The Triune God: Systematics, Volume 12 9781442685031

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COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN

VOLUME 12 T HE T R I U NE GOD: S Y S T E M AT I C S

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COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD

LONERGAN T HE T R I U NE GOD: S Y S T E M AT I C S translated from De Deo Trino: Pars systematica (1964) by Michael G. Shields edited by Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour

Published for Lonergan Research Institute of Regis College, Toronto by University of Toronto Press Toronto Buffalo London

www.utppublishing.com c Bernard Lonergan Estate 2007 Printed in Canada isbn 978-0-8020-9168-0 (cloth) isbn 978-0-8020-9433-9 (paper)

Printed on acid-free paper Requests for permission to quote from the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan should be addressed to University of Toronto Press.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Lonergan, Bernard J.F. (Bernard Joseph Francis), 1904–1984. Collected works of Bernard Lonergan. Contents: v. 12. The triune God ; Systematics / edited by Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 978-0-8020-9168-0 (v. 12 : bound). isbn 978-0-8020-9433-9 (v. 12 : pbk.) 1. Theology – 20th century. 2. Catholic Church. i. Lonergan Research Institute. ii. Title bx891.l595 1988

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c88-093328-3 rev

The Lonergan Research Institute gratefully acknowledges the generous contribution of t h e m a l l i n e r c h a r i t a b l e f o u n d a t i o n , which has made possible the production of this entire series. The Lonergan Research Institute gratefully acknowledges the contribution of p h i l i p p o c o c k toward publication of this volume. University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its publishing program of the Canada Council for the Arts and the Ontario Arts Council. University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial support for its publishing activities of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (BPIDP).

Contents

General Editors’ Preface, robert m. doran / xvii Translator’s Foreword, michael g. shields / xxiii ENGLISH TRANSLATION Preface / 3 1

The Goal, the Order, and the Manner of Speaking / 7 1 The Goal / 7 2 The Act Whereby the Goal Is Attained / 11 3 The Question or Problem / 21 4 The Truth of Theological Understanding / 31 5 The Twofold Movement toward the Goal / 59 6 Comparison of the Dogmatic Way and the Systematic Way / 67 7 A Consideration of the Historical Movement / 77 8 A Further Consideration of the Historical Movement / 87 9 The Object of Theology / 101 10 The Purpose of This Work / 117

2

An Analogical Conception of the Divine Processions / 125 The Problem / 127 Opinions / 131 Intellectual Emanation / 135

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Assertion 1: The divine processions, which are processions according to the mode of a processio operati, are understood in some measure on the basis of a likeness to intellectual emanation; and there does not seem to be another analogy for forming a systematic conception of a divine procession. / 145 Assertion 2: Two and only two divine processions can be conceived through the likeness of intellectual emanation, namely, the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love from both the Speaker and the Word. / 181 Assertion 3: Generation in the strict sense of the term is implied by the divine emanation of the Word, but not by the divine emanation of Love. / 189 Question 1: Is our act of understanding different from our [inner] word? / 203 Question 2: Can the existence of a Word in God be demonstrated by the natural light of reason? / 207 Question 3: Does the Word proceed from the understanding of creatures? / 213 Question 4: Is the ‘beloved in the lover’ constituted by love or produced by love? / 219 3

The Real Divine Relations / 231 Opinions / 233 Theological Notes / 233 Assertion 4: Four real relations follow upon the divine processions: paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. / 235 Assertion 5: These four relations are subsistent. / 239 Assertion 6: Three real relations in God are really distinct from one another, on the basis of mutual opposition. / 247 Assertion 7: The real divine relations are conceptually distinct from the divine essence but really identical with it. / 257 Four Notes / 261 Question 5: Can a relation be really identical with a substance? / 267 Question 6: Is it possible for the real divine relations to be really distinct from one another and really identical with one and the same divine substance? / 279 Question 7: What is the value of the distinction between ‘being in’ and ‘being to’? / 289

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Question 8: Is it by a major or a minor conceptual distinction that the divine substance is distinguished from the divine relations and, conversely, that the divine relations are distinguished from the divine substance? / 295 Question 9: Besides a real distinction and a conceptual distinction, is there a third intermediate distinction, called a ‘formal distinction on the side of the reality?’ / 299 4

The Divine Persons Considered in Themselves / 307 section 1 / 307 Question 10: What should be understood by the word ‘person’? / 309 Assertion 8: The real, subsistent divine relations, really distinct from one another, are properly called and are persons. / 325 Question 11: In what sense is God a person? / 329 Question 12: How many are there that subsist in God? / 331 Question 13: What does the word ‘person’ mean in regard to God? / 333 Question 14: What do numbers signify in God? / 335 Question 15: Is ‘person’ predicated analogously of God and of creatures? / 337 Question 16: What is the meaning of person as divine? / 339 Question 17: How is person related to incommunicability and to interpersonal communication? / 345 section 2 / 351 Assertion 9: The attributes of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are divided into common, proper, and appropriated. / 351 Assertion 10: The real divine relations constitute the divine persons and distinguish the persons constituted, and therefore are personal properties. / 363 Assertion 11: The notional acts are natural, conscious, intellectual, rational, necessary, autonomous, eternal, the foundation of order in God, but not voluntary except in a diminished sense. / 369 Question 18: Are the personal properties understood as prior to the notional acts? / 373

5

The Divine Persons in Relation to One Another / 377 Assertion 12: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit through one real consciousness are three subjects conscious both of themselves and of each of the others, as well as of their own act both notional and essential. / 377 Question 19: Are the Father, the Son, and the Spirit more appropriately called modes of being (Seinsweisen) than persons? / 391

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Question 20: Do the divine persons say to one another ‘I’ and ‘You’? / 397 Question 21: What is the analogy between the temporal and the eternal subject? / 399 Assertion 13: The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit dwell within one another both ontologically and psychologically. / 413 Assertion 14: Perfection has two formalities. The first is grounded upon act, while the second is derived from the unity of order. The first perfection is infinite as found in the divine substance. The second is verified in the divine relations taken together as so great that no greater perfection can be thought of. Although the two concepts of perfection are conceptually distinct, in God they refer to one undivided real perfection. / 421 6

The Divine Missions / 437 Assertion 15: What is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons is constituted by the divine perfection itself, but it has a consequent condition in an appropriate external term. / 439 Assertion 16: Whatever is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons as regards divine cognitive, volitional, and productive operation is constituted by the divine perfection common to the three persons as both the principle-by-which and the principle-which, and therefore is attributed distinctly and equally to each divine person. / 443 Question 22: Did God the Father sent his Son to redeem the human race? / 447 Question 23: Do the Father and the Son send the Holy Spirit? / 449 Question 24: Is a divine person sent by the one or by those from whom he proceeds? / 451 Question 25: Is it by appropriation that the Father and the Son are said to send the Holy Spirit? / 453 Assertion 17: The mission of a divine person is constituted by a divine relation of origin in such a way that it still demands an appropriate external term as a consequent condition. / 455 Question 26: In what way is an appropriate external term consequent upon a constituted mission? / 467 Question 27: Is the Holy Spirit sent as notional love? / 473 Question 28: Are the divine missions ordered to each other? / 479 Question 29: What is the formality of divine mission? / 483 Question 30: Is it appropriate that the divine persons be sent, the Son visibly and the Spirit invisibly? / 491 Question 31: Is the Son also sent invisibly and the Holy Spirit visibly? / 499

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Question 32: Is it by way of love that the divine persons are in the just and dwell in them? / 501 Assertion 18: Although the indwelling of the divine persons exists more in acts and is better known in acts, still it is constituted through the state of grace. / 513 Epilogue / 523 Appendices / 527 Appendix 1: Immanent Operation / 531 1 The Words ‘Action’ and ‘Operation’ / 535 2 The Two Proportions between Act and Potency / 535 3 Act of What Is Complete and Act of What Is Incomplete / 537 4 Nature / 539 5 Active and Passive Potency / 539 6 To Receive, Passion / 541 7 Action ( poi¯esis, factio) / 543 8 Vital Act / 547 9 Application to the Act of Understanding / 553 Appendix 2: The Act of Understanding / 559 1 The Notion of Object / 561 2 The Object of the Intellect as End and Term / 563 3 The Object That Moves the Intellect / 567 4 Passages in St Thomas on the Object as Mover / 569 5 Quiddity / 577 6 Various Meanings of ‘Species’ / 587 7 The Necessity for the Word / 597 Appendix 2A / 603 17 The Act of Understanding and the Uttering of an Inner Word / 603 18 Intellectual Emanation / 609 19 Spiration / 615 20 The Procession of Love / 621 Appendix 2B: From the Image to the Eternal Exemplar / 627 21 The Analogy of Intellect / 627 22 Implications of the Analogy with Respect to God / 631

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23 Implications of the Analogy with Respect to Man / 637 24 Excursus: The Natural Desire of the Intellect / 645 25 The Analogy of the Word / 659 26 The Analogy of Proceeding Love / 671 27 The Trinitarian Analogy / 681 Appendix 3: Relations / 687 Question 33: Are there internal relations? / 687 Question 34: Does an external relation add another reality intrinsic to the subject besides the reality of the internal relation? / 699 Question 35: Do there exist in creation (a) a simply absolute reality, (2) a simply relative reality, (3) a reality that is absolute in a qualified sense, (4) a reality that is relative in a qualified sense? / 713 Question 36: Is the division of relations into predicamental and transcendental appropriate? / 719 Question 37: Are real created relations appropriately divided into internal and external as regards essence, and into beings-which and beings-by-which as regards existence? / 729 Question 38: Can several real relations be internal to one and the same absolute? Are they really distinct from the absolute? Are they really distinct from one another? / 733 A Brief Question: Is the relation of identity transitive? / 737 Appendix 3A: Letter to Fr Gerard Smith,

S.J.

/ 739

Appendix 4: Passages from Divinarum Personarum / 743 1 Chapter 1, Sections 3 and 4 / 743 Section 3: Further Observations Concerning the Same Act / 743 Section 4: The Threefold Movement to the Goal / 755 2 Chapter 2, from the Definition of Emanatio Intelligibilis through Assertion 1 / 761 Assertion 1: The divine processions are to be conceived through their likeness to intellectual emanation / 765 3 Chapter 2, the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Paragraphs of Question 1 / 781 4 Chapter 2, Question 4 / 783 5 Corresponding to the Section The Council of Rheims, A.D. 1148, in Chapter 3 / 785 6 Assertion 6, Preliminary Observations, § 2 / 787

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7 One of the Arguments in Assertion 7, That the Divine Essence and a Real Divine Relation Are Really the Same / 787 8 Response to the Scotist Position on Formal Distinction on the Side of the Reality / 789 Index / 793

LATIN TEXT Prooemium / 2 Caput Primum: De Fine, Ordine, Modo Dicendi / 6 Sectio Prima: De Fine / 6 Sectio Secunda: De Actu Quo Finis Attingitur / 10 Sectio Tertia: De Quaestione seu Problemate / 20 Sectio Quarta: De Veritate Intelligentiae / 30 Sectio Quinta: De Duplici Motu in Finem / 58 Sectio Sexta: Comparantur Via Dogmatica et Via Systematica / 66 Sectio Septima: Motus Historici Additur Consideratio / 76 Sectio Octava: Motus Historici Consideratio Ulterior / 86 Sectio Nona: De Obiecto Theologiae / 100 Sectio Decima: Opusculi Intentio / 116 Caput Secundum: De Divinis Processionibus Analogice Concipiendis / 124 Problema / 126 Sententiae / 130 De Emanatione Intelligibili / 134 Assertum I: Processiones divinae, quae sunt per modum operati, aliquatenus intelliguntur secundum similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis; neque alia esse videtur analogia ad systematicam conceptionem divinae processionis efformandam. / 144 Assertum II: Per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis duae et tantummodo duae processiones divinae concipi possunt, nempe, verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque. / 180 Assertum III: Divinam Verbi emanationem, non autem emanationem Amoris, consequitur ratio generationis proprie dictae. / 188 Quaestio I: Utrum aliud in nobis sit intelligere et aliud verbum / 202

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Quaestio II: Utrum naturali rationis lumine demonstrari possit in Deo esse verbum / 206 Quaestio III: Utrum Verbum procedat ex intelligentia creaturarum / 212 Quaestio IV: Utrum ‘amatum in amante’ constituatur an producatur per amorem / 218 Caput Tertium: De Relationibus Divinis Realibus / 230 Sententiae / 232 Notae Theologicae / 232 Assertum IV: Ad processiones divinas sequuntur relationes reales quattuor, nempe, paternitas, filiatio, spiratio activa, et spiratio passiva. / 234 Assertum V: Quae quattuor relationes sunt subsistentes. / 238 Assertum VI: Tres relationes reales in Deo secundum mutuam oppositionem realiter inter se distinguuntur. / 246 Assertum VII: Relationes divinae reales ratione a divina essentia distinguuntur et realiter cum ea identificantur. / 256 Notae Quattuor / 260 Quaestio V: Utrum relatio possit esse idem realiter quod substantia / 266 Quaestio VI: Utrum fieri possit ut relationes divinae reales et realiter inter se distinguantur et realiter cum una eademque substantia divina identificentur / 278 Quaestio VII: Quid valeat distinctio inter ‘esse in’ et ‘esse ad’ / 288 Quaestio VIII: Utrum maior an minor sit rationis distinctio qua divina substantia a divinis relationibus et vicissim divinae relationes a divina substantia distinguantur / 294 Quaestio IX: Utrum praeter distinctionem realem et distinctionem rationis admittenda sit tertia intermedia distinctio quae dicatur formalis a parte rei / 298 Caput Quartum: De Divinis Personis In Se Consideratis / 306 sectio prima / 306 Quaestio X: Quid sub nomine personae intelligendum esse videatur /308 Assertum VIII: Relationes divinae reales, subsistentes, et inter se realiter distinctae proprie dicuntur et sunt personae. / 324 Quaestio XI: Quo sensu Deus sit persona / 328 Quaestio XII: Quot sint in divinis quae subsistant / 330 Quaestio XIII: Quid nomen personae significet in divinis / 332 Quaestio XIV: Quid in divinis significent numeri / 334 Quaestio XV: Quod analogice dicitur persona de divinis et de creatis / 336

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Quaestio XVI: Quaenam sit ratio personae qua divinae / 338 Quaestio XVII: Quemadmodum persona se habeat ad incommunicabilitatem et ad communicationem interpersonalem / 344 sectio secunda / 350 Assertum IX: Dividuntur attributa Patris, Filii, et Spiritus Sancti in communia, propria, et appropriata. / 350 Assertum X: Relationes divinae reales personas divinas constituunt et constitutas distinguunt, et ideo sunt proprietates personales. / 362 Assertum XI: Actus notionales sunt naturales, conscii, intellectuales, rationales, necessarii, autonomi, aeterni, fundamentum ordinis in divinis, sed non voluntarii nisi sensu diminuto. / 368 Quaestio XVIII: Utrum proprietates personales actibus notionalibus praeintelligantur / 372 Caput Quintum: De Divinis Personis Inter Se Comparatis / 376 Assertum XII: Pater, Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus per unam conscientiam realem sunt tria subiecta conscia tum sui tum cuiusque alterius tum actus sui tam notionalis quam essentialis. / 376 Quaestio XIX: Utrum Pater, Filius, et Spiritus convenientius modi essendi (Seinsweisen) quam personae nominarentur / 390 Quaestio XX: Utrum personae divinae ad intra dicant, Ego, Tu / 396 Quaestio XXI: Quaenam sit analogia subiecti temporalis et subiecti aeterni / 398 Assertum XIII: Pater, Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus tam psychologice quam ontologice circumincedunt. / 412 Assertum XIV: Duae sunt perfectionis rationes, quarum prima ex actu desumitur, altera autem ex unitate ordinis repetitur. Et prima quidem perfectio in divina substantia invenitur infinita; altera autem in divinis relationibus simul sumptis tanta verificatur quanta maior cogitari nequit. At quamvis duo perfectionis conceptus ratione inter se distinguantur, in Deo tamen unam indivisamque perfectionem realem dicunt. / 420 Caput Sextum: De Divinis Missionibus / 436 Assertum XV: Quae contingenter de divinis personis vere dicuntur ita per ipsam divinam perfectionem constituuntur ut conditio eorum consequens sit conveniens terminus ad extra. / 438 Assertum XVI: Quae contingenter de divinis personis secundum operationem divinam cognoscitivam, volitivam, productivam vere dicuntur per communem divinam perfectionem tamquam per

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principium et quo et quod constituuntur, et ideo tribus pariter personis distincte attribuuntur. / 442 Quaestio XXII: Utrum Deus Pater Filium suum ad genus humanum redimendum miserit / 446 Quaestio XXIII: Utrum Pater et Filius Spiritum sanctum mittant / 448 Quaestio XXIV: Utrum mittatur persona divina ab eo a quo procedat / 450 Quaestio XXV: Utrum per appropriationem Pater et Filius Spiritum sanctum mittere dicantur / 452 Assertum XVII: Divinae personae missio ita per divinam relationem originis constituitur ut tamen per modum conditionis consequentis convenientem ad extra terminum exigat. / 454 Quaestio XXVI: Quemadmodum terminus ad extra conveniens missionem constitutam consequatur / 466 Quaestio XXVII: Utrum missio Spiritus sancti sit secundum dilectionem notionalem / 472 Quaestio XXVIII: Utrum divinae missiones inter se ordinentur / 478 Quaestio XXIX: Quaenam sit ratio missionis divinae / 482 Quaestio XXX: Utrum convenienter divinae personae mittantur, et Filius quidem visibiliter, invisibiliter autem Spiritus sanctus / 490 Quaestio XXXI: Utrum Filius etiam invisibiliter et Spiritus sanctus visibiliter mittantur / 498 Quaestio XXXII: Utrum secundum caritatem divinae personae iustis insint atque inhabitent / 500 Assertum XVIII: Divinarum personarum inhabitatio, quamvis in actibus magis sit atque cognoscatur, per statum tamen gratiae constituitur. / 512 Epilogus / 522 Appendix I: De Operatione Immanente / 530 1 De vocibus ‘actio,’ ‘operatio’ / 534 2 De duplici proportione inter actum et potentiam / 534 3 Actus perfecti et actus imperfecti / 536 4 Natura / 538 5 Potentia activa et passiva / 538 6 Pati, passio / 540 7 Actio ( poi¯esis, factio) / 542 8 Actus vitalis / 546 9 Applicatio ad actum intelligendi / 552

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Appendix II: De Actu Intelligendi / 558 1 Obiectum / 560 2 De obiecto intellectus ut fine et termino / 562 3 De obiecto quod intellectum movet / 566 4 Testimonia S. Thomae circa obiectum movens / 568 5 De quidditate / 576 6 Quotuplex sit species / 586 7 De necessitate verbi / 596 Appendix II-A / 602 17 Intelligere et dicere / 602 18 Emanatio intelligibilis / 608 19 De spiratione /614 20 De processione amoris / 620 Appendix II-B: Ex Imagine Ad Exemplar Aeternum / 626 21 Analogia intellectus / 626 22 Analogiae consectaria quae Deum respiciant / 630 23 Analogiae consectaria quae hominem respiciant / 636 24 Appendix: De naturali desiderio intellectus / 644 25 Analogia verbi / 658 26 Analogia amoris procedentis / 670 27 De ipsa analogia trinitaria / 680 Appendix III: De Relationibus / 686 Quaestio XXXIII: Utrum sint relationes internae / 686 Quaestio XXXIV: Utrum relatio externa aliam realitatem subiecto intrinsecam addat super realitatem relationis internae / 698 Quaestio XXXV: Utrum in rebus creatis existant (1) realitas simpliciter absoluta, (2) realitas simpliciter relativa, (3) realitas absoluta secundum quid, (4) realitas relativa secundum quid / 712 Quaestio XXXVI: Utrum relationes convenienter in praedicamentales et transcendentales dividantur / 718 Quaestio XXXVII: Utrum relationes reales creatae convenienter dividantur, secundum essentiam in internas et externas, et secundum esse in entium-quae et entium-quibus / 728

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Quaestio XXXVIII: Utrum plures relationes reales uni eidemque absoluto internae esse possint; utrum realiter ab absoluto distinguantur; utrum realiter inter se distinguantur / 732 Quaestiuncula: Utrum relatio identitatis sit transitiva / 736 Appendix IV: Divinarum Personarum / 742 1 Chapter 1, Sections 3 and 4 / 742 Sectio Tertia: Ulteriora quaedam de eodem actu / 742 Sectio Quarta: De triplici motu quo ad finem proceditur / 754 2 Chapter 2, from the Definition of Emanatio Intelligibilis through Assertion I / 760 Assertum I: Processiones divinae sunt concipiendae per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis / 764 3 Chapter 2, the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Paragraphs of Question 1 / 780 4 Chapter 2, Question 4 / 782 5 Corresponding to the Section The Council of Rheims, A.D. 1148, in Chapter 3 / 784 6 Assertion 6, Preliminary Observations, § 2 / 786 7 One of the Arguments in Assertion 7, Relationes divinae reales ratione a divina essentia distinguuntur et realiter cum ea identificatur / 786 8 Response to the Scotist Position on Formal Distinction on the Side of the Reality / 788

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General Editors’ Preface

Before he began teaching at the Gregorian University in Rome in 1953, Bernard Lonergan taught a course entitled ‘De Deo Trino’ in 1945–46 at Coll`ege de l’Immacul´ee Conception in Montreal, and another course entitled ‘De Trinitate’ at Regis College (then College of Christ the King) in Toronto in 1949–50. His first course in Rome on ‘De Deo Trino’ was offered in the spring semester of 1955 to second- and third-year theology students. The texts used for the course were questions 27 to 43 of the first part of the Summa theologiae of Thomas Aquinas and a text written by Charles Boyer, s.j., of the Gregorian faculty, Synopsis praelectionum de SS. Trinitate. Lonergan produced his own notes for this course, a set of fifty pages issued to the students on 7 March (in those days the feast day of St Thomas Aquinas in the Catholic Church’s liturgical calendar). These notes consisted of three articles, of which the first and part of the second survived in the later texts that Lonergan composed on the Trinity and are published here as appendices 1 and 2. The first of Lonergan’s own texts on the Trinity was Divinarum personarum conceptionem analogicam evolvit Bernardus Lonergan, S.I., which was published ad usum auditorum (for the use of his students) by Gregorian University Press, Rome, in 1957. Lonergan taught the same course in the spring semester of that year and again in the fall semester of 1958, and we may presume that his own text supplemented the other readings that he had used earlier. He reissued the text with very slight modifications in 1959, and this version was used in his course ‘De Deo Trino’ in the fall semester of 1960. The three articles of 1955 and then the lengthy text of 1957 and 1959 were all part of that portion of trinitarian theology that was considered systematic, synthetic,

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xviii General Editors’ Preface speculative, as contrasted with the analytic, dogmatic treatment of the development of the church’s trinitarian doctrine. This portion of trinitarian theology was treated by Lonergan in a text published in 1961, De Deo Trino: Pars analytica, and both this text and Divinarum personarum were used in his course ‘De Deo Trino’ offered in the fall semester of 1962. The year 1964 saw the publication of the massive book De Deo Trino in two parts. The first part, now called pars dogmatica, was a revised version of the earlier pars analytica, and the second part, pars systematica, a revised version of Divinarum personarum. The present text is based on the pars systematica of the 1964 De Deo Trino. That is to say, the preface, the six chapters, the epilogue, and appendices 1, 2, and 3 of the present text consist of that work in its original Latin and in English translation on facing pages. What here are called appendices 2a and 2b consist of material from the 1955 notes that Lonergan chose not to publish in Divinarum personarum and in De Deo Trino, Pars systematica, and appendix 4 of the present book consists of the material from Divinarum personarum that was either omitted from the 1964 text or revised for inclusion in the later text. Thus, we may reasonably claim that we have assembled here the total output of Bernard Lonergan in the systematics of the Trinity down to 1964. Appendix 3a is the result of an editorial decision to include here a letter that Lonergan wrote to Rev. Gerard Smith, s.j., of Marquette University, who had written Lonergan with some questions on the theory of relations. In his later work Lonergan would suggest developments in the speculative portion of trinitarian theology, but these are only sketched in his work and left to others to complete. Those suggestions will be found in their appropriate places in other volumes of the Collected Works. Volume 11 of the Collected Works, The Triune God: Doctrines, will do for the pars analytica or pars dogmatica of De Deo Trino what we have attempted to do here for the pars systematica. Lonergan’s systematics of the Trinity stands in a tradition of theological reflection on this central mystery of the Christian faith, a tradition whose principal previous figures are St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas. That is to say, Lonergan is firmly in the tradition that employs what has come to be called a psychological analogy for understanding the divine processions. This analogy was first worked out by Augustine in his De Trinitate and furthered by Aquinas in both the Summa contra Gentiles and the Summa theologiae, prima pars, questions 27 to 43. Lonergan’s work develops that analogy. It represents the third and fourth moments in the development of that analogy: the third moment in De Deo Trino: Pars systematica, offered here in English translation, and the fourth in the later suggestion already alluded to, where the analogy proceeds ‘from above downwards’ in consciousness.

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General Editors’ Preface

There are two main differences in Aquinas’s presentation as compared with Augustine. Augustine presents the analogy psychologically, by an appeal to word and love as they proceed in human consciousness. Aquinas presents it both psychologically and metaphysically, and in fact more metaphysically than psychologically, though the psychology is clearly second nature to him. Moreover, Augustine proceeds throughout in the via inventionis, the way of discovery, and reaches the analogy in steps through the process of inquiry, whereas Aquinas follows a distinct ordering of questions that he calls the ordo disciplinae or the ordo doctrinae, the way of learning and teaching. By the time of the Summa theologiae Aquinas is doing theology in that order. It is the order proper to the systematic ordering of ideas. In the way of discovery, one begins with what is most clearly known to us and proceeds by way of analysis to the discovery of causes, reasons, explanation. In the way of learning and teaching, one begins with the causes, reasons, explanation reached in the way of discovery and composes synthetically the realities thus explained. Lonergan not only stands in this particular tradition; he also advances it, and quite considerably. His psychological penetration especially of the procession of inner word from act of understanding is more detailed and more differentiated in terms of interiority than was that of either Augustine or Thomas. He brings to the work the vast riches of his explorations of human cognitional and deliberative process in the mammoth work Insight ; and while many of the seeds of that work are potential, and a few of them actual, in the work of Aquinas, clearly Lonergan is standing on his own two feet as he works out the theory of intentional consciousness that he brings to bear on the psychological analogy. And his later suggestion ‘from above’ embarks on an entirely new line of thought that he has left to others to develop. The systematic part of De Deo Trino, like every work in systematic theology, has as its principal objective an understanding of a doctrine or set of doctrines that are already proposed by the church and/or accepted within a particular theological tradition. In the pars dogmatica of De Deo Trino, which will constitute volume 11 in the Collected Works, Lonergan presents five such affirmations. (1) God the Father neither made his own and only Son from some preexisting material nor created the Son from nothing, but from eternity out of his own substance generated the Son as consubstantial to the Father. (2) The Holy Spirit, the Lord and giver of life, proceeding from the Father, who spoke through the prophets, is to be adored and glorified together with the Father and the Son. (3) Therefore, one is the divinity, power, and substance of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, but three are the persons or hypostases distinguished from one another by their proper characteristics, which are all in the order of relation; hence in God

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everything is one except where the opposition of relation dictates otherwise. (4) The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle and by one spiration. (5) The dogma of the Trinity, which is a mystery properly so called, cannot by principles natural to us either be understood in itself or be demonstrated from its effects; this remains true even after revelation, when, however, reason illumined by faith can proceed, with God’s help, to an analogical and imperfect understanding of this mystery. That analogical and imperfect understanding is precisely the objective of the present volume. I asked my colleague and fellow General Editor, Frederick E. Crowe, who is well known not only for his general expertise in Lonergan’s work but also for the notes he wrote and the classes he taught in trinitarian theology and for his own contribution to an understanding of Aquinas’s position on love, 1 if he would contribute a few paragraphs to this General Editors’ Preface. Here is what he wrote: ‘Lonergan taught the Trinity for the first time in the fall semester of [the academic year] 1949–1950 at Regis College in Toronto. I attended those lectures in my fourth year of theology under his tutelage. They ended with a sweeping view of life and thought, exploiting the potentialities of the trinitarian categories of intelligence, word, and love. It was an exhilarating experience for me, and not only that: as well it became an anchor through several years of change in a changing world conceived in the categories of a changing theology. ‘The potentialities of the psychological triad had one drawback: they kept me from attending sufficiently to the riches of interpersonal relations. These I found a few years later in chapters 5 and 6 of Divinarum personarum. I do not say those riches were only potential in the lectures of 1949–1950; we receive what we are ready to receive, and whether or not Lonergan presented the ideas that were to become chapters 5 and 6, I was not ready to receive them. Even after those chapters came out in print and I was teaching them, I was still for some years a particular fan of the emanatio intelligibilis. ‘What have I to say now almost fifty years after Lonergan’s Divinarum personarum? I think chiefly that I am grateful to have focused first on intelligible emanation and to have come later to an appreciation of interpersonal relations. Watching theological education now somewhat from a distance, I have the impression that intelligible emanation is being shortchanged: interpersonal relations have seized the theological imagination, and intelligible emanation, along with the study of consciousness in general, is relegated to an interesting footnote. 1 See Frederick E. Crowe, ‘Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas,’ now available in Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, ed. Michael Vertin (Boston: Lonergan Workshop, 2000) 71–203.

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‘May this Collected Works edition of the systematic volume of Lonergan’s trinitarian theology do something to reverse the trend or at least to even the score. It will not be an easy task for theologians to assume. Consciousness itself must first gain a place of honor in philosophy and theology, and then intelligible emanation will be poised for the breakthrough now denied it. ‘When the theologians of intelligible emanation compete on a level playing field with those of interpersonal relations, I anticipate that what may start as competition will become collaboration, with the greatly increased riches that will accompany that development. This translation will, I believe, expedite the desired change and release a flood of studies authored by those for whom Latin is sadly a closed book.’ We turn now to a few minutiae of editing. As with the earlier volume 7, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, we follow the policy of confining to the Latin text the Gregorian University Press distribution into paragraphs of larger and smaller print, but with the reminder that this distribution was of some importance to Lonergan. As in other volumes, the Oxford American Dictionary and the Chicago Manual of Style have been relied upon, not slavishly but with a predisposition in their favor. In addition to using db and ds in reference to Denzinger’s Enchiridion, we have added in the English text nd, referring to equivalent numbers, where available, in Joseph Neuner and Jacques Dupuis, The Christian Faith, 7th ed. (New York: Alba House, 2001). We continue to use the New Revised Standard Version of the Bible. We also continue our practice of putting brackets around editorial footnotes and comments. The General Editors wish to thank Michael Shields for his very careful and dedicated attention to the work of translation. It is probably no exaggeration to say that decades, and we hope centuries, of readers will be grateful to him. We wish also to thank Daniel Monsour, who brings to the work of editing a text like this not only a depth of philosophical and theological penetration but also a facility for painstaking research that seems second nature to him. Professors Neil Ormerod and Charles C. Hefling offered very helpful suggestions after reading the penultimate text. We cannot issue this text to the public without mentioning the tremendous assistance that an earlier translation has brought to Lonergan students. This earlier translation, available in typescript at many Lonergan Centers, was done by John Brezovec. It was consulted by the editors on numerous occasions, as was the work on this volume done by Quentin Quesnell and the translation of the first chapter of Divinarum personarum done by Francis Greaney.

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xxii General Editors’ Preface We close with a note on the icon that we have chosen to use as a frontispiece, ‘Holy Theologian Bernard Lonergan in the Mystery of the Eternal Processions of the Most Holy Trinity.’ The noted iconographer William Hart McNichols wrote this icon in 2002, in commission from the Lonergan Research Institute. Fr McNichols quotes Frederick Crowe: ‘. . . in the mystery of the Trinitarian processions, and through his life to Method in Theology and beyond, in the welter of words that with other theologians it was his vocation to utter, Lonergan never lost what Thomas above all theologians could teach, that theology can be done, must be done, that when it is done, we are confronted with mystery and bow our heads in adoration.’ It was from there, Fr McNichols writes, that he took his inspiration for the icon. He used a painting by Lawren Harris, Canadian landscape painter, for the background, since, as he writes, ‘the vivid pine trees burning with light seemed perfect for the Theophany’ that he was attempting to portray. He added the maple leaves, he says, ‘as an affectionate touch thinking of my years of traveling to Canada to give retreats and the lovely friends made there.’ Finally, Fr McNichols writes, ‘In the icon Holy Theologian Bernard Lonergan receives insight and illumination from the Source he queried, the Most Holy Trinity.’ robert m. doran (For the General Editors)

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Translator’s Foreword

Exegi monumentum aere perennius Horace, Odes iii, 30

‘Monumental’ is a word that combines the meanings of massive, important, and lasting. It has been applied to Lonergan’s great philosophical work Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. I think it is very likely to be applied to his two-volume theological work De Deo Trino, ‘The Triune God.’ As related in the Editors’ Preface, Lonergan’s work on the Trinity took final form in 1964. If after more than forty years it has not yet received much recognition, the reason is obvious: it was written in Latin, an impenetrable barrier today to all but a very few. The Latin of this second volume combines the different layers of Lonergan’s own Latinity. He first studied Latin as a schoolboy at Loyola High School in Montreal (1918–22), then as a young Jesuit at Guelph (1922–26) and at Heythrop, England (1926–30), where he did further studies in the Greek and Latin classics for the University of London degree. By this time he would have become completely at home in classical Latin (not to mention Greek), able to compose in the style of Cicero or Livy or even in the taut elliptical style of Tacitus. During the next stage of his studies, in Rome (1933–40), Lonergan would have listened to lectures all delivered in Latin, sometimes quite elegant Latin, for that was the custom at the Gregorian University in those days. He read extensively in the writings of Augustine, Aquinas, and the medieval Scholastics, as well as books and articles on scholastic philosophy and theology written in ‘modern’ Latin that

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xxiv Translator’s Foreword were common in Roman Catholic seminaries in the last century. Then, from 1940 on, when it became his turn to take the professorial chair, first in Canada and later in Rome (1953–65), he delivered his lectures mainly in Latin and composed also in Latin the various supplementa, as he called them, to accompany and augment his lectures. The style of these minor works, where clarity was the prime consideration, was neat and simple and straightforward – very good Latin, but not classical. The Latin in this book steers a middle course between these different styles, the classical and the scholastic textbook style. Needless to say, it is excellent Latin throughout, perhaps tending more towards the classical in such parts as the first chapter, and more scholastic in style in the appendices, especially 1, 2, 2a, and 2b, which began life as a supplementum to the Roman lectures. There is a parallel variety in vocabulary, from strictly classical expressions to scholastic terminology, with occasional words like specializare and historicismus, coined by a kind of backformation from modern languages. Finally, I should like to express my gratitude to the editors: to Daniel Monsour for his helpful comments and suggestions about the translation, especially with regard to Lonergan’s English vocabulary; and to Robert Doran, whose invitation to me to undertake this translation has allowed me to have a part in making this monumental work available to a much wider readership. michael g. shields

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T H E T R I U N E G O D: S Y S T E M A T I C S

Prooemium

Imperfectam illam mysteriorum intelligentiam, quam fructuosissimam affirmare non dubitavit concilium Vaticanum, dupliciter investigamus. Primo enim capitulo quaenam ipsa sit secundum se et quemadmodum se habeat ad reliquam theologiam inquiritur. Altero autem, tertio, et quarto capitulis enitimur, ut intelligentia theoretice possibilis actu in mentibus nostris fiat circa divinas processiones, divinas relationes reales, divinas personas consubstantiales. 1 Non ergo de tractatu quodam theologico componendo et conscribendo hic agitur, sed de ea tantummodo parte quae strictiori quodam sensu speculativa est. Non solum enim ipsa fidei dogmata iam cognita atque stabilita supponimus, sed etiam omnes conclusiones quae ex fontibus revelationis deducuntur. 2 Alia enim est certitudo quae ita gignitur, alia autem est certorum intelligentia quam hic quaerimus unice. Quem in finem haud parum influunt sane tum metaphysica de operatione immanente, de relationibus, de subsistente, de persona, tum psychologica de conscientia, de intellectu, et de voluntate. At ne tota fere philosophia theologicum opusculum invadat atque obruat, ita processimus ut in ipsis argumentis minima et necessaria exponamus, in appendicibus autem paulo ampliora addamus, ad alia denique scripta eos remittamus qui profundius in quaestionem vel historicam vel speculativam inquirere velint.3

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Preface

We are going to investigate that imperfect understanding of mysteries that the First Vatican Council did not hesitate to acclaim as ‘most fruitful.’ We will proceed in two steps. Chapter 1 will cover the first step, asking what that understanding is in itself and how it relates to the rest of theology. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 will try to bring to life for us such understanding as is theoretically possible in regard to processions in God, real relations in God, and consubstantial divine Persons. 1 Our aim is to produce, not a complete treatise on the theology of the Trinity, but only that part of the treatise that is speculative in a stricter sense. The dogmas of faith are presupposed here as well enough known and established. Presupposed too are all the conclusions that can be deduced2 from the sources of revelation. They provide certitude, but certitude is not what we are aiming at here. All we are aiming at is the understanding of those truths that we accept as certain. The prosecution of our aim will be influenced not a little by metaphysics and psychology: metaphysics as regards immanent operations, relations, the subsistent, the person, and psychology in regard to consciousness, intellect, and will. But, lest our modest project be invaded and overwhelmed by practically the whole of philosophy, we have included in our arguments only what is indispensable. Further details have been relegated to appendices. Those who want to pursue the historical issues in further detail may turn to our ‘The Concept of Verbum in 1 [For some reason, no mention is made here of chapters 5 and 6; chapter 5 continues the discussion of the divine Persons, and chapter 6 treats the divine missions.] 2 [The presumption is that Lonergan means deduction in the strong logical sense of the term, and this presumption is supported by the way in which he will speak of ‘conclusions’ in theology at the various points at which that topic arises.]

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the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,’ Theological Studies 7 (1946) 349–92; 8 (1947) 35–79, 404–44; 10 (1949) 3–40, 359–93. Those who want to go more deeply into the speculative issues will have to consult our study Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, and another work, De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica. 3

3 [The historical work is now available as Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, vol. 2 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). The speculative works to which Lonergan refers are Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, originally published London: Longman, Green and Co., 1957; 5th ed. published as vol. 3 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); and Bernard Lonergan, De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1956, 1958, 1960, 1961, 1964); in English, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, vol. 7 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002). In the Latin text, these references to the ‘Verbum’ articles and to Insight and De constitutione Christi, are given only in footnotes. In the 1964 text, Lonergan added at this point the page numbers where the current edition differs from the earlier (1957, 1959) Divinarum personarum ... (see above, General Editors’ Preface). The earlier material is given here in appendix 4.]

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CAPUT PRIMUM

De Fine, Ordine, Modo Dicendi

Mirari neminem arbitramur quod, quaestionem speculativam aggredientes, notulas quasdam quae methodum respiciant praemittere decreverimus. Sicut enim investigantes a recto tramite vagantur, cum finem scientificum minus exploratum perspectumque habeant, ita etiam addiscentes neque parum sollicitantur neque minores patiuntur difficultates, si quidem non intelligunt quinam finis intendatur et quibusnam mediis procedatur. Quod sane eo facilius atque frequentius in theologia addiscenda accidere solet, quod non univoce sed analogice tantum theologia sit scientia, quod tot tamque diversa media in proprium finem adhibeat, quod pro mediorum diversitate diversimode procedat. Hoc ergo introductorio capitulo, communiores quasdam difficultates praecavendas intendimus. Brevius autem atque efficacius fore duximus, magis positivam rei intelligentiam promovere quam errores subtilius narrare invicteque refutare. Qua de causa, ordinate disserendum censuimus de fine qui intenditur, de actu quo finis attingitur, de motu quo ad actum proceditur. Quod quam schematicum sit, cum nemo non videat, omnibus manifestam fore speramus nostram intentionem, non tractatus de methodo in brevi absolvendi, sed notulas quasdam colligendi atque componendi.

Sectio Prima: De Fine Cum scientia sit certa rerum per causas cognitio, qui scientiam tamquam finem prosequitur, duo intendat necesse est. Si enim causarum cognitionem ita appetit ut certitudinem nullatenus assequatur, exercet sane ingenium sed de ipsis rebus

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CHAPTER 1

The Goal, the Order, and the Manner of Speaking

It is hardly surprising that we introduce our speculative inquiry with a few notes on method. Investigators soon lose the right track if they do not carefully examine and accurately grasp the goal of their science. So too, students can have serious difficulties and worries when they do not understand what the goal of their studies is and what means they should use to get there. This happens more easily and more frequently in the study of theology: theology is a science only analogically, not univocally; it uses an extraordinary number of widely different means to its proper end; and it has to proceed differently with each different set of means. So in this introductory chapter we will try to forestall a few of the more common difficulties. We have decided that it would be briefer and more effective to convey a more positive understanding of the issue than to present a nuanced account of the errors and then forcefully refute them. Therefore it seemed best to discuss in order the goal intended, the act by which the goal is attained, and the movement by which we advance toward that act. Since everyone can see how schematic this treatment is, we trust it will also be clear what our purpose is, to collect and put together a few notes, and not to attempt to present an entire treatise on method in such a brief space. 1 The Goal Science is the certain knowledge of things through causes. Thus, if science is our goal, we have to intend two objectives. If we are so intent on coming to know causes that we pay no attention to certitude, then we may exercise our ingenuity

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nihil addiscit. Si autem certitudinem tam magni aestimat ut rerum rationes et causas, quippe semper dubias, considerare nolit, crudam quandam atque indigestam rerum notitiam ita accumulare potest, ut ad veri nominis scientiam numquam perveniat. Nam sicut essentia et esse ita inter se cohaerent ut alterum sine altero inveniri non possit, ita duae nostri intellectus operationes, quae quaestionibus quid sit et an sit respondent, tam arcte connectuntur ut altera adhibita et altera neglecta laboretur frustra.

At omnis duorum coniunctio, quantumvis necessaria, veram quandam atque realem distinctionem praesupponit; neque cuipiam obscurum arbitror quam diversis procedatur methodis, etiam in naturalibus scientiis, nunc ad theorias inveniendas atque expoliendas, nunc autem ad certa proferenda iudicia. Quae sane methodorum differentia in theologica scientia adeo non minuitur ut maxime augeatur. Cum enim veritates supernaturales nisi per divinam revelationem nobis innotescere non possint, ex auctoritate atque fide certitudo theologica gignitur. Cum autem earundem veritatum intelligentia nisi pie, sedulo, sobrie inquirentibus concedi non soleat, ratio humana per fidem illustrata exerceatur necesse est (db 1796). Quae duo et quantum inter se distent et quam arcte cohaereant luculenter exposuit Aquinas.

... quilibet actus exsequendus est secundum quod convenit ad suum finem. Disputatio autem ad duplicem finem potest ordinari. Quaedam enim disputatio ordinatur ad removendam dubitationem an ita sit; et in tali disputatione theologica maxime utendum est auctoritatibus, quas recipiunt illi cum quibus disputatur ... Quaedam vero disputatio est magistralis in scholis, non ad removendum errorem, sed ad instruendum auditores ut inducantur ad intellectum veritatis quam intendit: et tunc oportet rationibus inniti investigantibus veritatis radicem, et facientibus scire quomodo sit verum quod dicitur: alioquin, si nudis auctoritatibus magister quaestionem determinet, certificabitur quidem auditor quod ita est; sed nihil scientiae vel intellectus acquiret, sed vacuus abscedet.1

Quam finis atque methodi differentiam non solum explicita doctrina inculcavit Aquinas sed etiam clarissimis illustravit exemplis. Nam ut caetera omittam, in

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and still learn nothing about the things themselves. On the other hand, if we make so much of certitude that we are not willing to consider the reasons and causes of things – an area of consideration in which there is always some uncertainty – then we may gradually accumulate a half-baked and undigested knowledge of things, yet never attain anything worthy of the name of science. Just as essence and existence are so closely connected that one can never be found without the other, so our minds perform two basic operations, corresponding to the two familiar questions What is it? and Is it so? and these are so closely connected that to use one and neglect the other is to labor in vain. Now every bringing together of two things, however necessary it may be, presupposes that the two are somehow really distinct; and I do not think it is difficult for anyone to see how different are the methods, even in the natural sciences, for discovering and refining theories, on the one hand, and for proposing judgments that are certain, on the other. This difference of methods is found in the science of theology, only intensified. For supernatural truths can be known by us only through divine revelation, and so certitude in theology is derived from authority and from faith. But an understanding of these same truths can be attained only by inquiring reverently, diligently, and judiciously, and so theology demands the exercise of human reason enlightened by faith (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). Aquinas brilliantly explained both how different these two procedures are and how intimately they are linked with one another. ... every act should be performed in a way adapted to its end. Now an argument can be directed to either of two ends. One kind of argument is directed to removing doubts as to whether something is so. In such arguments in theology, one relies especially on the authorities that are recognized by the persons with whom one is disputing ... But another kind of argument is that of the teacher in the schools. It seeks not to remove error but to instruct the students so that they understand the truth that the teacher hopes to convey. In such cases it is important to base one’s argument on reasons that go to the root of the truth in question, that make hearers understand how what is said is true. Otherwise, if the teacher settles a question simply by an appeal to authorities, the students will have their certitude that the facts are indeed as stated; but they will acquire no knowledge or understanding, and they will go away empty.1

Not only did Aquinas explicitly teach that there are those two different ends and methods, but he also left brilliant examples of the two different ends and methods 1 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones quodlibetales, 4, q. 9, a. 3.

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libro quarto Contra Gentiles diversis capitibus mutuo sibi succedunt tum disputationes quae de certitudine facti ex auctoritatibus procedunt, 2 tum disputationes magistrales in quibus adhibetur ratio ad intelligentiam assequendam. 3 His igitur dictis, quonam consilio brevissimum hoc opusculum compositum sit, facile aperitur. Cum enim lectoris fidem praesupponamus non solum certissimam sed etiam clare distincteque eruditam, in eo laboramus ut imperfecta illa et tamen fructuosissima fidei intelligentia (db 1796) promoveatur atque communicetur. Qua de causa, quia fidem iam doctam praesupponimus, praesens nostra intentio non est ut, cumulatis auctoritatibus, amoveantur dubia et errores refellantur. Quia vero fides etiam doctissima parum vel nihil ipsa mysteria intelligere potest, rationibus utimur quae veritatis revelatae radicem investigent et scire faciant quemadmodum verum sit.

Sectio Secunda: De Actu Quo Finis Attingitur Postquam de ipso fine dictum est, consequenter considerari oportet actum quo finis attingitur. Quae quidem consideratio omnino necessaria est. Quamvis enim in intelligentiam potius quam in certitudinem procedere intendamus, minime tamen intelligentiam potius incertam quam certam vel potius falsam quam veram volumus. Qua de causa, accurate perspiciendum est quinam sit intelligendi actus, quaenam sint eius proprietates, et quemadmodum hic actus ad verum et certum comparetur.4 Iam vero inde ab Aristotele distingui solent prima et secunda intellectus operatio. Prima enim dicitur operatio qua quaerimus quid sit vel cur ita sit, et rationem seu causam perspicimus, et definitionem vel hypothesin concipimus. Secunda autem dicitur operatio qua quaerimus an sit vel utrum ita sit, et evidentiam ponderamus, et propter evidentiam iudicium verum dicimus, et per verum tamquam per medium contemplamur ens. Quae quidem distinctio non temporis differentiam respicit, nam quamvis prima operatio sponte in secundam conducat (quod enim concipimus utrum existat statim quaerimus), etiam secunda operatio ad ulteriorem et perfectiorem operationem primam nos invitat, cum melius intelligere studeamus quod esse iam

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in his practice. One among many would be the way in which, in the fourth book of the Contra Gentiles, he alternates between arguments from authority, making for factual certitude,2 and arguments in which, as teacher, he uses reason to attain understanding.3 It is easy, then, in the light of what has been said, to state the point and purpose of this little treatise. We presuppose that the reader is most firm in his or her faith. We presuppose, too, that the reader is already well educated in the faith. Our aim will be merely to communicate and promote that imperfect yet most fruitful understanding affirmed by Vatican i (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). Since we presuppose an educated faith, we have no intention of trying to remove doubts and refute errors by piling up authorities. Because even the most learned faith can have little or no understanding of the mysteries, we are employing those reasons that probe the root of revealed truth and enable us to understand how it is true. 2 The Act Whereby the Goal Is Attained After speaking of the goal, we move to the act by which we attain it. That act requires our attention because, even though our aim is understanding and not certitude, still we hardly want an understanding that is uncertain rather than certain, or false rather than true. Therefore we must accurately grasp what the act of understanding is, what its properties are, and how this act is connected with what is true and what is certain.4 Ever since Aristotle, a distinction has been recognized between a first and a second operation of the intellect. In the first operation we ask, ‘What is it?’ or ‘Why is it so?’ and we grasp some reason or cause, and we conceive a definition or a hypothesis; but in the second operation we ask, ‘Is it?’ or ‘Is it so?’ and we weigh the evidence, and because of the evidence we utter a true judgment, and through the true as through a medium we contemplate being. The distinction of first and second operations does not regard a difference in time. Although the first spontaneously gives rise to the second (for we immediately ask whether what we conceive really is so), still the second operation also invites us to a further and better exercise of the first, since we want to understand better 2 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 4, cc. 2–9, 15–18, 27–39, etc. 3 Ibid. cc. 10–14, 19–26, 40–49, etc. 4 [The verb ‘comparare’ is variously translated – to connect, to relate, to compare – depending on the context.]

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sciamus. Quare, ut duae hae operationes secernantur, ad obiecta attendendum est.5 Obiectum vero aut est movens, aut terminus immanenter productus, aut finis. In prima ergo operatione obiectum proprium seu movens secundum statum praesentis vitae est quidditas seu natura in materia corporali6 existens, et obiectum ut terminus est definitio vel hypothesis concepta. In secunda autem operatione obiectum movens est evidentia sufficiens, et obiectum ut terminus immanenter productus est verum. In utraque autem operatione obiectum ut finis est ens, quod per totum intellectus processum intenditur.7

Proinde, ex hac finis unitate et identitate sequitur non simpliciter distincta esse quae supra enumeravimus obiecta. Unum enim idemque est quod sensibus experimur, quod quid sit inquirimus, cuius quidditatem in sensibilibus perspicimus, cuius definitionem propter perspectam quidditatem concipimus, de cuius existentia quaerimus, ad quod affirmandum sufficere evidentiam intelligimus, quod esse propter perspectam evidentiam affirmamus, cuius realitatem per veritatem iudicii cognoscimus, quod denique tandem melius meliusque cognoscitur per totum processum saepius iteratum, donec omnes rei aspectus tam perfecte quam vere intelligantur.

Praeterea, sicut unum est ens quod per multos actus cognoscimus, ita etiam unus quidam est actus quo de valore omnium actuum iudicatur. Verum enim, quod in solo iudicio formaliter cognoscitur, non solum ipsius iudicii veritatem respicit sed etiam caeterorum actuum. Ita si vere iudico hunc esse hominem, veritas iudicii dicit tum veritatem individui, quod sensibus innotescit, tum veritatem

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what we already know is so. Thus, in order to distinguish these two operations, we have to pay attention to their objects.5 There are several meanings of the notion ‘the object of an operation.’ It can mean what moves us to the operation, or the term immanently produced by the operation, or the objective of the operation. In the first operation the proper object, the object that moves, is, in the conditions of this present life, an intelligibility or nature that exists as embodied in corporeal matter;6 and the object as term is the conceived definition or hypothesis. In the second operation the object that moves is sufficient evidence, and the object as the immanently produced term is the true. But with each operation the object as the objective is being, which is intended throughout the entire intellectual process.7 The fact that both intellectual operations head to one and the same objective means, of course, that the objects we have just distinguished are not simply distinct. It is one and the same that we experience with the senses, about which we ask, ‘What is it?’ and whose intelligibility we grasp in the sensible data, and whose definition we conceive because of the intelligibility that we have grasped; it is still that one and the same about which we wonder, ‘Is it?’ ‘Is it really so?’ and about which we understand that there is sufficient evidence to answer yes, and that we affirm to be because of the evidence we have grasped, and whose reality we know by the truth of our judgment. And it remains this one and the same that is better and better known as we repeat this same process over and over again, until we come to understand every aspect of the thing as truly and perfectly as possible. Further, just as there is a unity in the being that we know through many acts, so also one single act judges the validity of all the acts. For the true, which is formally known only in judgment, regards the truth not only of the judgment itself but also of the other acts. Thus, if I truly judge, ‘This is a man,’ the truth of the judgment expresses the truth of the individual made manifest by the senses, the truth of the 5 [In all likelihood, this is not a statement that Lonergan would have made in his later work. In fact, it can be argued that, even prior to the publication of this work as De Deo Trino in 1964, he had shifted the priority between objects and operations to operations. A balance is reached in A Third Collection, ed Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, nj: Paulist Press, 1985) 141, in the paper ‘Religious Knowledge’: ‘Generalized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject’s operations without taking into account the corresponding objects.’] 6 [‘Corporeal’ in the expression ‘corporeal matter’ sounds redundant today, but in view of Lonergan’s discussion in Verbum of the different kinds of matter mentioned in Thomas’s texts, it seemed best to translate the Latin phrase literally. See Verbum 154–58.] 7 [See the famous definition in Insight (372): ‘Being ... is the objective of the pure desire to know.’]

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naturae, quae intelligendo perspicitur, tum veritatem existentiae, quae ipso iudicio ponitur. Quibus perspectis, dicendum est quonam actu intelligentia fidei attingatur. Et patet eam esse primam quandam intellectus operationem. Qui enim mysteriorum intelligentiam quaerit, non dubitat an sint mysteria vel utrum mysteria sint vera; qua dubitatione exclusa, excluditur secunda intellectus operatio. At hac operatione exclusa non manet nisi prima; quam sane operationem vult qui quaerit quid sit quod esse certo credit, vel propter quid ita se habeat quod ita se habere minime dubitat. Prima ergo intellectus operatio est mysteriorum intelligentia.

Attamen ita prima est ut tamen tempore prima non sit. Nam mysteriorum intelligentiam antecedit assensus fidei, qui, cum in verum sit, secunda quaedam operatio est. Et ipsum assensum fidei antecedit intelligentia quaedam catechetica, qua perspicitur quid dicere velint fidei articuli. Praeterea, ita mysteriorum intelligentia est prima intellectus operatio, ut tamen maxima intimitate cum aliis et secundis operationibus connectatur. Quamvis enim ipsa intelligentia secundum se non sit nisi prima operatio, tamen intelligentia est mysteriorum quae per antecedentem fidei assensum qua vera innotuerunt; et quam primum quaedam mysteria quodammodo intelliguntur, statim per secundam operationem quaeritur utrum id quod intelligendo perspectum sit etiam verum sit. Nihilominus, quamvis maxima quadam intimitate connectatur mysteriorum intelligentia tum cum vero revelato et antecedente tum cum vero consequente et theologico, remanet hanc intelligentiam secundum se esse actum quendam determinatum. Et ideo nunc proprietates eius sunt enumerandae ut postea de eius colligatione cum vero agatur. Primo, ergo, obiectum movens ad intelligentiam theologicam est, non quidditas in materia corporali existens, sed quidditas Dei in quo sunt mysteria abscondita. Quae quidem quidditas nos movet, non immediate uti in visione beatifica, sed mediate per verum divinitus revelatum et fide susceptum. Deinde, ipsa intelligentia theologica est imperfecta. Est enim actus finitus per speciem finitam limitatus.8 Sed actus finitus nullo modo proportionatur ad Deum

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nature grasped by understanding, and the truth of the existence posited in the judgment itself. Once this is grasped, we go on to say which act it is in which the understanding of faith is attained. Clearly it is an instance of the first operation of the intellect. A person who is seeking an understanding of the mysteries is not asking whether there are mysteries or whether they are true. As long as that type of question is excluded, the second operation of the intellect is excluded as well. And if the second operation is excluded, there remains only the first. It is this operation that one intends when one asks, ‘What is it?’ about something that one firmly believes exists, or ‘Why is it the way it is?’ about something that one does not in the least doubt is the way it is. The understanding of the mysteries is, then, an instance of the first operation of the intellect. Still, this operation is first, but not in the sense of being first in time. The assent of faith precedes the understanding of the mysteries, and the assent of faith is an assent to the true and so an instance of the second operation. And it is preceded by a catechetical understanding in which one grasps what the articles of faith mean. Notice too that the understanding of the mysteries is an instance of the first operation that is most intimately linked with other operations that are instances of the second. For although the understanding in itself is merely a first operation, still it is an understanding of mysteries that became known as true in an antecedent assent of faith; and as soon as any understanding of the mysteries is attained, the second operation begins to function, as one asks whether what has been grasped by understanding is also true. Nevertheless, while the understanding of the mysteries is most intimately linked both with the antecedent revealed truth and with the consequent theological truth, the fact remains that this understanding in itself is a quite determinate act. And so we will now list the properties of that act, so that later we may examine its connection with the true. First, then, the object that moves us to theological understanding is not some intelligibility embodied in corporeal matter, but the intelligibility of God, in whom the mysteries are hidden. This intelligibility moves us, not immediately as in the beatific vision, but mediately through the truth that God has revealed and that we have accepted in faith. Second, theological understanding is imperfect. It is a finite act, limited by a finite species.8 But a finite act is in no way proportionate to understanding perfectly the 8 [On the various relations of ‘species’ to the act of understanding, see Lonergan, Verbum 133–38. Lonergan also discusses ‘species’ below, pp. 586–97.]

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infinite perfectum perfecte intelligendum. Et ideo, cum obiectum intelligentiae theologicae sit mysterium quoddam in Deo absconditum, fieri non potest ut hac in vita et citra visionem beatam perfecta sit intelligentia theologica. Tertio, haec imperfecta intelligentia est analogica. Nam finitus intelligendi actus directe respicit aliquid finitum; et quod directe finitum respicit, nisi per viam analogicam ad infinitum non extenditur. Quarto, haec imperfecta et analogica intelligentia est obscura. Nam eatenus valet via analogica quatenus similitudo quaedam existit inter creatorem et creaturam. Sed ‘inter creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitudo notari, quin inter eos maior sit dissimilitudo notanda’ (db 432). Et ideo, sicut ex similitudine oritur quoddam lumen, ita ex maiori dissimilitudine oriuntur tenebrae maiores. Quinto, haec imperfecta, analogica, et obscura intelligentia theologica decursu temporum augetur. Eiusmodi enim est intellectus humanus ut ad actus perfectiores per actus intermedios pedetentim proficiat. Et sicut in caeteris, ita etiam in theologicis, gratia naturam non tollit sed perficit, uti ex ipsa historia theologiae patet. Qua de causa, dicendum est intelligentiam theologicam temporum decursu augeri. Sexto, haec imperfecta, analogica, obscura, atque pedetentim sese evolvens intelligentia etiam est synthetica. Nam eiusmodi est intellectus humanus ut non solum singillatim de rebus quaerat sed etiam, singulis intellectis, ulterius quaerat quemadmodum inter se comparentur. Quare post singula mysteria seorsum considerata, ulteriores oriuntur quaestiones circa nexum mysteriorum inter se et cum fine hominis ultimo. Quibus solutis, ad intelligentiam syntheticam pervenitur. Septimo, ipsa haec synthesis est imperfecta, analogica, obscura, et pedetentim sese evolvens. Synthesis enim nihil est aliud quam multorum simul intelligentia. Sed iisdem rationibus quibus probatur singulorum intelligentia esse imperfecta, analogica, obscura, et pedetentim sese evolvens, etiam probatur multorum simul intelligentia esse eiusmodi. Octavo, quamvis intelligentia theologica etiam synthetica sit imperfecta, analogica, obscura, atque pedetentim sese evolvens, nihilominus fructuosissima est. Semper enim est melior conditio intelligentis quam non intelligentis, tum in veris apprehendendis, tum in aliis verum docendis, tum in intima sua voluntate movenda, tum in aliis consiliandis atque dirigendis. Et ideo quo magis intelligentia theologica ad omnia revelata extenditur, eo plenius ipsa revelata apprehenduntur, eo efficacius docentur, et eo fidelius tota vita humana secundum omnes suos aspectus ad finem ultimum atque supernaturalem dirigitur.

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infinitely perfect God. Therefore, since its object is some mystery hidden in God, theological understanding cannot possibly ever be perfect in this life, this side of the beatific vision. Third, this imperfect understanding is analogical. For a finite act of understanding bears directly on something finite; but what bears directly on something finite can be extended only analogically to what is infinite. Fourth, this imperfect and analogical understanding is obscure. For analogy is valid to the extent that there is a similarity between Creator and creature, and ‘any similarity, however great, that is discovered between Creator and creature will always leave a still greater dissimilarity to be discovered’ (db 432, ds 806, nd 320). Thus, just as from the similarity comes some light, so from the dissimilarity comes a still greater darkness. Fifth, this imperfect, analogical, and obscure theological understanding develops over time. The human mind is such that it advances one step at a time through intermediate acts to acts that are more perfect. As in all else, so in theology, grace does not destroy nature but perfects it. This is clear from the history of theology. So it must be said that theological understanding develops in the course of time. Sixth, this imperfect, analogical, obscure, and gradually developing theological understanding is also synthetic. For the human mind is such that it does not wonder about things just individually but, understanding individual elements, goes on to ask how they are connected with one another. And so after the individual mysteries have been considered on their own, further questions arise about how they are connected with one another and with our last end. Answering these questions provides a synthetic understanding. Seventh, this synthesis is itself imperfect, analogical, obscure, and gradually developing. For a synthesis is no more than the understanding of many things together. The same reasons that prove that our understanding of individual matters is imperfect, analogical, obscure, and gradually developing also prove that the same will be true of understanding all those matters together. Eighth, although even synthetic theological understanding is imperfect, analogical, obscure, and gradually developing, still it is highly fruitful. The condition of one who understands is always better than the condition of one who does not, whether it be in apprehending truth or in teaching it to others or in moving one’s inmost will or in counseling and directing others. The more theological understanding is extended to all that has been revealed, the more fully then are those revealed matters apprehended, the more effectively are they taught, and the more faithfully is the whole of human life in all its aspects directed to its final supernatural end.

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Nono, neque parvus neque despiciendus percipitur fructus ab eo qui serio in theologicam intelligentiam ita tendit ut tamen eam parum assequatur. Qui enim intelligentiam theologicam quaerit, ad omnia attendat necesse est quae in intelligentiam theologicam ducant. Haec autem sunt quae Deus nobis revelavit et Dei ecclesia omnibus credenda proponit. Sed parvus non est fructus neque despiciendus qui inde percipitur quod revelata atque credenda serio, diu, accurate, exacte considerantur tum in se ipsis tum in iis quae ex ipsis consequuntur. Et ideo erronee concluditur quod, nisi ad intelligentiam mysteriorum de facto a singulis pervenitur, tempus teritur. Decimo, utrum vero existat intelligentia theologica, imperfecta, analogica, obscura, pedetentim sese evolvens, synthetica, atque fructuosissima, decernit summa sua auctoritate conc. Vaticanum i: Ac ratio quidem, fide illustrata, cum sedulo, pie, et sobrie quaerit, aliquam Deo dante mysteriorum intelligentiam eamque fructuosissimam assequitur, tum ex eorum quae naturaliter cognoscit analogia tum e mysteriorum nexu inter se et cum fine hominis ultimo; numquam tamen idonea redditur ad ea perspicienda instar veritatum, quae proprium eius obiectum constituunt (db 1796). 9

‘Crescat igitur ... et multum vehementerque proficiat, tam singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis quam totius Ecclesiae, aetatum ac saeculorum gradibus, intelligentia, scientia, sapientia ...’ (db 1800).10

Quibus perpensis, nihil aliud nos dixisse videmur quam id ipsum quod concilium Vaticanum ‘salutarem Christi doctrinam’ (db 1781) reputavit. 11

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Ninth, the benefit derived by someone who seriously strives for theological understanding but attains it only in small measure is neither slight nor to be disparaged. Whoever searches for theological understanding has to attend to everything that can lead to such understanding, and that means attending to what God has revealed to us and what the church of God proposes to be believed by all. But neither slight nor to be disparaged is the benefit that is derived from a serious, lengthy, careful, exact consideration of the truths that God has revealed and we are to believe, both in themselves and in all that follows from them. And so it is a mistake to conclude that, unless each one of us actually arrives at an understanding of the mysteries, time is being wasted. Tenth, does such theological understanding exist – imperfect, analogical, obscure, gradually developing, synthetic, and highly fruitful? Vatican i has answered that question authoritatively. Reason illumined by faith, when it inquires diligently, reverently, and judiciously, with God’s help attains some understanding of the mysteries, and that a highly fruitful one, both from the analogy of what it naturally knows and from the interconnection of the mysteries with one another and with our last end. Yet reason never becomes capable of understanding the mysteries in the same way as it does truths that are its own proper object (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132).9 ‘Therefore, let there be growth ... and all possible progress in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom in single individuals and in all, in each person and in the entire church, according to the degree proper to each age and each time ...’ (db 1800, ds 3020, nd 136).10

Reflecting on those words, one will see we have been speaking about what Vatican i already called ‘Christ’s saving doctrine’ (db 1781, ds 3000). 11 9 [Translation based in part on Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) 336, where, however, Lonergan uses ‘diligently, piously, soberly’ rather than ‘diligently, reverently, and judiciously.’] 10 [Relying somewhat on the translation found in The Church Teaches: Documents of the Church in English Translation (St Louis, B. Herder, 1955) § 80. The text is quoted from Vincent of Lerins.] 11 The importance of understanding in theology has recently been explained by Johannes Beumer, Theologie als Glaubensverst¨andnis (W¨urzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1953). [Lonergan’s review article on this book, ‘Theology and Understanding,’ was published in Gregorianum 35 (1954) 630–48. It appears as chapter 8 in Collection, vol. 4 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 114–32.]

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Sectio Tertia: De Quaestione seu Problemate 12 Postquam de fine egimus et de actu quo ad finem pervenitur, non nulla dici oportet de actu quo finis ante intenditur quam attingatur. Quae quidem anticipatio quaestio seu problema nominatur, et vel sponte fit, vel explicite, vel scienter. Sponte fit quaestio quatenus eam experimur admirationem quae origo est non solum omnis scientiae et philosophiae sed etiam omnis theologiae. Explicite exprimitur quaestio ubi clare et distincte dicimus quid quaeramus. Scienter denique ponitur quaestio ubi adduntur rationes cur haec quaestio poni debeat. Quod si has rationes quaesiveris quales sint, non omnes eiusdem generis esse invenies, sed alias ad problema cohaerentiae, alias ad problema intelligentiae, alias ad problema facti reduces. Ita tripliciter intelligi potest quaestio, Utrum Spiritus sanctus sit a se. Primo modo, exprimitur problema cohaerentiae, et ideo ad propositam quaestionem statim dicitur: Videtur quod non, nam Spiritus sanctus est a Patre et Filio; qui ab aliis est, a se non est; ergo Spiritus sanctus non est a se. Sed contra est quod Spiritus sanctus est Deus; et Deus est a se; ergo Spiritus sanctus est a se. Quo duplici argumento probatur utraque pars contradictionis ut constet existere problema cohaerentiae. Altero modo, exprimitur problema intelligentiae. Constat quidem Spiritum sanctum tum a se tum non a se esse; sed quaeritur quemadmodum utrumque simul verum esse possit. Et res quidem facillima esset, si Spiritus sanctus esset compositus, ut secundum aliud sit a se, secundum aliud autem non sit a se. Sed Spiritus sanctus est simplex prorsus, et ideo oritur gravissimum intelligendi problema. Tertio denique modo, exprimitur problema facti ut sensus sit utrum re vera existat tertia persona divina, utrum hoc in fontibus revelationis doceatur, utrum eodem sensu in fontibus intelligatur ac postea in conciliis et inter theologos.

Porro, quamvis haec tria problematum genera quam maxime inter se connectantur, alio tamen tempore magis ad aliud genus attenditur. Ita in ipsis scientiae

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3 The Question or Problem12 Having treated the goal and the act in which the goal is attained, we must now consider the act in which we intend the goal before we attain it. This anticipation we call a question or a problem, and we can consider it either as it occurs spontaneously or as it is explicitly expressed or as it is put scientifically. A question occurs spontaneously in the experience of wonder that is the origin not only of all science and philosophy but also of all theology. A question is expressed explicitly when we say clearly and distinctly what it is that we want to know. A question is put scientifically when we add the reasons why this question ought to be put. What kind of reasons? They are not all of one kind. Some reasons reduce to a problem of coherence, some to a problem of understanding, and some to a problem of fact. Take, for instance, the question, Is the Holy Spirit a se, from himself? There are three ways of understanding this question. In a first way, the question can be understood to express a problem of coherence, and so, on hearing the question, one at once answers no (Videtur quod non), because the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, and what is from others is not from itself; but then one remembers (Sed contra est ) that the Holy Spirit is God, and God is a se, and so the Holy Spirit is a se. Two arguments are used, to prove each side of a contradiction. That is a problem of coherence. In a second way, the question can be understood to express a problem for understanding. Granted that the Holy Spirit is both a se and not a se, how can both statements simultaneously be true? The matter would be quite simple if the Holy Spirit were composite; then the Holy Spirit could be a se in one respect and not a se in another. But the Holy Spirit is utterly simple, and so there arises a very serious problem for understanding. In a third way, the question can be understood to express a problem of fact, such that the meaning of the question is, Does there really exist a third divine person? Is this really taught in the sources of revelation? Is it understood in the same sense in the sources of revelation as it was later in the councils and among theologians? Furthermore, although these three kinds of problems are very closely interconnected, still in any particular period more attention might be paid to one kind 12 [This and the next two sections comprise the first set of pages (13–36 in the Latin text), and the only set in this chapter, that Lonergan mentioned at the end of the foreword as differing in a notable way from the text of Divinarum personarum. See below, appendix 4, § 1, pp. 742–61, for a translation of the material in Divinarum personarum that did not survive the changes that Lonergan made in these sections of De Deo Trino.]

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initiis ubi hominibus persuadendum est ut rei scientificae vacent, utilissimum esse potest problemata cohaerentiae ponere; et ideo Abaelardus, canonistarum inhaerens vestigiis, opus composuit Sic et non (ml 178, 1339–1610) in quo circa propositiones theologicas centum quinquaginta octo tum partem affirmativam tum partem negativam sustinuit. At parum est existentiam quaestionum demonstrare quarum tamen praetermittitur solutio. Alii ergo libros sententiarum composuerunt ut materiam problematum e scripturis et e patribus colligerent atque ordinarent; alii autem ipsas solutiones evolverunt, sive per modum commentarii in libros sententiarum, sive independenter in brevioribus quaestionum collectionibus, sive etiam in maioribus operibus quae totius theologiae summam exposuerunt. Ubi autem quaeruntur solutiones, iam ex problemate cohaerentiae ad problema intelligentiae transitur, unde et brevi addiscitur quaestiones poni non posse quocumque ordine, cum aliae solvi non possint nisi aliae prius sint solutae, aliae autem quam primum solvantur in solutionem aliarum conducant. Quare, alium invenies quaestionum ordinem in Scripto super libros sententiarum, alium autem in Summa theologiae; quam differentiam notavit S. Thomas in prologo primae partis Summae suae, ubi distinxit inter ordinem disciplinae et ordinem quem requirit librorum expositio. Proinde,13 sapientis est ordinare, et ideo sapientis est primum invenire problema quod eo sensu primum est quia (1) eius solutio solutionem aliorum problematum non praesupponit, (2) eo soluto expedite solvitur alterum, (3) primo alteroque solutis statim solvitur tertium, et similiter deinceps per omnia problemata consequentia atque connexa. Deinde, intelligentia est de principiis; sed principium definitur primum in aliquo ordine; et ideo intelligentiae est perspicere solutionem eius problematis quod primum est in ordine sapientiae. At eiusmodi est hic ordo ut, primo soluto, expedite caetera solvantur; et ideo eiusmodi esse debet intelligentia ut virtualiter in se contineat reliquarum quaestionum solutiones.

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than to another. Thus, in the early stages of scientific inquiry when it is still necessary to persuade people to devote themselves to science, it might be extremely useful to focus on the problem of coherence; and so Abelard, continuing in the footsteps of some canonists, composed his Sic et non (ml 178, 1339–1610), in which he presented supporting reasons for both the affirmative and the negative side of 158 theological propositions. But it would be of little value to prove the existence of questions yet never attempt to solve them. Hence some people composed books of Sentences to collect and organize, from scripture and the Fathers, material for problems. Others began working out answers, either in the form of commentary on those books of Sentences or independently in shorter collections of questions or in larger works that expounded a summa of the whole of theology. Seeking answers moved theologians beyond the problem of coherence to the problem of understanding. Working on that problem, they soon discovered that questions cannot be put in any order whatsoever. Some questions simply cannot be answered until others have been resolved. And sometimes the answers to one question immediately provide the answers to others. This discovery lies behind the differing order of the questions in St Thomas’s commentary on the Sentences and his Summa theologiae. He indicated the difference in the prologue to the first part of the Summa, where he distinguished the order of learning from the order demanded by running commentaries. Thus,13 putting things in their right order is the special talent of the wise person, and so the wise person will start with the problem that is first in the sense (1) that its solution does not presuppose the solution of other problems, (2) that solving it will expedite solving a second problem, (3) that solving the first and second problems will lead right away to solving a third, and so on through all consequent connected problems. Next, understanding is about principles. A principle is defined as what is first in some order. Therefore it belongs to understanding to grasp the solution of that problem that is first in the order proposed by wisdom. Since this order is such that solving the first means that the others are expeditiously solved, the understanding should be such as virtually to contain in itself the answers to the rest of the questions. 13 [Lonergan begins here to present a particular ‘take’ on the three intellectual virtues of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge. Thomas treated these virtues in Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 57, a. 2, and, as we have seen, Vatican i offered a prayer that ‘there be growth ... and all possible progress in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom in single individuals and in all, in each person and in the entire church, according to the degree proper to each age and each time ...’ (emphasis added, to stress a different order in the conciliar expression from that which Lonergan follows here).]

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Tertio, scientia est de conclusionibus. Sed eo ordine proponuntur quaestiones ut, prima soluta, nullo fere negotio ad caeteras solvendas procedatur. Quia ergo reliquae solutiones ad primam comparantur sicut conclusiones ad principium, omnes solutiones praeter primam ad scientiam pertinere videntur. Praeterea, ubi inter se connectuntur tum problemata tum solutiones, fieri non potest ut ipsi conceptus et etiam termini quibus conceptus exprimuntur inter se non connectantur. Quare, sicut caetera problemata, primo soluto, iam virtualiter solvuntur, ita etiam conceptus et termini, qui primum problema primamque solutionem definiunt atque exprimunt, nisi leviter non mutantur ut caeterorum definitioni atque expressioni inserviant. Unde et concludes non malevolum magistrorum arbitrium sed ipsas inter se connexas quaestiones et solutiones exigere tum conceptus systematice formatos tum terminologiam technicam quae non quibuscumque sed systematicis conceptibus correspondeat. Quae cum ita sint, problema intelligentiae solvitur, non quia singulis quaestionibus singula seorsum fiant responsa, sed quia tota quaestionum series per sapientiam ordinatur, quia prima quaedam quaestio foecundissimo intelligendi actu resolvitur, quia caeterae quaestiones vi primae solutionis ordinate solvuntur, quia systema definitionum ad solutiones formulandas introducitur, quia terminologia quaedam technica evolvitur ad conceptus definitos exprimendos.

Inventi autem systematis duo sunt propria et alia tria sunt accidentia. Et propria quidem sunt ut crescat et perficiatur; ei autem accidit tum ut male intelligatur, tum ut penitus reiciatur, tum ut facta, quorum intelligentia est, denegentur.

Crescit vero systema quatenus modo non solum vitali et organico sed etiam (quod superius est) intellectuali et rationali tum ad omnes theologiae partes extenditur tum philosophiam aliasque disciplinas humanas in suos fines adsumit. Perficitur autem systema quatenus augetur principii intelligentia unde et conclusiones profundius rem penetrant et latius extenduntur. Male intelligitur systema secundum illud: Quidquid recipitur, ad modum recipientis recipitur. Principii ergo intelligentia adeo non augetur ut minuatur. Nisi imperfecte non solvuntur tum problema primum tum connexa et consequentia problemata. At solutiones imperfectae, sicut partim solutiones sunt, partim etiam

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Third, knowledge has to do with conclusions. But the questions are put in such an order that, once the first is solved, the solutions to the others follow with almost no difficulty. Therefore, because the later solutions are connected to the first as conclusions are connected to some principle, all solutions after the first seem to be the proper province of knowledge. Besides, where both the problems and the solutions are interconnected, the concepts and even the terms that express the concepts must also be interconnected. Thus, if solving the first problem virtually solves all the others, the concepts and terms in which the first problem and the first solution are defined and expressed cannot be significantly changed if they are to serve to define and express the later problems and solutions. Clearly, then, it is not the arbitrary malice of professors but the interconnected questions and solutions themselves that demand both systematically formed concepts and a technical terminology that corresponds not to any concepts whatsoever but to systematic concepts. Thus, the problem of understanding is solved not because individual answers are provided to individual questions one at a time and separately, but because the whole series of questions is ordered by wisdom, because the first question is solved by a highly fruitful act of understanding, because the later questions are solved in an ordered way by the efficacy of the first solution, because a system of definitions is introduced through which the solutions can be formulated, and because a technical terminology is developed for expressing the defined concepts. Moreover, once a system has been discovered, it is susceptible to two proper and three accidental eventualities. It is proper to a system that it grow and that it keep improving itself. But it can also happen that the system is poorly understood, that it is completely rejected, and that the very facts that were understood in the system are now denied. A system grows to the extent that it is extended not only vitally and organically but also (and more important) in an intellectual and rational way to all parts of theology and draws upon philosophy and other human disciplines to serve its own ends. A system keeps improving itself insofar as the understanding of its principle increases so that the conclusions penetrate more deeply the matter under consideration and extend more widely. The poor understanding of a system is in accord with the dictum, Whatever is received is received according to the capacity of the receiver. Thus, the understanding of the principle, far from increasing, decreases. The first problem and all the connected subsequent problems are solved imperfectly. But imperfect solutions are only partly solutions, and so they are also partly new problems. These

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sunt nova problemata. Neque oriuntur haec nova problemata nisi remote ex fontibus revelationis; proxime enim ex systemate male intellecto procedunt. Nec satis. Ordinantur haec nova problemata per sapientiam non sapientium sed male intelligentium. Solvuntur haec nova problemata per eosdem quorum mala intelligentia novorum problematum fons erat atque origo. Novum ergo oritur systema, veri systematis simulacrum, cuius problemata non existunt, cuius ordo parum sapientibus placet, cuius principium superficialiter intelligentibus sufficit, cuius scientia palus quaedam est obscuritatis atque confusionis. At una non est insipientium insipientia, sed alia aliis placet.14 Novo ergo systemati succedit recentius: ex inopinato multiplicantur summa ingenia; regit non ratio per fidem illustrata sed partium studium; neque scientiarum historico sed cognitionis sociologo praeparatur materia.15

Penitus reicitur systema duplici de causa. Alii enim nisi systematis simulacra numquam cognoverunt; quae cum certo sciant non bona esse sed mala, omne systema necessario esse aberrationem iudicant. Alii autem profundiori quadam ignorantia laborant: nam ‘intelligere’ quid significet non capiunt; et ideo ubi de problemate intelligentiae agitur, nisi de problemate veri vel facti cogitare non valent. Quare, ubi rei divinae systematica quaedam intelligentia attingitur, hanc non intelligentiam esse reputant sed novam doctrinam dogmatibus philosophicis innixam. Ubi sententiae sanctorum systematice intelliguntur, easdem sententias non intelligi sed reici autumant.16 At systemate penitus excluso, penitus etiam excluditur problema intelligentiae. Aut ergo ad problema cohaerentiae reditur, ut subtilitate logica de absolute necessariis et de absolute possibilibus disputetur; quod saeculo decimo quarto et deinceps factum est. Aut, his exercitiis fere logicis

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new problems arise only remotely from the sources of revelation; proximately, they proceed from the poor understanding of the system. But there is more. The wisdom that puts the new problems into order is the wisdom not of the truly wise but of those who have poorly understood. The solutions to these new problems come from the very persons whose poor understanding was the source and cause of the new problems in the first place. Thus, a new system arises, but it is just a semblance of a true system. Its problems do not really exist, its order will please those who have little wisdom, its principle will satisfy only those whose understanding is superficial, and its knowledge will be a morass of obscurity and confusion. Still, foolishness is manifold: different people are unwise in different ways. 14 And so the new system is followed by an even newer one. Extremely clever schemes and ideas suddenly proliferate. The rule of reason enlightened by faith gives way to partisan zeal. The story can no longer be told by a historian of science but only by a sociologist of knowledge.15 System can be completely rejected for two reasons. Some people never were introduced to anything more than semblances of system; since they can easily see that these are no good, they judge that every system must be an aberration. But others suffer from a more serious ignorance. They do not grasp what it means to understand. When they hear of the problem of understanding, they can think only of the problem of truth or of fact. Thus, when some systematic understanding of divine reality is attained, they do not take it to be an understanding but some new teaching grounded in philosophical dogmas. When the ideas of the saints are being systematically understood, these same people claim that these ideas are not being understood but are being rejected.16 But once system is utterly excluded, the problem for understanding is also utterly excluded. Then either one simply goes back to the problem of coherence and disputes with logical subtlety about absolute necessities and absolute possibilities, as theologians did in the fourteenth 14 [We may note here an anticipation of an aspect of the functional specialty ‘Dialectic.’] 15 [Lonergan’s footnote refers to Yves Congar’s article ‘Th´eologie’ (Dictionnaire de th´eologie catholique, vol. 15 [29], Paris: Letouzey & An´e) column 410. This corresponds to material that can be found in Congar, A History of Theology, trans. and ed. Hunter Guthrie (New York: Doubleday, 1968) 141–43, where there are discussed (1) the consequences of the ‘useless subtlety’ manifest after Aquinas, when the dialectical method of the quaestio was pursued, not for the sake of understanding but for its own sake, and (2) the consequent crystallization of theology into petrified systems and schools, where the schools were a function of identification with religious orders. The latter identification may be what Lonergan has in mind when he speaks here of partisan zeal and of the sociology of knowledge. Congar did not use these terms.] 16 See the letter of John Peckham cited below, pp. 91, 93.

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tandem denique omissis, ad problema facti proceditur. Systemati denique accidit ut denegentur facta quorum intelligentia est. Quod aliter ab aliis fit, neque hic repetendum esse videtur quid senserint sentiantve Protestantes, rationalistae, liberales, athei optimismo humanistico innixi, modernistae, existentialistae, historici ‘critici,’ et relativistae historici. Remanet ergo ut dicta colligamus et enumeremus. Duos enim distinximus fines quorum alius certitudinem ex auctoritatibus percipit, alius autem fructum ex intelligentia certorum. Quam intelligentiam non solum imperfectam, analogicam, obscuram, et pedetentim sese evolventem diximus, sed etiam adeo foecundam ut problemate quodam primo soluto caetera problemata consequentia et connexa facile solverentur. At ipsa haec foecunditas suis haud caret incommodis: quod enim intelligi, crescere, perfici potest, idem vel male vel nullatenus intelligi potest, ut inter male intelligentes oriantur pseudo-systemata ad pseudo-problemata solvenda, dum non intelligentes ad problemata cohaerentiae redeant. Quod si in aliorum obscuritate et confusione, in aliorum claritate atque vacuitate, negantur ipsa facta quorum intelligentia vel cohaerentia quaerebatur, non sane desunt qui hanc negationem vel causam vel excusationem habuisse dicant in originali illa praesumptione quae mysteriorum intelligentiam assequi ausa sit.

At aequius iudicandum esse opinor. Abusus enim non tollit usum; neque abusus ignorabatur vel a c. Vaticano i quod, cum contra semirationalistas doctrinam catholicam positive exponeret, fidei intelligentiam et possibilem et fructuosissimam esse praedicavit, vel a Summis Pontificibus qui communem omnium doctorem renuntiaverunt S. Thomam. Sed praeterea, ut ad finem praesentem argumentum Card. Newman adaptem, scientiae pars omitti non potest quin triplex addiscentibus inferatur damnum.17 Nam primo ipsa omissio facit ut illa pars ignoretur. Deinde, quod gravius est, ipsa scientia mutilatur: quod enim scientiam qua scientiam constituit non in parte sed in toto invenitur; et ideo qui partem pro toto tradit, scientiae potius adversatur quam inservit. Tertio, quod gravissimum est, scientia mutilata citius tardius detorquetur: eiusmodi enim sunt exigentiae quae intellectualitatem atque rationalitatem constituunt, ut ipsa omissio

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and following centuries, or one finally rejects such seemingly logical exercises as well and concentrates only on the problem of fact. Finally, it can happen to a system that the facts it understands are denied. This can occur in many different ways, and there is no point in rehearsing here all the different positions that are or have been represented by Protestants, rationalists, liberals, atheists relying on humanistic optimism, modernists, existentialists, socalled ‘critical’ historians, and historical relativists. There remains the task of gathering together and summing up what we have said. We distinguished two goals, one that emphasizes certitude based on authorities, and another that emphasizes understanding what is already known as certain. We said that this understanding is not only imperfect, analogous, obscure, and gradually developing, but also fruitful, so that when some first problem is solved, the remaining connected problems will easily be brought to a solution. This very fruitfulness, however, has its disadvantages. The same system that can be understood, grow, and keep improving can also be poorly understood or not understood at all, with the result that those who understand poorly will concoct pseudo-systems to solve pseudo-problems, while those who do not understand at all will give up the effort and return to problems of coherence. And if in the obscurity and confusion of some and the clarity and emptiness of others the very facts that cried out for understanding and coherence are denied, some people surely will arise to claim that the cause of, or excuse for, this very denial lies in the original presumption of trying to understand the mysteries. I think a more equitable judgment should be made. The fact of abuse does not invalidate the right use. Vatican i was perfectly aware of abuses when, as part of a positive effort to expound Catholic teaching against the semirationalists, it pronounced the understanding of the faith to be both possible and highly fruitful. The later popes who named St Thomas ‘the universal Doctor’ also knew perfectly well the fact of abuse. But in addition, I should like to adapt to present purposes Cardinal Newman’s argument that a part of knowledge cannot be omitted without inflicting a threefold harm on learners.17 First, omitting the part means that they will not learn that part. Second, and more seriously, knowledge itself will be mutilated. What constitutes knowledge as knowledge is found not in the part but in the whole, and so to hand on some parts as if they were the whole is to work against knowledge rather than to serve it. Third, and most seriously of all, mutilated knowledge will sooner or later be distorted. The demands that constitute our intelligence and reasonableness will make the omission felt; they will 17 [Lonergan is alluding to Newman’s third discourse, ‘Bearing of Theology on Other Branches of Knowledge,’ in The Idea of a University.]

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sentiatur, ut compensatio seu supplementum quaeratur, ut caeterae quae traduntur partes ita a proprio officio et munere detorqueantur ut per se solae unum quoddam et totum exhibere videantur. Quam ob causam, quo vehementius ab omni speculatione theologica abstinetur, eo uberius in speculationibus historicis indulgetur; quamvis enim ipsa methodus empirica pedetentim ad sententias communiter receptas conducat, sola tamen methodus sine mente nihil facit; mens autem philosophice et theologice inculta, teste experientia, recentissimis ventis theoreticis modo huc modo illuc fertur.

Sectio Quarta: De Veritate Intelligentiae Quem quaeramus finem, quo actu attingatur, quemadmodum prius intendatur quam cognoscatur, diximus. Remanet tamen ut dicamus de intelligentia theologica atque systematica (1) utrum secundum se vera sit, (2) utrum verum sit quod intelligatur, et (3) utrum vera sit veri intelligentia. (1) In primis ergo illud omnino retinendum est quod intelligentia theologica secundum se neque vera est neque falsa. Nam, uti dictum est, haec intelligentia ad primam intellectus operationem pertinet, sed veritas vel falsitas formaliter nisi in secunda operatione non invenitur. Qua de causa, qui solam intelligentiam considerat, eam dicere potest perfectam esse vel imperfectam, proportionatam vel analogicam, claram vel obscuram, aliaque eiusmodi; qui autem quaerit utrum vera an falsa sit intelligentia, non solam intelligentiam considerat sed etiam ad subsequentem intellectus operationem accedit, qua quaeritur an sit, ponderaturque evidentia, atque profertur iudicium. Deinde, omne quod intellectu conspicimus, etiam verbo quodam interiori dicimus, exprimimus, manifestamus. At aliud est causam seu rationem conspicere, aliud vero evidentiae sufficientiam. Quare duplex est verbum interius. Aliud enim incomplexum dicitur quo res per conspectam causam seu rationem definitur; aliud autem complexum dicitur quo id, quod definitum est, existere affirmatur vel negatur. Et ideo sicut et ipsa intelligentia primae operationis de se neque vera neque falsa est, ita etiam verbum interius incomplexum, quo haec intelligentia exprimitur, de se neque verum est neque falsum. Tertio, quod verbo interiori concipimus, etiam exterioribus vocibus exprimimus; et cum illud verum vel falsum esse possit, etiam per metonymiam ipsae voces dici solent verae vel falsae; qui tamen usus in abusum vergere potest, si magis ad voces ipsas quam ad intentionem loquentis attenditur. Si enim deest interius verbum complexum, quo vel affirmatur vel negatur, voces exteriores nihil manifestant nisi

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require that a compensation or a supplement be sought and that the remaining parts of knowledge be wrenched from their proper role and task, until they appear by themselves alone to present some kind of unity and whole. For this reason, the more resolutely people abstain from theological speculation, the more abundantly they indulge in historical speculations. Empirical method will undoubtedly lead little by little to certain ideas being generally accepted, but method alone without a mind attains nothing; and experience teaches us how a mind innocent of philosophy and theology can be tossed back and forth by every new wind of theory. 4 The Truth of Theological Understanding We have spoken of the goal that we seek, of the act in which the goal is attained, and of how the goal is intended or anticipated before it is actually known. Now we have to reflect further on the precise nature of systematic theological understanding and ask: (1) is it true in itself? (2) is what it understands true? and (3) is the understanding of the true itself true? (1) First, then, one must by all means bear in mind that theological understanding is in itself neither true nor false. The reason is that theological understanding is, as we explained above, an instance of the first operation of the intellect, while truth and falsehood are found formally only in the second operation. Therefore, if we are considering only understanding, we can say that it is complete or incomplete, proportionate or analogical, clear or obscure, and so on. But as soon as we ask whether an understanding is true or false, we are no longer considering only understanding but have moved on to the next operation of the intellect, where we ask, ‘Is this so?’ and weigh the evidence and make a judgment. Second, whatever we intellectually grasp we also utter or express or manifest in an inner word. But it is one thing to grasp a cause or a reason, and something else to grasp the sufficiency of evidence. So there are two inner words. The first, by which something is defined in terms of its grasped cause or reason, is called the simple inner word. The second, by which what has been defined is affirmed or denied to exist, is called the compound inner word. And so, just as the understanding in the first operation is in itself neither true nor false, so also the simple inner word in which this understanding is expressed is in itself neither true nor false. Third, what we conceive in an inner word we also express in outer words; and since a sample inner word is true or false potentially, the outer words themselves also are often said to be true or false by metonymy. But this can be misleading even in this usage: one can pay more attention to the words themselves than to the intention of the speaker. If the compound inner word of affirmation or negation has not occurred, then outer words express only a simple inner word, whereby a

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verbum incomplexum, quo consideratur vel definitio vel hypothesis, vel etiam recitatur alterius cuiusdam sententia; et tunc quamvis multae sint voces, quamvis simul sumantur, quamvis adsint ‘est’ et ‘non est,’ tamen neque verae neque falsae sunt ipsae voces, cum non assertionis sed considerationis vel recitationis intentionem manifestent. Quibus perspectis, concluditur voces exteriores, quae intelligentiam theologicam qua talem exprimant, ne per metonymiam quidem veras esse vel falsas. Quarto, sicut ipsa intelligentia theologica est imperfecta, analogica, obscura, pedetentim sese evolvens, etc., ita etiam consequens verbum interius et consequentes voces exteriores sunt imperfecte intellectae et analogice et obscure. Haec ergo de intelligentia theologica secundum se, et de eius expressione sive interiori et conceptuali sive exteriori et verbali. (2) Deinde dicendum erat quemadmodum intelligentia theologica ad verum antecedens compararetur. Et in primis notandum est theologicam scientiam a naturali vel humana eo differre quod non a datis sed a veris incipit.18 In scientia enim naturali eorum quaeritur intelligentia quae sensibus dantur; nisi per sensibilia intellecta ad verum non acceditur; neque plus speratur quam per successivas semperque meliores hypotheses et theorias maiorem quandam attingere verisimilitudinem atque probabilitatem. Similiter, in scientia humana, quamvis non a nudis sensibilibus incipiatur sed a sensibilibus sensu quodam significatoque humano indutis, hic tamen sensus non accipitur ut verus; et ideo sicut scientia naturalis, ita scientia humana per probabiliores semper theorias ad verum propius accedere intendit. Sed qui in verbo Dei invenitur sensus, a divina scientia eaque infallibili procedit; et ideo theologia quae a veris revelatis incipit, scientia scientiae divinae subalternata esse dicitur. Quae cum ita sint, eo sensu intelligentia theologica est vera quod in vero divinitus revelato intelligendo consistit. Quod si aliud praeter verum a Deo revelatum intelligitur, adesse quidem potest intelligentia, sed adesse non potest intelligentia theologica. Quam enim intelligentiam laudavit c. Vaticanum i, illa eorum erat mysteriorum (db 1796) quae in Deo abscondita, nisi divinitus revelata, nobis innotescere non poterant (db 1795). Deinde, quaeri potest utrum scripturas an magisterium ecclesiae adeat theologus ut mysteria addiscat quorum quaerat intelligentiam.

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definition or a hypothesis is considered, or some other person’s idea is repeated; then of course even if there are many outer words, even if all are taken together, even if they contain the words ‘is’ or ‘is not,’ still those outer words cannot be either true or false, since they do not carry an intention to assert something, but only to consider or repeat an idea. Thus, the outer words that express theological understanding as such are not true or false even by metonymy. Fourth, as theological understanding itself is imperfect, analogical, obscure, gradually developing, and so on, so also the consequent inner word and the consequent outer words are imperfectly, analogically, and obscurely understood. So much for theological understanding in itself and for its expression, whether inner and conceptual or outer and verbal. (2) Next we have to state how theological understanding is connected to an antecedent truth. First, then, notice that theological science differs from natural or human science in that theological science begins not from data but from truths. 18 The natural sciences seek an understanding of sensible data; they approximate to truth only by understanding sensible data; and they hope for no more than to attain greater plausibility and probability by means of successive and ever better hypotheses and theories. The human sciences, too, begin from sensible data: not from bare sensibles, it is true, but from sensibles endowed with meaning and human significance. But they do not accept this meaning as true, and so like the natural sciences, they intend to approach ever nearer to truth by means of ever more probable theories. But the meaning that is found in the word of God proceeds from God’s infallible knowledge, and so a theology that begins from revealed truths is called a knowledge subordinated to divine knowledge. Since this is so, theological understanding is true in the sense that it consists in understanding the truth that God has revealed. When anything is understood besides the truth that God has revealed, one may indeed have understanding, but not theological understanding, the understanding commended by Vatican i (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132), that is, the understanding of those mysteries hidden in God that could not be known by us unless they were revealed by God (db 1795, ds 3015, nd 131). Second, one can ask whether the theologian should go to the scriptures or to the church’s magisterium to learn of the mysteries that he or she seeks to understand. 18 [In the light of Method in Theology it is clear that Lonergan would later have qualified this statement. Systematics begins not from data but from truths, but systematics is but one of eight functional specialties in theology.]

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Et primo dicimus, quantum ad verum verique sensum attinet, nihil referre utrum scripturas an magisterium adeat. Quod enim ab ecclesia omnibus credendum proponitur ut divinitus revelatum, idem in fontibus revelationis continetur (db 1792) et quidem eodem sensu ac ab ecclesia definitum est (db 2314; cf. 1800).

Attamen, stante dicta identitate veri et sensus, longe propius ad munus officiumque theologiae systematicae accedit declaratio ecclesiastica quam biblica. Categoriae enim quae dicuntur biblicae ad immediatum vitae usum pertinent secundum particulares quosdam scriptores, lectores, tempora, loca, adiuncta, occasiones, fines. Categoriae autem quae dici possunt catholicae in quaestionibus difficilioribus inventae sunt ad usum ecclesiae ubique dispersae, iure universalis, hisque in terris perpetuae.19 Illae quidem clariores erant quoad primaevos christianos, a nobis autem non addiscuntur nisi longioribus et difficilioribus studiis biblicis; hae autem interiorem quandam claritatem habent quae a quolibet perspici potest qui feliciter studia media peregerit. Illae ita Deum respiciunt ut simul homini dicant quid sentire, quid dicere, quid agere debeat; hae autem ipsam rem divinam secundum se ipsam exponunt. Magis commovemur ergo ubi Filius dicitur ‘splendor gloriae et figura substantiae eius’;20 sed clarius perspicimus problema theologicum ubi determinatur Filius Patri consubstantialis esse. Quae cum ita sint, manifestum videtur theologiam systematicam potius a definitionibus ecclesiae quam a studiis biblicis incipere. Cum tamen doctrinae revelatae fontes tot tantosque contineant thesauros veritatis ut numquam reapse exhauriantur (db 2314), multa sane sunt in scripturis quae nondum ab ecclesia definita sunt; neve haec omnia dicas minoris esse momenti. Alia enim mysteria,

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The first thing that we can say in response is that as far as the truth and the meaning of the truth are concerned, it does not make any difference whether one goes to the scriptures or to the magisterium. For whatever the church proposes to be believed by all as divinely revealed, that same truth is contained in the sources of revelation (db 1792, ds 3011, nd 219) and indeed with the same meaning as is defined by the church (db 2314, ds 3886, nd 859, cf. db 1800, ds 3020, nd 136). Still, even granted this identity in truth and in meaning, a church declaration is likely to be much closer to the task and role of systematic theology than is a biblical statement. So-called biblical categories pertain to the immediate uses of life for particular writers, readers, times, places, circumstances, occasions, and purposes, while what can be called ‘catholic’ categories have been discovered in working on very difficult questions, and they can be used by the universal church everywhere throughout the world, in every age.19 Biblical categories were quite clear for early Christians, but we today can master them only after long and difficult biblical studies. But the catholic categories have a certain inner clarity that can be grasped by anyone with a decent middle-school education. Biblical categories speak of God while at the same time telling us what we should feel, what we should say, what we should do. The catholic categories speak of divine reality in itself. We may be more stirred when the Son is called ‘reflection of God’s glory and the exact imprint of his very being,’20 but we grasp the theological problem more clearly in the statement that the Son is consubstantial with the Father. Therefore it seems beyond doubt that systematic theology begins from the definitions of the church rather than from biblical studies. Nevertheless, the sources of revealed doctrine contain such great and abundant treasures of truth that they are never really exhausted (db 2314, ds 3886, nd 859), and so there is much in scripture that has not yet been defined by the church, and some of it is of the greatest importance. Some great mysteries, such as the redemption, are so fully 19 [The expression ‘catholic categories’ can easily lend itself to misunderstanding. Lonergan does not mean just any of the customary forms of expression of the Roman Catholic Church, many of which are as particular and as culturally specific as ‘biblical categories.’ He means what in the Epilogue of Insight is called ‘the work of the speculative theologian seeking a universal formulation of the truths of faith’ (Insight 761). The issue will come up again. Note that this section was not in the earlier Divinarum personarum. There, the word catholica does not appear until later, and then most often in the sense of the Catholic Church. See below, p. 63, where ‘catholice’ is translated as ‘universally.’ But see also below, sections 7, 8, and 9, which were contained in the earlier version, and where the proper translation is ‘Catholic.’ The reference to ‘catholic categories’ may be seen as anticipating the question in Method in Theology regarding the transcultural base of the special and general categories.] 20 [Hebrews 1.3.]

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uti redemptio, adeo plene in fontibus exponuntur ut de iis vix umquam in ecclesia disputatum sit et ideo perpaucae atque breviores inveniantur magisterii declarationes. Alia autem mysteria, uti SS. Trinitas, in fontibus inveniuntur magis indirecte quam directe exposita, magis seorsum per partes quam simul per modum unius tractata; quae quidem ita admirationem, dubia, disputationes moverunt ut saepius et clarissime et exactissime ab ecclesia sint declarata. Quas ob causas, etsi facilius incipiat systematicus a declarationibus ecclesiae, non semper tamen facere potest quod facilius est. Proinde, ubi systematicus ipsas scripturas adit ut mysterium addiscat cuius intelligentiam quaerat, ne munus suum cum munere theologiae biblicae confundat; nisi ad proprium suum finem eumque solum attenderit, numquam ad eum perveniet. Illud ergo e scripturis attingere vult quod quaerendum non haberet si ecclesiae magisterium rem definivisset. Vult ergo quod in se clarum est, et ideo vult sensum significatumque categoriis quas superius dixi catholicis declaratum. Vult quod certo revelatum est, et ideo eas adhibet methodos technicas quae non ad probabilia vel probabiliora sed ad certa conducant. Vult quod ipsam rem divinam respicit, et ideo mentem Marci, Pauli, Ioannis, alteriusve scriptoris ita scrutatur ut ibi non sistat sed ulterius ad clarum et certum de Deo rebusque divinis procedat.

Haec ergo de fine. De mediis autem adhibendis ad finem assequendum et longior et difficilior esset dissertatio, cum in studiis hodiernis factus sit dogmaticus tamquam lapis offensionis. Modernae enim investigationis scientiaeque modernae tota est indoles ut ad data positiva exactissime attendat, ut ad intelligentiam promovendam efficaciter procedat, ut ad veritatem et positive et certo determinandam sese imparem inveniat. Quod ergo moderna methodologia omittit, illud facere debet dogmaticus. Quemadmodum vero illud facere possit, neque brevis quaestio est neque facilis. Hanc ergo quaestionem satius duxi ad aliam remittere occasionem quam celerius expedire. Tertio, mysteria divinitus revelata non solum in fontibus revelationis et in infallibilibus ecclesiae declarationibus inveniuntur sed etiam in aliis quae dicuntur locis theologicis.21 Quibus omnibus utitur systematicus ut mysterium addiscat

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treated in the sources that there have hardly ever been disputes about them in the church. As a result, declarations of the magisterium regarding them are rare and brief. On the other hand, there are mysteries like the Trinity that the sources treat more indirectly and in scattered texts than directly and as a single whole. These have provoked surprise, doubts, arguments, which have led in turn to the church declaring them quite frequently and very clearly and exactly. Therefore, although it may be easier for systematic theologians to begin from the declarations of the church, they are not always able to do what is easier. Accordingly, when systematic theologians go to the scriptures to learn about the mystery that they want to understand, they have to keep their own task distinct from that of biblical theology. Unless they concentrate exclusively on their own goal, they will not successfully arrive at it. What they want from the scriptures is something that they would not even have to look for if the church had already defined it. They want what is clear in itself, and so they want the meaning and the significance clearly expressed in the categories that earlier I called catholic. They want what has certainly been revealed, and so they use those technical methods that will lead, not to what is probable, not even to what is more probable, but to what is certain. They want what regards the divine reality itself, and so they examine the mind of Mark or Paul or John or any other writer, not to rest content with that, but to proceed further to something clear and certain concerning God and divine realities. This, then, is their aim. But what exactly are the means of attaining it? The answer to that question would be long and difficult, since in contemporary studies the dogmatic theologian has become something of a stumbling block. The whole thrust of modern research and modern science is to pay the most exact attention to positive data, to move effectively toward understanding those data, and to find oneself unable to determine positively and certainly just what the truth is. What modern methodology omits is precisely what dogmatic theologians have to do. But to say how they can do it is not a brief or easy task. Therefore I judge it better to postpone this question to another occasion rather than attempt too quick an answer here. Third, divinely revealed mysteries are found not only in the sources of revelation and in the infallible declarations of the church but also in other theological sources, or loci.21 Systematic theologians use all of these to learn about the mystery 21 [For Melchior Cano, theological loci name the ‘places’ where authority is to be found. Cano lists and discusses ten: scripture, apostolic traditions, the universal church, general councils, the papal magisterium, the Fathers, Scholastic theologians and canonists, natural human reason, widely shared opinions of philosophers and jurists, and history and human traditions. He also proposes on the basis of

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cuius intelligentiam quaerat. Sed ad caeteras notasque regulas illud adiungere velim quod superius de systemate male intellecto dixi. Quatenus enim mala intelligentia in theologiam intrat, eatenus oriuntur pseudo-problemata et evolvuntur pseudo-systemata. Quas domos in arena exstructas et facile et secure evitat systematicus ubi problema suum fundamentale ex dogmatibus ecclesiae desumit, ubi problemata connexa et consequentia e problemate fundamentali derivat, ubi ad quaestiones subordinatas vel ad appendices remittit problemata quae magis ex opinationibus hominum quam ex veris a Deo revelatis oriri videantur. 22 (3) Denique quaerendum erat quemadmodum intelligentia theologica ad verum consequens compararetur. Quae enim secundum se neque vera est neque falsa, eadem veritatem participat non solum antecedenter quatenus veri revelati intelligentia est sed etiam consequenter quatenus iudicatur veri mysterii veram esse intelligentiam.23 Et in primis, veritas consequens non ea est quae principiis communibus competit.24 Haec enim principia respiciunt transcendentalia, nempe, ens, unum, verum, bonum; in omni inquisitione et dubitatione humana adhibentur; ipsam hominis intellectualitatem atque rationalitatem quasi constituunt; et ideo defenduntur tamquam conditiones possibilitatis cuiuslibet cognitionis humanae. Quamvis

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that they want to understand. There are standard rules of procedure for this, but I wish to add what I said above about a system that is poorly understood. To the extent that poor understanding enters into theology, there arise pseudo-problems and there are developed pseudo-systems. Systematic theologians will easily and securely avoid such houses built on sand when they draw their fundamental problem from the dogmas of the church, when they derive connected consequent problems from their fundamental problem, and when they relegate to subordinate questions or to appendices those problems that seem to stem more from human opinions than from truths revealed by God.22 (3) Finally, how is theological understanding connected to consequent truth? The act of theological understanding is in itself neither true nor false, but it participates in the truth not only antecedently insofar as it is the understanding of a truth that has been revealed but also in a consequent fashion to the extent that it is judged to be a true understanding of a true mystery.23 First, then, this consequent truth is not the truth that belongs to common principles.24 These principles regard the transcendentals, namely, being, the one, the true, the good, and are employed in every human inquiry, including every case of human doubt. They practically constitute human intelligence and reasonableness, and so they are defended as conditions of possibility of any human knowing. these loci the positive and negative categorization of theological statements that became ‘theological notes’ and ‘censures.’ (See below, note 46.) Although Lonergan mentions here the term made current in Catholic theology by Cano, and refers cursorily to the first five of Cano’s loci, it is unlikely that what he has in mind is limited just to the loci delineated by Cano or by the tradition of dogmatic theology that developed from Cano. The sources or loci that he has in mind probably extend to wherever the ‘divinely revealed mysteries’ are found or made manifest, and especially to such privileged expressions of Christian living as prayer and the liturgy, the sensus fidelium, the law of the cross operating in human history, and in the holy lives of the saints – all of which systematic theologians can use ‘to learn about the mystery they want to understand.’ Still, the fact that he will refer here to ‘standard rules of procedure’ may indicate that he was thinking of the tradition that grew out of Cano’s De locis theologicis.] 22 [Thus, Lonergan’s own treatise on the Trinity starts on p. 65 of the Latin text and runs for 195 pages. It is followed by 54 pages of appendices. It contains 18 asserta (105 pages) and 90 pages of questions that arise at various points in the exposition.] 23 [What follows is a heuristic sketch in twelve points of theological truth in general – that is, what Lonergan is calling the consequent truth of theological understanding, or the truth consequent on theological understanding (1–7) – and how to judge it in any given case (8–12).] 24 [What is meant are such principles as the principle of identity, the principle of noncontradiction, the principle of sufficient reason, and so on. On these, see Verbum 69–70 and Insight 346–48, 356, 402, 543–44, 599.]

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ergo theologus haec communia principia necessario adhibeat, vel explicite et signate, vel implicite et exercite, quamvis praeterea haec principia et omnia et omnem singulorum aspectum includant, intelligentia tamen theologica interiorem quandam horum determinationem dicit, et ideo veritas consequens huius intelligentiae non eadem sit ac ipsorum communium principiorum. Deinde, veritas consequens non ea est quae ex perspecta rei essentia procedit sive per modum principii essentialis sive per modum demonstratae proprietatis. Hac enim in vita Deum cognoscimus non immediate per essentiam sed mediate per analogiam. Et ideo fieri nequit ut intelligentia divini mysterii sit vera ad modum perspectae essentiae. Tertio, intelligentiae theologicae veritas consequens alia est ac in theologia naturali attingitur. Aliud enim est quod naturalis ratio analogice de Deo concipit et ex creaturis de Deo demonstrat. Aliud est quod nobis innotescere non potest nisi divinitus revelatur et fide suscipitur. Tertium denique est quod ratio per fidem illustrata invenit cum de mysteriis stricte dictis inquisierit (db 1795, 1796, 1816).

Quarto, intelligentiae theologicae veritas consequens alia est ac veritas antecedens. Nam antecedens veritas est ipsum divinum mysterium a Deo revelatum et fide susceptum cuius quaeritur intelligentia. Consequens autem veritas est ipsius intelligentiae. Illud verum est fide divina et forte etiam catholica; hoc autem saepe non aliam habet notam seu censuram quam ‘probabile.’

Iterum, obiectum fidei divinae temporum decursu non mutatur; non enim mutatur ipsum fidei depositum (db 1800), et ipsae declarationes dogmaticae non proponunt nisi idem verum eodem sensu intellectum (db 1792, 1800, 2314). E contra circa doctrinam fidei crescit et proficit, tam singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis quam totius ecclesiae, aetatum et saeculorum gradibus, intelligentia, scientia, sapientia (db 1800). Cuius augmenti quaenam sit veritas quaeritur ubi de veritate consequente intelligentiae theologicae agitur.

Quinto, intelligentiae theologicae veritas consequens per se est quae hypothesi competit; et per se intelligo quod ex ipsa rei natura oritur.

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Now of course theologians have to use these common principles, whether explicitly and thematically or just implicitly and in practice. And without doubt these principles include all that is, as well as every aspect of every single being. Nevertheless, theological understanding adds a certain inner determination of these principles, and therefore the truth consequent on this understanding is not just the same as the truth of the common principles themselves. Second, the consequent truth is not the kind of truth that comes from grasping the essence of something, whether by grasping an essential principle or by grasping some demonstrated characteristic or ‘property.’ In this life we do not know God immediately by essence, but mediately by analogy. Therefore no human understanding of the divine mystery can be true with the kind of truth that comes from grasping an essence. Third, the truth consequent upon theological understanding is not the truth attained in natural theology. What natural reason conceives analogically about God and demonstrates about God from creatures is different from what can become known to us only if it is divinely revealed and accepted in faith. But different from each of these is what reason enlightened by faith finds when it inquires into the mysteries strictly so called (db 1795, 1796, 1816; ds 3015, 3016, 3041; nd 131, 132, 137). Fourth, the consequent truth of theological understanding is different from the antecedent truth. The antecedent truth is the divine mystery itself revealed by God and accepted in faith, a mystery whose understanding is being sought. The truth consequent upon theological understanding is the truth of that understanding itself. Thus, while the antecedent truth is ‘of divine faith’ and perhaps also ‘of Catholic faith,’ the consequent truth often deserves no other ‘note’ or qualification than ‘probable.’ Again, the object of divine faith does not change with time, for the ‘deposit of faith’ does not change (db 1800, ds 3020, nd 136), and the dogmatic declarations themselves propose only the same truth understood in exactly the same sense (db 1792, 1800, 2314; ds 3011, 3020, 3886; nd 219, 136, 859). In stark contrast to that, understanding, knowledge, and wisdom in regard to the doctrine of faith grow and advance, in single individuals and in all, in each person and in the entire church, according to the degree proper to each age and time (db 1800, 3020, nd 136). The question about the truth that is consequent upon theological understanding is a question about the truth of that continual growth and improvement. Fifth, the truth consequent upon theological understanding is per se the truth that belongs to a hypothesis. By per se I mean whatever comes to it from its own nature.

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Hypothesis ergo est ea expressio conceptualis et etiam verbalis quae principium enuntiat, ex actu intelligendi procedit, et problema quoddam primum solvit. Quae hypothesis ita secundum se neque vera est neque falsa, ut tamen vera esse possit; et quidem eo probabilior est, quo plura problemata virtualiter solvit; eo autem magis ad certitudinem accedit quo magis omnis alia excluditur via ad eadem problemata vel aeque bene vel melius solvenda. Porro, quae hypothesi competunt, ea omnia per se oriuntur ubi attingitur illa intelligentia quam laudavit c. Vaticanum i (db 1796). Qui enim fructuosissimam assequitur intelligentiam, is non silet sed loquitur: procedit ergo ex illa intelligentia verbum interius et exterius, seu expressio conceptualis et verbalis. Praeterea, de eodem loquitur, de quo antea ‘sedulo, pie, sobrie’ quaesivit; sed antequam intellexerit, de problemate solvendo loquebatur; et postquam intellexit, de problemate soluto loquitur. Praeterea, qui intelligentiam assequitur non qualemcumque sed fructuosissimam, non unicum quoddam ita solvit problema ut sterilis et sine fructu ulteriori sit solutio, sed ita unum directe solvit ut eo ipso multa et alia virtualiter solvat. Praeterea, qui mysterium divinitus revelatum aliquatenus intelligit, verum intelligit; quod verum nominavimus antecedens. Praeterea, ipsa mysterii intelligentia secundum se neque vera est neque falsa; nam, uti superius vidimus, haec intelligentia ad primam intellectus operationem pertinet, quae quaerit quid sit ; quam operationem sequitur altera, quae quaerit an sit ; neque veritas formaliter nisi in hac altera operatione attingitur. Praeterea, haec intelligentia, quae secundum se neque vera est neque falsa, tamen vera esse potest; fieri enim potest ut in subsequenti operatione affirmative respondeatur ad quaestionem an sit. Praeterea, eo probabilius affirmative respondetur quo plura solvuntur problemata connexa et consequentia. Denique tandem, eo magis ad certitudinem accedit haec affirmativa responsio quo magis excluditur omnis alia via ad eam assequendam intelligentiam quam laudavit c. Vaticanum i.

Sexto, secundum idem c. Vaticanum i crescit et proficit aetatum et saeculorum gradibus intelligentia, scientia, sapientia (db 1800). Existit ergo series quaedam historica quae modo minimum exhibet quasi semen, modo nascentem virgulam, modo incipientem arborem, ut scilicet fructuosissima sit mysterii intelligentia, non solum quia cum creverit et profecerit multa solvat problemata, sed etiam quia eiusdem anteriora minusque perfecta stadia posteriorem perfectionem praepararint, promiserint, et quodammodo continuerint. Comparantur proinde priora et posteriora intelligentiae stadia tum ratione obiecti intellecti, tum ratione analogiae adhibitae, tum ratione perfectionis

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A hypothesis, then, is a conceptual and also verbal expression that states a principle, that proceeds from an act of understanding, and that solves some primary problem. A hypothesis, of itself, is neither true nor false; nevertheless, it can be true. A hypothesis is more probable the more problems it has the potential of solving. And it moves closer to certitude as every other way of solving the same problems equally well or better is excluded. Moreover, these characteristics of a hypothesis are all verified when there is attained the understanding that Vatican i referred to (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). One who reaches an understanding that is most fruitful is not silent but speaks, and so there proceeds from such understanding an inner and an outer word, a conceptual and verbal expression. Again, the theologian speaks about precisely what he or she earlier inquired into ‘diligently, reverently, judiciously.’ But before understanding, one would speak about the problem to be solved, while after understanding, one speaks about the problem that has been solved. Again, one who reaches not just any understanding but one that is most fruitful does not solve just one single problem in a sterile fashion without bearing further fruit, but solves one problem directly in such a way that one simultaneously reaches a virtual solution of many others. Again, one who gains any understanding of a divinely revealed mystery understands something true; we have called that the antecedent truth. Again, that understanding of the mystery is in itself neither true nor false. As we saw above, such understanding belongs to the first operation of the intellect, in which one asks, ‘What is it?’ A second operation follows, the one that asks, ‘Is it so?’ and truth is formally to be attained only in this second operation. Again, this understanding, which of itself is neither true nor false, nonetheless can be true: one’s answer to the question, ‘Is it so?’ in the subsequent operation can be ‘yes.’ Again, the probability accorded to the affirmative answer is always greater when the number of connected consequent problems solved by the same understanding is greater. And finally, this affirmative answer is given with greater certitude the more every other way of attaining the understanding mentioned by Vatican i has been tried and found wanting. Sixth, the same Vatican i taught that understanding, knowledge, and wisdom grow and advance as ages and centuries unfold (db 1800, ds 3020, nd 136). Thus, there exists a historical series that begins with the tiniest seed and becomes a growing shoot and then a budding tree. Accordingly, the understanding of mystery is most fruitful not only because, with its growth and increase, it solves many problems, but also because its earlier, less perfect stages were the preparation and promise of, and somehow already contained, the later perfection. Earlier and later stages of understanding can be compared with one another, first in terms of the object understood, then in terms of the analogy employed, and

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adeptae. Et ratione obiecti intellecti in eodem sunt genere, eodem dogmate, eodem sensu, eademque sententia;25 nam idem semper est mysterium divinitus revelatum cuius intelligentia quaeritur. Ratione autem analogiae adhibitae ita ex multiplicitate ad uniformitatem proceditur ut, primo, multae et diversae tententur viae, deinde, ad unam quandam analogiam praeferendam augeatur consensus, tertio, in hac analogia profundius et exactius proponendo proficit intelligentia. Comparantur denique stadia ratione perfectionis adeptae non solum secundum intelligentiam quae principium plenius et profundius penetrat sed etiam secundum scientiam quae ex principio concludit et secundum sapientiam quae totam materiam ordinat.

