The United States’ Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940–1950 9780231898034

Traces the development of US policy in Southeast Asia during the critical period beginning with the Japanese-American ri

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The United States’ Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940–1950
 9780231898034

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
1. The United States and the Colonial System in Southeast Asia
2. The Rivalry of Japan and the United States Over Southeast Asia, 1940-1941
3. Planning for Decolonization in Southeast Asia, 1942-1943
4. United States'-European Differences Over Postwar Southeast Asia, December 1943-October 1945
5. Toward A Limited Anticolonialism: The Final Phase of Postwar Planning, November 1944-July 1945
6. The Nationalist Revolutions in Indonesia And Indochina, 1945-1947
7. The United States' Model: Decolonization in the Philippines
8. The Emergence of United States' Influence in Thailand, Burma, And Malaya, 1945-1948
9. The Indonesian Revolution, 1947-1949: The Fulfillment of Anticolonialism
10. The Vietnamese Revolution: The Evolution 311 of the Commitment to France, 1947-1950
11. The Redefinition of United States' Policy, 1949-1950
12. Conclusion
Abbreviations
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

The United States' Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940-1950

The United States' Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940-1950 Gary R. Hess

Columbia University Press New York 1987

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hess Gary R. The United States' emergence as a Southeast Asian power, 1940-1950. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Asia, Southeastern—Foreign relations—United States. 2. United States—Foreign relations—Asia, Southeastern. I. Title. DS525.9.U6H47 1987 (327.73059) 86-18861 ISBN 0-231-06190-0

Columbia University Press New York Guildford, Surrey Copyright © 1987 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America This book is Smyth-sewn.

Book design by J.S. Roberts

To Ryan

Contents PREFACE

ix

1. The United States and the Colonial System in Southeast Asia

1

2. The Rivalry of Japan and the United States Over Southeast Asia, 1940-1941

21

3. Planning for Decolonization in Southeast Asia, 1942-1943

47

4. United States'-European Differences Over Postwar Southeast Asia, December 1943-October 1945

83

5. Toward a Limited Anticolonialism: The Final Phase of Postwar Planning, November 1944-July 1945

121

6. The Nationalist Revolutions in Indonesia and Indochina, 1945-1947

159

7. The United States' Model: Decolonization in the Philippines

217

8. The Emergence of United States' Influence in Thailand, Burma, and Malaya, 1945-1948

251

9. The Indonesian Revolution, 1947-1949: The Fulfillment of Anticolonialism

275

10. The Vietnamese Revolution: The Evolution of the Commitment to France, 1947-1950

311

11. The Redefinition of United States' Policy, 1949-1950

333

12. Conclusion

367

ABBREVIATIONS

373

viii

Contents NOTES

375

BIBLIOGRAPHY

425

INDEX

441

Preface THIS STUDY TRACES the development of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia during the critical period beginning with the Japanese-American rivalry over the region in 1940-1941—when the United States sought to protect its own substantial interests in the region as well as those of the European colonial powers— and concluding with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. During that decade, the American interst in Southeast Asia increased substantially with the consistent objective of building close political and economic relations between the region and the Western nations, and, by 1949, with Japan as well. The extensive post-World War II planning, in which the State Department engaged from 1942 to 1945, sought to forestall antiWestern political movements and upheavals by providing for a peaceful, gradual transitition from European colonial rule to independence. After the war, the nationalist upheavals throughout Southeast Asia, particularly those in Indonesia and Indochina, forced the United States to make difficult choices between supporting the colonial policies of European allies or endorsing the nationalist aspirations of colonial peoples. With Communist leadership dominating the nationalist movement in Indochina and Communist influence strong elsewhere, especially in Burma and the Philippines, Southeast Asia appeared, by 1948-1949 as the Chinese Communist approached victory in their civil war struggle against the Kuomintang, to be especially vulnerable. The plans to rebuild the Japanese economy as a means of enhancing American interests in the Pacific also increased the importance of Southeast Asia for it could provide raw materials and markets for the Japanese. Thus, by the time of the Communist victory in China and the beginning of the Korean War, the United States had made plans to increase substantially its political, economic, and military commitments to the region.

X

Preface

This book began with an interest in World War II planning for postwar Southeast Asia, in particular the European colonial countries of Indochina, Indonesia, Burma, and Malaya. As the research progressed, it became increasingly evident that a broader regional study was called for, since American officials, from the time of the 1940-1941 crisis with Japan, began thinking of Southeast Asia in regional terms; the links between Japanese encroachments on Indochina and the status of the Netherlands East Indies and other areas of importance to the United States forced a change in political and strategic plans. As the war progressed, the regional approach was reflected in postwar planning. In particular, the assumption that the American experience in the Philippines provided a model for orderly training in self-government guided American anticolonial objectives. Also, the British-American differences over Thailand touched on colonial issues and highlighted the emerging American influence in that region. The decision to continue the study into the postwar period resulted from an interest in determining the extent to which wartime planning actually influenced later developments and from a conviction that, taken as a whole, the decade of the 1940s constituted an important unit of American policy in the region. For the sake of consistency, I have referred throughout the book to Thailand, not Siam. Both were official titles of the country during the period under consideration; in 1939, the name was changed from Siam to Thailand and in 1946, Siam again became the official name. Since 1949, Thailand has been the official name. I have been assisted by several agencies and individuals in this project. A fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities enabled me to devote six months to full-time research. In addition, grants-in-aid from the Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Harry S. Truman Library Institute facilitated travel to the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Truman Library respectively. The Faculty Researh Committee of Bowling Green State University provided support for several research trips to Washington, D.C., as well as to London. Gayle Morris, Sue Hayward Banchich, and Suzanne Carmichael provided vaulable help as student assistants. And Judy Gilbert typed the entire manuscript with efficiency, accuracy, and an unerring eye for problems.

Preface

xi

A number of colleagues have taken the time to offer advice on various parts of the manuscript. From 1982 to 1984,1 participated in a seminar on American-East Asian relations from 1931-1949 that Akira Iriye organized at the University of Chicago with funding provided by the Henry Luce Foundation. My seminar paper summarized the principal points of this book, and I benefitted immensely from the comments and suggestions of Warren Cohen, Sherman Cochran, Waldo Heinrichs (who also read part of the book manuscript), Robert Messer, Chihiro Hosoya, Luo Rangqu, K. Usui, Wang Xi, and of course, Akira Iriye. His support and encouragement have been especially helpful; and like all others working in the American-Asian area, I am indebted to his scholarship which has forced reconsideration of traditional ways of thinking. Besides the seminar participants, Frank Freidel, Melvyn Leffler, William Roger Louis, Robert McMahon, and Basil Rauch offered valuable advice. Their expertise on various aspects of this study proved exceptionally helpful. Finally, Russell Fifield, whose work on AmericanSoutheast Asian relations has served as a model of scholarship and objectivity, graciously went beyond the expectations of a reader for the Columbia University Press and offered to meet with me and go over the manuscript in detail. I am indebted to each of these scholars, and I hope that the final work reflects the high quality of their advice. My wife, Rose, has, as always, been supportive of my work, and has understood the need for absences to engage in research and the self-absorption which too often accompanies writing. My son, Ryan, too, has been encouraging, in countless ways that he will understand more fully some day. Gary R. Hess

The United States Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940-1950

1 . The United States and the Colonial System in Southeast Asia The power that rules the Pacific . . . is the power that rules the world. And, with the Philippines, that power is and will forever be the American Republic. Senator Albert Beveridge

PRIOR TO WORLD War II, Southeast Asia—aside from the Philippines—was a region of negligible concern to American policymakers. With the exception of the colonial administrative responsibilities in the Philippines and the diplomatic relations with Thailand (the region's only independent nation), the United States dealt with Southeast Asia principally through the European nations which dominated the area: the preeminent British, with their empire encompassing Malaya and Burma; the French, with their control over the Indochina states; and the Dutch with their prize colonial posession, the Netherlands East Indies. The colonial system served American economic interests, especially by providing raw materials and offering modestly expanding investment opportunities. Politically, the United States took pride in its colonial record in the Philippines and in a

2

The U.S. and the Colonial System

record of substantial influence in Thailand. By the late 1930s, however, the stability of the colonial system began to be undermined by Japan's expansion. The preservation of the Westerndominated political and economic structure of Southeast Asia depended upon European military power, especially that of Great Britain. But even before war began in Europe, Britain's capability to influence Asian affairs was diminishing. As a result, with the outbreak of Sino-Japanese warfare in 1937, the United States faced the issue of whether American interests necessitated an enlarged military and political role in Southeast Asia and the Pacific generally.

An Ambiguous Legacy: American Rule in the Philippines While participating in the Western colonial system, the United States considered its record in the Philippines to be exceptional—an example of enlightened colonial policy. Americans took pride in introducing economic and social improvements, and in preparing Filipinos for independence. The TydingsMcDuffie Act of 1934 established the Philippine Commonwealth as a transitional government in anticipation of American withdrawl in 1946. The American administration of the Philippines had indeed brought many changes during the four decades since the Spanish-American War, but the imperial record also betrayed political and economic inconsistencies that would leave an ambiguous legacy. From the early years of American dominance, control had rested on the "imperialism of suasion" which accommodated the interests, insofar as was possible, of the native elite. The sudden acquisition of the islands in 1898 gave the United States responsibility for a vast archipelago which had experienced, during the late ninteenth century, widespread discontent with the stultifying effects of Spanish administration. Various divisive forces fragmented the Philippine Revolution and its fledgl-

The U.S. and the Colonial System

3

ing government headed by Emilio Aguinaldo. Yet it required the dispatch of two-thirds of the American army to suppress the "insurrection." Following that brutal antiguerrilla campaign, the maintenance of the American position in the Philippines depended upon cultivating Filipino support, which resulted in drawing the elite into political participation and appropriating the modernization and nation-building process to which the elite was committed. In deference to the interests of the elite, the United States ignored the need for far-reaching social reform and economic development. Although American policy accommodated its interests, the elite pressed for independence which became the issue that gave it a unity of purpose and enhanced its political dominance. By the 1920s, the independence issue had become central to the Philippine-American relationship.1 The Philippine elite and American officials shared an interest in the modernization of the islands. The United States brought especially far-reaching quantitative and substantive changes to the educational system. From a total of fewer than 7,000 students in 1898, enrollment in elementary, secondary and collegiate schools increased to 1, 237,000 by 1935-36 and to over 2,000,000 by 1940-41. Moreover, the educational process was thoroughly Americanized in content, language, and method. While the educational reforms had certain defects (including too little attention to higher education and a concentration of training at that level in only a few professions), they substantially increased the literacy rate and served as an agent of westernization. Likewise, the development of a system of public health, the improvement of communications and transportation, the monetization of the economy, and the stimulus to urbanization all facilitated the modernization process.2 The Tydings-McDuffie Act resolved the question of independence, but not the problems derived from the policy of accommodation. The inadequacy of the independence legislation resulted partly from the fact that its principal impetus came from agrarian interests and labor groups that sought to reduce Philippine competition. As critics warned at the time,

