The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946-1948 0394465970, 9780394465975

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The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946-1948
 0394465970, 9780394465975

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
I. Origins of the Foreign Aid Program
1. The Prospect of an American World Order
2. Planning for Reconstruction: the Strategy of Deferment
3. Planning a Wilsonian World: The Strategies of Co-optation and Propaganda
4. American Diplomacy and the Reconstruction Issue in 1946
5. Deferring the Reconstruction Issue—Again
II. The Truman Doctrine
1. Winter 1946-7
2. Breakthrough on Foreign Aid
3. The Truman Doctrine as an Instrument of Propaganda
4. A First Try to Escape the Truman Doctrine
III. Foreign Aid and Internal Security
1. The President Announces a Domestic Truman Doctrine
2. The Battle Over Employee Loyalty
3. Internal Security and the Campaign for Foreign Aid
IV. The Marshall Plan
1. Planning the Marshall Plan
2. The Marshall Plan and American Economic Policy
3. The Marshall Plan and the Western Bloc
4. The Politics of the Marshall Plan
5. Return to Crisis Politics
V. The Cold War at Home
1. Focusing the Internal Security Issue: Spring 1947
2. Policing Internal Security
3. Education for Security
4. Internal Security and Interim Aid
VI. The Battle for the European Recovery Program
1. The Alignment of Forces
2. The Campaign for E.R.P.
3. E.R.P. and Crisis Politics: The War Scare of 1948
4. The Institutionalization of the Truman Doctrine
VII. Internal Security, E.R.P., and the Politics of 1948
1. Another Debate on Foreign Aid, Another Drive Against Subversives
2. The Republicans Try to Recapture the Internal Security Issue
VIII. The Legacy of the Truman Doctrine
1. The Failure of the Marshall Plan _
2. MacArthur and McCarthy
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism

The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of M cCarthyism Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security

1946-1948

Richard A4. Freeland

Alfred A . Knopf

1972

New York

THIS IS A BORZOI BOOK PUBLISHED BY ALFRED A. KNOPF, IN C.

Copyright © 1970,1 9 7 1 by Richard M iddleton Freeland AU rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Convetitions. Published in the United States by Alfred A . Knopf, Inc., New York, and simultaneously in Canada by Random House of Canada Lim ited, Toronto. Distributed by Random House, Inc., New York. ISBN: 0-394-46597-0 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7J-142958

Manufactured in the United States of America First Edition

For my mother and father, Margaret C h ild Freeland and Harry M iddleton Freeland

Thus w e debase H ie nature o f our seats, and m ake d ie rabble C all our cares fears; which w ill in tim e break ope The locks o’ the senate, and bring in the crows T o peck the eagles. Coriolanus, III, ı

Contents Acknowledgments

xi

I ntroduction

3

I O rigins o f th e F oreign A id P rocram 1

The Prospect of an Am erican W orld O rder

13

2

Planning for Reconstruction: the Strategy of D eferm ent

22

Planning a W ilsonian W orld: The Strategies of Co-optation and Propaganda

35

Am erican D iplom acy and the Reconstruction Issue in 1946

47

D eferring die Reconstruction Issue— A gain

58

3 4 5

II T he T ruman D octrine 1

W inter 1946-7

70

2

Breakthrough on Foreign A id

82

T he Trum an D octrine as an Instrument o f Propaganda

88

Jfcj

4}

A First T ry to Escape the Trum an D octrine

102

III F oreign Am and I nternal S ecurity

4

The President Announces a Dom estic Trum an Doctrine

115

The B atde O ver Em ployee L oyalty

117

y d ie U.N. This prom ised to be a central issue in his cam paign. T o m eet this and other chal­ lenges, C lifford believed, Trum an had to adopt a bold and aggressive course o f political conduct beginning in N ovem ber 1947 and lasting until the election.J t is evident, therefore, that the issue o f foreign aid w as com pletely caught up in the Stresses o f presidential politics in the tall ot 1947 and th a rth e special session was bound to be a m ajor forum tor .several key candidates o f both partiesT*r

ig 2

T h e T ruman D octrine and M c C arth yism

It is instructive, in this context, to consider the reelection strategy devised b y Clifford, for though his memo was not ac­ tually subm itted to the President until late Novem ber, it pro­ vides the best available indication o f political thinking w ithin the W hite House at the tim e that the President w as develop­ in g his plans for the special session on Interim A id. C lifford be­ lieved that the m ajor foreign policy issues in 1948 w ould be U .S.-Soviet relations and the pressures on the dom estic econ­ om y caused b y foreign assistance programs. H e thought that d ie strain o f dom estic politics w ould be too great to sustain a bipartisan approach to these issues. H e also believed that the President should assert him self as the nation's leader in matters o f foreign policy and not perm it others, for exam ple Secretary M arshall, to assume this role. Clifford, possibly recalling the effect on the President's popularity o f the Trum an D octrine speech, was entirely explicit about how this leadership could be asserted w ith maximum political gain. “There is consider­ able advantage to the Adm inistration,’’ he w rote, “in its battle w ith the Krem lin . . . the nation is already united behind d ie President on this issue. T he worse m atters get, up to a fairly certain point— real danger o f imminent w ar— the more there is a sense o f crisis. In times of crisis, the Am erican citizen tends to back up his president.” 42 This form ula had m uch to con­ tribute to the decision regarding the best means o f obtaining special econom ic aid for Europe. An “em ergency” session of Congress to m eet a new European “crisis” w ould provide an ideal opportunity for the President to assert his leadership, rally die country behind him, and strengthen his credentials as d ie protector o f Europe from the depredations o f the com­ munists. T he Adm inistration’s handling o f Congressional debate on Interim A id indicated a disposition to em phasize those as­ pects of the issue— em ergency relief and anti-communism— most likely to assure Congressional approval and strengthen the President’s political position. In his opening testim ony on the aid proposal, Secretary M arshall referred to d ie situation as an “em ergency” and stated that the funds w ere intended “to perm it the people o f these countries to continue to eat, work

T he Marshall Plan

193

and to survive d ie w inter.” This description o f Interim A id for France, Italy, and Austria as em ergency relief w as repeated b y Secretaries L ovett and Harriman in their appearances before die Congress. A sim ilar summary w as contained in a special address delivered b y die President to a joint session on Novem ­ ber 17. Common to a ll o f these statem ents w as the assertion that in considering Interim A id die Congress w as confronting legislation different in nature from the long-term aid program . Interim A id, it w as suggested, involved m aking available cer­ tain com m odities, particularly food and fuel, to sustain certain European countries during the com ing winter; d ie M arshall Plan involved a sustained program o f econom ic reconstruction. Though this distinction was expedient both because it per­ m itted Congress to consider Interim A id w ithout im p lid d y judging the M arshall Plan and because it em phasized the em ergency and hum anitarian aspects o f the Adm inistration’s proposal, it involved a basic distortion o f the econom ics o f for­ eign aid. Interim A id, like the M arshall Plan, was intended to m aintain the flow o f trade betw een the U.S. and Europe at certain levels. T he amounts o f aid requested for Interim A id w ould sustain this trade for the first three months o f 1948, after w hich the M arshall Plan m oney w ould continue the operation. The only difference betw een the tw o program s w as the period o f tim e for w hich m aintenance of trade was being sought.48 Though the em ergency relief aspect o f Interim A id w as a political asset, the key to Congressional action on die pro­ posal w as relating it to the communist challenge, and the A d­ m inistration lost no opportunity to bring this issue to the fore. O n O ctober 24, one day after he announced d ie decision to convene a special session, the President m ade a radio address to the nation describing an im pending crisis in France and Italy and warning that “totalitarian pressures” m ight becom e irresistible during the w inter if em ergency assistance w ere not approved. On N ovem ber 10, the first day of hearings on In-' terim A id, d ie Adm inistration released die first report on Greco-Turldsh aid; it revealed that communist pressures on the G reek governm ent had 'greatly increased in recent months, requiring much of Am erica’s intended econom ic aid to be

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T he T ruman D octrine and M cC abth yism

diverted to m ilitary uses. O n the same day, d ie report o f die Harriman Com m ittee, appointed b y President Trum an during the summer o f 1947, was released; it m ade headlines w ith its prediction that Am erican failure to approve the foreign aid program w ould lead to communist domination o f a ll Europe, the M iddle East, and North A frica, and m ight ultim ately force changes in the Am erican econom ic and political system. On N ovem ber 17 the President addressed a joint session o f Con­ gress and repeated the argum ent he had presented in his radio address three weeks previously.44 (T h is speech seems to be a clear indication o f the im pact o f the kind o f thinking repre­ sented in Clifford’s memo on the handling o f the cam paign for Interim A id. In it the President asserted him self as an ad­ vocate of strong anti-communist measures by proposing the aid program , and as determ ined to prevent econom ic aid from increasing inflation by proposing price controls. T he latter proposal seem ed such a transparent attem pt to embarrass the Republicans by m aking them either renege on previous oppo­ sition to price controls or accept future blam e for inflation that d ie speech w as w idely criticized as an attem pt to use die special session to launch a reelection cam paign.) T he Adm inistration’s propaganda initiatives in support o f Interim A id w ere reinforced by public statem ents of other prom inent figures. On O ctober 15 form er Secretary of State Byrnes clim axed his personal efforts to m ake the Am erican citizenry aw are o f the Soviet danger by publishing a memoir entitled Speaking Frankly, w hich received extensive coverage in the press. In this volum e (inspired, Bym es w rote, b y sev­ eral friends, probably including some of the officials struggling w ith the politics of foreign aid), the form er Secretary con­ fessed that he had disguised the true nature of U .S.-Soviet re­ lations during his Secretaryship, and cast the blam e for all postw ar difficulties on Soviet intransigence and im perialism . T he book published for the first tim e captured Germ an docu­ ments revealing the nature of the N azi-Soviet pact of 1939, in w hich H itler and Stalin divided Europe betw een them selves. Byrnes used these documents to justify the conclusion that the U.S.S.R.’s intention w as Mto dom inate, in one w ay or another,

The Marshall Plan

195

all o f E u rop e* H is final chapter contained a plea for approval, o f die M arshall Plan. On N ovem ber 29 Clayton published an article in the Saturday Evening Post that predicted, follow ing the same reasoning used in the Harriman report, that failure to enact die M arshall Plan would lead to communist domination o f all Europe and, u ltim ately, in thp Am prioan system . of governm ent. In the atm osphere created b y these statem ents, the Com m unist-led strikes that broke out in France and Italy in late N ovem ber to protest the M arshall Plan took on the as­ pect of revolutionary insurrections.45 This w ould not be the last tim e that a communist reaction to an Am erican initiative w ould play the ironic role of confirm ing for m any Am ericans the fears of communist aggression that had been used to justify the original initiative. In the context of this outpouring of high-level concern about communism in western Europe, Congress considered In­ terim A id. As Clifford's memo had predicted, the potentially inflationary im pact o f the program m ade m any legislators hesitant to support the Adm inistration. Vandenberg com­ m ented on N ovem ber 18 that "If the resistance w hich is build­ ing up to the litd e short-range European relief bill . . . is any criterion, our friend M arshall is certainly going to have a helluva tim e when he gets around to his long-range plan . . . politics is heavy in the air.” But Vandenberg had been thor­ oughly won over by the Adm inistration, and he knew how to use the public mood that the Adm inistration had created. Am erica s self-interest in Interim A id, he told his colleagues, "is the self-interest w hich knows that any w orld revolution w ould rate Am erica as a top-prize scalp.” W ithin a few days he was able to report the rout o f the opposition in d ie Senate: shall be greatly surprised if more than a dozen Senators dare to vote against the bill.” H ie b ill passed the Senate easily, w ith only six "daring" to oppose it. E ven Senator T a ft w ent along, though insisting that he w as unalterably opposed to the M ar­ shall Plan itself.45 H ie Adm inistration’s problem s in die House w ere even greater than in the Senate, for there the im m ediate political im pact of the inflation issue w as greater and in the House

"1

ig 6

T h e T ruman D octrine and M c C arth yism

there w as no Vandenberg to fight the Adm inistration’s battles. H ie first signs o f trouble cam e when Eaton w as unable to pre­ vent the reduction of the Adm inistration’s proposal b y seven m illion dollars in the b ill reported b y his Foreign Affairs com­ m ittee. Attem pts during floor debate to cut the authorization still further w ere defeated, but opponents o f die aid program showed considerable strength and won a num ber o f victories, including the im position o f lim its on w heat exports under the bill. B ut the debate in the House, as in the Senate, w as domi­ nated too m uch b y d ie issue o f communism to perm it more than token victories for opponents. Representative Busby of Illinois com plained about this: “N ever before has the Congress been so bom barded w ith propaganda. . . . w e get it from all sides b y official speakers, the press and the radio. T h ey all say d ie same thing— either vote for this aid to Europe or all E u­ rope w ill go communist.” But other Representatives, perhaps feeling a need to justify a politically uncertain vote, adopted the Adm inistration’s rhetoric w ith passion and eloquence. Congressm an E verett Dirksen, for exam ple, spoke o f “this red tide . . . like some vile creeping thing w hich is spreading its w eb w estw ard and w estw ard.” T h e b ill passed easily. A s T ed Lew is w rote in his political colum n: “T he Republican Party cannot risk, if it wants to win the election in 1948, the respon­ sibility for commie ascendency in western Europe— a respon­ sibility that Trum an w ould try to pin on the opposition if stop­ gap aid is too little or too late.” 47 Congressional debate on Interim A id w as, in a num ber o f significant respects, a repetition o f its action on GrecoTurkish aid. A gain Congress had acted in the context of an em ergency defined b y the Adm inistration as a choice betw een im m ediate action and communist ascendency in Europe. A gain the em ergency had been largely contrived b y the A d­ m inistration in response to dom estic political pressures. A gain the Republicans in Congress had m uttered resentments against the Adm inistration’s tactics, bu t again they had been over­ whelm ed by them. A gain, most im portantly, the real issues in­ volved in foreign aid w ent undiscussed. N either the hearings nor floor debate produced any serious discussion o f the rela­

T he Marshall Plan

19 7

tionship o f foreign aid to Am erican econom ic p olicy or polit­ ico-strategic interests. T h e chief casualty o f this reversion to crisis politics w as public understanding o f d ie governm ent’s foreign policy. An A .I.P.O . poll, designed to m easure the extent to w hich Am ericans w ere aw are o f d ie relationship betw een foreign aid and the dom estic econom y, asked a national cross section in N ovem ber to nam e the best w ays o f avoiding a business depression; only 1 per cent responded that increasing « p o rts or lending m oney to Europe so that they m ight bu y Am erican products w ould be an appropriate policy. Public consciousness o f the relationship betw een foreign aid and communism w as m ud i m ore evident. A poll taken am ong resi­ dents o f W ashington b y the W ashington Post indicated that the communist issue w as the chief factor in form ing people’s opinion o f the program : 65 per cent o f those favoring the program and 28 per cent o f those opposing it believed that the communists w ould com e to pow er in w estern Europe if Am eri­ can aid w as not provided. But public concern about this possi­ bility reflected the vague philosophical opposition to com­ munism prom oted b y the Adm inistration rather than any d e a r understanding o f its relationship to concrete Am erican in­ terests.4® It w as not necessary to be a purist about dem ocratic proc­ esses to be alarm ed about the character o f the discussion o f foreign assistance that occurred during debate on Interim A id. Serious practical objections to the terms o f the discussion w ere already obvious. O ne o f the most im portant w as im plied by the grow ing anger and confusion in Congress and the public at reports that the U.S. was actively supporting trade betw een the communist and non-communist w orlds. If the Soviets w ere really planning aggression w estw ard and if Europe w ere really on die verge o f communist takeover, it w as asked, w hy was the Adm inistration perm itting and even prom oting trade be­ tw een E ast and W est? W hen Britain com pleted a trade agree­ m ent w ith the Soviet Union in D ecem ber there w as a how l erf protest in Congress. Continuing Am erican trade w ith the Soviet Union w as exposed and condem ned on C apitol H ill and in the right-w ing press. Senator Know land likened such trade

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to sending scrap iron to Japan prior to W orld W ar II. The Com m erce Departm ent was forced to end its efforts to de­ velop U .S.-Soviet trade relations. T he ironies o f these develop­ m ents w ere profound. W e have seen that d ie revival o f EastW est trade in Europe w as one o f the m ajor purposes o f Am er­ ican foreign policy. Indeed, the State D epartm ent actually favored extending Am erican aid to eastern Europe under the M arshall Plan to prom ote East-W est trade, though for political reasons it did not suggest this to Congress. N ow , as a result of the rhetorical devices that the Adm inistration was em ploying to w in popular and Congressional approval for the aid pro­ grain, it w as forced to apologize for and take steps to curtail trade that it considered com plem entary to the program and econom ically advantageous to the U nited States.49 U ndoubtedly the most serious problem generated b y die anti-com m unist em phasis o f die debate on foreign aid in­ volved Am erican policy tow ard China. D uring debate on Greco-Turkish aid, a num ber o f Republicans w ho objected to M arshall’s im position o f an em bargo on arms shipments to China, and to the Adm inistration’s general attitude of resigna­ tion w ith respect to events in that country, had put Adm inis­ tration witnesses on the defensive b y asking if there w as any intention o f applying the Trum an D octrine to China. Adm inis­ tration responses had been equivocal. W ithin the Adm inistra­ tion, G eorge Kennan, who had objected to d ie Trum an D oc­ trine before its delivery precisely because it im plied Am erican aid to any country threatened by communism, urged in the re­ port of the Policy Planning Staff in M ay that steps be taken to correct this m isconception o f Am erican policy. D uring the summer o f 1947, how ever, nothing was done to im plem ent Kennan’s suggestion. Indeed, events evolved in precisely the opposite direc­ tion. E arly in the summer the Chinese Nationalists attem pted to exploit the Trum an D octrine b y initiating a new cam paign for Am erican aid. Republicans in Congress responded w arm ly. Senator Vandenberg w rote M arshall to com plain about the preoccupation o f the Adm inistration w ith Europe, and he su g g ested that Congress was not likely to approve any aid

T he Marshall Plan

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program that did not present a “total balance sheet.” O ther Republicans pressed d ie Adm inistration for a reappraisal o f the China policy. T o diffuse these demands, the A d­ m inistration lifted the arms em bargo and sent G eneral A lbert W edem eyer, the Am erican com m ander in China during W orld W ar II and a cham pion o f a strong Am erican commitment to that country, to China on a fact-finding mission. Although die Adm inistration appears not to have intended to im ply readi­ ness to sponsor a m ajor new program of aidjtp Chiang b y these actions, it could not avoid giving that impression. In any case, these attem pts to appease Republican demands on China w ere an indication o f the Adm inistration’s handling of the China problem during the summer of 1947. Its quite ob­ vious intention w as to satisfy the Republicans w ith minor concessions rather than to develop bipartisan support for its own policy. Vandenberg’s strong advocacy o f aid to China appears to have been the critical consideration m oving d ie Adm inistration in this direction, for it was largely to strengthen his position that the concessions w ere m ade.50 B y d ie fall of 1947, w hatever possibility m ay have once existed for developing a bipartisan p olicy on China had been lost. In the context of the presidential election, the Repub­ lican Party had seized on China as its issue in foreign policy. This developm ent involved a coalition o f those genuinely con­ cerned about the future of China and those more concerned about the future o f the Republican Party. Arthur Vandenberg was a strong adherent to this movement, and in his letters he consistently referred to China as the Republican contribution to Am erican foreign policy. In O ctober he stated that he op­ posed “any so-called ‘M arshall Plan’ w hich does not include China.” Governor D ew ey of N ew York, the leading prospect for the Republican nomination, w as m aking speeches urging a “two-ocean foreign policy.” O ther members of die “China bloc” in Congress— led by Bridges in the Senate and Judd and V oiys in the House— could be counted upon to take sim ilar view s. A t the same tim e, Senator T aft w as stressing his opposition to the M arshall Plan. The Adm inistration was thus faced w ith the possibility o f opposition from legislators who tended tow ard

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isolationism and governm ent econom ies, as w ell as the China bloc. U nder these circum stances it elected to m ake additional concessions to the advocates of aid to China. It approved lim ited Am erican m ilitary action in China o f an advisory and training nature, and it indicated that a program o f econom ic aid for C hiang Was being developed. Though these decisions involved very lim ited amounts of m oney, they entailed a fun­ dam ental shift from a policy o f gradually liquidating the Am erican commitment to one of strengthening it. These con­ cessions satisfied Vandenberg, bu t w ere not enough for Re­ publican cham pions of China in the House. Judd and Vorys successfully sponsored an amendment including China in the House Interim A id b ill, and urged Vandenberg to honor their initiative on this point. B asically sym pathetic to their purposes, Vandenberg agreed. T he final Interim A id b ill included a sm all allotm ent for China.51 The inclusion of aid to China in Interim A id, and the grow ­ ing Congressional pressure to reduce com m erce betw een East and W est, indicated how w ide w as the gap betw een the rheto­ ric that the Adm inistration was using to create support for for­ eign aid and the substantive econom ic and political interests the aid program w as designed to serve. .In both cases the rhetoric was being used to force the Arimirnctrntin" ini’r' f a ­ rcies directly contrary to its real intentions. But having let the period betw een Secretary M arshall’s speech o f June 5 and the debate on Interim A id pass w ithout a serious effort to m obilize solid public support for its purposes, the Adm inistration was constrained to do political battle upon the basis o f its crisis rhetoric rather than its substantive policies. On these issues, as on the issue o f dom estic communism and em ployee loyalty, the lim itations o f that rhetoric w ere becom ing apparent. A l­ though there w as possibly still tim e to correct this trend before die final debate on the M arshall Plan early in 1948, die lesson o f Interim A id was that the Trum an D octrine, only nine months previously a stroke b y w hich the Adm inistration had turned Congress to its w ill, w as now being turned back on its authors.

y

The Cold W a r at Home 1. Focusing the Internal Security Issue: Spring 1947 As the campaign for foreign aid developed, pressure* on the Administration to take vigorous steps in the field of internal security remained intense. The most important sources of these pressures were Congress and the Justice Department. W hile the imminent battle over the Marshall Plan denied Truman the option of resisting these demands, complying with them would support the effort for foreign aid.

^Concessions w ith regard to E ast -W est trade and China were" not die only prices the Adm inistration paid for foreign aid in 1947. As the first months o f the year had shown, the Adm inistration's reliance upon a strong anti-communist ap­ peal to m obilize support for foreign aid provided Congres­ sional Republicans w ith an irresistible opportunity to insist upon strong initiatives in the field o f internal security]) This circum stance had played a m ajor role in precipitating the battle betw een the Adm inistration and Congress for control o f the em ployee loyalty issue, w hich the Adm inistration had won b y proposing the loyalty program and convening a grand jury to consider evidence o f subversion b y federal officials. D uring the spring o f 1947, how ever, Congressional Republi­ cans m ade it clear that they w ould not easily be preem pted in this area. Betraying the extent to w hich their interest in the em ployee loyalty m atter w as political, they refused for several months to appropriate the funds requested for the President's program , and in m id-July the House approved a substitute

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measure sponsored by Congressm an Rees. O nly the existence o f the President's loyalty order provided the Adm inistration w ith the leverage it needed to defeat the substitute in Senate com m ittee and assure the establishm ent o f a program under its own control. Predictably, the President’s victory on em ployee loyalty did not prevent legislators from m aking regular attacks upon the new program or preclude specific demands bv^Congress w ith regard to other problem s of internal security/ Indeed, in the months im m ediately follow ing the Trum an D octrine speech the Adm inistration was provided w ith strong evidence that its difficulties arising from the political relationship betw een in­ ternal security and C old W ar foreign policy w ere just begin­ ning. In M ay, for exam ple, Styles Bridges won a point in his battle w ith the State D epartm ent regarding John C arter V in­ cent, the Asian expert, who according to Bridges was influenc­ ing Am erican policy toward China in favor of the Communists; V incent was transferred out of the D ivision on F ar Eastern A ffairs.1 E ven more striking w as the success of Bridges and T aber in forcing the State D epartm ent to dismiss summarily ten em ployees on grounds of disloyalty. T he latter incident merits a moment’s discussion, since it provided the most strik­ ing possible evidence o f the Adm inistration’s inability to resist the demands of Congressional Republicans in die field o f internal security. W hen the Senate Appropriations Com m ittee had been considering the State Departm ent budget in 1946, Com m ittee members had criticized Secretary Byrnes for retaining on d ie payroll, particularly in the overseas inform ation program, em ployees o f whose loyalty the Com m ittee was suspicious; shortly thereafter, to enhance Byrnes’s ability to cope w ith this problem , Congress had granted powers o f summary dis­ m issal to the Secretary o f State. D uring the follow ing year, no State D epartm ent em ployees had been rem oved under this pro­ vision. In the spring of 1947 the Departm ent’s budget again cam e before the Congress, and in M ay Taber’s House Com ­ m ittee voted to strike the entire proposed allocation for d ie overseas information program . W hen the D epartm ent appealed

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this decision to Bridges's Senate com m ittee d ie follow ing month, Secretary M arshall had just delivered his speech at H arvard C ollege, com m itting the Adm inistration to new ini­ tiatives in the field of foreign aid. M arshalls proposal bore upon the Senate com m ittee's deliberations in several w ays. First, should the com m ittee support the House com m ittee’s de­ cision to elim inate the inform ation program , the State D epart­ ment w ould be denied a tool it considered essential to com bat communist propaganda in Europe against Am erican econom ic aid. Such propaganda w as no sm all problem , as indicated b y d ie attention given European sensibilities in the fram ing o f M arshall’s proposal. M arshall repeatedly expressed concern about communist propaganda in Europe and during the sum­ m er o f 1947 he delivered a m ajor address specifically de­ nouncing it. Second, M arshall’s proposal m ade the establish­ m ent o f cooperation betw een the State D epartm ent and the Congressional appropriations com m ittees even more essential than it already was, since both com m ittees w ould be in posi­ tions to exert major influence over Congressional action on the M arshall Plan. (In fact, T aber w as explicitly identified b y M arshall as one o f those whose response to the H arvard speech he most feared.) This was the setting in w hich A d­ m inistration representatives testified on die State D epartm ent budget before Bridges’s com m ittee. The issue o f internal se­ curity w as quickly raised and the State Departm ent repre­ sentatives w ere criticized for the Secretary’s failure to m ake use o f his pow er of summary dism issal The Senators in­ dicated that the price of this laxity w ould be a cut in the State Departm ent’s appropriation, undoubtedly from the inform ation program , and die action o f Taber’s com m ittee left no doubt of the potency of this threat. T h e State Departm ent thus faced both the loss of a program of great im portance to the success o f the M arshall Plan and a serious conflict w ith the appropria­ tions com m ittees if it failed to satisfy the Senate com m ittee as to the loyalty o f its em ployees. On June 23 ten officials o f the D epartm ent o f State w ere summ arily discharged from their positions. N ew spaper reports, based upon a State D epartm ent press release, indicated that

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M c C a r t h y is m

the em ployees had been discharged for reasons o f security. Secretary M arshall, in announcing his personal review and ap­ proval o f the dismissals, stated that several o f the ten em ploy­ ees had been involved w ith a foreign power. T he inference w as w idely drawn that some o f diem had been Communists. T he ten dism issed em ployees, w ho had been granted no hear­ ings or statements of charges, found them selves stigm atized as disloyal and unable to find other em ploym ent. Their requests that they either b e presented w ith form al charges and an op­ portunity to answer them or perm itted to resign w ithout prejudice w ere ignored. It was not until the prestigious law firm o f Arnold, Fortas and Porter accepted the cases and sub­ jected d ie State D epartm ent to months o f legal harassment and adverse publicity that its officers agreed to perm it all the em ployees to resign without prejudice. In terms o f its political significance, this w as decidedly not a happy ending, for die D epartm ent had shown itself either unw illing or unable to of­ fer any basis for the dismissals and thus seem ed to have been m otivated only b y a desire to appease d ie appropriations com­ m ittees. The W ashington Post likened die State Departm ent's action to the Adm inistration’s concessions in the area of policy toward China, and expressed the view that M arshall and L ovett could have been induced “to defend so indefensible a procedure” only because they “w ere the victim s o f ruthless blackm ail from the appropriations rulers on C apitol H ill.” The comment was appropriate. Follow ing d ie announcement o f the ten dismissals, a suitable compromise was obtained on the budget for the overseas information program .2 T he Rees b ill and the cases of V incent and the ten State Departm ent em ployees left no doubt that the Congress w ould continue to press the Adm inistration for more aggressive ac­ tion in the field o f internal security. This in itself w ould have provided the im petus for continued attention b y die Adm in­ istration to the question of subversion during the spring and summer o f 1947. But the driving force behind concern w ith internal security was b y no means lim ited to the political in­ fighting betw een a Republican Congress and a D em ocratic ad­ m inistration. W ithin the Adm inistration itself w ere individuals

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and agencies as anxious as the Republicans in Congress to take strong steps in this field. None w as more distinguished in this respect than F.B .I. D irector H oover, w ho had long been anxious to m ove de­ cisively against the forces he felt w ere subverting traditional Am erican values. G iven d ie circum stances of increasing public concern w ith communism, Congressional interest in this issue, and H oovers immense personal standing am ong groups espe­ cially concerned w ith internal security, the F.B .I. D irector w as in a strong position. H oover seems to have com prehended the situation fully. H e indicated this in A pril by asserting the right to conduct a fu ll background investigation of any incum bent federal em ployee on whom the prelim inary check o f F.B .I. files, required b y the President’s loyalty order, developed “deroga­ tory information.” As the loyalty order had specifically left the decision to make such an investigation to the head o f the em ploying departm ent or agency, and had specifically desig­ nated the C ivil Service Commission as d ie agency responsible to make this kind of investigation when requested, H oover’s action seem ed a blatant effort to expand his influence over d ie loyalty program and thus over the entire federal bureaucracy. In the opinion of Stephen Spingam , a m ember o f the staff of the Presidential Commission that developed the loyalty order, Hoover’s m ove looked “as if the F.B .I. w ere subverting the Tem porary Commission’s report and the President’s E .O . w ith­ out so m uch as a by-your-leave to any o f the interested parties outside o f Justice.” T he issue w as brought to the attention o f the W hite House and precipitated a m ajor showdown be­ tween the C ivil Service Commission and the F.B .I. that clari­ fied the attitudes of several im portant individuals in the Tru­ man adm inistration. Attorney G eneral C lark strongly backed H oover and interceded w ith die President in his behalf. Trum an, how ever— in the words of a note b y Clifford— felt “very strongly anti-F.B.I. and sides positively w ith M itchell and Perkins [of die C .S .C .]. W ants to be sure to hold F.B .I. down, afraid of ‘Gestapo.’ ” Although a compromise acceptable to the President was devised, Trum an was not optim istic that it w ould stick. A s he w rote in a note to Clifford, “J. E dgar w ill in all

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p rob ab ility get this backward-looking Congress to give him w hat he wants. It’s dangerous.” T he President’s fears w ere w ell founded, for thorough investigations of incum bent em ployees w as the most popular of all issues related to internal security am ong Congressional Republicans. In due course Congress cut the budget for the loyalty program proposed b y the W hite House in a w ay that substantially curtailed the role o f the C iv il Service Commission.3 As this incident makes clear, the President w as quite aw are of die forces acting on him in the field of internal secu­ rity in the spring of 1947, but his sense that die situation was "dangerous” did not lead him to take any strong steps to soothe grow ing public agitation over d ie problem . His position is not difficult to understand. Failure on his part to satisfy public and Congressional concern in this area could underm ine his Adm inistration politically and leave him vulnerable to Repub­ lican attack. A t the same tim e, b y confusing his position on communism, such action w ould cripple his capacity to m obi­ lize support for the foreign aid program at a critical moment in the cam paign for its approval. In short, die potential costs o f a strong stand against die F.B .I. or H .U .A .C. w ould be very great, w hile the gains w ould be speculative and uncertain of achievem ent. A t the same tim e, as the announcement o f die loyalty program and die H .U .A .C. hearings already had demonstrated, continued decisive and conspicuous action against Am erican communists and subversives could help die Adm inistration solve w hat it considered die fundam ental problem o f internal security, w hich had nothing to do w ith disloyal federal em­ ployees but was related to the absence o f strong public support for its international policies.4 Such a benefit was not to be spum ed b y an Adm inistration faced w ith an extended and d if­ ficult batde for foreign aid. It w as especially not to be spum ed as public enthusiasm for the Trum an D octrine began to w ane in the late spring, m aking the Adm inistration aw are of the need to rekindle the kind o f public concern over the com­ m unist challenge that hgd contributed so decisively to passage o f Greco-Turkish aid\ In this setting, w hile planners in the

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State Departm ent w ere developing the M arshall Plan and girding them selves for the political battle it w ould precipitate, officials elsew here in the Trum an adm inistration w ere prepar­ ing to m ove forw ard w ith new and dram atic initiatives against Am erican communists and subversives. These plans fe ll into tw o broad categories: (1) program s o f counterpropaganda and police controls intended to destroy the effectiveness o f Am eri­ can communists and subversives as w ell as com bat Soviet propaganda; (2) program s o f education and propaganda, de­ signed to overcom e the w id ely held attitudes that inhibited public support o f the Adm inistration’s foreign policies.^/

2. Policing Internal Security Under the pressure of its effort to win support for C old War foreign policy, the Administration developed a number of programs to police public opinion. The Attorney GeneraTs list was published as a means of discrediting dissident organizations. Deportation actions were brought against aliens considered subversive. New efforts were made to control public access to information about international events and national policy. Taken together, these actions constituted a system of constraints upon opposition to official policy comparable to those used during the two world wars of the twentieth century.

tile problem o f communist propaganda, they alw ays referred to tiie ability o f the communists to appeal to broad segm ents o f the population through apparently patriotic appeals or organi­ zations thgt concealed their relationship to the communist m ovem e n t^ hus, President Trum an w orried about a coalition o f “reds, phonies and parlor pinks”; Forrestal, Clark, and Tru­ man feared the susceptibility o f the isolationists to communist appeals; Forrestal saw a de facto alliance o f communists and M EM BERS O F TH E TR U M A N ADM INISTRATION SPOKE o f

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pacifists, and J. E dgar H oover labeled “front" organizations the m ost effective instruments o f communist subversion. D e­ spite general agreem ent on the dangers represented b y this form o f propaganda in 1945 and 1946, at the tim e o f the T ru­ man D octrine speech the Adm inistration had devised no effec­ tive tool to com bat it; indeed, the Communists staged a m ajor cam paign against Greco-Turldsh aid during the spring o f 1947.^T he Adm inistrations efforts in the realm o f counter­ propaganda w ere lim ited to cooperation w ith the H ouse UnAm erican A ctivities Com m ittee, a crude instrum ent that the Adm inistration could not control and one w hose effectiveness w as lim ited by its reputation for partisanship as w ell as bizarre and irresponsible sensationalism. T he inception o f public debate on the foreign aid program lent new urgency to the problem o f communist propaganda, for nothing w as m ore predictable than the political opposition that foreign aid w ould encounter or the intensity w ith which the communists w ould exploit and encourage these difficulties for their own purposes. K u this setting (ffuT Justice D epartm ent developed one o f the /tost effective and controversial political instruments ever devised b y the Am erican governm ent: the A ttorney General's list o fsu h versive organizations? ) *T hc hst w as nothing more than a public designation b y the Attorney G eneral of organizations operating w ithin the U nited States that he considered "com m unist," “fascist," “to­ talitarian," or “subversive." Com piled for die first tim e during die spring and summer o f 1947 and m ade public late in die year, the list im m ediately dem onstrated a capacity to under­ mine the political effectiveness o f cited organizations^The day follow ing publication, for exam ple, the C onnecticutState Youth Conference, an organization listed because it had dem onstrated against Am erican intervention in G reece during die spring o f 1947, w as inform ed that the facilities of a H artford hotel that it had engaged for a planned convention w ould be unavailable. H ie N ational Council for Am erican-Soviet Friendship, w hich had actively prom oted U.S.-Soviet cooperation since 1943, re­ ported that as a result o f being designated “communist" it and its local affiliates Tost numerous members, officers and spon-

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son ; lost public support; lost contributions; lost attendance at m eetings; lost circulation o f their publications; lost acceptance b y colleges, schools and organizations o f their exhibits and other m aterial; have been denied m eeting places; have been denied radio t im e . . . are unable to gain members and support from federal em ployees . . . have been seriously frustrated.1* The N ational Council also reported substantial personal and professional dam age to its leadership. O ther organizations had sim ilar experiences. Though no quantified analysis o f the im ­ pact o f the list on cited organizations has been undertaken, existing scholarship supports the view that the list seriously im ­ paired the functions o f those groups included on it. T h e fact that m em bership in an organization on the list very quickly becam e the basis for disqualification for em ploym ent b y nu­ merous state and local governm ents and educational institu­ tions indicates that it w as accorded w ide credibility, and this w ould seem a significant measurem ent o f its effectiveness as counterpropaganda. W hen the Suprem e Court considered a challenge to the list brought b y three d te d organizations, all the Justices agreed that it had significantly im paired the effec­ tiveness o fth e organizations it nam ed.6 ÇT he authority under w hich the Attorney G eneral devel­ oped this list w as contained in the executive order b y w hich President Trum an established the loyalty program in M arch 1947. T he apparent purpose o f the list w as to provide federal officials adm inistering the loyalty program w ith one criterion b y w hich an em ployee’s loyalty m ight be ascertained^ In d ie language o f the executive order, “mem bership uï, affiliation w ith, or sym pathetic association w ith any foreign or dom estic organization, association, m ovement, group or com bination o f persons designated b y the Attorney G eneral as totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive” w ould b e one consideration in assessing an em ployee’s loyalty. Precisely how this standard was introduced into the loyalty program is not clear from the records o f the President’s Tem porary Commission. It is clear, how ever, that d ie Com mission provided for the developm ent o f the list as the natural consequence o f its acceptance o f this standard o f loyalty and that it considered the list only in re­

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lation to d ie lim ited purposes o f the loyalty program . Passing consideration w as given to the question o f publication, and the Commission agreed that it opposed such action, but left d ie decision in each case to the Attorney General. C lark chose to publish the entire list.7 The official story has alw ays m aintained that publication o f the Attorney G eneral’s list w as never intended for any purpose other than that im plied b y the President’s loyalty order. As Attorney G eneral C lark w rote in 1949, “the designa­ tions m ade pursuant to the order are intended to relate only to the specific purposes o f the order.” 8 This m ay be true. And it m ay be true that the onerous consequences of the list’s pub­ lication that ultim ately led the Suprem e Court to accord legal redress to cited organizations w ere nothing m ore than unin­ tended by-products. There is, how ever, strong reason to regard this story as official fiction, and to doubt that the A ttorney General’s decision to publish the list represented anything other than a deliberate attem pt by the Departm ent o f Justice to neutralize various political organizations that w ere, am ong other subversive things, im peding die Adm inistration’s efforts to w in support for C old W ar foreign policy. T he concern felt by the Attorney G eneral in 1946 and early 1947 regarding communist propaganda activities and his eagerness to com bat them have already been discussetf^CIark’s frustration derived from his inability to apply legal sanctions against communist activities^ N either of the federal statutes aim ed at subversive organizations— the Voorhis A ct and the .Foreign A ß«»"»« tfrm Art— frad proved to be an effec­ tive means of exposing communist activity. T o bring com­ m unist organizations under their regulations required die gov­ ernm ent to demonstrate that Am erican communist organiza­ tions w ere creatures o f the Soviet governm ent, or that they sought to overthrow the Am erican governm ent b y unconstitu­ tional means, attributes that, though generally assumed, could not be proven in a legally acceptable fashion. The Smith Arl aim ed at subversive activity b y individuals, was ineffective in punishing communists for d ie same reasons. Attorney G eneral C lark was pessim istic about devising a constitutional means o f

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subjecting communist activities to legal controls. H e advised Congress against legislative efforts that w ould define the Com m unist Party in such a w ay as to bring it w ithin the pur­ view o f the subversion statutes.9 His problem , then, was to destroy the effectiveness of communist and com m unist-affiliated organizations w ithout bringing legal sanctions against diem . T h e Attorney G eneral s list achieved this purpose. • T hat such a list, once published, w ould operate as coun­ terpropaganda could not have been unanticipated b y some­ one w ith as much experience in the field of internal security as Clark. The list he published in 1947 was not the first such en­ gine produced by the Am erican governm ent. T he practice o f p ublicly citing organizations as a counterpropaganda tech­ nique had been em ployed by Congressional com m ittees on a num ber o f occasions. T he Senate Judiciary Com m ittee in 1919, the Fish Com m ittee o f the House in 1930, and the M cCorm ack Com m ittee of the House in 1935 had all published lists o f communist organizations in order to lim it their effectiveness. In more recent years, the D ies Com m ittee (later the House Un-Am erican A ctivities Com m ittee) had em ployed this tech­ nique as standard practice. Both Clark and H oover endorsed die principle of publicizing communist activities as a potent means o f com bating them. Thus, the concept o f publicly listing subversive organizations derived from a tradition o f counterpropaganda. Certainly it is difficult to discover any con­ nection betw een publication of such a list and the purposes o f the loyalty program. The executive order contained no require­ ment that the list be published, and it is hard to im agine how its intended function o f assisting loyalty boards w ould b e en­ hanced b y such action. Indeed, the precedent w ith regard to the use o f such lists as part o f loyalty programs was to treat diem as confidential; this policy had been established b y the Justice Departm ent during W orld W ar II when it developed a sim ilar list as part o f Roosevelt's loyalty program . The list published in 1947 differed from the wartim e list in another im­ portant respect: w hile the earlier list contained only organiza­ tions to w hich governm ent em ployees belonged, a very small percentage o f the organizations cited by Attorney General

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C lark in 1947 or later contained any governm ent em ployees. Indeed, potential inclusion o f governm ent em ployees was not a consideration that Clark's departm ent considered relevant to placing organizations on the list. M oreover, as most of the groups cited b y the A ttorney G eneral w ere ostensibly engaged in activities entirely consistent w ith patriotism — though not, o f course, the Adm inistration's policies— and as a high percentage o f their members had no know ledge of their subversive leader­ ship or purpose, the list w ould not seem to have been a par­ ticularly valuable guide to discovering disloyalty am ong gov­ ernm ent em ployees.10 Although C lark has never explained his reasons for pub­ lishing the list, a sense of his view o f it can be derived from various acts and statements. In his most extensive public dis­ cussion o f tiie list, before the House Un-Am erican A ctivities Com m ittee in February 1948, C lark described it only in terms o f counterpropaganda: “It is our purpose to continuously survey this field in order to prevent listed organizations from assuming an alias as w ell as additional organizations being used for subversive propaganda.” L ater he referred to listed groups as “those organizations that are engaged in propaganda activity of a subversive character.*’ This preoccupation w ith counterpropaganda is revealing, for the ostensible purpose o f the list was to identify organizations that w ere the instruments o f foreign states or sought violent revolution. Clark's explana­ tion to H .U .A .C. o f his total strategy for com bating communism in Am erica further suggests that he view ed the list as a broad political instrument. “O ur strategic objective,” he stated, “must b e to isolate subversive movements in this country from effec­ tive interference w ith the body politic.” H e listed an eightpoint program to achieve this, w hich included: “ (5 ) continu­ ous study and public listing b y the Attorney G eneral o f subversive organizations under the President’s executive order; (6 ) com plete elim inatiqp of subversive persons from all gov­ ernm ent positions.”(A sith is makes clear, C lark view ed the list as an anti-communist tool entirely distinct from the effort to rid the governm ent o f disloyal em plo y e e s ^ This testim ony dates from early 1948, w ell after the list

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had been published and its effectiveness as counterpropaganda revealed, and thus proves only that C lark w as ready to use the list for a purpose for w hich it apparently had not been in­ tended. H owever, Clark’s unblinking acceptance o f the conse­ quences o f publication, com bined w ith his refusal to w ithdraw it or to establish form al hearing procedures to protect innocent organizations once these consequences w ere apparent, and, indeed, his com plete endorsem ent o f these consequences, strongly support the view that the results o f publication w ere neither unexpected nor unintended. M oreover, in A pril 1947, w hen w ork on the list w as just beginning, C lark sought legal advice on the Justice D epartm ent’s potential liability for placing organizations on it; it is doubtful that this question w ould have arisen had he not intended to publish it and w ere he not aw are o f its potential consequences. M oreover, as he told the House Appropriations Com m ittee in late 1947, he w as extrem ely cautious in developing the list and assigned a sig­ nificant portion o f the legal m anpower in the Crim inal D ivi­ sion to the task because o f his awareness that the list repre­ sented som ething Ma little b it contrary to our usual conception o f dem ocratic process.” It is doubtful that he w ould have ex­ ercised such caution or m ade such a statem ent w ith regard to a docum ent intended to remain confidential and to be used for internal adm inistrative purposes.13 In order to assess the im pact o f die Attorney General’s list on the public debate over C old W ar foreign policy, it is necessary to understand the manner in w hich it w as com­ piled. T h e authority o f die Attorney G eneral to assign organi­ zations to the list was lim ited b y no procedural requirem ents and qualified b y no right o f appeal. It w as solely the result of secret determ inations w ithin the Justice Departm ent and— until com pelled b y the Suprem e Court in 1950— the D epart­ ment consistently refused to m ake any public statem ent re­ garding the criteria b y w hich its designations w ere made. This left the Attorney G eneral free to apply as broad a definition to such words as “communist* or “subversive” as he saw fit. There is reason to believe that the men w orking on the list w ere inclined to define these words quite broadly. T w o o f

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Clark's special assistants drafted a memo during the summer o f 1947 setting forth the bases by w hich organizations should b e assigned to the list. T heir guiding principle w as that “the proposed criteria are designed to be elastic and flexible” and their suggestions w ere consistent w ith this sp irit In general, the criteria involved the advocacy o f political, econom ic, and social ideas that w ere “hostile or inim ical to the Am erican form o f governm ent” or tended to “prom ote the ideas and serve the interests o f a foreign governm ent” or “indicate lack o f bona-fide allegiance to the governm ent o f the U nited States.” The criteria involved no reference to specific acts. T h ey m ade no reference to specific connection&Jtftween do­ m estic organizations and foreign governm ents ( A “communist” organization was not defined as a group that took orders from the Soviet governm ent or d ie Am erican Com m unist Party, bu t one that advocated M arxist ideas, or supported the policies o f the Com m unist Party w hile advocating dem ocratic ideas, or follow ed policies “in accord w ith the governm ental p olicy o f Soviet Russia and opposed to that o f the U nited States^ The role o f the criteria set forth in this memo in influencing desig­ nations to the list is not clear, though its authors consistently worked very closely w ith C lark in m atters related to internal security. A t a minimum, the memo indicates the typ e of thinking that existed within the Justice Departm ent in 1947 when the list was first com piled.18 OßjTsufch criteria, it seems fair to state, any organization /that consistently opposed C old W ar foreign policy w ould have been a serious candidate for designation, and several organi­ zations that w ere active in this respect w ere citecbJn addition to the N ational Council for Am erican-Soviet Friendship, al­ ready m entioned, tw o Greek-Am erican groups that had op­ posed the Tsaldaris governm ent w ere cited on early editions of the list. T h e Am erican Slav Congress, w hich worked actively against the M arshall Plan, w as also cited. W e shall probably never know, in most cases, on w hat evidence designations to the list w ere m ade or w hether some organizations w ere cited solely because they opposed C old W ar foreign policy. In gen­ eral, the early editions o f the list w ere considered b y con­

