet some form of cognizance is central to its doing so, might of course seem to reinforce a view of will as a cognizant subject, and not simply as the inner essence of any co~nizant subject. 11§ 54, p. 329fn. It seems clear that, in referring to "a self-subsistent unity" (in einer für sich bestehenden Einheit), Schopenhauer means a union of two independently subsisting subjects, somehow joined together.

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describes as that "one eye that looks out from all cognizant beings." In Book Three, he says that we in some sense become this one eye in the apprehension of Ideas (§ 38, p. 242), and he describes it throughout Book Three as a "pure" and "etemal" subject of cognition, a subject that is pure precisely by virtue ofbeing purified ofwill. Or as he puts it in a supplementary chapter in the second volume: With the disappearances ofwill from consciousness, individuality, and with the latter its suffering and its hardship, is nullified. Therefore, J have described the pure subject of cognition which then remains over (das dann übrig bleibende reine Subjekt des Erkennens) as the etemal eye ofthe world that, albeit with very diverse degrees of clarity, looks out from allliving beings ... and thus, as self-identical, as always One and The Same, is the bearer ofthe world ofpersisting Ideas ... i So there is of course something other than will at play. But as has just been emphasized, there is also in some sense no cognizant subject distinct from a subject ofwilling. This is to such an extent the case that, as also emphasized earlier, Schopenhauer himselffrequently goes so far as to present himself as a materialist - and more so even in the second volume than in the first - and speaks as if it is simply a material organ (the brain) that is the ultimate cognizant subject. And of course, as a material organ, the "inner essence" of the brain is precisely will. It would be in at least one way presumptuous to attempt to resolve the difficulties raised by these points, or at least to do so in the name of Schopenhauer. For they turn on the relation between the cognizant subject and the subject ofwilling, by virtue ofwhich "they" are, in any individual subject, somehow a single subject. And Schopenhauer repeatedly characterizes the latter precisely as an inexplicable puzzle, as the unsolvable "knot of the world," "the miracle par excellence."ii Nonetheless, I venture to offer a proposal as to what might be in question, and might thus be the sort of "self-contradiction" that Schopenhauer sees in the life of ascetic saints.iii

iYolume II, eh. 30, p. 422.

iidas Wunder xar' d;oxr/v (kat' exochen): § 18, p. 139; § 51, p. 300. "world knot": Sufficient Ground, § 42 (der Weltknoten und daher unerklärlich ["and therefore inexplicable")). iii§ 55, pp. 340, 355; § 61, p. 390; § 68, p. 440; § 70, p. 467. As Schopenhauer himse1f states, the key to reconciling the eontradietion in question "lies in the

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Translator's Introduction

In this regard, one eannot help but turn to a perhaps somewhat surprising formulation in the first ehapter of the seeond volume of Will and Presentation. There, after again emphasizing that the world as presentation is a funetion of aetivities of the brain, and after reminding the reader that it exists only as a kind of "projeetion" on the part of the faculty of understanding or inteUeet, through a proeess whereby one's own body is always the "immediate objeet,"i Schopenhauer eharaeterizes the world as presentation by referenee to a fundamental polarity, one of the two poles of whieh is a cognizant subject that is identifiable with no individual subject. What may be surprising at first is that he does not then characterize the other pole as will. He charaeterizes it rather as matter, and indeed as matter described in a somewhat strange way: The world as presentation, the objective world, thus has as it were two poles, namely, the cognizant subject as such (das erkennende Subjekt schlechthin), apart from its cognitive forms, and then cmde (rohe) matter apart from form and quality. Both of them are altogether uncognizable: the subject because it is that which is engaged in cognition, matter because, apart from form and quality, it cannot be perceived. Nonetheless, they are both the fundamental conditions of all empirical pereeption. Thus emde, formless, entirely inert (i.e., will-less) matter, which can be given in no experience but is presupposed in all of them, stands over against the cognizant subject merely as such, which is likewise apresupposition of all experience. This subject is not in time, for time is only the more particular form belonging to all of its presentational activity (die nähere Form alles seines Vorstellens) ... ii Then he go es on to say that the two poles are "really one and the same

fact that the state in which one's character is removed from the power of motives does not proeeed immediately from the will, but from an alteration in one's manner of eognizanee" (§ 70, p. 468). (However, one should be eareful not to eonflate whatever sort of"self-contradietion" is supposed to be in question hefe with Sehopenhauer's repeated emphasis on will's "inner self-eonfliet" (Widerstreit mit sich selbst), and even self-eontradietion (innerer Widerspruch: § 52, p. 317), insofar as various parts of its phenomenon are in constant battle with one another.) iSee toward the end of section B., above. iiVolume n, eh. 1, p. 18.

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thing regarded from two opposing points of view," and that the one thing that they "are" is not will, but rather a phenomenon whose inner being is will. This is not the place to attempt to explain all of the wrinkles in this passage, although I return shortly to what might be involved in this particular way of characterizing "matter." But in light of what we have seen so far, the particular emphasis on matter in this context,i and Schopenhauer's general orientation in terms of a Kantian distinction between form and matter, the following strikes me as a plausible way of attempting to speak to the issue. We may suppose, first of all, that Schopenhauer uses the expression "pure subject of cognition" in two ways. Sometimes he uses it to refer to individual subjects, but precisely insofar as their state of cognizance has been in some manner purified of will; of course, it remains to ask what this involves. (On these occasions he also sometimes, but not generally, uses the term rein, "pure," in its adverbial form.) But sometimes, we might suppose, he is rather referring to what might be called a purely "formal" element in any cognitive state, over and above any of the matter, or arrangements of the matter, of which that state might be composed. As we have just seen, Schopenhauer emphasizes such an element precisely in that context where he describes the pure subject and matter as two poles of any concrete cognitive phenomenon, namely, in emphasizing the projective action whereby there is any sort of world as presentation for subjects in the fIrst place. It simply remains to see, first, how this formal element might be more specifically regarded, and in what sense it might be regarded as something "over and above" the matter of which a cognitive state is composed; and second, how it might be regarded as the seat of at least the possibility of a "pure subject" in the other of the two senses just distinguished. We need to allow that, in a signifIcant sense, a cognitive state is always made out of matter and nothing else besides. Otherwise, we could not account for Schopenhauer's tendency to put his view in materialist terms, even ifhe at other times formulates it in opposition to materialism. On the other hand, and just for the latter reason, there must be something about a cognitive state "over and above" whatever matter is in question. How are we supposed to think about this? Without going so far as to claim that this is how Schopenhauer hirnself thought

iIt is also noteworthy that, in speaking of the body as "immediate object" at the beginning of § 4, he does not speak of the latter as made out of matter, but precisely as "matter."

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Translator' s Introduction

about it, we might at least appeal to the following analogy. Consider any sort of situation or "state of affairs." It always involves certain constituents or ingredients. For example, take a being to the left of b relative to c: a, b, and c are the constituents of this situation. Yet clearly, the situation is something more than, or over and above, those constituents. So first, we might at least use the term 'form' to refer to that factor by virtue of which any situation or state of affairs is something "over and above" the body of matter of which it is composed. But suppose that Schopenhauer also intends something like the following distinction. The particular situation in our example, although involving something over and above the body ofmatter ofwhich it is composed, nonetheless consists in nothing more than a certain relation (or set of relations) that holds between portions of that body of matter. It is reasonable to suppose that any ordinary situation is in fact of this sort. But now suppose that, in Schopenhauer's thinking, this is precisely what distinguishes a state of cognizance from any other sort of situation or state of affairs. Wbile astate of cognizance is wbolly composed of some body of matter, it is, like any situation or state of affairs, possessed of some "form" wbereby it is sometbing more than that body of matter. But as opposed to any other sort of situtation, for Scbopenhauer, tbe "more" in question does not simply consist in relations holding between portions of tbe body of matter in question. So of wbat does it consist? All that we have, of course, is Schopenhauer's description in terms of what such a situation amounts to, that is, in terms of the "total" situation or state of affairs. In those tenns, it simply consists in whatever is involved in the projection of a world as presentation, and of the various types of presentation, precisely through the medium of such bodies of matter. It is just this, we might then suppose, and any "more particular form belonging to all of its presentational activity," that is the pure subject in the sense that is now in question. Now insofar as astate of cognizance is always a wholly material affair, it should follow that its inner being is always and inevitably will. Or at least, its inner being is will to the extent that will is the inner being of the matter of which it is composed, just as it is tbe inner being of the individual subject as a whole. But then, in what sense could there possibly be such states purified of will, that is, a "pure subject" in the first of the two senses now distinguished? At least a possible answer lies in our characterization of tbe second of the senses in question. Ordinarily, in projecting a world as presentation,i one's cognitive pro-

i Here

again. see toward thc end of section B., abovc.

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cess does not simply project, say, an array of sensory quality into a perceiver's pereeptual field. Ordinarily, at least, it also projects some portion ofthe very willjor life that is the pereeiver's inner being. More specifically, this amounts, as we might put it, not simply to "coloring" one's world in terms ofvarious arrays ofsensory quality, but also to the fact that, phenomenologically, various parts ofthat world "refer" to one as an individual subjeet with partieular motivations and drives (and to one another in terms ofthose motivations and drives). Various parts of one's world thus refer, we might say, precisely in a sense that has to do with the very meaning, for the subject, of that which is apprehended by that particular subject, i.e., apprehended through that particular body of matter. Such meanings are not simply products of some cognitive or affective process distinct from that of perception itself. At least ordinarily, they are part of the projective act that constitutes perception in the first place. i What we need to suppose, then, is that the sort of alteration in an individual subject that Schopenhauer describes as Aufhebung of its will does not consist in an aetual (or at least in a total) elimination of the will for life within that subject. Indeed, Sehopenhauer more than onee states or implies, not only that the will for life still exists (as presumably, after all, it must) within such a subject, but even that one's individual character - which seems most reasonably to be regarded, in Schopenhauer's thinking, as the specificjorm ofthe will for life in any individual subject - still continues to exist on some level. ii The respect in which it continues to exist is that it is still present within the material of which that subject, and even of which its cognitive states, are composed. At most, it is eliminated from the process of cognitive projection; at most, thereby, a certain sort of "servitude" to the will is eliminated. But the will in question is not eliminated at all. It is simply nullified in the respect that it is no longer projected into one's world as presentation, no longer colors one's world. In this translation, therefore, we speak only of "nullification," when what is said to undergo Aufhebung is indeed the will within any individual subject. This reading of Schopenhauer ean at least explain a number of things. Besides bearing on the conjunction of his materialism and his anti-materialism, as weIl as the apparent contradiction involved in the Aufhebung of the inner being of (or at least the inner being of the

iI

occasionally comment to this effect in the notes, in connection with certain of the term Beziehung (both relation and reference). lIE.g., § 13, p. 94; § 68, p. 454; § 70, p. 468.

