The Wafd, 1919 1952: Cornerstone Of Egyptian Political Power 0861990005, 9780861990009

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgements
Part One: 1914-1927
1 Egypt under British Domination
Notes
2 Anglo-Egyptian Administration during World War I
Notes
3 Rivalries among British Civil Servants
Notes
4 The Creation of the Wafd
Notes
5 Revolution
Notes
6. Negotiations
Notes
7 The Wafd in Power
Notes
8 End of An Era 1925-1927
Notes
9 The First Generation: Goals and Accomplishment
Part Two
10 The New Generation
Notes
11 Years of Confrontation 1937-1945
Notes
12 A Society in Conflict with Itself
Notes
13 Decline and Collapse 1945-1952
Notes
14 Ephemeral Phoenix
Notes
Bibliography

Citation preview

CORNERSTONE OF EGYPTIAN POLITICAL POWER

THE WAFD 191» - 1952

JANICE J.TERRY

•O * THIRD WORLD CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND PUBLISHING LTD LONDON

© THIRD WORLD CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND PUBLISHING LTD 117 PICCADILLY. LONDON W1

ISBN 0-86199-000-5

FIRST EDITION 1982

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................... 4 PART ONE 1914-1927 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Egypt under British Domination............................................ 7 Anglo-Egyptian Administration during WorldWar I ......... 23 Rivalries among British Civil Servants.............................. 53 The Creation of the W afd................................................... 71 Revolution ........................................................................... 98 Negotiations ...................................................................... 125 The Wafd in Pow er........................................................... 153 End of an Era 1925-1927 .................................................... 182 The First Generation: Goals and Accomplishments.........202 PART TWO 1928-1952

10 11 12 13 14

The New Generation........................................................... 213 Years of Confrontation 1937-1945 ....................................... 237 A Society in Conflict with Itself............................................ 265 Decline and Collapse 1945-1952 ....................................... 291 Ephemeral Phoenix ........................................................... 306 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................... 317

3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A number of individuals and institutions have contributed to this study. I am grateful for a HEW grant in 1973 which enabled me to gather material in Great Britain and to conduct a number of inter­ views in Egypt. Professor P.M. Holt at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, has been a sound source of direction and advice. Similarly, the curators for the excellent Middle East collection at St Antony’s College, Oxford, have been consistently helpful, providing not only guidance through the collection, but tea and electric heaters in the cold winter months. 1 also acknowledge Eastern Michigan University for the 1979 sabbatical leave during which time the manuscript was completed. During the course of conducting research for this study I have been assisted by numerous individuals. In particular, I would like to pay tribute to Professor Nabih Faris who, with his breadth of knowledge and zeal for learning, first generated my enthusiasm and curiosity about Arab history. Many Egyptians generously gave of their time to discuss and describe past events during innumerable interviews. Tahseen Bashir was particularly helpful in this regard. Dr Halim Doss and his charming wife Stefanie were unfailingly hospitable. They are indeed models of the type of friendship with which one is greeted throughout Egypt. I am also indebted to Richard Dewey for his careful reading of and comments on the manuscript. Finally, I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to my parents for their unstinting generosity and constant encouragement.

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PART ONE 1914-1927

1

EGYPT UNDER BRITISH DOMINATION When the First World War erupted in 1914, Great Britain had controlled Egypt for thirty-two years, during which time it had developed a complete, if somewhat complex, administration over an already extant Egyptian governmental organization. After suppressing the ‘Urabi revolt in 1882, the British government appointed Evelyn Baring, later Lord Cromer, as Consul-General. In effect, he ruled Egypt from 1882 to 1907 with the Egyptian Khedive and his ministers acting as subordinates. The Chancery, staffed by British civil servants, was the communications link between the governmental departments and the Egyptian ministries. By 1914 there were five British advisers: one each to the Education, Finance, Interior, Justice and Public Works Ministries respectively. To a large extent, the importance of the adviser depended upon personal considerations, but, in general, the Adviser to the Ministry of Finance was in the position to exert the most influence because the implementation of recommended projects by the other advisers depended upon treasury approval. Ultimate approval was subject, until 1904, to the control of the Caisse de la Dette which, in order to avoid international contro­ versies, was treated by the British with the greatest diplomacy. For administrative purposes Egypt was divided into 14 provinces headed by mudirs. The provinces were further sub­ divided into markazes (marakiz), consisting of groupings of villages headed by an *umda. [1] The judicial arm of the govern­ ment retained the local Muslim qadi, but simultaneously maintained the Mixed and Native Courts which allowed the foreign communities and religious minorities in Egypt judicial privileges they would not have held under strict application of the Shari'a. The Organic Law of 1913 created the Legislative Assembly 7

THEWAFD

composed of 91 members: 8 ministers, 66 members elected by second degree election, and 17 members nominated by the govern­ ment. The Assembly had the power to delay legislation by prolonging debate, but could not reject decisions passed by the Council of Ministers in conjunction with the British advisers. It could recommend legislative measures which were decided upon by the ministers. Consequently, the Legislative Assembly was essentially an advisory body and could not, although it was indirectly responsible to the Egyptian electorate, be considered a truly legislative body. The task of this political system was largely to act efficiently upon the demands originating from the British government. Prior to World War I, Egypt was nominally subject to the Ottoman Sultan, to whom it paid an annual tribute, although the Ottomans had no power within Egypt, as Great Britain was the real governing authority. The Consul-General received instruction from the British Foreign Secretary, who was responsible to Parliament. The demands of the British government were strictly limited in scope. It aimed to preserve law and order within Egypt, to prevent other foreign powers from gaining ascendancy, and to maintain the safety of the Suez Canal, which was the principal route to India and the British possessions in the Far East; the economic benefits which accrued to some British citizens as a result of Britain’s control over Egypt were peripheral to these other larger considerations. [2] Under such a system, the Consul-General was the dominant authority: as long as he maintained order the British government was content to allow him a free hand in ruling Egypt. Both Cromer and Kitchener, who was Consul-General from 1911 until he was made Secretary for War in 1914, clearly exercised all the pre­ rogatives of their office. Egyptians and the British administrators looked to them for approval or criticism. In contrast. Sir Eldon Gorst, Consul-General from 1907 until 1911, had the governmental departments assume a greater degree of control over adminis­ trative policies. Gorst adopted this method of government because he believed that the Egyptian national movement was a genuine one, and because he wished to delegate more authority to the Egyptians. When these steps appeared to diminish the power of the Consul-General and the British officials, Gorst’s regime was roundly criticized. Even the Governor-General of the Sudan, 8

EGYPT UNDER BRITISH DOMINATION

Reginald Wingate, who was himself to become Egyptian High Commissioner during a critical time, wrote of Gorst’s adminis­ tration that “ the Egyptian ministers are, most of them, Nationalist at heart and waverers are being intimidated; they grope about for a sign of firmness and decision from the Home Government and so far they have found none — The general impression is that our Government is so concerned in Home Politics that they have no thoughts for anything else.” [31 Interestingly, Wingate recognized as early as 1910 the authenticity of the Egyptian national feeling, but clung to the old idea that a firm English hand would control the Egyptian nationalists who were viewed rather . like unruly children in need of strong parental guidance. When Kitchener became Consul-General in 1911, he promptly reasserted personal control, an action which was widely approved by British officials in London and Cairo. Because of his reputation as a military hero, Kitchener secured a measure of popularity, or at least recognition, among the Egyptians. Enjoying the support of the government in London and the native population, Kitchener was able to effect his development plans for Egypt, but his work was terminated by his appointment as Secretary for War, although he planned to resume his position in Egypt after the War ended. World War I brought increased numbers of British army personnel into Egypt and placed demands for materials and men upon the administration. Owing to Egypt’s strategic geographic position, these requests had to be satisfied quickly and efficiently. Britain had to maintain firm control over Egypt — its land, people, and resources. The Ottoman Empire’s declaration of war against the Allies not only raised the question of the legal status of Great Britain in Egypt, but intensified British concern about the Suez Canal. Undoubtedly, the position of Great Britain in Egypt derived from her superior military power and visible presence in the country, but until the War, Britain had steadfastly asserted that she planned to remain in Egypt only until the Egyptians were able to rule themselves. Publicly, Great Britain adhered to the ideal expressed by Palmerston in his famous remark that he did not want Egypt, or wish it for ourselves any more than any rational man with an estate in the north of England and a residence in the south, would have wished to possess the inns on the north road. All 9

THEWAFD

he would want would have been that the inns should be well kept, always accessible, and furnishing him when he came with mutton chops and post-horses. [4] While some British officials propounded the notion that they were merely acting out Palmerston’s “ inn keeper” role, others were concerned over the tenuous legal position of Great Britain in Egypt, while British writers frequently pointed out that it would be many years before the Egyptians could rule themselves. [5] As early as May 23, 1914, Kitchener raised the issue of British status in Egypt with Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In a letter to Grey, Kitchener enclosed a draft Proclamation consisting of 21 clauses, which aimed to isolate Egypt from contact with the enemies of Great Britain in time of war. [61 Among other things, the Proclamation forbade commer­ cial agreements with enemy powers; although the Proclamation was subject to modification in respect to the Suez Canal. After the War broke out, the British immediately began to consolidate their position in Egypt. On October 18, 1914, Husayn Rushdi Pasha, formerly a Minister of Justice, and Prime Minister of Egypt from 1914 until 1919, delayed the opening of the Legislative Assembly for two months. Although some Egyptians objected to the delay, the British considered it a necessary precaution to prevent opposition to their control. In London and Cairo debate continued over whether annexation or the declaration of a Protectorate over Egypt was the best course. On November 1,1914, Grey telegraphed Milne Cheetham, Head of Chancery and then acting Consul-General, that declaration of the Protectorate was to be postponed until “ the rupture with Turkey is complete, for this would alter [the] status of Egypt, but there is no reason for postponing proclamation of martial law.” [7] Following this telegram. General John Maxwell, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in Egypt, proclaimed martial law, which was announced in the major Arabic newspaper, al-Muqattam, on November 3. Martial law negated the necessity for further post­ ponement of the opening of the Legislative Assembly, but the British preferred to ignore the Assembly. Notably the Assembly was never officially prorogued; the Egyptian nationalists later referred to this lack of parliamentary rule when they called, in 1919, for the reinstitution of the Assembly. 10

EGYPT UNDER BRITISH DOMINATION

British officials themselves were divided on the issue of annex­ ation as opposed to the declaration of a Protectorate in Egypt. Kitchener favored annexation as did some others, who held that outright control was the best and safest course. Others, particular­ ly officials in Cairo, namely Ronald Graham, Adviser to the Ministry of Interior; Edward Cecil, the Adviser to the Ministry of Finance; and Milne Cheetham, strenuously objected to annexation. They argued that veiled British authority over Egypt would cause the fewest objections from the Egyptians. After protracted discussion, the Foreign Office opted for the Protec­ torate, which was declared on December 18,1914. The state of war with Turkey was blamed for causing the announcement of the Protectorate. Egyptians were also warned that Britain would take any measures necessary for the defense and protection of the nation. [8] This continued as British policy until after the Suez Warm 1956. The Protectorate was drawn up by Cheetham, William Brunyate (Khedival Counsellor), Graham, and Ronald Storrs, the Oriental Secretary. The Arabic word used for ‘Protectorate’ was Himaya; subsequently its choice caused discussion because the word had unfortunate historical connotations. However, in a conversation between Storrs and Rennell Rodd, a member of the Milner Mission. Storrs related that when the text of the Protectorate was written he consulted with Rushdi Pasha concerning the Arabic terminology. Storrs contended that Rushdi himself had used the word Himaya. f91 Whatever the word signified to the Egyptian populace in 1919, the proclamation of the Protectorate was received quietly enough in 1914. Under the terms of the Protec­ torate, the Consul-General became the High Commissioner. According to international law Egypt became a territory where the interference of another foreign power was precluded, and where the protecting state assumed full sovereignty. On the Egyptian side, Rushdi Pasha later tried to justify his acceptance of the Protectorate on the grounds that the Egyptians had no other alternatives. After hearing that the British intended to declare a Protectorate, Rushdi discussed thé matter with Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Sa‘d Zaghlul, and 'Abd al-'Aziz Fahmi, all highly respected Egyptian notables. These men concluded that Egypt had no choice but to accept the terms offered by Britain. In his memoirs, Lutfi al-Sayyid corroborated Rushdi’s inter11

THE WAFD

pretation. adding that Rushdi talked to Wingate, then visiting Cairo from Khartoum, prior to the declaration of the Protectorate. At this time, Wingate told Rushdi that Egypt had to support Britain during the War, and that after the War ended, the question of Egyptian independence would be considered. Following Turkey’s declaration of war, Rushdi talked with Storrs who confirmed Wingate’s analysis. Feeling that there were, indeed, no other alternatives, Rushdi accepted the British Protectorate; however, he clearly expected that independence would be discussed immediately following the Armistice. When Rushdi died in 1928, the British acknowledged their debt to him for his support during that critical time. On the same day as the proclamation of the Protectorate, the Foreign office — in quick succession — announced the appoint­ ment of Sir Henry McMahon as High Commissioner, the deposition of ‘Abbas Hilmi, who was in Turkey, and the accession of Prince Husavn Kamil with the new title of Sultan. Husayn was reputedly pro-British, and his accession was favored among the British. On December 21, two days after the French had recog­ nized the Protectorate, Husayn was installed as the Sultan of Egypt. On the other hand, McMahon’s appointment surprised many who felt he was a poor choice. Graham’s name had been suggested, but, albeit a popular and recognized expert, Graham was rejected on the grounds that he was still too young and too closelv involved with the political intrigues of the Egyptian court to become the master of the Khedive when he had previously — at least in theory — been his servant. [10] McMahon, who was formerly Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, arrived in Egypt early in January 1915. He knew nothing of Egyptian society, spoke neither Arabic nor French, and was, in short, clearly out of his depth in the complicated relationships of the Egyptian court, and the British “ advisers” . McMahon’s views of the duties of the High Commissioner contrasted noticeably with those of his predecessor. McMahon thought that his main tasks were to keep peace among the army officers in Egypt and to facilitate the work of the civilian and military administration. Unfortunately, McMahon’s view of his position unwittingly encouraged the rivalry of Edward Cecil, Ronald Graham and Milne Cheetham who were all keen competitors to make their respective departments supreme. When McMahon made no 12

EGYPT UNDER BRITISH DOMINATION

attempt to reassert absolute control after his appointment, it was a cue to these rivals to begin moving behind his back for the power to make the crucial decisions with regard to Egyptian government. This rivalry among British civilian officials was further compli­ cated by a similar rivalry among British military officers stationed in Egypt. Consequently, while McMahon whiled away his time sailing on the Nile, the administration became increasingly riddled with intrigue and inefficiency. In addition, trouble arising from the division of civilian and military administration was apparent to officials in London, who were constantly faced with the task of delegating authority. The question of which group should exercise authority over definite spheres of Egyptian government continually plagued officials. Because the issue was never really settled, much attention that might otherwise have been directed towards the internal problems facing Egypt was diverted to the more mundane, but to British officials — both military and civilian — seemingly more relevant problem of rivalry and competition among themselves. This conflict was of importance because, from the onset of the War, Great Britain had feared that the Central Powers planned to attack the Suez Canal, and, for this reason, Britain had strongly fortified it. Under General Maxwell the army repelled a half­ hearted Turkish attack on the Canal in February 1915. During the same year, Alexandria was used as a base for the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, which fought in the Dardanelles, under Sir Ian Hamilton. After the inception of the Dardanelles Campaigns, Egypt became the sick station for soldiers returning from that front. Egypt was referred to by one expert as “ one huge Military Hospital from Alexandria right up to Luxor, to say nothing of the Provinces." [11] The difficulty in delineating specific areas of administration caused Grey, in December 1915, to telegraph McMahon that Maxwell, who commanded both the Canal and Western Fronts in addition to administering the martial law, had too much work. Grey reported that the War Office wished Maxwell to administer martial law, but that he was to be relieved of his Suez Command. Grey asked if Maxwell could be attached to the High Commis­ sioner as the Military Administrator of Martial Law. The Maxwell case underlined the difficulty of separating military and civilian duties in time of war. Nevertheless, Maxwell was relieved of his 13

THE WAFD

Suez Command and was replaced, in January 1916, by General Murray who held the position for only one year. Maxwell was retained as administrator of martial law and commander over the Western Front operations against the Sanusi in Libya. The proliferation of generals and military officers in Egypt was vet another problem for the British. McMahon mentioned that there were at least 100 generals in Egypt; this number later rose to around 150. [121 Even the perennially optimistic McMahon hoped that the difficulties between the military and civilian areas of dominance would sort themselves out eventually. The more realistic Graham noted that the relations between Murray and Maxwell, not to mention the other generals, were likely to remain strained. Wingate, who was kept informed of these rivalries, doubted that matters could remain permanently unsettled. He thought that the military system was questionable, but that the British would “ eventually come out on top in spite of the defects of our qualities.” [131 The rivalry between Maxwell and Murray ended when Maxwell was transferred from Egypt and Murray became full commander. In spite of the competition among the officers, the army kept a firm grip on the internal situation in Egypt which remained peaceful. Great Britain was confident that the Egyptians had accepted the Protectorate and were even content with their new status. Kitchener went so far as to tell the House of Lords on January 6. 1915. that “ the change had been most warmly welcomed by the native populace.” [14] Following Maxwell’s departure. McMahon, who had relied on him rather heavily for advice, became increasingly dependent upon Edward Cecil. McMahon’s position within Egypt was complicated by rumors of friction between himself and Sultan Husavn, and by the fact that most officials justifiably considered him nothing more than a cypher. Clayton and Graham both informed Wingate of these difficulties and urged him to come to Cairo. Wingate refused on the excuse that he was too busy with Sudanese problems. Consequently, discontent among the civil servants continued to escalate. Lord Hardinge, on his return trip from India to England, where he was to become - permanent Under-Secretarv at the Foreign Office, stopped in Cairo and reported the widespread dissatisfaction over McMahon’s work. [151 Hardinge talked with Graham, McMahon and many others, but McMahon was apparently unaware of the rumors 14

EGYPT UNDER BRITISH DOMINATION

concerning his poor performance. Matters were allowed to drift until Kitchener’s death in June 1916. The Foreign Office had been loath to make personnel changes because it was widely recognized that Kitchener planned to return to Cairo after the war. Kitchener’s death removed the deterrent to appointing a strong man as High Commissioner and the Foreign Office promptly began to consider candidates for the office. With this in mind, Hardinge personally wrote to Graham in July 1916 that he and Wingate were under review for the position. Graham responded with polite comments on Wingate’s abilities, but injected a moderating note on his personality. I must say I think the Sirdar would do very well in many ways — he is excellent with natives and would be sure to get on capitally with the Sultan and the Ministers. In the Soudan he had a wonderful hold on the Sheikhs etc. . . but is disliked by the British officials whom he fusses and worries to death. I am inclined to think he would be the best selection — he will give you lively times at the F.O. with his 10 page telegrams. Socially the W’s would do their duty nobly and make the Residency functions if possible more boring than they are now. [16] That Wingate found it easier to establish a rapport with Egyptians than with the British was to be a key factor in his problems as High Commissioner. As this narrative will demonstrate, it was far more important for the High Commissioner to have good lines of communications with the British than for him to have favorable relationships with Egyptian leaders. Of course, this exacerbated the already wide chasm in social relationships between the British and the Egyptians, who resented the isolation and arrogance of most British officials. Graham also complained about Cecil’s domination of the administration and of his close relationship with McMahon. Regarding the clique around Cecil, Graham wrote, “ I have never concealed my opinion as to how badly they want shaking and routing out.” [171 In reply, Hardinge told Graham that Grey had discussed the new appointment on several occasions and that he intended to nominate Wingate for the position. Since Graham was not to be 15

THE WAFD

appointed. Hardinge suggested he come to the Foreign Office as an assistant Under-Secretary, a post which Hardinge felt held promise for future advancement. [18] Graham expressed his gratitude for the offer and outlined his career objectives. The strength of my position here lies not so much in my administration as in the personal equation, which counts for so much in the East, and the fact that my staff, especially the native portions of it, like and trust me . . . I confess that the career that 1 had vaguely mapped out for myself was to leave here as soon as I could be spared, to have a good rest, to go to a Diplomatic post in a decent climate and possibly, some day or other, to return here .[191 Graham undoubtedly considered himself qualified as a future High Commissioner. In light of later developments, this fact should be borne in mind. Rather gratuitously Graham then told Hardinge that Wingate would do a fine job because he, too, understood Egypt. Graham kept Wingate informed of the Cecil intrigues and of others, but did not tell him of his personal aspirations or of his close friendship with Hardinge. Although ignorant of Graham’s expectations, Wingate had formed opinions concerning the frictions among the High Com­ missioner. the Commander-in-Chief, and the British civil servants. He had also thought out the problems presented by the lack of communication between the Foreign Office and the officials in Egypt. In a long letter of September 13, 1916, Wingate analyzed these problems, discussing the rivalry of Maxwell and Murray, and McMahon’s ambiguous position. He pointed out that it was absolutely necessary to have clear-cut lines of command and went on to consider the friction among the governing officials. Wingate noted that Maxwell knew far more about Egypt than McMahon and that his removal was probably a mistake. He bemoaned the fact that too many officials in Egypt did not have their minds fixed on winning the War, but on personal advancement and ambition which he felt were “ of very rapid growth in the intrigue soaked soil of Egvpt.’’ [20[ In Egvpt, British personnel were being transferred at a rapid pace. After Graham accepted the post in London, a dispute ensued over his replacement. Graham supported Clayton for the position. 16

EGYPT UNDER .BRITISH DOMINATION

while Cecil and McMahon backed James Haines, former Chief Collector of Taxes; Hardinge considered Cheetham until Graham informed him that Cheetham did not know Arabic and knew even less about Egypt and the Egyptians. [21] It was imperative that the Advisor to the Ministry of the Interior, who was the major British contact with the Egyptians, should have a thorough knowledge of the country and its people. Consequently, Graham was against Cheetham and was particularly opposed to Haines, because he was Cecil’s nominee, “ which damned him with the natives.’’ [22] McMahon, however, supported Haines and noted that Clayton could not be spared from the Arab Bureau and that he was disliked in some Egyptian quarters, owing to his connection with the military. [23] After a period of indecision, Haines was appointed, and true to the predictions proved to be totally inadequate. When Graham’s impending departure was announced, the Egyptian ministers planned a series of farewell parties. These and other tokens of Egyptian regret caused Graham to have second thoughts about leaving, but on September 27, he and his wife left amid a large-scale send-off, [24] which typified Egyptian hospitality, and which was to be repeated countless times over the next fifty years. By this time, Wingate’s appointment was almost official. Rumors of it were widespread among British officials long before it was publicly announced. On October 11, 1916, Grey asked Wingate if he would consider taking the position. Grey told Wingate that McMahon’s appointment had been temporary, and that with Kitchener’s death the Foreign Office wished to make a permanent nomination. Wingate was asked to name a successor as Governor-General of the Sudan, and to take a brief rest in London before assuming his responsibilities in Egypt. [25] Wingate replied thanking the Secretary for the honor, accepting the position, and recommending Lee Stack as acting GovernorGeneral. Stack had served in the Sudan from 1900, became Governor-General in 1919, and was to be assassinated by Egyptian nationalists — an event which precipitated a massive BritishEgyptian confrontation. By October 30 Wingate’s appointment was finalized, and was publicly announced on November 6 after which congratulations began to pour into his mail. From Cairo, Gayton reported that the appointment had been a blow to McMahon, but that it would “ do away with a 1000 difficulties 17

THE WAFD

and inaugurate a very different state of affairs.” [26] That Wingate’s appointment was universally popular is evidenced by this multitude of congratulations and by numerous favorable press-reports. McMahon resented being so summarily dismissed and remarked that the Egyptians ‘‘cannot but suspect that 1 have been inten­ tionally misleading them and this is hardly fair to me.” [271 He also doubted that Wingate was a suitable choice for the position of High Commissioner, but McMahon seems to have been the only individual who regretted the change. Wingate’s appointment was popular with ‘‘all elements of the population, because he was well known and had great personal prestige.” [28] Acting on Clayton’s suggestion, Wingate suggested that the Foreign Office give him a dual appointment as High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief. Wingate was eligible for this appoint­ ment as he possessed a full military rank. Officials in London rejected the idea; the refusal restricted Wingate’s exercise of power over the Egyptian government and left him in the same ambiguous position as McMahon vis-à-vis the army officers in Egypt. News of Wingate’s appointment caused speculation in Cairo as to whether he would stress the civilian or military aspect of the government. It must be remembered that Wingate was on the active military list and remained so even after he assumed the position of High Commissioner. During this time, he was also Commander of Operations in the Hijaz. Consequently, there was every possibility that Wingate would emphasize the military side. The debate assumed the form of discussion over what type of dress Wingate would wear when arriving in Cairo, since his dress would indicate the form of government he would adopt. The Foreign Office approved Wingate’s recommendation that he wear a military uniform. Having given thought to what form the adminis­ tration should take in Egypt, Wingate was anxious that the entire effort be directed towards winning the War. He wanted all personal intrigues within the administration to cease immediately. Wingate had cause to worry over these rivalries as he had been receiving letters about them for years. Unfortunately, these letters had dwelt more upon the personal aspects of the problems than upon the actual administrative and internal problems in Egypt. The predilection of British officials to expend as much — or more 18

EGYPT UNDER BRITISH DOMINATION

— of their energies on personal rivalries as on Egyptian problems severely impeded their abilities to deal with Egyptian nationalism, and, more specifically, with the Wafd. Although Wingate was aware of the personal conflicts in Egypt, he did not want to make far-reaching changes in the system until the War had been won. While Wingate had not been fully informed of the problems confronting the Egyptian nation, he did, however, have close friends among Egyptians, including the Sultan, with whom he had corresponded since the latter’s accession. Husayn was even reported to have said that “ the day the Sirdar occupies the Residency, I shall consider myself in Paradise.” [29] To cement this friendship, Wingate told Husayn that he hoped to discuss with him all of the problems facing Egypt. Husayn replied by giving a full report of his dissatisfaction with the British administration and referred to the Cecil clique as a ’Camorra’, [30] a secret organization in Naples. Wingate sent this note to Graham to ascertain the meaning of ‘Camorra’. In ill-health, the Sultan was advised by his doctors to vacation on his private yacht in Upper Egypt, where Wingate visited him on his way to Cairo. During this meeting, the governor of Aswan, and the Egyptian Minister of Finance, Yusuf Wahba Pasha, were present. In Wingate’s private notes on the interview, he wrote that the Egyptians were dissatisfied with the relations between them­ selves and the British advisers. They believed that the British did not pay enough attention to Egyptian views, and that they were not receiving an adequate share of governmental responsibility. [31] These same complaints were voiced again in 1919. After the interview, Wingate and Wahba travelled to Luxor, accompanied by Stewart Symes, Keown-Boyd, and Patterson, [32] all trusted subordinates from the Sudan who aided Wingate in organizing a smooth running administration. By bringing these men along, Wingate caused consternation among the officials in Cairo, and, to some extent, isolated himself. For example, Clayton feared Wingate’s appointment would eliminate his work in the Arab Bureau, while Storrs was largely deprived of his duties by Symes and Keown-Boyd. In Khartoum, Stack worried over the weakness created by the departure of so many experienced officials. If Wingate was aware of these considerations, he did not mention it. McMahon’s December 23 departure from Egypt was carefully 19

THEWAFD

timed to avoid Wingate’s arrival on the twenty-seventh. Wingate was greeted at the railway station by Ahmad Dhu al-Faqar (Zulficar), Head of Ceremonies, and a crowd of cheering Egyptians. Although Wingate did not formally receive the King’s appointment as High Commissioner until January, he promptly took control, sending his estimation of the current situation to the Foreign Office. This report was termed ‘satisfactory’ [33] by the officials in London, who, for the most part, relaxed and congratulated themselves on finding such an able man for the Cairo job. In retrospect, it seems likely that Wingate’s failure to visit London before taking up his responsibilities in Cairo created a further gap between himself and the men in power. The Asquith government, with which Wingate had had close ties, fell in December 1916 and was replaced by the Lloyd George Cabinet which knew little of Wingate. Had Wingate gone to London before Cairo, he could have become acquainted with the new Cabinet members, and, more importantly, informed them of his plans for Egypt. Time and again in British politics, the personal relation­ ships between the key official in Egypt and the men in the Foreign Office and the Cabinet were to be crucial. The High Commissioner who had good lines of personal communication with the top British officials was always more likely to secure his demands. Following his arrival in Cairo, Wingate held a series of interviews with Egyptian governors and important notables, all of whom greeted him favorably. Storrs remarked that Wingate was agreeable and that the “ Egyptians and even the English are almost demonstrative in their satisfaction.’’ [34] By the end of January, Storrs had decided that Wingate knew a great deal about local issues, but lacked the sophistication and comprehension needed to deal with politics in London. Again, this underlined Wingate’s political isolation which was later to make it difficult for him to explain the nature of Egyptian nationalism to the men in London who had predetermined that Egyptian nationalists could be easily curbed. With regard to his dealings with Egyptians, Storrs noted that Wingate’s reception technique was “ beyond praise’’, [35] and that when issues were presented he quickly made and effected decisions. From the Egyptian viewpoint Wingate’s arrival was greeted with enthusiasm; he made an auspicious beginning by listening to their opinions. The British were impressed by his hard work which contrasted pleasantly to 20

EGYPT UNDER BRITISH DOMINATION

McMahon’s more indolent pattern. Essentially, Wingate had a threefold responsibility. First, he had to implement the War effort; this entailed facilitating co-operation between the civilian and military officials, while maintaining the efficiency of the Egyptian government. In conjunction with this he was largely accountable for the direction of the Arab revolt in the Hijaz, over which Wingate had been appointed Military and Political Commander. Finally, he had to ensure that the relations between Foreign Office officials and those in Egypt remained cordial. Simultaneously, he was to make suggestions and advise London on all Egyptian matters. Notes 1. For more on British and local administrative organization see: Memorandum to the Residency written by Milne Cheetham, Head of the Chancery. It is undated, but was probably written in December 1916, SA151/11; J.I. Craig. “The Census of Egypt” . L'Egypte Contemporaine (1917), pp.221-22; Robert Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt (1882-1914) (Princeton, 1966) in which the role of the ‘Umda is discussed, pp.208-13; Somers Garke, “ The Unrest in Egypt: Part II. Tales of the Omdeh” , MP165. Also see: J.N.D. Anderson, “ Law Reform in Egypt: 1850-1950” , Political and Social Change in Modem Egypt, ed. P.M. Holt (London, 1968), pp.212-18; Malcolm McDwraith. “ Egyptian Nationalism” , Edinburgh Review (July, 1919), pp.60-77. 2. For a fuller analysis of the centrality of Suez in British foreign policy see: Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher, with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians (London, 1961). 3. Wingate to Slatin Pasha (Rowdy), March 23, 1910, SA431/11. Gorst’s regime is discussed by Peter Mellini, Imperial Policy and Egyptian Nationalism (19071914), PhD dissertation, Stanford University. 4. Palmerston to Lord Cowley, November 24, 1859; Evelyn Ashley, The Life and Correspondence o f Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, Vol. II (London, 1879), p.338. 5. Sidney Low, Egypt in Transition (London, 1914); Alfred Milner, England in Egypt (11th ed., London, 1904). 6. Kitchener to Grey. May 23, 1914, CAB11/77. Original destroyed November 23.1923. 7. Grey to Cheetham, November 1, 1914, FO407/183. Milne Cheetham was Counsellor to the Agency under Kitchener and Head of Chancery and Acting High Commissioner in Kitchener's absence after 1914. After 1919 he was assigned to the Foreign Office in London and later served in the Paris Embassy. 8. FO407/183. The text was published in Le Journal Officiel, December 18, 1914. 9. al-Ahram, March 18, 1927. This interview with Rushdi contains copies of the letters written by Husayn and Rushdi concerning the Protectorate and deposition of Khedive 'Abbas. It also deals at length with Husayn's acceptance of the throne left vacant by ‘Abbas’s deposition. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Hayati / (Cairo, n.d.), pp. 163-67. Ronald Storrs became Oriental Secretary in 1907; he was Military Governor of Jerusalem from 1917-1920.

21

THE WAFD >0. HP, Vol.93 (1915); Vol.92 (1911). 11. Director-General of Public Health Department, report to High Commissioner, July 3, 1918. R.W. Ford, Surgeon-General Department, to Semple, March 26, 1918. General John Maxwell served in 1882 as ADC for General Wolseley, was Commander of British troops in Egypt from 1908-1919, served in Ireland from 1916 to 1918, and accompanied the Milner Mission to Egypt in 1919. 12. McMahon to Hardinge, January 6, 1916; January 31, 1916, HP. Vol.72 (1916). On February 29, 1916, one member in the House of Commons asked if there were 117 generals in Egypt. The government’s reply did not give an exact figure. Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), LXXX (1910), 872. 13. Wingate to Clayton, February 11,1916, SA470. Graham to Hardinge, March 1, 1916, HP Vol.72 (1916). 14. Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Lords), XVIII (1915), 240. 15. HP, Vol IV (25), 1916; SA160/1. 16. Graham to Hardinge, July 20, 1916, HP. Vol.II (23), 1916. This is in response to Hardinge’s undated letter which was probably written in the middle of July, HP, Vol.l (22), 1916. Yl.lbid. 18. Hardinge to Graham, n.d. HP: Vol. 1 (22), 1916. 19. Graham to Hardinge. July 25,1916. HP. Vol.II (23). 1916. 20. Wingate to Gayton, September 13,1916, SA236/5. 21. Graham to Hardinge, September 9,1916, HP. Vol. IV (25), 1916. 22 .Ibid. 23. McMahon to Hardinge, September 25.1916, HP. Vol.IV(25), 1916. 24. Graham to Hardinge, September 9,1916, HP. Vol. IV (25), 1916: The Egyptian Gazette, September 28,1916. 25. Grey to Wingate, October 11,1916, SA160/4. 26. Gayton to Wingate, November 6,1916, SA160/5/1. 27. McMahon to Hardinge, November 10, 1916, HP, Vol. VI (27), 1916; Also see: Mervyn Herbert diary PPC October 13, 1916, HP. Vol. V (26); Lloyd George Papers. E3/12/1. 28. The Times, November 11,1916. 29. W.D. Kenny, British aide-de-camp to the Sultan, to Wingate, December 4, 1916, SA760/6. 30. Sultan Husayn to Wingate, November 23,1916, SA153/7. 31. Wingate’s note on the interview, held on December 21,1916, SA227. 32. Stewart Symes acted as A.D.C. to the Sirdar and had been Assistant Director of Intelligence in the Sudan. He was Governor of the Northern District in Palestine from 1920-1925, and later became Governor-General of the Sudan. Alexander Keown-Boyd served in the Sudan civil service from 1907 and was Wingate’s private secretary from 1917. He became Director-General for Foreign Affairs in Egypt in 1922, serving as an important power behind the scenes until 1937. B. Patterson was Wingate’s stenographer. 33. Wingate to Foreign Office, January 24, 1917, F0371/2926; Hardinge to Wingate, January 2,1917, SA163. 34. Storrs to Nina Cust, January 18,1917, Storrs Papers, Vol. II/4. 35. Note by an English Gvil Servant on the situation, January 31, 1917, Storrs Papers, Vol. n /4 .

22

2

ANGL0-EGYPT1AN ADMINISTRATION DURING WORLD WAR I To comprehend the origins and development of the Wafd it is first necessary to trace the progression of events in Egypt during the First World War for the war wrought profound changes in the economic and social life in Egypt. Every Egyptian was affected by the War which was generally perceived as a giant conflict among European nations. World War II would have similar impacts with remarkably parallel results. From the British viewpoint the main consideration during both wars was to win — all Egyptian sensibilities were to be minimized in face of the vastly more important task of marshaling energies for the wartime effort. As a consequence, Anglo-Egyptian officials faced two series of domestic problems during the wars: those related to the imple­ mentation of military demands, and those of an administrative nature which focused on the Sultan and his ministers. The first of these problems involved military demands for men, materials and money. The Labour Corps Before heavy troop movements began in the Middle East, the demands placed upon Egypt were minimal. The Labour Corps consisted of volunteers while only a few buildings, which were converted into hospitals and way-stations for soldiers going to the Balkan battlefields or for the wounded from Gallipoli, were requisitioned. But, as the War continued, British demands upon Egypt increased. The administration was forced to meet these military demands regardless of Egyptian opposition. As obtaining results for the ever expanding Labour Corps grew more difficult, a system of forced enlistment was initiated. At 23

THEWAFD

first, the Labour Corps was composed mostly of Sa'idis (men from Upper Egypt); they, however, refused to enlist for more than three months, and would not re-enlist until their savings had been depleted. Upon enlistment the volunteers were given an advance of £3. They were fairly well fed and received four to five piasters a day. The recruits worked on the Canal, in railway construction, and at the evacuation of Gallipoli, where their manual labor released soldiers for duty on the battlefront. By 1915, casualties among the Labour Corps were by “ no means rare” . [1] When the number of Sa'idi recruits dropped, British officials found it difficult to secure replacements, for the Egyptian population traditionally feared duty in the army which formerly had taken soldiers for an unlimited time. Then, too, the average Egyptian saw no reason why he should fight in a war which was a battle among foreigners and which had little relevance to Egypt. When the military, in 1917, kept some of the recruits over the agreed three-month limit, popular resistance became more pronounced. As an incentive, the army offered a bounty of 100 piasters, but this was only given after a six-month tour, and only to the more skilled laborers. Some others received 50 piasters, but they were a distinct minority. After Wingate questioned the value of rewards which were used so sparingly, the system was gradually terminated. When the bounty system proved inadequate other methods were considered. In 1916 the Labour Corps numbered around 2,973, while in 1917 it totalled 89,852. Of the latter figure, about 63,500 were stationed in Egypt and Palestine, and 16,234 in France, Mesopotamia, and Salonica. [2] The administration of the Corps was divided between the Egyptian and Palestinian sectors, with each having its own leadership. In order to deal with the increased needs in the most efficacious manner, Wingate organized a committee to study the problem and to report new. methods for obtaining recruits. From the Foreign Office, Graham opined that a direct appeal to the Sultan would have been more beneficial. Robert Cecil disagreed, doubting that an appeal to the Sultan’s loyalty for the British Empire would have much effect. Because it was awkward for the British to ask continually for recruits, Wingate wanted the Egyptian ministers to take the initiative. The committee reported that it would be unwise to repeat the 1914 Proclamation declaring that Great Britain would undertake the 24

ANGLO- EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION DURING WORLD WAR I

protection of Egypt during the War without Egyptian assistance. The British perennially wanted to maintain their military presence in Egypt, but whenever possible preferred that the Egyptians bear the financial burdens of that presence. In subsequent negotiations the Egyptians would steadfastly oppose the British military presence which was in fact a thinly veiled form of occupation. The British therefore concluded that there were few advantages to be gained from extending the period of enlistment or in lower­ ing the pay scale for the Labour Corps; indeed, the committee traced the low Egyptian volunteer rate to general prosperity, lack of loyalty to the British, and a hereditary mistrust of the army. To counteract these factors, the British recommended that Egyptian ministers and notables launch a campaign to increase the volunteer rate. [3] The Foreign Office officials were distressed because they felt that Egyptians were not doing their part to aid the Allies. After conferring with Rushdi and others, Wingate decided to raise the pay of the laborers by three to four piasters, the cost of which was to be borne by the Egyptian government — not the British — and to exempt volunteers from military service and the ghafir tax which was levied on Egyptians to pay for police protection. A propaganda program was introduced, while provincial officials were ordered to stimulate recruitment as best they could. Because the army felt that the laborers received sufficient pay, and the proposed increase would bring the Egyptian on a par with the British soldier, the increase was rejected. British officials did not want Egyptian workers to receive the same payment as British soldiers, but they rationalized their objections by pointing out that increased pay would mean increased savings, which would result in a decreased re-enlistment rate. Mudirs and notables exerted pressure in order to obtain volunteers, until May 1918, when Allenby demanded additional laborers to help in the military offensive in Palestine. Recognizing the difficulties this created, Allenby noted that a revival of the corvée system was probably the only means of securing the necessary workers. Allenby remarked that he was against compulsion, but that they were ‘‘between the Devil and the Deep Sea, and I don't know how to avoid it.” [4] Rushdi and the Sultan both opposed the institution of conscription, arguing that the 25

THE WAFD

number of recruits had dropped owing to the harvest and the casualties suffered among the workers. The proposed pay increase was again rejected, this time on the grounds that the country was too prosperous for the people to be swayed by such an induce­ ment! The idea that Chinese might be imported for the work was discarded because of transportation problems and the likelihood of racial difficulties. In the absence of any other solution, Wingate agreed to the requisition of labor from the villages “ on a sort of corvée system” [5] through the mudirs, ma'mirs, and ‘umdas. The Sultan and his ministers were informed of the decision and “ asked” to agree. To the British the system of a limited corvée seemed the only way to secure the needed workers without recourse to new laws. After the Sultan and the ministers (who had little choice but to agree) assented, Wingate told Haines to inform the Provincial Inspectors of the new system. Haines told the Inspectors that the village officials were to effectuate the limited corvée immediately, and that the ‘umdas were to obtain the expected number of recruits from each village; these recruits were taken to the markaz where they were collected and transported to the battlefield. To limit injustices, which were bound to occur from this veiled conscription, the ‘umdas were warned that discrimination in gathering recruits would be punished. Although the corvée increased the number of recruits, not surprisingly it had an adverse effect on Egyptians. The new system was reported­ ly worse than the old corvée and matters were particularly serious at harvest time when the lack of workers in the fields was a serious problem. [6] The Foreign Office disliked reports that the corvée would cause Egyptian criticism, but was not in a position to refuse military demands. The Sultan continued to oppose the corvée and the unfair methods utilized by the local officials. Rushdi attempted to placate Husayn, but the complaints continued. As a last resort, Haines suggested that criminals and “ roughs” [7] be employed. Believing these elements physically and mentally inferior, Allenby firmly rejected this proposal. Consequently, the corvée continued. By August 1918, the recruitment of “ compulsion by persuasion” [8] had swelled the Labour Corps to 123,035. Although complaints were supposedly systematically investigated, abuses arose because of over-zealous local officials and because the system itself entailed forced enlistment. 26

ANGLO- EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION DURING WORLD WAR I

When the War ended, Wingate quickly asked Allenby to release the men in the Labour Corps and to cease recruiting. Allenby, under pressure to maintain railway construction and surveillance, was unable to grant this request. In fact, he anticipated that Egyptian workers would be needed for months after the War. Although he recognized the danger of prolonging a system which aggravated the Egyptians, Wingate could do nothing to stop it. Evidence of the mounting opposition to recruitment became apparent when several mudirs were injured while trying to obtain “ volunteers” . Egyptian grievances were also multiplied by the shortage of foodstuffs caused by other military requisitioning. Demands for Military Materials To feed the soldiers stationed in Egypt and Palestine, military officers were forced to collect grain and other essentials from Egyptian and Sudanese farmers. The effect of these collections upon the Egyptian economy is closely related to the economic repercussions of the War. Egypt’s main crop was cotton, a commodity in wide demand during wartime. Thus, Egyptian cotton growers and merchants were in a position to gain consider­ able profits from the increased sales. With the exception of a brief interlude directly after the War began, when the cotton market experienced a moment of panic, which the British halted by guaranteeing the 1914 crop, cotton prices steadily rose throughout the war. [9] Rising prices encouraged cotton growers to extend their acreage of cotton which, of course, decreased the amount of land devoted to the cultivation of cereals. As the army demanded more and more cereals, British officials in Egypt were forced to limit by law the amount of land which could be planted in cotton. In 1914 a decree was passed limiting the amount of cotton grown in basin-irrigated areas and in Upper Egypt. In effect, this cut cotton cultivation to about one-third of the total crops grown in Egypt in 1915, in place of 77% in 1914. [10] After the production of cotton rose in 1916, Wingate had to balance the rising cotton cultivation with army demands for more cereals. Limiting the area devoted to cotton was difficult since the buyers in Lancashire wanted a ready supply of cotton at the lowest possible prices, and once the area planted in cotton diminished, prices naturally rose. Although crops of barley, wheat and sugar27

THEWAFD

cane were reported to be above average in 1917, in August, British officials declared another reduction in the amount of land under cultivation for cotton. The decree prohibited landlords and tenants from growing cotton on more than one-third of their land. Owing to this law only 1,315,572 feddans were cultivated in cotton in 1918 as compared to 1,755,000 feddans out of a cultivated area of 5,023,000 feddans in 1914. [11] To enforce this law, the Cotton Seed Control Board, consisting of five British members, was established. The Board set prices and arranged for the purchase and shipping of cotton for the British government. Wingate was praised for initiating these controls which were clearly directed toward satisfying British economic needs not Egyptian ones. Both the Sultan and Rushdi expressed concern over the effect that the enforced prohibition of cotton cultivation would have upon Egypt. They wanted to know why the army demands for cereals were so high, and warned that, if the price of cotton dropped, there was a possibility of a revolt. Wingate replied that the decision to plant cereals rather than cotton had been taken to eliminate the necessity of importing food-stuffs, which had occurred prior to the War. [12] The army estimated that it would need 37,000 tons of barley, 11,500 tons of wheat, and 500 tons of beans a month for 1918. This meant that Egypt would have a deficit of about 200,000 tons of cereal because it could not supply the needs of both the military and the local inhabitants. [13] The British hoped that cereal would be above average, so that the deficit would not be too great, as it was impossible — owing to political considerations — to lower cotton cultivation below one third the total cultivated area. Egypt had to provide the cereals for the military, although rising prices and eventual shortages in the native markets indicated an in­ sufficient supply of foodstuffs. The Egyptians were forced to pay these increases and also suffered from the shortages. The Cotton Control Commission was created in 1918 to prevent undue inflation of prices. This Commission was ordered to buy all the 1918 cotton crop; although growers were supposedly not compelled to sell to the Commission, no other export licences were granted. As a result, the Commission was able to set prices for all buying and selling. The profit made by the Commission, after world prices exceeded the estimates, was eventually returned to the Egyptian government. No British civil servant sat on the 28

ANGLO- EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION DURING WORLD WAR I

Commission, which was administered by leading businessmen, bankers, and cotton-growers. The government kept a close watch on the Commission, but did not participate directly. The Com­ mission is yet another example of the closer government control in commercial activity which was precipitated by the War. The government also took several steps to control or to regulate three aspects of Egyptian economic life during the War: measures of control were exercised in supply requisition, banking, and price maintenance. Through the Supplies Control Board, the govern­ ment attempted to facilitate the collection of cereals for the army and to control rising prices. This Board was created under the leadership of British officials in September 1917. Owing to the traditional governmental hesitancy to become involved in structur­ ing the economy, the Supplies Control Board was not created until the composition of imports and exports had already substantially altered. Because of the war, imports from the Central powers and Turkey, from whom Egypt had formerly received large quantities of goods, were stopped. In most cases, these goods were replaced by similar products from Great Britain or her colonies, but there is evidence that at least a few products ceased to be imported and were manufactured in Egypt. [141 Census returns from 1917 reveal that native manufacture, especially of textiles, expanded during the War. This expansion took place without the encourage­ ment of the British administration, which did not wish to rush industrialization in Egypt, since it might decrease British imports. British officials were willing to participate only in those facets of the economic system which directly affected Egypt’s wartime contributions, but preferred Egypt to import manufactured goods from Great Britain or the colonies on the classical model of colonial dependence on the mother country. Government reluctance to adopt methods to deal with rising prices is another indication of British determination not to become active participants in the private sector of the economy. Then, too, British officials had little experience with the effects of wartime demands upon prices, and were, therefore, uncertain of the most efficient manner with which to deal with the problems. The presence of numerous Allied troops in Egypt not only caused a change in the structure of importation, but also increased demands for foodstuffs and other necessities. With greater demand and scarcity, the prices of goods, especially of fuel 29

THEWAFD

] roducts and staple foods, rose alarmingly. Although the British press contended that price increases only affected Europeans living in Egypt, a glance at the actual price rises gives a contrast­ ing picture. Using the price index of 100 as the level of prices in 1914, the price of bread in 1915 was 97; this rose to 203 in 1917. Likewise, the price of petrol rose from 122 in 1915 to 209 in 1917. Even after prices of wheat and other foodstuffs were fixed in 1918, they were still approximately double the pre-war figures. [15] The Supplies Control Board endeavoured to enforce fixed prices, but with war­ time demands, hoarding, and the black market, this was a difficult task. Newspapers noted that the prosperity of Egypt was more apparent than real. By 1918, the cost of foodstuffs had reached crisis proportions. James Craig, Head of the Control Board, recommended the creation of wage-control boards in each town to adjust wages to the rising prices, and to exercise the fullest possible control on price levels. He warned that unless these solutions were immediately realized, British officials could expect an “ Insurrection in Egypt in the next twelve months.” [16] Craig’s suggestions were handed to Brunyate who vetoed them. When Wingate heard of the veto he blandly remarked that he trusted the Minister of Interior was prepared to deal with any disturbances in the towns caused by the shortage of breadstuffs. In the face of official determination to ignore the realities, Craig resigned. He was replaced by Morton (Ross) Taylor, who knew little about supply controls, bgt, after being on the job only a short time, also warned that trouble was inevitable. Meanwhile the Egyptian press persistently complained of the failure to control prices and of the fuel scarcities. Similar problems would arise during the Second World War. By permitting the more conservative British civil servants, particularly Brunyate, a free hand in dealing with the rising prices and scarcities, Wingate prevented the creation of organizations which might have dealt with the problems. It also became apparent that the Minister of Interior was not prepared to deal with disturbances arising from these disruptive ëvents. These factors played a crucial role in the support that the Nationalist movement gained in the countryside during 1918 and 1919. Although British control of prices and supplies in Egypt was half-hearted at best, the officials were prompt to act in order to 30

ANGLO- EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION DURING WORLD WAR I

ensure an adequate supply of bank notes for cotton purchases. Beginning in August 1914, the government agreed to a bank note issue which allowed for an increase in the money in circulation without the movement of gold, the transfer of which was severely restricted as a consequence of the War. In 1916, when the notes could no longer be covered by gold reserves in London or Egypt, they were covered by British Treasury Bills, which tied the British and Egyptian monetary systems even more closely than previous­ ly. The note issue of 1919 totalled £E39,900,000, with the bulk of the cover in British Treasury Bills; the total issue reached £E75,000,000 with only £E3,330,000 covered in gold. [17] This note issue established the exchange with Great Britain and made more economical use of gold, which, by the end of the War, was indeed a scarce commodity. However, the concomitant effect of the issue was to deflate the currency value, thus exposing it to an unlimited depreciation which contributed to an inflationary spiral. Owing to the exigencies of the War upon the monetary system and upon Egyptian resources, expenditures were to increase after the War. This forced the administration to use some of the Reserve Fund, then valued at seven million pounds. The Financial Adviser urged that the administration not begin new projects which entailed large capital output until stability had been re­ established. This advice was, of course, typical of pre-Keynesian economics, and in keeping with the traditionally conservative British approach to the economies of their colonies. After Cecil, the former Adviser to the Minister of Finance, left, Brunyate acting as Adviser carried on these conservative policies. It is not surprising that the advisers acted in such a manner, because they wished to maintain steady economic progress in Egypt, while avoiding all unnecessary debts and expenditures. When the War intensified the monetary demands placed upon Egypt, the advisers retrenched and refused to accept expenditures which were not deemed vital to the economy. Wartime demands were not only placed upon Egyptian resources, but also took the form of requests for monetary gifts from the government and private individuals. Direct Monetary Contributions The Red Cross campaigns were among the major appeals for Individual contributions. The campaigns were initiated in 1915 and 31

THEWAFD

continued until the Armistice. They were generally spearheaded by the wives of the British civil servants, who were all deeply committed to gathering as much money as possible. Wingate worked earnestly for these drives and proudly reported that by the end of the War, Egypt and the Sudan had given £E400,000. [18] This money had been collected among Egyptians, who were less interested in the Red Cross than the Europeans, who were generally more willing to donate. In their enthusiasm to please British officials the mudirs and ‘umdas often misused their authority in order to force Egyptians into giving to the Red Cross, an organization which benefitted Allied soldiers, and had a purely European administration — to say nothing of its Christian symbol­ ism. One 'umda when asked if all the donors had given willingly replied, “ Willingly! Every milleme was wrung from them by force!” [191 The Egyptian government also made monetary contributions towards the War effort. Brunyate estimated in 1918 that Egypt had given £E3,000,000 in gifts, lower railway rates, and decreased import taxes. This was in addition to the £E70,000 which had been earmarked for the Darfur expedition. [20] The War Office, which only took into account those amounts given in hard currency, not contributions like those provided to the Arab revolt or in intangibles like lower railway fees, deprecated the Egyptian contributions. When the War Office contrasted Egypt’s contri­ butions with the £100 million given by India, it concluded that Egypt was not doing her part. In justification, Graham noted that India had 35 times the population of Egypt, and that owing to the Capitulations, Egypt could not levy new taxes in order to secure a larger proportion of the wealth enjoyed by the landowners, merchants, and businessmen. The Capitulations system was constantly under consideration by the British who were eager to abolish it. A committee, with Brunyate as Chairman, was created in 1917 to investigate the system; one year later, after meeting 75 times, the committee issued its report. The desire to eliminate the Capitulations irritated foreign and religious communities in Egypt, as they were the primary benefactors of the system. Wingate and his colleagues warmly supported abolishing the Capitulations, which limited British freedom, and restricted a more equitable taxation policy. Various foreign residents in Egypt wrote against the abolition of 32

ANGLO- EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION DURING WORLD WAR I

the system, but their grievances were not seriously considered. In hopes of gaining some support from these groups, the Egyptian nationalists temporized over abolishing the Capitulations, later they even opposed abolishing the system. The matter, like so many others, was finally deferred for decision until after the War. /

Egypt and the Arab Revolt Finally, the Egyptians became unwitting economic supporters of the Arab revolt. The story of the Arab revolt and the negotiations which preceded it are both well known and widely debated. For this reason, only a brief examination of the political-military situation as it related to Egypt will be given here. [21] It suffices to note that, in addition to the tasks of Egyptian administration, the High Commissioner also had the responsibility of overseeing the operation of the Arab revolt. Before the War broke out, the British had been in contact with Sharif Husayn of Mecca through his son ‘Abd Allah. Although Kitchener was highly sympathetic toward an alliance of the British and the Arabs against the Ottoman empire, he stopped short of a settlement with ‘Abd Allah, but told him that the lines of communication should be kept open for further negotiations. When the War began the British were eager to encourage an Arab revolt which would contribute to the defeat of the Turkish forces and lessen the amount of Turkish assistance on the more important Western fronts. It was also widely held that an Arab revolt could be an effective deterrent against PanIslamism, which had been propagandized by the Turks. While McMahon was High Commissioner, the British and Sharif Husayn exchanged a series of letters concerning the mutually acceptable terms for an alliance. Sharif Husayn envis­ aged an independent Arab nation stretching from the Mediter­ ranean, to the Persian Gulf, to the Red Sea, under his leadership. While willing to accept an independent Arab nation in Saudi Arabia, the British had imperial interests of their own in Iraq and Palestine, and recognized similar French interests in Lebanon and Syria. The negotiations were further complicated by the necessity of forwarding all of the correspondence to London for decisions, by translation problems, and by the inefficient means of mail delivery in wartime. In spite of these difficulties, the two parties eventually came to an agreement based on the formulation — used 33

THE WAFD

by Kissinger in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war — of “ ambiguity and flexibility of interpretation” , which permitted the sides to unite their efforts and settle their differences over the boundaries after the Armistice. To no one’s surprise this ultimately created a tremendous amount of conflict and mutual recrimination. The Arab revolt began on June 9, 1916. The Sharif unilaterally declared himself King of the Hijaz and of the Arab nation on October 29. 1916, but the British, who were astounded by his declaration, only recognized his title as King of the Hijaz. McMahon remarked that the Sharif had been presumptuous to call himself King of the Hijaz, but that “to call himself King of the Arab Nation, before he had even got the Hedjaz, is absurd.” [22] By December 1916, the Arab forces led by the Sharif’s sons, ‘Abd Allah. Faysal, and ‘Ali, had captured Mecca, Yanbu’, Rabegh, and Ta’if, but Turkish forces remained in Medina and in control of the Hijaz railway. British military authorities were faced with the problem of whether or not to deploy Arab troops in the north in order to harass Turkish positions and keep its troops occupied. When Wingate became High Commissioner he was already military commander over the revolt, a position he had received early in October 1916. Consequently, Wingate’s most immediate concern when he reached Cairo was the dispatch of British or other European troops into the Hijaz. Early in December, Turkish forces had intersected lines of communications between Rabegh and Yanbu’ and threatened to take Rabegh. Without reinforcements Arab troops were not expected to withstand a full scale Turkish offensive. Acting on Wingate’s advice the War Cabinet had decided not to send British troops unless an emergency arose. On December 15. this decision was reversed, and Wingate was told that he could send a British brigade from Suez. Balfour also announced that if the revolt collapsed, owing to the lack of soldiers, the fault would be the Sharif’s since he refused aid which the British were willing to supply. [23] After a great deal of waver­ ing. the Sharif refused to accept the presence of European and non-Muslim troops in the Hijaz as their presence-would offend religious sensibilities. Although Muslim Senegalese troops were offered, they ultimately could not be transferred because they were occupied in subduing a tribal uprising near Jibouti. Wingate’s dual role as a civilian administrator and military 34

ANGLO- EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION DURING WORLD WAR I

commander also caused some confusion in London where relations between the War Office and the Foreign Office were often strained. As the War continued, the duties increased in both offices, and neither could spare the time or personnel to develop a proper administration to direct the British who were involved with the Arab revolt. Meanwhile, in Cairo, Wingate remained pre­ occupied with the pressing problem of keeping the Sharif’s forces from defeat. Fortunately for those committed to the Arab revolt, the anticipated Turkish advance on Rabegh never materialized, and the British military commanders realized that the Turkish forces were in no position to launch offensives against Arab garrisons supported by the British navy in the Red Sea. With this fact in mind, the British began reconsidering military operations in the north. However, the possibility of military offensives into the north raised the issue of French and Arab claims in Syria. Since August 1916, Brémond and his French mission had been co-operating with the British in the Hijaz. The mission served to protect French interests which were theoretically assured by the Anglo-French Treaty of May 16, 1916. The contents of this treaty, commonly known as the Sykes-Picot agreement, had not been officially communicated to the Sharif by either the British or the French. There are, however, indications that the Sharif knew the terms of the treaty after Jamal Pasha’s speech in Beirut on December 6, 1917, describing the general contents of the treaty, which divided the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire into areas of interest between the French and the British. [24] British officials expressed concern lest clauses in the treaty conflict with the agreement reached with the Sharif in the Sharif Husayn-McMahon corres­ pondence, [25] but for the British, French interests in Syria were of principal concern whenever they formulated policy regarding Arab military operations. The situation was further clouded by British interests in Palestine, since the status of Palestine arose whenever the War Cabinet discussed the Middle East. Both the French interests in Syria and Zionist ambitions in Palestine were remarked in the Cabinet meeting of April 3, 1917. Lloyd George and Curzon stressed the fact that Great Britain should not be committed to any agreement which would prejudice her best interests after the War; both had plans for British imperial dominance over the entire Middle East although no 35

THEWAFD

definitive policy of implementation had been formulated. After the British entered into three agreements (the Sharif HusaynMcMahon correspondence, the Anglo-French agreement, and the Balfour Declaration) textually at cross purposes with one another, conflict arose out of the general sense of the agreements and the interpretation of them by the involved parties. Acting under this cover of ambiguity, the British government avoided clarifying the misunderstandings over the agreements. Officials believed that disagreements over boundaries could be settled after the war. Owing to this ambiguity, diplomats in Cairo had to function without clear instructions on policy. This lack of direct policy was difficult to explain, not only to the Sharif, but also to Egyptian officials who were naturally confused by conflicting British promises. Wingate attempted to explain this ambiguity to Sultan Husayn noting that the British initiation and support of the Sherifian movement was mainly a war measure, that we had illusions as to the difficulty — if not impossibility — of the Sherif being able to weld together all these heterogeneous Arab units, that we were attempting to create some Islamic modus vivendi which would take the place of the Turk when expelled from the Holy Places of Islam, and that we fully realised it was impossible that the Sherif would ever acquire such widespread authority in the Islamic world as to secure his election as Khalif . . . on the other hand I pointed out to him that nothing succeeds like success. [26] The Sultan had persistently raised the issue of the successor to the Caliphate and viewed the Sharif and his followers with suspicion, describing them as a 'canaille’ or mob and rabble. While Wingate was momentarily occupied with placating the Sultan’s fear about the growing power of the Sharif, Sykes resumed negotiations with the Sharif to resolve the confusion which had arisen over the boundaries in Syria. In May 1917, Sykes and Picot visited the Sharif in Jiddah "to discuss how best to set on a firm foundation the independence of the Arab races.*’ [27] This meeting was precipitated by the Bolshevik publication of the terms of the Anglo-French treaty and Jamal Pasha’s speech. The meeting ended in a deadlock, as the Sharif refused to 36

ANGLO- EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION DURING WORLD WAR I

concede any territory. To reinforce his demands, he threatened to resign, unless all the lands agreed to in the Sharif HusaynMcMahon correspondence were given to the Arabs. However, by May, it was reported that Faysal had agreed to accept a position of the French in Syria identical to that which the British held in Mesopotamia. The French and British had used the word “ Syria” vaguely, and the disparity over the territory to which this term referred persisted until Great Britain frankly told the Sharif the terms of their agreement with the French. While the negotiations over the boundaries were in progress, Murray made a second attempt to take Gaza and to move into Palestine. After this offensive failed, General Allenby replaced Murray in June 1917. Whereas Murray had declined to support Faysal’s advance into the north, Allenby promptly realized the military potential of the Arab forces and gave them every encour­ agement. Operations in the north were therefore initiated, and in early July 1917, the Arabs took ‘Aqaba. Under the direction of a few trained British officers, the Arabs began to launch a series of attacks against the Hijaz railway and, in general, to harass Turkish transport. Following the victory of ‘Aqaba, T.E. Lawrence returned to Jiddah, where he talked with the Sharif. During the conversation, it became evident, if it had not been so before, that the Sharif would not countenance French annexation of Beirut or Lebanon. He told Lawrence that “the Hedjaz and Syria are like the palm and fingers of one hand and I could not have consented to the ampu­ tation of any finger or part of a finger without leaving myself a cripple.” [28] In Lawrence's report of this conversation, he pointed out that the Sharif had mentioned that there were no written records of the May meeting with Sykes and Picot, and that, in general, written documents on the negotiations were scarce. While maintaining that Syria was to be independent, the Sharif refused to discuss boundaries on the grounds that the War was still in progress; he stated that any settlement would have to be modified according to the military state of affairs when peace was declared. After the taking of ‘Aqaba, the High Commissioner in Egypt lost control of the military aspects of the Arab revolt. As Allenby advanced into Palestine, Arab forces increasingly came under his command. Wingate remained in charge of a few operations in the 37

THEWAFD

Hijaz; this clear-cut division of command was agreeable to Wingate who had always held that military matters necessitated cne leader. With Arab support on his eastern flank, Allenby led his troops steadily northwards, taking Damascus in October *918. All the captured territory was placed under Allenby’s direction which disturbed the French who wanted a joint adminis­ tration. Since British troops far outnumbered the French, and British officers were largely in command, the French were in no position to pursue their demands. The areas of command were delineated between Allenby and Wingate in June 1918, under which terms Allenby commanded operations north of the ‘Aqaba-Tabuk line, and Wingate comman­ ded the area south of this line. After the summer of 1917, Wingate’s work was limited to providing the British subsidy for the Sharif and to mitigating the rivalries among the Arab tribes in the Hijaz. Briefly, four major Arab leaders operated within the Arabian Peninsula during World War I: Ibn Rashid, a pro-Turkish leader in the northeast; Ibn Su’ud in the Nejd; Imam Yahya in the Yemen; ‘and Sharif Husayn in the Hijaz. From time to time, the Sharif and the Imam squabbled over boundaries, but these disagreements were usually quickly settled. The most lasting and intense rivalry was the one between Ibn Su’ud and the Sharif. While British officials in Egypt supported the Sharif, the officials in India and Mesopotamia favored Ibn Su'ud, who, like the Sharif, had been receiving a monthly subsidy since 1916. The competition between Ibn Su’ud and the Sharif clearly portended trouble, for it was practically inevitable that they come to blows. Until the outbreak of hostilities over Khurma, a desert oasis over which both Ibn Su’ud and the Sharif attempted to extend their power, British officers had been fairly successful in preventing armed clashes, but in the summer of 1918, the Sharif tried to reassert his authority over Khurma, and was repulsed by Ibn Su'ud’s forces. The battles irked officials in Cairo who resented the fact that Ibn Su’ud had been receiving aid from the British government. While the Foreign Office agreed the rivalry between the Sharif and Ibn Su’ud was a problem, it also demanded that peace between the two rivals had to be kept at all costs. As the rivalry intensified, the Sharif became more demanding; he requested more money and equipment and adopted a more obdurate stand over the boundary issue in Syria. 38

ANGLO- EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION DURING WORLD WAR I

Thus, by September 1918, Wingate advocated that the British make a statement of policy in regard to the Arabs and the Sharif. He hoped that this would solve the problems of the Syrian boundaries and the Sharif-Ibn Su’ud rivalry. Owing to this constant friction, Sykes and Picot returned to the Middle East in November. It was widely held that they would have to devise a more realistic agreement, since *‘their original agreement will need much alteration if not complete scrapping.” [29] By the time their negotiations had begun, the Armistice had been signed and there was no settlement with regard to the persistent Middle East problems. The War had ended, and the British had not issued a policy statement. The rivalry between Ibn Su’ud and the Sharif continued and both received their monthly British subsidy. Officials in Cairo tended to think that the Sharif was strong enough to repulse an attack from Ibn Su’ud, but they were later proven mistaken. Finally, the British High Commissioner in Cairo had to obtain and deliver the monthly subsidy to the Sharif. This subsidy was originally £125,000, until raised to £200,000 with a promise to raise it to £225,000 for five months after Medina was captured. The latter was an incentive for the Arab forces to capture Medina which they never managed. The money bought supplies and paid for the tribesmen to fight. Because the Sharif only accepted payment in gold, the currency most widely used in the Hijaz, the British Treasury found it increasingly difficult to supply the subsidy. Owing to the War, the Treasury was under severe strain and attempted to control stringently the allowance to the Sharif. Wingate objected to the Treasury’s unwillingness to provide the subsidy, for he felt that the Arab revolt had saved Great Britain millions of pounds and lives. The Treasury viewed the revolt as a minor and rather expensive military action. After much debate, the Treasury agreed to supply the funds, but it was a “ wrench” [30] for it to make that decision. When the Treasury would not — or perhaps could not — supply the funds, the Foreign Office wired in the autumn of 1917 that Egypt would have to use its own gold reserve for the October payment, but that the subsidy for the following three months would come from London. By November, Wingate was requesting additional funds and recommended that the extra £25,000 previously reserved for the 39

THE WAFD

Sharif after the capture of Medina be given to him immediately and continued for five months. He argued: Moreover, it is desirable for political reasons that King Hussein should not bear the whole brunt of operations in the Maan area and North and thus secure a preponderating voice in regard to the future settlement of the Syrian problem. 1 therefore strongly urge that the Commander in Chief be empowered by the War Office to exceed the sum of £200,000 already granted for Arab operations in the North and to increase it up to a total of at least £500,000 should it be found necessary to do so. When money is required, it is required urgently and it is not possible to await specific approval without the danger of losing opportunity. [311 The Treasury was willing to agree to the increase provided it did not entail further dispatch of gold from London. As a result, the British empire was called upon to assist in the effort. Eventually an agreement was evolved with the Government in India, whereby the British agent in Jiddah could draw up to £12,000 a week covered in rupee drafts with a latitude for emergencies. After the Treasury had consented to the increase, Brunyate submitted a note complaining that the increase was to be drawn from the banks in Egypt. He pointed out that the funds in the National Bank of Egypt had, by law, been held as security for the noteholders, but that these had been drawn upon until the Bank’s gold reserve was reduced from three and three-quarter millions to £E675,000. Brunyate concluded that it was not equitable for the War Cabinet to authorize additional expenditure and then expect the funds to be found by the European banks. But the matter remained unsettled until the summer of 1918, while the law continued to be contravened. In July 1918, the Foreign Office reviewed the amount of finan­ cial aid the British government had given the Sharif since 1916. To July 25,1918, he had received £4,500,000 in gold. Of this amount, about £1,000,000 had been recovered at Jiddah, £3,000,000 consigned from Egypt (all without Egyptian consent!), and the balance of £500,000 consigned from the Imperial government. After reviewing these figures, the Foreign Office informed Cairo 40

ANGLO- EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION DURING WORLD WAR I

that the portion payable in gold would either have to be reduced or the amount recovered at Jiddah increased, because the supply of such large amounts of gold from the Treasury was impossible owing to spiralling wartime expenditures. Then, too, once the gold went to Arabia, the depreciation on it was high. [32] For payment of the August and September subsidy, Wingate used the £400,000 sent from Australia. When funds were insuf­ ficient because of the demands made by the troops in the north, the Egyptian Ministry of Finance was forced to ask the banks in Egypt for aid. Credit Lyonnais gave £100,000 and the Banco di Roma £30,000 in gold; the French provided 875,000 francs in gold. [331 The British were reluctant to accept French aid, but, owing to financial pressures, were forced to do so. Brunyate finally recommended that further assignments of gold for Faysal’s subsidy should be directly received by the military authorities. So long as gold was being drawn from the Issue Department of the National Bank of Egypt the intervention of the Financial Adviser or of his office in withdrawing the money was desired by the Bank and was probably a real convenience. As soon as that source was depleted, it became obvious that any gold sent to Egypt for such purposes was the property of His Majesty’s government . . . any advantage theretofore attaching to the intervention of the Financial Adviser appeared to me to disappear. [34] In September, Wingate submitted his report in which he stated that by July 3, the gold supply in Egypt had stood at only £4,175, but that following this date, £75,000 had arrived from Malta and £400,000 from Australia. Total payments to the Hijaz amounted to £552,900. Owing to the delayed arrival of the Australian shipment of gold, Wingate had — once again — borrowed from the Egyptian banks. Even after this sum had been repaid, the gold reserve in Egypt remained unsatisfactory. The matter was further compli­ cated by continued demands for money for the Arab forces operating under Allenby. Eventually, more payments from Britain and the Imperial government were forthcoming, and the subsidies owing to the Sharif and Faysal were met. By the end of December 1919, the subsidy to the Sharif totalled £2,521,335/2/2. [35] Of 41

THEW AFD

this amount, the Egyptian government was estimated to have contributed £23,057 as a gift. No mention was made of the highly irregular borrowing of gold reserves from the Egyptian Reserve Fund or from Egyptian banks. Nor does the sum include that which was lost in interest during the time that large withdrawals had been made from Egyptian reserves. Consequently, in a little publicized maneuver, the Egyptians — albeit unwittingly — were forced to contribute to the Arab revolt from which they gained no meaningful recompense. This anomalous situation arose because Britain needed additional funds to keep the Sharif’s forces going, and was willing to use practically any means in order to secure the necessary money. The British government also believed that the colonies or dependencies should help pull their weight in the war effort. Many of these people, including the Egyptians, had quite different thoughts on the subject. The Sultan and his Ministers These aforementioned economic and internal questions occurred simultaneously with the change of the Sultanate and movements to modify Egypt’s legal status vis-à-vis Great Britain. It is impossible to discuss the changes in the Sultanate envisaged by the British without noting their views on the establishment of a Protectorate or the direct annexation of Egypt. Wingate favored annexation even after the Protectorate had been declared. He persistently talked of annexation, and intensified his pressure for it when Sultan Husayn, who was known for his pro-British views, became ill. As Husayn’s health declined, the British were forced to look for a suitable successor. Prince Kamal ad-Din, Husayn’s son, and Prince Ahmad Fu’ad, son of the late Khedive Isma'il, were the favorites. Graham supported Fu’ad, who was anxious to become Sultan, in contrast to Kamal who had never manifested any interest in politics, but preferred sports and hunting. Initially, Wingate merely warned that the Egyptians expected more influence in governmental decisions in the future; because of these expectations Wingate urged the Foreign Office to consider the form British government in Egypt was to take after the War. He was, actually, pushing the government to conclude a long term policy in Egypt, while in reality most British policies were short term ones, or formulated in reaction to crises. 42

ANGLO- EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION DURING WORLD WAR 1

The presence of the military in Egypt added to the confusion which made it impossible to judge the extent to which government duties had been relegated to the army. General Murray contended that the civil administration had become relatively unimportant, as the military had taken over most of the key responsibilities under martial law. On the other hand, Brunyate maintained that the military could not survive in Egypt without the aid of the civilian administration. After hearing these comments, Graham advised against annexation and recommended the continuation of the civilian administration; he believed that after the War the Sultan would travel to London along with other “ better class Egyptians . . . to pay their respects to the Protectorate.” [36] This scenario was never to be produced, because after the War the Egyptians demanded independence, not more British paternalism. Obvious­ ly, when Graham predicted continued Egyptian support he thought the Egyptians would continued to function happily within the framework of the Protectorate. As events unraveled, precisely the opposite was to occur. The Foreign Office tended to oppose annexation because it wanted to retain the Egyptian administration under its own direction. Therefore, it fought against the transfer of the Egyptian government to the Colonial Office. In a round-robin argument, the men in the Foreign Office asserted that to place Egypt under the Colonial Office would imply annexation, and that annexation was impossible because it would be a breach of faith with the Egyptians. The contest between those who favored annexation and those who opposed it continued through the spring of 1917. Ultimately the scheme for annexation was again rejected. The Foreign Office had to face the task of choosing a successor to Sultan Husayn. Graham pushed forward the candidacy of Fu’ad arguing that it was better for him to fail as Sultan than for Britain to annex Egypt. According to Wingate, it was too early to judge whether the Protectorate was a success or failure, but that its implementation had been greatly facilitated by the presence of a markedly proBritish Sultan. Wingate predicted that after Husayn died the British would find it considerably more difficult to govern Egypt. [371 Because he feared the accession of a less pro-British Sultan. Wingate pushed for annexation. He did not feel that any of the Egyptian princes were suitable, whereas, if Egypt were 43

THE WAFD

annexed, the Sultanate would be abolished, thereby eliminating the necessity of further worry. After the Foreign Office decided that a new Sultan had to be selected, Wingate responded that Kamal was the best candidate. Kamal, a powerful landowner in the Delta, was generally respected, but he was not interested in becoming Sultan. In September 1917, as Sultan Husayn’s condition worsened, Isma‘il Sirri Pasha, Minister of Public Works, suggested Kamal as successor. Sultan Husayn also supported Kamal’s candidacy. Realizing that the Egyptians were not wholly lovai to Great Britain, Wingate was anxious that a pro-British Sultan be selected. However much we may pride ourselves on having regenerated Egypt, we must not blind ourselves to the fact that we are not popular, and that although the Egyptians would rather have us than the Turks to rule them, the influence exercised by religious and racial affinity are such strong factors that nothing short of the practical blotting out of Turkey will ever make the Egyptians as a race really loyal to British rule. [381 For this reason, Wingate feared Fu’ad, who he suspected would not be easily managed. He also rejected Prince Omar Tusun as being pro-Turkish. Kamal was approached to become Sultan, but flatly rejected the offer, which was a relief to the Foreign Office. On October 8, Wingate had an interview with Fu’ad, who was asked at the time to become Sultan “ according to such order of succession as shall be established by agreement’’ [391 with Britain. Wingate stressed the importance of Fu’ad’s adopting a ‘wait and see’ policy, since immediate changes in the Cabinet or the Sultan’s aides were undesirable. Fu’ad accepted these conditions and the offer to become Sultan. Sultan Husayn died on October 9, and his son’s disclaimer, received the previous day, was published in Le Journal Officiel on October 10, along with the announcement of Fu’ad’s accession to the throne. Husayn was buried amid royal pomp and circumstance on October 10. Many, including Wingate, felt his loss deeply. On October 16, Fu’ad was officially recognized as Sultan by a public ceremony at which he delivered a speech drafted by Brunyate and edited by Wingate. Because neither Wingate nor the ministers were complacent over Fu’ad’s accession, they took every 44

