The United States between China and Japan [1 ed.] 9781443865050, 9781443842334

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The United States between China and Japan

The United States between China and Japan

Edited by

Caroline Rose and Victor Teo

The United States between China and Japan, Edited by Caroline Rose and Victor Teo This book first published 2013 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2013 by Caroline Rose and Victor Teo and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-4233-8, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-4233-4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements .................................................................................. viii Chapter One................................................................................................. 1 Contextualizing the United States in Sino-Japanese Relations VICTOR TEO and CAROLINE ROSE Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 21 The United States between China and Japan: Balancer, Arbitrator and Limits of Change VICTOR TEO Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 64 Toward Historical Understanding Across National Borders BU PING Chapter Four.............................................................................................. 83 Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The United States in the Sino-Japanese History Problem CAROLINE ROSE Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 102 Yakusuni Controversy and Sino-Japanese Reconciliation XIAOHUA MA Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 143 Sino-Japanese Relations in the Past and Present: Revisiting the Role of the US Factor and The Legacy of History YINAN HE Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 163 Rethinking Leadership in the Asia Pacific: Sino-Japanese Relations and the Preponderance of the United States VICTOR TEO

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Chapter Eight........................................................................................... 189 Sino-Japanese Relations and China’s Policy toward Japan in the Coming Decade JIANG LIFENG Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 233 US-China-Japan Trilateral Relations in Asia CHU SHULONG Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 256 The US Factor in Sino-Japanese Relations after 1969 LIU SHILONG Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 271 Asian Nexuses: US Relations with China and Japan in the Wake of the 9/11 Terrorists Attacks YONEYUKI SUGITA Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 296 The Legacy of Japan’s Colonial Past: Cultural Influences on Taiwanese Identity and Implications for Cross-Strait Relations HOI-YAN YAU AND HEUNG-WAH WONG Chapter Thirteen...................................................................................... 320 Balancing or Bandwagoning? Taiwan’s Role in Sino-Japan Relations MUMIN CHEN Chapter Fourteen ..................................................................................... 345 The Impact of the Ma Administration’s Mainland Policy on Quadrilateral Relations between the United States, China, Japan and Taiwan DA-JUNG LI Chapter Fifteen ........................................................................................ 357 Taiwan Walking a Tightrope: The United States and Japan in the Ma Government’s Cross-Strait Policy ROBERT TSENG-CHIA TSAI Chapter Sixteen ....................................................................................... 370 Taiwan on the Backburner of US Relations with China CHEN-SHEN J. YEN

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Chapter Seventeen ................................................................................... 382 Sino-Japanese Maritime Relations: Recent Developments and Legal Implications ZOU KEYUAN Chapter Eighteen ..................................................................................... 405 Ripe for the Revival of “Concert”?: The US Approach to a New Regional Order in Northeast Asia TOMOKO T. OKAGAKI Chapter Nineteen ..................................................................................... 423 The Compatibility of East Asia and Asia Pacific Multilateralism: Japan’s Strategic Rationales CHYUNGLY LEE Bibliography............................................................................................ 441 Contributors............................................................................................. 458

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The editors thankfully acknowledge the assistance of the colleagues who have made this book possible. A great debt is owned to the School of Modern Languages and Cultures, University of Hong Kong for making the logistical and financial resources for this project available. We are grateful to Dr. Kendall Johnson and Dr. Dixon Wong, present and former head of the School respectively, and Professor Kam Louie, Dean Faculty of Arts who have been so supportive of the project. The editors are also tremendously grateful to Miss Cheryl Lee, Miss Lolo Yu, Miss Belle Ho, Mr. Richard Edele, Miss Rose Vickridge, Mr Shu Sheng-Chi, Mr. Samuel Wong and Mr. Watson Lam for all their assistance in the organization of the workshop at the University and the subsequent production of this book. We would also like to express our sincere thanks to the learned scholars who have taken the time to come to Hong Kong to attend our workshop, in undertaking the many revisions required as well as their forbearance in waiting for this book to materialize. Even though the materials do not cover the very latest developments, there are nonetheless numerous insights that the various chapters that could offer in terms of outlining the patterns and complexities of East Asian International Relations. Finally, we would also like to convey our sincere thanks to the editors and staff at Cambridge Scholars Publishing for their confidence in us and for making this book possible.

CHAPTER ONE CONTEXTUALIZING THE UNITED STATES IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS VICTOR TEO AND CAROLINE ROSE Once again in August and September 2012, large scale anti-Japanese protests1 broke out across major Chinese cities as a result of the Japanese government arresting and deporting 14 Hong Kong, Taiwan and Chinese activists who landed on the Diaoyutai/Senkaku 2 islands on 15 August 2012. 3 This landing was interpreted as a victory on the part of many 1

According to newspaper reports, small scale and unsustained protests broke out in numerous cities including Harbin, Changchun, Shenyang, Yantai, Jinan, Qingdao, Linzhe, Shanghai, Suzhou, Taizhou, Wenzhou, Hangzhou, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Nanning, Guiyang, Wuhan, Nanjing, Chengdu, Zhengzhou, Taiyuan, Beijing, Yatai, Changsha, Zhuhai, Shandong, Dongguan involving a few hundred to a few thousand people. The protests in some cities escalated into violence with protestors attacking Japanese businesses and overturning Japanese- made cars, including police cars. The protests broke out intermittently all summer but over the weekend of 26 August 2012, Chinese police broke one protest in Dongguan, the industrial heartland of Guangdong province – signaling that the local and central government would no longer tolerate violent protests. See report in South China Morning Post, 26 August 2012. 2 The dispute over the Senkaku islands is intricately linked to the history of the incorporation of Ryukyu islands. The Ryukyu islands were paying tribute to both China and subsequently also to Edo. Ryukyu’s annexation by Japan was never formally acknowledged by China. In 1885, Sutezo Nishimura, petitioned the Meiji government to take formal control of the Senkaku islands which were considered linked to the Ryukyus. This was turned down by both the Foreign and Interior Ministers, Kaoru Inoue and Aritomo Yamagata as this might have aroused Chinese suspicions. It wasn’t until the beginning of January 1895 that the Japanese cabinet decided to incorporate the islands under Okinawa Prefecture’s control. See Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press. 2000, pp. 89–97. 3 Japanese politicians often visit the Yasukuni Shrine on this date in their “private” capacity and these visits are usually condemned by China and Japan. This year,

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Chinese but proved both provocative and opportune for Japanese ultraright nationalists and politicians in Japan. On 20 August, a similar landing was carried out by a 20-strong flotilla led by Satoru Mizushima, President of Gambare Nippon, a right-wing organization in Japan. They landed on Uotsuri (Diaoyu) and planted the Hinomaru (the Japanese flag) there. Among the group was Eiji Kosaka who was then running for election in Tokyo’s Arakawa Ward. 4 Shintaro Ishihara, the Governor of Tokyo, indicated he would lead another survey party in October 2012 to prepare for the Tokyo Metropolitan government’s purchase of three out of the five islets, even explicitly challenging the authorities to arrest him.5 There is nothing new about Chinese activists landing on Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands nor is there anything new to Japanese right-wing reactions or politicians utilizing this issue to garner political capital. What is new about this episode is that it came only a few days after the Japanese and Koreans traded words over President Lee Myungbak’s visit to the Dokdo 6 (Takeshima Islands) on 10 August 2012. President Lee’s visit, while not entirely unrelated to South Korea’s domestic politics, reminds us of President Medvedev’s visit to the Kuril islands7 on 1 November 2010.8 despite a call by Prime Minister Noda, two cabinet ministers, Jun Matsubara, Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission and Transport Minister Yu’ichiro Hata visited the Shrine. See http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120816a3.html 4 Antoine Bouthier, “Nationalists exult in Senkaku isle landing” Japan Times 20 August 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/rss/nn20120820a3.html; also see “Anniversary events at risk over isle feud” Yomiuri Shimbun, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120820003220.htm 5 “ ‘If I get arrested, OK’ says Ishihara on his upcoming visit to Senkakus” http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/if-i-get-arrested-ok-saysishihara-on-his-upcoming-visit-to-senkakus 25 August 2012 6 Known as the Liancourt Rocks in English, Takeshima in Japanese and Dokdo in Korean, this group of islands has been one of the core problems between South Korea and Japan. The Koreans consider that the Dokdo were lost when the Japanese annexed the islands as part of its territory in 1905 without informing Seoul amidst the Russo-Japanese War, incorporating the islands as part of the Shimane Prefecture. Many Korean scholars believe that in 1951, the United States, in pursuit of her strategic interests during the Cold War, softened her stance on Dokdo and that the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 was neutral towards the question of sovereignty over these islands. Interviews in Seoul in 2011 and 2012. 7 Russia controls the four southern Kuril islands over which Japan claims sovereignty – Iturup/Etorofu, Kunashir/Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Khabomai/Habomai. The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 does not explicitly recognize the sovereignty of the Soviet Union of those islands and this was vigorously disputed by the USSR at the time. See statement by Andrei Gromyko, USSR Permanent

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Together with Japan’s ongoing dispute with Russia over the Kurile Islands, the Dokdo (Takeshima) and the Diaoyutai (Senkaku) islands disputes all have their origins in the postwar settlement surrounding Article 2 of the Treaty of San Francisco9 signed in September 1951. While the Russian Federation and Korea effectively have administrative control of the islands over which Japan claims sovereignty, the administrative control of Diaoyutai/Senkaku was transferred to Japan with the reversion of Okinawa in 1971. Today, Japan’s claim is heavily premised on the doctrine of terra nullius – the idea that Diaoyutai/Senkaku were “no man's land” that was first discovered by the Japanese and over which Japan resumed sovereignty in 1971. Both China and Taiwan reject Japanese claims outright. In response, Tokyo has attempted to strengthen her grip on the islands through regular reiteration of her position in the international media, diplomatic maneuvers and domestic political rhetoric. What is significant about Tokyo’s position is that it is backed by the fact that the Senkaku islands are covered under her defense alliance with the United States. Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security applies to territories under the administration of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands. Hence in November 1996, Assistant Secretary of Defense Campbell stated that the basic position of the U.S. is that the Japan-U.S. security treaty would cover the Senkaku islands. Secretary of Defense William Perry reconfirmed this on 3 December 1996, and the State Department again in 2004.10 Prime Minister Taro Aso emphasized Japan’s American support twice within his short tenure. This ongoing territorial dispute raises questions not only about the direction of Sino-Japanese relations after the 2008 Hu-Fukuda joint communiqué in which it was agreed that China and Japan would seek to build a forward-looking and mutually beneficial relationship after the tempestuous Koizumi years,11 but the dispute also highlights the significant Representative to the United Nations at the New York Times, 9 September 1951, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F30712FF3B55177B93CBA91782 D85F458585F9&scp=4&sq=Gromyko&st=p 8 Russian president visits disputed Kuril Islands http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldasia-pacific-11663241 , 1 November 2010. He subsequently ordered the delivery of modern weaponry to the Kurils in February 2011 and returned for another visit on 3 July 2012. See The Russian Times, “Medvedev visits Kuril Islands – ‘important part of Russian land’” http://rt.com/politics/medvedev-kuril-islands-visit-284/ 9 For text on the treaty, see http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm 10 See write-up on Senkaku/Diaoyutai at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.htm 11 Gupta, Sourabh. “An 'Early Summer': Sino-Japanese Cooperation in the East China Sea,” Nautilus Policy Forum Online (2008),

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role that the United States continues to play in East Asian international relations, especially in the relationship between China and Japan. In particular, coupled with the memories of the Pacific War that continue to haunt East Asian politics, the postwar institutional arrangements hastily put in place at the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War have had a lasting impact on Sino-Japanese relations. Contextualized in this way, this volume interrogates the role the United States has played in Asia through her engagement with China and Japan, and the implications this has for Sino-Japanese relations as a whole. Recent scholarship on the evolution of Sino-Japanese relations has focused on the reasons and factors behind the disagreements between China and Japan. In turn, the increasingly frequent and high-profile disputes between China and Japan over a host of issues have elicited much interest in this bilateral relationship. From the emergence of the history textbook disputes in the mid-1980s to the surfacing of tensions over various economic, political, territorial and strategic issues, China and Japan appear to find cooperation difficult. The antagonisms include: PRC’s nuclear tests (1995), almost yearly disputes over Senkaku/Diaoyutai since 1996 including quarrels over East China Seabed oil and gas reserves 12 and alleged Chinese naval activities in Japan’s territorial waters 13 (or in the vicinity of Senkaku/Diaoyu); history-related issues such as visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the publication of revisionist historical texts and controversial remarks by Japanese public figures and politicians. 14 The www.nautilus.org/fora/security/08010Gupta.html ; also see Fukuda, Hu put focus on the future, see http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20080508a1.html; “Shirakaba gas field key to ‘progress’: Japan, China closer to joint development,” The Yomiuri Daily, May 9, 2008. 12 See Selig Harrison, “Seabed Petroleum in Northeast Asia: Conflict or Cooperation?” Wilson Center http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Asia_petroleum.pdf 13 Joseph Ferguson, “Submarine Incursion sets Sino-Japanese relations on the edge”, China Brief, Vol 4 Issue 23 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3695 14 Yuko Tojo, granddaughter of Hideki Tojo is a prominent revisionist who feels that “Japan did not fight a war of aggression. It fought in self-defense. Our children have been taught that their ancestors did evil things, and their country is evil. We need to give these children back their pride and confidence.” Associated Press, 11 June 2007; Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintaro is known to have claimed that the Rape of Nanking is fiction and a lie fabricated by the Chinese in an interview given to Playboy magazine (Vol 37, No. 10, p. 63). He is noted to have said that “prostitution was a good way of making a living at that time and that there were no signs that the women had entered the sex trade unwillingly”, Chosun Ilbo, 24

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narratives have shifted from merely seeing “historical disputes” between China and Japan as an issue of differing interpretation, to an issue where these historical disputes are symptomatic of larger and more insidious processes at work in the erosion of healthy and strong Sino-Japanese bilateral relations. Scholars such as Rose15 and He16 have argued that it is the lack of reconciliation between China and Japan after the Pacific War that is casting a shadow over their current interactions. Gilbert Rozman argues that the bilateral distrust in the relationships between each country has in effect impeded the prospects of regionalization. 17 From the perspective of International Relations theory, this continuing antagonism between China and Japan is puzzling, especially when predictions made by advocates of economic interdependence theory appear applicable to August 2012; former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also famously denied that the Japanese military was involved in the recruitment of wartime sex slaves, and this led to the U.S. House of Representatives adopting a non-binding resolution calling Japan to acknowledge and apologise for its wartime sex slavery. See House Resolution 121 tabled 31 Jan 2007, see text at http://etan.org/action/action3/02honda.htm#resolution; see also Tessa Morris Suzuki, “Japan’s Comfort Women: It’s time for the Truth (in the ordinary everyday sense of the word)”, Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, available at http://www.japanfocus.org/-Tessa-Morris_Suzuki/2373; former Prime Minister Taro Aso also holds a revisionist view of history. He consistently avoided answering questions on his family firm’s use of forced labour during the Second World War, see http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/19/japan. There are many others: for example, Yoshihisa Komori, Editor-at-Large for Sankei Shimbun, who denies the Nanjing Massacre and is renowned for his nationalist views, criticised Japanese intellectuals such as the President of the Japan Institute for International Affairs, Yukio Sato, for allowing essays critical of Japanese politicians who visit Yasukuni Shrine to be published on the JIIA website in 20052006. Nariaki Nakayama who served as PM Koizumi’s Education and Culture Minister also fought to censor textbooks that touched on Japanese wartime sex slaves, and also holds the position that Nanjing Massacre is a complete fabrication. He assisted then PM Abe in attempting to revise the 1993 Kono statement in which Japan admitted that the Japanese government had some responsibility in this issue. (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html ), and challenged the Japan Teachers’ Union, whom he considered to be extremely harmful to Japanese education because of their “defeatist” attitude towards history. 15 Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking to the Future?, (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005); 16 Yinan He, The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009). 17 Rozman, G. (2011) Northeast Asia's Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization, New Jersey U.S., Cambridge University Press.

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Sino-Japanese relations. For Neo-Liberalists, the problem is a question of inadequate engagement and the institutionalization of co-operative structures in East Asia. China and Japan have yet to embark fully on the joint development of regimes and institutions that could help ameliorate tensions in the region and harmonize the differences in opinions and outlooks in both their countries. Neo-Realists on the other hand, however, attest that the tensions in Sino-Japanese relations occur simply because they both have competing rather than complementary goals and national interests. 18 Scholars working in the Constructivist camp argue that nationalism exhibited in Sino-Japanese relations emanates from deepseated differences in national identities,19 their worldviews, perspectives and norms. There have been many surveys on how the Chinese and Japanese view history and historical questions.20 Most surveys show that public opinion polls point to “history” as the main impediment to stronger bilateral relations. However, such public perceptions may mask deep ideational and structural issues between China and Japan and prompt further questions: How did the historical issue develop into what it is today? How did the difference in perceptions come about? What were postwar China and Japan’s reasons for not taking measures to address these issues? Are these issues purely “bilateral” in nature, or do they involve multiple parties? Can these historical issues be fully addressed by China and Japan? Are these issues really “historical” in nature or could they be identified as a political power play? Rozman’s recent volume, United States Leadership, History and Bilateral Relations in Northeast Asia, hints at the significant but often understated role that the United States plays in the region’s historical

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See Peng Er Lam, Japan's Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power, (London: Routledge, 2006). 19 Rex Li, A Rising China and Security in East Asia: Identity Construction and Security Discourse, (London: Routledge, 2009); also see Gerrit Gong and Victor Teo, Reconceptualising the Divide: Identity, Memory and Nationalism in SinoJapanese Relations, (UK: Cambridge Scholars Publish, 2010) 20 For example, the 2008 Yomiuri Shimbun - Xinhua News Agency joint survey in 2008; the periodic Asahi Shimbun-Chinese Academy of Social Science Survey as well as the regular Asahi Shimbun Regular Public Opinion Poll (http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/backup/polls/polls_listing.htm ); Asian Barometer, http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/surveys/ ; in addition, also see Mindy L. Lotler, Naotaka Sugawara and Tetsuya Yamada, ‘Chinese and Japanese Public Opinion: Searching for Moral Security’ in Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No.1 2007, pp. 93-125; there are also regular Polls on Foreign Policy conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Office.

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disputes.21 This volume further problematizes the role of the United States against the backdrop of the issues and tensions found in the tempestuous relations between China and Japan. The first part of this volume thus tackles the history question in relation to Sino-Japanese relations and attempts to delineate the role of the United States against this backdrop. The questions deriving from the “burden of history” form the first set of fundamental obstacles in SinoJapanese relations. Victor Teo’s chapter provides a historical survey of the United States’ role in East Asia and contextualizes the discussion by highlighting the importance of the United States’ role in the historical dispute between China and Japan. Teo notes that the problems faced by China and Japan, especially in their lack of a common understanding of history as well as the structural problems between them, are an unintended consequence of historical developments as well as institutional arrangements made by the United States. In addition, while the United States may enjoy a privileged position of playing the “middleman” in these disputes and managing the tensions, Teo questions whether this is sustainable in the face of China’s rapid rise and Japan’s normalization agenda. Bu Ping’s chapter proceeds to lay out the critical importance of understanding the nature of the historical issues that trouble East Asian diplomacy. Outlining the efforts that have been made to transcend political boundaries through the study of history, Bu Ping identifies three layers in the dialogues over the history problem between China and Japan, namely political, emotional and academic. When the three layers coalesce, the history dispute becomes further complicated. Compared with the history of reconciliation in Europe, reconciliation in Asia lags behind. However, as Bu Ping argues, there are fundamental obstacles to reaching a common understanding of history, and that is the question that historians in both China and Japan need to contemplate. Historians need to rise above personal beliefs and cultural bias in order to clearly understand history from the perspective of the different layers, and subsequently offer suitable solutions. Mutual understanding is an active way to confront the disputes in the emotional and academic layers. Arguably, many of the problems between China and Japan today appear to have their roots in the 1950s. This raises further questions with regards to the role of the United States in the “creation” of these problems. Today, as we look for various solutions to try and temper, if not solve, the 21

Rozman, Gilbert (2010), U.S. Leadership, History and Bilateral Relations in Northeast Asia, New Jersey U.S., Cambridge University Press.

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history issues, more issues emerge. Would the resolution of these issues necessarily pave the way for smoother Sino-Japanese relations? Are the problems interlinked, and if so, how? How is it that historical issues have become “structural”, in an ideational sense, and further impede SinoJapanese relations from moving forward? Caroline Rose’s chapter considers the role of the U.S. in the origins and construction of the SinoJapanese history problem. It first traces the developments of the early postwar period, considering the impact of a rapidly changing international environment and emerging Cold War hostilities on Occupation policies in relation to Japan and the peace settlement. The chapter then turns to look at events in the 2000s and the U.S. government’s stance on such issues as the textbook controversy, Yasukuni Shrine issue and military sexual slavery. It also considers the role of U.S. domestic activist groups and individual politicians who tried to raise the issue of restitution between Japan and other Asian countries to a political level (albeit with little success), and explores the reasons for the U.S. government’s continued reticence – or inability – to apply pressure on the Japanese government. The chapter argues that although the U.S. often appears to take a neutral stance on the more sensitive issues in Sino-Japanese relations, in fact the tendency to ‘lean to one side’ has contributed to the persistence of the Sino-Japanese history problem. Ma Xiaohua further interrogates the question of history in SinoJapanese Relations. In her chapter on “The Yasukuni Controversy and Sino-Japanese Reconciliation”, Ma scrutinizes the important role that collective memory has played in contemporary U.S.-China-Japan relations. Answers to this question must reckon with the impact of the memories of World War II, or the Asia-Pacific War of 1931-1945 - the foundational moment of contemporary politics in the Asia-Pacific region. Ma’s chapter focuses on how history disputes based on different memories emerged and subsequently became an important factor affecting the relationships among the United States, China and Japan. Ma pays particular attention to the persistence of clashing collective memories as symbolized by the Yasukuni Shrine issue, and the ways in which the issue has escalated and become intertwined with other problems in the China-Japan relationship. He Yinan’s chapter examines the relative strength and mutual interaction between two distinct driving forces that have shaped postwar Sino-Japanese relations. One is the East Asian structural environment, which is to a great extent defined by U.S. strategy toward the region. The other is the enduring psychological and emotional shadow cast by the two countries’ history of traumatic conflict. When the international structure is negative, such as in the 1950s-60s with a solid U.S.-Japan alliance and

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Sino-American confrontation, it has the effect of trumping other factors and antagonizing China-Japan relations. But a positive structural pressure, such as Sino-American rapprochement during the 1970s-80s, improved Sino-Japanese relations to a limited extent because of both the U.S. security guarantee for Japan and the constraints of their historicallyderived mistrust and antipathy. He argues that since the Cold War, China and Japan have faced a unique structural environment that is neither clearly positive nor clearly negative. Although regional balance of power is more important than before, their relationship continues to be shaped and reshaped by their respective responses to the U.S. policy on the one hand, and their approaches to the historical legacy on the other hand. One of the biggest questions is, thus, how these historical issues are now intertwined with the development of Chinese and Japanese national identity and the corresponding values in Chinese, Japanese and American societies. Victor Teo’s chapter on “Reappraising U.S. preponderance through the prism of Sino-Japanese Relations: Some Implications for East Asia” reviews the implications of the contestation between China and Japan. Teo’s basic argument is that as a direct result of the difficulties in Sino-Japanese relations today, the United States has an unprecedented advantage in terms of her ability to exercise leadership in the region, ironically mirroring the circumstances created during the early stages of the Cold War. His chapter emphasizes that historical misunderstandings have come to be integrated into the national identity of these two giants, and explains how they have in turn contributed to the hegemonic status of the United States in Asia-Pacific. His assessment is that unless China and Japan are able to harmonize their collective memories and reconcile their differences, the situation in Sino-Japanese relations will continue to bolster the United States in a leadership position in Asia-Pacific affairs. This, however, might not be such a positive development given the need for the region to develop healthy and rigorous institutional mechanisms that are commensurate with economic development and political maturing. Festering nationalism based on lopsided interpretations of history cannot be sustainable in the long run. Today, many Japanese and Americans believe that they are very similar to each other, while the Chinese and Japanese believe that they are fundamentally different from each other – but it is questionable if this is true. Are the Americans and the Japanese so fundamentally different from the Chinese? Much of the narrative emanating out of Tokyo and Washington in support for the U.S.-Japan security alliance is based on existing public opinion and elite discourse. We often hear that the Japanese people espouse very different values, outlooks and aspirations

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from the Chinese and that they are ideologically much closer to the West. This could be seen in the much-debated idea of a “value-based” diplomacy for China espoused by former prime ministers Abe and Aso. After the collapse of the USSR, American and Japanese officials spoke of the ‘China Threat’, debating whether they should engage or contain China. From the Bush Administration to the Obama Administration, we have heard terms like “engagement”, “containment” or even “congagement” with regards to China. Chinese people’s aspirations and outlook are not so different from those of the Americans or the Japanese – as they too aspire to higher standards of living, peace and stability. Young Chinese are just as eager as Japanese or American youths to go abroad to work and travel and the ordinary citizen in Shanghai, Osaka or Chicago also has his/her worries about jobs, financial security and health costs. Most Chinese are just as proud of their country and as nationalistic as their Japanese or American counterparts. The point here is that the value schisms we are led to believe are not as big as prevailing Western discourse and public opinion would suggest. The second important category of obstacles in Sino-Japanese relations appears to be structural in nature. “Structural” here simply refers to concrete material and even ideational obstacles that prevent reconciliation between China and Japan. There is no shortage of scholars who argue that the U.S.-Japan security alliance is responsible for keeping things on an even keel between China and Japan. The Americans are responsible for “containing” the China threat as much as they are for keeping Japanese nationalistic sentiments in check. They are responsible for “balancing” and “engaging” the ascendance of China as much as they are for reassuring the region of the righteousness of Japanese “normalization”. From a longerterm perspective, this state of affairs might not be the best way forward. China and Japan must learn to handle and take their relations forward in a sincere and honest manner in the future. While the role of the United States is instrumental indeed in keeping the peace, no one in Asia today could actually imagine and forecast an Asia without the United States, much less one that is dominated by China and Japan. This arrangement ironically has become accepted by both China and Japan. Consequently, the United States has become, for a lack of a better word, the de facto “honest broker” when it comes not just to regional affairs, but also in mediating relations between various states. This is especially true when it comes to Sino-Japanese relations. Today there is a huge difference between diplomatic discourse and political reality, between the apparent will of the leadership and popular public opinion over the tone and direction of Sino-Japanese relations.

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The spirit of the 2008 Fukuda-Hu communiqué stipulates that the basis for the future of Japan-China interactions would be the “all round promotion of strategic and mutually beneficial relations.” While no doubt noble in intent and far-sighted in its aspirations, such a joint statement begets more questions: can Japan and China truly build a "strategic partnership" based on mutually beneficial interests, especially if Japan is structurally tied to the U.S. in regional security arrangements? The subsequent chapters thus examine perhaps what might be considered the greatest structural impediment to Sino-Japanese relations – that of the U.S.-Japan Bilateral Treaty (promulgated in 1951, revised and signed in 1960). In 1996, President William Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto reaffirmed the alliance and in 1997, the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Co-operation were revised.22 As an institution, this is one of the main reasons why “stability” has been maintained in East Asia, but its exceptional longevity after the Soviet threat has receded, and its unquestioned role cannot be taken for granted. Of course, many American scholars are of the persuasion that this bilateral alliance is critical to U.S.Japan defense co-operation and the preservation of the stability that East Asian economic growth needs. It is, however, the same alliance that arguably allows the more conservative elements in both countries to have the upper hand in domestic political debates. At the same time, many Asians believe that the U.S.-Japan security alliance is critical for peace and security in the region. In fact, the alliance is seen as sacrosanct by many defense policymakers and diplomats. From the Japanese and American point of view, the fundamental element that underpins the U.S.-Japan Security relations is the “China threat” theory that has found resonance among scholars and defense planners since the early 1990s. Today, neo-conservative politicians, the military-industrial complex and Pentagon officials’ think tanks act in concert with conservative elements of the Japanese elite. For the United States, this provides the impetus and the motivation for the Japanese to realign their goals more closely to U.S. foreign policy and preempts the possibility of Japanese strategic independence. This alliance allows the United States to achieve her strategic goals in Asia at subsidized cost, and provides a financial and technological basis for continued defense spending, rejuvenation of the military-industrial complex and maintenance of an entrenched presence in the most economically dynamic region in the world. Yet, as much as the U.S.-Japan security alliance is a bilateral agreement between two sovereign nations, the United States is keen to 22

Please see http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html

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justify the alliance and reduce strategic friction. To the Chinese, the existence of the alliance has always been justified implicitly on the basis of the prevention of a potential Japanese resurgence i.e. the Japan threat, and the ability of the U.S.-Japan security alliance to act as a political latch on Japanese strategic and global ambitions. At the same time, there are Japanese who support the U.S.-Japan Security alliance to oppose the rise of China, but who are also at the same time proponents of anti-U.S. rhetoric. Their views are either not publicized in the United States or ignored by the U.S. administration. Many specialists in the United States elect to turn a blind eye to the rhetoric of these nationalists whose views and narratives largely coincide with those presented in the Yushukan,23 in the name of national interests. Ironically, tolerance of such views in the name of national exigencies, largely rooted in the postwar era, continues to be relevant to today’s East Asia as Japanese mainstream politics shift rightwards. Notwithstanding the above factors, there are concrete reasons to consider whether the U.S.-Japan alliance is to be as effective and as useful when it comes to real world operationalization with regards to any scenarios involving China. Even during the Bush-Koizumi era (arguably the two leaders most “in sync” with each other in recent U.S.-Japan relations history), there were marked differences with regards to how both Tokyo and Washington approached the alliance.24 The next section of the book begins with a chapter that surveys SinoJapanese relations past and present from a Chinese perspective. Jiang Lifeng, former director at the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, explains how the Chinese perceive the development of Japanese politics, economics and society in the short term and suggests ways forward for the future conduct of Sino-Japanese relations. Jiang’s paper is written from the viewpoint of an area specialist and focuses on analyzing the developmental trends in Japan as the Chinese see it. As such, the chapter is written purely from a Chinese point of view and while the recommendations might be seen as partial only to the Chinese cause, the paper is nonetheless a very frank and sincere attempt at grappling with the very difficult road ahead for China and Japan in the short-term. Chu Shulong’s chapter, on the other hand, takes on the subject matter from an International Relations perspective. His chapter on “U.S.-China23

A revisionist war museum located on the grounds of the Yasukuni Shrine. Mochizuki, M., Strategic Thinking Under Bush and Koizumi: Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2003, pp 94-96; also see Reinhard Drifte, Japan's Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning?, (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 24

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Japan Trilateral Relations in Asia” examines the question of the United States’ role between China and Japan taking a holistic perspective. In particular, Chu argues that the relationship between China, Japan and the United States is both the foundation of peace and stability in East Asia but also the major source of strategic conflicts in the region. What Asia will become in future depends very much on these three countries and their relationships. The early decades of the 21st century are an era of dynamic change for China and Japan as well as the rest of Asia. The changes provide some opportunities but also pose significant challenges for all the countries in the region. Chu argues that to ensure that changes are going in the right direction, promoting peace and stability as well as managing the uncertainties caused by the dynamics, the U.S., China and Japan need a long-term stability mechanism to manage their relationships and regional issues. Liu Shilong, another esteemed scholar from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, focuses on the role of the United States in Sino-Japanese relations from 1969 onwards, evaluating its positive and negative influences on various aspects of the relationship. Liu makes the case that the impact of the U.S. on the Taiwan issue and the Diaoyu Islands issue between China and Japan has been largely negative. In the 1970s, US policy towards China had a positive impact on Sino-Japanese relations, but in the 1980s it played a less positive role, and in the early 1990s, the U.S. influence on Sino-Japanese relations was negative. In the early 21st century, the politically-cold Sino-Japanese relationship gave the United States a chance to play a positive role between China and Japan. Liu suggests that in the next decade, the United States might assume different roles in Sino-Japanese relations. The U.S. would probably play a negative role in the Taiwan issue in time to come, but on other issues such as the Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute, the United States would probably play a more positive role. Looking into the future, Liu argues that the U.S. factor in Sino-Japanese political relations will be more stable. The reason for this is that so long as there is enough room for Sino-Japanese relations to develop fully, the greatest dynamism will come, not from the external power of America, but from the two Asian neighbors themselves - China and Japan. Moving to the post-September 11 world, Yoneyuki Sugita surveys how the 9/11 attacks changed the way the United States managed its relations with the two Asian giants. Since 1945, the United States has not tolerated the existence of any hegemon in the East Asian region other than itself. Recently, however, Asian countries have begun to assert their autonomy and have formed pan-Asian organizations and forums such as ASEAN + 3 and the East Asian Summit which eschew U.S. involvement.

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The events of 9/11 acted as the springboard for the United States to develop what Sugita calls “Asian nexuses.” In order to manage the U.SJapan relationship, Washington used an “Iraq-Indian Ocean-North Korea” nexus. Japan reluctantly assisted the United States in Iraq and the Indian Ocean because it considered U.S. help vital for resolving issues concerning North Korea. Similarly, in its relationship with China, Washington took advantage of a “North Korea-Taiwan- China” nexus. The 9/11 attacks compelled the United States to focus its attention on Afghanistan and Iraq. Consequently, Washington asked Chinese President Hu Jintao to take the lead in organizing the six-power talks, which he accepted. In return, the United States supported China in its position regarding Taiwan. These Asian nexuses have strengthened U.S. bilateral ties with China and Japan, maintaining the former’s commitment and influence in Asia. The next section of the book focuses on the United States and its linkage to an extremely sensitive issue in Sino-Japanese Relations – Taiwan. Hoi-Yan Yau and Heung-Wah Wong examine the legacy of the Japanese colonial past by scrutinizing the cultural influences on Taiwanese identity and the implications for cross-straits relations. Yau and Wong chart the efforts of the U.S.-sponsored KMT government to ‘de-Japanize’ the Taiwanese people when they first came to the island in 1949. The KMT government adopted a globalization-cum-homogenization perspective in evaluating the cultural effects of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan. Yau and Wong argue that the KMT government was not completely correct because it was clear that the Taiwan people had, to an extent, resisted Japanese cultural homogenization. To be sure, resistance was not even; some Japanese cultural institutions were rejected, while others were welcomed by the Taiwanese people. By the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, we can even see the ‘resistance of culture’ through which some Taiwanese people tried to use the legacy of the Japanese colonial past as the cultural base for their own identity building, aiming at distancing their culture from Chinese culture. In the event, the legacy of the Japanese colonial past has become part of Taiwanese culture, marking the difference between Taiwanese and Chinese culture. Finally, Yau and Wong argue that such cultural separatism is further mediated by the Chinese concept of guojia (nation-state) and converted into a type of political separatism represented by Lee Teng-hui’s “two countries thesis” posing a major problem for cross-straits relations. Yau and Wong’s paper provides a glimpse of the cultural and ethnic politics that complicates Taiwanese domestic politics today. There is no question that the survival and growth of the American-backed KMT regime has had interesting

Contextualizing the United States in Sino-Japanese Relations

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implications for Taiwan’s continued development and in cross-straits affairs; but the Taiwan issue is taken seriously by Chinese analysts because of Japan’s sympathy for Taiwan. Due to this, Japan is often drawn into the U.S.-China debate on Taiwan unwittingly, even though Japan’s official position is to actually downplay her own relations with Taiwan. The question of Taiwan’s role in East Asian security is an important one. Chen Mu-Min argues that any thoughtful discussion of East Asian security must consider the centrality of China-Japan relations. What is easy to overlook, however, is the role of Taiwan in the power competition between China and Japan. Realists argue that a weaker state’s options include balancing (e.g. Taiwan aligning with Japan), bandwagoning (e.g. Taiwan leaning towards China) and neutrality. This chapter utilizes this framework to examine Taiwan’s relations with China and Japan in past decades, and attempts to answer the following questions: what are the motives behind Taiwanese leaders’ decisions to either seek an alliance with Japan or bandwagon with China? Does Taiwan play any role in the competition for power between China and Japan, or is its influence overstated? The article first introduces Taiwan’s three strategic options, followed by historical overviews of Taiwan-China and Taiwan-Japan relations, and the changes they have undergone since 2008. The balancing/bandwagoning model is then employed to offer explanations regarding Taiwan’s shift from tilting toward Japan to seeking reconciliation with China. This chapter also argues that political leaders in Taiwan are capable of altering relations with China and Japan, but find it difficult to please both heavyweight neighbors. Li Dajung offers an alternative perspective on the Taiwan issue in Sino-Japanese relations. Li’s chapter proffers some insights into the impact of the Ma Ying-Jeou’s mainland policy on the quadrilateral relations among the U.S., China, Japan, and Taiwan. This chapter argues that since 2008 the Ma administration has developed cross-strait ties and foreign policy in parallel. In terms of Taiwan’s traditionally most important trio of bilateral ties, the Ma administration can and should actively stabilize its respective relationships, positively and healthily promote cross-strait interactions, restore and repair mutual trust and cooperation between Taiwan and the United States, and work to establish special partnership relations between Taiwan and Japan on an unofficial basis. Li argues that in regional matters and with respect to cross-strait issues, moreover, Taiwan should not fall into the trap again of being seen as a ‘troublemaker’, but instead develop a forceful role as a regional peacemaker.

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In his chapter, Tsai Tseng-Jia, Director of National Chengchi University’s Institute of Japanese Studies, offers a sanguine analysis of the role of the United States and Japan in “Ma’s Cross Straits Policy towards China”. Tsai argues that since the Ma Government took office, it has adopted an active engagement policy toward China in contrast with the relatively passive posture taken by the DPP government in the previous eight years. Under the active engagement policy, the Ma government not only conducted a diplomatic truce with Beijing, opened up Taiwan to Chinese tourists and forged links in a comprehensive way, but also advocated a Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. Although this significantly reduced tensions with Beijing, the Ma government’s active engagement policy raised serious doubts from both American and Japanese government perspectives. In particular, Japan was concerned as to whether the Ma government’s new measures would change the previously longstanding policy of following the U.S.-Japan security alliance. As such, American and Japanese attitudes were the main force that recalibrated Ma’s mainland policy. In the meantime, the Ma Government began walking a tightrope on the Beijing-Tokyo-Washington triangular equilibrium. Yen Chen-Shen’s chapter entitled “Taiwan on the Backburner of United-States Relations with China” offers another take on Taiwan’s international relations within the framework of U.S.-China relations. Yen argues that the confrontational but isolationist approach adopted by President Chen Shui-bian was jettisoned in favor of a conciliatory one leading to a relaxation of cross-strait relations. Such a transformation was welcomed not just by Beijing but also produced a sigh of relief in Washington, D.C. At a time when the United States was trying to weather the financial storm and revitalize its economy, Washington needed Beijing’s cooperation in meeting challenges on many different fronts. Taiwan’s position of non-provocation of China, thereby not forcing the hands of Beijing and Washington to take action, would present a win-winwin situation for the triangular relations, allowing the three sides to all enjoy the fruits of a peaceful Taiwan Strait. However, this prompted concerns amongst others that Taiwan would be ignored and sacrificed as the US continues to strive for improvement of its relations with China. Thus, Yen argues that although Taiwan may have been dropped from the list of pressing issues in Washington’s bilateral relations with Beijing, it is nevertheless still on the stove, albeit on the back, rather than the front, burner. Beyond the question of Taiwan, the other extremely sensitive question in Sino-Japanese Relations is the question of how China and Japan will

Contextualizing the United States in Sino-Japanese Relations

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handle their maritime disputes – especially the Senkaku/ Diaoyutai islands. Zou Keyuan offers us some thoughts on developments in Sino-Japanese maritime relations and considers the legal implications therein. Maritime encounters and communications between China and Japan can be traced back several thousands of years. In recent years, the two countries developed their maritime relations in various ways, including inter alia, marine fishery management, joint marine scientific research and joint efforts in the protection of the marine environment. However, while there has been cooperation between the two sides in the maritime sector, tensions do exist. Both countries are keen to expand and maintain their rights and interests in their adjacent oceans. They both joined the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and accordingly enacted relevant laws governing the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf at the domestic level. The extension of national maritime zones inevitably caused tensions and conflicts between neighboring countries. The most salient maritime disputes between China and Japan rest with the East China Sea where the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are located. Considering the possibility of a settlement, Zou contrasts China’s ambivalence towards the use of international judicial mechanisms with Japan’s more active approach. Despite these differences, however, Zou concludes that a peaceful solution could be reached in the East China Sea. Tomoko Okagaki’s chapter, enticingly entitled “Ripe for the Revival of ‘Concert’?: The U.S. Approach to a New Regional Order in Northeast Asia”, raises an important question that affects the nature of U.S. foreign policy towards Sino-Japanese relations. After discussing how variables at different levels of analyses have shaped the way the U.S. has approached Northeast Asia since the end of WWII, Okagaki then assesses the nature of U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration in light of the circumstances that would enable a concerted, comprehensive approach to the solution of global problems among states. She argues that under the (first) Obama administration, there appeared to be a fortunate congruence among the direction in which the U.S. foreign policy, Sino-Japanese relations, and the international environment were moving. The U.S. administration was more selective and prudent in taking decisive diplomatic action, emphasizing multilateralism, negotiations and consultations with its partners. On the part of China and Japan, the two had recovered from the animosities that had prevailed in 2005, were rebuilding trust, and were becoming increasingly integrated into multilateral frameworks of regional and global cooperation. Okagaki argues that since 9/11, the need for global cooperation to meet new security threats has been shared among

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countries. The economic crisis also encouraged cooperation among great powers, rather than engaging in confrontation. The international environment, therefore, was ripe for the reemergence of an Asian-style “concert of Europe,” blending well with the nature of the new U.S. foreign policy, and that of regional politics. Under these circumstances, Okagaki considers the ways that the Obama administration might fine-tune its role, weighing and calibrating the capacity and willingness that China and Japan demonstrate in engaging in world affairs, which in turn would require both countries to articulate their respective policy stance vis-à-vis their bilateral relations as well as the nature of their standing in global security. Looking at the macro-picture of the United States’ global strategy, the multilateralism the United States is pursuing in Europe stands in stark contrast with the bilateral alliances that the United States is undertaking in Asia. These bilateral alliances render the United States very nervous about any groupings in Asia that exclude the Americans. 25 Through their diplomacy in Japan, the Americans have made it known that any regionalization plan that precludes the United States is doomed to failure – as demonstrated by Mahathir’s still-born East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) in the early 1990s. Yet making the U.S.-Japan Security an essential part of regionalization efforts might in the long run back-fire. Today, the ASEAN +3 formula is itself a reborn and repackaged version of Mahathir’s EAEC – and the fact that the proposal ostensibly emanated from ASEAN shows that the United States has very limited options to “contain” China. The United States can only be successful if the rest of the countries follow her lead, and this might not be likely. From a regionalization perspective, it is clear that during the last two decades, China, as opposed to Korea and Japan, has been most willing to facilitate Free Trade Agreements in the region. These FTAs will enlarge the Chinese-led Free Trade Zones to overshadow those of the Korea and Japanese FTAs. As economic rather than political integration is much easier to achieve, this puts China at the forefront of any regional integration exercise. Implicit in this is the influence of China in fostering the regionalization of the region as well as the exercise of leadership, especially in the economic sphere which has been the domain of the Japanese for almost fifty years. Rather than working with the Chinese to ensure that any form of regionalization does not exclude the United States, the United States encourages the Japanese to take on a leadership role and 25

Armacost, M.H. (2007), “The mismatch between Northeast Asian change and American distractions”, N.B.R Analysis, Vol.18 No.1, pp 5-12.