Cuius comparationis sit exemplum. S. Augustinus ergo et S. Thomas de eodem dogmate trinitario intelligentiam aliquam assecuti sunt; et eandem analogiam psychologicam uterque adhibuit. Quam analogiam psychologice exposuit S. Augustinus, eandem autem S. Thomas non solum psychologice sed etiam metaphysice, ut plenior apud eum sit principii intelligentia et latior esse possit sapientiae ordo et exactior conclusionum deductio. Septimo, crescenti et proficienti intelligentiae, scientiae, sapientiae non ponitur limes. Non ponitur ex parte obiecti intelligendi, nam mysterium divinum revelat infinitum, et infinitum non limitatur. Non ponitur ex parte analogiae: quamvis enim interdum demonstrari possit nullam aliam esse posse analogiam nobis hac in vita notam, attamen ipsa haec analogia petitur ‘ex iis quae naturaliter cognoscit’ ratio (db 1796); sed ratio humana in rebus naturalibus intelligendis non ita perfecte intelligit ut perfectius intelligere non possit. Non ponitur limes ex parte fontium revelationis qui tot tantosque veritatis thesauros contineant ut reapse numquam exhauriantur (db 2314). Non ponitur limes ex parte sapientiae organizantis: quo

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finally in terms of the perfection achieved. In terms of the object understood, the earlier and later are ‘within the same genus, within the same dogma, within the same meaning and view,’25 because it is always the same divinely revealed mystery that theologians are trying to understand. In terms of the analogy employed, there is a gradual progress from multiplicity toward unity, so that while earlier efforts at understanding explore in many different directions, gradually consensus solidifies around the use of some one analogy, and finally understanding makes gradual progress in the profound and exact use of this analogy. In terms of the perfection achieved, the stages are compared not only on the basis of an understanding that more fully and deeply penetrates the principle of the analogy, but also on the basis of a knowledge that draws conclusions from the principle and on the basis of a wisdom that orders all the material. As an example of this comparison, consider St Augustine and St Thomas. Each of them attained some understanding of one and the same dogma of the Trinity. Each of them used the same psychological analogy. But St Augustine expounded the analogy psychologically, while St Thomas expounded it both psychologically and metaphysically. His understanding of the principle, then, was more complete; more elements and wider perspectives could be embraced within his sapiential ordering; and his deduction of conclusions could be more precise. Seventh, there is no limit to the growth and progress of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom. The growth cannot be limited from the side of the object to be understood, because the divine mystery reveals what is infinite, and the infinite has no limits. The progress cannot be limited from the side of the analogy employed, for while it may be demonstrable in some cases that the analogy used is the only one possible to us in this life, even then the analogy remains something drawn ‘from what human reason knows naturally’ (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132), and no matter how thoroughly the human mind understands natural objects, there is always the possibility of understanding them better. Growth and progress cannot be limited on the side of the sources of revelation. The sources of revelation contain treasures of truth so many and so great that they can never really be exhausted (db 2314, ds 3896, nd 419). No limit can be placed on the side 25 [Vincent of Lerins, quoted by Vatican i (db 800, ds 3020, nd 136); the translation is one that Lonergan provided in some notes that he wrote while composing his paper ‘Doctrinal Pluralism’; the notes are found in the archives of the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto. An English translation of the Roman Liturgy of the Hours, for the Second Reading in the Office of Readings for Friday of the twenty-seventh week in ordinary time, has, ‘along its own line of development, with the same doctrine, the same meaning and the same import.’]

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magis enim ratio naturalia et analogica penetrat, quo magis fontium studium thesauros pandit, eo plura ordinanda habet crescens proficiensque sapientia. Non ponitur limes ex parte intelligentiae et scientiae theologicae; ubi enim sapientia intelligentiae proponit problema, ibi ratio per fidem illustrata, cum sedulo, pie, et sobrie quaerit, sperare sane potest aliquam se intelligentiam Deo dante esse assecuturam, tum propter ipsam Dei bonitatem, tum propter orationem c. Vaticani i ut ‘Crescat igitur . . . et multum vehementerque proficiat, tam singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis quam totius ecclesiae, aetatum et saeculorum gradibus, intelligentia, scientia, sapientia . . .’ (db 1800). Ubi autem attingitur principii intelligentia, sponte sua sequitur conclusionum scientia.

Octavo, sicut praeter bonum semen seminari possunt zizania, ita etiam praeter crescentem et proficientem intelligentiam oriri potest mala intelligentia; cuius consectaria iam superius consideravimus ubi de pseudo-problematibus et pseudosystematibus. Nono, iudicium ergo de veritate consequente intelligentiae theologicae e tribus maxime procedere videtur. Primo enim examinatur haec intelligentia secundum ea quae per se ex intelligentia profluunt, utrum quoddam problema solvat, utrum hoc problema sit mysterium divinum prout mediate, imperfecte, analogice, obscure hac in vita a nobis intelligi possit, utrum fructuosa sit intelligentia quae alia et connexa problemata virtualiter solvat, utrum alia sit analogia quae melius vel aeque bene eadem omnia resolvat problemata, an forte nulla alia sit analogia quae hac in vita a nobis cognosci possit. Deinde vero examinatur eadem intelligentia, non secundum se, sed secundum comparationem historicam, utrum idem problema antea sit consideratum, utrum directe an tantummodo indirecte, utrum in eadem an alia problematum complexione, utrum eadem an alia adhibeatur analogia, utrum analogia si eadem sit profundius penetretur, utrum novi addantur aspectus vel secundum profectum scientiarum naturalium et humanarum vel secundum profectum in studiis scripturisticis, conciliariis, patristicis, mediaevalibus, etc., utrum principii intelligentia caeteras conclusiones per reliquum opus deductas re vera fundet, utrum plura et pleniora nunc quam antea deducantur, utrum melius attingatur totius materiae unus quidam quasi intuitus atque conspectus, utrum iam perspici possint

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of the wisdom that orders things, since the more reason penetrates nature and natural analogies, and the more research into the sources opens new treasures, the greater the number of objects there are to be ordered by growing and advancing wisdom. Nor, finally, can any limit be placed on the side of theological understanding and theological knowledge themselves. Where wisdom proposes a problem for understanding, there reason illumined by faith and seeking diligently, reverently, and judiciously can hope that with God’s help it will indeed attain some understanding. The expectation is grounded in God’s goodness and in the prayer of Vatican i: ‘Therefore, let there be growth . . . and all possible progress in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom in single individuals and in all, in each person and in the entire church, according to the degree proper to each age and each time . . .’ (db 1800, ds 3020, nd 136). Moreover, where an understanding of the principle is attained, knowledge of conclusions follows of its own accord. Eighth, besides good seed, tares may also be sown; so too, alongside growing, developing understanding, misunderstanding may also appear. The consequences of that were considered above in our discussion of pseudo-problems and pseudosystems. Ninth, a judgment as to the consequent truth of theological understanding appears to rest chiefly on three considerations. First, we can examine this understanding in terms of what issues from it precisely as understanding. Does it solve some problem? Is the problem that it solves a divine mystery, something that can be understood by us in this life mediately, imperfectly, analogically, obscurely? Is the understanding fruitful in the sense that it provides a virtual solution to other connected problems? Is there another analogy that is better or at least as good in resolving all the same problems, or is there no other analogy that can be known by us in this life? Second, we can examine the same understanding not in itself but by way of historical comparison. Has the same problem been considered before? Was it considered directly or only indirectly? Was it considered in the same complex of problems or in a different one? Was the same analogy used or a different one? If the same one, is the analogy now being grasped more profoundly? Are new aspects being added to it, whether because of progress in the natural and human sciences or because of progress in studies of scripture, the councils, the Fathers, the medievals, and so on? Does understanding the principle really ground all the other conclusions deduced later in the treatise? Are more and more complete conclusions being deduced now than before? Is an overall view of the whole material now more easily reached? Can we now see further problems that call

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problemata ulteriora quae ulteriorem intelligentiae, scientiae, sapientiae profectum invitent et quasi exigant. Tertio denique examinatur eadem intelligentia secundum comparationem ad pseudo-problemata et pseudo-systemata quae forte hac in materia orta, divulgata, neque penitus derelicta sint. Quaeritur ergo utrum omnes quaestiones quae umquam sint positae pari modo considerentur, an forte fiat selectio ut aliae principaliter tractentur, aliae per modum quaestionis annexae, et aliae denique sileantur; utrum haec selectio communem usum sequatur an forte aliquo principio determinetur; utrum hoc principium sit quod mysterii divinitus revelati quaeratur intelligentia, quodque problemata ex mala intelligentia orta non tractentur nisi quatenus eorum omissio ea non amoveret quae mysterii intelligentiam apud multos impedirent.

Decimo, cum principalis quidam educationis fructus sit ut quis secundum diversa criteria in diversis materiis iudicet, non absque utilitate erit iudicium de intelligentia theologica cum aliis et theologicis iudiciis comparare. Differt ergo iudicium de intelligentia theologica ab omnibus quibuscumque conclusionibus theologicis. Nihil enim facilius est quam recte concludere: positis enim praemissis, aut conclusio necessario sequitur, aut non; si non, nihil valet; si vero sequitur necessario, non minus vera est conclusio quam praemissae. E contra, iudicium de intelligentia theologica non facillimum sed difficillimum est. Non enim agitur de conclusione sed de principio; quod principium modo possibile, modo minus modo plus probabile, modo saltem in ea linea seu via esse potest quae sola ad intelligentiam a c. Vaticano laudatam conducat. Differt deinde ab omnibus quae naturali rationis lumine mediantibus creaturis de Deo cognoscantur, et quidem tum problemate tum solutione. Differt problemate, nam problema seu quaestio quam solvit intelligentia theologica nisi ex revelatis non oritur; sublata enim revelatione, nullum existit problema nobis notum de Deo trino, de Verbo incarnato, de gratia Christi, de sacramentis novae legis, etc. Differt deinde solutione, nam philosophica de Deo cognitio neque inducit neque systematice evolvit analogias hypotheticas atque interne obscuras; sed quae in Deo analogice esse affirmat, ea etiam demonstrat. Ita philosophus diceret et demonstraret Deum esse conscium; sed philosophus demonstrare non

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for and practically demand further progress in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom? Third, we can examine the same understanding by comparing it with the pseudo-problems and pseudo-systems that may have arisen with regard to this subject matter, that may have spread abroad, and that may still to some extent prevail. Are all the questions that have ever been considered with regard to this subject matter being given equal treatment, or is a selection perhaps being made, so that certain questions are given priority, others are treated as secondary, and still others are left unmentioned? And if a selection is being made, is it made on the basis of custom, or on the basis of some principle? Is the principle found in the fact that what is being sought is some understanding of divinely revealed mystery, and that problems that have arisen from misunderstanding are not to be considered except where treating them is the only way to remove certain widely held obstacles to understanding the mystery? Tenth, if it is true that one major fruit of education is that we learn to use different criteria of judgment for different materials, then it is useful to compare the judgment regarding a theological understanding with other judgments that are made in theology. The judgment about a theological understanding differs, then, from any and all theological conclusions. Nothing is easier than to conclude correctly: once the premises are posited, the conclusion either follows necessarily or it does not; if it does not, it is not valid; if it does, it is no less true than the premises. In contrast, a judgment about a theological understanding is not easy; it is extremely difficult. What is in question is not a conclusion but a principle. The principle may be merely possible. It may be more or less probable. Sometimes all we can say about it is that at least it may be on the line or along the way that alone leads to the understanding that Vatican i referred to. Next, a judgment about a theological understanding differs from all that is known about God by the natural light of reason through the mediation of creatures. Indeed, it differs both in its problem and in its solution. It differs in its problem, for the problem or question that theological understanding resolves arises only from revelation; take away revelation, and there would be no problem known to us about the Trinity, the incarnate Word, the grace of Christ, the sacraments of the new law, and so on. It differs in its solution, for philosophical knowledge of God neither proposes nor systematically develops hypothetical, internally obscure analogies. When philosophy affirms something analogously about God, it also proves what it affirms. Thus, a philosopher would say and prove that God is conscious; but a philosopher cannot demonstrate that God is dynamically

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potest Deum esse dynamice conscium; neque ulla ei est valida ratio cur supponeret Deum esse dynamice conscium.26 E contra theologus supponit Deum esse dynamice conscium, non quia hoc demonstret, non quia clare hoc intelligat, sed quia in hoc uno et obscuro radicem invenit omnium obscurorum quae in Deo trino esse credit. Cf. Sum. theol., i, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2m. Differt tertio ab omnibus determinationibus dogmaticis, non quidem problemate, sed solutione. Non differt problemate, cum utrinque ponantur quaestiones quae (1) sublata revelatione tollerentur et (2) ipsas res divinas respiciant. Differt autem solutione, nam determinatio dogmatica fit per verum revelatum vel etiam quandoque per verum naturaliter notum, sed intelligentia theologica ulterius addit elementum hypotheticum quod neque fontes certo contineant neque ratio demonstret. Quae quidem particularius sunt dicenda.

Differt ergo quaestio dogmatica vel theologica a quaestione biblica, quia illa ipsas res divinas respicit, haec autem mentem auctoris de re divina. 27 Cuius differentiae exemplo sit, quo sensu Iesus Nazarenus sit Dei Filius. Biblicus enim inquirit quo sensu in singulis locis a Marco, a Paulo, a Ioanne, aliove, adhibita sit expressio ‘Dei Filius’; et ideo diversimode respondet pro diverso auctore, diversis adiunctis, diverso contextu. Dogmaticus autem eandem quaestionem aliter intelligit; non enim principaliter intendit de expressione investigare quid hic aliusve hagiographus certo vel probabiliter in mente habuerit cum hunc titulum, Dei Filium, usurparet; sed principaliter quaerit de ipsa re, de realitate Iesu Nazareni, quemadmodum ab omnibus semper fidelibus concipi debeat.

Differt deinde solutio dogmatica a solutione theologica. Ubi enim dogmaticus determinat Filium Dei non factum sed natum esse, nihil inducit hypotheticum sed ipsa revelata colligit, ponderat, intelligit. Nam sensu quodam singulari de

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conscious, and a philosopher has no valid reason for supposing that God is dynamically conscious.26 As a theologian, however, one supposes that God is dynamically conscious, not because one demonstrates this, not because one clearly understands it, but only because in this one obscure element one finds the root of all the obscure things one holds in faith concerning the triune God. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 32, a.1, ad 2m. A judgment about theological understanding differs, thirdly, from all dogmatic determinations. Here the difference has to do not with the problem but only with the solution. The difference does not have to do with the problem, because in both cases it is a matter of questions (1) that would not exist were it not for divine revelation and (2) that regard the divine realities themselves. The difference does have to do with the solution, because a dogmatic determination is made on the basis of revealed truth or, occasionally, also of some truth that is naturally known, but a theological understanding always adds some hypothetical element that is neither certainly contained in the sources nor demonstrated by reason. Let me try to explain this in a more particular fashion. The dogmatic question (like the theological) differs from the biblical question, for it asks about God, while the biblical question is asking what a given author thinks about God.27 Take, for example, the issue of what it means to say that Jesus of Nazareth is the Son of God. A biblical scholar asks how the expression ‘Son of God’ is used in text after text by Mark, by Paul, by John, by whomever. The answer will be different according to differences of author, circumstance, and context. But a dogmatic theologian understands the same question in a different way. The dogmatic theologian is not concerned primarily with finding out what this or that biblical author actually or probably had in mind in using the title ‘Son of God.’ What the dogmatic theologian is primarily after is the reality itself, the reality of Jesus of Nazareth, and how this reality should be conceived at all times by all believers. Next, the theological solution differs from the dogmatic. When as a dogmatic theologian one determines that the Son of God was not made but was begotten, one is not introducing anything hypothetical. One is drawing together, pondering, 26 [By ‘dynamically conscious’ Lonergan means ‘with conscious intellectual emanation,’ in the sense that a divine Word proceeds from a divine Dicere or that Amor proceeds from the divine Dicere and the divine Verbum. See the next chapter and Lonergan, Verbum 201–204.] 27 [Method in Theology will speak of this difference as the difference between direct discourse (the dogmatic and systematic questions and responses) and indirect discourse (the exegetical questions and answers).]

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Iesu adhibetur nomen, Filius; et idem, qui Iesus est, inter creaturas numerari non potest; et de eodem multa dicuntur quae Deo sunt propria; quae simul omnia sine ulla addita hypothesi important Filium non factum sed increatum, divinum divinitus natum.

Sed alterius generis est solutio proprie theologica. Ubi enim quaeritur qualis sit illa in divinis nativitas seu generatio, brevissime permultae virtualiter ponuntur quaestiones; neque tamen omnes statim menti occurrunt sed decursu temporum alia alteri accedit; quod si multae per revelata vel per vera naturaliter nota solvuntur, ipsae tamen solutiones alias et ulteriores movent quaestiones, donec manifestum fiat satis initiali problemati responderi non posse nisi clare distincteque excogitetur generatio quaedam prorsus singularis nobisque aliunde ignota prorsus. 28 Iam vero quod ad solutionem problematis excogitatur, illud qua tale hypothesis est. Quod nobis aliunde ignotum excogitatur, proprie dicitur hypothesis. Quod denique ita excogitatur ut ex eo tamquam ex principio sequantur tum quae fidei sunt tum quae ex fide concluduntur tum quae rationi contradicere non demonstrantur, non mera est hypothesis sed theoria multipliciter verificata.

Undecimo, derelinquenda esse videtur sententia, quae ‘conclusionis theologia’ nominari solet, ut scilicet (l) theologia tum a ratione tum a fide distinguatur, (2) theologia nulla habeat principia praeter ea quae vel ex fide vel ex ratione accipit, (3) theologia ipsa non sit nisi de conclusionibus, et (4) hae conclusiones sint vel purae (utraque praemissa ex fide accipitur) vel mixtae (alia praemissa ex fide, alia ex ratione accipitur). Nam in primis haec sententia doctrinam c. Vaticani i praetermittere videtur. Non enim decrevit concilium: Ac ratio quidem, fide illustrata, cum praemissas ex fontibus revelationis desumpserit eisque forte aliam ex ratione ipsa adiunxerit, per observatas regulas logicas ad conclusionem certissimam pervenit. Sed concilium aliud exposuit idque non parum diversum:

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and understanding what has been revealed. The name ‘Son’ is in fact used of Jesus in a singular way. The same one who is Jesus cannot be numbered among creatures. Many predications are made of him that are proper to God. Pull all of them together, and you do not have to add anything hypothetical in order to affirm that the Son was not made but that he is uncreated, divine, and born of God. But a properly theological solution is something of a different kind. When one asks what sort of thing that birth or generation in God is, one has in a very brief way virtually posed a large number of questions. But not all of these questions come to mind at once; rather, as time goes on different questions occur to different investigators. Many are solved through revelation or through naturally known truths; but these very solutions prompt further questions, until eventually it becomes clear that a truly satisfactory answer to the initial problem demands that a generation that is unique and completely unknown to us from any other source has to be arrived at and clearly and distinctly conceived and formulated. 28 Now an idea that is arrived at and conceived and formulated in order to provide a solution to a specific problem is, as such, a hypothesis. The ‘something that is unknown to us from any other source’ that is arrived at and conceived and formulated is properly called a hypothesis. Finally, something is not just a hypothesis if it is arrived at and conceived and formulated in such a way that there follow from it as from a principle items that are of faith as well as items that are concluded from faith, and if no step in the process is demonstrably contrary to reason. It is then a theory that is verified in many different ways. Eleventh, the view that is usually called ‘conclusions theology’ should be abandoned. This view of theology maintains (1) that theology is distinct from reason and from faith, (2) that theology has no other principles besides those it receives either from faith or from reason, (3) that theology itself is only about conclusions, and (4) that these conclusions are either ‘pure’ (both premises come from faith) or ‘mixed’ (one premise is from faith and the other from reason). This view is untenable. To begin with, it seems to overlook entirely the teaching of the First Vatican Council. The Council did not decree: Reason enlightened by faith, having drawn its premises from the sources of revelation and having perhaps joined to them one or other premise from reason itself, arrives by carefully observing rules of logic at a most certain conclusion. The Council’s teaching was quite different: 28 [arrived at and ... conceived and formulated’: the meaning is not one of deriving the implications of something already known but of ‘thinking in order to understand,’ as this notion is presented in Verbum 22–23 and 51.]

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Ac ratio quidem, fide illustrata, cum sedulo, pie, et sobrie quaerit, aliquam Deo dante mysteriorum intelligentiam eamque fructuosissimam assequitur tum ex eorum quae naturaliter cognoscit analogia tum e mysteriorum ipsorum nexu inter se et cum fine hominis ultimo . . . (db 1796). Aliud enim est inquirere ut intelligas, et aliud est rem ita perspectam habere ut conclusiones demonstrare possis. Aliud est analogiam quaerere ut imperfecta quaedam intelligentia mysteriorum attingatur, et aliud est praemissas ex scripturis vel etiam ex ratione depromere. Aliud est intelligentiam a Deo dante exspectare, et aliud est certitudinem ex regulis logicis accurate observatis percipere. Quae quam diversa sint, fugit neminem. Praeterea, minime obscura est concilii intentio. Nam antequam semirationalismi damnaret errorem (db 1816), positivam doctrinam catholicam exponere voluit, ideoque duos cognitionis ordines distinxit (db 1795) et partem rationis in excolenda veritate supernaturali docuit (db 1796). Praeterea, minime obscurum est quemadmodum haec mysteriorum intelligentia ad conclusiones puras et mixtas comparetur. Ubi enim ex revelatis mysteriis fiunt deductiones, ibi clare et distincte manifestantur problemata. Quo plures, quo magis exactae fiunt deductiones, eo plura et difficiliora manifestantur problemata. Et cum haec problemata ideo manifestentur quia ipsae praemissae divina mysteria narrant, fieri non potest ut haec problemata solvantur nisi quaedam mysteriorum intelligentia attingatur.29 Praeterea, ubi haec intelligentia ‘ex eorum quae naturaliter cognoscit analogia’ attingitur, introducitur elementum hypotheticum. Etsi enim eadem analogia materialiter in fontibus revelationis vel innuatur vel insinuetur vel suggeratur vel etiam clare indicetur, attamen eadem formaliter analogia cum omnibus suis implicationibus systematicis vix in fontibus adfuisse probatur. Quae cum ita sint, haud admitti potest sententia theologiam non esse nisi de conclusionibus puris et mixtis. Ex revelatis mysteriis enim logice sequuntur problemata, quorum solutiones nisi per intelligentiam mysteriorum non attinguntur; et ubi hae solutiones elementum hypotheticum inducunt (quod saltem est ipsum systema in intelligentia fructuosissima virtualiter contentum), ibi ponitur

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Reason illumined by faith, when it inquires diligently, reverently, and judiciously, with God’s help attains some understanding of the mysteries, and that a highly fruitful one, both from the analogy of what it naturally knows and from the interconnection of the mysteries with one another and with our last end (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). It is one thing to inquire in order to understand, and it is something else to grasp a reality so clearly that you can demonstrate conclusions from it. It is one thing to seek an analogy so that you can attain some imperfect understanding of mysteries, and it is something else to draw premises from scripture or also from reason. It is one thing to seek understanding with God’s help, and it is something else to lay hold of certitude from having accurately followed the rules of logic. Anyone can see the difference. Again, the Council’s intention is not in the least obscure. Before condemning the error of semirationalism (db 1816, ds 3041, nd 124), the Council wanted to make a positive statement of Catholic teaching, and so it distinguished two orders of knowledge (db 1795, ds 3015, nd 131) and taught the role of reason in cultivating supernatural truth (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). Again, the way in which this understanding of mysteries is compared to conclusions, whether pure or mixed, is also not in the least obscure. What happens when deductions are made from revealed mysteries is that the problems clearly and distinctly emerge. The more numerous and the more exact the deductions, the more numerous and the more difficult are the problems that emerge; and since the problems stand forth the way they do because the premises of the deductions tell of divine mysteries, the problems can never be solved unless some understanding of the mysteries is attained.29 Again, when this understanding is attained ‘from the analogy of what the mind knows naturally,’ a certain hypothetical element is introduced. Materially speaking, it is possible that the same analogy is hinted at, insinuated, or suggested in the sources of revelation; it may even be clearly indicated. But one can never prove that the formally identical analogy along with all its systematic implications is present in the sources. It follows that the idea that theology deals only with pure and mixed conclusions is simply mistaken. Logic applied to revealed mysteries leads to problems, the solutions of which can come only through some understanding of the mysteries. When these solutions introduce a hypothetical element (and at least the system virtually contained in a fruitful understanding is hypothetical), then there 29 [An instance of this process of deducing from revealed mysteries so as to state the problem clearly and distinctly occurs in the first assertion in the next chapter.]

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principium proprie theologicum, quod neque ex sola fide est, neque ex sola ratione, sed ex ratione per fidem illustrata et sedulo, pie, sobrie inquirente. Quantum autem ‘conclusionis theologia’ scientiae theologicae noceat, breviter dici oportet. Primo, enim, fovetur illa tendentia quae systematica et posterius inventa auctoribus prioribus imponat. Ubi enim quis systematica amat et tamen nullam scit probationis methodum praeter deductionem ex fontibus, sua systematica in fontibus scripturisticis, patristicis, mediaevalibus invenire solet. Deinde, cum systematici non omnes sint unius mentis et cordis, non unum tantummodo systema sed multa et diversa fontibus imponuntur. Tertio, cum verum criterion validi systematis in deductione ex fontibus non consistat, stante ‘conclusionis theologia,’ fieri haud potest ut ineptiora systemata refutentur et veriora serio probentur. Quarto, ubi florent studia exegetica, patristica, mediaevalia, impugnari solent theologi qui systemata deducant tamquam rei exegeticae, patristicae, mediaevalis prorsus imperiti. Quinto, cum ipsi exegetae, patristici, mediaevales non aliam sciant systematis probationem praeter deductionem ex fontibus, omne systema vanam quandam speculationem esse reputant. Quod si derelinqueretur ista opinatio – theologiam non esse nisi de conclusionibus puris et mixtis – adeo non inter se pugnarent systematici et positivi ut potius maximo mutuo adiutorio sibi essent. Non enim multum inter se distant (1) intelligere doctrinam et (2) intelligere historiam doctrinae. Ubi autem eadem semper est doctrina, idem scilicet dogma, idem sensus, eadem sententia, ubi praeterea aetatum et saeculorum gradibus crescit et proficit eiusdem doctrinae intelligentia, scientia, sapientia, ibi sane nulla esse potest valida ratio cur positivi et systematici mutuo sibi opponantur. Quod enim nunc a systematico intelligitur, idem iam pridem praeparatur; et ideo ex intellecta historia systematicus ad munus suum plene et exacte intelligendum pervenit, sicut etiam ex intellectis solutionibus posterioribus positivus ipsas res anteriores quaenam fuerint et quo tetenderint clarius et exactius perspicere atque iudicare potest.

Duodecimo, ita de veritate intelligentiae theologicae diximus ut duo et suprema criteria tacuerimus, quorum aliud naturam humanam aliud autem divinum revelationis fontem respicit. Et circa naturam humanam praetereundum non est illud peccati originalis vulnus quo homo, sensibilibus immersus, proprium quoddam sibi problematum

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is posited a specifically theological principle that comes neither from faith alone nor from reason alone, but from reason enlightened by faith and inquiring diligently, reverently, and judiciously. We need, then, to indicate the extent to which ‘conclusions theology’ does harm to theology as a science. First, it fosters a tendency to impose on earlier authors the systematic discoveries of a later time. Those who love system and know no other method of verification but deduction from the sources generally find their system in the scriptural, patristic, or medieval sources. Second, since not all systematic theologians are of one mind and heart, in the end not one but many different systems will be read into the sources. Third, since the real criterion of the validity of a system is not deduction from the sources, then if ‘conclusions theology’ prevails, it will hardly be possible to refute inept systems and seriously argue the case for more adequate ones. Fourth, now that scriptural exegesis, patristics, and medieval historical studies abound, theologians who deduce systems generally earn criticism for their ignorance of the scriptures, the Fathers, and medieval history. Fifth, as long as scripture scholars, patristic scholars, and medievalists are aware of no kind of systematic verification other than deduction from the sources, they will regard every system as so much empty speculation. On the other hand, if we abandon the idea that theology is about pure or mixed conclusions, not only will there be no real conflict between positive theologians and systematic theologians, but they will actually be of enormous assistance to one another. Understanding a doctrine is really not that far removed from understanding the history of the doctrine. If the doctrine is always the same, that is, the same dogma, the same meaning, the same view, and if moreover understanding, knowledge, and wisdom about the same doctrine grow and progress from age to age, then no valid reason remains why positive and systematic theologians should oppose one another. What is now understood by systematic theologians has been a long time in preparation, and so by understanding the history, systematic theologians will come to understand their task fully and exactly, just as by understanding later solutions positive theologians will be able to grasp more clearly and judge more accurately what really were the earlier states of affairs and in what direction they tended. Twelfth, we still have not mentioned the two supreme criteria by which the truth of a theological understanding has to be judged. One has to do with human nature, the other with the divine source of revelation. When we speak of human nature, we must not overlook the wound of original sin. Because of it human beings, immersed in sensible things, more or less create for

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genus fere creat. Quae in scholis exponuntur quaestiones et solutiones, 30 ultra horizontem vulnerati hominis versantur; et ideo ei videntur a realitate, a vita seria, ab utilitate longius aberrare; quod vult, quo indiget, prorsus aliud esse autumat ac ea quae audit et recitare fere cogitur. Cuius problema existentiale est ut scilicet e sensibilibus emergat, ut ‘reale’ non solum dicat sed etiam consentiat et quasi sentiat non ‘datis’ sed ‘veris’ innotescere. Quod si hoc existentiale problema ad campum obiectivum transfertur, si supponitur non de subiecti conversione intellectuali agi sed de ipsa re theologica, incipitur gravissima quaedam deviatio quae facillime innumeros fere asseclas invenit.

Circa vero divinum revelationis fontem, constat sensum alicuius veri ab eius mensurari intelligentia ex quo verum illud procedat. Quare, cum verum revelatum ex ipsa divina intelligentia procedat, a sola divina intelligentia mensuratur. Praeterea, cum his in terris nulli alteri nisi ecclesiae tradiderit Deus suam revelationem fideliter custodiendam et infallibiliter declarandam, manifestum est theologum non suae sapientiae confidere posse sed semper agnoscere debere ex solo ecclesiae magisterio determinari sensum tum ipsius veri revelati tum sacrorum dogmatum (db 1788, 1800, 1818). Quod si theologus, uti ipsa rei natura postulat, prompte et libenter sapientiam suam ecclesiae magisterio postponit, remedium simul invenit contra illum morbum, illud peccati vulnus, quod nuperrime indicavimus. Sectio Quinta: De Duplici Motu in Finem Finem diximus, actum quo finis attingitur, quaestionem quae finem anticipat, iudicium denique quo adeptio finis agnoscitur. Remanet ergo ut motum consideremus quo in finem procedatur; et cum duos distinxerimus fines, alium certitudinis, alium intelligentiae, duos pariter motus distinguamus necesse est; quorum alium nominamus dogmaticum, alium systematicum. Quemadmodum vero hi duo motus inter se comparentur, ex ipsa notione scientiae elucet. Scientia enim est certa rerum per causas cognitio; sed antequam res per causas cognoscantur, ipsae causae sunt inveniendae; et quamdiu causae nondum sunt inventae, communi quadam atque praescientifica cognitione utimur,

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themselves their own special kind of problems. The questions and the solutions that theology presents30 are generally outside the horizon of wounded human beings, to whom such things seem to wander far from reality, from serious living, and from any kind of usefulness. What people want and need, they say, is completely different from what they are taught and almost feel compelled to parrot. The existential problem is this: people have to emerge from the sensible, so as not only to say but also to agree and, as it were, to feel that the real becomes known not in the ‘given’ but in the ‘true.’ But if this existential problem is transferred to the objective level, if it is presupposed that the issue is not the intellectual conversion of the subject but theology itself, a very serious deviation, easily finding large numbers of adherents, has begun. As for the divine source of revelation, it is clear that the meaning of any truth has to be measured by the understanding of the one from whom the truth proceeds. A revealed truth proceeds from divine understanding and therefore it is measured only by divine understanding. Moreover, since here on earth God has entrusted divine revelation to none other than the church to guard it faithfully and declare it infallibly, it is clear that theologians cannot rely ultimately on their own wisdom but ought always to acknowledge that the church’s teaching alone is determinative of the meaning of revealed truth and of sacred dogmas (db 1788, 1800, 1818; ds 3007, 3020, 3043; nd 217, 136, 139). Theologians who, as the very nature of the material demands, promptly and gladly submit their own wisdom to that of the church will find in so doing a remedy for the disease, the wound of sin discussed in the preceding point. 5 The Twofold Movement toward the Goal We have discussed the goal, the act in which the goal is reached, the question that anticipates the goal, and finally the judgment in which it is acknowledged that the goal has been attained. We still have to consider the movement toward the goal, and since we have distinguished two goals, namely, certitude and understanding, we have to distinguish as well two movements. We call one dogmatic, the other systematic. How these two movements are related to each other can be clarified from the very notion of science. Science is the certain knowledge of things through their causes; but before things are known through their causes, the causes have to be discovered; and as long as the causes have not yet been discovered we rely on 30 [Literally, ‘that are set forth in the schools.’]

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qua res quidem apprehendimus et describimus quamvis causas earum adhuc ignoremus. Primus ergo motus quo ad scientiam acquirendam proceditur, ex communi quadam et praescientifica rerum descriptione incipit et ad causas cognitas terminatur: qui primus motus dicitur (1) analysis, quia ex confuse apprehensis ad causas seu rationes bene definitas procedit, et (2) via resolutionis, quia ipsas res ad causas earum reducit, et (3) via inventionis, quia causae antea ignoratae inveniuntur, et (4) via certitudinis, quia nobis manifestissima est communis et praescientifica rerum cognitio, et ideo argumenta nobis maxime certa ex hac cognitione incipiunt ut remotiora nobisque obscuriora demonstrent, et (5) via temporalis, quia causae non statim inveniri solent neque a quolibet investigante neque tandem sine fortuna. 31

Alter autem motus ex inventis incipit causis et ad res in causis intellectas terminatur: qui quidem motus dicitur et (1) synthesis, quia rationes fundamentales 32 adhibentur tum ad res definiendas tum ad proprietates earum deducendas, et (2) via compositionis, quia causae adhibentur ad res producendas vel constituendas, et (3) via doctrinae seu disciplinae, quia ex conceptibus fundamentalibus et maxime simplicibus incipit, ut aliis pedetentim adiunctis ad intelligentiam totius scientiae ordinate procedat, et (4) via probabilitatis, tum quia saepe haec via nisi probabilitatem non attingit, tum quia communi hominum aestimatione non certo discernitur ubinam ad certitudinem quandoque perventum sit, et (5) via simultaneitatis logicae, quia clare positis principiis caetera omnia non longioribus temporum intervallis sed brevissimis deductionibus atque applicationibus peraguntur. Quorum exempla qui quaerit, inter se comparet et historiam scientiae physicae vel chemicae et manuale quoddam quo talis doceatur scientia. Ex historia enim constabit has scientias ex sensibilibus quam maxime manifestis probationes efficere. Et tamen ubi libros adiveris manuales, aliud non invenies initium nisi tabulam elementorum periodicam unde ter centena millia compositorum derivantur vel, apud physicos, leges Newtonianas, geometriam quandam Riemannianam,

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the ordinary prescientific knowledge by which we apprehend things and describe them even before knowing their causes. So the first movement toward acquiring science begins from an ordinary prescientific description of things and ends in the knowledge of their causes. This first movement has been called: (1) analysis, because it starts from what is apprehended in a confused sort of way and moves to well-defined causes or reasons, (2) the way of resolution, because it resolves things into their causes, (3) the way of discovery, because previously unknown causes are discovered, (4) the way of certitude, because the ordinary prescientific knowledge of things is most obvious to us, and so the arguments we find most certain begin from such knowledge and go on to demonstrate matters that are more remote and more obscure to us, and (5) the temporal way, because causes are not usually discovered instantaneously, any more than they are discovered by just anyone or without a certain amount of good luck. 31 The other movement starts from the causes that have been discovered and ends by understanding things in their causes. This movement is called: (1) synthesis, because fundamental reasons32 are employed both to define things and to deduce their properties, (2) the way of composition, because causes are employed to produce things or to constitute them, (3) the way of teaching or of learning, because it begins with concepts that are fundamental and especially simple, so that by adding a step at a time it may proceed in an orderly way to the understanding of an entire science, (4) the way of probability, partly because it often attains no more than probability, but also because people frequently have no clear discernment of just where or when they have reached certitude, and (5) the way of logical simultaneity, because, once the principles have been clearly laid down, all the rest takes comparatively little time; it can be accomplished in a few short deductions and applications. For examples of the two ways, compare the history of a science like physics or chemistry with the textbooks from which these sciences are taught. History reveals that these sciences worked out their various demonstrations starting from the most obvious sensible data. But when one goes to a textbook, one finds at the beginning of the book, in chemistry, only the periodic table of elements from which three hundred thousand compounds are derived, or, in physics, Newton’s 31 [‘Luck’ was a theme for Lonergan, frequently mentioned both in passing remarks and in more serious comments. It sounds colloquial, but it is probably what he means here by ‘fortuna.’] 32 [In (1) under the first movement, Lonergan had spoken of ‘well-defined causes or reasons.’ Here we have only ‘reasons,’ but that is not to exclude causes. With regard to God, of course, there are no causes, only reasons, but here ‘reasons’ can be taken to include anything that is arrived at when the analysis conducted in the first movement terminates successfully.]

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mirosve ‘quantorum’ operatores. Qui enim inquirit vel investigat vel probat, ex manifestis incipit; qui autem docet, ex iis incipit conceptibus quorum intelligentia intelligentiam aliorum non praesupponit. Quibus perspectis, cum theologia analogice scientia quaedam sit, neque pars theologiae dogmatica a via analytica prorsus differt, neque pars theologiae systematica a via synthetica. Sicut enim in ordine naturali incipitur a communi quadam atque praescientifica cognitione, ita etiam in theologia incipitur ab iis quae Deus sub adiunctis particularibus et historicis revelavit. Sicut in ordine naturali ad causas inveniendas proceditur, ita in theologia idem verum eodem sensu catholice declaratur quod olim biblice33 revelatum est. Sicut inventis in ordine naturali causis ad rerum per causas cognitionem terminatur, ita in theologia mysteria divina, postquam catholice sunt declarata vel etiam definita, imperfecte quidem et obscure sed tamen fructuosissime intelligi possunt. Quae cum ita sint, secundum similitudinem quandam ad viam analyticam concipi potest via dogmatica. Haec enim est via certitudinis quae idem verum eodem sensu declarat ac revelavit Deus. Haec etiam via inventionis est quae eam invenit declarationem quae exigentiis ecclesiae et universalis et his in terris perpetuae consulat. Haec tertio est via analytica quae ex particularitate historica atque hebraica ad rationes communiter notas beneque definitas transit. Haec quarto est via resolutionis quae in multiplicitate revelatorum ipsa divina mysteria discernit atque exprimit. Haec denique est via temporalis cum nisi temporum decursu non attingitur catholica mysteriorum declaratio. Pariter, proinde, secundum similitudinem quandam ad viam syntheticam concipi potest pars theologiae systematica. Haec enim est via qua docent magistri discipulique addiscunt, si quidem illud vere addiscitur quod intelligitur, neque aliter ad intelligentiam pervenitur nisi ab eo incipitur cuius intelligentia intelligentiam aliorum non praesupponat. Haec praeterea est via synthetica quae ex uno alterove principio caetera ordinate exponit. Haec tertio est via compositionis quae totum quoddam divinum mysterium ex successione aspectuum rationumque multiplicitate componit. Haec quarto est via probabilitatis cum non certa ex revelatis deducat sed ipsa revelata ex priori quodam supposito atque hypothetico derivet. Haec denique est via simultaneitatis logicae, nam cum sapiens quaestionum ordinem invenerit et intelligens principium perspexerit, sequuntur sponte quadam

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laws, Riemannian geometry, or those remarkable quantum operators. The reason for this difference is, of course, that inquiring, investigating, and demonstrating begin with what is obvious, while teaching begins from those concepts that can be understood without understanding other elements. Now since theology is analogously a science, its dogmatic part is not completely different from the way of analysis, nor is its systematic part completely different from the way of synthesis. Just as in the natural order we begin from ordinary prescientific knowledge, so also in theology we begin from what God has revealed in particular historical circumstances. Just as in the natural order we proceed to the discovery of causes, so theology states universally in the same meaning the same truth that was once biblically33 revealed. Just as in the natural order the discovery of causes leads to the knowledge of things through the causes, so in theology once the divine mysteries have been declared or defined universally, they can be imperfectly and obscurely but still most fruitfully understood. It follows that the dogmatic way can be conceived as similar to the analytic way. It is a way of certitude in that it expresses the same truth with the same meaning as what was revealed by God. Second, it is a way of discovery in that it finds an expression appropriate to the needs of a universal church that is to endure till the end of time. Third, it is a way of analysis in that it moves from historical Hebraic particularity to generally known and well-defined reasons. Fourth, it is a way of resolution in that it discerns the divine mysteries in the multiplicity of what has been revealed, and gives expression to those mysteries. Finally, it is a temporal way because a universal expression of the mysteries is attained only in the course of time. In like manner and for like reasons the systematic part of theology can be conceived as similar to the way of synthesis. For it is the way in which teachers teach and students learn, at least if it is true that for something truly to be learned it must be understood and that the only way to reach understanding is to start with that whose understanding does not require the understanding of anything else. It is, moreover, a way of synthesis in that, starting from one principle or another, it lays out all the rest in an orderly fashion. Third, it is a way of composition in that it composes the whole of a divine mystery from a series of aspects and a multiplicity of reasons. Fourth, it is a way of probability because, rather than deducing certainties from what has been revealed, it derives what has been revealed from some prior hypothetical supposition. Finally, it is a way of logical simultaneity in that, once in one’s wisdom one discovers the order of the questions, and once in one’s understanding one grasps a principle, then the conclusions and the 33 [‘... catholice ... biblice’: see above, p. 35, note 19.]

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sua conclusiones atque applicationes; etsi enim haec consecutio a rigore logico deficiat, cum ex principio nisi imperfecte et obscure intellecto non procedat, non ideo tamen pedetentim et temporum decursu et fortuna favente ex principio systematico ad conclusiones pervenitur.

Quod si in via dogmatica processum agnovimus analyticum, resolutionis, inventionis, certitudinis, temporalem, si in via systematica pariter agnovimus processum syntheticum, compositionis, doctrinae et disciplinae, probabilitatis, et simultaneitatis logicae, minime tamen praetermittendum est haec nomina analogice adhiberi. Aliter enim in physica, aliter in chemica scientia intelliguntur analysis et synthesis. Aliter in scientiis naturalibus, aliter in scientiis humanis, aliter denique in theologicis disciplinis. Non enim eodem modo rerum materialium intelligitur natura ac verba Platonis; et Platonem ita intelligimus ut ipsi deinde iudicemus utrum Plato verum senserit; sed verbum Dei prius verum esse credimus quam quid doceatur investigemus. Suo ergo modo via dogmatica est analytica, resolutionis, inventionis, certitudinis, et temporalis; et suo pariter modo via systematica est synthetica, compositionis, doctrinae seu disciplinae, probabilitatis, atque simultaneitatis logicae.

Quam arcte vero duae hae viae inter se connectantur, eo magis attendendum est cum numquam deesse videantur quorum dimidiata sapientia partem pro toto sumere sibi aliisque tradere velit. Unum ergo et totum faciunt analysis et synthesis, resolutio et compositio, inventio et doctrina, certitudo et certorum intelligentia, diuturna investigatio et breve fructuum compendium. Quod si altera pars ita eligitur ut altera negligatur, non solum amittitur totum sed et ipsa pars electa corrumpitur. Qui enim partem dogmaticam negligit ut systematicam profundius colat, id ipsum negligit cuius intelligentiam quaerit; unde et mox oriuntur pseudo-problemata et pullulant pseudo-systemata quae subtilissime de omnibus ita disputent ut tamen mysteriorum intelligentiam praetermittant. Qui autem partem systematicam negligit ut fidelius et exactius dogmaticam retineat, unam eamque divinam revelationem ita in multa et distincta mysteria resolvit ut tamen in unitatem ex hac multiplicitate regredi non possit; quae pro omnium captu revelavit Deus, earum technicam expressionem decursu temporum ita invenit ut tamen non capiat quemadmodum haec technica docenda sint atque addiscenda; multa et technica certissime cognoscit, sed certorum intelligentiam praetermittere mavult; tempora praeterita

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applications follow of their own accord. This derivation of conclusions may be deficient in terms of logical rigor, since it proceeds from a principle that is only imperfectly and obscurely understood; but that does not mean that the process of arriving at conclusions from a systematic principle is the kind of thing that proceeds one step at a time over a long stretch of years, with a certain amount of luck. While we have acknowledged in the dogmatic way something of the process of analysis, of resolution, of discovery, of certitude, and of a temporal way, and in the systematic way something of the process of synthesis, of composition, of teaching and learning, of probability, and of logical simultaneity, we cannot ignore the fact that these terms are used analogously. Analysis and synthesis are understood in one way in physics and in another way in chemistry; they are understood in one way in the natural sciences, in another way in the human sciences, and in another way in theological disciplines. The way we understand the nature of material things is different from the way we understand the words of Plato; and when we understand Plato, we next judge whether what Plato held is true. But we believe that the word of God is true even before we investigate what it teaches. Therefore the dogmatic way has its own mode of being a way of analysis, of resolution, of discovery, of certitude, and a temporal way, and the systematic way has likewise its own mode of being a way of synthesis, of composition, of teaching or learning, of probability, and of logical simultaneity. How intimately these two ways are linked must be particularly stressed because there never seem to be lacking those whose diminished wisdom is ready and eager to take a part for the whole and to pass it on as such to others. Analysis and synthesis, resolution and composition, discovery and teaching, certitude and the understanding of what is certain, lengthy investigation and a brief compendium of results – these constitute a single whole. Those who choose but one part and neglect the other not only lose the whole but also spoil even the part that they have chosen. Those who neglect the dogmatic part in order to cultivate the systematic more profoundly are in fact neglecting what they are seeking to understand. Soon pseudo-problems emerge and pseudo-systems start to sprout, systems that dispute ever so subtly about everything while overlooking the understanding of the mysteries. But those who neglect the systematic part in order to hold faithfully and exactly to the dogmatic so resolve the one divine revelation into many different mysteries that no move can be made back from this multiplicity to unity; from what God has revealed for all to understand, they devise in the course of time a technical expression of that revelation, but they do not grasp how these technical matters are to be taught and learned. They know with certainty many technical matters, but choose to overlook the understanding of what they are

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scrutatur ut de conciliis, de documentis pontificiis, de patribus, de theologis colligat atque cumulet et technica et certissima, quorum tamen omnium sapienter ordinatum atque intellectum compendium excludit. Quibus peractis, stupens miratur homines pios theologiam dogmaticam spernere et ad biblicismum quendam, eumque parum tutum, confugere.

Sectio Sexta: Comparantur Via Dogmatica et Via Systematica Et distinctas et inter se connexas diximus viam dogmaticam viamque systematicam. Quemadmodum vero altera ad alteram comparetur, magis particulariter dicendum est; neve desint exempla concreta, a summis et brevissimis lineamentis theologiae trinitariae incipimus. In via ergo dogmatica (quam analyticam, resolutionis, inventionis, certitudinis, temporalem diximus), primae sunt missiones Filii atque sancti Spiritus quas narrat Novum Testamentum, secundum est dogma trinitarium ut simul affirmentur tum contra Sabellianos tres realiter distincti tum contra Subordinationistas unus solus Deus (db 48–51), tertia est trium consubstantialitas (db 54, 86), quartae sunt proprietates personales reales (Cappadoces), quinto perspicitur has proprietates esse relativas et has relationes esse originis, sexto harum originum intelligentia quaeritur et maxime invocatur analogia psychologica.

In via autem systematica (quam etiam syntheticam, compositionis, doctrinae, disciplinae, probabilitatis, et simultaneitatis logicae diximus), primo consideratur unus Deus,34 secundo, in Deo uno intelligente, sciente, diligente ponuntur emanationes intelligibiles,35 tertio, in emanationibus fundantur relationes,36 quarto, praecognitis emanationibus et relationibus, 37 considerantur personae in

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certain of. They rummage through the past collecting and accumulating technically established information concerning the councils, papal documents, the Fathers, the theologians, but they avoid the task of assembling a wisely ordered, intelligible compendium of all these matters. And after all this, they stand amazed that devout people reject dogmatic theology and take refuge in some form of biblicism that is itself hardly secure. 6 Comparison of the Dogmatic Way and the Systematic Way We have stated that the dogmatic way and the systematic way are distinct yet connected. Now we will state in greater detail how they are compared to each other. And for concrete examples, we will draw on the brief basic outlines of trinitarian theology. Thus, in the dogmatic way (which we have said is a way of analysis, of resolution, of discovery, of certitude, and a temporal way), there are first the missions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit narrated in the New Testament. Second, there is the trinitarian dogma, which affirms, simultaneously, against the Sabellians three who are really distinct and against the subordinationists one sole God (db 48–51, ds 112–15, nd 301–303). Third, there is the consubstantiality of the three (db 54, 86; ds 125, 150; nd 7, 305). Fourth, there are the real personal properties, which were worked out by the Cappadocians. Fifth, there is the recognition that these properties are relative and that the relations are relations of origin. Sixth, an understanding of these relations of origin is sought, and in particular an appeal is made to a psychological analogy. In the systematic way (which we have said is a way of synthesis, of composition, of teaching, of learning, of probability, and of logical simultaneity), the first consideration is of the one God.34 Second, in the one God, who understands, knows, and loves, there are posited intellectual emanations. 35 Third, on the emanations are based the relations.36 Fourth, supposing the emanations and the relations, 37 the per34 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, qq. 2–26. 35 Ibid. q. 27. [Lonergan, following St Thomas here, writes emanationes intelligibiles, where the adjective means ‘intellectual,’ ‘pertaining to the intellect’ as opposed to the senses, a meaning that ‘intelligible’ does not have in English. On p. 137 below, he notes the ambiguity and in three places writes intellectualis seu intelligibilis, ‘intellectual or intelligible.’ See also p. 185 below. Unless the context suggests otherwise, as it occasionally does (see, for example, appendix 2b, § 25, p. 763), we have translated emanatio intelligibilis as ‘intellectual emanation.’] 36 Ibid. q. 28. 37 Ibid. q. 29, Introduction.

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communi,38 quinto, considerantur personae singillatim,39 sexto, comparantur personae ad ea quae ante personas considerata sunt, nempe, ad divinam essentiam, 40 ad relationes seu proprietates,41 ad actus notionales seu emanationes,42 septimo, comparantur personae et inter se43 et ad nos.44 His ergo positis, ad comparationem proceditur. Et in primis elucet eadem realiter considerari tum in via dogmatica tum in via systematica. Non enim aliae sunt missiones Filii et Spiritus quae in Novo Testamento narrantur et aliae quas exponit S. Thomas in q. 43 primae partis. Neque alia est generatio divina de qua egit S. Athanasius et alia realiter est illa generatio de qua tum ante personas systematice conceptas (q. 27) tum iterum post (q. 41) egit S. Thomas. Et idem omnino de caeteris dicendum est, cum motus syntheticus nihil sit aliud quam ordinata expositio eorum quae in via analytica sunt inventa atque demonstrata. Deinde, quamvis de iisdem in utroque motu agatur, tamen alio et alio ordine ponuntur. Quod enim in alio motu prius invenitur, in alio posterius consideratur. Ita ad missiones terminat Aquinas, et ex missionibus incipit Novum Testamentum. Iterum, ad analogiam psychologicam terminat inquisitio patristica, ex qua tamen incipit Aquinas. Cuius inversionis ratio omnino universalis est. Qui enim inquirit vel dubitationes amovet, ex maxime manifestis incipit ut ad remotiora et obscuriora concludat. Qui autem docet, ex iis notionibus incipit quarum intelligentia intelligentiam aliarum non praesupponat ut, paulatim crescente complexitate, ad concretum intelligendum perveniat. Tertio, quamvis de iisdem in utroque motu agatur, ipsa tamen realiter eadem non eodem modo concipiuntur. Qui enim conceptus missionis in Summa de theologia exponitur, nempe, habitudo missi tum ad mittentem tum ad terminum, haud explicite in mentem venit primaevis christianis cum S. Pauli epistolas legerent. Neque Symbolum ‘Quicumque’ cum tres esse personas doceat, tres relationes subsistentes dicit. Neque huius differentiae deest ratio universalis, cum in via synthetica includitur totum elementum explicativum ad quod via analytica

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sons are considered all together.38 Fifth, the persons are considered individually.39 Sixth, the persons are related to each of the items considered before the persons were discussed: namely, to the divine essence,40 to the relations or properties,41 and to the notional acts or emanations.42 Seventh, the persons are related to one another43 and to us.44 That said, let us proceed to the comparison. In the first place, it is clear that the dogmatic and the systematic ways are concerned with the same realities. The missions of the Son and of the Spirit narrated in the New Testament are identical with the missions discussed by St Thomas in question 43 of the Prima pars of the Summa. The divine generation that St Athanasius wrote about is the same generation that St Thomas spoke of both in question 27, before he had presented his systematic conception of the persons, and in question 41, after he had completed that presentation. This kind of identity will be found all across the board, since the synthetic movement is simply an orderly exposition of what was discovered and demonstrated in the analytic process. Second, although each movement treats the same realities, still each posits the realities in a different order. What is prior in one is subsequent in the other. Thus, Aquinas ends with the missions, while the New Testament starts with them. Again, the patristic inquiry ends with the psychological analogy, while Aquinas starts with it. The reason for this inversion is completely universal: anyone who inquires or removes doubts starts from what is most obvious in order to conclude to what is more remote and more obscure; but anyone who is teaching starts with those notions that can be understood without presupposing the understanding of other notions, so that, by gradually increasing the complexity, one might arrive at an understanding of the concrete. Third, although the same realities are treated in each movement, they are conceived differently in each. The concept of a divine mission that is put forward in a Summa of theology, namely, the relation of the one sent both to the sender and to the term, is hardly what came explicitly to the mind of the first Christians as they read the letters of St Paul. Again, the Creed Quicumque teaches that there are three persons, but it does not mention three subsisting relations. There is also a universal reason for this difference: included in the way of synthesis is the entire 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

Ibid. qq. 29–32. Ibid. qq. 33–38. Ibid. q. 39. Ibid. q. 40. Ibid. q. 41; see q. 27. Ibid. q. 42. Ibid. q. 43.

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pedetentim procedit; qua de causa, solent libri manuales distinguere inter ipsum factum, quod ex auctoritatibus demonstrant, et intelligentiam facti, de qua saepius theologos disputantes exhibent. Quarto, haec formalis conceptuum differentia eo magis augetur quo priora in via dogmatica et posteriora in via systematica comparantur. Nam quo posterius in via systematica unumquodque ponitur, eo magis totam praeviam atque accumulatam intelligentiam praesupponit atque includit. Quo autem prius in via dogmatica unumquodque ponitur, eo magis simplicem facti narrationem exponit et omnem disputabilem intelligentiam evitat. Quinto, eadem formalis conceptuum differentia eo magis minuitur quo posteriora in via dogmatica et priora in via systematica comparantur. Nam ipsa via dogmatica in intelligentiam assequendam pergit et assecutam retinet atque cumulat; neque totam hanc intelligentiam statim in ipsis initiis exponit via systematica. Qua de causa, non tam magna est distinctio inter analogiam psychologicam ad quam concludit via dogmatica et eandem analogiam ex qua incipit via systematica.

Sexto, utriusque viae differunt probationes, tum quia diversi sunt conceptus formales, tum quia diversi intenduntur fines. Ita via dogmatica demonstrat relationes certo in Deo existere, tum ex nominibus Patris et Filii, tum ex necessitate distinctionis per sola relativa, tum ex actibus notionalibus; sed eadem via ignorat relationes prout personis quodammodo praecognoscuntur;45 et nisi post factum stabilitum quod sunt relationes, de earum fundamento cogitare non incipit. E contra, via systematica ex fundamento processionum ad relationes ponendas procedit; et cum personas nondum systematice conceperit, nisi per quandam anticipationem satis inconvenientem argumenta sumere potest ex personarum nominibus, proprietatibus, et actibus notionalibus. Quae differentia prorsus universalis est: omnis enim argumentatio ex prioribus procedit et ad posteriora praeparat; sed quae viae systematicae sunt priora, viae dogmaticae sunt posteriora; quae autem viae systematicae posteriora sunt, eadem viae dogmaticae sunt priora. Qua de causa, qui motu quodam commixto procedit ut simul via dogmatica et via systematica utatur, totum fere tractatum in singulis thesibus percurrere debet.

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explanatory element toward which the way of analysis proceeds one step at a time. This is behind the common distinction in the manuals between ‘the fact,’ which they prove from authorities, and ‘the understanding of the fact,’ in regard to which more often than not they show theologians arguing with one another. Fourth, this formal difference of concepts increases as we compare the elements that are prior in the dogmatic way with the elements that are subsequent in the systematic. The later an element is posited in the systematic movement, the more it presupposes and includes the whole previous cumulative understanding. But the earlier an element is posited in the dogmatic movement, the more it expresses a simple narration of fact and the more it avoids any controversial understanding. Fifth, the same formal difference of concepts diminishes as we compare the elements that are subsequent in the dogmatic way with the elements that are prior in the systematic. For the dogmatic way moves toward the attainment of understanding, and once it has attained understanding it holds onto it and adds it to previous achievements; and the systematic way does not immediately express all of this understanding at the very beginning. Thus, there is no great difference between the psychological analogy at which the dogmatic way concludes and the same psychological analogy from which the systematic way begins. Sixth, the proofs of the two ways differ, partly because of the formally different concepts, but also because of the different goals intended. The dogmatic way proves that relations certainly exist in God, arguing from the names of ‘Father’ and ‘Son,’ from the necessity that any distinctions in God be purely relative, and from the notional acts. But the dogmatic way is not aware of the relations insofar as they are somehow known prior to the persons;45 nor does it begin to think about the basis of the relations until it has established the fact that relations do exist. The systematic way, in contrast, proceeds from the foundation of the processions to posit the relations, and since it has not yet formed a systematic conception of the persons, it is only by an inappropriate anticipation that it would argue from the names, properties, and notional acts of the persons. The difference is completely universal: every argument proceeds from something prior and moves to something subsequent; but what are prior in the systematic way are subsequent in the dogmatic; and what are subsequent in the systematic way are prior in the dogmatic. Thus, anyone who tries to use a blend of the two at the same time will be compelled to run through practically the entire treatise in every individual thesis. 45 Ibid. q. 29, Introduction; see q. 27, Introduction; also Bernard Lonergan, ‘Theology and Understanding,’ Gregorianum 35 (1954) 637 [now in Collection at 121–22].

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Septimo, notae seu censurae theologicae ad viam dogmaticam proprie pertinent.46 Via enim dogmatica eadem est ac via certitudinis, quae ex maxime manifestis incipit et ad remotiora obscurioraque demonstranda procedit. Notae autem seu censurae theologicae nihil aliud dicunt quam gradum certitudinis vel probabilitatis qui singulis assertis competit. Quapropter, quasi in propria domo, in via dogmatica ponuntur notae theologicae. Quod si quis illud quaereret quod ad viam systematicam ita se haberet, sicut ad viam dogmaticam se habent notae seu censurae theologicae, forte ad conditiones intelligendi inveniendas duceretur. Non enim omnia in via systematica pari necessitate sunt intelligenda; sed alia eiusmodi sunt ut, nisi intelligantur, nihil in toto tractatu intelligi possit; aliarum autem negligentia nisi partem intelligentiae non aufert; alia denique ponuntur quo facilius alia intelligantur, vel clarius cum aliis quaestionibus connectantur, vel promptius ad applicationes producantur.

Quae tamen distinctiones, cum ad artem paedagogicam pertineant, iam pridem a bonis magistris adhibentur. At earum mentio forte illud illustrat, nempe, quam inconvenienter in via systematica ad notas theologicas multum attenditur. Viae enim systematicae finis proprius non certitudo sed certorum intelligentia est; neque tantum apud omnes est intelligendi desiderium ut proprius hic finis facile hominum mentes ab aliis considerationibus revocet. Viae autem systematicae valor eiusmodi est ut initio non perspiciatur, neque in ipso fine adepto plene aestimari possit, nisi accedant comparationes concretae, ut eluceat quantum inter se distent mens quidem certissima sed scientiae vacua et mens cuius certitudines informat, ordinat, dirigit synthetica quaedam omnium apprehensio. Viae denique systematicae securitas atque soliditas non criteriis ordinariis mensurantur; qui certitudinem quaerit, quam plurimos afferre solet testes communis fidei communisque doctrinae; qui autem intelligentiam quaerit, multitudinem tutius negligat et quam sapientissimum audiat; qua de causa, sancta mater ecclesia nobis studiorum ducem proponit non omnes pariter theologos, neque magis communes sententias, sed unicum S. Thomam. Octavo, aliter in via dogmatica, aliter autem in via systematica ad adversariorum sententias attendendum est. Qui enim adversarios refutat, ad ipsam eorum

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Seventh, theological notes or censures belong properly to the dogmatic way. 46 The dogmatic way is the same as the way of certitude, beginning from what is most obvious and moving to a demonstration of what is more remote and obscure. Theological notes or censures are intended to characterize the degree of certitude or probability proper to individual propositions. Such characterizations belong in dogmatic theology as in their proper home. Is there anything in the systematic way that corresponds to the role of theological notes or censures in the dogmatic? Let me suggest that an answer lies in discovering the conditions of understanding. In the systematic way the understanding of some points is more necessary than the understanding of others: some points are such that, unless they are understood, nothing else in the entire treatise can be understood; neglecting to understand other points may deprive us only of part of the understanding of the entire treatise; and finally, some points are included just so that others may be more easily understood or that the connections with other questions may be clearer or that we may proceed more promptly to the applications. These distinctions belong to the general art of pedagogy and have long been employed by good teachers. But mentioning them here perhaps illustrates how inappropriate it is to pay much attention in systematic theology to theological notes. The proper goal of the systematic way is not certitude but understanding those things that are certain. And not in everyone is the desire to understand so strong that this proper goal draws their minds away from other considerations. The value of the systematic way is not perceived at the beginning, nor can it be fully appreciated even when the goal is attained unless concrete comparisons are made to show the vast gulf that separates a mind full of certitudes but empty of anything scientific from a mind in which the synthetic grasp of all the issues gives form, order, and direction to its certitudes. Finally, the security and solidity of the systematic way cannot be measured by ordinary criteria. One who aims at certitude will appeal to as many witnesses of the common faith and the common teaching as possible, but one who aims at understanding can safely ignore the multitude and attend to the most wise. Thus, holy mother church proposes as guide for our studies neither all theologians equally nor even the majority opinion of theologians, but only St Thomas. Eighth, the opinions of one’s opponents play a different role in the dogmatic way from their role in the systematic. To refute adversaries, obviously one must 46 [On theological notes, see the entry ‘Theological Notes’ by William Henn, in The New Dictionary of Theology, ed. Joseph A. Komonchak, Mary Collins, and Dermot A. Lane (Wilmington, de: Michael Glazier, 1987) 1009–11.]

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doctrinam secundum proprium eorum sensum attendat necesse est; secus fictos hostes facilius vincere reputaretur. Et ideo in via dogmatica, ubi amoventur dubitationes omnes et plena quaeritur certitudo, adversariorum sententiae amplitudine quadam historica sunt exponendae. Qui autem ipsos errores exstirpare intendit ne alii decipiantur, radicem quaerat unde error speciem veritatis sibi assumat, ibique securim applicet; neque quicquam refert utrum hic illeve adversarius umquam ad illam radicem explicite vel animadverterit, cum de intima huius illiusve mente minime agatur sed de mentibus vel nunc existentibus vel futuris. Et ideo in via systematica non tam ad adversarios quam ad radices errorum attendere debemus.47 Duas ergo distinximus vias, aliam dogmaticam, aliam systematicam. Quae quidem, quamvis de iisdem rebus tractent, tamen ordinibus contrariis et oppositis procedunt, conceptibus formaliter distinctis utuntur, diversas probationes adhibent, aliter et aliter ad notas seu censuras theologicas se habent, et diversimode adversarios erroresque considerant. Cur? Quia ‘quilibet actus exsequendus est secundum quod convenit ad suum finem. Disputatio autem ad duplicem finem potest ordinari.’48 Quamvis enim idem sit ens quod et essentiam et esse habeat, quamvis eadem sit propositio qua exprimatur sive intelligibile (quod est verum) sive verum (quod est intelligibile), quamvis sine reduplicatione non distinguatur inter verum intelligibile qua verum et verum intelligibile qua intelligibile, tamen alia est intellectus operatio qua attingitur verum intelligibile qua verum, et alia realiter est operatio qua attingitur verum intelligibile qua intelligibile. Quod si alia et alia sint operationes, etiam alia et alia sunt methodi quibus ad operationes proceditur. Si enim certitudinem quaeris, ex maxime manifestis incipis et pedetentim ad obscuriora demonstranda pervenis; si intelligentiam quaeris, ex iis incipis quorum intelligentia intelligentiam aliorum non praesupponit; si autem confusionem mavis, exige intelligentiam ubi de certitudine agitur, et certitudinem quando intelligentia quaeritur.

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attend to their teaching in the sense in which they intend it; otherwise one earns the reputation of easily defeating straw men. And so in the dogmatic way, where all doubts are to be removed and where perfect certitude is sought, the opinions of one’s opponents have to be set forth in their full historical background. But to eradicate those errors and keep others from being deceived by them, one must seek the root whence the error is able to assume the semblance of truth, and there lay the axe. It makes no difference whether this or that individual historical adversary ever paid explicit attention to any of those roots, since here one is concerned not with the inmost mind of one or other historical figure but with the minds of people in the present and in the future. Consequently in the systematic way we should pay attention not so much to adversaries as to the roots of errors. 47 We have distinguished two ways, the dogmatic and the systematic. While they investigate the same realities, they proceed in contrary and opposed orders, they use formally distinct concepts, they employ different methods of proof, they have different relations to theological notes and censures, and they consider opponents and errors in different ways. Why all this? Because ‘every act should be performed in a way adapted to its end. Now an argument can be directed to either of two ends.’48 Although it is the one same being that has essence and the act of existence, although it is the same proposition by which there is expressed the intelligible (which is true) and the true (which is intelligible), and although we cannot without reduplication distinguish between intelligible truth as true and intelligible truth as intelligible, nevertheless there is one operation of the mind that attains intelligible truth as true, and a really distinct operation that attains intelligible truth as intelligible. But if the operations are different, so are the methods by which one proceeds to the operations. It follows that if you seek certitude, you begin from those items that are most manifest and gradually arrive at a demonstration of those that are more obscure; but if you seek understanding, you start from those items which you can understand without presupposing the understanding of others; if, however, what you prefer is confusion, then you demand understanding where certitude is the issue, and certitude where what matters most is understanding. 47 [In the introduction to the dogmatic part of this treatise on the Trinity, written later than this systematic part, Lonergan distinguishes ‘dogmatic’ from ‘positive,’ and assigns to the positive theologian this concern for the accurate representation of the minds of individual figures of history. In the dogmatic part, then, Lonergan treats historical figures and movements in the way he here describes as ‘systematic.’ He uses a review of history to perform the ‘dialectic’ function of going to the roots of error, without a profound concern ‘whether this or that individual historical adversary ever paid explicit attention to any of those roots.’] 48 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones quodlibetales, 4, q. 9, a. 3. See above, p. 9.

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Neminem sane arbitror confusionem velle. At haud semper clare distincteque perspicitur quanta sit confusio, ubi insufficienter inter viam dogmaticam viamque systematicam distinguatur. Ubi enim diversi sunt fines, diversa obiecta formalia, diversae operationes quibus fines diversi attinguntur, diversi ordines quibus in fines proceditur, diversi conceptus formales qui adhibentur, diversae probationes, diversae errorum considerationes, haud convenit ita opera theologica iudicare ac si unicus sit finis, unum formale obiectum, una operationum species, unus ordo quaestionum, una conceptuum formalium classis, unus probandi modus, una errorum consideratio. Quod si parum convenire videtur etiam si de solis viis dogmatica et systematica agatur, multo minus convenit ubi rei historicae consideratio accedit. Ad quam statim transeundum est.

Sectio Septima: Motus Historici Additur Consideratio Post vias dogmaticam atque systematicam inter se comparatas, iam addi oportet prioris et historici motus considerationem.49 Non enim unico quodam intuitu, angelorum more, ad eam fidei intelligentiam perventum est quae nunc inter catholicos communiter possidetur, sed saeculorum decursu ratio per fidem illustrata sedulo, pie, sobrie ita inquisivit, ut pedetentim seu modo humano vetera novis augeret et perficeret. Quod si ipsum hunc motum qualis fuerit perspicere volumus, duo consideranda videntur. Primo, enim, ii conceptus sunt formandi quibus clare et distincte apprehendi potest ipsius rei historicae ratio tum in genere tum in iis quae fidem catholicam propius respiciant. Deinde, post conceptus hac in sectione septima propositos, in sectione octava intelligentiam quandam quaeremus huius motus theologici, quocum intime connectitur dogmatum quae dicitur evolutio. Porro, ut a notionibus generalibus ordiamur, eiusmodi fere est distinctio inter naturam et spiritum, inter scientias naturales et scientias proprie humanas, ut ea ipsa quae quoad nos sunt priora, notiora, manifestiora, in naturalibus quidem immota manere videantur, in humanis autem levi quodam at perpetuo fluxu commutari. Colores enim et soni, gravia et levia, calida et frigida, sicca et humida, lenia et aspera, dura et mollia, et alia quaecumque sensibus innotescunt, ex

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I trust no one really wants confusion. But it is not always grasped how much confusion results from not keeping the dogmatic and systematic ways sufficiently distinct. Where the goals are different, where the formal objects are different, where the operations by which the different goals are attained are different, where the orders by which one moves toward the goals are different, where different formal concepts are employed, and different proofs and different ways of considering errors, it makes little sense to judge theological works as if they all had but one goal, one formal object, one kind of operation, one ordering of questions, one type of formal concept, one way of proving, and one way of considering errors. And if it makes little sense when the issue regards simply the dogmatic and systematic ways, it makes even less sense when the consideration of history is added. To that we now turn. 7 A Consideration of the Historical Movement After comparing the dogmatic and systematic ways with each other, we must now turn to a consideration of a prior, historical movement. 49 The understanding of faith that today prevails among Catholics was not arrived at by some single intuition, in the manner of the angels. Rather, over the course of the ages reason illumined by faith has searched diligently, reverently, and judiciously, so as gradually, in a human way, ever to augment and improve the old with the new. If we want to see what this historical movement really was like, two considerations are necessary. First, we need to form those concepts that will help us grasp clearly and distinctly the intelligibility of historical reality both in general and in those matters that touch the Catholic faith more intimately. Second, after proposing those concepts in this seventh section, we will seek in the next section some understanding of this theological movement, a movement which is intimately connected with what has been called the development of dogma. Again, to begin from general notions, the difference between nature and spirit, between the natural sciences and the properly human sciences, is that, for all practical purposes, those realities that are prior for us, better known to us, more obvious to us seem in the natural sciences to remain stable, whereas in the human sciences they undergo slight but continual changes. Colors and sounds, the heavy and the light, the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist, the smooth and the rough, the hard and the soft, and everything else that becomes known to the 49 [In Divinarum personarum (28) this reads ‘of a third, historical movement’ (tertii et historici motus). See below, appendix 4, § 1, esp. pp. 755–61, for the background that explains this difference.]

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immutata corporis nostri specie immutabilitatem quandam participant; et ideo in naturalibus scientiis univoca invenitur categoria quae priora quoad nos annuntiat. At alia est lex naturae, alia spiritus. Linguae enim et mores, structurae domesticae, oeconomicae, politicae, artes mechanicae et liberales, religiones et scientiae, non solum maxima quadam diversitate multiplicantur sed etiam mira quadam vel fecunditate vel inquietudine perpetuo augentur, florescunt, dilabuntur. Iam vero, illud singulis hominibus est prius, notius, manifestius, quod parvuli, pueri, adolescentes, iuvenes videbant, audiebant, faciebant. Quapropter, ex ipsa rerum humanarum varietate atque inconstantia maxime redditur aequivoca categoria quae priora quoad nos designat. Non enim unum quoddam fixum atque immutatum est illud nos; sed quot sunt epochae, quot aetates, quot culturae, quot nationes, quot classes sociales, quot fere homines, tot in rebus humanis mirae atque profundae inveniuntur differentiae in iis quae sponte priora, notiora, manifestiora reputantur.

Iam vero ex ipsis his differentiis quae brevi vocabulo culturales nominari possunt, statim oritur problema quoddam fundamentale, nempe, ut principium inveniatur transculturale, quo systematice ex iis quae huic sunt priora ad illa quae alteri priora sunt transiri possit. Et primum quoddam solutionis elementum ex psychologia profunda repetitur. Non enim solis sensibus conveniunt homines sed etiam symbolis illis spontaneis quibus sensibilitas et suam finalitatem spiritui manifestat et vicissim dictamina spiritus ipsa sibi aperit et quodammodo interpretatur. Quae quidem symbola qualia sint, quemadmodum adhiberi possint et debeant, et quonam fructu ad historiam praesertim religionum applicentur, multis et variis scriptis disserunt recentiores. Alterum autem solutionis elementum est lentior atque difficilior ille processus quo eruditi culturam et quasi mentalitatem alterius loci et temporis pedetentim induunt. Sicut enim in aliena natione degere, alienam linguam addiscere, alienas consuetudines sequi, aliena instituta quasi imbibere possumus, ita etiam eruditissimus quisque ex infinitis fere indiciis quae in monumentis atque documentis lateant non solum alienam sed etiam antiquam culturam quasi usu cotidiano suam quodammodo facere potest. Tertium proinde solutionis elementum in eo est ut non solum rerum gestarum narrationes legantur, comparentur, et in unam cohaerentemque recitationem redigantur, sed etiam ea omnia adhibeantur quae aliis scientiis novimus, ut totam alterius temporis vitam sub aspectu mechanico, artistico, oeconomico, politico, sociali, scientifico, philosophico, religioso, quantum fieri possit, intelligamus.

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senses seem to share a kind of immutability with the unchanged character of the human body. As a result, in the natural sciences the categories that express what is prior for us are univocal. But the law of the spirit is different from the law of nature. Languages and customs, domestic, economic, and political structures, the mechanical and liberal arts, religions and sciences not only are multiplied with great diversity, but they also go through recurrent patterns of increase, flourishing, and decay with an astounding fertility and restlessness. For individual human beings, what is prior, better known, and more obvious is whatever they were seeing, hearing, and doing when they were infants or children or adolescents or young adults. And so, as a result of the very variety and inconstancy of human affairs, the categories that indicate what is prior for us become equivocal in the extreme. The us in question is not something fixed and changeless. There are as many remarkable and deep differences in what are spontaneously counted as prior, better known, and more obvious in human affairs as there are periods, ages, cultures, nations, social classes – in fact, almost as many as there are individual human beings. These differences, which we may for brevity’s sake designate as ‘cultural,’ give rise at once to a fundamental problem: the problem of finding a transcultural principle that would enable us to pass systematically from what is prior for one person to what is prior for another. A first element in the solution is appropriated from depth psychology. Human beings are alike not just in their senses but also in those spontaneous symbols in which sensibility both manifests its own finality to spirit and conversely discloses to itself and, as it were, interprets the spirit’s own demands. As to what those symbols are, how they can and ought to be put to use, how fruitfully they can be applied especially to the history of religions – all that can be found in a number of different writings of recent authors. A second element in the solution is the slower and more difficult process by which scholars manage gradually to acquire the culture and almost the mentality of another place and time. Just as we can live in a foreign country, learn a foreign language, follow foreign customs, and as it were imbibe foreign practices, so too diligent scholars, working from the almost infinite number of clues that lie hidden in artifacts and documents, can make their own not only a foreign culture but also a culture of antiquity in its day-by-day living. A third element in the solution is that not only can narratives of past events be read, compared, and woven together into a single coherent account, but also everything we know from other sciences can be used to help us reach as full an understanding as possible of the whole life of another age in all its aspects: mechanical, artistic, economic, political, social, scientific, philosophical, religious.

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Quae tamen tria, etiam simul sumpta, ad plenam problematis solutionem vix conducere possunt. Faciunt sane ut singuli investigatores ex propria in alienam transeant culturam. Faciunt ut singuli investigatores omne forte quod ad alienam culturam pertineat in propriam quodammodo transferre possint. Imo faciunt ut multi investigatores, dummodo ipsi eiusdem culturae, eiusdem aetatis, eiusdem scholae sint, de obiectiva rerum gestarum serie atque sensu consentiant. Sed minime gravissimum illud maximeque inconveniens tollunt quod, quot sunt culturae, quot scholae, quot tendentiae, tot etiam fieri solent tum rerum gestarum narrationes tum dictorum scriptorumque interpretationes. Solvitur quidem problema transculturale quasi ex parte obiecti. Sed adeo insolutum manet ex parte subiecti ut saepius doceatur quaestiones ita esse dividendas ut eae quae materialia potius respiciant scientifice determinari possint, sed eae quae magis hominum principia, iudicia, consilia tangant quasi inevitabili cuidam relativismo derelinquantur.

Cuius divisionis ratio, partim ex iis quae superius diximus, partim ex principiis philosophicis vel methodicis explicatur. Ideo enim circa ea quae magis materialia sunt admittitur certitudo, quia in naturalibus fere univocum est quod quoad nos dicitur prius, notius, manifestius; ideo autem de culturalibus et spiritualibus praevalet scepticismus, quia in iis quae homini sunt propria, valde aequivocum invenitur quod quoad alios aliosque prius, notius, manifestius reputatur.50 Attamen, si quis quaesiverit quam ob causam rei historicae periti in relativis permaneant, cur tanto studio tantoque labore ex relativis-ad-alios ad relativa-ad-se-ipsos transeant, cur tandem ad illud non recurrant quod quoad se sit prius, notius, manifestius, saepius respondetur vel tutius evitari omnes philosophorum sententias vel philosophiam quandam relativisticam esse veram.

Quem ‘historicismum’ tum in se ipso, tum in praesuppositis suis philosophicis, tum in horum consequentiis theologicis, iterum atque iterum in litt. encycl. ‘Humani generis’ damnavit R.P. Pius xii.51 Quemadmodum vero ipsa relativismi radix impugnetur, et

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Still, these three elements, even when taken together, hardly provide a full solution to the problem. They help individual researchers cross over from their own culture to a foreign culture. They allow individual scholars somehow to make their own whatever belongs to the foreign culture. They even make it possible that many investigators, provided they belong to the same culture, age, and school of thought, might agree on the objective sequence and significance of historical events. But that hardly overcomes the very serious and most inconvenient fact that there are as many accounts of what was done and as many interpretations of what was said and written as there are cultures, schools, and tendencies of thought. The transcultural problem may indeed be solved, so to speak, on the side of the object, but on the side of the subject it remains unsolved. And that is why we are often told that there are two types of questions: those that deal with material reality can be settled scientifically, while those that touch rather on human principles, judgments, and decisions are left exposed to an inevitable relativism. This division of questions can be accounted for partly from what we have said already, and partly from certain philosophical or methodological principles. Certitude is allowed regarding what is more material, because what is prior for us, better known to us, more obvious to us in the realm of nature is for all practical purposes univocal. But skepticism prevails in regard to whatever is cultural and spiritual, because in the properly human realm there is considerable equivocity regarding what is prior for some and prior for others, better known to some and better known to others, more obvious to some and more obvious to others. 50 Still, suppose one asks, ‘Why do historical scholars settle for the merely relative? Why do they put so much study and so much labor into passing simply from what is relative-to-others to what is relative-to-themselves? Why do they not put their effort into uncovering what is prior, more knowable, more obvious in itself?’ The frequent response is either that it is safer to avoid all the opinions of philosophers or that some relativistic philosophy is true. This kind of ‘historicism,’ whether in itself or in its philosophical presuppositions or in the theological consequences of these presuppositions, was condemned again and again by Pius xii in his encyclical Humani generis. 51 In another work I have 50 [In Insight Lonergan remarks (p. 385) that the distinction between the univocal and the analogous properly regards concepts. The same holds true for the equivocal. So, properly speaking, the conceptual category ‘prior for us,’ in its application in the human realm, is what is equivocal. It is only by a less proper and extended use that one can speak of what is prior, better known, and more obvious as being equivocal, and indeed, as equivocal in the extreme. Note that later (p. 87) Lonergan speaks of the ‘equivocity of the category that announces what is prior.’] 51 Acta Apostolicae Sedis xlii (1950) 563–68, 573.

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scientifice ad veram documentorum interpretationem procedi possit, alibi egi. 52

Quibus perspectis, haec in genere de re historica concludenda videntur, nempe, et (1) existere problema quoddam transculturale, quod eo gravius fit quo magis ab externis et materialibus receditur et intimius ad differentias culturales attenditur, et (2) adaequate non resolvi hoc problema, etiamsi summa arte summaque sollertia transeatur ex iis quae quoad illos ad ea quae quoad hos priora, notiora, manifestiora sunt, seu (3) adaequatam problematis transculturalis solutionem haberi non posse nisi ea invocentur quae in ipsa interiori hominis vita inveniuntur absoluta, et (4) ideo tantum praevalere extra ecclesiam relativismum quendam historicum atque aprioristicum, vel quia methodice omnia philosophica excludantur, vel quia relativismus quidam philosophicus acceptetur atque propugnetur.

Iam vero ut ad quaestionem theologicam perveniamus, fieri non potuit ut problema transculturale inter christianos non oriretur. Ex alia enim parte, revelatio divina particulari populo, certis temporibus, certis sub adiunctis facta est, et ideo tum sacrae scripturae eloquia tum apostolica evangelii praedicatio ita homines particulares respiciebant ut conditionibus eorum culturalibus quodammodo implicata atque ligata manerent. At ex alia parte, ecclesia Dei omnium hominum est, omnis loci, omnis culturae. Qua de causa, eo ipso quod sub adiunctis particularibus universalis atque catholica53 fundata est ecclesia, iam constitutum est problema transculturale nostrum. Imo, intra ipsius novi testamenti ambitum, in ipsis ecclesiae exordiis cum contra iudaizantium consilium non solum gentibus praedicetur sed etiam eis ritualia mosaica non imponantur, problema transculturale et clare distincteque manifestatur et eiusdem problematis solutio quaedam praeclarissimo exemplo praebetur. Attamen, ut magis systematice procedamus, ampliari oportet distinctionem iam pridem factam inter priora quoad se et priora quoad nos. Et idem quidem maneat prius quoad se, quod etiam prius systematicum,54 prius theologicum, prius dogmaticum nominari licet. Quod vero ante dicebatur prius quoad nos, nunc subdividendum est in prius scripturisticum, patristicum, et contemporaneum, ut respective significetur id quod erat prius, notius, manifestius aut antiquae mentalitati

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discussed the way to attack the real root of relativism and sketched the method by which one can proceed scientifically to the true interpretation of documents. 52 With regard to history, then, we can draw the following general conclusions: (1) there exists a transcultural problem, and this problem grows more serious the more one’s attention is withdrawn from external material things and the more intimately it is directed to cultural differences; (2) this problem is not adequately solved even when one uses the greatest skill and care in moving from what is prior, better known, more obvious to one group to what is prior, better known, more obvious to another; (3) there can be no adequate solution of the transcultural problem without appealing to those absolute features that can be discovered in the interior life of human beings; (4) thus, the reason that there is so much a priori historical relativism outside the church is either that all philosophical pursuits are methodically excluded or that some kind of philosophic relativism is accepted and defended. Now let us come to the theological question. It was inevitable that a transcultural problem arise among Christians. On the one hand, divine revelation was given to a particular people at definite times and under definite circumstances; thus, the words of scripture and the apostolic preaching of the gospel were directed to particular human beings and so were necessarily implicated in and bound up with their cultural conditions. Yet, on the other hand, the church of God is for all people, at every place, in every culture. Therefore our transcultural problem is already constituted by the fact that a universal and Catholic53 church was founded under particular historical circumstances. Indeed, in the New Testament period itself, at the very origins of the church, when it was decided against the advice of the Judaizers not only to preach to the Gentiles but also to exempt them from Mosaic rituals, the transcultural problem was clearly and distinctly displayed, and, moreover, a magnificent example was given of a solution to the same problem. Still, if we are to proceed more systematically, we have to develop further the distinction already made between what is prior in itself and what is prior for us. What is prior in itself remains the same, but it may be called a ‘systematic prior,’ 54 a ‘theological prior,’ or a ‘dogmatic prior.’ And what we called ‘prior for us’ should be subdivided into a ‘scriptural prior,’ a ‘patristic prior,’ and a ‘contemporary prior,’ to signify respectively what was prior, better known, more obvious to an 52 Lonergan, Insight 366–71, 517–18, 585–617. 53 [See above, p. 35, note 19.] 54 [The choice has been made here to translate the various kinds of ‘prius’ in a fairly literal sense. Freer translations may make for easier reading, but the precise point is easily lost unless the translation remains close to the original.]

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semiticae vel palaestinensi, aut fidelibus patrum coaevis, aut fidelibus huius illiusve alterius loci, temporis, culturae. Ulterius, distinguantur motus transculturalis, motus theologicus, et motus dogmaticus, ut transculturalis dicatur motus ex priori scripturistico in prius patristicum, vel ex horum alterutro in prius contemporaneum, theologicus autem dicatur motus ex priori scripturistico vel patristico in prius systematicum, dogmaticus denique dicitur motus ubi prius systematicum magisterio ecclesiae confirmatur, docetur, definitur. Ita motus transculturalis fuit ut gentes intrarent in haereditatem populi Dei. Motus pariter transculturalis fuit ut formarentur mediaevales catenae, glossae, et sententiarum patristicarum collectiones. Motus transculturales sunt quos investigat sive missiologia sive profundior theologia pastoralis. At motus theologicus fuit ut conciperentur personae divinae ut consubstantiales, ut conciperetur Verbi divini incarnatio tamquam duarum naturarum in una persona coniunctio, ut conciperentur gratiae divinae tamquam habitus motusque absolute supernaturales, ut conciperetur sacramentum tamquam signum efficax gratiae. Denique tandem motus dogmaticus illustratur per Nicaenum concilium quod Filium Patri consubstantialem definivit, per concilium Chalcedonense quod Christum unam personam in duabus naturis definivit, per concilia Tridentinum et Vaticanum i in quibus permulta theologica quodammodo adhibita sunt tum ad fidem declarandam tum etiam ad eandem definiendam. Quae cum ita sint, non aliud in scripturis ponitur et aliud a theologis rite excogitatur, sed in utrisque idem dicitur secundum tamen aliud et aliud prius. Iterum, non aliud in scripturis ponitur et aliud in ecclesiae definitionibus, sed in utrisque idem quamvis secundum aliud et aliud prius. Denique, non alia est fides primaeva et palaestinensis, alia hellenistica, alia mediaevalis, alia contemporanea, sed idem in omnibus creditur quamvis secundum aliud et aliud prius exponatur.

Proinde, ut motus inter se comparentur, motus utique transculturalis ad quoddam hellenisticum terminatur, vel ad quoddam mediaevale, vel ad quoddam aliud contemporaneum. Sed motus proprie theologicus, cum ad prius quoad se terminetur, minime ad hellenisticum vel mediaevale vel aliud particularibus adiunctis culturalibus alligatum terminatur. Pari ergo ratione, motus dogmaticus calumniatur si homoousion mere hellenisticum reputatur vel transubstantiatio mere mediaevalis. Denique tandem toto caelo differunt motus theologicus et motus

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ancient Semitic or Palestinian mentality, or to the faithful of the patristic period, or to the faithful of this or that place, time, or culture. Furthermore, we can distinguish a transcultural movement, a theological movement, and a dogmatic movement. A transcultural movement is a movement from a ‘scriptural prior’ to a ‘patristic prior,’ or from either of these to a ‘contemporary prior.’ A theological movement is a movement from a ‘scriptural or patristic prior’ to ‘a systematic prior.’ And a dogmatic movement occurs when a ‘systematic prior’ is confirmed, taught, and defined by the church’s magisterium. So the entry of the Gentiles into the inheritance of the people of God was a transcultural movement. Likewise, the medieval creation of catenae, of glossae, and of collections of patristic opinions was transcultural. Transcultural movements are investigated both by missiology and by the more profound type of pastoral theology. But conceiving the divine persons as consubstantial, conceiving the incarnation of the divine Word as a union of two natures in a single person, conceiving divine graces as absolutely supernatural habits and motions, and conceiving sacraments as efficacious signs of grace were all theological movements. Finally, the dogmatic movement is illustrated by the Council of Nicea, which defined that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, by the Council of Chalcedon, which defined that Christ is a single person in two natures, and by the Council of Trent and the First Vatican Council, each of which employed a large number of theological elements both to state and to define the faith. On this basis we can say that what is set down in the scriptures is not different from the correct conclusions that theologians arrive at. Rather, the same thing is stated in each, in accord with one or another type of priority. Again, what is set down in the scriptures is not different from what is set down in ecclesial definitions. Rather, the same thing is stated in each, though in accord with one or other type of priority. Finally, the primitive Palestinian faith and Hellenistic faith and medieval faith and contemporary faith are not different faiths. Rather, the same thing is believed in all of them, even though expositions differ in accord with one or other priority. Accordingly, comparing these movements with one another yields the conclusion that a transcultural movement terminates, say, at a Hellenistic phase or at a medieval phase or at some other contemporary phase, whereas a properly theological movement, since it terminates at what is prior in itself, does not terminate at a Hellenistic phase or at a medieval phase or at some other phase bound to particular cultural circumstances. By the same token, then, to regard the homoousion as merely Hellenistic or transubstantiation as merely medieval is to disparage the dogmatic movement. And finally, there is an enormous difference between a theological movement and a dogmatic movement, for while they may coincide

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dogmaticus: quamvis enim quoad conceptus coincidere possint, aliud tamen est iudicium proferre privata theologi auctoritate, et longe aliud est ipsam fidem infallibiliter declarare sub ductu Spiritus Dei. Remanet ut et illud perspiciatur, nempe, quantum inter se differant problema transculturale et generale et idem problema prout in re catholica invenitur. Historicos enim vidimus summa quadam arte atque sollertia ex uno relativo in aliud relativum transire, neque ad prius quoad se et absolutum ascendere audere, cum tot tamque diversa a philosophis doceantur. Sed ecclesia Dei non solum ipsos motus transculturales perficit sed etiam una eademque voce ad omnes culturas omniaque tempora loqui potest, cum ad prius quoad se non solum ascendat sed etiam infallibiliter de ipso suo ascensu iudicet. Denique neque illud praetereundum ducimus, quod haec historiae analysis quam arctissime cohaeret cum iis quae iam sint dicta de fine theologico, de actu quo finis attingitur, et de motu quo ad actum proceditur. Nihil enim hic additur nisi illud unumque, nempe, quam ambigua quamque aequivoca sit illa categoria quae prius, notius, manifestius quoad nos annuntiat. Quo tamen addito, summis lineamentis statim elucent (1) differentiarum culturalium series quaedam historica, (2) problema transculturale et catholicum, (3) momentum viae dogmaticae quae ex prioribus quoad alios et alios ad priora quoad se procedat, (4) momentum viae systematicae quae ipsum prius quoad se ordinate explorat, et (5) quantum inter se differant motus transculturalis, motus theologicus, et motus dogmaticus. Quibus perspectis, via dogmatica viaque systematica non solum in proprium contextum concretum atque historicum ingredi videntur sed etiam speciale quoddam munus intra ipsum processum historicum exercere conspiciuntur.

Sectio Octava: Motus Historici Consideratio Ulterior Postquam diversos motus secundum diversos terminos distinximus, iam ipse motus, prout inter terminos procedit, considerari debet. Cumque de motu intellectuali agatur, illud in primis perspici oportet quod fieri non potest ut ipsi viri, quantumvis acuti, qui intellectualiter moveantur, clare et distincte proprium motum intelligant. Omnis enim motus ex fine intelligitur; et ideo qui finem non intelligit in quem movetur, motum in hunc finem intelligere non potest. Iam vero qui motu intellectuali movetur, in scientiam tamquam in finem movetur; quam sane

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conceptually, still it is one thing to offer a judgment on the private authority of a theologian and quite another to state the faith itself infallibly, under the guidance of the Spirit of God. We still have to determine the great difference that exists between the general transcultural problem and that same problem as it is found in Catholicism. We have seen how historians pass with consummate skill and astuteness from one relative view to another relative view, without daring to ascend to what is prior in itself and absolute, because philosophers propose so many and such diverse teachings. Yet the church of God not only accomplishes such transcultural movements, but also in one and the same voice it can speak to all cultures and all times. For it does ascend to what is prior in itself and, moreover, passes an infallible judgment on its own ascent. Finally, we must not overlook how intimately this analysis of history squares with what has already been said about the goal of theology, about the act whereby the goal is attained, and about the movement whereby we proceed to that act. For in this section we have added only one element to those considerations, namely, the ambiguity and equivocity of the category that announces what is prior, better known, more obvious with respect to us. Still, once this element is added, there immediately come to light in their main lines (1) a historical series of cultural differences, (2) the Catholic transcultural problem, (3) the importance of the dogmatic way that proceeds from what is prior for so and so to what is prior in itself, (4) the importance of the systematic way that explores in an ordered fashion what is prior in itself, and (5) how great a difference there is between transcultural movements, theological movements, and dogmatic movements. And once all this is grasped, the dogmatic way and the systematic way will be seen not only to enter into their proper concrete historical context, but also are perceived to exercise a special task within the historical process itself. 8 A Further Consideration of the Historical Movement We have distinguished different movements on the basis of their different starting points and goals. Now we have to consider movement itself as it proceeds from the starting point to the goal. Since the issue concerns intellectual movement, we have first to grasp that, no matter how intelligent the people involved in such a movement may be, they cannot understand their own movement clearly and distinctly. Every movement is understood from its goal, and so those who do not understand the goal to which they are moved cannot understand the movement to this goal. Now those who are involved in an intellectual movement are being moved to knowledge as goal, and as long as they are in movement, they do not

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scientiam nondum habet, quamdiu movetur; quam ob causam clare et distincte apprehendere non potest quemnam in finem moveatur; et ideo, fine parum intellecto, ipsum motum in finem parum intelligere potest. Quapropter haud mirandum est quod Romani Pontifices et ecclesiae Patres maximique theologi, quamvis per ipsos theologiae et dogmatum evolutio effecta sit, parum omnino de ipsa hac evolutione loquuntur. Inter opera enim humana, alia sunt quae prius intelliguntur quam fiant, alia autem quae prius fieri debent quam intelligi possint; et huiusmodi sane est omnis motus intellectualis. Attamen, quae praeter humanam intentionem fiunt, intentionem divinam minime excedunt. Qui enim per revelationem, particulari cuidam culturae accommodatam, fundavit ecclesiam universalisticam, non solum transculturale perspexit problema sed etiam eiusdem problematis solutionem praeparavit, inspiravit, gubernavit. Quod si quis ad hanc divinam intentionem attenderit, ei arduum nimis non erit evolutionem theologicam atque dogmaticam ex ipsa hac evolutione intelligere. Quodcumque enim factum est, Deo gubernante factum est. Quod si bonum factum est, Deo positive volente factum est; sin autem malum factum est, Deo permittente factum est. Sed definitiones infallibiles certo sunt bonae; haereses certo sunt malae; quae tamen duae non solum opponuntur sed etiam eatenus inter se connectuntur quatenus secundum intentionem humanam altera est alterius occasio et remedium, et quatenus secundum divinam intentionem ideo malum permittitur ut ex ipso malo bonum maius educatur. Quam ob causam, si singulae definitiones infallibiles sunt bonae, maius sane bonum est tota definitionum series, quae est ipsa dogmatum evolutio. Si singulae haereses sunt malae, maius malum est tota haeresium series. Quod si malum non permittitur nisi propter bonum maius, maius malum non permittitur nisi propter bonum maximum. Maximum ergo bonum est dogmatum evolutio, quam Deus operatus est priusquam de ea cogitaverint homines.

Quae cum generaliora sint, magis particulariter sunt declaranda. Quattuor ergo seligimus exempla, quorum primum est homoousion in quo solemniter relinquitur prius scripturisticum, alterum est dyphysismus chalcedonensis in quo tacite relinquitur prius patristicum, tertium est conflictus mediaevalis inter augustinismum et aristotelismum ex quo de facto systematice ad prius quoad se proceditur, quartum denique est subsequens incertitudo methodologica per quam suadetur ut accuratius perpendantur habitudines inter prius scripturisticum et prius systematicum.

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yet have the knowledge. Therefore they cannot clearly and distinctly grasp what goal they are moving toward; and if they do not so understand the goal, they do not so understand the movement toward the goal. Thus, there is nothing surprising about the fact that popes and Fathers of the church and the greatest theologians have had practically nothing to say about the development of theology and of dogma, even though they were the ones who effected the development. Some human achievements are understood before they happen, while others have first to happen before they can be understood. Every intellectual movement is of the latter kind. Still, what happens beyond the range of every human intention is hardly beyond God’s intention. The God who founded a universal church through a revelation accommodated to a particular culture has not only grasped the transcultural problem but also has prepared, inspired, and guided its solution. It will not be particularly difficult for one who attends to this divine intention to understand theological and dogmatic development from that development itself. For whatever has happened has happened under God’s governance. If something good has happened, it has happened in virtue of God positively willing it; but if something evil has happened, it has happened with God simply allowing it to happen. But infallible definitions are certainly good, and heresies are certainly evil; and yet definitions and heresies are not just opposed to each other but also connected with each other. For in the realm of human intention heresy is the occasion of definitions, and definitions are the remedy for heresy, and in the realm of God’s intention evil is allowed so that from the very evil there may be drawn a greater good. Thus, if individual infallible definitions are good, the whole series of definitions, that is, the very development of dogma itself, is a still greater good. If individual heresies are evil, the whole series of heresies is a still greater evil. But if evil is allowed only for the sake of a greater good, then a greater evil is allowed only for the sake of a very great good. The very great good in this case, then, is the development of dogma that proceeded under God’s guiding action even before human beings gave it any thought. That is all very general. To move to particulars, we select four examples. The first is homoousion, in which in a solemn definition the ‘scriptural prior’ is left behind. The second is Chalcedon’s two-natures doctrine, in which in a more tacit manner the ‘patristic prior’ is left behind. The third is the medieval conflict between Augustinianism and Aristotelianism, from which de facto there developed the systematic shift to what is prior in itself. The fourth, finally, is the subsequent methodological uncertainty, which urges us to examine more accurately the relations between the ‘scriptural prior’ and the ‘systematic prior.’

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Primo igitur in controversia ariana, quae per maximam partem saeculi quarti exaestuabat, alia erat quaestio aperte posita atque primaria, utrum Filius Dei fuerit creatura, et alia erat quaestio secundaria et quodammodo latens, utrum positiva et obligatoria fidei confessio aliis vocibus uti possit praeter eas quae in sacris scripturis legantur. Iam vero, circa hanc quaestionem secundariam, de facto concilium Nicaenum voce, homoousion, usum est; et de facto, post concilium Nicaenum acceptum, numquam dubitatum est alias voces praeter scripturisticas in symbolis fidei adhiberi. De facto ergo stabilitum est licite transiri ex priori quoad nos scripturistico ad aliud quod quoad se sit prius. Qua tamen in re quantum divinae providentiae intentio intentiones humanas excedat, ex eo perspicitur quod ne S. Athanasius quidem tale principium generale affirmaverit; cum enim decreta Nicaenae synodi defenderet, non methodum quandam dogmaticam vel theologicam defendebat sed exceptionem. Satius esse ducebat omnem fidei confessionem vocibus scripturisticis fieri, sed quo efficacius exstirparetur haeresis ariana, homoousion necessarium contendebat.

Qua de causa, etiam post concilium Nicaenum fieri potuit ut ille solus transitus credatur licitus qui a priori quoad nos scripturistico ad prius quoad nos patristicum procedat. Et ita opinabatur Severus Antiochenus qui, cum apud patres viderit vocem, natura, nihil aliud significare quam ens concretum atque completum, ut omnis natura etiam suppositum sit, unam tantum naturam in Christo Deo et homine agnovit, et ipsum concilium Chalcedonense tamquam nestorianum impugnavit. Qua de causa, non ob errorem christologicum a fide defecisse hi monophysitae videntur55 sed potius quia propter errorem methodologicum ecclesiae concilioque oecumenico obtemperare noluerunt. At haec monophysitarum causa adeo obscura erat, ut haud prohibere potuerit quominus alii crederent numquam prius scripturisticum esse relinquendum nisi ad prius patristicum transiretur.

Tertium ergo sit exemplum mediaevalis conflictus inter augustinianos et aristotelicos. Quem, Romam scribens, sic descripsit Ioannes Peckham, o.f.m., archiep. Cantuar.:

... et ut sacrosancta Romana ecclesia attendere dignaretur, quod cum doctrina duorum ordinum in omnibus dubitabilibus sibi pene penitus hodie adversetur; cumque doctrina alterius eorundem, abiectis et ex parte vilipensis sanctorum

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First, then, in the Arian controversy that raged through most of the fourth century, there was one question that was primary and was posed openly, namely, ‘Is the Son of God a creature?’ And there was another question that was secondary and somehow remained hidden, namely, ‘Can an explicit and obligatory profession of faith employ words other than those that we read in the sacred scriptures?’ Now in fact, as regards this secondary question, the Council of Nicea did use the word homoousion. And in fact, after the Council was accepted, there was never any doubt about using nonscriptural language in the symbols of faith. That means that in fact there was firmly established the legitimacy of a shift from the scriptural ‘prior to us’ to something that is prior in itself. Yet how greatly the intention of divine providence exceeds human intentions is evident from the fact that even Athanasius would not have affirmed such a general principle. When he defended the decrees of Nicea, he was not defending any dogmatic or theological method, but an exception. He thought it was quite satisfactory that every confession of faith be made in scriptural language, but he contended that homoousion was necessary to root out more effectively the Arian heresy. Thus, even after Nicea it remained possible to believe that the only licit transition is one that proceeds from a scriptural ‘prior for us’ to a patristic ‘prior for us.’ That is what Severus of Antioch thought. Since he found that the Fathers used the word ‘nature’ to mean a complete, concrete being, so that every nature is also a supposit, he acknowledged only one nature in Christ God and man, and so he rejected the Council of Chalcedon as Nestorian. It would seem, then, that what happened in the case of these Monophysites is not that they defected from the faith because of a christological error,55 but that they refused to comply with the church and the ecumenical council because of a methodological error. Yet the case of the Monophysites was so unclear that it could not keep others from believing that a ‘scriptural prior’ should never be abandoned except for a transition to a ‘patristic prior.’ And so we have the third example: the medieval conflict between the Augustinians and the Aristotelians. John Peckham, o.f.m., Archbishop of Canterbury, described the dispute in a letter to Rome: ... and that the Holy Roman Church might please notice how the teaching of the two orders [Franciscans and Dominicans] is almost completely opposed today on every debatable question. The teaching of one of these orders rejects and often 55 See J. Lebon, ‘La christologie du monophysisme syrien,’ in Das Konzil von Chalkedon: Geschichte und Gegenwart, ed. Aloys Grillmeier and Heinrich Bacht, vol. 1 (W¨urzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1951) 576–80.

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De Fine, Ordine, Modo Dicendi sententiis, philosophicis dogmatibus quasi totaliter innitatur, ut plena sit idolis domus Dei et languore, quem praedixit Apostolus, pugnantium quaestionum; quantum inde futuris temporibus poterit ecclesiae periculum imminere. Quid enim magis necessarium, quam fractis columnis aedificium cadere; quam vilipensis authenticis doctoribus Augustino et caeteris, foedum venire principem et veritatem succumbere falsitati?56

Qua in descriptione inter duas intellectus operationes satis distinxisse non videtur auctor. Aliud enim est quaerere quid sit, aliud autem est quaerere an sit. Quod si in hac secunda operatione sanctorum sententias abicis et philosophicis dogmatibus quasi totaliter inniteris, a fide sane deficis. Sin autem de fide nulla iam est quaestio, si ad sola dubitabilia restringitur totus conflictus, quemadmodum fieri potest ut domus Dei impleatur idolis, ut vilipendeantur doctores authentici ut Augustinus, ut alterius ordinis doctrina philosophicis dogmatibus quasi totaliter innitatur? Ea sola lege haec omnia conciliantur ut testem habeamus parum acutum quamvis, uti videtur, non minus acutum forte quam alii eiusdem aetatis. Non enim reapse agebatur de veris sed de intelligentia, neque de intelligentia philosophica sed de theologica, cum illud perfecerit saeculum xiii ut, etiam inter augustinianos, ex priori quoad fideles scripturistico et patristico, ad prius quoad se theologicum et systematicum transiretur.

Quod enim factum est in concilio Nicaeno cum homoousion sit definitum, quod factum est in concilio Chalcedonensi cum duae Christi naturae sint affirmatae, circa omnia fere vera revelata factum est per theologos mediaevales inquirentes, disputantes, distinguentes, determinantes. Praeterea, sicut homoousion fidem non destruit sed salvat, sicut duae Christi naturae fidem non destruunt sed statuunt, ita etiam (quamvis uti patet, sine auctoritate conciliari) priora quoad se in medio aevo quaesita et inventa fidem ordinant, protegunt, defendunt. Praeterea, sicut vel rationalismo vel relativismo historico indulget qui homoousion mere philosophicum vel dyphysismum mere hellenisticum iudicat, ita proprie theologica erat problematica mediaevalis seu integer ille quaestionum solutionumque complexus qui tantum tamque profunde in subsequentia concilia interdum influxisse perspicitur.

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The author seems to have failed to distinguish adequately the two different operations of the mind. Asking ‘What is it?’ is different from asking ‘Is it so?’ If, in answering this second question, you do indeed cast aside the teachings of the saints and for all practical purposes depend entirely on philosophical presuppositions, no doubt you do stray from the faith. But if faith is not the issue, if the argument is entirely about questions that really are debatable, how is it possible that the house of God is being filled with idols, or that authentic teachers like Augustine are being contemned, or that the teaching of one of the orders rests almost exclusively on philosophical dogmas? The only ground for such comments seems to be that the commentator was not a sagacious witness, although he was probably no less sagacious than others of the same period. The issue in these debatable questions was not truth but understanding, and not philosophical but theological understanding. The achievement of the thirteenth century, even among the Augustinians, was the transition from what was prior for the scriptural and patristic people of faith to the theological and systematic ‘prior in itself.’ What Nicea did in defining homoousion, what Chalcedon did in affirming two natures in Christ, this the thirteenth-century theologians, inquiring, disputing, distinguishing, settling their questions, did for almost all revealed truths. Moreover, as homoousion does not destroy the faith but preserves it, as the doctrine of two natures does not destroy the faith but stabilizes it, so in the same way (though, of course without the authority of church councils) the prior in itself, sought and found in the Middle Ages, orders the faith, protects it, defends it. Again, just as homoousion was more than something merely philosophical and the doctrine of the two natures more than merely Hellenistic – to claim otherwise would be in the first instance rationalism and in the second historical relativism – so the medieval problematic, that integrated complex of questions and answers that at times has manifestly had so great and so profound an influence on later councils, was properly theological. 56 F. Ehrle, ‘John Peckham u¨ ber den Kampf des Augustinismus und Aristotelismus in der zweiten H¨alfte des 13. Jhs.,’ Zeitschrift f¨ur katholische Theologie 13 (1889) 181.

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At aliud erat scripturistica et patristica priora et notiora ad theologicum et systematicum prius et notius reducere, aliud longe erat accurate atque exacte perspicere quemadmodum inter se comparentur hoc et illa. Etsi enim omnes theologi, sive Augustinum propius sequi dictitarent sive Aristotele uterentur, aliquam reductionem ad priora quoad se peragerent, ipse tamen interminatus inter eos conflictus satis demonstrat quam obscure quamque confuse intimam quaestionis rationem et veram disputationis causam perspexerint. Quam ob rem, nemo mirari potest posteriores theologos circa methodologicum problema non parum vel vacillari vel aberrare potuisse.

Quartum ergo nobis exemplum sit ipsa haec incertitudo. Quam enim arcte priora quoad se et priora quoad nos inter se connectantur, satis superius diximus: quorum scilicet via analytica est inventio atque probatio, eorundem prorsus via synthetica est sapienter ordinata expositio. At si intima haec coniunctio et interdependentia vel praetermittuntur vel minus clare perspiciuntur, sequitur tum speculationem in systemata tendere quae, quasi anima a corpore separata, fontes positivos negligant, tum ipsas inquisitiones positivas, directione atque integratione privatas, vel huc illuc vagari vel per modum ingentis cuiusdam acervi iacere inertes. Iam vero tripliciter abitur in systematicum quin synthesis attingatur. Primo enim, adeo dominari potest ancilla philosophica ut theologi prolixius in quaestionibus occupentur quae ex radice philosophica dependeant. Deinde, quamvis tum ad speculativa tum ad positiva attendatur, fieri potest ut magis iuxtapositio vel mixtio attingatur quam coniunctio atque synthesis. Tertio denique, adeo exaggerari potest ipsum systema ut positiva superfluant cum demonstrari possint. Quarum prima tendentia in decadentia saec. xiv et xv maxime conspicitur, quamvis deinceps theologiam vexare haud desiverit. Altera autem tendentia oritur inquantum ad ancillae dominationem additur necessitas apologetica. Tertia denique in semirationalismo saec. xix apparuit, cuius vita brevis concilio Vaticano i interempta est.

Tripliciter pariter, cum synthesis defuerit, in re positiva aberratur. Primo enim, suadet archaismus ut, recentiori saltem synthesi reiecta, ad stadium quoddam christianismi antiquius, simplicius, purius redeatur. Deinde autem, suadet futurismus ut, tam antiquiori quam recentiori synthesi spreta, novus quidam atque inauditus omnium conspectus acceptetur. Tertio denique, accedunt qui, tot tantisque theoriis mente defatigati, ita certitudinem quaerant ut omnem intelligentiam excludant. Iam vero novatores saec. xvi et posteriores pietistae archaismum scripturisticum extollebant; baianistae et iansenistae archaismum patristicum et augustinianum volebant; neque

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Nevertheless, to resolve what is prior and better known for scriptural and patristic writers into the theological and systematic ‘prior and better known’ is not at all the same as grasping accurately and exactly how the two are related to each other. For even if all theologians, both those who insisted they were more closely following Augustine and those who used Aristotle, were engaged in a certain amount of resolution into what is prior in itself, still the endless conflict between them is evidence enough of how obscurely and confusedly they grasped the inner intelligibility of the question and the true cause of the dispute. For that reason we should not be surprised that later theologians could be either quite uncertain or even in error regarding the methodological problem. And so our fourth example lies in this very uncertainty. We said enough above about the close connection between what is prior in itself and what is prior for us: what the way of analysis discovers and demonstrates is entirely the same as what the way of synthesis wisely orders. But if this intimate link and interdependence are overlooked or not clearly grasped, the consequence is both that speculation will tend to issue in systems that, like souls without bodies, neglect the positive sources, and that positive investigations, deprived of direction and integration, will wander aimlessly hither and thither or like some huge mass lie there in complete inertia. There are three ways of making the transition to the systematic without achieving a synthesis. First, the philosophical handmaid can be so dominant that theologians are occupied at great length with questions that at root are philosophical. Second, theologians can attend to both speculative and positive issues but achieve, not a joining and a synthesis, but just a juxtaposition and an aggregate. Third, system itself can be so exaggerated that positive elements become superfluous, since they can be demonstrated. The first tendency can be seen quite clearly in the decadence of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but it also troubled later theology. The second tendency occurs when apologetic exigencies combine with philosophical domination. The third tendency appeared in nineteenth-century semirationalism, whose short life was ended by the First Vatican Council. In parallel fashion, when synthesis is lacking there are three ways of going astray on the positive side. The first is an archaism that tempts people to reject at least the later syntheses and return to a more ancient, simple, pure stage of Christianity. The second is a futurism that tempts people to bypass earlier and later syntheses alike and to accept some new and as yet unheard-of overview of everything. The third is the tendency of those whose minds are so exhausted by a plethora of weighty theories that they settle for certitude and exclude all understanding. Now the sixteenth-century Reformers and the later Pietists extolled a scriptural archaism; the followers of Baius and Jansenius wanted a patristic and Augustinian

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ab hac tendentia immunes sunt recentissimi, qui ita theologiam vel biblicam vel patristicam praedicent ut omnem posteriorem theologiam fere omissam velint. Futurismus deinde conspicitur in liberalibus et modernistis, qui de vera indole religionis christianae errasse arbitrentur non solum catholicos et protestantes sed etiam patres ecclesiae et ipsos novi testamenti auctores. Tertius denique error consistit, non in eo quod vel rite dividitur positivae inquisitionis labor vel rite ponitur viae syntheticae fundamentum analyticum atque certum, sed in eo quod tanti aestimatur viae positivae necessitas atque soliditas, ut ad positivisticam quandam speculationis exclusionem perveniatur.

Quibus aberrationibus omnibus opponitur illa mysteriorum intelligentia quam docuit concilium Vaticanum. Quia enim datur mysteriorum intelligentia, datur intelligentia stricte theologica. Quia datur intelligentia stricte theologica, dantur etiam conceptus qui hanc intelligentiam exprimant et principia quae his in conceptibus fundentur. Quia dantur tum conceptus tum principia quae ex intelligentia stricte theologica oriuntur, vindicantur theologiae proprium obiectum, propria methodus, proprius campus. Quibus positis, stabilitur fundamentum unde dominationi ancillae philosophicae resisti possit. Excluditur pariter ea notio quae theologiam meram mixtionem velit, quasi scilicet theologia, propriis principiis privata, in solis conclusionibus consisteret, quae sive ex revelatis solis sive ex revelatis et philosophicis simul deducerentur. Excluditur denique illa tendentia positivistica quae omnem intelligentiam praetermittendam ducat. Proinde, quia haec intelligentia theologica decursu saeculorum augetur, excluduntur tum archaismus qui posteriorem intelligentiam illegitimam arbitretur, tum etiam anachronismus qui posteriorem intelligentiam extitisse fingat priusquam de facto extiterit. Praeterea, quia ecclesiae declarationes et definitiones per Spiritus sancti assistentiam infallibiles sunt, intelligentia theologica, inquantum in has declarationes et definitiones intrat, mutationem non admittit.57 Quare inventiones quas futuristicas nominavimus excluduntur. Denique tandem, quia intelligentia theologica imperfecta est, excluditur rationalismus et semirationalismus.

Motus ergo historici quattuor consideravimus exempla: (1) homoousion Nicaenum in quo prius scripturisticum derelinquitur; (2) dyphysismum Chalcedonensem in

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archaism; nor are theologians of our own age immune from the same tendency, who so praise biblical or patristic theology that they almost seem to prefer to omit all later theology. Next, futurism is seen in liberals and modernists, who suggest that not only Catholics and Protestants but also the Fathers of the church and the New Testament authors themselves were mistaken regarding the true nature of the Christian religion. Finally, the third error consists, not in the division of labor within positive studies, which is quite proper, nor in insisting on a solid analytic foundation for the way of synthesis, which is also quite proper, but in so highly esteeming the necessity and solidity of the positive path as to end up with a positivistic exclusion of speculation. The understanding of mysteries taught by the First Vatican Council is opposed to all of these aberrations. Because there is an understanding of mysteries, there is a strictly theological understanding. Because there is a strictly theological understanding, there are also concepts that express this understanding and principles that will be uttered in these concepts. Because there are concepts and principles that originate from a strictly theological understanding, the proper object of theology, its proper method, and its proper field of activity are vindicated. Once these points are grasped, a stable foundation is provided for resisting the domination of philosophy. On the same basis, the notion that theology is a mere aggregate, as if theology had no principles of its own and consisted only in conclusions drawn from revelation alone or from revelation and philosophy, is ruled out. And the positivistic tendency to neglect all understanding is also ruled out. Again, since this theological understanding increases age after age, there are ruled out both the archaism that regards later understanding as illegitimate and the anachronism that imagines that later understanding existed much earlier than in fact it did. Moreover, because declarations and definitions of the church are protected from error through the assistance of the Holy Spirit, the theological understanding that truly enters into these declarations and definitions will not change. 57 And so the figments that we have named ‘futurism’ are ruled out. Finally, since theological understanding is imperfect, rationalism and semirationalism are also ruled out. We have examined four examples of historical movement: (1) the homoousion of Nicea, in which the ‘scriptural prior’ was left behind; (2) the ‘two natures’ doctrine 57 [‘... mutationem non admittit.’ While writing ‘Doctrinal Pluralism’ several years later, Lonergan changed his terminology; from speaking of ‘immutability’ he moved to speaking of ‘permanence of meaning.’]

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quo prius patristicum derelinquitur; (3) mediaevalem conflictum inter augustinianos et aristotelicos in quo ad prius quoad se et systematicum proceditur; et (4) subsequentem incertitudinem methodologicam in qua aureum medium inter aberrationes varias et oppositas cernitur. In quibus omnibus illud maxime perspicitur quod aliud est dogmatum evolutionem efficere et aliud est eandem evolutionem intendere. Non erat intentio concilii Nicaeni ut communiter a priori scripturistico ad prius systematicum recedi possit. Neque erat intentio concilii Chalcedonensis, ut communiter a priori patristico ad prius systematicum recedi possit. Neque theologi mediaevales tam augustiniani quam aristotelici disputaverunt utrum ad prius systematicum procedendum sit. Neque communi quodam consilio coniuncti ita egerunt theologi saec xiv et xv, novatores et apologetae catholici, baianistae et iansenistae, semirationalistae et traditionalistae, liberales et modernistae, ut per varias et oppositas tendentias medium catholicum in clariori luce constituerent. Ipsum denique concilium Vaticanum I, non tam ulteriores conclusiones methodologicas fundare quam particulares errores condemnare et salutarem Christi doctrinam affirmare volebat.

At maxime in conciliis oecumenicis, a Nicaeno ad Vaticanum, dogmatum evolutio effecta est. Aliud tamen est singulas definitiones seorsum intendere, quod sane in singulis conciliis peractum est. Aliud autem est totam illam definitionum atque declarationum seriem intendere in qua dogmatum evolutio perspicitur; haec enim ipsius seriei intentio vires humanas ita excedit ut tamen Deo intendente, volente, gubernante, imo infallibiliter assistente, effecta sit. Neque cur efficiatur obscurum est, cum necessarium fuerit ut ecclesia Dei catholica atque universalis divinam revelationem catholice et universaliter exprimere possit. Quam dogmatum evolutionem concomitatur augmentum intelligentiae, scientiae, sapientiae. Aliquid enim intelligit, qui imperfecte vel homoousion vel transsubstantiationem intelligit. Quae qui intelligit, aliquid plus intelligit quam illi qui de consubstantialitate vel transsubstantiatione numquam clare et distincte cogitaverint. Sed ubi plus intelligitur, augetur sane intelligentia. Ubi ex aucta intelligentia deducuntur conclusiones, augetur scientia. Quo plura intelliguntur et sciuntur, eo magis ad eam sapientiam acceditur quae omnia ordinat atque iudicat. Denique tandem, cum rerum divinarum sapientia Deo propria sit, ne sapientissimi quidem theologi est de divinis iudicare absolute, sed suum iudicium submittat necesse est ad eum cui Deus his in terris infallibilitatem promisit.

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of Chalcedon, in which the ‘patristic prior’ was left behind; (3) the medieval conflict between Augustinians and Aristotelians, in which a move was made to a systematic ‘prior in itself’; and (4) the subsequent methodological uncertainty, in which we discerned a golden mean between various opposed aberrations. What stands out in all of this is that it is one thing to effect a development of dogma and something else to intend the same development. It was not the intention of the Council of Nicea to affirm a general possibility of passing from the ‘scriptural prior’ to the ‘systematic prior.’ Nor was it the intention of the Council of Chalcedon to affirm a general possibility of passing from the ‘patristic prior’ to the ‘systematic prior.’ The medieval theologians, whether Augustinian or Aristotelian, did not argue whether a shift should be made to the ‘systematic prior.’ Nor was it a common decision of the theologians of the fourteenth and fifteenth century, the Reformers and the Catholic apologists, the Baianists and the Jansenists, the semirationalists and the traditionalists, the liberals and the modernists, that by their different opposed tendencies they would place the Catholic mean in a clearer light. Even the First Vatican Council wished not so much to ground further methodological conclusions as to condemn specific errors and to affirm Christ’s saving doctrine. Still, a development of dogma was brought about, especially in the ecumenical councils from Nicea to Vatican I. But it is one thing to intend the individual definitions, one at a time, as each of the councils undoubtedly did, and it is quite another thing to intend the entire series of definitions and declarations in which the development of dogma can be seen. To intend that entire series surpasses human powers; nevertheless, it was brought about by God’s intention, will, governance, and infallible assistance. And the reason why it was brought about is not obscure: it was necessary if the Catholic and universal church of God is to be able to express God’s revelation in a Catholic and universal way. An increase in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom accompanies the development of dogma. One who understands imperfectly homoousion or transubstantiation does understand something – something more than those who may never have reflected seriously on either consubstantiality or transubstantiation. But where more is understood, obviously understanding increases. Then if conclusions are drawn from this increased understanding, knowledge increases as well. The more things there are that are understood and known, the more is progress made toward that wisdom that orders and judges all things. Indeed, since ultimate wisdom about divine matters belongs to God alone, it is not given even to the wisest theologian to pass judgment on divine matters in any absolute fashion; rather, it is necessary for theologians to submit their judgments to the one to whom God has promised infallibility on this earth.