oc~urrences

xxxviii

Translator's Introduction

matter composing) the very states of cognizance whereby it is to undergo Aufhebung in the first place, it also explains what might seem a further contradiction. Namely, Schopenhauer emphasizes that cause and effect apply only within the world as presentation; will itself cannot be affected, only its phenomena. Yet he frequently speaks as if will is affected precisely by its Aufhebung. But the contradiction disappears ifwe suppose that the alteration in question is fundamentally not in one's will as such, but rather in cognition. For the will is "affected," on the proposal in question, only in that it is prevented from being projected. But that is precisely - in both of the senses distinguished - a question of the "pure subject." Without trying to account for all the details of its particular formulation, this approach also goes some distance toward explaining the terms in which Schopenhauer describes the matter that is supposed to be the inseparable correlate of the pure subject in cognition. i For as noted earlier, if matter (as the subject's "immediate object") is a precondition for the world as presentation, then it cannot, as such, be anything like matter as we ordinarily think of it. But then neither is it will. For as we have seen, Schopenhauer contrasts both the pure subject and the matter in question with will, characterizing the latter as the inner being of phenomena that are relative to a world constituted by way of some sort of union of the two. Finally, this approach also goes some way toward explaining why Schopenhauer describes der Wille in terms that imply that it is really that "one eye" which looks out from a11 of US, and as if it is really what is having its effect when, by virtue of a special sort of cognizance, it undergoes Aufhebung. For according to what has been proposed, it is not only that der Wille is the inner essence of the matter of which any cognitive state is composed, but any such state is wholly composed out of matter. It is, however, up to the reader to judge the extent to which this approach might be helpful. ii

iOn the concept of matter, in addition to passages in the present volume, and in the first chapter of the second, to which I have referred above, the reader should consult chapter 24 ofthe second volume. iiA problem in any case remains as to the "identity" ofthe willing and cognizant subject(s). If the "pure fonn" of cognition is indeed something over and above any arrangement of the matter composing a cognitive state, then what could possibly account for arrangements of matter ever coming to be the matter of such states in the first place? Schopenhauer's view seems to be that cognizance arises in animallife precisely because, under the circumstances in question, it is the most effective way for will - in the fonn of the particular drives within an organism at that point - to reach its goal (in general, namely, the goal of

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E. TheText All published works undergo changes, from their first inception until they are ready for their fmal resting place on bookshelves. Thus a great deal of philological work has preceded our efforts, and we make no claim to add to it. In particular, with any work on a text that sterns from an age before the microchip, when misprints were commonplace and general editorial work was labor-intensive, one has to contend not only with numerous grammatical and lexical slip-ups, but also with the intentional "bettering" of grammar and punctuation by editors. In addition, Schopenhauer revised his chief work over aperiod of forty-two years, and not always with complete consistency. Schopenhauer completed The World as Will and Presentation in 1818, at the age of 30. He published it in December of that year with Brockhaus of Leipzig; the official date of publication was listed as 1819. Brockhaus published the second edition (expanded to two volumes) in 1844 and the third in 1859. Schopenhauer was not particularly happy with Brockhaus. On sending his manuscript, he had included the strict instruction that "not a single word should be changed, not even in the face of censorship. In this instance I would express the utmost displeasure publicly."j But that proved easier said than done. Schopenhauer's disillusionment with Brockhaus, which he voiced on several occasions, undeniably inspired hirn to assign the testamentary rights to his works to his trusted friend Julius Frauenstädt. Frauenstädt, a private scholar, then took it upon hirnself to publish a new edition of the work with Brockhaus, only this time as part of a complete edition of Schopenhauer's works. This was the first time that Schopenhauer would be published in summa, appearing on the shelves of German bookshops in 1873, thirteen years after his death, and then again in a second edition in 1877. The Frauenstädt edition was soon condemned by some for containing numerous orthographical errors, as welJ as for not having faithfully adhered to the fmal versions of texts as exactly and explicitly

achieving, whatever it may be, the "highest" possible level of manifestation under the circumstances): § 27, pp. 193ff. Yet this appears to conflict with Schopenhauer's view that the notion of a "sufficient ground" applies only precise1y within the world as presentation. On the other hand, the difficulty may seem at least mitigated by the fact that the "effect" in question is not a new form of will as such - for example, a new drive - but rather a new type of manifestation ofwill, namely, a material state that is now also a cognitive state. 'Arthur Schopenhauer, Gesammelte Briefe, ed. Arthur Hübscher (Bonn: Bouvier, 1978), p. 37; letter of 11 Ju1y, 1818.

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Translator's Introduction

approved for publication by Schopenhauer himse1f: the so-called Ausgabe letzter Hand. i Ihis was first emphasized by Eduard Grisebach in 1891, in the introduction to his edition ofSchopenhauer's works,ii and then by Gustav Friedrich Wagner, who compiled a list of problems with both the Grisebach and Frauenstädt editions, as weH as undertaking an encyclopedic index of names and concepts. iii Ihis work also went hand in hand with the continuing efforts to deal with problems stemming from the original editions themselves. iv

iRelevant to continuing debates over the final fonn to be given to the texts are (sometimes conflicting) notes in Schopenhauer's manuscript books, annotations and interleaved additions (Zusätze) made to personal copies (Handexemplare) of volumes published during his lifetime, and annotations made in manuscripts ofthe texts. For Schopenhauer's manuscript notebooks, see Arthur Hübscher's edition of Der handschriftliche Nachlass, 5 vols. (Frankfurt: W. Kramer, 1966-1975); tr. E. F. J. Payne: Manuscript Remains, 4 vols. (New York: Berg, 1988). For variations among the editions of The World as Will and Presentation published during Schopenhauer's lifetime, and relevant annotations and additions, see Hübscher's notes at the end ofthe second and third volumes, and on pp. 97ffand 14~ff ofthe seventh, ofhis edition ofSchopenhauer's works, utilized for the present translation in its latest edition: Arthur Schopenhauer, Sämtliche Werke. Nach der ersten, von Julius Frauenstädt besorgten Gesamtausgabe neu bearbeitet und herausgegeben von Arthur Hübscher, vierte Auflage, durchgesehen von Angelika Hübscher (Mannheim: Brockhaus, 1988). iiEduard Grisebach, ed., Arthur Schopenhauers sämmtliche Werke, 6 vols. (Leipzig: Reclam, 1891). iiiThe list of discrepancies was begun as part of a memorandum for the Brockhaus publishers (in which, at least in part, Wagner acquitted Frauenstädt of a number of Grisebach's complaints), then eventually appended to his index upon its publication (Encyclopädisches Register zu Schopenhauers Werken [1909]); see Arthur Hübscher's account in the introduction to his edition, vol. I, pp. 12-13, 15. Wagner's index was subsequently re-issued by Hübscher: Schopenhauer-Register (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1960). (The Handexemplare, having passed into pos session of a third party in the meantime, had only been available to Grisebach "over the course of some hours": Hübscher, vol. 1, p. 14.) iv In connection with Gennan writing refonns, for example, Schopenhauer's own corrections led to inconsistencies even in the spelling of the same word on a given page. He also insisted upon certain particular spellings and on the use of a somewhat individualistic grammar. In our own citations from the Gennan, we have simply modernized the spelling. As for Schopenhauer's style, many of his sentences and clauses are notably marked by a certain "run-on" quality; we have not generally tried to "correet" this. He also employs a larger array of punctuation than is customary today, often, for example, marshalling a parade

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Taking all such complications into account, Arthur Hübscher published arevision ofthe Frauenstädt edition between 1937 and 1941. We have chosen to base our translation on this editioni for two main reasons. First, it seems to be at this time the most widely utilized and therefore most generally available edition of Schopenhauer's works. To be sure, unlike Hübscher's edition, the more (and most) recent edition of The World as Will and Presentation, contained in Ludger Lütkehaus's edition ofthe works,ii strictly adheres the Ausgabe letzter Hand. But then, at least as Hübscher himself judges matters: The exact duplication in letter and form of Schopenhauer's Ausgaben letzter Hand means nothing other than to ignore all critical analysis and historical work on the text, means unconditional acceptance of all happenstance in its transmission, and therefore turns a blind eye to determining the author' s true intent, let alone to acting in accordance with it. iii In any case, substantive questions regarding materials in the absence of formal and explicit instructions regarding their employment in eventual further editions bear only in relatively minor respects on the work that concems us here (as opposed to the Parerga and Paralipomena, whose versions in Frauenstädt and Hübscher incorporate a great deal of such material).iv

of phrases punctuated by two or more colons. Without duplicating this particular feature, but by way of combinations of colons and semi-colons (which latter, like many authors of the day, Schopenhauer in any case employs with greater frequency than a modem translation might want to reproduce), we have tried to give some sense of this as weIl. Schopenhauer hirnself stated explicitly that the unorthodox style of his writing was intimately connected with the manner of his thinking: letter to Brockhaus of September 7, 1843 (Gesammelte Briefe, p. 202); cf. letter to Frauenstädt ofNovember 24, 1855 (p. 377). iSee note above. The two volumes of The Warld as Will and Presentatian are contained in vols. 2 and 3. iiLudger Lütkehaus, Arthur Schapenhauers Werke in fonf Bänden. Nach den Ausgaben letzter Hand (Zürich: Haffinans, 1988); there is also a supplementary volume to this edition: Ludger Lütkehaus, Beibuch zur Schapenhauer Ausgabe (Zürich: Haffinans, 1988). iiiHübscher, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 1, p.18. iVThere are, to be sure, significantly more instances of the incorporation of handwritten Zusätze, or of notebook material to which they refer, in volume 2 of the present work. However, we are careful to note this in each case.

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Translator's Introduction

The second main reason for employing Hübscher is simply that, again at least to date, it is the generally adopted standard for scholarly citations. In particular, the Schopenhauer-GesellschaJt (Frankfurt) specifies this edition for citations in its Jahrbuch. Furthermore, given that a new edition of Schopenhauer' s works is in progress at the Schopenhauer Forschungsstelle (Mainz), we have no desire to enter into controversies upon which others will soon pronounce with greater authority. Our aim has not been to make a pbilological contribution, nor a statement bearing on the latter. For the most part, our aim has simply been to produce a translation that is much more easily readable than those that are currently available, with a generally greater degree of consistency in the use of the main terms, and at least to some extent better capturing the feel of Schopenhauer's style ofwriting. i The present translation, tben, is based on the text of the third (1859) edition of Volume One of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, as edited by Arthur Hübscher and as contained in vol. 2 of his edition of Schopenhauer's Sämtliche Werke. (Pagination adjacent to lines in the margins of the translation corresponds to that of the 1859 edition, also to be found in Hübscher and on tbe whole identical with his own pagination. Like Hübscher, however, we do not identi(y exactly where in tbe line the page break occurs.) Our translation of Volume Two, primarily the work of David Carus, should follow shortly upon the present publication. In his preface to the second edition, Schopenhauer explains the decision not only to add a second volume, but to do so precisely by way of "supplementary chapters" (Ergzänzungen) linked to sections of the first. As the reader will note, there are also numerous revisions to the first volume in both its second and third editions. As should also be noted, Schopenhauer refers throughout to the corresponding supplements, and it is eminently worth pursuing the references in every case. VARIATIONS AND ADDITIONS (ZUSÄTZE) In footnotes and endnotes, we have provided selective information regarding variations among the editions (cited as A, B, and C, respecttively) published by Schopenhauer hirnself, as weIl as regarding his handwritten additions (Zusätze). (In cases of the latter, however, we generaIly simply note the change as between the relevant editions.) In general, we provide this material in endnotes. However, where a foot-

iThis section, to this point, has owed a great deal to David Carus.