ANGLO- EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION DURING WORLD WAR I

precaution to ascertain that he would be loyal. The apprehension over Fu’ad’s loyalty stemmed not only from his personality and education, but from the rumors that he wished to bring his personal entourage into the palace as aides and advisers. Fu’ad was the youngest son of Khedive Isma‘il, and had spent most of his youth in Italy where he had received a military education. He subsequently returned to Egypt where he was forced to watch the power exerted by his relatives in the Palace from afar. Fu’ad’s position was an awkward one because he was viewed with suspicion by Khedive ‘Abbas and by Sultan Husayn, both of whom felt that he had “ unseemly” ambitions to govern Egypt himself. Once on the throne Fu’ad was, almost from the beginning, to evidence his autocratic tendencies. He did not want Egypt to be a puppet for the British because he wished to be absolute ruler himself. Thus he also clashed with Zaghlul. Early Nationalist Demands The Egyptian ministers fretted lest Fu’ad’s followers should gain his complete support to the exclusion of the Cabinet. In hope of preventing such a development, Wingate tentatively suggested that one of Fu’ad’s private secretaries be British, and Rushdi was told to prevent any undesirable appointments. After Fu’ad became Sultan, Wingate heard that he planned to appoint Isma‘il Sidqi Pasha and ‘Amin Yahia Pasha to the Sultanic household staff. Sidqi had been Minister of Agriculture in 1913, held a law degree, had studied in France, and was noted for his rather outspoken views. He became Prime Minister in 1930. Yahia was a wealthy notable from Alexandria. Since both of these men were known for their nationalistic opinions, and Sidqi had previously been involved in a public scandal, Wingate opposed the appointments. Upon Wingate’s behest, Rushdi persuaded Fu’ad to forgo the appointments. This was the first indication that Fu’ad was neither as pliable, nor as amenable to British control, as Husayn had been. Fu’ad made his future intentions quite clear when Edwin Montagu, a member of the British Cabinet, visited Egypt in 1917. At a breakfast party, Fu’ad remarked that Egypt was England’s friend and she had only to grant its “ national aspirations” . [40] When Montagu pretended not to understand, Fu’ad repeated his demand three times. Finally. Montagu asked what national 45

THE WAFD

aspirations the Egyptians had. Fu’ad turned to Rushdi, and the two men replied: “ We want autonomy.” [41] Rushdi then asked Montagu to inform the British government of this demand. Montagu duly reported the conversation, which was summarily dismissed by the British. This exchange reveals how far removed the British officials were from reality when they refused to accept the validity of Egyptian national aspirations, but persisted in their dated views that the nationalist leaders were only men with personal ambitions for power and wealth. Following Montagu’s visit, Fu’ad made another attempt to introduce more nationalists into the government. He proposed the appointments of Sa‘d Zaghlul as Minister of Agriculture, and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Fahmi as Minister of Waqfs (Awqaf) in place of Ahmad Hilmi and Ibrahim Fathi. Zaghlul had been Minister of Education in 1906, Vice President of the Legislative Assembly in 1913, and had married the daughter of the former Prime Minister, Mustafa Fahmi. His abilities had been praised by Cromer in his farewell address, but his nationalist bent was equally well known. Fahmi was a noted lawyer, a close friend of the intellectual Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, and of Zaghlul, and had been a member of the Legislative Assembly. Both Zaghlul and Fahmi were in the vanguard of Egyptian nationalism in 1918, and formed the key leadership for the Wafd. Although British officials realized that Fathi and Hilmi did not have the qualifications for their positions, they supported them because they were loyal to Britain. Fathi had survived an attempt on his life in 1915, and had been a personal appointee of Kitchener, while Hilmi was a longtime advocate of British policies. Zaghlul was highly recommended — even Sultan Husayn had urged he replace Sidqi in 1915 — while McMahon had remarked that Zaghlul had been passed over twice for a ministerial appointment. McMahon had cautioned that the time would arrive when it would be unwise to keep Zaghlul out of governing circles. However, Kitchener refused to accept Zaghlul’s appointment, and had recommended Fathi for the position. Thus, Fu’ad was acting on precedent when he recommended Zaghlul. Echoing McMahon’s warnings, Wingate wrote: . . . the older Ministers chosen by K. [Kitchener] are proBritish but hardly worth retaining due to counts against them . . . That the inclusion of Zaghlul and Fahmy will give 46

ANGLO- EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION DURING WORLD WAR I

the reconstituted Ministry a somewhat stronger Nationalistic tendency is undoubted, but on the other hand 1 am not altogether adverse to this. [42] Wingate pointed out that the two nominees were well qualified and honest. He added that it was preferable to have them inside government circles, and tacitly on the British side, than working for the opposition outside the government. Wingate was advocat­ ing co-opting potential opposition by including it in the govern­ ment. Because this recommendation followed previous reports about growing nationalist sentiments among the Egyptians, and because the inclusion of Fahmi and Zaghlul — two well known nationalists — would increase political activism among Egyptian officials, the Foreign Office opposed the nominations. Montagu had also warned that Fu’ad was easily led and was vulnerable to nationalist intrigues. He reported that Wingate was cognizant of Fu’ad’s weaknesses and had great influence with him, but that, at the same time, nationalist agitation within Egypt was likely. . . . it is quite clear to me that there are national aspirations and desires for autonomy in Egypt as there are in India, fomented by extremists but existing to a greater or less degree, nascent or vigorous, in the minds of many, many people in Egypt. I am certain — and I think Sir Reginald Wingate would agree with me — that this problem will have to be faced in Egypt in the future . . . But I must predict with confidence, nevertheless, that in the future, and in the not distant future, the spirit of nationalism, strengthened by the events of the War and based upon pride of country, will have to be considered in Egypt. The very separation of Egypt from Turkey, the very acknowledgement of the Egyptian country and nation will make this less remote than it would otherwise have been. [431 These words were to have portentous meaning only a year after Montagu wrote them. In December, the issue of new ministerial appointments was further complicated when Rushdi joined the opposition by advo­ cating Hilmi and Fathi be fired and replaced by Sa‘d Zaghlul and 47

THE WAFD

‘Abd al-‘Aziz Fahmi. He also urged a clear definition of British rights in Egypt and the diminution of ‘abusive’ British inter­ vention. In his report to Wingate, Rushdi pleaded for a division of control over Egyptian foreign affairs, which would permit Egyptians greater responsibility for their government. After receiving Rushdi’s report, Wingate reconsidered his advice to accept Zaghlul and Fahmi; whereas he had formerly supported their nominations, he ultimately decided that the nationalist trend was becoming too strong and had to be halted immediately. Rushdi Pasha’s programme involves a complete break with the past. The basis of our control of Egypt is the ‘advice’ of H.M.G. tendered when necessary through their local representatives and the British heads of Departments. He proposes to free the Egyptian Government from this control except in certain limited respects. The whole system of our Protectorate would in my view be endangered by any such change. To ensure our position and make good our pledges to Foreign Powers we should have to introduce safe-guards in the shape of defined powers of veto and direct executive control. [441 Graham belittled Wingate’s report, remarking that he over­ estimated Rushdi. Graham rejected Zaghlul’s appointment, since Great Britain could not dismiss known pro-British ministers for two “ avowed Nationalists’’. [45] As a result, Wingate was ordered to retain the Cabinet as then constituted. By the time the Foreign Office directive was received, the proposed appointments and Rushdi’s report had become common knowledge among Egyptian officials. Rushdi then had to apologize for his ‘untimely report’ which Wingate thought had been written in order to gauge how far the British would permit the Egyptians a free hand. In a letter to Hardinge, Wingate described Zaghlul as a mauvais coucheur, but stressed that Rushdi had definitely repented. Although the personal enmity between Fu’ad and Fathi continued, the problem was finally solved by Fathi’s accepting a leave of absence, which ultimately turned into a resignation. He was replaced by Ahmad Pasha Ziwar, a pro-British notable and an Advocate-General of the Native Courts. Because of his loyalty, Ziwar held a variety of Ministerial posts after 1917. After Ziwar’s

ANGLO- EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION DURING WORLD WAR I

appointment Wingate hoped that the matter was closed. Let us hope that — for the moment at any rate — we shall have no more advanced political programmes, though we must expect a very frank exposé of National aspirations when the war is over and the settlement has to be made on several pending questions. By that time, however, I hope that the deliberations of the Capitulations Commission will have considerably cleared the atmosphere and that decisions on debatable points will be facilitated. [46] Wingate had come to believe that Rushdi’s program was merely an attempt to conciliate the Nationalists who had been gaining adherents to “ re-open the Legislative Assembly on the return of peace.” [471 Since there were so few qualified Egyptians for ministerial posts, the capable nationalist leaders were in favorable positions to gain support and power. Graham countered that, in fact, there were more qualified Egyptians than there had been during Cromer’s regime. The thrust of Graham’s remarks seems to have been that since Cromer had been able to manage, why could Wingate not do the same? Ironically, at the very time Wingate was becoming more intran­ sigent against the nationalists, the Foreign Office was having second thoughts regarding the wisdom of leaving Zaghlul in the political wilderness. Stemming from the reconsideration Wingate was informed that the Foreign Office did not oppose Zaghlul’s inclusion in the Cabinet. While willing to compromise on Cabinet Ministers, the Foreign Office staunchly held that Fu’ad did not have the right to change ministers without the consent of the British. Leading British officials in Cairo, particularly Cheetham and Brunyate, were not willing to recommend Zaghlul, nor was Wingate about to accept the responsibility of Zaghlul’s appoint­ ment in the face of their opposition. While British officials were worried that Zaghlul, once in the Cabinet, would not be a willing lackey, they also recognized that he was potentially dangerous as long as he remained outside the governing circles. But no one was willing to take the chance on appointing him to a Ministerial post. During the spring of 1918, murmurings of nationalist discontent were heard. Since the key nationalist leaders were outside the 49

THE WAFD

government, it was hard for the British to exercise pressure, short of arrest or exile, in order to persuade the leaders to desist from their political activities. Even Fu’ad was suspected by the British of listening to nationalist grievances and of sympathizing with them. Thus, the embryo of nationalist support among leading Egyptians had been fully apparent one year before the Armistice. The strength of the nationalist movement evidenced in 1919 was largely dependent upon the amount of support it gained from the fellah (fellahin) and the educated classes, many of whom had been alienated or angered by wartime demands. These grievances were loudly voiced immediately after the Armistice was signed. Notes 1. Young. PPC, P.108. For a sketch of the harsh treatment occasionally received by the recruits see: Diaries of George H. Rose, Essex Record Office. 2. P.G. El good. Egypt and the Army (Oxford, 1924), p.108. The 1917 figure is from a Wingate letter to Milner, December 11, 1919, SA173/3/1. Elgood’s figure for 1917 is 55,592. Wingate broke down the statistics as follows: total native labourers, 47,385; camel transport corps, 20,000; horse transport, 3,200; remounts. 1,200; veterinary, 1,100; medicine, 1,000; Imperial Camel Corps, 280; police E.E.F., 935; Mesopotamia, 154-1,089; casual labour, 14,000. 3. Report of Committee on Recruitment, Wingate to Balfour, August 20, 1917, FO407/183. The committee was composed of: Brunyate, Haines, G. Macauley, General Manager of the Railroads; and several military officers. 4. Allenby to Wingate, May 1,1918, SA175/3/1. 5. Wingate to Allenby, May 6, 1918, SA175/3/1. Note on meeting. May 5, 1918, held at the Residency, SA175/3/1. 6. Note by Admiral Calthome, Naval Commander in the Mediterranean, May 26.1913, SA171/1; FO371/3202. 7. Haines to Wingate, August 2,1919, SA169/2/1. 8. Wingate to Milner, December 11, 1919, SA175/3/1. Harmsworth in Parliament on March 31,1919, reported that the highest number of men in the Corps at one time was 95,829. Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CXTV (1918), 853. 9. In July 1914 prices were quoted at £9.10 per pound and on March 23, 1916, at £11.13. Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), LXXXI (1916), 1526. In October 1914, the cotton crop was guaranteed to £E4,875,000, to be covered in Egyptian Treasury bills; by December the cover was £E2.35 millions. National Bank o f Egypt 1898-1948 (Cairo, 1948), p.40. 10. Wingate to Foreign Office, September 11,1917, SA165/3/1. 11. Wingate to Foreign Office, August 7, 1918, SA169/3/1. A feddan is 1.038 acres. 12. Sultan Husayn to Wingate, August 25, 1917, SA154/1. Great Britain, Cd. 7358 (1914). Reports by His Majesty’s Agent and Consul General, on the finances, administration, and condition of Egypt and the Soudan in 1913. 13. Wingate to Graham, August 30,1917, SA165/2/2; also see: Food Supply report, September 8,1917, SA165/3/1.

50

ANGLO- EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION DURING WORLD WAR I 14. The Import Trade o f Egypt (1912-1916), Cairo (1917). Egyptian imports in 1916 reached £E30,072,213. with £E15,010,231 coming from Great Britain. Goods from the British colonies made up the majority of the remainder. Mohammed A1 Rifaat. The Monetary System o f Egypt: An Inquiry into its History and Present Working (London, 1935). Rifaat states that in 1919, 46.0% of Egyptian imports came from the United Kingdom and 53.0% of its exports went to that country. Appendix II. 15. Wingate to Foreign Office, December 1, 1917, F0369/926. Rifaat placed the overall price index of 1917 at 176, at 211 in 1918, at 231 in 1919, and at 312 in 1920. Also see: The Times, April 8,1918. 16. Craig report, 1919, SA244/3. Actually the report is a recapitulation of Craig’s continual problems in securing acceptance for his plans. 17. L.G. Roussin, “ The Present Monetary Regime in Egypt” , trans. from French in L'Egypte Contemporaine (February, 1924), P.5, SA107/16, Great Britain, Cmd. 957 (1920), Reports by His Majesty’s High Commissioner on the finances, administration, and condition of Egypt and the Sudan, 1914-1919, no.7. Crouchley. p.204 rounds off the gold coverage to £E3,400,000. 18. Wingate report on Egyptian work for the Red Cross to Arthur Stanley (Red Cross director in London), June 30, 1918, SA166/1. This report lists the Cairo membership which was completely European. 19. Lt. Col. C.F. Ryder, intelligence report, April 23,1919, FO141/780. 20. Memorandum on the suspense account, February 25, 1918, F0371/3199 21. Narratives of the revolt are found in: The Arab Bulletin, published weekly in Cairo. SA206; Lawrence, Seven Pillars o f Wisdom (London. 1935). For an account of the negotiations prior to the revolt see: George Antonius, The Aral Awakening (London. 1938); the text of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence may be seen in: CAB21/154; Sulayman Musa (ed.), ATThawra aT'Arabiyva al-Kubra (Amman, 1966), and Amin Sa’id, ATThawra aT'Arabiyya (Cairo, n.d.). 22. McMahon to Hardinge, November 10,1916, HP. Vol. VI (27), 1916. 23. War Cabinet, December 9, 1916, December 16, 1916, CAB23/1. Balfour to Wingate. December 15,1916, SA144/5. 24. Newcombe note. May 20, 1917, reported that the Sharif had been informed of the contents of the treaty, F0882/16. 25. Clayton to Wingate, January 14, 1916, SA136/1; Hogarth note. May 3, 1916, F0882/16. The key letters of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence are those which contain boundary delineations; Husayn to McMahon, July 14, 1915; McMahon to Husayn, October 24, 1915; McMahon to Husayn, December 13. 1915; Husayn to McMahon. January 1,1916, CAB21/154. 26. Wingate to Hardinge, April 17,1917, SA174/4; HP. Vol. HI (31), 1917. 27. Wingate to Sharif. May 14,1917, F0141/757. 28. Lawrence note, July 30, 1917, copy sent to the Arab Bureau and to Wingate. Enclosed in Wingate’s letter to Balfour, August 16,1917, F0141/825. 29. Wingate to Allenby, November 2,1918, SA170/3/1. 30. Graham to Wingate, October 12,1917, SA166/1/1. 31. Wingate to Foreign Office, November 13,1917, SA146/9. 32. Foreign Office to Wingate, July 25,1918, SA149/2. 33. Wingate to Foreign Office, August 4, 1918, SA149/5, part 3; Wingate to Foreign Office, August 5,1918, SA149/4, part 3. 34. Brunyate’s report, Wingate to Allenby, September 11,1918, SA147/7. 35. Allenby to Foreign Office, December 22,1919, F0141/828. 36. Graham note on the future status of Egypt, March 2,1917, SA137/10. 37. Wingate to Balfour, July 23,1917, SA237/10.

51

THE WAFD 38. Wingate to Graham, August 26.1917, SA165/2/2. 39. Wingate note on the interview with Fu’ad, October 8,1917, SA154/2. 40. Montagu diary. October 27,1917. Lloyd George Papers. FO40/1/1. 41 .Ibid. 42. Wingate to Hardinge. November 29,1917, SA166/2. 43. Montagu to Hankey, November 4,1917, CAB24/34, G.T. Series, 2837. Montagu wrote along the same lines to Lloyd George and Philip Kerr, Lothian Papers, GD40. 17-35. 44. Wingate to Foreign Office. December 9,1917, SA166/3/2; F0141/629. 45. Graham minute to Wingate’s letter of December 9,1917, F0371/2926. 46. Wingate to Hardinge, December 24,1917, F0141/629; F03'rl/3199. 47. Wingate to Balfour, December 27. 1917, F0371/3199.

3 RIVALRIES AMONG BRITISH CIVIL SERVANTS

The steady increase in the number of officials in Egypt was one of the most persistent domestic problems in Egypt and was a perennial grievance among all Egyptians. In 1882, Cromer’s staff numbered from 300 to 400, with Europeans holding about two percent of the positions and receiving 16 percent of the salaries. Owing to the extra work generated by the War, no records of the number of British officials were kept during Wingate’s tenure; in fact, the Foreign Office was unable to answer a Parliamentary question about the overweighted staff in Cairo. During the Milner Mission (December 1919 to March 1920), Egyptians held about 23 to 28 percent of the higher administrative positions, [1] which meant that British officials had increased to about 42 to 59 percent. In 1920, there were 21,193 Egyptians working in the government, or 86 percent of the total; their salaries equalled £E2,740,245, or 71 percent. There were 1,546 British officials, comprising six percent, who received £E732,273, or 19 percent of the salaries. Other nationalities held 1,812 jobs, or eight percent; they received £E377. 066, or ten percent of the salaries. In the salary range of £E1,500-£E2.999 (the highest level), there were only eight Egyptians as compared to 34 British. These figures do not include the Egyptian ministers, the Sultan, or members of the Legislative Assembly. In the salary range of £E240 and below, there were 19.061 Egyptian and 363 British workers. The figures indicate a mushrooming bureaucracy and a disproportionate number of British citizens in the higher government jobs. In addition, there is corresponding evidence that the quality and experience of the British officials — in terms of knowledge and ability — did not rise in proportion to their numbers. During the War. the younger and more capable men enlisted, leaving only 53

THEWAFD

those men who were thought to be unfit for wartime duty, or those too valuable to be expended. The dissatisfaction of the Egyptian elites increased when they continued to be treated with disdain by British bureaucrats who appeared less cultured and knowledge­ able than themselves. Even British officials in London noted that the Egyptian civil service was remarkable only for its lack of spirit and its inefficiency and was often “ mediocre” . [2] In the interviews given by members of the Milner Mission these comments were repeated countless times. British civil servants were criticized for their ignorance of the culture and for their isolation from Egyptian society. Officials tended to live clustered together in European ghettos like Gezira. Their social life centered around the Sporting Club or the Turf Club, to which Egyptians could not belong. Excluded from the posh European clubs, Egyptian Muslims gathered at the Muhammad ‘Ali Gub, while Copts met at the Ramses Club. The British generally only had contact with Egyptians on official levels, or saw them as bawwabs and servants in their isolated homes. Thus, the relationship was usually one of superior to subordinate. British society, for all practical purposes, was a closed one. Although British authorities did not purposely seek to offend the Egyptians, the insular nature of their society remained visible evidence of a foreign occupying force and reinforced the ethnocentrism of the European imperial presence. The High Commissioner’s task was not only to unify his own staff, but to act as a liaison between high ranking Egyptians and British officials. All too frequently, the British staff did little to alleviate these problems. According to the organization of the Residency, the High Commissioner was assisted by a private secretary, an assistant secretary, an A.D.C., three assistant A.D.C.s, a counsellor, and the Chancery, which was staffed with assorted clerks. The Oriental Secretary and the Arab Bureau also furnished the High Commissioner with information and advice. This system was to change very little through the years of the British presence in Egypt. During the Wat, the inexperience of the Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, the position which involved the most frequent contact with Egyptians, was a constant problem. Haines was unable to attain a rapport with Egyptians and his arrogant manner alienated many. He was even reported to have interviewed Muslim notables with his dog sitting on his shoulder! 54

RIVALRIES AMONG BRITISH CIVIL SERVANTS

Since Muslims traditionally viewed dogs as unclean, such rudeness inevitably offended religious sensibilities. In addition. Brunyate, Adviser to the Ministry of Justice, who was a hard worker and chaired many committees, often clashed with Egyptians. He was noted, even among the British, as a stubborn and tactless individual whose defects were described as “ conspicuously incommensurate with his ambition and he failed by attempting too much.“ [3] Because there were no substitutes for Brunyate or Haines, they were kept on the job. In this regard Cheetham's abilities were also questioned, particularly since he did not speak Arabic. This, then, left the High Commissioner without informed and perspicacious advice. Although Wingate was forced to keep most of the older British civil servants, he did take steps to remove one whose presence he considered detrimental to the smooth running organization he hoped to build. This man was Edward Cecil, the Financial Adviser and brother of Robert Cecil, Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1918), and Minister of the Blockade (19161918). Cecil was also closely related to A.J. Balfour, Secretary for Foreign Affairs. With such support, Edward Cecil was perhaps the most powerful man in Egypt. Wingate knew that the most success­ ful British administrators had ruled absolutely, but, in attempting to remove Cecil, Wingate clashed unnecessarily with politicians in London, many of whom had close connections with the Cecil family. Subsequent High Commissioners were to have similar difficulties when new governments were elected or Cabinet changes were made in London. Such changes often isolated administrators in Egypt or left them without their political patrons. For example, Wingate had been appointed by Grey with Asquith’s concurrence and when Asquith’s government fell, in December 1916, it was replaced by a smaller Cabinet led by Lloyd George. Whereas Wingate had been well known to members of Asquith’s government, he had only a passing acquaintance with Lloyd George or Lord Curzon who became President of Council. Lloyd George had had nothing to do with Wingate’s appointment, and had only been cursorily told of it by Grey. The War Cabinet under Lloyd George and his supporters were convinced that Asquith was too weak. Lloyd George promised to place the entire resources of the Empire on a war footing, and to win the War as quickly as possible. To accomplish these aims, he made it clear 55

THEWAFD

that most government power would be vested in the War Cabinet and himself. Although the Foreign Office remained in charge of the implementation of policy, decisions of consequence were made by Lloyd George and his Cabinet. Those decisions were often reached beforehand in the Prime Minister’s private conversations; consequently, those individuals close to Lloyd George were in excellent positions to gain his attention and support. If Wingate was aware of the changing political structure, vis-à-vis the importance of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, he did not attempt to augment his influence with Lloyd George or Curzon, but continued to report solely to Hardinge and Graham. Since these men were not close to the focus of power around Lloyd George, and Graham had ambitions of his own regarding Egypt, Wingate would have done well to make his views personally known to the Prime Minister. That Wingate was ultimately unable to obtain Cecil’s dismissal, or support for his policies with the Egyptian nationalists, was in some measure caused by his remote­ ness from politics and lack of influence in prominent circles within London. Wingate was encouraged by Hardinge and Graham to ask for Cecil’s dismissal. Indeed, Wingate had barely established himself in the Residency before he received letters from Graham reporting that the Egyptian administration, particularly the Financial Department, badly needed reform. In agreement, Wingate wrote that Cecil possessed too much power, and that his influence overshadowed that of the High Commissioner, who should have been the predominant figure. [4] To support his contention, Wingate referred to Cheetham’s memorandum which had outlined the proper roles for each Egyptian department. In this memo­ randum Cheetham emphasized the importance of the Chancery (a slightly self-serving emphasis, perhaps?), which acted as the clearing house for all information relayed to the High Commission­ er from the other departments. [5] Owing to the power he exercised as Financial Adviser, Cecil had encouraged Egyptian and British officials to report directly to him, thereby bypassing the legitimate channels. Wingate quickly saw that as long as Cecil remained it would be difficult for the High Commissioner to assume full authority. For this reason, he recommended Cecil’s dismissal. As a means of making the administration run more smoothly. 56

RIVALRIES AMONG BRITISH CIVIL SERVANTS

Wingate had asked that the Foreign Office accept Cecil’s request to enlist which had been submitted immediately after the War had begun. Wingate’s recommendations incited considerable discussion among Foreign Office personnel, who were divided between the Balfour-Cecil contingent and the Hardinge-Graham group over whether the request should be accepted. In this case, the decision was made not so much upon Wingate’s analysis as upon personal interests. Although Hardinge was convinced that Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, would not be influenced by familial considerations, others were not so certain. While the matter was still in the air, Cecil returned to London, on a leave of absence. After Cecil left, Wingate attempted to take over control, but was not completely successful. In Cecil’s absence, Ronald Lindsey, former Assistant Adviser to the Financial Department, became acting Adviser. A close personal friend of Cecil, he continued his policies and also kept him informed of all the Cairo news. British officials, who were uncertain whether Cecil would return or not, were reluctant to take sides and Wingate was not forceful enough to persuade them to accept his leadership. Meanwhile. Cecil was not idle in London. He visited Hardinge to emphasize his intention of returning to Egypt; Hardinge told him that his leave had been granted for unspecified military duty lasting four to five months, but that the matter remained undecided. Cecil also wrote to Wingate warning him that there was a movement among some officials to reorganize the adminis­ tration of all Middle Eastern departments under a single office. Cecil fatuously remarked that he had been consulted on the proposal, but had not expressed an opinion because he did not know Wingate’s views. In a coup de grâce, Cecil reported that his brother thought that the Foreign Office should not direct Middle Eastern affairs, but that, as part of a general imperial change, these affairs should be placed under a separate department. [6] Robert Cecil’s program placed the administration of Egypt under the direction of the Colonial Office. Hardinge opposed the suggestion because it implied annexation, which had been rejected lest it should cause untoward trouble within Egypt. Although Hardinge did not think that the Protectorate would end when the War did, he believed that Egypt was further advanced towards constitutional government than India. According to Hardinge, it was unsuitable for Egyptian administration to be directed by the 57

THE WAFD

Colonial Office; he further justified his position in that after an independent Arabia was established, the Foreign Office could work through the Egyptian administration in order to mediate between the Arabs and the French in Syria. In other words, Hardinge foresaw Egypt becoming the center from which infor­ mation on the Middle East would be received and transmitted. On the other hand, Cecil maintained that the duties of the Foreign Office were diplomatic in nature, while the governing of Egypt was essentially administrative. Cecil refuted Graham who contended that the basic administrative structure in Egypt was good, although certain departments needed reform. He seized upon Graham’s admission that reforms were needed as evidence that the entire system was faulty. According to Cecil, placing Egyptian administration under the Colonial Office did not raise the annexation issue, but, rather, regulated Great Britain’s control over Egypt. In his rebuttal, Hardinge wrote that placing Egyptian administration under the Colonial Office or the India Office would be a definite change for the worse. [7] Wingate neither submitted a memorandum on the issue, nor was he officially consulted. He wrote privately to Graham that if the Foreign Office were to continue to administer the Egyptian government, it needed to create adequate departments staffed by qualified personnel. Along the same lines, Wingate agreed with Hardinge concerning the development of Cairo as the British focal point of control for the Arab world. Wingate told Hardinge that he hoped that discussion concerning administrative changes had not arisen because of any deficiencies on his part. Hardinge opined that the problems of Egyptian administration could wait until after the Armistice. Wingate accepted Hardinge’s reassurance and did not attempt to inform other Cabinet members of his views; however, he did bluntly ask what the British intended to do about granting administrative posts to Egyptians. [81 This query was prompted by a memorandum written by Rushdi Pasha. Rushdi complained that Britain had taken control of the foreign affairs of Egypt after declaring the Protectorate and had left merely the ineffectual shell of the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs under Negib Pasha Ghali. He complained and asked that more Egyptians be permitted to participate in their own foreign affairs. Rushdi’s memorandum was obviously an attempt to secure more self-government after 58

RIVALRIES AMONG BRITISH CIVIL SERVANTS

the War. [91 Wingate favored giving the Egyptians a greater semblance of autonomy, but advised against letting them have any part in foreign affairs, even those in which Egypt was vitally concerned, f10] In contrast, Wingate’s bête noire, Edward Cecil, advocated giving the Egyptians more roles in foreign affairs; this opinion was elicited after Cecil heard that the Egyptian exiles in Switzerland planned to present similar claims. [11] Although Wingate did not expect the Foreign Office to initiate changes during the War, he wanted to know what the policies were, so that he could deal effectively with Egyptian attempts — like Rushdi’s memorandum — to gain more autonomy. Unfortunately, the question of future British policies was continually deferred by the Foreign Office. In the interim, the demands upon Egypt increased, and the relationships among Anglo-Egyptian officials worsened. Clayton, whose opinions Wingate valued, became Chief Political Officer for the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, a position which took him out of Cairo and placed him in closer contact with General Allenby. Ir the future, Allenby was to appoint Clayton as Adviser to the Ministry of Interior in Egypt. In Dayton’s absence, Wingate depended increasingly upon his protégés from the Sudan and a few of the older British officials. He did not. however, desist from his attempts to remove Cecil. In May. Wingate wrote Hardinge that he thought Cecil should remain in England for the duration of the War. Balfour considered the suggestion at length, and, finally, replied that he regretted there had been problems, but that Egypt required the best men available. For this reason, Balfour decided that Cecil should return to Cairo. [12] Wingate accepted the dictum gracefully, although he continued to affirm that adjustments would be necessary after the War. Whereas Wingate lost his battle to remove Cecil, Cecil had not only thwarted Wingate, but had had the opportunity to present his complaints and ideas personally to the men in London. In doing what he thought best, Wingate actually gave Cecil the opportunity to strengthen his own position. Wingate’s attempt to have Cecil dismissed also caused hard feelings among his colleagues in Egypt. Rather than healing old rivalries, the attempt to remove Cecil actually accentuated them. Lindsey’s resignation from the Department of Finance is one example of the type of disagreement which arose in Cecil’s 59

THE WAFD

absence. Thinking Wingate meant to introduce programs necessi­ tating heavy capital investments, Lindsey handed in his resignation. Like Cecil, Lindsey opposed such projects lest they place undue strain upon the Egyptian budget which was committed to expensive programs after the War; these included road construction, irrigation improvements, and public buildings. Wingate reported that he had no intentions of initiating new projects, but Lindsey was not placated, and persisted in resigning even though he was urged to reconsider. In face of this resig­ nation, Wingate announced that he favored creating a committee which would limit spending for each department and would eliminate the necessity for the High Commissioner to decide the allocation of funds. Not surprisingly, both Cecil and Lindsey objected, because they wanted the Financial Department to have complete independence in deciding such matters. Ultimately, Lindsey was persuaded to remain until Cecil returned, but his attempted resignation indicated the type of problems which persistently arose. While Wingate was busy trying to cope with the difficulties in Cairo, Robert Cecil submitted a memorandum, “ Future Egyptian Administration” , written by his brother to the Cabinet. The memorandum formulated a new organization for Egyptian administration and advocated the creation of a department which could combine the work of the existing Egyptian departments and the Arab Bureau. Cecil urged that a special committee be formed to consider the recommendations. The Cabinet acquiesced and the committee was formed. Members of the committee included: A.J. Balfour as chairman, Curzon, Milner, and Ronald Storrs as secretary. The committee met several times during the autumn of 1917 to hear the evidence given by Edward Cecil, Ronald Graham, McMahon, and Cheetham. In brief, the committee was to decide if the Egyptian administration was to remain under the direction of the Foreign Office or was to be transferred to the Colonial Office or another governmental department. Cecil wanted the decision to be made before the situation in Egypt became “ acute” [13] and rendered change impossible. As on previous occasions, officials in the Foreign Office were alarmed by the idea that the Egyptian administration might be removed from their tutelage. Before Cecil had even submitted the memorandum, Hardinge wrote to Wingate that the Cecil brothers 60

RIVALRIES AMONG BRITISH CIVIL SERVANTS

were intriguing against the Foreign Office. To halt the Cecil maneuvers, Graham, with Hardinge’s support, began a campaign against any proposal to eliminate Foreign Office control over Egypt. Hardinge felt that if officials would concentrate on winning the war, instead of starting these hare-brain schemes, it would save a lot of time and trouble and probably be more to the advantage of their own interests, but unfortunately these are people who love to undermine situations that are progressing satis­ factorily. [141 Hardinge termed Cecil’s memorandum as “ pernicious” . [151 Aiming to prevent the acceptance of the memorandum, Graham wrote a rebuttal in which he argued that to create a new depart­ ment would involve duplicating records, and, in short, make unnecessary work. He thought splitting the Egyptian adminis­ tration from the Foreign Office would place the High Commis­ sioner in an anomalous position vis-à-vis the advisers and the Egyptians. Although he was willing to admit the system was far from perfect, Graham wanted to delay changes until the War ended. Our future relations with the native population of Egypt will, in my belief, depend very greatly on the manner in which the inevitable problems are tackled at the end of the war and the personal relations which can be established with the Sultan, Minister and leading Egyptian notables. [16] Cecil did not disagree with Graham on the point that there would be turbulence in Egypt after the War. Indeed, he fully expected it. For this reason, he felt it absolutely vital that the means of dealing with Egyptian unrest should be provided before it occurred. Milner concurred and wrote: . . . the internal problems of Egypt are bound in the near future to force themselves upon the attention of the Govern­ ment and Parliament of this country, in a degree of which we have had no experience in the past . . . Unless we lose the war, Egypt will in the future be as much a part of the British 61

THE WAFD

Empire as India or Nigeria. [17] Both Curzon and Graham disputed Milner’s prophecy about trouble, but not the presentiment that Egypt would be incor­ porated into the Empire. Cheetham supported them because his primary objective was to assure that the power of the High Commissioner was not weakened. When Cheetham raised the issue of the Residency, Curzon askec^ about Wingate’s opinions. Since he had not been consulted, no one at the meeting could answer. Reverting to the problem of future trouble in Egypt, Balfour asked for Graham’s opinion. Graham replied that trouble was unlikely as long as Turkey remained weak. Balfour was anxious that the government be prepared to deal with Egyptian demands for further autonomy, but accepted Graham’s contention that separating the Foreign Office from the Egyptian administration would not solve the problem. In the end, the committee failed to adopt a resolution. By delaying a decision over what form the Egyptian administration was to take, Hardinge and Graham believed they had defeated Cecil’s proposals. The fact that they still did not have the wherewithal to deal with future problems was of secondary concern. Once more political and bureaucratic concerns had triumphed over Egyptian interests. Edward Cecil returned to Egypt in early October. Immediately after returning, he had an interview with Wingate. Wingate asked Cecil, who had not consulted him before writing his memorandum on the Egyptian administration, if the reports of the committee meetings had been submitted for the High Commissioner to read. Cecil doubted that any dossier on the subject would be sent to Egypt. Wingate interpreted this as a sign that the scheme had been finally rejected, and not that the High Commissioner’s position had been jeopardized. Wingate appears to have objected, not so much to Cecil’s reorganization scheme, as to the manner in which the plan had been presented to the Cabinet. That Cecil submitted the program without previous consultation indicated the extent of the division between the High Commissioner and the Advisers, and, further, how ineffectual Wingate had been in repairing the split. Following this “ preliminary skirmish’’ [18] between Wingate and Cecil, it became obvious that Cecil was too ill to continue 62

RIVALRIES AMONG BRITISH CIVIL SERVANTS

working. Cecil’s condition rapidly deteriorated: he left Egypt for Switzerland in December 1917, and died of tuberculosis only a year later. After Cecil’s departure, the Foreign Office was forced to find a suitable replacement. Lindsey had taken his leave and, in the absence of other qualified personnel, Brunyate was appointed temporary Financial Adviser. The Foreign Office was well aware of Brunyate’s shortcomings, and was not satisfied, but could think of no alternative. By 1918, Brunyate asked to be made permanent Financial Adviser. Wingate suggested that the permanent appointment be delayed until the Armistice, when a commission could come to Egypt in order to review the entire system and make recommendations based upon a firsthand study. This was the first suggestion that a formal survey of the Egyptian administration be made after the War. Although the idea was not implemented at the time it was suggested, it was to be raised again at a later date. Wingate did not want Brunyate’s appointment finalized, because he considered that new appointment would depend largely upon the policy adopted by the British after the War. If the tendency is towards greater powers of self-government for the Egyptians and a gradual relaxation of the purely British grip, then probably the best policy will be to make the financial government stronger than ever — to endeavour to maintain British prestige and authority by such means — in that event, a man of BRUNYATE’S calibre, training and experience would probably best serve the purpose. I f . . . the after-war policy is to maintain the status quo and to gradually acquire a firmer, but at the same time sympa­ thetic attitude towards native aspirations and introduce into the country a more normal form of government and Adminis­ tration than exists at present, then the adoption of the second alternative [appointment of a purely financial expert] would, I think, lead more quickly to the desired result. [19] Ignorant of the policy to be adopted, Wingate did not express further opinions. He granted Brunyate’s claim to the position, but noted that in important matters, personal considerations had to be overlooked. In the Foreign Office, Eyre Crowe, assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, opposed Brunyate, because the position demanded a man with more technical 63

THE WAFD

knowledge of economics than Brunyate possessed. The appoint­ ment was finally settled in February 1919, when Sir Richard Crawford was named Financial Adviser on Wingate’s recom­ mendation. Before Cecil left Egypt. Montagu, Minister of Munitions and member of the War committee, paid a short visit to Cairo. Montagu had never been to Egypt but was familiar with India. Reports of his visit were sent back to Lloyd George and were officially submitted to the Cabinet in the form of an extensive memorandum on Egypt. [20] It is noteworthy that Montagu’s visit directly followed the accession of Ahmad Fu’ad as Sultan and the debates on Egyptian administration. Doubtless, Montagu’s timely tour was in some measure aimed at gauging the effective­ ness of Egyptian government under Wingate. Montagu was favorably impressed by what he saw in Egypt and with Wingate. Let me say that I formed a good opinion of Reginald Wingate, 1 hope not prejudiced by the most considerate hospitality and patient discussion of the matters I asked him about. He is not perhaps a very clever man. His great knowledge of this part of the world and his character and manner have given him, so far as I can judge, a striking hold over the respect and affections, so far as they have any, of the Egyptians. [21) Montagu also remarked upon Wingate’s linguistic abilities, but noted that British and Egyptian officials were not on the best terms, owing to the increased influence the former had been permitted while McMahon had been in office. After reviewing the system, Montagu outlined what he considered the most suitable administration for Egypt. Montagu advocated that the Foreign Office (with the aid of a permanent Under-Secretary), continue to direct Egyptian administration. He also urged consolidation and co-ordination of all Middle Eastern matters under a single depart­ ment loosely connected with the India Office. There was little response to this suggestion and it is possible that Montagu’s report never reached the Foreign Office, nor was brought to the attention of officials outside the Cabinet, immediately following the visit. Lest Robert Cecil or others initiate programs to eliminate Foreign Office control, Hardinge set about creating a new Middle

RIVALRIES AMONG BRITISH CIVIL SERVANTS

East department within the Foreign Office. Applauding Hardin ge’s scheme, Wingate wrote that he was favorably disposed to beginning with a small nucleus and gradually enlarging the department. The major obstacle to Hardinge’s project was the force with which Cecil’s idea of a separate Middle East department was supported by other officials. Thus Hardinge was never able to implement his project. Finally, in February 1918, Curzon submitted the final report of the Egyptian Administration Committee.. In the report, Curzon emphasized that the committee had been formed to consider the merits of combining the direction of Middle Eastern affairs under one heading. This idea had been supported by Cecil, Milner, and McMahon, but had been opposed by Hardinge, Graham, and Cheetham; Curzon also referred to Montagu’s compromise solution. The committee made five recommendations: (1) it was premature to make definite commitments while the War con­ tinued, (2) an alteration in Egyptian control of Aden and the Arabian Peninsula would be necessary if the Arab Kingdom, under Sharif Husayn’s family, survived, (3) Palestine was outside the realm of discussion, (4) the administration of Egypt could not be removed from the Foreign Office during the War, (5) the department of Egyptian affairs, headed by Graham, was to be strengthened. [22] Curzon concluded: . . . in this way would be constituted a separate department of the Foreign Office capable of expansion, when circumstances require, either into a larger and better equipped body still under the Secretary of State, or into the more independent organisation which was the ideal of some of the witnesses [231 Although Wingate agreed with Curzon’s analysis, and even went so far as to suggest A.T. Lloyd as a suitable head for the proposed department, the administration of Middle Eastern affairs was not combined during the War. The Egyptian administration continued to be directed by Graham, while the Middle East Com­ mittee, Russian Committee, and Persian Committee met jointly, under Curzon’s direction, to formulate policies for the rest of the Middle East. Nonetheless, Cecil remained determined to establish a more efficient method for dealing with the Middle East. 65

THEWAFD

Although Lloyd George also realized that the Foreign Office needed changing, he hesitated to initiate innovations, owing to the personal aspects of the situation. Milner finally recommended that Lloyd George take personal control and leave the routine work to Robert Cecil. Following this suggestion, Robert Cecil wrote to Balfour that the Middle East Committee, while valuable, was not practicable. He wanted the Foreign Office and the War Office to create a special department for Middle Eastern Affairs. [24] This was yet another attempt to diminish Foreign Office domination. Cecil asked Hankey, Secretary to the Cabinet, to inform him of all War Cabinet meetings at which Middle Eastern questions, including those on Egypt, were discussed. By attending these meetings, Cecil hoped to circumvent the Middle East Committee led by Curzon. Having failed to secure a new department to direct Middle Eastern affairs, Cecil decided to try and create his own department within the Foreign Office. This, of course, counteracted Hardinge’s similar plan which had never materialized. Cecil chose Eyre Crowe to direct the department; Hardinge objected to the choice and contended that Graham was the best qualified candidate. Cecil gave both suggestions to Balfour, but privately announced that Crowe was the better choice; he also told Balfour that he would abandon the entire scheme rather than work with Graham. [25] Balfour was aware of the continual disagreements between Cecil and Hardinge; consequently, he took care not to act precipitately. He enquired whether Graham was not the best, since he was the only man in the Foreign Office with any first-hand knowledge of Egypt. Cecil’s reply was adamant. When I first spoke to him (Graham) he was against the whole proposal and he still is almost passionately anxious to retain Egypt as part of the ordinary Foreign Office organisation, partly I think because he hopes some day or another to be appointed High Commissioner there. For the same reason or some other, he is anxious to maintain in Egypt diplomats doing what is in truth administrative work . . . He further thinks that Egypt has little or no connection with Arabia. I can find no one else with this view. [26] On the strength of these arguments, Balfour consented to Crowe’s appointment as head of the new department. To soothe

RIVALRIES AMONG BRITISH CIVIL SERVANTS

Hardinge, Balfour wrote that Graham was needed in his current capacity as Hardinge’s assistant. Cecil immediately initiated the new department, while writing to Balfour that everyone in the Foreign Office seemed pleased with Crowe’s work. Hardinge was forced to acquiesce to Cecil’s plan to incorporate the direction of Palestine, Syria, Arabia, Mesopotamia, Persia, and Egypt under one department headed by Crowe, whom Hardinge thought was unsatisfactory. Hardinge was positive that the department was merely another attempt by Cecil to exclude Graham from control of the Egyptian administration. Cecil blithely ignored Hardinge’s complaints. His aim was to move Egypt from the direction of a diplomatic to an administrative department, and to end the dual control over Arabia. He sincerely believed that the dichotomy of control had to cease immediately — not after the War. In this matter, Cecil had the support of Clayton who warned that Great Britain had to formulate a policy for the Middle East before the War terminated, or expect a great deal of trouble to ensue. [27] Curzon, however, was not discouraged by Cecil’s complaints, or by the creation of the new department; he continued to hold meetings of the Middle East Committee. His only concession to Cecil was to admit that if the idea of a department which en compassed the administration of the entire Middle East was pursued, Allenby would have to be retained in an official capacity within that department. This suggestion, made on September 29. 1918, was the first clue that Allenby would play an active role in the Middle East after the War. [28] Cecil was the next official to suggest that Allenby be given a permanent position in the Middle East. Meanwhile, other civil servants heard of Cecil’s proposals, and submitted their own ideas for consideration. Frank Balfour of the Sudan civil service spoke with Wingate and they agreed that tc deal with the Middle East from Cairo presented great difficulties. Balfour thought it was more feasible to have two High Com­ missioners, one stationed in Cairo and the other in Baghdad. He warned Cecil just one day before the War ended: The administrative side of Egypt badly wants strengthening to cope with the difficulties which whatever approach to selfgovernment is to be given will bring in its train. The sooner 67

THE WAFD

we decide how far self-government there is to go, and tell the people what we intend, the better. The Nationalists are getting very restive already and no doubt will claim to be included under the category of 'liberated countries' mentioned in the recent pronouncement. [29] Balfour was referring to the Anglo-French Declaration of October 8, which reaffirmed Allied support for the independence of the former Ottoman territories in the Middle East. Balfour's warning came only a few days before the Egyptian delegation led by Zaghlul presented its demands for more self-government before Wingate at the Residency. That letters urging the formulation of policy were written at such late dates indicates the total want of definite policy with regard to the future of Egypt. The British had been warned — countless times — that the Egyptians would make demands for self-government after the War. But the government procrastinated, hoping to delay commitments until the seemingly more pressing problems caused by the War and the Armistice had been solved. Re-establishing a peace time economy and preparing for the Peace Conference were the primary consider­ ations of the British government during the latter part of 1918. In the months preceding the opening of the Peace Conference on January 18, 1919, politicians and diplomats were busy with pre­ liminaries and with the details of winning the general election. Lloyd George and most of the Cabinet went to Paris in early January 1919. Balfour, Hardinge, Crowe, Tyrrell, and Drummond — all from the Foreign Office — accompanied Lloyd George and his entourage to Paris. Curzon was given the job of Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Balfour’s absence. Cecil also went to Paris, and his departure pleased Hardinge, for it rendered Graham’s exclusion from the direction of Middle Eastern problems impossible. While most of the leading politicians and officials were in Paris, Curzon and Graham remained in London to deal with foreign affairs. Their tenure of office extended through the crucial months of the Egyptian revolution. These two men were the main formulators of British policy in Egypt during the crisis. Curzon's belief in the British imperial system and his stubborn attitudes were well known among British officials. In referring to Curzon, Montagu, with typical understatement, wrote: . . . there is . . . Lord Curzon who, for historical reasons of

RIVALRIES AMONG BRITISH CIVIL SERVANTS

which he alone is master, geographical considerations, which he has peculiarly studied, finds, reluctantly, much against his will, with very grave doubts, that it would be dangerous if any country in the world was left to itself, if any country in the world was left to the control of any other country but ourselves, and we must go there, as I have heard him say, for diplomatic, economic, strategic and telegraphic reasons. [30] Any recommendations to offer concessions to Egyptian national­ ism were hardly likely to be treated favorably by Curzon. That the High Commissioner in Egypt had his main support within the Foreign Office with Graham and with Hardinge, who was absent during the crucial months, hampered the acceptance of concessions or compromises with the Egyptian nationalists. Then, too, both Graham and Hardinge seem to have displayed more loyalty for one another than for Wingate; in this respect Graham’s ,own aspirations should be recalled. [31] Graham doubtlessly felt that he was best qualified to be High Commissioner and that he could rule Egypt without trouble arising from quarrels among Egyptians or British officials. Wingate, on the other hand, clearly had trouble in dealing with his subordinates, especially the British staff. He had clashed with Cecil, and to a large degree had failed to secure the confidence of Brunyate or Cheetham, the other leading civil servants. Nor did Wingate have the support of the politicians. He lacked the personal connections or prestige whioh would have been of paramount importance to an official advocating an unpopular policy. The contrast of effectiveness would be even more evident once Allenby and later Lampson became the ranking British officials in Egypt. In contrast, Wingate was not able to force his opinions upon officials in London; he failed to present carefully detailed programs for reforms, expansion, or adminis­ trative changes and was largely left to his own resources, a factor which made him highly vulnerable (if not ineffective) when the Egyptians began to agitate for more self-government.

THE WAFD

Notes 1. Milner Mission Report, FO840/19. Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modem Egypt: A Study o f the Higher Civil Servant (Princeton, 1957), p.3 J. 2. Milner Notes, 1917-1921, MP246; Gayton to Wingate, August 3, 1916, SA139/1. 3 . Rennell Rodd, Note on Appointments in Egypt, March 14, 1920. Also see Walrondto Milner. November 26, 1919, MP164. Stewart Symes, Tour o f Duty (London. 1946), p.26. 4. Wingate to Hardinge, January 21, 1917, SA175/4. 5. Oieetham memorandum to the Residency, n.d. (circa December 1916), SA 151/11. 6. Cecil to Wingate. March 19.1917, SA164/3. 7. Hardinge minute, n.d. FO407/183. 8. Wingate to Graham. May 28,1917, SA237/10. 9. Rushdi Memorandum. Sent by Wingate to Hardinge, May 29, 1917, HP. Vol. IV (32), 1917. It was seen by Cecil and Graham. Robert Hyde Greg, formerly in the British Agency. Cairo, was in charge of the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 1917-1921. 10. Wingate to Hardinge. May 20. 1917, HP. Vol. IV (32), 1917. 11. Cecil to Wingate. May 16, 1917, SA164/5. 12. Balfour to Wingate. July 18, 1917, Wingate Dossier to Milner, MPI62. 13. Cecil to Curzon, September 28,1917, CAB27/12. 14. Hardinge to Wingate, September 7,1917, SA236/7. 15. Hardinge to Wingate. September 26,1917, SA165/3/2. 16. Graham memorandum on Egyptian Administration, September 28, 1917, CAB27/12. 17. Milner memorandum on Egyptian Administration, October 31, 1917, CAB 27/12. The minutes of the meeting at which these memoranda were discussed are found in CAB27/12. 18. Wingate to Hardinge, November 29,1917. HP. Vol. VII (35), 1917. 19. Wingate to Hardinge, June 30,1918, SA237/19. 20. Montagu to Lloyd George, October 27, 1917, Lloyd George Papers, F40/1/1. 21. Montagu to War Cabinet. November 4, 1917, CAB24/34, G.T. series 2837. 22. Report on the Egyptian Administrative Council, by Curzon, and adopted by Council, February 20.1918, CAB27/12, G-162 Secret, Printed 1918. 23 .Ibid. 24. Cecil to Balfour, July 20,1918, Cecil Papers, BM51093. 25. Cecil to Balfour, August 21,1918, Balfour Papers, BM49738. 26. Cecil to Balfour, August 23,1918, Balfour Papers, BM49748. 27. Gayton to Ormsby-Gore, September 13,1918, Sykes Papers, F0800/221. 28. Curzon to Cecil, September 29,1918, Cecil Papers, BM51077. 29. Frank Balfour to Cecil, November 10,1918, Cecil Papers, BM51094. 30. Montagu to Balfour, December 20,1918, Balfour Papers, BM49748. 31. In 1916 and again in 1920, Graham wrote to Hardinge about the position. Graham to Hardinge, July 20, 1916, “ Speaking quite frankly, I believe that sooner or later I could run this place with fair success.” HP, Vol. II (23), 1916. Graham to Hardinge, August 11, 1920, “ I really believe I could run that country.” HP. Vol. II (43). 1920.

70

4 THE CREATION OF THE WAFD The initial attempts to organize Egyptian political leadership against the British Protectorate date from late in the summer of 1918 when three groups of prominent notables began to reflect upon the course of action which would most easily win Egyptian independence. Almost all of these leaders were aristocrats or urban bourgeois who wanted a larger share in determining the political life of their nation. They uniformly believed that the time was ripe for them to emerge as the governors of Egyptian political and economic affairs. Although many of these early spokesmen had had extended contacts with the British, notably in legislative and judicial circles, but to a lesser extent in business, British persistence in taking final decisions and in preventing able Egyptians from rising to meaningful policy-making positions, had forced these men, who were generally moderate, if not conser­ vative, to conclude that they had to demand freedom for Egypt. The nationalist movement which emerged in 1918 and 1919 owed its strength to the simultaneous appearance of rural dis­ content, aimed against British wartime abuses which were coupled with a severe inflationary spiral and shortages of staple goods, and the determination of an educated, politically conscious elite bent on securing the leadership of Egypt in its own hands. This elite sought to harness (and was largely successful in this) peasant and working class opposition to the British occupation. This elite became the leadership for the political organization — the Wafd — which was to be the most powerful political force in Egypt for over three decades. For its own purposes even the monarchy was a willing accom­ plice to the Nationalist demands. Sultan Fu’ad perceived Egyptian demands for British withdrawal as a means of freeing himself 71

THE WAFD

from the encumbering presence of the British High Commissioner and “ advisers” who were actually his superiors. In an indepen­ dent Egypt, Fu’ad would have the opportunity to rule as a real king, not as a puppet performing in front of the façade of Egyptian self-government. As a consequence, in the early days the Wafd leadership had — if not the visible support of Fu’ad — his tacit approval from behind the scenes. The open split between the Palace and the Wafd was caused later by the inevitable competition between the two for hegemony over the Egyptian political scene. Almost from the outset, the Wafd was able to incorporate all facets of Egyptian society behind its calls for independence. The aristocracy and the bourgeoisie were the first movers of the Wafd, but students, workers, peasants, women (for a lively feminist movement emerged in post war Egypt) and religious minorities quickly rallied behind the Wafdist demands. The inclusion of the powerful Coptic community, the largest Christian minority in Egypt, unified the nation and in the process provided the Wafd with some of its most capable strategists. Nor should the consider­ able financial contributions of the Copts be underestimated. Thus the Wafd — even before becoming a political party — was a movement representing all Egypt. Indeed, this was the source of its power. The Wafd was also assisted by the world wide phenomenon of rising nationalism. The fires of nationalism had been liberally stoked by President Wilson and the Allies in wartime pronounce­ ments concerning self-determination. The Fourteen Points and other Wilsonian ideals had had massive impact in Egypt where the elite, particularly the intellectuals, were confident that Egypt met the qualifications enabling it to take its place among the indepen­ dent nations of the world. National awareness had as its breeding ground the long and glorious history of Nile civilization. The Egyptians had the collective experience, not only of the Arab/Islamic epoch but the unique existence as the inheritors of one of the most ancient civilizations known to mankind. In addition, Egypt possessed an educated, cultivated elite, whose numbers far exceeded that of most other Middle Eastern areas and probably even some European nations. Although Egypt was economically still primarily agricultural, the nation’s financial infrastructure — banking, foreign exchange, and the Cotton 72

THE CREATION OF THE WAFD

Bourse — was highly sophisticated; the fact that many qualified Egyptians were excluded from important economic areas only made them resentful and more determined to eradicate foreign domination. Wafdist leadership became the voice of these sentiments. There are conflicting accounts as to who first suggested forming a delegation to negotiate with the British. All accounts agree that by August 1918 Prince Omar Tusun, Sa‘d Zaghlul, his friends and Prime Minister Rushdi had all discussed the possibility among themselves and with others. The first actual meeting of Egyptian leaders to discuss tactics seems to have occurred in September 1918 when Sa‘d Zaghlul met with Muhammad Mahmud and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Fahmi had been invited, but had been too ill to attend. [1] These men had broad experience in Egyptian government as members of the Legislative Assembly and in various ministerial posts. The leader. Sa‘d Zaghlul, was an Egyptian nationalist of essentially moderate views. Born in 1860 in the Delta of middle class origins, Zaghlul had been a megawir (scholarship student) at al-Azhar and subsequently graduated from law school. [2] His abilities soon attracted attention and he was appointed Minister of Education in 1906; in this position he earned a reputation for fairness, but on occasion clashed with the diffident and rigid Douglas Dunlop, Adviser to the Ministry of Education. A Scots­ man, Dunlop ran the Ministry like a true martinet and was noted for his total disregard of Egyptian sensitivities. As a firm believer in Parliamentary government and as a charismatic orator, Zaghlul was elected Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly in 1913, a post he held until the Assembly was dismissed by the British in 1914. From then on Zaghlul remained in the political wilderness, because as previously mentioned, the British were wary of his nationalist stands. In 1896, the tall, rather distinguished-looking Zaghlul married Safia Fahmi, the third daughter of Mustafa Fahmi, a former Prime Minister. The marriage was apparently encouraged by Princess Nazli, who, having once rejected him, married Fu’ad after he became Sultan. A man of considerable wealth, Fahmi was such a well known Anglophile that Egyptians joked when he died that his casket should have been wrapped in the Union Jack. Safia was to be Zaghlul’s close compatriot and an outspoken nationalist 73

THEWAFD

in her own right. The marriage was childless, although Zaghlul acted as guardian to his deceased sister’s two children, and Safia was close to her sisters’ families. In 1902, they moved into a large villa in Cairo which became known as Beit al-Umma, or House of the People. Like most wealthy Egyptians, the Zaghluls also had a country estate, located at Masgid Wasif in Gharbiyya. Socially, Zaghlul and his wife lived well; Zaghlul’s sociability and love for cognac were well known. He spoke French and began to learn German prior to World War I, but was never fluent in English. As was customary among the upper class in Egypt, Zaghlul and Safia travelled widely in Europe, particularly in France where Vichy was the favorite place for relaxation and partaking of the famous waters which not only Egyptians but Europeans felt had marvelous recuperative qualities. Afflicted with diabetes and past middle age when the Wafd was formed, Zaghlul nonetheless maintained a vigorous pace. He seemingly drew energy from his clear-cut position as the national­ ist leader and from his determination that Egypt should have a constitutional government. Possessing a keen sense of his own pre-eminence, he disliked political rivals; as a consequence he had a number of clashes with other ambitious politicians. However, none could approach his popularity. Zaghlul was the father image to his nation, and was wildly cheered and idolized throughout the countryside. Muhammad Mahmud, the second participant in the first meeting, had attended Balliol, Oxford, arid was an extremely wealthy landowner. His father had helped found the ‘Umma Party in 1907. Mahmud had been governor for Behara Province, but had been removed from the post after a number of peasants had been brutally treated. While his complicity in the beatings was never proven, the British held that he had been grossly neglectful. However, their anger towards Mahmud may actually have stemmed from the suspicion that he was intriguing with the Sanusi against the British. Aspiring to high positions, Mahmud was the first to split openly with Zaghlul, but initially his fluent English and considerable political astuteness were of great use to the Wafd. Born in 1871 in Dakahliyya Province, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid was educated at the Khedival School of Law and was the former editor of al-Jarida, the Nationalist party organ. Heavily influenced 74

t h e |c r e a t io n |o f t h e w a f d

by the teachings of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Lutfi al-Sayyid was the most academically able of the first Wafdist leaders. He became director of the Sultaniyya Library in 1915, a post he relinquished when he became active in nationalist politics. Lutfi al-Sayyid was not a politician and was at his best when writing or discussing philosophic questions concerning Egyptian nationalism and its relationship with Islam and western thought. Finally, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Fahmi, bom in 1870 in Minufiyya, was an eminent lawyer who had been President of the Barristers’ Asso­ ciation. He knew Lutfi al-Sayyid well as they had both been students together at the Khedival School. Fahmi had experience ic the Public Works Ministry, the Ministry of Waqfs, Ministry of Justice, and as a member of the Legislative Assembly. He was to become an ardent nationalist spokesman, and was an excellent public speaker. Along with Zaghlul, Fahmi was recognized as the “ brains” of the Wafd. Following the September meeting, Mahmud suggested sending an Egyptian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. Zaghlul quenched the idea with a cold shower (dush band), by saying the time had not arrived for such action. [3] Actually, Mahmud was not the first to suggest the idea, for Zaghlul himself had proposed that Egypt be represented at the Paris Conference in an interview with Mark Sykes in 1915. [4] After talking with Mahmud, Zaghlul discussed the scheme with Rushdi, who had been considering the same idea in cooperation with his close friend ‘Adli Yakan. It is also clear at this juncture that Rushdi hinted that the scheme had at least the tacit support of Fu’ad. At a tea party at Ra’s al-Tin Palace on October 9 (this date is much disputed among the sources) [5] ‘Omar Tusun approached Zaghlul with the idea of forming a delegation (wafd). Zaghlul responded that the idea was a beautiful one [6] and that he would discuss it with his friends. Still in Cairo, Zaghlul then talked briefly with ‘Adli to gain his opinion. Meanwhile, Sultan Fu’ad was also concerned about future political activities. He debated the issue with Wingate at a meeting on October 12. At this time, Fu’ad remarked that as Wingate did not understand him, he was looking forward to going to London after the war in order to discuss Egyptian problems directly with the officials in the Foreign Office. Fu’ad added that he wanted a Parliament with a Senate and a Ministry which would relieve him of the onus of personal respon75

THE WA FD

sibility. In light of Fu’ad’s later autocratic rule, it is likely that this verbal thrust was merely a test to ascertain British reaction to Egyptian political independence. Wingate retorted that the Legislative Assembly had been a worthless body, and that the country obviously was not ready for democratic institutions. [7] The meeting closed on this tense note which presaged the future acrimony between the Palace and the British government. A week later, on October 23, Zaghlul, Rushdi and Tusun met at a Residency garden party in Alexandria, and further delineated their plans. Zaghlul and Tusun agreed to continue their conver­ sation on the Cairo train on the following day. During the journey, Zaghlul accepted the plan to form a wafd, but expressed his reservations as to whether Egyptians could provide adequate funds for the venture. He remarked that ‘Ali Sha‘rawi could probably be persuaded to give £10,000 and that he and Tusun should canvas members of the Legislative Assembly, provincial councils, and notables for support. The two parted after agreeing to meet again; as events unravelled they were not to converse until two weeks later on November 12. [8] In the interim, Zaghlul met with ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Fahmi, Muham­ mad Mahmud, Lutfi al-Sayyid and ‘Ali Sha‘rawi. Sha‘rawi, an aristocratic large landowner from Minya, was a member of the Legislative Assembly. He was described by the British as a conservative, who had opposed social reforms in the Assembly. Sha‘rawi spoke only Arabic, and was thought to be a devoted Muslim and Egyptian. His wife, Huda, was a feminist and political activist. As Zaghlul had predicted, Sha‘rawi actively supported the plan to form the wafd and promptly gave £10,000 to further the goal. [91 Not surprisingly, the British in Egypt were well aware of Egyptian plans to make demands once the war ended. Wingate warned the Foreign Office to expect some form of nationalist agitation after the war. He was also worried by Fu’ad’s acceptance of nationalist elements. To placate the Sultan, Wingate recom­ mended small concessions like the approval of new palace furniture and assurances concerning ex-Khedive ‘Abbas be made. The latter was of particular importance because Fu’ad was concerned that ‘Abbas would try to return to Egypt. Eventually all of ‘Abbas’s considerable land holdings were expropriated by the government, and he was forbidden entry into Egypt. 76

THE CREATION OF THE WAFD

In short, the British wanted Fu’ad to remain under their domin­ ation, while retaining the guise of authority for the benefit of Egyptian sensibilities. Wingate recognized that an open split with Fu’ad would render the situation impossible, but that concessions, however unpleasant, had to be granted in order to assure Fu’ad’s loyalty. The Foreign Office tended to discount Wingate’s warnings. Ronald Graham, the most influential man in forming Foreign Office policies regarding Egypt, thought that Fu’ad was superior to any other recent Egyptian monarch. Completely ignoring the warnings, he wrote that the dispatches showed “ that the calm sea of Egyptian politics is scarcely ruffled by puffs of breeze which may be variable but do not presage any kind of storm.” [10] Wingate also reported that there was a rumor that an Egyptian peace delegation would present a petition for President Wilson’s support after the war ended. This rumor was given substance after a crowd, thinking peace had been declared, gathered at the U.S. Consulate in Alexandria. [11] Although he did not know what course to adopt in order to stop nationalist unrest, Wingate recognized the dangers inherent in the movement. He had subordinates confer with both Rushdi and Fu’ad in hopes that they would have alternate plans, but was not so naive as to presume that these two Egyptians were completely detached from the nationalist movement. The growing nationalist fervor was given further incentive by the Anglo-French declarations favoring self-determination for Syria, Mesopotamia and other nations. The object of the declar­ ation had been to allay Arab fears concerning British and French intentions. [12] However, it was to have more far-reaching effects than the British had anticipated. Encouraged by these Allied pronouncements, the nationalists continued their plans for demanding a change in Egyptian govern­ ment. Zaghlul met sporadically with his compatriots during the last weeks of October. These culminated with Zaghlul’s visit to the Residency on November 5. This was a preliminary encounter in which Zaghlul tried to gauge British opinion regarding the future status of Egypt. Zaghlul requested that the Legislative Assembly be reconvened, to which Wingate replied, *Allah ma es Sabairin, izza Sabiru , or God helps those who are patient. Zaghlul was hardly likely to accept such a platitude when Egyptians had been 77

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waiting for independence since the British occupation had begun thirty years previously. Nor did Wingate’s reply please the Foreign Office when condemned him for encouraging the national­ ists by granting interviews and recommending a moderate course! Once the Armistice was declared on November 11, 1918, nation­ alist feelings quickly gathered momentum. On the same day as the Armistice, Zaghlul, with ‘Ali Sha’rawi, and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Fahmi. met Ulrich Alexander, Wingate’s aide-de-camp, in the reading room at the Muhammad ‘Ali Club. Zaghlul promptly asked for an interview with Wingate for the ostensible purpose of introducing Sha‘rawi and Fahmi. Realizing that these men were known nationalists who would probably expound their viewpoints during the interview, Alexander asked Keown-Boyd, Wingate’s private secretary, for his assent before agreeing to Zaghlul’s request. After conferring with Cheetham and Wingate, KeownBoyd made an appointment for Zaghlul to meet with Wingate on November 13. [131 Evidently, Zaghlul had decided directly after his October 24 conversation with Tusun to work towards sending an Egyptian delegation to Great Britain. He made every effort to gather supporters, first from his close friends, Fahmi, Sha’rawi, Lutfi al-Savyid, and Muhammad Mahmud. [14] Others, notably Tusun, were also gathering followers. Tusun reports that after hearing on November 11 that Zaghlul had accepted the idea of sending a delegation, he went to Cairo where he stayed at Shepheard’s Hotel to await events. The next day, Mahmud telephoned him to report developments. After speaking with Zaghlul, Tusun, accompanied by Muham­ mad Sa‘id, met with Zaghlul and his four friends to argue over the plans for sending a delegation. Tusun was apparently a bit miffed at not having been included in the original plans to see Wingate. Zaghlul feared that two separate delegations, each demanding a hearing in London, would be formed: one led by Tusun or Sa‘id, and the other by himself. To placate the Prince, Zaghlul told him about the impending meeting at the Residency and remarked that although Tusun was certainly free to act as he wished, he hoped he would agree to join with the Zaghlul followers. Tusun was evidently pacified by this as he made no attempt to oppose publicly the impending interview. By this time, Zaghlul had probably received the written permission for the November 13 interview. 78

THE CREATION OF THE WAFD

Zaghlul also conferred with Fahmi and Sha'rawi in order to plan their strategy for the meeting. [15] At eleven o’clock on the morning of November 13, Zaghlul, Fahmi, and Sha'rawi were received at the Residency. The inter­ view, which marked the beginning of the long post-war struggle for Egyptian independence, began with Wingate telling Zaghlul and his friends that Egypt owed its unprecedented prosperity to Great Britain. [161 Agreeing about the country’s prosperity Zaghlul went on to advocate the immediate abolition of martial law, censorship, and other wartime measures. Wingate — again — advised patience. In polite disagreement, Zaghlul said he did not understand what Wingate was trying to say, whereupon Wingate told him that the Egyptians lacked foresight. Offended, Zaghlul reminded Wingate that he himself was an elected representative of the Egyptian people. Wingate countered by stressing that the Egyptian nationalists had not been moderate in their demands prior to the War, and had thereby caused a great deal of unnecessary inconvenience. At this point. Sha’rawi remarked that Egyptians wished to be true friends to England, as free men to free men, not as slaves to free men. (Inna narid an nakun asdiqa ’ li-lnkilterra al-hurr lil-hurr la al- ‘abd lil-hurr.) [17] “ Are you demanding independence?” asked Wingate. Zaghlul said “ yes,” while Fahmi rejoined that they wanted ‘‘lstiqlal tamm,” or complete independence. To support this demand he pointed out that Egyptians had worked hard for the Allied war effort, had a long glorious history, and an elite of educated and able people. Indeed, in comparison to countries like Serbia or Montenegro, both of which had been promised independence, Egypt was more advanced. Wingate emphasized that there were many uneducated people in Egypt, and that its strategic geographic position made it vulnerable to foreign encroachment. Zaghlul emphasized that the Egyptians wished to remain friendly with Great Britain and were willing to guarantee the safety of the Suez Canal, the road to India. In compromise, Sha'rawi even conceded that Egyptians might consent to retaining the British Financial Adviser. Zaghlul closed by telling Wingate that the Egyptians considered Great Britain to be the greatest liberal power in the world and were willing to present their demands solely to the officials in London. 79

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Wingate ended the interview noting that he had listened carefully, but that he had no idea of the British government’s intentions. Wingate was not surprised by the tone of the interview and had been prepared to counter the calls for independence, although he could not refute the fact that Egypt had aided the war effort and that countries with less glorious histories and fewer educated people were gaining independence. Lacking instructions from London, Wingate dealt with Zaghlul calmly, without alienating him, but promising nothing. Zaghlul and his friends had no sooner left when Wingate talked with Rushdi who promptly presented a letter requesting permission for himself and ‘Adli to travel to London for conver­ sations with Foreign Office officials. As Wingate suspected, Fu’ad had encouraged Rushdi to present his request, as he saw it was in his own self-interest to divide nationalist sentiment by having two Egyptian delegations go to London. Recognizing the potential behind Zaghlul — a man of consider­ able prestige — Wingate was concerned. While admitting that Zaghlul’s arguments were well founded, he simultaneously bemoaned the real motives of the nationalists. I must admit their attitude was generally correct, and to anyone less conversant than I am with Egyptian methods, their contentions would appear to have been dictated by pure patriotism and would give the impression that at long last Lord Dufferin’s inarticulate masses had become articulate and were about to reap the results of our patient labours of the past 40 years, in seeing a complete Egyptian regeneration on political lines dear to the British democracy. [18] While demeaning the true motivations of Zaghlul and his com­ patriots, Wingate did hope that they would have the. opportunity to travel to London. He wanted the nationalists to go to London, not because he supported Egyptian independence, but because he foresaw that it would be necessary to co-opt the nationalist leader­ ship in order to prevent a more widespread movement. In this case. Wingate (and the Egyptian nationalists themselves) — both far removed from the pressures and additional work caused by the impending Peace Conference — miscalculated the effect demands for Egyptian-British negotiations would have upon the 80

THE'CREATION'OF THE'WAFD

Foreign Office. The officials in London felt they were far too busy with the details of the Conference to be concerned with Egyptian nationalists, whose demands, in any case, they considered extreme and unacceptable. Goser to the growing Egyptian resistance against the British occupation, Wingate and Rushdi agreed that the question of the future of Egyptian rule had to be settled quickly. If these burning questions are not settled now, we are likely to have considerable difficulty in the future. The general spirit of self-determination to which the war has given birth, has taken a firm hold in Egypt and I think it is only just that the Sultan, his ministers and the Egyptians generally should be told how they stand, but presumably such conversations as are now suggested would be conducted entirely through His Majesty’s Government and Egypt (being a Protectorate) would in no sense come within the scope of the International Peace Conference, though the fact that India, the Dominions etc. are to be consulted, has naturally given our Egyptian friends hopes of similar consideration. [19] Wingate considered that the best approach would be to permit Rushdi and ‘Adli — who were both far more open to British persuasion than Zaghlul — to accompany the Wafd to London. None of the British wanted to accede to Egyptian demands for independence, but those closest to the scene recognized the wisdom of granting some concessions in order to prevent the nationalists from consolidating their position with the Egyptian masses. As predicted, the nationalists, directly after the November 13 interview, took steps to organize and formulate their program. From November IS to November 23, Zaghlul and his friends consolidated the nucleus of the Wafdist leadership and moved to garner support among the populace. On November 15, Zaghlul conferred with Tusun, Muhammad Mahmud, Sha'rawi, and Fahmi. According to Tusun, no delegation had been formally organized at this time. However, Makram ‘Ubayd (himself an ardent Wafdist and a close friend of Zaghlul’s) related that Zaghlul had already met with Isma'il Sidqi on the fifteenth when Sidqi, a friend of Tusun’s, had come to offer his aid for Zaghlul’s 81

THE WAFD

forces. [20] Zaghlul was hesitant to accept Sidqi because of his pro-Tusun proclivities. Zaghlul’s followers were also opposed to Sidqi’s inclusion, but he refused to be rejected. Sidqi, possessing considerable persuasive skills (and self-interest), convinced Zaghlul he wanted to help in the effort to secure Egyptian independence. At this time, Zaghlul was still apprehensive that Tusun would form another delegation under the leadership of Muhammad Sa‘id. [21] Anxious to avoid splits which would weaken the Egyptian case when it was presented to the British, Zaghlul sent Mahmud to Tusun and Sa‘id in order to persuade them not to form a second délégation. Mahmud and Fahmi both resolutely refused to consider anyone but Zaghlul as president of the delegation. Zaghlul’s leadership was already recognized by the time Hamad al-Basil began, on November 18, to circulate petitions urging the dispatch of a delegation, under Zaghlul, to present Egyptian grievances before the Paris Peace Conference. The petitions had been formulated several days earlier. Hamad al-Basil’s inclusion in the top echelon of leadership was a wise one as he was a former member of the Legislative Assembly and the only tribal leader in Wafdist higher circles. From Fayum, of badu origins, al-Basil remained in the Wafd except for six months in 1921, and was usually a member of the High Command. On November 20, Zaghlul, as Vice President of the Legislative Assembly, asked for passports for a Wafd Committee of Fourteen. The request was repeated on November 23 after no response had been received. The Committee of Fourteen included: Zaghlul, Sha'rawi, Fahmi, Muhammad ‘Ali (‘Aluba), Ism a‘il Sidqi, Mahmud Abu al-Nasr, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Dr Hafiz ‘Afifi, a former member of the Hizb al-Watani, Sinut Hanna, Muhammad Mahmud, ‘Abd al-Latif al-Makabati, Hamad al-Basil, George Khayyat, and Mustafa al-Nahhas. [22] Nahhas had been recruited by Yusuf Amin who was married to Zaghlul’s niece. A number of these men had been enlisted after Tusun and his..supporters had agreed not to form an opposing delegation. The Committee included former members of the Hizb al-Watani, Nahhas and ‘Afifi. The inclusion of Nationalist party members had earlier bothered Zaghlul who was fearful of their pro-Turkish and German reputations. 82

riU: C REATION OF THE WAFD

Al-Hizb al-Watani, the old nationalist party, had an organized leadership, but had been weakened by the disarray of its higher party leaders, many of whom were closely watched by British intelligence. The Hizb al-Watani was active in Europe, particularly in neutral Switzerland, but also had cells in Paris and exerted political pressure in Turkey and London — particularly among students. In fact, late in October Isma‘il Kamil, head of the exiled nationalists in Berne, had sent Balfour a petition from the Nation­ alist Party Committee in support of President Wilson’s program. It contained a plea for Egyptian independence and remarked that “ the ancient land of the Pharoahs would not remain in the chains of Britain, but that she will rise from this war free and mistress of her own destiny.’’ f23] Since the petition originated from nationalists in exile, the British ignored the warning. However, Zaghlul recognized the rivalry with the Nationalist party and was eager, if at all possible, to diminish its potential. As most Nationalist party members were far more radical and outspoken in their refusal to compromise with the British, they were dubious of Zaghlul’s moderation. However, the Nationalist members faced the reality that Zaghlul’s dele­ gation had the means, in terms of prestige and finances, to mobilize the country. Some of the membership split with Zaghlul over his moderation, but lacking second level support among urban professionals, and in rural areas, the Nationalist party was unable to pose meaningful competition against the Wafd in the ensuing events. In addition to the Nationalist party members who joined ranks, the Committee of Fourteen included key members of the Coptic community. Sinut Hanna was the first Copt to join the Wafd and he was immediately followed by George Khayyat. Before joining, Hanna asked Zaghlul, “ What will happen to the Copts after independence?’’ Zaghlul replied, “ We will be equal with no difference.’’ f24] Pleased with the answer, Hanna and Khayyat pledged their support. From a wealthy landowning Asyut family, Hanna had also been a member of the Legislative Assembly. His cousin, George Khayyat, was similarly from a wealthy landowning family. Muhammad ‘Ali ‘Aluba Bey, who was generally known simply as Muhammad ‘Ali, was a member of the Legislative Assembly and was a lawyer by profession. He was to split, along with 83

