The US-South Korea Alliance: Meeting New Security Challenges 9781626375185

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The US– South Korea Alliance

The US– South Korea Alliance Meeting New Security Challenges edited by

Scott Snyder

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2012 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2012 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The US–South Korea alliance : meeting new security challenges / Scott Snyder, editor. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-58826-805-1 (hc : alk. paper) 1. United States—Foreign relations—Korea (South) 2. Korea (South)— Foreign relations—United States. 3. National interest—United States. 4. National interest—Korea (South) I. Snyder, Scott, 1964– II. Title: U.S.–South Korea alliance. JZ1480.A57K6 2012 355’.0310973095195—dc23 2011043124 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

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List of Tables and Figures 1 Expanding the US–South Korea Alliance, Scott Snyder

1

2 The Maritime Relationship, Michael McDevitt

21

3 Counterterrorism, Kevin Shepard

43

4 Nuclear Nonproliferation, Fred McGoldrick

71

5 Outer Space, James Clay Moltz

101

6 Pandemics and Biological Threats, James L. Schoff

121

7 Climate Change, Heejun Chang and Lily House-Peters

145

8 Peacekeeping, Balbina Y. Hwang

173

9 Postconflict Stabilization and Reconstruction,

195

Michael J. Finnegan 10 Development Assistance and Humanitarian Aid,

209

Edward P. Reed 11 Will the Current Joint Vision Hold? Scott Snyder

239

List of Acronyms Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

251 257 269 273 293

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Tables and Figures

Tables

7.1 8.1 8.2

Strategies and Policy Directions in South Korea’s Five-Year Green Growth Plan

158

South Korean Contributions to Overseas Combat Operations

177

South Korean Contributions to Peacekeeping, Reconstruction, and Stabilization Operations

177

10.1 South Korean and US ODA Programs: Strengths and Interests

227

Figures

7.1

Change in Energy Intensity in the United States and South Korea, 1980–2008

147

Change in Per Capita Energy Consumption in the United States and South Korea, 1980–2008

148

7.3

US Energy Consumption by Type, 2007

150

7.4

Growth of Urban Populations in the United States and South Korea, 1950–2050

152

South Korean Energy Consumption by Type, 2007

160

7.2

7.5

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1 Expanding the US–South Korea Alliance Scott Snyder

THE SECURITY ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) has demonstrated success by both its longevity and its ability to maintain peace on the Korean peninsula. But the purpose and effectiveness of alliances as post–Cold War tools for achieving security aims are increasingly being questioned. The United States has emphasized the need for flexibility and resistance to deployment of fixed assets for a single purpose, while alliance partners have resisted being dragged into out-of-area commitments in locations that are distant from immediate security interests.1 Advances in technology have allowed the United States to project force from its own mainland without relying on forward-deployed forces, while overseas bases may become sources of vulnerability to direct attack by regional actors who themselves are expanding their own threat projection capabilities. As a by-product of these changes, some have argued that alliances will be replaced by coalitions of the willing while others predict that collective security arrangements will obviate the need to mobilize against a common threat.2 The implication of these arguments for the US-ROK alliance is that its demise is inevitable: either it is in terminal decline or China’s rise and pull on the peninsula and a resulting divergence of interests between the United States and South Korea will inevitably bring about the decline and dissolution of the alliance.3 Despite South Korea’s relative rise in power vis-à-vis North Korea, the rise of China-led regional economic integration, and the development of complex economic interdependence between the United States and China, the United States and South Korea are retaining, revitalizing, and promising to expand the dimensions of cooperation within the US-

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The US–South Korea Alliance

ROK security alliance. Only a few years ago many analysts were predicting the end of the US-ROK alliance during the tenure of South Korea’s progressive president Roh Moo-hyun, so it is surprising that both the US and ROK governments are embracing grand plans designed to establish a “comprehensive security alliance” with global reach, resulting in a surprisingly far-reaching Joint Vision Statement in June 2009.4 The Joint Vision Statement builds directly on the “strategic alliance for the 21st century” concept that Presidents Lee Myung-bak and George W. Bush had announced the previous year.5 Given South Korea’s increasing capability and self-sufficiency, the apparently waning North Korean conventional security threat, and traditional South Korean public resistance to being drawn into conflicts off the peninsula, this affirmation of the value and strength of the US-ROK security alliance as a foundation for twenty-first-century security cooperation may seem surprising. At the same time, South Korea’s democratic and economic development gives it a stake in US-led global stability on the basis of common values and newfound capacity to act as a partner with the United States on a comprehensive agenda for cooperation. The foundations are coming into place for the types of comprehensive cooperation that have come to characterize the transatlantic relationship6 at a time when Asia’s rise enhances the US need for like-minded Asian partners who share common regional and global interests. Today, South Korea plays a leading role in securing its own defense and is a rising contributor of public goods in the areas of peacekeeping, overseas development assistance (ODA), and postconflict stabilization. As a leading player in the global economy, South Korea has the capacity to shape its own interests instead of being subject to the whims of neighboring powers. Its contributions to and influence on the international community are also expanding, creating opportunities for expanded partnership, in both functional and geographic scope.7 All of these factors might easily provide justification for ending or drastically reducing the scope of the traditional alliance, yet the two governments are retooling the security relationship and mapping plans for expansion. Why, and why now? This volume evaluates the potential, rationale, and existing capabilities for both sides to support expanded US-ROK cooperation in response to specific nontraditional and global security challenges. In many cases, these are new frontiers for US-ROK security cooperation. The book covers nine areas of cooperation, including counterterrorism, maritime security, space, pandemics, postconflict stabilization and reconstruction, peacekeeping, overseas development assistance, nonprolif-

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eration, and climate change. Through analysis of these newly identified priorities, many of which have been explicitly identified in the US-ROK June 2009 Joint Vision Statement, it is possible to evaluate the likely path of future development of the US-ROK security alliance and also compare efforts to adapt the US-ROK alliance to a post–Cold War and post–September 11, 2001 (9/11), security environment with similar adaptation in both the US-Japan alliance and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).8 The next section provides a brief summary of developments in the US-ROK alliance over the course of the last two decades, including a comparison of these developments with efforts to adapt the US-Japan alliance and NATO to a security environment that prioritizes security cooperation to respond to nontraditional or global threats. This is followed by an identification of major principles and characteristics of alliance cooperation that will be required to meet the mutual interests of the United States and South Korea going forward. These considerations frame the in-depth assessments of the nine practical global and nontraditional areas of US-ROK security cooperation provided by the subsequent chapters. The concluding chapter ties together and assesses the implications of cooperation in each of the nine areas for the potential for establishing a comprehensive US-ROK security alliance.

US-ROK Alliance Adaptation Following the End of the Cold War

The US-ROK security alliance was forged in direct response to pressing security needs on the Korean peninsula. South Korea’s vulnerability to renewed attack from North Korea, and its strategic importance as a bulwark against the spread of Communist aggression at the start of the Cold War, knit US and South Korean security needs together. Formed in October 1953 with the signing of the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty after the Korean War hostilities ceased, the alliance provided a security guarantee to a weak South Korea completely dependent on the United States for its defense. Throughout the Cold War, the overarching South Korean concern was the possibility of US abandonment. For this reason, Nixon’s announcement of the withdrawal of troops from South Korea despite a significant commitment of South Korean troops to support US-led efforts in Vietnam in the late 1960s was a shock to Park Chung-hee. Likewise, President Carter’s efforts in the 1970s to fulfill a campaign promise to

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The US–South Korea Alliance

withdraw all US forces from South Korea on the basis of human rights concerns under Park Chung-hee’s authoritarian rule posed another serious challenge to the alliance. A further complication came in the context of Chun Doo-hwan’s coup d’état in May 1980, at which time South Koreans widely perceived the US Forces Korea (USFK) as complicit with if not supportive of Chun’s suppression of South Korea’s prodemocracy movement, sowing the seeds for South Korean resentment of USFK, especially among prodemocracy activists who later became known as the “386” generation.9 Despite the end of the Cold War, South Korea’s rapid economic development, and its political transition from authoritarianism to democracy, efforts to further reduce US forces and transfer key roles and missions to South Korea under the 1990 Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, known as the East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI), faced strong opposition from the South Korean government, which was still pursuing an international competition for influence with the North.10 Efforts under EASI came to a halt by 1992 as a result of rising tensions over North Korea’s nuclear development efforts. The first stage of the EASI restructuring plan, carried out over three years from 1990 to 1992, involved a 7,000-person US troop reduction, appointment of an ROK general officer to head the Military Armistice Commission, and the transfer of a number of operational tasks to South Korea as part of its goal of moving the United States from a “leading” to a “supporting” role on the Korean peninsula. The second phase of the plan envisaged transfer of patrol duties at the Joint Security Area (JSA), removal of two brigades of the US Second Infantry Division, and a reorganization of the Seventh Air Force into one fighter wing. The third stage involved determination of the appropriate long-term size of USFK based on a joint threat assessment and other regional needs that might be met by USFK, relocation of Yongsan to another location outside of Seoul, and transfer of the area under the responsibility of the US Second Infantry Division along with changes in the authority of wartime operational control (OPCON) and development of a US-ROK parallel command system.11 Although the first stage of the EASI was implemented, the rise of the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1991–1992 led then–secretary of defense Dick Cheney to freeze implementation of the EASI pending a resolution of the crisis.12 USFK in the early 1990s made a small reduction in forces, gave up a golf course at Yongsan, and ended combined forces’ control over South Korean military forces during peacetime, but there was almost no change in the essential structure of the US-ROK alliance. USFK head-

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quarters remained in Seoul with a footprint essentially unchanged since the Korean War, with US bases occupying choice ground in every major South Korean city. But South Korean and US views of the world, the region, and North Korea were no longer in lockstep with each other. Differences began to emerge. For the United States, North Korea became another flashpoint for regional conflict to be managed and was no longer a second front in a global ideological standoff while North Korea continued to be South Korea’s primary national security concern. At a political level, this difference in views—and the fragile psychological gap behind those views—became apparent as the Clinton administration chose to negotiate directly with North Korea over nuclear weapons in 1993, no longer deferring to South Korea over how to manage political contacts with the North. By the mid-1990s, South Korea had become an industrialized economy whose cities had begun to surround even US bases that had once been located in the countryside, while simultaneously undergoing a political transition from authoritarianism to democracy. North Korea could not compete with the South for international legitimacy anymore, but it remained an isolated conventional military threat while developing nuclear and missile capabilities. Despite these revolutionary changes in the strategic context surrounding the peninsula, most of the changes in the US-ROK alliance were evolutionary. The United States was still primarily responsible for South Korea’s defense. USFK maintained a level of operational flexibility befitting a wartime setting and had not undergone the type of consolidation of bases that had occurred in Japan in the 1970s. South Korean public perceptions of US bases had changed from a source of economic opportunity, when South Korea was poor, to a traffic irritant and occupier of prime real estate once South Korea had become rich. A missed opportunity to address some of these concerns and possibly put the US-ROK alliance on a firmer footing came in the mid1990s with the Nye Initiative and the reaffirmation of the US-Japan alliance. This review came about in part as a result of perceptions that the United States was losing its influence and might consider further force reductions in Asia, inciting concerns in Japan and a desire to strengthen the basis for a continuing US presence in the region. A review of the US-Japan alliance relationship led to a US-Japan joint review of the regional security environment, a revision of guidelines, and a reaffirmation of the US-Japan relationship that was announced by President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in 1996.13 That effort had been intended to encom-

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The US–South Korea Alliance

pass the US-ROK alliance, but the process of reaffirming the alliance with South Korea never got off the ground. There were some attempts by USFK to adjust to new South Korean conditions. In the late 1990s the Clinton administration negotiated initial steps in a Land Partnership Plan (LPP), whereby USFK prepared to vacate and return bases and land to South Korea and revised the terms of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to provide greater South Korean autonomy and responsibility in handling offenses by US military personnel in the case of off-duty offenses.14 But these changes did not correspond to the scope of change in the strategic environment, the structure of South Korean domestic politics, or the political economy of the relationship of the bases to the broader South Korean population. Another major development influencing the context for the alliance relationship was South Korea’s change in approach toward North Korea under Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy, most dramatically represented by the June 2000 inter-Korean summit. Kim Dae-jung’s trip to Pyongyang and the first-ever meeting between North and South Korean leaders was a historic event that had powerful reverberations for South Korean perceptions of security on the Korean peninsula. Upon Kim Dae-jung’s return from the North, he declared that his visit had forestalled the possibility of war on the Korean peninsula. Although this statement was widely regarded as overoptimistic, it served to both validate and facilitate a transformation of South Korean public perceptions of the North from the image of enemy to that of brother-in-need. Such a transformation carried with it a subtle implication for South Korean public perceptions of the US force presence in the ROK from that of necessity to that of luxury or even a legacy of the past era of inter-Korean conflict.15 Coinciding with the 2000 inter-Korean summit was an uptick in public incidents involving USFK personnel that was partially reflective of such a shift in perceptions among the South Korean public. These incidents were symptoms of a much deeper problem: the US-ROK alliance remained on autopilot, based on Cold War premises, structures, and patterns of interaction, but no serious effort had been made to review and update the strategic framework underlying the alliance in a manner similar to the process that led to the reaffirmation of the USJapan alliance. The first major incident that revealed the extent to which the standard operating procedures that had governed the US-ROK alliance were out of sync with new realities on the Korean peninsula was a traffic accident in 2002, when a US Army vehicle returning from exercises hit and killed two middle-school girls. The South Korean public response to

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the incident revealed an underlying feeling by South Koreans that USFK had not updated its perceptions of South Korea as a partner in line with South Korean economic and political accomplishments of recent decades. Second, South Koreans—fresh from a new national confidence deriving from their cohosting of and performance in the 2002 soccer World Cup—were grappling with South Korea’s improved international standing and implications of apparent progress in inter-Korean relations for South Korea’s security posture, stirring for the first time a domestic debate over whether the future direction of South Korean foreign policy should be tied so closely to the policy direction of the United States. This debate was fed by skepticism within South Korea’s emerging elites about the US motivations for invading Iraq in 2003 as well as about the rise of China as South Korea’s number-one economic partner from 2004. Third, the 2002 traffic accident provided a concrete illustration of how USFK presence might intrude on and conflict with the daily lives of South Koreans in ways that appeared to reduce rather than enhance South Korea’s security. Comments by President Bush in the 2002 State of the Union Address characterizing North Korea as part of the “axis of evil” 16 further inflamed South Korean opinion and raised doubts about whether the alliance would contribute in practical terms to enhancing South Korea’s security.17 All of these concerns served to underscore the lack of an updated rationale, shared vision, or articulation of mutual interest necessary to provide the alliance with political ballast to survive what should have otherwise been easily manageable incidents in the relationship.18 The traffic accident and its aftermath were an important catalyst for a broader reevaluation of many aspects of the security relationship. The incident coincided with US efforts under Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to review and update its global force posture to respond to new threats and new needs following 9/11, as well as increasing needs for troops to serve in Iraq. In South Korea the Roh Moo-hyun administration came into office in 2003 seeking greater independence and greater equality in its relations with the United States, simultaneously seeking “cooperative, self-reliant defense” while also maintaining the alliance.19 South Korea’s quest for greater recognition in the relationship coincided with the US preoccupation with the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US prioritization of those conflicts made the extent of South Korea’s “out of area” contributions a focus of the alliance and revealed a perception gap between Washington and Seoul

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The US–South Korea Alliance

regarding how to respond to challengers in the international system, including North Korea. Despite rhetoric that regularly suggested that the Roh and Bush administrations were philosophically out of sync with each other, especially on policy toward North Korea, both sides cooperated well to implement the reconfiguration of US forces on the peninsula and transfer of primary responsibility for security along the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Talks on the Future of the Alliance (FOTA) (2002–2004) and the Security Policy Initiative (SPI) (2004–2008) managed specific institutional and structural adjustments, including setting a timetable for replacing the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) with separate command arrangements in which the United States would play a supporting role. These efforts represented a significant evolution in the structure of alliance cooperation mechanisms that had been envisioned in the early 1990s as the third stage of implementing the EASI, but were conducted under Presidents Bush and Roh in the absence of a jointly identified shared vision for the future of the alliance. In the context of the Rumsfeld-initiated Global Posture Review, which sought to position US forces around the world more flexibly to be able to respond to a multiplicity of uncertainties and types of threats, the United States and South Korea worked together to realign the US force presence on the peninsula and revise command arrangements in support of a broader vision and regional role for the alliance. The realignment of USFK included a planned one-third reduction amounting to 12,500 troops, removal of US forces positioned in several camps along the DMZ to a central camp north of Seoul, and the redeployment of one of two US combat brigades from South Korea to Iraq, with the South Korean military taking over the major roles and missions near or at the DMZ. A second area of focus has been the dissolution of CFC in favor of arrangements that allow South Korea to retain sole operational control of its forces, with the United States providing “bridging capabilities,” especially in the areas of air support and intelligence collection.20 During this period, the Bush and Roh administrations came to a limited understanding on “strategic flexibility,” under which USFK forces may be deployed for missions off the peninsula and the South Korean government is not obligated to provide political or military support for such deployments. They also agreed on the dissolution of CFC and return of sole responsibility for operational control of Korean forces on the peninsula in wartime to the South Korean government, implemented a comprehensive security assessment, and laid the foundations for the US-ROK Joint Statement adopted by Presidents Bush and Roh at

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Gyeongju in November 2005. In this joint agreement, “The two leaders agreed that the alliance not only stands against threats but also for the promotion of the common values of democracy, market economy, freedom, and human rights in Asia and around the world”; affirmed alliance cooperation through the establishment of the Security Consultation for Alliance Partnership; and affirmed a range of security and political cooperation measures, including cooperation to address the North Korean nuclear issue.21 Under the Roh and Bush administrations, it sometimes appeared that the United States and South Korea had divergent interests that would result in the dissolution of the alliance. Some analysts in the United States and South Korea saw structural, political, ideological, and cultural reasons to write off the alliance as having little, if any, remaining strategic value. Adaptations on the margin sometimes seemed like an attempt to bail out a sinking ship. However, despite political differences in priority and approach to specific tactical issues regarding policy toward North Korea, it is also possible to argue that there is increasing overlap between the underlying political interests of both countries on a broad range of issue-specific areas where new forms of cooperation may potentially be built. Although Roh’s style of managing relations with the United States was politically contested within South Korea and entailed costs in terms of distancing South Korea from the traditional protection it had enjoyed through close security relations with the United States, the Roh administration was able to work together with the Bush administration on many sensitive alliance issues, including configuration of US forces, troop dispatch to Iraq, and negotiation (but not ratification) of a potentially strategically significant free trade agreement with the United States. By declaring that restoration of the US-ROK alliance is his top priority, Lee Myung-bak articulated South Korea’s traditional policy approach. The day after his election in January 2008, Lee Myung-bak affirmed his intent to “restore the US-ROK alliance based on the established friendship”22 as a primary anchor of South Korea’s foreign policy, suggesting that a decade of progressive rule had aimed at making South Korea more independent at the expense of its ties with the United States. During his first stop in the United States in April 2008, Lee declared that the “politicization of alliance relations will be behind us” and pledged that the alliance going forward should be based on the principles of “common values, trust, and peace.”23 The June 2009 US-ROK Joint Vision Statement signed by Presidents Lee and Barack Obama takes a step forward in identifying specific

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The US–South Korea Alliance

objectives for implementation of a broader alliance vision pledged under Bush and conveys a sense of partnership that reflects many of the underlying attitudes and principles of partnership necessary to the pursuit of mutual interests in Washington and Seoul. But the all-inclusiveness of the Joint Vision Statement gives no sense of priority among tasks and purposes for the alliance and risks creating overexpectations regarding the real capacities and priorities of the relationship by leaving the impression that the alliance is related to any world event. An issue-by-issue approach may instead yield many small steps that when taken together add up to a comprehensive framework for the US-ROK alliance. The Bush administration’s conceptualization of the war on terror as a universal threat had led it to frame the NATO alliance as well as the US-Japan and US-ROK alliances in global terms and to demand “out of area” contributions to postconflict stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.24 These efforts contributed to a sense of entrapment by alliance partners who faced pressure to support global postconflict stabilization operations alongside the United States. 2 5 US demands engendered varying measures of resentment and doubt among alliance partners in NATO, as well as in Japan and South Korea, regarding the sustainability of a global vision for their respective alliances with the United States. But South Korea’s newly elected president Lee Myungbak embraced the vision of a comprehensive US-ROK alliance from the beginning of his presidential term in 2008 and advanced the concept of a “global Korea” at the same time that US demands for out-of-area contributions from NATO and Japan were becoming a source of strain. 26 Meanwhile, US efforts to enhance global security cooperation with Japan foundered on long-standing constraints imposed by Japan’s postwar peace constitution, and a historic shift in power to the Democratic Party of Japan shifted the main focus of the US-Japan alliance to the question of how to resolve a protracted stalemate over the future of the Futenma Airbase in Okinawa.27 Although South Korean contributions to international security remain modest, the Lee Myung-bak administration has prioritized the US-ROK alliance, laid the foundations for South Korea’s hosting of the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, and enabled a surprisingly close personal relationship between Lee and President Obama. The 2009 US-ROK Joint Vision Statement provides a framework by which to expand US-ROK alliance cooperation beyond the peninsula and to new dimensions of international security, but many of these forms of cooperation are not new in the context of NATO or even the US relationship with Japan, in which security cooperation developed on

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the basis of common democratic values. Having gone through earlier transformations that redefined their rationales from the task of responding to a local threat to cooperation based on common democratic values, these alliances have already witnessed similar expansion in the scope of their security cooperation.28 Still, as was the case in NATO and the USJapan alliance, the expanded areas of cooperation represent a significant step forward in the US–South Korea alliance relationship. A consequence of enhanced South Korean capabilities and aspirations to make a more sustained international contribution, they enable the realization of new potential for the bilateral alliance. In addition, a comparison of the structure of NATO and the USJapan alliance with the US-ROK alliance reveals the importance of maintaining both a strategic purpose and an operational structure that are conducive to effective joint cooperation. From this perspective, the opportunity to operationalize US-ROK cooperation on off-peninsula security issues also strengthens alliance capabilities, reflecting South Korea’s growing interests and capacity and US efforts to work together with like-minded partners to preserve global stability.

Establishing a Mutually Beneficial Rationale for a US-ROK Comprehensive Security Alliance

The US-ROK alliance has clearly long ago outgrown the patron-client status that characterized the relationship when it was first established. The institutional structures for cooperation have also adapted in line with changes in respective military capabilities and needs, most notably in the transition to South Korea’s leading role in providing for its own national defense, with USFK providing critical support. The existing institutional structures, vested interests, and deeply ingrained routines of cooperation tend to inhibit a ground-up assessment of the respective interests, trends, and emerging challenges that are likely to demand future attention and cooperation if they are to be effectively addressed. Perhaps the most effective way of determining the type of cooperation that would be most conducive to the mutual interests of alliance partners in the twenty-first century might be to try to build the relationship from the ground up, without the benefit or constraints imposed by the existing institutional structures that bind together the United States and South Korea. The critical variable underlying such an approach will be the task of determining the qualities and characteristics of the type of relationship most likely to serve the mutual interests of the two

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The US–South Korea Alliance

countries. The first step toward identifying those characteristics is to identify the main factors shaping the international security posture and needs of the two countries. The development of such a shared vision might include the following assumptions regarding the respective security interests of the United States and South Korea. The United States will remain a global leader, but is no longer in a position to be the sole provider of public goods in the area of security. Moreover, global leadership in the twenty-first century requires a mix of specialized economic, political, security, and technical requirements that no single country can provide on its own. Thus, US leadership is constrained by a need for cooperation with other states, but no other state except the United States is likely to be willing to bear the lion’s share of the burdens of leadership. The United States will continue to play a leading role in responding to international crises, but it will increasingly seek partnerships with other like-minded countries to meet the political, security, and technical requirements to supply the public goods necessary to ensure global stability, security, and prosperity. South Korea as a leading global economy has expanded its capacity to the brink of the first rung of global leadership as the host and chair of the G-20 in November 2010. South Korea’s military capacities have grown in selected areas, but given the size and advanced level of neighboring military forces in the region, South Korea will still not feel completely comfortable on its own as an independent player in East Asia. South Korea will also have difficulty broadening its view of global affairs—seeing over the shoulders of China and Japan, respectively—in order to make contributions requisite to its size and status in a global context. Although South Korea has grown as an increasingly capable actor in a regional context, the fundamental choices of independence, alignment within the regional context of Northeast Asia, and alliance with a distant offshore balancer remain essentially the same. South Korea’s diplomatic profile has become more multidimensional at the same time that its political dependency on the United States has diminished, enhancing South Korea’s desire for diplomatic independence as well as its potential attractiveness as a partner with a different type of history and development experience from that of the United States. On the basis of these trends, one might argue that the following are potentially important characteristics of a newly reformulated partnership between the United States and South Korea: 1. A comprehensive alliance should be formed on the basis of a broad convergence of political interests and include traditional security

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as one among many areas of cooperation rather than as the primary focus of cooperation. 2. A comprehensive alliance should reflect a mutual commitment in which needs and responsibilities are shared, rather than being a one-way commitment in which there is an obligation by the United States to provide security without a reciprocal commitment to the partnership. 3. A comprehensive alliance should derive its primary raison d’être from common values internal to the alliance rather than being driven by an external threat (although it is entirely possible that provocative actions by third parties could become the focal point for alliance-based cooperation); however, alliance relations will continue to require exclusivity in sensitive spheres of security cooperation. 4. A comprehensive alliance, in principle, might be expanded or regionalized to include other partners with shared mutual interests in such a way that expands the capacity for security cooperation and production of public goods that enhances regional or global stability. 5. A comprehensive alliance will spread the risk and cost of provision of public goods and will be most effective when partners bring unique skills to meet common traditional or nontraditional security challenges. These five characteristics, or principles, of a comprehensive alliance between the United States and South Korea have the following implications for considering how to revamp the existing alliance relationship to more effectively meet shared needs: • The US-ROK alliance should be based on a broader foundation of political cooperation than currently exists. The existing structure of security cooperation has been critical to sustaining the alliance, but is not sufficient to meet the needs of the expanded political and security partnership. The security alliance has important implications for South Korean security in the event of military conflict, but the true benefits of a comprehensive alliance for South Korea are political—not military. A primary benefit South Korea seeks to derive from the alliance relationship in its modern diplomacy is to utilize the alliance as a platform and as a basis on which to enhance its political leverage in dealing with neighboring countries and to strengthen its position and status in the international community. These needs are not fully served by a relationship that is inordinately focused on military cooperation. As a country that is outside the core power groupings but is nonetheless an important secondary actor in international affairs, South Korea faces the challenge

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The US–South Korea Alliance

of how to improve its influence and standing to make a difference on global issues. Cooperation with the United States can be a politically effective and cost-effective way of enhancing South Korean influence without necessarily sacrificing South Korea’s status as an important and independent actor. Instead, a much broader structure of political coordination must be established in order to derive full advantage from the political aspects of alliance cooperation. • In line with its economic and political transformation, South Korea has already taken a leading role in providing for its own defense, relieving the United States of the full burden that was originally assumed when the United States took responsibility for South Korea’s defense. Given these changes, the terms of the military alliance need to be rewritten—and accompanied by a revolution in the way both countries think of the military alliance. Military commitments to mutual defense should be reciprocal, involving responsibilities and obligations to work together in response to peninsular, regional, and global threats. South Korea has already taken on such burdens in practice in Vietnam and Iraq, reflecting a step toward mutuality in security relations, but the fundamental terms of the relationship should be revised to reflect mutuality in the relationship. • The raison d’être for a US-ROK comprehensive alliance in the twenty-first century should derive from the common interests of the countries in alliance and focused on contributing to a broad conception of security rather than being justified on the basis of targeting a single threat; instead, military cooperation should be organized in such a way as to maximize respective capacities and contributions to preserve regional stability. If military coordination is organized in such a way as to maximize capacity to respond to multiple threats and is embedded in a broader politically based partnership designed to respond to regional, global, and functional security needs, it will be harder for neighbors to object to such cooperation. While there is no immediate reason for alliance coordination to be targeted against a single country, such coordination would retain a level of readiness sufficient to respond to the emergence of threats regardless of their origin. • An interest-based comprehensive alliance might lay the foundation for cooperation with like-minded countries on missions that serve common interests, both within and beyond Northeast Asia. Such an approach would allow for the flexibility to develop a bilateral and a regional response capacity in the event of natural disasters and humanitarian missions such as tsunami relief, environmental accident response, and search-and-rescue missions. Such cooperation might form the core of an

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eventual mechanism for multilateral security cooperation that would respond to common regional and global threats. • A comprehensive alliance already provides a means by which to reduce security costs through burden sharing. Determining a more equitable and sustainable method for spreading those costs—while also developing planning capabilities through which it might be possible for South Korea to develop specialized capacities that might be utilized as a means by which to contribute to international security—would in principle yield cost efficiencies that would free up budgets in both countries for investment in nonmilitary areas. Clear delineation of benefits from cost sharing and recognition of the alliance as a means by which both countries can yield cooperation dividends in the area of security would be an important step toward laying a sustainable foundation for such cooperation. Based on this analysis of specific new and emerging opportunities for US-ROK global and nontraditional security cooperation covered in the remainder of the book, the concluding chapter uses these assumptions as a benchmark for evaluating the areas that might be most promising as building blocks for promoting cooperation necessary to strengthen and expand the US-ROK alliance.

North Korea: The Centerpiece for Expanded US-ROK Alliance Coordination

As one considers the future of the US-ROK alliance in the near term, deterrence toward North Korea remains the raison d’être for the alliance and a near-term sine qua non for any expanded vision of alliance cooperation. This priority has intensified with North Korean nuclear and military provocations in 2010. These incidents have strengthened US-ROK cooperation to deter North Korea, but have also revealed gaps in bilateral coordination. The long-term vision for a comprehensive alliance also looks past North Korea toward continued cooperation to meet regional and global security challenges. This vision is necessary if the USROK security alliance is to be sustainable beyond the North Korean threat, but the North Korean threat remains the primary object that motivates effective alliance coordination. Many newly developing aspects of global cooperation potentially have direct relevance for the future tasks that the alliance may face on the peninsula, thereby serving as a vehicle by which to gain experience

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The US–South Korea Alliance

abroad in preparation for future challenges that may directly affect stability on the Korean peninsula. At the same time, South Korean defense planners face tension between the need to develop expeditionary resources and the potential immediate demands for capacity to meet new challenges in response to North Korean provocations or instability. While this volume focuses attention on new forms of security cooperation against the backdrop of the 2009 Joint Vision Statement and the implications of a “global Korea,” North Korea remains an integral part of the discussion, both because the threat from the North has provided the original rationale for the alliance and because nontraditional security lessons learned by South Korean troops abroad may find particular future relevance at home.

Outline of the Book

This volume evaluates the existing capabilities and potential contributions that South Korea and the United States might make to support expanded US-ROK cooperation to meet a wide range of nontraditional and global security challenges. The following analysis of these newly identified priorities for expanded alliance-based cooperation will provide a concrete basis for evaluating whether these new forms of alliance cooperation can strengthen the foundation for an enduring US-ROK security alliance, despite apparent new challenges to the idea of alliance-based political and security coordination in other parts of the world. This volume focuses primarily on the security aspects of US-ROK cooperation forming the bilateral alliance relationship and does not include an assessment of the ROK-US free trade agreement (KORUS FTA), despite the clear benefits of enhanced integration of the two economies for their long-term strategic partnership.29 In addition, while the volume is a collection of US assessments, the purpose of each contribution is to assess the prospects for practical cooperation in the respective issue areas based on the position of both the United States and South Korea and their mutual interests as they relate to expanded alliance cooperation. Topics have been selected to cover the following areas, starting with issues that are closest to the traditional forms of security cooperation that have formed the core of coordination for many decades. In Chapter 2, Michael McDevitt analyzes the recent expansion of ROK naval capacity, drivers of such developments, and significance for the future of the US-ROK alliance and bilateral navy-to-navy relationship. Kevin Shepard, in Chapter 3, explores the development of a wide range of

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counterterrorism activities through the US-ROK alliance that have been pursued on and off the peninsula in the wake of 9/11. Shepard suggests that South Korea’s growing regional leadership and participation in counterterrorism efforts offer an important opportunity for further strengthening alliance cooperation with the United States while solidifying its value as an active and equal partner. In Chapter 4, Fred McGoldrick considers prospects for a new bilateral civil nuclear energy agreement as a practical lens through which to assess potential cooperation, recognizing new opportunities and concerns arising from the major changes in South Korean capacities and approaches to nonproliferation over the past few decades. James Clay Moltz, in Chapter 5, examines space cooperation as a relatively new area of bilateral interest despite the long duration of the military alliance, and suggests prospects for civil and military space cooperation especially since 2008 and in recent multilateral contexts. In Chapter 6, James Schoff assesses prospects for expanded cooperation to prevent pandemic disease and biological threats, focusing on avian influenza as a challenge that the alliance has relevant resources and capacities to address. He considers US-ROK pandemic cooperation both within and outside the military realm and specifically in the alliance context. Given the emergence of green growth as a major theme of the Lee Myung-bak administration and arguments that South Korea can play a bridging role between developing and developed nations in tackling climate change, Heejun Chang and Lily House-Peters consider in Chapter 7 institutional channels for pursuing these goals and how the United States and South Korea could effectively cooperate in the context of the UN and other venues where global aspects of climate change are being discussed. The volume also highlights the challenges and opportunities inherent in cooperation on global security issues. In Chapter 8, Balbina Hwang highlights South Korea’s past experience with peacekeeping operations in such countries as East Timor and Iraq, the types of support activities the alliance could offer for expanded ROK peacekeeping missions, constraints on US support, and costs and benefits from the South Korean perspective. She explores the South Korean political debate over peacekeeping cooperation pursued through the bilateral alliance as opposed to independent ROK efforts under a UN mandate. Considering recent South Korean experience in such postconflict countries as Iraq and Afghanistan, Michael Finnegan analyzes in Chapter 9 ROK support to US-led missions abroad and implications for alliancebased cooperation in military and broader terms. In Chapter 10, Edward Reed assesses US-ROK cooperation in ODA activities given current

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The US–South Korea Alliance

South Korean contributions and plans to triple its ODA commitments as a new member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee. In the concluding chapter, I consider whether the expansion of the US-ROK alliance agenda to include global and nontraditional security cooperation will ultimately strengthen or weaken the US-ROK alliance. I also identify some challenges that may result from a functional approach to expanded cooperation within the alliance framework, and evaluate whether the vision that has been put in place thus far—and initial efforts to implement that vision—truly add up to a strong foundation for the future of the US-ROK alliance or whether peninsular, regional, and global changes are likely to finally result in a transformed environment that will ultimately preclude the realization of such an ambitious vision for US-ROK partnership on the foundations provided by the USROK security alliance.

Notes 1. US Department of Defense, Global Posture Review, 2005. 2. Rajan Menon, The End of Alliances (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 3. One scenario that suggests the plausibility of the decline of the alliance is laid out in S. Enders Wimbush, “A Parable: The U.S.-ROK Security Relationship Breaks Down,” Asia Policy, no. 5 (January 2008): pp. 7–24, http:// www.nbr.org. 4. Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, June 16, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov. 5. Statement of the US-ROK Summit, August 5, 2008, http://seoul.us embassy.gov. 6. Inspired by the end of the Cold War and the September 11, 2001, attacks, NATO’s purpose and subsequent missions evolved from a focus on defending Western Europe to seeking the peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area, and then began to take on global missions. Cooperation within NATO has since come to encompass a force readiness to manage crises and execute peacekeeping or peace enforcement, as well as defend against biological, chemical, and radiological threats and terrorism. For more information on NATO’s evolving purpose, see NATO, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” November 7– 8, 1991, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm; and NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” April 24, 1999, http://www.nato.int /cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm. 7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, 2008 Diplomatic White Paper, October 27, 2008, http://www.mofat.go.kr/English/. 8. For a detailed comparison of the military structures and objectives of NATO, the US-Japan alliance, and the US-ROK alliance, see Michael Finnegan,

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“Benchmarking America’s Military Alliances: NATO, Japan, and the Republic of Korea,” Center for US-Korea Policy, the Asia Foundation, February 2009, http://www.asiafoundation.org. 9. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, PA: Addison-Wesley Press, 1997). 10. For a comprehensive assessment of US military policy and operations in the Asia Pacific in the context of the restructuring of US forces in the region, see James A. Winnefeld, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin N. Lewis, Lynn D. Pullen, John Y. Schrader, and Michael D. Swaine, “A New Strategy and Fewer Forces: The Pacific Dimension,” RAND, 1992, http://www.rand.org. 11. An Kwang-ch’an, “A Study on the Military System on the Basis of the Constitution; Focused on the Operational Command Authority of the Korean Peninsula,” Ph.D. diss., Dongguk University School of Law, pp. 195–206, cited in Open Source Center Document no. KPP20060214024006. 12. See US-ROK Security Meeting Joint Communiqué, October 8, 1992, http://www.globalsecurity.org. 13. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999). 14. There were also negotiations at the end of the Clinton administration to revise SOFA to give South Korea’s judicial system a greater role in the handling of off-duty offenses involving US service members. 15. Scott Snyder, “North Korean Nuclear Factor and Changing Asia-Pacific Alliances,” in In-Taek Hyun, Kyudok Hong, and Sung-han Kim, eds., AsiaPacific Alliances in the 21st Century: Waxing or Waning? (Seoul: Oreum Publishing Company, 2007), pp. 221–239. 16. Text of President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address, Washington Post, January 29, 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com. 17. Seung-Hwan Kim, “Anti-Americanism in Korea,” Washington Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 1 (Winter 2002–2003), pp. 109–122. 18. David I. Steinberg, ed., Korean Attitudes Toward the United States: Changing Dynamics (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2005); Derek Mitchell, ed., Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the USROK Alliance, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, June 2004. 19. “National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea,” Blue House, Republic of Korea, 2003. See Scott Snyder, “A Comparison of US and South Korean National Security Strategies: Implications for Alliance Coordination Toward North Korea,” in Philip W. Yun and Gi-Wook Shin, North Korea: 2005 and Beyond (Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, 2006), pp. 149–166. 20. Stephen J. Flanagan and James A. Schear, eds., Strategic Challenges: America’s Global Security Agenda (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008), pp. 245–256. 21. Joint Declaration on the ROK-US Alliance and Peace on the Korean Peninsula, November 17, 2005, http://asiafoundation.org. 22. “President Elect Vows Creative Diplomacy,” Korea Times, December 19, 2007. 23. Lee Myung-bak’s address to the Korea Society 2008 Annual Dinner, April 15, 2008, http://www.koreasociety.org.

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The US–South Korea Alliance

24. The 9/11 attacks inspired the 2002 US Security Strategy, in which the United States declared “war against terrorists of global reach,” and expressed its expectation that allies would help to “promote global security.” In the chapter in this report titled “Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends,” the United States sought greater support from its allies in this war on terrorism, the scope of which extends beyond specific regions, requiring global cooperation. 25. See John R. Schmidt, “Last Alliance Standing? NATO After 9/11,” Washington Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 1 (Winter 2006), pp. 93–106. 26. Lee’s “Global Korea” campaign is detailed in “Keynote Address by President Lee Myung-bak at Global Korea 2009,” February 24, 2009, http://english.president.go.kr. 27. Michael Finnegan, “Managing Unmet Expectations in the US-Japan Alliance,” The National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report #17, November 2009. 28. The Gulf War and the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis caused tension in the US-Japan alliance and highlighted its geographic and capability limitations. The US-Japan alliance evolved in the post–Cold War period to emphasize peace and stability first in the region, and was challenged to take on global missions post-9/11. US-Japan alliance cooperation has expanded to include noncombat reconstruction, peacekeeping, and international humanitarian relief operations, rear-area support, and efforts in Proliferation Security Initiative and Missile Defense. For details on Japan’s transformation, refer to Noboru Yamaguchi, ”Japanese Adjustments to the Security Alliance with the United States: Evolution of Policy on the Roles of the Self Defense Force,” in The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 73–90. For details on NATO’s transformation, see note 6, this chapter, and Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 5 (September/October 2006), pp. 105–113. 29. For a recent US assessment of the KORUS FTA, see William H. Cooper, Mark E. Manyin, Remy Jurenas, and Michaela D. Platzer, “The Proposed US–South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implications,” Congressional Research Service Report, March 24, 2011, http://www .fas.org.

2 The Maritime Relationship Michael McDevitt

BEFORE MOVING TO A DISCUSSION OF THE FUTURE OF A United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) maritime relationship, it is useful to keep the geographic context of Northeast Asia in mind. It is a truism that “everything changes but geography.” Geography defines the “strategic DNA”—the military culture—that informs how the ROK and its neighbors strategically interrelate. Sayings such as “Korea is a shrimp among whales” or “Korea is a dagger pointed at Japan” are geographically based strategic aphorisms that define the Republic of Korea’s neighborhood. During the centuries of its hermit kingdom existence, Korea’s only external relationship of significance was with China. As a result, Korean strategic thinking, ultimately for both North and South Korea, was shaped by China’s influence.1 Since its 1953 division, Korea has developed the characteristics of both a continental and a maritime power. North of the thirty-eighth parallel, North Korea is economically, militarily, and politically continental in outlook. Since 1945, North Korea’s economic and political relationships have depended on either of the two great continental powers on its northern frontier—Russia (the former Soviet Union) or China. South of the armistice line, the Republic of Korea has become a de facto maritime nation in the decades since the end of the Korean War in 1953. Its economy, politics, and entire web of relationships are across the sea. But, since that war ended with an armistice, the threat of another North Korean attack still looms. As a result, the military culture of South Korea has been predominately army oriented. The inherent maritime orientation of South Korea was not translated into naval power because of

21

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The US–South Korea Alliance

the threat posed by the North Korean Army, postured close to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and because throughout its existence the ROK has had the benefit of a surrogate navy—the US Seventh Fleet—that implicitly looked after its off-peninsula maritime interests. Therefore, it is somewhat surprising to realize that South Korea has for the last decade and a half been constructing a very credible oceangoing navy. The focus of this chapter will be on this change, the rationale behind it, and what this means for the future of the US-ROK alliance.

The ROK Naval Tradition: “Just Nothing Whatsoever”

The ROK Navy (ROKN) points with justifiable pride to the heritage of naval prowess represented by Admiral Yi Sun-sin in the late sixteenth century.2 Yi was the tactical genius behind the development and employment of so-called Korean turtle ships. These ships were technically far superior to the motley array of vessels the Japanese had assembled to transport and then resupply its invading army during the 1592–1597 Imjin War. Thanks to Yi, the Japanese lost sea control and were unable to resupply the Japanese forces in Korea, and were eventually forced to withdraw.3 However, in the modern life of Northeast Asia, after the coming of Western powers, Korea had no real navy. Its fishermen plied the sea, of course, but as an isolated hermit kingdom it remained aloof, economically destitute and militarily backward and with no evinced interest in following Japan’s example of creating modern military and naval capability. To a large degree Korean security in the nineteenth century was underwritten by Imperial China. When Japan thrashed China in the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War—which foreshadowed the collapse of the Qing Dynasty—Korea was left exposed and vulnerable. During the fifteen years between the Sino-Japanese War and the annexation of Korea in 1910, Japan replaced China’s Sino-centric strategic order in Northeast Asia. When World War II ended in 1945, Korea, after thirty-five years as a Japanese colony, had no modern independent naval tradition to draw upon. In the words of a retired ROKN admiral, “The ROK Navy was created from nothing in November 1945. There were no men who had any experience with naval life, no ships, no logistics supplies, no maintenance facilities, no educational facilities and no manuals. Just nothing whatsoever.”4 This triggered a relationship between the US Navy (USN) and the soon-to-be-created ROKN that endures to this day. The USN provided

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landing craft, yard craft, and minesweepers. Then, following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, a US Naval Advisory Group was established. As a result, in addition to equipment, USN organizational concepts and approaches to training were the model for the ROKN. In discussions with retired ROK naval officers, they recall that officers who spoke good English were moved ahead professionally, and remembered that it was considered a professionally significant step if they were selected to attend US Navy schools in the United States. This long-standing relationship provides a firm foundation upon which to build for the future. However, it also needs to be acknowledged that over the decades US naval officers have not had nearly as much exposure to their ROKN counterparts as they have had to Japanese naval officers. Japan is the homeport for much of the US Seventh Fleet; the proximity of the two naval establishments makes interaction among mid-grade and senior officers easy, and the mission areas and concepts of operations are similar. As a result, the USN and Japan Maritime SelfDefense Forces (JMSDF) have trained together at sea, exercising openocean scenarios. In contrast, the ROKN operational focus has for obvious reasons been on coastal defense missions, which have never been a primary US Navy mission area. As a result, USN and ROKN operations have largely been confined to one major exercise per year, an exercise oriented on defending South Korea from the North. With the ROKN’s more recent focus on blue-water operations, this period of operational asymmetry between the maritime forces of South Korea and Japan in the perception of US naval officers should draw to a close. As ROKN operations expand to include regional and even global missions, there will be more opportunities for the USN and ROKN to interact operationally on the high seas.

Modernization of the ROK Navy

The official strategic vision for a new regional ROKN was outlined in March 2001 when President Kim Dae-jung said that South Korea would create a new “strategic mobile fleet” consisting of destroyers, submarines, and antisubmarine aircraft. In a speech before graduating midshipmen at the Korea Naval Academy in the southeastern port city of Chinhae, he said, “We will soon have a strategic mobile fleet that protects state interests in the five big oceans and plays a role of keeping peace in the world.”5 Without question, this is a vision one would associate with a regional or even global naval force, a force that could

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The US–South Korea Alliance

address issues of strategic concern that range beyond self-defense against the North. The Kim speech seems to have marked the fruition of ideas that had been percolating for several years; ambitions for an oceangoing navy were first publicly voiced by a responsible official in 1995 in a speech by Admiral An Pyong-tae upon assuming the office of ROKN Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).6 Today, the ROKN is well along the path of adding capabilities that will permit it to be both a homeland defense navy and a navy that can secure South Korean national interests on the high seas. This is not easy. The ROKN still has to be prepared to deal with a very real threat from the North, while also preparing for regional and global maritime missions for which it has little experience. It has to do both simultaneously, in the context of a South Korean military culture traditionally focused on ground warfare. The ROKN’s evolution, from a small force primarily dedicated to protecting the nation’s territorial waters and islands to a force that also has regional ambitions, started in the early 1990s with the decision to create a submarine force. The underlying conceptual basis can arguably be traced back to the Park Chung-hee era of the 1970s. As Victor Cha writes, “Integral to Park’s overall visions of a rich nation and strong army, [the] Yulgok [program] emphasized expansion in size, modernization and ‘self reliant’ development of South Korean defense capabilities.”7 The way the submarine program was actually executed has become the template for broader ROK navy building. The concept is a sensible incremental approach that gradually introduced new capabilities one step at a time. Not only is this a wise way to begin, it is also more budgetarily sustainable. It involves procuring and then eventually building in ROK shipyards a few smaller, less sophisticated classes of ships, and then based on the experience gained, gradually introducing increasingly sophisticated ship classes. For example, three small, 150-ton, coastal submarines were procured from Germany in the late 1980s. Three Type 209 submarines built in Germany followed these boats, and they, in turn, were followed by South Korean–built boats. Today, fifteen years later, the ROKN has ten Type 209 submarines and is building three new Type 214 boats, which are bigger and more capable. The first of these, with air independent propulsion, was launched in June 2006. The surface navy has grown as well—generally following the same template, only in this case all of the ships were built in South Korea, with the sophisticated combat systems coming from abroad. In the late

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1990s the three ships in the KDX I (3,200-ton) destroyer class were followed by six KDX II (4,500-ton) destroyers. Today the ROKN is building world-class guided missile–equipped destroyers: the 7,000-ton KDX IIIs, equipped with the AEGIS combat system. The first of this class (the KNS Sejong the Great) was launched in May 2007. A new class of nextgeneration frigates is also planned. Although open-ocean ROK navy building has been under way since the 1990s, the vision of a “five-ocean navy” was officially captured in September 2005 by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) “Defense Reform 2020,” whose underlying emphasis is on issues beyond the peninsula with a concomitant reduction in ground-force emphasis. The MND plan had been a work in progress since at least 1999.8 All the pieces of a true ROK open-ocean navy are programmed to be in place by around 2020.9 The centerpiece will be a five-ship class of large amphibious ships. This is a 14,000-ton ship that can carry some 750 South Korean marines, landing craft, and upward of ten helicopters. It is the perfect ship class for responding to crises and supporting UNendorsed peacekeeping operations. It also will enable the ROK to respond to the natural disasters that regularly plague East Asia. As currently envisioned these new forces will be organized into three “task flotillas,” one of which would always be on patrol south of Jeju Island (a glance at the map suggests that such an operating area would cover the entrance to the Korea Strait, the sea-lanes of communication [SLOCs] into the Yellow Sea, and the traffic headed to or from the East China Sea). The ROKN also plans to transform its marine corps from a force organized to fight in a North Korean invasion back to a more traditional amphibious response force. Of course, this emerging capability is also ideally suited for deploying force to underwrite ROK claims to disputed islands. If all the planned amphibious ships are actually built, South Korea will have the ability to embark a full brigade of ROK marines. The realization of this five-ocean navy, however, is likely to be delayed. In March 2011 the Ministry of National Defense announced its Korean Defense Reform 307 Plan, which foreshadows reductions in ROKN funding dedicated to a blue-water force structure. Press reports suggest that efforts to develop the blue-water force are being slowed, and plans to build more AEGIS destroyers and attack submarines have stalled. It seems that ROK Navy shipbuilding is going to place priority on addressing shortcomings in the antisubmarine warfare capabilities in the corvettes of the Cheonan class, which are mainstays of South Korea’s coastal protection capabilities. Thus, modernization will first

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The US–South Korea Alliance

focus on introducing the new class of patrol frigates that were already planned as replacements for the older, less capable ships. Still, despite this return to a focus on North Korea and the most immediate security problem that Seoul faces, it is evident that the ROKN has come a long way in its development, and that its leaders are set in the longer term to acquire a blue-water force.

Rationale: Why a “Five Big Ocean” Force?

Because building and sustaining a modern blue-water navy capable of operating throughout the world is a very expensive proposition, understanding the reasons that South Korean leaders have been willing to commit the necessary resources to navy building provides clues in understanding South Korea’s long-term strategic vision for the role that it hopes to play in the future. The willingness to invest in an expensive blue-water force that will also command significant resources to sustain it once built means that difficult resource allocation decisions have been taken that have long-term implications for future defense budgets. South Korea’s long-term military modernization plan is not only focused on the North Korean threat. The capabilities sought, especially major surface ships, clearly indicate a shift from a single-minded defense against an invasion to broader regional or even global contingencies.10 While it would be a mistake to read too much into ROK navy building as a stalking horse for broader ROK strategic ambitions (or its “vision”), the level of commitment of resources is suggestive. Appreciating the factors behind Seoul’s defense resource decisions is important for broader maritime cooperation because, as we will see, they align with US strategic interests in most, but not all, cases. The Desire to Be a Responsible Stakeholder

First, and most important, is the fact that the leadership of South Korea has come to appreciate that South Korea is a significant player on the world stage. The size of its economy, its vibrant political culture, and its overall success have contributed to a political and strategic weltanschauung that supports an important global role for the Republic of Korea. In other words, the Republic of Korea wants to be taken seriously as an influential, and responsible, global actor, which suggests that the characterization of Korea as a “shrimp among whales” has long since lost its validity. This change is manifested by an evolution in South Korean

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strategic thought from a peninsula-oriented view to one with ambitions to be a regional or even global player. This is one of the most interesting security-oriented trends in Northeast Asia. It also reflects the reality that for the first time in modern East Asian history, China, Japan, and South Korea are all militarily powerful, politically stable, and economically healthy. Just as Kim Dae-jung’s 2001 speech provided a public imprimatur for an oceangoing navy, the June 2009 Lee Myung-bak–Barack Obama presidential summit in Washington provides a very recent official codification of the ROK’s expanded strategic vision. The vision is made clear in the opening sentence of the Joint Vision Statement for the alliance, which indicates that the goal of the alliance is to “ensure a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia Pacific region, and the world.” The statement goes on to say that the United States and the Republic of Korea will work closely together to address “global challenges.”11 Perhaps the best contemporary encapsulation of Seoul’s broader vision was provided in 2006 during the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore. Then–ROK minister of defense Yoon Kwang Ung (a retired admiral) delivered a presentation titled “Deploying Forces for International Security: ROK’s Perspective.” In this presentation, he highlighted the ROK’s growing reputation for being a “responsible stakeholder.” He made clear that over the past ten years the ROK has actively participated in international peacekeeping as well as humanitarian relief and that it was actively procuring new capabilities to be able to do more in this regard. He also made clear that legislation in South Korea was being changed to make it easier to undertake these missions.12 The fact that the Kim, Roh Moo-hyun, and Lee administrations have all endorsed a broader strategic role for South Korea suggests there is a political consensus within South Korea that embraces the idea that the ROK should play a regional and global security role associated with responsible stakeholdership. The Geographic and Economic Factors

For all practical purposes the ROK is an island country. Today the ROK is the world’s fifteenth-largest economy (purchasing-power-parity terms) and twelfth-largest trading nation. Foreign trade represented approximately 70 percent of its GDP in 2008, and a whopping 99.7 percent of South Korea’s trade was conducted via sea routes. About 100 percent of its crude oil, 90 percent of its raw steel, and 73 percent of its food come via ship. These ships travel on the major sea-lanes of the world.13

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The US–South Korea Alliance

This reality is a big reason that Seoul is engaged in developing an oceangoing navy. Since the end of the Cold War, US naval officers and maritime strategists have not spent much time thinking about sea-lanes of communications per se. This is very different from the Cold War era, when determining how to secure the trans-Atlantic SLOC dominated much of the US Navy’s strategic and force-structure planning. Today, SLOC defense is a “lesser-included” benefit provided by forward-deployed naval forces. The concept of credible peacetime presence in East Asia and the Middle East has subsumed post–Cold War SLOC protection missions. Something very different is taking place in South Korea. The ROK government, led by the ROKN, has come to recognize the importance of SLOCs. At a 2007 conference one South Korean scholar made the point, “It is no exaggeration to say that protection of South Korea’s SLOCs is a life and death issue for the Republic.”14 According to the ROKN’s Glossary of the Terms of Maritime Strategy, the Republic of Korea depends upon four major SLOCs:15 1. The Korea-China Sea Lane directly connects the two countries’ major ports. China is now South Korea’s “four number ones” in terms of economic activity: (1) largest trading partner, (2) largest export market, (3) largest trade-surplus source, and (4) top outbound investment destination. As a result, South Koreans conclude that the importance of this sea-lane is certain to grow in the foreseeable future. However, the sealane also is plagued by illegal activities, maritime incidents, and disputed claims. 2. The Southwest Sea Lane reaches as far as the Middle East, Europe, and Africa, via the East and South China Seas. This is the major “oil SLOC.” This sea-lane is characterized by chokepoints (Taiwan, Bashi, and Malacca Straits), territorial disputes (South China Sea), and piracy. This, of course, is the sea-lane that Seoul’s antipiracy naval task force is currently protecting. 3. The Southeast Sea Lane crosses the Pacific. It passes south of Japan and Hawaii, and goes to North and South America. Not only is it a traditional commercial route to the United States and Latin America, it is the route, in reverse, that reinforcements from the United States would travel should a war or contingency take place on the Korean peninsula. 4. The Korea-Japan Sea Lane directly links the two countries for commercial and wartime purposes. In particular, this sea-lane would have a direct bearing on ROK-US sustainability in case of war. It con-

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nects to the peninsula the “rear-area support” that comes from US bases in Japan. The Evolving Nature of the North Korean Threat

Apparently, the basic strategic assumption behind President Kim Daejung’s “sunshine policy” was that Pyongyang was ready to acknowledge that it cannot reunite Korea on its terms and was willing to coexist with Seoul. A further assumption was that it was only a matter of time before the Pyongyang regime began to economically and politically evolve in a way that would lead to peaceful reunification with Seoul as the capital of a reunited Korean state. Although North Korean actions after the current Lee Myung-bak administration took office have made the assumptions underlying “sunshine” seem naïve, during the decade the policy was in place (1997–2007) there was a shift in ROK defense policy that downplayed the salience of the North Korea threat. This shift was also fueled politically by a nationalistic political dynamic in South Korea aimed at loosening dependence on the United States and US-ROK alliance. This was especially pronounced during the administration of Roh Moo-hyun.16 Seoul—by its actions, if not its words—increasingly focused on offpeninsula issues, especially territorial disputes with Japan, SLOC issues, and energy security. This had the budgetary effect of making more resources available for the ROK Navy and Air Force, because these are the services that would be essential for off-peninsula operations. The ROKN’s budgetary prospects during the decade were also enhanced by successful combat operations at sea against North Korea. The 1998 and 2002 West Sea battles, in which the ROKN destroyed several North Korean Navy ships, were reminders that while a North Korean invasion may not seem likely, smaller engagements can still take place. It was important for deterrence, national morale, and service prestige that the ROKN has demonstrated its ability to deal with any North Korean provocations in the maritime domain, and to win engagements if shooting starts. In addition to the 2009 Northern Limit Line (NLL) firefight17 and other issues associated with the NLL that remain today, the March 2010 KNS Cheonan sinking by a North Korean submarine, followed by the December 2010 artillery barrage against Yeonpyeong Island, served as a clarion call to the ROK leadership that North Korea remains a serious military threat. Consequently, North Korea has once again become the single-minded focus of the ROK Ministry of National Defense, which

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The US–South Korea Alliance

has redesignated the North as a “standing threat” from its previous categorization as a “potential threat.” In practical terms, this will have the short-term effect of shifting defense resources back to the army, and reprioritizing the navy’s modernization in line with the aforementioned Defense Reform 307 Plan. To address the primary North Korean threat, the ROKN has approximately 110 corvettes and patrol craft in active service. The primary mission of these units is coastal/littoral defense. These forces are also being modernized, with two new classes of missile-equipped patrol boats (400 and 200 tons), beginning to enter service. These new patrol craft, the ROK Navy’s extant large inventory of patrol craft, its minesweeping force, and its impressive submarine and antisubmarine forces are well suited to dealing with North Korean maritime threats. Whether they are up to the task is a question I am not equipped to judge, but clearly the leadership in Seoul thinks they are, otherwise different shipbuilding and ship procurement decisions would have been made. While the North Korean provocations of 2010 have understandably shifted the Lee administration’s focus to addressing first the most immediate security problem that Seoul faces, South Korea’s longer-term vision remains aimed at achieving its global ambitions. Besides wanting to play that larger global role, South Korea is also hedging against an uncertain regional power evolution. Like most countries, South Korea wants to enjoy a degree of strategic independence, in the sense that it cannot be coerced by any neighbor, nor must it depend upon another country to look after its own national interests. It currently has the economic means to pursue that vision. South Korea will likely want to have some sort of security alliance relationship with the United States, but Seoul presumably does not want to have to depend upon the US Seventh Fleet as its surrogate oceangoing navy. Nor does South Korea want to be dependent upon Japan working in harness with the United States for its maritime security. Finally, South Korea does not want to be under the thumb of China and its increasingly capable navy. The China Factor

A “history war” between China and Korea has been raging for at least a decade. One of the most neuralgic issues between China and South Korea (and perhaps North Korea as well) involves what China calls its “Northeast Project,” which Koreans believe is an attempt to hijack Korean history and incorporate it into China’s own. The fight is over the legacy of the Kingdom of Koguryo (Gaogouli in Chinese).

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The Kingdom of Koguryo existed from the first century B.C. to A.D. 668. At its height, under the emperor Gwanggaeto the Great, not coincidentally, the name of the lead ship of the ROK Navy’s KDX 1–class destroyers, Koguryo controlled a significant section of Northeast Asia, including territory that is now part of South Korea, North Korea, and China. From a Korean historical vantage point, it has long been considered one of the Three Kingdoms of Korea, a major wellspring of Korean civilization and culture. China has claimed that Gaogouli is historically Chinese—an assertion that outrages Koreans. Since at least 1980, the Chinese have claimed that Gaogouli is an integral part of the historical concept of “China.” Koreans scoff at such assertions, and make counteraccusations that describe Chinese historical revisionism as motivated by claims on Korean territory. Koreans argue that the Chinese interpretation does not hold water; they say that it is a clear political attempt to provide legitimacy for current Chinese borders by pretending that everything currently part of China has always been part of China.18 As one respected Korean China expert argues, it is a mistake to dismiss the Koguryo issue as an academic issue. In fact, in 1996 a Chinese government–sponsored campaign was ratified in the name of the Politburo Standing Committee by Hu Jintao. Some believe the political rationale behind the history war is the 2 million ethnic Koreans in China’s northeast provinces, and China’s fear that a reunited Korea could lay claim to what the Koreans call the “Gando” region, which includes much of present-day Manchuria.19 Another related neuralgic China issue is the apparent assumption within the ROK military that if North Korea were to collapse, the Chinese would intervene. The working assumption is that China would almost certainly try to intervene to sustain North Korea as a “buffer zone” because the establishment of a pro-Western regime would not be a good situation for China.20 Should North Korea collapse, there is the worry that a large number of refugees trying to escape from North Korea will take to the sea. Just as Vietnamese boat people became a maritime humanitarian issue following the fall of South Vietnam in 1973, there is every possibility that the ROKN, the China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and probably the US Navy would become involved in rescuing these North Koreans, should central authority in the North evaporate. In such humanitarian interventions, the potential for misunderstanding among naval and coast guard ships is real. This is one area ripe for ROKN-USN collaborative planning. Including the PLAN in such a collaboration

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The US–South Korea Alliance

would obviously be desirable, but it is virtually impossible to engage any official Chinese interlocutor in discussions regarding the potential failure of the Kim Jong-il regime because of its political sensitivity. South Korea and China recognize that their navies are active in the waters that wash the shores of both Korea and China. Both navies have recognized the need for cooperation in the Yellow/West Sea to deal with problems associated with refugees and issues such as illegal fishing and smuggling. This is the primary rationale behind the decision to establish a hotline between the ROKN Second Fleet and the PLAN North Sea Fleet in Qingdao. The link was put into operation in November 2008.21 The Yellow/West Sea is also an area where the ROK and China disagree over how to demarcate the continental shelf and overlapping exclusive economic zones (EEZs). This water space is also a prime local operating area of the PLAN and ROKN.22 The Japan Factor

In a recent article, Kim Taewoo, vice president of the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), wrote, The United States needs to be well advised over the magnitude of the Dokdo issue. Washington is well aware of the cruelty of past Japanese colonial rule, and the fact that Japan is far from repenting its past . . . the United States knows that Japan’s claims to Dokdo are shameless impudence to a neighboring country it harmed in the past.23

Many American observers of the territorial disputes between the ROK and Japan over Dokdo/Takeshima are puzzled because they consider the islets themselves a bunch of rocks not worth arguing about, much less fighting over. This misses the point. In many ways the disputes between Korea and Japan over Dokdo/Takeshima are a manifestation of the antipathy that many Koreans have toward Japan. Although these disputed islets have no intrinsic value, the associated economic zone is seen by Koreans as quite important. Thus, the sovereignty issue is not simply a matter of nationalism but also an issue of economic potential. The Dokdo dispute has such symbolic importance to South Koreans that they named their largest warship KNS Dokto. It is the first of South Korea’s new class of amphibious ships. This is a not-too-subtle signal that the ROK has capabilities in hand to either seize or hold the islets if it comes to that. Many in the South Korean military believe, probably correctly, that should a crisis with Japan ever arise, they cannot depend

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upon the United States to take their side.24 Thus, a South Korean oceangoing navy provides Seoul with a hedge against Japan’s well-recognized excellence as a regional naval power. This is not to claim that hedging against Japan is the primary motivation behind the decision to build up the ROKN, but it is certainly a factor. The ambiguity of South Korean attitudes toward Japan—a combination of visceral dislike, admiration, and collaboration—should not be a surprise to close observers of relationships in Northeast Asia. The episodic track record of the last twenty years of Japanese-ROK militaryto-military engagement is a classic illustration of how prickly the South Koreans are about issues surrounding Japan’s colonial and World War II history. Military relations between the two have been the first casualties of any diplomatic dust-up between Seoul and Tokyo. From a US policy point of view, promoting a “virtual” alliance among South Korea, Japan, and the United States is very difficult, despite years of trying by the State and Defense departments.25

Prospects for Enhanced Naval Cooperation Between the ROK and United States

The prospects for enhanced naval cooperation between South Korea and the United States are very good. A six-decades-old professional relationship makes it easy for the two navies to work together as the ROKN focuses on the transition from coastal defense to regional operations. Because the ROK is transforming into an oceangoing force, collaboration becomes simpler because new ROK Navy open-ocean missions are more closely aligned with the traditional operations of the US Navy. As the mission sets of the two navies converge, more opportunities for the two navies to work together will emerge. For example, the new ROKN AEGIS-equipped destroyer sailed to Hawaiian waters in 2010 to participate in USN system qualification and training. As the US-ROK maritime relationship grows closer, American interlocutors will need to develop a greater appreciation of South Korea’s strategic worldview. China looms large in South Korean security calculations. Geographic proximity and a close economic relationship with China make South Koreans acutely sensitive to Chinese reactions to anything that might be construed as being counter to Chinese security interests. One such issue revolves around the transformation in mission and posture of US forces stationed in South Korea. Over the last five years, US and South Korean defense officials have been working toward

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The US–South Korea Alliance

the objective that US Forces Korea (USFK) would be repostured, trained, and equipped so that they can be employed in missions that are regional or even global in nature rather than being limited only to defense of the Korean peninsula. This has come to be characterized as providing “strategic flexibility” for US forces on the peninsula. Expanding the role of USFK beyond defending the ROK became a major policy issue in South Korea because it raised the possibility that those forces could become involved in conflicts that were counter to the interests of the ROK—especially a Taiwan crisis with China. From Washington’s perspective, this issue was resolved in 2006 during the first strategic dialogue meeting between the US and ROK governments, when Washington officially acknowledged its sensitivity to Seoul’s concerns about unwilling or involuntary involvement in US crises or military activity beyond the Korean peninsula. While Americans may consider the problem solved, it remains a sensitive issue in Seoul because of ongoing concerns about Chinese perceptions regarding the expansion of the US-ROK alliance beyond the defense of South Korea. The Chinese have apparently been rather candid on this point in bilateral meetings with ROK officials.26 The Chinese assert that “strategic flexibility” is simply a euphemism that cloaks either direct involvement of US forces in South Korea in the containment of China or involvement in a Taiwan crisis. At the same time, the Chinese are also critical of the US-ROK alliance. For example, at the time of the May 2008 ROK-China summit, which established a “strategic cooperative partnership” between Seoul and Beijing, China’s foreign ministry spokesman remarked that the ROK-US alliance is a “relic” of past history. He went on to suggest that since it was formed in the Cold War as a military alliance, the alliance is inadequate to cope with the urgent global and regional problems of Northeast Asia, and that China’s “New Security Concept” was the much-preferred form of security relationship.27 As a result, the ROK security establishment feels the need to “ease concerns of China over the strengthening of the U.S.-ROK alliance.” Apparently, this is one reason why Seoul has been willing to develop its bilateral relationship with China by increasing cooperation in all areas, including the military arena. The objective is “to make China friendly to the ROK and, at the same time, cooperative towards the ROK-US alliance.”28 This implies that South Korea will need to pursue a national security strategy that balances relations between the United States and China. Clearly, one of the most important strategic challenges for Seoul in the future will be achieving “harmony between the ROK-US alliance

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and the ROK-China strategic partnership.”29 As the maritime partnership becomes closer, US interlocutors need to understand this strategic bind that Seoul finds itself in and remain alert to the fact that agreement on some ideas for increased maritime cooperation may take longer to reach because Seoul is weighing Beijing’s potential reaction. It is incumbent on the US side to be sensitive to Seoul’s strategic dilemma.