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Dogmatum denique evolutionem et intelligentiae, scientiae, sapientiae augmentum ita Deus per instrumenta ministerialia efficit ut a suo fine attingendo deficere non possit. Si enim abundant qui verum intelligibile diligant, tunc sane crescit et multum vehementerque proficit tam singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis quam totius ecclesiae, intelligentia, scientia, sapientia. Si autem veri intelligibilis refrigescit dilectio, in falsam intelligibilitatis speciem aberrant homines; multiplicantur problemata; suadentur solutiones falsae; oriuntur haereses; ut denique tandem, qui dilectione boni non moveantur, saltem per mala ingravescentia compellantur. Quam ob causam, sive verum intelligibile volumus, sive nolumus, minime impediri potest illud augmentum quod Deus intendit et viis suis inscrutabilibus efficaciter producit. Quae cum ita sint, ex quo incepimus, ad Aquinatem redeamus. Nostris enim temporibus non desunt quos ad disputationes magistrales theologiamque speculativam parum moveat illud argumentum quod, eiusmodi disputationibus omissis, auditor ‘nihil scientiae vel intellectus acquiret, sed vacuus abscedet.’ Quos tamen abstractum scientiae nomen non convincit, concreta forte scientiae realitas allicere potest. De illa enim mysteriorum intelligentia agitur quam non solum pedetentim in ecclesiae historia sese evolventem vidimus sed etiam ab ipsa divina intentione esse adhibitam ut revelatio, particulari mentalitati accommodata, expositionem universalem catholicamque accipiat. Sectio Nona: De Obiecto Theologiae Postquam consideravimus tum finem tum actum quo finis attingitur tum motum quo ad actum proceditur, oportet haec omnia in unum colligi, ut quodammodo per modum unius perspici possint. Quapropter, cum actus per obiecta et motus per terminos innotescant, breviter disserendum videtur (1) de duplici theologiae aspectu, (2) de eius obiecto ut fine, (3) de obiecto ut termino immanenter producto, (4) de obiecto ut movente, (5) de processu ex obiecto ut movente in obiectum ut terminum, et (6) de processu ex obiecto ut termino in obiectum ut finem. Primo, ergo, considerari potest theologia tum secundum se tum secundum comparationem ad alias scientias. Inquantum secundum se consideratur, de obiectis et processibus agitur. Inquantum autem ad alias scientias comparatur, distingui oportet inter commune et singulare. Omnibus enim scientiis commune est ut ita inter se distinguantur ut tamen non separentur, cum una sit rerum universitas intelligenda, neque unius hominis sit nisi unus intellectus qui omnem meram multiplicitatem invitus patiatur. Praeterea, permultis scientiis commune est ut alia aliam

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Finally, God through ministerial instruments brings about the development of dogma and the increase of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom in such a way that the goal God intends cannot fail to be attained. If there are many lovers of intelligible truth, then clearly the understanding, knowledge, and wisdom of one and all, of individuals as well as of the whole church, grows and makes great and vigorous progress. But if the love of intelligible truth grows cold, people are led astray by the false appearance of intelligibility; problems are multiplied; false solutions are urged; heresies arise; and the final result is that those who are not moved by love of the good are at least compelled by the mounting evils. Thus, whether we want intelligible truth or not, the increase that God intends and is effectively producing in inscrutable ways can never be thwarted. Thus, we return to our starting point, Aquinas. There are people today who are little moved to doctrinal disputations and speculative theology by the argument that without such disputations the student will ‘acquire no knowledge or understanding, but will go away empty.’ But if the abstract name of science does not convince them, perhaps the concrete reality of science can attract them. The point at issue is the understanding of mysteries that we have seen as not only gradually developing in the history of the church but also as having been used by God’s intention so that revelation, adapted to a particular mentality, might receive a universal and Catholic expression. 9 The Object of Theology Now that we have considered the goal, the act by which the goal is attained, and the movement toward that act, it is time to draw all these considerations together, so that they can be grasped from the unity of a single viewpoint. Therefore, since acts are known through objects and movements are known through their terms, we shall have to discuss briefly (1) the twofold aspect of theology, (2) the object as the goal of theology, (3) the object as an immanently produced term, (4) the object as moving, (5) the process from the object as moving to the object as a term, and (6) the process from the object as a term to the object as the goal. First, then, theology can be considered either in itself or in relation to other sciences. The consideration of theology in itself regards objects and processes. But the consideration of theology in relation to other sciences calls for a distinction between what is common and what is specific. It is common to all the sciences that, while they must be distinguished from one another, they must not be separated from one another; there is only one universe to be understood, and each human being has only one intellect – an intellect that submits to every mere multiplicity only reluctantly. Moreover, it is common to many sciences that one uses another

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adhibeat in propriam perfectionem: quod quidem eo magis verificatur quo magis ipsa concreta perfectioris obiecti realitas respicitur; et ita plures scientiae concurrunt in plantis cognoscendis quam in mineralibus, in animalibus quam in plantis, in hominibus quam in animalibus. Denique, singulare quoddam opus munusque sapientiae exigitur (cuius est omnia iudicare et ordinare), ut singulis scientiis et proprii fines determinentur et methodi propriae adaptentur, quo efficacius omnes in unam cohaerentemque intelligentiam unius universi procedant. Quibus perspectis, elucet tum theologiam alias scientias, maxime autem humanas, in suos usus convertere, tum etiam alias scientias, et praecipue humanas, a theologia addiscere oportere, cum hac in vita homo sit et peccato originali infectus et supernaturali Dei gratia ecclesiaeque magisterio adiutus. Qua in mutua opitulatione (db 1799), sapientiae munus exercet theologia, tum quia superiori fidei lumine dirigitur, tum quia sola hominem58 (prout de facto in statu naturae lapsae et reparatae versatur) in causas reducere potest. Quare, quamvis theologia etiam hoc in munere sapientiali alias scientias, puta, logicam, methodologicam, philosophicam, adhibere soleat et debeat, ipsius tamen est iustos singulorum fines determinare (db 1799).59

Porro, inquantum theologia secundum se consideratur tamquam particularis quaedam scientia, ea respicit obiecta quae supernaturali fidei lumine innotescunt, puta, Deum trinum, Verbum incarnatum, et caetera quae ad oeconomiam salutis

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to move to its own proper perfection; this is increasingly the case as the sciences treat the concrete reality of a more perfect object. Thus, more sciences collaborate in knowing plants than in knowing minerals, more in knowing animals than in knowing plants, more in knowing human beings than in knowing other animals. Finally, there is a need that wisdom (whose role it is to judge and order everything) exercise her specific office and function, in order to determine the proper ends and adapt the proper methods of the individual sciences so that all of them may proceed more effectively to a unified and coherent understanding of the one universe. From this it is clear both that theology must make use of the other sciences, and especially the human sciences, and also that the other sciences, and again especially the human sciences, should learn from theology. For in this life every human being is infected with original sin and helped by God’s supernatural grace and the magisterium of the church. In that mutual assistance (db 1799, ds 3019, nd 135), theology performs the function of wisdom, both because theology is guided by the superior light of faith and because only theology can resolve into causes the situation of humankind58 as in fact it exists in this state of fallen and redeemed nature. And so, although theology in the exercise of its sapiential function uses and should use other sciences such as logic, methodology, and philosophy, nevertheless it is up to theology to determine the proper ends of each of these other sciences (db 1799, ds 3019, nd 135).59 As for theology considered in itself as one particular science, it treats objects that become known by the supernatural light of faith, namely, the triune God, the incarnate Word, and other objects that pertain to the economy of salvation. 58 [Literally, ‘man.’ Lonergan is speaking neither about an abstract essence nor about individual human beings, but about a concrete aggregate or concrete universal in its fallen and redeemed situation. In ‘Finality, Love, Marriage’ (Collection 38) he says, ‘Now by man is meant not an abstract essence nor a concrete individual but the concrete aggregate of all men at all times.’ Again, in Insight (764) he speaks of the ‘concrete universal that is mankind in the concrete and cumulative consequences of the acceptance or rejection of the message of the Gospel.’] 59 [The claim may seem outrageous, but the sapiential function of theology described here extends the sapiential function implicit in the discussion of metaphysics in Insight as underlying, penetrating, transforming, and unifying all other departments of human knowledge (415–16; see also 432), and the sapiential function implicit in the discussion of transcendental method in Method in Theology (20–25) as having normative, critical, dialectical, heuristic, and foundational functions, and as being a flexibly systematic key to unified science. For an explicit discussion by Lonergan of the role of theology in relation to the other departments of knowledge, see Insight 765–68, and compare ‘The Role of a Catholic University in the Modern World,’ Collection 108–13. If the present state of theology in relation to other disciplines largely hinders theology in the effective exercise of its sapiential function, such an exercise is still something to be hoped for in the future. See also Insight 765–66.]

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pertinent. Inter se autem differunt fides et theologia, non quia alia et alia obiecta intendant, sed quia eadem obiecta alio et alio modo considerant. Quod enim credit fidelis, idem aliquatenus intelligit theologus; quod ergo fidelis ut verum affirmat, theologus ut verum intelligibile intendit. Sicut enim scientia non est quaelibet certa cognitio sed est certa rerum per causas cognitio, ita etiam super simplicem fidem addit theologia inquantum ex vero credito in verum et creditum et aliquatenus intellectum procedit. Deinde, sicut obiectum intellectus ut finis est ens, ita obiectum theologiae ut finis est Deus. Iterum, sicut obiectum intellectus ut finis non est aspectus quidam entis vel entis quaelibet ratio vel notio sed id ipsum quodcumque existit, ita etiam obiectum theologiae ut finis non est aspectus vel ratio vel notio Dei sed ipsa divina realitas. Cui primario obiecto accedunt alia secundaria, sive quia per ea in Deum ascendimus, sive quia in ea verius et plenius cognoscenda, Deo cognito, redimus. Quae quidem obiecta secundaria, quatenus ad obiectum ut finem pertinent, non secundum aliquem aspectum vel rationem vel notionem sed secundum ipsam eorum realitatem considerantur. Quare, cum theologus de oeconomia salutis inquirat, non notionem sed realitatem cognoscere vult.

Tertio, sicut intellectus ens determinatum in vero determinato tamquam in medio conspicit, ita etiam theologus obiectum ut finem attingit mediante quodam termino immanenter producto. Theologiae autem obiectum ut finis est Deus et caetera quae ad Deum referuntur. Quod obiectum attingit theologia mediante vero intelligibili, quod qua verum ex fide dependet et qua intelligibile ex quadam quasi rationum causarumque cognitione dependet. Sicut enim duplex est intellectus operatio, duplex quaestionum genus, duplex intelligendi actus, ita duplex est verbum seu terminus immanenter ab actu intelligendi productus.60 Iam vero omnis cognitio proprie humana eatenus cognitio est quatenus formaliter vera est; et ideo ad ipsam constitutionem cognitionis proprie humanae pertinet secunda intellectus operatio qua verum dicitur. Sed circa hanc operationem distinguitur inter fidem et caeteras cognitiones certas, inquantum

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Yet faith and theology differ from one another – not because they intend different objects but because they consider the same objects in different ways. What the believer believes, the theologian to some extent understands; what the believer affirms as true, the theologian intends as an intelligible truth. Just as science is not just any certain knowledge but certain knowledge of things through causes, so theology adds something to simple faith in that it proceeds from a truth that is believed to a truth that is both believed and to some extent understood. Second, just as the object of the intellect, where ‘object’ means ‘goal,’ is being, so the object of theology in the sense of its goal is God. Again, just as the object of intellect in the sense of its goal is not some aspect of being or some formality or notion of being but rather whatever exists, so too the object of theology in the sense of its goal is not some aspect or formality or notion of God but the divine reality itself. To this primary object are added other, secondary objects, whether because through them we ascend to God or because we return to them with a truer and fuller knowledge once we have reached some knowledge of God. As pertaining to the object that is theology’s goal, these secondary objects are considered, not in terms of some aspect or formality or concept, but in terms of their own reality. Thus, when the theologian inquires into the economy of salvation, it is to know not a concept but reality. Third, just as intellect knows determinate being in a determinate truth as in a medium, so too the theologian attains the object that is the goal of theology through the mediation of some immanently produced term. Now, the object of theology in the sense of its goal is God and everything else that is related to God. Theology attains that object through the mediation of intelligible truth, which as true depends on faith and as intelligible depends on some sort of knowledge of reasons and causes. For, just as there are two operations of intellect, two kinds of questions, and two acts of understanding, so there are two inner words, two terms immanently produced by an act of understanding.60 Now all properly human knowledge is knowledge to the extent that it is formally true; and so the second operation of intellect, in which the true is uttered, belongs to the very constitution of properly human knowledge. But as regards this operation we have to distinguish between faith and other kinds of certain knowledge. The other kinds of knowledge proceed 60 [Lonergan’s meaning is that the two kinds of inner words and terms that are immanently produced by the two kinds of understanding are in a relationship with the two kinds of understanding such that one kind of understanding immanently produces one kind of inner word and term, and the other kind of understanding immanently produces the other kind of inner word and term. But the Latin does not warrant the inclusion of this embellishment in the translation itself.]

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caeterae ex evidentia obiecti a subiecto perspecta procedunt, fides autem procedit ex evidentia obiecti perspecta non a subiecto sed ab alio cui creditur. Et secundum hoc, cum theologia fidei innitatur, a caeteris cognitionibus certis sive scientificis sive praescientificis seiungitur. Praeterea, sicut in omni ente finito aliud est esse et aliud est essentia, ita etiam in omni vero finito alia est ipsa ratio veri et aliud est ipsum cui ratio veri accedit. Iam vero id cui ratio veri accedit est terminus primae intellectus operationis; et cum secundum hanc operationem alia sit apprehensio praescientifica (in qua causae adhuc ignorantur) et alia scientifica (in qua res per causas concipiuntur), secundum hanc differentiam distinguitur tum inter scientiam caeterasque cognitiones tum etiam in supernaturalibus inter theologiam et fidem. Unde concludes, secundum primam intellectus operationem theologiam a fide differre et ad rationem scientiae accedere, et tamen secundum alteram intellectus operationem a scientia differre et fidei inniti. Quae mira coniunctio ideo fieri potest quod, cum theologiae obiectum supernaturale sit, intelligentia theologica ita est imperfecta ut evidentiam obiecti non attingat. Quarto, praeter obiectum intellectus ut finis (ens) eiusdemque obiectum ut terminus immanens (verum intelligibile), etiam consideratur obiectum ut movens ad intelligendum. Quod quidem obiectum nobis proprium et proportionatum, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est quidditas seu natura in materia corporali existens; quam ob causam, hac in vita nisi per analogias quasdam neque Deum neque angelos intelligere vel concipere possumus; sed alteram exspectamus vitam in qua divina quidditas seu essentia immediate nostrum intellectum moveat. Proinde, obiectum quod ad intelligentiam theologicam nos movet remote quidem est ipsa divina essentia seu quidditas, proxime autem est verum quod Deus de se nobis revelavit et per ecclesiam nobis proponit et ipsi per fidem suscipimus. Et idcirco differt theologia a scientiis naturalibus, quae ex sensibilibus incipiant et per intelligentiam ad verum inveniendum procedant. Non enim ex sensibilibus incipit theologia sed ex veris revelatis et creditis;61 neque ad eam attingit intelligentiam quae ad verum certo inveniendum sufficiat, sed ad illam obscuram, analogicam, et imperfectam qua verum, iam aliunde cognitum, aliquatenus illustratur et plenius possidetur.

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from evidence of an object grasped by the subject, while faith proceeds from evidence of an object grasped not by the subject but by someone else whom the subject believes. And so, since theology rests on faith, it is distinct from other certain knowledge, whether prescientific or scientific. Moreover, just as in every finite being existence and essence are distinct, so too in every finite truth the formality of truth is distinct from that to which the formality of truth is added. That to which the formality of truth is added is the term of the first operation of intellect. And since in this operation there is a distinction between prescientific apprehension (in which causes are not yet known) and scientific apprehension (in which things are conceived through causes), one can distinguish on this basis both between science and other kinds of knowledge and, on the supernatural level, between theology and faith. Thus, as regards the first operation of intellect, theology differs from faith and is more like science, but as regards the second operation of intellect, theology differs from science and relies on faith. The reason for these surprising conjunctions is that, because theology has a supernatural object, theological understanding is imperfect insofar as it never attains to evidence regarding its object. Fourth, besides the object of intellect in the sense of its goal (being) and its object in the sense of immanent term (intelligible truth), there is also the object in the sense of whatever moves us to understand. The object that moves us to understand, the one proper to us and proportionate to us in our present state, is the intelligibility or nature that exists in corporeal matter. It follows that in this life we cannot understand or conceive God or angels except through analogies; but we do await another life in which the divine quiddity or essence will move our intellect without mediation. Thus, the object that moves us to theological understanding is, remotely, the divine essence or quiddity and, proximately, the truth that God has revealed to us about God, that God proposes to us through the church, and that we accept in faith. For this reason theology differs from the natural sciences, which begin from sensible data and proceed through understanding to the discovery of what is true. Theology does not begin from sensible data but from truths revealed by God and believed by us;61 and theology attains, not the kind of understanding that would suffice for discovering with certitude what is true, but that obscure, analogical, and imperfect understanding that throws some light on the truth already known from elsewhere, and enables us to possess it more fully. 61 [See above, pp. 33, note 18.]

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Praeterea, quia obiectum movens ad intelligentiam theologicam est verum revelatum, principia scientiae theologicae dicuntur articuli fidei. Ulterius, cum scientiae subalternatae sit ut principia sua ex alia scientia accipiat, theologia scientiae subalternatae assimilatur, inquantum ex iis principiis incipit quae ex scientia divina per revelationem atque fidem accipit. Denique tandem, cum nulla scientia qua scientia mensuretur secundum cognitionem praescientificam ex qua incipiat, ita etiam perperam theologica scientia ut scientia mensuratur secundum cognitionem fidei ex qua incipit. Quinto, perspectis obiectis, iam considerandi sunt processus qui inter obiecta, quasi motus inter terminos, versantur. Et primo de eo processu agendum est qui ex obiecto movente in obiectum ut terminum progreditur. Quo in processu duo maxime distinguuntur. In unaquaque enim aetate convenienter distinguitur inter motum quendam fundamentalem quo iam cognita in scholis traduntur, et motum alium et superadditum quo actu investigantes augmentum intelligentiae, scientiae, sapientiae promovere nituntur. Secundum primum ergo atque fundamentalem motum62 incipitur ex iis quae nunc temporis vel manifeste ad ipsam fidem pertinent vel manifeste cum fide connectuntur; deinde ex his veris atque manifestis per viam analyticam ad eas conclusiones proceditur quae, quoad se, priores, notiores, manifestiores iudicantur; tertio, per viam syntheticam et ordine inverso ex prioribus quoad se proceditur in intelligentiam tum ipsius veri revelati tum etiam revelabilium quae cum vero revelato connectuntur. Secundum alium vero et superadditum motum,63 numquam deficiet sive obiectum movens sive necessitas impellens. Nam verbum Dei scriptum et traditum ‘tot tantosque continet thesauros veritatis, ut numquam reapse exhauriatur,’ et ideo

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Moreover, since the object that moves us to theological understanding is revealed truth, the principles of theological science are called articles of faith. Furthermore, since it is the property of a subordinate science to receive its principles from another science, theology is likened to a subordinate science in that it begins from those principles that it receives from divine knowledge through revelation and faith. Finally, since no science as science is measured by the prescientific knowledge from which it begins, it is incorrect to measure theological science as science by the knowledge of faith from which it begins. Fifth, after discussing the objects we have to consider the processes that function between the objects as movements between terms. And first we consider the process from the moving object to the object that is the term. In this process, there is a most important distinction to be made. In any age a distinction can be made between the fundamental movement by which is handed on in the schools what is already known and another, further movement by which active inquirers try to promote a growth of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom. The first, fundamental movement62 begins from what at any given time clearly belongs to the faith or is clearly connected with the faith; then from these clear truths this movement proceeds by the way of analysis to those conclusions that are judged to be prior, better known, more obvious in themselves; third, by the way of synthesis and in inverse order, the same fundamental movement proceeds from what are prior in themselves to an understanding both of revealed truth itself and of those realities that are revealable because of their connection with revealed truth. As for the second, further movement,63 there will never be lacking either a moving object or a compelling necessity. For the word of God written and handed on contains ‘so many and such great treasures of truth that it will never be really 62 [Note that this ‘fundamental movement’ comprises the two movements that in section 5 were spoken of in terms of analysis and synthesis. What joins them together into one is the notion of ‘handing on’ mentioned in the previous paragraph. A clear example of the two movements both being involved in handing on what is already known can be found in the two volumes of Lonergan’s De Deo Trino: the dogmatic part proceeds by way of analysis, the systematic part by way of synthesis and in inverse order, but each part is handing on what is already known. The ‘movement’ from moving object to term occurs, both by way of analysis and by way of synthesis, in those who learn from reading the two parts. The volume also provides examples of the second movement, however. See the next note.] 63 [While much in the present work qualifies in terms of this second movement, which goes beyond and advances what has been said before, Lonergan’s discussion of consciousness in the Trinity would seem to be one especially notable instance. But perhaps we might say that Lonergan’s position on consciousness affects the entire work and lifts the tradition into a new dimension.]

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‘sacrorum fontium studio sacrae disciplinae semper iuvenescunt.’ 64 Sed obiectum movens ad intelligentiam theologicam est verbum Dei scriptum et traditum. Numquam ergo ex parte obiecti moventis deerit motio ad theologicam intelligentiam, scientiam, sapientiam augendam. Quod si huic motioni parum attenditur, accedit necessitas impellens. Ita enim conditiones culturales vitae humanae perpetuo fere commutari solent, ut non solum bonos fructus exserant sed etiam hominis lapsi atque peccaminosi ignorantiam atque malitiam manifestent. Porro, sicut et ignorantia ita etiam malitia, quae lucem non diligit, rarius directe iis opponitur quae theologia clare intelligit atque efficaciter docet, frequentius autem atque probabilius ea indicat quae theologi vel non satis perspexerint vel perspecta haud efficaciter docuerint. Quam ob causam, cum eatenus augeantur tum pastoralis officii tum laboris apostolici problemata, quatenus conditiones culturales in peius commutentur, ex ipsis his problematibus oritur impulsus ut in iis perficiatur theologia ubi et ipsa profectu indigeat et practica urgeat necessitas.

Attamen duplex problematum genus agnosci oportet. Alia enim problemata sunt quae ideo solvantur quia vetera novis augeantur atque perficiantur; et circa quaestiones eiusmodi adhibendus est motus superadditus qui ex revelatione divina movente ad verum plenius intelligendum perveniat. Alia autem sunt problemata longe graviora, ubi id ipsum disputatur utrum re vera sint problemata, ubi dissentitur de ipsa problematis natura qualis sit, ubi id quod aliis remedium esse videtur ab aliis opponitur atque impugnatur tamquam malorum augmentum. Quibus sane in adiunctis, nihil proficiet qui vetera novis augere atque perficere studeat. Ubi enim de problematis existentia, natura, remedio penitus dissentitur, secundum alia et alia principia iudicatur; et ubi ipsa principia in conclusiones adeo oppositas conducunt, non de nova quadam et superaddenda perfectione sed de ipsis substantialibus atque veteribus rite intelligendis potius agitur.

Sexto, remanet ut brevissime ille motus consideretur qui ex obiecto immanenter producto in obiectum ut finem procedat. Iam vero cum intellectus sit voluntatem movere atque dirigere, immanenter in nobis producimus illum terminum qui est verum intelligibile, non solum ut obiectum ut finis in vero cognoscatur sed etiam ut voluntas in ipsum finem moveatur. Qua de causa, cum obiectum theologiae ut finis primario sit ipse Deus et secundario omnia quae ad oeconomiam salutis pertineant, ideo in nobis per theologiam producitur verum intelligibile, non solum

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exhausted,’ and so ‘the sacred disciplines are always being rejuvenated by the study of the sacred sources.’64 The object that moves us to theological understanding is the word of God written and handed on, and so from the side of the moving object there will never be lacking an impulse toward increasing theological understanding, knowledge, and wisdom. But if little heed is given to this impulse a compelling necessity ensues. The cultural conditions of human life continually change, and they do so in such a way that they not only produce good fruit but also manifest the ignorance and malice of fallen, sinful humanity. Now as ignorance, so malice, which loves not the light, is rarely directly opposed to those things that theology clearly understands and effectively teaches. More frequently and more credibly, it points to matters that theologians have not yet adequately grasped or at least have not yet expressed effectively in their teaching. For this reason, since problems multiply for the church’s pastoral office and its apostolic work in direct proportion to the worsening of cultural conditions, there arises from these very problems an impulse to complete theology in those areas where it needs improvement and where practical necessity requires. Nonetheless, two kinds of problems have to be acknowledged. Some problems can be solved by augmenting and by perfecting the old with the new. For such questions, one can rely on the additional movement that arrives at a fuller understanding of the truth under the influence of divine revelation. But there are other problems of a far more serious nature, where people dispute whether there are really problems at all, where there is no agreement about the nature of the problem, where what seems to some to be a solution seems to others to be an increase of evil. The person who is working to augment and perfect the old with the new provides no help at all in meeting these circumstances. Where there is complete disagreement about the existence and the nature of the problem and about its remedy, the judgments that are being made are based on conflicting principles; and where those principles lead to opposed conclusions, the issue is not one of finding some new improvement that can be added to the old substance; rather, the issue has to do with the substance itself and the correct understanding of the old. Sixth, we must consider very briefly the movement from the immanently produced object to the object as the goal. It is the intellect’s function to move and direct the will, and so when we immanently produce in ourselves the term that is intelligible truth, it is not only so that the object as goal may be known in the true but also so that the will may be moved toward that goal. Now the object of theology in the sense of its goal is primarily God and secondarily whatever pertains to the economy of salvation, and so intelligible truth is produced in us by theology 64 Acta Apostolicae Sedis xlii (1950) 568; db 2314, ds 3886, nd 859.

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ut finis intelligendo cognoscatur sed etiam ut caritas erga Deum atque proximum spiretur.65 Sicut enim non sola fide iustificatur homo sed ea fide quae per caritatem operatur,66 ita non sola theologia perficitur homo sed ea theologia quae caritatem profundius spirat et efficacius illuminat. Qua in motione, cum vehementius imprimat67 primum agens quam secundarium, pluris omnino valent gratuita Dei dona quam ea quae consequenter sunt in hominis potestate. Attamen sicut et ille graviter erraret qui ita omnia ex Deo exspectaret ut ipse ad modum servi inutilis68 nihil prorsus facere vellet, ita etiam quietismus intellectualis est reprehendendus. Si enim theologorum maximus ad finem vitae experiendo noverit quanto maius sit donum Dei quam opus theologicum, etiam meminisse iuvat S. Teresiam utiliora iudicasse veri theologi quam sancti sacerdotis consilia. Quae cum ita sint, ne theologiam spernamus quia alia et perfectiora inveniantur ipsa Dei dona; sed potius illud faciamus quod nunc exigitur ut ad maiora praeparati inveniamur. Sicut enim et caeterae paenitentiae, ita etiam theologia nos a sensibilibus retrahit ut spiritu augeamur atque confortemur.

Proinde, cum brevitatis causa theologiam ut sapientiam seu scientiarum reginam non consideravimus, idem aspectus etiam nunc omittendus est. Qui tamen, uti patet, summi momenti est tum ut totus intellectus et, per consequens, tota cultura Christo sit captiva, tum specialiter ad eum motum dirigendum qui infideles ad fidem conducere nitatur. At etiam in apologetica practica suas partes habet dogmatica; imo post diuturnam experientiam in Britannia Maiori concluserunt qui apud The Catholic Evidence Guild laborabant, efficaciorem quodammodo ad acatholicos convertendos esse claram exactamque dogmatis expositionem quam veritatis catholicae probationes atque defensiones. Quod autem ex ipsa peracta analysi consequitur, attentius considerari oportet. Si enim theologia ex priori scripturistico et patristico ad prius systematicum procedit, attingitur sane quoddam catholicum atque universale quod per omnia saecula immutatum manere potest. At hoc systematicum, quod per tres philosophiae

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so that not only may the goal be known by understanding but also love may be spirated65 toward God and neighbor. Just as we are not justified by faith alone but by that faith that works through love,66 so we are not perfected by theology alone but only by that theology that breathes forth charity more deeply and enlightens it more effectively. In this movement, the first agent exerts a more powerful influence 67 than the secondary agents, and so God’s gifts of grace are of far greater importance than what lies within human power as a consequence of these gifts. Still, just as one would make a serious mistake if one were so to await everything from God that, like a useless servant,68 one were not willing to do anything at all, so too intellectual quietism is to be condemned. Granted that the greatest of theologians at the end of his life came to experience God’s gifts as vastly superior to all theological achievement, it also helps to remember that St Teresa considered the advice of a genuine theologian more useful than that of a saintly priest. Let us not, then, spurn theology just because there exist other, more perfect gifts of God; rather, let us do what is required now, so that we may be found ready for those more perfect gifts. For theology, like other penitential practices, withdraws us from immersion in sensible things so that we may grow spiritually stronger. Finally, for brevity’s sake we have not considered theology as wisdom or as queen of the sciences, and we will not pursue the point here either. Still, this point is obviously of extreme importance both for making the whole mind, and consequently the entire culture, submissive to Christ, and especially for guiding the movement that would attempt to bring unbelievers to faith. In fact dogmatics has a role even in practical apologetics; people who had worked for years in the Catholic Evidence Guild in Great Britain concluded that a clear and exact presentation of dogma is more effective for converting non-Catholics than proofs and arguments in defense of Catholic truth. The consequences of this analysis have to be considered more carefully. If theology moves from the ‘scriptural and patristic prior’ to the ‘systematic prior,’ it reaches something Catholic and universal that can remain unchanged through all ages. But this systematic achievement, which we gradually learn through three 65 [The meaning of ‘spirated’ will be clarified in the trinitarian theology itself. The term refers to the procession of love.] 66 [See Galatians 5.6 and 1 Corinthians 13.2.] 67 [On ‘vehementius imprimat’ see Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) 298. As Lonergan says there, the meaning is that ‘the activity of the higher cause is a presupposition of the activity of the lower.’] 68 [See Matthew 25.14–30 and Luke 19.12–27.]

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et quattuor theologiae annos69 pedetentim ipsi addiscimus, magis substantiam quam modum eorum respicit quae ad fideles instruendos et infideles convertendos praedicare debemus. Qui enim curriculo philosophico et theologico priventur, haud ad prius quoad se et notius systematicum ascendere possunt. Cum autem ipsi nos tum prius systematicum tum prius contemporaneum cognoscamus, ad nos pertinet ut ex priori systematico ita transeamus ut idem ipsum secundum prius contemporaneum clare atque exacte exponamus. Sicut enim apostolus Paulus aliter ad Iudaeos aliter ad Gentes eundem sane Deum praedicavit, 70 ita etiam nos eandem fidem secundum prius systematicum addiscimus ut ipsi clare atque exacte intelligamus et eandem fidem secundum priora contemporanea exponimus, ut alios et alios secundum singulorum capacitatem clare atque exacte intelligere faciamus. Quod si quis dixerit haec quidem intellectu esse facillima praxi autem difficillima, hoc quidem ita concedi oportet (secus enim superfluerent scholae tum theologiae pastoralis tum missiologiae), ut necessaria quaedam distinctio non omittatur. Quodcumque enim intellectum est, eo ipso intellectu facillimum factum est; attamen donec intelligatur, valde obscurum, imo fere impenetrabile, videri solet. Posita distinctione inter prius quoad se et systematicum et, alia ex parte, prius quoad alios et alios, sane elucet tum theologiam scholasticam non esse quoddam relativum atque ideo antiquatum, tum idem verum in scripturis, in patribus, atque in conciliis etiam recentissimis exponi, tum scripturis et patribus non ita esse innitendum ut ea omittantur quae posterius clare ab ecclesia sunt proposita. At eadem distinctione omissa, tum practice tum speculative aberrari potest. Si 71 enim prius quoad se et systematicum fingitur esse prius quoad nos et contemporaneum, sequitur omnes quascumque gentes omnesque classes sociales eodem prorsus modo esse instruendas ac auditores in scholis theologicis. Si autem prius quoad se et systematicam fingitur esse prius quoad homines non modernos sed mediaevales, sequitur multiplex ille relativismus, qui secundum diversas suas tendentias atque manifestationes in litteris encyclicis, ‘Humani generis,’ damnatus est. 72

Haec ergo de praesenti sufficiant, etsi alia et ampliora et profundiora ad tractatum methodologicum omnino requirerentur. Ad scopum autem nostrum satis

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years of philosophy and four of theology,69 has more to do with the substance of faith than with the manner of expressing what we should be preaching in order to instruct the faithful and convert the unbelieving. People who have never been exposed to a course of philosophical and theological studies are not able to rise to what is first in itself or systematically better known. It is the responsibility of those of us familiar with both the ‘systematic prior’ and the ‘contemporary prior’ to move from the former to a clear and exact expression of the same thing in accord with the latter. Just as the apostle Paul preached the same God in one way to the Jews and in another way to the Gentiles,70 so too it is one and the same faith that we learn in accord with the ‘systematic prior’ in order that we might understand it clearly and exactly, and that we express in keeping with various examples of the ‘contemporary prior’ in order that we might bring many other people to understand it as clearly and exactly as each one is able. But if anyone says that these points are easy to understand but difficult to practise, I should have to grant the truth of that observation. That is why we have schools of pastoral theology and missiology. But I would also insist on a necessary distinction. Whatever is understood becomes very easy from the moment one has understood it; but until it is understood, it seems very obscure indeed, almost impenetrable. Once we posit the distinction between what is prior in itself and systematically and what is prior to one or other group, then it is clear that Scholastic theology is not just another relative reality and therefore out of date, that the same truth is expressed in the scriptures, in the Fathers, and in the most recent councils, and that it is wrong to try to rely so much on scripture and the Fathers as to overlook the subsequent clear formulations of the church. But if that distinction is overlooked, then errors can easily follow both in the speculative and in the practical order. For71 if it is thought that what is systematic and in itself prior is what is prior for us and for a contemporary mentality, then it follows that all nations and all social classes must be instructed in exactly the same manner as students in theological schools. On the other hand, if what is prior in itself and systematic is thought to be what is prior for medievals and not for modern men and women, there follows the many-headed relativism that in all its tendencies and manifestations has been condemned in the encyclical letter Humani generis. 72 Let what has been said suffice for now. A methodological treatise would have to include other more ample and more profound remarks, but it is enough for our 69 [A reference to the usual seminary course of training at that time.] 70 Acts 13.17–41; 14.15–18; 17.22–31. 71 [This sentence was omitted from De Deo Trino, it would seem by mistake. The translation is of a sentence that appears in Divinarum personarum at this point.] 72 Acta Apostolicae Sedis xlii (1950) 563–69; 571–75.

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est si modo quodam generaliori perspicitur et undenam oriatur motus theologicus, et quemadmodum procedat, et quid in nobis producat, et quinam inde fructus percipiatur. At motum theologicum ortum diximus ex obiecto movente quod est verum a Deo revelatum et ab ecclesia propositum et fide susceptum. Eundem motum procedere vidimus tum via analytica qua ex manifestioribus quoad nos ad prius quoddam quoad se atque systematicum ascenditur, tum via synthetica qua ex priori systematico in intelligentiam reditur tum ipsius veri revelati tum aliorum quae cum revelatis connectantur. Eundem etiam motum saeculorum decursu et ipsum quodammado moveri vidimus, cum obiectum movens sit fons quidam veritatis qui non exhauriatur, cumque rerum humanarum inconstantia semper nova problemata generet quibus quasi compellamur ut ad obiectum movens redeamus attentiores. Eiusdem praeterea motus immanentem terminum verum intelligibile esse perspeximus, cuius quidem veritas ex fide dependeat, cuius autem intelligibilitas ita in via analytica oriatur ut in via synthetica consolidetur. Denique tandem huius veri intelligibilis tanti sunt fructus, tum ut ipsi in Deum finem recte procedamus, tum ut alios efficaciter adiuvare possimus, ut ipsum primum Vaticanum concilium affirmare non dubitavit intelligentiam mysteriorum, etsi imperfectam, nihilominus esse fructuosissimam (db 1796).

Sectio Decima: Opusculi Intentio Finis ergo, qui hoc in opusculo intenditur, est intelligentia illa theologica quae est imperfecta, analogica, obscura, pedetentim sese evolvens, synthetica, fructuosa; quae quidem, quatenus intelligentia est, neque vera est neque falsa, sive in se sive in verbo interiori sive in verbo exteriori consideratur; quae de se non conducit sive in verum per se notum quoad nos sive in verum ex intrinsecis demonstrabile sive in hypothesin cuius intrinseca possibilitas vel clare vel distincte perspiciatur; quae tamen ad rationem veri pertingit, tum inquantum ex vero explicite vel implicite revelato incipit, tum inquantum alio vero philosophico vel historico utitur, tum inquantum secundum omnes suas consequentias cum vero revelato cohaeret, tum denique si ipsius veri revelati intelligentia est. Quem in finem proceditur non via dogmatica sed systematica. Non solum ergo vera revelata praesupponuntur sed etiam omnia quae ex veris revelatis deducuntur. Neque praesens intentio est sive ut augeatur certitudo de ipsis revelatis, sive ut confirmentur deductiones ex revelatis, sive ut efficacius adversarii veritatis catholicae refellantur. Sicut enim non vivit homo solo pane, ita etiam scientia non vivit certitudine sola. Et ideo, praesupposita certitudine fidei firmissima, praesuppositis

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purposes here to grasp in a fairly general way whence the theological movement arises, how it proceeds, what it produces in us, and what benefits can be reaped from it. We have said that the movement of theology has its origins in the object that moves that is the truth revealed by God, as that truth is proposed by the church and accepted in faith. We have seen that the same movement proceeds both by the way of analysis that goes from what are first and more obvious to us to what is systematically first in itself, and by the way of synthesis that returns from what is systematically first to a concrete understanding of revealed truth and all that is connected with it. We saw that the same movement itself undergoes some kind of development over the centuries, because the object that moves is an inexhaustible source of truth, and because the fickleness of human affairs is always generating new problems that compel us to return and be more attentive to the object that moves. We saw that the immanent term of the same movement is intelligible truth, whose truth depends on faith and whose intelligibility so emerges in the way of analysis as to be consolidated in the way of synthesis. Finally, the fruits of this intelligible truth are so great, both for guiding us rightly toward God our goal and for enabling us to give effective help to others, that the First Vatican Council did not hesitate to affirm that the understanding of the mysteries, even though imperfect, is nevertheless most fruitful (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). 10 The Purpose of This Work Our goal in this work is that imperfect, analogical, obscure, gradually developing, synthetic, and fruitful theological understanding. As understanding, it is neither true nor false, whether in itself or in its inner word or in its outer word. Of itself it does not lead to a truth that is per se known by us, or to a truth that is demonstrable from its own intrinsic principles, or to a hypothesis whose intrinsic possibility can be either clearly or distinctly grasped. Nevertheless it does relate to the formality of truth, in that it begins from something true that has been explicitly or implicitly revealed, in that it makes use of other truth, whether philosophic or historical, in that all its consequences are coherent with revealed truth, and in that it is an understanding of revealed truth itself. It proceeds to this goal, not by the dogmatic way but by the systematic. Therefore, it presupposes not only the revealed truths but also all that is deduced from the revealed truths. Our present intent is not to increase certitude about revealed truths, or to confirm deductions from revealed truths, or to refute more effectively the opponents of Catholic truth. For just as man does not live on bread alone, so knowledge does not live on certitude alone. Thus, presupposing firm certitude with regard to the faith, presupposing conclusions that have been deduced with

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conclusionibus certe deductis, praesuppositis adversariis iam pridem refutatis, certorum quaerimus intelligentiam. Incipitur ergo non a maxime manifestis ut obscuriora demonstrentur sed ex maxime obscuris ut ea quae iam pridem certa atque manifesta sint etiam intellecta fiant. Neque mira quadam perversitate ex obscuris incipitur quia obscura sunt, sed vera rectitudine ex prioribus quoad se incipitur etsi sint obscura. Qui enim intelligentiam ordinate quaerit, ex iis incipit quorum intelligentia intelligentiam aliorum non praesupponit. Qua de causa, non a personis divinis incipitur, cum intelligentia personarum intelligentiam relationum praesupponat. Neque a relationibus incipitur, cum intelligentia relationum intelligentiam processionum praesupponat. Neque a generatione Filii et spiratione Spiritus sancti incipitur, cum hae processiones, specifice inter se distinctae, aliquid prius et genericum communiter praesupponant. Et ideo ab emanatione incipitur tamquam a maxime fundamentali in via systematica. Et cum personae solummodo in capite quarto, cum relationes solummodo in capite tertio, cum generatio Filii et spiratio Spiritus solummodo ad finem capitis secundi considerentur, incipitur ab emanatione intelligibili prout in Deo concipi potest, antequam distinguantur duae processiones, antequam cogitentur quattuor relationes, antequam via systematica concipiantur tres personae.

Intellecta autem, quantum fieri potest, emanatione intelligibili divina, proceditur ad distinctionem duarum emanationum; duabus distinctis, determinatur utrum alia sit generatio et alia non; determinatis processionibus, ad relationes acceditur; et investigatis relationibus, ad personas terminatur. Quo in processu nihil aliud quaeritur quam ordinatum atque paedagogice directum intelligentiae augmentum. Illud enim quaeritur quod peculiare atque pretiosum perspexit Aristoteles in syllogismo epistemonico seu scientifico seu ‘faciente scire.’ Cum enim omnes syllogismi pariter in certas conclusiones conducant, syllogismus scientificus non solum conclusionem certam sed etiam intellectam gignit. Quam ob causam, cum theologia sit analogice scientia, syllogismis analogice scientificis utitur, ut certitudini aliunde acquisitae accedat etiam imperfecta quaedam intelligentia.73

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certainty, presupposing that opponents have already been refuted, we are seeking an understanding of what is certain. We begin, then, not from what is most obvious in order to demonstrate something more obscure, but from what is most obscure in order to understand what is already certain and obvious. We do not begin from what is obscure because it is obscure, as if motivated by some strange perversity. Rather we follow the straighforward procedure of beginning with what is first in itself even though it is obscure. Anyone seeking understanding in an orderly way begins from what can be understood without presupposing the understanding of anything else. This is why we do not begin with the divine persons, for understanding the divine persons presupposes understanding the relations. We do not begin with the relations, for understanding the relations presupposes understanding the processions. And we do not begin with the generation of the Son and the breathing forth of the Holy Spirit, for these processions, which are specifically distinct from each other, presuppose something prior, something generic in respect to both of them. Our starting point, then, is intellectual emanation, as that which is absolutely basic in the systematic approach. The persons are considered only in chapter 4, the relations only in chapter 3, and the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Spirit only toward the end of chapter 2. But our starting point is intellectual emanation as it can be conceived of in God, before the two processions are distinguished, before the four relations are considered, before the three persons are conceived systematically. When we have understood intellectual emanation in God as well as we can, we will go on to distinguish two emanations. Once we have distinguished the two emanations, we will determine whether one is generation and the other not; once the processions have been determined, we will proceed to the relations; and after the relations have been investigated, we end with a treatment of the persons. We are seeking nothing else in this process than an ordered and pedagogically guided growth in understanding. We are seeking that special precious quality that Aristotle discerned in the ‘epistemonic’ or explanatory syllogism, the syllogism that ‘makes us know.’ While all syllogisms lead equally to conclusions that are certain, the explanatory syllogism brings forth a conclusion that is not only certain but also understood. And so, since theology is analogously a science, it uses syllogisms that are scientific in an analogous way, in order to add some imperfect understanding to a certitude that has been acquired elsewhere.73 73 [Explanatory or scientific syllogisms are discussed in Verbum at 26, 28 and note 58, and 37. See also Lonergan, Phenomenology and Logic, vol. 18 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Philip J. McShane (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 101–106 and ‘Theology and Understanding’ in Collection at 116–20.]

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Viae ergo systematicae processus proprius et essentialis, quamvis sermone humano haud exprimatur nisi per deductiones etiam certas, tamen non ipsam hanc certitudinem intendit sed illud intelligentiae augmentum quod ex intelligentia unius oritur et pedetentim ad alia intelligenda extenditur. Quare, intellecta quodammodo emanatione intelligibili divina, proceditur ad intelligentiam emanationis Verbi et emanationis Amoris; his intellectis, proceditur in intelligentiam generationis divinae; et similiter in aliis gradatim evolvuntur notiones donec ad eam perveniatur intelligentiam quae hac in materia haberi possit. Neque plus hoc in opusculo directe intendi potest vel debet, cum iam sat complexum sit argumentum, cum alia circa quaestiones positivas sit methodus, cum minime desint eximia opera quibus fundamentum positivum modo amplissimo exponatur.

Indirecte tamen alios fructus neque eos parvos percipi posse arbitramur. Sicut enim in organismo quodam vivente non intelligitur totum nisi partes intelliguntur neque una pars aliis remotis atque seiunctis intelligi potest, ita etiam omnes scientiae theologicae partes adeo inter se cohaerent et mutuo dependent ut, vel una omissa parumve intellecta, caeterae proprium munus atque officium explere nequeant. Quod multis diversisque modis de motu theologico disserentes superius illustravimus. Quorum enim via dogmatica quaerit certitudinem, eorundem via systematica quaerit intelligentiam. Quorum via systematica intelligentiam quandam invenit, iisdem non semel suam auctoritatem communicavit ecclesia docens. Quae ecclesia docet, tamquam praemissas assumit via dogmatica. Quae autem in fontibus revelationis continentur sed via tum dogmatica tum systematica non satis considerantur, attentionem sibi vindicant per problemata apostolica et pastoralia ex ipsa hac negligentia orta, ut renovatis studiis positivis augeatur atque proficiat theologica intelligentia, scientia, sapientia.

At nostrae aetatis esse videtur studia positiva non solum summa quadam diligentia sed etiam methodo propria atque exacta prosequi. Quod cum factum sit, nisi pars theologiae speculativa et pari diligentia et methodo pariter propria atque specializata excolitur, haud fieri potest ut ex ipsa hac inaequalitate non oriantur difficultates, querimoniae, incomprehensiones, crises, imo et aberrationes. Quod si explodere volumus illam opinationem, scholasticismum esse antiquatum quam errorum fontem lamentatae sunt litterae encyclicae, ‘Humani generis,’ non parvae

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While the process that is proper and essential to the systematic way can hardly be expressed in human words except through deductions that are also certain, still it aims, not at this certitude, but at the increase of understanding that starts by understanding one item and then gradually extends to understanding others. Thus, given some understanding of intellectual emanation in God, we move to an understanding of the emanation of the Word and the emanation of Love. Having understood what we can of these, we go on to an understanding of generation in God. And so with all other points, one step at a time, we develop our ideas until we come to as much understanding as is available on these matters. Nothing more can be intended directly in this volume, nor should it be. The argument of the volume is already complex enough, the method of dealing with issues of positive research is quite different from what we are doing here, and there is no lack of outstanding works that set forth the positive foundation in a quite complete manner. We believe, however, that further benefits, and significant ones, can be gained indirectly from this study. Just as in a living organism the whole cannot be understood without an understanding of the parts, and no one part can be understood if the others are separated from it and taken away, so too all parts of theological science fit together and depend on one another to such an extent that if one part is omitted or poorly understood, the other parts cannot really fulfil their proper task and function. We illustrated this above in several different ways when we spoke about the movement of theology. The points on which dogmatic theology seeks certitude are the very same points that systematic theology seeks to understand. The points for which systematic theology has found some understanding are the very same points to which the teaching church has more than once lent its authoritative support. What the church teaches furnishes premises for dogmatic theology. On the other hand, those matters contained in the sources of revelation that have not been adequately considered in either systematic or dogmatic theology call attention to themselves because of the apostolic and pastoral problems that arise from this neglect, so that, through a renewal in positive studies, theological understanding, knowledge, and wisdom grow and advance. Today it appears that positive studies are being pursued not only most diligently but also with their own proper and exact methods. Since this is a fact, unless the speculative part of theology is pursued with equal diligence and with a method that is equally proper and specialized, there will arise from this inequality only difficulties, complaints, misunderstandings, crises, even aberrations. The encyclical Humani generis singled out as a regrettable source of errors the opinion that Scholasticism is out of date. If we want to demolish that opinion, I think it will

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utilitatis fore arbitror brevius quoddam opusculum quod eo clarius naturam theologicae intelligentiae illustrare possit, quod, caeteris omissis quae mentem distrahant, finem speculativum unice intendat.74

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help to have a brief work that illustrates the nature of theological understanding by aiming uniquely at the speculative goal, leaving out everything that might distract from that goal.74

74 [Lonergan’s reflections on Scholasticism as being ‘out of date’ would, of course, be much more nuanced following the Second Vatican Council.]

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CAPUT SECUNDUM

De Divinis Processionibus Analogice Concipiendis

Cum via systematica ex eo incipiat cuius intelligentia intelligentiam alterius non praesupponat, de processionibus ordiendum est. In processionibus enim fundantur relationes, ad quas consequuntur secundum nostrum concipiendi modum personae divinae. Circa processiones, primo ponitur problema, deinde enumerantur principales sententiarum classes secundum earum radices, tertio explicatur quid sit emanatio intelligibilis, quarto tria asserta stabiliuntur, et quinto solvuntur quaestiones annexae quattuor. Tria autem asserta respiciunt, primo, ipsam analogiam psychologicam generice sumptam, nempe quod processiones divinae sunt concipiendae per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis, deinde, genericae notionis differentiationem, nempe quod duae et tantummodo duae processiones divinae concipi possunt per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis, verbi scilicet a dicente, et amoris ab utroque, tertio, specificae notionis applicationem, nempe quod divina verbi emanatio, non autem emanatio amoris, est generatio proprie dicta. Quaestiones autem annexae respiciunt distinctionem inter intelligere et verbum, demonstrabilitatem Verbi divini, processionem Verbi divini ex intelligentia creaturarum, et habitudinem inter amorem et quod dicitur ‘amatum in amante.’ Quibus in omnibus, uti forte satis primo capitulo iam dictum est, non intenditur nisi viae syntheticae finis proprius. Qua de causa, hic non repetuntur ea fundamenta positiva quae ex documentis ecclesiasticis, ex sacra scriptura, ex patribus

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An Analogical Conception of the Divine Processions

Since the systematic way begins from what can be understood without presupposing the understanding of anything else, we must begin with the processions. For the processions are the basis for the relations, and in accordance with our manner of conceiving, the divine persons are conceived subsequently to conceiving the relations. Regarding the processions, first we present the problem, and then we list the principal groups of opinions, according to their roots; third, we explain what intellectual emanation is; fourth, we establish three assertions; and fifth, we solve four related questions. The first of the three assertions has to do with the psychological analogy taken generically: the divine processions are to be conceived by their likeness to intellectual emanation. The second assertion has to do with the differentiation of the generic notion: two and only two divine processions can be conceived by means of their likeness to intellectual emanation, namely, the procession of the word from the speaker, and the procession of love from the speaker and the word. The third assertion has to do with an application of the specific notion: the divine emanation of the word is properly called generation but the emanation of love is not. The related questions regard the distinction between understanding and the word, the demonstrability of the divine Word, the procession of the divine Word from the understanding of creatures, and the relationship between love and what is called ‘the beloved in the lover.’ In all of this, as perhaps was already stated sufficiently in the first chapter, we are aiming exclusively at the proper goal of the way of synthesis. For this reason, we will not repeat here the positive foundations that are customarily adduced

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atque theologis afferri solent. Nam, primo, in multis et eximiis operibus iam praesto sunt; deinde, non efficaciter proponuntur nisi proprio ordine qui ordini viae syntheticae omnino contrarius est; tertio, nimia complexitate iam oneratur nostrum argumentum; et quarto, perutile iudicamus viae syntheticae naturam indolemque propriam seorsum exponere; quamvis enim theologiae non sit nisi pars quaedam, ea tamen est pars quae nostris temporibus plus iusto aestimari non soleat.

Problema Fundamentale problema trinitarium in eo est quod et (1) Filius est tum a se tum non a se, et (2) Spiritus sanctus est tum a se tum non a se, et (3) aliter Filius et aliter Spiritus non est a se.

Nam Deus est a se. Sed Filius est Deus. Ergo Filius est a se. Similiter, Spiritus sanctus est Deus. Ergo etiam Spiritus sanctus est a se. Attamen, Filius non est a se. Nam est Filius, natus ex Patre, unigenitus, de substantia Patris, Deus ex Deo, lumen ex lumine, Deus verus de Deo vero (db 54). Similiter, Spiritus sanctus non est a se. Nam est ‘procedere ex Patre’ (db 86), et ‘ex Patre simul et Filio aeternaliter est, et essentiam suam suumque esse subsistens habet ex Patre simul et Filio, et ex utroque aeternaliter tamquam ab uno principio et unica spiratione procedit’ (db 691). Denique, aliter Filius non est a se, et aliter Spiritus sanctus non est a se. Nam Filius est unigenitus (db 54), sed Spiritus sanctus non est genitus sed procedens (db 39). Generatione ergo Filius sed spiratione (db 691) Spiritus oritur.

Iam vero idem secundum idem non potest simul affirmari et negari. Quare necesse est ut dicamus Filium secundum aliud esse a se et secundum aliud non esse a se. Pariter necesse est ut dicamus Spiritum sanctum secundum aliud esse a se et secundum aliud non esse a se. Denique necesse est ut aliud sit secundum quod Filius non est a se, et aliud secundum quod Spiritus non est a se.

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from church documents, from sacred scripture, and from the Fathers and the theologians. First of all, these elements are readily available in many excellent works; second, they are effectively set forth only in their own proper order, and that order is completely contrary to the order of the way of synthesis; third, our argument is already burdened with an overabundance of complexity; and fourth, we judge it most useful to exhibit separately the proper intrinsic nature of the way of synthesis; for, although the way of synthesis is only a part of theology, it is the part that is not too highly esteemed these days. The Problem The fundamental trinitarian problem lies in the following facts: (1) the Son is both a se, from himself, and not a se, not from himself; (2) the Holy Spirit is both a se, from himself, and not a se, not from himself; (3) the way in which the Son is not a se, not from himself, is different from the way in which the Holy Spirit is not a se, not from himself. Thus, God is a se, from himself. But the Son is God. Therefore, the Son is a se, from himself. Similarly, the Holy Spirit is God. Therefore the Holy Spirit is a se, from himself. Nevertheless, the Son is also not a se, not from himself. For he is the Son, the only-begotten, born of the Father, from the Father’s substance, God from God, light from light, true God from true God (db 54, ds 125, nd 7). Similarly, the Holy Spirit is also not a se, not from himself. For the Holy Spirit ‘proceeds from the Father’ (db 86, ds 150, nd 305) and ‘is eternally from the Father and the Son together, having his essence and his subsistent act of existence from the Father and the Son together, and proceeds eternally from both as from one principle and by a single spiration’ (db 691, ds 1300, nd 322). Finally, the way in which the Son is not a se, not from himself, is different from the way in which the Holy Spirit is not a se, not from himself. For the Son is the only-begotten (db 54, ds 125, nd 7), but the Holy Spirit is not begotten but proceeding (db 39, ds 75, nd 16). Therefore, the Son originates through generation, but the Holy Spirit originates through spiration (db 691, ds 1300, nd 322). Now, the same reality under the same aspect cannot be simultaneously affirmed and denied. Therefore, we must say that, in one way, the Son is a se, from himself, and in another way, not a se, not from himself. Similarly, we must say that the Holy Spirit is a se, from himself, in one way, and not a se, not from himself, in another way. Finally, it is necessary that the way in which the Son is not a se, not from himself, is different from the way in which the Holy Spirit is not a se, not from himself.

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Porro, ad solutionem huius problematis primus gressus est facillimus. Facillime enim dicitur Filius qua Deus esse a se sed qua genitus non esse a se. Facillime etiam dicitur Spiritus qua Deus esse a se sed qua spiratus non esse a se. Facillime denique aliud esse dicitur genitum esse et aliud spiratum esse. Attamen si tota solutio in vocibus exterius prolatis consistit, fit quidem sonus in aere sed, cum nihil habeatur in mente, ipse sonus omni sensu caret. Quod si quis diceret generationem Filii et spirationem Spiritus nihil aliud esse quam flatus vocis, sane haereticus esset. Quare ulterius procedendum est, ut dicamus quaenam sit mira illa emanatio secundum quam Deus est ex Deo, et quidem non alius Deus ex alio, sed idem ex eodem. Praeterea, dicendum est quid intercedat inter emanationem qua generatur Filius et aliam illam qua spiratur Spiritus. Denique, dicendum est cur prima emanatio sit generatio sed altera non sit generatio. Quae quidem quaestiones hoc in capite de processionibus tractantur.

Non tamen sufficit ut aliquid in mente intelligamus cum voces, generationem, spirationem, proferamus. Quod enim in mente intelligitur, nisi etiam in ipsa rerum realitate invenitur, ens rationis tantummodo est. Quod si quis diceret generationem Filii vel spirationem Spiritus esse entia rationis tantummodo, sane haereticus esset. Et ideo ulterius est procedendum ut dicamus quemadmodum in Deo simplicissimo Filius secundum aliud est a se et secundum aliud non est a se. Quod magnam habet difficultatem. Cum enim Filius sit Deus, et Deus sit simplicissimus, et in simplicissimo non sint aliud et aliud realiter, videtur sequi quod idem Filius secundum eandem realitatem tum a se est tum non a se. Quae quidem contradictio etiam circa Spiritum sanctum sequi videtur. Quocirca ponitur quaestio de relationibus divinis, utrum et quot sint reales, utrum inter se realiter distinguantur, utrum realiter an ratione a divina essentia distinguantur; et de his tractatur in capite tertio.

Manet tamen alius gressus. Sit quod generatio et spiratio sint non solum in vocibus sed etiam in mente, neque solum in mente sed etiam in ipsa realitate divina. Non alia tamen realitas in divinis est ponenda quam ea quae reapse ibi est. Confitetur fidelis tres personas divinas realiter inter se distinctas; at ex antecessis nihil concludit nisi tres relationes subsistentes realiter inter se distinctas. Quare in capite quarto dicendum erit utrum relationes divinae subsistentes tum ontologice tum psychologice sint veri nominis personae. Qua quaestione soluta, solvitur

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The first step toward solving this problem is very easy. It is very easy to say that, as God, the Son is a se, from himself, but, as begotten, the Son is not a se, not from himself. It is also very easy to say that, as God, the Holy Spirit is a se, from himself, but, as spirated, the Holy Spirit is not a se, not from himself. Lastly, it is very easy to say that being begotten is different from being spirated. Nevertheless, if the entire solution consists in externally uttered words, then a sound is indeed made in the air but, as nothing is present in the mind, the sound itself is completely without meaning. And if one were to say that the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit are words without meaning, one would surely be a heretic. Therefore, we must go further in order to say what this remarkable emanation is according to which God is from God, and indeed not one God from another God, but the same God from the same God. Moreover, we must say what the difference is between the emanation in which the Son is generated and the other emanation in which the Holy Spirit is spirated. Finally, we must state why the first emanation is generation but the other is not. These are the questions discussed in this chapter on the divine processions. However, it is not sufficient if we just understand something in the mind when we utter the words ‘generation’ and ‘spiration.’ If the something understood in the mind is not also found in reality, it is only a conceptual being. And if one were to say that the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit are merely conceptual beings, one would surely be a heretic. Therefore, we must go still further in order to say how within the absolutely simple God the Son in one way is a se, from himself, and in another way is not. This presents a great difficulty. For since the Son is God, and God is absolutely simple, and within absolute simplicity there is really no this and that, no ‘one’ and ‘another,’ it seems to follow that the same Son under the same aspect is both a se, from himself, and not a se, not from himself. The same contradiction seems to follow with respect to the Holy Spirit. Therefore we raise the issue of the divine relations, asking whether the divine relations are real and how many of them are real, whether they are really distinct from one another, whether they are really distinct from the divine essence or only conceptually distinct. These are the questions discussed in the third chapter. There remains a further step. Let us grant that generation and spiration exist not only in words but also in the mind, and not only in the mind but also in the very reality of God. Still, nothing is to be posited within the divine nature other than what is really there. The faithful confess three divine persons really distinct from one another; but the preceding outline of steps to be taken has ended with just three subsistent relations that are really distinct from one another. Therefore, in the fourth chapter we must determine whether, both ontologically and psychologically, the divine subsistent relations are persons in the true sense

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problema trinitarium fundamentale, ut sine contradictione et cum aliqua intelligentia concipiantur vereque affirmentur tres personae realiter distinctae in una eademque natura divina. Quae omnia per modum unius quasi simul conspecta, iam magis particulariter sunt consideranda. Primo, igitur, de processionibus divinis agendum est ut dicatur (1) quemadmodum in genere concipienda sit emanatio Dei ex Deo, (2) quemadmodum duae emanationes eiusmodi et tantummodo duae concipiantur, et (3) quam ob causam prima emanatio sit generatio proprie dicta, altera autem generatio non sit. Sententiae Circa processiones divinas quemadmodum intelligantur, aliae sententiae sunt erroneae, aliae insufficientes, aliae minus bene propositae, et alia S. Thomae. Sententiae erroneae eorum sunt qui peccent sive per excessum sive per defectum. Per excessum quidem peccant semirationalistae qui mysteria demonstrabilia affirmant et ea demonstrare nituntur; quae quidem sententia explicite et sub anathemate damnata est in conc. Vaticano i (db 1816). Per defectum autem peccant qui negant nos hac in vita vel imperfectam mysteriorum intelligentiam habere posse; quae sententia pio quodam sensu olim intelligi potuit ut, videlicet, errores haereticorum refellerentur vel audacia speculantium reprimeretur; cum tamen aperte conc. Vaticano i contradicat (db 1796), prorsus derelinquenda est. Sententiae autem insufficientes sunt eorum qui ita aliquid verum dicant ut tamen ipsum problema parum se intellexisse demonstrent. Ita verum omnino est quod bonum est sui diffusivum; at aliquid plus requiritur. Qualis enim est ista diffusio? Qualiter differt prima a secunda? Cur non sit tertia, quarta, sescentesima? Iterum, omnino verum est Deum trinum esse perfectam quandam amoris societatem. At redeunt quaestiones neque solvuntur. Sententiae minus bene propositae sunt eorum qui ita analogia psychologica utantur ut propriam huius analogiae vim atque efficaciam quodammodo praetermittant. Secundum hanc enim sententiam, quam credimus veriorem, existit similitudo quaedam inter divinas processiones et emanationes finitas quae in parte hominis intellectiva fiunt. At dupliciter concipi potest ipsa pars hominis intellectiva: uno modo, secundum ipsam partis intellectivae realitatem; alio modo, secundum

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of the word. Once this question is solved, the fundamental trinitarian problem is solved, so that without contradiction and with some understanding the three really distinct persons in one and the same divine nature may be conceived and truly affirmed. All that we have viewed as one and in a single glance must now be considered more particularly. First, then, we must discuss the divine processions in order to state (1) how in general the emanation of God from God is to be conceived, (2) how two such emanations and only two are to be conceived, and (3) why the first emanation is generation properly so called, while the other is not.

Opinions Some opinions about the ways in which the divine processions may be understood are erroneous, others are insufficient, still others are poorly propounded; then there is the opinion of St Thomas. The erroneous opinions err either through excess or through defect. The semirationalists err through excess; they affirm that the mysteries of faith are demonstrable, and they strive to demonstrate them. This opinion was explicitly condemned under an anathema by Vatican i (db 1816, ds 3041, nd 137). On the other hand, those who say that we cannot in this life have even an imperfect understanding of the mysteries of faith err by defect. This opinion could once have been understood as piety repelling heretical errors or curbing audacious speculation; but since it openly contradicts Vatican i (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132), it should be completely abandoned. The insufficient opinions express some truth but in such a way as to show that their proponents have only a slight understanding of the problem. Thus, it is entirely true that the good is self-diffusive; more than that, however, is required. What kind of diffusion is this? How does the first self-diffusion differ from the second? Why is there not a third, a fourth, a six-hundredth instance of self-diffusion? Again, it is entirely true that the triune God is the perfect society of love. But this gives rise to further questions; and they are not solved. By poorly propounded opinions I mean opinions of those who employ the psychological analogy, but in a way that overlooks to some extent the proper force and efficacy of the analogy. According to this approach, which we admit is closer to the truth than the previous approaches, some likeness exists between the divine processions and the finite emanations that occur in human intelligence. But human intelligence can be conceived in two ways: first, in accordance with the

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quandam analogiam ex parte hominis sensitiva deductam. Primo modo, concipitur intellectus humanus secundum ipsum intelligendi actum; et ita S. Thomas qui affirmat quod ‘anima humana intelligit se ipsam per suum intelligere, quod est actus proprius eius, perfecte demonstrans virtutem eius et naturam.’ 1 Alio modo, concipitur intellectus humanus, tum inquantum ex vocibus exterioribus proceditur ad conceptus universales, tum inquantum ex actu videndi corporali proceditur ad simplicem quandam apprehensionem spiritualem, qua conceptus nobis innotescunt; et ita Scotus, Scotistae, et non pauci alii qui tamen se S. Thomam sequi credant. Iam vero, inquantum concipitur intellectus humanus secundum propriam intellectus realitatem atque naturam, analogice procedi potest ad processiones divinas concipiendas; haec enim ipsa sententia est quae analogiam psychologicam defendit.2 Sed inquantum concipitur intellectus humanus per remotam quandam analogiam in sensibilibus et sensationibus fundatam, re vera omittitur id ipsum secundum quod invenitur similitudo inter Deum trinum et intellectum humanum; quo omisso, multum quidem laboratur, multum disputatur, at nihil clarum concluditur. Qua de causa, non solum adhibenda est analogia psychologica sed etiam ita intelligenda est ut non quaeratur similitudo inter partem nostram sensitivam et Deum trinum. Quod si ad ipsam nostram experientiam internam atque proprie intellectualem vel paulisper attendimus, haec tria invenimus. Primo, ‘Quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei intellectae, ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex eius notitia procedens.’3

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reality of intelligence itself, and second, in accordance with some analogy drawn from human sensibility. In the first way, the human intellect is conceived in terms of the act of understanding itself; thus St Thomas affirms that ‘the human soul understands itself by its understanding, which is its proper act, perfectly demonstrating its power and its nature.’1 In the second way, the human intellect is conceived first as proceeding from external words to universal concepts, then as proceeding from the corporeal act of seeing to some simple spiritual apprehension whereby concepts become known to us; this is the approach of Scotus and the Scotists, and of many others who believe they are following St Thomas. Now, if the human intellect is conceived in accordance with the intellect’s proper reality and nature, one is able to press forward to an analogical conception of the divine processions; this is the view that argues in favor of the psychological analogy. 2 But if the human intellect is conceived in accordance with some remote analogy founded in sensible data and sensations, one is overlooking the real basis for discovering the likeness between the triune God and the human intellect; and if this is overlooked one may labor strenuously and dispute extensively and yet conclude to nothing clear. Therefore, not only should the psychological analogy be employed, it must also be understood in such a way that the likeness is not sought between the sensitive part of our nature and the triune God. And if we attend even for a few moments to our own internal and properly intellectual experiences, we make three discoveries. First, ‘whenever we understand, by the mere fact that we do understand, something proceeds within us, which is the conception of the thing understood, issuing from our intellective power and proceeding from its knowledge.’ 3

1 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 88, a. 2, ad 3m. [The translation is Lonergan’s own, as given in ‘Insight : Preface to a Discussion,’ Collection 143.] 2 Ibid. q. 93, a. 6. 3 Ibid. q. 27, a.1 c. Note that the words ‘ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et’ [‘issuing from our intellectual power and’] are omitted in the edition of these questions (qq. 27–32) prepared by Bernhardus Geyer. See Bernhardus Geyer and Johannes Zellinger, Florilegium Patristicum xxxvii (Bonn: Hanstein, 1934) 6. [It may be added that these words change the referent of Thomas’s word ‘eius,’ from ‘rei intellectae’ to ‘vi intellectiva.’ Without these words, the translation would be something like ‘proceeding from knowledge of it,’ where ‘it’ is ‘the thing understood.’ But with these words added, ‘eius’ refers to the intellective power: ‘proceeding from its knowledge.’ The ‘knowledge’ here is what we will see later as a determination of the ‘intellective power.’ See below, p. 139, for the distinction between ‘a general fundamental light and further determinations of the same light.’]

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Deinde, ‘de ratione amoris est quod non procedit nisi a conceptione intellectus.’ 4 Tertio, ‘id quod procedit ad intra processu intelligibili, non oportet esse diversum: imo quanto perfectius procedit, tanto magis est unum cum eo a quo procedit.’ 5

Quae si intelliguntur, totum trinitarium problema fundamentale virtualiter solvitur, cum caetera non ulteriorem intelligentiam acquirendam exigant sed tantummodo intelligentiae adeptae ulteriores applicationes postulent.

De emanatione intelligibili Tripliciter de emanatione intelligibili disseritur. Primo modo, philosophice, ut de omnibus et singulis disputetur quae sive psychologice sive metaphysice mentem nostram respiciant. Altero modo, historice, ut exacte perspiciatur quid singuli philosophi atque theologi de mente nostra senserint. Tertio modo, theologice atque speculative, ut ea notitia nostrae mentis acquiratur ut intelligentia aliqua processionum divinarum haberi possit. At cum iam alibi nonnulla de quaestione tum philosophica6 tum historica7 conscripserimus, de praesenti sufficere videtur ut tertio modo procedamus. Rem ergo facillimam aggredimur. Non enim agitur de synthesi quadam philosophica perspicienda, neque de tota opinionum serie conspicienda atque diiudicanda, sed de simplici quadam atque brevissima reflectione peragenda. Quam quidem reflectionem omnes et singuli peragere possunt, quicumque ad aetatem rationis reapse pervenerint. Omnes enim experiendo novimus quid intercedat inter iudicium temerarium atque iudicium verum. Illud enim sine evidentia sufficienti profertur. Hoc autem in ipsa rei evidentia perspecta ita fundatur ut necessitate quadam intellectuali evitari

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Second, ‘it is of the nature of love not to proceed except from a conception of the intellect.’4 Third, ‘what proceeds internally by an intellectual process does not have to be different. Indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more it is one with that from which it proceeds.’5 Once we understand these three statements, the entire fundamental trinitarian problem is solved, at least virtually. The rest of what has to be said demands not the acquisition of further understanding, but only further applications of the understanding already achieved. Intellectual Emanation There are three ways of treating intellectual emanation. The first is philosophical; we investigate everything concerning our mind, whether from a psychological or from a metaphysical perspective. The second way is historical; we strive to understand exactly what individual philosophers and theologians thought concerning our mind. The third way is theological and speculative; we seek to acquire such knowledge of our mind as will enable us to have some understanding of the divine processions. Since we have already written something about both the philosophical question6 and the historical question,7 it seems sufficient here to proceed according to the third way. We are therefore attempting something very easy. For we are attempting neither to grasp some philosophical synthesis nor to review and pass judgment on a whole series of opinions, but to go through a simple, brief process of reflection. Everyone who has truly reached the age of reason can go through this process. Thus, we all know from experience the difference between a rash judgment and a true judgment. A rash judgment is produced without sufficient evidence. A true judgment, on the other hand, is a judgment so based on the evidence one has grasped that a certain intellectual necessity makes that judgment inescapable. 4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27 a.3, ad 3m. For more on this point, see the fourth question (pp. 218–29 below) on ‘the beloved in the lover.’ 5 Ibid. a. 1, ad 2m. See Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11, ¶¶ 1–8, §§ 3461–68. [Lonergan habitually counted the paragraphs in the Marietti manual edition of the Summa contra Gentiles. When paragraphs are indicated as they are here in the English text, the first numbering results from Lonergan’s counting, and the second is from the 1961 Marietti edition (Turin). Only the numbering from Lonergan’s counting appeared in Lonergan’s Latin text.] 6 Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. 7 Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas.

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non possit. Iam vero quod in iudicio temerario deest et in iudicio vero invenitur, emanatio intellectualis seu intelligibilis dicitur. 8 Quae sane emanatio nihil aliud est quam hoc quod quicumque evidentiam sufficientem perspicit, ex hoc ipso quod perspicit, per necessitatem quandam intellectualiter consciam, profert iudicium verum. Omnes etiam experiendo novimus quid intercedat inter definitionem memoriter repetitam et definitionem ideo propositam quia aliquid intelligendo perspeximus. Qui enim memoriter definitionem repetit, sonos quidem emittit, non quia quicquam intellexerit, sed quia habitum quendam sensitivum acquisivit. Qui autem ideo definitionem profert quia quod intellexit exprimere vult, non solum aliis verbis sed etiam multis diversisque exemplis illustrare potest id quod intendit; sicut enim in definiendo, ita etiam in illustrando, omne quod dicitur per ipsum intelligendi actum dirigitur atque quodammodo necessitatur. Iam vero quod in memoriter repetente deest sed in intelligente atque multipliciter explicante adest, iterum emanatio intellectualis seu intelligibilis dicitur. Quae sane emanatio nihil aliud est quam hoc quod quicumque intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, per quandam necessitatem intellectualiter consciam, tum definitiones tum explicationes atque illustrationes profert.

Omnes denique experiendo novimus quid intercedat inter actum voluntatis inordinatum rationique repugnantem et, alia ex parte, actum voluntatis ordinatum, honestum, obligatorium, sanctum. Bonum enim intellectu perspectum et ratione approbatum et voluntati impositum ita nos obligat ut, vel irrationales contra dictamen rectae rationis eligamus, vel rationales intellectui dictanti cedamus. Quod ergo in actu moraliter malo deest, in actu autem moraliter bono adest, processio illa spiritualis atque moralis est, quae ita efficaciter voluntatem obligat ut non solum bonum amare debeamus sed etiam bonum actu diligamus. Quae sane processio etiam emanatio quaedam intellectualis seu intelligibilis est, cum in eo consistat quod propter bonum intellectu perspectum appetitus potentia rationalis fiat rationalis actu. Propterea, cum ex ipsa sua natura voluntas sit appetitus rationalis, cum hic appetitus actu rationalis esse non possit nisi actu rationem sequatur, necessario dicitur quod ‘de ratione amoris est quod non procedat nisi a conceptione intellectus.’

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Now, what is lacking in a rash judgment and found in a true judgment is said to be an intellectual or intelligible emanation. 8 Indeed, this emanation is nothing other than the fact that, whenever we grasp sufficient evidence, from that very grasp of sufficient evidence, by an intellectually conscious necessity we bring forth a true judgment. Again, we all know from experience the difference between a definition repeated from memory and a definition proposed because we have grasped something through understanding. When we repeat a definition by memory, we certainly make sounds, not because we have understood anything, but rather because we have acquired some sensitive habit. However, when we produce a definition, because we want to express what we have understood, we can illustrate what we intend not only with other words but also with many different examples. As in defining, so also in illustrating with examples, everything we say is directed and, in a way, necessitated by the very act of understanding. Now, what is lacking in someone repeating things by memory but present in someone who understands and displays that understanding in a variety of ways is again what we are calling an intellectual or intelligible emanation. Indeed, this emanation is nothing other than the fact that, whenever we understand, from the very fact that we understand, by an intellectually conscious necessity we bring forth definitions as well as explications and illustrations. Finally, we all know from experience the difference between an act of will that is disordered and contrary to reason and one that is well ordered, right, obligatory, holy. For a good that is grasped by the intellect, approved by reason, and imposed upon the will obligates us in such a way that either we choose what is against the dictates of right reason and so are irrational, or we yield to the dictates of intellect and so are rational. Thus, what is lacking in a morally evil act but present in a morally good act is that spiritual and moral procession that effectively obligates the will in such a way that we not only ought to love the good, but actually do love it. This procession too is an intellectual or intelligible emanation, for it consists in the fact that a potentially rational appetite becomes actually rational because of a good grasped by the intellect. Therefore, since by its very nature the will is a rational appetite, and since this appetite cannot be actually rational unless it actually follows upon reason, we must say that ‘it is of the nature of love to proceed only from a conception of the intellect.’ 8 [On ‘intellectual’ as ‘intelligible,’ see above, p. 67, note 35, and below, pp. 143, 145, note 11.]

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Quibus in propria experientia interna quasi conspectis, ad emanationem intelligibilem concipiendam proceditur. Nam dupliciter sumus conscii: alio enim modo per partem sensitivam magis passivi subimus sensata et imaginata, desideria et timores, delectationes doloresque, gaudia et tristitiam; alio autem modo per partem intellectivam magis activi sumus cum conscie inquiramus ut intelligamus, intelligamus ut dicamus, evidentiam ponderemus ut iudicemus, consiliemur ut eligamus, velimus ut faciamus. Proinde in ipsa hac conscientia intellectuali atque activa distinguuntur lumen quoddam generale atque fundamentale et eiusdem luminis determinationes ulteriores. Fundamentale enim atque generale omnino lumen est ipsa nostra creata participatio luminis increati unde in nobis oritur omnis admiratio, omnis inquisitio, omnis reflectio; cui etiam attribuuntur illa principia generalissima quae nullam determinationem ex experientia derivatam contineant, puta, principia identitatis, non-contradictionis, rationis sufficientis, vel praeceptum faciendi bonum malumque vitandi. Quod tamen in nobis est intellectualiter et conscie operativum non solum hoc generali lumine constat sed etiam ipsis nostris actibus consciis ulterius determinatur; unde per modum materiae, sensibilia, per modum formae, actus intelligendi, per modum actus secundi, perspecta evidentia et iudicia et consilia ulterius determinant nos ipsos qua intellectualiter, rationaliter, moraliter conscios conscieque activos atque operativos.

Quibus perspectis, iterum audiamus S. Thomam: ‘Quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei intellectae, ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex eius notitia procedens.’ 9 Quando ergo intelligimus et eo ipso quod intelligimus, ex ipsa vi intellectiva quae est lumen generale conscientiae intellectualis, et ex notitia quae in actu intelligendi continetur et lumen generale determinat, procedit intra ipsam conscientiam intellectualem conceptio seu definitio rei intellectae. Similiter, quando evidentiam sufficere perspicimus, eo ipso quod perspicimus, ex ipsa necessitate luminis intellectualis per perspicientiam determinati, procedit intra ipsam conscientiam intellectualem affirmatio seu negatio vera. Similiter, quando bonum obligatorium iudicamus, eo ipso quod iudicamus, per ipsam nostram intellectualitatem seu rationalitatem spiramus volitionis actum.

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If we have adverted to all of this in our own internal experience, we can go on to a conception of intellectual emanation. For we are conscious in two ways: in one way, through our sensibility, we undergo rather passively what we sense and imagine, our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and sadness; in another way, through our intellectuality, we are more active when we consciously inquire in order to understand, understand in order to utter a word, weigh evidence in order to judge, deliberate in order to choose, and exercise our will in order to act. Accordingly, in this active intellectual consciousness we can distinguish a general fundamental light and further determinations of the same light. The fundamental and utterly general light is our created participation in uncreated light, the source in us that gives rise to all our wonder, all our inquiry, all our reflection. Again, we attribute to this light those most general principles that contain no determination drawn from experience; for example, the principles of identity, noncontradiction, and sufficient reason, or the precept that good must be done and evil must be avoided. Still, what is consciously and intellectually operative in us not only consists in this general light, but is further determined by our own conscious acts. Sensible data determine us after the manner of matter; acts of understanding determine us after the manner of form; grasping evidence, judging, and deliberating further determine us after the manner of second act as intellectually, rationally, and morally conscious and as consciously active and functioning. Bearing all this in mind, let us listen once more to St Thomas: ‘Whenever we understand, by the mere fact that we do understand, something proceeds within us, which is the conception of the thing understood, issuing from our intellective power and proceeding from its knowledge.’ 9 Accordingly, when we understand and by the very fact that we understand, from our intellective power, which is the general light of intellectual consciousness, and from the knowledge contained in the act of understanding that adds a determination to the general light, there proceeds within our intellectual consciousness a conception or definition of the reality understood. Similarly, when we grasp that the evidence is sufficient, by the very fact that we grasp it, and from the exigency of intellectual light as determined through that grasp, there proceeds within our intellectual consciousness either a true affirmation or a true negative assertion. Similarly again, when we judge some good as obligatory, by the very fact that we so judge, through our intellectuality, our rationality, we spirate an act of will. 9 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 1 c. See above, p. 133, note 3.

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Emanatio ergo intelligibilis10 est conscia origo actus realis, naturalis, et conscii, ex actu reali, naturali, et conscio, tum intra conscientiam intellectualem, tum vi ipsius conscientiae intellectualis actu priori determinatae. Actus: non definitur genere et specie, sed nota proportione declaratur, scilicet, actus : forma : potentia :: videre : visus : oculus :: audire : auditus : auris :: intelligere : species intelligibilis : intellectus possibilis :: velle : habitum volendi : voluntas :: esse : forma substantialis : materia prima. reale: id cui suo modo competit esse. naturale: dividitur reale in naturale (equus in se) et intentionale (equus qua intentus). Unde in actibus psychologicis duplex est aspectus; idem enim actus est intentionalis quatenus aliud respicit, et naturalis quatenus in se consideratur. conscium: praesens subiecto. In omni actu sensitivo et intellectivo, sive apprehensivo sive appetitivo, tria simul fiunt: (1) intenditur obiectum; (2) ipsum subiectum intendens redditur sibi praesens; (3) actus subiecti redditur subiecto praesens. Quam praesentiam acute distinguas a praesentia obiecti: praesens est obiectum ut quod intenditur, praesens est actus ut quo intenditur, praesens est subiectum ut quod intendit. Pariter distinguas hanc subiecti praesentiam per conscientiam a praesentia eiusdem subiecti per quandam reflexionem ve2l introspectionem: per reflexionem enim vel introspectionem praesens redditur subiectum ut obiectum, ut id quod intenditur; quod fieri non posset nisi subiectum iam sibi praesens ns eesset per conscientiam ut subiectum, ut id quod intendit.

intra conscientiam: intra rem secundum considerationem non metaphysicam sed psychologicam. Quod metaphysice est accidens inhaerens substantiae, vel actus in potentia receptus, idem psychologice est eventus conscius intra campum conscientiae. Notate tamen considerationem psychologicam et metaphysicam non ita distingui ut ‘conscium’ addat supra ‘ens’; nam ‘ens’ non est genus, et quod supra, extra, ultra ‘ens’ cogitatur non est nisi nihil. ‘Conscium’ ergo non dicit nisi ens in tali gradu perfectionis. conscientia intellectualis: quae actibus tum intellectus tum voluntatis constituitur; quae ab actibus sensitivis praescindit. Una sane in uno homine est conscientia,

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Intellectual emanation, then,10 is the conscious origin of a real, natural, and conscious act from a real, natural, and conscious act, both within intellectual consciousness and also by virtue of intellectual consciousness itself as determined by the prior act. Act : not defined through genus and species, but clarified by a familiar proportion, namely, act : form : potency :: seeing : eyesight : eye :: hearing something : the faculty of hearing : the ear :: understanding something : the intelligible species : the possible intellect :: willing : willingness : will :: existence : substantial form : prime matter. real: that to which, each in its own way, the act of existence belongs. natural: the real is divided into the natural (for example, a horse in itself) and the intentional (for example, a horse as intended). Hence, there are two aspects to psychological acts; for the same psychological act is intentional insofar as it refers to some other, and natural insofar as it is considered in itself. conscious: present to the subject. In every sensitive and intellectual act, whether apprehensive or appetitive, there are three things that occur simultaneously: (1) the object is intended; (2) the intending subject himself is rendered present to himself; (3) the act of the subject is rendered present to the subject. Distinguish sharply between the presence of the subject to himself and the presence of the object to the subject: the object is present as that which is intended, the act is present as that by which the object is intended, the subject is present as that which intends. In a similar way, distinguish this presence of the subject through consciousness and the presence of the same subject through reflection or introspection: reflection or introspection renders the subject present as an object, as that which is intended; but this could not be were not the subject already present to himself through consciousness, as subject, as that which intends. within consciousness: within a reality in accordance with a psychological, not a metaphysical, consideration. What metaphysically is an accident inhering in a substance or an act received in a potency is psychologically a conscious event within the field of consciousness. Note, however, that the distinction of a psychological consideration from a metaphysical consideration in no way implies that ‘conscious’ adds something beyond ‘being’; for ‘being’ is not a genus, and what is thought of as above, outside, beyond ‘being’ is nothing. ‘Conscious,’ therefore, refers to being at a certain degree of perfection. intellectual consciousness: constituted by acts both of intellect and of will while prescinding from sensitive acts. Certainly, in one human being there is just one 10 [The material from here to the beginning of assertion 2 (below, pp. 180–81) is different from what had appeared in Divinarum personarum. See below, part 2 of appendix 4, for the material in its earlier form.]

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quae tamen non homogenea est sed diversificatur secundum diversam actuum naturam. origo conscia: intra conscientiam oritur actus ex actu, actus realis, naturalis, conscius, ex actu reali, naturali, conscio. Ita qui canem videt magnum, aspectu ferocem, non ligatum, sponte timet. Sicut videre, etiam timere est actus realis, naturalis, conscius. Neque inter hos duos actus deest nexus: ideo timetur canis quia videtur. vi ipsius conscientiae: ubi oritur actus conscius ex actu conscio, ibi mediat ipsa conscientia ut, scilicet, (1) subiectum conscium qua conscium sit principium-quod processionis, (2) actus conscius qua conscius sit principium-quo processionis, (3) ipsa processio modum quendam intrinsecum habeat qui in processione inconscia (e.g., chemica) desit, (4) actus procedens quodammodo conscie sit propter et secundum actum principiantem. Excluditur ergo phaenomenalismus conscientiae qui causalitatem vel modum causalitatis proprium conscientiae negaret.

vi conscientiae intellectualis: ubi conscie oritur actus ex actu aliter mediat conscientia sensitiva et aliter mediat conscientia intellectualis. Ex actu sensitivo oritur alius actus sensitivus secundum particularem quandam legem naturae; sed ex actu intellectuali oritur alius actus intellectualis secundum conscias atque transcendentales exigentias ipsius intellectus; quae exigentiae non particulari cuidam naturae alligantur sed ad totum intelligibile, totum verum, totum ens, totum bonum ordinantur. actu priori determinatae: intra conscientiam intellectualem et vi conscientiae intellectualis dupliciter oritur actus. Et primo modo magisque spontaneo quasi ex potentia oritur actus; et sic ex quaestionibus sive speculativis sive practicis sive existentialibus ad actus intelligendi procedimus. Altero autem modo magisque autonomo ex actu priori oritur actus subsequens priori proportionatus; et sic definimus quia intelligimus et secundum illud quod intelligimus; sic iudicamus quia evidentiam sufficere perspicimus et secundum evidentiam perspectam; sic eligimus quia iudicamus et secundum quod iudicamus vel prodesse vel decere vel convenire vel deberi.11

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consciousness; still, that one consciousness is not simply homogeneous but diversified in accordance with the diverse nature of the acts. conscious origin: within consciousness act originates from act: a real, natural, conscious act from a real, natural, conscious act. Thus, if one sees a large fiercelooking dog without a leash, one spontaneously feels fear. Just as seeing is a real, natural, conscious act, so too is fearing. And these two acts are not unrelated: the dog is feared because it is seen. by virtue of consciousness itself : whenever a conscious act originates from a conscious act, consciousness itself mediates between the two, so that (1) the conscious subject as conscious is the principle-which of the procession; (2) the conscious act as conscious is the principle-by-which of the procession; (3) the procession itself has an intrinsic modality that is lacking in an unconscious procession such as a chemical procession; (4) the act that in some way proceeds consciously is because of and in accord with the act from which it proceeds. Therefore, the phenomenalism of consciousness that would deny causality, or the mode of causality proper to consciousness, is excluded. by virtue of intellectual consciousness: when act consciously originates from act, sensitive consciousness mediates in one way and intellectual consciousness in another. A sensitive act originates from another sensitive act according to a particular law of nature. But an intellectual act originates from another intellectual act in accord with the conscious, transcendental exigencies of intellect itself, which are not bound to any particular nature but are ordered to all that is intelligible, all that is true, all that is being, all that is good. as determined by the prior act : there are two ways in which an act originates within intellectual consciousness and by virtue of intellectual consciousness. In the first and more spontaneous way, an act originates as if from some potency; thus we proceed from speculative or practical or existential questions to acts of understanding. In another, more autonomous way, a subsequent act originates from a prior act and is proportionate to the prior act; thus, we define because we understand and in accordance with what we understand; again, we judge because we grasp evidence as sufficient and in accordance with the evidence we have grasped; finally, we choose because we judge and in accordance with what we judge to be useful or proper or fitting or obligatory.11 11 [On the term intelligibilis in the expression emanatio intelligibilis, as one employs the term analogically in the context of trinitarian theology, see Lonergan, Verbum 46–47: ‘The intelligibility of natural process is passive and potential: it is what can be understood; it is not an understanding; it is a potential object of intellect, but it is not the very stuff of intellect ... [It] is the intelligibility of some specific natural law ... but never the intelligibility of the very idea of intelligible law ... [It]

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ASSERTUM I Processiones divinae, quae sunt per modum operati, aliquatenus intelliguntur secundum similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis; neque alia esse videtur analogia ad systematicam conceptionem divinae processionis efformandam.

Ad terminos processio: origo unius ex alio. processus, emanatio: idem ac processio. procedens, principiatum: id quod oritur. principium, principians: id ex quo oritur. modus processionis: processio qua concreta; id quod addit haec vel illa processio super abstractam illam rationem, ‘origo unius ex alio.’ modi determinatio: modus determinatur ut distinguatur alia processio ab alia. externa determinatio: determinantur principium, procedens.

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ASSERTION 1 The divine processions, which are processions according to the mode of a processio operati, are understood in some measure on the basis of a likeness to intellectual emanation; and there does not seem to be another analogy for forming a systematic conception of a divine procession. Terminology procession: the origin of one from another. process, emanation: the same as procession. proceeding, originated: that which has an origin. principle, originating: that from which something has an origin. mode of procession: procession considered concretely; that which this or that procession adds beyond the abstract definition ‘origin of one from another.’ determination of mode: the mode is determined in order to distinguish one procession from another. external determination: the determination of the principle and of that which proceeds. is imposed from without: natures act intelligibly, not because they are intelligent, for they are not, but because they are concretions of divine ideas and a divine plan. On the other hand, the intelligibility of the procession of an inner word is not passive nor potential; it is active and actual; it is intelligible because it is the activity of intelligence in act; it is intelligible, not as the possible object of understanding is intelligible, but as understanding itself and the activity of understanding is intelligible. Again, its intelligibility defies formulation in any specific law; inner words proceed according to the principles of identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle, and sufficient reason; but these principles are not specific laws but the essential conditions of there being objects to be related by laws and relations to relate them. Thus, the procession of an inner word is the pure case of intelligible law ... [I]t is native and natural for the procession of inner word to be intelligible, actively intelligible, and the genus of all intelligible process ... for intelligence in act does not follow laws imposed from without, but rather it is the ground of the intelligibility in act of law, it is constitutive and, as it were, creative of law; and the laws of intelligible procession of an inner word are not any particular laws but the general constituents of any law, precisely because of this naturalness of intelligibility to intelligence, precisely because intelligence is to any conceived law as cause to effect.’ See also p. 185 below. The expression ‘intellectual emanation’ is being used here to translate emanatio intelligibilis. Lonergan’s three uses of ‘intellectual or intelligible emanation’ on pp. 135–37 show that in adopting this procedure we are not departing from Lonergan’s intention.]

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interna determinatio: determinatur ipsa origo, uti violenta vel naturalis, inconscia vel conscia, spontanea vel autonoma, etc.12 metaphysica determinatio: determinatio fit secundum notiones communes quae in metaphysica generali elaborantur, uti idem et aliud, potentia et actus, absolutum et relativum, etc. naturalis determinatio: determinatur modus secundum naturam quandam genericam vel specificam vel individualem, e.g., physicam, chemicam, biologicam, sensitivam, intellectualem, divinam. analogica determinatio: determinatur modus naturae ignotae secundum similitudinem naturae cognitae. processio ad extra, in aliud: origo alterius rei ex re alia. Ubi modi determinatio est externa et metaphysica. Illustratur factione, creatione, generatione animali. processio ad intra, in eodem: in eodem13 sunt tum principium tum procedens. Iterum modi determinatio est externa et metaphysica. Tripliciter autem intelligi potest illud ‘in eodem’: scilicet, in eodem subsistente, intra eandem conscientiam, in eadem facultate seu potentia.14

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internal determination: the determination of the origin itself as violent or natural, as unconscious or conscious, as spontaneous or autonomous, and so forth. 12 metaphysical determination: the determination uses the common notions that are worked out in general metaphysics, notions such as the same and the other, potency and act, the absolute and the relative, and so forth. natural determination: the mode is determined as proper to some generic or specific or individual nature, for example, physical, chemical, biological, sensitive, intellectual, or divine nature. analogical determination: the mode of an unknown nature is determined on the basis of a likeness to a known nature. external procession, into another: the origin of one reality from another. Here the determination of mode is external and metaphysical. Making, creating, and animal generation are illustrations. internal procession, in the same: both the principle and that which proceeds are in the same [. . .]13 Again, the determination of mode is external and metaphysical. However, ‘in the same’ can be understood in three ways, namely, in the same subsistent, within the same consciousness, in the same faculty or potency. 14 12 [If a procession, considered abstractly, is the origin of one from another, if the mode of procession refers to any determination of the procession that adds something beyond the abstract definition, and so enables one to consider a procession more concretely, if any proffered determination enables one to distinguish one procession from another, if an external determination enables one to distinguish one procession from another by determining the principle and that which proceeds, then an internal determination, as ‘the determination of the origin itself,’ is a determination that enables one to distinguish one procession from another, not by determining the principle and that which proceeds, but by determining the kind of procession it is. An internal determination of mode, then, is a determination of the procession qua procession, not the determination of the principle and of that which proceeds; and from this precise perspective it answers the question, What kind of procession? Each of the disjunctions that Lonergan mentions – violent or natural, unconscious or conscious, spontaneous or autonomous – would provide an answer to that question and so count as an internal determination of mode.] 13 [The ellipsis is an editorial addition. ‘In the same’ is an incomplete expression that is completed when one answers the question, In the same what? Lonergan effectively recognizes that ‘in the same’ is an incomplete expression when he goes on to say that ‘in the same’ can be understood in three ways.] 14 [Subsequent to an external determination of mode, one can ask whether that which proceeds is in another subsistent or in another consciousness or in another faculty or power, or whether it is in the same subsistent or in the same consciousness or in the same faculty or power. If the former is the case, the procession is said to be external; if the latter, the procession is said to be internal. ‘External,’ then, is being used to translate both ‘externa’ and ‘ad extra’; and ‘internal’ is being used to translate both ‘interna’ and ‘ad intra.’ While this may be a potential source of

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processio operationis: processio ad intra in qua principium et procedens comparantur sicut potentia et actus. Iterum modi determinatio est externa et metaphysica. Illustratur per actum visionis qui oritur ex potentia visiva et ex oculo; per actum intelligendi qui oritur ex intellectu possibili et ex specie intelligibili; per actum volendi qui oritur ex voluntate, ex habitu in voluntate recepto. 15

processio operati: processio ad intra in qua principium comparatur ad procedens sicut actus ad actum. Iterum modi determinatio est metaphysica et externa. Illustratur per actum appetendi qui oritur ex actu videndi, per actum definiendi qui oritur ex actu intelligendi, per actum iudicandi qui oritur ex actu perspiciendi evidentiam sufficientem, per actum eligendi qui oritur ex iudicio practico. 16

processio per modum operati: processio ad intra in qua actus principians et actus principiatus distinguuntur realiter, non tamen secundum esse absolutum, sed secundum esse relativum. Iterum modi determinatio est metaphysica et externa. Excogitata est haec definitio ad declarandum mysterium divinum.

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procession of an operation: an internal procession in which the principle and that which proceeds are related as potency and act. Again, the determination of mode is external and metaphysical. The procession of an operation is illustrated by the act of seeing taking its origin from both the power of sight and the eye, the act of understanding taking its origin from both the possible intellect and the intelligible species, the act of will taking its origin from both the will and from a habit received in the will.15 processio operati: an internal procession in which the principle is related to that which proceeds as act to act. Again, the determination of mode is metaphysical and external. A processio operati is illustrated by the act of desiring taking its origin from the act of seeing, by the act of defining taking its origin from the act of understanding, by the act of judging taking its origin from the act of grasping sufficient evidence, by the act of choosing taking its origin from a practical judgment.16 procession according to the mode of a processio operati: an internal procession in which the originating act and the originated act are really distinct, not however on the basis of absolute existence but on the basis of relative existence. Again, the determination of mode is external and metaphysical. This definition has been worked out in order to state clearly a divine mystery. confusion, the alternative would have been simply to leave ‘ad extra’ and ‘ad intra’ untranslated. Any potential confusion is avoided if one bears in mind that when ‘external’ is used to translate ‘externa,’ and ‘internal’ is used to translate ‘interna,’ ‘external’ and ‘internal’ refer to the determination of mode. But when ‘external’ is used to translate ‘ad extra’ and ‘internal’ is used to translate ‘ad intra,’ ‘external’ and ‘internal’ refer back to an external determination of mode to indicate whether that which proceeds is in another subsistent or in another consciousness or in another faculty or power, or whether it is in the same subsistent or in the same consciousness or in the same faculty or power. It is not surprising, then, that Lonergan should remark that just as with an external procession (into another) the determination of mode is external (externa), so with an internal procession (in the same) the determination of mode is also external (externa).] 15 [See Lonergan’s own careful formulation in English of the meaning of ‘processio operationis’ in Verbum 107: ‘... the emergence of a perfection from (and in) what is perfected ...’] 16 [The expression ‘processio operati’ has been left untranslated. It could, of course, be translated into English literally as ‘procession of the operated’; but that would hardly convey very clearly the meaning Lonergan intends to communicate by his use of the expression. In Verbum, Lonergan specifies that meaning: ‘the emergence of one thing from another’ (107); ‘... the inner word is to our intelligence in act as is act to act, perfection to proportionate perfection; in us the procession is processio operati ...’ (205–206). The meaning of ‘processio operati,’ then, is best conveyed by contrasting it with what is understood by ‘processio operationis.’ A processio operati is not the emergence of a perfection from (and in) what is perfected; it is a procession from act to act, from a perfection to a perfection.]

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processio divina: origo Dei ex Deo. Ubi modi determinatio est externa sed naturalis. Illustratur tum generatione Filii ex Patre tum processione Spiritus sancti ex utroque. emanatio intelligibilis: conscia origo actus realis, naturalis, conscii ex actu reali, naturali, conscio, tum intra eandem conscientiam intellectualem, tum vi ipsius conscientiae intellectualis actu principiante determinatae. Ubi modi determinatio est interna et naturalis. Qualis vero sit hic modus, iam supra expositum est. secundum similitudinem: analogica determinatio modi interni divinae processionis secundum modum internum quem in emanatione intelligibili experimur. intelligere: actus interior stricte spiritualis qui rarius et difficilius in tardioribus, saepius et facilius in acutioribus accidit. aliquatenus: mediate, imperfecte, analogice. Quod perfecte intelligitur, eius essentia immediate comprehenditur. conceptio: interior eius expressio quod inquirendo intenditur (conceptio heuristica) vel intelligendo perspicitur (conceptio propria). systematica conceptio: conceptio quae eam intelligentiam exprimit quae virtualiter ad omnes quaestiones alicuius tractatus resolvendas sufficiat. Sensus asserti In symbolo Quicumque fide credimus omnes atque profitemur: ‘Pater a nullo est factus nec creatus nec genitus. Filius a Patre solo est, non factus nec creatus, sed genitus. Spiritus sanctus a Patre et Filio, non factus nec creatus nec genitus, sed procedens’ (db 39). Quod ita est mysterium in Deo absconditum ut per rationem rite excultam e principiis naturalibus neque intelligi neque demonstrari possit (db 1816). At idem mysterium fide susceptum per rationem fide illustratam mediate, imperfecte, analogice, sed et fructuosissime intelligi potest (db 1796). Quare, in prima parte technica problematis formulatio evolvitur tum ut clare appareat quaenam sit doctrina intelligenda, tum etiam ut apparens amoveatur contradictio. Statuimus ergo divinam processionem esse per modum operati;

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divine procession: the origin of God from God. Here, the determination of mode is external yet natural. A divine procession is illustrated by the generation of the Son from the Father and also by the procession of the Holy Spirit from both the Father and the Son. intellectual emanation: the conscious origin of a real, natural, and conscious act from a real, natural, and conscious act, both within the same intellectual consciousness and also by virtue of that intellectual consciousness itself as it is determined by the originating act. Here, the determination of mode is internal and natural. We have already indicated above the kind of mode this is. on the basis of the likeness: the analogical determination of the internal mode of a divine procession on the basis of the internal mode that we experience in an intellectual emanation. understanding: an interior and strictly spiritual act that occurs more rarely and with greater difficulty in the slow-witted and more often and with greater ease in the sharp-witted. in some measure: mediately, imperfectly, analogically. What is understood perfectly is comprehended immediately through its essence. conception: the interior expression of what is intended by inquiry (heuristic conception) or of what is grasped by an act of understanding (conception in the proper sense). systematic conception: a conception that expresses an understanding that is virtually sufficient for resolving all the questions of a treatise. Meaning of the Assertion In the Quicumque Creed we all believe in faith and profess publicly: ‘the Father is not made by anyone, not created by anyone, not begotten by anyone. The Son is from the Father alone, and is not made, not created, but begotten. The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, and is not made, not created, not begotten, but proceeds’ (db 39, ds 75, nd 16). This is a mystery so hidden in God that from natural principles it can be neither understood nor demonstrated, even by a well-trained mind (db 1816, ds 3041, nd 137). Still, this same mystery, accepted in faith, can be understood mediately, imperfectly, analogically, and yet in a way that is most fruitful, by reason illumined by faith (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). Accordingly, in the first part of the assertion we develop a technical formulation of the problem so that it may be clear what the doctrine is that we seek to understand, and also to dispose of an apparent contradiction. Thus, we maintain that a divine procession is a procession according to the mode of a processio operati;

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quod, cum a doctrina fidei non differat nisi secundum adhibita nomina et verba, theologice certum est. In altera autem parte hypothetice proponitur solutio. Si enim supponeretur divinam processionem esse per modum emanationis intelligibilis, sequeretur eam esse per modum operati. Quae deductio seu consequentia hypothetica, quamvis cognitionem non augeat, tamen aliquam exprimit intelligentiam. In tertia denique parte de solutione hypothetica fertur iudicium, scilicet, non aliam nobis hac in vita esse viam qua ad mysterii intelligentiam a c. Vaticano i laudatam pervenire possimus. Sententiarum differentiae Alii sunt increduli qui ipsum mysterium negent. Alii scripturis credunt sed, modo ob hanc, modo ob aliam rationem infallibilia Ecclesiae dogmata accipere nolunt. Alii et scripturis credunt et dogma accipiunt, sed aliud mysterium esse et aliud problema reputant; et ideo mysterii intelligentiam praetermittendam esse affirmant. Alii proinde, sicut mysterium et dogma fatentur, ita etiam intelligentiam volunt, non tamen theologicam, sed vel rhetoricam vel philosophicam. Et illi quidem a problemate technice formulato et systematice resoluto abhorrent, neque unam quandam analogiam sed multas et diversas quaerunt, neque has explicite signare volunt sed implicite et exercite malunt procedere. Quibus e diametro opponuntur semirationalistae qui, sicut de Deo uno, ita etiam de Deo trino procedendum esse autumant; et ideo omnia volunt esse vel per se nota vel e principiis naturalibus demonstrata; quorum opinio tamquam haeretica condemnata est (db 1816).

Alii autem et scripturis credunt et dogmata amplectuntur et intelligentiam theologicam quaerunt. Quam tamen intelligentiam volunt esse conclusionem theologicam quae demonstratur ex veritatibus fidei et ex principiis naturaliter notis. Quos fugit intelligentiam esse de principiis, scientiam de conclusionibus; et ideo quia conclusionem quaerunt, ad intelligentiam non perveniunt. Alii ergo scripturis credentes et dogmata amplectentes et conclusiones theologicas deducentes, ex ipsis his conclusionibus ad problema technice formulatum procedunt; cuius solutionem non per deductionem sed per hypothesin quaerunt;

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and since this part of the assertion differs from the doctrine of the faith only in the words that it employs, it is theologically certain. In the second part of the assertion, we propose hypothetically a solution. If one were to suppose that a divine procession is after the manner of an intellectual emanation, it would follow that it is a procession according to the mode of a processio operati. Although this deduction or hypothetical conclusion does not increase knowledge, it does nevertheless express some understanding. In the third and final part of the assertion, we pass judgment on the hypothetical solution, namely, that in this life there is no other way for us to come to the kind of understanding of this mystery that Vatican i mentioned. Divergent Opinions There are unbelievers who deny the mystery itself. There are those who believe the scriptures but, now for this reason, now for that, are unwilling to accept the infallible dogmas of the church. There are those who believe the scriptures and accept the dogmas but consider mystery and problem two very different things; so they assert that the understanding of mystery should be disregarded. Then there are those who admit mystery and dogma and also desire understanding; not, however, a theological understanding, but either a rhetorical or a philosophical understanding. Those who seek a rhetorical understanding abhor the technical formulation and systematic solution of problems; they seek not one analogy but many different analogies, and without wishing to thematize any of them explicitly, they choose rather to proceed implicitly and unthematically. Diametrically opposed to this group are the semirationalists. They assert that one ought to proceed with regard to God as three just as one proceeds with regard to God as one. So they would have it that everything concerning God either be self-evident or be demonstrated from natural principles. Their view has been condemned as heretical (db 1816, ds 3041, nd 137). Further, there are those who believe the scriptures and embrace the dogmas and seek theological understanding. But they think the understanding should be a theological conclusion demonstrated from the truths of faith and from naturally known principles. It eludes their notice that, while science is concerned with conclusions, understanding is concerned with principles. So, because they aim at conclusions, they do not arrive at understanding. Then again, there are those who believe the scriptures, embrace the dogmas, and deduce theological conclusions, but also proceed from those very conclusions to a technical formulation of a problem. They seek the solution to the problem

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quam intelligentiam hypotheticam ea ratione acceptandam esse ducunt quod aliam a nobis hac in vita attingi posse negant. 17 Alii denique sunt qui modo obscuriori procedant. Quod hypotheticum est, quasi conclusio esset, demonstrare contendunt. Quae analogia est, e rebus naturalibus vere et proprie cognitis non hauritur. Quibus accedunt atque admiscentur auctoritatum interpretationes quae principiis hermeneuticis parum congruunt. 18

Pars prima: Divina processio est per modum operati. Haec pars non est nisi stricta deductio ex veritatibus fidei per notiones et principia metaphysica omnibus nota. Quare, est theologice certa. Arguitur autem dupliciter: primo, per viam quandam exclusionis ut non relinquatur nisi processio per modum operati; deinde, directe et positive stabilitur divinam processionem esse per modum operati; tertio, detegitur radix apparentis contradictionis.

18 Quaestionis historicae complexitatem ex appendicibus i et ii colliges. Indicationes generales ex sola Summa de theologia, breviter infra in Asserto ii ponuntur. Notate S. Thomam, quamvis ad mentem recentiorum et actu quasi signato psychologicam introspectionem non exercuerit, nihilominus ex ipsa experientia interna multas quaestiones resolvisse easque omnino fundamentales. Verbi gratia, principale quoddam argumentum contra Averroistas erat quod ‘hic homo intelligit.’ Contra Avicennistas arguit ‘lumen intelligibile nostrae animae connaturale’ esse idem quod Aristoteles nominavit intellectum agentem (C. Gent., ii, 77 § 5). Acute atque exacte distinguit inter conscientiam stricte dictam (animam sibi praesentem) et subsequentem investigationem circa naturam seu quidditatem animae (Sum. theol., i, q. 87, a. 1). Probat ex universali experientia necessitatem phantasmatis ad actum intelligendi exercendum (ibid. q. 84, a. 7). Caeterum, uti ex appendicibus satis manifestum erit, qui ad propriam conscientiam non attendant, litteram S. Thomae intelligere non possunt.

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not through deduction but through a hypothesis; and because they deny that we can attain any other understanding in this life, they think that the hypothetical understanding should be accepted.17 Finally, there are those who proceed in a more obscure manner. What is hypothetical they strive to demonstrate, as if it were a conclusion. They do not draw an analogy from natural realities truly and properly known. In addition, they throw into the mix interpretations of authorities that are hardly consonant with the principles of hermeneutics.18 Part One: Divine procession is procession according to the mode of a processio operati. This part of the argument is just a strict deduction from the truths of faith using metaphysical notions and principles that everyone knows. The conclusion, therefore, is theologically certain. We argue the point in two ways: first, by a process of elimination we are left with only divine procession according to the mode of a processio operati; second, we establish directly and positively that divine procession is procession according to the mode of a processio operati. In a third step of the argument we lay bare the root of an apparent contradiction. 17 [Not only is this the procedure that Lonergan himself has followed, but perhaps it also indicates one of the reasons for the relative complexity of this first assertion in comparison with its counterpart in Divinarum personarum. Lonergan is intent on distinguishing between the proper sense of drawing conclusions and the procedure of ‘conclusions theology.’ The drawing of a conclusion (divine procession is according to the mode of a processio operati) is for the sake of providing a technical formulation of the problem for understanding. But the task of understanding remains to be accomplished.] 18 The reader will gather the complexity of the historical issue from appendices 1 and 2. General indications of that complexity from the Summa theologiae alone are presented briefly in assertion 2 below. Note that although St Thomas may not have employed introspective psychology in the explicit, contemporary way, he did nonetheless resolve many questions, among them the most fundamental, from his own internal experience. For instance, the principal argument against the Averroists was that ‘this human being understands.’ Against the Avicennists he argued that ‘the intellectual light connatural to our soul’ is the same reality that Aristotle named the agent intellect (Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 77, ¶ 5, § 1584). He drew a sharp and exact distinction between consciousness in the strict sense (the soul present to itself) and subsequent investigation concerning the nature or quiddity of the soul (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 87, a. 1). He proves from universal experience the necessity of a phantasm for eliciting an act of understanding (ibid. q. 84, a. 7). For the rest, it will be sufficiently clear from our appendices that those who do not attend to their own consciousness will not be able to understand the words of St Thomas.

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1 Divina processio non est factio vel creatio. Nam c. Nicaenum eos anathematizat qui dicant: ‘Quia ex non existentibus factus est aut ex alia subsistentia aut essentia’ (db 54).19 Et idem repetit de Filio et addit de Spiritu sancto symbolum Quicumque superius citatum (db 39). Quemadmodum vero haec dogmata in fontibus revelationis contineantur, exponitur in parte dogmatica.20 2 Divina processio non est ad extra. Cf. S. Thomam, Sum. theol., i, q. 27, a. 1. Ad extra, seu in aliud, est processio in qua alia res est principium et alia res est procedens. Sed in divina processione idem Deus est Filius ac Pater, et iterum idem Deus est Spiritus sanctus ac Pater Filiusque. Ergo divina processio non est ad extra, seu in aliud.

3 Divina processio est ad intra sed neque operationis est neque operati.

Omnis processio est aut ad extra aut ad intra: si enim oritur alia res, est ad extra; si non oritur alia res, est ad intra. Sed est processio in Deo, quae tamen non est ad extra; ergo est ad intra. Haec ad intra processio non est processio operationis, qua oritur actus ex potentia. Nam in Deo nihil est imperfectum et perfectibile quod perficiatur. Et ideo in Deo esse non potest processio operationis. Neque haec ad intra processio est processio operati, qua oritur alius actus ex alio actu. Nam in Deo simplici non est nisi unus actus, isque infinitus; et ideo in Deo esse non potest processio operati.

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1 Divine procession is not a making or a creating. The Council of Nicea anathematizes those who say, ‘The Son was made from nothing, or from another subsistent or essence’ (db 54, ds 126, nd 8). 19 The Quicumque Creed that we cited above repeats this doctrine concerning the Son and extends it to the Holy Spirit (db 39, ds 75, nd 16). The way in which these dogmas are contained in the sources of revelation is treated in the dogmatic part of this treatise.20 2 Divine procession is not external. See St Thomas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 1. An external procession, a procession into another, is a procession in which the principle is one thing and what proceeds from it is another. But in divine procession the Son is the same God as the Father, and, again, the Holy Spirit is the same God as the Father and the Son. Therefore, divine procession is not an external procession, not a procession into another. 3 Divine procession is internal procession but it is neither a procession of an operation nor a processio operati. Every procession is either external or internal: if another reality is originated, the procession is external; if no other reality is originated, the procession is internal. But there is procession in God, and it is not external. Therefore, it is internal. This internal procession is not a procession of an operation, by which act originates from potency. For in God there is nothing imperfect and nothing perfectible that is to be perfected. Thus, procession in God cannot be a procession of an operation. Again, this internal procession is not a processio operati, by which one act originates from another act. For in God, who is simple, there is only one act, the infinite act. Thus, in God there cannot be a processio operati.

19 [db 54, ds 126, nd 8: ‘Eos autem, qui dicunt ... “Quod de non exstantibus factus est” vel ex alia substantia aut essentia ..., hos anathematizat catholica Ecclesia.’] 20 [cwl 11, The Triune God: Doctrines.]

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4 Divina processio est per modum operati. Definitur enim processio per modum operati: processio ad intra in qua actus principians et actus principatus distinguuntur realiter, non tamen secundum esse absolutum, sed tantummodo secundum esse relativum. Porro, haec definitio verificatur quoad omnia elementa in utraque divina processione. Habetur processio: oritur enim Filius ex Patre; oritur etiam Spiritus sanctus ex utroque. Habetur processio ad intra, uti superius conclusimus. Realiter distinguuntur actus principians et actus principiatus: realiter enim distinguuntur Pater et Filius; realiter etiam distinguitur Spiritus sanctus tum a Patre tum a Filio. Haec realis distinctio non est secundum esse absolutum: non enim est nisi unus Deus; tres autem personae divinae sunt unius substantiae seu consubstantiales. Denique haec realis distinctio est secundum esse relativum, uti statuit c. Florentinum: omniaque sunt unum ubi non obviat relationis oppositio (db 703).

5 Processio per modum operati non dicit contradictionem.

Contradictoria videntur haec duo: (1) Deum esse ex Deo, et (2) unicum esse Deum. Si enim vera et realis est origo Dei ex Deo, sequi videtur duos esse deos. Sin autem vere et realiter unicus est Deus, sequi videtur nullam esse processionem Dei ex Deo. Quae apparens contradictio tollitur per distinctionem inter processionem ad extra et processionem ad intra. Ubi processio est ad extra, alia res ex alia oritur; et ideo ponere processionem ad extra in Deo importaret vel duos deos vel saltem duas res. Ubi autem ad intra est processio in Deo, adeo non sequitur ut excludatur duos esse deos. Notate tamen hanc solutionem non esse nisi negativam. Exigeret enim positiva solutio aliquam explicationem differentiae inter naturam divinam et creatam. Generatio enim ad intra repugnat in homine, in leone, in arbore. Cur autem non repugnet in Deo, non dicitur sine positiva quadam doctrina de natura divina; quae doctrina iam quaerenda est in secunda parte argumenti.

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4 Divine procession is procession according to the mode of a processio operati. A procession according to the mode of a processio operati is defined as an internal procession in which the originating act and the originated act are really distinct, not however on the basis of absolute existence, but only on the basis of relative existence. Every element in this definition is verified in each of the divine processions. There is a procession: the Son originates from the Father; the Holy Spirit originates from the Father and the Son. There is internal procession, as we concluded above. The originating act and the originated act are really distinct: the Father is really distinct from the Son; the Holy Spirit is really distinct from both the Father and the Son. This real distinction is not on the basis of absolute existence: there is only one God; the three divine persons are of one substance, that is, consubstantial. Finally, this real distinction is on the basis of relative existence, as the Council of Florence has established: everything is one except where there is relational opposition (db 703, ds 1330, nd 325). 5 A procession according to the mode of a processio operati does not signify a contradiction. There seems to be a contradiction between these two assertions: (1) God is from God, and (2) there is only one God. For if there really and truly is an origin of God from God, it seems to follow that there are two gods. If, however, really and truly there is only one God, it seems to follow that there is no procession of God from God. This apparent contradiction is removed by the distinction between external and internal procession. When the procession is external, one thing originates from another, and so to suppose external procession in God implies either two gods or at least two things. However, when the procession in God is internal, the implication of there being two gods, so far from following on supposing the procession, is actually excluded. Note, however, that this solution is only negative. For a positive solution would demand some explanation of the difference between divine nature and created nature. Internal generation is excluded in a human being, in a lion, in a tree. But the reason internal generation is not excluded in God cannot be given unless one has a positive doctrine concerning the divine nature, and this doctrine is to be sought in the second part of the argument.

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Pars altera: Supposita in divinis emanatione intelligibili, sequitur processio per modum operati.

Hac altera parte determinantur quattuor. Primo, ex hypothesi emanationis intelligibilis et divinae concluditur divinam processionem esse per modum operati. Deinde, commonstratur per hanc deductionem attingi non augmentum cognitionis sed augmentum intelligentiae. Tertio, exponitur in quo consistat hoc intelligentiae augmentum. Quarto, explicatur intelligentiam ita adeptam esse mediatam, imperfectam, analogicam, obscuram. Comparatur ergo haec altera pars argumenti ad primam, sicut comparatur solutio hypothetica ad problema technice formulatum. In tertia vero parte quaeretur utrum ulla sit ratio cur haec hypothesis sit acceptanda. Cur autem sic et non aliter procedamus, tres sunt rationes. Primo, demonstrari non potest processionem per modum operati esse emanationem intelligibilem; nam ex minus determinato concludi non potest quod magis determinatum est. Deinde, sunt quorum demonstratio non sit quaerenda, nempe, principia. Iam vero praeter principia quae vel rationi sunt per se nota vel revelata a Deo fide suscipiuntur, etiam sunt principia proprie theologica; quae principia attinguntur non per solam fidem neque per solam rationem neque per deductionem ex fide et ratione sed per intelligentiam ad quam terminatur inquisitio rationis per fidem illustratae. Tertio, praesens quaestio est quaestio de principio, nam principium est primum in aliquo ordine; nunc vero versamur in primo asserto; et similiter in Summa theologiae S. Thomae primus articulus de re trinitaria est de divina processione et de emanatione intelligibili (i, q. 27, a. 1 c., ad 2m, ad 3m). Sed hoc principium non est naturaliter notum: agitur enim de mysterio stricte dicto. Neque hoc principium est divinitus revelatum: quod enim divinitus revelatum est, fide creditur; quod autem nunc quaeritur est intelligentia fidei, seu intelligentia eius quod a Deo revelatum et ab ecclesia propositum fide creditur.

Obiecerit tamen quispiam primo esse inspiciendas auctoritates S. Ioannis, S. Augustini, S. Thomae ut perspiciatur quemadmodum ab ipsis mysterium sit intellectum. Respondetur: qui vult non intelligere sed concludere principia, sic procedere debet; neque tamen per inspectionem auctoritatum ad intelligentiam analogiae systematicae pervenire poterit.