THE WAFD

Makabati, Mahmud, Sidqi, and Fahmi in 1921 to join the Liberal Constitutionalists. He, too, came from a wealthy landowning family. Mahmud Abu al-Nasr, lawyer, had been President of the Barristers’ Association, and was from a landowning family in Minufiyya. Isma‘il Sidqi, born in Alexandria in 1875, was from an extremely wealthy family. His father, a supporter of the Khedive, had been appointed Governor of Cairo. Sent to French schools, Sidqi attended law school and eventually entered the civil service where he worked in the Ministry of Interior. He was Minister of Agriculture in the Rushdi Ministry until forced to resign owing to a scandal involving a woman and money. A close friend of Fu’ad, Sidqi was eventually to use his Palace connections to attain the position of Prime Minister. He was known among Egyptians and Englishmen as a clever but unscrupulous politician. [25] Dr Hafiz ‘Afifi was a Cairene pediatrician who gained popularity for his service in the Red Crescent. His inclusion was important as he had been a member of the Hizb al-Watani. ‘Abd al-Latif al-Makabati, member of the Legislative Assembly, came from an old and respected landowning family in Gharbiyya. Another key addition to the Wafd’s membership was Mustafa al-Nahhas, who became Zaghlul’s right hand man and eventual leader of the Wafd. A lawyer by training, Nahhas was born in 1879 in Samanud. Unlike most of the other Wafdists, Nahhas came from a merchant family of moderate means. He was a noted judge in Tanta, and had been outspokenly critical of British policies. Amin Yusuf, a former member of the Hizb al-Watani and a relative of Zaghlul’s, suggested Nahhas as a possible candidate for Wafdist membership; he invited Nahhas to join during a conver­ sation in Groppi’s. After Zaghlul provided financial assistance for Nahhas to continue the support of his sister and her family, Nahhas readily joined the Wafd. Thus, of the fourteen original Wafdists, seven had been in the Legislative Assembly, twelve had substantial land holdings, and nine were professionals. Eight of the latter were lawyers, while ‘Afifi was the only doctor. Of the land holders, only Hanna, Khayyat, and al-Basil actually resided on their land while the rest were absentee landowners, collecting rents from the fellahin and periodically visiting to ensure that their holdings were efficiently directed. Geographically, the members represented a good cross-

THE C REATION OF THE WAFD

section of Egypt, and therefore could initiate support and action from all over the Egyptian countryside. The Wafdists were consequently in an excellent position to rally Egyptian villagers, many of whom were controlled financially and by tradition by key Egyptian families. With a substantial membership from the Legislative Assembly, the Wafd could also claim to be a represen­ tative body, many of whose members had been duly elected by local constituencies. Their economic and educational backgrounds made the Wafd leadership an elite one by any standards. In addition, the wives of the Wafd members were also usually of high social standing. Indeed, in many cases the wives were of higher social standing than their husbands. As such, the Wafd members were individuals of high socio-economic status, who were upwardly mobile. [26] In short, the Wafd leadership was composed of individuals who wished to attain control over Egypt’s political and economic institutions; they were nationalists in that they aspired to lead an independent Egypt, free from British domination. They anticipated that once the British were ousted, they would assume the authority over the important Egyptian governing institutions. The early Wafdists were not revolution­ aries or extremists, nor did they initially have any programs for social, agricultural, or economic reforms. What they desired above all was an Egypt free of the British, so that they, as the elite, could wrest control of the dominant decision-making roles. In summary, the Wafd leaders were bourgeois nationalists. As the Wafd had the support of the key Egyptian leaders, with economic power, and a unity of Muslims and Copts, other political groups had little hope of posing effective opposition to Wafdist domination. Consequently, by the middle of November, Tusun’s opposition to Zaghlul had clearly dissipated. Another cause of his acceptance of a secondary role was the Sultan’s antagonism. Since Tusun had a claim to the throne, Fu’ad was extremely sensitive to any attempts by the Prince to become active in political circles. For this reason, Fu’ad himself ordered Rushdi to cancel Tusun’s proposed meeting of Egyptian princes and notables originally scheduled for November 16. [27] After the cancellation, Tusun held a smaller soirée attended solely by princes on November 19. On this occasion, Tusun told his guests that Zaghlul should be given a free hand because the majority of the people supported him. He suggested that the princes aid Zaghlul’s 85

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efforts, noting that the ex-Khedive ‘Abbas was working along the same lines. The latter remark indicates that there was a rivalry for political power among the potential heirs to the throne, and that Tusun, if not openly supporting ‘Abbas’ return, was at least still in contact with the ex-Khedive. While awaiting their passports, Zaghlul and the Committee of Fourteen began a campaign to legitimize the movement by gaining the support of the members of the Legislative Assembly and provincial leaders. They circulated a pledge to the members of the Legislative Assembly which stated that the signatories appointed Zaghlul, Sha‘rawi, ‘Abd al-Latif al-Makabati, Muhammad Mahmud, and Lutfi al-Sayyid to act on behalf of the Assembly in seeking Egyptian independence. The pledge authorized the delegation to proceed to the Peace Conference directly. It ended on the note that £10,000 had already been given to subsidize the delegation. This was, of course, Sha‘rawi’s earlier donation. A similar pledge was circulated among the Provincial Councils and members of the Municipal and Local Councils; this pledge also included the names of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Fahmi and Muhammad ‘Ali Bey. [28] Ironically, this pledge, which was forwarded to the British and which was kept on file, has a large hole in it where an ‘umda, after hearing that the British opposed those who signed the document, put his thumb through his signature. The British ingenuously took this to indicate that the Egyptians were not sincere in their demands for independence. [29] Because it war> impossible to hold elections under Martial Law, Zaghlul’s supporters resorted to petitions to gain mass support, as the British were determined not to recall that body which they knew would be openly and vocally hostile to the continued occu­ pation. That the delegation was able to circulate these petitions among large segments of the population indicated that they were already fairly well organized prior to November 21 when the British finally forbade further distribution of the petitions. These aforementioned petitions received widespread circulation among the rural masses by the ‘umdas .and other provincial leaders whose support was gathered by Wafd members who were also members of the Legislative Assembly and therefore had provincial constituencies upon which to rely. They also had the aid of both the Association of Lawyers and students. Within the ten days between November 13 to November 23 they gathered approx86

THE CREATION OF THE WAFD

imately 100,000 signatures or about ten percent of the male population — a large sample of the Egyptian populace. Interestingly, when these authorizations (tawkils) were first circulated, the delegation had not yet formulated a definite program. The Wafd’s program of twenty-six articles was not officially signed until November 23. The first article defined the primary aim of the Wafd as gaining Egyptian independence. [30] The Wafd derived its authority from the nationalists of Egypt (Article 2). Here again the Wafd leadership was interested in legitimizing its movement by basing it on the support of the people. In this, the Wafd leaders clearly reflected their inclination toward western parliamentary forms and political systems. The Wafd was to last until independence was gained and was to dis­ band thereafter (Article 3). The early Wafd was not therefore a political party in the western interpretation of a party working towards getting and keeping political power. The Wafd, in its initial stages, was definitely a movement led by an Egyptian social and economic elite for the purpose of gaining independence from the British. Members joined by taking an oath and could be expelled by a three-fourths vote, or could resign (Articles 6 and 7). If a member resigned no money would be refunded. Members could visit locations in Egypt, but had to pay their own expenses (Articles 9 and 21). No member was to talk publicly of political matters before the delegation had discussed the policies to be taken (Article 20). There was to be a paid clerical staff, and funds would be collected from donations (Articles 23 and 24). The president was empowered with broad executive duties (Article 13), while the other articles dealt with delineating terms of member­ ship and the structure of the organization. Importantly, the Wafd was to ask only for complete independence (Article 5). Although the document makes several mentions of rules concerning internal party finances, it does not deal with any internal Egyptian financial or domestic issues. The program did not spell out any Egyptian reforms, what structure the future independent government was to take, nor did it state a political ideology. It was in this sense merely a document which stated the sole aim of the Wafd as securing independence for Egypt. When the British heard of the spreading enthusiasm for ending the Protectorate, the internal Inspectors were ordered to stop all gossip concerning independence! Through such repression — 87

THE WAFD

impossible to effectuate by any means — the British hoped to halt the mounting influence of the Wafd. The British advisor to the Ministry of Interior, Haines, subsequently spoke with Sha'rawi, Lutfi al-Sayyid, Hamad al-Basil, and Fahmi in an attempt to persuade them to stop circulating the tawkils. Keown-Boyd also attempted to coerce Hamad al-Basil to desist from his nationalist activities. Al-Basil, like his friends, refused to bow to British pressure. [31] The Wafd was determined to campaign for support among members of the Legislative Assembly, private individuals, and through the Egyptian press. In late November and early December the press issued a series of articles supporting independence, and the forthcoming Peace Conference. To escape the strict censorship, the journalists resorted to veiled criticism of various social ills and economic problems faced by the Egyptian nation. Journalists wrote long .articles bemoaning the problems facing Egypt, but avoiding the direct issue of the Protectorate and the British occupation. Such subterfuges were necessary under Martial Law which consider­ ably muzzled freedom of expression. While the nationalist forces in Egypt were determined to use every method available to gain independence, the Foreign Office became more resolved to reject Zaghlul and his delegation. The British refused to believe that Zaghlul represented the so-called “ responsible elements” within Egypt, nor were they prepared to take time out from the Peace Conference preparations to nego­ tiate. Moreover, Britain had no intention of giving the nationalists an opportunity to appear before the Peace Conference, as such an appearance would have been embarrassing. In Cairo, Wingate as High Commissioner was caught between the growing nationalist sentiment and the opposition to it in London. He had to operate between these two poles, trying to placate each side and attempting the impossible task of bringing the two contradictory sides closer together. Wingate’s job was not facilitated by the obdurate stand of many of his own advisers who were strongly opposed to Egyptian nationalism in any shape or form. Brunyate, the Financial and Judicial Adviser-,-went so far as to advocate a constitution allowing for the creation of a bicameral legislature with European representation in the Upper Chamber. Before submitting this proposal, Brunyate conferred with Rushdi who made no comment. In his arrogant fashion, Brunyate took 88

THE CREATION OF THE WAFD

Rushdi’s silence as assent for the plan. Actually nothing could have been further from the truth, for Brunyate’s proposals were a key factor in precipitating Rushdi’s resignation as Prime Minister. Wingate dutifully forwarded Brunyate’s scheme to London, but was dubious as to its efficacy. He was rightly convinced that the current outbreak of nationalist pressure could not be as easily repressed as previous ones had been. Then, too, because Wingate believed that the nationalists were honestly stating their goals and were not revolutionaries, he was inclined to think that negotiations could be fruitful. Officials in the Foreign Office disagreed. The group of politicians in London responsible for Egyptian policy were aware that discontent existed within Egypt, but were convinced that it was a temporary mood which would quickly fade. Zaghlul and his delegation were not content to wait until the conclusion of the Peace Conference for their demands to be considered, and did not delay in augmenting their support. When the petitions authorizing Zaghlul and the Committee to proceed to Europe were stopped and confiscated by the British authorities, the nationalists, led by Zaghlul, who signed himself Vice President of the Legislative Assembly and President of the Egyptian Dele­ gation, promptly complained. They also sent a series of telegrams to President Wilson and Prime Minister Lloyd George protesting their treatment and demanding independence. Since all mail passed through British censorship, the British were keenly aware of the Wafd’s tactics. Although the Foreign Office took steps to ensure that the United States did not answer Zaghlul, they allowed the messages to be sent. Wingate, too, was inundated with numerous letters and statements supporting the nationalist cause. With few exceptions, this correspondence, even when written by Copts, upon whom the British had traditionally relied, was favor­ able to Zaghlul. The Wafdist leaders had carefully orchestrated the sending of petitions and letters as yet another means of forcing the British to recognize the legitimacy of their movement. In response to this expression of public support and fearful of reports that there was growing nationalist sentiment in the schools and in the Delta towns like Tanta, Wingate advised that Zaghlul be permitted to leave Egypt. Wingate was worried lest nationalist sentiments escalate into public demonstrations, which under Martial Law would have been treated as seditious acts. However, at this juncture, there is no indication that Zaghlul or the Wafd in 89

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general considered employing force to secure Egyptian demands. Rather, they were desirous of working through peaceful channels and wished to negotiate openly with the British. The long awaited reply which refused permission for Zaghlul and the Wafd to leave Egypt was sent from London on November 27, 1918, arriving in Cairo on the following day. The telegram stated that the British government was anxious to grant increasing autonomy to Egypt, but that the time for such freedom had not yet arrived. The decision was based on the assumption that negotiations with Egyptian leaders were futile. The British position was clear — they would not, under any circumstances, negotiate with Zaghlul. As a moderating gesture, the British consented to invite Rushdi and ‘Adli to London at some unspecified date. Wingate then had the unpleasant task of informing Zaghlul that his request had been rejected, but that he was welcome to address his complaints to the Residency. When told of the refusal, Zaghlul demanded to know the reasons. No clear-cut reply to this question was forthcoming from the Residency. Insulted by the pre-emptory tone of the British offer to confer at some unspecified date in the future, and with his political reputation eroded by British rejection and increased power of the Wafd, Rushdi resigned from his position as Prime Minister. He simultaneously objected to Brunyate’s proposed constitution which, in his view, allowed for the annexation of Egypt — not for its independence. In his letter of resignation of December 2, Rushdi explained that the refusal to permit. Egyptians to discuss their status in London had forced him to conclude he could no longer act as Prime Minister. In concurrence, ‘Adli submitted his resignation as Minister of Education. Wingate rushed to confer with Fu’ad who grumbled that the resignations would cause an increase of nationalist effusion, which Wingate incorrectly held had been artificially engineered. On December 4, Wingate saw Fu’ad and Rushdi. who reaffirmed his determination to resign. Rushdi also noted that he had been accused of treason for accept­ ing the continuation of the Protectorate by one segment of the Egyptian population. Wingate urged Fu’ad to delay accepting Rushdi’s resignation in hopes that he could be persuaded to change his mind. Rushdi’s resignation precipitated a chain of interviews between the leading pro-British Egyptians and British officials. These 90

THE CREATION OF THE WAFD

interviews had one goal — to convince Rushdi to withdraw his resignation. In the course of these interviews complaints over tax Inspectors, untrustworthy mudirs, and wartime abuses were frequently voiced. These grievances plainly contributed to the eagerness with which all classes of Egyptians lent support to the Wafd. ‘Adli told Wingate that Zaghlul did not expect to obtain all of his demands, but felt that he had to ask for the maximum. [32] However, the interviews failed to change Rushdi’s position. As Haines remarked, the British had “ lost a really good Prime Minister for just — nothing at all.” [33] Refusing to admit defeat, Wingate and his staff continued their attempts to convince Rushdi and ‘Adli to reconsider. Other members of the Ministry, Isma‘il Sirri Pasha, Minister of War, and Yusuf Wahba, Minister of Finance, talked with them, but to no avail. Rushdi was convinced that the British Government had lost faith in him, nor could he realistically remain as Prime Minister when the majority of Egyptians were demanding independence, an issue the British refused to discuss. Rather than accept the reality of Wafdist power, the Foreign Office blamed Wingate for failing to control both Fu’ad and the nationalists. Wingate complained that the Foreign Office was being unfair because he had always made it a policy to talk with Egyptians when they had requested interviews. Later he justified his position because, “ there is an axiom of Egyptian Administration that if Orientals are refused a hearing, assurances avail not . . . they turn sulky, then desperate. The ‘Hall of Audience’ has always been a feature of Mohammadan rule.’’ [34] Indeed, Wingate offered to resign if the Foreign Office was no longer satisfied with his work. However, Wingate’s “ resignation’’ was in no manner an official one, and was not couched in strong language. Wingate was satisfied with the reassurance that the Foreign Office placed every confidence in his work and looked forward to seeing him in the near future. Despite British pressure, Rushdi refused to withdraw his resignation, and the Egyptian government continued without a Prime Minister. British officials had by this time gathered a fairly complete list of the Egyptian nationalists and their affiliations. The officials were alarmed by the inclusion of names of govern­ ment workers and promptly ordered that these individuals be 91

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warned that their activities endangered their jobs. To minimize nationalist reactions, Wingate proposed that the British should issue a declaration of intent. The Foreign Office vetoed this idea as it was anxious to prevent, at all costs, a discussion of the legal status of Egypt at the Peace Conference. Since most of the Allied powers had already accepted the Protectorate, only the Central powers remained, and they would be required to accept the Protectorate at the Conference. As Balfour and his staff were to attend the Conference, to which the Egyptians were definitely not welcome, the Foreign Office saw no reason for the delegation to leave Egypt. This approach seemed logical in London, but in Egypt, where -feelings were intensifying, it was impossible to justify. In a conversation with Fu’ad on December 12, Wingate was told that the Egyptians had expected strong foreign support for their struggle. The refusal of Great Britain to consider the question of independence had been a great shock to the Wafd leadership. Fu’ad, playing a double game, offered to talk with Rushdi to emphasize the willingness of the Foreign Office officials to talk after the Conference. Rushdi retorted that the Egyptians wanted immediate negotiations, and would consider him a traitor if he agreed to wait. For “ reasons of conscience’’ he was compelled to resign and was supported by ‘Adli. [351 Faced with the intransi­ gent attitude of the Ministers, Wingate finally had to face the fact that the Ministers were determined to resign. Wingate frankly stated that Rushdi had been forced to resign because he could not withstand growing nationalist pressure. Even this blunt statement on the popularity of the Egyptian nationalists failed to awaken the officials in London to the fact that the Wafd was a serious threat to British dominance. Officials persisted in describing Zaghlul as a leader who had no support from the fellahin and as an “ adventurer . . . playing his own hand.’’ [36] In attempt to circumvent the dilemma, Sirri suggested that Rushdi and ‘Adli go to London, but be detained in Paris for a few weeks. (This suggestion shows how far removed Sirri was from the motivations of British officials, whose main desire — above all others — was to prevent the subject of Egyptian-British relations from being raised at the Paris Conference.) Naturally, the officials in London rejected this proposal. The Foreign Office leadership could not accept that the Wafd was not a revival of the old national92

THE CREATION OF THE WAFD

ist party, but was a new, far more potent force which had been seeded by the War, the Arab revolt, and by grievances against the British occupation. While Wingate vainly struggled to change the disastrous Foreign Office policy, Rushdi and ‘Adli became impatient because their resignations had been held in abeyance for three weeks. Finally, on December 31, the Foreign Office wired that the Ministers could come to London, with no stops in Paris, in February. This was obviously not satisfactory to Rushdi, and was certainly not satisfactory to Zaghlul. Meanwhile, in London, most of the key Foreign Office officials, led by A.J. Balfour, left for the Paris Peace Conference. In their absence George Curzon was left in charge. Curzon had a well deserved reputation for driving hard work and a stubborn personality reflecting arrogance and a complete assurance in the wisdom of his own judgements. Once in power at the Foreign Office, Curzon immediately demanded a full history of the Egyp­ tian problem. He was to be largely responsible for decisions made in London during those crucial months prior to the Egyptian 1919 revolution. Curzon also promptly began to consider Wingate’s proposed journey to London. Others in London, namely Cecil (the brother of Wingate’s old bête noire), were thinking more in terms of Wingate's dismissal than of his temporary absence from Egypt. Indeed, Cecil had already chosen a suitable successor — an individual he was certain had the personality and reputation to deal with the nationalist demands with a firm hand. . . . I spoke to the P.M. and suggested that if Wingate was recalled home Allenby would be a suitable successor. This he warmly approved . . . But the P.M. wanted nothing done which would preclude Wingate’s return to Egypt if that were decided on . . . But I ought to add that everyone to whom I have spoken about W. is confident that he is not up to the job. 1371 As usual, Wingate was kept in the dark concerning the machin­ ations in London. In fact, his correspondence during this time reveals that, although he recognized the seriousness of the situation, he was still optimistic. He told the Foreign Office that 93

THE WAFD

the popularity of the Wafd leadership (always referred to in British documents as “the Nationalists” ) was growing, as their call for independence appealed to thefellahin, who had suffered during the War. Wingate noted that the movement also had the support of the educated classes. Privately, Wingate began to make plans to go to London in late January. By not informing members of his staff of his impending departure, Wingate further alienated those men who already doubted his capabilities. Confident that he could persuade the Foreign Office that the Wafd should be received in London, Wingate impressed upon Rushdi the importance of not telling Zaghlul and his supporters of the impending departure. Wingate told Rushdi that when the travel embargo was lifted, Cheetham would make the necessary arrangement for passports. Undoubtedly, Rushdi was encouraged by Wingate’s optimism and surely reported that information to Zaghlul. Unfortunately, at the very time Wingate was encouraging the Egyptian leaders, the officials at the Foreign Office were becoming increasingly opposed to the nationalists, as A.T. Lloyd’s minute of late January reveals. I gather that S.Z. holds the field, the Sultan says that the Extremists will only take the answer from H.M.G.: the position of the Ministers in the eyes of the Extremists must not be weakened: the Ministers will not come to England unless the Extremists are allowed to come too: the Ministers lay stress upon the importance of conciliating the nationalist party — It is all to be fought out in London — There are objections to such a course, but it may yet prove to be the best solution — to deport S.Z. and Ismail Sidki from Egypt. [38] Because he was convinced that there was no point in talking with Zaghlul, Graham full-heartedly agreed that deportation was probably the best approach. As Wingate made preparations to return to London for the first time since 1914, Allenby wrote that he was glad Wingate would have the opportunity to discuss Egyptian matters in London. He added that he saw eye to eye with Wingate on all Egyptian problems. Accompanied by his wife, Symes, and Mervyn Herbert, 94

THE CREATION OF THE WAFD

Wingate left Cairo on January 21. Before departing, he wrote a note to the Wafd and the Ministers, to the effect that he was going to London, and that, in his absence, which was not to be pro­ longed, Milne Cheetham would act as High Commissioner. Wingate also planned to stop in Paris to confer with Lloyd George, Balfour, and Hardinge. Behind the scenes, Graham continued to agitate for Wingate’s removal. Writing to Hardinge, Graham recounted Wingate’s policy for dealing with nationalist demands. According to Graham, Wingate had used the highly “ irregular” method of private inter­ views with the nationalists in an attempt to halt their growing influence. He advised that the request of the Wafd to leave Egypt be flatly refused. It would surely be better to tell them that their movement is frankly seditious, that we will have nothing to say to it or them, and that we shall not facilitate their journey to Europe in any way. [391 Graham predicted that the Ministers would resign, but felt that it was preferable to face the problem squarely, since the Ministers, once they realized their folly, would reconsider. Hardinge showed the letter to Balfour and wrote an encouraging reply to Graham. Hardinge noted that the past events in Cairo presented: . . . a curious mixture of weakness and a love of doing things behind other people’s backs. I am quite certain you are right in considering that the position ought to be faced squarely and that the movement should be treated as seditious. When the Ministers do come we should be frank and give them “ a good dressing-down” . That is really what they want before we can listen to any schemes of progressive develop­ ment in Egypt. No doubt some progress must be made in Egypt, but it should be on steady lines, not on the lines now advocated for India, which in my opinion constitute too big a jump all at once. If Wingate comes to see me on his way through Paris you may be quite sure that I shall speak perfectly frankly to him in practically the same sense as you have written to me. [40] 95

THE WAFD

Thus the officials in Paris and London had made up their minds, long before Wingate had the opportunity to confer with them, that the nationalists were to be curtly dismissed. Although Wingate certainly did not envisage an acceptance of the program for complete independence (he had staunchly supported the annex­ ation of Egypt), he recognized that the climate of Egyptian opinion in 1919 demanded that some concessions be made. He felt that if properly handled the Wafdist leadership would not be intractable, but could be persuaded to work with the British along moderate lines. However, he was not to have the opportunity to press home this line of argumentation, and events in Egypt were soon to outdistance all moves toward calm and peaceful negotiations. Notes 1. ‘Abbas Mahmud a1-‘Aqqad, Sa'd Zaghlul (Cairo, 1936), p.192. 2. Ibid. Hasan Zayyat, Sa'd Zaghlul min Iqdiyyat (Cairo, 1942), Lashin, *Abd alKhaliq, Sa'd Zaghlul (Cairo, 1971); Fina Gued Vidal, Sofia Zaghloul Sa'd ZaghlouH Paris. 1927). 3. 'Abd al-‘Aziz Fahmi. HadhihiHayati(Cairo, n.d.), p. 72. 4. Sykes report, August 10,1915, CAB17/176. 5. Omar Tusun, Mudhakkarat bima Sadara anna mundhu Fajr al-Haraka alWataniyya al-Misriyya min Sanat 1918 ila Sanat 1928 (Cairo, 1942), p. 6; al-'Aqqad, p. 192, al-‘Aqqad dates the party as October 12; Makram ‘Ubayd as noted in Zaghlul’s memoirs cites the date as October 13, while Shafiq in Hawliyat Misr al-Siyasiyya (n.p. 1926) and Rafi’i in Thawrat Sanat 1919 cite October 9. Also see Fahmi, Hadhihi Hayati; Lutfi al-Sayyid, “ Memoirs” , al-Musawer, November 17, 1950 and al-Ahram Institute, Thawrat 1919 (Cairo, 1973). 6. T u su n .p .192. 7. Wingate note on conversation with Fu’ad, October 12,1918, SA170/3/3. 8. Tusun, p. 7; Makram ‘Ubayd speech in al-Ahram, January 10,1935. 9. Lutfi al-Sayyid. p. 178; Shafiq, pp. 147-48; Graham note on Sha'rawi, November 25,1918, FO371/3204. 10. F0371/3199. On Wingate’s dispatch of August 31,1918 to Balfour. 11. Wingate to Hardinge, October 19,1918, SA170/2/2. 12. Balfour to Civil Commissioner in Baghdad, November 28, 1918, F0371/5227. Louis Mallet, February 7,1919, ‘Genesis of Anglo-French Declaration’, Lothian Papers. GD40-17-37. 13. Alexander to Wingate, March 25, 1919, SA327/10; “ Sa‘d’s Memoirs” , alMusawer, June 19,1936. 14. Makram ‘Ubayd speech, al-Ahram, January 10,1935. ' 15. Tusun. pp. 8-9; Rifa‘i, Thawrat Sanat 1919, p. 76; Shafiq, pp. 148-49. 16. Wingate’s Arabic version of the meeting, SA170/3/2; his English version is in his notes on the political crisis in Egypt, 1918-1920, SA151/8. The two versions are almost identical. Rafi'i, p. 70-72; Fahmi, p. 76; al-‘Aqqad, pp. 194-200; Muhammad Abu al-Fath, al-Mas’ala al-Misriyya wal-Wafd (n.p. n.d.). These versions are remarkably similar in accounting what was said, differing only in reporting who said what. “ Sa‘d’s Memoirs” al-Musawer, January 19,1936.

t h e Ic r e a t i o n Io f t h e ’w a f d

17. Wingate’s Arabic version, SA170/3/2. 18. Wingate to Hardinge, November 14,1918, F0141/773; HPVol. IV (39), 1918. 19. Wingate to Foreign Office, November 17,1918, F0141/773. 20. Tusun, p. 22; ‘Ubayd, al-Ahram, January 10,1935. 21. Ibid., Fahmi, pp. 72-84; Shafiq, p. 150. 22. Ibid., Committee of Fourteen list. Wingate to Foreign Office, November 15, 1918, F0141/773. 23. Isma’il Kamil to Balfour, October 24,1918, F0141/773. 24. “ Sa’d’s Memoirs” al-Musawer, June 19, 1935; ‘Ubayd, al-Ahram, January 19, 1935; Keown-Boyd note on interview with Hamad al-Basil on November 18, 1918; Zaghlul to High Commissioner, November 20,1918; November 23, 1918, FOI 41/810;FOl 41/773. 25. Isma’il Sidqi, Mudhakkarati (Cairo, 1950). 26. Louis Joseph Cantori, The Organizational Basis o f an Elite Political Party: The Egyptian Wafd (PhD, Chicago, 1966). 27. Tusun, p. 17; Haines note to Wingate, November 16,1918, SA170/2. 28. Petition in Arabic with translation, SA170/3/4. R.M. Graves (Inspector) to Keown-Boyd, December 1,1918; ‘Ubayd, al-Ahram, January 10,1935. 29. Wingate to all Inspectors, November 19,1918, FO141/810; Haines to Wingate, November 21. 1918, F0141/773; Residency notes, November 18, 1918, SA 170/3/2. 30. Zaheer Masood Quraishi, Liberal Nationalism in Egypt: Rise and Fall o f the Wafd Party (Allahabad. 1967). 31. Residency note, November 18, 1918, SA170/3/2. 32. Note on Wingate’s conversation with ‘Adli, December 9,1918, F0141/773. 33. Note on Haines’ conversation with Rushdi, December 8,1918, F0141/773. 34. Wingate notes on the Political Crisis in Egypt, 1918-1920, pp. 8-9, SA151/8. 35. Wingate talk with Fu’ad, December 12, 1918, summarized to Balfour, Decem­ ber 14. 1918, F0141/773; Brunyate note on conversations with ‘Adli and Thawraton December 13,1918; submitted December 15,1918, SA171/1. 36. Memorandum on Zaghlul, December 22,1918, FO371/3204. 37. Cecil to Balfour. January 4,1919, Balfour Papers, F0800/215. 38. A.T. Lloyd minute on Wingate dispatch of January 16, 1919, written on January 30.1919, F0371/3711. 39. Graham to Hardinge, January 22,1919, HP, Vol. II (40), 1919. 40. Hardinge to Graham. January 24,1919, HP, Vol. II (40), 1919.

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At six o’clock on the evening of March 8, British troops arrested Sa‘d Zaghlul, Isma'il Sidqi, Muhammad Mahmud, and Hamad al-Basil, throwing them in cells in Qasr al-Nil prison. The next day they were deported to Malta. The exile of these four key Wafdist leaders led to student demonstrations which soon escalated into massive strikes by students, government officials, professionals, women, and transport workers. Within a week, all of Egypt from Tanta to Asyut was paralyzed by general strikes and rioting. Railway and telegraph lines were cut, taxi drivers refused to work, lawyers failed to appear for court cases, and thefellahin marched through the streets shouting pro-Wafdist slogans and demanding independence. Violence resulted, with many Egyptians and Euro­ peans being killed or injured when the British attempted to crush the demonstrations. European quarters and citizens were singled out for attacks by angry crowds who had disliked the special privileges and economic benefits accorded foreigners in Egypt. Then on March 18 on the Luxor-Minya railway, a group of English­ men were attacked by a mob in Deirut. Crying “Ingleezi, Ingleezi,” the crowd vented its frustration by rushing the carriage where British officers were sitting. In the ensuing melée Alexander Pope Bey, British Inspector of Govern­ ment Prisons, and several British officers were killed. The mob then mutilated their corpses. The British were shocked and scared by the intense fury shown by the Egyptians, and extracted full vengeance. Scores of Egyptians were rounded up by the British in retaliation for the Deirut attack; 88 were tried, with 34 executed, a number imprisoned, and with one young boy given ten strokes. The demonstrations revealed the determination of Egyptians to secure their independence. The violent incidents occurred as 98

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thousands raged against the foreign occupation. The revolution of 1919 removed the veil of seeming submission. It belied the generation of passivity which the English had deluded themselves into believing connoted acceptance of the regime. Whereas the English, in typical imperial fashion, thought the Egyptians had benefited from their “ benevolent” rule and, indeed, owed them a debt of gratitude for bringing western civilization and technology to Egypt, the Egyptians hated being dominated and manipulated economically by foreign non-Muslims who generally treated them as second-class citizens in their own country. In the weeks prior to this arrest, Zaghlul had worked hard to mold the Wafdist organization, which, as events turned out, proved to be an efficient organ for directing the movement after his exile. In January, Zaghlul quietly made a brief tour of Egypt, going as far south as Asyut, where he was well received and collected money from the wealthy Copts. Zaghlul’s activities had two main functions: to consolidate support for the Wafd through­ out Egypt, and to secure a solid financial base for its activities. In addition, other Wafdists traveled through the countryside, collecting funds and eliciting support. Once the revolution began, these foundations held firm, and offered a smooth transition from Zaghlul’s direct control to local leaders who could direct antiBritish activities and continue to collect funds. Hamad al-Basil was particularly energetic in the weeks prior to his exile. In mid-January he held a “ tea party” for 150 which served as a forum for Zaghlul to speak on Wafdist goals. Zaghlul spoke eloquently on the subject of Egyptian independence, while emphasizing that the Sudan had to be regarded as the very heart of Egypt. This point was, of course, to be a major stumbling block in Egyptian-British negotiations for the next forty years. Zaghlul then read telegrams the Wafd had sent to the United States, pointing out that the Egyptians wanted to align themselves firmly behind Wilsonian principles. He argued for Egyptian control of its own finances, the neutrality of the Suez Canal, and for consti­ tutional government. Zaghlul did not mention the Sultan, which agitated Fu’ad. In conclusion, Zaghlul stated that the rights of foreigners would be respected in an independent Egypt. Later, other meetings, on a fairly large scale, were held by the Wafdists, in spite of the fact that under Martial Law political gatherings were forbidden.

THEWAFD

In February, Zaghlul invited 600 Egyptians for a public meeting in tents, but this was banned by the acting High Commissioner, Milne Cheetham. On the anniversary of Mustafa Kamil’s death, masses of Egyptians gathered at the nationalist’s tomb, shouting “ Long live Independence.’’ They then marched around Cairo gathering more supporters. Ultimately several dozen arrests, mostly of students, were made, and the crowd was dispersed. In spite of clear evidence to the contrary, Cheetham remarked that there was no question of further disturbances. [1] At this time Cheetham was either determined not to face the reality of Egyptian nationalism, or was telling officials in London what they wanted to hear. As late as February 24, Cheetham was saying that Zaghlul had no supporters, that the agitation was dying out, and that the movement could not be compared in importance to that of Mustafa Kamil’s earlier political struggle. [2] However, even the U.S. military mission in Egypt, which was small and generally ill-informed, reported the real possibility of armed disturbances. To this warning, Graham fatuously replied that the “ American Military Authority imagine Egypt is ‘seething’ when in reality she is only ‘teething’.’’ [3] Graham reiterated that Rushdi and ‘Adli could come to London, but that the “ Nationalist leaders’’ (by which he meant Zaghlul) were not invited. The rejection placed Rushdi and ‘Adli in an untenable position and they reiterated their resignations. This caused Cheetham to do a complete volte face and announce that there was no possibility of avoiding a political crisis. [4] But the Foreign Office insisted that events would turn in British favor and that a new government could be formed. Consequently, Fu’ad accepted the resignations on March 2 and he then saw Yusuf Wahba, ‘Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat, and Isma‘il Sirri to persuade them to form a new government. Contrary to British protestations, the Wafdist leaders were certainly not displeased by Rushdi’s and ‘Adli’s resignations. Indeed, their resignations reflected favorably on the Wafd’s own influence. The Wafd was, however, determined not to let the Sultan take advantage of the situation to aggrandize his own position. To force the Sultan’s hand, the Wafd sent Fu’ad a petition with fifteen signatures (Sha‘rawi was first on the list and Zaghlul last). The petition demanded that the case of Egyptian independence be placed before the Peace Conference. In pre100

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emptory terms the petition informed Fu’ad that the Protectorate was null and void and that the signatories were certain that he had only accepted to become Sultan under the Protectorate owing to wartime exigencies. The petition concluded on the note that there was not a soul in the country who did not désire indepen­ dence and appeal for Fu’ad’s support in the struggle. [5] The blunt tone of the petition offended Fu’ad, who sensed that the Wafd was, in fact, challenging his authority. Fearful of losing his dominance, Fu’ad promptly complained to British officials. Cheetham went so far as to observe that in England the petition would have been libelous. The British then had the G.O.C. General Watson write to all the signatories warning them that “ any a c t. . . tending to impede the conduct of the Administration will render you liable to severe measures under Martial Law.’’ [6] This was only a preamble to Zaghlul’s eventual arrest. None of the British really believed that the warning would make the Wafdist leaders desist from their activities. Cheetham was forced to admit he could not control Zaghlul and asked for permission to exile the key Wafdists, particularly Zaghlul. The Foreign Office readily agreed, but ordered Cheetham not to include Fahmi, who, evidently, the officials thought could be a moderating force, or was of too great a stature to be treated in such a fashion. Nor was Cheetham to arrest any more nationalists than judged absolutely necessary. The impending arrests were common knowledge among the British in Cairo. The arrests probably came as little surprise to Zaghlul for he had stopped writing in his diary immediately after Watson’s warnings lest the British confiscate important infor­ mation concerning the Wafd. [7] Safia Zaghlul was out visiting sick friends when Zaghlul and his compatriots, Sidqi, al-Basil and Mahmud, were arrested on March 8. Upon returning to Beit al-Umma, she immediately telephoned the British Residency to ascertain the truth. She announced that both she and Zaghlul offered their lives for their nation. [8] The next morning, the British shipped the four Wafd leaders to Malta where other Egyptian dissidents had been detained for the duration of the War. As soon as the news of the exile spread, Sha'rawi, Lutfi al-Sayyid, and Fahmi rushed to see Safia. She told them not to consider her as a woman but as a militant Wafdist. She was also prepared to travel wherever her husband was sent. 101

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The Wafd quickly began to formalize its plans for appropriate responses to the arrests, and to take measures to gain the prompt release of the leaders. In Zaghlul’s absence, Sha'rawi temporarily assumed command. He immediately sent a telegram, framed by Lutfi, to Lloyd George and Sultan Fu’ad to protest the arrests. Within 24 hours, the news of Zaghlul’s exile had spread throughout the countryside. Egyptians poured out into the streets protesting the arrests and demanding independence. With supporters throughout Egypt, the Wafd was soon to harness this energy behind its program. But ,with the narrow vision of the committed, Cheetham wired London that the arrest would check the independence movement and that the **administration of the country [was] in no way affected by the crisis.” [9] This telegram had not even reached London before its contents were no longer applicable to the Egyptian situation. Wafd leaders met in al*Azhar on March 9 to call for a general strike. The arrests sparked a noisy demonstration at the Higher Colleges and this spread by March 10 to all Cairo schools. The students first marched to Beit al-Umma where Fahmi urged them to go home. The striking students were soon followed by workers and lawyers. Clashes between students and the army promptly resulted in several student deaths, with Mustafa Amin falling as the first Egyptian martyr to the 1919 revolution. [10] In Tanta similar strikes caused the British, on March 12, to send troops to stop the rioting. Fahmi was apprehensive that the agitation would get out of hand. Later he became upset by news that demonstrators were breaking into Armenian quarters and killing people. He felt that such ill-directed violence would harm the Egyptian cause, and advocated the arrest and jailing of demonstrators caught engaging in such activities. In addition, he argued that the Wafd should exercise discipline to direct the nationalist movement along sound principles. [11] By March 11, telegraph and railway lines had been disrupted and often cut. Schools throughout the country, with the exception of the British administered private Victoria College in Alexandria where students were completely isolated from nationalist trends, closed as students refused to attend classes. Additional armed opposition to the strikers caused still more deaths. Fahmi moving­ ly described seeing demonstrators lying on Cairo streets. As an 102

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ambulance carried off one dying young man, he screamed his last words, “Yahia al-Watan” “ Long live the nation.” [12] British attempts to halt the disturbances escalated hostilities as armed clashes caused many casualties and deaths. The British were eager to assuage the countryside in order to restore com­ munication lines, but when they sent out soldiers, they were attacked by villagers and by badu who, whenever possible, confiscated British weapons and ammunition. [13] Several locales, such as al-Mina, went so far as to declare themselves republics. Al-Mina was governed for a short time by its chosen president, Mahmud ‘Abd al-Raziq. The people in Zifta set up a republic under a Revolutionary Council which was headquartered in the local coffee house. These republics were uniformly of short duration; [14] General Huddleston, with his Sudanese troops, put down the Mina government by March 30. As the strikes and demonstrations paralyzed communication lines in Egypt, the British became increasingly unable to restore order. The Wafd continued to push its advantage in order to mobilize the entire nation. On March 16, for the first time in modern Middle East history, Egyptian women staged a political march through the streets of Cairo. They threw off their veils, waved banners, and called for independence. The women were led by Safia Zaghlul, Huda Sha'rawi and Muna Fahmi Wissa. The British tried to discredit the latter by calling her demented. The husbands of these women were active in the Wafd, and most came from wealthy landowning families who had provided them with fairly good educations. Others such as Ihsan Ibrahim, Gamella Fahmi, Regine Khayyat, and Hayat Nureddin joined the march. The Women of Egypt Society was to assume an important role in forcing its opinions into the forefront, and in maintaining the Wafd program before the public eye. They were also among the first Third World women to assume an active role in the political struggle of their nation. These women went on to join the inter­ national women’s movement in the 1920’s and were in the vanguard of the feminist struggle. The women’s march preceded the March 17 demonstration which was the largest of the 1919 revolution. Over 10,000 teachers, students, workers, lawyers, and government employees started marching at al-Azhar and wound their way to Abdin Palace where they were joined by thousands more who ignored British road103

THEWAFD

blocks and bans. Makram ‘Ubayd, a Copt who was to become second in command of the Wafd, wrote that at the time, all classes and religions supported the Revolution. [15] Soon, similar demon­ strations broke out in Alexandria, Tanta, Damanhur, Mansur, and Fayum. In all of these locations, the British vainly tried to halt the growing nationalist sentiments, but their attempts met with violent confrontations and bloodshed, like the aforementioned Deirut incident. The newspapers reported the demonstrations and were generally favorable to them. Only al-Muqattam, the noted proBritish journal, demeaned the demonstrators charging that they were “ riff-raff.” Al-Muqattam received full British support, while pro-nationalist organs such as al-Nizam, al-Ahram, and others, were frequently censored, but continued to publish owing to Wafdist financial backing. Sha‘rawi was in charge of the High Command which oversaw and co-ordinated all Wafdist activities. Separate cells were located in Egyptian provinces and urban centers. Although British intelligence referred to these as Soviets, the cells were not in any way related to the Bolshevik party. Mosques were the main centers of political activity, while the General Strike Committee was directed by Wafdist lawyers in the Justice Department. Al-Azhar was a focal point of command in Cairo; its students were mobilized to implement assigned tasks. The most important cell was the Central Committee (lajna markaziyya) in Cairo which was under the direction of Mahmud Sulayman. Like other leaders, Sulayman was a landowner and had even been an ‘umda. Ibrahim Sa‘id acted as treasurer, Mahmud Abu al-Hasan, Secretary, and ‘Abd al-Rahman Fahmi was Secretary-General. Ibrahim Sa‘id was also a landowner, while ‘Abd al-Rahman was an activist and perhaps the most radical of the Wafdist leaders. ‘Abd al-Rahman, a close associate of Zaghlul’s, was responsible for organizing the strikes which closed businesses and stopped communications. His arrest and eventual trial was to become a cause célèbre among Egyptian nationalists. The Central Committee was composed of 44 Egyptians with the chain of command passing downwards as key leaders were arrested and jailed. Committees of students were also organized, as were priests and Muslim religious leaders, particularly the Shaykhs of al-Azhar who kept in the foreground by their advocacy 104

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of nationalist causes in the Friday talks in mosques throughout Egypt. Indeed, the Shaykh of al-Azhar, Abu Fadl, along with several other leading religious figures, personally visited the Residency on March 15 to urge the acceptance of Wafdist demands. Lutfi al-Sayyid directed a similar plea to the Advisor of the Interior. That government workers joined the strikes was particularly worrisome to the Foreign Office officials, who demanded that the workers either return to their offices or be fired. Lutfi al-Sayyid, who had worked for the government, had already left his post; at this time, Makram ‘Ubayd, educated at Oxford, who was employed in the Ministry of Justice, also quit. As his work was widely respected, the British regretted his resignation. The Wafd organized a write-in campaign in which literally hundreds of petitions from all over Egypt, signed by people from all walks of life, poured into the Residency. These demanded the release of Zaghlul and permission for him to travel to the Peace Conference. The finances of the Wafd were equally well organized. Sulayman, Hanna and Khayyat each contributed £3,000 to further the Wafd’s program, but the largest subscriber was Zaghlul himself, who reportedly sold much of his personal property to support the movement. Collection of Wafd subscriptions was carried on in great secrecy lest the British punish the donors. Others, such as government workers, contributed indirectly when their wages were docked by the British for every day they were out on strike. In addition, provincial governments began to contribute. Gharbiyya was the first provincial government to give, but Asyut, with donations approaching £100,000, was the largest single donor. [16] These substantial donations, which totalled almost a million pounds, enabled the Wafd to carry on a vigorous cam­ paign, to publish papers, issue pamphlets and posters, and to pay the expenses of their members once they reached Paris. The political propaganda included posters and leaflets which were distributed all over Egypt. These contained exhortations to the people to demand independence and reiterated that the struggle would continue. Such pamphlets were usually signed by key Wafdists, frequently al-Basil, Sha'rawi, and Khayyat. This political propaganda sometimes took the form of small pamphlets or newsletters, reporting about the arrests and attempts by the 105

THE WAFD

British to form a new ministry without Wafdist participants. Often the pamphlets featured pictures of Zaghlul and Safia. News* papers ran extended features on the lives and philosophies of the Wafd leadership. Soon Zaghlul’s features were familiar to all Egyptians; he was even pictured on envelopes and picture postcards. [17] Much of this material was written in flowery language calculated to arouse passions. It was full of political slogans such as: Long live Egypt! Long live Egypt! Best of all lands. By God it is your country, you (Egyptians). Remove bag and baggage, you (British). What insolence! What effrontery! You are a curse to us! You stick to us like an adhesive plaster! [18] Panicking, Cheetham realized, by March 15, that he was power­ less to stop the ever-growing demonstrations. He admitted that matters were completely out of his control, and that this state of affairs was likely to continue indefinitely. Every effort was made to restore order, but the nationalist fervor continued. General Bulfin took over military command, but lacked the necessary troops to pacify an entire nation. The military authorities called the Wafd leaders to the Savoy Hotel in Cairo to tell them that they were responsible for the revolution. Lutfi al-Sayyid replied that it was the fault of the British who had exiled Wafd leaders and used force against the Egyptians. He then advised that Rushdi, ‘Adli or Tharwat form a government. [19] Rumors abounded that the British were going to take reprisals against Wafd leaders. Fearing arrest, or possible execution, Fahmi and Lutfi went home and burned Lutfi's papers. These rumors never came to fruition, although the British did begin to make massive arrests, to survey villages with airplanes, to issue warnings against the demonstrators, and, in-general, to launch a more aggressive offensive against nationalist activities. They also began large scale reinforcement of their troops and to surround the ports with additional ships. When these steps failed to halt the nationalist uprising, Cheetham requested that the Wafd leaders be permitted to travel 106

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to London! Upon receiving this urgent telegram, Curzon wrote Balfour that the situation in Egypt could become critical. However, in spite of the ever worsening conditions, Curzon was opposed to granting concessions. To prevent further trouble, he recommen­ ded that Allenby be put in charge. Allenby, the famous war hero, was due to arrive momentarily in Paris from Cairo. But Curzon did not wait to hear from Balfour before accepting Graham’s advice — and his own inclination — to reject conces­ sions to the Egyptians. On March 17 he telegramed Cheetham that he was not to give in to the Wafd, was to restore law to the country, to repress the rioting, and to encourage “ reasonable Egyptians.’’ [20] The Foreign Office did not receive Balfour’s directive until noon on the eighteenth — one day after Curzon had taken the initiative and refused to concede. In his dispatch, Balfour agreed that law and order had to be restored, but that he was not altogether opposed to concessions: . . . in the meantime there need be no concealment of our readiness, after this has been satisfactorily accomplished, to discuss in London . . . grievances with Egyptian Ministers. If they think their task would be better performed if they were accompanied or immediately followed by persons qualified to represent the nationalist case even in its extreme form, I can see no objection. [21] Privately, Balfour added that this was the best advice he could give owing to his incomplete knowledge of the Egyptian scene. From this remark, Graham concluded that Balfour was leaving the matter in Curzon’s hands, and that further reference to Paris was unnecessary. This was, at least to some extent, a self-serving deduction as Graham and Curzon had taken matters into their own hands before Balfour’s more moderate advice had been received. After reading the rejection of concessions, Cheetham tried to extricate the British from responsibility for the Revolution and appealed for a reconsideration of the matter. No one in Egypt at that time could have believed that actual insurrectionary outburst was possible. Its sudden appearance and rapid growth is astonishing to the oldest members. . . . British officials incline to the belief that whatever 107

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Nationalist instigation there may have been must have been growing during several years, and that an explosion at some time was inevitable. . . . A concession if it can be devised which would facilitate such an understanding, and equally lighten the task of gover­ ning Egypt in the future is in my opinion needed. [22] After receiving this appeal, even Graham had to admit that the situation was serious and advocated that Allenby be consulted in Paris. The trend in British imperialist policy had often been to turn to a strong military figure in time of crisis. Meanwhile, Wingate, the actual High Commissioner, was vacationing in Scotland, and was not asked to return to London until March 19. By the time he arrived in London, Wingate knew he had lost most official support and that the Foreign Office hoped for his voluntary resig­ nation. Allenby had already been selected as the appropriate successor. Cecil, whose brother’s disagreements with Wingate have been noted previously, opted for Allenby because of his tremendous personal prestige. Graham wanted Allenby because he thought a military man would deal resolutely with the Wafd. With personal designs on the position, Graham entertained the hope that Allenby’s appointment would be temporary. On March 19, General Allenby, the greatest British hero to emerge from the First World War, arrived triumphantly in Paris. In the course of discussions with Lloyd George and Balfour, Allenby was given the post of Special High Commissioner to Egypt with the duty of restoring order. The King gave his formal assent by telephone; Allenby was given full military and civil authority. [23] He promptly left for Egypt, arriving on March 25. The Egyptian press announced his arrival along with extended articles on the continued rioting and strikes. Allenby was referred to as na'ib al-malik, which was the Arabic term applied to the regular High Commissioner. Wingate was not mentioned, [24] and, indeed, the Egyptians seem to have taken for granted that once the revolt began Wingate would not return. Wingate was told in writing by Balfour of Allenby’s so-called temporary appointment. After being informed, Wingate wrote a lengthy note on Egypt in which he recommended severe repressive measures be taken. This change of opinion was to some degree caused by his realization that Curzon and Graham supported a 108

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strong British policy with the maintenance of the status quo. By advocating strong oppressive measures against the Wafd, Wingate may have hoped to improve his chances of returning to Cairo. It was particularly goading to Wingate, himself an army officer, that Allenby had been appointed largely for his military stature. Allenby, for his part, seems to have gone to Egypt with an open mind as to what course to adopt against the revolutionaries. He wrote: I do not regard myself as committed to act with any section of opinion. It is too early to know results of declaration of main­ tenance of protectorate implied by terms of my appoint­ ment. [25] The situation quietened down when Allenby entered Cairo. Actually, the demonstrations lessened slightly as the Wafd prepared to see what attitude Allenby would adopt regarding nationalist demands. Official correspondence was no longer full of dire predictions concerning the rioting, while requests for military aid and additional troops ceased entirely. On March 26, Allenby “ invited” a group of Egyptians to the Residency, where he delivered an address ordering a return to law and order. To reinforce the warnings, the military authorities issued statements that violent demonstrations were prohibited and would be severely punished. Upon Allenby’s demands, a group of ‘Ulama, exministers, and nationalist leaders, including Rushdi, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Fahmi, Lutfi al-Sayyid, George Khayyat, Yusuf al-Nahhas, and Hafiz ‘Afifi, signed a statement urging Egyptians to stop demon­ strating. To some extent these men signed out of fear of British retaliation, but some were also anxious that the demonstrations were beginning to extend beyond the control of the Wafd. However, the major reason that the Egyptian nationalists agreed to call a halt to the demonstrations and strikes — which they undoubtedly could have prolonged indefinitely — was that they convinced Allenby to release the Wafd leaders and to permit them to travel to Paris. Allenby interviewed Rushdi and ‘Adli, both of whom recommended lifting travel restrictions, while persuading him that order would be achieved if these small concessions were granted. He also saw key Wafdists, among them 109

THE WAFD

Lutfi al-Sayyid, who requested the release of Zaghlul. He stressed that all of Egypt from the biggest man to the smallest was behind the Wafd. Allenby realistically concluded that the only way to stop the revolt was to grant the nationalists their demand to be heard. Consequently, on March 31, Allenby recommended to the Foreign Office and to Balfour in Paris that any “ respectable Egyptian who wished to do so be allowed to travel to Europe.” [26] Having taken a strong stand, Allenby expected prompt action. As a military hero, Allenby had been hailed as a victor by both Egyptians and Europeans; he was, therefore, able to demand more from British politicians than the weaker and less popular Wingate. Nonetheless, Allenby’s request for concessions to the Wafd greatly shocked the Foreign Office which had anticipated that he would exercise full military powers against Egyptian nationalists. In all likelihood Curzon was probably the most surprised by Allenby’s moderation. Only two days before Allenby’s request conceding to nationalist demands, Curzon had written he hoped Allenby would not be “ too fierce.” [27] At the same time Curzon had proposed that a mission, headed by Lord Milner, with whom he had spoken privately, should be sent to investigate the Egyptian situation. Curzon vigorously objected to Allenby’s request for concessions, and wrote Balfour that the recommendations were identical with those rejected in November and again in March. Curzon reiterated Wingate’s advice against granting concessions following the occurrence of violence. He believed Allenby had greatly misjudged the Egyptian scene, and that he was unaware of the plan to send a mission. Ironically, Wingate had proposed dispatching a mission as early as 1917, reviving the idea several years later. Both times the scheme had been firmly rejected by Graham. Curzon too had discarded the plan because sending a mission might have been “ interpreted as a mark of weakness.” [28] In lieu of concessions, Curzon merely resurrected the idea of a mission hoping that it would be accepted instead of Allenby’s moderate plan. Curzon lost this battle as Balfour refused to reject Allenby’s advice noting that he had just been appointed. Nor was Balfour about to run the political risk of alienating the popular war hero. While not rejecting the idea of a mission, Balfour suggested that 110

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the plan be submitted separately to Allenby, but not as an alter­ native to giving passports to the Wafd leaders. Although Balfour supported Allenby, the Foreign Office remained convinced that concessions were highly undesirable. Graham was “ in despair” [291 over Allenby’s plan, and forecast that the concessions would achieve “ immediate calm and the eventual loss of Egypt.” [30] He urged Hardinge and Curzon to do all in their power to dissuade Balfour from accepting Allenby’s policy. On April 1, Wingate, Curzon, and Bonar Law met to discuss British policy in Egypt. Curzon and Wingate concurred that granting concessions was a drastic error, but Bonar Law countered that the matter would be decided by the Cabinet. Curzon went white at this retort and made no reply. The meeting soon ended with Curzon writing to ask Balfour to reconsider. He stressed that Wingate concurred with him, but that he probably was not the right man to return as High Commissioner to Egypt. He noted that some Egyptians felt Wingate had betrayed them; however, no Egyptian sources make such references, but rather more correctly assume that Wingate was removed by the British government in favor of a stronger candidate, namely Allenby. Bonar Law also wrote to Balfour to advise that Allenby’s policy be accepted. He concurred that Wingate made a poor impression and was not up to the job in Cairo. It was, therefore, clear that Wingate would not be returning to Egypt, although he was retained, for appearances, as the nominal High Commissioner. Balfour stuck by Allenby, telling the officials in the Foreign Office in no uncertain terms that they were to stress their support for Allenby no matter what decisions he made. The Foreign Office then reluctantly acquiesced to Allenby’s demands. Allenby promptly reiterated his intentions. Outwardly quiet prevails, but Extremist feeling is increasing­ ly violent and dangerous. . . . I shall issue tomorrow proclamation to following effect: “ Now that order has been in great measure restored, I declare in agreement with His Highness the Sultan that there are no restrictions on travel, and that Egyptians who wish to leave the country will be free to do so.” Further I have decided that Sa‘d Pasha Zaghlul, Ism a‘il Pasha Sidki, Mohammad Pasha Mahmud, Hamad Pasha, 111

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[sic] El Basel shall be released from internment and given similar freedom of movement. I have carefully considered alternative proposal of Com­ mission under Milner. Such a Commission will be desirable later but would be useless now. [31] Allenby curtly told the Foreign Office and Balfour what his intentions were; he then proceeded to implement them without waiting for possible recriminations. The proclamation allowing the Wafd to leave Egypt and which freed those interned in Malta was published on April 7. It was greeted with laudatory editorials and with mad rejoicing by the populace. [32] The news of Zaghlul’s release was loudly cheered with mass demonstrations which soon became so exuberant that the British once again tried to restore order with force. Students carried Rushdi through the streets while Safia Zaghlul was driven through Cairo waving a flag to cheers of “ Long live the Nation.” British use of armed force caused several to be killed as a result of these demonstrations. All the schools closed in support of the Wafdist victory. When Allenby ordered the army to put down any demon­ strations more deaths and casualties resulted. Each funeral procession was a signal for fresh demonstrations to erupt. Politically, Allenby moved to restore moderate government by persuading Rushdi to form a Cabinet composed of pro-British Egyptians. Rushdi’s administration ran into difficulties as the Egyptians wanted Wafdist members in the Cabinet. As a consequence of political opposition, Rushdi was once again forced to resign on April 21. Allenby was not able to form another govern­ ment until nearly one month later. The Wafd worked hard to prevent the formation of a Cabinet because it wanted Zaghlul to head the government once independence had been attained. Even strongly conservative pro-British Egyptians were reluctant to participate in a Cabinet in face of such concerted pressure. The demonstrations shifted from expressions of joy at Zaghlul’s release to protests against the British occupation. In summary the Egyptians demanded: 1. the official recognition of the Wafd; 2. an end to the Protectorate and 3. for British sentries to be replaced by Egyptians. Strikes multiplied as students, lawyers, doctors, coalers on the Suez Canal, transport workers, and even the national police left their jobs. Allenby proclaimed that all 112

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government workers out on strike would be dismissed and would face possible prosecution. In response to this hard line stand, most workers returned to their jobs, but the lawyers continued to strike. These strikes encouraged the growth of trade unions, which had almost as many members by 1920 as many European nations. [33] By July Allenby threatened to close al-Azhar in order to stop Wafdist meetings there and to muzzle the Mufti’s pro­ clamations calling for independence. Allenby bemoaned that Zaghlul had not been permitted to go to London in 1918 as the Wafd had had some months to organize the country and the strikers. However, he also indicated his disdain for at least some elements of the demonstrators when he noted that the students were “ having the time of their lives.” [34] Students reluctantly returned to classes only after Allenby threatened to close the schools and to refuse granting diplomas. The Wafd also called for a boycott of all British goods, listing businesses, doctors, lawyers, and newspapers in Cairo, Alexandria, and in villages which were to be avoided by patriotic Egyptians. Continued British reprisals kept the casualty and death figures mounting. By summer over 800 Egyptians had been killed; there were 31 European and 29 British soldiers as casualties. British authorities estimated property damages at over half a million pounds. [35] Within a week of Zaghlul’s release, Allenby concluded that he would have those responsible for the agitation, namely the leaders in al-Azhar and the Ministry of Justice (the Wafdist lawyers), arrested. He also thought that the entire affadir had the “ smell of Bolshevism.” [36] This was merely a convenient rationalization — used by many British officials — to explain away the complete failure of their Egyptian policy. The Foreign Office officials treated Allenby’s newest rash of problems with an ’I told you so’ attitude, congratulating them­ selves for predicting that “ misplaced leniency” [37] would only result in a further deterioration of the British position. Meanwhile, the Wafd leadership was preparing to enter into its second phase which focused on discussions at the Paris Peace Conference, while maintaining the pressure of demonstrations, disruptions, and strikes in Egypt. Following the announcement releasing him, Zaghlul immediately made plans to present the Wafd’s demands at the Conference. In his memoirs, Zaghlul 113

THEWAFD

recorded that he warned his three friends not to be overcome with joy as such emotion would detract from their duties, [381 which were to secure independence for Egypt. Wafdist leaders stopped pressing for negotiations in London as they recognized that British officials were steadfast in their deter­ mination not to deal with them directly. Thus, by refusing to see the Wafdists, the Foreign Office caused the development of what they had hoped to avoid — the presence of the Egyptian dele­ gation at the Peace Conference. On April 11, the rest of the original Committee of Fourteen left for France. They were joined en route by Zaghlul, Mahmud, Sidqi, and al-Basil. Those leaving Egypt included: Sha‘rawi, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Fahmi, Lutfi al-Sayyid, Muhammad ‘Ali, Makabati, Hanna, Khayyat, Nahhas, ‘Afifi, Husayn Wasif, and Abu alNasr. Wasif Ghali, a Copt, ‘Abd al-Khaliq Madkur, a Cairene merchant, and Wisa Wasif, a Copt from Asyut, were also members of the delegation. Georges Dumani, Professor ‘Aziz Minsi, Muhammad Badr, formerly in the Ministry of Public Works, and Wasif acted as Secretaries and translators. The Wafd arrived in Paris on April 18, where Zaghlul and his most intimate associates were to remain until June 1920. By securing foreign governments* support for their policies and by having the Wafdists closely watched, the British tried to isolate the Wafd in Paris. Officials in London generally resented the fact that Allenby had apparently released the Wafdist leaders largely to keep them out of Egypt. Once in Paris, the Wafd embarked upon a program to place the Egyptian case for independence before the diplomats at the Conference. Unfortun­ ately for the Wafd, the British had far better sources of access to the crucial decision makers in Paris; they were, generally, able to persuade European and U.S. delegates to give short shrift to the Wafdists. Orlando, the Italian representative, did hear the Wafd’s case, but Clemenceau and, most importantly, Wilson, had subordinates talk with the Egyptians. They received little if any encouragement from these men. The Wafd prepared an extensive propaganda campaign with pamphlets, letters, and telegrams; they also tried to get a hearing in the European press. The press gave some publicity to the well documented materials on British atrocities in Egypt, but official delegates largely ignored these allegations. The British attempted to refute the atrocity stories, 114

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but their defense was considerably weakened when many of the Egyptian photographs of beatings proved to be authentic. The Wafd also published documented testimonies concerning violations of women, floggings, and pillaging by British soldiers. [39] Much to the dismay of the Foreign Office, Ramsay MacDonald consented to meet with members of the Wafd. This meeting encouraged Zaghlul who was, several years later, to negotiate with MacDonald concerning Egyptian-British relations. For the Wafd leaders, the U.S. delegation was — after the British — the most important. United States recognition of the British Protectorate in the spring had been a severe blow to the Egyptians who had placed considerable faith in Wilson's calls for self-determination. Encouraged by Joseph Folk, a U.S. politician from Missouri, the Wafd decided to send representatives directly to the United States, but had difficulty in securing visas and, more crucially, in determining who to send. The decision was further complicated after Yusuf al-Nahhas arrived in June with the news of the Wafdist politics in Egypt. His information indicated that internal rivalries had developed in Zaghlul's absence. With growing frustrations and continued rebuffs, the Wafd leaders in Paris soon began to quarrel among themselves. As early as May rumors started that Sidqi was in disfavor owing to his continual womanizing; he applied to return to Egypt in June. Wisa Wasif also asked for permission to return. ‘Abd al-Khaliq Madkur was actually the first Wafdist to return to Egypt, but announced that he had left for purely personal reasons. The most serious split apparently occurred over what delegates to send to the United States. Zaghlul himself wanted to go, but this was opposed by Makabati and Nahhas who feared leaving the presi­ dential office unoccupied; they thought that Mahmud would take advantage of Zaghlul's absence to improve his own political position. In support of their side, they argued that the British might want to negotiate with the Wafd through Milner (who was slated to form a Commission to investigate the Egyptian situation). Zaghlul debated with Lutfi al-Sayyid and Fahmi over the proposed trip. Stung by their allegations that he had to accede to the decisions of the majority, Zaghlul ultimately decided not to go to the United States. Zaghlul and Mahmud fought over bringing Makram ‘Ubayd to Paris to help with English translations. Mahmud, who had been 115

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handling the translations, was personally offended by ZaghluTs invitation to Makram. Zaghlul held that the work was falling behind and that ‘Ubayd’s abilities would be useful. These dis­ agreements resulted in Sidqi, Mahmud, Nasr, Wasif, Badr, and Minsi returning to Egypt in August. When interviewed by the press, Wasif and Nasr equivocated over the divisions within the Wafd. Both stressed that the Wafd would continue to work for independence. Sidqi, however, hinted that the divisions had been caused by the desire of some Wafdists to go to London. Ordered by the British authorities to remain out of politics, Sidqi diplo­ matically retired to his country estate where he stayed until ‘Adli formed a new Cabinet in 1920. [40] Nasr and Sidqi were later dismissed in absentia from the Wafd by the members in Paris. Sidqi held that he had resigned voluntarily. Makabati and alBasil reconsidered, while Makabati went off to Italy. Sha'rawi and Khayyat also left Paris, but announced they had done so for family reasons. The Foreign Office hoped that these divisions would cause a severe weakening of the Wafd’s popularity, and that the former Wafdists would return to Egypt as “ complete failures.“ [41] However, the Wafd countered with an open letter to the nation which stressed that it would continue to fight for independence. The splits in the higher echelons of Wafdist circles had little impact on the Egyptian populace whose imagination had been captured by the Wafd and the image of Zaghlul. He remained the most visible and popular national hero. Consequently, the splits in the Wafd only portended the long history of internal political intrigue among personalities who had ambitions of their own or who had differing views on strategy and tactics. Once the differences with Mahmud were overcome, he was sent to the United States. [42] He reached the U.S. in October and began working closely with Folk who wholeheartedly took up the Egyptian cause, and who was paid by the Wafd for his services. Both men spoke publicly on Egyptian nationalism and tried to launch a publicity campaign which had little mass impact, for the U.S. public remained ignorant of, or uninterested in, Egyptian affairs. Meanwhile, Zaghlul and his compatriots moved to less expensive quarters in Paris, and continued to publicize the Egyptian case. Their attempts to do so were thwarted consistently, and Zaghlul ultimately left for a short period of relaxation at 116

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Vichy. At the same time, political attention turned toward the abortive British Milner Mission to Egypt which the Wafd most effectively boycotted. On May IS, 1919, Lord Curzon had announced in the House of Lords that a mission would be sent to Egypt to “ inquire into the causes of the late disorders in Egypt and to report on the existing situation in the country and the form of constitution which, under the Protectorate, will be best calculated to promote its peace and prosperity, the progressive development of selfgoverning institutions, and the protection of foreign interests.” [43] By the very terms of the Mission it was clear that Curzon had no intention of granting independence, and rather, anticipated the continuation of the Protectorate for some time to come. The decision to continue the Protectorate, the thing against which the nationalists had been fighting, caused Zaghlul and the Wafd to oppose the Milner Mission. The Wafd announced its intention to boycott the Mission if and when it ever arrived in Egypt. They publicly declared their decision to ensure the Mission's complete failure by concerted opposition of all Egyp­ tians. [44] Once again officials in Cairo and London disregarded the Wafd’s warnings because they doubted the ability of the nationalists to carry through their avowed boycott by rallying the Egyptians behind the Wafd program. This denigration of nationalist power and organization was entirely in keeping with the traditional stance of the British officials vis-à-vis the Wafd. In London, the officials and politicians were primarily concerned with the membership of the Mission and tended to ignore the repeated warnings that the Mission would be useless if it were to investigate the situation only within the terms of the Protec­ torate. Once order had been partially re-established, Allenby, who had thought the Mission could have lessened tensions, began to redefine his position. Faced with repeated and persistent opposition by Egyptian leaders, Allenby realized that if the Mission were to be successful it had to arrive in Egypt immediately after the departure of the Wafd leaders for the Paris Conference in April, and before the Wafd organized fullscale opposition to it. [45] He urged the Foreign Office to dispatch the Mission without delay, suggesting the middle of May as an appropriate 117

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time for its arrival. Allenby was folly cognizant that any delay increased the Wafd’s ability to organize its opposition to the Mission by informing the Egyptian people of the reasons for the boycott. Milner, for reasons of health, flatly refused to travel to Egypt before September; the torrid Egyptian summer was obviously a major factor in his decision to delay the journey. [46] The officials in London felt that it was more important that Milner head the mission than for it to arrive when Allenby requested. Although Allenby vigorously protested, he was unable to sway either Milner or the Foreign Office. After managing in May to form a new Egyptian Ministry under Muhammad Sa‘id, Allenby believed that he could prevent further demonstrations and agreed to delay the Mission’s arrival. [47] In the interim, the Wafd was able formally to organize the boycott and to present its case against the Mission in the Egyptian press and through its organization which had workers throughout the Egyptian countryside. [48] All through the summer there were repeated strikes, threats, confiscation of weapons, and further arrests. But nothing seemed to break the Egyptian determination to oust the British. In London, the officials ignored the Egyptian activities directed against the Mission. Membership in the Mission was granted primarily on the basis of political allegiance because the politicians wanted a good balance in party affiliation. Parliamentary Debates and the Foreign Office records reveal that numerous politicians displayed a lively interest in joining the Mission and in deter­ mining its membership. Many applied to join, but owing to other commitments and pressures of the Peace Conference, it proved somewhat difficult to secure qualified men. [49] The Mission’s final membership included: Milner as head; Rennell Rodd, former Ambassador to Italy; John Maxwell, with years of military experience in Egypt; C. Hurst, legal adviser in the Foreign Office and later President of the International Court at the Hague; J.A. Spender, a Liberal; and Owen Thomas, from the Labour Party. Milner received payment for his services, while the other members received only expenses. By the time the Mission concluded its duties, the cost was over eleven thousand pounds. [50] Once the membership was formalized, Milner and his col­ leagues began preliminary preparations for their work in Egypt; 118

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Milner met with Wingate and Henry McMahon, High Commis­ sioner in Egypt from 1914 to 1916, in order to ascertain their opinions of the political situation. Wingate submitted a comprehensive memorandum dealing with toe history of the British occupation during toe War and toe subsequent revival of nationalist fervor, hi toe memorandum, Wingate tried to absolve himself of responsibility for toe 1919 Revolution, but did not offer any useful suggestions for future action. As autumn drew closer, AUenby, who feared a resurgence of strikes and violence, became more determined than ever that the Milner Mission should not come to Egypt. Meanwhile, toe Foreign Office became more resolute that toe Mission should proceed. Allenby sent repeated telegrams advocating toe postponement or cancellation of toe Mission; all of these were rejected. Allenby then went personally to London, but on this occasion he failed to carry his point of view. Milner maintained that although he had no personal feelings one way or another, postponing or cancelling toe mission would reflect poorly upon toe British government. Like other prominent politicians, Milner feared that if the govern­ ment renounced the Mission after publicizing it, toe cancellation would be interpreted by toe Egyptian nationalists, and others, as a sign of weakness. Milner also thought that Zaghlul and his “ merry men" [51] were making a mistake by not returning to Egypt to negotiate and to prevent Sa‘id from undermining toe Wafd’s superior position. Curzon, who wholeheartedly agreed with Milner, arranged for Allenby and Milner to meet in order to thrash out the problem. Curzon was certain that Milner’s view would prevail. By October 3, Milner, Allenby and Curzon reached a compromise whereby Milner agreed to yet another delay while Allenby returned to Egypt in order to eliminate Egyptian opposition and to reinforce the current Sa'id Ministry. [52] Sa‘id had earlier threatened to resign if toe Mission came to Egypt and toe British wanted to forestall this possibility. After returning to Cairo, Allenby reported that toe Mission would not be well received and, in fact, that its arrival would certainly precipitate new disturbances and might force toe Egyptian Ministry to resign. [53] In September, after a student threw a bomb at Sa'id in an attempted assassination, toe Ministers became increasingly anxious for their personal safety. 119

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A few weeks later riots broke out after Friday prayers in Alex­ andria. Angry crowds broke windows and looted shops in the fashionable European shopping district. More deaths and casualties resulted from police attempts to quell the rioting. Court trials of those arrested for various crimes against the British, including the Deirut incident, resulted in a number of death sentences which were widely debated within the Egyptian press. Allenby responded to the Alexandria riots and the continued Wafdist opposition, by warning Mahmud Sulayman and other Wafd members to refrain from all political activities. They refused and were promptly arrested. While the arrests were applauded by the Foreign Office officials, the Egyptians viewed the arrests as further evidence of British determination to maintain the protectorate. As a consequence of these events, Sa‘id resigned on November 17; four days later Yusuf Wahba formed a new Ministry. Nonetheless, arrangements for the dispatch of the Mission proceeded. By late November all of the members had left London. Milner arrived in Egypt on December 7 amid great secrecy made necessary to ensure the personal safety of the members of the Mission. Milner’s diary reveals that the members were practically imprisoned within the Semiramis Hotel for fear of remonstrances from the population. They were almost totally isolated from the people and were, as a consequence, in no position to carry on an investigation. This, of course, was exactly what the Wafd had threatened. Owing to the successful organization and publicity campaign by the Wafd, it was able to maintain an effective boycott of the Milner Mission. Demonstrations and strikes once again threatened to paralyze the country. At al-Azhar demonstrations took place after which British troops actually stormed this ancient and venerable insti­ tution. Al-Azhar was closed soon thereafter, despite the protests of the ‘ulama, who demanded an apology for the desecration. All the Egyptian newspapers, with the exception of al-Muqattam, supported the Wafd and continued to rally the Egyptians behind the boycott. [541 An attempt on the life of Yusuf Wahba, Prime Minister, on December 15, emphasized the unpopularity of the Ministry and underlined the fact that any Ministry formed under the Protec­ torate would not have the support of the population. These 120

REVOLUTION

assassination attempts continued periodically throughout the Mission’s stay in Egypt and prevented the institution of any stable government. Milner became disillusioned with the Mission’s lack of progress, expressing dismay that the Wafd had been able to organize its opposition so effectively. To break the boycott and to reassure the Egyptians that the Mission had good intentions, Milner took matters into his own hands. He issued a declaration on December 28 which asserted that his mind was open and that the members of the Mission would see all people regardless of their political affiliations. Milner referred to this declaration as his “ olive branch.’’ [551 Some of the more moderate Egyptian politicians and officials rallied behind this announcement and began privately to talk with members of the Mission. At this juncture, Allenby, who had refused to work with the Mission, left Cairo for a protracted hunting trip in the Sudan, having first visited with King Husayn in Jiddah. He continued to keep a cool, discreet distance from all the Mission’s activities. [56] Zaghlul and the rest of the key Wafd leadership persisted in opposing the Mission; they steadfastly refused to see members of the Mission in spite of negotiations by ‘Adli Yakan to convince them otherwise. Yakan tried to persuade Zaghlul to return to Cairo, but he responded by asking ’Adli to come to Paris. Zaghlul justified his position by noting that to negotiate at that stage would have weakened his stance in the eyes of the public; it might also have caused him to lose face by having his action interpreted as one of weakness. By January Milner noted that he and his colleagues were receiving less and less worthwhile information. The correspon­ dence and talks with Egyptians were substantially the same. The Egyptians had numerous grievances against the British and wanted, above all, complete independence. They were willing to negotiate what form an independent Egypt might take, but were inflexible on the matter of British evacuation. In a letter to Lloyd George, Milner remarked that the situation was much worse than he had anticipated. He noted that most Egyptians were sullen and restive under the continued British occupation. [57] By the middle of January, the Mission had split, with some of the members going south for interviews and sight-seeing, the latter taking rather more of their time than the investigations. Others went to 121

THE WAFD

Alexandria with the same purposes. Throughout this period the opposition to the Mission continued and, indeed, worsened owing to food scarcities and the ever spiraling prices. However, in purely private capacities some Wafdists did meet with members of the Mission. Amin Yusuf lent his good offices to introduce members of the Mission and the British press correspon­ dents with leading Wafdists at a reception. Following this, Spender and ‘Afifi met in the office of Gerald Delany, the Reuter’s correspondent in Cairo. Delany was often to act as a go-between for the British and Egyptian politicians. As a result of this meeting it was decided that Zaghlul should be invited to London. Accordingly, Hurst traveled to Paris to issue a personal invitation which was duly accepted. On June 7, Zaghlul arrived in London for talks with Milner. In the interim, Milner had reported to London that the Mission would leave Egypt by March. During their last ten days in Egypt, the members gathered together the materials they had collected; these included conversations, printed reports from British and Egyptian officials on all administrative levels, private correspon­ dence, and personal observations. These reports were to be completed when the members returned to London. The Mission admitted that the local situation had hardened, thereby consider­ ably lessening the chances for negotiations that would be highly favorable to the British. It was, furthermore, impossible for the members of the Mission to receive any indication from the Egyptians as to their desires beyond the injunction to “ see Zaghlul.’’ [58] Zaghlul had achieved tremendous popularity and support throughout Egypt. As a result, the Mission was forced to recognize that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to reach a settlement without Zaghlul’s participation and assent. On March 4, Milner had his last interview with Sultan Fu’ad who reiterated what most Egyptians had, in one form or another, already reported. Fu’ad reported that the Protectorate had to be dissolved and that the Egyptians had to receive a much larger share of self-determination. Milner took the occasion to congrat­ ulate the Sultan on the birth of his first son, ironically named Faruq or he who distinguishes right from wrong. Milner ended the interview on the note that the British at least had some idea of the facts surrounding the Egyptian problems. Milner then left Egypt and, after a short tour through Palestine, returned to London. 122

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Notes 1. High Commissioner to Foreign Office, February 3,1919, F0141/773. 2. Cheetham to Foreign Office, February 24,1919, F0371/3711. 3. Cheetham to Foreign Office, February 3, 1919, Graham note, February 8, 1919, F0371/3711. 4. Cheetham to Foreign Office, March 1,1919, F0371/3711. 5. Petition to Sultan, March 2,1919, F0371/3714. 6. High Commissioner to Curzon, March 5,1919, F0141/773. 7. Zaghlul Diary, Book 35, written in 1920. Foreign Office to Cheetham, March 7, 1919, F0371/3714; F03141/773; Keown-Boyd to Symes, March 5, 1910, SA172/5; Intelligence Report. March 7,1919, FO141/810. 8. Vidal. Sofia Zaghlul, p.33. 9. Residency to Foreign Office, March 9,1919, F0141/773. 10. Rafi’i, p. 131. 11. Fahmi Memoirs, al-Musawer, March 22,1935. 12. Ibid. 13. "Historical Documents," anonymous, al-Musawer, April 18,1934. 14. Lutfi al-Sayyid Diary, al-Musawer, November 17,1950. 15. Makram ‘Ubayd, "Our Revolution," al-Musawer, December 14,1951. 16. al-Musawer, February 12,1937. 17. Author’s private collection of Zaghlul memorabilia. 18. Translation of Egyptian declaration, F0371/3714. 19. Lutfi al-Sayyid Diary, al-Musawer, November 17,1950. 20. Foreign Office to Cheetham, March 17,1919, F0371/3714. 21. Balfour to Foreign Office, March 18,1919, F0371/3714. 22. Cheetham to Foreign Office, March 19,1919, F0371/3714. 23. Balfour to Foreign Office, March 20, 1919, F0371/3714; Foreign Office to Allenby, March 21.1919, F0371/3714. 24. al-Muqattam, al-Ahram. al-Nizam. 25. Allenby to Foreign Office, March 27,1919, F0371/3714. 26. Allenby to Foreign Office, March 31,1919, F0371/3714. 27. Curzon to Balfour, March 29,1919, Balfour Papers, F0800/215. 28. Wingate note, March 9,1919; Curzon minute, F0371/3714. 29. Graham to Hardinge, April 3,1919, HP, Vol.il (40). 1919. 30. Ibid. 31. Allenby to Foreign Office. April 6.1919, F0371/3714. 32. Al-Ahram. al-Ahali, al-Watan. 33. Cheetham to Foreign Office, October 6,1919, F0371/3728. 34. Allenby to Wingate, April 13,1919, SA162/2. 35. Rafi’i. p. 173; Shafiq. p. 527; F0371/3718. 36. Allenby to Wingate. April 21,1919, SA173/2. 37. Wingate note, 1922 on Allenby’s April 13,1919 letter, SA162/2. 38. Zaghlul Diary, April 11,1919. 39. Egyptian Association in Britain Report on Atrocities, May 14, 1919, F0371/ 3717/3721; photographs. F0371/378. 40. Sidqi’s Memoirs, al-Musawer, April 2,1948; al-Ahali, August 13,1919. 41. Graham minute. July 8,1919, F0371/3718. 42. See Records of the Department of State relating to Internal Affairs of Egypt, 1910-1929. US/Egypt 571/4-6. 43. Great Britain. 5 Parliamentary Debates (Lords), (1919), May 15,1919. 44. See al-Ahram, al-lslah, al-Ahali, al-Nizam, May-August 1919. These news-

123

THEWAFD papers contain numerous articles urging the Egyptians to boycott the Mission. Also see Rafi’i and Shafiq for accounts of the Wafd’s reaction to the Mission. 45. Allenby to Foreign Office, April 19,1919, F0371/3715. 46. Milner to Curzon, May 9,1919, Milner Papers, 164. 47. Allenby to Foreign Office, April 23; May 14; May 24,1919, F0371/3717. 48. British Intelligence Reports, May 1919, F0371/3717; also see the Egyptian press for this period. 49. F0371/3717; F0348/21. 50. F0371/3717; F0818/21. 51. Milner Memorandum, November 3,1920, FO371/4980. 52. When Curzon heard of Allenby’s determination to stop the Mission, he remarked, “ let him tackle Milner,” September 1919, Curzon memorandum on the meeting, October 3, 1919, F0371/3719. 53. Allenby to Foreign Office, November 14,1919, FO371/3720. 54. al-Muqattam, December 1919. This newspaper traditionally took a moderate view vis-à-vis the British. 55. Milner Diary, Milner Papers, 165. 56. Ibid. Milner’s last interview with Allenby, March 8, 1920, Milner Papers, 290. 57. Milner to Lloyd George, December 20, 1919. Lloyd George Papers, F39/1/52. 58. See Egyptian press for an articulation of this policy; also see Rafi’i, Shafiq, and Milner Diary.