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supports Japan to vie with China in casting its vision for U.S.-Japan alliance. It asks the Japanese nation to support the LDP’s agenda of normalization under the “umbrella” of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, and posits that the Treaty has the ability to solve many ills. As Ming Wan notes, this itself is a contradiction as it effectively turns the U.S.-Japan Security alliance, traditionally suited for regional security problems (especially pertaining to Taiwan and North Korea), into one that is supposedly built for global problems.26 At the same time, this no doubt undermines any prospects for the United States to build a partnership with the Chinese which could truly be global in its influence. After all, China seeks to make with friends with regimes around that world that eschew contact with the Americans (and whom Americans balk at working with). As China’s economy grows, it is only a matter of time before the size of her economy gives China the clout to assist or deter the United States in shaping and regulating global financial and economic matters. In many aspects, China, not Japan, is the natural partner in matters of global governance – starting from climate change to financial regulation to even disaster relief. A true-blue Sino-U.S. alliance might actually help to alleviate the global burden that the United States is shouldering if the Americans were less bent on promoting the importance of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in the Asia-Pacific at the expense of Chinese national interests. One of the most important strategies that regional countries have undertaken to temper China’s and Japan’s geopolitik contestation is through the building of multilateral institutions and the propagation of regionalization. In the final chapter, Lee Chyungly addresses this important issue by examining the compatibility of East Asia and Asia-Pacific multilateralism. Lee argues that developments in Asia-Pacific multilateral diplomacy suggest patterns of multi-track policy communications from networks of think tanks to state summits. In terms of footprints, APEC and ARF are the major multilateral processes in Asia Pacific, while APT and EAS are two relatively new ASEAN-hubbed establishments in East Asia. In spite of their overlapping memberships and agendas, Asia Pacific and East Asia multilateralism seem hard to merge but are compatible. Balanced interests of geopolitical strategies among major regional security actors, including the U.S., China and Japan, are critical determinants in sustaining such compatibility. Japan holds membership in all these mechanisms. Lee analyzes Japan’s multilateral strategies in the region and 26

Ming Wan, “The United States, Japan and the European Union: Comparing Political Economy Approaches to China” The Pacific Review Vol. 20 No. 3, pp 397-421.

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their relevance to regional orders, and argues that elements of regional multilateralism suggest that the two common bases, that is, the ASEAN “informal” way of diplomacy, and the evolutionary way of institution building and economic integration, serve Japan’s strategic interests and thus explicate its founding memberships in all the major regional processes.

CHAPTER TWO THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN: BALANCER, ARBITRATOR AND LIMITS OF CHANGE VICTOR TEO

Today we have learned in the agony of war that great power involves great responsibility … We, as Americans, do not choose to deny our responsibility. Nor do we intend to abandon our determination that, within the lives of our children and our children's children, there will not be a third world war. We seek peace — enduring peace. More than an end to war, we want an end to the beginnings of all wars -- yes, an end to this brutal, inhuman, and thoroughly impractical method of settling the differences between governments. The once powerful, malignant Nazi state is crumbling; the Japanese war lords are receiving in their own homeland, the retribution for which they asked when they attacked Pearl Harbor. But the mere conquest of our enemies is not enough. We must go on to do all in our power to conquer the doubts and the fears, the ignorance and the greed, which made this horror possible. —Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1945

Preamble When asked to comment on the role of the United States in the AsiaPacific, the ubiquitous response given by analysts in Tokyo, Seoul or Bangkok is that the United States’ role underwrites the peace and stability of the region. This image of the United States as a security guarantor underpins the primary raison d’etre that many of her allies are willing to go beyond mere rhetoric to support the presence of the United States in the region. In Southeast Asia, smaller countries like Singapore, the Philippines and even Islamic Brunei have been vocal proponents; while in Northeast Asia, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan have been vocal proponents of the

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US presence.1 Ironically, some Chinese scholars also hold the same view, despite their opposition to US hegemony. Taiwan’s security, largely maintained by the Taiwan Relations Act passed in 1979, firmly commits the United States to Taiwan’s security and defense. Today, Taiwan’s independence and viability as an international actor is not only maintained by the 150 F-16s the United States sold to Taiwan in 1992 (with another 60 F-16s under negotiation), but also thrives on the continued support by the United States for Taiwan’s democratic evolvement and security posture. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, a domestic United States law that compels the United States government to come to the aid of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack, is still critical to the preservation of de-facto Taiwanese independence today. Singapore, described as “steadfast friends”2 by US officials, is one of those without a formal alliance with the United States. Based on a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1990, Singapore today hosts the Task Force CTF73, the Logistics Group Western Pacific of the United States Navy’s Seventh Fleet. The Changi Naval base, a strip of reclaimed land several times larger than the old Pulau Brani Naval base, was constructed to meet the growing needs of the Singaporean Navy, as well as fulfilling the larger logistical need of visiting US Naval vessels, including the Nimitz-Class aircraft carriers. In 2013, the United States will deploy four new "littoral combat ships" - smaller, surface vessels intended for operations close to shore and able to deploy quickly to crises in Singapore.3 South Korea is in the process of constructing a controversial new naval base for the South Korean Navy, ostensibly for the North Korean threat. Ironically, the base is situated on the idyllic Jeju Island, also known as an “Island of World Peace” that hosts a large number of UNESCO World Natural Heritage sites. 4 The South Korean government justifies that the base will bring 1

This comes at a time when Southeast Asia military spending is increasing exponentially. Jane’s Defense estimated that Southeast Asian countries have collectively increased spending by 13.5% in 2011 up to $24.5 billion. It is estimated this will rise up to $40 billion by 2016. For a detailed analysis of Southeast Asia security see, “Military Balance in Southeast Asia”, www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP11-79.pdf 2 Rumsfeld, Donald H. "Secretary Rumsfeld Remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies." 6 June 2004. 3 http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_singapore/view/1200582/1/.html 4 For a firsthand account of the activism on Jeju, see http://savejejuisland.org/Save_Jeju_Island/Welcome.html The protests have been prominently covered by the major broadsheets and media centers, for example, see

The United States between China and Japan

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more tourists and prosperity as well as a natural evolvement of defense capabilities - the base, however, seems to be part of the larger US grand strategy to contain China.5 More tellingly, the base located in Gangjeong village in Jeju is 490km away from Shanghai, 1030km north of Taipei and about 1600km away from the Russian city of Vladivostok that lies near the DPRK-Russia border. It is, however, the US-Japan Security alliance that is the cornerstone of the US strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific. In the minds of most Asian policymakers, defense planners and diplomats, an Asia-Pacific without the US 7th fleet is almost unfathomable even as the defense spending of Asian countries has increased many times over the last few decades. Japan not only hosts approximately 10,000 U.S. Military personnel, it also pays for more than seventy-five percent of the costs of United States deployment.6 Former Vice-President Dick Cheney has acknowledged that it is cheaper for the United States to host these personnel in Japan than it would be in the United States. 7 The idea of the United States acting as the principal guarantor of peace and stability is a concept that has only come to be ‘naturalized’ as part of the strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War. This should not come as a surprise to anybody, for it is a unique result of historical forces over the last six decades coinciding with the geopolitical realities of the tempestuous 21st century politics. The political narratives and strategic discourses on why the United States occupies such an important position, however, go beyond just mere historical coincidence. Smaller countries such as Singapore, Thailand, and even Malaysia all profess to the maintenance of a partnership with the United States by choice. Middle-sized powers in East and Southeast Asia also appear to have this preference – South Korea, Indonesia and even Vietnam all seemed to have reached out and engaged with the United States. To these http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/19/world/asia/19base.html?pagewanted=all 5 The planned facility will be home to US and South Korean Naval vessels and a sea-based ballistic missile defense system call the Aegis. See http://www.japantoday.com/category/commentary/view/planned-naval-base-onjeju-island-has-security-implications-for-asia 6 The Japanese however would downplay this figure for the domestic audience and normal figures cited by Japanese scholars and bureaucrats would be around 30%40%. This ambiguity appears to be maintained so that the alliance could be “sold” more easily to the domestic constituents in both the United States and Japan. 7 See Council on Foreign Relations report “A Strategy for US-Japan Alliance”, http://www.cfr.org/japan/strategy-us-japan-alliance/p28010

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countries, the idea of having to accommodate a hegemon among all the potential candidates – the U.S., China, and Japan – is hardly a palatable choice. Nonetheless, given the realpolitik considerations – most if not all the countries in the region prefer the United States to remain in the region as it is the most “benign” of all great power candidates. The very stark reality that the United States is currently the sole superpower in the world should of course not be discounted – by any indicators of comprehensive national strength, the U.S stands head and shoulders above her closest competitors for pre-eminence. However, very often, it is suggested that countries do not bandwagon with the United States because of its strength, but because of its perceived ideology and its inherent character. The leadership that the United States exhibits in the region today is therefore a curious case. Even as late as the 1980s, even as Japan then was well regarded as one of the leading economic powers in the world, the bulk of the literature on International Relations in Asia-Pacific showed an inherent bias on Cold War realpolitik, focusing on the US-USSR-PRC strategic triangle. Japan’s role was often under-estimated, as she has always been regarded as United States’ junior with little or no autonomy in her foreign relations. Scholars also point to the asymmetrical nature of their relationship, arguing that the United States and Japan enjoy a much closer relationship than does China with Japan or with the United States. Yet, this “natural” state of affairs that we are so familiar with has only been a relatively recent phenomenon in the history of relations between the three countries. The current role of the United States as a hegemon, as a balancer and a final arbitrator of security in the Asia-Pacific is very different from its role the 19th and 20th centuries. How exactly did this role come about? Secondly, why is it that the United States today stands as the single most important country in China and Japan’s foreign policy agenda to the extent that the development of their foreign relations in almost all respects, in particular Sino-Japanese relations, seems to be contingent on their respective relationship with the United States? From history to security, from the Taiwan issue to UN reforms, it would appear that the United States plays an irreducibly important role in influencing China’s and Japan’s foreign relations. How exactly does the United States affect China and Japan, and in return, how do Sino-Japanese relations affect US strategy in East Asia?

The United States between China and Japan

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Of Fur Pelts, Missionaries and Adventurers: The Arrival of the Americans The United States played a very different role in 18th and 19th century Asia from its role today. Among the Western powers, the United States was the last to arrive in Asia. The Portuguese, Spanish, the Dutch and the French were way ahead in terms of their colonization projects.8 Having fought the American War of Independence against the British (1775-1783) and the Civil War of the 1860s, the United States spent most of the 19th century expanding and consolidating its political form over the modern continental United States. As a nascent nation, the United States had an interest in foreign affairs, and what little experience she had was concentrated in negotiating with the British, Spanish and Russians over the territorial boundaries within the continental United States. The arrival of the Americans in China and Japan far predated any “official” delegation that the United States government might have sent. Jonathan Spence documents in his book that for some three hundred years from the mid-17th century onwards, there were a number of Western advisors who put their knowledge and skills at the disposal of the Chinese. This included astronomers, soldiers, doctors, translators and engineers whose experiences have a similar continuity today. 9 8

The Portuguese had established trading posts in Malacca (1511), Macau (1514) and Timor (1515). Spain colonized Cebu (1565) and Manila (1571). The Dutch were established in Malacca (1641), and Great Britain’s presence was established via the Straits Settlements of Penang (1786), Singapore (1819) and Malacca (1824). The French were established in Indochina from 1858 onwards, and Germany gained possessions in New Guinea from 1884. After the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, the first five Treaty ports were established by the British in Shanghai, Canton, Ningpo, Fuzhou and Amoy, with Hong Kong ceded in “perpetuity” to the United Kingdom as well. The United States established a presence in Shanghai’s International Settlement (1842), in Guangxi’s Behai (1876), in Tianjin (1876) in Hebei and Harbin (1898) in Heilongjiang province. Even the Prussians (present day Germans) were able to capitalize upon colonizing the Southern Pacific Islands (such as Samoa, Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Mariana Islands) until the end of the World War I when Japan seized her colonies in Micronesia and concessions in China. 9 For a superb work on the roles various Americans have in China, see Jonathan Spence, To Change China: Western Advisers in China (Boston, Little Brown & Company, 1969). Spence documents the following Americans in China: Elijah Bridgman (circa 1830) was the first American missionary in China. Peter Parker (born 1804 in Massachusetts) worked as a doctor and a missionary in China from

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Ironically, it was the independence from Great Britain that compelled the Americans to turn their attention to the Pacific. As the eminent power prior to the 19th century, Britain’s empire and interests stretched across the world, overshadowing the achievements of the Portuguese and Spanish explorations in the 15th and 16th centuries. The loss of the thirteen British colonies in North America to form the United States was probably the biggest setback to the British Empire in 1776. 10 The British, however, were still powerful enough to ensure that control of their global possessions and territories remained firmly in her orbit. Correspondingly, this also meant that she was capable of denying the United States’ entrance as a strategic and economic player in these areas and although Britain resumed trade with the United States, their trade imbalance caused a 1834 (See Spence pp. 33-55). Frederick Townsend Ward, (born 1931 in Massachusetts) was an adventurer who arrived in Shanghai in 1859 who managed an anti-Taiping Army funded by Shanghai merchants, acting as a de-facto mercenary commander, who was later arrested by Admiral Hope for violating the Allied neutrality in the Civil War agreement. He later recruited and trained Chinese soldiers, and his force was named the “Ever-Victorious Army” by the Chinese government, auxiliary to the British, French and Qing troops against the Taipings. Ward was assisted by another American, Henry Andres Burgevine, who was appointed to the Command of Qing official Li Hungchang (See Spence, pp 57-80). William Alexander Parsons Martin (born Indiana, 1827) attempted to introduce western Science, Mathematics and Technology (and also Christianity) and subsequently trained many of China’s translators and officials to the West. He was subsequently incorporated as a mandarin by the Tsungli Yamen and in 1885 rose to a Second Rank official in Chinese official hierarchy. (See Spence, pp129-140); Horace Pitkin, an American missionary from Yale College class of 1892, was beheaded by Boxers. His fellow Alumna from Yale, Edward Hume, a doctor trained at John Hopkins, arrived in 1905 to do “God’s work” through Yale-inChina’s hope to set up a medical school, and struggled to keep the hospital going through the Warlord years of the Republican China era (See Spence, pp161-183); O. J. Todd, an American civil engineer who travelled to China in 1919, worked in Shantung, Hubei to fight the scourges of famine and flood amidst the turbulence of Chinese politics. He also oversaw the construction of a modern railway system for China (See Spence pp 205-216); Claire Chennault and Joseph Stilwell were two prominent Americans who worked for China in her War against Japan. Chennault and Stilwell were both tasked by the Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek to serve and lead different segments of the Chinese Army. See Spence, p 293 onwards ) 10 The States were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.

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massive gold shortage within the US as Britain maintained a huge deficit with its former colony. The economic difficulties meant that the United States had to look east for increasing trade opportunities. Merchants operating out of the East Coast in Salem, New York and Boston, Massachusetts were the first to sail to China and engage in what is known as the Canton Trade System in the 1780s.11 12 It was, however, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars that helped propel Americans to commercial success, as British Warships kept the French and French-allied merchants at bay, and neutral traders took their place from 1793 till 1812 onwards.13 The American merchants like their Russian counterparts (who before 1780s were the only ones) sold pelts to the Chinese. This was among the documented cargo (together with ginseng, fish, sandalwood and rum among other things) on The Empress of China and The Columbia, one of the earliest vessels to sail to China.14 Like their European counterparts, the American merchants soon ran a profitable trade plying a triangular route between the West, China (Macau-Canton) and Dejima in Nagasaki in Japan. Likewise, the earliest American presence in Japan predated “official” US-Japan interactions. Shoji Mitarai speaks of the arrival of two Americans 11 The Canton Trade system basically restricted foreign (western) merchants to Southern China, specifically to Macau. Generally, foreigners were restricted to certain ports which they could trade with the Chinese trade associations, known as Cohong during the trading season, but were to remain in Macau during the off season. The corruption, rampant smuggling, the need of trade expansion and the inefficient management as well as the British need for profits eventually saw the collapse of the system to be replaced by the Treaty Port System. See Paul Van Dyke, The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700-1845 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007); also see pp 1-18 in particular; also see Paul Van Dyke, Merchants of Canton and Macao (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2011). Van Dyke’s volumes are extremely rich in empirical descriptions and could be considered as the leading work on Chinese trade during the 18th and 19th centuries. 12 For an interesting graphic account, see Peter Purdue’s visual essay at http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/rise_fall_canton_01/pdf/cw_essay.pdf 13 James Fichter, So Great a Proffit: How the East Indies Trade Transformed Anglo-American Capitalism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2010) 14 Ibid, pp47-55; also p218; The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign has a teaching website whereby the details of the trade routes and the cargos of the American merchant vessels are laid out in detail. See http://teachingresources.atlas.uiuc.edu/chinatrade/resources/resource1_4.pdf

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in Osaka six decades before the Perry Expedition.15 This was more a result of coincidence than deliberate action. Led by Captain John Kendrick of Massachusetts, the expedition was funded by American businessmen and prominent politicians such as Thomas Jefferson and George Washington, with the former being particularly keen to build the shortest and most direct trade route to China, even before the Lewis and Clark expedition. John Kendrick arrived in Japan in May 1790 with the dual aim of trading in furs and exploration, but was met with a hostile reception from the Japanese Samurais. 16 This was not surprising, given how little the Japanese knew of the Americans. John Dower describes the earliest Japanese graphic portrayal of Americans in the 17th century as “humans with multiple arms and legs, people with huge holes running through their upper bodies, semi-human creatures feathered head to toe like birds”.17 During the Napoleonic War, due to conflicts with Britain as well as with the Sakakou policy in place, American vessels had been known to fly the Dutch flag when they entered the Nagasaki harbor to trade at Dejima. Dower notes that “in 1837, the unarmed trading ship Morrison had approached Uraga on a private mission to promote not only trade but also ‘the glory of God in the salvation of thirty-five million souls’ and was fired upon repeatedly at Uraga and again at Kagoshima on the Southern tip 15

See Mitarai, Shoji, An Exploration of the History of Cross-cultural Negotiation: The First U.S.-Japan Trade Negotiation before Commodore Perry's Arrival. IACM 17th Annual Conference Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=602701 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.602701. Kendrick led the US Ships Lady Washington and Grace (captained by William Douglas) entered into a Japan harbor near Kii Peninsula (near Osaka) at Oshima Island to obtain shelter from a storm 6 May1791. Whilst at the harbor, they tried to open negotiations to trade. This violated the Japanese Law of Seclusion and Tokugawa government. Kendricks’ attempt was ultimately unsuccessful, and they left two notes, one written in English and one in Chinese for the Japanese. Also see Mutarai, Shojim Kurofene izen: Amerika no Tainichi Seisaku wa Soko Kara Hajimatta (Before the Blackships: the Origins of U.S. Foreign Policy and Negotiations towards Japan) Tokyo, Daiichi Shobo, 1994. 16 See Donald Dalton Johnson and Gary Dean Best, The United States in the Pacific: Private Interests and Public Policies 1784-1899 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing, 1995), pp 22-25 on the state of the initial contacts; also see Scott Ridley, Morning of Fire: John Kendricks Daring American Odyssey in the Pacific (New York: William Morrow, 2010). 17 John Dower, Black Ships and Samurai: Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan (1853-1854), published by MIT at http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/ black_ships_and_samurai/bss_essay01.html

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of Kyushu”.18 In 1845, the crew of Manhattan, a whale ship that rescued 22 shipwrecked sailors at Bonin Islands (Ogasawara group of islands), were allowed to return the natives to Japan but were rebuffed from further contact and told never to return. In 1846, there was another expedition led by Commodore Biddle whose request for license to trade was rebuffed – as the Japanese would only trade with the Dutch. By Commodore Perry’s account, the USS Preble under Commander Glynn arrived in 1849 to secure the release of 16 sailors imprisoned by Japan, and succeeded despite the Japanese show of force in Nagasaki Harbor.19

The Genesis of the United States as an “Asiatic Power” The end of the Mexican-American War in 1846 and the incorporation of California as the 31st state of the United States in 1850 heralded in a new age for the United States. The absorption of the landmass on the West coast spurred the United States to perceive herself not only as a Pacific power but consequently formed the basis of her rise as a global power. Her relations with Asia, in particular Japan and China, drove the United States’ unprecedented rise. 20 Contextualized against this, the United States’ “official” entry into the Asian political landscape was therefore prompted by a combination of geopolitical realities and economic opportunism infused with visions of colonial grandeur. Three separate but interrelated events in the latter half of the 19th century set the tone for the staying power of the United States in Asia: the breakdown of the Canton Trade system and the signing of Treaty of Wangxia in 1844; the opening of Japan to the United States in 1853 and the transfer of the Philippines to United States rule after the defeat of Spain in 1898.21 From the beginning, the United States did not appear to have a coherent strategy in Asia, evidenced by the domestic debates on how the United States changed its

18

Ibid Perry, C.M. Narrative of the Expedition to the China Seas and Japan, 1852-1854, (First edition 1856) (New York, Dover Publications Inc, 2000).,pp 47-49 20 See Bruce Cummings, Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) 21 The final event that precipitated the entrenchment of the United States in Asia was the 1898 US-Spanish War over Cuba. Consequently her victory deprived the Spaniards of their possession of the Philippines for a mere $20 million. By 1902, the United States government had replaced the military authority in the Philippines, with Taft becoming the first governor in United State’s first Asian colony. 19

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mind about the colonization of the Philippines many times.22 Collectively, these events provided the United States with the opportunity to lay claim as an “Asian” power, and provided the eventual stage for her intervention in regional events in the Western Pacific, in both East and Southeast Asia. The Canton Trade system had been in place since 1757 until the 1842 Opium War. Instituted as the principal system by which the Qing officials regulated trade with foreigners, it also served as a system to minimize their interaction with Chinese civilians. The Canton Trade system only allowed the foreign (principally European) traders to engage with the authorized Chinese merchant houses known as the Cohong and confined their offseason residence to Macau. The system broke down for a variety of reasons – corruption, rampant smuggling as well as the determination of the imperial powers to replace it with the Treaty Port system. With the establishment of the Treaty of Wangxia in 1844, the Americans effectively “piggy-backed” on British imperial policy and established their own sphere of influence in China. The Treaty of Wangxia saw the establishment of extra-territoriality, secured the right to buy land in five treaty ports, and the bestowment upon the United States the most favored nation status. This treaty closely mirrored that of the Treaty of Nanking signed by the British. In the next decade or so, the United States would cast their gaze further out across the East China Sea to Japan. The administration of President Filmore (1850-1853) initiated what was then considered the largest expedition to Japan for a combination of reasons.23 First, the annexation of California marked a new milestone for the young nation, and rendered it a continental power with access to both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This provided a natural impetus for the United States to try and explore trade with Western Pacific nations from both the Pacific and Atlantic coasts.24 Second, the United States realized that, by and large, the British, the Dutch and other colonial powers had already taken stakes in the various strategic points in Asia, and Japan provided the frontier territory for the United States to try and gain a foothold in the world of imperial trade. Third, Japan’s location provided an attractive location for the United States to secure a constant supply of coal for her steamships plying the sea routes, and more importantly, Japan’s acquiescence in protection of shipwrecked Americans on whaling 22

Roy Watson Curry, “Woodrow Wilson and Philippine Policy” in The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol 41, No 3, (Dec 1954) p 435-452, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1897492 (accessed 30 June 2011) 23 Perry (2002), pp3-80 24 Ibid., Chapters 1, 12-14 and Chapters 19-15

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expeditions became an item of interest – given the experiences of previous Japanese sailors who have been shipwrecked there. The United States’ attempt to send an expedition to Japan cannot be viewed in isolation from the world events of that era and from her diplomacy with the other colonial powers, especially with Great Britain. Additionally, American interests were increasingly being threatened by revolutions and upheavals in China – starting from the Taiping Rebellion 25 through to the Boxer Rebellion. It was becoming clear she was prevented from participating fully in the division and partaking of Chinese cities as colonial prizes like the other Western powers, principally the British. Commodore Perry’s expedition to Japan in 1853 was therefore undertaken with the aim of shoring up the United States’ power and position in East Asia. What began as a primarily economic diplomatic mission to “open” up Japan began to take on a strategic dimension where the mission objectives also included the securing and protection of American merchants in China. Practicing what amounted to gunboat diplomacy, the United States employed methods used by her Western colleagues to force Japan to open up her ports to trade. With the signing of the Kanagawa Convention (also known as the Treaty of Peace and Amity) in 1854, 26 the United States spearheaded the opening of Japan, repeating what the British did with China at the end of the Opium War in 1843. In 1858, the United States compelled Tokugawa Japan to open up further the Treaty of Amity and Commerce. Consequently, Treaty ports with extraterritoriality at Kanagawa, Kobe, Nagasaki, Niigita and Hakodate were established, and opened to US citizens to live and trade. Japan subsequently signed similar treaties with the Netherlands, Russia, Great Britain and France shortly thereafter.27 If the Treaty of Wangxia (1844) and the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (1858) were the principal instruments by which the Americans established a foothold in China and Japan, it is her colonization of the Philippines that strengthened her presence in Asia. Today, the US colonization of the Philippines has always 25

Ibid This convention allowed US Coaling rights and the establishment of a US Consul in Shimoda. Interestingly, the date is being celebrated today in Shimoda and in Japan as the date of the establishment of US-Japan Diplomatic Relations. See http://nagoya.usconsulate.gov/wwwhn-20090516-bs.html 27 This, however, is where the similarity between China and Japan stopped insofar as the forcible opening is concerned. While the opening up by force forced both the Qing regime and Tokugawa (later Meiji) elites to undertake reforms, the outcome was very different. 26

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been presented as an “accidental” consequence of the US-Spanish war. This, however, is not exactly true. An important motivation behind the United States’ maneuvers in the Philippines had to do with the development within Sino-Japanese relations. Given China’s loss to Japan during the 1895 Sino-Japanese War and in reaction to Japan’s apparent ambitions then, President McKinley had thought that the colonization of the Philippines would strengthen the American position in Asia. Consequently, he ordered Commodore Dewey’s squadron anchored off Hong Kong to prepare for an attack on Manila, which paved the way for an entrenched American position in Asia. 28 In retrospect, from the mid-19th century onwards, the United States played an increasingly interventionist role in China and Japan. The “Asia strategy” of the United States was certainly conflicted and ambivalent. On the one hand, the Americans were themselves mindful of their colonial past and the idealism that infused their moral conscience meant that a considerable number of elites found colonial projects an aberrance, but this was countered by the youthful ambition of a young nation in an international system where imperialism and colonialism were the norm, not the exception. As with all colonial powers, this imperialistic mission was often guised in the language of Christian proselytisation, where the intervention was propagated as part of a divine mission to “civilize” the non-Anglo-Saxons. During that period, it was difficult to separate the intent and the action of private individuals and governmental officials for a number of simple reasons. First, private individuals often took on some sort of quasigovernmental or advisory role, and second, government officials often sought their support, consent and expertise because of their linguistic skills, local knowledge and connections. Missionaries, for example, were often at the forefront of these civilizing efforts even though for the most part they were not directly commissioned by the State. The missionaries vehemently protested against the importation of the Opium and the initial American policy was also explicitly against it. However, as opium proved to be immensely profitable, and given that some American officials were reportedly involved in the trade themselves at the time of implementation of the Treaty of Tianjin, the reality and stated policy were quite different.29 28

Arthur Cotterell, Western Power in Asia: Its Slow Rise and Swift Fall, 1415-1999, Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia), 2009: pg. 107-156 29 Michael Lazich, “American Missionaries and the Opium Trade in the NineteethCentury China,” Journal of World History Vol 17. No 2 (June 2006), pp 197-223.

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In truth, the United States, like any nation-state, was merely acting in maximizing her economic interests, in this case in East Asia. The United States did not “intervene” in China to help her to modernize nor did she “force” Japan to open up to “offer” her friendship and peace. The United States was simply a late arrival in East Asia in an attempt to extract lucrative economic benefits. In a nutshell, she was no different from the European imperial powers during this age of empire, and her interests in China and Japan were every bit as self-interested as those of the European powers.

Bringing Modernity to China and Japan: Unintended Consequences for Sino-Japanese Relations The role of the United States (and other Western powers) in their contact with East Asia is not entirely negative. The arrival of the Western powers, including the United States, was one of the primary external stimuli that compelled both the Chinese and Japanese elites to emulate them by undertaking reforms and modernization, and this has had tremendous implications for their bilateral relations. At the turn of the 19th century, Sino-Japanese relations had never been subjected to the intervention or consideration of third parties until this period, nor were their relations “equal” in the Westphalian sense of the word. Until then, China had always considered Japan to be one of the Asian countries under the Sino-centric sphere of influence. From the Japanese perspective, even though the Japanese had always maintained that they had been independent and sovereign through Japan’s diplomatic dealings from the 9th century onwards, it was not entirely clear if they (the Japanese) had given the Chinese the same message or if the Chinese received and/or understood it properly. The arrival of the West and the forcible opening of China and Japan had demonstrative efforts for Japan – for it heralded a period where the Japanese mindset underwent a complete and thorough shift. For both elites in China and Japan, they saw that modern (Western) science triumphed over the study of Confucian classics, and the application of technology and knowledge to their political, economic and social structures as well as military meant a fundamental re-orientation in their bilateral relations. Relations between China and Japan arguably underwent the greatest transformation over the hundred years from the 1840s to the 1940s. By the time the 1868 Meiji Restoration was in place, Japan had successively replaced her entire political-economic system, effectively transforming

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feudal Japan into a Westphalian nation-state. Japan, under the leadership of Ito Hirobumi,30 adopted a Constitution and a legal framework based on the Prussian model and transformed from a semi-feudal decentralized state into a modern Constitutional Monarchy, restoring the Meiji Emperor as the spiritual head of State where the oligarchy of genros (elders) would hold power in his name. The United States, together with Great Britain, was instrumental in the introduction of Western products and ideas outside the remit of the traditional Dutch and Portuguese trade circles. The former had a more important role as the Perry missions gave the Meiji Japanese a demonstration of modern gunboat diplomacy 31 , which the Japanese themselves put to good use in their subsequent wars. More importantly, it introduced, if not reinforced, among the Japanese elites, the ideas of Western governance and statehood – the persuasive and binding powers of a written Constitution32; the impartiality of coded justice; the distinct yet interrelated spheres of foreign and domestic foreign policy and most importantly, the idea that the destiny of modern nation-states is not predestined. This is perhaps far more significant and important than the “hardware” elements that many historical textbooks stress – e.g. in terms of industrial, military and naval technology such as improvements in cannon and artillery arsenals and steam-engine technology.33 Admittedly, 30 Ito Hirobumi was a Samurai in his youth before becoming one of the leading intellectuals and a politician in Meiji Japan. He was four times Prime Minister of Japan and also served as the first Resident General of Korea. Hirobumi studied at the University College London in 1863 (one of the Chosu Five) and in 1870 he went to United States to study the western currency system. In 1871, he was named as member of the Iwakura Mission to Washington, D.C. Hirobumi was subsequently assassinated by Korean nationalist An Jung-Guen. 31 Perry, pp 343 – 490; pp 500 -512 32 W. G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan (New York: St. Martin’s, 1990), p 7980; Ito Hirobumi apparently found the United States Constitution too liberal and instead chose to model the Meiji Constitution on the Prusso-German model. Please also see New York Times article describing the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889 http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9B00E5 D6143BE533A25750C1A9649C94619ED7CF 33 Richard Samuels in his seminal “Rich Nation, Strong Army” details the early stages of Japanese military modernization and how Japan sent delegations to Germany, Britain and the United States to learn about steam turbine engines and other sciences such as aeronautical studies. This, in turn, provided the Japanese with the basis for modernization which ironically was used in both the First and Second World Wars - See Richard Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army”, National

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not all the ideas and technology came from the United States. 34 The Japanese also borrowed fervently from Great Britain and Germany. Nonetheless, it maybe surmised that the opening of Japan by the United States was instrumental in the change of heart on the part of the Japanese elites, ironically, to preserve age-old Japanese ideals and traditions. There is no question that this process of modernization has had tremendous unintended consequences on Sino-Japanese relations. The rapid modernization of Japan, coupled with the cosmetic reforms instituted in China, meant that the traditional method of their engagement had largely been eroded. It also meant a leveling of the power relations between them, and certainly a rapid erosion of the cordiality and goodwill that existed between China and Japan in previous eras. The China experience confirmed sentiments that the Japanese have longed harbored – that there was nothing inherent in China’s system as superior or invincible and most importantly pre-ordained, and that through national unity, farsighted aspiration and skillful statecraft, it was entirely possible for a nation to become rich and powerful (fukuoku kyohei).35 36 The success of Japan in her modernization project is most manifested in her management of Sino-Japanese relations, seeking to reverse the hierarchy found in the Sino-centric system that has been so entrenched in East Asia since time Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp 84-107 34 Eizaburo Okuizumi, Japanese Studies librarian at the University of Chicago provides an interesting list of Japanese elites who have visited or trained in the United States, see “Famous Japanese Individuals to Visit Chicago in the Late 19th and early 20th Centuries: From Unknown Students to Distinguished Prime Ministers”, see https://ojs.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/JEAL/article/view/8675/8324; Kuroda Kiyotaka (1840-1900) from the Satsuma Domain (currently Kagoshima Prefecture) studied at the University of Michigan and later became President of the Imperial University of Tokyo. Kuroda invited General Horace Capron to assist in the development of Hokkaido and persuaded the Meiji government to allow promising young ladies to study in the United States. Kuroda became the 2nd Prime Minister of Japan. Takahashi Korekiyo (1854-1936) from Tokugawa Shogunate visited the US but was conscripted into forced slavery for a year. Like Kuroda before him he returned to the US and visited the Mercantile Exchange and Stockyard and became the first chief of the Patent office and a respected economist. In 1921, Takahashi became the Prime Minister of Japan. 35 See Samuels (1994), Chapter 1 and 2 for a conceptual discussion of linkages between national security and technological transformation of Japan. 36 This concept is also discussed at length in W.G. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp 350-378

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immemorial. Japan became increasingly aggressive in the affairs of Korea, and by the late 1880s various political factions in Korea began to align themselves with the Russians, Japanese and Chinese in their power struggles, paving the way for external intervention in the Peninsula. The Donghak Rebellion in Korea essentially broke the uneasy truce put in place by the Li-Ito Convention in 1885, and saw the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895. With the defeat of the Chinese and the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan annexed Formosa (Taiwan) directly and the Liaotung Peninsula (Manchuria) and had China declare that Korea was an independent nation (i.e. no longer under the Chinese sphere of influence). China also had to pay a total of 200 million taels and open Chongqing, Suzhou, Hangzhou and Jingzhou to Japan as Treaty Ports. As Paine so eloquently notes: China’s pretenses of military power [had] been shattered. To present day, China has yet to recapture its position as a major naval power that it forfeited by defeat in this war. This war was a turning point for China. The war shattered any basis for China’s tenacious sense of unbreachable superiority and forced a Chinese reappraisal of their place in the world. Defeat by Japan, a member of the Confucian world, did this more decisively than any Western defeat, including those in the Opium Wars, ever did or ever could. This was because defeat at the hands of an alien civilization could be discounted whereas defeat by a member of the Confucian order could not. Equally shattered were any vestiges of political stability in China. Victory by a transformed former member of the Confucian order fatally undermined the legitimacy of the order.37

The repercussions of this War were a lot more significant than what is frequently assumed – it decisively undermined the legitimacy of the Qing regime, it drove the Korean elites to align with Czarist Russia, paving the way for the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. In effect, the 1895 SinoJapanese War materialized the presence of a strategic vacuum in East Asia, and insofar as the United States was concerned, the overall effect was to heighten the uncertainty and insecurity of her bilateral relations with Japan. The consequent defeat of Russia allowed Japan to compete for dominance of the Korean Peninsula and, with the signing of the 1910 Japan-Korean Annexation Treaty, this signaled the consolidation of Japan as the preeminent power in East Asia. Japan’s precise emulation of the ways of 37

S.C.M Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power and Primacy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) pp 4-5

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the West, specifically of Great Britain, Germany and the United States, sent shockwaves through the Western powers. It also elevated the hopes of many nationalists in China who were truly inspired by Japan’s rise even though her predatory behavior had become the focal point of Chinese and Korean nationalism. The United States was perturbed by the rise of Japan and Russia, and by their policies in China. In order to preserve her own interests in China, the United States advocated the “Open Door” policy. First advocated by the Secretary of State John Hay in 1898, the notes were sent to France, Germany, Britain, Italy and Russia asking them to formally declare that they would uphold the territorial and administrative integrity of China and allow unimpeded access to the Treaty Ports in their sphere of influence in China. By the turn of the century, Russian encroachment in Manchuria after the Boxer Rebellion as well as the increased dominance of Britain increased the strategic anxiety of the United States.38 Consequently, the United States supported Japan in the Russo-Japanese War. The most desirable outcome for America would have been a greatly exhausted and weakened Japan and Russia, but unfortunately this was not to be the case. The United States intervened to bring about peace talks in order to ensure that her interests were met. 39 Unfortunately, the decisive victory of the Japanese brought about unforeseen consequences that brought US-Japan relations into gradual confrontation as an increasing number of Americans regarded a strong Japan as a threat to American interests in East Asia, particularly the Philippines. In 1907, President Roosevelt once again ordered the US Navy to study the reasons for the Japanese victory, and subsequently ordered more battleships for the Great White Fleet, and upon its completion sent it to the Pacific Ocean to demonstrate to Japan America’s naval power for demonstrative and deterrence purposes.40 For the first time, both rising powers recognized each other to be a threat and set the course of their relations on a path of slow deterioration, and this threat perception continued through the Taft (1909-1913) and 38 The United States used a portion of the reparations from the Boxer Rebellion to sponsor Chinese students in the United States and founded Tsinghua University. In this sense, the Americans’ role appears more “noble” than most of her European contemporaries. See http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/then/5779/index.html 39 Tal Tory and Sharon Halevi, “America’s first Cold War: The Emergence of a New Rivalry”, The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, ed. Rotem Kowner (London: Routledge 2007), p140 40 Ibid., p145-146

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Wilson administrations (1913-1921).41 By this time, the United States had evolved from being a neutral observer to a worried collaborator, and Japan had grown to become both a formidable competitor as well as an ally. How Japan perceived the First World War was remarkably very different from how the Americans saw it even though both the Japanese and the Americans were fighting alongside the Allies. Insofar as the Japanese are concerned, the Great War (as the First World War was then known) was seen as the perfect occasion to redefine the nation, and in this sense provided the perfect context and opportunity to reframe her imperialism in China as both necessary and evident to her international status. The domestic discourse in Japan just prior to the First World War focused on the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and also the prospect of a “race war” against the Western powers. In the eyes of these Japanese elites, intimate co-operation with China (read complete hegemony in China) was the only way to check the fastest growing power in East Asia – the United States. 42 It required Japan to not only participate fully in international affairs but also exact concessions that would enhance her stature in the eyes of the Western powers. For Japan, being “equal” to the Western powers was all important and anything less was unacceptable as it smacks of “racism”. As such, Japan seized the German Concessions in Shandong Province in 1914 and the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands in the Pacific and exacted the 21 Demands to China in 1915. She also participated in the Allied Expeditionary force to Siberia in 1918 following the defeat of Czarist Russia at the hands of the Bolsheviks. The Open Door policy was further eroded when the United States and Japan entered into what is now known as the 1917 Lansing-Ishii agreement, recognizing that Japan, by virtue of her geographical location, had special rights in Manchuria. In 1922, the Washington Conference Treaty abrogated this agreement, and Japan was forced to return the concessions she had seized from Germany back to China. Two years later in 1924, the passage of the Japanese Exclusion Act in the United States provoked a sustained and hostile reaction in Japan, probably not because of the exclusion itself, but rather that the Japanese were regarded as similar to other Northeast Asians (e.g. Chinese and Koreans) who were subjected to the same treatment.43 From Japan’s perspective, the “Open 41

Ibid., p143 Frederick R. Dickinson, War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914-1919 (Massachusetts, Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), pp80-81 43 This reminds us of the anti-American boycotts of 1905 that were largely triggered by the same sort of discrimination shown in the United States towards the 42