4

The U.S. and the Colonial System

independence was being granted in the wrong way and at the wrong time. The legislation provided no remedy for Philippine economic dependence on the United States and left the islands more vulnerable than ever to Japanese aggression.3 The Commonwealth government had little time to deal with the central problems of a maldistribution of political power, uneven economic development, and military insecurity. Economic dependency was the most intractable problem. Since the passage of the Underwood Tariff in 1913, which provided for reciprocal free trade between the mainland and the islands, the Philippine economy had been encouraged to produce and export sugar, hemp, and coconut oil into the American market and had, in turn, become dependent upon the import of consumer goods at the expense of the development of its own manufacturing. By 1930, the Philippines depended upon the United States for 79 percent of its exports and 63 percent of its imports. The Tydings-McDuffie Act provided for continued free trade until 1940 but with Philippine exports subject to quotas; there were no limits, however, on exports to the islands. As a result, Philippine dependence became even greater; by 1940, the United States was absorbing 83 percent of Philippine exports and providing 77 percent of the imports. Philippine labor remained heavily concentrated in agricultural production. In sum, neither the U. S. government nor the Philippine elite took advantage of the opportunity to parallel the planned political decolonization with steps leading to economic development. 4 The commitment to independence, nonetheless, was a significant step in the development of Western relations with colonial Asia. The rapidity of decolonization after World War II has obscured the impact of the Tydings-McDuffie Act as the first firm promise of independence to a colonial people. The decision was made, as noted, for diverse reasons, and despite their nationalist rhetoric, Filipino leaders acknowledged the dangers of severance from the United States; indeed, in the late 1930s, some Filipinos and Americans contemplated the postponement of independence. Regardless of the motives and second

The U.S. and the Colonial System

5

thoughts, the American policy exerted wide influence. Nationalists elsewhere in Asia were heartened. In the nearby East Indies, Indonesian leaders quickly raised the question of their independence from the Netherlands. The Dutch as well as the other Western powers were apprehensive about the implications of the American example for their own empires.5 The most serious shortcoming of American rule was the inability of the United States to defend the islands. For decades Philippine security had been recognized as precarious. War Plan Orange—the strategic plan for the contingency of war with Japan—anticipated that following an outbreak of hostilities, American forces would hold Manila Bay for as long as six months until they were reinforced when the United States would take the initiative in the Western Pacific. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, that strategy seemed "literally an act of madness." 6 The War Department, which in any event was sparsely funded, never provided the support necessary for a stong garrison and naval base at Manila. Moreover, Japan's League of Nations mandate over the Marshall, Mariana, and Carolina islands, which she had taken from Germany in World War I, effectively prevented any relief of the Philippines. War Department officers acknowledged that in the event of war, the Philippines would be lost quickly. In recognition of the limits of American Power, War Plan Orange was modified. In 1935, the navy stipulated that the Marshall and Carolina islands would have to be captured and developed as bases before the Philippines could be relieved. And the following year, the mission of the Philippine garrison was reduced to holding just the entrances to Manila Bay. To go further and concede the American inability to defend the islands, however, risked alienating important groups in both the United States and the Philippines. 7 General Douglas MacArthur set out to defend the indefensible. Following his tour of duty as U.S. Chief of Staff, MacArthur returned to the Philippines in 1935 as military adviser to Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon. The following year Quezon named him Field Marshall of the Philippine

6

The U.S. and the Colonial System

army which, as MacArthur's Chief-of-Staff Dwight Eisenhower later noted, was "a virtually nonexisting army." 8 Undaunted, MacArthur envisioned a nation of citizen-soldiers, modeled on the example of Switzerland, who would be trained for the defense of the islands. A fleet of torpedo boats, air force fighters, and bombers would engage invaders in hit-and-run tactics. Officials in Washington criticized MacArthur's scheme; citizensoldiers might be adequate to defend landlocked mountainous Switzerland, but not the Philippine archipelago. In Manila, Quezon initially supported MacArthur, but many leaders questioned whether the Commonwealth could absorb the cost of such a vast defense plan and maintained that defense remained an American responsibility until independence. Despite MacArthur's optimistic pronouncements, the training program moved very slowly and lacked adequate supplies. The Philippine public showed little enthusiasm, and the recruits were typically malnourished and poorly educated. The number of registrants for national conscription declined sharply between 1936 and 1940, and those completing basic training never approached the annual objective of 40,000 men. By that time Quezon had come to despair of defending the islands and, with other Filipinos, believed that neutralization offered the only means of avoiding defeat in the event of war between the United States and Japan. Much to the annoyance of MacArthur, Quezon championed early independence and neutralization of the islands.9 That alternative might well have served Philippine interests. When the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed, some members of Congress and other observers urged immediate American withdrawal. More recently, it has been argued that while an independent Philippines would still have been overrun by the Japanese, the conquest, administration, and withdrawal would likely have been much less devastating than the Philippines experience from 1942 to 1945. Philippine cooperation with Japan—a necessity under any circumstances—would have lacked the element of U.S. disloyalty which was to cause

The U.S. and the Colonial System

7

tensions in the Philippine-American relationship at the end of the war. Clearly retention of responsibility for the Philippines should have been accompanied by a substantial naval and air buildup sufficient to deter a Japanese invasion. But in view of the isolationist mood of the 1930s, congressional reluctance to support the military, and the priority given to Europe, the prospects for adequate defense of the Philippines were almost nil. Hence, the most practical, if not the ideal, solution to America's imperial problems in the mid-1930s might have been immediate independence.10

The United States and Thailand Next to the Philippines among the Southeast Asian countries, the United States exerted the greatest influence in Thailand. American relations with Thailand dated to the early nineteenth century when Thailand was gradually ending its self-imposed isolation from the West. Commercial contacts began in 1818 and grew out of the China trade. As was the case in the development of treaty relations with China, the United States followed the British lead in Thailand. Agreements of 1833 opening the Thai market and of 1856 granting extraterritorial privileges and "most favored nation" commercial status were both modeled on earlier British-Thai treaties. During the early twentieth century, the United States supported Thailand's determination to uphold its territorial integrity. Substantial territorial losses to the French in Indochina and the British in Malaya, and the extraterritorial privileges enjoyed by the Western powers, undermined Thailand's independence. In 1892 King Chulalongkorn established the practice of employing a foreign advisor, who was to come from a neutral country without territorial ambitions in Southeast Asia. For the first decade, a distinguished Belgian held the position of General Adviser, but beginning in 1902, a series of Americans, mostly graduates of Harvard Law School, were named to that

8

The U.S. and the Colonial System

important office. The appointments were coordinated by Harvard, the Department of State, and the Thai minister in Washington, subject to the approval of the King. The first two American advisers—Edward Strobel and Jens Westengard— strongly influenced Thailand's diplomatic development. In addition to advising the King on foreign affairs, the Americans served as Thai diplomatic agents and mediated in the frequent border disputes with neighboring countries. U.S. policy after World War I strengthened Thailand's international position. Entering the war on the Allied side, Thailand was represented at the Paris Peace Conference and was given membership in the Assembly of the League of Nations. At Paris, President Woodrow Wilson championed Thailand's appeal for an end to its unequal treaties with the Western nations. In 1920 the United States took the lead in relinquishing extraterritoriality and restoring tariff autonomy. With the revised American treaty as a model, the Thai government in 1924 sent its American adviser, Francis B. Sayre, who was Wilson's son-inlaw, on a mission to negotiate an end to the other unequal treaties. Within a year, Sayre negotiated revised treaties with the British, French and seven other Western nations, with the result that by 1927, Thailand had gained fiscal and judicial autonomy. For his achievement, Sayre was honored in Bangkok and later served as Thailand's representative on The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration.11 During the 1930s Thai-American relations became strained as a result of internal and international factors which encouraged a strident Thai nationalism with anti-Western overtones. A coup d'etat in 1932 headed by army officers and civilian intellectuals established a constitutional monarchy in Bangkok. The revolution also led to a struggle between the army group headed by Pibul Songgram and the civilians led by Pridi Panamyong. The civilians were dominant until 1938, when Pibul gained the ascendancy and established a virtual dictatorship. Nationalization of the economy sought to reduce the influence of the resident Chinese (who constituted about one-sixth of the

The U.S. and the Colonial System

9

population) and foreign-owned companies, including the American-owned Standard Vacuum Oil Company. This reinvigorated nationalism called for regaining territories lost to the British and French. To reaffirm the connection with Thai peoples living outside, the nation's English name was officially changed to "Thailand." (The Thai considered the historic name "Siam" to be of foreign origin.) Thailand's nationalism bore certain parallels to Japan's expansionism. American officials regarded Thailand as unnecessarily deferential to Japan, thus inviting Tokyo's influence. The United States and Thailand differed over Japan's takeover of Manchuria. In the Assembly of the League of Nations, Thailand was the only member to abstain in the vote on the Lytton Report condemning Japan's invasion. Thailand's silence on this issue, which ran counter to the counsel of the American adviser in Bangkok, was generally interpreted in both Tokyo and Washington as indicative of sympathy with Japan's ambitions. In reality, Thailand's abstention reflected principally its historic practice of upholding independence by not antagonizing a stronger nation. In the next few years, Japan cultivated Thailand's friendship and greatly extended its economic and cultural influence. Japan's share of Thailand's imports dramatically increased, with the result that by 1938 its share of that market nearly equalled that of Britain, which at the turn of the century had controlled 95 percent of Thailand's imports. Thai leaders looked to Japan for support in regaining their lost territories. While seeking to exploit once again a changing international situation to their nation's advantage, Thai leaders remained wary of Japan. By 1940, however, American officials had become skeptical about Thai protectations of determination to remain independent of Japan. 12

American Economic Expansion The American economic stake in Southeast Asia, while not comparable to that in western Europe or the western hemisphere,

10

The U.S. and the Colonial System

was nonetheless important. The principal interest in the region was as a source of raw materials, especially rubber, tin, and oil. By the 1930s, Southeast Asia supplied about 90 percent of American crude rubber and 75 percent of its tin. During the interwar period, Southeast Asia provided between 9 percent and 14 percent of the total value of American imports. Trade with Southeast Asia had followed the worldwide trend of expansion for a decade after World War I, a sharp decline between 1930 and 1934, and then uneven resurgence after 1935. Aside from the Philippines, the region was not a lucrative market for American products; the value of exports generally ran about one-third of that of imports. By the end of the 1930s, however, Southeast Asian countries were absorbing a modestly higher percentage of American goods; from 1920 to 1934, Southeast Asian countries altogether imported products at levels comparable to China, but moved significantly ahead of China after 1935. (Tables 1.1 and 1.2 detail the patterns of 1920-1940 trade.) The supply of raw materials provided the key economic link and led to mutual dependency, especially involving the United States with British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. Owing to American purchases of its rubber and tin, the Malayan economy became dependent upon the United States. The value of Malayan exports to the United States exceeded that of the Philippines throughout the 1920s and again after 1935, once a Depression-caused decline in rubber prices had been reversed. Indeed, the United States was Malaya's best customer, accounting for one-half to two-thirds of the rubber and tin exports. By the late 1930s, about 40 percent of Malayan exports were to the United States. Nowhere in Southeast Asia, however, was American trade more imbalanced, for the United States exported little to Malaya. American imports exceeded by ten to twenty times the value of exports to Malaya. The immense profits derived from the Malayan sales to America benefited the foreign-owned companies which ran the tin mines and rubber plantations. Since British capital dominated the investment in Malaya, American imports of rubber and tin meant that, from the perspective of Malayan nationalists, the