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Part Two: If one supposes intellectual emanation in God, it follows that there is a procession according to the mode of a processio operati. We settle four things in this second part of the argument. First, from the hypothesis of a divine intellectual emanation, we conclude that divine procession is according to the mode of a processio operati. Next, we show that through this deduction we attain not an increase in knowledge but an increase in understanding. Third, we clarify what this increase in understanding consists of. Fourth, we explain that the understanding so attained is mediate, imperfect, analogical, and obscure. This second part of the argument, then, is related to the first as a hypothetical solution to a problem is related to a technically formulated problem. In the third part of the argument we shall ask whether there is any reason why this hypothesis ought to be accepted. There are three reasons for proceeding in this way and not otherwise. In the first place, it cannot be demonstrated that a procession according to the mode of a processio operati is an intellectual emanation; for one cannot conclude from what is less determinate to what is more determinate. In the second place, there are things which one should not seek to demonstrate, namely, principles. Now, besides principles that are self-evident to reason or revealed by God and accepted in faith, there are also principles that are properly theological. They are attained not through faith alone, nor through reason alone, nor through deductions from faith and reason, but through an understanding that comes at the end of an investigation by reason illumined by faith. In the third place, the present question is a question of principle. For a principle is what is first in some order, and we are now dealing with the first assertion of our systematic investigation, in a way that is similar to the way in which St Thomas’s first article concerning the Trinity in the Summa theologiae is concerned with divine procession and intellectual emanation (1, q. 27, a. 1 c., ad 2m, ad 3m). But this principle is not naturally known: we are dealing with a mystery in the strict sense of the term. Nor is this principle divinely revealed: what is divinely revealed we believe by faith; but what is now being sought is an understanding of the faith, or an understanding of what has been revealed by God and proposed by the church for us to believe by faith. Still, someone may object that the first step should be the examination of various authorities, such as St John, St Augustine, and St Thomas, to ascertain how they understood this mystery. Our response is that this is the correct way to proceed if we seek not to understand principles but to conclude to principles. But we cannot arrive at an understanding of a systematic analogy just by examining what authorities have said.

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1 Quid significet emanatio intelligibilis, iam superius expositum est. Nunc clare et distincte concipere volumus qualis esset emanatio intelligibilis et divina. Quam conceptionem per modum suppositionis vel hypotheseos proponimus. Porro, cum emanatio intelligibilis sit vi ipsius conscientiae intellectualis actu quodam determinatae, supponendum est in Deo esse conscientiam, eamque intellectualem; supponendum etiam est hanc conscientiam aliquo actu determinari, qui sane actus non alius esse possit quam actus infinitus; supponendum est hanc conscientiam ita determinatam esse dynamicam, ut scilicet conscie exigat emanationem. Quibus suppositis primo sequitur actum infinitum esse actum principiantem. Non enim in Deo esse potest realis distinctio inter actum infinitum et divinam conscientiam; quae, cum non distinguantur, concipi non possunt ut realiter determinans et realiter determinata; et ideo dicendum est ipso actu infinito cognosci motivum propter quod et secundum quod exigatur emanatio. Qua cognitione atque exigentia conscia constituitur actus infinitus ut actus principians. Sequitur deinde vere et realiter intra divinam conscientiam oriri actum principiatum. Supponi enim non potest actum infinitum sibi non constare, ut conscie exigatur emanatio et tamen nulla sit emanatio, vel ut exigatur emanatio intra conscientiam et tamen non sit intra conscientiam. Quare, eo ipso quod ponitur actus principians, necessario etiam ponitur vera et realis emanatio; et ubi vera et realis habetur emanatio, ibi etiam habetur id quod emanat seu actus principiatus.

Sequitur tertio actum principiatum esse infinitum. Nam actus principiatus non est nihil, et ideo aut finitus est aut infinitus est. Sed finitus esse non potest. Nam omne finitum etiam est creatum; et omne creatum oritur per processionem ad extra; sed ad intra oritur actus qui intra conscientiam et vi ipsius conscientiae oritur. Praeterea, omne finitum est contingens; sed necessario oritur quod propter exigentiam ipsius divinae conscientiae oritur. Relinquitur ergo ut actus principiatus sit infinitus. Sequitur quarto oriri Deum ex Deo. Nam quod infinitum est, Deus est. Sed actus principians est infinitus; actus principiatus est infinitus; actus principiatus ex actu principiante vere et realiter oritur; ergo, supposita emanatione intelligibili atque divina, oritur Deus ex Deo. Sequitur quinto actum principiantem et actum principiatum non realiter distingui quoad esse absolutum. Nam uterque actus est infinitus; sed infinitum est

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1 The meaning of intellectual emanation has already been discussed above. Now we want to conceive clearly and distinctly what a divine intellectual emanation would be like. And we are proposing this conception as a supposition or a hypothesis. Moreover, since intellectual emanation exists by virtue of intellectual consciousness itself as determined by some act, we have to suppose that there is consciousness in God, and indeed intellectual consciousness. We also have to suppose that this intellectual consciousness is determined by an act, and that this act can only be the infinite act. Finally, we have to suppose that this consciousness, thus determined, is dynamic, that is, that it has a conscious exigence for an emanation. From these suppositions it follows, first, that the infinite act is an originating act. In God there cannot be any real distinction between infinite act and divine consciousness; and since they are not really distinct, they cannot be conceived as really determining and as really determined. Therefore, the motive on account of which and in accord with which there is an exigence for the emanation is known by the infinite act. And through this knowledge and conscious exigence, the infinite act is constituted as an originating act. Second, it follows that an originated act really and truly comes forth within divine consciousness. One cannot suppose that an infinite act is inconsistent with itself, that it has a conscious exigence for an emanation and yet there is no emanation, or that it has an exigence for an emanation within consciousness and yet there is no emanation within consciousness. Thus, if an originating act is posited, then necessarily, by that very fact, a true and real emanation is also posited. And if there is a true and real emanation, then there is also that which emanates, that is to say, there is also an originated act. Third, it follows that the originated act is infinite. For the originated act is not nothing, and therefore it is either finite or infinite. Now, it cannot be finite, for everything finite is also created, and everything created originates through external procession; but an act within consciousness and originated by virtue of consciousness is originated internally. Moreover, everything finite is contingent; but what is originated because of the exigencies of divine consciousness is originated by necessity. It remains, then, that the originated act is infinite. Fourth, it follows that God originates from God. Whatever is infinite is God. But the originating act is infinite; the originated act is infinite; the originated act truly and really comes forth from the originating act. Thus, on the supposition of divine intellectual emanation, God originates from God. Fifth, it follows that the originating act and the originated act are not really distinct with respect to absolute existence. For the originating act and the originated act are infinite. But there is only one infinite act; therefore, with respect to

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unicum; et ideo, quoad esse absolutum, esse non potest realis distinctio inter actum principiantem et actum principiatum. Sequitur sexto actum principiantem et actum principiatum realiter distingui quoad esse relativum. Supposita enim est realis emanatio quam necessario sequuntur oppositae relationes principiantis et principiati. Neque obstat quod idem actus est et principians et principiatus. Non enim agitur de emanatione causali quae tolleretur nisi causa et effectus essent duo absoluta realiter distincta. Sed agitur de emanatione intelligibili, secundum quam diligere bonum est honestum quia ex bono vere affirmato procedit, et bonum affirmare est verum quia ex perspecta evidentia procedit. Neque ulla ratione demonstratur hanc veritatem hancque honestatem ideo tolli quia actus perspiciendi, affirmandi, diligendi sit infinitus, et infinitus actus sit unicus. Supposita ergo emanatione intelligibili et divina, sequuntur omnia quae ad processionem divinam pertinent, quaeque sub nomine processionis per modum operati ex veritatibus fidei iam probavimus. Sed, ubi fit deductio, ibi habetur aliqua intelligentia; neque simpliciter tollitur haec intelligentia eo quod praemissa non est nisi suppositio seu hypothesis; quare, supposita emanatione intelligibili et divina, oritur aliqua fidei intelligentia.

2 Deinde, quaerendum est in quo praecise consistat momentum huius deductionis ex suppositione. Respondetur duplex esse posse momentum: aliud quod respicit cognitionem; et aliud quod respicit intelligentiam. Nam ubi fit deductio, ibi eatenus cognoscitur conclusio, quatenus cognoscitur principium; et eatenus intelligitur conclusio quatenus intelligitur principium. Porro, momentum cognitionis ex ipsa deductione iam facta, eaque sola, est nullum. Nam principium non cognoscitur sed supponitur; et ideo quod deducitur, vi ipsius deductionis, pariter non cognoscitur sed supponitur. Verum quidem est conclusionem iam aliunde esse cognitam; eam enim in parte prima ex veritatibus fidei demonstravimus. Attamen haec veritas conclusionis non est probatio principii, uti constat sive ex minori logica sive ex simplici reflexione aliud posse esse principium ex quo aeque bene vel melius deducatur eadem conclusio. Cf. Sum. theol. i, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2m. E contra, momentum intelligentiae non est nullum. Sane nisi mediate, imperfecte, analogice non intelligimus actum infinitum rationaliter et moraliter conscium; et ideo vi peractae deductionis non possumus nisi mediate, imperfecte, et

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absolute existence there cannot be a real distinction between the originating act and the originated act. Sixth, it follows that the originating act and the originated act are really distinct with respect to relative existence. Opposed relations of originating and originated necessarily follow upon the supposition of real emanation that we have made. And it makes no difference to this that the same act is originating and originated. For we are not discussing a causal emanation, which would cease to be if cause and effect were not two really distinct absolutes. We are discussing an intellectual emanation, according to which to love the good is right because loving proceeds from the good truly affirmed, and affirming the good is true because affirming proceeds from a grasp of evidence. And it cannot be demonstrated by reason that this truth and this rightness are to be excluded because the act of grasping evidence, of affirming, of loving is infinite, and there is only one infinite act. Thus, if divine intellectual emanation is supposed, all that pertains to divine procession and all that we have already proved from the truths of faith under the heading ‘procession according to the mode of a processio operati’ follows. Now, if there is a deduction, there is also some understanding; and this understanding is not annulled simply by the fact that a premise is only a supposition or a hypothesis. Thus, if divine intellectual emanation is supposed, there results some understanding of the faith. 2 Next, we must ask what precisely is the importance of this deduction from the supposition. To this we respond that it is important in two ways: one with respect to knowledge; the other with respect to understanding. For when a deduction is performed, the conclusion is known to the extent that the principle is known, and the conclusion is understood to the extent that the principle is understood. Now, the knowledge gained from the deduction, and from the deduction alone, has no importance at all. For the principle is not known but supposed; so what is deduced, on the strength of the deduction itself, is equally not known but supposed. Of course, it is true that the conclusion is already known from elsewhere, for we demonstrated the conclusion from the truths of faith in the first part of the argument. Nevertheless, the truth of a conclusion is not a proof of its principle, as is well known either from minor logic or from the simple reflection that there can be some other principle from which the same conclusion follows equally well or better. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2m. In contrast, the understanding gained does have some importance. To be sure, our understanding of the infinite, rationally and morally conscious act is only mediate, imperfect, and analogical; so on the strength of our completed deduction

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analogice intelligere processionem per modum operati. Attamen, vel mediata et imperfecta et analogica intelligentia non est nulla: imo, ea praecise est intelligentia quam laudavit c. Vaticanum i (db 1796).

3 Tertio, remanet ut declaretur vel illustretur adepta haec intelligentia. In genere, in eo est quod ad unum reducuntur quae multa sunt et inter se pugnare videntur. Multa enim sunt quae enumerantur in definitione processionis per modum operati; eaque ita inter se pugnant ut nisi in Deo qua infinito esse non possent. Quod magis particulariter declarandum est. Nam, uti manifestat ipsa deductio, alia sequuntur quia Deus est actus infinitus, et alia sequuntur quia Deus supponitur esse dynamice conscius. Ex infinitate enim sequitur quod procedens est infinitum, et ex unicitate infiniti sequitur quod procedens et principium non distinguuntur quoad esse absolutum. E contra, ex conscia exigentia, quae supponitur, sequuntur tum principium, tum emanatio, tum principiatum, tum realis distinctio quoad esse relativum. Porro, quamdiu seorsum consideramus quae ex ratione infiniti sequuntur, nulla oritur vel difficultas vel obiectio; pariter, quamdiu seorsum consideramus quae ex ratione exigentiae consciae sequuntur, nulla oritur vel difficultas vel obiectio. Sed quam primum haec omnia simul considerantur, multiplicari non desinunt difficultates atque obiectiones quae altitudinem mysterii manifestant. At hae difficultates atque obiectiones eatenus mitigantur, neque tantum negative sed etiam positive, quatenus ad unam radicem unumque principium reducuntur quae inter se pugnare videantur. Etsi enim directe reconciliare non possimus et realitatem processionis et consubstantialitatem procedentis, indirecte tamen et mediate reconciliantur per communem radicem quae est actus tum infinitus tum dynamice conscius, cum ex eius infinitate sequatur consubstantialitas, et ex eiusdem dynamica conscientia sequatur realitas emanationis.

4 Quarto praetermittendum non est quam imperfecta sit haec fidei intelligentia. Nuperrime dicebamus eatenus intelligi conclusionem quatenus intelligatur principium; nunc vero addimus eatenus non intelligi conclusionem quatenus non intelligatur principium. Etsi enim omnia quae ad processionem per modum operati pertineant in unam radicem reducantur et ideo aliquatenus intelligantur, attamen non melius intelligi possunt quam intelligitur ipsa radix.

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our understanding of procession according to the mode of a processio operati can only be mediate, imperfect, and analogical. But even mediate, imperfect, and analogical understanding is some understanding. Indeed, it is precisely that kind of understanding referred to by the First Vatican Council (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). 3 It remains to explain or elucidate this understanding that has been acquired. In general, this understanding consists in reducing to a unity many elements which seem inconsistent with one another. Many elements are enumerated in the definition of a procession according to the mode of a processio operati; and their inconsistency is such that they could actually exist only in God considered as infinite. This needs further explanation. It is clear from the deduction itself that some conclusions follow because God is infinite act, and others because one supposes that God is dynamically conscious. From God’s infinity, it follows that what proceeds is infinite, and from the fact that there is but one infinite being it follows that what proceeds and the principle from which it proceeds are not distinct with respect to absolute existence. On the other hand, from the conscious exigence, which we are supposing, there follow the principle, the emanation, the originated, and the real distinction with respect to relative existence. Thus, as long as we are considering just what follows from the notion of infinity, no difficulty or objection arises. Equally, as long as we are considering just what follows from the notion of a conscious exigence, no difficulty or objection arises. But as soon as we consider all these factors together, difficulties and objections keep multiplying. And this reveals the depth of the mystery. Still, these difficulties and objections are mitigated, not only negatively but also positively, to the extent that the multiple elements that seem to be inconsistent with one another are reduced to a single source and principle. For although we cannot reconcile directly the reality of the procession with the consubstantiality of what proceeds, at least they are reconciled indirectly and mediately through the common source, namely, the act that is both infinite and dynamically conscious, since consubstantiality follows from the act’s infinity, and the reality of emanation follows from the dynamic consciousness of the same act. 4 We must not overlook the imperfections of this understanding of the faith. We were just now arguing that a conclusion is understood to the extent that its principle is understood; now we add that to the extent that its principle is not understood, a conclusion is not understood. Although all the elements that pertain to a procession according to the mode of a processio operati can be brought back to a single source and so can be understood in some measure, nevertheless they cannot be understood better than the source itself is understood.

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Sed radix est actus tum infinitus tum rationaliter et moraliter conscius. Infinitum vero intelligimus non positive sed negative. Ipsam nostram rationalem atque moralem conscientiam potius vivimus quam clare et distincte intelligimus. Quae conscientia, si imago Dei esse supponitur, imago valde deficiens est, qua mediante divinam conscientiam nisi analogice et imperfecte concipere non valemus. Quinimo, non scimus in Deo esse conscientiam dynamicam; sed nisi illud non attigimus quod, supposita eiusmodi conscientia divina, ea sequuntur quae ex veritatibus fidei concluduntur. At ipsa haec imperfectio adeo non infirmat ut potius confirmet emanationem intelligibilem et divinam. Uti enim docuit c. Vaticanum i, ‘. . . numquam tamen idonea redditur [ratio fide illustrata] ad ea perspicienda instar veritatum quae proprium ipsius obiectum constituunt. Divina enim mysteria suapte natura intellectum creatum sic excedunt ut etiam revelatione tradita et fide suscepta ipsius tamen fidei velamine contecta et quadam quasi caligine obvoluta maneant, quamdiu in hac mortali vita peregrinamur a Domino . . .’ (db 1796). 21

Pars tertia: Praeter similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis non alia esse videtur analogia ad systematicam conceptionem divinae processionis efformandam. Multis et diversis viis processerunt auctores catholici ut eam assequerentur mysterii intelligentiam quam et possibilem et fructuosissimam affirmavit c. Vaticanum i (db 1796). Unde merito quaeritur quemadmodum de iis iudicari possit et quibusnam rationibus opinio alia alteri sit praeferenda. Quem in finem ea nunc criteria colligere et ordinare volumus, quibus prudens lector tum de aliis sententiis iudicare possit tum de suppositione nuperrime exposita. 1 Quaeritur de modo. Circa processionem distingui potest inter abstractam rationem et modum concretum. In concreto enim alius est procedendi modus in alia natura; sed abstracta processionis ratio (origo, nempe, unius ex alio) adeo brevis et tenuis est ut ab omni modorum differentia praescindat. Quaestio ergo ponitur, non de hac minima ratione quam quilibet nullo negotio attingit, sed de concreto modo divinae processionis. 2 Modus analogice notus. Modus concretus divinae processionis vel immediate vel mediate cognoscitur. Sed immediata Dei cognitio nisi ab ipso Deo et a beatis

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But the source is an act that is both infinite and rationally and morally conscious. We understand the infinite negatively, not positively. And even as regards our own rational and moral consciousness, we live it rather than understand it clearly and distinctly. This consciousness, if we suppose it to be the image of God, is an exceedingly deficient image through whose mediation we are able to conceive divine consciousness only analogically and imperfectly. Indeed, we do not know that there is a dynamic consciousness in God; all we arrive at is this: that, if it is supposed that divine consciousness is dynamic, then what is concluded from the truths of faith follows. Still, this imperfection itself confirms rather than weakens the supposition of divine intellectual emanation. For, as Vatican i taught: ‘. . . never, however, does it [reason illumined by faith] become capable of understanding the mysteries the way it does truths which are its own proper object. For divine mysteries of their very nature so exceed the created intellect that even when they have been given in revelation and accepted by faith, that very faith still keeps them veiled in a sort of obscurity, as long as “we are exiled from the Lord” in this mortal life . . .’ (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132).21 Part Three: Apart from the likeness of intellectual emanation there does not seem to be any other analogy for forming a systematic conception of a divine procession. Catholic authors have proceeded in many different ways to obtain that understanding of mystery that Vatican i has affirmed as possible and most fruitful (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). We may appropriately ask, then, how we should judge these attempts and why we should prefer one opinion to another. To this end, we wish now to collect and arrange those criteria by which a prudent reader can judge both other views and the supposition we have just been expounding. 1 The mode. We can distinguish between the abstract definition of procession and the concrete mode. In the concrete, there are different modes of proceeding in different natures; but the abstract definition of procession (namely, the origin of one from another) is so brief and minimal that it prescinds from every difference of mode. The issue, therefore, concerns not this minimal definition, which anyone can easily arrive at, but the concrete mode of divine procession. 2 The mode known by analogy. The concrete mode of divine procession is known either immediately or mediately. But only God and the blessed know God im21 [‘... vita peregrinamur a Domino ...’ is from 2 Corinthians 5.6. The next verse, included in db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132, but which Lonergan does not include, reads: ‘We live by faith, not by sight.’]

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non habetur, et ideo hac in vita a nobis quaeri non potest nisi mediata quaedam cognitio. Porro omnis mediata Dei cognitio necessario et imperfecta est atque analogica, cum omne medium finitum quam maxime deficiat in infinito repraesentando, et omnis cognitio quae per medium deficiens attingitur necessario sit imperfecta atque analogica. 3 Analogia systematica. Systematica nominatur analogia quae explicite et signate adhibetur neque unam tantummodo resolvit quaestionem sed totam quandam quaestionum seriem. Systematice ergo non procedit, vel qui analogias quidem adhibeat sed hoc nisi implicite et exercite non faciat, vel qui in distinctis quaestionibus, vel etiam in iisdem, diversas et semper novas adducat analogias, ut in fine nisi rhetoricum quendam exemplorum acervum non attingat. E contra theologum oportet systematice procedere, et eo magis qui de modo divinae processionis inquirat. Ideo enim non immediate de divinis personis quaeritur quales sint, sed a processionibus incipitur, quia iam pridem constat totius materiae trinitariae clavem in ratione processionis eiusque modo inveniri. Quae cum ita sint, quaerenda est analogia systematica quae ita modum divinae processionis concipiat ut virtualiter omnis alia quaestio theoretica de Deo trino iam solvatur. 4 E naturaliter notis. Docuit enim c. Vaticanum i quaerendam esse mysterii intelligentiam ‘. . . ex eorum quae naturaliter cognoscit analogia . . .’ (db 1796). Cuius rei ratio est quod omnis cognitio analogica etiam mediata est; et omnis mediata cognitio in aliqua cognitione immediata fundatur. Quare, cum supernaturalia nisi analogice non cognoscamus, sequitur nos ea nisi mediate non cognoscere. Et ideo relinquitur ut analogia ex rebus naturalibus desumatur. 5 Ex immediate cognita natura. Dupliciter res immediate et naturaliter cognoscimus: uno modo secundum rationes communes, uti sunt ens, unum, verum, et bonum, idem et diversum, actus et potentia, absolutum et relativum, et eiusmodi; alio modo secundum genericas et specificas rerum naturas. Et primo modo iam determinavimus divinam processionem esse per modum operati; altero autem modo supposuimus eandem processionem esse per modum emanationis intelligibilis. Et similiter in theologia naturali secundum rationem communem determinatur Deum esse ipsum esse, sed secundum rationem specificam determinatur Deum esse ipsum intelligere.

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mediately, and so in this life we can seek to acquire only some kind of mediate knowledge. Moreover, all mediate knowledge of God is necessarily imperfect and analogical; for every finite medium is extremely deficient in representing the infinite, and all knowledge that is arrived at through a deficient medium is necessarily imperfect and analogical. 3 Systematic analogy. An analogy can be called systematic if it is employed explicitly and thematically, and if it resolves not just one question but a whole series of questions. Thus, one is not proceeding systematically if one is employing analogies but is doing so only implicitly and unthematically, or if in relation to distinct questions, or even in relation to the same questions, one is always bringing forward new and different analogies, so that in the end one arrives simply at an accumulation of rhetorical examples. In contrast, a theologian ought to proceed systematically, and this is especially the case if one is investigating the mode of divine procession. Therefore, one does not begin asking about the characteristics of the divine persons but about the processions, since it is well established that the key to the entire trinitarian question lies in the meaning of procession and its mode. Since this is the case, we must seek a systematic analogy whose conception of the mode of divine procession is such that every other theoretical question concerning the triune God is already virtually solved. 4 From what is naturally known. Vatican i taught that an understanding of mystery is to be sought ‘. . . from the analogy of what is naturally known . . .’ (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). The reason for this is that all analogical knowledge is also mediate knowledge, and all mediate knowledge is grounded in some immediate knowledge. Therefore, since we know supernatural realities only by analogy, it follows that we know them only mediately, and so it remains that the analogy is to be drawn from natural realities. 5 From an immediately known nature. We know things immediately and naturally in two ways: in one way, according to common notions such as being, one, true, good, the same and the diverse, act and potency, the absolute and the relative, and other notions of this kind; in the other way, according to the generic and specific natures of things. Using the first way, we have already determined that divine procession is procession according to the mode of a processio operati; using the second way, we have supposed that the same procession is according to the mode of an intellectual emanation. Similarly, in natural theology it is on the basis of a common notion that God is determined to be the act of existing itself, but it is on the basis of a specific notion that God is determined to be the act of understanding itself.

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Porro, eiusmodi sunt rationes et principia communia ut, veritatibus fidei applicata, conclusiones pariant omnino certas. Attamen eo ipso quod communia sunt, non sufficiunt ad praesentem quaestionem solvendam quae analogiam vult systematicam. Ita enim cognoscendus est divinae processionis modus ut duae et specifice distinctae concipi possint processiones divinae, quarum alia generatio sit et alia generatio non sit; et similiter non solum de processionibus sed etiam de relationibus et personis et caeteris omnibus iam virtualiter et quasi in radice solutiones praebere debet analogia systematica. Quae cum ita sint, ultra metaphysicam analogiam entis procedi oportet, ut analogia quaeratur de determinata quadam natura quae a nobis immediate et naturaliter cognoscatur. 6 Ex spirituali natura. Quorum naturae immediate a nobis cognoscuntur, aut mineralia sunt, aut plantae, aut animalia, aut homines. Sed mineralia, plantae, et animalia prorsus sunt materialia; Deus autem omnino immaterialis est. Quare, cum analogia fundetur in similitudine, et analogia naturae in similitudine naturae, quaerenda est analogia trinitaria, non ex mineralibus, plantis, vel aliis animalibus, sed ex homine et quidem secundum ea quae homini sunt propria. Praeterea, quae homini sunt propria ita dividuntur ut alia inveniantur stricte spiritualia, alia autem quae intrinsece a corpore, vel a vita vegetativa, vel a vita sensitiva dependeant. Ita intelligere et iudicare et velle non solum homini propria sunt sed etiam nisi extrinsece a materia non dependent. Sed locutio ita homini propria est, ut tamen non exerceatur nisi ore et lingua et gutture, e quibus immediate procedit. Iam vero, nihil in Deo intrinsece a materia dependet; et ideo inter Deum et hominem similitudo naturae inveniri non potest nisi in iis quae non solum homini propria sunt sed etiam stricte spiritualia.

7 Ex processione spirituali. Similitudo naturae ad processionem non invenitur nisi in processione; et similitudo naturae ad modum processionis non invenitur nisi in modo processionis. Non ergo omnia homini propria et stricte spiritualia ad nostrum finem faciunt, sed tantummodo processiones stricte spirituales et modi stricte spirituales procedendi. Neque quaecumque processio stricte spiritualis ad nostrun finem facit, sed eae sunt praetermittendae in quibus procedit actus ex potentia vel habitu, cum in Deo non sit nisi actus. Neque modus stricte spiritualis quomodocumque est considerandus, sed procedi oportet ultra rationes communes ad modum procedendi specifice spiritualem;

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Moreover, common notions and principles are such that, when they are applied to the truths of faith, they yield conclusions that are completely certain. Still, because they are common, they are insufficient for solving the present question, which requires a systematic analogy. For the mode of divine procession must be known in such a manner as to allow us to conceive two specifically distinct divine processions, one of which is generation and the other is not. Similarly, the systematic analogy should provide solutions, at least virtually and as it were at the root, concerning not only the processions but also the relations and the persons and all other issues that may arise. For this reason, we have to go beyond the metaphysical analogy of being and seek an analogy from some determinate nature known by us immediately and naturally. 6 From a spiritual nature. What we have immediate knowledge of are the natures either of minerals or plants or animals or human beings. Minerals, plants, and animals are entirely material. God, however, is completely immaterial. Therefore, since analogy has its foundation in likeness, and since an analogy of nature has its foundation in a likeness of nature, the trinitarian analogy has to be sought not from minerals or plants or other animals, but from human beings, and specifically from the characteristics that are proper to human beings. Moreover, the characteristics that are proper to human beings are divided into those that are found to be strictly spiritual and those that depend intrinsically upon the body, or upon vegetative life, or upon sentient life. Thus, understanding and judging and willing not only are proper to human beings, but only extrinsically do they depend upon matter. On the other hand, speech is also proper to human beings; but it cannot be exercised without the mouth and tongue and throat, from which it immediately proceeds. Now, of course, there is nothing in God that depends intrinsically upon matter. So a likeness of nature between God and human beings can be found only in what is proper to human beings and, within that complex, only in what is strictly spiritual. 7 From a spiritual procession. A likeness of nature with respect to procession is found only in a procession; and a likeness of nature with respect to the mode of procession is found only in a mode of procession. Accordingly, not everything that is both proper to human beings and strictly spiritual serves our purpose, but only strictly spiritual processions and strictly spiritual modes of proceeding. Nor does every strictly spiritual procession serve our purpose. Those in which act proceeds from potency or from habit are to be excluded, for in God there is only act. Again, a strictly spiritual mode of procession is not to be considered in just any way whatever. One must go beyond common notions and consider a

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secus similitudo naturae non attingitur. Desumenda ergo est analogia ex processione creata in qua oritur (1) actus stricte spiritualis (2) ex actu stricte spirituali (3) secundum modum procedendi stricte spiritualem. Sed omnis actus stricte spiritualis est actus realis, naturalis, et conscius; et omnis actus conscius est intra conscientiam; et ubi intra conscientiam oritur actus conscius ex actu conscio, ibi ipsa origo est conscia et quodammodo vi ipsius conscientiae.22 Non enim epiphaenomena sunt actus conscii ut alius quidem alium sequatur quin alius vi alterius qua conscii oriatur. Praeterea, omnis actus stricte spiritualis quem cognoscimus, vel in intellectu est vel in voluntate. Desumenda ergo est analogia ex origine conscia actus realis, naturalis, et conscii ex actu reali, naturali, et conscia, intra conscientiam intellectualem et vi ipsius conscientiae intellectualis. 8 Ex modo procedendi spirituali. Porro, ut attingatur analogia secundum similitudinem naturae, ad ipsum internum procedendi modum attendi oportet, et ideo quaerendum est quid sit illud ‘vi conscientiae intellectualis.’ Differt ergo conscientia sensitiva ab intellectuali quia illa legibus specificis, haec legibus transcendentalibus, regitur. Unde in parte sensitiva oritur actus conscius ex actu conscio secundum spontaneitatem ipsius naturae sensitivae; quae spontaneitas ita per ipsam naturam determinatur ut acquisitis dispositionibus et habitibus perficiatur; unde prompte, faciliter, delectabiliter omnia operari possit quae huic determinatae naturae his in occurrentibus adiunctis conveniant. Sed in parte intellectuali ita datur spontaneitas ut tamen non regatur nisi legibus transcendentalibus, quae nulli naturae particulari alligantur sed ad ipsa transcendentalia, ens (= concretum, totum, existens), unum, verum, bonum, ordinantur. Quam ob causam, pars intellectualis est sui domina, sui determinativa, autonoma. Regitur quidem quatenus per transcendentale suum desiderium constituitur; et tamen ipsa se regit quatenus sub Deo agente ipsa se ad suos actus determinat secundum exigentias propriae intellectualitatis.

Quare, quod procedit ‘vi conscientiae intellectualis’ procedit in primis vi desiderii naturalis, vi spontaneitatis intellectualis, vi tendentiae et consciae et trans-

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specifically spiritual mode of proceeding. Otherwise, a likeness of nature is not attained. Therefore, the analogy must be selected from a created procession in which there comes forth (1) a strictly spiritual act (2) from a strictly spiritual act (3) according to a mode of proceeding that is strictly spiritual. But every strictly spiritual act is a real, natural, and conscious act; and every conscious act exists within consciousness; and where there originates a conscious act from a conscious act within consciousness, the originating itself is conscious, and, in a certain measure, by virtue of consciousness itself. 22 For conscious acts are not epiphenomena, such that one act follows from another without the second act originating from the first act by virtue of the first act as conscious. Moreover, every strictly spiritual act that we know is either in the intellect or in the will. The analogy, therefore, must be selected from the conscious originating of a real, natural, and conscious act, from a real, natural, and conscious act, within intellectual consciousness and by virtue of intellectual consciousness itself. 8 From a spiritual mode of proceeding. To attain an analogy according to a likeness of nature, we must attend to the internal mode of the proceeding itself, and so we must ask what is meant by ‘by virtue of intellectual consciousness.’ Sensitive consciousness differs from intellectual consciousness because sensitive consciousness is governed by specific laws, while intellectual consciousness is governed by transcendental laws. Thus, within sensitive consciousness conscious act originates from conscious act in accordance with the spontaneity of sensitive nature itself. The spontaneity is determined by nature itself in such a way that it is perfected through acquired dispositions and habits; then, one can perform promptly, easily, and with pleasure all that belongs to this determinate nature, in whatever circumstances. There is also a spontaneity of intellectuality but it is such that it is governed only by transcendental laws, laws that are bound to no particular nature but are ordered to the transcendentals themselves: to being (the concrete, the all, the existing), the one, the true, the good. For this reason, intellectuality is self-governing, self-determining, autonomous. It is indeed under rule inasmuch as it is constituted by its own transcendental desire; still, it rules itself inasmuch as under God’s agency it determines itself to its own acts in accordance with the exigencies of its own intellectuality. Thus, what proceeds ‘by virtue of intellectual consciousness’ proceeds above all else by virtue of natural desire, by virtue of an intellectual spontaneity, by 22 [Lonergan’s earlier remark on p. 143 is perhaps more precise: ‘the act that in some way proceeds consciously is because of and in accord with the act from which it proceeds.’]

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cendentalis. Quam radicalem tendentiam, seu spontaneitatem, seu desiderium, seu inclinationem multipliciter manifestamus. Eam enim quaestionibus exprimimus, tum practicis (quid faciendum, an faciendum), tum speculativis (quid sit, an sit), tum existentialibus (qualem ipse me efficere possim, debeam, an talem ipse me efficiam). Quam quaestionibus exprimimus, eandem praeceptis agnoscimus atque consecramus: inquirendum est, dubitandum est, deliberandum est. Quam praeceptis agnoscimus, eandem rationibus explicamus atque defendimus: inquirendum est ne ea iudicemus quae non intelligamus; dubitandum est ne specie veri falsis inhaereamus; deliberandum est ne caeci in perditionem ruamus.

Aliter tamen alia procedunt vi conscientiae intellectualis. Ubi enim conscientia intellectualis actu quodam conscio determinatur, ex conscientia determinata tamquam ex principio proxime proportionato procedit alius actus. Et eiusmodi est autonomia libertatis ubi eligimus quia ipsi iudicamus et secundum quod ipsi iudicamus; eiusmodi etiam est autonomia rationalitatis ubi iudicamus quia evidentiam perspicimus et secundum perspectam evidentiam; eiusmodi est autonomia claritatis ubi definimus quia in sensibilibus perspicimus intelligibile et secundum intelligibile perspectum.

Ubi autem conscientia intellectualis non iam determinata est per actum quendam conscium et intellectualem, magis invenitur conscia quaedam spontaneitas quam autonomia; et ita ex quaestionibus ad actus intelligendi procedimus. Denique tandem, quatenus ex dispositionibus vel habitibus de se inconsciis ad actus conscios proceditur, ipsa haec processio adeo non autonoma est ut potius inconscie fiat. Proinde, cum unumquodque cognoscatur secundum quod est actu, modus procedendi stricte spiritualis sumi debet, non secundum ea quae hominem manifestant potentialem sed secundum ea quae sunt actu. Processio autem ex actu non spontanea est sed autonoma, ut vi conscientiae per actum intelligendi determinatae oriatur verbum, et vi conscientiae per actum iudicandi (i.e., verbum complexum) determinatae oriatur electio. 9 Autonomia existentialis. Tripliciter in homine exercetur illa autonomia secundum quam ex intelligentia oritur verbum et ex verbo oritur electio. Primo modo, in practicis quatenus homo intelligit, iudicat, eligit agenda et facienda. Altero modo in speculativis quatenus homo de universo quaerit illudque quantum potest

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virtue of a tendency that is both conscious and transcendental. We manifest this radical tendency, this spontaneity, this desire, this inclination in many ways. For we express it in questions that are practical (‘What is to be done?’ ‘Is it to be done?’), in questions that are speculative (‘What is it?’ ‘Is it so?’), in questions that are existential (‘What can I, what should I make myself to be?’ ‘Am I to make myself such and such?’). What we express in questions, we also acknowledge and consecrate in precepts: we should ask questions, we should raise doubts, we should deliberate. What we acknowledge in precepts, we also explain and defend with reasons: we should ask questions lest we pass judgment on what we do not understand; we should raise doubts lest we adhere to a false appearance of truth; we should deliberate lest we rush blindly into ruin. Nevertheless, there are different kinds of processions by virtue of intellectual consciousness. For whenever intellectual consciousness is determined by some conscious act, then another act proceeds from that determinate consciousness as from its proximately proportionate principle. Such is the case with the autonomy of freedom whenever we choose because we ourselves judge and because our choice is in accordance with our judgment; such is the case with the autonomy of rationality whenever we judge because we grasp the evidence and because our judgment is in accordance with the grasped evidence; such is the case with the autonomy of clarity whenever we define because we grasp the intelligible in the sensible and because our definition is in accordance with grasped intelligibility. However, when intellectual consciousness has not yet been determined by some conscious intellectual act, there is conscious spontaneity rather than conscious autonomy; in this manner we proceed from questions to acts of understanding. Finally, to the extent that conscious acts proceed from dispositions or habits that are not themselves conscious, to that extent the procession itself is so far from being autonomous that it occurs unconsciously. Accordingly, since whatever is known is known insofar as it is in act, a strictly spiritual mode of proceeding must be taken, not according to what manifests human beings as potential, but according to what is in them in act. Further, the procession from act is not spontaneous but autonomous, as is the case when a word arises by virtue of consciousness as determined by the act of understanding, and a choice arises by virtue of consciousness as determined by the act of judgment (that is, by a compound word). 9 Existential autonomy. In human beings, this autonomy, according to which a word comes forth from understanding and a choice from a word, is exercised in three ways. In the first way, it is exercised in practical matters insofar as one understands, judges, and chooses what is to be done and made. In the second way, it is exercised in speculative matters insofar as one asks questions regarding the

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intelligit, unde et quale sit iudicat, ut denique in amorem quendam contemplativum universi prorumpat. Tertio denique modo in existentialibus quatenus homo de se ipso quaerit, et qualis esse debeat intelligit, et quemadmodum ipse se talem facere possit iudicat, unde procedit electio existentialis per quam, quatenus hic et nunc in se est, ipse se talem facit.

Proinde, analogia trinitaria ex exercitio autonomiae existentialis sumenda esse videtur. Qui enim de Deo trino quaerit, non Deum considerat ut creantem vel agentem, et ideo ab autonomia practica praescindit; neque Deum considerat quatenus omnia intelligit et iudicat et diligit, et ideo a speculativis praescindit; sed Deum considerat prout ipse Deus ab aeterno in se ipso constituitur ut trinus, et ideo analogiam ex processionibus secundum autonomiam existentialem sumit.

10 Conclusio. Quaestio ergo erat utrum processio divina sit per modum emanationis intelligibilis. Et primo quidem respondimus per talem similitudinem nos posse hac in vita aliquam mysterii intelligentiam assequi. Unde et altera orta est quaestio utrum ulla alia sit similitudo vel analogia unde aliter sed vel melius vel aeque bene a nobis hac in vita intelligi possit modus divinae processionis. Et huic quaestioni per seriem quandam disiunctionum respondimus. Cognitio enim divinorum aut immediata est, aut mediata, imperfecta, et analogica. Sed hac in vita nostra Dei cognitio immediata non est. Cognitio vero analogica haberi potest aut implicite, exercite, rhetorice, aut explicite, signate, systematice. Sed analogia theologica debet esse explicita, signata, systematica. Analogia systematica aut fundatur in communibus notionibus et principiis in metaphysica generali elaboratis, aut in determinata quadam natura creata uti physica, chemica, biologica, sensitiva, intellectuali. Sed notiones communes non sufficiunt ad analogiam systematicam et trinitariam. Analogia secundum similitudinem naturae desumitur aut ex natura materiali aut ex natura stricte spirituali. Sed Deus est prorsus immaterialis; et ideo similitudo non invenitur nisi in natura stricte spirituali. Modus procedendi in natura stricte spirituali qui hac in vita a nobis cognoscitur est vel (1) conscius et autonomus, et eiusmodi est emanatio intelligibilis tum verbi ex intelligente tum electionis ex verbo, vel (2) conscius sed spontaneus, et eiusmodi est processio actus intelligendi ex quaestionibus, vel (3) inconscius et spontaneus, et

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universe, understands it as much as one can, passes judgment as to its origin and nature, so that, finally, one breaks through to a contemplative love of the universe. In the third and final way, it is exercised in the existential sphere insofar as one asks about oneself, understands what kind of person one ought to be, judges how one can make oneself that kind of person, and from all of this there proceeds an existential choice through which, insofar as one is able here and now to do so, one makes oneself to be that kind of person. Accordingly, it seems that the trinitarian analogy ought to be taken from the exercise of existential autonomy. When one asks about the triune God, one is not considering God as creator or as agent, and so one is prescinding from practical autonomy. Nor is one considering God insofar as God understands and judges and loves all things, and so one is prescinding from speculative matters. But one is considering God inasmuch as God is in himself eternally constituted as triune, and so one takes one’s analogy from the processions that are in accordance with the exercise of existential autonomy. 10 Conclusion. The question, then, was whether divine procession is after the manner of intellectual emanation. Initially we responded that we can indeed acquire some understanding of the mystery in this life through such a likeness. So a second question arose, namely, whether there is any other likeness or analogy from which the mode of divine procession can be understood by us differently but either equally well or better. We have responded to this question through a series of disjunctions. Knowledge of the divine is either immediate or mediate, imperfect, and analogical. But in this life our knowledge of the divine is not immediate. Analogical knowledge can be either implicit, unthematic, and rhetorical, or explicit, thematic, and systematic. But a theological analogy should be explicit, thematic, and systematic. A systematic analogy is based either on common notions and principles elaborated in general metaphysics, or in some determinate created nature such as the physical, the chemical, the biological, the sensitive, the intellectual. But common notions do not suffice for a systematic trinitarian analogy. An analogy according to the likeness of nature is selected either from material nature or from a strictly spiritual nature. But God is completely immaterial; so the likeness is to be found only in a strictly spiritual nature. The modes of proceeding in a strictly spiritual nature that are known to us in this life are either (1) conscious and autonomous, such as the intellectual emanation of a word from understanding and the intellectual emanation of a choice from the word, or (2) conscious but spontaneous, such as the procession of an act of understanding from questions, or (3) unconscious and spontaneous, such as the

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eiusmodi est origo actus conscii quatenus fit ex potentia, dispositione, habitu, quae de se inconscia sunt. Sed Deus est actus purus, et ideo excluditur origo inconscia ex potentia, dispositione, habitu; neque Deus inquirit, dubitat, deliberat, et ideo excluditur processio conscia sed spontanea; quare, alia non relinquitur similitudo naturae ad modum divinae processionis nisi emanatio intelligibilis per quam oritur actus conscius ex actu conscio secundum modum et conscium et autonomum.

ASSERTUM II Per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis duae et tantummodo duae processiones divinae concipi possunt, nempe, verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque.

Ad terminos emanatio: quaecumque origo. emanatio intelligibilis: origo conscia actus intra conscientiam intellectualem et vi ipsius intellectualis conscientiae actu priori determinatae. dicens: principium emanationis intelligibilis quatenus per actum intelligendi determinatur. verbum: immanens terminus emanationis intelligibilis ex dicente. 23 spirans: principium emanationis intelligibilis quatenus determinatur tum per actum intelligendi tum etiam per consequens verbum quod est iudicium valoris. 24 amor: fundamentalis actus voluntatis: cf. Sum. theol., i, q. 20; i–ii, qq. 26–28; ii–ii, qq. 23–33. Qui quidem amor, quamvis non in intellectu sed in voluntate recipiatur, sane est intra ipsam conscientiam intellectualem, cum voluntas sit appetitus intellectum sequens seu intellectualis. Quare sicut verbum est immanens terminus emanationis intelligibilis ex dicente, ita amor est immanens terminus emanationis intelligibilis ex spirante.25 23 Duplex esse verbum interius sicut et duplex est operatio nostri intellectus, vide infra Appendicem ii, sect. 2. In Deo, tamen, sicut idem est esse quod essentia, et unica infinita est intelligendi operatio, ita unum est verbum. 24 ‘Spirans’ est idem quod ‘notionaliter diligens’ (Summa theol., i, q. 37, a. 1. c ad fin). 25 Vide etiam C. Gent., iv, 19. Circa ‘amatum in amante’ vide quaestionem annexam iv infra. Circa intellectualitatem voluntatis apud S. Thomam, considera argumentum quo probatur voluntatem Dei esse causam rerum: ‘Secundum hoc enim effectus

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origin of a conscious act from a potency, from a disposition, from a habit, which in themselves are unconscious. But God is pure act, and so unconscious origin from a potency, a disposition, or a habit is excluded. And God does not ask questions, raise doubts, or deliberate, so conscious but spontaneous procession is excluded. Therefore, there remains no likeness of nature to the mode of divine procession except the intellectual emanation through which a conscious act originates from a conscious act according to a conscious and autonomous mode. ASSERTION 2 Two and only two divine processions can be conceived through the likeness of intellectual emanation, namely, the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love from both the Speaker and the Word. Terminology emanation: any kind of originating. intellectual emanation: the conscious originating of an act within intellectual consciousness and by virtue of intellectual consciousness as determined by a prior act. the speaker: the principle of intellectual emanation inasmuch as that principle is determined by the act of understanding. the word: the immanent term of an intellectual emanation from the speaker. 23 spirating: the principle of intellectual emanation inasmuch as that principle is determined by both the act of understanding and the consequent word, when that word is a judgment of value.24 love: the fundamental act of will: see Summa theologiae, 1, q. 20; 1-2, qq. 26–28; 2-2, qq. 23–33. Although this love is received not in the intellect but in the will, it is certainly within intellectual consciousness, since the will is the appetite following naturally upon intellect, that is, is the intellectual appetite. Therefore, just as the word is the immanent term of intellectual emanation from the speaker, so love is the immanent term of intellectual emanation from the spirator. 25 23 In us there is a twofold inner word, just as there is a twofold operation of our intellect; see below, appendix 2, section 2. In God, however, just as God’s act of existence is identical with God’s essence, and just as there is in God a single infinite operation of understanding, so there is also just one word. 24 ‘Spirating’ is the same as ‘notionally loving’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 37, a. 1 c. ad fin.). [Divinarum personarum has iudicium practicum seu iudicium valoris, ‘a practical judgment or judgment of value.’] 25 See also Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 19. On ‘the beloved in the lover’ see question 4 below. On the intellectuality of the will in St Thomas, consider the argument by which he proves that the will of God is the cause of things: ‘For effects proceed from

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Nota theologica Quod sunt duae processiones divinae, de fide divina et catholica. Quod concipi possunt secundum emanationem quandam intellectualem et voluntariam, communis theologorum sententia. Quod concipiendae sunt secundum emanationem intelligibilem verbi a dicente et amoris ab utroque, videtur sententia S. Thomae.

Asserti intentio Continuatur via synthetica. Postquam enim determinatum est processiones divinas esse concipiendas per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis, remanet determinandum quot processiones eiusmodi in Deo concipi possint. Cumque duae et duae tantummodo inveniantur, congruit analogia psychologica cum iis quae ex fide cognoscimus. Sententiae Sententia S. Thomae brevissime sequentibus exponitur. Sum. theol., i, q. 93, a. 6: ... cum increata Trinitas distinguatur secundum processionem Verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque, ut supra habitum est ... Ibid. q. 27, a. 1: Quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei intellectae, ex vi intellectiva proveniens et ex eius notitia procedens. Comp. theol., c. 49: Quod autem aliquid actu ametur, procedit et ex virtute amativa amantis et ex bono amabili actu intellecto. Sum. theol., i, q. 27, a. 1: ... secundum similitudinem supremarum creaturarum, quae sunt intellectuales substantiae ... secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi in-

procedunt a causa agente, secundum quod praeexistunt in ea: quia omne agens agit sibi simile. Praeexistunt autem effectus in causa secundum modum causae. Unde, cum esse divinum sit ipsum eius intelligere, praeexistunt in eo effectus eius secundum modum intelligibilem. Unde et per modum intelligibilem procedunt ab eo. Et sic, per consequens, per modum voluntatis: nam inclinatio eius ad agendum quod intellectu conceptum est, pertinet ad voluntatem. Voluntas igitur Dei est causa rerum.’ Sum theol., i, q. 19, a. 4. Cf. q. 32, a. 1, ad 3m; q. 45, a. 6.

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Theological note That there are two divine processions is of divine and catholic faith. That these divine processions can be conceived according to some kind of intellectual and volitional emanation is the common opinion of theologians. That they are to be conceived according to the intellectual emanation of the word from the speaker and the intellectual emanation of love from both seems to be the opinion of St Thomas. Meaning of the Assertion The second assertion continues along the way of synthesis. For having determined that divine processions are to be conceived by means of the likeness of intellectual emanation, we still have to determine how many processions of this kind can be conceived in God. And since two and only two processions are to be found, the psychological analogy is congruent with what we know from faith. Opinions The opinion of St Thomas is presented very briefly in the following texts. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 93, a. 6: ‘. . . since the uncreated Trinity is distinguished according to the procession of the Word from the speaker, and of Love from both, as we saw above . . .’ Ibid. q. 27, a. 1: ‘Whenever we understand, by the mere fact that we do understand, something proceeds within us, which is the conception of the thing understood, issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from its knowledge.’ Compendium theologiae, c. 49: ‘The fact that an object is actually being loved proceeds both from the lover’s power to love and from the lovable good actually understood.’ Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 1: ‘. . . according to the likeness of the highest creatures, which are intellectual substances . . . according to intellectual emanation, the agent that causes them according to the way in which they preexist in the agent: because every agent brings about what is similar to itself. Further, effects preexist in their cause in accord with the mode of the cause. Therefore, since the divine act of existence is the divine act of understanding, effects preexist in the divine act of existence in accordance with the intellectual mode. Hence, they proceed from the divine act of existence through an intellectual mode of proceeding. Consequently, they proceed through the mode of will: for the inclination to put in act what has been conceived by the intellect pertains to the will. The will of God, therefore, is the cause of things.’ Summa theologiae, 1, q. 19, a. 4. See q. 32, a. 1, ad 3m; q. 45, a. 6.

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telligibilis a dicente ... Ibid. ad 2m: ... quod procedit ad intra processu intelligibili ... Ibid. ad 3m: ... procedere ut intimum et absque diversitate per modum intelligibilem ... Ibid. a. 2: ... per modum intelligibilis actionis ... Ibid. ad 2m: verbum quod secundum intelligibilem operationem procedit in nobis ... Ibid. ad 3m: verbum intelligibiliter procedens ...

C. Gent., iv, 11, § 8: Relinquitur igitur quod generatio divina secundum intellectualem emanationem sit intelligenda. Vide §§ 1–8. De Pot., q. 7, a. 10: ipsa res [materialis] quae est extra animam, omnino est extra genus intelligibile. Sum. theol., i, q. 87, a. 1: Essentia igitur Dei ... est simpliciter et perfecte secundum seipsam intelligibilis ... Angeli autem essentia est quidem in genere intelligibilium ut actus ... Intellectus autem humanus se habet in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia tantum, sicut et materia prima se habet in genere rerum sensibilium ...

Unde concludes: S. Thomam adhibuisse vocem ‘intelligibile’ 26 ad ea designanda quae stricte spiritualia sunt; 27 quo sensu emanatio verbi dicatur intelligibilis; eamque esse eiusmodi ut procedens non sit diversum a principio; pari modo concipi tum emanationem verbi tum emanationem amoris. Circa intellectualitatem voluntatis, vide supra annotationem 25. Circa ‘amatum in amante,’ vide infra quaestionem annexam iv. Caeteras autem sententias quae analogiam psychologicam aliter exponant, valde inferiores esse arbitror. Fundamentalem differentiarum radicem in eo esse opinamur quod operationes intellectuales et voluntariae concipiuntur, non secundum propriam earum realitatem atque naturam, sed tantummodo secundum analogias ex parte hominis sensitiva, uti supra diximus. 28 Accedit tamen et alia differentiarum radix quae provenit tum ex complexitate terminologica in scriptis ipsius S. Thomae (vide appendicem i) tum ex influxu augustinianorum qui doctrinam de actu vitali invenisse videantur. Quam ob causam etiam optimi commentatores operationem immanentem nisi valde obscure et confuse non concipiunt: verbi causa, Caietanus sic scribere potuit, ‘Intelligere ergo non est formaliter pati;

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such as that of the intelligible word from the speaker . . .’ Ibid. ad. 2m: ‘. . . what proceeds within by an intellectual procession . . .’ Ibid. ad. 3m: ‘. . . to proceed as innermost and without diversity through an intellectual mode . . .’ Ibid. a. 2: ‘. . . through the mode of intellectual action . . .’ Ibid. ad 2m: ‘. . . the word which proceeds in us according to an intellectual operation . . .’ Ibid. ad 3m: ‘. . . the word proceeding intelligibly . . .’ Summa contra Gentiles., 4, c. 11, ¶ 8, § 3468: ‘It remains, therefore, that divine generation must be understood according to intellectual emanation.’ See ¶¶1–8, §§ 3461–68. De potentia., q. 7, a. 10: ‘. . . the [material] thing which is outside the soul is also completely outside the order of the intelligible . . .’ Summa theologiae, 1, q. 87, a.1: ‘The essence of God, therefore, . . . is simply and perfectly intelligible in itself . . . The angelic essence is indeed in the order of the intelligible as act . . . But the human intellect is in the order of intelligible things as a being that is only in potency, just as prime matter is in the order of sensible things . . .’ From these texts one may conclude: St Thomas used the word intelligibilis 26 to designate whatever is strictly spiritual;27 in this sense of intelligibilis, the emanation of the word is said to be intelligible; the emanation is of a kind such that what proceeds is not different from the principle from which it proceeds; both the emanation of the word and the emanation of love are equally to be conceived in this way. On the intellectuality of the will, see note 25 above. On the ‘beloved in the lover,’ see question 4 below. I consider other opinions which explain the psychological analogy in different ways to be far inferior. As I mentioned above,28 I believe the fundamental source of the difference to be that intellectual and volitional operations are conceived, not in accord with their own proper reality and nature, but only in accord with analogies drawn from human sensibility. There is, however, another source of the difference, which arises both from the terminological complexity in the writings of St Thomas himself (see appendix 1) and from the influence of the Augustinians, who seem to have invented the doctrine of vital act. Because of this, even the best commentators conceive immanent operation only in an extremely obscure and confused manner. For instance, Cajetan was able to write: ‘To understand, therefore, is not formally to be passive; although, properly speaking, it is not even 26 [Here often translated ‘intellectual.’] 27 [On the intelligible and the spiritual, see Lonergan, Insight 670–71.] 28 See pp. 131, 133 above.

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quamvis, proprie loquendo, non sit etiam formaliter agere, sed potius active passiveque vitaliter operari. Et idem iudicium est de sensatione.’ 29 Et haec de sententiis sufficiant. Nam primo quaestiones de ratione operationis immanentis et de natura intellectus de se sunt philosophicae. Deinde, quam difficiles quamque intricatae sint hae quaestiones ex eo iudicari potest quod Appendices i et ii nihil faciunt nisi brevissime ea redigere quae alibi de sola mente S. Thomae conscripsimus. Tertio, vix componi potest argumentum indirectum, theologicum, et efficax ad has quaestiones philosophicas dirimendas, si quidem adversarius semper respondere potest obscuritatem vel confusionem, quae in sua positione detegatur, non ex errore philosophico sed ex ipsa mysterii altitudine provenire. Quae cum ita sint, satis esse duximus eas indicare radices unde diversitas sententiarum oriatur.

Argumentum Primo, arguitur duas processiones in divinis concipi posse secundum similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis. Nam Deus est ens per essentiam et ipsum intelligere, verum per essentiam et ipsum affirmare, bonum per essentiam et ipsum amare. Fieri enim non potest ut in summo ente desit perfectio intelligentiae, ut in summo vero desit verum formaliter (quod est affirmare), ut in summo bono desit bonitas ipsius amoris. 30 Iam vero omne affirmare quod cognoscimus eatenus verum est quatenus ex intelligente emanat; et omnis amor spiritualis quem cognoscimus eatenus rectus sanctusque est quatenus ex vera boni affirmatione procedit. Quare, si ullae emanationes intelligibiles in Deo concipi possunt, sane emanatio verbi a dicente et emanatio amoris ab utroque concipi possunt. Neque hae duae, si in Deo ponuntur, in unam solamque reducuntur. Nam contradictorie opponuntur duo haec: ex verbo emanare; ex verbo non emanare. Sed amoris est ex verbo emanare. Et verbi est non ex se ipso sed ex intelligente et

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formally to be active, but rather to operate vitally, both actively and passively. And our judgment is the same concerning sensation.’29 These remarks may suffice regarding opinions. For, in the first place, questions concerning the formality of immanent operations and the nature of the intellect, of themselves, are philosophical questions. Next, one can judge how difficult and how intricate these questions are from the fact that appendices 1 and 2 do nothing else except gather together in a very brief fashion what we have written elsewhere just on the mind of St Thomas regarding them. Third, one can hardly construct an argument that is indirect, theological, and effective in settling these philosophical questions if an opponent can always respond that the obscurity or confusion that is revealed in his own position comes not from a philosophical error but from the profundity of the mystery itself. Given these considerations, we consider it sufficient to indicate the sources from which the diversity of opinions arises. Argument First, we argue that in the deity two processions can be conceived on the basis of the likeness of intellectual emanation. God is being by essence and the very act of understanding, truth by essence and the very act of affirming, good by essence and the very act of loving. For it is impossible that the highest being lack the perfection of intelligence, that the highest truth lack truth in the formal sense (which is the act of affirming), that the highest good lack the goodness of love itself.30 Now, every act of affirming known to us is true to the extent that it emanates from one who understands; and every spiritual love known to us is right and holy to the extent that it proceeds from a true affirmation of a good. Therefore, if any intellectual emanations can be conceived in God, surely the emanation of the word from the speaker and the emanation of love from both of these can be conceived in God. If these two intellectual emanations are posited in God, they are not reducible to one emanation only. For ‘to emanate from the word’ and ‘not to emanate from the word’ stand to each other in contradictory opposition. But it is of the nature of love to emanate from the word. And it is of the nature of the word not to 29 Cajetan, In Summam theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 2, § xx; in the Leonine ed. of Thomas’s Opera omnia, vol. 5: 263. [On understanding as passive (pati), see Verbum 116–21.] 30 [In Insight (p. 681), Lonergan speaks of God not as the highest being, the highest truth, and the highest good, but as the primary being, the primary truth, and the primary good. Bearing this in mind provides a useful control for understanding accurately his use of ‘highest’ here.]

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dicente emanare. Iam vero in Deo poni non potest contradictio; et ideo in Deo ita poni non possunt et emanatio verbi et emanatio amoris ut una solaque sit emanatio. Duae ergo processiones divinae per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis concipi possunt. Deinde arguitur duas tantummodo in Deo processiones in Deo concipi posse per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis. Nam in Deo concipi non possunt nisi unum intelligere, unum verbum, unus amor. Sed unius amoris non est nisi una emanatio; unius verbi non est nisi una emanatio; neque intelligere divinum ex quodam alio principio emanare potest intelligibiliter. Ergo in Deo concipi non possunt nisi duae processiones inquantum ad similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis attenditur. Maior constat tum ratione actus tum ratione obiecti. Ratione actus, cum in Deo simplicissimo nisi unus actus non sit. Ratione obiecti, quia per actum infinitum intelligendi attingitur omne ens, per actum infinitum affirmandi attingitur omne verum, per actum infinitum amandi attingitur omne bonum. 31 Minor est evidens quatenus asseritur in unico actu aeterno et immutabili emanatio una unius verbi, et emanatio una unius amoris. In nobis autem aliqualiter invenitur intelligibilis emanatio actus intelligendi quatenus intellectualiter conscii inquirimus, investigamus, ratiocinamur ut ad actum intelligendi perveniamus. Sed hoc in Deo esse non potest, cum Deus non reducatur de potentia in actum intelligendi.

ASSERTUM III Divinam Verbi emanationem, non autem emanationem Amoris, consequitur ratio generationis proprie dictae. Asserti intentio Postquam determinatum est quemadmodum divina processio concipi possit et quot qualesque processiones sic concipiantur, quaeritur utrum generatio proprie dicta sit de ratione sive emanationis verbi sive emanationis amoris. Et illud affir-

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be from itself but to emanate from the one understanding and speaking. Now, certainly, one cannot posit contradiction in God; so the emanation of the word and the emanation of love cannot be posited in God in such a manner that there results one emanation only. Therefore, there are two divine processions that can be conceived through the likeness of intellectual emanation. Next, we argue that only two processions in God can be conceived through the likeness of intellectual emanation. For in God there can be conceived only one act of understanding, only one word, only one love. But there is only one emanation of one love; there is only one emanation of one word; and the divine act of understanding cannot intellectually emanate from some other principle. Therefore, in terms of the likeness to intellectual emanation, one can conceive only two processions in God. The major premise is certain both by reason of the act and by reason of the object: by reason of the act, since in God, who is absolutely simple, there is only one act; by reason of the object, because the infinite act of understanding attains the totality of being, the infinite act of affirming attains the totality of truth, the infinite act of love attains the totality of the good.31 The minor premise is evident inasmuch as it asserts that in a single eternal and immutable act there is one emanation of one word and one emanation of one love. In us, however, in some measure there is an intellectual emanation of the act of understanding, to the extent that when we are intellectually conscious we inquire, investigate, and reason, so that we may come to an act of understanding. But this is not the case with God, since God is not reduced from the potency to the act of understanding. ASSERTION 3 Generation in the strict sense of the term is implied by the divine emanation of the Word, but not by the divine emanation of Love. Meaning of the Assertion We have determined the manner in which divine procession can be conceived and the number and kinds of processions that are conceived in this manner. We now ask whether generation in the strict sense of the term applies formally either to the emanation of the Word or to the emanation of Love. And our response is 31 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, aa. 5–6, 9–14; q. 34, a. 3; q. 19, a. 3.

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matur, hoc negatur, ut ulterius congruere videatur analogia psychologica cum iis quae de fide cognoscimus. Nota theologica Quod Filius est genitus, Spiritus sanctus non genitus, de fide divina et catholica (db 39). Quod idem omnino est et Filius et Verbum, de fide divina et catholica. ‘In nomine Verbi eandem proprietatem importari quae in nomine Filii’ est sententia S. Thomae 32 et caeterorum theologorum qui S. Augustinum sequuntur;33 quos occasionem nactus approbavit Pius vi (db 1597).

Argumenti divisio Argumentum ex tribus dependet, nempe, ex ratione generationis proprie dictae, ex modo concipiendi naturam divinam, et ex differentia inter emanationem verbi et emanationem amoris. His igitur praemissis, facile concluditur emanationem verbi divinam, non autem emanationem amoris, importare rationem generationis proprie dictae.

De ratione generationis Late dicitur generatio apud Aristotelem origo substantiae materialis; ita passim in libris, De generatione et corruptione. Stricte sumpta, definiri solet generatio origo viventis a principio vivente coniuncto in similitudinem naturae.34 Non ergo est generatio proprie dicta (1) origo non viventis (v.g., aquae ex

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to affirm the first and deny the second. In this way, a further congruence between the psychological analogy and what we know by faith comes to light. Theological Note It is of divine and catholic faith that the Son is begotten and the Holy Spirit is not begotten (db 39, ds 75, nd 16). It is of divine and catholic faith that the same one is both Son and Word, entirely so [db 288, ds 548]. It is the opinion of St Thomas that ‘In the name “Word” the same property is implied as in the name “Son.” ’ 32 This is also the opinion of those theologians who follow St Augustine, 33 and their opinion, when occasion arose, received the approval of Pius vi (db 1597, ds 2698). Division of the Argument The argument hinges upon three points, namely, from the formality of generation in the strict sense of the term, from the manner of conceiving the divine nature, and from the difference between the emanation of the word and the emanation of love. With these points as premises, it is easy to conclude that the divine emanation of the Word includes the formality of generation in the strict sense of the term, but that the divine emanation of Love does not. The Formality of Generation For Aristotle, ‘generation’ in the wide sense denotes the origin of a material substance; this is the way the term is used in various places throughout his work On Generation and Corruption. Taken strictly, generation is usually defined as the origin of something alive from a conjoined living principle, with a resulting likeness in nature. 34 Accordingly, the following are not instances of generation in the strict sense of the term: (1) the origin of something that is not alive (for example, the origin 32 Ibid. q. 34, a. 2, ad 3m. [The property is ‘being born,’ nativitas: ‘Ipsa enim nativitas Filii, quae est proprietas personalis sius ...’ Ibid.] 33 Augustine, De Trinitate, vii, ii; ml 42: 936. [This text of Augustine is quoted by Aquinas at the place referred to in the previous note: ‘Unde dicit Augustinus, Eo dicitur Verbum quo Filius’ (‘Thus Augustine says, His name is Word because his name is Son’).] 34 [The words ‘in similitudinem naturae’ are difficult to translate, but Lonergan tells us what the expression means a couple of paragraphs later: for there to be generation, a ‘likeness in nature must result by virtue of the emanation itself.’ The expression is Aquinas’s. See Super I Sententiarum, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1. See also De potentia, q. 2, a. 4, ad 7.]

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hydrogenio et oxygenio), (2) origo viventis a principio non vivente (v.g, generatio dicta spontanea), (3) origo viventis a principio vivente sed non coniuncto (v.g, creatio viventium), (4) origo viventis a principio vivente coniuncto sed dissimili (v.g., origo capillorum ex capite), vel (5) origo viventis a principio vivente, coniuncto, simili sed non in similitudinem naturae (v.g., origo Evae ex Adamo per costam; non enim est de natura costae desumptae ut ex ea fiat mulier).

Quibus perspectis, concluditur generationem proprie dictam haberi vel non haberi secundum quod omnia et singula in definitione posita habentur vel non habentur. Et de praesenti specialiter attendendum est ad elementum quintum, nempe, in similitudinem naturae; quamvis enim requiratur, non sufficit ut emanans sit simile in natura; sed ut habeatur ratio generationis proprie dictae, haec in natura similitudo oriri debet vi ipsius emanationis.

De natura Dei Cum generatio sit in similitudinem naturae, considerari oportet quaenam sit Dei natura. Quae quidem quaestio quodammodo insolubilis videtur, cum nomen, natura, duplicite ita dicatur ut uno modo in Deo locum non habeat, alio autem modo a nobis hac in vita cognosci non possit. Nam secundum Aristotelem natura definitur principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens.35 Sed Deus est omnino simplex, secus non esset primum omnium principium. Et ideo in Deo nulla potest esse realis distinctio inter principium motus vel operationis et ipsum motum seu operationem. Hoc ergo sensu natura in Deo poni non potest. Si autem sumitur natura pro essentia, ita natura in Deo agnosci potest ut tamen eam non cognoscamus. Nam hac in vita nescimus quid sit Deus. Quamvis enim nomen, Deus, imponatur ad divinam naturam significandam, ipsum tamen

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of water from hydrogen and oxygen); (2) the origin of something alive from a principle that is not living (for example, so-called spontaneous generation); (3) the origin of something alive from a living principle, but not from a conjoined living principle (for example, the creation of living beings); (4) the origin of something alive from a conjoined but dissimilar living principle (for example, the origin of hair from the scalp); (5) the origin of something alive from a conjoined and similar living principle, but a living principle whose similarity to the originated is not in a likeness in nature (for example, the origin of Eve from Adam through a rib, for it does not pertain to the nature of a rib taken from a man that a woman comes to be from it). Thus, we can conclude that there is generation in the strict sense of the term if and only if each and every element included in the definition is applicable. And in the present discussion we must pay special attention to the fifth element of the definition, namely, ‘with a resulting likeness in nature’; for although it is necessary that what emanates be similar in nature to that from which it emanates, this is not sufficient. To have the formality of generation in the strict sense, this likeness in nature must result by virtue of the emanation itself. The Nature of God Since generation results in a likeness in nature, we have to consider the question, What is the nature of God? But this question seems somehow insoluble, since we use the term ‘nature’ in two ways, and in the first way the term is not applicable to God while in the second it refers to that in God which in this life we cannot know. Thus, according to Aristotle, nature is defined as the principle of motion and rest in that in which it exists first and per se and not as an accident. 35 But God is absolutely simple; otherwise God would not be the first principle of all things. So there cannot be in God a real distinction between a principle of motion or of operation and the motion or operation itself. In this sense, therefore, nature cannot be posited in God. However, if ‘nature’ is taken in the sense of essence, then nature can be acknowledged in God, but we do not know it. For in this life we do not know what God is. Although the name ‘God’ is assigned to signify the divine nature, never35 Aristotle, Physics, ii, 1, 192b 23: [‘... nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute.’ The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941) 236.]

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nomen non a cognita natura sumitur; et ideo nomen, Qui est, maxime proprium Dei nomen videtur, quia hoc nomen ab esse Dei sumitur et omnem formam determinantem omittit ut significet quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum. 36 Sed contra est quod secundum S. Thomam intelligere Dei est eius substantia, 37 et Dei natura est ipsum eius intelligere,38 et creaturae intellectuales sunt ad imaginem Dei quia similitudinem specificam habent. 39 Quare respondendum videtur quod, si natura sumitur pro essentia, ideo hac in vita nescimus quid sit Deus quia Deum non intelligimus per speciem divinae essentiae proportionatam.40 Quod tamen minime prohibet quominus hac in vita analogice Deum cognoscamus et ipsa analogice cognita ita ordinemus ut aliquid sit primum per modum naturae seu essentiae. Et hoc sensu natura Dei est eius intelligere, ad quod consequuntur Dei infinitas et aseitas et simplicitas et quodcumque in Deo est sed nobis incognitum. Infinitas enim ita est de ipsa intellectus ratione ut intellectus, qui est actu respectu totius sui obiecti, infinitus sit. Cum enim intellectus sit quo est omnia fieri, cumque ‘omnia’ nullam limitationem specificam vel genericam admittat, obiectum intellectus est ens totum. 41 Unde concluduntur intellectum ita in suum obiectum tendere ut non quiescat donec Deum per essentiam videat;42 et omnem intellectum creatum esse potentiam passivam;43 et omne intelligere creatum esse aliud a substantia creaturae, aliud ab eius esse, et aliud a potentia eius operativa;44 et intellectum, qui est actus respectu totius obiecti, esse ens infinitum. 45

Porro, ens infinitum non potest esse ab alio; et ideo intellectus in actu respectu totius obiecti est a se.

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theless the name itself is not derived from a known nature; so it seems that the name ‘the One who is’ is the most proper name of God, because this name is taken from God’s act of existence and leaves unmentioned every determining form in order to signify an infinite ocean of substance.36 On the other hand, according to St Thomas God’s act of understanding is God’s substance,37 God’s nature is God’s very act of understanding,38 and intellectual creatures are in the image of God because they possess a specific likeness. 39 It seems, therefore, that one ought to respond that, if ‘nature’ is taken in the sense of essence, then in this life we do not know what God is because we do not understand God through a species proportionate to the divine essence. 40 Still, this in no way prevents us from knowing God analogically in this life or from ordering what we know analogically in such a way that some element of what we know analogically is first after the manner of a nature or essence. In this sense, the nature of God is God’s act of understanding, upon which follow God’s infinity and aseity and simplicity, and whatever else there is in God but unknown to us. Indeed, infinity so belongs to the very notion of intellect that an intellect in act with respect to its total object is infinite. For since the intellect is such as to become all things, and since ‘all things’ admits no specific or generic limitation, the object of intellect is the totality of being.41 It follows that intellect tends toward its object in such a way that it does not rest until it beholds God in God’s essence; 42 that every created intellect is a passive potency;43 that every created act of understanding is distinct from the substance of the creature, distinct from its act of existence, and distinct from its operative potency;44 and that an intellect in act with respect to its total object is infinite being.45 Moreover, infinite being cannot be from another; so intellect in act with respect to its total object is from itself. 36 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 13, a. 8 c. and ad 2m; a. 11 c. and ad 1m. [In speaking of God as an infinite ocean of substance, in the context of considering the name of God, ‘the One who is,’ Thomas is referring back to St John Damascene: ‘For he keeps all being in his own embrace, like an ocean of essence infinite and indeterminate.’ De fide orthodoxa, i, 9.] 37 Ibid. q. 14, a. 4; see q. 54, aa. 1–3. 38 Ibid. q. 18, a. 3 c. ad fin. 39 Ibid. q. 93, aa. 2–4. 40 Ibid. q. 12, aa. 2, 4, 5, 11. 41 Ibid. q. 79, a. 7. 42 Ibid. q. 12, a. 1; see 1-2, q. 3, a. 8; q. 5, a. 5; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, cc. 25–63. 43 Summa theologiae, q. 79, a. 2. 44 Ibid. q. 54, aa. 1–3. 45 Ibid. q. 79, a. 2. See also Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 98, ¶ 9, § 1835.

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Praeterea, infinitum excludit potentiam; quod enim in potentia est ad perfectionem ulteriorem, eo ipso a ratione infiniti deficit. Praeterea, intellectus in actu est intelligibile in actu; et secundum hoc tantum intellectus aliud est ab intelligibili, quia utrumque est in potentia.46 Sed infinitum potentiam excludit. Ergo intelligere quod est actu respectu totius obiecti non distinguitur ab intellectu qui intelligit. Praeterea, ipsum infinitum qua cognoscibile seu intelligibile non distinguitur ab intelligere quo intelligitur.47 Denique, intelligere infinitum est verum respectu sui ipsius, non secundum similitudinem quasi duo essent cognitio et cognitum, sed secundum absentiam dissimilitudinis.48 Praeterea, non aliud est esse naturale infiniti et aliud esse eius intentionale. Nam esse alicuius naturale est esse quo est; et esse eius intentionale est medium quo cognoscitur. Sed in infinito idem est intelligere, quo cognoscitur, et intelligibile quod cognoscitur. Ergo idem est eius esse naturale ac eius esse intentionale.49

Praeterea, infinitum est omnino simplex. Nam unum intelligere est simplex; et intelligere infinitun est unus actus; et hic unus actus est idem ac omne quod infinitum de infinito cognoscit. Praeterea, quamvis nos infinitum non concipiamus nisi analogice inquantum ascendimus ab intelligere nostro finito, tamen ipsum infinitum intelligere perfecte se comprehendit. Neque se comprehendit ut aliud ab ipso intelligere sed ut idem omnibus modis. Et ideo si Dei natura concipitur ut intellectus in actu respectu totius sui obiecti, sequuntur et Dei infinitas, et Dei aseitas, et Dei simplicitas, et quodcumque in Deo est sed nobis incognitum est.

Si autem natura sumitur non pro essentia, unde caetera omnia sequantur, sed pro principio intrinseco operationis, iterum concludi potest divinam naturam esse intellectualem. Quamvis enim nulla prorsus distinctio realis in Deo poni possit secundum quod Deus naturaliter nobis innotescat, tamen prout Deus nobis per fidem et theologiam cognoscitur, inveniuntur reales personarum distinctiones quae per relationes originis constituuntur. Iam vero ‘non est idem modus originis in omnibus, sed modus originis uniusciusque est secundum convenientiam

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Again, the infinite excludes potency; for what is in potency to a further perfection falls short of infinity by that very fact. Again, the intellect in act is the intelligible in act; and intellect differs from the intelligible only to the extent that both are in potency. 46 But the infinite excludes potency. Therefore, understanding that is in act with respect to its total object is not distinct from the intellect that understands. Furthermore, the infinite itself as knowable or intelligible is not distinct from the act of understanding by which it is understood.47 Finally, the infinite act of understanding is true with respect to itself, not because of a likeness, as if the knowing and the known were two, but because of the absence of unlikeness.48 Again, the natural act of existence of the infinite is not different from its intentional act of existence. For the natural act of existence of some being is the act of existence by which it is; and its intentional act of existence is the medium by which it is known. But in the case of the infinite, the act of understanding by which the infinite is known is the same as the intelligible which is known. Therefore, the natural act of existence of the infinite is the same as its intentional act of existence.49 Again, the infinite is absolutely simple. For a single act of understanding is simple; and an infinite act of understanding is a single act; and this single act is identical with all that the infinite knows concerning the infinite. Again, although we conceive the infinite only analogically inasmuch as we ascend from our finite act of understanding, nevertheless the infinite act of understanding comprehends itself perfectly. And it does not comprehend itself as different from its very act of understanding but as identical in every way. And so if the nature of God is conceived as an intellect in act with respect to its total object, then the infinity of God, the aseity of God, and the simplicity of God all follow, as does everything else in God that remains unknown to us. If, however, ‘nature’ is taken not in the sense of essence from which all else follows, but in the sense of the intrinsic principle of operation, we can conclude again that the divine nature is intellectual. For although absolutely no real distinction can be posited in God according to our natural knowledge of God, still, as we come to know God through faith and theology, we discover real personal distinctions in God that are constituted through relations of origin. Now, ‘the mode of origin is not the same in all things; rather, the mode of origin of each thing is 46 47 48 49

Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 2. Ibid. q. 14, a. 4. Ibid. q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m. Ibid. q. 34, a. 2, ad 1m; see also q. 27, a. 2 c. and ad 2m.

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suae naturae: aliter enim producuntur animata, aliter inanimata; aliter animalia, et aliter plantae. Unde manifestum est quod distinctio divinarum personarum est secundum quod divinae naturae convenit.’50 Sed ‘increata trinitas distinguitur secundum processionem Verbi a dicente et amoris ab utroque.’ 51 Et ideo, cum origines in divinis sint secundum emanationes conscientiae intellectualis, concludendum est divinam naturam esse intellectualem.

Quod differt emanatio verbi ab emanatione amoris Cum generatio sit in similitudinem naturae, postquam considerata est Dei natura, remanet ut inter se comparentur emanatio verbi et emanatio amoris. Qua quidem in comparatione distingui oportet (1) ipsam rem, (2) intelligentiam rei, (3) verbum rei, et (4) amorem rei. Conscientia enim intellectualis ita se ad rem habet ut, primo, rem intelligat, deinde, ex intelligentia dicat verbum rei verum, tertio, ex intelligentia verboque spiret rei amorem et, quarto, vi ipsius amoris in rem amatam feratur. Iam vero, eatenus habetur verbum rei verum quatenus efformatur intra intellectum perfecta rei similitudo. Qua de causa, illa emanatio qua verbum oritur est in similitudinem rei efformandam. E contra, eatenus habetur amor rei quatenus amans in rem amatam inclinatur, fertur, impellitur, eique unitur atque adhaeret. Qua de causa, illa emanatio qua oritur amor est in inclinationem, impulsum, adhaesionem constituendam. Quae quidem duo inter se quodammodo opponuntur. Cum enim obiectum intellectus sit verum, cumque verum intra ipsum intellectum inveniatur, ita occupatur intellectus in veram rei similitudinem intus efformandam ut ii qui scientiis vacent frigidiores et leviores videantur, cum parum in ipsas res secundum se inclinentur, impellantur, ferantur. E contra, cum obiectum voluntatis sit bonum, cumque bonum non intra voluntatem sed extra et in ipsis rebus existat, ita amans cum ipso amato occupatur ut ii qui magis affectus quam scientias colant caeci dicantur.

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in accord with what befits its own nature: animate things being produced in one way, inanimate things in another; animals in one way and plants in another. It is evident, therefore, that the distinction of divine persons is in accord with what befits the divine nature.’50 But ‘the uncreated Trinity is distinguished on the basis of the procession of the Word from the Speaker and of Love from both.’ 51 And so, since the origins in God are according to the emanations of intellectual consciousness, we must conclude that the divine nature is intellectual. The Emanation of the Word Differs from the Emanation of Love Since generation results in likeness of nature, after having considered the nature of God, it remains for us to compare the emanation of a word and the emanation of love. In this comparison we must distinguish (1) a thing itself, (2) the understanding of it, (3) the word concerning it, and (4) the love for it. For intellectual consciousness is related to something in such a way that, first, it understands it, next, from that understanding it utters a true word concerning it, third, from that understanding and word it spirates a love for it, and fourth, by virtue of that very love it is borne toward what is loved. Now, there is a true word concerning something to the extent that a perfect likeness of it is formed within the intellect. So this emanation, by which the word comes forth, results in the formation of a likeness of the thing. On the other hand, there is love for something to the extent that the one loving is inclined, borne, impelled toward what is loved, and is united with and adheres to it. So this emanation, by which loves comes forth, involves the constitution of an inclination, an impulse, an adhesion. Indeed, to some extent these two emanations are opposed to each other. Since the object of intellect is truth, and since truth is found within the intellect, the intellect is so engrossed in the formation within itself of a true likeness of something that those who devote themselves to the sciences seem rather cold and aloof, since they are not much inclined, attracted, or given to things themselves for their own sake. But since the object of will is the good, and since the good exists not within the will but externally and in things themselves, the one loving is so absorbed with what is loved that those who cultivate the affections more than the sciences are said to be blind. 50 Ibid. q. 93, a. 5. 51 Ibid. a. 6.

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Quod si per intellectum caecitas et per voluntatem levitas evitantur, perfectus quidam conscientiae circulus completur.52 Ab ipsa enim re incipitur ut intellectu perspiciatur, et perspecta verbo vero repraesentetur, et repraesentata ita amore diligatur ut in ipsam rem secundum se redeatur. Quibus perspectis, manifestum videtur quo differant emanatio verbi et emanatio amoris. Verum enim et falsum in mente sunt; bonum autem et malum sunt in rebus. Quia ergo intellectus tendit in verum interius, intrinseca ratio emanationis verbi est in similitudinem rei veram intus efformandam. Quia autem voluntas tendit in bonum exterius, intrinseca ratio emanationis amoris est ut inclinationem in ipsam rem actuet.53

Argumentum Ea emanatio rationem generationis proprie dictae habet in qua omnia verificantur quae ad hanc rationem pertinent. At omnia verificantur in divina verbi emanatione, non autem omnia in divina amoris emanatione. Ergo divina verbi emanatio, non autem emanatio amoris, est generatio proprie dicta. Maior est evidens et minor per partes probatur. Nam divina verbi emanatio est origo, cum omnis emanatio est quaedam origo. Est origo viventis, nam Deus est vivens et divinum verbum est Deus. Est origo viventis e principio vivente, nam Deus est vivens et principium verbi seu dicens est Deus. Est origo viventis e principio vivente coniuncto, nam coniuncta sunt quae intra eandem conscientiam sunt emanationis principium et terminus. Est origo viventis e principio vivente coniuncto in similitudinem, nam eiusmodi est emanatio verbi ut ex ipsa sua ratione in similitudinem veram efformandam procedat.

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But if the intellect avoids blindness, and the will aloofness, then a perfect circle of consciousness is complete.52 For one begins from some thing itself in order to grasp it intellectually; once it is so grasped, it is represented by a true word; and once it is so represented, it is loved with a love that returns one to the thing as it is in itself. This makes clear the difference between the emanation of the word and the emanation of love. For truth and falsity are in the mind; but good and evil are in things. Therefore, because the intellect tends toward an interior truth, the intrinsic formality of the emanation of a word tends to the formation within of a true likeness of a thing. But because the will tends toward an exterior good, the intrinsic formality of the emanation of love is the actuation of an inclination toward the object loved.53 Argument If in an emanation everything pertaining to the formality of generation is verified, then that emanation is generation in the proper sense. But everything pertaining to the formality of generation is verified in the divine emanation of the Word, but not in the divine emanation of Love. Therefore, the divine emanation of the Word is generation in the proper sense, but the divine emanation of Love is not. The major premise is evident, and the minor is proved part by part. The divine emanation of the Word is an origin, for every emanation is an origin. The divine emanation of the Word is an origin of one living, for God is living and the divine Word is God. The divine emanation of the Word is the origin of one living from a living principle, for God is living, and the principle of the Word or the Speaker is God. The divine emanation of the Word is the origin of one living from a conjoined living principle, for what are within the same consciousness as the principle and term of an emanation are conjoined. The divine emanation of the Word is the origin of one living from a conjoined living principle resulting in a likeness, for by reason of the emanation itself of the Word, the Word proceeds as forming a true likeness. 52 [That is, if in one consciousness intellect and the affections and will all function properly together, the unbalanced emphases are avoided and the circle of consciousness is complete.] 53 Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m.

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Est origo viventis e principio vivente coniuncto in similitudinem naturae, nam idem est Dei esse intentionale ac eius esse naturale et ideo, quamvis caetera verba vera non sint similia nisi secundum esse intentionale, Dei verbum eo ipso quod est simile secundum esse intentionale necessario etiam est simile secundum esse naturale. E contra, divina amoris emanatio, quamvis sit origo viventis e principio vivente coniuncto, quamvis per hanc emanationem oriatur Deus secundum esse Dei naturale, deest tamen unum elementum generationis proprie dictae illudque necessarium. Nam emanatio amoris non est in similitudinem rei efformandam sed in impulsum seu adhaesionem ad ipsam rem secundum se constituendam. Quare, quamvis ex hac emanatione oriatur id quod est simile in natura, sicut et Eva erat similis Adamo, ipsa tamen emanationis ratio non est in similitudinem constituendam, sicut et costa ex latere Adami desumpta non ex intrinseca sui ratione sed ex superveniente Dei virtute in Evam formandam processit.

QUAESTIO I Utrum aliud in nobis sit intelligere et aliud verbum 54 Cum actus ex obiecto sumat speciem, ubi aliud et aliud inveniuntur obiecta specifica, alius et alius actus distingui debent.55 Iam vero in intellectu nostro distinguuntur obiectum ut finis (ens), obiectum ut terminus secundae operationis (verum), obiectum movens ad secundam operationem (evidentia sufficiens), obiectum ut terminus primae operationis (definitio, hypothesis), et obiectum movens ad primam operationem (quidditas seu natura in materia corporali existens). Porro, ens et verum convertuntur; quae convertuntur, specie non differunt; et ideo eodem actu quo attingitur verum etiam attingitur ens. Qua de causa, verum dicitur medium in quo ens cognoscitur. At aliud est verum et aliud est evidentia sufficiens; et ideo alio actu perspicitur evidentiam sufficere, et alio actu affirmatur verum vel negatur falsum; qui duo

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The divine emanation of the Word is the origin of one living from a conjoined living principle with a resulting likeness in nature, for God’s intentional act of existence is the same as God’s natural act of existence; so, although all other true words are likenesses only with respect to an intentional act of existence, the Word of God, from the very fact that it is likeness in intentional act of existence, necessarily also is likeness in natural act of existence. The divine emanation of Love, on the other hand, even though it is the origin of one living from a conjoined living principle, even though through this emanation God originates in accordance with God’s natural act of existence, nevertheless one element of generation in the proper sense is lacking, and that a necessary one. For the emanation of love does not lead to the formation of a likeness of a thing but to constituting an impulse toward or adhesion to the thing itself for its own sake. Therefore, although there does originate from this emanation something that is similar in nature, just as Eve was similar in nature to Adam, nevertheless the formal intelligibility of this emanation does not lead to the constitution of likeness, just as the rib taken from Adam’s side proceeded to the formation of Eve not on account of the intrinsic formality pertaining to the rib, but from the supervening power of God. QUESTION 1 Is our act of understanding different from our [inner] word? 54 Since an act takes its species from its object, if one discovers different specific objects, one must distinguish different acts. 55 Now, in relation to our intellect one distinguishes the object that is the goal of intellect (being), the object that is the term of the second operation of intellect (the true), the object that moves the intellect toward its second operation (sufficient evidence), the object that is the term of the first operation of intellect (a definition, a hypothesis), and the object that moves the intellect toward its first operation (the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter). Furthermore, being and the true are convertible; whatever are convertible are not different in species; so being is also attained by the same act by which the true is attained. For this reason, the true is said to be the medium in which being is known. But the true is one thing, and sufficient evidence is another; so the act by which evidence is grasped as sufficient is different from the act by which the 54 See appendix 2. 55 [Lonergan’s discussion of agent object, terminal object, and transcendent object on pp. 149–51 of Verbum is a helpful supplement to this discussion.]

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actus emanatione intelligibili sat manifesta inter se connectuntur, cum ideo verum affirmare possimus quia evidentiam sufficere perspexerimus. 56 Quare circa secundam intellectus operationem qua respondetur ad quaestionem, an sit, omnino distingui oportet inter intelligere, quo perspicitur evidentia sufficiens, et affirmare verum, quod est verbum interius prolatum.

Ad primam autem intellectus57 operationem movet, quae exterius est, quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens. Et primo quidem sensibus innotescit materia corporalis et individualis. Deinde ex intellectu agente oritur admiratio ut quaeratur vel quid sit vel propter quid ita sit. Tertio formatur phantasma quo clarius eluceat in ipsis sensibilibus quod in iis perspiciendum sit intelligibile. Quarto intellectus possibilis, ad phantasma conversus, in phantasmate perspicit intelligibile, quidditatem, aliamve causam. Quinto intellectus possibilis, cum iam actu intelligat rei quidditatem aliamve causam, dicit verbum interius incomplexum, quod est rei definitio vel quidditativa vel per aliam causam. Iam vero idem est intelligibile quod in sensibilibus perspicitur et quod in definitione dicitur. Aliud tamen est obiectum ubi perspicitur, et aliud est obiectum ubi definitur. Nam ubi perspicitur, seorsum per sensum innotescit materia corporalis, et seorsum per intellectum innotescit quidditas sive natura sive causa. Ubi autem definitur, in unum componuntur quae antea distinctis actibus innotescebant; nam in definitione ponitur materia corporalis non individualis sed communis; et definitur non ipsa quidditas, natura, causa, sed res secundum suam quidditatem, naturam, causam. Quia ergo diversa sunt obiecta, diversi sint actus necesse est.

Ne quis vero nominibus terreatur, addantur exempla. Quid sit eclipsis? Eclipsis est obscuratio facta in corpore caelesti per interpositionem alterius corporis caelestis. En definitio quidditativa, nam dicit quid sit eclipsis. Quomodo ergo a qualibet alia definitione differt? Quia non tantum similitudines sensibiles enarrat sed etiam causam seu propter quid assignat. Causa enim eclipsis est interpositio alterius corporis caelestis: quae quidem causa in ipsis sensibilibus vel saltem in phantasmate intelligendo perspicitur antequam eclipsis per causam definiri possit.

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true is affirmed and the false is denied. It is quite clear that these two acts are connected to each other by an intellectual emanation, for we are able to affirm the true because we have grasped evidence as sufficient. 56 Therefore, as regards the second operation of intellect, by which we respond to the question, Is it? one must distinguish very carefully between the act of understanding by which the sufficiency of evidence is grasped and the act of affirming the true, which is a word uttered within. With respect to the first operation of intellect,57 the object that moves, which is external, is the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter. First, corporeal and individual matter is made known through the senses. Second, from the agent intellect a wondering arises that asks, ‘What is it?’ or ‘Why is it so?’ Third, a phantasm is formed in which the intelligible that is to be grasped in sensible data becomes more clearly manifest in the sensible data themselves. Fourth, the possible intellect, directed to the phantasm, grasps in the phantasm an intelligible, a quiddity, or another cause. Fifth, the possible intellect, since it now actually understands the quiddity of a reality, or another cause, utters a simple inner word, which is the definition of the reality through its quiddity or through another cause. Now the intelligible that is grasped in sensible data is the same as the intelligible that is uttered in the definition. Nevertheless, the object when grasped is different from the object when defined. For when it is grasped, corporeal matter becomes known separately through the senses, but the quiddity or nature or cause becomes known separately through the intellect. However, when it is defined, what became known earlier through distinct acts are now brought together into one; for in the definition common corporeal matter is posited, but not individual corporeal matter; and the quiddity, nature, or cause are not themselves defined, but rather the reality is defined in accordance with its quiddity, nature, or cause. Therefore, because the objects are different, the acts must be different. Lest one be deterred by this terminology, we add these examples. What is an eclipse? An eclipse is the darkening brought about on a heavenly body by the interposition of another heavenly body. That is a quidditative definition, for it states what an eclipse is. How, then, does it differ from any other kind of definition? It differs in that not only does it set forth sensible similarities, but it also assigns a cause or reason why. For the cause of an eclipse is the interposition of another heavenly body: that cause is grasped in the sensible data themselves, or at least in the phantasm, by an act of understanding, before an eclipse can be defined through its cause. 56 I have explained precisely what evidence is sufficient in chapter 10 of Insight. 57 [The material in this and the next two paragraphs represents a change from Divinarum personarum. For the earlier material, see below, section 3 of appendix 4.]

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Quid sit circulus? Circulus est locus punctorum in eadem superficie plana iacentium et aequaliter a centro distantium. En alia definitio quidditativa. Non enim dicit circulum esse figuram planam perfecte rotundam sed assignat causam cur circulus necessario sit perfecte rotundus. At ipsa haec necessaria consequentia in phantasmate intelligendo est perspicienda antequam intelligibiliter emanare possit circuli definitio. 58 Quid sit homo? Animal rationale. En definitio quae quidditativa est quia causam assignat. Quod enim sensibus innotescit est corpus organicum tale. In quo corpore intelligitur forma, quae quidem anima est et sensitiva et rationalis. Quia forma est anima sensitiva, res est animal. Quia forma est anima rationalis, res est animal rationale. Quibus perspectis, fundamentum gnoseologicum hylemorphismi elucet. Ideo enim res materia et forma componantur necesse est, quia eas sentiendo et intelligendo concipimus.

QUAESTIO II Utrum naturali rationis lumine demonstrari possit in Deo esse verbum Circa factum, solutio patet ex damnatione semirationalismi in concilio Vaticano (db 1816). Ut tamen certitudini accedat intelligentia quaedam, considerandum est qua necessitate verbum in nobis inveniatur, ut concludi possit utrum ulla sit verbi necessitas in Deo quam naturaliter cognoscere possimus. 59 Prima ergo necessitas verbi in nobis est ut ex perspecta causa seu quidditate in rem concipiendam procedere possimus. Nam ad actum intelligendi movemur per rerum causas seu quidditates; quae tamen causae seu quidditates non sunt res ipsae sed rerum partes vel relationes; et ideo prima necessitas verbi est ut ex

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What is a circle? A circle is the locus of points lying on the same plane surface and equally distant from a center. That is another quidditative definition. For it does not state that the circle is a perfectly round plane figure; rather, it assigns the cause why the circle necessarily is perfectly round. Moreover, this necessary consequence itself must be grasped in the phantasm by an act of understanding before there can be an intellectual emanation of the definition of the circle. 58 What is a human being? A rational animal. That again is a quidditative definition, because it assigns the cause. For what becomes known through the senses is a certain kind of organic body. A form is understood in this body: the soul that is both sensitive and rational. Because the form is a sensitive soul, the reality is an animal. Because the form is a rational soul, the reality is a rational animal. Once these things have been grasped, the gnoseological foundation of hylomorphism comes to light: because we conceive realities by means of sensation and understanding, it is necessary that they be composed of matter and form. QUESTION 2 Can the existence of a Word in God be demonstrated by the natural light of reason? As to the fact, the answer is obvious from the condemnation of the semirationalists by the Vatican Council (db 1816, ds 3041, nd 137). Still, in order to add some understanding to our certitude, we must consider by what necessity there is a word in us, so that we can determine whether there is any necessity for a word in God that we can know naturally.59 A first reason, then, that a word is necessary in us is to enable us to proceed from a grasp of a cause or quiddity to a conception of a thing. For we are moved to an act of understanding by the causes or quiddities of things; but these causes or quiddities are not the things themselves, but parts or relations of the things; 58 [The ‘necessary consequence’ Lonergan refers to here is perhaps more clearly explained on p. 33 of Insight : ‘... in approaching the definition of the circle, there occurred some apprehension of necessity and impossibility ... [I]f all the radii are equal, the curve must be perfectly round; and if any radii are unequal, the curve cannot avoid bumps or dents. ‘Further, the necessity in question was not necessity in general but a necessity of roundness resulting from these equal radii. Similarly, the impossibility in question was not impossibility in the abstract but an impossibility of roundness resulting from these unequal radii. Eliminate the image of the center, the radii, the curve, and by the same stroke there vanishes all grasp of necessary or of impossible roundness. ‘... [T]he insight is the act of catching on to a connection between imagined equal radii and, on the other hand, a curve that is bound to look perfectly round.’] 59 [For an earlier discussion by Lonergan of the same issue, see Verbum 199–204.]

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perspecta quidditate in rem quidditative definitam procedatur. Altera autem verbi necessitas est ut ex definitionibus et ex perspecta evidentia in res qua existentes procedamus, quod tamen non fit nisi ex perspecta evidentia procedat verum affirmatum in quo tamquam in medio ens cognoscatur. 60 Tertia autem verborum necessitas est ut scientias excolere possimus. Nisi enim verba universalia formarentur, totum mundum aspectabilem numquam scire possemus, sed ad particularia experta vel imaginata religaremur. Item, nisi verba exacte definita formarentur, fluxu quodam imaginum ad modum mentalitatis mythicae ferremur, cum numquam clare et distincte constaret de quanam re ageretur. Quarta denique verborum necessitas est ut ultra limites mundi aspectabilis per analogias et viam eminentiae procedamus. Quod sane numquam fieri posset nisi verba interiora tum definitiva tum iudicativa formarentur. Quae quattuor necessitates hanc communem radicem habent, quod aliud est obiectum quod nos ad intelligendum movet et aliud est obiectum in quod tamquam in finem tendimus. Quod enim movet intellectum nostrum hac in vita est quidditas rei materialis; finis autem in quem intellectus tendit est totum ens. Quia enim ex quidditate incipimus, primo requiritur verbum ut res per quidditatem definiatur, deinde requiritur verbum ut res definita utrum existat iudicetur, tertio requiruntur verba ut ex sensibilibus in universum aspectabile convertamur, et quarto requiruntur verba ut ultra mundum materialem in Deum ascendere possimus. Iam vero, eiusmodi necessitas verbi in Deo esse non potest. Intellectus enim divinus a nullo alio movetur neque in ullum aliud tendit tamquam in finem, sed perfectione infinitus existit aeternus, tum se ipsum comprehendens tum omnia alia in se ipso perfecte intelligens atque sciens. Quantum autem ad argumenta quae interdum proferuntur quasi Verbum divinum demonstrantia, facile solvuntur. Obici enim potest claram atque distinctam non esse intelligentiam quae verbis non exprimatur. Sed divina cognitio omnino clara atque distincta est. Ergo non est sine expressione per verbum. Respondetur. Intelligentia per multos actus non est clara atque distincta sine verbis, conceditur; intelligentia per unum actum infinitum non est clara atque distincta sine verbis, negatur. Et contradistinguitur minor.

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so the first reason that a word is necessary in us is so that from having grasped a quiddity, we may proceed to a thing as quidditatively defined. A second reason is to enable us to proceed from definitions and from a grasp of evidence to things as existing. This does not occur unless from a grasp of evidence there proceeds a true affirmation in which, as in a medium, being is known. 60 A third reason is to enable us to cultivate the sciences. For if universal words were not being produced we would never be able to know the whole visible universe; rather, we would be confined to experienced or imagined particulars. Again, if exactly defined words were not being produced, we would be tossed about by the flow of images after the manner of the mythic mentality, since it would never be clearly and distinctly determined what we were talking about. A fourth and final reason is to enable us to proceed beyond the limits of the visible universe by means of analogies and the way of eminence. One could never so proceed unless interior words were being formed both for defining and for judging. These four reasons for the necessity of a word have this common source, that the object that moves us to the act of understanding is different from the object toward which we tend as toward a goal. For the object that moves our intellect in this life is the quiddity of a material thing; but the goal toward which intellect tends is the totality of being. Because we begin from a quiddity, the word is required, first, so that the thing may be defined through its quiddity; second, so that we may judge whether what we have defined exists; third, so that we may be directed away from sensibly perceived particulars toward the entirety of the visible universe; and fourth, so that we may be able to reach beyond the material world to God. Now the necessity of the word in God cannot be of this kind. For the divine intellect is not moved by something else, nor does it tend toward something else as toward a goal, but being infinite in perfection, it exists eternally, perfectly comprehending itself and perfectly understanding and knowing everything else in itself. The arguments which are sometimes presented as demonstrating the existence of a divine Word are easily answered. Thus, one can object that an understanding that is not expressed in words is not clear and distinct; but divine knowledge is perfectly clear and distinct; therefore, divine knowledge is not without expression through a word. Response: I concede that an understanding through many acts is not clear and distinct without words; I deny that an understanding through one infinite act is not clear and distinct without words. And I contradistinguish the minor. 60 [An affirmation or judgment is the second kind of inner word. On the division of inner words into definitions and judgments, see above, p. 31.]

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Distinctio autem sic explicatur. Per se, cum verbum nihil sit nisi expressio eius quod intelligendo innotescit, verbum nihil claritatis et nihil distinctionis addere potest super intelligentiam. Per accidens autem, ubi multi et diversi et imperfecti sunt actus intelligendi, verba sunt necessaria ad claritatem et distinctionem; et ita in nobis, si nulla essent verba, haud scire possemus quid iam perspectum haberemus et quid investigandum maneret.

Obicitur deinde dualitatem subiecti et obiecti esse de ipsa ratione cognitionis. Nisi ergo subiectum divinum verbum diceret, se ipsum cognoscere non posset. Sed Deus se cognoscit. Ergo verbum dicit. Respondetur. Suppositum principium esse simpliciter falsum, neque aliud habet fundamentum quam imaginationem hominis aspicientis et rei conspectae. Propter suppositum principium Platonici posuerunt in primo quodam ordine Ideas aeternas subsistentes simplices, in secundo vero gradu deos qui Ideas contemplarentur. Propter idem principium Scotus posuit distinctionem suam formalem a parte rei, uti inferius patebit. Propter idem principium G¨unther et Rosmini demonstrationem Verbi divini sese invenisse arbitrabantur. Propter idem principium, J.-P. Sartre ita distinguit en soi et pour soi ut Deum realem, sui conscium et simplicem, tamquam contradictorium impugnet. Propter idem principium concipitur conscientia tamquam perceptio sui et in difficuitates insolubiles circa conscientiam Christi pervenitur.61

At contraria omnino sunt principia Aristotelica et Thomistica. Intelligibile enim in actu est intellectus in actu.62 In his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et intellectum. Secundum hoc tantum aliud est intellectus et aliud est intelligibile, quia utrumque est in potentia.63

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The distinction is explained in the following manner. Of itself, the word can add no clarity and no distinctness above understanding, since the word is merely the expression of what becomes known through the act of understanding. In an incidental manner, however, words are necessary for clarity and distinctness when there are many diverse and imperfect acts of understanding; and so if there were no words in us, we should hardly be able to know what we have already grasped and what remains to be investigated. Objection: The duality of subject and object is intrinsic to the very idea of knowledge. Therefore, if the divine subject were not to utter a word, he would not be able to know himself. But God knows himself. Therefore, he utters a word. Response: The principle presupposed is simply false and has no basis other than imagining a person looking and the object looked at. Because of this presupposed principle, the Platonists postulated simple, subsistent, eternal Ideas in a first order, and on the second level the gods who contemplated the Ideas. Because of the same principle, Scotus posited his formal distinction a parte rei, as will be clear below. Because of the same principle, Anton G¨unther and Antonio Rosmini thought they had discovered a demonstration of the divine Word. Because of the same principle, Jean-Paul Sartre distinguishes between en soi and pour soi in such a way that he impugns as contradictory a God who is real, who is conscious of himself, and who is simple. Because of the same principle, consciousness is conceived as perception of oneself, a view that leads to insoluble difficulties regarding the consciousness of Christ. 61 Aristotelian and Thomist principles are entirely opposed to this supposed principle. For the intelligible in act is the intelligent in act. 62 The intelligent and the understood are the same in those things that are without matter. Accordingly, the only reason why the intellect and the intelligible object are not the same is that both are in potency.63 61 [On consciousness conceived as the perception of an object vs. consciousness as experience, and the difficulties consciousness conceived as the perception of an object creates for understanding the consciousness of Christ, see ‘Christ as Subject: A Reply,’ Collection 162–79, and The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, parts 5 and 6.] 62 [This is Lonergan’s statement of the meaning of the proposition Intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu, including his translation here of ‘intellectus’ as ‘the intelligent.’ See Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958–1964, ed. Robert C. Croken, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran, vol. 6 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) 137.] 63 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, aa. 2 and 4.

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Obicitur denique adeo perfectam esse conscientiam intellectualem et dynamicam ut necessario in Deo perfectione infinito ponatur. Respondetur. Quoad se, conceditur. Quoad nos, negatur. Nam in Deo processio Verbi omnino necessaria et omnino perfecta est. Sed in iis quae naturaliter de Deo cognoscimus, non demonstratur conscientiam intellectualem et dynamicam esse perfectionem puram, et ideo non demonstratur eam esse in Deo ponendam. Et ex iis quae fide credimus, minime ad perfectam intelligentiam pervenimus; imo inter se pugnare videntur et realitas emanationis et consubstantialitas emanantis, et ideo haec duo simul vix considerare possumus.

QUAESTIO III Utrum Verbum procedat ex intelligentia creaturarum Et videtur quod non, cum Verbum Dei sit necessarium et aeternum, creaturae autem sint contingentes et ex tempore. Sed contra est doctrina S. Thomae, nempe, Deum uno actu intelligere se et creaturas, unoque Verbo dicere se et creaturas; praeterea, sicut intelligentia divina est sui cognoscitiva, creaturarum autem et cognoscitiva et factiva, ita Verbum Dei est Dei expressivum, creaturarum autem et expressivum et operativum. 64

Ad solutionem autem difficultatis praemissae, animadvertendum est non omnes theologos analogiam psychologicam eodem modo intelligere. Qui enim concipiant verbum ex obiecto procedere sicut actus videndi ex coloribus, haud admittere possunt Verbum divinum ex creaturis procedere. Qui autem, altius quodammodo considerantes, verbum ex notitia obiecti procedere concipiant, minorem patiuntur difficultatem, cum obiectum non causa simpliciter sed concausa quaedam sit. Qui vero ad rationem conscientiae intellectualis penetrent, nullam habent difficultatem; quod tamen perspici oportet. Emanationis enim intelligibilis principium proprium non obiectum est sed subiectum. Quod de Deo patet, cum ipse sit omnium rerum primum principium. Quod etiam in nobis quodammodo evidens est, cum emanatio intelligibilis fieri non possit nisi inquantum subiectum actu sit intellectualiter conscium.

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Objection: Finally, dynamic intellectual consciousness is so perfect that it must be posited in God, who is infinite in perfection. Response: If this statement is considered in itself, I concede. If it is considered in relation to us, I deny it. For the procession of the Word in God is utterly necessary and utterly perfect. But in what we know naturally concerning God there is no demonstration that dynamic intellectual consciousness is a pure perfection, and so it cannot be demonstrated that it must be posited in God. We do not attain a perfect understanding even from what we believe by faith; indeed, the reality of the emanation and the consubstantiality of the one emanating seem so to conflict with each other that we can hardly consider the two of them simultaneously. QUESTION 3 Does the Word proceed from the understanding of creatures? The answer seems to be no, for the divine Word is necessary and eternal, while creatures are contingent and temporal. On the other hand, there is the doctrine of St Thomas that in one act God understands himself and creatures, and that in a single Word God utters himself and creatures. Again, as divine understanding in regard to self is knowledge of that self but in regard to creatures is both divine knowledge of them and productive of them, so the divine Word is expressive of God and also both expressive and productive of creatures.64 However, for the solution to the foregoing difficulty, one must observe that not all theologians understand the psychological analogy in the same manner. Those who conceive the word as proceeding from the object as the act of seeing proceeds from colors can hardly admit that the divine Word proceeds from creatures. On the other hand, those who, considering the issue somewhat more profoundly, conceive the word as proceeding from knowledge of an object labor under a lesser difficulty, since the object is not the cause all by itself, but is a concurrent cause. But those who arrive at the formality of intellectual consciousness have no difficulty at all; this, however, needs to be carefully considered. The proper principle of intellectual emanation is not the object but the subject. This is obvious in God, since God is the first principle of all things. But it is also evident to some extent in us, since an intellectual emanation can occur only inasmuch as a subject is intellectually conscious in act. 64 Ibid. q. 34, a. 3. [In one of his own copies of the text, Lonergan added by hand, ‘Cf. q. 37, a. 2.’]

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Praeterea, emanationis intelligibilis necessitas non ex obiecto provenit sed ex conscia intellectualitate subiecti. Quia enim conscientia intellectualis sibi debet ut suam intelligentiam vere sibi exprimat, consequitur ut id quod intelligitur vere exprimi debeat. Quia conscientia intellectualis sibi debet ut honeste suum amorem largiatur, consequitur ut quae vere bona iudicantur etiam amari debeant. Quod si per accidens vel intelligentia deficit vel iudicium errat, non praevalet debitum ignotum ut quis teneatur contra conscientiam agere, sed debitum cognitum ut quis teneatur secundum evidentiam iudicare et secundum iudicium eligere.

Quod si obicitur exaggeratam esse hanc conscientiae autonomiam, respondetur dupliciter. Primo enim, ipsa divina autonomia, cum absoluta sit, exaggerari non potest: et cum de hac autonomia intelligenda agatur, obiciens extra ipsam quaestionem ad alia vagari videtur. Deinde, subordinata quidem est autonomia conscientiae humanae, non tamen omnibus et quibuscumque obiectis, sed subiecto infinito ad cuius imaginem facta est et quod imitari tenetur. At ulterius considerandum est aliter alia obiecta intrare tum in actum intelligendi ex quo emanat verbum tum in actum intelligendi atque verbum ex quibus emanat amor. Aliud enim est obiectum primarium divinae intelligentiae, quod est ipsum divinum esse; alia autem sunt obiecta secundaria quae triplici quodam gradu cum obiecto primario connectuntur: aliter enim cum divina essentia connectuntur possibilia sub ratione entis considerata; aliter connectuntur possibilia sub ratione possibilis considerata; et aliter denique connectuntur actualia omnia, sive praeterita, sive praesentia, sive futura.65 Sub ratione enim entis, possibilia nihil sunt praeter ipsam divinam potentiam activam quae ea facere potest. Et secundum hoc Deus intelligit et dicit possibilia, inquantum intelligit et dicit suam potentiam, quae est eadem omnino ac sua essentia vel suum intelligere. Sub ratione vero possibilis, possibilia sunt in Deo intelligente et dicente per modum cuiusdam entis rationis impliciti. Et dico per modum entis rationis, quia tota possibilium realitas est divina potentia activa. Dico per modum entis rationis impliciti, quia Deus non tot dicit verba distincta quot sunt distincta possibilia.

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Again, the necessity of an intellectual emanation arises not from the object but from the conscious intellectuality of the subject. Because intellectual consciousness owes it to itself to express to itself its own understanding, and to express it truly, it follows that what is being understood ought to be expressed truly. Because intellectual consciousness owes it to itself to bestow its own love rightly, it follows that what is judged as truly good ought also to be loved. And if perchance understanding is deficient or judgment erroneous, an unknown obligation does not prevail in such a way that one is duty-bound to act against one’s conscience; rather, a known obligation prevails, so that one is duty-bound to judge in accordance with the evidence one has and to choose in accordance with one’s judgment. But perhaps it will be objected that we are exaggerating this autonomy of consciousness. There are two answers to this. First, since divine autonomy is absolute, it cannot be exaggerated; and since we are endeavoring to understand this autonomy, the objector seems to stray beyond this subject of inquiry to other matters. Second, the autonomy of human consciousness is indeed subordinate, not to every object whatsoever, but to the infinite subject in whose image it has been made and whom it is bound to imitate. Moreover, we must consider further that different objects enter differently both into the act of understanding, from which the word emanates, and into the act of understanding and the word, from which love emanates. For the primary object of divine understanding, the divine being itself, is one thing, and secondary objects are another. The latter are related to the primary object by a threefold gradation: possibles considered under the formality of being are related to the divine essence in one way, possibles considered under the formality of the possible are related to the divine essence in another way, and finally all actual realities, whether past, present, or future, are related to the divine essence in yet another way. 65 Considered under the formality of being, possibles are nothing but the divine active power itself which is able to produce them. And according to this, God understands and utters the possibles inasmuch as he understands and utters his power, which is entirely the same as his essence or his act of understanding. Considered under the formality of the possible, possibles are in God understanding and uttering, after the manner of an implicit conceptual being. I say ‘after the manner of a conceptual being’ because the entire reality of the possibles is the divine active power. I say ‘after the manner of an implicit conceptual being’ because God does not utter as many distinct words as there are distinct possibles. 65 [Helpful here is the discussion in Insight of the primary and secondary components in the idea of being. See Lonergan, Insight 668–74, 683–84.]

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Et tamen dico omnia et singula possibilia distincte inesse Deo quatenus Deus intelligendo potentiam suam clare et distincte omnia et singula possibilia intelligit, et dicendo potentiam suam omnia et singula possibilia clare et distincte unico Verbo infinito dicit. Tertio denique in obiecto secundario sunt actualia omnia, praeterita, praesentia, et futura. Quae quidem omnia qua actualia et Deus intelligendo intuetur et Verbo dicit et Amore procedente amat. Quod si alius existeret mundus, alia qua actualia et intueretur et diceret et amaret, non quasi alius et alius esse posset Deus, non quasi aliae et aliae esse possent divinae emanationes intelligibiles, sed quia cognitio et affirmatio et amor actualium super actum infinitum intelligendi et affirmandi et amandi non addunt nisi relationem rationis.

Quibus perspectis, emanatio Verbi divini utique dependet a divina conscientia intellectuali et ab actu intelligendi infinito. Quia haec conscientia hicque intelligendi actus non solum sunt idem inter se sed etiam idem ac divinum esse, divina essentia, et divina potentia, etiam emanatio Verbi divina dependet a divina essentia atque potentia. Ulterius, quia divina intelligentia includit possibilia qua possibilia per modum cuiusdam entis rationis impliciti, etiam divina Verbi emanatio sibi debet ut etiam dicat possibilia qua possibilia per modum cuiusdam entis rationis impliciti. Ulterius, quia divina intelligentia, accedente relatione rationis super actum infinitum, omnia actualia prout sunt intelligit, etiam emanatio divini Verbi sibi debet ut, accedente rationis relatione, omnia actualia Verbo dicantur, et emanatio divina Amoris sibi debet ut, accedente rationis relatione, omnia actualia Amore procedente amentur. Denique tandem, quia divina intelligentia clarissime perspicit Verbum divinum Amoremque divinum a relatione rationis non dependere, quia clarissime perspicit omnia actualia atque possibilia prorsus dependere a divina intelligentia, a divino verbo, a divino amore, ita procedit verbum divinum ab intelligentia creaturarum, ut creaturae a verbo dependentes vere et aeternaliter dicantur, et ita procedit amor divinus ab intelligentia et affirmatione creaturarum, ut creaturae ut ab amore dependentes honeste et aeternaliter amentur.

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Yet I say that each and every possible is in God distinctly inasmuch as God, in understanding his own power, clearly and distinctly understands each and every possible, and in uttering his own power, clearly and distinctly utters each and every possible in the one and only infinite Word. Third, and finally, all actual realities, past, present, and future, are among the secondary objects of divine understanding. Indeed, all these actual realities, precisely as actual, God knows immediately in understanding them, utters in the Word, and loves in proceeding Love. And if another world were to exist, other realities as actual would be known immediately and spoken and loved, not as if God were able to be now this and now that, not as if the divine intellectual emanations were able to be now this and now that, but because the knowledge and affirmation and love of actual realities adds only a conceptual relation to the infinite act of understanding, affirming, and loving. Accordingly, the emanation of the divine Word is surely dependent upon divine intellectual consciousness and upon the infinite act of understanding. Because this consciousness and this act of understanding are not only identical with each other but also the same as the divine act of existence, the divine essence, and the divine power, the divine emanation of the Word is also dependent upon the divine essence and upon the divine power. Furthermore, because divine understanding includes possibles as possibles after the manner of an implicit conceptual being, the divine emanation of the Word also owes it to itself to utter as well possibles as possibles after the manner of implicit conceptual beings. Moreover, because divine understanding, with a conceptual relation accompanying that infinite act, understands all actual realities as they are, the emanation of the divine Word also owes it to itself that all actual realities be uttered with the accompanying conceptual relation, and the divine emanation of Love, with the accompanying conceptual relation, owes it to itself that all actual realities be loved through proceeding Love. Finally, because divine understanding grasps with perfect clarity that the divine Word and divine Love are not dependent upon the conceptual relation, because divine understanding grasps with perfect clarity that all actual realities and possibles are utterly dependent upon divine understanding, upon the divine Word, and upon divine Love, it follows that the divine Word proceeds from the understanding of creatures in such a manner that creatures are truly and eternally being uttered as dependent upon the Word, and the divine Love proceeds from the understanding and affirmation of creatures in such a manner that creatures are rightly and eternally loved in dependence upon this Love.

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QUAESTIO IV Utrum ‘amatum in amante’ constituatur an producatur per amorem 66 Cf. T. L. Penido, Eph. theol. Lov. 14 (1937) 33–68; 15 (1938) 338–344; I. Dockx, Angelicum 15 (1938) 419–428; J. A. Robilliard, Bull. thom. V 1, 135–39, § 185; H. Dondaine, Bull. thom. V2, 547 s., § 696; A. Patfoort, Bull. thom. X2, 531–534, § 1217.

Sum. theol., i, q. 27, a. 3 c.: ... in divinis non est processio nisi secundum actionem quae non tendit in aliquid extrinsecum, sed manet in ipso agente. Huiusmodi autem actio in intellectuali natura est actio intellectus et actio voluntatis. Processio autem verbi attenditur secundum actionem intelligibilem. Secundum autem operationem voluntatis invenitur in nobis quaedam alia processio, scilicet processio amoris, secundum quam amatum est in amante, sicut per conceptionem verbi res dicta vel intellecta est in intelligente. Unde et praeter processionem verbi, ponitur alia processio in divinis, quae est processio amoris.

Sum. theol., i, q. 37, a. 1 c: Sicut enim ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam intelligit, provenit quaedam intellectualis conceptio rei intellectae in intelligente, quae dicitur verbum; ita ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam amat, provenit quaedam impressio, ut ita loquar, rei amatae in affectu amantis, secundum quam amatum dicitur esse in amante, sicut et intellectum in intelligente. Ita quod, cum aliquis seipsum intelligit et amat, est in seipso non solum per identitatem rei, sed etiam ut intellectum in intelligente, et amatum in amante.

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QUESTION 4 Is the ‘beloved in the lover’ constituted by love or produced by love? 66 See Maurilio Teixeira-Leite Penido, ‘Gloses sur la procession d’amour dans la Trinit´e,’ Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses 14 (1937) 33–68; ‘A propos de la procession d’amour en Dieu,’ Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses 15 (1938) 338–44; I. Dockx, ‘Note sur la procession de terme dans la volont´e,’ Angelicum 15 (1938) 419–28; J.A. Robilliard, Review notice of M. T.-L. Penido, ‘Gloses sur la procession d’amour dans la Trinit´e,’ Bulletin thomiste 5:2 (1937) 135–39, § 185; H. Dondaine, Review notice of M. T.-L. Penido, ‘Gloses sur la procession d’amour dans la Trinit´e,’ M. T.-L. Penido, ‘A propos de la procession d’amour en Dieu,’ and I. Dockx, ‘Note sur la procession de terme dans la volont´e,’ Bulletin thomiste 5:8 (1938) 547–49, § 696; A. Patfoort, Review notice of B. Lonergan, Divinarum personarum conceptio analogica, Bulletin thomiste 10:2 (1958) 531–34, § 1217. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 3 c.: ‘. . . in God there is procession only according to action that does not tend toward something extrinsic but remains within the agent itself. But such action in an intellectual nature is that of the intellect and that of the will. The procession of the word is considered in connection with the action of the intellect. However, another procession is found in us in connection with the operation of the will, namely, the procession of love, whereby the beloved is in the one who loves, just as the reality spoken or understood is in the one who understands through the conception of the word. Hence, in addition to the procession of the Word, another procession is to be posited in God, namely, the procession of Love.’ Summa theologiae, 1, q. 37, a. 1 c.: ‘Just as from the fact that someone understands something, there comes forth in the one who understands some intellectual conception of the reality understood, which is called the word; so from the fact that someone loves something, there comes forth in the affection of the lover some impression, so to speak, of the reality loved, whereby the beloved is said to be in the one who loves, just as what is understood is in the one who understands. So it is that, when one understands and loves oneself, one is in oneself not only by an entitative identity, but also as what is understood is in the one who understands, and as the beloved is in the one who loves.’ 66 [The material in this question differs from the earlier version in Divinarum personarum. For the earlier material, see below, part 4 of appendix 4. The first two paragraphs of that part of the appendix state clearly the significance and importance of this question for trinitarian theology.]