6 NEGOTIATIONS The unanimous conclusions reached by the Milner Mission were submitted to Curzon on May 17, 1920, about the same time Zaghlul was being tendered an invitation to participate in negotiations in London. In his covering letter for the proposals, Milner promised a full report on the Mission’s methods and findings, but owing to the urgency of the situation was submitting the conclusions as quickly as possible. The Mission recommended that, in light of the “ sound aspir­ ations” [1] of the Egyptian nationalists, a treaty be concluded between Great Britain and Egypt which would grant Egypt full sovereignty over its internal government, including the right to conclude treaties with foreign nations. In return, Egypt was to acknowledge the right of Great Britain to maintain Capitulatory rights with some modifications. Britain was also to have the right to military bases, on a vastly reduced scale, and to prevent foreign intervention in Egypt. Milner’s proposal discussed at length various “ in-house” reforms which were to be effectuated within the British adminis­ tration. Milner observed that British officials had been distant from the Egyptians, had engaged in personal rivalries to the detriment of efficient administration, and had shown a marked decline in overall abilities while increasing numerically. In light of these problems, he suggested reforms to eradicate the abuses which had exacerbated Egyptian-British relations. The High Commissioner was to remain in a privileged administrative position, but the number of British advisers was to be reduced to two. Pensions for British officials, which had been paid by the Egyptian government, were to be continued, but procedures and terms for these pensions were to be the subject of further dis125

THE WAFD

eussions between the two governments. With regard to Egyptian legislative procedures, Milner recommended that elections for the Legislative Assembly be held as soon as some measure of stability had been restored. He advocated that the Assembly be encouraged to operate as freely as possible and be assisted on the road to complete representative authority as it was “ essential to the healthy development of political life in Egypt.” [2] The concluding pages of the report dealt with the touchy issue of Sudanese-Egyptian relations. Milner suggested that Britain issue a forthright declaration to the effect that the Sudan was to be kept under British tutelage. However, Egyptian vital interests would be studiously considered. Egyptian personnel in the Sudanese bureaucracy and army were to be gradually reduced in numbers and replaced by Sudanese. The Egyptian treasury supported a substantial percentage of Sudanese development schemes and official expenses, but was to be relieved of this responsibility insofar as possible. In addition, Britain was to pledge that Egyptian rights to an “ ample and assured supply” [3] of Nile waters would be guaranteed through a formal declaration. With the exception of the Sudanese issue, the Mission’s recom­ mendations closely paralleled the Wafdistdemands. Consequently, Curzon and other officials were extremely angry at what they considered to be a complete caving in to Egyptian nationalism. Curzon had hoped that Milner would dismiss the Wafd demands out of hand; thereby making any compromises or talks with Zaghlul unnecessary. [4] The wide circulation, both in Britain and in Egypt, of the recommendations raised the issue of whether or not Britain was bound by the Mission’s report. Curzon, opposing the concessions, contended that the Mission had not been a royal one, but merely a special group whose recommendations were only suggestions for possible action and in no way constituted definitive policy. Milner tended to agree with Curzon, but felt personally bound to support and call for the adoption of the Mission’s findings. Allenby, who concurred with the conclusions, which were similar to his own, argued that the government was bound by the Mission’s report. [5] This debate was still in progress when Zaghlul arrived in London. The visit had been proposed by Hurst when he met with Zaghlul, and had been formalized through the good offices of 126

NEGOTIATIONS

‘Adli who left Egypt in the middle of April to confer with Zaghlul in Paris. Certain he could persuade Zaghlul to go to London, ‘Adli and Sirri had co-ordinated their demands for the British prior to ‘Adli’s departure. Their program was again remarkably similar to Milner’s recommendations. True to his predictions, ‘Adli convinced Zaghlul that the British were prepared to enter serious negotiations and that an agreement could be reached. The Foreign Office too described the Wafdists as in a “ much less intransigent frame of mind.” [6] Accordingly, an advance party of Wafdists, Fahmi, ‘Ali Mahir, and Mahmud, recently returned from the United States, was dispatched to London. ‘Ali Mahir had joined the Wafd after the first split within the ranks had occurred in Paris. A lawyer, who spoke excellent English, Mahir was a nephew of ‘Abd al-Rahman Fahmi. He was called to join the Wafd in London immediately and to bring Rushdi’s and Tharwat’s opinions. ‘Adli was the main nonWafdist to accompany the party and was to negotiate with the British privately. The advance group sought to ascertain whether Zaghlul’s presence in London would be beneficial and, indeed, if it were safe for him to come. When ‘Adli asked if the Wafd were in fact welcome and would be free to leave at will, Milner angrily retorted that it was not the Middle Ages and that Zaghlul could come and go as he pleased. [7] Reassured, the advance party cabled for Zaghlul. Lutfi al-Sayyid, al-Basil, Makabati (who had returned from Italy), Sinut Hanna, and Muhammad ‘Ali joined Zaghlul in London at the Metropole Hotel. L.A. Fanous, a graduate of Oxford, acted as press correspondent for the delegation which received lively press coverage in London and Cairo. Zaghlul gave a banquet at the Carlton Hotel for the press and members of Parliament where he expounded on Egyptian aspirations. He emphasized that there was no reason why Egypt and Britain should not remain the closest allies and, in general, sought to allay British fears concerning Egyptian radicalism. Meetings between Zaghlul and Milner commenced immediate­ ly. The idea of a British-Egyptian treaty was promptly accepted by both parties. In general, the negotiations proceeded along the lines of Milner’s recommendations, but hit stumbling blocks over safeguards of Capitulatory rights, the extent of Egyptian repre­ sentation in foreign nations, and, most importantly, over the time 127

THEWAFD

schedule for the proposed Egyptian independence. Compromises were reached on the first two issues; these kept the substance of Milner’s original intent, but were more acceptable in form to the Wafd. According to the Zaghlul-Milner Agreement, which was not actually an agreement but more of a joint communiqué, Egypt agreed to a British military presence, the maintenance of British Financial and Judicial Advisers, and the Capitulations. Egypt was to be an independent sovereign state with Great Britain supporting Egyptian entry into the League of Nations. No mention was made of the Sudan; however, assurances were given privately along the lines of the original Milner plan. Milner was apparently well satisfied that such an arrangement would safeguard British vital interests in Egypt and the Middle East. He attempted to convince his less optimistic colleagues in the government of that fact. For his part, Zaghlul was not so sanguine that he could “ sell” the agreement either to the Egyptian masses or to members of his own organization in Cairo. [8] Egyptian demands were for “ complete independence.” Egypt­ ians wanted the Protectorate abolished immediately and the exact date for independence was not given in the agreement. Many Wafdists, and Zaghlul himself, had argued after the 1919 revo­ lution that Egyptians should not negotiate with the British until after independence had been secured. Zaghlul had been per­ suaded to soften this stance lest the British become more stubbornly determined never to grant independence or lest they enter negotiations with conservative Egyptians and/or the Palace. The latter actions would have considerably weakened the Wafd’s legitimate claims to represent all Egyptians. To complicate matters further, the negotiations had emphasized the deep personality contrasts between ‘Adli and Zaghlul. [9] ‘Adli, who spoke English, used soft diplomatic language which appealed to the British officials. On the other hand, Zaghlul, who spoke no English, was stiff and uncompromising. A personal enmity, which was never completely eradicated, developed between the two men. By September relations between ‘Adli and Zaghlul were far from cordial. It was obvious that the negotiations had reached an impasse. As a result, Zaghlul, in August, sent Makabati, Luffi al-Sayyid, Mahmud, and Mahir back to Egypt with the agreement. They were 128

NEGOTIATIONS

to present the program to the nation in the best possible light. The agreement was first published in the Egyptian press on September 10. It was immediately attacked by the Hizb al-Watani and by some Wafdists. The agreement was discussed in the local Wafd committees where amendments were taken down and passed through the chain of command. In October, ‘Afifi, Wasif and Mustafa Nahhas rejoined Zaghlul; they brought with them news of general Egyptian reactions to the agreement and information about Wafdist internal politics. Political opinions in Egypt had become considerably more leftist in outlook and radical in program since Zaghlul’s exile from Egypt in the previous year. The year had been one of continued strikes and demonstrations, while the press had kept up its campaign against the British occupation. Students periodically staged demonstrations throughout 1920; these focused not only on the British, but were also directed against Fu’ad. Students, activated by Wafd committees, began to jeer at shaykhs who, acting on advice from the Palace, praised Fu’ad in their Friday services. [10] Public speakers including a U.S. citizen, Lucy Bromley who was married to an Egyptian, spoke publicly in mosques and praised the Wafd while criticizing the British. Such tactics frequently led to wider disturbances such as those in Alexandria in March. As prices steadily rose during the autumn it became easier to mobilize massive strikes and parades. In mobilizing urban workers and students, the Wafd made full use of old alliance patterns in which single individuals could control several dozen patrons. In addition, a move toward national economic independence led by a group of Egyptian bourgeoisie, as opposed to the local foreign bourgeoisie, was an integral part of the political and social unrest. [11] The foreign bourgeoisie included Greeks, Italians, Levantines, and the British whose interests were defended by the British Chamber of Commerce. The local Egyptian bourgeoisie which formed the core of Wafdist leadership was in direct competition not only with the imperial power, but with the foreign groups which enjoyed the continued benefits of the Capitulations. Ironically, British entrepreneurs were also irked by the economic advantages the Capitulations granted their European competitors, but the British government — however sympathetic to its own nationals — had primarily to consider British foreign policy vis-à-vis international power politics. As a result the government 129

THE WAFD

trod carefully with regard to altering or dissolving the Capitu­ lations, lest it cause undue hostility among other European governments. One of the first Egyptian steps for more economic independence was the campaign begun in 1919 to form an Egyptian Bank. Bank al-Misr became a reality in May 1920 when Tal'at Harb, the primary mover of the scheme, established the bank with solely Egyptian shareholders who used surplus capital accrued from the W.W.I. boom. Simultaneously, the Egyptian Chamber of Commerce escalated its activities and began to spread into provincial towns. Local industries such as the Salt and Soda Company and Egyptian Sugar Company also profited both by the war boom and national sympathy after the war. Not surprisingly, the increased prosperity and national strength of indigenous Egyptian business irritated the British who resented and feared the competition which would continue as a factor in the EgyptianBritish rivalry throughout the interwar years. The sustained national unease caused rumors that Allenby was to be replaced by Graham or Rennell Rodd. Even Egyptians wondered if Allenby’s appointment would be extended. But at this juncture, there was little talk in London of sending out a new man to quell disturbances which Allenby had been unable to handle. Fu’ad, too, worried that events had moved away from his control. Talk of a constitutional monarchy made Fu’ad uneasy as he realized his own power could be limited. Attempting to disguise his own ambitions, Fu’ad questioned “ the moral fibre of his people’’ and their “ fitness for assumption of serious responsi­ bility.’’ [121 He demeaned the role of women by deprecating the raising of Egyptian children whose moral training, in his opinion, was completely neglected. In light of the subsequent life of Faruq, Fu’ad’s only son, the latter remark is particularly ironic. In Zaghlul’s absence, the Wafd’s Central Committee main­ tained an active role within the unions, student groups, and professional organizations. In September, fifty members of the Legislative Assembly met at Mahmud Sulayman’s home to affirm support for the Zaghlul-Milner proposals. Two supporters of Muhammad Sa‘id, who with the aid of Omar Tusun was still maneuvering for a position of power, rejected the proposals, as did a member of the Hizb al-Watani which had earlier rejected the 130

NEGOTIATIONS

idea of negotiations. The rest affirmed their support, but advocated qualifications to lessen the power of the two British advisers and the British military presence. They also wanted to have an equal share with the British in governing the Sudan. However, there were considerably more radical groups within the Wafd who were determined not to lose the Wafdist ascendancy over all other political elements in Egypt. These members had begun to form secret cells which engaged in tactics of assassin­ ations both of the British and their Egyptian collaborators. After the January attempt on Ismail Sirri it was clear that no member of a Cabinet formed without Wafdist participation was safe. As a result. Prime Minister Yusuf Wahba, who had never possessed real authority, resigned to be replaced by Muhammad Tewfik Nessim, a judge from a Turkish family, who lacked any base of political support. In June a bomb was thrown at him, near Abdin Square: however, in a presentiment of the future, the bomb was probably meant for Lee Stack, Sirdar of the Sudan. Several soldiers were killed in attacks, while Muhammad Shafik, Minister of Agri­ culture. and Husayn Darwish, Minister of Waqfs (Awqaf), narrowly escaped with their lives in separate attacks. A number of students were arrested after the attempt on Nessim; as a result of subsequent trials one student was executed for the attempt. The July execution was the result of a series of trials, both civil and military, which lasted almost six months. Rahman Fahmi, a member of the Central Committee and the man the British held responsible for organizing these attacks, was arrested on July 1 and imprisoned in Qasr al-Nil. [13] Fahmi, with 28 others, was tried in a Military Court. The trial excited a good bit of Egyptian interest as Fahmi was a popular figure. His death sentence aroused further demonstrations on his behalf. As a result of Milner’s advice, Fahmi’s sentence was commuted by Allenby who hoped the gesture would pacify Egyptians. The British, particular­ ly those in Egypt, were horrified by what they considered gross weakness and a travesty of justice. [14] The Egyptians largely viewed Fahmi as a nationalist hero who had been acting in the best interests of the nation. Thus the events of 1919 and 1920 had pushed many Wafdists to adopt more forceful positions vis-à-vis the British. It also served to harden Wafdist attitudes toward Egyptian politicians, many of whom would have happily settled for a large measure of British 131

THEWAFD

control. As a consequence, the Wafd Central Committee gave only grudging approval of the Zaghlul-Milner draft. Personally, Zaghlul was inclined to continue the negotiations if they were to result in independence. In the face of growing pressure from within his own movement. Zaghlul began to reassess his more moderate position. Certainly, the older, more established members of the original Wafd favored negotiations, but the true strength of the Wafd lay within the local committees and the countryside where demands were overwhelmingly for immediate independence. The call for Istiqlal tamm, complete independence, had captured the public imagination to the extent that the Wafd had either to deliver complete independence or risk losing its popular support. Consequently, Zaghlul could not sustain the backing of the Egyptian people without publicly adopting a hardline stand toward British occupation. By mutual consent the negotiations had been broken off in the autumn. However, acting on the advice of some of his compatriots, Zaghlul had left the door open for further negotiations. When talks ceased, the Wafd had returned to Paris. Milner submitted his final report in December. It was not substantially different from the preliminary one except that it was somewhat brief and the language was modified to take into account Egyptian sensibilities. The report was not published until May 1921, by which time the British had decided to ignore the Mission's conclusions. Since the policy makers in London had hoped that the Mission would Te­ inforce the government's decision not to negotiate with the Wafd, it was scarcely surprising that they were dismayed when Milner supported concessions. When faced with national uprisings within its colonies, the British frequently dispatched Missions to investigate; in theory these Missions were to be objective and to draw first-hand conclusions. Generally, British policy makers wanted these Missions to confirm decisions already made. When, as in the case of the Milner Mission, the findings were precisely those which the government had refused to consider, the conclusions were criticized and/or ignored. The debate within the British government only reinforced the Wafd's position as the Egyptians made excellent propaganda for their cause by playing up the disarray within British ruling circles. Meanwhile, the personal friction among the Wafdists in Paris intensified. In October the Wafd was asked to return to London for 132

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further discussions. After some debate, Fahmi, Zaghlul, Mahir and Nahhas, acting as secretary, returned, but no substantive changes were reached regarding the original proposal. Milner suggested that the time had come to send representatives of the Egyptian government to Britain for formal talks aimed at conclud­ ing a treaty between the two nations. [15] Zaghlul properly feared that this was yet another attempt by the British to eliminate the Wafd from the negotiations and to re-establish more moderate, that is to say, more pro-British, Egyptians in positions of authority. As Ministries were made by the British authorities in Egypt, acting with the assent of the Palace, it was highly improbable that any so-called “ legitimate government represen­ tatives” would include Wafdists. The Wafd, therefore, immediate­ ly rejected Milner's unpalatable suggestion. In addition, the debates had brought into the open the very real division of opinion within the Wafd over the issue of ending the Protectorate before participating in further negotiations. When he returned to Paris, Zaghlul wired the Central Committee that he would not become involved in negotiations to the detriment of Egypt. When Fahmi objected to the strident tone, Zaghlul modified the messages to anoease his friend. Privately, Nahhas had written his friend ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi‘i, who was respon­ sible for the editorial policy of al-Akhbar, that ‘Adli was a disaster. Rafi‘i published in al-Akhbar that ‘Adli was a stumbling block in the negotiations. Zaghlul was held responsible for the article. ‘Adli was naturally furious when he heard that people were criticizing him behind his back. He stormed into Fahmi’s room, throwing down the news, which had been cabled to him from Cairo, and demanded to know who had said he was a traitor. Fahmi, as usual, acted as mediator, pointing out that ‘Adli had held private talks with Milner. ‘Adli retorted, “ Does that make me a traitor?” Zaghlul revealed a personal grievance by saying that when they had talked with Milner in French, Milner, in an aside, had spoken with ‘Adli in English and ‘Adli had never translated what had been said. ‘Adli responded, “ then any Egyptian who speaks with an Englishman in English in the presence of another Egyptian who does not know the language means he is making a deal with the English.” [16] He then implied that Milner had said something personal about Zaghlul which had “ saddened him” so he did not want to translate something which might have hurt 133

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Zaghlul’s feelings. In support of ‘Adli, whom he described as an honest man who had helped the Wafd, Fahmi resigned on December 29, 1920. Zaghlul tore up the resignation. A week later Fahmi urged Zaghlul to accept Milner’s request to negotiate with the official repre­ sentatives of the Egyptian government and to renew his trust in ‘Adli. Fahmi had some support among the Wafdists, but Zaghlul disagreed. Al-Sayyid wrote out a draft declaration along the lines of Fahmi’s recommendations, but Zaghlul announced excitedly that to accept the draft would be suicide. Indeed, for the Wafd to have accepted negotiations by the Egyptian Ministry, which had been hand picked by the British, would have meant voluntarily conceding its legitimacy to the Palace and the more pro-British forces within Egypt. Because compromise was impossible, Fahmi, al-Basil, Mahmud, al-Sayyid, and Muhammad ‘Ali ‘Aluba left Paris with their draft. Before they presented it to the Central Committee, Zaghlul cabled that he rejected the terms of Fahmi’s and alSayyid’s draft. As a result, Fahmi decided to withdraw from politics. ‘Ali Mahir tried to convince Zaghlul to settle the differ­ ences, but Zaghlul responded, “ I have slaughtered them before they slaughter me.” [17] While the Wafdists were arguing among themselves, the British government moved ahead with its plan to bring an official Egyptian delegation to London. Curzon consented because ‘‘if we do not take the opportunity to settle the Egyptian problem on lines which, though we might not a priori have chosen them, are yet compatible with our retention of British predominance in Egypt, we may find the British Labour or Socialist Government at no very distant date may grant complete independence and sacrifice our position altogether.” [18] Conservatives in the Foreign Office persistently worried that the Liberals or leftists (all of which tended to be equated in Conservative eyes) would surrender to nationalist demands throughout the empire. While the Liberal and Labour parties may have been publicly more willing to engage in face to face negotiations, the results of these meetings tended to be the same whether the Conservatives or Liberals led them. This is simply to say that no British political party had any intention of giving up the pre-eminent control of Britain over Egypt and the Suez Canal. Late in February, Allenby sent Fu’ad a formal 134

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invitation asking for the formation of an official delegation to confer with the British in order to substitute “ for the protectorate a relationship which would, while securing the special interests of Great Britain and enabling her to offer adequate guarantees to the foreign Powers, meet the legitimate aspiration of Egypt and the Egyptian people.” [19] To Allenby’s surprise, Fu’ad was not particularly enthusiastic about the proposal. Undoubtedly, Fu’ad was disquieted by the move which would diminish his own authority; he was also concerned over the very real difficulties of forming any delegation while the Protectorate continued to exist. Furthermore, while it was not overtly stated that Wafdists were to be excluded, the terms of the invitation implied that they were not welcome, nor was it likely the Wafd would participate while the Protectorate remained in effect. Fu’ad tentatively proposed Mazlum, President of the Legislative Assembly, Nessim, Muhammad Sa‘id, Rushdi, Wahba, Sirri, and ‘Adli whom he discounted as having no follow­ ing within the country. Fu’ad feared ‘Adli’s power, but dared not exclude him entirely. [20] Nessim, who advocated postponing the negotiations, visited with Allenby who rejected further delay. Allenby returned to the Palace to meet with Fu’ad. Allenby pointed out that the British had doubts over the sincerity of Sa’id’s commitment to constitutional government; Allenby preferred that Sa‘id be excluded from the delegation. Having spoken with the other prospective members, Fu’ad reported that Mazlum would invite Zaghlul (who was still in Europe), but that Zaghlul would probably refuse. Mazlum originally accepted to act as president of the mission, but owing to Sa’id’s intrigues, Mazlum ultimately refused to participate. ‘Adli, on the other hand, doubted that the negotiations would have fruitful results. In fact, ‘Adli did not want to parti­ cipate in the negotiations unless he were made Prime Minister. He argued that although he had no personal ambitions, as Prime Minister he would be in a better position to implement future agreements. [21] Nessim graciously assented to step down to make way for a newly constituted ‘Adli Ministry. As a result, ‘Adli formed a new Cabinet on March 17. All Wafdists were excluded although Isma‘il Sidqi, who had been dismissed from the movement, acted as Minister of Finance. ‘Adli, however, impressed upon the British that he could count on 135

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the support of many prominent Wafdists. Owing to the earlier split, ‘Adli knew that Fahmi, Muhammad ‘Ali, and Lutfi al-Sayyid would publicly promote his policies. With their patronage, ‘Adli thought he could carry enough political weight to effectuate his program without Zaghlul’s backing. When he hea i of the new 'Adli Ministry, Zaghlul, from Paris, issued a declaration demanding to head the delegation, the withdrawal of Martial Law, and the end to all censorship. Britain was, of course, not about to withdraw Martial Law until it was certain its favored position would continue. Realizing that the British and more conservative Egyptians were attempting to circumvent the Wafd, Zaghlul rushed back to Egypt. He was met by a triumphant celebration on April 4. The train route from Alexandria to Cairo was crowded with Egyptians waving banners and shouting for Zaghlul. To emphasize his identification with the masses, Zaghlul promptly visited the "Martyrs’ Graves” for those Egyptians killed in the 1919 revolution. There was no doubt that Zaghlul had the complete support of the Egyptian masses who enthusiastically cheered him wherever he went. Privately, Zaghlul and 'Adli met to discuss the forthcoming negotiations. As if to reinforce the appearance of good will between the two leaders, posters were published depicting Zaghlul and 'Adli together. Zaghlul tenaciously demanded to head the delegation. When 'Adli refused the relations between the two politicians became colder and colder. In an interview for al-Ahram on April 25, ‘Adli publicly criticized Zaghlul’s policies which he maintained prevented an agreement between the British and the Egyptians. Zaghlul angrily responded in a speech in Shubra (a densely populated quarter of Cairo) during which he totally withdrew his support for 'Adli’s Ministry. Zaghlul retorted that if 'Adli went to London it would be like George IV negotiating with George IV. This rousing speech, delivered in Zaghlul’s famous oratorical style, had two divergent results. It incited further mass demon­ strations, while leading to the resignations of several leading Wafdists who supported 'Adli. ‘Ali Sha'rawi, Mahmud, al-Basil, Lutfi al-Sayyid, Makabati, and Muhammad 'All 'Aluba all resigned publicly. They were joined by 'Afifi, Madkur, and Khayyat. Sha'rawi and others published letters accusing Zaghlul of intrigue. This open split had been brewing since the rift in Paris. In fact, it only formalized a division which had taken place 136

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some months earlier. In support of Zaghlul, demonstrations broke out in Tanta; these were finally quelled by the police. On May 21, large riots took place in Cairo and Alexandria. The troubles in Alexandria evidently began when a Greek and an Italian shot into a group of demonstrators; the ensuing clash resulted in a number of deaths. Eventually, a British regiment restored order. In spite of the overwhelming Egyptian support for Zaghlul, plans went on for ‘Adli’s departure. Zaghlul privately indicated he would be willing to participate in a delegation with Mazlum as President, but the British took this as a sign of weakness, and rejected the suggestion. In a presentiment of the future, Lindsey, in the Foreign Office, remarked that if they “ could get rid of Sa‘d Zaghlul we might have some smooth water, but things are not yet ripe for deporting him. It would only make him a martyr. With luck and a little more rope he may come to grief yet; the danger is that things may collapse first.” [22] Churchill’s visit to Egypt for the famed Cairo Conference, where the British attempted to settle all the problems of their Middle Eastern empire, had also incited open and vociferous criticism from the Egyptians. When Churchill, in a speech in Manchester, spoke of “the elastic circle of empire” which included Egypt, Zaghlul denounced him. The students at al-Azhar staged yet another strike in protest. Ignoring all these clear cut indications of hostility, ‘Adli, accompanied by Rushdi, Sidqi, Shafik, Yusuf Sulayman, a judge and ex-Minister, and Ahmad Tal*at. President of the Court of Appeal, left for London. Tharwat, as Minister of Interior, acted as Prime Minister in ‘Adli’s absence. In London, ‘Adli conferred with Lloyd George, Curzon and Foreign Office officials. The negotiators went over the various differences concerning the Capitulations and the British advisers. As these differences were gradually eradicated, 'Adli brought up the perennial dilemma of Egyptian-Sudanese relations, which heretofore had been unmentioned. This brought the negotiations to an abrupt halt. It seems likely that the Sudanese issue was raised — at least partially — because ‘Adli was concerned over Zaghlul’s burgeoning popularity back in Egypt. The Wafd had not been idle in ‘Adli’s absence, but had kept up a lively press campaign against the negotiations, while embarking on a series of political “ whistle-stop” appearances. Zaghlul 137

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constantly appeared at public functions, attended by an Egyptian officer in full uniform. Everywhere he went Zaghlul was met by enthusiastic crowds. He often journeyed by rail between Masgid Wasif, in Gharbiyya, where Safia had a country estate, and Cairo. All along the route he was warmly greeted by eager Egyptians. The Wafd also initiated another petition campaign against the ‘Adli negotiations; they collected about a million and a half signatures. [23] Posters and circulars supporting Zaghlul and criticizing those who had left the movement were widely distri­ buted. The dissidents responded through Muhammad ‘Ali who spoke of Zaghlul’s bad faith and that he had offered the British substantial concessions. Zaghlul gave an interview, published in al-Muqattam on July 27, to ‘Abd al-Halim al-Bayli, a professor and later a member of the Wafd High Command, to refute these allegations. In the interview, Zaghlul categorically denied Muham­ mad ‘Ali’s charges; this initiated an extensive public feud between Zaghlul and the dissidents which was carried on mainly in the pages of the Egyptian press. Wafdists were also active in stirring up support in Europe. ‘Ali Shamsi, a landowner whose father Amin had been in the Legislative Assembly and who had contacts with the ex-Khedive ‘Abbas, acted as an envoy for Zaghlul and was active in propaganda work in Italy and Switzerland; Prince ‘Aziz Hasan carried on similar work in Paris. These techniques proved particularly effective among Egyptian students in Europe. Zaghlul’s political legitimacy was also bolstered by the September visits of a British Labour group along with Major Barnes, a Liberal Coalition Member of Parliament. This group was cordially fêted by the Wafd which sponsored a tour of the Delta by rail and other “ sight-seeing” trips. The Labour group was ridiculed by the class conscious Foreign Office officials as “ engine drivers or boiler-makers.” [24] In Egypt, the delegation was met with the usual large crowds shouting, “ No President but Sa‘d” and “ Long Live Sa‘d!” [25] British military authorities did however forbid Zaghlul and the Labour group from visiting Tanta where, it was feared, their presence would incite violent demon­ strations. Zaghlul protested the cancellation, observing that it clearly demonstrated the need for the abolition of Martial Law. A deputation from Tanta also protested the prohibition, while groups from the countryside gathered in Cairo to rally against the move. 138

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In October, Zaghlul made a steamer trip to Upper Egypt. In many places fighting broke out between supporters of Zaghlul and ‘Adli. Subsequently, Zaghlul was forbidden to stop at several villages. He then brandished flags and spoke while the steamer continued on its way and veiled women waved in support. [26] The British watched Zaghlul’s actions closely but, as of yet, were not ready to move directly against him. Zaghlul’s tours not only indicated continued mass support, but were calculated to reinforce participation in the Wafd and to increase financial contributions for the movement. However, the clouds of future trouble were gathering while Allenby was in London. He spoke in the Foreign Office of the likelihood that Zaghlul would have to be permanently banish­ ed. [27] November 13, the date of the first Wafd-British confron­ tations, was marked by two rival demonstrations in Cairo. The anti-Wafd faction met at the Continental Hotel, where ‘Abd al-4Aziz Fahmi was the most noted speaker. He praised the Sultan and urged all Egyptians to support ‘Adli. The Wafdists met in tents on the Munira football field. Zaghlul spoke for over three hours; he called for independence and denounced ‘Adli. Hanr.a and Nahhas also spoke, and donations were* collected. After the speeches, the crowd marched to Beit al-Umma. Because negotiations in London had slowed to a standstill, ‘Adli left Europe in late November. ‘Adli’s return to Egypt was greeted politely by his aristocratic followers. In Cairo his retinue was bombarded with mud and tomatoes; ‘Adli was spat upon and insulted. A reception in ‘Adli’s honor was held at the Continental Hotel. Zaghlul was spotted motoring by the Hotel twice, [28] but did not directly confront his enemy. At the reception, Fahmi spoke eloquently of ‘Adli’s work, but expressed his regret that the British were reluctant to grant Egyptian demands. The latter remark referred to Allenby’s December 3 communication to Fu’ad in which he had traced the breakdown of the negotiations and had reiterated Britain’s desire to end the Protectorate once proper assurances had been provided. In stark comparison, ‘Adli was extremely nervous and stumbled his way through a plodding talk. The vivid contrast between ‘Adli’s and Zaghlul’s oratorical skills perhaps best demonstrates the differences between the two men. Whereas Zaghlul could hold an audience spellbound for over three hours, ‘Adli even had difficulty in speaking before a select group 139

THE WAFD

of his avowed supporters. ‘Adli was taciturn by nature and lacked the personal magnetism which made Zaghlul a national hero. The U.S. Ambassador Howell, who was quite sympathetic to the Wafd, noted that “ ‘Adli is a Taft while Zaghlul is a Roose­ velt.” [29] ‘Adli’s style appealed to the British who found it easy to negotiate with him, but it was Zaghlul, whose blunt manner offended the British who expected respect from their colonial subjects, who captured the imagination of the Egyptians. Zaghlul’s demands for the prompt abolition of the Protectorate were also more in keeping with Egyptian national aspirations. There was little mass support for ‘Adli’s program of accepting continued British tutelage. U.S. Ambassador Howell again encapsulated the conflict when he observed: It should always be remembered that if one wishes a babe to walk, the usual custom is to put him on his feet and urge him to at least toddle . . . Great Britain, upon the other hand, holds Egypt in her lap and proclaims to the world that she cannot walk. [30] After ‘Adli’s return, Zaghlul published a Manifesto denouncing the negotiations and calling for a policy of non-cooperation with the Ministry. As shops closed and more students went on strike, it became clear that ‘Adli lacked public support, and, in the face of mounting opposition, he would have to resign. Fu’ad was not sorry to see ‘Adli out of power, but behind the scenes was supporting Tharwat in his maneuvering to oust Zaghlul from the Egyptian political arena. ‘Adli resigned on December 9, but because it was almost impossible to form another Ministry, his resignation was not accepted until December 24. Egypt was left without a Ministry until March 1922, when a new Ministry under Tharwat was finally instituted. With no Egyptian Ministry, the assassination of two British soldiers and recrudescent nationalist agitation, Allenby moved swiftly to curtail Zaghlul’s activities. He banned a projected Wafdist rally for December 20. In strong terms, Allenby cabled the Foreign Office that if Zaghlul accepts the rebuff . . . my object will have been achieved. If on the other hand he makes trouble, I am ready 140

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to deal with him. In the event of necessity arising for the deportation of Zaghlul, I hope that you will arrange for his reception and detention in one of His Majesty’s possessions overseas. He should not be allowed to proceed to any Euro­ pean destination. [31] At the same time, several Wafdists, including Nahhas and Hanna, were placed under police surveillance. After receiving Allenby’s warning, Zaghlul immediately met in his home with members of the Wafd. Makram ‘Ubayd, who had just returned from London, argued that there was nothing to do but refuse the British order. Zaghlul full-heartedly agreed and drafted the Wafd’s response that no one had the authority to halt the Wafd from its “ sacred duty” to secure Egyptian indepen­ dence. [32] When al-Basil heard the news he rushed to Zaghlul’s home which he had not entered since splitting from the Wafd in April. Zaghlul was delighted to see his old friend who announced that any aggression against Zaghlul was an aggression against Egypt. [33] Demonstrations in protest broke out throughout Cairo; these resulted in several more deaths. On Friday morning, December 23, British soldiers arrested Zaghlul at Beit al-Umma. Safia Zaghlul pleaded to be taken with her husband, but was curtly rebuffed. Zaghlul was then moved to Suez to await deportation. The Wafdist leaders quickly gathered in the afternoon at Fath Allah Barakat’s home; they were warned by British authorities that no harm would befall them if they stopped interfering in politics. Barakat rejoined that the Wafd represented the nation and that as free men they would never willingly agree to surrender their freedom of action. Consequently, two hours later the police came to arrest Sinut Hanna, Fath Allah and ‘Atif Barakat, Nahhas, and Makram ‘Ubayd. They too were taken to Suez from where they were deported to Aden. The deportations pleased ' Adli and Tharwat who had advocated such action for some time. [34] Allenby also revealed that he thought Egyptian women were more fanatical than the men, and that if Safia Zaghlul or any others became too belligerent he would deport them without hesitation. [35] However, the arrests did not curtail Wafdist power, but, on the contrary, considerably strengthened it for the former dissidents promptly returned to the Wafdist ranks. The entire nation once 141

THE WAFD

again prepared to demonstrate its universal support for Zaghlul. It was, according to Clayton, British Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, the most dangerous period faced by the British, during which time only the City and Provincial defense schemes prevented complete insurrection. [36] Amin al-Rafi‘i called for the unity of Wafdists, whereupon Fahmi, Lutfi al-Sayyid, ‘Aluba, Makabati, Mahmud, George Khayyat and ‘Afifi rejoined. A new High Command of Wasif Butrus Ghali as President, Wisa Wasif, ‘Ali Mahir, the newly reunited members, 'Ali al-Shamsi, 'Alawi al-Gazzar, Murad al-Shari‘i, Marqus Hanna, and 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gamal took over direction of the Wafd. On December 29, Zaghlul and his compatriots sailed for Aden. Allenby ordered that Zaghlul be treated with courtesy, and that his diabetic condition receive proper treatment. Allenby wanted the Wafdists promptly moved to far off Ceylon, but bureaucratic red tape and illness delayed the departure. Makram became severely ill with malaria, but finally recovered under Nahhas’s careful nursing. Late in February, the British moved to transport Zaghlul to the Seychelles, but owing to his advanced age finally consented for Makram to accompany him. Makram was selected because he was the youngest and also knew English. After a week in the Seychelles, Zaghlul was told that the rest of the deportees would join him. Supported by a monthly stipend provided by the British, Nahhas, Hanna, Makram and Zaghlul took up residence in one home. The Barakat brothers lived in a second nearby house. The deportees joked that Zaghlul assigned Nahhas with keeping up the house as he was interested in cleanli­ ness; Hanna, who liked food, was to be maître d’hôtel; ‘Atif Bara­ kat was to be cashier because he was a miser. [37] The Wafdists joined in communal meals while passing their time reading old journals and their censored correspondence. The Egyptians were closely watched by British agents who made daily reports back to London. ‘Ubayd also began to teach Zaghlul English. Then, much to the dismay of the British, the tropical climate began to affect Zaghlul’s already precarious health. Some more cynical British observers thought that Zaghlul ate and drank too much and that if he wanted a longer life (he was already in his 60’s) he should not have “ twisted the lion’s tail.’’ [38] However, Allenby and others were vitally concerned that Zaghlul not die while under 142

NEGOTIATIONS

British care. Zaghlul’s death at this time would certainly have martyred him and would probably have laid the British open to charges of “ foul play.” Consequently, Zaghlul was quietly moved in August to Gibraltar where his wife was permitted to join him. Doctors visited him daily to check on his progress, which was reported to the British who closely observed Zaghlul’s state of health. A few months in a more temperate climate revitalized Zaghlul whose energy was described as amazing. The British fumed that Zaghlul seemed “ likely to continue for years to be a source of expense.” [39J In Egypt the Wafd had from the outset of Zaghlul’s arrest rallied protests. The continued agitation made it impossible for Allenby to form a new Ministry, for no Egyptian could afford to be labeled as a British collaborator. The Wafd organized a boycott of all British goods and shops. All the signatories to this order, al-Basil, Wasif, Khayyat, Wasif Ghali, Marqus Hanna, ‘Alawi al-Gazzar, and Murad al-Shari‘i, were arrested but quickly released. Allenby personally talked with Basil, Hanna, and Mahir, warning them to desist from such “ seditious” activities. They in turn impressed upon him the Wafd’s intentions to continue its protests until the Protectorate was withdrawn. In light of Egyptian determination to gain its nationalist goals, Allenby concluded that the British should promptly withdraw the Protectorate. Allenby was so certain his opinion would prevail that he made a bargain with Tharwat “ with which the Protectorate over Egypt would be lifted, leaving for subsequent discussion and eventual settlement the subjects relating to the British position in E g y p t [40] But the Foreign Office was reluctant to surrender without adequate guarantees. Furious, Allenby replied on January 25 that were his advice not followed all chance of a friendly Egypt would be lost. Allenby then delivered the coup de grâce by tender­ ing his resignation. [41] In a flurry, the Foreign Office asked that Gayton and Amos, the Judicial Adviser, come to London for discussions. Since Allenby had the full support of his hand picked administrative staff, four British advisers, including Gayton and Amos, also threatened to resign. In a cleverly worded reply, framed by Lloyd George himself, Allenby’s resignation was rejected, while his high handed move was subtly rebuked. [42] Allenby was asked to come to London in person. Allenby, accompanied by Gayton and Amos, arrived in 143

THEWAFD

London in early February. The confrontation between Allenby and his advisers against Curzon, Hankey, and Grigg took place in the presence of Lloyd George at Number Ten Downing Street on February 15. Lloyd George opened the meeting by saying how pleased he was to have an opportunity to discuss Egyptian matters personally with Allenby, because misunderstandings so often arose in written correspondence. He reiterated that he was of the opinion that in the November Cabinet meetings dealing with Egypt it had been decided that an Egyptian government should be formed which would sign a treaty guaranteeing Britain's pre-eminent position. Allenby replied that it was impossible to form such a government, and that any treaty had to be a unilateral one. He gave a short summary of the recent events in Egypt. He also referred to his dispatch of February 2, which had provided an extensive narrative of Egyptian political events for the previous year. [43] Allenby explained that Tharwat’s life would be in the gravest danger were he to bargain with the British over independence. In other words, independence was a non-negotiable demand. A plot to assassinate Tharwat had been uncovered just prior to Allenby’s departure. In Allenby’s view it was essential to have a friendly Ministry which could deal openly with the British once indepen­ dence was attained. Allenby had warned those working against Tharwat (Allenby was referring to the Wafdists previously detained); he also pointed out that the moderates in Egypt were afraid Zaghlul would return. Allenby proposed that Britain was strong enough to grant independence and still retain its vital interests, but that without a declaration of independence, any Egyptian dealing with the British would be regarded as a traitor. At this juncture, Lloyd George asked what was to be done if it were not possible to secure a treaty since Britain was not willing to give up its special interests in Egypt. Allenby answered, " . . . get rid of the Protectorate and then the effect will be such that opinion in Egypt will be so mollified that the Egyptians will concede to your term s." [44] Always the politician, Lloyd George responded that such a policy would be hard to justify in the House of Commons. Allenby countered that he meant to state that the British were willing to withdraw the Protectorate and that the guarantee of the interests Britain wished to retain was that it had occupied Egypt for forty years and could continue to do so for 144

NEGOTIATIONS

another forty years. As a compromise, the Prime Minister sugges­ ted that Allenby and another official of the British Government state clearly how far Britain was prepared to go. If the Egyptians refused they would have to be forced to accept the British conditions. Allenby flatly refused to return to Egypt under these conditions. No amount of debate could convince him otherwise. Amos interjected that if the British continued under their present policy they would be forced to annex Egypt as no other course was possible. Lloyd George said that a socialist government might be willing to give up Egypt but that no other government would willingly “ give up British control over Egypt.” f45] Curzon emphasized that to follow Allenby’s policy meant giving Egypt her independence, which she had never had. Lloyd George fully concurred. Still fuming, Allenby explained that he had tried without success for three years to maintain the Protectorate, and that if the Government did not accept his advice he would resign. Adjourning the meeting, Lloyd George asked for the matter to be taken up again in the afternoon. At six o’clock the officials reconvened. Allenby handed in a draft stating Britain’s vital interests which were to be reserved for further discussion after the withdrawal of the Protectorate. In summary the issues were: 1. security of communications, 2. defense of Egypt, 3. Capit­ ulations, 4. the Sudan. Debate ensued over interpretations of the draft and alternate wordings submitted by Edward Grigg. Allenby insisted that unless his draft were accepted he would resign. Lloyd George asked Allenby, “ who said he had been patient for five weeks, to be patient for five minutes more.” [46] Lloyd George was concerned how Egypt was to be ruled if a Ministry could not be formed. Allenby said that with the acceptance of his draft he felt fairly confident he could form a Ministry, but that with any other proposal it would be impossible to do so. The Prime Minister wanted more time to consider the matter and to consult with the Cabinet. Allenby asked why the draft could not be accepted immediately. Lloyd George observed that he was aware of Allenby’s difficulties, but that he had to remember Britain was a Parliamentary democracy. The meeting closed on the note that Allenby and his advisers were to meet the next day at the Foreign Office to go over the draft letter. This revised draft would then be submitted to the Cabinet in the evening. 145

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Lloyd George presented the draft to the Cabinet on February 17. He was immediately criticized for not living up to his pledges in Parliament. Lloyd George had affirmed publicly that Parliament would be consulted on Egyptian matters; while the Cabinet was reluctantly willing to affirm the proposal to end the Protectorate, the Parliamentary issue was a troublesome one. As a result, Lloyd George, Allenby, Hankey, Grigg, Curzon, and Chamberlain, who was Lord Privy Seal, met again at Downing Street on February 20. At this time Lloyd George detailed that problem. He recognized that it would be awkward if the policy were made public in Parliament before it had been communicated to Fu’ad but that once Fu’ad were informed the British could hardly rescind the offer. As a result, he had decided Allenby should make the offer without Parliamentary approval. Curzon sketched out the implementation of the policy. Allenby was to present the draft with the British Government’s reser­ vations as a supplement; hopefully, Tharwat would be able to form a Ministry promptly thereafter. At the same time, the proposal would be submitted to Parliament for debate. Allenby said he could deliver the declaration on February 27, and that the Parlia­ mentary announcement could be made the next day. Having secured a victory, Allenby pursued some matters of protocol before the meeting was adjourned. That no mention was made of the Wafdists or the leaders in exile only highlights the British determination to undercut the party and to implement its own will on Egypt. The British were still trapped by the illusion that with military power and political acumen they could destroy the Wafd nationalist support. Allenby returned directly to Cairo where the scenario played exactly as had been planned. Sultan Fu’ad was pleased with the announcement, and Tharwat immediately formed a Ministry. Parliamentary debate took place on March 14, after which the Government’s policy was overwhelmingly approved. This was a pro forma gesture as Egyptian independence had been published on March 1. Fu’ad was officially proclaimed King over an independent Egypt on March 15. A committee, selected by the King, to draft a constitution was formed under Rushdi’s leadership. Feeling matters were well in hand, Allenby left for a tour of the Sudan where he saw his close friend Lee Stack, Sirdar of the Sudan. 146

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While the British may have congratulated themselves for the unilateral declaration which seemed to bring a lull in hostilities, the Proclamation certainly did not arouse enthusiasm among the Egyptians. Indeed, independence day was celebrated in many towns with demonstrations against the declaration. The declar­ ation by the British was universally believed to hinder autonomy through the preservation of British special interests. Before independence had been declared, the Wafd had decided to employ Gandhi’s tactics of non-cooperation and boycotts; in fact, the British were concerned that Gandhi and Zaghlul were in communication with one another. [47] Members of the High Command tried to gain support from the U.S. Embassy, but were not encouraged. [48] To keep their demands before the public eye, the Wafd continued to publish pamphlets and political statements which were circulated throughout Egypt and Europe. After her husband’s second exile, Safia Zaghlul formed a Women’s Committee of the Wafd; this committee issued myriads of petitions and demands for the release of the deportees. In this capacity, it soon earned the reputation as one of the most vocal Wafdist organizations. Crowds began to gather outside Beit al-Umma shouting for Umm Misr (Mother of Egypt). In 1923, Huda Sha'rawi formed a Union of Egyptian Women which attended the International Congress of Women in Rome. At the conference they caused a stir by publicly removing their veils — a step in the direction of personal liberation. The women in the Wafd were to take an active and leading role in furthering Wafdist policies, and, indeed, were often influential decision makers in their own rights. However, these Wafdist tactics fell short of outright confron­ tations with the British. When more peaceful tactics brought minimal results, the protests did begin to take on much more violent aspects. In particular, there was a marked increase in the assassination of British personnel and Egyptians who maintained close relationships with foreigners. In Cairo alone four were Killed and nine wounded in 1922. While the Wafd High Command publicly denounced underground ‘‘terrorist” tactics such as assassination, certain members of the Wafd were involved. One of the main Wafdist radicals, *Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, was already serving a prison term for his role in “ guerilla warfare tactics’’ during 1919 and 1920. During the 1919 revolution secret societies, 147

THE WAFD

such as the Society of Vengeance and the Black Hand, had been formed; these operated on a cell system in which each cell or block was assigned a specific task (e.g., cutting a railway line). [49] Once the task was accomplished the cell was dissolved. This organizational structure made it difficult for the British to break down the societies. Because the populace was largely sympathetic to these anti-British tactics, the British were rarely able to secure evidence or “ eye witness” accounts of the assassin­ ations. even though many of them took place on crowded streets in broad daylight. The foreign community blamed Allenby for the continuation of these attacks, grumbling that he should employ “ iron fist” techniques against the Egyptians. After the deportations, the Wafd had added Marqus Hanna, a Copt related to the Khayyat family, one of whom had been deported, Murad al-Shari‘i, Alawi al-Gazzar, ‘Ali al-Shamsi, and *Abd al-Qadir al-Gamal to its high level Command. The addition of these new members, who were generally more radical in outlook than the original Wafdists, precipitated — once again — the resignations of Lutfi al-Sayyid, Mahmud Muhammad ‘Aluba, Makabati, and ‘Afifi. The new High Command published in July a manifesto which demanded the release of Zaghlul and his colleagues. As a result, the British military authorities arrested those who had signed the decree. They were: al-Basil, Wasif, Khayyat, Marqus Hanna, Gazzar, Shari'i, and Wasif Butrus Ghali. They were originally sentenced to death, but the Military Court which tried them commuted the sentences to seven years’ imprisonment. These Wafdist leaders were all to be released by May 1923. With the arrest of many of its key leaders, the Wafd formed yet another High Command composed primarily of representatives of the urban middle olass. Those in the new command were: al-Misri al-Sa‘di, who had a badu background; Husayn al-Qasabi; Shaykh Mustapha al-Qayati, Head of al-Azhar; Salama Mikha’il, a Copt; Fakhri ‘Abd al-Nur; and Muhammad Nagib al-Gharabli. They called upon the people to sustain their struggle against the British. As protests and strikes continued to impede the efficient adminis­ tration of the state, and terrorist activities increased, Allenby was pressured to adopt stronger measures against the Wafd. Consequently, in August, he arrested more Wafdist leaders. These included: ‘Abd al-Nur; ‘Abd al-Sattar al-Basil, a half 148

NEGOTIATIONS

brother to Hamad; Mustafa al-Qayati; Muhammad al-Nuqrashi, an official in the Ministry of Agriculture; Ragab Iskandar, a government doctor; Nagib al-Gharabli, a leader from Tanta; and Hasan Yasin, a leader of the student movement. These men remained in prison for three months. Under stricter censorship, newspapers were not even supposed to mention Zaghlul’s name, a move which vastly amused Zaghlul. In addition, Wafdist funds were seized. This money was used to subsidize costs incurred by the deportees. This policy caused Lindsey in the Foreign Office to remark, . .w e should not let it be known that we are making one set of Zaghlul’s agitators pay for the other set’s incarcer­ ation.” [50] Continued arrests of its leaders failed to crush the Wafd, for it merely regrouped and escalated its opposition. Petitions signed by Bayli and others were sent to King Fu’ad demanding Zaghlul’s release. [51] Trouble was also brewing between the Ministry and the Palace. Fu’ad had long disliked Tharwat who was heavily influenced by Sidqi. By November, Tharwat was seriously threatening to resign because of Fu’ad’s hostility. Tharwat did resign on November 29 and was replaced by Nessim. Fu’ad was also working to diminish the political potential of ‘Adli, who was even encouraged by the King to attend the Lausanne Conference in order to remove him from the Egyptian political scene. Ultimately two delegations, one from the Wafd led by Hasan Hasib, and a government one led by Seif Allah Yusri, attended the Lausanne Conference. As a means of strengthening his ties with the Wafd, Fu’ad received Hasib prior to his departure to Switzer­ land, but refused to meet with Yusri, the official delegate. Fu’ad also began to give large subsidies to various Wafdist journals. Fu’ad supported various Wafdist causes, not because he was in agreement with the Wafdist leaders, but because he wanted to undercut other influential politicians. ‘Adli posed the only real threat to Fu’ad’s ascendancy among Egyptian conservatives. This threat was intensified when ‘Adli took steps to found a party of his own. On October 30, the conser­ vatives, including the members of the committee which had been appointed to draft the constitution, met at the Continental Hotel. They declared themselves a new party, the Liberal Constitutional­ ists, and to no one’s surprise elected ‘Adli as president. Membership included Makabati, Fahmi, al-Sayyid, ‘Afifi and 149

THEWAFD

several other former well known Wafdists. Zaghlul had heard about ‘Adli’s plan before the party had been officially announced. Letters from Zaghlul to ‘Adli, which may not be authentic, were subsequently published. In this corres­ pondence, Zaghlul expressed hopes that ‘Adli would concentrate on freeing Egypt. ‘Adli responded that he would work for Zaghlul’s release. [52] These superficially friendly letters did little to bridge the deep gap between the two parties. In November, Hasan Razih and Isma‘il Zahdi, members of the Liberal Consti­ tutional party, were shot by a student who was thought to have had Wafdist connections; this incident intensified the enmity between the Constitutionalists and the Wafd. Thus four years after its inception the Wafd still had not attained its goal — namely, independence for Egypt — nor had it secured political power. Egypt had been declared an independent nation under the 1922 Declaration, but the victory had been a hollow one for the Egyptians. The Declaration had been unilaterally proclaim­ ed by the British who hoped to assuage Egyptian nationalists by granting them a façade of autonomy, while maintaining all of Britain's vital interests. Even the concession of the 1922 Declar­ ation had only been gained through the most intensive pressure by Allenby who had used his own prestige and reputation as a lever. The Wafd had been totally shut out of any direct involve­ ment, although the British had been forced to compromise because of the 1919 Revolution in which the Wafd had played a crucial role. The Wafd had both incited the 1919 movement and had ridden its crest. It was also clear that any meaningful solution for a peaceful settlement of British-Egyptian relations would have to be accepted and formalized by the Wafd which was the only movement with any claim to political legitimacy within Egypt.

Notes 1. Report of the Special Mission to Egypt — General Conclusions, 1920, Milner Papers, 163, p. 1. 2. Ibid., p. 8. 3 .Ibid., p. 12. 4. Milner Papers, 163; CAB 24/112. 5 . Curzon to Balfour, April 28, 1919: “ I had never contemplated a Royal Com­ mission with Milner as its Chairman — I thought and still think that he should

150

NEGOTIATIONS go as Lord Dufferin did — as a Special Commission with a number of col­ leagues.” Balfour Papers, F0800/216. 6. Milner to Curzon, August 19, 1920, Milner Papers, 162. Maurice Hankey, British Secretary to the Peace Conference, to Lloyd George, October 22, 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F24/3/18. Foreign Office to High Commissioner, May 20,1920, F0141/629. 7. Fahmi Memoirs, al-Musawer, December 2,1949. 8. Interview ‘‘D’un Notable Egyptien à Propos des Négociations de Londres,” L ’Egypte, July 15,1920, p. 5. Q.Al-Ahram. 10. Intelligence Report, March 24-March 30,1920, F0371/4984. 11. Tignor, Deeb, Davis, al Messiri. 1?. Frederic de Billier, U.S. Chargé d’affaires, to Secretary of State, July 3, 1920, U.S. 571/3. Records of the Department of State relating to Internal Affairs of Egypt, 1910-1929. Hereafter cited as U.S./Egypt 571. 13. ‘Abd al-Rahman Fahmi memoirs, January 3,1936, al-Musawer. 14. Richard Adamson memoirs, JQ3801, Saint Antony’s Middle East Collection, Oxford. 15. Statement by Lord Milner made at the meeting between the Special Mission to Egypt and Sa‘d Pasha Zaghlul and his colleagues at 3 p.m. at the Colonial Office on 9th of November. 1920, F0371/4981. 16. Fahmi Memoirs, al-Musawer, December 2,1949; HadhihiHayati. 17. Ibid.. December 9,1949. 18. Curzon Memorandum Egypt Situation, February 1921, p. 59, F0371/6295. 19. High Commissioner to the Sultan, February 26,1921, p. 59, F0371/6294. 20. R.C. Lindsey Memorandum, March 14, 1921 on Allenby to Curzon, March 13, 1921, F0371/6294. 21. Allenby to Curzon. March 18,1921, F0371/6294. 22. Lindsey Memorandum, May 19, 1921 on Allenby to Curzon, May 19, 1921, F0371/6296. 23. Intelligence Reports, June 1921, F0371/6297. 24. Lindsey Memorandum, September 13,1921, FO371/6301. 25. Commandant of Police, Galioubia Province, September 27, 1921, FO 371/ 6313. 26. F.M. Edwards, Inspector of Finance, report 1921, DTI07-2-22, Saint Antony’s, Oxford. 27. Lindsey Memorandum, October 1,1921, FO371/6305. 28. Intelligence Reports, November 1921, F0371/6313. 29. Howell to Secretary and Under Secretary of State, September 3, 1921, U.S. 571/4. 30. Ibid. 31. High Commissioner to Foreign Office, December 20,1921, FO371/6308. 32. Allenby to Foreign Office, December 23,1921, F0371/6308. 33. Fakhri ‘Abd al-Nur Diary, al-Musawer, August 22, 1947: History of the Wafd (Those who left the Wafd), al-Musawer, November 4, 1932; "Les Conditions de Saroit Pacha,” La Revue Egyptienne, February 19, 1922. The latter was a pro-Wafdist weekly, edited by Georges Dumani. 34. Allenby to Foreign Office, December 27,1921, FO371/6309. 35. William Whiting Andrews, U.S. Chargé d’affaires, to State Department, December 28,1921, U.S./Egypt 571/15. 36. Clayton to Ernest Scott (who acted as High Commissioner in Allenby’s absence). May 12,1922, SA470/15. 37. Interview with Ustaz Hilmi, brother of Makram ‘Ubayd, January 22, 1973;

151

THE WAFD al-Jil al-Jadid, interview with public servant of Hanna, January 18,1955. 38. Murray to Edward Grigg, Foreign Office official, F0371/7734. 39. Murray Memorandum, October 27,1922, F0371/7738. 40. Memorandum of a conversation at 10 Downing Street, February 15, 1922. Hereafter cited as February 15,1922 Conversation, F0371/7731. 41. Allenby to Foreign Office, January 25,1922, F0371/7731. 42. Ulrich Alexander to Wingate, January 29, 1922, SA240/1; Foreign Office to Allenby, January 28,1922, FO371/7730. 43. February 15, 1922 Conversations, F0371/7731; see also: Allenby to Curzon, February 2,1922, F0371/7731. 44 .Ibid. AS.Ibid. Ab. Ibid. 47. War Office to Foreign Office, October 4, 1921, FO371/6305; al-Ahram study, p. 511. 48. Howell to Secretary of State, February 23,1922, U.S./571/4. 49. P. Russell, Commander of Cairo Police, to Graham, October 28, 1919, FO 371/3720; Allenby to Foreign Office, May 24.1922, F0371/7734. 50. Lindsey Memorandum, December 20,1922, F0371/7739. 51. Telegrams and Petitions to King Fu’ad, September-November, 1922; Royal Archives, Dar al-Kutub. 52. al-Ahwal, September 28,1922.

7 THE WAFD IN POWER

During the first three months of 1923, the constitutional question preoccupied officials. Agreement on the constitution was hampered by Fu’ad’s insistence on the allocation of wide pre­ rogatives for himself. In short, he did not want a constitutional monarchy. Fu’ad believed a one party parliamentary “ dictator­ ship” — for he knew the Wafd as the single most powerful party could easily dominate all national elections — to be the worst form of government. [1] He had closely observed the constitutional committee which he had personally selected, and had quarreled persistently with Tharwat over the constitutional drafts. On the other hand, Allenby was determined that the constitution should be a democratic one and was prepared to pass the constitution over Fu’ad’s objections if need be. [21 In an hour by hour account, Allenby carefully delineated how he literally forced Fu’ad to sign the draft constitution, [3] which made no mention of the Sudan. Fu’ad wanted to have the title King of the Sudan as well as the title King of Egypt. Having tired of Fu’ad’s procrastination, Allenby finally told the King on January 30 that he had until seven o’clock in the evening to sign the draft. As it was a Friday, the Muslim holy day, Allenby agreed to delay until noon on Saturday. When two o’clock arrived and Fu’ad was still hedging, Allenby announced that the deadline had passed. Sa‘id Dhu al-Faqar (Zulficar), the Grand Chamberlain, rushed back to the Palace to confer with Fu’ad. Dhu al-Faqar then telephoned Allenby to report that an affirmative reply would be delivered by seven o’clock. Allenby reinserted the clause concerning the accep­ tance of the views of the British government when the draft was returned to him. (This form of last minute confrontation was to be replayed with stunning results by Lampson and Faruq during 153

THE WAFD

W.W. II.) By nine o’clock on the same evening, the ever-patient Dhu al-Faqar had returned with Fu’ad’s signature on the proper form. The constitution, based largely on the Belgian model, was officially promulgated on April 19. The extent of Allenby’s inter­ vention was widely known. In general, ‘‘public opinion appeared to appreciate that, had they been so minded. His Majesty’s Government might have seized the occasion to re-establish in part at least their former position in Egypt.” [4] Concomitantly, Fu’ad’s already unpopular public image was further tarnished. The British were not altogether unhappy over Fu’ad’s declining authority for while they did not want the dominance of the Wafd, they did not desire an autocratic monarchy which would have been even more difficult to manipulate. The constitution provided for full civil liberties with a two house Parliament. The King nominated two-fifths of the members in the Senate with the remainder elected on a representative basis; deputies were publicly elected. Under the constitution it proved easy for the Wafd to dominate any Parliament in which elections were open and free. The King kept rather wide powers as he had the right to dismiss any Parliament, although he could not use the same reason for dismissal on two consecutive occasions. The period was further complicated by Nessim’s resignation on February 5; this was another blow to Fu’ad who had favored Nessim’s Ministry. Allenby did not propose to let Fu’ad have a free hand in forming another Ministry. Fu’ad consulted with Mazlum, Muhammad Sa‘id and even ‘Adli: Mazlum’s candidacy was not acceptable to Allenby because of his pro-Zaghlul tenden­ cies, while Sa‘id was excluded because of his reputation for intrigue. Allenby conferred with ‘Adli, his favorite; ‘Adli was willing to take office if he received certain concessions. He wanted the release of Zaghlul and those imprisoned in al-Maza, and the suspension of Martial Law. [5] The prospect of an ‘Adli Ministry was unwelcome both to the King and to the Wafd. The Wafd and the Palace were occasionally uneasy bedfellows when it suited their respective self interests to join forces against the British or potentially threatening third parties. Consequently, the Wafd, and Palace newspapers both launched attacks on ‘Adli who was dismayed by articles in the Palace organs. Liberté and Balagh. He therefore declined to form a Ministry. After Allenby rebuked Fu'ad for this intervention, ‘Adli agreed to test public opinion 154

THE WAFD IN POWER

which momentarily seemed favorable. Then a series of bomb attacks resulted in new stringent military measures against the Wafd. In face of this opposition ‘Adli withdrew his candidacy. Fu’ad proceeded to suggest a neutral government or what was known as a Ministry of Affairs. With no alternatives in sight, Allenby agreed to the formation of such a Ministry under Yahya Ibrahim, on March 15. Ibrahim had experience in the Ministries of Justice and Education, but had no political reputation. In spite of the sporadic bomb attacks, Allenby by February felt that Egypt was stable enough to warrant the release of Zaghlul from Gibraltar to Europe. [6] To release Zaghlul would, in Allenby’s opinion, have secured good will for the British as it would have been interpreted as a gesture of friendship. In London, Bonar Law, the new Prime Minister, and Curzon met with Members of Parliament who reiterated Allenby’s request. [7] While the release was still being debated, Cairo was struck by a new wave of bombings. On February 7, an attempt was made on the life of a Railways official; this was followed by a series of bombings which resulted in several deaths. Allenby appointed a military governor in Cairo, levied a fine and cordoned off the quarter of the city where the more radical elements resided, searched for arms, arrested a number of suspects including some Wafdists, and shut Zaghlul’s house which had been used as a meeting place. These measures had little effect. On March 5 there was an attempt to bomb the British General Headquarters. More Wafdists, including members of the High Command, Husayn al-Qasabi, Muhammad Nagib al-Gharabli, Ragab Iskandar, Satama Mikha’il, and ‘Abd al-Halim al-Bayli, were arrested. The Wafd merely replaced them with its fourth High Command. Hasan Hasib acted as President of the Command which was considerably more militant in composition. Once again Martial Law was more strictly enforced. The persis­ tent bombings and assassinations underscored the fact that events would not move smoothly so long as Zaghlul remained incar­ cerated. Recognizing the futility of further application of Martial Law, Allenby determined that Zaghlul should be released. Concerned over what it considered a dangerous drift toward violence, the Foreign Office asked Allenby to come to London for discussions. Allenby refused saying that “ such a move . . . would cause 155

THEWAFD

sensation here and would be interpreted as indicating that His Majesty’s Government were embarrassed by the situation and were contemplating a change of policy.” [8] The Foreign Office cabled a series of questions on the future status of Egypt which Allenby answered in detail. Accustomed to prompt obedience to his orders in the military, Allenby was not about to be dissuaded by the Foreign Office from his adopted course. On March 24, he proposed that Zaghlul be released without asking for guarantees (which would have been impossible to assure at any rate). He recommended that the release be announced simultaneously in Cairo and London, and that there should be no advance publicity. Zaghlul was informed on March 31,1923, that he and his party were free to go to Europe. Zaghlul’s request for passage money was refused with the remark that he had ‘‘lived free . . . for some time even if against his will.” [9] Zaghlul’s release was greeted wjth spontaneous celebrations all over Egypt. The press announced the news with banner headlines citing British press announcements that Zaghlul’s health had caused his release. The latter was, of course, a diplomatic means of explaining what had been essentially a political conces­ sion. [10] Zaghlul left Gibraltar for France on April 4; his progress was avidly followed by the Egyptian press. [11] Most of the members of the High Command imprisoned in March were released on April 15, while most of the prisoners in al-Maza were freed on May 17. The Wafd exiles still in the Seychelles were finally set free in June. Only the issue of Martial Law remained unsettled. On July 5, Martial Law was withdrawn. The Indemnity Law which granted British officials substantial pensions was promulgated at the same time. Once Egypt was rid of Martial Law there was nothing to prevent Zaghlul from returning home. His health vastly improved, Zaghlul promptly applied ior a passport, which he did not receive for several weeks. During the summer months, all the political parties, Hizb al-Watani, Liberal Constitutionalists, and the Wafd canvassed the provinces for support in the upcoming elections.' To protect himself from any eventuality, Fu’ad apparently donated funds to all the parties. The traditional old family leadership seemed to maintain its former power throughout rural Egypt; only in urban Cairo and Alexandria did these traditional alliances and lines of 156

THE WAFD IN POWER

authority show any signs of disintegration. No matter what their party affiliations, the old elites continued their local ascendancy. This was particularly worrisome to the Wafd whose former members, Mahmud and Makabati, maintained their- political positions in their local provinces. [12] The continued power of the traditional families is clear evidence that Egyptian political parties were not groupings of different social-economic strata joined under a mutual ideology for the purpose of getting and keeping political power, but were, in fact, still personality or family oriented affiliations in western garb. Attempting to counter the traditional elites, in the rural areas, the Wafd organized student tours to promote Wafdist candidates. These groups and prominent Wafd leaders visited the provinces to talk about their candidates and, whenever possible, to under­ score their affiliation with Zaghlul, the only politician with a truly national following in Egypt. Such tactics were not necessary in Cairo and Alexandria where, with support from the workers and professions, the Wafd felt fairly confident of victory. Wafdist efforts were rewarded when they won resounding victories in the autumn primaries. After Zaghlul returned the High Command was reorganized with Zaghlul, al-Basil, Hanna, Khayyat, Nahhas, Butrus Ghali, Wisa Wasif, and Makram ‘Ubayd resuming their positions of authority. The Executive Committee was led by the former leaders of the High Command, al-Misri, al-Sa‘di, Qasabi, Qayati, Mikha’il, Fakhri, ‘Abd al-Nur, Muhammad Nagib al-Gharabli, Mahmud Isma‘it, Ragab Iskandar, ‘Abd al-Halim al-Bayli, Hasan Hasib, Husayn Hilal, Mustafa Bakir, Ibrahim Ratib and ‘Atta ‘Afifi. On September 17, Zaghlul landed in Alexandria to a tumultuous welcome. The crowd’s size and enthusiasm left no doubt that he was by far the most popular Egyptian politician. Zaghlul was driven through the cheering crowds before calling on King Fu’ad. Fu’ad stressed the need for moderation, and Zaghlul assured him of his loyalty. While both men professed to be pleased with the interview, Fu’ad could scarcely keep from being alarmed and somewhat jealous of Zaghlul’s popularity. In the afternoon, Zaghlul met with Egyptian students. In a temperate speech, Zaghlul recalled that he had lived through two exiles and did not want a third. [13] The next day, Omar Tusun gave Zaghlul a huge 157

THE WAFD

banquet at Garidges Hotel during which time Zaghlul delivered a short and moderate speech. His return to Cairo was met with the same wild enthusiasm as evidenced in Alexandria. In a show of temporary unity, Tewfik Nessim even drove Zaghlul to Beit al-Umma. Anxious to avoid a direct confrontation with both the British and the Palace, Zaghlul was markedly temperate in his public state­ ments. He took care not to offend Fu’ad and softened the Wafd’s vituperative attacks on the Liberal Constitutionalists. In fact, Zaghlul personally was shocked at the more violent aspects of the Wafd’s tactics which had appeared in his absence. He was eager for the Wafd to win a legitimate victory at the polls. Zaghlul was confident that his party could start Egypt on the road to a working Parliamentary government. In political terms, the Wafd soon appeared as the moderate party bridging the gap between the conservative Liberal Constitutionalists, who had earned the reputation of co-operating excessively with the British, and the so-called radical Hizb al-Watani which had rejected any asso­ ciation with the British. In addition, the Wafd was led by the most popular man in Egypt. The Wafd had, in short, a winning com­ bination. During the elections, Allenby wisely absented himself from Egypt for a tour of the Sudan. Archibald Kerr, with whom Zaghlul had an amiable working relationship, was left in charge of the Residency. The Wafd won an overwhelming victory in the January 12 elections. The 1923 Electoral Law provided indirect elections with financial and educational voter qualifications. The Wafd, Constitutional Liberals, Hizb al-Watani, and Independents all ran candidates. The Wafd received 44.9 percent of the vote, win­ ning 179 of the 211 Parliamentary seats. [14] Yahya Ibrahim handed in his resignation on February 4; Fu’ad asked Zaghlul to form a Ministry, and on February 7, Zaghlul officially announced the first “ People’s Ministry.” The Ministry was carefully selected, representing a cross section of Egyptian society. Tewfik Nessim acted as Finance Minister; Mustafa Nahhas was Minister of Transportation; Fath Allah Barakat, a landowner and relative of Zaghlul’s, was Minister of Interior and Muhammad Sa‘id served as Minister of Justice. The venerable Ahmad Mazlum acted as President of the Chamber of Deputies. A noted Copt, Wasif Butrus Ghali, was selected as 158

THE WAFD IN POWER

Minister of Foreign Affairs; Hasan Hasib was Minister of War. Ahmad Mahir, Marqus Hanna, and Gharabli acted as Ministers of Education, Public Works and Waqfs (Awqaf) respectively. Fath Allah's nomination was opposed by some Wafdists who favored his brother, ‘Atif, but upon the advice of Safia and others, Zaghlul selected the able Fath Allah. The King objected to Marqus Hanna, a Copt, who had originally been chosen as Minister of Justice. Fu’ad did not think a Christian should hold this position in a Muslim country; as a consequence, Hanna's nomination was withdrawn. Fu'ad also opposed ‘Ali Shamsi, because of his support of ex-Khedive 'Abbas. To placate Fu’ad, Shamsi was omitted from the Ministry. Zaghlul’s mandate as Prime Minister was obviously to conclude a treaty with the British which would assure the full independence of Egypt. The Labour leader Ramsay MacDonald’s almost simul­ taneous accession to power in Great Britain gave Zaghlul high hopes for the success of his mission. Several members of MacDonald’s Cabinet had been in the Labour delegation which had toured Egypt under Wafd auspices and had publicly commit­ ted themselves to much of the Wafd program. On March 15,1924, the first Egyptian constitutional Parliament opened amid national rejoicing. The political prisoners still in jails were released in a gesture of goodwill. Crowds of students, women demanding the vote, and onlookers gathered to glimpse the Prime Minister and Members of Parliament. Cries of “ Egypt and the Sudan’’ predominated. Fu’ad and Zaghlul rode together to the Parliament building where both delivered speeches voicing high hopes for the venture. Allenby watched the proceedings from the Diplomatic Gallery above and must have wondered how long the uneasy truce between Fu’ad and Zaghlul would survive. Parliamentary debates were lively affairs ranging from technical matters concerning irrigation to quality education. [15] Makram ‘Ubayd initiated many of the debates on social matters including urban problems and workers’ wages. He displayed extensive knowledge coupled with a brilliant oratorical style. While Members of Parliament did vote themselves a substantial annual salary they took their duties seriously. Zaghlul led many of the debates, particularly those dealing with hydraulic matters which, as a matter of course, raised the question of Egyptian-Sudanese relations. By the summer, budgetary 159