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note is attached for an independent reason, we inc1ude the relevant information at that point, rather than adding an endnote as weH. Again, we have been selective. In general, we omit changes that seem to us of no substantive import (e.g., changes in spelling, or to merely stylistic effect) and additions or revisions to citations of Schopenhauer's own works, where the cited material had appeared between the editions and so could not have been cited earlier. (We also remind the reader only periodically that the Latin translations of Greek quotations were all added in the third edition.) In addition, we take note of all those cases where Hübscher follows Frauendstädt in the actual inclusion of a handwritten Zusatz to the third edition. The information regarding these variations has been derived primarly from Hübscher's appendix to the second, and from pp. 97ffand 142ff of the seventh, volume of the Sämtliche Werke. In addition, we have consulted the material contained in the sixth volume of the edition of Paul Deussen. i In the latter respect, we have benefited from Karsten Worm's electronic edition, Schopenhauer im Kontext, based on the Deussen editionY This of course facilitated our work quite apart from its utility in regard to variations and Zusätze. Without such an aid, it is obviously considerably more difficult to maintain the ideal of a reasonably consistent translationiii and to undertake serious revisions of the work in progress. However, except where noted, our [mal authority has been Hübscher.

iSchopenhauers Sämtliche Werke (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1911.fJ). As Hübscher notes, Deussen is particularly praiseworthy for having evaluated Schopenhauer's Handexemplare. On the other hand, the latter fell into his possession too late to apply them to his work on The World as Will and Presentation. But then finally, according to Hübscher, with the Otto Weiss edition (Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke [Leipzig: Hesse and Becker, 1919]), "long years of work came to a elose, diligent labour in interpreting and analysing the texts was completed: today there is nothing more to be gained from Schopenhauer's annotations" (Hübscher, vol. 1, p. 21). iiVol. 5 ofthe series Literatur im Kontext au/CD-ROM, ed. Karsten Wonn (Berlin: InfoSoftWare, 2001 [Release of 3/2002]). iiiWhere no matter of substantive import is in question, we do not in fact endeavor to maintain the strictest consistency. (Where comment to the effect is judged of possible interest to the reader, we of course provide it in footnotes.) This is because one of our primary aims has been to produce as highly readable a translation as possible, as weH as one that so far as possible does justice to Schopenhauer's own style. On the other hand, we of course aim at this without sacrifice of substantive accuracy.

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SECTIONS PARAGRAPHS BRACKETED MATERIAL From the start, The World as Will and Presentation was divided into four Books and an Appendix (titled "Critique of Kantian Philosophy"); the latter amounted, after revisions, to over twenty percent of the whole. Within each of the four Books, a division into sections was first indicated by means of horizontal lines employed as breaks. The second and third editions replaced this with a system of numbering concluding with § 71. However, no tides were provided for the sections or other indication of their contents. For the convenience of the reader, we have followed each section number, in brackets, with a general indication ofthe section's contents. (An overview ofthese contents can then be found in our "expanded version" of Schopenhauer's own table of contents.) Schopenhauer does not by far, or at least not at first glance, use paragraph breaks to the extent that a modem reader fmds almost indispensable. But he does make frequent use of a dash (-) to the effect of what others intend with paragraph breaks. We have therefore introduced the latter at such points. (On a few occasions, however, Schopenhauer's dashes are pretty elearly meant to function only as such.) In addition, on a few occasions in the Appendix, a paragraph break has been added where none is indicated in the text. This is of course meant for the convenience ofthe reader, and indicated in footnotes. Throughout, unless otherwise indicated, wherever brackets ([ ... ]) occur, they enelose material inserted by the translators. FOOTNOTES, ENDNOTES, PAGINATION Two types of footnotes are employed. Those that are designated with "daggers" (t, t, tt) are Schopenhauer's. Those that are designated numerically in lowercase roman (i, ii, iii.. .), and enelosed in brackets ([ ... ]), are ours. The latter are employed mainly for two purposes: to inform the reader as to some bit of the German text, sometimes with reference to further discussion in the Introduction, and for the provision of information regarding Schopenhauer's citations and references. The endnotes are ours, but again oftwo types. Where the endnote number is in boldface, the corresponding note contains brief commentary thought to be of possible interest to the reader. Otherwise, the endnotes contain information regarding variations among, and Zusätze to, the A, B, and C editions of Schopenhauer's text. (However, where a footnote has been attached for independent reasons to a passage for which this is relevant, the corresponding information is put in the footnote.)

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Again, marginal pagination adjacent to lines of the translation is that of the third German edition, as also to be found in the margins of Hübscher's edition of the Sämtliche Werke and on the whole identical with his own pagination. (The only significant divergence in Hübscher occurs in his edition of the second volume, occasioned by his insertion of Zusätze.) CIT ATIONS AND OTHER LANGUAGES In our aim to expand upon Schopenhauer' s generally abbreviated citations, and for help with translations from various languages, we have relied to a large extent on the information provided by Hübscher on pp. 217ff of the seventh volume of his edition of Schopenhauer's works, on the index of names and subjects provided at the end of that same volume, and once again on Deussen, upon whom (and upon others going back to Frauendstädt and Wagner) Hübscher's own efforts are founded. However, we have on a number of occasions provided additional information thought to be of likely interest to the reader. Since these contributions pale in comparison with those preceding us, we do not bother to note where in particular we go beyond them. For material other than German, we provide translations in the footnotes. Unless otherwise indicated, the translations are our OWll. In the case of translations from the Greek, except for Plato and Aristotle, we rely on a combination of the translations provided by Deussen and Hübscher, Schopenhauer's Latin translations (added in C), and (last and to the least effect) our OWll expertise. For Plato and Aristotle, since there are easily accessible "standard" collections available to the Anglophone reader, we avail ourselves of their translations and note the fact in footnotes: for Plato, those of the various translators contained in the edition of Edith Hamilton and Huntington Caims;i for Aristotle, those of the various translators contained in the edition of Jonathan Bames. ii With regard to the Greek, we follow E. F. 1. Payne's practice in his earlier translation of the present work, adding (and correcting) accent and breathing marks. For this, we are thankful both to Payne and to Karsten Worm's electronic edition ofDeussen.

iEdith Hamilton and Huntington Caims (eds.), The Collected Dialogues of Plato (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989; originally, The Bollingen Foundation, 1961). iiJonathan Bames (ed.), The Complete Works ofAristotle: the Revised Oxford Translation, in two volumes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

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Translator' s lntroduction

Within the body ofthe text, we retain Schopenhauer's own sometimes casual approach to citations, at least to the extent of replicating his abbreviations and occasional inconsistencies. However, proper citations are provided in the footnotes; we also regularize Schopenhauer's punctuation and provide italics for titles where appropriate. In general, we also follow Schopenhauer in not using quotation marks to distinguish occurrences of words or phrases that are "mentioned" as opposed to being "used." In citing the German in footnotes and endnotes, we modemize the spelling.

F. The Present and Other Translations There have already been two complete and one abridged English translation of the present work: The Warld as Will and Idea, translated in three volumes by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, i The Warld as Will and Idea, abridged, edited by David Berman and translated by Jill Berman/ i and The Warld as Will and Representation, translated in two volumes by E. F. J. Payne. iii Payne's translation has long been standard, we have frequently found it useful to consult it, and it is in some respects certainly difficult 10 expec1 10 do better than he has done. As already noted, however, one of our main aims is to provide a translation that is generally more accessible to ordinary readers just by virtue of being more "readable," more generally consistent in the use of main terms, and coming at least closer to the actual feel of Schopenhauer' s writing. Part of achieving this aim concems the sheer rhythm of Schopenhauer's prose: sometimes quite strikingly staccato, but on the whole much more fluid than one might otherwise have supposed. iv But part of

iLondon: Trubner & Co., 1883-1886. iiLondon: J. M. Dent (Everyman Library), 1995. iiiIndian Hills, Colorado: Falcon's Wing Press, 1958 (New York: Dover Publieations, 1966 [slightly eorreeted re-issue]). ivAlthough it is not exclusively by this means, the omission of eonjunetions often contributes to the staeeato effect. For example: "wants nothing further, ean get nothing further, has repose in pereeption, satisfaetion in the present" (p. 67); "is pereeptually eognizant, immediately and eompletely, of the mode of effeetuality of alever, pulley, gear, the self-supporting eharaeter of domes, ete." (p. 87); "have merely perceptual presentations, however, no concepts, no reflection, are therefore bound to the present, can give no consideration to the future" (p. 194); "the excellence, virtue, even the saintliness ofpartieular individuals, the perversity, wretchedness, guile ofmost, the profligacy ofmany" (p. 296); "is the object in itself; is an objeet that has no need of a subjeet, is an

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it simply turns on terminology. In this regard, it seems to us that the particular constructions that we have favored involving the ubiquitous terms vorstellen and Vorstellung have not only the substantive advantage highlighted in the first section of this Introduction, but also that of conveying Schopenhauer' s thoughts in ways that are more natural to ears not habituated to certain habits in academic philosophy. Similarly, a less heavily academic feel, and even a certain degree of positive vitality, seems to us to have been facilitated by the decision to employ a fuHer array of terms than is customary for the equally ubiquitous erkennen and Erkenntnis. In this case, the decision against "know," "knowledge," etc. - reserved, on the whole,i for wissen and Wissen - is only the most obvious part of it. Of equal import to our desire for a heightened sense of vitality, and thereby also to our ability to preserve more of the actual rhythm of Schopenhauer's prose, has been the liberation brought by our decision not to hold with stubborn consistency to an overly limited range of possibilities. Thus rather than make do, for example, with the single term "cognition," we have made ftee use, as particular contexts seems to us to recommend, to the whole array of cognates familiar to readers in English: cognize, be cognizant of, take cognizance of, recognize; cognition, cognizance, recognitionY Further obstades to the ordinary reader have also been avoided with the refusal of undue submission to some practices by now standard for Kant, and just for that reason posing at least a temptation in the translation of Schopenhauer. In this respect, but with greater consistency than Payne, we follow hirn in translating Anschauung as "perception," and not as "intuition" (reserving the latter for Schopenhauer's Intuition). Obviously, the term in question then needs to be taken sufficiently broadly. In particular, it needs to be aHowed to extend beyond sense perception and indeed even beyond ordinary "empirieal" perception in general, in order to cover the fuH range indeed meant to be covered by Anschauung, namely, in order to aHow the indusion of a special sort of

individual thing and yet not in time and space because it is not perceptual, is an object of thought and yet not an abstract concept" (p. 5l3); "provided the method for the inquiry, broke the path, fell short, for the rest, of the goal" (p. 612). I have also refrained, so far as possible, from breaking up Schopenhauer's sometimes lengthy sentences. For example: pp. 64, 147-8,246-7,424-5,525 (2).

i See

the next section for additional details on the translation of some terms. iiObviously, we do not regard this as in conflict with our aim at a greater degree of consistency than has been customary.