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Door” policy advocated by the United States presented Japan with fewer opportunities as time passed. It was clear that conditions in Japan were worsening in the mid-1920s. The Siberian expedition and Japan’s activities had depleted Japan’s wartime earnings. The growth of the Zaibatsu, Japan’s multinational companies, was severely constrained by Washington’s policies put in place, even as the Japanese strove to ensure that the empire they had built up would continue to service Japan’s overall economic growth and material needs. Increasingly, it was clear that the United States was keen but unable to effectively constrain Japan without compromising her position. For all intents and purposes, the United States’ proposal for “Open China” was at best hazy, and was hardly respected by the powers of the day.44 From the 1920s onwards, the strategic balance had tilted decisively in favor of Japan. As Trask argues, “revolution and weakness in China, modernization and nationalism in Japan, ambition and idealism in the United States – all these came together during the World War in an imposition of the close connections between the internal dynamics of individual states, the affairs of a given geographical location, and the grandstanding concerns of the World Powers” and Wilson’s policy towards China never quite met the demands of an effective strategy across Japan and outside the region. 45 If the United States was not getting far with reining in the Japanese elites and their taste for imperial expansion, she was certainly facing difficulties in trying to keep her interests in China. Not only was the United States’ “Open Door” policy seen as a sign of weakness by the other colonial powers, it also did not gain her credibility with the Chinese. In 1905, large-scale anti-American protests broke out, as did a boycott movement over a variety of factors: implementation of exclusionary laws and application of treaties by the US; sensitivity towards the mistreatment of Chinese in the United States and general anger against humiliation that Chinese. See Jing Li, “China’s America: Chinese Perceptions of the United States, 1900-1989” Journal of Oriental Studies 34 (1991): 1-18; also see Guangsheng Liao, Antiforeignism and Modernization in China. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1990. Print.; also see Thomas Chinn et. Al. (eds) A History of Chinese in California (San Francisco, Chinese Historical Society of American, 1969). 44 Raymond Esthus, “The Open Door and the Integrity of China, 1899-1922: Hazy Principles for Changing Policy” in Etzold, Thomas (ed), Aspects of Sino-American Relations since 1784, (New Viewpoints, New York, 1978) pp 48-74 45 David Trask, “Sino-American Relations during the Paris Peace conference of the 1919 in Etzold, Thomas (ed), Aspects of Sino-American Relations since 1784, (New Viewpoints, New York, 1978) pp 75-101

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eroded the dignity of China.46 This gradually abated as the attention of the Chinese was soon averted to other matters, and by 1908 there was a similar movement to boycott Japanese businesses that had a larger effect, as Sino-Japanese trade was substantially larger than Sino-American trade. 47 It was not until the 1911 Revolution that the United States’ relations with China improved. This owed to the hopes of Yuan Shikai, the Manchu mandarin who had by then assumed the Presidency of the Republic in place of Sun Yat-sen. In the early years, the young Republic is only perhaps a theoretical construct – in reality, China was governed by a coalition of regional warlords who had only a loose affiliation with the Yuan government. Yuan was keen to engage and improve China’s relations with the United States as he required financial aid in order to counter the Five-Power Consortium formed by Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Japan.48 Naturally, Yuan also saw merit in the United States’ “Open Door Policy” which effectively restrained the outright colonization of China by the various powers. The isolationist and non-committal tendencies seen in US policy meant that the aid that China sought during this period was not forthcoming, as the United States sought to balance her interests in maintaining a friendly relationship with China and in balancing her relations with the powers, especially Japan in Asia. Even though Asia saw the emergence of three new regimes in early 20th century –the Xinhai Revolution saw the founding of the Republic of China (1911), Taisho Japan that emerged after Meiji Japan (1912- 1926), and the Soviet Union (1922) after the Bolshevik Revolution – international relations in East Asia exhibited no major change during this period from the era before. If anything, the competition to carve up China became more intense between the imperial powers. Sino-Japanese relations began to spiral downwards. The Warlordism that prevailed in China with the new installment of the KMT government only provided the Japanese with increasing opportunities for further aggression. With the imposition of the 21 Demands upon Yuan Shikai in January 1915, Japan renewed her assault on Chinese sovereignty. The May 4th 1919 protests cemented Japan’s role as central to Chinese nationalism and identity in the decades to come. Ironically, this came at a time when Japan herself was flirting with liberal 46 Sin Kiong Wong, China’s Anti-American Boycott Movement in 1905: A Study in Urban Protest (New York: Peter Lang, 2002), pp12-37 47 Ibid., pp 172 - 183 48 Lai-Wah Lourdes Chow, “Sino-American Relationship during the Presidency of Yuan Shih-Kai: Perception and Reality”, MA Thesis 1987, The University of Hong Kong, available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10722/30180

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democracy at home and adopted liberal reforms. Her foreign policy on the contrary was becoming increasingly imperialistic and as right-winged as in the era before. Japan insinuated herself as an actor in China’s domestic politics, with both the Communists and Kuomintang rallying against her as the principal enemy of the Chinese people. The Soviet Union had by then established relations with both the nascent Chinese Communist Party as well as the Kuomintang in China. The United States, unlike the Soviets, did not appear to take a great interest in the emergence of the Communist Party of China, and did nothing to hedge her relations with the two parties largely due to her isolationism as well as the economic troubles of the interwar years. With the Wall Street crash in 1929, the onset of the Great Depression brought about a catastrophic decade of high unemployment, falling incomes, deflation and general financial malaise plagued the United States. Spreading beyond the borders of the United States, the Great Depression rapidly afflicted economies worldwide – including those of China and Japan. In foreign policy terms, it caused her to turn further inward. The United States did not react to many of the incidents that occurred in the 1930s – the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian seizure of Ethiopia and German expansion in Central and Eastern Europe, including the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938.49 The effective retrenchment of the United States paved the way for a complete deterioration in SinoJapanese relations as Japan sought to expand her interests in the region. The tone and direction of Sino-Japanese relations were not solely decided by only Japan’s ambitions, but also by the developments within China. In China, following the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925, and the successful Northern Expedition in 1927, Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT had by and large consolidated their political hold on urban China. Jiang’s efforts to modernize China and to balance Sino-Japanese relations did not do well, largely because he inherited a system that could do very little for China’s large population, and partly because KMT China was one still very much controlled by warlords and factional interests. Chiang had initially reached out to Germany in hopes that relations with Germany would help contain the Japanese, but with the onset of Hitler’s relations with the Japanese, China found that it was left with only the little aid the Americans provided.50 KMT China’s Nanjing decade saw some improvements in the 49 See write up provided by historian of the US State Department, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/GreatDepression 50 John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History (Cambridge,

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urban life of the Chinese, but the reforms were largely limited in face of the corruption that had permeated all strata of the bureaucracy. The Great Depression brought an economic slump to China, and once it hit, Chiang’s governmental apparatus was not strong enough to halt the silver exports or stem the deflationary trend.51 The United States largely did not participate actively in helping the Nationalist government stop the Japanese nor did it prevent the KMT from decimating the Communists. The non-intervention of the United States unfortunately necessitated the downward spiral of Sino-Japanese relations into an abyss of no return, and its support of the KMT regime laid the foundations of Sino-US relations for the next half century. The Great Depression did not leave the Japanese economy unscathed even though Japan’s economic problems vis-à-vis those of the United States’ or Britain’s were comparatively and relatively less severe.52 From the 1920s to the 1930s, Japan’s industrialization was in a “take off” mode, but this period coincided with the problems in the international political economy. Just as Japan was recovering from the Great Kanto earthquake, the impact of the Great Depression also hit Japan severely, especially in the rural areas. In 1932, famine had set in Japan’s countryside to the extent that instances of cannibalism could be found. 53 Japan’s economy had deteriorated badly by then, to the extent that, for many Japanese nationals, the ideas justifying further expansion into Manchuria as a solution became idealized and romanticized. Also during this time, stimulated by favorable exchange rates, Japan’s increasing exports (in particular, cotton products) increased her trade frictions with India, the United States and Britain, Massachusetts: Belknap of Harvard University Press 1998), pp 285-293 51 For an interesting account of the political economy of China during the Great Depression, see Tomoko Shiroyama, China During the Great Depression: Market, State and the World Economy 1929-1937 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2008) 52 Iwami, Toru, Okazaki Tetsuji, and Yoshikawa, Hiroshi, “The Great Depression in Japan: Why was it so short?” in Dick, Trevor (ed) Business Cycles since 1800: New Historical Perspectives from Historical Evidence, (UK: Edward Elgar, 1998), pp 28-48 ; also see Antony Best, Imperial Japan and the World: 1931-1945 (Volume III Economics and Finance), (London: Routledge, 2011) 53 “ … it wasn’t only the people of the olden days who ate flesh. We too are eating the flesh of human beings. In order to make it possible for children to survive, we have to feed them their parents’ flesh. To make it possible for parents to survive, we have to eat the children’s flesh. So, right now I am trying to stay alive by eating my daughter’s flesh.” Mikiso Hane, Peasants, Rebels and Outcastes: The Underside of Modern Japan (New York, Pantheon, 1982), pp130-131

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whose governments increased their level of protectionism. Frustrated by this, Japan began to look towards Manchukuo as an export market to monopolies, and a market that could support Japan’s heavy industries with abundant oil and coal.54 Hence, while the old Japanese imperial empire had the tacit approval of the Western powers, the military expansion marked by the 18 September 1931 incident marks an expansion beyond the borders of her old empire that led to an all out destructive war with China, and also a sudden disruptive extension of Japan across Asia, challenging the status quo of Western imperialism.

Between Enmity, War and Alliance: The United States in Sino-Japanese Relations From the 1930s onwards, Sino-Japanese relations degenerated into outright war. Prime Minister Hamaguchi’s shooting in 1931 marks the beginning of a period which historians claim is “government by assassination”, as the Japanese military increasingly involved itself in domestic politics to restore direct Imperial rule which it regarded necessary to protect its security interests.55 By the winter of 1931, Japan had invaded Manchuria, established Manchukuo and encouraged settlers to move to China. This also came at a time when the Americans reevaluated their position with regard to the Soviets. Tensions between the Soviet Union and Japan escalated in the aftermath of the 1931 Manchurian crisis – and both the Soviets and the United States saw an ally in China to contain the Japanese.56 To the dismay of Washington (and the rest of the Western powers), Japan followed on with a full-scale invasion of China under the pretext of the Marco Polo Bridge incident in 1937. As such, even when Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated into an all out protracted war of national annihilation, the United States was careful to encourage and assist Chinese resistance (e.g. via shipments) against Japan without overt confrontation. There was also a perception in Washington that the struggles between China and Japan should not become an overt burden on the United States that was beset by recessionary problems of her 54

Takafusa Nakamura, “The Yen Bloc, 1931-1941” in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds) The Japanese Wartime Empire 1931-1945 (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1996), pp170-186 55 Hugh Byas, Government by Assassination (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1942) 56 Tetsuya Sakai, “The Soviet Factor in Japanese Foreign Policy, 1923-1937” Acta Slavica Iaponica, 1988 (6), pp 2-40

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own. Yet, in retrospect, the broader framework of Sino-Japanese relations cannot possibly be delinked from US-Japan relations and the development of US-China relations. One critical component in US-Japan relations was how the “Open Door Policy” in China, articulated by the United States, was being interpreted by Japan. The US saw it as a policy to balance the different powers’ interests while protecting her own; the Japanese, on the other hand, saw it as a strategic opportunity to exploit China’s resources for her growing economy and infrastructure.57 Naotake Sato, writing in 1940, argued that Japan must not only settle the “China affair” but in turn must adjust her relations with the major powers. Sato argued that the United States should reconsider her attitude towards the abrogation of 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, just as China should realize the futility of mounting an anti-Japanese resistance movement.58 It was not until the overt Pearl Harbor attack that the United States was driven into War with Japan. Her entrance into a direct confrontation with Japan was thus almost five decades in the making and was directly caused by Japan’s decision to pre-empt and prevent the United States from entering the War. The United States’ half-hearted support of China (until Pearl Harbor’s attack, at least) stemmed from a very limited understanding within Washington regarding the situation in China at the time: Sino-US relations at this juncture were actually premised almost solely upon USKuomintang relations. The Americans knew very little about the domestic conditions of China, and even less about the Communists. There was a severe lack of information with regard to the Communist movement concerning their aims, tactics, aspirations, successes and failures. From 1937 to 1944, the United States government had no official contact with the Chinese Communist Party.59 The first American visitors to Red China 57 A Asada, “Japan’s ‘Special Interests’ and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922” American Historical Review, 67 (1961): 62-70 ; also see A Asada, “From Washington to London: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Politics of Naval Limitation, 1921-1930” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 4. 3 (1993): 147-91 58 The Konoye statement on 6 Oct 1940 was made in London. Prince Konoye argues that the Tripartite movement was prepared to fight with the United States should the United States fail to understand and accommodate their position. Further to the conditions, Japan, Germany and Italy will recognize the United States' leadership in the Western hemisphere if the United States agrees to recognize Japan's leadership in Asia and the leadership of Germany and Italy in Europe. See digitized newspaper here: http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/17699660 59 Kenneth E. Shewmaker, Americans and Chinese Communists, 1927-1945

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were not diplomats, but were journalists, businessmen, doctors, educators, military observers and missionaries.60 To be sure, the Communists were not without American friends – albeit, none of official capacity status.61 It is ironic, therefore, to hear American officials espouse that while they have gained “Japan” after their surrender, the United States had effectively “lost” China to the Communists. The United States’ entrance into the War as a full-fledged ally of China, unfortunately, did not increase the Americans’ understanding of how their policies impacted on domestic Chinese politics, as their support of the Kuomintang remained steadfast even though the party’s popularity had evidently declined. Allied support of the KMT, however, did not mean that all the resources were utilized to counter Japan. Instead, Chiang diverted plenty of resources towards suppressing the Communists, which was futile given the Communists’ robust support on the ground. It was not until 1943 that American diplomats began to see the inherent danger in the KMTCCP rivalry – beyond the fact that it was not helping the anti-Japanese war effort, the rivalry would escalate into civil war that would provide the USSR a chance to back the Communists in China. The Americans aimed, therefore, to avert civil war by encouraging a political settlement and to strengthen the KMT position, partly by building up its armies, and partly by urging it to reform itself.62 The United States also had problems cooperating with Chiang’s forces. Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek’s antagonisms with General Stillwell (who represented the United States in China in the allied war effort), and the KMT-CCP infighting meant that after all this time, Chiang was still unable to fend off the Japanese Imperial Army. By the end of the civil war, Chiang who commanded a 3-million strong military force that outnumbered the Communist forces three to one, had to flee to Taiwan and barricaded his forces there. As such, from the beginning of the Pacific War, China was regarded by the US government as critical to the war effort because China was able to restrain almost half of Japanese overseas troops - a significant strategic factor in the eventual (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), pp3-4 60 Shewmaker went on to detail the lives of Americans such as Agnes Smedley, Edgar and Helen Foster Snow and James Bertram and their role in the Communist struggle. One reporter, T.A. Bisson, divided China into two parts – Nationalist or “feudal China” and “Communist or “democratic” China. 61 Edgar Snow and Agnes Smedley were examples of Americans who had served and struggled with the Communists. 62 Fairbank, John King, The United States and China (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p306

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defeat of Japan. 63 By the end of the War, however, the Americans established that it was the Soviets, and not the Chinese, that would be the deciding factor in the end of the Pacific/Sino-Japanese War.64 The end of the Sino-Japanese War effectively marked the institutionalization of a new world political order and security architecture in East Asia. This became evident decades later not only as a result of the Cold War but more importantly because of an understated reason – the role of the United States in the domestic politics of both China and Japan. The American occupation of Japan meant that almost all institutions in Japan were “Americanized” – from the Constitution that was written for the Japanese, to the organization of party politics, to defense arrangements.65 The United States facilitated many former right-wing 66 elements to continue in the 63

David Rees, The Defeat of Japan (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997), p53 ibid, p63; It is a well known fact that the United States’ main military man in China, General Stilwell had a feud with Chiang Kaishek and another American General, Chennault. This is widely documented in most history texts. See John E. Shephard, Warriors and Politics: The Bitter Lesson of Stilwell in China, US Army War College Report in Perimeters, March 1989, pp 61-75 available at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD= ADA517708 ; also see Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp 262-290 65 Interestingly, there were studies commissioned by the Americans to try and understand the Japanese better, especially during the Pacific War. One of the most interesting pieces representative of this era is Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (London: Routledge and Paul Keegan, 1967). 66 American cover-up of the atrocities committed by acquitted Class-A war criminals is well-documented by Sheldon H. Harris. In an effort to obtain invaluable intelligence on extensive Japanese knowledge of bacteriological warfare (herein BW) and preempt the Soviets from doing so, Dr. Norbert Fell, Division Chief of Fort Detrick’s Planning Pilot-Engineering Section, “promised them [the Japanese BW experts he interviewed – namely Ishii, Kitano, Wakamatsu, and Naito] immunity…so long as they gave him and others from Detrick the fruits of their research.” See Sheldon H Harris. Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-45, and the American Cover-up. (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 202. Another example will be Nobusuke Kishi, who, like many other Class-A war criminals, was eventually discharged from Sugamo prison – arguably due to reasons of political expediency. Bolstered by his personal ties with Japanese political and business elites, Kishi quickly assumed the position of the 56th and 57th Prime Minister of Japan from 1957-1960 and, among many international rebranding maneuvers, was responsible for the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. 64

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participation of public life in Japan, and while making good antiCommunist allies, this are the same group of people who have very different memories of the Pacific War and many whom are considered to be right-wing elements of the political spectrum. The Korean War and the intervention of the Chinese had confirmed the widespread view that there was a monolithic threat in the region, thereby validating the necessity of the application of the United States’ Containment strategy. The exigencies of these strategic circumstances meant that insofar as U.S grand strategy was concerned, the rearmament and reorientation of Japan to “contain” the Communists was necessary. As the bulwark of US strategy in Asia, Japan was once again put into a confrontational stance with the newly founded People’s Republic despite the domestic resistance in Japan. It was under these circumstances that the institution of the US-Japan security treaty was born. As such, the two most critical events insofar as the American occupation of Japan was concerned were the formation of the two Party system in Japan in 1955, which saw the emergence of the Liberal Democratic Party, and the promulgation of the 1960 revised US-Japan Security Treaty. This Treaty not only underpinned Japanese Foreign Policy since the post War era, but is also the bedrock of US grand strategy in East Asia that extends until present day. The founding of the People’s Republic and the entry of the Chinese People’s Volunteers saw the hardening of the United States’ position with regards to Taiwan. Shifting from a non-committal stance, President Truman saw the necessity of declaring the Taiwan Straits to be neutral waters and deployed the US 7th Fleet to prevent Communist forces from retaking Taiwan. When the US naval blockade was lifted by President Eisenhower in 1953, Chiang’s military efforts to try and retake the mainland led to a military response by Mao where Quemoy and Matsu, the offshore islands between Taiwan and China, were bombarded heavily by a shelling campaign from 1954.67 This crisis only stopped after protracted negotiations between the United States and China. This, however, did not prevent further hostilities and by 1958, Mao was both angry at the intimate strategic relations between Taiwan and the United States and worried that reunification would never happen. 68 Adopting a hard-line response and 67 Robert Accinelli. Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950-1955. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996). In the book’s introduction, Accinelli points out that the central problem Truman faced was how to keep strategically important territory (such as Taiwan) without incurring additional liabilities or unwanted responsibilities. 68 Chen, Jian. Mao’s China and the Cold War. (Chapel Hill: The University of North

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also out of domestic political concerns, the PRC proceeded to shell Quemoy from August to October 1958. Nonetheless, the United States’ response in sending a larger naval dispatchment did succeed in deterring the Chinese. From the mid-1950s onwards, as the Great Leap Forward and subsequently the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution raged, the radical stance of China’s foreign policy saw the PRC confronting both the USSR and the United States (and, by extension, also Japan). Needless to say, Taiwan too came under the United States’ influence and like Japan, most of the institutions in Taiwan were modeled after American institutions. Washington’s insistence on the protection of Chiang’s regime through the intervention of the US 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Straits was perceived as a further infringement on the sovereignty of the new People’s Republic and insofar as the People’s Republic was concerned, the United States’ intervention in the Taiwan Straits was a direct threat to the PRC’s viability as a nation-state. It is important to point out this: For the first time in six decades, China and Japan stopped fighting and Sino-Japanese relations entered into a new phase where reconciliation was then possible. Yet China and Japan had little latitude in their choices given the new geopolitical environment they found themselves in. The Cold War effectively created an environment where normal interactions between the formal combatants were frozen, and normalization retarded. The questions of whether wartime justice has been served through the Tribunals, the matter of apologies and wartime compensation, the question of sovereignty and territorial control over Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands and the development of historiography and memories of war had their roots in this immediate postwar period. The arrangements set in place (by the United States as the principal architect) constrained and impeded the healthy development of contemporary SinoJapanese relations. The thaw in Sino-Japanese bilateral relations did not arrive until 1972 after the Sino-US rapprochement, and it was only after the Cultural Revolution and the demise of Mao in 1978 when the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was signed between China and Japan that relations began to improve for China and Japan. The latter had become an economic superpower by the late 1980s and had, through her economic success and Carolina Press, 2001). Chen Jian argued that Mao’s decision-making was based more on ideological than strategic reasons and most of the foreign policy issues involving Mao were interpreted in such a way as to bolster his own position and his political campaigns.

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foreign aid, established a de facto leadership among Asian countries. Emerging out of two disastrous decades of political upheavals, the People’s Republic under Deng was anxious to jumpstart her reforms. By the 1980s, China and Japan had built a complimentary economic relationship while they each searched for a substantial way forward for Sino-Japanese relations in this new era. Deng Xiaoping and his Japanese counterpart, Nakasone, had by and large managed to keep contentious issues such as the dispute over the Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Islands off the table.69 The formula used was to leave such complicated issues to be resolved by the wisdom of the next generation, and the mission for China and Japan was to focus on their respective economic development and modernization projects. China needed capital, technology and modernization blueprints for a wide variety of industries and sectors, and Japan needed raw materials, cheap industrious labor and market access. The low key Sino-Japanese economic relationship took off in a big way in the 1980s as the USSR threat became gradually less acute due to the declining ability of the Soviets to challenge the United States and the advocation of Glasnost and Perestroika by Gorbachev. This period was also characterized by increased tension between the United States and Japan owing to the political and economic ascendance of Japan – namely, the question of trade deficits, rising Japanese nationalism and US-Japan defense co-operation. 70 Sino-US relations were not all that rosy either, given President Carter’s advocacy for human rights changes and democratization. Nonetheless, defeating the Soviet threat still held mandated importance for China and Japan in US grand strategy and the centrality of the United States insofar as Chinese and Japanese foreign policies were concerned. It has been two decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the 69

Tsuyoshi Hsegawa and Kazuhiko Taogao, East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism (Westport, Connecticut: Praegar Security International, 2008), p45; also see Shaw, Han-yi, The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C., and Japan. Baltimore (Maryland: University of Maryland School of Law, 1999) 70 Tokyo governor, Shintaro Ishihara, and Sony Chairman, Akio Morita, published an essay in 1989 entitled “The Japan that can say No” which envisages a Japan that is capable of stepping out of the United States’ shadow. This essay caught widespread attention in the United States and Japan and is largely seen as the documentation of an intellectual and popular nationalism against the United States in Japan, testifying to the economic rise of Japan.

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initial years of the Post Cold War era, scholars were concerned whether the United States would withdraw strategically from the Western Pacific, given the economic troubles that post Gulf War America faced. The Japanese were particularly apprehensive, as they had grew accustomed to US strategic presence, and regardless of the nationalistic sentiments at home, few were sure what a strategically independent Japan would be like on the world stage. Beyond that there were bigger issues regarding the legality of her reforms, as well as her legitimacy in the eyes of the Japanese people as well as neighboring countries. Contemporaneous to this debate is the question of the China threat – scholars and policymakers debate intensely with regard to the ascendance of China and the repercussions this has for the region. Some are of the view that China is a threat, others not. A mutual question that China’s neighbors considered seriously was how they should handle their respective relations with the emerging China in addition to how to best take advantage of the economic rise of this Asian giant. Among all the Asian countries, there is no question that Japan faced the most serious consequences as a result of China’s rise. With the benefit of hindsight, the years after 1995 saw the greatest challenge to Japan’s China policy. Japan was significantly offended when China went ahead with her nuclear tests in 1994 and thus, imposed sanctions upon China for ignoring the sensitivities of nuclear weapons. Tokyo was also upset at Chinese influences on Taiwan’s first direct election through the Taiwan Straits Missile Crisis. As such, Japan regarded such activities as testament to China’s lack of respect of democratization and her non-observance of the rule of law. Beyond that, China’s irredentist agenda also inevitably affected the security of Japan’s seaplanes. Even as Japan and China tried to reconcile in 1998, with the hosting of Chinese President Jiang Zemin, the diplomatic visit could hardly be considered to be a success – given the high profile acrimonies that surfaced over historical memories. Japan regarded the Chinese’s insistence of a written apology to be uncouth and Jiang’s lecture on history at a dinner hosted by the Japanese Emperor to be impolite and unbecoming. Gradually from 1999 onwards, reports began to surface in the Japanese media that Chinese research vessels were violating the territorial waters of Japan, and disputes over the ownership of the gas and oil resource dispute took on an increasing security dimension. By the time Koizumi stepped down, the disagreements in Sino-Japanese relations that started out as protests over textbooks had morphed into something deeper and more intense between the Chinese and the Japanese people –as if they were headed for some sort of nationalistic conflict. These developments meant that questions of continued US involvement in Asia

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raised at the end of the Cold War were largely confirmed. By 1996, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto reaffirmed that the USJapan security alliance remained the cornerstone for their respective security objectives, and, in 1997, the revised guidelines for this were issued. Insofar as Sino-Japanese relations were concerned, the end of the Cold War brought about an unprecedented opportunity for bilateral relations to greatly improve. What had transpired, however, was that the rigid structural international environment that regulated Sino-Japanese relations in effect all but disappeared within a short span of two years. This resulted in tremendous challenges in the way China and Japan conceive of their international relations, their relationship with the United States and their mutual relations. If theorists of International Relations are correct in their analyses, then China and Japan should in theory move closer to each other to balance the only hegemon left. This, unfortunately, did not happen; rather, Japan ironically sought to align more closely than ever before with the United States. Neo-Realists like Stephan Walt argue that states balance against threats, not power. Japan and the United States have, therefore, chosen to balance against the China threat, rather than the hegemonic power of the United States. Yet, something is amiss here. Why should Japan consider United States less of a threat than China – even though it was the United States that dropped the nuclear bombs on Japan during the Second World War? Why does the United States perceive Japan to be less of a threat than China, given the disparity in the comprehensive national strength between the two nations? In short, how does one account for the continuing influence of the United States over China, or for that matter, over Japan? Two immediate precipitating events from the period from 1989 to 1992 may shed some light: For the Chinese – the Tiananmen Square Incident71 and for Japan – the end of the first Persian Gulf War72. 71

The Tiananmen Incident on June 4th 1989 was no doubt precipitated by the developments in Eastern Europe as well as the visit of Gorbachev to China. The Chinese leadership was deeply wary of the “Peaceful Evolution” strategy of the United States to bring about regime change in China. Japan followed the G7 countries and imposed sanctions upon China following the Tiananmen Square massacre but, following the Gulf War, Japan was asked by the United States to lift the sanctions on China and pave the way for the G7 countries to follow suit. Author’s personal communication with an interlocutor in Tokyo, who was then Prime Minister Kaifu’s personal secretary. 72 Kuwait took out a prominent advert after the successful UN campaign led by the United States which drove Saddam Hussein back to Iraq. The advert prominently

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Beijing saw US complicity in fuelling the Tiananmen Square massacre and in assisting to smuggle the student leaders to the United States afterwards. Much of the Chinese leadership was convinced that the Americans were trying to effect regime change,73 and that the ultimate goal was for China to implode so a democratic system could be put in place. Consequently, the hard line backlash was subsequently interpreted as a sign of nationalistic backlash and anti-Americanism. Even as Deng believed that the capitalistic reforms should carry on, the immediate decade following the collapse of the Berlin Wall was a difficult time for Sino-US relations. In particular was the emerging narrative on the “China threat” and the impact this has had on Chinese international relations. The strategic friction of this narrative provided the Chinese with a dilemma – do they soften on the assertion of their rights in hopes of cultivating a more favorable international image in order to eradicate doubts or do they harden their position while ensuring that they maintain somewhat cordial but cautious relations with the United States and her allies, in particular with Japan? Concurrently at the behest of the Americans, Japan lifted the previously imposed sanctions on China after the Tiananmen Square Incident because of the PRC’s neutral stance within UN Security Council deliberations on whether to invade Iraq. The Japanese contributed almost USD $50 billion for their war effort but were shocked when they found that they had been left out of the advert the Kuwaitis put up in the New York Times thanking all the countries who had participated in the war to liberate Kuwait. Naturally this incident prompted a deep reflection within Japanese society and government on Japan’s role in world affairs and correspondingly, their conduct of foreign and security relations in the recent past. At this juncture, both China and Japan began to respectively reexamine their relationship with the United States. China wanted a peaceful partnership and sought regime legitimacy while Japan aspired to a greater listed and thanked all countries who participated in the war effort, but Japan was left out despite donating more than USD $1 billion towards the campaign. This issue became one of the major impetuses for the Japanese to reflect and rethink their strategic posture. The popularity of the “normalization” agenda of the Liberal Democratic Party as well as the rightwards shift in Japanese politics must be contextualized against this incident. 73 Zhang Liang, Andrew Nathan, Perry Link, Orville Schnell (eds) Tiananmen Papers, United States: Public Affairs, 2002; Zhao Ziyang (Author), Bao Pu (Editor), Renee Chiang (Editor), Adi Ignatius (Editor), Prisoners of the State, The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang

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role in world affairs and a more “equal” partnership with the United States. Curiously, more than ever before, the United States gradually became more involved in the domestic politics of both China and Japan in the new era, even though this was a time when the three powers were radically rethinking their respective roles and strategies for their increasingly prominent roles on the world stage. The quasi-partnership that China and Japan had in working against the Soviet threat under Cold War conditions was clearly fostered by their respective relations with the United States. 74 To date, this has not changed in any fundamental way. For the most part, Sino-Japanese relations remained a clear domain of the diplomats and politicians. The Rapprochement Nixon and Kissinger brought about between China and the United States in 1972 shocked Tokyo into seeking normalization with China. The People’s Republic, ever so eager to isolate the KMT regime in China, moved to normalize relations with Japan very quickly – perhaps too quickly. In a way, Mao was responsible for the implementation of the 1972 normalization, and it is questionable that, if a national consensus was to be taken at that time in China, there would be popular support for it. In short, the 1972 normalization and subsequent Treaty signed in 1978 did not involve both the Chinese and the Japanese citizens fully. If it was the United States that had hastened the normalization between China and Japan, one also wonders if it is the United States that had unintentionally prevented China and Japan from effecting a deeper and more widely felt reconciliation. The Cold War had effectively imposed a structure that prevented the Japanese from effecting a deeper reconciliation not just with the Chinese, but curiously also with the Koreans and the Taiwanese. The Cold War structure also essentially kept the Chinese and the Korean nations in East Asia divided, with the United States standing in between the warring nations to keep the peace or, viewed alternatively, preventing genuine dialogue and reunification from occurring. In a nutshell, within a short span of four decades, the United States is now deeply involved in the domestic politics of China, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan and to a limited extent (and ironically) North Korea. Ironically, as they conjure up new strategies and doctrines, the insecurities that both Japan and China faced both in their domestic politics 74

The state of “partnership” between China and Japan is best perhaps captured by what Victor Cha describes of the relationship between ROK and Japan in his work, Alignment Despite Antagonism, where he documents South Korea’s tempestuous relations working with Japan as one of the pillars in US grand strategy in East Asia.

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and foreign policies saw both Tokyo and Beijing hardening their attitudes towards each other. This is primarily because both countries are no longer burdened by the exigencies of the Cold War, and also because of the increasing pluralism and prosperity in both China and Japan. By the mid1990s, it was clear that Sino-Japanese relations on the grassroots level were not going in the direction where most forward-looking and moderate politicians wanted them to go. Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s controversial 1998 visit to Japan is itself an interesting case in point. The Japanese had given President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea a few weeks to issue a written apology before his arrival, but their refusal to provide a similar apology marred the circumstances of the third Sino-Japanese political document released in 1998. As both China and Japan struggled to put historical memories behind them, all the signs pointed towards an inevitable deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations. By the time Koizumi’s reign was over, Sino-Japanese relations were at an all-time low. The Chinese and the Japanese have, from the mid-1990s, contended over a wide variety of issues: China’s nuclear tests; the Taiwan Straits Missile Crisis and the election of the Taiwanese President; the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, energy resources in East China Seas and the mutual allegations of naval incursions; and of course, the wide ranging historical issues – visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and revisionist remarks by Japanese politicians, inaccurate historical textbooks, accusations over the instrumental use of history and general disagreements over wartime responsibility and the question of apologies. This list is by no means exhaustive but is enough to give an indication. These developments prompt the following questions: what is the role of the United States among Sino-Japanese relations? Does it play a balancing role between China and Japan in order to prevent the outbreak of any hostilities that directly and indirectly involve the two Asian giants? Or should we construe that its role is like that of any other nation-state in pursuit of her self-interests – and in this case from a neo-Realistic point of view, the objective of the United States would probably be to prevent any sort of alliance or even reconciliation between the second and the third largest economies in the world? How do the dynamics of the current realpolitik maneuvers affect interpretations of past events? Are the national interests of the allies of the United States best served by closely aligning their goals with the United States? For example, are the Japanese people’s aspirations and goals best served with Japan reaffirming her

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55

security alliance with the US?75 Would the South Koreans76 be best served in continuing their alliance with the United States, in what many interpret as an anti-China alliance?

Conclusion: The Enduring Role of the United States When one considers the brief history of the United States in Asia, especially in her interactions between China and Japan, one can discern a few patterns. The motivations, means, constraints and challenges that compel the United States in her Asian policy have evolved over time, and so have been the impact of her dealings with China and Japan and correspondingly, in and on Sino-Japanese relations. Conversely, the role which Japan and China perceive the United States to play in the development of their mutual bilateral relations, and consequently of SinoJapanese relations, has evolved significantly. First, the United States’ initial foray into the region was primarily guided by economic interest; and upon securing her presence, she intervened increasingly to promote her strategic interests and political concerns to that of a colonizing power in the footsteps of Britain. By the early decades of the 20th century, the United States assumed the role of a Pacific Power principally through the establishment of Treaty ports in China, the opening of Japan and the colonization of the Philippines. The earlier years in the region gave the United States experience in dealing with the Chinese and the Japanese, and her diplomacy with both no doubt colored her worldview of how these two Asian powers behaved and operated. Across the different political eras (Qing, Republican, Communist in China; Meiji, Taisho, Wartime and post War Japan), the United States gradually became important to both countries – not just economically but 75 See Shimura Takashi, “Alliance, Bases and Okinawa – Why does Japan Stop thinking?” 8 Oct-Nov 2011, http://www.japanechoweb.jp/jew0802/ - Translated from the Feature: 60 years of the Japan-U.S. Alliance: “Domei Kichi Okinawa – Naze nihon wa sikou teishi ni ochiirunoka,” Chuokoron, October 2011, pp. 92–99. (Courtesy of Chuo Koron Shinsha) [October 2011] ; also see Glosserman, Brad, “Japan-US Security Relations: A Testing Time for the Alliance” CSIS Pacific Forum Conference Report March 2009, http://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_v09n14.pdf; also see Susumu Yabuki, “To Prosper in the ‘Chinerica”-Dominated World, Japan Should Aim to Become Asia’s Switzerland Jakarta Globe, 03 July 2012 76 See Doung Bandow, “Ending the U.S.-Korea Alliance” 9 June 2008 in The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/article/ending-the-us-korea-alliance-2102

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politically as well. The end of the Second World War represents a clear turning point with regards to the influence of the United States. By 1945, the United States emerged as a clear centre within the global economy, and led the anti-Soviet bloc in Asia (principally her allies Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and other countries such as Singapore and Thailand) in the containment of the Soviet threat. Her Cold War strategy to contain the Soviets not only rendered her a principal player in East Asia, but also entrenched her economically as the single most influential actor in the region, leading Japan and her other allies to become the viable political and economic entities they are today. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States had unquestionably become the most powerful actor in the Asia-Pacific and whose participation is critical to all its political and economic developments. There is no question that, today, the United States is truly a Pacific power. Table One at the end of the chapter presents a summary of the characterization of the United States’ role in Asia from the 17th century to the present. Second, throughout the last century or so, the United States was by far the largest economy when compared to China or Japan (See Table Two below). During the same period, she has consistently allied with the weaker of the two powers in the region to balance against the state that the US regarded as the most threatening. For the most part, from the beginning of the twentieth century until the end of the Second World War, the United States clearly sided with China – even though she did not take an outright confrontational stance with Japan until the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. For the better part of the Cold War, the United States perceived the Soviet threat and its various manifestations to be a monolithic one (i.e. the North Koreans, the Vietnamese and Maoist China) and confronted these countries with the assistance with Japan. Only when the Sino-Soviet split became apparent did the United States and the PRC reconcile to jointly contain the Soviet threat. From 1972 until 1989, the United States and China entered into a relationship that could be described as a quasialliance. However, by the mid-1990s, the United States tightened her alliance with Japan in an effort to “con-engage” a rising China. Yet, judging from the trajectory of economic growth stipulated in the table as shown, it becomes questionable if in fifty years time, this sort of allying with the weaker of the two powers would still work as a foreign policy strategy. Assuming the growth trajectory remains what it is today, the thought that one day China might overtake the United States as the single largest economy in the world is not an unthinkable prospect – what would the implication be for such alliance politics?

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Table Two: Gross Domestic Product77 of the United States, China and Japan (Millions 1990 International Dollars78) 1700

1820

1870

1913

1950

1973

2003

USA

527

12,548

98,374

517,383 1,455,916 3,536,622 8,430,762

Japan

15,390

20,739

25,393

71,653

China

82,800 228,600 189,740 241,431

160,966 1,242,932 2,699,261 244,985

739,414

6,187,984

What is most remarkable is how well the United States has managed to present herself as the “balancer” to preserve peace and stability in the region over the last six decades or so. Japanese policymakers have constantly talked about the necessity of having the United States to balance China (as do many of the Southeast Asian countries). Interestingly within China itself, the idea of the United States’ presence appears to resonate for different reasons. Chinese scholars have also talked of the need for a “stable” strategic environment necessary for economic growth and ascendance to greatness. Hence they grudgingly accept that US presence in Japan is necessary to keep the Japanese from having independent strategic decision-making power and to forestall Japanese rearmament (or in reality over-the-top rearmament). Beyond that, Chinese analysts also appear to believe that the presence of the United States would provide a measure of assurance to the Southeast Asians, and would, in the long run, be beneficial for China’s rise as US presence might decrease the political resistance the Chinese might otherwise experience. The rise of China poses an exceptional challenge for both Japan as well as the United States. In particular, the United States has never known an Asia that has both a strong China and a strong Japan, and has never seen a period when the relations between the two giants have been mutually respectful, strong and cordial. As such, the idea of her strategic presence being “necessary” to keep the peace is deeply engrained among American and Japanese policymakers and many other Asian countries. 77 Data extracted from Augus Maddison, Contours of the World Economy, 1- 2030 AD: Essays in Macro-Economic History, Oxford University Press, 2007 78 The Geary-Khamis dollar, otherwise known as the international dollar, is a hypothetical unit of currency that has the same purchasing power parity that the U.S. dollar had in the United States at a given point in time. In this case, it refers to 1990 dollar.

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Fourth, this “balancing of threat” that has come to dominate American and Japanese political discourse appears somewhat capricious if we scrutinize the history of belligerency in the region. The “balancing of threat” refers to the often-cited need for an American strategic presence to deter possible threats in the region by American or Japanese analysts. To be sure, one should look at the states that embarked on the use of force either to settle political-economic problems or to preempt the rise of possible strategic difficulties. Only the United States and Japan have mounted large-scale offensive military operations far from their shores. The military skirmishes that are often cited for the basis of the China threat need not necessarily support the “China threat” thesis: China’s entry into the Korean War (1950-53); the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War; the 1969 brief border dispute with Soviet Union over Damansky/Chenbao Island; the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War (Third Indochina War) and their conflict over Paracel Islands and the 1988 skirmish over Johnson Reef in the Spratly Island chain. All these incidents occurred on Chinese borders and the causes of these skirmishes were either ideological (e.g. with USSR), political and/or punitive in nature - i.e. China attacks and withdraws unilaterally to make a political point. The point here is this: as the exasperated Chinese analysts always say – the People’s Republic has never gone far beyond her shores to invade others, and given the interconnectedness of the world and the growth of the Chinese economy, the PRC would have a wider range of policy tools at her disposal. The USJapan security alliance might not be all that necessary. Fifth, even as the United States continues to play a “balancing” role with Japan against China, it is questionable if this role is sustainable. At the same time, even the US-Japan security alliance serves as a deterrent to any escalation of conflict, it is not a mechanism for conflict resolution or tension reduction in the region itself. Even though Japan and the United States see eye to eye on issues such as human rights, the US-Japan alliance, seen as increasingly directed at Chinese power, is at odds with a system where China is principally establishing the perimeters of financial and economic interactions in the region with the United States. There appears to be tensions derived from the directions of the military-strategic alliances in the region, as the United States strives to tighten her alliance with Japan (among others) against the political-economic realignment led by USChina co-operation in the financial and economic architecture of the AsiaPacific. Today, there is a recognizably dire need for China and the United States to move towards better relations to help resolve many issues that require the joint efforts of the largest and second largest economies in the World. This is not because China is “better” or more altruistic than Japan,

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but in many cases, simply because China herself is part of the problem. One such example would be reform of the global financial system in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Another example would be environmental degradation or nuclear proliferation on the nuclear peninsula. On these issues, the United States might find a more “natural” partner in China than with Japan, and as such balancing China’s rise with US-Japan relations might not always serve the United States’ national interests. At the same time, the very fact that China wields influence in many parts of the world where the United States has no political clout or diplomatic traction certainly means that the United States would require China’s support in these areas - contrasting prevailing narratives of the United States as a hegemonic power. The reality is that a United States-China partnership is better equipped and more suited to resolve global problems, with the added impetus that there is an unmistakable adjustment in the strategic parity between China on one hand, and the United States and her allies on the other. As such, the United States should (re)consider exactly which national interests are served with a strategy of ignoring the tensions in Sino-Japanese relations. The endeavor to reassess the United States’ role in Sino-Japanese relations cannot be divorced from re-examining American intervention in both Chinese and Japanese domestic politics nor can it be detached from understanding US interests worldwide. The continuing role the US has in the Taiwan issue, her influences in Japanese domestic politics through her linkages with the LDP and the US-Japan security alliance only continue to reproduce and perpetuate Cold War realities in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific. The cornerstone of the United States’ strategy, the US-Japan security alliance, is seen to be the primary mechanism which this “peace” or “stability” is premised upon. Yet, as both China’s and Japan’s economies continue to grow, there is an increasing divergence as to how the US-Japan security alliance is being interpreted. Japan’s political right certainly interprets this mechanism as being central to Japan’s normalization efforts, just as China interprets the same mechanism to be necessary to keep Japan in check. Advocates of Taiwan independence perceive this mechanism to be vital in assisting them in their struggles, while Chinese hardliners perceive this as an institution that prevents Chinese reunification. The point here is this: there is every expectation that the United States might be chain-ganged and dragged into a war involving China, Japan and even Taiwan. As the region’s military budget increases exponentially with their respective growing economies, one wonders if a more balanced and amicable SinoJapanese relationship would be a better way forward to regional peace and stability.