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5-11; Hartendorp, The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, 2:640-45; Meyer, Diplomatic History of Philippine Republic, pp. 55-58; J C S Staff Plan for Recapture of Luzon, May 20, 1944, JCS Files/CCS 381 Philippine Islands. 18. Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration,, pp. 122-23; Steinberg, "Philippine 'Collaborators'," p. 74; New York Times, March 17, 1946. 19. Steinberg, "Philippine 'Collaborators'," pp. 71-74; Friend, Between Two Empires, pp. 247-53; Hartendorp, Japanese Occupation of Philippines, 2:635-37; Steintorf to Stettinius, May 2, 1945, DOS: 811.B.00/5-245; Steintorf to Stettinius, J u n e 8, 1945, DOS: 811.B.00/6-845; Vinson to Truman, Aug. 30,1945, H S T Papers, PSF Foreign Affairs File-Box 185; Memorandum of Conversation (Taussig), Jan. 25, 1945, Taussig Papers, Box 49. 20. Roosevelt Press Conference, April 5,1945, Press Conferences of Roosevelt, 25: 113-14, SC Document 64, Feb. 24, 1945, DOS: Inter-Intra; Staff Comm. Minutes, Feb. 26, 1945, DOS: SC; Ickes to Roosevelt, March 22 and April 6, 1945, FDR Papers OF 400Box 39, Stettinius to Steintorf, April 13, 1945 and Steintorf to Stettinius, April 14,1945, DOS: 811.B.01/4-1345; Steintorf to Stettinius, March 21, 1945, FRUS 1945, 6:119596. 21. Truman Statement, May 5, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1199-1200; Memorandum on Meeting, April 17, 1945, HST Papers, PSF Foreign Affairs File-Box 185; Osmena to Truman, May 3,1945, HST Papers; Stettinius to Truman, April 19, 1945, Stettinius Papers, Box 734. 22. New York Times, July 1, 1944. 23. George E. Taylor, The Philippines and the United States, pp. 108-18; Hartendorp, Japanese Occupation of Philippines, 2:637-42; Steinberg, "Philippine 'Collaborators'," pp. 68-71; Memorandum of Conversation (Steintorf), Dec. 6,1944, DOS: 740. 0011PW/12-644; Mills to Lockhart, June 19, 1945, DOS: 811.B.00/5-545. 24. Steintorf to Byrnes, Aug 13, 1945, FRUS 1945, 6:1231-32; Acheson to Steintorf, Sept. 10, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1233; Ickes to Osmena, Sept. 11, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1233-34; Steintorf to Byrnes, Sept. 5, 1945, and Ballantine to Acheson, Sept. 7, 1945, DOS: 811B.00/9-545. 25. Osmena to Ickes, Sept. 12, 1945, FRUS 1945, 6:1234-35; Steintorf to Byrnes, Sept. 15, 1945, FRUS 1945, 6:1235. 26. Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration, pp. 125-26; Steintorf to Byrnes, Sept. 17, 1945, DOS: 811B.00/9-1745; Steintorf to Bymes, Sept. 19, 1945, DOS: 811B.00/91945; David Bernstein, The Philippine Story, pp. 210-12. 27. McNutt and Fortas to Truman, Sept. 29, 1945, Rosenman Papers, Philippine Folder. 28. Fortas to Ickes, Oct. 1, 1945, Interior Files, CCF-3692. 29. Hasset to Latta, Aug. 20, 1945, HST Papers, OF 1055; Fortas to Truman, Sept. 12,1945, ibid.; Ickes to Truman, Nov. 7, 1945, ibid.; McNutt to Truman, Nov. 13, 1945, ibid.; Truman to Osmena, Nov. 14, 1945, ibid.; Truman to Clark, Oct. 25, 1945, ibid.; Gardner to Ickes, Nov. 8 and 16, 1945, Gardner Papers, Philippines Folder; Memorandum of Conversation (Mill), Nov. 2, 1945 DOS: 811B.01/11-245; Steinberg. Philippine Collaboration, pp. 127-28; Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Sess., pp. 10893, 11470, 12136. 30. I. George Blake, Paul V. McNutt, pp. 227-373; Ickes to Roosevelt, Feb. 6, 1945, FDR Papers, Map Room Box 21; Philips to Stettinius, May 9, 1945, FRUS 1945

7. Decolonization in the Philippines

405

6:1200-01; Memorandum by Lockhart, April 21, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1197-99; Memorandum on Philippines, May 1, 1945, Marshall Papers, Philippine File; Ickes to Truman, July 17, 1945, Interior Files, CCF-3692; DuFault, "Francis B. Sayre," pp. 449-61. 31. Blake, Paul V. McNutt, pp. 348-50; Lockhart to Acheson, Dec. 26, 1945 and Moffat to Acheson, Dec. 27, 1945, DOS: 811B.01/12-2645; Acheson to Lockhart, Jan. 2, 1945, DOS: 811B.01/1-246; Steintorf to Byrnes, Jan. 11, 1946, DOS: 81B.01/1-1146; Grunder and Livezey, Philippines and the United States, pp. 248-49; Patricio R. Minot, "Paul V. McNutt," pp. 149-81. 32. Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration, pp. 132-34; Clark to Truman, March 1, 1946, HST Papers, PSF-Box 185. 33. Clark to Truman, March 1, 1946, and Patterson to Truman, March 4, 1946, HST Papers, PSF-Box 185. 34. MacArthur to Clark and Patterson, March 3, 1946, MacArthur Papers, RG 9 Messages, Blue Binder Series-War Crimes. A copy of MacArthur's message was attached to the Patterson-Truman memorandum of April 4, 1946. 35. Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration, pp. 139-63; MacArthur to Patterson, Dec. 14, 1946, MacArthur Papers, RG 9 Messages, Blue Binder Series-Philippine Islands; Roxas to MacArthur, July 3, 1946, ibid. 36. Hartendorp, Japanese Occupation of Philippines, 2:637-47; Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration, pp. 128-30; Steinberg, "Philippine 'Collaborators'," pp. 74-77; Friend, Between Two Empires, pp. 254-58. 37. Blake, McNutt, pp. 352-60; USAF-Pacific to USNR Liaison Officer, July 17, 1945, DOS: 896.00/7-1745; Steinberg, "Philippine 'Collaborators'," pp. 75-76. 38. Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration, pp. 143-44. 39. Friend, Between Two Empires, p. 252; Meyer, Diplomatic History, pp. 4-6; Mulligan to Tydings, Sept. 28, 1945, Tydings Mission File, Jones Papers; Osmena to Truman, Nov. 9, 1945, HST Papers, PSF-Box 185; Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 10526-528, 10570, 10602, 10795; Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 6208-11, 6248, 6683. 40. Grew to Roosevelt, March 20, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1216-17; Sec. State Staff Comm., March 20 and April 10, 1945, DOS: SC; Meyer, Diplomatic History, pp. 9-10. 41. Meyer, pp. 10-11; Legarda and Garcia, "Economic Collaboration," pp. 13233; Byrnes to Truman, ca. Oct. 1945, HST Papers, PSF-Foreign Affairs Files; Byrnes to Truman, Nov. 8, 1945, HST Papers, OF 1055; Osmena to Truman, Nov. 8, 1945, HST Papers, PSF Box 185; Byrnes to Hawes, Nov. 26, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1219-20. 42. Anderson to Truman, Jan. 7, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:861-63; McNutt to Ely, Jan. 18, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:863-66; Byrnes to Truman, Jan. 28, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:868-89; Meyer, Diplomatic History, pp. 11-12; Blake, McNutt, pp. 350-63; Minot,"McNutt," pp. 140-49; Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 2753-54, 2758-60, 2760-64, 2824-56, 3533-40, 3985-87. 43. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 11466. 44. Ibid., pp. 11469,11785,11036-38; Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3435-50, 3987, 4038-39, 4266. 45. McNutt to Truman, April 23, 1946, HST Paperss, White House Bill File; Friend, Between Two Empires, pp. 258-61; Minot, "McNutt," pp. 108-39; Meyer, Diplomatic History, pp. 6-10; McNutt to Truman, Dec. 11, 1945, HST Papers, PSF Box 185. 46. Wallace to Truman, April 19,1946, HST Papers, OF 1055; Byrnes to Truman,

406

7. Decolonization in the Philippines

April 20, 1946, HST Papers, White House Bill File; Appleby to Latta, April 26, 1946, H S T Papers; Smith to Latta, April 29, 1946, HST Papers; Byrnes to Truman, April 18, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:873-75. 47. Steintorf to Byrnes, April 24, 1946, DOS: 811B.01/4-2446; Manila Daily Bulletin, April 16, 1946; Nation, June 1, 1946, p. 643; Manila Chronicle, June 22, 1946; David Wurfel, "Problems of Decolonization," in Frank H. Golay, ed., The United States and the Philippines, pp. 149-52; Grander and Livezey, Philippines and United States, pp. 262-64; Legarda and Garcia, "Economic Collaboration," pp. 133-34; Sung Yong Kim, United States-Philippine Relations, pp. 3-8; Teodora V. Cortes, "Interaction Patterns," pp. 113-39. 48. Fifield, Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, pp. 63-64; Meyer, Diplomatic History, pp. 13-15; Kim, United States-Philippine Relations, pp. 4-6; Memorandum by Fetter, May 14, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:878-79. 49. Meyer, Diplomatic History, pp. 15-16; Grew to Truman, May 3, 1945, H S T Papers, PSF Box 185; Forrestal to Truman, ca. May 1945, H S T Papers, PSF Box 185; Stimson to Truman, May 14, 1945, HST Papers, P S F Box 185; Stettinius to Truman, April 22,1945, Stettinius Papers, Box 734; Stimson to Truman, May 11, 1945, Marshall Papers, Box 96-A; SWNCC Minutes, May 2,1946, DOS: SWNCC Box 1, SWNCC Summary Actions and Decision, Series 38, DOS: SWNCC Box 3; SWNCC Summary Actions and Decisions, Series 276, DOS: SWNCC Box 4; Memorandum of Conversation (Grew), May 14, 1945, FRUS 1946 6:1207-9. 50. Memorandum by Vincent, June 6, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:880-81; State Dept. Memorandum, June 14, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:885-86; Acheson to McNutt, July 2, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:895; Entry of July 5, 1946, MilliB, ed., Forrestal Diaries, 5:1126-27; Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 6704, 6966-68, 7045, 8298; Meyer, Diplomatic History, p. 17. 51. Meyer, pp. 58-60. 52. All-India Congress Committee, Congress Bulletin, Aug. 3, 1946. 53. Meyer, Diplomatic History, pp. 48-53. 54. McNutt to Truman, July 3,1946, Jones Papers, War Damage and Rehabilitation File; Roxas to Truman, July 3, 1946, Jones Papers; Memorandum to Truman, Aug. 20, 1946, HST Papers, PSF Box 185; McNutt to Ely, July 14, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:883-84; McNutt to Byrnes, Sept. 14, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:916-17; Clayton to McNutt, Sept. 17, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:918; Byrnes to McNutt, Dec. 30, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:942; McNutt to Byrnes, Dec. 31, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:942-43. 55. McNutt to Byrnes, Sept. 16,1946, FRUS 1946 8:917; McNutt to Byrnes, Sept. 25, 1946, ibid., p. 919; McNutt to Byrnes, Sept. 30, 1946, ibid., p. 920; Acheson to McNutt, Oct. 15,1946, ibid., pp. 921-22; McNutt to Bymes, Sept. 7,1946, ibid., pp. 9079; Memorandum of Conversation (Ely), Nov. 19, 1946, ibid., p. 932; Davies to Bymes, Nov. 27, 1946, ibid., p. 933; McNutt to Bymes, Nov. 7, 1946, ibid., p. 924; McNutt to Bymes,Nov. 10, 1946, ibid., p. 926. 56. Patterson to Bymes, Nov. 29, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:934-35; Memorandum by Bymes, Dec. 1, 1946, ibid., p. 935; McNutt to Byrnes, Dec. 23, 1946, ibid., pp. 939-40; Patterson to Bymes, Dec. 27, 1946, ibid., pp. 940-41; Acheson to McNutt, Jan. 14, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1102-3; SWNCC Summary Actions and Decisions, 340 Series, DOS: SWNCC Box 4; Meyer, Diplomatic History, pp. 41-48; Fifield, Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, pp. 62-63; Kim, United States-Philippine Relations, pp. 407; Vincent to Acheson, Nov. 20, 1946, DOS: 896.00/11/2046; Cortes, "Interaction Patterns," pp. 67-108.