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"perception," first, ofpure space and time, as pure "forms" belonging a priori to the eognitive process, and, seeond, of that special sort of presentation that Sehopenhauer caUs an Idee. But that is weIl within the capacity of the English term in question. (The reader will soon discover how we then deal, for example, with cases where Anschauung and Wahrnehmung - both of them naturally "pereeption" in most eases oeeur in elose proximity.) We depart from previous translations altogether, however, with regard to the Sehopenhauerian-Kantian notion of purely "formal" elements - in particular spaee, time, and eausality for Sehopenahuer as apriori eomponents of the cognitive process. The ears of academic philosophers, or at least of those who are reasonably familiar with Kant, are attuned to such phrases as "forms of cognition," "forms of intuition (or perception)," "forms ofpossible objeets ofhuman eognition (pereeption, ete.)." To such readers, these phrases may not carry a particular misleading suggestion, namely, that certain types or kinds of eognition or pereeption are in question, or particular types or kinds of objeets thereof. They will simply suggest what is intended: the role of certain forms or formal elements belonging or pertaining to the cognitive process or, correlatively, to the corresponding objects. But to

other ears this is frequently unclear. For this reason - and regrettably, somewhat ponderously - we generally have Schopenhauer speaking here of either of forms "belonging to" (e.g.) perception, or else of forms "pertaining to" the corresponding objects ofperception. We do, however, follow Payne in a second instance of departure from praetices that are common in the translation of Kant, namely, in that we generally translate Erscheinung as "phenomenon" rather than "appearance." (We use the latter only for the "appearing," or "comingto-appearance," ojphenomena.) in addition to sounding more natural, as we believe, to the ordinary reader, this decision is aimed at avoiding the suggestion that Schopenhauer's "will" - in making its various appearances preeisely as phenomena - is to be thought of as doing so simply by virtue of the fact that it is a single "thing" variously perceived. For the same reason, we therefore generally translate erscheinen as "to make its appearance," rather than "to appear" in the first place. i On the

iThe "perception-correlate" nation is certainly apart of what Schopenhauer has in mind. But it is not simp/y a question, for Schopenhauer, of things that "appear" in the particular sense connected with that notion. In particular, the terminology of "appearance" runs the risk of obscuring the more fundamental notion of "will" as what might in various contexts equally weH be called "force"

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other side, one might of course appeal to the fact that Schopenhauer is critical of Kant's use of the distinction between "phenomenon" (Phänomen) and Noumenon in connection with his own distinction between Erscheinung and Ding an sich ("thing in itself').i But, given the other considerations, this is to our mind an insufficient ground for avoiding the English 'phenomenon' where, in connection with Schopenhauer's own distinction between phenomenon and "thing in itself," he is not equating the latter with any sort of "noumenon" at all, that is, with any sort ofpurely intelligible or conceptual entity. Apart from matters of translation as such, we have already noted some other respects in which we are aiming at something more "readerfriendly" than the alternatives, namely, with respect to paragraph breaks and the addition of section-headings. Finally, and on a lighter note, an equally central component of our endeavor to present a more vital and spirited Schopenhauer finds expression in a somewhat less reserved approach to Schopenhauer's sense of humor. Thus, for example, we equate his frequently repeated accusations of Windbeutelei - generally directed against Fichte, Schelling, and Hege! - simply and plainly as accusations of "windbaggery," as opposed to, for example, a more gentlemanly "bombast" or "humbug" (Payne). And we have Schopenhauer refer to a certain line of Kantian argument - ein aufNadelspitzen einherschreitender Kantischer Beweis - as a proof that comes "striding on the points of needles," rather than merely as one that is "hairsplitting"; and to a certain other auf Stelzen einherschreitender proof as indeed one that comes "striding upon stilts," rather than merely as a proof that is "stilted." But in the first place, again, our aim has simply been this: without sacrifice of accuracy in substance or in scholarly respects, to provide a translation that is both more easily readable by intelligent readers in general, and at the same time conveying something more of a sense ofSchopenhauer's own style.

or "energy" or "power," and which also "appears" in the very different sense in which forces can be said to manifest or express themselves. The two notions may easily be regarded as integrated into the notion of a "phenomenon." And they can of course also be regarded as integrated into the notion of an "appearance." But with the latter, there is more of a tendency to favor the perceptioncorrelate notion. (We may in any case regret the suggestion that der Wille is any kind of"thing" at all, conveyed by Schopenhauer's own description ofit as "thing in itself. ") i§ 15, p. 106fn.

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G. Selective Notes on Some Terms In this section, for the convenience of the reader, we collect some of the terms highlighted above, in some cases briefly recapitulate the points made in their regard, and note a few additional terms. Where exceptions of any significance occur in the translation, this will be indicated in footnotes. (Unless otherwise noted, the treatment of verbs and adjectives will be consonant with the corresponding nouns as treated below.) We do not by any means aim at completeness. However, we have also provided numerous footnotes with citations of the German throughout the translation. Anschauung - perception. This includes ordinary sense perception and the apprehension of mental images, the apprehension of space and time as "pure forms" belonging to the perceptual process apriori, and the apprehension of ldeas (Ideen). (Though he does not do so in the case of Ideas, Schopenhauer also uses the term Anschauung to refer both to such apprehension on the part of a perceiver and to what is thereby apprehended, considered just as such.) See also Wahrnehmung. Auffassung - apprehension. See also Wahrnehmung. Aufhebung - elimination, nullification; always the latter when what is in question is the Aufhebung ofwill. See section D, above. (sich) besinnen - generally, to reflect. However, it should be noted that we do not take this to recommend "reflection" for Besonnenheit (below), insofar as the latter refers to a certain overall state of mental/spiritual life, albeit one originally attained to, and in general maintained, by way of the practice of reflective consideration. GeneraHy, "refleetion" will be Reflexion or, for mirror-reflections, Reflex. Besinnung will sometimes be "refleetion" as weH, but also sometimes translated in ways more consonant with OUf understanding of Besonnenheit. (Note also that "reflective consideration" generally translates Überlegung, mainly in order to distinguish the latter from Betrachtung: generaHy, consideration, but also particularly in the context of aesthetics - regard. However, (sich) überlegen with respect to some matter is generally simply to consider it.) Besonnenheit - thoughtful awareness. This has been variously and inconsistently rendered by other translators. i

i As for the extent of variation, it might be noted that, in the dramatic opening passage of Book One ("'The world is a presentation to me' - this is a truth

The World as Will and Presentation

li

Beziehung - standing alone, generally relation (as likewise, Verhältnis and Relation), hut sometimes reference. In the context Beziehung ... auf, frequently reference. See further notes within the translation and in section D., above. Empfindung - sensation. See seetion B. erkennen - to be cognizant of, to take cognizance of, on a numher of occasions, to recognize (which latter also consistently translates anerkennen and wiedererkennen); occasionally, to cognize. Erkennen (the nominalized verb) - generally, cognition; occasionally, cognitive activity. Erkenntnis - generally, cognizance; sometimes, recognition or cognition. ("Recognition" also translates Anerkennung and Wiedererkennung and, where noted, Rekognition.) Note: "Knowledge" is generally Wissen - with Wissenschaft, as is standard, science - hut also on occasion Kenntnis. Erkenntisart - mode ofcognition. Erkenntnisweise - manner of cognizance. Erscheinung - generally, phenomenon (as also, consistently, Phänomen); appearance, when what is in question is the appearing or comingto-appearance of some phenomenon. Die erscheinende Welt - the phenomenal world. See toward the end of section F. Form (followed by genitive) - frequently, "form" belonging to (aspects of the cognitive process) or pertaining to (the corresponding objects). This is mainly to avoid possible ambiguity in talk about, for example, either "forms of perception" or "perceptual forms." However, we generally use "cognitive form" for hoth Erkenntnisform and Form der Erkenntnis (or Form des Erkennens). See toward the end of section F. Gestalt, Gestaltung - mode, when used (as repeatedly) for one or more of the four "forms" of the Principle of Sufficient Ground; otherwise, Gestalt is generally form or structure. Grund - ground; in compounds, generally fundamental, sometimes basic.

that applies to every living and cognizant being. However, the human being alone can bring it to reflective [reflektierte] abstract consciousness; and when he actually does this, philosophy's thoughtful awareness [philosophische Besonnenheit] has come to him."), it has been translated as diversely as "discernment," "discretion," and "wisdom." In any case, I cannot forbear from mentioning that our final decision on this term has been one of the most satisfying upshots of our discussion ofparticular terms.

lii

Translator's Introduction

Idee - Idea (with upper-case initial). See section 0, as also for the following. Objektivität - objectivity. Objektität - objectivization. Objektivation - objectification. Principium individuationis - principle of individuation; however, we leave the expression in Latin See section B. Satz vom [zureichenden} Grunde - Principle of Sufficient Ground. See section B. Vernunft - (the faculty of) reason. We translate Grund as ground, not "reason." See section B. Verstand - (the faculty of) understanding. See section B. Vorstellung - presentation. See seetion A. Wahrnehmung - perception. This is broader in one way than Anschauung, in that it extends to the perception of truths, and also to the inner perception of one's state apart from the spatial conditions of perception. But it is in another respect narrower, applying (apart from perception of truths) only to cases of empirical perception. Where the two terms occur in sufficient proximity, we use "perceptual apprehension" for Wahrnehmung; by itse1f, however, "apprehension" is Auffassung. der Wille - generally, will (as opposed to the will). See section C. Wissen - knowledge. See note on Erkenntnis, above.

H. Selective Bibliography SCHOPENHAUER: COLLECTED MATERIALS IN GERMAN Der handschriftliche Nachlass, 5 vols. (Frankfurt: W. Kramer, 19661975), ed. Arthur Hübscher; tr. E. F. J. Payne: Manuscript Remains, 4 vols. (N ew York: OxfordlBerg, 1988). Gesammelte Briefe [Collected Letters], ed. Arthur Hübscher (Bonn: Bouvier, 1978; 2nd ed. 1987). Philosophische Vorlesungen [Philosophical Lectures]. Aus dem handschriftlichen Nachlass, 4 vols., ed. Volker Spierling (Munieh: R. Piper, 1984-1985). Sämtliche Werke [Complete Works]. Nach der ersten, von Julius Frauenstädt besorgten Gesamtausgabe neu bearbeitet und herausgegeben von Arthur Hübscher, vierte Auflage, durchgesehen von Angelika Hübscher, 7 vols. (Mannheim: Brockhaus, 1988) - The World as Will and Presentation is in vols. 2 and 3, the basis for the present translation.

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The World as Will and Presentation

Schopenhauer im Kontext (vol. 5 of series Literatur im Kontext on CDROM), foUowing Schopenhauers Sämtliche Werke, vols. I-VI, ed.

Paul Deussen (Munieh: Piper Verlag, 1911-1926).

Werke in fünf Bänden. Nach den Ausgaben letzter Hand, 5 vols., ed. Ludger Lütkehaus (Zürich: Haffmans, 1988). See section E., above, regarding Ausgaben letzter Hand. SCHOPENHAUER:

W ORKS AND SELECTIONS IN ENGLISH

DIE WELT ALS WILLE UND VORSTELLUNG,

(1859;

IST ED.,

2

VOLS., 3RD EDITION

1819; 2ND ED., 1844)

The World as Will and Idea, tr. in 3 vols. by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp (London: Trubner & Co., 1883-1886).

The World as Will and Representation, tr. in two vols. by E. F. J. Payne (Indian Hills, Colorado: Falcon's Wing Press, 1958; repr. New York: Dover Publications, 1966). The World as Will and Idea Abridged in one Volume, ed. David Berman, tr. JiU Berman (London: J. M. Dent, 1995). (Everyman Library). OTHER WORKS CURRENTLY AVAlLABLE

Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grund (referred to in this translation as On the Fourfold Root ofthe Principle of Sufficient Ground; Schopenhauer himself also refers to it either as "the treatise on the Principle of Sufficient Ground" or "the introductory treatise"). 1st edition (1813) Schopenhauer's Early Fourfold Root: Translation and Commentary, F. C. White (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1997 [Avebury Series in Philosophy]). 2nd edition (1847) On the Fouifold Root ofthe Principle of Sufficient Reason, tr. E. F. J. Payne (La SaUe, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1974).