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tem porary observers to be quite restrained, and even die W ashington Post, w hich strongly opposed the list in princi­ ple, took no issue w ith the specific designations on the list pub­ lished in 1947. So far as this w riter knows, only one organiza­ tion, the N ational Council for Am erican-Soviet Friendship, has ever won a court ruling indicating that the Justice D epartm ent was not able to justify its designation.14 T h e m ajor influence of d ie list on die debate over C o ld W ar foreign policy, how ever, m ay not have derived from its effects on the organizations it nam ed, onerous as these w ere. It must b e rem em bered that prior to 1950 no one knew or could know on w hat basis groups w ere placed on die list. T he m ean­ ing o f die list was so am biguous that the W ashington Post could state in an editorial in late 1947 that “to be compre­ hensive and to avoid discrim ination the Departm ent of Justice w ould have to sw eep into the disloyal category every organi­ zation w hich in any w ay disavows policies the governm ent is follow ing.“ In circum stances perm itting such a view from such a sophisticated source, it w ould have been entirely rea­ sonable— it m ay even have been right— to assume that active’ and consistent opposition to the Adm inistration’s foreign poli­ cies was sufficient to w in a place on the list. G iven the burden­ some consequences of such a citation to the organizations and individuals affected, the m ere possibility o f this could not but have had a significant effect on organized dissent from the Adm inistration’s foreign policies. U nfortunately, quantitative measurements o f the actual effects o f the list have been few . Ralph S. Brown, author of a study o f federal security pro­ grams, told a Senate subcom m ittee in 1956 that the only scientific study done in this area did find, on the basis o f testi­ mony b y governm ent em ployees, that the existence o f the list m ade them reluctant to join organizations of w hich they w ere unsure. Since the list also becam e a test o f em ployability in state and local governm ents, defense-related industries, and schools, and o f eligibility for passports, occupancy o f federally financed housing, and tax exemptions, it does not seem ex­ cessive or im prudent speculation tc(suggest that the Attorney G eneral’s list had a profoundly suppressing effect upon politi­

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cal dissent in the U nited StatesT jn this sense, the im pact o f the list’s publication was to enroll d ie w hole c o u n ty in a vast loyalty program T^Tıe President's loyalty order had had the im portant but lim ited result o f creating conditions in w hich individuals on the governm ent payroll w ould feel it necessary to keep to a straight political path; now this effect, based in part upon an appeal to patriotism , in part upon intim idation, reached out to the w hole population. W ith specific reference to the M arshall Plan (support of w hich w as becom ing a m ea­ surem ent o f a citizen’s patriotism and opposition to com­ m unism ), this conclusion w ould seem to apply w ith particular force. It w as w id ely speculated in late 1947, for exam ple, that the next edition of the list w ould include H enry W allace’s Progressive C itizen’s Association, w hich represented d ie m ajor organized opposition to the Adm inistration’s foreign policies. A nd in fact governm ent em ployees w ho publicly opposed the M arshall Plan w ere challenged by security officials under the jy ith o rity o f the loyalty order.18 V T he Attorney G eneral’s list was only the m ost dram atic and innovative effort b y the Justice D epartm ent to support the cam paign for C old W ar foreign policy during the summer and fall o f 1947. C lark also m obilized die F-fi-T- and ihn Bureau o f Im m igration and N aturalization for a full-scale program to “deport aliens involved in commu nist activities. L ike the device o f issuing lists to cripple dissident organizations not subject to legal sanction, the practice o f deporting aliens to rid die country of subversive ideas had a long history o f sporadic usage in the annals o f Am erican security policy. T he associa­ tion of Am erican radicalism w ith im m igrants and aliens is one o f the classic traditions in Am erican politics; for exam ple, the m ajor radical organization in the U nited States in d ie late nineteenth century, die Industrial W orkers o f the W orld, con­ tained a high percentage o f immigrants and aliens, and this pattern also applied to the Am erican Com m unist Party follow ­ ing its form ation in 1919. In these circum stances, efforts in Congress to com bat radicalism frequendy took die form o f amendments to die im m igration law s. Numerous such pro­ posals w ere directed against the I.W .W . but, for a variety o f

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political reasons, it proved im possible to develop Congres­ sional m ajorities in support o f them. T he nativist sentim ent produced b y W orld W ar I, how ever, proved potent enough to inspire legislation providing for the exclusion and de­ portation o f aliens espousing revolutionary ideas or belong­ in g to organizations that did so; that no broad deporta­ tion drive ensued was the result o f d ie interpretation o f diese powers b y the executive branch. T he political tensions imme­ diately preceding W orld W ar II produced legislation in­ creasing the governm ent's powers to expel radical aliens, but the w ar in Europe and the U .S.-Soviet alliance prevented any broad application of these law s to dom estic communists. Thus, at the o id o f W orld W ar II, the Justice D epartm ent possessed broad and largely unexploited powers to deport aliens en­ gaged in subversive activities. M eanwhile, the Am erican Com ­ m unist Party had been grow ing steadily, and the popula­ tion o f the U nited States had com e to include thousands o f aliens w ho participated actively in the Party's affairs./This com bination of circum stances, in the context o f the Adm inis­ tration's desire to neutralize d ie Am erican Com munist Party, rendered a m ajor deportation drive alm ost inevitable^)* It cam e as one of the earliest clear indications of the deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations, w hen the Trum an admin­ istration w as still p ublicly optim istic about continuing the wartim e spirit of cooperation. C lark began to deport aliens w ho w ere considered communists b y die Justice D epartm ent shortly after assuming the Attorney Generalship. B y m id-1946 die program had read ied sufficient proportions to e lid t a com­ plaint from the N ational Law yers G uild. In February 1947 Clark reported that “w e have deported 124 persons on the grounds o f communism.” Follow ing the Trum an D octrine speech C lark intensified the cam paign as part o f die general effort to consolidate d ie country behind C old W ar foreign policy. H e instructed F.B .I. D irector H oover to prepare a list of alien communists, and initiated deportation proceedings against them w henever possible. B y the end of the year he was able to report three hundred active cases. A t die same tim e, he sponsored a study o f the ethnic characteristics o f Am erican

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communists and discovered that over 91 per cent w ere either immigrants or the children of immigrants or m arried to some* one in one o f these tw o categories. In short, alm ost all com­ munists w ere vulnerable directly or indirectly to punishm ent through deportation proceeding?. Perhaps inspired b y this realization, C lark ordered the preparation o f legislative pro­ posals to clear aw ay existing impediments to prom pt deporta­ tion actions. In instances w here im m igrant activists had protected them selves against deportation b y taking out citizen­ ship, the Justice D epartm ent showed itself resourceful in find­ ing means to overcom e this obstacle: in June 1947, for exam ple, the Im m igration and N aturalization Service sought revocation o f citizenship from Isadore Lipshitz, an im m igrant w ho w as active in the Society for the Prevention o f W orld W ar III, on the ground that an adulterous affair had rendered him unfit to be an Am erican.17 O t t - it s relationship to the debate on C old W ar foreign policy, tiie deportation drive functioned in a m aim er sim ilar to the Attorney G enerali lis p ln the most lim ited sense it pro­ vided a potent means o f excising from the body politic a sig­ nificant num ber o f dissident voices. In at least several instances aliens w ho w ere active in opposition to C old W ar foreign policy and the M arshall Plan w ere arrested and held w ithout bail on E llis Island. G erhart E isler was apprehended w hile m aking a speaking tour to denounce Am erican foreign policy as the “renazification o f Germ any.” John W illiam son, the labor secretary of the Com m unist Party, was taken into custody fo l­ low ing his publication in the D aily W orker o f a series o f arti­ cles criticizing C .I.O . President Philip M urray for his support o f the M arshall Plan. Ferdinand Sm ith was picked up twentyfour hours after he shared a speakers’ platform w ith Henry W allace and w hile en route to a m eeting o f the N ational M ari­ tim e Union at w hich endorsem ent o f the M arshall Plan w as the m ain item on the agenda. Attorney G eneral C lark w as com­ p letely candid that his use of the legally dubious practice of holding these and other aliens w ithout bail— a practice that was disallow ed b y a federal court in M arch 1948— w as in­ tended to prevent the detained individuals from continuing

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their political activities. ordered M r. E isler picked up,” h e stated in discussing one of the cases, “because h e had been m aking speeches around the country that w ere derogatory to our w ay o f life.” 18 A s w ith the Attorney G eneral's list, the m ajor im pact o f diese arrests on die cam paign for the M arshall Plan undoubtedly la y in their indirect psychological and politi­ cal consequences rather than their direct silencing of sub­ versive voices. T h ey w ere a clear w arning to all unnaturalized aliens (upon whom , as the report to C lark on Am erican com­ munists indicated, radical movements heavily depended) that active opposition to C old W ar foreign policy could subject diem to severe penalties. T hey also suggested to native Am eri­ cans that opposition to the Adm inistration’s policies w as an alien concept, to be associated w ith deportable crim inals. I W hile Clark’s Justice D epartm ent was developing the Attorney G eneral’s list and the deportation drive as w ays o f striking directly at those w ho w ere organizing dissent from the Adm inistration’s policies, several agencies o f the governm ent w ere developing program s reflecting an entirely different ap­ proach to d ie problem of policing internal security: the tight­ ening of official control over information, particularly inform a­ tion about governm ental activities^ In m any w ays official censorship is the natural counterpart of police activity against dissidents: the form er lim its the basis for dissent at the source w hile the latter attacks those seeking to promote dissent; and the tw o instruments have tended to be used b y the Am erican governm ent in tandem , most notably in tim e o f w ar. Both have been justified, traditionally, as essential instruments o f national security. But because both also abuse dem ocratic con­ cepts o f civil liberty, tradition prior to 1947 had tended to lim it their use to m ilitary em ergencies. T he problem , of course, lies in defining a situation in w hich national security requires extraordinary measures. The tw o w orld wars of the twentieth century w ere clear cases, and there w as no significant opposi­ tion to the establishm ent of form al censorship procedures dur­ ing these conflicts. But w hat o f the circum stances prevailing in the U nited States in 1947, when the officials prim arily re­ sponsible for the conduct o f Am erican foreign policy con­

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sidered them selves engaged in international problem s as sig­ nificant as any w ar, and w hen d ie electorate w as threatening their efforts to respond to this situation? It is d e a r from th e Adm inistration's developm ent o f such unprecedented peace­ tim e policies as d ie em ployee loyalty program and the A t­ torney G eneral's list that it was prepared in these circum stances to em ploy instrum ents that had traditionally been reserved fo r w artim e em ergencies; it is not surprising, therefore, that efforts w ere also m ade to invoke various form s o f official censorship. T he im pulse w as most clearly articulated b y high offi­ cials o f d ie defense com m unity w ho had w atched p u b lic opinion force d ie reduction o f m ilitary activities and expendi­ tures to levels they considered im prudent. In late 1946, fo r exam ple, Forrestal received a letter from W alter Lippm ann pointing out that "pu blic relations officials o f both the W ar and N avy Departm ents have been out o f hand for som e tim e* w ith their announcem ents o f "new and terrifying w eapons* and "other stories . . . w hich are boastful or th reaten in g* Lippm ann w as w orried that such publicity w ould produce a "public reaction* that w ould m ake it even m ore difficult than it already w as for the tw o departm ents to obtain adequate appropriations. Perhaps inspired b y Lippm ann's letter, F or­ restal becam e very conscious o f stories em anating from d ie m ilitary establishm ent, and in early 1947 he w rote M arshall com plaining about testim ony b y certain naval officers before a Senate subcom m ittee on Arm ed Services. W h ile claim ing that the testim ony had been factual, Forrestal expressed w orry about "their future use, w hen the w ave o f pacifism com es, b y people interested in attacking all those identified w ith our m ilitary forces.* Robert Patterson, d ie Secretary o f W ar prior to the m erger o f W ar and N avy, seem ed to feel the thrust o f Lippm ann's com ments congenial also. In a letter to R oy H ow ard, publisher o f the Scripps-H oward papers, in A ugust 1947 he responded to a series o f articles b y Robert Ruark ex­ posing the m alpractice o f a U .S. Arm y general in Italy: "A fter every w ar,* Patterson w rote, "it has been the fashion to take snipes at the arm y. In other tim es there has been no great

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harm done because a long period o f peace and tranquility was in prospect. This tim e, I fear, it is different. W e stand in need o f a strong arm y and constant criticism o f the dem oraliz­ ing variety m ay cost the country dear.” 19 Forrestal’s letter to M arshall and Patterson’s to H oward involved quite different types o f press stories, but both expressed deep official concern w ith the kind o f inform ation about the Arm ed Forces being printed in the mass m edia, and both betrayed an im plicit de­ sire to bring such stories under some form o f control. For­ restal’s belief that the press should be used as an “instrument o f Am erican foreign policy* has already been m entioned, and this b elief led him , when he becam e Secretary o f D efense in 1947, to propose various innovations in the relationship be­ tw een the governm ent and the press that seem designed to m eet the kind o f problem identified b y him self and Patterson. H e tried various approaches. One was to prevent hostile reporters from covering m ilitary activities. In O ctober 1947 it w as reported that the Arm y had revoked the credentials o f eleven Am erican correspondents during the previous tw elve months and denied credentials to another fifty on the grounds that they had communist connections. In early 1948 Forrestal sought to system atize this policy b y requiring all news­ men applying for accreditation to the Arm ed Forces to pass a loyalty test. Am ong the proposed grounds for disqualifica­ tion w as mem bership in or close relationship to organizations cited on the Attorney G eneral’s list; apparently, newsmen w ere to be held to the same requirem ents o f loyalty as gov­ ernm ent em ployees. Forrestal’s plan, patterned after pro­ cedures developed during the w ar, evoked much criticism and had to b e m odified substantially. Another approach w as to develop an ongoing structure for cooperation betw een the press and the Arm ed Forces. In M arch 1948 Forrestal asked the press to agree to consult w ith an inform ation board, w hich he intended to establish within the D epartm ent o f D efense, prior to publishing inform ation in areas that he w ould desig­ nate vital to the national security. This suggestion, too, pro­ duced a storm of criticism from the press, and the plan w as shelved. Forrestal’s argum ent that such a procedure w as es-

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sential to protect m ilitary secrets w as Ineffective because he could not docum ent serious breaches o f security under the existing system and because the newsmen suspected that w hat he had in mind involved far m ore than d ie protection o f offi­ cial secrets. T he press im m ediately labeled the proposal a plan o f censorship and in A pril the Am erican Society o f N ewspaper Editors passed a resolution condem ning "all forms o f censor­ ship.” G iven Forrestal’s acknow ledged attitude tow ard the press, it is difficult to fau lt the suspicions o f the newsm en.30 In rejecting Forrestal’s proposals, press officials argued that the proper place to control inform ation was at the source, w ithin d ie federal bureaucracy, not through increased controls over the press. The point was w ell taken by several key mem­ bers o f the Trum an adm inistration. Indeed, it w as one that die Adm inistration had anticipated, for the executive order creating the loyalty program provided that the disclosure o f “confidential” inform ation b y a federal official could be the basis for dismissal on grounds o f disloyalty. T he developm ent o f this provision further illustrates the attitude o f d ie Adm inis­ tration tow ard public opinion and d ie requirem ents o f internal security in 1947. T he President’s loyalty order em powered the Security A dvisory Board o f the State-W ar-N avy Coordinating Com m ittee to develop procedures to govern the handling o f official inform ation, and the Board circulated a draft set of rules in the fall o f 1947. Under it official docum ents w ere di­ vided into classifications o f “top secret,” “secret,” “confidential,” “restricted,” and “unclassified.” T he draft rules also defined the roles o f agency officials in classifying inform ation and en­ forcing regulations, and detailed procedures for the handling and transmission o f documents. These categories and pro­ cedures w ere based upon rules that had been em ployed for many years b y the Arm ed Forces.31 Ç in discussing these proposals, it m ust be recognized that tiie governm ent had am ple reason to consider the developm ent o f im proved controls over official inform ation essential^ The Amerasia case had m ade it quite clear that existing'procedures w ere far from perfect, and the allegations o f B entley and Cham bers, being explored b y a federal grand jury as the Se­

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curity Advisory Board was drafting its rules, lent further sup­ port to this view . A ttorney G eneral C lark believed that im proved procedures w ere required to com bat m odem es­ pionage tactics, and during 1947 his departm ent drafted legis­ lation that proposed expanding the Espionage A ct o f 1917 to include any im proper transmission o f inform ation concerning national defense. T he danger of such proposals, o f course, w as that they could reach far beyond their purported purposes and becom e tools b y w hich the Adm inistration enforced certain modes of thought on its own public. This w as clearly the case w ith d ie Attorney General’s list and Forrestal’s plans for cooperation betw een the press and the m ilitary; it was also the case w ith d ie rules for handling inform ation developed b y the Security A dvisory Board. T he definition o f “confidential” proposed by the Board illustrates the point: T he term confidential as used herein applies to in­ form ation d ie unauthorized disclosure o f w hich, al­ though not endangering die national security, w ould be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of die na­ tion or any governm ental activity thereof or w ould cause unwarranted injury to an individual or serious adm inistrative embarrassment or difficulty or w ould be o f advantage to a foreign nation.22 It is difficult to im agine any factual disclosure that m ight in any w ay subject the governm ent to criticism that could not have been interpreted as being w ithin the m eaning o f this definition and therefore a basis for a charge o f disloyalty, [th e application o f m ilitary inform ation controls to the entire federal gov­ ernment was in itself a proposal o f unprecedented severity; d ie definition assigned to “confidential” inform ation seem ed designed to elim inate entirely the possibility o f public state­ ments b y federal em ployees that m ight serve as a basis for controversy, criticism , or dissent concerning Adm inistration policies^ B y chance, a newspaperm an obtained a copy o f d ie draft rules and published a series o f articles describing them — w ith spectacular results. T he Am erican Society o f N ews­

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paper Editors adopted a resolution condem ning d ie attem pt to apply m ilitary censorship codes to the entire governm ent. A n investigation w as launched by d ie Executive Expenditures Com m ittee of the House. Q uestioned on the m atter at a news conference in N ovem ber, President Trum an belittled the issue b y calling it a “straw man“ and stated that the rules w ere m erely prelim inary and had not been considered or approved b y him.^ A sa result of pressures from Congress and the press, no attem pt w as m ade to im plem ent d ie ruIesTYhe m atter w as dropped. T he Chairm an o f the Security Advisory Board w as dismissed. D espite these developm ents, how ever, the status o f the draft rules rem ained unclear. U nder Secretary o f State Lovett authorized a statem ent that the rules had m erely cod* ified existing procedures, and in A ugust 1948 Senator Hom er Ferguson told the Senate that it w as entirely possible that the rules w ere currently operating on a de facto basis. U nder these circum stances, it seems likely that even w ithout form al appli­ cation of the proposed rules d ie willingness of federal officials to disclose information that could becom e die basis o f public controversy was dim inished. T he m atter w as not clarified until 1951, w hen President Trum an prom ulgated an executive order identical in its essentials w ith the proposals he had dismissed as a “straw man” in the fall of 1947.23 The Adm inistration’s efforts to establish greater control over d ie inform ation received b y the Am erican people w as not confined to Forrestal’s proposals for press/governm ent co­ operation and the new provisions o f the loyalty program . T he State D epartm ent used its powers for sim ilar purposes b y adopt­ ing a policy o f denying passports to Am erican reporters whose overseas travels w ere considered “not in the interest o f die U nited States.” W hat this could mean becam e clear in early 1948 when A. B. M agil, a reporter for the D aily W orker, w as de­ nied permission to leave the country. T h e State D epartm ent refused to give reasons for the decision, but it is difficult to disagree w ith the view voiced b y Representative Isaacson on the floor o f the House that the case involved an attem pt to “pre-censor” the Am erican press “b y barring its correspondents from an area of the news.” T h e case produced so m uch ad­

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verse publicity that d ie State D epartm ent agreed to issue M agil a passport, but this d id not alter the fact that the case had revealed w hat State D epartm ent officials referred to as d ie “settled policy* o f die Adm inistration. Representative Isaacson w as him self denied a passport in 1948, and the A d­ m inistration even discussed applying this sanction against H enry W allace, though d ie idea w as rejected as politically hazardous. The Justice D epartm ent and d ie State D epart­ ment cooperated to apply a policy com plem enting diese pass­ port regulations to aliens visiting th e U nited States. Com ­ munists w ere sim ply refused permission to visit the country except in extrem ely lim ited and highly controlled situations involving diplom atic personnel. Aliens granted visas to the U nited States w ere placed under a new set o f regulations that shortened from a year to six months d ie period o f tim e they w ere perm itted to rem ain in this country. If a visitor intended to travel the visa was granted for only three months. Steps w ere taken to tighten surveillance o f alien visitors and to pre­ vent them from influencing public opinion in an undesirable manner. Each visiting alien was now required to agree “not to pursue any purpose not specifically authorized b y im m igration officials.* In reporting the new rules, d ie W ashington Post cited Justice D epartm ent sources as indicating that this new requirem ent meant, in effect, “that visitors w ill be required to pledge that they w ill refrain from any speechm aking or propaganda activities unless authorized to do so b y this gov­ ernm ent* 34 T o consider the com bined significance o f the various re­ strictions placed upon public debate during the period in w hich the foreign aid program was before the Congress is to becom e aw are o f w hat must inevitably seem a coherent pattern o f official behavior.IThç Attorney G enerals list, the deportation drive, the new controls on official inform ation and on access of die press and public to it, die new controls upon alien visitors— all had a common origin in policies that had been developed during wartim e em ergencies to protect national security b y as­ suring public support o f the m ilitary efforts This is not to say that a central decision w as ever taken b y th e President or the cabi­

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net to use such techniques to support the cam paign for C old W ar foreign policy. Such a decision m ay have been taken, bu t it w ould not have been necessary to explain or understand these developm ents. For it is clear that there w as am ong high officials o f the Adm inistration a shared sense o f crisis arising out of the reluctance of the Am erican people and the E ightieth Congress to support the levels o f expenditure for an involve­ m ent in international affairs that the Adm inistration con­ sidered essential to the protection o f Am erican econom ic and m ilitary interests. T h e Trum an D octrine speech, the handling o f the debates on Greco-Turkish aid and Interim A id, and die m anner of the announcem ent o f the M arshall Plan w ere all indicative o f the Adm inistration’s awareness and fear o f this situation, and o f its response to it. The controls upon public debate that w ere developed during this same period w ere fu lly consistent w ith the spirit and intention o f the Adm inis­ tration’s approach to the debate on foreign aid; they are there­ fore explicable as the individual acts o f high governm ent officials operating w ithin the broad fram ework of policy estab­ lished b y the President and attem pting to use the powers o f their offices to advance these policies. W hen these develop­ ments are considered together, of course, the question of w hether they w ere a ll part o f a centrally determ ined policy becom es far less im portant than d ie realization that in 1947, as m uch as in 1917 or 1941, d ie Am erican people w ere being m obilized for w orld w ar.

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3. Education for Security To overcome the shortcomings of American opinion revealed by the campaign for foreign aid, the Administration désignai a series of educational programs to promote internationalism, patriotism, and love of democracy.

'T h e ' m e n abou nd P resident T r u m a n could not have been more conscious of the fact that it w as the tendencies of broad public opinion, rather than die activities of subversive organi­ zations, that m ade necessary the tactics em ployed during debates on foreign aid and required new restrictions upon public discussion o f national issuesSNor, aw are that the debate on foreign aid was only the~BëgUïlung of an extended postw ar concern w ith international questions, did they ignore the fact that diese techniques w ere short-term palliatives that did not reach d ie heart o f the Adm inistration’s political difficulties in the field of foreign policy. W hat w as really required, it w as w idely agreed, w ere sustained programs o f public education to propagate a deeper commitment to the Am erican system and a fuller understanding o f Am erica’s international role that w ould im m unize the people against subversive and dissident

appeals. A ttorney G eneral C lark w as inclined to believe that pub­ lic susceptibility to w hat he called “the rising tide o f totali­ tarianism that is com ing to our shores” derived from a letdow n in patriotic sentim ent or, more fundam entally, a loss o f en­ thusiasm for Am erican dem ocracy. H e believed that w hat w as required w as “to reawaken in the Am erican people the loyalty w e know them to have to the Am erican w ay o f life,” and he had no doubt as to how this should be achieved. “In the final analysis,” he told an audience in Boston, “our best defense against subversive elements is to m ake the ideal o f dem ocracy a living fact, a w ay of life such as to enlist the loyalty o f the in­ dividual in thought, in feeling, and in behavior.” H e believed

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that the goal could best b e reached through program s o f pub­ lic education that w ould elim inate inequality and prejudice in Am erican society and prom ote dem ocratic values. C lark w as not alone in his analysis o f d ie problem or his em phasis on education as the solution. (K. presidential commission on m ili­ tary training listed as the first requirem ent o f national se­ curity a population that w as strong, healthy, educated, and im bued w ith an understanding o f dem ocracy and sense o f per­ sonal responsibility to m ake it work. T h e President’s Commis­ sion on H igher Education reported that “one o f Am erica’s urgent needs today is a continual com m itm ent to the princi­ ples of dem ocracy” and that “w e cannot b e so sure that the future o f the dem ocratic w ay o f life is secure.” It proposed program s that w ould instill “a fu ller realization o f dem ocracy in every phase o f living.” This Commission touched on a second issue of m ajor im portance by proposing additional program s “directed explicitly for international understanding and co­ operation^ This w as a point w ith w hich the leaders of the foreign p olicy bureaucracies could readily agree. As Forrestal put it: T h e education of our people on w orld m atters is one o f the most vital needs o f the country.” T h e Com mis­ sioner o f Education, John Studebaker, summ arized the tend­ ency o f all these viewpoints succinctly: in d ie face o f the communist challenge, he stated, the essential and pressing educational task was “to bring up young citizens who really understand and cherish Am erican dem ocracy, w ho are w ellinform ed and skillful in thw arting the purposes of the totalitari­ a n , and w ho understand and accept their responsibilities in today’s rapidly shrinking and increasingly interdependent world.” 28 Such ideas did not originate w ith the men around Presi­ dent Trum an in 1947. It w as a common perception o f President Roosevelt’s wartim e advisers that the fundam ental popular disinclination to international involvem ents, com bined w ith the expected postw ar letdow n in patriotic sentim ent, w ould m ake it difficult for the Am erican governm ent to pursue the kind of foreign policies that w ere considered essential to Am erican interests. Roosevelt’s advisers had attem pted to develop pro­

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grains responsive to this problem , and the one that attracted d ie most attention and support w as com pulsory m ilitary train* ing for a ll young men. Though such a program was signifi­ cantly related to anticipated postw ar m ilitary requirem ents, its value as an educational tool was considered to be of equal, if not greater, im portance. In 1945, for exam ple, Secretary o f W ar Stimson told a com m ittee o f Congress that Universal M ilitary Training (U .M .T.) was desirable because it could help create “the disciplined, trained and patriotic citizenry’* essen­ tial to the support o f the international role of the U nited States in the postw ar w orld. G eneral M arshall expressed a sim ilar view . Forrestal indicated that this aspect o f U .M .T. was even more im portant than the m ilitary aspect: “I w ant [U .M .T.],'" he told a friend, “b u t I w ant it more for citizenship than for de­ fense.” Trum an explained that he didn’t “like to think of it as a universal m ilitary training program . I w ant it to be a uni­ versal training program ” that could instill values such that “w e w ill have sold our republic to the com ing generations.” G iven this w ide support for U .M .T. at the highest levels o f governm ent, it is not surprising that the postw ar adm inistra­ tion, faced w ith die political problem s that Roosevelt’s advisers had anticipated, turned to U .M .T. w ith enthusiasm. President Trum an first proposed it to Congress in 1945, only to find that political currents w ere running strongly against any new m ili­ tary program . U nw illing to accept this verdict as final, Tru­ man resubm itted U .M .T. in 1946 and 1947, only to m eet recurrent Congressional rebuffs. Frustrated on U .M .T. and confronted w ith the pressing need to solve the political prob­ lems that the Adm inistration’s international policies had un­ covered, the Adm inistration sought new approaches. An ap­ pealing suggestion cam e from Congressm an Clarence Brown of O hio, w ho m entioned to Forrestal that m any o f d ie purposes o f U .M .T. could be achieved through the p ublic schools. This idea— though not necessarily as a result of Brown’s suggestion — took hgld w ithin the Adm inistration.26 (/T h e mission of educating young Am ericans for life in the C o ld W â r fell to the O ffice o f E ducation ^ The im pact o f this upon the Adm inistration’s educational policies w as dram atic.

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In 1946 Com m issioner Studebaker’s annual report had con­ cerned itself w ith teacher shortages, inadequate physical facili­ ties, and other traditional educational com plaints. T h e 1947 report struck an entirely different note: "W hen historians com e to record the developm ents of the past year,” d ie Com missioner began, “they w ill probably set in bold italics d ie grave disap­ pointm ent and grow ing anxiety o f the Am erican people w ith respect to the fruits o f W orld W ar II.” These new interna­ tional developm ents, Studebaker reported, basically altered the significance and mission o f public education in the U nited States. Perhaps aw are that the Adm inistration w as now look­ in g to public education to perform a task once intended for a program o f m ilitary training, Studebaker took as the new role o f education the one assigned it in the report o f a presidential commission on Universal M ilitary Training. "T he single most im portant educational frontier o f all,” he stated, involved the need to "strengthen national security through education.” D uring 1947 the O ffice o f Education developed new program s responsive to all aspects o f the official analysis o f the short­ comings of Am erican opinion at the onset o f the C old W ar.*7 C^The most significant new thrust w as designed to com bat d ie widely-observed letdown o f patriotic sentim eaP E m bod ied in the “Zeal for Am erican D em ocracy” program , this effort was intended, according to the O ffice o f Education, "to vitalize and im prove education in the ideals and benefits o f dem ocracy and to reveal the character and tactics of totalitarianism .” The main thrust of this program w as to encourage the schools to prom ote a "patriotic emphasis” in public education and to pro­ vide technical assistance and m aterial to schools to c a n y out this effort. T he O ffice o f Education pursued these objectives b y sponsoring several conferences for national organizations o f educators and dedicating N ational Education W eek for 1947 to the problem o f education and security. T he effect o f such efforts was dem onstrated w hen the Am erican Federation o f Teachers chose the them e "Strengthening Education for N ational and W orld Security” for its annual convention in A u g u st T o provide substance to its cam paign, the O ffice of Education prepared a series o f pam phlets and study guides

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for use In schools at all levels. Am ong the latter w as a series entitled “G row ing into D em ocracy,” w hich “shows how the principles o f dem ocracy m ay be inculcated in children through precept and experience,” and a series o f study guides for both secondary and college classes “as an aid to the use erf T h e Strategy and Tactics o f W orld Communism’ issued b y the E ightieth Congress.” 28 Ç A second area o f m ajor em phasis in the new educa­ tional programs was the promotion of w hat the O ffice o f E du­ cation called “worId-mindedness * -y ndoubtedly a response to d ie realization that most adult Am ericans had little or no understanding o f the outside w orld or appreciation o f its im­ portance to the U nited States, this program encouraged local schools to sponsor courses related to international affairs and understanding. T he O ffice o f Education distributed bibliogra­ phies dealing w ith the U nited Nations and its m em ber states, as w ell as records o f m eetings o f the G eneral Assem bly. A t the same tim e the N ational Education Association, the Am erican Federation of Teachers, and the Am erican C ouncil on Educa­ tion sponsored programs w ith sim ilar purposes. T he school children o f the postwar period w ere not to be raised according to the provincial notions o f the men and wom en w ho had elected the E ightieth Congress.” CU nlike the Adm inistration’s efforts to w in approval o f foreign aid through appeals to fear and prejudice, there w as in the conception of these educational program s much that w as positive and reflective o f the highest ethical ideas in Am eri­ can cu ltu re T he emphasis in the program to prom ote “w orld­ m indedness” for exam ple, w as on the principles o f the U nited Nations, not realpolitik. T h e literature published b y die O ffice o f Education to support the “Zeal for Am erican D em ocracy” program did not em phasize m ilitant patriotism or anti-com ­ munism, but egalitarianism , lack o f prejudice, fairness, de­ cency. E ven Attorney G eneral C lark, w ho tended to speak loudly and carry a b ig stick when it cam e to communism, em phasized the perpetuation o f these positive social values in his discussions o f the role o f education in the C old W ar. N or did C lark and other Adm inistration officials fail to recognize

7

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that diese values im plied certain substantive reforms, for ex­ am ple in the areas o f civil rights and econom ic and educational ideas flow ed from a response to the challenge o f communism entirely distinct from the Trum an D oc­ trine, the A ttorney G eneral’s list, and the deportation drive, and represented in m any w ays a dom estic analogy to m ultitoterahsm ^F or just as d ie wartim e architects o f the Adm inis­ tration’s policies believed that the establishm ent o f w hat they conceived to be an equitable international order w ould both strengthen d ie position o f the U nited States and promote w orld peace, so d ie proponents o f these educational and social ideas believed that die creation o f a just social order at home w ould strengthen the position o f the federal governm ent and underm ine efforts to prom ote dissidence and disharmony. T o recognize this analogy, how ever, is to suggest a major problem , for the W ilsonian aspects o f m ultilateralism , as distinct from its usefulness as an econom ic and political tool in the C old W ar, w ere increasingly being regarded in 1947 as visionary form ulations o f doubtful applicability to the imme­ diate international situation. T he O ffice of Education’s educa-tiorial and social ideas also represented idealistic, long-term approaches whose im m ediate im pact upon the cam paign for foreign aid could b e m arginal at best. Indeed, neither the spirit of international cooperation being propagated through the cam paign for “world-m indedness,” nor the libertarian, dem ocratic values encouraged b y the "Zeal for Am erican D em ocracy” program w ere really consistent w ith d ie foreign policies o f the Trum an adm inistration in 1947 or the m ethods being used to prom ote them. W e have already seen that the Adm inistration fe lt constrained to squash the W ilsonian illu­ sions that Roosevelt had prom oted, and it was equally unlikely — at least in the short run— that the values encouraged b y the O ffice of Education’s new program s w ould prevail against those prom oted b y the im m ediate pressures o f the cam paign for C o ld W ar foreign policy.30 Illustrative o f the fragility o f the concepts underlying these educational program s was the one attem pt that w as m ade

The C old W ar at Home

7

*33

in 1947 to m erge die ideas of the * eal for Am erican D em oc­ racy” program w ith the im m ediate requirem ents o f the cam ­ paign for foreign aid. A ppropriately, this project w as spon­ sored b y Attorney G eneral Clark, w ho was a spokesman for the drive to achieve security through education as w ell as the architect o f the Adm inistration’s cam paign against subversion and dissent. The idea, conceived b y C lark and F.B .I. D irector H oover in the spring of 194'/, Wttÿ lu sponsor a nationw ide paUiolic~ am paign that could overcom e the present national umud, com bat communist propaganda, an prprpding fen months in. the

debates on Creco-Turkish aid and Interim Aid. Because Britain w ould be the m ajor beneficiary of the program , the anti-British attitudes that had influenced the debate on the loan w ere particularly relevant. In w hat was probably an in­ dication of sensitivity to this problem , the Adm inistration attem pted to w ithhold from Congress breakdowns of the amounts of aid to go to each country under E.R .P., but was forced b y Congressional pressure to supply this information. M oreover, polls m easuring public opinion on the relative im­ portance of foreign and dom estic issues indicated levels of belief in the prim acy o f international problem s only slightly higher than those registered at the time of debate on the British -Loan. The Adm inistrations battle against postw ar isolationism was far from won; indeed, debate on E.R.P. w ould bethecritiCR İ indication of the readiness of the Am erican people to accept a continuing role as a great pow er in international affairs. Not 'O nly'did most Am ericans consider dom estic issues preem inent in January 1948, but the prim ary dom estic issue— inflation— seem ed likely to affect directly public attitudes on E.R .P., since the prevailing notion w as that foreign aid w ould place new strains upon dom estic supply. This argum ent against E.R.P.

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was being pressed on both left and right, in the pages o f the Daily W orker and in the speeches of Republican Senators from the M idwest. A second dom estic issue o f m ajor im portance was tax reduction, w hich also seem ed likely to com e into direct conflict w ith large-scale foreign aid.s /p erv a d ing discussion o f all other issues in the debate on E .R .R T oF cou rse, w as the partisan politics o f a presidentialelection y e a r jr h e first prim aries w ere only three months aw ay when E.R.P. was subm itted to Congress. Trum an had already begun to cam paign, and his address to the Congress during debate on Interim A id w as generally felt to have injected par­ tisanship into the foreign aid issue. Congressional Republicans, whose party intended to cast itself as the cham pion of the] Am ericari~consumer by advocatin g budget cuts» tax reduction)! and strong anti-inflationary measures, w ere not expected b j the Adm inistration to eschew partisanship in dip debate on* E.R.P.____ — T he Adm inistration w as never perm itted to doubt that the various sources of opposition to foreign aid w ould produce a determ ined attack upon E.R .P. D uring debate on Interim A id, numerous Republicans— most prom inently Senator T a ft— had supported the Adm inistration w hile m aking clear state­ ments o f opposition to the long-range program . It was clear, however, that the opposition w ould not attem pt to defeat die program outright— a goal that w ould split the Republican Party and m ake it susceptible to charges of consigning Europe to die communists— but to develop alternative proposals be­ hind w hich Republicans could unite. O n the same day that the Adm inistration subm itted E.R.P. to Congress, for exam ple, the House Foreign Affairs Com m ittee began hearings on an alternative foreign aid program sponsored b y Republican R ep­ resentative Christian H erter o f M assachusetts. H erter’s pro­ posals had to be taken seriously, as he w as highly respected in Congress as an expert on international problem s and had chaired a special com m ittee o f the House that had been in­ vestigating the problem s o f European recovery and foreign aid since A pril 1947. M oreover, it had been the House Foreign

4

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T he T ruman D octrine and M cC arth yism

Affairs Com m ittee that had forced a reduction in the amount o f the Interim A id program and added to it, against d ie wishes o f d ie Adm inistration, an authorization for China. In die Senate, of course, the Adm inistration could rely upon strong support from Arthur Vandenberg. Still, T a ft w as openly against E.R.P. and this foreboded a solid core o f opposition from M idwestern Republican Senators. H iough T a ft him self, m ade cautious by his presidential aspirations, rem ained in die background, by the second w eek in January a Taft>oriented group o f tw enty Senators had organized behind Republican W hip Kenneth W herry in opposition to the Adm inistration's proposals. Vandenberg, like T a ft a presidential hopeful, seem ed certain to attem pt to accom m odate these Republican dissidents, and this m ight lead him tow ard concessions that the Adm inistration w ould prefer not to m ake, as it had on die China issue during Interim A id. Both d ie Senate group and the H erter proposal agreed that the Adm inistration’s program should be altered in tw o specific w ays: b y reducing the total am ount to be authorized for the first year to four billion dollars, and by creating a private corporation, directed b y businessmen and independent of the D em ocratic adm inistra­ tion, to run it. The second point was one w here Congressional concern over internal security im pinged very directly upon E .R .P., for one m ajor source o f support for this suggestion w as die feeling— repeatedly expressed during die debate on Interim A id— that the State Departm ent was subject to com­ m unist influence.4 Upon w hat appeals could the Adm inistration rely to com bat Congressional opposition to its proposals? As w e have seen, in the period betw een M arch 1947 and January 1948 it had failed to develop solid p ublic support for any o f die sub­ stantive policies upon w hich the foreign aid program w as based. T he close relationship of E.R.P. to the m ultilateral com m ercial policies that the Adm inistration w as attem pting to prom ote seem ed more likely to hurt than help the program in Congress. T he importance of maintaining existing levels o f trade to dom estic production, em ploym ent, and Incom e seemed likely to be overshadowed by p ublic and Congres-

T h e Battle for E.R .P.

* 5*

sional concern over d ie inflationary aspects o f foreign aid. T he relief aspect o f the foreign aid program had a lw a y sb ë en one o f tile strongest sources o f public support for the Adm inistra^ tion but, as T aft's attitude indicated, this seem ed less likely to b e decisive in debate on a large-scale, long-term program like E .R .P. than Interim A id and could not be relied upon to assure support for the fu ll authorization requested b y the Adm inis­ tration. There w as, finally, the anti-com m unist appeal. Pre­ vious debates on foreign aid had indicated that this w as the Adm inistration’s m ost potent argum ent, and early indications w ere that this factor alone w as enough to keep the Republicans from m aking an open attem pt to defeat the program . B ut previous experience had also shown that the anti-communist argum ent could be turned against the policies o f the_Administration b y forcing it toward expanded m mmı'hnpnff Phina and restrictions on trade w ith the communist world- M ore­ over, to insist too strongly upon the necessity of E .R .P. to protect Europe from the Soviets w ithout discussing Am erican econom ic self-interest w as to raise questions about the prefera­ b ility o f econom ic over m ilitaiy aid to w estern Europe. ffihihT a ll the likely argum ents for E .R .P. w ere flaw ed, there w as no possibility that President Trum an could com­ pensate for their weakness through the exertion o f personal influence and présfigt^ Indeed, in early 1948 the President’s popularity ratings w ere as low as they had been in N ovem ber 1946. H enry W allace had declared his presidential candidacy as head o f a third party in D ecem ber 1947, indicating the President’s vulnerability on the left. Trum an’s decision not to support the partition o f Palestine had reduced his standing am ong Am erican Jews. H is civil rights m essage to Congress in February rapidly organized Southern Dem ocrats against him and initiated m ovem ent tow ard a second split in the Dem o­ cratic Party. U nder attack from a ll sides, w ithout strong per­ sonal standing w ith the electorate, Trum an seem ed a political goner in early 1948. T h e press talked m atter-of-factly o f the next adm inistration and reported D em ocratic pressures on him not to seek nomination. A personal appeal from him w ould count for little in the battle for E.R.P.®

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2. The Campaign for E.R.P. In speeches and testimony before Congressional com m ittees, Administration officials argued that E.R .P. was essential to save western Europe from communism and to protect American econom ic interests. But these officials failed to make a coherent case for the program on either strategic or econom ic grounds, and the public remained apathetic. A s the vote in \ Congress approached, a defeat for the ) Administration seem ed likely. '

its cam paign fo r E .R .P. during debate on Interim A id. T h e Harrim an, K rug, and N ourse reports— all im pressive volum es— w ere subm itted to d ie m em bers o f Congress. Speaking tours w ere scheduled for a num ber o f top Adm inistration officials, including M arshall, C layton, Forrestal, and— consistent w ith d ie Adm inistration’s understanding o f the political link betw een foreign and inter­ nal security— A ttorney G eneral Clark. A sem i-official organiza­ tion o f prom inent businessm en and governm ent officials, the Com m ittee for the M arshall Plan, w as organized to lobby for E .R .P. Charles Bohlen, a State D epartm ent Soviet expert, w as p laced in charge o f p ublic relations concerning E .R .P., and L ew is D ouglas, a form er Congressm an turned diplom at, w as given responsibility for Congressional liaison. M achinery w as established to provide daily reports on the attitudes o f Con­ gressmen and Senators. T he entire operation w as set in m otion on January 5, w hen Bohlen delivered the first in a series of prom otional speeches. Congressional hearings began in d ie Senate on January 8 and in the House on the 11th .6 ^ W hen the cam paign for the M arshall Plan began, it T h e A d m in istr a tio n

h ad begun organ izin g

The Battle for E.R.P.

*53

largely responsible for the problem s o f Europe and hence for die necessity of the E uropean Recovery Program . This had em erged as a dom inant them e of speeches on foreign aid by M arshall and Acheson in the summer of 1947; it was the thrust of M arshall s report to the nation follow ing the London Con­ ference in N ovem ber 1947; and it figured prom inently in the presentation of Bohlen on Januaiy 5 as w ell as those of M arshall and D ouglas in their opening statem ents in testifying on behalf of E.R .P.7 Though this interpretation of events served the political interests of die Adm inistration in prom oting foreign aid, it did litde to illum inate the basic econom ic problem s of postw ar Europe. As has been indicated in earlier chapters, these prob­ lems derived alm ost entirely from the econom ic and social dislocations that had been produced b y the w ar and from the failure o f the W estern governm ents— including the U.S.— to make adequate provision for postw ar reconstruction. Com ­ munist Parties in western Europe had adopted policies o f vigorous support of recovery efforts in France and Italy and had altered this stance only when forced out of the coalition governm ents in early 1947. The M ay 1947 report of the Policy Planning Staff had em phasized the point that it did “not see Com munist activities as the root of the present difficulties in western Europe” but attributed these problem s to the effects of the w ar. Though Soviet control of eastern Europe had rertainly played a role, though by no means the major one, in retarding in western Europe, it was fqr frntr> '»harflfiterize Soviet policies as designed to prevent recovery in the W est; rathefpüS w e have seen, they reflected Soviet priorities siSg&rding econom ic and political reconstruction in the E asts ^The Adm inistrations claim that Soviet intransigence V a s the cause of the division of Germ any, of the lack of jprogress in reconstructing that country, and of integrating its 1 econom y w ith d ie rest of Eurupe did ttôt accord with the facts. ‘D uring the w ar, the influence on Am erican policy of the idea of “pastoralizing” postwar Germ any and the resistance of the U.S. to efforts by the A llies to develop four-powers plans for Germ an occupation com bined to retard preparations for die

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econom ic reconstruction o f Germ any and prom ote the kind o f autonomous zonal-occupation arrangem ents that m ade re­ covery difficult. In postw ar negotiations am ong d ie A llies on Germ any, the level o f industrial production proposed b y the U .S. w as no higher than that proposed b y the Soviet Union. T he delay in negotiatin g a Germ an settlem ent satisfactory to both the U.S. and the U S S R . derived at Jgast as m uch from Am erican as Soviet intransigence. M oreover, the m ost persistent opposition to Germ an reconstruction cam e from France, not d ie Soviet Union. A s to the critical problem o f integrating Germ an production into the econom y o f western Europe, as late as O ctober 1946 Thom as B laisdell, C h ief o f d ie Am erican M ission for Econom ic A ffairs in London, fe lt it necessary to com plain to C layton that the Am erican govern­ m ent’s failure to develop terms for econom ic cooperation be­ tw een the m ilitary authorities in Germ any and die M ission for Econom ic A ffairs w as retarding the developm ent o f an inte­ grated approach to d ie problem o f European recovery.* B y early 1948, o f course, the issue o f great-powers cooperation having died, Am erican diplom acy w ith die Soviet Union w as concerned prim arily w ith achieving propa­ ganda victories. In this context, one could hardly expect d e a r treatm ents o f the facts from either side, and the political fortunes of d ie foreign aid program w ere very m uch enhanced b y stating that die problem s it w as intended to correct w ere the results o f Soviet and Com m unist perfidy^) C allin g attention to the p rop agan d ists nature o f official statem ents on this point is w orthw hile only because it helps to explain d ie intense bitterness that developed am ong the Am erican people tow ard the U.S.S.R. in the postw ar period. Told that the Soviets and the Communists w ere responsible for disappointing the alw ays illusory Am erican hopes for the postw ar w orld and thus for forcin g die U .S. to accept unwelcom e burdens, d ie Am erican people developed a thoroughly understandable hostility tow ard their form er ally, an attitude m ade m ore bitter b y their long-held distrust o f the Soviet state. T h e value o f the imme­ diate political gains won b y d ie Adm inistration in fostering this p ublic m ood m ust b e w eighed against its tendency to lim it

T he Battle for E .R .P.