Implications of the OPCON Shift on Future Maritime Cooperation

South Koreans refer to the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) and the concomitant disestablishment of Combined Forces Command (CFC) as the “Koreanization of Korean Defense.” 30 This characterization is itself suggestive and reflects the attitude of the Roh administration that floated the idea in 2005. Since that time, however, many South Korea security experts have begun to question the timing, if not the idea itself.31 Opposition is based on the shift from “one command, two nations” to “two commands, two nations.” This approach is seen as dangerous because it violates the principle of unity of command. To some it is perceived as the first US step in backing away from the defense commitment to South Korea. The recent attacks on the South by North Korea also reinforce another concern: that the North Korean threat has not gone away, and until it does South Korea and the United States would be foolish to disestablish CFC. The reality is that the shift in OPCON from CFC to the ROK military will inevitably mean a shift from “institutional cooperation” toward “selective cooperation,” in which political factors become more predominant. As long as “selective cooperation” includes greater maritime cooperation, the OPCON transfer should be a positive factor for the future. That will not happen automatically, however, and in the case of the severed formal institutional relationships something will need to take its place. That something might be a “common strategic vision” with the US Navy. South Korean strategists have been thinking about this and suggest that a common strategic vision would “address security situations both on the Korean peninsula as well as in the region, and will require close coordination at the strategic policy level.”32 This broad conception of a common vision permits a very broad agenda that could include issues such as trilateral cooperation with Japan; shared assessments of Chinese intentions; and cooperation on nontraditional maritime security issues, such as the ongoing cooperation on antipiracy patrols, disaster relief, SLOC secu-

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The US–South Korea Alliance

rity, and the like. Having a “common plan” will be especially important after the OPCON transfer is complete since there will be no combined staff at the ready to orchestrate operations.

Antipiracy Operations: A Case Study in USN-ROKN Global Maritime Cooperation

A commonplace observation is that operations at sea will not eradicate piracy; eradication can only be accomplished with the imposition of law and order in Somalia, which does not seem likely in the near to medium term. Thus, the best that maritime forces can do is try to keep piracy in check. In other words, today’s antipiracy coalition seems destined to be a very long-term mission that will test the political will of the countries involved as well as challenge the ability of the navies involved to routinely rotate ships on station. Setting aside the long-term implications of maintaining an antipiracy maritime force, the response by the international community has provided a unique opportunity for many navies to gather together in a common purpose. The ROK government’s decision in 2009 to dispatch a task group, which has been named the Cheonghae Unit, comprising one KDX II–class destroyer (4,500 tons) that carries a Lynx helicopter, three RIBs, and a VBSS team of thirty people, was evidence of the desire to play a broader global stakeholder role by demonstrating that the Republic of Korea has the means and ability to make a contribution to global order. The ROK Navy Task Force has two missions—protecting South Korean–flagged merchant traffic and supporting antipiracy operations more broadly by joining the Combined Maritime Force (CMF), also known as Task Force 151.33 In January 2011 the ROKN Task Force successfully executed a counterpiracy rescue operation in the Arabian Sea, retaking the South Korean chemical tanker Samho Jewlery from Somali hijackers. The United States assisted in this mission by evacuating the tanker’s wounded captain via helicopter after the firefight between South Korean commandos and the pirates. The antipiracy deployments (at the time of this writing the ROKN was on its eighth counterpiracy rotation) is an important event for the ROKN: the first operation in which the navy has had to sustain a force at sea thousands of miles from home for several months. An antipiracy deployment is a very useful “battle laboratory” for the ROK Navy, because it has the opportunity to observe close at hand the tactics, techniques, and procedures of other navies, adopt best practices, and refine its own concepts of operations. Distant deployments of this sort high-

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light the importance of logistics and will provide many lessons learned for the future. Most important, this operation is a real manifestation of the shared US-ROK vision of an alliance that is global in nature, and provides a basis for future maritime operations that the United States and South Korea can conduct together or undertake as part of a larger coalition.

Conclusion

For a half-century, US Army–to–ROK Army interaction has been the central feature of the US–South Korean military relationship. Now, as it evolves into one with greater regional and international scope, the alliance will out of necessity increasingly rest on a strong foundation of navy-to-navy cooperation—a historic departure for both navies. Over the past fifty-five years, navy-to-navy cooperation was, with a few exceptions, limited to dividing the tasks and responsibilities associated with defending against North Korea. This remains relevant today, but it is not sufficient. Until the turn of this century, the actual capabilities of each navy did not match up well, with the exception of very specific coastal defense missions such as minesweeping. In addition, exercises tended to be scripted and pro forma. That is no longer the case. Defense of the peninsula is still an important shared mission, because North Korea remains a problem. As long as the threat of another North Korean invasion remains a possibility, albeit a remote one, ROK strategic planning must sustain some focus close to home. But the relationship between the US and ROK navies need not remain stuck in the past. Assuming operational control of its forces in time of war satisfies the natural political desire of South Korea to be seen as an equal, and in some cases leading, partner in security issues dealing with its own fate. Furthermore, despite a slower introduction of large warships like the AEGIS destroyers, the reality remains that the ROK Navy has become more than simply a coastal defense force—it is a regional navy of note. That reality means that close navy-to-navy ties will continue to command attention of senior US naval leaders in the Pacific, and that with future growth of the ROK Navy, the naval relationship will evolve into one that is more equitable. The apparent working assumption among South Korea planners that China will act in ways counter to ROK interests should North Korea collapse, nationalistic (patriotic) outrage over excessive historical and territorial claims, and concerns about the growth of the People’s Liberation

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The US–South Korea Alliance

Army (PLA), especially its navy and air force, combine to create a strategic predisposition in the ROK to hedge its bets with China by sustaining a strong US-ROK alliance. On the other hand, for reasons of geography, history, culture, and growing economic connections with China, South Korean strategists are careful to take Chinese perceptions into account when its security relationship with the United States goes beyond the defense of South Korea. The Koreans are not blind to this dilemma. Since China has already made known its anxieties regarding the issue of “strategic flexibility,” it is not unreasonable to anticipate that China will continue to use the opportunities provided by ongoing ROKChina senior military dialogues to raise this issue. This could make the ROK military, including of course the ROKN, become more conflicted as it seeks to balance its relationship with the United States and China. For both political and security reasons, this need to balance may make it far more difficult for the US-ROK alliance to be as comprehensive as both navies may desire in achieving a common or complementary strategic vision, something that will have to be encapsulated in a supporting document to the broader alliance vision of June 2009. To achieve a common strategic vision, US interlocutors will need to understand long-term US objectives for the alliance. What is Washington’s future vision for the US-ROK alliance? As both countries work to put flesh on the bones of the 2009 Joint Vision Statement, naval cooperation will inevitably be a key element because South Korea and the United States both have global maritime interests that overlap in many important ways. Now that South Korea is putting in place the naval capabilities necessary to support those interests, it is reasonable to assume that addressing maritime problems such as antipiracy will increasingly be on the alliance agenda. Alliance managers will likely need to work out some sort of understanding of “interest-based shared roles and missions” that will help shape planning, exercises, and concepts of operations for both military and naval establishments. There is a rich menu of topics for the ROKN and USN to discuss, such as regional stability, China, cooperation among Northeast Asian navies, the Global Maritime Partnership (formerly called the 1,000-ship navy), regional missile defense, information sharing, humanitarian assistance, UN peacekeeping operations, piracy, disaster relief, sea-lane, security, and the maritime aspects of the war on terrorism. Clearly, US and ROK naval interests do not entirely overlap when it comes to perceptions and concerns about Japan. The US Navy in its dealings with their ROKN counterparts will have to be clear that, while

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they appreciate Seoul’s feelings regarding Japan’s inability to satisfactorily atone for past wrongs, as fellow democracies with common interests, the Republic of Korea and Japan should have a close strategic relationship. After all, the menu of issues that the US Navy and ROK Navy have in common is the same list that both navies have in common with the JMSDF. In the end, it is in America’s strategic interest to develop an operational relationship with the ROKN that is as close as the relationship the USN currently has with the JMSDF. This will take time, but fortunately the process is under way.

Notes This chapter represents the views of the author alone, and should not be construed as representing the views or positions of either the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) or the Department of the Navy. 1. Victor Cha, “Strategic Culture and Military Modernization of South Korea,” Armed Forces and Society, vol. 28, no. 1 (Fall 2001), p. 116. 2. Quote in subhead from RADM (ret.) Han Sang-ki, “ROK Navy Experiences in Cooperation with the US Navy and Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force,” paper presented at a Center for Naval Analyses–Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy conference, The Future of ROK Navy–US Navy Cooperation, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 22, 2007. 3. For a good recent article on Yi and the turtle ships, see Heidi Holtz, “Complementary Keys to Naval Victory,” Naval History (August 2009), pp. 50– 55. 4. RADM Han, “ROK Navy Experiences.” 5. President Kim Dae-jung’s speech before graduating midshipmen, Korea Naval Academy, Chinhae, 2001, www.globalsecurity.org (emphasis added). 6. See the official ROK Navy website, www.navy.mil.kr/about/oceannavy _5jsp. 7. Cha, “Strategic Culture and Military Modernization,” p. 101. 8. Bruce W. Bennett, A Brief Analysis of the Republic of Korea’s Defense Reform Plan, RAND National Defense Research Institute Occasional Paper, December 2005, p. 1. 9. The major warships would include nine KDX I and II destroyers, six KDX III AEGIS destroyers, seventeen new frigates, eighteen modern submarines, and associated helicopters and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. 10. John Ikenberry, Chung-in Moon, and Mitchell Reiss, “The Search for a Common Strategic Vision: Charting the Future of the US-ROK Security Partnership,” a report of the US-ROK Strategic Forum, February 2008, www .nautilus.org/fora/security/08018USROKFORUM.pdf, p. 25; Cha, “Strategic Culture and Military Modernization,” p. 103. 11. Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, June 16, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov.

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12. Text of speech by ROK minister of defense Yoon Kwang Ung, June 3, 2006, Singapore, in author’s possession. Author attended the conference. See also Shangri-la Dialogue archive, www.iiss.org. 13. CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications /the-world-factbook/. 14. South Korean scholar remarks during CNA-Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 2007. Conference commentary was not for attribution. 15. Described in Kim Taeho, “The ROK Navy’s View on SLOC Security and Humanitarian Assistance: An Overview and Critique,” paper presented at a CNA–Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 2007. 16. Kim Taewoo, “ROK Military Transformation and ROK-US Security and Maritime Cooperation: MD, PSI and Dokdo Island,” International Journal of Korean Studies, vol. 7, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2008), pp. 45–60. See pp. 45–48 for a discussion of this point. 17. “Koreans Exchange Fire in Naval Clash,” Associated Press, November 10, 2009, www.foxnews.com. 18. For a comprehensive analysis of the history war, see Jonsan Ahn, “The Korea-China Textbook War—What’s It All About,” George Mason University’s History News Network, March 6, 2006, http://hnn.us/articles/21617.html. 19. Kim Taewoo, “China’s Territorial Ambitions? Enduring Patterns and New Developments,” in The PLA Navy Build-up and ROK Navy–US Navy Cooperation, a conference report, published in Korean and English by the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, Seoul, June 2009, p. 351. 20. RADM Jung Ho-sub, “PLA Navy’s Build-up and ROK–US Naval Cooperation,” in The PLA Navy Build-up and ROK Navy–US Navy Cooperation, p. 351. 21. Captain Yoon Suk-joon, “The Chinese Naval Modernization and Its Impact on the Republic of Korea,” in The PLA Navy Build-up and ROK Navy–US Navy Cooperation, pp. 435–442; Jung Sung-ki, “S. Korea, China Open Military Hotlines,” November 24, 2010, www.defensenews.com. 22. Jung Ho-sub, “PLA Navy’s Build-up,” 460. 23. Kim Taewoo, “ROK Military Transformation,” 56. 24. This assertion is based on personal discussions with serving ROK officers over the past twenty years. 25. See, for example, Victor Cha, “Japan-Korea Relations: Questions, Questions, and More Questions,” Comparative Connections, vol. 3, no. 2 (2001), pp. 120–128. 26. The issue of strategic flexibility for Korea-based forces, specifically the ability to use US forces stationed in Korea for missions beyond Korea and not in the defense of Korea, was discussed at the inaugural “strategic dialogue” between the US secretary of state and the ROK foreign minister in January 2006. The ROK made it clear that the ROK was not going to be drawn into a conflict against its will. (See statement of General B. B. Bell, Commander, US Forces Korea, before the House Armed Services Committee, March 9, 2006, www.usfk.mil.) 27. Lee Tai Hwan, “Korea, China Enter Strategic Partnership,” Korea Herald, May 31, 2008, www.sejong.org. See also Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun,

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“Establishing a ‘Strategic Cooperative Partnership,’” Comparative Connections, vol. 10, no. 2 (July 2008), pp. 109–110, www.csis.org. 28. Jung Ho-sub, “PLA Navy’s Build-up,” 469. 29. Ibid., p. 470. Interestingly, while reports by US and ROK experts acknowledge the necessity for Seoul and Washington to have a common approach to China, they do not recognize the difficult problem that Seoul faces in trying to balance its relationships between Beijing and Washington. See, for example, Ikenberry et al., “Search for a Common Strategic Vision.” 30. This section is based upon a number of conversations I have had with active and retired ROKN flag officers over the past two years. 31. Ikenberry et al., “Search for a Common Strategic Vision,” p. 24. The debate has not waned since this report was written. In the four conferences with former Korean officials or retired officers in which this author has participated over the past two years, the topic always comes up. 32. Jung Ho-sub, “PLA’s Naval Build-up,” pp. 155–160. 33. Dr./Captain Chung Samman (ROK Naval War College), “The Role of the ROK Navy in Anti-Piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden,” paper presented at the Third CNA–Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy Conference on ROKNUSN Peacetime Operations, San Francisco, California, August 27–28, 2009. The ROKN Task Group (TG) deployment is scheduled to last about four and a half months. Logistically, the ROKN TG expects to make a port call in Djibouti about once every two to three weeks. It will refuel at sea from USN ships, but replenish other supplies in port Djibouti.

3 Counterterrorism Kevin Shepard

THE END OF THE COLD WAR, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE Republic of Korea, and the United States filling the role of sole superpower meant drastic changes in the political and security environment surrounding the US-ROK alliance, yet for many years, inter-Korean conflicts and North Korean nuclear programs meant little shift in the military focus of relations between Seoul and Washington. The events of September 11, 2001, drastically changed that. Terrorist strikes on US soil marked the end of the post–Cold War period and the launch of a new era in which the United States is determined to wipe out terrorism throughout the world. It also underlined the importance to US national interests of international nonproliferation and denuclearization efforts, as well as the global spread of democracy and human rights. The manner in which the George W. Bush administration executed these efforts redefined alliances around the globe, including relations with South Korea. At the turn of the twenty-first century, South Korean public support for the US-ROK alliance had fallen to less than 20 percent. Despite this, the South Korean government joined with the US-led coalition avenging the September 11 terrorist attacks on American soil, and President Kim Dae-jung sent condolences and an offer of assistance almost immediately following the attacks. South Korea quickly signed on to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, committing government assets to the “Global War on Terror,”1 and has supported US military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003. However, the terrorist attacks ultimately had the effect of further challenging the foundation of the US-ROK alliance, as it served to drive

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apart to a greater extent previously divergent perceptions of the two allies regarding the threat posed by North Korea and the role of US forces on the Korean peninsula. North Korea became more threatening to Washington within the international realm as a member of President Bush’s “Axis of Evil”2 and as a possible proliferation threat, while the liberal South Korean presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun regarded North Koreans as wayward siblings, and sought peaceful exchanges and cooperation with Pyongyang. Many in the South saw the North Koreans as less of a threat and more of a needy neighbor. In addition, Seoul felt forced to choose between weakening ties with the United States by failing to support its war on terrorism and worsening relations with North Korea and China if it did. With China’s power on the rise and inter-Korean relations improving, South Korea was torn between interests. The decision was made to support US efforts, but this support drew considerable criticism both from abroad and from domestic opponents. During the Roh administration, South Korean authorities begrudgingly agreed to the withdrawal of 3,000 American troops—approximately 10 percent of United States Forces Korea (USFK)—to be deployed to Iraq before returning to the United States. A negotiated agreement in 2006 allowed for the possibility of deployment of US troops to respond to other threats in the region, with the caveat that the United States respect South Korea’s regional security concerns, and not deploy troops within the region without the consent of the South Korean people. 3 South Korean politicians and the public alike were divided between those who perceived such moves as representing Seoul’s growing autonomy and those who were concerned that they reflected a lack of commitment on the part of Washington to the US-ROK alliance.

Lee Myung-bak Stresses Alliance Rebuilding

President Lee Myung-bak came into office in 2008 on an ambitious platform that looked promising to those hoping to further relations between Seoul and Washington. Among the issues President Lee included in his inaugural speech on February 25, 2008, were shifting from ideological policies to pragmatism, increasing South Korea’s role in international cooperation efforts, and a direct promise to repair relations with the United States and restore the alliance that has lasted for over half a century.4 During a joint press conference with President Bush on April 19, 2008, President Lee reemphasized his desire for a “future-oriented partnership” and “strategic alliance” with the United States, calling for a

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“twenty-first-century strategic alliance” capable of expanding the potential for more diverse cooperation.5 This declaration came at a time when the United States was pushing to redefine the nature of the alliance, and the role of American troops on the Korean peninsula, in particular. When President Lee sat down with President Bush less than two months after moving into Cheong Wa Dae, the two discussed expanding the US-ROK alliance to further strengthen cooperation on a range of nontraditional security issues related to US counterterrorism efforts, including “nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, global coalition against terrorism, peace-keeping operations . . . countering transnational crime . . . and advocating human rights and democracy.”6 As the US effort to eliminate terrorism concludes its first decade, Washington needs the support of its allies now more than ever, and as Washington’s concerns grow regarding terrorist activity in Asia, this presents a timely opportunity for South Korea to concurrently strengthen the alliance and establish an important role for itself in the region by coordinating counterterrorism efforts with the United States. This chapter highlights ongoing cooperative efforts between the United States and South Korea, as well as South Korea’s relative strengths and future opportunities to continue to expand and deepen counterterrorism cooperation—a means of further enriching and ensuring relevance for the US-ROK alliance. As President Lee seeks to further strengthen cooperation with the United States, it appears that there is considerable room for growth. The military threat to South Korea posed by the North—the basis for South Korea’s military alliance with the United States from the beginning— continues to weaken.7 At the same time, Americans in Washington are pushing hard to shift the focus of US efforts toward nonproliferation and counterterrorism cooperation while Seoul and many activist groups in South Korea increasingly call for a more equal alliance between the two to replace the Cold War patron-client relationship. A 2009 poll shows that while the large majority (88 percent) of South Koreans have confidence in President Obama’s foreign policy and more than half (63 percent) see Washington as “generally cooperative with other countries,” 81 percent of South Koreans polled answered that the United States abuses its power to force South Korea to do what it wants, and 92 percent stated that Washington uses the threat of military force to gain advantages. Seventy-five percent (compared to 64 percent in 2008) call the United States “hypocritical” and believe that it does not apply the same standards and laws to itself as it promotes for other countries.8 New controversy arose in the summer of 2011 in light of reports that US forces

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The US–South Korea Alliance

improperly disposed of Agent Orange and other toxins on the peninsula. These reports again sparked calls for renegotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). In addition, ongoing delays in the move from Yongsan Garrison in the heart of Seoul to Camp Humphries near Osan provide fodder to critics who want US forces out of South Korea, fan the fears of those who see such a move as a further indicator of a lack of commitment, and sideline powerful political and business interests that have committed to supporting the relocation program. For Seoul and Washington to strengthen the alliance, both must look for opportunities for cooperation and coordination outside the Korean peninsula, and especially for cooperative efforts in which South Korea can take the initiative. According to the June 16, 2009, Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, a document produced during the first summit between Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama, (1) both countries are prepared to move the alliance focus overseas, (2) both are actively seeking to strengthen the alliance, (3) both recognize the security threat posed by terrorist activities, and (4) both seek to spread those shared ideals that arguably most threaten terrorist organizations in the Middle East and South Asia. In the Joint Vision Statement, the two reaffirmed their shared belief in “open societies” and a “commitment to free democracy and a market economy.” Based on these values, Washington and Seoul pledged to “build a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional and global scope . . . work[ing] shoulder-to-shoulder to tackle challenges” faced by both nations. Among these challenges, the vision statement highlighted “terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, organized crime and narcotics.”9 This set the stage for South Korea’s active cooperation in US-led global counterterrorism campaigns.

South Korean National Interests at Stake

Of course, while the current ROK administration seeks to further coordination with the United States as well as expand efforts to participate in regional and global cooperative efforts, this in itself does not drive Seoul’s counterterrorism efforts. South Korea has not been immune to the threat of terrorism, nor has the country been remiss in building its own robust antiterrorism strategies and capabilities. The government has taken seriously its responsibility to protect its citizens domestically and abroad, which includes (1) protecting national defense and other government as-

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sets from cyberterrorism; (2) protecting the nation’s airports and airplanes; (3) ensuring safe transit of South Korean citizens, both at home and abroad; and (4) working with regional and global allies to prevent or eliminate the social and political environments that breed terrorist activity. To these ends, South Korea’s national interests are well aligned with those of the United States as well as its neighboring regional partners. Korea’s history of terrorism stretches back further than the ROK itself. The Chosun Dynasty lost its last queen, Empress Myeongseong,10 in a murderous terrorist act perpetrated by a group of Japanese assassins at the end of the nineteenth century.11 One of South Korea’s earliest activists, Kim Gu, sought to avenge her death, and led a group known as Aeguktan (Patriot Corps), which carried out hand-grenade attacks and other assassinations against Japanese and Koreans alike. His actions led some to extol him as a revolutionary hero, but others to condemn him as a terrorist.12 Furthermore, throughout the struggles of a divided peninsula, the South has repeatedly been challenged by terrorist activities credited to North Korea.13 More recently, however, South Korean civilians have suffered abduction and murder at the hands of terrorists overseas, due in part to Seoul’s support of US counterterrorism activities, and in particular, its dispatch of troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. The June 2004 abduction and beheading of South Korean citizen Kim Sun-il by Iraqi insurgents with al-Qaeda ties proved to be a catalyst in Seoul’s decision to further expand its counterterrorism capabilities and cooperative efforts. The incident convinced the ROK National Assembly to introduce comprehensive antiterrorism legislation, and for Cheong Wa Dae to issue Presidential Directive 47, revising its National Anti-terror Action Directive in March 2005. The directive aimed at institutionalizing interagency committees, creating a weekly working group meeting, putting together a counterterrorism council chaired by the prime minister, and establishing a Terrorism Information Integration Center within the National Intelligence Service. 14 Since then, other South Korean civilians have also suffered at the hands of terrorists in Nigeria, 15 Afghanistan,16 and Yemen,17 as well as off the coast of Somalia,18 serving as continual reminders to the government and public in South Korea that expanded coordination on counterterrorism issues is more than cooperation for the sake of the US-ROK alliance, but that Seoul has a direct national interest in supporting and advancing counterterrorism efforts, domestically and overseas. South Korea has also hosted a number of internationally high-profile events, including the 1988 Olympics, the 2002 South Korea–Japan World Cup, the 2005 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

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The US–South Korea Alliance

forum, and the 2010 G-20 Summit, and has cooperated with the United States and other countries to avoid terrorist attacks at each of them. Authorities have preempted some more recent terrorist activity as well, with the South Korean Police National Agency arresting suspected smugglers with links to Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan as recently as July 2009.19 This was just the latest in ongoing efforts by South Korean national police, who have arrested dozens of foreigners suspected of participating in or supporting terrorist activities in recent years.20

South Korean Legislative Efforts

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, South Korea has also taken a number of legal steps to raise counterterrorism capabilities. Residents and nonresidents now must file paperwork on any transfer of funds to or from individuals or entities the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Committee deems to be associated with the Taliban, al-Qaeda, or any other suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations. 21 This was in conjunction with the October 9, 2001, signing of the International Convention for Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. On November 28, 2001, South Korea’s Financial Transaction Reports Act and Proceeds of Crime Act went into effect, requiring banks and other financial institutions to report to the Korea Financial Intelligence Unit (KoFIU) any transactions suspected of being linked to money-laundering schemes. This was just one day after the US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) concluded a meeting in San Francisco and released an Issue Statement explaining that the three discussed the “changed global environment following the September 11 terrorist attacks,” and stated that the “US delegation expressed thanks for South Korean and Japanese contributions to the international effort to end terrorism.” 22 In fact, the issue of terrorism emerged as an impetus for improved cooperation among Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo. Victor Cha notes that despite “months of controversy over history-related issues,” relations between Seoul and Tokyo were improving, as “US-Japan-ROK trilateral coordination proceeded apace with American prosecution of the war against terrorism in Southwest Asia as one of the major topics of discussion.”23 South Korea’s support for US-led international cooperation continued to grow as Seoul instituted similar financial restraints, on December 27, 2001, on funds related to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), naming several senior offi-

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cials of the Angolan rebel group. This was in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 1173 and 1127. In 2002, ahead of the South Korea–Japan soccer World Cup, South Korean lawmakers introduced a Terrorism Prevention Bill so aggressive that Amnesty International expressed concern that the act would allow authorities to overstep the boundaries set forth by human rights conventions of which South Korea is a member.24 Early in 2009, an antiterrorism bill was submitted to the South Korean National Assembly that would change the criminal code to allow confiscation of funds and other assets related to terrorist activities, as well as real estate, stock-market holdings, or other profits gained through such activities. This bill reflects the South’s willingness to cooperate with the United States and other countries in international counterterrorism campaigns by allowing them to freeze terror-related funds upon request from international organizations, and imprison anyone found to be withholding or concealing assets related to terrorist activities. This coincided with the South’s entry into the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) effort. The APG is one of eight regional groups modeled on the globally oriented Financial Action Task Force (FATF), set up “to ensure the adoption, implementation and enforcement” of financing standards as set out in the FATF Forty Recommendations and FATF Eight Special Recommendations to combat terrorism and money laundering, which are considered the global standards. FATF is self-described as “an intergovernmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.”25 Established in 1989 and currently with thirty-four member jurisdictions and two member regional organizations, the FATF not only draws up criminal justice and regulatory measures to prevent terrorist financing but also recommends cooperative and preventive measures for private financial institutions, casinos, real estate brokers, and others involved in the transfer of large sums of money. In addition, the task force reviews the standards and the policies of member countries, working collaboratively to ensure that the highest level of financial security is being maintained. In 2006, as the APG became an affiliate member of the FATF, South Korea became an FATF Observer, and then a full member in 2009. Results of a FATF evaluation of South Korea’s efforts released in June 2009 show that “Korea has demonstrated political commitment, and commitment by government agencies and the private sector, to anti–money laundering efforts since the mid 1990s,”26 and noted that Seoul has established the necessary agencies and measures to

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The US–South Korea Alliance

combat illegal financial transactions, although there were still issues that needed to be addressed, as well as penalties and sanctions that needed more stringent enforcement.

South Korean Military Support for US Counterterrorism Efforts

With the US invasion of Afghanistan in search of al-Qaeda leadership, South Korea was challenged with a demand from Washington for a new sort of counterterrorism cooperation. Washington pressured Seoul on alliance responsibilities, while the mutual defense treaty requirements were stretched to new boundaries in defining defense of a nation. South Korea was torn among North Korean condemnation, South Korean public distaste for overseas dispatch, the recognition that ties with China were of growing importance, and pressure from the Bush administration to justify US troop deployment to the Korean peninsula. In the face of considerable skepticism from his domestic constituency, President Roh Moo-hyun offered logistical and medical support for the Afghanistan campaign. Washington thanked Seoul for the support with public warnings to North Korea, offering reassurance of the US commitment to South Korean defense, and backed these up with deployment of a squadron of F-15 fighter jets based in Alaska.27 By the end of 2002, South Korea had dispatched more than 100 mobile medical units, a landing ship tank (LST), four C-130 transport aircraft, and military equipment for the Afghan army, as well as promised US$40 million in reconstruction aid, 500 noncombat engineers, and 100 additional medical personnel following the end of hostilities.28 President Lee further committed to sending another 300 troops and 130 civilians in 2010.29 Following President Obama’s spring 2011 announcement of the plan to draw down US forces in Afghanistan, the Lee administration declared ROK forces would remain in Afghanistan unless the US move increased the security risk to South Korean forces, at which time the decision to deploy them would be revisited.30 Previously, South Korea had agreed in 2003 to dispatch more than 3,600 troops to Iraq in the form of the Zaytun Unit to serve as peace/construction support units. From 2004, more than 13,800 soldiers were rotated in and out of the Zaytun Unit each year, the last of which were withdrawn and returned to Seoul in December 2008. Seoul has also committed more than US$200 million in assistance to Iraq since 2004.

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US Terror-Related Interests in Asia

Asia has become a quintessential region in the US effort to wipe out terrorist activity, with fully 75 percent of all terrorism-related casualties occurring in the region,31 a region with active terrorist groups even before the launch of the US offensive. Asia is home to some of the most fragile of significant democracies and markets in the world, and yet is a region in which radical Islamic groups are becoming increasingly entrenched. The United States depends on its allies in Asia to cope with the nontraditional security threats posed by the growing number of terrorist groups, and South Korea’s own efforts to combat terrorism have made it easier for Seoul to cooperate with US-led counterterrorism campaigns. Despite increasing counterterrorism cooperation, soon after engaging South Korea and other Asian allies, Washington was faced with a difficult situation. Despite wanting to call on South Korea to share more of the burden of the alliance and provide more support to US-led operations elsewhere, Sheldon Simon found that “the widespread problem of interoperability between [US Pacific Command] and its [Theater Security Cooperation] partners is of particular concern. All partner armed forces, regardless of their level of modernization and professionalism, see themselves falling further and further behind U.S. military capabilities and, therefore, less able to interact with U.S. armed forces.” Simon argues, “This technological gap and problems relating to the releasability of US military technology mean that close collaboration . . . may be limited,” despite South Korea’s efforts to “develop capabilities that could enhance their security roles in East Asia.”32 The United States would need greater flexibility to rely on its own military assets, while asking South Korea to bear a greater share of the burden of support roles, including intelligence, diplomacy, and other noncombatant roles. In the South Korea–US Joint Statement on Strategic Dialogue released in January 2006, US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and ROK foreign minister Ban Ki-moon agreed on “strengthened cooperation on fighting terrorism, and exerting common efforts for the observance and implementation of international security cooperation regimes for the prevention of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their delivery means.”33 However, as Dr. Simon noted in his study, the US forces needed to rely more on their own “releasability” than on military cooperation from South Korea. This, in part, led to Secretary Rice and Minister Ban agreeing that “the ROK, as an ally, fully understands the rationale for the transformation of the U.S. global military strategy,

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The US–South Korea Alliance

and respects the necessity for strategic flexibility of the U.S. forces in the ROK. In the implementation of strategic flexibility, the U.S. respects the ROK position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.”34

South Korea’s Regional Antiterrorism Cooperative Efforts

Terrorism is as much a regional issue for South Korea as it is a global threat. As President Lee pushes to further develop South Korea’s middle-power role in Asia, coordination with the United States and support for US initiatives in regional forums are equally important tasks for Seoul. The previous administration failed at attempts to maximize the advantage of South Korea’s cultural popularity and economic capacity in the region. While South Korea has been coming into its own as a model economy and democracy, former president Roh Moo-hyun’s goal of becoming a political and diplomatic “regional balancer” in 2005 was overly ambitious. The initiative was highly criticized and almost immediately dropped,35 but the idea was not misplaced, simply misguided. The overly nationalistic Roh administration defined a middle-power state as a hub, or balancer. What is more appropriate, however, for South Korea is the role of a facilitator and a partner—an emerging power providing examples and models for others. President Lee Myung-bak understands the value South Korea has to offer—and the benefits it stands to reap—by playing such a role. In his inaugural speech in February 2008 he called for a move away from ideological approaches, and instead stressed that South Korea’s foreign policy would be implemented “as befitting our economic size and diplomatic capacity.”36 South Korea can play a substantial regional role in terrorism prevention, and in particular, in advocating democratic and human-rights standards that would help in eliminating environmental conditions conducive to terrorist recruiting efforts. Seoul is already working with ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) as well as bilaterally with the United States, China, Japan, Australia, and other friends on these efforts, and the US Department of State has recognized, year upon year, that South Korea “has taken a leading role in joint counterterrorism projects with other members of the Asia-Pacific region.”37 After the 2004 beheading of a South Korean national and the resultant boost in visibility of the need for counterterrorism action, South Korea has been extremely active in regional multilateral efforts, including its hosting of the third conference

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on Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR III) in February 2005, hosting an Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and cochairing (with the Philippines) an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Seminar on Cyber-Terrorism in October of the same year, as well as conducting and hosting a variety of training events. The South Korean National Police Agency worked with the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) to cohost a two-week training course in international investigative cooperation and cybercrime investigation, and another two-week course in 2005 training Thai law enforcement officials on applying forensic science in response to acts of terror. In 2007, South Korea took on the role of Chair Economy at the APEC Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF), and hosted the ARF’s Fourth Seminar on Cyber-Terrorism in October of the same year. The US State Department noted that “traditionally focused on potential terrorism from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the South Korean government broadened its attention to acts of terror beyond the Korean Peninsula.”38 South Korea held bilateral talks with a number of nations, including Mexico, Germany, France, the United States, and Japan on terrorism-related issues, and continued to host law enforcement, counterterrorism, antipiracy, and terrorism management training for a number of Southeast Asian countries.39 In 2008, South Korea continued to play a leading role in ARF counterterrorism efforts, and in cyberterrorism prevention and response efforts, in particular. Along with its focus on cyberterrorism, Seoul continued to host a range of other regional training seminars, with KOICA hosting counterterrorism and capacity-building training programs.40 During the Sixth ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on CounterTerrorism and Transnational Crime, held in February 2008, South Korea supported the US proposal to form an ASEAN Regional Forum Workplan for Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, while pushing for more cooperation on cyberterrorism issues, distributing a concept paper on the establishment of a Virtual Working Group to battle the growing use of the Internet as a weapon for terrorism. On July 13, 2009, during the Third ROK-Japan Counter-Terrorism Consultation, the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (MOFAT) ambassador for international counterterrorism, Lee Joon-gyu, and his Japanese counterpart, ambassador in charge of international counterterrorism cooperation Kiyoshi Araki, “reaffirmed the necessity of strengthening the international counterterrorism efforts such as capacity-building assistances to developing countries as well as de-radicalization efforts.”41 Trilateral cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Japan could further bolster these efforts.

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The US–South Korea Alliance

MOFAT has appointed an ambassador for Counterterrorism and Afghanistan Affairs to work with the National Counter-Terrorism Council established by the terror prevention bill. South Korea has not only bolstered domestic counterterrorism efforts along with bilateral cooperation with the United States but South Korea also participates in seven international conventions, and there is discourse within the National Assembly on ratification of five other international treaties. South Korea’s active participation in this wide variety of international counterterrorism cooperation measures essentially means that multilateral and bilateral cooperation with the United States, in the region and on the international stage, has been ongoing since at least 2001. Effective expansion of that cooperative relationship could result from looking at increasingly broadened nonmilitary capabilities, as well as continued military ties. In August 2003 the South Korean Customs Service joined the US Container Security Initiative in the port city of Busan. South Korea in 2008 began to issue electronic passports and reached an agreement with the United States on the exchange of traveler screening information in a bid to identify possibly threatening passengers. On October 28, 2008, the first annual Korea-US Counter-Terrorism Consultation was held, with South Korean MOFAT ambassador for international counter-terrorism cooperation Oh Gabriel meeting with US Department of State coordinator for counterterrorism Dell Dailey to discuss “ways to promote counter-terrorism cooperation and the importance of regional counter-terrorism activities, and international collaborative measures to eradicate piracy off the coast of Somalia.”42 South Korea has also been a vocal advocate of international counterterrorism and terrorism prevention efforts at the UN level. These efforts and President Lee’s vision for South Korea’s role as a diplomatic middle-power state in the region provide an impetus for counterterrorism cooperation with the United States within the framework of multilateral international cooperative efforts.

Challenges to Cooperation

As much as President Lee has championed cooperative efforts with the United States, he has spent the better part of his term in office digging his way out of a hole created by his failure to achieve public consensus in support of his policies and his underestimation of the ability of opposition forces to rally the people. Despite being elected with the proud nickname of “the bulldozer,” once in office President Lee’s assumption

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that the country could be run like a corporation, with the public simply needing to trust the president and then await positive results, has cost him significant political capital. Contributing to the administration’s public relations difficulties have been (1) fallout over the allowance of US beef imports, (2) attempts to consolidate ministries, (3) the selection of possibly the wealthiest group of presidential advisors ever seen in South Korea, (4) attempts to push through the Grand Canal project, (5) his calls for overhauling the education system, and (6) the investigation into improprieties by the late Roh Moo-hyun. While many support Lee’s drive to improve relations with the United States,43 this has not translated into approval of US-led efforts to fight terrorism,44 or approval of South Korea’s direct participation in theaters such as Afghanistan.45 Despite successful US-ROK counterterrorism coordination efforts to date, and the continuing growth of South Korean counterterrorism capabilities, public approval for further cooperation—and active troop dispatch, in particular—will be a challenge that the South Korean administration must tackle. While President Lee has declared that “the politicization of alliance relations shall be behind us,”46 that has proven to be out of his control, and the sensitivity of South Korean support for US campaigns must be taken into account. Another critical variable in the realm of cooperation between Seoul and Washington is and will continue to be Pyongyang. While the large majority of counterterrorism cooperation is not directly aimed at or driven by North Korea, the military nature of many cooperative efforts means that North Korea has and will continue to voice concerns over increased capacity in the South Korean military. With the removal of North Korea from the US Department of State’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, South Korea can argue that counterterrorism cooperation is not aimed at North Korea and therefore should not be seen as a threat to Pyongyang. However, the North Korean response and its impact on inter-Korean relations must be taken into account. President Lee’s policy toward the North has come under heavy criticism for being less forgiving of North Korea’s lack of reciprocity. Any strengthened cooperation with the United States that has the potential to worsen the inter-Korean relationship draws the ire of domestic liberal and other opposition forces. In conjunction with the deterioration of inter-Korean relations since the beginning of the Lee administration, South Korea announced its full participation in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) following the North’s second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. This was despite North Korea’s reminder that it “has already seriously warned the South Korean authorities against [full participation in the

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The US–South Korea Alliance

PSI] and repeatedly clarified its stand that it would strongly counter those moves of the Lee group . . . regarding them as a declaration of a war as it is pursuant to its American master’s policy.”47 It was an indication that South Korea was prepared to further strengthen ties with the United States and participate in international coalitions without regard to the reaction from North Korea. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service seized and searched several containers shipped by North Korea in October 2009, giving credence to Seoul’s commitment to international efforts despite Pyongyang’s objections.48 However, President Lee has also reiterated Seoul’s ongoing willingness to “start talks and cooperation with the North over all issues between us, at any time, at any level” during his speech on August 15, 2009, marking the sixty-fourth anniversary of Korea’s national liberation. These declarations have continued, despite the 2010 sinking of the ROK Navy ship Cheonan and North Korea’s artillery bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island. South Korea has stated that an apology for these provocations would indicate North Korea’s sincerity in future talks but is not a condition to reengagement. In addition, on August 17, 2009, Hyundai Group chairwoman Hyun Jung-eun returned from a trip to North Korea during which she secured the release of the South Korean worker arrested in the Kaesong Industrial Complex on March 30, 2009, as well as agreements from Kim Jong-il to reopen the North Korean border to South Korean tourists and to participate in new inter-Korean cooperative projects. However, the stalemate in inter-Korean relations and subsequent North Korean provocations during 2010 rendered the resumption of the project impossible. In June 2011, South Korean business representatives traveled to Mount Kumgang, despite North Korean agitation that inter-Korean talks were not worth having and a general sense that the North was not willing to hold productive discussions. The August 2009 death of former president Kim Dae-jung provided yet another impetus for dialogue between the two Koreas, with a highlevel North Korean delegation led by Kim Ki-nam attending funeral services and then conveying a message to President Lee from Kim Jongil. This was quickly followed by an announcement that the two Koreas would soon hold a reunion of separated family members over the Chuseok (fall harvest) holiday as well as reports that Pyongyang had invited US special envoy Stephen Bosworth and chief nuclear negotiator Sung Kim to visit North Korea.49 South Korean public support for US-ROK relations grows in accordance with the threat felt by North Korean actions and is a reflection of the state of inter-Korean relations. In the past decade, support for the al-

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liance hit all-time lows when inter-Korean summits were held (18.9 percent in September 2000, and 31.9 percent in December 2007), while peaking following North Korean nuclear and missile testing (63.8 percent in December 2006, and 51.9 percent in February 2009). 50 Pyongyang’s choice of brinkmanship or conciliatory actions in the future will impact South Korean domestic support for greater cooperation with Washington. If inter-Korean relations and cooperation were to improve in the future, Seoul would take into consideration the response from Pyongyang when cooperating with the United States, and both Seoul and Washington need to be aware of the potential impact Pyongyang could have on future cooperative efforts. This could impact, or be reflected in, next year’s elections. The Cheonan incident and Yeonpyeong Island shelling led to a dramatic shift in South Korean public opinion, with the majority of people accepting the risk of escalation were the South to respond to North Korean provocation. How this will play out in domestic South Korean politics is, as of yet, unclear.

Opportunities for Antiterrorism Cooperation

The alliance does not, and should not, find its justification only in the North Korean threat. In order for South Korea to maintain an equal and self-determinant position in the alliance with the United States, Seoul and Washington should coordinate their efforts in multilateral global campaigns. This coordination can find traction in • Addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. • Taking measures to prevent as well as combat terrorism. • Building state capacity to prevent and combat global terrorism and to strengthen the UN system to help meet this end. • Upholding human rights and the rule of law. South Korea has already established that it fully supports these measures, which are the four pillars of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Seoul specifically outlined its position of support for these realms of counterterrorism through a speech by Ambassador Shin Boonam at the 117th Plenary Meeting of the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly on August 5, 2008.51 More specifically, in order to obtain South Korean public consensus and maintain balance in the US-ROK alliance while still ensuring a relevant and robust relationship, as well as maximizing capacity in counterterrorism efforts, the United States and

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The US–South Korea Alliance

South Korea should focus on the South’s relative strengths in the following fields. Cyberterrorism

While the United States was proposing widespread capacity building for counterterrorism cooperation at the Sixth ASEAN Regional Forum, South Korea specifically presented a concept paper on establishing a Virtual Working Group to “enhance the response capacity against the cyber terrorist threat.”52 South Korea has also noted the threat of, and need for cooperation against, cyberterrorism in discussions with other regional partners. During the Japan-ROK Counter-Terrorism Consultation in July 2009 the two sides acknowledged the importance of cooperation in a number of realms of antiterrorism cooperation, but specifically stated that “both sides will continue to share information about recent cyber attacks to the ROK as well as to the United States.”53 At the ARF ISM on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime in Vietnam in 2009, South Korea again took a leading role. ROK minister of foreign affairs and trade representative Yoon Lee called for increased cooperation from all members and urged other ARF participants to join the ARF Virtual Meeting of Experts on Cyber Security. South Korea cochaired the first meeting, in 2009, in conjunction with the Philippines and Bangladesh. Intelligence Sharing

In the traditional US-ROK military alliance, the intelligence-to-force ratio was relatively low, as the Cold War and the defense of South Korea from an attack from the North relied on “boots on the ground,” with the United States providing the South with a “human tripwire” in the form of American soldiers on the border between the two Koreas. In the US efforts to eradicate terrorism, however, execution of missions requires high levels of intelligence, and this in turn requires Washington to depend more on intelligence from foreign liaison services, law enforcement agencies, and overseas security services. 5 4 South Korean intelligence-gathering capabilities continue to grow, and if the sharing of information within the Proliferation Security Initiative and Container Security Initiative (CSI) programs in which Seoul already participates were to continue, both the United States and South Korea would benefit from broadened access to information as well as training opportunities for both countries.

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In addition, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has, within the last few years, worked toward building the Server in the Sky, an international information consortium that shares biometric data on those seeking international travel. South Korea has already upgraded requirements for ROK residents and begun issuing electronic passports, and has agreed to share some information with the United States; the US push for global biometric information sharing is yet another realm in which South Korea could participate. As South Korea has recently arrested a number of foreign visitors on charges of terrorism-related activities, it stands to reason that such cooperation would not only bolster the alliance, but also improve security at South Korean entry points. Incheon International Airport serves as a major hub of travel throughout Asia, and could serve as a vital information-gathering center for international efforts to curb terrorism. This could also boost South Korean and US cooperation with the US Defense Department’s Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS), to which as many as fifty countries currently contribute.55 Military Cooperation

Antipiracy cooperation, with the deployment of ROK naval ships and special forces to the eastern coast of Africa, previous deployments to Iraq, continued cooperation in Afghanistan, and joint training on the Korean peninsula in conjunction with the strengthening of ROK forces, all further US-ROK counterterrorism efforts. In the future, while these efforts continue, it would be beneficial for South Korea to focus its military investments less on conventional force power and more on state-of-the-art technological advances, which would not only ease the burden on ROK ground forces but also be more applicable to international multilateral efforts to prevent and pursue terrorism. The ROK ground forces are spending budget allocations by tripling multiple rocket launchers and other artillery pieces, as well as purchasing “sophisticated tanks, armored vehicles and other advanced tactical vehicles” in an effort to build a “slimmer but stronger” army.56 The modernization of ground forces is in conjunction with joint US-ROK digital command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and fire-control systems. Upgrading technological cooperation and broadened interoperability capacity will facilitate future cooperation not only with the United States but also in other multilateral efforts. The run-up to the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) to South Korea and realignment of USFK has seen a

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The US–South Korea Alliance

significant buildup of military capabilities by South Korea. However, while the increased interoperability provided by these upgrades further strengthens the US-ROK military alliance, it is not likely that such ROK ground forces would participate in campaigns on foreign soil. South Korean naval and special forces, however, are actively participating in antipiracy and antiproliferation efforts, and joint coordination efforts allow for greater interoperability in these fields as well. In order to optimize strategic military interoperability and overall capability, South Korea should continue to invest more in C4I capabilities. The lack of these capabilities means continued reliance on US assets, as well as the inability to fully participate as an equal partner in US-led international efforts requiring high levels of intelligence sharing, such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), despite the government’s support for the initiatives. Not unrelated to the previous section on intelligence sharing, there is room for capacity growth within the military communications and intelligence institution as well. Admiral Timothy Keating, former commander of the US Pacific Command, reported to Congress in 2008, “USPACOM requires pervasive and persistent surveillance to understand adversary plans and intended actions,” and explained that communications and human intelligence resources are “critical to preventing strategic or tactical surprise,” but “the size of our theater and scarcity of available assets hamper opportunities to shape the environment.”57 For these reasons, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld issued a directive on April 3, 2006, to establish Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) at a number of military command centers, one being at USFK. The JIOC established at USFK is meant to help transform “military intelligence from being a staff function into . . . an operational concept.”58 Admiral Keating has called implementation of the JIOC program “key to synchronizing operational requirements” with South Korea and other information providers.59 The South Korean military’s training and preparedness regarding chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) warfare also offers an opportunity for further US-ROK counterterrorism cooperation. At the May 2009 ARF ISM on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, the United States announced that it wished to lead regional bioterrorism and security-related works, but that it is seeking a regional partner with which to coordinate efforts. With South Korea’s advanced pharmaceutical industry and concurrent safeguards, as well as the South Korean military’s extensive training and preparedness, Seoul is in a good position to cohead such efforts with the United States. South Korea has already

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begun coordinating regional efforts to prepare for chemical attacks. In 2007, South Korea worked in conjunction with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to organize and host an “International Assistance and Protection Course” aimed at “planning and building a support team in civil protection system, civil defense, and decontamination operations in contaminated areas, as well as in appropriate responses and countermeasures in the event of incidents involving chemical-warfare agents.” The South Korean government showed its commitment and expertise, with Brigadier General Kwonheon Lee, commander, ROK Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense Command, opening the workshop, and demonstrating to OPCW deputy director-general John Feeman the CBR Defense Command’s emergency response measures in the event of a terrorist attack.60 With South Korea already established as a leader in chemical warfare response coordination and cooperation, Seoul should take the opportunity to establish itself as a regional leader in biosecurity as well, coordinating ASEAN efforts along with the United States. Regional Diplomatic Leadership

ASEAN members have recognized that the underlying causes of terrorism include “socioeconomic matters” and “marginalization and alienation of certain groups in the society.” The group has also agreed that community outreach programs, public education, public awareness, and the protection of human rights are vital in removing the incentive for disenfranchised youth to migrate toward extremist groups employing terrorism.61 South Korea has proven itself to be a leader in these endeavors, sponsoring and hosting training and coordination meetings bilaterally and multilaterally in order to draw up plans and to raise standards in preempting terrorist activities. President Lee’s objective of pursuing South Korea’s middle-power status as an example for others in the region plays an important role in South Korean and US interests, and should Seoul continue down the path that it has chosen, the US-ROK alliance will be stronger for it. A significant boost to South Korea’s image as a benevolent power and role model for other emerging states will come from Seoul’s goal of tripling overseas development assistance (ODA) by 2015. This will go a long way toward bolstering South Korea’s diplomatic, social, and political efforts to ensure that environments conducive to terrorism are eliminated.62 South Korean soft power in the region has been recognized as a positive force,63 and holds much potential for leading efforts, in cooperation with both Washington and

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its Asian allies, to eliminate some of the root causes that facilitate recruitment by radical groups. Capacity and Awareness Building

As noted above, it has become vital for the United States to rely on overseas intelligence agencies, but bilateral cooperation between Washington and its allies is insufficient. The stateless and mobile nature of terrorist organizations has meant that the need for multilateral, international cooperation on intelligence sharing and law enforcement is greater than ever.64 In order to build capacity for such cooperation, the United States should be able to rely on South Korean efforts. South Korea currently hosts training sessions for security forces from throughout the region. Topics have included physical security, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, cooperative investigation, and intelligence sharing. Michael Smith, director of the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), has noted South Korea’s expertise in airport security and other realms of antiterrorism efforts. 65 The efforts that South Korea has taken to improve the level of security throughout the region as well as health-care training in Afghanistan and other regions have considerably contributed to US military operations to eradicate terrorism. Continuing to provide this and other training and capacitybuilding opportunities to other countries in Asia not only increases capacity but also builds alliances and increases awareness. Through these training exercises, South Korea plays a vital role in US-led efforts to prevent the spread of terrorism. In February 2008 at the Sixth ARF ISM on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, the United States proposed the establishment of an ASEAN Regional Forum Workplan for Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime in order to facilitate capacity building in the region. South Korea can continue to play a leading role, coordinating training and capacity-building workshops in conjunction with other ASEAN members and supporting the US initiative for more multilateral antiterrorism cooperation. One model for such efforts is the successful Operation Enduring Freedom– Philippines. This operation, run primarily by the US Special Operation Command Pacific, advised and trained the Philippine military in counterterrorism operations. Eight months of counterterrorism operations in 2007 were deemed successful in both weakening the terrorist threat and improving civic and public relations. The US Pacific Command has called for allied assistance, “especially Australia, Japan and South Korea,” to continue to build and expand the program.66

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US-ROK Bilateral Capacity Building

Capacity building does not have to mean US-ROK coordination on efforts in other countries. There is room for counterterrorism cooperation within the alliance. Continued joint military training improves preventative and response capabilities of both countries. In April 2002 the Korea Combat Training Center was established in order not only to continue training but also to “develop concepts, construct systems . . . and support combat experiments related to the Republic of Korea Army reorganization.”67 Ongoing annual training such as Ulchi Freedom Guardian, the largest annual computerized command-and-control exercise in the world, ensures that developing communications and intelligence capacities are fully utilized to enhance US-ROK military prowess. South Korea is also designing advanced Korea Simulation System (KSIMS) models, which will “enable [the ROK] to conduct various exercises independently with its own models while remaining able to conduct ROK-US bilateral exercises interdependently on an interoperable . . . basis.”68 The military is not the only realm in which the United States and South Korea should exchange information. Mutual evaluations by the Financial Action Task Force show that not only are there areas for improvement in the financial management and oversight sectors of the United States and South Korea, but that where one is lacking, the other excels. The United States was cited for needing to strengthen customer identification requirements, while “customer identification and verification represent a strength in the Korean preventive measures.”69 FATF recommends that South Korea further strengthen its counterterrorist financing (CFT) system, newly coming into effect in December 2008, as well as its anti– money laundering (AML) standards; on the other hand, the United States “has an effective regulatory and supervisory framework for monitoring compliance with AML/CFT measures.” The United States’ highly criticized Transportation Security Administration would be remiss in not reviewing South Korea’s expertise in airport security. Opportunities abound to further strengthen the US-ROK alliance by working together both within and outside of bilateral relations to jointly increase capacity and by moving together toward realizing national interests.

Conclusion

As long as South Korea continues to broaden and strengthen its capabilities in ways that can also support US efforts to fight terrorism, it will

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not only further solidify relations with Washington, but by participating in international efforts can also continue to reinforce its image as a powerful player in the international community and a source of stability in Northeast Asia. President Obama’s “diplomacy of listening” provides an opportunity, possibly not available during the George W. Bush administration, for South Korea to assert itself and its voice to Washington on cooperative schemes in areas in which it is relatively stronger. With concurrent issues of lingering doubt in South Korea regarding the commitment of the United States, and the South Korean public and ROK government demanding more equal recognition in the US-ROK alliance, Washington and Seoul need to find new avenues for expanded cooperation. In today’s world, counterterrorism is one vital realm in which just such cooperation can be found. South Korea’s initiatives in Asia, setting a new benchmark for cooperation and coordination not only with Washington but also with regional allies, serve as an integral part of the war on terror. With South Korea taking the lead in a plethora of initiatives in coordination with ASEAN, the UN, the United States, and other partners, Seoul and Washington can build a stronger, more balanced, and more effective alliance, as well as more effectively execute counterterrorism efforts. This cooperative relationship should be incorporated with the ties both South Korea and the United States have with Japan. The commander of US Pacific Forces has stated, “This is particularly relevant since our three nations have the financial resources, logistical capability, and planning ability to handle complex contingencies throughout the region.”70 In this unfolding era of South Korea finding its leadership role as a middle-power state under the pragmatic leadership of President Lee Myung-bak, counterterrorism cooperation is an area in which South Korea is recognized as strengthening the alliance by having “taken a leading role” through which the alliance can best be strengthened. This expanded bilateral cooperation has positioned the alliance in ways that have enhanced its value and utility in support of shared national interests, providing a solid foundation that future administrations in Washington and Seoul will be able to build on if they so choose. South Korea is capable of providing support for and expanding US interests in Asia, and in many realms can do so more effectively than the United States. This regional leadership boosts South Korea’s role in Asia as well as ensuring greater equity in its alliance with the United States. Deepened cooperation in the fields of airport and event security, cyberterrorism, interagency intelligence sharing and joint investigation, antiproliferation, shipping security, and financial oversight should alleviate South

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Korean concerns of US commitment to the alliance, as these are vital interests in Washington’s counterterrorism campaign. While the United States should recognize the growing capacity of South Korea, at the same time Seoul needs to not only step up to the plate on current issues but also introduce legislation to ensure that this renewed cooperation does not leave office with the current administration. The United States can rely on South Korea for leading diplomatic, social, and preemptive counterterrorism campaigns through Asian multilateral organizations. Working together on such efforts is a win-win burden-sharing strategy that will broaden and deepen the alliance while best maintaining an eye on relative strengths and national interests.

Notes 1. The Obama administration has chosen now to refer to counterterrorism efforts as “Overseas Contingency Operations,” asking Pentagon and other government officials to refrain from using “Long War” or “Global War on Terror” (Scott Wilson and Al Kamen, “‘Global War on Terror’ Is Given New Name,” Washington Post, March 25, 2009, p. A04). 2. President Bush named North Korea, Iran, and Iraq members of the “Axis of Evil” in his January 2002 State of the Union Address, http://georgewbush -whitehouse.archives.gov/. 3. The “it” in “that it would not deploy troops” has been criticized as being deliberately vague, so that those wishing to believe South Korean troops would not deploy within the region, but that US forces could, are able to interpret the agreement in such a manner, while opponents to strategic flexibility can maintain that USFK needs the consensus of the Korean people in order to deploy American forces to neighboring conflicts. 4. Among other goals set forth by President Lee during his inaugural speech on February 25, 2008, he stated that, “at times over the last ten years, we found ourselves faltering and confused,” but that now “we must move from the age of ideology into the age of pragmatism.” Lee promised that “the Republic of Korea will take a more positive stance with a greater vision and carry out global diplomacy under which we actively cooperate with the international community,” that South Korea would “work to develop and further strengthen traditional friendly relations with the United States into a future-oriented partnership,” and that he would “also strengthen [South Korea’s] strategic alliance with the United States” (Lee Myung-bak, “Together We Shall Open a Road to Advancement,” inaugural speech, February 25, 2008, http://english.hani.co.kr). 5. “President Bush Participates in Joint Press Availability with President Lee Myung-bak of the Republic of Korea,” Camp David, April 19, 2008, http://seoul.usembassy.gov. 6. “Full Text of S. Korea–US Summit Statement,” April 20, 2008, http:// asiafoundation.org. 7. Despite the North’s two nuclear tests, both of which were remarkable in

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how much smaller they were than the initial tests of any other nuclear state, the majority of strategists in both Washington and Seoul believe proliferation by North Korea is a much greater threat to security than a direct military offensive, negating the need for US troops prepositioned on South Korean soil. 8. “Though Obama Viewed Positively, Still Much Criticism of US Foreign Policy: Global Poll,” WorldPublicOpinion.org, July 7, 2009, http://www.world publicopinion.org. 9. “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,” June 16, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov. 10. Empress Myeongseong’s official title was “Hyoja Wonseong Jeonghwa Hapcheon Honggong Seongdeok Myeongseong Taehwanghu” (the Filial and Benevolent Origin of Holiness, Proper in Changes, Uniter of Heaven, Immensely Meritorious and Sincerely Virtuous Grand Empress Consort Myeongseong). She is also commonly known as “Queen Min.” 11. This incident is known as the Eulmi Incident, when sword-bearing assassins murdered the queen and several other women in Gyeongbokgung Palace at the time, allegedly raping the bodies before dragging the queen’s corpse out and burning it. Fifty-six men faced criminal charges in Japan for their roles in the attack, but all were acquitted due to lack of evidence. See Han Young-woo, Myeongseonghwanghuwha Daehanjeguk (Empress Myeongseong and the Korean Empire) (Seoul: Hyohyeong Publishing, 2001). 12. Ki-Baik Lee, A New History of Korea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 365–366. 13. These activities include attempts to assassinate presidents, both on South Korean soil and abroad, airline bombings and hijackings, kidnapping of South Korean residents, and murders of North Korean defectors aiding the South Korean government. For more details of North Korean terrorist activity, see Dick K. Nanto, “North Korea: Chronology of Provocations, 1950–2003,” Congressional Research Service Report, March 18, 2003, http://www.fas.org. 14. US Department of State, “US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2005—Republic of Korea,” April 28, 2006, http://www.globalsecurity.org. 15. In June 2006, five South Korean civilians were abducted from a natural gas facility run by Shell Petroleum Development Company in the Nigerian Delta. All five were released unharmed. In January 2007, nine South Koreans working for Daewoo Engineering and Construction were seized at a pipeline construction site in Bayelsa, Nigeria. All nine were later released unharmed. 16. On July 19, 2007, twenty-three South Koreans were kidnapped in the Ghazni Province of Afghanistan. Two were executed, and the remaining twentyone were released after a promise by the South Korean government to withdraw troops from the country by the end of 2007. Taliban spokespersons claim that South Korea also offered US$20 million, a charge the South Korean government failed to respond to adequately, although there were reports that the money was to be spent building hospitals. All 210 noncombatant troops were withdrawn in December 2007. 17. Four South Koreans were killed and another three injured in a bomb attack on March 15, 2009. The group was in Shibam, Yemen, sightseeing at the UN World Heritage site when the bomb, linked to al-Qaeda, went off. On June 15, 2009, it was reported that another South Korean in an unrelated incident had been abducted and killed, along with seven Germans and a Briton.

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18. In the first widely reported example, a South Korean ship, the Dongwonho 628, and its crew of twenty-five were attacked off the Somalian coast on April 4, 2006. The crew was later released after a negotiated settlement was reached. The Cheonghae Unit, as ROK antipiracy forces are known, continues to successfully deter and disrupt pirates’ efforts by both conducting escorting duties and sending ROK special forces to take down pirate crews. Several Somali pirates, after arrest by ROK special forces, were taken to South Korea and sentenced to life imprisonment. 19. Kang Shin-who, “Taliban-Linked Drug Smugglers Arrested,” Korea Times, July 26, 2009, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr. 20. Strategy Page, “Counter-Terrorism: South Korea Comes Clean,” September 23, 2008, http://www.strategypage.com. 21. This falls under the realm of UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001); see http://www.un.org. 22. US Department of State, Office of International Information Programs, “Joint Press Statement by Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) Meeting,” November 27, 2001. 23. Victor Cha, “Japan-Korea Relations: On Track and Off Course (Again),” Comparative Connections, vol. 3, no. 4 (January 2002), p. 120. 24. Amnesty International, “Terrorism Prevention Bill: Granting Greater Scope for Increased Human Rights Violations,” April 11, 2002, http://asia pacific.amnesty.org. The bill allows for the use of the death penalty in punishing “the leader of a ‘terrorist’ organization,” meaning that Amnesty International, as stated in the article on its website, would oppose the bill regardless of other content, as “Amnesty International opposes the death penalty in all cases.” 25. See the Financial Action Task Force website, http://www.fatf-gafi.org. 26. Financial Action Task Force (FATF), “Mutual Evaluation of the Republic of Korea,” http://www.fatf-gafi.org. 27. “US will send F-15 jets to S. Korea,” Straits Times, August 17, 2004. While the deployment of fighters to South Korea would be logistically explainable as merely a replacement of force withdrawn from the region with the redeployment of the USS Kitty Hawk carrier group, it would also serve to reassure those within South Korea who constantly measure US support through the lens of military might vis-à-vis US Forces Japan (USFJ). 28. Sheldon W. Simon, “Theater Security Cooperation in the US Pacific Command: An Assessment and Projection,” NBR Analysis, vol. 14, no. 2 (2003), p. 16. 29. Jae-soon Chang, “S Korea Planning Afghan Troop Deployment,” Time, October 30, 2009, http://www.time.com. 30. Press briefing with Spokesperson and Deputy Minister for Public Relations Cho Byung-jae, ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, June 23, 2011, http://www.mofat.go.kr/english. 31. US Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000,” April 30, 2001, http://www.state.gov. 32. Simon, “Theater Security Cooperation in the US Pacific Command,” pp. 4–5. 33. “Korea-US Joint Statement on Strategic Dialogue,” January 19, 2006, http://www.korea.net. 34. Ibid.