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Quaeritur de illa realitate, quae nominatur ‘amatum in amante,’ utrum sit idem realiter ac amor, actus amandi, an forte realiter distinctum ab amore et ex amore procedens. Si primum dicis, tunc ‘amatum in amante’ constituitur per amorem; si alterum, tunc ‘amatum in amante’ producitur per amorem. Priori sententiae favet prior locus allatus: ibi enim amatum dicitur esse in amante secundum processionem amoris, sicut res dicta vel intellecta est in intelligente per conceptionem verbi. Nam constituitur ‘res dicta vel intellecta’ in intelligente per ipsum verbum; pariter ergo constituitur ‘amatum’ in amante per ipsum amorem procedentem.

Posteriori sententiae favet posterior locus allatus: ibi enim ex hoc quod aliquis intelligit provenit conceptio rei intellectae in intelligente, et similiter ex hoc quod aliquis amat provenit quaedam impressio rei amatae in affectu amantis. Nam producitur verbum per actum intelligendi et ideo pariter producitur ‘amatum in amante’ per actum amandi. Momentum huius quaestionis in eo est quod oppositis sententiis correspondent opposita systemata theoretica. Alii enim analogiam trinitariam inde sumunt quod statuunt in nobis duas processiones, aliam intra intellectum et aliam intra voluntatem, ut secundum illam actus intelligendi producat verbum et secundum hanc actus amandi producat ‘amatum in amante’; et ita sensit Ioannes a S. Thoma 67 et generatim Thomistae. Nos autem analogiam trinitariam inde sumimus quod in nobis experimur duas processiones, quarum prima est intra intellectum, altera autem est ex intellectu in voluntatem, et secundum primam iudicamus quia et secundum quod evidentiam sufficientem perspicimus, secundum alteram vero eligimus quia et secundum quod iudicamus. Ideo sententiam Thomistarum hac in re non sequimur, tum quia ab experientia nostra interna praescindit in concipienda analogia trinitaria et psychologica, tum quia ab experientia nostra interna praescindit in interpretandis textibus S. Thomae de re psychologica. At generalem hanc quaestionem ad appendices I et II remittimus ut de praesenti unice quaeramus utrum apud S. Thomam ‘amatum in amante’ constituatur an producatur per actum amandi.

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Regarding that reality which is named ‘the beloved in the lover’ we are asking whether it is really the same as love, the act of loving, or whether perhaps it is really distinct from love and proceeds from love. If you say the former is the case, then ‘the beloved in the lover’ is constituted by love; if you say the latter is the case, then ‘the beloved in the lover’ is produced by love. In favor of the former opinion is the first passage cited above: according to that passage, the beloved is said to be in the one who loves in accordance with the procession of love, just as the thing spoken or understood is in the one who understands it through the conception of the word. For ‘the reality spoken or understood’ is constituted in the one who understands through the word itself; in like manner, therefore, the ‘beloved’ is constituted in the lover through proceeding love itself. In favor of the latter opinion is the second passage cited above: there, from the fact that someone understands, there issues forth in the one understanding a conception of the thing understood, and similarly from the fact that someone loves, there issues forth in the affection of the lover a kind of impression of the thing loved. For the word is produced by the act of understanding, and so, in like manner, ‘the beloved in the lover’ is produced by the act of loving. The importance of this question is that corresponding to these opposed opinions there are opposed theoretical systems. Some take the trinitarian analogy from determining that there are two processions in us, one within intellect and the other within will; so that, just as the act of understanding produces the word in the first procession, so the act of love produces the ‘beloved in the lover’ in the second; John of St Thomas67 and Thomists generally have been of this opinion. But we take the trinitarian analogy from the fact that we experience in ourselves two processions, the first of which is within intellect, while the second is from intellect toward will. In the first procession, we judge because and according as we grasp the sufficiency of evidence. And in the second, we choose because and according as we judge. Thus, we do not follow the opinion of Thomists in this matter, both because it prescinds from our internal experience in its conception of the psychological trinitarian analogy, and because it prescinds from our internal experience in its interpretation of the texts of St Thomas on psychological reality. However, we postpone this general question to appendices 1 and 2, and for now we ask only whether in the writings of St Thomas ‘the beloved in the lover’ is constituted or produced by the act of loving. 67 Joannis a Sancto Thoma, Cursus theologicus in summam theologicam D. Thomae, i, q. 27; disp. xii, a. 7, § iv (Paris: Ludovicus Viv`es, 1884) 142.

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Respondemus citando loca in quibus (1) adest ‘amatum in amante’ quia adest amor et non quia aliquid per actum amoris producatur, (2) explicite ponitur analogia in eo quod Spiritus sanctus procedit a Verbo sicut in nobis amor procedit a verbo mentali, (3) Spiritus sanctus dicitur ipse amor procedens, et (4) excluditur a voluntate processio per modum rei operatae. C. Gent., iv, 19 § 4: Sic igitur quod amatur non solum est in intellectu amantis, sed etiam in voluntate ipsius: aliter tamen et aliter. In intellectu enim est secundum similitudinem suae speciei: in voluntate autem amantis est sicut terminus motus in principio motivo proportionato per convenientiam et proportionem quam habet ad ipsum. Sicut in igne quodammodo est locus sursum ratione levitatis, secundum quam habet proportionem et convenientiam ad talem locum: ignis vero generatus est in igne generante per similitudinem suae formae.

Unde concludes: sicut locus sursum est in igni ratione levitatis quae est principium motivum in locum sursum, ita amatus est in amante ratione amoris qui est principium motivum in amatum. Neque in textu dicitur quidquam de termino immanenter producto sive per amorem sive per levitatem ignis. C. Gent., iv, 19 § 7: Cum autem ostensum sit quod amatum necesse est aliqualiter esse in voluntate amantis; ipse autem Deus seipsum amat: necesse est quod ipse Deus sit in sua voluntate ut amatum in amante. Est autem amatum in amante secundum quod amatur; amare autem quoddam velle est; velle autem Dei est eius esse ... Unde oportet quod Deus, secundum quod consideratur ut in sua voluntate existens, sit vere et substantialiter Deus.

Ubi notabis: amatum esse in amante secundum quod amatur, non secundum quod aliquid per amorem intra voluntatem producitur; neque valeret argumentum si aliud esset velle et aliud ex actu volendi productum esset ‘amatum in amante.’ De Malo, q. 6, a. 1 ad 13m: ... amor dicitur transformare amantem in amatum, inquantum per amorem movetur amans ad ipsam rem amatam.

Quare ‘amatum in amante’ per amorem constituitur inquantum movetur amans in amatum, et non inquantum aliquid producitur intra voluntatem per amorem. Comp. theol., c. 49: ... id quod amatur est in amante secundum quod amatur actu. Quod autem aliquid actu ametur, procedit et ex virtute amativa amantis, et ex bono amabili

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We answer by citing texts in which (1) ‘the beloved’ is present ‘in the lover’ because love is present and not because something is produced by the act of love, (2) the analogy is explicitly posited in the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Word just as love proceeds in us from our mental word, (3) the Holy Spirit is called proceeding Love, and (4) a procession after the manner of a thing operated is excluded from the will. Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 19, ¶ 4, § 3560: ‘. . . what is loved is not only in the intellect of the lover, but also in the lover’s will, yet not in the same way in the two instances. What is loved is in the intellect by reason of a likeness of its species; but what is loved is in the will of the lover as the term of a movement is in its proportionate motive principle through the suitability and proportion that the principle has to the term. Just so, a higher level is, in a way, in a flame by reason of the lightness according to which it possesses the proportion and suitability to such a level; but the generated flame is in the generating flame through the likeness of its form.’ From this, one will conclude: just as the higher level is in a flame by reason of lightness, which is the principle of motion toward the higher level, so the beloved is in the lover by reason of love, which is the principle of motion toward the beloved. Nowhere in the text is anything said concerning a term immanently produced, either by love or by the lightness of the flame. Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 19, ¶ 7, § 3563: ‘. . . it has been shown that it is necessary that the beloved be in some way in the will of the lover. But God loves himself. It is necessary, then, that God himself be in God’s own will as the beloved in the lover. But what is loved is in the lover inasmuch as it is loved; an act of love is a kind of act of will; God’s act of willing is God’s own act of existence . . . Hence, it must be that God, inasmuch as he is considered as existing within his own will, is truly and substantially God.’ In this passage one will note: the beloved is in the lover inasmuch as the beloved is loved, not inasmuch as something is produced in the will by love; the argument would not be valid if the act of willing were one thing and ‘the beloved in the lover’ produced from the act of willing were another. De malo, q. 6, a. 1, ad 13m: ‘. . . love is said to transform the lover into the beloved inasmuch as the lover is moved by love toward the very object that is loved.’ Therefore, ‘the beloved in the lover’ is constituted by love inasmuch as the lover is moved toward the beloved, and not inasmuch as something is produced within the will by love. Compendium theologiae, c. 49: ‘. . . what is loved is in the one loving inasmuch as it is actually being loved. The fact that an object is actually loved proceeds from the lover’s capacity to love, and also from the lovable good actually understood.

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actu intellecto. Hoc igitur quod est amatum esse in amante, ex duobus procedit: scilicet ex principio amativo et ex intelligibili apprehenso, quod est verbum conceptum de amabili.

Qui locus determinat tum id quo constituitur ‘amatum in amante’ tum ea ex quibus procedit ‘amatum in amante’; neque adeo detorqueri potest ut asseratur ‘amatum in amante’ produci per amorem, non produci per verbum, esse aliud ac ipse amor. Saepius autem alibi docetur Spiritum procedere a Verbo, sicut amor ex verbo mentali: In I Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 1 ad 4m: ... a Verbo procedit Spiritus sanctus, sicut a verbo mentali amor. Ibid. d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 sol.: ... quia potest esse duplex intuitus, vel veri simpliciter, vel ulterius secundum quod verum extenditur in bonum et conveniens, et haec est perfecta apprehensio; ideo est duplex verbum: scilicet rei prolatae quae placet, quod spirat amorem, et hoc est verbum perfectum; et verbum rei quae etiam displicet ... aut non placet. Cf. In III de Anima, lect. 4 § 634 s. C. Gent., iv, 24, § 12: Nam amor procedit a verbo: eo quod nihil amare possumus nisi verbo cordis illud concipiamus. Ibid. iv, 19, § 8: Quod autem aliquid sit in voluntate ut amatum in amante, ordinem quendam habet ad conceptionem qua ab intellectu concipitur, et ad ipsam rem cuius intellectualis conceptio dicitur verbum: non enim amaretur aliquid nisi aliquo modo cognosceretur ... Necesse est igitur quod amor quo Deus est in voluntate divina ut amatum in amante, et a Verbo Dei, et a Deo cuius est Verbum procedat.

De Pot., q. 9, a. 9 ad 3m (2ae ser.): nihil enim potest amari cuius verbum in intellectu non praeconcipiatur; et sic oportet quod ille qui procedit per modum voluntatis sit ab eo qui procedit per modum intellectus, et per consequens distinguatur ab eo. Cf. ibid. q. 10, a. 2 c.; ad 2m; ad 7m; a. 4 c. Ibid. q. 10, a. 5: Non enim potest esse nec intelligi quod amor sit alicuius quod non est intellectu praeconceptum; unde quilibet amor est ab aliquo verbo, loquendo de amore in intellectuali natura. Sum. theol., i, q. 36, a. 2 c: Necesse est autem quod amor a verbo procedat: non enim aliquid amamus, nisi secundum quod conceptione mentis apprehendimus. Unde et secundum hoc manifestum est quod Spiritus sanctus procedat a Filio. Cf. ibid. q. 27, a. 3 ad 3m. Comp. theol., c. 49.

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Accordingly, the fact that the beloved is in the one loving proceeds from two principles: from the loving principle, and from an apprehended intelligible, which is the word that has been conceived concerning the lovable.’ This passage determines both what constitutes ‘the beloved in the lover’ and that from which ‘the beloved in the lover’ proceeds; and, indeed, it cannot be so twisted as to assert that ‘the beloved in the lover’ is produced by love, not by the word, and is different from love itself. Rather, in other passages St Thomas quite frequently teaches that the Spirit proceeds from the Word as love proceeds from a mental word. Super I Sententiarum, d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4m: ‘. . . the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Word the way love proceeds from a mental word.’ Ibid. d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 sol.: ‘. . . since there can be two apprehensions, either of truth by itself or of truth as expanded to take in the good and the fitting – and this latter is a complete apprehension – hence there are two words, namely, of something pleasing that is set forth, a word that spirates love – and this is a complete word – and the word of something also that displeases . . . or does not please.’ See In III de Anima, lect. 4, §§ 634–35. Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 24, ¶ 12, § 3617: ‘For love proceeds from a word, inasmuch as we cannot love anything unless we conceive it in a word of the heart.’ Ibid. c. 19, ¶ 8, § 3564: ‘But that something is in the will as what is loved is in the lover (means that) it has a certain relation to the conception by which intellect conceives it and to the thing itself whose conception by the intellect is called the word: for nothing would be loved unless it were in some way known . . . It is necessary, therefore, that the love by which God is in the divine will as the beloved in the lover proceed both from the Word of God and from God whose Word he is.’ De potentia, q. 9, a. 9, ad 3m (2nd series): ‘. . . nothing can be loved whose word is not first conceived in the intellect; hence, the one who proceeds by way of the will must be from the one who proceeds by way of the intellect, and consequently is distinguished from that one.’ See ibid. q. 10, a. 2 c.; ad 2m; ad 7m; a. 4 c. Ibid. q. 10, a. 5: ‘It cannot be, nor can it be understood, that there is a love for something that has not first been conceived by the intellect; therefore, every love is from some word, when one is speaking of love in an intellectual nature.’ Summa theologiae, 1, q. 36, a. 2 c.: ‘It is necessary that love proceed from the word: for we do not love anything except inasmuch as we apprehend it in a mental conception. Accordingly, from this too it is clear that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.’ See ibid. q. 27, a. 3, ad 3m; Compendium theologiae, c. 49.

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De Rat. Fidei ad Cantorem Antioch., c. 4: Manifestum est autem quod nihil amare possumus intelligibili et sancto amore nisi quod actu per intellectum concipimus. Conceptio autem intellectus est verbum, unde oportet quod amor a verbo oriatur. Verbum autem Dei dicimus esse Filium, ex quo patet Spiritum sanctum esse a Filio.

Sicut ergo amor e verbo procedit, ita Spiritus sanctus e Verbo divino procedit; unde mirum non est S. Thomam docuisse Spiritum sanctum esse ipsum Amorem procedentem et non aliquid aliud quod per Amorem procedentem producitur. Sum. theol., i, q. 37, a. 1 Sed contra: Ipse Spiritus sanctus est Amor. Ibid. c.: Inquantum vero his vocabulis (amore, dilectione) utimur ad exprimendam habitudinem eius rei quae procedit per modum amoris ad suum principium et e converso; ita quod per amorem intelligatur amor procedens .. . sic Amor est nomen personae. Cf. ibid. ad 3m; ad 4m. Ibid. a. 2 c.: Pater et Filius dicuntur diligentes Spiritu sancto vel Amore procedente. Cf. ibid. ad 3m; ad 4m. Ibid. q. 38, a. 1 c.: particeps divini Verbi et procedentis Amoris. Ibid. a. 2c: ... cum Spiritus sanctus procedit ut Amor. Ibid. ad 1m: Spiritus sanctus, quia procedit a Patre ut Amor.

Quantum autem ad comparationem inter processionem verbi et processionem amoris, haec docuit neque retractavit Aquinas: De Ver., q. 4, a. 2 ad 7m: Haec autem est differentia inter intellectum et voluntatem: quod operatio voluntatis terminatur ad res, in quibus est bonum et malum; sed operatio intellectus terminatur in mente, in qua est verum et falsum, ut dicitur in vi Metaph. [lect. 4, § 1240]. Et ideo voluntas non habet aliquid progrediens a seipsa quod in ea sit nisi per modum operationis; sed intellectus habet in seipso aliquid progrediens ab eo, non solum per modum operationis sed etiam per modum rei operatae.

Unde concludes: Si nihil procedit intra voluntatem per modum operati, ‘amatum in amante’ constituitur et non producitur per amorem. Obicitur tamen amorem non posse a verbo procedere. Nam amor est actus vitalis. Omnis actus vitalis ab ea potentia producitur in qua recipitur. Ergo amor producitur, non ab intellectu vel a verbo sed ab ipsa voluntate in qua recipitur. Respondetur istam sententiam de actu vitali non esse S. Thomae, uti postea in Appendice i stabilietur. Sed ultro concedimus eandem de actu vitali sententiam

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De rationibus fidei contra Saracenos, Graecos et Armenos ad Cantorem Antiochiae, c. 4: ‘It is clear that we are able to love nothing with an intellectual and holy love that we do not actually conceive by means of the intellect. But the conception of the intellect is the word; hence, it is necessary that love come forth from the word. Now, we say that the Word of God is the Son; it is clear, then, that the Holy Spirit is from the Son.’ Therefore, just as love proceeds from the word, so the Holy Spirit proceeds from the divine Word. It is no wonder, then, that St Thomas taught that the Holy Spirit is proceeding Love itself and not something different that is produced by proceeding Love. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 37, a. 1, Sed contra: ‘The Holy Spirit himself is Love.’ Ibid. c.: ‘Insofar as we use these words (amore, dilectione) to express the relationship to its own principle of that reality which proceeds after the manner of love, and vice versa, so that by “love” proceeding love is understood . . ., and so Love is the name of a person.’ See ibid., ad 3m; ad 4m. Ibid. a. 2 c.: ‘The Father and the Son are said to be loving through the Holy Spirit or through proceeding Love.’ See ibid. ad 3m; ad 4m. Ibid. q. 38, a. 1 c.: ‘. . . partaker of the divine Word and of proceeding Love.’ Ibid. a. 2 c.: ‘. . . since the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love.’ Ibid. ad 1m.: ‘The Holy Spirit because he proceeds as Love from the Father.’ Moreover, as regards this comparison between the procession of the word and the procession of love, Aquinas taught the following and never retracted it. De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m: ‘There is this difference between intellect and will: the operation of the will terminates at things, in which there is good and evil; but the operation of the intellect terminates in the mind, in which there is the true and the false, as is said in Metaphysics vi [lect. 4, § 1240]. Consequently, the will does not have anything going forth from itself, except what is in it after the manner of an operation; but the intellect has in itself something that goes forth from itself, not only after the manner of an operation, but also after the manner of a reality that is the term of the operation.’ Thus, one may conclude: if nothing proceeds within the will after the manner of a term of an operation, then ‘the beloved in the lover’ is constituted by love and not produced by love. However, it may be objected that love cannot proceed from the word. For love is a vital act. Every vital act is produced by that faculty in which it is received. Love, therefore, is produced, not by the intellect or by the word, but by the will itself in which it is received. Our response is that this opinion concerning the vital act is not that of St Thomas, as we will establish later in appendix 1. But we concede without hesitation

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optime explicare cur Thomistae velint et probare nitantur ‘amatum in amante’ non constitui sed produci per amorem. Instatur tamen nostram interpretationem non satis attendere ad evolutionem doctrinae S. Thomae circa processionem secundam. Cf. Bull. thom., X 2, p. 534, § 1217. Respondetur superfluere hypothesin de evolutione ubi attendatur ad explicitam doctrinam S. Thomae. Explicite docuit S. Thomas: (1) secundam processionem esse amoris ex verbo; (2) Spiritum sanctum esse tum ‘amatum in amante’ tum amorem procedentem; (3) non esse processionem in voluntate nisi per modum operationis; et (4) amatum esse in amante secundum quod amatur. Quam maxime evoluta esset haec sibi cohaerens doctrina si in stadio quodam posteriori certo constaret (1) secundam processionem esse, non amoris ex verbo, sed ‘amati in amante’ ex amore, (2) Spiritum sanctum esse ‘amatum in amante’ sed non esse amorem procedentem, (3) esse in voluntate processionem per modum rei operatae, (4) amatum esse in amante, non quia ametur, sed quia ex hoc amore procedit aliquid realiter distinctum quod nominetur ‘amatum in amante.’

Attamen de hac maxima evolutione adeo non certo constat ut in probationem non afferantur nisi loca in quibus forte implicite inveniri potest non tota sententia Ioannis a S. Thoma sed hoc illudve elementum.

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that that opinion concerning the vital act explains very well why Thomists hold and endeavor to prove that ‘the beloved in the lover’ is not constituted by love but is produced by love. Nevertheless, it may be urged that our interpretation does not attend sufficiently to the development of St Thomas’s doctrine concerning the second procession. See A. Patfoort, Review notice of B. Lonergan, Divinarum personarum conceptio analogica, in Bulletin thomiste 10:2 (1958) 534, § 1217. Our response is that a hypothesis concerning development is superfluous when one attends to St Thomas’s explicit doctrine. St Thomas taught explicitly (1) that the second procession is the procession of love from the word; (2) that the Holy Spirit is both ‘the beloved in the lover’ and proceeding Love; (3) that the only procession in the will is the procession after the manner of an operation; and (4) that the beloved is in the lover inasmuch as the beloved is being loved. This internally consistent doctrine would have evolved to the extreme if in some later stage it could be proved beyond doubt (1) that the second procession is not the procession of love from the word, but ‘of the beloved in the lover’ from love, (2) that the Holy Spirit is ‘the beloved in the lover’ but is not proceeding Love, (3) that there is a procession in the will after the manner of a reality that is the term of the operation, (4) that the beloved is in the lover, not because the beloved is being loved, but because something really distinct proceeds from this love, which is named ‘the beloved in the lover.’ However, such extreme development is so far from having been proved beyond doubt that the only texts adduced in its favor are those in which perhaps implicitly there can be found, not the fullness of John of St Thomas’s thought on the point, but only certain elements of it.

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CAPUT TERTIUM

De Relationibus Divinis Realibus

Postquam duae divinae processiones specifice distinctae sunt conceptae, quaeritur quamnam realitatem iis attribui oporteat. Et primo concluditur quattuor esse in Deo relationes reales, quae quidem quoad rem cum processionibus identificantur. Deinde statuitur has relationes esse subsistentes. Tertio probatur tres subsistentes relationes realiter inter se distingui. Et quarto explicatur relationes reales divinas realiter cum divina substantia identificari sed ratione ab eadem substantia distingui. Quibus classicis assertis accedunt notae quattuor et quaestiones quinque. Notae respiciunt tum conciliaria tum explicativa, nempe, in Deo esse Trinitatem non quaternitatem, in Deo omnia esse unum ubi non obviat relationis oppositio, in Deo essentialia et notionalia ratione distingui et realiter identificari, et de Deo illegitimum esse syllogismum qui per medium essentiale ex notionali ad notionale concludat. Proinde quaeritur quemadmodum relatio possit identificari cum substantia, quemadmodum salvetur principium identitatis comparatae, quid valeat distinctio inter esse in et esse ad, utrum maior an minor sit rationis distinctio inter divinam substantiam divinasque relationes reales, utrum admittenda sit distinctio quae dicitur formalis a parte rei.

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CHAPTER THREE

The Real Divine Relations

Now that we have conceived the two specifically distinct divine processions, we must ask what reality is to be attributed to them. First, we conclude that there are in God four real relations and that these are really identical with the processions. Next, we establish that these relations are subsistent. Third, we show that three of these subsistent relations are really distinct from one another. And fourth, we explain that the real divine relations are really identical with the divine substance but conceptually distinct from that same substance. To these classical assertions we add four notes and five questions. The notes have to do with matters both conciliar and explanatory, namely, that in God there is a trinity and not a quaternity, that in God everything is one where there is no distinction by relational opposition, that in God what is essential and what is notional are conceptually distinct but really identical, and that concerning God it is illegitimate in a syllogism to argue from what is notional to what is notional using what is essential as the middle term. Accordingly, we ask how a relation can be identified with the substance, how the principle of compared identity can be safeguarded, what is the value of the distinction between ‘being in’ and ‘being to,’ whether the conceptual distinction between the divine substance and the real divine relations is a major or minor one, and whether the so-called ‘formal distinction on the side of the reality’ is admissible.

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Sententiae Quam antiqua sit Patrum de relationibus divinis doctrina, in parte dogmatica exponitur.1 Mediaevales entitatem relationis divinae inquirentes, post tentamina parum felicia tum Gilberti Porretae (db 389; cf. ds 745) tum Abbatis Ioachim de Flora (db 431 s.), in eas pervenerunt conclusiones quae deinceps, si nominales quosdam excipias Scotique distinctionem formalem, factae sunt inter omnes theologos sententiae communes: videlicet, quattuor esse in Deo relationes reales et quidem subsistentes; quarum tres realiter inter se distingui; ratione denique sed non realiter inter divinam substantiam divinasque relationes reales distingui.

Notae theologicae Quattuor quae sequuntur asserta sunt theologice certa. Certo enim concluditur esse relationes reales in Deo ex ipsis nominibus, Pater, Filius; certo pariter concluditur quattuor esse relationes reales divinas ex duabus processionibus (db 54, 691); certo pariter concluditur tres reales esse relationes divinas realiter inter se distinctas ex trinitate personarum, sive cum Patribus arguis personas consubstantiales non posse realiter inter se distingui nisi per relationes originis (cf. db 280), sive brevius ex conc. Florentino axioma adsumis ‘omnia unum esse ubi non obviat relationis oppositio’ (db 703); certo etiam concluditur relationes reales et divinam substantiam non realiter inter se distingui quia ‘in Deo solummodo Trinitas est, non quaternitas’ (db 432); quare pariter certum est relationes reales esse subsistentes (cf. db 389, ds 745), certo denique concluditur saltem ratione distingui inter relationes reales et divinam substantiam, cum haec nec generet nec gignatur nec procedat, et tamen Pater generet, Filius gignatur, Spiritus sanctus procedat (db 432).

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Opinions Just how early is the teaching of the Fathers on the divine relations is set forth in the dogmatic part of this work.1 The medieval theologians inquired about the entity of a divine relation, and after the infelicitous attempts of Gilbert de la Porr e´ e (db 389; see ds 745) and Abbot Joachim of Flora (db 431–33, ds 803–808, nd 317–20), they arrived at those conclusions which, apart from the views of some nominalists and Scotus’s formal distinction, subsequently became the common opinions of all theologians: namely, there are in God four real and indeed subsistent relations; three of these are really distinct from one another; and finally, there is a conceptual but not a real distinction between the divine substance and the real divine relations. Theological Notes The four assertions presented in this chapter are theologically certain. From the very names ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ we conclude with certainty that there are real relations in God. With equal certainty we conclude from the two processions that there are four real divine relations (db 54, ds 125–26, nd 7–8; db 691, ds 1300, nd 322). It is likewise a certain conclusion from the Trinity of persons that three real divine relations are really distinct from one another, whether with the Fathers we argue that consubstantial persons cannot be really distinct from one another except by relations of origin (db 280, ds 530, nd 314) or, more succinctly, we adopt the axiom of the Council of Florence that in God ‘everything is one where there is no distinction by relational opposition’ (db 703, ds 1330, nd 325). We can also conclude with certainty that there is no real distinction between the real relations and the divine substance, since ‘in God there is only a trinity, not a quaternity’ (db 432, ds 804, nd 318); and therefore it is equally certain that the real relations are subsistent (db 389, ds 745). Finally, it is a certain conclusion that there is at least a conceptual distinction between the real relations and the divine substance, because the substance neither generates nor is generated nor proceeds, and yet the Father generates, the Son is generated, and the Holy Spirit proceeds (db 432, ds 804, nd 318). 1 [That is, in what will be volume 11, The Triune God: Doctrines. See there thesis 3. Since Lonergan had not written the pars dogmatica when he published Divinarum personarum, the text there refers rather to R. Arnou, De Deo Trino (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1933) 129–40.]

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ASSERTUM IV Ad processiones divinas sequuntur relationes reales quattuor, nempe, paternitas, filiatio, spiratio activa, et spiratio passiva. Ad terminos processio: origo unius ab alio. sequuntur: scilicet, secundum nostrum modum concipiendi in via synthetica; in via autem analytica ex personis distinctis ad proprietates relativas concluditur, et ex proprietatibus relativis ad processiones; denique, si ipsam realitatem divinam respicis, processiones sunt idem realiter quod relationes. relatio: ordo unius ad aliud. reale: id quod vere est; opponitur enti rationis quod concipitur quidem sed in rebus non est. paternitas: relatio generantis ad generatum. filiatio: relatio generati ad generantem. spiratio: processio amoris ex dicente et verbo. spiratio activa: relatio spirantis ad spiratum. spiratio passiva: relatio spirati ad spirantem. Argumentum 1 Ex reali processione Verbi sequitur realis relatio verbi ad principium quod verbum dicit; et cum haec processio sit generatio proprie dicta, haec realis relatio verbi ad suum principium est filiatio. 2 Ex reali processione amoris sequitur realis relatio amoris ad principium quod amorem spirat; et cum haec processio non sit generatio proprie dicta, haec realis relatio non est filiatio et convenienter nominari potest spiratio passiva. 3 Processio verbi intellectualiter conscia est ex perspecta intelligibilitate rei dicendae; praeterea, ex hac intelligibilitate perspecta oritur in intellectu perspiciente necessitas quaedam intellectualis ad verbum dicendum; quae necessitas ad verbum dicendum, cum re vera in intellectu existat, est relatio realis ad verbum dicendum et, orto iam verbo, est relatio realis ad verbum dictum; denique tandem cum in divinis verbum dicere sit Filium generare, relatio realis ad verbum aeternaliter dictum, Filium aeternaliter generatum, est relatio realis paternitatis.

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ASSERTION 4 Four real relations follow upon the divine processions: paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. Terminology procession: the origin of one from another. follow upon: that is, according to our manner of conceiving in the way of synthesis; contrariwise, in the way of analysis we conclude from distinct persons to relative properties and from relative properties to processions; and with respect to the divine reality itself, the processions are really the same as the relations. relation: the order of one to another. real: that which truly is; it stands in opposition to conceptual being, to what is conceived but does not exist in reality. paternity: the relation of the one who generates to the one generated. filiation: the relation of the one generated to the one who generates. spiration: the procession of love from the speaker and the word. active spiration: the relation of the spirator to the spirated. passive spiration: the relation of the spirated to the spirator. Argument 1 From the real procession of the Word, there follows a real relation of the word to the principle that speaks the word; and since this procession is generation in the proper sense, this real relation of the word to its principle is filiation. 2 From the real procession of love, there follows a real relation of love to the principle that spirates love; and since this procession is not generation in the proper sense, this real relation is not filiation, and can fittingly be termed passive spiration. 3 The intellectually conscious procession of the word is from the grasp of the intelligibility of whatever is to be uttered; moreover, from this grasp of intelligibility there emerges in the intellect that grasps it an intellectual necessity to speak the word. Since this necessity to speak the word really exists in the intellect, it is a real relation to the word to be spoken, and, once this word is uttered, a real relation to the word spoken. Finally, since in God to speak the word is to generate the Son, the real relation to the eternally spoken Word, the eternally generated Son, is the real relation of paternity.

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4 Processio amoris intellectualiter conscia est ex perspecta atque affirmata bonitate rei amandae; praeterea, ex hac perspecta atque affirmata bonitate oritur in perspiciente atque affirmante necessitas quaedam intellectualis seu moralis ad amorem spirandum; quae quidem necessitas, cum re vera in perspiciente atque affirmante existat, est relatio realis ad amorem spirandum et, orto iam amore, ad amorem spiratum; denique tandem haec realis relatio spirantis ad spiratum convenienter nominatur spiratio activa. 5 Quibus perspectis, concluditur ex realibus processionibus divinis quattuor esse in Deo relationes reales, nempe, paternitatem, filiationem, spirationem activam, et spirationem passivam. Obicitur.2 Videntur relationes paternitatis et spirationis activae esse non reales sed rationis tantum. Quod enim valet de principio quod est Deus Creator pariter valet de principio quod est Deus Pater vel Deus Spirator. Sed creatio activa est relatio rationis tantum. Ergo pariter paternitas et spiratio activa sunt relationes rationis tantum. Respondetur. Deest paritas, cum diversimode comparetur principium ad principiatum. Aliud enim principium est principiato inferius, et eiusmodi est instrumentum quod effectum exserit ultra propriam perfectionem. Aliud deinde principium est principiato aequale, quatenus principium realiter ordinatur in principiatum et vicissim principiatum realiter ordinatur in principium; et eiusmodi sunt pater et filius. Tertium denique principium est principiato superius, et eiusmodi principium est finis principiati; et tale principium non realiter ordinatur in principiatum, nam finis non est propter id quod est ad finem. Porro, Deus creator est omnium tum principium tum finis (db 1785), et ideo creatio activa est relatio rationis tantum. Sed Deus Pater non comparatur ad Deum Filium sicut creator ad creaturam, vel sicut finis ad id quod est propter finem; et ideo deest paritas. Scholion Processiones ratione distinguuntur a relationibus et realiter cum relationibus identificantur. Ratione distinguuntur, nam non est idem concipere originem unius ab alio ac concipere

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4 The intellectually conscious procession of love is from the grasp and affirmation of the goodness of whatever is to be loved; moreover, from this grasp and affirmation of goodness there emerges in the one who grasps and affirms it an intellectual or moral necessity to spirate love; since this necessity really exists in the one who has grasped and affirmed goodness, it is a real relation to the love that is to be spirated and, once this love has arisen, a real relation to the love spirated; finally, this real relation of the spirator to what is spirated is fittingly termed active spiration. 5 Once these matters are grasped, we conclude from the real divine processions that there are four real relations in God, namely, paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. It might be objected2 that the relations of paternity and active spiration seem to be not real but only conceptual. For what holds for the principle that is God the Creator holds equally for the principle that is God the Father or God the Spirator. But active creation is only a conceptual relation. Therefore paternity and active spiration are likewise only conceptual relations. In reply we say that these two cases are not the same, since a principle and what originates from it are related in various ways. There is a principle that is inferior to the originated, such as an instrument that has an effect beyond its own proper perfection. There is another principle that is equal to the originated, as when the principle is really ordered to the originated and the originated in turn is really ordered to its principle; father and son are an example of this. Finally, there is a third case in which the principle is superior to the originated, as when the principle is the end of the originated. This sort of principle is not really ordered to what it originates, for an end does not exist because of that whose end it is. Now God the creator is both principle and end of all things (db 1785, ds 3004, nd 113), and therefore active creation is a conceptual relation only. But God the Father is not related to God the Son as creator to creature or as the end to that whose end it is. And so the two cases are not the same. Excursus The processions are conceptually distinct from, but really identical with, the relations. The processions and relations are conceptually distinct, for to conceive the origin of one from another is not the same as to conceive the order of one to 2 [The material from this point to the Excursus did not appear in Divinarum personarum.]

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ordinem unius ad aliud; v.g., pater non habet originem a filio sed habet ordinem ad filium. Realiter identificantur, nam ubi processio est sine ullo motu, ipsa processio nihil est in rebus praeter relationem; uti manifestum est etiam in creatione quae sine motu fit; cf. Sum. theol., I, q. 45, a. 2 ad 2m, et a. 3. Cum tamen ad singulas processiones sequantur binae relationes, ulterius quaeritur cum quanam relatione realiter identificetur processio. Cui quaestioni per distinctionem respondendum est. Si enim processio concipitur tamquam origo, constat originem, et ideo processionem, realiter esse in eo quod originem habet; et sic processio realiter identificatur cum filiatione et cum spiratione passiva. Si autem processio concipitur tamquam actio, subdistinguendum est: nam uno modo concipitur actio tamquam in agente vel ab agente, et sic processio realiter identificatur cum relatione reali agentis; sed alio modo concipitur actio tamquam in passo, et sic iterum processio realiter identificatur cum eo quod originem habet seu cum filiatione et spiratione passiva. Cuius quaestionis momentum perspicitur cum quaeratur utrum in divinis processio verbi et processio amoris realiter inter se distinguantur. Si enim sumitur processio tamquam origo vel tamquam actio in passo, affirmative respondendum est cum filiatio et spiratio passiva realiter inter se distinguantur. Si autem sumitur processio tamquam actio in agente vel ab agente, negative respondendum est cum paternitas et spiratio activa, ut postea demonstrabitur, non realiter inter se distinguantur. Quibus perspectis, sine distinctione non videtur admittenda sive thesis sive argumentatio quam ponit J. Brinktrine. 3

ASSERTUM V Quae quattuor relationes sunt subsistentes. Asserti intentio Cum ex duabus processionibus ad quattuor relationes reales nuperrime concluserimus, iam via synthetica procedentes ex relationibus ad subiecta subsistentia

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another; a father, for example, does not originate from his son, but he does have an order to his son. The processions and relations are really identical, for when there is a procession without any motion, the procession itself is nothing in reality except a relation; this is manifest also in creation, in which there is no motion; see Summa theologiae, 1, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2m, and a. 3. Nonetheless, since two relations follow upon each procession, one may further ask with which relation the procession is really identical. The answer demands a distinction. If a procession is conceived as an origination, it clearly follows that the origination, and therefore the procession, is really in that which is originated; and in this case the procession is really identical with filiation and with passive spiration. But if a procession is conceived as an action, we must make a further distinction: if the action is conceived as being in or from the agent, the procession is really identical with the real relation of the agent; but if the action is conceived as being in the recipient, the procession is really identical with that which is originated, that is, with filiation and passive spiration. The importance of this question can be seen if one asks whether in God the procession of word and the procession of love are really distinct. For if the procession is understood as an origin or an action in the recipient, the answer must be yes, since filiation and passive spiration are really distinct. But if the procession is understood as an action in or from the agent, the answer must be no, since, as we will show later, paternity and active spiration are not really distinct. For this reason, we cannot accept without some distinction the thesis and argumentation of J. Brinktrine that ‘within God there is only a virtual, not a real, distinction between generation and spiration.’3 ASSERTION 5 These four relations are subsistent. Meaning of the Assertion From the two processions we have just concluded to four real relations, and we now continue along the way of synthesis to argue from the relations to sub3 J. Brinktrine, Die Lehre von Gott. II. Von der g¨ottlichen Trinit¨at (Paderborn: Verlag F. Sch¨oningh, 1954) 72: ‘Zwischen der innerg¨ottlichen Zeugung und der Hauchung besteht nur ein virtueller, kein realer Unterschied.’ [Lonergan’s review of this book in Gregorianum 37 (1956) 665 will appear in cwl 20, Shorter Papers.]

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arguimus, videlicet, ex paternitate ad Patrem, ex filiatione ad Filium, ex spiratione activa ad Spiratorem, ex spiratione passiva ad Spiritum. Quae quidem conclusio, aliquo saltem sensu, necessaria est. Si enim existit realis paternitas, existit id quo aliquis realiter sit pater; et similiter de aliis. Cum tamen Deus sit omnino simplex, nulla haberi potest realis distinctio inter id quod et id quo. Qua de causa, eo quod habetur realis paternitas, non solum habetur id quo est pater sed etiam id quod est pater; et similiter in aliis. Quo perspecto, conscripsit acutissimus noster: ‘Sicut ergo deitas est Deus, ita paternitas divina est Deus Pater.’4 Quae omnia ut ordinate dicantur, primo de ratione subsistentiae, deinde de huius rationis applicatione in divinis, tertio de decretis concilii Remensis, quarto de ipso argumento tractabimus. Ipsum vero assertum, quoad rem, est theologice certum, sed quoad modum dicendi est communis certaque sententia. Quid sit subsistens 5 Multa quae esse dicantur, non omnia eodem modo sunt. Sunt enim chimerae, at tantummodo in mente, et ideo entia rationis sunt. Sunt possibilia, at tantummodo in potentia agentis vel etiam materiae, et ideo potius esse possunt quam sunt. Sunt accidentia, at in alio esse iis competit, et ideo magis insunt quam sunt. Sunt principia entis constitutiva, ut essentia et esse, materia et forma, substantia et accidens, potentia et actus, quae tamen non ipsa sunt sed iis aliquid est. At praeter haec omnia quae sunt secundum quid, nempe, in mente, in potentia alterius, in alio, quibus aliud, etiam et principalius esse dicuntur mineralia, plantae, animalia, homines, angeli, Deus, Pater, Filius, Spiritus. Quae cum sint simpliciter, cum sint ea quae revera sunt, nomen speciale sibi vindicant et dicuntur subsistentia.

Subsistens est ergo quodcumque est id quod est; et dividitur contra ens rationis, possibile, accidens, et principium entis constitutivum.

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sistent subjects – that is to say, from paternity to the Father, from filiation to the Son, from active spiration to the Spirator, and from passive spiration to the Spirit. This conclusion is inevitable, at least in some sense. For if there exists real paternity, there exists that by which someone is really a father, and similarly for the other relations. But since God is utterly simple, there cannot be in God a real distinction between that which is and that by which it is. Hence from the fact that there is real paternity there is not only that by which there is a father but also that which is a father, and similarly for the other relations. Thus also St Thomas with his characteristic acumen wrote, ‘Therefore just as divinity is God, so divine paternity is God the Father.’4 To set forth these matters in orderly fashion, we will first treat what is meant by subsistence, then see what application this has to God, third, deal with the decrees of the Council of Rheims, and fourth, present our argument. As far as its content is concerned, this assertion is theologically certain. But in its mode of expression it is a common and certain opinion. The Subsistent 5 Many things are said to be, but they do not all exist in the same way. There are chimeras, but these are only in the mind, and thus are conceptual beings. There are possible beings, but they are only in the potency of an agent or even of matter, and are therefore what can be rather than what are. There are accidents, but their mode of being is to be in something else, and therefore they ‘are in’ rather than simply are. There are the constitutive principles of being, such as essence and existence, matter and form, substance and accident, potency and act; none of these themselves are, but by them something is. But besides all of the above, which are in a qualified way, namely, in the mind, or in the potency of something else, or in another, or as that by which another is, there are those things that are first and foremost said to be – minerals, plants, animals, humans, angels, God, the Father, the Son, the Spirit. Since all of these simply are and truly are, they are rightly given the special designation ‘subsistent.’ A subsistent, then, is whatever simply is that which is. It is distinguished from conceptual beings, possibles, accidents, and the constitutive principles of being. 4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 29, a. 4. 5 See Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 32–35.

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Quid in divinis subsistat Ex antecessis patet in divinis subsistere quodcumque est id quod est. At Deus est omnino simplex; nam omne compositum ipsius suae compositionis causam habeat necesse est; et ideo, cum Deus sit primum omnium principium, nullam prorsus compositionem realem admittit. Iam vero in ente omnino simplici nihil esse potest quod non sit ipsum ens simplicissimum. Et ideo quodcumque in Deo realiter est, idem est ac Deus, idem est ac id quod est, idem est ac id quod subsistit, et ideo ipsum subsistat necesse est. Qua de causa, cum nomina quae de Deo dicantur eum significandi modum habeant qui creaturis compositis nominandis conveniat, distingui solet in nominibus divinis inter id quod significatur et modum significandi. Nam id quod significatur semper est illud summum ens absolute simplex; modus autem significandi, praesertim in abstractis, magis creaturis compositis quam Deo simplici aptatur. Sive enim dicimus Deum, sive dicimus divinitatem, id quod significatur est idem summum ens omnino simplex; et tamen secundum modum significandi per nomen, Deus, dicere videmur id quod est et per nomen, divinitas, dicere videmur id quo est. Concilium Remense, A.D. 1148 6 Quae olim huic concilio attribuebatur Professio fidei de Trinitate (db 389–392), ab ipso concilio emissa esse non videtur (ds 745). Quatenus ergo dogmatice proceditur, 7 illud tantum afferendum est quod, teste Ottone Frisingensi, in causa Gilberti Porretae definivit Romanus Pontifex, nempe, ‘. . . ne aliqua ratio in theologia inter naturam et personam divideret, neve Deus divina essentia diceretur ex sensu ablativi tantum, sed etiam nominativi’ (ds 745; db in nota ad 389). 8 Quod si nulla ratio inter divinam personam naturamque divinam dividit, nulla sane est realis distinctio inter Patrem et deitatem.

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What Is It in God That Subsists? From the foregoing it is clear that whatever in God is that which is, is subsistent. But God is utterly simple; for every composite being necessarily has a cause of its own composition, and so, since God is the first principle of all things, there can be no real composition whatever in God. Now, in an utterly simple being there can be nothing that is not that simple being itself. In God, therefore, whatever really is, is the same as God, is the same as that which is, is the same as that which subsists, and hence necessarily subsists. Consequently, nouns that are used of God have the way of signifying that is suitable for speaking of composite creatures. Regarding the divine names, therefore, we must distinguish between what they signify and their way of signifying. What they signify is always that supreme and absolutely simple being; but the way they signify, especially in the case of abstract terms, is better suited to composite creatures than to the simple God. Whether we say ‘God’ or ‘divinity,’ we mean the same utterly simple supreme being; but in saying ‘God’ we seem to be emphasizing that which is, while in using the term ‘divinity’ we seem to be emphasizing that by which God is. The Council of Rheims, A.D. 1148 6 The document Professio fidei de Trinitate (db 389–92), once attributed to the Council of Rheims, was apparently not issued by it (ds 745). Hence the only dogmatic statement that needs to be mentioned here is the pronouncement which, according to Otto, Bishop of Freising, was defined by the pope [Eugene iii] regarding the case of Gilbert de la Porr´ee:7 ‘. . . no theological formality is to divide nature and person, nor in the phrase Deus divina essentia are the last two words to be understood in the ablative case only but also in the nominative’ (ds 745, db 389 note). 8 If no formality divides a divine person and the divine nature, then surely there is no real distinction between the Father and divinity. 6 [See below, section 5 of appendix 4, pp. 784–87, for the version of this section that appeared in Divinarum personarum.] 7 Two recent works on the thought of Gilbert de la Porr´ee are M.E. Williams, The Teaching of Gilbert Porreta on the Trinity, Analecta Gregoriana 56 (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1951) and M.A. Schmidt, Gottheit und Trinit¨at nach dem Kommentar des Gilbert Porreta zu Boethius, De Trinitate (Basel: Verlag f¨ur Recht und Gessellschaft, 1956). 8 [When the words divina essentia are taken in the ablative case, Deus divina essentia means ‘God (is) by the divine essence,’ whereas when they are taken in the nominative case the expression means ‘God (is) the divine essence.’]

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Praeterea, quia Deus divina essentia esse dicitur non solum sensu ablativi sed etiam nominativi, non solum Deus est deitate (sicut et homo est humanitate) sed etiam Deus est deitas (etsi hic homo non sit humanitas). Quae quidem ad iam dicta redeunt. Etsi enim quoad modum significandi ‘deitas,’ ‘paternitas,’ ‘filiatio,’ dicant id quo, tamen quoad rem significatam non alia et alia sunt res quas dicunt ‘Deus’ et ‘deitas,’ vel ‘Pater’ et ‘paternitas,’ et ideo sicut ‘Deus’ et ‘Pater’ dicunt id quod, ita pariter ‘deitas’ et ‘paternitas’ pariter dicunt realitatem, non qua aliud est, sed quae ipsa est seu subsistit.

Argumentum In Deo idem est quod est et quo est. Atqui relationes divinae reales saltem sunt quo est. Ergo relationes divinae reales sunt quod est. Proinde, id quod est subsistit. Ergo relationes divinae reales subsistunt. Maior: sensus est quod, quamvis quoad modum significandi distinguatur inter ea quae nominant quod est (Deus, Pater) et ea quae nominant quo est (divinitas, paternitas), tamen quoad id quod significatur idem omnino dicitur, ut divinitas realiter sit Deus et paternitas realiter sit Pater. Quae maior probatur sive ex ipsa divina simplicitate, sive ex eo quod repugnat primum omnium principium esse compositum, sive ex eo quod ab Eugenio iii decretum esse testatur Otto Frisingensis. Minor: evidens est quod si in Deo habetur realis paternitas, eo ipso habetur id quo Deus est Pater; et similiter in aliis. Conclusio: ergo divina paternitas est Deus Pater, divina filiatio est Deus Filius, divina spiratio activa est Deus Spirator, et divina spiratio passiva est Deus Spiritus. Addita maior: declarat ipsam rationem subsistentis. Scholion In creatis differunt tum quoad modum significandi tum quoad id quod significatur homo et humanitas, pater et paternitas, filius et filiatio. Aliud enim in creatis est subsistens quod est; aliud autem est essentia, vel forma, vel relatio qua est.

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Besides, since the words Deus divina essentia are theologically correct whether divina essentia be taken in the ablative or in the nominative case, not only does God exist by divinity, just as a man is human by his humanity, but also God is divinity, even though a man is not humanity. These points bring us back to what has already been said. With regard to the way of signifying, ‘divinity,’ ‘paternity,’ ‘filiation’ mean that by which, but with regard to the reality that is signified there are not two different realities meant by ‘God’ and ‘divinity,’ or by ‘Father’ and ‘paternity’; and so just as ‘God’ and ‘Father’ mean that which is, so also ‘divinity’ and ‘paternity’ mean, not the reality by which something else is, but the reality which itself is or subsists. Argument In God, that which is and that by which it is are identical. But the real divine relations are at least that by which. Therefore the real divine relations are that which is. Further, that which is subsists. Therefore the real divine relations subsist. The meaning of the major premise is that, although there is a distinction in their way of signifying between those words that name that which is (God, Father) and those that name that by which it is (divinity, paternity), still what they signify is in each case the very same reality, so that divinity really is God and paternity really is the Father. This major premise is proved from the divine simplicity itself, from the fact that there cannot be composition in the first principle of all things, and from the decree of Pope Eugene iii as reported by Otto of Freising. Regarding the minor premise, it is obvious that if in God there is real paternity, by that very fact there is that by which God is Father; and similarly for the other divine relations. Thus the conclusion: divine paternity is God the Father, divine filiation is God the Son, divine active spiration is God the Spirator, and divine passive spiration is God the Spirit. The second major premise is simply the definition of ‘subsistent.’ Excursus In the case of creatures, man and humanity, father and paternity, son and filiation differ both in the way they signify and in what they signify. For in creatures, the subsistent which is differs from the essence or form or relation by which it is.

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In divinis autem differunt quoad modum significandi sed non differunt quoad id quod significatur Deus et divinitas, Pater et paternitas, Filius et filiatio, Spirator et spiratio activa, Spiritus et spiratio passiva. Praeterea, in creatis distinguitur inter subiectum quod relatione refertur et ipsam relationem qua refertur; in divinis autem idem est subiectum quod refertur et relatio qua refertur; et ideo cum in divinis realis relatio ponatur, non solum ponitur id quo aliquid refertur sed etiam ponitur id ipsum quod refertur; posita enim paternitate, eo ipso ponitur et Pater; et similiter in aliis.9 Praeterea, elucet quid sibi velit distinctio inter relationem ut relationem et relationem ut subsistentem. Relationes enim ut relationes sunt paternitas, filiatio, spiratio activa et passiva. Relationes autem ut subsistentes sunt Pater, Filius, Spirator, Spiritus. 10 Quae respective inter se differunt quoad modum significandi sed coincidunt quoad realitatem quae significatur.

ASSERTUM VI Tres relationes reales in Deo secundum mutuam oppositionem realiter inter se distinguuntur. Ad terminos tres: nempe, paternitas, filiatio, spiratio passiva. relatio: ordo unius ad aliud. reale: quod non tantum concipitur sed etiam vere est. distincta sunt quorum unum non est aliud. realiter distincta sunt quorum unum qua reale non est aliud qua reale. mutuo opponuntur relationes quarum altera est alterius terminus; ita pater est terminus ad quem refertur filius, et vicissim filius est terminus ad quem refertur pater. Praemittenda 1 Relatio eiusdem ad idem est ens rationis tantum. 9 Cf. Sum. theol., i, q. 40, a. 3: ‘Non enim proprietates personales sic intelliguntur advenire hypostasibus divinis, sicut forma subiecto praeexistenti: sed ferunt secum sua supposita, inquantum sunt ipsae personae subsistentes, sicut paternitas est ipse Pater.’ Quod proprietates idem dicunt ac relationes, vide ibid. q. 40, introd.

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In regard to God, however, ‘God’ and ‘divinity,’ ‘Father’ and ‘paternity,’ ‘Son’ and ‘filiation,’ ‘Spirator’ and ‘active spiration,’ ‘Spirit’ and ‘passive spiration’ differ in the way they signify but not in what they signify. Besides, in creatures the subject that is related by a relation is not the same as the relation by which it is related; but in God the subject that is related and the relation by which it is related are the same; since, therefore, real relation is posited in God, there is posited not only that by which something is related but also that itself which is related; when paternity is posited, by the same token the Father is posited, and likewise in the case of the other divine relations. 9 Moreover, the meaning of the distinction between relation as relation and relation as subsistent is made clear. The relations as relations are paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration, whereas the relations as subsistent are Father, Son, Spirator, and Spirit.10 The respective pairs differ in the way they signify but are the same in what they signify. ASSERTION 6 Three real relations in God are really distinct from one another, on the basis of mutual opposition. Terminology three: that is, paternity, filiation, and passive spiration. relation: the order of one to another. real: that which is not only conceived but also truly is. distinct : one is not the other. really distinct : one as real is not the other as real. mutually opposed relations: each is the term of the other; thus father is the term to which son is related, and conversely son is the term to which father is related. Preliminary Observations 1 A relation of the same to the same is only a conceptual being. 9 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 40, a. 3: ‘For the properties of the persons are not to be understood as coming to the divine hypostases as form comes to a preexisting subject; rather, their own supposits come with them, since they are the subsistent persons themselves, as, for example, paternity is the Father himself.’ That ‘properties’ means the same as ‘relations,’ see ibid. q. 40, introduction. 10 [‘Spirator,’ of course, is not a distinct subsistent, but is identical with the Father and the Son as one principle. See below, pp. 252–55.]

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Nam idem realiter ad se ipsum non refertur nisi bis idem concipitur; et relationes inter duos conceptus eiusdem realitatis manifeste sunt entia rationis tantum.

2 Si relationes mutuo oppositae non realiter distinguuntur, non sunt relationes reales.11 Nam relatio eiusdem ad idem est ens rationis tantum. Et relationes mutuo oppositae non realiter inter se distinctae sunt relationes eiusdem ad idem. Ergo relationes mutuo oppositae non realiter inter se distinctae sunt entia rationis tantum. Maior constat ex prima conclusione. Minor constat ex definitione relationum mutuo oppositarum. Nam relationes mutuo oppositae sunt quarum altera ad alteram terminatur; quod si altera ab altera non realiter distinguitur, idem realiter bis ad se ipsum refertur. Unde concludes: Si relationes mutuo oppositae sunt reales, realiter inter se distinguuntur. Quod sequitur ex praecedente per conversionem propositionis hypotheticae. Nam secundum logicam minorem ubi valet ‘Si A, tunc B,’ ibi necessario valet ‘Si non B, tunc non A,’ et vice versa.

3 Relationes reales multiplicantur per se inquantum multiplicantur ordinationes reales, et multiplicantur per accidens inquantum multiplicantur subiecta realia quae realiter ordinantur. Relatio enim definitur ordo unius ad aliud. Quare cum relatio in se spectata sit quidam ordo, per se relationes reales multiplicantur, quia a parte rei sunt ordinationes reales inter se realiter distinctae. Praeterea, cum subiecta realiter inter se distincta per unam numero relationem realem realiter referri non possunt, per accidens multiplicantur relationes reales quia multiplicantur subiecta realia.

4 Per solam terminorum multiplicationem multiplicantur relationes rationis, sed non multiplicantur relationes reales. Cuius ratio est quod terminus est aliud praeter subiectum et subiecti relationem, et ipsa relationis terminatio ad aliud nihil est a parte rei nisi ipsa huius alterius existentia obiectiva.

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For the same is not really related to itself, unless the same is conceived twice; and the relations between two concepts of the same reality are obviously only conceptual beings. 2 If mutually opposed relations are not really distinct, they are not real relations. 11 For the relation of the same to the same is only a conceptual being. And mutually opposed relations that are not really distinct from one another are relations of the same to the same. Therefore, mutually opposed relations that are not really distinct from one another are only conceptual beings. The major premise is clear from the first conclusion. The minor premise is clear from the definition of mutually opposed relations. For mutually opposed relations are those in which each has the other as its term; but if each is not really distinct from the other, then the same is actually related twice to itself. Hence the conclusion: if mutually opposed relations are real, they are really distinct from one another. This conclusion follows from the antecedent by the conversion of a hypothetical proposition. For according to minor logic, when the proposition ‘If A, then B,’ obtains, the proposition ‘If not B, then not A’ necessarily also obtains, and vice versa. 3 Real relations are multiplied per se insofar as real orderings are multiplied, and they are multiplied per accidens insofar as the real subjects that are really ordered are multiplied. For relation is defined as the order of one to another. Therefore, since relation considered in itself is an order, real relations are multiplied per se because in reality they are real orderings really distinct from one another. Moreover, because subjects really distinct from one another cannot be really related by a relation that is numerically the same, real relations are multiplied per accidens because real subjects are multiplied. 4 By the multiplication of terms alone, conceptual relations are multiplied, but not real relations. The reason is that the term is something other than the subject and the subject’s relation, and this termination of a relation at another is nothing in reality except the objective existence of this other. 11 [See below, appendix 4, section 6, p. 787, for the earlier version (Divinarum personarum) of this short section 2.]

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Qua de causa, si A, B, et C sunt realiter aequalia, aequalitas A ad B ab aequalitate A ad C distinguitur ratione sed non realiter. 5 Si relationes unius subiecti sunt unum ordine, ratione distinguuntur sed realiter sunt una relatio. Nam relatio in se spectata est ordo quidam; et quae sunt unum ordine nisi unum ordinem non faciunt. Quare, una relatione reali realiter refertur natura substantialis tum ad potentias accidentales, tum ad formas in his potentiis recipiendas, tum ad actus per formas eliciendos, tum ad effectus qui actibus producuntur. Nam omnes hae relationes sunt unum ordine et, si seorsum concipiuntur, haec separatio vel est mera mentis praecisio vel est error; non enim ordinatur natura substantialis ad potentias accidentales quin eo ipso ordinetur ad formas in potentiis recipiendas, etc., neque ordinatur ad formas accidentales quin ad potentias ordinetur, etc. Praeterea, sicut natura substantialis una relatione ad potentias, formas, actus, et effectus ordinatur, ita etiam singulae potentiae, formae, actus, et effectus singulis relationibus realibus12 ad caetera ordinantur quae uno eodemque systemate inter se connectuntur.

6 Inquantum dicens, verbum, et amor unum obiectum respiciunt, singuli singulis relationibus realibus ad binos alios referuntur realiter. Tamquam unum obiectum dicentis, verbi, et amoris sit quoddam bonum. Tunc dicens perspicit sufficientiam evidentiae ut bonitas obiecti verbo vero affirmetur et ideo amore honesto ametur. Deinde, propter perspectam evidentiam verbo vero dicitur bonitas propter quam obiectum amandum est. Tertio, spiratur amor propter evidentem bonitatem a dicente perspectam et verbo vero affirmatam. Unde elucet dicentem, verbum, et amorem, inquantum unum obiectum respiciunt, uno quodam relationum systemate inter se referri; et ideo una relatione reali refertur dicens tum ad verbum tum ad amorem; una relatione reali refertur verbum tum ad dicentem tum ad amorem; et una relatione reali refertur amor

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Therefore, if A, B, and C are really equal, the equality of A to B is distinguished conceptually but not really from the equality of A to C. 5 If the relations of a single subject stand in a single order, they are conceptually distinct but are really a single relation. For considered in itself, a relation is an order; and when things are made one by ordering, the order itself is one. Therefore, it is through a single real relation that a substantial nature is really related to accidental potencies, to forms to be received in these potencies, to acts to be elicited by these forms, and to the effects produced by these acts. For all these relations stand in a single order, and if they are conceived separately, this separation is either merely a mental prescinding or it is an error; for a substantial nature is not ordered to accidental potencies without by that very fact being ordered to forms to be received in the potencies, and so on, nor is it ordered to accidental forms without being ordered to those potencies, and so on. Besides, just as a substantial nature is ordered by a single relation to potencies, forms, acts, and effects, so also single potencies, forms, acts, and effects are related by single real relations12 to all the other things that are interconnected in one and the same system. 6 Inasmuch as speaker, word, and love regard the same object, each one is really related to the other two by a single real relation. Let us say that the one object of speaker, word, and love is some good. In that case the speaker grasps the sufficiency of the evidence for affirming in a true word the goodness of that object and therefore loving it with a right and proper love. Next, because of the evidence grasped, the goodness because of which the object is to be loved is expressed in a true word. Third, because of the evident goodness grasped by the speaker and affirmed in the true word, love is spirated. From this it is clear that speaker, word, and love, inasmuch as they regard one object, are related to one another in a single system of relations; and therefore speaker is related to both word and love by a single real relation, word is related to both speaker and love by a single real relation, and love is related to both speaker 12 [The meaning is that it is by one relation that one potency is related to everything else in the system, by one relation that another potency is related to everything else in the system, by one relation that a form is related to everything else in the system, and so on. So too, the next sentence means that it is by one relation that the speaker is related to the word and to love; it is by one relation that the word is related to the speaker and to love; it is by one relation that love is related to the speaker and to the word – as the following paragraph confirms.]

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tum ad dicentem tum ad verbum. Dicit enim dicens non verum abstractum ut verbum dicere possit quin simul amorem spiret, sed verum concretum atque bonum unde fieri nequit ut verbum dicat quin eo ipso spiret amorem. Neque verbo dicitur verum abstractum ut a dicente dependeat et tamen amorem non spiret, sed verbo dicitur veritas qua affirmatur bonitas, et ideo eiusmodi est dependentia verbi a dicente ut a spiratione amoris separari non possit. Amor denique rationalis atque bonus est, non solum propter bonitatem affirmatam, non solum propter perspectam evidentiae sufficientiam ad affirmandam bonitatem, sed propter utramque simul, nempe, propter bonitatem quae ratione sufficienti perspecta affirmatur.

Argumentum Cum quattuor in Deo sunt relationes reales, non determinatur quaenam realiter inter se distinguantur nisi per sex comparationes, nempe, (1) paternitatis et filiationis, (2) spirationis activae et passivae, (3) paternitatis et spirationis activae, (4) paternitatis et spirationis passivae, (5) filiationis et spirationis activae, (6) filiationis et spirationis passivae. Iam vero paternitas et filiatio realiter inter se distinguuntur, nam sunt relationes et reales et mutuo oppositae quae supra demonstratae sunt realiter inter se distingui. Pariter spiratio activa et spiratio passiva sunt relationes reales et mutuo oppositae et ideo pariter inter se realiter distinguuntur. Paternitas autem et spiratio activa Patris sunt relationes reales dicentis ad verbum et ad amorem; quae relationes ratione sed non realiter inter se distinguuntur. Nam supra demonstratum est relationes eiusdem, si unum ordine sunt, nisi unum ordinem unamque relationem realem non constituere; atqui relationes dicentis ad verbum et ad amorem sunt unum ordine, cum ille qui uno verbo verum bonum dicat simul et verbum dicat et, mediante verbo, amorem spiret. Pariter, filiatio et spiratio activa Filii sunt relationes reales Verbi ad dicentem et ad amorem; quae relationes ratione sed non realiter inter se distinguuntur. Nam relationes quae ordine unum sunt nisi unum ordinem unamque relationem realem non constituunt; atqui relationes Verbi ad dicentem et ad amorem sunt unum ordine, cum uno Verbo dicatur verum bonum quod qua verum a dicente oritur et qua bonum ad amorem spirandum ordinatur; et ideo ratione inter se distinguuntur sed realiter unum ordinem intelligibilem constituunt.

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and word by a single real relation. For the speaker does not utter an abstract truth as if able to speak the word without at the same time spirating love, but utters a truth that is concrete and good, so that it is impossible to speak the word without by the same token spirating love. Nor is the word spoken an abstract truth that would depend upon the speaker and yet not spirate love; rather, in the word the truth is uttered by which goodness is affirmed, and therefore the dependence of the word upon the speaker is such that it cannot be separated from the spiration of love. Finally, love is rational and good, not only because of the affirmed goodness, and not only because of the grasped sufficiency of evidence for affirming goodness, but because of both together, that is, on account of goodness that is affirmed because sufficient reason for doing so has been grasped. Argument Since in God there are four real relations, we can determine which ones are really distinct from one another only by making six comparisons, namely (1) of paternity with filiation, (2) of active spiration with passive spiration, (3) of paternity with active spiration, (4) of paternity with passive spiration, (5) of filiation with active spiration, and (6) of filiation with passive spiration. Now paternity and filiation are really distinct from each other, since they are real and mutually opposed relations, and we have shown above that such relations are really distinct from each other. Similarly, active spiration and passive spiration are real and mutually opposed relations, and so they too are really distinct from each other. But paternity and the active spiration of the Father are real relations of speaker to word and to love; these relations are distinct from each other conceptually but not really. For we demonstrated above that relations of the same, if they are made one by ordering, constitute but a single order and a single real relation; but the relations of speaker to word and to love are made one by ordering, since the one who in one word utters a true good speaks the word and at the same time, through the mediation of the word, spirates love. Similarly, filiation and the active spiration of the Son are real relations of word to speaker and to love; these relations are distinct from each other conceptually but not really. For relations that are made one by ordering constitute only one order and one real relation; but the relations of word to speaker and to love are made one by ordering, since in the one word there is spoken a true good, which as true arises from the speaker and as good is ordered to the spiration of love; and therefore, they are distinct from each other conceptually, but in reality constitute a single intelligible order.

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Denique tandem spiratio passiva realiter distinguitur tum a paternitate tum a filiatione. Nam spiratio passiva est relatio realis amoris ad dicentem et ad verbum; cui vicissim opponitur realis spiratio activa dicentis et verbi ad amorem; quae realis spiratio activa non realiter distinguitur a paternitate vel a filiatione. Quibus perspectis, concluditur tres relationes reales in Deo realiter inter se distingui, nempe, paternitatem, filiationem, et spirationem passivam. Spiratio autem activa, quamvis a spiratione passiva realiter distinguatur, realiter tamen non distinguitur a paternitate vel a filiatione. Scholion Quaesierit tamen quispiam utrum spiratio activa Patris realiter distinguatur a spiratione activa Filii. Et videtur quidem realis distinctio admittenda, quia Pater et Filius sunt duo subiecta realiter inter se distincta, et uterque realiter spirat amorem, et duo subiecta realiter distincta per unam numero relationem realem non realiter referuntur. Sed contra est quod in Deo omnia unum sunt ubi non obviat relationis oppositio (db 703); neque mutuo opponuntur spiratio activa Patris et spiratio activa Filii. Respondetur quod aliter in nobis et aliter in Deo habentur dicens et verbum. In nobis enim alio actu intelligitur et alio actu concipitur seu iudicatur. At in Deo unus tantum est actus infinitus quo et intelligit et dicit et concipit et iudicat. Qua de causa, in nobis duae spirationes activae reales realiter distinguuntur, quia a duobus actibus realiter distinctis procedit spiratio. Sed in Deo ubi unus tantum habetur actus qui et dicens et verbum est, unum tantum spirandi principium habetur; et cum ex hoc uno principio non spiratur nisi unus amor, nisi una realis spiratio activa haberi non potest. Ad illud autem quod in contrarium affertur quod Pater et Filius sunt duo subiecta realiter inter se distincta, distinguendum est: sunt duo realiter distincta inquantum sunt Pater et Filius, conceditur; sunt duo realiter distincta inquantum amorem spirant, negatur. Sicut enim Pater et Filius sunt realiter unus Deus, ita etiam realiter sunt unum spirandi principium seu unus spirator; et similiter Pater et Filius et Spiritus, quamvis tres sint personae, tamen sunt unus Deus et unum creandi principium seu unus creator. db 704. 13

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Finally, passive spiration is really distinct from both paternity and filiation. For passive spiration is the real relation of love to speaker and to word, to which conversely there is opposed the real active spiration of speaker and word to love; this real active spiration is not really distinct from paternity or from filiation. From all this we conclude that there are in God three real relations really distinct from one another, namely, paternity, filiation, and passive spiration. Although active spiration is really distinct from passive spiration, still it is not really distinct from paternity or from filiation. Excursus One may ask whether the active spiration of the Father is really distinct from that of the Son. It might seem that they are really distinct, since the Father and the Son are two subjects really distinct from each other, each of whom really spirates love, and two really distinct subjects are not really related by a relation numerically the same. Against this, however, is the fact that in God all things are one where there is no relational opposition (db 703, ds 1330, nd 325); and there is no mutual opposition between the active spiration of the Father and the active spiration of the Son. Our response is that speaker and word are found differently in us and in God. We understand in one act and conceive or judge in another act. But in God there is but one infinite act by which God understands and speaks and conceives and judges. Hence in us the two real active spirations are really distinct, since spiration proceeds from two really distinct acts. But in God, where there is but one act that is both speaker and word, there is but one principle of spiration; and since only one love is spirated from this one principle, there can be only one active spiration. Regarding the objection that the Father and the Son are two subjects really distinct from each other, we grant that the two are really distinct as Father and Son, but deny that the two are really distinct in spirating love. Just as the Father and the Son are really one God, so also are they really one principle of spiration, one spirator; and similarly, the Father and the Son and the Spirit, although they are three persons, are nevertheless one God and one principle of creation, one creator (db 704, ds 1331, nd 326).13 13 See below, pp. 356–63.

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ASSERTUM VII Relationes divinae reales ratione a divina essentia distinguuntur et realiter cum ea identificantur. Ad terminos relationes divinae reales: nempe, paternitas, filiatio, spiratio activa, et spiratio passiva. essentia divina: deitas; cum tamen in Deo nulla sit compositio realis, deitas est Deus; et ideo quoad id quod significatur, essentia divina dicit ipsum Deum prout est tribus personis communis, seu prout Deus est et Pater et Filius et Spiritus. distincta sunt quorum unum non est aliud. ratione distincta sunt quorum conceptus unius non est conceptus alterius. realiter distincta sunt quorum unum qua reale non est aliud qua reale. realiter identica sunt quae realiter non distinguuntur. Argumentum Triplici proceditur gressu ut primo probetur divinam essentiam divinamque relationem realem non esse eadem tum re tum ratione, deinde ea esse eadem re, unde tertio relinquatur ea non esse eadem ratione.

Primo, ergo, divina essentia et divina relatio realis non sunt eadem tum re tum ratione.

Nam de eodem secundum rem et rationem non praedicantur contradictoria. Atqui de divina essentia et de divina relatione reali praedicantur contradictoria. Ergo divina essentia et divina relatio realis non sunt eadem tum re tum ratione. Maior est contradictionis principium quod valet de eodem (re) secundum idem (ratione). Minor exemplis constat, v.g., Pater non est Filius, et Deus est Filius; sed ‘Filius’ et ‘non Filius’ sunt contradictoria; ergo Pater et Deus non sunt idem et re et ratione. Et similiter fit argumentum comparando alias relationes reales cum divina essentia.

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ASSERTION 7 The real divine relations are conceptually distinct from the divine essence but really identical with it. Terminology real divine relations: namely, paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. divine essence: divinity; but since in God there is no real composition, divinity is God; therefore, the reality signified by ‘divine essence’ is God as common to the three persons, that is, God as Father, Son, and Spirit. distinct : one is not the other. conceptually distinct : the concept of one is not the concept of the other. really distinct : one as real is not the other as real. really identical: they are not really distinct. Argument We shall proceed in three steps: to prove, first, that the divine essence and a real divine relation are not the same both in reality and in concept; second, that they are the same in reality; third, that therefore it remains that they are not the same in concept. First, then, the divine essence and a real divine relation are not the same both in reality and in concept. Contradictory terms cannot be predicated of the same thing both in reality and in concept. But contradictory terms are predicated of the divine essence and a real divine relation. Therefore, the divine essence and a real divine relation are not the same both in reality and in concept. The major premise of this syllogism is the principle of contradiction, which applies to the same thing (reality) in the same respect (concept). The minor premise is clear from examples, such as ‘The Father is not the Son’ and ‘God is the Son’; but ‘Son’ and ‘not Son’ are contradictory terms; therefore, the Father and God are not the same both in reality and in concept. The same argument holds in comparing the other real relations with the divine essence.

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Obici tamen potest quod, quamvis verissime Filius sit Deus, tamen admittenda non videtur propositionis affirmativae conversio simplex; et ideo dubitari potest de illa praemissa, nempe, Deus est Filius. Respondetur. Primo, si Socrates est hic homo, hic homo est Socrates; sed ‘Deus’ et ‘Filius’ sunt termini singulares, sicut ‘Socrates’ et ‘hic homo’; et ideo ubi termini sunt utrique singulares, propositio etiam affirmativa convertitur simpliciter. Deinde, quod Deus est Filius est expressa doctrina conc. Lateranensis IV (db 432): ‘... una quaedam summa res est, incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis, quae veraciter est Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus sanctus; tres simul personae, ac singillatim quaelibet earundem.’

Deinde, divina essentia et divina relatio realis sunt eadem realiter. Primo, arguitur ex divina simplicitate. Nam deitas et paternitas sunt aut (1) realiter diversa et incomposita, aut (2) realiter diversa et composita, aut (3) realiter identica. Sed si eligitur primum, Pater non est Deus, quod est haereticum. Si eligitur secundum, Deus non est simplex, habet causam suae compositionis, et ideo non est primum principium; quod etiam est haereticum. Ergo relinquitur tertium, nempe, deitas et paternitas sunt realiter idem. Et similiter probatur identitas realis inter divinam essentiam et alias relationes divinas reales. Iterum,14 arguitur ex principio Anselmiano quod in conc. Florentino (db 703) docetur, nempe, quod in divinis omnia sunt unum ubi non obviat relationis oppositio. Nam paternitas et divina essentia non sunt relationes mutuo oppositae, cum divina essentia non sit relatio et multo minus relatio paternitati opposita. Ergo paternitas et divina essentia sunt unum. Et similiter probatur quod divina essentia et quaelibet alia relatio divina realis sunt unum. Iterum, arguitur ex principio quod in conc. Lateranensi iv contra Abbatem Ioachim definitur: ‘in Deo solummodo Trinitas est, non quaternitas’ (db 432). Nam, uti supra probatum est, sunt tres relationes divinae reales quae realiter inter se distinguuntur. Iam vero si tres relationes realiter a divina essentia distinguerentur, haberetur quaternitas. Et ideo cum quaternitas non sit admittenda,

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One might object here that although it is most true that the Son is God, yet a simple conversion of an affirmative proposition seems inadmissible; hence it may be doubted that the premise, ‘God is the Son,’ is correct. In reply to this objection we note, first, that if Socrates is this man, this man is Socrates; but ‘God’ and ‘Son’ are singular terms, just as are ‘Socrates’ and ‘this man’; thus, in the case where each term is singular, even an affirmative proposition is simply convertible. Second, that God is the Son is the explicit doctrine of the Fourth Lateran Council (db 432, ds 804, nd 318): ‘. . . one supreme reality, incomprehensible and ineffable, which is truly the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit: three persons taken together, and each of them taken individually.’ Second, the divine essence and a real divine relation are really the same. First, this is argued from the simplicity of God. For divinity and paternity are either (1) really different and not a composite, or (2) really different and a composite, or (3) really the same. But if we choose the first alternative, then the Father is not God, which is heretical. If we choose the second, God is not simple, there is a cause of God’s composition, and therefore God is not the first principle, which is likewise heretical. Therefore, we are left with the third alternative, that divinity and paternity are really the same. And the real identity between the divine essence and the other real divine relations is proven in the same way. Again,14 this is argued from Anselm’s principle as taught in the Council of Florence (db 703, ds 1330, nd 325), namely, that in God all things are one where there is no relational opposition. For paternity and the divine essence are not mutually opposed relations, since the divine essence is not a relation and much less is it a relation opposed to paternity. Therefore, paternity and the divine essence are one. And it is similarly proved that the divine essence and any other divine real relation are one. Again, this assertion is argued from the principle defined in the Fourth Lateran Council against the position of Abbot Joachim: ‘In God there is only a trinity, not a quaternity’ (db 432, ds 804, nd 318). For, as was proven above, there are three real divine relations really distinct from one another. But if the three relations were really distinct from the divine essence, there would be a quaternity. And since a quaternity cannot be admitted, 14 [In Divinarum personarum Lonergan here presents another argument from what had been thought to be the position of the Council of Rheims. See below, appendix 4, section 7, pp. 786–89.]

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distinctio realis inter essentiam et relationem divinam realem est reicienda.

Tertio, divina essentia a divinis relationibus realibus ratione distinguitur. Quod primo concluditur ex iis quae iam sunt probata. Si enim essentia divina et relatio divina realis sunt eadem realiter et, praeterea, non sunt eadem re et ratione, relinquitur ut eadem non sint ratione. Deinde, eadem est conclusio ex definitione distinctionis rationis. Nam ratione distincta sunt quorum conceptus unius non est conceptus alterius. Sed conceptus paternitatis non est conceptus deitatis. Ergo paternitas et deitas ratione distinguuntur. Et similis habetur conclusio comparando divinam essentiam cum aliis relationibus divinis realibus. Notae Quattuor Quare in Deo solummodo Trinitas est, non quaternitas. Quod assertum in conc. Lateranensi iv (db 432) contra Abbatem Ioachim definitur. Cuius ratio est quod, quamvis in Deo sint tres relationes reales realiter inter se distinctae, tamen quia hae relationes realiter cum divina essentia identificantur, in Deo non invenitur quidquam realiter quartum quod tribus relationibus addi possit. Notate autem hoc concilii principio assumpto, facillime probari quod tres relationes divinae reales et realiter inter se distinctae non possunt realiter distingui sive a divina essentia sive (per extensionem quandam) a quarta relatione reali quae est spiratio activa.15

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a real distinction between the divine essence and a real divine relation must be rejected. Third, the divine essence is conceptually distinct from the real divine relations. This conclusion follows first from what has already been proven. For if the divine essence and a real divine relation are the same in reality and, as well, not the same both in reality and in concept, it remains that they are not the same in concept. Furthermore, the same conclusion follows from the definition of a conceptual distinction. For things are conceptually distinct if the concept of one is not the concept of the other. But the concept of paternity is not the concept of divinity. Therefore, paternity and divinity are conceptually distinct. And a similar conclusion is had by comparing the divine essence with the other real divine relations. Four Notes Why there is only a trinity, not a quaternity, in God. This assertion was defined in the Fourth Lateran Council (db 432, ds 804, nd 318) against Abbot Joachim. The reason for it is that, although there are in God three real relations really distinct from one another, yet because these relations are really identical with the divine essence, there is in God no really fourth something that could be added to the three relations. Note that if this principle of the council is assumed, it is very easy to prove that the three real divine relations really distinct from one another cannot be really distinct either from the divine essence or, by extension, from the fourth real relation, active spiration.15 15 [There is something of a slip here, it would seem. In Assertion 6 on p. 253, Lonergan writes: ‘[A]ctive spiration and passive spiration are real and mutually opposed relations, and so they ... are really distinct from each other.’ But in the present context he says that if one assumes the principle enunciated by the Fourth Lateran Council, ‘it is very easy to prove that the three real divine relations really distinct from one another cannot be really distinct from the divine essence or, by extension, from the fourth real relation, active spiration’ (italics added). Now ‘the three real divine relations’ include passive spiration. Part of what Lonergan is saying in this second reference, then, is that passive spiration is not really distinct from active spiration – which contradicts what he said in the statement in Assertion 6. Accordingly, if we are not to assume that Lonergan is guilty of actually contradicting himself, we must assume that he made a slip here.]

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Etiam in divinis omnia sunt unum ubi non obviat relationis oppositio. Quod ab Anselmo enuntiatum principium in conc. Florentino (db 703) inter ea recensetur quae sacrosancta Romana Ecclesia firmiter credit, profitetur, et praedicat. Et inquantum implicite16 dicit omnia non esse unum ubi obviat relationis oppositio, ex eo constat quod per relationes reales et mutuo oppositas realiter inter se distinguuntur Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Inquantum autem explicite17 dicit omnia esse unum ubi non obviat relationis oppositio, ex eo constat quod relationes reales realiter cum divina essentia identificantur et, praeterea, in Deo simplicissimo omnia attributa realia realiter cum divina essentia identificantur. Notate autem, hoc concilii principio assumpto, facillime probari tum personas divinas realiter inter se distinctas nisi per mutuas relationes reales et oppositas non distingui, tum etiam, cum divina essentia non sit relatio et multo minus relatio relationi opposita, divinam essentiam realiter identificari tum cum relationibus divinis realibus tum cum omnibus attributis essentialibus. Ulterius, in divinis essentialia et notionalia ratione distinguuntur et realiter identificantur. Essentialia dicuntur attributa quae in ipsa ratione divinae essentiae fundantur et ideo tum de singulis personis tum de omnibus pariter praedicantur, v.g., quod sunt, vivunt, intelligunt, amant, creant, gubernant, etc. Notionalia vero dicuntur quae unam alteramve relationem realem important et ideo non de omnibus personis praedicari possunt sed solummodo de illa cuius

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In God all is one where there is no relational opposition. The Council of Florence (db 703, ds 1330, nd 325) listed this principle, enunciated by Anselm, among those propositions which the holy Roman Church firmly believes, professes, and proclaims. In implying16 that all are not one where there is relational opposition, this principle makes it clear that by reason of real mutually opposed relations, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are really distinct from one another. But in stating17 that all is one where there is no relational opposition, this principle makes it clear that the real relations are really identical with the divine essence, and also that in God, who is most simple, all real attributes are really identical with the divine essence. Note also that if this principle of the council is assumed it is very easy to prove both that the really distinct divine persons are distinct only by reason of their mutually opposed real relations, and that, since the divine essence is not a relation, and much less a relation opposed to a relation, the divine essence is really identical both with the real divine relations and with all the essential attributes. Furthermore, in God the essential and the notional are conceptually distinct but really identical. Essential attributes are those that are founded in the very formality of the divine essence and therefore equally predicated of each person and of all – for example, that they are, they live, they understand, they love, they create, they govern, and so on. The notional are those that imply one or other real relation and therefore cannot be predicated of all the persons but only of that person whose relation What it seems Lonergan intends to say is that neither the divine essence nor active spiration is a fourth something in addition to the three real and really distinct divine relations of paternity, filiation, and passive spiration. But active spiration, the relation of the spirator to the spirated, that is, the relation of speaker and word to love, while really identical with paternity and filiation, is really distinct from passive spiration. Or again, it may be said that active spiration, although it is a real relation and different in concept from paternity and filiation, is not really distinct from them but is really identical with them, just as the divine essence is identical with the divine relations.] 16 [In a handwritten marginal note in Divinarum personarum, Lonergan wrote at this point implicite, that is, ‘implicitly.’] 17 [On the same page in Divinarum personarum, Lonergan wrote in the margin explicite, that is, ‘explicitly.’ Thus, the words implicite and explicite were added in the present edition.]

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est illa relatio; v.g., Pater generat sed non gignitur, spirat sed non spiratur; Filius gignitur sed non generat, spirat sed non spiratur; Spiritus neque generat neque gignitur neque spirat sed spiratur; etc. Iam vero, cum relationes et essentia ratione distinguantur et realiter identificentur, patet essentialia et notionalia etiam ratione distingui et realiter identificari.

Quare inter extrema notionalia illegitime adhibetur essentiale tamquam terminus medius syllogisticus. Cuius ratio est quod syllogismus in principiis identitatis et non-contradictionis fundatur; quae principia respiciunt idem secundum idem, seu id quod est idem et re et ratione. Sed notionalia et essentialia, quamvis sint eadem re, non sunt eadem ratione. Et ideo inter extrema notionalia terminus medius essentialis facillime fallacias introducit. Exemplo sit illud: Filius est Deus; Deus generat; qui generat est Pater; qui est Pater, non est Filius; ergo Filius non est Filius. Ubi contradictio sequitur ex eo quod inter extrema notionalia, quae utrinque sunt Filius, ita introducitur terminus medius essentialis, nempe, Deus, ut in diversis praemissis significet, non idem secundum idem, sed idem secundum aliam et aliam rationem. Nam idem realiter est Deus qui est Pater et qui est Filius; sed secundum aliam rationem habetur praemissa quod Filius est Deus, et secundum aliam habetur alia praemissa quod Deus generat seu est Pater. At aliud sit exemplum et maioris momenti. Nam in conc. Lateranensi iv, db 432, decretum est: ... quod una quaedam summa res est, incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis, quae veraciter est Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus; tres simul personae, ac singillatim quaelibet earundem: et ideo in Deo solummodo Trinitas est, non quaternitas; quia quaelibet trium personarum est illa res, videlicet substantia, essentia seu natura divina: quae sola est universorum principium, praeter quod aliud inveniri non potest: et illa res non est generans, neque genita, nec procedens, sed est Pater qui generat, et Filius qui gignitur, et Spiritus Sanctus qui procedit: ut distinctiones sint in personis, et unitas in natura. Licet igitur ‘alius sit Pater, alius Filius, alius Spiritus Sanctus, non tamen aliud’: sed id quod est Pater, est Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus idem omnino; ut secundum orthodoxam et catholicam fidem consubstantiales esse credantur.

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it is; the Father, for example, generates but is not generated, spirates but is not spirated; the Son is generated but does not generate, spirates but is not spirated; the Spirit neither generates nor is generated nor spirates but is spirated. Since the relations and the essence are conceptually distinct and really identical, clearly what is essential and what is notional are also conceptually distinct and really identical. Therefore it is illegitimate in a syllogism to argue from what is notional to what is notional using what is essential as the middle term. The reason for this is that syllogisms are based upon the principles of identity and noncontradiction; these principles regard the same in every respect, that is to say, what is the same both really and conceptually. But the notional and the essential, although really the same, are not the same conceptually. Hence to use what is essential as a middle term between notional extremes very easily leads to fallacious conclusions. Here is an example. The Son is God; God generates; the one who generates is the Father; the one who is the Father is not the Son; therefore the Son is not the Son. The contradiction arises from the fact that between the notional extremes, both of which are ‘Son,’ an essential middle term, ‘God,’ is introduced, so that in different premises there is signified not what is the same in every respect, but the same in different respects. For it is the same God in reality who is both the Father and the Son; but it is in one respect that one premise states that the Son is God and in another respect that the other premise states that God generates or is the Father. But there is another and more important example of this. In the Fourth Lateran Council it was decreed (db 432, ds 804–805, nd 318–19): ... there is one supreme reality, incomprehensible and ineffable, which truly is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; three persons together, and each of them individually; and therefore in God there is only a trinity, not a quaternity, because each of the three persons is that reality, namely, the divine substance, essence, or nature; it alone is the principle of all things, besides which there is no other; and that reality is not generating nor generated nor proceeding, but it is the Father who generates and the Son who is generated and the Holy Spirit who proceeds: so that the distinctions pertain to the persons, and unity to the nature. Therefore, although ‘the Father is one, the Son another, and the Holy Spirit still another, yet there is no other reality’; but that reality which is the Father, is the Son, and is the Holy Spirit entirely the same; so that according to orthodox and catholic faith they are believed to be consubstantial.

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Quod difficile videri potest. Nam affirmatur quod illa summa res est Pater, quod Pater est generans, et quod illa summa res non est generans; item, affirmatur quod illa summa res est Filius, quod Filius gignitur, et quod illa summa res non est genita; item, affirmatur quod illa summa res est Spiritus, quod Spiritus procedit, et quod illa summa res non procedit. Unde concludendum videtur quod illa summa res est et generans et non generans, genita et non genita, procedens et non procedens, ut triplex habeatur contradictio. Sed contra est quod superius explicavimus, nempe, valent syllogismus et principium contradictionis ubi agitur de eodem secundum idem, seu de eodem tum re tum ratione. Iam vero ubi dicitur quod illa summa res veraciter est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, manifeste non agitur de essentia divina prout a personis praescindit et in se ipsa consideratur. Sed ubi dicitur quod illa summa res non est generans neque genita neque procedens, agitur de essentia divina prout a personis praescindit et secundum rationem essentiae consideratur, cum statim addatur ‘ut distinctiones sint in personis, et unitas in natura.’ Qua de causa, in diversis assertis, quamvis agatur de eodem secundum rem, non tamen agitur de eodem secundum idem, seu de eodem tum re tum ratione; et ideo contra intentionem concilii non est fallaciter syllogizandum ut ad contradictionem perveniatur.

Quibus intellectis, elegantissima habetur probatio quod relationes divinae reales et divina substantia seu essentia tum realiter identificantur tum ratione distinguuntur. Nam sine reali identitate non habetur quod illa summa res veraciter est Pater et Filius et Spiritus. Et sine distinctione rationis non habetur quod illa summa res non est generans neque genita neque procedens, sed Pater est qui generat, Filius est qui gignitur, et Spiritus est qui procedit.

QUAESTIO V Utrum relatio possit esse idem realiter quod substantia Et videtur quod non, nam decem genera entis realiter inter se distinguuntur; sed relatio et substantia sunt genera diversa, nempe, quid et ad quid; ergo relatio non potest esse idem realiter quod substantia.

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This may be difficult to grasp. For it affirms that that supreme reality is the Father, that the Father generates, and that that supreme reality does not generate; again, it affirms that that supreme reality is the Son, that the Son is generated, and that that supreme reality is not generated; and still again, it affirms that that supreme reality is the Spirit, that the Spirit proceeds, and that that supreme reality does not proceed. The conclusion would seem to be that that supreme reality generates and does not generate, is generated and is not generated, proceeds and does not proceed – a threefold contradiction. Against this, however, is what we have explained above, that the principle of contradiction is legitimately applied, and a syllogism valid, when the reasoning is about the same thing in every respect – in other words, about what is the same both really and conceptually. But when it is said that the supreme reality truly is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, obviously the reference is not to the divine essence as prescinding from the persons and considered in itself. On the other hand, when it is said that the supreme reality does not generate nor is it generated nor does it proceed, the reference is to the divine essence as prescinding from the persons and as considered according to the formality of the essence, since immediately are added the words, ‘so that the distinctions pertain to the persons, and unity to the nature.’ Therefore although the different statements are about the same reality, they are not about the same reality in every respect, that is, about what is the same both really and conceptually; and so one must not in opposition to the council construct fallacious syllogisms with the result that one arrives at contradictions. When one has understood this, one has an exquisite demonstration of the fact that the real divine relations and the divine substance or essence are both really identical and conceptually distinct. For without real identity, we should not be able to say that in truth that supreme reality is the Father and the Son and the Spirit. And without a conceptual distinction we should not be able to say that that supreme reality neither generates nor is generated nor proceeds, but that it is the Father who generates, the Son who is generated, and the Spirit who proceeds. QUESTION 5 Can a relation be really identical with a substance? It may seem that a relation cannot be the same as a substance, for the ten categories of being are really distinct from one another; but relation and substance are different categories, namely, ‘something’ and ‘to something’; therefore, a relation cannot be really identical with a substance.

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Praeterea, relatio est accidens; sed accidens realiter a substantia distinguitur; et ideo relatio non potest esse idem realiter quod substantia. Praeterea, relatio est essentia secundum quid, et substantia est essentia simpliciter; sed essentia secundum quid non est essentia simpliciter; ergo relatio non potest esse idem realiter quod substantia. Sed contra est quod relationes divinae reales non realiter sed ratione a divina substantia distinguuntur; ergo saltem in divinis relatio potest esse idem realiter quod substantia. Praeterea, omne subsistens est in genere substantiae; sed relationes divinae reales sunt subsistentes; ergo saltem in divinis relatio potest esse idem realiter quod substantia. Respondeo dicendum quod ad huius quaestionis solutionem duplex requiritur consideratio; primo enim ipsae notiones relationis, accidentis, et substantiae sunt exacte intelligendae; deinde, clare atque distincte perspiciendus est modus quo hae notiones in rebus verificentur. Circa primum, animadvertendum est notiones relationis, accidentis, et substantiae esse genericas et ex diversis definiendi modis derivari. Alia enim definiuntur per ea quae ipsa sunt; alia autem definiuntur per ea quae ipsa non sunt, et quidem dupliciter, cum alia definiantur per aliud in quo sunt et alia definiantur per aliud ad quod sunt. V.g., homo definitur per ea quae ipse homo est: definitur enim homo animal rationale, ubi homo tum animal est tum rationalis est. Definiuntur autem simitas, eclipsis, circulus, per ea quae ipsa non sunt: in definitione enim simitatis ponitur nasus, in definitione eclipsis ponitur quoddam corpus caeleste ut sol vel luna, in definitione circuli ponitur superficies plana; sed simitas non est nasus sed in naso; eclipsis non est sol vel luna sed obscuratio facta in sole vel in luna; circulus non est superficies plana sed in superficie plana; et ideo his in exemplis fit definitio per aliud in quo definitum invenitur. Definiuntur denique relativa omnia per aliud: relativa enim sunt quorum esse est ad aliud se habere; ubi tamen notandum est relativa definiri non per aliud in quo sunt sed per aliud ad quod sunt.

Iam vero per definitiones innotescunt essentiae rerum, et ideo quot sunt genera definitionum, tot sunt genera essentiarum. Quorum ergo sunt definitiones per ea quae ipsa sunt, seu per se, eorum sunt essentiae simpliciter. Quorum autem sunt definitiones per aliud, eorum sunt essentiae secundum quid, et quidem dupliciter;

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Besides, a relation is an accident; but accident and substance are really distinct, and therefore a relation cannot be really identical with a substance. Again, a relation is essence in a qualified sense, whereas substance is simply essence without qualification; but essence in a qualified sense and essence without qualification are not the same, and so a relation cannot be really identical with a substance. Against these arguments, however, is the fact that the real divine relations are distinguished from the divine substance not in reality but only in concept; therefore, at least in God a relation can be really the same as the substance. Moreover, every subsistent is in the category of substance; but the real divine relations are subsistent, and therefore at least in God a relation can be really the same as the substance. I respond that two considerations are required to resolve this question: first, the very notions of relation, accident, and substance must be understood exactly; second, the way in which these notions are verified in things must be clearly and distinctly grasped. Regarding the first consideration, note that relation, accident, and substance are generic notions and are derived through different ways of defining. Some things are defined by what they themselves are; others are defined by what they themselves are not, and this is so in two ways, since some are defined in terms of another in which they are, and others are defined in terms of another to which they are. For example, a human being is defined by what a human being is: for a human being is defined as a rational animal, where a human being is both animal and rational. But snubness, eclipse, and circle are defined by what they themselves are not. ‘Snubness’ is defined in terms of ‘nose,’ ‘eclipse’ in terms of a heavenly body such as the sun or the moon, and ‘circle’ in terms of a plane surface. Snubness is not a nose but in a nose, an eclipse is not the sun or the moon but a darkening in the sun or in the moon, and a circle is not a plane surface but in a plane surface. Thus, in these examples the definition is stated in terms of another in which is found what is defined. Finally, all relatives are defined in terms of another; for relatives are those whose existence is to be to another, and so one must take note that relatives are defined not in terms of another in which they are but in terms of another to which they are. Now, the essences of things are known through definitions, and so there are as many kinds of essences as there are kinds of definitions. The essences of what are defined by what they themselves are, or through themselves, are essences without qualification. The essences of what are defined through another are essences in a qualified sense, and this in two ways: the essences of what are defined through

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nam quorum sunt definitiones per aliud in quo sunt, eorum sunt essentiae secundum quod in alio sunt; et quorum sunt definitiones per aliud ad quod sunt, eorum sunt essentiae secundum quod ad aliud sunt. Praeterea, unicuique competit esse secundum suam essentiam. Quorum ergo sunt essentiae simpliciter, sicut per se definiuntur, ita iis competit esse per se. Quorum autem sunt essentiae secundum quid, sicut per aliud definiuntur, ita iis quodammodo competit esse per aliud, et quidem dupliciter. Nam quae definiuntur per aliud in quo sunt, iis competit esse in alio; et quae definiuntur per aliud ad quod sunt, iis competit esse ad aliud. Quibus perspectis, elucet (1) quid sit substantia, (2) quotupliciter dicatur accidens, (3) quo sensu relatio sit accidens, et (4) quam genericae sint hae definitiones. Primo, enim, elucet substantiam esse id cui competit esse per se. Deinde elucet accidens dici dupliciter: sensu enim latiori, accidens est quodcumque habet essentiam secundum quid; sed sensu strictiori, accidens est cui competit esse in alio. Tertio elucet relationem et sensu latiori esse accidens, quia per aliud definitur, et non esse accidens sensu strictiori, quia non definitur per aliud in quo est, et ideo ei non competit ex ipsa sua ratione esse in alio. Quarto denique elucet has definitiones substantiae, accidentis, et relationis non proxime desumi ex concreta rerum realitate, sed valde remote ex genericis modis quibus definiuntur, nempe, per se, per aliud, per aliud in quo definitum invenitur, et per aliud ad quod definitum est.

At notionibus exacte intellectis, ad alteram solutionis partem procedendum est, cum ex solis notionibus ad distinctiones rationis concludi possit sed, nisi notiones ad res comparentur, ad distinctiones reales numquam perveniatur. Ratione enim sunt distincta quorum conceptus unius non est conceptus alterius; et ideo facillime ex dictis concluditur ratione inter se distingui tum substantiam et accidens tum accidens stricte dictum et relationem. Sed realiter sunt distincta quorum unum qua reale non est aliud qua reale; et ideo ad realem distinctionem probandam omnino considerari oportet ipsam realitatem ad quam notiones applicantur. Quod, quamvis universaliter verum sit, maxime est observandum ubi notiones sunt genericae atque remotissimae, cum nihil in rerum natura sit mere genericum. Ita nihil legitime concluditur nisi distinctio rationis inter relationem et accidens stricte dictum, ex eo quod relationi competit esse ad aliud et accidenti stricte dicto competit esse in alio. Quod manifeste confirmatur ex rebus materialibus in

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another in which they are are essences that are in another, and the essences of what are defined in terms of another to which they are are essences that are to another. Further, it is proper to each thing to be in accord with its essence. Those whose essences are without qualification are defined through themselves, and so it is proper to them to be through themselves. Those whose essences are qualified in some respect are defined through another, and so it is proper to them to be through another. This is so in two ways: it is proper to those that are defined through another in which they are, to be in another, and it is proper to those that are defined through another to which they are, to be to another. From all this, then, it is clear (1) what substance is, (2) the various meanings of ‘accident,’ (3) in what sense a relation is an accident, and (4) how generic these definitions are. First, then, it is clear that a substance is that to which it is proper to be through itself. Second, it is clear that ‘accident’ is used in two ways: in a broader sense, an accident is whatever has a qualified essence, but in a stricter sense an accident is that to which it is proper to be in another. Third, it is clear that a relation is both an accident in a broader sense, since it is defined through another, and not an accident in the strict sense, since it is not defined through another in which it is, and therefore ‘to be in another’ is not what is proper to a relation by definition. Fourth, it is clear that these definitions of substance, accident, and relation are not derived proximately from the concrete reality of things, but quite remotely from generic ways of defining, namely, through self, through another, through another in which the defined is, and through another to which the defined is. Once these notions are understood exactly, we may proceed to the second part of the solution to this question. From notions alone we can conclude to conceptual distinctions, but unless notions are related to things, we shall never arrive at real distinctions. For those things are distinct conceptually when the concept of one is not the concept of the other, and therefore from what we have said it is quite easy to conclude that substance and accident, and also accident in the strict sense and relation, are conceptually distinct. But there is a real distinction when one as real is not the other as real, and so to prove a real distinction we must definitely consider the reality itself to which the notions apply. Although this is universally true, it must especially be observed when the notions are generic and quite remote, since nothing real is merely generic. Thus, from the fact that it is proper to a relation to be to another, and to an accident in the strict sense to be in another, it is not legitimate to conclude to anything other than a conceptual distinction between relation and accident in the strict sense. This is clearly demonstrated in the case of material things, in which

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quibus multae inveniuntur relationes quae de facto in alio sunt quamvis hoc iis non competat ex ipsa relationis ratione. Iterum nihil legitime concluditur nisi distinctio rationis inter substantiam et relationem, ex eo quod substantia est essentia simpliciter et relatio est essentia secundum quid. Genericus enim aspectus secundum quem realitas quaedam est substantia minime excludit possibilitatem alterius aspectus secundum quem eadem realitas sit relativa. Ita omnis substantia finita, secundum quod substantia est, per se definitur, essentiam simpliciter habet, eique competit esse per se. At omnis substantia finita etiam est natura quaedam; omnis natura finita est principium intrinsecum operationis; et omne reale principium operationis ad operationem suam realiter distinctam refertur realiter. Et ideo, perspecta concreta rerum realitate, elucet idem realiter secundum alium aspectum esse substantiam et secundum aspectum alium esse relationem realem. Quibus simul consideratis, elucet relationem posse esse vel accidens stricte dictum vel substantiam. Cuius ratio est quod oppositio contradictoria non viget neque inter esse ad aliud et esse in alio neque inter essentiam simpliciter et essentiam secundum quid. Quod enim ad aliud est, etiam in alio esse potest; et quod secundum unum aspectum suae realitatis habet essentiam simpliciter, secundum alium aspectum eiusdem realitatis habere potest essentiam secundum quid. E contra, cum oppositio contradictoria vigeat inter esse per se et esse in alio (nam per se idem valet quod non in alio), fieri non potest ut eadem realitas sit et substantia et accidens stricte dictum; qua de causa, accidentia eucharistica, quamvis de facto in alio non sint, nihilominus accidentia manent quia ex ipsa eorum ratione atque natura eiusmodi sunt ut iis competat esse in alio. Quae si in rebus creatis inveniri possunt, multo magis in divinis sunt agnoscenda. Deus enim in nullo genere est,18 et ideo quamvis per deficientem nostrum concipiendi modum de divina substantia et de divinis relationibus loquamur, tamen ex conceptibus eiusmodi ad ipsam divinam realitatem parum accedimus, et ideo temerarie ex iis argueret qui certo concluderet divinam substantiam non posse esse realiter idem ac divina relatio. Praeterea, cum hac in vita sciamus non quid Deus sit19 sed quid Deus non sit, aspectus tantummodo divinae perfectionis eosque ex magna parte negativos 19 Ita S. Thomas passim, v.g., Sum. theol., i, q. 3, introd.; q. 1, a. 7, ad 1m; q. 2, a. 2 ad 2m; q. 12, a. 12 ad 1m; a. 13 ad 1m; q. 13, a. 8 ad 2m. Huius sententiae fundamenta vide in appendice ii, § 5. Neque aliter sentit P. Lennerz, De Deo Uno, n. 112; quod

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there are many relations that in fact are in another even though this is not what is proper to relations by definition. Again, from the fact that substance is essence without qualification and relation is a qualified essence, it is not legitimate to conclude to anything other than a conceptual distinction between substance and relation. For the generic aspect according to which a given reality is a substance does not at all exclude the possibility of another aspect according to which the same reality may be relative. Thus every finite substance, as substance, is defined through itself and has an essence without qualification, and it is proper for it to be through itself. But every finite substance is also a nature; every finite nature is an intrinsic principle of operation; and every real principle of operation is really related to its really distinct operation. Therefore, once the concrete reality of things is understood, it is clear how the same thing according to one aspect is a substance and according to another aspect is a real relation. When all these matters are considered together, it is evident that a relation can be either an accident in the strict sense or a substance. The reason for this is that the opposition between being to another and being in another, or between essence without qualification and qualified essence, is not a contradictory opposition. For what is to another can also be in another; and what according to one aspect of its reality has essence without qualification, according to another aspect of the same reality can have qualified essence. On the other hand, since there is a contradictory opposition between being through itself and being in another – for ‘through itself’ is the same as ‘not in another’ – it is impossible for the same reality to be both a substance and an accident in the strict sense. It is because of this that the eucharistic accidents, although in fact they are not in another, nevertheless remain accidents, because by their formality and nature it is proper to them to be in another. If this is the case in creation, all the more must it be acknowledged in God. For God is not in any genus,18 and therefore, although we talk about the divine substance and the divine relations according to our limited way of conceiving things, yet through such concepts we attain little understanding of divine reality itself, and so it would be presumptuous to conclude with certitude from these concepts that the divine substance cannot be really the same as a divine relation. Besides, in this life we know, not what God is,19 but rather what God is not. Hence we know merely aspects of divine perfection, and those are for the most 18 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 3, a. 5. 19 Passim in Aquinas. See, for example, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 3, Introduction; q. 1, a. 7, ad 1m; q. 2, a. 2, ad 2m; q. 12, a. 12, ad 1m; a. 13, ad 1m; q. 13, a. 8, ad 2m. For the basis for this opinion, see appendix 2, § 5. H. Lennerz, De Deo Uno (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1948) § 112, is of the same opinion; for what St Thomas

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cognoscimus, neque ea positiva Dei intelligentia gaudemus ut adaequate perspicere possimus quemadmodum hi multi et diversi aspectus inter se in unum conflentur. Qua de causa, nullum serium confici potest argumentum ex eo quod non intelligitur quemadmodum in unum reale et ratio substantiae et ratio relationis coincidere possint. Nam etiam in naturaliter notis melius ex eo arguitur quod intelligitur quam ex eo quod non intelligitur; et in mysteriis divinis quaerenda est intelligentia non perfecta sed imperfecta illa quam parit ratio per fidem illustrata dummodo sedulo, pie, sobrie quaerat. Praeterea, dici non potest ita inter se pugnare substantiam et relationem ut in uno eodemque reali inveniri non possint, cum sufficiat vel unum exemplum positivum ad assertum universale et negativum refellendum. Sed ex multis exemplis constat realitatem substantiae relationes reales non excludere. Nam omnis substantia finita componitur ex potentia et actu qui realiter inter se referuntur; omnis substantia materialis realiter componitur ex materia et forma et esse quae realiter inter se referuntur; omnis substantia finita sive materialis sive immaterialis est natura quaedam specifica, quae est principium intrinsecum operationum, ubi operationes realiter a principio distinguuntur, et ipsum principium realiter ad operationes realiter distinctas refertur. Praeterea, quo magis genericas substantiae et relationis rationes cum ipsa divina realitate comparamus, eo minus esse per se et esse ad aliud sibi opponi videtur. Non enim divina realitas per se esse desinit quia a Patre ad Filium et a Patre Filioque ad Spiritum communicatur; communicatio enim substantiae rationem substantiae non destruit; et tamen ipsa haec communicatio relationes reales fundat. Praeterea, relationes reales in communicatione fundatae non referunt Deum ad aliud quod Deus non est, sed altera relatio subsistens ad alteram et oppositam refertur et, cum omnes hae relationes cum realitate divinae substantiae realiter identificentur, quam maxime minuitur tum relationis esse ad aliud tum etiam relationis oppositio ad esse per se. Ad primum ergo quod obiciebatur,20 dicendum est quod sicut in aliis scientiis ita etiam in metaphysica duplicem cognitionem distingui oportet: alia enim est praescientifica rerum cognitio, in qua rerum causae adhuc ignorantur; alia autem est scientifica rerum cognitio,

enim a S. Thoma nominatur ‘scire quid sit,’ ab eo nominatur ‘quidditativa quidditatis cognitio.’

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part negative ones. We do not enjoy a positive understanding of God so as to be able to understand how these many diverse aspects come together into one. As a result, no serious argument can be made on the basis of the fact that we do not understand how the formality of substance and the formality of relation can come together into one reality. Even in what we know naturally it is better to argue from what we understand than from what we do not understand; and in the case of the divine mysteries we have to seek, not a perfect understanding, but that imperfect understanding that reason enlightened by faith generates when it inquires diligently, reverently, and judiciously. Moreover, one cannot say that substance and relation are so incompatible that they cannot exist in one and the same reality, since even one positive example suffices to refute a universal negative assertion. But it is clear from many examples that the reality of substance does not exclude real relations. For every finite substance is composed of potency and act, which are really related to each other; every material substance is really composed of matter and form and existence, which are really related to one another; every finite substance, whether material or immaterial, is a specific nature, which is an intrinsic principle of operations, where the operations are really distinct from the principle and the principle itself is really related to the really distinct operations. Again, the more we compare the generic notions of substance and relation with the divine reality itself, the less do being through itself and being to another seem to be opposites. The divine reality does not cease to be through itself because it is communicated by the Father to the Son and by the Father and the Son to the Spirit; for the communication of the substance does not destroy the formality of substance; and yet this very communication is the foundation of the real relations. Again, the real relations founded on communication do not relate God to another that is not God; rather, one subsistent relation is related to the other opposite subsistent relation, and since all these relations are really identical with the reality of the divine substance, the being to another of relation as well as the opposition of relation to being through itself are diminished as much as possible. In reply to the first contrary argument,20 we say that in metaphysics as in all other sciences, one must distinguish between two kinds of knowledge. The first is a prescientific knowledge of things, in which the causes of things are not yet known. terms ‘to know what (a thing) is’ Lennerz calls ‘quidditative knowledge of a quiddity’ [Lennerz, § 112, p. 91: ‘Non autem quidditative quidditatem Dei cognoscimus’]. 20 [See the beginning of this question 5, p. 267. The argument, again, is that relation cannot be the same as substance because the ten categories, among which are substance and relation, are really distinct from one another.]

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in qua res per causas suas cognoscuntur. Iam vero metaphysica est scientia rerum per causas ultimas; causae autem ultimae et constitutivae sunt potentia et actus, materia et forma, essentia et esse, et essentiarum divisiones supra expositae; ultima autem causa efficiens et finalis est Deus; et inquantum res per tales causas cognoscuntur, habetur cognitio metaphysica scientifica. E contra, decem praedicamenta sunt, non ultimae rerum causae, sed ultima rerum genera; quae quidem genera ultima pertinent ad cognitionem metaphysicam qua praescientificam, videlicet, in ordine ad causas investigandas atque inveniendas; et ideo de praedicamentis tractatur, non in ipsa metaphysica, sed in logica. 21

Quae cum ita sint, valde ruditer procedit qui ex praedicamentis qua talibus arguit. Quamvis enim sint genera et ultima et inter se distincta, quantum attinet cognitionem metaphysicam praescientificam, tamen ipsa cognitio praescientifica non est nisi stadium praeparatorium ad cognitionem proprie scientificam. Praeterea, postquam ad cognitionem scientificam perventum est, manifeste standum est in iis quae clare et distincte per causas demonstrantur, neque ullo modo arguendum est ex ipsis praedicamentis nisi ad eos convincendos qui scientiam metaphysicam vel non capiant vel adhuc forte non intellexerint. Quam ob rem, in responsione supra posita, substantiam, accidens, et relationem in ultima constitutiva realia reduximus, nempe in essentias quibus competit esse per se vel in alio vel ad aliud; et secundum haec iudicavimus utrum substantia possit esse idem quod relatio. Praeterea, notandum est eandem fere esse rationem circa distinctionem quae fieri solet inter relationes praedicamentales et relationes transcendentales. Aliae enim sunt relationes quae cognitione metaphysica praescientifica innotescunt; et huiusmodi sunt quas enumerat Aristoteles,22 nempe, secundum quantitatem, secundum actionem et passionem, et secundum mensurabile et mensuram. Aliae autem sunt relationes quae per ipsam investigationem metaphysicam innotescunt; et huiusmodi sunt tum ea quae in sex ultimis praedicamentis inveniuntur tum ea quae inter principia rerum constitutiva intercedunt. 23 Porro, ad hanc differentiam sequitur alia. Priores relationes a primis et maximis doctoribus investigatae sunt; posteriores autem relationes qua tales investigari non potuerunt nisi postquam primi et maximi doctores ipsam scientiam metaphysicam invenerunt et

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The second is a scientific knowledge of things, in which things are known through their causes. Now, metaphysics is the knowledge of things through ultimate causes. The ultimate constitutive causes are potency and act, matter and form, essence and existence, and the divisions of essences stated above. The ultimate efficient cause and final cause is God. Insofar as things are known through these causes, there is scientific metaphysical knowledge. On the other hand, the ten categories are not the ultimate causes of things but the ultimate kinds of things. These ultimate kinds belong to metaphysical knowledge as prescientific, that is, as directed to investigating and discovering causes, and therefore the categories are treated in logic, not in metaphysics itself.21 Since this is so, to argue from categories as such is to proceed without due rigor. For although the kinds of things are ultimate and distinct from one another as far as prescientific metaphysical knowledge is concerned, still this prescientific knowledge is itself but a preparatory stage for properly scientific knowledge. Besides, once one has arrived at scientific knowledge, one must obviously stay with what has been clearly and distinctly demonstrated through causes and should not in any way argue from the categories unless to convince those who either do not grasp metaphysical knowledge or perhaps have as yet not understood it. Therefore, in the foregoing reply we reduced substance, accident, and relation to their ultimate real constitutive elements, that is, to essences to which it is proper to be through itself, or in another, or to another; and in accordance with this we have judged whether a substance can be the same as a relation. Moreover, practically the same argument applies to the distinction that is made between categorial relations and transcendental relations. The first are those relations that are known by prescientific metaphysical knowledge; these are the ones listed by Aristotle,22 namely, relations according to quantity, according to action and passion, and according to the measurable and the measure. The second are those relations that are known through metaphysical investigation; such relations are both those that are found in the last six categories and those that obtain among the constitutive principles of things.23 Again, another difference follows from this distinction between prescientific and scientific knowledge. Categorial relations were investigated by the earliest group of great thinkers; but transcendental relations as such could not have been investigated until after those first great minds had founded and developed 21 [See Lonergan, Insight 420.] 22 See Thomas Aquinas, In V Metaphys., lect 17, §§ 1001–1003. 23 [For further data on a Scholastic discussion regarding relations in ‘the last six categories’ and relations ‘among the constitutive principles of things,’ see below, appendix 3, pp. 718–29.]

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perfecerunt; ex ipsa enim rei natura tardior oritur metaphysica relationis metaphysicae. At neque prima neque secunda differentia facit aliam distinctionem quam historicam. Et ipsa quae fit distinctio inter relationes praedicamentales (seu priores) et transcendentales (seu posteriores) additam habet inconvenientiam quod rudes conducit in pestiferam notionem quod metaphysica est rerum cognitio non per ultimas causas sed per ultima genera. Quibus perspectis, scientificam credimus relationum esse distinctionem in subsistentes, subsistentium, et eorum quibus constituuntur subsistentia. Sic enim relationum divisio gradus rerum ontologicos consequeretur.24 Ad secundum 25 dicendum quod accidens dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, ut significet id cui competit esse in alio; alio modo, ut significet omne quod per aliud definitur sive per aliud in quo est sive per aliud ad quod est. Iam vero si primo modo sumitur accidens, concedendum est substantiam non posse esse idem realiter quod accidens, sed negandum est relationem ex ipsa sua ratione esse accidens in hoc sensu. Si autem secundo modo sumitur accidens, concedendum est relationem esse accidens, sed negandum est accidens hoc sensu latiori cum realitate substantiae pugnare.

Ad tertium 26 denique conceditur substantiam esse vel habere essentiam simpliciter et relationem habere essentiam secundum quid; at negandum est fieri non posse ut una eademque realitas sit et secundum se essentia simpliciter et secundum quod communicatur essentia secundum quid.27

QUAESTIO VI Utrum fieri possit ut relationes divinae reales et realiter inter se distinguantur et realiter cum una eademque substantia divina identificentur Et videtur quod non, quia ea quae sunt eadem uni tertio sunt eadem inter se. Qua de causa, si relationes reales realiter inter se distinguuntur, identificari non possunt

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metaphysical knowledge. For the metaphysics of metaphysical relation naturally emerges rather slowly. But neither the first nor the second difference makes for more than a historical distinction. And the distinction between the former relations, the categorial, and the latter, the transcendental, has this added inconvenience, that it gives the uninformed the pernicious notion that metaphysics is knowledge of things not through ultimate causes but through ultimate categories. Accordingly, we hold that the distinction of relations into subsistent relations, the relations of subsistents, and the relations of the constituents of subsistents, is scientific. For this division of relations corresponds to the ontological degrees of reality. 24 In reply to the second contrary argument,25 we say that accident can be understood in two ways. First, it signifies that to which it is proper to be in another. Second, it signifies anything that is defined either through another in which it is or through another to which it is. If we take accident in the first sense, we must concede that a substance cannot be really the same as an accident, but we must deny that a relation by definition is an accident in this sense. But if accident is taken in the second sense, we must concede that relation is an accident, but deny that an accident in this broader sense is incompatible with the reality of substance. In reply to the third contrary argument,26 we concede that a substance is or has essence in an unqualified sense, while a relation has essence with qualification. But we must deny that it is impossible for one and the same reality to be both an unqualified essence with respect to itself and a qualified essence with respect to its communication.27 QUESTION 6 Is it possible for the real divine relations to be really distinct from one another and really identical with one and the same divine substance? It seems impossible, since two things that are the same as a third thing are identical with one another. Hence, if real relations are really distinct from one another, they 24 See appendix 3. 25 [See above, p. 269. The argument is that relation is an accident, and accident is really distinct from substance, so that relation cannot really be identical with substance.] 26 [See above, p. 269. The argument is that relation is essence in a qualified sense and substance is simply essence without qualification, and that the two are not the same, so that relation cannot be identical with substance.] 27 [See p. 273 above.]

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realiter cum una eademque substantia divina. Si autem realiter identificantur cum una eademque substantia divina, realiter inter se distingui non possunt. Sed contra est quod Pater non est Filius, et nihilominus unus idemque Deus et Pater est et Filius. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est huius quaestionis aspectus. Alius enim est aspectus logicus, inquantum invocatur principium identitatis comparatae, nempe, quae sunt eadem uni tertio sunt eadem inter se. Alius autem est aspectus realis, cum absoluta et relativa neque eodem modo realia sint neque eodem modo realiter inter se distinguantur. Et quantum ad aspectum logicum attinet, dicendum est eandem esse rationem de principio identitatis ac de principio contradictionis: principium enim identitatis nihil est aliud ac positiva eius assertio cuius oppositum per principium contradictionis excluditur. Iam vero inter omnes constat illegitime applicari principium contradictionis ubicumque agitur vel de diversis vel de eodem secundum diversos aspectus; et ideo illud solum per principium contradictionis excluditur quod idem secundum idem (seu idem re et ratione) et est et non est. Pariter ergo dicendum est illegitime applicari principium identitatis ubicumque agitur vel de diversis vel de eodem secundum diversos aspectus: et ideo illud solum sub principio identitatis cadit quod idem secundum idem (seu idem re et ratione) respiciat.