25$

possibilities fo r reducing East-W est tensions in subsequent years. A second basic them e in d ie Adm inistration’s case against communism w as that failure-to appropriate d ie funds requested under the E .R .R w ould le a d to communist ascend­ ency in w estern Europe. Secretary M arshall provided a char­ acteristic statem ent o f this/argum ent in his testim ony before the Senate Foreign Relations Com m ittee: So long as hunger, poverty, desperation, and result­ ing chaos threaten the great concentration o f people in western Europe . . . there w ill steadily develop social unease and p olitical confusion on every side. L e ft to their own resources there w ill be, I believe, no escape from econom ic distress so intense, p oliti­ ca l confusion so w idespread, and hopes o f the fu ­ ture so shattered that the historic base o f western civ iliza tio n . . . w ill take on a new form in the im age o f the tyranny that w e fought to destroy in Germ any. . . . O ur national security w ill be seriously threat­ ened. W e shall live, in effect, in an arm ed cam p, regulated and controlled. . . . O ur assistance, if w e determ ine to em bark on this program o f aid to westem Europe, müsT"bé ü d eq u a te tcT do fheTjob. . . . Either- undertake to 'm eet fhe requirem ents o f the problem or don’t undertake it at all. . . . If w e de­ cide that d ie U nited States is unable or unw illing effectively to assist in the reconstruction o f western Europe, w e must accept the consequence o f its col­ lapse into d ie dictatorships o f police states. . . . \ There is no doubt in m y m ind that the w hole w orld hangs in the balance. JITie'TJefense D ep artm en ^ ro vid ed Congress w ith a concrete Statement o f w hat Æê danger o f w hich M arshall spoke m eant in terms o f Am erican expenditures for national security. If E.R.P. w ere approved, the U.S. could look forw ard to continued reductions in expenditures for arms, b u t if it w ere rejected the D efense D epartm ent w ould b e forced to recom m end an im­ m ediate increase o f 25 per cent in m ilitary spending. T o pro-

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vide support and em phasis for its w arnings regarding the Soviet Union, the State D epartm ent m ade p ublic in m idJanuary a num ber o f diplom atic docum ents captured from Germ any during the w ar. These papers concerned discussions betw een the U.S.S.R. and Germ any in 1939 on the subject o f dividing Europe into tw o spheres o f influence and seem ed to confirm the assertions o f Am erican officials that d ie Soviet Union w as an expansionist pow er. This last initiative surprised British Foreign M inister Bevin, w ho criticized d ie action before Commons on February 4, stating that the docum ents jv e re out o f context and did not tell the w hole story.* T he danger o f em ploying heated elucidations o f the communist m enace as argum ents for expeditious approval o f the M arshall Plan w as that this technique had becom e identified w ith Adm inistration efforts to force Congressional action on foreign aid. A lthough the Senate Foreign Relations "Com m ittee treated Secretary M arshall w ith bland respect during his testim ony, Lew is D ouglas, appearing die next day, was w arned b y a friend o f E.R .P., Senator G eorge, that the State Departm ent had better be careful about asserting its proposals too dogm atically. G eorge indicated that he felt D ouglas and M arshall w ere using the fear o f communism to bludgeon Congress into approving the Adm inistration’s pro­ gram in exactly die form proposed. do not think d ie State D epartm ent is justified,” G eorge stated, “in presenting ab­ solute alternatives. . . . F or instance, the Secretary o f State says that w e must do the w hole of this or none. N ow I do not know w hether, if w e reduced it slighdy, it w ould necessarily destroy the w hole program . . . that is the technique o f the propagandist that I do not think you should resort to.” This confrontation w as qu ickly sm oothed over, w ith m utual agree­ m e n t that, neither side suspected tire other o f dishonorable m otives. N everdieleisT iT had been suggested strongly that the Adm inistration’s m anipulation o f Congress on die issue o f Greco-Turkish aid had not been forgotten and that the mem­ ory w ould com plicate consideration o f E .R .P. W hen M arshall and D ouglas appeared before the H ouse Foreign A ffairs

1

T he Battle for E.R.P.

*57

Com m ittee a few days later, their discussion o f the com m unist m enace w as considerably m uted. Secretary M arshall said no more than an honest analysis w ould perm it: “T h e situation in Europe has not yet developed to the point w here the grim progression from econom ic uncertainty to tyranny is probable. But w ithout U nited States support o f European self-help, this progression m ay w ell becom e inevitable.” This tentative tone was also discernible in the testim ony o f D ouglas.10 In addition to the resistance o f Congress to efforts by the Adm inistration to railroad approval o f d ie M arshall Plan, there w as a second reason, in some w ays m ore basic, w hy State Departm ent witnesses found it necessary to retreat.from the strong anti-Soviet arguments that they had presented early in the Hearings on E.R .P.: the M arshall PJan assumed a con­ tinuation o f good relations betw een the Soviet Union and the W est. As previous discussions of the recovery problem have pointed out, m any of the raw m aterials required by western European countries to achieve their production goals could be obtained only from eastern Europe, and the recovery pro­ gram developed b y the C .E .E .C . depended upon a continuation and expansion of trade betw een this region and western Europe, a trade that the Soviet Union was in a position to control. W as it sound policy to im plem ent a recovery program that depended upon die cooperation o f a country that mani­ fested, in the words of Secretary M arshall, only “determ ined opposition to a plan for European recovery” and that intended to seize w estern Europe b y em ploying “econom ic distress . . . for political ends”? W hen the subject o f East-W est trade was under discussion, a variant assessment o f U .S.-Soviet relations was em ployed b y Adm inistration witnesses, as is d e a r from the follow ing exchange: M r. Javtts: I s it not also true that one o f the assumptions of die Paris Plan is that w ithin the next four or five years a m uch greater quantity of, for exam ple, tim ber w ill flow from eastern Europe to w estern Europe? Sec . M a r sh a l l : T hat is the hope.

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M r. Javtts: S o d ie basic assumption in the w hole E.R.P. even goes to die betterm ent o f relations w ith the Soviet Union and its satellites? Se c . M a r sh a ll : T h at is w hat w e hope. (Characteristically, President Trum an rendered the most con* case statem ent o f the Adm inistration’s paradoxical analysis o f U .S.-Soviet relations. Asked at a press conference to comment on the continuation o f com m ercial relations betw een the U nited States and d ie Soviet Union at a tim e w hen d ie tw o countries w ere engaged in an open pow er struggle, die Presi­ dent stated sim ply that the U.S.S.R. w as a “friendly_nation and had been buying from the U nited States right along.*'1) In the course o f 1947, as it becam e clear to Am erican officials that there w ould be no rapid progress tow ard the establishm ent o f m ultilateral com m ercial relations, the em­ phasis o f the Adm inistration’s econom ic case for foreign aid shifted from concern over the reordering o f w orld trade rela­ tionships to the more im m ediate problem o f m aintaining existing levels o f trade and assuring Am erican access to im­ portant m arkets. This em phasis w as noticeable in d ie cam­ paign for E .R .P. F or exam ple, w hen Secretary M arshall addressed d ie Cham ber o f Com m erce in Pittsburgh in m idJanuary, he w arned that if E.R.P. w ere not approved, European countries w ould be forced to adopt restrictive trade practices, governm ent control o f European com m erce w ould becom e inevitable, and com m erce betw een the eastern and western hem ispheres w ould be depressed: “T h e cum ulative loss o f foreign m arkets and sources o f supply w ould unquestionably have a depressing influence on our dom estic econom y and w ould drive us to increased measures of governm ent control.” O ne o f the interesting developm ents during d ie hearings w as that, as the Adm inistration toned down the anti-cpmmunist argum ent on behalf of foreign aid, it Jended to g iv / increased w eight to com m ercial considerations. ' Vhus, in his appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Com m ittee shortly after Senator G eorge had reprim anded D ouglas and the State D e­ partm ent for being too aggressive in asserting d ie communist

T he Battle for E .& P .

*59

issue, M arshall not only offered a m uch-diluted statem ent of the com m unist danger in Europe but accorded equal w eight to political and econom ic factors: "W hy should the people of the U nited States accept European burdens in dus m anner? E uropean econom ic recovery, w e feel sure, is essential teethe preservation o f basic freedom in d ie m ost critical area o f dm w orld today. European econom ic recovery is essential to thà return of normal trade and com m erce throughout the w o rld .j 'M arshall repeatedly ranked these tw o considerations as equal in his testim ony before the House Com m ittee, as did D ougläs. T he thrust of this testim ony w as strongly supported in the testim ony o f other cabinet officers before both House and Senate Com m ittees. Secretary Harrim an stated that "produc­ tion of m any industrial and agricultural products in this coun­ try . . . has been developed based upon the participation o f Europe in international m ultilateral trade” and that "die decline o f Europe w ould require far-reaching adjustm ents” that w ould "be costly in terms o f em ploym ent and standards o f livin g to our people.” Secretary K rug stated that "die European R ecovery Program is essential to our w ell-being and security; m ultilateral trade throughout the w orld m ust be restored.” Secretary Anderson pointed out that "w e are going to have abundance o f agricultural production and w e shall continue to need export outlets for some of our m ost im portant com m odities.” H e stated that "it w ould not be pleasant to contem plate” a w orld in w hich Europe "provided litd e or no outlet for U nited States farm products.” 12 This emphasis npni^ the econom ic necessity for d ie U nited States in extend airl to E urope seem ed to catch Con­ gressmen and Senators b y surprise. For exam ple, Senator Vandenberg, w ho w orked in very close association w ith the State D epartm ent throughout this debate, told Secretary Anderson, follow ing his argum ent about the reliance o f the farm econom y upon exports, that "you leave m e rather breath­ less w ith your presentation because I w ould think, funda­ m entally, that any exports w ould have some sort of an im pact on dom estic price levels.” Vandenberg also pointed out that "the preoccupation o f our colleagues is w ith the im pact o f this

2ß O

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program on the dom estic econom y.” And, indeed, w henever Adm inistration witnesses drew attention to d ie role o f E .R .P. in prom oting exports, Congressional inquisitors turned to the issue o f inflation. T o soothe concern on this point, the Adm inis­ tration offered various assurances. It pointed out that pro­ curem ent provisions under E.R .P. w ould perm it dom estic procurem ent only o f item s not in short supply. It argued that m aintenance o f high levels o f exports low ered production costs and thus actually reduced prices. It estim ated that the levels o f exports under E .R .P. w ould not rise bu t actually decline som ewhat. D espite such argum ents, m ost Congressm en and Senators w ho responded to the econom ic argum ent re­ m ained skeptical. L ik e Vandenberg, m ost seem ed surprised that d ie Adm inistration w ould try to sell d ie program as profitable to the U .S., w hen so m uch o f the p ublic rhetoric depicted E .R .P. as an exercise in Am erican self-sacrifice. From d ie speeches m ade about E.R .P. on the floor o f the Congress, it is evident that these econom ic argum ents did not carry m uch w eight w ith the legislators.18 ■ f In explaining the relationship o f E .R .P. to its long-range Com m ercial policies, the Adm inistration faced its greatest challenge. T he extent o f the problem w as suggested b y the response o f Vandenberg w hen he learned that C layton be­ lieved d ie provisions o f the E .R .P. legislation “requiring the participating countries to cooperate to reduce barriers to trade not only am ong them selves bu t w ith other countries . . . m orally com m itted the U.S. to a reciprocal p olicy o f general tariff reduction, as w e could not im pose upon the European nations w hat w e w ere not w illin g to do for ourselves.” Though Clayton’s com m ent w as fu lly consistent w ith the w hole his­ tory and design of E.R .P., Vandenberg responded w ith a strong rebuttal: “I do not agree w ith d ie C layton interpretation. . . . M r. C layton w ill not help our present case b y any such argu­ ment.” T h e political judgm ent o f Vandenberg seem ed to be shared b y m em bers o f d ie Adm inistration, for they did not offer the prom otion o f m ultilateralism as an argum ent in favor o f E .R .P. and did not include C layton in the list o f officials to testify in support o f the legislation. In fact, had d ie legislation

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26ı

not contained specific requirem ents that participating coun­ tries prom ote m ultilateral com m ercial policies, the subject m ight never have been raised during the hearings. W hen asked b y a Congressm an w ho had noticed this provision, “if I approve this b i l l . . . w ould I be expressing m y approval o f d ie R eciprocal Trade Agreem ents?” D ouglas answered, “D efinitely not.” D ouglas argued that d ie provisions o f E .R .P. w ith regard to d ie reduction o f trade barriers “applies to d ie undertakings m ade b y these particular countries and . . . does not expressly com m it the U nited States to such a policy.” Though this care­ fu lly w orded statem ent w as true, it was far from a candid ex­ position o f the im plications o f E .R .P. for Am erican com m ercial, policy. T h e Adm inistration fu lly recognized that the countries o f Europe w ould never succeed in achieving a balance o f pay­ ments in their trade w ith the dollar area— the stated objective o f E.R.P.— unless they could increase their earnings o f dollars via exports. T h e chief means b y w hich this could be accom ­ plished was a relaxation of Am erican im port restrictions/Thus," reductions in the Am erican tariff w ere a critical part o f the entire strategy o f E.R.P.>İWhen C layton appeared before the H ouse Foreign Affairs Com m ittee at the request o f Representa­ tive Javits, he m ade this point clear b y stating that the success o f the European R ecovery Program depended upon the estab­ lishm ent o f the International T rade O rganization. M oreover, as Clayton also m ade clear, the Adm inistration saw E .R .P. as a means o f achieving the m ultilateral com m ercial objectives to w hich it continued to be com m itted, w hich also im plied ac­ ceptance o f these principles b y the U .S. T he principles o f the I.T .O ., C layton pointed out, w ould b e im plem ented through die E.R .P., prior to the establishm ent o f the proposed organiza­ tion.14 In its developm ent o f the econom ic aspects o f E .R .P., a^ of the political aspects o f the program , the Adm inistration failed to m ake a coherent case for its proposals. O ne moment, d ie Adm inistration w as stating that the U .S. had no selfish interests in E.R.P.; the next, it w as insisting that the program was essential to the Am erican econom y. O ne high-ranking official w ent on record to the effect that the program had

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nothing to do w ith d ie R eciprocal T rade Agreem ents Program ; a second indicated that trade agreem ents w ere an indispensa­ b le part o f E.R .P. U nder diese circum stances, it is not surprising that the A dm inistrations cam paign for E .R .P. failed to elicit a strong surge o f p ublic support. B y the end o f January it w as evident that d ie public inform ation program to prom ote E.R.P. w as having little effect. A lthough the polls indicated that aw are­ ness and approval o f the program w ere w idespread, they also revealed that this support w as superficial and entirely unendiusiastic. F or exam ple, d ie percentage o f Am ericans approving the program fe ll off sharply when it was linked b y pollsters w ith the necessity o f postponing the tax cut or accepting in­ creased inflation or food rationing. T he lack o f real p u blic com m itm ent to E.R .P. w as to b e explained b y the fact that alm ost no one in Am erica understood the fundam ental im por­ tance o f the program . A p oll taken in February b y the G allup organization reported that 56 per cent o f Am ericans regarded E.R .P. as essentially an act o f charity, 8 per cent fe lt it w as designed to "curb communism,* and 35 p er cent offered m iscellaneous explanations or had no opinion. T he A .I.P.O . re­ ported in die same month that only 14 per cent o f Am ericans could be classified as “inform ed” about the M arshall Plan, an astonishingly low figure even given the p u b lics traditional apathy tow ard foreign affairs. D uring debate on the British Loan 25 per cent o f the population had been classified as "inform ed,* and 37 per cent w ere found to b e in this category during debate on Greco-Turkish aid .18 T h e popular indifference to E .R .P. w as w id ely recognized. A t a m eeting o f the Senate Foreign Relations Com m ittee on January 26, Senator V andenberg referred to this m atter and suggested that the program w as too com plex to be readily understood b y the general public. Senator B arkley blam ed the press for not givin g adequate coverage to the discussion o f issues during Congressional hearings. A lso on January 26, d ie Alsops observed that the Adm inistration had failed to arouse a sense of urgency in the population about E .R .P. and offered as an explanation the "strange anom aly” o f recent Am erican

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foreign p olicy that the Adm inistration’s m ajor proposals had been “p ut forw ard in elaborate m oral, hum anitarian, and econom ic fan cy dress w ith the real m otives . . . largely sup* pressed.* W alter Lippm ann also blam ed the Adm inistration fo r failin g to discuss the issues o f foreign p olicy w ith the people. “T here is a notion h eld b y some in W ashington,* h e w rote, “that the only w ay to w in the support o f Congress for th e M arshall Plan is to frighten it. . . . T h e practitioners o f this notion have been operating fo r nearly a year, ever since d ie crisis o f last M ard i during w hich the Trum an D octrine w as im provised.* Lippm ann fe lt that the lade o f p u blic sup­ p ort for the program w as attributable to the Adm inistration’s failu re to m ake a strong case to the p ublic on its behalf.16 A s it becam e d e a r that the Adm inistration had failed to generate a d e a r p ublic m andate for E .R .P., the likelihood that the program w ould be altered in the m anner proposed b y the H erter recom m endations or the W herry group in the Senate increased. T h e opposition forces w ere given a strong boost in la te January w hen form er President H erbert H oover, a re­ spected elder statesm an w ith acknow ledged expertise in the area o f postw ar relief, p u b lid y announced him self in favor o f a program costing four billion dollars, the same figure tow ard w hich both groups w ere w orking. Ironically, the Adm inistra­ tion’s w illingness to perm it Am ericans to regard E .R .P. as charity rather than p olicy strengthened the appeal o f H oover’s alternative, as his proposal w as frankly concerned w ith relief rad ier than recovery. T h e Alsops w rote cm January 25: “H oover has . . . greatly increased a threat that w as already qu ite b la c k .. . . A ltogether it is tim e to adm it that the position [o f E .R .P.] in Congress is very blade indeed.” T h eir assessment th e follow ing day w as even more grim : “A s o f today action on E .R .P. is likely to be greatly delayed; the program w ill prob­ a b ly be festooned w ith unw orkable restrictions and the am ount appropriated is expected to be som ewhere near . . . four billion dollars.* Lippm ann shared the Alsops’s pessimism re­ gardin g the disposition o f Congress. O n February 9 he pre­ d icted that the Adm inistration w ould w in no m ore than a tentative, interim appropriation for E .R .P., w ith the question o f

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and

M c C a r t h y is m

a long-term com m itm ent deferred until after the election. Predictions elsew here in the W ashington press w ere sim ilar.17 T he Adm inistration recognized that it had failed to generate a public m andate for E .R .P., and there w ere indica­ tions that a new effort to stir p ublic support w as being con­ sidered. Lippm ann reported that M arshall had been advised to "make another speech, or another tw o or three speeches, about the horrors and dangers o f communism and to publish some m ore docum ents and some m ore intelligence reports.” T h e Alsops stated that a high-level debate w as going on w ithin the Adm inistration over how to create an adequate sense o f urgency in the p ublic regarding E .R .P .18

3. E.R.P. and Crisis Politics: The W ar Scare of 1948 In the midst of Congressional debate on E .ft.P 7 \ the elected government of Czechoslovakia fe ll 1 before a Communist coup and the Soviet Union 1 strengthened its military ties to Finland. The interpretation of these events by Administration f officials produced a full-scale war scare in the V , U.S., which decim ated Congressional resistance to < N E.R .P. This war scare was without real foundation and represented another effort by the Administration to scare the country and Congress into supporting foreign aid.

J

Of

t h e tw o

H ouses

of

C oncress , the Senate posed the lesser

problem for the Adm inistration in the debate on the European R ecovery Program . There w ere several reasons for this. T h e .Senate w as considered more experienced and reliable in m at­ ters o f foreign policy. It w as also less likely to be influenced decisively b y p ublic opinion. F inally— and most im portant— the fate of E .R .P. in the Senate w as in the hands o f a pow erful and expert cham pion, A rthur Vandenberg. T h e ability o f the R epublican Chairm an o f the Senate Foreign Relations Com ­

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m ittee to produce Senate m ajorities in support o f the Adm inis­ tration’s foreign aid program s had been proven in the debates on G reco-Turkish aid and Interim A id. Since d ie beginning of th e E ightieth Congress, the Adm inistration had courted him fervently. Indeed, the story o f V andenberg’s co-optation by the Trum an adm inistration provides a fascinating exam ple of personal politics at the highest level o f governm ent. W hen Trum an, M arshall, and Acheson m et w ith Congressional lead­ ers to discuss G reco-Turkish aid, for exam ple, A chesons bril­ lian t recitation o f the Adm inistration’s case w as calculated to touch sym pathetic chords in V andenberg’s thoughts, and the Senator’s letters indicate that he im m ediately adopted A cheson’s rhetoric as his own. A similar phenomenon took jplace w hen V andenberg reacted'~ isapprovdngIy to rumors of im­ pending proposals fo r large-scale foreign aid in the spring o f 1947. Though Ih ere appears to have been a hiatus in this courtship during the summer o f 1947 (perhaps the result o f A chesons retirem ent from the A dm inistration)L w hich w as a sour c e o f difficulty to the Adm inistration when it sought the Senators assistance in convening the special session on Interim A id , the careful solicitation o f his help on E.R .P. began in the fa ll of 1947. H e was supplied w ith im pressive studies and ma­ terials supporting the program . T h e Adm inistration provided him w ith assistance in w riting speeches and even arranged speaking engagem ents for him. V andenberg w as obviously im­ pressed. “T h e preparations the State D epartm ent has m ade fo r the next showdown [debate on E .R .P.] are am azing,” he w rote. “I have never seen better w ork.” Thus Vandenberg becam e an ardent advocate of E .R .P. and com m itted his con­ siderable parliam entary talents and energies to achieving its adoption. This com m itm ent w as strongly reinforced by the increased political stature he attained through his leadership o f the fight for foreign aid, and b y his desire to m aintain Re­ publican unity in an election year that m ight bring a crown to his ow n head.19 From the beginning o f Senate consideration of E.R.P., V andenberg sought to weaken the resistance o f opponents b y follo w in g a p olicy o f scrupulous conciliation tow ard them ,

3

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and

M c C a r t h y is m

particularly the Taft-oriented group led b y W herry. Vandenb erg w as careful to allow opposition view points a fu ll airing during the hearings, to insist that expressed objections b e reasonably answered, and to m ake concessions w here this could b e done w ithout crippling the projected program . O n the principal issues o f dispute he sought com promises ac­ ceptable to both d ie Adm inistration and his colleagues. T o resolve d ie issue o f adm inistering E.R .P., for «cam ple, he sub­ m itted the problem to the Brookings Institute for a nonparti­ san, expert analysis, and obtained a proposal acceptable to both the State D epartm ent and to m ost o f his colleagues. O n the m ore difficult issue o f the am ount to b e authorized, h e persuaded die Adm inistration not to seek more than a general m oral com m itm ent to a four-year program , and further as­ suaged skeptics b y agreeing to shorten d ie period covered b y d ie initial installm ent o f E .R .P. funds from fifteen to tw elve months, though insisting that the Adm inistration be given the fu ll am ount (5.3 billion dollars) that it claim ed it needed during this period. H e w as able, in the end, to m eet m ost o f the objections raised b y responsible critics and to report a b ill w ith the unanimous support o f his com m ittee. B y February 18 the Alsops w ere able to report jubilantly that “the Senate opposition, alw ays confused bu t once form idable, is form idable no longer.” T he Senate debate in M arch revealed d ie strength o f Vandenberg s work. W hen the crucial vote cam e on a pro­ posal by T a ft to reduce the authorization fo r the first year to 4 billion dollars, the Adm inistration s forces w on an easy victory, 56-31, w ith Senate Republicans evenly divided.20 T h e situation in the House w as entirely different. Charles Eaton, Chairm an o f the House Foreign A ffairs Com m ittee, w as an elderly Baptist m inister w ho provided hum or and charm but very litd e leadership to d ie activities o f his com m ittee. H e was w illin g to fight for die Adm inistration’s proposals but, as the Interim A id debate had shown, he w as unable to do so effectively. It had been the House Foreign Affairs Com m ittee that had initially refused to authorize d ie am ount o f Interim A id recom m ended b y the Adm inistration. It had been d ie same com m ittee that had overridden the Adm inistration to

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include an authorization for aid to China in d ie program . In both cases, the positions taken b y d ie H ouse com m ittee had v e iy nearly defined the final shape o f the Interim A id bill. M oreover, d ie extended deliberations o f the H ouse com m ittee had delayed Congressional action on Interim A id tw o w eeks beyond the date thought acceptable b y the Adm inistration. A ll o f this had m ade Eaton pessim istic about his ability to w in approval for E .R .P. from his own com m ittee. O n January 2 he predicted that action on d ie program m ight not occur until June 1, tw o months beyond the Adm inistration’s deadline.81 O ther observers shared Eaton’s fears about the outcom e o f H ouse consideration o f E.R .P. Representative John M cCor­ m ack predicted in D ecem ber that die battle for E .R .P. w ould b e the “most difficult” fight he had experienced in Congress. T h e reports o f the Com m ittee for the M arshall Plan con­ sistently referred to the situation in the House as unprom ising. Lippm ann and the Alsops agreed that the House w ould pro­ vid e the m ajor obstacle to approval o f the Adm inistration’s program .22 W hen the House com m ittee began drafting its European R ecovery b ill during the first w eek in M arch, it appeared that d ie potential danger to the Adm inistration’s program that it represented w ould be realized. Although b y this tim e H erter’s proposal o f an independent agency to adm inister E .R .P. had ceased to be an im portant issue, Vandenberg having supplied an effective solution to dispute on this m atter, tw o crucial issues rem ained. First w as the am ount to be authorized— and here H erter’s proposal for expenditures o f 4.5 billion dollars in the first year had strong support am ong House Republicans. Second w as the tim etable for H ouse action. On M ardi 1 the H ouse Com m ittee d ed d ed to include E .R .P. in an omnibus foreign aid b ill that w ould include all pending Adm inistration proposals— the program o f econom ic assistance for China that d ie Adm inistration had prom ised during debate on Interim A id, a new installm ent on Greco-Turkish aid, and a num ber of lesser program s. M oreover, Speaker M artin indicated that die H ouse w ould insist upon extending m ilitaiy aid to China, rather than the econom ic aid program that the Adm inistration

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an d

M c C a r t h y is m

proposed.28 T h e potential effect o f these decisions upon d ie Adm inistration's schedule for action on E .R .P. w as alarm ­ ing: d ie inclusion o f d ie program for Europe in a com plex om nibus program w ould offer E .R .P.’s increasingly frustrated opponents an opportunity to m ire the program in extended debate and m ight involve tim e-consum ing negotiations be­ tw een H ouse and Senate; d ie high ly controversial nature o f die House s intention to insist upon m ilitary aid to China (w hich the Adm inistration strongly opposed) also seem ed likely to lengthen debate on the aid program indefinitely. I f the proposed House procedure w ere retained it seem ed likely that the A pril ı deadline set b y the Adm inistration w ould not be m et; gaps w ould appear in the foreign aid pipeline, and M arshall Plan funds w ould not be available in tim e to influ­ ence the Italian elections. O stensibly concerned about the latter issue— though in all probability he w as equally upset b y some other aspects o f the House proposals— Secretary M arshall, accom panied b y L ovett, w ent to C ap itol H ill on M ard i 8 to urge Speaker M artin to have E .R .P. considered as a single m easure. T h e follow ing d ay the House R epublican leadership announced its decision to ignore M arshalls request, arguing that E.R .P. m ight be jeopardized in d ie House if it w ere subm itted alone, but expressing the hope that passage o f the omnibus b ill w ould b e achieved by A pril 10. Chairm an Eaton, how ever, agreed to attem pt to convince his com m ittee to consider E.R .P. as a single measure. This cam e to nothing. O n M arch n the House Foreign A ffairs Com m ittee voted against Eaton and insisted that E.R .P. b e included in the omnibus bill. T h e W ashington Post com m ented that this decision "foreshadow ed a possible delay in the final approval o f the European R ecovery Program until too late to influence d ie Italian elections." M arquis C hilds, predicting that these plans m ight delay approval o f E.R.P. until June, called the Republican behavior so irresponsi­ b le as to require Am ericans to rethink their apparent intention to turn the country over to them in N ovem ber. T he N ew York Tim es reported that d ie H ouse C om m ittees action "brought to a new low level the prospect for a bi-partisan approach to

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foreign p olicy questions in the H ou se” T h e Adm inistration, certainly, concluded that E .R .P. could not be passed in tim e to keep the foreign aid pipelines fu ll, for President Trum an re­ quested that the Congress approve im m ediately fifty-five m illion dollars in additional Interim A id to finance European recovery until M arshall Plan funds becam e available.24 The danger that Congressional approval of E.R.P. w ould be delayed by the actions of the House was elim inated by a 'dram atic alteration in the atm osphere of international politics as perceivFcTandTnterp reted in W ashington. The events that produced this new situation occurred tw o w eeks prior to the -ci İIİL’Jİ"Tliömenf m the House Foreign Affairs Com m ittee’s lfcÜtfêfâfïôns~ôn UTCP. ö n February 25 the non-cörrtftmnist governm ent of Czechoslovakia fell from p ow er and was re­ placed b y a Com m unist regim e. Shortly thereafter it w as lèarned that tire Soviet Union had invited Finland to partici­ pate in a m utual-defense treaty. These events, like previous indications o f Soviet im perialism , triggered in the U nited States apprehensions as to the ultim ate design of the U.S.S.R. s pattern o f expansion. T he W ashington Post ran a front-page m ap o f Europe w ith the area under Soviet dom ination shaded. T he caption stated: “Russia M oves W estw ard— W here N ext?” Arrows pointed to Italy, France, Finland, and Austria. M arquis C hilds reported on M arch 4 that the coup in Czechoslovakia had elim inated the assurance, previously w idespread in W ash­ ington, that the U.S.S.R. did not w ant w ar w ith the U nited State». For a short tim e it appeared that the anxiety produced in Am erica b y this new m anifestation o f Soviet im portunity w ould subside, as had happened on previous occasions. Then, on M arch 10, it w as reported that the sym bol o f C zech dem oc­ racy, Jan M asaryk, had been killed under m ysterious circum ­ stances in Prague. This catalyzed a rem arkable series of events.28 A t a news conference on M arch 10 Secretary M arshall w as asked to express his view s on the international situation. H e replied w ith unexpected foreboding: “There are great fears as to the developm ents.. . . T he situation is very, very serious.” W ith specific reference to events in Czechoslovakia and the

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death o f Jan M asaryk, M arshall stated that a “reign o f terror“ existed in that country. Such statem ents from a man not noted for his em otionalism attracted considerable attention. T h e N ew York Tim es printed the headline: “m a r sh a ll stirred b y w o rld crisis .” On M ard i 11 President Trum an w as asked a t his new s conference if he retained his often-expressed confi­ dence in w orld peace. H e answered: “It has been som ewhat shaken, but I still believe that eventually w e w ill get w orld peace.” T h e W ashington Tim es Herald m ade a headline o f the com m ent: “t r u m a n . . . says co n fid en ce in p e a c e sh a k en .” A lso on M ard i 11, Secretary M arshall, in an address at the N ational C athedral in W ashington, repeated the sentim ents h e had expressed on the previous day: “T h e w orld is in the m idst o f a great crisis, influenced b y propaganda, m isunderstanding, anger and fear.” H e urged the rapid approval o f d ie European R ecovery Program .2* O n M arch 13 form er Secretary o f State Byrnes, speaking Hit the C itadel in South Carolina, d te d the above statem ents o f [die President and Secretary o f State as evidence that a m ajor international crisis w as at hand. Bym es told his audience that 'T h ere is nothing to justify the hope that w ith the com plete absorption o f Czechoslovakia and Finland the Soviets w ill be satisfied.” H e referred to Soviet am bitions in G reece, T urkey, Italy, and France. Turning to the Italian elections, he sug­ gested that the Com munists could not w in. “If the Soviets intend to act in Italy as they have in H ungary and C zecho­ slovakia,” he w ent on, “w e can expect them to m ove w henever they reach the conclusion that the Com munists cannot w in .. . . T h ey w ill not w ait until the elections to disclose that the Com m unists are in d ie m inority.” C allin g for rapid passage o f E .R .P. and a program o f national rearm am ent, Byrnes con­ cluded that “it is im portant to think o f the situation that m ay 'èxist four or five weeks from now as a result o f our failure to provide adequately for the national defense.” H is reference to J h e possibility o f a clash betw een the U.S. and d ie Soviet Union over Italy in the next few w eeks w as w id ely reported in /the press. T h e W ashington Tim es H erald carried d ie headline: “byrnes sees w orld crisis w ith in fiv e w eeks .” T h e W ashing­

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ton Pott also printed the story on page one and reported in its lead paragraph Byrnes’s w arning that w orld crisis m ight come w ithin four or five w eeks.27 T estifyin g before d ie Senate Foreign Relations Com ­ m ittee on M arch 15 on behalf o f an extension o f aid to G reece and Turkey, M arshall stated that "T he hour is far m ore fateful than it w as one year ago. . . . Totalitarian control has been tightened in . . . [the] countries of eastern Europe. . Ö tfıer "European“peoples fSöe'U similar-fK reâ tô f "being drawn against their w ill into the communist o r b it.” Qp thç s^mç day the W ashington~Tim es Herald reported that the Adm inistration was considering a promise of m ilitary support for the western European nations and a w arning to the U .S.S.R. that_further expansion of communist pow er wQiild produce a direct U.S.Soviet confrontation. The headline stated: “t r u m a n w eigh s NEW ‘ sTOP-RUSSIA’ MOVE.” 28

O n 'M a rc h 16 the W hite House announced that die President w ould m ake a special statem ent before a joint ses­ sion of Congress the follow ing day. T he headline in T he N ew York Tim es read: “t r u m a n t o t e l l congress to m o r r o w o f w orld statu s .” T he W ashington Pott also ran a headline on d ie announcem ent: “t r u m a n t o address congress to m o r r o w a s crisis m o u n ts .” T h e Tim es H erald printed d ie headline: “m il. HEARS TRUMAN TOMORROW ON CRISIS: MTT-1TARY Am a g a in st reds lik e ly t h e m e .” The New York Tim es's headline die follow ing m orning read: “te n se c a p it a l a w a its t r u m a n speech .” T he W ashington Tim es Herald told its readers: “t r u m a n w il l ask v a st w ar p r epa r a tio n .” T he President's address to Congress on M arch 17 w as carried on nationwide radio. H e stated that “rapid changes are taking p lace [in Europe] . . . w hich affect our foreign p olicy and our national security. There is an increasing threat to nations w hich are striving to m aintain a form o f governm ent w hich grants free­ dom to its citizens.” H e then turned to a detailed indictm ent of Soviet policy, w hich had “destroyed the independence and dem ocratic character o f a w hole series o f nations in eastern and central Europe,” and warned that “this ruthless course of action and the clear design to extend it to the rem aining free

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nations o f Europe” w as the essence o f the current crisis. H e referred to the situations in Czechoslovakia, Finland, G reece, and Italy, and concluded: “I believe that w e have reached a point at w hich the position o f the U nited States should be m ade unm istakably clear.” H e thçn urged the Congress to apprOVe the E .R .P. rapidly, tO enact a program nf Universal "M ilitary Training, and to approve a tem porary renewal of Se­ le c tiv e Service. “A t no tim e in 'o u r history,” lie * stated in closing, “has unity am ong our people been so vital as it is at d ie present tim e.” O n the evening o f M arch 17 the President repeated the same them es in a St. Patrick's D ay address in N ew York C ity, a speech also carried on nationw ide radio. H eadlines the follow ing m orning w ere devoted to his state­ ments. The W ashington Post: “t r u m a n asks t e m p o r a r y DRAFT, UMT AND AID FOR EUROPE TO CHECK AGGRESSION BY Russia ”; the Tim es H erald: “congress

sp l it

on

president 's

DEMANDS FOR UMT, DRAFT TO STOP RED EXPANSION”; The N ew

York Tim es: “t r u m a n

asks te m p o r a r y d r aft im m e d ia t e l y

AND UNIVERSAL TRAINING AS THE PRICE OF PEACE.” 29

Form al efforts to increase the strength o f die Arm ed Forces began im m ediately after the President requested them . M arshall addressed the first session of a hearing b y the Senate Arm ed Services Com m ittee on U niversal M ilitary Training w ithin hours after the President's speech: “I w ish to express in person to you m y own concern over the accelerated trend in Europe,” he stated. “In the short years since the end o f hostilities this trend has grow n from a trickle into a torrent.” H e referred to the Balkans, H ungary, Czechoslovakia. H e in­ terpreted the Italian election as deciding “not only w hether Italy w ill continue w ith its restoration of true dem ocracy” but “w hether the disintegrating trend to w hich I have referred m ay reach the shores of the A tlantic.” H e concluded w ith an analogy to H itler: “It is said that histoiy never repeats itself. Y et if these free people are one b y one subjugated to p olice state controls even the blind m ay see a deadly parallel.” M ar­ shall stressed the im portance of passing E .R .P. q u ick ly to m eet d ie threat. His statem ent prom pted the headline in the W ashington Tim es Herald: “m a r sh a ll fears w a r m o v e b y c o m ­

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T he next day the Senate Arm ed Services Com m ittee heard the heads o f the m ilitary establishm ent, w ho testified to the im m ediate necessity o f rebuilding d ie Arm ed Forces. T he N ew York Tim es ran d ie headline: “ m il it a r y h eads c a l l u m t , d r a ft v it a l fo r s a f e iy ." A lso on M ard i 18, d ie State D epartm ent m ade p u blic dispatches from Athens reporting that three Soviet-supported International Brigades w ere poised in the Balkans ready to attack across the border into G reece. T h e them es em ployed b y M arshall in his testim ony before the Senate Arm ed Services Com m ittee characterized tw o addresses he delivered shortly thereafter on a trip to d ie W est Coast. O n M arch 19, at B erkeley, he again likened the present situa­ tion to that w hich existed in 1939, when he had “w atched the N azi governm ent take control o f one country after another until finally Poland w as invaded in a direct m ilitary opera­ tion.” H e urged speedy approval o f E.R .P. T h e next day, in Los A ngeles, he stressed again the parallel betw een the situa­ tion in Europe and Germ an expansion under H itler. A gain he urged quick action on E.R.P. The New York Tim es reported both speeches in front-page headlines.30 O n M arch 20 it w as reported that the Soviet representa­ tive on the A llied Control C ouncil in Berlin had w alked out of a council m eeting. This event cam e at the end o f a stiffen­ ing o f relations betw een the form er A llies in Berlin. T w o days later the W hite House announced that it had cancelled plans for the State D epartm ent to take over responsibility for the occupation o f Germ any in July. T he Arm y w ould retain con­ trol. On M arch 21 the W hite H ouse released the “United States Industrial M obilization Plan— 1947," a general blue­ print for m obilizing the country’s industrial resources in case of w ar.81 T h e Senate Arm ed Services Com m ittee heard the D e­ fense D epartm ent’s proposals for an enlargem ent o f the Arm ed Services on M arch 25. Secretary Forrestal prefaced the presen­ tation w ith a statem ent repeating the analogy voiced b y Sec­ retary M arshall betw een Germ an expansion in 1939 and current Soviet policy. Follow ing his introduction, each o f the Services presented specific program s for increases in their m ie s ."

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strengths. T h e N ew York Tim es reported: “to p m ilita r y m en URGE U.S. TO ARM TO SHOW WE WOULD FIGHT FOR FREEDOM.”

T h e m ost spectacular piece o f inform ation produced b y this testim ony cam e from N avy Secretary Sullivan, w ho told die com m ittee that subm arines “belonging to no nation w est o f d ie ‘iron curtain’ have been sighted off our shores.” E schew ing interpretation o f this developm ent, he nevertheless recalled, “that an early step o f the Germ ans in 1917 and 1941 w as to deploy subm arines off our coasts.” Although this statem ent was only a sm all piece in an immense body o f testim ony, it received headline attention. T he N ew York Tim es ran it as a subhead and d ie Tim es Herald m ade its headline o f the dis­ closure: “Ru ssian subs p r o w l w e st COAST w ater s .” Subsequent hearings on the rearm am ent proposals produced a steady procession o f front-page stories about current m ilitary dangers.32 This series o f ominous disclosures, portentous interpre­ tations, and som ber warnings produced, through its harvest o f spine-tingling headlines, a dram atic effect upon the p olitical atm osphere o f W ashington. A s early as M ard i 13, follow ing the first statem ents about the new crisis b y M arshall and Trum an, d ie W ashington Tim es Herald published an a rtid e b y W alter Trohan entitled “W hispers of W ar G row L ou d Throughout the C apital,” w hich described the m ood o f anxiety that these statem ents had excited. James Reston, w riting in T he N ew York Tim es, described a sim ilar atm osphere: “T h e m ood o f the capital this w eekend is exceedingly somber. F or the moment the sw eep o f great events seems to overw helm d ie men trying to deal w ith them. . . . even the President has m entioned that aw ful three-letter w ord, w ar.” Several days later the Alsops published an article in the W ashington Post entided “H ow W ar M ight Com e,” w hich began w ith die o b ­ servation that “the atm osphere in W ashington is no longer a postw ar atm osphere. It is, to put it blundy, a prew ar atm o­ sphere. . . . it is now universally adm itted that w ar w ithin th e next few months is certainly possible.” O n M arch 28, Jerry K lutz, in his W ashington Post colum n on the d v il service, reported that the w ar scare had produced rumors that th e

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federal governm ent w as about to transfer a num ber o f agencies out o f W ashington. W alter Lippm ann described d ie atmo­ sphere in W ashington at the end of the month b y stating that “T h e President’s m essage, d ie speeches, testim ony, and press conferences o f M r. M arshall, M r. F on estal, M r. R oyall, M r. Sullivan and M r. Sym ington have put this country in the po­ sition o fjjrep arin g . . . for a w ar." 33 (T h e^ w ar scare o f 1948 term inated the problem of achieving House authorization o f d ie Adm inistration’s pro­ posals for d ie European R ecovery Program AOn M arch 16 the H ouse Republican leadership and the m ajority m em bers o f the House Foreign Affairs Com m ittee, anticipating the Presi­ dent’s speech, decided to accelerate d ie tim etable for House action on E .R .P. Speaker M artin announced that H ouse Foreign Affairs w ould report d ie b ill b y M arch 18 or ig , and that final House action w ould be forthcom ing b y the Adm in­ istration’s A pril 1 target date. T h e follow ing day the Foreign A ffairs Com m ittee rejected H erter’s proposal that aid to Europe during the first year be reduced to 4.5 billion dollars and approved the program in exactiy the amount proposed b y d ie Adm inistration. T he om nibus foreign aid b ill w as re­ ported on M arch ig . In d ie report die House com m ittee stated that it w as taking sw ift action o n E .R .P . to h elp “reverse the trend o f communism in Europe" and expressed the hope that the m easure w ould have an influence on the Italian elections. T h e spiritual leader o f d ie b ill’s opponents, H erbert H oover, also rethought his position. O n M ard i 23 he announced him­ self in favor o f the Adm inistration’s program . T h e b ill w as never seriously threatened during a debate that consum ed m ost o f the final w eek o f M ardi. In that debate forty of the forty-four Congressm en w ho expressed opinions on E.R .P. argued that the purpose o f the m easure w as to oppose com­ m unist aggression. There w as little chance that a m easure so conceived w ould m eet serious opposition in the atm osphere th at prevailed in m id-M arch 1948. House action approving th e b ill as reported cam e on M arch 31 in a rem arkable session described b y W ashington Post w riter Ferdinand Kuhn: “A s th e roll call w ent on in a seething and excited H ouse shouts

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o f ‘aye* cam e from one R epublican after another w ho h ad seldom , if ever, voted for any international le g is la tio n 84 ecting the early release o f d ie European R ecovery o rom the House Foreign A ffairs Com m ittee an prom pting its rapid ratification b y the w hole House, d ie w a r scare o f 1948 brought the Adm inistration’s foreign aid program safely through w hat had been anticipated to be its m ost diffi­ cult te st) T he extent to w hich this expeditious House action depended upon d ie unusual m ood o f m id-M arch w as m ade d e a r tw o months later w hen the appropriation b ill for E .R .P. was being considered. In M ay the House Appropriations Com ­ m ittee, chaired b y John T aber, the m ost indefatigable cutter o f budgets in Congress, reported a reduced appropriation fo r E.R.P. On this occasion, the fear of w ar w ith the Soviet Union having subsided, the sponsors o f E.R.P. w ere unable to obtain sufficient votes to defeat Taber’s proposal. D uring the M arch crisis an attem pt to cut the authorization for E.R .P. had at­ tracted only sixty votes in the House. Taber’s efforts, though supported b y the House Republican leadership, w ere eventually frustrated b y die adam ant opposition o f Senator V andenberg and even Senator T aft, w ho together persuaded the Senate not to com prom ise d ie program initially approved b y Congress. Their successful batde to save the Adm inistration’s program dem onstrated to w hat extent E.R.P. was saved from reduction b y the w ar scare, for it was the vote on the authorization— its im plied “m oral commitment” to E .R .P. and its practical effect o f having set the program in motion at the authorized level— that provided V andenberg and T a ft w ith their ch ief argu­ ments in opposing Taber.85 Because the w ar scare played such a decisive role in achieving final passage o f E.R.P. it is worth­ w hile to exam ine the ingredients o f that h ectic and bodeful interlude. The w ar scare o f 1948, specifically the events in Czechoslovakia ancTFinland that prom pted it^ m ust b e view ed in die rtf jhfejbook. T w o sit­ context established Ja . th e fir«» uations there described had form ed the basic assumptions of Am erican p olicy in the postw ar period prior to M arch 1948: ( 1 ) the Soviet U nions physical devastation during the w ar

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had m ade it unlikely that it could sustain any m ajor m ilitary e ffœ ijm d queÆ ônahlë- tfià f TTTrinhldT m n lrol a sphere of influ­ ence larger than that attained as a result o f the w ar; ( a ) Am erica possessed the ability, through air suprem acy— par­ ticularly the atom ic bom b— to punish the Soviet Union in­ tolerably should it launch an attack, even though there w as no force in western Europe capable o f resisting the R ed Arm y. These tw o factors had allow ed the Am ericans to be confident that the U .S.S.R., w hatever its ultim ate am bitions m ight be, did not w ant and w ould not initiate w ar w ith the U nited States. A corollary o f this assessment w as that the Soviets w ere w illing to conduct their international relations on the basis (Dif a ja c it understanding ranren^ipg sphere«; pf influence.