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35. Soon-ok Shin, “A Failed ‘Regional Balancer’: South Korea’s SelfPromoted Middle Power Identity,” conference paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention, New York, February 2009, http://www.allacademic.com. 36. Lee, “Together We Shall Open a Road to Advancement.” 37. US Department of State, “US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2005—Republic of Korea.” 38. US Department of State, “Chapter 2—Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview,” April 30, 2008, http://www.fatf-gafi.org. 39. US Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2007—Korea, South,” April 30, 2008, http://www.state.gov. 40. US Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2008—Republic of Korea,” April 30, 2009, http://www.unhcr.org. 41. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The 3rd Japan-ROK CounterTerrorism Consultation,” press release, July 13, 2009, http://www.mofa.go.jp. 42. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, “Outcome of the 1st Korea-US Counter-terrorism Consultation,” October 30, 2008, http:// www.korea.net/. 43. The percentage of South Koreans with a favorable opinion of the United States rose from less than half in 2003 to 79 percent in 2010 (Pew Global Attitudes Project, “South Korea: Opinion of the United States: Do You Have a Favorable or Unfavorable View of the US?” Spring Survey, 2011, http:// pewglobal.org. 44. South Korean support of US antiterrorism efforts was steady at 24 percent in 2002 and 2003, falling as low as 10 percent approval in 2007, and then climbing, but only back to 27 percent, in 2010 (Pew Global Attitudes Project, “South Korea: US Anti-Terrorism Efforts: Do You Favor or Oppose US-Led Anti-Terrorism Efforts?” Spring Survey, 2011, http://pewglobal.org). 45. While 49 percent of South Koreans wanted ROK troops to remain intheater in a 2010 survey, the 2011 announcement by President Obama of a drawdown of US forces led to an ROK announcement that the deployment of troops may be revisited if the security situation in Afghanistan changes (Pew Global Attitudes Project, “South Korea: Support for War in Afghanistan: Should the US and NATO Keep Troops in Afghanistan or Remove Them?” Spring Survey, 2011, http://pewglobal.org). 46. Lee Myung-bak, “Address to the Korea Society 2008 Annual Dinner,” April 15, 2008, http://www.koreasociety.org. 47. “CPRK Regards S. Korea’s Full Participation in PSI as Declaration of War Against DPRK,” Korean Central News Agency, May 27, 2009, http://www .kcna.co.jp. 48. Tony Chang, “(2nd LD) S. Korea Searched Suspicious N.K. Containers: Sources,” Yonhap, October 5, 2009, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr. 49. Jung-wook Kim and Myo-ja Ser, “US Envoy Plans Nuclear Talks with North in Sept.,” JoongAng Daily, August 25, 2009, http://joongangdaily.joins.com. 50. East Asia Institute Center for Public Opinion Research, “Rising North Korean Threat Perception and Support for Korea-US Alliance,” April 10, 2009, http://www.eai.or.kr. 51. Shin Boo-nam, “UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” August 5, 2008, http://www.internetkorea.com. 52. “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report,” presented at the Sixth ASEAN Regional

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Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, Semarang, Indonesia, February 21–22, 2008. 53. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The 3rd Japan-ROK Counter-Terrorism Consultation,” July 13, 2009, http://www.mofa.go.jp. 54. Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and US Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 118. 55. Derek S. Reveron, “Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror,” Orbis, vol. 50, no. 3 (2006), pp. 453–468. 56. Jung Sung-ki, “S. Korean Military to Triple Artillery Against N. Korea,” Korea Times, June 21, 2009, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr. 57. “Statement of Admiral Timothy J. Keating, US Navy, Commander, US Pacific Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on US Pacific Command Posture,” March 11, 2008, http://www.pacom.mil. 58. Gerry J. Gilmore, “DoD to Set Up Joint Intelligence Operations Centers Worldwide,” American Forces Press Service, April 12, 2006, http://www .defense.gov. 59. “Statement of Admiral Timothy J. Keating.” 60. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, International Assistance and Protection Course Held in the Republic of Korea, July 4, 2007, http://www.opcw.org. 61. “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report.” 62. Kim Se-jeong, “Korea to Triple Overseas Assistance,” Korea Times, November 30, 2008. 63. Im Hyug-baeg, “How Korea Could Become a Regional Power in Northeast Asia: Building a Northeast Asian Triad,” working paper, US-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Washington, DC, October 2008; Christopher B. Whitney and David Shambaugh, “Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multinational Survey of Public Opinion,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs and East Asia Institute, 2008, http://www.thechicagocouncil.org. 64. John Deutch, “Terrorism,” Foreign Policy 108 (1997), p. 21. 65. Lee Chi-dong, “U.N. Official Backs S. Korea’s Anti-terrorism Bill,” Yonhap News Agency, March 26, 2009, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr. 66. Senate Armed Forces Committee, “Statement of Admiral Timothy J. Keating, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture,” March 11, 2008, http://www.pacom.mil. 67. Kuan-min Kim, Eighth US Army Public Affairs, “Senior ROK-US Soldiers Train Together at Korea Combat Training Center,” June 24, 2009, http://www.army.mil. 68. YongHyo Kim, YoungJu Lee, and ChongHo Lee, “Advanced Simulation Architecture as an ROK-US OPCON Transformation Enabler,” paper prepared for the Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation & Education Conference, 2008. 69. Financial Action Task Force (FATF), “Anti–Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism,” June 26, 2009, http://www .fatf-gafi.org. 70. “Statement of Admiral Timothy J. Keating.”

4 Nuclear Nonproliferation Fred McGoldrick

THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA SHARE strong interests in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and both states have compelling reasons to expand their cooperation to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime. Foremost among these reasons is the threat posed by the nuclear weapons program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), along with Pyongyang’s development and export of missile technology. The DPRK has withdrawn from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and has expelled inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It has conducted two nuclear explosive tests, in October 2006 and in May 2009. It already has a reprocessing facility to separate plutonium from nuclear wastes and in November 2010 revealed to visiting American scientists a uranium enrichment capability, a process that gives North Korea a second means of building nuclear weapons. In defiance of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, the North Koreans have launched missile tests and have continued to export weapons and sensitive technologies to countries such as Myanmar. In 2010 the North Koreans killed fortysix sailors aboard the South Korean ship Cheonan and launched an artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island that killed four more South Koreans. These hostile actions set back the prospects for a return to the Six-Party Talks (among the DPRK, China, Japan, the ROK, Japan, and the United States) that had been aimed at dismantling Pyongyang’s nuclear program. North Korean nuclear ambitions present direct threats to regional stability and to the security of the United States and its allies in East Asia, particularly the Republic of Korea

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and Japan. Moreover, they could provide an incentive for countries in the region to consider developing their own nuclear weapons capability. Beyond the Korean peninsula itself, several developments over the past few years threaten the foundations of the global nonproliferation regime and endanger the national security interests of both the United States and the ROK. Terrorist groups have sought to acquire nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials. The clandestine network of A. Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, has transferred sensitive nuclear technology and weapons design information to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and possibly others. Iran clandestinely acquired uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in violation of its NPT obligations. Concerns have also emerged that an NPT party could acquire sensitive nuclear plants, produce weapons-usable materials using such facilities, and then withdraw from the NPT on ninety-day notice and develop a nuclear weapon without technically violating the treaty. These concerns have led to numerous proposals to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology.1 At the same time, rising energy demands, apprehensions about the security of energy supplies, the volatility in the prices of fossil fuels, and fears of global warming have led many countries to give serious consideration to initiating or expanding civil nuclear power programs. Although the March 2011 nuclear disaster at the Fukushima nuclear power facility has led countries to reassess their plans for nuclear energy and may slow down nuclear expansion, many countries remain committed to nuclear power. The global expansion of nuclear power could impose additional strains on the nonproliferation regime, particularly if such growth leads to the dispersal of sensitive nuclear technologies. These developments come at a time when South Korea has shown interest in establishing a capability to reprocess the used nuclear fuel discharged from its nuclear power plants and to use the recovered plutonium in fast reactors as well as in acquiring a domestic enrichment capacity—aspirations that put it at odds with long-standing US policy to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies and the use, or the accumulation of stockpiles, of plutonium. All this suggests the need for enhanced US-ROK cooperation to strengthen the nonproliferation regime and to devise an approach to the South Korean nuclear fuel cycle that minimizes the threat of nuclear proliferation. This chapter first reviews the importance of maintaining the political and strategic foundation upon which any nuclear nonproliferation

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cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Korea must take place. It then describes specific actions that the two countries have taken to date to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Third, it suggests additional steps that each side could take, either individually or in collaboration, to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Finally, it discusses the question of replacing the existing US-ROK peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement, which expires in 2014, and the need to reconcile South Korea’s ambitions to reprocess its used nuclear fuel and recycle the recovered plutonium with US policy to discourage the spread of sensitive nuclear capabilities. The way the two states resolve this issue could have a significant effect on the prospects for a successful outcome to efforts to denuclearize North Korea and will set an important global precedent for how to balance civil nuclear fuel cycle arrangements with the need to minimize the risk of proliferation.

The Pillars of US-ROK Collaboration on Nonproliferation

US and ROK cooperation on nonproliferation rests on certain bargains, some of which are explicitly set forth in the NPT, while others are rooted in important political, strategic, and national security interests of both states. The NPT and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

The United States and the Republic of Korea are both parties to the NPT—the United States as a nuclear weapon state (NWS), and the ROK as a non–nuclear weapon state (NNWS). One of the basic bargains of the NPT is that the NNWS foreswear the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons or any nuclear explosive device (Article II) and accept IAEA inspections on all their peaceful nuclear activities (Article III). In return for these commitments, Article IV of the treaty affirms the right of all parties to develop and use nuclear energy in conformity with their nonproliferation obligations. It also obliges all parties to the NPT in a position to do so to assist the civil nuclear programs of other parties that are acting in conformity with their treaty obligations. As an NNWS that is party to the NPT and that possesses a major civil nuclear power program, South Korea places special emphasis on its right to enjoy the full benefits of nuclear energy as set out in Article IV of the treaty and believes that right includes the employment of reprocessing and enrichment technology.

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Nuclear Arms Reductions, Disarmament, and Security Assurances

An additional element of the NPT bargain is reflected in Article VI of the treaty, which calls upon all parties to engage in good-faith negotiations on effective measures relating to ending the nuclear arms race at an early date, to nuclear disarmament, and to achieving a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. In other words, the NNWS are prepared to give up nuclear weapons as long as the NWS make a commitment to eliminate their nuclear arms. The Obama administration is making a major push to begin fulfilling this obligation. The ROK will be watching how the arms controls initiatives of the United States will affect South Korean security, as discussed below. Beyond these explicit bargains, another tacit understanding underlies the nonproliferation regime, namely the expectation by NNWS that their renunciation of nuclear weapons will not jeopardize their own national security. Although not specified in the text of the NPT, the willingness of NNWS to forgo nuclear weapons depends to a great extent on the confidence they have that their security will be protected against attacks or threats of attack by nuclear weapon states or more powerful countries. The United States has extended security assurances, including a “nuclear umbrella,” to South Korea since the inception of the mutual defense treaty between the two countries in 1953. This treaty has been at the core of the relationship between Washington and Seoul, and its security guarantee is essential to convince not only South Korea but also other NPT states in the region, including Japan, that their decision to forgo nuclear weapons will not threaten their national security. US security assurances and the US-ROK mutual defense treaty, in particular, constitute the foundation of US-ROK cooperation in the nonproliferation field and form the validation of South Korea’s own nonproliferation commitments, including its adherence to the NPT. Security Assurances and the Republic of Korea

The critical nexus between security assurances and nonproliferation commitments manifested itself in the ROK-US relationship in the past. In 1970 President Richard Nixon decided to withdraw the Seventh Division from South Korea over the vehement protestations of General Park Chung-hee, then president of the ROK. President Nixon’s decision, along with the failure of US policy in Vietnam, undermined Seoul’s

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faith in the US alliance and prompted the military government of South Korea to try to purchase a reprocessing plant from France with a view to acquiring a nuclear weapons option. Only US threats to cast the entire US-ROK security relationship into doubt persuaded the government of General Park to halt, at least temporarily, the ROK’s nuclear weapons program.2 Again in 1977 the announcement by the Carter administration of its plans to withdraw US ground combat forces from South Korea over a five-year period damaged South Korean confidence in US security commitments. No US officials had even consulted with either South Korea or Japan before President Carter’s decision.3 In 1978 the ROK reopened discussions with the French about buying a reprocessing facility. This time it took the personal intervention of President Carter with French prime minister Valery Giscard d’Estaing to block the deal. Confidence in the US security guarantee was only restored in July 1979 by President Carter’s decision to defer further withdrawals of US ground troops.4 In the early 1990s, US troop reductions and the removal of nuclear weapons from South Korea led to concerns in both South Korea and the United States that these steps would weaken the US deterrent against the DPRK and the US commitment to the South.5 Some believe that further troop reductions in 2004 and the relocation of US troops away from Seoul, together with heavy US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, also led to concerns in South Korea that the United States was abandoning Seoul.6 The United States has repeatedly sought to assure the ROK of its willingness and ability to provide for Seoul’s security by reiterating its commitment to its treaty obligations. Shortly after the North Korean nuclear test in October 2006, the United States and South Korea issued a joint communiqué that explicitly reaffirmed the continuation of the extended deterrence offered by the US nuclear umbrella consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty.7 On June 16, 2009, the United States recommitted itself to the defense of South Korea, including keeping Seoul under its nuclear umbrella. After a meeting between US president Barack Obama and South Korean president Lee Myung-bak, the two countries released a joint statement that included this pledge: “We will maintain a robust defense posture, backed by allied capabilities which support both nations’ security interests. The continuing commitment of extended deterrence, including the US nuclear umbrella, reinforces this assurance.”8 In addition to the positive security assurances extended to South Korea, the United States has indicated during the course of the six-party

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negotiations that it does not intend to attack or invade the DPRK with conventional or nuclear weapons. The Obama Initiative for Nuclear Arms Reductions

The importance of security assurances must be kept in mind as President Barack Obama implements the initiative to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear arms that he outlined in his April 5, 2009, speech in Prague.9 As a first step toward this goal, the US and Russian governments concluded a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which entered into force on February 5, 2011, after its ratification by the US Senate and the Russian Duma. The new START requires each country to cut its deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 1,550 warheads, down from the maximum of 2,200 allowed by 2012 under the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which expired in December 2009. President Obama has also set forth an even more ambitious goal: “The United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons” and “will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same.”10 Obama’s initiative to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons has been lauded by the NNWS as a serious step in fulfilling the bargain contained in Article VI of the NPT. Nonetheless, the president’s initiative has raised some concerns that it would undercut the deterrent value of the US nuclear arsenal as other nuclear states are modernizing theirs and deprive the United States of the ability to deter multiple adversaries at once. Some believe that these concerns include the fear that an agreement on deep cuts in US and Russian nuclear weapons would erode the credibility of US “extended deterrence” and lead key allies, including possibly South Korea, to question the reliability of the US “nuclear umbrella” and to seek, or at least consider, acquiring their own nuclear weapons.11 North Korea has a number of nuclear devices, may be moving to restart its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, has enrichment capability, and is developing offensive missile capabilities. In addition, the US security assurances to South Korea are directed not only at the DPRK but also at China, a nuclear weapon state. Japan would also be apprehensive about any weakening of the US security assurances, and South Korea would be concerned that any Japanese doubts about the US security umbrella would lead Tokyo to reconsider its nonproliferation commitments. These anxieties should not serve as an argument against deep nuclear arms reductions or the goal of nuclear disarmament. Rather, they

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are a caution that, as the United States moves to reduce nuclear arms and thereby make progress toward fulfilling its NPT Article VI commitments, it will need to move deliberately and in close consultations with South Korea as well as others in the region so as to avoid undermining the credibility of the US deterrent. During this process, the importance of extended nuclear deterrence should not be exaggerated. As the history of US decisions to withdraw nuclear weapons and troops from South Korea demonstrates, what is critical is the ROK’s confidence in the credibility of its overall relationship with the United States and the continued ability of the United States to convince the South Koreans that it has no intention of abandoning them and that the United States will provide credible non–nuclear deterrence guarantees, if its goals of significant nuclear arms reductions and eventual elimination are realized. This is perhaps one of the reasons why President Obama in his Prague speech cautioned that the United States would “maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary and guarantee that defense to our allies.”12 In sum, a continued, credible US guarantee of the security and stability of the Korean peninsula and the region will be essential to ensuring a sustained ROK commitment to the NPT and to preserve the nonproliferation regime in Northeast Asia. A reaffirmation of US security assurances has become particularly important in light of the recent provocative North Korean actions in conducting missile and nuclear weapons tests.

The United States, the Republic of Korea, and Nuclear Nonproliferation

With the bargains described above as the foundation of their nonproliferation cooperation, the United States and the Republic of Korea have actively promoted an effective international nonproliferation regime on both an individual and a collaborative basis. What They Have Done

Both countries participate in various international institutions and arrangements and adhere to key instruments of the global nonproliferation regime, including the NPT, the NPT Exporters Committee (or Zangger Committee) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The latter two are informal groups that have established nonproliferation guidelines for

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the export of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology. Each has concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and has ratified the Additional Protocol to their IAEA safeguards agreements.13 The United States and the ROK also • Adhere to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which requires parties to establish national laws treating nuclear terrorism as a criminal act and to make offenses punishable by suitably severe penalties. • Participate in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, a program launched by the United States to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear material located at civilian sites worldwide.14 • Support UNSC Resolution 1540, which requires states to “adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws” to deny weapons of mass destruction, their components, and “means of delivery” to any “nonstate actors.”15 The ROK has joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an international effort launched by the United States in May 2003 to help block illegal shipments of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technologies. The ROK had been reluctant to do so for fear of antagonizing North Korea.16 Seoul had been reconsidering its stance on the PSI for many months, but the decision to join remained uncertain as a result of intense internal debate due to concerns about North Korean reactions.17 However, in reaction to Pyongyang’s nuclear test of May 2009, South Korea announced it would join the pact immediately.18 President Obama convened the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in 2010, during which forty-seven world leaders agreed that nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security, and joined the United States in its call to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years. The Republic of Korea has taken on a leadership role in this area by agreeing to host the second Nuclear Security Summit in 2012. Most importantly, the United States and the ROK have been working together and with China, Japan, and Russia to achieve a verified cessation and dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program. Close and effective consultation and coordination in their approach will be essential to dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem. This has not always been the case. Disagreements on questions of strategy and tactics between the United States and the ROK over North Korea as well as electoral politics during the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush adminis-

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trations sometimes made difficult a coordinated approach to the DPRK.19 In their dealings with North Korea, each country will need to ensure that its policies take fully into account the national interests of the other, and both Washington and Seoul need to harmonize their policies to prevent North Korea from taking advantage of any splits in the alliance on the issue of Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. What Additional Steps They Should Take

The global nonproliferation system remains under considerable strain, and both the United States and the ROK should take additional steps to align their policies and more fully participate in efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. In general, the United States needs to move forward more aggressively in supporting the reduction of nuclear armaments, the banning of nuclear testing, and the production of weapons-usable materials for nuclear weapons. The ROK needs to take on a greater leadership role in the nonproliferation field that is proportionate to its status as a country with a major nuclear power and research and development (R&D) program and as an advanced economy. In particular, the United States and the ROK should take the following specific actions: 1. The two states should recognize and act upon the fact that the financial situation of the IAEA is at the breaking point. Underfunding of the agency is seriously compromising its ability to meet its safeguards, security, and safety responsibilities. The United States and the ROK should initiate coordinated efforts, along with like-minded states, to urge member states of the agency to increase the IAEA’s resources.20 2. Both states should more actively provide assistance to help other states to implement their obligations under UNSC Resolution 1540, as many states are lagging in carrying out their 1540 responsibilities. Clandestine, illicit trade in sensitive nuclear items is threatening to undermine the nonproliferation regime.21 3. Both countries need to ratify the newly amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). The ROK has not yet ratified the CPPNM. Although a party to the original CPPNM, the United States has yet to ratify amendments to the convention that were agreed to by a diplomatic conference in July 2005.22 4. Both states should cooperate in trying to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force as soon as possible. The ROK has already ratified the treaty, but it could take an active role in encour-

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aging other states to join the CTBT. The US Senate voted down ratification of the CTBT in 1999. President Barack Obama has now committed his administration to ratification of the treaty, and both the ROK and the United States should commit to urge all states to adhere to the CTBT. 5. Both states should work together to support the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) that would establish an effectively verifiable ban on the production of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium for nuclear explosives. 6. The United States and the ROK should establish a mechanism to collaborate in ensuring effective controls on international trade in nuclear materials, equipment, and technology. The United States was for many years the central player in the global nuclear market and used that position to help shape the nonproliferation norms and rules that have governed the civil nuclear market. While it no longer enjoys the dominant role it did four decades ago, the United States remains a participant in the international market for commercial nuclear power.23 The growth of the South Korean nuclear power program has positioned the ROK to play a major role in international nuclear trade. South Korea has developed nuclear expertise to design and build nuclear power reactors and has become one of the very few states that will have the industrial capacity to export major nuclear systems.24 With the growing global interest in nuclear power, the ROK is eager to compete in the international market. Until recently, its lack of experience in the international arena and of market connections limited South Korea’s ability to secure international orders. However, the South Korean nuclear industry has begun to partner with foreign suppliers in order to provide complete nuclear power plants on the global market.25 An ROK nuclear component supplier recently announced that it has signed a US$200 million contract with Westinghouse to supply by 2014 the main plant components of the third-generation plant, the AP1000TM model.26 Doosan Heavy Industries in consortium with Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) and other South Korean or foreign firms is now in a position to market a successor to the APR-1400 in collaboration with Westinghouse.27 In 2009, South Korea concluded a huge deal with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for the sale of four nuclear power reactors for some $20 billion. In January 2010 the South Korean Ministry of Knowledge Economy declared that it aimed to achieve exports of eighty nuclear power reactors worth $400 billion by 2030.28

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China appears to be one of the main markets that the South Korean nuclear industry is aiming to penetrate. In April 2007, Doosan signed a letter of intent for a contract with Westinghouse for the supply of two pressure vessels and four steam generators for two AP1000 nuclear power reactors it will construct in China.29 Doosan supplied steam generators, pressurizers, and other nuclear power equipment to China. The South Korean firm has supplied a reactor pressure vessel to the Qinshan nuclear power plant in China, which was the company’s first export sale of the major equipment for a nuclear reactor.30 In 2008, Doosan signed a memorandum of understanding with China National Nuclear Company to bid jointly on nuclear power projects. Doosan is already contracted to provide large components such as steam generators for Chinese nuclear power plants, and the firms expect to work together on more Chinese projects in Southwest Asia and Africa. China is involved in Pakistan’s nuclear power program and is also interested in supporting a new program in Bangladesh.31 The conditions under which the ROK transfers nuclear equipment, components, and technology to China will be important given Beijing’s role in assisting the Pakistani nuclear program. Seoul must ensure that none of the items or know-how it supplies China will be retransferred to Islamabad, which is not a party to the NPT and has refused to accept IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities.32 The ROK is also considering Jordan and Turkey as well as India and Japan as potential markets for its nuclear reactors.33 On December 2, 2008, the ROK signed a nuclear energy cooperation agreement with Jordan in several areas, such as technical assistance, site selection, design, construction, and nuclear safety. In addition, KEPCO and the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) have signed a memorandum of understanding.34 According to press reports of March 2008, South Korea has taken the lead in talks to sell Jordan a nuclear power plant through a private deal without a formal bidding process. Saudi Arabia has also announced plans to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with South Korea.35 South Korean interest in nuclear trade with politically volatile areas of the world such as the Middle East puts a premium on ensuring effective nonproliferation controls that provide the maximum protection against the misuse of civil nuclear technology for military or nuclear explosives purposes. It is particularly important that, as civil nuclear programs are established in the Middle East, they avoid the presence of sensitive nuclear technologies that would threaten regional stability. The NSG has recently amended its guidelines on transfers of sensitive nuclear technology. The United States has licensed nuclear technology to

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South Korea on the condition that the United States approve any retransfer to certain countries. So to the extent that US-licensed nuclear knowhow is to be reexported to China and countries in the Middle East, the United States must consent to such retransfers.36 The ROK has adopted the nuclear export guidelines of the NSG but has limited experience in implementing nonproliferation assurances and controls as a nuclear supplier. In this connection it is worth noting that the United States concluded an agreement with the UAE in 2010 that contains legally binding assurances that the UAE would not possess enrichment and reprocessing facilities. The United States is considering whether to require this condition in agreements with other countries but has confirmed that the fields of cooperation, terms, and conditions accorded by the United States to the UAE for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be no less favorable in scope and effect than those which may be accorded, from time to time, to any other non–nuclear weapon state in the Middle East in a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. South Korea’s nuclear cooperation agreement contains no similar provision. Nor do the agreements that other nuclear suppliers have concluded with countries in the Middle East. As the ROK concludes its own bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with states in the Middle East and other areas of concern, Seoul and Washington should find it useful to consult with each other and other nuclear suppliers with a view to ensuring that such agreements with countries in regions of instability or high proliferation risk contain strict nonproliferation assurances and controls.

New US-ROK Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: A Precedent for a New Global Nuclear Architecture

Since the current US-ROK peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement expires in 2014, the two countries have begun to negotiate a replacement agreement. This new US-ROK civil nuclear trade accord could serve as an important vehicle for enhancing the peaceful nuclear programs of both countries while establishing effective nonproliferation conditions and controls that should govern such programs. More Stable Cooperation and More Rigorous Nonproliferation Controls

The US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978 requires that all new US peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements obligate cooperating

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partners to accept rigorous nonproliferation conditions on US nuclear exports of US nuclear equipment and nuclear materials. Since enactment of the NNPA, the United States has concluded agreements with some twenty-four countries and two international organizations—the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM and its twenty-seven member states) and the IAEA plus Taiwan, which contain all of these new nonproliferation controls. If a new agreement contains all these requirements under the NNPA, it may enter into force after the president has submitted the proposed text to Congress for ninety days of continuous session unless Congress enacts legislation to disapprove it. However, if a proposed new peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement lacks any of these requirements, approval of such a new agreement requires the enactment of a resolution of approval by both houses of the US Congress. Given these legal and political realities, US negotiators will undoubtedly press for including all the conditions specified in the NNPA in any new peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with the ROK. These controls are far more extensive than those contained in the existing US-ROK agreement, which was concluded in 1974. A new US-ROK accord could have clear benefits for both countries. It could provide a stable basis for peaceful nuclear trade and cooperation for the future. It could establish a model for strict nonproliferation controls that South Korea might include in its own bilateral nuclear cooperation with other countries. Unlike the existing US-ROK accord, the new agreement would be reciprocal in nature and impose the same conditions on ROK exports of nuclear materials and equipment to the United States as it does on US nuclear supplies to South Korea. In this respect the agreement offers the opportunity both to strengthen nonproliferation controls on civil nuclear trade and to lessen the one-sided nature of past nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In addition, the two countries could enhance their contribution to the nonproliferation regime by setting forth in the agreement itself or in an agreed minute their shared views on nonproliferation and their specific intentions and commitments to strengthen civil nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation. For example, the agreement text itself or a side document could reiterate the commitment of each government to • Promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in each country and avoid hampering, hindering, interfering with, or delaying the peaceful nuclear activities of either party. • Support the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

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• Strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, including increased financial and technical support. • Ensure effective controls on their nuclear exports and assist other countries in establishing strong export control systems. • Support restraint in the export of sensitive nuclear technology. • Promote the application of the most effective physical protection techniques. • Conduct research and development on the proliferation resistance of nuclear fuel cycle activities, including both technical and institutional barriers to diversion. • Work together to urge countries to adopt the universal entry into force of the Additional Protocol to IAEA safeguards agreements, the conclusion of a verifiable FMCT, and the entry into force of the CTBT. The new agreement could also give formal recognition to, and elevate the status of, the Joint Standing Committee on Nuclear Energy Cooperation (JSCNEC). The United States and the ROK established the JSCNEC in 1980, and it has become the central forum for exchanging views on a wide range of technical and policy matters, including such subjects as environmental and waste management, nuclear energy R&D, nuclear safety, nuclear fuel cycle issues, safeguards, the NPT, nuclear export controls, nuclear supply assurances, regional proliferation concerns, nuclear smuggling, and nuclear cooperation with other countries. Differences over the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

The one issue that is most likely to complicate the negotiation of a new US-ROK peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement is the implementation of a US right to consent to the reprocessing of used nuclear fuel from the South Korean nuclear program.37 About two-thirds of South Korea’s used power reactor fuel has been produced from nuclear material supplied under the US-ROK peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. The existing US-ROK agreement provides that nuclear material supplied to South Korea may be reprocessed only in facilities acceptable to both parties upon a joint determination that IAEA safeguards may be effectively applied. US nonproliferation legislation now requires that new US agreements contain an expanded US consent right to include not only nuclear material supplied by the United States but also all nuclear material that has been used in a US-supplied reactor. To date the United

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States has not consented to any reprocessing or alteration in form of content of US-supplied used nuclear fuel in South Korea. South Korea’s used nuclear fuel problem. South Korea is heavily de-

pendent on nuclear power. By 2030 nuclear power will account for 59 percent of South Korean electricity generation. However, South Korea faces serious challenges in managing its used nuclear fuel.38 The government has not yet found a solution to the storage problem. The lack of adequate used fuel storage capacity could lead to a shutdown of existing reactors and could be one of the biggest stumbling blocks for South Korea’s plans to generate more nuclear power.39 In the longer term, the ROK must find a place to dispose of its high-level nuclear waste. The government established the Korea Radioactive Waste Management Co. Ltd (KRWM) in early 2009 as an umbrella organization to resolve South Korea’s waste management disposition, and particularly to forge a national consensus on high-level wastes. However, the ROK has not yet raised the question of selecting a site for the disposal of high-level waste, an issue that will undoubtedly spark considerable controversy. In 2007 the government began construction of South Korea’s first repository for mid- and low-level nuclear waste but only after some twenty years of highly contentious debate. The government promised to donate US$300 million to the local community in Gyeongju, the host city of the final repository. In addition, the government will provide US$4 billion to financially support the community. South Korea currently has twenty reactors in operation, six under construction, and has plans to increase nuclear capacity to thirty-eight reactors by 2030. These reactors will produce more than 100,000 tons of used nuclear fuel by 2100. South Korea is interested in establishing a capability to minimize the accumulation of used nuclear fuel discharged from its nuclear power plants and potentially to recycle it by using the transuranic elements in fast reactors. Thus, South Korea needs to find both short- and long-term solutions to managing the back end of its nuclear fuel cycle. The only realistic answer in the near term is interim storage of spent fuel either at reactors or at a central storage facility or multiple regional facilities, although these alternatives are likely to encounter strong public opposition. For the long term, some in the ROK government and the R&D community believe that a certain form of reprocessing—called pyroprocessing—is the most sensible solution to managing South Korea’s nuclear waste. They believe that the disposal of used nuclear fuel would be a formidable task because South Korea’s population density is among the world’s highest

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and its present infrastructure makes impossible road transport of used nuclear fuel whose transport canister weight is more than 110 tons. For the South Koreans, these factors put a premium on minimizing nuclear waste. Pyroprocessing and proliferation risks. A major objective for South Korea in negotiating a new agreement with the United States will most likely be to obtain US consent on an advance, long-term basis both to reprocessing or pyroprocessing of used nuclear fuel subject to the agreement and to the use of the recovered plutonium and other transuranics in fast reactors. However, the United States has long approached the issue of reprocessing with great caution because this technology poses several proliferation risks. Classic plutonium-uranium extraction (PUREX) reprocessing separates plutonium from all fission products. This separated plutonium may be used as fuel in civil nuclear reactors, but it is also directly usable in nuclear weapons. With the possession of such material, a state could abrogate its nonproliferation commitments and produce a nuclear weapon within a short period of time. Reprocessing plants are also challenging and costly to safeguard. Finally, separated plutonium offers a tempting target to nonstate actors. International attention on dealing with the proliferation risks of reprocessing has focused on two different strategies. The first is the socalled once-through fuel cycle, which eschews reprocessing and disposes of used nuclear fuel as waste. Proponents of this approach have argued that reprocessing is more costly than the once-through fuel cycle strategy and presents far greater risks of proliferation. The United States has long promoted this policy, beginning with the Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter administrations in the 1970s. The other strategy focuses on the development of new, more “proliferation-resistant” technologies that do not separate pure plutonium. The administration of George W. Bush placed considerable emphasis on the development of such proliferation-resistant fuel cycles as part of its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). One of the technologies that the United States has been examining is pyroprocessing, the technology in which South Korea is particularly interested. The plutonium product of pyroprocessing is not pure but is mixed with uranium, some rare-earth fission products (notably cerium-144), and the other transuranic elements, namely americium, curium, and neptunium. The United States has been engaged in some cooperation with the ROK on pyroprocessing at the R&D level. However, the United States

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has agreed to the participation of South Korean scientists only on a caseby-case basis in joint pyroprocessing experiments involving used nuclear fuel at US laboratories. In addition, scientists in South Korea have been restricted to using natural uranium, which does not contain plutonium. And the United States has not allowed any “hot” processing of used nuclear fuel subject to the existing US-ROK nuclear cooperation agreement in South Korea. Pyroprocessing has been under development in the Argonne National Laboratory and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). In 2005, South Korea built a laboratory-scale Advanced Conditioning Processing Facility (ACPF) in the Irradiated Material Examination Facility of KAERI. On December 23, 2007, the Ministry of Science and Technology announced a civil nuclear energy plan that aims to build a functioning next-generation fast reactor and a pyroprocessing or pyrorecycling fuel cycle by 2028. The plan is to begin construction of a pilot pyroprocessing facility by 2012 and to complete the facility by 2016. It also envisages a semicommercial facility in place by 2025.40 Observers both within and outside the US government have argued that pyroprocessing and pyrorecycling are not really proliferationresistant because the technology separates most fission products from the plutonium and thus removes the major technical barriers to its use in nuclear weapons. In addition, the draft Nonproliferation Impact Assessment (NPIA) of GNEP Programmatic Alternatives by the US Department of Energy reached the preliminary conclusion that the candidate reprocessing technologies under study by GNEP, including pyroprocessing, suggest only modest improvements in reducing proliferation risk over existing PUREX technologies and that these apply primarily to nonstate actors.41 US policy toward reprocessing in other countries has exhibited a striking continuity of approach over several decades. The United States has granted consent to reprocessing only in countries that already have advanced nuclear programs, including reprocessing and enrichment plants; that have excellent nonproliferation credentials; and that present no proliferation risk or are located in areas of only limited proliferation danger. To date, the United States has approved the reprocessing of USobligated used nuclear fuel only in EURATOM and Japan, and has agreed to consent to such reprocessing in a future Indian reprocessing facility. For all other countries, US administrations from Ford’s through George W. Bush’s have sought to restrict the spread of reprocessing and have declined to give consent to reprocessing of US-obligated spent fuel. The US Congress has recently underlined its support for this policy

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in the United States–India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act of 2008, which required the president to certify that it is “the policy of the United States to work with members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), individually and collectively, to agree to further restrict the transfers of equipment and technology related to the enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel” (Section 104 [a]).42 The Obama administration, the US-ROK peaceful nuclear agreement, and reprocessing. The Obama administration’s approach to reprocessing

in South Korea was addressed in written answers that Ellen Tauscher provided to Senator Richard Lugar, ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in connection with her nomination hearings for the position of undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. Senator Lugar asked, “Does the Administration contemplate any changes in existing nuclear cooperation agreements, in particular those with Taiwan and the Republic of South Korea, to allow reprocessing of US-origin materials in those nations?” Tauscher’s written answer was as follows: Pursuant to the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, all US nuclear cooperation agreements with partner countries require that the United States give its consent to reprocessing of spent fuel containing US-origin nuclear material by those countries. The agreements with Euratom, India and Japan provide programmatic consent 43 for reprocessing within the European Union, India and Japan. The Administration does not believe that such programmatic consent to reprocessing is necessarily appropriate in other cases, including Taiwan and the Republic of Korea. [emphasis added]

Tauscher’s use of the words “necessarily appropriate” in reference to the possibility of US programmatic consent to reprocessing is ambiguous and would appear to leave open at least the possibility of such US approval of reprocessing in both places. However, Tauscher’s answer to another of Senator Lugar’s questions would appear to close the door to reprocessing of US-obligated used nuclear fuel in South Korea. Senator Lugar’s question was “Do you believe that an agreement that allowed any form of reprocessing to take place in South Korea would violate the 1992 Joint Declaration, in particular its clear statement that ‘The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities’?” Ms. Tauscher’s answer: “I believe that the existence of a reprocessing plant in the Republic of Korea would be incon-

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sistent with the commitments made in the 1992 Joint Declaration.”44 Washington has regarded the 1992 North and South Korean Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in which both parties agreed to forgo possession of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, as a key component of realizing nuclear stability on the Korean peninsula.45 The United States has feared that any South Korean pyroprocessing program would undermine the 1992 North-South denuclearization agreement at a sensitive time in US efforts to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program. South Korea and the United States agreed in October 2010 to conduct a joint feasibility study on pyroprocessing and other ways of handling spent nuclear fuel. The two sides decided to pursue a two-track strategy in negotiating a new agreement. They will try to conclude talks on other issues on renewing the nuclear agreement at least a year before its expiration, or by March 2013, to give time for approval by the legislatures of both parties. In the event that the joint study does not produce a satisfactory outcome by then, the new accord will have a clause to the effect that pyroprocessing technology may be considered after completion of the joint study.46 Points of Contention: The United States

The United States will find it difficult to consent to pyroprocessing in South Korea for a number of reasons, including the following: 1. As noted above, it will be extremely difficult for the United States to consent to any kind of reprocessing on the Korean peninsula, if Washington perceives that such a decision would jeopardize the satisfactory resolution of the nuclear issue in the North, including a nuclear-weaponfree Korean peninsula. 2. Finding a rationale for making an exception for South Korea to its long-standing policy of preventing the spread of sensitive nuclear facilities will be challenging. To date, the only exceptions have been Japan and EURATOM, and more recently a promise to give India advance consent to reprocessing. 3. The ROK differs from Japan and EURATOM in that it has neither built nor operated reprocessing facilities and is, therefore, not in a position to argue that its existing programs should be grandfathered in, like those in Japan and EURATOM. 4. Most members of the arms control and nonproliferation community in the United States will oppose any kind of reprocessing and will

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lobby the Executive Branch and the Congress against any arrangements allowing reprocessing or pyroprocessing in South Korea. 5. A growing international consensus has emerged favoring a halt to the further spread of national enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.47 6. The NSG has been examining ways to strengthen its guideline on transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies. 7. Acceptance of South Korean pursuit of pyroprocessing would not only be controversial in America, but it may also raise regional and global nonproliferation concerns. Points of Contention: The ROK

The ROK will press the United States hard for advance, long-term consent to reprocess (or pyroprocess) used nuclear fuel subject to the bilateral agreement. First, as a sovereign state and as a party to the NPT, the ROK will argue that it has the right to engage in reprocessing as long as it is abiding by its NPT obligations. Seoul will point to the wording of Article IV of the NPT that states, “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.”48 South Korea will cite this legal basis in resisting any notion that the ROK should be denied a reprocessing or pyroprocessing capability. Second, Seoul will point to the fact that North Korean reprocessing and its conduct of a nuclear test constitutes a violation of the two countries’ 1992 denuclearization agreement and that it renders null and void the South Korean commitment in that agreement not to possess enrichment or reprocessing capabilities. Third, South Korea finds it discriminatory that the United States has given India, Japan, and EURATOM advance, long-term consent to reprocessing and the use of plutonium while refusing the ROK the same treatment, even though South Korea has a major nuclear power and R&D program. Seoul sees the US-Japan civil nuclear cooperation agreement, in particular, as the benchmark for a new US-ROK agreement. Fourth, South Koreans disagree with their US counterparts about reprocessing and have asserted that the pyroprocessing technology they have developed is not reprocessing because no plutonium is separated from other transuranics when they are separated from uranium. They also argue that the technology is proliferation-resistant49 and that any

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concerns about their pyroprocessing research and development program can be put to rest by effective safeguards.50 Fifth, the ROK will charge that the United States cannot deny the ROK consent to reprocessing after it has given preferential treatment to India, a non-NPT party.51 In its recently concluded peaceful nuclear cooperation with India, the United States has promised to give advance, long-term consent to reprocessing in India. Specifically, paragraphs (iii) and (iv) of Article 6 of that agreement provide that the Parties grant each other consent to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or equipment so transferred. To bring these rights into effect, India will establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards and the Parties will agree on arrangements and procedures under which such reprocessing or other alteration in form or content will take place in this new facility. Consultations on arrangements and procedures will begin within six months of a request by either Party and will be concluded within one year.52

The United States and India have reached agreement on the arrangements and procedures for safeguarding the proposed Indian reprocessing plant, as required by the terms of the US-Indian peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. The US-Indian agreement has given the South Koreans the argument that the United States should be prepared to grant the ROK the same treatment with respect to pyroprocessing of US-obligated spent fuel as it has accorded India with respect to reprocessing, based on the following rationales: • The ROK has assumed all the obligations and burdens of an NPT party whereas India has not. • The ROK has a close alliance with the United States and has a security treaty with the United States, where India does not. • The Korean peninsula is a region that is no more politically unstable than South Asia. Some Options

Given the positions that the United States and ROK have on reprocessing and pyroprocessing/recycling, is a resolution of this issue possible?

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Just say “no.” The United States could adopt the position it has taken with the vast majority of its cooperating partners and simply decline to give advance, long-term consent to pyroprocessing in South Korea. Under this option the United States could offer to explore with the ROK options on interim storage of used nuclear fuel either in the ROK or offshore. The United States would consider any future requests to pyroprocess US-obligated used nuclear fuel on a case-bycase basis. South Korea would then have to store its used fuel indefinitely and possibly consider disposing of it as waste. This stance would be fully consistent with long-standing US policy and would be supportive of Washington’s efforts to prevent the spread of reprocessing capabilities. It would encounter no opposition from the nonproliferation, arms control, and environmental communities in the United States and would most likely receive a positive reception in the US Congress. The South Koreans would find this outcome highly unsatisfactory, particularly in light of the fact that the United States had been cooperating with the ROK on research into pyroprocessing and thereby had encouraged Seoul to pursue this technology, and that the United States has given consent to other countries with major nuclear programs. South Korea would find it difficult to proceed with its plans to develop and deploy commercial pyroprocessing technology in the face of the uncertainty of any US response to an ROK request to pyroprocess in the future or to make plans for the long-term disposition of its used nuclear fuel. International storage or disposal facilities. South Korea could explore

the option of establishing an international or regional storage or waste disposal facility. While this idea has generated a great deal of support and enthusiasm for many years and notwithstanding the potential value of such a facility, no country has yet come forward and agreed to host such a facility. Nonetheless, this is a realistic option for the foreseeable future for South Korea or any other country. Domestic storage. One short-term possibility is the establishment of dry

cask storage at reactor sites or the construction of a central storage or regional storage sites. South Korea is likely to face some political obstacles in taking this approach, but interim dry cask storage would provide near-term and mid-term relief to the utility industry and would not raise any nonproliferation concerns. However, it does not address the longterm problem.

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Reprocessing abroad. Another option would be for the United States to

permit the ROK to transfer some or all of its US-obligated spent fuel to Europe for reprocessing. There are indications that the US government might be willing to take this approach as long as there is no return of the separated plutonium to South Korea. However, South Korea would view such a US position as severely discriminatory because the United States has granted Japan consent to reprocessing and the use of plutonium in Japanese nuclear facilities, including the return of Japanese plutonium recovered from overseas reprocessing.53 In addition, without the option of returning the recovered plutonium to South Korea, South Korean utilities would have to pay for the indefinite storage of their recovered plutonium in Europe. They are unlikely to find acceptable customers for such plutonium since there is no real market for this material. Pyroprocessing. Secretary Tauscher’s response to Senator Lugar’s question that “the existence of a reprocessing plant in the Republic of Korea would be inconsistent with the commitments made in the 1992 Joint Declaration” would seem to allow the possibility of US consent to reprocessing in the ROK only under very limited circumstances, if at all. At a minimum, it is hard to imagine that the United States would agree to pyroprocessing by South Korea until a satisfactory resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue had been achieved. The United States has attached considerable importance to join the ROK-DPRK joint declaration of 1992. Moreover, all the countries involved in six-party talks would likely have to accept the idea of South Korean pyroprocessing. A consensus on this question may be difficult to achieve since it is questionable whether the DPRK would agree to forgo sensitive nuclear activities unless the ROK agreed to the same kind of restraint. If the North Korean problem were to be satisfactorily resolved, the United States might be prepared to agree to some form of pyroprocessing under strict nonproliferation conditions. One possibility is that the 1992 inter-Korean declaration will be replaced at some time in the future by some broader understanding that contemplates some form of reprocessing and enrichment under special controls, restraints, and conditions on the Korean peninsula. Under the present circumstances, such a development seems highly uncertain. The second option is that the United States determines that pyroprocessing is not, in fact, reprocessing. At the moment, this question is still under review by the US government, but it is fair to say that the United States in general regards pyroprocessing as a whole as reprocessing since this technology has been developed to the point where

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the plutonium product is quite pure. However, there may be some room for maneuver for electro-reduction as opposed to electro-refining, since the former leaves a product that contains mostly uranium and some fission products and that, therefore, is less proliferation-prone than electro-refining. A third option would be for the United States to make some commitment to approve long-term pyroprocessing in South Korea along the lines similar to the arrangements that the United States has made with India and Japan. In other words, the United States could agree in principle to consent to pyroprocessing and pyrorecycling of US-obligated nuclear fuel in a facility that South Korea might construct in the future provided that it was designed, managed, and operated under mutually acceptable nonproliferation conditions and met agreed-upon safeguards criteria.54 The United States actually grants such consent only when it is satisfied that pyroprocessing/recycling in South Korea would not exacerbate the proliferation risks on the Korean peninsula. The ROK and the United States could make a joint commitment to work with each other on the development of proliferation-resistant pyroprocessing technology and with the IAEA on related advanced safeguards techniques. The ROK R&D facility could become a test bed for the development of such pyroprocessing and safeguards technologies and could be utilized to design high levels of security and safeguards into new nuclear systems and facilities from the outset, including the inherent technical characteristics of the process and the safeguards measures to be taken. The R&D by the ROK and the United States would be aimed at designing a commercial facility in such a way as to restrict the ability to adjust the technical parameters to produce separated plutonium as well as safeguards systems that could be designed to provide timely detection of any alteration of parameters. The two states would agree that the ROK would move toward the establishment of a commercial capability only on a step-by-step basis and only when both the United States and the ROK have jointly agreed that pyroprocessing in the ROK is sufficiently “proliferation-resistant” and may be effectively safeguarded. One element of this step-by-step approach would be to continue to restrict “hot” processing to the United States until the two sides reach an agreement on the proliferation resistance and safeguards effectiveness, at which point some hot processing R&D would take place in the ROK. Seoul could take additional steps to make South Korean pyroprocessing activities more palatable to Washington. For example, the ROK could make a legally binding commitment in the new ROK-US peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement to refrain from possessing a PUREX re-

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processing capability, since this would make it easier to obtain a purer and more easily handled product than from a pyroprocessing plant since the pyroprocessing facility would contain a mixture of plutonium, uranium, and fission products and would require substantial further reprocessing. It could also agree to co-locate all pyroprocessing, fuel fabrication, and advanced burner reactors as part of the future South Korean nuclear program, thus minimizing the risk of theft.55 Whether the United States would agree to the kind of arrangement outlined above is open to question. It would conflict with long-standing US opposition to the spread of reprocessing and the use of plutonium, and it is questionable whether any pyroprocessing can be made to be sufficiently proliferation-resistant to make the plutonium product unusable in nuclear weapons. Finally, this kind of arrangement would encounter serious opposition in the US nonproliferation community and the US Congress. Another option would be to consider some kind of joint venture or multinational entity that would establish strengthened barriers to proliferation and avoid national control of this sensitive technology. Seoul could commit to making any pyroprocessing facility in South Korea a joint venture that would entail US or multinational participation in the management or operation of the facility. The enterprise could possibly involve the IAEA in the policymaking or management of the plant. Given the potential political, economic, and management complexities of any such endeavor, the establishment of a joint venture or multinational R&D pyroprocessing facility might be a prudent first step. This option would have several advantages. It would help the United States maintain its position opposing the spread of sensitive nuclear facilities because the ROK pyroprocessing facility would constitute an alternative to nationally controlled facilities. A plant with US or multinational involvement could also establish additional barriers, through greater transparency, to the diversion of nuclear materials to nonpeaceful purposes and thus serve as an important complement to international safeguards and physical protection. The presence of a multinational staff would place participants under a greater degree of scrutiny by partners and may also constitute an additional obstacle against a breakout by the ROK. Finally, it offers a less discriminatory approach than a regime that allows a few states to continue their national programs while strongly discouraging most states from acquiring such technologies. Whether such additional commitments and restrictions would be acceptable to the United States remains to be seen. In evaluating these and possibly other options, the negotiators will be challenged in trying to de-

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sign a new US-ROK agreement that is tailored to the ROK program and at the same time avoids setting a precedent for other states to acquire their own sensitive nuclear facilities. The way the two countries resolve this issue could establish a model for reconciling the nuclear fuel cycle aspirations of an advanced nuclear power such as South Korea with global concerns about the proliferation risks of reprocessing.

Notes 1. Such proposals have included the following: strengthening nuclear fuel assurances for countries that forgo their own enrichment and reprocessing plants, strengthening supplier restrictions on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, placing sensitive nuclear facilities under some form of multinational control or auspices, establishing arrangements for supplier states to take back spent fuel from consumer states, and developing and deploying proliferation-resistant fuel cycle systems. 2. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (New York: Basic Books, 1997), pp. 68ff. 3. Fred Hoffman, “The Role of Intelligence in President Jimmy Carter’s Troop Withdrawal Decisions,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (January–March 2002). 4. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 73. 5. Ibid., pp. 258–260. 6. Jane Roh, “Asia, Europe Brace for US Troop Realignment,” Fox News, September 28, 2004. 7. The Thirty-eighth Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communiqué, October 20, 2006, http://www.nukestrat.com. 8. Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, June 16, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov. 9. Remarks by President Barack Obama, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov. 10. Ibid. 11. Michael Richardson, “N-clouds over US Umbrella,” Canberra Times, August 6, 2009. 12. Remarks by President Barack Obama, Prague. 13. The latter provides the IAEA with rights to additional information on and access to a state’s peaceful nuclear activities, thereby enhancing the IAEA’s ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities. 14. On September 21, 2007, South Korea became the twelfth country to remove all US-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) research reactor fuel from two research reactors at the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute in Daejon. See “South Korea Free of US HEU,” World Nuclear News, September 21, 2007. 15. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), http://daccess-dds -ny.un.org. 16. Michael A. Fletcher, “Bush Fails to Persuade S. Korea on Sanctions; Roh Vows to Help Block N. Korean Nuclear Exports,” Washington Post, November 19, 2006.

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17. Lee Chi-dong, “S. Korea in Confusion over PSI Participation,” Yonhap, April 19, 2009. 18. Hyung-Jin Kim, “UN Condemns North Korean Nuclear Test,” Associated Press, May 26, 2009. 19. Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 20. IAEA member states recently approved an increase of 5.4 percent in the IAEA budget, half of which is real growth and half for price adjustment. This represents an important step forward in principle but still falls far short of what is really needed. 21. UN Report of the Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), April 25, 2006, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org. 22. The existing convention creates obligations to provide physical protection to the export and import of nuclear materials and during international transit. The amended convention makes it legally binding for states party to the convention to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport. It also provides for expanded cooperation between and among states to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevent and combat related offenses. The amendments will take effect once they have been ratified by two-thirds of the states party to the convention. 23. All but one of the US nuclear power plant vendors and nuclear fuel designers and manufacturers for light water reactors have now been acquired by their non-US-based competitors (“The US Domestic Civil Nuclear Infrastructure and Nonproliferation,” white paper presented by the American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness, Washington, D.C., May 2007, http://www .nuclearcompetitiveness.org). 24. According to a report by the IAEA, India, China, and South Korea are expected to witness a rapid increase in nuclear equipment manufacturing capabilities and emerge as significant contributors to global nuclear construction. According to the report, the industrial capacity of suppliers in the nuclear sector has decreased in the last twenty years, leading to fewer reactor designs, skilled employees, and project management organizations from which to choose. Currently, nuclear system suppliers are based in the United States, Russia, South Korea, Japan, India, France, China, and Canada. The localization of skills and capabilities in China, India, and South Korea is expected to enhance the nuclear capabilities of these countries (International Atomic Energy Agency, “International Status and Prospects of Nuclear Power,” December 2008, http://www.iaea.org). 25.The ROK government announced on April 1, 2009, that South Korea is seeking overseas buyers for indigenously made nuclear reactors through a joint venture arrangement with a leading British engineering company. The joint venture is among state-run Korea Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO), Korea Gas Corp. (KOGAS), Korea Development Bank (KDB), and Britain’s Amec engineering group, a global leader in engineering services and project management. The agreement signed in London gives Amec a majority 54 percent stake in the joint venture that is to be set up in October, with KEPCO, KOGAS, and KDB holding 19 percent, 15 percent, and 12 percent shares, respectively. A ministry official said, “The new joint venture that will be headquartered in South Korea

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should be helpful in gaining access to Asian, Middle Eastern, and European countries that are looking to build new reactors.” The ministry in charge of the country’s industrial and energy policies said that Amec will operate a project management program to train local energy experts who could contribute to the overall future competitiveness of South Korean companies (“S. Korea Looks to Export Nuclear Reactors Through Joint Venture,” TradingMarkets.com, April 1, 2009. 26. Lee Jae-sung, “Korea Seeking to Lead World Nuclear Market,” Korea Times, August 19, 2008. 27. “South Korean Nuclear Power Independence,” World Nuclear News, May 28, 2008. 28. World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in South Korea,” http://www.world-nuclear.org (updated May 2011). 29. “Westinghouse Enlists Doosan for China,” World Nuclear News, April 27, 2007. 30. “Doosan Delivers to China,” World Nuclear News, February 9, 2009. 31. “South Korean Nuclear Power Independence.” 32. Moreover, international confidence in the effectiveness of nuclear export controls was shaken by the disclosures of the nuclear operations of A. Q. Khan, the father of the Pakistani uranium enrichment program. 33. “S. Korea Seeks Nuclear Reactor Sales to Jordan,” Yonhap, April 19, 2009; “South Korea Nears Nuclear Trade Deals with India and Japan,” Global Nuclear Security Newswire, April 10, 2010. 34. “South Korea Offers Help to Jordan, Philippines,” World Nuclear News, December 2, 2008; “Jordan, South Korea Initial Nuclear Cooperation Accord,” Middle East News, October 23, 2009. 35. “Saudi Arabia/N-Pact with South Korea to Boost Power Generation,” ArabNews.com, May 11, 2011. 36. 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 810. 37. There have also been reports that the ROK may also consider the acquisition of enrichment technology, a step that could also conflict with US nonproliferation policy. See “Seoul Considering Options to Improve Energy Efficiency,” Korean Herald, July 8, 2009. 38. At the end of 2007, South Korea had a combined storage capacity of 12,561 tons of used nuclear fuel that is discharged from its twenty nuclear reactors currently in operation. The total spent fuel inventory stored at reactor sites in the ROK now exceeds 10,000 metric tons. Officials at Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. recently revealed that the spent fuel pools for Korea’s sixteen pressurized power reactors at three existing sites will be full as of 2016. ROK aims to forge a stakeholder consensus by 2016 on how it will manage its growing inventory of spent power reactor fuel. 39. “Lack of Storage Capacity Clouds Nuclear Power Plan,” Korea Times, December 2, 2007. 40. Lee Joon-seung, “S. Korea’s Aims to Develop a Functioning Fast Reactor, Advanced Fuel Cycle by 2028,” Yonhap, December 23, 2007. 41. With respect to pyroprocessing, the Nonproliferation Impact Assessment (NPIA) stated that the compact and batch nature of pyroprocesses favors co-locating a fuel recycle facility with a group of advanced burner reactors, thus reducing the need for a large centralized processing facility and possibly

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reducing transportation of separated transuranic material, including the plutonium, and the attendant physical protection concerns. Pyroprocessing remains an experimental process not yet deployed on a production scale. Misuse could take longer than estimated if there are complications in modifying or scaling up the process. On the other hand, development of new pyroprocessing methods could allow for misuse scenarios that take less time to complete. The NPIA also stated that pyroprocessing poses challenges for material accountancy and would require significant safeguards technology and system development before effective safeguards systems could be implemented even for engineering-scale facilities. An effective safeguards approach for such facilities should be designed to detect both misuse of the facility and diversion of nuclear material. See US Department of Energy, Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, “Draft Nonproliferation Impact Assessment for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Programmatic Alternatives,” December 2008, http://www.brc.gov. 42. Text of H.R. 7081 [110th]: United States–India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, October 3, 2008, http://www.govtrack.us. 43. Programmatic consent means advance, long-term US consent to reprocessing and the use of plutonium in the peaceful nuclear programs in these countries under specified safeguards and physical protection measures. 44. Pre-Hearing Questions for the Record, Senator Richard Lugar, Nomination of Helen M. Tauscher to Be Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, http://lugar.senate.gov. 45. “Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” January 20, 1992, http://www.nti.org. 46. Hwang Doo-hyong, “S. Korea, US Agree to Begin Joint Study of Pyroprocessing Spent Nuke Fuel,” Yonhap, October 25, 2010. 47. For example, Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, director-general of the IAEA, has urged countries to agree to a moratorium on the construction of new enrichment and reprocessing facilities in return for their receiving guarantees of delivery of nuclear fuel for peaceful production of electricity. He has also advocated placing all enrichment and reprocessing plants under some form of international auspices or control. In December 2005 the High-Level UN Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change issued a report that called for a limited moratorium on the construction of any further enrichment or reprocessing facilities, with a commitment to the moratorium matched by a guarantee of the supply of fissile materials by the current suppliers at market rates. The members of the Group of Eight have also issued statements in which they said, “It is important to develop and implement mechanisms assuring access to nuclear fuel related services to states as an alternative to pursuing enrichment and reprocessing activities.” 48. “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” entered into force on March 5, 1970, http://www.un.org. 49. Daniel Horner and Mark Hibbs, “US Debating Whether Pyroprocessing Qualifies as Reprocessing for Korea,” Nuclear Fuel, June 2, 2008. 50. Mark Hibbs, “Pyroprocessing Proliferation Issues Can Be Solved, Korean Experts Say,” Nuclear Fuel, June 13, 2008. 51. Until recently the United States required that all non–nuclear weapon

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states (India is a non–nuclear weapon state under international law) accept comprehensive safeguards as a condition of significant nuclear cooperation. The George W. Bush administration departed significantly from this principle when it persuaded the US Congress to change the US Atomic Energy Act and the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to revise its international guidelines in order to enable nuclear cooperation with India by exempting India from the requirement for accepting comprehensive IAEA safeguards. 52. US and India Release Text of 123 Agreement, Office of the Spokesman, Department of State, August 3, 2007, http://web.archive.org. 53. Mark Hibbs, “US Might Permit Offshore Reprocessing but Not Return of South Korean Plutonium,” Nuclear Fuel, September 21, 2009. 54. In the 1988 US-Japan peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement, the United States agreed to the future reprocessing of US-obligated spent fuel at the then-yet-to-be-built Rokkasho facility, provided that Japan agree to allow the IAEA to apply safeguards in accordance with a safeguards concept that had been agreed to in advance by the United States and Japan. 55. The Nonproliferation Impact Assessment of GNEP Alternatives stated, “The compact and batch nature of pyroprocesses favors co-locating a fuel recycle facility with a group of advanced burner reactors thus reducing the need for a large centralized processing facility and possibly reducing transportation of separated transuranic material, including the plutonium, and the attendant physical protection concerns” (US Department of Energy, “Draft Nonproliferation Impact Assessment for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Programmatic Alternatives”).

5 Outer Space James Clay Moltz

SOUTH KOREA IS A RELATIVELY NEW ACTOR ON THE SPACE scene. Its accomplishments include the development of a series of satellites of increasing sophistication, the operation of a half-dozen satellites in orbit, and the creation of a modern satellite data center. But, after several years of extensive growth, its space budget has recently declined to about $215 million, and it has faced new technological challenges in attempting to develop its own space-launch vehicle. By contrast, the United States has launched hundreds of satellites since 1958 and has a space budget of $64 billion a year, covering the full range of space activities—from science to human spaceflight to commercial activities to military programs. Given these disparities, it is perhaps not surprising that bilateral cooperation in the space field has been very limited. In the context of decades-long US space cooperation with Japan, Tokyo’s provision of a key module to the International Space Station, and Japan’s robust launch capabilities and ongoing astronaut program, the underdeveloped state of US–South Korean space cooperation seems anomalous and is worthy of more detailed analysis. This chapter seeks to explain the reasons for South Korea’s relatively late entry into the field of space technology, its still quite limited cooperation with the United States, and prospects for expanding space ties in the context of efforts to strengthen the US-ROK relationship. It argues that despite the substantial differences in current space capabilities, there are areas for fruitful cooperation both in the civil sector and, perhaps even more importantly, in the military space field. Although the alliance relationship allowed the United States to limit South Korea’s missile efforts in the past, these close military ties could facilitate rapid

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expansion of space cooperation, if the two leaderships decide to move in this direction. Space technology is becoming increasingly internationalized, and many countries are becoming more dependent on space assets for their communications, meteorology, navigation, resource management, and economic data transfers, as well as a wide variety of military functions. The United States is still the world’s leader in most of these areas, thus heightening its dependency on space. As more countries acquire ballistic missiles or dual-use civilian space-launch vehicles, the potential vulnerability of US national space assets has become a growing concern. China’s successful test of a kinetic antisatellite weapon in January 2007, Iran’s development of a space-launch booster, and North Korea’s efforts to become a space power have heightened these risks. In the face of these emerging challenges, the United States has until recently focused largely on national means of addressing them. The exception has been the decades-long quest of the United States for an international convention to reduce orbital space debris, which won UN approval in December 2007, although it remains a voluntary mechanism. Since the Barack Obama administration has entered office, new and expanded international mechanisms are being considered to strengthen space security, including a possible code of conduct, heightened transparency in space situational awareness, and increasing international outreach. One method mentioned in the 2011 National Security Space Strategy is enhanced cooperation with allies, such as South Korea, to increase interoperability, allow for the sharing of assets, and provide for redundancy in case of the loss of specific national space assets.1 Such actions—particularly if built into a broader coalition network, organized on a civil, commercial, or military basis— could dramatically reduce US and other participating nations’ space vulnerabilities, thus increasing their collective space security and making successful attacks against their space systems much more difficult to achieve. Could enhanced US-ROK space cooperation contribute to such a process? The answer offered here, despite the relatively limited depth and breadth of US-ROK space links today, is a definite “yes.” More specifically, as the two allies face a rising China and a possibly destabilized North Korea in transition, securing and expanding US and ROK space assets would promote crisis stability and assist in timely decisionmaking. Joint civil and military space planning could also help reduce costs over the long run. The rest of this chapter reviews the history of South Korean space efforts, their relative lag in comparison to those in a number of other

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advanced industrial countries, and the reasons behind the recent acceleration of ROK space activities, ranging from scientific to commercial to military. Included in this discussion is the question of US-ROK space cooperation, and the historical reasons for the problems the two sides have experienced in developing space ties. In particular, Seoul and Washington have differed over missile proliferation concerns and related export control issues, both in the context of the alliance relationship and the security situation on the Korean peninsula more generally. This section also explains why ROK-Russian cooperation to date has actually exceeded ROK-US space ties. Next, the chapter turns to the question of why expanding US-ROK space cooperation now might make sense, what areas might be the most beneficial to develop, and how these activities could help strengthen both sides’ space capabilities and the alliance itself. It then analyzes potential incentives as well as possible barriers, including political, economic, and military factors. While general security concerns associated with space technology are likely to be one concern—particularly on the US side—this chapter concludes that other areas of mutually beneficial US-ROK cooperation suggest that this issue can be managed successfully and could lead to advantages for the United States in terms of diversifying its space assets and rendering single-point failures of key capabilities less likely. Such ties could also begin a process of constructing more effective and less vulnerable space networks among US allies that would help ensure the ability of all partners to maintain safe access to and productive use of space, even in the face of rising military capabilities by potential adversaries.