THEWAFD

considerations occupied much of the Members’ time. Zaghlul’s more autocratic tendencies often revealed themselves in Parlia­ ment. He had a short temper which flared easily in the free swinging Egyptian debates. Zaghlul may have been the hero of the masses, but in Parliament he was liberally criticized. At these times, Mazlum frequently' acted as the conciliator. As Prime Minister, Zaghlul moved to bring as many Egyptians as possible into the administration. Many of these appointees were members of his own family, which started an unfortunate tradition of nepotism which other Wafd leaders were to emulate. This ulti­ mately led to widespread corruption and inefficiency on many levels of the Egyptian government. However, with all his faults, Zaghlul was committed to Parliamentary government and was eager for Egypt to take its place as an equal among the western democracies. But Zaghlul’s methods and goals were not without severe critics, not only from the Liberal Constitutionalists, but from members of the Wafd party itself. Many questioned whether or not Zaghlul could, or should, negotiate with the British. Zaghlul argued that his overwhelming election victory and a Labour Party Prime Minister gave him two advantages which had not previously existed. More radical Wafdists persisted in their bombing tactics and resorted to violence which was criticized but not controlled by the Wafd Executive Committee. Little time was to elapse before Zaghlul bitterly regretted that he had not eradicated the more radical elements from the party. The division between the moderates and the radicals highlighted the basic social and economic cleavage between the bourgeoisie, professional, and landowning elite which had initially formed the Wafd, and the second echelon of its leadership which largely represented the upwardly mobile urban workers. Using traditional alliances the Wafd leadership could rally massive urban crowds in short order, but the gap between that leadership and the urban cadres remained throughout the party’s existence. Lacking a program for dynamic development, the Wafd failed to answer the needs of the masses who remained disfranchised. The more ideologically committed nationalists, on the right and left, came to perceive that the Wafd — with its elitist bourgeois power base — would never effectuate a social or economic revolution in Egypt. They also understood that Great Britain would never 160

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voluntarily withdraw from Egypt and that therefore all nego­ tiations were useless. They had concluded that only force could drive the British from Egypt. As a result there was a proliferation of political groups on the left and the right during the 1920’s and 1930’s. However, Zaghlul had a charismatic appeal for masses of Egyptians who viewed him as the “ Father figure’’ who would oust the foreigners. Blinded by adoration, they failed to see, or to care, that the Wafd as a party, and Zaghlul as its leader, were not offering meaningful domestic programs. As long as the masses were willing to grant full support to Zaghlul, the Wafd could be assured of remaining the majority party. With his keen political sensitivities, Zaghlul recognized his power, while at the same time underestimating the very real strength of a few committed nationalists who would use any means to gain their end. As a result, Zaghlul did not discern that the more radical nationalists — although a small minority — could not only undermine the Wafd, but ultimately could destroy Zaghlul’s government. Ignoring more radical opposition, Zaghlul quietly began arrangements for the Egyptian-British negotiations in the spring. [16] Zaghlul was optimistic, but the Foreign Office feared a repetition of the stillborn ‘Adli discussions. Through the good offices of the Egyptian Ambassador to Britain, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ‘Izzat, an Anglophile and aristocrat, and Wasif Ghali, the British ultimately agreed to open discussions; although they still reserved the four vital interests elucidated in the February 28, 1922 Declar­ ation. With some variations, this was to set the pattern for all Egyptian-British negotiations through 1952. Zaghlul responded by vehemently denouncing the February Declaration, which was then repudiated by the Chamber of Deputies in May. A full six years after its inception, the Wafd officially became a political party in April 1924. By formalizing its position the Wafd paved the way for its participation in the forthcoming negotiations. All the Wafd members of the lower chamber provided the party’s General Council, while the Executive Committee, paralleling the former High Command in duties, was elected with one deputy from each province of 14 deputies, and two for each with more than fourteen. [17] The members submitted questions and proposals to be studied by the Committee which was the pivotal office within the party structure. The Committee moved to revitalize the Wafd 161

THE WAFT)

as a movement outside its Parliamentary membership. In this regard, it had difficulties, for the Wafd’s experience was similar to other movements which had become institutionalized into a party and which, in the process, had lost much of their mass appeal. The Wafd was further constrained by the somewhat narrow outlook of its leadership. Nowhere was the essentially middle class, capitalist attitude of the Wafd leadership more apparent than in the Wafd reaction to the strike of factory workers in Alexandria. [18] Early in March, a group of workers from the Egyptian Salt and Soda Company, a soap firm, and the Gas Company, struck and actually seized several factories. They demanded increased wages, severance pay, better working conditions, and decreased working hours. Although the trade unions had wholeheartedly supported the Wafd from 1919, Zaghlul moved quickly to put down the strikers. The Communist party was blamed for inciting the workers and was banned in July. Its members were tried in secret. (Liberal Consti­ tutionalism in Egypt never extended so far as to include the extremes on the left or right.) The Egyptian Communist party was a small group of dedicated idealists, composed mainly of Europeans (many were Russian Jews), who were led by Joseph Rosenthal. The party had been active since the early twenties in organizing rent strikes and workers, while calling for educational reforms and other social improvements. However, it was extreme­ ly small in numbers, and actually had minimal following among Egyptian workers in both Alexandria and Cairo. Consequently, the purging of the party was merely an attempt to shrug off the responsibility of the Wafd for failing to meet the demands of the urban workers. Incidentally, it was also a convenient excuse for ridding the nation of the communist organization which was mis­ trusted by both the British and the key Wafdists. As previously noted, the British had persistently attempted to link nationalist disturbances to Bolshevism, but had consistently failed to find any real coordination or relationship between the two phenomena in Egypt. The key Wafd leaders were therefore eager to disavow any connections with the Communist party. Even as it moved toward formalizing its existence as a political party, the Wafd leadership was also reluctant to set down a party program. The Wafd, in short, did not have a program for social and economic develop162

THE WAFD IN POWER

ment. It preferred to base its appeal on the personal popularity of Zaghlul, and upon the calls for complete independence from the imperial power. While there were murmurs of discontent from the more activist members, and from the more radical parties like the Hizb al-Watani, the Wafd was able to generate a surprising amount of grass root support without a platform which answered the desperate needs of the Egyptian people. Indeed, the most vigorous criticisms against Zaghlul were based not on the Wafd’s failure to lead the way in domestic development, but were leveled against his relationships with the British. The most virulent attacks, often focusing on Zaghlul personally, were led by Husayn Haykal, editor of al-Siyasa, the Liberal Consti­ tutionalists’ journal. Haykal excoriated Zaghlul for his failure to deal with the Sudanese question. At one point, he even compared his dictatorial tactics to those employed by fascists under Musso­ lini. [19] These attacks reflected the tendency in Egyptian politics to focus on personalities rather than issues. In May, al-Siyasa published Huda Sha'rawi’s “ Manifesto to the Men and Women of Egypt’’ in which Zaghlul was accused of vacillation in dealing with the issue of independence. Privately, Huda Sha’rawi was annoyed because her son-in-law had been dismissed from the Government; a good deal of the Manifesto was directed against Zaghlul personally. The Wafdist press, in turn, belittled the Manifesto, but as the leader of Egypt’s feminist movement, Sha'rawi’s opinions carried a good deal of weight. To counter the power of Huda Sha’rawi, two Wafdist women’s organizations published statements upholding Zaghlul and the party. However, these Wafdist feminist committees never had the authority of Sha’rawi’s groups. As opposition continued to mount, Zaghlul, in a clever political move, on June 28, before the Lower House, threatened to resign. The Parliament was stunned by the announcement and, as might have been expected, called for Zaghlul to remain in office. Zaghlul forced the issue by tendering his resignation to King Fu’ad who reiterated his desire that Zaghlul remain Prime Minister. By threatening to resign, Zaghlul managed to undercut the opposition by forcing the political factions within Egypt to reaffirm their support for his government and, by implication, the negotiations with Great Britain. Public sympathy was manifested with demon­ strations throughout Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said and Suez. Even 163

THE WAFD

al-Siyasa and al-Akhbar gave at least half-hearted approval to Zaghlul’s government. With these votes of confidence, Zaghlul announced on June 30 that he would remain in office. In early July, Zaghlul moved to mend his fences with the unions by attending a tea for the tramway workers. He spoke of his sympathy for the laboring class and its important role in Egyptian development. Zaghlul’s political maneuvering earned him the grudging admiration of the Foreign Office which noted, ‘‘Zaghlul Pasha is an extremely adroit politician and his speech to these workmen is merely another instance of this fact.” [20] But like all personalities in the public eye, Zaghlul had his avowed enemies who would have gladly seen him removed from the political arena. On July 12, a student recently returned from Germany attempted to assassinate Zaghlul while he stood on the Cairo Railway platform. He sustained flesh wounds in the chest and arm. The assailant, ‘Abd al-Latif Khaliq al-Dabbashani, son of a former judge, was thought to have had connections with the Hizb al-Watani. The attempted assassination sparked riots in Cairo which led to sporadic attacks against the Armenian community; these were severely criticized by Zaghlul who, despite his age, was not noticeably impeded by the wounds. He left Cairo, with his arm still in a sling, on July 22 en route to Europe for meetings with MacDonald. Stopping in Alexandria, Zaghlul was met by massive crowds. He called on Fu’ad and Allenby. More importantly, on July 23, Zaghlul made peace with ‘Adli in their first meeting since 1921. Ziwer and Mazlum gave him a farewell reception attended by the Diplomatic Corps and poli­ ticians, all of whom were in Alexandria to escape the humid summer heat in Cairo. Zaghlul, accompanied by Safia, Wasif Ghali, his wife, and Kamal Selim, Zaghlul’s secretary, sailed for France on July 25 amid a huge bon voyage party. Nahhas followed on August 1. Muhammad Sa‘id acted as Prime Minister in Zaghlul’s absence. After Zaghlul’s holiday in Vichy and protracted preliminary arrangements, negotiations opened on September 25. Zaghlul entered the negotiations aiming for the complete independence of Egypt and the Sudan. He recognized that the British would, in all probability, not have discussed the matter were it not for the 1919 revolution and the continued pressure the Wafd had mounted against the British regime. While Zaghlul personally was opti164

THE WAFD IN POWER

mistic, Wafdists in Egypt warned the populace that their goal might not be reached in which case the nation would have to redouble its efforts. [21] Zaghlul, accompanied by Dr. Hamid Mahmud and Kamal Selim, expected private interviews with the cordial MacDonald; when meeting with MacDonald, Zaghlul was surprised to find officials from the Foreign Office in a formal setting. The British, who were alarmed by the increasing number of nationalist incidents in Khartoum, wanted to deal with the Sudanese question first. Zaghlul admitted that he wished the issue to follow the “ natural order” [22] of things. He outlined his five key demands: 1) withdrawal of the British army from Egyptian cities, 2) removal of British Judicial and Financial Advisers, 3) dropping of Capitu­ lations, 4) cessation of British control over Egyptian foreign affairs, 5) international control of the Suez Canal. He did not mention the issue of the British Sirdar as head of the Egyptian army — an interesting omission in light of subsequent events. MacDonald immediately rejected the fifth demand, but asked about the possibility of concluding a treaty. Zaghlul agreed, remarking that an alliance would prevent other foreign powers from gaining entry into Egypt. In later meetings, the British suggested leasing military sites, but Zaghlul refused this proposal. Negotiations floundered when neither side could agree on specific terms. The negotiations ended in complete failure. Zaghlul returned empty handed to Egypt on October 20. He had a two hour interview with Fu’ad. Both men announced their mutual pleasure with the other. At this time it suited Zaghlul and Fu’ad to avoid an outright confrontation. Fu’ad was still seeking to woo the Wafd in order to buttress his own popularity. Privately, Fu’ad characterized Zaghlul as being like a woman. “ You can win him with a smile or a rose.” [23] For his part, Zaghlul said of Fu’ad, “ I still have need of his Majesty” (‘Va* encore besoin de la grâce de Sa Majesté” ). [24] Later, Zaghlul was entertained by the members of Parliament. Zaghlul’s reception was cordial, but lacked the wild enthusiasm shown on his former home-comings. With Parliamentary and popular support, the Wafd could not retreat from its firm demands for Egyptian independence. The question was what tactics the party should adopt once the negotiations had failed. Personally, Zaghlul was inclined to take a moderate stand; 165

THE WAFD

some of the other Wafdists urged radical tactics. In his public appearances, Zaghlul generally avoided mention of the Sultan, while urging unity among the political parties. He took steps to close the rift with the Hizb al-Watani by having interviews with several of its leaders including Shaykh Shawish, who had assumed leadership of the party. Shawish had spent most of the war in Switzerland where he was closely watched by British Intelligence because of his reputation as a radical. Following these interviews there was even talk of Shawish taking a Ministerial post, [25] but this was never actually seriously considered by the Wafd, nor would the British have permitted an avowed “ radical” to assume a high position of authority. From his home, Zaghlul met almost daily with members of the Wafd High Command; including ‘Ubayd, Bayli, Nuqrashi, al-Basil and Fath Allah Barakat with whom he often dined. In addition, he met with provincial leaders and with the ill-fated Lee Stack on November 2. These leaders kept Zaghlul well informed of political undercurrents. During this period, the Wafd remained financially solvent, but had difficulty in agreeing on future tactics. A boycott of British goods was urged by ‘Ubayd, but not ratified by Zaghlul. Ironically, Huda Sha‘rawi with a group of Egyptian women did pass a reso­ lution to boycott British firms and merchandise; the more radical Sha‘rawi formed women’s committees in the provinces to publi­ cize this boycott. [26] The Wafd considered the formerly successful strike tactic, but calls for massive strikes met with tepid response from the workers who undoubtedly recalled Zaghlul’s earlier harsh treatment of their own strikes. The King was rather more successful in his intrigues to incite strikes at al-Azhar, the former bastion of Wafdist supporters. Fu’ad’s close confidant, Hasan Nashat, an old enemy of both Zaghlul and the British, was responsible for the maneuvering which led to student demonstrations for the King and against Zaghlul. Nashat had presumably arranged for agents, possibly his own brother, to spy upon Zaghlul during his Paris sojourn. Infuriated by Nashat's intrigues, Zaghlul demanded that he be removed from his post as Under-Secretary for Waqfs (Awqaf), remaining only as Head of the King’s Cabinet. [27] Fu’ad reluc­ tantly agreed, conferring the honor of the Cordon of the Order of the Nile, an honor useful for purposes of prestige and, according to some, for its resale value in gold, upon his old friend. 166

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When the Palace continued to undermine the government, Zaghlul announced that he was resigning for reasons of health. It was commonly acknowledged that the division between the Wafd and the Palace was the actual cause of Zaghlul’s November 15 resignation which caught members of Parliament by surprise. At the same time, Tewfik Nessim announced his resignation. Ahmad Mahir had recently been appointed Minister of Education and rumors of further new appointments had angered Nessim. On November 16, the Wafdist delegates to Parliament held a meeting presided over by Zaghlul; at this time they gave him an overwhelming vote of confidence. Students also gathered outside to cheer for Zaghlul. While marching around Cairo, the crowds reportedly yelled, “ Sa‘d or Revolution,” ‘‘Sa'd aw Thawra, Sa‘d aw Thawra. ” This was reminiscent of the anniversary celebration of the November 13 meeting at which time Makram ‘Ubayd had spoken of the need for continued nationalist support. [28] Throughout his political life, ‘Ubayd was to remain implacably anti-British and an advocate of social and economic reforms. The British had noted ‘Ubayd’s remark and were later to hold him responsible for stirring up nationalist passions. With these public gestures of support, Zaghlul met with Fu’ad and withdrew the resignation. From his home, Zaghlul thanked the crowds, some of which had earlier attacked several newspaper offices (al-Liwa, al-Kashkul) which had published anti-Wafdist articles. [29] Following Zaghlul’s Parliamentary victory over the Palace, he appointed ‘Ali Shamsi, whom Fu’ad had once rejected, as Minister of Finance. Once again through a calculated political gamble, Zaghlul had managed to triumph over Fu’ad. The victory was extremely short-lived for on the afternoon of November 19, the Sirdar of the Sudan, Sir Lee Stack, was assassin­ ated. Driving back from the Ministry of War, Stack received wounds in his foot, abdomen, and head; his Aide-de-Camp and chauffeur were also wounded. The assassins, dressed in western garb, escaped in a taxi-cab. A nearby policeman gave chase, but was also wounded. Stack’s chauffeur drove to the Residency where the badly wounded Sirdar was given emergency treatment. He had not yet been moved to the Anglo-American hospital when Zaghlul, who had been dining when told of the attack, rushed in to give his personal condolences. [30] Allenby, whose temper was 167

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notorious, bellowed that Zaghlul was responsible for the outrage. Stack was Allenby’s old and trusted friend; personally aggrieved by the attack, Allenby was determined that the crime would be avenged. Stack had held the positions of Governor-General of the Sudan and Sirdar of the Egyptian Army since Allenby’s appoint­ ment; as head of the Egyptian army he had been openly criticized in the Egyptian Parliament and by the Wafd in general. Leaving hurriedly, Zaghlul went directly to the Palace to confer with Fu’ad. An astute politician, Zaghlul knew that the attack could mean the end of his Ministry and the Wafdist government. With this in mind he sought, in so far as possible, to repudiate the attempt and to be as compromising as national pride would allow. He gave several interviews stressing that the government would do all in its power to bring the assailants to proper justice. Zaghlul’s political enemies took advantage of the crisis by implicating him and other Wafdists in the crime. The editor of alLiwa was promptly arrested for making such a claim. A tense wait followed while Stack was taken to the hospital; he died late on November 20. Because Stack was both popular and well known, the British community — to say nothing of Allenby himself — was outraged. Many blamed Allenby for past concessions which had permitted leaders from secret societies, which had used assassin­ ation as a political tactic, to be released from prison. Before Stack’s death, Zaghlul had talked with the doctors, King Fu’ad, the High Commissioner and the Cabinet members. He issued statements urging the populace to assist the authorities, noting that the driver of the taxi cab had been arrested. He announced a £1,000 reward for the capture of the others. Upon hearing of Stack’s death, Zaghlul, accompanied by other Cabinet members, went to the hospital and the Residency. They then held a Cabinet meeting to debate what should be done. While Zaghlul was struggling to hold his government in power, Allenby was busily planning to effect the strongest possible punishment. He proposed to demand an apology, the punishment of the assailants, a large indemnity (a quarter of a million pounds), British take-over of Egyptian foreign affairs, maintenance of the Judicial and Foreign Office Advisers, and total British control over the Sudan. Later, Allenby added that Egypt should agree to an unlimited increase of irrigation expansion schemes in the Sudan under the Gezira Plan, and to the British taking “ appropriate 168

THE WAFD IN POWER

action to safeguard their interests in Egypt and the Soudan.” [31] He urged the Foreign Office to accede to the demands in all haste. Allenby was desirous of implementing the terms immediately. During the crisis, telegrams frequently crisscrossed between Cairo and London; this, plus the fact that telegrams were sent in a constant stream as events progressed, meant an increased likeli­ hood of confusion. On Thursday November 20, the British Cabinet decided to approve Allenby’s requests “ subject to certain amend­ ments.” [32] The Foreign Office responded that an indemnity should be voluntary and that the irrigation expansion plans should cover only the previously agreed upon 300,000 acres. [33] In the interim. Stack had died and Allenby had escalated his demands for retribution. Stack’s funeral was held Saturday, November 22 amid great tension; Zaghlul, the Cabinet, Allenby, and the Diplo­ matic Corps attended; at the graveside, Allenby was visibly shaken. Not satisfied with Zaghlul’s public declarations of regret, Allenby had already concluded that Zaghlul had to accept total responsibility for the assassination. Parliament was scheduled to meet to five o’clock in the after­ noon; news had it that Zaghlul planned to resign at that time in order to avoid accepting the inevitable British ultimatum. Allenby was determined Zaghlul would not escape so lightly. Allenby wanted to demand half a million pounds, or even a million, as reparations, for that was the “ sort of humiliation which is under­ stood” [34] in Egypt. He cabled London that he intended to present the demands to Zaghlul before Parliament convened on the twenty-second. He was impatient for the full approval of the British government, demanding immediate ratification for all of his demands. [35] As the time moved closer to the five o’clock deadline Allenby had set for himself to present his ultimatum, he became increas­ ingly tense. While he had not yet received final confirmation from the Foreign Office, he had the ultimatum fully prepared. Finally, at fifteen minutes before five, Allenby concluded he would act with or without Foreign Office approval. The Foreign Office response, which contained amendments to Allenby’s original draft, arrived as he was leaving. Allenby spontaneously decided not to wait for the cable to be deciphered and the appropriate alterations to be made, but to present his personal demands without the approval of 169

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the British government. Accordingly, Allenby, attired in a lounge suit as a symbol of contempt, rode amid a large company of British horsemen, to Zaghlul’s office. Allenby read the ultimatum in English, knowing that Zaghlul could not understand him, and strode out before the translation was read. The ultimatum ordered that Egypt: (1) apologize (2) prosecute the assailants (3) pay a £500,000 indemnity (4) withdraw all troops from the Sudan (5) consent to unlimited increase of Sudanese irrigated areas, and (6) ‘‘withdraw all opposition in prospects hereafter specified to the wishes of His Majesty’s Government concerning protection of foreign interests in Egypt.” [36] It concluded that the British would take appropriate measures to protect their interests. Zaghlul was given twenty-four hours to comply. After receiving the ultimatum, Zaghlul rushed to the Palace. Fu’ad masked his pleasure at the turn of events he knew would probably bring about the downfall of his rival. When Zaghlul offered to resign, Fu’ad, not wishing to appear overly eager, told him to consider the matter carefully. Following this meeting, Zaghlul conferred with Cabinet members for several hours and then held a closed session of the Chamber of Deputies. They gave him a vote of confidence to draft the appropriate response to the ultimatum. With these instructions, Zaghlul returned to his home where the Cabinet met late into the evening. The Wafd carefully dis­ cussed which terms of the ultimatum were acceptable and how the party should urge the populace to react. Whether or not demon­ strations, some of which had already broken out in Alexandria, should be encouraged was the subject of rigorous debate. Finally, they decided to accept all terms except the last two dealing with Capitulations and the Sudanese irrigation schemes. Had the Wafd leaders known that Allenby had taken matters into his own hands, vastly exceeding the terms of his authority, and that the British Cabinet had the gravest misgivings over the demands and, more particularly, over Allenby’s insubordination, they might have found a way to turn the loss into a victory. However, no matter how annoyed the officials in London were in times of crisis, they publicly presented a united front with the chosen representatives of their government. Consequently, the Wafd remained ignorant of the serious rift between Allenby and the British Cabinet. In London a special Cabinet meeting was called to deal with 170

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Allenby’s urgent request for accession to his ultimatum. By two o'clock London time, the aforementioned fateful, amended ulti­ matum had been dispatched; it ordered the Egyptians to pay up to a million pounds, not in an indemnity, but to the Sudanese defense force over an extended period. [37] It also delineated more carefully the terms for extending irrigation in the Sudan, and with regards to the Capitulations. Finally, it provided two days for the Egyptians to respond. In toto, the document was much more moderate in tone and substance than Allenby's. When officials received word from Allenby that he had sub­ mitted his own ultimatum, they were quietly furious. Chamberlain, a man noted for passivity and prudence, wrote Allenby a letter which was never sent, tracing the points at which Allenby "acted contrary to instruction." [38] In subsequent cables, Allenby was informed that the government had tried to take into account public opinion and that the indemnity had "the appear­ ance of a vindictive penalty," [39] not in keeping with British tradition. Chamberlain censured Allenby for not waiting for the Cabinet’s decision. . . . I shall be glad if you explain more fully your reasons. I do not at present understand the extreme urgency under which you acted. His Majesty’s Government feel bound to support you in the action that you have already taken in this emergency, but it may be necessary after the immediate crisis is over to restate position in accord with the terms of my telegram No. 226 [the amended ultimatum]. [40] He also asked Allenby to confer with H.H. Asquith who was visit­ ing Egypt at the time. Caught up in the uncertain climate of opinion, Asquith agreed with Allenby that there should be no "hovering or delay." [41] On November 23, Zaghlul visited the King to ask him to inter­ cede in order to secure an extension in time for the response. Fu’ad reluctantly agreed. Allenby received requests for extensions from the Palace through Leon Castro, editor of La Liberté. In a last desperate effort to mollify Allenby, Castro hinted that the Wafd might be willing to reopen negotiations for a treaty. Castro’s attempt failed, and Allenby ordered that the response be delivered 171

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by eight o’clock in the evening. At four o’clock Wasif Ghali delivered the reply which acceded to all the demands but the last two. Allenby responded in writing that he was unilaterally withdraw­ ing Egyptian armed forces from the Sudan and would proceed with the irrigation expansion. Furthermore, he expected payment of the indemnity before noon on the next day. Meanwhile, Zaghlul had handed his letter of resignation to Sa‘id Dhu al-Faqar (Zulficar), the faithful Master of Ceremonies for the Palace. Allenby was still resolved to have all the demands properly accepted by the Wafdist government before Zaghlul left office. Insofar as possible, Allenby wanted to humiliate Zaghlul in hopes that he and the Wafd party Would lose all future credibility in Egypt. Allenby undoubtedly hoped that the Wafd would be so discredited it could never return to the Egyptian political arena. To ensure this, he proposed to seize the tobacco customs, to deploy British soldiers in Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said and Suez, to send airplanes over provincial towns, and to sever diplomatic relations. Under these terms Allenby would have remained as Commander-in-Chief and protector of foreign communities. Recognizing the “ illegality” of this action Allenby remarked, “ I suppose one more anomaly does not matter.” [42] As a final resort, Allenby reported that if anyone else were shot, hostages would be taken. Allenby again asked for immediate acquiescence to his proposals. Chamberlain’s repro­ bations obviously had had little impact on Allenby. Always conscious of public opinion and international legalities, officials in London were appalled by some of Allenby’s requests. They interpreted taking of hostages to mean Allenby would have them shot; this was “ a measure so repugnant to British traditions that only in last extremity if at all would public opinion .. . and . . . British dominions . . . ” [43] have supported Allenby on this point. Nor did the government see any advantage to severing diplomatic relations. Chamberlain was still in the process of framing a response when he heard — over Reuter's wire service —.that Allenby had told Zaghlul the customs would be occupied before receiving the Foreign Office response. Even for the moderate Chamberlain it was the final straw. He cabled Allenby that: I leave to you who are on the spot fullest discretion as to measures required to preserve order subject to what I have 172

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said about shooting hostages but I must insist that political measures of grave import not affecting internal situation of Egypt alone shall not be undertaken till I have approved them. In particular you are not to declare martial law without express approval of His Majesty’s Government. [44] True to form, Allenby simply responded, “ This is true. I much regret having failed to inform you immediately.’’ [45] He then proceeded to trace the progress of events. Wishing to forego further humiliation, Zaghlul pressured Fu’ad for the immediate acceptance of his resignation. While he was still awaiting a reply, Zaghlul had the Ministry of Finance deliver the £500,000 indemnity to Allenby before the noon deadline. A note protesting the unilateral action in the Sudan accompanied the check. Following this, the indemnity was divided as follows: £40,000 to Mrs. Stack; £5,000 to the chauffeur; £3,000 for Campbell, the Aide-de-Camp; approximately £450,000 for the Sudan. [46] After sending the indemnity, Zaghlul forwarded a second letter of resignation to Fu’ad. This was accepted at 1:30 in the afternoon. A short time before the acceptance, while Zaghlul was already at the Palace, Allenby ordered the seizure of the customs house. [47] The customs was actually occupied at five o’clock. As a consequence, Zaghlul did not actually receive official confirmation of Allenby’s order to seize the customs house until he returned to his office, by which time he was no longer Prime Minister. Thus, Allenby had the dubious honor of having presented the Foreign Office with a fait accompli twice in one week. Chamberlain cabled after eight in the evening that he had no choice but to uphold Allenby’s actions, but that British policy was to secure the Sudan and to “ interfere as little as possible in Egypt.’’ [48] Upon reflection, Chamberlain had concluded that the British govern­ ment could only control Allenby’s actions by sending out a trusted civil servant who would heed the traditional patterns of authority. Consequently, Chamberlain asked his old confidant, Neville Henderson, a long-time and respected diplomat in the Foreign Office, to proceed immediately to Cairo as an official Minister. Chamberlain facetiously explained to Allenby that Henderson had his fullest confidence and would make Allenby’s work much easier. [49] Henderson’s role was, of course, to oversee Allenby’s 173

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actions; his presence served as explicit evidence that the British government was highly displeased with Allenby’s conduct. Initially, Allenby merely thanked Chamberlain for sending Henderson, but later he would have a great deal to say about the appointment. [50] On the evening of November 24, Zaghlul went to the Chamber of Deputies to announce his resignation. He told the Deputies that he had resigned owing to the British ultimatum, but that the Wafd would work with any new Ministry which had the interests of Egypt at heart. He returned with Muhammad Sa’id to Beit alUmma, where crowds of students had gathered. Zaghlul advised them not to demonstrate as he feared bloodshed. The old man sadly told them as a “ pitying father” to “ keep quiet.” [51] Safia then spoke urging the students to disperse, but a small number met in the basement of the house where they decided to strike, to be prepared for demonstrations, to publish protests against the British, and to support only those Ministries which had the approval of the Wafd. Ziwer Pasha, a jovial and loyal pro-British Egyptian, had already been approached about becoming Prime Minister. Even before Stack’s assassination, Fu’ad had discussed with Allenby the possibility of forming a Ministry “ which would have more regard for honest and stable administration and which would be strongly anti-Wafdist.” [52] Therefore, Zaghlul had not even announced his resignation to the Parliament before Ziwer had formed a new Cabinet, which was published on the following day. Members included: Ahmad Khashaba, a recent dissenter from the Wafd as Minister of Education; Ahmad Musa, Justice; Osman Muharram, Public Works; Muhammad Sayyid Aba ‘Ali, Agri­ culture; Muhammad Sidqi, Waqfs (Awqaf); Yusuf Cattoui, Direc­ tor of Bank al-Misr, as Finance Minister; Nakhla al-Motei, a Copt, as Minister of Communications, and Muhammad Yahia, Minister of War. Ahmad Dhu al-Faqar (Zulficar), with close ties to the Palace and the Ambassador to Italy, took the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Office officials sub­ sequently congratulated themselves that the extremists had been replaced by able men. [55] The Ziwer Ministry was one calculated to adopt pro-British and pro-Fu’ad stands on all crucial issues. Later, Tewfik Rifaat took over as Minister of Education, a post he had held on a former occasion. Rifaat had a well deserved repu174

THE WAFD IN POWER

tation for harshness, having previously ordered that insubordinate students be beaten. [54] Ahmad Sidqi then became Minister of the Interior. Parliament was prorogued on November 26 in pre­ paration for new elections. With Ziwer’s Cabinet safely in power, Allenby felt more confi­ dent. The customs seizure had been effected without incident, and with the increased number of British soldiers and the fleet in Alexandria harbor,, it seemed unlikely there would be further incidents. However, Allenby wanted to make doubly certain violent outbreaks against the British would not occur by arresting Egyptians thought to be in any way involved with terrorist acti­ vities. As several of these men were members of Parliament the arrests raised the legal questions of Parliamentary immunity and the propriety of the British military arresting citizens of another “ independent” nation. Allenby was hardly to be deterred by such legalistic “ niceties” and proceeded to have Makram ‘Ubayd, ‘Abd al-Rahman Fahmi and Nuqrashi arrested on November 27. As a face-saying device, Ziwer announced that he had been responsible for the arrests. Although the Wafd half heartedly attempted to arouse the populace against these new arrests, there were few outbreaks of violence. [55] Certainly there was no indi­ cation the populace was ready to resist on anywhere the scale of 1919 or 1922. Workers could not be convinced to demonstrate even by the arrest of Fahmi who was a popular nationalist figure. Obviously, the masses were fearful of British retaliation, and, more crucially, largely apathetic to the Wafd which had not provided the sort of dynamic nationalist leadership which had been expected. The Foreign Office was concerned over the obvious illegality of Allenby’s arrests, but did not make an issue of the problem because there were no negative reverberations from either the Egyptians or foreign nations. [56] Allenby presented Ziwer with a series of conditions for the withdrawal of British troops from the customs. These were: full acceptance of the original ultimatum, acceptance of certain changes in the retirement procedure for British officials in the Egyptian government, autonomy with some regulations of the Judicial and Financial advisers over budgets, changes in adminis­ trative organizations in the Ministry of Finance, and the agree­ ment of the Egyptian government to accept the advice of the Financial adviser in case of controversy. [57] These terms re175

THEWAFD

established British control over Egypt; in fact, it was largely a return to the procedures operative under the Protectorate. No Wafdist Ministry would have considered accepting these terms which effectively gave away any semblance of Egyptian indepen­ dence, but Ziwer agreed. Unexpectedly, the Council of Ministers failed to give prompt approval; after some pressure from Ziwer assent was obtained. Interestingly, the most vocal dissenter was the Minister of Education, Khashaba the former Wafdist. [58] He was soon replaced by the more malleable Rifaat. Once agreement had been reached, the customs was evacuated in early December. Meanwhile, the arrest of over seven hundred Egyptians pro­ ceeded. Although Ziwer hesitated, Makram ‘Ubayd, and other Wafdists, were released from prison in the middle of December. No evidence could be found to implicate him with Stack’s assassin­ ation, but he was prosecuted for what was termed his “ revolution­ ary November 13 speech.” [59] Fahmi and Nuqrashi had been detained until after Parliament was prorogued; this prevented them from using Parliament as a platform for vocal dissent. A judge then ruled that the arrests of the deputies were legal and even extended the period of detention which enabled the British to detain Nuqrashi until late in February. When the detention of the deputies and others without cause raised a legal problem the British considered declaring a state of siege; this would have provided for broad legal powers without recourse to actual Martial Law. The two Na’it brothers allegedly involved in the actual Stack assassination were finally arrested on February 21, 1925; they, along with half a dozen others, were publicly tried for the crime. At this trial a great deal of evidence on other assassinations, dating from before World War I, and on secret societies, was given. Most of the evidence rested on the sole confession of Shafiq Mansur. Nuqrashi and Fahmi were implicated because they knew several of the accused. Nashat was involved because of a photo­ graph showing him in the company of the accused. Owing to lack of evidence both Nuqrashi and Fahmi were later freed; however, seven of the accused were hanged in June 1925. Still determined to blame the Wafd for the assassinations, the British tried Ahmad Mahir and Nuqrashi in 1926 — a full two years after the Stack murder. They were both acquitted, but their case became yet another source of friction between the Egyptians, 176

THE WAFD IN POWER

who refused to believe that two leading politicians (Mahir had even been in the Zaghlul Ministry) were involved in these crimes, and the British, who were convinced of their guilt. In fact, they remained on the British Black List until the 1940’s. The Black List was devised by British Intelligence to prevent “ undesirables” who were under surveillance from entering Britain. This list will be discussed at greater length in a later chapter. Mansur gave extensive testimony concerning his membership in a secret society involved in assassination plots. [60] As early as 1906, he had decided that legal ways were fruitless in ousting the British. As* a consequence, he had joined a secret society. The group’s first mission was to assassinate Ministers who worked with the British; Butrus Ghali had been its first victim. Shaykh Shawish, from the Hizb al-Watani, had been involved with the group but had dropped out prior to his departure for Europe. Mansur, with several others, testified as to attempts on various Egyptian Ministers from 1914-1919. He told how his group had contacted the Na’it brothers who were known to work for the assassination of British officials. Mansur reported that Nuqrashi and Ahmad Mahir had maintained a discreet contact with the group, but when he failed to substantiate the charge, it was ultimately construed as hearsay evidence. Mansur reported that *Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i had stopped seeing members of the group after Parliament had opened in 1924. Mansur also reported that he knew ‘Abd al-Latif Sufani, who was on trial for committing the crime. A number of those mentioned in the trial had been tried for other assassinations and bombings. Weapons for these attacks had come from the black market. The bombs were made by individuals who had gained some experience in World War I (although there was evidence that several had lost their lives while experimenting with weapons). Some weaponry was also purchased from the badu who had actively foraged from British personnel during the War. The testimony seemed to bear out the widespread belief that those responsible for many of the assassination attempts and bombings were, or had been, involved with the Hizb al-Watani. There was, however, little or no direct evidence that there had been substantial involvement by key members of the Wafd or even their subordinates. A number of those accused received death sentences, but these 177

THEWAFD

were commuted to various prison terms. Upon release from prison, one Na’it brother went to Austria, while the other, after an extended prison term, remained quietly in Cairo. Mahir and Nuqrashi were acquitted largely on the votes of the two Egyptian judges. In angry protest, Judge Kershaw resigned. He was supported by a note of protest from the British government. Not surprisingly, the British were furious over the light punishments meted out to the accused. They also feared further attacks. Indeed, throughout the crisis the government warned Allenby to be on his guard against attempts on his life. Ironically, Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization, with its own program for “ independence” from imperial powers, informed the Foreign Office of the rumors concerning plans to assassinate the British High Commissioner in Egypt. [61] With a sophisticated spy net­ work throughout the Middle East, the. Zionists were often to pass on bits of information to the British. While Allenby took the warnings seriously to guard himself against attacks from Egyptian nationalists, he had considerably more difficulty in arming himself against the criticisms of the Foreign Office. Many officials felt Allenby should be removed from the Cairo post because of his unilateral actions during the Stack crisis. For his part, Allenby was personally offended by Henderson’s presence in Egypt. He informed Chamberlain of his displeasure in no uncertain terms. Mr. Henderson’s appointment has ruinous effect. Under present conditions I cannot offer resignation but if my tele­ gram of today is refused I must ask you to submit my resig­ nation for as soon as possible as I do not have confidence of Government. In the meantime I shall loyally carry out instructions you may give me. [62] Chamberlain forwarded Allenby’s complaint to the Prime Minis­ ter, Bonar Law, and also consulted with the King. The King was primarily upset that Allenby had appeared in a lounge suit when presenting the ultimatum to Zaghlul. [63] Stamfordham, Secretary to the King, honestly could not understand why Allenby had “ for one moment taken exception to what you [Chamberlain] have done in sending him such a valuable assistant as Mr. Henderson; and apparently the former fails to realise the consideration and 178

THE WAFD IN POWER

generosity which you have shown him, with regard to the com­ munication to the Egyptian Government made on his own authority and contrary to your instructions.” [64] Chamberlain felt Allenby was being absolutely unreasonable, but, in typical fashion, allowed himself time ‘‘for cool reflec­ tion.” [6S] In the interim, Allenby forwarded a series of extended explanations for his actions. Allenby in no way apologized for his actions; he justified them with historical narratives on the chain of events behind his decisions. [66] While officials were not con­ vinced by his arguments, particularly those that seemed to imply dalliance on the part of the British government in replying to his demands, they were nonetheless somewhat mollified. [67] Chamberlain went so far as to congratulate Allenby on the successful conclusion of the crisis, regretting that there had been a misunderstanding. The officials were anxious Allenby not make the rift public — an action which would have caused considerable embarrassment, to say nothing of probably inciting further Egyptian reactions. Consequently, Chamberlain appealed to Allenby to remain quietly in office. [68] Although Allenby refused to withdraw his resignation, he consented to remain temporarily, but there was little doubt Allenby’s tenure of office would be of fairly short duration.

Notes 1. Interview with Samir Dhu al-Faqar (Zulficar), February 16,1973. 2. Lindsey memorandum, November 8,1922, F0371/7738. 3. Allenby to Foreign Office, February 11, 1923, FO371/8960. Elie Kedourie “ Genesis of the Egyptian Constitution of 1923,” Political and Social Change in Modem Egypt, ed. P.M. Holt (London: 1968). 4. Allenby to Curzon, July 19,1923, Number 492, F0371/8962. 5. Allenby to Curzon, July 19,1923, Number 488, F0371/8962. 6. Allenby to Foreign Office, February 14,1923, FO371/8960. 7. Foreign Office to Allenby, February 28,1923, FO371/8960. 8. Allenby to Foreign Office. March 9, 1923, FO371/8960. 9. H. Butler Memorandum, April 6, 1923, F0371/8964. 10. La Liberté. March 31,1923. 11. al-Musawer, April-May 1923. 12. Intelligence Reports. July 18; July 23; September 11,1923, F0371/8968. 13. Ernest Scott (Acting High Commissioner), to Foreign Office, September 17, 1923, F0371/8968. 14. Quraishi, Appendix C. Foreign Office reported Wafd Carried 178 seats. FO 141/452. 15. Allenby to MacDonald, July 7, 1924, F0371/10021; Journal Officiel, 1924-26;

179

THEWAFD al-Musawer. June 19, 1936; Jacques Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revo­ lution (London: 1972), pp. 367-81. 16. Allenbv to Foreign Office, April 7; April 11,1924. 17. Muhammad Ibrahim al-Juziri (ed.), Athar al-Za'im Sa'd Zaghlul (Cairo: 1927), p . 129. 18. U.S. Consul Ernest L. Ives to State Department, April 11. 1924, U.S./Egypt 571/7; Intelligence Report. July 15. 1921, F0371/6299. 19. al-Sivasa, March 25, 1924: the Wafdist al-Balagh and Mahrusa responded to these attacks. January-July 1924. 20. Nicols Memorandum, July 15,1924, F0371/10021. 21. Interview with Makram ‘Ubayd, Mahrusa, July 28, 1924. 22. Memorandum of Conversations of MacDonald and Zaghlul, September 29, 1924. F0371/10042. 23. Kerr to MacDonald. October 24.1924, F0371/10072. 24 .Ibid. 25. Diarv of Zaghlul’s daily activities, October 20-November 24, 1924, Intelligence Report. F 0371/10022. 26. Allenby to MacDonald, November 2, 1924; Allenbv to Austen Chamberlain. November 9. 1924, F0371/10022. 27. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 9. 1924-, F0371/10022. 28 . La Liberté. November 14, 1924. 29. Diary of Zaghlul's activities, F0371/10022. 30. Ibid: Misr, November 20-December 1, 1924. 31. Allenby to Foreign Office. Number 361, November 19, 1924: Allenby to Foreign Office. Number 368, November 20. 1924, FO141/502; Petit Journal Illustré, November 30. 1924, Extraits des Journaux, Royal Archive. Dar al-Kutub. 32. Cabinet 61. November 20. 1924, F0371/10044. 33. Foreign Office to High Commissioner, Number 217, November 20. 1924, FO 141/502. 34. Allenby to Foreign Office, Number 380. November 21, 1924, FO141/502: FO 371/10042. 35. Allenbv to Foreign Office. Number 376. November 21; Number 369, November 22. 1924, F 0371/10042. 36. Allenby to Foreign Office, Number 381, November 21, 1924; this is a full text of the ultimatum; Allenby to Foreign Office. Number 386, November 22, 1924; a description of the ultimatum’s presentation, F 0371/10044. 37. Cabinet Meeting. 62, November 22, 1924; Foreign Office to Allenbv. Number 226. November 22.1924, F0371/10044. 38. Chamberlain to Allenby. no date, but probably written November 23 or Novem­ ber 24. 1924, F 03 7 1 /10047. 39. Foreign Office to Allenby, Number 228, November 22. 1924, F0371 /10044. 40. Chamberlain to Allenby, Number 232, November 22, 1924, F 0371/10044. 41. Asquith to Chamberlain, November 23, 1924, AC51. 42. Allenby to Foreign Office. Number 390, November 24, 1924, F 0 3 7 1 /10044. 43. Foreign Office to Allenby. Number 237, sent at 10:55, November 24. 1924: the language had been altered to read, “ His Majesty’s Government disapprove shooting of hostages. This measure must not be adopted in any circumstances.’* Foreign Office to Allenby. Number 240. November 24, 1924, F0371/10044. 44. Chamberlain to Allenby. Number 239, November 24,1924, F0371/10044. 45. Allenby to Chamberlain, Number 402. November 24,1924, F 0 3 7 1 /10044. 46. Allenby to Foreign Office, November 24, 1924, F0371/10044. 47. Allenby to Chamberlain, Number 402; Allenby to Foreign Office, Number 409, November 24, 1924, F0371/10044; text of order, Allenby to Foreign 180

TH E W A FD IN POWER Office, Number 403, November 24,1924, F0371/10044. 48. Chamberlain to Allenby, November 24,1924, F0371/10044. 49. Chamberlain to Allenby, Number 24Î>, November 24,1924, F0371/10044. 50. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 25,1924, FO141/502. 5 1 . Zaghlul events, November 24, 1924, F0371/10022; Misr, November 24-25, 1924. 52. Allenby to Foreign Office, Number 395, November 24,1924, F 0371/10044. 53. Murray Memorandum on December 3, 1924 on Allenby to Foreign Office. FO 371/10022. 54. Nicols Memorandum, November 26,1924 on Allenby to Foreign Office, Novem­ ber 26, 1924, F0371/10045. 55. Misr, November 29,1924. 56. Review of the General Situation, November 19, to December 8, 1924, Allenby to Chamberlain, December 13, 1924, F0371/10022. C. Hurst Memorandum, November 26-29, 1924, F0371/10044. Allenby to Foreign Office, November 27, 1924, F0371/10045. 57. Allenby to Foreign Office, November 27,1924, F0371/10045. 58. Allenby to Foreign Office, Numbers 436, November 27; 458, 468, 469, Novem­ ber 30, 1924, F0371/10045. 59. Allenby to Foreign Office, December 14,1924, F0371/10046. 60. High Court Department, Judicial Section, Cairo, The Case of the Sirdar, file 14. 61. Foreign Office to Allenby, November 27,1924, F0371/10045. 62. Allenby to Chamberlain, November 27,1924, AC51/1-149. 63. Chamberlain to Stamfordham, November 24,1924, AC51/1-149. 64. Stamfordham to Chamberlain, November 28,1924, AC51/1-149. 65. Chamberlain to Stamfordham, November 29,1924, AC51/1-149. 66. Allenby to Chamberlain, December 7, 1924, F0371/10046; December 13, 1924, F0371/10022. 67. Chamberlain to Allenby. December 22,1924, F0371/10046. 68. Chamberlain to Allenby, December 22,1924, AC51/1-149

181

8 END OF AN ERA 1925-1927

The year 1925 saw the Wafd temporarily eclipsed by King Fu’ad’s political initiatives. Ziwer’s Ministry was nothing more than a rubber stamp for both the British and the King. Determined not to lose the golden opportunity to become the dominant force within the government, Fu’ad, and his advisers, organized a new party — the Ittihad or Union. The Ittihad was formed to compete against the Wafd in the upcoming elections, and received liberal financial backing from the Palace. The popular press promptly dubbed the new party Hizb al-Malik, or the King’s Party. Organized by Hasan Nashat, but officially led by Yahia Ibrahim, the Ittihad proclaimed itself a new party in January 1925 at the Semiramis Hotel. It immediately bought out the old pro-Palace journal, La Liberté, which became its official mouthpiece. In addition, the party attracted several prominent dissidents from the Wafd, including ‘Abd al-Halim Bayli who had left the Wafd in 1924 over a personal rivalry. He became editor of the main Ittihadist journal. Election campaigning in 1925 was strictly limited under the close supervision of Isma'il Sidqi, the Minister of the Interior. Sidqi clamped a severe censorship on the press and pamphleteer­ ing. The electoral laws were also changed to provide an indirect two stage process for voting: districts were altered in ways the Palace hoped would hinder Wafdist candidates. Meanwhile, the Wafd and Zaghlul maintained extraordinarily low profiles. [1] Zaghlul did very little public campaigning, for under Sidqi’s oppressive controls the Party’s activities were rigorously curtailed. In spite of these restrictions, the Wafd still won a majority of seats in Parliament. Sidqi had done his utmost to prevent a Wafd­ ist victory by going into the rural areas and encouraging local officials to deter Wafdist campaigners. Nonetheless, the Wafd 182

END OF AN ERA 1925- 1927

received about 46 percent of the vote, winning over 53 percent of seats in Parliament. [2] The Liberal Constitutionalists collected about 20 percent of the vote, while the Ittihad received only 17 percent. Ignoring the Wafd’s popular vote, the Palace proceeded to back Ziwer’s coalition Ministry of Liberal Constitutionalists, Ittihadists and Independents. Parliament opened on the morning of March 23. Zaghlul ran against Tharwat for Speaker of the House and received 123 votes to Tharwat’s 85. Fu’ad was furious as he had anticipated being able to control more votes on the floor. Determined Zaghlul was not to have another opportunity, to gain ascendancy, Fu’ad dis­ solved Parliament in a proclamation read by Ziwer in the afternoon session. Parliament had been convened for less than half a day. Fu’ad then called for yet another round of alterations in the electoral laws; not until February 1926 did Fu’ad finally sign the decrees which set elections for May of that year. Ziwer continued as Prime Minister in the interim. In this period of political repression, the distaff side of the Wafd remained fairly active, as did feminist groups in general. Both Sidqi and the British were more reluctant to use restraining measures against women, who, as a consequence, had a somewhat larger area in which to maneuver politically than the male Wafdists. The female Wafdists continued to meet, and were even photographed for Egyptian publications without their veils. [3] Women also pushed for voting rights, earning a victory for exten­ ded education in both the liberal arts and technology when a girls’ school was opened in Shubra, a district of Cairo. [4] Girls were also permitted to enter the same general examinations given to male students. Huda Sha’rawi and Munira Thabet were in the vanguard of the Egyptian suffragette movement. [5] In 1925 the Egyptian feminists, encouraged by Huda Sha’rawi, also published a monthly magazine, L ’E gyptienne. Edited by Ceza Nabaraoui, the publication issued articles in French of general political interest, reports on matters of social concern (education, medicine), and notes on the arts (sculpture, novels, poetry). As with their European counterparts, the Egyptian feminists were primarily from the upper middle classes and held distinctly western outlooks. They believed that the nationalist struggle against imperialism had to be accompanied with a similar struggle for personal independence and equality. Their active political work 183

THE WAFD

was to continue throughout the period, even in times when the larger Wafd party as a whole had to maintain relatively passive positions owing to the repression of the British and/or the Palace. Once the 1925 elections had been held, Allenby felt he had discharged his duties and asked to be relieved of his post. Chamberlain agreed, having already made an identical suggestion in a letter which crossed Allenby’s. Chamberlain stressed that the history of the division between himself and Allenby should not be made public. After assenting, Allenby suggested that he would leave in June. Henderson was to remain in Egypt until an appro­ priate successor was named. Behind the scenes Chamberlain was already considering George Lloyd for the post. A Cambridge graduate, Lloyd had broad colonial experience in India. In earlier correspondence, Lloyd had informed Chamberlain of his firm belief in taking a strong hand regarding Colonial matters. An imperialist in the nineteenth-century style, Lloyd had opposed the concessions offered in the Milner proposals and, by inference, indicated his disapproval of Allenby’s moderate gestures. Dis­ agreeing with Allenby’s fist-in-glove techniques, Chamberlain concluded that Lloyd would be the ideal man for the touchy position in Cairo. Then, too, Lloyd had proven himself to be a trustworthy Foreign Office bureaucrat, in contrast to Allenby’s direct, blunt military style. Lloyd eagerly accepted the post when it was offered. Contrary to his expectations, Allenby was only informed of Lloyd’s appointment by a Reuter’s communiqué which effectively pre-empted him from informing Fu’ad prior to the public announcement. This was yet another direct rebuff to Allenby who hastily began to prepare for his departure. During May and June Allenby was fêted by both the European and Egyptian community. Amid a large and friendly crowd Allenby and his wife left Egypt on June 14. [6] While the farewell may have been cordial, there was no doubt that Allenby was leaving because, once again, the Foreign Office had become disenchanted with its representative in Egypt. Allenby had made both friends and enemies through his high­ handed demands for the independence of Egypt, the release of Wafdists from exile, and other concessions to Egyptian national­ ism. His successor was from an entirely different mold. George Lloyd assumed his tasks in October, although Hender­ son remained in Cairo for another year. Before taking the post, 184

END OF AN ERA 1925- 1927

Lloyd had secured a large measure of freedom for his day-to-day administrative policies. Indeed, according to Lloyd, even MacDonald, then leader of the opposition party in Britain, had told him, “ be as liberal as you may be . . . but be firm, eternally firm . . [7] With advice to take a firm line even from the supposedly liberal elements within Britain, Lloyd felt he had a carte blanche to take over the entire Egyptian administration. As if to demonstrate the Ministry’s actual political insignifi­ cance, Ziwer followed Allenby to Europe, leaving Yahia Ibrahim as deputy Prime Minister. Sidqi simultaneously left to undertake negotiations with the Italian government over Egyptian-Libyan border disputes. Ziwer was to remain on vacation for four months. The Palace took advantage of the lull to foment a quarrel with ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Fahmi, Minister of Justice. This led to the resig­ nation of the Ministry and its replacement with a group which was entirely loyal to Fu’ad. During the summer months political activity hit its lowest point since the war. Only a stricter revision of the Penal Code and a controversy over a religious tract by Shaykh ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq punctuated the otherwise passive political scene. The religious debate occurred after Raziq argued that the Caliphate, recently abolished by Ataturk, was not necessary to the continuation of Islamic life. Fu’ad, who had ambitions to claim the title for himself, or in the future, for his family, objected to Raziq’s tract. He encouraged other religious figures to refute Raziq’s arguments. As a consequence, the liberals in the Cabinet resigned only to be replaced by Ittihadists. Party activities were kept to a minimum while the Wafd remain­ ed silent about its future plans. When ‘Adli resigned as head of the Liberal Constitutionalists, he was replaced by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Fahmi who reluctantly accepted the post. [8] When he arrived in Cairo, Lloyd promptly took steps to assert his dominant position. He refused to bring the usual diplomatic letters of credence for King Fu’ad, arguing that to have done so would have indicated his parity with the other foreign diplomats. He, of course, had every intention of maintaining a tight hold over all aspects of Egyptian politics. The storm broke in October, when the Palace decreed a new Law of Associations, putting much stricter controls on the activities and membership of political associations and other social groups. All the opposition political parties vigorously opposed this 185

THE WAFD

new law. The Wafd published a declaration against the law which had been drafted by Judge Purcival with George Lloyd's full agreement. Unlike Allenby, Lloyd was not in the slightest chastened by contravening the Egyptian constitution. [9] The Prime Minister, Ziwer, had belatedly returned from his extended vacation in early November, but was, in effect, merely a puppet for Lloyd's demands. To counter Fu’ad’s growing autocracy, and to form some sort of effective front against the continually escalating British force, the Wafd called for a Parliamentary meeting on November 21. When the delegates met at the Parliament building, they found it occu­ pied by military forces. Like other monarchs before him, Fu'ad was eager to preserve fullest possible authority over Parliament. As long as this did not interfere with British interests, Lloyd was content to allow Fu’ad dominance over the Parliamentary structures. Not to be deterred, the delegates adjourned to the Continental Hotel which was the scene of huge mass demon­ strations for the Wafd. Zaghlul was given a noisy welcome. Displaying more of his old flamboyant form, Zaghlul lived up to expectation by calling for a reconciliation of all political parties to oppose the Palace and the new decree. The vote was unanimous to reopen the Parliament, and to protest the unconstitutionality of the Government’s recent actions. [10] Zaghlul was elected president by a unanimous vote; Muhammad Mahmud, representing the Liberal Constitutionalists, assumed the position of Vice-President. The coalition between the Wafd and the Liberal Constitution party did not indicate a revival of the friendship between Zaghlul, ‘Adli, or Fahmi; it was merely a matter of political expediency. Then, too, the Wafdist leaders were apprehensive that were they to assume too public a posture, they would be liable for severe recriminations from both the Palace and the British. The coalition with the Liberal Constitutionalists brought — once again — the more moderate elements of the Egyptian political sphere into the Wafdist circle. This provided the party with a more acceptable image. However, while the new coalition campaigned for public support, Lloyd was busily working behind the scenes. In December, he forced Fu’ad to accept a settlement of the Italian-Egyptian border dispute. Simultaneously, he worked to remove Nashat from the Palace. Although cognizant of Nashat’s considerable abilities, Lloyd felt that his ambition encouraged 186

END OF AN ERA 1925- 1927

Fu’ad along lines which were contrary to Britain's best interests. As a result, Lloyd determined that Nashat should be transferred from Cairo. Under Lloyd’s direct pressure, Fu’ad succumbed and agreed to appoint Nashat as Egyptian Minister to Spain. A new electoral law which was passed in early December disfranchised ten to fifteen percent of the electorate. Lloyd had opposed the law which he thought was desirable, but politically unwise at the time. (11] It is probable that he permitted the law to pass because it made Fu’ad even more unpopular in the public eye. Fu’ad’s unpopularity increased when he summarily dis­ missed Muhammad Zaghlul as Under-Secretary of State. The British, who were eager to maintain a close balance of power between the Palace and the various political parties (particularly the Wafd), were not displeased to see Fu’ad’s star on the wane. With things going fairly well, Lloyd in January 1926 took the opportunity to make his first trip to the Sudan. He returned in time for the forthcoming elections. The coalition of Wafdists and Liberal Constitutionalists seemed assured of victory, particularly after sub rosa attempts by the British to break the coalition by promising the Liberals Ministerial posts failed to lure the moderates out of the coalition. Fahmi refused to be co-opted by the British or the Palace which had been responsible for his resignation from the Ziwer Ministry in 1925. The coalition’s executive committee, with the active parti­ cipation of Fath Allah Barakat representing the Wafd and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Fahmi for the Liberal Constitution party, called for a National Congress in February. Fearful of the coalition’s growing strength, Ziwer wanted to cancel the meeting, but Lloyd correctly surmised that such closure would precipitate unnecessary public hostility. He preferred to hold his hand in hopes that Zaghlul would over-step himself. The Congress met on February 19 at Mahmud’s Cairo palace and was attended by local and foreign correspondents and about 1200 Egyptians. [12] It condemned the unconstitutional government, while demanding the institution of a popularly elected one with the return of the 1924 electoral law. A massive Wafdist victory, with the Liberal Constitutionalists coming in on its coat-tails, was virtually assured long before the actual elections in May. Even with the new electoral law which had been purposely framed to deter Wafdist strength, the party still maintained the overwhelming electoral majority. 187

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Within the coalition some arguments arose over which politicians should stand for election in given districts, but in a wise political move, the Wafd actually gave several districts to the Liberals. In the election, the Wafd carried 68 percent of the vote, gaining 171 seats (81 percent). [13] The Liberal Constitutionalists gathered 29 seats, the Hizb al-Watani 29, and the Ittihad a single seat. Zaghlul had once again been democratically elected to lead the Egyptian government. The two major questions were clearly: one, would Zaghlul take the position as Prime Minister? and, two, would the British permit him to lead a Ministry a second time? Since Zaghlul had refused to accept the British Declaration of 1922, Lloyd concluded that he could not become Prime Minister. Lloyd hoped that Zaghlul could be quietly persuaded not to take the position, thereby eliminating another direct confrontation. Well aware that there was considerable British opposition to his returning to office, Zaghlul temporized over his decision. He held extended meetings with members of the Wafd and Liberal Con­ stitution party. Even Wafdist members were reluctant to risk another round of Egyptian-British hostilities, and the likelihood of arrests and exile by attempting to force another Zaghlul Ministry. Then, too, there were indications that the Wafd would have had more difficulty in mobilizing the entire nation for massive displays of support. ‘Adli, too, reiterated in his talks with Zaghlul that Lloyd was absolutely determined — at any cost — to prevent a Wafdist Ministry under Zaghlul’s leadership from being formed. For Zaghlul to have taken command would have been tantamount to throwing down the gauntlet. Lloyd would probably have sent Zaghlul into exile for a third time; as an aging sexagenarian Zaghlul was adverse to being forced to leave his home for what certainly would have been his final years. But still he procrasti­ nated. Zaghlul told ’Adli that he was still thinking of forming his own Ministry. ‘Adli, who lived across from the U.S. legation, reported these behind-the-scene machinations to the U.S. Ambas­ sador, who thought Lloyd was far too domineering. In U.S. Ambassador Howell’s estimation, the Egyptians were as capable of “ self-government as Cuba, Mexico or some countries even on this side of the Atlantic that might be truthfully named.’’ [14] The State Department subsequently received complaints over Howell’s anti-British stands, and the next U.S. Ambassador was to be 188

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considerably more pro-British. After Zaghlul refused to see Lloyd without an invitation, Faris Nimr, editor of al-Muqattam, who frequently acted as an ‘‘umbilical cord” [15] between the two, arranged a meeting. Almost a week after the elections, Zaghlul met with Lloyd on May 29 at the Residency. With all of his old fire, Zaghlul demanded to know why his Ministry would be unacceptable. The supercilious Lloyd was affronted by Zaghlul whose “ arrogant and provocative language made it essential to prepare for action.” [16] He demanded that before he could become Premier Zaghlul had to accept the 1922 Declaration, not refer in Parliament to the Sudan, and to be respectful toward the King. Zaghlul curtly refused the first two demands and left. Lloyd had no intention of sitting back and letting Zaghlul act as an independent agent. The Egyptian leader had no sooner left the Residency than Lloyd took steps for a show of British force. He promptly wired London “ suggesting” in the strongest of terms that a battleship be ordered into Alex­ andria’s harbor in all possible haste. This was a direct return to the gunboat diplomacy of the nineteenth century, and was meant to force the Egyptians to recognize that the British would not, under any circumstances, give up their pre-eminent position. Lloyd also exerted the strongest pressure upon members of Parliament, making it quite clear that he would absolutely not recognize Zaghlul as Prime Minister. Zaghlul returned to Beit al-Umma for quiet consultations during which it became evident that the Wafd probably could not emerge victorious from another struggle against the British. The trend against Zaghlul’s heading a Ministry was reinforced after HMS Resolute arrived in Alexandria on the afternoon of June 2. Lloyd’s power play had the anticipated results. After this signal that the British were determined to retain their dominant role, even the more radical Wafd leaders questioned the wisdom of Zaghlul assuming the Prime Minister’s office. The decision was already made when the members of the new Parliament met at the Continental Hotel on June 3. No Ittihadists were represented, but all the other noted politicians attended. Indirectly, most of the representatives indicated in their speeches that Zaghlul should not accept the Premiership. Zaghlul’s doctor also publicly stated that his health was not up to the task; it was the medical evidence of poor health that was the ostensible 189

THE WAFD

excuse for Zaghlul’s refusal to form a Ministry. Finally, Zaghlul himself stood to speak. In an emotion-laden moment he quietly announced that he would not form a Ministry, but was passing on the role of Prime Minister to ‘Adli Yakan. [17] The Wafd had won the election, but lost the government. Zaghlul left in the company of his closest Wafdist colleagues, Nahhas, Fath Allah Barakat, and al-Gharabli. On June 5, a defeated Zaghlul met again with Lloyd, who, flush with victory, was pleased to see Zaghlul in a conciliatory frame of mind. Zaghlul also saw Fu’ad to reaffirm his allegiance. Following these meetings ‘Adli accepted to form a government. Zaghlul still hoped to influence the choice of Ministers, but even on this point, Lloyd interfered. Zaghlul wanted Nahhas, Secretary General of the Wafd and a close aide, to be in the Ministry, but the British, sensing they now had the upper hand, refused. As a consequence, Nahhas was excluded. The Ministry included: Marqus Hanna, Minister of Finance; Ahmad Muhammad Khashaba (who had been a Minister of Education for a short time in the Ziwer Cabinet) as Minister of War; ‘Ali al-Shamsi, Minister of Education; Muhammad Gharabli, Minister of Awqaf; Muham;mad Barakat, Minister of Agriculture; and Othman Muharram, Minister of Public Works. The Liberal Constitutionalists, Tharwat and Muhammad Mahmud, took the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Communications respectively, while Ahmad Zaki Abu alSu‘ud, who had been president of the Senate, Under-Secretary of State for Justice and who was an Independent, became Minister of Justice. Few of the six Wafdists in the Ministry had been stead­ fastly loyal to the Wafd. Hanna had dropped his allegiance, but was noted for his anti-British stance; in a like fashion al-Shamsi had also left Wafdist circles over a personal grievance. With a new Ministry which excluded the most vocal (and most effective?) Wafd members, both the British and Fu’ad felt confi­ dent enough to permit Parliament to open on June 10. The King and ‘Adli spoke, while Zaghlul sat among the senators and representatives. Amid general celebrations and canon fire, Egypt returned to Parliamentary government. The only dark spot on the proceedings was the brewing storm over the trials of the Wafdists arrested for the assassinations in 1922. After the court, on May 25, acquitted four of the six Wafdists who were on trial for these crimes, the English judge, Kershaw, 190

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resigned in protest. In his June 2 letter he roundly criticized the Egyptian justices who had delivered the not guilty verdicts. In complete agreement with Kershaw, Lloyd refused to accept the decision. In a note to ‘Adli, Lloyd curtly informed him that “ In these circumstances His Majesty’s Government must reserve complete liberty to take such steps as the future may show to be necessary for the discharge of the duty thus incumbent upon them.” [18] In other words, Lloyd was warning the Egyptians that the British would, if necessary, return to a more overt form of absolute control. They were warned that if the legitimate Egyptian institutions failed to comply “ willingly” with British decisions, other means would be implemented. As a result, one of the Egyp­ tian judges, ‘Ali Salim, was forced to resign his office; he was replaced by the pro-British ‘Ali ‘Izzat, of Turkish origin. With matters seemingly well in hand, Lloyd left for Europe, and Fu’ad departed for a tour of Egypt. But Zaghlul was clearly still the dominant figure. Whenever he was absent Parliamentary decisions lagged, as representatives were loath to take decisive actions without his counsel. They voted to raise their salaries to £600 per annum, causing Egyptian wags to tag them “ the 600 pound deputies.” On a more serious level, Parliament also began to talk about selecting the village ‘umdas by direct elections. With its tremendous grassroot support this would have given the Wafd added power throughout the countryside. ‘Adli was fearful of giving the Wafd yet more influence, but wavered in taking a decision. Britain was against providing the Wafd additional authority and made its opposition public. Once Britain opposed the change, the Wafd dropped the demand. In August, Parliamentary debate was highlighted by a public flare of tempers between the old antagonists, ‘Adli and Zaghlul, but matters were smoothed over and Parliament adjourned peacefully in late September. When Parliament reconvened in November, the conflict over the pensions for retired British officials was one of the first issues to occupy the members. Lloyd, too, was concerned over the issue. He had already asked for reports on the pension question from his advisers who had recom­ mended — not surprisingly — a substantial increase in remuner­ ation. Oddly enough, the recommendations from the Foreign Office were much more moderate; this fact angered Lloyd who was ever-mindful of extracting what he felt were full British rights from 191

THE WAFD

Egypt. Lloyd discussed the matter with Zaghlul who was entirely open to compromise on the matter. Interestingly, Zaghlul never objected to the proper payment of British officials, nor could he be accused of anti-British attitudes. His personal relationships with individual British citizens always remained cordial [19] — even when he was under forced exile. Zaghlul was much more interes­ ted in guaranteeing real Egyptian independence and constitutional rights than in quibbling over what were in fact matters of secon­ dary importance. As a result, the pension question was solved through a mutually satisfactory compromise. However, the growing friction between the Wafd and the Palace was not so easily moderated. A certain amount of rivalry was not altogether displeasing to the British who cleverly took advantage of the conflict to divide and rule. On the other hand, if the conflict threatened to become an open break, the fragile balancing act of playing off the two sides would be impossible. For his part, Fu’ad was dissatisfied with Zaghlul’s return as the preeminent political figure. Then, too, Zaghlul and the Wafdists in general were inclined to give short shrift to Fu’ad’s presence and royal cere­ monies. Fu’ad was also insulted by Lloyd’s growing tendency to surround himself with what amounted to regal trappings. * For example, when traveling to Alexandria, Lloyd ordered special railway trains just for his entourage. When driven through Cairo, Lloyd had all the traffic halted so he could pass unimpeded. These gestures were generally accorded to the ruling monarch, not to the head diplomatic official from a foreign nation, even if that nation did have special interests. There was little Fu’ad could do against Lloyd’s affronts, but he could, and did, do all in his power to subordinate Zaghlul. The Ittihadists began a lively press campaign against the Wafd, using Zaghlul as a particular butt for ridicule and criticism. Matters came to a head over membership on Parliamentary committees. Ahmad Mahir became President of the Comptabilité Committee (Finance Committee) and Nuqrashi became Secretary for the Education Committee. Both of these Wafdists had recently been acquitted in the assassination trials and were, therefore, highly suspect in British eyes. Fu’ad too, fretted over the rising power of the more militant Wafdists. Lloyd, with full Foreign Office support, thereupon warned Zaghlul and ‘Adli of the British 192

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opposition. Lloyd was pleased that neither of the two leaders chose to make an issue over these appointments. At this time, Lloyd was anxious to avoid a direct conflict because he wanted a favorable decision on his demands for the retention of a number of British officials in Egypt. These personnel matters, retirement benefits and the number of British officials in Egypt, were still unanswered when a new, and far more crucial, issue came to the foreground. Simply put, the question was, should the British or the Egyptians have control over the Egyptian army? As he did on most points, Lloyd adopted the attitude that the 1922 Declaration gave the British control; the Wafd, of course, wanted to bring the army, particularly the officer corps, under its political purview. A great many Egyptian officers were Wafdist sympathizers, who, in addition to their anti-British attitudes, also held distinctly anti-monarchical views. Khashaba as Minister of War was pushing to increase Egyptian control over all aspects of the military. To this end, he had enlisted the support of Ahmad Mahir and Nuqrashi. They in turn had presented the problem to Zaghlul who supported their claims. Khashaba wanted Parliamentary acquiescence to increase the reserves, to create an air force, and to abolish many of the restrictions concerning carrying arms. Prior to Stack’s assassination, the Egyptian army had been under the Sirdar’s command. After Stack’s death, his assistant, Huddleston, had become head of the army. However, the British felt that their paramount position was gradually being eroded by the increase of politically active Egyptian army officers. ‘Adli had been slow to lend his support to the Wafd demands because he knew the British would likely oppose them. Sensing he was losing Wafdist confidence, ’Adli chose to resign as Prime Minister. He used the refusal of the Parliament to vote to praise the Ministry for its encouragement of Bank al-Misr as an excuse. When the Parliament rejected this motion, ’Adli announced that the refusal was tantamount to a vote of lack of confidence. As a result he tendered his resignation on April 18, 1927. Zaghlul and others reiterated that the vote did not imply a lack of confidence. At this juncture, Zaghlul did not feel that the Wafd was strong enough to confront the British directly; consequently, the Wafd did not want the coalition — however shaky — to collapse. But ’Adli stubbornly refused to reconsider. As a conciliatory gesture, 193

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the Wafd thereupon put forward Tharwat as a probable candidate. On April 26, 1927, Tharwat, who had the King’s support as well, once again became Prime Minister. The issue of more Egyptian control over the army was the main reason behind ‘Adli’s abrupt resignation. Lloyd had previously protected himself politically by discussing the problem of army control with Chamberlain. Both Lloyd and Chamberlain had agreed upon a hardline approach to the issue. Lloyd had then impressed the British viewpoint on the matter upon Fu’ad. However, much to Lloyd’s surprise, at the very moment the issue came to a head, the Foreign Office appeared to alter course. William Tyrrell, the permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who was visiting Cairo at the time, received a letter from the department in which a much more moderate line was recom­ mended. Lloyd was considerably annoyed by this alteration, which in his view diminished British authority. He also believed it to be edging away from the 1922 Declaration to which he had so persistently adhered. As a consequence, and believing he had Chamberlain’s fullest support, Lloyd continued to adopt a strict interpretation of the 1922 Declaration in his conversations with both Fu’ad and Tharwat. Procrastinating temporarily, Zaghlul attempted to ascertain what the British attitude on the army issue would be. Without doubt, he had the fullest sympathies of the Egyptians. Full confirmation of widespread Egyptian support for the Wafdist position was evidenced when Tharwat wrote Lloyd that the Egyptian army issue was not covered in the 1922 Declaration. Lloyd quickly replied in a concise letter outlining Britain’s rights in Egypt according to his interpretation of the 1922 Declaration. Lloyd’s letter, dated May 29,1927, spelled out that Britain, accor­ ding to Lloyd’s interpretation, had the clear and undisputed right to maintain strict control over the Egyptian army. He refuted the Egyptian claims to increase reserves or to gain authority over the officer corps or inspector generals’ positions. In short, he was demanding that the status quo (British dominance) remain in effect. [20] Lloyd’s unswerving adherence to the strictest interpretation of the 1922 Declaration met with mixed reactions. Many British citizens in Egypt and England believed it was high time that Britain adopt a hard line policy with regard to Egyptian national194

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ism. They applauded Lloyd’s cleverness and undoubted abilities at playing power politics. Others accused him of “ Cromerism” or of attempting to annex Egypt to the diminishing British empire. Owen Tweedy observed that annexation appeared to be Lloyd’s solution. “ I hope I’m wrong but again and again the word — and we never heard it three years ago — crops up without anyone lowering his voice.” [21] However, no one questioned that Lloyd had inner tenacity or what Tweedy termed *‘guts.” [22] Knowing he had the support of Chamberlain, Lloyd chose to ignore the moderate tone of some Foreign Office communications. Instead he followed his original plan to halt any Egyptian moves to increase their areas of authority. Following the stiffly-worded May 27 letters, Lloyd ordered British warships into Alexandria and Port Said. Once again, Lloyd had delivered a direct blow to Wafdist attempts to diminish British power in Egypt. The presence of the British navy in the key Egyptian ports effectively halted the maneuvers to alter the status quo with regard to the army. The Egyptian government replied on June 3 to Lloyd’s letter; the reply, which was worded to accept the stipulations in form, while not subscribing to their legalities, failed to assuage Lloyd. In London, the Foreign Office cabled that it desired to negotiate a “ provisional agreement.” As Chamberlain was in Geneva, these orders were sent by Baldwin. Using the Secretary's former agree­ ment with his policies as protection, Lloyd ignored the new Foreign Office directives. He cabled London that negotiations at that time were useless. Baldwin replied that he feared Tharwat would reject any ultimatum which would then force the British to take direct action. Lloyd countered that, based on private talks with the Prime Minister, he was certain that the Egyptian government could continue to give ambivalent answers. Quietly, he was communi­ cating with both Tharwat and Zaghlul who was amenable to conciliation largely because there were no other recourses. The matter was settled by Lloyd requesting further elucidation which prompted a second letter. The latter was more acceptable in tone than the first reply. Thus Lloyd was at long last appeased, and the matter of army control was temporarily shelved. With this victory, the British reopened the possibility of direct negotiations. As Zaghlul was not publicly at the head of the 195

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Ministry, the British could save face by negotiating with the more malleable Tharwat, who also lacked Zaghlul’s fiery determination. With King Fu’ad due to make his first royal visit (which had been slightly delayed owing to the army crisis) to London, the time seemed propitious for Tharwat to engage in formal talks at the Foreign Office. In London, the King was warmly greeted by George V and Queen Mary. After the usual ceremonies, serious talks could begin. Tharwat spoke with Chamberlain at the Foreign Office; as in previous discussions, agreements on most issues were quickly reached, and again, as in other talks, the Sudanese issue proved to be the stumbling block. Neither Chamberlain nor Tharwat raised the problems of Sudanese-Egyptian relations in their initial conversations. Based on the Tharwat-Chamberlain discussions, both the British and the Egyptians drew up draft treaties. The Egyptians agreed to postpone the Sudanese issue for further negotiations, but reiterated that there should be a return to the pre-1924 status quo, and that the Nile waters should be justly distributed. [231 The more detailed British draft specified four major points: 1. that the interests of Britain and Egypt be recog­ nized, 2. that the Condominium continue, 3. that the distribution of the Nile waters be modified, and 4. that Egypt continue to finance the administration of the Sudan. After the initial conversations, Tharwat left London in August for the Continent. In Paris he met with W. Selby, private secretary to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Tharwat knew he had little chance of convincing the Egyptian Parliament — dominated by Wafdists — to accept the draft treaties; however, he was still amenable to omitting all mention of the Sudan. Chamberlain, who had devised this formula in order to circumvent a seemingly insurmountable impasse, was in full agreement. Back in Cairo, Lloyd was distressed by the conciliatory attitude of Chamberlain; he was correctly convinced that no treaty had the slightest chance of acceptance as long as the Wafd was ascendant. While the treaty proposals were still being discussed, events caused a radical alteration in the Egyptian political scene. On the evening of August 23, Sa‘d Zaghlul died. He was 67 years old; he had enjoyed virtual control over the dominant political movement in Egypt for almost a decade. His pre-eminence was undisputed and his ability to hold sway over so many conflicting viewpoints in times of very rapid change and tremendous outside pressures 196

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must surely rank him among the most astute political figures in modern Egyptian history. Zaghlul had been ailing with a fever for about a week; with his age and chronic diabetic condition, any illness was serious. Although confined to bed, Zaghlul had continued to meet with other Wafd members to discuss various Egyptian problems. However, he certainly suspected that he would not survive this last illness. When Safia asked him on the afternoon of his death how he was, Zaghlul replied, “ Je suis fini, je suis fini.” [24] Soon after this exchange, he lapsed into a coma and died at nine-thirty in the evening. News of Zaghlul’s death spread quickly and crowds soon gathered outside Beit al-Umma in mourning. King Fu’ad, who was still in Europe, ordered that Zaghlul be given a full state funeral. In accordance with Islamic law, the funeral was held the following day with a large cortège making its way to the cemetery of Imam al-Shafi‘i. Seventeen canon shots were fired followed by seventeen more when the coffin was interred. The traditional forty days of mourning ensued. The death of Zaghlul meant the loss of the leading Egyptian national hero and left the Wafd without a leader. As noted by the U.S. Chargé d ’Affaires, Zaghloul did not leave a political will but died in a chastened mood, that ostensibly at least leaned toward a desire for mutual understanding and agreement between Egypt and England. To save Parliamentary Government for Egypt and lead steadily but surely to the realization of her national aspirations was his final program. [25] The question remained what politician was to assume the mantle of Zaghlul’s leadership. In the absence of a directive from Zaghlul, the competition within Wafdist circles for the key leadership position was fairly keen. When Tharwat returned to Egypt he paid a courtesy visit to Safia Zaghlul who, upon her husband’s death, had assumed a more important leadership role. All the Egyptian politicians — even those not in the Wafd — were eagerly watching for who would succeed to the Wafd leadership. There were several leading candidates from the High Command along with a number of secondary potentials. Fath Allah Barakat and Mustafa Nahhas 197

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appeared to be in the forefront as the most likely successors. Fath Allah was related to Zaghlul and had enjoyed the patri­ arch’s closest confidences. His nationalist credentials were impeccable for he had been a faithful Wafdist and had even been exiled with Zaghlul to the Seychelles. Barakat’s skills as a political tactician were widely recognized, but several factors mitigated against his candidacy. First, both the Palace and the British were openly hostile to Barakat whom they felt was too extreme. In this regard, Barakat was certainly characterized as a hardliner who had generally urged the adoption of forceful uncompromising national­ ist policies. But he was not actually in the younger, more extreme faction of the party. Barakat’s abilities could have served the Wafd well by providing it — in the absence of its charismatic founder — with the continuation of dynamic, energetic leadership. However he had alienated ’Amin Yusuf by promising to suggest his name for a post in a Ministry when Yusuf had proposed strengthening Zaghlul’s government by including younger men. Barakat had not fulfilled his pledge and the posts had gone to Ahmad Mahir, Nuqrashi, and Fath Allah’s own son, Baha’ ad-Din Barakat. However, the second negative factor operating against Barakat proved his downfall. Barakat had made the grievous error of arguing with Safia Zaghlul over an inheritance settlement; as was too often the case in crucial Wafdist decisions, personal consider­ ations were to play a dominant role. On September 14 and 18, the Wafd met in camera to decide who was going to assume Zaghlul’s position. [26] At these meetings, Safia Zaghlul announced her decision to withdraw from the political arena, but before doing so she made one last recommen­ dation. She declared against Barakat and for Mustafa Nahhas. Safia’s opposition stifled Barakat’s adherents; her withdrawal from politics remained in effect over general policy and tactics, but Safia was later to play other crucial roles on future personnel questions within the ruling Wafdist elite. Her voice — in support or opposition — had and continued to have tremendous weight. Safia’s support meant that Nahhas had the overwhelming edge against his rivals. Wisa W asif s possible candidacy was dismissed because he lacked a national image. Nuqrashi and Mahir were omitted because of their more extreme political views and, although this was not overtly stated, because of their alleged contacts with the radical secret societies. Makram ‘Ubayd was the 198

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other outstanding candidate. Makram’s close relationship with Zaghlul was nationally acknowledged. He was probably one of Zaghlul’s closest friends; Zaghlul publicly called Makram “ my adopted son.” ‘Ubayd was one of the few original political thinkers in the Wafd; he was responsible for devising and writing most of the Wafdist political platforms and was, in his own right, a brilliant public speaker. He used his knowledge of Islamic and Christian texts to sway audiences who were impressed both with his style, and the content of his speeches. However, ‘Ubayd was one Wafdist who eschewed personality cults, preferring to stress the power of the masses. He noted in a later memorial to Zaghlul that “ Sa‘d’s greatness was mingled with the people’s greatness, that one wondered if he were giving or taking? Was he inspiring or being inspired? He was exchanging greatness between himself and the nation. He used to give to the nation and the nation gave to him.” [27] But ‘Ubayd was a Copt in an overwhelming Muslim nation (90%); this factor alone meant he could never really hope to assume effective leadership of the Wafd. Recognizing this, 'Ubayd threw his prestige support to his old friend Nahhas. Thus it was decided that Mustafa Nahhas should become the Wafd’s second president. Nahhas was a Parliamentary repre­ sentative from his old home of Samanud, and had been a judge in Tanta, prior to his inclusion within the Wafd in 1919. He had served loyally since joining the movement and therefore had impeccable party credentials. Unlike many of the older Wafd leaders, Nahhas did not come from a landed wealthy family. His moderate financial position was later to make him vulnerable to economic inducements and to charges of corruption. Nahhas’s moderate income was one reason he only married at a relatively advanced age and then his familial relations, like those of other Wafdists, were frequently to involve him in allegations of nepotism and graft. In a September 24 meeting, the Wafd publicly paid tribute to Safia Zaghlul, but was otherwise remarkably restrained in making further political pronouncements. By this time Nahhas’ position was assured. Two days later, on September 26, at the Sa‘d C ub, Nahhas was formally proclaimed President by the unanimous vote of the Wafdist members of Parliament. Makram ‘Ubayd, Nahhas’s confidant, was named General Secretary. Nahhas then gave his 199

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first speech as President. He reaffirmed Wafdist determination to gain national sovereignty, emphasizing that the party wished to consolidate the constitutional government before reaching an Anglo-Egyptian settlement. [28] On September 27, Nahhas and Prime Minister Tharwat had their first official conference since Nahhas’ election. Although the conversation was cordial, it was soon evident that Zaghlul’s death had also meant the demise of any hope for the ratification of the Tharwat-Chamberlain draft treaty. Under new leadership, which lacked the national mandate held by Zaghlul, the Wafd had to push for new negotiations. Thus Tharwat’s treaty was stillborn. The forty days of mourning for Zaghlul ended on October 17 with a commemorative ceremony. Tharwat, the Ministers, Senators, and Wafdists gathered at a pavilion near Beit al-Umma to give eulogies for the deceased national leader. The first era of Wafdist political domination had ended. What form the new leadership would take remained to be seen. Notes l.S ee: al-Musawer, January-March 1925 in which the campaigning is played down in clear contrast to the coverage of the 1924 elections. 2 . Quraishi, p. 231; Appendix C, al-Musawer sets Wafdist returns at 60% of the popular vote, February 10,1950. 3. al-Musawer, March 13,1925. 4. al-Musawer, July 24,1925; January 7,1950. 5. al-Musawer, August 2,1925. 6. George Lloyd to Chamberlain, September 6, 1917; September 17, 1920, AC 18/1/1-46. 7. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cramer, Vol. II (London: 1934), 143. 8. Fahmi, Hadhihi Hayati. 9. U.S. Ambassador Howell to Secretary of State, Joseph Grew, November 21. 1925, U.S./Egypt 571/6. 10. al-Rafi*i, FiA ‘qab al-Thawrat Misriyya (Cairo: 1948), pp. 232-5. 11. Lloyd, p. 152. 12. al-Musawer, February 26,1926. 13. Quraishi, 232; Lloyd gives figures as 144 seats for Wafd, 5 for Hizb al-Watani, 28 Liberals, 7 for Ittihadists, p. 163. Wafd gained 65-68% of popular vote, al-Musawer, February 10, 1950. For pictures of victors see: al-Musawer, April 30.1926; June 4,1926. 14. Howell to Secretary of State, February 16,1926, U.S./Egypt 571/6. 15. Howell to Secretary of State, June 7,1926, U.S./Egypt 571/6. 16. Lloyd, p. 165. 17. al-Musawer, June 11,1926; al-Musawer, "Memoirs of Fikri Abaza, October 7, 1949". Abaza reportedly urged further opposition, but failed to carry the

200

END OF AN ERA 1925- 1927 majority. Even in victory, Lloyd ungraciously belittled Zaghlul, attempting to show that the representatives were against him and were the major factor in his failure to form a Ministry, pp. 166-167. 18. Lloyd to Prime Minister, June 2,1926, p. 173. 19. Owen Tweedy Diary. November 18,1926, St. Antony’s, Oxford-. 20. Lloyd, pp. 202-209; Appendix C. 21. Owen Tweedy Diary, January 2, 1927, St. Antony’s, Oxford. 12.Ibid., January 23,1927. 23. For fuller discussion of Egyptian interests in the Sudan see: L.A. Fabunmi, The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations: a Case Study in Power Politics, 18001956 (Westport, Conn: 1975), 1st ed. Longmans, 1960. 24. Vidal. Sofia Zaghlul, p. 63. 25. North Winship, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim to State Department. September 13. 1927. Howell had been replaced for a more pro-British U.S. representative, U.S./Egypt, 571/6. 26 .Ibid., Author’s interviews with Ustaz Hilmi (brother to Makram ‘Ubayd), and Samir Dhu al-Faqar (Zulficar), 1973. 27. Makram ‘Ubayd, al-Musawer, August 25,1939. 28. Shafiq, VII, 487-91.