In practice this meant that although the Soviet Union sup­ ported the efforts of national Communist Parties to reduce American influence in western Europe— just as the U.S. at­ tempted to strengthen the position of the non-communist parties in eastern Europe— it was clear thattKe*U,.S,S.R. would ncTmore intervene actively on behalf of such efforts than the United States would go to war to prevent communist domi­ nation of Poland or Hungary. America’s entire foreign policy, including the decision to defer rebuilding the Armed Forces until E.R.P. had been approved, was based on the assumption, successfully tested in Iran, Greece, and Turkey, that if the United States made a strong show _of oppoşltiohllû-ûâmrnu'mst arnbTtjons jp an area within jfap wn of influ­ ence, the Soviets would concede the point. Were events in Czechoslovakia and Finland of such a nature as to invalidate the above set of assumptions and pol­ icies? There w ere tw o possible interpretations o f these events; either the Soviet Union w as consolidating its position w ithin Its sphere of influence before the U nited States, through E .R .P., Avas able to institutionalize its pow er in the W est, or the U.S.S.R. w as abandoning its previous adherence to the spheresof-influence arrangem ent and intended to obtain territory in the W est before Am erican aid increased the difficulty o f ex­ pansion. v D uring and after the w ar d ie U.S.S.R. consistently had

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asserted, and the U nited States accepted, the dom inant inter­ est o f the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia. T h e first indication o f this situation had com e in 1944 when, die eventual liberation o f Czechoslovakia being a certainty, the C zech governm ent proposed a treaty w ith the U nited States, G reat Britain, and the Soviet Union. T he U.S. and U .K . rejected the C zech offer, pointing to d ie inability o f their arm ies to reach central Europe for some tim e; the Soviet Union, w hose troops w ere on its border w ith Czechoslovakia, accepted. From that tim e, on m atters ranging from the m anagem ent o f U .N .R .R .A. to d ie liberation o f Prague, the U nited States had repeatedly recog­ nized and deferred to the w ishes o f the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia. T he influence o f the Soviet Union on this country becam e clear during the summer o f 1947, w hen the C zech governm ent, having accepted Secretary M arshall’s offer to participate in the European R ecoveiy Program , w ithdrew at the behest o f the Soviet Union. As for the coup itself, d ie C zech Com munists had held all the vital positions o f pow er since 1945 and could have im posed com m unist rule at any time. T h eir failure to do so reflected their belief, w hich b y early 1948 had proved unjustified, that they could com e to pow er through parliam entary elections. T he m ovem ent tow ard the coup had been discernible as early as lanuary 1948 and reflected not a pattern o f Soviet expansion w estw ard but con­ solidation o f Soviet control over an area it already dom inated.8* T h e distribution of pow er in Finland was sim ilar to the situation in Czechoslovakia. A t the end o f the w ar, d ie Soviet arm y had dom inated Finland. T h e A llied Control Com mission in that country had been an agency o f the Soviet m ilitary authorities. In the post-occupation period, Finland had fo l­ low ed international policies exp lid d y in harm ony w ith the w ishes o f the Soviet Union. Indeed, Finland’s President from 1946-56, Juho Passildvi, had laid down in 1944 the “Passikivi line,” by w hich the Finns pledged them selves to Mdo nothing in conflict w ith the wishes o f the Soviet Union.” T h e m utualdefense treaty proposed to Finland b y the Soviet Union in F eb ­ ruary 1948 was lenient by Soviet standards. It pledged Finland to fight any aggressor attacking die U.S.S.R. through Finland,

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but Finland w as not obliged to assist the Soviets in other cir­ cum stances and Soviet help to Finland w ould b e “subject to m utual agreem ent.’*37 W hile it is easy to establish that, there w as nothing about events in Czechoslovakia and Finland in early 1948 to support the belief that a basic shift in Soviet p olicy had taken place, other developm ents in Europe established a context w ithin w hich these events m ight have assum ed special significance. In January 1948, for exam ple, Britain had initiated talks w ith France and the Benelux countries to explore d ie establishm ent o f bilateral defensive agreem ents. T h e im m ediate im petus for this seems to have been the failure o f the London Conference o f N ovem ber 1947 and the decision, taken b y the W estern pow ers follow ing it, to eschew all pretense o f seeking the re­ unification o f Germ any and proceed w ith the establishm ent of a separate W est Germ an state. T h e w estern European powers concurred that the London decision on Germ any m oved the C old W ar in Europe to a new level of tension, and at Brussels in February they agreed to the establishm ent o f a regional defensive alliance. Am erican support w as im m ediately solic­ ited. T w o other situations lent support to the notion o f a sig­ nificant increase in tensions in Europe. First, there had been some reports o f a potential Com m unist coup in Italy if the elections seem ed to b e going in favor o f the non-communist parties. Intelligence o f this kind had w orried Secretary Forrestal as early as Septem ber 1947, to the point that he dis­ cussed w ith L ovett Am erica’s ability to intervene m ilitarily to suppress such an action and m ade the m atter the subject of a m eeting o f the N ational Security Council. Prior to the elections there w ere reports through British intelligence channels that a coup w as being prepared w ith outside support. Soviet troop m ovem ents w ere taking place that could be interpreted as preparing support for a coup. A second point o f concern w as Berlin. O n M ard i 5 G eneral C la y sent a telegram to W ash­ ington that reported a m arked stiffening o f U .S.-Soviet rela­ tions in the Germ an capital, evidently an early w arning of the U .S.S.R.'s subsequent boycott o f the Control C ouncil. C la y com m ented that he had for some tim e been confident that

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w ar betw een the U nited States and d ie Soviet Union w ould not com e for several years but that he w as now afraid that w ar “m ight com e w ith dram atic suddenness." ** AU o f diese developm ents w ere on die m inds o f Am erican officials in early 1948. F or the purposes o f this study, o f course, the intrinsic significance o f developm ents in Europe in 1948 is less im por­ tant than the perception o f them b y Am erican officials at the tim e. It m ust b e rem em bered that the w ar scare o f 1948 did not occur in response to published reports from eastern Europe in February but foUowing a series of statem ents and leaks from high Am erican officials in m id-M arch, all o f w hich can be traced to one o f three sources: (1) the State D epartm ent, m ainly through Secretary M arshall; (2 ) the D efense D epartm ent; (3 ) the W hite House. Interacting w ith a ll three sources, o f course, was the press itself. The behavior and interaction o f these four elem ents are w hat must be explained if the w ar scare o f 1948 is to be understood. The contribution of Secretary MarshaU and the D epart4nent n f ■ ’srarp w a r sn are m a t « îh c la n H a l M a rg h a ll’g ^ ffesT conference remarks on M arch 10 w erp r>ffi™a1 comments in the series of events that produced the w ar scare, and in the subsequent tw o w eeks his appearancesTtefore Congressional com m ittees and his speeches on the W est Coast heightened the grow ing sense n f im m e d ia te nrisfc. T w o facts about these initiatives are notable: the three form al speeches that MarshaU delivered in this period w ere aU appeals for d ie rapid approval o f the European R ecovery Program , and M ar­ shall’s press conference of M arch 10 cam e one day after the H ouse R epublican leadership announced its decision to ignore his request that E.R.P. be considered as a single m easure. These facts suggest the possibility that MarshaU w as m otivated to alter his usual calm and aloof m anner m ainly to expedite passage of E .R .P. H e undoubtedly felt frustrated b y his efforts to hasten approval: his apparent attem pt to intim idate the Senate Foreign Relations Com m ittee had won a strong re­ buke from one o f the Com m ittee’s key members; now the H ouse leadership w as ignoring his appeal. A ccording to W alter

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Lippm ann and the Alsops, as indicated above, there had been discussions w ithin the State D epartm ent since m id-February concerning how to create the sense o f urgency required to ex­ p ed ite passage o f E .R .P. w ith explicit consideration given to a p u b lic statem ent b y M arshall defining anew d ie com m unist threat to Europe. Lippm ann had reported that d ie D epart­ m ent w as considering the publication o f more diplom atic d oc­ um ents; the subsequent release o f m aterials reporting Soviet troop m ovem ents in the Balkans suggests that his inform ation w as sound. (There is no reason to belieye th a i-MeishirH nl any Ijnie altered his assum ption that theS Ù.S.S.R. did not w ant w ar w itt^ tn e .united^Ja.tps. H e had been inform ed in the fall o f 1947 by G eorge Kennan that if the M arshall Plan becam e effective, the U .S. w ould have to expeetvthe Soviets to con­ solidate their position in C zechoslovaks^) A lthough Kennan w as out o f the country in m id -M arcE ig4 8 , w hen he heard h ow events w ere being interpreted in W ashington, he imme­ d iately dispatched a cable to the State D epartm ent reiterating his view . M arshall w as certainly not surprised or alarm ed b y th e decision o f the w estern Europeans to form a m ilitary al­ liance, or inclined to base an interpretation o f events in F eb ­ ruary on this decision, for the w estern European alliance w as the product o f a conversation betw een M arshall and Bevin in D ecem ber 1947. U nfortunately, there is no published record o f M arshall's response to the C la y telegram or the intelligence reports about Ita ly , bu t follow in g the C zech coup he consistently took positions indicating that he did not expect w ar w ith the Soviet U nion. F or exam ple, w hen he w as visited on M ard i 2 b y a delegation o f Senators anxious to know if the coup required n ew efforts tow ard m ilitary preparedness, he replied that w h at w as needed w as sw ift enactm ent o f U niversal M ilitary Training. U .M .T., w hich M arshall had advocated for sev­ eral years as a signal to the w orld that the U .S. did not intend to shirk international leadership, w as designed prim ar­ ily to strengthen the reserves b y requiring all eighteen-yearolds to undergo six months o f training and accept a position in

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a reserve unit. As these men w ould not b e available for active service after their training, U .M .T. w as directed tow ard cre­ ating a pool o f trained men over an extended period o f tim e and— except for its tendency to increase voluntary enlistm ents in the regular forces— w ould not significantly increase the Arm y’s ability to respond to an im m ediate em ergency. It w as b y no means a crash program to prepare for im m inent hos­ tilities. M oreover, w hen he testified on behalf o f U .M .T. before the Senate Arm ed Services Com m ittee in m id-M arch, M arshall voiced the b elief that if U .M .T. w ere approved, “the probabili­ ties are that w e w ill avoid trouble.” O n M ay 7 he told a highJevel budgetary m eeting that Am erican p olicy w as based upon the assumption that there w ould be no w ar. M arshall’s p u blic statem ents, in fact, never suggested the im m inence o f w ar, only the existence o f a new international crisis. H e never m ade clear the exact nature o f this crisis, and given his assumption that the Soviets w ere not about to initiate w ar, it is difficult to understand w hat he m eant, unless he believed (hat the con­ solidation o f the Soviet position in areas it already controlled constituted a significant crisis for the W est. T h e more likely possibility is that to M arshall the crisis o f M arch 1948— like the crises of M arch and N ovem ber 1947— w as m ainly a crisis o f dom estic politics, given reality b y the appropriate inter­ pretation of international events.39 H ad M arshall’s cam paign for E.R .P. occurred in isolation, the crisis o f M arch 1948 m ight never have developed into a full-scale w ar scare. For the statem ents, disclosures, and de­ velopm ents that caused an im age o f arm ed conflict to m ate­ rialize in the em pty space o f fear created b y M arshall’s an­ nouncem ent o f a new and undefined crisis all had their origins elsew here, m ainly in the D efense Departm ent. It w as the Pentagon, after all, that w as responsible for proposing a re­ arm ament program in M ard i 1948 and for m uch spectacular testim ony before Congress, including Sullivan’s comments about hostile subm arines. T he Pentagon w as also responsible for form er Secretary Byrnes’s startling speech o f M ard i 13, w hich suggested a showdown w ith the U.S.S.R. in a few weeks. T o understand the activities o f the D efense D epartm ent

2Ô3 d ie Adm inistration's p olicy o f deferring efforts to rearm until the foreign aid pro­ gram w as approved b y Congress. T h e resulting lade o f atten­ tion to defense appropriations had brought the Arm ed Forces to a state o f nearly total im potence b y early 1948. T h e extent o f the depletion w as revealed in a D efense D epartm ent report on February 18. It indicated that troop levels w ere fa r below the num bers currently authorized and w ere not sufficient to im plem ent the existing em ergency w ar plan. T he com m itm ent o f a single division at any o f the numerous trouble spots o f the w orld w ould require a partial m obilization. This presentation brougjht hom e sharply to Forrestal, the Secretary o f D efense, th e need to set plans in motion to rebuild the Arm ed Forces— plans that w ould in any case have been in order w ith the cam paign for E .R .P. nearing conclusion. U .M .T., tiie Arm y’s long-standing solution to its m anpower problem , had been consistently blocked by Congress. O n F eb­ ruary 16 Chan G um ey, Chairm an o f the Senate Arm ed Ser­ vices Com m ittee, reiterated to Forrestal his com m ittee’s un­ w illingness to begin hearings on U .M .T. until a precise state­ m ent o f the program ’s cost and a total m ilitary bu dget w ere produced. Forrestal reflected at this tim e that it w ould be advisable to convene the Service chiefs outside W ashington for a conference to develop a com prehensive defense program .40 On M arch 2 Forrestal lunched w ith M arshall, follow ing tiie latter’s m eeting w ith the delegation o f Senators concern­ in g the situation in Europe. Both men w ere im pressed b y the apparent readiness o f the Senators to respond to M arshall’s suggestion that quick action b e taken on U .M .T. T alk at the lu n d i centered upon w ays o f m obilizing forces for a new cam paign for this long-sought program and, according to For­ restal, consideration was given to “a joint effort by M arshall and m yself to get a concurrent resolution through the House and Senate givin g approval im m ediately to the p rin d p le o f U .M .T., linking tiie im plem entation to a subsequent bill, tiie thought being to capitalize on the present concern o f the country over the events o f last w eek in Europe.” This m eeting w as undoubtedly the origin o f tiie decision to in d u d e a new

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appeal for U .M .T. in the President's address o f M arch 17, b u t Forrestal— w ith recent reports o f low troop levels on his m ind — had an agenda o f his own. T h e day after his lu n d i w ith M arshall, he told d ie Chairm an o f the H ouse Arm ed Services Com m ittee that he believed serious consideration should b e given to a revival o f Selective Service in order to bring troop levels up to authorized strength. Forrestal m oved qu ickly to initiate his program w hile die crisis lasted. O n d ie evening o f M ard i 3 he and Arm y Secretary R oyall dined w ith form er Sec* rotary Byrnes and persuaded him to m ake a p u blic plea fo r rearm am ent, including U .M .T. and Selective Service. This w as the im m ediate origin of Bym es’s speech of M arch 13, for w hich Forrestal provided both m aterial and p u b lid ty arrangem ents. In his m emoirs, Byrnes does not recall any discussion o f th e danger o f w ar w ith d ie Soviet Union at the dinner w ith For­ restal and Royall; the conversation, he w rites, w as about the difficulty o f getting Congress to approve expenditures for re­ building the Arm ed Forces. T h e follow ing day Forrestal con­ tinued his cam paign b y calling Senator G eorge to suggest that a group o f key Senators be convened to hear a "presentation o f the w orld situation b y a m em ber o f the arm y staff,” w hich w ould undoubtedly have been the same disturbing report o f low troop levels that convinced Forrestal o f the necessity o f Selective Service. Forrestal also decided that the tim e had com e to convene d ie m eeting o f Service chiefs that he had conceived tw o w eeks previously. T h e conference w as sched­ uled for the follow ing w eek in K ey W est, Florida.41 It is im portant to note that a ll of these initiatives oc­ curred prior to the receipt o f C lay’s provocative telegram on M arch 5. This telegram has p layed a m ajor role in most explana­ tions o f the w ar scare o f 1948, m ainly, it seems, because the published version o f Forrestal’s diary includes a copy o f it along w ith editorial notes suggesting that it w as the cause o f m uch anxiety and furious intelligence activity in W ashington. It is difficult to know the real effect o f this telegram because it was im m ediately pressed into service b y Forrestal to support d ie cam paign for rearm am ent diat he had already launched. It is equally difficult, for the sam e reasons, to interpret the ac­

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tivation o f d ie Arm ed Forces’ Intelligence services that C lay’s telegram apparently caused, particularly their com bined esti­ m ate, issued in m id-M arch, that w ar w as not probable w ithin sixty days. Both developm ents w ere so thoroughly self-serving in terms o f the interests o f d ie defense com m unity and so thoroughly consistent w ith Fonrestal’s strategy o f exploiting d ie crisis to obtain rearm am ent that it w ould b e foolish, in the ab­ sence of strong supportive evidence, to take them at face value. A nd there is no real supporting evidence that there w as con­ cern am ong m ilitary leaders that w ar w as im minent in M arch 1948. In fact, high-ranking officers w ere reported to consider U .M .T. m ore im portant than the draft and w hen specifically pressed on the likelihood o f im m inent w ar, they tended to deny d ie possibility. Forrestal’s only recorded com m ent on the ques­ tion o f w ar w as thoroughly circum spect. “It is inconceivable," h e w rote on M ard i 16, in response to the day’s headlines, “that even the gang w ho run Russia w ould b e w illin g to take on w ar, bu t one alw ays has to rem em ber that there seem ed to b e no reason for H itler to start w ar." H ow ever one m ay w eigh politi­ ca l factors in assessing die reactions to C lay’s telegram and the reports o f the intelligence services, the basic point is that the D efense Departm ent had reached the decision that im m ediate expansion o f the Arm ed Forces w as necessary prior to the events in Czechoslovakia and Finland, and that developm ents there w ere seen m ainly as a prom ising occasion to w age the necessary political cam paign. A tb e s t,th e C la y telegram gave im petus to both the cam paign and the. sense of urgency w ith w hich it w as conducted^ I t is unlikely that d ie activities o f the D efense D epartm ent— or their im pact upon the p ublic mood— w ould have been significantly different had the telegram never been sen t*2 (T h e President’s role in generating the w ar scare o f 1948 w as cöfisKİerably less im portant than that o f M arshall and F on estal. T h e im petus for his decision to address a joint session o f Congress cam e from M arshall, and the substance o f d ie President’s proposals clearly com bined the policies sought b y his tw o cabinet officers. In terms o f im pact upon public opinion, the press build-up given the speech w as at least as

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im portant as the speech itself, fo r the predictions o f vast n ew m ilitary initiatives w idely reported prior to the address proved unfounded, despite d ie President’s urgent tontT) There is no reason to believe that d ie President w as T earful o f w ar in M arch 1948. N othing in his memoirs suggests any other con* elusion. In speaking o f events in eastern Europe he states that “to the people o f Europe . . . these com m unist m oves looked like the beginning of a b ig push,” bu t he does not suggest w hat the object o f a “b ig push” m ight have been and seem s to be talking about the general increase in tension that produced d ie Brussels conference, w hich had been initiated w ell before February.48 In any case the President does not suggest that he or anyone else in W ashington w as seriously concerned about w ar, and does not even recall the w ar scare or the C la y tele­ gram. It seems im possible to avoid the conclusion that the w ar scare o f 1948 was yet another exercise in crisis politics b y d ie i Trum an adm inistration. This tim e, how ever, the im pact seems to have been greater than w as bargained for, fo r there w ere reports that both Trum an and M arshalLagere distressed b y the extent o f p ublic hysteria that w as generatetD M arshall regarded the creation o f a w ar m entality as harmfuTTo the cam paign for E .R .P., as d ie likelihood of w ar m ade econom ic aid irrational; there is evidence that he w as far from enthusiastic about die D efense Departm ent’s decision to push for rearm am ent beyond U .M .T. in M arch 1948. His testim ony on the revival o f Selective Service w as notably cool. In M ay he and the President rather abruptly reined in d ie Pentagon’s cam paign to enlarge the m ilitary budget and placed a ceiling on the defense program considerably below w hat d ie Arm ed Forces requested. O n M arch 23 The N ew York Tim es reported that M arshall w ould personally attend a conference in Latin Am erica, and pointed out that this m ove seem ed intended to calm current fears o f w ar. T w o days later G eneral C la y held a press conference in G erm any to say that he was “not die least b it apprehensive” and that “m uch too m uch is being m ade o f this.” 44 D uring the critical days of House consideration o f E .R .P. and prior to d ie initiation o f the D efense D epartm ent’s cam paign for rearm a-

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m ent on M arch 25, how ever, the initiatives o f both M arshall and Trum an trad ed to heighten rather than calm d ie crisis atm osphere. B y perm itting d ie idea o f im m inent w ar to go un­ repudiated once it had been introduced, b y playing to this fear through the m anner in w hich die President's speech w as billed and delivered, both the President and the Secretary o f State perm itted the speculation in the press to grow steadily m ore w ild and d ie public mood steadily m ore agitated. T he final batde in the year-long cam paign for foreign aid w as thus won in the sam e manner as the first.

4. The Institutionalization of the Truman Doctrine Passage of E.R .P. was purchased at a price to the Administration’s policies. Congress, continuing to take the Truman Doctrine UteraUy and inspired by the war scare, amended the program to include aid to China and to restrict East-W est trade.

\ / v

Although th e Adm inistration succeeded in w inning Con­ gressional approval o f its fu ll request for E.R.P. before A pril 1, 1948, the victory w as not total. D uring debate on Interim A id there had been indications that on tw o critical issues— Am er­ ican p olicy tow ard China and East-W est trade— Congress w as inclined to follow the rhetoric o f the Trum an D octrine rather than d ie p olicy o f the Trum an adm inistration. D ebate on E.R .P. reaffirm ed the Congressional attitude on both points. T h e Adm inistration’s China A id Program , prom ised dur­ ing hearings on Interim A id, w as subm itted to Congress on February 20, 1948. It w as clear from the draft program that the Adm inistration intended only a minimum effort. O f the 570 m illion dollars that w as requested, alm ost the entire sum w as to be used to finance im ports o f specific com m odities, par­ ticularly food and clothing, needed for relief; 60 m illion dollars

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w as to b e available for very lim ited reconstruction p rojects, although the State D epartm ent m ade it plain that conditions in China precluded any com prehensive or long-term program o f econom ic recovery. Indeed, nothing w as m ore evident from tiie State D epartm ent's presentation than its reluctance to involve itself in China at all. M arshall described at length th e difficulties the D epartm ent had experienced in devising w ays in w hich aid could b e usefully allocated to China, and in­ dicated that the U .S. could not anticipate m uch progress from the proposed program or look forw ard to a tim e w hen aid to C hina w ould not be necessary. "You w ill w aste a good part o f your effort,” he told Congress. M oreover, the Secretary w as a t pains to m ake it clear that China could b e helped only through initiatives o f the N ationalist governm ent itself, initiatives that could not reasonably b e anticipated in ligh t o f that govern­ ment’s past perform ance, and that the Adm inistration intended to undertake no deep com m itm ent to correcting the situation in China: “. . . the program should not involve the virtual un­ derw riting o f the future o f the Chinese econom y. T he U nited States should not b y its actions b e put in the position o f being charged w ith a direct responsibility for the conduct o f the Chinese governm ent.” In executive session M arshall m ade clear his reason for w ishing to avoid such responsibility: tire com plete defeat o f the N ationalist regim e, he told the Senate Foreign Relations Com m ittee, w as a real and present pos­ sibility.46 T h e Adm inistration’s program w as hardly adequate to satisfy C hiang Kai-shek’s advocates in the Congress or else­ w here. W hile the Adm inistration w as w illing to make a total effort to save w estern Europe from communism, it w as evi­ dently unw illing, Congressm en suggested during tire hearings, to m eet the same problem forthrightly in Asia. Adm inistration witnesses w ere asked, as they had been asked before, to d if­ ferentiate betw een the policies for Europe and Asia. Policies same, conditions different, they repeated. T h ey w ere asked to distinguish betw een conditions in G reece and China. There w ere sim ilarities, they adm itted, principally that the main

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threat to both governm ents w as m ilitary in nature. Y et the Adm inistration proposed no program o f m ilitary assistance to China. It qu ickly becam e evident that m ilitary aid w ould h e d ie m ajor issue betw een the Adm inistration and Congress. T he H ouse Foreign A ffairs Com m ittee heard testim ony from W il­ liam B u llitt and G eneral W edem eyer insisting that China could be saved only b y a substantial investm ent o f m ilitary as­ sistance b y d ie U.S. F eelin g that no program o f m ilitary aid that d ie U .S. could undertake w ould be effective, d ie Adm inis­ tration strenuously opposed such proposals. T h e political lines on d ie China issue had been drawn months previously, how ­ ever, and in M arch the H ouse R epublican leadership an­ nounced itself in opposition to the Adm inistration on this is­ sue.4* T h e b ill reported b y the House Foreign Affairs Com m it­ tee and approved b y d ie w hole H ouse not only provided a specific grant o f m ilitary aid to China bu t included that provi­ sion in the section o f the omnibus b ill covering m ilitary as­ sistance to G reece, a procedure that m ade it clear that Am er­ ica’s commitments to the tw o countries w ere to be id en tica l Although the House version o f the China A id Program was nothing more than a literal im plem entation o f the Trum an D octrine, its im plications for Am erican foreign p olicy could not have been less acceptable to the Trum an adm inistration. In presenting its own China A id Program , the State D epart­ m ent had em phasized its unwillingness to undertake long-term commitments regarding the political and econom ic future of China. In d ie end, the Senate saved d ie Adm inistration from the obvious perils im plicit in the House’s action b y insisting that China aid be provided for in a separate section o f the om­ nibus bill, and b y deleting specific m ention o f m ilitary aid to China. T h e Senate’s action drew expressions o f praise and relief from m any o f E.R .P.’s better-inform ed advocates, and per­ haps these w ere justified in the face o f the threat represented b y the House bill. But fundam entally it w as naïve to expect that the section o f the b ill in w hich aid w as provided or d ie specific language b y w hich it w as extended w ould m ake m uch difference in the m eaning attached to the Adm inistration’s ac­

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tion. W hat w ould b e rem em bered was that the Adm inistration had undertaken a program o f aid to China as part o f a global effort to h alt the spread o f communism. H ow ever m uch the Adm inistration m ay have hedged its bets in presenting the China A id Program to Congress, d ie episode had com m itted the U nited States to the defense o f China if only b y demon­ strating the unwillingness o f the Adm inistration to repudiate d ie Trum an D octrine p u b licly b y facin g up to the difference betw een its attitudes tow ard Europe and Asia. T h e country witnessed a dram atic exam ple o f the Adm inistration’s edginess on this point when the President, at his news conference on M arch n , denied that the U nited States had ever sought to in­ clude d ie Com m unists in a coalition governm ent in China.47 Dem ands for greater restrictions on Am erican exports to communist countries o f potential w ar m aterial had been one of the prim ary Congressional responses and am endm ents to the Trum an D octrine. M oreover, m any m embers o f Congress had expressed their dism ay at the fact that some o f the countries o f w estern Europe that w ere receiving Am erican assistance w ere trading heavy industrial goods to com m unist countries. Skirmishes betw een the Adm inistration and Congress on both issues had occurred during the first session o f the E ightieth Congress, but, as in d ie case o f China policy, the showdown cam e w hen the Adm inistration sought approval o f die Euro­ pean R ecovery Program . B asically, the Adm inistration opposed general prohibi­ tions on Am erican exports o f potential w ar m aterials to east­ ern Europe or d ie Soviet Union. Am erican trade w ith the Com ­ m unist w orld w as profitable and necessary to d ie U nited States. B y one estim ate, 40 per cent o f Am erica’s 432-milliondollar export trade w ith d ie com m unist countries o f Europe m ight com e under a general ban on exports o f potential w ar m aterial. E ven more im portandy, the U .S. w as receiving 20 to 25 per cent of its m anganese and chrom e, both essential to the production o f steel, from the Soviet Union. T o appease Congressional concern on this issue, how ever, the Adm inistra­ tion did take steps to lim it Am erican exports to the U .S.S.R. In

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January 1948 the State D epartm ent announced lim itations on d ie export o f w ar surplus radar in response to Congressional protests that shipm ents w ere being obtained b y the Soviet Union. D uring his testim ony on E .R .P., Com m erce Secretary Harrim an inform ed Congress that all exports to Europe, east and w est, w ould require export licenses after M ard i 1. These steps w ere not enough to satisfy Representative M undt, the m ost outspoken and tenacious opponent o f East-W est trade in Congress, w ho rem inded Harrim an during the hearings that “w e are sort o f engaging in econom ic strife or ideological w ar­ fare or som ething9 and indicated that “w e are going to have to have some kind o f m odification to . . . [die] open trade program w ith the Soviets.” M undt also m ade it clear that he w as dissatisfied w ith the Adm inistration’s attitude tow ard trade betw een eastern and western Europe, a trade w hose continua­ tion w as considered essential to the success o f E.R.P. by die Am erican and European governm ents. Representative M undt, apparendy fearing that w estern Europe w as suicidal, served notice that changes in current policies w ould have to be m ade. “If w e exercise no control w hatsoever,” he pointed out, “if w est­ ern Europe in its natural desire to get w heat and coal, starts trading w ith the satellite countries, or w ith the U .S.S.R., freight cars, trucks, im plem ents of w ar, I cannot see how d ie E .R .P. can succeed under those conditions.” 48 D uring House debate on E .R .P., M undt offered an am end­ m ent to the omnibus b ill directing the adm inistrator o f E.R.P. to refuse deliveries of goods used in the production o f w ar m aterials to governm ents that m ight trade them w ith Com ­ m unist countries. T h e am endm ent further directed the adm inis­ trator to halt Am erican exports to die Com m unist countries o f Europe w henever it was in the national interest to do so. H ow successful Representative M undt w ould have been in obtaining approval o f this am endm ent (w hich the Adm inistration strongly and explicidy opposed) had there been no w ar scare is impos­ sible to estim ate; a poll b y the G allup organization in early February indicated that most Am ericans felt trade w ith the U.S.S.R. should b e stopped. T h e w ar scare, how ever, m ade

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lim itations on trade irresistible. T h e Adm inistration’s position w as further w eakened b y the disclosures o f a House subcom ­ m ittee at the height o f the w ar scare concerning Am erican ex­ ports o f w ar surplus material» particularly forty-six B-24 en­ gines, from N ew York to the Soviet Union and Poland in 1947. D espite the hasty im position b y the Adm inistration o f new export controls to offset these revelations, the M undt am endm ent w as adopted b y the H ouse w ith slight m odifica­ tion. E ven this, in the circum stances prevailing in the House during the vote on E.R .P., represented a m odest victory fo r tire Adm inistration. T h e enflam ed Congressm en cam e close to im posing an em bargo on all Am erican exports to the U.S.S.R. H ie M undt am endm ent was only the beginning o f a continu­ in g political battle that w ould keep the Trum an adm inistration on the defensive for the rem ainder o f its tenure. B etw een 1948 and 1952 Congress w ould include increasingly serious restrictions on East-W est trade in its authorizations o f aid to Europe. T he Adm inistration, unable to contain this tendency, w ould b e constrained in 1951 to publicly oppose E ast-W est trade w hile privately assuring European governm ents that it did not object to this activity.49 T h e attitudes o f Congressional m ajorities on East-W est trade and aid to China, and the Adm inistration’s inability to resist the inclusion o f provisions reflecting them in the E.R .P. legislation, w ere significant sym bols o f the basic political real­ ity o f the year-long cam paign for foreign aid. In M arch 1948, as in M arch 1947, it was clear that the Trum an adm inistration had failed to inspire broad p ublic understanding and support o f its definition of Am erica’s international interests. A t the end o f this year, as at the beginning, Congress affirmed not the strategies o f Am erican foreign policy bu t a rhetoric o f anti­ communism in the m idst o f international crisis. N othing m ade this latter fact more plain than the insistence o f R epublican leaders that the European R ecovery Program w ould be en­ dangered if it w ere offered as a single program rather than as part o f a global effort for the containm ent o f communism. T h e Trum an D octrine, not the M arshall Plan, w as approved b y Congress in M arch 1948.

V II Internal Security, E.R.P., and the Politics of 19 4 8 1. Another Debate on Foreign Aid, Another Drive Against Subversives T he Administration reinforced the anticom m unist appeal of its campaign for E.RJ*. through a highly publicized series of arrests of alien communist leaders. Its spokesmen also began explicitly to denounce opponents of E.R .P. as communists. These tactics were highly supportive of the President’s campaign for nomination sind election.

B y th e t im e Congress began considering the European Re­

covery Program , it w as apparent to anyone w ho had follow ed developm ents in W ashington since d ie Trum an D octrine speech that a new cam paign against dom estic communists could be expected to accom pany the new debate on foreign auO W hen Congress had been considering Greco-Turldsh aid, th e Adm inistration had released the report o f a presidential commission on subversion in the federal bureaucracy and an­ nounced the loyalty program ; w hen it had taken up Interim A id, it had done so in the m idst o f a w ide-ranging Adm inistra­ tion offensive against subversion, effected through educational program s, patriotic rallies, an acceleration o f loyalty investiga­ tions, and d ie issuance of the A ttorney G en erals list. N ow, in the first months o f 1948, as the attention o f the country w as occupied b y the clim actic finale o f the year-long debate on aid to Europe, a series o f aggressive initiatives b y the Justice D e­ partm ent once again rem inded d ie Am erican people o f die

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peril to their internal security represented b y the international com m unist m ovem ent. On January 17 new spapers reported that A lexander Bittlem an, a prom inent official o f the Am erican Com m unist Party, had been arrested on a deportation warrant. An im­ m igrant to the U nited States from Russia in 1912, Bittlem an had joined the Am erican Com m unist Party upon its founding in 1919, and in ensuing years had becom e a Com m unist leader o f national reputation, achieving a position on the Party’s na­ tional com m ittee. Reports o f the arrest indicated (hat action had been taken on specific order from A ttorney G eneral C lark acting under the Im m igration A ct o f O ctober 16, 1918, w hich em pow ered him to deport "aliens w ho believe in, advise, ad­ vocate, or teach, or w ho are m embers o f or affiliated w ith any organization, association, society, or group, that believes in, advises, advocates, or teaches: ( 1 ) the overthrow b y force or violence o f the governm ent o f the U nited States. . . H ie sudden arrest for deportation o f a man w ho had been a resi­ dent o f the U nited States for thirty-six years and an avow ed Party m em ber for twenty-nine years on the basis o f a thirtyyear-old law caused some surprise, and the new spaper reports reflected puzzlem ent over the m eaning o f the Attorney G en­ eral’s action.1 It qu ickly becam e clear that Bittlem an’s arrest w as part o f a pattern. Less than a w eek later it w as reported that C laudia Jones, an im m igrant black w riter, secretary of the N ational W om en’s Com mission o f the Com m unist Party, a prom inent figure in the Young Com m unist L eague, and a mem­ ber o f the International Com m ittee o f the Com m unist Party, had been arrested b y im m igration officials on charges sim ilar to those against Bittlem an. O n February 2 the Justice D epart­ m ent arrested G eih art Eisler, another im m igrant and lately a colorful w itness before the H ouse Un-Am erican A ctivities Com m ittee, on charges o f subversion and passport fraud. E igh t days later new spapers announced the arrest of John R. W illiam son, N ational Secretary of the Com m unist Party. T he charges against W illiam son involved illegal advocacy and m aking false statem ents to officials about his birthplace when

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he em igrated to this country. Six days later Ferdinand C . Sm ith w as arrested. A black im m ig râ t from Jam aica, Secretary o f the N ational M aritim e Union, abd a m em ber o f d ie N ational Com m ittee o f the Com m unist Party, Smith w as charged w ith subversive activity and illegal entry. T w o days later M rs. B eatrice Johnson w as arrested on a deportation warrant. Also an im m igrant, she had been d ie prom otion m anager o f the N ew Masses and a long-tim e Party secretary in N ew York and Chicago. T w o days after Mrs. Johnson’s arrest, im m igration officials announced that Charles D oyle, an im m igrant C .l.O . leader, had been taken into custody. Irving Potash, M anager o f d ie F ur and Leather W orkers Union, an im m igrant and a m em ber o f d ie C entral Com m ittee o f the Com m unist Party, w as arrested for deportation on order from A ttorney G eneral C lark on M arch 1. It w as reported on M arch 6 that the Justice D epartm ent w as investigating H arry B ridges, an Australian, and regional director o f the C .I.O . on the W est Coast, for a possible deportation action. On M arch 18 Immi­ gration officials arrested eight W est Coast aliens for deporta­ tion. T h ey w ere accused o f being members o f subversive organizations.2 These arrests w ere evidendy part o f the deportation drive against com m unist aliens that had been under w ay since 1946. N evertheless, the sudden appearance on the front pages o f the nation’s papers o f articles describing deportation actions against m ajor communist figures w as a surprising de­ velopm ent to m ost people. H itherto the Justice D epartm ent had not portrayed its deportation activities as directed against communists, and in fact had avoided publicizing its efforts in this area. N ow it not only announced that the arrests w ere part o f an anti-com m unist cam paign and openly sought to publicize diem , but its m ethod o f handling the arrests seem ed governed at least as m uch b y a desire to foster p ublic con­ cern over internal security as to execute substantive penalties against specific individuals. T h e distribution o f the arrests at regular intervals over a two-m onth period, for exam ple, m ade sense only from a theatrical point o f view . Insofar as the com plaints against those arrested derived from their connec­

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tions w ith the Com m unist Party (p art or a ll o f the charges in every ca se), the Justice D epartm ent had been aw are o f their activities for years and could have m ade the arrests at any tim e. It is more difficult to pinpoint the dates on w hich the Justice D epartm ent becam e aw are that it could bring actions against several o f diese aliens fo r passport fraud or illegal entry, but in at least one o f the cases, that o f G erhart E isler, the F .B .I. w as fu lly aw are o f d ie relevant incidents b y O ctober 1946 and had recom m ended deportation at that tim e. T h e dram atic tim ing o f the arrests seems to have been deliberate and unrelated to d ie discovery o f bases for deportation. In this context d ie fact that several w ell-know n individuals w ere arrested in a cluster also suggests a desire b y the Justice D e­ partm ent to achieve maximum public effect.3 In at least five o f the cases, m oreover, the arrests am ounted to little m ore than a publicity stunt, for there w as no likelihood that deportation actually could or w ould be ef­ fected. T w o previous attem pts to deport H arry Bridges had failed for lack of evidence o f proscribed activity. Bitdem an, Johnson, and Potash w ere a ll arrested on the sole ground that their m em bership in the Com m unist Party in itself exposed them to penalties under law s prohibiting advocacy by aliens o f violent revolution. T h e Am erican Com m unist Party, o f course, did not adm it that it advocated violent revolution, and (before 1950) the Justice D epartm ent, as Attorney G eneral C lark consistently observed in his elucidations o f the fu tility o f the Sm ith A ct, had never persuaded the courts otherwise. A lso, because these three cases involved deportations to countries in the Soviet sphere o f influence, there w as little chance that expulsion could be accom plished even if the courts perm itted it; experience had shown that Iron Curtain countries w ould refuse to receive individuals deported from the U nited States, and Am erican law held agreem ent w ith the receiving country a prerequisite for deportation— a point C lark freely adm itted and frequently com plained of. W hile it thus seems clear that deportation w as im possible in at least four of the cases, in the instance o f C erhart E isler it seems unlikely that the Justice D epartm ent actually w anted to accom plish expulsion. Eisler's

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attorney pointed out that E isler had been trying to g et out o f d ie country for years and only a year previously had been arrested for attem pting to do so. C learly this dram atic series o f arrests cannot be understood as a sim ple effort to rid the country o f objectionable aliens.4 H ie beginning o f a more satisfying explanation appears to lie in the system of political forces that had developed around the cam paign for foreign aid. It w as obvious to the Adm inistration that the clim actic debate on the M arshall Plan w ould be the occasion for new charges b y Congressional Re­ publicans o f executive laxity in the field o f internal security. T his had occurred during every Congressional debate on for­ eign aid since the Trum an D octrine. Such charges w ere voiced on schedule, most passionately b y Richard Nixon, a young Congressm an from C alifornia anxious to use his seat on d ie Un-Am erican A ctivities Com m ittee to launch a cam paign for the Senate. T h e deportation drive provided the Adm inistration uadi the defenses it required. Responding to Nixon’s charges in an address in Los A ngeles in early M arch, A ttorney G eneral C lark w as able to point to the recent arrests as evidence that he w as w orking actively against subversion in d ie U nited States. B ut the deportation drive, like the actions against dom estic communists during previous debates on foreign aid, had an offensive as w ell as a defensive aspect. T he arrests of E isler, Sm ith, and W illiam son silenced voices that w ere actively w orking against the Adm inistration’s foreign policies. A t die same tim e, they contributed to the developm ent o f yet another upsurge o f popular concern over the internal communist m enace that supported the anti-com m unist appeal o f the cam paign for E .R .P^ Itis probably not too m uch to say that d ie arrests played a m ajor role in preparing d ie country psycho­ logically for the w ar scare o f 1948. T he arrests also appear to have been an extension of a Justice D epartm ent practice of using moments o f p u blic concern over communism to press for new authority in the field o f internal secu n ty^ It w ill be recalled that C lark had attem pted to use the popular agitation caused b y the Canadian spy disclosures in 1946 to prom ote d ie loyalty program , and H oover had attem pted to capitalize

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on concern over internal security during debate on G recoTurldsh aid to expand his influence over loyalty investigations. In the m idst o f d ie popular agitation fostered b y the debate on E .R .P. and the alien arrests, C lark subm itted to Congress several o f the legislative ideas that his staff had developed during 1947. Am ong these w as a proposal that the Attorney G eneral b e em pow ered to detain alien subversives indefinitely w ithout b ail until arrangem ents for deportation could b e com­ p le te d ^ ^ V h ile the deportation drive thus reflected several o f the same political forces that had surfaced during previous de­ bates on foreign aid, the Adm inistration’s use o f this issue in early 1948 w as unique in its explicit and public com bination w ith d ie President’s cam paign for nomination and elec* tioflrSThis cam paign w as going badly at d ie beginning o f 19457 O ne o f the m ajor problem s w as H enry W allace: having declared his readiness to lead a third-party m ovem ent bu ilt around d ie Progressive C itizen’s Association in D ecem ber 1947, W allace w as cam paigning vigorously in early 1948, and his efforts seem ed to b e having an effect. In February Senator G len T aylor, one o f the Adm inistration’s most outspoken critics on foreign policy, announced his decision to join the W allace ticket as the candidate for the vice-presidency. Sim ultaneously, d ie Independent Progressive Party o f C alifornia achieved a dram atic success in a petition cam paign to place die new party and H enry W allace on the prim ary ballot in C alifornia. M ost im portantly, in a contest w id ely regarded as a test o f W al­ lace’s strength, a Progressive candidate decisively w on a spe­ cial Congressional election for a traditionally D em ocratic seat in N ew York C ity, despite active cam paigning for the D em ocratic candidate by M ayor O ’D w yer and E leanor Roose­ velt. In com bination these developm ents appeared to indicate substantial strength for W allace. T he press responded b y granting him m ore extensive and serious coverage. T h e ap­ parent effectiveness o f the W allace cam paign had not been expected b y the President’s political advisers, and began to b e a source o f serious concern to them. There w ere several other signs o f d ie President’s political

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vulnerability. Southern D em ocrats, enraged b y Trum an's civil rights m essage in early February, w ere w ell on the w ay to form ing the Düdecrat Party that w ould ultim ately split d ie Dem ocrats on the right and threaten the sw eep in the South that Clifford’s election strategy had assumed. T he Adm inis­ tration’s confused handling o f the Palestine issue w as jeopardiz­ ing its support w ithin the Jewish com m unity. Both liberals and labor continued to feel and express alienation from the A d­ m inistration for a w hole list of reasons, and stories of corrup­ tion and influence-peddling w ithin the President’s circle o f advisers dam aged his standing w ith d ie general electorate. In these circum stances the President’s chances for nomination, not to m ention election, began to look doubtful. Public opinion polls showed his popularity at a low point and indi­ cated that he w ould be defeated b y D ew ey, Stassen, Vandenberg, or M acArthur. Spokesmen for alm ost every branch o f the D em ocratic Party began to suggest or dem and that he step down. A “D raft Eisenhower” m ovem ent w as launched; it w ould continue to the eve of the convention.8 Since at least N ovem ber 1947, w hen C lifford com pleted his memo on the politics o f 1948, the men around the Presi­ dent had seen the anti-com m unist issue as em inently service­ able in the President’s efforts for nomination and election. It w as believed that the President could retain the support o f urban C atholic voters by em phasizing this issue, and could neutralize H enry W allace b y p ublicly linking him w ith the communists. In the political straits in w hich the President found him self in early 1948, he and his advisers m oved to apply this strategy. On February 23 D em ocratic N ational Chairm an H ow ard M cGrath attacked W allace for accepting the support o f d ie communists. In one o f his speeches of M arch 17, at the height o f the w ar scare, the President tw ice rejected the support o f “H enry W allace and his Com munists,” callin g an alliance w ith the enem ies o f Am erican security too high a price to pay for election. H e repeated the charge that W allace w as an ally o f the communists on M arch 29. T he Com m unist press interpreted the deportation drive com ­ pletely w ithin the context o f this attack on W allace, an under­

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standable view point inasm uch as the arrests sim ultaneously crippled a national organization actively w orking for W allace and branded as crim inal an im portant part o f that organiza­ tion’s leadership. T h e arrest o f Ferdinand Sm ith the day after h e shared a speakers’ platform w ith W allace seem ed a d e a r e f­ fort to associate W allace w ith subversive activity.7 Ç One b f the most interesting exam ples of the relationship betw een the President's political efforts and his use o f the anti-com m unist issue involved his attem pts to secure the sup­ port o f organized laborX ^ lifford considered such support in­ dispensable to the President in 1948, yet labor had been deeply divided in its attitudes tow ard the Trum an adm inistration and its foreign p olid es. T h e leadership o f the C .I.O . had regarded Trum an w ith suspidon at the beginning of his presidency, had objected strongly to his handling o f the w ave o f strikes in 1946, and had form ed an im portant part o f the early resistance to the p olicy o f “firmness” w ith d ie Soviet Union. C .I.O . President Philip M urray had been a vigorous critic o f the President's loyalty order. W ithout doubt the m ajor factor shaping the C .I.O .’s positions on these issues w as the w id ely held view that Trum an w as deserting the liberal, pro-labor policies follow ed b y his predecessor. A secondary bu t nevertheless significant influence on the C .I.O .’s attitudes cam e from tire communists, w ho dom inated several m ajor industrial unions and held sig­ nificant pow er in the national organization. It is a m easure of d ie lim iting influence of politics upon the Adm inistration’s concern w ith dom estic communism that in 1946 and 1947 neither the President nor the A ttorney G eneral attem pted p u blicly to relate com m unist influence in the C .I.O . to the President's difficulties in w inning labor support for his policies. Indeed, the Adm inistration had dem onstrated notable sensi­ tivity to the feelings o f labor w ith respect to d ie issue o f com ­ munism. W hen President Trum an, in his anger at the threatened railroad strike in 1946, w rote a draft statem ent condem ning com m unist influences in labor, the speech w as discreetly shelved under the gentle prodding o f Clifford. W hen the A ttorney G eneral’s list w as issued in D ecem ber 1947, it contained not a single labor union or organization.8