8. Thailand, Burma, and Malaya

407

57. Hernando J. Abaya, Betrayal in the Philippines, pp. 21-150, 175-223, 255-70; Bernstein, Philippine Story, pp. ix-xii, 203-70; Taylor, Philippines and the United States, pp. 109-115; Friend, Between Two Empires, pp. 252-53. 58. McNutt to Byrnes, Sept. 8, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:909-10; Edelstein to Byrnes, Aug. 24, 1946, DOS: 896.00/9-446; Daviea to Byrnes, Sept. 4, 1946, DOS: 896.00/9446.

8. The Emergence of United States' Influence in Thailand, Burma, and Malaya, 1945-1948

1. Byrnes to Winant, Aug. 15, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1278-79; State Dept. Memo Aug. 18,1945, FRUS 1945 6:1281-82; British Embassy to State Dept., FRUS 1945 6:128390; State Dept. to British Embassy, Aug. 31,1945, FRUS 1945 6:1296-1303; SWNCC 177, Aug. 23, 1945, JCS Files/CCS 092 Thailand S.l; Landon to SWNCC, DOS: 892.01/ 8-2345; Fine, "Liquidation of World War II in Thailand," pp. 71-72. 2. Fine, "Liquidation of World War II in Thailand," pp. 73-75; Merrell to Byrnes, Sept. 6, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1305-6; Memorandum of Conversation (Moffat), Sept. 6, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1306-7; Sansom to Moffat, Sept. 6, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1307-8; Winant to Byrnes, Sept. 6, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1308; British Embassy to State Dept., Sept. 8, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1309-14; British Embassy to State Dept., Sept. 10, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1316-22; State Dept. to British Embassy, Sept. 19, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1323-30; Donovan to Truman, Sept. 6, 1945, HST Papers, OSS Files; Cheston to Truman, Sept. 10,1945, HST Papers, OSS Files; US Army Liaison Kandy to CG, US Forces, I-B Theater, Sept. 7,1945; CG, US Forces, I-B Theater to CG, SEAC, Sept. 8,1945, JSC Files/CCS 092 Thailand S.2; US Army Liaison Kandy to War Dept., Sept. 9, 1945, ibid. 3. Yost to Byrnes, Sept. 24,1945, FRUS 1945 6:1332-33; Yost to Byrnes, Sept. 26, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1339; British Embassy to State Dept., Sept. 29, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1342-46; Acheson to Winant, Oct. 2, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1348; State Dept. to British Embassy, Oct. 9, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1352-55; Vincent to Acheson, Oct. 31, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1363-64; Byrnes to Yost, Dec. 31, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1413-14; State Dept. to British Embassy, Oct. 25, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1360-63; Cheston to Truman, Sept. 25, 1945, HST Papers, OSS Files; Fine, "Liquidation of World War II in Thailand," pp. 7478. 4. Yost to Byrnes, Nov. 23, 1945, DOS: 892.01/11-2345; Yost to Byrnes, Nov. 24, 1946, DOS: 892.01/11-2445; Yost to Byrnes, Dec. 13, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1388-90. 5. British Embassy to State Dept., Nov. 12, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1367-69; State Dept. to British Embassy, Nov. 23, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1371-73; State Dept. to British Embassy, Nov. 29, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1377-80; Memorandum of Communication to British Embassy, Nov. 29,1945, FRUS 1945 6:1381; Fine, "Liquidation of World War D in Thailand," pp. 78-81. 6. British Embassy to State Dept., Dec. 10,1945, FRUS 1945 6:1385-86; Acheson to Yost, Dec. 13, 1945, ibid., p. 1390; Acheson to Winant, Dec. 13, 1945, ibid., pp. 139197; Yost to Brynes, Dec. 14,1945, ibid., p. 1397; Acheson to Mallon, Dec. 14,1945, ibid., p. 1398; Yost to Brynes, Dec. 15, 1945, ibid., pp. 1398-99. 7. British Embassy to State Dept., Dec. 18, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1400; Winant to Brynes, Dec. 18, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1401 ¡Acheson to Winant, Dec. 19,1945, FRUS 1945 6:1404; Acheson to Yost, Dec. 22, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1406-7; Fine, "Liquidation of World War • in Thailand," pp. 80-82.

408

8. Thailand, Burma, and Malaya

8. Pluvier, Southeast Asia from Colonialism to Independence, pp. 405-7; Russell H. Fifield, Americans in Southeast Asia, pp. 92-93. 9. Byrnes to Bonnet, Oct. 1, 1945, FRUS 1945 6:1346; Siamese Legation to State Dept., Oct. 15,1945, ibid., p. 1356-57; Memorandum by Moffat, Oct. 16, 1945, ibid., pp. 1358-60; Brynes to Yost, Jan. 2, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:978-80. 10. Caffery to Byrnes, May 11, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:1000-1; Yost to Byrnes, May 24, 1946, ibid., pp. 1002-3; Pridi to Truman, May 27, 1946, ibid., p. 1005; French Embassy to State Dept., June 3, 1946, ibid., p. 1010-13; Truman to Pridi, June 7,1946, ibid., p. 1016; Byrnes to Caffery, June 8,1946, ibid., pp. 1016-18; Memorandum of Conversation (Moffat), June 11,1946, ibid., pp. 1018-20; Harriman to Byrnes, June 14,1946, ibid., pp. 1022-23; Acheson to Harriman, June 22, 1946, ibid., p. 1024; Acheson to Johnson, June 22,1946, ibid., pp. 1026-27; Byrnes to Harriman, July 19, 1946, ibid., pp. 1036-37; Acheson to Truman, July 31, 1946, ibid., pp. 1045-46. 11. Memorandum of Conversation (Moffat), Aug. 19, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:106667; Memorandum of Conversation (Moffat), Aug. 28,1946, ibid., pp. 1072-74; Acheson to Caffery, Aug. 30, 1946, ibid., p. 1075; Memorandum of Conversation (Moffat), Oct. 1, 1946, ibid., pp. 1078-80. 12. Memorandum of Conversation (Moffat), Oct. 2, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:1080-81; Stanton to Byrnes, Oct. 17, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:1088-92; Stanton to Byrnes, Dec. 17, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:1104-5. Shortly after completing his tour of duty in Thailand, Stanton wrote his memoirs; see Edwin F. Stanton, Brief Authority; Excursions of a Common Man in an Uncommon World. Although half of the book is devoted to his mission in Bangkok, there is little discussion on American policy and problems. 13. Yost to Byrnes, April 26, 1946, DOS: 892.00/4-2646; David A. Wilson, "Thailand," p. 21-22. 14. Ibid., pp. 22-24; Fifield, Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, pp. 243-45; Yost to Byrnes, June 5, 1946, DOS: 892.00/6-546. 15. Byrnes to Stanton, April 4, 1947, DOS: 892.00/3-2747; Stanton to Marshall, April 8, 1947, DOS: 892.00/4-847; Stanton to Marshall, April 10, 1947, DOS: 892.00/ 4-1047; Marshall to Stanton, April 17, 1947, DOS: 892.00/4-1047; Stanton to Marshall, April 19, 1947, DOS: 892.00/4-1947; Smith to Marshall, J a n . 16, 1947, DOS: 892.00/ 1-1647; Acheson to Yost, Feb. 5, 1947, DOS: 892.00/2-547; Stanton to Marshall, July 2, 1947, DOS: 892.00/7-2747. 16. Fifield, Americans in Southeast Asia, pp. 98-100; Marshall to Stanton, Nov. 10, 1947, DOS: 892.00/11-947; Memorandum of Conversation (Landon), Nov. 10, 1947, DOS: 892.00/11-1047; Butterworth to Lovett, Nov. 11, 1947, DOS: 892.00/11-1147; Memorandum of Conversation (Lacy), Nov. 11, 1947, DOS: 892.00/11-1147; Memorandum of Conversation (Landon), Nov. 12, 1947, DOS: 892.00/11-1247; Stanton to Marshall, Nov. 13, 1947, DOS: 892.00/11-1347; Marshall to Stanton, Nov. 14, 1947, DOS: 892.00/11-1347; Memorandum of Conversation (Faus), Nov. 18, 1947, DOS: 892.00/11-1847; Stanton to Marshall, Nov. 19, 1947, DOS: 892.00/11-1947; Landon to Butterworth, Nov. 25, 1947, DOS: 892.00/11-2447; Memorandum of Conversation (Landon), Dec. 8,1947, DOS: 892.00/12-847; Douglas to Marshall, Dec. 9,1947, DOS: 892.00/ 12-947; Stanton to Marshall, Dec. 11, 1947, DOS: 892.00/12-1147; Stanton to Marshall, Dec. 18, 1947, DOS: 892.00/12-1847; Lovett to Stuart, Dec. 29, 1947, DOS: 892.00/ 12-2947. 17. Lovett to Stanton, April 9, 1948, DOS: 892.00/4-848; Stanton to Marshall, April 11, 1948, DOS: 892.00/4-1048; Lovett to Stanton, April 12, 1948, DOS: 892.00/