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One of the most positive steps that the United States could embark on is to facilitate the resolution of the dispute surrounding history and historically related questions pertaining to Sino-Japanese relations. After all, it is safe to assume that most American veterans who had served in the Pacific theatre would not identify with the exhibits in Tokyo’s Yushukan at Yasukuni Shrine. There are many scholars 79 who are already at the forefront of this movement and have written on various aspects of the United States’ complicity in the unwitting creation of these “burdens of history”. If there is one role that the United States should look forward to in the region, it should be a role of an honest broker in an attempt to cultivate everlasting and deep-seeded reconciliation and peace between China and Japan. However, judging by the statements coming from Washington on the Senakaku/Diaoyu dispute, it is unlikely that this will materialize anytime soon.

79

For example, scholars such as John W. Dower have argued that the United States’ decision to exonerate the Emperor of War responsibility in the aftermath, reveals the United States’ open embracement of right-wingers such as Kishi to become Japan’s Prime Minister. See John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, New York: Norton, 1999 page 562; also see Harris Sheldon’s Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945; also see Norris, Robert S.; William M. Arkin, and William Burr (January/February 2000). “Where they were: how much did Japan know?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol 56, No.1, pp 11– 13, 78–79.

Interaction through the Canton Trade System; restrained from greater influence by other colonial powers

Last of the Imperial Powers to arrive in Asia

Colonization of the Philippines

Period of Accommodation and Isolation

Principal Member of the Allies Camp in defeating the Axis Powers; assisted KMT China and Southeast Asia in resistance of Japan

Prior to mid 17th century

1840s – early 1900s

1900s - 1941

1941 - 1945

Covert Resistance All out war enemy combatant

Full fledge Ally (After Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor)

US successfully “opens” up Japan; establishment of Treaty Ports; Imperialism Engagement and Constraining of Japan

Little contact

Japan

Covert assistance

Pro-China Orientation

Establishment of Treaty Ports; Imperialism

China

Asia

Periodization

61

Allied with China to defeat Japan; intervened in Chinese domestic politics through the support of the KMT regime

Indirectly aided Japan’s modernization; equipped Japan with means for imperial expansion

Contributed to the breakdown of Sino- centric system

Little bearing

Sino-Japanese Relations

Table Three: Characterization of the United States’ Role in Asia from the 17th Century to Present

The United States between China and Japan

1946 - 1972

62

Asia became a theater which is part of US Global Cold War Strategy

US fought the PRC during the Korean War and openly confronted the PRC and the USSR

Enactment of the 1979 Taiwan Act and the continued support for Taiwan makes the United States a principal actor on one of the key issues affecting Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy

Subsequent intervention by the US 7th Fleet prevented PRC from achieving reconciliation;

US supported the KMT during the Chinese Civil War

Chapter Two

Japan assuming the role of US’s “unsinkable” aircraft carrier

Remolding of Japan internal institutions and politics and support of LDP ensures Japan’s continued support for US policies;

Occupier, then principal Cold War Ally

Many current problems in Sino-Japanese relations such as Senkaku/ Diaoyu dispute, wartime apologies, compensation and wartime responsibilities all originated from arrangements made or facilitated by the United States during this period.

Through the International Tribunal of the Far East and the arrangements made to accommodate/preserve the institution of the Emperor and the containment of PRC; the United States created an ideological and material structure that prevented genuine reconciliation and dialogue consolidation between PRC and Japan.

US-led much of Asia in the containment of the Soviet threat

United States as the dominant hegemon in International Relations

1972 - 1989

Post Cold War “Containment” and Engagement of China; US frequently appears in China’s strategic narratives of her Peaceful Rise

Quasi Ally

Re-affirmed ally status; US as an inhibitor or enabler in Japan’s Normalization process ?

Ally

The United States between China and Japan

Balancer and also agent that limits any real and substantive change in Sino-Japanese relations

Common Soviet threat meant that bilateral issues are shelved; China and Japan are not “allies” per se, but have relations normalized and are strategically aligned because of their affiliation with the United States

Played a relatively neutral role in Sino-Japanese relations; era where contemporary SinoJapanese relations are cordial

63

CHAPTER THREE TOWARD HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING ACROSS NATIONAL BORDERS BU PING

The establishment of international dialogue to achieve shared historical understanding has aroused considerable interest in recent years. The joint effort and achievements of Germany and France in producing the history textbook, Europe and the World since 1945, have been considered a successful example in this area. 1 When compared to the situation in Europe, the differences over historical understanding in Asia, particularly those arising between China, Japan and Korea in the East Asian region, seem especially pronounced. Where the situation in East Asia is concerned, the question is whether China and Japan are able to hold a dialogue over issues of history and establish historical understandings across national borders.

The Efforts of East Asian Countries to Build Historical Understandings across National Borders In recent years, scholars from China and Japan have made significant efforts toward establishing historical understandings between their countries. From the late 1990s onward, a number of Japanese universities organized research projects on the theme of “Mutual Understandings and Misunderstandings in East Asia.” Scholars from Japan, the United States, China (including Taiwan) and South Korea participated in the project, holding discussions over issues concerning historical understandings in East Asia and eventually publishing edited volumes on their research 1

Claudia Schneider, “The Japanese History Textbook Controversy in East Asian Perspective”, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 617 (2008): 107-122.

Toward Historical Understanding Across National Borders

65

findings.2 During the same period, educational institutions and academic groups in Japan and Korea established joint research mechanisms, such as the Japan-Korea History Textbook Seminar, organized by the Seoul City University History Textbook Studies Society and the Tokyo Gakugei University History Education Studies Society, and the Japan-Korea History Societies Joint Historical Research Seminar, organized by ten historical studies and history education groups from both countries. History education in China has also been making efforts to become integrated with the rest of the world. The aims of such moves have been to “place Chinese history within the larger context of world history, consider Chinese history as part of world history and understand developments and changes in Chinese history as much as possible from a global perspective.”3 With the transition of China’s school instruction materials system from a state-determined one to one based on evaluation by experts in 1985, the production of history textbooks in China has moved toward greater diversification. In the mid to late 1990s, Japan saw a current of historical revisionism that appeared along with an ultra-nationalistic movement to write “New History Textbooks.” Subsequently, people from various countries in East Asia held active discussions with the goal of reaching shared historical understanding. They raised the issue of co-existence in East Asia and the history textbook question,4 and produced results based on joint research.5 2

See Yamamuro Shinichi, ed., Kokusai Symposium: Nihon-Chuugoku-Kankoku Kan no Sougo Ninshiki to Gokai no Hyoshou [International Conference on Phenomena of Mutual Understandings and Misunderstandings between Japan, China and Korea] (Kyoto: Institute for Research in Humanities, Kyoto University, 1998); Asakura Yuuko and Joetsu University of Education East Asian Studies Society, eds., Rekishi Hyousyou toshite no Higashi Asia: Rekishi Kenkyu to Rekishi Kyouiku to no Taiwa [East Asia as a Historical Phenomenon: Dialogues between Historical Research and History Education] (Osaka: Seibundo, 2002); Futaya Sadao, ed., 21 Seiki no Rekishi Ninshiki to Kokusai Rikai: Kankoku-ChuukokuNihon kara no Teigen [Historical Understandings and International Harmony: Proposals from Korea, China and Japan] (Tokyo: Asashi Shoten, 2004). 3 Kong Fangang, “Watashi no Rekishi Gakushuu to Rekishi Kyouiku no 50 Nen” [My 50 Years in Historical Studies and History Education] in 21 Seiki no Rekishi Ninshiki to Kokusai Rikai: Kankoku-Chuukoku-Nihon kara no Teigen [Historical Understandings and International Harmony: Proposals from Korea, China and Japan], ed. Futaya Sadao (Tokyo: Asashi Shoten, 2004). 4 The Historical Science Society of Japan, ed., Rekishi Kyoukasyo wo Meguru Nikkan Taiwa: Nikkan Goudou Rekishi Kenkyuu Symposium [Japan-Korea Dialogues around History Textbooks: Japan-Korea Joint History Research Symposium] (Tokyo: Ootsuki Shoten, 2004).

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From 2002 onwards, representatives from academia, school teachers’ associations and civic groups from China, Japan and South Korea organized an annual forum on “Historical Understanding and Peace in East Asia.”. Based on discussions in the forum, an editorial board on the joint history of China, Japan and Korea was formed. After three years of joint research and discussion, the edited volume, Looking Towards the Future: The History of Modern China, Japan and Korea, was published. This book appeared in the form of supplementary teaching materials, which have been used in secondary schools in all three countries. Moreover, students from all three countries have been holding relevant annual history study summer camps and other interactive activities. In 2001, some Japanese scholars, including Professor Mitani Hiroshi from the University of Tokyo, as well as some Japan-based Chinese scholars, including Professor Liu Jie, established the “Japan-China Young Historical Scholars Conference” to discuss social change in China and Japan within the context of historical issues. After several years of effort, the edited volume, Historical Understandings across National Borders, was published simultaneously in Japan and China. The volume provides in-depth discussions of significant issues pertaining to modern history in the context of historical understandings between China and Japan.6 These aforementioned national borders-crossing efforts in joint historical research and the writing of teaching materials have been realized in different ways, and the depth of analysis attained by the various joint research projects has been by no means uniform; yet the efforts toward national borders-crossing historical understanding share common goals. The first goal is to enable various East Asian countries to challenge the dominant influence of Western-centric theses and increase the proportion of Asian narratives in the writing of world history. The second goal is to ascertain the relationship between various countries’ respective national 5

Kimishima Katsuhiko, Kyoukasho no Shisou: Nihon to Kankoku no Kingendaishi [Thinkings in School Textbook: History of Modern and Contemporary Japan and Korea] (Tokyo: Suzusawa Shoten, 1996); Chung Jae-Jeong, Kankoku to Nihon: Rekishi Kyouiku no Shisou [Japan and Korea: Thinkings in History Education] (Tokyo: Suzusawa Shoten, 1998). 6 See Liu Jie, Mitsuya Hiroshi, and Yang Daqing, eds., Chaoyue Guojing de Lishi Renshi: Laizi Riben Xuezhe ji Haiwai Zhongguo Xuezhe de Shijiao [Historical Understandings across National Borders: From the Angle of Japanese and Chinese Overseas Scholars] (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2006). For the Japanese-language version, see Kokkyou wo Koeru Rekishi Ninshiki: Nicchu Taiwa no Kokonomi [Historical Understandings across National Borders: An Attempt at Sino-Japanese Dialogue] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 2006).

Toward Historical Understanding Across National Borders

67

histories and East Asian history, and, in particular, to answer the question of whether a history of East Asia that transcends the national history framework can be established. Here, the term “transcends” constitutes a very important concept. How to transcend national histories and national historical memories is a challenging question that requires historians to correlate diverse historical memories, explore their interrelationships and consider their commonalities. Even if the interrelationships and commonalities are weak and tentative, it is still necessary to devote serious research to them in order to realize common historical understandings. Also deserving close attention is the beginning of government-directed joint historical research during this period. Japan and Korea began their joint historical research project in 2002. After the end of its first phase in 2005, the project’s second phase began at the end of 2006. It has now been going on for two years. The joint historical research project between China and Japan is divided into two groups: the ancient history (including the middle centuries) group and the modern history group, with altogether 16 research topics (seven topics on ancient history and nine topics on modern history). The modern history group has confirmed its topics as well as its keywords within each topic. Both sides have been required to base their writings and discussions on jointly determined topics and keywords in order to attain depth of analysis in their research.

The Different Levels on which Historical Differences between China and Japan Exist The aforementioned national borders-crossing efforts to attain shared historical understanding between China and Japan have elicited different comments from various parties. Some have welcomed the efforts, while others have felt that they were unthinkable and have expressed criticism and opposition. The reason behind this is a failure to recognize the various levels on which the contentious issues of history between China and Japan exist.7 The issues of history between China and Japan exist on political, emotional and academic levels—three different yet interrelated domains. 7

The issues of history between China and Japan discussed here refer to problems between China and Japan within the area pertaining to understandings of modern history. They do not include current issues in Sino-Japanese relations that have certain historic origins. These current issues remain either unresolved or are in the process of being resolved. They include the disposal of deserted chemical weapons, the Diaoyu Islands, and issues concerning territorial rights and natural resources such as the dispute over oil and natural gas resources in the East China Sea.

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Holding a dialogue about these issues of history will only be possible when these various levels are recognized and differentiated. First, let us consider issues at the political level; these are concerned predominantly with the nature of Japan’s war against China in the earlier part of the 20th century. Without a doubt, this was a war of aggression launched by Japanese militarists against China. The key question is whether Japan has been self-reflective about the war. If we look at the content of the China-Japan Joint Declaration in 1972 or the China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978, we can see that the Japanese government exhibited a positive attitude. In 1993, the then Japanese prime minister Hosokawa Morihiro made it clear that the war was “a war that was wrong” as well as “a war of aggression.” In 1995, the then prime minister Murayama Tomiichi went even further by delivering a speech on the 50th anniversary of the end of the war that has been recognized by subsequent Japanese prime ministers. 8 If we were not aware that this expression of remorse and recognition of the responsibilities of war have faced extremely strong and continuous opposition from the right-wing and conservatives in Japanese society, especially some conservative members of parliament, we might be misled into thinking that problems at the political level have been resolved. Unfortunately, the political circle in Japan has denied the true nature of the war of aggression ever since the end of the war. This has especially been the case since the consolidation of the 1955 System. An undercurrent of revivalism has been alive in Japanese society and a return tide of historical thinking that gives approval to the “Great East Asia War” has become a widespread trend. Some politicians’ verbal expressions of “remorse” are in disagreement and even conflict with their real understanding of the war of aggression. 9 Such attitudes 8

Hosokawa Morihiro (prime minister of Japan, 1993–1994) admitted that the war started by Japan had been a “war of aggression,” “a war that was wrong.” Murayama Tomiichi (prime minister of Japan, 1994–1996) said that, “during a certain period in the not-too-distant past, Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly those of Asia. In the hope that no such mistake will be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humanity, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology.” See Takeuchi Minoru and 21 Seiki Chuugoku Souken, eds., Nicchuu Kokkou Bunkenshuu [Collection of Documents on Diplomatic Relations between China and Japan] (Sousousha, 2005), 440–441. 9 Kishi Nobusuke (prime minister of Japan, 1957–1958, 1958–1960) defended himself during his imprisonment. He argued that Japan was “rightfully defending itself.” He didn’t feel that Japan should be remorseful over the Asia Pacific War. Even if Japan should be remorseful, he felt that this should be over why Japan was

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were to influence subsequent Japanese politicians to a great extent. The intellectual trend arising in the 1980s toward “a complete liquidation of 40 years of postwar politics,” historical revisionism and the activities of the Liberalist History Studies Society in advocating the writing of “New History Textbooks” in the 1990s, and the repeated visits by Japanese prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine are all closely related to these particular attitudes. In 1995, 105 members of parliament from the Liberal Democratic Party formed the Historical Research and Discussions Committee. In viewing the Nanjing Massacre as a “fabrication” and wartime “comfort women” as engaged in an “act of commercial trading,” and using these perspectives as their starting point, these politicians sought to deny in a comprehensive manner the Japanese military’s responsibilities in the war and the nature of the war as a war of aggression. More recently, an essay by Air Self-Defense Force Chief of Staff Toshio Tamogami denying that Japan had been an aggressor nation was awarded a prize. All of these events explain why dialogue at the political level over the nature of Japan’s war of aggression remains unresolved; ultimately, these debates revolve around a matter of principle about what is right and what is wrong. The second level at which contentious issues of historical understanding exist is that of popular emotion and sentiment. Dialogue at this level should seek to rectify the differences that have arisen from the contrasting ways in which people in China and Japan experience, remember and perceive history. Remembrance of wartime victimization constitutes the deepest level of historical memories about the war among people in China and Japan. For example, keywords concerning the war of aggression that are widely mentioned in China include the Nanjing Massacre, Unit 731, and the Three Alls Policy—“Burn All, Kill All, Loot All,” whereas those in Japan include the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the air raids on Tokyo and the Battle of Okinawa. There is no doubt that these historical experiences of the war among people in both countries are facts, yet they do not add up to a balanced whole. People in Japan bear the double historical burden of simultaneously being the victims and the victimizers during the war. If they are continually constrained by a “one-sided, narrow perspective within their own country,” 10 this will lead to “a lack of consciousness of their past role as victimizers” and consequently an “defeated.” See Hara Yoshishisa, Kishi Nobusuke: Kensei no Seijika [Kishi Nobusuke: A Politician with Power] (Iwanami Shinsho, 1995), 121–122. 10 Onuma Yasuaki, Tokyo Saiban, Sensou Sekinin, Sengo Sekinin [The Trial of Tokyo, War Responsibility and Postwar Responsibilities] (Tokyo: Toushindou, 2007), 144.

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inability to understand the historical experiences of the people in the victimized country during the same historical process. For instance, the anti-nuclear movement has been an important starting point for the development of Japanese democratization and the peace movement. However, in view of a general lack of remorse over wartime responsibility regarding victimizing other nations, it is impossible for such an overt emphasis on the experience of victimization caused by atomic bombings to gain widespread sympathy and understanding. 11 The failure of the Hiroshima Atomic Bombing Archive to hold exhibitions in the United States proves to be a typical example. Of course, the lack of understanding on the part of the Japanese people over the victimization of Chinese people during the war is largely due to controls exerted by the Japanese militarist government over public opinion during wartime. The responsibility does not lie with the people in general. The inability of people from both countries to interact and communicate in a comprehensive manner over this issue in the years after the war has also led to differences in understanding. Hence the main question related to establishing dialogue at the level of popular emotion and sentiment is how to deepen exchange and mutual understanding between people from both countries. The third level at which dialogue needs to be established is the academic level. Historians from both countries need to conduct exchanges to discuss historical source material and differences in research methodology. At the same time, historians need to look into differences in understanding arising from contrasting historical experiences. Concerning the acquisition and use of historical source material, at present historical scholarship in both countries inadvertently makes greater use of materials located within its own country, as well as materials that are relatively easy to obtain from the other side. This has been due to circumstantial constraints and language barriers. Most researchers continue to face subjective and objective barriers in trying to use materials from the other side in a comprehensive manner. However, with the ongoing opening of archives in both countries and the strengthening of language capabilities, barriers in this area are gradually being removed. Differences in research methodologies constitute a problem that has had a decisive influence. In its research on the war of aggression launched by Japan, historical scholarship in China has paid attention not only to the description and analysis of concrete issues, it has also tried to dig into what lies behind a number of seemingly isolated phenomena and raised the 11 Yoshita Hiroshi, Gendai Rekishigaku to Sensou Sekinin [Modern Historical Scholarship and Responsibilities of War] (Aoki Shoten, 1997), 183–188.

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issues on hand to the higher level of historical philosophy to scrutinize their fortuity and inevitability, as well as individuality and universality. As for historical scholarship in Japan, even if historians acknowledge the nature of the war as a war of aggression, they tend to be more focused in general on the circumstantial factors behind several particular events. Taking research on the factors that led to the outbreak of China’s war of resistance against Japan as an example, Chinese scholars usually begin their discussions with the formation of Japan’s expansionist “line of advantage” concept and “continental policy,” whereas Japanese scholars tend to place greater emphasis on the background of China’s anti-Japanese boycott or the fortuity of circumstances leading up to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Hence, while Japanese scholars devote a great deal of energy to seeking out which party fired the first shot in the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Chinese scholars have felt that more attention should be paid to the reasons why Japanese troops were able to station themselves in Fengtai and conduct military exercises against the Chinese troops led by General Song Zheyuan. Chinese scholars have also felt that it is necessary to think about the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in connection with Japan’s further aggression in North China after the invasion of Manchuria on September 18, 1931, such as the Shanhaiguan incident, the Battle of Jehol, the nibbling of North China, the formation of the East Hebei Autonomous Council and the Fengtai Incident.12 Another contentious issue at the academic level is the concrete number of Chinese victims of the Nanjing Massacre. This was covered in the postwar Tokyo Trial and the Nanjing Trial. The verdict of the Tokyo rial (January 19, 1946) confirmed that “more than 200,000” 13 Chinese had been killed, whereas that of the Nanjing Trial (March 10, 1947) confirmed that “the total number of victims reached 300,000 and above.”14 Although the judgments on the number of victims of the Nanjing Massacre made by 12 The representative work that tries to seek out who fired the “first shot” is Hata Ikuhito, Rokoukyou Jiken no Kenkyuu [A Study of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident] (University of Tokyo Press, 1996). Hata Ikuhito argues that the first shot was fired by Chinese troops (see chapter 4). 13 See the verdict of the Tokyo Trial. The verdict exists in many versions of text. The record of the number of victims in the Nanjing Massacre in the various versions is the same. The one that I referred to is the translated version by the United States National Archives, with archival number: Group 153, Entry 169, Location 270/2/21/03, Box 8. 14 See the verdict on Tani Hisao generated by the Government of the Republic of China Ministry of Defence War Crime Tribunal, Nanjing datusha shiliao ji [Historical Documents on the Nanjing Massacre], vol. 24, 2006, 389.

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these trials attained a degree of accuracy that was only to the nearest 100,000, these were the result of a great deal of effort in searching and collating various sources, evidence and records. They also provide the basic facts for later generations to understand the massacre. Lying at the heart of issues concerning the massacre are the atrocious and inhumane acts performed by the Japanese army on the Chinese people, such as the rape of women, the collective slaughtering of captured soldiers who had laid down their arms, as well as the destruction of city buildings and residential homes. From the perspective of the history of the development of international relations after World War II, what is most important is to sum up this crucial historical lesson and prevent similar incidents from happening again. Research on the massacre should never avoid selfreflection regarding where responsibility lies for the war, and lessons from history should be consolidated no matter which interpretative angle is adopted in historical inquiries. However, ever since the 1980s, the rightwing and conservatives in Japan have tried to deny the existence of the massacre as the starting point in their attempt to completely overturn the responsibilities for the war that Japan bears. Being unable to deny the massacre as a fact, they have instead tried to divert public attention away from the truth by resorting to finding “gaps” in issues concerning the number of victims and using the ludicrous logic that “the massacre did not exist because the number of victims is unreliable.” All these constitute an attempt to transform what is essentially an issue of right or wrong at the level of determination of nature and value judgment into an empirical issue at the quantitative and statistical level. Doubts expressed over the number of victims in the name of empirical research constitute in reality a trap set up by right-wing and conservative scholars. 15 However, there are some scholars who have failed to see through this political trap and have generated over a long period of time totally unconstructive discussions and debates on the issue of numbers. Empirical research may be important, yet positioning it and the question of the accuracy of research inappropriately leads to a situation in which one fails to see the wood for the trees; in other words, describing only a part of an event prevents one from seeing overall historical trends. This is the point at which one falls into the trap set by the right-wing and conservatives. It is necessary to be vigilant about this.

15

Kasahara Tokushi and Nankin Jiken Ronsoushi, Nihonjin ha Shijitsu wo Dou Ninshiki Shite Kita ka [History of Controversies over the Nanjing Massacre: How have the Japanese People Understood the Historical Fact?] (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2007).

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A further example of disputes at the academic level can be seen in arguments regarding the existence or non-existence of the Tanaka Memorial as a document. This issue has already generated differing views in historical scholarship. No matter whether the document existed or not, whether it is a concrete fact or a forgery, the real nature of the issue is that the events taking place in East Asia and actions taken by Japan thereafter were in accordance with the plans laid out in the “memorial.” Historical scholarship may have expressed varying views in discussions and debates over the “memorial” itself, but there has been relatively unanimous understanding that “the events happening in Asia thereafter and the corresponding actions taken by Japan seemed to treat the ‘Tanaka Memorial’ like a textbook by following what had been given there.” Even Mamoru Shigemitsu, who became Japan’s foreign minister, felt that “it is difficult to clear up the foreign countries’ suspicions over this document” when gauging historical development after the appearance of the “memorial.”16 Whether the Tanaka Memorial existed as a historical document or not is certainly a problem that requires empirical research. However, it does not constitute essential evidence in proving Japan’s expansionist activities. A simplistic argument of “yes” or “no” would be insufficient to sum up the true nature of the problem. Even among Japanese scholars who do not think that the Tanaka Memorial itself existed as a document, there are many who have taken note of the truth of historical development. For example, Eguchi Keiichi, who felt that “The ‘Tanaka Memorial’ is a forgery,” made it clear that “whatever debates about this issue should take the forgery argument as the starting point and only then could we discuss who had been the real author.” However, he also soberly pointed out where the real problem lies: “The actual intention of those who deny the existence of the ‘Tanaka Memorial’ is to deny the aggressive nature of Tanaka Giichi’s foreign policies and use the forgery argument to clear Tanaka Giichi of his guilt and responsibilities.”17 Among Chinese scholars who are more familiar with the situation in Japan, there are also some who expressed doubts about, and even denied the authenticity of, the origins of

16

Shigemitsu Mamoru, Showa no Douran [Turbulence in the Showa Era] (Chuuou Kouronsha, 1952), 33. 17 Eguchi Keiichi, “Tanaka Jousoubun no Shingi” [The Authenticity of the Tanaka Memorial], Nihonshi Kenkyu [The Study of Japanese History] 85 (1965): 60–65. The same article can be found in Eguchi Keiichi, ed., Nihon Teikoku Shugishi Kenkyuu [History of Japanese Imperialism] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1975), 297–301.

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the Tanaka Memorial as a document from the empirical point of view.18 After World War II, there were indeed more Japanese scholars who questioned the existence of the Tanaka Memorial on the basis of the characteristics of Japan’s wartime political institutions and the format of official papers. Meanwhile, some Chinese scholars who did not possess a strong background in Japanese studies used the Tanaka Memorial as a standard source in their research. Yet, as discussed above, if it is examined from the perspective of academic research, the matter cannot be reduced to a simplistic argument of “yes” or “no.” Summarizing various kinds of scholarly opinions into a simplified narrative of “Japan says ‘no, it does not exist,’ while China says ‘yes, it does’” is not only totally unscientific but is also full of critical logical traps. Some people attribute the aforementioned differences in historical approach to the fundamental differences between the respective scholastic traditions of China and Japan, placing empirical research directly in opposition to theories and inquiries. However, such an argument is in itself unscientific. Conducting empirical research on a specific problem is the fundamental task of historical research. This simply cannot be overlooked no matter which country a scholar comes from. Empirical textology in China has always been a tradition of historical scholarship. In the 30 years 18

The examples include Yu Xinchun, “Chuugoku no Nihon Gaikoushi Kenkyuu” [China’s Research on Japan’s History of Diplomacy], The Aichi University Institute of International Affairs Journal 73 (1983): 177; Zou Youheng, “‘Tianzhong zouzhe’ zhenwei lun” [The Authenticity of the “Tanaka Memorial”], Waiguo wenti yanjiu 1 (1994): 1–16; Zou Youheng, “Ruhe kandai Zhong Ri guanxi shi shang de zhe zhuang gong’an: zai lun ‘Tianzhong zouzhe’ zhi zhenwei” [An Unresolved Case in the History of Sino-Japanese Relations: Taking a Second Look at the Authenticity of the “Tanaka Memorial”], Waiguo wenti yanjiu 2 (1995): 1–18. Apart from the aforementioned works, a number of scholars have analyzed the issue from a variety of angles, such as Zhang Bofeng, “‘Tianzhong zouzhe’ de zhenwei wenti” [Issues Concerning the Authenticity of the “Tanaka Memorial”], Lishi yanjiu 2 (1979): 78–82; Shen Yu, “Riben dongfang huiyi he Tianzhong Yiyi neige dui Hua zhengce: ping ‘Tianzhong zouzhe’ weizao shuo” [Japan’s Far East Conferences and the Tanaka Giichi Cabinet’s China Policy: A Critical Analysis of the Forgery Argument Concerning the “Tanaka Memorial”], Jindai shi yanjiu 1 (1981): 273–291; Shen Yu, “Guanyu ‘Tianzhong zouzhe’ ruogan wenti de zai tantao” [Reconsidering Some Issues Pertaining to the “Tanaka Memorial”], Lishi yanjiu 2 (1995): 82–94; Shen Yu, “Guanyu ‘Tianzhong zouzhe’ chaoqu ren Cai Zhikan ji qi zishu de pingjia wenti” [A Critical Analysis of Tsai Chih-kan, Copier of the “Tanaka Memorial”, and his Self-Narrated Account], Jindai shi yanjiu 3 (1996): 282–301.

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since the launch of China’s reform and open-door policy, historical scholarship in China has achieved considerable progress in empirical research in areas such as social history and the history of everyday life. In Japan, historians working in areas such as public history and social history, which include Marxist historiography as well as the field of empirical history under the aegis of academicism scholarship, have all been concerned with research on specific issues. Comprehensive and detailed historical sources, and their easy availability and access, have also contributed to the prosperity of empirical research. Furthermore, studies on the “micro” aspects of social history do not necessarily run into conflict with the “macro” perspective of interrelationship exploration. First of all, China’s traditional shi (history) has tried to gauge the relationship between politics and morality through an understanding of people in the past. This is the principle of “learning and drawing lessons from the past” that was brought up by Sima Qian. The tradition of official history started by the Shiji (Records of the Grand Historian) has served as a model for historical ideology in China. Indeed, history has served the purpose of clarifying rights and wrongs in China. The question is, has historical study in Japan failed to possess the same political and moral purpose as in China? In fact, official history in ancient Japan, with the Nihon Shoki (The Chronicles of Japan) as its genesis, has been written under the influence of Chinese culture. Even though the tradition of state-sanctioned official history has not been continued in Japan, this does not mean that history has been separated from either politics or morality. Neither has history been a mere “telling of stories from the past.” In fact, various “views of history” have been popular in Japan. The three levels at which differences in historical understanding between China and Japan exist are by no means separated by clear-cut boundaries. In fact, issues at all three levels have interpenetrated and influenced one another. Differences in historical understanding at the political level seem to be concerned predominantly with value judgments regarding the precise nature of the war. Those who openly rationalize war are small in number. According to the a public opinion poll in Japan, those who think that Japan’s war against China was a war of aggression make up a high proportion, at 68.1 percent.19 Yet in reality, differences in understanding arising from contrasting historical experiences between both countries and 19

Public opinion poll figures in the Yomiuri Shimbun, Kenshou Sensou Sekinin [Examining the Responsibilities of War] (Chuuou Kouronsha, 2006).

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people from both countries have often been utilized by conservative political power and this raises such differences to the political level. The lack of thoroughness in the postwar war crimes trials in turn has led to a lack of consciousness among Japanese people about Japan’s past role as victimizer. Many Japanese people simply feel that they were the victims of the Japanese military’s propaganda. They have little understanding about issues surrounding the Japanese military’s war crimes, such as the wartime “comfort women,” the Nanjing Massacre and biological and chemical warfare. As such, their sense of responsibility for the atrocities of war has been slow in growing. This has provided narrow nationalism, which denies the responsibilities of war, leeway to gaining considerable influence in society. They have tried to stir up emotions among people from both countries whose historical experiences are already in an imbalanced state. Their purpose has been to generate narrow nationalistic sentiment and transform emotional issues into political issues. Similarly, some of the differences in historical understanding in the area of empirical research belong originally to the academic level.20 If a certain aspect of history is given partial emphasis during the process of research, this can inadvertently be used by political powers, in spite of the wide availability of historical sources, to “prove” partial truths in the name of “empiricism.” Given the differences in historical experience between people from Japan and China, the results of such “empirical research” will not only fail to gain emotional acceptance from the public, but also intensify antagonism between both countries. As some Japanese historians have pointed out, historical revisionists have used differences in the understanding of historical facts (such as the issue concerning the number of victims) as a platform for discussion. They have tried to replace questions of responsibility with problems in historical understanding, in order to avoid questions of political responsibility. Historical revisionists have used questions about historical facts as research subjects, while concealing their political motives in doing so and provoking disputes about issues of understanding. They have also tried to replace issues of political ideology with those of historical perception and have used opinions such as “whenever wars took place in human history, there were always casualties,” and “why should Japan be the only state to bear all responsibility” to avoid having to accept the responsibilities of the war.21 20

Belonging to this level are questions about the existence of the Tanaka Memorial and the actual number of Chinese victims in the Nanjing Massacre. 21 Mizoguchi Yuuzou, Chuugoku no Shougeki [The Impact of China] (University of Tokyo Press, 2004).

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Research on the Asia Pacific War provides an example of this revisionist approach. Instead of inquiring into the responsibility that Japan bears for its attack on Pearl Harbour, some Japanese scholars have continued to search for circumstantial justification for Japan’s initiation of the war, such as the US embargo on the export of steel and scrap iron to Japan, and the economic blockade on Japan. Some have even insisted on advocating the so-called “ABCD encirclement” theory propagandized by the militarist government in the prewar period. 22 Meanwhile, they have emphasized various diplomatic efforts made by Japan to avoid the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States and have argued that the Hull Memorandum, dated December 1941, was an ultimatum of the United States’ rejection of negotiations as well as the reason behind the outbreak of war. While research of this kind takes place at the academic level, a conclusion such as “Japan was compelled to start the war due to intolerable circumstances”23 is bound to ruffle public emotions and affect relations between countries. The concept of the “compound war,” which has become increasingly manifest in perceptions of the war within Japanese society in recent years, has been undergoing reinforcement. Even though some politicians admitted during question-and-answer sessions in parliament that Japan “had committed acts of aggression on China” and “ruled the Korean Peninsula as a colony,” they expressed doubts that Japan’s war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands had been a war of aggression.24 There is no fundamental difference between such attitudes and the “war of survival and self-defense” against the United States, France and the Netherlands or the “Great East Asian War,” which were trumpeted by the Japanese military during World War II. This position has developed even further to produce the argument that the USSR contravened the principles laid down in the treaty of neutrality, and occupied Manchuria “illegally” in

22

This refers to the theory of “American-British-Chinese-Dutch Encirclement,” which the Japanese government and media went all out to propagate before the outbreak of the Asia Pacific War. The theory was merely a kind of propaganda and had no factual basis. See Eguchi Keiichi, Nihon no Shinryaku to Nihonjin no Sensoukan [Japan’s War of Aggression and the Japanese Perception of War] (Iwanami Shoten, 1995), 26. 23 Inaba Masao, Kobayashi Tatsuo, Shimada Toshihiko, and Sumida Ju, Taiheiyou Sensou he no Michi [The Path toward the Asia Pacific War], vol. 7 (Asahi Shimbunsha, 1963) is the key work that represents this kind of historical explanation. 24 See Asahi Shimbun, October 25, 1994.

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August 1945.25 During the period of transition in the mid 1990s from an older political system to a newer one, and the transfer of power from an older generation of politicians to a younger generation, the opinion of the Japanese media and political circles underwent a major change. The “new generation” of politicians has often argued that “the war had ended more than 10 years before we were born.” Their sense of guilt over the war simply cannot be compared with that of the older generation of politicians. Opinions pertaining to historical revisionism have become active, including the promotion of the notion that the postwar era has now ended and demands for a historical re-evaluation of the Asia Pacific War, as well as other wars. This newly developing nationalism has even targeted a number of phenomena that emerged in the postwar period, such as the Peace Constitution and democratism education. Propagators of this ultranationalism “deny words and actions by the Japanese government over the issues of historical understandings,”26 openly demand the rewriting of the postwar period and advocate amendment of Article 9 of Japan’s constitution. Within such a context, it is difficult for differences in historical understanding at the emotional and academic levels to avoid political manipulation.

Historians and Historical Understanding across National Borders Differences in historical understanding at the political, emotional and academic levels require different solutions. Differences at the political level are closely related to structural changes in Sino-Japanese relations. Another way of seeing this is that these problems result from structural changes in relations between both countries. Professor Mori Kazuko has pointed out in her analysis of this phenomenon: Sino-Japanese relations enter a period of structural transformations around 1995–96. China’s tremendous economic growth and Japan’s economic

25

See Nakamura Masanori, Sengoshi [History of the Postwar Era] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005). 26 Arai Shinichi, Rekishi Wakai wa Kanou ka? [Is it Possible to Achieve Historical Reconciliation?] (Iwanami Shoten, 2006), 282.

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stagnation led some people in Japan to regard China as a competitor…this resulted in the rise of the idea of “the China threat” in Japan.27

Such structural changes have also been reflected in differences in historical understanding. These structural changes have fuelled the rise of the idea of “the end of the postwar era” as well as an active wave of historical revisionism that has promoted “the conclusion of the postwar period” and demanded a historical re-evaluation of the Asia Pacific War. However, with the continuation of the structural changes in Sino-Japanese relations, and the growing clarity of fundamental trends, especially efforts toward establishing a mutually beneficial strategic relationship between China and Japan within the larger international environment, there may be new ways to resolve problems at the political level. Historians need to be concerned with disputes in historical understanding at both the emotional and academic levels. Dialogues need to be established regarding such disputes, drawing upon historians’ grasp of historical source materials and an understanding of the problems involved, as well as common experiences of exchanges, thereby providing a good foundation for encouraging mutual understanding between people from both countries. Such dialogues should be shaped by the following key considerations.

Clearly differentiate between the different issues that exist at the academic, emotional and political levels As discussed, differences in historical understandings at the academic, emotional and political levels interpenetrate and influence each other. While it is not easy to grasp their precise boundaries, in some instances it is important to try to do so. Treating issues at the political level as relating to the field of academic research will lead to a loss of direction and endless disputes. Expecting academic discussions to alleviate problems at the level of popular emotion is also somewhat idealistic. However, for issues originally belonging to the level of academic research, which have come to involve problems at the political and emotional levels, it is necessary that scholars continue to approach them from the academic perspective. They must ensure that these issues do not spill into the domain of popular emotion among people from both countries and that they are not transformed into political problems. Issues that have already spilled into 27

Mouri Kazuko, Nicchu Kankei: Sengo kara Shin Jidai he [Sino-Japanese Relations: From the Postwar Period to a New Era] (Iwanami Shoten, 2006), 130.

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the popular domain and have both stirred up emotion among people from both China and Japan and impacted upon diplomacy between these countries should be closely studied in academia. Ultimately, sincere efforts to resolve the issues at the emotional and political levels should be pursued.

Take into account the fact that most people now no longer have direct experience of the war With the passing of more than 60 years since the end of World War II, the number of people who directly experienced it is declining steadily and the influence of their wartime experiences on the younger generation is also decreasing. According to statistics, those who were born after the war now consist of more than 70 percent of the current population. Those who are 40 to 60 years of age may have acquired some sentimental knowledge of the war from the older generation through word of mouth. As for young people around the age of 20, it is difficult for them to obtain such knowledge even from their parents. Where the majority of people are concerned, the urgent task now is to avert a growing trend in which understanding of the war is becoming increasingly abstract. For many young people, the war belongs to the distant past, and it is viewed much like a game that only takes place in the virtual environment of computers.28 Young people who possess such an abstract understanding of the war can be easily misled and encouraged down a path toward narrow nationalism. In order to prevent such dangerous trends from taking place, historians should enable the younger generation to develop a deeper understanding of the history of the war. Through history education, historians need to encourage the younger generation to think about the history and future of East Asia from a much broader perspective.

Achieve common possession of historical facts to create the conditions for shared understanding Shared historical understanding requires time and the right conditions to develop. The most fundamental task in this regard is to achieve common possession of historical facts. Only with this as its basis, can historical understanding across national borders be established. There are certainly difficulties in achieving common possession of historical facts even among people in the same country. Resolving this problem requires a 28 Yamada Akira, Rekishi Shusei Shugi no Kokufuku [Overcoming Historical Revisionism] (Tokyo: Koubunsha, 2001), 10–11.

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peaceful academic environment as well as cool and objective academic inquiry. Even though the currently active academic exchanges among governments and people of East Asian countries have elicited differing views and criticisms, what has become undeniable is that the state of isolation with “national histories” as its basis has been broken. The focus of such academic exchanges has been to resolve issues concerning the common possession of historical facts. With closer interaction among scholars, as well as an increase in the extent to which historical facts are shared, academic research will find increasing possibilities to cross national borders.

Take into account the time lag that exists between the public and historians in achieving shared historical understanding The primary focus of the work of scholars is on issues and problems at the level of academic research, while the public at large understand historical issues and problems mainly through people’s personal experiences. Popular understanding of history tends to be emotionally driven and easily influenced by the media. As such, public understanding of the results of joint research needs a step-by-step process as well as cooperation among various groups in society, in particular the media, in order to be realized. A lack of recognition of this point combined with an emphasis on achieving quick results, will achieve little. In recent years, a greater openness to tourism has greatly encouraged exchange between people from various countries. With this as a basis, greater efforts in translating monographs and articles from both sides could create the necessary conditions for knowing each other’s historical understandings within a broader setting. We should enable others to know ourselves and at the same time adopt a proactive approach to know others. This principle is not simply an issue at the political level. It is also not the emotional issue of some people. It is rather a requirement to achieve the goals of peace and development as well as a necessary process in the development of human society. In conclusion, establishing historical understanding across national borders has a greater significance than building stable relations among East Asian countries. Such a move should not solely be motivated by a consideration of the benefits it will bring to each individual country’s diplomatic strategy. The establishment of historical understanding across national borders will create the basic conditions for achieving shared understanding at both societal and cultural levels in East Asia, Asia and the entire world. Although positive changes cannot be expected to occur

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immediately, there is still a real need to make definite efforts toward achieving this goal.