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E ven w ithout official condem nation o f com m unist in­ fluence in the labor m ovem ent, the position o f the communists w ithin the C .I.O . w as increasingly com prom ised during 1946 and 1947 as developing C old W ar tensions exposed latent con­ flicts betw een liberals and communists. T h e national leader­ ship m oved steadily in an anti-com m unist direction and into accord w ith the Adm inistration's policies; Trum an helped this tendency b y vetoing the T aft-H artley A ct and casting the M arshall Plan in a form that seem ed conciliatory to the Soviets. B y O ctober 1947 the national convention o f the C .I.O . w as ready to invite Secretary M arshall to address it, to greet him w arm ly, and to pass a resolution generally supporting his ideas on aid to Europe, though the communists retained sufficient strength to prevent an explicit endorsem ent o f the M arshall Plan. In d ie months follow ing the convention, the Com m unist Party and com m unist leaders and sym pathizers w ithin the C .I.O . de­ cided to throw their w eight against the M arshall Plan and be­ hind a third-party candidacy for H enry W allace. T h e stage w as set for an open conflict betw een these leaders and the national leadership o f the C .I.O . in January 1948 w hen the N ational Ex­ ecutive Com m ittee o f the labor organization passed resolutions supporting E.R.P. and opposing W allace’s candidacy. Several left-w ing unions indicated they w ould not support the national leadership on either p o in t D ivergence b y individual unions from national p olicy was not uncommon in the C .I.O ., bu t in early M arch the national leadership took the unusual step o f in­ sisting that a ll m em ber unions a c c e p tjts position on these tw o issues or face disciplinary action^W aUace and E .R .P. becam e d ie battlefields on w hich the internaT w ar betw een the com ­ munists and anti-communists in the labor m ovem ent w as to be f< vas at this point that the Adm inistration first m oved against union officials it considered communists, and its tar­ gets tended to be the same men w ho w ere defying the national leadership o f the C .I.O . T w o o f those arrested in the deportation drive of early 1948 w ere am ong the sm all group o f labor leaders responsible for the decision to support W al­ lace and oppose E.R.P. These w ere John W illiam son, labor

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secretary o f the Com m unist P arty and the central figure in most accounts o f this decision, and Irving Potash, a high offi­ cial of the F ur and Leather W orkers U nion and one o f the m ajor union leaders to support the dissident m ove. T h e appearance o f Justice D epartm ent officials in San Francisco to consider deportation proceedings against H arry Bridges occurred im­ m ediately follow ing his refusal to support the national leader­ ship o f d ie C .I.O . on W allace and E .R .P. A t a minimum, d ie Adm inistration’s actions show ed its readiness to attack labor leaders w ho w ere opposing both its politics and policies as soon as they had been flushed from the protective shelter o f d ie C .I.O .’s national organization. B ut the arrests also seem ed an attem pt to reconstruct the badly dam aged alliance betw een the D em ocratic adm inistration and d ie leadership o f die C .I.O . that w as so im portant to the President’s am bitions. T h e ar­ rests o f several prom inent labor leaders w ho w ere opposing d ie policies o f d ie C .I.O . leadership w ere clear warnings to other union leaders contem plating support of W allace or op­ position to E.R.P. and thus boosted the efforts o f the C .I.O .’s N ational E xecutive Com m ittee to consolidate the entire or­ ganization behind itself. It w as being rum ored in early 1948 that C .I.O . president M urray w as supporting the m ovem ent to deny Trum an the D em ocratic nom ination. T h e President’s advisers m ay w ell have reasoned that b y throw ing the m uscle o f the federal governm ent behind M urray in his struggles w ithin the C .I.O ., an im portant step w ould have been taken tow ard w inning his support for the President’s own political efforts.10 There is no inconsistency in seeing the deportation drive o f early 1948 in relation to both d ie cam paign for the E uro­ pean R ecovery Program and d ie President’s cam paign few nomination and election. T he “neutralization” o f H enry W al­ lace not only w eakened the appeal o f one of the President’s political opponents, but underm ined the effectiveness o f those w ho w ere resisting C old W ar foreign policy. B y em phasizing the association o f W allace w ith the communists, whose sup­ port W allace refused to renounce, d ie im plication was m ade— as W allace w ith justice charged in response to the President’s

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speech o f M arch 17— that only communists supported his criticism o f the Adm inistration’s foreign policies. This im plica­ tion w as strongly reinforced b y the repeated conjunction of attacks upon dom estic communists w ith debates on foreign aid. A nd such tactics w ere inevitably generating a public at­ m osphere in w hich not only governm ent em ployees, aliens, m embers of dissident organizations, but also individuals in the general population, w ere m ade to feel that public opposition to the Adm inistration’s policies w ould cause them to be branded as communists, w ith all that this was com ing to mean socially and econom ically. A s early as O ctober 1947, a report in T he New York Tim es by W illiam S. W hite on public attitudes tow ard E.R .P. indicated that considerable latent hos­ tility tow ard foreign aid w as being repressed b y people fearfu l o f being considered pro-communist. N ow , in the context o f ş direct attem pt to associate the m ajor national spokesman for the opposition to E.R .P. w ith the communists, this fear w as in­ evitably strengthened. These developm ents prom pted Senator T aylor to tell the Senate o f an anti-Adm inistration rally at w hich F .B .I. operatives had conspicuously recorded d ie names o f all present. T aylor com m ented: I think it is getting so that thousands upon thousands o f loyal Am ericans are afraid to express any opin­ ion at variance w ith the line laid down b y the bi­ partisan m oguls for fear o f being called red or sub­ versive. T aylor’s opposition to the Adm inistration’s policies makes him a tainted witness, but the W ashington Post— whose strong sup­ port o f the Adm inistration’s efforts to prom ote E.R .P. rendered its editors reluctant to criticize that cam paign directly— took note o f the sam e m ood in com m enting upon the reaction o f the W hite H ouse to criticism of the loyalty program b y an Assistant Secretary o f the Interior. "O ne w ould think, judging from the indignation this letter has evoked,” the Post w rote, "that criticism of an executive order is tantam ount to treason. . . . This is a very dangerous idea— the idea that dissent is

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equivalent to disloyalty.** Perhaps the m ost interesting indica­ tion o f the political atm osphere that w as developing in th e U nited States was a com m ent b y Charles Bohlen, the State D epartm ent official directly responsible for the public cam ­ paign for E .R .P. and a man w ho undoubtedly fe lt great personal responsibility for w hat w as happening. In a rem arkable aside inserted in an address on the aims of Am erican foreign p olicy, Bohlen stated: I think is it w orthw hile to digress b riefly to point out that w hen w e use the term Communism, w e need to know just w hat w e mean. . . . A ny loose definition o f Communism w hich w ould em brace progressive or even radical thought o f native origin is not only m isleading but actually dangerous to the foundations o f dem ocratic society. Confusion on this issue and suspicion w hich can be sown betw een Am ericans o f different political view s but o f equally sincere patriotism w ould be o f great advantage to the Com m unist purpose.11 Bohlen’s critique o f the attem pt to associate dissent (note his interesting use o f the term “progressive” ) w ith com­ munism w as, o f course, an attem pt to qu iet the w ind b y w hispering against it, and d ie political dem ise o f H enry W al­ lace in 1948 provided a clear indication o f the extent to w hich the association Bohlen feared was taking hold in d ie U nited States. In January 1948, before the successes o f the Progressives in February and M arch, a N ew York W orld Telegram p o ll showed W allace getting 7 p er cent o f d ie vote in a national election. Follow ing the Adm inistration’s efforts to link W al­ lace w ith the communists, his popularity show ed a steady decline. B y June his support had dropped to 6 per cent, b y A ugust 5 p er cent, and by O ctober 4 per cent. O bservers o f d ie cam paign agree that it w as the association o f W allace w ith th e communists, in the context o f d ie coup in Czechoslovakia and, later, the Berlin blockade, that w as responsible for his steady loss of public follow ing. And w hat happened to the W allace m ovem ent is only partly suggested b y p ublic opinion polls:

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as d ie link betw een W allace and d ie communists becam e es­ tablished in the popular m ind, W allace and his follow ers found them selves increasingly subject to every kind o f har­ assment. It becam e difficult for W allace to obtain m eeting places, and those w ho m ade them selves his lieutenants or advocates frequently becam e the objects o f pressure from their em ployers. T h e first violent attacks upon those attending a W allace rally cam e in A pril. T h ey continued throughout the cam 12 prim ary casualty of this “neutralization” o f die W al­ lace m ovem ent w as not the Progressive Party or W allace him­ self but open p ublic debate about Am erican foreign There are m any com plaints one m ight m ake about W allace as a spokesman for an alternative to C old W ar foreign policy, not the least of w hich was his failure to understand that the H ullian com m ercial policies he advocated had been one o f the m ajor causes o f tension betw een d ie Am erican and Soviet governm ents. A nd it w as true that the W allace m ove­ m ent depended heavily upon the Am erican Com m unist Party for its organizational m uscle, and W allace did seem unw illing to face squarely the issues posed b y d ie loyalty o f d ie com ­ munists to the Soviet governm ent. B ut despite all this, W al­ lace— and W allace alone am ong m ajor national figures— did raise questions about Am erican policy, about the official por­ trayal o f the Soviet Union as the aggressive and expansionist force that w as causing all the w orld’s troubles, and about the econom ic m otives behind Am erican policies, questions that con­ tained a large part o f the truth and bear up at least as w ell as the official rhetoric o f the Adm inistration under the reexam in­ in g eye o f history. These issues m erited fu ll public discussion in 1947-8 b y the m ost responsible and articulate men d ie country could produce. That, in p lace o f this debate, W al­ lace’s argum ents w ere subm erged in a rhetoric o f anti-com ­ munism and official innuendo about his loyalties, his follow ers m ade the subject of harassment and even violence, and mem­ bers o f the genera] public forced to brave accusations o f dis­ loyalty and pro-communism if they listened to the tendency o f his thought, deprived the Am erican people o f the fu ll public

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hearing on momentous Issues to w hich they w ere entitled. M ore than any other feature o f the year-long debate on the foreign aid program , the attack on W allace sym bolized the na­ ture o f the m ethods b y w hich d ie Adm inistration consolidated p ublic support behind C old W ar foreign policy. ^D enunciations o f W allace w ere only part o f the Adm inistratiorPs~broad cam paign against dom estic subversion that w as an integßd part o f the overall effort to m obilize support for foreign a icQ B y M arch 1948, w ith the end o f the debate on E .R .P .,"itw as possible to develop a sense o f the significance o f this cam paign in the year follow ing the Trum an D octrine speech. A ttacks on dom estic communism had helped the effort to m obilize support for E .R .P. b y strengthening d ie anti-com ­ m unist appeal of the Adm inistration’s cam paign for that pro­ gram , reinforcing the tactics o f crisis politics repeatedly em­ ployed in debates on foreign aid, attacking directly opponents o f Am erican foreign policies, intim idating potential opponents, and building an association in the popular m ind betw een op­ position to communism and support for E .R .P. A t the same tim e, the cam paign against subversion had prevented the Republicans from exploiting an issue on w hich they had scored the D em o­ crats in 1946 and on w hich they w ere hoping to capitalize in 1948. Finally, this cam paign helped consolidate the D em ocrats behind the President through its neutralization o f H enry W al­ lace, support of the anti-com m unist elem ents in the labor m ove­ m ent, and appeal to C atholic constituencies! Thus, in the year follow ing the Trum an D octrine speech, the attack upon do­ m estic communism, w hich m any believed to have been forced upon d ie Adm inistration b y R epublican pressure, had been transformée^ into one o f the m ost potent political weapons in the Adm inistration’s arsenal.^

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2. The Republicans T ry to Recapture the Internal Security Issue During the spring of 1948 Congressional Republicans made several attempts to regain the initiative in the field o f internal security, held by the Administration since early 1947. These failed, but the Administration’s use o f the subversion issue during the debate on foreign aid helped ensure that it would be a major factor in American politics in 1948 and thereafter.

^Despite th e usefulness o f the anti-com m unist issue to the Adm inistration in 1947-8, it was b y no means clear that in sponsoring such tactics the President w as not storing up ills that w ould affect his political future.^ Tie problem s of internal security and dom estic communism w ere w ell established as Republican issues in Am erican politics b y reason o f that party’s long advocacy o f stem corrective efforts w ith regard to diem . In prom oting public concern over these m atters, the President w as also inviting Republicans to attem pt to turn the issue against his Adm inistration, just as the rhetoric o f the Trum an D octrine had invited die Republicans to insist upon an increased Am erican effort in China. T he Adm inistration’s early success in seizing the initiative on the issue of em ployee loyalty, and its assiduous efforts to cooperate w ith and out­ flank the Republicans on this issue during the subsequent year, had prevented internal security from becom ing an area o f m ajor partisan contention during the extended consideration o f foreign aid. N evertheless, partisan conflict over this issue had simm ered at the fringes o f political debate since the opening o f the E ightieth Congress. In early 1948, at the start o f an election year that the Republicans believed offered them their best chance to capture the presidency since 1928, and in the anti-com m unist heat generated b y the debate on E.R.P. and the w ar scare of 1948, it w as not possible that they w ould fail to reassert the traditional leadership in the battle against dom estic

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subversion, w hich they believed to b e one o f their m ost ap­ pealing political im ages. Speaker M artin sounded the call to battle in his L in co ln s B irthday address: T h e N ew D eal Adm inistration knew fu ll w ell the intentions o f the Krem lin. W e Republicans w arned o f the m ardi o f communism for ten or tw elve years. W e told the nation the communists w ere sneaking into high governm ent places. N ow it is going to take a R epublican adm inistration to clear out the fifth col­ umnists and traitors from the governm ent structure. Those w ho insisted for years on keeping them there w ill never do the job.18 'There *w ere tw o w ays in w hich Congressional Republicans "could regain the initiative in the field of internal security. T h ey could take advantage o f their control o f Congress to enact legislation more im pressively anti-com m unist than d ie Adm inistration’s program s; they could also act upon their an­ nounced intention o f exposing com m unist infiltration o f d ie federal bureaucracy, a project that they had deferred in early 1947 ow ing to the Adm inistration’s convention o f a federal grand ju iy to hear evidence on tfre .«qihjeet. Both tactics w ere attem pted during the debate on E .R .R ^y A s m ight be expectedf the House Un-Am erican A ctivities Com m ittee)led the w ay. A lthough H .U .A .C . had sponsored no legislation since its creation in 1938, there had been indications in 1947 that its m em bers w ould attem pt to draft a com prehen­ sive set o f statutes to cripple the communist m ovem ent in d ie U nited States. Com m ittee m embers M undt and Nixon had w orked on anti-com m unist law s, and M undt had offered a b ill requiring communists to register as foreign agents. These w ere token gestures, how ever, and it w as not until February 1948 that the com m ittee initiated serious hearings regarding d ie legisla­ tiv e resources available for the batde against Am erican com­ m unists.14 A ttorney G eneral Clark, H .U .A .C .’s first witness, offered a detailed statem ent of the legal and practical obstacles to draft­ in g legislation that w ould effectively curb communist activi-

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ties in the U nited States. I f certain kinds o f activities— such as advocacy o f violent overthrow o f the governm ent— w ere proscribed, he stated, com m unist organizations could escape prosecution b y altering their constitutions to com ply w ith the new requirem ents. It w ould b e extrem ely difficult to prove them gu ilty o f activities or beliefs that they w ould b e at pains not to endorse and w ould undoubtedly specifically repudiate, just as they denied any intention o f attem pting violent over* throw o f the governm ent in order to escape existing bans of such advocacy. If, on the other hand, the law specifically nam ed communist organizations as proscribed, it w ould probably b e struck down as being discrim inatory, in violation o f due process, and possibly a b ill o f attainder. M oreover, if some constitutional legislation could b e drafted that w ould effectively require communists to acknow ledge their sub­ versive intentions, the net effect w ould be to force them under­ ground, m aking their activities more difficult to observe. ). E dgar H oover had opposed bills to outlaw the Com m unist Party on this practical ground. A lthough he did not say so explicitly, C lark’s testim ony strongly im plied that he did not believe sw eeping new legislation to curb the activities o f Am erican communists w as desirable. H e proposed a few am endm ents to existing law s and stated that the F .B .I. w as m ak­ in g a maximum effort to contain the problem o f subversion.18 C lark’s ill-disguised aversion to efforts to proscribe com­ m unist organizations b y law obviously offended H .U .A .C .’s own predilections, and Representative Nixon, w ho conducted the hearings at w hich C lark appeared, w as at pains to extract from the A ttorney G eneral some kind o f sanction for the com ­ m ittee’s intention. H e asked C lark if he did not agree that ex­ isting legislation w as inadequate to deal w ith the com m unist problem . C lark im plied assent b y referring to the fact that he had proposed several legislative ideas him self. Nixon then w on­ dered if the adoption o f the A ttorney G eneral’s proposals w ould fu lly curb com m unist activities. C lark acknow ledged that probably they w ould not do so. F inally Nixon sought the A ttorney G eneral’s opinion o f the general principle o f forced disclosure (requiring com m unist organizations to label them ­

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selves and their propaganda as com m unist) as a means o f deal­ in g w ith d ie problem . C lark replied that if one set aside d ie problem s o f how forced disclosure m ight b e achieved w ithout driving the Party underground or violating the constitution, h e endorsed the general principle o f requiring com m unist organi­ zations to adm it their true nature.1* T h e numerous obstacles to anti-com m unist legislation that C lark cited did not discourage H .U .A .C fO n M arch 15, at the height o f the w ar scare, Representative Mündt- introduced the Com m unist Control A ct o f 1948, HR5852; w hen H .U .A .C . reported the b ill six w eeks later it rested its argum ent for ap­ proval squarely upon the rhetoric o f the President's foreign policy: O n M arch 17 d ie President asked the Congress to appropriate several billions o f dollars to build Am erican defenses against die w orld communist conspiracy of w hich the com m unist m ovem ent in d ie U nited States is a constituent elem ent. . . . T o resist com m unist aggression abroad and ignore it at home w ould be an utterly inconceivable pattern of procedure^ H ie proposed legislation began b y defining the com­ m unist m ovem ent as dom inated b y a foreign pow er, deter­ m ined to establish a com m unist dictatorship in the U nited States, and constituting a clear and present danger to this country; it then provided severe penalties for participation in organizations and activities w ith the purposes it defined com­ m unist organizations as pursuing, and, finally, required organi­ zations designated as com m unist b y the A ttorney G eneral to register w ith the Justice D epartm ent. U nder the b ill, organi­ zations designated com m unist could register w ith the Justice D epartm ent and accept the penalties that this admission w ould bring upon them , or they could deny that the b ill applied to them and accept prosecution for non-com pliance. Q uite ob­ viously, the b ill did not differ significantly from sim ple pro­ scription o f com m unist organizations, w hich C lark opposed on both constitutional and practical grounds.17

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H ouse debate on HR5852 dem onstrated the political pow er that the anti-com m unist issue w as developing in the U nited States. Consider, for exam ple, the m anner in w hich Representative Nixon used A ttorney G eneral C lark’s testi­ m ony before H .U .A .C . on F ebruary 5: T he A ttorney G eneral o f the U nited States . . . w as asked specifically if he did not like the legislation before the Com m ittee to present his own legisla­ tion. H e did not do so bu t he did do this. . . . H e did state that a registration statute applicable to such com m unist organizations w ould be o f assistance to him in m eeting this danger. T h at is one of the prin­ cipal effects of this legislation. . . . T he point I wish to drive hom e is this: the A ttorney G e n e ra l. . . said legislation w as necessary to m eet the clear and present danger of communism to the U nited States. On the basis o f [his] opinion, the Com m ittee acted. W e certainly did not think the Congress, in the face o f d ie A ttorney G eneral’s own statem ent that he did not have . . . the legislative pow er to control this m enace, should sit id ly b y and do nothing. This is w hy this legislation is before the House today.18 It w as a rem arkable speech. H ow, in spite o f C lark’s presenta­ tion o f a com prehensive list o f desirable anti-com m unist m ea­ sures, Nixon could assert that the A ttorney G eneral had o f­ fered no legislation is a m ystery. H ow he could suggest that the A ttorney G eneral endorsed d ie legislation approved b y H .U .A .C ., indeed that H .U .A .C . w as acting at d ie request of d ie A ttorney G eneral, in the face o f C lark’s clear statem ents o f opposition to the kind o f m easure Nixon w as presenting, is an even greater m ystery. It is difficult to believe that the op­ ponents o f HR5852 did not ask C lark to correct Nixon’s dis­ torted use o f his testim ony, and this suggests the greatest m ystery o f all— C lark m ade no public com m ent on HR5852. C lark’s silence is understandable only in terms of d ie political potency that anti-communism had acquired b y early 1948. Indeed, this incident deserves attention only because it reveals the extent to w hich, at this tim e, a high Adm inistration official

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w ith solid anti-com m unist credentials could b e intim idated b y d ie radical anti-com m unists in Congress. Indeed, C lark's subm issive behavior during his interrogation b y Nixon during the hearings, w hen d ie Congressm an tendentiously m aneu­ vered him to obtain an opening (or H .U .A .C . action in an area w here C lark clearly did not w ish d ie Com m ittee to intrude, w as a rem arkable illustration o f the Adm inistration's unw ill­ ingness to place itself in the position of opposing H.U.A.C.*s anti-com m unist efforts. President Trum an, w hose record makes it clear that he w ould have shared Clark's opposition to HR5852, shared also his unw illingness to oppose the m easure in public. A sked at a press conference to com m ent upon the b ill, the norm ally outspoken President rem ained silent, con­ fining him self to a quotation from J. E dgar H oover to the effect that it w as not a good idea to outlaw the Com m unist Party. This incident also reveals the lim ited nature o f the Adm inistra­ tion's real concern about d ie Com m unist Party, for if it regarded die Party as a serious problem it surely w ould have opposed strenuously legislation that J. E dgar H oover believed w ould m ake the effort to contain com m unism m ore difficult.19 If neither the President nor the Attorney G eneral felt suf­ ficiently secure p olitically to denounce a b ill they strongly op­ posed because of the strength o f anti-com m unist sentim ent in the country, it was not possible to expect that m any m em bers o f the House w ould do so. Indeed, during debate on HR5852, several Congressm en com m ented on the political difficulty o f opposing this legislation, and in d ie end only fifty-eight Repre­ sentatives w ere w illin g to do so. T he b ill passed w ith a b i­ partisan m ajority o f three hundred and nineteen Representa­ tives supporting it.20 If the Com m unist Control A ct o f 1948 had ever reached the Senate floor, it is hard to see how it could have been de­ feated in the atm osphere of an election year in w hich Congress had just agreed to spend billions o f dollars to stop communism in Europe. A veto o f this b ill at this tim e in his political career w ould have earned the President more right to the respect o f liberals than his veto o f the Internal Security A ct o f 1950, w hich incorporated HR5852 and cam e in tim e o f less political stress.

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HR5852, how ever, was never reported b y the Senate Judiciary Com m ittee, w hich concluded that it w as certainly unconstitu­ tional, a result that Attorney G eneral C lark helped prom ote b y sending a letter to d ie Senate Com m ittee in M ay specifying legal objections to d ie m easure.21 Thus w as frustrated one sig­ nificant effort b y H ouse Republicans to seize d ie internal security issue. (T h em o st potent w eapon available to H ouse Republicans in th eirefforts to dram atize sim ultaneously die strength o f their ow n opposition to communism and the weakness o f d ie A d­ m inistration’s com m itm ent on this issue w as the investigation and exposure o f w hat they considered to b e the governm ent’s continued em ploym ent o f subversive individuals. This was d ie issue that the Republicans had expected most hopefully to ex­ ploit after d ie 1946 elections, and the area in w hich the A d­ m inistration felt most acutely the need o f d efen d in g itsejn First to raise this issue in 1948, not surprisingly, w as House A p­ propriations Com m ittee Chairm an John Taber. E arly in F eb­ ruary, as the Senate Foreign Relations Com m ittee was debating d ie role o f the State D epartm ent in adm inistering E .R .P., T aber inform ed the W ashington Tim es H erald that his com m ittee w ould soon publish a list o f one hundred and eight undesirable State D epartm ent em ployees, some o f whom w ere security risks for reasons o f disloyalty. This list w as m ade p ublic on February 27, and less than tw o w eeks later T aber reported that tw o em­ ployees had been fired as a result o f his labors. D uring d ie second w eek o f M arch the House Com m ittee on E xecutive Ex­ penditures held a hearing on H am ilton Robinson, State D epart­ m ent Security Officer, whose loyalty was questioned as a result o f the fact that his second cousin w as considered a potential security risk. Robinson resigned his position in the Departm ent shortly thereafter.22 As predictable as Taber’s initiative in first raising d ie sub­ ject o f disloyal federal em ployees w as the flam boyance w ith w hich the H ouse Un-Am erican A ctivities Com m ittee involved itself in the issue. On M ardi 1 H .U .A .C . issued a report denounc­ in g D r. E dw ard U. Condon, D irector o f d ie Bureau o f Stand­ ards, as "one o f d ie w eakest links in Am erican security.” This

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report, w hich T he N ew York Tim es greeted as a "m asterpiece o f unfair innuendo,” w as a collection of Condon’s supposed im­ proprieties, supported b y distorted, inconclusive, and gossipy docum entation. It w as pointed out in the press that the report w as little more than a w arm ing over o f accusations m ade against Condon b y H .U .A .C . Chairm an Thom as during 1947, charges that had been so insubstantial that no hearings had been held on them. T he only im pressive evidence published b y the com m ittee w as a letter from F .B .I. D irector H oover to the Secretary o f Com m erce concerning a security investigation of Condon; it referred to Condon’s suspicious associations w ith a Soviet agent. T w o days after the com m ittee issued its report, how ever, the W ashington Post claim ed to vhave proof that H .U .A .C . had not published H oover’s entire letter, that the com­ m ittee had, in fact, om itted a final paragraph stating that there w as no evidence o f m isconduct on Condon’s part. Subsequently the Post reported that die com m ittee also had doctored Hoover’s letter to strengthen its case against Condon. In response to H .U .A .C .S accusations, Condon requested a hearing. Although a date for such a hearing w as set b y Chairm an Thom as, again, as in 1947, the com m ittee failed to follow through. N o hearing w as held.28 Through the entire Condon episode, the House commit­ tee, not noted for its strict evidentiary requirem ents in m aking charges, provided no reason to believe that its statem ents w ere based upon any substantial inform ation. W hy the com­ m ittee placed itself in a position o f m aking accusations it could not support in order to revive a spent controversy has never been conclusively explained. T h e m ost reasonable theory is that it w as being true to its tradition o f doing som ething spectacular shortly before H ouse consideration o f its budget request, sched­ uled to take place only a w eek after H .U .A .C . issued its re­ port on Condon.24 T h e significance o f the "Condon case,” how ­ ever, lies not in the behavior o f the House com m ittee, w hich w as only dem onstrating yet again its w ell-proven recklessness, but in the responses to it o f the country’s leading politicians: d ie in­ cident dem onstrated more clearly than debate on HRs8«af the determ ination of the R epublican Party to exploit the internal

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security issue and the basic inabilit y o f the Dem ocrats to pro­ vide effective opposition to their efforts^) T h e Condon incident w as fraught w ith political im plica­ tions. Condon had been appointed b y H enry W allace during the latter’s tenure as Secretary o f Com m erce; H .U .A .C .’s action in questioning his loyalty placed Trum an in the position o f de­ fending an official o f his Adm inistration w ho w as associated w ith a man he w as attem pting to associate w ith the com­ munists. U nquestionably the case w as w ell designed to em­ barrass the President, and it is possibly for this reason that H .U .A .C . had die fu ll support o f the H ouse R epublican leader­ ship in its conduct o f the case. In M ay R epublican N ational Chairm an C arroll R eece -urged Congressional Republicans to support H .U .A .C .’s efforts against Condon.28 T h e political di­ mensions o f the incident are therefore clear: w hatever its origins, the incident becam e a partisan effort b y House Repub­ licans to harass and em barrass the President. In this context the response o f House Dem ocrats to the situation w as particu­ larly revealing. I h e House had occasion to vote on tw o issues involving H .U .A .C. in the m idst of the furor over Condon. T he first related to H .U .A .C .’s budget request for 1949, w hich cam e before die House on M arch 9, in the m idst of d ie distressing develop­ ments in Czechoslovakia and Finland and six days after the Post had discovered H .U .A .C .’s omission o f a key passage from the H oover letter. T h e com m ittee w as asking for tw o hundred thousand dollars, tw ice the am ount it had received for 1948 and more than ever had been granted a com m ittee o f the House. H .U .A .C .’s detractors argued that die com m ittee’s beha­ vior in the Condon case ought not be rew arded by doubling its budget. W hatever other Representatives m ay have fe lt on the merits o f this question, not m any o f them w ere prepared to vote against the House com m ittee. T h e requested budget w as passed b y an overw helm ing bipartisan vote, 337-37, w ith 1 Re­ publican and 2 Am erican Labor Party Representatives joining 34 D em ocrats in opposition.26 E ven more significant was H ouse action on the issue o f access to confidential files that grew out of the Condon case.

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In the w ake o f the Post's claim s that H .U .A .C . had published distorted inform ation from Condon's file, d ie Com m ittee as­ serted that it had in its possession only those portions o f the H oover letter published in its report, and requested Secretary o f Com m erce Harrim an to settle the questions about the letter b y m aking available to H .U .A .C . the F .B .I.’s file on Condon. Be­ cause F .B .I. files contained a potpourri o f investigatoiy m aterial — rumors, reports false and true, m iscellaneous accusations that could be, in irresponsible hands, the cause o f considerable unjustified political and personal dam age to their subjects— the p olicy o f die executive bran d i had traditionally been to consider them highly confidential docum ents. C itin g this long­ standing policy, Secretary Harrim an refused to m ake Condon’s file available to H .U .A .C . Com m ittee Chairm an Thom as an­ nounced that he w as prepared for a showdown and subm itted to the House a resolution dem anding that the President m ake Condon's file available, thus raising an issue o f unlim ited im­ plications in terms o f the politics o f internal security. If H .U .A .C . could dem and and receive access to confidential files concern­ ing security investigations o f Adm inistration offidals, w hat havoc it could p lay w ith the issue o f em ployee loyalty! A nd there w as no reason to doubt— indeed, there w as every reason to assume— that H .U .A .C ., as the leader o f the R epublican drive in the field o f internal security, w ould exploit such a precedent to the fullest during die 1948 presidential cam paign. D espite diese obvious ram ifications, the House endorsed H .U A .C .’s de­ mand for access to the files b y an overw helm ing bipartisan vote o f 399-29, w ith 104 Dem ocrats joining ig 6 Republicans in support o f the resolution. This vote, together w ith the vote on H .U .A .C .’s budget, m ade unm istakably clear the irresistible po­ litical pow er that the internal security issue had assumed b y the spring o f 1948. W ith an exam ple o f H .U .A .C .'s irresponsibility and partisanship clearly before them , enormous m ajorities o f both parties had voted to double that com m ittee's resources and provide it w ith access to confidential and explosive in­ form ation about the D em ocratic adm inistration. W hen d ie issue o f Congressional access to confidential inform ation was raised in a second resolution proposed b y the H ouse E xecutive

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Expenditures Com m ittee in M ay, H ouse D em ocrats, not in­ tim idated b y the p olitical consequences o f voting against a com m ittee associated w ith opposition to communism, united in opposition to the m easure.27 T h e significance o f all this w as not lost on President Tru­ man. In the m idst o f d ie Condon episode he decided that the tim e had com e to p u t an end to bipartisan exploitation o f the in­ ternal security issue, and specifically to the practice o f coopera­ tion betw een his Adm inistration and H .U .A .C . w hich had ob­ tained since early 1947. As soon as H .U .A .C . m ade its initial re­ quest for access to the Condon file, the President issued a broad directive stating that “any subpoena, or dem and, or request for inform ation [concerning F .B .I. loyalty investigations] . . . shall b e respectfully d e clin e d . . . and shall be referred to the office of the President for such response as the President shall determ ine to b e in die p ublic interest.” A ttorney G eneral C lark, the archi­ tect o f the Adm inistration's p olicy o f cooperation w ith H .U A .C . in the field o f internal security, now dropped the conciliatory tone he had consistently taken tow ard the com m ittee and pub­ licly accused it of stealing the H oover letter from Com m erce D epartm ent files. W hen H .U .A .C . responded to all this b y w in­ ning House approval o f the resolution dem anding that the Presi­ dent open Condon’s file, Trum an prom ptly announced his inten­ tion to d efy the order. A fter this, the Condon incident petered out. Speaker M artin dem onstrated his com m itm ent to the cause by threatening to sponsor a joint resolution insisting that the file b e opened, bu t his effort failed for lack o f Senate cooperation. 28 (^ T h e Condon incident, like the proposed Com m unist Con­ trol A ct o f 1948, had little practical result, bu t together these incidents indicated an im portant shift o f initiative from the Adm inistration to Congressional Republicans in the field o f in­ ternal security. From early 1947 to early 1948 Congressional Republicans had been forced to accept the cooperation o f the Adm inistration w ith their efforts in this field, and to respond to various Adm inistration actions and initiatives related to in­ ternal security. In these circum stances, their carping criticism s o f d ie Adm inistration did little to im prove their p olitical grip on

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this issue. D riven b y the Adm inistration’s tactics to dem and in­ creasingly stringent action against subversives in order to es­ tablish d ie superiority o f their anti-communism, they had now pushed the issue beyond the point at w hich the Adm inis­ tration, w ith the debate on foreign aid com pleted and W allace a dim inishing problem , w as prepared to m atch diem . T h ey had defied the Adm inistration b y sponsoring legislation that w ould effectively outlaw d ie Com m unist Party. E ven more im por­ tant, they had resum ed the attack upon the Adm inistration s policies tow ard em ployee loyalty. T h e attack on D r. Condon had led to d ie first clear break betw een Congressional R epub­ licans and the Adm inistration on an issue o f internal security. In A pril H .U .A .C . intensified the now open conflict b y issuing a report accusing the Adm inistration o f “coddling” Am erican communists. A ll these efforts w ere, o f course, inept thrusts, w hich the Adm inistration successfully parried, bu t the efforts failed for lade o f substance, not because the Adm inistration had political control o f the internal security issue. Indeed, even in failure these initiatives dem onstrated conclusively the w eak­ ness and vulnerability o f the Adm inistration to Republican ac­ tions in this area. Both the H ouse and broad public opinion had shown that they w ould vote w ith H .U .A .C . if the A d­ m inistration attem pted to block one o f its anti-com m unist initiatives. Encouraged b y this situation, Congressional R epub­ licans w ere m aking clear that they w ere determ ined to re­ assert their traditional dom inance in the field o f internal secu­ rity and w ould m ake a sustained effort to exploit the public fear o f com m unist subversion that the Adm inistration’s cam ­ paign for foreign aid had done so m uch to encourage. T h e de­ bate on foreign aid thus ended w ith the im m ediate achieve­ m ent o f the Adm inistration shadowed b y indications that in die field o f internal security, no less than that o f p olicy tow ard China, the fu ll price o f success had yet to b e reckoned.

V III The Legacy of the Truman Doctrine 1. The Failure of the Marshall Plan _ T he political intent of the Marshall Plan to create a W estern bloc based upon an American*, oriented commercial system was never realized. \ The cause o f this failure was the refusal of the American Congress to reduce barriers to imports, thus preventing the developm ent of balanced trade between Europe and the U.S. Beginning in 1950, the U.S. turned to an integrated, "Atlantic” military organization— N .A .T .O .— for the basis of W estern political cohesion.

/ \

T h e history o f the European R ecovery Program betw een 1948 and 1952, the four years originally projected for its existence, involved the gradual replacem ent o f Am erican econom ic assistance by m ilitary aid and a shift o f articulated em phasis from econom ic and social objectives w ithin a “Euro­ pean” fram ework to the defense and security o f the “A tlantic Com m unity.” In retrospect it is possible to see die first indica­ tions o f these changes as early as the beginning of 1948. A t that tim e Britain, France, and the Benelux federation first suggested a W estern defense organization and initiated negotiations w ith the U nited States that led, in 1949, to the establishm ent o f both the N orth A tlantic T reaty O rganization (N .A .T.O .) and a m odest program o f European rearm am ent financed b y the U nited States. These initiatives, how ever, w ere intended not to replace E.R .P. but to support it, and did not im ply any

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alteration o f the assumption that econom ic aid should b e the prim ary tool and econom ic recovery and reorganization the prim ary aim s o f Am erican p olicy in Europe. N .A .T .O . w as to provide an atm osphere o f security in w hich econom ic re­ covery could proceed as planned; a basic principle o f die rearm am ent program w as that it should not interfere w ith the econom ic objectives o f E.R.P. “N one o f us dream ed at that tim e,” G eorge Kenn an has w ritten, “that the constructive im­ pulses o f this enterprise [E .R .P.] . . . w ould b e sw allow ed up in the space of-tw o. or three years b y program s o f m ilitary as­ sistance.” 1 (Beginning in 1950, how ever, the U nited States assumed th ele a d ersh ip in pressing for greater efforts w ith respect to the defense and rearm am ent o f w estern Europe, and persisted in this course at the expense of both econom ic recovery and econom ic integration in Europe, tw o o f the m ajor announced objectives o f the European R ecovery Pro-

granD

O bviously som ething critical to the conception o f E.R .P. changed betw een 1947, w hen the program w as put forw ard, and 1950, when it w as replaced b y rearm am ent. O ne considera­ tion that had declined in significance during these years in­ volved Am erican exports. In 1947 there had been w idespread fear that unless adequate levels o f exports could be main­ tained, the Am erican econom y w ould suffer a serious postw ar depression. This fear proved less than fu lly w arranted, how ­ ever, as it failed to take account o f significant changes in the structure o f the Am erican econom y since 1930. T h e fear o f a postw ar depression largely disappeared after the m ild reces­ sion o f 1949, from w hich the foreign aid program , along w ith other federal spending program s and m onetary devices, helped extricate the econom y. B y A ugust 1949 the U nited States had begun a new period o f expansion, and, particularly after the outbreak o f w ar in Korea, inflation becam e a far more im por­ tant cQQcera than exports for Adm inistration econom ists.2 C rh e re w ere also significant changes in the realm o f inter­ national politics betw een 1948 and 1 9 5 0 ^ 0 viet actions in Czechoslovakia and Berlin in 1948-9, w hatever they m ay have

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m eant in fact, im pressed m any observers in d ie W est w ith d ie aggressive character o f Soviet p olicy and provided an initial im petus for a strengthening o f W estern defenses. T he Soviet explosion c r f a n atom ic hom b in Septem ber 1949 elim inated thëlV m èncan m onopoly on atom ic energy and w ith it d ie de­ terrent upon w hich Am erican m ilitary p olicy had relied since the w ar. T h e collapse o f N ationalist China shifted the balance o f pow er, it seem ed, in favor o f the Soviets. A n analysis o f W estern defense requirem ents undertaken b y the State and D efense Departm ents follow ing these latter tw o developm ents produced a docum ent, m odestly tided NSC-fif^ calling for m assive rearm am ent o f both the U nited States and w estern E urope and a quadrupling o f d ie annual Am erican defense b u d g e t Finally, the N orth Korean attach across the 38th. par­ allel in June 1950 seem ed to indicate that the Soviet govern­ m ent w as prepared to sponsor m ilitary action against areas beyond the line o f authority established b y its armies during W orld W ar II. It also provided the Adm inistration w ith a po­ litical opportunity to ask Congress to approve the rearm am ent program previously outlined in N SC-68.3 These developm ents, particularly the Soviet explosion o f an atom ic bom b, m ust be credited w ith explaining m ud i o f the increased em phasis upon W estern rearm am ent beginning in 1950. There is, how ever, m uch about the rearm am ent program that these developm ents do not explain. W hy, for exam ple, did d ie U nited States press for die organization o f rearm am ent on an A tlantic basis, w ith direct Am erican participation and leadership, rather than— follow ing d ie m odel o f E.R .P.— on a European basis w ith Am erican support? M oreover, w h y did the U nited States urge the governm ents o f Europe— w hich w ere, after all, responsible fo r the areas endangered b y the presum ed Soviet threat— to undertake levels o f defense ex­ penditure and integrated defense planning significandy greater and m ore elaborate than w hat the Europeans them selves fe lt the situation required, and push this effort to a point that d ie Europeans eventually rejected large amounts o f aid offered b y the U .S. to support its defensive p la n ?4 T h e answers to

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diese questions m ust be found in the relationship betw een the rearm am ent program and the broad political p olicy of die U nited States w ith respect to western Europe. That policy had rem ained essentially unchanged after 1946, at w hich time the U nited States com m itted itself to organ­ izin g a W estern bloc of non-™ ™ ™ »"1'** cfof£“~ A m ari^n leadership. A restatement of this policy provided th*» haşir» fWURWOfk of N SC-68. This paper, like C lifford’s 1946 memo, saw the w orld as divided into Am erican and Soviet spheres o f influence betw een w hich an extended period o f tension w as to be anticipated, though w ar was not inevitable. T he purpose o f Soviet policy— also seen in terms sim ilar to those em ployed b y C lifford in 1946— w as described as the extension o f Soviet pow er through the acquisition o f new satellites and the w eak­ ening o f com peting systems of pow er. T h e appropriate re­ sponse to this challenge w as to construct an opposing and, apparently, equally unified system o f pow er in the W est w ith "the U.S. as its political and m aterial center w ith other free nations in variable orbits around it.” D ean Acheson, die Am erican Secretary of State and one o f the architects o f N SC-68, accepted the challenge it contained as the guiding purpose of his diplom acy; as an ardent cham pion o f the view that Am erica’s most significant interests lay in Europe, he bent his efforts unw averingly to the organization of the A tlantic com m unity behind Am erican leadership. A s a p ublic advocate o f the doctrine o f N SC-68, Acheson’s m essage w as alw ays the same: the U nited States m ust create “situations o f strength” in the non-communist w orld; it m ust prom ote “strength and unity” in the W est; it m ust “m aintain as spacious an environ­ m entas-possible in w hich free states m ight exist and flourish.” 5 \This policy, it m ust be noted, w as at least as political as it was m ilitary. T he construction of an effective defensive system w as im portant, bu t greater em phasis— in N SC-68 and in the p ublic statem ents of the Secretaiy o f State— was con­ sistently given to the broader issue o f consolidating an Am erican-oriented system of power. O n this point the attitude o f the Trum an adm inistration appears to have been consistent from 1949 to 1 9 5 2 ^ originally supported N .A .T .O . not because

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it w ould contain an anticipated Soviet offensive— it w as ac­ know ledged that no such offensive w as likely and that, should one com e, the proposed defense arrangem ents w ould add little to W estern ability to stop it— bu t because it w ould pro­ m ote cohesion w ithin Europe and betw een Europe and North Am erica. Such cohesion, w hich inevitably involved Am erican dom inance o f w estern Europe, w as an essential part o f d ie conception o f the W estern bloc, for Munity in Europe,” Acheson told Congress in 1950, “requires the continuing assistance and support o f the U nited States. W ithout it free Europe w ill fa ll apart.” T he relative w eights attached b y Acheson to develop­ ing a cohesive organization o f the A tlantic com m unity and developing a m ilitary defense against Soviet attack w as sug­ gested b y his response to d ie defensive arrangem ents approved at d ie Lisbon m eeting o f the N .A .T.O . m inisters in 1952. This w as a critical m eeting, the culm ination of tw o years o f Am eri­ can efforts to develop an acceptable basis for integrated A tlantic rearm am ent. But reviving Franco-Germ an rivalries seem ed to be threatening the w hole program . T h e high costs o f Am erican defense proposals w ere causing the European governm ents to com plain that econom ic recovery w as being underm ined. A t Lisbon a special com m ittee reported on the defense levels that could be attained consistent w ith the econom ic capabilities o f Europe. Upon hearing the report, Om ar B radley, d ie Am erican C h ief o f Staff, insisted that it did not provide for forces ade­ quate to defend Europe against a Soviet attack. T h e proposals did represent, how ever, force levels that the N .A .T.O . m inisters could and did accept, and Acheson, far from being dejected, w as exultant. “W e seem ed to have broken through a long series o f obstacles and to have finally started tow ard a m ore united and strengthened Europe and an integrated A dantic defense system ,” he later w rote. “T he w orld that lay before us shone w ith hope.” T h e goal, quite d ea rly, had been to establish an Am erican-oriented p olitical organization in the W est, not to p rovid e protection against a Soviet m ilitary thrust.6 Although Am erica's basic political p olicy tow ard Europe — the organization o f the W estern bloc or A tlantic com m unity behind Am erican leadership— rem ained unchanged from 1946

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to 1952, the strategy for achieving it altered radically. C lif­ ford’s 1946 memo specifically stated that the p rim aiy tool for d ie developm ent o f the W estern bloc should b e econom ic aid. T h e assumption o f Am erican p olicy during 1946-8 w as that Am erican econom ic strength, translated into program s o f financial aid, could b e used to create an Am erican-oriented économ ie and com m ercial system upon the basis o f w hich a W estern p olitical bloc could b e consolidated. D uring diese years Am erican econom ic pow er w as consistently used to support political elem ents in Europe friendly to the U nited States, to underm ine those that opposed Am erican leadership, and to com m it the countries o f Europe to the m ultilateral com m ercial practices that w ould bind them into an Am ericanoriented econom ic system . A s the ineffectiveness o f French efforts to prom ote an independent Europe “betw een east and w est” in 1945-6 indicated, this strategy had been im m ensely successful. Y et N SC-68 proposed an entirely different m ethod for organizing d ie W estern bloc. W hat d ie situation now required, this docum ent held, was “a bold and massive program o f rebuilding the w est’s defensive potential.” From 1950 onward, rearm am ent through N.A.T.U. rather than econom ic aid through E.R.P. was die mechanism for the organization o f the W estern bloc. The issue therefore arises: outside o f the positive, strate­ g ic considerations urging rearm am ent upon d ie U nited States, w as there any com pelling reason w hy the political strategy o f econom ic aid should have been rejected in 1950? T h e pros­ pect o f dim inishing Am erican-aid paym ents after 1952, o f course, prom ised to reduce Am erican leverage on European politics, bu t this developm ent had alw ays been anticipated, and it had been hoped that, prior to this tim e, the W estern bloc could be firm ly established. A more fundam ental point w as that, despite the success o f E.R.P. in rehabilitating the econ­ omies of western Europe, the program failed as an instrum ent for consolidating the W estern bloc on a long-term basis. This failure w as significandy related to die netw ork o f dom estic political problem s catalyzed b y the foreign aid program and by the response o f the Trum an adm inistration to them>

T he Legacy o f the Truman D octrine

325

Am erica s com m ercial program for the postw ar w orld had alw ays involved one consistently underem phasized con­ tingency; m ultilateral commercial principles could not be adopted b y E nropegjj states unless the U nited States accepted significantly increased imports from Europe!N ^ere~w as'"both a political and an econom ic basis for this. T he political point w as that other trading nations w ere not likely to reduce bar­ riers to Am erican exports unless the U nited States m ade reciprocal reductions in its tariffs and quotas/ T he econom ic issue, equally im portant, stemmed from d ie fact that the m ain financial problem o f European nations after the w ar w as a n f Hnllgr«- it w as to protect dollar reserves that re­ strictions on im ports from Am erica w ere im posed b y the governm ents of Europe in 19 4 ^ 7. O nly through increased dollar earnings by European countries could this problem be overcom e, and an increase in Am erican imports was the m ost obvious w ay for this end to be attained. This point, and its relationship to the political goals of d ie. U nited States, w as fu lly understood b y Am erican officials. Acheson stressed it in tts"D e lta Council speech of M ay 8, 1947, b y stating that v w e inrdie'U flited Stàtës m ust'take a slà rg e a volum e o f imports as w e possibly can. . . . There can be no stability or security in the w o rld fo r any öFuş until foreign eonntriey fire able to pay in com m odities and services for w hat they need to im port." ‘C t ÿfdn~mâde the point w ith equal clarity w hen he told the Congress that the success o f the European R ecovery Program depended upon the establishm ent of the International Trade O rganization. T he basic vehicle for m odifying the Am erican tariff w as the R eciprocal Trade Agreem ents Program , and the m embers o f the Trum an adm inistration w ere explicit about the im portance of this legislation to their entire foreign policy. In supporting R eciprocal Trade, for exam ple, Acheson argued that "the preservation and developm ent o f sound trading re­ lationships w ith other countries of the free w orld is an essen­ tial and im portant elem ent in d ie task of trying to build unity and strength in the free worl947; John O ’D onnell in th e Washington Tim es Herald, O ctober 17 , 1947; J e n y G reene in ibid., D ecem ber 2 , 1947. F or the appointm ent o f sp ecial com m issions, see W esterfield, p p . 2 75 -6 . 35. F or the S tate D epartm ent p u b lic inform ation program , see W . P h illip s D avidson : "M ore T h an D ip lom acy,” in M arkel, p . 139. F or p u b lic opinion on the M arshall P lan, see the Public Opinion Quarterly ( P O Q ), Sum m er 1948, p . 365; su rvey o f opinion in TNYT, Septem ber 28, 1947. 36. F or V andenberg, see A rthur H . V andenberg, Jr.: The Private Papers o f Senator Vandenberg (B oston , 19 5 2 ), p . 38 1; the A k o p s in th e W ashington Post, July 9, 1947. F or L o vett, see M illis and D uffield, p . 296. F or F orrestal, see ibid., p. 305. P h illip s in TN YT, July 20, 1947. F or Stassen, see M illis and D uffield, p . 310 . R esten in TNYT, O ctob er 29, 1947; Washington Post ed itorial o f N ovem ber 6 , 1947. F or Sum ner W elles, see (hid., N ovem ber 1 1 , 1947. 37. See C rip p s’s speech in TNYT, O ctob er 9 ,1 9 4 7 ; also reports in TNYT, on O ctober 9 and 10. F or discussion o f official concern w ith grow th o f state trading in E urope in late 1947, see "E con om ic R eport,” dated D ecem ber 30, 1947, Bureau o f B u d get fold er, C lifford Papers, (W ash in gton , D .C .). 38. F or discussion o f altern ative w ays to finance E urop e, see A rthur

386

39.