8. Thailand, Burma, and Malaya

409

4-848; Marshall to Stanton, April 13, 1948, DOS: 892.01/4-1348; Stanton to Marshall, April 16, 1948, DOS: 892.01/4-1748; Lovett to Stanton, April 21, 1948, DOS: 892.00/41748; Landon to Butterworth, April 22,1948, DOS: 892.01/4-2248; Memorandum of Conversations (Stanton), July 29, 1948, DOS: 892.01/7-2948; Reed to Butterworth, Aug. 13, 1948, DOS: 892.01/8-1248; Donald E. Neuchterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia, pp. 52-58. 18. Legation at Bangkok to Foreign Office, Dec. 6,1948, FO 371/54422; Stanton to Marshall, March 5, 1947, DOS: 892.00/33-547; Agreement with Siam on Sale of Surplus American Property, FRUS 1946 8:1108-9; Minute by Anderson, Nov. 19, 1946, FO 371/ 54422. 19. John F. Cady, Modern Burma, pp. 427-84; Frank N. Trager, ed., Burma, pp. 1-25; Dorothy Guyot, "The Burma Independence Army"; Jones, Japan s New Order, pp. 352-90. 20. Donovan to Roosevelt, Dec. 19,1941, FDR Papers, PSF Box 163; Donovan to Roosevelt, Feb. 28, 1942, FDR Papers, PSF Box 163; Memorandum by Murray, Dec. 31, 1941, DOS: 740.0011PW/1764; Schnare to Hull, Feb. 9, 1942, DOS: 740.0011PW 1850; Memorandum to Ailing, March 17,1942, DOS: 845C.00/56; Gauss to Hull, April 9,1942, DOS: 845C.00/59; Gauss to Hull, Aug. 12, 1942, FRUS 1942: China, pp. 127-29. 21. Roosevelt to Churchill, April 16, 1942, cited in Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 6; Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 108. 22. Thorne, Allies of a Kind, pp. 345-46, 608-09; Cady, Modern Burma, pp. 485-511. 23. WM Conclusions, 54 (43) 3, April 14, 1943, CAB 65; WM 61 (45) 6, May 14, 1945, ibid.; Hull to Merrell, April 12, 1944, DOS: 845 C.01/13B; Merrell to Hull, June 1, 1944, DOS: 845C.01/14; Merrell to Hull, June 9, 1944, DOS: 845C.01/15; Memorandum by Berry, Aug. 17,1944, DOS: 845C.01/15; Merrell to Hull, Aug. 22,1944, DOS: 845C.00/ 8-2244; Langdon to Hull, Aug. 31, 1944, DOS: 845C.00/8-3144; Memorandum by Hall, Jan. 19, 1945, DOS: 845C.00/1-1945; Memorandum of Conversation (Sharp), April 19, 1945, DOS: 845C.00/4-1945; Winant to Stettinius, May 26, 1945, DOS: 845C.00/5-2645; Merrell to Stettinius, May 30, 1945, DOS: 845C.00/5-3045; Donovan to Stettinius, May 21, 1945, DOS: 845C.01/5-2145; Gatewood to Lovett, June 28, 1945, DOS: 845C.01/62845; Donovan to Lovett, July 1, 1945, DOS: 845C.01/7-145. 24. Cady, Modern Burma, pp. 499-504; Mountbatten, Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, pp. 144-45, 200-3. 25. Cady, Modern Burma, pp. 517-39; Thorne, Allies of a Kind, pp. 684-86. 26. Gatewood to Byrnes, July 10,1945, DOS: 740.0011PW/ 7-1045; Cady to Berry, Aug. 1, 1945, DOS: 845C.01/8-145; Merrell to Byrnes, Aug. 24, 1945, DOS: 845C.01/ 8-2445; Memorandum of Conversation (Cady), DOS: 845C.00/11-645; Abbey to Byrnes, Nov. 21, 1945, DOS: 845C.00/11-2145; Henderson to Acheson, Dec. 10, 1945, DOS: 845C.00/12-745; Abbey to Byrnes, Jan. 25, 1946, DOS: 845C.00/1-2546; CIB, April 15, 1946, DOS: Inter-Intra Comm., Box 13. 27. Abbey to Byrnes, April 22, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:1-3. 28. Abbey to Byrnes, May 4, 1946, DOS: 845C.00/5-446; Abbey to Byrnes, May 13, 1946, DOS: 845C.00/5-1346; Abbey to Byrnes, June 1, 1946, DOS: 845C.01/6-146; Cady to Minor and Berry, June 10,1946, DOS: 845C.01/6-1046; Abbey to Byrnes, July 5, 1946, DOS: 845C.00/7-546; Flood to Bymes, Aug. 13,1946, DOS: 845C.00/8-1345; Packer to Bymes, Sept. 20, 1946, DOS: 845C.00/9-2046. 29. Acheson to Gallman, Nov. 8,1946, FRUS 1946 8:6-7; Acheson to Packer, Nov.

410

8. Thailand, Burma, and Malaya

15,1946, FRUS1946 8:7; Acheson to Gallman, Dec. 10,1946, FRUS 1946 8:10; Byrnes to Gallman, Dec. 17,1946, FRUS i 9468:11-12; Byrnes to Packer, Dec. 20,1946, FRUS 1946 8:12-13; Byrnes to Packer, Dec. 24, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:13; Packer to Byrnes, Dec. 16, 1946, DOS: 851C.OOA3-1646. 30. Cady, Modern Burma, pp. 541-58; Josef Silverstein, "Burma," pp. 85-86; Packer to Byrnes, Nov. 30, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:8-10; Byrnes to Stuart, Dec. 16, 1946, FRUS 1946 8:11; Gallman to Marshall, Jan. 22,1947, FRUS 1947 6:3-4; British Embassy to State Dept., Jan. 22,1947, FRUS 1947 6:4-5; State Dept. to British Embassy, Jan. 23, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:5; Marshall to Gallman, Jan. 29, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:11. 31. Henderson to Marshall, Feb. 10, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:16-17. 32. Byrnes to Packer, Feb. 11, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:17-18; Gallman to Marshall, Feb. 12,1947, FRUS 79476:18-19; Packer to Marshall, June 10,1947, FRUS 19476:30-32; Packer to Marshall, July 2, 1947, DOS: 845C.00/7-247. 33. Cady, Modern Burma, pp. 554-57; Packer to Marshall, April 19, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:22; Marshall to Truman, May 28, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:23-24; Memorandum of Conversation (Packer), May 28, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:25-28; Packer to Marshall, June 3, 1947, DOS: 845C.00/6-347. 34. Cady, Modern Burma, pp. 557-77; Trager, ed., Burma, Japanese Military Administration, pp. 22-25; Josef Silverstein, "Political Thought in Burma," pp. 78-90. 35. Packer to Marshall, Aug. 4, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:40-41; Packer to Marshall, Sept. 19, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:44; Packer to Marshal], Nov. 13, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:47; Lovett to Packer, Dec. 19,1947, FRUS 19476:47-49; Gallman to Marshall, Jan. 29, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:11-13; Dahl to Hare, Nov. 10, 1947, DOS: 845C.00/11-1047; Packer to Marshall, Nov. 11, 1947, DOS: 845C.00/11-1147; Acly to Marshall, Nov. 13, 1947, DOS: 845C.00A 1-1347; Douglas to Marshall, Nov. 20, 1947, DOS: 845C.O0A1-2O47; Acly to Marshall, Dec. 3, 1947, DOS: 845C.00/12-447; Packer to Marshall, Aug. 2, 1947, DOS: 845C.00/8-247; Acly to Marshall, Dec. 20, 1947, DOS: 845C.00A2-2047; Smith to Marshall, Feb. 3, 1947, DOS: 845C.00/2-347; Smith to Marshall, Feb. 4, 1947, DOS: 845C.00/2-447. 36. Frank Trager, "Historical Perspectives on Independent Burma," pp. 71-91; Frank Trager, "Burma's Foreign Policy," pp. 90-102; William C. Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Policy, pp. 42-47. 37. Huddle to Marshall, March 20, 1948, DOS: 845C.00/ 3-2049; Huddle to Marshall, March 21, 1948, DOS: 845C.00/ 3-3148; Douglas to Marshall, April 2, 1948, DOS: 845C.00/4-248; Huddle to Marshall, April 12, 1948, DOS: 845C.00/4-1248; Huddle to Marshall, April 16, 1948, DOS: 845C.00/4-1648. 38. Huddle to Marshall, May 28, 1948, DOS: 845C.00/6-2748. 39. Huddle to Marshall, June 4, 1948, DOS: 845C.OO/6-348; Donovan to Marshall, Sept. 15, 1948, DOS: 845C.00/9-1448; Memorandum of Conversation (Sparks), Sept. 21, 1948, DOS: 845C.00/9-2148; Acly to Marshall, Oct. 18, 1948, DOS: 845C.00/ 10-1848; Memorandum of Conversation (Lacy), July 27, 1948, DOS: 845C.00/7-2748; State Dept. to Marshall, Oct. 18,1948, DOS: 845C.00/10-1848; Memorandum of Conversation (Parsons), Oct. 21, 1948, DOS: 845C.OOAO-2148. 40. Acly to Marshall, Dec. 7, 1948, DOS: 845C.00/12-748; Memorandum of Conversation (Usher), Jan. 14, 1949, DOS: 845C.00/1-1449. 41. Landon to Vincent, March 14, 1946, DOS: 890.00/3-1446. 42. Sodhy, "Passage of Empire," pp. 120-30.