A History of South Korean Space Activities

Given the successive damage caused to the industrial structures of South Korea by World War II and the Korean War, followed by the difficult years of rebuilding under authoritarian rule and threat of subversion from the North, it is not surprising that space technology did not develop as a serious pursuit in the ROK until the mid-1980s. The lag indeed partially explains the absence of a significant history of bilateral US-ROK space cooperation. Only in the 1970s did South Korea begin to research missile technology, drawing on the US Nike-Hercules missile. This move came in response to fears of North Korea missile developments and concern over possible weakening of the US-ROK alliance. The United States eventually agreed to provide Seoul with upgraded

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technology for its surface-to-surface missile program, but in 1979 required that the ROK government sign an agreement limiting the range of any systems derived from this technology to no more than 180 kilometers in range.2 For all intents and purposes, this grounded any independent South Korean space-launch aspirations. In 1985 the Ministry of Science and Technology issued a plan for the initiation of a space program over ten years. 3 The government founded the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) in 1989 to lead this national research and development program,4 although other organizations participated in these efforts as well. KARI’s mission, like that of NASA, included supervision and promotion of both aircraft and space technology. Seoul’s motivation for entering into the space field at this time appears to have been driven largely by technological and commercial motivations, rather than military concerns. Unlike for the United States and the Soviet Union, China, and other major powers, South Korea had no geostrategic need to develop long-range ballistic missiles for military purposes since its main adversary was reachable by short-range missiles, aircraft, ships, and even long-range artillery. Instead, the ROK government adopted a “two-track approach” toward acquiring space technology via the same import substitution model for commercial purposes that it had used in shipbuilding, automobiles, and electronics, while also seeking to develop its own systems, starting with small satellites.5 South Korea completed its first satellite (with British assistance) in 1992 and contracted with France to launch the so-called Korean Institute of Technology Satellite (Kitsat or Uribyol, in Korean)–1 aboard an Ariane-4 rocket.6 In 1996 the ROK government began working toward more advanced national space capabilities with its adoption of a fiveyear plan for space, which was subsequently updated twice (in 2000 and 2005). These plans focused on satellite development, completion of a space-launch vehicle, and construction of a national capability to compete in the global commercial space market.7 After launching two more versions of its original Kitsat series (the second of these built in cooperation with a US commercial satellite provider), South Korea completed the first of its more advanced Korean Multi-Purpose Satellite (Kompsat1) in 1999, which carried an “electro-optical camera, an ocean-scanning multi-spectral imager, and a space physics sensor,”8 and traveled into space aboard a US commercial rocket. But as South Korea sought to expand its space program in the early 1990s beyond domestic satellite construction and to compete with North Korea’s developments in the missile field, particularly after its success

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with the Nodong missile and efforts to test the larger Taepodong-1, Seoul began to bridle under the limitations of its 1979 accord with the United States. In compliance with the US-ROK agreement, devoted ROK research into space-launch technology focused initially on the solid-fueled Korean Sounding Rocket (KSR)–1, tested during the 1990s.9 This effort eventually succeeded by 2002 in developing a small, three-stage, liquid-fueled rocket,10 but this system lacked the thrust to orbit a satellite.11 Much of the expertise for these efforts came from young South Korean scientists and engineers trained in American universities and eager to apply their skills once they returned home to build up the nation’s space program. This training proved to be an important, unofficial source of US-ROK space cooperation. In the meantime, changes in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) had begun to allow certain new members to this nonproliferation accord, including Brazil, to maintain rocket programs for space-launch purposes only. With this in mind, South Korea engaged in discussions with the United States and other MTCR members to join the organization, accepting significant export control requirements and limits on its military systems in order to gain access to potential spacelaunch technologies from other members. This process came to fruition in March 2001.12 But South Korea’s hopes of acquiring help from the United States for a space-launch vehicle proved elusive. Due to tightened US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) after the 1999 Cox Committee report and other US legislation discouraging exports that might create competitors to US space-launch vehicles (the US Space Transportation Policy), the United States raised hurdles to corporations that might have been willing to provide this technology to the ROK. By contrast, the Russian Federation—still smarting economically from the sharp downturn of the 1990s and less concerned about undermining its relatively robust stable of commercial launchers—agreed to support South Korean efforts to acquire a first-stage booster, and an agreement was reached in the fall of 2004.13 Eventually South Korea settled on a design from the Khrunichev enterprise based on its Angara rocket. Since then, the ROK government has invested US$418 million in the Korean Space Launch Vehicle (KSLV)–1 effort 14 and additional funds for the construction of the Naro Space Facility, located on the southwestern Korean island of Oenaro. After a series of technical delays, it attempted to launch a three-stage KSLV-1—consisting of a Russian first stage, a South Korean second stage, and a South Korean satellite—in August 2009. The first stage worked as planned, and the

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second stage ignited and carried the satellite to its release point. But the fairing covering the satellite failed to release properly, causing the spacecraft to lose velocity, tumble, and eventually reenter the atmosphere. A second test in June 2010 ended with a failure even earlier in its flight. Still, KARI pledges to continue to work toward a successful launch within the next year. Meanwhile, North Korea has also failed in two attempts to launch a satellite, one aboard a Taepodong-1 in 1998 and another aboard a Taepodong-2 in 2009. Technically speaking, however, South Korea is by far a more advanced space power than the North, judging from its space experience, foreign contacts, operational facilities, and manufacturing capabilities in the area of satellites. Subsequent versions of the Kompsat series have continued to improve upon its imaging capabilities, with Kompsat-2 offering one-meter-resolution black-and-white images and four-meter color images,15 thanks in part to technology provided by Israel.16 Kompsat-3, planned for launch in 2012, is scheduled to provide sub-meter resolution and will have a service life of at least four years.17 A follow-on Kompsat-5 will offer all-weather capability via the use of synthetic aperture radar technology, as well as capabilities in the areas of environmental monitoring, oceanography, and land management.18 South Korea also owns a number of commercial communications satellites purchased from providers in France, the United States, and Japan. The ROK developed some of its own technology for the multipurpose Communications, Ocean, and Meteorological (Coms) satellite built with EADS Astrium, which has operated in geostationary orbit (22,300 miles) since mid-2010. In the area of satellite-aided navigation, the ROK is currently working on a satellite-based augmentation system to provide increased signal accuracy for Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite signals in the Korean peninsula region.19 As part of its effort to build national interest in space and to develop its international reputation as a spacefaring nation, South Korea began a human spaceflight effort in 2004, linked to its booster contract with Russia, plus an additional fee of some US$24 million.20 In April 2008, after a year of training in Russia, its first astronaut—a twenty-nine-yearold female engineer named So-yeon Yi—traveled to the International Space Station via a Russian Soyuz spacecraft for a week of research activities.21 Upon her return Yi became a national hero in South Korea. But KARI has since put a hold on its astronaut program due to budgetary concerns. Indeed, financial issues remain a serious brake on South Korean space ambitions. While the space budget increased by 65 percent in

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2006,22 it has since then failed to expand much further, making new initiatives difficult. The Military Dimension

According to some experts, military motivations have played an important role in driving South Korea’s recent interest in space. As Kyungmin Kim argues, “South Korea’s space developments can be attributed to perceived threats posed by North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and missiles.”23 In terms of military space assets, South Korea has fielded a military communications satellite in geostationary orbit (Mugunghwa [or Koreasat]-5)24 and has a dual-use Earth observation and reconnaissance capability through its recent Kompsat additions (although it does not advertise this system as having military uses). But the Mugunghwa-5, built by the French Alcatel corporation, suffered a malfunction requiring technical corrections to restore its signal.25 Most likely, South Korea is already working to develop domestic technologies to augment and eventually replace it. Moreover, as the Kompsat imaging satellites improve in terms of resolution and sensor technologies, higher-quality data will be available to South Korea and, potentially, to its commercial clients and military allies. Kyung-min Kim notes that an advanced Kompsat-3A satellite with an infrared electrooptical camera will be launched in 2012 and “will serve both military and civilian purposes.”26 KARI’s creation of a multimission control center to handle and manage satellite data at its main facility in Taejon represents a growing capability for the ROK government and its various users. Apparent gaps in South Korea’s military space capabilities include independent national systems for missile early-warning, precision navigation, and signals intelligence, although its ability to borrow from US capabilities and the small size of North Korea mitigate some of the national security implications. South Korea—like all other users of space except Russia, the United States, and China—lacks offensive military space capability at the present time. Some residual capability may exist in the ROK’s growing arsenal of ground- and sea-based missile defense systems, although none have been tested against space objects. Indeed, South Korean space security policy has traditionally supported the annual UN resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)—despite the lack of US support for the measure. Like all other major spacefaring countries, South Korea is a member of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and other UN-supported conventions on the

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registration of spacecraft and on liability for possible damage associated with its space activities. Recent International Contacts (Non-US)

In terms of South Korea’s international relations in regard to space, the ROK has had significant outreach involving France, Germany, India, Israel, Russia, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom, as well as five other countries, totaling more than thirty-four foreign space organizations.27 South Korea has largely used cooperation as a venue to acquire specific technologies needed to develop its space capabilities further. Virtually alone among major Asian space programs, it has participated in the cooperative activities of both the Chinese-sponsored Asia-Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications (AP-MCSTA) and the Japanese-sponsored Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF). However, these data exchanges have been rather limited, and South Korea has not invested heavily in operational space activities with its Asian neighbors. Moreover, it has refrained from joining the Chinese-hosted Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), a formal, membership-based body formed in December 2008 to provide more structure to the AP-MCSTA program. South Korea’s main hope in the short term for international commercial space exports resides in the satellite sector. South Korea has already logged some successes: it provided critical technology for Malaysia’s RazakSat and played a major role in the development of the United Arab Emirates’ DubaiSat-1,28 both of which were launched successfully on foreign rockets in July 2009. In terms of its own access to orbit, the ROK has thus far purchased launch space on French, US, Russian, Russian/Ukrainian, and Indian boosters. It plans to launch its Kompsat-3 aboard a Japanese H2-A rocket.29 Indeed, even if the South Korean KSLV-1 is successful in launching a microsatellite, the ROK will likely continue to use foreign launchers for some time, due to the KSLV-1’s limited payload capacity. South Korea hopes to have a much larger KSLV-2 rocket available to boost heavier and higher-altitude satellites into space by around 2019,30 at which point it will likely begin to move much of its future business to its domestic system. However, due to inherent limitations in its location and the number of launchers it can reasonably be expected to build, use of foreign launch services will likely remain part of South Korea’s overall space strategy. South Korea is highly motivated to become a top-ten space power in the next decade, to include the capability of conducting autonomous

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launches and by achieving international respect for its space technology. It is clearly on its way toward this goal, but it still faces a number of milestones. One current goal of South Korea is to develop an enhanced domestic system for GPS augmentation. Scheduled to be incorporated into its COMS-II satellite, the ROK hopes to offer such a service beginning in 2013.31 South Korea is also cooperating with European countries in building the Galileo precision-navigation system to provide additional coverage and capability. In this regard, the government is largely following a path initiated by the United States and joined by virtually all major space powers in attempting to develop new uses for GPS navigation to stimulate the domestic economy and enhance its related infrastructure. A recent and fundamentally new type of cooperative program involving South Korea’s space program is the Satellite Technology for the Asia-Pacific Region (STAR) project. This unique venture, which began in 2009, links six countries (Japan, the ROK, India, Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam) for joint development of small, remote-sensing satellites to enhance regional cooperation in Earth observation. 32 Japan has pledged to launch the first planned spacecraft in 2012. Notably, the project includes three close allies of the United States plus India, with which Washington is engaged in a major strategic rapprochement. This may be the harbinger of greater cooperation among US friends and allies in space, although this project does not include the United States itself. Recent US-ROK Space Ties

As noted above, due to its status as a late developer in space and earlier US concerns about possible South Korean missile proliferation, USROK space cooperation is still in its infancy. At the same time, there is considerable recent enthusiasm in both Taejon (where KARI is located) and Washington for the expansion of these ties. While the initial contacts began under the George W. Bush administration, the Obama administration’s 2010 National Space Policy and its emphasis on “strengthened international collaboration” and on “leveraging existing and planned space capabilities of allies and space partners” have now made such outreach a centerpiece of US policy.33 These trends come at a time when the broader space field is witnessing a sharp increase in the number of actors while challenges to space security are also growing, creating a higher priority for intra-alliance space cooperation. In early 2008 the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST, located in Taejon) and the NASA Ames Research Center

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(located in Mountain View, California) signed a memorandum for cooperation focused on small satellite development.34 This project initiated a series of meetings and the establishment of two visiting scientist positions at NASA Ames for KAIST researchers.35 Their two parent organizations—KARI and NASA—subsequently negotiated and signed an umbrella agreement in August 2008, providing the basis for further discussions and the expansion of bilateral contacts. In April 2009 a NASA team with representatives from all four of the main mission directorates (Aeronautics, Exploration Systems, Science, and Space Operations) visited KARI to begin the process of developing mutually beneficial areas for cooperation.36 A KARI team visited NASA headquarters in July 2009 and NASA administrator Charles Bolden attended the Sixtieth International Astronautical Congress, which was hosted in Taejon, South Korea, in October 2009. Subsequently NASA and the Korea Astronomy and Space Science Institute signed an accord in July 2010 for cooperative work in solar and space physics, and a delegation from Korea’s Ministry of Education, Science and Technology visited NASA headquarters in December 2010 to discuss broadening the scope of US-ROK space cooperation. KARI has also been participating in the NASA-led International Lunar Network to share information from a variety of planned unmanned missions to the Moon. These efforts mark a good start, but much of the cooperation still consists of prospective activities and exchanges rather than any actual joint operations in space, suggesting that more concrete work will need to be done before the bilateral relationship will begin to bear fruit and become regularized.

Prospects and Incentives for Expanded Space Cooperation

In considering options for expanding US-ROK space cooperation, there are a variety of possible incentives: political, economic (including technological), and military. It is useful to review some of the issues involved in each category before turning to possible concrete projects. In the political arena, possible benefits for expanded space cooperation could be considerable, particularly given the past and ongoing gap in political support among younger generations of South Koreans for the US alliance. Judging from demonstrations over the past decade and public opinion polls, the expanding post–Korean War population of South Koreans is less supportive than its elders of strong ties with the United States, although North Korea’s behavior since 2006 has begun to shift

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public opinion more in a pro-US direction. Space activity is still relatively new to the South Korean population, and support is relatively high among the youngest generation, including among college students. The political problem for the US-ROK alliance is that young South Koreans’ closest identification of a foreign country with the South Korean space program is Russia, which launched So-yeon Yi into orbit. Photographs and videos of Yi with her Russian flight team flooded South Korea during and after her mission. The failure of the United States to play a leading role in this ROK “first” represents a serious missed opportunity. While the KARI-NASA agreement is a positive step forward politically, there are not yet any specific results to publicize for the South Korean population. Until that happens and until significant space cooperation emerges on the scale of the Yi flight with the Russians, there is unlikely to be any political upside from space activity for the US-ROK alliance. Useful possibilities to consider for KARI-NASA cooperation should include lunar robotic missions, deep-space exploration, Earth remote sensing, and human spaceflight. While certain areas would involve possible “costs” for collaboration (such as joint meetings and technological costs to build in compatibility), there would be long-term benefits in terms of strengthening contacts among scientists, enhancing public awareness of the bilateral relationship in space, and providing additional pillars for the US-ROK alliance. Although human spaceflight is likely to be the most complex interaction, it should be included in any future package because of its significant benefits as a larger “symbol” for bilateral cooperation of trust and technical equality. In addition, it could eventually enhance prospects for commercial interaction and for sharing of civil space assets. However, the United States will not be able to offer South Koreans access to the International Space Station or other astronaut missions until it develops a new human-rated launch vehicle via either NASA or commercial industry, hopefully by 2015. As discussed above, commercial ties between the United States and South Korea in space to date have been relatively limited. South Korea’s space program has purchased or jointly developed satellites in the past with several US aerospace corporations. But US companies have faced higher export control hurdles since 1999 in dealing with foreign countries regarding space technology, including with South Korea. Notably, most of the cooperation in satellite technology dates to the pre-1999 period. Moreover, South Korea’s own interest in developing its national manufacturing capabilities in the space technology field has stimulated its desire to limit these contracts to one-off purchases.

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But going it alone has costs, too. South Korea faces a number of challenges with its domestic space projects, particularly related to funding, experiential knowledge (from actual space operations), and competitors. As Japan has found, simply acquiring space-launch technology and advanced satellites does not guarantee a market, particularly when less expensive competition from China, Russia, and possibly other providers makes entry into the international market difficult. As Japan realized recently, opening the door for domestic industry to develop new military technologies for space is one means of strengthening domestic industry without having to rely on external commercial contracts. Of course, such a strategy requires an adequate increase in the domestic space budget to cover this expansion. Given South Korea’s current financial challenges, such increases will be hard to acquire and to maintain. These dynamics continue to make cooperation and the use of outside services attractive. Space provides clear military benefits to Seoul in its ongoing struggle against the North, thanks to data provided by ROK satellite communications, remote sensing, and other reconnaissance capabilities. At present, the DPRK lacks all of these assets. The ROK also receives additional information from US military sources, which themselves draw on space-based assets. South Korea clearly intends to continue developing its domestic capabilities in many of these areas. At the same time, however, all countries active in space face high costs in attempting to build domestic space capabilities across the board. Military capabilities are some of the most expensive. For this reason, South Korea may be well served to investigate new avenues for the sharing of military space assets and data, rather than building a full array of space systems for itself. A major South Korean advantage is its location. Besides the ROK, both Japan and the United States have strong interests in monitoring military activities in North Korea. Such interest and the availability of a possible “pool” of resources make cooperative options viable and perhaps desirable. To date, the United States has largely dominated this field and provided data to its smaller allies on a case-by-case basis, depending on the perceived need to share information. With both Japan and South Korea developing increasingly capable satellites to monitor events and communications in North Korea and elsewhere in the region, new synergies might be possible, if political obstacles related to information sharing and possible transfers of technology and know-how can be overcome. The advantages of such an integrated system relate not only to potential cost savings but also to reduced vulnerability to possible attack, thanks

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to the benefits of enhanced redundancy.37 Indeed, the creation of regional or truly international systems for space reconnaissance, communications, and navigation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, as well as between these countries and NATO allies (given the dynamic nature of the space environment and orbital physics) makes sense from a variety of levels. While such high-level reports as the Rumsfeld-led space commission in 2001 warned about US national vulnerabilities in space and the likely need to deploy space-based defenses,38 greater transnational cooperation and redundancy are a much less confrontational (i.e., with fewer likely hostile foreign reactions), less expensive, and likely more effective option. This logic clearly underlines the 2011 National Security Space Strategy. Such a network of satellites could be coordinated via shared data links, ground stations, or space-based communications, with spares kept in orbit (as currently with the US GPS system) to combat possible system failures, as well as possible hostile kinetic or electronic attacks. Even a modest increase in the number of space assets available to such a network would greatly increase the challenges facing possible attackers, including China, the DPRK, or other conceivable rivals. Announcing such multilateral, networked capabilities in peacetime could also have a deterrent effect in wartime, as rivals would know in advance that their attacks would not only be costly but likely futile in terms of trying to remove the system’s capability. Increasing the number of partners, moreover, could boost this deterrent effect by expanding the range of affected countries—in essence providing an attacker with the unsavory option of turning a limited conflict with one member into an unwinnable war against many. Developing multiple-launch capabilities across various countries—including South Korea—to enable rapid reconstitution of the network from the ground would be another measure to strengthen such a network. But while this discussion may sound advantageous in theory, would advanced space powers like the United States be interested in including smaller space actors like South Korea in their plans? In fact, senior Pentagon officials have recently been considering exactly this type of option due to growth of space threats and the possible benefits in terms of cost sharing, redundancy, and alliance solidarity. As Peter Wegner, director of the Department of Defense’s Operationally Responsive Space Office, stated in early 2009, “The Obama space policies have been very aggressive and strong on the idea of using space as a diplomatic tool.”39 Gaining additional “allies” in space with the ability to launch timely assets in a crisis or to provide “surge” capabilities during a conflict where additional bandwidth is required by US or coalition

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forces serves the interests of all partners in such efforts. Unfortunately, in the recent past, US export control regulations and simply a failure to engage in out-of-the-box thinking have blocked such avenues. Yet Wegner argues, “There are a lot of nations around the world that want to have deeper collaboration with the US government in space.”40 He proposes that the United States initiate joint military programs for space to supplement similar efforts in the civil space arena.41 This has already begun with Australia through the Wideband Global Satcom system and the Australia-US Space Situational Awareness Partnership. South Korea is another country likely to be receptive to efforts to expand space cooperation and has assets it can bring to the table. Such capabilities could supplement and help secure US space access and thereby enhance mutual security. These collaborative efforts could begin in areas related to monitoring the DPRK, where both sides share a clear interest. The creation of a joint military unit to handle and compare classified intelligence material would take time, but makes sense and could serve mutual interests. Similarly, linking satellites with a missile-tracking function or providing such data to select, cleared officers could be an appropriate vehicle for enhancing missile defense cooperation, as well as providing useful contacts and training opportunities that could be highly beneficial in a crisis. However, given that low-Earth-orbit spacecraft (those most valuable for reconnaissance) are only present above specific areas for short (but eventually repeated) periods, the satellites of just two countries will inevitably experience some gaps. For this reason, cooperation would work better in a multilateral context. It makes sense to include Japan as well as US NATO allies with space intelligence assets within this network. An effort to institutionalize such cooperation could increase effectiveness, bring the security benefit of having redundant capabilities and data inputs, and reduce single-point failure risks dramatically. Enhanced US-ROK space contacts and cooperation could also provide benefits in terms of helping to shape the future space security environment within Asia. As the international community seeks to prevent future tests of kinetic ASAT weapons and establish a code of responsible conduct in space, greater policy coordination between Washington and Seoul would be beneficial. Again, strategies of coalition building within Asia, to include Japan, could greatly enhance prospects for increasing international stability in space. The United States, South Korea, and Japan, for example, could begin to establish formal norms and procedures for their space interactions—such as policies of noninterference and mutual support—that could then be expanded to include other coun-

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tries. NATO allies could be the first to be added, and then friendly countries like India and Israel. But even China could be offered membership, if it agreed to the established norms. It is worth noting that the United States has maintained a mutually beneficial noninterference pledge with Russia affecting all reconnaissance satellites since 1972. Such an expanded set of commitments with Asia could serve as an important confidence-building measure as well. Ultimately, closer ties between the United States and South Korea on space might provide an effective incentive for eventually bringing a reformed DPRK into the fold. Although conditions are not currently favorable for the engagement of North Korea, efforts by surrounding states to ensure responsible behavior by Pyongyang in space will likely be necessary within the decade. North Korea’s accessions to the Outer Space Treaty in late 2008 and to the Convention on the Registration of Space Objects are two first steps. But hard-line trends within the current regime make it unlikely that space technology could be shared with North Koreans safely, and political dynamics at the international level (due to Pyongyang’s recent nuclear- and missile-related behavior) have placed any space-related incentives (such as launch access, satellite assistance, or data sharing) off the current US-ROK agenda with the North. Should these conditions change and if a new leadership in Pyongyang were to agree to policies of nuclear/missile restraint, there might be possible avenues to pursue in a trilateral context or at the region-wide level (with China and Russia) to help usher in North Korea to the responsible use of space and its integration into a broader system of space security agreements within Asia. Notably, South Korean astronaut So-yeon Yi mentioned in an interview the day before her flight in April 2008 her hope for eventual North-South reunification and her wish that the North Korean people would eventually come to see her spaceflight as a shared national achievement.42 Such an outreach effort—under the right conditions—could help make space cooperation an arena for important ROK-DPRK confidence- and security-building measures.

Possible Obstacles to or Risks of Enhanced Cooperation

While there are many potential benefits of increased space cooperation between the United States and South Korea, it is worth reviewing the possible pitfalls of such activities. These can be organized into three basic categories: scientific-technological, political-economic, and securityrelated.

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Increased cooperation between the ROK and the United States in space science and technological development arguably carries several risks. For the United States, there is the possible risk of technology outflow, given South Korea’s obvious interest in acquiring more advanced space hardware and software. While current ITAR regulations provide significant oversight of all NASA-related, university-led, and commercial technologies, an enhanced volume of space trade could possibly increase the risks of some harmful diversion. For this reason, careful personnel reliability mechanisms will need to be in place at South Korean enterprises to ensure that such technologies remain protected. Cooperation in technological development could also conceivably create new competitors for US satellite firms down the road. While this argument must be considered, the countervailing value of an increased market for US products within South Korea and the possible generation of new technologies through joint ventures must be factored in on the positive side as well. Moreover, such trends are more consistent with prospective conditions in the context of the ratification of the South Korean–US Free Trade Agreement. In terms of political-economic costs, expanded US-ROK contacts in space could conceivably alienate US allies in the region (such as Japan) and heighten concerns by possible adversaries (the DPRK and China), causing a dangerous reaction. While such dynamics are possible, favorable political mechanisms for establishing US-ROK space cooperation could be created to mitigate any possible regional fears of an “exclusive” relationship, particularly if these new systems (depending on the technologies involved) reached out either to other allies (such as Japan) or to a broader range of regional players (such as India, China, Indonesia, and others). Again, in space, the most effective partnerships—where possible—are likely to be multilateral, given the transnational nature of space itself and the set of potential problems it encompasses. At the South Korean domestic level, the notion of working with the United States could conceivably reduce the element of nationalism that to date has helped drive funding for the program, even while benefiting the alliance. From an economic perspective, moreover, the short-term costs of establishing cooperative programs and operations are likely to exceed the potential individual costs of undertaking these projects (such as a lunar research mission). This is particularly so for the United States as the more advanced partner since the ROK lacks the technology to undertake such a mission individually. Over the long term, however, the overall expense of establishing new projects or building new space capabilities should eventually decline as South Korea becomes a more ca-

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pable partner with the ability to bring both technology and financing to the table. Politically, South Korea could maintain domestic support by carving out specific components, project areas, or responsibilities (as with the Canadian robotic arm on the International Space Station or the Japanese Kibo module) to place its “flag” in space and to rally national pride. Having a South Korean astronaut involved could strengthen this connection as well, particularly in future lunar missions. Expanding South Korea’s reliance on space for security benefits is likely to have the same dual-edged advantages as it has had for the United States. Increased American reliance on space for its day-to-day domestic economic activity and military operations has increased its vulnerability to the potential loss of these systems. South Korea faces the same risks, in the case of possible future attacks on ROK space assets, jamming of their signals, or damage to related ground stations. At the same time, however, these risks increase significantly when such capabilities are pursued unilaterally and when countries only rely on national assets. Sharing the burden with allies and building in redundancies and data-sharing opportunities will greatly reduce risk and help increase deterrence from attack. For these reasons, there seem to be relatively few security-related “costs” of increased cooperation with the United States, from the South Korean perspective. For Washington, the risk of technology leakage in the military sphere is raised somewhat with expanded cooperation, but this has to be balanced against the security benefits from a more “distributed” network and the political benefits of strengthened alliance capabilities and cohesion. Given the relative weight of all of these factors, this cost-benefit analysis of enhanced US-ROK space cooperation seems to tilt strongly in favor of increasing these ties. The apparent recent support of NASA and the Pentagon for this new direction is indicative that significant portions of the US space community have made a similar evaluation.

Conclusion

Given the inherent technological sensitivities, traditionally high degree of nationalism, and tendencies for self-reliance that have characterized space activities to date, the limits of US-ROK space cooperation can be readily understood, even in the context of the alliance. But the growing logic of internationalism and multilateral cooperation in space science, commerce, and security provides strong countervailing reasons to support an expansion of US-ROK ties. From

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the perspectives of burden sharing, enhanced capabilities, increased security, and strengthening of the bilateral and larger multilateral USled alliance network, space cooperation seems to make increasing sense. Recent, albeit tentative, progress in the US-ROK space science relationship is an indicator of a growing receptivity to this trend, as are the recent Pentagon statements about prospects for new joint military projects with allies in space. But in order to push such progress forward and to expand its reach, greater political attention will be required to change existing patterns regarding space policy in both countries. Since the United States has the more capable of the two space programs, greater responsibility for policy initiatives should originate in Washington. Priority areas might include a decision to devote specific funding from the NASA budget to enhanced US-ROK cooperative projects, US reform of existing ITAR restrictions (by a review of the list of controlled items) to allow greater commercial cooperation, consideration by the State Department of bilateral and regional initiatives to enhance space cooperation within Northeast Asia, and serious Pentagon investigation of possible avenues for joint military projects as well as strengthened space security measures (possibly including treaties). Progress in each of these areas could bear fruit in enhancing the space capabilities of both nations while contributing to the long-term stability of the US-ROK alliance. Given the high degree of integration of US and ROK military forces, the success of South Korean democratization since the late 1980s, the pending free trade agreement between the two countries, and the narrowing range of political differences between the two allies on the issue of North Korea, the still highly restrictive scope of bilateral space cooperation represents an anomaly. While there are understandable historical reasons for this gap, the time has come to begin to bridge it and bring space cooperation up to the level of the rest of the relationship.

Notes The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s alone and do not represent the official policies of the US Navy or the US government. The author thanks Michael Auslin, Seongho Sheen, Michael Finnegan, Scott Snyder, and other participants in an Asia Foundation workshop on October 9, 2009, for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. 1. US Department of Defense, “National Security Space Strategy: Unclassified Summary,” January 2011, http://www.defense.gov. 2. Daniel A. Pinkston, “North and South Korean Space Development:

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Prospects for Cooperation and Conflict,” Astropolitics, vol. 4, no. 2 (Summer 2006), p. 212. 3. Ibid., p. 211. 4. Korea Aerospace Research Institute, “KARI,” organizational booklet (KARI-PUBL-2007-007). 5. Won-hwa Park, “Recent Space Developments in South Korea,” Space Policy, vol. 26, no. 2 (May 2010), p. 117. 6. Changdon Kee, “A South Korean Perspective on Strengthening Space Security in East Asia,” in John M. Logsdon and James Clay Moltz, eds., Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives (Washington, DC: George Washington University, Space Policy Institute, January 2008), p. 15. 7. Kyung-Min Kim, “South Korean Capabilities for Space Security,” in Logsdon and Moltz, Collective Security in Space, pp. 66–67. 8. Kee, “A South Korean Perspective on Strengthening Space Security in East Asia,” p. 15. 9. Ibid. 10. Daniel Pinkston, “Space Cadets: The Korean Peninsula’s Rocket Competition,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (September 2009), p. 10. 11. Pinkston, “North and South Korean Space Development,” p. 212. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid., p. 213. 14. Space Foundation, The Space Report: 2011 (Colorado Springs, CO: Space Foundation, 2011), p. 54. 15. Kee, “A South Korean Perspective on Strengthening Space Security in East Asia,” p. 15. 16. Kim, “South Korean Capabilities for Space Security,” p. 69. 17. Korea Aerospace Research Institute, “KARI,” p. 9. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid., p. 8. 20. Pinkston, “North and South Korean Space Development,” p. 214. 21. Yi was originally the alternate chosen by a panel of government officials from an original applicant pool of 35,000 Koreans. However, the Russian government threw out the top Korean choice (a young male amateur athlete and researcher for an ROK company) for repeatedly taking proprietary Russian space manuals out of the training facility, in violation of Russian rules. As a result, Yi stepped in and successfully completed the mission. 22. Cho Jin-seo, “Budget for Space Projects Remains Flat,” Korea Times (online), January 16, 2008, http://m.koreatimes.co.kr. 23. Kim, “South Korean Capabilities for Space Security,” p. 73. 24. Daniel Pinkston, “South Korea to Launch First Military Communication Satellite and Improved Observation Satellite,” WMD Insights (April 2006). 25. “Glitch Cripples S. Korea’s First Military Satellite,” Korea Times, September 5, 2008. 26. Kim, “South Korean Capabilities for Space Security,” p. 70. 27. Korea Aerospace Research Institute, “International Coopration [sic],” http://www.kari.re.kr. 28. Pinkston, “Space Cadets,” p. 11. 29. Yoko Kubota and Jon Herskovitz, “Japan Rocket to Launch South Korean Satellite,” Reuters, January 12, 2009.

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30. Park, “Recent Space Developments in South Korea,” p. 118. 31. Kee, “A South Korean Perspective on Strengthening Space Security in East Asia,” p. 16. 32. “Six Asian Nations Partner on Satellite Development,” Space News, June 8, 2009, p. 18. 33. The White House, “National Space Policy of the United States of America,” June 28, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov. 34. NASA Ames Research Center, “NASA Ames Explores Possible Collaboration with South Korea,” press release, January 28, 2008. 35. Author’s interview with DeVon Fleming, Office of External Relations, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC, May 8, 2009. 36. Ibid. 37. On how such an architecture might be constructed, see Will Marshall, “Reducing the Vulnerability of Space Assets: A Multitiered Microsatellite Constellation Architecture,” Astropolitics, vol. 6, no. 2 (May–August 2008), pp. 154–199. 38. See “Report of the Commission to Assess US National Security Space Management and Organization,” January 11, 2001, http://www.dod.mil. 39. Peter Wegner, quoted in Turner Brinton, “ORS Director Urges More Milspace Collaboration with US Allies,” Space News, February 16, 2009, p. A3. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. BBC interview with So-yeon Yi, April 7, 2008, http://www.youtube.com /watch?v=ylMmhB052pw.

6 Pandemics and Biological Threats James L. Schoff

FORMER DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGAnization (WHO) Dr. Lee Jong-wook warned in 2005 that it was only a matter of time before an avian flu virus—most likely H5N1— acquires the ability to be transmitted from human to human, sparking the outbreak of human pandemic influenza. We don’t know when this will happen, but we do know that it will happen. Now is the time to build global consensus . . . [because] if we are unprepared, the next pandemic will cause incalculable human misery.1

Dr. Lee would not have been surprised that his prediction came true within four years, though he probably did not expect that the new strain would erupt first in the Western Hemisphere and combine components of avian, swine, and human viruses. But as command surgeon for US Forces Japan (USFJ) Colonel Mark Presson once observed, “That’s the challenge of flu management and prevention. Today’s issue may not be tomorrow’s.”2 All of the investments, planning, and global and regional conferences carried out earlier in the decade when avian flu concerns were particularly high did pay dividends in 2009, as global preparedness and public awareness were certainly improved in time for the outbreak of a new influenza virus, H1N1 (often called swine flu), in April. Officials in Mexico and the United States first detected the new strain after linking late-season flu cases in Mexico, Texas, and California. Within days of the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the WHO confirming the presence of a new influenza strain, the virus quickly spread across Mexico, the United States, and Canada. Initially, officials

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believed the virus could be contained to North America, but in an era of globalization and air travel, the virus spread quickly to South America, Europe, and Asia. After just seven months, the swine flu sickened millions of people worldwide in more than 200 countries and territories, causing at least 6,000 deaths.3 The value of US pandemic cooperation initiatives with its allies, including South Korea, was evident as well during this H1N1 outbreak, as it facilitated the exchange of information among them and the coordination of prevention, detection, and treatment efforts. More can be done in this area, however, not only because pandemic threats are constantly changing, but also to help build more diverse and sophisticated alliance relationships that bring together a wider range of ministries, departments, and agencies to address common challenges of all types. This will ultimately serve to improve the ability of the alliance to work on these issues with other countries, through multilateral initiatives, and with international organizations. Preparing to fight pandemic threats is an attractive candidate for US-ROK alliance cooperation because of the following characteristics: • It is useful. • The need is constant. • It is inherently an interagency or “whole-of-government” responsibility in collaboration with international bodies (so it “exercises” these increasingly important alliance “muscles”). • It is “exportable” (it can help protect the homeland and third countries overseas). • The alliance skills are applicable to other health and biological threats. • It is not politically controversial. Still, bilateral cooperation on pandemic issues is usually subordinate to both national and broader multilateral action in this area, and since the alliance is already crowded with priorities that lack adequate funding, US-ROK initiatives will likely be modest and in support of the global response infrastructure that already exists. Even relatively modest cooperation, however, if well targeted and consistently practiced, can benefit the alliance and the region. For the United States and South Korea, health-care-sector development aid overseas, vaccine research, and specialized military training could be the most productive cooperation priorities. All of this can be carried out bilaterally, but collaborating with other allies (such as Japan) and with certain regional forums will

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maximize their impact. By leveraging certain unique alliance strengths (together with trilateral and other minilateral initiatives in East Asia), the allies can make practical contributions to global health and national security while also boosting alliance cooperation and regional nontraditional security cooperation more generally. To begin a discussion of how to accomplish these objectives, we should review the pandemic challenge and the overall regional and global response infrastructure with which alliance managers seek to integrate.

Pandemics and the Global Response Infrastructure

Policymakers and defense planners never know when the next serious pandemic will occur, and its impact can be quite severe if we are unprepared. Recent experience shows that even relatively mild and isolated pandemics can cause a great deal of human and economic suffering, not to mention one with a scale similar to the H1N1 outbreak in 2009. According to a report by the International Health Regulative Review Committee (IHR), by August 2010 when WHO announced the transition to the postpandemic period, laboratory-confirmed deaths caused by the 2009 H1N1 virus had reached 18,500. Interestingly, the immediate economic impacts of a pandemic might arise more from the uncoordinated efforts of individuals and countries that attempt to avoid infection and contact, rather than from actual death or illness. For example, the economic impact of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2002–2003 was disproportionate to the number of total infections and deaths. The SARS outbreak infected about 8,500 people globally, of which only 813 died.4 Economic losses in East Asia, however, reached US$18 billion, or 0.6 percent of gross domestic product.5 Countries not directly affected by SARS also experienced large economic losses, as overall global economic losses reached an estimated US$50 billion.6 The economic impact of the H1N1 outbreak ended up being less dramatic, in part because governments have learned to better balance the need to protect the public while avoiding hyperbole and overly restrictive policies that can choke off commerce unnecessarily. Good US-ROK coordination in 2009, for example, led to tightened inspection requirements for ROK imports of US pork, but it did not halt US sales to its sixth-largest export market. Seoul lifted those restrictions within four months. To mitigate the potential adverse impacts, governments must develop

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local, national, regional, and international emergency preparedness plans to try to control an outbreak within and beyond their borders, maintain essential social services such as health care and law enforcement, and reduce the total economic and social impact of a pandemic. Since no single government or institution has the capacity to combat an influenza pandemic alone, preparedness and emergency planning require a serious intergovernmental and civil-military response. This is especially true in the Asia Pacific region, since it is the most possible source of an avian flu (H5N1) outbreak, which many experts think will be much deadlier than H1N1.7 There are three types of influenza virus: A, B, and C. Type C viruses cause mild illness in humans. Types A and B, however, cause epidemics or seasonal flu outbreaks within a community or region over a given period. Type A viruses are found in a number of different animals, such as chickens, ducks, pigs, and horses, as well as among humans, whereas type B viruses typically circulate only among humans. At this time, there are four main influenza A virus subtypes that have been isolated from birds or pigs circulating among humans today (H1N1, H1N2, H3N2, and H3N1). A type A virus can cause a pandemic when three conditions are met: (1) a new influenza A virus emerges in the human population, (2) the strain causes serious human illness or fatality, and (3) the strain spreads easily from person to person worldwide.8 The socalled bird flu threat in East Asia (H5N1) is still the biggest concern of regional health professionals, because experience suggests that it stands a good chance of becoming a historically deadly virus once it is transmittable from human to human.9 The H5N1 avian influenza was first detected circulating among wild birds in May 1997, after authorities linked the death of a three-year-old boy to a viral outbreak on three rural chicken farms in Hong Kong. The virus, however, continued to mutate and quietly spread among chicken flocks in China, eventually reemerging and rapidly affecting poultry in eight other Asian nations by late 2003.10 Despite multiple attempts to contain the bird flu virus, H5N1 remains a concern. Since 2003 the WHO has confirmed 566 human cases and 332 deaths in fifteen countries (most in Central, South, and Southeast Asia), including at least 50 cases and 26 deaths in 2011 alone.11 The H1N1 outbreak of 2009 (the first global flu epidemic in forty-one years) reminded the world just how quickly spreading and uncontrollable such a health threat can be. Even though international and regional bodies are better prepared than they were a decade ago to help mitigate potential damage, the global health infrastructure is still fragile, and it relies heavily on the contributions of individual states.

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The WHO, headquartered in Geneva, is the UN specialized agency on human health. As such, the WHO is the central actor for coordinating the global response to an avian influenza outbreak, advising countries to develop national preparedness plans, create or strengthen surveillance systems, and coordinate national and international efforts. In 1952 the WHO established the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network to serve as a global alert mechanism designed to identify influenza viruses with pandemic potential. This network includes four WHO Collaborating Centers located in Australia, Japan, the UK, and the United States, and 112 National Influenza Centers (NICs) around the world, including the Korea National Institute of Health (KNIH) in Seoul. As fears mounted regarding a possible avian flu outbreak in the late 1990s, the WHO created the Global Outbreak Alert & Response Network (GOARN) in 2000 to serve as a technical collaboration clearinghouse of human and technical resources for the rapid identification of and response to infectious disease outbreaks. The GOARN international team includes epidemiologists, infection control experts, and laboratory technicians from over 130 partner institutes, such as the CDC, KNIH, the National Institute of Infectious Diseases in Japan, and other national and international organizations. Team members travel to report on avian influenza outbreaks, conduct field research, and collect data. In late April 2009, for example, GOARN sent experts to Mexico to support local health authorities and to disseminate information throughout the network. After the cholera outbreak in Haiti in October 2010, GOARN deployed more than twenty epidemiologists and specialists to provide training and supervision in cholera treatment, infection control, and information management, as well as support to Haiti’s Ministry of Public Health in improving the cholera alert and response system. Although the WHO is the central actor for coordinating the global response to an influenza outbreak, its limited budget competes with other programs to treat a variety of illnesses, such as malaria, resurging tuberculosis and poliomyelitis, the global AIDS pandemic, and other respiratory and infectious diseases. The WHO’s program budget for 2010–2011 is about US$4.5 billion, which is not much more than for a large US hospital system.12 Other important organizations in the global and regional infrastructure to help prevent and prepare for pandemic diseases are the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. For example, in July 2006, the WHO, FAO, and OIE jointly established the Global Early Warning and Response System

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(GLEWS) to track transboundary animal diseases. ASEAN also manages its own pandemic-related program and initiatives. After the SARS experience and more avian flu outbreaks in 2003, the UN system realized that more efficient and specialized coordination was needed, so in 2005 it created the Office of the United Nations System Influenza Coordination (UNSIC) with a coordinator seconded by the WHO at the UN assistant secretary-general level. The UNSIC’s main tasks include implementing a comprehensive unified strategy for the UN system on prevention, preparedness, and response to pandemic influenza, as well as helping develop and test country and regional preparedness strategies and contingency plans. Several UN agencies work closely with the UNSIC, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which collaborated with UNSIC in 2008 to develop the first concept of operations for the UN system in an influenza pandemic. Throughout this time the UNSIC worked with individual countries and regional forums to increase funding, stimulate research, and improve global reporting, interagency coordination, and the UN system’s own preparedness. Ironically, the very last line in the UN’s concept of operations paper is “It is anticipated that this [plan] will continue to be tested through simulation exercise at global, regional, and country levels during 2009.”13 The H1N1 flu outbreak did just that, and in a very real way. Pandemic influenza is a uniquely global health challenge, but it is also intensely local. Californians began contracting H1N1 in May 2009, for example, and by August there were school closings in Incheon due to the virus. The inability to contain a new flu strain once it is transmittable among humans is a sobering reality. Despite this important global dimension of the pandemic issue, however, the primary response is local (i.e., countries implementing their own plans and getting vaccines and medicine where they are needed). This is not the type of disaster where the world mobilizes to help an affected country, such as the case of a large earthquake, because everyone is facing the flu at the same time. Still, the global health infrastructure can make a difference during times of crisis. One example of effective global mobilization is the relatively quick development, production, and distribution of H1N1 vaccines. Although health policy officials strive for development and mass production of new vaccines within five months, accomplishing this for a brand-new strain at a scale of about 3 billion doses is still a major achievement (local problems with distribution notwithstanding), which involved researchers in several countries. In fact, a South Korean research team at

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Chungnam National University was among the first to develop a human vaccine, derived from samples provided by the United States.14 Such quick and large-scale vaccine development would not be possible without the UN’s global network, but success also relies heavily on the capacities of a few key countries. There are only a small number of flu vaccine producers in the world, and South Korea fortunately joined this group just a year before the H1N1 outbreak. Within this subset of key countries overall, US-ROK cooperation can pay dividends. Examining how each ally addresses the pandemic flu challenge, both domestically and internationally, will help us identify ways to maximize that value.

US Strategies for Addressing Pandemics

As part of the global push to enhance preparedness, the US government unveiled its National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza in November 2005, to guide national planning in order to limit the spread of avian flu and mitigate the potential economic and social impacts of the virus. Seven months later the government completed its implementation plan, which translates the national strategy into over three hundred actions and expectations. Specifically, the implementation plan outlines the US government response at each pandemic alert phase and details the roles and responsibilities of the federal and local governments, law enforcement agencies, and private-sector entities. Actions outlined to prevent and contain influenza outbreaks include the following categories: guidance on government continuity, human and animal health protection, transportation and border control, and public safety and security measures. The implementation plan also directs the US government to coordinate surveillance and rapid response efforts with international partners given the limited global capacity to detect and contain avian influenza. Moreover, the plan designates the Departments of State and Homeland Security (DHS) as the lead agencies for coordinating an international and domestic response, respectively, to pandemic influenza. To carry out its role on the international front, the State Department established the Avian Influenza Action Group in March 2006 to coordinate efforts with international organizations (WHO, FAO, and OIE) and key federal agencies, including the Department of Defense (DoD), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the CDC. A State Department official of ambassador rank leads the group and is the department’s special representative on avian and pandemic influenza.

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The US government has committed a large amount of resources at home and abroad to combating the emerging threat of an influenza pandemic. Shortly after announcing the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, President George W. Bush requested US$7.1 billion in aid to fund domestic and international avian flu initiatives over several years. Congress approved US$3.8 billion and US$2.3 billion for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively. In response to the outbreak of H1N1 in 2009, President Barack H. Obama requested US$1.5 billion.15 At the 2008 International Ministerial Conference on Avian and Pandemic Influenza in Egypt, the United States committed approximately US$320 million in grants and technical assistance to support international organizations and countries threatened by H5N1. The United States is the largest donor to these global efforts, as it has contributed over US$950 million worth of such assistance to international organizations and to over 90 countries around the world.16 USAID, along with the Departments of State, Agriculture, Defense, and Health and Human Services (HHS), has provided material and technical assistance to affected or at-risk countries, including laboratory equipment, reagents, and protective equipment. Moreover, USAID has funded communication and public awareness campaigns in over 34 countries and sent scientists, veterinarians, and emergency personnel to help build laboratories, diagnose avian influenza, and advise on poultry surveillance and vaccination programs. USAID has been particularly active in Vietnam, funding model village projects and organizing joint cross-border pandemic exercises with China and Laos.17 All of these deliberate steps helped prepare the US government for the H1N1 outbreak in 2009. Of the US$3.8 billion Congress appropriated in fiscal year 2006 to fund preparations for pandemic planning, for example, the US government allocated US$3.3 billion to HHS for influenza monitoring and surveillance, vaccine development, antiviral stockpiling, state and local preparedness, and communication planning. By the time H1N1 hit, the United States’ strategic national stockpile (SNS) contained nearly 80 million treatment courses of antiviral drugs.18 The SNS also has 6 million treatment courses on reserve to help contain outbreaks in other countries. Vaccines are more effective for disease containment, however, and HHS remains concerned that the United States is overly dependent on other countries for vaccine manufacturing. The H1N1 experience also showed that production techniques need to be modernized around the world to ensure vaccine supply in a most timely fashion. Recent developments in vaccine production have focused on replacing the traditional chicken egg–based

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manufacturing methods with recombinant DNA technology or mammalian cell culture systems, to provide better preproduction preparedness, more rapid scale-up of production, and faster time last-dose delivery. 19 The DoD is an important source of support to State and DHS, and it is intimately involved in assisting civil authorities, international partners, and foreign governments with global surveillance and emergency pandemic preparedness. For example, the DoD Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (DoD-GEIS) supports military training, public health research, and outbreak response to emerging infectious disease threats. DoD-GEIS, which in 2008 became a division of the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC),20 has a rich network of overseas medical research laboratories and treatment facilities that detect, research, and treat infectious diseases. Moreover, DoD-GEIS shares epidemiological data, laboratory samples, and surveillance reports with the CDC, WHO, and other international partners. In addition to influenza surveillance activities, DoDGEIS has assisted affected and at-risk countries with pandemic preparedness and response plans, provided diagnostic support, and trained health-care workers and other first responders. Despite the military’s commitment to providing domestic and international support to civil authorities, international partners, and foreign governments, DoD’s top priority in the fight against pandemics is safeguarding US defensive capabilities, specifically maintaining force health protection, and operation readiness. Of all the major combatant commands, US Pacific Command (USPACOM) has been in the forefront in planning for a potential pandemic, largely because the majority of animal and human avian influenza outbreaks to date have occurred in the Pacific theater and therefore within USPACOM’s area of responsibility. USPACOM’s Pandemic Influenza Fusion Working Group has prepared a USPACOM plan for pandemic flu, and supporting plans for foreign and domestic response have also been developed by the Combined Support Force–503 (CSF-503 Marine Forces Pacific), the Joint Task Force–Homeland Defense (JTF-HD), subordinate unified commands, such as US Forces Korea (USFK), and each respective base command. Throughout all of this planning in the defense community to help combat pandemic flu is an underlying belief that such preparation and training will be useful in combating other biological threats and biohazards. The Marine Corps Bases Japan concept plan for response to pandemic flu, for example, is actually combined with biohazard preparedness. When one looks carefully at how the plan creates a frame-

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work to combat pandemic flu, it becomes easier to see why this is the case, since many of the steps to prepare for and manage a pandemic will apply directly to other bio threats. These include a variety of force protection measures, policies for restriction of personnel movement and use of prophylaxis, plans for increased volume of information flow, and the coordination of external public releases with host nations’ public health officials. The US-ROK alliance focuses keenly on these issues because it estimates that North Korea possesses thirteen types of biological weapons, including cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, and typhoid fever.21 There are other useful overlaps from a US-ROK alliance perspective discussed later in this chapter. The US government and the military have also carried out a number of exercises in recent years to test their planning assumptions, though given the number of relevant actors in a real pandemic crisis, it is difficult to conduct these exercises on a regular basis. To date, USPACOM has conducted several deliberate planning-and-exercise programs in support of civil authorities in Asia, including tabletop exercise and regional capacity-building programs. In October 2005, USPACOM sponsored an influenza seminar in Pearl Harbor to educate and inform public health emergency officers from across the Pacific about the risks and challenges of avian influenza, as well as the potential effects of the virus on military operations and deployments. In June 2006, roughly sixty select individuals from USPACOM, US Marine Corps Forces Pacific, and other US government agencies, including medical professionals and operational planners, conducted a three-day tabletop exercise in Hawaii to promote interagency coordination. In addition, USPACOM hosted an interagency pandemic exercise in July 2007 that involved a variety of US government departments, as well as relevant UN offices and nongovernmental organizations.

ROK Strategies for Addressing Pandemics

Earlier last decade, South Korean health and policy experts estimated that the potential burden of pandemic influenza in South Korea could overwhelm its resources, paralyze the economy, and cause severe health consequences. To prevent this, Seoul took a number of steps to mitigate the negative consequences of an avian influenza outbreak and enhance the country’s capacity to respond to the emerging public health threat. As in the United States, the efforts to prepare for a possible avian flu outbreak helped the country deal with the swine flu crisis. Even though

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about a million people were infected and at least eighty-five deaths were linked to the virus in the first seven months of the swine flu outbreak, the ROK government handled this challenge as well as most other developed nations, and it learned valuable lessons for the future. In the past few years, South Korea adopted legal frameworks and introduced manuals for pandemic preparedness, such as the Framework Act on the Management of Disasters and Safety, Basic Guideline for National Crisis Management (Presidential Decree No. 124, July 2004) and the Practical Manual for Communicable Disease Response (September 2005). Moreover, legal provisions for medical service and communicable disease control, such as the Quarantine Act, the Emergency Medical Service Act, and the Communicable Disease Prevention Act, provide the legal basis for pandemic preparedness and response. In anticipation of an emerging influenza crisis, South Korea has attempted to • Integrate the national crisis and communicable disease management systems. • Train and educate personnel. • Stockpile antiviral medications, personal protective equipment, and prepandemic vaccines. • Strengthen critical infrastructure to ensure the continuity of central and local government, businesses, schools, military, and other essential services. • Build capacity for vaccine production. • Enhance infrastructure for risk communication. The ROK’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan, introduced in 2006, assigned responsibilities to government bodies and health and animal experts in seven areas: (1) command, control, and coordination; (2) risk communication; (3) surveillance; (4) health-care service; (5) vaccines and antiviral medications; (6) public health measures; and (7) education and research.22 According to the pandemic influenza response plan, the commandand-control system during a national crisis comprises the following: • The National Security Council, headed by the president. • The Central Crisis Management Committee, headed by the prime minister. • The Head Office for Crisis Management, headed by the minister of health and welfare (MW). • The Head Office for Communicable Disease Management,

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headed by the Korea Center for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC). • The local government offices for Crisis Management and Communicable Disease Management. Although the MW technically decides when and how to respond to an influenza outbreak, the National Security Council and the Central Crisis Management Committee officially trigger and execute the national influenza response plan, particularly when the epidemic alert level is highest. This was the case during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, when the central crisis center was initially managed by the KCDC director in April, then the MW in May, and on up the chain to the prime minister when flu cases were spiking in early November. When fuller interagency cooperation was required to help manage the spread of the virus (through either imposing travel restrictions or suspending military reserve training), the ROK government’s plan was relatively effective at facilitating a whole-of-government response.23 South Korea does not yet have a clear interagency mechanism for managing the government’s interaction on the international stage, however, and so it has no counterpart to the US State Department’s Influenza Action Group. The ROK government has been working to improve its many surveillance systems, some of which suffered from poor utilization and underreporting in the past. These systems include the rumor surveillance system, the infection specialist network, the emergency-room-based syndrome surveillance system, the laboratory-based surveillance, and the sentinel surveillance system, which tracks influenza cases and school absenteeism. Also, the Korea Influenza Surveillance Scheme (KISS, ironically enough) monitors influenza activities to detect epidemics and contributes to the development of influenza control measures and influenza vaccines. KISS issues weekly reports on laboratory data and clinic/hospital admissions for influenza-like illnesses (ILI) and pneumonia. In addition to strengthening surveillance systems, the pandemic influenza response plan includes strategies to establish quarantines, restrict movement, and introduce border control measures such as entry and exit health screening, health alert notices, and the issuance of health declaration cards. Authorities implemented many of these steps during the H1N1 outbreak, and although it did provide them with useful information and perhaps slowed down the pandemic to some degree, the new virus resisted all efforts at containment and forced the government to focus on managing the consequences. It was a humbling experience that

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demonstrates the importance of identifying and understanding as early as possible the potential implication of an outbreak. South Korea’s pandemic influenza response plan identifies three tools to prevent, contain, and manage an avian and human influenza pandemic: (1) antiviral agent acquisition, (2) influenza vaccine development, and (3) public health intervention. Regarding vaccines, South Korea recently developed some domestic capacity for vaccine production (only the second producer in Asia), and it has increased the seasonal influenza vaccination rate to about 35 percent of the population. The Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy authorized the Green Cross Corporation to build a vaccine production facility, which came on line in 2008. Moreover, the KNIH, the National Veterinary and Quarantine Service, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and several private vaccine companies and universities are conducting research projects on vaccine development. Building upon this capability and improving research and production techniques could be a beneficial area of US-ROK cooperation. In addition, the national influenza response plan urges government agencies to test response measures with annual simulations and tabletop exercises, as well as to conduct research projects on the effectiveness of public health measures, the psychosocial aspects of a crisis and its aftermath, and legal and ethical issues related to pandemic influenza. Since 2004 the KCDC has hosted several tabletop exercises to test the national pandemic preparedness and response plan, identify weaknesses, and revise the plan accordingly. In fact, South Korea is one of the few governments in the western Pacific region that has run such elaborate simulations for central and local government agencies and international experts. In 2004 the KCDC conducted its first tabletop exercise in crisis management for emerging infectious diseases, and it held a second exercise in March 2005. Over 150 participants from various government agencies, national intelligence, police, emergency management, and the armed forces medical command were involved in the March simulation. Observers included policy and military game experts, health policy officials from Japan, and WHO representatives. The exercise identified significant obstacles to prevention and containment, such as the lack of public health workers for infection control, insufficient supply of protective medical equipment and antiviral medications, and inadequate methods of distributing central stockpiles. Efforts to overcome these obstacles improved South Korea’s readiness in 2009, and ROK authorities have shared their lessons learned with other countries through such

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forums as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Emerging Infectious Network (EINet). Follow-up ROK exercises expanded the involvement of international observers and experts, including those from the UN, World Bank, the private sector, the United States, Japan, China, Indonesia, Singapore, and other APEC economies.24 On the military front, South Korea has adopted a slightly different approach to planning and preparedness for pandemic influenza than the United States (in part, because the ROK’s reserve force is so large that its civilian and military policies are more closely intertwined). The Armed Forces Medical Command (AFMC) developed its own surveillance system to monitor emerging infectious diseases and detect incidents of avian influenza and biohazard threats. The AFMC’s surveillance system consists of three different structures to screen for influenza and other infectious diseases among military personnel: the Notifiable Infectious Disease Reporting System, the Pneumonia Surveillance System, and the Emergency Room Surveillance System. The Notifiable Infectious Disease Reporting System monitors various infectious diseases designated by the infectious disease prevention law, such as typhoid fever, malaria, tuberculosis, yellow fever, and other newly reported infectious diseases, in order to contain the spread of the disease through early recognition, patient isolation, and reinforcement of preventive measures. The infectious disease prevention law classifies the various infectious diseases into five categories based on the severity of the disease, the availability of vaccines, and the requirements for notification, surveillance, and monitoring. Pandemic influenza is part of group 4, along with yellow fever, dengue fever, smallpox, and botulism, and requires immediate notification once detected. About twenty military hospitals and institutions report infectious disease cases to the AFMC through this system, in addition to providing secondary medical care to patients transferred from medical battalions and field hospitals. The AFMC then issues weekly status reports and analyses on the diseases reported by the network hospitals. These models could be useful for other countries in East Asia that have similarly close connections between the civilian and military populations. The most innovative and advanced of the three surveillance systems is the Emergency Room Surveillance System, which detects certain infectious diseases by monitoring the symptoms and clinical conditions of patients visiting emergency care centers at the military hospitals. The twenty participating hospitals report daily to the AFMC on the number of patients and the clinical conditions observed even if the diagnoses are not final. To detect either an emerging infectious disease (such as SARS,

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foodborne infection, or pandemic influenza) or the presence of an infectious disease used as a biological terror weapon (such as smallpox or anthrax), the Emergency Room Surveillance System monitors and reports on five syndromes (acute rash syndrome, acute neurologic syndrome, hemorrhagic syndrome, acute respiratory syndrome, and acute diarrhea syndrome). In response to a serious pandemic influenza outbreak such as H1N1 or possibly avian flu, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) sets up a disaster response center and a central military infectious disease control center, headed by a disaster management and health policy team, respectively. Each service component (army, navy, air force) also sets up a disaster response center and infectious disease control center and reports to the MND. In addition, the AFMC assembles a military hospital infectious disease control team, and the Armed Forces Medical Research Institute (AFMRI) oversees a laboratory-based surveillance center. The MND requires the AFMC and each of the service components to cooperate, share information, and communicate results and status reports immediately with each other and with the MND. Finally, the MND works closely with the National Security Council, the MW, and other government agencies throughout each stage of the pandemic influenza attack. Despite all of the attention focused on swine flu in 2009, the ROK government remains attentive to the avian flu threat, having been affected by the H5N1 virus at various times during the 2000s. The first major outbreak occurred in 2003 and 2004, during which more than 5 million birds were culled in an effort to control the outbreak. Two years later, South Korea confirmed the presence of H5N1 again, after roughly 6,500 poultry died at a commercial farm in the hub of the poultry industry. Authorities immediately culled more than 236,000 chickens and ducks at six farms within a 500-meter radius, along with 300 pigs and 577 dogs within the area.25 ROK authorities deployed about 240 soldiers in protective gear to seventeen checkpoints around the quarantine area to control the movement of people and vehicles. Despite culling more than 2 million birds in 2006 and 2007, the nation suffered another significant outbreak in 2008, first noticed at a farm near the US air base at Kunsan.26 South Korea is one of only a small number of countries to experience such recurring avian flu outbreaks, and combined with the presence of 28,000 US troops on the peninsula, avian flu preparedness can take on a distinctive bilateral flavor. US troops stationed in South Korea, for example, are prepared to support the host government (if requested) with rapid containment operations in support of civilian authorities.

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After all, many of their own family members will be living in the affected communities—not to mention the number of local residents who work on US military installations, so depending on the circumstances, it can be difficult to separate US bases from the response equation. Moreover, military bases have vital resources, such as medical personnel and equipment, that may assist the local community during the initial phases of the potential health crisis. However, the extent of US assistance is uncertain given the competing demands to focus on force health protection, maintain operational readiness, and support US domestic containment operations for pandemic influenza. Government officials and military planners should address some of these issues now to avoid any misunderstandings or loss of critical time during an initial response to a possible human-to-human outbreak of H5N1. In this regard, the allies’ swine flu experience is a useful case study for joint evaluation. As noted earlier in this chapter, although bilateral cooperation on pandemic issues is usually subordinate to both national and broader multilateral action in this area, even relatively modest cooperation can benefit the alliance and the region if it is well targeted and consistently practiced. Some of this cooperation could be narrowly targeted on the alliance, such as how to jointly improve force protection, prepare for possible biological attacks by North Korea, or sort out legal and logistical issues to support each other and maintain trade ties when a pandemic occurs. The allies can also combine their joint efforts with that of a few other key countries to support the global health infrastructure for prevention, containment, and response. The preceding discussion regarding each country’s pandemic flu response priorities and its relative strengths on the international stage provides us with a solid foundation from which to recommend useful avenues of closer alliance cooperation.