40.

4 1.

42. 43.

44.

45.

46. 4 7.

48. 49.

T he T ruman D octrine and M c C arth yism K rock In T N Y T , Septem ber 30, 1947; G ardner, p p . 3° 3- 5; James R est on in TNYT, O ctober 22, 1947. F or H arrim an’s com m ent, see M illis and D uffield, p . 302. F or anti­ com m unism and re lie f as the b est argum ents fo r foreign a id , see Jones, p. 179 ; the A lsops in th e W ashington Post, July 9, 1947; W illiam S. W h ite in TNYT, O ctob er 3 1, 1947. F or early reports o f the sp ecial session, see James Reston in TNYT, M ay 25, 1947; C a b e ll P hillips in TN YT, July 20, 1947; M illis and D uffield , p . 306. F or Trum an’s m eeting w ith le a d e n , see A ssociated Press (A P ) story, July 15 , in V andenberg Scrapbook, V andenberg P ap en . See letter from L o vett to V andenberg o f Septem ber 2 1, 1947» V andenberg P a p en . F or the ca llin g o f the sp ecial session, see W esterfield, p. 280. P h illip s, “T h e M irror C a lled C ongress,” pp. 19 5 -9 ; Ross, p p . 2 9 -54 ; M acD ou gall, p p . 15 4 -5 , 163, 2 0 0 -1. C lifford m em o discussed in P h illip s, 19 7 -9 ; Ross, p . 2 1 -7 ; A l Y am ell, “ T h e Im pact o f th e P ro­ gressive P arty on th e D em ocratic P arty in th e 1948 P residential C am paign,” unpublished doctoral dissertation, (U n iv e n ity o f W ash­ ington, 19 6 9 ). C liffo rd quoted in Y am ell, p p . 2 6 -7 , 3 3 -4 . M an h all: H ouse Com m ittee on F oreign A ffairs, Interim A id for Europe hearings, p . 8. F or analyses o f the econom ics o f Interim A id , see ibid., p p . 88, 140, 148, Senate Com m ittee on F oreign R elations, European Interim A id A ct of 1947 hearings, p . 56. F or Trum an statem ents, see his Public Papers, 1947, pp. 476, 492. F or th e report on G reco-T urldsh a id , see TN YT, N ovem ber 1 1 , 19 4 7. F o r the H arrim an report, see President’s Com m ittee on F oreign A id : European Recovery and American A id (W ash in gton , 19 4 7 ), pp . B 6 -7 . See Jam es F . Byrnes : Speaking Frankly (N e w Y ork, 19 4 7 ), pp. 295, 306 ff; B yrnes does not m ake clear w h o w ere th e friends w ho urged him to w rite the book, b u t Forrestal had been suggestin g th e d isclo­ sures m ade b y Byrnes since the sum m er (see m em o from Forrestal to L o vett o f 15 July 1947, Forrestal Papers, Box 12 5 ), and took a great interest in the book’s p o litical im pact (se e m em o from F orrestal to B yrnes o f N ovem ber 1, 1947, Forrestal Papers, Box 12 6 ). C layto n ’s article w as “ Is T h e M arshall Plan O peration R athole?” , Saturday Evening Post, N ovem ber 29, 1947. F or strikes, see M arquis C h ild s in the W ashington Post, M arch 16 , 1948. V andenberg’s com m ent in his Private Papers, p . 380. See also C R , 8 0 :1, p. 10702. F o r B usby, see C R , 8 0 :1, p . 1 1 1 5 5 . T e d L ew is in th e W ashington Tim es Herald, N ovem ber 17 , 1947. D irksen q uoted in ibid., D ecem ­ b er 13, 1947. F or th e A IP O p oll, see the W ashington Post, N ovem ber 2 1, 1947. T h e p oll o f D C residents is in ibid., N ovem ber 10, 1947. F or Congressional view s on E ast-W est trade, see T e d L ew is in th e

N otes

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W ashington Tim es Herald, D ecem ber 15 , 1947. F o r K now land’s com m ent, see C R , 8 0 :1, p. 10827. F or th e reduction o f the Com ­ m erce D epartm en t program , see d ie W ashington Tim es Herald, O ctob er 1 7 , 1947; ed itorial in the Washington Post, N ovem ber 25, 1947; article on T horp testim ony b efore Senate A ppropriations C om ­ m ittee in ibid., D ecem ber 13, 1947; series b y Lippm ann on E astW est trade in th e W ashington Post durin g N ovem ber. 50. F or C h in a, see T a n g T sou: America’s Failure in China (C h ica g o , 19 6 3 ), p p . 4 5 1-6 4 ; W esterfield, ch ap ter titled "T h e R ediscovery o f C h in a.” F or K ennan’s efforts, see K ennan, pp. 339, 359, 3 7 0 -1. F or the N ationalist cam paign fo r m ore U .S . aid, see M illis and D uffield, p . 285. F or V andenberg’s com m ent, see letter from V andenberg to M arshall o f June 24, 19 4 7, V andenberg Papers. 5 1 . F or V andenberg, see letter from V andenberg to W eb b er o f O ctober 14 , 1947, V an den berg Papers. F or D ew ey, see articles in th e Wash­ ington Tim es Herald on N ovem ber 2 1 and 2 5, 1947. F or Adm inis­ tration efforts, see T an g, pp. 464-70 ; W esterfield, pp. 26 2 -3 ; Senate C om m ittee on F oreign R elations, Interim A id hearings, M arshall's opening statem ent and testim ony on p. 43; H ouse Com m ittee on F oreign A ffairs, Interim A id hearing?, p p . 2 -3 , 7. F or th e JuddV orys efforts, see W esterfield, p . 262; editorial in th e W ashington Post, D ecem ber 1 1 , 1947. F or V andenberg on C h in a as a R epublican issue, see letter to Stevenson, A p ril 5, 1948, letter to K now land, D e ­ cem ber 1 1 , 1948, letter to M cG riff, Ju ly 1 , 1947, V andenberg Papers. F or com m ent on the W edem eyer m ission, see R uth M ontgom ery in d ie W ashington Tim es H erald, January 8, 1948.

V T he C old W ar at H om e 1. F or C ongressional inaction on the loyalty-program b u d get, see m em o, Spingam fo r file, o f A p ril 9, 1947, Spingam Papers, Internal Secu rity file; m em o from C lifford to the President o f M ay 7 , 1947, Trum an Papers, O F 2 5 2 -K (4 5 -4 7 ). F or the R ees lo ya lty b ill, see E a rl L a ­ tham : The Communist Controversy in W ashington (C am b rid ge, M ass., 19 6 6 ), p . 368; Congressional Record ( C R ) , 8 0 :1, p p . 8942 ff, 8950 ff. F or B ridges and V in cen t, see letter from V andenberg to Peterson o f M ay 2 7, 1947, V andenberg Papers. 2. T h e b est account o f this incident is in B ert A ndrew s: W ashington W itch H unt (N e w York, 19 4 8 ). F or the legislative history o f the State D epartm ent b u d get in 1947, see C R , 8 0 :1, p p . 5 18 7, 7886, 8265. F or M arshall's concern w ith com m unist propaganda in E urope, see W alter M illis and E . S . D uffield, ed s.: The Forrestal Diaries (N e w York, 1 9 5 1 ), pp . 24 2-3 ; see M arshall’s speech o f July 1 , 1947, in Department of State Bulletin ( D S B ), V ol. 17 , p . 83. F or M arshall’s statem ent on T ab er, see in terview o f M iall b y Brooks in O ral H is-

388

3.

4.

5. 6.

7.

T he T ruman D octrine and M cC arth yism to ry P roject on E R P a t Trum an L ib rary. F or com m ent in press su g­ gestin g th at som e o f d ie ten are Com m unists, see d ie W ashington Tim es Herald, N ovem ber 3 , 1947. W ashington Post cites from ed i­ torial, "S ecu rity R esignations,” N ovem ber ig , 19 4 7 and ed itorial, N ovem ber ix , 1947. F or th e F B I-C S C conflict, see m em o from Spingam to F o le y o f A p ril 9 , 1947, Spingam Papers, Internal Secu rity file. Spingam quote from m em o o f Spingam to F o ley o f A p ril 4, 19 4 7, Spingam papers, T reasury D epartm ent file; see also d ie N ew Y ork Herald Tribune, M ay 12, 1947. F or C lark ’s position, see m em o from d ie A ttorn ey G eneral to the President o f M ay 1 , 1947, Trum an Papers, O F 2 5 2 -K (4 5 -4 7 ). F or C liffo rd s quote on Trum an’s position, see p en ciled note dated M ay 2, 1947, in E lsey Papers, Su b ject file, Internal Secu rity, F ed eral E m ployee L o ya lty Program (T ru m an L ib ra ry ). F o r Trum an’s quote, see co p y o f note from Trum an to C liffo rd in E lsey Papers, S u b ject file, Internal Secu rity, F ed eral E m ployee L o ya lty Program . F or resolution o f conflict, see series o f mem os b y Spingam in S pin gam Papers. See the sam e source fo r final C ongressional action. F or an excellen t statem ent o f th e relationship b etw een u n ity and secu rity, see the President’s A d visory Com m ission on U niversal T rain ­ in g, Report (W ash in gton , 19 4 7 ), p . 20. F or com m unist propaganda cam paign, see J. E d gar H oover: Masters of D eceit (N e w York, 19 5 8 ), p. 75. F or a general discussion ö f the A ttorn ey G eneral’s list, see E lean or B ontecou: T he Federal Loyalty-Security Program (Ith a ca , N . Y ., 19 5 3 ). F or the C on n ecticu t State Youth C on feren ce, see th e W ash­ ington Post, D ecem ber 6, 1947. F or th e N ational C ou n cil, see "C om ­ p lain t fo r Injunction and D eclaratory Judgm ent,” filed w ith th e U .S. D istrict C ou rt fo r the D istrict o f C olum bia, m im eographed co p y in the files o f the A C L U , V o l. 9. F or a general discussion o f th e im pact o f the list on organizations, see Bontecou, pp. 202-3. f o r discussion o f institutions th at used the list, see B ontecou, p p . 1 7 7 -8 , 2 0 0 -1; also the testim ony o f R alph S. Brow n in Senate C om m ittee on th e Judiciary, 84:2, hearings b efore the Subcom m ittee on C onstitutional R ights, p p . 252-80. F or the Suprem e C ou rt opinions, see Joint AntiFascist Refugee Com m ittee v . McGrath, 341 U .S. 12 3 ,19 5 0 . F or th e President’s E xecu tive O rder, see E .O . 9835, quoted in Barton J. Bernstein and A . J. M atusow , eds.: The Truman Adm inis­ tration (N e w York, 19 6 6 ), p p . 358 -63. F or th e com m ission’s in­ tentions regarding the list, see m inutes o f the Subcom m ittee o f th e President’s T em porary Com m ission on January 14 , 1947, Spin gam Papers, President’s T em porary Com m ission, 1946, V .X I; see in th e sam e file the m inutes o f the com m ission m eeting o f January 15 , 1947, and m em o fo r the file on the com m ission m eeting o f January

15. 8. L etter from C lark to L o eb o f M ay 10, 1949, A C L U files.

N otes 9.

10 .

11.

12 .

13 . 14 .

389

See C lark testim ony b efore H U A C in H ouse Com m ittee on U nA m erican A ctivities, F eb ru ary 5, 1948, hearings on legislation to ou tlaw the Com m unist P arty, pp. 2 1-2 ; also, C lark letter to th e Senate Judiciary in Senate Com m ittee on th e Judiciary, hearings on H R 5852, 80:2, p. 424. F or a history o f such lists, see A u gust Raym ond O gd en : T he D ies Com m ittee (W ash in gton , D .C ., 19 4 3 ), p p . 17 , 25, 35, 15 7, 178 . F or C lark on p u b lic listin gs, see H U A C hearings on legislation to ou tlaw the Com m unist P arty. F or H oover on p u b lic listin g, see “ R ed Fascism in the U nited States T o d ay,” Am erican, F ebru ary, 1947. F or discus­ sion o f the list m aintained durin g W orld W ar II, see B ontecou, p . 17 . F o r th e lack o f relationship betw een th e 1947 list and governm ent em ployees, see B ontecou, p . 174 ; also, the opinion o f M r. Justice Bur­ ton in 34 1U S 128 . It should b e m entioned, fo r the record, that C lark w as under pressure from various lib eral spokesm en to publish the list on the ground that a secret list w ould b e pernicious and create an atm osphere o f unresolvable suspicion: see th e editorial in th e W ashington Post o f N ovem ber 1 1 , 1947; statem ent b y E lean or R oosevelt in T he New York Tim es ( T N Y T ), M arch 26, 1947; R obert Cushm an, “ T h e President's L o ya lty P urge,” Survey Graphic, M ay, 1947. See also T N Y T fo r A p ril 13, 1947, p. 10, A p ril 2 0 ,19 4 7 , June 1, 1947» Septem ber 12 , 1947, D ecem ber 9, 1947. See C lark ’s testim ony b efore H U A C on F ebru ary 5, 1948, in H U A C hearings on legislation to ou tlaw the Com m unist P arty, p p . 18, 2 2 -4 , 32; see also C lark’s testim ony to the Senate Judiciary in Senate Com ­ m ittee on the Judiciary, 8 1 :1 , hearings on S1832, p p . 3 2 1-2 . F o r Forrestal’s internal ad vocacy o f som ething like the A ttorn ey G en­ eral’s list, see m em o from Forrestal to C liffo rd o f O ctob er 16, 1947, F orrestal Papers, Box 126. F or C lark ’s inquiries on le g a l lia b ility , see m em o from F ord to M cG regor o f A p ril 17 , 1947, V anech Papers, Box 1 , file F B I-L o ya lty . F or C lark’s testim ony to H ouse A ppropriations, see H ouse Com m ittee on A ppropriations, hearings on Justice D epartm ent b u d get fo r 1949, D ecem ber, 1947, p . 13: see also testim ony o f T . V incent Q uinn in ibid., p . 67. See the m em o dated July 24, 1947, from E delstein and D u ggan to M cG regor, V anech Papers. F or G reek-A m erican organizations, see Stephen D . X ydis: G reece and the Great Powers (T hessalon ike, 19 6 3 ), p . 546. F or the A m eri­ can S lav C ongress, see the statem ent o f D r. L ou is L . G erson re­ gardin g opposition o f A S C to M arshall Plan in C on feren ce o f Schol­ ars on E R P , Trum an L ib rary. T h e Post quote is from the editorial o f D ecem ber 6, 1947; for other reactions to th e 1947 list, see the W ashington Tim es Herald, D ecem ber 6, 1947 (H U A C ); B ontecou, p . 172 . T h e N ational C o u n cil C ase is interesting fo r show ing w h at an organization had to go through to obtain redress and for how long

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T h e T ruman D octrine and M cC arth yism

an unjustified citation could rem ain in effect. T h e N ational C o u n cil first sued fo r redress in D .C . D istrict C ou rt in 1948 and w as one o f three cases in volvin g th e list d ecid ed b y th e Suprem e C ou rt in Joint-Ànti-Fascist v . McGrath in 1950. T h at decision rem anded th e case to the D istrict C ou rt w ith instructions th at the governm ent show cause fo r its citation . T h e A ttorn ey G en eral subm itted an affidavit to th e court stating, though not docum enting, his reasons fo r considering the C o u n cil a com m unist-front organization. T h is affidavit asserted that the C ou n cil w as organized b y the Com m unist P arty, th at its leaders w ere appointed b y the P arty, th at th e P arty took active leadership in the C o u n cil’s financial affairs and a ctivities, th at the C ou n cil consistently supported the Com m unist P arty lin e. T h e C ourts held this inform ation sufficient to ju stify th e A ttorn ey G en eral’s listin g. M eanw hile, the Internal S ecu rity A ct o f 1950 h ad been passed, establishing the Subversive A ctivities C on trol B oard (S A C B ) and ordering the A ttorney G en eral to require su bversive organizations to register w ith the governm ent. T h e N ational C o u n cil w as ordered to register. It disputed the designation and w as granted a hearin g b y S A C B . A s the charges brought b y the governm ent w ere id en tical to those upon w h ich the C o u n cil’s designation on the A t­ torney G en eral’s list w as pred icated, it is fa ir to assum e th at th e inform ation presented b y the governm ent durin g this hearin g w as also that w h ich had led to the origin al listin g. S A C B found the order to register justified. T h e N ational C o u n cil appealed. T h e F ed eral C ircu it C ou rt o f W ashington, D .C ., ruled in 1964 th at the evid en ce presented b y the governm ent w as not sufficient to prove th at th e C ou n cil w as established b y the C P or th at its finances or activities w ere controlled b y the Com m unists. T h us, sixteen years after b ein g cited b y the A ttorn ey G eneral, the C ou n cil w on its reversal; assum ­ in g the final decision to be just, th e C ou n cil had been e ffective ly crip p led fo r sixteen years w ith ou t cause. See 104F. Supp. 56 7, p p . 5 7 0 -1 and 32 aF .ad 3 75. 15 . See the W ashington Post ed itorial o f D ecem ber 9 , 1947; see also the opinion o f M r. Justice D ouglas in 3 4 1U S 12 3 . F or B row n’s state­ m ent, see B row n’s testim ony b efore Senate Subcom m ittee on C on ­ stitutional R ights, 84:2, pp . 233-4 ; fo r w idespread use o f th e list, see ibid., pp . 252-80. For the relationship betw een support o f th e M arshall P lan and anti-com m unism , see W illiam S. W h ite in T N YT, O ctob er 3 1 , 1947. F or speculation on W allace, see Frank W ald rop in the Washington Times Herald, D ecem ber 1 1 , 1947; see also num erous speakers in th e H ouse d eb ate on H R 5852, 80:2. F or th e F B I attitu de tow ard W allace, see D avid L ilien th al: The Journals o f David Lilienthal, V ol. II (N e w Y ork, 19 6 4 ), p . 180. F or opposition to th e M arshall Plan and lo ya lty cases, see A lan D . H arper: The Politics of Loyalty (W estp ort, C onn ., 19 6 9 ), p. 49. 16. F or the early history o f th e relationship betw een opposition to radicalism and im m igration law s, see W illiam Preston, Jr.: Aliens

N otes

391

and Dissenters (C am b rid ge, M ass., 19 6 3 ); John H igham : Strangers in d ie Land (N e w Y ork, 19 6 5 ). See also W alter G oodm an: T he Com m ittee (N e w Y ork, 19 6 8 ), p . 9; L atham , p . 34. 1 7 . F o r N ational L aw yers G u ild , see the statem ent and resolution b y it o f Ju ly 5 and 7 , 1946, in Trum an Papers, O F 10 M ise. ( 19 4 5 19 4 6 ). F or C lark ’s statem ent o f F eb ru ary 1947, see H ouse Com ­ m ittee on A ppropriations, hearings on Justice D epartm ent A ppro­ priation fo r 1948, p . 17 . F or th e deportation-drive sh ift into high gear a fte r d ie Trum an D octrin e, see th e article in th e W ashington Post, F ebru ary 2 a, 1948, “ A lien R ed O uster Push H its S trid e." F or C lark ’s statem ent a t the year’s end, see H ouse Com m ittee on A ppro­ priations, hearings on Justice D epartm ent b u d get fo r 1949, p . 39. F or C lark and report on eth n icity o f com m unists, see Latham , p . 42; see also C lark's testim ony in Senate C om m ittee on the Judiciary, hearings b efore Subcom m ittee on Im m igration and N aturalization on S1832, 8 1 :1 , pp. 3 18 -2 0 . F or L ip sh itz, see articles b y W estbrook P egler in the Washington Tim es Herald fo r January 9 and 10, 1948. 18 . F or E isler, see the W ashington Tim es Herald, F eb ru ary 3, 1948, p . i ; in terview in Daily W orker, F ebru ary 1 , 1948. F or W illiam son, see TN YT, F ebru ary 1 1 , 1948. F or Sm ith, see the Washington Tim es Herald, F ebru ary 17 , 1948; C urtis D . M acD ougall: G ideon's Army (N e w Y ork, 19 6 5 ), p . 397. F or C lark quote, see his testim ony b efore H U A C on legislation to ou tlaw the Com m unist P arty, F eb ­ ruary 5 ,1 9 4 8 , p . 3 1. 19 . F or Lippm ann, see Lippm ann’s letter to F orrestal o f N ovem ber 1 1 , 1946, F orrestal Papers, Box 7 o ( L ) . F or F orrestal, see F orrestal’s let­ ter to M arshall o f F eb ru ary 6, 1947, Forrestal Papers, Box 125. F or Patterson, see letters H ow ard to Patterson o f A ugust 15 and 16, 19 4 7, and attached response from Patterson to H ow ard, Papers o f R obert Patterson (L ib ra ry o f C o n gress). 20. T h e report o f O ctob er 1947 is in th e W ashington Tim es Herald, O ctob er 18, 1947. F o r the new sm en’s lo ya lty program , see the letter from Cornish to F oster o f O ctob er 4, 1948, A C L U files, 1948, V ol. 10; letter from H olm es to Forrestal o f O ctob er 5, 1948, in ibid .; letter from F orrestal to F oster o f O ctober 6 , 1948, in ibid.; letter from B aldw in to F oster o f O ctob er 13 , 1948, in ibid.; TN YT, O cto­ b e r 2 1, 1948, and D ecem ber 15 , 1948. F or F orrestal’s censorship plan, see the W ashington Tim es Herald, M arch 5 ,19 4 8 ; the Washing­ ton Post, M arch 30, 1948; Jam es R . W iggin s: Freedom or Secrecy (N e w Y ork, 1964) p p . 10 0 -1; R obert Sum m ers: Federal Information Controls in Peacetim e (N e w Y ork, 19 4 9 ); fo r a related developm ent, see the story on C la y ’s controls on new s reporting in G erm any in the Washington Post fo r A p ril 25 and 26, 1948. F or th e A S N E resolu­ tion, see th e W ashington Post, A p ril 18, 1948. 2 1 . F o r the history o f this provision, see m inutes o f d ie Subcom m ittee o f the President’s T em porary Com m ission on E m ployee L o ya lty for January 23, 19 4 7, Spingarn Papers, President’s T em porary Com m is-

392

T h e T r u m a n D o c t r in e

and

M c C a r t h y is m

sion, VJCI, F i; m inutes o f the Subcom m ittee m eeting o f F e b ra a iy 14 , 1947, in ibid.; letter from P eu rifoy to V an ech o f F eb ru ary 13 , 1947, in ibid.; m em o from the Justice D epartm ent to th e P resident’s T em porary Com m ission o f F eb ru ary 18, 1947, in ibid.; m em o from Spingarn to F o ley o f F ebruary 16, 19 4 7, in ibid. See also hearin gs o f th e H ouse C om m ittee on E xpenditures in the E xecu tive D ep art­ m ents, 8 0 :1, N ovem ber 14, 1947, pp. 1 3 -1 4 , 2 1 , 2 7, 32, 34. 22. F o r C lark ’s b e lie f in th e need fo r n ew controls, see his testim ony to H U A C hearings on legislation to ou tlaw Com m unist P arty. F o r legislation prepared in the Justice D epartm ent relative to th is, se e m em o from Spingarn to the President o f Ju ly 14 , 1950, S p in gam Papers. F o r the quotation from the d raft rules, see th e C om m ittee on E xecu tive E xpenditures, hearings o f N ovem ber 14 , 19 4 7, p p . 13 -14 -

23. F or the A S N E resolution, see d ie W ashington Tim es Herald, O cto­ b e r 2 7, 1947. F or d ie investigation b y d ie H ouse Com m ittee on E xecu tive E xpenditures, see the hearings o f N ovem ber 14 , 19 4 7. F or T ru m an s com m ent, see H arry S. T rum an: Public Papers (W a sh ­ ington, D .C ., 19 4 7 ), p . 482. F or the press reaction, see th e W ash­ ington Tim es Herald, ed itorial o f N ovem ber 10, 1947, a rticle o f N ovem ber 15 , 1947; G eorge Sokolsky on N ovem ber 2 7, 1947; F ran k H olem an on D ecem ber 30, 1947. F or Ferguson, see C R , 80 :2, p . 10190. F or L o vett, see C R , 80 :2, p . 10190. 24. F or the M agil incident, see th e Washington Post, M arch 2 5, 1948, A p ril 2 , 1948, A p ril 3, 1948. F or Isaacson, see M acD ougall, p . 399. F or W allace, see M illis and D uffield, pp. 2 6 1-2 . F o r Justice p o licy on com m unist visitors, see hearings b efore Senate Subcom m ittee on Im m igration and N aturalization, July 15 , 1949, testim ony o f A ttor­ n ey G eneral C lark . F or n ew rules governin g alien visitors, see th e W ashington Post, January 17 , 1948; see also T id e 8, C h ap ter 1 , C o d e o f F ederal R egulations, 13 FR296. F or an incident arisin g under these new rules, see stories regardin g treatm ent o f M adam e Joliot-C urie in the W ashington Tim es Herald, M arch 19 , 1948, p . 4; the Washington Post, M a rd i 20, 1948, A p ril 22, 1948. 25. F o r C lark ’s statem ent, see th e W ashington Post, N ovem ber 22, 19 4 7; press release o f A p ril 1 1 , 1947, D epartm ent o f Justice, in A C L U files, V ol. 9, D epartm ent o f Justice, #2; TNYT, M ay 1 1 , 1947, p . 3 5 . F or th e com m ission on m ilitary training, see th e report o f the P resi­ dent’s Com m ission on U niversal T rain in g, p . 20; Com m ission on H i^ ie r E d u cation : Report (W ash ington, 19 4 7 ), p p . 2 , 7 -1 3 . F o r F orrestal, see letter from F orrestal to W h itn ey o f M arch 14, 19 4 7, Forrestal Papers, Box 125. F or Studebaker, see TNYT, D ecem ber 1 , »947, P- 3 1. 26. F or Stim son, see H enry L . Stim son and M cG eorge B undy: O n A ctive Service in War and Peace (N e w York, 19 4 7 ), p . 597; Stim son D ia ry , Stim son Papers, January 9, 1945, p . 2. F or M arshall, see Senate A rm ed Services Com m ittee, 80 :2, hearings on U niversal M ilitary

N otes

27. 28.

29. 30.

3 1.

32.

33 .

393

T rain in g, p . 5. F or Forrestal, te e th e record o f a phone conversation b etw een F orrestal and H oyt o f D ecem ber 2, 1947, F orrestal Papers, Box 74 ( H ) . F or Trum an, see H arry S . Trum an: Years of Trial and H ope (G ard en C ity , 19 5 6 ), p . 54; also T rum an: Y ear of D ecisions (G ard en C ity , 19 5 5 ), p p . 5 10 -12 . F o r B row n, see M illis and D u ffield, p p . 24 3-4 . See U .S. O ffice o f E d u cation , A nnual R eport, 1947. Studebaker’s sp eech reported in TNYT, A ugust 3 1 ,1 9 4 7 , E 7. F or a description o f the "Z ea l fo r A m erican D em ocracy” program , see d ie O ffice o f E ducation’s A nn ual R eport, 1948, p p . 4 8 5 -7. F or th e A m erican F ederation o f T each ers, see TN YT, A u gu st 18, 1947, p . 19. F or sam ple bulletin s issued un der th e Z eal fo r A m erican D em ocracy Program , see bulletins num bered 10, 1 1 , and 15 , issued durin g 1948. See the O ffice o f E d u cation , A nnual R eport, 1948; A nnual R eport o f F ederal S ecu rity A gen cy, 1949: O ffice o f E d u cation , p p . 10 -16 . F or typ ica l d a r k statem ents on this su b ject, see bis sp eech in Boston on M ay 10, reported in TN YT, M ay 1 1 , 1947, p . 35; sp eech in D an­ v ille , K entucky, reported in TN YT, N ovem ber 16, 1947, 2 5:2 . It is also interesting to note J. E d ga r H oover’s preoccupation w ith th e problem o f ju ven ile d elin qu en cy durin g this period. T h is subject com pletely dom inated featured articles in the FBI Law Enforcem ent Bulletin durin g 19 4 6 -7. It is interesting to sp ecu late on how the O ffice o f E ducation could h ave d eveloped program s that in m any w ays ran counter to th e ideas inherent in other Adm inistration p olicies. T h is p rob ab ly reflects a num ber o f factors, in clu d in g lack o f coordination w ith in the gov­ ernm ent, th e tenden cy o f the O ffice o f E ducation to take th e rhetoric o f th e A dm inistration's foreign p o licy literally, and, perhaps m ost im portant, the a b ility o f A m erican officials to id en tify pow er politics p layed b y them selves w ith W ilsonian liberalism . F or th e origins o f Freedom T rain , see the W ashington Post, N ovem ­ b er 22, 1947; "C a p ita l Stuff” in th e Washington Tim es Herald, M arch 4, 1948. F o r the W h ite H ouse C on feren ce, see TN YT, M ay 16 , 1947, 1 1 :4 . See also TN YT, M ay 23, 1947, 5 :1 , and article in th e Magazine. F or V andenberg, see letter from V andenberg to R oberts o f A u gu st 12 , 1947, V an den berg Papers. F or refe rences to internal secu rity in d ie d ebate on Interim A id , see C R , 8 0 :1, p p . 110 64 ( B e ll) , 110 9 g (R o b iso n ), 110 95 (H o ffm an ), 11086 (R a n k in ), 1 1 1 1 0 (M u n d t), 1110 3 (K e rste n ), 110 39 (R a n k in ). F or references to th e relation­ ship o f internal secu rity to inflation in the d eb ate on Interim A id , see C R , 8 0 :1, p p . 110 6 7 (L a n d is ), 110 39 (B u ffitt), 1 1 1 5 1 (K n u t­ so n ). F or C liffo rd ’s m em o, see Irw in Ross: The Loneliest Campaign (N e w York, 19 6 8 ), p p . 2 3 -4 ; H arper, p . 66. F or com m unist support o f W allace, see M acD ougall, pp. 252, 2 5 6 -7 .

394

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34. F or th e S tate D epartm ent, see TN YT, O ctob er 8, 1947; A C L U p ress release, O ctob er 13 , 1947, A C L U files, V oL 19 , C iv il S ervice # 2, 1947. F or F lem in g, see d ie W ashington Tim es Herald, O ctob er 2 8 , 1947, p . 1. F or th e L o ya lty R eview B oard, see th e W ashington Tim es Herald, N ovem ber 9, 1947, p . 1; “T h e F ed eral D ia ry ,” b y Jerry K lu tz, in d ie W ashington Post, N ovem ber 14 , 19 4 7. 35. TNYT, N ovem ber 1 1 , 1947, p . 29; TNYT, N ovem ber 29, 1947, 1 5 :5 ; TNYT, D ecem ber 1 ,1 9 4 7 . 36. F o r th e p atriotic rally, see th e W ashington Tim es Herald, Novem ­ ber 20, 1947. F or C lark , see th e W ashington Post, N ovem ber 2 7 , 1947. F o r M artin, see d ie W athington Post, N ovem ber 28, 19 4 7. F or Trum an, see TNYT, N ovem ber 29, 1947. F or V andenberg, se e C R , 8 0 :1, V andenberg’s opening sp eech on Interim A id . 3 7 . See the W ashington Tim es Herald, O ctob er 29, D ecem ber 7, D ecem ­ b er 9 , 1947. 38. See R obert E . S trip lin g: T he Red Plot Against America (D r e x d H ill, P a., 19 4 9 ), p p . 63, 65. F or the file on E isler, see H U A C , 8 0 :1, hearings regardin g H anns E isler. F or the deportation request, see TN YT, Septem ber 2 7, 1947. F or Justice's com pliance and Thom as’s quote, see TNYT, O ctober 3, 1947. 39. See H U A C , 8 0 :1, hearings regarding Com m unist Subversion in H ollyw ood. F or a discussion o f d ie registration cards, see R obert K . C arr: The House Un-American A ctivities Com m ittee (Ith a ca , N .Y ., 19 5 2 ). F o r R ussell, see H U A C H ollyw ood hearings, p . 296. F o r attem pts to im plicate the R oosevelt adm inistration, see C R , 80: x, A2687; C arr, p p . 58, 6 8 -9 . F or contem pt citations, see T a b le, note 26, C h ap ter III. 40. F or leaks, see th e Washington Tim es Herald, O ctob er 16 , 1947, p . 1 , “ C a p ita l Stuff” b y John O ’D onnell; also d ie W ashington Post, N ovem ber 5 , 19 4 7, N ovem ber 1 1 , 1947, p . 1; the Washington Tim es Herald, D ecem ber 1, D ecem ber 7 / 19 4 7 . F or a com plete list o f these leaks, see V olum e 1 7 o f US v . Dennis, pp. 12 8 7-9 . F or R ogge, see TNYT, N ovem ber 8, 1947; letter to the author o f F ebru ary 7 , 1967. F or C h ild s, see th e Washington Post, N ovem ber 2 1 , 1947. F or the N ational G uard, see th e W ashington Post, N ovem ber 10, 1947. 4 1. F or M acL eish , see TNYT, M ay 17 , 1947, 1 7 :1 . F or K ennan, see G eorge F . K ennan: Memoirs (N e w Y ork, 19 6 9 ), p. 3 17 . F or Conant, see TNYT, O ctob er 18, 1947. F o r Schlesin ger, see TN YT, N ovem ­ b er 2, 1947, V I, p . 7. 42. F or the A dm inistration’s assurances, see Trum an’s statem ent to the L o ya lty R eview B oard, N ovem ber 14 , 1947, in Public Papers, 1947, p. 489. F or tension in the fed eral bu reau cracy o ver secu rity, see L ilien th al, w ho is fu ll o f references to the grow ing paranoia am ong fed eral adm inistrators; see esp ecially V o l. II, pp. 189-90 . F o r H U A C s intentions, see d ie Washington Post, D ecem ber 2 7, 1947. F or p ublic support fo r H U A C , see the C a llu p p oll in the W ashington Post, D e­ cem ber 5, 1947. S tate actions are discussed in W alter G ellh om : The

Notes

395

States and Subversion (Ith a ca , 19 5 2 ), pp. 7 -8 , 55, 282, and th e clos­ in g essay, " A G en eral V ie w .” F or universities, see th e W ashington Post ed itorial o f D ecem ber 20, 1947. F o r the P hiladelphia incident, see TN YT, N ovem ber 2, 1947. F or N ew Y ork, see T N Y T , N ovem ber 17 , 1947, 4 :5 . F or T renton, see M acD ou gall, p . 2 15 . F or other incidents, see M acD ougall, p p . 2 15 ff.

V I T h e B a ttle for th e E uropean R ecovery P rogram 1. F or the Adm inistration’s ob jectives, see the Senate C om m ittee on F oreign R elations, h e a rin g on E R P , pp. 4 -6 . T h e D alton quote is an excerpt from th e D alton D iaries fo r June 2 7, 1947, cited in C on ­ feren ce o f Scholars on the E uropean R ecovery Program , M arch 2 0 -1, 1964, H arry S. Trum an L ib rary, p . 2 1. 2 . See d ie Department o f State Bulletin ( D S B ) , 1948, V o l. 18 , p . 4 5 1; the A k o p s in the W ashington Post, January 7 , 1948. 3. T h e quotation is from an article, c. the first w eek in January, 1948, foun d in the V andenberg Scrapbooks, V andenberg Papers. F or the A dm inistration’s failu re to subm it breakdow n o f aid , see th e letter from V andenberg to Snyder o f January 24, 1948, V andenberg Papers. F or polls on isolationism , see C h ap ter I, note 53. F or th e p o litica l im pact o f inflation, see d ie A k o p s in the W ashington Post, D ecem ber 5, 1947. 4 . See analyses o f T a ft’s view s and th eir significance in th e Washing­ ton Tim es Herald fo r O ctober 29, N ovem ber 29, and D ecem ber 1, 1947. F or the W h erry group, see the W ashington Post, January 14 , January 3 1, 1948; the A kop s in the Post, January 14, 1948; “ C ap ital C ircu s” in th e Times Herald, January 16, 1948. F or th e H erter pro­ posal, see the Tim es Herald, D ecem ber 19, 1947. 5. T h e fo llo w in g p oll regarding the President’s p op u larity w as p u b ­ lished in th e Washington Post, A p ril 2 3 ,19 4 8 . Q u ery: D o you approve or disapprove o f th e w a y Trum an is han­ d lin g his job as President?

Jan. 4 7 F eb . 47 M arch 4 7

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

35

47 39 23 33 29 30

48

60

NOOPINION l8 13 17 13 l6

Ju ly 4 7 54 O ct. 4 7 55 T od ay 36 14 See also th e A k o p s in the Post, F ebru ary 4, 1948; C a b e ll P hillips in The New York Tim es ( T N Y T ) , M arch 7 , 1948 ( E 3 ) ; John O ’D on­ n ell in the Tim es Herald, M arch 24, 1948; M arquis C h ilds in the Post, M arch 2 6 ,19 4 8 .

396

T h e T r u m a n D o c t r in e

and

M cC

a r t h y is m

6. T h e R ecords o f T h e Com m ittee fo r th e M arshall P lan are housed at d ie Trum an L ib rary; D SB is b est source fo r official speeches. A lso , fo r C layto n , see Ross P ritch ard: "W ill C layto n : Industrial States* m an ," unpublished d octoral dissertation ( F letch er School, T u fts Uni* versity, 19 5 6 ). F or Forrestal, see W alter M illis and E . S . DufiBeld, ed s.: The Forrestal Diaries (N e w Y ork, 19 5 1 ), p . 367. F or C lark , see TNYT, January 2 1, 1948, 13 :4 . 7 . F o r th e em ergence o f th e anti-Soviet them e du rin g sum m er o f 1947, see A cheson’s speech o f June 15 , DSB, V o l. 16 , 1947, p . 12 2 1. F o r M arshall’s report to nation, see the Tim es Herald, headline articles fo r D ecem ber 16 and 19, 1947. F or B ohlen’s, M arshall’s, and D ou glas’s statem ents on E R P , see Senate hearings on E R P . 8. F or the P o licy P lanning S taff quote, see H arry B ayard P rice: T he Marshall Plan and Its Meaning (Ith a ca , N .Y ., 1 9 5 5 ), p. 22. F o r th e role o f the idea o f p astoralizin g G erm any on U .S. plans, see M anuel G ottlieb : The German Peace Settlem ent and the Berlin Crisis (N e w Y ork, i9 6 0 ), pp. 3 6 -9 and gen erally. F or the U .S . attitu d e tow ard plann ing for occupation and its im pact on developm ents in G erm any, see P h ilip E . M osely, "T h e O ccu pation o f G erm an y," F oreign Affairs, V o l. 28, N o. 4, July 1950. F or the U .S. position on le v e l o f industry, see L u ciu s C la y : D ecision in Germany (G ard en C ity , 19 5 0 ), p . 109; E . F . Penrose: Econom ic Planning for Peace (P rin ceton , 19 5 3 ), p . 295. F or U .S. intransigence on G erm any, see B ru ce R . K u klick: "C om m erce and W orld O rd er," unpublished doctoral dissertation (U n iversity o f Pennsylvania, 19 6 8 ), gen erally; B laisd ell letter dated O ctob er 1 , 1946, in B laisd ell Papers, Box 7 , "M iscellaneous D ocu ­ m ents from the London M ission: 19 4 5 -4 6 ." 9 . F or M arshall’s testim ony, see Senate Com m ittee on F oreign R ela­ tions, hearings on E R P , pp. 2, 4 , 10. F or the D efen se position, see ibid., p p . 444, 478, 485-8. F o r pu blication o f th e docum ents, see the Washington Post, January 22, 1948; the W ashington Tim es Her­ ald, January 22, 1948. See B evin ’s quote in the Post, F eb ru ary 5, 1948; see also Lippm ann in the Post, F eb ru ary 12 , 1948. 10. F or the G eorge-M arshall dispute, see the Senate Com m ittee on For­ eign R elations hearings on E R P , pp . 15 9 -6 1. F or M arshall's opening statem ent to the H ouse, see the H ouse C om m ittee on F oreign A f­ fairs, Hearings on Postwar Recovery Policy, pp. 2 9 -3 1. 1 1 . F or th e first M arshall quote, see the Senate Com m ittee on F oreign R elations, E R P H earings, p. 4. F or th e M arshall-Javits d ialogu e, see th e H ouse Com m ittee on F oreign A ffairs, Hearings on Postwar Recovery Policy, p . 98. F or Trum an, see TN YT, M arch 26, 1948, p. 8. 12. F or M arshall’s Pittsburgh sp eech, see DSB, 1948, V o l. 18, p . 108. F o r M arshall quote, see th e H ouse Com m ittee on F oreign A ffairs, Hear­ ings on Postwar Recovery Policy, p. 3 1. F or D ouglas, see p p . 16 3 -4 . F or H arrim an, see the Senate C om m ittee on F oreign R elations, E R P

N otes

13.

14 .

15 .

16 .

17.

18 . 19 .

20. 2 1. 22.

397

hearings, p . 249. F o r K rug, see ibid., p . 355. F o r A nderson, see p p . 3 1 5 -1 6 . F or V andenberg, see ibid., p . 325. F or A dm inistration argum ents on inflation, see p p . 240, 242, 243, 2 5 1, 2 5 5 -6 ; H ouse C om m ittee on F oreign A ffairs, Hearings on Postwar Recovery Policy, p p . 329-30. F or the self-sacrifice them e, see B ohlen’s sp eech in DSB, 1948, V o l. 18 , p . 78. F or the C layton -V an d en berg disagreem ent, see th e letter from D u lles to V andenberg o f M arch 4, 1948, and rep ly o f M arch 6 , 1948, V an­ denberg Papers. F or D ouglas, see the H ouse C om m ittee on Foreign A ffairs, Hearings on Postwar Recovery Policy, p. 163. F or C layton , see ibid., p p . 322, 324, 325, 3 77. F or V andenberg’s assessm ent o f the rum or that C layton w ould b e the E R P adm inistrator, see th e letter from V andenberg to M arshall o f M arch 24, 1948, V andenberg Papers. F or E R P and tax reduction and inflation, see the Survey R esearch C en ter p oll o f "b etter inform ed citizen s” and Fortune p oll o f business executives, sum m arized in m em o from Collisson to K rug, F eb ru ary 5, 1948, subject file, Box 66, K rug Papers (L ib ra ry o f C o n gress). F o r the le v e l o f p u b lic aw areness o f E R P , see M artin K reisberg: "D ark A reas o f Ignorance,” in L ester M arkel et a l.: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (N e w Y ork, 19 4 9 ), p . 52; Public Opinion Quarterly (P O Q ), Sum m er 1948, p . 365. F or p u b lic conceptions o f E R P , see K riesberg, p. 55. F o r V an den berg and B arkley, see the Washington Post, January 2 7, 1948. See th e Alsops in the Post, January 26, 1948, and Lippm ann in ibid., January 20 and F ebruary 9, 1948. See the A lsops in the Washington Post, January 25 and 26, 1948; Lippm ann in th e Post, F ebru ary 9, 1948; see also M arquis C h ild s in d ie Post, F eb ru ary 1 1 , 1948; Post editorial, F ebru ary 1 1 , 1948; Post article b y A lfred F rien d ly, January 28, 1948. L ippm ann in th e Post, F eb ru ary 9, 1948; the Alsops in ibid., Jan­ uary 2 6 ,19 4 8 . F or letters ad op tin g A cheson’s lin e, see V andenberg’s letters to Benscoe o f M arch 4, to B ennett o f M arch 5, to G race on M arch 7 , 1947, V andenberg Papers. F or th e A dm inistration’s use o f V anden­ berg as a speechm aker, see M illis and D uffield, p . 3 4 1. V andenberg’s quote is from his Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (B oston, 19 5 6 ), p. 380. V andenberg’s Scrapbook in the V andenberg Papers contains an excellen t com pilation o f new spaper articles on his grow ­ in g role as a presiden tial candidate. H . B radford W esterfield: Foreign Policy and Party Politics (N e w H aven, 19 5 5 ); the A lsops in the Post, F ebru ary 18, 1948. F or E aton, see the Tim es Herald, January 2, 1948, p . 2. F or M cC orm ack, see th e Papers o f the Com m ittee fo r the M arshall P lan (C M P ), m inutes o f m eeting o f D ecem ber 18, 1947. F o r Com ­

398

23.