CHAPTER FOUR BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: THE UNITED STATES IN THE SINO-JAPANESE HISTORY PROBLEM CAROLINE ROSE

The Origins of the History Problem and the US Role A number of factors impeded reconciliation between China and Japan during the Cold War period, and an understanding of the role of the US government(s) and Occupation policies is essential here. Although the Tokyo war crimes trials and trials held in China brought some individuals to justice, it is widely felt that the war crimes trials failed to deal fully with Japan’s transgressions in China. In particular, the architects and perpetrators of biological and chemical warfare, sexual slavery and forced labor were not tried, and, of course, Emperor Hirohito enjoyed the protection of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) under General MacArthur. Within the context of the Cold War, Japan and China were soon divided by the hostile political environment, with the United States quickly realizing the worth of Japan as an ally in East Asia resulting in a series of somewhat generous concessions in the form of the cancellation of the reparations program, the “reverse course,” the cessation of the purge of Japanese bureaucrats, the winding up of the war crimes trials and so on. With the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT) in 1951 and subsequent bilateral settlements with many of Japan’s former enemies in the 1950s, in addition to the establishment of the US-Japan alliance, the seeds of what would emerge as the history problem 30 years later were sown, with the United States inextricably intertwined in the process.

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War Crimes Trials and the Telling of History: Justice and Truth? In theory, war crimes trials aim to “police the past” by bringing to trial those guilty of committing crimes against humanity. 1 They bring the perpetrators to account and also help to “individualize the guilt” by identifying the crimes of individual leaders or soldiers. 2 Trials are also about uncovering the facts about wartime conduct and policies, and have the potential to promote mutual understanding and reflection. Minear reminds us, for example, that one of the aims of the trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo was “the writing of official history.”3 In practice, however, and as the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) highlighted, war crimes trials can be highly problematic, and the desire of Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan to establish an authentic record of prewar and wartime events in the Asia Pacific was, according to many, ill-fated and the project a failure.4 The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (hereafter Tokyo trial) held between 1946 and 1948 was charged with the task of identifying and bringing to account Class A war criminals (i.e., those responsible for crimes against peace).5 The Tokyo trial in particular has been criticized as an example of victor’s justice or for promoting a view of Japan’s actions as particularly evil. The trial is seen by some as deeply flawed in legal, political and historical terms, as unfair, hypocritical, rushed and biased, while others consider it highly successful in its pursuit of justice and commitment to the punishment of inhumane crimes. 6 Although some of Japan’s war criminals and the crimes they perpetrated were prosecuted, many 1

This section originates from Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking to the Future (London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), Chapter 2. 2 Andrew Rigby, “Forgiving the Past: paths towards a culture of reconciliation” (paper presented at IPRA, Tampere, 2000). 3 Richard H. Minear, Victor's Justice: the Tokyo war crimes trial (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Centre for Japanese Studies, The University of Michigan, 2001), 126. 4 Minear, Victor's Justice, 158. 5 In addition, military tribunals carried out throughout Asia prosecuted thousands of Class B and C war criminals (that is, those responsible for conventional war crimes, crimes against humanity or “planning, ordering, authorization, or failure to prevent” crimes against humanity) See John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the aftermath of World War II (London: Penguin, 1999), 443-7. 6 For summaries and examples of these points of view, see Dower (1999), 442-484; Minear, Victor's Justice, and Timothy P. Maga, Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese war crimes trials (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2001).

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individuals, notably the emperor, evaded responsibility. More important is that certain crimes against humanity, mainly those committed against Asians, were not fully dealt with during the Tokyo trial. At the Tokyo trial, 23 of the defendants were found guilty on the charge of waging war against China, seven of them being sentenced to death. Of these seven, two individuals, Hirota Kǀki (former foreign minister) and Matsui Iwane (commanding officer of the Japanese forces in central China), were found guilty in connection with atrocities in Nanjing. 7 But no charges were brought against those thought to be responsible for the capture and enslavement of Chinese forced laborers (for example, Kishi Nobusuke). Information about crimes committed at Unit 731 and other chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities was never introduced to the court because of the desire of the United States to acquire information about the program and keep it secret.8 This was despite a mounting set of evidence about Japan’s CBW program gathered throughout the period of the trial based on information from other governments (notably China), Japanese informants and non-Japanese witnesses. The marginalization of Chinese, and indeed other Asian, victims during the Tokyo trial meant that the suffering of “comfort women,” forced laborers and victims of biological experimentation were overlooked or “slighted,” to use Awaya Kentaro’s term.9 The (current) Chinese view of the Tokyo trial is that the process was severely weakened by the absence of Emperor Hirohito from the witness box, the cover-up of the CBW activities and the failure to prosecute Ishii Shirǀ.10 The international conditions prevailing at the outset of the war crimes trials were very different to those that were developing in 1948 as the trials

7

Specifically, they were found guilty on Count 55 “Disregard of duty to secure observance of and prevent breaches of Laws of War” (Minear, Victor's Justice, 203). 8 For information on the suppression of evidence about biological and chemical experimentation see Sheldon Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese biological warfare, 1932-45, and the American cover-up (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). 9 The Dutch trials held in Jakarta in 1948 dealt with Dutch “comfort women” and Totani refers to the body of Japanese research on the trials which describes the evidence brought forward on sexual slavery and forced labor. See Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trials: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II (Harvard University Press, 2008), 179-80 and 253-5. 10 Tian Huan, Zhanhou ZhongRi guanxi shi 1945-1995 [A history of post-war Sino-Japanese relations, 1945-1995] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2002), 63.

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were brought to an “early” close (after 31 months).11 Dower highlights the irony of the World War II allies in 1948 who, while continuing to reject the arguments of the defense (which stated that the motivation for Japan’s actions in Asia grew partly from the fear of chaos and Communism in China), were enveloped in a “growing sense of a global Armageddon between communist and anticommunist forces.”12

Japan’s ‘Collective Amnesia’ The trials had a further outcome, leading to what many have described as Japan’s collective amnesia about the war. The Tokyo trial, in particular, had a profound influence on the interpretation of the war and the way Japanese were able to “forget” their wartime practices. In the words of Ienaga Saburǀ: There has been a tendency to reject the Tokyo trial in toto as unfair, and this tendency is linked inseparably with a second tendency: to assert the legitimacy of the war waged by Japan and to suppress or obliterate the aggressive nature of that war and the inhuman criminal activity that took place.13

Yoneyama talks about the “remarkable indifference about Japan’s prewar and wartime legacy,” 14 and Japan is often accused of a forty-year silence on the subject of the war and the issue of war responsibility. Much has been written on Japan’s national forgetting, and Japan is often compared, unfavorably, with Germany in this regard. Germany’s success in dealing with its past is held up by Japanese and Chinese alike as the model which Japan failed to emulate. But the case has perhaps been overstated and it is worth remembering that the events of the war, and the issue of war responsibility, were debated in Japan very early in the 11 Keenan appears to have been under pressure from the US government and McArthur to speed things up as the trials became somewhat drawn out. That said, as Totani notes, given the large volume of evidence, the various prosecution teams did well to complete their presentations in a relatively short time span, but with a deleterious effect on the education mission of the trial (Totani, Tokyo War Crimes Trials, 115). 12 Dower (1999), 469. 13 Ienaga Saburǀ, “The Historical Significance of the Tokyo Trial,” in C. Hosoya, N. Ando, Y. Onuma and R. Minear (eds), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: an international symposium, (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1986), 167. 14 Lisa Yoneyama , Hiroshima Traces: time, space, and the dialectics of memory, (Berkeley, California: University of California, 1999), 5.

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postwar period, and sporadically ever since. In Orr’s words, “the amnesia was intermittent and often only partial.” 15 Dower recounts the “general mood” of the Japanese people in the immediate aftermath of the war, as described by the US State Department in 1945, as being in favor of “fixing war responsibility.” Furthermore, there was a growing conviction that “Japan should not have undertaken aggressive warfare.”16 As the Tokyo trial revealed more and more about the shocking conduct of Japanese troops overseas (particularly in China), so too did the discussion develop amongst the Japanese public, left-leaning press and intellectuals about who should hold responsibility. This debate, admittedly, did not last long. Once again realpolitik and SCAP intervened: “as the Cold War intensified and the occupiers came to identify newly communist China as the archenemy, it became an integral part of American policy itself to discourage recollection of Japan’s atrocities.”17 This took the form of suppression or censorship, for example, of honest and sensitive literary accounts and reflections on Japan’s war crimes. This in turn enabled the Japanese to “forget” the war, or specifically the role of Japan as victimizer during the war, a process no doubt welcomed by those who failed to see Japan’s war as anything but one of liberation from the West. Nonetheless, the battle lines for the debate on the interpretation of the war and war responsibility in Japan had already been drawn by 1948, with those on the left supporting the war-of-aggression point of view, and those on the right and in ruling circles preferring to defend the emperor and lay the blame on military-clique politics.18

Pauley’s Reparations Program and the Peace Treaty “Waiver” Reparations, 19 a further stage in the reconciliation process, can help two former enemies to reconcile their differences in the form of material measures (for example, cash payments, provision of health care, etc.) or symbolic measures (for example, apologies, construction of memorials, etc.). It is often the acknowledgement by the perpetrators of their former wrongdoings which is as important as the material compensation offered 15

James Orr, The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan (University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 173. 16 Dower (1999), 476. 17 Ibid., 508. 18 Ibid., 476-8. 19 This section is drawn from Rose (2005), Chapter 2.

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in these cases. The 1972 Joint Communiqué between China and Japan ostensibly settled the past as far as state-level negotiations were concerned, but the agreement by the Chinese government to waive reparations must be understood in the context of earlier postwar settlements and US/Occupation policies on reparations. Discussions between the Allied powers about the nature of a postwar settlement were underway even before the Japanese surrender 20 and promised favorable outcomes for China in terms of reparations. Under the Potsdam Declaration, Japan would be obliged to pay reparations in kind (jitsumono baishǀ), and according to the Initial Post-Surrender Policy on Japan, produced by the Americans in September 1945, Japan would hand over assets and capital which would be dispersed by the Allied powers as reparations. The Kuomintang (KMT) government had produced a statement in March 1945 to clarify its position that, as the country that suffered the most at the hands of the Japanese military, China had a keen interest in reparations from Japan. In fact the Chinese argued that they should claim at least 50 percent of the total value of Japan’s capital and assets. 21 By October 1946, the Chinese government had calculated an estimated sum of deaths and damages inflicted by the Japanese on China between 1937 and 1945 (excluding Northeast China and Taiwan) amounting to $31.3 billion in direct damages (public and private property), $20.4 billion in indirect damages, and 10.4 million military and civilian deaths or injuries.22 Edwin W. Pauley was appointed by President Truman to produce a reparations policy for Japan (he had carried out the same task for Germany). His interim report was announced in December 1945. The main objectives of his recommended program were to prevent another build-up of Japanese industrial power (and therefore a revival of an imbalance of economic power in Asia with Japan dominating the region) by moving

20

For example, the Allied UN Declaration of January 1942, the Yalta Agreement, the Cairo and Potsdam declarations and the Basic Post-Surrender Policy of the Far East Commission. 21 This was the “Outline of China’s claims for reparations from Japan” (Zhanhou duiRi jianghe tiaojian gangyao). Further statements emerged in 1947. See A. Yamagiwa, “Gendaishi ni okeru baishǀ mondai” [The reparations issue in contemporary history], Chnjgoku kenkynj, 21 (1991), 12-33. 22 Zhu Jianrong, “Chnjgoku wa naze baishǀ o hǀki shita ka” [Why did China waive reparations?), Gaikǀ Fǀramu, 49 (1992), 28.

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most of Japan’s plant and machinery to Asian countries as reparations.23 Both the Far Eastern Commission and SCAP General Headquarters (GHQ) accepted the plan initially, and work began on designation of factories to be made available for transfer. By March 1947, 1/3 of the plants had been designated, but there were conflicts between the recipients as to how the spoils would be divided. In April 1947, the interim report announced that an initial 30 percent of the total reparations claim would be disbursed. China would receive 15 percent, with the Philippines, Britain and Holland each receiving 5 percent. It remained then for the materials to be transferred. As part of a program of advance transfers, some reparations were made to China between January 1948 and September 1949. China received approximately 22 shipments of machinery and equipment worth US$22.5 million.24 In addition, $18.1 million-worth of stolen property was returned to China. However, as early as the middle of 1947, Pauley’s plan was already being questioned by some in the US government who thought that the reparations program would hold back Japan’s economic growth for too long, thereby imposing greater Occupation costs. Holman remarks on the “significant change of attitude within the United States administration” on the role that Japan should take in the economic sphere. Whereas in 1946 the aim of the reparations mission was to enable Chinese and Korean economic development and assure their independence of Japan, by 1947 the focus was on “‘the reconstruction of those two great workshops of Europe and Asia—Germany and Japan.’”25 Those critical of the Pauley plan, including by 1947–48 General MacArthur, argued that it failed to take into account the burden that it would place on the Japanese economy, and to a lesser extent, the people. In addition, the removal of large amounts of capital equipment to China and Korea, it was felt, would not ameliorate the economies in recipient countries to the extent that it could make any significant contribution to their industrialization.26 Rather, it was 23

W. S. Borden, The Pacific Alliance: United States foreign economic policy and Japanese trade recovery, 1947-1955 (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 66. 24 Tian (2002), 69. 25 D.S. Holman, “Japan’s Position in the Economy of the Far East,” Pacific Affairs 20, no. 4 (1947): 371 citing Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson. 26 Holman “Japan’s Position,” 372-3. See also Scheiber’s account of MacArthur’s u-turn on reparations—previously a staunch supporter of a more punitive reparations program, in 1947 he dismissed the idea of reparations as “sheer nonsense” and in March 1948 demanded their abandonment since Japan had “already paid over fifty billion dollars by virtue of her lost properties in Manchuria, Korea, North China

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thought that greater contribution could be made to the recovery of the region’s economy through the resurrection of Japanese industry which could then supply neighboring countries with the consumer goods and construction materials they sought.27 Other factors undoubtedly contributed to a growing skepticism about the reparations plan. By 1948, SCAP policy on Japan and its economic and political rehabilitation was beginning to shift as Cold War tensions rose. As the policy of containment emerged in the face of the perceived Communist threat from the Soviet Union, China and Korea, the US government began to identify Japan as an ally in the region and started to reverse some of its earlier policies. By May 1949, Pauley’s reparations plan was cancelled and the issue of Japan’s reparations was put on hold. By November 1950, as part of the US government’s plans for a peace treaty with Japan, it was suggested that reparations be waived.28 The cancellation of the US reparations plan did not put a stop to the requests of the governments of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) in the early 1950s. The ROC’s ambassador in Washington, Wellington Koo, told John Foster Dulles (special envoy to President Truman charged with the task of drawing up a peace treaty with Japan) in 1950 that “China anticipated reparations from Japan in any peace treaty.”29 In the PRC’s case, in response to the proposed SFPT, Zhou Enlai stated on August 15, 1951, that “it is essential that countries occupied by Japan and having suffered great losses…must reserve the right to claim compensation.”30 According to figures produced by the PRC in 1951 these losses amounted to 10 million killed and $50 billion in economic damages.31 Yet by 1952 Taiwan had agreed to waive reparations in the Peace Treaty signed between Japan and Taiwan, and in 1972 the PRC did the same in the Joint Statement signed with Japan. Furthermore, no “special” economic package was arranged with either country in place of

and the outer islands.” Harry N. Scheiber, “Taking Responsibility: Moral and Historical Perspectives on the Japanese War –Reparations Issues,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 20, no. 233 (2002): 245. 27 Holman (1947), 379. 28 See Yamagiwa (1991). 29 John Price, “A Just Peace? The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty in Historical Perspective,” JPRI Working Paper No. 78, (June 2001), 5. 30 Zhu (1992), 29. 31 Ibid., 28.

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reparations as was the case with Korea or Burma.32 The reasons for this are linked to the SFPT.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty Amidst the Cold War climate of the early 1950s, 48 countries signed the SFPT in 1951, but, ironically, this did not include those countries that had suffered the most at the hands of Japanese aggression, or who were the most resistant to the evolving US-centered security architecture of the region, that is China, Korea and the Soviet Union. Neither the government of the PRC nor that of the ROC was invited to the peace conference due to a difference of opinion between the British government (which wanted to recognize the PRC) and the American government (which favored recognition of the ROC). In the end it was agreed that the Japanese government would be allowed to sign a separate treaty with whichever of the two governments it chose—although, as is well known, there was to be very little choice in the matter. Part of the United States’ plans to make Japan an ally in the region included the need to revitalize the economy. This impacted upon the issue of reparations during the negotiation process. The United States was insistent that the signatories to the SFPT should waive their claims to reparations since Japan was not in a position to pay full damages, and that providing “full reparations would harm Japan’s economy and create a breeding ground for communism.” 33 Not all the parties welcomed the suggestion. The Philippine government was the most vocal in its protest, demanding compensation for $8 billion in damages. It failed to secure this amount, but it did manage to get the inclusion of clause 14(a) into the treaty which had the effect of relegating reparations to a post-treaty process, limiting claims to states, not nationals (that is, individuals), and allowing for reparations to be in kind (for example, through the provision of services), therefore easing the strain on the Japanese economy. 34 32 The economic aid packages arranged between Chinese and Japanese governments since 1979 are generally regarded as reparations by proxy, but these packages were not discussed as part of the negotiations for normalization in 1972 and cannot be regarded as official reparations. 33 Price (2001), 2. 34 Ibid., 8. Article 14 (a) and (b) of the SFPT reads as follows: 14 (a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to

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Nonetheless, as Scheiber argues, the “extraordinarily generous terms” of the treaty and the specification of waivers provided Japan with a “tactical advantage” (when compared with Germany, for example) in “standing firm against the judgments of history.”35 The developments between 1945 and 1952 in effect created “unfinished business” for China and Japan that would emerge in the 1980s and beyond in the form of the history problem. For Scheiber, …this process of covering up and hiding away [from the past] was justified because of asserted imperatives of inter-Allied rivalries and the Cold War situation that emerged immediately after the war, but was already taking shape even before the German and Japanese forces had surrendered.36

In addition to these Cold War imperatives, Scheiber suggests that “simple greed” also lies behind the failure of individuals, corporations and governments to face up to the past. He discusses the issue of art plundered by the Nazis, for example, and the begrudging response of European companies and banks to divulge details of World War II-related transgressions and undertake to pay compensation. Nonetheless, while moral responsibility has since been accepted by European actors, particularly

maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the same time meet its other obligations. Therefore 1. Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question 2. (I) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (II) below, each of the Allied Powers shall have the right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of all property, rights and interests of (a) Japan and Japanese nationals, (b) persons acting for or on behalf of Japan or Japanese nationals, and (c) entities owned or controlled by Japan or Japanese nationals (abridged). (b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for the direct military costs of the occupation. 35 Scheiber (2002),234. 36 Ibid., 233.

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since the 1990s,37 the same cannot be said for Japanese governments since the end of the war. Again this has its origins in US policy and pursuit of its own strategic goals (for Scheiber this is mainly in the form of MacArthur’s domination of SCAP) during Occupation, which had the effect of “successfully insulat[ing] the Japanese people and their postwar leadership from the moral and political force of world opinion.” 38 This insulation came in the form of financial, physical and “psychological” protection with US intervention in the reparations program, their dominance over the Allied Council and the Far Eastern Council, the introduction of the waiver into the Peace Treaty, and so on.39 As the next section will suggest, the US policies of the early postwar period have therefore had far-reaching repercussions on China-Japan relations, not least in contributing to the creation of a set of conditions in which the history problem could germinate. Ironically, however, they have also created a difficult situation for subsequent US governments which, while trying to remain aloof or neutral, have increasingly found themselves caught between a rock and a hard place in relation to the history problem. Voices critical of the US official position (which seeks to protect the US-Japan alliance and uphold the wording of the SFPT, etc.) have come to the fore since the 1990s as activists have attempted to seek restitution for victims of Japanese wartime atrocities and have questioned the US government’s own moral stance on the history problem.

The History Problem and the Ambiguous Role of the United States The standard view of the role of the United States in China-Japan political relations is that the United States favors non-interference and a neutral position. This is an accurate description—to a point. When one considers some of the US government’s actions on the compensation cases brought in US courts, however, the picture is less clear. In addition, at the height of Sino-Japanese tensions in the mid-2000s, it appears that there may have been some attempts to raise with the Japanese government US concerns arising from Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, though somewhat circuitously. In addition, the response to former Prime Minister 37 Though it must be said not always willingly—see Bill Niven, Facing the Nazi Past: United Germany and the legacy of the Third Reich (London and New York: Routledge, 2002) 38 Scheiber (2002), 233. 39 Ibid., 240.

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Abe’s comments on the “comfort women” issue had the effect of galvanizing public and official opinion on Japan’s war responsibility and no doubt contributed to the passing of the House resolution in 2007. According to Ming Wan, while the United States has not intervened actively in Sino-Japanese political relations, “it has engaged on a limited scale in leveraging and maneuvering between China and Japan.” 40 The main influence manifests itself in a much bigger way—in the sense that “US structural power” (that is, its preeminent status as a major superpower, with Japan as an ally, since the end of World War II) “explains why China and Japan have not become and are not likely to become allies in the foreseeable future.”41 Ming Wan cites two occasions since 1972 when the United States has been forced to clarify its position on Sino-Japaneserelated issues. The first instance was the conclusion of the 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT) when President Carter urged Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo to sign the treaty (for which negotiations had come to a temporary stalemate) in their May summit. The second instance relates to the Senkaku/Diaoyu disputed islands issue, on which the United States has consistently adopted a neutral stance since US-China normalization under Nixon, but which in 1996, under Japanese pressure, went as far as to state that it was obliged to defend the islands under the US-Japan Security Treaty should the need arise. Largely, however, the US approach appears to be one of observation and non-intervention. For instance, in the 2001 textbook dispute, it “took a deliberate position not to get involved.”42 As well, in the East China Sea disputes, anti-Japanese demonstrations and Japan’s bid for a permanent United Nations Security Council seat in the mid-2000s, the United States also “kept silent.”43 In addition to a lack of intervention, there has also been very little in the way of attempts by the United States to manipulate China and Japan for the pursuit of the United States’ own interests—with the exception of Nixon in the 1970s when the United States was aiming to pursue its own strategic interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union rather than China and/or Japan. US influence in Sino-Japanese relations for Ming Wan therefore lies, first, in the ability to “affect threshold events,” such as rapprochement in the 1970s (which had a positive effect on Sino-Japanese relations) and the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance in the 1990s (which had a negative effect, as Japan chose to enhance its security cooperation with its ally, 40

Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Stanford University Press, 2006), 178. 41 Ibid., 179. 42 Ibid., 180. 43 Ibid.

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causing concern in China about attempts to contain China), and second, in the shaping of the boundaries of Sino-Japanese political relations “explaining to a large extent a clear absence of close political cooperation or severe clashes between Beijing and Tokyo.”44 Liang Yunxiang also takes the view that the United States has fundamentally taken a neutral stance on the China-Japan history problem, but, because of its alliance with Japan, there is a tendency for the United States to favor Japan by refraining from any criticism of Japanese actions. For Liang, this in turn has helped to nurture in some Japanese politicians a “mistaken awareness” of the history problem.45 This is an important point, but I would go further than Liang in his analysis of the US government’s stance. While various administrations may well have chosen not to speak out on certain issues in Sino-Japanese relations, the position on the legal aspects of the peace settlement has been clarified a number of times, particularly in recent years. This has done considerable harm to the restitution issue since it has enabled the Japanese government and judiciary to persist in the view that legal responsibility for wartime actions has been fulfilled and no further action is required, while ignoring the issue of moral responsibility. Scheiber, for example, recounts Secretary of State Colin Powell’s statement on the 50th anniversary commemoration of the signing of the Peace Treaty in October 2001 when the Japanese foreign minister “spoke of the regrettable nature of acts committed by Japan in the war, but still stopped short of an outright apology” and Powell reiterated “the US government’s position that the Peace Treaty ‘waiver’ foreclosed any claim of reparations, such as those being sought in California litigation by former prisoners of war.”46 In fact, the US position has been far from neutral in some of the compensation cases going through US courts, where the Bush (and Clinton) administrations took what Bazyler describes as a “hostile approach” to the cases,47 issuing very clear statements of interest. This tendency to “lean to one side” of course stems from the Occupation period and the peace settlement, to which the United States is obliged to adhere. But it can also be explained in terms of strategic factors, and the

44

Ibid., 185. Liang Yunxiang, “ChnjNichi kankei ni okeru rekishi ninshiki mondai to Amerika yǀso” (The History Problem in China-Japan Relations and the American Factor) in Unǀ Shigeaki and Tang Yanxia (eds) Tenki ni tatsu Nicchnj kankei to Amerika (Tokyo: Kokusai Shoin, 2008), 171. 46 Scheiber (2002), 236. 47 M. J. Bazyler, “Holocaust restitution in the United States and other claims for historical wrongs: an update,” International Civil Liberties Report (2001). 45

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need of the United States to maintain, and indeed strengthen, its alliance with Japan in the post-Cold War period. The next section will consider some of the US-based compensation cases involving East Asian plaintiffs and the role of the US government, before moving on to consider some of the attempts by US legislators to pass resolutions through Congress.

Activism in the United States in the 1990s and 2000s: Too Little, Too Late? In the 1990s, hopes were high that cases brought by American and Asian former prisoners of war (POWs), forced laborers and “comfort women” would be won in US law courts because of the success of US law firms in Holocaust restitution cases. 48 In addition, changes had been made to the statute of limitations on matters relating to World War II, courtesy of a law enacted in July 1999 that extended the period within which claims could be made to 2010.49 By the early 2000s, at least 10 cases against Japan or Japanese companies were pending in the United States, three of which were on behalf of Chinese claimants.50 Despite high hopes for these lawsuits, however, most were dismissed. Reasons for the dismissals are varied: cases brought against Japanese companies on behalf of American or Allied former POWs were dismissed on the grounds that signatories to the SFPT are not allowed to claim compensation. Those brought on behalf of non-US, non-Allied power victims (e.g., Koreans and Chinese) against Japanese companies have been dismissed for a number of other reasons. One judge, for example, found that the California law 345.6 was unconstitutional, while, in other cases, “pressure” from the US government via its statements of interest prevented the cases from proceeding. 51 Finally, those cases brought against the Japanese government on behalf of former “comfort women” have failed, also because of the US government’s stance. The influence of the US government in these lawsuits is, therefore, worth noting, and Bazyler puts the failure of the court cases down to the 48

See Rose (2005) Chapter 4. California Code of Civil Procedure Section 354.6. By contrast, Japan’s statute of limitations was (and remains) 20 years after the event. 50 Kyodo News, October 18, 2000; Bazyler, “Holocaust restitution”. 51 Statements of interest represented the US government’s view and tended to preclude claims against the Japanese government or companies under the 1951 SFPT. 49

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government’s pro-Japan stance and its willingness to side with Japanese companies. The defense lawyers acting on behalf of one group of Korean and Chinese “comfort women” protested against the US government’s statement of interest arguing that the position adopted by the Department of State was “a strategic one, rather than a legal one” aimed at maintaining the status quo in US-Japan relations. The pro-Japan stance of the US government has been contrasted with its position on the issue of German compensation, in which the government played an active role in encouraging Germany to set up a compensation fund and some US judges were willing to uphold claims for compensation brought in US courts when it appeared that Germany was not keeping to “its part of the bargain.”52 To take one example, the case filed by Michael Hausfeld of Cohen Milstein in September 2000 with the Columbia District Court sought compensation from the Japanese government on behalf of 15 named plaintiffs (“and all others similarly situated”), among them four Chinese women.53 The lawsuit was brought on the basis of the Alien Tort Claims Act which allows non-US citizens to bring claims against other non-US citizens (here the Japanese state). By October 2001, however, the case had been dismissed and had gone to appeal. As with some of the forced labor cases that preceded this one, the court’s decision was probably swayed by a statement of interest issued by the George W. Bush administration in May 2001 in support of the defendant’s case (that is, the Japanese government), arguing in favor of a dismissal. The main reason given in the statement of interest was that Japan is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act which disallows US courts from establishing jurisdiction over such lawsuits.54 The Bush administration was heavily criticized by US lawyers and academics for employing double standards, and being self-serving and inconsistent on human rights and other reparations issues. Park argues, for example, that the United States “ignored the human rights protection policy that it advocated in previous cases by urging the court not to hear the case.” 55 “Arbitrary self-interests” (that is, the desire to maintain a stable relationship with Japan) were seen to be at the root of the United States’ decision to file its statement of interest, and Park argues that given 52

See Niven (2002), 234, and Bazyler (2002),. “Ex-sex slaves file suit in US”, Japan Times Online, September 20, 2000. 54 Byoungwook Park, “Comfort women during World War II: are US courts a final resort for justice?” American University International Law Review, 17, no. 2 (2002): 403-58. 55 Ibid., 456. 53

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that the United States failed to take up the issue of sexual slavery in the immediate aftermath of the war, it has a “moral responsibility to pursue reparations” now. Johnson (and others) saw the US-based cases as a meaningful opportunity to raise awareness of the wartime atrocities and thereby apply pressure on the Japanese government to act. But for this to happen, US government support was needed. With no such support forthcoming, the prospects for success in the US courts were always slight.56

Critical Voices: Cautious Criticisms and House Resolutions Liang suggests that US government impartiality on the Sino-Japanese history problem can be explained by the fact that disputes between China and Japan over the past do not pose a threat to any core US interests.57 However, in the mid-2000s this appeared to change as (albeit very cautious) criticisms began to emerge from some in (or attached to) the US administration of Koizumi’s stance on the history issue (that is, his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine) and the attendant deterioration of China-Japan and Korea-Japan relations. In addition, the United States’ continued silence on the history issue seemed to be increasingly untenable as it appeared that both Japanese and US interests were potentially being harmed by the ongoing tension between Japan and its neighbors.58 While relations between China and Japan improved considerably once Prime Minister Abe Shinzo took the helm, the spat over his interpretation of the Japanese government’s role in military sexual slavery during the war provided a further impetus to those in the United States seeking a formal acknowledgement and apology from Japan through congressional resolutions. There have been a number of attempts on the part of US members of Congress to introduce bills calling upon the Japanese government to

56

See Park (2002) ; Bazyler (2002) and Nathalie I. Johnson, “'Justice for ‘Comfort Women’: will the alien tort claims act bring them the remedies they seek?” Penn State International Law Review, 20, no. 1 (2001): 253-74. 57 Liang (2008), 172. 58 See Kwen Weng Kin, “Koizumi's Obstinacy Could Isolate Japan: Yasukuni and Asia,” Japan Focus, January 22, 2006, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Kwan_WengKin/1881; Norimitsu Ohnishi, “US needs Japan’s diplomacy but Tokyo isn’t talking,” New York Times, June 25, 2006; and Liang “ChnjNichi kankei.”

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accept war responsibility (for example in 1997 and 200059). However, it was not until the mid-2000s that this movement gathered momentum. In April 2006, a non-binding resolution was brought by Democrat Lane Evans and Republican Chris Smith (House Resolution 759), which called on the Japanese government to formally acknowledge and accept responsibility for its sexual enslavement of young women in the 1930s and 1940s. There appeared to be greater support for this bill than previous attempts, given the increasing importance of Chinese-American and Korean-American lobby groups, and support from members of both political parties. There was also an important change of focus in this resolution away from calls for compensation to acceptance of responsibility, in addition to a change of strategy to submitting a resolution to the House of Representatives only (rather than a concurrent resolution requiring approval in both Chambers). 60 The resolution also mentioned the recommendations of the United Nations and Amnesty International reports on the “comfort women,” showing a greater appreciation of international awareness and interest in this matter.61 However, despite high hopes, the resolution was not taken to a vote before Congress adjourned for elections. The powerful Japan lobby was thought to be partially responsible for slowing the resolution down, in addition to the concerns of some in Congress about the potential damage such a resolution could do to USJapan relations.62 This therefore represented yet another success for “the combined forces of the US State Department and the Japan Lobby, which, since the 1951 San Francisco Treaty, have protected the Japanese government from pressures to accept responsibility for its war crimes and provide reparations for its victims.”63

59

In June 25, 2000, a resolution was submitted by Lane Evans to the International Relations Committee for consideration in 106th Congress; in July 1997 William Lipinski’s resolution was passed by the Committee’s Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific, but scrapped “when congressmen delayed resolutions, fearing damage to relations with Japan’. See Alexis Dudden, “US Congressional Resolution Calls on Japan to Accept Responsibility for Wartime Comfort Women,” Japan Focus, April 22, 2006, http://japanfocus.org/-H_R__759-/1908. 60 Dudden (2006); Ken Silverstein, “Cold Comfort: The Japan Lobby Blocks Congressional Resolution on World War II Sex Slaves,” Japan Focus, October 21, 2006, http://japanfocus.org/-Ken-Silverstein/2253. 61 Dudden (2006). 62 See Silverstein (2006). In particular, the Japanese government employed a US company (Hogan and Hartson) to prevent HR759 reaching a vote. The main advocate for Japan in this case was House minority leader Bob Michel. 63 See Dudden’s introduction to Silverstein “Cold Comfort”.

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In January 2007 a new resolution (House Resolution 121) was submitted to the International Relations Committee by Mike Honda calling for the Japanese government to apologize and provide accurate public education about the “comfort women” system. The resolution gained greater attention than in the past, not least because of the response within Japan, and from Prime Minister Abe himself. On March 1, 2007, Prime Minister Abe denied Japanese government responsibility for the forced coercion of women and girls into sexual slavery. 64 Abe’s denial was a response to the resolution. He stated that there was no evidence that “comfort women” recruitment had been “forcible in the narrow sense of the word.” This was reiterated a few days later in the Diet (so this was no slip of the tongue) when he clarified what the “narrow sense of the word” would mean (that is, “officials forcing their way into houses”). While he agreed with the notion that recruitment was forcible in the “broad sense of the word,” he felt “no historical responsibility for this, since he [has] made it clear that he and his government [would] not apologize whatever the outcome of the US Congressional resolution.”65 With Abe’s blunder on the “comfort women” system, his visit to the United States in April and the advert placed in The Washington Post by a group of Japanese politicians protesting against the content of the resolution, US criticism increased further, particularly in the media. 66 These developments appeared to have a positive effect on the outcome of the resolution—it won a majority of votes in June 2007 and in July was adopted as a non-binding resolution in Congress. Liang argues that this sort of pressure from US political circles and the public had an effect in Japan. As evidence, he cites the improvement in relations between China and Japan after Koizumi’s departure, and Abe’s apology for his slip-up on the “comfort women” issue. 67 However, since this was a non-binding resolution, Japan was under no obligation to respond and a resolution to the apology issue would need direct (US) government intervention. As we have since seen, this has not been forthcoming.

64

See Alexis Dudden and Kozo Mizoguchi, “Abe’s Violent Denial: Japan’s Prime Minister and the ‘Comfort Women,” Japan Focus, March 2, 2007, http://japanfocus.org/-K-MIZOGUCHI/2368. 65 See Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Japan’s ‘Comfort Women’: It’s time for the truth (in the ordinary, everyday sense of the word),” Japan Focus, March 8, 2007, http://www.japanfocus.org/site/view/2373. 66 Liang (2008), 174. 67 Liang (2008), 174.

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Concluding Reflections The developments of the mid-2000s indicated a greater awareness at both grass-root and political levels of the problems arising from the failure to deal fully with the past, and particularly noticeable were the criticisms directed at the US government itself for failing to accept responsibility for its own role in the history problem. Gi-Wook Shin expresses this most articulately, if a little too optimistically: It is now time for Americans to take issues of historical injustice in northeast Asia seriously. The US has a clear interest in ensuring that the peace and prosperity of a region so vital to its future is not undermined by the past. So it is appropriate that Congress is taking a role in trying to heal the wounds of history. But simply demanding Japan’s apology will not be enough. America must also confront its own responsibility in ignoring Asians’ suffering. By fully acknowledging what war-crimes victims went through, the US can help bring Japan and its neighbors closer together.68

The extent to which the United States could actually fulfill (or indeed would be willing to fulfill) this role remains open to question. As this chapter has suggested, the international environment in the early postwar period framed the US stance on the peace settlement, a position that remains largely unchanged. Similarly, in the post-Cold War period, the protection and strengthening of the United States’ relationship with Japan has tempered the US government’s stance on China-Japan political relations. It is therefore difficult to see how this position could undergo radical change under the present circumstances.

68

Gi-Wook Shin, “Beyond apology, moral clarity: Urging Japan to apologize for war crimes is not enough. The US must confront its own role in ignoring Asians’ suffering,” Christian Science Monitor, April 2, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0402/p09s02-coop.html.

CHAPTER FIVE YASUKUNI CONTROVERSY AND SINO-JAPANESE RECONCILIATION XIAOHUA MA

Introduction What part has collective memory played in contemporary SinoJapanese relations? How has history played a role in postwar Japan’s relations with its neighbors and cast dark shadows on Asia-Pacific regional security? Answers to these questions must reckon with the impact of memories of World War II, or the Asia-Pacific War of 1931-1945, a time of troubles that continues to be the foundational period to affect Japan’s relations with its neighboring countries, particularly with China. Judging merely from media reports, accounts and sources of the Chinese side, the answer is fairly simple: recollections of the wartime experience have inflamed disagreements between China and Japan. However, things are more complicated than that. In a less obvious but more important way, collective memory has also been responsible for the positive features of the relations between China and Japan. The answers to these questions lie in an analysis of the social and political structure set up in China and Japan after the end of World War II. To understand how collective memory has had this impact, one needs to distinguish between the different kinds of collective memory. In this paper, I argue that historical understanding is a form of collective memory, which has been an enormously constructive force in the shaping of contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. Firstly, I focus on how a dispute over the interpretation of history, particularly the Yasukuni controversy, emerged within Japan and between Japan and China. Secondly, I discuss how the Yasukuni dispute has intensified and subsequently aggravated the mutual mistrust and antagonism between the peoples of the two countries. Finally, I offer a few reflections on the implications of my analysis for the future of

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the Yasukuni problem (Yasukuni mondai), both for China and Japan in order to find a road toward historical reconciliation.

Yasukuni – Unfinished Reform Yasukuni Shrine in History Yasukuni Shrine, which means “shrine for pacifying the nation” is located in Tokyo near the Imperial Palace. The shrine, initially established in 1869 as Tokyo Shokonsha on the orders of Emperor Meiji, was originally intended to venerate those who had fallen in the service of the new Meiji government on the battlefield of Japan’s internal war – the Boshin War – and deified them as “gods” or spirits (Kami). Ten years later it was renamed as the “Yasukuni Shrine,” which implies a holy place for establishing peace in the nation. 1 Within the shrine the war dead are regarded as “heroic spirits” (Eirei) and enshrined there together as an indissoluble whole. 2 The shrine became the most important national memorial for mourning Japan’s war dead after its establishment. Prior to World War II, Yasukuni played a significant role in unifying the spirit of the Japanese people around war and the military. The shrine was completely controlled by the military authorities, especially the Ministry of War. It later enshrined the souls of soldiers who died in Japan's international conflicts: starting from the invasion of Taiwan in 1874, the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the Russo-Japanese War, the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1931-1945 and World War II. At present, 2.46 million war dead are enshrined at Yasukuni. However, the nature of the shrine changed fundamentally after Japan's defeat in 1945, from a national memorial to a solely religious organization. Shortly after the end of the war, Ishibashi Tanzan, a journalist who later became prime minister (from December 23, 1956 to February 25, 1957), was the first Japanese to request the government to dismantle the shrine. In an article “To Abolish the Yasukuni Shrine” published in October 1945, Tanza stressed the necessity for the abolishment of Yasukuni because he considered that “the war dead for the Greater East Asia War which had 1

For the history of Yasukuni Shrine, see Tokoro Isao, Yokoso Yasukuni Jinja e [Welcome to Yasukuni Shrine] (Tokyo: Yasukuni Shrine Publication, 2000). 2 For Shinto religion, see Kuroda Toshio, “The World of Spirit Pacification: Issues of State and Religion,” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, 23/3-4 (1996), p.321-351; Oue Shinobu, Yasukuni Jinja [Yasukuni Shrine] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1984); and Klaus Antoni, “Yasukuni-Jinja and Folk Religion: The Problem of Vengeful Spirits,” Asian Folklores Studies, 47 (1988), p.123-136.

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caused the tremendous disaster to the country would feel insult.” 3 On December 15, 1945, the GHQ enacted the Shinto Directive (Shinto shirei), a guideline to reform Shinto and State Shinto, regarded as a root of militarism, was abolished4 The GHQ ordered Yasukuni to either become a secular government institution, or a religious institution which is independent from the government. Yasukuni chose the latter and became the same as any other shrine, a religious corporation that falls under the jurisdiction of the local government (in Yasukuni's case, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government). Article 20 of the current Japanese Constitution enacted in 1947 stipulates that a representative of state cannot pay tributes at a religious institution because the action violates the principle of separation of state and religion. 5 Neither the government nor any administrative authorities provide financial assistance to religious corporations, although they are given tax-exempt status. The imperial connection is fundamental to an understanding of Yasukuni and the meaning of its rites. The shrine's relationship to the imperial family also underwent major changes in the period following the war. Imperial visits to the shrine began with the Meiji Emperor, followed by the Taisho Emperor. 6 Though not made every year, they usually coincided with the annual festivals when they occurred. The Showa Emperor’s visit started in 1929 and continued annually after Japan waged an aggressive war in China in 1938 until the end of the war in 1945 due to the heavy causalities in the battle. 7 There is a record of the Showa Emperor visiting the shrine immediately after the restoration of Japan's sovereignty at the end of the American Occupation and Yasukuni had been visited routinely by members of royal family as well. Nevertheless, the Showa Emperor terminated his visits after 1975 because he resented the fact that Class-A war criminals are enshrined in the shrine, according to a note discovered in a memorandum left by former Chief Steward of the Imperial Household Agency Tomita Tomohiko, released on July 21, 3

Ishibashi Tanzan, “Yasukuni Haishi no Ron” [Demand for Abolishing Yasukuni] Toyo Keizai Shimbo, October, 1945. 4 For the GHQ’s reform of the Yasukuni Shrine, see Akasawa Shiro, Yasukuni Jinja [Yasukuni Shrine] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005), p.40-49, and John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (London: Penguin, 1999). 5 Takahashi Tetsuya, Yasukuni Mondai [Yasukuni Problem] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 2005), p.104-5. 6 The Meiji Emperor visited the Yasukuni Shrine seven times and the Taisho Emperor twice in all. Oue Shinobu, Yasukuni Jinja, p.132. 7 Ibid., p.133-4.