9. Indonesia: Fulfillment of Anticolonialism

411

43. Ibid., pp. 131-50; Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, pp. 3-35 et passim.

9. The Indonesian Revolution, 1947-1949: The Fulfillment of Anticolonialism 1. Pluvier, Southeast Asia from Colonialism to Independence, pp. 434-36; Wolf, Indonesian Story, p. 49; Hudson, "Australia and Indonesian Independence," pp. 226-39; Grady to Marshall, July 23, 1947, DOS: 856E.00/7-2344; Flexer to Marshall and Patterson to Marshall, July 24, 1947, DOS: 856E.00/7-2447; Wilson to Marshall and Flexer to Marshall, July 25, 1947, DOS: 856E.00/7-2547; Smith to Marshall, July 26, 1947, DOS: 856E.00/7-2647; Grady to Marshall, July 27,1947, DOS: 856E.00/7-2747; Minnigerode to Marshall, July 28, 1947, DOS: 856E.00/7-2847; Thompson to Marshall, July 29, 1947, DOS: 856E.OO/7-2947; Smith to Marshall, MacDonald to Marshall, Grady to Marshall, July 30, 1947, DOS: 856E.O0/7-3O47; Service to Marshall, July 31, 1947, DOS: 856E.00/ 7-3147; Smith to Marshall, Aug. 2,1947, DOS: 856E.00/8-247; Mallon to Marshall, Aug. 3, 1947, DOS: 856E.00/8-247; Smith to Marshall, Aug. 5, 1947, 856E.00/8-547; Wadsworth to Marshall, Aug 11, 1947, DOS: 856E.00/B-1147; McVey, Soviet View of Indonesian Revolution, pp. 21-22. 2. Grady to Marshall, July 29, 1947, DOS: 856E.OO/7-2947; Grady to Marshall, July 23 and 26, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:985, 990-91; Charles Wolf, Jr., "Hornet's Nest in Indonesia," Nation, Aug. 2, 1947, pp. 124-25. 3. Memorandum of Conversation (Morgan) and British Embassy to Department of State, July 24, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:986-89; Baruch to Marshall, July 21, 1947, DOS: 856E.OO/7-2147; Douglas to Marshall, July 24, 1947, DOS: 856E.00/7-2447; Douglas to Marshall and Foote to Marshall, July 25, 1947, DOS: 856E.00/7-2547; Marshall to Douglas, July 26, 1947, DOS: 856E.00/7-2647. 4. Moffat to Thorpe, July 24, 1947, HST Papers, OF Box 4; Vincent to Lovett, Villard to Bohlen, and Memorandum by Bohlen, July 29, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:993-96; Marshall to Truman, July 30, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:997. 5. Memorandum of Conversation (Armour), July 30, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:997-98; Baruch to Marshall, July 31, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1001-02; Marshall to Baruch, Aug. 1, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1004; Foote to Marshall, Aug. 1, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1004-6; Memorandum of Conversation (Lovett), Aug. 2, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1006-8; Foote to Marshall, Aug. 6, 7, and 8, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1015-19; Memorandum of Conversation (Ringwalt), Aug. 8, 1947, DOS: PSEA Box 12. 6. Foote to Marshall, Aug. 12,14,17, and 19,1947, FRUS 1947 6:1022-29,1034-37; Lovett to Foote, Aug. 19,1947, FRUS 29476:1037; Foote to Marshall, July 29,1947, DOS: 856E.00/7-2947. 7. Johnson to Marshall, Aug. 16, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1033-34; Memorandum of Conversation (Landon), Aug. 20,1947, FRUS 1947 6:1037-39; Lovett to Baruch, Aug. 21, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1039-42; Lovett to Foote, Aug. 27, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1042-43; Memorandum by Lovett, Aug. 28, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1043; Landon to Marshall, Aug. 22, 1947, DOS: 856E.00/8-547; Lewis to Marshall, Aug. 21, 1947, DOS: 856E.00/ 8-2147. 8. Marshall to Johnson, Aug. 8, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1020-21; Grady to Marshall, Aug. 9, 1947, "DOS: 856E.00/8-947; Memorandum of Conversation (Penfield), Aug. 1, 1947, DOS: PSEA Box 13; George M. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia,

412

9. Indonesia: Fulfillment of Anticolonialism

pp. 215-17; Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, pp. 388-94; Wolf, Indonesian Story, pp. 138-43. 9. Foote to Marshall, Sept. 22,1947, FRUS 79476:1051-52; Lovett to Austin, Oct. 10,1947, FRUS 1947 6:1053; Livengood to Marshall, Oct. 11,1947, FRUS 1947 6:1053-54; Marshall to Lovett, Oct. 21, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1059-60; Austin to Marshall, Oct. 25, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1060-63; Memorandum of Conversation Landon, Oct. 13,1947, DOS: 856E.00/10-1347; Memorandum of Conversation (Lacy), Oct. 18,1947, DOS: PSEA, Box 13; Memorandum "Netherlands East Indies" Oct. 21,1947, DOS: PSEA, Box 12; Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, pp. 385-86. 10. Memorandum of Conversation by Marshall, Sept. 8,1947, FRUS 79476:104851; Livengood to Marshall, Oct. 29, 31, Nov. 7, 13, and 17, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1063-74; Lovett to Livengood, Nov. 18, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1074; Baruch to Marshall, Sept. 6, 1947, DOS: 856E.00/9-647; Foote to Marshall, Sept. 16, 1947, DOS: 856E.00/9-1647; Livengood to Marshall, Sept. 17, 1947, DOS: 856E.00/9-1747; Davies-Penfield Memorandum, Sept. 5, 1947, DOS: PSEA Box 13; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 220-22. 11. Livengood to Marshall, Dec. 1, 4, and 6, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1075-81. 12. Lovett to Livengood, Dec. 19, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1084-85. 13. Livengood to Marshall, Dec. 13 and 20, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1082-83, 1085-89; Livengood to Marshall, Dec. 23, 1947, DOS: 856E.00/12-2347; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 222-25; McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, pp. 195205. 14. Lovett to Livengood, Dec. 31, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:1099-1101. 15. Livengood to Marshall, Jan. 5,6,7,9,10,12, and 19,1948, FRUS 1948 6:57-67, 69-76, 78-79; Marshall to Livengood, Jan. 7 and 10, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:68, 72; Memorandum of Conversation (Hulley), Jan. 6, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:64-65; Marshall to Netherlands Embassy, Jan. 9,11, and 13,1948, FRUS 1948 6:70-71, 75, 77; Bonsai to Marshall, Jan. 12, 1948, DOS: 856E.00/1-1248; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 226-28. 16. Louis Fischer, The Story of Indonesia, p. 103. 17. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 239-46; Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, pp. 400-8. 18. Lovett to Livengood, Jan. 23, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:81; Memorandum of Conversation by Armour, Jan. 29, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:85-86; Memorandum of Conversation by Lacy, Feb. 4, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:88-89; Rusk-Hickerson-Butterworth to Marshall, Feb. 10, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:91-94; Livengood to Marshall, Feb. 20, 24, 26, March 2, 4,10, 25, and April 6, 8, 10, 11, 16, 26, 28, 30, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:99-105, 107-8; 113-17; 127-28; 133-36; 143-48, 157-61; Lovett to Livengood, March 5, and April 19, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:114, 148-49; Baruch to Marshall, March 2, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:109-11; Marshall to Austin, FRUS 1948 6:108; Gallman to Marshall, Feb. 19, 1948, DOS: 856E.00/5-1248. 19. Marshall to Livengood, April 30 and May 7, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:161-64; Livengood to Marshall, May 11, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:168-69; Memorandum of Conversation (Nolting), May 12, 1948, DOS: 856E.00/5-1248. 20. Livengood to Marshall, May 10, 21, 25, 28, 29, 31 and June 1, 3, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:164-68, 178-83, 185-86, 189-91, 199-207, 210-13; Lovett to Livengood, May 27 and 31, 1948, ibid., pp. 186-87, 198. 21. DuBois to Marshall, June 5, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:218-23; Livengood to Marshall, June 6 and 7, 1948, ibid., pp. 223-28.

9. Indonesia: Fulfillment of Anticolonialism

413

22. Marshall to Livengood, June 8, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:229-31; Livengood to Marshall, June 11, 1948, ibid., pp. 234-37. 23. Memorandum of Conversation (Lacy), June 11, 1948, DOS: 856E.00/6-1148; Butterworth to duBois, June 8,1948, DOS: 501BC Indonesia/8-548; Baruch to Marshall, June 12, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:237-38; Marshall to Livengood, June 12, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:239-40. 24. Livengood to Marshall, June 16 and 18, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:250-51, 253-55; Memorandum of Conversation (Lovett), June 14, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:234-35; Livengood to Marshall, June 14, 1948, DOS: 856E.00/6-1448; Baruch to Marshall, June 14, 1948, DOS: 856E.00/6-1448; Andrew Roth, "Jokja Journal," Nation, June 26,1948, pp. 715-17; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 248-49. 25. Livengood to Marshall, June 12,16, 23, 25, 28, and 30,1948, FRUS 1948 6:24043, 248-50, 261-62, 267-73, 275-77; Marshall to Livengood, June 14, 16, and 25, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:245-46,251-52,269-70; Marshall to Embassy in Netherlands, June 24,1948, FRUS 1948 6:266; Memorandum of Conversation (Scott), June 23, 1948 FRUS 1948 6:262; Andrew Roth, "American Flipflop in Indonesia," Nation, July 10,1948, pp. 39-41; Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, pp. 393-95. 26. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 249-55; McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, pp. 219-33. 27. Marshall to Livengood, July 6, 23, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:277, 288-89; Livengood to Marshall, July 10,16, 21,26, and 28,1948, FRUS 1948 6:278-79, 283-93; Memorandum of Conversation (Butterworth), July 27, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:290-91; Memorandum of Conversation (Lacy), July 21, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:285; Memorandum of Conversation (Lovett), July 12, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:282-83; Memorandum for Lovett, July 12, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:279-81; Memorandum of Conversation (Reed), July 7, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:277-78; Memorandum of Conversation (Reed), July 21, 1948, DOS: 856E.OO/7-2248; Reed to Butterworth, July 22, 1948, DOS: 856E.00/7-248; Memorandum of Conversation (Sparks), July 23, 1948, DOS: 856E.00/7-2348; Marshall to Livengood, Aug. 3, 1948, DOS: 856E.00/8-248; Acly to Marshall, Aug. 9, 1948, DOS: 856E.01/8-948. 28. Netherlands Embassy to Dept. of State, July 9, 1948, DOS: 856E.OO/7948; Memorandum of Conversation (Nolting), Aug. 3, 1948, DOS: 856E.00/8-348; Memorandum of Conversation (Butterworth), Aug. 2,1948, FRUS 1948 6:296-97; Memorandum of Conversation (Reed), DOS: PSEA Box 12. 29. Memorandum of Conversation (Lacy), Aug. 12, 1948, DOS: 856E.01/8-1248; Baruch to Marshall, July 24, 1948, DOS: 856E.00/7-2448; Livengood to Marshall, Aug. 15, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:299-302. 30. Livengood to Marshall, Aug. 26, 1948, DOS: 856E.00/8-2648; Livengood to Marshall, Aug. 19 and 22, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:303-06. 31. Reed to Benninghoff, Aug. 27, 1948, DOS: 856E.00/8-2748. 32. Livengood to Marshall, Aug. 16, 26, 28, 31 and Sept. 1, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:302-3, 306-12, 314-15. 33. Barco to Rusk, Sept. 3, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:318-22; Marshall to Livengood, Sept. 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, and 20, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:325-31, 335, 339, 355-56; Livengood to Marshall, Sept. 7, 11, 13-18, and 21, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:322-24, 333-43, 351-53, 359-60; Baruch to Marshall, Sept. 10 and 13,1948, FRUS 1948 6:331-32, 337-38; Memorandum of Conversation (Marshall), Sept. 17,1948, FRUS 1948 6:343-45; Memorandum of Conversation (Lovett), Sept. 17,1948, FRUS 1948 6:345-47; Memorandum of Conversation (Far Eastern Affairs), Sept. 17-18,1948, FRUS 1948 6:347-50; Memorandum of Conversation