Über das Sehen und die Farben, 2nd edition (1854; 1st. ed, 1816). On Vision and Colors, tr. E. F. J. Payne, ed. with introduction by David E. Cartwright (New Y ork: Berg, 1994).

Über den Willen in der Natur, 2 nd edition (1854; 1st ed., 1836). On the Will in Nature, tr. E. F. J. Payne, ed. with introduction by David E. Cartwright (New York: Berg, 1992).

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Preisschrift über die Freiheit des Willens (written in 1839, publ. in Norwegian in 1840). On the Freedom of the Will, tr. Konstantin Kolenda (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1991). Prize Essay on the Freedom ofthe Will, ed. with introduction by GÜllter Zöller, tr. by E. F. J. Payne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 [Cambridge Texts in the History ofPhilosophy]). Tbe above published in German in 1841 (2 nd ed., 1860), along with the following work, as part of Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (The Two Fundamental Problems ofEthics). Schopenhauer sometimes refers to the latter simply as the Ethics, and sometimes as The Fundamental Problems ofEthics.

Preisschrift über die Grundlage der Moral (1840; also titled Über das Fundament der Moral, and referred to in this translation as Prize Essay on the Foundation ofMorality). On the Basis of Morality, tr. E. F. 1. Payne, with introduction by David E. Cartwright (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1998; repr. of 1995 ed. by Berghahn Books, revising original translation by Payne published by Bobbs-Merrill, 1965). Parerga und Paralipomena. Kleine Philosophische Schriften, 2 vols. (1851). Parerga and Paralipomena. Short Philosophical Essays, 2 vols., tr. E. F. 1. Payne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; reissue of edition of 1974). Selections from the above: Essays and Aphorisms, tr. R. 1. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1970). The Wisdom ofLife (tr. of Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit, from vol. I), tr. T. Bailey Saunders (New York: Dover Publications, 2004). The same translator also offers a number of other packagings of essays from these volumes.

FREQUENTLY CITED IN NOTES Aristotle. The Complete Works ofAristotle: the Revised Oxford Translation, 2 vols., ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Kant, Immanuel. Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (and successors) (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1900 - ).

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References in the form Ak. n.n are to volume and page number in this edition. Kant, Immanuel. Critique 0/ Pure Reason, cited in AlB format for pagination in the first (1781) and second (1787) editions (standardly indicated in current editions). Currently available translations, all equally worth consulting: Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929); Wemer Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1996); Allen Wood and Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). The latter is part ofthe Cambridge Edition of the W orks of Immanuel Kant in Translation, containing authoritative translations of all of Kant's works. (Other works of Kant are referred to in footnotes throughout the present translation.) Plato. The Collected Dialogues 0/ Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Caims (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989 [Bollingen Foundation, 1961]). SOME USEFUL BOOKS ON SCHOPENHAUER IN ENGLISH Atwell, John E. Schopenhauer. The Human Character (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). Atwell, John E. Schopenhauer on the Character 0/ the World. The Metaphysics 0/ Will (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1995). Cartwright, David E. Historical Dictionary 0/ Schopenhauer's Philosophy (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press [Rowman and Littlefield], 2005). Fox, Michael (ed.). Schopenhauer. His Philosophical Achievement (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980). Hamlyn, D. W. Schopenhauer (London: RoutIedge, 1980; repr. 1999). Hübscher, Arthur. The Philosophy 0/ Schopenhauer in Its lntellectual Context: Thinker Against the Tide (tr. of Denker gegen den Strom. Schopenhauer Gestern - Heute - Morgen [Bonn: Bouvier, 1973]), tr. Joachim T. Baer and David E. Cartwrigbt (Lewiston, NY: Edwin MeIlen Press, 1989). Jacquette, Dale (ed.). Schopenhauer, Philosophy, and the Arts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Jacquette, Dale. The Philosophy 0/ Schopenhauer (MontreallKingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005). Janaway, Christopher (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Janaway, Christopher. Schopenhauer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Janaway, Christopher. Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

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Translator's Introduction

Magee, Bryan. The Philosophy 0/ Schopenhauer, 2 nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Safranski, Rüdiger. Schopenhauer and the Wild Years 0/Philosophy, tr. Ewald Osers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990 [Gennan original Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1987]). von der Luft, Eric (ed.). Schopenhauer. New Essays in Honor o/his 20dh Birthday (Lewiston, NY: Edwin MeIlen Press, 1988). (Includes extensive bibliographies compiled by David E. Cartwright and Eric von der Luft). White, F. C. On Schopenhauer 's Fourfold Root 0/ the Principle 0/ Sufficient Reason (Leiden: E. J. BrilI, 1992). Y oung, Julian. Willing and Unwilling. A Study in the Philosophy 0/ Arthur Schopenhauer (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987). Young, Julian. Schopenhauer (London: Routledge, 2005). Papers in English also appear in the Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch, annual publication ofthe Schopenhauer-Gesellschaji (Frankfurt am Main).

I. Acknowledgments I want first to emphasize the benefit of my collaboration with David Carus. I look forward, as should readers of this first volume, to the upshot of an equally fruitful collaboration on the second. Nor can I forbear from reiterating my gratitude to the numerous scholars and translators who have preceded us, but in particular to the inspiration of E. F. J. Payne. While I venture to offer the present translation as in some respects an advance, its possibility has owed much to resources unavailable to Payne; perhaps it owes yet more to what he had already done without them. I also most warmly acknowledge the collegial and supportive environment ofthe Philosophy Department ofthe University ofTennessee, which has not failed to be nurturing, and a virtual second family, since I began teaching here in 1974. I am also greatly appreciative of the College of Arts and Sciences' funding of Adam Winck as a research assistant during one of my summers of work on the project. Adam rescued me from various slip-ups. But more positively, I have benefited from numerous thoughtful suggestions on his part. On a more personal note, I mention the fmal years of my parents' lives. Their states of mind did not pennit appreciation of the work that I was doing at the time. But the ethic of work that I had received from tllem kept me going as they faded. In particular, I thank Pat and Tim Street, who cared for my mother and father for two years, and so made it possible for them to live as long as possible in their own horne. And I thank Peggy Anderson and Carolyn Brown, who cared for my father in

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Knoxville during his final year and a half. The stimulation that they provided, and the love that they showed both hirn and rny entire family, gave me a peace ofmind that I cannot forget. My memories ofwork on this project are inextricably interwoven with memories of Peggy and Carolyn. But more irnportant than all: rny wife Jean and our granddaughter Megan, who is very much like our own daughter. Without being able to return to thern from work on this project, it could not have been done.

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The World as Will and Presentation BY ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

THIRD EDITION, IMPROVED AND GREATLY EXPANDED FIRST VOLUME

Four Books with an Appendix Containing the Critique of Kantian Philosophy

That nature might in the endfathom itse!f?

-GOETHE1

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Schopenhauer'sTahle of Contents Expanded PREFACES TO THE THREE EDITIONS

9

FIRST BOOK The W orld as Presentation: First Consideration Presentation as Subject to the Principle of Sufficient Ground: The Object ofExperience and Science

31

§ 1. The One-Sided Approach ofBook One 31 § 2. Correlativity of Subject and Object § 3. § 4.

§ S.

§ 6.

§ 7.

§ 8. § 9. § 10. § 11. § 12. § 13.

Subjection of Object to the Principle of Sufficient Ground Space and Time as Ground ofBeing Objects ofPure Perception 3S Causality and Pure Understanding Matter in Essence Causality Sensation vs. Perception The Body as Immediate Object 37 Disputes about the Reality of the External W orld Life as a Dream 42 More on the Body as Immediate Object Understanding without Concepts Human and Animal 1ntelligence 49 Systems that Proceed from the Object or Subject Alone Natural Science More on the Principle of Sufficient Ground S6 Conceptual Reason vs. Perceptual Understanding 67 Concepts as Abstractions Logic as Science 7 I More on Logic, Science, and Knowledge 83 The Concept of "Feeling" as a Negative Concept 84 Advantages and Disadvantages ofReason 86 A Theory of Humor 92

3

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Expanded Table ofContents

§ 14. More on the Sciences Superiority ofPerception over Proof

96

§ IS. Mathematics, Logic, Truth, Philosophy I04 § 16. Practical Reason Properly and Falsely So-Called 120 SECONDBOOK The W orld as Will: First Consideration The Objectification ofWill

131

§ I7. The Inner Meaning ofPresentations - Not an Object § 18.

§ 19. § 20.

§ 21.

§ 22. § 23.

§ 24.

The Demand Not Satisfied by Science I3I Mysterious Character ofNatural Forces The Body Given in T wo very Different Manners Immediate Experience of the Body as \Vill An Entirely Unique Sott of Cognizance 136 Extension of this T wofold View to the W orld as a Whole 140 Actions Deterrnined by Character plus Motive Empirical vs. Intelligible Character No Ultimate Explanation of the Latter Individual Bodies as Individual Wills Objectified 144 Will as Thing in Itself 147 Extension of the Concept ofWill Will and Force 149 Groundlessness of Will as Thing in Itself Beyond the Principle of Individuation All Phenomena Subject to Complete Determinism Causes, Stimuli, and Motives 15 I Time, Space, and Causality only Forms Belonging to Cognition Pure Mathematics and Pure Natural Science The Futile Attempts ofNatural Science to Fathom Ultimate

Reality IS8 § 25. Space and Time as the Principle oflndividuation Preliminary Comparison with Plato' s Theory ofIdeas § 26. Original Forces and the Characters ofThings as Ideas Secondary Status ofNatural Laws and Causes [71 § 27. More on the Limitations ofNatural Science 1ntimation of the Thing in Itself in Nature A Cautious Philosophy ofNature 180

168

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§ 28. Higher Levels ofObjectification ofWilllnseparable from Lower Internal and External Purposiveness in Nature Empirical and Intelligible Character Again 196 § 29. Groundlessness ofIdeas Will as Thing in ItselfWithout Ultimate Purpose

206

THIRDBOOK The W orId as Presentation: Second Consideration Presentation Independent of the Principle of Sufficient Ground The Platonic Idea: The Object of Art

2II

§ 30. Levels of Objectification ofWill as Platonic Ideas 211 § 31. Platonic Ideas and Kant's Thing in Itself 212 § 32. Platonic Ideas as Presentations/Not the Thing in Itself as Such Kant's lnconsistency 217 § 33. Cognition Freed from Relations in the Cognizance ofldeas § 34. The Subject Will-Iess in Its Cognizance ofIdeas Release from the Principles of Sufficient Ground and Individuation 221

21 9

§ 35. Ideas distinguished from their Phenomena 225 § 36. The Replication ofldeas in Art § 37. § 38. § 39. § 40. § 41. § 42. § 43. § 44.

§ 45.

§ 46.