Areas for Enhanced Cooperation

The 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic was an important test of the allies’ and the world’s ability to handle such a crisis, and it reminded officials that pandemic threats are not just theoretical. The object of planning going forward, however, will be the H5N1 virus, because it remains the most likely of the most potentially devastating pandemics. Since the majority of avian and human infections of the H5N1 virus to date are within the Asia region, experts believe a pandemic is imminent and that it will originate in the Pacific region. Although policy planners have

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made significant progress in preparing for a pandemic influenza crisis, challenges remain with regard to coordinating and integrating planning efforts, leveraging existing partnerships, enhancing interoperability, combining resources, and identifying areas for enhanced cooperation within a multilateral context. Health and medical science cooperation is an important area for the allies to step up collaboration. For example, the allies’ top health policy officials signed a health and medical sciences cooperation agreement in July 2009, renewing a previous agreement, which could boost joint research projects and scientific exchanges if properly implemented. 27 Through DoD-GEIS partnership, laboratory capacity-building initiatives have been conducted in South Korea at the Sixty-fifth Medical Brigade, including various disease surveillance programs and military influenza lab equipment support.28 The two governments also pledged to coordinate their activities with global and regional health bodies. Such efforts resonate with Seoul’s “Global Korea” foreign policy vision that “engages proactively with the international community in the service of peace and development.” They also flow naturally from the US-Korea Joint Vision for the Alliance, announced by the two presidents in June 2009, which promotes cooperation in the area of epidemic diseases.29 This is the right direction for the alliance, but it cannot reach its full potential without sustained support by both governments. The new health sciences agreement, for example, requires identification of an appropriate entity to oversee practical implementation, but this needs to be at a high enough bureaucratic level to provide the leadership necessary to fulfill the agreement’s promise. The allies also need to develop mutually agreed-upon guidelines for implementation of the above-mentioned joint vision, beyond the defense-only guidelines signed in late 2010. The allies should also use this opportunity to facilitate bilateral and multilateral interagency cooperation. Currently, US-ROK pandemic disease cooperation revolves primarily around personal relationships among key officials in the allies’ foreign ministries and embassies, health and welfare ministries (e.g., the Office of Global Health at the HHS International Flu Unit and the ROK’s director-general for health policy), and preeminent research institutes (e.g., ties between the CDC and the KCDC, and the US National Institutes of Health [NIH] and the KNIH). These relationships are valuable, and they manage productive cooperative programs. There are limits to how well they coordinate with each other as a group, however, since they tend to operate in different bureaucratic channels. There is even less cross-fertilization between the civilian and military sides of

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these issues. An important first step for improving bilateral cooperation, therefore, would be to foster bilateral interagency dialogue on these issues, and one useful topic for discussion is a review of allied and multilateral cooperation during the H1N1 crisis. Through such an exercise, officials will gain a better sense of the full range of activities that went on during 2009, and it will help prepare them for future crises. The future of allied interaction is multiagency-oriented, because it is coordination across various disciplines that will help our countries make the most of limited resources to effectively tackle complex national security challenges. Vaccine research is needed, of course, but so too is coordination of development assistance programs in countries with fragile health-care infrastructure. In fear of a potential outbreak of H1N1, WHO provided an emergency supply of 35,000 Tamiflu tablets to North Korea in May 2009,30 but that didn’t stop epidemics from breaking out in the impoverished country, where many people are already undernourished and have weak immune systems. In December, South Korea sent to the northern neighbor its first government-to-government unconditional humanitarian assistance since early 2008. The shipment of medications, including 400,000 doses of Tamiflu and 100,000 doses of Relenza,31 was followed by another offer in February 2010 from the Lee Myung-bak government to send 200,000 liters of antiflu hand sanitizer to the North.32 However, medical assistance in response to the H1N1 flu has so far been sporadic and lacking in coordination. Investments should be complementary and avoid redundancy, reaching into areas of veterinary medicine and animal husbandry in rural villages, as well as good governance practices back in the capital. When an outbreak or a biological threat is identified, immigration, customs, and transportation policies must be coordinated, and force protection for the allies’ armed forces is another key concern. All of this requires financial resources, so cooperation at the Asian Development Bank or the World Bank will be beneficial. Thus, this one issue requires coordination among officials and specialists in foreign, defense, health, development aid, agriculture, transportation, and financial affairs (bilaterally and with other partners such as Japan, Australia, and others). Involving nongovernmental organizations and multinational companies active in both countries is another opportunity to deepen the bilateral relationship and to contribute regionally and globally. Getting back to the issue of overseas aid coordination, and as noted in Edward Reed’s chapter in this volume on development assistance and humanitarian aid, Seoul has ambitious plans for its overseas aid programs, as it aims to increase assistance to developing countries threefold

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by 2015. The health and technology sectors are high priorities for greater giving. This is appropriate given the fact that failure to promote local awareness in developing countries and improve their ability to deal with an influenza pandemic renders all other prevention measures practically useless, especially in an avian flu scenario. To help jump-start the initiative by providing sufficient financial resources, South Korea’s foreign ministry planned to expand its total budget by an additional 15 percent in 2011, 33 following 20 percent budget increases in 2009 and 2010.34 At a 2011 UN conference on least developed countries, Vice Minister Min Dong-seok pledged to increase ROK’s overseas development assistance (ODA) budget “in the next four years to around 3 billion US dollars or 0.25% of GNI,” particularly related to support in the health sector.35 The allies should devote some coordinated aid resources in the area of flu prevention and local health-care improvements for developing countries in Southeast Asia. The Development Assistance Committee within the OECD, and other regional forums in East Asia, of which South Korea is a member, can provide opportunities to coordinate aid giving in a multilateral context. In addition, the allies should consider North Korea’s unique situation when it comes to dealing with a global pandemic, not only from a threat prevention perspective, but also for humanitarian reasons and as a potential opportunity to improve relations with North Koreans. Avian flu has infected North Korean poultry farms in the past (most dramatically in 2005), and because the virus is often carried by migratory birds, even North Korea’s extreme state of isolation is no guarantee of protection. It is possible that the H5N1 virus will mutate in North Korea and become transmissible from human to human, and this could significantly complicate outside efforts to quickly study and contain the outbreak. The lack of North Korean interaction with other countries did limit its exposure to the swine flu pandemic, though a few cases were reported at the joint North-South industrial park at Gaesong. A major outbreak in North Korea could do serious damage to its undernourished population, so allied and regional initiatives to strengthen health and medical science ties with North Korea (in partnership with the UN Development Program and the WHO) can be useful on many fronts. Tabletop exercises, simulations, and workshops are an effective means to iron out the details and integrate response efforts. The exchange of disaster response plans helps pinpoint weaknesses and identifies the gaps and opportunities for enhanced cooperation, especially since countries and regions have developed different approaches to pandemic influenza planning. South Korea, and specifically the KCDC,

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have taken a lead in organizing regional tabletop exercises to help participants refine plans, but the frequency of minilateral and multilateral collaboration is increasing. For example, Australia and Singapore cohosted the APEC round-the-clock desktop simulation exercise in June 2006 (APEC Pandemic Response Exercise 2006), which tested regional communication networks, and they later cosponsored a lessons-learned workshop and shared results with APEC economies. In addition, South Korea, Japan, and China carried out their first joint flu outbreak drill in October 2008 to align policies and facilitate communication during a crisis. High-level regional policy networks are important as well. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) health ministers met with their counterparts in South Korea, Japan, and China in May 2009 to discuss regional measures to combat pandemics, including information sharing, collaborative studies, and joint exercises. In May 2010 the ASEAN Regional Work Plan on Health Development 2010–2015 was finalized, providing a framework for effective cooperation among ASEAN countries in the prevention and preparedness of infectious diseases. Various collective mechanisms were established at the ASEAN Health Ministers Meetings later that year, including the ASEAN Plus Three Partnership Laboratories (APLs) to strengthen laboratory surveillance and networking in the region. There has also been discussion about the possibility of expanding ASEAN health collaboration to engage other countries from the East Asia Summit (EAS).36 US cooperation with South Korea (and other partners in East Asia) is an efficient way to tap into this wider field of regional dialogue. Timely and reliable information is critical to effective collaboration and coordination among regional and multilateral agencies, partners, and foreign governments and militaries. To date, multiple government and multilateral agencies have launched websites to announce information on the avian flu. However, each website has tailored the information to fit its audience. To see the big picture of the situation around the world, therefore, it is necessary to browse through dozens of Internet sites and portals. Although the WHO website includes links to pandemic influenza reports, general information, surveillance and infection control guidelines, national influenza pandemic preparedness plans, and situation country updates, it is not a clearinghouse of all available information. The allies can work together and with others to improve existing networks, rather than try to create an entirely new information resource. The Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) within the Bureau for Intelligence and Research at the US Department of State has been working since 2002 on creating a portal to share unclassified, usable in-

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formation across the government and with international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector in preparation for and response to complex humanitarian emergencies worldwide. Information collected includes best practices for humanitarian information management and real-time satellite imagery of migration movements or war-torn areas. The HIU data are not available to the public, but it does make certain information and imagery available to other public sites such as ReliefWeb, when necessary, and there might be times when this is useful in a bilateral or regional context. Over and above the devastating health and economic impact of a potential influenza pandemic, additional threats could arise to menace global security. For example, how does the international community respond to countries that fail to report avian flu incidents? Some experts claim that the Indonesian government was aware of the presence of H5N1 in the country for two years, but failed to slaughter poultry in infected areas. Indonesian officials only reported incidents of avian flu once humans were infected. International health authorities have also suspected China of underreporting avian flu incidents in poultry and humans. The lack of transparency on avian flu issues in some countries dramatically increases the risk of a sustained human-to-human transmission of the H5N1 virus. Rapid detection and response efforts will determine the extent to which a human-to-human transmission of H5N1 can be contained, which requires efficient coordination among the initially affected nation, responsible international agencies, and other countries in the region assisting as needed. Within this latter group, the United States and South Korea can play a valuable role (along with a few other countries such as Japan, Australia, and Singapore), working in support of the affected nation and UN agencies, and they can function more effectively if they respond as a well-prepared and well-coordinated core group. In order to prepare themselves, the core group nations’ ministries of foreign affairs, health, and defense, along with foreign officials and forces stationed abroad, should spend time as a group to consider their respective roles in implementing rapid containment measures. Militaries need a better understanding of the mandate and plan for humanitarian assistance and disaster response missions. Militaries also need to identify the logistical and infrastructural capabilities of the nations requesting assistance in order to match the needs of the afflicted area. Tabletop exercises, particularly military-to-military and multilateral exchanges, help planners identify the expectations of host nations and address the different political and legal dimensions of a military response to pandemic influenza. Periodic training focused on disaster relief efforts

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would be beneficial, as well as standardized operating procedures and memoranda of understanding on the use of ports and airfields. In addition to improving military-to-military coordination, institutional linkages among animal and human health experts should be strengthened to improve information exchange across laboratory and communicable-disease networks. Moreover, partnerships with all stakeholders in the public and private sectors should be developed to ensure national and regional coordination for pandemic response. Partnerships with the private sector (such as tourism, communications, food suppliers, airline industries, financial services, and other trade and industry) encourage business continuity plans, maintain public confidence, and mitigate the negative economic impact of a pandemic influenza. Moreover, partnerships with pharmaceutical manufacturers increase the capacity of nations and regions to stockpile vaccines and other treatment medications. Partnerships with nongovernmental organizations, such as the United Way and the Red Cross, also guarantee additional support services in meeting the basic food, shelter, and medical needs of individuals isolated or quarantined during a pandemic. Raising public awareness and engaging the public as partners also increase the effectiveness of and compliance with government containment measures. Finally, the recommendations for pandemic influenza preparedness planning have wider biodefense policy implications. Improving laboratory surveillance techniques and risk communication networks, drafting business continuity and emergency response plans, strengthening regional and multilateral networks, enhancing interoperability, and creating information-sharing systems help prevent and control other security challenges, including natural disasters, terrorism, and any future biological and chemical threats. Such threats demand the same planning and response as pandemic influenza—that is, a focus on threat awareness, prevention, surveillance, detection, and recovery. Whether the international community is prepared to meet such future challenges depends on the planning and coordination done today.

Notes 1. Lee Jong-wook, “Opening Remarks Presented at the Meeting on Avian Influenza and Pandemic Human Influenza,” World Health Organization, November 7, 2005, http://www.who.int. 2. Vince Little, “Military ‘Concerned’ by Bird Flu Cases,” Stars and Stripes, January 26, 2005. 3. World Health Organization Global Alert and Response, Pandemic H1N1 2009—update No. 73, http://www.who.int.

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4. World Health Organization, “Cumulative Number of Reported Probable Cases of SARS,” July 11, 2003, http://www.who.int. 5. Erik Bloom, Vincent de Wit, and Mary Jane Carangal–San Jose, Potential Economic Impact of an Avian Flu Pandemic on Asia. ERD Policy Brief Series, no. 42, Asian Development Bank, Economic and Research Department, 2005. 6. “Finding the Source of SARS,” US News & World Report, September 29, 2005, http://www.usnews.com. 7. David Evans, Simon Cauchemez, and Frederick G. Hayden, “‘Prepandemic’ Immunization for Novel Influenza Viruses, ‘Swine Flu’ Vaccine, Guillain-Barré Syndrome, and the Detection of Rare Severe Adverse Events,” Journal of Infectious Diseases, vol. 200, no. 3 (August 1, 2009), pp. 321–328. 8. US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Pandemic Flu Questions and Answers,” January 17, 2006, http://www.cdc.gov. 9. Early indications of avian (H5N1) flu suggest a possible mortality rate of roughly 60 percent. If it became transmittable from human to human, this rate could certainly drop, but it could still be as high as 5 percent. For comparison, the mortality rate of H1N1 might reach 0.5 percent, and seasonal flu is about 0.1 percent. The deadly Spanish Flu of 1918 was about 2.5 percent, while the less transmittable SARS was almost 10 percent. 10. Affected countries included Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. World Health Organization Secretariat, Strengthening Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response, Fifty-eighth World Health Assembly, provisional agenda item 13.9 (A58/13), April 7, 2005. 11. As of October 10, 2011. The actual number of infected people with the H5N1 virus, however, might exceed current figures, since milder cases often go unreported. As a result, the mortality rate might not be as high as 60 percent. See World Health Organization Global Alert and Response, Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) Reported to the WHO, http://www.who.int. 12. World Health Organization, “Proposed Program Budget 2010–2011,” http://apps.who.int. For comparison, the Johns Hopkins medical system’s annual operating budget for 2009 is about US$4.1 billion. 13. “Concept of Operations for the UN System in an Influenza Pandemic,” prepared by UN System Influenza Coordinator and the Pandemic Influenza Contingency Team, September 19, 2008, http://www.un-pic.org. 14. Song Sang-ho, “Researcher Claims World’s First Swine Flu Vaccine,” Korea Herald, May 19, 2009. 15. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Obama’s Letter to Congress on Global H1N1 Outbreak,” May 1, 2009, http://www.america.gov. 16. US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “US International Avian and Pandemic Influenza Assistance Approaches $950 Million,” released on October 25, 2008, http://2001-2009.state.gov. 17. US Agency for International Development, “USAID Provides $3.6 Million to Extend Influenza Aid in Vietnam,” USAID Regional Development Mission for Asia, press release, September 23, 2009, http://www.usaid.gov. 18. US Department of Health & Human Services Press Office, “Secretary Sebelius Takes Two Key Actions on Strategic National Stockpile,” April 30, 2009, http://www.hhs.gov. 19. President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, “Report to

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the President on Re-engineering the influenza Vaccine Production Enterprise to Meet the Challenges of Pandemic Influenza,” August 2010, http://www .whitehouse.gov. 20. According to official introduction of AFHSC available at http://afhsc .mil/geisPartners. 21. Jung Sung-ki, “North Korea Has 13 Types of Biological Weapons,” Korea Times, October 5, 2009. 22. The plan is available at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza /ROK_National_Pandemic_Plan.pdf. 23. “Lee Requests ‘Full Cooperation’ in Fight Against Flu,” Yonhap News Agency, November 3, 2009. 24. Additional information on past pandemic influenza exercises is available at the Korea Centers for Disease Control website, http://www.cdc.go.kr /kcdchome/. 25. “South Korea Scurries to Stem the Spread of Highly Virulent Bird Flu,” Yonhap News Agency, November 26, 2006, http://english.hani.co.kr. 26. “South Korea Culls All Domestic Fowl in Seoul,” Reuters News Agency, May 12, 2008. 27. US Department of Health and Human Services, “HHS Renews Memorandum of Understanding on Health and Medical Science with the Republic of Korea,” July 14, 2009, http://www.global health.gov. 28. Jose L. Sanchez, Matthew C. Johns, Ronald L. Burke, Kelly G. Vest, Mark M. Fukuda, In-Kyu Yoon, Chanthap Lon, Miguel Quintana, David C. Schnabel, Guillermo Pimentel, Moustafa Mansour, Steven Tobias, Joel M. Montgomery, Gregory C. Gray, Karen Saylors, Lucy M. Ndip, Sheri Lewis, Patrick J. Blair, Paul A. Sjoberg, Robert A. Kuschner, Kevin L. Russell, David L. Blazes, AFHSC-GEIS Capacity Building Writing Group, “Capacity-Building Efforts by the AFHSC-GEIS Program,” BMC Public Health, May 4, 2011, http://www.biomedcentral.com. 29. “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,” June 16, 2009, http://seoul.embassy.gov. 30. “H1N1 Flu Outbreak to Weigh Heavily on North Korea,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, December 9, 2009. 31. “North Korea Seen Battling Wave of Flu,” The Wall Street Journal, December 31, 2009, http://online.wsj.com. 32. “South Korea Sends Anti–Swine Flu Sanitizer to North,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, February 23, 2010. 33. Foreign Minister’s Press Briefing, December 14, 2010, http://www .mofat.go.kr. 34. Spokesperson’s Regular Press Briefing, October 1, 2009, http://www .mofat.go.kr. 35. Statement by H. E. Min Dong-seok, vice minister, at Fourth United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries, May 12, 2011, http://www .mofat.go.kr. 36. Joint Statement of the Tenth ASEAN Health Ministers Meeting, July 22, 2010, http://www.aseansec.org.

7 Climate Change Heejun Chang and Lily House-Peters

CLIMATE CHANGE IS A PRODUCT OF INCREASING CONCENTRAtions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere. While GHG concentrations naturally fluctuate over time, the increasing concentrations over the last century are primarily caused by anthropogenic activities.1 The process of fossil fuel combustion to create energy for electricity, heating, cooling, and transportation releases carbon dioxide and other GHG emissions into the atmosphere, causing increased concentrations. During the last 150 years, global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide have increased by more than 30 percent. It is estimated that by the year 2100 these concentrations will be 41 to 158 percent higher than they are today.2 Temperature change has not impacted all parts of the world equally, with certain locations experiencing temperature increase above the global average. During the twentieth century, the average temperature of the globe rose by 0.74 degree Celsius, while that of South Korea increased by 1.7 degrees Celsius3 and temperatures across the contiguous United States rose by approximately 0.6 degree Celsius.4 The overall total US GHG emissions rose by 17 percent from 1990 to 2007,5 while GHG emissions in South Korea increased 90.1 percent between 1990 and 2005, the fastest growth rate among the rest of the twenty-nine Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.6 The impacts of climate change in the twenty-first century will likely be wide-ranging and unpredictable, affecting the lives of billions of people through increased threats to public health, shifts in historic weather patterns, and changes in the availability and quality of energy, water,

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and food supplies. More specifically, changes in precipitation patterns and an increase in storm frequency and intensity may contribute to an increased occurrence of wildfires, droughts, and floods; changes in water quality and quantity; rising sea levels; and widespread pest and disease outbreaks.7 The negative effects of climate change can be curtailed through two methods: mitigation, the reduction of GHGs emitted into the atmosphere, and adaptation, the adjustment of human behavior, habitats, and ecosystems to these changes. In 2007 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) cautioned that in order to minimize the extent of climate change, global carbon emissions must peak no later than the year 2015 and be reduced 50 to 85 percent below 2000 levels by the year 2050. In his 2008 study, Ryan warns that achieving such a significant reduction in GHG emissions will require a restructuring of the systems of production and consumption, to increase diversity and decrease vulnerability.8 Although climate change is a global phenomenon, the strategies of mitigation and adaptation must be initiated and implemented at various spatial scales, from the local neighborhood up to the national, and even international, levels.9 A strengthening argument envisions systems of production, distribution, and consumption as increasingly decentralized, with emphasis on the effectiveness of local policy and cooperation.10 The global consensus that climate change is occurring and is due to human activities has led policymakers and researchers across the globe to develop and implement guidelines, strategies, and recommendations for mitigation and adaptation at the national and local levels.11 Given that climate policy is tightly related to economic and energy policy (e.g., energy intensity and CO 2 emissions), successful implementation of global climate change mitigation and adaptation requires international collaboration. In this chapter, we examine the current mitigation and adaptation strategies being implemented at multiple spatial scales in the United States and South Korea and suggest areas that might best support international cooperation for increased future success in combating climate change in both nations and beyond. South Korea is uniquely positioned for developing climate change policy since the country can bridge the gap between developed countries and developing countries worldwide. Additionally, the US-ROK alliance in climate change policy can help coordinate an international relations policy dealing with North Korea, a country currently struggling with energy and food shortages. Climate change could further exacerbate the existing food and energy insecurity in that country, potentially disrupting the political regime.12

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US Mitigation Strategies for Addressing Climate Change

In the United States, the rising levels of GHG emissions are highly associated with patterns of urban development over the last fifty years. The preference for low-density suburban and exurban developments, which are not well connected to public transportation systems, has resulted in significant increases in vehicle miles driven. Consequently, with nearly two-thirds of all oil consumption processed into fuel for transportation,13 Americans now drive more than any other society and are responsible for almost 25 percent of total global GHG emissions.14 During the past quarter-century (1980–2006), the United States has experienced steadily decreasing energy intensity, the level of which has dropped by 43 percent from 1980 to 2008 (see Figure 7.1), due to high economic productivity, an increase in the fuel efficiency of vehicles, and a push toward sustainable lifestyles. However, per capita energy consumption has remained nearly level with 2008 per capita consumption equaling 330

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million British Thermal Units (Btu) per person, only slightly below the twenty-nine-year average of 338 million Btu per capita (Figure 7.2). In 2007 the Energy Independence and Security Act became law, establishing recommendations and mandates to reduce US GHG emissions. The legislation includes a mandatory increase in vehicle fuel economy standards to 35 miles per gallon by 2020, increased production of renewable fuels from 9 billion gallons in 2008 to 36 billion gallons by 2022, and increased energy efficiency for residential, commercial, industrial, and public buildings. Carbon Trading

The creation and implementation of a national carbon trading market in the United States, although widely viewed as having significant potential to reduce GHG emissions, remains controversial. In 2009 the US Climate Action Partnership (USCAP) recommended for passage into

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law the national Cap and Trade Legislation for Reducing GHG Emissions, which would require an emissions cap set at 80 percent below 2005 levels by the year 2050.15 The process of creating a carbon market requires four steps: (1) establishment of a mandatory cap on emissions; (2) allocation of allowances, equivalent to the cap amount, to the targeted emitters; (3) accurate measurement and reporting of emissions by emitters; and (4) enforcement of the cap so that the market is confident in the value of carbon emissions. Proponents of the carbon market argue that it provides opportunities to obtain low-cost emission reductions, promotes technological innovations, will reduce the economic impact of mitigation on consumers, and will indirectly lead to the diversification of energy sources and reduce air pollution.16 At the regional level, establishing a carbon market has been successful, with two regions, the Northeast and the West, leading the way. The Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which began in 2008 with the purpose of limiting emissions of carbon dioxide from power plants, represents the first mandatory, market-based effort in the United States. The regional partnership comprises ten northeastern and midAtlantic states (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont) and has a two-stage implementation process. At the first stage, the region’s power companies must stabilize their 2012 emissions at 2008 levels or turn in allowances bought on the market. At the second stage, 2018 emissions must be 10 percent below 2008 levels.17 The Western Climate Initiative represents a regional partnership among seven western US states (Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington) and four Canadian provinces (British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec) to reduce GHG emissions to 15 percent below 2005 levels by 2050. The California State Environmental Protection Agency has pursued extensive mitigation policies, including the implementation of the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, which called for restoring California’s GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and a more aggressive reduction of 80 percent below 1990 levels by the year 2050.18 A statewide carbon market has been identified as one of the main strategies to significantly reduce GHG emissions to meet the 2020 and 2050 targets. Renewable Energy

Currently, renewable energy constitutes a small portion of total energy consumption in the United States. In 2007, renewable energy sources

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represented 7 percent of total energy consumption (see Figure 7.3) and 8.4 percent of total electricity generation.19 A dominant source of US renewable energy is biomass, which accounts for 53 percent of total renewable energy and is mainly used for transportation fuel in the form of ethanol, for residential and commercial heating, and for manufacturing paper. The US government has set a target that by 2030, renewable-generated electricity will account for 15.8 percent of total US electricity generation.20 In an effort to increase the creation and implementation of mitigation policies at the state level, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) passed the State Climate and Energy Partnership Program in 2005. This legislation represents a voluntary partnership between the federal government and sixteen participating states. Best practices promoted through the partnership include the following: states developing their own clean energy plan; supporting local businesses and consumers with tax incentives, rebates, and grants for renewable energy investments; establishing minimum energy efficiency requirements for residential and commercial buildings; and funding private-sector development of technologies that reduce energy dependence.21 The Climate and Energy Partnership Program established the national-level rebate program for consumers who purchase products to increase the energy efficiency and renewable energy profiles of their

Figure 7.3 US Energy Consumption by Type, 2007

Coal 22% Wind Solar 5% 1% Petroleum 40% Hydroelectric 36%

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Source: US Department of Energy, US Energy Information Administration, Washington, DC, 2007.

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homes. Currently, the US government offers tax rebates of 30 percent of the cost of products and materials to improve household energy efficiency or establish renewable energy production.22 The rebate program for buying and installing energy-efficient appliances is administered at the state level. In Los Angeles, California, consumers receive a US$250 rebate for purchasing a high-efficiency clothes washer and US$50 for a high-efficiency dishwasher.23 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provides a tax credit for producing fuel from nonconventional sources, incentives for the production of renewable electricity energy, including landfill gas, and the creation of the Loan Guarantee Program, which provides up to 80 percent of the cost of projects that decrease air pollutants or GHG emissions and employ new or improved technologies. In 2009 the Barack Obama administration used the Loan Guarantee Program to stimulate wind energy production, as it currently only accounts for 5 percent of total US renewable energy (see Figure 7.3). The companies Nordic Windpower and Beacon Power were offered conditional loan guarantees for US$16 million and US$43 million, respectively, to support the expansion of windpower and to develop products to support reliable and efficient power grid operation.24 Urban Structure

The growing body of research and literature focusing on climate change mitigation through the reduction of GHG emissions supports the development and redevelopment of land to encourage high-density, mixeduse, and pedestrian- and transit-friendly communities. This type of development fulfills the design criteria of sustainable urbanism and smart-growth reform movements. The average density of new US developments is two dwelling units per acre, far below the sustainable urbanism goal of eight units per acre.25 Increased density has the advantages of supporting public transit service and reducing carbon generation by 30 percent and energy consumption by 50 percent.26 Stone et al. found that a doubling of mean population density throughout their eleven Midwest metropolitan study areas would have the effect of reducing vehicle carbon dioxide emissions by 30 percent compared to the business-asusual scenario, while fully integrating conventional hybrid technology would only reduce vehicle emissions by 18 percent.27 This finding is significant because it is projected that by 2050 the United States will be 90 percent urban, an 11 percent increase over 2000 levels (Figure 7.4). Multifamily housing can reduce the energy required to heat and cool by 30 to 35 percent, compared with detached, single-family housing. As

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Republic of Korea

Source: UN Secretariat, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision (New York: United Nations, 2007).

homes and buildings become more energy efficient per square foot, the variable household size will become even more significant in determining household energy savings. A comparable household in a sprawling community has on average 21 percent more floor area than in a compact community.28 Compact growth also incurs an estimated 11 percent reduction in infrastructure costs and can reduce vehicle miles traveled per capita by 20 to 40 percent.29 The opportunity to restructure the built environment of the United States utilizing sustainable urbanism and smart-growth principles will be unprecedented in the years between 2009 and 2050, as it is projected that 66 percent of the development that will exist in 2050 does not yet exist today.30 Case studies in the US cities of Atlanta, San Diego, Portland, and San Antonio have demonstrated that as site density increases and the mix of jobs, housing, and retail becomes more balanced, per capita vehicle miles driven and carbon dioxide emissions decline.31 For example, in New York City, the average resident produces 7.1 metric

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tons of carbon dioxide annually, less than one-third the national average of 24.5 metric tons. These savings are based on an efficient transit system that encourages nearly 66 percent of New Yorkers to forgo driving a personal vehicle to work, and predominantly multifamily housing, which uses less energy than freestanding structures.32 Farr describes some exemplary communities, including Glenwood Park in Atlanta, Georgia, a dense, mixed-use neighborhood developed on a brownfield site.33 By complying with the federal Energy Star program, each home has an energy saving of 1.3 megawatts per year. The de-emphasis of automobiles, through limiting parking availability and promoting diverse transit options, has succeeded in reducing total miles driven by residents by over 1.6 million miles. In Boulder, Colorado, the Holiday neighborhood boasts smaller, more compact, and less expensive homes than traditional suburbs, with a density of twenty units per acre, twice the Boulder city zoning regulation density of ten units per acre. The use of passive solar heating, whole-house fans, and alternative cooling devices limits the use of traditional air conditioning and has reduced utility bills by 50 percent. In an effort to reduce car dependence, residents receive a bus pass as part of their homeowner association dues, which has resulted in a 30 percent reduction in miles driven compared to the average American. Transportation Sector

At the national and state levels, many of the mitigation policies being proposed and implemented focus attention on the regulation of and technological advances in vehicle fuel efficiency and fuel carbon content. In order to realize climate stabilization, the United States must bring carbon dioxide emission levels to 33 percent below 1990 levels by 2030 to be on a path to a carbon dioxide reduction of 60 to 80 percent by 2050. However, the US Department of Energy forecasts a 48 percent increase in driving between 2005 and 2030, resulting in carbon dioxide emissions from cars and light trucks remaining at 26 percent above 1990 levels in 2030.34 Efforts to reduce vehicle GHG emissions focus on dual objectives: reducing the overall number of vehicle miles traveled and increasing the percentage of those miles that are fueled by renewable sources, such as biofuels, electricity, solar power, and hydrogen. The sustainable urbanism design concept, discussed earlier, promotes mixed-use neighborhoods, dense developments, integrated public transport, and pedestrian-friendly road networks directly targeting a reduction in vehicle miles traveled at the local level. At the

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national level, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 introduced a tax credit, up to US$2,000, for hybrid vehicles purchased between 2006 and 2010 in order to encourage consumers to buy hybrids rather than traditional fuel vehicles. The Obama administration proposes increasing the hybrid car tax credit to US$7,500. The promotion of hybrid vehicles through incentive programs and the push to increase fuel-efficiency standards for traditional fuel vehicles are often viewed as a win-win situation; however, this enthusiasm tends to mask some of the problems associated with vehicle emissions mitigation strategies. Chandra et al. argue that although hybrid sales have increased significantly due to the rebate programs, the majority of the hybrids sold have been at the expense of small fuel-efficient vehicles, not large SUVs and trucks with high carbon emissions.35 Another barrier to utilizing increased fuel-efficiency standards to reduce carbon emissions is the rebound effect. The rebound effect states that as a car’s mileage improves, less gas is needed, thus it becomes less expensive to drive and the demand to drive increases. Research indicates that over the period 1966 to 2001 the cumulative rebound effect was 20 to 25 percent, but the effect has been decreasing and for the period 1997 to 2001 it was 10.7 percent.36 Thus, if the government increases fuel economy standards by 40 percent and there is an 11 percent rebound effect, the targeted vehicles will be driven 4.4 percent more miles than currently driven, which could lead to increased congestion on roadways and negate carbon emission savings. Carbon Sink Through Forestation Efforts

One major carbon sink is forests. Trees have the ability to mitigate climate change by sequestering carbon dioxide and reducing building energy use through cooling and shading in the summer and reducing heat loss in the winter. In 2000, US forests and agricultural soils sequestered 11 percent of total US carbon dioxide emissions, and in 2004, rural forests sequestered 10.6 percent of total carbon dioxide emissions, while urban trees removed an additional 1.5 percent.37 Since 2000 the national government has encouraged private landowners to voluntarily adopt land use and management practices that sequester additional carbon in forest systems and agricultural soils. For example, one governmentfunded program is financing the afforestation of 500,000 acres of bottomwood hardwood forest in the Mississippi River valley.38 At the local level, the city of Portland, Oregon, has set a clear goal to expand the urban forest canopy to cover 33 percent of the metro area by 2030.39

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Furthermore, Portland has focused efforts to maximize the current urban forest, through retention of the existing canopy, maintaining tree health, and planting large-species trees. 40 Measures to protect and augment forests are important as forests will be especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, due to increased occurrences of drought, wildfire, and pest outbreaks in the future.

US Adaptation Strategies for Addressing Climate Change

Mitigation policies and recommendations alone will not be sufficient to reduce the impacts of climate change; adaptation strategies will also be necessary.41 Adaptation strategies are based in the theory of resiliency, encouraging vulnerable communities to anticipate and plan for change and shape community response, such that negative outcomes of climate change are minimized and communities are able to quickly and effectively rebound.42 Adaptation needs vary widely based on geographic location, natural amenities, urban environment, and the socioeconomic characteristics of a community. Thus, the most effective adaptation policies tend to be chartered at the local or regional level, rather than at the national level.43 While adaptation is not a new phenomenon, anthropogenic climate change represents a new challenge because the changes to temperature, weather patterns, and resources likely to occur in the twenty-first century will be larger, faster, and less predictable than past experiences with historical climate variability. Many adaptation strategies represent a paradigm shift away from centralized systems of production and consumption toward increased diversification and distribution of energy resources and production, food production, and water resources.44 For example, renewed attention is being focused on increasing the resiliency of water resources, especially in low-supply, high-demand areas, by localizing the production and retention of potable water, harvesting rainwater, and utilizing gray water when appropriate. Ryan notes that these local, distributed systems of production and consumption rely on strong social and cultural drivers for their success.45 Adaptation strategies include maintaining the urban forest in order to cool buildings and sidewalks and sequester carbon and the provisioning of alternative sources of energy.46 Although mitigation policies often encourage increased density, adaptation strategies may require the preservation of open space for floodwater management, bioswales, natural infiltration, and ventilation for natural cooling between housing

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units. Specific US examples of the implementation of climate change adaptation policies include the support of planning policies that prioritize and foster local food production and consumption in Keene, New Hampshire; zoning regulations to protect new coastal tourist developments in Miami Dade County, Florida; a weatherization program to reduce home energy use and increase structural resilience to storms for low-income families in Portland, Oregon; requirements for new developments to preserve and utilize local sources of renewable energy in Aspen County and Boulder, Colorado; and renewed enforcement of building and urban design requirements that minimize energy consumption while retaining heating and cooling capability in Chicago, Illinois.47 A leading US county in the creation and implementation of adaptation strategies is King County, Washington, the location of the Seattle metropolis. Leaders in King County believe that to be successful in reducing the impacts of global climate change, actions must occur at the local level, spearheaded by local governments and stakeholders who can apply policies with a direct influence on individual communities. In 2007, King County released a Climate Plan that outlines strategic adaptation actions in the following six areas: climate science; public health, safety, and emergency preparedness; land use, buildings, and transportation structure; surface water management, freshwater quality, and water supply; economic, agricultural, and forestry impacts; and biodiversity and ecosystem resilience. The adaptation policies and recommendations highlight an emphasis on research, monitoring, and the application of climate science in planning and decisionmaking, the creation of flood control zones, the adoption of a flood hazard management plan, investment in reclaimed water from a water treatment facility to produce 7 million gallons of reclaimed water per day for irrigation and industry use, the implementation of a watershed-based habitat recovery plan, and increased monitoring of freshwater quality and sediment load.48

South Korean Mitigation Strategies for Addressing Climate Change

The ROK government established the Climate Change Committee (CCC) in April 1998 and since then has implemented four action plans. The committee, chaired by the prime minister, makes and monitors national action plans for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The first three action plan periods lasted three years starting from 1999. During the first national action plan

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(1999–2001), CCC established foundations in climate change policies and research and development (R&D) in mitigation technology, and assessed the Kyoto mechanism. During this period, South Korea accomplished twenty-seven tasks, including voluntary agreement with private companies and expansion of the renewable energy supply.49 During the second national action plan (2002–2004), CCC still focused on mitigation strategies, including GHG reduction strategies, GHG mitigation policies, and public participation. Climate adaptation strategies have been included in the third national action plan (2005–2007). The Lee Myung-bak administration announced “Low Carbon, Green Growth” as a new paradigm of national development during the country’s sixtieth anniversary of independence on August 15, 2008.50 In January 2009, in response to the deepening economic recession, the ROK government released an economic stimulus package of approximately US$38.1 billion. Eighty percent of this stimulus package was allocated to environmental sectors, the highest ratio among comparable packages compared with other G-20 governments. In July 2009, South Korea announced a Five-Year Green Growth Plan (5YGGP) for implementing green growth. This five-year plan, which amounts to 2 percent of South Korea’s GDP (US$83.6 billion), is expected to create 1.56 to 1.81 million green jobs in the next five years. Table 7.1 lists the main strategies and ten policy directions in South Korea’s Five-Year Green Growth Plan. Carbon Trading

Although South Korea is a non–annex 1 party among OECD countries, the ROK government announced its voluntary target for GHG emission reductions in August 2009. As part of a national consensus-building process, South Korea’s Presidential Committee on Green Growth announced three mitigation scenarios for 2020 in comparison with business-as-usual (BAU) scenarios. The first scenario seeks a reduction of 21 percent from BAU. This target, an 8 percent increase over the 2005 level, can be achieved through mostly implementing measures with short-term cost. The second scenario is the 27 percent reduction from BAU, the same emission level as 2005. To achieve that goal, additional measures will be needed with a mitigation cost of less than 50,000 Korean Won per ton of carbon dioxide. The third scenario is the most radical, decreasing emission levels by 30 percent from BAU. This is a 4 percent reduction from the 2005 level, which requires aggressive measures with high mitigation cost. This ambitious plan is currently in public review, seeking an

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Table 7.1 Three Strategies and Ten Policy Directions in South Korea’s Five-Year Green Growth Plan Strategies

Policy Directions

Measures for climate change and securing energy independence

Reduce carbon emissions Decrease energy dependence on oil and enhance energy self-sufficiency Support adaptation to climate change impacts

Creation of new growth engines

Develop green technologies as future growth engines Greening of industry Develop cutting-edge industries Set up policy infrastructure for green growth

Improving quality of life and strengthening the status of the country

Green city and green transport Green revolution in lifestyle Enhance national status as a global leader in green growth

Source: UN Environment Programme (UNEP), Green Economy Initiative, “Overview of the Republic of Korea’s Green Growth National Vision” (Geneva, Switzerland: UNEP, 2009), www.unep.ch/etb.

active participation of various stakeholders. The government plans to announce its final mitigation target by the end of 2009.51 While developing a GHG emission inventory and carbon trading system is voluntary in nature, some private companies develop these systems swiftly (e.g., LG chemical, SK energy). In October 2010, South Korea–based electronics company LG Electronics was recognized by Korea’s Carbon Disclosure Project as the country’s leading “green” company in terms of CO2 emissions. The company has pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 30 million tons annually between 2009 and 2020, a cumulative reduction of more than 200 million tons. Another incentive is a carbon point system that rewards monetary benefits to consumers who have reduced carbon dioxide emissions from the previous year. To be eligible for this program, consumers need to register as members at http://cpoint.or.kr. If a consumer uses less energy in the current month compared to the average usage of the same month in the previous year, the amount of reduction in GHG emission is automatically calculated and the customer will get points (e.g., 112 points per 1 m3 reduction of gas consumption). This point system has been implemented since 2008, applying to various utility bills, including electricity, water, and gas. As of August 2009, 145 local governments (of the 232 local governments in South Korea) are implementing this carbon

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point system. Each local government uses different methods for offering rewards within the carbon point system. Some local governments return cash to customers, while other governments offer a public transportation pass, gift card, and discounted parking pass. Another noteworthy achievement is the integration of a carbon point system and a carbon cash-back point system. The carbon cash-back point system has been implemented since May 2009 by the Ministry of Knowledge Economy. When consumers purchase low-carbon products or buy products from low-carbon facilities, they obtain carbon cashback points. Many private markets and banks are now participating in this program. The list of companies that produce low-carbon products is found at www.co2cashbag.com. The Ministry of Environment has an ambitious goal of increasing low-carbon products to 500 by 2012.52 Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), GHG emissions can be cut by a third by saving energy and using it efficiently. As a country heavily reliant on foreign oil, South Korea has strived to reduce its reliance on oil through enhancing energy self-sufficiency and increasing its share of renewable energy. Traditionally, however, industrial restructuring and climate mitigation strategies have been dealt with separately. As a result, many heavy industries that consume a large share of electricity and emit GHGs have been subsidized by the government, providing disincentives in investing in energy-efficient measures. As shown in Figure 7.1, the energy intensity of South Korea remained generally constant between 1980 and 2000, and has been above US levels since 1992. However, with the help of the general environmental movement and sophisticated IT technology, energy-efficient structures have been introduced in the industrial restructuring process in the last decade, contributing to a reduction in carbon intensity. Indeed, South Korea was praised for its smart grid (intelligent power system) during the G8 expanded meeting in Italy in 2008. As oil prices skyrocketed in 2008, the ROK government announced new targets of renewable energy supply. The main policies addressed in the new targets were increasing shares of renewable energy from electricity suppliers, expanding investment in renewable energy R&D, and increasing biodiesel supply in the transportation sector. While the first two policies have reasonable and achievable targets, the third policy has some problems in its implementation. Because biodiesel is mostly made from palm oil imported from Southeast Asia, it has its own environmental

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consequences, including carbon sequestration, in other countries that produced it. The development of renewable energy is also an important part of the 5YGGP. According to that plan, the share of new and renewable energy in total energy use is planned to increase from 2.7 percent (2009) to 3.78 percent (2013), and more than double to 6.08 percent (2020). As shown in Figure 7.5, since virtually all renewable energy is currently generated from waste, there is still a lot of room for the development of alternative forms of renewable energy. Since the initiation of 5YGGP, many green industries that produce windpower turbines, solar batteries, and LEDs have seen increases in their revenues. Some of their production revenues increased by 200 percent during the first quarter of 2009. Other major world banks, such as Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan, have increased investments in green industries in South Korea. For example, Goldman Sachs has invested approximately US$25 million in renewable-energy-producing companies in South Korea since 2007. JP Morgan announced its plan to establish a Korea Green Fund to invest US$100 million in green industries in June 2009.53 Urban Structure

While cities occupy just 2 percent of the world’s landmass, more than half of the world’s population lives in cities. Cities are also main sources

Figure 7.5 South Korean Energy Consumption by Type, 2007

Coal 25% Wind 1.3%

Petroleum 44%

Solar Thermal 0.6%

Hydroelectric 22.6%

Firewood and Renewable 2% Nuclear 15% Natural Gas 14%

Photovoltaic 0.2% Biomass 4.1% Waste 71.2% 71.3%

Source: Korea Energy Economics Institute, Korea Energy Statistical Information, Seoul, Korea, 2008.

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of GHG emissions, using more than two-thirds of world energy. As the urban population is projected to grow continuously to 70 percent by 2050, it is imperative to devise a plan that minimizes environmental impacts and benefits economies. One such strategy was initiated by the Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI). CCI developed a Climate Positive Development Plan in collaboration with the US Green Building Council (USGBC). Seoul participated in this plan, along with fifteen other cities around the world. The emphasis of this plan is to reduce the net GHG emissions to below zero, which means that property developers and local governments will need to work together to design and implement new urban design and planning schemes. This strategy illustrates the urgent need for integrated urban planning that encompasses energy, water, waste, transportation, and lighting systems.54 One study shows that Seoul would fall short of meeting the Kyoto Protocol because current intervention strategies would result in GHG emission reductions of 2.1 million metric tons, below the target annual carbon dioxide emission reduction goal of 3.4 million metric tons. The required additional GHG emission reduction can be met by adopting new energy-efficient-building standards.55 Transportation Sector

The transportation sector contributes to more than 20 percent of total carbon dioxide emissions in South Korea. The number of passenger cars has increased more than 200 percent in the last two decades, notably in urban areas. Similar to the United States, one way to reduce GHG emission in the transportation sector is to increase vehicle efficiency. To moderate vehicle emissions, new vehicle regulations will be implemented and less polluting vehicles promoted. In this way, as much as 600,000 additional tons of carbon dioxide emissions will be prevented. First initiated in the capital city, Seoul, many city buses are now being converted to use liquefied natural gas that emits less GHG than dieselburning buses. Additionally, 7,920 hybrid cars, 1,750 fuel cell vehicles, and 13,080 natural gas buses and cleaning vehicles will be on roadways by 2012. South Korea has an ambitious goal of becoming a world leader in the green car industry. By 2013 when the 5YGGP ends, South Korea expects to be one of four leading countries along with the United States, Germany, and Japan.56 The ROK government also provides incentives to encourage the use of electric cars. Since 2009, when customers purchase hybrid cars, they can save up to approximately US$3,000 in tax rebates. Additionally,

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some banks developed a new green account such as a “low-carbon green account” or green world account. If people sign up for using public transportation or bicycles when they open a bank account, they can obtain a lower interest rate on a credit card or some bank fees can be waived. Some of the interest benefits will be donated to environmental organizations. It is anticipated that such incentives would increase the use of bicycles from 1.5 percent in 2009 to 5 percent in 2013. The ROK government also initiated new incentives in August 2009 as part of the 2009 tax reform. These green accounts will be tax-exempt for interest earned up to US$3,000.57 Another strategy to reduce GHG emissions is to increase the share of public transportation. With high population density and compact city structure, most major cities in South Korea have phenomenal public transportation systems. With the scale of economy, public transportation fare is relatively cheap (e.g., round-trip ticket for the subway in Seoul is less than US$1). According to 5YGGP, public transportation will increase to 55 percent of total transport use by 2013. To achieve that goal, the use of trains would increase from 19 percent to 30 percent between 2009 and 2013. Bicycle use will be promoted with the construction of 3,114 kilometers of additional bicycle lanes nationwide in the next ten years. Approximately 1,700 kilometers of bicycle lanes will be constructed along the river corridors as part of the four major river (the Han, Geum, Nakdong, and Yeongsan) restoration project. The restoration project was originally initiated as part of the “Green New Deal” policy in January 2009 and later included in the 5YGGP with total funding of approximately US$17.5 billion.58 Carbon Sink Through Forestation Efforts

Approximately 70 percent of South Korean land is covered by forests, making it relatively well protected during the last four decades. South Korea’s national forests had been mostly destroyed during the Korean War, but the ROK government in the 1960s initiated an aggressive reforestation plan. The establishment of national parks and forests has helped prevent illegal logging in forests, while the establishment of greenbelts around major cities has served to prevent urban sprawl to adjacent rural areas. However, according to a study by Choi and Chang, although the carbon uptake of South Korean forests was high (with an average removal efficiency of 12 percent), it was offset by dramatic increases in fossil fuel burning between 1973 and 2002.59 Forest fires, typically occurring during the spring dry season, are an additional source of carbon

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emissions in South Korea, as witnessed in the 2000 forest fire. As most climate change simulation studies project increasing frequency of forest fires in the future, it is imperative to establish comprehensive forest management plans. Although not explicitly stated in 5YGGP, there are plans to increase forested and wetland areas to absorb carbon more efficiently. One plan is to quantify the ecosystem services value of national forest, urban forest, and agricultural lands in terms of carbon sinks to prioritize areas for conservation. Another plan is to increase internationally registered wetlands from thirteen in 2009 to seventeen in 2013. Related to this plan is restoration of urban streams that have been either covered by concrete or degraded by urban development. The plan is to restore riparian vegetation from 1,800 ha in 2009 to 2,500 ha in 2013, increasing the proportion of ecological streams from 60 percent to 70 percent by 2013. Altogether, South Korea aims to increase the capacity of national forest resources from 862 million m 3 to 953 million m 3 (10.6 percent increase) in undertaking the forest protection and forest ecosystem management programs.60 There are also plans to establish a foundation for more environmentally friendly agriculture that captures methane more efficiently and to recover methane generated from landfills. To achieve this goal more efficiently, multiscale assessment is needed by combining national-scale forestry inventory with locally specific forest and wetland management.

South Korean Adaptation Strategies for Addressing Climate Change

As South Korea will clearly be affected by climate change, the ROK government and its associated research institutes have expanded research on climate change impacts and adaptation in recent years. Under the Fourth National Action Plan for Climate Change (2008–2012), there are two central climate adaptation strategies in South Korea. One is to strengthen capacity by increasing the role of local government and by nationwide public campaigning. The second is to establish and implement a sectoral adaptation plan. To establish a sectoral adaptation plan, the first task is to quantify the impact of climate change by sector. Accordingly, it is necessary to improve the forecast of long-term climate change in South Korea. To achieve this task, such governmental agencies as the National Institute of Environment Research (NIER) and National Institute of Meteorological Research (NIMR) have been working

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on improving projections of future climate change using cutting-edge General Circulation Model (GCM) downscaling methods. These highresolution climate change scenarios have been used in climate change impact assessment in various sectors and geographical areas. A geographical approach is complementary to a sectoral approach as impact assessment is essentially a crosscutting theme, and in local places climate adaptation actions take place more efficiently. Accordingly in South Korea, four geographical areas—coastal areas, urban areas, agricultural areas, and forested areas—have been suggested for spatially explicit climate change impact assessment. This approach is similar to the one used in the US National Climate Change Impact Assessment conducted during the Bill Clinton administration in the 1990s. Some local governments have taken swift actions to address the impact of and adaptation to climate change. For example, in 2006 the city of Seoul, where a quarter of South Korea’s population resides, became a member of C40, a group of the world’s largest cities committed to tackling climate change. To combat climate change, Seoul has launched a comprehensive climate change action plan called the “Save Our Seoul (SOS)” project. The SOS project has three main components: “(1) development of infrastructure to create a basic foundation for the measures, (2) GHG mitigation to restrain climate change phenomena, and (3) climate change adaptation measures to minimize the impact on the citizens.”61 Climate mitigation strategies are being realized through new policies in the building, transportation, and energy sectors. First, the Building Retrofit Project will reduce GHG emissions by increasing energy efficiency in public and private buildings. The city of Seoul and the Clinton Climate Initiative have signed a mutual agreement to work on this issue. Second, Seoul will further encourage the use of public transportation. Seoul has seen a 10 percent annual reduction in carbon dioxide emissions after the implementation of the voluntary “Weekly No Driving Program,” although the number of private cars has increased. Additionally, carbon dioxide emissions will be further reduced by creating an eco-friendly transportation system that expands bus lanes, compressed natural gas (CNG) buses, and bicycle lanes. Third, Seoul plans to expand the use of renewable energy. It has plans to construct the world’s largest hydrogen fuel cell power plants in the southwestern and northwestern parts of Seoul and a solar power plant at the World Cup Park. Climate adaptation strategies include reducing flood risks, mitigation of urban heat island effects, efficient urban water management, and public health and education.62 For example, the Star City rainwater har-

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vesting system, which has been operating in forty-seven cities in South Korea since 2008, has demonstrated that the system saves water, mitigates floods, and reduces the energy requirement of water transfer by increasing efficiency. This suggests that the rainwater harvesting system may also serve as a climate change adaptation strategy.63

International Cooperation

International cooperation involving the United States has been most successful when it strikes a balance between the domestic development agenda and reducing GHG emissions. Historically, the United States has sought cooperation with other nations to advance research on global climate change, collaborate on the development of energy efficiency and carbon sequestration technologies, deploy climate observation systems, and improve methods of emissions monitoring and measurement.64 In 2002 the United States and South Korea established a cooperative relationship utilizing the structure established by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The dialogue between the two nations reflected the international cooperation goals stated above, focused on increasing clean and renewable sources of energy, improving efficiency and conservation, advancing renewable technology and implementation, capturing and utilizing heat waste and methane emissions from landfills, and monitoring and measuring climate change in the Pacific Rim. A review of bilateral climate change agreements and cooperation strategies for reducing GHG emissions provides insight into areas of technology advancement, policy creation and implementation, and green economy building that should be prioritized in US-ROK cooperation. Two relevant partnerships aiming to mitigate the impacts of climate change through comprehensive recommended plans of action exist between the UK and South Korea65 and between the United States and China.66 In 2003 the Strategic Programme Fund (SPF) was established to support the goal of the UK government to promote a low-carbon, high-growth global economy through support of international climate security, energy security, and economic reform projects.67 The SPF programs in Korea partner with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and key businesses and industries—including Samsung and LG, and retail giants E-Mart and Tesco—to accelerate South Korean business investment toward a low-carbon future coupled with higher diversity and reliability of energy supply. Current projects include promoting cost-

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effective cap and trade policy in South Korea, establishing a business forum for climate change, developing industry-wide carbon footprint labeling and government incentives for low-carbon products, and increasing South Korean business participation in the Carbon Disclosure Project.68 Growing cooperation between the United States and China represents a primarily NGO-driven partnership model rather than a legislative model. A partnership between the US-based Carnegie Endowment and Beijing’s Global Environmental Institute facilitates informal discussion between US and Chinese energy experts and political leaders, promoting two priorities for future cooperation: increasing consumption of existing energy efficiency technology and promoting joint development of energy technologies, specifically carbon capture and storage and fuel economy.69 International cooperation between the Asia Society and US Pew Center has produced the Initiative for US-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate, which recommends enhancing the diversity, reliability, independence, and renewable capacity of both nations’ energy supplies, while laying the foundation for a prosperous, low-carbon economy.70 The US National Resources Defense Council released key recommendations for strengthening relations between the United States and China, which urge engagement in serious bilateral meetings on climate change, promotion of green jobs and high-efficiency vehicles and transportation systems, expansion of GHG monitoring, and increased investment in research on carbon capture and storage technology.71 The World Resources Institute (WRI) highlighted the lack of a strong and consistent national US policy focused on clear goals for international cooperation with China.72 A policy brief released by the WRI advocates for the establishment of a long-term legislative partnership between the United States and China focused on technology development and deployment, policymaking, and strengthening GHG monitoring.73 Given China’s current supply of North Korea’s energy and food, it is necessary to consider China’s climate policy, which is closely associated with food and energy production, in developing the US-ROK alliance in climate policy. The goals of the international cooperation currently occurring between the UK and South Korea and between the United States and China reveal important themes that should be prioritized in bilateral climate policy efforts between the United States and South Korea. The aforementioned partnerships have achieved measurable success and integrate key leaders from business, industry, and technology development with policymakers from governmental and nongovernmental agencies.

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Areas of future cooperation should include strong incentives to curb carbon emissions through tax credits for consumers and producers; expansion of a safe and convenient public transportation system; investment in alternative forms of renewable energy; compact, dense, and livable urban development; and forestation. As climate mitigation and adaptation action can take place most efficiently at the local level,74 it is important to share information and experiences regarding climate change issues among cities in both countries. For example, cities that are similar in size and facing similar problems (e.g., flooding, saltwater intrusion) can work together to develop intelligent strategies to combat climate change. More broadly, not only cities in the United States and South Korea but also cities in China and Japan could exchange resources and information about climate action plans through multilevel governance to make climate-resilient cities, which will help achieve the economic, social, and environmental sustainability of the affected cities.75 As a bilateral relationship between the United States and South Korea continues to develop, open dialogue between business and government will be crucial to ensure that policy meets climate security and economic security goals in both countries and beyond. Incorporating representatives from business and industry in future US-ROK climate change agreements will also be essential to realizing the potential for joint development and deployment of energy technology, encouraging expanded emissions monitoring and reporting, and implementing successful, cost-effective cap-and-trade markets. Finally, bilateral policy decisions between the United States and South Korea should include transparent and consistent goals with realistic timelines for completion and robust sources of funding to guarantee policy implementation and project completion.

Notes 1. Susan Solomon et al., Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 2. Ibid. 3. Climate Research Lab, Understanding Climate Change in Korea: Present and Future (Seoul: National Institute of Meteorological Research, Korea Meteorological Administration, 2009). 4. National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Satellite and Information Service, National Climatic Data Center, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov. 5. US Environmental Protection Agency, “Inventory of US Greenhouse Gas

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Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2007,” EPA 430-R-09-004, April 15, 2009, http://www.epa.gov. 6. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 2007, http://unfccc.int. 7. Solomon et al., Climate Change 2007; US Climate Action Partnership (USCAP), “A Blueprint for Legislative Action: Consensus Recommendations for US Climate Protection Legislation,” January 2009, http://www.pewclimate.org. 8. Chris Ryan, “Climate Change and Ecodesign: Part I: The Focus Shifts to Systems,” Journal of Industrial Ecology, vol. 12, no. 2 (April 2008), pp. 140– 143. 9. Ronald F. Abler, Global Change and Local Places: Estimating, Understanding, and Reducing Greenhouse Gases, Association of American Geographers Global Change and Local Places Research Group (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 10. City of Portland and Multnomah County, Climate Action Plan, 2009, http://www.portlandonline.com; Chris Ryan, “Climate Change and Ecodesign, Part II: Exploring Distributed Systems,” Journal of Industrial Ecology, vol. 13, no. 3 (June 2009), pp. 350–353. 11. Solomon et al., Climate Change 2007; Elisabeth M. Hamin and Nicole Gurran, “Urban Form and Climate Change: Balancing Adaptation and Mitigation in the US and Australia,” Habitat International, vol. 33, no. 3 (July 2009), pp. 238–245. 12. Benjamin Habib, “Climate Change and Regime Perpetuation in North Korea,” Asian Survey, vol. 50, no. 2 (2010), pp. 378–401. 13. Douglas Farr, Sustainable Urbanism: Urban Design with Nature (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2008). 14. Reid Ewing et al., Growing Cooler: The Evidence on Urban Development and Climate Change (Washington, DC: Urban Land Institute, 2008). 15. Md Rumi Shammin and Clark W. Bullard, “Impact of Cap-and-Trade Policies for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions on US Households,” Ecological Economics, vol. 68, nos. 8–9 (2009), pp. 2432–2438; US Climate Action Partnership, “A Blueprint for Legislative Action.” 16. Assembly Bill No. 32 (AB 32): California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov. 17. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) website, http:// www.rggi.org. 18. Assembly Bill No. 32: California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006. 19. Official energy statistics from the US Energy Information Administration, 2007, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energy_in_brief/renewable_energy.cfm. 20. US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2010. 21. US Environmental Protection Agency, “Clean Energy–Environment Guide to Action: Policies, Best Practices and Action Steps for States,” April 2006. 22. Federal tax credits for energy efficiency. See Energy Star website, http://www.energystar.gov. 23. California Energy Commission, 2009. See Flex Your Power website, http://www.fypower.org.

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24. US Department of Energy, “Obama Administration Offers $59 Million in Conditional Loan Guarantees,” press release, July 2, 2009, http://www .lgprogram.energy.gov. 25. Farr, Sustainable Urbanism. 26. Ibid. 27. Brian Stone Jr., Adam C. Mednick, Tracey Holloway, and Scott N. Spak, “Mobile Source CO2 Mitigation Through Smart Growth Development and Vehicle Fleet Hybridization,” Environmental Science and Technology, vol. 43, no. 6 (2009), pp. 1704–1710. 28. Ewing et al., Growing Cooler. 29. Ibid. 30. Arthur C. Nelson, “Leadership in a New Era: Comment on ‘Planning Leadership in a New Era,’ Journal of the American Planning Association, vol. 72, no. 4 (December 2006), pp. 393–409; and Ewing et al., Growing Cooler. 31. Ewing et al., Growing Cooler. 32. Ibid. 33. Farr, Sustainable Urbanism. 34. Ewing et al., Growing Cooler. 35. Ambarish Chandra, Sumeet Gulati, and Milind Kandlikar, “Green Drivers or Free Riders? An Analysis of Tax Rebates for Hybrid Vehicles,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 60, no. 2 (2010), pp. 78–93. 36. Kenneth A. Small and Kurt Van Dender, “Fuel Efficiency and Motor Vehicle Travel: The Declining Rebound Effect,” Energy Journal, vol. 28, no. 1 (2007), pp. 25–51. 37. US Department of State, US Climate Action Report 2010, Washington, DC, June 2010, http://www.state.gov. 38. Ibid. 39. City of Portland and Multnomah County Climate Action Plan 2009, http://www.portlandonline.com. 40. Ibid. 41. Richard J. T. Klein, E.Lisa F. Schipper, and Suraje Dessai, “Integrating Mitigation and Adaptation into Climate and Development Policy: Three Research Questions,” Environmental Science and Policy, vol. 8, no. 6 (December 2005), pp. 579–588; G. Robbert Biesbroek, Rob J. Swart, and Wim G. M. van der Knaap, “The Mitigation-Adaptation Dichotomy and the Role of Spatial Planning,” Habitat International, vol. 33, no. 3 (July 2009), pp. 230–237; Hamin and Gurran, “Urban Form and Climate Change”; Casilda Saavedra and William Budd, “Climate Change and Environmental Planning: Working to Build Community Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Washington State, USA,” Habitat International, vol. 33, no. 3 (July 2009), pp. 246– 252. 42. Saavedra and Budd, “Climate Change and Environmental Planning.” 43. Abler, Global Change and Local Places. 44. Ryan, “Climate Change and Ecodesign, Part II”; US Environmental Protection Agency, “Climate Change: Health and Environmental Effects,” http://epa.gov. 45. Ryan, “Climate Change and Ecodesign, Part II.” 46. Hamin and Gurran, “Urban Form and Climate Change.” 47. Ibid.

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48. 2007 King County Climate Plan, February 2007, http://your.kingcounty .gov; Saavedra and Budd, “Climate Change and Environmental Planning.” 49. Government of the Republic of Korea, The Second National Communication of the Republic of Korea Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2003. 50. Lee Myung-bak, “A Great People with New Dreams,” Address by President Lee Myung-bak on the Sixty-third Anniversary of National Liberation and the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Founding of the Republic of Korea, August 15, 2008, http://english.president.go.kr. 51. UN Environment Programme (UNEP), Overview of the Republic of Korea’s Green Growth National Vision: An Interim Report, United Nations Environment Programme as part of its Green Economy Initiative, Geneva, Switzerland, 2009. 52. Ministry of Environment in Korea, 2009, http://www.mi.go.kr. 53. See Green Growth Korea, 2009, http://www.greengrowth.go.kr. 54. “Korea: Clinton Climate Initiative to Demonstrate Model for Sustainable Urban Growth with Projects in 10 Countries on Six Continents” (Toronto: Port of Entry, May 20, 2009), http://www.portofentry.com. 55. J. H. Jo, J. S. Golden, and S. W. Shin, “Incorporating Built Environment Factors into Climate Change Mitigation Strategies for Seoul, South Korea: A Sustainable Urban Systems Framework,” Habitat International, vol. 33, no. 3 (July 2009), pp. 267–275. 56. Green Growth Korea. 57. Ibid. 58. UNEP, Overview of the Republic of Korea’s Green Growth National Vision. 59. S-D Choi and Y-S Chang, “Evaluation of Carbon Uptake and Emissions by Forests in Korea During the Last Thirty Years (1973–2002),” Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, vol. 117, nos. 1–3 (2006): pp. 99–107. 60. Green Growth Korea. 61. Y-H Kim, “Green Growth: Korea’s New Strategy,” Korea Herald News, March 25, 2009, http://www.koreaherald.co.kr. 62. Ibid. 63. M. Y. Han and J. S Mun, “Operational Data of the Star City Rainwater Harvesting System and Its Role as a Climate Change Adaptation and a Social Influence,” Water Science and Technology, vol. 63, no. 12 (2011), pp. 2796– 2801. 64. US Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change—US Climate Policy: Bilateral Partnerships and Activities, April 2011, http://www.epa.gov. 65. British Embassy in the Republic of Korea, Climate Section in British Embassy, Seoul, 2009, http://ukinkorea.fco.gov.uk. 66. Asia Society and Pew Center on Global Climate Change, A Roadmap for US-China on Energy and Climate Change, 2009, http://www.asiasociety.org; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Xie Zhenhua, and Maria Cantwell, US-China Climate Change Cooperation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 18, 2009, http://carnegieendowment.org; National Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Strengthening US-China Climate Change and Energy Engagement, 2009, http://docs.nrdc.org; Deborah Seligsohn et al., “China, the

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United States, and the Climate Challenge,” World Resources Institute Policy Brief, World Resources Institute, October 2009, http://pdf.wri.org. 67. British Embassy in the Republic of Korea, Climate Section in British Embassy, Seoul. 68. Ibid. 69. Mathews, Xie, and Cantwell, US-China Climate Change Cooperation. 70. Asia Society and Pew Center on Global Climate Change, A Roadmap for US-China on Energy and Climate Change. 71. NRDC, Strengthening US-China Climate Change and Energy Engagement. 72. Seligsohn et al., “China, the United States, and the Climate Challenge.” 73. Ibid. 74. H. Chang and L. House-Peters, “Cities as Place for Climate Mitigation and Adaptation: A Case Study of Portland, Oregon, USA,” Journal of Korean Geographic Society, vol. 45, no. 1 (2010), pp. 49–74. 75. Miranda A. Schreurs, “Multi-Level Governance and Global Climate Change in East Asia,” Asian Economic Policy Review, vol. 5, no. 1 (2010), pp. 88–105.

8 Peacekeeping Balbina Y. Hwang

THE YEAR 2010 WAS DIFFICULT FOR INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS, with two particularly bold provocations by North Korea—the sinking of an ROK naval vessel Cheonan in March, and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November—marking a return in inter-Korean relations to the dark days before the advent of the Sunshine policy in 2000. Yet, ironically, 2010 was also one of the strongest years in the US-ROK alliance after several particularly rocky years since 2002. While North Korea’s continued belligerence and recalcitrant behavior have certainly been dominant drivers in unifying the interests of the two allies, Washington and Seoul’s efforts to build common interests beyond the Korean peninsula have also been important factors in strengthening the alliance relationship and expanding areas of future cooperation. While the Korean peninsula has always maintained a steady position in Washington’s global and regional strategies, Seoul’s perception of its own role in contributing to stability beyond the peninsula has changed in recent years commensurate with profound changes that the nation itself has experienced. And while North Korea and the existential threat it continues to pose to South Korea remain predominant in the ROK’s strategic priorities, Seoul has in recent years exhibited efforts that offer intriguing possibilities for it to truly fulfill its national goal of becoming a “global Korea.” One of these has been South Korea’s growing interest and participation in peacekeeping activities around the globe.