Quibus perspectis, facilis omnino est responsio ad obiectionem supra positam, cum perperam ibi invocetur principium identitatis comparatae. Nam reales relationes divinae re sed non ratione cum divina substantia identificantur; et ideo nihil efficere potest principium identitatis, quod ea sola respicit quae eadem sunt non solum re sed etiam ratione. Cum tamen solutio stricte logica merum effugium videri possit si nulla addatur explicatio de ipsis rebus, etiam considerandum est quemadmodum se habeat allata distinctio ad casus diversos. Primo, ergo, si absolutum, A, est realiter idem cum absoluto, C, et pariter absolutum, B, est realiter idem cum absoluto, C, tunc dari non potest nisi distinctio mere nominalis tum inter A et C tum inter B et C, ut, v.c., A sit hoc vestimentum, et B sit hoc indumentum, et C sit haec tunica, ubi vestimentum, indumentum et tunica non sint nisi diversa nomina eiusdem prorsus rei. Cuius ratio est quod, si duo absoluta sunt realiter idem, nulla est intelligibilitas unius quae non sit per identitatem intelligibilitas alterius; et quae tum re tum intelligibilitate sunt eadem, nisi nominibus inter se distingui non possunt. Qua de causa, allata distinctio inter

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cannot be really identical with one and the same divine substance. If, however, they are really identical with one and the same divine substance, they cannot be really distinct from one another. But against this is the fact that the Father is not the Son, and nevertheless one and the same God is the Father and is the Son. In replying to this question, we must point out that it has two aspects. The first aspect is logical, in that an appeal is made to the principle of compared identity, namely, that two that are identical with a third are identical with each other. The other aspect is real, since absolutes and relatives are not real in the same way and are not really distinct from each other in the same way. As far as the logical aspect is concerned, the formality of the principle of identity is the same as that of the principle of contradiction; for the principle of identity is simply the positive statement of that whose opposite is negated by the principle of contradiction. Now all agree that it is illegitimate to apply the principle of contradiction whenever the question is about either different things or about the same thing under different aspects; therefore, the only thing denied by the principle of contradiction is that the same thing in the same way – the same both really and conceptually – both is and is not. It is similarly illegitimate to apply the principle of identity whenever the question is about different things or about the same thing under different aspects; therefore, the only thing that falls under the principle of identity is the same thing under the same aspect – the same thing both really and conceptually. In view of this it is quite easy to reply to the above objection, since it incorrectly appeals to the principle of compared identity. The real divine relations are identical with the divine substance in reality but not conceptually. Therefore the principle of identity does not apply, since it regards only those things that are the same not only really but also conceptually. Since, however, a strictly logical solution can seem to be merely an evasion if there is no added explanation about the things themselves, we must also consider how the distinction we have made applies in different cases. To begin, then, if an absolute, A, is really the same as an absolute, C, and an absolute, B, is likewise really the same as an absolute, C, then the distinction between A and C and between B and C can be only verbal: for example, A is this vestment, B is this garment, and C is this tunic, where ‘vestment,’ ‘garment,’ and ‘tunic’ are but different nouns for a thing that is entirely the same. This is so because, if two absolutes are really the same, there is no intelligibility in one that is not identical with the intelligibility of the other. And when they are the same both in reality and in intelligibility, they can be distinct only verbally. For this reason, if only absolutes are being considered, the distinction we have

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re et ratione et re sed non ratione, si de solis absolutis cogitatur, omni vero sensu caret. Deinde, si relativum, A, sit realiter idem cum absoluto, C, et relativum, B, sit realiter idem cum eodem absoluto, C, fieri non potest ut mere nominalis sit distinctio sive inter A et C sive inter B et C. Eiusmodi enim est absolutum ut suam rationem intra suam realitatem contineat atque claudat; eiusmodi autem est relativum ut per suam rationem ultra propriam realitatem ad aliam respiciat; et ideo absolutum et relativum non solum nomine sed etiam intelligibilitate necessario inter se distinguuntur, cum fieri nequeat ut eadem ratio et intra suam realitatem tota contineatur et ultra suam realitatem ad aliam realitatem respiciat. Qua de causa, allata distinctio inter re et ratione et re sed non ratione, ubi duo relativa cum eodem absoluto comparantur, non tantum diversa nomina sed etiam diversas eiusdem rei intelligibilitates dicat necesse est. Cuius rei exemplum classicum est realis identitas ab Aristotele affirmata tum inter motum et actionem tum inter motum et passionem. Apud Aristotelem enim actio definitur actus huius ut ab hoc, scilicet, actus qui agentis est inquantum ab agente procedit, et passio definitur actus huius ut in hoc, scilicet, actus qui patientis est inquantum in patiente recipitur; et cum idem sit actus qui et ab agente procedit et in patiente recipitur, scilicet, ipse motus ab agente productus et in patiente receptus, sequitur tum actionem tum passionem esse realiter idem cum motu. Quibus perspectis, etiam elucet cur tam difficile hoc theorema multis videatur. Nam et actio et passio super ipsum motum relationes, ut ab hoc, ut in hoc, addunt; sed longe alia est haec addita intelligibilitas ab intelligibilitate motus absoluti; et ideo multis perdifficile videtur quod tam diversae relativorum et absoluti intelligibilitates in uno eodemque reali inveniuntur.

Denique, ubi duo relativa cum eodem absoluto realiter identificantur, non solum intelligibilitate ab absoluto distinguantur necesse est sed etiam realiter inter se distingui possunt. Nam, uti supra demonstratum est, relationes et reales et mutuo oppositae necessario realiter inter se distinguuntur. Sed relationes quae cum eodem absoluto realiter identificantur sunt relationes reales. Et ideo si eiusmodi sunt earum rationes intelligibiles ut mutuo opponantur, etiam realiter inter se distinguuntur. Quod sane totius nostri problematis clavis est atque solutio. Absolutorum enim est ut realiter non distinguantur nisi eadem ratio et ab uno ponatur et ab alio non ponatur. Sed relativorum ulterius est ut realiter inter se distinguantur, non solum

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made between ‘really and conceptually’ and ‘really but not conceptually’ is quite meaningless. Next, if a relative, A, is really identical with an absolute, C, and a relative, B, is really identical with the same absolute, C, the distinction between A and C or between B and C cannot be merely verbal. For an absolute is such that it contains and encloses its essential meaning within its own reality, whereas a relative is such that by reason of its essential meaning it goes beyond its own reality to look towards another. Therefore, an absolute and a relative are not only verbally distinct but are also necessarily distinct in intelligibility, since it is impossible that the same meaning be both totally contained within its own reality and at the same time look towards another reality beyond its own. This is why when two relatives are related to the same absolute, our distinction between ‘really and conceptually’ and ‘really but not conceptually’ necessarily signifies not only different words for the same reality but also different intelligibilities of the same reality. The classic example of this is the real identity that Aristotle affirmed between motion and action and between motion and passion. He defines action as ‘the act of a thing considered as being from this thing,’ that is, an act of an agent considered as proceeding from the agent, and passion he defines as ‘the act of a thing considered as being in this thing,’ that is, the act of a recipient considered as being received in the recipient. And since the act that proceeds from the agent is the same as that which is received in the recipient, namely, the motion produced by the agent and received in the recipient, it follows that both action and passion are really identical with motion. One can see from this example why this theorem is apparently so difficult for so many. For ‘action’ and ‘passion’ add to motion the relations ‘as from this’ and ‘as in this’; but this added intelligibility is far different from the intelligibility of the motion of an absolute, and therefore to many it seems extremely difficult to see that such diverse intelligibilities of the absolute and of relatives are present in one and the same reality. Finally, when two relatives are really identical with the same absolute, not only must they be distinct in intelligibility from the absolute but also they can be really distinct from each other. For, as we demonstrated above, relations that are both real and mutually opposed are necessarily really distinct from one another. But relations that are really identical with the same absolute are real relations. Therefore, if their intelligible conceptions are opposed to one another, such relations are really distinct from one another. This surely is the key to the solution of our whole problem. Absolutes are such that there is no real distinction between them unless the same conception can be posited of one and not of the other. In the case of relatives, on the other hand, there is the further fact that they are really distinct from one another not only by the

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per positionem et non-positionem eiusdem rationis, sed etiam per mutuam oppositionem diversarum rationum. Quae quidem oppositio, inquantum realis est, ex realitate relationum dependet; et haec realitas ex uno eodemque absoluto haberi potest. Sed eadem oppositio, inquantum oppositio est, ex solis rationibus dependet; nam oppositae sunt relationes inquantum altera ad alteram terminatur; et altera ad alteram terminatur, non quia relationes sint reales, sed quia earum rationes mutuo se respiciunt. Qua de causa, quae sunt eadem uni tertio, non necessario sunt eadem inter se. Nam duo relativa cum eodem tertio realiter identificari possunt; quod si realiter identificantur, saltem ratione intelligibili ab absoluto distinguuntur; et si eiusmodi sunt rationes ut mutuo opponantur, etiam realiter inter se distinguantur necesse est.28 Cuius tamen exemplum in rebus creatis non inveniri fatendum est. Actio enim et passio, sensu Aristotelico, quae realiter cum motu identificantur, non mutuo opponuntur, cum actio agentem respiciat et passio patientem. Imo, cum ab agente et in patiente ad unam atque indivisam intelligibilitatem pertineant, ordine unum sunt et nisi unum ordinem seu unam relationem realem non constituunt. Si vero actio intelligitur ut relatio agentis ad patiens, et passio intelligitur ut relatio patientis ad agens, sane habentur relationes et reales et mutuo oppositae. Attamen actio et passio sic intellectae cum uno eodemque tertio realiter identificari non possunt, cum actio actum, passio potentiam supponat, et idem secundum idem non possit esse et actu et potentia. Qua de causa, solummodo in divinis inveniuntur relationes et reales et mutuo oppositae et cum eodem absoluto realiter identicae, inquantum per unum actum infinitum habentur et principium verbi, et verbum, et amor procedens. Obiectio vero quae primo loco posita est, sic cum responsionibus et instantiis exponi potest. Quae sunt eadem uni tertio sunt eadem inter se; atqui Pater et Filius sunt eadem uni Deo; ergo sunt eadem inter se. Respondetur. Quae uni tertio sunt eadem tum re tum ratione, sunt eadem inter se, conceditur. Quae uni tertio sunt eadem re sed non ratione, sunt eadem inter se, negatur. Et minor contradistinguitur: Pater et Filius sunt eadem uni Deo, tum re tum ratione, negatur, re sed non ratione, conceditur.

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positing and non-positing of the same conception but also by the mutual opposition of diverse conceptions. This opposition, as real, depends upon the reality of the relations, and this reality can be had from one and the same absolute. But this same opposition, as opposition, depends solely upon the conceptions. For relations are opposite inasmuch as each is the term of the other, and each is the term of the other not because the relations are real but because their conceptions regard one another. Hence, what are identical with the same third are not necessarily identical with one another. For two relatives can be really identical with the same third; but if they are really identical, they are distinguished from the absolute at least by an intelligible conception. And if their conceptions are such that they are mutually opposed, the relatives must also necessarily be really distinct from one another.28 Still, we must admit that there is no example of this to be found in creation. Action and passion in the Aristotelian sense, which are really identical with motion, are not mutually opposed, since action regards the agent and passion the recipient. In fact, since ‘from the agent’ and ‘in the recipient’ pertain to one undivided intelligibility, they stand in a single order and constitute but one order or one real relation. If, however, action is understood as a relation of the agent to the recipient and passion as a relation of the recipient to the agent, then indeed we have relations that are real and mutually opposed. Nevertheless, action and passion understood in this way cannot be really identical with the same third, since action supposes act, passion supposes potency, and the same reality in the same respect cannot be both in act and in potency. Only in God, then, are to be found relations that are real, mutually opposed, and really identical with the same absolute, inasmuch as through one infinite act there are in God the principle of the word, the word, and proceeding love. The objection that was put at the beginning of this question can be stated as follows, together with the replies and the further objections. What are identical with one third thing are identical with one another; but the Father and the Son are identical with the one God, and therefore are identical with one another. In response, we grant that what are identical with one third thing both really and conceptually are identical with one another; but what are identical with one third thing in reality but not conceptually are not identical with one another. And we deny that the Father and the Son are identical with the one God both in reality and conceptually; we do concede that they are identical with the one God in reality but not conceptually. 28 See ‘A Brief Question,’ p. 737.

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Instatur. Distinctio rationis nihil facere potest ut adsit distinctio realis. Respondetur. Nihil efficitur ad distinctionem realem per distinctionem mere nominalem, conceditur. Nihil efficitur ad distinctionem realem ubi in eadem realitate verificantur diversae rationes intelligibiles, nempe, absoluti et relativi, negatur. Instatur. In eadem realitate verificari non possunt rationes intelligibiles adeo diversae ut ad distinctionem realem fundandam sufficiant. Respondetur. In eadem realitate verificari non possunt rationes intelligibiles adeo diversae ut fundari possit distinctio realis absolutorum, conceditur, relativorum, subdistinguitur, non mutuo oppositorum, conceditur, mutuo oppositorum, negatur. Et ratio est quod tum absoluta tum etiam relativa non mutuo opposita non realiter inter se distinguuntur nisi per positionem et non-positionem eiusdem rationis, et patet unam rationem non posse simul poni et non poni per eandem realitatem. E contra, relativa realia et mutuo opposita per ipsam mutuam oppositionem realiter distingui demonstrantur; neque ulla invenitur contradictio in eo quod in eadem realitate verificantur relativa mutuo opposita.

Instatur. Saltem nulla existit possibilitas concreta ut relativa mutuo opposita in eadem realitate verificentur. Nam in rebus creatis nullum prorsus invenitur exemplum; et in divinis res non concipitur nisi ponendo processionem realem in qua idem realiter actus ex se ipso quodammodo oriatur. Respondetur. Ut relativa mutuo opposita in eadem realitate verificentur, nulla invenitur possibilitas concreta, distinguitur, nulla quae ex rebus creatis demonstretur vel a nobis perfecte intelligatur, conceditur, nulla quae ex divina revelatione certo credatur et a nobis aliqualiter intelligatur, negatur. Nam fide constat eundem Deum esse Patrem et Filium, Patrem autem non esse Filium. Quod quidem aliquatenus a nobis intelligitur per analogiam psychologicam. Praesens enim problema nihil est aliud quam transpositio quaedam illius problematis ex quo incepimus, nempe, quemadmodum Filius sit et a se et non a se, vel quemadmodum habeantur et realitas emanationis et consubstantialitas emanantis. Si enim haec habentur, etiam habentur duae relationes reales mutuo oppositae, realiter inter se distinctae, et tamen cum eadem substantia divina identicae. Ad illud autem quod additur de actu ex eodem actu, notanda est differentia inter conc. Nicaenum et Lateranense iv. Ubi enim in Nicaeno dicitur ‘Deum ex Deo,’ intelligi oportet

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It might be urged that a conceptual distinction can contribute nothing to making a real distinction. In response, we grant that through a merely verbal distinction, nothing is produced pertaining to a real distinction. We deny that nothing is produced pertaining to a real distinction when diverse intelligible conceptions, namely, that of the absolute and that of the relative, are verified in the same reality. It might be urged further that there cannot be verified in the same reality intelligible conceptions so diverse as to be able to ground a real distinction. In response, we grant that in the same reality there cannot be verified intelligible conceptions so diverse as to be able to ground a real distinction between absolutes, or a real distinction between relatives that are not mutually opposed; but we deny that diverse intelligible conceptions verified in the same reality cannot ground a real distinction between relatives that are mutually opposed. The reason is that both absolutes and relatives not mutually opposed are really distinguished only through affirmation and nonaffirmation of the same conception, and obviously a single conception cannot be simultaneously affirmed and not affirmed by reason of the same reality. On the other hand, we have shown that real and mutually opposed relatives are really distinct by reason of their mutual opposition; and there is no contradiction in the fact that mutually opposed relatives are verified in the same reality. Still, one might object, at least there is no concrete possibility for mutually opposed relatives to be verified in the same reality. For there is no instance of this whatever in creation; and in God this can be conceived only by positing a real procession in which the really same act somehow or other originates from itself. To this we answer that, although there is in the created world no instance that has been proven or is perfectly understood by us of mutually opposed relations being verified in the same reality, nevertheless such an instance is to be believed with certitude from divine revelation, and is to some extent understood by us. For from faith we are certain that the same God is Father and Son, and that the Father is not the Son. We understand this to a certain extent through the psychological analogy. For the present problem is but a transposition of the problem with which we began, namely, how the Son is both from himself and not from himself, or how there is present both the reality of the emanation and the consubstantiality of that which emanates. For if these two are present, there are also two real, mutually opposed relations, really distinct from each other and yet identical with the same divine substance. As to what the objector adds about an act emerging from the same act, one must note the difference between the statement of the Council of Nicea and that

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Deum Filium esse ex Deo Patre, ut nomen essentiae divinae concrete sumatur et a relationibus personalibus non praescindat. Ubi autem in Lateranensi iv dicitur quod ‘illa res non est generans neque genita neque procedens,’ intelligi oportet illam rem esse divinam substantiam, essentiam, seu naturam prout ratione distinguatur a relationibus personalibus.

Instatur. Nihilominus non salvatur principium identitatis comparatae; et statim probatur. Quamvis enim principium directe respiciat ea quae sunt eadem tum re tum ratione, tamen contradictoria de eodem praedicari non possunt nisi praeter distinctionem rationis etiam invenitur distinctio realis. Verbi causa, idem homo non potest esse et mortalis et immortalis nisi realiter distinguuntur anima qua est immortalis et materia qua est mortalis. Pariter idem Deus non potest esse et Pater et Filius nisi secundum aliud realiter est Pater et secundum aliud realiter est Filius.

Respondetur. Contradictoria de eodem praedicari non possunt nisi praeter distinctionem rationis etiam invenitur distinctio realis, distinguitur, contradictoria et absoluta, conceditur, relativa mutuo opposita, subdistinguitur, requiritur aliqua realis distinctio, nempe, ipsorum relativorum, conceditur, requiritur realis illa compositio quae absolutis competit, negatur.

Et explico. ‘Immortale’ et ‘mortale’ stricte sunt contradictoria, quia eadem potentia respective tollitur et ponitur; et ideo ad realem compositionem intra hominem rite concluditur. Sed ‘Pater’ et ‘Filius’ realiter distinguuntur quia sunt relativa mutuo opposita; et mutua oppositio relativa realem compositionem in absoluto non demonstrat.

QUAESTIO VII Quid valeat distinctio inter ‘esse in’ et ‘esse ad’

Differt categoria relationis ab aliis inquantum distinguuntur relationes (non autem substantiae vel qualitates vel alia praedicamenta) in relationes reales et relationes rationis. Porro, conceptus compositus dupliciter reduplicatur: considerari enim potest relatio realis vel qua relatio est vel qua realis est. Quae duae reduplicationes nominari consueverunt ‘esse ad’ et ‘esse in.’ Sicut enim substantiae competit esse per se, sicut accidenti stricte sumpto competit esse in alio, ita etiam relationi,

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of the Fourth Lateran. The phrase in Nicea, ‘God from God,’ must be understood to mean that God the Son is from God the Father, in which the name of the divine essence is expressed concretely, without prescinding from the personal relations. But in the statement of the Fourth Lateran Council, ‘. . . that reality does not generate nor is it generated nor does it proceed,’ the expression ‘that reality’ is the divine substance, essence, or nature as conceptually distinct from the personal relations. Still, one might object further, the principle of compared identity is violated; here is the proof. Although this principle directly regards what are the same both really and conceptually, still contradictories cannot be predicated of the same thing unless, besides a conceptual distinction, a real distinction is also present. For example, the same man cannot be both mortal and immortal unless there is a real distinction between the soul by which he is immortal and the matter by which he is mortal. Similarly, the same God cannot be both Father and Son unless by reason of one thing he is really the Father and by reason of another thing he is really the Son. We answer this objection as follows. That contradictories cannot be predicated of the same thing unless, besides a conceptual distinction, a real distinction is also present, is true in the case of contradictory absolutes. For it to be true in the case of mutually opposed relatives, a real distinction is required between the relatives themselves; but there is not required that real composition that is proper to absolutes. Let us explain. ‘Immortal’ and ‘mortal’ are strictly contradictory, since the same potency is respectively denied and affirmed, and therefore one correctly concludes to a real composition in a human being. But ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are really distinct since they are mutually opposite relatives; and mutual relational opposition does not prove real composition in an absolute. QUESTION 7 What is the value of the distinction between ‘being in’ and ‘being to’? The category of relation differs from the other categories in that relations are distinguished into real relations and conceptual relations. There is no similar distinction for substances or qualities or other predicaments. Moreover, a composite concept is reduplicated in two ways: for a real relation can be considered either as it is a relation or as it is real. These two reduplications are usually termed ‘being to’ and ‘being in.’ For just as it is proper to a substance to be through itself, and just as it is proper to an accident in the strict sense to be

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eo ipso quod relatio est, competit esse ad aliud; qua de causa relatio realis qua relatio dicitur ‘esse ad.’ Praeterea, cum communiter relationes sunt accidentia, eam habent realitatem quae accidentibus competit, nempe, ‘esse in’; et ideo relatio realis qua realis dicitur ‘esse in.’ Quibus perspectis, concludes ‘esse ad’ et ‘esse in’ non esse concipienda per modum essentiae et esse ut ex eorum compositione quoddam totum efformaretur, sed ea esse concipienda tamquam duas notas unius relationis realis. Cuius distinctionis, in reduplicatione fundatae, duplex est valor et periculum unum. Valor primus ex eo est quod reales personarum divinarum distinctiones oriuntur, non ex positione et non-positione eiusdem rationis, sed in unica reali positione relationum mutuo oppositarum. Aliis verbis, distinctio realis personarum ex oppositis ‘esse ad’ proxime oritur. Valor secundus ex eo est quod Filius habet omne quod Pater, excepta paternitate. Filius enim non realiter distinguitur a Deo; Deus non realiter distinguitur a Patre; et tamen Filius realiter distinguitur a Patre, quia distinctio personarum est secundum opposita ‘esse ad.’ Et idem valor iterum apparet ex eo quod ‘. . . Deitas . . . nec minoratur in singulis, nec augetur in tribus; quia nec minus aliquid habet, cum unaquaeque persona Deus singulariter dicitur, nec amplius, cum totae tres personae unus Deus enuntiantur’ (db 279); quia scilicet fundantur personarum distinctiones non in positionibus contradictoriis et realibus sed in oppositis ‘esse ad.’

Periculum autem unum est ne ex mente decidat quod ‘esse ad’ nihil est nisi aspectus reduplicatus relationis realis; quod eo facilius fit cum de mysterio disputetur. Age vero, nullum prorsus esset mysterium SS. Trinitatis si uni actui puro et infinito accederent tantummodo tria entia rationis. Quod tamen interdum supponi videtur cum elegantius et efficacius solvantur difficultates atque problemata. Quare omnino animadvertendum est eandem divinam realitatem et vere unam et vere trinam secundum duos aspectus ratione distinctos a nobis ita apprehendi ut secundum aspectum absolutum unus sit Deus et secundum aspectum relativum tres sint relationes subsistentes realiter inter se distinctae. Quapropter non minus reales sunt relationes tres quam essentia una, cum pariter in suprema realitate divina tam relationes quam essentia inveniantur. Et tamen non realiter inter se distinguuntur essentia et realis relatio quaelibet, cum ratione tantummodo distinguantur aspectus Dei absolutus et aspectus Dei relativus.

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in another, so it is proper to a relation as a relation to be to another. Hence, a real relation as a relation is said ‘to be to.’ Furthermore, since in general all relations are accidents, they have that reality that is proper to accidents, namely, ‘to be in,’ and therefore a real relation as real is said ‘to be in.’ From this we conclude that ‘being to’ and ‘being in’ are not to be conceived after the manner of essence and existence so as to form a whole out of parts, but are to be conceived as two aspects of one real relation. This distinction, based on reduplication, is valuable in two ways, and has one danger. It is valuable, first, because the real distinctions among the divine persons arise, not from the affirmation and nonaffirmation of the same formality, but in the single real affirmation of mutually opposed relations. In other words, the real distinction of the persons arises proximately from one ‘being-to’ opposing another ‘being-to.’ Second, it is valuable because of the fact that the Son has all that the Father has, except paternity. The Son is not really distinct from God; God is not really distinct from the Father; yet the Son is really distinct from the Father, because the distinction of persons is by reason of the mutual opposition of one ‘being-to’ and another ‘being-to.’ The same value is clear from the fact that ‘. . . God . . . is not less in each one [of the persons] nor greater in all three [together]; for there is no less reality when any one of the persons is individually called God, nor is there more when all three persons are declared to be one God’ (db 279, ds 529, nd 312). That is to say, the distinction of the persons is grounded not on real contradictory affirmations but on the mutual opposition of one ‘being-to’ and another ‘being-to.’ The one danger is that one may lose sight of the fact that ‘being to’ is only a reduplicated aspect of a real relation, and this occurs more easily when the discussion concerns a mystery. In fact, there would be no mystery of the Trinity at all if three merely conceptual beings were attributed to one pure infinite act. This seems sometimes to be supposed, when difficulties and problems are solved too neatly and efficiently. Hence, it is most important to note that we apprehend the same divine reality that is both truly one and truly threefold according to two conceptually distinct aspects, so that according to the absolute aspect there is one God and according to the relative aspect there are three subsistent relations really distinct from one another. The three relations, therefore, are no less real than the one essence, since the relations as well as the essence are equally present in the supreme divine reality. And yet there is no real distinction between essence and each real relation, since there is only a conceptual distinction between the absolute and the relative aspects of God.

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Proinde, cum reduplicetur relatio realis ut considerentur relatio realis qua relatio (esse ad) et relatio realis qua realis (esse in), verum omnino est realem relationum distinctionem proxime oriri ex ‘esse ad’; sed pariter verum est eandem relationum distinctionem futuram fuisse non realem sed rationis si haberentur tantummodo ‘esse ad’ sine reali ‘esse in’; nam relationes mutuo oppositae, nisi sunt reales, non realiter inter se distinguuntur. Praeterea, verum omnino est Filium habere omnia quae habet Pater, paternitate excepta, quia realiter identificantur tum filiatio cum deitate tum deitas cum paternitate. At minus verum non est tam paternitatem quam filiationem esse realem, et realiter inter se distingui realem paternitatem et realem filiationem. Praeterea, verum omnino est quod Deus non minoratur in singulis nec augetur in tribus, quia tota divina realitas a singulis habetur, neque aliquid maius quam tota divina realitas a tribus simul sumptis habetur. At pariter verum est ratione distingui a divina essentia tres relationes reales, quae omnes realiter inter se distinguuntur. His igitur perspectis, allatae distinctionis simul et valorem et periculum agnosce. Cum enim aliud sit verum et aliud totum verum, aliud est in clariori quadam luce divinam unitatem exponere, aliud autem est in clariori quadam luce tum divinam unitatem tum divinam trinitatem simul manifestare. Illud facit allata distinctio, et ideo maximum quendam valorem habet. Hoc autem facere potest nulla brevis distinctio, cum de mysterio in Deo abscondito agatur. Quam ob causam, cum tam trinitatem in unitate quam unitatem in trinitate confitemur, nullo modo ex allata distinctione inter ‘esse ad’ et ‘esse in’ ratiocinari licet, quasi tota doctrina trinitaria in hac sola distinctione contineatur. Quamvis enim vera sit distinctio, quamvis utilissima sit, quamvis nullum afferat periculum dummodo evitetur abusus, attamen incipit abusus quam primum vel implicite supponitur quoddam verum partiale esse totum verum.29

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Accordingly, when a real relation is reduplicated to consider a real relation as relation (being to) and a real relation as real (being in), it is entirely true that the real distinction between the relations arises proximately from ‘being to.’ But it is equally true that the same distinction between the relations would not be real but only conceptual if there were only the ‘being to’ without a real ‘being in’; for if they are not real, then mutually opposed relations are not really distinct from one another. Further, it is entirely true that the Son has all that the Father has, except paternity, since filiation is really identical with deity and deity with paternity. But it is no less true that both paternity and filiation are real, and that the distinction between real paternity and real filiation is a real distinction. Again, it is entirely true that God is not diminished in each or increased in the Three, because the whole divine reality is possessed by each, and nothing more than the whole divine reality is possessed by the Three together. But it is equally true that the three real relations, which are all really distinct from one another, are conceptually distinct from the divine essence. Having understood this, one can easily see the value and at the same time the danger of this distinction. Since truth is one thing and the whole truth is another, it is one thing to throw more light on the divine unity and quite another to throw more light simultaneously on both the divine unity and the divine trinity. The former is what this distinction does, and therefore it has a very great value. But no short and simple distinction can achieve the latter, since we are dealing with a mystery hidden in God. Therefore, since we confess both trinity in unity and unity in trinity, we may by no means argue on the basis of this distinction between ‘being to’ and ‘being in’ as if the whole doctrine of the Trinity were contained in this distinction alone. Although this distinction is true, although it is most useful, and although there is no danger in it as long as abuse is avoided, still abuse creeps in as soon as one supposes, even implicitly, that any partial truth is the whole truth.29 29 [Lonergan’s remark in this question that difficulties and problems concerning the unity and the threefoldness of God are solved ‘too neatly and efficiently’ through the use of the distinction between ‘being in’ and ‘being to’ is an obvious reference to some of the trinitarian literature with which he was familiar. In that literature, it seems, the distinction occasioned a perhaps unwitting semirationalist distortion of trinitarian theology, of the kind condemned by Vatican i. Accordingly, Lonergan has a twofold concern in this question. First, he is concerned to emphasize that, while the distinction based on the reduplication of the composite concept ‘real relation’ does not capture the whole truth of the doctrine of the Trinity, it is a legitimate, valuable, and fruitful instrument of understanding when judiciously employed. For with the context of the preceding discussion, the distinction

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QUAESTIO VIII Utrum maior an minor sit rationis distinctio qua divina substantia a divinis relationibus et vicissim divinae relationes a divina substantia distinguantur

Ad terminos distincta sunt quorum unum non est aliud. ratione sunt distincta quorum conceptus unius non est conceptus alterius. maior seu adaequata est rationis distinctio ubi conceptus unius conceptum alterius non actu dicit ne implicite quidem. minor seu inadaequata est rationis distinctio ubi conceptus unius conceptum alterius actu dicit saltem implicite. substantia: id cui competit esse per se. divina substantia: actus purus. relatio: ordo unius ad aliud; id cui competit esse ad aliud. relationes divinae: paternitas, filiatio, spiratio activa et passiva. Sententiae Alii distinctionem utrinque maiorem defendunt, uti Ferrariensis, Toletus, Molina, Vasquez, Billot, Buonpensiere, et Boyer.30 Alii distinctionem utrinque minorem docent, uti forte Caietanus, certo Ioannes a S. Thoma, et Galtier.31 Alii maiori distinctione substantiam a relationibus, minori autem relationes a substantia secernunt, uti Suarez, Ruiz. Nota: Sine censura theologica libere disputatur quaestio.

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QUESTION 8 Is it by a major or a minor conceptual distinction that the divine substance is distinguished from the divine relations and, conversely, that the divine relations are distinguished from the divine substance? Terminology distinct : one is not the other. conceptual distinction: the concept of one is not the concept of the other. major or adequate conceptual distinction: the concept of one does not actually express the concept of the other, even implicitly. minor or inadequate conceptual distinction: at least implicitly the concept of one actually expresses the concept of the other. substance: that to which it is proper to be through itself. divine substance: pure act. relation: the order of one to another; that to which it is proper to be to another. divine relations: paternity, filiation, active spiration, passive spiration. Opinions Among those who defend a major distinction in both cases are Ferrariensis, Toletus, Molina, Vasquez, Billot, Buonpensiere, and Boyer. 30 Others hold for a minor distinction in both cases: perhaps Cajetan, certainly John of St Thomas, and Galtier.31 Still others, such as Suarez and Ruiz, hold that the divine substance is distinct from the relations by a major distinction, but the relations are distinct from the substance by a minor distinction. Note that this is an open question, lacking any theological note. facilitates one in holding together in imperfect understanding and affirming that in God there is both real trinity in unity and real unity in trinity. At the same time, however, he is at pains to warn against the semirationalist distortion of the distinction that overlooks or forgets that ‘being to’ is only a reduplicated aspect of a real relation.] 30 Carolus Boyer, Synopsis praelectionum de Sanctissima Trinitate (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1949) 133–39. 31 Paul Galtier, De Sanctissima Trinitate: in se et in nobis (Paris: Beauchesne, 1933) §§ 285–87.

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Solutio Cum omnis conceptus ex actu intelligendi procedat illudque exprimat quod intelligendo perspicitur, remote quidem ex obiecto intelligentiae, proxime autem ex ipso intelligendi actu determinandum est quid per conceptum dicatur. Praeterea, ubi alii auctores alios esse conceptus affirmant, procul dubio alii aliorum sunt actus intelligendi et alia etiam sunt horum actuum obiecta formalia. Qua de causa, quaestio praesens nihil aliud postulare videtur nisi ut explicetur secundum quosnam intelligendi actus circa quaenam obiecta formalia procedant aliorum auctorum conceptus alii. Inprimis igitur sit obiectum formale ipsa divina realitas prout fide atque ratione per fidem illustrata apprehenditur. Quod sane obiectum est actus infinitus rationaliter conscius qui secundum duas rationes substantiae et relationis a nobis concipitur. Inquantum enim ponitur infinitus actus essendi, intelligendi, concipiendi, iudicandi, et amandi, ponitur divina substantia. Inquantum autem ponuntur duae emanationes rationaliter consciae, nempe, verbi a dicente et amoris ab utroque, ponuntur divinae relationes. Et sic manifeste habetur distinctio minor relationum a substantia, cum emanationes rationaliter consciae sine actu intelligendi, dicendi, amandi haberi non possint. Et similiter etiam habetur distinctio minor substantiae a relationibus; quamvis enim naturale lumen rationis humanae eiusmodi non sit ut perspicere valeat talem necessario esse actum intelligendi infinitum ut verbum dicat et per dictum verbum amorem spiret, nihilominus ratio per fidem illustrata aliquatenus hoc intelligit, et secundum hanc intelligentiam imperfectam non concipit divinam substantiam quin etiam emanationes intellectuales et consequentes relationes saltem implicite dicat.

E contra, sit obiectum formale ipsa divina realitas, non prout theologice intelligitur atque concipitur sed prout genericis prorsus conceptibus substantiae atque relationis subest. Iam vero genericus substantiae conceptus est eius cui competit esse per se, et genericus relationis conceptus est eius cui competit esse ad aliud. Qui substantiae conceptus, cum aliud actu non dicat ne implicite quidem, distinctione rationis maiori a conceptu relationis secernitur; neque tollitur haec maior distinctio eo quod hic praecise conceptus divinae realitati applicatur. Et similiter genericus relationis conceptus explicite non dicit nisi id cui competit esse ad aliud; et quamvis ex hoc conceptu solo ad subiectum concludi possit, alia sane requiritur

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Solution Since every concept proceeds from an act of understanding and expresses what is grasped by understanding, the determination of what is expressed in a concept proceeds remotely from the object of understanding and proximately from the act of understanding itself. Moreover, when different authors affirm that concepts are different, their acts of understanding are no doubt different, as well as the formal objects of these acts. The present question, therefore, seems to require only that we explain from which acts of understanding concerning which formal objects the different concepts of different authors proceed. First of all, then, there is the case in which the formal object is the divine reality itself as apprehended by faith and by reason enlightened by faith. This object is, indeed, a rationally conscious infinite act that is conceived by us according to the two formalities of substance and relation. In speaking of an infinite act of existence, of understanding, of conceiving, of judging, and of loving, we are referring to the divine substance. But in speaking of two rationally conscious emanations, namely, of word from speaker and of love from both, we are referring to the divine relations. From this it is clear that the relations are distinct from the substance by a minor distinction, since the rationally conscious relations cannot be had without an act of understanding, of speaking, and of loving. The substance is similarly distinct from the relations by a minor distinction; for although the natural light of human reason is not capable of grasping that an infinite act of understanding is necessarily such that it utter a word and through the uttered word spirate love, nevertheless reason enlightened by faith understands this to some extent, and in accordance with this limited understanding it does not conceive the divine substance without also at least implicitly affirming the intellectual emanations and the consequent relations. In contrast, there is the case where the formal object is the divine reality not as understood and conceived in theology, but as understood and conceived under the wholly generic concepts of substance and relation. Now, the generic concept of substance is the concept of that to which it is proper to be through itself, and the generic concept of relation is the concept of that to which it is proper to be to another. Since the concept of substance does not actually indicate ‘other,’ even implicitly, it is set off from the concept of relation by a major conceptual distinction; and this major distinction is not denied by the fact that this concept taken precisely is applied to the divine reality. Similarly, the generic concept of relation explicitly indicates only that to which it is proper to be to another; and although from this concept alone one can conclude to a subject, another premise is certainly

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praemissa ut demonstretur subiectum esse substantia; nam in rebus creatis id quod per relationem ad aliud refertur non sola est substantia sed etiam est accidens (ut verbum ad intelligere, vel amor ad utrumque), et principium entis intrinsecum (ut potentia ad actum, etc.), et ens rationis (ut differentia ad genus); in divinis autem subiectum quod per relationem ad aliud refertur non est divina substantia, cum divina substantia non generet et ideo non referatur ad Filium, neque gignatur et ideo non referatur ad Patrem, neque spiret et ideo non referatur ad Spiritum, neque spiretur et ideo non referatur ad Patrem simul et Filium.

Quibus perspectis, elucet quemadmodum omnes theologorum sententiae fundamentum quoddam habeant. Nam qui defendunt rationis distinctionem utrinque minorem, ex theologica intelligentia ipsius divinae realitatis procedunt. Qui autem defendunt rationis distinctionem utrinque maiorem, ex genericis conceptibus systematice definitis arguunt. Denique tandem qui mediam incedunt viam iudicare videntur secundum fortiora aliorum argumenta. QUAESTIO IX Utrum praeter distinctionem realem et distinctionem rationis admittenda sit tertia intermedia distinctio quae dicatur formalis a parte rei 32 Et admittenda videtur. Nam Deus Pater perfecta obiectivitate ipse se cognoscit. Iam vero ante omnem operationem mentis et solummodo ex parte obiecti visi, Deo Patri exhibentur et deitas et paternitas aut ut una atque prorsus indivisa realitas aut ut duae realitates aut ut una realitas cum duplici formalitate obiectiva. Atqui neque primum membrum admitti potest neque secundum. Ergo admittendum est tertium quod est distinctio seu non-identitas formalis ex parte rei. Maior ex fundamento evidenti ponit disiunctionem completam. Minor autem per partes probatur. Primum membrum admitti non potest. Si enim ex parte obiecti visi ante omnem operationem mentis nulla prorsus exhibetur distinctio inter deitatem et paternitatem, necessario sequitur quod, ubicumque videtur deitas, etiam videtur paternitas ut res omnino eadem.

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required to demonstrate that the subject is a substance. For among creatures, that which is referred to another by a relation may be not only a substance but also an accident (such as a word related to the act of understanding, or love to both), or an intrinsic principle of being (such as potency related to act, and so on), or a conceptual being (such as difference related to genus); but in God, the subject that is referred to another by a relation is not the divine substance, since the divine substance does not generate and therefore is not related to the Son, is not generated and therefore is not related to the Father, does not spirate and therefore is not related to the Spirit, and is not spirated and therefore is not related to the Father and the Son together. It is clear from this how all the opinions of the theologians have some foundation. Those who hold for a minor conceptual distinction from both sides argue from a theological understanding of the divine reality itself. But those who defend a major conceptual distinction from both sides argue from systematically defined generic concepts. Finally, those who follow a middle course seem to base their judgments on the stronger arguments of other theologians. QUESTION 9 Besides a real distinction and a conceptual distinction, is there a third intermediate distinction, called a ‘formal distinction on the side of the reality’? 32 The argument in favor of such a distinction is as follows. God the Father knows himself with perfect objectivity. But prior to any operation of the mind and solely on the part of the object seen, divinity and paternity are manifested to God the Father either as a single and absolutely indivisible reality or as two realities or as one reality with two objective formalities. But neither the first nor the second member can be admitted, and therefore one must admit the third, which is the formal distinction or nonidentity on the side of the reality. The major premise lays down a complete disjunction based on an evident foundation. The minor premise will be proven part by part. The first member cannot be admitted. For if on the part of the object seen, and prior to any operation of the mind, no distinction whatever between divinity and paternity is displayed, it necessarily follows that, wherever divinity is seen, paternity is also seen as being the very same reality. Hence there arises this dilemma, that 32 John Duns Scotus, In I Sent., d. 2, q. 7; d. 8, q. 4. Rep. Par., In I Sent., d. 45, q. 2. The prior history of the question is treated by B. Jansen, ‘Beitr¨age zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung der Distinctio Formalis,’ Zeitschrift f¨ur katholische Theologie 53 (1929) 317–44, 517–44.

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Unde exsurgit dilemma: aut Filius est Pater aut Filius non est Deus. Si enim Filium dicis Deum, cum deitas sit eadem realitas ac paternitas, etiam Filium dicis Patrem; quod haeresis Sabelliana est. Si autem Filium negas Patrem esse, cum paternitas sit eadem realitas ac deitas, etiam negas Filium esse Deum; quod haeresis Ariana est. Neque secundum membrum admitti potest. Si enim alia realitas est deitas et alia realitas est paternitas, tunc Deus est Deus et Pater est Pater, sed Pater non est Deus; quod est haereticum. Neque utiliter ad quamlibet compositionem confugies, cum compositi alia pars de alia numquam praedicetur. Remanet ergo tertium quod distinctionem formalem importat. Primum enim membrum dicit distinctionem rationis; secundum dicit distinctionem realem; tertium denique intermediam ponit distinctionem secundum quam in una realitate agnoscuntur formalitates quae ex parte rei non sunt identicae; quae sane distinctio differt tum a distinctione reali quae duas realitates ponit tum a distinctione rationis quae formalitatum diversitatem non in re sed in sola mente ponit. Praeterea, per distinctionem realem et distinctionem rationis non habetur disiunctio completa, et ideo tertia est admittenda distinctio intermedia. Nam per distinctionem realem ponuntur realitates duae. Per distinctionem rationis ita ponitur una realitas ut omnis distinctio vel soli menti attribuatur vel, si fundamentum in re agnoscatur, saltem hoc fundamentum reale non sit distinctio ex parte ipsius rei. Et ideo manifeste remanet ulterior distinctio agnoscenda secundum quam mentalis rationum distinctio in obiectiva non-identitate formalitatum ex parte rei fundatur.

Respondeo argumentum Scoti ex duobus dependere, quorum aliud est generale et aliud particulare. Generale est systema quoddam gnoseologicum in mytho perceptionistico 33 fundatum ut, scilicet, veritas seu obiectivitas necessario consistat in conformitate, similitudine, adaequatione inter percipientem et perceptum. Particulare autem est quod in divinis saltem ratione distinguuntur paternitas et divinitas. Quae sane distinctio rationis est casus omnino specialis, cum intime connectatur cum distinctione reali inter personas divinas. Quibus suppositis, quaeritur de veritate seu obiectivitate huius distinctionis saltem rationis in mente divina.

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either the Son is the Father or the Son is not God. For if you say that the Son is God, then since divinity is the same reality as paternity, you also say that the Son is the Father, which is the Sabellian heresy. But if you say that the Son is not the Father, then since paternity is the same reality as divinity, you also say that the Son is not God, and this is the Arian heresy. Nor can the second member be admitted. For if divinity is one reality and paternity another, then God is God, and the Father is the Father, but the Father is not God, which is heretical. Nor will it help to appeal to any sort of composition, since one part of a composite is never predicated of another. There remains, then, the third member, which argues for a formal distinction. For the first member affirms a conceptual distinction, and the second a real distinction; the third affirms an intermediate distinction according to which there are acknowledged in one reality formalities that are not identical on the side of the reality. This distinction surely differs both from a real distinction, which posits two realities, and from a conceptual distinction, which posits formalities that are diverse not in reality but only in the mind. Besides, real distinction and conceptual distinction do not form a complete disjunction, and therefore a third, intermediate distinction must be admitted. For through a real distinction there are posited two realities, and through a conceptual distinction there is posited one reality in such a way that every distinction is attributable to the mind alone or, if there is acknowledged a foundation in reality, at least this real foundation is not a distinction on the side of the reality itself. Obviously, therefore, a further distinction must be acknowledged according to which the mental distinction of concepts is founded upon the objective nonidentity of formalities on the side of the reality. This argument from Scotus depends on two premises, one general, the other particular. The general premise is a particular gnoseological system based on a perceptionist myth,33 namely, that truth or objectivity necessarily consists in a conformity, a similitude, a correspondence between the perceiver and the perceived. The particular premise is that in God paternity and divinity are at least conceptually distinct. This conceptual distinction is, of course, an entirely special case, since it is intimately connected with the real distinction between the divine persons. With these points presupposed, the question has to do with the truth or objectivity of this distinction, which is at least a conceptual distinction in the divine mind. 33 See above, p. 211.

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Iam vero, secundum suppositum systema gnoseologicum, haec distinctio non potest esse vera nisi correspondeat alicui non-identitati a parte rei. Atque haec non-identitas poni non potest in aliquo remoto, e.g., in non-identitate Patris et Filii, nam quaeritur de iis quae immediate a Deo Patre perfecta obiectivitate videntur. Existit ergo in re non-identitas aliqua deitatis et paternitatis, secus vera et obiectiva non esset distinctio saltem rationis quae est in mente Dei Patris immediate deitatem et paternitatem clarissime et perfectissime perspicientis. Attamen, quod necessario sequitur ex suppositis Scoti minime sequitur ubi systema suum gnoseologicum reicitur. Quare, circa divinam cognitionem dicendum est quod in Deo idem prorsus est intelligere quod est esse; unde ipsa veritas seu obiectivitas cognitionis divinae de Deo non est similitudo inter cognoscere et cognitum sed dissimilitudinis absentia. 34 Quibus positis, tollitur totum fundamentum ab argumento Scoti suppositum. Circa vero nostram cognitionem dicendum est eam non perfici donec proferatur iudicium, ut cognitio distinctionis necessario sit iudicium comparativum negativum. Unde ea definiuntur distincta quorum unum non est aliud. Realiter ergo distinguuntur quorum unum qua reale non est aliud qua reale. Ratione autem distinguuntur quorum conceptus unius non est conceptus alterius. Quae rationis distinctio subdividi potest secundum causas cur alius et alius sit conceptus; et ubi causa diversi conceptus est in re, habetur distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re; ubi autem causa diversi conceptus est in sola mente, habetur distinctio rationis tantum. Quibus addi non potest distinctio formalis a parte rei ut, scilicet, formaliter a parte rei distinguantur quorum aliud qua formale non sit aliud qua formale. Quid enim significet illud qua formale? Aut enim dicit reale aut non. Si dicit reale, tunc unum qua reale non est aliud qua reale, et habetur distinctio realis. Sin autem dicit non-reale, tunc unum qua non reale non est aliud qua non reale, et habetur distinctio quae non est a parte rei. Ad primum ergo quod in contrarium obicitur dicendum est quod maior falsum supponit. Nulla enim cognitio in dualitate radicatur, cum sensus in actu sit sensibile in actu, et intellectus in actu sit intelligibile in actu. Et multo minus divina ipsius divinitatis cognitio dualitatem importat, cum in his quae sunt sine materia idem sit intelligens et intellectum, et ipsa veritatis ratio in divina Dei cognitione non in similitudine sed in absentia dissimilitudinis consistat.

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On the presupposed gnoseological system, this distinction cannot be true unless it corresponds to some nonidentity on the side of the reality. But this nonidentity cannot be located in anything remote, such as the nonidentity of the Father and the Son, for we are inquiring about those things that are immediately seen with perfect objectivity by God the Father. Therefore there exists in the reality some nonidentity of divinity and paternity, for otherwise the at least conceptual distinction in the mind of God the Father immediately perceiving divinity and paternity with utmost clarity and perfection would not be true and objective. However, what follows necessarily from Scotus’s presuppositions by no means follows when his gnoseological system is rejected. Thus, as regards divine knowledge, it must be said that in God understanding and being are absolutely the same. Hence the very truth or objectivity of divine knowledge of God is not a similarity between knowing and the known but the absence of dissimilarity.34 On this basis the entire foundation presupposed by Scotus’s argument is removed. And in our knowledge, which is not complete until a judgment is made, knowledge of a distinction is necessarily a negative comparative judgment. Hence, those are defined as distinct of which one is not the other. Those are really distinct of which one as real is not the other as real. Those are conceptually distinct of which the concept of one is not the concept of the other. This conceptual distinction can be subdivided according to the causes of the difference in concepts: when the cause of a different concept is in the reality, the distinction is a conceptual distinction with a foundation in reality; but when the cause of the different concept is in the mind alone, there is a conceptual distinction only. To these there cannot be added any formal distinction on the side of the reality that would on the side of reality formally distinguish one as formal from another as formal. For what would ‘as formal’ mean? Either it means the real or it does not. If it means the real, then one as real is not the other as real, and so there is a real distinction. But if it does not mean the real, then one as not real is not the other as not real, and so there is a distinction that is not on the side of the reality. With regard to the first argument advanced in favor of this intermediate distinction, we must point out that its major premise rests on a false supposition. No knowledge is rooted in duality, since sense in act is the sensible in act and intellect in act is the intelligible in act. Much less does God’s knowledge of divinity entail duality, since in what is without matter the one who understands and what is understood are identical, and the very essence of the truth in divine knowledge of God consists not in similarity but in the absence of dissimilarity. 34 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m.

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Supposita ergo dualitate reiecta, sequitur nullum esse obiectum quod divinam quandam inspectionem vel realiter vel sana ratione antecedat; sequitur etiam divinum esse et divinum intelligere esse prorsus idem, ut eodem actu et sint Pater et Filius et Spiritus, et intelligant se esse Deum, et intelligant Patrem esse neque Filium neque Spiritum, Filium autem non esse Spiritum. Quae omnia uno simplicissimoque actu ita cognoscunt ut nulla sit conceptuum multiplicatio, nulla sit iudiciorum multitudo, nulla sit intelligentiae imperfectio, et nulla problemata mysteriosa infirmis nostris ratiociniis solvenda.

Quibus perspectis, absurdum fere videtur trilemma propositum. Iam enim sufficit error quo noster concipiendi modus in res materiales ita transfertur ut ipsae res non solum suis realitatibus sed etiam nostris formalitatibus constituantur atque distinguantur. At longius progreditur qui nostrum concipiendi modum a divina perfectione alienissimum in ipsam divinam realitatem quodammodo inferat. Ad secundum autem quod obiciebatur dicendum est disiunctionem inter distinctiones reales et rationis esse completam, dummodo in ipsis rebus valeat contradictionis principium. Si enim unumquodque aut est aut non est, in ipsis rebus necessario habetur aut ens aut nihil. Quare si formalitates sunt entia quorum unum non est aliud, distinctio est realis; et si formalitates non sunt entia quorum unum non est aliud, distinctio est rationis.

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Once the supposed duality is rejected, it follows that there is no object that either really or in sound reason is antecedent to some divine inspection. It also follows that the divine act of existence and the divine act of understanding are absolutely identical, so that by the very same act the Father and the Son and the Spirit are, understand that they are God, and understand that the Father is neither the Son nor the Spirit and that the Son is not the Spirit. All this they know in one most perfectly simple act, so that there is no proliferation of concepts, no multiplicity of judgments, no imperfection in understanding, and no mysterious problems for our feeble human reasoning to try to solve. Accordingly, the proposed trilemma is rather absurd. It is error enough when our manner of conceiving is transferred to material things in such a way that those things themselves are constituted and distinguished not by their own realities alone but also by our conceived formalities. But it is a much worse error when our way of conceiving things, so far removed from divine perfection, is brought to bear in some way upon the very reality of God. With regard to the second argument in favor of this distinction, we must point out that the disjunction of real distinctions and conceptual distinctions is complete, as long as the principle of contradiction is valid with regard to things themselves. For if every thing either is or is not, then in things themselves there necessarily is either being or nothing. Therefore, if the formalities are beings, one of which is not the other, the distinction is real; and if the formalities are not beings, one of which is not the other, the distinction is conceptual.

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CAPUT QUARTUM

De Divinis Personis In Se Consideratis

Post consideratas processiones et relationes, iam de ipsis personis divinis agendum est; et primo quidem de iis in se consideratis, deinde de iis inter se comparatis, 1 tertio de iis secundum habitudinem ad nos.2 Circa ipsas personas duo maxime sunt consideranda. Quare, prima quadam sectione, ratio seu definitio personae investigatur atque divinis personis applicatur; sectione autem secunda, quaeritur de attributis personarum divinarum, de proprietatibus earum actibusque notionalibus.

SECTIO PRIMA Circa rationem personae, primo, multa et diversa quae de persona sunt proposita in unitatem quandam rediguntur (Quaestio X ), deinde, Patrem, Filium, Spiritum proprie dici et esse personas probatur (Assertum VIII ), tertio, ad pleniorem rei intelligentiam adduntur varia. Ita quaeritur an Deus sit persona (Quaestio XI ), quot in divinis subsistant (Quaestio XII ), quid in divinis significetur et per nomen personae (Quaestio XIII ) et per numeros (Quaestio XIV ). Quibus perspectis, ulterius investigantur analogia personae divinae et personae creatae (Quaestio XV ), ratio personae divinae qua divinae (Quaestio XVI ), et habitudo personae tam

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CHAPTER FOUR

The Divine Persons Considered in Themselves

Having considered the processions and the relations, we must now turn our attention to the divine persons themselves. First, we will consider the persons as they are in themselves, next, the persons with respect to one another, 1 and third, the persons in their relation to us.2 Concerning the persons themselves, there are two considerations that are most important. Accordingly, in the first section of this chapter we will investigate the essential meaning or definition of person and apply it to the divine persons; in the second section we will examine the attributes of the divine persons, their properties, and the notional acts.

SECTION 1 We first bring together into some unity the several diverse proposals that have been offered regarding the meaning of person (question 10); next, we prove that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are properly called and are persons (assertion 8); and third, we add a few observations for a fuller understanding of this matter. Thus, the questions arise whether God is a person (question 11), how many subsistents there are in God (question 12), what there is in God that is signified by the word ‘person’ (question 13) and by numbers (question 14). From this we go on to investigate the analogy between a divine person and a created person (question 15), the meaning of divine person as divine (question 16), and the 1 [See chapter 5.] 2 [See chapter 6.]

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ad incommunicabilitatem quam ad communicationem interpersonalem (Quaestio XVII ). QUAESTIO X Quid sub nomine personae intelligendum esse videatur Ex antecessis constat tres esse in divinis relationes reales, subsistentes, realiter inter se distinctas, nempe, Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum sanctum. Nunc autem quaeritur utrum hae relationes re vera sint personae proprie dictae. Quare in primis determinari oportet quid sub nomine personae intelligi debeat. Cui tamen quaestioni modis quinque respondetur. Primo enim dictum est requiri quoddam nomen commune, ut quos singillatim dicamus Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum sanctum, communiter dicamus personas. Ita S. Augustinus: ‘Cum ergo quaeritur quid tria, vel quid tres, conferimus nos ad inveniendum aliquod speciale vel generale nomen quo complectamur haec tria, nec occurrit animo . . .’ 3 ‘Quaesivit quid tria diceret: et dixit substantias sive personas, quibus nominibus non diversitatem intelligi voluit sed singularitatem noluit; ut non solum ibi unitas intelligatur ex eo quod dicitur una essentia, sed et trinitas ex eo quod dicuntur tres substantiae vel personae.’4 Sed post hoc responsum fiebant definitiones quarum praecipue memorantur et Boethii, ‘rationalis naturae substantia individua,’ et Richardi de S. Victore ‘divinae naturae existentia incommunicabilis,’ et S. Thomae ‘subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali.’ Tertio, propositae sunt theoriae plus minus metaphysicae, ut Scoti, Capreoli, Caietani, Suarezii, Tiphani, et forte aliorum. Quarto, persona dicenda esse videbatur vel conscientia, vel individualitas conscia, vel distinctum centrum conscientiae, vel aliud psychologicum. Quinto, denique, ita explicatur persona ut concrete apprehendi debeat; et ita persona est quacum ineuntur relationes personales, vel cui dici potest ‘tu,’ vel quae simpliciter a genere ‘rerum’ distinguitur, vel quae naturaliter ad communicationem cum personis aliis ordinatur, et similia; quae tamen omnia non per

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relation of person to incommunicability as well as to interpersonal communication (question 17). QUESTION 10 What should be understood by the word ‘person’? From what we have said, it is clear that there are in God three real relations that are subsistent and really distinct from one another, namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Now we ask whether these relations are truly persons in the proper sense. The first thing to determine, therefore, is what is to be understood by the word ‘person.’ There are five ways in which this question is answered. First, it was observed that some common word was needed, so that those whom we singly call the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, we may speak of in common as persons. As St Augustine put it, ‘When we ask, Three what? or Three who? we are led to find some special or general word under which we may include all three, and none has occurred to us . . .’3 ‘[Human limitation] asked what it should call the Three. And it replied, “substances” or “persons.” By these names it did not wish to convey any idea of diversity, but it wished to avoid any idea of singleness, so that not only would unity be understood by speaking of one essence, but also trinity would be understood by speaking of three substances or three persons.’4 Second, after this answer, definitions were formulated, most notably that of Boethius, ‘individual substance of a rational nature,’ that of Richard of St Victor, ‘incommunicable existence of the divine nature,’ and that of St Thomas, ‘distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature.’ Third, theories that were more or less metaphysical were proposed by Scotus, Capreolus, Cajetan, Suarez, Tiphanus, and possibly others. Fourth, it seemed that the person should be said to be consciousness, or conscious individuality, or a distinct center of consciousness, or some other psychological reality. Fifth, and finally, the person is explained in such a way that it has to be apprehended concretely. Thus, a person is one with whom personal relationships are entered into, or one to whom one can say ‘you,’ or whatever is simply distinguished from the category of ‘things,’ or one who is by nature ordered to communication with other persons, and so on. These, however, are not to be understood 3 Augustine, De Trinitate, vii, iv, 7; ml 42, 939. 4 Ibid. vii, iv, 9; ml 42, 942.

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modum definitionis sunt intelligenda, sed potius per modum descriptionis eorum quae unusquisque ex propria experientia vitali atque personali recolere debeat. Cuius multitudinis non alia invenitur unitas nisi ea quae ex ipsa quaestione repetitur. Ut enim exemplo utar, secundum Aristotelem ignis erat unum de quattuor elementis, sed secundum recentiores ignis est activitas quaedam chemica. At quamvis responsa maxime inter se distent, idem sane ab Aristotele intellectum est et a recentioribus intelligitur cum quaeratur quid sit ignis. Hac enim quaestione ab utrisque significatur eadem quodammodo natura in iisdem specifice sensibilibus intelligenda. Quare, ipsa quaestio seu ipsa dynamica orientatio animi admirantis atque inquirentis, cum determinatis sensibilibus vel veris determinatis applicetur, structuram quandam heuristicam5 constituit quae quodammodo una in diversis responsis permaneat. Quod si conceditur, perspici potest quemadmodum inter se habeant quinque modi supra enumerati. Nam apud S. Augustinum notio personae divinae est ipsa quaestio, quid tres. Iam habetur structura heuristica, at nondum haberi videtur circa responsum nisi perplexitas. Apud Boethium, Richardum, S. Thomam definientes, illud est novum quod interdum quaeritur non particulariter, quid tres, seu quid sit persona divina, sed generaliter, quid sit persona.6 Proinde, cum hae definitiones clare et distincte inter se comparari non possint nisi quaestionibus metaphysicis determinetur quid sit natura intellectualis, quid substantia, quid individuum, quid existentia, quid incommunicabile, quid subsistens, quid distinctum, mirari non possumus gressum ulteriorem quo Scotus, Capreolus, Caietanus, Suarezius, Tiphanus rationem personae per theorias metaphysicas exposuerunt. At multae erant hae theoriae metaphysicae, neque tantummodo circa personam disputabatur; quare ad quaestiones gnoseologicas, quippe quoad nos magis notas, confugerunt philosophi; et cum caetera omnia psychologice declarari solerent, valde inconveniens habebatur ipsam personam aliter quam psychologice exponi. Cum denique non minus multiplicarentur theoriae gnoseologicae quam metaphysicae, recentissimi censuerunt ab omni speculatione abstinendum esse et ad

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as definitions but rather as descriptions of what everyone should find by consulting his or her own personal life experience. The only unity in all these proposals lies in the question itself. An example of this sort of unity is that, while for Aristotle fire is one of the four elements, now it is understood as a chemical reaction. Yet, however divergent these answers are, both Aristotle and modern scientists have the same thing in mind when they ask what fire is. In asking this question, both in some way have in mind the same nature that is to be understood in specifically the same sensible data. When this question, therefore, this dynamic orientation of the wondering and inquiring mind, is brought to bear upon determinate sensible data or upon determinate truths, it constitutes a heuristic structure,5 which remains somehow one whatever answers are given. Now if this is granted, then one can understand how the five ways mentioned above are related. With St Augustine the notion of divine person was the question itself, Three what? Here we have already a heuristic structure, but there was apparently no answer yet, only perplexity. What was new in the definitions of Boethius, Richard, and St Thomas is that sometimes they asked not the particular question, Three what? or, What is a divine person? but the general question, What is a person?6 Further, since these definitions cannot be clearly and distinctly compared to one another unless by raising metaphysical questions one determines what an intellectual nature is, what a substance is, what an individual is, what existence is, what is meant by ‘incommunicable,’ by ‘subsistent,’ and by ‘distinct,’ it is not surprising that Scotus, Capreolus, Cajetan, Suarez, and Tiphanus took the further step of expounding the meaning of person in terms of metaphysical theories. But there were many such metaphysical theories, and person was not the only disputed notion. So philosophers turned to gnoseological questions as being better known quoad nos; and since it was the custom to explain everything else in psychological terms, it was considered quite inappropriate to explain the person in any way other than psychologically. Since there was as great a proliferation of gnoseological as of metaphysical theories, in recent times thinkers have decided to cease all speculation and return 5 For an illustration of heuristic structure, see Lonergan, Insight, chapter 2. [See ibid. 759 for a discussion of the identity of the heuristic concept of ‘fire’ over the centuries.] 6 [The statement is not quite accurate regarding Richard. As Lonergan says in Phenomenology and Logic 332, ‘In Richard of St Victor you get another definition, this time not of a person in general but of a divine person ...’]

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ipsam vitam concretam redeundum. Qui quo magis ut homines atque veri nominis personae extiterint7 eo clarius perspiciunt quantum intercedat inter ea quae diversis pronominibus significentur. Qui enim ‘ego’ dicere potest et cui dicitur ‘tu’ sane persona est; de quo autem dicitur ‘id,’ non persona est sed res tantum. Quod cum experientiam concretam, vitalem, personalem describere velit, multipliciter exponi potest. His igitur perspectis, praeter multitudinem opinionum circa personam elucet unam quandam extitisse structuram heuristicam se temporum decursu evolventem. Ipsa enim S. Augustini particularis quaestio non omittitur cum generaliter de persona quaeratur. Neque personae definitiones praetermittuntur cum altius in fundamenta metaphysica inquiratur. Neque rerum cognitio secundum ultimas entis causas excludit entis conscii considerationem. Neque generalis consideratio entis conscii impedit quominus etiam ens sui conscium in relationibus suis concretis investigetur. Qua de causa, Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum sanctum personas esse dicemus, tum secundum nomen, tum secundum definitionem, tum secundum constitutionem metaphysicam, tum secundum conscientiam, tum secundum relationes et inter se et ad nos. Quod tamen magis particulariter declarari oportet, cum ita evolvi soleat structura heuristica ut non solum ad verum plenius cognoscendum procedat sed etiam hominis lapsi obtenebratam mentem prodat atque manifestet. Et ideo circa singula stadia aliquid dicendum videtur. In primis ergo definitio Boethii, quamvis recte exponi possit, 8 tamen non sine difficultate exponitur. Si enim persona est individua substantia rationalis naturae, tres personae, tres substantiae esse videntur; at in Deo nisi unam substantiam non admittimus; et ideo Boethii definitio secundum sonum verborum difficultates magis facit quam solvit. Definitio autem Richardi nisi momentum historicum habere non videtur; et ideo satis fore duximus in quaestione quadam annexa de ratione incommunicabilitatis disserere.9 Unde non relinquitur nisi definitio S. Thomae, quam fusius alibi iam exposuimus.10

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to concrete life. The more people ‘exist’ 7 as human beings and as persons in the true sense, the more clearly they will perceive how great is the difference in the meanings of different pronouns. For one who is able to say ‘I’ and one who can be addressed as ‘you’ are certainly persons; but whatever is referred to as ‘it’ is not a person but only a thing. This is open to explanation in many different ways, since it means describing the concrete personal experience of life that people have. This being the case, it is clear that besides the multitude of opinions about what a person is, there exists a single heuristic structure that has been developing over the course of time. St Augustine’s particular question is not left aside when we ask about the person in a general sense. Nor do we overlook the various definitions of person when we inquire more deeply into the metaphysical foundations. Nor does the knowledge of things through the ultimate causes of being exclude a study of conscious being. Nor does a general consideration of conscious being prevent us from investigating being that is conscious of itself in its concrete relationships. Accordingly, we will call the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit persons: persons in name, persons by definition, persons by reason of metaphysical constitution, persons by reason of consciousness, and persons by reason of relations both among themselves and to us. However, a more detailed clarification is needed here, since a heuristic structure generally develops in such a way that it not only leads to a fuller knowledge of the truth but also betrays and manifests the darkened mind of fallen humanity. For this reason it seems worth while to say something about individual stages in the process. First, then, although Boethius’s definition can be correctly explained, 8 still this is not easy to do. For if a person is an individual substance of a rational nature, the three persons would seem to be three substances. But we admit only one substance in God, and therefore this definition as it is worded creates more difficulties than it solves. The definition of Richard of St Victor seems to have only a certain historical importance, and so we have felt it sufficient to discuss it in a related question about the meaning of incommunicability. 9 Therefore we are left with St Thomas’s definition, which we have expounded at greater length elsewhere. 10 7 [See the section ‘Existenz’ in Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 18–31.] 8 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 29, a.1. 9 [Lonergan is referring to question 17. See below, pp. 345–51. However, Richard is not mentioned there by name.] 10 Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 8–43. [The actual definition appears at least twice in St Thomas’s works: in Super I Sententiarum, d. 23, q. 1, a. 4 c., and De potentia, q. 9, a. 4 c.]

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Deinde, quamvis auctores maxime de constitutione personae finitae disputent, 11 de constitutione personae infinitae vix disputare possunt, cum tanta sit divinae personae simplicitas ut unum idemque realiter sint eiusdem personae essentia, esse, relatio, subsistentia, proprietas, actusque notionalis. Quare, cum de realibus non sit disputandi locus, nisi de ratione personae divinae non fiunt disceptationes; quas convenientius in quaestionibus annexis absolvendas esse duximus.

Tertio, circa conscientiam et profundior et subtilior et gravior est quaestio. Et gravitas sane manifesta est: si enim tot sunt personae quot sunt conscientiae, aut tritheismus ex tribus personis concluditur, aut Deus unipersonalis propter divinam unitatem affirmatur;12 et similiter in Christologia, aut personae unitas in monophysismum aut duarum naturarum distinctio in nestorianismum conducit; neque kenoticismus re vera tertiam aperit viam. Quaestionis autem subtilitas ex ipsa conscientiae ratione oritur. Aliud enim est esse conscium aliud autem est scire (scientia proprie dicta) se esse conscium. Illud omnium est, cum nihil aliud sit quam ipsa mentis praesentia sibi; quae quidem praesentia eo ipso efficitur quod natura nostra sensitiva vel intellectualis sive apprehendendo sive appetendo actuatur; neque quidquam refert quodnam obiectum vel apprehendatur vel appetatur cum conscii et conscie alia apprehendamus et appetamus, neque ideo conscii efficiamur quod in nos ipsos convertamur, cum conscientia ex parte ipsius subiecti convertentis inveniatur et non ex parte obiecti ad quod convertatur. Qua tamen conversione peracta, incipit aliud quod scire se esse conscium dicitur. Conscius enim se ipsum ex parte obiecti sistit quatenus conscientiam intelligit atque concipit et se conscium esse vere affirmat. Qua de causa, ipsum subiectum conscium ipsaque subiecti conscientia omnem sui conscii intelligentiam et conceptionem et affirmationem et antecedit et concomitatur et, his omissis, superest; sed nisi definimus quid sit conscientia et nisi vere affirmamus

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Next, although there has been a great deal of disagreement about the constitution of a finite person,11 it is scarcely possible to dispute the constitution of an infinite person, since the simplicity of a divine person is so great that the essence, the act of existence, the relation, the subsistence, the property, and the notional act of the same divine person are one and the same. Therefore, since the realities are beyond dispute, the only disagreements are about the formality of divine person, and we have judged it more convenient to settle these in related questions. Third, the question about consciousness is more profound, more subtle, and more serious. Its seriousness is obvious: if there are as many persons as there are consciousnesses, then either three persons would mean that there are three gods or else God would be one person because of divine unity. 12 There is a similar case in Christology, where either the oneness of the person leads to monophysitism or the duality of natures leads to Nestorianism; nor does kenoticism provide a valid third way. The subtlety of the question arises from the very nature of consciousness. It is one thing to be conscious, but it is quite another to know, through knowledge in the proper sense, that one is conscious. To be conscious belongs to everyone, for consciousness is simply the presence of the mind to itself. This self-presence is effected by the very fact that our sensitive and intellectual nature is actuated by both apprehending and desiring. It does not matter what object is apprehended or desired, since we as conscious subjects consciously apprehend and desire different things. Nor do we become conscious by adverting to ourselves, since consciousness is on the side of the adverting subject and not on the side of the object adverted to. But when this adverting to ourselves is done, we begin the second step, namely, knowing that we are conscious. For one who is conscious places oneself on the side of the object inasmuch as one understands and conceives consciousness and truly affirms that one is conscious. Therefore, a conscious subject and the consciousness of the subject precede and accompany all understanding and conception and affirmation of oneself as conscious, and remain when these operations regarding oneself are omitted. But unless we define what consciousness is, and unless we 11 Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 44–75. 12 [That is, if there are as many persons as there are consciousnesses, and vice versa, then three persons would mean three consciousnesses and three separate consciousnesses would mean three gods; or, from divine unity it follows there is one consciousness, and if the number of persons is the same as the number of consciousnesses in God, there is only one person in God.]

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nos secundum definitionem esse conscios, ad scientiam proprie dictam circa propriam nostram conscientiam non pertingimus. 13 Cui subtilitati accedit quaestionis profunditas. Cognitio enim proprie humana triplici perficitur gressu, videlicet, ut primo sive externe sive interne experiamur, et deinde inquirendo circa sensibilia vel conscia intelligamus et concipiamus, et tertio reflectentes et evidentiam ponderantes verum affirmemus et per verum tamquam per medium ens cognoscamus. At aliud est triplici hoc gressu processum cognoscendi perficere, aliud autem est triplici eodem gressu cognitionem nostram triplici gressu perfectam cognoscere. Qua de causa, qui ita triplicem perficiunt gressum ut ad solum primum cognoscendum perveniant, in empiristarum abeunt partes qui aliud nobis cognoscibile non agnoscant nisi externa sensibilia et internum ‘ego’ empiricum; quod etsi manifeste pugnet cum ipsa eorum intelligentia, multis tamen et diversis modis una eademque defenditur doctrina, quae ideo aliquando materialismus, deinde sensismus, tertio empirismus, quarto phaenomenalismus, quinto positivismus, sexto pragmatismus nominatur. Alii autem ita triplicem cognitionis gressum perficiunt ut non solum primum sed etiam alterum clare distincteque perspiciant; et cum eadem sensibilia vel similia et conscia aliter ab aliis intelligi soleant, hi nominantur vel relativistae inquantum nullum intelligibile simpliciter verum habere possunt, vel immanentistae inquantum nisi per verum iis ignotum ad ens non pertingitur, vel idealistae inquantum nihil posse verum esse nisi perfectam omnium intelligibilium intelligentiam docent, vel instrumentalistae inquantum unumquodque intelligibile tamdiu verum habent quamdiu in consectaria practica et felicia conducat, etc. Alii denique non solum triplici gressu cognoscunt sed etiam ipsos tres gressus quales sint perspiciunt; et hi sunt realistae qui affirment ens nostrae cognitioni proportionatum ita potentia, forma, actuque componi, sicut et ipsa nostra cognitio experiendo, intelligendo, et iudicando perficitur.

Quae cum ita sint, qui de conscientia humana loquitur facillime in errorem abit, nisi omnes fere philosophias perspectas habet quid veri quidve falsi dicant. Quod si tam facile circa ipsam conscientiam humanam erratur, facilius se ingerit falsitas cum analogice ex conscientia humana ad divinam concipiendam proceditur.

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truly affirm that we are conscious in the sense of this definition, we do not attain knowledge, properly speaking, of our own consciousness. 13 In addition to the subtlety of the question there is its profundity. Knowledge that is properly human is achieved in three steps: first, we experience externally or internally; second, through inquiry into the data of sense or of consciousness, we understand and conceive; and third, by reflecting and pondering the evidence we affirm what is true, and through truth as through a medium we know being. But it is one thing to complete the process of knowing through these three steps and quite another to come to know by this same three-step process that our knowledge is achieved in these three steps. For this reason, in completing these three steps, those who come to know only the first step join the ranks of the empiricists, who do not acknowledge that there is anything we can know besides external sensible data and an internal empirical ‘ego.’ Despite the fact that this position is manifestly in conflict with their own intelligence, nevertheless this same position is defended in many different ways: at one time it takes the form of materialism, then of sensism, third of empiricism, fourth of phenomenalism, fifth of positivism, and sixth of pragmatism. Others, however, in completing this three-step cognitional process, do so in such a way that they clearly and distinctly grasp not only the first step but also the second. And since the same or similar data of sense and data of consciousness are wont to be understood by different persons in different ways, there are some that are called relativists, who cannot consider any intelligible to be absolutely true, or immanentists, for whom truth, through which alone being is attained, is unknown, or idealists, who hold that nothing can be true except a perfect understanding of all intelligibles, or instrumentalists, who hold that any intelligible is true only as long as it leads to successful practical results, and so forth. Others, finally, not only know by the three-step cognitional process but also grasp the nature of those three steps. They are the realists, who affirm that being that is proportionate to our knowing is composed of potency, form, and act, just as our knowing is achieved through experience, understanding, and judging. In view of this, one who discusses human consciousness will easily fall into error unless he or she has a thorough grasp of virtually all philosophies, discerning what is true from what there is false in them. But if it is so easy to err regarding human consciousness, falsity will even more easily enter in when one proceeds to conceive divine consciousness by analogy with the human. So it was not unreasonable 13 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 87, aa. 1–3. See Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 156–89. [Also relevant are ‘Christ as Subject: A Reply,’ Collection 166–68; ‘Cognitional Structure,’ ibid. 208–10; and Method in Theology 8–9.]

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Quapropter non irrationabiliter ii processerunt theologi qui de divina conscientia magis silere quam errare maluerint. At nostris temporibus longe augetur quaestionis acuitas. Nam alia ex parte clarius perspici videtur intima personae ratio: illud enim personae proprium atque distinctivum esse dicitur, quod ipsa talis sit qualem se esse posse perspexerit et fieri voluerit; quod quidem perspicere atque fieri personae fere ‘existere’14 est, neque in ideali quadam solitudine sed sub adiunctis vitae humanae concretis et una cum aliis personis perficitur. Alia autem ex parte, si haec vera sit personae humanae conceptio, haud facile proceditur ad personam divinam analogice concipiendam. Imo, quod longe gravius est, ita in subiecto insistitur et ita omne quod obiecti rationem habeat contemnitur ut haec doctrina neque cum fide neque cum theologia traditionali componi possit. Cum enim fides nostra ita sit assensus in verum (db 1789, 1791) ut, mediante vero, ad realitatem divinam nobis revelatam pertingamus, fieri non potest ut tota obiecti obiectivitatisque ratio impugnetur quin ipsa nostra fides prout a conc. Vaticano intelligitur simul reiciatur. Cum praeterea traditio catholica et theologica in vero et ente fundetur, pariter necesse est ut obiecti despectus etiam traditionalis theologiae despectus sit.

Quibus perspectis, cum opinationes recentiores neque ignorare neque negligere liceat, 15 secernendum esse censemus quod nostris temporibus vere de persona dicatur ab iis quae ex empiricismo vel immanentismo philosophico procedant. Quod enim vere de personae ratione perspicitur, non in eo fundatur quod ultra experientiam et intelligentiam in tertium nostrae cognitionis gressum non ascenditur. Quinimo, quatenus praetermittuntur rationalis reflectio, et virtualiter inconditionati perspicientia,16 et autonoma illa necessitas intelligibilis qua veri verbi dictio ex intelligentia reflexa emanat, et consequens illa necessitas pariter autonoma atque intelligibilis in qua obligatio quaedam moralis consistit et volitionis spiratio, eatenus sane ea praetermittuntur quae personae maxime sunt propria atque distinctiva.

Proinde, quamvis obiectivitatem obiectumque multipliciter dicamus pro diversitate gressuum quibus perficitur cognitio humana, caeteri sensus in hunc tamquam in principalem reducuntur, ut obiectivitas nihil sit nisi veritas, et obiectum nihil aliud dicat quam quod mediante vero innotescat. Qui sane sensus a nullo reici potest qui supremam personae

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for theologians to remain silent rather than to err on the question of divine consciousness. In our day, however, this question has become much more acute. For, on the one hand, the deepest meaning of person seems to be more clearly understood: what is said to be proper to and distinctive of a person is that a person is what one has understood one can be and what one has willed to become. This understanding and becoming of the person is for all practical purposes what is meant by Existenz. 14 It is not achieved in some ideal isolation, but in the concrete circumstances of human living and together with other persons. On the other hand, while this conception of the human person is true, it is not easy to take the next step and conceive analogically a divine person. Indeed, and far more serious, there is such an emphasis on the subject and such disdain for anything that has the formality of object that this doctrine is incompatible with both faith and traditional theology. Since our faith is an assent to the true (db 1789, 1791, ds 3008, 3010, nd 118, 120), so that through the mediation of the true we arrive at the divine reality that has been revealed to us, one cannot oppose the whole notion of object and of objectivity without at the same time rejecting our faith itself as understood by Vatican I. Moreover, since the Catholic theological tradition is founded upon truth and being, to despise the object is necessarily to despise traditional theology as well. Accordingly, since we ought neither to be ignorant of nor to disregard more recent notions,15 we hold that true contemporary opinions about the person should be separated from those that proceed from philosophical empiricism or immanentism. For a correct understanding concerning the meaning of person is not based on a position that fails to go beyond experience and understanding and to rise to the third step in human knowing. In fact, to the extent that one ignores rational reflection, the grasp of the virtually unconditioned, 16 the autonomous intellectual necessity whereby the uttering of a true word emanates from reflective understanding, and the similarly autonomous intellectual necessity consequent upon it, in which moral obligation and the spirating of volition consist – to that extent one surely ignores those features that are most proper to and distinctive of a person. Again, although we speak of objectivity and object in many different ways in keeping with the various steps in which human knowledge is achieved, all other meanings are reducible to this principal one, that objectivity is simply truth, and ‘object’ denotes only that which is known through the medium of the true. No one 14 [See above, note 7.] 15 Acta Apostolicae Sedis 42 (1950) 563 [db 2308, ds 3879]. 16 See Lonergan, Insight, chapter 10.

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perfectionem in emanationibus intelligibilibus secundum veritatem et honestatem consistere perspexerit. Neque alius obiectivitatis vel obiecti sensus exigitur, sive ut fides ad mentem concilii Vaticani acceptetur, sive ut theologiae traditionalis soliditas atque profunditas agnoscantur. Quod autem multos his in rebus decipere videtur praetereundum non esse censemus, nempe, sicut duplex est realismus, nativus scilicet atque criticus, ita etiam dupliciter dici ‘reale,’ ‘obiectum,’ ‘evidens,’ ‘cognoscere,’ et similia. Alia enim est ratio realitatis, obiectivitatis, evidentiae, cognitionis, in quantum fides quaedam animalis in mundum quendam fertur obiectorum quorum singula sunt iam, extra, ibi, nunc, et hoc sensu ‘realia.’ 17 Alia prorsus est earundem notionum ratio, in quantum mens, quaestionibus ducta, ex intelligentia eorum quae experitur naturas rerum concipit, ex inconditionato perspecto verum affirmat, et in vero tamquam in medio apprehendit ens.18

Iam vero eiusmodi est cognitionis praephilosophicae ambiguitas ut utroque modo sit realistica. Eiusmodi est immanentismi infelicitas ut realismum nativum reiciat quin ad realismum criticum perveniat. Eiusmodi est phaenomenologia transcendentalis ut a realismo nativo incipiat, ut per suspensionem quandam non solum iudicii sed etiam omnis ‘interesse’ hanc nativam realitatem tamquam phaenomenon consideret, ut praeter phaenomenon exterius etiam interna phaenomena agnoscat, ut nativam tendentiam atque orientationem reiciat quae phaenomena interna in externa reducat (mechanismus, behaviorismus), ut novam atque ‘transcendentalem’ orientationem laudet quae externa phaenomena in interna reducat.19 Quibus tamen omnibus nihil efficitur nisi realismi nativi inversio: ubi enim antea omnia reducebantur ad obiectum realismi nativi, nunc omnia reducuntur ad eiusdem realismi subiectum, subtiliori sane modo conceptum. At subiectum eiusmodi minus est quam humanum. Neque ad subiectum humanum revelandum reapse pertingitur donec per inconditionatum ad verum perveniatur et in vero, tamquam in medio, cognoscatur ens. Quod si ad verum et ens hoc sensu intellecta non attingitur, usurpari sane possunt

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who has grasped that the supreme perfection of a person consists in the intellectual emanations in the realms of truth and goodness can reject this meaning. Nor is any other meaning of objectivity or of object required either in order to accept the meaning of faith according to the First Vatican Council or in order to acknowledge the soundness and depth of traditional theology. However, we should not overlook what apparently misleads many in this matter, namely, that as there are two realisms, naive and critical, so also ‘real,’ ‘object,’ ‘evident,’ ‘to know,’ and similar notions have two different meanings. The first is a meaning of reality, objectivity, evidence, and knowledge according to which a kind of animal faith is carried toward a world of objects that are each already, out, there, now, and in this sense, ‘real.’ 17 The other, quite different meaning of these very same notions is that according to which the mind, led by questions, conceives the natures of things from an understanding of what it has experienced, affirms the true from grasping an unconditioned, and apprehends being in the true as in a medium.18 Now, the ambiguity of prephilosophic knowledge is that it is realistic in both senses. The misfortune of immanentism is that it rejects naive realism without arriving at critical realism. The character of transcendental phenomenology is that it begins from naive realism, considers this naive reality as a phenomenon by suspending not only judgment but also every ‘interest,’ recognizes internal as well external phenomena, rejects the naive tendency and orientation that reduces internal phenomena to external (mechanism, behaviorism), and extols a new ‘transcendental’ orientation that reduces external phenomena to internal. 19 All this merely produces an inversion of naive realism: where previously everything was reduced to the object of naive realism, now everything is reduced to the subject of the same realism, conceived, no doubt, in a more subtle way. But this sort of subject is less than human. Nor is anything really achieved towards revealing a human subject until the true is arrived at through an unconditioned, and being is known in the true as in a medium. But if there is no arriving at the true and being, understood in this sense, one can, of course, use the words ‘true’ 17 Ibid. 275–79. 18 [See the discussion of the meaning of object in ‘Natural Knowledge of God,’ in Bernard Lonergan, A Second Collection, ed. Bernard J. Tyrrell and William F.J. Ryan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) 121–24.] 19 Thus, among many other astute and profound observations, Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europ¨aischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Ph¨anomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die ph¨anomenologische Philosophie, ed. Walter Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954). [In English, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).]

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voces, verum et falsum, ens et esse, existens et transcendens, praesentia et participatio, sed non ideo ultra limites novi cuiusdam immanentismi re vera pervenitur. Quae omnia ideo sunt dicta ut clarius appareat quemadmodum circa conscientiam procedi oporteat. Si enim sub ratione veri et entis conscientia apprehenditur atque consideratur, simul salvantur et ipsa conscientiae ratio atque natura, et traditionalis theologiae methodus quae de veris et entibus tractat, et dogma catholicum quod per verum ad Deum qua trinum accedit. Si autem quis speciem antiquatae opinionis timet, si rationem veri et entis renuntiat ut subiectum intimius scrutetur, non solum ipse se implicat in immanentismo, idealismo, relativismo, sed etiam velit nolit in partes liberalium et modernistarum abit.

Quae cum ita sint, de conscientia personae divinae tamquam de ente per verum cognito disseramus necesse est. Quod si fit, nullo fere negotio tota res peragitur. Nam ‘intelligere inconscium’ sensu caret; pariter ‘intelligere inconscie’ sensu caret. At divinum esse est divinum intelligere; divinum ergo esse et conscium et conscie est. Praeterea, divinae processiones, divinae relationes subsistentes, et quidquid aliud realiter in Deo esse dicitur, etiam realiter cum divino esse identificantur; pariter ergo et conscia et conscie sunt. Quare, si divinae relationes reales, subsistentes, realiter inter se distinctae sunt personae, et consciae sunt personae et conscie inter se distinguuntur.

De relationibus denique interpersonalibus eadem fere est ratio. Alius enim est personalismus laudabilis et alius est personalismus exaggeratus. Exaggeratum dicimus qui, rationem veri et entis praetermittens, ad solam intersubiectivitatis experientiam attendere velit. Laudabilem autem censemus qui ita in vero insistat atque inhaereat ut verum semper sit mensura, neve umquam verum revelatum diminuatur quo clarius vel facilius cum experientia concreta, vitali, personali concordare videatur. Quibus perspectis, ad quaestionem principalem redeundum est, nempe, quid sub nomine personae intelligendum esse videatur. Quinque enim intelligimus. Nam, inprimis, persona est commune nomen quo respondemus quaerenti, quid tres? Deinde, persona est, secundum definitionem S. Thomae, subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali. Tertio, persona divina est vel relatio subsistens vel subsistens relatione distinctum. Quarto, persona divina est subiectum distinctum et sui conscium tum qua subiectum tum qua distinctum. Quinto, personae divinae

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and ‘false,’ ‘being’ and ‘existence,’ ‘existent’ and ‘transcendent,’ ‘presence’ and ‘participation,’ but without thereby really getting beyond the limits of some new immanentism. We have said all this in order that it may be seen more clearly how we ought to proceed with regard to consciousness. For if consciousness is apprehended and studied under the formality of the true and of being, then at one and the same time there are preserved the meaning and nature of consciousness, the method of traditional theology that treats truths and beings, and Catholic dogma, which through the true attains God as triune. If, however, one is afraid of what seems to be antiquated thinking, if one rejects the notions of the true and of being so that one can examine the subject more intimately, not only does one involve oneself in immanentism, idealism, and relativism, but also willy-nilly one joins the liberals and the modernists. Thus, we must discuss the consciousness of a divine person as being known through the true. If this is done, there will hardly be any difficulty in dealing with any of these questions. For ‘unconscious understanding’ makes no sense; similarly, ‘understanding unconsciously’ makes no sense. But the divine act of existence is the divine act of understanding; the divine act of existence, therefore, is conscious and consciously is. Moreover, the divine processions, the divine subsistent relations, and whatever else is said to be really in God are also really identical with the divine act of existence; they are therefore likewise conscious and consciously are. Hence, if the real, subsistent divine relations really distinct from one another are persons, those persons are conscious and are consciously distinguished from one another. Finally, the reasoning is practically the same for interpersonal relations. A praiseworthy personalism is one thing, but an exaggerated personalism is quite another. By an exaggerated personalism we mean one which, ignoring the formalities of the true and of being, wants to attend only to the experience of intersubjectivity. But we deem that personalism praiseworthy which so insists upon and adheres to the true that the true is always the measure, and revealed truth is never compromised in order that it may seem to accord more clearly and more easily with concrete personal life experience. With all this well understood, we must return to our principal question, What does it seem should be understood by the word ‘person’? The answer is that we understand five things. To begin with, ‘person’ is a common word that answers the question, Three what? Next, a person is, according to St Thomas’s definition, ‘a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature.’ Third, a divine person is a subsistent relation, or a subsistent that is distinct by reason of a relation. Fourth, a divine person is a distinct subject and is conscious of himself both as subject and as

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relationibus interpersonalibus non solum inter se referuntur sed etiam qua personae constituuntur. Quae quidem ita inter se cohaerent ut posita definitione consequantur caetera. Et ideo non omnia quinque sunt stabilienda de Patre, Filio, et Spiritu, antequam eos proprie dictas personas nominare possimus; sed sufficiet solius definitionis verificatio ut rite nomen personae iis tribuatur. E contra, cum personae notio, uti dictum est, saeculorum decursu plenius intellecta sit, quae posterioris sunt inventionis in traditione priori non inveniuntur explicite posita. Frustra apud S. Augustinum quaeres definitionem S. Thomae; neque inde legitime concludes doctrinam catholicam de personis divinis nihil aliud esse quam convenientiam nominis communis quo facilius de Patre, Filio, et Spiritu simul disseratur. Eiusmodi enim conclusio ad idem genus pertinet ac opinio reprobata, nempe, ‘ad pristinos fontes redeundum est et ex antiquorum scriptis recentiora Magisterii constitutiones ac decreta explicanda sunt.’ 20 Similiter, quamvis theologi mediaevales data opera de conscientia minime disputare soliti sint, satis patet catholicos nedum theologos sed ne fideles quidem umquam Deum inconscium vel personas divinas inconscias adorasse. Quis enim ab inconscio peteret misericordiam, vel quis eam petendam non habet? Quod si ad sensum fidelium pertinet divinas personas esse conscias, theologi est viam quaerere ad hanc conscientiam clare distincteque declarandam, ne ipse illius servi inutilis reprehensionem audiat, qui talentum domini acceptum in confossa terra abdidit.

ASSERTUM VIII Relationes divinae reales, subsistentes, et inter se realiter distinctae proprie dicuntur et sunt personae. Termini relatio: ordo unius ad aliud. divina: increata. realis: quae non tantum cogitatur sed etiam esse vere affirmatur. subsistens: ens simpliciter; id quod est; et ideo subsistentia non sunt (1) accidentia quae insunt ei quod est, (2) principia entis intrinseca quae ipsa non sunt sed iis

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distinct. Fifth, by reason of their interpersonal relations the divine persons are not only related to one another but are also constituted as persons. All of this is so coherent that everything else follows from the definition. Therefore, not all five of the above need to be verified concerning the Father, the Son, and the Spirit before we can identify them as persons properly so called; the verification of the definition alone suffices for rightly calling them persons. On the other hand, since the notion of person, as we have said, became more fully understood over the centuries, later developments are not found explicitly stated in the earlier tradition. You will look in vain for St Thomas’s definition in the works of St Augustine; but it is illegitimate to conclude from this that the Catholic doctrine of the divine persons is merely the convenience of a common name that allows us to speak more easily about the Father, Son, and Spirit taken together. Such a conclusion falls into the category of an opinion that has been condemned as follows: ‘One must have recourse to the early sources [of revelation], and the more recent constitutions and decrees of the magisterium are to be explained by means of the ancient documents.’ 20 Similarly, although medieval theologians usually did not expressly discuss consciousness, it is quite clear that neither Catholic theologians nor even the Catholic faithful ever adored an unconscious God or unconscious divine persons. Who would ever ask for mercy from an unconscious being, and who does not think it must be asked for? But if it belongs to the sensus fidelium that the divine persons are conscious, it belongs to theologians to look for a way to provide a clear and distinct explanation regarding this consciousness, lest they incur the reproach of being useless servants who have buried the talent they have received from the Lord [Matthew 25.14–30]. ASSERTION 8 The real, subsistent divine relations, really distinct from one another, are properly called and are persons. Terminology relation: the order of one to another. divine: uncreated. real: what is not only thought but truly affirmed to be. subsistent : a being in the strict sense; that which is. Therefore, the following are not subsistents: (1) accidents, which are in something that is; (2) intrinsic principles of a being, which themselves are not but are that by which is constituted that 20 Acta Apostolicae Sedis 42 (1950) 568.

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constituitur id quod est, (3) possibilia quae esse possunt sed non sunt, et (4) entia rationis quae cogitantur tantum sed esse non vere affirmantur. realiter distincta sunt quorum unum qua reale non est aliud qua reale. proprie dicuntur: secundum ipsam rei rationem dicuntur, et ideo non secundum sensum translatum uti in metaphora, metonymia, etc. persona: subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali. natura: principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens. intellectualis: quae respicit totum ens, totum verum, totum bonum. Status quaestionis Argumentum iam pridem inceptum saepiusque explicatum continuatur. Quod enim via analytica ex fontibus revelationis certo concluditur, idem ipsum via synthetica aliquatenus intelligitur. Credere enim iubemur ut intelligamus. Via ergo analytica ex creditis concludimus ut plenius, accuratius, distinctius credamus. Via autem synthetica ad fructum intelligentiae percipiendum procedimus.

Praesentis ergo quaestionis status eiusmodi est ut alia et multa iam peracta praesupponuntur neque illis nunc addatur nisi unum quoddam atque parvulum intelligentiae elementum. Praesupponuntur enim omnia prorsus quae in via analytica ex fontibus revelationis directe vel indirecte concluduntur, sive circa alias quaestiones, sive etiam circa quaestionem praesentem. Praesupponuntur etiam omnia quae capite secundo de processionibus et capite tertio de relationibus aliqualiter intellecta sunt. Quae cum praesupponantur, hic non repetuntur. Illud ergo unum parvulumque intelligentiae elementum nunc assequendum nihil aliud est quam perspicere nexum hoc in asserto positum, nempe, si sunt relationes divinae reales, subsistentes, et inter se realiter distinctae, sunt veri nominis personae.

Argumentum Relationes divinae reales, subsistentes, et inter se realiter distinctae proprie dicuntur et sunt personae si sunt subsistentia, distincta, et in natura intellectuali. 21

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which is; (3) possible beings, which can be but are not; and (4) conceptual beings, which are only thought of but are never truly affirmed to be. really distinct : one as real is not the other as real. are properly said: that is, according to the very nature of something, and so not in a transferred sense, as in a metaphor or by metonymy or by similar figures of speech. person: a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature. nature: the principle of movement and of rest in that in which it is primarily and per se and not by accident. intellectual: what regards all being, all truth, all good. The State of the Question Our argument, begun very early on and frequently developed further, is continued here. For the certain conclusions that are drawn from the sources of revelation in the way of analysis are precisely what are to some extent understood in the way of synthesis. We are bidden to believe in order to understand. Therefore, in the way of analysis we draw conclusions from what we believe in order to believe more fully, more accurately, more precisely; but in the way of synthesis we proceed to gather the fruit of our understanding. The state of the present question is such that the many other points that have been made are presupposed, and nothing is added to them now save one small element of understanding. For there are presupposed all the conclusions drawn directly or indirectly in the way of analysis from the sources of revelation concerning the other questions and also concerning this present question. There are presupposed as well all the points that have to a considerable degree been understood in chapter 2 concerning the processions and in chapter 3 concerning the relations. Since all these are presupposed, there is no need to repeat them here. The one small element of understanding that must now be added is simply to grasp the connection expressed in this assertion, namely, that if there are divine relations that are real, subsistent, and really distinct from one another, they are persons in the true sense of the word. Argument The real, subsistent divine relations, really distinct from one another, are properly called and are persons if they are subsistents, distinct, and in an intellectual nature.21 21 [The statement would seem tautological, if the words ‘in an intellectual nature’ were not added. The meaning seems to be that the real divine relations are properly

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Atqui sunt subsistentia, distincta, et in natura intellectuali. Ergo proprie dicuntur et sunt personae. Maior desumitur ex definitione personae. Minor per partes probatur. (1) Sunt subsistentia. Nam agitur non de relationibus ut relationibus (scilicet, de paternitate, filiatione, spiratione) sed de relationibus subsistentibus quae sunt Pater, Filius, Spiritus, quorum unusquisque est Deus et ens simpliciter et ipsum esse subsistens. (2) Sunt distincta. Nam agitur de relationibus divinis realibus inter se realiter distinctis. Quia agitur de relationibus divinis realibus, agitur de iis quae realiter distinguuntur ab omni creatura. Quia agitur de relationibus realiter inter se distinctis, agitur de iis quae realiter distinguuntur non solum a creaturis sed etiam intra ipsam divinitatem. (3) Sunt in intellectuali natura tum inquantum subsistunt tum etiam inquantum inter se realiter distinguuntur. Nam inquantum subsistunt, sunt Deus. Atqui Deus est in intellectuali natura quia omnia entia ordinate intelligit intelligendo ipsum ens per essentiam, et omnia vera ordinate scit sciendo ipsum verum per essentiam, et omnia bona ordinate vult volendo ipsum bonum per essentiam. Ergo relationes divinae reales, inquantum subsistunt, perfectissime sunt in natura intellectuali cum perfectissime et se et omnia alia intelligunt, sciunt, et volunt. Et praeterea, inquantum inter se realiter distinguuntur, relationes divinae reales sunt in natura intellectuali. Nam sunt, mutuo opponuntur, et realiter inter se distinguuntur hae relationes secundum emanationes intellectuales et intellectualiter conscias; sed emanationes intellectuales et intellectualiter consciae esse non possunt nisi inquantum natura est intellectualis; ergo relationes divinae reales, inquantum inter se realiter distinguuntur, sunt in natura intellectuali. QUAESTIO XI Quo sensu Deus sit persona Secundum conc. Lateranense IV (db 432), Deus est et Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus; et ideo cum Pater et Filius et Spiritus sint tres personae, etiam Deus est tres personae.22

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But they are subsistents, distinct, and in an intellectual nature. Therefore they are properly called and are persons. The major premise is taken from the definition of person. The minor premise is proven as follows in three parts. (1) They are subsistents. For it is not relations as relations (paternity, filiation, and spiration) that we are discussing, but the subsistent relations that are Father, Son, and Spirit, each of whom is God and being in the strict sense, and subsistent existence itself. (2) They are distinct. For we are discussing real divine relations that are really distinct from one another. Since we are discussing real divine relations, we are discussing what are really distinct from every creature. And since we are discussing relations that are really distinct from one another, we are discussing what are really distinct not only from creatures but also within the divinity itself. (3) They are in an intellectual nature both as subsisting and as really distinct from one another. As subsisting, they are God. But God is in an intellectual nature, for God understands all beings in an ordered way by understanding being itself by essence, knows all truths in an ordered way by knowing truth itself by essence, and wills all good things in an ordered way by willing good itself by essence. It follows, then, that the real divine relations, as subsistent, are in an intellectual nature in the most perfect way, since they most perfectly understand, know, and will both themselves and everything else. Besides, precisely as really distinct from one another, the real divine relations are in an intellectual nature. For these relations are, are mutually opposed, and are really distinct from one another, all on the basis of emanations that are intellectual and intellectually conscious. But intellectual and intellectually conscious emanations are impossible unless the nature is intellectual; therefore, real divine relations, as really distinct from one another, are in an intellectual nature. QUESTION 11 In what sense is God a person? According to the Fourth Lateran Council (db 432, ds 804, nd 318), God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit; and therefore, since the Father and the Son and the Spirit are three persons, God also is three persons. 22 called and are persons if they satisfy the definition of person, that is, if they are subsistent, distinct, and in an intellectual nature. See the brief statement ad maiorem immediately following.] 22 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 39, a. 6.

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Secundum idem concilium, ‘in Deo solummodo Trinitas est, non quaternitas’; et ideo Deus non est quarta quaedam persona praeter Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum. Cuius ratio est quod persona est subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali; et cum Pater sit Deus, non realiter distinguitur Deus a Patre; et similiter de aliis. Et ob eandem rationem Deus Spirator est duae personae, nempe, Pater et Filius; neque Spirator est alia persona praeter Patrem et Filium. At ulterius quaeritur quo sensu Deus sit persona, cum ita cognoscatur Deus ut ignoretur SS. Trinitas. Et in primis respondetur hanc quaestionem esse non de Deo sed de conceptu et quidem de conceptu qua imperfecto. Et praeterea additur conceptum magis imperfectum et conceptum minus imperfectum esse duos conceptus qui inter se comparantur non secundum identitatem realem obiecti sed secundum mutationem intentionalem subiecti. Quibus positis, dicendum est quod per nomen, Deus, intelligitur ‘habens divinam naturam,’ quod est ‘subsistens in divina natura,’ quod est ‘subsistens in natura intellectuali.’ Praeterea, ex hypothesi, ignoratur SS. Trinitas et ideo pariter ignoratur personam esse ‘subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali,’ nam hac in definitione non ponitur ‘distinctum’ nisi post cognitam SS. Trinitatem. Qua de causa, qui ita Deum cognoscit ut SS. Trinitatem ignoret, cognoscit ‘subsistens in natura intellectuali’ et ignorat ‘subsistens in natura intellectuali’ non esse personam per definitionem. Aliis verbis, propter ignorantiam tum SS. Trinitatis tum personae, cognoscit Deum ut personam.

QUAESTIO XII Quot sint in divinis quae subsistant Subsistens idem dicit quod ens simpliciter, seu id quod est, seu id quod in tali gradu ontologico invenitur ut principio entis constitutivo, et accidente, et possibili, et ente rationis sit perfectius. Cum tamen quaeratur quot sint quae subsistant, implicite additur alia ratio super rationem subsistentis; nam non connumerantur nisi quae inter se distinguuntur. Et ideo idem est quaerere quot sint subsistentia distincta ac quaerere quot sint subsistentia. Iam vero subsistens distinctum est suppositum. 23 In divinis autem sunt tria et tantummodo tria supposita. Et ideo ad quaestionem respondendum est esse in divinis tria quae subsistant.

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According to the same Council, ‘In God there is only a trinity, not a quaternity.’ Therefore God is not some fourth person besides the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. The reason is that a person is a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature; and since the Father is God, God is not really distinct from the Father, and so in the case of the other persons. And for the same reason God the Spirator is two persons, namely, the Father and the Son; nor is the Spirator another person besides the Father and the Son. But it may be further asked in what sense God is a person, since God can be known without the Most Holy Trinity being known. The first thing to say is that this question is not about God but about a concept and, indeed, about a concept as imperfect. Then there is added the fact that a more imperfect concept and a less imperfect concept are two concepts compared to each other not on the basis of the real identity of the object but on the basis of an intentional change in the subject. On these grounds, it must be said that the word ‘God’ is understood to mean ‘having a divine nature,’ which means ‘subsisting in a divine nature,’ which in turn means ‘subsisting in an intellectual nature.’ Furthermore, according to the supposition the Trinity is unknown, and it is therefore likewise unknown that a person is ‘a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature,’ since the word ‘distinct’ was not added to the definition until after the Trinity was known. Therefore, one who knows God but does not know the Trinity knows ‘a subsistent in an intellectual nature’ and does not know that ‘a subsistent in an intellectual nature’ does not satisfy the definition of person. In other words, one who is ignorant of both the Trinity and the definition of person thinks of God as a person. QUESTION 12 How many are there that subsist in God? A subsistent is the same as a being in the strict sense, or that which is, or that which is found at such an ontological level that it is more perfect than a constitutive principle of being, or an accident, or a possible being, or a conceptual being. However, since we are asking how many there are that subsist, we implicitly add another formality to that of subsistent, for we number only what are distinct from one another. Hence to ask how many distinct subsistents there are is the same as asking how many subsistents there are. Now a distinct subsistent is a supposit.23 But in God there are three and only three supposits. Therefore, the answer to this question is that in God there are three that subsist. 23 [On supposit, see Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 34–41.]

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Quod si instatur quod Deus subsistit, respondetur hoc minime negari. Quamvis enim Deus subsistat, non tamen subsistit ut quartus praeter Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum, cum ab iis non realiter distinguatur. Quod si instatur quod Deus ratione a personis distinguitur, respondetur distinctiones rationis fundare enumerationes eorum quae sint non in Deo sed in nostra mente. Quod si instatur in divinis non esse nisi unum esse subsistens, unum subsistere, unum subsistendi principium, haec sunt omnino concedenda. Nam secundum modum significandi haec dicunt non id quod est sed id quo est; et ideo clare respiciunt non divinas personas sed communem substantiam. Quod si instatur relationes non addere ulterius quoddam subsistere super ipsum esse subsistens et ideo facere non posse ut sint tria subsistentia, respondetur obiectionem supponere falsum, nempe, relationes addere realiter super ipsum esse subsistens et cum eo componi. Re vera, relationes sunt idem quod ipsum esse subsistens et, quia idem sunt, pariter subsistunt. Quod si relationes tres realiter inter se distinctae subsistunt, sunt in divinis tria quae subsistunt.

QUAESTIO XIII Quid nomen personae significet in divinis Respondetur personam in divinis significare individuum vagum. 24 Ad cuius tamen intelligentiam ordiendum est a Socrate, qui secundum genus est animal, secundum speciem est homo, secundum individuum singulare est Socrates, sed secundum individuum vagum est persona. Ubi notandum est quod nomina generica vel specifica, etiam singulariter usurpata ut hoc animal, hic homo, Socrati imponuntur ex natura animalis rationalis et hanc Socratis naturam significant. Nomina autem individua, uti Socrates vel persona, significant in recto quoddam subsistens et in obliquo naturam in qua individuum subsistit. Denique illud intercedit inter individuum singulare et individuum vagum, quod persona dicitur sive de Socrate sive de Platone sive de Aristotele, sed Socrates dicitur de solo Socrate. Proinde in divinis Pater et Filius et Spiritus nominant individua singularia, persona autem nominat individuum vagum. At neque in divinis neque in humanis datur quidquam

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If one objects that God subsists, we answer that we do not in the least deny this. For although God does subsist, God does not subsist as a fourth over and above the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, since God is not really distinct from these three. If one objects that God is conceptually distinct from the persons, our answer is that conceptual distinctions are grounds for numbering not what are in God but what are in our minds. If one objects that in God there is only one subsistent act of existence, one act of subsisting, one principle of subsisting, we fully agree. For according to the mode of signifying, these refer not to that which is but to that by which something is. Clearly, then, they regard not the divine persons but the common substance. If one objects that the relations do not add any further act of subsisting to subsistent existence itself and therefore cannot bring it about that there be three subsistents, our answer is that the objection contains a false supposition, namely, that the relations really add something to subsistent existence itself and enter into composition with it. But in fact the relations are the same as subsistent existence itself, and, since they are the same, they likewise subsist. But if the three relations really distinct from one another subsist, there are in God three that subsist. QUESTION 13 What does the word ‘person’ mean in regard to God? In God, ‘person’ signifies an individual in an indeterminate sense, an individuum vagum.24 To understand this, let us begin with Socrates, whose genus is animal, whose species is human, whose determinate individuality is to be Socrates, but whose individuality in an indeterminate sense is to be a person. Note that generic and specific predicates, even when used in the singular, as ‘this animal,’ ‘this man,’ are applied to Socrates by reason of the nature of a rational animal and signify this nature of Socrates. But terms referring to individuals, such as ‘Socrates’ or ‘person,’ directly signify a subsistent and indirectly the nature in which the individual subsists. Finally, there is this difference between a determinate individual and an individual in an indeterminate sense, that ‘person’ is predicated of Socrates or of Plato or of Aristotle, but ‘Socrates’ is said only of Socrates. Accordingly, in God, ‘Father,’ ‘Son,’ and ‘Spirit’ name determinate individuals, while ‘person’ names an individual indeterminately. But neither in divinity nor in humanity is there anything indeterminate that exists in reality, and therefore 24 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 30, a. 4.

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vagum a parte rei, et ideo illud commune quod per personam significatur est secundum rationem, nempe, rationem subsistentis distincti in natura intellectuali. Attamen illud intercedit inter nomen personae applicatum divinis et humanis, quod humanis quidem applicatur per modum cuiusdam universalis cum de multis praedicetur secundum esse differentibus, sed divinis applicatur tribus quae tamen nisi unum esse non habent.

QUAESTIO XIV Quid in divinis significent numeri Respondetur numeros dupliciter definiri posse. Uno modo, secundum materialem multiplicationem enumeratorum; et ita enumerantur digiti tangendo primum, alterum, tertium, etc., vel subtilius ita enumerantur ipsi actus enumerandi ut sine fine procedi possit. Porro, cum Deus sit prorsus immaterialis, numeri hoc sensu intellecti in divinis inveniri non possunt. Alio ergo modo definiuntur numeri per propositiones hypotheticas. Si enim ponuntur sequentes propositiones: (1) A est; B est; C est; D est; ... (2) A est neque B neque C neque D neque ... (3) B est neque C neque D neque ... (4) C est neque D neque ... tunc definiri possunt numeri per sequentia: Est unum, si verae sunt propositiones (1) non autem (2), (3), ... Sunt duo, si verae sunt propositiones (1) et (2) non autem (3), ... Sunt tria, si verae sunt propositiones (1), (2), (3) non autem (4), et ita in infinitum procedi potest. Iam vero numeri sic definiti non ponunt nisi ens et negationes, ens quidem per propositiones (1), negationes autem per propositiones (2), (3), (4), ... Et numeri eiusmodi inter philosophos nominantur transcendentales, quia materialem multiplicationem non supponunt.25 Proinde, cum vera sint sequentia: Pater est; Filius est; Spiritus est; Pater est neque Filius neque Spiritus; Filius non est Spiritus; et ‘in Deo solummodo Trinitas est, non quaternitas’ (db 432); sequitur numerum ternarium transcendentalem esse ponendum in divinis. 26

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the common element that ‘person’ signifies is what is common according to a formality, namely, the formality of a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature. Still, there is this difference between the word ‘person’ as applied to God and as applied to humans, that it is applied to the latter as a universal, since it is predicated of many who differ in their acts of existence, whereas it is applied to the divine Three who nevertheless have but one act of existence. QUESTION 14 What do numbers signify in God? Numbers can be defined in two ways. According to the first way, they are defined on the basis of the material multiplicity of what are numbered. In this way, you can number your fingers by touching the first, the second, the third, and so on. More subtly, you can count the acts of numbering themselves all the way to infinity. However, since God is absolutely immaterial, numbers in this sense do not apply to God. According to the second way, numbers are defined by hypothetical propositions. For if one states the following propositions: (1) A is; B is; C is; D is; . . . (2) A is neither B nor C nor D nor . . . (3) B is neither C nor D nor . . . (4) C is neither D nor . . . then numbers can be defined by the following: There is one, if propositions (1) are true but not (2), (3), . . . There are two, if propositions (1) and (2) are true but not (3), . . . There are three, if propositions (1), (2), (3) are true but not (4), and so on to infinity. Now, numbers defined in this way state only being and negations – being in propositions (1), negations in propositions (2), (3), (4), . . . Philosophers call numbers of this kind transcendental, since they do not suppose material multiplicity. 25 Therefore, since the following propositions are true: ‘The Father is’; ‘the Son is’; ‘the Spirit is’; ‘the Father is not the Son or the Spirit’; ‘the Son is not the Spirit’; and ‘in God there is only a trinity, not a quaternity’ (db 432, ds 804, nd 318), it follows that the transcendental number three must be affirmed in God. 26 25 [This (Scholastic) philosophical notion of transcendental number is not the same as the mathematical notion of transcendental number. Lonergan refers to the latter in Phenomenology and Logic 60.] 26 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 30, a. 3.

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QUAESTIO XV Quod analogice dicitur persona de divinis et de creatis Univoca ponunt idem in multis; aequivoca ponunt diversa; analoga denique idem dicunt quod tamen aliter in aliis verificatur. Iam vero persona non dicitur aequivoce de divinis et de creatis. In utrisque enim eadem verificatur definitio, nempe, subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali. Neque dicitur persona univoce de divinis et de creatis. In creatis, enim, tot sunt personae quot sunt substantiae. In divinis, autem, tres sunt personae, sed una tantummodo est substantia. Relinquitur ergo ut analogice dicatur persona de divinis et de creatis, cum in utrisque eadem verificetur definitio et tamen aliter in divinis et aliter in creatis veritatem habeat. Quae quidem analogia proxime in eo est quod aliter distinguuntur personae divinae et creatae. Creatae enim personae secundum substantiam distinguuntur, angeli quidem secundum distinctionem substantialem et specificam, homines autem secundum distinctionem substantialem et numericam. Divinae autem personae distinguuntur, non secundum substantiam cum consubstantiales sint, sed secundum relationes uti in conc. Florentino dicitur, ‘omniaque sunt unum ubi non obviat relationis oppositio’ (db 703). Quod si quis ulterius inquirit cur haec differentia inter personas divinas et creatas inveniatur, ad differentias naturae intellectualis recurrendum est. Intellectus enim definitur per habitudinem ad ens; nam intellectus est quo est omnia fieri; et omnia ad nullum genus restringitur. Sed alius intellectus se habet ad totum ens ut actus; et hic est intellectus infinitus atque divinus qui et se comprehendit et omnia alia in se intelligit. Alius autem intellectus se habet ad totum ens ut potentia, et quidem dupliciter: uno modo, ut semper sit in actu respectu suorum intelligibilium, et hic est intellectus angelicus; alio modo, ut de potentia in actum procedat, et hic est intellectus humanus.27 Porro, ad has differentias circa naturam intellectualem sequuntur differentiae circa subsistentiam. Si enim natura intellectualis est actus totius entis, est infinita, a se, et omnino simplex. Quia omnino simplex est, nulla datur realis distinctio inter id quod est et id quo est. Quia

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QUESTION 15 Is ‘person’ predicated analogously of God and of creatures? Univocal predicates affirm the same thing about several individuals; equivocal predicates affirm different things; analogous predicates state the same thing, which, however, is verified differently in different individuals. Now, ‘person’ is not predicated equivocally of God and of creatures, for in each case the same definition is verified, namely, a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature. Nor is ‘person’ predicated univocally of God and of creatures. For in creatures there are as many persons as there are substances, whereas in God there are three persons but only one substance. It remains, therefore, that ‘person’ is predicated analogously of God and of creatures, since in each case the same definition is verified, and yet it has truth in different ways in God and in creatures. This analogy is based proximately on the fact that divine persons and created persons are distinguished differently. Created persons are distinguished on the basis of substance – angels on the basis of specific substantial distinction, humans on the basis of numerical substantial distinction. The divine persons, however, are distinguished not on the basis of substance, since they are consubstantial, but on the basis of relations, as stated by the Council of Florence: ‘everything is one where there is no distinction by relational opposition’ (db 703, ds 1330, nd 325). If you wish to inquire further why there exists this difference between divine and created persons, you must refer to differences in intellectual nature. Intellect is defined by its relation to being; for intellect is that which can become all things, and ‘all’ is not restricted to any genus. But there is one intellect that is related as act to all being, and this is the infinite intellect of God, which comprehends in itself both itself and everything else. Another kind of intellect is related as potency to all being, and this in two ways: first, as one that is always in act with respect to its own intelligibles, and this is the angelic intellect; and second, as one that proceeds from potency to act, and this is the human intellect. 27 Further, certain differences concerning subsistence follow upon these differences in intellectual nature. If an intellectual nature is the act of all being, it is infinite, a se (from itself), and absolutely simple. Because it is absolutely simple, there is no real distinction between that which is and that by which it is. And because there is no such 27 Ibid. 1, q. 79, a. 2.

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nulla talis datur distinctio, omne quod ei inest est quod est et subsistens, uti supra de relationibus divinis qua subsistentibus diximus. Si autem natura intellectualis est finita, datur oppositio inter finitudinem propriae realitatis et infinitatem obiecti adaequati, nempe, entis totius. Propter hanc oppositionem demonstrat Aquinas in omni natura intellectuali finita realiter distingui haec quattuor, nempe, substantiam, esse, potentiam operandi, et ipsam operationem. 28 Propter has distinctiones reales inter ipsum subsistens et causas intrinsecas quibus constituitur, manifestum est quod non omne quod intellectuali naturae finitae inest etiam est id quod est seu subsistens. Denique ad has differentias circa subsistentiam sequuntur differentiae circa distinctionem. Quia enim in natura intellectuali infinita non datur distinctio inter quod est et quo est, sequitur relationes divinas reales esse subsistentes; et ulterius quia hae relationes reales mutuo opponuntur, sequitur eas esse realiter inter se distinctas. Unde in natura intellectuali infinita subsistens distinctum est relatio subsistens. Quia autem in natura intellectuali finita aliud est quod est et alia sunt quibus est, patet aliud esse ipsum subsistens, alias esse causas intrinsecas quibus constituitur subsistens, neque ullam ex his causis esse subsistentem. Quamvis ergo subsistens finitum in natura intellectuali et distinctum sit et relationes habeat, tamen sicut et ipsum subsistens ita etiam subsistentis distinctio et subsistentis relationes causas intrinsecas habent; et ex his causis intrinsecis subsistit nulla. Et ideo in natura intellectuali finita fieri non potest ut distinctio ex relatione subsistente proveniat; nam in tali natura habentur et subsistens et distinctum et relatum ex causis quae non subsistunt et, cum omnis relatio sit subiecti ordo ad aliud, per prius habetur subsistens distinctum, quod est subiectum, quam habeatur eiusdem ordo ad aliud.

QUAESTIO XVI Quaenam sit ratio personae qua divinae Cum communis ratio personae sit analoga, quaeritur quaenam sit ratio ad quam pervenitur cum concipiatur persona non secundum rationem personis divinis et creatis communem sed secundum rationem personae divinae propriam.

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distinction, all that is in it is that which is and is subsistent, as we have said above concerning the divine relations as subsistents. If, however, the intellectual nature is finite, there is an opposition between the finitude of its own reality and the infinity of its adequate object, total being. Because there is this opposition, Aquinas proves that in every finite intellectual nature these four are really distinct: substance, act of existence, operational potency, and operation itself.28 On account of these real distinctions between a subsistent itself and the intrinsic causes by which it is constituted, it is manifest that not everything that is in a finite intellectual nature is also that which is, or subsistent. Finally, as a consequence of these differences regarding subsistence, there are differences regarding distinction. Since in the infinite intellectual nature there is no distinction between that which is and that by which it is, it follows that the real divine relations are subsistent; and further, since these real relations are mutually opposed, it follows that they are really distinct from one another. Hence, in the infinite intellectual nature a distinct subsistent is a subsistent relation. In a finite intellectual nature, on the other hand, that which is and that by which it is are different, and therefore it is obvious that the subsistent itself and the intrinsic causes by which it is constituted are not the same, and that none of these causes is subsistent. Therefore, although a finite subsistent in an intellectual nature both is distinct and has relations, nevertheless, just as the subsistent itself has intrinsic causes, so also do the distinction of the subsistent and the relations of the subsistent have intrinsic causes, and none of these intrinsic causes subsists. Hence, in a finite intellectual nature it is impossible for a distinction to result from a subsistent relation; for in such a nature the subsistent, the distinct, and the related are from causes that do not subsist; and since every relation is an order of the subject to another, the distinct subsistent, which is the subject, is prior to its order to another. QUESTION 16 What is the meaning of person as divine? Since the common meaning of person is analogous, the question arises about the essential meaning we arrive at when we form the concept of person, not according to the meaning that is common to both divine and created persons, but according to the meaning proper to a divine person. 28 Ibid. q. 54, aa. 1–3.