Genius and Madness 227 Degrees of the lnnate Capacity for Cognizance ofIdeas 239 The Subjective Side of the Aesthetic Experience 240 The Aesthetically Sublime 245 The Stimulating as the Contrary of the Sublime 253 Everything Beautiful in its Own Way Further Comparison with Plato 254 The Subjective and Objective Sides of the Aesthetic Expetience 258 The Aesthetic Display of the Most General Ideas of Matter Architecture and the Fine Art ofWater-Conduction 259 The Fine Art of Gardens Painting that Depicts Incognizant Beings Paintings and Sculptures of Animals 264 Historical Painting and Sculpture Human Beauty and Grace Standards and Ideals of Beauty 266 Why Laokoön does not Scream 273

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§ 47. Nudity and Clothing - For Body and Mind 277 § 48. Historical Painting and the Idea ofHumanity 277 § 49. The Difference between Ideas and Concepts Substance vs. Mannerism in Art 28I § 50. The Expression of Concepts in Art Allegory and Symbol 285 § 51. The Literary Arts Poetry and History - Song - T ragedy The ldea of Humanity 291 § 52. The Special Case of Music 305

FOURTHBOOK The W orld as Will: Se co nd Consideration With the Achievement of Self-Cognizance Affirmation and Denial of the Will for Life

321

§ 53. The Ethical Part of this W ork not Practical Philosophy No "Ought" to be Prescribed The Irrelevance or History 32 I § 54. Life and Death The Eternal Present No Individual Survival Affirmation and Denial of the Will fOT Lift. 325 § 55. Freedom and Detenninism Compiete Self-Denial the Only Possible Freedom within the Phenomenon Empirical, Intelligible, and Acquired Character 338 § 56. Cognition as Motive and as Quieter ofWill

Will Lacking in Ultimate Purpose Life as Constant Suffering 36I § 57. Life, Death, Suffering, Boredom 365

§ 58. Happiness Negative and Transitory Reiigious Superstition 373 § 59. More on the Misery of Life Optimism and Pessimism 378 § 60. Affirmation of the Will for Life The Sex Drive lts Strongest form A Glimpse of Eternal Justice 381

Expanded Table ofContents

7

§ 61. The Egoism Inherent in Every Being 387 § 62. Self-Affirmation Extended to Denial of the Will in Others

§ 63. § 64. § 65. § 66.

§ 67.

§ 68.

§ 69. § 70.

§ 71.

Right as a Purely Negative Concept Moral vs. Legal Right and W rong Purpose of the State Justification ofPunishment 389 Temporal vs. Eternal Justice 408 Eternal Justice Obscurely Felt by Everyone 415 Good. Bad, Evil. Malice Conscience as Feeling 418 True Virtue not a Matter ofMorality or Dogmas Grounded in Intuitive, not Abstract Cognizance Righteousness vs. True Goodness 427 True Virtue as Pure Love Its Grounding in Compassion Crying and Compassion for Oneself 435 From Virtue to Asceticism - Denial of the Will for Life The Example of Saintly Individuals Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism T wo Paths to Self-Denial 438 Suicide 462 Denial ofWill the Only Real Freedom in the Phenomenon Will and Phenomenon in Contradiction Cognition in Contradiction with Will Christian Symbolism 467 Nothingness 474

APPENDIX Critique of Kantian Philosophy

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Preface to the First EditionI

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1818

How this book should be read in order that it may possibly be understood: it is my intention to state that here. - What is to be communicated through it is a single thought. Nonetheless, despite all efforts, I could find no shorter way to communicate it than this entire book. - I take the thought to be that which has been sought at great length under the name of philosophy, and whose discovery has been, precisely for that reason, held by the historically cultivated to be as impossible as that of the philosophers' stone, even if Pliny has already told them: Quam multa fieri non posse, priusquam sint facta, judicantur? (Hist. nat.7, lY According to the various sides from which the one thought to be communicated is considered, it shows itself to be that which has been called metaphysics, that which has been called ethics, and that which has been called aesthetics; and of course it would have to be all of this, were it what, as I have already confessed, I take it to be. A system of thoughts must always have an architectonic structure, i.e., one in which one part always supports the other, but not the latter also the former, the comerstone finally supports them all without being supported by them, the pinnacle is supported without supporting. By contrast, a single thought, however encompassing it may be, must preserve the most complete unity. If nonetheless, for the sake of communication, it allows of a division into parts, then the structure of these parts

t'How much is judged to be impossible, until it is done?": Historia naturalis (Natural History) VII, 1,6.]

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must yet in turn be an organic one, i.e., one where every part sustains the whole just as much as it is sustained by the whole, none is the fIrst and none the last, the whole thought gains in distinctness by way of each part, and even the smallest part cannot be fuHy understood unless the whole is already understood in advance. - In the meantime, a book must have a fIrst and a last line and will to that extent always remain very unlike an organism, however much like the latter its content may be; consequently, form and content will stand in contradiction bere. It is self-evident that, under such circumstances, the only advice for penetrating the thought set forth is to read the book twice, and indeed tbe fIrst time witb much patience, which can only be drawn from the freely accorded belief that the beginning presupposes the end almost as much as the end does the beginning, and every earlier part likewise the later almost as much as the latter the former. I say "almost." For it is in no way altogether so, and whatever is possible has been honestly and conscientiously done to begin with that which least of a11 waits for illumination from what comes later, and in general to do whatever could facilitate the easiest possible comprehension and distinctness. Indeed, a certain degree of success might have been achieved in this, if the reader does not, which is very natural, think not merely of whatever has been said in the course of his reading, but also of possible consequences. In the latter case, besides the many contradictions actually at hand with respect to opinions ofthe day, and presumably also ofthe reader, there can be added so many other anticipated and imaginary ones that what is still mere misunderstanding is bound to show forth as lively disapproval - misunderstanding, however, of which one is a11 the less cognizant as such, given that the laboriously achieved clarity of exposition and distinctness of expression surely never Jeaves doubt as to the immediate sense of what has been said, even if it cannot simultaneously pronounce its relations to everything else. For this reason, therefore, as stated, the first reading requires patience drawn from the confIdence that, with the second, one will see much or a11 in an entirely different light. In any case, the serious striving toward full and even easy intelligibility, with a very difficult subject, is what justifies the fact that a certain repetition is found here and there. Indeed, the organic structure ofthe whole, unlike the construction of a chain, sometimes makes it necessary to touch on the same point twice. Precisely this construction as we11, and the very tight interconnection of a11 the parts, has not permitted me the division, which I otherwise fInd most worthwhile, into chapters and sections/ but

tKapitel und Paragraphen. The four Books are divided directly into a total

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has forced me to make do with four main divisions: as it were, four points of view on the one thought. In each of these four Books, on account of the necessary treatment of relevant details, one needs to be particularly careful not to lose sight of the main thought or progression of the entire exposition. - Herewith, then, is pronounced the first and, like those to follow, unavoidable demand on the unsympathetic reader (unsympathetic to the philosopher, precisely because the reader is one himsel!). The second demand is this: that one read the introduction before the book, even though it does not stand in the book, but appeared five years earlier under the tide On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of x Sufficient Ground: a Philosophical Treatise. i - Without acquaintance with this introduction and propaedeutic, true understanding of the present work is altogether impossible,ii and the content of that treatise is presupposed throughout as if it stood in the book. In any case, if it had not already preceded this work by several years, it would in fact not properly head it as an introduction, but rather be incorporated into the first Book, which now, in the absence of what is said in that treatise, indeed shows a certain incompleteness on account of these gaps, which it has ever to fill by reference to that treatise. Nevertheless, so great was my aversion to plagiarizing from myseIf, or laboriously reproducing in other words what was already sufficiendy stated, that I preferred this path, despite the fact that I could now give the content of that treatise a somewhat better exposition, particularly insofar as I have purified it of many concepts stemming from having been too caught up in Kantian philosophy at the time, such as the concepts of Categories, outer and inner sense, and the like. Nevertheless, those concepts are yet to be found even there only because I had so far not truly engaged with them in depth, therefore only secondarily and quite out of contact with the main issue. For this reason, then, through acquaintance with the present

of seventy-one numbered but untitled "sections," beginning with the second edition. For convenience, headings have been added to indicate the general contents ofthe sections (italicized and placed within brackets).1

tÜber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde: Eine philosophische Abhandlung (1813; 2nd ed., 1847). Grund is traditionally translated "reason" with regard to this principle, but is "ground" throughout the present translation; see introduction for discussion. To emphasize the importance attached to it by Schopenhauer, I present it with initial capitals throughout: Principle of Sufficient Ground.] ii[This is something of an exaggeration; in any case, I comment on relevant issues in the introduction and occasional endnotes.]

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work, correction of such points in that treatise will automatically take effect in the reader's thoughts. But only if, through that treatise, one has fully recognized what the Principle of Sufficient Ground is and means, how far its validity does and does not extend, and that this principle does not exist before all things, with the entire world existing only as a consequence and in accordance with it, as it were as its corollary, but rather that it is nothing more than the form within which objects, always conditioned by the subject, ofwhatever sort they may be, are everywhere cognized insofar as the subject is a cognizant individual - only then will it be possible to enter into the method of philosophizing that is for the first time here atempted, utterly diverging from everything preceding. But the same aversion to plagiarizing my own words, or even to saying exact1y the same thing a second time in other and worse terms, having already preempted better ones, has occasioned yet a second gap in the first Book of this work, insofar as I have omitted everything that stands in the first chapter of my treatise On Vision and Colors i and would otherwise have found its place here word for word. Thus also, acquaintance with this earlier short work is here presupposed. The third demand to be made on the reader, finally, could even be tacitly presupposed. For it is none other than acquaintance with the most important phenomenonii to have occurred in philosophy in two millennia and that lies so near at hand to uso I mean the chief works of Kant. The effectiii that they produce in a spirit to which they actuallyiV speak, I in fact find to be, as has indeed already been said, altogether comparable to the operation for cataracts on a blind person. And if we would continue the comparison, then my purpose is to be characterized by the fact that Iwanted to put cataract lenses in the hands of those on whom that operation has been successful, for the employment ofwhich that operation itself is thus the most necessary condition. As much, accordingly, as I take my point of departure from what the great Kant has accomplished, serious study of his works has nonetheless allowed me to discover significant mi stakes in them, which I

tÜber das Sehen und die Farben: written in 1815, initially held from publication in the hope - proved vain - of an endorsement by Goethe, whose antiNewtonian views on light and color Schopenhauer shared, then published in 1816 and expanded in the second edition of 1854.] ii[Erscheinung] iii[Wirkung] iv[wirklich]

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have had to separate out and displayas objectionable, in order to be able to presuppose and apply what is true and excellent in his doctrine, xii pure of them and refined. In order, however, not to interrupt and confuse my own exposition with frequent polemic against Kant, I have put the latter into a separate Appendix. However much, then, in accordance with what has been said, my work presupposes acquaintance with Kantian philosophy, it thus to the same extent presupposes acquaintance with that Appendix. i Therefore, it would in this respect be advisable to read the Appendix first, all the more so as its content has definite connections precisely with the first Book of the present work. On the other hand, given the nature of the matter, it could also not be avoided that the Appendix now and then refer to the work itself; from this nothing else follows than that, just as much as the main part of the work, it must likewise be read twice. The philosophy of Kant, then, is the only one with which a thorough acquaintance is directly presupposed by that which is to be here expounded. - If beyond this, however, the reader has lingered in the school of the divine Plato, he will be an the better prepared and the more receptive to hearing me. But if he has even yet further shared in the benefaction ofthe Vedas, access to which, opened up to us through the Upanishads,ii is in my eyes the preeminent greatness that this still young century has to show over earlier ones - in that Tpresume that the influence of Sanskrit literature will be no less deep in its reach than that of the revival of Greek literature in the 15 th CentuI")? - if, I thus assert, the reader has in fact already received and embraced consecration from the ages-old Indian wisdom, then he is best of all prepared to hear what I have to expound to hirn. It will then not speak to hirn, as to many others, in foreign, indeed hostile terms. For, if it does not sound too vain, I would maintain that every one of the individual and disparate XJIl pronouncements that constitute the Upanishads can be derived as a consequence from the thought to be communicated by me, although in no way, converse1y, is the latter already to be found there.