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2005.8 The current Emperor (Akihito) has never visited the shrine after his enthronement in 1989. Figure 1: Japan’s Unfinished Reform: A New Cooperation

Chinese cartoon criticizes the GHQ leader General Douglas MacArthur for cooperating with Class-A war criminals to reform Japan in the occupation era while he was “manipulating” the emperor. (Source: China Monthly Review, November 1950)

The Origin of the Controversy Controversy over Yasukuni has long been a part of Japanese politics. The movement toward state management of the shrine originated shortly after the American Occupation in 1945. There has been a strong desire among the bereaved families to restore Yasukuni's national status to provide a place where their beloved ones who died for the country could 8 The memo left by former Chief Steward of the Imperial Household Agency Tomohiko Tomita, quoted Showa Emperor as saying that the enshrinement of top war criminals was the reason why he stopped visiting the shrine. This memo was written on April 28, 1988, the year before the emperor died, and released to public by Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 21, 2006.

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be honored in the postwar era. In 1951, the Japan War Bereaved Families Association (Nihon Izokukai), was formed, then with more than eight million members and comprising the backbone of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). On July 30, 1952, the LDP politicians first raised the issue to renationalize the shrine in the Diet and the debate on how to manage Yasukuni started.9 It was at this moment that an unexpected episode occurred which sparked the political campaign to renationalize Yasukuni. The stubborn refusal to pay respects to Yasukuni by US Vice-President Richard Nixon during his 1953 visit to Japan became a crucial factor for the Japanese government to construct a national memorial – a symbol for mourning the war dead of the country.10 The Izokukai requested the new memorial to be constructed within the territory of the Yasukuni Shrine as “it will be a center for the nation’s commemorative ceremony.”11 Under the pressures of the Izokukai, the project was frustrated in 1954 and in the end a political compromise was reached between the government and the Izokukai in 1956, which treated the newly constructed memorial as a national body to solely “preserve the remains of the war dead” in order to maintain Yasukuni as a central facility to mourn the war dead of the country.12 This compromise led to the consequence of Yasukuni’s dual identity functioning as a place for mourning the war dead of the nation while admitting its independent status as a religious institution, further complicating the Yasukuni controversy. The new memorial completed in 1959, known as the Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery nearby Yasukuni, was originally planned as a national memorial to commemorate the war dead of the country by the government. However, it failed to function thoroughly. This failure can be clearly seen in Japan’s typical national ceremony to commemorate the war dead – National Ceremony for the Commemoration of War Dead (Zenkoku senbotsusha tsuitoshiki) on August 15 every year - which has never been 9

Tanaka Nobumasa, Yasukuni no Sengo Shi, [A History of Yasukuni in the Postwar Era], (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002), p.43; Akasawa Shiro, Yasukuni Jinja, p.107-10. 10 On November 19, 1953, US Vice-President Richard Nixon refused to pay respects to Yasukuni scheduled by Japanese government during his Japan visit. Tanaka Nobumasa, Yasukuni no Sengo Shi, p.74-5. 11 “’Sengo’ kara doko e (11) : Chidorigafuchi no hakamamoriyaku” [From “Postwar” to Where: Chidorigafuchi’s Role as A Tomb-Keeper], Mainichi Shimbun, August 18, 2006. 12 For the debate on the construction of the memorial of the unknown war dead, Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery, see Akasawa Shiro, Yasukuni Jinja, p.110-20.

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conducted in the newly-established national memorial due to pressures from the Izokukai. 13 The newly-discovered documents reveal that there was even a consensus between the government and the Izokukai, in which the government would not invite foreign leaders to visit the national memorial in order to maintain the “dignity of Yasukuni.”14 The “Nixon Incident” and the establishment of a new memorial sparked the anxiety of the shrine. Several bills aiming to restore national management of Yasukuni were proposed in the Diet in the 1960s. For example, “A Bill for the National Establishment of the Yasukuni Shrine” (Yasukuni jinja hoan) was introduced in 1969, but in the end it was defeated.15 Again in March 1975, a “Bill for Expression of Respect to the War Dead” (Hyokei hoan), which would have allowed the emperor, government leaders and the members of the Self Defense Forces, to worship at the Yasukuni Shrine in their official capacity, was proposed but again it was withdrawn due to the strong opposition from the opposition parties, labor unions, as well as religious organizations.16 The opposing forces treated this political move as a serious violation of the constitutional principle of the separation of state and religion, and also in direct connection with “the revival of the militarism.” 17 Subsequently the Izokukai shifted its strategy by pushing for official prime minister’s visits to Yasukuni after 1975.18

13

Because of the pressures of the Yasukuni Shrine and Izokukai, the First National Ceremony for the Commemoration of War Dead was held in Tokyo Hibiya Hall on August 15, 1963, and the second one was at the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 1964. Subsequently, on August 15, 1965, the government made a decision to conduct the national ceremony in Nihon Budokan due to the strong opposition of the pubic opinion and this national ceremony held in Nihon Budokan became an annual routine aftermath. Murakami Shigeyoshi, Irei to Shokon [Commemoration and Pacification of the Spirits], (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1974), p.213. 14 “’Sengo’ kara doko e (11) : Chidorigafuchi no hakamamoriyaku” [From “Postwar” to Where: Chidorigafuchi’s Role as A Tomb-Keeper], Mainichi Shimbun, August 18, 2006. 15 Cyril Poweles, “Yasukuni Jinja Hoan: Religion and Politics in Contemporary Japan,” Pacific Affairs, 49 (Autumn 1976), p.491-505. 16 Akasawa, Yasukuni Jinja, p.148-50; Tanaka, Yasukuni no Sengo Shi, p.140-42. 17 Tanaka, Yasukuni no Sengo Shi, p.111. 18 For more on Izokukai and its political campaign, see Hatano Sumio, “Izoku no meiso: nippon izokukai to ‘kioku no kyogo’,” [The Straying of the Bereaved Families: Nihon Izokukai and the Conflicting Memory], Hosoya Chihiru and Iriye Akira, eds., Kioku Toshite no Pearl Harbor [Pearl Harbor as Memory] (Kyoto: Minervashobo, 2004), p.256-272.

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Changing Political Landscape: Symbolism of Miki’s Visit on August 15 Prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni had a long history. Shortly after the war, Prime Ministers Higashikuni Naruhiko and Shidehara Kijuro made pilgrimages to Yasukuni for the annual festivals in 1945. Prime ministerial visits repeatedly occurred after the end of the occupation, first by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru in 1951, mainly during the annual festivals. This custom of prime ministerial visits for the annual festivals continued before 1975.19 However, Prime Minister Miki Takeo changed the custom for the shrine visit which ultimately became a new source for the Yasukuni controversy. On August 15, 1975, the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II, Miki visited Yasukuni. This is the first time for the prime minister to pay tributes to the shrine for an occasion other than the annual festival. More importantly, Miki stated publicly that his visit was in “an unofficial capacity” in response to the media interview in the aftermath.20 This is clear evidence showing that Miki’s visit marks a strategic shift of the Yasukuni issue from the legal movement to a symbolic political action – the official prime ministerial visit. On the other hand, Miki’s visit on August 15 triggered a debate for the future of the controversy – the nature of prime ministerial visits in an official or unofficial capacity. In seeking to support official prime ministerial visits on August 15, the Association for Commemorating the Heroic War Dead (Eirei ni kotaeru kai) was formed in 1976, mainly sponsored by the LDP members in the Diet and chaired by Ishida Kazuto, former Chief Judge of the Supreme Court.21 It should be noted that Miki’s “August 15 visit” signifies a special implication for Japanese commemorative politics. As a result, the Japanese Diet passed an act to rename August 15 – the Day of the End of the War to a “National Day for Mourning War Dead and Commemorating Peace” on

19

Yoshita Shigeru (7 times), Kishi Nobusuke (2 times), Ikeda Hayato (5 times), Sato Esaku (11 times) and Tanaka Kakue (6 times). Tanaka Nobumasa, Yasukuni no Sengo Shi, p. 113. 20 Prime Minister Miki stressed his visit in an “unofficial capacity.” After his visit, the Japanese government stipulated that “an unofficial visit” should sign a name without official title in the visiting list, use non-governmental car, pay the fee from the personal money, and visit alone without accompany of other officials and public servants. Tanaka Nobumasa, Yasukuni no Sengo Shi, p.143. 21 Tanaka, Yasukuni no Sengo Shi, p.144-5.

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April 13, 1982.22 Miki’s successors followed the new tradition: later Prime Ministers Fukuda Takeo and Suzuki Zenko continued this practice of visiting the shrine on the day of August 15. Strong opposition from China did not begin with Miki's visit in 1975. However, opposition erupted with Nakasone’s official visit in 1985. The reason for the foreign criticism is that 14 Class-A war criminals convicted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Trials), including wartime Prime Minister Tojo Hideki, were secretly enshrined at Yasukuni on October 17, 1978, a week before the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty was formally concluded on October 23. 23 However the enshrinement of Class-A war criminals became public knowledge only a year later, when it was exposed by a major Japanese newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun.24 In fact, enshrinement of the war criminals occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Although the nature of Yasukuni changed fundamentally in the postwar era, the government continued to make decisions regarding the enshrinement of the war dead. One sufficient criterion for enshrinement for war dead at the shrine is that a person should be listed as having died while on duty in the war dead registry of the government. In 1956 the Ministry of Health and Welfare initiated to be involved in the enshrinement of the war dead, including Class-B and C war criminals after 1959.25 The government listed the convicted war criminals for technical reasons to ensure that the surviving family members could receive a pension. On March 10, 1959, the Ministry of Health and Welfare secretly sent the lists to Yasukuni to enshrine the war dead, including the convicted Class-B and C war criminals. 26 On February 8, 1966, the list of the convicted 12 Class-A war criminals was formally sent to the shrine.27 On 22

“An Act for the Establishment of a Day to Memorialize War Dead and Commemorate Peace,” April 13, 1982. See Japanese Welfare Ministry Homepage

23 Asahi Shimbun, December 16, 2005. 24 Asahi Shimbun, April 19, 1979. 25 Mainichi Shimbun, October 15, 1968. 26 Uesuki Takashi, “Yasukuni ‘A kyusenpan goshi’ no saidai no konkyo ‘saishin meihyo o Koshesho ga torikeshiteita” [The Most Important Evidence from the Ministry of Health and Welfare to Yasukuni for the Enshrinement of ‘Class-A War Criminals’ – Lists of Enshrinement Disappeared], Shukan Bunshu, September 7, 48:34 (2006), p.36 27 The list of 12 Class-A war criminals includes Tojo Hideki, Itagaki Seishiro, Kimura Heitaro, Doihara Kenji, Matsui Iwane, Muto Akira, Hirota Koki (seven death by hanging), and Umezu Yoshijiro, Koiso Kuniaki, Hiranumu Kiichiro and Shiratori Toshio (four lifetime imprisonment), and Togo Shigenori (20-year imprisonment). Uesuki Takashi, “Yasukuni ‘A kyusenpan goshi’ no saidai no

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January 31, 1969, both the government and the shrine reconfirmed to enshrine the 12 convicted Class-A war criminals. 28 However, Tsukuba Fujimaro, then Chief Priest of Yasukuni who considered that Class-A war criminals should bear responsibility for the war, shelved it. 29 The enshrinement of 14 Class-A war criminals (including two who died before a judicial decision due to illness) was completed on October 17, 1978 when Matsudaira Yoshitami, former Imperial Household Minister, became Chief Priest..30 Obviously, the complexity and problematic situation of the Yasukuni Shrine is a direct consequence of a decision made by the Japanese government and the shrine as well. Therefore, it is clear that commemorating the war dead at the shrine resonates with strong political purpose. Some argue that the rituals and commemorative events in the shrine help to re-contextualize social memories to support the wartime militarism in Japan.31 It should be noted that the enshrinement of 14 Class-A war criminals singles out a significant political move for the right-wing forces to legitimize Japan’s war. Rightists treat Yasukuni as a symbol of patriotism and national identity and consider that the condemnation of Japan’s cruel wartime behaviors naturally leads to a condemnation of Japan’s modern history, which emerged in the Meiji Era.32 Matsudaira Yoshitami, then Chief Priest of the konkyo’ ‘saishin meihyo’ o Koshesho ga torikeshiteita,” Shukan Bunshun, September 2006, p.33-37. 28 “Kuni to yasukuni jinja ga ittai de goshi susumeru” [The Government and Yasukuni Shrine Implemented the Enshrinement of War Criminals Together], Asahi Shimbun, March 28, 2007. 29 “Showa tenno ‘Yasukuni memo’” [The Showa Emperor’s Memorandum on Yasukuni], Tokyo Shimbun, July 21, 2006. Tsukuba Fujimaro was a member of the royal family and became the first Chief Priest of the Yasukuni Shrine on January 25, 1946 in the postwar era (until March 20, 1978 after he died on service). 30 It is a well-known fact that 14 Class-A war criminals are enshrined in the Yasukuni Shrine. However, according to the government list, only 12 Class-A war criminals’ names were registered in the list. Two convicted Class-A war criminals Nagano Osami and Matsuoka Yosuke who died before a judicial decision was reached (due to illness) were enshrined in Yasukuni, together with 12 Class-A war criminals. Now the shrine venerates a total of 1,068 convicted of war criminals, including 14 Class-A war criminals. 31 John Nelson, “Social Memory as Ritual Practice: Commemorating Spirits of the Military Dead at Yasukuni Shinto Shrine,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 62:2 (May 2003), p. 443-67. 32 Daiki Shibuichi, “The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan,” Asian Survey, March-April, 2005, p.197-215.

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shrine, stated publicly that “if we do not deny the view that Japan is guilty, then the Japanese national spirit can never be revived.”33 He even treated his acts to enshrine 14 Class-A war criminals as “the great pride of his work in his life.” 34 The enshrinement of 14 Class-A war criminals, however, as a Japanese essayist Hosaka Masayasu puts, equaled to “a secret coup d’état” in Japan, which thoroughly changed the landscape of postwar politics. 35 Consequently, Prime Minister Nakasone brought Yasukuni into the international arena in 1985.

Yasukuni – An Internationalized Controversy Nakasone’s official visit in 1985 triggered a metamorphosis more profound than any previous prime ministerial visits in Japan’s history and internationalized the controversy. In order to create a new national identity, Yasukuni emerged on the Japanese political agenda in the 1980s. In fact, Nakasone visited Yasukuni several times before, but on August 15, 1985, he stated publicly that his visit was in “an official capacity” and stressed that the official visit was an integral part of his political goal to reconstruct postwar Japan – “Comprehensive Settlement of the Postwar Politics” (Sengo senji no sokessan). 36 Immediately, his official visit stirred vehement criticism both at home and overseas. China reacted immediately by showing anger and strong resentment. State-controlled newspapers such as the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), reported vocal expressions of outrage and adamantly protested Nakasone’s visit and treated it as a “sign of the revival of Japanese militarism.” 37 Nakasone’s visit provoked a hostile reaction from China that was almost comparable to the earlier textbook uproar in 1982 when Japanese textbooks were portrayed in the news media as glossing over Japan’s wartime record, most famously by deleting the term “invasion” and substituting the word “advance,” although some Japanese argued that the textbook issue was “erroneously reported” and “manipulatively created by 33 Yoshitami Matsudaira, “Yasukuni’ Honshi Juyonnen no Munen” [Fourteen Years Mortification to Serve in the Yasukuni Shrine], Shokun, December 12 (1992), p.166. 34 “Yasukuni: ‘Sengo’ kara doko e (11) – A kyu Senpan Goshi no Genryu” [Yasukuni: From ‘Postwar’ to Where (11) – The Beginning of the Enshrinement of Class A War Criminals], Mainichi Shimbun, August 19, 2006. 35 Hosaka Masayasu, “Yasukuni jinja to A-kyu Senpan” [Yasukuni Shrine and Class-A War Criminals] Sekai, 756:9 (September 2006), p.146. 36 Asahi Shimbun, August 15, 1985. 37 Renmin Ribao, August 15, 1985.

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the left-wing forces in Japan.” 38 The fact is that the ambiguities and uncertainties have characterized the emotional underpinnings of SinoJapanese relations after 1982. Figure 2: Nakasone’s Rush to Return to Yasukuni

Class-A war criminals said: “We are so busy at the 40th anniversary of the end of the war.” (Source: Asahi Shimbun, August 18, 1985)

38

This view can be exemplified in Okazaki Hisahiko’s “Kyokasho Mondai ni hi o Tsuketa Nihon Kokunai no Hitobito o Hinan Suru,” [To Criticize Those Who Ignited the Textbook Problem in Japan] Chuo Koron, 6 (June 2005), p.171-84.

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China’s official position on Yasukuni can be summarized in Chairman Hu Yaobang’s statement that past conflicts should be precisely evaluated, that the Chinese people should distinguish “a small handful of Japanese war criminals and that the Japanese people in general and the people in China had equally been victims of Japanese militarism.”39 To differentiate between “a small handful of Japanese militarists” and ordinary Japanese people in remembering war history contributed to a favorable attitude toward China in postwar Japanese society, despite the differences in the political systems of the two countries.40 In response, Nakasone accepted Hu’s statement and understood China’s criticism of his official visit. Meanwhile, as foreign denunciation was reinforced by domestic condemnation, Nakasone attempted to moderate his position by saying that he appreciated his critics’ viewpoint. Given the controversy he caused, Nakasone stated publicly that the provocation would not be repeated in following years, because “Japan should respect the feelings of Asian countries” to rid international isolation which would subsequently threaten Japan’s national interests and international reputation.41 Another reason was to defend Hu Yaobang – his friend among the Chinese leadership. 42 Considering the necessity of geopolitics, Japan needed China’s cooperation while the Soviet Union was perceived as a serious threat to its national security in the Cold War era. Nakasone attempted to remove the names of the Class-A war criminals from Yasukuni by persuading the shrine and the families of the war criminals. His proposal, treated as “bowing to foreign pressure,” antagonized the right-wing politicians and provoked the stern opposition

39

Hu Yaobang, “Fazhan zhongri youhao guanxi de sidian ijian” [Four-point Statement to Promote Friendly Relationship with Japan], Renmin Ribao, October 19, 1985. 40 Japanese Cabinet poll shows that more than 70 percent of Japanese respondents held a favorable feeling toward China since the poll started in 1978. This tendency continued until the Tiananmen Incident occurred in 1989. Japanese Cabinet, Gekkan Yoron Chosa [Public Opinion Survey Monthly], May 2001, p.72. 41 Nakasone Yasuhiro’s Address in the Diet, “Senzan no Nihon no Shippai o Kurikaesanai tameni” [Japan Can Not Repeat the Mistake of the War] September 16, 1986, in Funabashi Yoichi, ed., Nihon no Senso Sekinin o do Kangaeru ka [How to Consider Japan’s War Responsibility] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 2001), p.155-59. 42 Nakasone Yasuhiro, “Watashi ga Yasukuni Jinja Koshiki Sanpai o Dannen shita Riyu,” [Why I Stopped an Official Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine ], Seiron, (September 2001), p.100-11.

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from the shrine, as well as Tojo’s family.43 Subsequently the crisis was resolved, although Nakosone’s proposal was frustrated. On August 14, 1986, Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda Masaru made a public announcement that there would be no official visit to Yasukuni because the previous visit had given rise to criticism from neighboring countries which had endured tremendous suffering and loss through Japan’s past actions, admitting, “in effect, that an official visit amounted to worship of Class-A war criminals responsible for these actions.”44 Except for the flare-ups over the history dispute, Sino-Japanese relations in the 1980s generally enjoyed a mood of friendship and were widely believed to be “the best in the two-thousand-year history.”45 On the popular level, Chinese attitudes toward Japan were friendly to a considerable degree. An opinion poll conducted in 1987 showed that a great number of Chinese respondents chose Japan as the foreign country with the “best image,” far ahead of European countries and the United States. 46 “Japan Fever” overwhelmingly influenced by Japanese pop culture, including movies, dramas, and cartoons, characterized the 1980s. For example, Japanese actor Takakura Ken, acting as a silent but passionate and muscular Japanese man in the movie, Across the Furious River (Kimi yo fundo no kawa o watare; Zhuipu in Chinese), captured the hearts of hundreds and thousands of Chinese audiences and he has even been enlisted as one of the “Fifty Most Important Persons Who Influenced the Chinese in history.”47 At the government level, China took a rather positive view through the 1980s and its policy toward Japan remained basically unchanged from the time of the Sino-Japanese normalization of 1972 despite the skirmishes. China realized Japan’s economic and technological cooperation was indispensable for its modernization and made a commitment to strengthen 43 In a media interview, Tojo Yoko, granddaughter of Japan’s wartime leader Tojo Hideki, sternly opposed to the de-enshrinement of Class-A war criminals, by saying that “to slaughter the Chinese people was not an aggression, but a benevolent action.” Asahi Shimbun, June 15, 2005. 44 Asahi Shimbun, August 14, 1986. 45 Soeya Yoshihide, “Japan’s Relations with Japan,” in Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Tanaka Akihiko, eds., The Golden Age of the U.S.-China-Japan Triangle 1972-1989 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002), p.223. 46 Gilbert Rozman, “China’s Changing Images of Japan, 1989-2001: The Struggle to Balance Partnership and Rivalry,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 2 (2002), p.98. 47 This data is based on a public survey conducted in June 2006 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Huanqiu Shibao, July 31, 2006.

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bilateral relations. In the meantime, Japan sought to construct amicable relations with China based on a willingness to support China’s economic development with large loans such as Official Development Assistance (ODA). Without changing its fundamental policy of friendship toward Japan, China engaged in a delicate balancing act over the history issue. When Premier Zhao Ziyang met Nakasone at the United Nations on October 23, 1985, he reaffirmed the necessity of a stable bilateral relationship and did not mention Yasukuni. 48 Regarding the Yasukuni issue, Beijing claimed that the two countries had reached a consensus that Japanese top-level politicians such as the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Chief Cabinet Secretary would not visit the Yasukuni Shrine. 49 However, a potential crisis existed. The bitter battle over Yasukuni between the two countries re-erupted as the domestic and international environments changed.

Memory War and Increase of Mutual Mistrust Conflicting Memories The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s represented a significant transformation in the structure of Japanese politics and foreign policy. In 1993, when the LDP hegemony over Japanese politics was broken for the first time, non-LDP Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro came to power and admitted that Japan’s war was an “aggressive war.”50 Later the LDP entered into a coalition with its long-time Cold War opponent, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). The emergence of a coalition government resulted in a fundamental transformation in Japan’s political agenda. When the JSP was in coalition with the LDP, socialist Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi took the lead on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II to address the question of Japan’s imperialist legacy and apologized for its wartime aggression, although the Diet refused to pass the apology resolution. 48

Tanaka Akihiko, Nichu Kankei 1945-1990 [Sino-Japanese Relations 1945-1990], (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1991), p.137-149. 49 China State Councilor and Former Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan released Japan had made a promise that “To respect Chinese feelings, Prime Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary, and Foreign Minister will not visit the Yasukuni Shrine in the future” during Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda Masaru’s China visit in 1985, when he met Japanese delegation in Beijing on November 3, 2005. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 3, 2005. 50 Asahi Shimbun, August 11, 1993.

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These advances, however, led to fierce opposition in Japanese society and provided new stimulus for right-wing revisionism. Inside the Diet, the LDP members who insisted that Japan’s war was to “free Asian countries from Western imperialism” firmly opposed any apology for the war, represented by the “Association for the Members in the Diet to Commemorate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the End of the War” (Shusen gojushunen giin renmei) and the “Committee for History Investigation” (Rekishi kento iinkai) which later led to the publication of a propaganda book, “An Affirmative Examination of the Greater East Asia War” (Daitoa senso no sokatsu) on August 15, 1995. 51 Outside the Diet, the opposing forces mainly came from a number of nationalist groups including the Izokukai and National Council for Defending Japan (Nippon o mamoru kokumin kaigi). In addition, a group of nationalist academics initiated a campaign to “reform history education,” represented by Fujioka Nobukatsu’s “Reform of Modern History” (Kindaishi no jugyo kaikaku) and Nishio Kanji’s “Association for Writing New History Textbooks” (Atarashi rekishi kyokasho o tsukurukai). The nationalists claim that Japan has a right to interpret history in its own way and should not be influenced by the values of foreign countries.52 Under these circumstances, in the 1990s many cabinet ministers and members of the Diet visited Yasukuni on August 15. On July 29, 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro visited the shrine, eleven years after Nakasone’s official visit. Hashimoto’s visit heightened Chinese concerns about increasing Japanese self-assertiveness. The visit could not be repeated due to vehement criticisms from China. Japanese nationalists felt resentment that they were still not allowed to mourn their war dead even 50 years after the end of the war and condemned China’s interference with Japan’s “internal affairs.” 53 This resentment heightened when President Jiang Zemin asked for a “written apology” instead of “deep remorse” for 51

Nanamura Akira, Matsumoto Kenichi, eds., Daitoa Senso no Soukatsu [An Affirmative Examination of the Greater East Asia War] (Tokyo: Tendensha, 1995). The main arguments in this book are: “The Greater East Asia War” was not an invasion, but a just war to “liberate Asian countries from the Western aggression;” the “Nanking incident” and “comfort women” were fabrication; and it is government responsibility to correct the current history textbooks because Japanese textbooks are teeming with negative terms such as “aggression” and “invasion.” 52 Gavan McCormack, “The Japanese Movement to ‘Correct’ History,” Laura Hein and Mark Selden, ed., Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2000), p.53-73. 53 For Japanese views on the Yasukuni Shrine, see, Kobori Keiichiro, Yasukuni Jinja to Nihonjin [Yasukuni Shrine and Japanese], (Kyoto: PHP, 1998).

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Japan’s past aggression in an agreement during his 1998 Japan visit. 54 Japanese apology fatigue and the Chinese demand for a “formal apology” repeatedly occurred in the next several years and bilateral relations continued to deteriorate. Figure 3: “We Are In Self-Defense”

Japanese nationalistic groups are reforming history education to whitewash the aggressive history, saying “we fought the war for self-defense.” (Source: Renmin Ribao, April 11, 2001)

On the other side of the relationship, nationalistic fervor ran high in China and Chinese attitudes became vehemently anti-Japanese. The increase of Japanese ultra-nationalists and politicians including several 54 Being the first Chinese top leader to visit Japan in the postwar era, President Jiang Zemin taught Japanese to “learn a lesson from history” and demanded a “written apology” instead of “deep remorse” for Japan’s past wrongs in the agreement during his Japan visit in November 1998. Japan yet only focused on future and welcomed him by a stubborn refusal to China’s demand. Unfortunately the historical visit of Chinese President ended in an extremely unhappy mood and became “disastrous” in Sino-Japanese relations, which later led to the stern condemnations in China, as well as in Japan. Later Jiang Zemin recalled his visit and showed strong resentment about Japan’s handling of history in his memoir. Yomiuri Shimbun, August 11, 2006.

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cabinet members who repeatedly denied Japan’s wartime atrocities in the 1990s aroused deep concern and resentment from China. The Chinese media began to devote a large amount of coverage to reporting the dark pages of Japan’s aggressive history. Chinese Media coverage in the 1980s concentrated on the communist leadership in the War Against Japanese Aggression. Yet the strategy shifted in the 1990s, with an emphasis on the crimes committed by the Japanese army. China asserted that “Japan is not truly remorseful about its brutal wartime aggression” when Nagao Shigeto, Minister of Justice denied Japanese wartime atrocity by saying that “the Nanking [Massacre] Incident was fabrication” in May 1994. 55 Chinese criticism became extremely stern when Prime Minister Hashimoto visited Yasukuni in 1996. Meanwhile, patriotic education highlighting Chinese victimhood initiated in the early 1990s to reinforce the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party’s regime generated popular grievances against Japan as well. 56 As a result of these reinforcing domestic developments, history education in the 1990s no longer focused on the traditional ideological conflicts of class struggle, instead shifting to the conflicts between the Chinese and the Western powers, particularly Japan, which invaded and humiliated the Chinese in the past century.57 When Japanese crimes were highlighted, the Chinese media, particularly local newspapers targeting Japan’s wartime atrocities, showed no mercy toward Japan. While discussing in Internet chat rooms, many Chinese tended to believe the entire Japanese people, not merely militarists, were cruel and inhumane. As words inspire habits of thought, such discussions caused their attitudes toward Japan to harden.58 According to a survey in 1997, Chinese images of Japan were the “Nanking Massacre,” (selected by 81%) “Japanese aggression in China” (81%), and Tojo Hideki, Japan’s wartime leader, was

55

Renmin Ribao, May 7, 1994. Xiaohua Ma, “Constructing National Memory of War: War Museums in China, Japan, and the United States,” in Marc Gallicchio, ed., The Unpredictability of the Past: Memories of the Asia-Pacific War in US-East Asian Relations, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), p.161-167. 57 For the transformation of Chinese historiography, see, Yinan He, “National Mythmaking and the Problems of History in Sino-Japanese Relations,” in Japan’s Relations with China, Lam Peng Er, ed., (London: Routledge, 2006), p.69-91. 58 For example, some chatrooms on www.warchina.com. Also chatrooms on the People’s Daily, for example, “Haizimen Yanzhong de Kangri Zhanzheng: Weisheme Ribenren Ruci Canren” [The Anti-Japanese War in Children’s Eyes: Why the Japanese People Were So Inhuman], Renmin Ribao, August 5, 2005. 56

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ranked first as a “typical Japanese.” 59 Chinese negative images toward Japan still increased. The anti-Japanese sentiment further escalated when Japanese right-wing groups denied Japan’s wartime atrocities by saying that “the Nanking Massacre was the biggest lie in the 20th century” in a rally held in Osaka in January 2000. Japanese right-wing extremists’ denial of the massacre infuriated the Chinese people and caused Chinese emotional responses. Japanese government and media systems were attacked by Chinese hackers, with the words “Nanking Massacre” written in Chinese or English on all the successfully hacked pages. 60 The electronic vandalism of Chinese “Red Hackers” targeted Yasukuni since Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro visited the shrine in 2001, which caused the shrine’s electronic system to be paralyzed numerous times each year after the visit was made.61 Chinese views of Japan became rather negative and an “anti-Japanese war in the cyber-world” (Wangluo Kanzhan) started throughout China after Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit in 2001.62

Koizumi’s Visits – Japanese Puzzle Leadership transitions have often become opportunities to adjust policy. Political power shifts give Japan challenges and opportunities. Touted as a “political reformer,” Koizumi came to power in 2001. He promised to remake Japan into a state that possesses political influence and power commensurable with being the second largest economy and a major contributor to world affairs. He also declared his support for constitutional revision as a long-term goal, so as to allow Japan to possess regular armed forces (in effect abolishing the restraints of Article 9). Upon taking office on April 26, 2001, Koizumi, who at times enjoyed the highest approval 59

This was the first survey in China to investigate younger generation’s attitudes toward Japan. Zhongguo Qingnianbao [Daily of China Youth], February 15, 1997. 60 The hacker attack incident started on January 24, 2000 and continued for about one week. In the hacker attack, the Science and Technology Agency Website was rewritten with the messages such as “Japan has no courage to the truth of history” and demanded Japan’s official apology. Asahi Shimbun, January 24-30, 2000. Later, a Chinese computer hacker claimed sole responsibility for the attacks on Japanese government and media computers, saying the electronic vandalism was justified by Japan’s refusal to the apology for the 1937 Nanking Massacre, The New York Times, January 31, 2000. 61 Yomiuri Shimbun, January 6, 2005. 62 Zhu Ping, “Jingguo Shenshe Yinhung Yinfa Zhongguo Mingjian ‘Kangzhan’” [The Spirits at the Yasukuni Shrine Ignited An Anti-Japanese War among the Chinese Civilians], Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan [China Weekly News], Vol. 2, January 12, 2004.

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ratings of any prime minister in Japanese history, promised that “no matter what kind of criticism I receive I will pay a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.”63 During an interview with the Kyodo News Agency, Koizumi responded, “I think [such a visit] is only natural as a Japanese citizen and as prime minister of Japan.” “From Japanese feelings, all the deceased should be venerated,” he added, “I still do not understand why we should discriminate against the dead since they [Class A war criminals] had already received the death penalty.”64 Later Koizumi reinforced his stance in the Diet, saying that “it is not Japanese culture to trace back the guilty [of Class-A war criminals] after they died.” 65 Treating his visit as a measure to promote Japanese culture, Koizumi easily aroused public sympathy and drew considerable support, especially among the right-wing forces in Japan. Koizumi repeatedly justified his actions on the grounds that it is “unseemly to discriminate among the war dead” 66 and all of them, including Class-A war criminals, should be honored equally. Indeed, his remarks reflected a widely held view in Japanese public opinion that the Tokyo Trials were unjust. Furthermore, there is also a perception that the Class-A war criminals were not convicted of having committed the atrocities, but were instead held responsible for crimes against humanity and for leading Japan into war. Thus their convictions were believed to be biased, as the Tokyo Trials failed to recognize Japan’s self-proclaimed legitimate demands for waging a war – that it was acting as a vanguard to liberate its Asian neighbors from the grasp of Western imperialism.67 Even today there is still no national consensus on whether those Class-A war criminals convicted by the Allied Forces were indeed criminals in Japan. Some Japanese politicians stated publicly that “there were no war criminals in Japan.”68 Even former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo publicly 63 According to a survey conducted by Asahi Shimbun in May 2001, the approval rate for Koizumi Cabinet was 84% and it was up to over 90% later. This is an unprecedented record in Japanese history. Asahi Shimbun, May 29, 2001. 64 Sankei Shimbun, August 2, 2001. 65 Mainichi Shimbun, January 28, 2003. 66 Jeff Kingston, “Awkward Talisman: War Memory, Reconciliation and Yasukuni.” East Asia, 24.3 (2007): 304 67 ibid. 68 For example, on May 26, 2005, Masahiro Morioka, a high-ranking official from Ministry of Health, Welfare and Labor, stated publicly that “There were no war criminals in Japan at all” while showing his support of Koizumi’s visits to Yaskuni.” In response to the media, on June 25, 2005, the spokesman of the Yasukuni Shrine made a clear statement that those “so-call war criminals were not “criminals” according to Japanese laws. Tokyo Shimbun, June 25, 2005.

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questioned the legitimacy of the Tokyo Trials. The great majority of Japanese believe that the Tokyo Trials, organized under the American Occupation, were “unjust.” This view is expressed not only by nationalist groups, but also by a great number of politicians, journalists and scholars. According to a Mainichi poll of June 2006, 69 percent of Japanese respondents felt that the trials were “unjust but Japan had no choice.”69 This skepticism of the Tokyo Trials, reflected for example in the questioning of the legal processes of the Trials and United States’ responsibility for dropping the atomic bombs while forgetting Japan’s wartime atrocities, and highlighting Japanese victimhood symbolized by Hiroshima, has fostered Japanese historical amnesia in the postwar era.70 The six visits of Prime Minister Koizumi˄2001ˉ2006˅undoubtedly provoked strong rebukes from China. Thus, Japan’s postwar efforts to promote reconciliation with China were “derailed by Koizumi’s apparent nonchalance toward historical sensitivities.71” While his visits to Yasukuni elicited international resentment, it had induced many Japanese to consider what the dispute is about. Furthermore, it ought to be noted that considerable domestic opposition to Koizumi’s visits did exist. The Japan Communist Party, the Japan Socialist Party, and leading political parties such as the New Komeito, a coalition partner in the Koizumi cabinets, all publicly opposed the visits.

69

According to the survey, 81% of LDP politicians responded that the Tokyo Trials were “unjust,” and more than 68% of Minshuto and Komeito politicians held the similar view. Mainichi Shimbun, June 25, 2006. 70 For Japanese questioning of the Tokyo Trials, see, Ushimura Kei, “Sensou Sekinin” Ron no Shinjitsu [The Truth of the “War Responsibility”], and Saiko “Seiki no Igon” to Tokyo Saiban: Tainichi Senpan Saiban no Seishinshi [Reexamination of “The Will of the Century,” (Kyoto: PHP, 2006). Japanese memory of World War II selectively focuses on the final stage of the war, symbolized by the American bombings of Japanese cities and dropping the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. According to a government survey in 1972, only 26 percent of Japanese respondents considered that “Japan did bad things in the war,” but at the same time over 46 percent Japanese polled held the opinion that “Japan had no choice but to fight.” Yutaka Yushida, Nihonjin no Sensokan [Japanese Views of the War], (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), p. 125. For Japanese victimhood, see James J. Orr, The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001). 71 Jeff Kingston (2007), p.305

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Figure 4: “No Apology, No Crime”

Japanese nationalistic forces pay homage to Yasukuni while shouting “No Apology, No Crime.” (Source: Fengci yu Youmo, September 5, 2001)

In the wake of his 2001 visit, approximately one thousand Japanese citizens filed a lawsuit against the Prime Minister .RL]XPL, arguing that the visits violated the separation of state and religion. The Japanese government was thus placed in an awkward position. On one hand they argued that that the visits were not official and on the other, the principle of separation between state and religion had not been breached. In response to charges that the prime minister had signed the visitors’ registry book with his official title and traveled to the shrine in an official car, the government spokesman disingenuously responded that these actions were personal and private. On September 29, 2005, the Tokyo Supreme Court ruled that Koizumi’s visits were “private” while the next day the Osaka

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Supreme Court ruled that he visited Yasukuni in his official capacity which violates the constitution.72 Thus even today in Japan, there is still no national consensus to settle the controversy. The press carried critical commentary about Yasukuni. Three major newspapers, the Asahi, Nikkei and Mainichi in Japan were against Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni. Japanese public opinion polls showed the public equally split for and against Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits. Those in favor say that China should not give orders regarding what the Japanese should do. Those against the visit say that Koizumi should not upset China. In August 2006, polls conducted by the Mainichi suggested that 50 percent of Japanese respondents supported Koizumi’s visits, slightly more than those who opposed (47 percent). The primary reason given by respondents for supporting the visits is that all nations commemorate those soldiers who died in past wars and “it is not wise to terminate merely due to the foreign condemnation.”73 The polls suggest that foreign protests have not done much to sway Japanese public opinion. On the contrary, foreign condemnation has heightened nationalist sentiment and contributed to Japanese antagonism. The outcome is that the positive attitudes toward China among the Japanese people have declined. Instead, negative Japanese opinions about China grew increasingly in the Koizumi era. The 2005 government poll reported that only 32 percent of respondents had a favorable image of China, down from 38 percent in 2004 and 48 percent in October 2001. During the 1980s, similar polls reported that more than 75 percent of respondents had favorable feelings about China. 74 A Yomiuri poll in August 2006 shows that 67 percent of Japanese respondents held a negative image of China.75 The dramatic hardening of sentiment toward China is clearly a reaction to anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, as well as other political frictions, including China’s nuclear submarine intrusion into Japanese waters in November 2004.

72

Japan Times, August 16, 2006. Mainichi Shimbun, August 17, 2006. An Asahi survey in 2005 shows the similar tendency. 39% of Japanese respondents felt it was not wise for prime minister to stop the visit just because of foreign criticism. Asahi Shimbun, June 28, 2005. 74 The data is from Cabinet Office, Government of Japan.

75 Yomiuri Shimbun, August 11, 2006. 73

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Figure 5: Japanese Attitudes toward China (1978-2005)

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(Source: Cabinet Office of Japan, Public Opinion on Foreign Affairs)

A Traumatic Memory: Yasukuni in Chinese Politics Yasukuni is controversial not because it is a memorial to worship 2.46 million war dead who gave up their lives for the Emperor in the past wars, but rather because it is a symbol of Japanese militarism. The Chinese hold negative views of the Yasukuni Shrine as they were historically the victims of Japanese imperialism. Some scholars argue that modern Chinese national identity has been formed by their struggle against Japanese aggression.76 Due to the unique historical and cultural relations, there is an essential emotional component in Sino-Japanese relations that often defies “rational calculation” of economic and political interests. 77 Chinese animosity emanating from historical enmity frequently generates a political climate that defies economic rationality and causes strains in bilateral relations. How did the Chinese view the Yasukuni Shrine and how did this perception affect Chinese politics?

76 For detail, see, Edward Friedman, National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995); and Neil Renwich & Qing Cao, “China’s Political Discourse Towards the 21st Century: Victimhood, Identity, and Political Power,” East Asia: An International Quarterly, 17:4 (Winter 1999), p.111-43. 77 For detail, see, Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

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Yasukuni: A Symbol of “National Humiliation” Chinese memory of Yasukuni has a long history. Historically, China’s encounter with the Yasukuni Shrine originally started far earlier than the prime ministerial visits. The Yasukuni Shrine, a symbol of the Meiji Era located nearby the Imperial Palace, attracted Chinese visitors after its establishment. Shortly after the Tokyo Shokonsha was renamed the Yasukuni Shrine in 1879, Wang Tao, a renowned philosopher and social reformer in the late Qing Dynasty, first recorded how the shrine honored and deified the war dead in his book Travelogue to Japan published in 1879. He detailed how the Meiji government used religion – “a spirit of loyalty” to unify the country and pointed out that the reinforcement of state power by using the “military shrine” contributed to Japan’s modernization.78 However, the Chinese concerns grew and embraced a thoroughly negative view toward Yasukuni after Japan initiated an aggressive war in China, particularly after the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. In 1882, a symbolic architecture of the Meiji Era – the Yushukan, the oldest museum in Japan was constructed at the shrine and attracted the eyes of the Chinese. 79 In 1903, when Chinese education delegates visited Yasukuni they were agitated by the Yushukan, Youjiuguan in Chinese, considering the exhibits to be “completely an insult to the Chinese people” because they justified Japan’s war against the Qing Empire. 80 Chinese delegates visited the Yushukan in September 1906 after the RussoJapanese War, in which the main battles occurred in Northeast China. The Chinese first were astonished to see the grandiose statue of General Omura Musushiro, founder of the modern Japanese military, erected at the entrance gate of the shrine and realized the necessity of military force for China’s modernization. Nevertheless, they considered the Yushukan as an affront that hurt the feelings of the Chinese people as the exhibits glorified Japan’s triumph in China. “Japan’s war treasure in the museum – war 78

Hu Min, Jingguo Shenshe Da Jiemi [To Unveil the Secret of the Yasukuni Shrine] (Beijing: World Knowledge Publication, 2005), p. 4-6. 79 For the history of the Yushukan Museum, see Ohara Yusuo, ed., Yasukuni: Yushukan no Sekai [The World of the Yasukuni Yushukan], (Sankei Shimbun, 2003). 80 Mu Quansun, Ri You Hui Bian [The Collective Works for Japan Visits], 1903, in Jiaoyu Kaocha Ji: Wanqing Zhongguoren Riben Kaochaji Jicheng [Collective Works of the Educational Delegations: The Chinese Visits to Japan in the Late Qing Dynasty], Lui Shunchang, ed., (Hangzhou University Press, 1998), Vol.2, p.525.