24.

25. 26. 2 7.

28. 29.

30.

3 1. 32.

33.

34.

35. 36.

T h e T r u m a n D o c t r in e

an d

M c C a r t h y is m

m ittee fo r th e M arshall P lan, see C M P m inutes o f D ecem ber 18 , Stein 's reports from W ashington on F ebru ary 6, 20 and 26, 1948, in C M P p a p e n ; letter from Patterson to P h ilbin o f F eb ru ary 20, 1948, B ox 4 1, Patterson Papers (L ib ra ry o f C o n gress). F o r th e A lsops, see the Port, D ecem ber 28, 1947, and F ebru ary 4, 1948. F o r L ip pm an n , see th e Port, D ecem ber 24, 1947. F or H eiter, see th e Washington Port, F eb ru ary 28, 1948. F or th e H ouse C om m ittee, see TN YT, M arch 2, 1948. F o r M artin, se e TNYT, M arch 8, 1948. TN YT, M arch 9 , 10, and 12, 1948; th e W ashington T im es H erald, M arch 10, 1948; th e Washington Port, M arch 12, 1948; M arquis C h ild s in the Post, M arch 10, 1948. M arquis C h ild s in the Port, M arch 4, 1948; the Port, F eb ru ary 2 7, 1948. TNYT, M arch 1 1 and 12, 1948; the lim e s Herald, M arch 14, 1948; H arry S. Trum an: P u b lic Papers (W ash in gton , D .C ., 19 4 8 ), p . 178 . T h e text o f Byrnes’s speech is printed in the Senate C om m ittee on Arm ed Services hearings on Universal Military Training, 80 :2, p p . 399-403; see also TN YT, M arch 14 , 1948; th e Tim es Herald, M arch 12, 1948; the Port, M arch 14, 1948. F or M arshall, see the Washington Port, M arch 16 , 1948. H eadline in the Times Herald, M arch 15 , 1948. TN YT, M arch 16, 17 , 18, 1948; the W ashington Port, M arch 16 , 18 , 1948; the W ashington Tim es Herald, M arch 16, 17 , 18, 1948. T ru ­ m an’s speech in his PubUc Papers, 1948, p . 182. M arshall quote in Senate Arm ed Services C om m ittee, U M T hearings, p . 4. F or headlines, see TNYT, M arch 19 , 20 and 2 1 , 1948; th e W ashington Tim es Herald, M arch 18, 19 , 1948. TN YT, M arch 2 1 and 24, 1948; d ie W ashington Tim es Herald, M arch 2 1 and 24, 1948. F o r Forrestal, see his opening statem ent to Senate Com m ittee on Arm ed Services, U M T hearings on M arch 25, 1948. F or Sullivan , see ibid., p . 365; TNYT, M arch 26 and 28, 1948; the W ashington Port, M arch 26, 1948; the W ashington Tim es Herald, M arch 26, 1948. TN YT, M arch 13, 1948; the Washington Tim es Herald, M arch 13, 1948; th e A b op s in the Washington Port, M arch 17 , 1948; Jerry K lu tz in th e Port, M arch 28, 1948; W alter Lippm ann in the Post, M arch 3 0 ,19 4 8 . F or M artin, see TNYT, M arch 17 , 1948; th e W ashington Port, M arch 17 , 1948. F or the H ouse Com m ittee action , see TN YT, M arch 18, 20, 1948. F or th e H ouse C om m ittee’s report, see the Congressional Quarterly, 1948, p. 182. F or H oover, see the Port, M arch 25, 1948. T h e com m ent on th e role o f anti-com m unism is based upon a reading o f the H ouse d eb ate in th e Congressional Record ( C R ) , 80:2. For K uhn, see the Post, A p ril 1, 1948. F or appropriation incident, see W esterfield, p p . 289-90. F or C zech oslovakia, see Ivo D u ch acek: “ C zech oslovakia,” in Stephen

Notea

3 7. 38.

39 .

40. 4 1.

42.

43.

44.

399

D . K ertesz, e d .: T he Fate o f East Central Europe (N o tre D am e, In d ., 19 5 6 ), p p . 19 2 -2 12 . See D on ald S. C on n ery: T he Scandanaoians (L on d on , 19 6 6 ), pp . 4 9 6 -50 1. F or th e President’s sum m ary o f d ie origins o f th e w estern E uropean p a ct see H arry S. Trum an: Years of Trial and H ope (G ard en C ity , 19 5 6 ), p . 2 4 1; also G eorge F . K ennan: Memoirs (N e w Y ork, 1969)» p p . 4 1 9 -2 1 . F or th e Italian situation, see m em o d ated Septem ber 22, 1947, “ M eetin g w ith W ar and Secu rity C ou n cils,” F orrestal Papers, B ox 126. F or S oviet troop m ovem ents, see C on feren ce o f Scholars, p . 2 1. F or C la y ’s telegram , see M illis and D uffield , p . 387. F or K en n an s view s and his role, see K ennan, Memoirs, p p . 4 2 2-6 . F or the M arshall-B evin conversation, see C h arles B ohlen: T he Trans­ formation o f American Foreign Policy (N e w York, 19 6 9 ), p. 90. F or M arshall’s m eeting w ith the Senators, see M illis and D u ffield , p p . 38 4 -5; th e Washington Post, M arch 3, 1948. F or th e significance o f U M T , see the Senate Com m ittee on A rm ed Services hearings on U M T , pp. 28, 33, 36; Lippm ann in th e Post, M arch 22, 1948. F or M arshall’s com m ent to d ie A rm ed Services, see th e C om m ittee’s hearings on U M T , p . 20. F o r M arshall’s com m ent o f M ay 7 , see M illis and D u ffield , p. 432. F or the m eeting o f F ebru ary 18, see M illis and D u ffield , p p . 3 7 5 -7 . F or Forrestal's view , see ibid., p. 378. F o r the Forrestal-M arshall lunch , see M illis and D uffield , p p . 38 4 -5. F o r F orrestal’s statem ent about S elective S ervice, see ibid., p . 386. F o r th e dinner w ith B yrnes, see James F . B yrnes: AU in O ne Lifetim e (N e w Y ork, 19 5 8 ), pp . 3 9 6 -7. F or the F orrestal-C eorge conversa­ tion, see M illis and D uffield, p . 386. F or th e K ey W est M eetin g, see ibid., p . 390; the Washington Post, M arch 12, 1948. F or C la y ’s telegram and its effect, see M illis and D uffield, p p . 387, 395. F or F orrestal’s use o f it in th e cam paign fo r rearm am ent, see M arquis C h ild s in the Washington Post, A p ril 6 , 1948. F or th e m ili­ ta ry preferen ce fo r U M T , see th e Post, M arch 19 , 1948. F or the com m ent o f A rm y Secretary R oyall on the threat o f w ar, see th e Senate A rm ed Services C om m ittee hearings on U M T , p. 339. F o r d ie F orrestal quote, see M illis and D uffield , p . 395. F or th e President’s com m ents on th e w ar scare, see his Years of Trial and H ope, p . 2 4 1. E uropean press reports from the period do not indicate an y general fear o f w ar; in fa ct th ey contain consistent repudiations o f this rum or. S ee, fo r exam ple, report from N orw ay in th e Washington Post, A p ril 24, 1948; report from P rague in th e Post, M arch 2 1, 1948; report on the speech o f Benjam in C oh en , A ssistant Secretary G en eral o f the U N , in the Post, M arch 23, 1948; report from th e U .S.S.R . in the Washington Tim es Herald, A p ril 8, 1948; report o f a sp eech b y L ord Inverchapel, B ritish A m bassador to d ie U .S ., in th e Tim es Herald, M arch 18, 1948. F or Trum an’s concern o ver the w ar hysteria, see M illis and D uffield,

400

45.

46. 4 7. 48.

49.

T h e T r u m a n D o c t r in e

and

M c C a r t h y is m

p . 408; th e W ashington Post, M arch 28, 1948. F or M arshall's testi­ m ony on the S elective S ervice, see the Senate C om m ittee on A rm ed Services, U M T hearings, p p . 5, 9. F or M arshall’s trip , see T N Y T , M arch 23, 1948. F or C la y 's new s conference, see TN YT, M arch 2 6 , 1948, p. 13. F or Trum an’s and M arshall’s reining in o f th e D efen se D epartm ent cam paign, see M illis and D uffield, p p . 430 -2, 4 3 5-4 0 . F or th e C h in a A id Program , see T a n g T sou: Am erica's Failure in China (C h ica g o , 19 6 3 ), p. 472. F or M arshall’s testim ony, see th e H ouse C om m ittee on F oreign A ffairs, Hearings on Postwar Recovery Policy, opening statem ent on F eb ru ary 20, 1948, and p . 1554. F o r M arshall's com m ent on C h ian g’s collapse, see T an g, p . 356. F or H ouse leadership, see statem ent b y M artin in th e W ashington Tim es Herald, M arch 8, 1948. F o r com m ent b y Trum an, see T an g, p . 474; see also ed itorial in th e W ashington Post about H ouse action on C h in a, A p ril 3, 1948. F or th e econom ic valu e o f U .S. trade w ith the U .S .S .R ., see Jam es Reston in TNYT, M arch 26, 1948; H ouse C om m ittee on F oreign A ffairs, Heatings on Postwar Recovery Policy, p . 479. F or n ew lim its on U .S . trade w ith th e U .S .S .R ., see ibid., p . 487; th e W ashington Post, January 1 1 , 1948. F or th e first M undt qu ote, see H ouse Hear­ ings on Postwar Recovery Policy, p . 487. F or the A dm inistration’s attitu d e on E ast-W est trade in E urop e, see Ibid., p . 488; Senate Com m ittee on F oreign R elations hearings on E R P , p p . 11 3 , 304. F o r M undt’s response, see H ouse Hearings on Postwar Recovery Policy, p p . 488-9, 1559 -6 0 ; see also W h erry sp eech in th e Senate, qu oted in TN YT, M arch 5, 1948. F or the in itial and final versions o f the M undt am endm ent, see C R , 80:2, p p . 3755, 4059. F or the G allu p p o ll, see th e Washington Post, F eb ru ary 6, 1948. F or th e M arch crisis o ver E ast-W est trade, see TNYT, M arch 24, 1948, p. 1; the Post, M arch 26 and 2 7, 1948; d ie W ashington Tim es Herald, M arch 25 and 2 7 ,1 9 4 8 . F or consideration o f an em bargo, see the Post, M arch 3 1, 1948. F or the Adm inistration v . Congress on E ast-W est trad e, 19 4 8 -52 , see Fum iss and Snyder: Introduction to American Foreign Policy (N e w York, 1 9 5 5 ), p . 13; D ean C . A cheson: Present at the Creation (N e w York, 19 6 9 ), pp. 559> 634; P rice, pp. 16 8 -70 , 364; Raym ond F . M ikesell: United States Econom ic Policy and International Relations (N e w York,

195*). V II I nternal S ecurity , E R P , and th e P o litics o f 1948 1. F or B itdem an’s arrest, see th e W ashington Tim es Herald, January 17 , 1948; Daily W orker, January 18, 1948. F or the A ct o f O ctober 16, 19 18 , see 8 U S C (i9 4 6 e d ) 137.

N otes

401

2 . See d ie W ashington Tim es Herald fo r d ie fo llo w in g: Jones, January 2 1, 1948; E isler, F eb ru ary 3 , 1948; W illiam son, F eb ru ary 1 1 , 1948; Sm ith, F eb ru ary 17 , 1948; Johnson, F ebru ary 19, 1948; D o yle, F e b ­ ru ary 2 1 , 1948; Potash, ibid., M arch 2 , 1948; B ridges, M arch 7 , 1948, d ie W ashington Post, M arch 7 , 1948. F or th e W est C oast E ig h t, see the Post, M arch 19 , 1948. See also article in the Daily W orker, January 26, 1948, fo r a gen eral discussion o f th e deportation d rive. 3. F o r th e new p u b licity tactics b y th e Justice D epartm ent, see th e Washington Post, F eb ru ary 22, 1948, 4M . F or evid en ce about E isler, see H U A C hearings on G erhart E isler, p. 30. 4. F or th e fu tility o f deportation attem pts to eastern E urop e, see C lark’s testim ony in H U A C hearings on legislation to outlaw th e Com m unist P arty, p . 23. F o r the in ab ility to connect com m unists w ith ad vocacy o f violen t revolt, see ibid., p . 2 1. T h is situation w as altered b y tw o developm ents in 1950. F irst, in Dennis et al. v . US (3 4 1U S 4 9 4 ) th e Suprem e C o u rt h eld th at m em bership in the Com m unist P arty d id in volve ad vo cacy o f violen t revolution. Second, th e Internal S ecu rity A c t o f 1950 em pow ered the E xecu tive to deport aliens w ith com m u­ nist connections. F ollow in g these developm ents m any o f those ar­ rested in 1948 and later freed w ere rearrested and deported. F or E isler’s attorney's statem ent, see th e Washington Post, F eb ru ary 3, 1948. 5 . F o r N ixon’s ch arge and C lark ’s response, see the W ashington Tim es Herald, M arch 10, 1948. F or E isler, Sm ith, and W illiam son, see C h ap ter V , p . 24. F or Justice’s legislative proposals, see C lark ’s open­ in g statem ent to H U A C hearings on legislation to ou tlaw the Com ­ m unist P arty. 6 . F or T aylo r’s decision, see C u rtis D . M acD ou gall: G ideon's Army (N e w Y ork, 19 6 5 ), p p . 3 0 6 -11. F or C aliforn ia, see M acD ougall, p p . 3 1 1 - 1 2 . F o r N ew York election , see M acD ou gall, pp . 3 2 3 -5; Irw in Ross: The Loneliest Campaign (N e w Y ork, 19 6 8 ), p . 66; A l Yam eQ , "T h e Im pact o f the P rogressive P arty on the D em ocratic P arty in the 1948 Presidential C am paign,” unpublished doctoral dis­ sertation, (U n iversity o f W ashington, 19 6 9 ). F or th e press response to W allace, see M acD ougall, p. 306. F or m ore on Trum an’s p o litical troubles, see Ross, p p . 64, 6 7 -8 , 72, 73. 7 . F or attacks on W allace, see M acD ougall, p p . 325, 337, 3 4 1, 363. F o r the com m unist interpretation o f th e deportation d rive, see the Washington Post, M arch 7 ,1 9 4 8 ; the Washington Tim es Herald, F eb ­ ruary 17 , 1948. See also the Daily W orker fo r this period, w h ich consistently expressed this view . 8 . F or M urray on the lo ya lty program , see letter from M urray to the P resident o f A p ril 14 , 1947, Trum an Papers, O F 2 5 2 -K . F or the om ission o f lab or from the A ttorney G e n era ls list, see E lean or Bontecou : The Federal Loyalty-Security Program (Ith a ca , 19 5 3 ), p. 172 ;

402

T h e T r u m a n D o c t r in e

and

M cC

a r t h y is m

d ie W ashington Port, ed itorial, D ecem ber 6, 1947. F or T ru m an ’s statem ent on com m unism in labor, see C a b e ll P h illip s: T he Truman Presidency (N e w Y ork, 19 6 6 ), p . 116 . 9. F or m y account o f the internal struggles w ith in th e C IO , I h a v e relied upon M ax M . K am pelm an: T he Communist Party os the C IO (N e w Y ork, 19 5 7 ); Irvin g H ow e and L ew is C oser: The Am erican Com m unist Party (B oston , 19 5 7 ); M acD ougaU . F or th e C IO con ­ vention endorsem ent o f th e M arshall Plan, see K am pelm an, p. 1 1 1 ; fo r a differen t version, see Ronald R adosh: American Labor and U S . Foreign Policy (N e w Y ork, 19 6 g ). F or th e decision o f com m unist unionists to support W a lla ce and oppose E R P , see K am pelm an, p p . 1 4 1 -4 ; M acD ougaU , p p . 2 6 2 -3 . F or th e decision o f th e N ation al E xecu tive Com m ittee to en force its position on W a lla ce and E R P , see the Washington Port, M a rd i 1 1 , 1948. 10. F or Potash and W illiam son, see K am pelm an, p. 142. F or B ridges, see the W ashington Port, M arch 7 , 1948; M acD ougaU , p p . 3 1 8 -19 . F or M urray’s support o f E isen how er in early 1948, see M acD ougaU , P- 4731 1 . F o r W a lla ce’s critiq u e o f Trum an’s charges, see d ie W ashington Port, M arch ao , 1948. F or W h ite, see The New York Tim es ( T N Y T ), O ctob er 3 1 , 1947. F or T aylo r, see th e Washington Port, M a rd i 10, 1948. F or th e Post ed itorial, see edition o f January 10, 1948. F or B ohlen, see the Department of State Bulletin (D S B ), VoL 18, N o. 46, p . 79. 12. T h e Telegram poU is cited in Ross, p. 149; fo r subsequent p olls, see pp. 15 7 , 166, 228. F o r harassm ent o f W a lla ce supporters, see M ac­ D ougaU , p p . 340, 3 6 1-3 , 366, 369, 374, 3 75, 396 ff; fo r earlier m anifestations, see p p . 150, 15 8 -9 , 16 7. F or the influence o f inter­ national events, see M acD ougaU , p. 343. F or th e d ecisive nature o f th e com m unist issue in W allace’s dem ise, see Ross, p. 224; M acD o u gall, p. 435. 13 . F or M artin’s sp eech , see th e Popular G overnm ent L eagu e Bulletin N o. 230, M arch 12, 1948, in A C L U files, V ol. 10, L o ya lty Probes and Seditious Speech. C ooperation betw een C ongress and th e A d ­ m inistration d id not en tirely disappear in early 1948, though it b e­ cam e such a m inor them e o f Am erican p olitics th at its m anifestations are not w orth d etailed discussion. N evertheless, fo r som e exam ples see articles on Justice D epartm ent response to com plaints b y Senator BaU about tax status o f subversive organizations, in th e Washington Tim es Herald, F ebruary 3, 5, 1948. See also C lark ’s prom ise to assist M undt in d raw in g up anti-com m unist legislation in H U A C hearings on legislation to ou tlaw the Com m unist P arty, p . 3 1. 14. M undt stated in a letter to the author that he and N ixon w orked on anti-com m unist legislation in early 1947, and reports o f this activity w ere carried in th e Washington Post on D ecem ber 7, 2 1 , and 27, 1947. M undt’s 1947 biU w as H R4422, 8 0 :1. 15. See H U A C hearings on legislation to ou tlaw the Com m unist Party.

Notes

403

16 . Ibid., p p . 3 3 -4 . 17 . Q uotation from H U A C report on H R 5852, A p ril 30, 1948, 80: a . 18. F or N ixon’s statem ent, see th e Congressional Record ( C R ), 80:2, p . 6047. 19. T h e statem ent about th e President is based upon th e fa c t th at h e tended to fo llow th e a d vice o f C lark on issues like this and in 1950 used the argum ents C lark m ade to H U A C in 1948 in his veto o f th e Internal S ecu rity A ct. M oreover, he freq u en tly q u oted H oover on th e in advisab ility o f ou tlaw in g th e Com m unist P arty. 20. F or statem ents in Congress about th e p o litical d ifficu lty o f opposing H R 5852, see C R , 80:2, pp. 5866 (J a v its), 5873 (H o lifie ld ), 5853 (L y n c h ), 5864 (M ille r), 5868 (C a rro ll). 2 1. F or C lark ’s letter, see the Senate Com m ittee on th e Judiciary, 80:2, hearings on H R 5852, pp. 4 2 2 -5. 22. F or T ab er, see the Washington Tim es Herald, F ebru ary 10 and 28, 1948; C R , 80:2, p . 2585. F or E xecu tive expenditures, see TNYT, M arch 13 and M ay 22, 1948. 23. F or a d etailed stu dy o f the Condon report, see R obert K . C arr: T he House Un-American Activities Com m ittee (Ith a ca , 19 5 2 ), pp . 1 3 1 53. F or the 1947 charges against C ondon, see M arquis C h ild s in th e W ashington Post, M arch 12 , 1948. F or Post disclosures on H oover letter, see issues o f M arch 3 and 25, 1948. 24. F or the relation o f the Condon case to th e H U A C b u d get d eb ate, see C arr, pp . 13 2 -3 . 2 5. F o r Condon and W allace, see M arquis C h ild s in the W ashington Post, M arch 12, 1948. F or R eece’s statem ent, see TN YT, M ay 2, 1948. F or M artin, see p . 3 17 . 26. See CR, 80:2, pp. 2405, 2407, 2409 (B u sb e y ), 2 412 (B la tn ik ). 2 7. F o r th e vote on th e H U A C resolution, see the W ashington Post, A p ril 23, 1948. F or an earlier d ebate over Congressional access to files, see dispute betw een H offm an and the A dm inistration, O ctober, 1947. H offm an, the Chairm an o f th e H ouse E xecu tive E xpenditures C om m ittee, requested access to certain files in O ctober 1947 and w as refused on grounds sim ilar to those given in th e Condon case. (S e e the letter from Trum an to H offm an o f O ctob er 8, 19 4 7, Trum an Papers, O F 2 [19 4 7 ].) T h e President had m ade one exception to this rule w hen the State D epartm ent g a ve T ab er inform ation on secu rity checks o f its em ployees. T ab er, as th e case o f the dism issal o f ten State D epartm ent em ployees in June 1947 indicates, w as in a sp ecial position and used the inform ation to launch a p u b lic attack on the D epartm ent in early 1948. F or H ouse action on th e resolution o f the E xecu tive E xpenditures C om m ittee, see th e Congressional Quarterly, 1948, p. 2 77. 28. F or Trum an’s d irective, see his Public Papers, 1948, p. 181 ; th e W ashington Post, M arch 16, 1948; H arry S . Trum an: Years of Trial and Hope (G ard en C ity , 19 5 6 ), p. 282. F or C lark ’s statem ent, see TNYT, May 14, 1948.

404

T h e T r u m a n D o c t r in e

an d

M c C a r t h y is m

V III T h e L egacy o f th e T ruman D octrine 1. F or th e relationship o f rearm am ent to recovery in 19 4 8 -9 , see D ean G . A cheson: Present at the Creation (N e w Y ork, 19 6 g ), p . 309; H arry S. Trum an: Years of Trial and H ope (G ard en C ity , 19 5 6 ), p . 24; letter from V andenberg to Sheppard o f January 2 7, 1949, V andenberg Papers; L ou is H alle: The C old War A s History (L o n ­ don, 19 6 7 ), p . 189. F or the Kennan qu ote, see G eorge F . K ennan: Russia, the Atom , and the W est (N e w Y ork, 1 9 5 7 ), p . 9. 2 . See th e C o u n cil o f E conom ic A dvisors: Midyear Econom ic Review (W ash in gton , July 19 5 0 ), pp . 2 7 -3 7 , 47; G ordon G ray e t a l.: Report to the President on Foreign Econom ic Policies (W ash in gton , D .C ., N ovem ber 19 5 0 ), p p . 7 0 -1 . 3. F or S oviet p olicies, see T rum an: Y ears o f Trial and H ope, p p . 2 4 0 -1. F or im pact o f bom b and C h in a, see A cheson, p . 345. F or K orea as opportunity for rearm am ent, see M arcus Raskin and R ichard B arnett: After Twenty Years ( N ew Y ork, 19 6 6 ), p . 29. 4. H ie question o f E uropean v. A tlan tic rearm am ent is raised and dis­ cussed in Ben T . M oore: N A T O and the Future o f Europe (N e w York, 19 5 8 ), p p . 1 , 2 4 -7 . F or E uropean rejection o f U .S. m ilitary aid , see A cheson, p . 709. 5. T h e quoted passage from N S C -6 8 is taken from C a b e ll P hillips: The Truman Presidency (N e w Y ork, 19 6 6 ), p p . 30 3-6; see also P au l Y . H am m ond: "N S C -6 8 : P rologue to R earm am ent," in W arner R . S ch illin g et a l.: Strategy, Politics and D efense Budgets (N e w Y ork, 19 6 2 ), p p . 3 0 7 -18 . F or A cheson quotes, see Department of State Bulletin (DSB), M arch 20, 1950; H ouse W ays and M eans Com ­ m ittee, 8 2 :1, hearings on Extension o f Reciprocal Trade Agreements A ct, p . 7; see also K ennan, C hapters 18 and 19, esp ecially p . 488. 6. F or p o litica l significance o f rearm am ent, see W alter L aF eb er: Amer­ ica, Russia, and the C old War (N e w Y ork, 19 6 8 ), pp. 7 7 -8 ; Trum an, Years of Trial and H ope, p . 248; B arnett and R askin, p p . 18, 22, 23, 2 7. F or L isbon m eeting, see A cheson, p . 623. 7. F or th e first A cheson quote, see DSB, V ol. 16, p . 9 9 1. F or C layton , see above, C h ap ter V I, p. 2 6 1. F or the second A cheson qu ote, see th e Senate Com m ittee on F in an ce, 8 2 :1, hearings on Extension of Re­ ciprocal Trade Agreements A ct, p . 4. F or Trum an, see th e H ouse Com m ittee on W ays and M eans, 8 1 :1 , hearings on Extension of Re­ ciprocal Trade Agreements A ct, p p . 2, 6 -7 ; Senate C om m ittee on F in an ce, 80:2, hearings on Extension o f Reciprocal Trade Agree­ m ents A ct, 80:2, p p . 48 3 -5; G eorge M cG h ee, “ E conom ics o f P eace," DSB, V ol. 16, June 22, 1947, p . 119 6 . 8. F o r a sum m ary o f the 1948 A ct, see th e H ouse W ays and M eans C om m ittee, 8 1 :1 , hearings on R T A extension, p . 4; Raym ond F . M ikesell: United States Econom ic Policy and International Relations

Notes

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14. 15.

16.

405

(N e w York, 19 5 2 ), p . 307. F or C layto n , see the Senate C om m ittee on F in an ce, 80:2, hearings on R T A extension, p . 464. F or the C layton -V an d en berg exchange, see the letters from C layton to V and enberg o f A p ril 2 1, June 8, and June 12, 1948, and V an den berg replies o f A p ril 22 and June 9 , 1948, V andenberg Papers. F or T horp, see th e State D epartm ent press release cited in M ikesell, p . 307. F or m ovem ent tow ard protectionism after 1947, see W illiam Y . E llio t e t a l.: The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy ( N ew Y ork, 1955 ), p. 299, note 3; R ichard N . G ardner: Sterling Dollar Diplo­ macy (O xford , 19 5 6 ), p . 373; A cheson, p. 634. F or th e A cheson quote, see the Senate Com m ittee on F in an ce, 8 2 :1, hearings on R T A extension, pp . 6 -7 . F or inconsistencies w ith G A T T in the 19 51 A ct, see ibid., p. 1 1 ; G ardner, p . 375. F o r agricu ltu ral p o licy, see G ardner, p p . 3 7 4 -5 . F o r repudiation o f G A T T , see Senate C om m ittee on F in an ce, 8 2 :1, hearings on R T A extension, p. 1 1 . F or dem ise o f IT O , see G ardner, pp. 3 6 1-7 8 ; Ross P ritch ard: “W ill C layton : Industrial Statesm an,” unpublished doctoral dissertation (F le tch e r School, T u fts U niversity, 19 5 6 ), p p . 385, 392, 393. F or A dm inistration's rejection o f H ullianism , see A cheson, p . 727. F or the im port d eclin e, see H arry B ayard P rice: The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning (Ith a ca , 19 5 5 ), p. 102. F or devaluations, see P rice, p . 130. F or conclusions about E R P , see the C ou n cil o f E conom ic A dvisors: Midyear Economic Review (W ash in gton , D .C ., Ju ly 19 4 9 ), p . 4 1; C ou n cil o f E conom ic A dvisors: Annual Economic Review (W ash in gton , D .C ., January 19 5 0 ), p. 123; C ou n cil o f E conom ic A dvisors: Midyear Economic Review (W ash in gton , D .C ., July 19 5 0 ), p . 88; Report of the ECA-Commerce Mission (W ash in gton , D .C ., 1949)» P- 4; P rice, p. 129; A cheson, p . 325. See the Report of the ECA-Commerce Mission, pp. 8, 1 1 ; E conom ic Cooperation A dm inistration: Seventh Report to Congress (fo r the q u arter ended D ecem ber 3 1, 19 4 9 ); G ray e t a l., p p . 76, 79 , 87, 94; E llio t et a l., pp . 290-305. See P rice, p p . 100, 10 1, 1 2 1 -7 , 134- 5F or the im pact o f E uropean integration on trade w ith the dollar area, see P rice, p . 284; C ra y , et a l., p. 26; W illiam D ieb old : Trade and Payments in Western Europe (N e w York, 19 5 2 ), pp. 13, 233. F or the b u ild in g o f reserves, see G ray et al., p. 32. F or the U .S. loss o f interest in the liberalization o f intra-E uropean trade, see P rice, p . 324; E rnst H . V an D er B eu gel: From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership (A m sterdam , 19 6 6 ), p. 264. F or the econom ic result o f rearm am ent, see M ikesell, p. 3 3 1; D ieb old , pp . 420, 427; C ra y et a l , pp. 7, 33, 37; P rice, p p . 15 6 -7 , 363; Com ­ m ittee fo r E conom ic D evelopm ent: Economic Aspects of North Atlantic Security ( 1 9 5 1 ) , pp. 1 0 -1 1 , 13 , 1 5 -1 6 , 3 1 -2 . F or rearm a­ m ent and the A tlan tic econom ic integration, see M ikesell, pp. 283-4. F or the U .S. attem pt to join th e O E E C , see A cheson, p . 395. F or

4 o6

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and

M c C a r t h y is m

institution al changes, see P rice, p . 165; D ieb o ld , p . 424. F or E u ro­ pean resentm ent o f U .S. p olicies, see P rice, p p . 324, 35g; A cheson, PP* 560 ,56917 . F or Trum an’s fe a r o f p u b lic response to th e sp ecial m essage on d efen se proposals, see th e Washington Post, M arch 28, 1948. F or the statem ent on splinter parties, see Trum an, Public Papers, 1948, Press C on feren ce o f M ay 13 . T h e June speech is cited in Irw in Ross: The Loneliest Campaign (N e w Y ork, 19 6 8 ), p . 82. 18. F or the A d m in istration s loss o f hope on C h in a in O ctob er 1948, see T a n g T sou: America's Failure in China (C h ica g o , 19 6 3 ), p . 495. F or the report o f th e m ilitary adviser, see A cheson, p. 305. 19. F or the change in th e nature o f th e grand ju ry proceedin g, see "A ffid avit o f John F X M cG oh ey," filed in opposition to m otion to dism iss indictm ents in U.S. v . Dennis, V ol. 17 . F or R epublican calls fo r prosecution o f A m erican Com m unists, see J. P arnell Thom as, cited in The New York Times ( TNYT ), A p ril 2, 1947, 3 2 :1 . F or V andenberg and Ferguson, see V andenberg speech o f A p ril 26, 1948, cited in TNYT, A p ril 29, 1948. F or th e dispute betw een th e W h ite H ouse and the F B I on the grand ju ry, see G eorge Sokolsky in the Washington Times Herald, M arch 10, 1948; see also Sokolsky article in ibid., M arch 8, 1948. F or the tip to H U A C on grand ju ry pro­ ceedin gs, see R obert E . S trip lin g: The Red Plot Against America (D rex e l H ill, P a., 19 4 9 ), p p . 9 5 -6 . F or Trum an’s "red h erring" com m ent, see TNYT, Septem ber 3, 1948, 1 :1 . F or Trum an’s cam ­ p aign address about dom estic com m unism , see his O klahom a C ity sp eech o f Septem ber 28, 1948, in Trum an’s Public Papers, 1948; Ross, p p . 203-4. F or background o f d rafts o f the speech, see the Spingam Papers, W h ite H ouse Assignm ent. F or Trum an’s denuncia­ tion o f H U A C , see TNYT, A u gu st 20, 1948. F or C lark ’s denunciation o f H U A C , see TNYT, A ugust 16, 1948; "M on th ly B u lletin " #80 o f A C L U , N ovem ber 1948, in A C L U files. V ol. II, H U A C #9, 1948. F or a gen eral discussion o f these events, see A lan D . H arper: The Politics of Loyalty (W estp ort, C on n ., 19 6 g ), p p . 69 ff. 20. F or the vie w th at the com m unist issue help ed Trum an in 1948, see Ross, p p . 2 53 -4 . F or p u b lic support fo r H U A C hearings, see the W ashington Star, Septem ber 7, 1948. F or D ew e y’s cam paign tactics, see Ross, p p . 19 7 ff; H . B radford W esterfield: Foreign Policy and Party Politics (N e w H aven, 19 5 5 ), p p . 2 9 6 ff. 2 1. F o r the H iss indictm ent, see W alter G oodm an: The Committee (N e w York, 19 6 8 ), pp. 2 6 5-6 . F or C h in a, see A cheson, pp . 3 0 5-7; K . S. L atou rette: America’s Record in the Far East (N e w Y ork, 19 5 0 ), p . 105; Senate A rm ed Services C om m ittee, 8 2 :1, Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 18 5 5 -6 ; T an g, p p .

498- 922. F or C ongress, see T an g, pp . 4 9 9 -50 1, 5 18 , 529, 534; A cheson, p p . 3 0 2 -7, 34 9 -52 , 354, 370. 23. F o r p u b lic opinion about C h in a, see G ab riel A lm ond: The American

Notes

407

People and Foreign Policy (N e w Y ork, 19 5 0 ), p . 105; T a n g T sou,

24.

25.

26. 2 7. 28. 29.

30.

p . 538. F or th e preparation o f th e C h in a W h ite P aper, see A cheson, p. 302. F or Form osa, see th e Senate A rm ed Services C om m ittee, Hearings on the Military Situation In the Far East, p p . 1 6 6 7 -9 ,1 6 7 2 5 , 16 8 1; A cheson, p . 350. F o r T rum an's statem ent, see A cheson, p . 3 5 1. F or A cheson’s sp eech, see A cheson, p p . 3 5 7 -8 ; T an g T sou , p . 535; L ato u iette, p . 58; D S B , January 13 , 1950, p p . 1 1 6 - 1 7 . F o r the announcem ent on th e U N , see T an g , pp. 523, 526. F or U .S. p o licy on recognition, see T an g, p p . 5 13 , 5 1 4 -1 6 . F or th e A cheson qu ote, see TNYT, O ctob er 5, 19 5 1, p . 1; T an g, pp . 506, 547. F or the im pact o f th e fa ll o f C h in a on U .S. p o licy in Southeast A sia, see L atou rette, p p . 57, 6 6 -7 ; H arold M . V in acke: The United States and the Far East (L on d on , 19 5 2 ), p p . 9 6 -7 ; The Role of ECA in Southeast Asia (W ash in gton , 1 9 5 1 ), pp. 2 -3 . F or C h in a and Euro* pean rearm am ent, see T an g, p p . 50 2-3, 5 1 1 ff; A lfred Stein berg: The Man from Missouri (N e w Y ork, 19 6 2 ), p . 360. F or V ietnam , see G eorge K ahin and John W . L ew is: The United States in Vietnam (N e w Y ork, 19 6 9 ), p p . 3 0 -1. F or A cheson and the confirm ation hearings, see A cheson, p p . 250 -3. F or B ridges, see T an g, p . 50 1. F or H urley’s response to th e W h ite P aper, see T an g, p. 509. F or C ongressional response to th e W h ite Paper, see A cheson, p . 307. F or th e presiden tial com m ission on lo ya lty, see the m em o b y Stephen Spingam in Spingarn Papers, W h ite H ouse Assignm ent— Internal S ecu rity F ile, fo ld er on "N a ­ tion al D efen se— Internal Secu rity and In d ivid u al R ights,” V o l. I, F old er 1, Box 30. F or the attem pt to abolish H U A C , see G oodm an, p p . 272 ff; m em o from C lark to d ie President o f D ecem ber 2 1 , 1948, C liffo rd Papers, fo ld er on Com m ittee on U n-A m erican A ctivities. F or th e A dm inistration’s assessm ent o f th e p u b lic m ood, see m em o from Spingam to C liffo rd o f A p ril 6, 1949, Spingam Papers, W h ite H ouse A ssignm ent, "In tern al S ecu rity F ile — N ational D efen se and G en eral L o yalties,” fold er on "N ation al D efen se— L o ya lty L egisla­ tion ,” Box 33. F or Trum an’s articulation o f this analysis, see ed i­ torial in the Washington Post, January 19 , 1949. See A cheson, p p . 3 2 1, 3 6 0 -1; T an g , p . 509; P h illip s, p . 373. See P h illip s, pp . 38 4 -5; T an g, pp. 540 -4; A cheson, p p . 3 6 4 -5. F or M cC arth y os. A dm inistration, see P h illip s, p p . 3 8 5-6 , 392; for Trum an tour, see Stein berg, p p . 3 7 1 -2 . F or com plete accounts o f the decision to interven e, see Trum an, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 3 3 1-9 ; A cheson, pp . 4 0 1-13 ; G len n D . P aige: The Korean Decision (N e w Y ork, 19 6 8 ), p p . 79 -2 72 ; T an g, p . 558. F or the first Johnson quote, see P aige, p. 17 7 . F or th e de­ cision regardin g troops, see P aige, pp. 149, 187. F or th e second Johnson qu ote, see P aige, p . 264. F or Trum an’s refu sal to discuss dom estic p olitics, see P aige, p . 14 1. F or discussions o f Form osa decision, see P aige, pp . 12 5 -6 , 133, 244; T an g, p p . 5 5 8 -6 1; L ou is H alle: The Cold War as History (L on d on ,

4 o8

T h e T r u m a n D o c t r in e 1967)» P P ' 20 6 -10 ; K ennan,

and

M c C a r t h y is m

Memoirs, p . 5 13 ; T rum an, Year* of Trial

and Hope, p . 334. 3 1. F o r th e announced U .S. go al in K orea, see P aige, p . 205; T an g, p .5 6 9 . 32. F or th e A cheson quote, see A cheson, p . 365. F or the M ac A rth ur incidents, see A cheson, p p . 422, 425; Trum an, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 349- 5833. F o r M arshall’s appointm ent, see A cheson, p. 365. F or the veto, see Trum an, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 284. F or the W ake Island trip, see ibid., p p . 36 3-70 ; H alle, p . 223. F or th e election , see L aF eb er, p p . 10 7-8 . 34. For debate on military goals in Korea, see Acheson, p p . 4 4 5-52 ; Kennan, Memoirs, p p . 5 1 4 -1 5 ; Matthew Ridgway: Soldier (New

York, 1956), P- 4335. See K ennan, Memoirs, p p . 5 17 -2 3 ; A cheson, p. 446. 36. F o r the rejection o f the p eace plans, see A cheson, p . 4 19 . F or T ru ­ m an’s statem ent, see Trum an, Years of Trial and Hope, p . 359. F or M acA rthur’s instruction, see ibid., p . 359. See also T a n g , p . 569 ff. 37. F or the H alle quote, see H alle, pp . 2 19 -2 0 . F or M acA rthur’s orders and the U N resolution, see A cheson, pp. 4 52 -3 . F or the U .S. re­ sponse to C h in ese w arnings, see H alle, pp. 2 13 -2 5 ; A cheson, p . 452; Trum an, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 3 6 1-2 . F o r C h in ese interven­ tion , see A llen W h itin g: China Crosses the Yalu (N e w Y ork, i9 6 0 ), pp . 9 2 -1 1 6 ; T an g, p p . 580-6. 38. F or th e Trum an quote, see Trum an, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 40 3-4. F o r the A cheson quote, see A cheson, pp. 4 78 -8 5. 39. F or d ie term ination o f trade w ith C h in a, see L atou rette, p . 134; Senate Arm ed Services C om m ittee, Hearings on the Military Situation in Far East, p. 172 5. F or Form osa, see ibid., p . 175 5 . F or the recognition o f C h in a, see ibid., p . 1820. F or C h in ese Com m unist adm ission to the U N , see ibid., pp . 1935, 2024. F or M acA rthur’s use o f th e Trum an D octrin e, see Trum an, Years of Trial and Hope, pp.

353- 440. F or a statem ent o f the differen ce in attitu d e tow ard com m unism in Southeast A sia in th e late 1940’s and th e 1960*$, see K ennan, Mem­ oirs, p . 339. 4 1. F or Trum an’s attitu d e tow ard th e Internal S ecu rity A ct o f 1950, see th e veto m essage in Trum an, Public Papers, 1950 p. 254. F or Trum an’s attitu de tow ard the Im m igration A ct o f 1952, see the veto m essage in Public Papers, 19 5 2 -3 , p . 445.