********* But most readers have already risen up with impatience and burst forth with the objection held back so long with difficulty: how dare I lay a book before the public with demancis and conditions, of which the first two are presumptuous and quite immodest, and for that matter at a time

i[Agam, something of an exaggeration on Schopenhauer' spart.] "[See relevant note to § 1 ofBook One.]

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when there is such a general abundance ofunique thoughts that, by way of the presses in Germany alone, they are made public property in three thousand substantial, original, and quite indispensable works annually, and in addition in countless periodicals, not to mention the daily papers? - at a time when, in particular, there is not the least lack of quite original and deep philosophers, but rather more of them living simultaneously in Germany alone than could have been exhibited by any other span of centuries? How is one ever to get through it all, asks the indignant reader, if one has to set to work so circumstantially with a book? Since I have nothing in the least to bring forth in the face of such objections, I hope only for some thanks from these readers for having wamed them in timely fashion, so that they not lose a single hour with a book that it could not be fruitful to read without fulfilling the stated dcmands, and that should therefore be neglected entirely, particularly since one may in any case wager much that it is not able to speak to them, that it will rather always bc only paucorum hominum,i and must therefore calmly and modestly await those few whose uncommon mode ofthinking finds it enjoyable. For even apart from the complications and cxertion that it imposes on the reader, what cultivated individual of today, whose knowledge approaches that splendid point where ''paradoxieal" and "false" are entirely the same thing, eould bear to eneounter on almost every page thoughts that straightforwardly contradict what he has yet onee and for all confirmed as true and settled? And then how unpleasantly deeeived will many a one feel if he meets here with no talk at all of that whieh he believes has altogether to be sought preeisely here, because his way of speculating coincides with that of a stillliving great philosopher, t who has written truly touching books and has only the slight weakness that he takes everything of which he had leamed and approved prior to his fifteenth year to be fundamental thoughts innate to the human spirit. Who could bear all this? Therefore, my advice is just to set the book back down. But I myself fear that I cannot get out of it in this way. The reader who has arrived at the preface, which dismisses him, has paid cash for the book and is asking: where is my compensation? - My last refuge is now to remind him that he yet knows how to utilize a book in many ways, even without reading it at all. It can fill a gap in his library just as weIl as many others, where, neatly bound, it is certain to make a good

i["a matter for a few men": Horace, Satires 1,9,44.] tp. H. Jakobi. [Priedrich Heinrich Jakobi (1743-1819); the "talk" to be anticipated is presumably that ofmatters ofreligious faith. Note added in C.]

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appearance. Or he can lay it on the dressing table of his learned lady friend, or on the tea table. Or indeed fmally, which is certainly the best of all and as I especially advise, he can review it.

********* And so, after allowing myself the joke to which hardly a page in this altogether ambiguous life can be too serious to grant a place, I put the book forth with inner seriousness, in the conviction that it will sooner or later reach those to whom alone it can be directed, and in any case submitting with composure to the fact that it too will meet in full measure the fate that, in every cognitive achievement - thus all the more in the most important - has always befallen the truth, to which is allotted only a short celebration of victory between the two long periods in which it is condemned as paradoxical and deprecated as trivial. The former fate tends to strike its author as weIl. - But life is short and truth far-reaching and long-lived. Let us speak the truth. (Written at Dresden in August 1818.)3

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Not to contemporaries, not to fellow citizens - to humanity I consign my now completed work, with the confidence that it will not be without value for them, even if, as is entailed by the lot of that which is a good of any sort, this may be recognized only late. F or it can only have been for humanity, not for the quickly passing generation occupied with its momentary delusion, that my mindi has been, almost against my will, for a long life through uninterruptedly devoted to work on it. Nor could the lack of interest in it during this time cause me to waver as to its value. For I continually saw that which is false, bad, in the end absurd and senseless, t standing in general admiration and reverence, and considered that, if those who are capable of recognizing the genuine and right were not so rare that one can look around for them in vain for some twenty years, there might not be so few who are capable of producing it that their works subsequently constitute an exception to the evanescence of earthly things - by which fact one then loses that quickening hope for posterity which is needed as fortification by anyone who has set himself a high goal. Whoever seriously takes up and pursues a matter that does not lead to material utility must not count on the interest of contemporaries. But he will surely for the most part see, in the meantime, that the semblance of such matters gains authority in the world and enjoys its day. And this is in the order of things. For the matter itself must also be pursued for

tKopj] tHegelian philosophy.

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itself. Otherwise it cannot succeed. For foresight is everywhere a threat to insight. i Accordingly, just as the history ofliterature thoroughly testifies, anything ofvalue, to gain authority, has needed a great deal oftime, particularly when it is of the instructive, not of the entertaining, variety; and in the meantime, falsehood glittered. For it Is difficult if not impossible to unite a thing with the semblance of that thing. It is indeed precisely the curse of this world of hardship and neediness that everything has to serve and be indentured to them. Precisely for this reason, the world is not made so that any noble and sublime striving within it, such as that for light and truth, may thrive unobstructed and for its own sake. Rather, even when such a thing has been able to gain authority, and its concept is thereby introduced, material interests, personal purposes, will at once appropriate it as their instrument - or their mask. Accordingly, after Kant had brought philosophy once more into repute, it too was indeed soon bound to become the instrument of purposes - of political ones from above, or personaiones from below even if taken strictly it was not it but its double, which passes for it. This must not even trouble uso For the unbelievably great majority of human beings are, according to their nature, altogether capable of none other than material purposes, indeed can comprehend none other. Thus striving for truth alone is much too high and eccentric a sort of thing that we might expect that all, that many, or even that only a few take an honest part in i1. If one nonetheless sometimes sees, as, e.g., precisely now in Germany, a striking mobility, a general state of doing, writing, and talking in matters of philosophy, then one may confidently presuppose that the actual prim um mobile/i the hidden incentiveiii for such activity despite all ceremonious airs and assuranees, is only real, not ideal, purposes, namely, that it is personal, official, ecclesiastical, political, in short, material interests that one has in view here, and that mere partiality of purposes consequentJy imparts such powerfuJ movement to the many pens iv of supposed philosophers, hence that foresight, not insight, is the guiding star of this noisy bunch, v while truth is certainly the last thing to be thought about. Truth is not a matter of partisanship. vi Rather, it can make its way through such a weIter of philosophical dis-

i[Absicht ... Einsicht] ii ["first mover"] 111 [Triebjeder] iv [Feder] V[dieser Tumultuanten] vlSie findet keine Parteigänger.]

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pute as calmly and unnoticed as through the winter night of the darkest century caught up in the most rigid ecclesiastical faith, where it is perhaps communicated only as a secret doctrine to a few devotees, or indeed only entrusted to parchment. Indeed, I would say that no time can be less favorable for philosophy than that in which it is shamefully misused by the one side to make politics, by the other side to make a living. i Or does one perhaps believe that, with such striving and in the midst of such a fray, the truth will come to light as well, as a kind of extra on which one had not set one's purpose? Truth is no whore who throws herself on the neck of those who do not desire her. Rather, she is so shy a beauty that even one who sacrifices everything to her can still not be certain ofher favor. Now if governments make philosophy into a means for their polit- xix ical purposes, scholars, on the other hand, see in philosophical professorships a trade that feeds its man like any other; they thus press after them amidst assurances of their good disposition, Le., intention to serve those purposes. And they keep their word: not truth, not c1arity, not Plato, not Aristotle, but the purposes that they have been employed to serve, are their guiding star and at once also become the criterion of truth, of value, of what is worthy of attention, and of their opposites. What therefore does not correspond to those purposes - and it may be the most important and most extraordinary thing in their discipline - is either condemned or, where this is unseemly, strangled with unanimous silence. Just look at their unanimous eagemess in opposition to pantheism. Is there any fool who believes this proceeds from conviction? And however could that philosophy which has been degraded into a way of eaming one's bread fail to degenerate into sophistry? Precisely because this is inevitable and the rule has always applied, "Whose bread I eat, his song I sing," eaming money with philosophy was for the ancients the characteristic mark of the sophist. - But now there is the added fact that, since nothing but mediocrity is to be expected anywhere in this world, may be demanded, or is to be had for money, one has to make do with it here as weIl. From this we then see, in all the German universities, beloved mediocrity endeavoring to establish a still quite non-existent philosophy by its own means, and indeed in accordance with a prescribed measure and goal - a spectacle that it would be almost cruel to ridicule. While philosophy has to this extent long had to serve altogether as a means, on the one hand for public, on the other for private, purposes,

i[als Staatsmittel...als Erwerbsmittel]

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I have, undisturbed thereby, pursued the train of my thoughts for more than thirty years, and precisely only because I had to and could not do otherwise, from an instinctive drive that was yet supported by the conviction that what truth an individual has thought and what obscurity he has illurninated will yet at some time also be grasped by another thinking spirit, will speak to it, give it pleasure, and console it; such a one we are addressing, just as those similar to us have addressed us and thereby been our consolation in this living wasteland. In the meantime, one pursues his subject for its own sake and on its own terms. But then the strange thing with philosophical meditations is that precisely only that which one has thought through and examined for oneself is subsequently also of benefit to others, but not that which was already originally intended for others. The former is in the first instance marked by its character of thoroughgoing honesty. For one does not seek to deceive oneself, nor to pass off empty shells on oneself; thereby, all sophistry and aB word-mongering then drop out, and in consequence of this every sentence written repays at once the effort to read it. Accordingly, my works bear the stamp of honesty and openness so distinctly on their brow that they are just by that fact in glaring contrast with those of the three famous sophists of the post-Kantian period. One always finds me in the standpoint of rejlection,i i.e., rationally thoughtful awarenessii and honest communication, never in the standpoint of inspiration, otherwise known as intellectual perception,iii or also absolute thought, but by its rightful name windbaggeryiv and charlatanism. In this spirit therefore working, all the while continuing to see the false and the bad standing in general recognition, indeed windbaggeryt and charlatanismt most highly revered, I have long since given up on the approval of my contemporaries. A body of contemporaries that has for twenty years raved about a Hegel, that spiritual Caliban, as the greatest of philosophers - so loudly that it reverberated throughout the whole of Europe - could not possibly cause one who has seen this to lust after its approval. It has no more laurels to bestow; its approval has

i[Reflexion] ii[der vernünftigen Besinnung. Normally, throughout, the less frequently employed Besinnung will also be translated as "refleetion," while Besonnenheit will be, by itself, "thoughtful awareness."] iitintellektuelle Anschauung] iV[ Windbeutelei] tFichte and Schelling. [Note added in Cl tHegel. [Note added in Cl