414

9. Indonesia: Fulfillment of Anticolonlalism

(Lovett), Sept. 14, 1948, DOS: 856D.00/9-1448; Baruch to Marshall, Sept. 15, 1948, DOS: 856E.00/U-1548; Memorandum of Conversation (Ogbum), Sept. 15, 1948, DOS: 856E.01/9-1548; Baruch to Marshall, Sept. 17, 1948, DOS: 856E.01/9-1648; Memorandum of Conversation (Hickereon), Sept. 21, 1948, DOS: 856D.00/9-2148. 34. Memorandum for Lovett, Sept. 23, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:364-65; Graham to Marshall, Sept. 16, 1948, DOS: 856D.00/9-1648. 35. McVey, Soviet View of Indonesian Revolution, pp. 39-80; New York Times, Sept. 17, 1948; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 255-58, 300-02; S.N. Aidit, Communist Party of Indonesia, pp. 31-35; S.N. Aidit, Problems of the Indonesian Revolution, pp. 81-89; Livengood to Marshall, Sept. 20, 28, and Oct. 4, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:353-55, 357-59, 379, 382; Lovett to Livengood, Sept. 27, Oct. 1, 7, and 28, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:378-79, 381-82, 390, 438-39; Livengood to Marshall, Sept. 20, 1948, DOS: 856E.(K)/9-2048; Reed to Butterworth, Sept. 24, 1948, DOS: 856D.00/9-2448; Marshall to Livengood, Oct. 8,1948, DOS: 856E.01/10-848; Livengood to Marshall, Oct. 12, 1948, DOS: 856D.00A0-1248. 36. Livengood to Marshall, Sept. 25, Oct. 10 and Oct. 13,1948, FRUS 1948 6:37172, 402-5, 416-18; Lovett to Livengood, Sept. 29, Oct. 6, 11, 12, and 13, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:380, 388-89, 406-7, 409-10, 412-14; Baruch to Marshall, Sept. 26, Oct. 10, 12, and 13, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:376, 400-1, 410-11, 415-16; Lovett to Baruch, Oct. 9 and 10, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:399, 401; Marshall to Lovett, Oct. 13, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:414-15; Memorandum of Conversation (Reed), Sept. 24, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:369-71; Hulley to Hickerson-Butterworth, Sept. 24, 1948, DOS: 856D.00/9-2448. 37. Livengood to Marshall, Oct. 14, 19, 23, 29, Nov. 1 and 4, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:418-19, 421-34, 439-41, 446-49, 452-53. 38. Lovett to Livengood, Nov. 5, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:457-65. 39. Livengood to Marshall, Nov. 6, 11, 19, Dec. 2, 3, and 5, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:465-67, 481-84, 493-94, 506-9, 511-12, 520-26; Lovett to Livengood, Dec. 3 and 4, 1948, ibid., pp. 512-14, 517; Lovett to Hague Embassy, Nov. 10, 1948, ibid., p. 478; Lovett to Paris Embassy, Nov. 17, 1948, ibid., pp. 488-89. 40. Steere to Marshall, Dec. 18, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:573-74; Lovett to Livengood, Dec. 6, 13, 14, and 18, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:527-29, 552, 558-59, 574-76; Livengood to Marshall, Dec. 14, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:555-58; Steere to Marshall, Dec. 7, 10, and 16, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:530-31, 542-43, 565-66; Dept. of State to Netherlands Embassy, Dec. 7, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:531-35; Memorandum for Lovett, Dec. 13, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:55052; Memorandum of Conversation (Lacy), Dec. 7, 1948, DOS: 856D.00/12-748; Memorandum of Conversation (Butterworth), Dec. 15, 1948, DOS: 856D.00/12-1548; Memorandum of Conversation (Lovett), Dec. 20,1948, DOS: 856D.00/12-1748; Memorandum of Conversation (Butterworth), Dec. 9, 1948, DOS: 856D.00/12-948; Memorandum of Conversation (Reed), DOS: 856D.00/12-848; Indian Embassy to Department of State, Dec. 17, 1948, DOS: PSEA Box 12; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 332-36. 41. Raymond E. Stannard, "The Role of American Aid," pp. 1-6; Fischer, Story of Indonesia, pp. 118-22; New York Times, Dec. 25, 1948; McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, pp. 251-59; Lockett to Marshall, Dec. 21, 1948, DOS: 856D.00/12-2148; Doolittle to Marshall, Dec. 21, 1948, DOS: 856D.00/12-2148; Lewis to Marshall, Stanton to Marshall, Cole to Marshall, Ispahani to Marshall, and Derry to Marshall, Dec. 23, 1948, DOS: 856D.00/12-2348; Lockett to Marshall, Jan. 3, 1949, DOS: 856D.00/1-349. 42. Memoranda of Conversations (Lovett), Dec. 20 and 24, 1948, FRUS 1948

9. Indonesia: Fulfillment of Anticolonialism

415

6:587-92, 602-3; Lovett to Jessup, Dec. 18, 19, 23,1948, FRUS1948 6:577-78, 585-86, 597600; Lovett to Livengood, Dec. 20, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:592-93; Lovett to London Embassy, Dec. 24, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:603; Douglas to Marshall, Dec. 20, 1948, DOS: 856D.0O/12-2O47; Memorandum of Conversation (Sparks), Dec. 22, 1948, DOS: PSEA Box 12; Lovett to Hoffman, ca. Dec. 20, 1948, and Hoffman to Van Kleffens, Dec. 22, 1948, DOS: PSEA, Box 11. 43. Lovett to Jessup, Dec. 24 and 27, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:603-04, 608; Baruch to Marshall, Dec. 24, 26, and 29, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:604-6, 613; Holmes to Marshall, Dec. 25, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:605; Lovett to Paris Embassy, Dec. 26, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:606-7; Caffery to Marshall, Dec. 27, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:607-8, 611-12; Soemitro Djojohadikoesoemo to Lovett, Dec. 27 and 28,1948, FRUS 1948 6:609-11; Lovett to Moscow Embassy, Dec. 30, 1948, FRUS 1948 6: 613-16; Baruch to Marshall, Dec. 30,1948, DOS: 856D.00/12-3048; Memorandum of Conversation (Allison), Dec. 24,1948, DOS: 856D.00/ 12-2448; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 339-42. 44. Lovett to Certain Officers, Dec. 31,1948, FRUS 1948 6:717-20; Memorandum of Conversation (Ogburn), Jan. 12, 1949 and Lewis to Marshall, Jan. 12, 1949, DOS: 856D.00/1-1249. 45. Livengood to Marshall, Jan. 3, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:119-21; Lovett to Austin, Jan. 6, 1949, ibid., pp. 131-32; Butterworth to Bohlen, Jan. 7, 1949, ibid., pp. 136-37; Memorandum of Conversation (Lovett), Jan. 11, 1949, ibid., pp. 139-41. 46. Lovett to Manila Embassy, Jan. 11,1949, FRUS 1949 7:141; Jessup to Lovett, Jan. 12, 1949, ibid., pp. 144-48. 47. Jessup to Marshall, Jan. 17, 18, and 26, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:161-66, 171-72, 194-95; Kirk to Marshall, Jan. 18,1949, FRUS 1949 7:170; Kirk to Acheson, Jan. 22,1949, FRUS 1949 7:188; Baruch to Acheson, Jan. 20, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:179-83; Austin to Marshall, Jan. 19, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:175-76; Netherlands Embassy to Dept. of Stete, Jan. 17,1949, FRUS 1949 7:157-61; Memorandum of Conversation by Bancroft, Jan. 18, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:169-70; Memorandum by Rusk, Jan. 18, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:168-69; Memorandum of Conversation (Acheson), Jan. 22, 1949, Acheson Papers, Box 64; Acheson to Hague Embassy, Jan. 28, 1949, DOS: 856D.00/1-2749; Holmes to Acheson, Jan. 28, 1949, DOS: 856D.00/1-2849; Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, pp. 394-98. 48. Ibid., pp. 386-88; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 34245, 389-403. 49. Acheson to Hague Embassy, Jan. 31 and Feb. 5, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:197; 208; Livengood to Acheson, Feb. 2,1949, FRUS 1949 7:200-1; Austin to Acheson, Feb. 4,1949, FRUS 1949 7:206-7; Baruch to Acheson, Feb. 4,1949, FRUS 1949 7:206; Kird to Acheson, Feb. 9, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:212-23; Reed to Butterworth, Feb. 9, 1949, DOS: 856E.00/ 2-949; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 404-5. 50. Memorandum of Conversation (Butterworth), Feb. 11, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:225-26; Douglas to Acheson, Feb. 18, 1949, ibid., pp. 242-43; Dept. of State to Netherlands Embassy, Feb. 23, 1949, ibid., 246-47; Baruch to Acheson, Feb. 23, 1949, ibid., pp. 247-48; Acheson to Livengood, Feb. 16 and 26, 1949, ibid., pp. 233-35; Livengood to Acheson, Feb. 22, 25, 26, 27 and March 1, 1949, ibid., pp. 244-46, 259-60, 262-65, 269-78. 51. Livengood to Acheson, March 27, 29, and 30, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:348-50, 353-55. 52. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 415-17.

416

9. Indonesia: Fulfillment of Anticolonialism

53. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, pp. 279-81. 54. Baruch to Acheson, March 17 and 22, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:324, 338-39; Austin to Acheson, March 21 and 22,1949, FRUS 1949 7:332-38; Memorandum by Rusk, March 21, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:331-32; Van Kleffens to Acheson, March 18, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:325-30; Dept. of State to Indian Embassy, March 2, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:287-88; Henderson to Acheson, March 16, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:323; Memorandum of Conversation (Sparks), March 29, 1949, Acheson Papers, Box 64; Pakistan Embassy to Dept. of State, March 3, 1949, and Memorandum by Lacy, Feb. 18, 1949, DOS: PSEA Box 12; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 413-14. 55. P P S Report, March 29, 1949, DOS: P P S Files Box 2. 56. Memorandum of Conversation (Acheson), March 31, 1949, Acheson Papers, Box 64. 57. Acheson to Livengood, April 2, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:355-57. 58. Livengood to Acheson, April 3,12, 14, 21, 24-28, and May 1, 4-6, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:359-61, 366-72, 386-93, 400-7; Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, pp. 408-10; J. Foster Collins, "The United Nations and Indonesia," pp. 115-20. 59. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, pp. 397-99.