Alliance Expansion and PKO: The US Perspective

Long before September 11, 2001, the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War propelled the United States and its partners 173

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around the world to contemplate the proper role of alliances in the new world order. But in the aftermath of the precipitous events of 9/11, the United States expedited efforts to seek changes in existing alliance structures to meet counterterrorism and proliferation priorities. One consequence of the new approach was the worldwide realignment of the US armed forces, dictated by the Global Defense Posture Review and the Integrated Global Presence and Base Strategy, resulting in the restructuring of overseas US military units to enable them to deploy rapidly in the event of regional crises. The focus on global capabilities is critical because one of the greatest challenges in countering global terrorism is the impossibility of a single country alone confronting transnational threats—such as nuclear proliferation, genocide, communicable diseases, climate change, and desperate poverty among the world’s most vulnerable people—any of which can threaten global stability and security. In an attempt to address these issues, the “Group of Eight” (G8), during their summit at Sea Island in 2004, identified peacekeeping and peacebuilding as an area of concern to the international community, requiring collective, coherent, and coordinated action.1 The leaders also agreed to a landmark focus on the training of peacekeeping troops with a particular focus on Africa, and produced an extensive set of commitments that were to be achieved by 2010. This agreement recognized that the number of peace support operations throughout the world continues to grow, but there is a lack of welltrained and equipped units able to respond to these increased demands. The G8 leaders adopted an “Action Plan on Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations.” The plan would articulate a strategic vision and an integrated approach on activities ranging from peacekeeping to postconflict stabilization, and would address the involvement, as needed, of military, police, judicial, and other civilian components that are fully interoperable and possess a common mandate and objectives.2 In the months following the G8 summit, the US government established the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) to expand on the goals of the Sea Island Action Plan. Since its establishment, GPOI has provided peace support operations, training, and nonlethal equipment for the militaries of fifty-six partner countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Central/South America, as well as staff training, technical assistance, equipment, and building refurbishments for two regional headquarters and twenty-three peace support operations training centers.3 GPOI capacity-building activities are implemented through partnerships

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between the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense, with US combatant commands playing important implementing roles. The United States surpassed its commitment adopted at the G8 Sea Island summit to train and equip 75,000 new peacekeepers to be able to participate in peacekeeping operations (PKO) worldwide by 2010. The Department of State’s GPOI succeeded in training and equipping more than 81,000 new peacekeepers, and facilitated the deployment of nearly 50,000 peacekeepers to twenty UN and regional peace support operations to secure the peace and protect at-risk populations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, and Sudan.4 The GPOI embarked on its second phase in 2009,5 shifting the focus from providing direct training to increasing the self-sufficiency of partner countries to conduct sustainable, indigenous peace support operations training on their own. In doing so, GPOI helped partner countries achieve full operational capability in peace support operations training and consequently develop stronger partners in the shared goal of promoting peace and stability in postconflict societies.6 Barack Obama’s administration has shifted the emphasis toward working with the UN on peacekeeping challenges. Clearly, in an era of transnational security threats, the UN is an essential forum for addressing global challenges that undermine US national security, as well as a centerpiece in securing American interests as part of the Obama administration’s “new era of engagement.” Effective UN peacekeeping efforts directly serve US national security interests since these operations help protect civilians, stabilize fragile peace settlements, and prevent regional conflicts from spinning out of control and producing humanitarian disasters, flows of illicit arms, state failures, and lawless areas that can become safe havens for terrorists and drug traffickers.7 UN PKO are also cost-effective for the United States: instead of paying 100 percent of the costs for a unilateral deployment, the United States pays about one-fourth of the costs for UN PKO missions, with other UN members collectively sharing the burden for the rest. As of July 2011 there were sixteen UN PKO missions deployed on four continents, with more than 99,600 troops and police from 115 countries.8 Nevertheless, the inadequacy of UN PKO efforts in meeting global needs is clearly revealed by the reality that numerous non-UN actors have stepped in to conduct peace operations, often without the Security Council’s authorization.9 Such efforts seem to demonstrate the regionalization of peace operations, but in fact, as Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams demonstrate, efforts have defied this trend by often going “out-of-area,” and non-UN peace operations are often conducted by

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individual states and “coalitions of the willing.” Moreover, Bellamy and Williams note, such a development does not necessarily challenge international society’s fundamental norm of nonintervention without hoststate consent, as might be expected.10 Other peacekeeping efforts have sought UN legitimization but stopped short of actual UN operationalization. In Afghanistan, for example, a UNSC mandate in December 2001 established the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to promote security and development in that country. Today NATO commands a force of 56,000, comprising military personnel from forty-one countries and led by the United States. The Obama administration, like George W. Bush’s administration before it, continues to actively seek support from America’s Asian allies, including South Korea, to stabilize Afghanistan’s political, security, and economic environment. Despite a US presence in Afghanistan and Iraq for over ten years, or perhaps because of it, one of the most pressing goals of the Obama administration is to avoid prolonged and costly engagement of US ground forces. Yet the security goals of the United States in Afghanistan will continue for the foreseeable future, and as such, US policymakers will seek to augment their efforts with the security forces of allied partners. In addition to the constraints on US forces and the waning domestic support to sustain them is the difficulty that the United States faces in large parts of the Muslim world. With its leadership diminished and moral legitimacy in question, cooperation with allies and among coalitions is seen as a preferred solution to global challenges such as the reconstruction of Afghanistan and long-term stabilization of Pakistan.11

The ROK’s PKO Experience

UN-led PKO began as an effort by the international community to manage complex crises that pose threats to international peace and security, and have since evolved into one of its main tools to achieve stability. It first operated in Palestine with the establishment of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1948. Over the next six decades, a total of one million troops representing 120 countries have taken part in sixty-three UN-led PKO, and currently there are almost 116,000 personnel serving in sixteen different peace operations.12 The ROK’s active participation in PKO started more recently, beginning with an engineering battalion dispatched to Somalia in 1993. Since then, the ROK has

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deployed approximately 5,000 service members to 16 countries; today South Korea remains active in nine operations (Tables 8.1 and 8.2). In addition to activities explicitly organized under a UN command—which are usually limited to monitoring areas of conflict—the ROK has been an active participant in operations coordinated under multinational forces (MNF), which have included direct involvement in the settlement of conflicts and reconstruction efforts. While these are technically not “peacekeeping operations,” reconstruction and stabilization efforts led by the United States have been considered under the broad umbrella of PKO by both the ROK government and the general South Korean public.13 The two largest of such operations have been

Table 8.1 South Korean Contributions to Overseas Combat Operations Operation

Dates

Contribution

Vietnam War Gulf War (Desert Shield/Desert Storm) Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates

1965–1973 1991

312,853 troops 154 medical support personnel 160 air force transport groups

Source: ROK Ministry of National Defense, White Paper, May 2009.

Table 8.2 South Korean Contributions to Peacekeeping, Reconstruction, and Stabilization Operations Operation

Type

Date

Contribution

Somalia East Timor Angola Georgia Western Sahara Kashmir Afghanistan

UN PKO UN PKO UN PKO UN PKO UN PKO UN PKO MNF-UNIFIL PRT UN PKO

1993–1994 1993–2004 1995–1997 1994–2010 1994–present 1994–present 2001–2007 2010–present 2002–2003

UN PKO UN PKO MNF UN PKO UN PKO UN PKO UN PKO UN Stabilization Mission

2003–present 2004–2006 2004–2008 2005–present 2007–present 2007–present 2009–present

516 engineers 3,244 troops 600 troops 98 observer troops 542 medical support personnel 126 observer troops 1,000 troops in OEF 460 troops ROK general as commander of UNPKF 10 observer troops 5 observer troops 3,600 troops 24 observer troops 4 observer troops 359 troops 2 observer troops

2010–present

240 engineers

Cyprus Liberia Burundi Iraq Sudan Nepal Lebanon Côte d’Ivoire Haiti

Source: ROK Ministry of National Defense, White Paper, May 2010.

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Iraq and Afghanistan, which represent the most visible and tangible contributions by the ROK to international coalition efforts and to its alliance with the United States. South Korea was one of the first countries to join Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan in late 2001, with the deployment of C-130 aircraft and a logistical support team. Concurrently Seoul also allocated tens of millions of dollars to finance Afghan reconstruction and development. And in August 2004 the deployment of more than 3,600 ROK forces represented the second largest military presence in Iraq— second only to Great Britain—consisting of combat troops, medical teams, and engineers. In fact, the ROK has contributed far more toward global security and stability operations than it often receives credit for, having deployed more than 325,000 South Korean troops in total to twenty-two trouble spots in support of a variety of US, UN, and other international missions. For the last several decades, the ROK has been one of the most consistent supporters of US-led security operations, contributing substantial troops to the Vietnam War, the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq, and Afghanistan. And in the peacekeeping realm South Korea has participated in areas as diverse as Somalia, East Timor, Angola, Western Sahara, Georgia, Kashmir, Cyprus, and Lebanon. Some of these activities have produced significant impact beyond what the absolute contribution may indicate. For example, the South Korean presence in Cyprus was a single position, but it was the first time that an ROK officer had been in the lead command of a UN Peacekeeping Force (UNPKF), bringing both unprecedented prestige and invaluable experience to the ROK military leadership.14 And in Lebanon, while the 350 troops dispatched only comprise a small percentage of the total 15,000 UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the ROK is the only formal treaty ally of the United States in UNIFIL and thus a key strategic partner vis-à-vis US interests, given that the United States does not have a military presence in Lebanon.15 Korean activities in PKO have included humanitarian and medical assistance; maintenance of public order; election supervision; reconstruction of nations suffering from civil war, genocide, and famine; rebuilding public facilities; building new public facilities; and armistice monitoring, patrol, inspection, and mediation. Beyond active participation, the ROK’s financial contributions make it the tenth-largest donor to the UN in the world (US$100 million annually).16 And beyond active deployment, the ROK has expanded cooperation and training exercises by dispatching a platoon of marines to participate for the first time in a

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multinational peacekeeping exercise held in Mongolia in August 2009; the ROK had previously participated in this annual “Khan Quest” exercise since 2006 but only as an observer, sending working-level officers.17 South Korea’s experience with PKO has been largely successful, and considered valuable and worthy activities by ROK officials. The South Korean public, however, has been less than enthusiastic, particularly regarding the two largest MNF operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The deployment of the Zaytun Unit to Iraq ultimately became a symbol of national pride by most South Koreans due to the unit’s exemplary performance during its service in the Arbil Province of northern Iraq.18 One ROK commander’s personal handbook detailing guidelines for operating in Iraq was even translated into English and distributed to other coalition forces as a model for success. But the public’s somewhat begrudging approval came only as the mission ended, and was a dramatic turnabout from the tremendous criticism that had initially been heaped on the Roh Moo-hyun administration for committing ROK troops to the US-led stabilization effort in Iraq. The ROK deployment to Afghanistan in support of the MNF (2001– 2007) led by the ISAF19 also proved to be a valuable experience for its duration but was highly controversial back home and ultimately ended prematurely due to a public uproar. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in December 2001 created ISAF in response to UN Security Council Resolution mandates.20 ISAF was NATO’s first and largest ground operation outside Europe and as of June 2009 comprised over 61,000 personnel from forty-two different countries. ISAF is led by NATO commanders but since its inception has created a multinational framework that allows smaller nations to take a prominent role in the reconstruction effort. In total the ROK dispatched 780 military medical personnel who provided medical services to a total of 23,000 residents and allied forces. In addition, 1,332 military engineering support personnel successfully implemented construction efforts.21 The South Korean public, however, largely overlooked these successes. From the beginning, the Roh administration had little public support for the deployment of ROK troops to Afghanistan, with most viewing the decision as a “demand” from the United States as a quid pro quo of the alliance. Reflecting similar anti-US sentiments seen elsewhere in the world at the time, many South Koreans considered Afghanistan and al-Qaeda as an “American problem” and a battle in which they did not want to become embroiled. South Korean criticism

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The US–South Korea Alliance

of its government’s decision to continue the mission in Afghanistan steadily grew to a crisis point on July 19, 2007, when twenty-three South Korean missionaries were captured and held hostage by the Taliban.22 Two of the hostages were brutally beheaded before a deal was reached in August between the Taliban and the ROK government in which South Korea agreed to withdraw its force of 200 troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2007. This tragic and unfortunate incident caused further friction in the alliance relationship as South Koreans demanded that the United States do more to resolve the issue, while Washington remained firm on its policy of not negotiating with terrorists. Ultimately, this episode rattled South Korean confidence and prompted much national soul-searching about its presence overseas,23 while Washington learned to approach any future discussions about ROK contributions with utmost sensitivity. The lesson learned by both countries was that without proper management, the alliance could readily fall victim to events related to PKO decisions. Indeed, recent experience under two new administrations in Seoul and Washington—Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama, respectively— has shown that prioritization of alliance management can, under strong leadership, sway public opinion and promote solid support for new areas of engagement. Seoul’s decision in late 2009 to redeploy a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) of approximately 460 troops to Afghanistan by mid-2010 was a clear recognition by the Lee administration that such a move would not only be in the country’s national interest but boost US commitment to South Korea’s defense.

The Rationale for ROK PKO Participation

To date, the strongest argument made in public debates for South Korean participation in PKO has been that doing so will help maintain and enhance the US-ROK alliance. Embedded in this logic is the implication that the ROK is following US direction rather than perceiving any real independent value from such endeavors. Furthermore, achievement of South Korean national interests is secondary to the primary goal of preserving the alliance relationship with the United States; in other words, PKO are but one utilitarian tool of alliance management. This may indeed have been the driving motivation in the past to justify politically sensitive PKO activities, particularly to a skeptical public. If so, however, ROK leaders would do better in the future to validate these operations through a framework that clearly articulates and demonstrates how they directly

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contribute to South Korean national interests and goals. Not doing so undermines the very principles upon which the joint vision for the alliance is based, but also endangers its successful pursuit over the long term. The rationale for South Korean participation in multinational PKO encompasses a wide range of national interests, including contributing to regional and global security by preventing further conflict and enhancing stability; raising the ROK’s international profile through tangible contributions that are not only commensurate with its global economic status, but go beyond by demonstrating measurable sacrifice; repaying its debt to the international community—twenty-one countries participated in the US-led UN Command to support the ROK during the Korean War;24 and enhancing the ROK’s own security by establishing a reputation as a proactive stabilizing force rather than a belligerent one. This last rationale has the additional benefit of allowing South Korea to differentiate itself in a proactive manner from its Northeast Asian neighbors China and Japan. The ROK has already begun doing so through its six-year deployment to Afghanistan as part of ISAF, whereas both China and Japan have exhibited reluctance to date. China has been unwilling to join a NATO-led coalition, as opposed to one with a clear UN peacekeeping mandate, in addition to concerns about inflaming already negative sentiments from large Chinese Muslim populations in response to a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deployment in Afghanistan. Furthermore, in an era of growing resentment and concern over China’s aggressive economic presence in other regions—particularly in underdeveloped countries prone to domestic civil violence and unstable governments—a Chinese military presence might be viewed with greater suspicion than an ROK presence. Japan also is reluctant to contribute Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to ISAF due to prevailing constitutional constraints and pacifist constituencies at home, as well as recent political uncertainty with the installation of a new opposition government that has pledged to rethink many of Japan’s traditional foreign policy strategies, including ending the Maritime SDF’s refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. The current Japanese preoccupation and focus on adjusting its alliance relationship with the United States—reminiscent of the ROK experience during the Roh Moo-hyun administration—make an active Japanese presence in Afghanistan highly unlikely.25 South Korea thus has a unique opportunity to present itself as a responsible member of the international community and the only power from Northeast Asia that is able to manifest its stated values-based policies of promoting peace, stability, and prosperity into positive action.

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The US–South Korea Alliance

The ROK military also has a considerable advantage over those of China and Japan, and an active deployment to Afghanistan affords a distinct venue to display these assets. The Chinese military has had little experience fielding military units overseas outside of limited UN missions, raising doubts about the PLA’s logistical capabilities to effectively support such a deployment. In addition, with little experience in multinational military operations, the PLA’s performance would likely lag behind those of well-trained NATO forces with a high degree of interoperability and long-standing habits of cooperation. The Japanese SDF’s (JSDF) limitations would also be readily apparent in an Afghanistan deployment if not create outright liabilities for ISAF, as NATO troops would likely be required to protect the JSDF unit, as was the case in Iraq. In contrast, ROK forces, with their depth of experience from a wide range of PKO and MNF missions as well as decades of training with US Forces Korea (USFK), would be able to readily demonstrate their high level of military prowess.26 Active ROK participation in PKO also affords the opportunity to firmly contrast itself to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as the North continues to isolate itself in the community of international opinion through its belligerent policies and rhetoric. Establishing a clear differentiation with the DPRK is important not only to delegitimize North Korea’s threatening behavior but also to prevent the North from being accepted as a de facto nuclear state. Finally, current ROK investments in global PKO increase the likelihood of future reciprocity by the international community in the advent of Korean reunification, which will most likely require tremendous foreign assistance. Other important rationales for participation in PKO are more practical in nature, such as gaining valuable training and operational exercise for the ROK military and defense personnel. This not only enhances practical field experience, but also helps to prepare for the event that a future North Korean contingency is as likely to involve stabilization efforts as direct combat. Beyond the military benefits, participation in multinational operations also provides opportunities for South Korean government officials and bureaucracies to learn how to cooperate with foreign counterparts and build relationships and trust with other countries, as well as improve civil-military operation capabilities. And finally, PKO participation also allows the ROK to establish an early positive presence in the peacekeeping area that can provide the basis for later economic development by South Korean businesses. Other arguments made in public debates supporting active ROK

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participation in PKO stem from a utilitarian calculation of their benefits: to help the ROK become elected as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council, to upgrade South Korea’s image in the United States, and to gain US support for ROK strategy toward the DPRK. While the other rationales laid out earlier also have utility in serving South Korea’s national interests, their primary purpose is not purely a functional means to achieve narrowly defined and specific goals. Rather they support a broader vision of the ROK’s expanded role in the international community. Pursuit of PKO for solely functional purposes not only undermines the essential values and principles underlying peacekeeping activities but is inherently self-defeating in the long term because it continues to politicize the alliance and perpetuates the old view of a patron-client relationship with the United States. This in turn makes it more likely that the government’s decision to participate in PKO will be fraught with political sensitivity, which renders garnering public support even more difficult. Thus, the task for South Korean leaders is to make a strong case to the public that South Korean participation in PKO unequivocally serves the national interest and benefits the country. For President Lee Myungbak this should be a relatively easy task in that PKO serves as an ideal means of promoting many of the administration’s established goals for his term. These include creating a “vibrant economy,” developing a “global Korea” that is a “human resource powerhouse,” establishing a “proactive welfare” system, and a “government serving the people.” Peacekeeping participation affords the opportunity to channel one of South Korea’s strongest comparative advantages—human resource capital—toward contributing to an important global security issue, and reinforces international recognition of a “global Korea.” It also benefits the maintenance of a “vibrant economy” that will continue its reliance on international markets for its strength. PKO participation is an integral part of moving the ROK toward full achievement and implementation of its Defense Reform. Specifically, peacekeeping missions afford opportunities for the ROK military to gain direct experience in one of its most important stated goals: to achieve “an information/knowledge-based qualitative structure” in order to better actualize “the central concept of ‘jointness’ in future warfare.”27 Arguably, one of the most efficient ways for ROK military personnel to gain such knowledge and experience is to engage in operations with a broad exposure to new technologies and methods—while keeping risk levels to a minimum—and to train with international forces (other than US) and in areas off the Korean peninsula.

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Finally, recent disasters such as in Haiti have added an entirely new dimension to ROK’s PKO activism that goes beyond the country’s typically practical or utilitarian motives for participation. An earthquake on January 12, 2010, in Haiti created a humanitarian disaster disproportionate to its initial cause, shocking the world with the ensuing devastation. The UN, which already had a stabilization mission in place in Haiti since 2004, quickly increased its deployment of PKO troops from 6,940 to 8,940 within days of the disaster, and the ROK National Assembly approved a Reconstruction Support Group (Danbai Unit) comprising 240 personnel on February 27. The South Korean public’s support for relief efforts in Haiti, however, was surprisingly overwhelming, with millions of dollars raised within days of the earthquake and thousands of private South Korean groups volunteering to go to Haiti. Such an unexpected outpouring of support for Haiti was perhaps more revealing about the transformation that had occurred in South Korean society than about the disaster in a faraway land: 2010 marked a turning point in South Korea’s national psyche and its self-perception of its place in the global community, symbolized by playing host to the G-20 Leaders’ Summit in Seoul. While the ROK had become a member of the OECD in 1996, in November 2009 it became the first country ever that had been a former aid recipient to join the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), marking an important graduation to donor country. These milestones have had a profound effect on the nation’s current self-image as a confident, prosperous nation but whose recent past as a poor and struggling country has left a strong sense of global responsibility.

The Future: PKO Prospects

While the unfortunate events in Afghanistan in 2007 led to the precipitous withdrawal of ROK forces, the current Lee Myung-bak administration has expressed a strong commitment to the expansion of PKO participation globally. PKO is, as often stated by the president and other ROK officials, perfectly in line with one of the ROK government’s national goals: to become a “global Korea.” As such, the government has embarked on a careful and thorough exploration of future PKO possibilities. The focus has been a Ministry of National Defense (MND)–led effort to establish a legal and systematic basis for the expansion of peacekeeping missions, as well as the requisite enhancement of military capabilities.

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Specifically, these efforts include, first, supporting enactment through close coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) of the “PKO Participation Act” (the provisional name), which would simplify the domestic bureaucratic procedures required to dispatch troops, and second, conducting an MND review of the formation and size of standing ROK forces for possible availability in PKO missions. This would enable a timely response upon request from the global community to join peacekeeping efforts and ensure successful mission accomplishment. A third effort is strengthening the functions of the existing “Military PKO Center” in order to improve PKO training, cultivate instructors, and develop doctrines. A fourth is expanding and pursuing cooperation and exchange opportunities for PKO-related exercises and conferences with foreign countries.28 One concrete indication of the ROK’s commitment to implementing these initiatives is the launching of an MND-sponsored exchange and cooperation program with NATO, as well as representative participation in the annual ROK-NATO Policy Consultative Meetings established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2008.29 Closer cooperation with NATO outside the confines of the US-ROK alliance would facilitate acceptance by South Koreans of the critical importance of achieving stability in Afghanistan for many other nations besides the United States, and could also blunt some of the most vocal criticism from South Korean progressives who object to giving in to US demands. The need for greater participation from countries such as South Korea is likely to increase in the short to medium term in Afghanistan as the battle to root out extremist elements spreads across the country and spills over not just into Pakistan but also across the border into the Central and South Asian region.30 All three Northeast Asian powers and Russia have strategic interests in this region, and they all share a desire for stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, due partly to their growing political and economic engagement with neighboring countries in Central and South Asia. And like China, Japan, and Russia, South Korea has considerable political and commercial interests in Central Asia. But here, too, the ROK may have a unique advantage over China and Japan. Over the last decade South Korea has bolstered its relations with nations in Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where there was once a sizable Korean diaspora. South Korean energy firms are active in the region, including a consortium of South Korean firms that operates in one of Kazakhstan’s Caspian fields. In addition, South Korea has already contributed to building the infrastructure needed to supply ISAF troops, a network that will be critical to long-term stabilization and development of Afghanistan. As Joseph

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Ferguson and Drew Thompson point out, Hanjin—the parent company of Korean Air—has negotiated a commercial air cargo deal with the Uzbek government, and has developed an air cargo hub at the airport in Navoi in central Uzbekistan. ISAF has shipped nonmilitary goods destined for Afghanistan via the Navoi route, although air cargo is expensive and inadequate for long-term needs. Thus, Ferguson and Thompson suggest that in addition to force contributions, the ROK government could demonstrate its commitment to Afghanistan by subsidizing these flights, thereby contributing a unique benefit to the MNF effort.31 Finally, all of Northeast Asia would benefit from the establishment of reliable transportation networks in Central Asia, because among other benefits, it would open up stable energy supplies from that region. This is yet another opportunity for South Korea to seize leadership through President Lee’s “New Asian Initiative” by taking advantage of its existing networks in the region. Indeed, on October 30, 2009, the ROK government announced initial plans to reengage actively in Afghanistan by sending troops and police officers to help protect its aid workers. The commitment was fulfilled when the independent South Korean Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) started operation in July 2010 in the northern province of Parwan, consisting of 100 civilian workers and 40 police officers guarded by a 320-member contingent unit. In addition to the deployment, the government announced increased support by expanding aid, including additional equipment, medical services, and vocational training programs, as well as increasing the number of civilian volunteers.32 In terms of financial assistance, the ROK government has pledged to contribute US$500 million to Afghanistan in the next five years, on top of the US$180 million already provided through the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) since 2002.33 Another US$200 million in aid will be offered to Pakistan over the next four years as part of international efforts to combat terrorism in that country.34 Since Lee’s inauguration in February 2008,35 there has been a clear recognition by the MND leadership of the importance of South Korean participation in PKO, not only for securing future peace and stability, but—as explicitly noted in its 2008 Defense White Paper—because of the country’s “past history as one of the UN’s largest beneficiaries,” and perhaps its most exemplary success story. As such, a number of potential future missions are currently under review by the ROK government, including expansion of current PKO missions by increasing contributions of transport aircraft and other equipment; dispatch to Darfur, Sudan; and provision of heavy equipment, transport helicopters, and ships for a

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number of PKO missions. South Korea’s proven record of success in PKO in such places as East Timor and Lebanon makes it a natural partner to any UN- or MNF-led efforts throughout the world.

Constraints on ROK PKO

South Korea’s rapidly growing appetite for outward global expansion and its impulse to do so across a wide range of issues and venues, combined with its commitment to strengthen and transform its bilateral alliance with the United States, offer the possibility for a distinct bilateral partnership in the future. But as Victor Cha observes, “History has shown that Seoul sometimes remains constrained by a version of its own parochialism, which has often stood in the way of elevating the alliance to an international role.” 36 Thus, South Korea’s singular priority on North Korea ultimately diverted policies that began as lofty visions of expanding South Korea’s regional or global presence beyond the peninsula—such as “segyehwa,” a globalization policy initiated in 1993—faltered as they became eclipsed by policy toward the North.37 But taking advantage of a foundation established a decade earlier as well as changing conditions in the international environment, the Lee Myung-bak administration’s venture to establish a meaningful leadership role for the ROK in the international community may bear fruit. Nevertheless, President Lee faces a number of substantial constraints that will test his ambitions and resolve. The most challenging of these is rooted in South Korea’s complex social and political environment, which ironically is a testament to the remarkable success of US patronage under the alliance through the enabling of a vibrant if noisome democratic society. While democratic consolidation in the ROK political system has reached a certain level of maturity, leadership institutions remain fragile and are particularly vulnerable to attacks from opposition forces. Complicating matters further is that although the opposition may be highly organized and well represented by political interests, they are deeply rooted to social cleavages, which makes them particularly enduring and often immune to political compromise. It is not surprising, then, that a recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study measuring social conflict around the world ranked the ROK as the fourth worst among twenty-seven member nations.38 Although a seemingly puzzling phenomenon, particularly in such a famously homogenous society as South Korea,39 social conflict has in-

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creased with political democratization because political freedoms were unleashed so suddenly (1987) upon a society that had traditionally been highly regulated by rigid customs and rules and was unaccustomed to a culture that permitted, much less encouraged, personal liberties such as individual expression. Amplifying this dynamic was rapid proliferation of modern technology—in particular, the Internet—that empowered citizens with anonymous and unfettered license to organize and make their voices heard. Despite these surface changes, there remained a long historical tradition deeply rooted in Confucianism that opposed social or political injustice.40 South Korea’s two most recent leaders, the former president Roh Moo-hyun and the current president Lee Myung-bak, found themselves to be the relentless target of opposition-based criticism from the beginning of their tenures in office, and they were under constant attack to delegitimize their respective leaderships. The most popular and perhaps easiest issue to target as the source for a wide range of public dissatisfaction has been the alliance with the United States, largely because the relationship has been more than just a joint defense agreement; it has always been a political partnership as well, making it especially vulnerable to politicization by the public. The result has been the crippling of presidential power over issues such as the opening of the domestic beef market to US imports and the dispatch of troops to international missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. While these issues are certainly related to the alliance, they should have been debated publicly within the parameters of their respective issue areas and framed as a discussion of furthering national interests rather than implicating the alliance. One sampling of the kind of deep-seated, lingering suspicion of both the ROK and US governments that remains in the public consciousness is this recent editorial from the left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun: The U.S. invaded Iraq without any legal or procedural justification, and the ROK’s Zaytun Unit was dispatched to the Iraq war in this context. This was a fatal mistake which debased the quality of our alliance with the US and considerably undermined the identity of our foreign deployment of Korean troops to Afghanistan directly and indirectly. What happened in the Iraq War is being repeated in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it is said that the [ROK government] is failing to flatly deny the U.S. request and is just watching the situation. This would not have been the case if Seoul had learned even a small lesson from its troop dispatch to Iraq. (Hankyoreh Shinmun, December 20, 2008)

Lee Myung-bak (as well as future leaders of South Korea) will likely continue to confront public excoriation of his foreign policies, and

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many observers will attempt to draw linkages to the alliance. In the face of such a political environment, some have argued that one way to sustain public support for the alliance and build momentum toward the establishment of a broader partnership is to try to focus on the intrinsic, rather than merely the strategic, value of the alliance; that is, its benefit to the South Korean people is derived not just from the function of deterring North Korean aggression but from the very values and principles that the relationship stands for and promotes: democracy, open societies, stability, and so on.41 While it is certainly critical and even necessary to build a successful partnership based on the foundation of shared values—and its importance will only increase as the partnership continues to evolve in the future—it is insufficient to fundamentally alter South Korean public attitudes regarding national security, which remain profoundly focused on peninsular concerns above all else.42 While South Koreans have become more comfortable with the terminology of universal or global values and have incorporated their use in regular public discourse, there remains an elemental, almost primordial chasm between what South Koreans can tangibly identify as immediate and imperative security interests—those that are local—and abstract goals and principles that are universal and therefore further removed from their national identity and interests. In order to bridge this divide and prod South Koreans toward embracing international goals and values in concrete terms, the ROK leadership must convince the public that these are integral to their own national interests rather than of indirect relevance. US leadership can do its part through close cooperation with its partner to provide a unified rationale for how the alliance plays a pivotal role in preserving the entirety of national interest—not just peninsular, but regional and global. The most acceptable paradigm may be to frame the alliance not as the objective goal toward which national interests should be directed, but rather as the most effective means of achieving mutual interests over the long term. Furthermore, this framework should be able to articulate future scenarios beyond unification of the peninsula. Such a shift can likely be achieved only gradually and over the medium to long term. In the interim, the two governments should, at a minimum, endeavor to protect the alliance from any further damage or erosion. In implementing activities such as PKO that extend South Korea’s reach to regional and global areas, the ROK government will have to manage more than just a fractious domestic audience at home. The government will be increasingly challenged by the proliferation of South

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Korean NGOs and their growing involvement in multilateral activities overseas, such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance missions. These groups often act outside the purview of governmental oversight and are at times either oblivious to dangerous conditions or purposefully ignore them.43 This can often lead to disastrous consequences and seriously complicate national policies, as was seen in Afghanistan in 2007.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the US-ROK alliance played a critical role in ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia for the last half century. Now as the world confronts a vastly different security environment than the Cold War when the alliance was born, the question for US and ROK policymakers is how best to transform the current and existing functions of the unique security relationship to address twentyfirst-century issues. The critical need for peacekeeping operations will only increase in the future, making it the ideal area for expansion. At the same time, South Korea’s rapid modernization and development in the last few decades have propelled the country’s international status and advanced its own military capabilities to world-class levels. But even as the ROK has the sixth-largest military worldwide, its contributions to international peacekeeping and stabilization operations remains comparatively limited, as is the case for the rest of Asia. Indeed, based on the size of militaries and economies in the Asia region, there is considerable peacekeeping capability in the region that is not being fully utilized. Despite its middle-power status, South Korea can play a unique leadership role in the global community by actively increasing its support for and participation in peacekeeping missions around the world. President Lee Myung-bak has laid out a bold and ambitious future for South Korea, one that envisions dramatically altering the ROK’s international role; PKO thus offers an ideal way to implement his goals. Moreover, a joint vision for the direction of the bilateral alliance has been agreed upon by the two allies, which calls for the transformation of the relationship into a true partnership that can address security issues not only concerning the Korean peninsula but on a regional and a global scale as well. Increasing South Korean commitment to PKO would also serve to achieve this goal. Although it will not be an easy task, with careful coordination and management, South Korea has the potential to make a significant contribution to international stability and, in so doing, enhance its domestic security. The bilateral effort to identify

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areas of cooperation will ensure that the US-ROK alliance maintains a unique relationship worthy of continued investment and commitment, and more importantly, serves the national and strategic interests of both sides, making the alliance a necessary endeavor.

Notes 1. Peace operations involve the dispatch of expeditionary forces, with or without a UN mandate, to implement an agreement between warring states or factions, which may (or may not) include enforcing that agreement in the face of willful defiance. Although the UN has the most experience in authorizing and conducting such operations, the organization has never possessed a monopoly on them (Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, “Who’s Keeping the Peace: Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations,” International Security, vol. 29, no. 4 [Spring 2005], p. 157). 2. “G8 Report on Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding,” G8 Summit 2008 website, http://www.g8italia2009.it. 3. US Department of State, “GPOI History,” http://www.state.gov. 4. US Department of State, “US Department of State Surpasses Target of 75,000 Trained Peacekeepers by 2010,” http://www.state.gov. 5. This reflects fiscal years 2010–2014, beginning annually on October 1. 6. US Department of State, “US Department of State Surpasses Target.” 7. US Mission to the United Nations, “Progress Report by the United States Mission to the United Nations: A New Era of Engagement, Advancing America’s Interests in the World,” press release no. 082(09), April 29, 2009. 8. The UN Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping /documents/bnote010101.pdf. 9. For instance, these include ten peace operations in Africa since 1990 led by regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC), and the African Union. In Europe, they have included Albania, Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Afghanistan under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the Americas, the United States led a multinational force into Haiti (2004); in Asia, Australia has led two peace operations, in East Timor (1999) and the Solomon Islands (2003). Bellamy and Williams, “Who’s Keeping the Peace,” p. 157. 10. Ibid., p. 158. 11. Joseph Ferguson and Drew Thompson, “A Northeast Asian Solution for Af-Pak,” PacNet #49, July 9, 2009. 12. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines 2011. 13. The clearest manifestation of the lack of technical distinction between activities that are considered PKO and those of stabilization/reconstruction is their discussion in the ROK Ministry of Defense White Papers, which makes no

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such explicit differentiation. See ROK Ministry of National Defense, White Paper, 2009. 14. The commanding officer was Hwang Jin-ha, the former defense attaché to the ROK embassy in Washington, DC (1999–2002). He is currently an elected member of the ROK National Assembly (Grand National Party–GNP) and serves as chairman of the GNP’s International Security Committee. 15. Other contributors to UNIFIL are Belgium, Brunei, China, Croatia, Cyprus, El Salvador, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Tanzania, and Turkey (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 2011). 16. The ROK ranks thirty-sixth in troop and personnel contributions for UN PKO missions (0.4 percent of total UN personnel), although when considered within the context of South Korea’s relatively small total population—45 million—South Korean contributions are proportionately higher (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 2011). 17. About forty-five nations, as diverse as Germany, India, Bangladesh, and Cambodia, take part in this annual exercise to practice joint PKO activities. 18. This despite one highly publicized and unfortunate incident of bribery and corruption involving several ROK uniformed personnel in Iraq. 19. The mandate of ISAF is to “support the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRA) by providing and maintaining a secure environment in order to facilitate the re-building of Afghanistan and the establishment of democratic structures, and to assist in expanding the influence of the central government across the country” (North American Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], International Security Assistance Force, http://www.nato.int). 20. The UNSC Resolutions include 1386, 1413, 1444, and 1510. In October 2003 the UNSC passed UNSCR 1510, authorizing ISAF to extend its mission beyond Kabul. 21. Several military medical staff remained in Afghanistan to work with ROK civilian-led medical service and training teams after the official withdrawal of ROK forces in December 2007. 22. The missionary group, composed of sixteen women and seven men, was captured while traveling from Kandahar to Kabul by bus on a mission sponsored by the Saemmul Presbyterian Church. Two men, Bae Hyeong-gyu, a forty-two-year-old South Korean pastor of Saemmul Church, and Shim Seongmin, a twenty-nine-year-old South Korean man, were executed on July 25 and July 30, respectively. Although the South Korean government offered no statement, a Taliban spokesman claimed that the militant group also received some US$20 million in exchange for the safety of the captured missionaries (as reported in a series of articles from Chosun Ilbo, July 20–September 5, 2007). 23. Public anger wavered between those who blamed the ROK government for incompetence in handling the issue and for paying a ransom and others who turned the blame on the missionaries themselves for putting themselves in a harmful situation. 24. The UN command led by the United States included troops from twentyone different countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark,

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Ethiopia, France, Greece, India, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, and the UK. 25. Japan is reportedly considering increasing financial aid to Afghanistan but has no intention of sending ground troops to the region, given that “in the current situation we can’t guarantee the safety of our civilians” (statement by Foreign Minister Okada, “Japan May Provide More Aid to Afghanistan,” Associated Press, September 20, 2009). 26. Ferguson and Thompson, “A Northeast Asian Solution for Af-Pak.” 27. ROK, Ministry of National Defense, White Paper, 2008, pp. 98–99. 28. Ibid., pp. 141–142. 29. ROK Ministry of National Defense Announcement, February 2009, www.mnd.mi.kr. 30. Ferguson and Thompson (“A Northeast Asian Solution for Af-Pak”) make a strong case for the critical importance of neighboring Central and South Asia to any future success in securing stability in Afghanistan. 31. Ibid. 32. News reports from Yonhap, May 5, 2009, and Arirang News Services, June 25, 2009; Republic of Korea Government, “Contributions by the Republic of Korea to Afghanistan,” press release, July 3, 2009, Korea.net. 33. Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, press release, April 15, 2011, http://www.mofat.go.kr. 34. “Korea to Aid Terrorism Effort,” Yonhap, April 17, 2009. 35. The election and appointment of Ban Ki-moon—an ROK national—as UN Secretary-General in January 2007 has also been an important factor in spotlighting South Korean interest in UN activities. While Secretary-General Ban has been notably careful and sensitive about using his leadership role in promoting specific South Korean interests, his position nevertheless has spurred South Korean pride and interest in supporting the United Nations. 36. Victor Cha, “Outperforming Expectations: The US-ROK Alliance,” in Kurt M. Campbell et al., Going Global: The Future of the US–South Korea Alliance (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, February 2009), p. 10. 37. President Kim Young-Sam launched “segyehwa” in 1993 amid much fanfare, but the crisis with North Korea over its nuclear programs at the time sapped and diverted leadership attention and the resources necessary for its implementation. 38. According to the study, the social conflict index for South Korea was 0.71, considerably higher than the OECD’s average of 0.44. Only three member nations—Turkey (1.2), Poland (0.76), and Slovakia (0.72)—had higher social conflict indexes than South Korea. The United States ranked eighth overall and Japan tenth, ahead of European nations such as Denmark (twenty-seventh) and Sweden (twenty-sixth) (“OECD Ranks Korea 4th Worst for Social Conflict,” Dong-A Ilbo, June 25, 2009). 39. South Korea’s “homogeneity” may actually work against broad public empathy toward other countries and cultures, and makes building a domestic constituency in support of PKO more difficult. 40. Note that political or social “injustice” was judged within the strictly formulated hierarchy established under Confucianism, and should not be equated with the Judeo-Christian notion of equality among all.

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41. Victor Cha, among others, often makes this argument. For one such discussion, see Cha, “Outperforming Expectations: The US-ROK Alliance.” 42. Such a mentality is deeply rooted in South Korea’s strategic culture of “nationalistic survival,” a paradigm presented and analyzed in my dissertation. See Balbina Hwang, “Globalization, Strategic Culture, and Ideas: Explaining Continuity in Korean Foreign Economic Policy” (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2006). 43. James L. Schoff and Choi Hyun-jin analyze the impact of this relatively new phenomenon in their paper “Reform Locally, Act Globally? Crisis Management Trends in Korea,” Korea Economic Institute Academic Paper Series, vol. 3, no. 3 (April 2008), www.keia.org.

9 Postconflict Stabilization and Reconstruction Michael J. Finnegan

WHILE CERTAINLY NOT A NEW PHENOMENON, THE RECENT Iraq and Afghanistan experiences have drawn keen attention to the area of stabilization and postconflict reconstruction and questions about how governments should cooperate in these important tasks. This chapter is not about the details of such operations. Much has been written on improving approaches, tactics, techniques, and procedures for stability and reconstruction operations. Rather, this chapter explores questions of why and how closer cooperation in the area of stabilization and reconstruction would make a difference to the US-ROK relationship. The United States and the Republic of Korea have significant shared values and interests, as articulated in summit declarations and the 2009 alliance vision statement. In a statement following the April 2008 USROK summit, the two presidents pledged “to develop the current ROKUS alliance into a strategic alliance that seeks to enlarge common interests,” “in order to effectively address new security challenges of the 21st century.” They also noted the “close coordination between the two countries in restoring peace and providing reconstruction assistance in major conflict regions of the world.”1 In a June 2009 statement articulating a new vision for the alliance, the two presidents pointedly stated, “The Alliance will enhance coordination on peacekeeping, post-conflict stabilization and development assistance.”2 As the alliance looks to expand its applicability as a tool of national security for both nations beyond the peninsula, clearly activities such as stabilization and reconstruction are on the menu. President Lee Myung-bak has articulated his strong desire for a strategic alliance. This can be seen as reflecting the growing ROK recog-

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nition of the effects of globalization and an interest in global stability, if only for economic reasons. Accordingly, ROK leaders are increasingly willing to consider broader cooperation as a means of meeting ROK interests, increasing the ROK international profile, and strengthening the alliance. This chapter attempts to lay out the argument about why the allies should seriously look at cooperation in the area of stability and reconstruction operations. Distinct strategic and operational benefits can result from such cooperation, both in terms of international security and in terms of strengthening the alliance, but also in much more practical, tactical terms. However, significant political impediments must be addressed if the alliance is to achieve expanded cooperation.

The Benefits of Expanded Cooperation

From an alliance standpoint, increased and broadened cooperation is almost always a net positive. More cooperation generally means more resilient ties and by extension a strengthened alliance. In the case of the US-ROK alliance, broadening the aperture of cooperation for the alliance beyond the single task of “defend South Korea” is a deliverable benefit in and of itself. It allows for new avenues of cooperation and, in the case of stability and reconstruction, for developing a synergy of military, developmental, and diplomatic skill sets that not only brings the two governments into closer coordination but also provides a base for jumping off into more critical missions closer to home: North Korea. Arguably, the single most challenging operation the United States and South Korea will likely face on the peninsula is a situation of collapse or instability in North Korea to which they must respond. Such a situation will demand critical skill sets—skill sets that must be developed and practiced together if our actions are to be effective and serve our mutual interests. Stabilization and postconflict reconstruction operations away from the peninsula allow the ability to develop the skills, processes, and procedures to work together in a potential postcollapse scenario. Such cooperation would better prepare the allies to manage any postinstability situation in the North, to deliver the needed stability and security to minimize the immediate effects of a collapse or other situation of instability, and to establish conditions necessary for the longterm economic and social reconstruction necessary to achieve the ultimate goal of unification. Beyond the clear advantages offered to the alliance of such in-

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creased cooperation, the United States having South Korea as a partner on the international stage is a positive in that it is one more flag outside the tent, if you will, providing additional capacity and legitimacy to any stability operation.3 For the ROK, further expanding its profile in the international security arena outside peacekeeping would bring political and prestige benefits. The ROK’s contributions in Iraq were a showcase for its unique approach to building stability and fostering economic growth. The unfortunate perceptions surrounding Iraq, though, have limited the impact of this significant contribution on South Korea’s international image. The ROK, as a vibrant democracy and dynamic economic power, has much to offer and much of which to be proud.

The ROK Experience

The Republic of Korea has developed key skills needed in stabilization and reconstruction missions that have provided significant domestic and international experience. Beyond its own obvious history with postwar reconstruction, three areas bear emphasis: ROK participation in international peacekeeping efforts; recent ROK experience with postconflict stabilization and reconstruction in East Timor, Iraq, and Afghanistan; and ROK planning for stabilization and reconstruction in North Korea following conflict or collapse. While peacekeeping and postconflict stabilization are technically different and distinct missions, they are closely related in the basic military skill sets that are required. Moreover, the ROK military, bureaucracy, and public tend to blur the distinctions a bit; indeed, the Zaytun Unit that served in Iraq was termed a “peace and reconstruction division.”4 As such, the ROK’s significant experience with peacekeeping operations, which dates back over a decade now, has a direct bearing on how it is prepared for postconflict stability operations. In increasingly complex missions in Western Sahara, Georgia, India-Pakistan, East Timor, Cyprus (where an ROK officer led the mission for two years), and, most recently, Lebanon, the ROK military has honed skills necessary to building and maintaining stability. The ROK military has admirably and effectively capitalized on this experience through the development of a Peacekeeping Training Center that inculcates the lessons learned in these operations into the broader force. The PKO experience and the subsequent training efforts have resulted in an ROK military (primarily army) that is well versed in the basic skill sets and doctrine of stability operations.

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Moreover, these experiences have been expanded upon through the very successful and significant operations in Iraq. The Zaytun Unit’s work in northern Iraq from 2004 through 2008 has been heralded as a model in how military units should support stability and reconstruction efforts. While the caveat must be offered that the operations in the Kurdistan region were carried out under relatively benign circumstances, the Iraqi insurgency being centered further to the South, the unit’s operations remain a laudable model of how a military interacts with a civilian population to engender stability and assist in reconstruction efforts. In particular, the ROK force effectively built and sustained important partnerships with the local population that engendered security and fostered reconstruction efforts, worked directly with the local population to carry out development projects, and assisted in developing local stability and reconstruction capacity through vocational, governmental, and security training. The activities of the Zaytun Unit built on those of the Evergreen Unit in East Timor in the late 1990s. The interaction of the ROK units with the local population was a signature of the ROK mission, and included effective efforts at vocational training as well as economic and basic infrastructure development. Interestingly, much of the limited reconstruction approach in both of these missions is rooted in the SaeMaul, or New Village, Movement of the 1970s in South Korea, emphasizing diligence, self-help, and cooperation.5 Development projects in the Evergreen and Zaytun context were carried out in such a way as to build buy-in from the local residents; in a postconflict situation, this helps to reinforce stability. Unfortunately, despite the ROK being one of the first countries to offer and realize support to Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002, due to political backlash following the kidnapping and murder of South Korean missionaries in Afghanistan in 2007 the ROK experience with reconstruction in that war-torn country was, for a period of time, more limited and less successful. While ROK engineering efforts as well as medical support arguably contributed in a significant way to early attempts to build stability in Afghanistan after the initial defeat of Taliban forces, its full commitment to the peacekeeping and rebuilding of Afghanistan has become more evident and widely recognized since South Korea renewed military engagement in the region with a growing role and responsibilities in supporting various reconstruction projects. An independent Korean Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) was launched in July 2010 to provide development assistance particularly in the areas of “education, public health care, agriculture and rural development, and governance,” after South Korea officially signed the Participation and

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Financing Agreements with NATO to participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Stationed in the city of Charikar in the northern province of Parwan, the South Korean operation team consists of 100 civilian workers and 40 police officers, under the protection of a 320-member contingent named the Ashena Unit.6 A separate medical team of the PRT is operating the hospital at the US air base in Bagram, providing medical treatment to the local community. As part of ROK’s grant aid and technical cooperation programs, the Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), jointly with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and other international organizations, has engaged Afghanistan government officials in various training sessions to develop and improve local administrative capacities. In terms of financial assistance, Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Jae-shin made a pledge at the ISAF foreign ministers’ meeting in Berlin in April 2011 to contribute another US$500 million to Afghanistan in the next five years on top of the US$180 million already provided through KOICA since 2002. The purpose is to further “strengthen the capabilities of the Afghan military and police and achieving economic and social development.”7

How the United States Views This Area

For the United States, the need to build international capacity in the area of stability and reconstruction operations has, of course, been sharpened by Iraq and Afghanistan. To the extent that it has achieved success in the former, Afghanistan looms incredibly large with the growing insurgency mixed with the desperate need to achieve stability that can allow for construction of infrastructure and a base for economic growth. With insurgency and stability operations sapping US military capacity, international cooperation more than ever is seen as a political advantage—more flags outside the tent—as well as an urgent operational necessity. For the United States, the ROK is seen as one of the few countries with the military, political, and economic capacity to contribute in a meaningful and substantial way. Multinational cooperation is difficult under the best of times and circumstances. If unpracticed, this cooperation becomes immeasurably more difficult; witness the continuing struggle for a coherent allied NATO response in Afghanistan. Similarly, while conventional wisdom would say that the US-ROK alliance should enable the allies to operate together, unfortunately the United States has not had a long history with the ROK in this specific area of operation and cooperation. Despite sig-

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nificant experience in planning and training for general or limited war on the peninsula, postconflict stabilization and reconstruction planning for the ROK has been cursory at best. The ability of the allies to cooperate in postconflict operations has been hampered by the ROK’s general reluctance to discuss how the alliance would deal with either the aftermath of war or collapse in North Korea; witness the 2006 halt by the ROK government to allied response planning for instability in North Korea. In practical terms, the allies have been able to plan for the defeat of North Korea, but not what to do together to secure the victory afterward. The reluctant attitude on the part of the ROK has appeared to stem from a complex mix of issues of autonomy, questions over US support for reunification goals, concerns over Chinese perceptions, and a desire to maintain independent ROK plans for dealing with what are arguably issues of stability and reconstruction. However, beginning with the humanitarian disaster and broad economic collapse in North Korea in the mid-1990s, when the specter of what has euphemistically been called a “situation of sudden change” first really took root in alliance thinking, there has been a greater interest in developing plans and capacity for an alliance response (e.g., the development of the first instability CONPLAN, or contingency plan, in 1998). These early efforts were hobbled by a decade of ROK leadership that was by most assessments overly concerned with DPRK sensitivities to such planning. The current ROK administration has clearly put more emphasis on preparing for North Korean instability, but remains cautious on how far the alliance can or should go in planning, building capacity, and exercising their shared capabilities. Current US efforts in this regard recognize that the ROK should lead any postconflict (or postinstability) stability and reconstruction effort in North Korea, seeking to understand what the ROK plan is and ensuring that the two allies know how to act together. In this situation, the United States, because of pressing needs in Afghanistan as well as the high potential to be called to act in Korea, is eager to find ways to build upon years of ROK-US combined planning and combat training to expand capacity in the area of stabilization and reconstruction operation. Not only is such cooperation strategically useful, it is operationally imperative.

The US Approach as a Starting Point

As the United States has evolved its operational approach to stability and reconstruction, it has developed an interagency framework for plan-

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ning and carrying out such operations. The US approach calls for a civilian-led, military-supported, whole-of-government approach that focuses on five stability sectors: • Security: Focus is on establishing a stable security environment and developing legitimate institutions and infrastructure to maintain that environment. • Justice and reconciliation: This sector encompasses policing, civil law and order, and the court systems of a state, including efforts to provide for a fair, impartial, and accountable justice system while ensuring an equitable means to reconcile past crimes and abuse arising from conflict or disaster. • Humanitarian assistance and social well-being: This sector includes efforts to meet the immediate need for water, food, shelter, emergency health care, and sanitation, as well as actions to find and implement sustainable solutions necessary to prevent the recurrence of systemic failures while ensuring the social well-being of the people. • Governance and political participation: Tasks in the governance and political participation sector address needs to establish effective, legitimate political and administrative institutions and infrastructure. • Economic stabilization and infrastructure: Programs in this sector set the building blocks for comprehensive national reform efforts aimed at building the institutions and processes that can ensure the sustained viability of the state.8 Neither the Department of Defense nor the US military is the lead agency in stability and reconstruction operations, but rather they support the whole-of-government approach through stability operations9 and the execution of five essential tasks: • Establish civil security: This can include military and civil actions to bring about a cessation of hostilities; to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate military forces and personnel; to enforce border control; to protect critical personnel and infrastructure; and to clear military hazards to civilians (e.g., unexploded ordnance or mines). • Establish civil control: This can include direct action and support to civilian forces to bring about public order and security as well as support transition to a civilian justice system. • Restore essential services: This can include use of military forces to provide essential civil services (electricity, water, shelter, medical support, etc.), assist in the management of dislocated civilians, support

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food distribution and non-food-related relief programs, reestablish civilian public health and education services, and so on. • Support governance: This includes actions to support transition to civilian governance and security support for elections, as well as support for development of local governance and anticorruption efforts. • Support economic and infrastructure development: This includes immediate efforts to restore basic services and infrastructure (transportation, telecommunications, agriculture, etc.) to support economic stability. This support continues through efforts to provide a secure environment for economic generation and enterprise creation, as well as support for the variety of public and private market organs necessary for economic growth.10 This framework and each of the areas in it offer broad opportunities for expanded cooperation.

Expanding Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Cooperation

In broad terms, as the United States and the Republic of Korea have looked to fulfill pledges to expand cooperation in this arena, the nations have an opportunity to build a systematic, whole-of-alliance approach to stability and reconstruction operations. There is a diplomatic aspect, an economic aspect, a humanitarian aspect, a military security aspect, and a strategic aspect to all situations of instability and the response to them. The United States, through the approach outlined above, is attempting to implement a whole-of-government planning approach. The ROK takes a similar approach to its planning for North Korea. Melding these two approaches into a whole-of-alliance planning approach would enable the allies, when the political decision is made to act together, to synchronize all the tools of their respective national power—diplomatic, economic, and military—to achieve the goals of the alliance partners. If the vision of the alliance is to truly “enhance coordination” in this area, the place to start is in the initial assessment and planning process. One specific suggestion for expanding cooperation and enhancing coordination would be to develop an alliance postconflict stabilization and reconstruction management system, modeled on and drawing from existing US and ROK interagency planning systems. Such a strategic-level system would be the foundation for a new series of assessment and training initiatives aimed at improving alliance government coordination.

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Concurrent with the development of such an intergovernmental, whole-of-alliance approach, the two militaries should develop combined doctrine for stability and reconstruction operations. Such doctrine development could be embedded in a larger effort to establish combined doctrine for the broad range of nontraditional military actions across the spectrum of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, stability, and reconstruction. This effort could include development of a standing, ROK-led alliance task force for stabilization operations, a test bed for developing combined doctrine for military support to postconflict situations. This could be a cadre-level (no troops) effort with a broad mandate to look at doctrine, training, and capacity building, as many tasks related to peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief also have applicability in stability and reconstruction operations. Such an effort would have applicability to both off- and on-peninsula contingencies, which is an important benefit. As a practical matter, establishing such a group at the ROK’s Peacekeeping Training Center would make sense, as much of South Korea’s expertise in the skill sets needed is resident here. As pointed out earlier, cooperation within the alliance on planning and tasks related to managing North Korea in a postconflict or postcollapse situation has not enjoyed the level of focus necessary to ensure success. Taking this out of a pure North Korea context can have a significant political advantage in the ROK. Expanded cooperation that could lead to a generic approach to stabilization and reconstruction would go a long way to filling in critical gaps in the current level of planning for on-peninsula contingencies. In the context of military capacity building for stability and reconstruction operations, the United States and South Korea should look for ways to expand training and exercise opportunities for critical unit and soldier skill sets as well. Stability and reconstruction operations place a high demand on police (both military and civilian), construction engineers, medical specialists, and civil affairs personnel.11 Combined training related to these fields should be expanded. The immediate elephant in the room in this discussion of expanding cooperation in stability and reconstruction is, of course, Afghanistan. As indicated above, the need for increased cooperation in Afghanistan is huge—and growing.12 Also as indicated, and as discussed below, South Korean domestic politics continues to challenge ROK contributions. Acknowledging this situation, expanded US-ROK cooperation in Afghanistan should pay large dividends for both allies in a very comprehensive way. Taking a comprehensive approach, building cooperative mechanisms at the strategic and operational levels and exercising that

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capacity in a tactical situation would indeed open a new chapter in the US-ROK alliance.

Potential Obstacles to Achieving Cooperation

From an operational standpoint, there is no obstacle to increasing cooperation in the area of stability operations. Indeed, among allies and partners, South Korea is well poised to do so due to its high degree of broad interoperability with the US military. Redeployment of ROK troops in Afghanistan has allowed for more integration of defense forces, including joint aerial surveillance over the PRT site and training of South Korean security forces to prepare for further integration into the base defense plan at the Bagram airfield. Obviously there is also a new bureaucratic aspect to this brand of cooperation, as the US Department of State must develop the processes and mechanisms to coordinate wholeof-government operational measures with the ROK on a scale not seen before. The signing of the US-ROK Development Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on June 24, 2011, provides a basis in theory for more active cooperation on international development in Afghanistan beyond South Korean contributions to postconflict stabilization and training of the Afghanistan security forces. The primary obstacle to expanding ROK-US cooperation in postconflict stabilization situations remains the issue of the durability of public support for such efforts among the South Korean public. The US government as well as the public sees such cooperation as a natural extension of the alliance. Unfortunately, a significant sector of the South Korean public sees the alliance as meant to perform the sole function of defending South Korea. Potentially expanded cooperation beyond this basic mandate has become seriously politicized. Opponents of expanded cooperation raise the specter of South Korea being coerced or dragooned into operations that put South Korean national interests as well as South Korean citizens at risk, tapping into a broad sentiment that South Korea is at a disadvantage in dealing with the United States and has limited political autonomy. ROK governments that have often couched decisions that were made for sound, interest-based reasons as having been made “for the alliance” have exacerbated this situation. The clear solution to this situation is for the ROK government to make an unambiguous argument to the South Korean people that the nation’s interests—not alliance politics—demand an expansion of cooper-

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ation in specific areas. Whether South Korean bureaucrats and political leaders are capable or willing to do so remains unclear, even though the South Korean public has nonetheless begun to understand why expanding cooperation is in the South Koreans’ interest, and why doing so in the context of the alliance is advantageous. According to a 2011 poll, 87 percent of South Korean participants considered the US-ROK alliance “necessary to some degree” or “very necessary.”13 Such positive public views on strengthening ties with the United States coincide with a transition in South Korean self-perceptions from being an aid recipient to being a major donor nation capable of making a substantial contribution to global security and development and reflecting the country’s growing efforts to expand its international profile in realizing the goal of a “global Korea.” As this task has its most immediate application in Afghanistan, the ROK public’s perceived allergy to participation in Afghanistan is a significant obstacle that appears to have been overcome with return of military forces in 2010, when 49 percent of the ROK population was in favor of keeping troops in Afghanistan, a significant rise from only 28 percent who supported a South Korean military presence in Afghanistan in 2007.14 However, the ROK government has been under mounting pressure for a potential early withdrawal of troops following continuous attacks on its PRT facilities, leading to increasing concerns about the safety and security of South Korean personnel.15 Such voices have become louder following the Barack Obama administration’s decision to begin withdrawal from Afghanistan in summer 2011. 16 Once again, though, the ability of the ROK government to overcome this obstacle is dependent upon its ability and willingness to take a national security argument to the public in a convincing way. Stability in Afghanistan is a global security issue that the ROK has a stake in, something the Lee Myung-bak administration has recognized in its decision to reengage on the ground in Afghanistan. That strategic rationale is an argument that the South Korean people can very likely understand, if it is put to them as a clear South Korean interest. As discussed earlier, ROK concerns over how Pyongyang will perceive expanded cooperation in an area that obviously has applicability to a North Korean contingency will likely remain an impediment. While the current ROK government is, at base, less concerned with North Korean sensitivities, it remains very concerned about the domestic ROK political scene. Opposition political leaders could criticize ROK commitments to operations such as the one in Afghanistan by pointing to

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US-ROK exercises and training related to generic situations of stability operations as “preparations” for a North Korea contingency. And they would be right in a sense, as any activity that increases the ability of the two allies to better communicate, coordinate, and operate by extension better prepares them to address any situation that might threaten ROK national security on the peninsula. Again, how effective such an argument is remains a function of the political skill and will of the ROK administration.

Conclusion

The specter of global or regional instability and the implications of failed states are shared concerns of all developed nations. The United States and South Korea have together dealt with such situations before—in the aftermath of the Korean War. South Korea’s experience of rising from the ashes of war to achieve nothing short of a miracle in less than two generations gives it a unique perspective and capacity that can make an important contribution to international security. In the context of the alliance—of an alliance response to global security challenges— the ROK contribution can go a very long way to strengthening its own security, both in general terms and specifically as relates to North Korea. To the latter, increasing cooperation in the area of stability and reconstruction, improving coordination mechanisms, and building new operational and tactical capacity would fill a critical gap in the alliance’s tool kit. Moreover, such new capacity would increase the ROK’s ability to utilize the alliance not only to meet a potential contingency in North Korea but also to set the conditions for a successful transition to stability and a national unification process. In the current context, Afghanistan offers a ready opportunity to expand and sharpen the allies’ combined capabilities in this critical mission area. In broader terms, strengthening the alliance in the strategic and operational areas as described here would provide for a stronger alliance and, by extension, a stronger position from which the ROK can engage its neighbors. A strong US-ROK alliance clearly contributes to a stable Northeast Asia region. Such cooperative measures as described here would not only strengthen but also improve the alliance, fulfilling the “mutual” pledge embodied in the Mutual Defense Treaty. This and other opportunities to build on the already strong alliance to fulfill a broader vision must be seized.

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Notes 1. Full text of ROK-US summit statement at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr /www/news/nation/2008/04/116_22786.html. 2. Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, June 16, 2009, Washington, DC, at http://www .whitehouse.gov. 3. General Robert Orr, in surveying the American strategy for stability and reconstruction, put it as follows: “The United States, for all its resources, needs three things that the international community can offer: additional capacity, legitimacy, and burdensharing.” In Robert C. Orr, ed., Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), p. 299. 4. Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 2008, p. 138. The discussion of reconstruction operations is contained in the section titled “Participation in International Peacekeeping Operations.” While a clear distinction among peacekeeping, peace enforcement, reconstruction, and stability operations would be appreciated, as with the environment in which they are carried out, clarity is elusive. 5. “Korean Troops Welcomed by Kurds in Iraq,” Iraqi News (Online), March 20, 2006, http://www.iraqinews.com. 6. Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Korea’s Contributions to the International Community,” March 10, 2011, http://www .mofat.go.kr. 7. Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Outcome of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of the ISAF Contributing Nations,” April 15, 2011, http://www.mofat.go.kr. 8. US Army, FM 3-07, Stability Operations, chapter 2, Washington, DC— Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 6, 2008, http://usacac.army.mil. 9. DoD Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations, September 16, 2009, http://www.dtic.mil. 10. US Army, FM 3-07, Stability Operations, chapter 3. 11. Hans Binnendjik and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2004), p. 38. 12. Joseph Ferguson and Drew Thompson, “A Northeast Asian Solution for Af-Pak,” PacNet #49, July 9, 2009. 13. “Korea-US Alliance and Northeast Asian Security,” the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, March 28, 2011, http://asaninst.org. 14. Pew Global Attitudes Project, “South Korea: Support for War in Afghanistan: Should the US and NATO Keep Troops in Afghanistan or Remove Them?” 2010, http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=9&country=116. 15. “Korean Base in Afghanistan Hit by Artillery,” Korea Times, May 5, 2011, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr. 16. Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett-Avery, and Mary Beth Nikitin, “U.S.–South Korea Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report, July 8, 2011, http://www.ncnk.org.

10 Development Assistance and Humanitarian Aid Edward P. Reed

ON JUNE 24, 2011, THE US SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE FOReign minister of the Republic of Korea signed a “Statement of Intent to Cooperate on Global Development” in which the two sides agreed on principles and a process for building a “close partnership in development cooperation.”1 This agreement opens an exciting and potentially significant new sphere for cooperation between two longtime allies. However, practical and sustained implementation is likely to face a number of challenges. This chapter provides an overview of the two national aid programs and suggests an approach to initiating bilateral cooperation. The United States has a long track record in providing overseas development assistance (ODA) to less developed countries. It continues to provide more official assistance, as defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), than any other country, though less in proportion to the size of its economy than a number of European countries. South Korea, on the other hand, is a relative newcomer to international development cooperation, with modest official assistance beginning in 1987. Although it has grown rapidly since then, the volume of South Korea’s official aid in 2010 was only 4 percent of US foreign aid and is among the lowest among OECD members relative to its gross national income (GNI). By another measure, the US aid bureaucracy is massive, employing over 10,000 national and local staff scattered across a number of cabinet departments and agencies, in Washington, DC, and overseas. The Korean aid bureaucracy is minuscule by comparison: the two primary agencies that distribute over 80 percent of the aid employ only about 300 persons, of whom about 90

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are based outside of South Korea. Given these and other contrasts, how might South Korea and the United States cooperate in the area of development assistance in ways that are beneficial to both sides and a net gain for the recipients of aid? And how might such cooperation make a difference to the US-ROK alliance? This chapter argues that active and innovative US-ROK cooperation in assisting less advanced countries has the potential to enrich and advance the aid programs of the United States and South Korea while expanding the bilateral alliance into an area of positive partnership with a global demonstration effect. As a leader in the G-20 and the host in 2011 of the most important global aid forum, South Korea is emerging into the leadership ranks on the global stage and is demonstrating its commitment through an expanded aid program. The United States is placing enhanced emphasis on development aid as a third pillar (along with diplomacy and defense) in its global strategy. There is potential for cooperation and mutual learning in three areas: high-level aid policy dialogue; collaboration on urgent global themes, such as climate change and food security; and project-level partnerships in selected countries to explore and demonstrate new aid strategies. As an indirect benefit, effective bilateral cooperation in this area will contribute to preparing the two allies for a cooperative approach to rebuilding North Korea if and when that becomes possible.