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Quae quidem quaestio hanc habet difficultatem quod Deus non est in ullo genere, sive proprie ut species, sive per reductionem. 29 Quam ob causam, cum rationem divinae personae quaeramus dupliciter responderi potest et debet, quo clarius appareat quantum a sublimi perfectione divina nostri conceptus deficiant. Primo enim modo concipitur persona divina ut relatio subsistens; et secundum hoc dicimus personas divinas esse Patrem divinum, Filium divinum, Spiritum divinum; ut ponatur relatio in recto (Pater, Filius, Spiritus) et addatur essentia in obliquo (‘divinus’ enim divinitatem seu essentiam divinam importat). Alio autem modo concipitur persona divina tamquam essentia per relationem distincta; et secundum hoc dicimus personas divinas esse Deum Patrem, Deum Filium, Deum Spiritum; ut in recto ponatur essentia per modum hypostasis (ponitur enim Deus non divinitas) et in obliquo addatur relatio (Pater enim paternitatem importat, Filius filiationem, Spiritus spirationem passivam). Quare S. Thomas: ‘. . . hoc nomen persona significat relationem in recto et essentiam in obliquo: non tamen relatio inquantum est relatio [v.g., paternitas], sed inquantum significatur per modum hypostasis [v.g., Pater]. Similiter etiam significat essentiam in recto et relationem in obliquo, inquantum essentia est idem quod hypostasis [i.e., non deitas sed Deus]; hypostasis autem significatur in divinis ut relatione distincta; et sic relatio, per modum relationis significata [v.g., paternitas], cadit in rationem personae in obliquo.’30 Neque inter has duas rationes quaerendum videtur quaenam sit verior. Ideo enim habentur duae rationes quia id quod in se est simplex per multa concipimus. Nam ad rationem personae divinae constituendam concurrunt tum essentia tum relatio tum subsistentia; et cum in divinis pariter subsistant et essentia et relatio, persona divina pariter concipitur sive ponitur essentia subsistens per relationem distincta sive ponitur relatio subsistens per simplicissimam realitatem divinam. Obicitur. Dixerit tamen quispiam subsistentiam magis ad essentiam quam ad relationem pertinere. At quamvis hoc verum sit de rebus creatis, non ideo verum est in divinis. Cum enim in divinis non detur distinctio inter id quod et id quo, nihil in divinis est reale quin eo ipso sit subsistens. Praeterea, quamvis nos concipiamus prius essentiam quam relationem,

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The difficulty in this question is that God is not in any genus, either properly as a species or by reduction.29 For this reason, when we ask about the essential meaning of a divine person, the answer can and ought to be given in two different ways, in order that it may be clearly seen how far our concepts fall short of the sublime perfection of God. According to the first way, a divine person is conceived as a subsistent relation, and in this way we say that the divine persons are the divine Father, the divine Son, and the divine Spirit, thereby directly stating a relation (Father, Son, Spirit) and indirectly adding the essence; for ‘divine’ implies divinity, or divine essence. According to the second way, a divine person is conceived as an essence that is distinct by a relation. In this way we say that the divine persons are God the Father, God the Son, and God the Spirit, so that we directly state an essence in the form of a hypostasis (we say ‘God,’ not ‘divinity’), and indirectly add a relation: ‘Father’ implies paternity, ‘Son’ filiation, and ‘Spirit’ passive spiration. For this reason St Thomas says, ‘. . . this word “person” directly signifies a relation and indirectly an essence; yet not a relation as a relation [paternity, for example], but as signified in the form of a hypostasis [Father]. Similarly, “person” directly signifies essence and indirectly relation, since the essence is the same as the hypostasis [that is, not divinity but God]. But a hypostasis in God is signified as being distinct by a relation, and thus relation, signified in the form of a relation [for example, paternity], indirectly enters into the definition of person.’ 30 It would seem pointless to ask which of these meanings is more correct. We have two meanings because we form many concepts of what is in itself simple. Essence and relation and subsistence come together to form the meaning of divine person; and since in God essence and relation equally subsist, divine person is equally conceived whether there is affirmed an essence that subsists as distinct by reason of relation or a relation that subsists by reason of the absolutely simple divine reality. Here one might interject that subsistence pertains more to the essence than to a relation. We would reply that while this is true of creatures, it does not follow that it is true of God. Since in God there is no distinction between what is and that by which it is, nothing in God is real that is not by the same token subsistent. Besides, although we conceive essence as prior to relation, we do not thereby penetrate 29 Ibid. q. 3, a. 5. [On reduction, Thomas gives the example of ‘point’ and ‘unity’ being reduced to, or resolved into, the genus ‘quantity’ because they generate extension and number.] 30 Ibid. q. 29, a. 4; see q. 40, a. 1. [What is within the brackets in this paragraph is Lonergan’s own clarifying addition to the text of Thomas.]

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non ideo profundius penetratur in ipsam realitatem divinam in qua nullum est genus et nihil prius aut posterius est (db 39). Instatur tamen quod persona dicitur ad se, et ideo magis vera videtur ratio quae ponit essentiam in recto et relationem in obliquo. Sed ad se non est nisi relatio alicuius ad se ipsum; et omnis talis relatio est ens rationis tantum; quare, ad se non videtur intimam personae rationem manifestare.31 Quod si per relationem, ad se, intelligitur subsistentia, utique ad se dicit aliquid personae omnino proprium. Tamen cum in divinis omne reale eo ipso subsistat, ratio subsistentiae non magis favet essentiae quam relationi, ut supra dictum est.

Instatur tamen quod alia nomina sunt absoluta et alia relativa; relativa quidem ut amici et propinqui et vicini; absoluta autem ut individuum, suppositum, persona, vel ut homo, equus, leo. Eo ipso quod quis est amicus, vel propinquus, vel vicinus, vel pater, vel filius, est amicus alterius cuiusdam, propinquus alterius cuiusdam, vicinus alterius cuiusdam, pater alterius cuiusdam, filius alterius cuiusdam. Sed eo ipso quod quis est individuum vel suppositum vel persona vel homo vel equus vel leo, non est individuum alterius vel suppositum alterius vel persona alterius vel homo alterius vel equus alterius vel leo alterius. Et hic est sensus a S. Augustino intentus, cum concluserit personam non dici ad alium sed ad se.32

Respondetur. Hoc argumentum est ex usu sermonis humani. Iam vero non quaeritur hic de convenientia nominis personae sed de ratione eius quod in divinis ut persona existat. Neque mirum est quod dogma trinitarium non inveniatur implicite contentum in nominibus, ab hominibus inventis, ad homines qua subsistentia distincta rationalia designandos. Instatur iterum, nam ratio formalis personae dicit subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali, ratio autem materialis secundum quam ratio formalis in divinis verificatur est relatio; et ideo relatio pertinet non ad rationem formalem personae sed tantummodo ad rationem materialem.33 Respondetur quod obiciens loquitur secundum rationem analogam quae aliter in divinis et aliter in creatis verificatur; sed praesens quaestio respicit non hanc rationem analogam sed rationem personae qua divinae.

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any deeper into the reality of God in whom there is no genus and no before and after (db 39, ds 75, nd 16). But one might further object that ‘person’ is said with reference to oneself, and therefore the meaning that states essence directly and relation indirectly seems to be more true. To this we reply that ‘with reference to oneself’ is merely the relation of something to itself, and such a relation is only a conceptual being. ‘With reference to oneself,’ therefore, seems not to express the deepest meaning of person.31 But if by ‘with reference to oneself’ subsistence is understood, then indeed ‘with reference to oneself’ states something that is entirely proper to a person. Still, since in God all that is real thereby subsists, the formality of subsistence does not incline more towards essence than to relation, as we have said above. Another objection would argue that some nouns are absolute and others relative. ‘Friend’ and ‘relative’ and ‘neighbor’ are relative terms; ‘individual,’ ‘supposit,’ ‘person’ are absolute terms, as are ‘man,’ ‘horse,’ ‘lion.’ By the very fact that one is a friend, a relative, a neighbor, a father, or a son, one is a friend of someone else, a relative of someone else, a neighbor of someone else, a father of someone else, a son of someone else. But if one is an individual or a supposit or a person or a man or a horse or a lion, one is not by that fact an individual of someone else or a supposit of someone else or a person of someone else or a man of someone else or a horse of someone else or a lion of someone else. And this is the meaning that St Augustine had in mind when he concluded that the word ‘person’ is not predicated with reference to another but with reference to oneself. 32 But, we say in reply, this argument is based on human word usage. It is not a question of the appropriateness of the word ‘person’ but of the meaning of that which in God exists as a person. Nor is it strange that the dogma of the Trinity is not found implicitly contained in words coined by human beings in order to designate human beings as distinct rational subsistents. Still, the objector continues, the formal meaning of person denotes a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature, whereas the material meaning by which the formal meaning of person is verified in God is relation. Therefore, relation pertains not to the formal meaning of person but only to its material meaning. 33 But this objector is speaking about the analogous meaning that is verified differently in God and in creatures, whereas the present question concerns not this analogous meaning but the meaning of person as divine. 31 See db 278, ds 528, nd 311. 32 Augustine, De Trinitate, vii, vi; ml 42, 943. 33 Thus Galtier, De Sanctissima Trinitate in se et in nobis, thesis 17, p. 208.

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Arguitur autem in oppositum quod sunt tres personae divinae et tres relationes subsistentes realiter inter se distinctae, non autem tres essentiae; et ideo praeferenda est illa ratio personae divinae secundum quam persona divina concipitur ut relatio. Respondetur facilius solvi quasdam obiectiones ex eo quod ratio personae divinae est relatio; sed non ideo impeditur quominus etiam secundum aliam rationem solvantur. Quamvis enim tres sint personae, minime sequitur tres esse essentias; nam cum in ratione personae ponatur essentia in recto, ponitur non essentia qua essentia sed essentia qua hypostasis; sed in divinis hypostasis est per relationem distincta; et ideo tres personae seu tres hypostases sunt, non tres essentiae, sed tres per essentiam subsistentes et per relationes proprias distinctae.34 Instatur tamen quod essentia qua essentia est deitas, essentia autem qua hypostasis est Deus. Sed non sunt tres dii. Ergo nulla est solutio. Respondetur quod si solo naturali rationis lumine procedatur, idem sunt hypostasis, subsistens, et suppositum; et secundum hoc valet obiectio. Sed, supposita fide, dicendum est quod idem quidem sunt hypostasis et suppositum, sed utrumque addit super subsistens; hypostasis enim vel suppositum (reale) est subsistens distinctum. Quare, fide supposita, cum ponatur essentia qua hypostasis, in obliquo importatur relatio distinguens. 35

QUAESTIO XVII Quemadmodum persona se habeat ad incommunicabilitatem et ad communicationem interpersonalem Ad huius quaestionis intelligentiam, a ratione unius ordiendum videtur. Porro, unum dicitur tripliciter. Primo modo, numerice, secundum quantitatem discretam; et sic in rebus materialibus distinguimus primam, alteram, tertiam, etc. Secundo modo, formaliter seu naturaliter, et sic dicimus acervum lapidum esse unum per accidens, hominem autem esse unum per se; homini enim sed non acervo qua tali inest quoddam principium formale et naturale unde unitas in multis partibus habeatur. Tertio denique modo, actualiter, secundum quod unum definitur indivisum in se et divisum a quolibet alio; quod nihil aliud significat quam hoc, quod omne quodcumque principiis identitatis (indivisum in se) et

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An objector could argue in the opposite direction that there are three divine persons and three subsistent relations really distinct from one another, but not three essences; and therefore, the meaning of divine person according to which a divine person is conceived as a relation is to be preferred. Our answer to this is that, although some objections are more easily solved by taking the meaning of divine person as a relation, this does not prevent one from solving them on the basis of the other meaning. Although there are three persons, it does not at all follow that there are three essences; for when essence is predicated directly of person, it is not essence as essence that is predicated but essence as a hypostasis. But in God a hypostasis is distinct by reason of a relation, and therefore the three persons and three hypostases are, not three essences, but three that are subsistent by essence and distinct by their proper relations. 34 Yet, the objector insists, essence as essence is divinity, while essence as hypostasis is God. But there are not three gods, and so the above answer is not valid. But, we say in reply, if you proceed by the light of human reason alone, then hypostasis, subsistent, and supposit are all the same, and on this supposition the objection holds. But on the supposition of faith it has to be said that indeed hypostasis and supposit are the same, yet both add something to subsistent; for a hypostasis or (real) supposit is a distinct subsistent. Therefore, supposing faith, when essence as hypostasis is posited, a distinguishing relation is indirectly implied.35 QUESTION 17 How is person related to incommunicability and to interpersonal communication? For an understanding of this question we must begin with the meaning of ‘one.’ There are three uses of ‘one.’ First, ‘one’ is used numerically, in relation to discrete quantity; in this way, regarding material objects we distinguish the first, the second, the third, and so on. Second, ‘one’ is used formally, or in relation to a nature, and in this way we say that a pile of stones is one per accidens but a man is one per se; for there is in a man, but not in a pile as such, a formal, natural principle whence there is unity among the many parts. Third, ‘one’ is used in an actual sense, and in this way ‘one’ is defined as that which is undivided in itself and divided from everything else. What this means is simply that everything whatever

34 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 39, a. 1; q. 29, a. 4. 35 Ibid. q. 39, a. 1, ad 1m.

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non-contradictionis (divisum a quolibet alio) subest.36 Iam vero unitas numerica non est de ratione personae, cum angeli et personae divinae sint prorsus immateriales. Neque unitas naturalis est de ratione personae, cum in Christo sit una persona sed duae naturae, et in Deo sit una natura sed tres personae. Et ideo unitas quae ad personam pertinet est unitas actualis. Proinde unitas actualis non addit super ens nisi negationes: nam indivisium in se negat divisionem internam et divisum ab omni alio negat confusionem cum alio quolibet. Qua de causa, cum negationes nihil rebus addant, eo modo eaque perfectione unumquodque est unum, quo modo et qua perfectione est ens. Sed ens dicitur analogice. Et ideo etiam unitas actualis secundum analogiam dicitur ut idem aliter in aliis verificetur. Porro, analogia entis triplicem maxime divisionem entium importat. Alia enim entia dicuntur quae tamen non subsistant; et eiusmodi sunt causae entis intrinsecae, et accidentia quibus competit alteri inesse, et possibilia quae non addant realiter super potentiam agentis vel etiam materiae, et entia rationis quae extra mentem nihil sunt. Alia autem entia dicuntur simpliciter quia ipsa subsistunt, quamvis non omne subsistat quod ad ea pertineat; et eiusmodi sunt mineralia et plantae et animalia et homines et angeli, qui omnes subsistunt et tamen principiis intrinsecis et non subsistentibus componuntur. Aliud denique est ipsum esse quod non solum subsistit sed etiam omnino simplex est, ut omne quod ei realiter identificetur etiam subsistat; et eiusmodi est solus Deus.

Quam entis analogiam sequitur analogia unitatis actualis. Sicut enim non-subsistentia minus sunt entia, ita minus sunt actualiter una; principia enim entis constitutiva inter se mutuo referuntur ut ratio cuiusque rationem alterius importet; et ideo quamvis sint indivisa in se, non tamen simpliciter dividuntur ab alio; et eadem est ratio de accidentibus et multo magis de possibilibus et de entibus rationis. Subsistentia autem creata sicut simpliciter sunt ita simpliciter sunt una, ut tamen sint multa secundum quid, cum multis causis

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is subject to the principle of identity (‘undivided in itself’) and to the principle of noncontradiction (‘divided from everything else’). 36 Now, numerical unity is not part of the essential meaning of person, since angels and the divine persons are entirely immaterial. Nor does natural unity belong to the essential meaning of person, for in Christ there is one person but two natures, and in God there is one nature but three persons. Therefore, the kind of unity that belongs to person is actual unity. Thus, actual unity adds only negations to being; for ‘undivided in itself’ negates internal division, and ‘divided from everything else’ negates commingling with anything else. Therefore, since negations add nothing to things, something is one in the same way and with the same perfection as it is being. But being is predicated analogously. Therefore, actual unity is also predicated by analogy, so that the same notion is verified differently in different things. Furthermore, the analogy of being implies especially three divisions among beings. First, some are called beings which, however, do not subsist; such are the intrinsic causes of a being; accidents, to which it belongs to exist in another; possible beings, which add nothing in reality to the potency of an agent or even to that of matter; and conceptual beings, which exist only in the mind. Again, some are beings in the strict sense, because they themselves subsist even though not all that belongs to them subsists; such are minerals, plants, animals, humans, and angels, all of which subsist and yet are composed of intrinsic nonsubsistent principles. Finally, there is the act of existence itself that not only subsists but also is absolutely simple, so that everything that is really identical with it also subsists; such is God, and God alone. The analogy of actual unity is consequent upon this analogy of being. Just as nonsubsistents are beings in a lesser sense, so they are actually one in a lesser sense. The constitutive principles of a being are mutually related, so that the definition of each implies the definition of another; therefore, although they are undivided in themselves, still they are not simply divided from one another. The same reasoning applies to accidents, and all the more to possible beings and conceptual beings. As created subsistent beings are in the strict sense, so also they are one in the strict sense; yet they are multiple in a certain respect since they are composed of many 36 [See the discussion of the meanings of ‘one’ in Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 30–33. Also helpful is ‘Christology Today: Methodological Reflections,’ in A Third Collection 91: ‘Thirdly, there is one in the sense of one and the same. It is the one that presupposes the intelligible unity ... but adds to it an application of the principles of identity and contradiction. So it is one in the sense of the old definition: indivisum in se et divisum a quolibet alio.’ See also ‘The Origins of Christian Realism,’ in A Second Collection, at 258.]

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intrinsecis componantur; et praeterea, quamvis secundum esse sint simpliciter, tamen secundum operari aliud alio indiget secundum ordinem universi. At ipsum esse subsistens, cum onmino simplex sit, sicut et perfectissime est ens, ita perfectissime est unum. Quibus perspectis, aliud adiunge. Ex emanationibus enim intelligibilibus sequuntur relationes reales et realiter inter se distinctae. Quae quidem relationes, nisi in Deo sunt, non maiorem entitatem vel unitatem habent quam ea quae in infimo non-subsistentium gradu ontologico invenitur. Et si in ipso Deo sunt relationes eiusmodi, cum Deus sit omnino simplex, etiam hae relationes sunt Deus atque ideo subsistunt; neque participative subsistunt ut mineralia, plantae, homines, angeli, sed per essentiam subsistunt cum earum esse sit esse divinum et earum subsistere sit subsistere divinum. Relationes ergo divinae reales tum entitatem tum subsistentiam quam perfectissimam habent. Sed unum non addit super ens nisi negationes, ut omnis perfectio unitatis ex perfectione entitatis et habeatur et mensuretur. Relationes ergo divinae reales, sicut perfectissimam entitatem et subsistentiam, ita etiam unitatem perfectissimam habent. Quae cum ita sint, iam considerari oportet quemadmodum personae divinae et creatae se habeant ad incommunicabilitatem et communicationem. Et in primis per incommunicabilitatem nihil aliud significatur quam illa realis distinctio qua reale unum non est reale aliud. Deinde, haec incommunicabilitas adeo communicationi non opponitur ut a communicatione necessario praesupponatur. Nulla enim est realis relatio nisi inter ea quae sunt realiter distincta. Et ideo nulla est realis communicatio nisi inter ea quae sunt realiter distincta. Neque incommunicabilitas plus dicit quam realem distinctionem qua hoc non est illud. Tertio, personae divinae per idem sunt et incommunicabiles et communicantes. Nam per relationes reales inter se realiter distinguuntur et ideo sunt incommunicabiles. Et per easdem relationes sunt inter se communicantes, tum quia altera relatio alteram in sua ratione includit, tum quia relationes realiter identificantur cum processionibus quibus Pater suam essentiam communicat Filio, et Pater Filiusque eandem essentiam communicant Spiritui sancto.

Quarto, personae divinae non inter se distinguuntur realiter sive secundum substantiam sive secundum esse sive secundum operationem essentialem, cum in divinis omnia unum sint nisi obviet relationis oppositio (db 703). Quinto, personae creatae realiter inter se distinguuntur secundum substantiam, et per consequens secundum esse et secundum operari. Alia enim est substantia Socratis et alia Platonis; aliud pariter est alterius esse et aliud est alterius operari. Et ideo incommunicabiles

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intrinsic causes. Besides, although subsistents are (in the strict sense of are) on the basis of an act of existence, still in regard to operation they need one another, in accordance with the order of the universe. Since the subsistent act of existence itself is absolutely simple, as it is most perfectly being, so it is most perfectly one. Once this is grasped, we must add a further point. From intellectual emanations there follow real relations that are really distinct from one another. Now such relations, except those in God, have no greater being or unity than that which is found at the lowest ontological level of the nonsubsistents. And if there are such relations in God, then, since God is absolutely simple, these relations are also God, and therefore subsist; nor do they subsist by participation, as do minerals, plants, animals, humans, and angels; they subsist by essence, since their existence is divine existence and their subsistence is divine subsistence. Therefore, the real divine relations possess the most perfect reality and subsistence. But ‘one’ adds only negations to being, so that all perfection of unity is both had and measured from the perfection of being. Therefore, just as the real divine relations possess the most perfect reality and subsistence, so also they possess the most perfect unity. With this in mind, then, we must now consider how the divine persons and created persons are with respect to incommunicability and communication. First, by incommunicability we mean just that real distinction by which one that is real is not another that is real. Second, this incommunicability is not only not opposed to communication but in fact is necessarily presupposed by it. For there is no real relation except between things that are really distinct. Therefore, there is no real communication except between things that are really distinct. Nor does incommunicability mean anything more than the real distinction by which this is not that. Third, it is through the same real relations that the divine persons are both incommunicable and in communication. For through the real relations they are really distinct from one another and therefore incommunicable, and through the same relations they are in communication with one another, both because one relation includes another in its meaning and because the relations are really identical with the processions by which the Father communicates his essence to the Son, and the Father and the Son communicate the same essence to the Holy Spirit. Fourth, the divine persons are not really distinct from one another on the basis of substance or of existence or of essential operation, since in God everything is one where there is no distinction by relational opposition (db 703, ds 1330, nd 325). Fifth, created persons are really distinct from one another on the basis of substance, and consequently also on the basis of existence and operation. For the substance of Socrates is not the substance of Plato, and likewise the existence and

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sunt personae creatae secundum substantiam, esse, et operari.

Sexto, in personis creatis communicatio consequitur naturam earum intellectualem. Quod enim infra intellectualem naturam invenitur, nisi intelligentia, ratione, et voluntate informatur, potius animale vel biologicum vel corporale nominatur quam communicatio personalis. E contra, cum natura intellectualis sit ea quae ad totum ens, totum verum, totum bonum referatur, posita natura intellectuali consequuntur habitudines et communicationes interpersonales. Septimo, differunt personae divinae et creatae sicut simplex et compositum. Per idem enim persona divina est ens et unum et subsistens et distinctum et intellectuale et communicans. Persona autem creata ita est composita ex causis intrinsecis ut ipsa subsistat per causas non subsistentes. Quamvis ergo natura intellectualis dicat relationem ad totum ens et ideo ad omnes personas, quamvis haec relatio identificetur cum ipsa natura intellectuali, tamen alia est persona finita quae est et alia est natura qua est; et ideo ita subsistit persona creata ut non subsistat illa relatio qua radicitus ad alias personas referatur. Caeterum, si persona creata per naturam suam intellectualem constitueretur, Christus assumpsisset non solum naturam humanam sed etiam personam humanam; quod est contra fidem.

SECTIO SECUNDA Postquam ea consideravimus quae rationem seu definitionem personae divinae respiciunt, iam de iis agendum est quae de personis divinis praedicantur. Et primo quidem divinarum personarum attributa dividuntur in communia, propria, et appropriata (Assertum IX ), deinde relationes demonstrantur esse personales proprietates (Assertum X ), tertio investigantur actus notionales (Assertum XI ), et quarto de ordine inter actus notionales proprietatesque personales quaeritur (Quaestio XVIII ). ASSERTUM IX Dividuntur attributa Patris, Filii, et Spiritus Sancti in communia, propria, et appropriata.

Nam trium est una essentia, substantia, natura. Quidquid ergo de Deo ratione essentiae dicitur etiam attribuitur singulis personis, quia singuli sunt Deus. Et haec attributa nominantur communia vel essentialia.

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operation of one of them is not the existence and operation of the other. Created persons, therefore, are incommunicable by reason of substance, existence, and operation. Sixth, in the case of created persons, communication results from their intellectual nature. As for communication present in natures below the intellectual, unless it is informed by intelligence, reason, and will, such communication is more fittingly called animal or biological or bodily than personal. On the other hand, since intellectual nature is that which regards the totality of being, truth, and goodness, once there is an intellectual nature, interpersonal relationships and communications follow. Seventh, divine persons differ from created persons as the simple differs from the composite. For it is through the same that a divine person is being and one and subsistent and distinct and intellectual and in communication. A created person, on the other hand, is composed of intrinsic causes, so that it subsists through causes that are not subsistent. Hence, although intellectual nature denotes a relation to the totality of being and therefore to all persons, and although this relation is identical with intellectual nature itself, nevertheless a finite person that exists is not the same as the nature by which it exists, and therefore a created person subsists, whereas that relation by which it is radically related to other persons does not subsist. Otherwise, if a created person were constituted through its own intellectual nature, Christ would have assumed not only a human nature but also a human person; but this is contrary to Christian faith.

SECTION 2 We have considered what has to do with the meaning or definition of a divine person. The discussion now turns to the attributes that are predicated of the divine persons. First, the attributes of the divine persons are divided into common, proper, and appropriated (assertion 9); second, the relations are shown to be personal properties (assertion 10); third, we investigate the notional acts (assertion 11); and fourth, we inquire about the order between the notional acts and the personal properties (question 18). ASSERTION 9 The attributes of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are divided into common, proper, and appropriated. The three divine persons have one essence, one substance, one nature. Hence, whatever is stated of God by reason of essence is also attributed to each person, because each person is God. These attributes are called common or essential.

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Praeterea, tres sunt realiter inter se distinctae. Sunt ergo quae ab una alterave persona divina habentur, quae tamen a tribus non habeantur; secus tres non realiter distinguerentur. Iam vero distinguuntur divinae personae secundum quattuor relationes reales; et ideo omnia eaque sola quae has relationes importent, de una vel de duabus personis sed non de tribus dicuntur; et haec nominantur propria vel etiam notionalia. Praeterea, inter attributa essentialia sunt ea quae quandam similitudinem ad attributa propria habeant; et cum haec sint hominibus magis nota quam ipsa propria, consuetum est ea usurpare ad personas notificandas; et haec quae ex essentialibus ad propria ita trahantur appropriata dicuntur, et ita uni personae attribuuntur ut tamen aliae personae non excludantur. Quibus positis, per omnia divinarum personarum attributa percurrendum est et, secundum principia supra exposita, inter communia, propria, et appropriata distinguendum est. Quod cum longius sit, ea sufficit notare quae quandam difficultatem facere possint. Ingenitus. Vi vocis, negat originem per generationem, et sic tam Spiritui sancto quam Patri convenit. Sed vi usus, negat omnem originem sive per causalitatem sive per emanationem intelligibilem, et sic convenit soli Patri. 37 Enumeratur autem ‘ingenitus’ una cum quattuor relationibus realibus, ut sint quinque notiones fundamentales quae ad notificationem trium personarum distinctarum pertinent. 38 Pater et Filius. Sunt nomina personarum propria ex ipsis relationibus derivata quibus, ut relationibus, hae personae distinguuntur et, ut subsistentibus, constituuntur. Verbum. Est nomen Filii proprium quia importat relationem ad actum intelligendi ex quo intelligibiliter emanat. Similiter, dici eandem relationem importat et dicere relationem oppositam; et idem valet de concipi et concipere. Convenit tamen aliqua nomina reservare ad ipsum hunc actum sub aspectu absoluto designandum; et sic usi sumus voce, affirmare. Circa dici, vide ulteriora, p. 368.

38 Ibid. q 32, aa. 2-4. Momentum huius notionis negativae elucet, cum ad divinam attendatur monarchiam, ‘quae augustissima est Ecclesiae Dei praedicatio’ (db 48, ds 112). Pater enim ingenitus est fons, origo, principium totius Trinitatis.

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Furthermore, the three persons are really distinct from one another. Therefore, there are the attributes that belong to one or other divine person but not to the three; otherwise, the three would not be really distinct. Now the divine persons are distinguished on the basis of the four real relations, and therefore all that and only that which entails these relations is predicated of one or two of the divine persons but not of the three. These are called proper or also notional. Again, among the essential attributes are those that have a certain similarity to the proper attributes, and since they are better known to us than the proper attributes, it is customary to use them in making the persons known. Those attributes that are transferred in this way from essential to proper are called appropriated attributes, and are attributed to one person without, however, excluding the others. Having said this, we really should go through all the attributes of the divine persons and, in accord with the principles stated above, distinguish between the common, the proper, and the appropriated. But since this would be quite a lengthy task, it will suffice if we take note of those attributes that could present some difficulty. Unbegotten. The word itself denies origin by way of generation, and so applies to the Holy Spirit as well as to the Father. But as it is generally used, it denies all origin whether through causality or through intellectual emanation, and used in this way it applies only to the Father.37 ‘Unbegotten,’ however, is listed along with the four real relations, so that there are five fundamental notions that pertain to making known the three distinct persons.38 Father and Son. These are proper names of persons, names derived from the relations which as relations distinguish these persons and as subsistent constitute them. Word. This is a proper name of the Son, because it implies a relation to the act of understanding from which the Word emanates intellectually. Similarly, to be spoken implies the same relation, and to speak implies the opposed relation; and the same holds for to be conceived and to conceive. Nevertheless, it is fitting to keep some terms to designate this act in its absolute aspect, and for that we have used the expression to affirm. On to be spoken, see below, p. 369. 37 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 33, a. 4. 38 Ibid. q. 32, aa. 2–4. The importance of this negative notion is evident in reference to the divine monarchy, ‘which is the most august proclamation of the church of God’ (db 48, ds 112, nd 301). For the unbegotten Father is the source, origin, and principle of the entire Trinity. [In these articles Thomas’s word for the first notion is ‘innascibilitas.’]

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Verum, veritas. Secundum definitionem veri, nempe, adaequationem intellectus ad rem, non importatur relatio originis; et ideo haec sunt nomina essentialia. Tamen, si consideratur verum, veritas, secundum criterion quod est perspecta evidentiae sufficientia, importatur relatio originis; et secundum hanc considerationem habetur nomen Filii proprium.39 Similiter, si consideratur emanatio intelligibilis ex evidentia perspecta in verbum, importatur verum secundum criterion veritatis, et ideo prima processio divina proprie dici potest emanatio secundum veritatem. Imago. Cum imago sit similitudo expressa, dici non potest de Deo Patre. Secundum S. Augustinum de solo Filio dicitur, sed secundum Patres graecos Spiritus dicitur imago Filii. Quam ambiguitatem solvit S. Thomas eodem modo quo probat processionem Spiritus sancti non esse generationem, nempe, imago non tantum est expressa similitudo sed ea quae vi originis similitudinem habet. Et sic imago est nomen Filii proprium.40 Spiritus. Vi vocis denotat immaterialitatem divinae substantiae et est nomen commune. Inquantum subauditur ‘spiratus,’ importatur relatio originis et usurpatur ut nomen proprium.41 Sanctus. Vi vocis denotat puritatem divinae bonitatis et est nomen commune. Spiritus sanctus. Vi usus, est nomen proprium tertiae personae divinae. Et secundum sanctitatem proprium intelligi potest inquantum emanatio intelligibilis amoris est in qua sanctitas voluntaria consistit (caute voluntarium a libero distingue)42 ut Pater et Filius sint sancti secundum quod sunt principium sancti amoris, Spiritus sanctus autem sit ipse amor sancte procedens. Amor, dilectio, amare, diligere. Secundum se nullam important relationem nisi ad obiectum amatum vel dilectum; et cum haec relatio non sit originis, haec nomina sunt essentialia, sicut supra de vero et veritate dictum est. Attamen, sicut omne verum formale ex evidentia perspecta procedit, ita etiam omnis amor et dilectio intellectualis ex iudicio valoris procedit; et ideo si magis ad rem quam ad nomen attenditur, propria facile discernuntur. Sicut enim nos amamus et diligimus, non quia simus ipse noster amor vel dilectio sed quia sumus principia intrinseca huius amoris vel dilectionis, ita Pater et Filius proprie dicuntur ‘notionaliter diligentes’ vel ‘notionaliter amantes’ inquantum sunt principium ex quo procedit divinus amor seu dilectio. Et similiter Spiritus sanctus proprie nominatur

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The true, truth. The definition of the true as the correspondence of the mind to reality does not imply a relation of origin, and so these terms are essential. Still, if one considers the true or truth according to the criterion of grasping the sufficiency of the evidence, a relation of origin is implied, and on this consideration we have a name that is proper to the Son.39 Similarly, if one considers the intellectual emanation from the evidence grasped to the word, the true is implied according to the criterion of truth, and therefore the first divine procession can properly be called an emanation by way of truth. Image. Since an image is the expression of a likeness, it cannot be said of God the Father. According to St Augustine, it is said of the Son alone, but in the Greek Fathers the Spirit is called the image of the Son. St Thomas solved this ambiguity in the same way that he proved that the procession of the Holy Spirit is not a generation, namely, that an image is not only an expression of a likeness, but one that has likeness in virtue of origin. Thus ‘image’ is a proper name of the Son.40 Spirit. The word denotes the immateriality of the divine substance, and in this sense is a common name. Inasmuch as ‘spirated’ is understood, the relation of origin is implied, and it is used as a proper name.41 Holy. The word denotes the purity of divine goodness and is a common term. Holy Spirit. This is the usual proper name of the third divine person. It can be understood as proper with respect to holiness inasmuch as the intellectual emanation of love is that in which voluntary holiness consists (being careful to distinguish ‘voluntary’ from ‘free’),42 so that the Father and the Son are holy as the principle of holy love, while the Holy Spirit is the love itself that proceeds in a holy manner. Love, to love. In themselves, these words do not imply any relation except to the object loved. And since this relation is not a relation of origin, these are essential terms, as we said above concerning ‘the true’ and ‘truth.’ Still, just as all formal truth proceeds from a grasp of evidence, so also all intellectual love proceeds from a judgment of value; and therefore if one attends more to the reality than to the words, these terms are easily seen as proper terms. For just as we love, not because we ourselves are our love, but because we are the intrinsic principles of this love, so too the Father and the Son are properly called ‘notionally loving’ inasmuch as they are the principle from which divine love proceeds. And the Holy Spirit 39 40 41 42

Ibid. q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m. Ibid. q. 35, a. 2. Ibid. q. 36, a. 1, ad 1m, ad 2m. [See below, p. 373.]

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cum dicatur ‘amor procedens’ vel ‘dilectio notionalis,’ quia haec relationem originis important.43 Quare cum quaeratur utrum Pater et Filius se diligant Spiritu sancto, si ablativum sumitur pro principio amoris, negatur, si ablativum sumitur pro eo quod procedit, sicut arbor floret floribus, subdistinguitur, si intelligitur de amore essentiali, negatur, si intelligitur de amore notionali, conceditur. 44

Donum. Inquantum importatur gratuita donatio ex benevolentia donantis procedens, adest relatio originis. Inquantum primum donum quo omnia alia dona donantur est ipse amor benevolentiae, habetur proprium nomen Spiritus sancti, cum hoc primum donum sit amor procedens.45 Principium. Est primum in aliquo ordine, et secundum diversitatem ordinis dicitur proprie vel communiter. Ita Pater est principium Filii, Pater et Filius sunt principium Spiritus sancti, Pater, Filius, et Spiritus sanctus sunt principium omnis creaturae.46 Quia principium dicit aliquid absolutum,47 et quia principium importat relationem ad id quod procedit,48 Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti, et tres personae sunt unum principium omnis creaturae; nam sunt unum

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likewise is properly named when spoken of as ‘proceeding love’ or ‘notional love,’ because these terms imply a relation of origin. 43 When, therefore, we ask whether the Father and the Son love each other ‘by the Holy Spirit’ (Spiritu sancto), the answer depends upon the force of the ablative. If the ablative is taken to mean the principle of love, the answer is negative; but if the ablative is taken to mean that which proceeds, as a tree blossoms with flowers, we must further distinguish: if essential love is understood, the answer is again negative, but if notional love is understood, the answer is affirmative. 44 Gift. If a gratuitous act of giving that proceeds from the benevolence of the one who gives is implied, there is a relation of origin. Since the first gift by virtue of which all other gifts are given is the love that flows from benevolence, this term ‘gift’ is a proper name of the Holy Spirit, since this first gift is proceeding love. 45 Principle. A principle is that which is first in some order, and according to different orders ‘principle’ is predicated properly or commonly. Thus, the Father is the principle of the Son, the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit, and the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are the principle of all creation. 46 Since a principle denotes something absolute,47 and since a principle implies a relation to what proceeds,48 the Father and Son are the one principle of the Holy Spirit, and the three persons are the one principle of all creation; for they are 43 44 45 46

Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 37, a. 1. Ibid. a. 2. Ibid. q. 38, a. 2. Ibid. q. 33, a. 1; q. 36, a. 4; q. 45, a. 6; q. 32, a. 1, ad 3m (db 460, ds 850, nd 321; db 691, ds 1300, nd 322; db 704, ds 1331, nd 326). 47 Ibid. q. 41, a. 5. 48 [The sentence to this point appears paradoxical, especially since Lonergan will later say in appendix 3 that ‘relation’ is an order of one to another, and is opposed to the absolute. The reference in the Summa to which Lonergan appeals asks whether the power of begetting signifies a relation, and not the essence. Thomas’s answer is no. Power is that by which the agent acts, and the power of begetting signifies the divine nature directly, and the relation only indirectly. Power does not signify the relation itself of a principle, but that which is a principle, not in the sense that the agent is a principle, but in the sense of that by which the agent acts. In divine generation, that by which the Begetter begets is common to the Begotten and the Begetter by a community of identity. The divine essence is the principle by which the Begetter begets. Presumably, this is what Lonergan has in mind in referring the reader to this article, as indicated a few lines later in his remark that ‘the absolute that is the principle is the essence ...’ There is a discussion of this issue in Verbum 216–17 and note 130. See below, note 54. Perhaps the content of ‘absolute’ is best captured in the notion of those realities whose definitions are through what the realities themselves are, that is, an absolute is anything that is defined through itself. Something that functions as a principle, then, would be an absolute if there is a definition of its reality that is through itself.]

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absolutum, et in illo absoluto non importatur alia relatio quam ea quae est ad id quod procedit.49 Praeterea, quia in divinis nihil est quod non sit Deus, nihil est tantummodo ut quo, et omne est ut quod. Et ideo quamvis absolutum quod est principium sit essentia, et essentia secundum modum significandi dicit id quo, tamen cum in divinis essentia subsistit, etiam illud principium est subsistens et principium-quod. Quod si obicitur principium-quod esse suppositum, et duo supposita spirare et tria creare, respondetur suppositum esse subsistens distinctum, sed omne subsistens esse ens quod et principium quod et ideo suppositum addere rationem distincti super subsistens et super principium-quod. Potentia. Dicitur de Deo vel secundum nostrum modum significandi tantum vel realiter. Dicitur secundum modum significandi tantum inquantum distinguuntur potentia et actus essendi vel intelligendi vel affirmandi vel volendi vel, generaliter, perfectibile et perfectio.50 Dicitur autem realiter secundum quod ad intra alia persona ex alia procedit vel ad extra secundum quod creatura ex Deo procedit. 51 Dicitur ad extra secundum potentiam ad opposita, sed dicitur ad intra secundum quod vere dicitur id esse posse quod necessario est. 52 Prout ad intra dicitur, est potentia vel generandi vel spirandi; inquantum potentia est principium, in recto dicit divinam essentiam; inquantum potentia generandi et spirandi dicit aliquid proprium, in obliquo importatur relatio;53 et quidem inquantum potentia generandi est ut generet, importatur paternitas in obliquo; inquantum autem est ut generetur aliquis, importatur filiatio in obliquo; et similiter distinguitur active et passive significata potentia spirandi.54

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one absolute, and in that absolute no relation is implied other than the relation to what proceeds.49 Furthermore, since there is nothing in God that is not God, there is nothing that is only that-by-which; everything is that which is. Therefore, although the absolute that is the principle is essence, and essence according to our way of signifying means that-by-which, still, since in God essence subsists, so also that principle is subsistent and is a principle-which. But to an objection that a principle-which is a supposit, and that two supposits spirate and three create, the answer is that a supposit is a distinct subsistent; but every subsistent is a being-which and a principle-which; and therefore ‘supposit’ adds the formality ‘distinct’ to ‘subsistent’ and ‘principle-which.’ Potency is either predicated of God only according to our way of signifying or it is predicated really. It is predicated only according to our way of signifying when we distinguish between the potency and the act, whether of existing or of understanding or of affirming or of willing or, in general, between the perfectible and the perfection.50 But it is predicated really according to the fact that internally to God one person proceeds from another, or that externally creation proceeds from God.51 It is predicated externally as a potency to opposites, but internally inasmuch as it is truly affirmed that what necessarily is can be. 52 As predicated internally, it is the potency to generate or to spirate. Inasmuch as potency is a principle, it refers directly to the divine essence. Inasmuch as the potency to generate or to spirate refers to something proper, it indirectly implies a relation. 53 Indeed, inasmuch as the potency to generate is for generating, paternity is indirectly implied; but inasmuch as it is the potency for something to be generated, filiation is indirectly implied. The potency of spirating is similarly distinguished in an active and a passive sense.54 49 [And this is only a conceptual relation. See Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 94–97.] 50 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 41, a. 4, ad 3m. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. ad 2m. [That is, it is said ad extra on the basis of a power that bears on what is not necessary (‘secundum potentiam ad opposita’), but it is said ad intra inasmuch as what necessarily is is truly said to be able (posse) to be.] 53 Ibid. a. 5. 54 Ibid. a. 6, ad 1m. [The following from Verbum 216–17 may be helpful (leaving out the footnotes, where the texts are cited). ‘[T]hough the generation of the Son is “per modum intelligibilis actionis,” though a proper name of the Son is the Word, still Aquinas did not conclude that the principle by which the Father generates is the divine intellect or the divine understanding. In us the inner word proceeds from understanding, and our understanding is really distinct from our substance, our being, our thought, our willing. But in God substance, being, understanding, thought, willing are absolutely one and the same reality. Accordingly, Aquinas not merely in

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Quibus perspectis, admireris brevem et simplicem elegantiam S. Thomae circa principia vel potentias, unde actus notionales sint. Cum enim in divinis nulla sit realis distinctio inter perfectibile et perfectionem, inter substantiam et potentiam operativam, inter intellectum et voluntatem, quaestiones de principio remoto et proximo verbi et amoris non sunt nisi quaestiones secundum modum significandi, quae totae solvuntur secundum conclusiones pure philosophicas. Theologicae autem distinctiones sunt inter emanationem causalem ad extra et emanationem intelligibilem ad intra, inter emanationis principium et id quod emanat, inter emanationem intelligibilem secundum veritatem et emanationem intelligibilem secundum sanctitatem. Et hae duae emanationes distinguuntur, non quia aliud sit divinum verum et aliud divinum bonum, non quia alius sit divinus intellectus et alia sit divina voluntas, sed quia contradictio implicatur si eadem dicitur emanatio secundum veritatem ac emanatio secundum sanctitatem, uti supra probatum est. Alius, aliud. ‘Licet igitur “alius sit Pater, alius Filius, alius Spiritus sanctus, non tamen aliud”.’55 Solus. Non dicitur absolute ut significetur solitarius; dicitur tamen comparative de essentialibus, v.g., solus Deus est aeternus.56 At caute omnino adhibendus est de personalibus propter rationes multas et intricatas quas exponit Aquinas. 57

55 Greg. Naz., Ep. 1 ad Cledon., mg 37, 179. db 432. Cf. Sum. theol., i, q. 31, a. 2, ubi ulterius addiscitur evitanda esse de divinis personis nomina diversitatis, differentiae, separationis, divisionis, disparitatis, discrepantiae, singularis, unici, confusi, solitarii.

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When one has grasped all of this, one can only admire the terse and simple elegance of St Thomas in expounding the principles and potencies from which there are the notional acts. Since in God there is no real distinction between perfectible and perfection, between substance and operative potency, between intellect and will, questions about the remote and proximate principle of the word and of love are simply questions about the way of signifying, which are all solved through purely philosophical conclusions. The theological distinctions, however, are those between external causal emanation and internal intellectual emanation, between the principle of an emanation and that which emanates, between intellectual emanation by way of truth and intellectual emanation by way of holiness. And these two emanations are distinguished, not because divine truth and divine goodness are two different things, nor because the divine intellect and the divine will are two different things, but because a contradiction is implied if the emanation by way of truth is said to be the same as the emanation by way of holiness, as was proven earlier. Other (person), other (thing). ‘Therefore, although the Father is one person, the Son is another, and the Holy Spirit is a third, there is no other thing [in God].’ 55 Alone. This term is not used in the absolute sense of ‘solitary.’ It is, however, used comparatively with respect to essential attributes – for example, that God alone is eternal.56 But it should be used with the utmost caution concerning the persons, for the many involved reasons given by Aquinas. 57 his commentary on the Sentences but also in his Summa makes the divine essence the principle of divine generation. The one divine essence is common to Father and to Son. As the Father’s, the essence is the potency by which the Father generates; as the Son’s, the essence is the potency by which the Son is generated. The potentia spirandi is conceived in parallel fashion. Father and Son are one principle because they are one God. They are “duo spirantes” but “unus spirator.” As the potentia generandi means the divine essence but connotes a personal property, so also does the virtus spirativa. The procession of love is not voluntary but natural, even though it is “per modum voluntatis.” The same argument in the same passages establishes the existence of both potentia generandi and potentia spirandi ... It seems to follow that the divine essence is the principle by which the Father generates the Son and by which Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit; that potentia generandi and potentia spirandi, while in recto they mean the same divine essence, still in obliquo connote different personal properties. This is all very far from the type of trinitarian theory in which the Word is generated by the divine intellect and proceeding Love is spirated by the divine will.’] 55 Gregory Nazianzen, Epistola 1 ad Cledonium, mg 37, 179. db 432, ds 805, nd 319. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 31, a. 2, where St Thomas notes that the words ‘diversity,’ ‘difference,’ ‘separation,’ ‘division,’ ‘disparity,’ ‘discrepancy,’ ‘singular,’ ‘unique,’ ‘commingled,’ and ‘solitary’ ought to be avoided in speaking of the divine persons. 56 Ibid. q. 31, a. 3. 57 Ibid. a. 4.

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Deus genuit Deum, vere dicitur. Nam nomen, Deus, significat eum qui naturam divinam habet, seu essentia concrete significata supponit pro persona. Sed alius qui naturam divinam habet genuit alium qui naturam divinam habet. 58 Pater, Filius, et Spiritus sunt unus Deus, unus creator, sed tres existentes, tres creantes. Quod praedicatur de personis ponitur in singulari vel plurali, secundum quod praedicatum est substantivum vel adiectivum; nam substantiva habent numerum ex se ipsis secundum formam significatam; adiectiva autem habent numerum ex suppositis de quibus praedicantur; et ideo dicitur, unus Deus, quia una est essentia divina, unus creator, quia unum est principium creandi, sed tres existentes vel creantes, quia tres sunt qui existunt et creant.59 Symbolum autem ‘Quicumque’ (db 39) reverenter exponi solet secundum quod adiectiva sensu substantivi dicuntur.

Pater et Filius sunt unus spirator sed duo spirantes.60 Ratio autem est eadem ac supra. Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, est Trinitas, est tres personae. Quod verum est per identitatem, cum tam subiectum quam praedicatum dicant supposita divina. 61 Substantia, essentia, natura divina . . . non est generans neque genita nec procedens. db 432. Et ratio est quia propria abstracte significata non praedicantur de essentialibus abstracte significatis.62 Caeterum recoli oportet, quod supra dictum est,63 illegitimum esse syllogismum ex proprio per commune ad proprium.

ASSERTUM X Relationes divinae reales personas divinas constituunt et constitutas distinguunt, et ideo sunt proprietates personales. Facilius ex ipsa probatione orditur, quae asserti intentionem satis manifestat. Primo, ergo, relationes divinae reales personas divinas constituunt si positis relationibus eo ipso ponuntur personae.

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God has generated God. This statement is true. For ‘God’ signifies one who has the divine nature, that is to say, the essence meant concretely stands for a person. But one person who has the divine nature has generated another who has the divine nature.58 Father, Son, and Spirit are one God, one creator, but they are three existing and three creating. What is predicated of the persons is stated in the singular or in the plural, according to whether the predicate is a substantive or an adjective; for substantives have number in themselves, according to the form signified, whereas adjectives have number from the supposits of which they are predicated. Therefore, we say that there is ‘one God’ because there is one divine essence, ‘one creator’ because there is one principle of creating, but ‘three existing’ and ‘three creating’ because there are three who exist and create.59 The creed Quicumque (db 39, ds 75, nd 16) is customarily given a benign interpretation according to which the adjectives are taken as substantives. The Father and the Son are one spirator but are two spirating.60 The reason is the same as the above. God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, is a Trinity, is three persons. This is true by reason of identity, since both subject and predicate name divine supposits. 61 Substance, essence, the divine nature . . . is neither generating nor generated nor proceeding. db 432, ds 804, nd 318. The reason is that proper attributes signified abstractly are not predicated of essential attributes signified abstractly. 62 Also, one must remember what we said above,63 that that syllogism is illegitimate in which from a proper attribute one concludes to a proper attribute through a common attribute as a middle term. ASSERTION 10 The real divine relations constitute the divine persons and distinguish the persons constituted, and therefore are personal properties. It will be easier to begin with the proof itself, which quite clearly states the intent of this assertion. First, then, the real divine relations constitute the divine persons if by the very fact that the relations are posited the persons are posited. 58 59 60 61 62 63

Ibid. q. 39, a. 4. Ibid. a. 3. Ibid. q. 36, a. 4, ad 7m. Ibid. q. 39, a. 6; a. 5, ad 5m. See db 432, ds 804, nd 318. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 39, aa. 5 and 6. [See above, pp. 264–67.]

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Atqui positis relationibus eo ipso ponuntur personae. Ergo relationes divinae reales personas divinas constituunt. Maior est evidens si clare distincteque intelligitur quid sit constitutivum. Iam vero in finitis constitutivum est causa quaedam rei intrinseca propter quam realitas rei correspondet veritati de re; ita Socrates existit per actum essendi, est homo per formam substantialem, est hic per materiam individuantem, est sapiens per habitum intellectualem, etc. In divinis autem, ubi non sunt causae, analogice dicitur constitutivum ut significetur illa ratio, quoad se quodammodo prior, qua posita eo ipso habetur illud cuius quaeritur constitutio. 64 Minor autem ex antecessis constat. Supra enim stabilitum est rationem personae divinae esse vel relationem subsistentem vel hypostasin relatione distinctam. Et secundum utramque expositionem, posita relatione, sequitur persona in divinis. Si enim concipitur persona ut relatio subsistens, tunc posita relatione in divinis, eo ipso habetur relatio subsistens. Nihil enim in divinis realiter est quod non sit Deus; et nihil realiter est Deus quod non subsistat. Qua de causa, in divinis relationes non adveniunt suis suppositis, sed sua supposita secum ferunt; 65 vel, ut idem aliter dicatur, relatio divina non tantum est ordo ad aliud sed etiam ordinatum ad aliud, ut paternitas sit Pater, filiatio sit Filius, spiratio passiva sit Spiritus, et generaliter relatio sit relatio subsistens seu persona. Si autem concipitur persona divina per essentiam in recto et per relationem in obliquo, sicut et ipsa haec conceptio ita etiam argumentatio paulo difficilior est. Non enim eo sensu persona divina dicit essentiam in recto ut, posita essentia, ponatur persona et, positis tribus essentiis, ponantur tres personae. Et ideo clare intelligendum est quid significetur quando dicatur ‘essentia per modum hypostasis.’ Non enim dicit essentiam abstracte consideratam (deitatem), neque dicit essentiam divinam secundum considerationem concretam et philosophicam (habens deitatem), sed dicit essentiam divinam secundum considerationem concretam et theologicam (distinctum habens deitatem). Qua de causa, quando in recto ponitur essentia per modum hypostasis, ponitur subsistens distinctum; et cum in divinis non sit distinctio realis nisi per relationes (db 703), essentia per modum hypostasis, sicut includit distinctum, etiam in obliquo includit relationem.

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But by the very fact that the relations are posited the persons are posited. Therefore, the real divine relations constitute the divine persons. The major premise is evident if the meaning of ‘constitutive’ is clearly and distinctly understood. In finite beings a constitutive is some intrinsic cause of a thing because of which the reality of the thing corresponds to the truth of the thing. Thus Socrates exists through an act of existence, is a human being through a substantial form, is this through individuating matter, is wise through an intellectual habit, and so on. In God, however, who has no causes, ‘constitutive’ is used in an analogous sense to signify that formality, in some manner prior in itself, by the very positing of which there follows also that whose constitution we are seeking. 64 The minor premise is clear from what we have said. For we have established that the formality of divine person can be taken either as a subsistent relation or as a hypostasis distinct by reason of a relation. In either case, once a relation is posited, there follows a person in God. For if a person is conceived as a subsistent relation, then by the very fact that a relation in God is posited, there is a subsistent relation. There is nothing really in God that is not God, and there is nothing really in God that does not subsist. Therefore, in God the relations are not added to their supposits, but bring their supposits with them.65 Or, to put it another way, a divine relation is not only an order to another but also someone ordered to another, so that paternity is the Father, filiation is the Son, passive spiration is the Spirit, and generally a relation is a subsistent relation or a person. If, however, divine person is conceived directly through essence and indirectly through relation, then the argumentation, like this conception itself, is a bit more difficult. For defining divine person directly through essence does not mean that if essence is posited a person is posited, nor that if three essences are posited, three persons are posited. Therefore, one must clearly understand what is meant by the phrase ‘essence in the manner of a hypostasis.’ For it does not mean essence considered abstractly (divinity), nor does it mean divine essence considered concretely and philosophically (possessing divinity), but it means divine essence considered concretely and theologically (someone distinct possessing divinity). When, therefore, essence in the manner of a hypostasis is directly posited, a distinct subsistent is posited; and since in God there is no real distinction except through the relations (db 703, ds 1330, nd 325), essence in the manner of a hypostasis, as it includes what is distinct, also indirectly includes relation. 64 See Lonergan, 44–53; The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 44–75, 90–105. 65 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 40, a. 3; see q. 29, a. 4; q. 33, a. 2, ad 1m; q. 40, a. 1, ad 1m and ad 2m; q. 40, a. 2.

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Quibus perspectis, habetur intentum. Illud non est personarum constitutivum, quo posito, non ponuntur personae; et illud est personarum constitutivum, quo posito, ponuntur personae. Sed posita deitate vel deitate subsistente, non ponuntur tres personae; et posita deitate subsistente et distincta, ponuntur relationes et ideo personae. Ergo personae divinae relationibus constituuntur.

Deinde, consideranda venit altera asserti pars, nempe, relationes divinae reales personas constitutas distinguunt. Quod auctoritate probatur facillime. In Deo enim ‘omnia sunt unum ubi non obviat relationis oppositio’ (db 703). Sed personae sunt, non unum, sed tres inter se distinctae. Ergo per relationum oppositionem inter se distinguuntur.

Quod iterum probatur rationem assignando. Eatenus enim personae divinae distinguuntur quatenus unaquaeque persona quoddam distinctivum habet. Quod distinctivum, si ens rationis est, facit distinctionem rationis; si autem reale est, aut substantia est, aut accidens, aut relatio. Sed personae divinae sunt realiter distinctae, et ideo distinctivum non est ens rationis. Iterum, personae divinae sunt consubstantiales, unam eandemque substantiam habentes, et ideo distinctivum reale non est substantia. Ulterius, in Deo nullum est accidens, et ideo distinctivum reale non est accidens. Et ita relinquitur ut relationes divinae reales personas constitutas distinguant. Tertio, per modum corollarii additur definitio proprietatis personalis. Proprietas enim personalis in divinis est illud attributum proprium quod personam constituit atque distinguit. Sed, uti supra probatum est, relationes divinae reales personas constituunt atque constitutas distinguunt. Ergo relationes divinae reales, qua personarum constitutivae et distinctivae, sunt proprietates personales. Quarto, additur et aliud corollarium, nempe, abstractis per intellectum relationibus, tolluntur personae divinae.66 Nam, uti probatum est, positis relationibus, ponuntur personae; et non positis relationibus, non ponuntur personae; et ideo abstractis per intellectum relationibus, tolluntur personae.

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With this well understood, we have achieved our aim. That which is posited without the persons being thereby posited is not a constitutive of the persons; and that which, when it is posited, means that the persons are posited is constitutive of the persons. But when divinity or subsistent divinity is posited, the three persons are not posited; and when distinct subsistent divinity is posited, the relations and therefore the persons are posited. Therefore, the divine persons are constituted by the relations. Next, we come to consider the second part of the assertion, that the real divine relations distinguish the persons constituted. This is very easily proven from authority. For in God ‘all things are one except where there is relational opposition’ (db 703, ds 1330, nd 325). But the persons are not one person, but three who are distinct from one another. Therefore, they are distinguished from one another through relational opposition. This can also be proven by assigning the reason. For the divine persons are distinct insofar as each person has something distinctive. If that distinctive feature is a conceptual being, it yields a conceptual distinction; but if it is real, it is either a substance or an accident or a relation. Now, the divine persons are really distinct, and therefore the distinctive feature is not a conceptual being. Again, the divine persons are consubstantial, having one and the same substance, and therefore the real distinctive feature is not a substance. Furthermore, in God there is no accident, and therefore the real distinctive feature is not an accident. It remains, therefore, that the real divine relations distinguish the persons they constitute. Third, the definition of a personal property is added by way of a corollary. In God, a personal property is that proper attribute which constitutes and distinguishes a person. But, as we have shown above, the real divine relations constitute the persons and distinguish the persons constituted. Therefore, the real divine relations as constitutive and distinctive of the persons are personal properties. Fourth, we add another corollary, namely, that if one intellectually abstracts the relations [from the persons], the divine persons do not remain. 66 For as we have demonstrated, once the relations are posited the persons are posited; and if the relations are not posited the persons are not posited. Therefore, if one intellectually abstracts the relations [from the persons], the persons do not remain. 66 Ibid. q. 40, a. 3. [The article asks ‘whether the hypostases still remain when by thought (per intellectum) the relations are abstracted from the persons (utrum, abstractis per intellectum relationibus a personis, adhuc remaneant hypostases).’ Hence the additions placed in brackets in the text.]

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ASSERTUM XI Actus notionales sunt naturales, conscii, intellectuales, rationales, necessarii, autonomi, aeterni, fundamentum ordinis in divinis, sed non voluntarii nisi sensu diminuto. Actus notionales sunt attributa divina et propria, quae non per nomina vel adiectiva sed per verba exprimuntur; v.g., generare, generari, dicere, dici, spirare, spirari, notionaliter diligere, procedere ut amorem. Secundum genesin nostrorum conceptuum distinguuntur: (1) emanationes intelligibiles quae non praesupponunt nisi conceptum Dei intelligentis, affirmantis, diligentis; (2) relationes ut relationes, quae in emanationibus fundantur; (3) eaedem relationes quatenus propter divinam simplicitatem sunt subsistentes, (4) personae quae relationibus subsistentibus constituuntur, (5) proprietates quibus personae distinguuntur, et (6) actus notionales qui sunt emanationes quatenus personas supponunt et de personis praedicantur. Quae tamen omnia distinguuntur non realiter sed secundum nostrum modum intelligendi et concipiendi.67 Notate tamen dici dupliciter posse accipi: uno modo, de Verbo qui procedit inquantum a Patre dicitur; alio modo, de omnibus quae a Deo intelliguntur et per Verbum dicuntur. Primo modo, praedicatur actus notionalis de persona divina; alio modo, significantur obiecta quae actu notionali attinguntur. Et similiter distinguendum est inter principium amoris, ipse amor procedens, et obiecta quae amantur. Actus notionales sunt naturales.68 Nam natura est principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est; motus autem late dictus includit actum perfecti ut intelligere et velle; et huiusmodi actus manet in subiecto, quia natura est principium intrinsecum ipsius actus (in eo in quo est); et si ipsa natura est potentia, processio actus est processio operationis, secundum quam perfectio perfectibili accedit; si autem natura est actus, processio actus est processio operati, secundum quam actus ex actu est; si denique idem est actus procedens ac actus ex quo procedit, processio dicitur per modum operati.69

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ASSERTION 11 The notional acts are natural, conscious, intellectual, rational, necessary, autonomous, eternal, the foundation of order in God, but not voluntary except in a diminished sense. The notional acts are the proper divine attributes expressed not by nouns or adjectives but by verbs: for example, to generate, to be generated, to speak, to be spoken, to spirate, to be spirated, to love notionally, and to proceed as love. From the viewpoint of the genesis of our concepts, we distinguish: (1) the intellectual emanations, which presuppose only the concept of God understanding, affirming, and loving; (2) the relations as relations, which are grounded in the emanations; (3) the same relations as subsisting on account of God’s simplicity; (4) the persons who are constituted by the subsistent relations; (5) the properties by which the persons are distinguished; and (6) the notional acts that are the emanations inasmuch as they presuppose the persons and are predicated of the persons. All of these are distinguished, not in reality, but according to our manner of understanding and conceiving.67 Note, however, that ‘to be spoken’ can be taken in two ways: first, as predicated of the Word who proceeds as spoken by the Father, and second, as predicated of everything that is understood by God and spoken through the Word. In the first way, a notional act is predicated of a divine person; and in the second way, objects are signified which are attained by a notional act. The same distinction is to be made between the principle of love, proceeding love itself, and the objects that are loved. The notional acts are natural.68 For a nature is a principle of movement and of rest in that in which it is. Movement in the broad sense includes the act of what is complete (actus perfecti), such as the act of understanding and the act of willing; this kind of act remains in the subject, because a nature is an intrinsic principle of the act itself (‘in that in which it is’). And if the nature itself is a potency, the procession of the act is a processio operationis, and on this basis a perfection is received in the perfectible. But if the nature is an act, the procession of the act is a processio operati, and on this basis an act proceeds from an act. Finally, if the proceeding act is identical with the act from which it proceeds, the procession is said to be per modum operati.69 67 Ibid. q. 41, a. 1, ad 2m. 68 Ibid. a. 2, ad 3m and ad 4m. 69 [See above, pp. 154–59.]

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Iam vero generatio Filii et spiratio Spiritus sancti sunt ex principio intrinseco quod non est perfectibile sed perfectione infinitum; et id quod procedit pariter est perfectione infinitum; et cum infinitum sit unicum, processio est per modum operati. Quare omnia verificantur quae ad actus naturales constituendos requiruntur. E contra, multipliciter excluditur origo per modum facientis seu agentis. Agens enim agit potentia activa, quae est principium motus vel mutationis in alio secundum quod aliud; unde quod ita oritur est per actionem transeuntem ad extra; et haec actio est praedicamentum actionis, exercitium causalitatis efficientis. Unde Filius et Spiritus, si per modum agentis essent orti, extra Deum essent et facti vel creati, et non consubstantiales (cum nihil sit causa sui); quae consectaria sunt contra symbola fidei. Actus notionales sunt conscii. Conscium enim non addit super ens sed dicit ens in sufficienti perfectionis gradu. Deus autem est perfectione infinitus; et quia est omnino simplex, eius esse est eius intelligere et affirmare et velle; et cum hi actus non possint esse vel inconscii vel in inconscio, quidquid est in Deo simplici et perfectione infinito eo ipso est conscium. Actus notionales, naturales, et conscii sunt intellectuales. Nam supra probatum est ipsam Dei naturam esse intellectualem. Actus notionales etiam dici possunt rationales, non eo sensu quo ratio dicit transitum de potentia in actum, sed eo sensu quo rationale ponitur in definitione personae inde a Boethio.70 Actus notionales sunt necessarii. Repugnat enim infinitati perfectionis divinae ut perspiciatur evidentiam sufficere ad verbum dicendum et tamen verbum non dicatur; et pariter repugnat ut perspiciatur bonum infinitum et iudicetur hoc bonum per spiratum amorem esse amandum et tamen amor non spiretur. Actus notionales sunt autonomi. Existit enim necessitas actuum notionalium, non ex eo quod Deus superiori cuidam legi sive metaphysicae sive gnoseologicae sive morali subsit, sed ex ipsa intrinseca perfectione naturae intellectualis et divinae. Actus notionales sunt aeterni. Actus enim necessarii in aeterno sunt aeterni. 71 Actus notionales ordinem in divinis fundant. Qui quidem ordo in eo est quod Filius est ex Patre et Spiritus est ex Patre Filioque.72 Sed ordo Filii ex Patre est

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Now the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit are from an intrinsic principle that is not perfectible but is infinite in perfection; likewise, what proceeds is infinite in perfection; and since there is but one infinite, the procession is per modum operati. Therefore, all that are required to constitute the acts as natural are verified. On the other hand, there are many ways to exclude origin by way of a maker or of an agent. For an agent acts by active potency, which is the principle of movement or of change in another precisely as other. Hence, what proceeds in this way does so by an action that goes out; this action is the predicament of action, an exercise of efficient causality. Thus, if the Son and the Spirit had proceeded by way of an agent, they would be outside of God, made or created, and not consubstantial (since nothing is the cause of itself). These conclusions are contrary to the creeds. The notional acts are conscious. ‘Conscious’ adds nothing to being, but denotes being at a sufficient degree of perfection. But God is infinite in perfection; and because God is absolutely simple, God’s act of existence is God’s act of understanding, God’s act of affirming, and God’s act of willing; and since these acts can be neither unconscious nor in what is unconscious, whatever is in the simple and infinitely perfect God is by that very fact conscious. Acts that are notional, natural, and conscious are intellectual. We have proven above that the nature of God is intellectual. The notional acts can also be called rational, not in the sense of reason as a progression from potency to act, but in the sense it has had in the definition of person ever since Boethius.70 The notional acts are necessary. It is inconsistent with the infinity of divine perfection to grasp that evidence is sufficient to speak a word and not speak that word; it is likewise inconsistent to grasp the infinite good and judge that that good ought to be loved by spirated love, and yet not spirate that love. The notional acts are autonomous. The necessity of the notional acts exists not because God is subject to some higher metaphysical or gnoseological or moral law, but by reason of the intrinsic perfection of the divine intellectual nature. The notional acts are eternal, for acts that are necessary in what is eternal are themselves eternal.71 The notional acts are the foundation of order in God. This order consists in the fact that the Son is from the Father, and the Spirit is from the Father and the Son.72 But the order of the Son from the Father is by way of generation, the order 70 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 29, a. 3, ad 4m. 71 Ibid. q. 42, a. 2. 72 Ibid. q. 42, a. 3.

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secundum generationem, ordo Spiritus ex Patre Filioque est secundum spirationem, et hi duo ordines ordinantur quia amor spiratus secundum sanctitatem est ex verbo generato secundum veritatem.73 Quia vero actus notionales sunt aeterni, hic ordo non est secundum successionem temporalem. Quia autem actus notionales sunt non causales sed naturales, hic ordo non est secundum prius et posterius causae et effectus. Sed attenditur ordo in divinis secundum originem et secundum naturam divinam intellectualem. Actus notionales dici possunt voluntarii secundum voluntatem concomitantem, sicut de Socrate dicitur quod voluntate sua homo est inquantum vult hominem esse. Sicut enim Pater et Filius et Spiritus sciunt, ita etiam volunt se esse Patrem et Filium et Spiritum. E contra, hi actus non sunt voluntarii quasi procedentes ex voluntate vel volitione tamquam ex principio realiter distincto; Verbum enim procedit ex actu intelligendi qua dicente; et Amor procedit ex actu intelligendi et Verbo qua spirantibus. Attamen secundum quod concipitur amor divinus ut actus voluntatis divinae, amor dici potest voluntarius, dummodo voluntarium et necessarium cum libero non confundatur, et voluntas divina non erronee supponatur principium realiter distinctum ab amore divino. 74

QUAESTIO XVIII Utrum proprietates personales actibus notionalibus praeintelligantur Circa actus notionales passive significatos, nempe, generari, spirari, nulla invenitur difficultas, si quidem actus notionalis concipitur tamquam via ad personam proprietate constituendam; et ideo praeintelligitur actus notionalis. Circa actus notionales active significatos, nempe, generare, spirare, cum spiratio activa personam non constituat, etiam deest difficultas. Sed nonnullis crux quaedam insolubilis videtur quaestio utrum circa primam personam actus proprietati an proprietas actui praeintelligatur, videlicet, utrum Pater sit quia generet, an generet quia Pater.75 Quam quaestionem resolvit S. Thomas distinguendo relationem qua relationem et relationem qua personae constitutivam, ut paternitas qua personae constitutiva

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of the Spirit from Father and Son is by way of spiration, and these two orders are ordered because the love that is spirated on the basis of holiness is from the Word that is generated on the basis of truth.73 Because the notional acts are eternal, this order is not based on temporal succession. And because the notional acts are not causal but natural, this order is not based on the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of cause and effect. Rather, the order within God is based on origin and on the divine intellectual nature. The notional acts can be said to be voluntary by reason of a concomitant willingness, as one can say about Socrates that he is a man by his will inasmuch as he is a man willingly. For just as the Father, the Son, and the Spirit know they are the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, so also they will to be the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. On the other hand, these acts are not voluntary as if proceeding from a will or from a volition as from a really distinct principle. For the Word proceeds from an act of understanding as speaking, and Love proceeds from the act of understanding and the Word as both spirating. However, when we conceive divine love as an act of divine will, love can be said to be voluntary, so long as voluntary and necessary are not confused with free, and the divine will is not incorrectly thought to be a principle really distinct from divine love. 74 QUESTION 18 Are the personal properties understood as prior to the notional acts? Concerning the notional acts that are signified in a passive sense, namely, to be generated and to be spirated, there is no difficulty, since the notional act is conceived as the way towards constituting the person by the property; therefore, the notional act is understood as prior. Concerning the notional acts that are signified in an active sense, namely, to generate and to spirate, again there is no difficulty in the case of active spiration, since it does not constitute a person. But many consider it to be an unsolvable question whether with regard to the first person the act is understood as prior to the property or the property as prior to the act – in other words, whether he is Father because he generates or generates because he is Father. 75 St Thomas solves this question by distinguishing between the relation as relation and the relation as constitutive of the person, so that paternity as constitutive of 73 Ibid. q. 27, a. 3, ad 3m. 74 Ibid. q. 41, a. 2. 75 [See Lonergan, Verbum 213–14.]

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antecedat actum notionalem, paternitas vero qua relatio consequatur actum et super actum fundetur.76 Quae sane solutio non facit difficultatem realem, cum una et eadem res in divinis sit et personae constitutiva et eiusdem actus notionalis et eiusdem relatio. Neque facit difficultatem conceptualem, cum alius conceptus sit relatio qua proprietas constitutiva, alius sit relatio qua relatio, et ideo non idem sit conceptus qui actui notionali praeintelligitur et qui eundem actum consequitur. Cuius tamen manifestationem forte adiuvat consideratio analogiae psychologicae. In nobis enim temporalibus, cum per perspectam evidentiam intelligibiliter necessitemur, facile distinguitur inter realem ordinationem, tempore priorem, ad verbum verum dicendum et realem ordinationem, tempore posteriorem, ad verbum verum iam dictum. In Deo autem aeterno pariter aeterna est autonoma necessitas intelligibilis, et aeterna ordinatio ad verbum dicendum, et aeternum verbum, et aeterna relatio ad verbum dictum. Qua de causa, quia temporales sumus, quaerimus utrum proprietas actui praeintelligatur; et quia Deus aeternus est, nisi ratione non distinguimus inter praeintellectam relationem qua proprietatem et consequentem relationem qua relationem.

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the person is prior to the notional act, while paternity as a relation is consequent upon the act and is grounded upon the act. 76 This solution certainly presents no real difficulty, since one and the same reality in God is constitutive of the person and of its notional act and of its relation. Nor does it present a conceptual difficulty, since relation as a constitutive property is one concept and relation as relation is another, and therefore the concept that is understood as prior to the notional act is not the same as that which is consequent upon that act. A consideration of the psychological analogy may help to clarify this point. Living as we do within time, when we are intellectually constrained by grasping the sufficiency of evidence, we easily distinguish between the real ordering, temporally prior, to the true word to be spoken, and the real ordering, temporally subsequent, to the true word now spoken. In God, however, who is eternal, autonomous intellectual necessity is likewise eternal, the ordering to the word to be spoken is eternal, the word is eternal, and the relation to the word spoken is eternal. Therefore, because we are within time, we ask whether the property is understood as prior to the act; and because God is eternal, it is only conceptually that we distinguish between relation as a property understood as prior and the consequent relation as relation.

76 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 40, a. 4; De potentia, q. 10, a. 3. Ludovicus Billot, De Deo Uno et Trino (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1935) 619–21.

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CAPUT QUINTUM

De Divinis Personis Inter Se Comparatis

Quae divinarum personarum conscientiam atque propriam perfectionem respiciant iam sunt consideranda. Primo, ergo, ex emanationibus intelligibilibus concluditur singulas divinas personas esse conscias tam sui quam alterius cuiusque (Assertum XII ). Deinde recentiorum quorundam sententia examinatur qui Patrem et Filium et Spiritum non personas sed essendi modos nominatos esse velint (Quaestio XIX ) et, post consideratam locutionem divinam (Quaestio XX ), inter se comparantur subiecta aeterna atque subiecta temporalia (Quaestio XXI ). Tertio, divinarum personarum circumincessio tam psychologica quam ontologica affirmatur (Assertum XIII ). Quarto, quemadmodum dogma trinitarium divinam perfectionem magis nobis manifestet, explicatur (Assertum XIV ). ASSERTUM XII Pater, Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus per unam conscientiam realem sunt tria subiecta conscia tum sui tum cuiusque alterius tum actus sui tam notionalis quam essentialis. Asserti intentio Quae iam pridem implicite in assertis continentur nunc explicite ponuntur. Nihil enim hoc asserto affirmatur nisi hoc quod in divinis sunt tres reales et realiter inter se distinctae relationes subsistentes in emanationibus intelligibilibus fundatae. Sed visum est hanc quaestionem non antea tractari, tum quia personas inter se comparat, quod non facit Aquinas nisi in q. 42, tum quia minuitur difficultas si iam de actibus notionalibus actum est.

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CHAPTER 5

The Divine Persons in Relation to One Another

We must now consider what pertains to the consciousness of the divine persons and to the perfection proper to them. First, then, from the intellectual emanations we conclude that each divine person is conscious not only of himself but also of each of the others (assertion 12). Next, we examine the opinion of some recent theologians who would prefer that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit be called not persons but rather modes of being (question 19); and after considering divine locution (question 20), we compare eternal subjects and temporal subjects (question 21). Third, we affirm both the psychological and the ontological circumincession of the divine persons (assertion 13). Fourth, we explain how the dogma of the Trinity more clearly manifests to us the divine perfection (assertion 14). ASSERTION 12 Father, Son, and Holy Spirit through one real consciousness are three subjects conscious both of themselves and of each of the others, as well as of their own act both notional and essential. Meaning of the Assertion What has hitherto been implicitly contained in assertions is now stated explicitly. For nothing is affirmed in this assertion except this, that in God there are three real and really distinct subsistent relations based upon intellectual emanations. But it seemed preferable to leave this question until now, both because it compares the persons to one another, which Aquinas does only in his question 42, and because there is less difficulty if the notional acts have already been treated.

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Conscientiae ratio ‘Conscium’ dicitur tripliciter: (1) de subiecto quod est conscium; (2) de actu quo est conscium; (3) de actione qua alius subiecti actus ab alio emanat. Ita conscius dicitur homo; conscium etiam dicitur sentire, intelligere, iudicare, eligere; conscia denique dicitur et deliberatio qua iudicium ex perspecta evidentia, et consiliatio qua electio ex mediis consideratis, emanant. 1

‘Conscientia’ proinde in genere cognoscitivo ponitur cum notitiam quandam importet, sed a caeteris cognitionis speciebus eo distinguitur quod notitiam dicit non obiecti sed subiecti et actus subiecti vel etiam actionis subiecti. Conscientia ergo nostra est non visi sed videntis, non auditi sed audientis, non intellecti sed intelligentis, non definiti sed definientis, non affirmati sed affirmantis, non electi sed eligentis, non eius quod appetitur vel desideratur vel timetur sed appetentis, desiderantis, timentis. Praeterea, quamvis homo possit se intelligere et definire et affirmare et diligere, etiam tunc distinguendum est inter id quod cognoscitur vel appetitur ex parte obiecti et id quod ex parte ipsius subiecti innotescit, ut hoc conscientiae, illud autem vel alteri cognitionis speciei vel appetitioni attribuatur. Denique tandem, quamvis haec sui cognitio ex parte obiecti nisi per reflexionem quandam atque introspectionem non fiat, omnino fallax est conclusio ipsam conscientiam per reflexionem quandam vel introspectionem fieri; sive enim ipsi in nos reflectimur sive circa alia prorsus apprehendendo et appetendo agimus, pariter ipsi nobis sumus praesentes; et inquantum sic nobis praesentes sumus, non autem inquantum nos ipsos tamquam obiecta cognoscimus, habetur veri nominis conscientia.2

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The Notion of Consciousness ‘Conscious’ is predicated in three ways: (1) of the subject that is conscious, (2) of the act by which the subject is conscious, and (3) of the action whereby one act of the subject emanates from another act. Thus a man is said to be conscious; so also sensing, understanding, judging, choosing are said to be conscious; and finally reflection, whereby a judgment emanates from a grasp of evidence, and deliberation, whereby a choice emanates from a consideration of means, are also said to be conscious.1 Consciousness, then, belongs to the genus of knowledge, since it involves some type of awareness; but it is distinguished from other species of knowing in that it denotes awareness not of an object but of the subject and of the act of the subject or even of an action of the subject. Our consciousness, therefore, is not of what we see but of ourselves seeing, not of what we hear but of ourselves hearing, not of what we understand but of ourselves understanding, not of what we define but of ourselves defining, not of what we affirm but of ourselves affirming, not of what we choose but of ourselves choosing, not of what we desire or fear but of ourselves desiring or fearing. Besides, although we can understand, define, affirm, and love ourselves, even here a distinction must be made between what we know or desire on the side of the object and what we are aware of on the side of the subject, so that the latter belongs to consciousness but the former belongs to another species of knowledge or to appetition. Finally, although this knowledge of oneself on the side of the object is attained only through some type of introspective reflection, it would be quite incorrect to conclude that consciousness itself is attained through some type of reflection or introspection. For whether we are reflecting upon ourselves or are concerned with entirely other things that we are apprehending or desiring, we are present to ourselves in either case; and it is inasmuch as we are thus present to ourselves, and not inasmuch as we know ourselves as objects, that we have consciousness in the true sense of the word.2 1 [Deliberatio is translated here by ‘reflection’ and consiliatio by ‘deliberation,’ because of the way in which Lonergan uses the terms ‘reflection’ and ‘deliberation’ elsewhere, especially in his frequent mention of ‘questions for reflection’ and ‘questions for deliberation.’ It might be suggested, of course, that, if the judgment involved is a judgment of value, then it emanates from ‘deliberation’; in that case ‘consiliatio’ would be ‘counsel.’] 2 For a fuller treatment of the nature of consciousness [Latin: ‘Fusius rationem conscientiae exposuimus ...’], see Lonergan, Insight, chapter 11, and The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, parts 5 and 6. [See also ‘Christ as Subject: A Reply,’ in Collection 162–79.]

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Definiatur ergo conscientia illa notitia quae ex parte subiecti habetur et respicit, non obiectum actus, sed subiectum ipsumque actum vel etiam actionem eiusdem subiecti. Notate tandem denique ‘conscium’ non addere super ens sed ipsum ens dicere prout est in tali gradu perfectionis ontologicae. Quare, quae requiruntur atque sufficiunt ut vere dicatur quod Petrus sentit vel intelligit, etiam requiruntur atque sufficiunt ut vere dicatur quod Petrus conscie sentit vel conscie intelligit. Caeterum, inane imaginationis figmentum est sive inconscie sentire, sive sentiens inconscium, sive inconscie intelligere, sive intelligens inconscium.

Conscientia divina secundum actum essentialem Quibus perspectis, analogice ad divina procedendum est; et inprimis conscientiam divinam considerari oportet secundum actum essentialem, i.e., secundum ipsum actum purum atque infinitum inquantum quodammodo ab emanationibus et a relationibus realibus praescinditur.3 Iam vero Deus et se et alia intelligit, scit, vult. Neque inconscius Deus inconscie intelligit, scit, vult, sed conscius et conscie. Et ideo in divinis habentur tum subiectum conscium tum conscius actus intelligendi, sciendi, volendi.

Proinde, Pater et Filius et Spiritus sunt Deus. Ergo Pater conscius conscie intelligit, scit, vult; Filius conscius conscie intelligit, scit, vult; Spiritus conscius conscie intelligit, scit, vult. Porro, circa hanc divinam conscientiam quae per actum essentialem habetur, sequentia sunt notanda. Primo, quia conscientia est et subiecti ut quod et actus ut quo, Pater est conscius et sui et actus sui; et idem est dicendum de Filio et de Spiritu. Deinde, quia in divinis non datur distinctio realis inter relationes et substantiam, pariter in divinis non datur realis distinctio inter subiectum quod est conscium et actus quo est conscius. Tertio, quia Pater, Filius, et Spiritus sanctus non realiter distinguuntur nisi secundum relationes oppositas, fieri nequit ut per actum essentialem, qui a relationibus 3 ‘Quodammodo’ praescinditur: videlicet, non ut a tribus subiectis divinis praescindatur, sed ut a mutua trium conscientia methodice et momentanee abstrahatur.

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Let us therefore define consciousness as that awareness that is had on the side of the subject and that regards not the object but the subject of an act, and the act itself, or even an action of that subject. Finally, note that ‘conscious’ adds nothing to being but denotes being itself at a certain degree of ontological perfection. Therefore, whatever is required and sufficient in order to say truly that Peter senses or understands is also required and sufficient to say truly that Peter consciously senses or consciously understands. To speak of sensing unconsciously, or of someone sensing unconsciously, or of understanding unconsciously, or of someone understanding unconsciously, is but an empty figment of the imagination. Divine Consciousness on the Basis of Essential Act Once these matters are grasped, we must proceed analogically to a consideration of God; and first we must consider divine consciousness on the basis of essential act, that is, on the basis of the pure and infinite act itself, prescinding in a way from the emanations and the real relations.3 Now God understands, knows, and wills both God and all that is not God. Nor does an unconscious God unconsciously understand, know, and will; rather, a conscious God consciously understands, knows, and wills. Therefore, in God there is both conscious subject and conscious act of understanding, knowing, and willing. Furthermore, the Father and the Son and the Spirit are God. Therefore, the conscious Father consciously understands, knows, and wills; the conscious Son consciously understands, knows, and wills; the conscious Spirit consciously understands, knows, and wills. Moreover, regarding this divine consciousness had through essential act, the following points should be noted. First, since consciousness is of the subject as that which is conscious and also of the act as that by which one is conscious, the Father is conscious both of himself and of his act; and the same holds for the Son and the Spirit. Second, since in God there is no real distinction between relations and substance, similarly in God there is no real distinction between the subject that is conscious and the act by which the subject is conscious. Third, since the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are really distinct only on the basis of relational opposition, it is impossible that through essential act, which 3 We say, ‘in a way’: that is to say, not as prescinding from the three divine subjects, but as abstracting methodically and for the moment from the mutual consciousness of the Three.

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praescindit, Pater habeat distinctam conscientiam Filii vel Spiritus; et similiter fieri nequit ut Filius habeat distinctam conscientiam Patris vel Spiritus; et idem de Spiritu dicendum est.

Obicitur: Pater per actum essentialem optime intelligit et se et alias personas. Respondetur: non est sermo de obiecto quod intelligitur sed de subiecto quod intelligit. Instatur: Pater est conscius non solum sui sed etiam sui actus: qui actus realiter identificatur cum Filio et Spiritu; ergo per actum essentialem Pater est conscius ex parte subiecti tum Filii tum Spiritus. Respondetur: non diximus nullam esse conscientiam aliarum personarum, sed diximus non esse distinctam conscientiam aliarum personarum; et ratio erat quod actus essentialis, sicut praescindit a relationibus, pariter praescindit a distinctionibus quae relationes consequuntur.

Quarto, sicut per actum essentialem qua talem eadem divinitas eodem modo a tribus habetur ut Pater et Filius et Spiritus sit unusquisque pariter Deus, ita etiam per actum essentialem qua talem eadem divina conscientia eodem modo a tribus habetur, ut Pater et Filius et Spiritus sit unusquisque pariter conscius et sui et actus sui essentialis. Quinto, haec per actum essentialem conscientia analogice tantummodo se habet ad nostram conscientiam. Tam enim in divinis quam in nobis conscientia est notitia ex parte subiecti tum sui tum actus sui. Sed in nobis haec notitia est praevia atque informis: praevia quia praerequiritur ut ipsi nos clare et distincte ex parte obiecti cognoscamus; informis quia illam claritatem atque distinctionem non habet quae in cognitione ex parte obiecti invenitur. In Deo autem actus essentialis non est praevius ad alium actum neque per alium actum transit ex obscuro et confuso in clarum et distinctum; sed Deus est ipsum intelligere, in quo nulla realis distinctio intercedit inter subiectum qua divinum et obiectum qua divinum. Sexto, quamvis non sit realis distinctio inter subiectum qua divinum et obiectum qua divinum, minime sequitur superfluere rationem conscientiae secundum actum essentialem. Nam non solum habetur obiectum qua divinum sed etiam obiecta secundaria; quae tamen Deus conscius conscie cognoscit qua obiecta et quidem qua a subiecto distincta. Praeterea, in re trinitaria unaquaeque persona per actum

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prescinds from the relations, the Father should have a distinct consciousness of the Son or of the Spirit; and similarly it is impossible that the Son should have a distinct consciousness of the Father or of the Spirit; and the same is true for the Spirit. One might object here that the Father through essential act most fully understands both himself and the other persons. To this we reply that we are not speaking here about the object that is understood but about the subject who understands. But, the objector goes on, the Father is conscious not only of himself but also of his act; this act is really identical with the Son and the Spirit; therefore, through essential act the Father is conscious, on the side of the subject, of both the Son and the Spirit. In answer to this we point out that we have not said that there is no consciousness of the other persons, but that there is no distinct consciousness of the other persons. And the reason was that, as essential act prescinds from the relations, it likewise prescinds from the distinctions that are consequent upon the relations. Fourth, just as through essential act as such the same divinity is possessed in the same way by the Three, so that the Father and the Son and the Spirit are God, each of them equally, so also through essential act as such the same divine consciousness is possessed in the same way by the three persons, so that each of them is equally conscious both of himself and of his essential act. Fifth, this consciousness through essential act is related only analogously to our consciousness. For both in God and in us consciousness is an awareness on the side of the subject of both oneself and one’s act. But in us this awareness is preliminary and unstructured: preliminary, because it is a prerequisite for us to know ourselves clearly and distinctly on the side of the object; unstructured, because it lacks that clarity and distinctness that is present in knowledge on the side of the object. In God, on the other hand, essential act is not preliminary to another act, and it does not go, by means of another act, from what is obscure and vague to what is clear and distinct; rather, God is understanding itself, in whom there is no real distinction between the subject as divine and the object as divine. Sixth, although there is no real distinction between the subject as divine and the object as divine, it by no means follows that the notion of consciousness on the basis of essential act is superfluous. For there is not only the object as divine but also the secondary objects, and these God as conscious consciously knows as objects and indeed as distinct from the subject. Besides, in the Trinity each person

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essentialem tres personas ex parte obiecti comprehendit; neque inconscia persona inconscie tres comprehendit. Actus notionales Actus notionales enumerantur praecipue quattuor: generare, generari, spirare, spirari. Quibus quodammodo declarandis secundum analogiam psychologicam accedunt respective: dicere, verbum, notionaliter diligere, et amor procedens. 4 Ad completum horum actuum conceptum intrant omnia fere elementa trinitaria: nam (1) ut adsit ratio actus requiritur ipse actus infinitus; (2) ut adsit specifica distinctio requiruntur processiones, nempe, generatio et spiratio; (3) ut distinguantur processionum aspectus activus et passivus requiruntur relationes quattuor reales, nempe, paternitas, filiatio, spiratio activa, et spiratio passiva; et (4) cum actus sint suppositorum, hae relationes sunt considerandae prout sunt subsistentes, nempe, ut Pater et Filius, Spirator et Spiritus. Quibus perspectis, elucet cur S. Thomas in prima parte Summae de processionibus in q. 27, de actibus autem notionalibus in q. 41 egerit. Processiones enim concipi possunt si solummodo praesupponitur unus Deus intelligens, sciens, volens; sed ad actus notionales concipiendos ulterius requiruntur relationes reales realiter inter se distinctae, subsistentes, et cum substantia divina realiter identicae. Cum tamen in divinis realiter distinguantur neque relationes ut subsistentes a relationibus qua relationibus neque ipsae relationes a processionibus, sufficit dicere actus notionales super actum divinum essentialem addere relationem divinam realem, quae sane nisi ratione ab eo quod est actus essentialis non distinguitur. Conscientia divina secundum actus notionales De existentia huius conscientiae divinae facile constat. Nam duae processiones divinae realiter identificantur cum quattuor relationibus, cum nihil aliud sit processio in divinis, ubi nullus est motus, quam habitudo principii ad terminum et habitudo termini ad principium. Praeterea, hae quattuor relationes sunt subsistentes, ut idem realiter sit tum subiectum quod relatione refertur tum ipsa relatio qua refertur. Praeterea, ipsae processiones sunt emanationes intellectuales et

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through essential act comprehends the three persons on the side of the object; nor does an unconscious person unconsciously comprehend the Three. Notional Acts The notional acts are principally these four: to generate, to be generated, to spirate, and to be spirated. By way of clarifying these according to the psychological analogy, the following are applied to them, respectively: to speak, word, to love notionally, and proceeding love.4 The complete conception of these acts involves almost all the elements of trinitarian theology. For (1) in order for the formality of act to be present, the infinite act itself is required; (2) for the specific distinction to be present, the processions, that is, generation and spiration, are required; (3) to distinguish the active and the passive aspects of the processions, the four real relations are required, namely, paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration; and (4) since acts are acts of supposits, these relations are to be considered as subsistents, that is, as Father and Son, Spirator and Spirit. It is clear, then, why St Thomas in the first part of the Summa theologiae dealt with the processions in question 27 but with the notional acts only in question 41. For the only presupposition needed to conceive the processions is the one God understanding, knowing, and willing; but to conceive the notional acts there are further required the real relations that are really distinct from one another, subsistent, and really identical with divine substance. However, since in God there is no real distinction between the relations as subsistent and the relations as relations or between the relations and the processions, it suffices to say that notional acts add to essential divine act real divine relation, which, of course, is only conceptually distinct from essential act. Divine Consciousness on the Basis of the Notional Acts The existence of this divine consciousness is easily demonstrated. For the two divine processions are really identical with the four relations, since in God, where there is no motion, there is no procession other than the relation of a principle to its term and the relation of a term to its principle. Besides, these four relations are subsistent, so that the subject that is related by a relation and the relation itself by which it is related are really the same. Again, the processions themselves are intellectual and intellectually conscious emanations, and therefore whatever 4 [That is to say, by psychological analogy the same notional acts are: to speak, word spoken, notionally to love, and proceeding love.]

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intellectualiter consciae; et ideo pariter intellectualia atque intellectualiter conscia sunt quae realiter cum processionibus identificantur. Intellectualia ergo atque intellectualiter conscia sunt (1) subiecta quae relationibus inter se referuntur et (2) ipsae relationes quibus inter se referuntur. Et ideo secundum hanc conscientiam Pater et Filius et Spiritus sunt unusquisque conscius tum sui tum alterius cuiusque, cum fieri nequeat ut quis conscie ad alium referatur quin eo ipso sit conscius tum sui tum alterius ad quem refertur. Proinde, haec divina secundum actus notionales conscientia est una. Una enim sit conscientia necesse est ubi ex unico intelligendi actu semel atque aeternaliter dicitur unicum verbum, ubi ex unico intelligendi actu unicoque verbo semel atque aeternaliter spiratur unicus amoris actus, ubi consubstantiales sunt tum actus intelligendi, tum verbum, tum amoris actus. At quamvis una sit haec divina secundum actus notionales conscientia, cum tamen alii actus aliis sint proprii, aliter ab aliis una eademque habetur conscientia. Nam intellectualiter conscius Pater conscientia intellectuali generat Filium; intellectualiter conscius Filius in conscientiam intellectualem a Patre generatur; intellectualiter conscii Pater et Filius conscientia intellectuali spirant Spiritum sanctum; et intellectualiter conscius Spiritus in conscientiam intellectualem a Patre Filioque spiratur. At realiter inter se distinguuntur generare et generari; realiter pariter inter se distinguuntur spirare et spirari; neque minus inter se distinguuntur conscie generare, conscie generari, et conscie spirari. Quare omnino concludendum est unam divinam conscientiam quae secundum actus notionales consideratur, tripliciter a tribus haberi; quod sane necessarium est, si quidem Pater, Filius, et Spiritus sunt unusquisque conscius tum sui tum alterius cuiusque, cum per unam conscientiam alii aliorum conscii esse non possint nisi eadem conscientia ab aliis aliter habeatur.

Quae conscientia quam veri nominis sit Quam veri nominis sit haec conscientia, omnino animadvertendum est. Sane ex parte obiecti sciunt pariter Pater, Filius, et Spiritus et Patrem conscie generare Filium, et Filium a Patre conscie generari, et Patrem Filiumque conscie spirare Spiritum, et Spiritum a Patre Filioque conscie spirari. At quod ex parte obiecti

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are really identified with the processions are likewise intellectual and intellectually conscious. Therefore (1) the subjects that are related to one another by relations and (2) the relations themselves by which the subjects are related to one another are intellectual and intellectually conscious. Thus, on the basis of this consciousness, the Father and the Son and the Spirit are, each of them, conscious both of himself and of each of the others, since it is impossible for anyone to be consciously related to another without by that very fact being conscious both of oneself and of the other to whom one is related. Further, this divine consciousness on the basis of the notional acts is one consciousness. There is necessarily only one consciousness when from a single act of understanding a single word is once and eternally spoken, when from a single act of understanding and a single word a single act of love is once and eternally spirated, and when the act of understanding, the word, and the act of love are consubstantial. But, although this divine consciousness on the basis of the notional acts is one, nevertheless since distinct notional acts are proper to distinct persons, one and the same consciousness is had distinctly by the distinct persons. The intellectually conscious Father generates the Son by intellectual consciousness; the intellectually conscious Son is generated into intellectual consciousness by the Father; the intellectually conscious Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit by intellectual consciousness; and the intellectually conscious Spirit is spirated into intellectual consciousness by the Father and the Son. But to generate and to be generated are really distinct from each other, and similarly to spirate and to be spirated are really distinct from each other; and to generate consciously, to be generated consciously, and to be spirated consciously are no less distinct from one another. We must, then, most certainly conclude that the one divine consciousness, considered on the basis of the notional acts, is possessed by the Three in three distinct ways. This is surely necessary, if indeed the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are, each of them, conscious both of himself and of each of the others, since they could not be conscious of the others by one consciousness unless each of them possessed the same consciousness in a distinct way. How This Consciousness Is Consciousness in the True Sense It is most important to acknowledge that this is consciousness in the true sense of the term. Without doubt, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit alike know on the side of the object that the Father consciously generates the Son, and that the Son is consciously generated by the Father, and that the Father and the Son consciously spirate the Spirit, and that the Spirit is consciously spirated by the Father and the

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sciunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus, etiam ex parte obiecti concludit theologus. Id ipsum vero quod a divinis personis scitur et a theologis ex fide concluditur non solum scitur vel concluditur sed etiam existit. Et prout existit, ex parte subiecti est, nempe, ex parte subiecti quod est Pater dum conscie Filium generat, ex parte subiecti quod est Filius dum conscie a Patre generatur, ex parte subiecti quod est Pater et Filius dum conscie Spiritum spirant, et ex parte subiecti quod est Spiritus dum conscie a Patre Filioque spiratur.

Ulterius, sicut ipsa analogia psychologica ex alio non desumitur quam ex conscientia intellectuali in sensu maxime proprio, ita conscientia divina, quae secundum actus notionales ex hac analogia concipitur, sane conscientia intellectualis est non solum in sensu maxime proprio sed etiam in realitate maxime perfecta. Quid enim aliud per emanationem verbi intellectualiter consciam significamus quam illam ordinationem ad verbum proferendum quae ex perspecta intelligibilitate evidenti exsurgit conscia atque conscie necessitans? Quid aliud per emanationem amoris intellectualiter consciam intelligimus quam illam ordinationem ad amandum quae ex perspecta atque affirmata bonitate exsurgit conscia atque conscie obligans? Quid denique nobis magis intimum vel in nobis magis excellens invenitur quam intellectualiter ad verum necessitari et moraliter ad bonum obligari? In quibus tamen homo non est nisi imperfecta atque longinqua imago illarum emanationum et intellectualium atque intellectualiter consciarum quibus Filius a Patre generatur et Spiritus ab utroque procedit. In nobis enim multi sunt intelligendi actus et pauci perfecti, multa sunt verba neque omnia vera, multi sunt amores neque omnes honesti. In nobis praeterea aliud realiter est subiectum, aliud eius intelligere, aliud eius verbum, et aliud eius amor. Sed in divinis unus est actus infinitus tum intelligendi tum sciendi tum volendi et, cum desit subiectum ab hoc actu realiter distinctum, tria constituuntur subiecta realiter inter se distincta per relationes subsistentes quae realiter cum emanationibus intellectualibus et intellectualiter consciis identificantur.

Unam realiter esse divinam conscientiam Claritatis causa distinximus inter divinam conscientiam inquantum per actum essentialem habetur et divinam conscientiam inquantum per actus notionales habetur. Quae tamen minime sunt duae conscientiae realiter inter se distinctae. Sicut enim non realiter sed ratione distinguuntur divina essentia et divinae relationes reales, ita etiam non realiter sed ratione distinguuntur actus essentialis

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Son. But what the Father, the Son, and the Spirit know on the side of the object, theologians conclude to on the side of the object. But the very same reality that is known by the divine persons and concluded to from faith by theologians is not only known or concluded to, but also exists. And as to existence, it is on the side of the subject, namely, on the side of the subject that is the Father in consciously generating the Son, on the side of the subject that is the Son in being consciously generated by the Father, on the side of the subject that is the Father and the Son in consciously spirating the Spirit, and on the side of the subject that is the Spirit in being consciously spirated by the Father and the Son. Furthermore, just as the psychological analogy itself is taken solely from intellectual consciousness in the most proper sense, so divine consciousness, which is conceived on the basis of the notional acts by way of this analogy, is surely intellectual consciousness not only in the most proper sense but also in the most perfect reality. For what else do we mean by the intellectually conscious emanation of a word than that ordering to the uttering of a word which as conscious and consciously compelling arises from the grasp of manifest intelligibility? What else do we understand by the intellectually conscious emanation of love than that ordering to loving which as conscious and consciously obligating arises from the grasp and affirmation of goodness? Finally, what is more intimate to us or of greater excellence within us than to be intellectually constrained to the truth and morally obligated to the good? And yet in all this a human being is but an imperfect and distant image of those intellectual and intellectually conscious emanations in which the Son is generated by the Father and the Spirit proceeds from both. For we have many acts of understanding and few of them complete, many words and not all of them true, many loves and not all of them good. Besides, in us the subject is really one thing, its act of understanding another, its word something else, and its love something else again. But in God there is but one infinite act at once of understanding and knowing and willing, and since there is no subject really distinct from this act, three subjects really distinct from one another are constituted by the subsistent relations that are really identical with the intellectual and intellectually conscious emanations. Divine Consciousness Is One in Reality For the sake of clarity we have distinguished between divine consciousness as had through essential act and divine consciousness as had through the notional acts. But these are not in any way two consciousnesses really distinct from each other. Just as the divine essence and the real divine relations are distinct not in reality but in concept, so also essential act and the notional acts are distinct not in reality

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et actus notionales. Nam actus notionales super actum essentialem non addunt nisi relationes reales; quae relationes non realiter sed ratione ab essentia divina et ab actu divino essentiali distinguuntur. Proinde, cum actus essentialis et actus notionales non realiter sed ratione distinguantur, conscientia per actum essentialem a conscientia per actus notionales non realiter sed ratione distinguitur. Per unum enim actum conscium nisi una conscientia haberi non potest. Neque obstat quod aliud est Patrem esse conscium tum Filii tum Spiritus, aliud autem est Filium esse conscium tum Spiritus tum Patris, aliud denique est Spiritum esse conscium tum Patris tum Filii. Quamvis enim verissimum sit tria esse subiecta divina et conscia, minime sequitur tres esse conscientias realiter inter se distinctas. Sed, uti supra dictum est, ubi unicus est actus, unica est conscientia; sed quia plura sunt subiecta, plura etiam sunt subiecta conscia; et ideo relinquitur quod tria subiecta sunt invicem conscia per unam conscientiam quae aliter et aliter a tribus habetur.

QUAESTIO XIX Utrum Pater, Filius, et Spiritus convenientius modi essendi (Seinsweisen) quam personae nominarentur K. Barth, cum antiquam personae definitionem etiam obsoletam esse iudicet, Patrem, Filium, Spiritum modos essendi (Seinsweisen) nominare mavult.5 Qua in electione fidelem se esse aestimat ad ea quae olim theologi protestantes et etiam hodie theologi catholici sub nomine personae divinae re vera intellexerint. Qua de fidelitate dubitari potest, cum non tres sed unum in divinis subsistere affirmet: ‘... was proprie subsistit, ist ja nicht die Person als solche, sondern Gott in den drei Personen, aber eben: Gott als dreifach proprie subsistens.’6

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but in concept. For the notional acts add only real relations to essential act, and these relations are distinct from the divine essence and divine essential act not really but conceptually. Accordingly, since essential act and the notional acts are distinct not really but conceptually, consciousness through essential act is not really but conceptually distinct from consciousness through the notional acts. Only one consciousness can be had through one conscious act. The fact that it is one thing for the Father to be conscious of both the Son and the Spirit, another for the Son to be conscious of both the Spirit and the Father, and still another for the Spirit to be conscious of both the Father and the Son does not militate against this. For although it is quite true that there are three conscious divine subjects, it does not in the least follow that there are three consciousnesses really distinct from one another. Rather, as we have said above, where there is a single act there is a single consciousness; but because there are several subjects, there are also several conscious subjects; and therefore it remains that the three subjects are conscious of one another through one consciousness, which the Three possess in distinct ways. QUESTION 19 Are the Father, the Son, and the Spirit more appropriately called modes of being (Seinsweisen) than persons? Karl Barth, having judged the definition of person that is ancient to be also obsolete, prefers to call the Father, the Son, and the Spirit Seinsweisen, ‘modes of being.’5 In doing so, he thinks he is being faithful to what the early Protestant theologians and also contemporary Catholic theologians really understand by the term ‘divine person.’ But there is reason to doubt this fidelity, since he asserts that there are not three who subsist in God but only one: ‘. . . was proprie subsistit, ist ja nicht die Person als solche, sondern Gott in den drei Personen, aber eben: Gott als dreifach proprie subsistens.’6 5 Karl Barth, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik, i, 1, 2nd ed. (Zollikon: Verlag der Evangelischen Buchhandlung, 1939) 386; [in English, Church Dogmatics, i, 1, trans. G.W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975) 366: ‘It is obvious for one thing that the ancient concept of person, which is the only possible one here, has now become obsolete ... we prefer to call the Father, Son, and Spirit in God the three distinctive modes of being of the one God subsisting in their relationships one with another.’] 6 Die Kirchliche Dogmatik, i, 1: 380; Church Dogmatics, i, 1: 361: ‘What proprie subsistit is not the person as such but God in the three persons, God as thrice proprie subsistens.’

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Quam sententiam impugnat J. Brinktrine.7 Eam Confessioni Augustanae contradicere fatetur C. Welch.8 E contra, Hermann Volk interpretatus est Seinsweise tamquam aequivalentiam inter personam et Existenz, quam conceptionem ab antiquiori personae notione nisi accentu non differre iudicat.9 R. P. Witte,10 quem anceps consului, notavit quanta claritate K. Barth docuerit Christum esse unum subiectum duarum naturarum. At quidquid sit de exegesi Barthiana, C. Welch non solum docet personas divinas esse modos essendi seu existendi sed etiam in divinis non agnoscit nisi unum cui dici possit ‘tu.’ 11 Quare, operae pretium esse videtur determinare (1) utrum persona divina vere dici possit modus essendi, (2) utrum tres sint in divinis quibus dici possit ‘tu,’ (3) utrum ipsae personae divinae ad intra dicant ‘ego,’ ‘tu,’ et (4) quemadmodum existentialis conceptio personae in divinis admitti possit.12 In quibus omnibus nostra est intentio non auctores iudicare sed rem investigare. Primo, ergo, tam proprie quam ipse Deus subsistunt Pater, Filius, Spiritus sanctus. Quia enim Deus subsistit, et Pater est Deus, manifeste Pater pariter subsistit; et simili argumento concluditur Filium et Spiritum pariter subsistere. Deinde, si quaeritur utrum Pater qua talis (die Person als solche) subsistat, idem est respondendum; nam Pater est relatio subsistens; et manifeste subsistens qua subsistens subsistit. Tertio, si quaeritur utrum paternitas qua talis subsistat, aut ponitur quaestio de nostris conceptibus aut de ipsa re. Si ponitur de nostris conceptibus, respondetur quod ratione distingui solet inter relationem qua relationem et relationem qua subsistentem; et ideo conceptus paternitatis qua talis ratione distinguitur a conceptu Patris qua talis. Si autem ponitur quaestio de ipsa re, cum nulla sit realis distinctio inter divinam paternitatem et

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This opinion is rejected by J. Brinktrine.7 Claude Welch admits that it contradicts the Augsburg Confession.8 On the contrary, Hermann Volk has interpreted Seinsweise as making ‘person’ equal to ‘Existenz,’ and considers that there is only a difference of emphasis between this conception and the traditional notion of person.9 In my uncertainty on this point, I consulted Fr Witte,10 who remarked how clearly Barth taught that Christ was one subject of two natures. But whatever may be said about the interpretation of Barth, Welch not only holds that the divine persons are modes of being or of existing but also recognizes in God only one who can be addressed as ‘Thou.’11 Hence it seems worth while to determine (1) whether a divine person can truly be said to be a mode of being, (2) whether there are three in God who can each be addressed as ‘you,’ (3) whether the divine persons among themselves say ‘I’ and ‘you,’ and (4) how the existential conception of person is admissible in God. 12 In all this our intention is not to pass judgment on authors but to investigate the matter itself. First, then, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit subsist as properly as God subsists. For since God subsists, and the Father is God, clearly the Father equally subsists; and by the same reasoning we conclude that the Son and the Spirit equally subsist. Second, if one asks whether the Father as such (die Person als solche) subsists, the answer is the same. For the Father is a subsistent relation, and obviously a subsistent, as subsistent, subsists. Third, if one asks whether paternity as such subsists, the question is either about our concepts or about the reality itself. If the question is about our concepts, the answer is that it is customary to draw a conceptual distinction between the relation as relation and the relation as subsistent; and therefore the concept of paternity as such is conceptually distinct from the concept of Father as such. But if the question is about the reality, since there is no real distinction between divine 7 J. Brinktrine, Die Lehre von Gott, vol. 2 (Paderborn: F. Scho¨ ningh, 1954) 130–32. 8 Claude Welch, The Trinity in Contemporary Theology (London: SCM Press, 1953) 190–91. 9 Hermann Volk, ‘Die Christologie bei Karl Barth und Emil Brunner,’ in Alois Grillmeier and Heinrich Bacht, Das Konzil von Chalkedon, vol. 3 (W¨urzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1964) 634, note 9: ‘Person als “Existenz” oder “Seinsweise” ...’ 10 [Johannes Witte, a Jesuit and professor of theology at the Gregorian University and a colleague of Lonergan’s. He taught Protestant theology, and is the author of De theologia Protestantium (3rd ed., Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1962).] 11 Welch, The Trinity in Contemporary Theology 276, 188, 274. [Welch uses the word ‘Thou,’ but in translating Lonergan ‘you’ will be employed.] 12 [The first two of these questions are treated in this section, the third in the next (question 20), and the fourth in question 21.]

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Deum Patrem, omnino dicendum est divinam paternitatem subsistere. Quarto, modus essendi dividitur contra subsistens cum subsistens dicat id quod est, modus essendi autem dicat modum quo est. Quare cum subsistant tum Pater, tum Pater qua talis, tum paternitas divina quoad id quod significatur, modus essendi est neque Pater neque Pater qua talis neque paternitas divina quoad id quod significatur.

Quinto, id quod est verum in sententia opposita respicit non realitatem divinam sed nostros conceptus. Quatenus enim relationes qua relationes concipimus, dici potest relationes ut modos essendi concipi. Ita qui dicit Patrem a Filio per paternitatem distingui concipit paternitatem qua paternitatem; neque in hoc conceptu includitur conceptus subsistentis; divinum enim subsistens distinctum a divino subsistente distincto distinguitur neque per ‘divinum’ neque per ‘subsistens’ sed per ‘distinctum.’ Sexto, quantum ad argumenta quae K. Barth attulit ut suam opinionem traditionalem demonstret, distinctione opus est. Clarissime enim docet c. Lateranense iv quod ‘... una quaedam summa res est ... quae veraciter est Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus sanctus; tres simul personae, ac singillatim quaelibet earundem; ... quaelibet trium personarum est illa res ...’ (db 432). Quantum autem ad Patres Cappadoces qui personas ut tropoi t¯es hyparxe¯os conceperint, distinguendum est inter verum revelatum cuius intelligentia per theologiam quaeritur et ipsam hanc intelligentiam quae decursu saeculorum augetur. Porro, constat verum revelatum esse quod Pater est Deus, Filius est Deus, Spiritus est Deus; et ulterius constat Patres Cappadoces hoc verum revelatum agnovisse; et denique tandem constat Patres Cappadoces de tropois t¯es hyparxe¯os per modum explicationis esse locutos. Neque vere traditionalis est opinio mere regressiva: secus tolleretur illud intelligentiae, scientiae, sapientiae augmentum a conc. Vaticano per ipsa verba Vincentii Lirinensis laudatum.

Septimo, minime nos fugit syllogismos et distinctiones quas afferimus parum congruere methodo theologiae dialecticae quae ad divinum Subiectum ita ascendere intendat ut erronea quaedam obiectivitas evitetur. At nisi haec methodus ad tria divina Subiecta clare pervenit, insufficientiam propriam ipsa demonstrat. Octavo, si in divinis non est nisi unum subsistens, sane in divinis non est nisi unus cui dici potest ‘tu.’ Non enim cum modis essendi colloqui solemus. Sed ex antecessis constat

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paternity and God the Father, it must by all means be said that divine paternity subsists. Fourth, a mode of being is contradistinguished from a subsistent, since ‘subsistent’ denotes that which is, but ‘mode of being’ denotes the mode by which something is. Therefore, since from the point of view of what is meant the Father subsists, and the Father as such subsists, and divine paternity subsists, then from the point of view of what is meant neither the Father, nor the Father as such, nor divine paternity is a mode of being. Fifth, what is true in the contrary opinion regards not the divine reality but our concepts. Inasmuch as we conceive relations as relations, relations can be said to be conceived as modes of being. Thus one who states that the Father is distinguished from the Son through paternity conceives paternity as paternity, and this concept does not include the concept of subsistent; for a distinct divine subsistent is distinguished from another distinct divine subsistent neither by ‘divine’ nor by ‘subsistent’ but by ‘distinct.’ Sixth, as to the arguments that Barth adduces to show that his opinion is traditional, a distinction is needed. The Fourth Lateran Council very clearly teaches that ‘there is one supreme reality . . . which truly is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; three persons taken together, and each one of them taken singly; . . . each of the three persons is that reality . . .’ (db 432, ds 804, nd 318). As for the Cappadocian Fathers, who conceived the persons as tropoi t¯es hyparxe¯os, ‘modes of being,’ one must keep in mind the difference between revealed truth, the understanding of which is sought by theology, and this understanding itself, which develops in the course of time. Besides, it is clear that the revealed truth is that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Spirit is God; and furthermore it is clear that the Cappadocian Fathers acknowledged this revealed truth; and finally, it is clear that the Cappadocian Fathers spoke of tropoi t¯es hyparxe¯os by way of explaining this truth. Nor is a simply regressive opinion truly traditional; otherwise there would be eliminated that ‘growth in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom,’ in the words of Vincent of Lerins, which are quoted with approval by the First Vatican Council. Seventh, we are fully aware that the syllogisms and distinctions we are presenting have little in common with the method of dialectical theology, which aims at reaching up to the divine Subject in such a way as to avoid an erroneous objectivity. But if this method does not clearly arrive at three divine Subjects, it reveals its own insufficiency. Eighth, if in God there is only one subsistent, certainly in God there is only one who can be addressed as ‘you.’ For we do not usually converse with modes of being. But from what we have shown, it is clear that in God there are three

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tres esse in Deo qui subsistant; et ideo ex hoc argumento non concluditur ad unicum ‘tu’ divinum. Nono, ex scripturis satis constat eiusmodi esse Deum Patrem ut ei dici possit ‘tu.’ Nos enim oramus, ‘Pater noster ...’ Et ipse Dominus orat, ‘... ut omnes unum sint, sicut tu, Pater, in me, et ego in te, ut et ipsi in nobis unum sint’ (Io 17.21). Quod si Filius ipse dicit ‘ego’ et discipuli ei dicunt ‘tu,’ alia est persona divina cui secundum scripturas dici potest ‘tu.’ Denique tandem, cum Spiritus sanctus Patri Filioque consubstantialis atque coaequalis sit, minime ei negari potest quod Patri Filioque conceditur. Et ideo sunt tres in divinis quibus dici potest ‘tu.’

Decimo, si ulterius quaeritur utrum eiusmodi sint nostrae relationes interpersonales cum tribus divinis personis ut singulis dicere possimus ‘tu,’ iterum distinctione quadam utendum est. Si enim includuntur illae relationes interpersonales quas inimus quatenus reale per verum cognoscimus, sane cum per veritatem a Deo revelatam et fide susceptam tres personas divinas agnoscamus, ita cum tribus agere possumus ut singulis dicamus ‘tu.’ Sin autem illae solae relationes reputantur interpersonales quae subiecto per experientiam propriae intersubiectivitatis innotescant, nova quaedam atque valde complexa oritur quaestionum series quam nunc praetermittendam esse ducimus. Satis enim abstracta atque irrealis est intricata haec quaestio,13 tum quia nemo SS. Trinitatem cognoscit nisi per verum revelatum (db 1795), tum quia nemo adeo est intellectu diminutus ut numquam reale per verum cognoscat.

QUAESTIO XX Utrum personae divinae ad intra dicant, Ego, Tu Respondeo quod in divinis sicut una persona tantum est generans, ita una tantum est dicens. Sicut enim generans se habet ad Filium, ita dicens se habet ad Verbum; et sicut eadem proprietas significatur tam per nomen Verbi quam per nomen Filii, ita eadem proprietas significatur tam per nomen dicentis quam per nomen generantis. Qua de causa, in divinis ad intra nemo dicit nisi Pater. Id autem quod dicitur, dupliciter accipitur: uno modo, secundum habitudinem ad dicentem, et sic dicitur Verbum; alio modo, secundum habitudinem ad obiecta cognita; et

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who subsist; and therefore following this reasoning we do not conclude to a single divine ‘you.’ Ninth, it is quite clear from scripture that God the Father is one who can be addressed as ‘you.’ We pray, ‘Our Father . . .’ And our Lord himself prays, ‘. . . that all may be one. As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be one in us’ ( John 17.21). But if the Son himself says ‘I’ and the disciples address him as ‘you,’ there is another divine person to whom, according to scripture, one can say ‘you.’ Finally, since the Holy Spirit is consubstantial and coequal with the Father and the Son, there cannot be denied to the Spirit what is granted to the Father and the Son. Therefore, there are in God three who can be addressed as ‘you.’ Tenth, if the further question is asked whether our interpersonal relations with the three divine persons are such that we can say ‘you’ to each of them, again a distinction is needed. For if there are included those interpersonal relations which we enter into insofar as we know the real through the true, then certainly, since through the truth revealed by God and accepted by faith we acknowledge three divine persons, we can thereby converse with the Three, addressing each one as ‘you.’ But if the only interpersonal relations recognized as such are those that are known to the subject through the experience of his or her own intersubjectivity, there arises a whole new and quite complex series of questions that we think best to omit here. For this question13 is really rather abstract and unreal and complex, both because no one knows the Holy Trinity except through revealed truth (db 1795, ds 3015, nd 131) and because no one is of such feeble intelligence as never to have known the real through the true. QUESTION 20 Do the divine persons say to one another ‘I’ and ‘You’? Our answer is that within God, just as only one person is generating, so only one is speaking. For as the one generating stands to the Son, so the one speaking stands to the Word; and just as the same property is signified by ‘Word’ as by ‘Son,’ so the same property is signified by ‘speaking’ as by ‘generating.’ Therefore, within God no one speaks except the Father. That which is spoken, however, can be taken in two ways: according to the relation to the one speaking, and then the Word is spoken; and according to the 13 [That is, whether our interpersonal relations with the three divine persons are such that we can say ‘you’ to each of them, when interpersonal relations are thought to be known only on the basis of intersubjective experience.]

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hoc modo, sicut Pater dicit ex intelligentia et Dei et Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti et omnis creaturae et omnium possibilium, ita per Verbum dicuntur Deus et Pater et Filius et Spiritus et omnes creaturae et omnia possibilia. 14 Qua de causa, omnia quae significari possunt per pronomina, Ego, Tu, dicuntur a Patre per Verbum; sed ad intra in divinis non audiuntur soni materiales, neque sunt multi conceptus distincti sed unus tantum qui est Verbum.

Ad extra autem nihil prohibet quominus sit locutio ex voluntate divina procedens, vel secundum quod Verbum incarnatum dicit, ‘Tu, Pater, in me, et ego in te,’ 15 vel secundum quod ‘misit Deus Spiritum Filii sui in corda vestra clamantem: Abba, Pater. 16 Sed in divinis ad intra nihil procedit ex actu voluntatis tamquam ex principio realiter distincto. 17

Denique tandem inquantum haec pronomina, Ego, Tu, per quandam metaphoram significant relationes interpersonales quam perfectissimas, satis infra constabit quid dicendum sit de relationibus eiusmodi in divinis.

QUAESTIO XXI Quaenam sit analogia subiecti temporalis et subiecti aeterni 18

Analogum dicit unum idemque quod tamen aliter in aliis verificatur. Subiectum est nomen quoddam relativum; et tot diversis adhibetur sensibus quot (specifice) sunt quorum aliquid subiectum est. Hic non agitur de subiecto logico (quodcumque de quo fit praedicatio), neque de subiecto recipiente (id in quo fit receptio, uti actus in potentia, esse in essentia, formae in materia, accidentis in substantia), neque de subiecto habitus (quod comparatur ad habitum, sicut obiectum ad actum; ita Deus dicitur subiectum scientiae theologicae).

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relation to objects that are known, and in this latter way, as the Father speaks from his understanding of God and of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit and of all created things and of all possible beings, so through the Word are spoken God and Father and Son and Spirit and all created things and all possible beings.14 Therefore, all that can be signified through the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’ are spoken by the Father through the Word; but within God no material sounds are heard, nor are there many distinct concepts, but one alone who is the Word. Externally to God, however, nothing prevents the occurrence of an utterance that proceeds from the divine will, whether it be one in which the incarnate Word says, ‘As you, Father, are in me and I am in you,’15 or one that states that ‘God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, “Abba! Father!”’ 16 But within God there is nothing that proceeds from an act of the divine will as from a really distinct principle.17 Finally, since these pronouns, ‘I’ and ‘you,’ in a certain metaphorical way signify the most perfect interpersonal relationships, what follows below will make sufficiently clear what must be said about such relationships within God. QUESTION 21 What is the analogy between the temporal and the eternal subject? 18 That which is verified in different ways in different subjects is said to be analogous. ‘Subject’ is a relative term. It has as many different meanings as there are specific instances where something is a subject. We are dealing here not with a logical subject (anything concerning which a predication is made) nor with a recipient subject (that in which something is received, as when act is received in potency, existence in essence, form in matter, or an accident in a substance) nor with a subject of a habit (which is related to a habit as an object is to an act; in this last sense, God is said to be the subject of the science of theology). 14 [See above, p. 217, the last paragraph of question 3, ‘Does the Word proceed from the understanding of creatures?’] 15 John 17.21. 16 Galatians 4.6; Romans 8.15. 17 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 41, a. 2. 18 On the temporal subject, see Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 18–31.