10. The Vietnamese Revolution: The Evolution of the Commitment to France, 1947-1950 1. Colbert, "The Road Not Taken," pp. 608-28; Marshall to Certain Officers, Jan. 29, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:19; Grady to Marshall, Feb. 19, 1948, DOS: 851G.00/2-1948. 2. Irving, First Indochina War, pp. 37-80. 3. Weekly Review, July 1, 1947: French-Vietnamese Conflict, DOS: PSEA Box 9. 4. Ibid. 5. Marshall to Reed, July 17, 1947, FRUS 2947 6:117-18; O'Sullivan to Marshall, July 3, 19 and 21, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:108-9, 120-23; Reed to Marshall, July 24, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:123-26; Caffery to Marshall, June 3, 1947, DOS: 851G.00/6-347. 6. Landon to Butterworth, Nov. 18, 1947, DOS: 856D.00/11-1847. 7. Ibid. 8. Minute by Street, Nov. 6, 1947, FO 371/63457; Drumright to Whitteridge, Oct. 31,1947, and Southeast Asia Dept. Note on Ho Chi Minh, Aug. 1947, FO 371/63457; Landon to Vincent, July 28, 1947, DOS: PSEA Box 9; Reed to Marshall, May 7, 1948, DOS: 851G.00/6-748. 9. Lacy to Penfield, Feb. 17, 1948, DOS: PSEA Box 9; Memorandum of Conversation (Butterworth), March 17, 1948, DOS: 851G.00/3-1758; Abbott to Marshall, Nov. 5, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:54-55; Marshall to Nanking Embassy, July 2, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:28-29. 10. Reed to Marshall, Sept. 15, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:137-38. 11. O'Sullivan to Marshall, Sept. 24, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:140-41; Reed to Marshall, Sept. 27, 1947, ibid., pp. 141-42. 12. Caffery to Marshall, Oct. 28, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:145-46; Landon to Butterworth, Oct. 24, 1947 and Memorandum: French Military Capability (ca. Oct. 1947), DOS: PSEA, Box 9. 13. Butterworth to Hickerson, April 29, 1948, DOS: PSEA, Box 9; Memorandum

10. Vietnam: Commitment to France

417

of Conversation (Lacy), Feb. 21, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:20; Memorandum of Conversation by Stanton, Feb. 24, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:21-23; Memorandum of Conversation (Landon), Feb. 24, 1948, DOS: 851G.00/"2-2448. 14. Abbott to Marshall, June 30, 1948, DOS: 851G.01/6-3048. 15. Reed to Marshall, June 14, 1947, FRUS 1947 6:103-5. 16. Reed to Marshall, July 11, 1947, FRUS 7947 6:110-16; Wallner to Lacy, Feb. 12, 1948 and Butterworth to Hickereon, May 25,1948, DOS: PSEA Box 9; Memorandum of Conversation (Moffat), April 11, 1947, DOS: 851G.01/4-1147; Reed to Marshall, June 9, 1947, DOS: 851G.00/6-947; O'Sullivan to Marshall, July 10, 1947, DOS: 851G.00/ 7-1047; Reed to Marshall, June 27, 1947, DOS: 851G.00/6-2747; O'Sullivan to Marshall, June 21,1947, DOS: 851G.00/6-2147; Rendali to Marshall, Jan. 24,1948, DOS: 851G.00/ 1-2448; Reed to Marshall, Jan. 13, 1948, DOS: 851G.00A-1348; Riddick to Marshall, Aug. 12, 1948, DOS: 851G.01/8-1248. 17. Rendali to Marshall, June 8,1948, DOS: 851G.01/6-848; Rendali to Marshall, June 7, 1948, DOS: 851GT.01/6-748; Rendali to Marshall, June 9, 1948, DOS: 851G.01/ 6-948. 18. Marshall to Paris Embassy, July 3,14, and Aug. 30,1948, FRUS 1948 6:29-30, 33, 40; Caffery to Marshall, July 9, 1948, ibid., pp. 31-33; Marshall to Abbott, Aug. 27, 1948, ibid., p. 38; Abbott to Marshall, Aug. 28 and Sept. 7, 1948, ibid., pp. 39-42. 19. Memorandum of Conversation (Lacy), May 10, 1948, DOS: 851G.01/ 5-1048. 20. Policy Statement on Indochina, Sept. 27, 1948, FRUS 1948 6:43-49. 21. Acheson to Paris Embassy, Feb. 25, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:8-9. 22. Caffery to Acheson, March 6 and 16, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:9-10, 12-14. 23. Reed to Butterworth, April 14, 1949, DOS: 851G.OO/4-1449. 24. Abbott to Acheson, May 6, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:22-23; Memorandum of Conversation (Landon), March 2, 1948, DOS: 851G.00/3-248; Memorandum of Conversation (Landon), April 14, 1948, DOS: 851G.00/4-1448. 25. Bruce to Acheson, May 24 and June 2, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:32-33, 36-38; Memorandum of Conversation (Ogbum), ibid., pp. 27-28. 26. Acheson to Paris Embassy, June 6 and 16, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:38-45, 56-57: Bruce to Acheson, June 13, 1949, ibid., pp. 45-46; Abbott to Acheson, June 10, 1949, ibid., pp. 45. 27. Lovett to Certain Officere, June 14, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:53-54; Douglas to Acheson, June 15, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:55-56; Henderson to Acheson, June 17 and 21, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:57-58, 61-62; Stanton to Acheson, June 17, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:58-59; Memorandum of Conversation (Landon), June 21, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:62-63; Memorandum of Conversation (Ogbum), June 23, 1949, DOS: 851G.01/6-2149. 28. Ogbum to Reed and O'Sullivan, June 28, 1949, DOS: PSEA, Box 9. 29. Ibid. 30. Abbott to Acheson, Sept. 8, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:75; Acheson to Abbott, July 1949, FRUS 1949 7:70; Indochina Policy Study, August 1949, DOS: PSEA, Box 9; Locke« to Acheson, Aug. 5, 1949, DOS: 851G.01/8-549; Reed to Jessup, Aug. 22,1949, DOS: 851G.00/8-2249; Gibson to Acheson, July 8, 1949, DOS: 851G.01/7-849. 31. Bruce to Acheson, July 6, 1949, DOS: 851G.01/7-649; Bruce to Acheson, July 22,1949, DOS: 851G.01/7-2249; Abbott to Acheson, Aug. 26,1949, DOS: 851G.01/8-2649; Gibson to Acheson, June 29, 1949, DOS: 851G.01/6-2949; Gibson to Acheson, Oct. 20, 1949, DOS: 851G.00/10-2149; Gibson to Acheson, Oct. 21, 1949, DOS: 851G.00/10-2149;

418

10. Vietnam: Commitment to France

Gibson to Acheron, Oct. 26, 1949, DOS: 851G.00/10-2649. 32. Andrew Roth, "Asia's Tito?" Nation, Sept. 10, 1949, p. 244; Roth, "Night Club Emperor," Nation, Sept. 10, 1949, pp. 247-60. 33. Memorandum of Conversation (Butterworth), Sept. 9, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:7679; Holmes to Acheson, Sept. 9, 1949, ibid., pp. 79-80. 34. Memorandum of Conversations (O'Sullivan), Sept. 28, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:83-89. 35. Butterworth to Acheson, Oct. 20, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:92-94; Henderson to Acheson, Sept. 14,1949, DOS: 851G.01/S-1449; Abbott to Acheson, Sept. 23,1949, DOS: 851G.01/9-2349; Stanton to Acheson and Donovan to Acheson, Oct. 6, 1949, DOS: 851G.01A0-649. 36. Reed to Butterworth, Nov. 7, 1949, DOS: PSEA, Box 9. 37. Memorandum of Conversation (Reed), Nov. 28, 1949, DOS: 851G.01/ 11-2849. 38. Acheson to Paris Embassy, Dec. 1, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:101-2. 39. Bruce to Acheson, Dec. 11, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:105-10. 40. Bruce to Acheson, Nov. 21,1949, FRUS 1949 7:97; Holmes to Acheson, Dec. 5, 1949, DOS: 851G.01/12-549; Abbott to Acheson, Dec. 6, 1949, DOS: 851G.00A2-649. 41. Acheson to Abbott, Dec. 19,1949, DOS: 851G.00/12-1949; Gibson to Acheson, Dec. 22, 1949, DOS: 851G.00/12-2249. 42. Abbott to Acheson, Dec. 24,1949, DOS: 851G.01/12-2449; Abbott to Acheson, Dec. 27, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:114. 43. Fifield, Americans in Southeast Asia, pp. 142-45; Colbert, "Road Not Taken," pp. 608-28; Record of NSC Meeting, Dec. 30, 1949, U.S. House, CAS, United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967 (Book 1), I: A-56 to A-58. 44. NCS 48-1, Dec. 23,1949, U.S House, CAS, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, (Book 1), II: A-45. 45. Acheson to Stanton, Dec. 23, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:113. 46. Stanton to Acheson, Dec. 28, 1949, FRUS 1949 7:115; Acheson to Manila Embassy, Jan. 7, 1950, FRUS 1950 6:691-92; Henderson to Acheson, Jan. 7, 1950, FRUS 1950 6:692-93; Cochran to Acheson, Jan. 11,1950, FRUS 1950 6:693; Stanton to Acheson, Jan. 12, 1950, FRUS 1950 6:693-94. 47. Acheson to Stanton, Jan. 17, 1950, FRUS 1950 6:697. 48. Bruce to Acheson, Jan. 13, Feb. 3 and 6, 1950, FRUS 1950 6:694-95, 719, 721; Memorandum of Conversation (Acheson), Feb. 3, 1950, ibid., p. 719. 49. Bruce to Acheson, Jan. 31, 1950, FRUS 1950 6:704-5; New York Times, Feb. 1-2, 1950. 50. Acheson to London Embassy, Jan. 30, 1950, FRUS 1950 6:703-4; Acheson to Truman, Feb. 2, 1950, ibid., pp. 716-17. 51. Memorandum of Conversation (Merchant), Feb. 16, 1950, FRUS 1950 6:733. 52. Yost to Perkins, Jan. 31,1950, FRUS 1950 6:710-11; Bruce to Acheson, Feb. 22, 1950, ibid., pp. 739-43; Report to NSC, Feb. 27, 1950, ibid., pp. 744-47; Merchant to Acheson, March 7,1950, ibid., pp. 749-51; Marshall to Acheson, April 14,1950, ibid., pp. 780-85; Truman to Acheson, May 1, 1950, ibid., p. 791. 53. Memorandum by Gullion, Dec. 7, 1949, FRUS 1950 6:700-2; Abbott to Acheson, Jan. 29, 31 and Feb. 9,1950, ibid., pp. 702-3, 705-7, 725-26; Bohlen to Acheson, Feb. 16, 1950, ibid., pp. 734-35; Memorandum of Conversation at Quai d'Orsay, March

11. Redefinition of U.S. Policy

419

13.1950, ibid., pp. 754-57; Gullion to Acheson, March 18and April8,1950, ibid., pp. 76263.773-76; Memorandum by Gibson, March 14, 1950, ibid., pp. 759-61; Acheson to Paris Embassy, March 29, 1950, ibid., pp. 768-71. 54. U.S. House, CAS, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 (Book 1), II: A-l to A-3, A-35; Joseph M. Siracusa, "The United States, Vietnam, and the Cold War," pp. 82-101.

11. The Redefinition of United States' Policy, 1949-1950 1. On the review of American East Asian Policy in 1949-50, see Warren I. Cohen, "Acheson, His Advisers, and China, 1949-1950," pp. 13-52; John Lewis Gaddis, "The Strategic Perspective," pp. 61-118; Thomas H. Etzold, "The Far East in American Strategy, 1948-1951," pp. 102-26; William S. Borden, The Pacific Alliance; Michael Schaller, "Securing the Great Crescent" 392-414; Russell Buhite, Souiet-American Relations in Asia, 1945-1954, pp. 37-66, 186-235; Andrew J. Rotter, "The Big Canvas," pp. 193-386; Fifield, Americans in Southeast Asia, pp. 130-56; Robert M. Blum, Drawing the Line; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 89-126. 2. PPS Paper 'U.S. Policy Toward Southeast Asia" (March 29, 1949), DOS: PPS Files, Box 2; PPS Minutes, March 25 and 29, 1949, DOS: PPS, Box 32. 3.PPS Paper "U.S. Policy Toward Southeast Asia" (March 29, 1949), DOS: PPS Files, Box 2. A Ibid. 5. U.S. House, CAS,-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 (Book 1), I, A-56to A-58; PPS 51, May 19, 1949, DOS:PPS Files, Box 2. On growing Soviet interest in Southeast Asia, se