South Korea’s ODA: An Overview

South Korea is a newcomer to the aid donor community. In fact, it is one of the first countries to graduate from being a recipient of massive postwar and developmental assistance to becoming an OECD member and provider of aid to less developed countries. Between its liberation from Japan in 1945 and the 1990s, South Korea received some US$12.7 billion in development assistance from the United States, other countries, and the multilateral development agencies. South Korea’s generally effective use of foreign aid has been cited as an important factor in the country’s rapid economic advancement.2 South Korea’s assistance to other countries was officially inaugurated with the establishment of the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) in 1987, a concessional loan window under the ExportImport Bank of Korea. In 1991 the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) was created under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to manage grant and technical assistance programs. Over the last

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two decades South Korea’s aid infrastructure and volume have increased gradually, with more rapid expansion since 2005. In January 2010, South Korea became a member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the prestigious group of major aid providers that works to increase, coordinate, and improve the effectiveness of bilateral aid. In line with this step, South Korea has committed to a major increase in its official development assistance (ODA) by 2015, up to 0.25 percent of its GNI, which, if achieved, would result in tripling its current level of assistance.3 South Korea’s commitment to increasing its ODA and raising its profile in the aid community is closely linked with the country’s broader effort to take a leadership role in Asia and on the world stage. South Korea represents the fourteenth-largest economy in the world.4 Its economy is tied closely to East Asia through trade, investment, tourism, and dependence on migrant workers. It is playing an increasingly prominent role in the ASEAN Plus Three grouping, as demonstrated by the inauguration of the ASEAN-Korea Centre in Seoul in March 2009. In November 2010, South Korea hosted the G-20 meeting of finance officials and heads of government in Seoul, and ensured that development cooperation was high on the agenda for the first time. In clear recognition of its emerging global role related to ODA issues, South Korea hosted the fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4), in 2011, where strategies for attaining the Millennium Development Goals and fulfilling the commitments made in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action were discussed.5 In short, this is a time of expansion but also of self-examination and realignment in South Korea’s ODA programs. South Korea is looking for new models and new partnerships to strengthen and expand its ODA operations. It could be a fortuitous time for increased cooperation with another bilateral donor such as the United States.

Current Status of South Korea’s ODA South Korea’s Aid Architecture and Management

Similar to a number of other aid-providing countries, South Korea divides its development assistance primarily between a concessional loan portfolio and a grant and technical assistance portfolio. Each is administered separately. Bilateral loans, as well as trust funds established with multilateral institutions, are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of

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Strategy and Finance (MOSF) with operations handled by the Korea Import-Export Bank through its Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF). MOSF’s role in assembling and managing the overall government budget gives it particular weight for influencing the size and allocation of the ODA budget. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) has jurisdiction over the grant and technical assistance programs, as well as contributions to the programs of multilateral organizations. Most of the grant and technical assistance programs are implemented by KOICA working under MOFAT. About 10 percent of South Korea’s total ODA is scattered among a large number of other ministries and government agencies, mostly in the form of training and technical assistance projects. MOFAT represents South Korea in the major multilateral forums related to ODA policy and coordination, including the OECD, the United Nations Millennium Project, the High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness, and international development agencies such as the United Nations Development Program. MOFAT also manages and negotiates bilateral cooperation with aid recipient states and cooperation with other donor governments. For these reasons MOFAT has the heaviest responsibility within the Korean bureaucracy for setting and pursuing ODA goals and for interacting with other ODA players. South Korea’s international volunteer program, which began modestly in 1990, has become one of the most visible and popular aspects of its international cooperation program. In 2009 President Lee Myung-bak launched World Friends Korea to bring under single management and brand a number of public and private overseas volunteer programs and to increase coordination in the field.6 Coordinated by KOICA, the program has placed around 1,000 two-year volunteers annually in recent years, making it second only to the Peace Corps in program size. Over the past twenty years, some 7,800 volunteers have been dispatched to developing countries to work in the fields of education, health, rural development, and IT applications.7 KOICA has facilitated a high degree of coordination and even integration of the volunteers into South Korea’s country development cooperation programs. Recognizing the need for better coordination of ODA policies, strategies, and programs, a high-level committee was created in January 2006 under the office of the prime minister. The Committee for International Development Cooperation (CIDC) includes among its members representatives from MOFAT, MOSF, and other relevant ministries as well as several representatives from the private sector, with the prime minister serving as chairman. The full committee meets only once or

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twice annually. It has considered and approved a national Mid-term ODA Strategy paper as well as the annual operational plans of the major agencies. In December 2009 the South Korean National Assembly adopted the Basic Law on International Development Cooperation that establishes overarching goals, principles, and guidelines for South Korea’s ODA programs. Although it did not integrate the administration of the grant and loan programs, the legislation called for strengthening the CIDC and establishing an administrative and coordinating body within the office of the prime minister.8 South Korea’s Aid Volume and Allocation

In 2010 the total volume of South Korea’s ODA was US$1,168 million, or 0.12 percent of GNI. For the first time South Korea topped the $1 billion mark, and its year-on-year increase was 25.7 percent, the second highest among DAC member countries. In terms of volume, this places South Korea in a similar category with Finland (US$1,335 million), Austria (US$1,199 million), and Turkey (US$967 million), though Finland and Austria contribute much more as a percentage of their GNI— more than 0.55 and 0.32 percent, respectively. Compared with the United States, the largest single ODA donor, South Korea’s total ODA is about 4 percent of the total US amount.9 South Korea’s ODA volume has steadily increased since 2001, with an exceptional bulge in 2005 when South Korea made extra contributions to Iraq and Afghanistan as well as a onetime subscription to the Inter-American Development Bank. Of South Korea’s 2009 total ODA expenditure of $816 million (the last year for which a breakdown is available), US$580 million was in the form of bilateral aid, while US$236 million was contributed through multilateral channels. The bilateral aid was allocated between project grants and technical assistance programs (US$366 million) administered primarily by the KOICA and concessional loans under the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (US$214 million) administered by the Export-Import Bank of Korea. South Korea’s bilateral assistance, both for grant and loan aid, is provided almost entirely through government-to-government agreements. Less than 2 percent of KOICA’s grant and technical assistance aid is provided through Korean nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).10 The policy guidance under which KOICA operates does not provide for grants to non-Korean international or recipient-country development NGOs. The ROK government has made official commitments to increase

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the volume of its ODA to 0.25 percent of GNI by the year 2015. If this materializes it would mean that total ODA (grants and loans) would come to approximately US$3 billion, or a 200 percent increase between 2010 and 2015. Obviously this will be a major fiscal and political challenge given the global financial problems that began in late 2008, but if recent annual rates of increase are maintained, the goal appears to be within reach.11 The official figures for South Korea’s ODA do not include the humanitarian and other assistance that South Korea has provided to North Korea, although aid by other countries to the North is considered in calculating their ODA. According to South Korea’s constitution, the division of the peninsula is temporary and the territory controlled by North Korea is not a foreign state but is under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea. Another factor is that South Korea’s aid to the North is entangled with complex political considerations that complicate valuing it according to strict DAC guidelines. Nevertheless, the value of the South’s humanitarian aid to the North has been substantial. South Korea reports that from 1995 to 2010 it contributed food, fertilizer, medicines, and other forms of assistance worth over 3 trillion won, or about $2.5 billion. In addition, South Korea has supported multilateral aid efforts in the North through the World Food Programme, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).12 Although it is not clear how much of this assistance would qualify as ODA under DAC guidelines, if a large portion of this were included, Korea’s ODA total, as a percentage of GNI, would be substantially larger.13 South Korea’s Aid Policies and Priorities

A general principle that guides much of South Korea’s approach to international cooperation is that other countries can benefit from South Korea’s own remarkable development experience. This has led to two major tendencies in its aid programs: (1) providing a large portion of its aid in the form of loans, based on the view that such aid engenders responsible investment and disciplined accounting, both critical to longterm development success; and (2) focusing on training in South Korea and dispatch of South Korean technical advisors as major strategies for assisting other countries. The emphasis on loans over grant aid runs counter to the trend among DAC members, and South Korea has made a commitment to gradually shift the balance. Training and consulting can certainly contribute to human and institutional capacity building, and

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South Korea has formalized this effort in a Knowledge Sharing Program. However, South Korea faces the challenge of integrating and focusing widely dispersed efforts for long-term impact on particular institutions in partner countries.14 South Korea’s recent emergence from underdevelopment makes its experience more accessible to countries that are looking for lessons and models. Thus, it is important that South Korean experts accurately extract lessons from South Korea’s own development experience as a basis for sharing with today’s developing countries. South Korea’s rapid economic transformation has long been a case to be explained in the literature of development. There is broad agreement that the global context within which South Korea moved rapidly up the ladder from laborintensive production to high-value production for export markets has changed drastically. And there were many particular, if not unique, circumstances that favored South Korea’s development because of its front-line position in the Cold War. The leadership style of President Park Chung-hee is often indicated as a critical element in South Korea’s early success, but authoritarian rule cannot be comfortably recommended to aid recipient countries. Nevertheless, South Korea can rightly point to certain policies and developmental investments that many countries could emulate. These could include the importance of land reform, government guidance and planning, emphasis on education, early investment in science and technology research, compensating investments in rural and agricultural development, as well as using aid to build domestic technical capacity and a local production base for long-term development.15 South Korea is taking its own history and experience into the global debate on development aid. Even before becoming a member of the OECD-DAC, South Korea participated in the major multilateral forums on improving aid effectiveness, including as host of the HLF-4 in Busan. South Korea has adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and incorporated relevant targets into its policy documents and program guidelines. South Korea has committed to taking steps to apply the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and to target more of its aid to the least developed countries (LDCs). South Korea has signed on to the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) and is participating in the follow-up to the Monterrey Consensus on increasing aid commitments. In 2008, South Korea became a participant in the Multilateral Organizations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN). South Korea has taken practical steps toward implementing these various commitments. It continues to disburse its aid to a large number

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of countries around the globe. However, in 2007, eighteen countries were identified as midterm “strategic partner countries.” These include seven countries in Asia, four countries in Africa, three countries in Central and Latin America, two countries in the Middle East, and two countries in Central Asia. Selection was based, apparently, on a mix of criteria, including need, resource diplomacy, and strategic commitments. In 2006, South Korea made a special commitment to increase its assistance to greatest-needs areas in Sub-Saharan Africa with a particular focus on the MDGs. South Korea has channeled funds generated by the Air Ticket Levy Fund to efforts by UNITAID to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria in Africa. It has also directed some funds to South Korean NGOs that have opened health programs in African countries. In the Mid-Term ODA Strategy (2007–2010), for the first time South Korea identified “priority sectors” for its assistance. Considering the MDGs, partner-country priorities, South Korea’s comparative advantage, and mutual economic benefit, South Korea identified seven priority sectors: human resource development, public health, governance, information and communications technology, rural development, industrial infrastructure, and environment and global issues. With this broad set of issues South Korea aims to better integrate its aid efforts using both loans and grant aid. Gender and local environmental concerns are considered crosscutting issues, but these have received less attention to date. Finally, South Korea has committed to basing its program planning on country assistance strategies (CAS) that reflect the actual conditions, needs, and aid gaps for each target country. Preliminary CAS were developed for the eighteen strategic partner counties in 2007. The CAS were produced with the assistance of South Korean research consultants and were based primarily on data supplied by ROK embassies in the particular countries. Apparently, however, MOFAT and MOSF developed separate rather than integrated CAS for each target country.16

Challenges Facing South Korea’s ODA Program

South Korea’s ODA program has come a long way in a short time. To some extent the attention to international assistance has lagged behind the rapid emergence of South Korea on the world stage in terms of its economic position and its diplomatic aspirations. However, the ROK government has recognized this fact and is moving rapidly to correct it.

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In 2008, South Korea invited the OECD-DAC to conduct a “special peer review” of its ODA program in order to identify areas that needed strengthening. Also, a number of South Korean development experts have produced invited and uninvited evaluations of South Korea’s foreign aid programs. The South Korean NGO community has added its voice to those calling for improvements in the ROK’s programs. Based on these various critiques, a number of challenges to South Korea’s ODA program can be identified.17 Need for Overall Program Coordination

South Korea’s various aid programs continue to suffer from lack of coordination in Seoul and in the field, resulting in scattered efforts and reduced long-term impact. Efforts to address this problem through the recently strengthened CIDC and development of national Country Assistance Strategy appear not to have been very successful. In particular, the two primary program pillars, KOICA and the EDCF loan program, continue to develop and implement programs separately. They also organize competing policy reviews and international conferences in Seoul on ODA issues.18 Strengthening Aid Effectiveness

South Korea is to be commended for signing on to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and related multilateral commitments.19 However, as pointed out by the DAC in its 2008 Special Review of South Korea’s ODA program, South Korea lags behind most other major donors in applying some of the basic aid effectiveness principles. The DAC finds South Korea particularly weak on the criteria of alignment with recipient partners’ own country strategic plans and systems, harmonization and cooperation with other donors, and untying of aid.20 In 2006, fully 98 percent of South Korea’s bilateral aid was fully or partially tied to use of South Korean companies, products, or manpower. The average for DAC members in 2006 was 47 percent. Since then, South Korea has set targets for drastically reducing the proportion of tied aid by 2015. Expanding Field-Based Infrastructure

Although overseas staffing has increased in the last three years, South Korea still has only about ninety aid program representatives (from

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KOICA or the EDCF program) in its embassies around the world to coordinate its aid programs in the field. Usually there are only one or two representatives in major program countries, with administration in many countries the responsibility of the diplomatic representatives. Managing the large number of overseas volunteers consumes a great deal of the time and attention of many KOICA overseas representatives. KOICA line staff are mainly young and enthusiastic, but the agency appears to be seriously understaffed for the mandate it has been given, especially considering the rapid increase in the ODA budget. Demand-Based Rather Than Supply-Based Assistance

There is a tendency for South Korea to bring the same forms of assistance to most situations. In the field there is heavy emphasis on physical infrastructure (roads, schools, training centers, hospitals, etc.) for which long-term sustainability without ongoing support is frequently a problem. A large portion of the aid budget goes to training programs held in South Korea and to paying South Korean consultants to advise partner governments and institutions. Such inputs can certainly be part of an effective program, but would be more effective if based on an initial onthe-ground assessment of needs framed by a Country Assistance Strategy and with reference to the Millennium Development Goals. Balanced Emphasis on Branding

As with almost all aid providers, South Korea is anxious to receive recognition for the aid it provides and to create a positive image in the aid-recipient countries. Since it has a relatively small amount of aid to dispense, South Korea places more emphasis on branding than most aid providers. This leads to favoring high-visibility projects that may or may not be the highest-priority needs. It also leads to little aid being provided through multilateral channels and reluctance to join donor coalitions, to provide budget support, or to partner with local or international NGOs. Expanding Cooperation with Other Players

For many of the reasons cited above, South Korea’s ODA programs tend to operate in relative isolation from other international donors in the field. This is understandable given the lean staffing and the relatively limited resources. However, it can become a serious problem as South Korea ramps up its aid in priority countries where multiple donors are

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operating, such as Cambodia, and in fragile or conflict-affected states such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Increasing Collaboration with Nongovernmental Organizations

There is only limited collaboration between South Korean ODA agencies and development NGOs. South Korea channels only about 1 percent of its ODA to Korean NGOs operating overseas, and has no provision for working directly with partner-country civil-society organizations. The South Korean NGO sector is not insignificant. The South Korean umbrella group of development NGOs reported that their fiftysix member organizations spent about $400 million for overseas development projects in 2007, which, if accurate, would represent more than one-half of Korea’s total ODA expenditures for that year.21 Expanding its cooperation with South Korean, international, and partner-country NGOs would enable South Korea’s ODA to enlarge its focus on addressing basic needs and human rights issues. Public Knowledge and Support

MOFAT and KOICA have increased their outreach to the Korean public in recent years, which appears to have had positive results. Survey results indicate that public support for assisting less developed countries has increased from 62 percent in 2005 to 89 percent in 2011.22 The Korean public appears to be more aware of the obligation it owes to the international community for its own economic progress, as well as its continuing dependence on expanding global prosperity and security. Whether this high level of support can survive an economic downturn, or Korean unification, remains to be seen. Pending Liability: North Korea

While South Korea has provided substantial assistance to the North for over a decade, the financial liability of early unification will no doubt be massive by comparison. North Korea has a per capita GDP only 5 percent that of the South and with a population of some 25 million, half the size of the South. Estimates of the cost to South Korea for substantially raising Northern living standards in a reasonable time frame vary widely, but $1.5 trillion over twenty to thirty years is widely cited, or some $50 billion per year.23 If and when that bill comes due, it would certainly take priority over assistance to others.

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Overview of US ODA

The United States has a much longer and more complex history as an aid donor than South Korea. Nevertheless, like South Korea’s, the US ODA effort has recently entered a period of creative debate over its future direction and the need for enhancing the effectiveness of its massive aid programs. After a slow start, the Barack Obama administration has launched several initiatives to reestablish development aid as a major part of America’s international relations. US foreign aid is rooted in a broadly felt humanitarian impulse among Americans to help those obviously in need. However, it has usually been justified politically on very practical grounds. Born in the Cold War, the US foreign aid program has always had a strong link to US global security concerns. This link was further strengthened in the response to the September 11, 2001, attacks. As a product of the United States’ political process, aid has also been aligned with US commercial interests at home and abroad. These different motivations for aid, though not necessarily conflicting, have resulted in program drift and fragmentation over the years since the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was enacted. That legislation created the US Agency for International Development (USAID) as the primary agency for delivering humanitarian and development aid. Today US assistance is delivered through a large number of channels and agencies, creating serious coordination problems.24 The United States continues to be the world’s largest single donor country. Development aid totaled some US$30 billion in 2010. Although aid allocations have been on an upward trend since 2007, US ODA is still only 0.21 percent of GNI, one of the lowest among the members of the OECD-DAC. Moreover, contrary to the belief of many Americans, development aid amounts to no more than 1 percent of the total US federal budget. It is fair to mention, however, that US private philanthropy supporting assistance to people in developing countries is probably greater in volume than official aid.25 The United States is certainly the biggest player on the block when it comes to foreign aid. Over the past six years, significant changes have been introduced in the administration of US foreign assistance. Under the George W. Bush administration new program initiatives were launched and a new position of director of foreign assistance was created to improve coordination, but the basic problems of program coordination and focus remained unaddressed. With strong encouragement and pressure from the nongovernmental development sector, the Obama administration has attempted to establish devel-

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opment as the third pillar of US foreign policy, alongside defense and diplomacy. In September 2010 President Obama issued the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development, providing policy mandates and guidance to all US government agencies involved in overseas development. This was followed by the groundbreaking Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review that seeks to integrate all civilian US efforts overseas. Central to this effort was a plan to rebuild USAID and strengthen its leadership role in the United States and the global development communities. The challenge now facing the US administration is following through on these bold plans in a period of increasing financial austerity.

US ODA Architecture

The current US foreign aid establishment is so complex and scattered that it is difficult to give a short overview. In addition to the major agencies involved, foreign aid is distributed through some twenty other US departments, agencies, and offices. Also, the aid that can be defined as ODA is buried within multiple layers of legislation termed “foreign aid,” which in turn is found within the “international affairs” (the “150 account”) of the federal budget. Following is a summary description of the major agencies involved. USAID administers most of the bilateral development and relief programs, including economic development, health, food and agricultural assistance, and strengthening democracy. In FY2010, USAID administered a budget of $20.3 billion. It employed a total staff—in Washington, DC, and approximately eighty overseas missions—of over 8,800 US citizens and locally recruited staff. A program to increase the number of permanent American staff was initiated in 2008.26 Nevertheless, the size of the USAID budget and staff is much smaller than it was two decades ago. Much of the USAID budget is channeled to US private contractors who plan and implement programs on the ground. The USAID administrator reports to the secretary of state but does not have jurisdiction over all State Department aid programs, much less programs outside of the department. The Department of State directly administers several large programs. The Global AIDS Initiative begun under President Bush had an FY2010 budget of $5.4 billion and an entire office of its own. Another $12 billion was allocated to an array of programs, including refugee

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relief, human rights promotion, and law enforcement, plus security-related programs. State also channels funds to some international agencies, such as UNICEF. The Department of the Treasury participates in and channels contributions to multilateral development organizations such as the World Bank and regional development banks, deals with foreign debt reduction initiatives, and provides financial technical assistance. For these programs it was allocated $2.7 billion in the FY2010 budget. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was created in 2004 as a government corporation chaired by the secretary of state to administer the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) initiative. Operating independently of other aid agencies, the MCC channels significantly higher levels of aid to countries that enter into measurable agreements to implement economic, political, and social reforms viewed as supportive of successful development. With a staff of only 300 the corporation managed a budget of $1.1 billion in FY2010. Other important US aid programs include the Peace Corps ($400 million in FY2010), the Trade and Development Agency ($55 million), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation ($29 million), and contributions to regional development foundations ($53 million). The Department of Defense (DoD) manages large programs for training and equipping foreign military, with the bulk of the aid going to Israel, Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The DoD also funds and manages programs that could qualify as ODA, including development assistance in conflict zones, disaster relief, and perhaps some aspects of counter-drug projects. The military has vastly expanded its role in delivering nonmilitary assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the OECD does not count any aid delivered by the military in calculating US ODA. US Aid Policies and Priorities

The Obama administration has outlined a new strategic direction for US development assistance that emphasizes (1) sustainable development based on broad-based economic growth, (2) an operational model focused on effectiveness and results, and (3) an institutional architecture that harnesses development capabilities spread across the government.27 Official guidelines assert, “Economic growth is the only sustainable way to accelerate development and eradicate poverty.” Emphasis is placed on the next generation of emerging markets (“more South Koreas and fewer North Koreas,” as USAID administrator Rajiv Shah has said),28 game-

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changing technologies, building public-sector capacity in developing countries, and balancing civilian and military resources in conflict and postcrisis situations. The operational model explicitly emphasizes country ownership and responsibility, close coordination with other public and private donors, and rigorous impact evaluation. In an effort to enhance administrative coordination and program coherence, the new policy aims to strengthen USAID and bring the USAID administrator into national security consultations, establishes an Interagency Policy Committee on Global Development, mandates the chief of mission in each partner country to ensure coordination across all programs at the national level through country assistance strategies, and creates a Global Development Council to solicit input from outside government. Some idea of current US ODA priorities can be ascertained by examining the allocation of the bulk of development aid. Under an initiative launched in 2006, called the “F Process,” steps were taken to bring some cohesion to the fragmented State and USAID programs by consolidating the planning and budgeting process and developing an overarching framework for categorizing and reporting on programs. All budgeted programs were grouped by fairly loose criteria under five broad headings. The allocation of FY2010 funding was distributed as follows:29 Peace and Security, 29.5 percent; Investing in People (primarily health), 31.1 percent; Governing Justly & Democratically, 10.4 percent; Promoting Economic Growth & Prosperity, 14.8 percent; Humanitarian Assistance, 14.2 percent.30

Challenges in US ODA

The US foreign assistance effort is massively larger and more complex than that of South Korea’s. Nevertheless, it is striking that many of the problems and challenges facing the US program parallel those faced by the smaller South Korean ODA program. It is also interesting, and important for the purposes of this study, that both countries are now undergoing a period of soul searching about how to reorganize and improve their ODA programs. The Obama administration appears to have responded to many of the concerns raised over the last several years by the US aid establishment.31 Like South Korea, the United States has also benefited from a DAC Peer Review, conducted early in 2011.32 US aid experts and the DAC report identify a number of issues that require attention, as follows.

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Building Public and Political Support

Putting meat on the bones of the new aid policy and strategy directions will require support from the US Congress and the understanding of the American public. The US public is far behind South Koreans in understanding and supporting development assistance. Polling consistently shows that while most Americans support humanitarian aid abroad, they vastly overestimate the share of the US federal budget that goes to foreign aid, and they put aid at the top of the list for cuts during periods of fiscal austerity.33 American politicians take advantage of this softness when it comes time to find budget reductions. Strong leadership and more effective education programs will be needed to garner support for achieving the vision outlined in the administration’s new policy initiatives. Greater Coordination of Effort

Whether the steps taken by the Obama administration will reduce program fragmentation and enhance coordination of effort remains to be seen, but many observers remain skeptical. Nongovernmental experts had recommended that a cabinet-level position be established (as in the UK) in order to put foreign assistance on an equal footing with diplomacy and defense. While strengthening the mandate and efficiency of USAID may help, observers are not impressed by the limited authority and access given to the administrator. The full impact of the US aid effort will likely continue to be hampered by scattered programs and divided authority. Integrating Strategies for Fragile and Recovering States

Effective humanitarian aid and developmental assistance are critical for stabilizing and reforming states in conflict or emerging from conflict. The United States has allocated massive aid to such states in recent years. Using the lessons learned, strategies should be developed for coordinating and delivering aid from the various sources that effectively address the most critical problems in ways that do not conflate the roles of military and civilian actors. Commitment to Aid Effectiveness Principles

The DAC Peer Review highlights three areas to which the United States should give attention: (1) increased use of partner-country systems for

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contracting and channeling aid, (2) in-country harmonization and cooperation with other donors, and (3) further reducing the amount of aid “tied” to US suppliers and products. In spite of some reduction in recent years, the United States has one of the highest levels of tied aid among current DAC members. “Buy America” restrictions are embedded in much US aid legislation based on political considerations, and thus only incremental progress can be expected. There are strong arguments to be made for open procurement from cost-effectiveness and local capacitybuilding perspectives. Improving Monitoring and Evaluation

USAID has announced renewed attention to results-oriented programming and impact evaluation. Fragmented programs, fluctuating budget levels, and relatively short timelines have always made monitoring and evaluating US aid programs difficult. Independent and practical evaluation is critical for achieving long-term impact, and for reporting results to legislators and the general public. To meet this challenge, USAID and other US agencies can draw on the increased attention given by development experts to developing innovative and credible monitoring and evaluation techniques.

Rationale and Basis for US-ROK Cooperation in ODA

The US and ROK governments have agreed at the highest levels to expand their alliance to include active cooperation in the area of international development assistance. However, the ROK and US foreign assistance programs differ tremendously in scale, operational infrastructure, and program complexity. Perhaps it is not immediately apparent that there would be mutual benefit from cooperation between these asymmetrical programs. Nevertheless, some considerations suggest mutual benefits that each could derive from consultation and cooperation. Shared Rationales for Cooperation

The United States and South Korea, along with other major world economies, share a strong national interest in a stable global environment in which economic growth can recover and continue. As a highly export-dependent economy, South Korea has a particular interest in stabilizing and expanding markets for its technology-heavy exports and for

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gaining access to the resources upon which its industrial base relies. Both countries are using ODA as one strategy in their tool kits to support development in strategic parts of the world in a way that generates goodwill and mutually beneficial commercial ties. The United States has taken the lead in responding to crises in fragile and transitional states in strategic parts of the world but looks to its allies also to contribute to a common effort. The United States recognizes that the crises in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo cannot be resolved by military force alone, but that humanitarian and development assistance is essential for bringing rapid and lasting improvements in people’s lives. While there are limitations to South Korea’s capacity to assist on the military side, it has a lot to offer based on its own historical experience in helping to rebuild postconflict or fragile states, and the United States would welcome an expanded partnership with South Korea in this area. In general, cooperation in the area of ODA is a natural and positive way for South Korea and the United States to expand the scope of their historical alliance. The primarily military and peninsula-related focus of the US-ROK alliance is already shifting as the regional and global factors that brought it into existence change. To the extent the governments in both countries see value in maintaining a close alliance in this shifting context, cooperation in the area of ODA can help create a new basis and image of the alliance that could attract the support of their publics and the respect of the world community. Particular South Korean Rationales for Cooperation

By joining the OECD-DAC, placing development cooperation high on the G-20 agenda, and hosting the fourth High-Level Forum on aid effectiveness, South Korea has joined the ranks of major international aid donors. However, as one of the newest players and with a relatively small budget, it will be challenging for South Korea to meet the expectations that it has raised. Dialogue and cooperation with the US aid community can be an opportunity to sharpen its program quality and move into a leadership role in the context of a comfortable and established alliance framework. Cooperation with the United States could focus on specific effectiveness issues while demonstrating increased harmonization among donors, a key element of aid effectiveness. A very particular rationale in South Korea’s case is preparation for contingencies in relation to North Korea. Through their alliance structures South Korea and the United States are already discussing diplomatic and military contingencies for various scenarios of change in

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North Korea. It is highly likely that, under such contingencies, humanitarian and developmental assistance would become an urgent and costly need. Cooperation in ODA now in other fragile contexts could provide unique and timely experience and models for a cooperative response on the peninsula. Comparative ODA Strengths and Interests

It is useful, based on our earlier analysis of the two programs, to identify the particular strengths and program interests of the two ODA programs. This comparison can suggest areas in which cooperation could be based on shared interests or on complementary strengths (see Table 10.1).

Some Examples of ODA Bilateral Cooperation

Donor countries and agencies can cooperate in a number of ways in the area of development assistance. Most of the major bilateral agencies regularly consult on policy issues through multilateral forums (e.g., the Development Assistance Committee) and bilateral meetings. There is collaboration in the field through joint studies, program consortia, and joint project evaluations. Korea has recently begun to increase its participation in such activities, and some examples could suggest a starting point for US-ROK bilateral cooperation.

Table 10.1 South Korean and US ODA Programs: Strengths and Interests South Korea

United States

A US aid success story

Wealth of ODA experience and models

Relevant and accessible to developing countries

Dense field-based infrastructure

Technical training capacity

Experience in fragile/transitional states

Information and green technologies

Extensive partnerships with NGOs

Agricultural and rural development

Governance and democracy

Infrastructure development

Large-scale resources

Focus on East Asia; commitment to expand aid to Africa

Focus on Africa; strategic interest in South Asia

Second-largest overseas volunteer program (World Friends Korea)

Largest overseas volunteer program (Peace Corps)

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Bilateral Policy Dialogues

South Korea has participated in several high-level bilateral dialogues on ODA policy. In June 2008, South Korea and Japan held the first Aid Policy Consultation, following up on a commitment made at the summit between the two national leaders earlier that year. The two governments agreed to coordinate their positions at DAC and other multilateral meetings and to mandate that their aid agencies collaborate on selected program initiatives in Asia and Africa.34 South Korea has also conducted three policy dialogue meetings with the UK (the third meeting took place in February 2008), as well as separate high-level dialogues with the European Union, Sweden, and Norway. The apparent purposes of these dialogues have been to smooth the way for South Korea’s membership in the DAC and to compare positions on aid architecture, aid effectiveness, and program initiatives related to achieving the MDGs. In some cases intentions have been expressed to pursue collaboration in the field.35 Bilateral Program Cooperation

Cooperation between South Korean aid agencies and other aid agencies in the field has not been extensive, but it does appear to be increasing. Not surprisingly, given the similarity in organizational structures and development policies, cooperation is more advanced with Japan than with other donor countries. One example is collaboration between KOICA and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in Afghanistan, where the two agencies have designed and are jointly implementing a vocational training-of-trainers program. In-country sessions are held in the Korean-built training center at Bagram Air Base with alternating classes taught by South Korean– and Japanese-provided trainers. (The Japanese contracted trainers from Iran to conduct classes.) Some of the Afghan participants travel to South Korea and Japan for additional training. The two agencies are also supporting the same project in Afghanistan to develop and promote soybean production.36 A similar initiative is being planned between the two agencies in Cambodia focused on training and infrastructure for rehabilitating an irrigation system. Earlier, in 2005, KOICA and JICA organized a joint training course for Chinese scientists on restoration of freshwater ecologies. In both cases, cooperation took the form of coordination of separate training activities for the same target participants. An interesting example of triangular cooperation has developed among South Korea and Chile and other South American countries.

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KOICA works with Chile to plan and staff training programs in Chile for development officials and workers from other countries in the region. The purpose is to strengthen the capacity of Chile’s own programs as well as to provide training in the region in a more efficient manner. Inquiries directly to a number of KOICA field representatives revealed a trend toward more cooperation on an independent basis by field offices. Several KOICA representatives reported that they more frequently participate in country-level multilateral donor consultations, sectoral meetings, and workshops. Also, KOICA representatives in several countries reported cooperation between the Korean Overseas Volunteers and the JICA and UN volunteers. Korea-US NGO Cooperation

In 2008 the Asia Foundation (TAF) entered into a partnership with the government-funded Korean Development Institute School of Public Policy and Management (KDI School) for implementing a program aimed at supporting South Korea’s role as an aid provider to developing countries in Asia. The program taps the foundation’s extensive network covering eighteen countries in Asia to organize projects that enhance the capacity of staff of ROK government agencies and NGOs to develop and implement effective development assistance programs. TAF organizes intensive orientations and long-term fellowships in developing Asian countries for Korean government and NGO development managers. TAF also cooperates with Korean agencies to organize training programs in South Korea for government and NGO representatives from developing Asian countries, and facilitates dialogue between South Korea and other countries on development issues through international conferences. Funding for all direct costs is provided by the Korean government through KDI School, while TAF contributes its operational network and staff time.37 The Brookings Institution worked with KOICA and JICA to organize a research project comparing perspectives on development cooperation issues, including aid and development effectiveness. A book has been published and made available to participants in the upcoming Busan High-Level Forum.38

Possible Obstacles to Successful Cooperation

The United States and South Korea have a broad agenda of security, economic, and other important issues as a focus for strengthening their

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bilateral relationship. Cooperation in the area of ODA, if not the most compelling, has a strong rationale for the reasons elaborated upon earlier. Nevertheless, a number of factors might be considered obstacles that must be addressed in order to initiate and sustain cooperation on ODA. Many in South Korea’s aid agencies acknowledge that they could probably benefit from the longer and broader US aid experience, but there is some anxiety about being overshadowed. On the US side, it may be difficult to view cooperation with South Korea’s much smaller and younger aid institutions as contributing to achieving its own ODA goals. Looking at it another way, however, South Korea’s emergence from being one of the largest benefactors of US aid to becoming an equal partner in the DAC is a unique success story that the two countries share. Taking this relationship to the level of cooperation in effective assistance to less advanced countries is a demonstration of a strikingly successful bilateral relationship that could positively contribute to the broader diplomatic goals of both countries. Timing might be considered a problem. The aid establishments in both countries are undergoing a period of organizational transition involving inward focus and institutional reorganization. The flip side is that both programs are more open to innovation than before, and the case can be made that new ideas and strategies can emerge from modest but practical cooperative efforts. Likewise, the aid bureaucracies in both countries are feeling overstretched and may view a mandate to add bilateral cooperation at policy and program levels as an additional burden without clear payoff. On the other hand, USAID is moving to replenish its staff rosters with development professionals, and KOICA is staffed at the entry and middle levels by highly motivated young people with more international experience and consciousness than many of their elders. It is likely that there are key staff in each agency that would see value in bilateral cooperation. Both the United States and South Korea place high priority on national branding through ODA, so sharing credit and recognition for development aid may be difficult. However, joint branding of selected cooperative projects in the field would demonstrate a commitment to harmonization in the interests of the recipient countries, a main principle of aid effectiveness. A more sticky issue is that both countries link their aid programs broadly (and sometimes more directly) with the drive for national commercial benefits. Cooperation in areas that offer the prospect for such benefits may create problems. Nevertheless, this could be approached as

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an opportunity to contribute to the development of global norms to guide public-private partnerships that are clearly beneficial to the less developed countries while helping to meet the legitimate economic goals of donor countries.

A Suggested Approach to US-ROK Cooperation on ODA

The June 2011 agreement signed by the ROK and US governments to cooperate in the area of international development provides an outline of how this cooperation might proceed. The agreement calls for annual development consultations, led by KOICA and USAID, which will set the agenda and review progress. It also empowers KOICA and USAID to form a working group to develop detailed plans for cooperation. The agreement identifies a number of priority areas around which cooperation might be developed: global hunger and food security, climate change and environment, disaster response and humanitarian assistance, overseas volunteerism, promotion of public-private partnership, health and education, and aid effectiveness. It calls for focusing initially on maternal and child health in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is a fairly comprehensive list that gives the working group broad latitude in developing concrete programs for cooperation. What follows are a few ideas that might be considered in narrowing and focusing bilateral cooperation in order to move forward and produce some early results. Cooperation could proceed along three tracks: policy dialogue, global themes, and field-level cooperation. Policy Dialogue

This is a time of widespread evaluation and reconsideration of the role and effectiveness of foreign assistance in the development process of poorer countries. Following HLF-4 in Busan, the debate is expected to move to more fundamental questions related to supporting sustained, self-reliant, and widely beneficial growth in developing countries. Busan included new voices from non-DAC donors, such as China, India, and Brazil, and from civil-society representatives who are challenging the basic underpinnings of the traditional approach to aid and calling for major changes in the design and delivery of assistance. In this context, a joint Korea-US Policy Dialogue on Development Cooperation, a management-level group, could make an important contribution.

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A joint dialogue and research program could focus on drawing up practical lessons for contributing to the ongoing aid debate. This dialogue would build on the ROK’s major Knowledge Sharing Program that seeks to analyze and draw out lessons from South Korea’s own development experience that could be valuable to today’s developing countries. A joint ROK-US team composed of government aid staff as well as academic and NGO development experts from the two countries39 could undertake or commission joint studies focusing on such issues as • Lessons from the history of US aid to South Korea, 1953–1980. • Lessons from recent US and South Korean aid programs to selected regions or countries. • Effective strategies for promoting sustained and equitable economic growth drawing on the experience of South Korea and other middle-income countries. • Shared perspectives and joint positions on major issues before the international aid community, particularly in the area of aid effectiveness. • Models for effective collaboration with national and international nongovernmental development organizations. • Analysis of the North Korean economy and formulation of plans for cooperation in supporting reconstruction and development in a reforming North Korea. In implementing this program of dialogue and consultation, the two agencies should undertake mid- to long-term staff exchanges at the policy and management levels, as called for in the bilateral agreement, in order to deepen mutual understanding and stimulate mutual learning. Global Themes

The bilateral dialogue group should select two or three issues critical for global development progress and mandate focused and sustained research and cooperation in the selected areas. Research outcomes would include policy recommendations as well as proposals for field-based collaboration. Drawing on the priorities listed in the bilateral agreement, possible long-term focus issues might include the impact of climate change on the least developed countries and possible responses, food security in the most vulnerable regions, development cooperation in fragile and postconflict states, and effective strategies for sustained economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.

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Field-Based Cooperation

Building on the research initiated by the policy dialogue group, national ODA agencies in the two countries should design and implement projects for cooperation in selected countries. Specific plans will emerge from the research and consultative process. Linking field-based cooperation with broader themes might suggest tackling the following issues. Climate change: Focus on selected countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific that are faced with major negative impacts caused by warming temperatures and rising sea levels. Southeast Asia is South Korea’s high-priority area for ODA and of strategic concern to the United States. South Korea’s recent focus on green growth and its expertise in IT could have important applications to studying and mitigating the local impact of climate change. Food security: Select two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that have particular food security challenges. USAID has recently launched the Feed the Future initiative with a major focus on Africa, while South Korea has valuable experience in agricultural technology and community development. Sustained improvements in maternal and child health, a priority identified in the bilateral agreement, are closely tied to longterm food security. Fragile states: South Korea has gained important experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the United States is seeking a renewed commitment from its allies in these and other transitional states. Cooperating in a bilateral or multilateral consortium on projects to strengthen governance in one such context would help meet political expectations and would draw on South Korea’s experience and strengths in human and institutional capacity building. Just as important, experience with bilateral and multilateral cooperation in these challenging environments would be valuable preparation for a cooperative response to sudden change in North Korea. In planning and implementing cooperative projects in such areas, the two ODA programs should commit to the following processes that maximize aid effectiveness. Most importantly, the relevant national agencies of the aid-recipient countries should be fully involved in planning and implementing projects, and building local capacity should be of primary concern. With this in mind, South Korean and US teams could conduct a joint Country Assistance Strategy exercise to ensure that the projects contribute to addressing pressing local needs and fit

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long-term development goals. In implementing projects, a division of labor might work best. Some activities might be carried out by joint US-ROK teams, while other activities (e.g., training programs) might be implemented separately as part of an overall integrated project plan. In building local capacity, participation by local nongovernment sectors (civil society organizations, the business community, and community organizations) should be incorporated into project planning and implementation. Finally, a full evaluation and report on the project should be made by a joint US-ROK team that documents the process, assesses impact, draws out lessons for improvement, and suggests how the project can be scaled up. International Volunteer Programs

Peace Corps and World Friends volunteers represent a valuable and important resource for strengthening support for international cooperation in the two countries as well as a motivated and experienced pool for future staffing of development agencies. In pursuing bilateral cooperation, there might be a special project to explore and initiate cooperation between the two volunteer organizations. This dialogue could focus initially on sharing at the program administration level, but then explore the possibility of cooperation in areas such as in-country training, placement identification, and volunteer support. Collaboration between the returned volunteer organizations in the two countries should also be pursued, focusing on support for development studies and new opportunities for service.

Conclusion

From the beginning the US-ROK alliance has included a development and economic cooperation component. Initially this bilateral cooperation was aimed at supporting the economic development of South Korea as a strategic partner in the Cold War. More recently, with South Korea’s successful development, the two allies have sought mutual benefit from economic cooperation. Viewed from this perspective, creating a partnership for more effective development assistance to less advanced countries is a natural extension of this unique alliance. Not only will such a partnership advance their shared strategic and security goals, but bilateral cooperation on ODA will potentially lead to improvements in the aid programs of both countries. In the United States

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and South Korea, ODA is assuming a more central role in foreign policy. In both countries, aid-delivery philosophies and delivery agencies are under review. Cooperation between two close allies can be a nonthreatening means of introducing new ideas and testing new approaches. Furthermore, expanding cooperation into the area of development assistance introduces a positive dimension into the alliance that can win the support of the publics in the two countries and the respect of the international community.

Notes Special thanks to Kang Seomy and Paul Choi for assistance with research and data gathering. 1. “Statement of Intent to Cooperate on Global Development between the Department of State of the United States of America and the United States Agency for International Development and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea and the Korea International Cooperation Agency,” signed in Washington, DC, June 24, 2011, http://www.state.gov. 2. Kim Eun-mee, “From Development to Development Cooperation: Transforming 20th-Century South Korea’s Development to 21st-Century Development Cooperation,” unpublished manuscript in possession of the author, March 2011. 3. “OECD-DAC Special Peer Review Memorandum of the Republic of Korea, February 2008,” Journal of International Development Cooperation, KOICA, no. 1 (2008), pp. 91–142; the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade website, http://www.mofat.go.kr. 4. “World Development Indicators Database,” World Bank, July 1, 2011, http://siteresources.worldbank.org. 5. Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, http://www.aid effectiveness.org. 6. Na Jeong Ju, “Korea’s Peace Corps Launched,” Korea Times, May 7, 2009, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr. 7. These figures refer to Korean Overseas Volunteers, the two-year service program comparable to the US Peace Corps. A number of other governmentsupported volunteer programs have dispatched short-term volunteers so that Korea’s volunteer presence abroad is larger than this number implies. “Where Do WFKs Volunteers Work?” World Friends Korea, http://www.worldfriends korea.or.kr. 8. Jang Yong Seok, “Yu mu sang tonghabgwanli ‘ODA kibonbeob’ jejeong” (Comprehensive Management of Loans and Aid: “ODA Fundamental Law” Establishment), Asia Kyeongje (Asia Economy), December 6, 2009, http:// www.asiae.co.kr. 9. OECD-DAC statistics, http://www.oecd.org/document/61/0,3746,en _2649_34447_47515235_1_1_1_1,00.html; http://stats.oecd.org/wbos /Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ODA_DONOR.

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10. Support to South Korean NGOs managing projects in developing countries is restricted to one-half of direct program costs and no funding provided for staff or operating costs. 11. South Korea has announced a 2011 ODA budget of $1.52 billion. This represents a 30 percent increase over the 2010 total of $1.17 billion. See “S. Korea to Spend 1.7 tln Won on Poorer Nations This Year,” Yonhap News, March 6, 2011, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr. 12. “Humanitarian Assistance Data,” Korean Ministry of Unification, http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?pgname=AFFhumanitarian_assistance. 13. This fact was acknowledged in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Development Cooperation of the Republic of Korea, DAC Special Review,” August 8, 2008, http://www.oecd.org. South Korea reported to the DAC that assistance valued at $558 million delivered to North Korea in 2007 qualified as ODA, though the DAC did not attempt to verify this. Meanwhile, South Korea’s assistance to the North has fallen off sharply since 2008. 14. The Korean Development Institute (KDI) is collaborating with the World Bank to address some of these issues. One example is an international conference held in November 2009 on “Development Consulting: Search for Best Practices.” 15. For a particularly insightful piece on applying the lessons of Korea’s development to Korea’s development assistance, see Park Soo-deok, “Ways to Share Korea’s Development Experience with Africa,” Korea Focus, vol. 19, no. 2 (Summer 2011), pp. 112–125. Also, Kim Eun-mee, “From Development to Development Cooperation.” 16. Chung You-ah, “Han’guk Gongjeokgaebalwonjo (ODA) eui ‘Gukgajiwonjeonryak (CAS)’ Hwalyong Hyeonhwang-gwa Gwajae” (Current Practice and Tasks for Country Assistance Strategies in Korea’s ODA), Journal of International Development Cooperation, KOICA, no. 2 (2009), pp. 9–18. 17. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Development Cooperation of the Republic of Korea, DAC Special Review.” Several civil-society groups monitor Korea’s ODA programs, including ODA Watch Korea, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), Korean NGO Network Against Global Poverty, and the Korean Association for International Development Cooperation. PSPD coordinated an initiative to provide NGO input to DAC’s special peer review of South Korean ODA in 2008. See Representatives of the Korean NGOs, “Korean NGOs’ Position Paper on Korea’s ODA Policy,” People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, March 7, 2008, http://blog.peoplepower21.org. 18. South Korea’s ODA Watch and several development NGOs issued a sharp criticism of the December 2009 ODA Basic Law charging that it fails to correct the fundamental problem of South Korea’s ODA, namely the split responsibility between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance. See “Simindanchedeul, gugje gaebal hyeoblyeok gibbon beoban jaegeomto yocheong” (Civic Groups, Request for Re-evaluation of International Development Cooperation Law), Yonhap News, December 4, 2009, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr. 19. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, signed in 2005 by most donors (including the United States and South Korea) and many aid-recipient countries, commits signatories to make progress in five areas: “1) Ownership—

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Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption; 2) Alignment—Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems; 3) Harmonisation—Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication; 4) Results—Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and results get measured; and 5) Mutual Accountability—Donors and partners are accountable for development results.” See “Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action,” Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, http://www.oecd.org. 20. Untying aid was one of four additional goals set in the supplementary agreement signed in Accra in 2008, stating, “Donors will relax restrictions that prevent developing countries from buying the goods and services they need from whomever and wherever they can get the best quality at the lowest price.” 21. This dollar figure is 410,331,000,000 in Korean won. See Representatives of the Korean NGOs, “Korean NGOs’ Position Paper on Korea’s ODA Policy.” 22. Also, the percentage of South Koreans who feel that the aid volume is either about right or too small was 73 percent in 2011, compared to 58 percent in 2008. See Korean Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), World Economic Update, “ODA-e Daehan Yeoronjosa Juyo Naeyonggwa Sisajeom” (Major Findings and Recommendations from a Public Opinion Survey on ODA), vol. 11, no. 19 (June 27, 2011). 23. Peter M. Beck, “Contemplating Korean Reunification,” The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2010, http://online.wsj.com. President Lee Myung-bak’s proposed “unification tax” would aim to raise only some $11 billion over ten years, but even that has met with political resistance. Kim Young-jin, “Korea Working on Details of ‘Unification Tax’: Sources,” Korea Times, July 18, 2011, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr. 24. For a comprehensive overview of current US foreign assistance programs, see Curt Tarnoff and Marian Leonardo Lawson, “Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs and Policy,” Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, February 10, 2011. 25. American international private philanthropy was valued at $37.5 billion in 2009, greater than US ODA of $28.8 billion that year. See “The Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances 2011,” Center for Global Prosperity, Hudson Institute, 2011, http://www.hudson.org. 26. USAID’s staff is composed of foreign service officers (FSOs), other US citizen employees, and foreign service nationals (citizens of host countries). In FY2008, through the new Development Leadership Initiative (DLI), USAID committed to doubling the number of FSOs (currently 1,200) by 2012. 27. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: US Global Development Policy,” September 22, 2010. 28. “Remarks by Dr. Rajiv Shah, Administrator, USAID, to the Center for Global Development on January 19, 2011,” http://www.usaid.gov. 29. See Tarnoff and Lawson, “Foreign Aid,” 5. 30. “Foreign Aid Reform,” United States Government Accountability Office, April 2009 (GAO-09-192). 31. Among those who have weighed in on the debate are the Center for Global Development, the Brookings Institution, InterAction, an expert-heavy

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coalition called the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network (or the Wye River Consensus Group), the US Government Accountability Office (in a report requested by members of Congress), as well as many individual development experts. 32. “The United States (2011) DAC Peer Review: Main Findings and Recommendations,” Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, http://www.oecd.org. 33. Chicago Council on Global Affairs, “Constrained Internationalism: Adapting to New Realities, Results of a 2010 National Survey of American Public Opinion,” 2010, pp. 25–28. 34. Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper 2008,” http://www.mofa.go.jp (see section 2, “Collaboration Among Donor Countries”). 35. Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea, “Korea-UK Policy Dialogue on Development,” February 22, 2008, http:// news.mofat.go.kr. 36. Japan International Cooperation Agency, “A Most Unusual Cooperation,” July 2009, http://www.jica.go.jp. 37. The Asia Foundation and Korea Development Institute (KDI) initiated a new project, in 2010, on Asian Approaches to Development Cooperation. Government and nongovernmental aid experts from Korea, China, India, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have gathered in a series of dialogues to discuss how these emerging Asian donors implement development cooperation and how their experience might be brought into the global debate on development and aid. 38. Homi Kharas, Koji Makino, and Woojin Jung, eds., Catalyzing Development: A New Vision for Aid, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, June, 28 2011. 39. Participants in the policy dialogue could include program managers from the major government ODA agencies, as well as selected NGO representatives and development experts from each country. On the South Korean side, nongovernmental representatives should include the Korean Development Institute (KDI), the Korean Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), the Korean Association for International Development and Cooperation, and the Korean Consortium for Overseas Cooperation. Many organizations on the US side could be mentioned, including the Center for Global Development, the Brookings Institution, InterAction, and the Asia Foundation.

11 Will the Current Joint Vision Hold? Scott Snyder

THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH KOREA PRESENTED IN THEIR June 2009 Joint Vision Statement a robust and comprehensive vision for cooperation. Expanded forms of security cooperation were at the center of the agenda, buttressed by a considerably expanded network of efforts to develop new forms of economic and political cooperation. This vision has been put forward in an attempt to fulfill newly emerging twentyfirst-century security objectives, which include the possibility of enhanced partnership-based cooperation in any area of the world and on a wide range of issues. This agenda aspires to expand US-ROK interestand value-based cooperation in the Asia-Pacific regional context as a catalyst for achieving stability, prosperity, mutual understanding, confidence, and transparency. But is this aspirational document so ambitious and far-reaching that it is not viable, or is it a practical vision that will catalyze sustainable cooperation in a wide range of areas, deepening the network of ties between the two countries and strengthening the overall relationship? Moreover, will resource constraints among the United States and its NATO, Japanese, and South Korean allies render the vision of joint cooperation impracticable to meet global security challenges or to respond to China’s rise? This volume has assessed a wide range of global and functional areas in which political and security cooperation between the United States and South Korea is being expanded and deepened. Each chapter has examined in practical terms whether such cooperation would be feasible, how it might be further developed, and what practical steps might be taken to promote more effective joint efforts. The results have been mixed; some areas—such as nonproliferation, pandemics, and

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counterterrorism—show great potential for the realization of more intensive joint cooperation that will clearly contribute to mutual interests of the two countries. On the other hand, in other areas—such as international peacekeeping, overseas development cooperation, climate change, and space—there is clearly an asymmetry in approaches or capacities between the two countries that must be overcome first, before practical cooperation is likely to develop in ways that would justify the return on investment in such cooperation. To avoid overextending expectations for the US-ROK alliance partnership requires a careful assessment of how and in what specific areas South Korean capabilities may continue to develop and which areas hold the greatest promise for combined contributions. The chapters in this volume identify a number of significant challenges to the forms of cooperation under consideration. Some of these challenges are operational in the sense that implementation of a new vision requires the development of new structures for coordination. The addition of new items to the overall agenda of the alliance also makes the task of managing closer cooperation more difficult because it adds another ball that must be juggled in the ongoing effort to determine priorities, even if it presumably represents a deepening of shared interests and an expanded foundation justifying continuation of the relationship. Other challenges are conceptual. For example, are apparent shared interests indeed “special” or “deep” enough to be justified on the basis of—and to strengthen—the alliance framework as an effective way of characterizing the relationship, or does the idea of “alliance” lose meaning in a networked world where a “special” bilateral relationship may only constitute one component of a broader framework for mobilizing issue-based cooperation among like-minded nations? What is special about the contributions (and potential costs) of alliance-based coordination as opposed to other forms of cooperation that might be undertaken independently of the alliance in implementing a nation’s foreign policy? The task of alliance management in a globalized, international environment requires simultaneous management of cooperation and conflict on multiple issues and may be considered through three lenses: (1) whether shared global interests are sufficiently compelling (and can gain sufficient domestic political support) to support cooperation between alliance partners, (2) how to meet practical challenges inherent in managing a more complex bilateral agenda of shared priorities, and (3) the impact on regional dynamics of the strengthening of the US-ROK alliance relationship.

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Placing the Alliance into a Global Context

The traditional US-ROK alliance discourse has tended to center on how to defend against a specific common threat from North Korea or on how to ensure that the benefits of cooperation, especially as it relates to offpeninsula cooperation, contribute to mutual interests in ways that gain public support. Traditionally, alliances have been driven by perception of a common external threat, which in turn has fixed attention almost exclusively on ensuring that the mechanics of such cooperation are sustainable for the duration of the threat. But interest- and value-based cooperation assumes that mutual interests provide a basis for expanding cooperation to a wider range of issues or problems regardless of the existence of an external threat. The institutionalization of new forms of cooperation promotes the sustainability of the alliance and deepens the intrinsic value of alliance-based cooperation, as Victor Cha has argued.1 But it also creates pressure on the alliance to deliver sufficient capacity to justify the national investment in expanding and strengthening cooperation with allies. When considering alliance contributions to global issues, the alliance coexists with other bilateral and multilateral frameworks of “likeminded” or “strategic” cooperation, including other security alliances and regional groupings. Many of these parallel efforts are complementary and overlapping. Political cooperation among allies provides a basis for building coalitions within the international community in support of specific shared values and interests or in an effort to respond to common security threats. The US-led alliance network, of which South Korea is a part, has developed around a core set of values that allies have a collective interest in protecting and maintaining as core principles for maintaining stability within the international community. The original purpose of the US-ROK alliance of deterring North Korea serves to reinforce mutual interests in regional stability and global nonproliferation. South Korea’s contributions to postconflict stabilization operations in Iraq or Afghanistan not only may be based on and facilitated by the bilateral US-ROK alliance, but also become embedded in a broader global coalition and provide South Korea with credit and prestige in the international community. The development of such a comprehensive agenda for the bilateral alliance contributes to the consolidation of collective interests in a stable international order by enlarging international capacities to promote functional cooperation and address newly emerging, nontraditional threats to global security.

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Michael Finnegan’s analysis of US-ROK cooperation on postconflict stabilization in Afghanistan underscores the ways in which such cooperation can benefit the alliance. If both sides pursue cooperation based on mutual interests rather than primarily on obligations imposed by one partner on the other, this approach can maximize the value of cooperation for both sides. The concept of pursuit of mutual interest has been particularly hard for some to accept, precisely because of the legacy of South Korea’s security dependency on the United States that has contributed to deterrence against outside attack. But as the alliance develops into a more diversified partnership, it will become possible for South Korea to bring its own, expanded assets to the table in the service of global stability, which serves both ROK and US interests. In addition to promoting cooperation based on mutual interests in global stability, the US-ROK alliance partnership serves as a platform for South Korea to contribute as a responsible stakeholder to leadership in the international community as well as to gain prestige associated with international leadership as South Korea seeks to fulfill its vision of a “global Korea.” The development and rationale for South Korea to contribute responsibly to the global nonproliferation regime or for South Korea to build an oceangoing navy underscore ROK interests in contributing to the stability of the global order, in gaining prestige benefits as a result of South Korean contributions to international operations, and in supporting a stable environment for South Korea’s export orientation that has been at the core of its economic growth strategy for decades. South Korea’s newly developed capacity to contribute to the protection of sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs) and willingness to join antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden provides a capacity to contribute to international stability together with the United States and others with an interest in maritime stability. Likewise, the development of South Korean capabilities dedicated specifically as a contribution to international peacekeeping further underscores South Korean willingness to undertake greater international responsibilities and contributions to global peace and stability. These are tasks that the alliance should find ways to support as a means by which to elevate South Korea’s contributions and profile internationally. Although there are benefits that arise from expanding the scope of alliance cooperation to address commonly shared nontraditional and global security challenges, such a framework for cooperation also faces some specific challenges. For instance, what if nonallies have

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more to bring to the table than allies as cooperative partners, especially in addressing functional issues that constitute common problems that transcend alliance cooperation? What unique contributions is the USROK alliance able to make, or what “value-added” can the alliance specifically offer, that other partnerships cannot? The United States and South Korea may commit to work together to address climate change, but China is the country that can make a real difference in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The US-ROK alliance may have inherent capabilities that enable cooperation to counter pandemic diseases, but China has been the incubator and an active contributor to managing the regional effects of diseases such as Severe Acute Respiratory System (SARS) and bird flu. South Korea has committed to fielding a standing force of 1,000 peacekeepers to increase from the current 727 personnel, but China, whose current number of contributors to international peacekeeping already reaches nearly 2,000,2 may continue to dwarf South Korea’s capacity to contribute to a UN peacekeeping force. Nevertheless, South Korea is still more likely to share the same interests and judgments with the United States about the relative priority of specific forms of peacekeeping operations, making South Korean contributions potentially more politically valuable to the United States than Chinese contributions. In terms of mutual benefits there are many functional issues where existing bilateral or multilateral channels present an alternative to the US-ROK alliance. In these cases, alliances may feel pressure to develop specialized capabilities to contribute to addressing specific challenges. Or it may be better for the alliance to limit its efforts to address particular issues well for fear of overextending its capacity. To the extent that the US-ROK alliance is being called upon to address global issues, it is also necessary to provide a direct link between the global issue to be addressed and the combined interest of the alliance partners in working together to address that issue. It is not sustainable to say that the alliance will address every global issue on the agenda. At the same time, cooperation on global issues should result in direct benefits that may strengthen the alliance and should be designed to enhance the overall strength of the alliance. There may also be benefits that arise from close alignments among like-minded allies whose populations collectively share interests in enhanced cooperation to promote common objectives as they relate to functional issues like climate change or other human security issues. But alliance-focused cooperation on global issues might also overextend the alliance in ways that sap its capabilities and result in discord among its members.

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The Prioritization Challenge

A second major challenge that accompanies the broadening and deepening of the alliance to areas beyond traditional security is the need for more robust mechanisms for managing differences in priorities and expectations. For instance, what sorts of expectations should the United States and South Korea have for each other as allies regarding levels of commitment and real contributions—for example, in the case of US global missions in peacekeeping, postconflict stabilization, and development assistance? One of the dangers of expanding the scope and application of the alliance is that the alliance may not be well suited to making contributions on certain issues or problems or where there are conflicting priorities within the alliance. Although South Korea may have developed new capabilities in many areas where it is possible to make global contributions, the South Korean hierarchy of interests may not always coincide with that of the United States, or domestic political obstacles may prevent South Korea from using capabilities for specific purposes despite the existence of a compelling mutual interest in alliance-based cooperation. For this reason, the challenge of managing priorities and differences in hierarchies of interests and capabilities between alliance partners becomes a critical task that must be managed in order to avoid unnecessary friction between allies. This task requires a strengthened capacity for interagency coordination within the governments of the two allies and an effective mechanism for managing multiple issues and actors within the alliance in such a way as to promote a whole-of-alliance approach to managing existing and emerging issues. As the focus of cooperation shifts from primarily military to broader transnational and nontraditional security issues, the alliance also faces potential structural conflicts that might result from competing bureaucratic interests. An effective mechanism is needed for coordinating the prioritization of alliance cooperation and for promoting parallel cooperation on multiple issue areas. At the same time, the development of a capacity for comprehensive alliance coordination must take into account the likelihood that in some functional areas there will exist an asymmetric level of capabilities or a mismatch in approaches between the two governments that might inhibit prospects for cooperation in a specific area. For instance, Heejun Chang and Lily House-Peters’s chapter on climate change policy in the United States and South Korea reveals that the respective bureaucratic approaches of the two nations on this issue are very different from each other, with South Korea adopting a central-government-led, top-down

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approach while the United States provides little top-down governmental guidance, leaving the states and the private sector to make new regulatory requirements and contributions to innovation on climate change issues from the bottom up. Because of the structural differences in managing the climate change issue between the two governments, it becomes harder to manage or promote effective cooperation between the two countries. In other cases, it may just be a matter of time before South Korea develops sufficient capabilities in a particular area to justify a broader scope of cooperative effort between the two sides. For instance, prospects for meaningful coordination on overseas development assistance might have been hard to justify before South Korea joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Donor Assistance Committee (DAC), but now that South Korea has hosted the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and is making itself felt as a new donor in the international community, it is easier to imagine mutual benefits that might be derived from US-ROK efforts to discuss policy coordination on development assistance. Likewise, South Korea’s interest in developing space capabilities, including satellite launch capabilities, opens a broader range of potential areas for cooperation between South Korea and NASA. NASA may not have been interested in pursuing a cooperative relationship with South Korea several years ago, but South Korea’s desires to make advances in this area have made the potential for new forms of cooperation more attractive. South Korea’s expanded naval capabilities increase the potential for new forms of naval cooperation between the United States and South Korea, to include planning, exercises, and operations between the two navies. South Korea’s involvement in the multilateral antipiracy task force in the Gulf of Aden has provided South Korean naval crews with valuable experience working in a multinational environment and has enhanced development of the practical skills necessary to defend sea-lanes against piracy on the high seas. Another factor that complicates the challenge of managing priorities between allies is the influence of public opinion. Despite enhanced ROK capabilities and broadened interests, an increase in ROK contributions to the alliance faces potentially significant domestic opposition within South Korea. For instance, South Korea’s commitments to USled efforts in postconflict Afghanistan may be perceived in South Korea as purely serving US strategic interests. A question that may arise is whether South Korea should undertake global responsibilities as part of the alliance or more independently from the United States. As Michael

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Finnegan observes, “The US government as well as the public sees such cooperation as a natural extension of the alliance. Unfortunately, a significant sector of the ROK public sees the Alliance as meant to perform the sole function of defending the ROK.”

The US-ROK Alliance and Northeast Asia

The Korean peninsula is the pivot upon which Northeast Asian regional stability rests. Stability on the Korean peninsula has implications for Northeast Asian regional stability and vice versa. In this context, the US-ROK alliance has served as a stabilizer that has mitigated the prospect of renewed regional rivalry or conflict in Northeast Asia of the sort that occurred on the Korean peninsula in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The US-ROK alliance may continue to play a stabilizing role in regional relations by providing a platform for a confident South Korea to interact more confidently and effectively with its larger neighbors than would be the case if South Korea attempts to manage relations with China and Japan on its own. The US-ROK alliance has been focused primarily on deterrence against North Korean aggression and it is poised to play a critical role in shaping prospects for peninsular and regional stability as part of the process of Korean reunification. The core mission of the alliance has been the task of deterring North Korean aggression, but as the balance of power on the Korean peninsula has shifted in favor of South Korea, the US presence has served to provide a stabilizing framework for inter-Korean reconciliation and to support the management of regional stability in the event of North Korean instability. From that perspective, many of the functional capabilities that are being developed through off-peninsula alliance coordination clearly are applicable to the mission of stabilizing the Korean peninsula in the event of a North Korean collapse, thereby enhancing the combined capabilities of the alliance to deal with instability in North Korea. The US presence also provides a means by which to maintain regional stability by assuring South Korea that external involvement of other countries on the peninsula in the context of Korean reunification will be minimized. In this respect, the alliance not only is a platform for South Korea to enhance its regional and global diplomatic profile, but also provides a ready mechanism through which to support international coordination in response to a complex humanitarian emergency on the peninsula and a vehicle by which to maintain regional geopolitical stability at a time of transition on the peninsula itself.

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The development of comprehensive capabilities to provide security by deterring external aggression and by providing capacity to address nontraditional security issues offers opportunities for South Korea to cooperate with other US allies, such as Japan, on the basis of a compelling interest in the promotion of human security. The close military relationships that exist in a bilateral context between the United States with South Korea and Japan can be broadened to promote trilateral cooperation on issues such as the prevention of pandemic diseases or counterterrorism. Buttressed by an approach to international development that is rooted in common values and interests in the promotion of international stability, the United States, South Korea, and Japan are natural partners in addressing both the political and technical aspects of development as major contributions to peacekeeping and postconflict stabilization. However, one of the major questions in a regional context remains the role of the alliance in terms of South Korea’s rapidly growing complex interdependence with China. As Michael McDevitt observed, “ROK military analysts recognize that one of Seoul’s biggest national security challenges is balancing between the US-ROK alliance and the China-ROK strategic partnership. South Korea sustains a strong USROK alliance amid ongoing concerns about China’s historical and territorial claims, military buildup, and potential responses to Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) instability. At the same time, given close geographic, historical, cultural, and economic ties with China, ROK strategists are careful to consider Chinese perceptions of a strengthened alliance.” The development of a comprehensive approach to the alliance based on mutual interests provides a rationale for the alliance that is not threat-based, while also providing a clear hedge against South Korean concerns that complex interdependence with its increasingly powerful neighbor might lead to political interference or constraints on South Korea’s own diplomatic freedom of action.