9 THE FIRST GENERATION: GOALS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS World War I marked a turning point in Egyptian political develop­ ment. British wartime demands for money, foodstuffs, livestock, and human labor galvanized Egyptian hostility against the foreign occupation forces. The nationalist yearning — apparent even before the War — was given further impetus by Wilsonian proclamations supporting self-determination for all peoples. After the War, masses of Egyptians fervently believed they were, at long last, to attain national autonomy. A small, highly organized and financially well-placed Egyptian elite formed the first leadership for the post-war nationalist move­ ment. They fashioned themselves into a Wafd, a delegation, to secure independence from the British. Because economic dis­ location following the War continued to be severe, they had no difficulty in mobilizing the masses behind a program for complete independence. Sa'd Zaghlul, as a respected and highly charis­ matic figure, easily dominated the Wafd movement and captured not only the support of the elite, but, more importantly, of the Egyptian masses. The British were caught in the dilemma between rising national­ ism and their desire to maintain imperial authority. Time and time again the British government, whether controlled by Conserv­ atives or Liberals, had reiterated that Britain would never voluntarily cede its vital control over the political, economic, and military structures of the Egyptian nation. As High Commissioner in 1918 when the Wafd first expressed the desire to negotiate for eventual Egyptian independence, Reginald Wingate urged the adoption of a compromise position. He wanted to co-opt the Wafdist leadership before it was able to harness the antagonism of the Egyptian rural and urban workers 202

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against the British Protectorate. In order to circumvent a full scale rebellion, Wingate exhorted British policy makers to negotiate with the Wafd. The Foreign Office officials were too busy with the more pressing demands of the Paris Peace Conference to contend with what appeared to be the extreme and relatively unimportant demands of a handful of Egyptian nationalists. Lacking a national image or political influence, Wingate was unable to effectuate his recommendations for compromise. Thus the Wafdist leaders were curtly rebuffed. In addition, the British were bewildered at the lack of Egyptian gratitude for the benefits of imperial domination; too often officials had mistaken the cultural tendency to avoid direct confrontations for Egyptian acquiescence to British control. As a consequence many in the Foreign Office were genuinely surprised and offended by the demands for complete indepen­ dence. Initially, Zaghlul and his colleagues would have been satisfied to negotiate a settlement which would have granted a semblance of Egyptian independence, while preserving British interests regard­ ing the Suez Canal, capitulations, military installations, and even financial concerns. After the British closed the door to all forms of negotiations, the Wafd leadership was understandably angry. In order to sustain its image as a nationalist movement, the Wafd promptly escalated its demands against the British. It immediately called upon all patriotic Egyptians to denounce the British occupation. Returning to London, Wingate made a last effort to persuade the Foreign Office to alter its no-compromise stand. His attempts were doomed to failure as officials had already decided that a firm authoritarian governor could easily eradicate any troublesome Egyptian nationalist demands. A military figure with a reputation for strict discipline, Allenby seemed the ideal choice. Foreign Office officials anticipated that Allenby would rapidly return order to the Egyptian scene. Once in Cairo, Allenby quickly appraised the situation and found that the nationalist movement was far more deep-seated and powerful than he had been led to believe. On the mistaken assumption that the Wafdist leadership, particularly Sa‘d Zaghlul, had largely manufactured nationalist agitation for independence, Cheetham, acting in the absence of the High Commissioner, had concluded that the removal of these leaders from Egypt would 203

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effectively stifle further nationalist demands; as a consequence, Zaghlul and his closest associates had been arrested and exiled to Malta. Contrary to British expectations, the deportation of the Wafd leadership was the catalyst for a full scale national revolution. With the price of basic necessities rising daily, desperate shortages of commodities, and the continued highly visible presence of numerous British soldiers stationed throughout the countryside, the Egyptian people needed little encouragement to vent their frustrations and hostilities against the British. As a result, when the news of Zaghlul’s arrest reached the provinces, demonstrations spontaneously broke out throughout the nation. These soon escalated into more violent acts directed against foreigners in general. With a sophisticated network of organizers in key Egyptian cities and villages, the. Wafd was able to dominate the political scene and to channel most of the Egyptian nationalist sentiments into support for its own leadership. The 1919 Revo­ lution was the first time in its modern history that the Egyptian rural and urban populations actively united against the existing governmental structures. Indeed, the 1919 Revolution marked the only time to date that the Egyptian masses actively participated in attempting to overthrow the system. It was therefore the only true mass revolution that modern Egypt has experienced. With his military training, Allenby recognized that were the Egyptian masses to maintain vocal and active opposition to the British, it would necessitate huge expenditures of arms and men to sustain even a modicum of law and order. If the revolution were to continue for long the dominant position of Britain would clearly become untenable. To forestall such a possibility, Allenby prag­ matically reversed his earlier hard line to a recommendation for negotiations between the Egyptians and the British. When the Foreign Office proved reluctant to accept his advice, Allenby forced the issue by placing his not inconsiderable prestige behind his policies. In face of Allenby’s concerted pressure, the Foreign Office was forced to compromise. Zaghlul was freed to join the other delegates in Paris, while the futile Milner Mission was eventually dispatched to Cairo to see if it were still not possible to eliminate Egyptian nationalism. The Egyptians rallied behind the Wafdist calls to boycott the Mission, thereby effectively demonstrating that 204

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a settlement could only be reached through negotiations with the Wafd. Much to the dismay of Foreign Office officials, Milner reached identical conclusions to Allenby’s and recommended negotiations towards granting Egyptian independence. Opposed to nego­ tiations, the British government tried its utmost to reject the recommendations of both Allenby and Milner, but continued disorders in Egypt and an intensification of Egyptian demands ultimately made it impossible for the Government not to nego­ tiate with the Wafd. By heading a prolonged national revolution, the Wafd eventual­ ly forced the British to meet in face-to-face discussions to deal with the issue of Egyptian independence. However, the British negotiated tenaciously to keep their vital interests not only in Egypt, but in the Sudan as well. Once they had achieved nego­ tiations, it became much more difficult for the Wafdist leadership to maintain the mobilization of the masses or to achieve a mutually acceptable settlement with the British. Having promised complete independence the Wafd could hardly accept less. When the Wafd refused to desist from its call for Egyptians to demand the end of the Protectorate and of Martial Law, its leaders were again arrested and sent into exile. In the four years since its inception the Wafd had managed to become the only political organization with majority support in rural and urban areas. Zaghlul’s charismatic personality had elicited genuine regard from the Egyptian people who considered him the only true Egyptian nationalist leader. Other Egyptian political leaders lacked mass support; their positions were based upon British aid or familial loyalties. In a like respect, Egyptians generally viewed King Fu’ad as a Turkish aristocrat who had scant sympathy for Egyptians except insofar as he could become their ruling monarch. His autocratic bent alarmed not only Egyptian nationalists, most of whom were sincerely committed to Parliamentary government, but the British as well. If at all possible, the British were desirous of balancing the Palace against the Wafd and did not want either to gain a clear ascen­ dancy. For his part, Fu’ad attempted to collaborate with all Egyptian political factions in hopes of emerging as the dominant force. However, he was only able to secure control when the political parties, particularly the Wafd, were severely repressed 205

THE WAFT)

and autocratic measures were enacted with the tacit approval of the British. As long as its leaders were in exile, the Wafd refused to co­ operate with any Ministry or other Egyptian parties. As no other politicians had grassroots support they were either merely puppets for the British or were soon forced to resign lest they be marked as traitors. Without Wafdist backing, no Egyptian politician could long remain in office. The Wafd also organized an effective series of strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts which considerably dis­ rupted all Egyptian institutions. Allenby hoped to undercut the Wafd — whose leaders were either in exile or under arrest — by unilaterally proclaiming Egypt to be an independent nation. Once again he had to fight his own government in order to achieve his goal, but, once again, his force­ ful personality and threats of resignation compelled the British officials to ratify what was to them the distasteful 1922 Declaration of Independence. The Declaration was equally distasteful to the Wafd which denounced it as an illegal unilateral proclamation which maintained British imperial status under a new formulation. Unable to establish a stable Egyptian government to run the newly "independent” nation, Allenby finally decided to permit Zaghlul to return. With overwhelming popular support there was no doubt that the Wafd would easily triumph in any and all demo­ cratic elections. Hence in 1924 Zaghlul and the Wafd finally assumed political leadership. The Wafd had proclaimed itself a political party only a short time before its election victories, and showed a marked reluctance to develop a domestic program. It continued to base its primary appeal upon the personality of Zaghlul and upon its reputation as a party which would only accept complete independence. In spite of this, the Wafd agreed to lead a Ministry while the 1922 Declar­ ation — with its clear-cut reservations concerning British interests was still very much in effect. Zaghlul mistakenly thought that, because the Labour Government was in power, he could successfully negotiate with the British. His discussions were no more fruitful than others, since the British adhered to their vital interests and refused to allow any compromises with regard to the Sudan, which remained a major obstacle in all Egyptian-British negotiations. By failing to secure a treaty with the British, the Wafd lost considerable support in Egypt. 206

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Once in power, the Wafdist leaders also adopted positions on domestic matters which largely reflected their bourgeois capitalist leanings. The Wafd rejected the demands of the workers who, once activated, quickly became advocates for more radical pro­ grams. They wanted more far-reaching social and economic changes which most of the Wafd was not willing to consider. Rebuked by the Wafd, the more radical Egyptian nationalists adopted violent terrorist tactics against both the British and the conservative Egyptian elements. The Wafd leaders repudiated such tactics; Zaghlul and his compatriots were opposed to radical programs of any sort, and saw the danger they posed to their own positions. But the Wafd could not uproot the small secret societies which were highly dedicated and determined. Terrorist activities culminated in the assassination of Lee Stack which ignited a blazing response from Allenby. Thoroughly infuriated, Allenby threw all prudence to the winds; he determined to extract the fullest possible revenge for the assassination. Although the Foreign Office officials wanted Egyptian matters kept in close check, they also expected to be the final arbitrators on all policy matters. Allenby committed the cardinal offense by taking matters into his own hands without waiting for Foreign Office approval. Allenby’s ultimatum demanding excessive financial and political retribution succeeded in bringing down the Zaghlul ministry, but it also caused his own fall from office. In an unprecedented move, the Foreign Secretary even sent a trusted official to Cairo to oversee Allenby’s activities. In face of Allenby’s determination to humiliate him publicly, Zaghlul had no choice but to resign. Neither the British nor King Fu’ad were distressed by the Wafd’s temporary eclipse. As soon as diplomatic protocol allowed, Allenby was replaced by George Lloyd. King Fu’ad used this interim to assert his own prerogatives. When elections were held with extensive monarchical inter­ ference and the Wafd still returned a majority to Parliament, Fu'ad summarily dismissed the Parliament. However, Fu’ad’s growing autocracy alienated even conservative Egyptians and disturbed the British. Lloyd, who was more than a match for Fu’ad in authoritarian tendencies, was determined to secure Britain's predominant status by adhering closely to a strict interpretation of the 1922 Declaration. Fu’ad’s attempt to take complete control of the governmental 207

THEWAFD

apparatus drove the other Egyptian political parties — which were primarily divided over personality conflicts not ideological differ­ ences — into a mutual coalition dominated by the Wafd. After protracted maneuvers by the Palace, the British Resident, and the Coalition Party, new elections were held. Once again, Zaghlul attained an easy victory at the polls; however, there was never any possibility that the British would again risk their authority by permitting Zaghlul to become Prime Minister. In lieu of another violent conflict, the Wafd leaders — many of whom had reached an age when they preferred Parliamentary debate to armed struggle — sought a compromise. Zaghlul refused to form a Ministry and named the esteemed but unpopular ‘Adli in his stead. A Ministry representing the various Egyptian political factions was created, but had no more success than previous ones in reaching a settlement with the British over Egyptian grievances. Matters had reached a stalemate when Zaghlul died in 1927. With his death the Wafd leadership passed to younger politicians, many of whom came from more modest backgrounds, but who were eager to attain a similar standard of living. As a consequence, they continued the unfortunate practice of nepotism which so plagued every level of Egyptian society and, like their predeces­ sors, failed to devise programs of sweeping domestic changes. However, they did persist in pressuring the British for more Egyptian controls and were similarly rejected. The first generation of Wafdist leaders were then a closely inter-related group of landed aristocrats and wealthy professionals who believed the time had come for them to assume control over an independent Egyptian nation. They were committed to Parlia­ mentary democratic forms on western models, but wanted to save the existing capitalist structures which they anticipated domin­ ating. The Wafd secured massive popular support not because its leaders offered the people radical societal changes., but because it focused its efforts towards ousting the British. The British were viewed as the primary enemy. Once they were removed from Egyptian soil, then the far more complicated task of creating new internal structures could begin. In some respects* the Wafd was fortunate that the British proved such stubborn opponents, for as long as the British remained the focal point of hostilities, the Wafd was not under heavy pressure to formulate a domestic program for development. On the other hand, the lack of such a program 208

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gradually eroded much popular commitment to the Wafd, which was increasingly riddled with internal rivalries and charges of corruption. Gradually, the Wafd was to become another symbol of the irrelevant and politically bankrupt Egyptian government which neither answered the needs of the people nor ousted the British imperial power.

PART TWO 1928-1952

10 THE NEW GENERATION

The presidency of Nahhas opened propitiously with his election as Speaker of the House in November. However, there were two ominous factors looming in the background. First, and in the long run more crucial, was King Fu’ad’s determination to wrest political control from the Wafd. Secondly, there was the ever­ present issue of the British-Egyptian treaty. Fu’ad’s long-anticipated European tour had been a resounding success and had given him considerable encouragement to assert his authority. Fu’ad had received a warm welcome in England, exchanging messages concerning the mutual interests of their respective nations with King George V who had provided the type of lavish hospitality befitting a visiting monarch. After a tour of Liverpool and several cotton textile manufacturing areas, Fu’ad had left for the Continent where he met with his old friend King Victor Emmanuel and with Mussolini. Throughout his reign Fu’ad maintained his close contacts with many Italians, including Ernest Verrucci (the Italian architect and confidant of the King). The British were particularly suspicious of Verrucci whom they suspected of spying for Mussolini’s fascist government. Although Fu’ad sent his condolences upon the death of Zaghlul, he did not interrupt his royal tour which did not end until November. Meanwhile, Tharwat (Sarwat) had concluded several series of negotiations with Chamberlain and had returned to Egypt with a draft treaty. Tharwat had met with the newly elected Wafdist president, Nahhas, in September, but had failed to reach a formal agreement with him over the course of the negotiations. Following this meeting, Tharwat returned for further conversations with Chamberlain in London. Lloyd opposed the draft as he rejected granting concessions, particularly on the presence of British troops 213

THE WAFD

in Egypt. Furthermore, he knew that the treaty had no chance of acceptance by the Egyptians. Matters came to a crisis point when Tharwat presented the draft treaty which allowed for a continued British military presence in Egypt and limited British involvement in legislation and adminis­ tration affecting the foreign communities. In the mutual agree­ ment of the Foreign Office and Tharwat there was no mention of the Sudan. Both the Wafd and the King strongly objected to these terms. There was no chance Nahhas would accept Tharwat’s draft unless changes were made on the issues of the British troops and on the Sudanese question. Facing the concerted opposition of the Wafd, Parliament, and the Palace, Tharwat, weakened by a diabetic condition, spoke of resignation. Tharwat was also plagued by internal bickering within his own Cabinet. Fu’ad had expected the resignation, but fretted that Tharwat was keeping important matters from him. On their side, the British were steadfastly opposed to altering the treaty in any fashion. The Foreign Office went so far as to tell Lloyd that martial law would be imposed and Tharwat would be encouraged to dissolve Parliament if the treaty were not accepted. Murray in the Foreign Office felt that in the past the British had “ showed the Egyptians that there was a whip in the cupboard; if we want to get the treaty signed the time has come to take it out and crack it.’’ [1] The Wafd hoped to avert an open clash with the British by strengthening its position through a coalition with the Liberals. Meetings were held between the two parties in January 1928, but both Mahmud and Sidqi were conspicuous in their absence. Apparently Mahmud was hopeful that once Tharwat resigned, Nahhas would be unacceptable as a Prime Minister, and that he would get the nod for the office. [2] Mahmud was Vice President of the Liberal party which had not had a president since Fahmi’s resignation in 1925. Behind the scenes, Fu’ad was encouraging the opposition and was in direct communication with the Wafd. This distressed the Foreign Office which recognized that “ Fuad wants Sarwat out, [andl Wafd in so it will be ousted by us and then he will have control.’’ [3] With this in mind, Lloyd saw Fu’ad and in his usual overbearing fashion advised the King to cease his political maneuvering. However, by March, even Lloyd had concluded that 214

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Tharwat’s Ministry was an untenable one. He then suggested letting the Wafdists in as they were certain to be discredited at which time the British could reassert their authority. Secretly, Fu’ad had also called in Nahhas to discuss the possibilities of forming a coalition Cabinet with a Wafdist Prime Minister. [4] On March 4, Tharwat handed Lloyd the Egyptian government’s rejection of the proposed treaty on the ground that it sought to legalize the occupation of Egypt by British forces. Tharwat handed in his resignation on the same day. Tharwat died in 1929 in Paris and was much mourned by the British who had respected his parliamentary skills. By March 16, Nahhas agreed to form a Cabinet which included Mahmud as Minister of Finance. To assuage British sensibilities, Nuqrashi and Ahmad Mahir, who were anathemas for their alleged conspiracy in terrorist acts, were excluded. A series of domestic problems arose almost immediately. Nahhas was anxious to increase Wafdist support in the provinces and, as in the past, sought to employ students to gamer aid. Therefore, he attempted to curb police interference against student demonstrations which had been frequent occurrences during the Tharwat Ministry. Makram ‘Ubayd and Nuqrashi were both in close contact with student groups and were generally thought to be the main organizers of student activities. Not alto­ gether displeased with this turn of events, the Foreign Office officials bided their time as the demonstrations would “ give us an admirable opportunity of administering a rap on the knuckles of the Wafd.’’ [5] The Foreign Office was particularly anxious to undercut the power of ’Ubayd and Nuqrashi, both of whom were considered to be dangerous agitators. Indeed, in spite of its denials, the Foreign Office had placed both men on a blacklist of dangerous suspects. ‘Ubayd had been put on the list by Allenby in 1925 for an alleged “ proclivity for throwing bombs.’’ [6] Nuqrashi had been placed on the list in 1926; others included ‘Abd al-Halim, ‘Abd al-Bayli, ‘Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, Hamad al-Basil, ‘Abd al-Hamid Sa‘id, and ‘Ali Shamsi whose name was removed in 1929. [7] When 'Ubayd traveled to England in 1928 his name had to be removed from this blacklist before he was permitted to enter. While in England Makram ‘Ubayd made several speeches on Egyptian nationalism and met with other Wafdists living in Great 215

THE WAFD

Britain. His actions were constantly watched by the Home Office, which was fearful ‘Ubayd could use his journey as an excuse to incite anti-British sentiments. A clash between the Wafd, which was determined to obtain Egyptian independence, and the British, who were equally resolved to protect their vital interests, was inevitable. The Assemblies’ Bill, which limited the executive’s authority to prevent public meetings, precipitated the confrontation. Nahhas was eager to secure Senate approval of the Bill in spite of British opposition to it. In April, Lloyd verbally warned Nahhas against pursuing passage of the Bill, but when these warnings were ignored, Lloyd, acting on Foreign Office directives, handed Nahhas an ultimatum on April 29. Nahhas was to give written assurances the Bill would not be passed; failing this assurance the British government would “ take such action as the situation may seem to require.” [8] The threat was backed up by the appearance of British warships off the Egyptian coast. The Egyptians acceded to the demand, while repeating that they did not accept the 1922 Declaration or British interference in domestic matters. Lloyd wanted to push the advantage but was deterred by the Foreign Office which was satisfied with the response. [91 Humiliated, Nahhas tenaciously held on to office although much of his support had evaporated as a result of his clash with the British. It was now just a matter of time before Fu’ad moved to take advantage of the situation. Fu’ad’s excuse to dismiss Nahhas was his involvement in the infamous Sayf ad-Din case. Years before, the mentally ill prince had attempted to assassinate Fu’ad, who was his brother-in-law. Ironically, Fu’ad was granted trusteeship over Sayf ad-Din’s considerable fortune. After protracted legal struggles to gain control of the estate, Sayf ad-Din’s mother had hired Nahhas and two other lawyers to represent her case. In an oddly fortuitous lead, an alleged copy of the financial agreement between the plaintiff and Nahhas appeared in the press. Nahhas was accused of trading in favors and using his position to augment his personal income. Nahhas countered that he had left his law practice in 1927 and that the so-called revelations were nothing more than a plot to discredit his Ministry. But the damage had been done and Fu’ad was quick to take full advantage of the situation by curtly dismissing Nahhas’s Ministry, which was also plagued with 216

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internal dissent. Mahmud had made a half-hearted attempt to resign in May, but had been persuaded to remain in the Cabinet. He then resigned permanently in June. Mahmud’s resignation caused the collapse of the coalition as the Liberals no longer needed the support of the Wafd. After Nahhas’s dismissal, a new Ministry under Mahmud was formed. Mahmud forged a coalition of Liberals and Ittihadists. After suspending the Parliament, which was still strongly proWafdist, he dissolved it in July; it was to be Egypt’s last Parlia­ ment for the next three years. Fu’ad had won. The Wafd was out of power and the new Ministry was decidedly more malleable to Fu’ad’s wishes. The British too were pleased with the develop­ ments, and Lloyd left for his summer holiday in an optimistic mood. However, the Wafd leadership did not sit by quietly to permit the Monarchy or the British to reassert an autocratic government. As in the past, the Wafd attempted to stir up enthusiasm against the government through the press and public speeches. Mahmud’s Ministry responded by instituting severely repressive censorship measures which effectively muzzled most of the Wafd’s opposition. There were attempts in July and November to call members of the Parliament to speak out against the repressive tactics, but the Ministry proved strong enough to withstand these criticisms. Mahmud made the fullest possible use of the police and informers who ferreted out potential political enemies practically before they had been mobilized. He also crossed Nahhas by backing a series of highly critical articles in the press; these ridiculed Nahhas who was said to have made more blunders in twelve months than Zaghlul had made in his entire lifetime. [10] Mahmud’s stringent measures effectively curbed the Wafd for a short period of time, but as the repression continued opposition was bound to mount. By January 1929, the Wafd was calling for a general Congress. Mahmud quickly responded by banning the Congress and several journals including Rose al-Yusuf and Sharq al-Jadid. His political position was further guaranteed when he was elected President of the Liberal Constitution party with ‘Afifi as Vice President. In retaliation, Nahhas announced a general boycott of foreign goods. The Wafd also circumvented Mahmud’s proscription against the Congress by holding a meeting of the Wafdist Parliamentary group on February 7. Eighty-five attended 217

THE WAFD

including Nahhas who received an ovation for his recent acquittal by the Court of Discipline in the Sayf ad-Din case. Subsequently, a large delegation, numbering about 1S00, attempted on February 28 to present petitions to the Palace; the group was blocked by the police, but a few individuals did gain entry. On March 26, the Wafd issued a public statement against the government. Under the law for the protection of the regime, the Wafdist signatories (Nahhas, ‘Ubayd, Gharabli, Ahmad Mahir, Nuqrashi, and many more) could have been prosecuted. Because the British and Fu’ad were against further alienation of the Wafdists, the signatories were not arrested. Indeed, Fu’ad was hopeful that the hiatus between Mahmud and the Wafd would widen in order that he could step in to fill the vacuum. For this reason he encouraged the Ittihadists to negotiate with the Wafd. The Wafd also sent ’Ubayd and Gharabli to Paris and London to gather further support for their campaign against Mahmud’s authoritarian regime. In fact, even the British were becoming alarmed that Mahmud had overstepped himself. They worried lest the repression of the Wafd backfire, causing an explosion of proWafdist demonstrations throughout the countryside. Then, too, the Foreign Office officials did not want Fu’ad to become so strong that he would make an attempt to become the absolute ruler of Egypt. From the British point of view, it was advantageous to keep the Wafd just strong enough to balance the autocratic tendencies of the Monarch without being strong enough to govern single handedly. After receiving Oriental Secretary Laurence Graffiey-Smith’s reports on the political state in Egyptian provinces, many officials in London concluded that the Wafd could not be permanently destroyed. Typical of this changing perception of the Wafd was the comment, My experience leads me to think that every Egyptian of any intelligence is at heart an Arabist, a Nationalist, a Wafdist . . . one must come to the conclusion that the Wafd will never be finally broken. [11] As British officials became convinced the Egyptian situation needed to be handled with velvet gloves, and as a new Labour government came to power, Lloyd’s continued tenure in office 218

THE NEW GENERATION

came into question. IJoyd was universally known as “ a dyed in the wool imperialist and really, in this century, an anachronism.” [12] It was, therefore, only a matter of time before he would be asked to resign. Much as McMahon, Wingate, and Allenby before him, Lloyd was eased out of his position by the Prime Minister, then Ramsay MacDonald, and the Foreign Secretary, Arthur Hender­ son, who believed that Lloyd’s hardline tactics were not in the best interests of the British empire. The new British government wanted someone who would not grate Egyptian national sensibilities and whose personality was not as irritating to Egyptian leaders as Lloyd’s had often been. In late May 1929, Lloyd was relieved of his duties for the ostensible reason that his views and that of the government were too widely divergent to be compromised. Lloyd left Egypt for his summer leave in July and never returned. Lloyd’s “ encouraged” resignation caused some clamor from Parliament where Winston Churchill took up the cause. [13] Churchill’s defense of Lloyd failed and he was to remain in the political wilderness until Churchill brought him back into his wartime government. Unfortunately, Lloyd did not have long to enjoy his return to public work for he died in 1941. Lloyd was replaced by Percy Loraine, a career diplomat. From the Egyptian point of view Loraine was personally and politically a marked improvement over his predecessor. Loraine was a gentle­ man whose pleasing personality ingratiated him with both Nahhas and Fu’ad. He golfed, was a good shot, and enjoyed sports which endeared him to the British community as well. Loraine arrived in September and immediately began working to remove Mahmud and to have him replaced with a more moderate leader. Mahmud had spent much of the summer in England where he had been negotiating with Henderson for a British-Egyptian treaty. Mahmud had secured the assent of the Liberal Constitu­ tionalists for these negotiations; with the newly released Nile Waters Agreement signed by the British, Mahmud felt fairly confident that he could succeed where so many others had failed. Not to be upstaged, Fu’ad, accompanied with a large entourage, also embarked on a European tour. While the Mahmud-Henderson agreement of August was a marked improvement on the Tharwat draft (Egyptians were to be responsible for the foreign communi­ ties, the Sudan was to remain under the legal status provided in 1924, both nations were to follow mutually agreeable foreign 219

THE WAFD

policies, and British troops in Egypt were to be geographically limited), there was little hope that Nahhas would ever accept a treaty formulated by his political enemy. As a result, the British government, which was eager for a settlement, moved to oust Mahmud’s Ministry. On October 2, Mahmud, lacking popular backing, resigned. Loraine gloated that he had cut the “ Gordian knot of the situation” which was a “triumph” . [14] ‘Adli Yakan was brought back to form an interim ministry since everyone anticipated a Wafdist victory in the December 1929 elections. As in every election which was honestly conducted, the Wafdists won a resounding victory, commanding also eighty percent of the popular votes. All the political parties had lavishly courted the electorate. One Liberal Constitutionalist was reported to have held a tea party for ‘umdas where the food was served by a Greek waiter in European dress, and under the saucers were envelopes with one hundred pounds. The Ittihadists gave a dinner party where two hundred pound gifts were given. The Wafd was said to entice the ‘umdas with offers of good positions in Cairo. [15] With his clear cut popular mandate, Nahhas formed an all Wafdist Ministry, including Nuqrashi, noted for his political acumen as Communications Minister, and Butrus Ghali as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Makram ‘Ubayd was picked as Finance Minister with Gharabli, a lawyer, as Minister of Justice, Baha’ ad-Din Barakat as Minister of Education and Hasan Hasib as Minister of War. Osman Muharram, Muhammad Safwat (a lawyer and trusted Wafdist), and Mahmud Basyuni were appointed Ministers of Public Works, Agriculture, and Waqfs respectively. Loraine was satisfied with Nahhas whom he coolly analyzed as having a “ good heart, a very large street value by reason of his form of oratory, and obstinacy. His defects [are] boundless vanity, a deficient third dimension in his reasoning capacity, and a not quite immaculate moral courage. The personal element ranks with him too highly, and his talent is for party politics of a rather hectic kind, rather than for statesmanship.” [16] In spite of his penchant for political intrigue, Nahhas was confident he could forge an acceptable treaty with the British. Consequently, a new series of negotiations with Henderson began in March 1930. Nahhas was accompanied by several journalists, 220

THE NEW GENERATION

Makram ‘Ubayd, his closest adviser, Wasif Ghali and Ahmad Mahir. After the delegation received a warm welcome in London it was encouraged to think that at long last an agreement was imminent. In his blunt fashion, Nahhas pushed Egyptian demands for local autonomy and claims over the Sudan. The last — as usual — proved to be the fatal stumbling block. Nahhas wanted no restrictions on Egyptian immigration to. the Sudan and, more importantly, new negotiations on the Sudan within the year. The British refused to accede to either of these demands. Henderson subsequently published a White Paper on the negotiations, but owing to a change in the political scene in Egypt, Nahhas never published his version. In May Nahhas was forced to return to Egypt empty handed. He attempted to mitigate the setback by emphasizing domestic reform, but inevitably the King saw this as the prime opportunity to remove his rival. [17] Thus in June, Nahhas’s Cabinet fell. Isma'il Sidqi, the old political opportunist and brilliant intriguer, took over the portfolios of Prime Minister, Interior and Finance. The Cabinet constituted the old enemies of the Wafd, for Sidqi, acting on Fu’ad’s directives, was to try and break the Wafdists’ political monopoly. Ignoring the bans on meetings, the Wafdists spoke out agains. Sidqi’s Ministry which it considered unconstitutional. Sidqi turned a blind eye to the Wafdist criticisms, closed the Parliament, and defied the Wafd to react. In response, the Wafd held a large meeting of Parliamentary members and local leaders at the Sa‘dist club in Cairo. Here they reiterated their support for the consti­ tution (which ironically they had some years before so strongly opposed). Various Wafdists also attended the Internationa* Parliamentary Congress in London where they pressed their case for constitutional government in Egypt. In June, Parliament was closed when a chain was placed across the gates of the House of Assembly. On June 23 — the day the chains were broken — according to a prearranged plan, the fire­ men, acting on order from the President of the Assembly,- broke down these barriers. [18] Nahhas then set out on a tour through the provinces; everywhere he went there were demonstrations. Violence was met with the armed police. When a number of proWafdist ‘umdas resigned, Sidqi had them fined. In retaliation, the Wafdists urged people to stop paying taxes and convinced a 221

THE WAFD

number of provincial councils to follow suit. To bolster Sidqi, the King had a Royal Decree issued to close Parliament which deprived the Deputies of their immunity; this automatically endangered leading Wafdists and undercut political opposition. Obviously disturbed by the agitation that Sidqi’s strong arm tactics incited, the British moved to more neutral ground. Loraine, upon MacDonald's instructions, informed both Nahhas and Sidqi that the British would keep out of any political rivalries, but would hold both men publicly responsible for damage to foreign persons or property. In their usual fashion, the British buttressed the position by having two warships move into the port of Alexandria. The British recognized that the Fu’ad-Sidqi combi­ nation was inherently unstable and that ultimately it would have to be replaced. [19] But for the time being, neutrality appeared to be the best option. Disregarding the Wafdist agitation, Sidqi remained confident that he could wrest complete political control from their domain. To do so, he knew that the 1923 Constitution had to be radically altered. He rationalized that direct elections made the fellahin elect representatives they did not even know. Of course, what he planned to do was to substitute an electoral system which would destroy the grassroots Wafdist support. Consequently, the proposed 1930 Constitution reduced the number of Senate seats to 100 and created a two-tiered system of elections. [20] When the 1930 Constitution was announced on October 22, the Liberal Constitutionalists who had tacitly supported Sidqi were noticeably distressed. Sidqi met with both Mahmud and Haykal to discuss the new constitution over which Mahmud had several reservations. When they failed to reach an agreement, the withdrawal of Mahmud split the Liberal Constitutionalists, with most of the old guard remaining with Sidqi’s camp, while the liberals joined the opposition. After this split, Sidqi moved to form his own political party composed of Salah Ma‘lum, Muhammad Allam, Tawfik Doss, Ibrahim Fahmi, ‘Abd al-Fattah Yahia and others. [21] While the Hizb al-Sha’b (The People’s Party) soon had its own headquarters and journal, it was never anything more than a personal vehicle for Sidqi. Having disavowed the new constitution, Mahmud was anxious to mend his fences with the Wafd. For purely pragmatic reasons, 222

THE NEW GENERATION

Nahhas was relatively willing to consider a coalition of the two parties. The moderates favored a union of the two parties, but the more radical elements in the Wafd were opposed to the idea. Atta ‘Afifi and Nuqrashi acted as go-betweens to secure inter­ party co-operation. When he first heard of this, Nahhas was furious, but he finally agreed to coordinate the opposition to Sidqi. Memories of Mahmud’s autocratic regime seemed to pale in comparison to the more overt repression under Sidqi. As a result of prolonged talks, a coordination committee was organized; this was composed of Barakat, ‘Ubayd, Haykal, and Aluba. In April 1939, the committee met in Barakat’s Zamalak home to devise tactics to fight Sidqi. A propaganda campaign aimed at intellectuals was to be launched. In order to secure the active support of the masses, the com­ mittee decided that the leaders of the Wafd and Liberal Consti­ tutionalists would travel by train to Tanta. When Nahhas and Mahmud arrived at the train station, they found it surrounded by police. With a group of young men, Mahmud — noted for his lively temper — stormed the doors. In the ensuing fracas, Mahmud’s tarboosh fell to the ground, but the delegation gained entry. They then settled in the train which finally moved off towards — not Tanta — but Giza. After much dallying and oration, cars came to fetch the leaders back to Cairo. People reading the newspapers the next morning duly noted the more revolutionary aspects of this rather farcical affair. Once back in Cairo the leaders regrouped to decide on further courses of action. After some debate, it was decided the leaders should go to Beni Suef. Crowds gathered at the station to see if there would be a repetition of the earlier confrontation. They were to be disappointed as Sidqi had learned not to provide a public confrontation which would only inflame pro-Wafdist passions. The train left only to be met by armed soldiers in Beni Suef, and Mahmud and Nahhas were forced to return to Cairo without having held public demonstrations. It was then decided that the Beni Suef trip should be repeated with automobiles being used as the means of transport. The second expedition proved a success with a large meeting being held in the Wafd building. On Sidqi’s orders, the large demonstrations held throughout the town were dispersed by force. [22] Knowing they could not hope to win the forthcoming elections. 223

THE WAFD

the Wafdists and Liberal Constitutionalists called a boycott. The elections were held among widespread charges of corruption and bribery. One police inspector was even transferred when he refused to pressure the electors. Both the Wafdists and the Liberal Constitutionalists did all in their power to rally their local supporters against the elections. [23] After the elections resulted in the expected victory for Sidqi, Nahhas and Mahmud both criti­ cized the unfair electoral practices, calling for new openly conducted elections. Subsequent investigations discredited Sidqi who was held responsible for the electoral excesses. Refusing to acknowledge any wrongdoing, Sidqi pressed for renewed negotiations with the British. The British were under­ standably reluctant to formulate another treaty which, they felt, had little chance of gaining acceptance. After Sidqi’s overtures to Loraine were rebuffed, ‘Afifi took up the cause. As they feared the Sidqi government might easily be repudiated in the near future, the British continued to vacillate. On the other hand, by the autumn of 1931, Sidqi’s anti-Wafdist campaign had begun to show signs of success. Sayid Mursi, President of the Wafd in Alexandria, and Ahmad Mursi Badr resigned from the Wafdist Central Committee. Their resignations were followed by those of Husayn Hilal, former Vice President of the Chamber of Deputies and President of the Wafd Committee in Dakahliyva. The Wafd promptly condemned Hilal as a traitor and dismissed him from the party. Hilal then wavered between alliances with Sidqi’s Sha‘b party and *Ali Mahir’s Ittihadists. There were further defections among both the Wafdist and Liberal Constitutionalist families in Behara, Minufiyya, and Gharbiyya. the populous, wealthy, former Wafdist (Strong­ hold. [241 These defections were clear indications that the Wafdist cadre was not as loyal as the party would have liked. There was also general dissatisfaction with party tactics from the more liberal branches of the party. Many conservatives feared that the SidqiPalace forces would finally be able to destroy the Wafdist mono­ poly of popular support. Fearing this dangerous trend, Nahhas bolstered the party by symbolically reinforcing its traditions and ties to the early national­ ist struggles. He constantly appeared at Zaghlul’s grave or at Beit al-Umma where he spoke in glowing terms of the past glories of the Wafd. The Wafd also apparently gave the green light for its 224

THE NEW GENERATION

more extremist branches to escalate their violent opposition to the government. Consequently, there was a marked increase in assassination attempts and bombings. The Wafd also called for a boycott of all British goods. The British ridiculed this tactic, for they believed it would “ take more than this boycott to drive the dandified Egyptian back to native garb.” [25] Foreign Office officials, while apprehensive over violent repercussions, were somewhat heartened by what appeared to be cracks within the Wafdist ranks. They hoped that Sidqi would yet succeed in splitting the Wafd. [26] Percy Loraine began to advocate opening negotiations with Sidqi; Fu’ad too was anxious to secure a treaty. During September 1932, Sidqi got his long awaited request when he met with Sir John Simon, British Foreign Secretary in Geneva. Simon opened by noting that Great Britain recognized the firmness of Sidqi’s position since he had been Prime Minister for two years (a not inconsiderable time consider­ ing the vagaries of Egyptian politics). Sidqi stressed the need for revision of the Capitulations and for Egyptian entry into the League of Nations. Simon reiterated British insistence on the maintenance of its troops in Egypt and on its interests in the Sudan. Following this meeting, the Foreign Office set up a sub­ committee to deal with the proposals. Remaining skeptical, some officials bemoaned Sidqi’s repressive measures which they were certain would ultimately cause his downfall. [27] After Sidqi’s failure to move the negotiations in a direction acceptable to Egyptians, Loraine became increasingly concerned that the Cabinet would fall. He therefore tried to get a coalition government which would include the Wafd as well as other Egyptian political parties. Although the Liberal Constitutionalists favored the idea, the Wafd opposed it. This division, which occurred almost simultaneously with an internal Wafdist argu­ ment, caused further splits within the party. In the fall, Makram ‘Ubayd had quit the Iskandar bomb case over what he felt had been inappropriate judicial actions. Gharabli, whom some felt was a tenth-rate lawyer, and with whom Makram had had previous conflicts, publicly disagreed with Makram*s stand. Nahhas riposted by criticizing Gharabli’s failure to stand by Makram. Angered by this public rebuke, Gharabli resigned. Asked to reconsider, Gharabli wrote a letter which angered Nahhas who then proceeded to read it aloud to the Wafdist Corn225

THEWAFD

mittee. A vigorous debate followed with Barakat, Basil, Shirai, Gazzar, ‘Abd al-Nur, and Atta ‘Afifi supporting Gharabli. Others including ‘Ubayd, Nuqrashi, Hasib, Sinut Hanna, and Ahmad Mahir sided with Nahhas. At this point, of the twelve surviving original Wafdist members (Zaghlul, Makabati, Wasif had all died), only Basil, Hanna, Nahhas, and Khayyat remained, and at least two of those were in the moderate wing. Sidqi now led the Sha‘bist party, with Mahmud and Muhammad ‘Ali as Liberal Constitutionalists, and Fahmi, Sayyid and ‘Afifi as former Liberal Constitutionalists. Nasser was an Ittihadist and Lutf Allah was an independent. After consulting with Madame Zaghlul, whose opinions were still highly valued, Nahhas pushed for Gharabli’s removal from the party. Gharabli’s supporters issued an open statement, while Safia Zaghlul publicly sided with Nahhas. Behind the scenes, Mahmud attempted to mediate the dispute, but given his penchant for intrigue and his personal ambitions, there is little question that, in fact, he probably helped to widen the rift. [28] At this juncture, Sidqi made a serious political error. Had he retired quietly to let the personalities continue their public wrang­ ling, it is probable that the splits would have seriously damaged Wafdist power. Instead, Sidqi moved to interfere. In fact, Sidqi’s repressive tactics only caused the Wafd to close ranks once again. Badly misjudging the situation, Sidqi moved to close the House of the People which was a sacred symbol of Egyptian nationalism. The nationalist struggle was never more strongly personified than in the person of Safia Zaghlul. Thus when she was told that her home could only be used for private occasions and that journalists were to be denied entry, the former quarreling Wafdists were bound to coalesce around Safia. She immediately issued an indignant letter drafted by ‘Ubayd to which the populace rallied. True to the British predictions, the “ persecution by Sidqi reunites the Wafd [;] it must end in a victory for the Nahhas clique and weaken the position of the moderate members.’’ [29] Sidqi’s Cabinet was also plagued by dissension caused by personal ambition and the growing dissatisfaction of several Ministers with the more flagrant corruption and repression of Sidqi’s administration. Both ‘Ali Mahir and ‘Abd al-Fattah Yahia resigned over scandals, but were probably more influenced by Palace pressures than moral considerations. As a result, Sidqi 226

THE NEW GENERATION

reshuffled his Cabinet in January 1933 and again in March. Clearly, Sidqi’s Ministry was not to be long-lived. Sidqi fell in September to be replaced by Fu’ad’s choice, *Abd al-Fattah Yahia, who upon returning from Paris, found the Palace had selected his entire Cabinet. He was a weak, although self-important person­ ality, who initially appeared to be the ideal choice as a puppet to Fu’ad. Autumn brought changes in the British administration as well. In February, Percy Loraine left Cairo on urgent family business. His prolonged absence caused rumors to fly, and by August it was announced that he had been appointed Ambassador to Ankara. Both Loraine and his wife, Louise, regretted leaving Egypt which they had enjoyed. Loraine blamed John Simon, Foreign Secretary, for his removal, but Loraine’s own history of poor health (he had suffered a nervous collapse) was undoubtedly a major contributory factor in his removal. Others speculated that his treatment of the British community had caused offense, or that he had not behaved in a manner befitting a British official (a flirtation with a woman, perhaps?). Rumors aside, Loraine’s rather liberal approach to Egyptian politics was not popular with many Foreign Office officials who thought that policy dictated that Britain should control events in Egypt in so far as possible. Loraine’s removal in some ways calls to mind the short tenure of Edwin Gorst twenty-five years previously. Loraine was replaced by Miles Lampson, a giant of a man who arrived in January 1934. Lampson had been H.M. Minister in China and had originally been scheduled for the Ankara post; he had excellent connections in London (he was god-father foi Princess Elizabeth) and had the sort of attractive personality which seemed to befit the Cairo position. More importantly Simon considered Lampson to be the type of man who could control the Egyptians and who would use either charm or threats to implement British policy. Sidqi’s fall had been a victory more for the King than for the Wafd which was still in some disarray. Fu’ad lost no time in pressing his advantage. The Cabinet owed its tenuous legitimacy to him, but lacked popular backing and was beset with scandals. Lacking clearly formulated programs, the political parties seemed adrift — a lack of direction which seemed to infect the entire nation. The British, too, pointedly did not wish Fu’ad to become 227

THE WAFD

completely autocratic; consequently, they insisted on the removal of any Palace adviser who seemed either anti-British or was too subservient to Fu’ad. This policy was reflected in the forced removal of al-Ibrashi as Chief of the Royal Cabinet. Journalists also began to question why the politicians lacked direction. In one Musawer article entitled “ What did we lose between November 13,1918, and November 13,1934?“ the writer openly blamed not only the British, but the corrupt Egyptians for the lack of meaningful democratic forms in Egypt. There is no hope of any progress unless the British occupation ends, and there is no hope of progress as long as there are persons who are ready to carry out the orders of the British and get a place in the Cabinet. [30] At the time the aforementioned was published, Yahia’s ineffec­ tual Ministry had just resigned. Muhammed Tewfik Nessim, who had some connections with the Wafd, formed a new Cabinet which remained in power until 1936. When Nessim failed to supervise fair elections he was forced to resign. This resignation was encouraged from behind the scenes by continued machinations by the Palace. After his resignation as Prime Minister, and as President of the Hizb al-Sha‘b, Sidqi, whose health had been somewhat impaired by a stroke, remained out of the public eye for a short time. By 1935 he had been reelected President of the Sha‘b party. He had also maintained his contacts with Fu’ad who probably encouraged him to foment conservative agitation against Nessim. Throughout this interim, the Wafdist leaders maintained their rather vigorous schedule of public appearances. In the spring of 1935, Nahhas, accompanied by ‘Ubayd, toured Upper Egypt, visiting churches and mosques, making innumerable speeches and meeting with countless delegations. [31] It was all rather like the sound and the fury, signifying nothing. The Wafd had sought to mark its political revival by holding a Congress in January 1935. In the course of discussions, Nahhas had advocated negotiating with the British. At this time the Wafd remained hopeful that Nessim would reinstitute the old constitution which would bring about a return of a Wafdist government. Opposing this approach, the Liberal Constitutionalists looked — ironically — more liberal 228

THE NEW GENERATION

than the Wafd. As time elapsed and the 1923 Constitution was still not revived, the Wafd ultimately had to withdraw its support of Nessim’s Ministry. There was also a flurry of anti-British activity which was incited by Britain’s reluctance to opt for a return to constitutional govern­ ment. There was also hostility to the British response over the Italian-Ethiopian crisis which had prompted the British to force public cooperation from Egypt in any joint military efforts which they might deem necessary. By December 193S, with all parties, with the possible exception of King Fu'ad, wishing a return to the constitution and renewed negotiations, the Egyptian political parties formed a United Front to push toward that goal. The United Front included an odd assortment of political viewpoints, encompassing such diverse personalities as Nahhas, Mahmud, and Sidqi. The Front first presented the King with a note demanding the return to the 1923 Constitution and, secondly, presented a note to Lampson demand­ ing a renewal of the treaty negotiations. This precipitated the fall of Nessim’s government. With ‘Ali Mahir running messages back and forth, talks began between Lampson and Nahhas who worked to devise a mutually acceptable formula for new negotiations. From the outset, Nahhas made it clear that the Wafd would not negotiate without an elected government. Lampson pressed Nahhas to negotiate through the United Front. Although he was open to that idea, Nahhas was advised by ‘Ubayd that the Wafd should only negotiate when it was in power. This stand was consistent with Makram’s approach; except in times of crisis, he was opposed to coalitions and persistently sought to further purely Wafdist aims. Attempting to intercede, ‘Ali Mahir asked Nahhas for a coalition. Interestingly, he was to submit the answer to Lampson before informing the King. At this point, Mahir obviously had his finger on where the real authority in Egypt rested; some years later, he was not to be so astute. Nahhas proposed that a nonparty government be formed to hold elections, because the Wafd would not join a coalition government. Not surprisingly, Mahmud and Sidqi — ever ambitious — both offered to serve in such a government. After some argument, the Wafd finally agreed to: 1. a neutral Cabinet, 2. immediate negotiations, 3. negotiators to be Sidqi, Mahmud, Hilmi, ‘Issa, Shamsi, ‘Afifi, and five or six 229

THE WAFD

Wafdists, 4. elections in May, 5. ‘Ali Mahir as Prime Minister. After the Wafd agreed to a formula which was acceptable to the British, officials in London were stunned by their success. “ The impossible has happened — not for the first time in Egypt,” [32] remarked one official. ‘Ali Mahir was charged in January 1936 with forming an interim government. Mahir was to remain in office until the forthcoming May elections which were guaranteed under the December return to the 1923 Constitution. ‘Ali Mahir, an early right wing supporter of the Wafd, in contrast to his more radical brother, Ahmad, had been director of the School of Law and Minister of Education and Justice under Sidqi. He had clashed with Sidqi over the alleged miscarriage of justice in several cases. Mahir was an opportunist whose inclinations for political intriguing and maneuvering were well known. Delany, the Reuter’s correspondent and confidant of many Egyptian politicians, believed Mahir was not as anti-British as many thought, but that he was a “ tricky man and it was never easy to penetrate his mind.” [331 As Prime Minister, Mahir proved to be extraordinarily hard-working and recommended a number of domestic reforms. Preparations for the May elections moved forward only to be briefly interrupted by King Fu’ad’s death in April. Since Fu’ad had been ailing for several years, his death was not altogether unexpected; his son, Faruq, succeeded him on May 6. Unfortun­ ately, Faruq had been raised in the Palace surrounded by syco­ phants who acquiesced to his every whim; it was not the atmosphere calculated to produce a King of integrity or dynamic leadership. Nor were Faruq’s intellectual abilities ever a match or even close to those of his father. But in the first honeymoon years of his reign, these flaws remained hidden from the public. When he first came to the throne, Faruq’s ability to speak Arabic (which his father had never really mastered), his tall boyish good looks, and Sandhurst education (although incomplete and with a poor achievement record) made him a popular figure. Indeed, Faruq’s coronation seemed an auspicious moment for the monarchy. In the May elections the Wafd once again won a resounding victory by capturing about 89 percent of the popular vote. The Wafd secured 157 seats in parliament, the Liberals 17, Sha‘b 8, Ittihad 5, Watan 4, Independents 16 of which 12 went to the Wafd, and the Sa‘dists 6. [34] Holding the popular mandate Nahhas 230

THE NEW GENERATIO N

formulated his third Wafdist government. The Cabinet included: Nahhas as Prime Minister, Interior, Public Health; Wasif Butrus Ghali, Foreign Affairs; ‘Ubayd, Finance; Nuqrashi, Communi­ cations; Muharram, Public Works; and Safwat, Waqfs. Hamdi Sayf al-Nasser became Minister of Agriculture with Mahmud Ghaleb as Justice; Ali Fahmi, War and Marine; ‘Abd al-Salam Fahmi Muhammad Gom‘a, Commerce and Industry; and ‘Ali Zaki al-‘Urabi, Education. With the inclusion of several new faces and the more radical tenor of the membership, the new Cabinet was not a pleasing one to the British. However the Wafd felt that the Cabinet did reflect the relative strength of the party. Its mass popularity seemed assured, and the party was ready to embark on successful negotiations with the British. Even before the elections, the negotiations, according to the January agreement, had been resumed. The negotiations team had finally included: Nahhas, Mahmud, Sidqi, Ghali, ‘Issa, Shamsi, 'Afifi, ‘Ubayd, Muharram, ‘Ali Mahir, Yahia, Ahmad Mahir, and Nuqrashi. The Foreign Office voiced strong opposition to the latter two negotiators, whom it held responsible for the violence of the 1920’s, but they were accepted as a compromise measure. British officials in Cairo received orders that they were to be “ cool” to both Ahmad Mahir and Nuqrashi. [35] The negotiations opened on March 9 with Lampson leading the British delegation. Both sides seemed eager — if not overly opti­ mistic — for a settlement. Matters had deteriorated to no one’s benefit so that settlement indeed seemed the only way out of the impasse. The Wafd had lost valued national support by its failure to achieve a rapprochement or victory over the British, while the British had expended great effort and expense to achieve the eve r elusive agreement which would protect their interests. Although the British could have achieved a temporary military settlement, they preferred to gain their ends by peaceful means if at all possible. Many Egyptians, too, agreed that the settlement had been too long delayed. On the negative side, there were distinct signs that at least a portion of the Egyptian populace thought the Wafd was not acting in the best interests of the nation by negotiat­ ing with the British. Al-Musawer even went so far as to print a cartoon cover depicting Lampson and Nahhas steamrolling the negotiations over the land. [36] Under Top Secret Green, the Foreign Office and War Office 231

THE WAFD

exchanged details of British texts which covered the items on which the British could or would compromise. Meetings between Egyptian negotiators and Lampson were cordial, but, in spite of the camaraderie, ‘Ubayd privately opined that the chances of success were about two percent. [37] The March 16 meeting was stormy as both sides had finally reached the heart of the differences. By March 26 Great Britain provided pre-prepared texts of the proposals. The texts began with a discussion of the military considerations as the War Office had made it abundantly clear that it considered Egypt of inestimable strategic importance. In fact, the War Office demands often exceeded those of the Foreign Office which was then left with the responsibility of securing the objectives through negotiations. The Foreign Office documents — all marked top secret — are voluminous testimonies to the minute detail with which the British government had considered each and every aspect of its interests in Egypt. The first meetings focused upon the number and location of British troops and upon the length of time they were to remain in Egypt. Long arguments over terminology, for example pooling/ englobées, ensued. The example involved the progressive time limits under which troops would be moved from place to place as long as they avoided public appearances in large towns where their presence was certain to generate animosity. [38] By the end of April, Nahhas was pushing for a rapid conclusion to the negotiations; Nahhas obviously wanted to present the Egyptian electorate with a treaty in time for the last minute voting. In this he was to be disappointed; however, the Wafd scarcely needed a treaty in order to obtain an overwhelming electoral victory. Lampson too was fearful of breaking off negotiations lest the Wafd, in the wake of an impressive elected victory, should escalate its demands when the negotiations resumed. Finally, it was agreed that the negotiations would reopen in May; when discussions did begin it soon became evident that there was some division among the British negotiators over the extent of compromises which should be granted. As was usually the case, the man at the helm in Cairo, in this-instance Miles Lampson, was more inclined to compromise than were the officials sitting in London. When the rift became clear, Lampson hurried back to London to present his case. With the assistance of public pressure, articles urging compromise in The Times, and some 232

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supporters in the Foreign Office, Lampson’s views carried the day. Consequently, when negotiations reopened in July, matters went more smoothly. There were some acrimonious exchanges when Britain pressed for Egypt to finance the building of barracks to house British soldiers, but when faced with the unanimous Egyp­ tian opposition, the British purportedly compromised by agreeing to pay one fourth of the costs! Mahmud became increasingly stubborn as the negotiations continued. Although he may have been seriously concerned with the concessions which the Egyptians were granting, Mahmud was certainly reluctant to see the Wafd succeed where he had failed. Ironically, it was the more radical Makram ‘Ubayd who tried to persuade Mahmud to agree. In his usual adept fashion, Lampson too recognized the danger of Mahmud’s splitting off from the negotiating team at so crucial a juncture; Nahhas and Lampson, who were already drawing closer together, may well have discussed the unfavorable ramifications that the separation of the Liberal Constitutionalists would have had upon the ratification of the treaty. As a result, Lampson lunched with Mahmud in order to assuage any fears he had over the treaty itself, or over being squeezed out of power as a result of the Wafdist success in securing a treaty. In this regard, political considerations undoubtedly played a deciding role in ‘Ubayd’s and Nahhas’ behavior. Whereas ‘Ubayd had formerly taken a hardline stand against major compromises over the British presence in Egypt and the Sudan, once it appeared that the Wafd — his party — was to settle the dispute, he changed his approach and began to take a much more conservative position. Nahhas too was eager for a settlement; following his habitual behavior he relied heavily on ‘Ubayd’s advice in these matters. As point after point was agreed upon, and it actually looked as if the long-delayed treaty was to become a reality, Lampson became understandably nervous and urged haste. To hurry matters, he even suggested telephoning messages back and forth from Cairo to London. The Foreign Office, ever security conscious, vetoed that idea as too risky. Having rushed through the considerations of the Capitulations and the Sudan (the bête noire of former negotiators), the parties formally signed a draft treaty on August 26, 1936. The treaty, entitled “ the Treaty of Alliance’’, declared the friendship of the 233

THEWAFD

two nations and agreed both would adopt foreign policies which were not inconsistent with the declared friendship. [39] The treaty provided for a defensive and offensive military alliance whereby Britain would come to the aid of Egypt if it were in a war. Egypt was to provide aid in the event the war included Great Britain. Subsequently, these seemingly innocuous clauses were to be the subjects of violent debates and momentous decisions. The two nations were to exchange Ambassadors, while British inspectors and advisors in the Ministries of Justice and Finance were to be removed, as was the British Inspector-General of the Egyptian army. Britain agreed to assist in abolishing the muchhated Capitulations; this clause was implemented under the Montreux Convention in 1937. Egypt was also to be admitted into the League of Nations. The Suez Canal remained under the stipulations of the 1888 Treaty without international control to which Britain was opposed. British forces remained in the Canal zone, but, in theory at least, Egypt was to be the guardian of the Canal. This matter was to be reconsidered after twenty years (1946). The number of British soldiers and their positioning was prescribed, although rather vague allowances as to increased numbers and their presence were to be permitted in wartime. British units were to remain in Alexandria for eight years, after which time they were to be transferred to the Canal Zone. As a concession, Egypt had also agreed to build and maintain a number of strategic roads to facilitate troop movements in time of crisis. The British Air Force was also to have access to Egyptian airspace without restrictions. With regard to the Sudan, Egypt obtained the right to negotiate new treaties, while Egyptian immigration to the Sudan was to be unrestricted except for reasons of health or public order. These were actually minor points as the governance of the Sudan re­ mained in British hands. At a special November session of the Chamber of Deputies, the Wafdist body ratified the treaty after speeches lauding its benefits. A few days later on November 19, 1936, the treaty received Senate approval. In speaking before Parliament in favor of the treaty Makram ‘Ubayd reported that it was a beginning, a written agreement which when implemented with actions would bring real independence. Through oratory which was nothing short of brilliant, ‘Ubayd convinced those listening that the 1936 treaty, 234

THE NEW GENERATION

which continued the British military presence and authority in the country and which left Britain in virtual control of the Sudan, was the beginning of complete independence. To some it was hard to believe that this was the same fiery nationalist who had said that for Egypt to give up the Sudan would be physical suicide. [40] Hamad al-Basil perhaps best reflected the honest ambivalence many Wafdists felt when he stated: To be frank, this treaty is good and better than any other treaty. It might not be complete independence, but it is the nearest thing to it. [41] Ahmad Mahir said the treaty was the first step. While the Liberal Constitutionalists were less enthusiastic in their support, both Haykal and Mahmud spoke for the treaty. When the treaty was finally ratified the British heaved a sigh of relief. It was then left for the Wafd to demonstrate that the treaty with the British actually meant Egyptian independence. Herein lay the basic problem, for the treaty had no sooner been signed than many Egyptians, particularly the youth, demanded evidence that the patron-client relations between the British and Egypt had ended. As the British became increasingly concerned over the gathering war clouds in Europe, it became proportionate­ ly impossible for the Wafd to sustain its claims of having achieved Egyptian independence. While the Wafd might “ crown Nahhas with laurels” the singing of the treaty produced a wave of antiWafdist and anti-British demonstrations. Notes 1. John Murray Minute. January 11,1928, F0371/13114. 2. George Lloyd to Austen Chamberlain, January 6,1928, F0371/13114. 3. John Murray Minute, January 20,1928, F0371/13114. 4. George Lloyd to Foreign Office, March 9, 1928; March 13, 1928, F0371/13114. 5. John Murray Minute, March 20, 1928, F0371/13117. 6. Foreign Office Minute. September 25,1928, on R.A. Hoare to Lord Cushendun, September 1,1928, F0371/13123. 7. Home Office. January 1929, F0371/13841. 8. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer (London, 1934), Vol. II, 272; North Winship. Chargé d’Affaires to U.S. State Department, April 30,1928, US 571/6. 9. Lloyd, pp. 272-274; al-Rafi'i, Fi Aqab . Vol. II, 39-41. 10. Franklin Mott Gunther, American Minister, to State Department. August 31.

235

THEWAFD 1928. US571/6. 11. Robert Lindsay Minute. March 16. 1929. F0371/13841. 12. Franklin Mott Gunther to State Department. February 28.1929. US571 /6. 13. Lloyd describes his resignation in Egypt Since Cromer, pp. 303-323; Gerald Delany, Six Memos on Lord Lloyd, 1927-1929, St. Antony’s College, Oxford. 14. Percy Loraine to wife, Louise, October 3, 1929 in Gordon Waterfield notes for biography on Loraine, St. Antony’s College, Oxford. Gordon Waterfield, Pro­ fessional Diplomat: Sir Percy Loraine ofKirkharle (London, 1973). 15. Alexander Keown-Boyd Memorandum, December 12, 1930, St. Antony’s College. Oxford. 16. Percy Loraine to P.G. El good, January 26,1937, St. Antony’s College, Oxford. 17. al-Musawer, March-May 1930. 18. Alexander Keown-Boyd report, September 15,1930, FO371/14620. 19. John Murray Minute, September 23,1930, FO371/14620. 20. Isma’il Sidqi Memoirs, al-Musawer, May 14,1948. 21. al-Musawer, October 31, November 21,1930. 22. Haykal, Mudhakkirat, Vol. I, 330; also see: al-Musawer, February 9, 1931; April-May, 1931. 23. See Foreign Office Reports, FO371/16108-9. 24. Memorandum on Pblitical Opposition for European Department, Alexander Keown-Boyd, May 27,1932, FO371/16109. 25. Maurice Peterson Minute, May 19,1932, FO371/16109. 26. Foreign Office Reports, October 1931, FO371/15407. 27. Foreign Office Reports, September-November 1932, FO371/16110. 28. Foreign Office Reports, October-November 1932, FO371/16110; Interview with Ustaz Hilmi Makram ‘Ubayd, May 16,1973. 29. R. Hare Minute, November 6,1932, FO371/16110. 30. ‘Abd al-Rahman Nasir, “ What did we lose between November 13, 1918 and November 13,1934?” al-Musawer, November 16, 1934. 31. Husni ‘Abd al-Hamid, al-Za'im f i al-Sa'id (The Leader in Upper Egypt), Cairo, n.d.. gives practically a day-by-day account of the tour. For discussions of the Congress see: al-Rafi‘i, Fi ‘Aqab, Vol. II and al-Ahram, January 9,1935. 32. Foreign Office Minute, January 30, 1936 on Miles.Lampson to Foreign Office, January 30,1936, F0371/20097. 33. Gerald Delany to Keren Wavell (son of General Wavell), July 27, 1953, St. Antony’s College, Oxford. 34. Foreign Office Report, F0371/20104; slightly different figures are given in FO 371/20108. 35. Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, January 30, 1936, Foreign Office directives on letter, F0371/20097. 36. al-Musawer, April 17,1936. 37. Secret Police Report, F0371/20101. 38. Foreign Office files on negotiations, F0371/20102. 39. See Foreign Office files, F0371/20100-20107 for details on treaty; for discus­ sion of treaty see: Mahmud Y. Zayid, Egypt’s Struggle fo r Independence, Beirut, 1965. 40. Interview with Ustaz Hilmi Makram ‘Ubayd, March 4, 1978; interview with Sa‘d ‘Abd al-Nur, March 9,1978. 41. Hamad al-Basil, “ Hamad al-Basil talks about the parties to the treaty,” alMusawer, September 4.1936.