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trophy and booty were looted from China,” one wrote in his Travelodge. “It is too humiliating for the Chinese to confront the tragedy being invaded [by Japan].”81 It is therefore clear that Chinese enmity against Yasukuni which justifies Japan’s aggressive wars in China through the displays of war relics, weapons, and trophy, etc. originally started from the Yushukan. It is difficult to fathom how deep the historical antagonism runs but it has largely derived from Japan’s aggression in China a century ago and later escalated as Japan’s invasion expanded into China, particularly after the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1931-1945. As a Chinese historian puts, “Yasukuni thorns the hearts of the Chinese people when Japan glorifies its victory in China.”82

Japan’s Boom of the “Yasukuni Culture.” The Yushukan Museum as an integral part of Yasukuni embraced defeat after Japan surrendered in 1945. In September 1945, the Yushukan was dismantled when the American Occupation started. There was a plan to reform it as a “center for entertainment” in the 1950s.83 Subsequently, the Yushukan survived but experienced a long “era of winter.”84 It was renovated in December 1985 after Nakasone’s official visit, opened in July 1986 and greatly expanded and reopened to the public in the summer of 2002 after Koizumi’s visit in August 2001 - which marked the beginning of “a bubbling era of the Yushukan.” It is reported that the visitors to the Yasukuni Shrine and the Yushukan increased profoundly after Koizumi’s 2001 visit, with more than six million visitors each year.85 The exhibits in the newly-refurbished museum present an interpretation of the shrine’s history. The Yushukan shares much in common with war museums of former imperialist powers everywhere, as its exhibits glorify the self-sacrifice, bravery, and loyalty of the soldiers who fought for the glorified empire. Like museums everywhere, the Yushukan exhibits construct a narrative about Japan’s modern wars. The exhibits in the “Greater East Asia War” section attempt to interpret Japan’s war in a “global perspective” and stress that the United States forced Japan into World War II in order to help itself out of the Great Depression. Thus Japan’s attack at Pearl Harbor helped President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “political plot” to succeed, and in the end, the American economy 81

Lou Liran, Qiang He Dong Yu Riji [Dairy of Japan Visit], 1906, Vol. 2, p.832. Hu Min, Jingguo Shenshe Da Jiemi, p. 49. 83 Tsubouchi Yuzo, Yasukuni (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1999), p. 273-87. 84 Tanaka, Yasukuni no Sengoshi [Yasukuni in the Postwar Era], p.16-7. 85 “Yasukuni baburu” [Yasukuni Bubble], Mainichi Shimbun, August 10, 2006. 82

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“recovered completely” after the United States entered the war. As its English pamphlet depicts, the museum is designed to “shed a new light on modern Japanese history.” While introducing Japan’s war in Asia, nevertheless, it disguises three deeply hurtful facts about Japan’s wars in China: the first is the fact of aggression, the second the fact of perpetration; and the third the fact of responsibility. By concealing the three significant facts, the Yushukan remembers a war that is forever “glorious,” therefore obliterating the possibility that not all the Japanese war dead died glorious deaths. The evidence of the “glorious war” can be seen clearly in the entire exhibition halls, particularly the last one – the result of “the Greater East Asia War.” The exhibit concludes with the remark of Indian Justice Radha Binod Pal, who was the only Asian judge at the Tokyo Trials insisting that the Japanese were innocent of all war crimes and the Western imperialists were the real aggressors in Asia.86 Judge Pal’s remark, presented along with a magnified photograph and a colorful map to illustrate the independence of Asian countries after the war, implies that Japanese soldiers fought heroically and successfully to “liberate Asia from the yoke of the Western imperialism.” Yasukuni even constructed a monument and statue to commemorate Radha Binod Pal at the shrine in June 2005 to publicize the legitimacy of Japan’s war. This is precisely the real purpose of the Yasukuni Shrine, to demonstrate Japan’s legitimacy in waging war. In order to present how Yasukuni has played a significant role in unifying the glorified nation, a 50-minute propaganda movie – “We Will Never Forget: With Gratitude, Blessing and Pride” (Watashitachi wa wasurenai: kansha to inori to hokori) – is shown in the central hall of the museum and introduces the historical developments of Yasukuni and its significant role in creating religious nationalism and the national spirit from the Meiji Era to World War II. With regard to the war in China, the movie portrays a peaceful Japanese army being compelled to fight because of the violent activities of Chinese “terrorists” against the Japanese – yet, there is no mention of invasion, aggression and the atrocities committed by the Japanese army. Instead, visitors are encouraged to believe that this is a “war against terror” and that Chinese terrorism was the cause of the fighting. While explaining the Japanese occupation of China’s wartime capital – Nanking, the exhibit states:

86

Radha Binod Pal, “Judgment’ in the Tokyo Judgment: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East, April 29 1946- November 12, 1948,” B.V.A. Roling and C.F. Ruter, eds., (Amsterdam: University Press Amsterdam, 1977).

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Chapter Five After the Japanese surrounded Nanking in December 1937, General Matsui Iwane distributed maps to his men, with foreign settlements and the safety zone marked in red link. Matsui told them that they were to observe military rules failing which they will be severely published. He also warned Chinese troops to surrender, but commander in chief Tan Shengzhi ignored the warning. Instead, he ordered his men to defend Nanking to the death, and then abandoned them. The Chinese were severely defeated, suffering heavy casualties. Inside the city, residents were once again able to live their lives in peace.

As this depicts, the museum displays avoid using any negative terms to describe the brutal military conquest of Nanking and deny the striking fact that the Nanking Massacre ever happened. Instead, they claim that the Chinese government was negligent in its duties, which resulted in the Chinese people being “abandoned.” By condemning Chinese “negligence,” Yasukuni helps to absolve Japan from any responsibility for the war. More strikingly, the narratives in the exhibits even mistakenly assert that Manchuria was Japanese territory but “now is occupied by China” and justify Japan’s aggressive war in China. The Yushukan’s glorification of Japan’s militarist ideology and denial of its war crimes and responsibility, as a Chinese historian puts it, “is a sort of perilous Yasukuni culture spreading throughout the Japanese society.”87 Yasukuni justifies Japanese militarism, not only through its veneration of war criminals and ritual practice, but also through the display of war relics and weapons, such as the human torpedo and Kamikaze pilots in the museum exhibits at the shrine, which unambiguously legitimize Japan’s aggressive war. In the shrine, Japan is the victim, provoked by Chinese “terrorists.” Thus it is clear that Yasukuni represents Japan’s failure to come to terms with its war history and the futility of attempting to assert a narrowly nationalistic narrative of war memory. The Yushukan’s spin on history is deeply flawed; depicting the Chinese people’s resistance of Japan’s invasion as “terrorists” is gratuitously insulting to the Chinese people and all those who fought to defend their motherland against Japanese imperialism. For the Chinese, Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni, which justifies Japan’s wars, have supported Japan’s militarist ideology. Thus they treated Koizumi’s visit as a clear sign of Japan’s

87

Wu Guangyi, “Weixian de jingguo wenhua” [Perilous Yasukuni Culture], Renmin Ribao, August 12, 2005.

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returning to those days of militarist glory and view it as a symbol of Japan’s unwillingness to confront its militarist past.88 Figure 6: A Busy Work

This Chinese cartoon depicts how Japanese right-wing forces are beautifying Japan’s militarism and denied that Nanjing Massacre has never occurred in history. (Source: Fengci yu Youmo, September 5, 2001)

The militarist ideology of the shrine glorifying Japan’s aggression was not highlighted in the Japanese media until June 2005. Ironically, the Yomiuri Shimbun, a major newspaper with the largest circulation in Japan, which had strongly supported prime ministerial visits, dramatically changed its tone and opposed Koizumi’s visits after the anti-Japanese demonstrations occurred in 2005 throughout China. An editorial on June 4, 2005 requested the government to construct a new national memorial for 88 For Chinese views on the Yasukuni Shrine, see, Hua Ming, Jingguo Shenshe Da Jiemi , p.46-60..

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the war dead to replace Yasukuni.89 Surprisingly, the conservative Yomiuri for the first time began to show its clear stance against prime ministers’ visits to the shrine and advocated a neutral national memorial. Later Watanabe Tsuneo, owner of the Yomiuri, the giant of the Japanese media, stated publicly that the decisive factor for this strategy shift was due to his visit to the Yushukan, which “explicitly justifies Japan’s war and beautifies Japan’s militarism.”90 The policy shift of the Yomiuri became a new momentum for the Japanese media to delve into the question of war responsibility and reexamine the Yasukuni problem. 91 At the same time, it also aroused Japanese concerns of the essence of the Yasukuni problem. Kuriyama Takakazu, former ambassador to the United States, criticized Koizumi’s visits, saying that the visits “have given an impression to the public that the [Japanese] government supports the militarist ideology of the Yasukuni Shrine – the glorification of the Greater East Asia War.”92 Some Japanese, for example Togo Kazuhiko, former ambassador to the Netherlands, even advocated a fundamental reform of Yasukuni, including removal of the Yushukan outside the shrine. 93 Even those who have strongly supported prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni such as Okazaki Hisahiko, former ambassador to Thailand, opposed “the immature antiAmerican view” of the Yushukan appeals to the public.94 On the other hand, Japan’s boom of “the Yasukuni Culture” aroused concerns in the international society. Abdul Irsan, Indonesian Ambassador 89

“Kokuritsu Tsuito Shisetsu no Genritsu Isoge” [To Construct a National Memorial to Commemorate the War Dead Urgently], Yomiuri Shimbun, June 4, 2005. 90 Ronza ed, Yasukuni to Koizumi Shusho: Tsuneo Watanabe vs. Yoshibumi Wakamiya [Yasukuni and Prime Minister Koizumi] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 2006), p.10. 91 For example, the Yomiuri Shimbunsha formed a “Committee to Examine War Responsibility” in 2005 and published a comprehensive book about Japan’s war responsibility the next year. For detail, see, Committee to Examine War Responsibility of the Yomiuri Shimbun, Kensho Senso Sekinin [An Examination of War Responsibility] , (Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha, 2006), Vol.1-2. 92 Gaiko Forum 1, January 2006. 93 Togo Kazuhiko advocates reforming the Yasukuni Shrine, including the removal of Class A war criminals’ spirits and the Yushukan Museum outside the shrine. For more, see, Kazuhiko Togo, “A Moratorium on Yasukuni Visits,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 2006, p.5-15. 94 Okazaki Hisahiko, “Yushukan kara mijukara hanbeikan o haise,” [To Do Away with the Immature Anti-American Historical View in the Yushukan], Sankei Shimbun, 25 August 2006.

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to Tokyo, criticized Yasukuni after his visit in April 2006 because the history being taught in the Yushukan is wrong and “it mistakenly claims that Indonesia became independent due to Japan’s war contribution.” 95 Even the United States – Japan’s only ally in Asia - came to break the silence after 2006. U.S. Ambassador Thomas Schieffer stated publicly that the Yushukan museum, which depicts Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor as an act of self-defense, was “very disturbing.”96 Meanwhile U.S. lawmakers such as Henry Hyde, the Republican Chairman of the House of Representatives’ Committee on International Relations, criticized the Yushukan for “distorting history” and asserted that the “Yasukuni Culture” has threatened US security interests in Asia.97 Former President George H. W. Bush criticized Koizumi’s visits, saying that “the shrine distorts World War II history” during his visit to Beijing in December 2006.98 Under the severe criticism, particularly American pressure, Yasukuni decided to rewrite its narratives concerning Japan’s war with the United States in October 2006. 99 The shrine, however, sternly refused Chinese demands when China asked to revise the exhibits which justify Japan’s war in Asia.100 Later Yasukuni softened its stance and decided to rewrite some narratives concerning the war in China in December 2006.101 Finally the newly-organized exhibits in the museum reopened on January 1, 2007, but still refused to acknowledge Japan’s war crimes and responsibility. For example, while explaining the reason of the Sino-Japanese War, the old 95

Mainichi Shimbun, August 10, 2006. Hans Greimel, “Tensions Mount Over Japanese War Shrine,” The Boston Global August 13, 2006. 97 “Bei kain iinkai ‘Yushukan’ no tenji naiyo minaoshi motomeru” [US House Asks to Revise the Exhibits in the Yushukan], Yomiuri Shimbun, September 15, 2006. 98 “George H. W. Bush Says Japanese Shrine Distorts History,” www.chinanews.cn (December 15, 2006), , 99 Nagae Taro, “Beichu no yasukuni ‘yushukan’ hihan ni oeru” [Responses to the American and Chinese Criticism on the Yushukan], Shokun, November 2006, p.94-103. 100 “Yasukuni Jinja Yushukan: Bei ga Hihan no Kijutsu Shusei, Ajia Kanren wa Kaezu” [The Yushukan at the Yasukuni Shrine: To Revise the Narratives Concerning the US Due to the American Criticism But Not Revise the Exhibits Relating to Asia], Mainichi Shimbun, October 6, 2006. 101 “Yasukuni Jinja: Yushukan no Tenji Ichibu Hyogen o Kaeru Hoshin” [The Yasukuni Shrine: Yushukan Changes Its Policy and Decides to Revise Some Parts of the Exhibits], Mainichi Shimbun, December 20, 2006. 96

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narratives claimed that China refused Japan’s peace proposal, which in the end led to the war. Instead, the newly-rearranged displays moderated the tone but blamed the anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese for inciting Japan to fight. Immediately, the Chinese media expressed strong anger against the rearranged displays and narratives in the museum by saying that Japan is not sincere in reflecting on its war responsibility and continues to ignore the feelings of the Chinese people.102 An article even criticizes that the newly-rewritten narratives are meant to “fawn on [Japan’s] old brother – the United States.”103 Needless to say, Yasukuni’s double standard – proAmerican and anti-Chinese attitude became a new striking evidence to indicate Japan’s insincerity toward reconciliation with China and further reinforces the mistrust of the Chinese people. As a Chinese editorial puts it, the newly-rewritten narratives in the museum are much worse as the exhibits delete all factors disadvantageous to Japan and continue to distort history to hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.104

Frustration of a “Diplomatic Revolution” Although the public remained deeply suspicious about Japan, China realized that aroused nationalist sentiment might become the driving force for deteriorating mutual respect and trust between the two countries. In 2002-2003, China witnessed a remarkable public debate on China’s policy toward Japan. One direct reason was mainly due to an episode which occurred in 2002. On April 19, 2002, the Asahi interviewed Jiang Wen, a Chinese director renowned for his movie “Japanese Devils Have Come” (Guizi Laile)–award-winner of the 2000 Cannes International Film Festival. Jiang revealed that he visited Yasukuni several times when he was making the movie in Japan. 105 In response to a Chinese media interview, Jiang repeatedly acknowledged his visits to the public on June 102

Guo Yina, “Riben Jingguo shenshe Youxiuguan chongxin duiwai kaifang: Huai tang bu huan yao” [The Yushukan Museum in Japan’s Yasukuni Shrine Rearranged: Changed the Title But Not the Real Content], Guoji Xianqui Daobao [Daily of International Pioneers], January 5, 2007. 103 Wu Gufeng, “Jingguo Shenshe ‘Gai Wenzi’ Bugai Qinglue Shiguan” [The Yasukuni Shrine: Rewriting the Words But Not Revising Its View of Aggression], Renmin Ribao, January 4, 2007, . 104 Yu Qing, “Jingguo Shenshe Jieshuoci Gai le Naer” [How Have the Narratives of the Yasukuni Shrine Revised], Huanqiu Shibao, January 3, 2007. 105 Asahi Shimbun, April 19, 2002.

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28. 106 Immediately, his remarks ignited widespread condemnation and indignation throughout the society. Many Chinese nationalists treated Jiang’s visits as a “political issue” and a test of “Chinese national integrity.”107 The social responsibility and morality of the celebrities was sternly questioned. Jiang was treated as a “traitor” and an article even stated that his visits “stick Chinese national scar and trauma” and damaged Chinese “national dignity.”108 On the contrary, some argued that Jiang’s visits were merely for conducting research for his movie. They publicly defended Jiang, saying that to go to Yasukuni did not mean to worship Japanese war criminals and appealed to the public “not to emotionalize patriotism.” A well-known author Shi Tiesheng argued that “to reveal Japanese crimes of militarism does not imply the same as standing on the side of militarism.”109 Feng Jinhua, a “national hero” who vandalized a sculpture of a lion at the entrance of the Yasukuni Shrine to protest Koizumi’s visit on August 13, 2001, defended Jiang saying that the Chinese should be encouraged to go to Yasukuni to understand the real essence of Japanese militarism.110 As the debate shows, Yasukuni is a place that easily stimulates Chinese national emotions. In fact, Jiang Wen was not the first Chinese reported to have visited Yasukuni. In 1985 Zhou Erfu, vice-minister of the Ministry of Culture and a well-known novelist, was dismissed from office after he visited the shrine during his Japan tour in October 1985. The government asserted that his visit “seriously damages Chinese national dignity and integrity.”111 It is therefore, obvious that the Chinese are not tolerant of visits to Yasukuni even by the Chinese themselves. Chinese historians, for 106

Beijing Qingnian Bao [Daily of Beijing Youth], June 28, 2002. Many articles criticized Jiang Wen’s Yasukuni visits, for example, Wang Chenhui, “Mingren de shehui zeren: Ping Jiang Wen Qui Jingguo Shenshe” [Social Responsibility of the Celebrities: My View on Jiang Wen’s Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine], Meiri Xinbao, June 29, 2002; and “Jiang Wen Qui Jingguo Shenshe Gan Sheme” [Why Jiang Wen Went to the Yasukuni Shrine], Xinwenhua Bao [Daily of New Culture], July 31, 2002. 108 Ling Xingdong, “Jiang Wen Suowei Fanxia le Minzu Daji” [Jiang Wen’s Visits Made A Serious Mistake in Chinese National Dignity],

109 Yu Shaowen, “Qingxuihua de Aiguozhuyi Bushi Zhenzheng de Aiguozhuyi” [Emotionalized Patriotism Is Not A Real Sense of Patriotism], Beijing Qingnianbao, June 28, 2002. 110 Feng Jinghua, “Meiyou Biyao Weici Qui Gongji Jiang Wen” [It Is Unnecessary to Attack Jiang Wen Just for the Visit], Beijing Qingnianbao, July 1, 2002 (online). 111 “Zuojia Zhou Erfu Quishi” [Death of Author Zhou Erfu], Beijing Qingnianbao, January 10, 2004. 107

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example, Bu Ping, director of the Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), clarified that the reason for Chinese intolerance was that “most of the war dead enshrined at the shrine were the victimizers to the Chinese people.”112 Yasukuni in the Chinese national collective memory, as many Chinese argue, “is an insult and humiliating place in the traumatic collective memory of the Chinese nation” as it reflects the entire history of Japan’s aggressive wars in China.113 As the debate intensified, memories of past Japanese aggression again generated anti-Japanese animosity throughout China. The dispute on “Jiang Wen Visits Yasukuni” caused repercussions in the whole of society. The increasing anti-Japanese sentiment caused concerns in Chinese academics, journalists and think-tank researchers. To begin with, Ma Licheng, a senior commentator of Renmin Ribao who had been responsible for writing articles on Chinese political reform, published an article in an influential journal, Strategy and Management in December 2002, after the 16th CCP Congress which marked the transition of Chinese leadership. Ma criticized Chinese ultra-nationalist criticism against Japan and appealed to a “new-thinking” (Xin Siwei) in China’s policy toward Japan. 114 In response to Ma’s insistence, Shi Yinhong, a specialist on international politics, proposed a “Diplomatic Revolution,” insisting that China should make a political compromise with Japan to rid of the history issue from the political agenda, and help Japan play a bigger role in world affairs such as through participation in the United Nations Security Council.115 Immediately, their articles sparked a heated public debate. In support of Shi’s opinion, Feng Zhaokui, a leading specialist on Japanese history in the CASS, insisted on the establishment of an amicable relationship without demanding Japan’s apology because Japan had

112

For Chinese scholars’ arguments, see, “Yasukuni sanpai no nan ga warui to iu no da” [Why Is It Bad to Visit the Yasukuni Shrine], Bungei Shunjun, August 2005, p. 94-111. 113 “Jiang Wen Qui Jingguo Shenshe Gan Sheme” [Why Jiang Wen Went to the Yasukuni Shrine], Xinwenhua Bao [Daily of New Culture], July 31, 2002. 114 Ma Licheng, “Duiri Guanxi Xin Siwei” [A New-Thinking of China’s Policy Toward Japan] Zhanlue Yu Guanli [Strategy and Management], 6 (Winter 2002). Later Ma Licheng’s argument was published in Japan. Ma Licheng, Nihon ha mo Chugoku ni Shazai Sinakude ii [Japan Should No Longer Apology to China], (Tokyo: Bungei Shunshu, 2004). 115 Shi Yinhong, “Zhongri Jiejin Yu Waijiao Geming” [Sino-Japanese Approach and Diplomatic Revolution] Zhanlue Yu Guanli, 2 (2003).

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contributed to China’s modernization in the postwar era.116 The advocates of a “diplomatic revolution” argue that China should stop putting too much weight on the history issue and that the burden of history has consumed too much positive energy. Therefore China should move forward toward constructing an amicable partnership with Japan. 117 In contrast to their assertions, Jin Xide, an expert on Japanese politics in the CASS, sternly opposed their stances, considering their opinions “too simplistic.” He insisted that none of the bilateral problems were caused by China, and Japan should be blamed for causing the trouble. He said it would be impossible for China to approach Japan as long as Japan was not willing to cooperate with China to solve the history issue.118 In sum, critics contend that it is impossible to build a solid foundation for a long-term relationship if Japan refuses to unambiguously atone for its war responsibility. The “new-thinking” proponents challenge the Chinese public to examine its own ultra-nationalist prejudice against Japan. However, it does not stem the swelling tide of the anti-Japanese sentiment. Indeed, the summer and autumn of 2003 witnessed a profound xenophobia toward Japan. In June, internet activists organized the first petition to oppose Japan’s proposal of a Beijing-Shanghai high-speed train. In August, rather than celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, Chinese and Japanese diplomats spent much time on solving the issues of the Japanese chemical weapons incident which occurred on August 4, in which one Chinese died and many were injured in Qiqihaer, Northeast China. The Chinese government tried to limit the scope of a growing resentment among the ordinary people toward Japan on issues relating to civilian compensation of war victims and Japan’s failure to clear the chemical weapons left behind by the Japanese army at the end of the war that continues to cause casualties today. However, more than one million Chinese signed a petition demanding Japan’s compensation for the victims. In September, Japanese businessmen’s “sex tour” in Zhuhai again sparked anger in Chinese society. In the eyes of the Chinese nationalists, the Japanese were symbolically “raping China and humiliating the Chinese

116 Feng Zhaokui, “Zailun duiri guanxin ‘xin siwei’” [Another Discussion o the New-Thinking], Zhanlue yu guanli [Strategy and Management], No. 5 (2003), p.77-79. 117 For the argument of the “new-thinking,” see, Peter Hays Gries, “China’s ‘NewThinking’ on Japan,” The China Quarterly (2005), p.831-850. 118 Jing Xide, Nichu Shinsiko to wa nani ka [What Is the New Thinking in China and Japan], (Tokyo: Nihon Kyobosha, 2003).

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people.”119 In October, more than 1000 students protested a “vulgar skit” performed by Japanese students during a university festival in Xi’an. Viewing the skit as a “deliberate affront to the Chinese people,” the demonstrators shouted slogans such as “Down with Japanese Imperialism” and “Boycott Japanese Goods,” etc. and finally the anti-Japanese sentiment dramatically increased throughout society. 120 These incidents indicate that Chinese traumatic memories of the war remain vivid. Thus the skepticism raises the basic question: Can the Chinese new leaders overcome the negative image of Japan derived from past conflicts and lay the past to rest in order to pursue a constructive relationship based on China’s own national interests? A power shift occurred in the political circle in China: Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao became the fourth generation of communist leadership after Koizumi’s third visit to Yasukuni in January 2003. The new Chinese leaders realized that the rising anti-Japanese sentiment might become the driving force for deteriorating mutual respect and trust between the peoples of the two countries and were anxious to stabilize relations with Japan. An example of the policy shift can be witnessed from Hu’s remarks when he first met Koizumi in May 2003. Unlike his predecessor President Jiang Zeming, Hu refrained from publicly criticizing Koizumi’s repeated homage to Yasukuni. On May 31, Hu met Koizumi in Saint-Petersburg, Russia and put forward a future-oriented foreign policy by expressing deep gratitude to Japan’s assistance to China’s struggle against the SARS outbreak. During their conversation, Hu did not mention Yasukuni in the hope of opening formal and informal channels so that the interrupted mutual top-level visits could resume.121

119

The incident took place on September 16-18. Four hundred Japanese businessmen visited Zhuhai city and hired 500 Chinese prostitutes for a weekend sex party at the hotels. In Chinese eyes, September 18 – beginning of Japan’s invasion in China in 1931 has been recorded as a “Day of National Humiliation” in Chinese collective memory. The Chinese outraged when the incident was reported and many Chinese nationalists considered the incident as Japan’s “symbolic rape” of the Chinese people. According to an online survey, approximately 90 percent Chinese responded that the Japanese conducted the sex tour to “humiliate China.” Joseph Kahn, “China Angered by Reported Orgy Involving Japanese Tourists,” The New York Times, September 30, 2003. 120 For the rise of the anti-Japanese sentiment in China, see, Shimizu Yoshikazu, Chugoku ha Naze “Hannichi” ni natta ka [Why China Began to Be Anti-Japanese], (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjun, 2004); and Chugoku ga Hannichi o Suteru hi [The Day for China to Discard the Anti-Japanese Sentiment], (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2006). 121 Mainichi Shimbun, May 31, 2003.

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Rather than responding to China’s conciliatory gestures, Koizumi instead expected to persist with the Yasukuni pilgrimages and made little effort to resolve the crisis. China was disappointed when Koizumi made his annual visits to Yasukuni on January 1, 2004, the fourth one in his term. Koizumi consistently condemned foreign criticism publicly, saying that “he could not understand why the foreign countries opposed Japan to mourn its war dead” while showing his strong determination to continue the visits. Koizumi’s intransigence angered the Chinese people when he reiterated “it is not Japanese culture to trace back the guilty [of Class-A war criminals] after they died” in the Diet and continuously criticized China’s “interference in [Japan’s] internal affairs.”122 Under these circumstances, Beijing was unable to put aside the history issue and hardened its policy toward Japan. The first signal came in March 2004 during the National People’s Congress. During a media interview, Premier Wen explicitly expressed Japanese leader’s repeated Yasukuni visits as the key issue to disturb top leaders’ mutual visits over the past three years. In an APEC meeting in November 2004, President Hu confronted Koizumi directly about the Yasukuni visits. Shortly after the meeting at the tenth Summit of ASEAN and East Asian leaders, he warned Koizumi again that the Yasukuni issue would damage the bilateral relationship. 123 Subsequently, the anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005 testify to the powerful societal resistance to the “diplomatic revolution.” The outcome is that Chinese positive feelings toward Japan have declined dramatically. Later, anti-Japanese sentiment in China triggered by the disputes over Yasukuni further escalated into the disputes over territorial boundaries and natural resources.124 A public survey conducted on August 15, 2006 reported that more than 60 percent of Chinese respondents felt that China and Japan would wage a war in the future because of the disputes over history and natural resources. 125 No doubt Japanese politicians’ overconfidence and insensitivity to Chinese feelings has amplified Chinese antagonism. It is clear that if China and Japan fail to find quick and effective measures to stop the further deterioration of their 122

For Koizumi’s remarks on Yasukuni, see, Ronza, ed., Yasukuni to Koizumi Shusho: Tsuneo Watanabe vs. Yoshibumi Wakamiya [Yasukuni and Prime Minister Koizumi], (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 2006), p.101-7. 123 Zhu Jianrong, Ko Kin To: Tainichi senryaku no hone: nashonarizumu no kuno [Hu Jintao’s Strategy toward Japan: His Distress to Chinese Nationalism], (Tokyo: Kadokawashoten, 2005), Chapter 2. 124 For detail, see, Yian He, “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging SinoJapanese Conflict,” Journal of Contemporary China, (2007), p.1-24. 125 Zhongguo Xinweng Zhoukan [China News Weekly], August 15, 2006.

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relationship, tensions between the two Asian neighbors could escalate into a fierce confrontation or even a military conflict, which will subsequently destroy the foundation of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Conclusion: Toward Sino-Japanese Reconciliation The past still overshadows the present. Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated dramatically due to Prime Minister Koizumi’s annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which inflamed the history dispute. Recently, the Yasukuni controversy is becoming increasingly intertwined with other sources of serious political friction such as territorial disputes. The resurgent nationalism in the two countries has fostered regional uncertainty and instability and has become a potential threat to security and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Controversy over Yasukuni is not only an issue concerned with commemorative politics, but also one deeply rooted in the historical debate over war memory, responsibility, and reconciliation. As a result of the dispute over Yasukuni, Japan still has difficulty assuming leadership in promoting regional cooperation. This difficulty will continue unless Japan takes clear steps toward historical reconciliation. Despite numerous apologies, several questions still remain. How should Japan come to grips with the past and convince its neighbors of its sincerity, reduce tension and mistrust and set the stage for more constructive dialogue in the future? On the other hand, how can China find the tolerance necessary to get beyond these historical conflicts in order to construct a new partnership with Japan so that the two Asian neighbors can embrace a new vision for the future to maintain peace and stability in the region? Undoubtedly confidence building is crucial for de-escalating tensions. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s Beijing visit in October 2006, shortly after his inauguration in September, and Premier Wen Jiabao’s Tokyo visit in April 2007 demonstrate that both China and Japan are willing to play down historical differences in favor of stable relations. The leaders in the two countries realize that there are high risks involved if bilateral relations are colored by mistrust and enmity, and are making efforts to improve the ties and sweeten the atmosphere. However, there has been no concrete breakthrough in the most contentious Yasukuni issue bedeviling the bilateral relations. The difficulty lies in the ethnocentric sentiment, history education, and mutual mistrust and enmity stemming from different positions. On the other hand, the question still remains: How can Japan mourn its war dead without hurting the feelings of the Chinese people? When the

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controversy erupted in 1985, China took a clear stance that “it is not difficult to sort out the problem if the de-enshrinement of Class-A war criminals is solved.” Later, China repeatedly stated that “Class-A war criminals must be responsible for Japan’s aggressive war” when the controversy re-erupted. 126 Furthermore Premier Wen Jiabao reiterated China’s stance, saying that “only a handful of militarists should be held responsible for [Japan’s] war of aggression and ordinary Japanese people were also victims” in his address to the Japanese Diet during his Japan visit in 2007. 127 To China, a country that was invaded and severely victimized by Japan’s aggression in the past century, this can be seen as an enormous political compromise, pursuing the responsibility of merely “a handful of Japanese militarists.” However, the question is: Who are “a handful of Japanese militarists” in Chinese eyes? Some Japanese express concern that if Class-A war criminals are de-enshrined, the crimes of Class-B and C war criminals enshrined at Yasukuni would be questioned in the aftermath. 128 Foremost, the Chinese government should make an unambiguous statement to identify “a handful of militarists” – or merely Class-A war criminals - to bear responsibility if that is the final solution, although the majority of the Chinese people could not accept Japanese prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni even if the spirits of Class-A war criminals are separated from the shrine.129

126

Renmin Ribao, April 14, 2002; and June 9, 2005. Reiji Yoshida, “Wen Gives Historic, Upbeat Diet Speech,” The Japan Time, April 13, 2007. 128 For example, Sugimoto Nobuyuki, Daichi no Hoko: Moto Shanghai Soryoji ga mita Chugoku [The Call of the Earth: China in the Eyes of a Former Japanese Consulate General in Shanghai], (Kyoto: PHP, 2006), p.325-326. 129 A public survey conducted by China Daily on August 15, 2005 showed that more than 90 percent of the Chinese respondents said that “they cannot accept Japanese prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.” Another survey conducted in August 2006 indicated that only 30 percent pulled said that “they can accept Japanese prime ministerial visits if the spirits of Class-A war criminals are separated.” This survey was co-sponsored by the academia and economic elites in China and Japan. 127

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Figure 7: Removal Service of Class-A War Criminals

Can a Simple Bunshi (de-enshrinement) help Japan to Say Sayonara to its war history? (Source: Asahi Shimbun, August 8, 1999)

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Despite the feelings of the Chinese people, the Yasukuni issue is a much more complex problem, involving the position of the shrine itself in Japanese society, religious nationalism, traditional and cultural practices, different constitutional interpretations and the ways in which history is perceived. Therefore it needs time, courage, wisdom, as well as the efforts of both sides. Nonetheless, Japan must take the initiative in solving this thorny issue. Within Japan, all the major daily newspapers except the Sankei have opposed prime ministerial visits. It is important to bear in mind that Japan had made efforts to solve the controversy before Koizumi came to power. In 1999, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka Hiromu formally proposed to enshrine separately the spirits of Class-A war criminals from the other war dead so that Yasukuni could once again be made a semigovernment body. Yet this proposal was subsequently shelved. Some argue that the spirits enshrined at Yasukuni are inseparable. However, the Izokukai, the biggest organization supporting the shrine, has recently decided to consider the possibility of Bunshi (de-enshrinement) of Class-A war criminals. Koga Makoto, President of the Izokukai, stated publicly to support the de-enshrinement of Class-A war criminals.130 Former Foreign Minister Aso Taro joined the public discourse about paying tribute by suggesting that the government take over the shrine, strip it of its religious status and turn it into a secular war memory.131 His proposal to depoliticize Yasukuni and reinvent it as a secular war memorial has been a longstanding aim of some factions within the LDP and is motivated by the desire to make it into a politically acceptable place for paying tribute to the war dead.132 This seems to be a plausible way of settling the controversy. If we come back to the original situation that Yasukuni can mourn the war dead exclusively based on the list composed by the government, there should be room for Yasukuni to adapt to the political decision taken by the government without jeopardizing Shinto’s fundamental beliefs and traditions. Moreover, the historical imperial connection is fundamental to an understanding of Shinto and Yasukuni’s rites. The role of the emperor, however, has been overwhelmingly overlooked when the controversy erupted. The spirits of the war dead who believed that they died for the emperor could never be pacified if the Japanese Emperor stopped paying respects to the shrine. Therefore, it is obvious that the method of dealing 130

“Izokukai Kaicho Naze A-kyu Senpan Bunshi o” [President of Izokukai: Why Should Class-A War Criminals Be De-enshrined], Bungei Shunju, 84:11 (2006), p.144-153. 131 Japan Times, August 9, 2006. 132 Yomiuri Shimbun, August 10, 2006.

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with Class-A war criminals is crucial to solving the Yasukuni problem. It is necessary for Japan to deliberate about why Class-A war criminals were enshrined at the shrine and what the significance of Yasukuni is in Japanese society and traditional religious practices. In all, the Yasukuni problem is an extremely important issue for the Japanese themselves to consider seriously about Japan’s past acts in order to find a proper way to honor the war dead of the nation. Can Japan ignore the significance of Class-A war criminals to find an answer to the question of war responsibility? The more these issues are openly discussed in Japan, the harder it will become for the Japanese to ignore responsibility for the past. On the other hand, China bears responsibility as well. Japan’s aggression left the deepest scar on Chinese society. Nationalism based on historical antagonism against Japan continues to simmer in Chinese society. China needs to reflect on its own history while demanding Japan to “face up to history squarely.” Recently some scholars insisted on reflection on China’s “distortion of history” and even requested the government to reexamine the history education regarding Japan’s wartime atrocities and appealed to the public “not to view Japan with eyes full of national hostility.”133 Both Chinese and Japanese historians have begun to participate in joint history projects, as more educational programs and dialogues are needed in the future. China and Japan have made a commitment to promoting cultural exchanges to deepen mutual understanding, which is a good start. The cultural programs for mutual understanding and trust represent an enormous positive trend for amicable bilateral relations. In sum, how to solve the Yasukuni issue depends on the courage and wisdom of the Japanese people, as well as the Chinese. This new hope can exist as long as China and Japan are making efforts to push forward ties toward reconciliation.

133

Ge Hongbing, “Zhongguo Yin Tingzhi ‘Xuanchoushi’ Fanri Xuanchuan” [China Should Stop the Anti-Japanese Propaganda], Xinmin Wanbao [Daily of Xinmin], June 20, 2007.

CHAPTER SIX SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN THE PAST AND PRESENT: REVISITING THE ROLE OF THE US FACTOR AND THE LEGACY OF HISTORY HE YINAN

Introduction In this chapter, I will examine two distinct driving forces that have shaped postwar Sino-Japanese relations. One is the East Asian structural environment, which is to a great extent defined by US strategy toward the region. The other is the enduring psychological and emotional shadow cast by the two countries’ history of traumatic conflict. While the former largely affects the inter-governmental ties between China and Japan, the latter exerts considerable influence both on inter-governmental ties and popular relationships. I will demonstrate the relative strengths of, and interaction between, the US factor and the historical legacy by offering a brief review of the trajectory of postwar Sino-Japanese relations. In the first period after World War II, the 1950s to 1960s, negative structural constraints due to the US Cold War strategy in East Asia trumped all other variables, including memories of the historical legacy, and decisively blocked SinoJapanese reconciliation. In the second period after the war, the 1970s to 1980s, while the structural environment became favorable to bilateral reconciliation after Sino-American rapprochement, it failed to promote comprehensive political cooperation and societal harmony, which was to a large extent because of limitations resulting from the unresolved historical legacy. Since the end of the Cold War, the US strategy toward the region, a combination of hedging and engaging with China, and tight alliance with Japan, has not carved out a clear regional international structure. Nor do

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the dominant trends in the Sino-Japanese balance of power dictate the development of China and Japan’s strategic relationship in the future. Whether China and Japan become strategic partners or rivals in the foreseeable future will continue to be influenced by their respective responses to the United States, as well as their handling of the enduring history problem.

1950s to 1960s: Antagonism from the Start The two East Asian neighboring countries, China and Japan, have come into repeated violent clashes with one another in recent history, starting with the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895 and culminating in an immensely destructive war from 1937 to 1945. Approximately 10 million Chinese people died and uncertain millions of people were wounded in this war.1 Chinese people remember vividly the horrendous Japanese war atrocities, including indiscriminate killing, raping, chemical and biological warfare, forced labor and sexual slavery. The perpetrator country, Japan, lost over three percent of its total population, including 1.7 million military personnel and nearly 1 million civilians.2 Japanese people also retain painful memories of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the American firebombing of Tokyo, and the miserable fate of Japanese soldiers and civilians after they surrendered to the USSR in August 1945. At the end of World War II, formal Sino-Japanese ties were out of the question because Japan was placed under American occupation and China was embroiled in an all-out civil war. American occupation of Japan was initially aimed at disarming and demilitarizing the country to make sure that it would no longer pose a military threat.3 From the late 1940s, when 1

The Nationalist government officially claims total Chinese military casualties of 3.3 million and civilian casualties of approximately 8.4 million. See Y. Yin, Chnjnichi Sensǀ Baishǀ Mondai (Tokyo: Ojanomizu Shobǀ), 384. The Communist government used to claim more than 21 million Chinese casualties, including 10 million deaths. See Information Office of the State Council of the People of the Republic of China, Zhongguo de Renquan Zhuangkuang, part 1. But in 1995, Chinese president Jiang Zemin dramatically increased the casualty estimate to 35 million in a public speech commemorating the end of World War II. See H. Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, vol. 2, 1971–1995 (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe), 948. 2 J. Dower, War without Mercy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 295–9. 3 See the “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” released on September 22, 1945, in C. Hosoya, Nichibei Kankei Shiryǀshnj 1945–97 (Tokyo:

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the Cold War emerged in Asia, the Truman administration accorded strategic priority to Japan. The National Security Council Report 132, approved on October 7, 1948, stipulated a so-called “reverse course” of US policy toward Japan, which shifted the focus of occupation from punishment to rehabilitation. 4 Later, in a speech in January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson included Japan in America’s Pacific “defense perimeter.” After the Korean War broke out, Washington pressed Japan to rearm and signed the US-Japan Security Treaty, or the Anpo, to knit Japan tightly into a broad defense framework. The treaty granted the United States exclusive rights to use military bases in Japan and stated that American forces stationed there would be utilized “to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.” The Japanese leader at the time, Yoshida Shigeru, did not feel that monolithic international Communism presented a real threat to Japan, and worried instead about the heavy economic burden incurred by American military bases and Japan’s rearmament. But because Japan depended on American economic aid and political backing for national rebuilding, and the signing of the Anpo was directly linked to the early conclusion of a peace treaty and the restoration of Japanese sovereignty, Yoshida had few other choices but to become America’s Cold War ally.5 As for China, during the Chinese Civil War the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) grew resentful about American military aid to their political adversary, the Kuomintang (KMT), or the Nationalist Party. In June 1949, Mao Zedong declared that China would lean toward Socialism. In February 1950, moreover, China signed a military alliance treaty with the USSR, prompting hardliners in Washington, such as John Foster Dulles and Dean Rusk, to demand the reconsideration of America’s China policy; in particular, they advocated an increase in military assistance to Taiwan.6 Once the Korean War erupted, Truman ordered a naval blockade of the Taiwan Strait and American-led UN troops quickly landed on the Korean Peninsula. Fearing that the United States might launch a two-front attack from Manchuria and the Taiwan Strait, Mao decided to intervene in Korea University of Tokyo Press, 1999): 28. 4 “Recommendations with Respect to U.S. Policy toward Japan,” National Security Archive, NSC 132. 5 The two treaties were actually both signed on September 8, 1951. 6 T. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 128–30; N. Tucker, “John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the ‘Two China’ Policy,” in John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, ed. Richard H. Immerman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 236–37.