Financial Constraints and the Impact of China’s Rise

The US fiscal crisis has emerged as a practical obstacle that will speed a transition from a system in which the United States was the sole guarantor of regional stability in East Asia to one in which the United States is a primary guarantor of security, but is no longer sufficient in and of itself to provide security in East Asia, requiring supplementary measures to fill the gap.

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The gap can be filled in two potential ways: greater contributions by US allies in concert with the United States or a stepped-up willingness by China to contribute to East Asian stability, most likely in a mix of competition and cooperation with the United States. The impact of this shift will likely have several implications for the alliance. First, a security environment that relies on both the United States and China to guarantee stability will be characterized by greater volatility than when the United States alone played the role of security guarantor, possibly creating a wider array of security demands that the US-ROK and US-Japan alliances will be required to meet. Second, there will be greater pressure on South Korea to choose in specific circumstances between the United States and China, while it is in South Korea’s interests to avoid having to make choices between the two countries. Third, perceptions of China as an emerging threat (and partner) will strengthen the value of the US-ROK alliance at the same time that it heightens mutual expectations regarding the level of investment and commitment to the alliance. This circumstance is particularly troubling when it involves differences over financial resources, which are likely to increase conflict and disrupt smooth coordination between allies in ways that make the fulfillment of the aspirations contained in the Joint Vision Statement impracticable.

Conclusion: Practical Steps Toward Expanded US-ROK Alliance Cooperation

Based on this in-depth analysis of specific areas identified in the June 2009 Joint Vision Statement regarding opportunities for expanding USROK alliance cooperation to address regional and global issues, this volume emphasizes the following specific suggestions for enhancing bilateral policy coordination going forward: The importance of promoting a whole-of-alliance approach. For alliance cooperation to realize maximum benefits, the United States and South Korea must both take a whole-of-government approach that promotes effective interagency and multisectoral cooperation. This will require the establishment of improved coordinating mechanisms designed to enhance whole-of-alliance coordination and prioritization of many different forms of cooperation. Enhanced coordination in the management of alliance issues would need to support a broadening of cooperation to include peacekeeping, postconflict stabilization and reconstruction, non-

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proliferation, overseas development assistance, pandemics, and climate change in addition to existing areas of cooperation. Division of labor based on comparative advantage. It will be necessary for both governments to identify and promote cooperation in areas where there is a clear convergence of national interests and complementarities in relative capabilities. In cases where the respective capabilities of the two countries are asymmetric, it might be possible to consider the distribution of specialized roles based on comparative strengths. South Korea’s increasing capabilities enhance the potential for it to make specific contributions to international stability based on its own expanded self-interest. The United States must utilize the expanded alliance partnership to advance shared regional and global priorities in specific areas such as maritime security and postconflict operations in which South Korea is willing and able to make valuable contributions as a US ally. Domestic support, national interests, and political will. Realizing the full potential of the alliance will depend on a combination of ROK domestic support and political will from both Seoul and Washington to exercise and build such new capabilities within the context of the alliance. The ROK government will have to identify areas of cooperation where it seeks to play a greater role as well as to convince the public that such global contributions are in the national interest. To enhance domestic support and understanding, both sides must also work together to build closer ties among business, civic, cultural, and other institutions in support of the vision embodied in the Joint Vision Statement. Balancing a “global” and “regional” alliance with continued policy coordination on North Korea. The convergence of Barack Obama’s and Lee Myung-bak’s DPRK policies and strategic worldview has provided a basis for expanded cooperation in many new areas: the commitment of both presidents to the “complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea” and a “definite and comprehensive resolution” to the DPRK nuclear issue has reaffirmed the convergence of American and South Korean interests regarding North Korea and has provided a foundation for broadened cooperation in other areas.3 In fact, expanded offpeninsula cooperation on such issues as peacekeeping, stabilization and reconstruction, development assistance, and pandemic crises has proven itself to have practical application to North Korea’s long-term stability and Korean unification, thereby strengthening the capacity of the alliance to deal with North Korean contingencies. Integration of the US-ROK alliance with other frameworks as a platform for promoting global stability. The US-ROK alliance is complementary with other US-led bilateral and multilateral alliances, form-

250

The US–South Korea Alliance

ing the foundations for the spread of interest- and values-based cooperation to deal with common human security challenges and threats to existing international structures for cooperation. The United States and South Korea must continue to integrate the alliance within an existing regional core and global network of like-minded nations, and to actively develop its capacities to contribute to a collective response to global challenges. South Korea’s hosting of the November 2010 G-20 in Seoul and the 2012 Global Security Summit provide unique opportunities through which the US-ROK alliance framework can also be a platform for the promotion of multilateral cooperation in the service of global economic stability and international security.

Notes 1. In Kurt M. Campbell et al., Going Global: The Future of the U.S.–South Korea Alliance, Center for a New American Security, Washington, DC, February 2009, http://www.cnas.org. 2. UN Peacekeeping Operations, Monthly Summary of Contributions (Police, Military Experts on Missions and Troops), July 31, 2011, http://www .un.org. 3. Republic of Korea, Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President, “S. Korean, U.S. Presidents Concur on N. Korea Strategy,” November 19, 2009, http:// english.president.go.kr.

Acronyms

AAA ACPF AFHSC AFMC AFMRI AML APEC APG APLs AP-MCSTA APRSAF APSCO ARF ASEAN ASEM ASW BAU Btu CAS CBR CCC CCI CDC CENTRIXS

Accra Agenda for Action Advanced Conditioning Processing Facility Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center Armed Forces Medical Command Armed Forces Medical Research Institute anti–money laundering Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering ASEAN Plus Three Partnership Laboratories Asia-Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asia-Europe Meeting antisubmarine warfare business as usual British thermal unit country assistance strategies chemical, biological, and radiological Climate Change Committee Clinton Climate Initiative US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System

251

252 CFC C4I CIDC CMF CNA CNO Coms CPPNM CSI CTBT CTED CTF CTTF DAC DHS DMZ DoD DoD-GEIS DPRK EAS EASI EDCF EEZ EINet EPA EURATOM FAO FATF FMCT 5YGGP FOTA GCM G8 GHG GLEWS GNEP

Acronyms

Combined Forces Command command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence Committee for International Development Cooperation Combined Maritime Force Center for Naval Analyses Chief of Naval Operations communications, ocean, and meteorological satellite Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Container Security Initiative Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate counter-terrorist financing Counterterrorism Task Force Donor Assistance Committee US Department of Homeland Security Demilitarized Zone US Department of Defense DoD Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System Democratic People’s Republic of Korea East Asia Summit East Asian Strategic Initiative Economic Development Cooperation Fund exclusive economic zone Emerging Infectious Network US Environmental Protection Agency European Atomic Energy Community Food and Agriculture Organization Financial Action Task Force Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty Five-Year Green Growth Plan Future of the Alliance General Circulation Model Group of Eight greenhouse gas Global Early Warning and Response System Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

Acronyms

GNI GOARN GPOI G-20 HHS HIU HLF IAEA IEA IHR ILI IPCC ISAF ISM ITAR JAEC JICA JIOC JMSDF JSA JSCNEC JSDF JTF-HD KAERI KAIST KARI KCDC KDB KDI School KEPCO KHNP KIDA KISS KNIH KoFIU KOGAS KOICA Kompsat KORUS FTA

253

gross national income Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network Global Peace Operations Initiative Group of Twenty US Department of Health and Human Services Humanitarian Information Unit High-Level Forum International Atomic Energy Agency International Energy Agency International Health Regulative Review Committee influenza-like illnesses Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change International Security Assistance Force Inter-Sessional Meeting US International Traffic in Arms Regulations Jordan Atomic Energy Commission Japan International Cooperation Agency Joint Intelligence Operations Centers Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces Joint Security Area Joint Standing Committee on Nuclear Energy Cooperation Japanese Self-Defense Force Joint Task Force–Homeland Defense Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology Korea Aerospace Research Institute Korea Center for Disease Control and Prevention Korea Development Bank Korean Development Institute School of Public Policy and Management Korea Electric Power Corporation Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Korean Institute for Defense Analyses Korea Influenza Surveillance Scheme Korea National Institute of Health Korea Financial Intelligence Unit Korea Gas Corp. Korea International Cooperation Agency Korean Multi-Purpose Satellite Korea-US free trade agreement

254 KOV KRWM KSIMS KSLV KSR LDCs LPH LPP LST MCA MCC MDBs MDGs MND MNF MOFAT MOPAN MOSF MOU MTCR MW NATO NGO NIC NIER NIH NIMR NLL NNPA NNWS NOAA NPIA NPT NSG NWS OCHA ODA OECD

Acronyms

Korean Overseas Volunteers Korea Radioactive Waste Management Co. Ltd Korea Simulation System Korean Space Launch Vehicle Korean Sounding Rocket least developed countries Landing Platform Helicopter Land Partnership Plan landing ship tank Millennium Challenge Account Millennium Challenge Corporation multilateral development banks Millennium Development Goals Ministry of National Defense (Republic of Korea) multinational forces Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Republic of Korea) Multilateral Organizations Performance Assessment Network Ministry of Strategy and Finance (Republic of Korea) Memorandum of Understanding Missile Technology Control Regime minister of health and welfare North Atlantic Treaty Organization nongovernmental organization National Influenza Center National Institute of Environment Research US National Institutes of Health National Institute of Meteorological Research Northern Limit Line Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act non–nuclear weapon state National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Nonproliferation Impact Assessment Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Nuclear Suppliers Group nuclear weapon state Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs overseas development assistance Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Acronyms

OEF OIE OPCON OPCW PAROS PKO PLA PLAN PRT PSI PUREX R&D ROK ROKN SARS SDF SLOC SNS SOFA SPF SPI STAR START TAF TCOG UAE UNDP UNEP UNFCCC UNICEF UNIFIL UNITA UN PKO UNSC UNSCR UNSIC UNTSO USAID

255

Operation Enduring Freedom World Organization for Animal Health operational control Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space peacekeeping operations People’s Liberation Army People’s Liberation Army Navy Provincial Reconstruction Team Proliferation Security Initiative plutonium-uranium extraction research and development Republic of Korea Republic of Korea Navy Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Self-Defense Forces sea-lanes of communication Strategic National Stockpile Status of Forces Agreement Strategic Programme Fund Security Policy Initiative Satellite Technology for the Asia-Pacific Region Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty The Asia Foundation US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group United Arab Emirates United Nations Development Programme United Nations Environment Programme United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon National Union for the Total Independence of Angola United Nations Peacekeeping Operation United Nations Security Council United Nations Security Council Resolution United Nations System Influenza Coordination United Nations Truce Supervision Organization US Agency for International Development

256 USCAP USFJ USFK USGBC USN USPACOM WHO WRI

Acronyms

US Climate Action Partnership US Forces Japan US Forces Korea US Green Building Council US Navy US Pacific Command World Health Organization World Resources Institute

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The Contributors

Heejun Chang is professor of geography at Portland State University,

where he teaches courses on hydrology, climate and water resources, global water issues and sustainability, GIS for water resources, and spatial quantitative analysis. He has published numerous articles in journals such as Climatic Change, Climate Research, Hydrological Processes, International Journal of Climatology, Journal of Environmental Management, Journal of Hydrology, Landscape and Urban Planning, River Research and Applications, Science of the Total Environment, Water Research, and Water Resources Research. Michael J. Finnegan is a founder and senior partner of New Magellan Ventures in Washington, DC, a portfolio company with interests in venture capital investment and advisory services, transportation, energy, telecommunications, and strategic mineral resources. From 2008 to 2010, he was a senior research associate with the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). Lily House-Peters is a PhD student in the School of Geography and

Development and a graduate research associate with the Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy at the University of Arizona. She is currently a graduate research associate on the NSF Coupled Human and Natural Systems (CNH) project titled Strengthening Resilience of Arid Region Riparian Corridors: Ecohydrology and Decision-making in the Sonora and San Pedro Watersheds. Balbina Y. Hwang is visiting professor at Georgetown University, where she teaches courses on East Asian political economy, security,

269

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The Contributors

and politics. She has also taught at the National Defense University. She worked as senior policy analyst for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation, and from 2007 to 2009 she served as senior special adviser to the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs at the US Department of State. Michael McDevitt, Rear Admiral, US Navy (ret.), is a senior fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) Strategic Studies, a not-for-profit, federally funded research center in Washington, DC. Previously, he was director of the East Asia Policy office for the secretary of defense during the George H. W. Bush administration. He also served for two years as the director for strategy, war plans, and policy (J-5) for US CINCPAC. Fred McGoldrick is a partner in Bengelsdorf, McGoldrick, and Associ-

ates, LLC, an international consulting firm. He has extensive experience in the nuclear nonproliferation and international nuclear policy fields. Previously, he held senior positions in the US Department of Energy and the US Department of State, where he negotiated US peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements and helped shape US policy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He also served in the US Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. James Clay Moltz holds a joint appointment at the Naval Postgraduate

School in the Department of National Security Affairs and in the Space Systems Academic Group. Previously, he served as a consultant to the NASA Ames Research Center and the US Department of Energy, and has worked in the US Senate. He is the author of Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks (2012) and The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests (2011). Edward P. Reed was the Korea representative of the Asia Foundation,

based in Seoul from 2004 to 2011. In 2004, he was associate director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. From 1997 to 2000, he served as country director for North Korea for World Vision International and managed a program of relief, rehabilitation, and agricultural assistance. He represented the American Friends Service Committee in Northeast Asia from 1994 to 1997, after serving as assistant director of the international division of AFSC from 1985 to 1994.

The Contributors

271

James L. Schoff serves as senior adviser for East Asia policy in the office of the Secretary of Defense, where he focuses on US alliance relations with Japan and the Republic of Korea, trilateral security cooperation, and crisis management in the region. He is on a two-year assignment at the Department of Defense on loan from the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), where he is director of Asia-Pacific studies. This chapter was written before he joined the Department of Defense, so his views do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense. His IFPA publications include “Consensus Building and Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies (2010); In Times of Crisis: USJapan Civil-Military Disaster Relief Coordination (coauthored with Marina Travayiakis) (2009); and Tools for Trilateralism: Improving USJapan-Korea Cooperation to Manage Complex Contingencies (2005). Kevin Shepard is a strategic analyst for United States Forces, Korea

(USFK). He was formerly a James A. Kelly Korean Studies Fellow with Pacific Forum CSIS and a research fellow with the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University. He has written numerous articles regarding North Korean political issues and North Korean corporate governance. Scott Snyder is senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the pro-

gram on US-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC. He served as adjunct senior fellow for Korea studies at the council beginning in the fall of 2008. Until September 2011, he was director of the Center for US-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation, where he also served as Korea country representative from 2000 to 2004. His publications include China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security (2009), Paved with Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea (coedited with L. Gordon Flake) (2003), and Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (1999).

Index

Abduction of South Koreans, 66(nn15,16), 180, 192(nn22,23) Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), 215 Adaptation, climate change and: ROK strategies, 163–165; US strategies for, 155–156 Additional Protocol, 96(n14) Advanced Conditioning Processing Facility (ACPF), 87 Aeguktan (Patriot Corps), 47 Afforestation, 154–155, 162–163 Afghanistan, 7, 17; abduction and murder of South Koreans, 66(nn15,16), 180, 192(nn22,23); aid volume and allocation, 213; benefits of ROK involvement in postconflict processes, 198–199; China and Japan’s reluctance to participate in PKOs, 181–182; increased ROK-US cooperation in postconflict processes, 203–204; ISAF mandate, 192(n19); Koreans’ criticism of ROK involvement, 188; NATO peacekeeping efforts, 176, 179; ODA coordination and cooperation, 219, 228, 233; ROK involvement in peacekeeping, 178– 180, 185–186; ROK support for US invasion of, 43; ROK’s civilian casualties, 192(nn22,23); ROK’s counterterrorism cooperation, 50; ROK’s public antipathy to

participation, 205; terrorist activities, 47, 48, 66(n16); US troop drawdown, 68(n45); US view of postconflict processes involvement, 199–200 Africa: overseas development assistance, 231; peacekeeping forces, 174, 191(n9) Agent Orange, 46 Air cargo deal, 186 Air Ticket Levy Fund, 216 Airport security, 63 Alliance. See Bilateral cooperation Amec engineering group, 97(n25) Amnesty International, 67(n24) Angola, 48–49 Anti–money laundering (AML) standards, 63 Antipiracy operations, 36–37, 41(n33) Antiviral agents, 133 APEC Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF), 53 APEC Pandemic Response Exercise (2006), 140 Araki, Kiyoshi, 53 Argonne National Laboratory, 87 Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC), 129 Armed Forces Medical Command (AFMC), 134–135 Armed Forces Medical Research Institute (AFMRI), 135

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274

Index

Arms reduction initiative, 76–77 Arms reductions, 74 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), 52, 126, 140 ASEAN Plus Three group, 211 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Seminar on Cyber-Terrorism, 53 ASEAN Regional Forum Workplan on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, 53, 58, 60, 62 ASEAN-Korea Centre, 211 Asia: avian flu pandemic, 136–137; ROK-NGO ODA cooperation, 229; US terror-related interests in, 51–52 Asia Foundation (TAF), 229, 238(n37) Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), 49–50 Asia Society, 166 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Emerging Infections Network (EINet), 134 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, 47–48 Asia-Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications (AP-MCSTA), 108 Assassinations, 47, 66(n11) Astronaut program, 106–107 Atlanta, Georgia: urban GHG mitigation, 153 Australia: diplomatic use of space technology, 114; Global Influenza Surveillance Network, 125; pandemic response, 140; peacekeeping operations, 191(n9) Australia-US Space Situational Awareness Partnership, 114 Austria: aid volume, 213 Authoritarian rule, 4–5, 215 Avian flu, 17, 121–124, 127–131, 135– 137, 141, 143(nn9,10,11) “Axis of evil” speech, 7, 65(n2) Bae Hyeong-gyu, 192(n22) Ban Ki-moon, 51–52, 193(n35) Bangladesh: nuclear power, 81 Basic Law on International Development Cooperation, 213

Beacon Power, 151 Beheading of South Koreans, 52, 180, 192(nn22,23) Bicycle use, 162 Bilateral cooperation: argument for ROK peacekeeping participation, 180–184; avian flu preparedness, 135–136; capacity building for postconflict processes, 199–200; climate change, 146, 165–166; constraints on ROK’s PKO participation, 187; counterterrorism cooperation, 63; development agreement, 209; expanding space technology cooperation, 110–115; global context of the alliance, 241– 243; global security needs constraining US leadership, 12; hazards of and obstacles to enhanced space cooperation, 115– 117; history of ROK’s space technology, 103–104; large-scale H1N1 vaccine development, 127; military space operations, 101–102, 101–104; nonproliferation commitments, 74–75; obstacles to cooperation in postconflict processes, 204–206; ODA cooperation, 225–231; pandemic response, 136–142; pandemic threat initiatives, 122–123; peacekeeping, 173–174, 179–180; postconflict processes, 195–197; prioritization issues of the alliance, 244–246; reformulating US-ROK partnership, 13–15; ROK’s social and political conflict, 188–189; strategic, operational, and tactical cooperation for postconflict processes, 202–204. See also Joint Vision Statement (2009) Bilateral response capacity, 14–15 Biodiesel, 159–160 Biohazard preparedness, 129–130, 142 Biological threats, 121–122. See also Chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) warfare; Pandemics

Index

Biomass, 150 Biometric data, 59 Bird flu. See Avian flu Blue-water force, 25–26 Bolden, Charles, 110 Bombing incident, 66(n17) Border opening, North Korea’s, 56–57 Bosworth, Stephen, 56 Boulder, Colorado: GHG mitigation, 156; urban GHG mitigation, 153 Branding, 218, 230 Brookings Institute, 229 Budget: space technology, 101 Building Retrofit Project, 164 Burden sharing: security costs, 15 Bush administration: avian flu initiatives, 128; “axis of evil” speech, 7, 44, 65(n2); Global AIDS Initiative, 221–222; IAEA safeguard, 100(n53); Lee’s commitment to US alliance rebuilding, 44–46; nonproliferation policy and North Korea, 78–79; nuclear fuel cycle, 86; strategic alliance concept, 2; strategic flexibility, 8–9; US foreign aid initiatives, 220; US war on terror, 10; US-ROK space ties, 109 Business-as-usual (BAU) scenarios for carbon reduction, 157 California: energy rebates, 151 California State Environmental Protection Agency, 149 Cambodia, 228 Cap and Trade Legislation for Reducing GHG Emissions, 149 Cap and trade policy (ROK), 166 Capacity building, 57, 62, 63, 199– 200, 203 Carbon cash-back point system, 159 Carbon Disclosure Project, 158 Carbon point system, 158–159 Carbon trading, 148–149, 157–159 Carnegie Endowment, 166 Carter administration: military withdrawal from South Korea, 3–4; nonproliferation commitments, 75; nuclear fuel cycle, 86

275

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 121–122 Central Asia: peacekeeping operations, 185–186 Central Crisis Management Committee (ROK), 131–132 Chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) warfare, 46, 60–61, 135 Cheney, Dick, 4 Cheong Wa Dae, 47 Cheonghae (antipiracy) Unit, 36 China: avian flu, 124; climate change initiatives, 165–167; concerns over North Korean collapse, 31–32; hazards of and obstacles to enhanced space cooperation, 116; Koguryo, Kingdom of, 30–31; Korea’s nineteenth century security, 22; multilateral space technology cooperation, 115; North Korea nuclear program, 78; nuclear power markets, 81–82; Obama’s arms reduction initiative, 76; reluctance to participate in PKOs, 181–182, 185; response to North Korean threat, 37– 38; ROK’s growing interdependence threatening alliance, 1–2, 247; sealanes of communication, 28; shaping Korea’s strategic thinking, 21; South Korea’s growing regional leadership role, 12; space technology, 102; US avian flu response initiatives, 128; US-ROK maritime relationship, 33– 35, 41(n29) China National Nuclear Company, 81 Cholera outbreak, Haiti’s, 125 Chosun Dynasty, 47 Chun Doo-hwan, 4 Chungnam National University, 127 Civil control, 201 Civil nuclear energy technology: differences over the nuclear fuel cycle, 85–86; growth of South Korea’s industry, 80–82; moratorium on new reprocessing facilities, 99(n47); NPT and, 73; pyroprocessing and proliferation risks, 86–88; US sources, 97(n23) Civilian space launch vehicles, 102

276

Index

Climate change, 17; international cooperation, 165–167; origins and progress of, 145–146; ROK adaptation strategies, 163–165; ROK mitigation strategies, 156– 163; US adaptation strategies, 155–156; US mitigation strategies, 147–155; US-ROK ODA policy dialogue, 233. See also Mitigation of greenhouse gases Climate Change Committee (CCC), 156–157 Clinton, Bill, 5, 19(n14), 78–79 Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI), 161 CO2 production, 153 Cold War: priorities of the alliance, 3– 4; ROK’s economic transformation, 215; role of international alliances after, 173–174; sea-lanes of communication, 28; US foreign aid program, 220 Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS), 59 Combined Forces Command (CFC), 8, 35–36 Combined Maritime Force (CMF), 36 Command and control: ROK pandemic response plan, 131–132 Commerce and trade: commercial nuclear power, 97(nn23,24); economic impact of pandemics, 123–124; international trade in nuclear technology, 80; linking ODA to, 230–231; satellite technology, 108–109; sea-lanes of communication (SLOC), 28–29; space technology, 111–112 Commercial energy trade, 97(n25) Commercial nuclear power, 97(n23,24) Committee for International Development Cooperation (CIDC), 212–213, 217 Common interests reformulating USROK partnership, 14 Common strategic vision, 35–36, 38 Communications: satellite technology, 106 Communications, Ocean, and

Meteorological (COMS) satellite, 106 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 79–80, 84 Confucianism, 188, 193(n40) Congress, US: nonproliferation controls, 83; nuclear fuel reprocessing, 87–88; ODA support, 224 Container Security Initiative (CSI), 54, 58, 60 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), 79, 97(n22) Convention on the Registration of Space Objects, 115 Cost sharing, 15 Counterterrorism, 17; anti–money laundering standards, 63; antiterrorist legislation, 67(n24); bilateral capacity building, 63; capacity and awareness building, 62; cooperation challenges, 54–57; cooperation opportunities, 57–65; intelligence sharing, 58–59; LeeBush strategic alliance, 45; military cooperation, 59–61; regional diplomatic leadership, 61–62, 65(n3); ROK legislation, 48–50; ROK military support for US efforts, 50; ROK’s national interests, 46–48; ROK’s regional cooperative efforts, 52–54; US interests in Asia, 51–52 Country assistance strategies (CAS), 216 Coup d’état, 4 Cyberterrorism, 47, 58 Cyprus: peacekeeping, 178 Daewoo Engineering, 66(n15) Dailey, Dell, 54 Death penalty, 67(n24) Deaths: avian flu, H1N1, and SARS, 123, 131, 143(nn9,11) Defense Reform 2020 program, 25, 183 Democracy: global security

Index

cooperation, 11; political transition to, 4–5 Democratic consolidation, 187–188 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). See North Korea Development assistance. See Overseas development assistance Diplomatic leadership, 61–62 Disarmament, 74 Disaster relief, 141–142, 222 Disease: climate change and, 146; ROK’s development aid, 216. See also Pandemics Division of labor (US-ROK), 249 Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, 32–33 Domestic politics: benefits of involvement in postconflict processes, 197–198; counterterrorism cooperation challenges, 54–57; enhanced space cooperation, 116–117; ROK public support for the alliance, 249 Donor country, ROK’s transition to, 184, 210–211, 215 Doosan Heavy Industries, 80–81 DubaiSat-1, 108 Early-warning systems, 107 East Asia Summit (EAS), 140 East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI), 4–5, 8 Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), 210, 217, 218 Economy: domestic space-launch technology, 111–112; expansion of the ROK navy, 27–29; fiscal crisis influencing the alliance, 247–248; GPS navigation, 109; impact of H1N1 and SARS on, 123; independent security role, 12; ROK’s emergence from underdevelopment, 215; US growth-based ODA, 222–223; US operational approach to postconflict processes, 201; US-China interdependence, 1–2 Education and training: capacity building for postconflict processes, 203; Japan-ROK ODA cooperation,

277

228; peacekeeping forces, 174–175; ROK regional security training sessions, 62 Effectiveness of ODA, 217, 224–225 El Baradei, Mohamed, 99(n47) Electro-reduction, 94 Emergency Room Surveillance System, 134–135 Energy: change in energy intensity in the US and South Korea, 147(fig.); change in per capita consumption in the US and South Korea, 148(fig.); civil nuclear energy technology, 72, 73; climate change and energy security, 146; differences over the nuclear fuel cycle, 85–86; energy efficiency, 159–160; growth of South Korea’s nuclear power industry, 80–82; moratorium on new reprocessing facilities, 99(n47); pyroprocessing and proliferation risks, 86–88; renewable, 149–151, 159–160; ROK’s carbon point system, 158–159; ROK’s climate change adaptation strategies, 164; South Korean consumption by type, 160(fig.); US adaptation strategies, 155–156; US consumption, 147– 148; US consumption by type, 150(fig.) Energy Independence and Security Act (2007; US), 148 Energy Policy Act (2005), 151, 154 Energy rebates, 151 Enrichment, 98(n37) Environmental concerns. See Climate change Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 150 Essential services, 201–202 Ethnic Koreans in China, 31 Eulmi Incident, 66(n11) EURATOM: nonproliferation controls, 83; nuclear fuel reprocessing, 87, 89, 90, 93 Evergreen Unit, 198 Executive power (ROK), 188 External threats: reformulating USROK partnership, 13

278

Index

F Process, 223 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 59 Feeman, John, 61 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 49–50, 63 Financial Transaction Reports Act, 48 Finland: aid volume, 213 Fiscal crisis (US), 247–248 Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), 80, 84 Five-ocean navy, 25, 26 Five-Year Green Growth Plan (5YGGP), 157, 160, 161 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 125 Food production, 156 Food security, 146, 233 Ford administration: nuclear fuel cycle, 86 Foreign Assistance Act (1961; US), 220 Forest fires, 162–163 Forward-deployed forces, 1 Fourth National Action Plan for Climate Change (2008–2012), 163 Fragile states, 224, 226, 233. See also Afghanistan; Iraq France: uranium reprocessing facility, 75 Free trade agreement, 16 Fukushima disaster, 72 Futenma Airbase (Okinawa), 10 Future of the Alliance (FOTA; 2002– 2004), 8 G8 summit, 174 Galileo precision-navigation system, 109 Gando region (China), 31 General Circulation Model (GCM) of climate change, 164 Geography: expansion of the ROK navy, 27–29; Northeast Asia, 21–22 Germany: Korean naval submarines, 24 Giscard d’Estaing, Valery, 75 Global AIDS Initiative, 221–222 Global Early Warning and Response System (GLEWS), 125–126

Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (DoD-GEIS), 129, 137 Global Environmental Institute (China), 166 Global force posture (US), 7–8 Global initiative: increasing IAEA resources, 79 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, 78 Global Korea foreign policy vision, 137, 242; North Korea eclipsing attention and resources, 193(n37); peacekeeping efforts, 184–187 Global Maritime Partnership, 38 Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), 86, 100(n55) Global Outbreak Alert & Response Network (GOARN), 125 Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), 174–175 Global Positioning System (GPS), 106, 109, 113 Global Posture Review, 8 Global security: comprehensive security alliance, 11–15; NATO, 18(n6); reformulating US-ROK partnership, 12–14; support for the alliance, 249–250; US foreign aid program, 220; US war on terror, 7, 10, 20(n24), 43, 65(n1). See also Security Global war on terror, 10, 20(n24), 43, 65(n1) Global Warming Solutions Act (2006), 149 Goldman Sachs, 160 Governance: US operational approach to postconflict processes, 201–202 Green growth, 17 Greenhouse gases (GHGs), 145–146, 148–149. See also Mitigation of greenhouse gases Gulf War, 20(n28), 177(table), 178 H1N1 virus, 121–122, 124, 126–133, 135–136, 138–139 Haiti, 125, 184; earthquake, 184 Hanjin company, 186

Index

Hankyoreh Shinmun newspaper, 188– 189 Hashimoto, Ryutaro, 5–6 Health: global health infrastructure, 124–125; health and medical sciences cooperation agreement, 137. See also Pandemics High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4), 211, 215 High-Level UN Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 99(n47) Homogeneity, South Korea’s, 193(n39) Housing: climate change mitigation, 151–152 Hu Jintao, 31 Human rights: antiterrorism cooperation, 57 Human spaceflight, 106, 111 Humanitarian assistance: bilateral and regional response, 14–15; fragile and recovering states, 226; ROK peacekeeping activities, 178, 184; ROK provision to North Korea, 214; US operational approach to postconflict processes, 201. See also Overseas development assistance Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU), 140–141 Hwang Jin-ha, 192(n14) Hybrid vehicles, 154, 161–162 Hydrogen fuel-cell power, 164–165 Hyun Jung-eun, 56 Hyundai Group, 56 Illegal fishing, 32 India: nuclear cooperation agreement, 91; nuclear cooperation initiative, 88; Satellite Technology for the Asia-Pacific Region, 109 Industrialization, 5 Infectious disease reporting system, 134 Influenza virus, 124. See also Avian flu; H1N1 virus Infrastructure development, 202; ODA priorities, 217–218 Institutional structures: comprehensive security alliance, 11–12

279

Intelligence sharing, 58–59 Intelligence-to-force ratio, 58–59 Inter-American Development Bank, 213 Interest-based comprehensive alliance, 14–15 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 146 Inter-Korean relations, 56–57, 173 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Additional Protocol, 78, 96(n13); Japan’s compliance, 100(n54); nonproliferation controls, 83; North Korea’s expulsion of, 71; nuclear cooperation agreements, 100(n53); strengthening, 84; underfunding of, 79, 97(n20); USROK pyroprocessing agreement, 95 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 43, 78 International cooperation: antiterrorism cooperation, 57–65; avian influenza response groups, 127–129; climate change, 146, 165–167; counterterrorism efforts, 52–54, 62; diplomatic use of space technology, 114; economic impact of pandemics, 123; global context of the alliance, 241–243; H1N1 outbreaks, 124; improving Koreans’ global standing, 7; North Korea as regional and global nuclear threat, 71–72; nuclear fuel reprocessing, 87–88; ODA coordination and cooperation, 218–219, 220, 232; pandemic response initiatives, 122– 127; postconflict processes, 196–197; ROK hosting high-profile events, 47–48; ROK’s PKO expansion, 187; space technology, 102, 108–109; trilateral counterterrorism efforts, 48–49; US-ROK nonproliferation activities, 77–79; US-ROK ODA policy dialogue, 232. See also Overseas development assistance; Peacekeeping International Health Regulative

280

Index

Review Committee (IHR) report, 123 International Lunar Network, 110 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 176, 179, 192(n19), 199 International Space Station (ISS), 101, 111, 117 International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 105 International volunteer programs, 212, 234, 235(n7) Internet use: ROK’s social conflict, 188 Iran: uranium enrichment capability, 72 Iraq, 7, 17; abduction of South Koreans, 47; aid volume and allocation, 213; benefits of ROK involvement in postconflict processes, 197–198; Koreans’ criticism of ROK involvement, 188; ODA coordination and cooperation, 219, 233; peacekeeping efforts, 176, 178–179; ROK support for US invasion of, 43, 50; ROK’s contributions to stability, 197; South Korea’s defense provision, 14 Japan: antiterrorism cooperation, 58; climate change initiatives, 167; domestic space-launch technology, 112; expansion of the US-Japan alliance, 20(n28); Fukushima disaster, 72; geography of Northeast Asia, 21; Global Influenza Surveillance Network, 125; global security cooperation, 10–11; hazards of and obstacles to enhanced space cooperation, 116; IAEA and, 100(n54); Korea’s history of terrorism, 47; multilateral space technology cooperation, 114– 115; naval history, 22; North Korea’s nuclear program, 78; nuclear fuel reprocessing, 87, 89, 90, 93; Obama’s arms reduction initiative, 76; ODA cooperation, 228; pandemic response initiatives, 129–130; peacekeeping in

Afghanistan, 193(n25); reluctance to participate in PKOs, 181–182, 185; ROK’s common strategic vision with the US Navy, 35–36; satellite technology, 108, 109; sealanes of communication, 28–29; South Korea’s growing regional leadership role, 12; space program, 101; trilateral counterterrorism efforts, 48, 53; US alliance solidifying US-ROK alliance, 5–6; US and ROK naval interests, 38–39 Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF), 39, 181 Jeju Island, 25 Joint Declaration (1992), 93 Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs), 60 Joint Standing Committee on Nuclear Energy Cooperation (JSCNEC), 84 Joint Statement on Strategic Dialogue (2006), 51 Joint Vision Statement (2009), 9–11, 16; challenges to, 238–239; common points for expansion and strengthening the alliance, 46; naval cooperation, 38; pandemic response cooperation, 137; strategic alliance concept, 2; strategic flexibility, 8–9; suggestions for enhancing bilateral policy coordination, 248–250. See also Bilateral cooperation Jordan: nuclear power, 81 Jordan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC), 81 JP Morgan, 160 Judicial system, 19(n14) Justice: operational approach to postconflict processes, 201 Kaesong Industrial Complex, 56 Kazakhstan, 185 Keating, Timothy, 60 Khan, A. Q., 72 Khan Quest, 179, 192(n17) Kim Dae-jung, 6; modernization of the navy, 23–24; response to 9/11, 43; view of North Korea, 44

Index

Kim Gu, 47 Kim Jong-il, 32; opening North Korea’s border to ROK tourists, 56 Kim Ki-nam, 56 Kim Sun-il, 47 Knowledge Sharing Program (ROK), 232 KNS Cheonan, 29–30, 56, 71, 173 KNS Dokdo, 32 KNS Dongwonho, 67(n18) Koguryo, Kingdom of, 30–31 Kompsat-1, 104 Kompsat-2, 106 Korea, Republic of (ROK): aid architecture and management, 211–213; aid policies and priorities, 214–216; aid volume and allocation, 213–214; carbon sink through forestation, 162–163; carbon trading, 157–159; climate change adaptation strategies, 163– 165; development assistance, 209–210; energy efficiency and renewable energy, 159–160; GHG mitigation of the transportation sector, 161–162; GHG mitigation strategies, 156–163; ODA history, 210–211; overseas combat operations, 177(table); peacekeeping efforts, 176–180; urban GHG mitigation, 160–161. See also Bilateral cooperation; Lee Myung-bak Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), 109–110 Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), 104, 106–107, 110, 111 Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), 87 Korea Center for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC), 133, 139–140 Korea Combat Training Center, 63 Korea Development Bank (KDB), 97(n25) Korea Development Institute (KDI), 238(n37) Korea Development Institute School of Public Policy and Management (KDI School), 229

281

Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), 81, 97(n25) Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS), 97 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP), 80 Korea Influenza Surveillance Scheme (KISS), 132 Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), 230, 231; Afghanistan aid, 186; counterterrorism, 53; EDCF and the creation of, 210–211; grant and technical assistance programs, 212, 213; Japan-ROK ODA cooperation, 228; ODA coordination and support, 217, 218, 219; postconflict processes in Afghanistan, 199; regional ODA cooperation, 229 Korea National Institute of Health (KNIH), 133 Korea Radioactive Waste Management Co. Ltd. (KRWM), 85 Korea Simulation System (KSIMS), 63 Korea Strait, 25 Korea-Japan Sea Lane, 28–29 Korean Defense Reform 307 Plan, 25, 30 Korean Institute of Technology Satellite (Kitsat or Uribyol), 104 Korean Multi-Purpose Satellite (Kompsat I), 104 Korean Overseas Volunteers, 235(n7) Korean Sounding Rocket (KSR)–1, 105 Korean Space Launch Vehicle (KSLV)–1, 105 Korean War, 181, 192(n24) Kyoto Protocol, 161 Kyung-min Kim, 107 Land Partnership Plan (LPP), 6 Laos: US avian flu response initiatives, 128 Latin America: ODA cooperation, 228–229 Leadership: democratic consolidation, 187–188; diplomatic, 61–62 Lebanon: peacekeeping, 178 Lee Joon-gyu, 53–55

282

Index

Lee Kwonheon, 61 Lee Myung-bak: climate change mitigation, 157; commitment to US alliance rebuilding, 44–46; counterterrorism cooperation, 52, 64; desire for strategic alliance increasing cooperation, 195–196; diplomatic leadership in counterterrorism efforts, 61–62; expanding peacekeeping operations, 186–187; global diplomatic leadership on counterterrorism, 65(n3); Global Korea foreign policy vision, 137, 184–187, 189, 193(n37), 242; increasing ROK’s independence and equality, 9–10; international volunteer program, 212; military support for US Afghanistan campaign, 50; naval expansion in the face of the North Korean military threat, 30; naval expansion to regional and global arenas, 27; North Korea policy, 55–56; North Korea’s H1N1 outbreak, 138; peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan, 180; reengagement in Afghanistan, 205; regional counterterrorism efforts, 52; ROK’s peacekeeping efforts, 183; social and political conflict, 188– 189; strategic alliance concept, 2; US NPT obligations, 75 LG Electronics, 158 Loan Guarantee Program, 151 Local initiatives: ROK adaptation for climate change, 164; ROK’s carbon point system, 158–159; US climate change adaptation, 156 Low-Earth orbit spacecraft, 114 Lugar, Richard, 88, 93 Lunar exploration, 111 Malaysia, 109; satellite technology, 108, 109 Manufacturing: commercial nuclear power, 97(n24) Maritime relationship: antipiracy operations, 36–37; Somali attack on South Korean ship, 67(n18). See also Naval capacity and forces

Mexico: pandemic emergency response, 125 Middle East: civil nuclear power, 81– 82 Middle-power status, ROK’s, 61–62 Military: alliance shift from military to ODA initiatives, 226; counterterrorism cooperation, 59– 61; intelligence-to-force ratio, 58–59; international counterterrorism efforts, 54; missile programs, 103–104; pandemic response, 129, 137–138, 141–142; postconflict processes doctrine development, 203; reformulating US-ROK partnership, 14; space program, 101–102; Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 6, 19(n14), 46. See also Counterterrorism; North Korea as security threat; US Forces Korea Military, ROK: benefits of involvement in postconflict processes, 197–199; counterterrorism cooperation, 59– 61; pandemic response, 134–135; South Korea’s defense provision, 14; space technology benefits, 112– 113; support for US counterterrorism efforts, 50; withdrawal from Afghanistan, 66(n16). See also Peacekeeping Military, US: avian flu preparedness, 135–136; global realignment after 9/11, 174–175; hazards of and obstacles to enhanced space cooperation, 116; Obama’s withdrawal of US forces in Afghanistan, 68(n45); operational approach to postconflict processes, 201; space technology benefits, 112–113; US NPT obligations, 75; US terror-related interests in Asia, 51–52. See also Peacekeeping; US Forces Korea Military culture: Koreans’ view of Obama’s foreign policy, 45–46; North Korea shaping, 21–22. See also Naval capacity

Index

Military dimension of space technology, 107–108 Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) initiative, 222 Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), 222 Millennium Development Goals (MDG), 211, 215, 216 Minister of Health and Welfare (MW), 131–132 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT; ROK), 54, 185, 212–213, 216, 219 Ministry of National Defense (MND), 135, 184–185 Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF; ROK), 211–212, 216 Missile technology, 71, 103–105, 107– 108. See also Space technology Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 105 Missionaries, 192(nn22,23) Mitigation of greenhouse gases, 146–147; carbon sink through forestation, 154–155, 162–163; carbon trading, 148–149, 157–159; renewable energy, 159–160; ROK strategies for, 156–163; transportation sector, 153–154, 161–162; urban systems, 160–161; US strategies for, 147–155 Money laundering, 48, 49, 63 Mongolia: peacekeeping, 179, 192(n17) Monterrey Consensus, 215 Multilateral cooperation: security cooperation, 15. See also International cooperation; Regional actors and cooperation Multilateral Organizations Performance Assessment Network (OPAN), 215 Multinational cooperation: US view of postconflict processes involvement, 199–200 Mutual benefit: comprehensive security alliance, 11–15, 242 Mutual Defense Treaty (1953), 3, 75

283

Myeongseong (empress), 47, 66(nn10,11) NASA, 111, 245 NASA Ames Research Center, 109– 110 National Counter-Terrorism Council, 54 National Influenza Centers (NICs), 125 National Institute of Environment Research (NIER), 163–164 National Institute of Meteorological Research (NIMR), 163–164 National Intelligence Service (ROK), 56 National interests: argument for ROK peacekeeping participation, 180– 184; building a partnership on shared values, 189–190; counterterrorism efforts, 46–48; US-ROK cooperation on postconflict processes, 204–205 National parks and forests, 162–163 National Resources Defense Council (US), 166 National Security Council (ROK), 131–132 National Security Space Strategy, 102, 113 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, 127 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 48–49 Nationalistic survival, 194(n42) NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 3, 18(n6); Afghanistan peacekeeping efforts, 176; peacekeeping in Afghanistan, 179; ROK’s cooperation in PKO, 185; war on terror, 10 Natural disasters, 14–15, 146, 184 Naval capacity and forces, 16, 21–22; China’s role in Korean security, 30– 32; counterterrorism cooperation, 60; enhanced US-ROK cooperation, 33–36; expansion in the face of North Korean threat, 29–30;

284

Index

geographic and economic factors in expansion, 27–29; Japanese dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima, 32–33; Korea as regional or global player, 26–27; modernization of the ROK navy, 23–26; OPCON shift, 35–36; ROK naval tradition, 22–23; USROK overlaps and conflicts naval interests, 38–39 New Village Movement, 198 Nigeria: terrorist activities, 47, 66(n15) Nike Hercules missile, 103 Nixon, Richard M., 74–75 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs): aid volume and allocation, 213–214; ODA coordination and collaboration, 216, 219, 229, 236(n10); ODA peer review, 217; pandemic preparedness, 142; peacekeeping, 189–190; US-ROK ODA policy dialogue, 232 Non–nuclear weapon states (NNWSs), 73, 99(n51) Nonproliferation. See Nuclear nonproliferation Nonproliferation Impact Assessment (NPIA) of GNEP Programmatic Alternatives, 87, 98(n41), 100(n55) Nordic Windpower, 151 North and South Korean Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 89 North Korea, 1–2; “axis of evil” speech, 7, 65(n2); as buffer zone for China, 31; climate change, 146; Cold War priorities of the US-ROK alliance, 3–4; driving counterterrorism cooperation, 55– 56; eclipsing ROK’s globalization policy, 187, 193(n37); H1N1 outbreak, 138–139; hazards of and obstacles to enhanced space cooperation, 116; issues influencing the US-ROK alliance, 246–247; multilateral space technology cooperation, 115; pandemic response, 139; pyroprocessing, 93– 94; ROK participation in PKO, 182; ROK participation in postconflict

processes, 205–206; ROK response to political instability or collapse, 196, 200; ROK’s development assistance, 219; role in expanded US-ROK alliance coordination, 15– 16; South Koreans’ shift in attitude to the US, 110–111; space technology, 102, 106; Sunshine Policy, 6; US and ROK’s diverging views of, 5, 44; US-Japan alliance, 20(n28); US-ROK ODA policy dialogue, 232 North Korea, as security threat: biological weapons, 130; Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island attacks, 29– 30, 56, 71, 173; Combined Forces Command (CFC) controversy, 35; denuclearization agreement violations, 90; importance of USROK ODA cooperation, 226–227; naval expansion in the face of the evolving military threat, 29–30; nuclear nonproliferation, 71; nuclear tests, 65–66(n7), 71, 75; Obama’s arms reduction initiative, 76; reconfiguring ROK-US alliance in view of, 45–46; ROK-US shared defense mission, 37–38; terrorist activities, 47; US NPT obligations, 75; use of space technology to monitor, 112–113; US-ROK global nonproliferation initiative, 77–78 Northeast Asia: geography of, 21–22; issues influencing the US-ROK alliance, 246–247; Koguryo, Kingdom of, 31 Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 149 Northern Limit Line (NLL) firefight, 29 Notifiable Infectious Disease Reporting System, 134 NPT Exporters Committee, 77–78 Nuclear cooperation, 100(n53) Nuclear fuel cycle, 84 Nuclear fuel reprocessing. See Reprocessing nuclear fuel Nuclear nonproliferation, 17; arms reductions and disarmament, 74;

Index

differences over the nuclear fuel cycle, 84–89; moratorium on new nuclear facilities, 99(n47); needed US-ROK steps, 79–82; North Korea’s nuclear test, 65–66(n7); Obama initiative, 76–77, 88–89; peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 73; pyroprocessing, 86–88, 90–91, 96(n1); regional and global threats to, 71–73; security assurances, 74– 76; stable cooperation and rigorous controls, 82–84; underfunding, 97(n22); US-ROK agreement points of contention, 89–92; US-ROK nonproliferation activities, 77–79; US-ROK pyroprocessing agreement, 93–96 Nuclear Security Summit, 78 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 82 Nuclear technology: bilateral civil agreement, 17; differences over the nuclear fuel cycle, 85–86; North Korea as regional and global threat, 71–72; North Korea’s nuclear tests, 65–66(n7), 71, 75; nuclear waste, 85–86; US-Japan alliance, 20(n28); weapons technology, 86 Nuclear umbrella, 74 Nuclear weapon states (NWSs), 73 Ny Initiative, 5 Obama administration: avian flu response initiatives, 128; counterterrorism cooperation, 64; CTBT ratification, 80; diplomatic use of space technology, 113–114; Joint Vision Statement, 9–10; military support for US Afghanistan campaign, 50; nonproliferation initiative, 88–89; nuclear arms reduction initiative, 76–77; Overseas Contingency Operations, 65(n1); overseas development policies and priorities, 220–221, 222–223; reconfiguring alliance in view of North Korean threat, 45– 46; renewable energy initiatives, 151; ROK’s peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan, 180; space technology,

285

102; UN peacekeeping operations, 175; US NPT obligations, 75; US troop drawdown in Afghanistan, 68(n45); US-ROK space ties, 109; withdrawal from Afghanistan, 205 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 126 Oh Gabriel, 54 Oil SLOC, 28 Olympic Games (1988), 47–48 Once-through nuclear fuel cycle, 86 Operation Enduring Freedom, 178, 198 Operation Enduring Freedom– Philippines, 62 Operational control (OPCON), 35–36, 59–60 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 18; money laundering, 49–50; ODA coordination, 245; ODA peer review, 217, 223–225, 236(n17); pandemic response, 139; ROK transition from aid recipient to donor, 184, 210–211, 215, 230; ROK’s ODA challenges, 226–227; social conflict index, 187–189, 193(n38); US foreign aid, 209, 220 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 61 Orr, Robert, 207(n3) Outer space. See Space technology Outer Space Treaty, 107–108, 115 Overseas Contingency Operations (US), 65(n1) Overseas development assistance (ODA), 17–18; branding, 218; challenges to ROK program, 216– 219; challenges to US program, 223–225; counterterrorism, 61–62; criticism of ROK’s Basic Law, 236(n18); NGO collaboration, 219; North Korea, 219; Obama initiatives, 220; obstacles to USROK cooperation, 229–231; pandemic response cooperation, 138–139; peer review, 217, 223– 225, 236(n17); policy dialogue, 231–232; ROK and US history of, 209–210; ROK budget, 236(n11);

286

Index

ROK’s architecture and management, 211–213; ROK’s history of, 210–211; ROK’s policies and priorities, 214–216; ROK’s volume and allocation, 213–214; South Korea’s expanding role and influence, 2; US architecture, 221– 223; US monitoring and evaluation, 225; US-led global stability and, 2; US-ROK cooperation, 225–229; US-ROK cooperation outline, 231– 234 Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 222 Pakistan, 72; nuclear power, 81; peacekeeping efforts, 176 Palestine: UN-led peacekeeping, 176 Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan (ROK), 131 Pandemics: economic impact, 123– 124; enhancing cooperation, 136–142; global emergency response initiatives, 125–127; global response infrastructure, 123– 127; influenza virus types, 124; pandemic cooperation initiatives, 122–123; ROK response strategies, 130–136; US strategies, 127–130 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 236–237(n19) Park Chung-hee, 3; modernization of the navy, 24; nonproliferation commitments, 74–75; ROK’s economic transformation, 215 Peace Corps, 222, 234 Peacekeeping: in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas, 191(n9); argument for ROK participation, 180–184; benefits of involvement in postconflict processes, 197–199; bilateral agreements and UN mandates, 17; challenges to ROK expansion, 189–190, 243; constraints on ROK participation, 187–190; ISAF mandate, 192(n19); ROK contributions to reconstruction, stabilization, and, 177(table); ROK involvement, 176–

180; ROK personnel contributions, 192(n16); ROK’s commitment to global expansion of, 184–187; ROK’s goal of expansion, 173; Sea Island summit, 174–175; South Korea’s expanding role and influence, 2; UN and non-UN actors, 175–176, 191(n1); UNIFIL, 192(n15) Peacekeeping Training Center (ROK), 197, 203 Pearl Harbor, 130 People’s Liberation Army (PLA; China): response to North Korean threat, 37–38 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN; China), 31–32 Pew Center, 166 Philippines: antiterrorism cooperation, 62 Piracy, 36–37, 41(n33), 54, 67(n18) Plutonium stockpiles, 72 Plutonium-uranium extraction (PUREX), 86 Political conflict (ROK), 187–189 Political participation, 201–202 Political transition, 4–5 Politics reformulating US-ROK partnership, 12–14 Population density, 151, 152(fig.) Portland, Oregon: GHG mitigation, 154–155 Postconflict stabilization and reconstruction: Afghanistan, 185– 186, 203–204; benefit to the US-ROK alliance, 242; multinational peacekeeping, 177– 178; obstacles to US-ROK cooperation, 204–206; ODA strategies, 224, 226; peacekeeping versus, 191–192(n10); ROK contributions, 177(table); ROK’s expanding role and influence, 2; strategic, operational, and tactical cooperation, 202–204; US operational approach, 200–202, 207(n3); US view of, 199–200; US war on terror, 10; US-ROK cooperation, 196–197

Index

Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development (2010; US), 221 Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), 107 Private philanthropy, 220, 237(n25) Proceeds of Crime Act, 48 Production and consumption, climate change and, 146, 155–156 Programmatic consent for nuclear fuel reprocessing, 88, 99(n43) Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 55–56, 58, 60, 78 Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), 198–199 Public health initiatives, 133 Public opinion: affecting prioritization between allies, 245–246; Koreans’ view of the US, 68(n43); Obama’s foreign policy, 45–46; public mistrust of government institutions, 188–189; ROK’s ODA, 237(n22); ROK’s peacekeeping efforts, 179– 180, 183, 192(n18); support for alliance, 43; US-ROK cooperation on postconflict processes, 204–205 Public transportation, 153, 162 Pyroprocessing, 86–88, 89–95, 96(n1), 98(n41) Pyrorecycling, 86–88, 94 al-Qaeda, 47, 66(n17) Qinshan nuclear power plant (China), 81 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (US), 221 Rainwater harvesting, 164–165 RazakSat, 108 Rebound effect, hybrid vehicles and, 154 Reconstruction. See Postconflict stabilization and reconstruction Recovering states: ODA strategies, 224 Recycling, 98(n41) Refugees: China’s concerns over North Korean collapse, 31–32 Regional actors and cooperation: China and Japan’s reluctance to participate in PKOs, 181–182; civil

287

nuclear power, 81–82; counterterrorism and money laundering legislation, 49; counterterrorism cooperation, 64– 65; diplomatic leadership in counterterrorism efforts, 61–62; North Korea as military threat, 30; North Korea as regional and global nuclear threat, 71–72; Obama’s arms reduction initiative, 77; pandemic cooperation, 122–123, 125, 140; peacekeeping in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas, 191(n9); postconflict processes, 206; reformulating US-ROK partnership, 13–14; ROK antiterrorism cooperative efforts, 52–54; ROK Navy, 24; ROK regional security training sessions, 62; Satellite Technology for the Asia-Pacific Region, 109; South Korea’s growing regional leadership role, 12; space technology, 113, 116; support for the alliance, 249; US and ROK alliances outside the Korean peninsula, 46; vulnerability to direct attack by, 1 Regional (US) cooperation: carbon trading, 149 Regional response capacity, 14–15 Regional security: counterterrorism, 65(n3) Regulation: counterterrorism and money laundering legislation, 49 Renaissance satellites, 115 Renewable energy, 149–151, 159–160 Renewable fuels, 148 Reprocessing nuclear fuel, 75, 84, 86, 90–91, 93–95, 96(n1), 99(n43), 100(n54) Research and development: climate change mitigation, 157; limits to missile technology research, 105 Reunification with North Korea, 219, 246 Rice, Condoleezza, 51–52 Roh Moo-hyun, 2; broadening ROK’s strategic role, 27; improprieties, 55;

288

Index

increasing ROK independence and equality with the US, 7–9; peacekeeping efforts, 179–180; regional counterterrorism efforts, 52; social and political conflict, 188; strategic flexibility, 8–9; support for US Afghanistan campaign, 50; view of North Korea, 44 Rumsfeld, Donald, 7, 60 Russia: human spaceflight effort, 106; missile technology, 105; multilateral space technology cooperation, 115; North Korea nuclear program, 78; ROK-Russian space cooperation, 103; shaping Korea’s strategic thinking, 21; space technology, 111, 119(n21); START, 76 Satellite deployment, 101 Satellite technology, 104, 108–112, 114 Satellite Technology for the AsiaPacific Region (STAR), 109 Sea Island Action Plan, 174–175 Sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs), 27–29, 242 Seattle, Washington: energy adaptation and mitigation, 156 Security, 17; alliance priorities, 247; “axis of evil” speech, 7; burden sharing of security costs, 15; climate change and energy security, 146; global comprehensive security alliance, 10–11, 12; hazards of and obstacles to enhanced space cooperation, 115–116; Lee’s prioritization of the US-ROK alliance, 10; nonproliferation commitments, 74–76; North Korea’s role in expanded US-ROK alliance coordination, 15–16; obstacles to ODA cooperation, 229– 231; operational approach to postconflict processes, 201; reformulating US-ROK partnership, 13–14; ROK regional training sessions, 62; ROK’s domestic

interests, 46–48; ROK’s growing interdependence with China, 247; South Korea’s expanding role in global and regional security, 1–3; strengthening space security, 102; UN peacekeeping operations, 175; US war on terror, 20(n24). See also Counterterrorism; Naval capacity and forces; Nuclear nonproliferation Security Consultation for Alliance Partnership, 9 Security Policy Initiative (SPI; 2004– 2008), 8 Security Strategy (US), 20(n24) Segyehwa (globalization policy), 187 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 88 September 11, 2001: global realignment of US armed forces, 174–175; ROK response to, 43; triggering reevaluation of the USROK alliance, 7; trilateral counterterrorism efforts, 48; US foreign aid program, 220; US Security Strategy, 20(n24) Server in the Sky, 59 Severe Acute Respiratory System (SARS), 123, 143(n9), 243 Shah, Rajiv, 222–223 Shell Petroleum, 66(n15) Shim Seong-min, 192(n22) Shin Boo-nam, 57 Simon, Sheldon, 51 Singapore: pandemic response, 140 Sino-Japanese War, 22 Six-Party Talks, 71, 75–76 Smart-growth movement, 151–153 Smith, Michael, 62 Smuggling, 32 Social conflict (ROK), 187–189, 193(n38) Social injustice, 188, 193(n40) Somalia: piracy, 36, 47, 67(n18); ROK peacekeeping, 176–177, 177(table) South Korean Customs Service, 54 Southeast Sea Lane, 28 Southwest Sea Lane, 28 Space debris, 102

Index

Space-launch vehicle, 101, 105–106 Space technology, 17; expanding USROK cooperation, 110–115; hazards of and obstacles to enhanced cooperation, 115–117; international relations, 108–109; military dimension, 107–108; ROK’s history and lag, 103–110; ROK’s satellite construction and deployment, 104–105; South Korea’s lag, 103; US-ROK ties, 109–110 Spanish flu, 143(n9) Stabilization. See Postconflict stabilization and reconstruction Star City rainwater harvesting, 164– 165 State Climate and Energy Partnership Program (2005), 150–151 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 6, 19(n14), 46 Storage of nuclear fuel, 92–93, 98(n38) Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), 76 Strategic flexibility, 8–9, 34, 40(n26); China’s anxiety over, 38 Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim (1990). See East Asian Strategic Initiative Strategic national stockpile (SNS), 128 Strategic partner countries, 216 Strategic Programme Fund (SPF), 165 Strategic worldview, South Korea’s: US-ROK maritime relationship, 33–35 Submarine program, 24 Sung Kim, 56 Sunshine Policy, 6 Surveillance systems: pandemic preparedness, 129, 132, 134–135, 137 Sustainable urbanism, 151–154 Swine flu. See H1N1 Taiwan crisis, 34 Taliban, 48, 66(n16), 180, 192(nn22,23)

289

Tamiflu, 138 Task flotillas, 25 Task Force 151, 36 Tauscher, Ellen, 88–89, 93 Tax credits: energy, 151 Technology: ROK’s military gap, 51– 52; ROK’s social conflict, 188; US economic growth-based ODA, 223. See also Nuclear technology; Space technology Technology transfer, 72 Temperature, global, 145–146 Territorial disputes: Japanese-ROK Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, 32–33 Terrorism: biological warfare, 135; cyberterrorism, 47, 58; financial controls, 48; global nonproliferation initiative, 78; Korea’s history of, 47, 66(n11); North Korea’s activities, 66(n13); regional and global threats to nuclear nonproliferation, 72; ROK support of antiterrorism efforts, 68(n44); Taliban’s abduction and murder of South Koreans, 180. See also Counterterrorism Terrorism Information Integration Center, 47 Terrorism Prevention Bill (2002), 49 Thailand: Satellite Technology for the Asia-Pacific Region, 109 Thirty-eighth parallel, 21–22 Tied aid, 217, 225, 237(n20) Tourism and travel: biometric data sharing, 59; opening North Korea’s border to ROK tourists, 56 Trade. See Commerce and trade Trade and Development Agency, 222 Traffic accident, 6–7 Transportation sector: GHG mitigation, 161–162; renewable energy, 159– 160 Transportation Security Administration (TSA; US), 63 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 71–76, 77–78, 84 Trilateral (US-ROK-Japan) cooperation, 48, 53, 248

290

Index

Turkey: aid volume, 213 Turtle ships, 22 Ulchi Freedom Guardian, 63 UN Development Programme (UNDP), 199 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 57 UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 178, 192(n15) UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), 176 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 82, 108 United Kingdom: climate change initiatives, 165; Global Influenza Surveillance Network, 125; ROK’s satellite construction and deployment, 104 United Nations: Ban Ki-moon, 193(n35); global pandemic response, 125–127; Korean War, 192(n24); outer space conventions, 107–108; peacekeeping operations, 175–176, 178–179, 184; ROK’s UNSC membership, 183 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), 156–157, 165 United Nations Security Council (UNSC): counterterrorism efforts, 48; Resolution 1540, 78, 79 United Nations System Influenza Coordination (UNSIC), 126 United States: carbon sink through forestation, 154–155; carbon trading, 148–149; climate change mitigation strategies, 147–155; development assistance, 209–210; enhanced US-ROK naval cooperation, 33–36; Japanese-ROK Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, 32–33; naval tradition, 22–23; ODA architecture, 221–223; operational approach to postconflict processes, 200–202; reconfiguring alliance in view of North Korean threat, 45– 46; renewable energy, 149–151; strategy for postconflict processes, 207(n3); transportation initiatives

for GHG mitigation, 153–154; urban initiatives for GHG mitigation, 151–153; view of postconflict processes, 199–200. See also Bilateral cooperation United States–India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act of 2008, 88 Uranium enrichment, 71–75 Urban development: climate change and, 147–148; GHG mitigation, 151–153, 160–161; growth of urban populations in the US and South Korea, 152(fig.); ROK’s climate change adaptation strategies, 164 Urban forests, 154–156, 162–163 US Climate Action Partnership (USCAP), 148–149 US Department of Defense, 129, 137, 222 US Department of Energy, 87, 153 US Department of Homeland Security, 127 US Department of State, 127, 140– 141, 221–222 US Department of Treasury, 222 US Forces Korea (USFK): comprehensive security alliance, 11–15; counterterrorism cooperation, 59–61; death of South Korean girls, 6–7; EASI, 4–5; reduction under EASI plan, 4–5, 8; South Korea’s judicial system, 19(n14); US-ROK maritime relationship, 34–35. See also Military US Green Building Council (USGBC), 161 US Naval Advisory Group, 23 US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), 82–83 US Pacific Command (USPACOM), 60, 129, 130 US Security Strategy (2002), 20(n24) USAID, 127–128, 221, 223, 230, 231, 237(n26) US-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate, 166

Index

US-Japan peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement, 100(n54) US-ROK Development Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), 204 Uzbekistan, 185–186 Vaccine development, 126–127, 128– 129, 133 Values: building a partnership on shared, 189–190; reformulating USROK partnership, 13 Vietnam: ROK’s contribution to overseas combat operations, 177(table), 178; Satellite Technology for the Asia-Pacific Region, 109; South Korea’s defense provision, 14; US avian flu response initiatives, 128; US policy failure, 74–75 Vietnam War, 3 Volunteer program, ROK’s, 212, 235(n7) War on terror, 7, 10, 20(n24) Water resources, 155–156 Weapons capability, 71 Wegner, Peter, 113–114 West Sea battles (1998, 2002), 29 Western Climate Initiative, 149

291

Westinghouse, 80 Wetlands, 163 Whole-of-alliance approach to postconflict processes, 202–204, 248–249 Whole-of-government approach to postconflict processes, 201 Wideband Global Satcom system, 114 Wind energy production, 151, 160 World Cup (2002), 7, 47–48, 49 World Friends, 234 World Health Organization (WHO): global health infrastructure, 125– 126; pandemic response, 138, 140; ROK pandemic response simulations, 133; swine flu outbreak, 121–122, 123, 124 World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), 125 World Resources Institute (WRI), 166 Yellow/West Sea, 32 Yemen, 47, 66(n17) Yeonpyeong Island, 29, 71, 173 Yi So-yeon, 106, 111, 115, 119(n21) Yi Sun-sin, 22 Yoon Kwang Ung, 27 Yoon Lee, 58 Zanger Committee, 77–78

About the Book

HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH KOREA BEST cooperate to address new security challenges? Can the US-ROK alliance serve to advance South Korea’s interests and at the same time help the US to more effectively pursue its own global and regional security objectives? In the context of these questions, the authors explore the possibilities for enhanced cooperation in both traditional and nontraditional spheres. The chapters, all organized around a common set of questions, address issues ranging from counterterrorism, military affairs, and nuclear nonproliferation; to the environment, pandemics, and biological threats; and to peacebuilding, development assistance, and humanitarian aid. In each chapter, the authors consider the capacities and potential for cooperation on both sides, assess the corresponding challenges, and propose new forms of collaboration. Scott Snyder is senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on US-Korea Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is author of China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security and Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior, and coeditor (with L. Gordon Flake) of Paved with Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea.

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