236

11 YEARS OF CONFRONTATION 1937-1945

Following the ratification of the 1936 Treaty, the Wafd enjoyed what was to be an all too short period of political triumph. The Treaty had no sooner been signed than steps to end the Capitul­ ations were put into action. The Montreux Convention from April through May 1937 abolished the Capitulations and designated that the Mixed Courts be closed by 1949. Although Egyptian reaction to the 1936 Treaty had been lukewarm at best, the recep­ tion accorded to Nahhas upon his return from Montreux was genuinely enthusiastic. The abolition of the Capitulations was a significant move toward genuine self-government; as the Prime Minister who had apparently wrested this victory from the Euro­ pean nations, Nahhas received accolades from both his party and his nation. In June when his ship arrived in Alexandria’s harbor, it was met by a women’s reception committee which then accompanied the Prime Minister to the welcoming crowd. Nuqrashi and ‘Ubayd were on hand to embrace and congratulate Nahhas on his success. This was practically the last festive occasion when the old political allies, Nahhas and ‘Ubayd, would stand together publicly. In a departure from his usual form, Nahhas gave a rather low-keyed speech, but the celebration fête continued until midnight. [1] During this relatively halcyon period, the Wafd was able to secure amnesty for the political prisoners of 1919, but was warned against decreasing the importance of the British Residency by removing the guards who surrounded the building. Nahhas reconstituted his government in August and seemed confident of continued success. On the surface it appeared that things were at long last going smoothly for the Wafd; the murmurs of dis­ content from within the party as well as from outside elements 237

THE WAFD

were still at low pitch. Outright opposition was, however, soon to be heard throughout the nation. Some workers of the Wafd Labor Council complained about the lack of attention accorded to their problems. Such difficulties were typical of Wafdist and labor relations. The Wafd generally tried to rally working class support in times of political troubles, but its leadership had rather consistently ignored the demands of labor when the party was actually in power. The essentially bourgeois Wafd leaders and its working class party cadres always remained alienated one from the other. Thus the Wafd sat back and did nothing when a jabor demonstration, estimated at 14,000, was crushed outside the Palace in the autumn. [21 By this time it was also clear that the personal conflicts among the key Wafdists had reached a breaking point. Nahhas and ‘Ubayd had aggravated not only the labor cadres, but also many of the students who were in close contact with Nuqrashi. The personal enmity between Nahhas and Nuqrashi had long been a problem within the Wafd Executive Council. Nahhas’s rather tepid reception in Tanta during his September visit could hardly have reassured him of his continued popularity within the party. When Ahmad Mahir publicly aligned himself with Nuqrashi against Nahhas and ‘Ubayd a split was inevitable. In September, Nuqrashi was ousted from the party. Mahir’s ouster followed several months later. Nuqrashi and Mahir subsequently formed the Sa‘dist party which stood in direct opposition to the Wafd.. A new Wafdist Executive was formed with Sabri Abu Alam; Yusuf al-Guindi; Muhammad al-Wakil (related to Nahhas by marriage); Muhammad Kamil ‘Ulema; Muhammad Maghazi, an Alexandrian cotton merchant; Muhammad Hefni al-Tarzi, a landowner from Asyut; and Ahmad Mustafa ‘Amr, a substantial contributor to the party from Asyut; Bushra Hanna, brother of the late Sinut Hanna, who had died in 1934, also from Asyut; Sayyid Bahnas, a Beni Suef landowner; and Fahmi Wissa, whose well known wife, Esther, had toured Europe speaking for the party, also sat on the Executive. [3] Once again the Executive was largely composed of prominent landowners and persons of wealth. Meanwhile, the split between the Palace and the Wafd continued to widen. Nahhas and Faruq personally disliked one another. Faruq hated Nahhas’s condescending manner which 238

YEARS OF CONFRONTATION 1937- 1945

generally manifested itself by Nahhas treating the King as a small child. Accustomed to public and private adulation, Nahhas was jealous of Faruq’s popularity among the Egyptians, and he un­ doubtedly feared the possible threat to his own position. In November, there had also been an attempt on Nahhas’s life which ‘Ubayd believed had been fostered by the Palace. Very much his father’s son, Faruq was desirous of asserting his own authority. Faruq’s 1937 tour of the provinces had met with enormous popular success; his coronation in July was yet another occasion for public demonstrations of loyalty. His charm, manners, and good looks — not yet turned to corpulence — as well as the astutely cultivated reputation of being a devout Muslim, made Faruq the favorite of the crowds. In addition, the announcement of his impending marriage to Farida Dhu al-Faqar (Zulficar) was greeted with genuine enthusiasm. [4] The pretty bride-to-be came from a Turkish family which was as close to aristocracy as any in Egypt. Farida had been hand picked by Queen Nazli in hopes of taming her rather wayward son. Nazli was not the only one con­ cerned over Faruq’s increasingly petulant, if not irresponsible, actions. The British were worried not only over the behavior they considered unbecoming to a ruling monarch, but over the difficulty they were having in controlling Faruq. If he were to become completely unmanageable, he would pose a threat to their covert authority, but with his popular support, it would be difficult to discipline him without causing an outburst of anti-British senti­ ments. The British had attempted to mold Faruq by having him sent to Sandhurst and by providing him with mentors who were supposed to guide his personal behavior. Spoiled since birth, Faruq rejected this guidance, selecting his friends from among the numerous obsequious courtiers that surrounded the Palace. Rather than sail, play tennis, or read (avocations preferred by the British), Faruq preferred the less wholesome pursuits of gambling, driving fast cars, and womanizing. [5] Faruq also evidenced an alarming tendency toward kleptomania, and tales of his purloining entire sword collections, watches, and other items which caught his fancy, soon became the talk of Egyptian society. Hearing of these, and other less attractive transgressions, the Foreign Office concluded that Faruq was not welcome at the coronation of George VI; after extended vacillation he was told he could watch the 239

THE WAFD

parade from a private home, but was not to be accorded an official status. [6] This slight further rankled with the young Monarch. Dissatisfied with both Nahhas and Faruq, but recognizing their popularity, the British had several options. They could stand aside and let matters take their own course, they could support Nahhas, or they could advise both Nahhas and the King. The British were inclined to adopt a “ wait and see” posture; however, this became increasingly impractical as Faruq persisted in obstructing British attempts at guidance. He slighted Lampson whenever possible, and while polite in face-to-face conversations was consistently late for their appointments or feigned illness when he was really out pleasure driving. Like Nahhas, Lampson also had the tendency to treat Faruq as a small boy. Privately, Lampson wondered about the disparity of Faruq’s physical size, his age, and his behavior. Lampson once sent Lancelot Oliphant in the Foreign Office a photograph of the King with the comment, “ who would say a boy of 19!!“ [71 Exasperated with Faruq. Lampson, as early as 1937, began to think in terms of more drastic action against the wayward Monarch. In a special Secret Green dispatch, he bluntly admitted, . . . how dearly I should like to be authorized to hit our young friend over the head and put him firmly in his place. [8] In a presentiment of the future, Lampson suggested they could “ get our young friend either to heel — or get out [and] save us all an infinity of trouble in the future . . . ” [9] The question of Faruq’s abdication was raised in 1941 after the Shah of Iran (whose son was married to Faruq’s sister) was forcibly deposed by the British. At that time, Anthony Eden remarked that, “ there is much to be said for Faruq doing a shah.’’ [10] In fact, Lampson even warned Faruq that if he did not become more cooperative he would wind up like his sister’s father-in-law. The officials in the Foreign Office agreed that Faruq would probably have to be deposed, but they were inclined to wait until matters had become more acute. They only hoped that he would not have caused “ too much harm” [11] in the interim. Eden and the others wanted to be certain that they chose “the right issue and above all the right moment” [12] to force Faruq’s abdication. To the British, the events of 1937 did not seem to warrant direct 240

YEARS OF CONFRONTATION 1937- 1945

intervention. Consequently, when Faruq moved to remove his enemy Nahhas from office, and to surround himself with advisers who were markedly anti-British, Lampson refrained from meddling m Palace affairs. In his political maneuverings, Faruq was advised and often directed by Ahmad Hasanayn who was the King’s Chief Secretary. He was a masterful intriguer who sought to increase the power of the Palace at the expense of Great Britain and the Wafd. Hasanayn, a close personal friend of Queen Nazli’s, with whom it was rumored he was actually married, had close contacts within the Wafd leadership. He often used these contacts to play the Wafd against the British or other rival parties. In such a way, Hasanayn was able to pull the strings of a number of puppet groups, while he himself remained in the background. As a result, no one could be absolutely certain on which side Hasanayn stood, although it was best to assume he constantly tried, by divide and rule methods, to set all of the Egyptian political parties and movements at loggerheads so that the Palace might emerge victorious. Using his reputation as a champion of Islam, Faruq also sought to ingratiate himself with Shaykh Muhammad Mustafa alMaraghi, Rector of al-Azhar. (He had first been appointed in 1928, resigned, and was reappointed in 1935). Maraghi was an out­ standing religious reformer with impeccable credentials. With his conservative, anti-Wafdist tendencies, he fell in league with the Palace’s plan to make al-Azhar the cornerstone of the anti-Wafdist student movement. For a time, Maraghi also supported Faruq’s claim over the Caliphate. Because of his zeal and influence, Maraghi’s favor was curried by Egyptian politicians for many years. Using anti-Wafdist demonstrations which had been instigated by the Palace as the excuse, Faruq dismissed Nahhas’s govern­ ment in December 1937. Mahmud, who had been intriguing from behind the scenes, was charged with forming his second ministry. The Foreign Office expressed concern that Nahhas’s fall would increase foreign influences (the Italian Verrucci was still a constant presence in the Royal entourage). Lampson expected Mahmud would be “ quite ruthless’’ f131 in circumventing the power of the Wafd. To achieve victory in the forthcoming spring elections, Mahmud had the electoral districts gerrymandered to the detriment of the 241

THEWAFD

Wafd and also reallocated the Parliament seats. Mahmud’s supporters were driven to the polls, while Wafdist voters were harassed. As a result, the government won the expected victory. Mahmud’s new Cabinet included the former Wafdists, Ahmad Mahir and Nuqrashi, who joined as Ministers of Finance and Interior. Their inclusion was a public rebuff to the Wafd. It was also indicative of the negative results of Nahhas’s failure to compromise or deal effectively with disagreements within the party. To some extent this obdurate tendency by Nahhas had been fostered by ‘Ubayd who was himself soon to become the victim of Nahhas’s refusal to brook criticism or accept honest differences of opinion within Wafdist ruling circles. More firmly entrenched after the elections, Mahmud suggested taking legal action against the Wafd. Lampson counselled against such repressive measures which would only incite a backlash of Wafdist support. Knowing that in any honestly conducted election the Wafd were the probable victors, Lampson wisely realized that at the grassroots level most Egyptians were sympathetic to the Wafd and that the Wafd would eventually return to power. [14] To keep in touch with the leading politicians, whether in power or not, Lampson initiated a series of parties; he ingratiated himself with the leading Egyptians in the genial social atmosphere in a technique that he used often and to great effect. Miles Lampson’s second wife, Jacqueline (of Italian heritage) was also adept at social functions, and gathered enormous amounts of information from the wives of politicians and even Queen Nazli who often reported on Farida’s marital difficulties with the errant Faruq. For political considerations, Lampson tried to keep relations with Faruq cordial, but it was an uphill battle. As Lampson noted, Faruq wanted to be the “ independent King of Independent Egypt” [15]; this, of course, was exactly what the British were equally determined was not to occur — either under the Palace or the Wafd. In August 1939, the ailing Mahmud (he died in 1941) resigned over an argument of whether the Prime Minister- had the right to choose his own Ministers. He was replaced by ‘Ali Mahir who had inveigled himself into Faruq’s good graces. The Sa'dists, led by Ahmad Mahir and Nuqrashi, agreed to participate in the new government, but the Liberal Constitutionalists refused. Rumors throughout Cairo circulated to the effect that Mahir intended to 242

YEARS OF CONFRONTATION 1937- 1945

destroy all political rivals so that Faruq could rule autocratically. ‘Ali Mahir had a reputation as a “tricky man” who was publicly quite anti-British, although there were those who thought that claim was exaggerated. Certainly Mahir was convinced that Great Britain would never leave Egypt willingly, and that the only alternative was to side with Germany. [16] ‘Ali Mahir’s installation coincided with the opening of World War II, which was to. change drastically Britain’s willingness to allow Egypt to work out its own political destiny. With the begin­ ning of the War, Egypt again became vital to Britain’s defense. Britain had to insure, if not the wholehearted support of Egypt, at least its acquiescence to the pursuit of British military and political policies during the crisis. During the bleak first twentyfour months of the War, Britain carefully monitored Egyptian reactions. As the Allies fell back before the victorious Axis powers in devastating after devastating defeat, the Egyptians grew increasingly convinced that Germany would win the War. Many were pleased at the prospect, not because they subscribed to the Nazi philosophy (although a few did), but because they viewed any enemy of their enemy as a friend. Britain was the enemy. Any means which would ensure the cessation of British occupation was viewed with favor; if that meant an alliance with Germany, so be it. For their part, the British would use any means — diplomatic or military — to prevent an Egyptian-German alliance. To test the leanings of key Egyptians, Lampson conducted a series of small informal luncheons. At one of these, Nahhas told Lampson that ‘Ali Mahir was to blame for the anti-British sentiments. He further warned that more violent demonstrations could be expected unies:, constitutional liberties were preserved. He was against strict press censorship or instituting Martial Law. The British discounted the warnings for they were already monitoring the mail, movements, and telephone calls of the key Egyptian politicians. They were, however, content that Nahhas seemed friendly. [17] With the balance of the Palace weighted against them, the Wafd leaders saw that their best chance to return to political power rested with the British. Thus Nahhas sought to discredit his political opponents even though it meant making an uneasy alliance with the imperial power against which the Wafd had originally directed all of its energies. In April, Nahhas presented 243

THE WAFD

Lampson with a letter signed by the Wafd Executive and Parlia­ ment group in which the party reaffirmed its friendship with Great Britain. The letter went on to note that Egypt hoped to participate in future peace negotiations and to negotiate a settlement over the Sudan. The Wafd expressed concern that the economic problems caused by W.W.l. not be repeated. It was as if the Wafd were tacitly threatening that the economic crisis after W.W.l. had pre­ cipitated the 1919 Revolution and that such an event could be repeated. The Wafd also remarked that the rest of the Arab world would not sit idly back if action was taken against Egypt. To the British this letter was political opportunism at its very worst. Foreign Office officials interpreted the letter as an attempt by the Wafd to play at international politics; they were furious at being criticized during the crisis of the War and demanded retri­ bution. In an emotional interview with Lampson, Nahhas stoutly denied the allegation. Lampson made it clear “ what a worm” he thought Nahhas was; others thought the Wafd should go to “ the Devil or the Seychelles once more.” [18] Faruq opined that Nahhas was being misled by Makram ‘Ubayd who, in his opinion, should have been put before the firing squad. [19] In light of subsequent Palace relations with Makram it appears that Faruq too was trying to encourage the British to destroy the Wafd as that would leave Faruq a clear field in which to play his own political game. But Faruq’s machinations failed to deceive the astute Lampson, who was discomfited over Nahhas’s public embarrassment. . . . Nahhas had been both naughty and very stupid over this inexcusable outburst; he thoroughly deserved a rap over the knuckles. But I will confess, for your own pink ear, that I am not quite happy about it. You see the Wafd still control at least 60% of the country (most people say 80%), and one must keep an eye on the future. Consequently, it might have been better that you should have awaited the complete text of the Wafd letter (which was due to reach you Saturday or Sunday) before flying off the handle so quickly? . . . for the Wafd still is essentially the Egyptian people. And when eventually the lid blows off the boiler owing to increased pressure, 1 should just as well I wasn’t sitting on it in company with Ali Maher! [20] 244

YEARS OF CONFRONTATION 1937- 1945

Lampson went on to wonder if the extremely strong reaction of the Foreign Office might not have indicated “ The hand of Winston [Churchill] in foreign policy?” [21] Churchill’s strongly held im­ perialistic opinions were well known throughout the empire; Lampson, in particular, undoubtedly remembered Churchill’s support of George Lloyd, the hardline imperialist. Surprised by the strong British reaction to a ploy he had viewed as quite in keeping with the situation, Nahhas hurried to mend his fences. He issued a second more moderate and conciliatory letter which met with the satisfaction of the British who then considered the matter closed. Safia Zaghlul subsequently admitted to Lampson that the letter had been a false move which the Wafd had had cause to regret. [22] The premature demands for revisions of the 1936 Treaty had been ‘Ubayd’s idea, with which, as usual, Nahhas had concurred. Once it was clear that the Wafd would not lead an anti-British insurrection, Lampson was free to turn his attentions to Faruq who was becoming increasingly troublesome. As military move­ ments drew closer to Egyptian borders, it became more important for the British to be assured of the full cooperation and loyalty of Egypt. Since ‘Ali Mahir’s pro-German sentiments were apparent and Faruq’s reactions unpredictable at best, the British took steps to guarantee Egyptian loyalty. The Foreign Office pondered whether Egypt should declare war if Italy came into the fray. Officials knew Egyptian opinion on the issue was divided. From the Egyptian point of view, the war — like the first one — was essentially a European conflict which they hoped to avoid. Egypt had nothing to gain from the war as it was not even assured of a place in any peace settlement; their exclusion from Versailles was still keenly remembered by Egyptian politicians who were deter­ mined not to be rebuffed twice. Then, too, involvement in the War only meant that Egyptian resources and labor would be expended at the nation’s expense with little hope of any positive gains. In addition, as things were progressing in 1940, it looked to many that Britain might well lose its battle against Germany which would have left Egypt on the losing side aligned next to its old antagonist. Well aware of Egyptian attitudes, the British concluded that Egypt need not be pressed to enter the War as long as Allied military efforts were not impeded. The issue of declaring Martial 245

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Law also arose. It was decided that Martial Law would only be declared if Egypt did not fulfill all of its obligations. It is clear from these decisions that British officials, in spite of the 1936 Treaty, still considered Egypt as part and parcel of the British empire; to them it was not an independent nation, but merely an important strategic location over which Britain had the ultimate military and political control. Lampson informed both the Palace and Nahhas of the British decisions regarding the war effort. Nahhas preferred a Wafdist government which Lampson was inclined to accept. ‘Ali Mahir’s and Faruq’s reactions were much more ambivalent. When Mahir began circulating rumors that he was being unfairly treated by the British — a claim not altogether unsubstantiated — Lampson concluded that Mahir had to be removed. To Lampson it was a matter of prestige which had already been badly shaken by the personal affronts of Faruq and by the War itself. Faruq was opposed to Martial Law under which he would have had to relinquish what authority he held. In effect, it would have been a public statement that the British were reasserting their overt control over Egypt and that the King and the political parties only existed on their sufferance. While this was, in fact, true, Faruq and the Wafd understandably preferred that the fact remain informally understood rather than publicly institutionalized. In retaliation Faruq talked vaguely about abdicating rather than to have his jurisdiction so impaired. Nothing would have pleased the British more, and Lampson was directed that: should King talk of abdication you have authority to accept it. It will then be necessary to see that he does not remain at large in Egypt nor go out of British control. . . [23] Lampson feared that Faruq would attempt to escape the British circle altogether. If Faruq had publicly defected to the Axis powers, it would not only have been embarrassing for the British, but could have posed an outright danger were the King to use his reputation to foment discontent within Egypt. Determined to prevent such a possibility, the British secret service maintained constant surveillance over all the airports lest Faruq attempt to escape in any of his private planes which were piloted by Hungarians. British sources reported that the ever-present 246

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Verrucci had given Faruq a letter offering Italian asylum. Conse­ quently, when the King flew to his summer palace outside Alex­ andria, British airplanes escorted him; the pilots had instructions to force Faruq’s plane to land if it turned west. [24] After much procrastination — during which time Faruq, in council with Hasanayn, decided what course to take — the King reluctantly agreed to see Lampson. Lampson was quick to press his advantage. He forced Faruq’s secretary to leave the room so he could dress down the King in private. Lampson wasted no time in bluntly telling Faruq that the British meant to have an Egyptian government which would strongly pursue the war effort. He urged Faruq to send for Nahhas which Faruq declined to do. Lampson told the King he had until sunset of June 23 to get rid of ‘Ali Mahir and institute a neutral government. The choice was to agree or abdicate. Lampson thought Faruq might succumb to the pressure, but was not sanguine about the future. We may possibly turn the present corner without a change of Monarch here; but I gravely doubt if it will last long. We shall have to watch him all the time. [25] In the evening, Hasanayn telephoned Lampson to accede tt Mahir’s removal. He suggested the installation of a neutral government. Lampson retorted that any government had to have Nahhas’s support as the Wafd controlled the populace. Speed was also of the essence. He ruled out Sidqi as being too unpopular and suggested either4Afifi or Sabri. Thus Faruq reluctantly agreed to Mahir’s replacement by Hasan Sabri on June 24. Sabri was well known to the Residency where he had been calling for years with all of the Egyptian backroom political gossip. Originally a Wafdist, from Giza, he had supported Sidqi’s regime and had been in a number of Cabinets. His appointment was acceptable to the British officials although they bemoaned his rather difficult personality and tendency toward hairsplitting. Nahhas’s reactions to these political machinations were, of course, crucial. Because he commanded the largest Egyptian following, Nahhas could either accede to the British demands or threaten them with open rebellion fostered by the Wafd. In the midst of a life and death military struggle, the British, not un247

THE NVAI ü

naturally, wanted Egyptian peaceful acquiescence if at all possible. Recognizing that Faruq was absolutely opposed to a Wafdist government, Nahhas was willing to accept a neutral Cabinet. Preferring a less pro-British candidate than Sabri, Nahhas suggested Seif Allah Yusri who also had close contacts with the Residency. Of Albanian origin, Yusri’s extra-marital affairs with relatives of the King’s family had soured his associ­ ation with Faruq. Nahhas may well have suggested »Yusri for this very reason as he was never slow to nettle Faruq whenever possible. Bargaining, Nahhas agreed to accept Sabri if the Chamber were dissolved and new elections held. New elections would, of course, have brought in another Wafdist government. Meanwhile, Lampson pressed Faruq to meet with Nahhas; Faruq refused which necessitated using intermediaries. Finally, by June 28, both Nahhas and Faruq had agreed to Sabri. Lampson felt that although the solution was not ideal, it was a workable compromise. He was also hopeful that the confrontation might have taught Faruq a lesson. [26] Nahhas was not displeased by the turn of events which had put Faruq in a very bad light. In ‘Ali Mahir, Faruq had lost an adviser and champion; his dismissal was definitely a loss for the Mon­ archy. Nahhas, too, anticipated further confrontations between the Palace and the Residency. As long as the Wafd maintained relatively cordial relations with the British, Nahhas was encour­ aged that as a result of the decline of Faruq’s power, the Wafd (with British acquiescence!) would emerge triumphant. The summer months were filled with threatening rumors of Axis advances along the Egyptian borders; there were air raids and prices soared. British positions seemed precarious on all fronts. Then in November Sabri suffered a heart attack and died on the floor of Parliament while delivering a speech. It was a blow to British hopes for peaceful relations. Husayn Sirri, acceptable to both the British and the Palace, was selected as the replacement. Initial Palace suggestions for ‘Ali Mahir had been curtly rejected by the British. Because Sirri had cordial relations with the Palace, his appointment was something of a setback for the Wafd which had been gratified by Faruq’s declining fortunes. With the War came the anticipated shortages, higher prices, and government restrictions on cotton cultivation. In many ways it was a repetition of the years 1914 through 1918. As economic 248

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conditions worsened, public disaffection increased. Meanwhile the open antagonism between the Wafd and Faruq continued unabated. After Faruq rebuffed Nahhas at Aswan in December, the Wafd retaliated by boycotting the King’s 1941 birthday celebrations. Neither side was as much interested in Egyptian welfare as it was in emerging as the ultimate victor. The prize was, of course, control over Egypt’s political destinies. In order to win, both sides had to court, or at least heed, British desires, while appearing publicly to be against the British presence in Egypt. Taking full advantage of this split, the British nonetheless acknowledged the limitations, both in Britain and Egypt, of play­ ing both sides against the middle. As one Foreign Office official wrote: . . . the Wafd have always had the ear of the Labour Party in this country, who have, sometimes with disastrous results, listened to their tales of woe and have acted in a sense directly opposed to the advice of the High Commissioner, [sic] What­ ever else happens we must be careful not to commit that mistake again. We can only play Egyptian politics in so far as they benefit us. It would be definitely wrong to authorize any action vis-à-vis Nahhas without the full consent of the British embassy and the Military and Naval authorities in Egypt. [271 To which the conservative party man and Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, remarked, “ I agree emphatically.” [281 As domestic affairs continued to worsen during 1941, the antiBritish attitudes throughout Egypt sharpened. Just as it had in 1918 and 1919, the Wafd was quick to take full advantage of this development. Sensing that the winds of change might well bring a fall of Britain’s pre-eminence in Egypt, the Wafd and the Palace sought to mend their rift. ‘Ali Mahir was probably the direct intermediary, although Hasanayn definitely was the mainspring. As a result, Nahhas met with Faruq in August. Immediately thereafter, Nahhas attacked Great Britain in a speech at Zaghlul’s mausoleum. He followed the commemorative speech of Zaghlul’s death with an equally hostile one in Alexandria. Similar state­ ments were issued in Parliament where British censors could and 249

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did stop all Egyptian newspapers on the days these statements occurred. The Wafd circumvented the press censorship by print­ ing pamphlets giving texts of the speeches. Whenever possible these were confiscated by the police. The adverse financial situation more than Wafdist agitation led to strikes by bus and tramway workers in September. They were asking for a 40% wage increase which more closely approximated price increases than the ten percent wage hike proposed by the government. The British blamed Nahhas for the strike, or as one official wrote. Nahhas was the “ nigger in the woodpile.” [291 HI By February 1942, ‘Ubayd had formed a joint committee to study the food situation. Actually the Wafd leaders were willing to work amicably with the British so long as they were the pre-eminent Egyptian political authorities. Toward this end, Nahhas suggested a number of compromises. First, the Wafd could form a cabinet; secondly, there could be a urtited cabinet under Nahhas or there could be a United Front cabinet. From the outset, Lampson concluded that the British would probably have to bring the Wafd into power; this analysis seemed more valid as Faruq’s intransigence grew and as the domestic situation became more critical. Lampson tried to keep a tight rein on Faruq through Hasanayn with whom he was in constant contact. Still calling Faruq “ the boy,” Lampson warned Hasanayn that if the King persisted in intriguing against the British, he could expect dire consequences. Lampson was furious when Sirri, who was also close to the Embassy, reported that Faruq had not learned his lesson. Indeed, Faruq had gone so far as to tell Salib Sami that, “ Sir Miles has won the first round but I am going to down him on the second.” [30] “ What cheek!” [311 fumed Lampson. With Rommel advancing toward Egypt and crowds shouting pro-German slogans, Sirri’s position was precarious and he resigned on February 2. Sirri recommended sending for Nahhas as Barakat, Ahmad Mahir and Haykal were not viable candidates to form a stable government. Lampson was inclined to agree because he knew Nahhas would play if he backed him. [321 The showdown between Lampson and Faruq was imminent. With War Council assent, Lampson presented an ultimatum to Hasanayn on February 4 at a little after noon. Faruq was told he had until six o’clock that evening to ask Nahhas to form a govern250

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ment. If he refused he would have to suffer the consequences. Lampson impressed on Hasanayn the “ folly of the King’s holding out.’’ [33] If Lampson did not hear by six o’clock he planned, in the company of the General Officer in Command of troops in Egypt (GOC), to see Faruq; the “ necessary military dispositions would have been made meantime.’’ [34] Promptly informed of Lampson’s intentions, Faruq called Nahhas. In most of these negotiations. Amin Osman (Uthman), whom Lampson regarded as an “ unmitigated bore,” [35] acted as an intermediary with Has anayn pulling the strings from behind the scenes. Amin was in close contact with the Embassy and sought to ingratiate himself by bringing information to the British and by serving as a messenger when necessary. During the afternoon, Faruq saw a stream of visitors including: Sirri, Nahhas. Sidqi, ‘Ali Mahir, Khalil, Ahmad Mahir, Ahmad Ziwer, Yahia, Haykal, ‘Issa, ‘Afifi, Shamsi, Baha’ ad-Din Barakat, and Mahmud Hasan. From each he elicited advice about what to do; all told him the same thing, “ have Nahhas form a Cabinet.” Nahhas admitted that he knew of the British interference, but that only the King could appoint a Prime Minister — a position he was willing to accept. Faruq, however, still somehow hoped to avoid knuckling under to the British pressure. At six o’clock, Hasanayn called Lampson to report that Faruq could not accept the British demand, but that Nahhas was still at the Palace. He then asked if Nahhas would still accept being Prime Minister if Faruq abdicated. According to Amin, Nahhas was willing to take the position in either case. Lampson curtly told Hasanayn he would see the King promptly at nine o’clock. Lampson. General Stone, and “ stalwart military officers armed to the teeth” [36] saw Faruq “ in [the] most dramatic circum­ stances at nine p.m.” [37] While they were arriving, lines of military transport, including tanks, loomed up to surround the Palace. The Court Chamberlain was “ visibly startled” when he heard the “ rumble of tanks and armored cars.” [38] The presence of British tanks surrounding the Palace in the center of Cairo clearly had the desired impact. Lampson and Stone were ushered into the Palace where they waited about five minutes. As Lampson was about to object, he was told the King was ready. The Court Chamberlain tried to stop Stone, but Lampson brushed him aside and strode into Faruq’s 251

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presence. Visibly shaken, Faruq started to leave; Lampson cut him off saying that he took the answer to be no. He then handed Faruq the text of the abdication letter on heavily embossed paper. The text made it clear that Faruq was no longer fit to occupy the throne and that he renounced the throne and the right of his heirs to the Monarchy. Faruq was to sign at once. When the King, obviously intimidated by Lampson, seemed inclined to sign, Hasanayn stopped him with a few words of Arabic. Faruq sheepishly asked if he could have another chance, and he offered to send for Nahhas. To press his advantage, Lampson purposely hesitated before agreeing. After some rather desultory conversation, the victorious Lampson departed. Follow­ ing his return to the Embassy, Lampson received a call from Hasanayn asking if the British troops could be withdrawn — a request which was duly implemented. As Lampson summarized, So much for the events of the evening which I confess I could not have more enjoyed. It was surely tempting to have insisted on King Faruq’s abdication which I believe I could have extracted. But the course of wisdom seemed on balance (very reluctantly I admit) to lie in allowing him to send for Nahhas. [39] Lampson regretted that Faruq had changed his mind at the last minute (thanks in large measure to the wily Hasanayn), but there was no choice other than to keep him since he had acceded to the British demands. Eden was overjoyed that his confidence in Lampson had not been misplaced and warmly congratulated him on his “ firm­ ness” . [40] Other officials described it as a “ spirited per­ formance,” [41] but knew that troubles with the Egyptians would persist. As Eden analyzed the situation, It is a safe bet that Egyptian politics will be troublesome and Wafd particularly so. The fact that we put Wafd in will be known to all Cairo . . . Yet I remain convinced that on main lines our policy was right. [42] All of Cairo, and indeed all of Egypt, did know that the Wafd had cooperated with the British against the Palace. Nahhas, the 252

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leader of the major nationalist party, was now recognized as having made an alliance, for purely political reasons, with the imperial power. In so doing, Nahhas further eroded the genuine popular support the masses had spontaneously accorded the Wafd and its leaders since 1919. The average Egyptian, whether a tramway worker, fellah, or army private, increasingly perceived the Wafd as further removed from his own interests. By 1942 the Wafd no longer represented either the national or economic aspir­ ations of most Egyptians. Generally, the Wafd had never empha­ sized domestic programs; party leaders consistently defined the party in political terms, [43] but for over 25 years it had been seen as the most effective nationalist party. Now that raison d’être was also compromised. Within one half hour of meeting with Faruq, Nahhas was having a friendly chat with his new-found ally Lampson. He announced that, according to the prearranged plan, he would form a Wafdist Cabinet, including ‘Ubayd, Hilali, and Muharram. Under close censorship, the popular press lauded the new Nahhas government and minimized the role of the Palace. Front pages were full of pictures of Nahhas, including one depicting Zaghlul in heaven with his hand on Nahhas’ shoulder. [44] The Wafd thus sought to emphasize its historical connections with the major nationalist hero. The Foreign Office noted that it would closely watch the trouble­ some ‘Ubayd; Lampson warned Hasanayn to keep Faruq in line. But the headstrong Faruq never lost an opportunity to pour out his side of the story. He told the Turkish Ambassador that he had considered abdication but that Hasanayn had advised against it. He also tried to elicit the support of the United States Ambassador who immediately passed on Faruq’s conversations to the British. [45] As a result, Faruq was completely isolated and slumped further into moral decline. He spent more and more time gambling and womanizing. As far as the British were concerned, Nahhas initially proved an agreeable Prime Minister. He tried to keep pro-Axis represent­ atives out of Parliament, was willing to eradicate pro-Italian elements in the government, agreed to increase public security measures, and told the provincial governors to suppress any anti-British propaganda. [46] After rather protracted discussion Nahhas and the British 253

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agreed to bury the case of General ‘Aziz ‘Ali Masri, whose proAxis views had been a constant irritant to the British. After moves to exile the pro-German ‘Ali Mahir to South Africa or the Sudan failed, he was finally placed under close surveillance in his country home. When ‘Ali evaded his watch, he was arrested at the Senate building and sent to the provinces where he would be outside the center of political activity. [47] On the domestic front, ‘Ubayd worked to improve distribution of scarce food stuffs and vital commodities. Nahhas pushed for a daily five piaster wage increase for agricultural workers; recog­ nizing the problems of inflation and wanting to avoid labor diffi­ culties, the British reluctantly agreed. In the spring elections, boycotted by the Sa‘dists and Liberals, the Wafd easily won. However, domestic matters worsened as the more extreme groups continued to oppose the Wafd. Yet another split between Wafdist leaders was also brewing. Nahhas and his closest adviser, Makram ‘Ubayd, were growing disenchanted with one another. Makram had seen Lampson following the February 4 confrontation to obtain guarantees that such open British intervention would not recur. Lampson was not about to give any assurance on this point, and the visit only increased the mistrust of the British officials for the widely respected but somewhat acerbic ‘Ubayd. ‘Ubayd, who was Nahhas’s intellectual superior, and who was of a more populist bent ideologically, was also becoming distressed over the growing despotic tendencies of Nahhas, who was increasingly giving favors and positions to relatives and personal friends. Nepotism had been a constant problem within the Wafd from the days of Zaghlul, but Nahhas, according to ‘Ubayd, began abusing the privilege by granting unseemly favors to his young wife’s family — the Wakils. Under Nahhas’s direction, the Wakils were appointed to numerous positions regardless of ability; in addition, it appeared many were lining their own pockets with ill-gotten gains. By May, Madame Nahhas, who personally disliked ‘Ubayd and perhaps feared his personal zeal, was telling Jacqueline Lampson that Makram was playing the Palace against Nahhas, and that the former friendship had gone cold. As the man who heard and told all, Amin reported that Faruq had wanted to reconcile Nahhas and ‘Ubayd, who was, in fact, negotiating with the Palace. ‘Ubayd was certainly never a monarchist, but he was willing to conspire with 254

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the Palace against Nahhas. [48] Faruq was a willing partner in this intrigue because he hoped — correctly so — that his inter­ ference would precipitate the final split. To oust Makram, Nahhas tendered his resignation which he knew the King could not accept; he then reformed his Cabinet, leaving Makram out of the Ministry. By July, with his patience “ wearing thin” , Nahhas read Makram out of the party — the very party Makram had helped to found. In a startling tergiversation, Makram retaliated by forming a new party. The Independent Wafd Bloc (al-Kutla al-Wafdiyya ab Mustaqilla) included many of his own supporters. The ambitious Sirag ad-Din eventually replaced Makram as Secretary-General of the Wafd. The split between Nahhas and ‘Ubayd is indicative of the lack of direction and inner force among the key Wafd leaders. There was a marked lack of ideological commitment, and the party rested more and more on political intrigues and personal vested interests than on any higher national goals. Lampson was anxious lest the split cause a serious weakening of the Wafd’s position. For this reason, he counselled against taking action to curtail Makram. Lampson even went so far as to warn Dr. Mahfouz, Egypt’s pre-eminent gynecologist (incidentally, Jacqueline Lampson’s doctor as well), who was related to Makram by marriage, that Makram should tone down his virulent state­ ments against Nahhas. Mahfouz bewailed the entire affair as a folly which was bad for the Copts. Lampson pointed out that Makram was not essentially anti-British, but that he was “ such a violent individual that he’s very difficult to handle.” [49] In some ways the differences between Nahhas and ‘Ubayd are those of a political opportunist as compared to a true believer. ‘Ubayd often seemed violent because he had deeply held convic­ tions as to the nature of Egyptian nationalism and the social welfare of the Egyptian people. Although Nahhas was certainly a nationalist, his attitudes regarding social welfare were less well developed. In fact, as president of the Wafd he had not devised programs for domestic development; the few programs which the Wafd had championed were almost entirely the work of 'Ubayd. ‘Ubayd felt deeply about the misery of the fellahin and wanted the wealth of the nation to be more equally distributed to the benefit of all of its citizens. Having no such convictions, and, in fairness, not having had the good fortune to be bom into wealth, Nahhas 255

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became an easy prey for avaricious and ambitious politicians; he often was to be the dupe in the hands of those who had no compunction about illicit gains. From a wealthy family, Makram was accustomed to the luxuries money could buy and had no fears for the financial well-being of his family. For Nahhas, luxury was a new and not unpleasant result of his political career. He was seduced not only by the charms of his pretty young wife, but by the delights of financial security. The split between Nahhas and ‘Ubayd proved impossible to heal; although Lampson warned Nahhas to put a stop to the corruptions of the Wafd, he did not take action against the leader, in large measure because the Wafdist transgressions appeared minor in comparison to those of the Palace. The summer drifted by to be highlighted by the visit of Winston Churchill. The visit was a success and even Faruq was on his best behavior when talking with the British Prime Minister. In spite of the War, Lampson and his gracious wife held a series of fairly lively social gatherings. Soon thereafter, there was talk that Lampson was being considered for the Vice-Royalty of India, a position which Lampson would have accepted with alacrity. Eden had been offered the position by his mentor, Churchill, but had rejected it. As Lampson anticipated, Linlithgow was awarded the prized position. As a reward for services rendered (the February 4 confrontation) and perhaps as an amend for not getting the ViceRoyalty, Lampson received a peerage in January 1943; he was henceforth known as Lord Killeam. Soon thereafter the quarrel between Nahhas and ‘Ubayd came to a ferocious climax. In February 1943, ‘Ubayd published his Black Book which closely detailed all of Nahhas’s corrupt dealings. The book was highly damaging to Nahhas’s reputation and soon became the rallying point for all Wafdist opponents. King Faruq immediately attempted to use the allegations to force Nahhas’s resignation. Although the British never had considered Nahhas a “ plaster saint’’ [50] they saw no alternative to his regime. As Eden put it, “ surely Nahhas is our friend and the King is not. Let us stand by our friends.’’ [51] While it was well known that the British would only bolster their friends insofar as it suited their best interests, at this juncture, Nahhas was the best guarantee of keeping firm control over Egypt. Consequently, Lampson forcefully told 256

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Hasanayn, who had threatened to resign over the issue, that the British would stand by Nahhas. In a huff Hasanayn did temporarily resign. Nahhas retaliated by renewing his pressure against his political enemies — particularly ‘Ubayd and the al-Azhar leaders — and by reshuffling his Cabinet. Unfortunately, as even the British had to admit, he did nothing to correct the behavior which had led to ‘Ubayd’s charges. Nahhas had surprised the British “ by his reasonableness and staunchness as an ally,” [52] but the internal problems of the Wafd were not resolved. Again, the Wafd proceeded to carry on the old, bad policy of favouritism and nepotism by the government in power, and of making hay, financially, while the sun shone; a policy which was encouraged shamelessly by Nahhas Pasha’s wife and her family. His Majesty’s Government were, however, more concerned with retaining what was in their view, the administration most likely to further the . . . war effort, and also sustaining a proved friend, [the latter appears to have been inserted as an after thought] than with such purely ethical (though maybe awkward) considerations . . . [53] This forthright analysis of British policy emphasizes the fact that the British were playing a purely political game. Lampson might urge Nahhas to curb his excesses, but would not do anything to stop the behavior. Seeing that a good deal of Nahhas’s power had been eroded, the British still estimated that the Wafd would probably command at least 60 percent of the votes in a popular election. Concerning this estimation, the incisive Scrivener (Foreign Office official) wrote, the “ brains’’ are anti-Wafd and the “ brawn pro-Wafd.’’ [54] Using the charges in ‘Ubayd’s Black Book as a basis for agree­ ment, the Wafdist opposition formed a United Front. In November it presented a note to the Allied Power meeting in Cairo that the Suez Canal should be entirely Egyptian after the War. The Front followed in December with a letter signed by Liberal Consti­ tutionalists, Sa’dists, Watanists, and Independent Wafdists to the effect that Egypt should be represented in any Peace Con­ ference and that the Sudan was an integral part of the nation. The 257

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1944 sequel to the Black Book contained even more damaging charges against Nahhas and reinforced the United Front. The Wafd countered by staging a huge silver jubilee to com­ memorate the founding of the party. With all participants receiv­ ing a 50 percent discount on their rail fares (a favorite party inducement) 60,000 delegates attended. The Congress also attracted a number of journalists from Arab nations. Seeking to reinforce Arab support of the Wafd, Nahhas emphasized Egypt’s pan-Arab and pro-Palestinian stand. He also noted that Egypt was doing all in its power to assist the war effort. Egypt had announced its support for the Atlantic Charter and anticipated that after the War, Egypt and the Sudan would be one nation. Nahhas stressed that the Wafd represented the way of democracy in contrast to the opposition which had chosen other roads. Minister of Interior and Secretary-General of the party, Fu’ad Sirag ad-Din, talked on increasing public security and social re­ forms. The Congress focused on reconstruction and domestic reforms which were sorely needed. The party also planned to create a five year plan to utilize the hydro-electric power of the Aswan dam and to increase the acreage under irrigation. Unexpectedly, an accidental collision between Faruq’s speeding limousine and a British army truck robbed the Congress of much public attention which was momentarily deflected. Faruq used his minimal injuries as an excuse to avoid meeting with Nahhas and the other Ministers. [55] Using the accident to personal advantage, Faruq had his good fortune played up in the press, which resulted in a temporary increase in his prestige. Large crowds gathered outside the hospital to await further reports on the King’s health. Faruq’s reputation had sunk to such a low point, he would do practically anything to regain some of his former popularity. Not incidentally, the ploy deflected some of the limelight away from Nahhas. The fact is that as soon as the King thinks he can dismiss Nahhas without risking a show-down (and maybe his own dis­ missal) with us, he will do so; and that as soon as Nahhas thinks he can raise the constitutional issue in Egypt, he will do so. [56] Nahhas may not have been the most loyal ally, but he certainly 258

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appeared, in British eyes at any rate, the lesser of two evils. Once again Faruq was forced to bide his time. As tensions between the Palace and the Wafd grew, the oppo­ sition intensified its anti-Wafd campaign. In January, speaking from his office, ‘Ubayd charged Nahhas with complete subser­ vience to the British; he also railed against the open British intervention in Egyptian politics. In the spring of 1944, Nahhas launched a tour of the provinces to regain some of the support he had lost through the months of political wrangling. Faruq resented the tour which he characterized as semi-royal. The King then initiated his own series of royal tours. While the Wafd managed to win a Parliamentary vote of confi­ dence in March, its position had clearly been adversely affected by both the Palace and United Front campaigns. Charges that the government had been negligent in halting a malaria epidemic in the Delta further undermined Nahhas’s prestige. Quick to move against Nahhas’s vulnerability, Faruq on April 12 presented Lord Killeam with a note to the effect that Hasanayn would be a better Prime Minister than Nahhas. Not opposed to free elections, Lampson realized that Hasanayn was “ well known as out and out henchman of the Palace.” [57] With Hasanayn in power, the elections would not be free and Nahhas could not hope to win. Although the British had been expecting a move by Faruq in this direction, they had not quite decided what their course of action would be. Killearn thought he had persuaded the King to delay further action until he received instructions from London; however, Faruq ignored Killearn by signing a rescript revoking the Ministry. This open affront infuriated Killeam who held that this was “ a clear breach of the Palace pledge to take no action pending seeing me again.” [58] Churchill had already cabled Killeam that he had to confer with the Cabinet before authorizing Faruq’s abdication, but that the government would certainly align itself against whomever moved to alter the status quo. Churchill placed full confidence in Killeam whose judgement he held in high regard. [59] When the Cabinet met on April 17, it agreed with Churchill’s decision to support Nahhas against the King. When Killeam saw Faruq on the afternoon of April 18, he had full authority to tell him that if he took “ precipitate action” [60] with regard to changing the Ministry, he should be prepared to 259

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accept the consequences. In what amounted to a bewildering replay of the 1942 confrontation, Faruq was again forced to submit. Through Amin, both the King and Hasanayn were warned to desist from their anti-Nahhas campaign. Typically, Churchill was completely willing to use force if the need arose. We must not be frightened about using tanks, and military should begin gathering 40 or 50 of them within easy reach of Cairo. [61] After Faruq’s capitulation, the British heaved a sigh of relief for “ another period of tranquillity” [62] had been insured. Amin also called on Nahhas to interrupt his provincial tour to return to Cairo. Nahhas rushed back to the capital to find that although he was still Prime Minister, his hold on the office was tenuous at best. [63] The opposition had clearly hoped that Faruq’s gambit would bring down Nahhas. However, they were not deterred and resumed their campaign with renewed vigor. To mark the occasion of Fu’ad’s death (May 6), ‘Ubayd delivered a passionate address directed against the government. A pamphlet with the text of the talk was distributed throughout the countryside. The police seized over 4,000 of the booklets and arrested its printer, a pro-‘Ubayd deputy. Without British assent, Nahhas had ‘Ubayd arrested on May 9. (Makram’s family contend that the British were aware of the impending arrest.) As might have been expected, ‘Ubayd’s arrest provoked huge demonstrations. In the excitement, over a thousand gathered at Makram’s home to protest his detention. Ahmad Mahir, Ramadan, and Haykal wrote to Killeam to protest ‘Ubayd’s treatment. Subsequently, he was transferred from the European lock-up to an Egyptian prison. There was also an unsubstantiated rumor of a plot against Nahhas. by young army soldiers. Finally, ‘Ubayd was moved to the Delta where the humid climate and mosquitoes soon impaired his health which had been somewhat frail since he had contracted malaria when exiled with Zaghlul and ironically! — Nahhas. The ‘Ubayd family petitions to Killeam eventually obtained Makram’s release to a Cairo hospital. [64] ‘Ubayd’s detention precipitated a number of opposition mani­ festos against Nahhas. One plea directed to the Egyptian people asserted that “ Imperialism refused to listen to your cries and shut 260

YEARS OF CONFRONTATION 1937- 1945

its eyes to the glory of your awakening.” [65] It went on to advocate the evacuation of all foreign soldiers after the war, the return of the Suez Canal, and the union of Egypt and the Sudan. Authorship of the Manifesto was attributed to ‘Ubayd whose skill in framing impassioned oratorical and prose statements was widely touted.- Amin was told by the British to watch ‘Ubayd closely because he might have been smuggling out political statements through one of his visitors. [66] Politically, things were relatively quiet during the summer months. By the time autumn arrived, the military situation had swung in favor of the Allies. Once they were assured of a military victory, the British no longer needed Nahhas. They could now afford to resume their position behind the Embassy screen as the so-called “ imperial observers” and to let matters among the contestants for the Egyptian government take their own course. British authorities had always planned to step back once the military crisis ended; even during the 1944 spring confrontation between Faruq and Nahhas, the Foreign Office had noted that it hoped to “ stand aside and leave matters to Faruq” [67] when the next crisis occurred. By September, the British had decided the relations between Nahhas and Faruq had “ deteriorated beyond repair.” [68] With the military situation firmly in hand, the British were now content to stand aside and let Nahhas fall. Ahmad Mahir was suggested as his replacement. The Wafd attempted a reconciliation; when that failed, Nahhas offered to resign over the Sudan, the exclusion of Egypt at the peace conference, and the British demands that Egypt pay the pensions of British soldiers killed at al-Alamain. In no mood to let Nahhas (who had been at least partially responsible for his many humiliations at the hands of the British) off so easily, Faruq refused Nahhas’s resignation. Hasanayn delivered Nahhas’s dismissal on October 8, 1944. Ahmad Mahir was directed to construct a new Cabinet. Acting in Killearn’s fortuitous absence. Secretary Shone, crying crocodile tears, expressed British regrets, but noted they had done all that could be expected for Nahhas. Foreign Office officials also noted that: the prospects for Nahhas are not bright and we can only hope that we should not be involved in trying to defend him from 261

THE WAFT)

too-vicious onslaughts. [69] The Wafdist collaboration with the British thereby ended on a sorry note. Nahhas was ignominiously pushed into the political wilderness where he had exiled so many of his former compatriots. As World War II ended, the Wafd was splintered into several competing camps — there would be no concerted national uprising against the imperial power, led by the once all powerful United Front. The divisions benefited only Britain which continued to maintain its presence and controls. In the wake of the Wafdist fall, political power and popular support would fall to the numer­ ous movements on the right and the left which, in the absence of effective Wafdist programs, had harnessed religious figures, youth, workers and peasants. From now on, command rested in the hands of extremists who threatened the very existence of all institutionalized authorities including the Wafd, the Palace, and even the British.

Notes 1. al-Musawer, June 11,1937. 2. Foreign Office reports, FO371/20886. 3. Ibid. 4. See al-Musawer which featured the King and family in practically every issue, 1937 and 1938. 5. Foreign Office files on Faruq, F0371/20107; 21946; 23304. 6. Foreign Office files on Faruq, FO371/20882. 7. Miles Lampson to Lancelot Oliphant, February 26,1939, F0371/2336S. 8. Miles Lampson to Lancelot Oliphant, November 30,1937, FO371/20888. 9. Ibid. 10. Anthony Eden Memorandum, October 1,1941, F0371/27433. 11. Foreign Office officials’ comments on Faruq, March 2,1939, FO371/23304. 12. Thompson Memorandum, January 1941, marked in red by Anthony Eden, F0371/27428. 13. Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, March 17,1938, F0371/21946. 14. Foreign Office reports, 1938, F0371/21946; 23304. 15. Miles Lampson to Lancelot Oliphant, January 6,1939, FO371/23304; For more on Queen Nazli and her relationship with Faruq and others see: Miles Lampson to Lancelot Oliphant, February 15, 1939, F0371/23304; Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, January 16,1941, F0371/27428. The latter relates a telephone conversation in which Queen Nazli was depicted as being pro-British, but as having little influence over her son. Anthony Eden was amused by the report and thanked Lampson for sending it. 16. Gerald Delany to Keren Wavell, July 27,1953, St. Antony’s College, Oxford. 17. Foreign Office reports, 1944, F0371/41436, marked Secret Green; also: FO

262

YEARS OF CONFRONTATION 1937- 1945 371/24624; 27428. 18. Miles Lampson to Horace Seymour. April 2,1940, F0371/24624. 19. Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, April 3,1940, F0371/24624. 20. Miles Lampson to Horace Seymour, April 8,1940, F0371/24624. 21 .Ibid. 22. Miles Lampson to Anthony Eden, January 28,1941, F0371/27428. 23. Foreign Office to Miles Lampson, June 22, 1940, F0371/24625. 24. Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, July 5.1940, F0371/24625. 25. Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, June 23,1940, F0371/24625. 26. Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, June 29,1940, F0371/24625. 27. Charles Harold Bateman Memorandum, April 28,1941, F0371/27431. 28 .Ibid. 29. C.H. Balein Minute, September 18, 1941 on Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, September 16. 1941, F0371/27432. 30. Lampson Diaries, February 1,1942, St. Antony’s College, Oxford. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid., February 3,1942. 33. Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, February 4, 1942, F0371/31567, marked as “of particular secrecy.” 34. Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, February 4,1942, No. 486, F0371/31567. 35. Lampson Diaries, February 19,1942. 36. Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, February 5,1942, No. 491, F0371/31567. 37. Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, February 4,1942, No. 489, F0371/31567. 38. Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, February 5,1942, No. 491, F0371/31567. 39. The Killeam Diaries, 1934-1946, ed. Trefor E. Evans (secretary to Lampson) (London, 1972), p.215. Much of the account is also given in the published portion of the diaries. 40. Anthony Eden to Miles Lampson, February 5,1942, F0371/31567. 41. Patrick Scrivener, February 6,1942, F0371/31567. 42. Anthony Eden Memorandum, February 6,1942, F0371/31567. 43. Interview with Sa‘d ‘Abd al-Nur, March 9,1978. 44 . al-Musawer, February 13,1942. 45. Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, February 19; March 1,1942, F0371/31568. 46. Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, March 5,1942, F0371/31569. 47. See Foreign Office files on ‘Ali Mahir, FO371/31570. 48. Interview with Ustaz Hilmi Makram ‘Ubayd, March 4, 1978; also see Lampson diaries. May 23,*1942. 49. Lampson diaries. August 20.1942. 50. Anthony Eden to Lord Killearn, April 15,1943, F0371/35531. 51. Ibid. 52. P. Scrivener Memorandum on Political Situation, October 25, 1943, F0371/ 35539. S3.Ibid. 54. P. Scrivener. October 1943, F0371/35533. 55. Foreign Office files, FO371/35540. 56. P. Scrivener Memorandum, December 3,1943, FO371/35540. 57. Lord Killearn to Foreign Office, April 18,1944, F0371/41327. 58. Lord Killeam to Foreign Office. April 18,1944, No. 759, F0371/41327. 59. Winston Churchill minute on Killeam to Foreign Office, April 18, 1944. F0371/ 41327. Also see Winston Churchill to Lord Killeam, April 16, 1944, F0371/ 41327. 60. Lord Killeam to Foreign Office. April 18,1944, No. 759, F0371/41327. 61. Winston Churchill Memorandum, April 23,1944, F0371/41328. 62. P. Scrivener Minute, April 25. 1944, on Lord Killeam to Foreign Office, April

263

THEWAFD 24.1944, F0371/41328. 63. Foreign Office file. May 1,1944, F0371/41328. 64. Interview with Ustaz Hilmi Makram ‘Ubayd, May 6, 1978; according to Hilmi, Killeara himself gave the orders for Makram’s transfer. 65. “ Fifth Opposition Manifesto,” June 1944, F0371/41329. 66. Ibid ., Foreign Office minutes on above. 67. P. Scrivener Minute, April 25, 1944, on Lord Killeam to Foreign Office, April 24.1944, F0371/41328. 68. P. Scrivener Memorandum, September 30,1944, F0371/41333. 69. A.V. Coverly-Price Memorandum, October 10,1944, F0371/41333.

12 A SOCIETY IN CONFLICT WITH ITSELF During the years of Nahhas’s presidency of the Wafd until the 1952 Revolution, the fabric of Egyptian society was rent by internal contradictions which elude precise descriptions or interpretations. For every generalization about the society there is a contradictory one which was certainly equally valid. Essentially an agricultural nation, Egypt boasted two of the Mediterranean’s most sophisti­ cated and sumptuous cities. Most Egyptians were rural, traditional, and highly religious. The elite which made up most of the political leadership was urban, modem, and secular. A caveat to their secularization was the fact that all Egyptian leaders — even so-called revolutionary ones — paid at least lip-service to Islam; they thereby paid tribute, not so much to Allah, as to the religiosity of the masses. The fellahin had age-old ties to the land and remained firmly rooted in thousands of villages hugging the banks of the Nile. The elite travelled throughout European capitals where they imbibed deeply of Continental manners, fashions, and attitudes. Egyptian politicians championed the ideal of western parliamentary democracy — a chimera — in a system which remained basically authoritarian. In a nation where almost 90 percent of the population was illiterate, there flourished a highly educated, literate elite. The creative results, novels, essays, short stories, plays, sculpture, of the lively intellectual life mirrored the contradictions of society in general. Writers like Taha Husayn, Tawfik al-Hakim and Mustafa ‘Abd al-Raziq, to name a few of the literary lumin­ aries, filled their works with descriptions and discussions of Egyptian society and its problems. The Union of Arab Writers and New Writers’ Gub were favorite gathering places for young literati whose works received enthusiastic reception from avid 265

THE WAFD

readers. Over one hundred journals covered daily political and cultural events. In the musical sphere, Umm Kalthum had begun her long and glorious career surrounded by dozens of other classical and popular musicians whose work soon made Cairo the entertainment capital of the entire Arab world. The plastic arts were perhaps best represented by the works of Mahmud Mukhtar, whose sculptures of “ The Awakening of Egypt“ and Zaghlul graced central midans in Cairo. All of these artists were faced with the basic conflict of how to integrate western ideas and modes with traditional Islamic/Arab civilization upon which the Egyptian experience had impressed its unique hallmark. In the field of economics, the problems and impacts were even more enormous. Egypt was — and still is — a poor agricultural nation. Owing to unfavorable trade balances, a growing popu­ lation, and a paucity of basic raw materials needed for industrial­ ization, the economy of twentieth-century Egypt had been relatively stagnant. The glitter of Cairo and Alexandria with their plethora of luxury goods and impressive villas peopled with urbane sophisticates (so well dissected and glorified by Lawrence Durrell in The Alexandria Quartet) often blinded the outsider to the grinding poverty and day-to-day struggle for existence among the poor workers and fellahin (peasantry) who formed eighty to ninety percent of the Egyptian population. The distribution of wealth was incredibly unequal; a few (perhaps as much as ten percent of the population) lived, ate, dressed, and played in the styles popularized by the European aristocracy, but the majority spent their waking hours scratching out a subsistence livelihood for themselves and their families. While King Faruq cavorted around Europe lavishing outrageous gifts and favors among his courtiers, peasants on the royal estates were rumored to be working for one piaster a day. There was some notable industrial development, based pri­ marily on import substitution, from the nineteen-twenties until the 1952 Revolution. Representing about 15 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP), the industrial sector continued to make up only a small percentage of the total labor force. In addition, the industrial base was dominated by a few large incorporated firms; the bulk employed fewer than 10-15 people and, in this regard, could still be characterized as cottage industries. Wages continued to be low and never kept pace with steadily rising prices. 266

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Growth of labor unions (syndicates) was sporadic and, as demonstrated, was not encouraged by the political parties, particularly the Wafd which had had frequent altercation with the unions. Union leaders were particularly interested in improving wages and working conditions which often fell far below European standards. Given the high illiteracy rate (estimated at 89.2%) in 1927), the relative standard of labor was low, but hours were long, safety controls were, deficient, and there were few workmen compensations. The employment of very young children who worked long hours with low pay was another serious abuse. Collective bargaining to alleviate these grievances generally existed only between a few employers and their workers. [1] Occasionally, the Wafdist lawyers had exploited labor cases for individual or political reasons, but generally speaking, political parties refrained from cooperating with the unions. When unions did forge lasting political affiliations, they were generally to be with more extreme movements which will be discussed presently. Most of the indigenous industrial growth was financed by the popular Bank Misr group which under Tal‘at Harb’s dynamic leadership was respected for nationalist as well as sound financial reasons. [2] With high profits to be gained in manufacturing, landowners, many of whom were Wafdists, soon began to plow their capital into industrial ventures; this trend forged an inseparable linkage between Egyptian landowners and new industrialists who had identical economic interests. With many Wafdists holding extensive land and industrial investments, the leadership of the party generally tended to support private enterprise and those plans which would protect their own interests. ‘Ubayd, probably best described as a democratic socialist, and Ramadan, were two notable exceptions to this trend. Not surprisingly, the common Egyptian soon began to regard the Wafdist leaders as identical to the older ancien régime and to view both as contrary to his own interest. As previously noted, from the first day of the 1919 Revolution, the bourgeois interests of the Wafd leaders had caused conflict with the workers who supported the nationalist aims of the party. Whenever confrontations between the rank and file and the leadership occurred, the latter almost invariably remained true to the principles of ownership and management. Both of the world wars provided tremendous incentives to local 267

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Egyptian manufacturers who benefited from the interference in old trade patterns with Europe. However, after both wars ended, the Egyptians again found themselves in keen competition with European businesses; whenever this occurred the Egyptians, not unnaturally, demanded more governmental protection. Egyptian industrialists had also to contend with locally produced goods from foreign held companies; this was one of the major reasons for the Egyptian dislike of the Capitulations, which gave foreign businessmen operating in Egypt certain advantages. In 1930, for the first time in the century, Egypt passed a tariff protection law of about 15-20 percent; the plan had been developed under Mahmud’s regime, but was implemented under a Wafdist administration. Egyptian industrialists were particularly active in the field of food processing, textile manufacturing and some consumer goods. The Tobacco and Cigarette Company, financed by Bank Misr, was a fairly typical rising concern during the nineteen-forties. It was formed with Egyptian capital and employed Egyptian workers. Whereas previously, cigarettes had been solely imported, Egyptian industrialists now sought to create a market for locally produced goods. Not only did government tariffs help in this regard, but company officials sought to change consumer habits by encouraging Egyptians to buy goods of local manufacture as a demonstration of their nationalist commitments. They touted the quality of their product and urged the use of Egyptian cigarettes at all diplomatic missions. [3] Well known political and social figures, including women (who generally were the wives or daughters of landowners and/or industrialists who stood to make substantial profits with the success of local firms) publicly encouraged the purchase of locally made goods. While some undoubtedly had monetary gains in mind, there is also no doubt that the desire to foster national industries was a sincere one. Wafdist leaders were in the forefront of the movement to encourage local industry. As ‘Ubayd re­ marked, all Egyptians should seek to assist the development of a modem society which would produce all the goods it needed. He often wore Egyptian-made goods and on one public occasion pointed to his Egyptian-made tie, remarking that it had cost only ten piasters when any foreign-made necktie would have cost at least twenty-five piasters. On the same occasion, Nahhas reported that his shirt, tie, and handkerchief had all been locally made, and 268

A SOCIETY IN CONFLICT WITH ITSELF

that he hoped soon to be able to wear Egyptian-made shoes as well. [4] Nahhas also wore a medal of the national weaving group which he had promoted. Al-Basil spoke publicly in favor of national industries, stressing the competition they would give to foreign firms; he advocated the development of better means of communi­ cation and forging links of producers and consumers. As a party the Wafd identified itself with local production and sought to encourage private enterprise. [5] As a political tactic, the Wafd often tried to encourage and organize boycotts of all European goods, particularly those of British manufacture. Wafdists organized local committees, frequently led by Wafdist women’s committees, to spread the word of these boycotts, and at least once urged Egyptians to burn their British clothes. The boycotts met with minimal success; their failure was in part owing to British interference, but in large measure was owing to patterns of consumption among the Egyp­ tian bourgeoisie who tended to believe European goods were superior. The status value of European products was not to be underestimated. Manufacturers reaped considerable financial gains from increased local demand for their products which were in even shorter supply during the war and post-war years. Although the industrial growth record for the decade prior to the 1952 Revo­ lution is an impressive one, it was still only a small overall per­ centage of the Egyptian national output or employment. Unemployment or disguised unemployment continued to be high even during wartime when even the British encouraged the production of local goods. With the increased demand and supply shortages, there was also the expected spiral of price increases. This inflationary spiral was, of course, more adversely felt by the poor who were already operating within much narrower economic confines. When the urban worker’s belt was already fastened at the third notch, there was little more for him to save by econo­ mizing. In contrast the fat pashas (or fat cats as the Egyptian currently calls them) had ample girth upon which to rely. The Wafdist government of the nineteen-forties was unable to curb the continued price increases so that the cost of living went from 125 in 1926 to 208 by October 1942. In 1942 the cost of food alone went up to 209. [6] There was also the perennial problem of distribution of goods. Whenever shortages occurred in rural 269

THE WAFD

areas there was always the possibility of public demonstrations which all the various Egyptian ministries and, of course, the British tried to prevent. During the war years, when there were heavy concentrations of British troops in evidence, most of the discontent of the populace was focused against the British, but once the war ended and the British troops disappeared or were confined to bases along the Suez, worker and peasant anger over high prices and shortages was directed at the party in power. Encapsulating the problem, one cartoonist depicted Egypt ill in bed. Nahhas asked the doctor how she was and the doctor answered, “ She is much better, but the high prices still threaten her life.” [7] Similar inequities and inflationary difficulties affected the agricultural sector as well. Yields per hectare were among the highest in the world, but the fellah continued to live at a subsis­ tence level. He generally was a tenant farmer who rented land on an annual basis from large (usually absentee) landowners. By the First World War, the British had initiated a number of large irri­ gation projects, but the increase in acreage available for culti­ vation from 1914 to 1952 never kept pace with the population growth. In simple terms this meant that more people had to eke out livings on less acreage per person. Technical advances, higher yield seeds, fertilizers, while helpful, did not compensate. Cotton — ever King — and cereals were the major products. Cotton made up about 80 percent of the foreign capital, but its prices and demand were essentially controlled by the foreign market which left the individual Egyptian peasant at the mercy of the landowners, speculators, and European buyers. With growing demands for cotton and cereals and less land available, owners were able to charge practically whatever they wanted for their acreage; consequently rents for the peasantry rose over 500 percent from 1940 to 1950. In the self-deprecating humor for which the long suffering Egyptian peasant is famous, farmers joked that as long as the feddan was rented for 20 or 30 pounds the poor would die, and that Nahhas should tell the pashas to be good men. [8] Although Egypt emerged from the war as a creditor to its old enemy and banker — Great Britain — the Wafd squandered away its opportunity to gain either substantial concessions from Britain or capital resources, which before devaluation and the removal of 270

A SOCIETY IN CONFLICT WITH ITSELF

Egypt from the sterling zone amounted to some 450 to 500 million pounds. Britain was scarcely in a position to repay the debt and pleaded the glories of bankruptcy brought about in the cause of fighting for a higher good. But more forceful negotiators than the Wafd should have been able to extract more meaningful conces­ sions in the post-war period. In the post-war years, the Egyptian government passed a fiveyear program, a repetition of the 1935 plan which had been still­ born owing to the war. The plan earmarked huge expenditures for agricultural and capital development, but the promises remained paper ones. In reality the government spent less than half of the proposed amounts, while the industrialists argued that they were already overtaxed and burdened by governmental controls. The Wafd was inclined to agree and attempted to balance the budget by limiting public expenditures, governmental employment, and by raising import tariffs. [9] Government attempts at increasing public participation in the economy were too little, too late. The royal family had long sought to encourage agriculture, had founded an agricultural society, and sponsored agricultural exhibitions (the first in 1926), but since the family was also the largest single landowner, these efforts were not without personal motivations. A cooperative movement began as early as 1906/7 with laws governing it being passed by 1923. [10] Government guarantees to projects which met approval were granted, and the number of cooperative societies increased from four in 1924 to 1636 in 1946 with over 500,000 members. These societies were both urban and rural, but given the total population the cooperative movement remained extremely small. The government under Wafdist Fu’ad Sirag ad-Din also sponsored rural welfare centers. [11] The plan was essentially a good one, but, aiming for only 25 villages with six centers, it was too small to make much impact. The government looked to develop rural reconstruction societies, local bodies of villages with depart­ mental supervisors to help distribute supplies, encourage edu­ cation, improve health standards, and to assist small landowners. Under the plan, a study of the constantly rising rents was begun; the report advocated using radio to popularize new techniques (a fairly novel approach at the time), urged the increase of handi­ crafts, and the decreased usage of “ black tea“ as opium was 271

THE WAFD

popularly known. Six centers with a social worker, doctor and periodic health care workers were actually established. By 1950 that number had risen to 126 centers. However, given the thousands of Egyptian villages in need, the government effort, while laudable, no more than scratched the surface. In the field of human rights, particularly women’s rights, the picture was somewhat brighter. As previously noted, the develop­ ment of an effective women’s movement had been an integral part of the 1919 Revolution, but, in marked contrast to other social and political groups which had espoused the Revolution, the women’s movement continued to provide vigorous and dynamic leadership, making an impact not only in the area of equal rights, but in the fields of health, public welfare, politics, and education as well. Most wives of Wafdist leaders were active in women’s commit­ tees which generally followed the lead of the party Executive which was exclusively a male domain. Although the popular press tended to report on the lighter interests of the distaff side, running countless features about their hobbies (music and gardening seemed to predominate), many of the Wafd leaders were often influenced by their feminine counterparts. Zaynab Nahhas’s sway over her husband was both infamous and unfortunate, but she was the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, Safia Zaghlul, Huda Sha’rawi, Munira Thabet, Amina Sa‘id, and, to a lesser extent, Esther Wissa stand as remarkable examples of astute politicians in their own rights. Huda Sha’rawi, originally a pro-Wafdist, was the most well known feminist who pushed for women’s rights not only in Egypt but in the Arab world as well. After disagreeing with several Wafdist leaders, Sha’rawi, like her male compatriots, left the party to form a splinter women’s committee which often proved more effective than the Wafdist women’s committees. Esther Wissa, wife of Fahmi Wissa, was General Secretary of the Women’s Wafdist Committee; she traveled widely to speak for the party and was known as being more strong-willed than her husband. The rivalry of Sha'rawi’s and the Wafd’s feminist groups was every bit as intense as that between the Wafd and the splinter parties headed by former Wafdists. Perhaps the most dramatic, and potentially most damaging to the Wafd, clash followed the publication of ‘Ubayd’s Black Book. Sha'rawi, who had been on 272

A SOCIETY IN CONFLICT WITH ITSELF

bad terms with Nahhas for years, immediately rallied behind ‘Ubayd by publishing a Feminist League letter to Nahhas con­ demning British interference with regard to ‘Ubayd’s allegations. Interestingly, Sha‘rawi, unlike the other signatories, always signed her full name as opposed to her husband’s name. Nahhas was furious and ordered Huda Sha‘rawi’s home raided; the raid turned up nothing seditious, but did attract even more sympa­ thizers to Sha‘rawi’s side. Huda Sha'rawi was a constant irritation not only to Nahhas but to the British as well. The British were quick to see her influence and her nationalist stand which was directed primarily against themselves. Following the afore­ mentioned letter, which had over 200 signatures, one British official remarked: It will be observed that Madame Huda Sha'rawi, the promoter of this petition, is anti-British to a degree, she is always , seeking out some new reason for protesting against our activities, or alleged activities, or inactivities. [12] As an outstanding spokesperson for the rights of Arab women, Sha‘rawi’s anti-British opinions carried impact that far exceeded the Egyptian boundaries which was one of the major reasons that the British kept a very close eye on all of her activities. At the Arab Feminist Congress held in Cairo in 1944, Huda Sha’rawi served as President. After an opening address by the Egyptian Minister of Education, Sha'rawi spoke to the delegates from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt and Transjordan. In spite of warnings from the British, she bravely spoke out for the equal rights of all Arab women, particularly the Palestinian women. [13] Various receptions, including one by Safia Zaghlul, were held before the last emotional meeting where speakers emphasized their oppo­ sition to Zionism (while de-emphasizing their anti-British opinions), and support for equal rights. The congress passed resolutions urging Arab governments to increase women’s rights, to work towards Arab unity, and to affirm the self-determination of Palestine with an Arab majority and an end to Jewish immi­ gration. Telegrams were sent to President Roosevelt and Churchill to protest their pro-Zionist stands. The delegates also urged Arab leaders to buy land in Palestine to deter further Jewish purchases. While the resolutions of the Congress were 273

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scarcely pleasing to the British, they were delighted when the Syrian and Lebanese delegates — owing largely to their antiFrench attitudes — were markedly pro-British. The Congress demonstrated the high level of political consciousness among both Egyptian and other Arab women, and drew attention to the problems and struggles of women in the area. One of the major areas of hostility was in the labor force. The female activity rate in Egypt, and in the Arab world generally, reflected the agricultural nature of the area. The exact number of women active in agricultural work is difficult to ascertain owing to the seasonal and/or part-time work in which women engaged. Although the statistics were not, and are not, published, it was assumed that women's wages reflected the general tendency to discount or, at the very least, to minimize the contribution of women to agricultural productivity. Women’s wages were often lower than those of their male counterparts, or their contributions were viewed as integral to the extended family group. In Egypt there were also many unpaid female and child agricultural workers. Although Egyptian women were in the forefront of the feminist element, their participation in the work-force did not keep pace with early promise. Indeed, the level of female participation in the Egyptian labor force remained relatively stagnant and, in fact, dropped slightly after the 19S2 Revolution, when many minority groups which had a higher rate of female participation either left Egypt or dropped out of the work force. [14] It may well be inferred from this that the single best incentive for increasing the level of female participation was not necessarily a more liberal society — which existed in the urban areas of Egypt — but a healthier economy. Politically, Safia Zaghlul remained by far the most important woman within Wafdist circles. Although she had ostensibly “ retired” from the political arena after supporting Nahhas’s candidacy for president, she continued to offer advice and her considerable influence to party leaders and programs. Her opinions were valued and she was frequently consulted on matters of strategy. Safia Zaghlul’s public support or appearances for Wafdist candidates had considerable impact. She continued to support Nahhas, visiting him in the hospital in 1940, until the split with Nuqrashi, to whom she was related; at this point, Safia supported Nuqrashi and was never again on good terms with 274

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Nahhas. As far as the masses were concerned she was revered as the mother of Egyptian nationalism. Her home, Beit al-Umma, was a meeting place for Wafd leaders and youth who regularly gathered in the basement to discuss and formulate party tactics. Safia Zaghlul’s death in January 1946 was cause for national mourning. Her funeral was solemn and orderly in marked contrast to the disturbances which occurred at the funeral of the recently deceased Amin Osman. Lord Killearn, the Grand Chamberlain, the Prime Minister, and the Cabinet all attended; Nahhas was conspicuous by his absence which was publicly attributed to ill­ ness, but which was, in fact, based on the political split which Nahhas refused to forget. Killearn used the occasion as an oppor­ tunity to ask Nuqrashi, next to whom he walked in the funeral cortège, about a pension for the widow of Amin Osman. Even in death it was business as usual. Nonetheless, Killearn held Safia Zaghlul in high esteem and perhaps best summarized her contri­ bution when he wrote that she was a woman of principle and as the embodiment of the tradition directed by her late husband of devotion to the Egyptian national cause. [15] Finally, women’s contributions toward equalizing and improv­ ing educational opportunities should be noted. [16] From the time of the 1919 Revolution, Amina Sa‘id, a tireless campaigner for women’s rights, had led those demanding equal treatment for women in all aspects of society. Through leaflets, books and all means of propaganda she pushed for throwing off the veil, better legislation regarding women’s rights, and the improvement of education. Women attended the first Egyptian conference on primary education in 1925 and by 1929 had attained equal certi­ ficates for women in Secondary schools and the opening of the University faculties of Arts, Law and Medicine. The faculties of Agriculture and Engineering remained closed for a short time, but with constant pressure these barriers soon fell. Munira Thabet meanwhile was unceasing in her efforts to gain women the right to vote. While Egyptian feminists were able to secure a vast number of reforms and to alter the status of women in the nation, the movement — like the Wafdist leadership — remained an urban and middle class one. Thus the biggest problem remained the 275

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generally liberal attitudes and treatment of women in urban areas, and the unequal and conservative treatment of masses of women in rural areas. Indeed, the clear-cut separation of various levels of Egyptian society was one of the nation’s greatest problems. At the pinnacle of the society stood the Royal family with its reputation for intrigue and internecine rivalries. Fu’ad with his authoritarian bent and aloofness had not been popular, but he had been respected. His intelligence and regard for royal traditions were well known; throughout his regime he worked to foster a respect for the monarchy as a symbol of authority and to encourage educational and cultural institutions which would be a credit to the royal house. Upon Fu’ad’s death, his young son and sole heir, Faruq, ascended to the throne on May 6, 1936, amid genuine popular acclaim. Faruq was the pampered only son among five sisters. His mother. Queen Nazli, had been closely watched by Palace spies, including her own lady-in-waiting, Madame Cattoui; Nazli, daughter of the wealthy ‘Abd al-Rahim Sabri, had initially spurned Fu’ad’s attentions and only consented to the marriage after he had become King. [17] Nazli had precious little influence over her only son who, like his father, tended to ignore all of her advice. As a consequence, Faruq from birth had been surrounded by people who pandered to his every wish and were all too lax in instilling discipline. His lack of education and direction were not immed­ iately apparent and only became so as he aged and his complete lack of self-control, interest in the most venal subjects, and total disregard for those around him became clear to all. However, when Faruq first became King, the Egyptians greeted him with loving affection. He was perceived as a young man sincerely attached to Islam who was the first truly Egyptian King. Although the British who were close to the young King, whom they considered nothing more than an over-grown boy, worried over his lack of interests, they were hopeful he could be molded into an appropriate royal figure. The Wafd, newly returned to power, was never so sanguine over its relations-with the King. The coronation ceremony of 1937 was the first test case between Nahhas and Faruq; it set the stage for an enmity which continued throughout Faruq’s reign. The stocky, abrupt Nahhas tended to patronize Faruq who not unnaturally resented Nahhas treating him like a young boy, but also for infringing on royal prerogatives. 276

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Jealous in guarding royal authority, Faruq’s advisers pushed for the Islamic oath of allegiance (baya) at the coronation in the Citadel which was to be led by the Shaykh of al-Azhar. The Wafd, ever fearful of a recrudescence of royal authoritarianism, objected on the grounds that as a constitutional monarch Faruq owed his first allegiance to the Parliament. Both Nahhas and Faruq sought popular support for their positions, using students to demon­ strate in their respective favors. As will be shortly discussed, this tendency to manipulate the passions of the students and extremists was to have disastrous ramifications for both the Palace and the Wafd, neither of which were able to control the forces which they had unleashed. Faruq’s popularity continued unabated with his engagement and marriage to Farida who came from the renowned Dhu al-Faqar (Zulficar) family. Her father had been on the mixed courts and her grandfather had been governor of Cairo. In a marriage of convenience arranged by Queen Nazli, the new Royal couple made an attractive pair. On the surface all seemed to be the picture of idyllic royal contentment, but Faruq’s less attractive passions were already becoming a worry to both Egyptians and Britons who served as his advisers. [18] By 1943, there were rumors of a rift between the royal couple; by 1946, the break became an open one. In 1948, Faruq publicly repudiated Farida and his daughters to flaunt public convention in a series of public affairs. Finally, he married Narriman, who not only had been engaged to another, but, to Egyptian dismay, was from a lower middle class family. Six months before Faruq’s downfall, she produced an heir, Fu’ad, for a throne which was soon to be toppled. Faruq’s decline from public esteem was heightened not only by the low moral tenor of the royal entourage, but by the increasingly ludicrous insistence by the Palace that Faruq was a religious figure. The charade disintegrated into opera bouffe when he announced via a fatwa (religious legal opinion) that he was a descendant of the Prophet. Public sensibilities were outraged; in face of these degradations public support for Faruq evaporated. Faruq kept his throne only so long as the British wished to juxta­ pose the conflicting forces of the Palace and the Wafd. The Wafd, seeking to lessen its previous cooption by the imperial force, moved closer to the Palace; this coalition further tarnished the public image of Wafdist leaders whose open flirtation with the 277

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corrupt regime raised questions over their own honesty. In this regard, Nahhas himself failed to set the example which could have reinforced the credibility of the party as the only truly nationalist force within the nation. Nahhas’s succession to Zaghlul’s mantle had begun auspicious­ ly. With tears in his eyes he had accepted the presidency in hopes that Egypt would “ realize its aspirations and strengthen the roots of its constitutional regimes.” [19] Although not the Wafd’s keenest intellect» Nahhas had an earthy quality and vigor which endeared him to Egyptians. While his oratory failed to cast the spells of Makram’s, his speaking style had a hard hitting appeal which sparked genuine enthusiasm. The British were often put off by his appearance, occasionally calling him (in private, of course) the “ crossed eyed albatross,” [20] but common Egyptians sympathized with the man who seemed to personify their own aspirations and struggles. In the early years Nahhas also benefited from the sensitive political antennae of Makram ‘Ubayd. The Wafd, even under Zaghlul, had always been prone to personal favoritism (a not uncommon phenomenon in traditional societies where the extended family is highly valued); however, most observers date the onset of Wafdist abuses and corruption from the time of Nahhas’s marriage. In 1934, just before his fiftieth birthday, Nahhas married 23-year-old Zaynab al-Wakil. Nahhas’s marriage had been encouraged by other Wafdists in order to stop rumors of his involvement with a married woman and, more importantly, in order that he might secure a govern­ ment pension for his family. Under Egyptian law, a man had to marry by the time of his fiftieth birthday in order to qualify for such a pension. Consequently, there had been a flurry of activity among Wafdists to find an appropriate wife for Nahhas. When Lisa Mallak showed the leader a photograph of the pulchritudinous Zaynab, he cried, “ how beautiful she is,” but he threw the photo down when he heard she was from the Wakil family who were known Sha'bists from Behara. Ever the astute politician, Makram craftily noted that once married to Nahhas, Zaynab — and her entire family — would quickly become Wafdists. [21] Makram even offered to loan Nahhas, who did not have a family inheritance, money for the marriage. Ultimately, Nahhas borrowed from Bank Misr using Makram’s name as collateral. Because Nahhas’s relative poverty, in comparison to the generally affluent Wafdist 278