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been prostituted, and its reproach can mean nothing. That I am serious about this can be seen from the fact that, if I had ever sought the approval of my contemporaries, I would have had to strike out twenty passages that absolutely contradict all their views, indeed are bound in part to give them offense. But I would count it as dereliction on my part to sacrifice even a syllable to that approval. My guiding star has been quite seriously the truth. Following it, I can in the first instance seek only my own approval, entirely turned away from an age sunk deep with respect to all higher spiritual endeavors and from a demoralized nationalliterature in which, exceptions aside, the art of combining high words with lowly dispositions has reached its pinnacle. From the mistakes and weaknesses necessarily attaching to my nature, as to each its own, I can of course never escape; but I will not augment them with unworthy accommodation. For what now concerns this second edition, it pleases me first of all to find nothing to have to retract after twenty-five years, thus my fundamental convictions have maintained themselves at least in my own person. The alterations in the first volume,i the only one containing the text of the first edition, accordingly never touch what is essential, but rather concern partly only secondary matters; but for the most part they consist in usually brief, elucidative additions here and there. Only the "Critique of Kantian Philosophy"ii has received significant corrections and extensive additions. For these could not here be brought into a supplementary Book such as has been provided in the second volume xxii for the four Books that expound my doctrine proper. With the latter I chose that form of enlargement and improvement for the reason that the twenty-five years elapsed since their composition have brought such a notable alteration in my manner of exposition and in the tone of delivery that it just would not do to fuse the content of the second volume into a whole with that of the first, by which fusion both would have been bound to suffer. I therefore put forth the two works in separation, and have often changed nothing in the earlier exposition even where I would now express mys elf quite differently; for Iwanted to guard against spoiling the work of my younger years with the carping of old age. What might need correction in this respect will, with the help of the second volume, surely right itself automatically in the mind of

i[The second vohune, comprised of"Supplements (Ergänzungen) to the Four Books ofthe First Volume," was added for the second edition.] u[The Appendix to the first edition aud thus to the first volume of the subsequent editions.]

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reader. Both volumes stand, in the fun sense of the term, as the other's complement, namely, to the extent that this rests on the fact that the one stage of a person's life is, in an intellectual respect, the complementi of the other. Therefore, one will find not mere1y that each volume contains that which the other does not have, but also that the advantages of the one consist precisely in that which is absent from the other. If, accordingly, the first half of my work has that advantage over the second which only the fire of youth and the energy of initial conception can bestow, the latter, by contrast, will surpass the former through its maturity and completeness in working out thoughts, which is imparted only to the fruits of a long course of life and its industry. For when I had the force for the original conception of my system's fundamental thought, pursuing it at once into its fOUf branches, returning therefrom to the unity of their stern, and then distinctly depicting the whole, I could not yet have been in the position to work out all the parts of the system with the completeness, thoroughness, and detail that can be attained only through many years of meditation on it. The latter is required in order to test and to illustrate it with countless facts, support it with the most diverse sorts of confirmation, illuminate it brightly from an sides, set the various points of view in accordingly bold contrast, cleanly separate the multiplicity of materials and set them forth well-ordered. Therefore. although it would of course have to have been more pleasant for the reader to have my work as a whole from a single mold, instead of its now consisting of two halves that need to be brought together in use, I wish that he consider the fact that it would have been required for this that I had accomplished at a single stage of life what is possible only in two, in that I would have had to possess for the task at one stage of life the properties that nature has distributed between two entire1y different ones. Accordingly, the necessity ofproviding my work in two mutually supplementary halves is comparable to that according to which, since it is impossible to make it in a single piece, one produces an achromatic object lens by conjoining a convex lens of crown glass with a concave lens of flint glass, the united effect of which alone accomplishes one's purpose. On the other hand, however, the reader will find some compensation for the inconvenience of the simultaneous employment of two volumes in the variety and relief entailed by treatment of the same subject, by the same mind,ii in the same spirit,iii but in very different years. thl~

XX111

i[Ergänzung: thus sometimes "supplement" and sometimes "complement."] ii[Kopj]

iii[Geist: sometimes, also "mind"]

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In any case, for someone who is not yet familiar with my philosophy, it is altogether advisable to read the fIrst volume from the start without bringing in the supplements, and to utilize the latter only on a second reading. For it would otherwise be too hard for hirn to grasp the system in its interconnections, in which only the fIrst volume exhibits it, while XXIV in the second the main doctrines are more thoroughly grounded and completely developed individually. Even someone who should faH to decide upon a second reading of the fIrst volume will do better to read the second only after it and for itself, in the straight sequence of its chapters, which of course stand in an (albeit looser) interconnection with one another; its gaps will be completely fIlled for him by his recollection of the fIrst volume, if he has understood it well. In addition, he fInds references everywhere back to the relevant passages of the fIrst volume, in which, for the divisions that were designated in the fIrst by mere separators, I have provided section numbers i for this purpose in the second edition. I have already explained in the preface to the ftrst edition that my philosophy takes its point of departure from Kantian philosophy and therefore presupposes a thorough acquaintance with it; I repeat it here. For Kant's doctrine produces in every mind that has grasped it a fundamental alteration so great that it can be counted as aspiritual rebirth. It alone, namely, is actually capable of removing the realism innate to the mind, stemming from the original function of intellect, something for which neither Berkeley nor Malebranche suffices. For they remain too much with generalities, while Kant goes into particulars, and indeed in a manner that knows neither antecedent nor duplicate ii and has an entirely unique, one might say immediate, effect on the spirit, in consequence of which the latter undergoes a thorough undeceivingiii and thenceforth views all things in a different light. Only hereby, however, does it become receptive to the more positive insights that I have to give. Someone, by contrast, who has not mastered Kantian philosophy, whatever else he may have done, has remained, as it were, in astate of innocence, namely, caught up in thai natural and childish realism into xxv which we are all born and which makes everything possible for us, only not philosophy. Consequently, such a person relates to the former as

tParagraphenzahlen ofthe fonn '§ n.' In each case, on the other hand, the bracketed section headings, indicating content, are added by the translator.] ii[weder Vorbild noch Nachbild] iii[Enttäuschung]

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one not of age to one who iS.i That this truth sounds so paradoxical nowadays, which would in no way have been the case in the first thirty years following the appearance of the Critique ofPure Reason,ii comes from the fact that a generation has since grown up that does not really know Kant - for more is needed for this than a fleeting, impatient reading, or areport at second hand - and this in turn from the fact that this generation, in consequence of bad direction, has squandered its time with the philosophical theses of ordinary minds, thus those without a calling for it, or indeed of windbagging sophists whom one has irresponsibly cried up to them. Thus the confusion in initial concepts and in general unspeakable crudeness and plodding in its own philosophical eJIorts, visible through the cover ofthe preciousness and pretentiousnessiii of the generation thus educated. But anyone who supposes he can get to know Kant's philosophy from other people's accounts ofit is caught up in a hopeless error. Rather, r must give serious waming regarding reports of this kind, particularly from recent times. And indeed, in these very latest years, I have come across ac counts of Kantian philosophy in the writings of Hegelians that actually tend toward the fantastic. How indeed are minds already twisted and spoiled in the freshness of youth by Hegelish nonsense iv yet supposed to be capable of following Kant's profound investigations? They are early accustomed to taking the most hollow word-mongering for philosophical thoughts, the most pitiful sophisrns for mental acuity, and nitwitted silliness v for dialectics, and their minds have been disordered by the reception of frenzied verbiage in which, in an effort to think something, the mind tortures and exhausts itself in vain. For them no critique of reason is in order; for them, no philosophy. For them a medicina menüsvi is in order - to start, as a cathartic, something like a petit cours de senscommunologie, vii and then one has to wait to see whether in their case there can ever again be talk ofphilosophy. The Kantian doctrine will therefore be sought in vain anywhere other than in Kant's own works; but these are thoroughly instructive, even where he goes astray, even where he is mistaken. In consequence

i[wie ein Unmündiger zum Mündigen] ii[First edition, 1781] iii[Pretiosität und Prätensiosität] iV[durch den Unsinn der Hegelei] V[läppischen Aberwitz] medicine for the mind"] vii["a short course in commonsenseology"]

vt'a

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of his originality, that which really applies to all genuine philosophers applies in the highest degree to him: one gets to know them only from their own writings, not from the reports of others. For the thoughts of those extraordinary spirits can never stand filtration through the ordinary mind. Born behind broad, high, finely arched brows, beneath which beaming eyes shine forth, when they are transported into the narrow accommodations and low-roofed housing of narrow, flattened, thickwalled skulls from which dull glances spy, directed toward personal purposes, they lose all force and alllife and no longer seem themselves. Indeed, one can say that this type of mind works like a curved mirror, in which everything is twisted, distorted, loses the proportionality of its beauty, and displays a deformed face. Only from the authors themselves can philosophical thoughts be received; therefore, whoever feels driven to philosophy has to seek out its immortal teachers in the still sanctity of their works themselves. The main chapters of every one of these genuine philosophers will provide one hundred times more insight into their doctrines then the dragging and squinting reports about them that everyday minds produce, which are usually deeply caught up in addition in the philosophical fashion of the moment, or in their own fondest opinions. But it is a matter for amazement how decisively the public prefers to grab after those second-hand accounts. Here there seem in xxvii fact to be working those elective affinities by virtue of which common natures are drawn to their fellows, and would accordingly rather hear from their fellows what even a great spirit has said. Perhaps this rests

on the same principle as that of the system of Mutual Instruction,i according to which children learn best from their fellows.

********* A further word for philosophy professors. - The sagacity, the aeeurate and subtle taet, with whieh they have recognized my philosophy, right from its appearanee, as something entirely at odds with, indeed surely dangerous to, their own endeavors or, to speak in popular terms, not their thingii - just like the sure and acute politics by virtue of which they at once discovered the only correct proeedure to adopt in

i[des wechselseitigen Unterrichts. The earliest promoter of this method in Germany seems to have been Heinrich Daniel Zschokke (1771-1848). It is often discussed in connection with the contemporaneous "monitorial" system wherein the better students teach the inferior - developed in England by Andrew Bell (1753-1832) and Joseph Lancaster (1778-1838).] "[nicht in ihren Kram passt]

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the face of it, the complete unanimity with which they put that procedure into application, finaHy the persistence with which they stayed tme to it - I have long since had to admire. This procedure, which is incidentaHy to be recommended for its absolute ease of execution, consists, as is weH known, in completely ignoring and thereby secreting a thing - in the terms of Goethe's mischievous expression,i which really means suppressing that which is weighty and significant. The effectiveness of this silent method is heightened by the Corybantic damor with which the births of the spiritual progeny of those who are in on it are mutuaHy ce:lebrated, and which compels the public to look and take note of the weighty airs that accompany the exchange of welcoming cheers in the matter. Who could fail to recognize the purposiveness in tbis procedure? Yet there is no objection to be raised against the principle prim um vivere, deinde philosophari.ii The gentlemen would live, and in particular live on philosophy: to this they have been directed, with wife and child, and, despite Petrarch's povera e nuda vai filosofia,iii they have hazarded it. But now my philosophy is altogether not set up for living on it. For that, it is first of all entirely lacking, of the initial, indispensable prerequisites for a weH-paid chair ofphilosophy, a speculative theology, which yet - despite that bothersome Kant with his critique of reason - is supposed to and must be the main theme of all philosophy, even if the latter thereby assurnes the task of evermore speaking of that of which it ean know absolutely nothing. Indee