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M cC

a r x h y is m

Schilling, Warner R., et al.: Strategy, Polities, and Defense Budgets. New York: Columbia University Press; 1962. Schmidt, Karl: Henry Wallace: Quixotic Crusade 1948. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press; i960. Sherwood, Robert: Roosevelt and Hopkins. New York: Harper & Brothers; 1948. Shulman, Marshall: Stalin’s Foreign Policy Reappraised. Cam* bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 1963. Steinberg, Alfred: The Man from Missouri. New York: Putnam; 1962. Stimson, Henry L., and McGeorge Bundy: On Active Service in War and Peace. New York: Harper & Brothers; 1948. Stripling, Robert E.: The Red Plot Against America. Drexel HiU, Pa.: Bell Publishing Co.; 1949. Summers, Robert: Federal Information Controls in Peacetime. New York: H. W . Wilson; 1949. Tang Tsou: America’s Failure in China, 2 Vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1963. Theoharis, Athan: “The Escalation of the Loyalty Program,” in Barton J. Bernstein: Politics and Policies of the Truman Ad­ ministration. Chicago: Quadrangle; 1970. Truman, Harry S.: Economic Report of the President. Washington, D .C.: USGPO; 1948. ---------: Memoirs. 2 Vols.: Year of Decisions (1955) and Years of Tried and Hope (1956). Carden City, N.Y.: Doubleday; 1956. ---------: Public Papers. Washington, D .C.: USGPO; 1945-51. United Nations Economic and Social Council: Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the VN Conference on Trade and Employment, E/PC/T/33. London, 1946. ---------: Report of the Temporary Subcommission on Economic Reconstruction of Devastated Areas, E/156. September 18, 1946. United States v. Dennis et al., U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Cir­ cuit, Vol. 17. New York: Adams Press; 1949. U.S. Attorney General: Annual Report: 1948. Washington, D.C.: USGPO; 1949. ---------: Annual Report: 1949. Washington, D .C.: USGPO; 1950. U.S. Congress, hearings of the House Committee on Appropriations: Third Supplemental Appropriation for 1948. 80:2. ---------: Justice Department Budget for 1948. 80:1. ---------: Justice Department Budget for 1949. 80:1. U.S. Congress, hearings of the House Committee on the Civil Ser­ vice: Report of Investigation with Respect to Employee hoy-

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I

Index

A cheson, D ean, 7, 17 , 2 7 -8 , 43, 60, 62, 80, 83, 15 1 , 18 1; on C h in a, 1 1 2 -1 3 , 34* - 3, 344- 5, 350, 354, 3 5 6 -7 ; and G recoTurkish aid , go , g i , g2, 9 6 -g , 10 4-9; and N SC -68, 32 2 -3; R e­ publican attack on, 34 5-6 , 347, 360; as spokesm an fo r foreign aid , g o -3 , g 6 -g , 10 4 -g , 15 5, 16 0 -1, 163, 179 -8 0 , 18 1, 182, *53 , *6 5, 3 2 7 -8 alien deportation d rive, 2 1 6 - ig , 225, 232, 294-8, 299-300, 360 A lsop, Joseph and S tew art, 180, 263, 264, 266, 267, 274, 281 Amerasia case, 120, 122, 123, 14 1, 222 A m erican C iv il L ib erties U nion, 144 A m erican Com m unist P arty, 1 1 8 19, 149, 2 14 , 236, 244, 335; and deportation d rive, 2 16 -18 , 294-8, 299-300; H .U .A .C . and, 14 6 -7 , 30 8 -18 passim; at­ tem pted ou tlaw in g o f, 3 0 9 -18 passim; postw ar strategy o f, 13 8 -4 1; in U .S. governm ent, 12 1; and W allace can d id acy, 299-302 A m erican F ederation o f L ab or, 174 A nderson, C lin ton , 164, 259 anti-com m unism : and C o ld W ar consensus, 5; foreign and do­ m estic, pairin g o f, 13 5 -50 pas­ sim, 207; in Trum an D octrine strategy, 9 - 1 1 , 8 6 -7 , 89, 9 4 10 1, 150, 19 3 -4 , 2 0 6 -7, *3 4 -4 5

passim, 2 5 1, 3 3 4 -5; see also com m unism A ron, Raym ond, 173 A sia: postw ar conditions in, 14; Trum an D octrine ap p lied to,

357-8 A tlan tic C h arter, 24, 39 “ A tlan tic Com m unity,” 3 19 atom ic bom b: econom ic pow er and, 3 1 -2 , 52; S oviet possession o f, 4, 1 1 , 3 * 1 , 346-7 A ttlee, C lem ent R ., 34, 70, 356 A ttorney G eneral’s list, 1 1 , 220, 225, 232, 293, 300, 336, 360; as counterpropaganda, 2 0 8 -13 , 241; criteria o f, 2 1 3 -1 5 ; effect on dissent, 2 1 5 -1 6 A ustria, 189 A xis pow ers, d efeat o f, 14

B arkley, A lben W ., 262 B aruch, B ernard, 65, 101 B elgium , 72 Benelux federation , 16 1, 279, 3 19 B en tley, E lizab eth , 1 2 1 -2 , 133, 222, 242, 337, 338, 339 B erlin blockad e, 3 2 0 -1, 33g B evin , E m est, 90, 9 1, 155, 168, 182, 183, 256, 281 B id au lt, G eorges, 168 B id d le, F ran cis, 14 8 -9 B ittlem an, A lexander, 294, 296 B laisd ell, Thom as, 254 B lum , L éon , 49, 55

•• 11

I n d ex

B ohlen, C h arles, 170, 252, 253; on dissent, 304 B radley, O m ar, 323 Bretton W oods, 38, 4 5 -6 , 63, 66,

77 B ricker, B ridges, B ridges, 199,

John, 76 H arry, 295, 296 Styles, 1 1 1 , 130, 132, 134, 20 2-3, 3oa, 3 4 1. 344. 345,

347 B row der, E arl, 138 B row n, C laren ce, 229 B row n, R alph S ., 2 15 B udenz, L ou is, 144 B ulgaria, 137; Y alta agreem ent on,

86 B u llitt, W illiam , 289 B ureau o f Im m igration and N aturäHz a b o n .'Z lfl^ B utler, H ugh, 79 "" B yrnes, Jam es, 23, 43, 44, 56, 6 1 , 62, 66, 68, 78, 130, 194, »02 ; and G reco-T urldsh aid , 82, 87, 90, 9 1 , 9a, 100, 102; strategy on U .S.-Soviet relations, 5 1 a, 54, 13 5 -6 , 13 7 -8 ; on “ w orld crisis’* (1 9 4 8 ), 2 7 0 -1, 282, 284

C affrey, Jefferson, 55 capitalism , Soviet v ie w o f, 21 C ase, Francis, 8 7-8 C en tral In telligen ce A gen cy, 174 Cham bers, W h ittaker, 1 2 1 -2 , 133, 222, 242, 337, 338, 339, 340 C h ian g K ai-shek, 1 1 0 -1 2 , 19 g, 200, 288, 336; w ith draw al to For­ m osa, 3 4 0 -1 C h ild s, M arquis, 103, 242, 268, 269 C h in a: attem pts to extricate U .S. from , 3 4 0 -1, 349; c iv il w ar in, 1 1 0 -1 3 , 198-200, 3 3 6 -7 , 34 0 4; com m unist victo ry in, 4, 1 1 , 3 2 1, 3 3 6 -7 , 3 4 0 -1 ; M cC arran proposal fo r aid to, 3 4 1-2 , 343;

N ationalists in, 1 1 0 -1 2 , 19 8 -9 , 288, 3 2 1, 3 3 6 -7 , 340; suspen­ sion o f m ilitary aid to, 3 4 0 -1; U .S. aid to, 198-200, 250, 2 5 1, 2 6 7-8 , 287-90 C h in a A id Program , 287-90 C h in a lo b b y, 1 1 1 - 1 2 , 199, 3 4 1, 346 C h u rch ill, W inston, 23, 24, 28, 43; “ iron curtain” speech o f, 64, 13 8 -9 ; and S talin , 29 C iv il S ervice Com m ission, 12 3 -4 , 20 5-6 C lap p , G ordon, 132 C lark , Tom , 12 2 -3 , 125, 137, 140, 242; as E .R .P . lob b yist, 252; and Freedom T rain , 2 33-4 , 238; and H .U .A .C ., 30 8 -12 , 3 17 , 338- 9, 345- 6; and N ixon, 3 1 1 - 1 2 ; role in dom estic C o ld W ar, 14 2 -4 , 14 8 -9 , 205, 20819 passim, 223, 2 2 7-8 , 2 3 1-2 , * 33, * 40, * 94-8 C la y , L u ciu s D ., 279-80 , 2 8 1, 2 8 4 -

5, *86 C layton , W ill, 17 , 48, 5 1, 59, 6 a, 65, 66, 69, 70, 7 * . 74 , 79 , 80, 247; and E .R .P ., 15 a, 153, 155. 16 2 -3 , 166, 168, 169, 170 , 195. 252, 260, 2 6 1, 327; a t G eneva conference on G .A .T .T ., 1 5 7 62, 168; on Trum an D octrine, 8 8 -9, 94, 95, 98, 106, 10 7-9 ,

157-8 C lifford , C lark , 9 1 -2 , 205, 346; election strategy o f, 1 9 1 -2 , 2 3 5-6 , 2 41, 299, 322; and T ru ­ m an D octrin e speech, 9 8 -9 ; on U .S .-S oviet relations, 5 6 -7 , 6 7, 75 , 84 C o ld W ar: education for, 2 27-34 ; m obilization fo r in U .S ., 8 -1 2 , 94, 2 2 5-6 ; U .S. counterpropa­ ganda in , 2 0 7 -16 , 2 19 ; U .S. victories in , 94, 176 ; and W est­ ern b lo c form ation, 16 7 -7 8 C old W ar consensus, 5

»•• m

Index Com bs, J. M ., 12 0 -1, 122, 124 Com intern, 18 7 -8 C om m ittee fo r E uropean E conom ic C ooperation (C .E .E .C . ), 15 5, 156 . »59. 162, 16 5 -6 , 168, 183, 187, 2 57, 330, 3 3 1; and O .E .E .C ., 332, 333 Com m onw ealth trading b lo c (ster* lin g b lo c ), 1 8 -1 9 , 48, 73 ; see also G reat B ritain com m unism , com m unists: in C h in a, 10 9 -13 , 198-200, 3 3 6 -7 , 3 4 0 4; in C zech oslovakia, 269, 278; in European lab or m ovem ent, 172 , 17 3 -5 ; foreign aid as a w eapon against, 9 -10 , 5 6 -8 , 8 6 -7 , 89, 9 4 -10 1, 10 2 -9 , 1 1 3 14 , 16 7 -7 8 , 190, 19 3 -5 . * 5i . * 5 5 -7 , 345i m ilitary threat o f, 10 2-3 ; p u b lic agitation over, *44, 335. 359: 1 * Southeast A sia, 34 3 -4 ; U .S . fears o f, 4 -5 , 1 1 3 -1 4 , 142, 150, 244, 335; U .S. glob al com m itm ent against, 10 2 -14 passim; in w estern E u ­ rope, 6, 33, 54- 5, 56, 74, 97, 172 -8 , 18 7-8 , 193; see also A m erican Com m unist P arty Com m unist C ontrol A ct o f 1948, 3 10 -13 , 3 17 , 353 C onant, Jam es B ., 243, 244 C ondon, E d w ard U ., 3 1 3 -1 8 ,

336 C ongress, U .S ., 6 , 8, 24; and B rit­ ish loan, 6 1-9 ; an d E .R .P ., * 4 6 -5 1, * 55- 6i , *6 4 -9 , * 75- 6, 287-92; F .D .R . and, 2 5 -6 , 4 4 5; investigations o f subversion b y , 117 -2 2 , 12 8 -33, 14 4 -50 , 2 3 8 -4 1, 244, 30 8 -18 passim, 340; restriction o f E ast-W est trade b y , 290 -2; Trum an ad­ m inistration and, 4 4 -5 , 6 1-9 , 7 9 -8 1, 83, 87, 96, 100, 10 2 -14 , 12 9 -3 1, 14 4 -50 , 179 , 18 1-2 , 19 2 -3 , 19 5 -8 , 200, 2 0 1-5 , 2 4 6 S i, * 9 * , 3 0 7 -18

C on n ally, Tom , 349 C on n ecticu t State Youth C on fer­ en ce, 208 C ou n cil of F oreign M inisters ( 19 4 6 ), 136 C zech oslovakia: Com m unist cou p in , 2 6 9 -78 , 3 15 , 3 2 0 -1; Soviet backgroun d in , 2 7 7 -8

D oily W orker, 139, 144, 224, 249 D alton, H ugh, 7 5 , 248 "D eclaration o f F ou r N ations,” 39,

4* D efense D epartm ent, U .S .: control o f new s m edia b y , 2 19 -2 2 ; in defense o f E .R .P ., 255; and m il­ itary expansion, 2 7 3 -5 , *8 2 -5 ; N SC -68 docum ent o f, 3 2 1-4 , 333; role in 1948 w ar scare, 2 8 2 -5 d e G asperi, A ld d e , 173 d e G au lle, C h arles, 17 5 D em ocratic P arty: and election o f 1948, 19 1; left-lib eral w in g o f, 7 7 -8 , 84, 128; Southern w in g o f, 25, 119 , 129, 2 5 1, 299 D ennis, E u gen e, 14 6 -7 , 149 depression o f i9 3 o ’s, 16,. 1 7 D ew ey, Thom as, 120, 199, 299; cam paign strategy of, 339-40 D ies, M artin, 118 , 119 , 346 D ies com m ittee, 118 -2 0 , 2 11 Dirlcsen, E verett M ., 132, 196 D ixiecrat P arty, 299 D ouglas, L ew is, 252, 253, 256, 258, 259, 261 D oyle, C h arles, 295 D uclos, Jacques, 138 D u lles, John F oster, 43, 1 1 1 , 354 D um barton O aks conference (1 9 4 4 ),

40, 4*

eastern E urop e: E .R .P . and, 1 6 7 7 1 , 198, 247; S oviet policies in,

I n d ex

iv

20, 2 1, 29, 30, 32, 40, 4 7, 5 1 , 78, 169, 247, «S3, 277 E aton, C h arles, 77 , 196, 2 6 6 -7, 268 “ E ” com m ittees, 153 , 168 E conom ic C om m ittee fo r E urope ( E .C .E .) , 16 8 -9

Economic Cooperation Administra­ tion (E.C.A.), 330, 331, 332,

333 E den , A nthony, 7 E isenhow er d raft m ovem ent, 299 E isler, G erhart, 14 4 -6 , 147> 218, 239, 294, 2 9 6 -7 E isler, H anns, 239-40 elections o f 1946, 6, 8, 63, 6 7, 7 5 6, 318 ; secu rity issue in , 12 1, 123, 12 7-3 0 elections o f 1948, 8, 16 0 -1, 1 9 1 -2 , 2 3 5-6 , 298-306 passim, 307; com m unist issue in, 339-40 espionage, 346; in C an ad a, 120, 122, 123, 130, 242, 297; in U .S. governm ent, 12 1 E spionage A ct o f 19 17 , 223 E urope: com m unist rise in as U .S. concern, 6, 33, 5 4 -5 , 17 2 -8 , 18 7-8 , 193, 253; custom s union plan for, 16 1, 163, 3 3 1-2 ; im ­ port restrictions in, 15 7-6 0 , 187, 258; labor organizations in, 172 , 17 3 -5 ; postw ar eco­ nom ic conditions in, 5 -6 , 9, 1 3 14, 2 0 -1, 33, 7 0 -5 , 152 , 156, 1 5 7 -6 1 , 16 3 -4 , 182, 18 7-9 0 ; rearm am ent o f, 3 19 -2 4 ; and reconstruction issue in 1946, 4 7-6 9 passim; role o f B ritish econom y in, 7 4 -5 ; spheres o f influence in, 20, 2 1, 29, 30, 40,

42- 3, 5 1 , 57, 75, 78, 113 . 168, 247, 256, 277; U .S. reconstruc­ tion o f d eferred, 2 2 -3 5 passim, 37, 58 -6 9 passim; W estern b lo c in, 113 , 153, 16 7 -7 8 , 3 19 -2 4 ; see also eastern E urope European Paym ents U nion (E .P .U .), 331

E uropean R ecovery Program (E .R .P .; M arshall P la n ): cam ­ paign for, 5, 9 -1 2 , 246-92 pas­ sim; and C ongress, 7 , 158, 2 4 6 5 1, 2 5 5 -6 1; crisis p olitics in support o f, 264 -8 7; dissent against intim idated, 2 16 , 218— 19, 30 2-6; failu re o f, 3i^ ~33; goals o f offset b y adm inistration strategy, 1 1 ,1 9 6 -2 0 0 , 250, 2 5 1, 292, 3 3 3-4 ; G reco-T urkish aid as forerunner o f, 8 2-8 ; interim aid in advan ce o f, 187—200 pas­ sim; planning o f, 1 5 1 -6 ; and U .S. econom ic p olicy, 15 7 -6 6 , 32 5-34 ; in U .S. p o litical con­ text, 17 8 -8 7, 2 9 3 -3 18 passim; and U .S. trade barriers, 325-32; and W estern b lo c, 16 7 -7 8 ; see also foreign aid exchange rates, 3 7 E xport-Im port Bank, 26, 49, 5 1, 59, 89-90, 188; len din g author­ ity o f exhausted, 60; proposal to expand authority o f, 6 1 , 69

fascism , investigations o f, 118 F ederal Bureau o f Investigation, 120, 12 1, 12 2 -3 , 124. 133, 14 1, 20 5-6, 2 16 , 239, 240, 338 F ed eral E m ployee L o ya lty Program , 10, 1 1 5 -1 6 , 202, 220, 293; and elections o f 1946, 12 1, 123, 1 2 7 - 30; foreign p o licy and, 12 8 - 34, 14 1-4 ; historical b ack­ ground o f, 1 1 7 -2 3 ; and T em po­ rary Com m ission on E m ployee L o ya lty, 12 3 -7 , »33, M 2, 20910 Ferguson, H om er, 224 F in lan d, 137; S oviet treaty w ith , 269, 270, 278, 3 15 F oreign A gents R egistration A ct, 13 7, 210 foreign aid : as avenue to W ilsonian w orld order, 35-47 passim, 57,

Index 232, 329; backgroun d o f, 1 3 69; changes in U .S . view s on, 7 - 1 1 , 19 2 -7 , 2 75 -6 ; and crisis p olitics, 8 2-8 , 9 2 -10 1, 1 1 3 -1 4 , 187-20 0 , 26 4 -8 7; econom ic os. strategic valu es in , 176 -8 ; goals o f offset b y adm inistration propaganda, 1 1 , 196-20 0, 250, 2 5 1, 292, 33 3 -4 ; G reece and T u rkey as breakthrough for, 8 2-8 ; and intern al secu rity, 11 5 -5 0 passim , 2 3 4 -4 5, 2 9 3 306; as lin ked to anti-com m u­ nism , 9~10, 56“ 8» 88« 8 6-8 , 94— 10 1, 10 2 -14 passim; 128, 14 0 1, 16 7 -7 8 passim, 187-20 0 , 2 34-45 passim, 2 5 5 -7 ,2 9 8 -3 0 6 , 308; m ilitary aspects o f, 10 2 -3 , 268; m obilization o f support for, 6 1 -9 , 8 2 -10 1, 1 1 3 -1 4 , 128, 187-200, 246-92 passim; and patriotism , 232 -4 ; and re lie f program s, 190, 19 2 -3 , 248; R e­ publican proposals for, 249-50 , 263; strategy o f deferm ent to­ w ard , 2 2 -3 5 passim, 58 -6 9 pas­ sim, 128, 16 1-2 ; and U .S. trade patterns, 5 -6 , 26, 5 0 -1 , 60, 73 , 15 7 -6 6 passim, 1 7 1 - 2 ,1 7 7 ,1 9 3 , 19 7, 248, 2 58 -6 2, 3 2 5-8 ; see also E uropean R ecovery Pro­ gram ; G reco-T urkish A id Pro­ gram ; Interim A id Program Form osa: N ationalist w ith draw al to, 340, 342; U .S. p olicy tow ard,

34*. 346, 349, 350, 357 Forrestal, Jam es V ., 24, 40, 48, 66, 68, 75 , 87, 1 7 0 -1 , 186, 252; as C o ld W ar policym aker, 13 1, 13 5-4 0 , 20 7-8; and new s m edia, 13 7 -8 , 220-2; on U .M .T ., 229; and w ar crisis o f 1948, 273, 2 8 3 -5 F ran ce, 29, 72, 75 , 168, 3 19 ; com ­ m ercial policies o f, 159, 187; com m unists in , 5 4 -5 , 5 7, 74, 97, 17a , 1 7 3 - 4 , 175- 8, 195; and

v

G erm any, 172 , 17 5 , 279, 323; U .S. aid to, 49, 5 1 . 55- 6, 59, 156 , 175 , 17 7 , 188, 189, 193; in V ietnam , 3 4 3 -4 Freedom T rain program , 10, 2 3 3 -4 , 238, 241 F uchs, K laus, 346

G aston, H erbert, 126, 143 G eneral A greem ent on T ariffs and T rad e ( G .A .T .T .), 3 6 -7 , 46, 69, 73, 79 , 15 7 -6 2 , 326 G en eva C on feren ce (1 9 4 7 ), 1 5 7 62, 182 G eorge, W alter F ., 256, 258, 284 G erm any, 16; “ B izonia” in , 5 4 -5 , 59, 74 , 17 a , 175 , 18 8 ,18 9 ; e co ­ nom ic reconstruction o f, 5 3 -4 , 153, 2 53 -4 ; and reunification question, 33, 5 4 -5 , 253, 279; and U .S .-S oviet relations, 2 9 30, 3 * . 53- 4, 253- 4. 256, 279 G old , H arry, 346 G reat B ritain , 13 , 54, 278, 3 19 ; "au sterity program ” o f, 156 , 158 -9 ; and C h in a, 354, 355, 356; com m ercial policies o f, 1 8 19 , 2 7 -8 , 36, 72 , 7 4 -5 , 158 -60 , 187; co-optation o f in to U .S .planned institutions, 3 6 -8 ; eco­ nom ic crisis in , 7 0 -3 , 74 , 83, 156, 15 8 -9 , 329; econom ic ties w ith U .S ., 18 -19 , 2 7 -8 , 3 6 8, 7 1 ; and E .R .P ., 15 5 -6 , 177, 248; and G reco-T urkish aid , 75 . 8 2 -3 , 8 9 -9 3 . 142; opposi­ tion to in U .S ., 248; role o f in E uropean econom y, 7 4 -5 , 8 2 3; U .S. a id to , 23, 2 7 -8 , 4 7 -9 , 5 1, 58- 9, 6 1 -9 , 71, 96, 17 7 , 188, 189 G reco-T urkish A id Program : C on ­ gressional approval o f, 179 ; d e­ bates and hearings on, 10 2 -14 , 134, 15 7 -8 , 248, 265; propa­ ganda used fo r, 8 6 -10 1, 14 2 -3 ,

vi

I n d ex

H ull, C ord ell, 15 , 16 , 1 7 -1 8 , 19 , 19 3 -4 , 393; Trum an's speech on, 8 4 -8 , 89, 9 8 -9 , 10 0 -3 ,13 3 . 24» 30, 38. 39» 43» 45» 48» 95» 98, 159, 182 142, 150, 15 7, 168, 192 G reece, 5 1; B ritish aid w ithdraw n H ungary, 13 7, 2 77 H urley, P atrick J., 1 1 0 - 1 1 , 134, from , 75 , 8 2 -3 , 8 9-93; com ­ m unist rebels in , 75 , 82, 8 4 -5 , 344» 345 Ickes, H arold L ., 62 86, 97, 98, 116 , 140, 19 3 -4 ; S oviet m oves against, 90; U .S. — im m igratiop -A ct o f 1950^360 Industrial W orkers o f the W orld , aid to, 9, 56, 59, 8 2 -1 1 4 p as­ sim , 267; see also G reco-T ur2 1 6 -1 7 Interim A id Program , 9; and C on ­ kish A id Program gress, 243, 2 4 6 -7, 248, 249, G reenglass, D avid , 346 267; crisis p olitics in support G rew , Joseph, 14 1 o f. 18 7 -9 7; em ergency re lie f G urney, C h an , 283 v ie w o f, 190, 19 2 -3 , 248; and internal secu rity, 2 34 -4 5, 293; propaganda fo r as self-d efeat­ H alle, L ouis, 355 in g, 196-200, 250, 251 H arrim an, A verell, 30, 3 1 , 33, 40, internal secu rity: educational pro­ 43, 53, 75. 140, 185, 193. 194. gram s fo r, 2 2 7-34 ; 2nd foreign 195. 25* , 2 9 1, 3 16 , 352 H ebert, F . E dw ard, 3 4 5 -6 aid , 115 -5 0 passim, 2 34 -4 5, H erter, C h ristian , foreign aid pro­ 293-306, 308, 345; Justice D e ­ posal o f, 249-50 , 263, 267, 275 partm ent role in , 14 2 -50 , 208 H iss, A lger, 4, 1 1 , 12 1, 338, 340, 19; and link w ith M cC arthyism , 3 4 1, 344, 345, 346, 358 -9 358-60 ; see also A ttorney G en­ H oover, H erbert, 65, 263, 275, 350 eral’s list; F ed eral E m ployee H oover, J. E d gar, 12 1, 12 2 -3 , 138, L o ya lty Program ; H ouse U n140, 146, 208, 2 1 1 , 2 17 , 233, A m erican A ctivities C om m ittee; 240, 309; as adm inistration Justice D epartm ent spokesm an, 14 8 -9 ; and C ondon Internal Secu rity A ct o f 1950, 3 12 , case, 3 14 , 3 15 , 3 16 , 3 17 ; pow er 352, 353, 360 o f, 20 5-6, 2 9 7-8 International Bank fo r R econstruc­ H opkins, H arry, 23 tion and D evelopm ent, see H ouse F oreign A ffairs C om m ittee, W orld Bank 249-50 , 258 -9 , 2 6 1, 2 66-9, 276 International M onetary Fund H ouse U n-A m erican A ctivities (I.M .F .), 37, 74 , 122, 189 C om m ittee (H .U .A .C .), 10, International T rad e O rganization 12 1, 14 1, 294, 325; adm inistra­ ( I .T .O .) , 37, 74 , 2 6 1, 325; charter o f, 16 1, 162, 188, tion attack on, 338 -9 , 34 5-6 ; adm inistration cooperation w ith , 3 3 0 -1 14 4 -50 , 206, 208, 2 3 8 -4 1, 244; Iran, S oviet forces in , 53, 68, expanded program o f, 13 2 -3 , 136 135; and H iss, 340; and m ovie isolationism : and E .R .P ., 186, 248; industry, 2 4 0 -1 ; origin o f, 118 ; in fears o f U .S. w artim e lead ­ and R epublican anti-com m unist ers, 2 4 -7; rejection o f in post­ d rive, 30 8 -18 passim w ar U .S ., 6 - 7 H ow ard, R oy, 220, 221 Italy, 137, 168; com m ercial p olicies

Index o f, 159 , 18 7; com m unists in,

56, 57» 74. 97, 17«,

17 3 -4 , 195, >47, 279; elections in , 247, 268, 270, 272, 275, 279; U .S. aid to, 56,

59, 95,

156 , 17 7 , 188, 189,

193 Japan, 14, 16 , 43; in W orld W ar II, SO, 34, n o Javits, Jacob, 10 7-8 , 2 57-8 , 261 Jenner, W illiam , 76 Johnson, L ou is, 349 Jones, Joseph, 8 0 -1, 83, g6 , 98, 99, 103, 140, 15 1 Josephson, L eon , 14 5 -6 , 14 7, 149 Judd, W alter, 112 , 199, 200, 344,

ftjA _

'

vii

L attim ore, O w en , 348 L eagu e o f N ations, 16 L eah y, W illiam D ., 43 L en d L ease, 22, 23, 2 5 -6 , 2 7-8 ; Trum an's term ination o f, 34, 4 7 L ilien th al, D a vid , 1 3 1 -2 Lippm ann, W alter, 7 1 , 78, 103, 179 , 180, 220, 263, 264, 267, 275, 28 0 -1 London C on feren ce o f Foreign M inisters (1 9 4 5 ), 5 1 L o vett, R obert, 159, 162, 176 , 186, 193, 204, 224, 268, 270 L o ya lty R eview B oard, 237 L u ce, H enry, 1 1 1

.ju stic e D epartm ent, U .S .: alien deportation b y , 2 1 6 -1 9, 22p. 232. ■ a y 4 a n B - c o m m u n is t cam - I M acA rthur, D ou glas, 299; crossing o f 38th p arallel b y , 356; in Jifiign o f, 10, 1 1 7 , 120, 133, K orea, 3 5 0 -7 14 2 -50 , 2 0 8 -19 , 239-40 , 2 9 3 8, 3 0 1-2 , 337; inform ation leaks/ M cC arran, P at, 3 4 1, 347 M cC arth y, Joseph R ., 4, 12 , 76; from , 2 4 1-3 ; see also A ttorney G eneral's list charges o f, 3 4 7-8 , 3 5 1; “ D ec­ laration o f C on scien ce" against, 348; W h eelin g speech o f, 347 M cC arthyism : d eb t to Trum an K ennan, G eorge, 33, 56, 68, 10 0 -1, adm inistration, 358-60 ; theories 102, 15 1, 16 8 -9 , 170 , 198, 243, 244, 2 8 1, 320, 354, 355 about origins o f, 4r-5 K eynes, John M aynard, 2 7, 34, 38, M cC lo y, John J., 33 M cC orm ack, John W ., 68, 132, 267 47-9 M cG rath, H ow ard, 299 K now land, W illiam , 76 , 19 7 -8 , 341 K orea, K orean W ar, 4 , 1 1 , 320; M acL eish , A rch ib ald , 35, 243, 244 M agil, A . B ., 2 2 4 -5 background o f, 348-50 ; Inchon landing in , 355; M acA rthur’s M ansfield, M ike, 107 role in, 35 0 -7; 38th p arallel in, M ao T se-tu n g, 4, 343 M arshall, G eorge C ., 7 , 8 1, 82, 87, 355, 356 96, 1 5 1 , 176 , 18 1, 182, 220, K rug, Julius A ., 185, 252, 259 2 2 1, 253, 278, 30 1; and C h in a, 1 1 1 , 198, 288; and C ongress, lab or unions: com m unist issue in, 20 3-4, * 47. * 5* . * 55- 9, * 65, 300-2, 306; in E urope, 172 , 268; H arvard speech on E .R .P . b y , »55, 1 6 7 -7 1 , 18 3 -5 , 19 1, »73-5 L ab ou r P arty, G reat B ritain, 189 200, 203; role o f in w ar scare, L atin A m erica, 1 7 1 , 329; U .S. com ­ 280-2, 285; as Secretary o f D e­ m ercial relations w ith , 16 0 ,16 4 , fense, 3 5 2 -3 ; on Trum an D o c­ 166, 247 trine, 100; and U .M .T ., 229,

viii

I n d ex

2 8 1-2 ; on “ w orld crisis,” 2 6 9 70, 2 7 2 -3 , 280, 281 M arshall P lan, see E uropean R e­ co very Plan (E .R .P .) M artin, Joseph, 79 , 13 1 , 133, 2 6 7 8, 275; on subversion, 308 M asarylc, Jan, 269-70 M iddle E ast, 83, 96; con flict over o il, 75, 99; and Palestine ques­ tion , 2 5 1, 259 M illikin , E u gen e, 7 7 , 80 M olotov, V yach eslav M ., 39, 42, 68, 136, 16 7 -8 M onnet, Jean, 49 M orgenthau, H enry, Jr., 16, 23 M oscow C on feren ce o f F oreign M inisters (1 9 4 3 ), 30 -1, 39, 4 * m ultilateralism : ad vocated in F .D .R . adm inistration, 16 -2 3 , 2 7, 36; B ritish concessions to, 4 7 -9 ; econom ic aid as precondition o f, 7 3 -4 ; and G eneva C on fer­ en ce (1 9 4 7 ), 15 7 -6 * ; opposi­ tion to in E uropean econom ic crisis, 157-6 0 ; S oviet suspicions about, 3 0 -1, 169; U .S . barriers to, 18, 19, 4 5 -6 , 4 7, 6 5 -6 , 99, 3 2 5-32 ; and U .S. econom ic ex­ pansion, 4 9 -5 1; see also trade, trade patterns M undt, K arl, 106, 109, 132, 2 9 1 2, 308, 310 , 353 M urray, P h ilip , 2 18 , 300

N itze, P au l, 5 1 , 60, 72 , 154 N ixon, R ichard M ., 297, 308, 309, 353; on anti-com m unist legisla­ tion, 3 1 1 - 1 2 N orth A tlan tic T rea ty O rgan ization (N .A .T .O .), 3 19 -2 0 , 3 2 2 -4 N ourse, E d w in , 85, 252 O ’D onnell, John, 18 6 -7 O ’D w yer, W illiam , 298 O ffice o f E d u cation , 2 29 -32, 2 3 7-8 overseas inform ation program , 202-4

Palestine, partition o f, 2 5 1, 299 P assildvi, Juho, 278 Patterson, R obert, 220 -1 Perkins, F rances, 1 4 -1 5 P hilippines, U .S. trade w ith , 160 P hillips, C a b e ll, 186 Poland, 277; and Y alta, 86 Potash, Irvin g, 295, 302 Potsdam C on feren ce (1 9 4 5 ), 32, 43, 54, 1 4 1 . 347 President’s Com m ission on H igher E d u cation , 228 President’s T em porary Com m ission on E m ployee L o ya lty, 12 3 -7 , 133, 14 2 -4 , 345 P rogressive C itizen ’s A ssociation, 2 16 , 244, 298-306 passim

Q uebec C on feren ce ( 19 4 4 ), 23, 26 N ational A d visory C o u n cil, 56, 59, 60, 69, 72 N ational C ou n cil fo r A m erican S oviet F riendship, 208-9, 2 14 , 2 15 N ew D eal, 25; lin ked to subver­ sion, 119 -2 0 , 308, 33 7-4 0 new s m edia: censorship o f, 2 19 -2 5 ; investigations o f, 1 1 ; as instru­ m ent o f foreign p o licy, 13 7 -8 , 221 N im itz, C h ester W ., 140

R andolph, Jennings, 129 R ankin, John, 132, 3 4 5 -6 R ecip rocal T rad e A greem ents pro­ gram , 79 , 80, 159, 18 1, 2 6 1, 3 2 5 -8 , 330 R eece, C arroll, 3 15 R ees, E d w ard , 12 1, 202, 204 R epublican P arty: anti-com m unist thrust o f, 119 , 123, 128, 12 9 30, 13», 196, 199, 201, 2 3 4 -5 ,

Index 24», 3 0 7 -18 , 3 3 6 -4 1. 344- 53; and C h in a lo b b y, 1 1 1 , 1 12 , 19 8 -9 , 3 4 1, 346; conservative b en t o f, 25, 62, 7 5 -6 , 1 1 9 , 129; econom izing role o f, 6 2 -3 , 6 5, 76, 95, 249; foreign aid pro­ posals o f, 249-50 , 263, 267; oposition to foreign aid in , 6, 6 2 -3 , 7 6 -7 , 79 -8 0 , 9 4 -5 ; tariff p olicies o f, 19, 159 Reston, Jam es, 95, 103, 180, 18 1, 186, 274 R hee, Syngm an, 355 Robinson, H am ilton, 3 13 R ogge, O . John, 242 R oosevelt, E lean or, 298 R oosevelt, Franklin D ., 9 , 16 , 17 , 110 , 19 1, 2 1 1 , 228; bipartisan foreign p olicy under, 4 4 -5 ; and B ritain, 2 7-8 ; co-optation strat­ e g y in adm inistration o f, 3 5 -4 3 ; and isolationist threat, 2 4 -7 , 45; m ultilateralism advocated in adm inistration o f, 1 6 -2 1; postw ar plans o f, 1 4 -1 5 , 2 0 -6, 30, 3 7 , 232; and S oviet U nion, 2 1, 22, 2 9 -3 3 , 4 1 , 114 , 120, 135; spending policies o f, 65; subversion alleged in adm inis­ tration o f, 119 -2 0 , 133, 14 7, 2 4 0 -1, 33 7-4 0 , 344; and w ar­ tim e coalition , 29-30 , 66 R oyall, K enneth, 275, 284 R uark, R obert, 220 Rum ania, 137; S oviet control of, 5 1 -2 ; and Y alta agreem ent, 86

San F rancisco C on feren ce (1 9 4 5 ), 40, 42, 43, 44, 46, 63 Schlesin ger, A rth ur, Jr., 243, 244 S cott, H ugh, 340 S ecu rity A d visory B oard, 2 22 -4 S elective S ervice, 272, 273, 284, 286 Senate A rm ed Services C om m ittee, 282, 283

ix

Senate F oreign R elations Com m it­ tee, 2 7 1, 280, 349 Seventh F le et, 3 4 1, 349 Sherw ood, R obert, 15 Sm ith, Ferdinand, 2 18 , 295, 297, 300 Sm ith, M argaret C h ase, 348 Sm ith A ct, 210 , 296, 33 7, 338 S oviet U nion: a id requirem ents o f, 23, 3 0 -3 , 170; atom bom b ex­ ploded b y , 4, 1 1 , 3 2 1, 3 4 6 -7 ; co-optation o f into U .S.-plan ned institutions, 38 -4 3, 47; and C zech oslovakia, 2 77-8 ; in east­ ern E urope, 20, 2 1, 29, 30, 32, 40, 4 7, 5 1, 78, 169, 253, 2 77; and E .R .P ., 16 7 -7 2 , 182, 183, 2 5 3 - 9; and F in land, 269, 2 77, 278; and G erm any, 29-30 , 32, 53- 4, 2 53 -4 , 256; and K orea, 353, 354; and N .A .T .O ., 3 2 2 4; postw ar persp ectives o f, 2 1, 23, 5 1 , 16 9 -70 ; postw ar p ow er o f, 1 3 -1 4 , 20, 2 7 6 -7 ; propa­ gan d a o f, 1 3 7 - 8 ,1 4 1 ,1 8 4 ; pu b­ lic im age under F .D .R ., 4 1 -2 , 6 4 ,6 6 ,1 1 4 ,1 3 5 ; sp ecter o f, and aid program s, 64, 6 6 -7 , 86, 87, 9 9 -10 0 , 1 1 3 -1 4 , 128, 14 1, 182, 19 4 -8 , 2 5 3 -5 , 2 6 9 -8 7 passim; in Trum an adm inistration prop­ agan da, 9, 43- 4, 1 1 3 -1 4 , 1 3 7 8, 194. 2 5 3 -5 , 305; U S. atti­ tudes tow ard, 8, 9, 20, 22, 44, 64, 6 6 -7 , 1 1 3 -1 4 , 135- 6, 194, 2 5 4 - 5; U .S . challen ges to, 5 1 4; and U .S. containm ent p o licy, 5 2 -3 ; U .S. trade w ith , 258, 290-2; in w artim e allian ce, 2 9 30, 4 1 -2 , 66, 114 , 2 17 Sp in gam , Stephen, 205, 346 S talin , Joseph V ., 23, 29, 3 1, 32, 4 1. 194, 345 Stassen, H arold, 186, 1 9 1 , 299 State D epartm ent, U .S ., 36; con­ trol o f press b y , 2 2 4 -5 ; 2nd foreign a id , 59 -6 0 , 6 1 -2 , 69,

X

I n d ex

8 2 -3 , 9 6 -8 , 1 5 1 -6 , 198, *5 5 “ 7, 265; and security issue, 1 2 1, 13 0 -1, 138, 20 2-4, 3 13 , 3 4 4 -5 , 349; testim ony o f on aid pro­ gram s, 10 4 -10 , 2 57-8 , 265; and w ar scare o f 1948, 280-2 State-W ar-N avy C oordin ating C om m ittee (S .W .N .C .C .), 1 5 1 , 152, 154 , * 2 * Stim son, H enry L ., 16 , 23, 24, 33, 3 4 -5 , 40, 43. 48. 59. 182, 229 Studebaker, John, 228, 230, 2 3 7-8 , 241 Suprem e C ou rt, U .S ., 2 10 , 2 13 Sym ington, Stuart, 275

T ab er, John, 7 7 , 13 0 -1, 202, 203, 276, 3 13 , 344, 347 T a ft, R obert A ., 6 2 -3 , 19 1, 195, 199, 3 4 1. 347, 350; and E .R .P ., 249, 250, 2 5 1, 266, 276 T aft-H artley A ct, 301 tariffs, 69; U .S. position on, 18, 19, 4 5 -6 , 158 -60 , 3 2 5-34 ; see o&o trade, trade patterns T aylor, G len , 298, 303 Thom as, J. P arnell, t i g , 132, 134, 144, »45, 148, »49, 240, 3 14 , 3 16 , 346 T horp, W illard , 170 , 327 trade, trade patterns : in A ngloAm erican relations, 1 8 -19 , 2 7 8, 3 6 -8 , 47- 9, 58 -9 , 7 0 -3 , 15 8 60; betw een eastern and w est­ ern E urop e, 2 0 -1, 33, 170 , 19 7, 198, 2 57-8 , 287, 292; econom ic aid and, 5 -6 , 26, 5 0 -1 , 60, 73 , 15 7 -6 6 passim, 1 7 1 -2 , 17 7 , 193. 19 7, 248, 258 -6 2, 32 5-6 4 ; and E uropean im port restric­ tions, 15 7-6 0 , 18 7, 325; p ay­ m ents deficits in, 37, 72 , 74^5, 165, 188; p o litical controls over, 9 8 -9 ; and postw ar m ultilater­ alism , 1 6 -2 1 , 27, 3 0 -1 , 36, 4 5 S i, 63, 15 7 -6 2

T rohan, W alter, 274 Trum an, H arry S .: address to C on ­ gress on 1948 crisis, 2 7 1 -2 , 28 5-6 , 287, 30 2 -3; c iv il rights m essage o f, 299; on Com m unist “ m enace,” 3 3 5 -6 ; on European rehabilitation, 35, 59; foreign p o licy changes e ffected b y , 7 1 1 ; on international trade, 7 3 4; and isolationism , 2 4 -5 , 35, 6 4 -5 ; and labor, 6 7, 300-2; lib ­ eral-left criticism o f, 8, 6 7, 7 7 8, 179 , 184, 1 9 1 , 2 5 1; lo ya lty order o f, 1 1 5 -1 6 , 12 3 -3 4 , 202, 205, 209, 2 16 , 2 4 1, 300; and M acA rthur, 353, 35 5 -6 ; and M cC arthyism , 358-60 ; p olitical troubles o f, 7 7 -9 , 15 1; reaction to anti-com m unist legislation, 3 12 ; and S oviet im age in U .S ., 4 3 -4 , 6 6 -8 ; strategy fo r reelection , 19 1 -2 , 2 3 5 -6 , 241, 299, 322; on U .S .-S oviet rela­ tions, 258 Trum an adm inistration: a id tied to U .S . p o litical interests b y , 9 10, 56 -8 , 6 1 -2 , 16 3 -6 , 1 7 1 -2 , 187-20 0 passim; ap peal o f to C ath olics, 306, 339; attem pts to q u iet anti-com m unism , 3 3 4 40, 3 4 5 -6 ; bipartisan foreign p o licy o f, 12 9 -3 1, 192; censor­ ship in, 2 19 -2 5 ; charges o f d is­ lo yalty in , 30 7-8 , 3 1 3 -1 8 ; C h in a p o licy o f, 1 1 0 -1 3 , 134, 198-200, 2 5 1, 3 3 6 -7 , 34 0 -4 , 345, 357; containm ent p o licy o f, 5 2 -3 ; counterpropaganda techn ique o f, 2 0 7 -16 passim ; crisis p olitics o f, 8 2-8 , 9 2 -10 1, 1 1 3 -1 4 , 187-20 0 , 264-8 7; and F .B .I., 14 8 -9 , 205-6; “ firm ­ ness” tow ard Soviets, 5 1 -4 , 128, 129, 168, 300; Form osa p olicy o f, 342, 346, 349, 3 5 °, 357; and H .U .A .C ., 135, 1 4 1, 14 4 -50 , 206, 2 3 8 -4 1, 3 0 8 -18 ,

Index 33 8 -9 , 345- 6; K orean p o licy o f, 3 4 8 -5 7 passimi and lab or un­ ions, 30 0 -2; passport denial un­ der, 2 2 4 -5; p olice activities o f, 9, 1 0 -1 1 , 1 1 7 -3 4 passim, 2 0 7 26 passim, 293-306; propa­ ganda activities o f, 9 -2 0 , 4 3 -4 ,

xi 4 2 -3 ; com plaints to about Soviet U nion, 136; and K orea, 3 5 1, 356; and reconstruction problem s, 153; U .S . attitudes tow ard, 44. 45, 46, 64, 66; U .S .-S oviet negotiations on, 40,

46, 6 4 -5 , 8 8 -10 1, 1 1 3 -1 4 , 14 * , 1 9 1 -7 , 2 2 7-3 4 ; R epublicans and, 6 2 -3 , 65, 75-8 0 , 9 4 -5 , 96, 1 1 1 - 1 2 , 12 1, 123, 1 2 7 -3 1 , 19 0 1, 19 5 -6 , 19 8 -9 , 2 0 1-4 , 2 4 9 50, 263, 3 0 7 -18 passim, 3 3 6 4 1, 3 4 4 -5 3 , reversal o f inform a­ tion p o licy b y , 6 7 -8 , 13 5 -6 ; standing o f w ith Jew s, 2 5 1, 299; and W estern E uropean b lo c, 113 , 153, 16 7 -7 8 , 3 19 -2 4 Trum an D octrine: application o f to A sia, 3 5 7 -8 ; C h in a p o licy inconsistent w ith , 10 9 -13 , 198, 34 2 -4 ; econom ic aspects stressed, 10 2 -9 , 258 -62; ed u ­ cational im plem entation o f, 2 2 7-34 ; global im plications aired , 10 2 -14 ; G reco-T urldsh aid and, 8 2 -114 passim; ideo­ lo g ica l basis o f, 9 -10 , 8 6 -7 , 9 6 101 ; institutionalization o f, 288-92; Interim A id and, 1 8 7 200 passim; le g a cy o f, 3 19 -6 0 passim; as propaganda instru­ m ent, 8 8 -10 1, 1 1 3 -1 4 ; speech on, 7, 9, 8 4 -8 , 89, 9 6 -9 , 10 2 3, 133, 142, 150, 15 7, 168, 192; “ w orld-m indedness” program and, 2 3 1-2 T saldaris, Constantine, g o , 92, 2 14 T u rk ey: B ritish aid to, 75 , 82, 9 1 2; Soviet Union and, 53, 68, 90, 97, 98; U .S . aid to, 9, 8 2 10 1; see also G reco-T urldsh A id Program

46 U nited N ations R elief and R ehabil­ itation A g en cy (U .N .R .R -A .), 2 5 -6 , 60, 278; U .S . w ith draw al from , 61 U nited States: an ti-S oviet b lo c consolidated b y , 16 7 -7 8 ; a tti­ tudes tow ard E .R .P . in , 17 8 -9 , 18 5 -7 , 262, 263; b ila tera l agreem ents o f, 160, 162; and B ritain , 1 8 -19 , 23, 2 7 -8 , 3 6 -8 , 4 7 -9 , 7 1 , 15 5 -6 , 158 -60 , 248; econom ic p olicies o f, 5 -6 ,1 6 -2 1 , 26, 4 5 -6 , 5 0 -1 , 7 3 -4 , 15 7 -6 6 , 2 58 -6 2, 3 2 5-3 4 ; em ploym ent levels in, 4 9 -50 , 247; E uropean reconstruction deferred b y , 2 2 35 passim, 3 7, 58 -6 9 passim, 128, 16 1 -2 ; export m arkets re­ q u ired b y , 5, 26, 5 0 -1 , 60, 73 , 16 3 -6 , 182, 258, 260, 320; glo b al com m itm ents o f, 10 2 14 passim; industrial grow th o f, 17 ; left-lib eral coalitions İn, 13 9 -4 °; postw ar econom y o f, 5 -6 , 17-2 0 , 34, 4 9 -5 °, 16 3 -4 ; postw ar p ow er o f, 14; and re­ construction issue in 1946, 4 7 69 passim; tariff p olicies o f, 18 , 19. 4 5 -6 , 69, 158 -60 , 325- 34; view s on aid changed in , 7 - 1 1 , 19 2 -7 , 2 75 -6 ; w ar scare ( 1948) in, 2 6 9 -8 7 passim, 297, 307 U niversal M ilitary T rain in g (U .M .T .), 229, 230, 272, 273, 2 8 1-2 , 283, 285, 286 U .S .S .R ., see S oviet U nion

U n ited N ations, 8; and adm ission o f C h in a, 354; charter drafted ,

Vandenberg, A rthur, 44,64,68, 77, 8°, 89, 90, 96, 132, 134, 190,

I n d ex

xii

19 1, 299, 327; and C h in a, 19 8 9; and E .R .P ., 152 , 18 1, 195, 19 8 -9 , 250, 259-60, 262, 2 6 4 6, 276; and internal security,

*35 V ersailles, treaty o f, 15 V ietnam , U .S. involvem ent in, 3 4 3 -

4 V in cen t, John C arter, 202, 204, 344 Voorhis A ct, 210

132,

134,

W aldrop, Frank, 18 7 W allace, H enry A ., 16, 35, 62, 6 7, 2 19 , 244, 3 15 ; as adm inistration critic, 179 , 184, 2 16 , 225; "n eu ­ tralization’* o f, 236, 298-306 passim, 334; and th ird p arty m ovem ent, 19 1, 236, 2 5 1, 2 9 8 300, 30 2-6; on S oviet U nion, 7 7 -8 , 140 W arren, E arl, 19 1 W atkins, A rthur, 76 W edem eyer, A rthur, 199, 289 W elles, Sum ner, 26, 186 W h erry, K enneth, 250, 263, 266,

347, 351 W h ite, H arry D exter, 12 1-2 , 338

W h ite, W illiam S ., 303 W illiam s, John, 76 W illiam son, John R ., 218, 2 9 4 -5, 297, 3 0 1-2 W ilson, W oodrow , 7 ; econom ic p rincip les o f, 1 5 - 1 6 ,1 9 , 20, 22; and isolationism , 24, 45; w orld order o f revived , 3 5 -4 7 passim , 232, 329 W ood, John, 346 W orld B ank, 24, 26, 38, 60, 6 1, 122, 189; B ritish skepticism about, 37 “ w orld-m indedness,” 2 3 1-2 W orld W ar I, 2 17 ; plans fo r re­ covery from , 1 5 -1 6 W orld W ar II, 13 , n o ; coalition factors in, 29 -32 ; econom ic causes o f, 16; lo ya lty considera­ tions in, 116 , 12 3 -4

Y alta C on feren ce (1 9 4 5 ), 23, 32, 39, 4*. 43. 44, 86, 347

“ Z eal fo r A m erican D em ocracy” program , 2 3 0 -1, 232 -3, 2 3 7 -8 ,

336

A NOTE ABOUT THE AUTHOR

R ichard F reelan d w as bom in 1941 in N ew Jersey,

was graduated from Am herst C o llege in 1963, and studied for a year in England at the U niversity o f Bristol before receiving his Ph.D . in history from d ie U niversity o f Pennsylvania in 1969. D r. Freeland has taught history at the U niversity o f Pennsylvania, Boston C ollege, and Northeastern U niversity. H e is presendy assistant to the chancellor o f d ie U niver­ sity o f M assachusetts/ Boston.

A NOTE ON THE TYPE

This book w as set in Caledonia, a L inotype face designed b y W . A . D w iggins. It belongs to the fam ­ ily o f printing types called "m odem face” b y print­ ers— a term used to m ark the change in style o f type letters that occurred about 1800. Caledonia borders cm the general design o f Scotch M odem , bu t is m ore freely draw n than that letter. Com posed, printed, and bound by T he Haddon Craftsm en, Inc., Scranton, Pennsylvania. Typog­ raphy by Constance D oyle.