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leaders, was well known, his death as a wealthy man caused endless speculation. Initially, as with the new King, the decline of the personal reputations of many of the Wafdist leaders was kept from the public. The years 1936 and 1937 were probably the apex of Nahhas’s popularity. He had succeeded in signing a treaty with the British and, more effectively, had secured under the Montreux Convention the abrogation of the detested Capitulations. Nahhas’s reception after returning from Montreux had been a regal one. But as the years passed, there were more and more rumors of Nahhas’s submission to his wife’s wishes. Members of her family were appointed to high positions and Nahhas became extremely lax in overseeing the personal honesty of the other Wafdists who — it was whispered — were using their public offices to amass large fortunes. Charges of favoritism, bribery, and outright financial manipulations were made. Behind the scenes, Makram ‘Ubayd, whose financial integrity was impec­ cable, kept a running record. As long as he remained Nahhas’s closest confidant he kept his own counsel. ‘Ubayd had clashed with Nahhas and Lampson after the February 1942 confrontation. In addition, ‘Ubayd made no secret of his anger over the excesses of the Wakil family. As Minister of Finance he was in a position to take effective action against the corruption and political abuses. Torn between his old friend and familial attachments, Nahhas chose the latter; the close association between ‘Ubayd and Nahhas soured, but ‘Ubayd refused to resign from the party. In a pretext devised to oust 'Ubayd, Nahhas resigned in May 1942, but was immediately asked by Faruq, who had been in­ structed by the British that Nahhas was to remain in office, to form another Ministry. With alacrity, Nahhas formed a new Cabinet which excluded ‘Ubayd. In July, Makram was expelled from the Wafd. He wasted no time in forming an opposition party, the Independent Wafd Bloc which rallied no lesser notables than Ahmad Mahir and others. The rivalry between the Wafd and Makram converged over the campaign for President of the Native Bar. In campaigning for office, 'Ubayd had rallied supporters from the Coptic community, and from Alexandria and Asyut. Most believed that 'Ubayd had the majority, but Basyuni was declared the victor. [22] Privately, Makram vowed he would have revenge for the electoral manipulation, concocted by Nahhas, which had 279

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caused his defeat. The spring 1943 publication of Makram ‘Ubayd’s Black Book (ial-Kitab al-Aswad), with over 200 pages detailing Wafdist corruption, hit Cairo like a bombshell. In spite of opposition from his family, Makram had the book secretly published. In a dramatic gesture, his younger brother left copies of it on all the Government Ministers’ desks; Hasanayn was given a copy to hand personally to King Faruq who was delighted to have more ammunition to use against his old bête noire, Nahhas. Within days, thousands of copies had been distributed. As privy to all the internal Wafdist activities, Makram’s charges of cor­ ruption — at the highest levels — were serious threats to the government. In the Black Book Makram argued that he had been dismissed because he had opposed favoritism. In the vivid prose which had helped to make him one of the leading politicians, he described the venality of Nahhas and his wife. The two were accused of purchasing their lavish Garden City home with illgotten gains, of favoring the Wakil family, and of abusing ministerial power. More seriously, Nahhas was charged with fixing prices, particularly on sugar and yarn. The list of charges was long and well documented. [23] Nahhas’s public image was badly discredited. He immediately retaliated by attempting to force ‘Ubayd out of his Parliamentary seat. The Foreign Office fretted that the tempest would undermine the government; to avoid favoritism Lord Killearn refused to meet with ’Ubayd and did not reply to the letters from Ahmad Mahir and ’Ubayd protesting British inter­ ference. [24] With legal advice from the British, Nahhas attempted to refute the charges, but for many he was guilty by association. For their assistance, no mean factor given the erosion of Wafdist popularity, the British expected that Nahhas would keep some semblance of democratic government. He was warned not to rig elections which would bring charges of authoritarian government and which would “ deprive the expression of the popular will of all validity.’’ [25] Faruq responded to the Wafdist woes by muttering that the corrupt government needed to be replaced. He received petitions (no doubt devised by Makram) urging the removal of Nahhas. Naturally, Faruq emphasized the popular opposition to Nahhas and refused to meet him at the annual government tea party 280

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commemorating accession day. When questions over the allegations in the Black Book arose in Parliament, where in 15 hour sessions, ‘Ubayd argued his case, Nahhas filibustered and, on British advice, tried to turn the open debate away from the issues of corruption and toward vague discussions of democratic principles. [26] At this juncture, the British did not want to see Nahhas fall from power, but they did begin to prepare for that unpleasant possibility. The Foreign Office officials advised that if he were to fall, the British would “ bid him a fond farewell. From the point of view of the future it is most desirable not to forfeit the Wafd’s friendship.” [27] Recog­ nizing the dilemma, Churchill was willing to gamble because the British could always “ reserve . . . intervention for a later stage.” The choice was to brazen it out or let Nahhas go. The British opted to let things take their own course while giving Nahhas assistance from behind the scenes. At his best in open political frays, Nahhas, in public at least, was not the slightest daunted by his opponents; he met them head-on, using the press and all of the repressive measures the government could wield to refute the charges. 'Ubayd was finally placed under house arrest and moved first to the Delta and then to a Cairo hospital. In the absence of ‘Ubayd’s counsel, Nahhas turned to Sirag ad-Din. Nahhas always had a close confidant, but, interestingly, never picked a successor. In light of the Wafdist collusion with the British and the new charges of massive abuses of power, the old guard — Nahhas in particular — had politically outlived their usefulness. With wise leadership, the Wafd would have done well to generate new leaders in the post-war years, but such was not the case. The old guard continued to cling jealously to its favored position and refused to consider the infusion of new blood. It closed its eyes to the collapse of the Wafd’s credibility and thereby insured its final demise. Excluded from decision making positions in the major political party of the nation, Egyptian youth found other outlets for their political and nationalist fervor. Students formed the nucleus of the various extreme movements which proliferated in the interwar years. Educational institutions, both secondary and those for higher education, had grown rapidly since the 1919 Revolution. Many schools were overcrowded and short staffed; the'curriculum tended to* emphasize western tech­ nology and liberal democratic thought which conflicted with the 281

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society, monarchy, corrupt political structures, and the continued British presence. Egyptian students too often found themselves inundated with western ideas and ideals at the same time that the society around them held directly conflicting mores. The disso­ nance between wanting to adopt these western views and forward­ ing Egyptian national aspirations forced many Egyptian youths into more activist and radical political movements. [28] With their vast energies, Egyptian students were fertile potential for the national movements which were disenchanted with the old political parties. All Egyptian students, with the possible exception of those enrolled at the isolated Victoria College, were political activists to some degree. The dynamism of Egyptian youth had first been recognized and harnessed by the Hizb al-Watani. Even after the premature death of Mustafa Kamil, the National Party continued to attract those ideologically or physically committed to the politics of action. Although small numbers quietly continued their covert activities, the National Party members had become less influential with the ascent of the Wafd. During the 1920’s many assassins of Egyptian and British personages would continue to come from the ranks of the Hizb al-Watani. However, the Wafd leaders were quick to recognize the potential of Egyptian students as demonstrators. As early as 1919 the Wafd had utilized urban mobs and the youth as weapons in the struggle against the British. [29] Youthful adherents to the Wafd and the Liberal Constitutionalists were organized into Youth Committees (Rabita Lijan al-Shubban al- Wafdiyyin al-Ummah) led by Zuhayr Sabri. The paramilitary Blue Shirts (al-Qumsan al-Zarqa) evolved out of this organization. [30] Mahmud Labib, who had a German education and an authoritarian personality, led the Blue Shirts which received Nahhas’s blessing. Subsequently, Muhammad Bilal became head of the Blue Shirts. By the summer of 1936, the Blue Shirts whose motto was “ obedience and Struggle“ (al-Ta‘a wal-Jihad) numbered in the ten thousands. The organization was not a movement in the strict definition of the term as it had a hierarchical control and its members had to pledge complete allegiance to the Wafd. Nahhas originally meant to use the Blue Shirts against the rival Young Egypt (Misr Fatat), but owing to subsequent political divisions was often to unleash them against Wafdist dissidents. 282

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Other extremist groups, all influenced to varying degrees by the European dictators, particularly Mussolini and Hitler, were to be powerful rivals to the Wafd. Gashes between these groups frequently disrupted daily life in Egyptian cities as Misr Fatat’s Green Shirts fought openly with Wafdist Blue Shirts. The Young Egypt Society and the Muslim Brotherhood were the two major rivals to Wafdist dominance. Misr Fatat, led by Ahmad Husayn and Fathi Radwan, whose fathers both had been government officials from small landowning families, embodied an aggressive nationalist ideology with an activist strategy to gain members and influence. [31] During the 1930’s, Radwan, who had some fame as a journalist, and Husayn, who had been one of the founders of the Piasters Plan whereby collections were made throughout the nation to support Egyptian development schemes, formed Young Egypt to emphasize Egyptian national goals. Advocating a national renaissance, the movement stressed puritanical attitudes and a martial spirit. Amid the growing violence of the age, the military emphasis held some attraction. By 1937, some university students, with the assistance of their professors, had already begun military training. Accentuating the symbolism of the fatherhood of the Egyptian nation. Young Egypt also supported the Monarchy in its struggle against the Wafd. A similar militarism was evidenced in the Muslim Brotherhood which had been created in 1929 by Hasan al-Banna, a school teacher of lower middle class origins. [32] It was publicized that the Brotherhood sought to recreate an Islamic Y.M.C.A.-styled organization with stress on community spirit, games, and healthful pursuits. The misconception led many observers to underestimate or to discount the real strength and potential of the organization which emphasized the rejuvenation of the Egyptian nation through a return to Islamic principles. [33] The Ikhwan also embodied an aggressive policy of eradicating all foreign influences. Unlike Misr Fatat, the Brotherhood had pan-Islamic intentions and gained a wider following than a merely national one. Both Misr Fatat and the Muslim Brotherhood attracted youthful members who had become disenchanted with the Wafd. Generally eager for immediate results, the students were at first dismayed and then angry over the Wafd’s compromises and alliances with the British. The Wafd was both unable and unwilling to attract 283

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active youthful members who found outlets for their nationalist politics in other organizations. Outside governments also main­ tained contacts and gave some support to the Egyptian move­ ments; these outside influences were minimized after the British tightened security and censorship during the War. In addition, both Misr Fatat and the Brotherhood were periodically courted by the Palace which moved to discredit and undermine the Wafd. Young Egypt — as a Wafdist adversary — received money from the Palace, ‘Ali Mahir, and other Wafdist enemies. ‘Ali Mahir and Prince Muhammad ‘Ali, who was personally impressed with their goals, also gave financial assistance to the Brethren. [34] As the tactics of both movements were publicly disavowed, those who rendered financial and political backing did so covertly, but it was impossible to keep such matters secret in the maelstrom of Egyptian politics. If al-Banna or Husayn did not “ leak” the identities of their backers in order to attract new ones or to dramatize their credibility, then the numerous spy networks operating in Egypt uncovered the information. As a result, Husayn’s meetings in ‘Ali Mahir’s home were duly noted by the British intelligence which maintained close surveillance over Egyptian personalities who were openly critical of British policies, and, indeed, over friendly Egyptians as well. [35] The first round of battles between the Wafdist Blue Shirts and Misr Fatat’s Green Shirts occurred in 1936 when Nahhas publicly denounced Husayn’s organization. The fighting soon spread from Cairo into the provinces where the Blue Shirts appeared to be the victors. Nahhas’s rather ambiguous attitude to the Elue Shirts — on one hand he was content to use them to attack his opponents, but on the other he publicly eschewed violence — certainly gave informal encouragement to extremist tactics. There was even a division of opinion within the Wafdist leadership over the party’s lack of direction with regard to violence; this division later became an open one. The direct result of Nahhas’s wavering was the marked decrease in law and order. The summer of 1937 after Nahhas returned from Montreux was probably the zenith of Blue Shirt power and violence. Youth delegations were among the crowds which gathered to greet Nahhas upon his return. A huge Wafdist Youth Conference followed in Cairo. The rift between Nahhas and Nuqrashi, who had been opposing some of Nahhas’s policies, became public around 284

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the same time. Once ousted from the party, Nuqrashi then argued that the existence of the Blue Shirts was evidence of the dicta­ torial tendencies of the Wafd; he openly called for their disso­ lution. In agreement, Faruq, all the while supporting Misr Fatat, demanded the Blue Shirts disband. This resulted in open fighting and violent demonstrations. On November 28, 1937, Izz ad-Din ‘Abd al-Qadir, a former member of Misr Fatat, attempted to assassinate Nahhas outside his Heliopolis residence. Nahhas retaliated by arresting Husayn and others. The swords were clearly drawn. Strikes of students, with the injury of many, ensued. Nahhas publicized the violence by visiting the wounded in hospital. After several students died, a day of general mourning was declared. Safia Zaghlul spoke to the crowds, led by young girls, outside Beit al-Umma. Immediately following this series of clashes, Safia again spoke exhorting the demonstrators to further jihad (struggle). The political parties were clearly not trying to quell violence; they were, indeed, seeking to capitalize on it for their own ends. The violent clashes distressed the British, but benefited the Palace as the Wafd expanded its energies against rival political groups rather than against the authoritarian regime. Worse, the clashes escalated the violence which created a climate of opinion which increasingly accepted brute force as a means of gaining political goals. While few publicly advocated violence, everyone recognized its impact. Violence was, however, a double edged sword which could be equally deadly when turned against its proponents. By failing to mobilize the violent forces around the removal of the imperial power, the Wafd only weakened itself and its reputation as the pre-eminent nationalist voice. Indeed, the Blue Shirts were to become the proverbial monster which once given life turns to threaten its creator. As early as 1936, the British had counseled moderation, but Nahhas and ‘Ubayd had remained sanguine over their abilities to control the Blue Shirts. Nahhas did warn the organization to concentrate on harmless physical activities and not to carry knives or truncheons. Rather lamely, he characterized the Blue Shirts as a “ spontaneous movement of countryside boys,“ [37] a description which fooled no one. The British supported Faruq’s and Nuqrashi’s moves to dissolve the colored shirts, but they would not countenance any unconsti285

THE WAFD

tutional moves by the King to repress political discontent. They merely warned the leaders of the movements of their individual responsibility to control their adherents. Although the British were loath to risk a constitutional crisis by forcing the dissolution of the colored shirts, they did take military precautions. Secretly, they began testing the effectiveness of tear gas as a method of crowd control; Keown-Boyd, Russell Pasha (the powerful Commandant of the Cairo police) and several Egyptians were present at the test which clearly indicated the effectiveness of the new weapon. Wanting to avoid allegations of using police state tactics or chemical warfare, the British secretly decided that the use of tear gas would remain in the hands of the military. As long as the Egyptian police did not have access to tear gas, the difficulty of reaching a joint British-Egyptian agreement over its uses against Egyptian crowds could be effectively circumvented. [381 Meanwhile, even Nahhas had grown concerned over the nega­ tive impacts of the escalating violence. By the end of 1937 he ordered the Blue Shirt squads to be directly subordinated to himself. To prevent individual squad actions, which could easily occur without Executive Council knowledge, Nahhas demanded that the Supreme Executive Council of the Blue Shirts be composed of six appointed members, four party figures, and Sabri and Bilal. Bilal also issued a statement against the use of all weapons. Nahhas’s commands notwithstanding, the fighting between the colored shirts only stopped when, in March 1938, Mahmud’s government issued a law banning all para-Military organ­ izations. [39] Haykal, Minister of Education, Bayli, Wahib Doss and Iskandar all publicly reiterated the Government’s determin­ ation to halt student agitations. They noted that the students had served the nation in the past, but that the time had arrived when they should return to their studies and the pursuit of culture and maturity. [40] With the onset of World War II, the strict military censorship facilitated the control of the para-military groups which had been thoroughly disassociated from the Wafd by the time Nahhas returned to power in 1942. During the War, Britain was then free to concentrate most of its surveillance resources on those indi­ vidual Egyptians who were sympathetic to the Axis powers. Many Egyptians were in fact amenable to an Axis victory. According to 286

A SOCIETY IN CONFLICT WITH ITSELF

popular thought, if Germany were to win the war, Britain would be ousted and Egypt would, at long last, be completely independent. Naturally, German agents and Egyptian fellow travelers did every­ thing possible to encourage pro-Axis opinions. A later published letter by Anwar al-Sadat perhaps captures the general Egyptian attitude toward Nazi Germany wherein Hitler was perceived as a powerful nationalist leader. f41] Although recognizing Hitler’s weaknesses and the short sighted diplomacy of von Ribbentrop, Sadat lauded Hitler’s charismatic national appeal which had done much to return Germany to its rightful glory. Other Egyptians kept in close contact with German agents and even opened channels of communication with von Papen. [42] Italian agents were also active in Egypt; the continued presence of Italians in the royal entourage was a constant source of concern to the British. British intelligence agents also kept a close watch over Egyptian army Chief of Staff, ‘Aziz ‘Ali al-Masri, who had been Faruq’s tutor and who had many Nazi contacts. After ‘Ali Mahir was forced into exile and arrested, Masri was coerced into retirement; because they feared an outbreak of violence over the issue, the British did not force Masri to be tried for treason. [43] Once the Wafd returned to power, it assumed much of the respon­ sibility for keeping the pro-Axis Egyptians under close watch, and in curtailing their public activities. Zionist agents, such as Joseph Levy, a United States citizen and correspondent for the New York Times, who was in close contact with ‘Abd al-Rahman Azzar, Minister of Social Affairs, were also active in Egypt during and after W.W.II. [44] Another correspon­ dent. Delany, was utilized by the British as a mediator and as an informant. [451 In addition to availing themselves of the services of other agents, the British fought pro-Axis propaganda with an Arabic whispering campaign which was ultimately expanded by Freya Stark through the Brotherhood of Freedom. [46] As the War drew to a close, a new wave of Egyptian nationalism began to crest. After the censorship and security measures had been lessened, there was a recrudescence of radical activities leading directly to a series of assassinations of Egyptian leaders. One by one. Ahmad Mahir, Amin Osman, and Nuqrashi were shot down and removed from the political arena through a reign of terror. With information from British agents, th£^ Egyptian police 287

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responded by arresting dozens of suspects and by trying to break the chains of command of the various underground terrorist organizations. Of the twelve young men tried for Osman’s assass­ ination, several had been implicated in attempted murders of Nahhas in 1945 and of British army personnel. Among these was Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat (misnamed al-Sadati in British sources) who was listed as a 27 year old ex-army officer. [47] Sadat was accused of having been involved in several attempts against Nahhas, attempting to kill pursuers after the Osman murder, attempting to murder bystanders by throwing grenades at the automobile carrying Nahhas, attempting to murder army personnel, and of stealing a constable’s revolver with intent to escape. However many charges the British might have compiled against Sadat, he was, in fact, fairly typical of disaffected national­ ist Egyptian youth. After Mahir’s death, ‘Ubayd had reported that there were at least twenty more Egyptians who had vowed to kill any Prime Minister who had declared war. [48] Officials in the Foreign Office admitted that “ student agitation had been the curse of Egypt for the past 30 years.’’ [49] The British exerted particular pressure for the execution of Lord Moyne’s assassins. The two Zionist youths who had assassinated Moyne were, ironically, lauded by the Egyptians who sympathized with most nationalist actions against the British. Nuqrashi wavered before agreeing to the execution of the Zionist youths, but was forced to submit to British pressures. The British blamed the Palace for helping to foment student agitation and laid the respon­ sibility. correctly so. squarely at the door of Hasanayn. Hassanein Pasha’s influence was latterly, perhaps, unwisely exercised in advising His Majesty in internal affairs. He adopted a dangerous policy of bringing King Faruq into competition with the Wafd in demagogic appeals to the students to demonstrate in favour of King Faruq and not discouraging them from indulging in anti-British slogans during such demonstrations, based on the usual demands for evacuation and unity of the Nile Valley. [50] However, the prevalent lawlessness continued as attacks on public roads, boycotts, demonstrations and riots spread throughout the cities and countryside. The students and their supporters had 288

A SOCIETY IN CONFLICT WITH ITSELF

become the masters of the situation; [511 however much the political parties, in particular the Wafd, might bewail the violence and disorder, they were powerless to stop the effusion of national­ ist fervor. The unabated student agitation coupled with public unrest over high prices, scarcities, overcrowded housing, and hunger was to be the impetus behind a full scaled conflagration. 1. H.B. Butler, Report on Labour Conditions in Egypt with Suggestions for Future Social Legislation (in Arabic, English and French) (Cairo: Government Press. 1932). 2. For more detailed discussions of Egyptian industrial development see: A. Gritly. The Structure o f Modem Industry in Egypt (Cairo, 1947); Marius Deeb. "Bank Misr and the Emergence of the Local Bourgeoisie in Egypt", ed. Elie Kedourie in The Middle Eastern Economy: Studies in Economics and Economic History (London, 1976); Patrick O’Brien, The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System (London, 1966); E. Papasian, L ’E gypte Economique et Financière (Cairo, 1923). 3. aTMusawer, February 5,1939. 4. “ Our leaders give the example for the nation,” aTMusawer, March 27,1931. 5. aTMusawer, March 27; April 3,1931. 6. General Reports, February-March, 1943, FO371/35530. 7. aTMusawer, March 3,1950. 8. aTMusawer, February 24,1950. 9. P.J. Vatikiotis, The Modem History o f Egypt (London, 1969), p. 334. 10. G.E. Heyworth-Dunne, Egypt: the Cooperative Movement, Muslim World Series No. 6 (Cairo, 1952); interestingly, the book is dedicated to ‘Ali Mahir, Minister of Social Affairs in 1939. 11 .Annual Report on the Rural Welfare Centers, Ministry of Social Affairs, Intro­ duction by Fu’ad Sirag ad-Din (Cairo, 1942). 12. Edwin Arthur Chapman-Andrews Minute, May 4,1943, F0371/35533. 13. Foreign Office reports on Arab Feminist Congress, FO371/45930; 41335. 14. Female activity rate in Egypt was 4.2 in 1950 and 3.7 in 1970, Equality o f Oppor­ tunity and Treatment o f Women Workers, Report VIII, International Con­ ference. 60th Session, Geneva, p. 10. 15. Lord Killeam to Ernest Bevin, January 12, 1946, F0371/33392. 16. aTMusawer. July 31. 1925: August 2. 1945; January 7, 1950. 17. aTMusawer, July 30, 1937; July 28, 1939 (Cairo, 1977). Nazli’s activities were reported to the British by several spies. F0371/27428; al-Jil, August 23. 1954, highlights some of Nazli’s more indecorous behavior. 18. Foreign Office reports. F0371/27428; 35539; 41436; 41425. 19. aTMusawer. November 18, 1932. 20. Gordon Waterfield, Professional Diplomat, p. 187. 21. Interview with ‘Ustaz Hilmi Makram ‘Ubayd, March 4, 1978. 22. Political and Economic Report, December 25-31,1942, F0371/35528. 23. Makram ‘Ubayd, al-Kitab al-aswad ( The Black Book) (n.d., n.p. 1943). Inter­ view with Ustaz Hilmi Makram ‘Ubayd. March 4. 1978. 24. Lord Killeam to Foreign Office. April 18, 1943, F0371/35531. 25. Winston Churchill to Anthony Eden, April 30,1943, F0371/35532. 26. Lord Killearn to Foreign Office. May 7. 1943. F0371/35533: aTMusawer Mav28. 1943.

289

THEWAFD 27. P. Scrivener Memorandum, April 27,1943, F0371/35534. 28. Secondary Education: its defects and means o f reform (Ahmad Najib al-Hilali. Mihister of Education) (Cairo Government Press, 1935). 29. Memoirs of Sir Thomas Rapp, St. Antony’s College, Oxford. 30. James P. Jankowski, “The Egyptian Blue Shirts and the Egyptian Wafd, 19351938,” Middle Eastern Studies. VI (1970), pp. 77-95. 31. James P. Jankowski, Egypt's Young Rebels (Stanford, 1975), has fullest discussion of the history of Misr Fatat. 32. Richard Mitchell, The Society o f Muslim Brothers, (New York, 1969); Ishak Musa Husaini, The Moslem Brethren (Beirut, 1956), have the best summaries of the Brotherhood. 33. David Holden Memorandum, St. Antony’s College, Oxford. 34. Lord Killearn to Foreign Office, November 16, 1944, F0371/41335. 35. Foreign Office reports, F0381/20101; 10107. 36. al-Musawer, September-December 1937. 37. Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, July 9,1936, FO371/20113. 38. Lord Killearn to Foreign Office, November 17, 1944, F0371/41355 and Foreign Office Report. February 15. 1936, F0371/20100. 39. Foreign Office Report. March 11. 1938, F0371/21946. 40. “ All parties say it is dangerous that students get involved in politics.” alMusawer, November 25,1938. 41. Anwar al-Sadat, “ If Hitler were alive, what would you say to him?” alMusawer, September 19, 1953. 42. P. Scrivener Memorandum. March 31. 1942, FO371/31570. 43. Foreign Office file on al-Masri, F0371/27432. 44. heiles Lampson to Lord Halifax, January 8,1940, F0371/24622. 45. P. Scrivener Memorandum. March 25,1945, F0371/45919. 46. Laurence Grafftey-Smith, Bright Levant (London, 1970). 47. Reginald James Bowker to Ernest Bevin, November 30, 1946, F0371/53341; Foreign Office Weekly Reports, January 1946, FO371/53330. 48. Lord Killearn to Foreign Office, February 24,1945, F0371/45918. 49. P. Scrivener Memorandum, March 1,1945, F0371/45918. 50. Reginald Bowker to Ernest Bevin. February 25,1946, FO371/53404. 51. Reginald Bowker to Ernest Bevin, March 9,1946, FO371/53330.

790

13 DECLINE AND COLLAPSE 1945-1952

Following Nahhas’s precipitate fall from grace, Ahmad Mahir, a former Wafdist, formed a Ministry largely composed of former members of the party. Perhaps most galling to Nahhas was the release of ‘Ubayd and his subsequent appointment as Minister of Finance. ‘Ubayd was still in a Cairo Italian hospital regaining his strength from the exigencies of his exile when he heard the news of his appointment. Once back in power, Makram made a swift recovery, attacking his new job with his customary zeal. Elections, which the Wafd boycotted, were held in January, whereby a majority of Mahir’s Sa'dist candidates were elected. Although Mahir’s appointment caused the British some discomfort as they recalled his complicity with various extremists during the 1920’s, most officials felt that his pro-British conversion had been sincere. Mahir’s tenure in office was punctuated by the trial of Lord Moyne’s assassins and the issue of Egypt’s entry into the War. In 1943, Lord Moyne, British Colonial Secretary, had been assassin­ ated by two Zionist youths who viewed the act as an attack against the British empire which was a major stumbling block to the realization of a Jewish state in Palestine. Shocked, the British vowed revenge for the assassination. The Egyptians who were responsible for trying the accused were told in no uncertain terms that the two youths were to be found guilty and duly executed. Many Egyptians, although opposed to Zionism, were sympathetic to Moyne’s assassins who, in the popular imagination, had struck a blow against the mutual enemy — the British. The public trial; presided over by Egyptian judges, attracted a good deal of atten­ tion and, not surprisingly, led to a marked increase in Zionist activity in Egypt. Acting on British instructions, the judges found the accused guilty; the death sentences were carried out in March 291

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1945. The debate over whether or not Egypt should declare war against the Axis powers excited even more intense passions. Given the tumultuous events of the War, many Egyptians viewed entry into the conflict, at such a late date, as complete submission to the British will. On the other hand, if Egypt were to refuse to declare war, Britain had made it abundantly clear that the nation would not be represented either in the United Nations or at any peace conferences which might be convened. Torn between two equally unpleasant alternatives, Mahir had little room for maneuvering; acting under the strongest possible British pressures, he finally decided to press the Parliament for a declaration of war. With a Sa'dist majority in Parliament, Mahir succeeded in gamering the necessary votes, but his victory was to be a hollow one. On Feb­ ruary 24, 1945, as he walked through the Pharaonic Hall of Parlia­ ment on the way to the Senate, Dr. Mahir was assassinated by a young extremist, Mahmud Issawi. In a twist of fate, the assassin had been released from prison by the Wafd in the June 1944 period of liberalization. Issawi proudly reported that there were many more would-be assassins waiting to attack the enemies of the Egyptian nation. [1] Upon hearing of the assassination, Lord Killeam rushed to the Parliament to offer his condolences. With an eye, as always, on the future, *Ali Mahir, brother of the deceased, subsequently visited Killeam to thank him for his sympathy and, not incidental­ ly, to suggest they meet again to discuss the social reform Egypt so badly needed. Orderly demonstrations occurred in the wake of Mahir’s death, while both Young Egypt and the Muslim Brother­ hood were suppressed. Mahir’s assassination was to be the first in a series of killings which would eliminate many Egyptian poli­ ticians who either had capitulated or were suspected of capitulat­ ing to British policies. After Mahir’s death, the real decision makers — the people who could make or break governments — were the extremists. With a single shot or bomb the radical groups on the left or right could paralyze the government and could prevent a politician from taking any public stand which might be construed as pro-British or counter to Egyptian nationalism. As is often the case when terror holds sway, the effectiveness of the government plummeted. To British dismay, Nuqrashi replaced Mahir; carrying through 292

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his friend’s policy, Nuqrashi, with Killeam in the wings, pushed through the Egyptian declaration of war on February 25, 1945. The Wafd — now off stage — opposed the declaration warning the government not to commit itself. Ignoring these cues, Nuqrashi struggled to hold his loosely knit coalition government together and to devise a formula that would silence the extremists, fore­ stall British interference, and further Egyptian interests. Attempt­ ing to balance mutually incompatible forces, Nuqrashi was doomed to failure. The British mistrusted him for his alleged radical activities; the extremists hated him for declaring war; and the Wafdists saw him as yet another contender for political power. Nuqrashi had scarcely been installed in office when terror struck once again. This time Amin Osman was the target. In early March as assailant attacked Osman with a knife which was only deflected by a small Qur’an which Amin habitually wore. It was common knowledge that in the words of one British official, “ In the present wave of hysteria which seems to be passing over Egypt, it is probably Amin’s pro-British record that earned him this un­ pleasant experience.’’ [2] Amin’s barakat (good fortune) was shortlived for on January 5, 1946, he was shot three times at point blank range as he entered the old Victoria Gub. Six hours later he was dead. The assassin confessed not only to the Amin murder, but to having thrown bombs at Nuqrashi and British soldiers in the past. Killeam mourned Amin as a “ true and loyal friend of ours and a great patriot.’’ [3] For others, Amin’s funeral was a signal for massive anti-government displays. On less than twelve hours notice, over 100,000 people swarmed out onto the streets yelling “ Down with Nuqrashi’’ and waving banners. The Wafd, which could still rally the Cairo crowd, was behind this show of public disaffection which was directed more against Nuqrashi than against the British. In fact, Sirag ad-Din had told the crowd that anti-British slogans were not in order. [4] Nahhas and the Wafd were, of course, anxious to bring down Nuqrashi’s regime which had been particularly hostile to them. Nuqrashi, who was “ definitely at his best in the matter of public security,’’ [5] (strange praise from the formerly hostile British) had instituted censorship whenever political agitation had gone too far. With renewed energies ‘Ubayd, as Finance Minister, had enthusiastically persecuted the Wafd leaders, but against Palace and British opposition had failed to bring Nahhas to trial. How293

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ever, Nahhas’s brother-in-law was arrested. Publicly, ‘Ubayd charged Nahhas with taking money from the collections for malaria victims during the epidemic. For this and other alleged charges, Nahhas’s bank accounts in the National Bank were frozen. The Wafdist Gub was also watched, its members harassed, and occasionally forbidden entry. In June there was actually a scuffle on the floor of the Senate between a pro-*Ubayd and Wafdist delegate. Nuqrashi had forbidden Nahhas to tour the provinces and sought to limit Wafdist activities as far as possible. The Wafd reacted with boycotts and attacks against the regime; it reserved its most virulent broad­ sides for ‘Ubayd who had become Nahhas’s personal nemesis. On the domestic front Makram kept his popularity by talking about raising the standard of living and improving the lot of the masses. His Independent Wafdist Bloc had formulated a program aimed at ousting foreigners, uniting the Sudan and Egypt, encour­ aging national businesses and banks, exempting the poor from taxation, and separating the universities from governmental control. Makram also advocated sexual equality and the elimin­ ation of the class system. His program was a broadly based one which focused not only on national issues but on the all too long neglected domestic problems facing Egypt. In a sense, the Inde­ pendent Wafdist Bloc was the only party in post war Egypt to present a clearly developed domestic program for internal reforms. But it was too little, too late. The relations between Makram and Nuqrashi, who had never been on close terms, were also strained. Makram also quarreled with ‘Abd al-Hamid Badawi, Minister of Finance. Only the intervention of the Palace, acting on the omnipotent Hasanayn’s incentive, healed the rift between Nuqrashi and ‘Ubayd in the spring of 1945. Faruq was no more pleased with Nuqrashi than he had been with Nahhas, but wanting above all to prevent a Wafdist return to power, he was content to await the right moment before moving. Nuqrashi knew there was only one way he could hope to emerge victorious from the forces aligning against him. The answer lay in successful negotiations with the British. Now that the wartime crisis had passed, the British were not eager to reopen negoti­ ations where the Egyptians would again push for complete independence, which the British were determined not to grant. In 294

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spite of Killearn’s support for negotiations, the Foreign Office was inclined to drag its collective feet, allowing Nuqrashi enough time to destroy himself. In London, many officials had become increas­ ingly disenchanted with Killearn’s rather high handed approaches; many disliked being pushed to make speedy decisions. It was the old story. The man in the field wanted an immediate solution to persistent problems in order to avoid open revolt. The men in London, far from the clamor and violence, wanted slow deliberate progression. Scrivener reflected this attitude when he wrote: “ Lord Killeam finds it very difficult to allow the Egyptian Government the rope to hang themselves but they seem engaged in tying the knot for him!” [6] Unfortunately, Scrivener failed to take into account the fact that there were few alternatives to Nuqrashi. The Wafd was largely discredited owing to Nahhas’s alliance with the British during the War. In the future, in order to compensate for its Wartime history, the Wafd would be even more eager to advocate nationalist goals. On the plus side, because of its well organized party organization, the Wafd still controlled the rural masses. As for the Palace, even the British admitted that Faruq liked neither democracy nor themselves. Lacking a perfect choice, the British were inclined to give the Monarchy a try. “ It is susceptible to pressure; and if it proves in fact to be hopelessly reactionary, we can think again. At the moment we are rather getting the worst of both worlds. We are being ’squeezed’ (quite politely) by the King; we are being rather ragged by the King’s Government and we are suspect to the Wafd opposition.’’ [7] Criticism of Killearn, formerly the hero of the Churchill entour­ age, continued; the advent of the Atlee government brought matters to a breaking point. On February 4, 1946, Killearn received a “ bombshell’’ appointing him envoy to Southeast Asia. As Killearn viewed it: Quite a nice little message to receive in fact. On the first blush one might I suppose read it as a compliment, but the more one ponders on it the more obvious does it seem that this is a choice little intrigue engineered no doubt by the Palace here . . . to get me out of Egypt before negotiations begin . . . [the] odds are about 1,000 to 1 against these Treaty negotiations going through . . . But at the same time to be 295

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more or less *'kicked upstairs” has its galling personal side. Again, one really has had enough of this funny country and all its intrigues and malicious back bitings. [8] Killeam’s ship, like so many of his predecessors’ (Cromer, Mc­ Mahon, Wingate, Allenby, Lloyd) had foundered on the shoals of Egyptian and British politics. Several of Killeam’s influential friends interceded with Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, but the choice was either retirement in a few months or Southeast Asia. Killeam rather philosophically concluded that, They really have been rather dirty dogs; after 40 years strenuous service in the Foreign Office, not all unsuccessful either, I think, one had the right to hope for something better and more straightforward. But such I suppose is always the way of Governments. One remembers the old saying ‘‘Put not your trust in Princes.” [9] Lord Killeam left Egypt one week later to be replaced by an old Middle East hand and Foreign Office official. Sir Ronald Campbell. Fast on Killeam’s departure, Hasanayn, Faruq’s Polonius, died, not of heart failure as many had expected, but in an accident where a British lorry skidded into his automobile. Hasanayn’s death left Faruq in the midst of weak-minded, ill-directed servants; without the keen political advice of Hasanayn, Faruq became increasingly the victim of his own debaucheries. Meanwhile, disorders proliferated as students, Wafdists and workers demanded renewed negotiations. Makram, who was already disaffected from the Government, chose this moment to resign from the Cabinet. In the wake of other Independent Wafdist resignations, Nuqrashi’s government collapsed, and Faruq ordered the crafty Isma‘il Sidqi to form a Cabinet. His appoint­ ment did nothing to quell the rioting and striking which, as in 1919, had become commonplace throughout Egypt; the difference was that the Wafd no longer led or controlled the demonstrators who were clandestinely supported by the Ikhwan, Young Egypt, the Palace, and other political parties. Sidqi formed a coalition government without ‘Ubayd who had 296

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expected to be included. Under Palace pressure, ‘Ubayd reluc­ tantly agreed to accept his exclusion quietly; it was generally thought that Sidqi secured the acquiescence of the Ikhwan with money. With Sidqi in power, and a new Ambassador in Cairo, the British Government agreed to reopen negotiations. Talks began in May and faltered along until August when a complete deadlock was reached. Open clashes between the Wafd and the Brotherhood continued, while there were violent riots in Alex­ andria and Cairo. Random bombings were also becoming frequent occurrences. To emphasize their dissatisfaction, Wafdist students declared a general mourning period over the British occupation. In August, Nahhas wanted to hold a three day Wafd Congress, but the authorities, fearing further polarization of the situation, refused the request. The Wafd, ‘Ubayd, and Young Egypt countered by refusing the negotiations and calling for the issue to be placed before the United Nations. In light of the opposition to the negotiations, the delegation was dissolved. Hopeful of creating concerted pressure, Sirag ad-Din went so far as to try and reconcile Nahhas and ‘Ubayd, but the mutual recriminations had gone too far for either to swallow their pride, even for political gain, and both carried the vendetta to their graves. In the absence of a viable alternative, the British agreed to private negotiations with Sidqi in London. The British secret service watched Sidqi carefully as his reputation as a womanizer was well known. Their fears were unnecessary as Sidqi “ reserved his indiscretions until his return.’’ [10] While Sidqi was conversing with Bevin over the issue of British troops in Egypt, the Wafd, Sa‘dists, and Independent Wafdists condemned the negotiations. Public opinion rallied behind calls for complete British evacuation; unfortunately, inter-party rivalries prevented the creation of a United Front. The opposition could prevent a settlement, but, owing to its own factionalism, could not propose or implement a solution. Arguing that the Anglo-Egyptian friendship had to continue, Sidqi opined that the Egyptians, with the exception of the Wafd, extra-Parliamentary opposition, and some “ miniscule parties’’, [11] wanted the British to remain. He failed to take into account that the aforementioned compromised the majority of politically active Egyptians. Sidqi agreed to forego Egyptian interests in the 297

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Sudan in order to gain British acquiescence over troop placements; this was clearly unacceptable to the opposition. Sidqi’s govern­ ment, lacking any basis of support, collapsed in December. A coalition Sa'dist-Liberal Cabinet led by Nuqrashi was returned to power. Amid growing violence, Nuqrashi placed the Egyptian problem before the United Nations Security Council. That ploy, too, failed to oust the British or to alter their stand with regard to the Sudan. Throughout 1947, the British encouraged indepen­ dence movements in the Sudan and continued to evacuate troops from Egypt according to the formula given in the 1936 Treaty. Just as matters reached an impasse, the Palestine conflict moved front stage; all eyes shifted to focus on the larger, potential­ ly more dangerous conflict between the Palestinians and the Zionists. The rest of the Arab world and the super powers as well were to become actors in the dramatic struggles of these two diametrically opposed nationalisms. Wafdist relations with various Arab leaders dated back to the 1920’s when there had been numerous meetings between Arab and Wafdist leaders. Zaghlul, Barakat, and Nahhas had each expressed public regret over Arab national reversals in Syria and Iraq. In spite of some criticism, the party had thrown its full weight behind the Arab League which some considered a purely British creation. Confident of the efficacy of Arab unity, Nahhas consistently supported the Palestinian cause. Indeed, Palestine was practically the only issue upon which all facets of Egyptian political opinion could coalesce. The United Nations November 1947 decision to partition Palestine was greeted with a scream of anger from Egyp­ tians. Anti-Jewish demonstrations broke out, and a number of Jewish businesses, including the famous Cicurel department store on Sharia Fu’ad, were burned. When the first Arab-Israeli war began in 1948, the Egyptian people enthusiastically supported the Palestinians and the other Arab nations. [12] Although the army, disastrously led by Faruq’s hand picked favorites, was clearly unprepared for battle, the war was, initially, a popular one. Only as news of defeat trickled back into Cairo did disaffection grow. The Palace was thoroughly discredited after reports spread of the corruption at the front among the officers, the black-market sale of arms meant for the front and faulty weaponry. Talk around Cairo had it that the Muslim Brotherhood was paying more for discarded Allied equipment purchased from the badu than was the govem298

DECLINE AND COLLAPSE 1945- 1952

ment. The Wafd, too, was obviously incapable of rectifying the problems. Only a group of army officers, including Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, who were thoroughly disillusioned with all of the Egyptian political groups, believed that when the time came they could and would save Egypt. In the interim, the tragedy of escalating violence continued. With some courage, ignoring the threats to his life, Nuqrashi moved to repress the Muslim Brotherhood which retaliated by shooting down the Prime Minister in the Ministry of Interior in January 1949. The daring assassination had been led by men in police uniforms. Ibrahim ‘Abd al-Hadi, a loyal Sa‘dist, acceded to the head of the party and the government. Several weeks later, in February, Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Ikhwan, was assassinated. The Brotherhood vowed further revenge. During the last months of 1949, any settlement with the British, let alone a return to Parliamentary government, seemed further away than ever. The Independent, Husayn Sirri, was charged with forming another coalition government with elections slated for January 1950. The political parties, not least of all the Wafd, promptly fell to squabbling over electoral districting. [13] Nahhas kept his popular image with frequent public appearances where with his flamboyant oratory he was at his best. Not infrequently, he was carried away by his own eloquence, striking table tops with his fist and haranguing the cheering crowds. [14] When news that the Wafd had again carried the elections spread, Cairenes rushed to Nahhas’s Garden City house to con­ gratulate the victor. Appearing on the balcony, Nahhas spoke extemporaneously. The outgoing Sirri started a precedent by visiting Nahhas in his home before moving over to become head of the Royal Court. [15] The last Wafdist Cabinet included: ‘Abd al-Latif Mahmud, Public Health; ‘Ali Zaki Arabi, Mustafa Nasser, Sulayman Ghanem, Commerce; Sirag ad-Din, Interior; Muharram, Public Works; Muhammad al-Wakil, National Economy; Ahmad Husayn, Social Affairs; and Taha Husayn, the most renowned choice as Minister of Education. Although many of the most noted Wafdists were no longer members of the party, the new Cabinet was composed largely of the old guard. Nahhas’s failure to include new cadres with dynamic programs was one of his most grievous errors; however, he preferred to be surrounded with old allies in whom he could place his trust and, perhaps, around whom he did 299

THE WAFD

not need to feel threatened intellectually or politically. The last Wafd government maintained correct if uneasy relations with the Palace. Faruq and Nahhas appeared together at the opening of Parliament, and the Wafd celebrated the anniversary of the coro­ nation with the customary festivities. Nahhas announced his desire to reopen the negotiations with the British who procrastinated. The failure to reach an accord incited anti-government press attacks which also criticized the high prices, and continued economic malaise that the government seemed powerless to correct. Egyptian pundits depicted Nahhas, the old school master, teaching the British Ambassador how to read the words “ evacuation” and “ unity” . [16] After exchanging notes, the British and the Egyptians finally opened conversations in the summer of 1950. Slim and ChapmanAndrews forwarded the British arguments, while Muhammad Salah ad-Din, Nahhas, Ibrahim Makki, Ibrahim Faraj, Sirag ad-Din, and ‘Ali Zaki Husni variously presented the Egyptian case. Britain emphasized its fears of Russian expansion and tried to include the question of Israel in the negotiations. Allegedly, United States President Truman echoed these fears by urging closer relations to combat the common enemy — communism — and went so far as to offer his services as a mediator to the dis­ pute. [17] The Egyptians discounted these arguments and demanded the evacuation of their nation. They also totally rejected the inclusion of Israel, in particular the issue.of the Gaza Strip, in the negotiations. Negotiations dragged on month after month with no noticeable movement on either side. In need of the political boost an agree­ ment would bring domestically, the Wafd pressed for a conclusion, but the sides were too far apart on military matters and on the issue of the Sudan to reach a compromise. Fearing the Cold War expansion of the Soviet Bloc, the British were determined not to lose their strategic advantage in Suez; with pressing domestic needs, the Egyptians saw the Cold War as secondary to national self interest. The debates concentrated on the number of British troops in Egypt, troop placements, a time schedule for troop withdrawal, and, as always, returned to the old impasse — the Sudan. Twelve months later the same arguments with some vari­ ations were still being presented. With waning support at home, the Wafd regretted the lack of progress, but failed to devise a 300

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formula which could break the stalemate. In criticism, the Egyp­ tian press declared: The Egyptian Wafd has been feeding on “ the Egyptian issue” , “ evacuation” , “ unity” and “ complete indepen­ dence” . . . The Wafd has eaten too much of that food and the people are asking how long the Wafd will keep feeding on this meal . . . we need innovation; there should be something new. [18] The British accused the Wafd of inflexibility, and the Wafd accused the British of procrastinating and of imperialist designs. [19] The impasse culminated with Nahhas’s dramatic unilateral abrogation of the 1936 Treaty on the floor of the Egyptian Parliament in October 1951. The Treaty to which Nahhas himself had agreed had been cast aside. Nahhas announced that he had signed the 1936 Treaty for the sake of Egypt and that for “ Egypt’s sake I ask you to annul it.” [20] Because the abrogation was calculated to attract popular support, and perhaps to deflect interest away from the internal corruption of the party itself, it was only momentarily effective. Nor did the abrogation secure British acquiescence to Egyptian demands. Simply, the Wafd had nothing with which to replace the 1936 Treaty. Failing agreement, the British troops remained, and the march towards Sudanese inde­ pendence continued apace. The abrogation was a grande geste on the part of the Wafd; most Egyptians were not deluded. In short, the Wafd had failed once again to secure a settlement of the long-standing conflict with the British. With the Wafdist failure, the initiative passed for the last time into the hands of the mob. During the ensuing months, there was a fresh outbreak of antiBritish demonstrations which were heavily concentrated along the Canal Zone. Many of these attacks were probably initiated by the Ikhwan. To halt these attacks, the British decided to occupy Ismailiyya, removing all Egyptian personnel stationed there. They demanded that the Egyptian police turn in their arms and leave the area; the Minister of Interior, Sirag ad-Din, curtly rejected the demand. In retaliation, the British forces bombarded the compound killing scores of Egyptians. The following morning, January 26, 1952, the Bulak Nizam 301

THE WAFD

(police in a district of Cairo) in the ‘Abbasiyya barracks, in sym­ pathy with their colleagues, began marching through Cairo. They were soon joined by other Egyptians. In accord with the anger and frustrations of the crowd, the police stood by and let it pass. The Wafdist government was not initially displeased at the demon­ stration, which, at this juncture, was still in the garb of a patriotic display. The Wafd hoped that the British would be moved by the evidence of Egyptian support for the nationalist cause. Apparent­ ly, Salah ad-Din, Egypt’s Ambassador to the United Nations, had earlier suggested permitting some agitation in order to get the question of Egyptian relations with Great Britain on the floor of the General Assembly. Others rather ingenuously hoped that the agitation would force the British into a compromise. In the past well orchestrated mass demonstrations had achieved for the Wafd some measure of success in modifying British policies with regard to Egypt. But the times, if not the Wafd, had changed. In 1952, the Wafd no longer controlled the masses. Other more revolutionary forces were at work that Saturday. By the time the crowd, now rapidly turning into a rather ferocious, angry mob, reached Sharia Fu’ad and the Opera, it was completely out of control. [21J According to one Wafdist eye-witness (who ironically was on the streets to cause agitation) the mob and its rage had completely exceeded expec­ tations. The spark had been lit and, with what seemed to be an extraordinary degree of coordination, first the Rivoli Theatre opposite the Opera House, then the Shepheard’s Hotel (that epitome of a western watering hole!), Cicurel’s department store and the Turf Club (bastion of British nabobs) went up in flames. The entire European district of Cairo and buildings housing the luxurious, the foreign, the expensive were attacked, burned, and destroyed. The rebels vented their long pent up frustrations on the concrete symbols of that life style and consumerism which, while on their soil and built with their sweat, had forever remained outside their reaches. In the flaming chaos, dozens were trampled and killed. The city was in open anarchy and rumors flew that riots were spreading to other urban centers. Meanwhile, the insoucient Faruq continued his luncheon for police officers. Sirag ad-Din, as Minister of Interior, was responsible for restoring order. And where was he? In the morning he had been purchasing some land and afterwards swore that he had not been 302

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contacted about the riots until after twelve o’clock. The head of the armed forces swore he had telephoned him at ten and at noon to report on the gravity of the situation. After several dozen people had been killed and over 700 buildings burned, Sirag ad-Din ordered the army into action to restore calm. [22] As usually happens following events like Black Saturday, as the riot was soon dubbed by Egyptian wags, there were vindictive claims and counter claims over who was actually responsible. Who, indeed, had planned the riot? Not wanting to accept the responsibility, the Wafdist government hastily pinned the blame on outside agitators, in particular, Ahmad Husayn of Young Egypt. Husayn, who was tried for the riot, claimed that he had been used as a scapegoat, and that the Brotherhood, Communists, and, indeed, the Wafd had been responsible. [23] In retrospect, what appears evident is that all of the political groups, on the left, right, and center, wanted a demonstration for their own gains. The political leaders, from Nahhas to Husayn, thought they could dominate the masses. The Brotherhood and Young Egypt may well have escalated the demonstration by supplying the tanks of petrol which stoked the flames. But it was the people, who were tired of empty promises and the government’s perennial failures to improve the standard of living, who lit the fires. On that Black Saturday, the Egyptian people’s rage and impotence exploded in a mass orgiastic phantasmagoria. It was an ugly climax to half a century of failure. Now thorough­ ly frightened by the Wafd’s own weakness, Nahhas promptly declared Martial Law. From that moment on, observers suspected that the army would subsequently play a major role in Egyptian government, but the Wafd, contributing to its own destruction, blithely ignored the obvious signs of army dissatisfaction. In a sense the Wafd was responsible for its own demise by refusing to see the forest for the trees. Blinded by its traditional approaches, the Wafd continued to concentrate its efforts against the estab­ lished political rivals and the Palace. In the interim between January and the July Revolution even the British enemy seems to have taken second place in Wafd interests to the dominant issue of domestic rivalries. In the wake of the internecine warfare that had been fought among Egyptian politicians for the last thirty years, the army seemed the only institution capable of restoring order, ousting the British, and, in the long run, more importantly, of 303

THEWAFD

instituting and implementing meaningful domestic reforms. The army’s entry into the political arena was only a matter of time. First, the King was to have one last triumph over the Wafd. During the riots, Faruq had been jeered by the mob, but, knowing that much of the army was not loyal, he had not responded strong­ ly. However, his walking tour through Cairo two days after the riot and visits to the wounded of his guard had been favorably received. For Faruq the burning of his capital was clearly the fault of the government in power, namely the Wafd. On January 27, Faruq dismissed the Wafdist government; Nahhas had been ousted for the last time. By February 1 the enigmatic ‘Ali Mahir had formed a new Cabinet, keeping the Martial Law, and the censorship measures instituted by Nahhas. Mahir put himself forward as a nationalist who would unite the country so that its “ hopes and aspirations’’ [24] might be realized.

Notes 1. Lord Killearn to Foreign Office, February 24, 1945, F0371/45918. 2. P. Scrivener Memorandum, March 3, 1945, F0371/45919. 3 . Lampson Diary. January 5. 1946, St. Antony’s College, Oxford; Lord Killearn to Frncst Bcvin. January 8. 1946. F0371/53341. 4. Foreign Office files, January 7, 1946, F0371/53341. 5. Foreign Office files. October 8, 1945. F0371/45931. 6. P. Scrivener Memorandum, June 24, 1945, F0371/45921. 7. P. Scrivener Memorandum. October 7. 1945, F0371/45925. 8. Lampson Diary. February 4, 1946; February 6, 1946. St. Antony’s College, Oxford. 9 .lb id.%February 11. 1946. 10. E. Burgess Memorandum, October 5, 1946, F0371/53314. 11. Manuscript Note on Sidqi Pasha’s conversations with Ernest Bevin, 1946, St. Antonv’s College. Oxford. 12. Sec al-Musawer and other Egyptian publications, 1947-1949. 13. al-Musawer. October 7. 1949; December 16, 1949. 14. al-Musawer. October 28, 1949. 15. al-Musawer. January 13. 20, 1950. 16. Fikri Abata (Abazza), “ Pain and Discontent,” al-Musawer, June 30, 1950. 17. “ Open letter from H.S. Truman to Mustafa al-Nahhas,” al-Musawer, June 29, 1951. 18. Fikri Abata to Mustafa Nahhas, al-Musawer, July 27, 1951; August 2, 1951. 19. Reeords o f Conversations. Notes and Papers exchanged between the Royal Egyptian Government and the United Kingdom Government. March 1950November 1951 (Cairo Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1951); Anglo-Egyptian Conversation on the defence o f the Suez Canal and on the Sudan. December 1950-November 1951. Egypt No. 2 (1951), London, Cmd. 8419.

304

DECLINE AND COLLAPSE 1945- 1952 20. al-Musawer, October 12,1951. 21. Eyewitness accounts; al-Musawer, March 14,1952. 22. al-Musawer, March 14,1952. 23. Ahmad Husayn, Qadiyah al-Tahrid ‘ala Harq Madinah al-Qahirah. (Who burned Cairo) (Cairo, 1957). 24. al-Musawer, February 1,1952.

14 EPHEMERAL PHOENIX

Lasting only a month, ‘Ali Mahir’s government was plagued by constant interference from Faruq who saw the collapse of the Wafd as the prime opportunity to reassert his own control. Because the political parties were incapable of maintaining order, there was some renewed sympathy toward rule by a strong man. Mahir had no sooner taken office than Faruq pushed for the inclusion of his confreres, Ahmad Tal'al and Kamel ‘Ali Kawish, to the Cabinet. Mahir succeeded in rebuffing the appointment of Tal‘al, but the Cabinet resigned before Kawish became Under-Secretary to the Ministry of the Interior. In addition to thwarting the King’s dictatorial sallies, Mahir had to deal with purging the corruption of the political parties. Ever the crafty politician, Mahir was reluctant to purge the parties before gaining a victory in the negotiations with the British. He was especially circumspect with regard to the Wafd which, while partially disarmed, was still capable of rallying some rural and middle class support. Much of the opposition thought that purging the parties should take first priority. Ahmad Husayn who met with Mahir was particularly forceful in advocating the trials of corrupt politicians. Mahir attempted to co-opt Husayn by offering him a Cabinet position which Husayn, himself a perspicacious politician, wisely refused. Husayn did however take a ministerial post in a subse­ quent government. Husayn also argued that the vast properties of King Faruq should be distributed to the masses much as the properties of the Shah of Iran had been given away after his removal. Neither Mahir nor his successors were to have any success in reducing the land held by the royal family. [1] After their fall from power, the Wafdists met frequently to 306

EPHEMERAL PHOENIX

formulate tactics by which they might again assume the reins of control. The decline of Nahhas’s authority brought a concomitant extension of the influence of Sirag ad-Din who played an increas­ ingly important role in decision making. Publicly, the chain­ smoking Sirag ad-Din sought to exonerate himself from the responsibility for the burning of Cairo. Ordered not to leave his ‘Izbah (country estate) in Bilbays, Sirag ad-Din was released when Husayn Sirri became Prime Minister in July. Sirri personally telephoned Sirag ad-Din to give him the news of his release and to joke that the detention had been beneficial because having lost weight he now looked like a deer. [2] ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Tawil who had been arrested was also released. Nahhas greeted his friend and adviser, Sirag ad-Din, with hugs and kisses. However the opposition to the Wafd continued to gather momentum. Editorials appeared in the press urging Nahhas’s resignation as President of the Wafd. He was described as an exhausted old man who had been in power too long to carry the mantle of leadership. [3] Although Nahhas, like Zaghlul before him, never chose a successor, Sirag ad-Din appeared the most likely candidate to fill the vacuum caused by Nahhas’s decline in popularity. In the aftermath of Black Saturday, the Wafd had imposed Martial Law, but once the party was out of power, it immediately demanded the return to Parliamentary government. The political leadership was divided over the issue; as expected, Faruq opposed reopening Parliament. Mahir’s Cabinet could not agree and ultimately resigned after Parliament failed to reconvene. [4] Faruq charged Naguib Hilali with forming a new Cabinet which finally dissolved Parliament in March. Originally, elections were planned for May; convinced of their ability to win the impending elections, the Wafdists rejoiced. Their enthusiasm was cut short when Hilali postponed the elections for an unspecified period. After Hilali’s government fell in late June, Husayn Sirri formed a new Cabinet which survived its differences with Faruq over the treatment of the army and the candidate for the Ministry of Defense until July 20,1952. Hilali had advised Faruq to accept General Muhammad Neguib as Minister of Defense, but Faruq had stubbornly insisted on forcing his brother-in-law Isma'il Shirin’s candidacy. Hours before the Free Officer’s coup d’état brought down the King and the government, Hilali returned to power as Prime Minister. 307

THE WA FD

As the accusations against the Wafd continued to mount, the party formed a large committee to defend the leaders against charges of corruption and negligence and to launch its own investi­ gation of party culpability. However, the impending investigations did not deter the Wafd leaders from making their annual European summer sojourns. On the occasion of his July departure, Nahhas announced that We will come back and return your constitution, your free­ dom; so prepare yourselves for the coming election cam­ paign. [5] Fatefully, this report of his speech was not published until after the army take-over of the government. Sirag ad-Din, Muhammad Ghanem, and ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Tawil also left for Europe within the same month as their party leader. Indeed, when the key Wafdist leaders left Egypt in July 1952, one could not help but feel that they were perhaps escaping from more than the searing summer heat. It was as if the inner life of the party had also been consumed in the smouldering ruins of Black Saturday. In the six months which elapsed between the burning of Cairo and the July Revolution, the Wafd totally failed to rebuild its image as an effective national party. In contrast to previous years when the party had been out of power, the Wafd leaders did not embark on any provincial tours to gather mass support or, in populist fashion, to put the party’s case directly before the people. Nor did the leaders originate any propaganda programs to deflect domestic dissatisfaction toward the major historic enemy — Great Britain. Indeed, the Wafd was reputed to have made overtures to foreign embassies, presumably Britain and the United States, to force a return pf the party to power in much the same manner as its return had been effected in 1942. In light of subsequent events, it is clear that if such overtures were made — as seems likely — they were refused. Seeing the ineffectiveness of the Wafd, the foreign powers, particularly Great Britain, were again content to sit back and let both the Wafd and the Monarchy destroy themselves. Hilali alluded vaguely to “ maneuvers” and “ unknown currents” [6] as reasons for his June resignation. Publicly, Nahhas stoutly denounced these allegations as salacious lies which the people would not believe. In an ineffec308

EPHEMERAL PHOENIX

tuai justification of the party, he reiterated the oft repeated but never attained goals of “ complete evacuation” and “ unity of the Nile;” but the Wafd seemed to do precious little either domestic­ ally or internationally to achieve these national ambitions. What the Wafd did was to keep all of the old leaders, failing, even for the sake of appearances, to purge any of its Executive Council. Again, Nahhas and his associates proved intractable when urged to strengthen the party by admitting younger, more dynamic members into the Executive. [7] By refusing fresh counsel, the top Wafd leaders deprived the party of the creative energy which might have been thereby generated. They also isolated themselves from the younger Wafdists who, outside the rarified atmosphere of the ruling clique, were in closer touch with the climate of opinion among the common people, and who were, more crucially, more open to contacts with newer political asso­ ciations such as the Free Officers. Given the bourgeois origins and life styles of the Wafd leaders, it was unlikely, in the formalized segregation of classes which typified Egyptian society at the time, that any of them would have known or socialized with members of the Free Officers. Army officers below the rank of General were usually from lower middle class origins and had rural or provincial backgrounds. Typically, they were young, upwardly mobile, technically trained, and politically radical. The Free Officers were a marked contrast to the aging, affluent, liberally educated but increasingly conser­ vative Wafd leaders. The Wafd leaders were later to deny all contacts with any of the Free Officer membership and would, in retrospect, wonder at their own ingenuousness in failing to recognize either the positive or negative potential posed by the young army officers. While these analyses may well be colored by subsequent historical developments, and an understandable desire to paint as positive a picture of the party as possible, tu. Wafd leaders were undoubtedly blinded at the time by their own history which led to the erroneous assumption that the Wafd had always been and would continue to be the major political force in Egypt. The privileged social and economic positions of Nahhas and his companions only reinforced this belief. However, no such class or historical interpretations can so easily explain away the Wafd’s failure, in face of the national crisis, to forge a United Front which might have been able to mitigate the 309

THE WAFD

overweening and completely unjustified ambition of the Palace. In order to confront the British and/or the Palace, the Wafd, in the past, had formed alliances of political convenience with other parties. In 1952 it made no significant moves in the direction of coalition. The participation in a coalition of the more radical movements, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood and Young Egypt, was a far more complex issue. On one hand, the Wafd had good reason to fear and mistrust both groups which had been in measure responsible for the escalation of violence which had shattered the fragile political balance wherein the parties, with the Wafd universally recognized as the ascendant group, vied for dominance over the Palace. Likewise, the Brethren and, to a lesser extent. Young Egypt had made their disdain for the Wafd well known. Many Brethren and members of Young Egypt held that the weaknesses and errors of the Wafd had cost Egypt its national sovereignty; for them only concertèd violent struggle against Great Britain and any other force which threatened Egyptian independence would succeed. Yet, the Brethren and Young Egypt had also been weakened by the loss of their leaders and by the allegations of their irresponsible and dangerous activities. In those crucial months prior to the army’s intervention, one other course lay open to the Wafd — that was to announce a domestic program behind which the majority of Egyptians could be mobilized in order to attain their national potential economically, domestically, and politically. With a healthy united domestic front, Egypt under Wafdist leadership might have successfully challenged and ousted Great Britain. But Wafd leaders had always seen the major raison d’être of the party in political terms. Eco­ nomic and social issues were, if considered at all, of secondary importance. The few individuals who had urged the formulation of creative and innovative domestic programs had long since either left or been ousted from the party. Thus, none of the Wafdist leaders, least of all Nahhas, had the inclination or farsightedness to devise a national program of development. With such a program the Wafd might well have been able to mobilize the Egyptian masses behind its banner. In failing to respond to the urgent needs of the masses, the Wafd leadership signalled the death knell for its own party. The Revolution of July 23, 1952, heralded the end not only of the Wafd, but of the Monarchy and the era of western Parliamen310

EPHEMERAL PHOENIX

tary government. In July a group of Free Officers, led by Colonel Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser with General Muhammad Neguib osten­ sibly at the helm, implemented a coup d’état. The Free Officers (RCC) announced their intentions of ousting the Monarchy, eradicating British presence in Egypt and fashioning a new society free of the feudal and corrupt characteristics of the ancien regime. King Faruq, failing to secure assistance from the United States Embassy, was forced to abdicate in favor of his infant son, Fu’ad, who was removed when the republic was declared in June 1953. In what proved to be the first step towards the eradication of the multi-party system, the old parties were told to purify themselves. When Nahhas and other Wafd leaders returned to Egypt they attempted, as in days gone by, to co-opt the Free Officers by offer­ ing Muhammad Neguib, the ostensible leader, the title of Pasha. The offer was made almost at the same time that the interim civilian council led by ‘Ali Mahir had been ordered to abolish the use of titles! The new guard was now in power; Nahhas’s ill-timed offer only highlighted the outmoded approaches of the Wafd. The Wafd was told in no uncertain terms that it was either to rid itself of the corrupt leaders or face a purge led by the army. With the thoroughly unpleasant prospect of a trial looming, Sirag ad-Din submitted his resignation from the party on September 12; after discussing and arguing over the new law of the parties, Nahhas told the Executive Council of the party that he too was resigning. He had discussed the resignation with his wife, the source of much of his political troubles, and with Sirag ad-Din and ’Abd al-Salam Gom’a. Both had advised him to leave gracefully and not to sign his resignation letter as “ Leader of the people” ; after weighing the consequences, Nahhas reluctantly agreed. [8] All political parties were then formally dissolved in January 1953. In a dénoue­ ment, members of the Wafd leadership and others were tried for corruption and crimes against the state in public courts. Dissolving into mutual recriminations, each witness had his own version for throwing the responsibility of the violence and corrup­ tion onto others. ’Ali Mahir accused all of the politicians (except himself of course) of permitting the tyranny of the King; Hilali blamed the Wafd for negotiating with the British, and Sirri contended that the Ministers had all been puppets of the King. Makram ‘Ubayd, ever the orator, announced that “the snakes of the Wafd” had attacked him. [9] ‘Abd al-Hadi, a former Prime 311

THE WAFD

Minister, was actually sentenced to death as he had been a Sa'dist and had been opposed to Egypt’s entry into the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Most of the sentences were commuted and the old political leaders given prison terms (many of which were commuted in 1960) or placed under what amounted to house arrest. The property of many, including Zaynab al-Wakil, was confiscated as were the vast land holdings of the royal family. The reins of power soon passed directly to Gamal ‘Abd alNasser, the army and the new technocrats who became the new middle class. The Wafd was thoroughly discredited, and its leaders shuttled into oblivion to spend the ensuing years in mouldering villas or lush apartments far from the preying eyes of Nasser’s intelligence service. One by one the older leaders died. Makram ‘Ubayd died quietly at age 72 in 1961. Nahhas died in 1965. His funeral precipitated a spontaneous display by thousands of Egyptians who shouted, “ To paradise Mustafa,’’ and “ Nahhas leader of the Nation — you lived a hero and you died a hero.’’ Thus at least some Egyptians expressed their continued esteem and perhaps appreciation of Nahhas’s role as a national leader. The remaining Wafdists in Egypt or in exile bemoaned the errors and glories of the past which seemed to grow brighter with the passing years. They were apparently only relics of a by-gone era. Then in 1976, Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, heir to Nasser’s mantle, suddenly announced the return of a party system. The old Wafdist pashas showed a rather amazing vitality and quickly announced that they were reforming the Wafd party. Led by Sirag ad-Din and Ibrahim Faraj, both of whom had served prison terms on charges of corruption, abuse of power, and meeting with Nehru and Nahhas after the 1952 Revolution, the newly reconsti­ tuted party hurried to formulate its charter and internal organ­ ization. Sirag ad-Din was made President and Faraj became Secretary-General. Under the law governing party organization, parties needed twenty members of Parliament to become legal. The Wafd rather easily attracted no fewer than 25 members with Dr. Muhammad Hilmi Murad acting as leader of the Wafdist Parliamentary group. The Wafd gathered, in a short interval, a notable degree of support and few doubted his estimates when Sirag ad-Din suggested that in freely held elections the Wafd would get 30 percent of the votes*, the Central party 40 percent, the independents 15 percent and the parties of the left and right 312

EPHEMERAL PHOENIX

about 15 percent. [10] As in times past, the strength of the party lay with its superior organization. The new Wafd, six months after its rebirth, claimed about 100,000 adherents with thirty-five in its High Command, which was ultimately to have fifty members. The general High Command was to embody one hundred and fifty. In a pyramid structure, the Women’s Committee and Student Committee were under the High Command. The Councils from the Delta and Upper Egypt came below in the organizational structure. Initially, command was to originate at the top, but 100 of the leaders were ultimately to be elected from each town, province and so on to the General Command; the other 50 were to be chosen from the High Command. The leaders also envisioned the creation of 31 sub-committees, each with seven to 15 members, to deal with such diverse topics as students, irrigation, the High Dam, agriculture, domestic affairs, law, health, and women. No women were on the original High Command, but the leaders seemed amiable to the inclusion of several. Women who had joined the Wafd were determined to make these meaningful decision making roles; they did not perceive their inclusion as mere tokenism. [11] The new Wafd was to be a combination of the old system (developed primarily by Fath ‘Allah Barakat), and the French Gaullist system. Unfortunately, the new Wafd leaders generally lacked the charismatic appeal of a de Gaulle. In what may well have been a contradiction of terms, the leaders foresaw a return to the republican parliamentary system similar to that of the Fifth Republic. However, this may also have been an abortive attempt to assuage President Sadat’s fears of meaningful political com­ petition. The Wafd leaders wanted a Prime Minister and a parliament representative of a cross section of the population. The members believed that the new Wafd’s revival was indicative of the popular desire for a return to representative government. In this regard, the leaders attempted to attract membership from a fairly wide variety of the population. For example, Sirag ad-Din held weekly Monday night open houses for students and youth. However, the leadership remained largely representative of the middle class and, in the vacuum left by the demise of the Monar­ chy, of a few members of the ancien regime. The primary goals of the party remained political with the members viewing themselves as the true bearers of the nationalist 313

THEWAFD

spirit. The surviving members of the original Wafd almost unani­ mously characterized the old party’s greatest weakness as Nahhas’s refusal to bring in new membership. They correctly pointed to the Wafd’s image as a national party as its greatest strength. The new Wafd attempted to recapture that image while minimizing the impact of Nasser’s regime. They advocated return­ ing to private enterprise, encouraging foreign investments, returning sequestered property and in sum totally eradicating the socialist measures enacted under Nasser. On a political level the members seemed sincerely committed to a parliamentary system, and freedom of speech and the press. The period 1977 and the first months of 1978 was one of great enthu­ siasm. After over twenty years of a tightly controlled state system, Sadat had agreed to liberalize the system in order to allow some of the pent up political frustrations to be released. His move was also calculated to gain his regime the approval of the western nations who espoused democratic parliamentary systems. It was a neces­ sary political maneuver particularly in light of the hope and anger caused by his November 1977 visit to Israel. With economic disaster a constant possibility, and a desire to undercut Nasserism, Sadat appears to have cultivated the middle class as a major force of political support. But once the parties, particularly the Wafd, seemed to be attracting the bulk of centrist sympathizers and their members appeared to be sincerely commit­ ted to an open democratic system, Sadat’s own political support was eroded. Few political leaders, least of all the wily Sadat, would long endure such a risk. When Shaykh Ashur Muhammad Nasser, the popular out­ spoken Parliamentary member, publicly denounced Sadat, the Wafd, worried lest their guarded criticism had become too blatant, hastened to replace him. Ashur was subsequently dismissed from the People’s Assembly for calling the body a ‘’puppet theatre.” [12] It was clear that Sadat’s move toward parliamentary government would go only so far as to permit superficial oppo­ sition and that the regime would not tolerate meaningful dissent. By June 1978 Sadat had begun to crack down on the parties of the left and the right. Nearly all issues of the leftist journal, al-Ahali, which in March had published a markedly critical article by the influential Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal (Nasser’s old confidant and a political contender for power), were suppressed. 314

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The leftist National Unionist party then disbanded. The three ranking Wafdist leaders were subsequently enjoined from further political activity. On June 2, 1978, fearing more overt govern­ mental repression, the new Wafd voted to disband. Dearly aimed at Sirag ad-Din, Sadat’s new internal security law forbade any public life for anyone who had held a Ministerial post prior to the 1952 Revolution. To undercut the left, a new law forbidding atheists from political activity was promulgated. The left retaliated by putting forward a Christian and a Muslim. On the 1978 anniversary of the 1952 Revolution, typically a time for startling announcements, Sadat proclaimed that the major party (the Arab Socialist Union) was to be disbanded and that he would form a new one. Nasser had also used this technique whenever the governmental party could no longer claim mass support or when it had outlived its usefulness. The parties were meant to be cosmetic gestures toward the west, in particular the United States, but, in essence, political power continued to rest with one authoritarian figure, in this case, Anwar Sadat. Notes 1.AkerSaa', December 31,1952. 2. al-Musawer, July 11, 1952; see the Public Prosecutor’s account of the Sirag ad-Din investigation in al-Musawer, March 14,1952. 3. Hilmi Solam, “ We want the leaders to confess” , al-Musawer, May 16,1952. 4 . AkerSaa’, December 31,1952. 5. al-Musawer, July 25,1952. 6. al-Musawer, July 4,1952. 7. Interview with Sa‘d ‘Abd al-Nur, March 9,1978. 8 . AkerLaht (Lahza), October 8,1952; al-Musawer, September 12, 1952; January 2,1954. 9. Brigadier C.D. Quilliam to Lester Pearson (Prime Minister of Canada), October 3,1953, St. Antony's College, Oxford. 10. “The Phoenix New Wafd,” Middle East, April 1978. 11. Interviews with Wafd members, 1978; “ Program for Wafd Committees,” March 1978. 12. Egyptian Gazette, March 23,1978; March 30,1978.

315

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Hadit hah. Cairo, 1964. Sa‘id, Amin, al-thawra al- ‘Arabiyya al-Kubra. Cairo, n.d. Shafiq, Ahmad. Hawliyat Misr al-siyasiyya. Tamhid I. n.p., 1926. ----------- Mudhakkaratifi nisf qam. Cairo, 1936. Sidqi, Isma‘il. M udhakkarati. Cairo, 1950. Thabit, Karim, al-malik F u’ad. Cairo, 1944. ----------- Sa‘dfikayathi. Cairo, 1929. Tusun, ‘Umar. Mudhakkarat bima sadara ‘anna mundhu fajr alharaka al-wataniyya al-Misriyya min sanat 1918 ila sanat 1928. Cairo. 1942. ‘Ubayd, Makram. al-kitab al-aswad. Cairo, n.d. Wahida, Subhi. fi usulal-mas'ala al-Misriyya. Cairo, 1950. Yunis, ‘Abd al-Hamid, and ‘Uthman Tawfiq. al-Azhar. Cairo, 1946. Zaghlul. Sa‘d. kalimat Sa'd Zaghlul fi'I-jam ’iyyat al-tashri'iyyat wa fi ahadithihi al-siyasiyya li sanat 1914. Cairo, 1914. Zayyat, ‘Abduh Hasan. Sa'd Zaghlul min iqdiyyat. Cairo, 1942. IX. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS A. Published in Egypt 1. Arabic al-'Adl al-Ahali al-Ahram al-Ahwal al-Akhbar AkrLahta AkrSaa ’ al-Balagh al-Hal al-Hilal al-Hikma al-lslah al-Jalil: al-Jalil Jadid al-Kashkul al-Kawkab al-Mahrusa al-Manar al-Minbar Misr 330

al-Muqattam al-Musawer al-Mustaqbal al-Nizam al-Siyasa al-Umma Wadi’l-Nil al-Watan 2. English and French Arab Bulletin, June 6 , 1916-January 11,1919. The Egyptian Gazette L ’Egypte Egyptian Illustration, 1915. L ’E gyptienne La Liberté Le Progrès La Réforme La Revue Egyptienne La Revue Sioniste, January 4 , 1918-April 19,1918. The Star o f Egypt, 1915. The Sphinx, February 1917-June 1917. The Truth, 1916. B. Other newspapers and periodicals Sudan Herald (Khartoum) The Near East and India (London) The Times (London) X. UNPUBLISHED THESES Cantori, Louis Joseph. The Organizational basis of an elite political party: The Egyptian Wafd (PhD. Chicago, 1966). Mellini, Peter J. British Imperial policy and Egyptian nationalism (1907-1914). (PhD. Stanford, 1969). XI. INTERVIEWS Sa’d ‘Abd al-Nur Kama! Selim Ustaz Hilmi ‘Ubayd (Ebeid) Samir Dhu al-Faqar (Zulficar) 331