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to fight the Americans. Thus far, the rise of a bipolar international structure from the late 1940s had drawn China and Japan into opposing strategic camps and made them adversaries in the first hot war in postwar history. In the subsequent two decades, American policy toward China was characterized by what A. Doak Barnett terms “containment and isolation.”7 This policy required active cooperation with Japan. Washington encouraged Japan to expand trade and investment to non-Communist countries in Asia in order to increase the economic strength and political stability of this area. Besides using Japan as the regional economic engine, the United States also emphasized Japan’s military role. Their 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement committed Japan to carrying out incremental remilitarization and assuming greater responsibility for its defense. Japan’s collaboration with America’s containment strategy determined that it had to develop a formal relationship with Taiwan, South Korea and other American allies in Southeast Asia. But in the eyes of Beijing, Japan’s formal recognition of the Taiwan regime was in outright defiance of Chinese interests. Beijing was also sensitive to Japan-South Korea relations because South Korea was China’s adversary in the Korean War. Chinese anger toward Japan soared, especially when Prime Minister Satǀ agreed in a joint statement with Nixon in 1969 to link Japanese national security to the defense of Taiwan and South Korea. Therefore, by the time China and Japan became independent, unified states, the Cold War had already unfolded, forcing them to make strategic choices between the American and Soviet blocs. Japan endorsed strategic collaboration with the United States in order to regain national sovereignty and receive generous economic assistance, while China sought security and economic partnership with the Soviet Union. Despite the absence of direct mutual threat, China and Japan nevertheless were deeply enmeshed in the global rivalry between the Eastern and Western blocs. For about two decades, structural conditions were wholly unfavorable for bilateral reconciliation to take place. Did the traumatic memories of World War II function to reinforce Sino-Japanese antagonism during this first period after the war? The answer is an ironic “no.” Both nations well remembered the recent war, and a lot of Chinese people held a negatively stereotyped image of Japan based on such memories. But their historically rooted emotions were never allowed to be vented in public discourse, nor were government policies significantly constrained by any history issue toward the other country, 7

Congressional Quarterly Inc., China and U.S. Far East Policy, 1945-1966, 279.

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largely because the Chinese government deliberately echoed a Japanese myth that blamed only a small handful of Japanese militarists for the war while deemphasizing and even suppressing areas of memory divergence. In order to boost political influence, which had been compromised by their inextricable ties with the wartime government, as well as to mobilize public support for the pro-US international strategy, Japanese conservative elites constructed three main national myths. First, the “myth of the military clique” blamed a small group of military leaders for launching the war and asserted that the Japanese people were innocent victims of the war. This myth whitewashed the complicity of a wide range of wartime political actors, and ignored the enthusiastic support that numerous ordinary Japanese had given to the war policy. Second, the Westerncentric myth held Japan responsible for opening hostilities against the Western Allies but evaded its aggression and the atrocities it carried out in Asia. Third, the “heroic sacrifice” myth honored the imperial soldiers for having sacrificed themselves for the nation but circumvented the fundamental mistakes of the war policy and atrocities committed by the military. Aided by their domination in Japanese politics, especially vis-àvis the progressive elites associated with left-wing forces, the conservatives were able to disseminate these myths through such institutional tools as the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, media control and educational policies, postwar compensation policies and war commemoration rituals.8 It should be noted that the United States was not totally innocent in the process of Japanese mythmaking because the institutional legacy of American occupation had a path-dependent influence over Japanese war memories. This point can be driven home by a comparison with the Allied occupation of Germany after the war. In Germany, the Allies consistently favored “German politicians with clear anti- or at least non-Nazi credentials” to run postwar German politics while prosecuting or purging a large number of ex-Nazis. 9 Members of the new ruling class were predominantly recruited from the democratic parties of the Weimar Republic, many of whom had been in prisons or concentration camps or excluded by the Nazi regime. Although quite a few Nazi sympathizers later were de-purged and even returned to public office, the German 8

For a lengthy discussion of Japanese national myths after the war, see Y. He, The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 9 J. Herf, “Post-Totalitarian Narratives in Germany: Reflections on Two Dictatorships after 1945 and 1989,” in “Reckoning with the Past: Perpetrators, Accomplices and Victims in Twentieth and Twenty-first Century Narratives and Politics,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 9, nos. 2–3 (2008): 165.

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government was staunchly anti-Nazi, and no mainstream politicians would deny Nazi crimes.10 In Japan, the purge of militarists was much less strict than in Germany. The occupation authorities screened about 21.7 percent of the German population in the US occupation zone alone, compared to 3.2 percent of the total Japanese population. The screening procedures for Germans were also more intensive and rigorous, as the questionnaire contained 150 items (compared to 23 in Japan), and on average each occupation official screened only 16.5 Germans compared to 770 Japanese.11 Moreover, after the “reverse course” began in Japan, the United States abandoned the morally cleaner political left to support the conservatives, who had deep connections with the wartime government. This allowed many militarist sympathizers and even supporters, such as war criminals Shigemitsu Mamoru (convicted by the Tokyo Trial as a Class A war criminal but later appointed foreign minister under Prime Minister Hatoyama) and Kishi Nobusuke (a Class A war criminal suspect who was never tried and later became the prime minister), to return to political prominence after the occupation ended. Naturally, this conservative government was ambiguous about Japanese war crimes. Moreover, the Japanese emperor was exonerated of war responsibility and the monarchy system was kept intact, which ensured the postwar continuity of the Kokutai, a nationalistic ideology centered on emperor reverence. The Kokutai ideology encouraged Japanese people to take pride in their national history and tolerate the right-wing view that glorified a war fought in the name of the emperor. Another institutional legacy of the early postwar years concerns the education system. The Allies retained the prewar federalist education system in West Germany to thwart any renewed totalitarian control of education, whereas in Japan the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) failed in its attempt to decentralize the education system. 12 Therefore, the German central government—no matter how conservative it 10

Ibid.; P. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 86–87. 11 M. Shibata, Japan and Germany under the U.S. Occupation: A Comparative Analysis of Post-war Education Reform (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005), 68. 12 D. Levy and J. Dierkes, “Institutionalising the Past: Shifting Memories of Nationhood in German – and Immigration Legislation,” in Memory and Power in Post-war Europe Studies in the Presence of the Past, ed. Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); J. Tent “Mission on the Rhine: American Educational Policy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1949,” History of Education Quarterly 22, no.3 (1982).

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was—had little influence over school education, and from the 1960s progressive education reform was able to emerge in a few German states and later successfully spread to other states. Such localized reform, however, was impossible under the centralized textbook certification system in Japan. Additionally, representing the majority of textbook authors, German teachers had heavy input into the content of education; but in Japan, teachers were largely excluded from the decision-making institutions regarding textbooks and curricula. 13 Whereas the younger generation of West German teachers played a significant role in shifting German historical perspectives from the 1970s onward, institutional constraints made it much harder for progressive teachers in Japan to push for education reform from the bottom up. Despite Japan’s obvious distortions of history, the Chinese government did not take issue with Japanese war memory as it did several decades later. The Chinese grand strategy at the time focused on counterbalancing the threat of “American imperialism” and opposing the Americansupported Taiwan regime. Meanwhile, Beijing carried out “People’s Diplomacy” with Japan, a semi-official diplomatic campaign aimed at reverting Tokyo’s policy of non-recognition of Beijing. In line with these strategies, Chinese school textbooks magnified the role of the CCP in the national resistance campaign against Japan, and condemned the KMT for kowtowing to Japan and the United States for conniving with Japanese aggression. But this narrative drew a line between “the small handful of Japanese militarists” and ordinary Japanese people. This soft tone echoed Japan’s “myth of the military clique,” so as to promote a favorable impression of Communist China in Japanese society and facilitate “People’s Diplomacy.” Chinese official history still collided with the other two Japanese myths that glorified the imperial army and denied Japan’s victimization of Asia. But Beijing deliberately set aside these differences lest the Chinese people confuse Japan with their “true archenemies”: the KMT and America. Throughout this period, Beijing never insisted that formal relations with Japan should be conditional on Japanese repentance or restitution. Moreover, Beijing adopted an exceptionally generous policy on war-related issues, including Japanese war crimes trials, war reparations and the repatriation of Japanese nationals. It did so in order to win the hearts and minds of the Japanese people and eventually lure the Japanese 13

J. Becker, “Textbooks and the Political System in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945–1975,” The School Review 86, no. 2 (1978): 254; M. Shibata, Japan and Germany under Occupation: A Comparative Analysis of Post-war Education Reform (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005), 85.

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state to the Chinese side of the Cold War fault line. Most young Chinese at the time had minimal knowledge of Japanese wartime atrocities, as statecontrolled textbooks rarely mentioned them and academic research on this topic was banned. Private stories about the “Japanese devils” survived, but only within families and small communities. Additionally, totalitarian control of the public space of discourse in China precluded an independent role for public opinion in foreign policy making.14 In sum, despite national mythmaking and the failure to resolve the historical burden during this stage, Japanese and Chinese war memories were quasi-convergent (meaning that they shared the same myths and downplayed their historiographic disagreements). As such bilateral conflict over the history issue was by and large absent. This would have allowed a more formal political relationship to arise if it had not been for the overarching shadow of the American Cold War in Asia. Without American opposition, most Japanese leaders would have countenanced a more formal relationship with China, given their common economic interests, historical ties and Japan’s desire to enhance its international status through an autonomous foreign policy. However, the overwhelmingly negative structural environment trumped all other positive intentions and political efforts. Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization never materialized during this period.

1970s to 1980s: Progress and Reaction From the late 1960s, the Sino-Soviet split intensified. The mutual hostility was so intense that the Soviet Union increased its military deployment along the border from 30 divisions in 1970 to 44 divisions a year later, posing a formidable security threat to China.15 In order to find a counterweight to the Soviet threat, Beijing reached out to the West for support. Beijing’s intentions coincided with the interests of the Nixon administration in seeking Chinese assistance to end the Vietnam War and to facilitate the broader goal of balancing Soviet power, which had reached a strategic parity with that of America. In February 1972, Nixon went to China and signed the Shanghai Communiqué, which included the principle of opposition to “hegemony,” China’s code word for the USSR. 14

On Chinese war myths established in this stage, see Y. He, “Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950–2006,” History and Memory 19, no. 2 (2007). 15 J. Cheng, “Mao Zedong’s Perception of the World in 1968–1972: Rationale for the Sino-American Rapprochement,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 7, nos. 3–4 (1998): 251.

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Initially, the United States tried to improve relations with Beijing while striving for détente with Moscow simultaneously. But this even-handed policy melted away from the late 1970s, when the Soviets engaged in active military intervention in the Third World and superpower détente deteriorated into confrontation. To contain the increasingly audacious Soviet expansion, Washington began to play the “China card.” In December 1978, Washington formally recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and reiterated the anti-hegemony line. Shortly afterward, Deng Xiaoping visited America, where he openly denounced Soviet hegemonism and sought American endorsement of China’s military action to contain Soviet-supported Vietnam. China also began in 1980 to receive American military technology.16 Sino-American strategic cooperation remained robust in the 1980s despite the two states’ friction over the Taiwan Relations Act, enacted in April 1979, and Reagan’s arms sale to Taiwan. Beijing indeed adopted a so-called “independent foreign policy” at the Twelfth Party Congress in September 1982. But the policy was less an immediate change of international strategy than rhetoric to express Beijing’s displeasure with Washington’s Taiwan policy as well as to appease CCP hardliners who opposed Westernized domestic reform. Beijing could not be truly independent from American strategic support because of the continuing USSR threat to China. The Soviet threat did not begin to recede until 1988, when Gorbachev agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan, encouraged Vietnam to leave Cambodia and reduced the Soviet military presence in the Far East and Central Asia. In fact, Sino-American relations warmed up considerably from 1983, after the two nations temporarily addressed American arms sales to Taiwan and a few other controversial issues. Bilateral high-level official consultations were held regularly, and the two militaries established working-level exchanges. The Reagan administration also loosened hightech export control to China and allowed it to buy sophisticated American weapons with federal financing. Such cooperation developed so remarkably during the second half of the 1980s that these were considered the “Golden Years” of the Sino-American relationship.17 16

W. Tow, “China and the International Strategic System,” in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, eds. Thomas W. Robinson and David L. Shambaugh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 182. 17 H. Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992), 165–69; J. Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999), 136.

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Overall, the profound transformation of the international system during the 1970s to 1980s created positive structural conditions for China and Japan, both aligned with the United States strategically, to develop a comprehensive, harmonious relationship. In reality, however, even in the heyday of their friendship, China was constantly alert to the threat of a Japanese militarist revival, and their security cooperation was kept at such a low key that “in the true sense of the word [it] does not exist.”18 Their economic interdependence was limited as Japanese foreign direct investment in China was negligible, and trade in strategic areas was virtually absent. As for popular relations, despite many high-profile gestures of societal goodwill after normalization, mutual understanding, which is crucial for removing stereotypes and enhancing genuine popular amicability, was lacking. 19 Popular friendship, if any, was built upon romantic imagination and the manipulation of propaganda rather than personal judgment. Multiple factors account for these limitations in bilateral cooperation. While China tried to forge a tight security relationship with Japan, Japan was much more cautious, afraid that such a relationship would not bring additional security benefits but only increase the danger of Japan’s entrapment in a future Sino-Soviet conflict. Trying to implement omnidirectional diplomacy at the time, Japan was also concerned that close strategic collaboration with China would strain its relations with Southeast Asian countries.20 Another reason why Japan never depended on China for national security, even though both countries faced the common Soviet enemy, was the existence of the US-Japan alliance. The availability of a powerful security guarantor provided Japan with the luxury of not having to seek close strategic cooperation with its Asian neighbors. Still, one more important reason for the lack of bilateral cooperation was that throughout this stage, China and Japan, only satisfied with building a façade of friendship, failed to take up the golden opportunity 18

J. Glaubitz, “Japan,” in Chinese Defense Policy, eds. Gerald Segal and William T. Tow (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 228–30. 19 Direct, free access to information about the other society was rare during this period. Published trip reports of Japanese visitors to China betrayed traces of deliberate arrangements on the Chinese side so that the visitors only saw what Beijing wanted them to see. The overall level of contact between the two societies remained low, moreover, and lagged far behind the contact that Japan had with other Asian countries. Ordinary Chinese people had even fewer opportunities than Japanese people for direct contact with foreign countries. 20 W. Tow, “Sino-Japanese Security Cooperation: Evolution and Prospects,” Pacific Affairs 56, no. 1 (1983): 63.

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provided by a positive structural environment to settle their historical accounts. When visiting Beijing to seal the normalization deal, the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka expressed “deep reflection” for “much trouble that Japan brought to the Chinese people during an unfortunate period” in history. But he did not say exactly what happened during this “unfortunate period” or use the word “apology.” Regarding war reparations, the official position of the two governments was that China waived all claims to reparation from Japan upon normalization. This agreement, reached at the time for political expediency, created great legal challenges later when the question reemerged. Moreover, all Japanese prime ministers from 1972 to 1981 worshiped at the Yasukuni Shrine, a Shintoist temple in Tokyo dedicated to the spirits of the Japanese war dead. The old myth about the distinction between Japanese militarists and ordinary Japanese people during the war was kept in place, now to justify diplomatic normalization. And no cross-national textbook cooperation was attained. Overall, Chinese and Japanese war narratives remained quasiconvergent. As old myths persisted, so did Chinese grievances and mistrust toward Japan—they remained subdued in the public space but nevertheless informed Chinese caution about Japanese militarism. For example, Zhang Xiangshan, the vice chair of the China-Japan Friendship Association and a member of Zhou Enlai’s inner circle on Japan policy, openly warned of a potential Japanese threat in a formal policy statement in 1973.21 Zhou’s internal party report in March 1973 crystallized China’s paradoxical attitude to Japan: If it [Japan] becomes completely reliant on America’s military protection, it is clear that America will hold the economic throat of Japan. Therefore Japan has no choice but to develop its own military power. But with military build-up there is the worry that Japan may walk down the old path of militarism!22

Historical grievances also spoiled the atmosphere for economic cooperation. Chae-jin Lee observed in his seminal study of the Baoshan Steel project, a symbol of Sino-Japanese friendship from the late 1970s, that anti-Japanese bias was prevalent among China’s economists and high21

T. Muno, “Pikin de Kangaeta Nihon to Chnjgoku no Dansǀ,” Chnjǀ Kǀron, July 1973, 216-7. 22 E. Zhou, “Shnj Onlai Kokusai Jǀsei ni Kansuru Himitsu Ensetsu,” Chnjǀ Kǀron, November 1976, 174.

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ranking economic bureaucrats. When Japan protested against China’s unilateral decision to cancel the contracts for the second-phase construction in 1980, Chinese officials reacted with even more bitter repulsion. 23 Later, the Japanese government gave in, putting together a loan package to keep the project going. Beijing believed that such Japanese concessions were all but natural given Japan’s historical debts.24 The history problem was an even more conspicuous factor in the deterioration of the bilateral relationship in the 1980s, beginning with the 1982 Japanese textbook controversy. Beijing seized the opportunity of the textbook controversy to boost patriotism at home and appease the conservative faction within the CCP. After the incident, Chinese school education shifted from its previous emphasis on class struggle and CCPKMT confrontation to the conflicts between the Chinese nation and those foreign nations that had invaded China in the past, especially Japan. Although the two governments still maintained the old “myth of the military clique,” their memory disagreements, especially regarding Japanese war crimes, Chinese suffering and the role of the Japanese military, were publicized. Thus, their historical narratives were no longer quasi-convergent but had now become ostensibly conflictual. These greater divergences of memory worsened popular feeling in both China and Japan toward the other country. Chinese student demonstrations against Japan were largely provoked by the textbook controversy and Nakasone’s Yasukuni visit. But Chinese protests over the history issue tended to elicit frustration among the Japanese public because they remembered the war as a miserable experience for themselves, largely filtering out the memory of Japan’s wrongdoings to others.25 Furthermore, Chinese elites were seriously concerned about the security implications of the perceived Japanese denial of war responsibility. During the 1982 textbook controversy, Chinese official media explicitly linked Japan’s war memory with the possibility of its militarist revival. 26 Chinese strategic analyses of Japan also disapproved of Japan’s historiography and raised

23

C. Lee, China and Japan (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1984), 57, 74–5. A. Tanaka, Nitchnj Kankei 1945–1990 (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 1991), 114. 25 Poll by the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, July 1985, in Cabinet Secretariat of Japanese Prime Minister, Seron Chǀsa Nenkan, 1986, 564. 26 See, for example, the PLA Daily editorial on August 3, 1982, and the article published in the monthly Hongqi, the CCP’s mouthpiece, in September 1982. H. Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1971–95), 357–8, 371–5. 24

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serious concerns about Japan’s future trends, such as in the following statement by a leading Chinese expert on international relations: There has been a flood of great-nation chauvinist sentiments in Japan, personified by the denial of responsibility for the aggressive war, reversion of historical verdict, and even revival of the old dream of “Japanese Empire,” such as to think that Japan is superior and look down upon other countries especially Asian neighbors, and to be extremely overbearing owing to great wealth…This trend, if allowed to continue, will not only hamper Sino-Japanese friendship and peace in Asia and damage Japan’s international image, but also bring Japan down the road of militarism, the danger of which has been testified in the past.27

Finally, bilateral disputes in the 1980s were frequently politicized. The Chinese side held a strong sense of historical entitlement and expected Japan to make concessions. Take the Taiwan issue, for instance: in the eyes of China, it was a present, bitter reminder of China’s national victimhood. China held Japan responsible for Taiwan’s severance from the “motherland,” and felt it was Japan’s duty to assist it in its national unification. In economic relations, Japan, having devastated the Chinese economy during the war, was expected to help its economic modernization generously. As for Japan, because its mainstream historiography minimized Japanese war responsibility vis-à-vis victimized Asian countries, it seemed a far-fetched notion to Japanese people that China should be entitled to Japanese concessions in bilateral disputes just because of the war. Although truly assertive Japanese diplomacy with China would not occur until after the Cold War, Tokyo showed resentment in the 1980s toward what it saw as China’s high-handedness, using history as the justification.28

Post-Cold War: Volatility and a Downward Spiral The Cold War bipolar structure ended at the beginning of the 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States became the only superpower in the world, though it failed to establish a Pax Americana.29 27

F. He, “Zhongri Guanxi yu Yazhou Heping,” Riben Wenti 4 (1987): 6. Y. He, The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 231. 29 For academic debates on the durability and legitimacy of post-Cold War American hegemony, see G. Ikenberry, America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). 28

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This systemic change caused a profound transformation of the East Asian international structure. With the end of superpower confrontation, many argued that the traditional form of strategic interaction—the balance of power between regional powers in a multipolar setting—has resumed dominance in East Asia.30 For the first time, Sino-Japanese relations faced an uncertain international structure. On one hand, China and Japan’s strategic solidarity vis-à-vis the common Soviet threat faded away with the end of the superpowers’ confrontation. And the uneven economic growth of the two countries and their assertiveness in military and international affairs since the 1990s raised realpolitik concerns about power redistribution. Japan’s economy entered a recession after the bubble economy failed around 1990, whereas China’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth has maintained a nearly double-digit rate for the most part since then. China’s military modernization since the 1990s has also boasted a double-digit annual increase in defense spending, substantial acquisition of advanced weapons from Russia, and active upgrading of its nuclear, submarine and missile forces.31 As for Japan, it has not only sent Self-Defense Force (SDF) units overseas on a wide range of peacekeeping missions, but also strengthened the US-Japan alliance and weighed in more actively on regional security issues, such as those in the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait.32 On the other hand, these structural changes have not warranted a straightforward strategic confrontation, only a sense of potential rivalry. First, the rise of China has fallen short of challenging the status quo of the international balance of power, or Japanese superiority in air and naval power.33 As for Japan, its post-Yoshida grand strategy has maintained a 30

A. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International Security 18, no. 3 (1993–1994). 31 D. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 32 For Japan’s security policy changes since the 1990s to strengthen its regional and global roles, see C. Hughes, “Japanese Military Modernization: In Search of a ‘Normal’ Security Role,” in Strategic Asia 2005–06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, eds. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005). 33 For some recent studies that caution against overstating Chinese military power despite rapid development, see R. Betts and T. Christensen, “China: Getting the Question Right,” The National Interest (Winter 2000–2001); B. Gill and M. O’Hanlon, “China’s Hollow Military,” National Interest (Summer 1999); and D. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). For the argument supporting Japan’s security confidence in the face of the rise of China, see M. Green,

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dual focus of acting more assertively in international affairs with American support and fostering stable relations with its Asian neighbors.34 Japan has not enlarged its army or built up its power projection capability, flexed its military muscles overseas freely, or gone nuclear, although it has had the capacity to do so. Furthermore, Japan and China have many shared interests, such as economic complementariness, a wish to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, and a common desire for a peaceful Pacific Rim to ensure sea-lane safety and overseas market access. Considerable room for bilateral cooperation also exists over various global issues “ranging from energy security, environmental protection, climate change, [and] prevention and control of diseases to counter-terrorism, combating transnational crimes and the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”35 While the structural environment does not preordain Sino-Japanese rivalry or cooperation, two important factors may significantly sway their political relationship in the foreseeable future. The first is US policy in the region and the responses it may get from China and Japan. Given a continuing, rapid rise of China, two possible scenarios of US policy may occur. One is that the United States might emphasize a hedging-balancing policy, with a focus on strengthening bilateral security cooperation surrounding China, such as the US-Japan alliance and the US-India strategic partnership. But the US-Japan alliance has paradoxical implications for China: the alliance is seen as benign if it serves as a “cork in the bottle” of Japanese militarism, or even in the bottle of US policy,36

“Managing Chinese Power: The View from Japan,” in Engaging China: the Management of An Emerging Power, eds. Alastair I. Johnston and Robert Ross (London: Routledge, 1999); Y. He, “Ripe for Cooperation or Rivalry? Commerce, Realpolitik, and War Memory in Contemporary Sino-Japanese Relations,” Asian Security 4, vol. 2 (2008); K. Pyle and E. Heginbotham, “Japan,” in Strategic Asia 2005–06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, eds. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), 97–100; and C. Twomey, “Japan, A Circumscribed Balancer: Building on Defensive Realism to Make Predictions about East Asian Security,” Security Studies 9, vol. 4 (2000): 185–93. 34 R. Samuels, “Japan’s Goldilocks Strategy,” The Washington Quarterly 29, vol. 4 (2006). 35 Quoted from “Speech by Premier Wen Jiabao of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China at the Japanese Diet,” April 12, 2007, http://manchester.chineseconsulate.org/eng/xwdt/t311107.htm. 36 C. Twomey, “The Dangers of Overreaching: International Relations Theory, the US-Japanese Alliance, and China,” in An Alliance for Engagement: Building

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but would appear provocative if it takes on an interventionist posture in Asia. Especially since the late 1990s, the alliance has become more assertive about ensuring Taiwanese security and accelerated missile defense cooperation, which China suspects would be used to defend Taiwan or neutralize the Chinese nuclear deterrence. Thus, the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, if it exceeds a certain limit, could spark deep Chinese suspicion and generate a Sino-Japanese security dilemma.37 The other possible US policy option is to emphasize engagement over hedging vis-à-vis China, provided that both countries’ common economic and strategic interests in Asia (e.g., jointly coping with the global economic crisis and the danger of nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula) continue, China’s rise conforms to the US-dominated international framework, and their mutual diplomacy manages to stay clear of domestic political distractions. If the United States maintains both a collaborative relationship with China and the security alliance with Japan, this would ease the pressure, the so-called gaiatsu, placed by the United States on Japan and allow it to develop a more autonomous foreign policy toward China that is based more on Japan’s own economic and political interests. This scenario should provide the best external environment for China and Japan to develop a stable, cooperative relationship. But what if the rise of China is stunted because of a sudden slowdown in Chinese economic growth? Mearsheimer argues that if the region lacks a hegemon that can challenge US power, the United States may pull back from Asia, which would allow Japan to develop independent military capabilities, including nuclear weapons.38 If this happens, it may trigger a nervous response from China and even give rise to another Sino-Japanese war. This is obviously a dangerous scenario, to avoid which the United States should remain engaged in the region. If the US factor is the exogenous force shaping Sino-Japanese relationship in the post-Cold War era, another important, endogenous factor is China and Japan’s treatment of wartime history. From the 1990s, Japan’s conservative ruling elites perpetuated old national myths not only Cooperation in Security Relations with China, eds. Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2002), 24. 37 For a comprehensive discussion of China’s complex feelings about the US-Japan alliance, see T. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security 23, vol. 4 (1999). 38 J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton, 2007), 399–400; and M. Mochizuki, “Japan’s Shifting Strategy toward the Rise of China,” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, vols. 4–5 (2007).

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to justify an assertive diplomatic agenda but also to use the tool of memory to mobilize public support for their electoral strategy and domestic reform programs. In the meantime, the goals of enhancing internal cohesion and boosting regime legitimacy motivated the Chinese government to employ a twofold strategy of launching a patriotic history education campaign at home and attacking Japan’s attitude toward history in the diplomatic arena. Besides, Japan’s ambiguous attitude toward its war responsibility simply reinforced anti-Japanese myths in Chinese propaganda and exacerbated popular demands in China to settle historical accounts. Consequently, the bilateral memory gap continued to widen and political disputes over the history issue repeatedly erupted in this period.39 China’s history polemics with Japan temporarily relaxed in the early 1990s, when it sought Japan’s help to break out of its post-Tiananmen international isolation, but they flared up anew from the mid-1990s, particularly in response to a few provocative events in Japan, including the problematic war resolution passed in the Diet in 1995 and Prime Minister Hashimoto’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1996. Bilateral relationships further plummeted following President Jiang Zemin’s formal visit to Tokyo in November 1998, during which he harshly criticized Japan’s wartime history and demanded Japanese contrition. After this Japanbashing strategy turned out to be counterproductive, Chinese leaders softened their rhetoric on wartime history. 40 But a ceasefire over the history issue was shortly broken, this time by Prime Minister Koizumi, who started annual worship at Yasukuni from October 2001. In protest, Beijing suspended mutual state visits and again pressured Japan to adopt “a correct historical view.” An obvious result of the history disputes has been a downward spiral in bilateral popular relationships. Painful recollections of Japanese war crimes and the Chinese people’s suffering were commonly invoked when ordinary Chinese people were asked to describe their national image of Japan. The largely negative popular image of Japan in China can be ascribed not just to Chinese historical grievances but also to a deep contempt for Japan, which in Chinese eyes has failed to conduct a process of sincere, thorough soul-searching about the war. In a 2004 poll by the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 39

Y. He, “Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950–2006,” History and Memory 19, no. 2 (2007). 40 G. Rozman, “China’s Changing Images of Japan, 1989–2001: The Struggle to Balance Partnership and Rivalry,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 2 (2002).

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only 6.3 percent of respondents felt “close” or “very close” to Japan, while 53.6 percent felt “not close”; when asked why they felt not close to Japan, the most-selected answers were “Japan has not done real self-reflection about its history of aggression against China” (61.7 percent) and “Japan invaded China in recent history” (26 percent); by contrast, only a few (6.9 percent) selected the answer “because Japan formed a military alliance with the United States and posed a security threat to China.” 41 These surveys suggest that it was really historical memory, rather than realpolitik factors, that accounted for Chinese public animosity toward Japan. As for Japanese popular perceptions of China, there were three dips in Japanese feelings of closeness toward China: after the June Fourth Incident in 1989, during the mid-1990s, and from 2001. The first dip was mainly caused by profound Japanese disenchantment with China’s promises of social stability and political democracy. The other two dips were to a large extent due to Japanese feelings of frustration in response to what they saw as Chinese obsession with wartime history and a stubborn anti-Japanese attitude. In addition to worsening popular images of one another’s country, acrimonious historical disputes have also intensified both China and Japan’s perceptions of being mutually threatened by the other. The Chinese side tends to infer threatening intentions from perceived Japanese unrepentance about the history of the war. For example, in July 2003, a People’s Daily editorial raised the sharp question, “Is Japan’s quest to attain the status of a large military power a normal pursuit?” The author answered: First, in the past Japan has launched many wars of aggression, causing a great deal of damage and harm. Up to now, it has refused to admit and show remorse for its crimes in the war of aggression against China…Second, Japan’s military strength has exceeded its defense needs. Japan’s foreign security policy has gradually exceeded the boundary of “for defense only.”…How can it be possible that people are not worried about a Japan which has refused to show remorse for its war of aggression, which is wantonly developing its military power, which has abandoned the policy of “for defense only,” and which is planning to revise its constitution of peace?42

41

L. Jiang, “Zhongguo Minzhong dui Riben de Buqinjingan Xianzhu Zengqiang,” Riben Xuekan 6 (2004). 42 “Article Views ‘Obstacles’ to Sino-Japanese Relations,” People’s Daily, July 22, 2003.

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Articles published in academic and policy-oriented journals echoed official media. For example, one author opined: While its military power increase does not necessarily mean Japan would be entangled in military conflict, such risk should not be ignored…And if one considers rising Japanese nationalist thoughts that lack a correct understanding of history, one may argue that Japan will become the biggest factor of instability in Asia.43

Other Chinese analysts believed that Japan would not have increased its military power in the first place if it had truly come to terms with its past. One author claimed that the same nationalist and militarist thoughts that had caused Japanese aggression in the past remained influential in Japan, justifying its historical amnesia, eliminating its sense of national shame, and removing the psychological obstacles keeping the country from becoming a great military power.44 But most people from the Japanese side reject the Chinese charge that Japan harbors malicious intentions as a result of wartime history. They instead feel that China has intentionally used the history card either to scapegoat Japan for domestic political reasons or to seize the moral high ground and relegate Japan to a subordinate position in the overall bilateral relationship.45 They also worry that China may be developing a dangerous nationalist trend in seeking to shake off national humiliation through the resurrection of a “great Chinese empire,” which may cause China to act more aggressively in the region and threaten the interests of its neighbors. From the mid-1990s, the Asian Security series published by the Japan Research Institute for Peace and Security repeatedly warned that “with dreams of empire,” China believed that it should dominate the region that was traditionally its sphere of influence; moreover, China tended to defy international criticism because the memory of past national trauma made it highly sensitive to “foreign meddling” in its internal affairs.46 The director of the institute, Watanabe Akio, also suggested in an article in 2004 that by emphasizing the “hundred years of humiliation” and eulogizing the 43

J. Li, “Lengzhan Jieshuhou de Riben Junshi Zhanlue Tiaozheng de Lujing Fenxi,” Guoji Luntan 7, vol. 3 (2005): 68. 44 C. Lü, “Riben Chuantong Wenhua yu Junshi Guannian,” Riben Xuekan 5 (2004). 45 On the belief among Japanese elites about Beijing’s use of the history card vis-àvis Japan, also see D. Yang, “Mirror for the Future or the History Card? Understanding the ‘History Problem,’” in Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twentyfirst Century, ed. Marie Soderberg (London: Routledge, 2002). 46 Japan Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian Security (1993–94): 7, 95; Asian Security (1994–95): 6–7.

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“glorious resurrection of the Chinese nation,” China’s thesis of a peaceful rise actually betrayed its deep-seated resentment and sense of inferiority, and it raised the suspicion that China was attempting to rebuild the old dream of the “China Order.” 47 In short, similar to the way in which it caused Chinese suspicion of Japanese militarist ambitions, the elites’ disapproval of the ways in which China has handled wartime history has also been an important factor, if not the most important factor, in stimulating Japanese concerns about Chinese intentions. The burden of history will continue to weigh heavily on Sino-Japanese relations in the 21st century. Against the backdrop of China’s vibrant economy and Japan’s stagnation, the unresolved history issue and its political impact will only aggravate the Japanese perception of the “China threat” and Chinese suspicion of Japan’s desire to constrain its growth. Some efforts have been made to address the historical legacy bilaterally in recent years. After Abe succeeded Koizumi as prime minister in 2006, Beijing and Tokyo launched a joint historical study involving historians from both sides. This is a significant step forward from previous sporadic historians’ dialogues that lacked official endorsement. Not ready to write a single narrative, the project committee, made up of historians from China and Japan, in the end had each side submit its own version of bilateral history.48 Having quarreled for decades over the history issue, China and Japan need a long-term, painstaking process to gradually bridge their memory gap. In this process, the two sides will have to exercise an extraordinary amount of patience, dedication, and resilience.

47

A. Watanabe, “Higashi Ajia Kyǀdǀtai o Mezasu Nagai Reesu ga Hajimatta,” Chnjǀ Kǀron (December 2004): 35–36. 48 The Chinese and Japanese reports of the joint history project are available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/rekishi_kk.html.

CHAPTER SEVEN RETHINKING LEADERSHIP IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC: SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AND THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE UNITED STATES VICTOR TEO

Introduction The involvement of the United States worldwide in all aspects of global affairs is almost a natural, unquestioned phenomenon. From the Middle East peace process to the fighting of drug cartels in Latin America, from promoting democracy in Southeast Asia to confronting piracy in the Gulf of Aden, one cannot help but notice the conspicuous and often overwhelming US presence in the affairs of regions far from American shores. Nowhere on earth is this phenomenon more apparent than in East and Southeast Asia. The presence of the United States today in East and Southeast Asia is accepted by the majority of the political elites and general population as a “natural” part of Asia’s political and strategic landscape. Of course, there are always a number of states that find US dominance in world or regional affairs to be an abnormal and aberrant affair, such as Iran,1 Iraq,2 Cuba3 1 K. Vick, “Iran’s Religious Leaders Renews Anti-US Rhetoric,” Washington Post, June 5, 2006. ; see also “Iran’s Supreme Leader Accuses U.S. of Terrorism,” Fox News, June 25, 2011. .

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and Sudan,4 and, in East Asia, North Korea.5 Such sentiments are by no means widespread, but nonetheless the attitude toward US dominance in each country is by no means uniform. In East Asia, at least, right-wing nationalists in each country, whether they are Chinese, 6 Japanese 7 or Korean,8 are all too anxious to voice their opposition to what they perceive as US hegemony infringing on their country’s sovereignty. In Southeast Asia, particularly in Maritime Southeast Asia (Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, southern Philippines, Singapore), there remains a sizable segment of the Muslim population that views US foreign policy none too favorably. It would be fair to say that such sentiments are not articulated by the passive majority in these Asian countries, and neither do they represent the voice of the mainstream political elites. Most Asian regimes, even those that 2

“Al-Sadr Hammers Anti-US Message in 1st Iraq Speech,” ABC News, January 8, 2011. ; see also “In Iraq, a popular cleric cranks up anti-U.S. rhetoric,” CNN, January 8, 2011, . 3 “Anti-US march packs Cuban capital,” BBC News, January 24, 2006, ; see also “Castro attacks U.S. while reading from 50-year-old speech,” Reuters, September 28, 2010. . 4 Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu, “World’s ‘Anti-Terror Axis’: Iran, Pakistan and Sudan,” Israel National News, June 26, 2011,

5 “War Crimes Committed by the US Sixty Years Ago,” Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, June 4, 2011, 6 For example, see “Taiwan Independence Turn American,” KMT, August 13, 2007, ; “Lee Teng Hui’s visits to Cornell Draws Protests from Chinese Students,” People’s Daily, June 29, 2001,

7 “Okinawa Protests Against US Troops,” BBC News, July 20, 2000, ; see also “Thousands Participate in Tokyo Anti-Nuclear Protest,” Japan Probe, April 11, 2011, ; see also “Okinawa Call to Shape New US-Japan Era,” Asia Times, February 6, 2010, 8 “Anti-US Protests Grow in Seoul,” BBC News, December 8, 2002, ; see also “Bush Arrives in Seoul, anti-US Protest Fizzles,” Reuters, August 5, 2008,

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may fundamentally like to see a reduction in US dominance for their own reasons, seek to have non-confrontational if not cordial ties with the US government. This state of affairs cannot be explained by the mere fact that the United States is a “superpower.” Hegemony cannot be explained by the power factor alone because it is tautological to do so; we cannot say that the United States is powerful because it is influential, or for that matter that it is influential because it is powerful. Moreover, given that the United States first came to the region some 150 years ago on Commodore Perry’s famous Black Ships,9 the fact that the United States is seen as a “natural” power in the Asia Pacific region is itself an interesting phenomenon. To be sure, the United States has since 1945 possessed all indicators of a superpower. Many commentators10 are not sanguine about the ability of the United States to exercise power continuously as the region’s hegemon anymore, given its unbridled spending over the last two decades and the burgeoning US budget deficit. 11 The fact that US spending has been fuelled by borrowing two trillion worth of dollars from China and Japan, the two major powers in the Asia Pacific, further puts the validity of US preponderance in the region into question. Is the fact that US global reach is fuelled by borrowed money an indicator of its strength or a sign of its weakness? After all, no banking institution or nation-state would be willing to lend to a country without some sort of collateral, but the very fact that China and Japan continue to buy US treasury bonds in such alarming times may well testify to the kind of clout the United States has. The word “preponderance” needs to be scrutinized more carefully. While one might assume that it equates to 9

See section 2 in J. L. McClain, A Modern History of Japan, (US: Norton Press, 2002), 119 onwards. 10 J. Rettig, “Debt Fight Reinforce China’s Negative Views of America,” US News, July 15, 2011, ; see also U. Dadush, “American’s ‘Safe Haven’ Status Cannot Shelter It Indefinitely,” Financial Times, July 19, 2011, ; See also C. M. Reinhart, K. S. Rogoff, “The Aftermath of Financial Crisis,” NBER Working Paper 14656 (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009). 11 “Gold Tops $1600 US on Debt Fears,” CBC News, July 18, 2011, ; see also James Politi, “Deficit Talks Focus on Least Challenging Deal,” Financial Times, July 18, 2011, .

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hegemony, preponderance is often referred to by scholars as a doctrine and grand strategy. The key elements12 of preponderance as a grand strategy are as follows: 1. 2. 3.

The creation and maintenance of a US-led world order based on preeminent US political, military and economic power and on American values; Maximization of US control over the international system by preventing the emergence of rival great powers in Europe and East Asia; The maintenance of economic interdependency as a vital US security interest.

Needless to say, this notion of a US-led world order emerged from the ruins of World War II and the origins of such thinking is to be found in the 1948 State of the Union speech by the then president Truman 13 (and subsequently by all US presidents, with no exception). The implementation of the National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) called for the United States to embark on military build-up in order to combat a “new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own.” The onset of the Korean War gave rise to George Kennan’s containment strategy articulated in a 1947 article called “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” in which a “long-term, patient but vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies” was called for.14 The consequences of the Korean War have cemented the United States as a power in East Asia since 1951. The articulation of the containment strategy and the NSC-68 formed the cornerstones of US foreign policy in which US political ideals and systems were to be exported worldwide. Today, no one doubts the resolve of the United States to do this when the history of the Korean War or the Vietnam War is reviewed. We can say that US foreign policy has, since the end of the Vietnam War, shown a great deal of consistency in terms of its end goal: the continuation of the United States’ position as an eminent power in global 12

See C. Layne, “From Preponderance to Off-shore Balancing,” International Security 22, no. 1 (1997), specifically the first seven pages of his article, which lay out the basic tenets of this grand strategy. 13 For example, see the 1947, 1948 and 1951 State of the Union speeches by President Truman, . 14 For easy reference of full text of the article, see G. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” reproduced . The quote comes at the end of Part 2 of the article.

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affairs. This is a trend that persists consistently throughout the United States’ foreign policy agenda. In the 1994 State of the Union address, President Clinton claimed, in reference to the United States, that the “world’s greatest power…must maintain [its] defenses and responsibilities, and that the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere.” 15 More poignantly, in his 2003 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush16 articulated that the US-led world order had to be defended: We seek peace. We strive for peace. And sometimes peace must be defended. A future lived at the mercy of terrible threats is no peace at all. If war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause and by just means, sparing, in every way we can, the innocent. And if war is forced upon us, we will fight with the full force and might of the United States military, and we will prevail.

President Obama, while campaigning in Berlin,17 articulated the same lofty visions and ideals in his first major foreign policy address: In this new world, such dangerous currents have swept along faster than our efforts to contain them. That is why we cannot afford to be divided. No one nation, no matter how large or powerful, can defeat such challenges alone. None of us can deny these threats, or escape responsibility in meeting them…Partnership and cooperation among nations is not a choice; it is the one way, the only way, to protect our common security and advance our common humanity…Now is the time to join together, through constant cooperation, strong institutions, shared sacrifices, and a global commitment to progress, to meet the challenges of the 21st century…the scale of our challenge is great. The road ahead will be long. But I come before you to say that we are heirs to a struggle for freedom. We are a people of improbable hope. With an eye toward the future, with resolve in 15

For a copy of the State of the Union address, see . 16 See President Bush’s State of the Union address, January 29, 2003; see also Stephen Zunes, “An Annotated Overview of Foreign Policy Segments of George W Bush’s State of the Union Address,” Foreign Policy in Focus, January 29, 2003,