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Sed agitur de subiecto quod est persona et quidem secundum quod est persona conscia. Subiectum ergo intelligitur subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali; et hoc subiectum consideratur secundum comparationem ad naturam suam intellectualem. Proinde, analogia de qua quaeritur est analogia subiecti qua subiecti: tam enim temporale quam aeternum subiectum est subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali; sed aliter temporale subiectum, aliter autem subiectum aeternum ad propriam naturam intellectualem comparatur. Aeternum est subiectum quod intrinsece immutabile est. Temporale est subiectum quod non solum mutabile sed etiam materiale est. Quare, aeterni subiecti nunc est idem semper, sed subiecti temporalis nunc est fluens. Nam nunc se habet ad subiectum sicut tempus se habet ad motum subiecti; et ideo subiecti immutabilis est idem semper nunc, subiecti autem mutabilis et materialis est nunc continuo fluens.19 Notate subiectum temporale et vere realiterque mutari et nihilominus permanere idem identice tam per mutationes substantiales (mors, resurrectio) quam per mutationes accidentales. Subiectum enim est subsistens distinctum, seu ens simpliciter, seu id quod est, seu id quod habet essentiam substantialem aliaque principia constitutiva. Quare, cum subsistens vere et realiter suis principiis intrinsecis constituatur, iis mutatis ipsum vere et realiter mutatur; et tamen cum subsistens non sit adaequate20 idem ac sua principia constitutiva, permanet idem identice quamvis (intra limites) mutentur principia. Quocirca, cave multiplicem ambiguitatem nominis substantiae, quae dicit vel (1) essentiam substantialem hac forma hacque materia compositam, vel (2) id quod habet essentiam substantialem, vel (3) secundum cognitionem praemetaphysicam, genus seu praedicamentum quod in primam et secundam substantiam dividitur, vel (4) alia multa et interdum mira secundum varias substantiae conceptiones rudiores et erroneas. Et cum nomen accidentis etiam magis sit ambiguum, semper recurre ad notiones metaphysicas fundamentales cum fiant obiectiones ex ratione substantiae vel accidentis vel utriusque.

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We are dealing rather with a subject that is a person and, indeed, a person as conscious. Hence ‘subject’ is understood as a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature; and this subject is considered in relation to his intellectual nature. The analogy, then, about which we are inquiring is the analogy of the subject as subject; for a temporal subject as well as an eternal subject is a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature, but a temporal subject and an eternal subject are related to their respective intellectual natures in different ways. An eternal subject is one that is intrinsically immutable. A temporal subject is one that is not only mutable but also material. Consequently, the now of an eternal subject is always the same, while the now of a temporal subject changes. For now is to a subject as time is to the motion of a subject; and therefore the now of an immutable subject is always the same, while the now of a mutable and material subject is continuously flowing. 19 Note that temporal subjects really and truly change and yet remain the same in their subsistent identity through both substantial changes (death, resurrection) and accidental changes. For a subject is a distinct subsistent, that is, a being in the strict sense, that which is, that which has a substantial essence and other constitutive principles. Therefore, since a subsistent is really and truly constituted by its own intrinsic principles, when they change the subsistent itself really and truly changes; and yet, since the subsistent is not adequately 20 the same as its constitutive principles, it remains the same in its subsistent identity even though, within certain limits, its principles may change. Here one must be aware of the manifold ambiguity of the term ‘substance,’ which denotes either (1) a substantial essence composed of this form and this matter, or (2) that which has a substantial essence, or (3) in premetaphysical knowledge, the genus or predicament that is divided into first and second substance, or (4) many other and sometimes strange things, in accord with various crude or erroneous notions of substance. And since the word ‘accident’ is even more ambiguous, one must continually have recourse to basic metaphysical notions whenever objections are raised premised upon a concept of substance or accident or both. 19 Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis libros Physicorum, 4, lect. 18, § 1121 in the Angeli-Pirotta edition, § 586 in the Marietti edition, and § 5 in the Leonine edition. [See Lonergan, Topics in Education 227: ‘Fundamental thought about time in St Thomas is in terms of the nunc. Eternity is the ‘now’ that has no change, the ‘now’ of a being that does not change; and time is the ‘now’ of a being that does change.’] 20 [‘adequately’: see the statement in Insight (525) that ‘[w]hen P is a thing and Q is one of its metaphysical elements, the real distinction is inadequate.’]

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Quibus perspectis, primo subiectum temporale, deinde subiectum aeternum comparandum est ad ea quorum est subiectum secundum naturam suam intellectualem. Primo, ergo, subiectum temporale est subiectum alterius naturae praeter intellectualem. Nam intellectualis natura de se est immaterialis; et ideo subiectum sine alia atque materiali natura non esset temporale. Deinde, intellectualis natura subiecti temporalis est potentialis, et quidem dupliciter. Primo modo, inquantum subiectum temporale dicitur in genere intelligibilium ut potentia tantum, quia initio intellectus noster est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum. Alio modo, inquantum actuatio naturae intellectualis non est nisi forma quodammodo21 et actus praesuppositae vitae sensitivae. Et forma quidem quodammodo est secundum primam intellectus operationem, videlicet, quatenus circa sensibilia inquirimus et in sensibilibus causas intelligimus, et causas intellectas una cum materia communi abstracta concipimus. Actus autem quodammodo est secundum alteram intellectus operationem et consequentem operationem voluntatis, videlicet, quatenus reflectentes de conceptibus quaerimus an sit, et evidentiam ponderamus, et iudicia speculativa et practica formamus, et secundum iudicia eligimus. Quae quidem vitae sensitivae informatio atque actuatio intellectualis ipsam vitam sensitivam praesupponit; nisi enim iam per operationes sensitivas conscii efficimur, nihil per intellectum vel voluntatem operari possumus, si quidem hac in vita nisi in phantasmate nihil prorsus intelligimus actu. 22 Tertio, subiectum temporale prius per accidens quam per se est subiectum naturae suae intellectualis qua actuatae. Unumquodque enim dicitur per se vel per accidens secundum quod fit vel ex intentione agentis vel praeter intentionem agentis. Iam vero quatenus consideratur intentio illius agentis quod naturam subiecti temporalis creavit et conservat et ad agendum applicat, patet omnino per se actuari naturam intellectualem subiecti temporalis. Quatenus autem consideratur intentio ipsius subiecti temporalis, etiam patet non prius actuationem naturae intellectualis intendi posse quam ipsum subiectum sciat se habere naturam intellectualem; neque minus evidens est subiectum temporale non posse scire se habere naturam intellectualem antequam ipsa haec natura sua sit actuata.

21 Videlicet, non ontologice sed intentionaliter. Quod sentitur se habet ad id quod intelligendo innotescit, sicut potentia ad formam. Ontologice vero tam actus sentiendi quam actus intelligendi sunt actus secundi.

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With these observations in mind, we will relate, first temporal and then eternal subjects, to what they are subjects of in their respective intellectual natures. First, then, temporal subjects are subjects of another nature besides the intellectual. For an intellectual nature as such is immaterial, and therefore a subject lacking another and material nature would not be a temporal subject. Second, the intellectual nature of a temporal subject is potential, and that in two ways. First, temporal subjects are said to be in the genus of intellectual beings only as potency, since initially our intellect is a tabula rasa, a slate upon which nothing has been written. Second, the actuation of our intellectual nature is, in a sense,21 only a form and an act presupposing sentient life. It is in a sense a form, in accordance with the first operation of the intellect, that is, insofar as we inquire about sensible data, understand causes in these data, and conceive the causes understood, together with abstract common matter. And it is in a sense an act, in accordance with the second operation of the intellect and the consequent operation of the will, that is, insofar as by reflecting on concepts we ask whether something is so, weigh the evidence, make speculative or practical judgments, and make choices in accord with our judgments. This intellectual informing and actuation of sentient life presupposes that sentient life; for unless we are rendered conscious through the operation of our senses, we cannot operate at all by intellect or will, since in this life we actually understand absolutely nothing except in a phantasm.22 Third, temporal subjects are per accidens the subjects of their intellectual nature as actuated before they are per se the subjects of their intellectual nature as actuated. Anything whatever is said to be per se or per accidens depending upon whether it comes to be by the intention of the agent or apart from the intention of the agent. Now, if one considers the intention of that agent who created and conserves the nature of a temporal subject and who applies it to its action, it is quite clear that the intellectual nature of a temporal subject is actuated per se. But if one considers the intention of temporal subjects themselves, it is also clear that the actuation of their intellectual nature cannot be intended before they know that they have an intellectual nature; nor is it any less evident that temporal subjects cannot know that they have an intellectual nature before this nature has been actuated. 21 That is, intentionally, not ontologically. What is sensed is to what is known through understanding as potency is to act. But ontologically the act of sensing as well as the act of understanding are second acts. 22 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 7.

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Praeterea, sicut subiectum temporale non propria intentione sed spontaneitate naturali fit actu inquirens, intelligens, iudicans, volens, ita etiam idem subiectum temporale ipsas suas operationes intellectuales prius modo quodam spontaneo gubernat quam easdem operationes gubernare addiscat secundum intentionem propriam et intellectam et approbatam et electam. Haec enim gubernatio sui plene conscia atque deliberata praesupponit exactam atque perdifficilem ipsius suae naturae intellectualis cognitionem secundum normas atque exigentias suas intrinsecas. Neque haec exacta atque difficilis cognitio haberi potest nisi per operationes intellectuales. Quare donec acquiratur, necesse est ut operationes intellectuales subiecti temporalis gubernentur secundum spontaneitatem illius luminis intellectualis quod in nobis est participatio quaedam creata lucis increatae. Quibus perspectis, elucet subiecti temporalis duo esse tempora: aliud quidem prius in quo secundum spontaneitatem naturalem est subiectum naturae suae intellectualis actuatae; aliud autem posterius in quo sciens et volens propria intentione subiectum est naturae suae intellectualis actuatae et actuandae. Quarto, eiusmodi est subiecti temporalis conditio ut vix fiat transitus ex priori ad posterius tempus nisi sub influxu aliorum subiectorum temporalium. Eatenus enim subiectum temporale ex propria intentione vitam suam sensitivam intellectualiter informat atque actuat quatenus fit vera sui sibi manifestatio et honesta sui acceptatio. Quae quidem manifestatio fit vel concrete et symbolice vel technice et exacte: concrete et symbolice quidem inquantum evolvitur cultura quaedam humana seu modus vivendi moribus, consuetudinibus, praeceptis, narrationibus determinatus atque declaratus; technice autem et exacte inquantum scientifice et philosophice in naturam humanam inquiritur. 23 Sed manifestum est utramque obiectificationem naturae humanae multorum hominum collaborationem praesupponere; et ulterius clarum est singula subiecta temporalia ex aliorum influxu non parum adiuvari ad voluntariam acceptationem naturae humanae manifestatae. Quinto, tres distingui possunt modi quibus fieri potest transitus ex tempore priori ad posterius tempus subiecti temporalis. Primo, enim, fieri potest ut subiectum temporale, sive in repraesentatione symbolica sive technice, naturam suam intellectualem eiusque normas intrinsecas intelligat, et quia intelligat, eam affirmat atque approbet, et quia approbet, eam propria voluntate amplectatur eiusque

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Besides, just as temporal subjects become actually inquiring, understanding, judging, and willing not by their own intention but by a natural spontaneity, so also the same temporal subjects conduct their intellectual operations spontaneously before they learn how to direct them in accordance with their own understood and approved and chosen intention. For this fully conscious and deliberate self-direction presupposes an exact and very difficult knowledge of their own intellectual nature in all its intrinsic norms and exigencies, and this exact and difficult knowledge can be had only through their intellectual operations. Consequently, until this knowledge is acquired, the intellectual operations of temporal subjects must necessarily be conducted in accord with the spontaneity of that intellectual light which in us is a created participation in uncreated light. From this it is clear that there are two phases of a temporal subject: the first is a prior phase, when by one’s natural spontaneity one is the subject of one’s actuated intellectual nature; the second is a subsequent phase, when, as knowing and willing, one is by one’s own intention the subject of one’s intellectual nature both as actuated and as to be actuated further. Fourth, the condition of a temporal subject is such that one can hardly make the transition from the first phase to the second apart from the influence of other temporal subjects. For temporal subjects intellectually inform and actuate their sense life by their own intention to the extent that they experience a true self-revelation and a genuine self-acceptance. This revelation takes place either concretely and symbolically or technically and exactly: concretely and symbolically, as a particular human culture or way of life develops as delineated and expressed in its mores, customs, precepts, and stories; technically and exactly, as human nature is studied in science and philosophy.23 But it is obvious that both objectifications of human nature presuppose collaboration on the part of many; and it is also clear that all temporal subjects are greatly helped through the influence of others to come to a willing acceptance of this revelation of their human nature. Fifth, there are three ways in which this transition from the prior to the subsequent phase of a temporal subject can be made. First, it is possible for temporal subjects, whether through symbolic representation or technically, to understand their intellectual nature along with that nature’s intrinsic norms, and because they understand it, to affirm and approve of it, and because they approve of it, to 23 [A similar topic is treated from a different perspective in Lonergan, Insight, chapter 17, § 1.2, ‘The Genesis of Adequate Self-knowledge,’ and § 2.5, ‘The Appropriation of Truth.’]

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normas sequi intendat. Deinde, autem, etiam fieri potest ut subiectum temporale, quamvis ipsum suam naturam parum intelligat, tamen alterius, qui intelligit, verba audit et credit, et secundum hanc fidem propria voluntate et intentione vivit, et tandem denique ad intelligentiam etiam pervenit, secundum illud ‘crede ut intelligas.’ Tertio, denique, fieri potest ut subiectum temporale alteri ita dilectione coniungatur ut unio amoris in unionem fidei conducat, et unio secundum fidem in intelligentiam terminetur. Quare, si modos respicimus quibus temporalia subiecta fiunt personae temporis posterioris, aliae fiunt tales personae magis secundum intelligentiam, aliae autem magis secundum verbum verum, et aliae denique magis secundum amorem honestum. Sexto, in statu naturae lapsae valde impediuntur subiecta temporalia quominus vere et honeste fiant personae temporis posterioris. Nam quatenus subiectum temporale est subiectum naturae sensitivae, est centrum quoddam apprehensionum, appetitionum, et aliarum operationum quae naturali quadam spontaneitate et fiunt et regulantur. Quatenus autem est subiectum naturae intellectualis procedere debet ad obiectivum quendam rerum ordinem intelligendum, et ad proprium munus intra illum ordinem perspiciendum, et ad propriam eidem ordini subordinationem acceptandam. Quatenus, denique, et sensitivae et intellectualis naturae subiectum est, maxime evolvitur vis imaginativa et maxime liberatur ipsa vita sensitiva, tum ut intellectus ad totum ens intelligendum procedere possit, tum ut pars hominis sensitiva vivere possit secundum inventiones atque dictamina partis intellectivae. 24 At ipsa haec imaginationis evolutio atque vitae sensitivae liberatio faciunt quidem ut subiectum temporale totum quendam operationum campum intret qui, cum in signis et instrumentis inveniendis et usurpandis consistat, minime per leges animalibus naturaliter inditas reguletur vel gubernetur. Praeterea, donec subiectum temporale ad posterius quod diximus tempus perveniat, fieri non potest ut ipsum sapienter atque efficaciter se dirigat atque gubernet. Ita ergo in priori tempore a lege animalium in campum activitatis artisticum, dramaticum, practicum liberatur, ut ad legem propriam intellectu perspectam et ratione impositam et voluntate electam nondum perveniat. Quo sane in statu ex influxu aliorum subiectorum ea per amorem et fidem amplecti atque addiscere potest quaecumque illa alia subiecta iam didicerunt atque amplexi sunt. At longe facilius subiecta temporalia ea addiscunt quae huius

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embrace it by their own will and to intend to follow its norms. In the second way, temporal subjects, although they may themselves have little understanding of their own nature, can nevertheless hear and believe the words of another who does understand, and by their own will and intention live according to what they believe, and finally even arrive at an understanding of it, in accordance with the dictum, ‘Believe in order to understand.’ In the third way, temporal subjects can be so intimately one with another through love that this loving union leads to oneness in belief, and oneness in belief in turn leads to understanding. Hence, if we look at the ways by which temporal subjects become persons of the subsequent phase, we see that some come to it more by way of understanding, others more by way of the true word, and still others by way of genuine love. Sixth, in the state of fallen human nature, there are many obstacles that prevent temporal subjects from truly and genuinely becoming persons of the subsequent phase. For, insofar as temporal subjects are the subjects of a sentient nature, they are centers of apprehensions, desires, and other operations that occur and are regulated by a certain natural spontaneity. But insofar as one is the subject of an intellectual nature, one ought to proceed to understanding an objective order of reality, to perceiving one’s own role within that order, and to accepting one’s own subordination to the same order. Finally, insofar as one is the subject of both a sentient and an intellectual nature, one’s imagination develops greatly and the life of the senses is greatly liberated, so that intelligence can proceed to understand the full range of being, while the senses can live in accord with the discoveries and dictates of intelligence.24 But as a result of this very development of the imagination and liberation of the life of the senses, temporal subjects enter a total field of operations which, since it consists in finding and using signs and instruments, is not at all regulated or directed by laws that are innate in animals. Besides, until temporal subjects arrive at what we have termed the subsequent phase, it is impossible for them to direct and govern themselves wisely and effectively. Thus in the prior phase temporal subjects are freed from the law of animals to engage in the artistic, dramatic, or practical fields of activity, without having arrived at their own law understood by intelligence, imposed by reason, and chosen by the will. In this state a temporal subject, influenced by other subjects, can, of course, through love and belief embrace and learn whatever those other subjects have learned and embraced. But temporal subjects much more easily learn what is 24 [On free images, see especially Bernard Lonergan, Understanding and Being, ed Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) 109 note 4, 136, 314–15.]

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vitae utilitatem et commoditatem respiciant, cum ipsa experientia errores per consectaria manifeste connexa demonstret. Quae autem hominis intimam naturam verumque hac in vita munus et huius vitae sensum finemque respiciant, cum methodo empirica per consectaria clare connexa determinari non possint, ita sacerdotibus, poetis, philosophis speculanda relinqui solent, ut caeteri, quasi peracta laboris divisione, liberius ad res proprias attendant. Qua de causa, et gentes incultae mythis deditae inveniuntur et, quamvis progredientibus artibus et scientiis homini adveniant media semper perfectiora ad propriam naturam sibi manifestandam eiusque intrinsecas normas declarandas, pari tamen passu augentur confusionis et obscurationis occasio, copia, facultas. Caeteris enim difficultatibus accedit voluntas parum honesta. Nam qui in priori tempore versantur, non solum excellentiam posterioris minus clare perspiciunt sed etiam propriam ad posterius tempus conversionem minus efficaciter volunt. Qui iis magistris credere possint qui veriora doceant, aliis credere malunt qui faciliora suadeant. Qui amicos magis honestos habere possint, iis tamen se coniungunt quibuscum suavius et dulcius vivitur. Unde et maior hominum pars, angustam portam praetereuntes, spatiosam incedunt viam. 25 Parum sciunt quid homo esse debeat; neque totum quod sciunt facere volunt. Sicut intellectus eorum a vero intelligibili deficit, ita voluntas etiam a cognito intelligibili et vero declinat; neque huius defectus atque declinationis consectaria intra singulos manent, tum quia errantibus creditur et amicis peccantibus consentiunt, tum quia actiones humanae rationi contrariae situationes humanas faciunt absurdas, et ipsa haec situationum absurditas incautis videtur evidentia empirica ad demonstrandam eorum ineptitudinem qui rationem sequi velint.26

Septimo, si subiectorum temporalium et fides et amicitia ita sunt ambivalentes ut, quamvis maximo adiutorio esse possint, tamen a vero intelligibili et a bono vero saepius retrahant et in mediocritatem quandam nimis humanam conducant, ad ipsa subiecta aeterna atque divina confugiendum est. Sit ergo nostra fides in Verbum aeternum carnem factum; sit nostra amicitia in Spiritu sancto; in Spiritu per Filium clamare audeamus, Abba, Pater; ut ad imaginem Dei ex intentione divina conditi, secundum imaginem Dei ex propria intentione vivamus, et fore speremus ut socii in civitate Dei fiamus hac in vita fideles et in futura beati.

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useful and convenient for daily living, where experience itself reveals our mistakes through their obvious consequences. But what concerns the inner nature and true role of a person in this life and the meaning and purpose of this life, no empirical method can determine through their obvious consequences. So these matters are generally left to the speculations of priests, poets, and philosophers, so that others, as if by a division of labor, are freer to attend to their own interests. Because of this, primitive peoples are found to be given to myths, and although through the advancement of the arts and sciences ever more perfect means are provided for revealing to one one’s proper nature and making its intrinsic norms clear, nevertheless there is also a corresponding increase in the opportunity for, and the amount and influence of, confusion, ignorance, and error. Added to all these problems is the fact of a less than upright will. Those who are in the prior phase not only perceive the excellence of the subsequent phase less clearly, but also will their conversion to it less effectively. Those who could believe the teachers who teach what is true prefer to listen to others who urge them to choose what is easier. Those who could have more upright friends nevertheless go along with those who live a life of enjoyment and pleasure. Thus the greater part of humanity, bypassing the narrow gate, take the broad road instead. 25 They have little knowledge of what a human being ought to be, and they do not want to put into practice the little they know. As their intellect falls short of intelligible truth, so also their will shies away from knowledge that is intelligible and true. The consequences of this deficiency and avoidance do not remain within single individuals, not only because people believe those who are in error and friends consent to the sins of their friends, but also because human actions that are contrary to reason create human situations that are absurd, and the very absurdity of these situations is seen by the thoughtless to be empirical evidence that proves the ineptitude of those who wish to follow reason. 26 Seventh, if the belief and friendship of temporal subjects are so ambivalent that, while they may be very helpful, they nevertheless frequently draw temporal subjects away from intelligible truth and true good and lead them into an all too human mediocrity, then we must take refuge in the eternal divine subjects. Let our belief, then, be in the eternal Word made flesh, let our friendship be in the Holy Spirit; and in the Spirit through the Son let us dare to cry out, ‘Abba, Father’; so that being by God’s intention created in the divine image we may by our own intention live according to that image, and hope that we may become faithful citizens of the city of God in this life and blessed in the life to come. 25 [See Matthew 7.13–14.] 26 [See Lonergan, ‘Finality, Love, Marriage,’ in Collection, at 26–27.]

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Quibus perspectis, ad analogiam subiecti aeterni procedendum est ut quid simile sit et quid diversum videamus cum subiectum aeternum ad naturam suam intellectualem comparatur. Et inprimis subiecta aeterna qua talia, cum immaterialia sint, aliam naturam praeter intellectualem non habent. Neque in genere intelligibilium sunt ut potentia, sed intellectus eorum est actus infinitus totius entis. Neque aliud et aliud admittunt tempus ut secundum prius per accidens et secundum posterius per se sint subiecta naturae intellectualis actuatae, cum actus intelligendi infinitus ab aeterno comprehendat quid sit intelligere et quaenam sint normae intellectui intrinsecae. Quae cum ita sint, quam maxima est differentia inter subiecta aeterna atque subiecta temporalia. Et tamen haec parva invenitur similitudo quoad utrumque subiectum est intellectualis naturae. Sicut enim intellectus divinus se habet ad totum ens ut actus, ita intellectus humanus se habet ad totum ens ut potentia; circa omnia enim intellectus noster quaerit, quid sit, et an sit; neque quiescit hoc desiderium naturale, quaestionibus manifestatum, donec ipse Deus per essentiam cognoscatur. 27 Praeterea, sicut nos fimus subiecta naturae intellectualis actuatae inquantum inquirendo ultra sensibilia ascendimus, et intelligendo secundum veritatem iudicamus, et iudicando secundum honestatem actum voluntatis spiramus, ita etiam subiecta aeterna sunt subiecta inquantum secundum veritatem dicitur Verbum et secundum honestatem spiratur Amor. Praeterea, sicut nos fimus subiecta per se seu secundi temporis inquantum ipsam nostram naturam intellectualem intelligimus, eamque nobis concipiendo et iudicando manifestamus, eamque intellectam atque manifestatam ita diligimus ut eam in omnibus sequi velimus, ita etiam subiecta aeterna ab aeterno sunt subiecta inquantum infinita natura intellectualis et ipsa se intelligit, eamque sibi Verbo manifestat, eamque intellectam et manifestatam Amore infinito diligit. Praeterea, sicut nos ad perfectionem secundi temporis vel magis secundum intelligentiam vel magis secundum fidem vel magis secundum amorem pertingimus, ita subiecta aeterna sunt subiecta, alius quidem inquantum ex intelligentia dicit Verbum, alius autem inquantum est Verbum ex intelligentia dictum, tertius denique inquantum est Amor ex intelligentia dicente Verboque dicto procedens. Praeterea, sicut nos alius ab alio dependemus tum secundum generationem carnalem ut existamus tum secundum doctrinam et fidem et amorem ut personae secundi temporis fiamus, ita etiam subiecta aeterna inter se ordinantur ut Pater

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With this in mind, let us proceed to the analogy of the eternal subject, so as to determine what is similar and what different when an eternal subject is related to his intellectual nature. First and foremost, eternal subjects as such, since they are immaterial, have no nature other than the intellectual. Nor is it as potency that they are in the genus of intellectual being: their intellect is the infinite act of all being. For them there is not one phase after another, so that they are per accidens subjects of an actuated intellectual nature in an earlier phase, and per se in a later phase, since the infinite act of understanding comprehends from eternity what understanding is and what the norms intrinsic to intelligence are. Thus, there is the greatest possible difference between eternal subjects and temporal subjects. Still, there is this small similarity, in that both are subjects of an intellectual nature. Just as the divine intellect is as act with respect to all being, so the human intellect is as potency with respect to all being. For our intellect asks with regard to everything, ‘What is it?’ and ‘Is it?’ and this natural desire, manifested in questions, does not rest until it knows God by essence.27 Besides, just as we become subjects of an actuated intellectual nature inasmuch as we rise above sensible realities through inquiry, make judgments in accordance with truth through understanding, and spirate an act of will through judging in accordance with goodness, so also eternal subjects are subjects inasmuch as a Word is spoken in accordance with truth, and Love is spirated in accordance with goodness. Again, just as we become subjects per se, subjects of the second phase, inasmuch as we understand our intellectual nature and manifest it to ourselves by conceiving and judging, and so love it as understood and manifested that we will to follow it in all things, so also the eternal subjects are subjects from eternity inasmuch as the infinite intellectual nature understands itself and manifests itself to itself by the Word, and by infinite Love loves itself as understood and manifested. Moreover, just as we attain the perfection of the second phase either more by way of understanding or more by way of belief or more by way of love, so the eternal subjects are subjects, one inasmuch as from understanding he speaks the Word, another inasmuch as he is the Word spoken from understanding, and the third inasmuch as he is Love proceeding from understanding speaking and the Word spoken. Again, just as we depend upon one another both for our very existence through carnal generation and for becoming persons of the second phase through teaching and faith and love, so also the eternal subjects are so ordered among themselves 27 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 3, a. 8; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, cc. 25–63.

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sit ingenitus, Filius autem ex Patre sit secundum generationem intellectualem, Spiritus sanctus denique ex Patre Filioque secundum sanctitatem procedat. Quae tamen omnia ita sunt similia ut maior in singulis sit dissimilitudo. Infinitum enim intercedit inter intellectum qui se habet ad totum ens ut potentia et intellectum qui se habet ad totum ens ut actus. Neque circa sensibilia inquirens ad intelligendum movetur qui actu infinito intelligit. Neque umquam anceps haeret subiectum aeternum inter liberationem a limitationibus animalibus et intelligentiam naturae intellectualis. Neque prius sui conscium est secundum notitiam quandam praeviam et informem ut postea se sibi clare et distincte verbo manifestet. Neque per actus intermedios ad actus intelligendi perfectiores procedit, neque multa verba dicit, neque multis actibus diligit, neque a processione secundum veritatem neque a processione secundum sanctitatem deficere potest, sed idem actus aeternus et infinitus et intelligendi est et affirmandi et diligendi. Neque ab obiectis finitis specificatur actus infinitus sed per id quod est et ens per essentiam et verum per essentiam et bonum per essentiam. Neque ulla viget distinctio realis inter substantiam et accidens, vel inter esse et operari, vel inter subiectum et actum. Neque alia est constitutio subiecti ut existat et alia est constitutio personae secundi temporis ut ex propria intentione secundum naturam suam intellectualem existat. Neque dicens ita est intelligens ut simul non sit infinita affirmatio et infinitus amor; neque verbum ita est verum dictum ut simul non sit infinita intelligentia et infinitus amor; et amor procedens non ita est amor ut simul non sit infinita intelligentia et affirmatio infinita. Sed subiecta aeterna sunt ab aeterno unus idemque actus infinitus; et per ipsas emanationes secundum veritatem et sanctitatem sunt et subiecta et inter se distincta et inter se ordinata ordine simul et originis et intelligibili et personali.

ASSERTUM XIII Pater, Filius, et Spiritus sanctus tam psychologice quam ontologice circumincedunt. Circumincessio28 (circuminsessio, perikh¯or¯esis) divinarum personarum tum in scripturis, tum apud patres, tum in conc. Florentino docetur.

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that the Father is ungenerated, the Son is from the Father by way of intellectual generation, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son by way of holiness. In all these there is a similarity, but in each of them the dissimilarity is much greater. There is an infinite distance between an intellect that is to all being as potency and an intellect that is to all being as act. Moreover, one who understands by an infinite act is not moved to understanding by inquiring about sensible data. Again, an eternal subject is never caught in a tension between the poles of liberation from animal limitations and the understanding of intellectual nature. Nor is he first conscious of himself by way of a preliminary and unstructured awareness in order later clearly and distinctly to manifest himself to himself in a word. He does not proceed through intermediate acts to more perfect acts of understanding, or speak many words, or love in many acts, nor he is capable of failing in his procession by way of truth or in his procession by way of holiness, but the selfsame eternal and infinite act is an act of understanding and of affirming and of loving. Again, infinite act is not specified by finite objects but rather by that which is being by essence and true by essence and good by essence. Nor is there here a real distinction between substance and accident, or between existing and operating, or between subject and act. Nor is there one constitution of the subject’s existence and another constitution for a person of the second phase to exist by his own intention in accordance with his intellectual nature. Again, the Speaker is not understanding without being at the same time infinite affirmation and infinite love; and the Word is not the spoken truth without being at the same time infinite understanding and infinite love; and proceeding Love is not love without being at the same time infinite understanding and infinite affirmation. But eternal subjects are from eternity one and the same infinite act; and through those very emanations by way of truth and of holiness they are subjects and distinct from one another and ordered among themselves in an order that is an order of origin and, at the same time, intellectual and personal. ASSERTION 13 The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit dwell within one another both ontologically and psychologically. The doctrine of the circumincession28 (circumincessio, circuminsessio, perich¯or¯esis) of the divine persons is taught in scripture, in the Fathers, and in the Council of Florence. 28 In addition to the usual textbooks, see Jean-Arthur Chollet, ‘Circuminsession,’ Dictionnaire de Th´eologie Catholique 4 (1932) 2527–32; Gustave Bardy, ‘Trinit´e,’ ibid. 30 (1950) 1693–96; August Deneffe, ‘Perichoresis, circumincessio, circuminsessio:

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Io 10.38: et si mihi non vultis credere, operibus credite, ut cognoscatis et credatis quia Pater in me est et ego in Patre. Io 14.10: Non creditis quia ego in Patre et Pater in me est? Io 17.21: ut omnes unum sint, sicut tu, Pater, in me, et ego in te, ut et ipsi in nobis unum sint. 1 Cor 2.10 s.: Spiritus enim omnia scrutatur, etiam profunda Dei. Quis enim hominum scit quae sunt hominis nisi spiritus hominis qui in ipso est? Ita et quae Dei sunt nemo cognovit nisi Spiritus Dei.29 Mt 11.27: Et nemo novit Filium nisi Pater; neque Patrem quis novit nisi Filius et cui voluerit Filius revelare. Pro patribus loquatur S. Fulgentius,30 quem citat conc. Florentinum: ‘Propter hanc unitatem Pater est totus in Filio, totus in Spiritu sancto; Filius totus est in Patre, totus in Spiritu sancto; Spiritus sanctus totus est in Patre, totus in Filio . . .’ (db 704). Quare ipsa circumincessio prout his effatis proponitur est de fide divina et catholica. Exponitur autem a S. Thoma tum secundum divinam essentiam, tum secundum relationes personales, tum secundum origines. 31 Secundum essentiam quidem sic exponitur. In unoquoque est tum sua essentia tum omne quod realiter identificatur cum sua essentia. Sed singulae personae divinae sunt ipsa divina essentia cum realiter a divina essentia non distinguantur. Ergo Pater est in Filio, quia Pater est sua essentia, sua essentia realiter identificatur cum essentia Filii, et essentia Filii est in Filio; et similiter Filius est in Patre, Pater et Filius sunt in Spiritu sancto, et Spiritus sanctus est in Patre.

Et idem concluditur ex eo quod singulae personae divinae sunt consciae per actum divinum essentialem, et praeterea realiter identificantur cum actu divino essentiali. Nam quicumque realiter est intra conscientiam alterius re vera est in illo alio. Sed actus divinus essentialis quo singulae divinae personae sunt consciae est intra conscientiam singularum personarum. Et praeterea singulae

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John 10.38: ‘. . . even though you do not believe me, believe the works, so that you may know and believe that the Father is in me and I am in the Father.’ John 14.10: ‘Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me?’ John 17.21: ‘. . . that they may all be one. As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be one in us.’ 1 Corinthians 2.10–11: ‘. . . the Spirit scrutinizes all matters, even the deep things of God. Who, for example, knows a man’s innermost self but the man’s own spirit within him? Similarly no one knows what lies at the depths of God but the Spirit of God.’29 Matthew 11.27: ‘. . . no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him.’ Let St Fulgentius, whom the Council of Florence quotes, represent the Fathers: 30 ‘Because of this unity the Father is entire in the Son, entire in the Holy Spirit; the Son is entire in the Father, entire in the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit is entire in the Father, entire in the Son’ (db 704, ds 1331, nd 326). Therefore this circumincession, as expressed in these statements, is a matter of divine and catholic faith. It is explained by St Thomas in terms of the divine essence, in terms of the personal relations, and in terms of the origins or processions.31 In terms of the divine essence, the explanation is as follows. In each and every thing there is its essence and all that is really identical with the essence. But each of the divine persons is the divine essence itself since none of them is really distinct from the divine essence. Therefore, the Father is in the Son, because the Father is his essence, and his essence is really identified with the essence of the Son, and the essence of the Son is in the Son. And similarly, the Son is in the Father, the Father and the Son are in the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is in the Father [and in the Son]. The same conclusion follows from the fact that each divine person is conscious through the essential divine act and, moreover, is really identical with the essential divine act. For whoever is really within the consciousness of another is really in that other. But the essential divine act, by which each of the persons is conscious, is within the consciousness of each of the persons. And besides, each person is this Eine terminologische Untersuchung,’ Zeitschrift f¨ur katholische Theologie 47 (1923) 497–532; G.L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London: S.P.C.K., 1952, 1964) chapter 14, ‘Co-inherence.’ 29 [This is the translation found in the New American Bible. The nrsv translation did not represent the meaning that Lonergan intended in citing this text.] 30 De fide ad Petrum, 1, 4. ml 65: 674. 31 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 42, a. 5.

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personae sunt ipse actus essentialis. Qua de causa, singulae personae realiter sunt intra ipsam conscientiam cuiusque alterius.32 Deinde secundum relationem sic exponi potest. Absoluti est esse per se et in se, quia totam suam rationem per propriam realitatem habet et intra suam realitatem claudit. Relativa autem sunt quorum esse (ratio) est ad aliud se habere, quia ipsa eorum ratio alterius rationem in se includit et ipsa eorum realitas nihil aliud est quam respectus ad aliud. Ita Pater est Pater quia Filium habet, et vicissim Filius est Filius quia Patrem habet; in ratione ergo Patris includitur Filius, et in ratione Filii includitur Pater; at realitas Patris est realitas ipsius huius rationis, et similiter realitas Filii est realitas rationis, Filii; ergo sicut Pater includitur in ratione Filii, per consequens quodammodo includitur in relativa realitate Filii; et similiter Filius quodammodo includitur in relativa realitate Patris; et idem est dicendum circa Spiritum sanctum.

Quod et manifestius perspicitur cum ulterius consideratur relationes divinas reales esse intellectualiter conscias. Non solum enim quod supra positum est de mutua inclusione divinarum personarum in relativa alterius cuiusque realitate a singulis divinis personis ex parte obiecti (sicut et a nobis) cognoscitur, sed etiam id ipsum quod divinae personae sunt est ordo seu ordinatio intellectualiter conscia. Paternitas enim est ordinatio intellectualiter conscia ex perspecta evidentia ad verbum dicendum et dictum; et haec paternitas est ipse Pater. Filiatio pariter est ordo intellectualiter conscius verbi dicti ad perspectam evidentiam infinitam ex qua dicitur; et haec filiatio est ipse Filius. Spiratio passiva denique est ordo intellectualiter conscius ad bonum infinitum et intellectu perspectum et verissimo iudicio affirmatum; et haec spiratio passiva est ipse Spiritus sanctus. Quod ergo docet S. Thomas ‘unum oppositorum relative esse in altero secundum intellectum’ (Summa theologiae, q. 42, a. 5), exponi potest non tantummodo secundum intellectum nostrum quatenus nos intelligimus relationes divinas, sed etiam secundum intellectum divinum quatenus personae divinae relationes divinas comprehendunt, neque tantummodo secundum intellectum divinum quatenus ex parte obiecti hae relationes intelliguntur, sed etiam quatenus ex parte subiecti intellectualiter conscii unaquaeque persona cuiusque alterius conscia est.

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essential act itself. Hence, each person is really within the very consciousness of each of the other two.32 Next, circumincession can be explained in terms of relation. It belongs to an absolute to be per se and in itself, because it has its total meaning through its proper reality and encloses it within its own reality. It belongs to what is relative, on the other hand, that its existence or meaning is to be related to another, because the very meaning of the relative includes within itself the meaning of another, and its very reality is just a relation to another. Thus, the Father is Father because he has a Son, and conversely the Son is Son because he has a Father. ‘Son,’ therefore, is included in the meaning of ‘Father,’ and ‘Father’ is included in the meaning of ‘Son.’ But the reality of the Father is the reality of this meaning itself, and likewise the reality of the Son is the reality of the meaning of ‘Son.’ Therefore, as ‘Father’ is included in the meaning of ‘Son,’ consequently the Father is in some way included in the relational reality of the Son, and similarly the Son is in some way included in the relational reality of the Father. And the same reasoning applies to the Holy Spirit. This is more clearly seen when we further consider that the real divine relations are intellectually conscious. For not only is what we have said above concerning the mutual inclusion of the divine persons in the real relation of each to each of the others known on the side of the object by each of the persons (as it is also known by us), but also that very reality which the divine persons are is an intellectually conscious ordering. Paternity is the intellectually conscious ordering from grasped evidence to the Word to be spoken and to the Word spoken; and this paternity is the Father himself. Filiation is likewise the intellectually conscious ordering of the Word spoken to the grasp of infinite evidence from which it is spoken; and this filiation is the Son himself. Passive spiration, finally, is the intellectually conscious ordering to the infinite good grasped by intellect and affirmed in an eminently true judgment; and this passive spiration is the Holy Spirit himself. Thus, we can expound the teaching of St Thomas, that ‘one of the relatively opposed is in the other on the basis of intellect’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 42, a. 5), not only from the perspective of our intellect inasmuch as we understand the divine relations, but also from the perspective of the divine intellect inasmuch as the divine persons comprehend the divine relations, and not only in accordance with the divine intellect inasmuch as these relations are understood on the side of the object, but also inasmuch as, on the side of the intellectually conscious subject, each person is conscious of the other two. 32 [See the discussion in assertion 12 above.]

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Secundum origines denique sic exponitur. Quia emanatio intelligibilis est intra realitatem et conscientiam eius ex quo est, Filius est intra realitatem et conscientiam Patris, et similiter Spiritus sanctus est intra realitatem et conscientiam Patris et Filii. Praeterea, quamvis in nobis singulis non sit nisi una persona et unum subiectum conscium, in divinis sunt tres personae et tria subiecta conscia. Qua de causa, non solum Pater ut principium Filii et Pater Filiusque ut principium Spiritus sancti habent aliam personam intra suam conscientiam atque realitatem ut ex iis procedentem, sed etiam Filius ut procedens a Patre et Spiritus ut procedens a Patre Filioque habent respective Patrem et Patrem Filiumque intra propriam conscientiam atque realitatem.

Quod et aliter exponi potest. Deus enim est ens per essentiam et ipsum intelligere, verum per essentiam et ipsum affirmare, bonum per essentiam et ipsum diligere. Quae quidem tria ratione tantum inter se distinguuntur ut ipsa divina realitas sit intelligibile actu intellectum et per identitatem divinum verum actu affirmatum et per identitatem divinum bonum actu dilectum. Attamen Pater est Deus intelligens ut principium Verbi; et Verbum est Deus affirmans ut procedens a Patre; et Spiritus est Deus diligens ut procedens a Patre Filioque. Quare, unaquaeque persona est in alia secundum quod ipsa est ens et intelligens et ideo in Patre, verum et affirmans et ideo in Filio, bonum et diligens et ideo in Spiritu.

Quod et aliter exponi potest. Cum enim in divinis idem sit esse intentionale ac esse naturale, Verbum est Deus non solum secundum esse intentionale sed etiam secundum esse naturale; et ideo aliae personae sunt in Verbo, cum eorum esse naturale etiam esse intentionale sit. Et secundum hoc dicitur Deus esse in divina intentione Dei intellecta seu in Verbo.33 Praeterea, quamvis in nobis amor non faciat nisi quandam quasi identificationem amantis cum amato secundum quod amicus a poeta dictus sit dimidium animae suae,34 in divinis amor facit veram et plenam identitatem amantis et amati; et secundum hoc verissime dicitur Deus amatus esse in Deo amante;35 quare inquantum Pater et Filius amantur amore procedente qui est Spiritus sanctus, sunt in ipso hoc amore. Iterum, quamvis Pater

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Finally, in terms of origins circumincession can be explained as follows. Because an intellectual emanation is within the reality and the consciousness of that from which it is, the Son is within the reality and the consciousness of the Father, and similarly the Holy Spirit is within the reality and the consciousness of the Father and the Son. Besides, although in our case each of us is but one person and one conscious subject, in God there are three persons and three conscious subjects. Consequently, not only the Father as the principle of the Son, and the Father and the Son as the principle of the Holy Spirit, have another person within their consciousness and their reality as the one proceeding from them, but also the Son as proceeding from the Father, and the Spirit as proceeding from the Father and the Son, have, respectively, the Father, and the Father and the Son, within their own consciousness and reality. This can be explained in another way. God is being by essence and the very act of understanding, is true by essence and the very act of affirming, is good by essence and the very act of loving. These three are distinguished from one another only conceptually, so that the divine reality is an intelligible actually understood, and by identity divine truth actually affirmed, and by identity divine goodness actually loved. But the Father is God understanding as the principle of the Word, and the Word is God affirming as proceeding from the Father, and the Spirit is God loving as proceeding from the Father and the Son. Therefore, each person is in another inasmuch as that person is being and understanding, and so in the Father; inasmuch as he is true and affirming, and therefore in the Son; and inasmuch as he is good and loving, and therefore in the Spirit. There is still another way of explaining this. Since in God intentional existence and natural existence are one and the same, the Word is God not only on the basis of intentional existence but also on the basis of natural existence; therefore, the other persons are in the Word, since their natural existence is also intentional existence. And according to this, God is said to be in the divine understood intention of God, that is, in the Word.33 Besides, although in us love effects only a quasi identification between the lover and the beloved, whereby a friend is said by the poet to be dimidium animae meae, ‘half of my soul,’ 34 in God love involves a true and full identity between the lover and beloved, and according to this, God as loved is most truly said to be in God as loving. 35 Therefore, inasmuch as the Father and the Son are loved by proceeding Love, which is the Holy Spirit, they are in this very love. Again, although the Father and the Son are consubstantial 33 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11. 34 [Horace, Odes i, 3, l. 8.] 35 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 19.

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et Filius sint consubstantiales ratione generationis divinae, etiam sunt consubstantiales ratione amoris qui duos in unum coniungit; et secundum hoc Spiritus sanctus dicitur nexus Patris et Filii, non quasi processione intermedius esset, sed quia quos natura fecit consubstantiales, etiam amor infinitus ab aeterno sub alio aspectu unum facit.36 ASSERTUM XIV Duae sunt perfectionis rationes, quarum prima ex actu desumitur, altera autem ex unitate ordinis repetitur. Et prima quidem perfectio in divina substantia invenitur infinita; altera autem in divinis relationibus simul sumptis tanta verificatur quanta maior cogitari nequit. At quamvis duo perfectionis conceptus ratione inter se distinguantur, in Deo tamen unam indivisamque perfectionem realem dicunt. Asserto intentio Triplici asserto una respicitur quaestio, nempe, quaenam sit perfectio divina quae, cum naturali rationis lumine nobis innotescere non possit, per dogma SS. Trinitatis reveletur. Ad cuius solutionem statuitur (1) sub nomine perfectionis non unum sed duos intelligi conceptus, (2) quorum alium in divina substantia et alium in divinis relationibus simul sumptis ita verificari, ut (3) una realiter sit ipsa divina perfectio.

Sententiae Quam quaestionem theologi alii aliter solvere solent. Qui enim aliam perfectionis rationem non considerant nisi eam quae in actu perspicitur, relationes divinas reales perfectionem ponere negant, cum manifeste relationis sit non actum ponere sed positum referre. Ita multi inter quos recensentur Durandus, Caietanus, Molina, Billuart, Gonet, Billot, et Boyer. 37

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by reason of divine generation, they are also consubstantial by reason of the love that joins the two into one; and it is according to this that the Holy Spirit is said to be the bond between the Father and the Son, not as a go-between by way of a procession, but because those whom nature has made consubstantial, infinite love also makes one from eternity on other grounds. 36 ASSERTION 14 Perfection has two formalities. The first is grounded upon act, while the second is derived from the unity of order. The first perfection is infinite as found in the divine substance. The second is verified in the divine relations taken together as so great that no greater perfection can be thought of. Although the two concepts of perfection are conceptually distinct, in God they refer to one undivided real perfection. Meaning of the Assertion This threefold assertion concerns a single question, namely, the nature of divine perfection, which, since we cannot come to know it by the natural light of reason, is revealed through the dogma of the Trinity. In answer to this question we state that (1) by the term ‘perfection’ not one but two concepts are understood, (2) one of which is verified in the divine substance and the other in the divine relations taken together, and this in such a way that (3) there is really a single divine perfection. Opinions Theologians have proposed various solutions to this question. Those who consider only the formality of perfection that is grounded upon act deny that the real divine relations posit perfection, since it is clear that a relation does not posit act but relates an act that has been posited. Among the many who are of this opinion are Durand, Cajetan, Molina, Billuart, Gonet, Billot, and Boyer.37 36 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 37, a. 1, ad 3m. [Aquinas distinguishes ‘secundum originem,’ where the Holy Spirit is not a ‘medium’ and ‘secundum praedictam habitudinem,’ which is the mutual Love by which the Father and the Son love each other, where the Spirit is a ‘medium.’] 37 Carolus Boyer, Synopsis praelectionum de SS. Trinitate (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1949) 208–209.

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Qui autem necessarium ducunt per maximum SS. Trinitatis mysterium maximam nobis revelari perfectionem, ita divinis relationibus propriam perfectionem vindicant ut tamen in diversas partes abeant. Alii enim, uti Suarez, tres perfectiones reales realiter inter se distinctas astruunt. Alii autem, ut Franzelin, Pesch, Galtier,38 ita unam perfectionem realem defendunt et duas perfectionis rationes praetermittunt ut propriam sententiam quodammodo destruere videantur. At cum fieri nequeat ut omnibus inter se dissentientibus consentiatur, haec nobis sententia defendenda censetur ut, sicut divinae substantiae divinarumque relationum una sit realitas, etiam una sit realis perfectio; et pariter, sicut alia sit substantiae ratio et alia relationum, ita alia perfectionis ratio substantiae et alia relationibus attribuatur. Qua de causa, primae et tertiae sententiae concedimus unam realem perfectionem divinam, secundae autem et tertiae eatenus consentimus quatenus magnam Dei perfectionem per dogma SS. Trinitatis revelari contendunt.

Argumentum Primo, quod actus perfectionem dicit. Nam ens per potentiam et actum ita dividitur ut per potentiam limitetur et per actum perficiatur; et ideo singula entia eatenus a perfectione deficiunt quatenus per potentiam limitantur, et eatenus perfectione ornantur quatenus actu sunt. Deinde, quod alia etiam est perfectionis ratio quae ex unitate ordinis desumitur. Notate dupliciter dici ordinem: uno modo, secundum quod relatio definitur ordo unius ad aliud; alio modo, secundum quod multa ita inter se ordinantur ut unum quoddam constituant. Primo modo, ergo, quaelibet relatio est ordo; sed secundo modo non habetur ordo nisi inquantum multa multis mutuisque relationibus unitatem quandam intelligibilem conficiunt; v.g, acervus lapidum lignorumque ordinis unitate caret, et tamen lapides lignaque rite disposita unam domum faciunt. Proinde, sciendum est nihil posse habere rationem finis nisi rationem perfectionis habeat. Finis enim est ultima cuiusque perfectio, et ideo unumquodque inquantum existit est ens simpliciter, sed inquantum ad finem pertingit est bonum

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Those who judge it necessary that the supreme perfection be revealed to us in the supreme mystery of the Trinity assert a perfection proper to the divine relations; but they explain this in different ways. Some, such as Suarez, affirm three real perfections really distinct from one another. Still others, such as Franzelin, Pesch, and Galtier, 38 hold for one real perfection but ignore the two formalities of perfection, and so seem to contradict their own view. Since it is impossible to agree with all of these disparate opinions, we opt to defend the following view, that just as the divine substance and the divine relations are one reality, so also is there one real perfection, and that similarly, just as the formality of substance and the formality of relations are different, so also the formality of perfection attributable to the substance is different from the formality of perfection attributable to the relations. Therefore, we agree with the first and third of the above opinions, that there is one real divine perfection, and with the second and third insofar as they contend that the great perfection of God is revealed in the dogma of the Trinity. Argument First, act denotes perfection. Being is divided into potency and act in such a way that it is limited by potency and perfected by act; therefore, each individual being is lacking in perfection to the extent that it is limited by potency, and is endowed with perfection to the extent that it is in act. Second, there is another formality of perfection, which is found in the unity of order. Note that order can be understood in two ways: first, according as relation is defined as the order of one to another; second, according as many things are ordered to one another in such a way as to constitute a unity. In the first sense, therefore, any relation is an order; but in the second sense, there is no order except insofar as many things compose an intelligible unity through many mutual relations. A pile of stones or of wood, for example, lacks the unity of order, and yet stones and wood properly arranged make one house. Note too that nothing can have the formality of end unless it has the formality of perfection. For the end is the final perfection of each thing, and therefore each and every thing, inasmuch as it exists, is a being in the strict sense, but 38 Galtier, De SS. Trinitate in se et nobis, § 290.

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simpliciter et perfectum simpliciter.39 Praeterea, ratio finis ultimaeque perfectionis non solum singulis qua singulis competit sed etiam multis qua multis. Omne enim agens propter finem agit; et ideo si fiunt multa, propter finem fiunt. Qui sane finis ipsa materialis multitudo esse non potest; nam multitudo qua materialis certo termino caret: v.g., si melius reputatur duo facere quam unum, sequitur multo melius esse tria facere quam duo; et sic in infinitum proceditur, quod infinitum contra rationem finis est.40 Neque multorum finis esse potest ut substantiae multae in unam substantiam convertantur, cum haec non multorum perfectio sed potius destructio esset. Neque multorum finis esse potest ut singula qua singula quam maxime perficiantur; ita enim multa qua multa sine fine relinquuntur. Et ideo dicendum est multorum finem ultimamque perfectionem in unitate ordinis consistere. Quae quidem unitas neque multitudinem tollit neque indeterminate multiplicat neque informem relinquit sed eam perficit praecise inquantum multitudo est. Quod et multis comprobatur exemplis. Nam in primis, ‘perfectius participat divinam bonitatem et repraesentat eam totum universum quam alia quaecumque creatura.’ 41 At universum non est unum quoddam totum nisi per unitatem ordinis.42 Qui ordo est finis universi intrinsecus, secundum illud: ‘finis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso existens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi.’43 Praeterea, angeli ordinantur et inter se et relate ad caeteras creaturas. 44 Praeterea, perficiuntur homines hac in vita non solum per bona particularia quae singuli appetunt atque prosequuntur, sed etiam per unitatem ordinis tum domesticam tum oeconomicam tum politicam tum socialem, quam multi qua

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inasmuch as it attains its end, it is good in the strict sense and perfect in the strict sense.39 Furthermore, the formality of end and of final perfection applies not only to individual things as individual but also to many individual things as many. For every agent acts because of an end, and so if there occur many, they occur because of an end. But of course this end cannot be the material multitude itself, for a multitude as material lacks a definite term. For example, if it is thought better to make two things than one, it follows that it is much better still to make three than two, and so on to infinity. But this infinity is contrary to the formality of end. 40 Nor can the end of the many be to make one substance out of many substances, since that would mean the destruction rather than the perfection of the many. Nor can the end of the many be that each individual as individual attain its maximum perfection, for this leaves the many, precisely as many, without an end. We must conclude, then, that the end and final perfection of the many consists in the unity of order. This unity does not do away with the multitude or multiply it indefinitely or leave it unstructured, but perfects it precisely as a multitude. This is confirmed by a number of examples. First of all, ‘the universe as a whole more perfectly participates in and represents the divine goodness than does any single creature.’ 41 But the universe is not a single whole except through the unity of order.42 This order is the intrinsic end of the universe: ‘The end of the universe is a good existing in it, that is, the order of the universe itself.’43 Also, the angels are ordered both among themselves and in relation to other creatures.44 Moreover, human beings in this life are perfected, not only through the particular goods that each one desires and seeks to obtain, but also through the unity of order, whether domestic or economic or political or social, that the many as many 39 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1m. [Thomas’s and Lonergan’s point, of course, is not that each thing is first a being that is not good in any sense if it is not perfect, and then a being that, once it attains its end, is also good because perfect. To the extent that something is in act, it has attained an end and is in that sense good and perfect secundum quid, in a qualified sense, even if it has not attained its final perfection, where it would be good and perfect simpliciter, in the strict sense.] 40 Ibid. q. 47, a. 3, ad 2m. 41 Ibid. a. 1 c. 42 Ibid. a. 3. 43 Ibid. q. 103, a. 2, ad 3m. 44 Ibid. qq. 108–11.

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multi eo vehementius appetunt quo clarius rerum causas perspiciunt et ab errore individualismi exaggerati recedunt. Praeterea, cum singuli homines multis partibus constent, etiam multae hae partes qua multae in propriam perfectionem tendunt. Et ideo inter bona corporalia maxima recensetur sanitas quae est dispositio secundum rectum ordinem partium tum inter se tum ad totum hominem; et similiter inter bona spiritualia maxima quaedam recensetur iustitia illa interna ad quam supernaturalis iustificatio terminatur, quae est rectitudo quaedam ordinis prout supremum hominis subditur Deo et inferiores vires animae subduntur supremae, scilicet rationi. 45 Quibus perspectis, procul dubio concludendum videtur duplicem esse perfectionis rationem, cum entia singula qua singula ad finem et perfectionem per actum pertingant, et eadem entia multa qua multa per unitatem ordinis perficiantur. Tertio, secundum rationem perfectionis quae ex actu desumitur, divina substantia est perfectione infinita. Nam divina substantia est actus purus sine ulla potentiae admixtione. Sed unumquodque limitatur per potentiam et per actum perficitur. Ergo divina substantia, propter actum, est perfecta et, propter negatam potentiam, est perfectione infinita. Quarto, in divinis relationibus simul sumptis verificatur ratio perfectionis quae ex unitate ordinis desumitur. Nam ratio perfectionis quae ex unitate ordinis desumitur in eo consistit quod multa ita inter se ordinantur ut unum ordine constituant. Atqui in divinis relationibus verificatur mutua illa ordinatio quae unum ordine facit. Ergo in divinis relationibus simul sumptis verificatur ratio perfectionis quae ex unitate ordinis desumitur. Maior definit unitatem ordinis. Minor ex antecessis constat. Nam paternitas divina est ordinatio ad verbum dicendum atque dictum; filiatio autem est ordinatio verbi ad dicentem; spiratio activa est ordinatio ad amorem spirandum et spiratum; spiratio passiva est ordinatio amoris ad spiratorem; et cum spiratio activa sit eadem realiter ac paternitas et filiatio, unum quoddam ordine ex his quattuor relationibus realibus constituitur.

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desire all the more eagerly the more clearly they perceive the causes of things and move away from the error of exaggerated individualism. Besides, since individual human beings are made up of many parts, these many parts also, as many, tend to their proper perfection. And so the greatest among the goods of the body is considered to be health, which is the well-ordered disposition of the parts both among themselves and for the person as a whole. Similarly, among spiritual goods the greatest is considered to be that interior justice at which supernatural justification terminates, which is a certain rightness of order according to which the highest element of a person is subordinated to God and the lower powers of the soul are subordinated to the highest, namely, to reason. 45 From all this it seems we must without doubt conclude that perfection has two formalities, since individual beings as individuals attain their end and perfection through act, and these same many beings as many are perfected through the unity of order. Third, from the standpoint of the formality of perfection that is grounded upon act, the divine substance is infinite in perfection. The divine substance is pure act without any admixture of potency. But each being is limited through potency and perfected through act. Therefore, the divine substance, because of act, is perfect, and because of the denial of potency is infinite in perfection. Fourth, the formality of perfection derived from the unity of order is verified in the divine relations taken together. The formality of perfection that is derived from the unity of order consists in the fact that many things are so ordered among themselves as to constitute an ordered unity. But in the divine relations there is verified that mutual ordering that produces an ordered unity. Therefore in the divine relations taken together there is verified the formality of perfection that is found in the unity of order. The major premise of this syllogism is the definition of unity of order. The minor premise is clear from what has been said. For divine paternity is an ordering to the Word that is to be spoken and is spoken; filiation is an ordering of the Word to the Speaker; active spiration is an ordering to Love that is to be spirated and is spirated; passive spiration is an ordering of Love to the Spirator; and since active spiration is the same in reality as paternity and filiation, from these four real relations there is constituted an ordered unity. 45 Ibid. 1-2, q. 113, a. 1.

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Quinto, tanta est haec perfectio secundum unitatem ordinis quanta maior cogitari nequit. Nam eiusmodi perfectio secundum unitatem ordinis considerari potest vel formaliter ut unitas quaedam vel materialiter inquantum multa sunt ordinanda. Sed sub utroque aspectu perfectio ordinis in divinis est summa. Ergo tanta est haec perfectio quanta maior cogitari nequit. Sub aspectu enim formali triplex perfectionis gradus distingui potest. Alia enim est perfectio ordinis quae ordinatis ab extrinseco imponitur, et eiusmodi perfectio invenitur in artefactis, puta, in lapidibus et lignis ita ordinatis ut domum unam constituant. Alia deinde est perfectio ordinis quae in societate invenitur, ubi ipsum ordinis bonum constituitur eo quod a multis perspicitur, aestimatur, atque eligitur. Alia denique est perfectio ordinis quae intra conscientiam intellectualem per se invenitur atque in eo consistit quod bonum ordinatae conscientiae ideo attingitur quia intelligitur et ideo bonum affirmatur et ideo honeste eligitur. Iam vero secunda est perfectior quam prima, tum quia prima ab extrinseco imponitur sed secunda ex ipsis ordinatis qua intellectualibus oritur, tum quia prima nisi divisim in singulis existit sed secunda tota in singulis intentionaliter invenitur. Tertia vero est perfectior quam secunda cum non solum ab intrinseco oriatur et tota intentionaliter ordinatis insit, sed etiam ipsa tota perfectio quae intenditur eo ipso realiter perficiatur quia intellecta probe affirmetur et affirmata honeste eligatur. Porro, in creaturis intellectualibus non invenitur perfectio ordinis inter personas nisi secundum alterum et imperfectiorem modum; et ipse tertius modus non attingitur nisi inquantum actus accidentales intra conscientiam finitam inter se ex parte subiecti rationalis ordinantur. In divinis autem secundum tertium atque perfectissimum modum inter se ordinantur personae ut divina trium societas non solum ex parte obiecti intelligatur, affirmetur, diligatur, sed etiam ex parte subiecti secundum emanationes intelligibiles per veritatem verbi et sanctitatem amoris procedentis constituatur ipsa intellecta, affirmata, dilecta trium societas. Quam ob causam, sub aspectu formali tanta est dicenda perfectio divini ordinis quanta maior cogitari nequit, praesertim cum haec perfectio ab intellectu creato naturaliter non possit intelligi. Deinde sub aspectu materiali, quatenus sunt multa inter se ordinanda etiam tanta invenitur perfectio quanta maior cogitari nequit. Non enim constituuntur haec multa inquantum eadem perfectionis ratio in alio ponitur et ab alio tollitur, sed inquantum relationes mutuo sunt oppositae; neque aliae sunt hae relationes

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Fifth, so great is this perfection based on the unity of order that no greater can be thought of. The kind of perfection that is based on the unity of order can be considered either formally as a certain unity or materially as the many that are to be ordered. But under both aspects the perfection of order in God is supremely great. Therefore, this perfection is so great that no greater can be thought of. For under the formal aspect, three degrees of perfection can be distinguished. The first degree is the perfection of order that is imposed from without upon what is to be ordered. This sort of perfection is found in artifacts such as stones and wood that are so ordered as to constitute one house. The second degree is the perfection of order that is found in a society, where the good of order is constituted by what is understood, evaluated, and chosen by several persons. The third degree is the perfection of order that is found within intellectual consciousness per se and consists in the fact that the good of a well-ordered consciousness is attained because it is understood and therefore affirmed as good and hence responsibly chosen. Now, the second degree is more perfect than the first, both because the first is imposed from without while the second emerges from the ordered individuals themselves as intellectual, and because the first exists dividedly in each individual while the second is found intentionally in its entirety in each one. The third degree is more perfect than the second because not only does it emerge from within and exist intentionally in its entirety in what is ordered, but also this total perfection that is intended is achieved in reality by the very fact that, having been understood, it is justly affirmed, and having been affirmed, it is responsibly chosen. Besides, among intellectual creatures the perfection of order as it occurs between such persons is found only in the second and less perfect way; and the third way is attained only inasmuch as accidental acts within a finite consciousness are ordered among themselves on the side of the rational subject. In God, however, the persons are ordered among themselves in the third and most perfect way, so that the divine society of the three persons is not only understood, affirmed, and loved on the side of the object, but is also, on the side of the subject, and according to the intellectual emanations through the truth of the Word and the holiness of proceeding Love, constituted as that understood, affirmed, and loved society of three. Consequently, under its formal aspect the perfection of the divine order must be said to be so great that no greater can be thought of, especially since this perfection cannot be naturally understood by a created intellect. Next, under the material aspect, insofar as there are several to be ordered among themselves, this perfection is again so great that no greater can be thought of. For these individuals are not constituted as several individuals inasmuch as the same note of perfection is affirmed of one and denied to another, but inasmuch as they are mutually opposed relations; nor are some of them these relations while others

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et alia sunt subiecta quae relationibus ordinantur, sed ipsae relationes sunt subsistentes; neque multi et accidentales sunt actus quibus intelligitur, affirmatur, diligitur, sed unus atque infinitus est actus; neque intelligitur tantummodo quoddam ens per participationem sed ens per essentiam, neque affirmatur tantummodo quoddam verum per participationem sed verum per essentiam, neque diligitur tantummodo quoddam bonum per participationem sed ipsum bonum per essentiam; neque inter se realiter distinguuntur vel ens vel verum vel bonum vel intelligere vel affirmare vel diligere; ut perfectissima sit unitas unius conscientiae ita ordinatae ut tres personae per eandem conscientiam sint singulae suo modo consciae. Sexto, divina perfectio secundum actum et divina perfectio secundum ordinem ratione distinguuntur et realiter identificantur. Nam perfectio secundum actum est divina substantia, et perfectio secundum ordinem est divinae relationes simul sumptae. Sed divina substantia et divinae relationes ratione distinguuntur et realiter identificantur. Ergo per conceptus inter se distinctos unam eandemque perfectionem divinam apprehendimus. Difficultates Videtur esse in divinis trina perfectio relativa quae distinguitur a perfectione absoluta. Nam tres sunt relationes reales realiter inter se distinctae, et distincta realitas dicit distinctam perfectionem. Praeterea, esse conscium est quaedam perfectio; sed aliud est Patrem esse conscium Filii et Spiritus; aliud est Filium esse conscium Patris et Spiritus; aliud est Spiritum esse conscium Patris et Filii. Respondetur. Distincta realitas absoluta dicit distinctam perfectionem, conceditur; distincta realitas relativa dicit distinctam perfectionem, subdistinguitur, per se sola, negatur, una cum correlativo, subdistinguitur, dicit perfectionem realiter distinctam ab absoluto, negatur, ratione ab absoluto distinctam, conceditur.

Et eodem modo respondetur ad additam rationem. Nam esse conscium dicitur absolute et relative; et in divinis sicut unus est actus, ita una est conscientia; et sicut tres sunt personae, ita tres sunt mutuo consciae; quod mutuum esse conscium non realiter distinguitur ab una conscientia qua tres sunt mutuo consciae. Deinde ex parte contraria obicitur: Eadem realiter perfectio non potest esse et perfectio actus et perfectio unitatis ordinis. Ergo opinio proposita in absurdum ducit.

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are subjects that are ordered by the relations, but these relations themselves are subsistent. There are not many accidental acts of understanding, of affirmation, and of love, but one and the same infinite act. What is understood is not some being by participation but being by essence, what is affirmed is not something true by participation but what is true by essence, and what is loved is not some good by participation but the good by essence. There is no real distinction between being and truth and goodness and understanding and affirmation and love. Accordingly, there is a most perfect unity of the one consciousness that is so ordered that three persons are each in their own way conscious through the same consciousness. Sixth, the divine perfection grounded upon act and the divine perfection found in order are conceptually distinct but really identical. The perfection grounded upon act is the divine substance, and the perfection found in order is the divine relations taken together. But the divine substance and the divine relations are conceptually distinct and really identical. Therefore, we apprehend one and the same divine perfection through distinct concepts. Some Difficulties and Their Solution There seems to be in God a threefold relative perfection, distinct from the absolute perfection. For there are three real relations really distinct from one another, and a distinct reality indicates a distinct perfection. Besides, to be conscious is a perfection; but it is one thing for the Father to be conscious of the Son and the Spirit, another for the Son to be conscious of the Father and the Spirit, and still another for the Spirit to be conscious of the Father and the Son. We answer this in the following way. We agree that a distinct absolute reality indicates a distinct perfection; but that a distinct relative reality by itself alone indicates a distinct perfection, we deny. We also deny that a distinct relative reality together with its correlative indicates a perfection that is really distinct from the absolute, but we concede that it indicates a perfection that is conceptually distinct from the absolute. We reply to the added reason in the same way. For ‘to be conscious’ can be taken absolutely or relatively, and in God, as there is one act, there is one consciousness. And just as there are three persons, so there are three who are mutually conscious, and this mutual consciousness is not really distinct from that one consciousness whereby the three are mutually conscious. Next, a difficulty from the opposite side. A perfection that is really the same cannot be both the perfection of the act and the perfection of the unity of order. Therefore, the opinion that has been proposed leads to absurdity.

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Respondetur. Sicut a nobis hac in vita non perfecte intelligitur, vel quod processio divina simul importat realitatem emanationis et consubstantialitatem emanantis, vel quod relationes divinae sunt idem uni tertio quin sint idem inter se, vel quod realitas divina dicit tres personas in una natura, ita etiam non perfecte intelligitur quod una perfectio realis simul et rationem actus et rationem unitatis ordinis habet. Attamen, sicut et illud, ita et hoc ita imperfecte intelligi potest ut decursu saeculorum ipsa intelligentia augeatur (db 1796, 1800). Nam secundum quod in divinis est unus actus unaque conscientia, intelligitur perfectio secundum rationem actus; et secundum quod in divinis per emanationes intelligibiles intra eandem conscientiam constituuntur tres conscii, intelligitur perfectio secundum rationem ordinis.

Instatur. Secundum opinionem propositam non tanta est perfectio in singulis quanta in tribus, si quidem perfectio unitatis ordinis invenitur non in singulis seorsum sumptis sed in tribus simul consideratis. E contra, secundum auctoritates 46 tanta est perfectio in singulis quanta est in tribus. Ergo opinio proposita admitti non potest.

Respondetur. Etiam secundum opinionem propositam tanta est perfectio in singulis quanta in tribus simul sumptis. Non enim affirmamus nisi unam perfectionem realem, et ubi una tantummodo realis perfectio habetur, patet eam se ipsa neque maiorem neque minorem esse posse. Quantum autem ad rationem additam attinet, duo sunt notanda: nam primo auctoritates 47

47 Asseritur aequalitas eo fere sensu ac consubstantialitas: db 39, 79, 254, 428, 461 ss., 703 s. Ulterius concludit conc. Toletanum xi: ‘una illis vel indivisa atque aequalis Deitas, maiestas sive potestas, nec minoratur in singulis, nec augetur in tribus; quia nec minus aliquid habet, cum unaquaeque persona Deus singulariter dicitur, nec amplius, cum totae tres personae unus Deus enuntiantur’ db 279. Fortius loqui videtur Augustinus: ‘Sed hic in rebus corporeis, non tantum est res una quantum tres simul, et plus aliquid sunt duae quam una res: caeterum in illa summa Trinitate tantum est una quantum tres simul, nec plus aliquid sunt duae quam una.’ De Trin., vi, x, 12; ml 42, 932. ‘In ipso igitur Deo cum adhaeret aequali Patri Filius aequalis aut Spiritus sanctus Patri et Filio aequalis, non fit maior Deus quam singuli eorum; quia non est quo crescat illa perfectio.’ Ibid., viii, 9; 930.

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We answer this as follows. Just as in this life we do not perfectly understand that a divine procession involves simultaneously the reality of an emanation and the consubstantiality of what emanates, or that the divine relations are identical with a third without being identical with one another, or that the divine reality means three persons in one nature, so also we do not perfectly understand that one real perfection has at once the formality of act and the formality of the unity of order. And yet, as the former, so also the latter can be imperfectly understood in the sense that over the centuries this understanding increases (db 1795, ds 3016, nd 132; db 1800, ds 3020, nd 136). For by reason of the fact that in God there is one act and one consciousness, perfection is understood in connection with the formality of act; and by reason of the fact that in God through the intellectual emanations there are constituted three conscious subjects within the same consciousness, perfection is understood in connection with the formality of order. But, the objector goes on, according to the above-mentioned opinion, there is not as much perfection in each of the persons as in the three together, since the perfection of the unity of order is found not singly in each person but in the three taken together. On the contrary, according to the authorities, there is as much perfection in each of the three as in the three together.46 This opinion, therefore, is inadmissible. In reply we assert that also according to our opinion there is as much perfection in each of the persons as in all three together. For we affirm that there is only one real perfection; and where there is only one real perfection, it obviously cannot in itself be more or less. As to the reason adduced by the objector, two points should be noted. First, the authorities are concerned mainly with the consubstantiality of the persons, 47 46 db 39, ds 75, nd 16; db 79, ds 173, nd 306/21; db 254, ds 501, nd 627/1; db 428, ds 800, nd 19; db 461–63, ds 851–53, nd 22–24; db 703–704, ds 1330–31, nd 325–26. 47 The documents speak of equality in virtually the same sense as consubstantiality; see the references in the previous footnote. The Eleventh Council of Toledo further concludes as follows: ‘... to [the three persons] belongs undivided and equal divinity, majesty, and power, which is neither diminished in each nor increased in all three. For [God] does not have anything less when each person individually is said to be God, nor anything more when all three persons are declared to be one God’ (db 279, ds 529, nd 312). St Augustine seems to speak even more forcefully: ‘But here among corporeal realities, one thing is not as great as three things together, and two things are more than one; in the most high Trinity, however, one is as much as three together, and two are no more than one’ (De Trinitate, vi, x, 12; ml 42, 932). And, ‘In God, therefore, since the equal Son is united to the equal Father and the equal Holy Spirit is united to Father and Son, God is not greater than each of them, for there is nothing whereby this perfection can be increased’ (ibid. vi, viii, 9; ml 42, 930).

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principaliter ad consubstantialitatem attendunt ne credantur Pater et Filius esse plus quam Pater, sicut Petrus et Paulus sunt plus quam Petrus; deinde vero non minus docent auctoritates trium circumincessionem quam unius cum tribus aequalitatem. Porro, quod per hanc aequalitatem tolli videtur, idem per circumincessionem quasi restauratur. Nam secundum aequalitatem non plus est in tribus quam in una persona; sed secundum circumincessionem in Patre est totus Filius totusque Spiritus sanctus, et similiter in Filio et in Spiritu sunt aliae duae personae (db 704).

Quibus perspectis, ad ipsam obiectionem respondetur per distinctionem inter nostram considerationem et divinam realitatem. Considerare non possumus divinam perfectionem ordinis ubi de una sola persona cogitamus et ab aliis duabus praescindimus, conceditur; per talem considerationem attendimus ad perfectionem quae singulis divinis personis inest, negatur; nam secundum doctrinam circumincessionis in singulis divinis personis non solum est ipsa substantia aliarum personarum sed etiam relatio seu proprietas personalis quae realiter cum hac substantia identificatur. Ne ergo confundas (1) id quod divina persona est et (2) perfectio quae in divina persona est. Pater non est Filius, sed Pater est in Filio (Io 10.38; 14.10, 11, 20; 17.21, 23). Instatur. Saltem res facilius intelligitur ubi in Deo non agnoscitur alia perfectionis ratio praeter actum. Respondetur. Ubi de mysterio agitur, facilior intelligentia haud verior esse potest.

S. Thomas, Sum. theol., 1, q. 42, docet tres personas aequales aeternitate (a. 2), magnitudine (a. 4), et potentia seu potestate (a. 6). Aequalitas supponit unitatem essentiae et distinctionem personarum, sed super relationes originis non addit aliam relationem realem, sive ratione essentiae (quia relatio alicuius ad se ipsum non est realis) sive ratione relationum (quia relatio relationis est ens rationis tantum). Ibid., a. 1 ad 4m. Circa aequalitatem potentiae non affirmat Filium posse generare; quod tamen aequalitati non obstat, quia potentia dicit absolutum, sed per sola relativa distinguuntur potentia generandi active et passive significata; quare Pater et Filius sunt aequales secundum potentiam generandi, inquantum uterque habet hanc potentiam, Pater quidem secundum posse generare, Filius autem secundum posse generari. Ibid., a. 6 ad 3m.

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lest anyone believe that the Father and the Son are more than the Father, as Peter and Paul are more than Peter alone. Second, the authorities teach the circumincession of the three as clearly as they teach the equality of one with the three. Thus, what may seem to be subtracted through this equality is, so to speak, restored through circumincession. For by reason of their equality, there is no more in the three than in one person; but by reason of their circumincession, the Son is entire in the Father, and the Holy Spirit is entire in the Father, and similarly the other two persons are in the Son and also in the Holy Spirit (db 704, ds 1331, nd 326). Accordingly, the objection is answered by distinguishing between our way of thinking and the reality of God. We concede that when we are thinking of one person and prescinding from the other two we are unable to consider the divine perfection of order. But we deny that in such a consideration we are adverting to the perfection that is present in each of the divine persons; for according to the doctrine of circumincession, there is in each of the divine persons not only the very substance of the other persons but also the relation or personal property that is really identical with this substance. Therefore, be careful not to confuse (1) that which a divine person is with (2) the perfection that is in a divine person. The Father is not the Son, but the Father is in the Son ( John 10.38, 14.10, 11, 20; 17.21, 23). A final objection. At least this matter is easier to understand when the only ground of perfection recognized in God is act. Our reply to this is that when one is dealing with mystery, an easier understanding can hardly be a truer one.

St Thomas, in the Summa theologiae, 1, q. 42, teaches that the three persons are equal in eternity (a. 2), in greatness (a. 4), and in potency or power (a. 6). Equality supposes unity of essence and distinction of persons, but it does not add another real relation to the relations of origin, either by reason of the essence, since the relation of anything to itself is not a real relation, or by reason of the relations, since a relation of a relation is but a conceptual being (ibid. a. 1, ad 4m). Concerning equality in power, he does not assert that the Son can generate; yet this is not contrary to equality, because power denotes an absolute, whereas by themselves alone the relatives are distinguished by generative power taken in the active sense and taken in the passive sense. Therefore, the Father and the Son are equal in terms of generative power, in that the Father can generate and the Son can be generated (ibid. a. 6, ad 3m).

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CAPUT SEXTUM

De Divinis Missionibus

Post divinas personas in se consideratas et inter se comparatas, iam de earundem missionibus ad nos agendum est. Quae cum alios tractatus theologicos etiam respiciant, v.g., De Verbo Incarnato, De Gratia, De Ecclesia, De Revelatione, neque plena amplitudine sunt investigandae neque citius faciliusque dimittendae, sed ea moderatione examinari debent ut fundamentum in doctrina trinitaria clare exhibeatur et, praeterea, sufficienter indicetur quanta lux in alios tractatus inde derivari possit. Cum tamen quaestionem in multis disputatam1 aggrediamur, a principio quodam fundamentali ordimur quod tam divina opera ad extra quam divinas ad extra missiones respicit (Assertum XV ). Quod quidem principium statim divinis ad extra operibus applicatur (Assertum XVI ), sed ante ad divinas missiones non extenditur (Assertum XVII ) quam de ipso missionum facto non nulla stabiliantur (Quaestiones XXII–XXV ). 1 Disputatio magis circa consequentem in iustis inhabitationem quam de ipsis missionibus fieri solet. Series quaestionum enumeratur apud S. Tromp, Litterae encyclicae, ‘Mystici Corporis Christi,’ Textus et Documenta, ser. theol., 26, Romae 1943, p. 115. Circa non paucas opiniones opus utilissimum composuit H. Schauf, Die Einwohnung des heiligen Geistes, Freiburg im Breisgau 1941. Editionem revisam auctamque notamus, P. Galtier, L’Habitation en nous des trois personnes, Roma 1949. Nuperrime scripsit P. De Letter, ‘Created Actuation by the Uncreated Act,’ Theological Studies 18 (1957) 60–92; cf. 24 (1963) 402–22.

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CHAPTER 6

The Divine Missions

After considering the divine persons in themselves and in their relations to one another, we must now treat their missions to us. Since the missions enter into other theological treatises, for example, on the incarnate Word, on grace, on the church, and on revelation, they neither need to be investigated in all thoroughness here nor too quickly or too easily dismissed. But they ought to be investigated to the extent that their basis in trinitarian doctrine may be clearly revealed and, in addition, that sufficient indication may be given of how much light the other treatises can derive from this. Since, however, we are addressing a question that contains many disputed points,1 we begin with a fundamental principle that regards both the external works of God and the external divine missions (assertion 15). We apply this principle immediately to the external works of God (assertion 16), but do not extend it to the divine missions (assertion 17) until we have established several points concerning the fact of the missions (questions 22–25). 1 Disagreement is usually more about the consequent indwelling in the just than about the missions themselves. There is a list of questions in Sebastian Tromp, Litterae encyclicae, ‘Mystici Corporis Christi,’ Textus et Documenta, series theologica, 26 (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1943) 115. For a most useful work dealing with several opinions, see H. Schauf, Die Einwohnung des heiligen Geistes (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1941). We note the revised and augmented edition of Paul Galtier, L’habitation en nous des trois personnes (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1949). More recently there is an article by P. De Letter, ‘Created Actuation by the Uncreated Act,’ Theological Studies 18 (1957) 60–92; see also [by the same author] ‘The Theology of God’s Self-Gift,’ ibid., 24 (1963) 402–22.

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Quibus in omnibus, principium est vera et contingentia, quae sive communiter sive proprie de divinis personis dicantur, in divinis constitutionem, in creatis autem terminum habere. Quare, quamvis opera ad extra divina necessario sint communia, missiones stricte dictae necessario sunt propriae, si quidem ratione divinae essentiae operatur divina persona sed, nisi ratione relationis originis, vere et realiter non mittitur. Quibus perspectis, tota quaestio ad quaestionem facti reducitur, nempe, utrum vere et realiter missi sint non solum Filius sed etiam Spiritus sanctus. Cum ergo certissimum esse videatur ipsum Spiritum sanctum a Patre et Filio vere et realiter mitti, post quaestionem (XXVI ) de termino constitutam missionem consequente, modo magis concreto de missione Spiritus sancti disseritur quemadmodum haec missio sit secundum dilectionem divinam notionalem (Quaestio XXVII ), quemadmodum ad missionem Filii ordinetur (Quaestio XXVIII ), quaenam sit utriusque missionis ratio comparativa (Quaestio XXIX ), qua convenientia mittantur personae divinae, et Filius quidem visibiliter, invisibiliter autem Spiritus sanctus (Quaestio XXX ), utrum praeterea Filius invisibiliter, Spiritus visibiliter mittantur (Quaestio XXXI ), utrum secundum caritatem divinae personae iustis insint atque inhabitent (Quaestio XXXII ), quod denique divinarum personarum inhabitatio, quamvis in actibus magis cognoscatur, tamen per statum constituitur (Assertum XVIII ). ASSERTUM XV Quae contingenter de divinis personis vere dicuntur ita per ipsam divinam perfectionem constituuntur ut conditio eorum consequens sit conveniens terminus ad extra. Ad terminos quae vere dicuntur: sive explicite sive implicite revelata sunt. contingenter: quae esse vel non esse possunt; v.g., creatio, actualis oeconomia salutis. de divinis personis: de una, duabus, vel tribus, sive proprie sive per appropriationem; statuitur enim theorema generale. perfectio divina: ipsa divina realitas qua identica cum una, duabus, vel tribus relationibus subsistentibus et realiter inter se distinctis, prout particularis quaestio determinabit. constituuntur: analogice dicitur ad entis finiti constitutionem; sicut enim ens finitum principiis intrinsecis componitur et constituitur, ita ens infinitum per infinitam suam perfectionem absolute simplicem constitui dicitur.

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The principle in all of this is that contingent truths, whether predicated of the divine persons commonly or properly, have their constitution in God but their term in creatures. Therefore, although the external works of God are necessarily common to the three persons, the missions in the strict sense are necessarily proper, since a divine person operates by reason of the divine essence but is not really and truly sent except by reason of a relation of origin. Accordingly, the entire question is reduced to a question of fact, namely, whether not only the Son but also the Holy Spirit has really and truly been sent. Since, therefore, it seems most certain that the Holy Spirit is really and truly sent by the Father and the Son, after question 26 dealing with the term consequent upon the constitution of the mission we shall discuss in a more concrete way the mission of the Holy Spirit: how this mission is based upon notional divine love (question 27), how it is related to the mission of the Son (question 28), what is the formality of each mission as compared to the other (question 29), the appropriateness of the manner in which the divine persons are sent, the Son visibly and the Holy Spirit invisibly (question 30), whether also the Son is sent invisibly and the Spirit visibly (question 31), whether it is by way of charity that the divine persons are present in and dwell in the just (question 32), and lastly, that the indwelling of the divine persons, although better known through acts, nevertheless is constituted by a state (assertion 18). ASSERTION 15 What is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons is constituted by the divine perfection itself, but it has a consequent condition in an appropriate external term. Terminology what is truly predicated: what has been revealed, either explicitly or implicitly. contingently: what can be or not be; for example, creation, the present economy of salvation. of the divine persons: of one, of two, or of three, either properly or by appropriation; for a general theorem is being established. divine perfection: the divine reality itself as identical with one or two or three relations that are subsistent and really distinct from one another, as determined by the particular question. constituted: this is said by analogy to the constitution of a finite being; for just as a finite being is composed of and constituted by intrinsic principles, so infinite being is said to be constituted by its infinite and absolutely simple perfection.

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conditio: quod ad aliud constituendum vel efficiendum est necessarium, quamvis causa constitutiva vel effectiva non sit. consequens: conditio aut praevia aut simultanea aut consequens est prout eius necessitas aut antecedit aut concomitatur aut consequitur alterius constitutionem vel productionem. terminus: aut operationis est aut relationis. conveniens: scilicet, ipsi vero de quo agitur; v.g., si agitur de Deo creante lucem, conveniens terminus est, non aer vel aqua vel terra, sed lux creata. ad extra: non divinum. Adversarii Nullus theologus catholicus praesens assertum explicite negat. In quaestionibus tamen particularibus non pauci sunt qui velint ea quae contingenter de divinis personis vere dicantur, non per ipsam divinam perfectionem constitui, sed per solum terminum ad extra, vel per miram quandam compositionem increati et creati, vel nominibus et verbis potius quam rebus. Quare valde multae sunt opiniones tum de constitutione Verbi incarnati tum de missione Spiritus sancti.

Argumentum Primo, per ipsam divinam perfectionem constituuntur ea quae contingenter de divinis personis vere dicuntur. Nam ubi adest ratio constitutiva perfectionis infinitae, superfluit quaelibet alia. Atqui tam singulae personae divinae quam omnes sunt perfectionis infinitae. Ergo superfluit omnis alia ratio constitutiva praeter ipsam divinam perfectionem ut ea constituantur quae contingenter de divinis personis vere dicantur. Deinde, ea quae contingenter de divinis personis vere dicuntur adaequationem veritatis non habent sine conveniente termino ad extra. Nam deest adaequatio veritatis ubi verum est contingens sed correspondens realitas est simpliciter necessaria. Sed explicite de veris contingentibus quaeritur; perfectio divina est simpliciter necessaria; et ideo si excluditur terminus ad extra, tollitur adaequatio veritatis. Tertio, necessarius ad extra terminus non est causa constitutiva sed tantummodo conditio et quidem conditio neque praevia neque simultanea sed consequens.

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condition: that which is necessary for constituting or producing something else, though it is not the constitutive or effective cause. consequent : a condition is either prior or simultaneous or consequent according as the necessity for it precedes or accompanies or follows the constitution or production of something else. term: either of an operation or of a relation. appropriate: suited, that is, to the particular truth under discussion; for example, if God as the creator of light is being discussed, the appropriate term is not air or water or earth but created light. external: not divine. Adversaries No Catholic theologian at the present time explicitly denies this assertion. In particular questions, however, there are several who would hold that whatever is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons is not constituted by the divine perfection itself but solely by the external term, or by some strange composition of the uncreated and the created, or by nouns and verbs rather than by things. Hence, there is a great variety of opinions both about the constitution of the incarnate Word and about the mission of the Holy Spirit. Argument First, what is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons is constituted by the divine perfection itself. For where there is present a formality constitutive of infinite perfection, any other formality is superfluous. But each divine person as well as all together are infinite in perfection. Therefore, any constitutive formality other than the divine perfection itself is superfluous for constituting whatever is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons. Second, what is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons has no correspondence of truth without an appropriate external term. For the correspondence of truth is lacking where a truth is contingent but the corresponding reality is absolutely necessary. But our inquiry is explicitly about contingent truths, and the divine perfection is absolutely necessary; therefore, if there is no external term, there is no correspondence of truth. Third, the necessary external term is not a constitutive cause but only a condition, and indeed a condition that is not prior or simultaneous but consequent.

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Non est causa constitutiva, tum quia superfluit ubi adest perfectio infinita, tum quia unumquodque constituitur per realitatem non alienam sed propriam. Est tantummodo conditio quia non est causa, et tamen necessario requiritur. Est conditio non antecedens neque simultanea sed consequens, quia personae divinae sunt absolute independentes relate ad omnia creata. ASSERTUM XVI Quae contingenter de divinis personis secundum operationem divinam cognoscitivam, volitivam, productivam vere dicuntur per communem divinam perfectionem tamquam per principium et quo et quod constituuntur, et ideo tribus pariter personis distincte attribuuntur.

Asserti intentio In asserto antecedente universaliter actum est de iis quae contingenter de divinis personis vere dicuntur. Nunc de tribus generibus veritatum eiusmodi quaeritur, nempe, quae respiciunt divinas personas per naturam divinam cognoscentes, volentes, facientes contingentia. Quae omnes operationes per commune principium quo et quod constitui asseruntur, et ideo tribus personis pariter, non confuse tamen sed distincte, attribui. Sententia proposita est communis et certa et, quantum ad ea quae producuntur, specialem approbationem habet, nempe: ‘Ac praeterea certissimum illud firma mente retineant, hisce in rebus omnia esse habenda Sanctissimae Trinitati communia, quatenus eadem Deum ut supremam efficientem causam respiciant.’ db 2290. Argumentum Quodcumque divina persona scit, vult, facit, per propriam suam scientiam, volitionem, potentiam scit, vult, facit. Praeterea, eadem realiter est divinae personae scientia, volitio, potentia, ac ipsa divina essentia. Praeterea, haec essentia, cum subsistens sit, principium est non solum quo sed etiam quod.

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It is not a constitutive cause, both because that is superfluous where infinite perfection is present, and because each thing is constituted by its own reality and not by that of another. It is only a condition, because it is not a cause, and yet it is necessarily required. It is not an antecedent or a simultaneous but a consequent condition, because the divine persons are absolutely independent with respect to all created things. ASSERTION 16 Whatever is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons as regards divine cognitive, volitional, and productive operation is constituted by the divine perfection common to the three persons as both the principle-by-which and the principle-which, and therefore is attributed distinctly and equally to each divine person. Meaning of the Assertion The previous assertion made a universal statement about true contingent predications concerning the divine persons. Now the question is about three kinds of such truths, namely, those concerning the divine persons knowing, willing, and producing contingent things through the divine nature. All such operations are asserted to be constituted by a common principle-by-which and principle-which, and therefore are attributed to the three persons equally, yet not confusedly but distinctly. This opinion is common and certain and, as regards what are produced, has been given this special approval: ‘And besides, this most certain truth must be firmly borne in mind, that in these matters all things are to be held as being common to the Holy Trinity, inasmuch as these same things are related to God as their supreme efficient cause’ (db 2290, ds 3814, nd 1996). Argument Whatever a divine person knows, wills, and produces, that person knows, wills, and produces by that person’s own knowledge, will, and power. Moreover, the knowledge, will, and power of a divine person is the same in reality as the divine essence itself. Also, this essence, since it is subsistent, is not only a principle-by-which but also a principle-which.

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Praeterea, divina essentia est divina perfectio tribus pariter communis. Ergo quodcumque divina persona scit, vult, facit, per divinam perfectionem tribus personis pariter communem, tamquam per principium et quo et quod, scit, vult, facit. Quae quidem conclusio nisi secundum modum loquendi non differt ab asserto quod ‘quae contingenter de divinis personis secundum operationem divinam cognoscitivam, volitivam, productivam vere dicuntur, per communem divinam perfectionem tamquam per principium et quo et quod constituuntur.’ Ulterius, vere et realiter unicuique attribuitur quod per realitatem et perfectionem suam propriam constituitur. Sed quodcumque de qualibet divina persona vere dicitur secundum divinam operationem vel cognoscitivam vel volitivam vel productivam, per divinam perfectionem tribus communem constituitur. Ergo quodcumque de una divina persona secundum has operationes vere dicitur, pariter etiam de aliis vere dicitur. Quare, quaecumque Deus Pater scit, vult, facit, etiam et Filius et Spiritus sciunt, volunt, faciunt, cum trium sit una essentia, una scientia, una volitio, una potentia. db 703. Ulterius, quae tribus pariter personis attribuuntur, non confuse sed distincte iis sunt attribuenda. Sicut enim ordine quodam eandem essentiam habent Pater et Filius et Spiritus, ita pariter ordine quodam eandem scientiam, eandem volitionem, eandem potentiam habent Pater, Filius, et Spiritus. 2 Porro, ubi adest ordo, deest confusio; si quidem ubicumque est pluralitas sine ordine, ibi est confusio. 3

Obicitur Quot sunt supposita tot sunt principia-quae, nam suppositum est principium-quod; atqui in divinis tria sunt supposita; ergo in divinis tria sunt principia quae. Respondetur. Ratio in maiori addita est vera, sed ipsa maior distinctione indiget, quia per relationes mutuo oppositas multiplicari possunt supposita sed multiplicari non possunt principia-quae. Quot enim sunt subsistentia distincta tot sunt supposita, conceditur. Quot sunt subsistentia distincta tot sunt principia-quae, subdistinguitur, si subsistentia secundum

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Furthermore, the divine essence is the divine perfection common to the three persons equally. Therefore whatever a divine person knows, wills, and produces, that person knows, wills, and produces by the divine perfection common to the three persons equally as both the principle-by-which and the principle-which. This conclusion differs only verbally from the assertion that ‘whatever is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons as regards divine cognitive, volitional, and productive operation is constituted by the divine perfection common to the three persons as both the principle-by-which and the principle-which.’ Further, there is truly and really attributed to each thing whatever is constituted by that thing’s own proper reality and perfection. But whatever is truly predicated of any divine person with regard to a cognitive or volitional or productive operation is constituted by the divine perfection common to the three persons. Therefore whatever is truly predicated of one divine person with regard to these operations also is truly and equally predicated of the others. Hence, whatever God the Father knows, wills, and produces, the Son and the Spirit also know, will, and produce, since there is one essence, one knowledge, one will, and one power for the Three. db 703, ds 1330, nd 325. Besides, what is attributed equally to the three persons is to be attributed to them not confusedly but distinctly. For just as the Father, the Son, and the Spirit possess the same essence according to a certain order, so likewise according to a certain order the Father, the Son, and the Spirit have the same knowledge, the same will, the same power.2 Moreover, where there is order, there is no confusion, for wherever there is multiplicity without order, there is confusion. 3 Objection There are as many principles-which as there are supposits, for a supposit is a principle-which; but in God there are three supposits; therefore in God there are three principles-which. Reply. The reason adduced in support of the major premise is true; but the premise itself needs a distinction, because supposits can be multiplied through mutually opposed relations whereas principles-which cannot. That there are as many supposits as there are distinct subsistents, we agree. That there are as many principles-which as there are distinct subsistents, we subdistinguish as follows: if the 2 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 45, a. 6, ad 2m. 3 Ibid. q. 42, a. 3, Sed contra.

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absoluta distinguuntur realiter, conceditur, si subsistentia secundum relativa in uno absoluto distinguuntur, negatur. Quot enim sunt principia tot sunt absoluta, cum principium quoddam absolutum dicat:4 in Deo autem non est nisi unum absolutum.

QUAESTIO XXII Utrum Deus Pater Filium suum ad genus humanum redimendum miserit Respondeo clarissime sacram scripturam docere Deum Patrem Filium suum ad genus humanum redimendum misisse. Ne tamen quaestio de missionibus divinarum personarum potius de conceptu quam de rebus ponatur, praestat quaedam citare. Gal 4.4: At ubi venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus Filium suum factum ex muliere, factum sub lege, ut eos, qui sub lege erant, redimeret, ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus. Eandem doctrinam abundantius exponit S. Ioannes. Qui mittit enim est Deus Pater (Io 3.16 s.; 5.23; 8.16; 14.24; 20.21), vivens Pater (Io 6.57), Pater testificans (Io 5.37), Pater trahens (Io 6.44), Pater dans mandatum (Io 12.49), solus Deus verus (Io 17.3), quem nesciunt persecutores (Io 15.21). Filius missus non suam docet doctrinam sed eius qui eum misit (Io 7.16; 7.18; 8.28; 12.49; 14.24); pariter missus Filius non suam quaerit voluntatem sed eius qui eum misit (Io 4.34; 5.30; 6.38; 8.29); imo, Filius a se ipso non potest facere quidquam (Io 5.19; 5.30). Non ita mittitur Filius ut sit solus (Io 8.16; 8.29; 10.30, 38) neque a se ipso venit (Io 7.28; 8.42), sed et ipse scit a quo sit et quis eum miserit (Io 7.29) et affirmare potest, ‘qui videt me, videt eum qui misit me’ (Io 12.45), et tandem denique vadit ad eum ‘qui me misit’ (Io 7.33; 16.5). Missus est Filius ex caritate Patris (1 Io 4.9; Io 3.16; Rom 8.32) in similitudinem carnis peccati (Rom 8.3) in salutem mundi (Io 3.17) ut vivamus per eum (1 Io 4.9), ut homines credant, cognoscant mittentem Patrem et missum Filium (Io 5.24; 6.29; 11.42; 17.8, 21, 23, 25) et habeant vitam aeternam (Io 5.24; 17.3). Quae quidem missio suam extensionem habet. Sicut enim Pater mittit Filium, ita Filius mittit apostolos (Io 17.18; 20.21). ‘Sicut misit me vivens Pater, et ego vivo.

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subsistents are really distinguished on the basis of absolutes, we agree, but if the subsistents are distinguished on the basis of relatives in a single absolute, we deny. For there are as many absolutes as there are principles, because ‘principle’ denotes an absolute;4 but in God there is only one absolute. QUESTION 22 Did God the Father send his Son to redeem the human race?

Our answer is that sacred scripture most clearly teaches that God the Father sent his Son to redeem the human race. Still, lest the question regarding the missions of the divine persons seem to be about concepts rather than realities, it is best to quote the following texts. Galatians 4.4: ‘But when the fullness of time had come, God sent his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, in order to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as children.’ St John has more fully expounded this same teaching. For the one who sends is God the Father ( John 3.16–17, 5.23, 8.16, 14.24, 20.21), the living Father (6.57), the Father testifying (5.37), the Father drawing [people to Jesus] (6.44), the Father giving a command [to Jesus] (12.49), the only true God (17.3), whom the persecutors do not know (15.21). The Son who was sent teaches not a doctrine of his own but that of the one who sent him ( John 7.16, 7.18, 8.28, 12.49, 14.24); similarly, the Son who was sent seeks not a will of his own but the will of the one who sent him (4.24, 5.30, 6.38, 8.29); indeed, the Son can do nothing by himself (5.19, 5.30). The Son was not sent to be alone ( John 8.16, 8.29, 10.30, 38), nor did he come on his own (7.28, 8.42); but he knows the one from whom he is and who has sent him (7.29), and he can say, ‘Whoever sees me sees him who sent me’ (12.45), and finally, he goes to him ‘who sent me’ (7.33, 16.5). The Son was sent out of the Father’s love (1 John 4.9; John 3.16; Romans 8.32), was sent in the likeness of sinful flesh (Romans 8.3), for the salvation of the world ( John 3.17), that we might live through him (1 John 4.9), that the world might believe and know the Father who sends and the Son who is sent ( John 5.24, 6.29, 11.42, 17.8, 21, 23, 25) and have eternal life ( John 5.24, 17.3). This mission has its extension. For just as the Father sends the Son, so the Son sends the apostles ( John 17.18, 20.21). ‘Just as the living Father sent me, and I live 4 [See above, p. 357, where Lonergan refers to Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 41, a. 5.]

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propter Patrem, et qui manducat me, et ipse vivet propter me’ (Io 6.57; cf. 5.26) ‘Qui accipit si quem misero, me accipit; qui autem me accipit, accipit eum qui me misit’ (Io 13.20; cf. Mt 10.40; Lc 10.16); e contra, ‘qui non honorificat Filium, non honorificat Patrem, qui misit illum’ (Io 5.23). Constat ergo (1) personam divinam esse mittentem, (2) aliam personam divinam esse missam, (3) personam divinam missam vivere propter mittentem, docere doctrinam mittentis, velle finem mittentis, operari opera mittentis, (4) personam divinam esse missam ad personas humanas ut vivant, credant, cognoscant, diligant, maiora opera faciant (Io 14.12; cf. 9.3 s.; 10.32, 37; 14.10 s.; 15.24; 17.4), et (5) hanc missionem aliis mediantibus ad alias extendi personas humanas.

QUAESTIO XXIII Utrum Pater et Filius Spiritum sanctum mittant Respondeo sacram scripturam clare certoque docere missionem Spiritus sancti a Patre Filioque, quamvis non tam abundanter de hac missione loquatur. Gal 4.6: Quoniam autem estis filii, misit Deus Spiritum Filii sui in corda vestra clamantem: Abba, Pater. Io 14.26: Paraclitus autem Spiritus sanctus, quem mittet Pater in nomine meo, ille vos docebit omnia et suggeret vobis omnia, quaecumque dixero vobis. Cf. Io 14.16 s. Io 15.26: Cum autem venerit Paraclitus, quem ego mittam vobis a Patre, Spiritum veritatis, qui a Patre procedit, ille testimonium perhibebit de me. Cf. Io 16.7; 1 Pet 1, 12. Quare, Spiritus sanctus missus dicitur dari (Io 14.15; Rom 5.5; 1 Thes 4.8; 1 Io 3.24; 4.13), accipi (Rom 8.15; 1 Cor 3.2; Gal 3.2; Io 20.22; cf. 2 Cor 11.4), haberi (Rom 8.11; 1 Cor 7.40; cf. Heb 6.4; Iud 19), inhabitare (Rom 8.9, 11; 1 Cor 3.16; 6.19; 2 Tim 1.14), effundi (Tit 3.5; Act 2.33), tribui (Gal 3.5), esse pignus hereditatis (Eph 1.14; cf. 2 Cor 1.22; Rom 8.23), sigillare (Eph 1.13; 4.30).

Praeterea, sicut doctrina Filii missi non sua est sed Patris, ita etiam Spiritus missus suam doctrinam non proponit; Io 16.13: Cum autem venerit ille Spiritus veritatis, docebit vos omnem veritatem; non enim loquetur a semetipso; sed quaecumque audiet loquetur . . .

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because of the Father, so whoever eats me will live because of me’ ( John 6.57; see 5.26). ‘Whoever receives one whom I send receives me; and whoever receives me receives him who sent me’ ( John 13.20; see Matthew 10.40, Luke 10.16); conversely, ‘Anyone who does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent him’ ( John 5.23). It is clear, therefore, (1) that a divine person is the one sending, (2) that another divine person is sent, (3) that the divine person who is sent lives because of the one sending, teaches the doctrine of the one sending, wills the aim of the one sending, and performs the works of the one sending, (4) that the divine person is sent to human persons in order that they may live, believe, know, love, and perform greater works ( John 14.12; see 9.3–4, 10.32, 10.37, 14.10–11, 15.24, 17.4), and (5) that through the mediation of others this mission extends to other human persons. QUESTION 23 Do the Father and the Son send the Holy Spirit? Our answer is that sacred scripture clearly and with certitude teaches the sending of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son, although there are fewer texts concerning this mission. Galatians 4.6: ‘And because you are children, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, “Abba, Father.”’ John 14.26: ‘But the Advocate, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, will teach you everything, and remind you of all that I have said to you.’ See John 14.16–17. John 15.26: ‘When the Advocate comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth who comes from the Father, he will testify on my behalf.’ See John 16.7 and 1 Peter 1.12. Hence, the Holy Spirit who is sent is said to be given ( John 14.15; Romans 5.5; 1 Thessalonians 4.8; 1 John 3.24, 4.13), to be received (Romans 8.15; 1 Corinthians 3.2; Galatians 3.2; John 20.22; see 2 Corinthians 11.4), to be had (Romans 8.9; 1 Corinthians 7.40; see Hebrews 6.4; Jude 19), indwelling (Romans 8.9, 11; 1 Corinthians 3.16, 6.19; 2 Timothy 1.14), to be poured out (Titus 3.5; Acts 2.33), to be supplied (Galatians 3.5), to be the pledge of our inheritance (Ephesians 1.14; see 2 Corinthians 1.22; Romans 8.23), to be a seal (Ephesians 1.13, 4.30). Besides, as the doctrine of the Son who is sent is not his own but that of the Father, so also the Spirit who is sent does not teach his own doctrine; John 16.13: ‘When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth; for he will not speak on his own, but will speak whatever he hears . . .’

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Praeterea, sicut Filius missus non est solus (Io 8.16, 29), ita etiam Spiritus missus et inhabitans non est solus. Postquam enim S. Ioannes de Paraclito mittendo narrat ‘ut maneat vobiscum in aeternum’ et ‘apud vos manebit et in vobis erit’ (Io 14.16 s.), mox addit ‘ad eum veniemus et mansionem apud eum faciemus’ (Io 14.23). Similiter S. Paulus facillime transit ex Spiritu ad Christum: ‘si tamen Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis’ (Rom 8.9), et ‘si autem Christus in vobis est’ (Rom 8.10). Unde tam S. Ioannes quam S. Paulus interdum de Deo manente (1 Io 4.12, 13, 16) et de templo Dei (1 Cor 3.16; 6,16) loquuntur. QUAESTIO XXIV Utrum mittatur persona divina ab eo a quo procedat

Respondeo missionem dupliciter intelligi posse: primo modo, secundum doctrinam et loquendi modum ipsius Novi Testamenti; alio modo, secundum doctrinam et loquendi modum in aliis documentis inventum. Si primo modo intelligitur missio, constat ipsam divinam personam mitti et quidem ab ea persona vel ab iis personis a qua vel a quibus procedit. Nam in Novo Testamento (1) solus Pater inter personas divinas non mittitur; (2) Filius a Patre mittitur ad homines ut doctrinam non suam sed Patris doceat, ut voluntatem non suam sed Patris quaerat, ut opera non sua sed Patris faciat; (3) Spiritus sanctus a Patre et Filio mittitur, non ut a se ipso loquatur, sed ut ea quae audiverit doceat; (4) S. Paulus in uno eodemque loco (Gal 4.4–6) eodem vocabulo exapostell¯o bis utitur, primo ad missionem Filii, deinde ad missionem Spiritus Filii designandam; et (5) in libris Novi Testamenti ipsae voces apostell¯o, apostolos, exapostell¯o, pemp¯o communiter sensum quendam technicum habent, nempe, personam missam a mittente auctoritatem accipere ut quoddam munus apud alios adimpleat. 5 Quam ob causam theologi catholici docere solent ipsam originis relationem personae missae intra rationem missionis includi;6 et ideo arguere solent Spiritum sanctum a Filio procedere quia a Filio mittitur. 5 Etiam usurpantur de expulsis daemoniis, de dimisso pullo, de immissa falce; sed usus fere continuus est interpersonalis secundum illud, ‘sicut misit me Pater, ego mitto vos.’ Io 17.18; 20.21. Cf. concordantiam graecam NT; vel G. Kittel, TWNT 1, 397–448 (K. H. Rengstorf).

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Furthermore, as the Son who is sent is not alone ( John 8.16, 29), so also the Spirit who is sent and indwelling is not alone. For after John tells about the Advocate who is to be sent ‘to be with you forever’ and says that ‘he abides with you, and he will be in you’ ( John 14.16–17), he soon adds, ‘We will come to them and make our home with them’ ( John 14.23). St Paul likewise very easily goes from the Spirit to Christ: ‘. . . since the Spirit of God dwells in you’ (Romans 8.9), and ‘if Christ is in you’ (Romans 8.10). Thus, both John and Paul sometimes speak of God abiding (1 John 4.12, 13, 16), and of the temple of God (1 Corinthians 3.16, 6.16). QUESTION 24 Is a divine person sent by the one or those from whom he proceeds? Our answer is that ‘mission’ can be understood in two ways: in the first way, according to the teaching and manner of speaking found in the New Testament itself; in the second way, according to the teaching and manner of speaking found in other documents. If ‘mission’ is understood in the first way, it is clear that a divine person himself is sent and indeed is sent by that person or by those persons from whom he proceeds. For in the New Testament (1) the Father alone among the divine persons is not sent; (2) the Son is sent to the world by the Father to teach not his own doctrine but that of the Father, to seek not his own will but that of the Father, to perform not his own works but those of the Father; (3) the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son, not to speak on his own but to teach what he has heard; (4) St Paul in the very same text (Galatians 4.4–6) uses the word exapostell¯o twice, first to designate the mission of the Son and then to designate the mission of the Spirit of the Son; and (5) in the New Testament the words apostell¯o, apostolos, exapostell¯o, and pemp¯o generally have a somewhat technical meaning, namely, that the person sent receives authority from the one sending to fulfil some duty towards others. 5 For this reason Catholic theologians regularly teach that the relation of origin of the person sent is included in the formality of mission, 6 and accordingly regularly argue that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son because he is sent by the Son. 5 These words are also used in the sense of expelling demons [Matthew 8.31], releasing the [donkey and] colt [Matthew 21.3], wielding a sickle [Mark 4.29; Revelation 14.15, 18]; but they are almost always used in an interpersonal sense, as in the text, ‘As the Father has sent me, so I send you’ ( John 20.21; see 17.18). See the concordance to the Greek NT, or G. Kittel, ed., Theologisches W¨orterbuch zum Neuen Testament 1, 397–448 (K.H. Rengstorf). 6 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 43, a. 1.

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Attamen non omnia documenta eodem modo loquuntur ac ipsum Novum Testamentum. Nam apud Isaiam (48.16) legitur: ‘et nunc misit me Dominus Deus et Spiritus eius.’7 Quod quidem S. Augustinus8 et conc. Toletanum xi 9 intelligunt de missione Filii a Spiritu sancto. Quibus auctoritatibus motus, S. Thomas duplicem sensum distinxit quo dicatur missio: uno modo, ut persona mittens intelligatur principium personae missae; alio modo, ut persona mittens intelligatur principium alicuius effectus ad extra producti.10 Et primo modo loquitur Novum Testamentum, uti ex supra dictis constare videtur. Secundo autem modo intelligenda sunt quaedam alia documenta, cum in iis revera non agatur nisi de effectu producto in Christo qua homine.11 Quibus perspectis, ad quaestionem propositam sic respondetur. Ubi sensus est divinam personam a divina persona vere et realiter mitti, uti in Novo Testamento, intra ipsam missionis rationem includitur realis relatio, qui ab alio; et cum eiusmodi realis relatio in divinis non realiter distinguatur ab ipsa relatione originis, necessario sequitur divinam personam non mitti nisi ab eo (iis) a quo (quibus) procedat. Ubi autem sensus est quemlibet effectum finitum ad extra produci, missio late intelligitur pro productione, et re vera tres divinae personae pariter hunc effectum producunt, quamvis de una sola vel de duabus per appropriationem praedicetur.

Notate autem in sequentibus, nisi aliud constat, semper intelligenda est vox missio in sensu technico secundum illud Io 20.21: ‘Sicut misit me Pater, et ego mitto vos.’ QUAESTIO XXV Utrum per appropriationem Pater et Filius Spiritum sanctum mittere dicantur Respondeo tripliciter intelligi potest hoc quod mittitur Spiritus sanctus: primo modo, ut producatur effectus finitus spiritualis in creatura; alio modo, ut ipsa

11 Ita Galtier, § 396. Aliter tamen haec intelligi possunt, nempe, per missionis constitutionem active significatam; de qua vide infra Quaestionem xxvi.

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Still, not all documents speak in the same way as the New Testament. For Isaiah 48.16 reads, ‘And now the Lord God and his Spirit has sent me.’ 7 This text St Augustine8 and the Eleventh Council of Toledo9 understood as the sending of the Son by the Holy Spirit. Influenced by these authorities, St Thomas distinguished two senses of the word ‘mission.’ In the first sense, the person sending is understood as the principle of the person sent; in the second sense, the person sending is understood as the principle of any effect produced externally. 10 The New Testament uses the word in the first sense, as seems quite clear from the texts cited above. Some other documents are to be understood in the second sense, since in fact they are only about an effect produced in Christ as man. 11 With all this well understood, we proceed to answer this question. When the sense is that a divine person is really and truly sent by a divine person, as is the case in the New Testament, a real relation ‘who from another’ is included in the very formality of mission; and since this sort of real relation in God is not really distinct from the relation of origin, it necessarily follows that a divine person is not sent except by the one or by those from whom that person proceeds. When, however, the sense is that any finite effect is produced externally, ‘mission’ is broadly understood as production, and in reality the three divine persons equally produce this effect, even though by appropriation it is predicated of only one or of two. In what follows, note that, unless some other meaning is clear, ‘mission’ is always understood in the technical sense, as in John 20.21, ‘As the Father has sent me, so I send you.’ QUESTION 25 Is it by appropriation that the Father and the Son are said to send the Holy Spirit? That the Holy Spirit is sent can be understood in three ways: first, that a finite spiritual effect is produced in a creature; second, that the third divine person 7 [In the nrsv this is translated, ‘And now the Lord God has sent me and his spirit.’ But the New International Version has, ‘And now the Sovereign Lord has sent me with his Spirit,’ which could be understood as saying what the text Lonergan uses says.] 8 Augustine, Contra Maximinum, ii, 20; ml 42, 790. 9 db 285, ds 538, nd 633. 10 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 43, a. 8. 11 Thus Galtier, De SS. Trinitate in se et in nobis (Paris: Beauchesne, 1933) § 396 [p. 277]. Yet these can be understood in another way, namely, through the constitution of a mission signified actively; on this, see below, question 26.

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divina persona tertia veniat in creaturam; tertio modo, ut ipsa divina persona tertia ab aliis duabus vere et realiter mittatur. Si primo modo accipitur, haberi non potest nisi appropriatio; nam omnia divina opera ad extra sunt communia. Si altero modo accipitur, non constat nisi de appropriatione, nam venire de se non importat relationem originis et, ubi non obstat relationis oppositio, omnia sunt communia. Si tertio modo accipitur, non potest esse appropriatio. Si enim vere et realiter ab aliis mittitur ipse Spiritus sanctus, habetur in ipso Spiritu sancto vera et realis relatio secundum quam ad mittentes ordinatur ut a quibus. Quae realis relatio ipsius Spiritus sancti non potest esse nisi spiratio passiva quae Spiritui sancto omnino propria est. Porro, haec tertia acceptio magis secundum doctrinam Novi Testamenti esse videtur, uti supra habitum est. ASSERTUM XVII Divinae personae missio ita per divinam relationem originis constituitur ut tamen per modum conditionis consequentis convenientem ad extra terminum exigat. Asserti intentio Cum ex antecessis constet Filium a Patre et Spiritum sanctum a Patre Filioque mitti, iam de constitutione ontologica missionis quaeritur. Quid per constitutionem ontologicam intendatur, cum rem fusius alibi exposuerimus,12 hic notionem exemplo illustrare sufficit. Supponamus verum esse ‘Petrum esse hunc hominem sapientem.’ Tunc quaerere de constitutione ontologica huius veri nihil aliud est quam quaerere quid a parte rei requiratur et sufficiat ut verum sit Petrum esse hunc hominem sapientem. Iam vero requiruntur et sufficiunt (1) actus essendi, ut verum sit Petrum esse, (2) materia individuans, ut verum sit Petrum esse hunc, (3) forma humana, ut verum sit Petrum esse hunc hominem, (4) habitus sapientiae in intellectu possibili receptus, ut verum sit Petrum esse sapientem, et (5) quoddam ens quod seu subsistens his omnibus compositum, ut habeatur Petrus cum his attributis.

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himself comes into a creature; third, that the third divine person himself is really and truly sent by the other two. The first sense of the Holy Spirit being sent is possible only by appropriation; for all works of God ad extra are common to the three persons. In the second sense, there is clearly no more than appropriation, for ‘to come’ in itself does not imply a relation of origin, and where there is no distinction by relational opposition, everything is common. In the third sense, there can be no appropriation. For if the Holy Spirit is really and truly sent by the others, there is in the Holy Spirit himself a true and real relation according to which he is ordered to the ones who send as to those from whom. This real relation of the Holy Spirit can only be passive spiration, which is wholly proper to the Holy Spirit. Thus, this third sense seems to be more in keeping with the teaching of the New Testament, as presented above. ASSERTION 17 The mission of a divine person is constituted by a divine relation of origin in such a way that it still demands an appropriate external term as a consequent condition. Meaning of the assertion Since it is clear from the foregoing that the Son is sent by the Father, and the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son, we now go on to ask about the ontological constitution of a mission. Since we have more fully explained elsewhere what is meant by ‘ontological constitution,’12 it will suffice here to illustrate this notion by an example. Let us suppose that it is true that ‘Peter is this wise man.’ Then, to ask about the ontological constitution of this truth is nothing else than to ask what in reality is required and is sufficient for it to be true that Peter is this wise man. Now, the following are required and are sufficient: (1) an act of existence, for it to be true that Peter is, (2) individuating matter, for it to be true that Peter is this, (3) a human substantial form, for it to be true that Peter is this man, (4) the habit of wisdom received in his possible intellect, for it to be true that Peter is wise, and (5) a beingwhich, a subsistent, composed of all the above, in order to have Peter with these attributes. 12 Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 46–75, 98–105.

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Quaerimus ergo quid requiratur atque sufficiat ut verum sit tum Filium a Patre esse missum, tum Spiritum sanctum a Patre Filioque esse missum. Cui quaestioni respondemus duplici asserto: primo, divinae personae missionem constitui per ipsam divinam originis relationem; deinde, quamvis eiusmodi missio per solam relationem originis constituatur, tamen terminum ad extra convenientem exigi. Quare, nihil aliud dicimus quam id quod iam ante diximus, tum generaliter in asserto xv de omnibus quae contingenter de divinis personis vere dicantur, tum in simili de iis quae contingentem operationem cognoscitivam, volitivam, vel productivam divinae personae qua divinae attribuunt, tum in particulari cum alibi de constitutione Christi ontologica egerimus. 13 De praesenti qualis sit terminus missionibus conveniens non determinatur sed quaestionibus subsequentibus relinquitur. Sententiarum differentiae Circa ea quae contingenter de una alterave divina persona qua divina vere dicuntur, inter omnes de duobus constat, nempe, (1) nihil reale et intrinsecum addi divinae personae qua divinae propter tale verum, et (2) tale verum adaequationem cum re non habere sine termino ad extra convenienti. De primo constat quia persona divina qua divina est immutabilis; de altero constat quia verum contingens sine re contingenti haberi non potest. Attamen circa constitutionem horum verorum contingentium, in tres praecipue partes abeunt auctores. Prima enim est classis eorum qui dicant tale verum contingens constitui, non per immutatam realitatem divinam sed per terminum ad extra convenientem, videlicet, inquantum hic terminus speciali quodam modo respicit ipsam divinam personam de qua fit vera praedicatio contingens. Ita circa Incarnationem a sequacibus Scoti et Tiphani ponitur relatio specialis in natura assumpta ad solum Verbum assumens; et similiter circa increatum Spiritus sancti donum, a multis tenetur hoc donum qua datum constitui eo quod in gratia sanctificante habetur relatio specialis ad donum divinum, quod quidem donum vel est ipse Spiritus sanctus vel per appropriationem Spiritus sanctus dicitur. Aliis tamen videtur unumquodque per propriam suam realitatem constitui et ideo solam termini relationem non sufficere. Quare secunda classis eorum

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We ask, therefore, what is required and is sufficient for it to be true that the Son is sent by the Father, and that the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son. We answer this question with two assertions: first, that the mission of a divine person is constituted by a divine relation of origin itself; second, that although such a mission is constituted by a relation of origin alone, nevertheless an appropriate external term is required. Therefore we are saying nothing more than what we have said previously, in a general way in assertion 15 concerning all that are truly predicated contingently of the divine persons, and in the same general way concerning those predications that attribute a cognitive, volitional, or productive contingent operation to a divine person as divine, and in a particular way when treating elsewhere the ontological constitution of Christ. 13 For the present we are not determining the nature of the appropriate term of the missions but will leave that for later questions. Various opinions Regarding what is truly predicated contingently of one or other divine person as divine, two points are clear, namely, (1) that nothing real and intrinsic is added to a divine person as divine on account of such a truth, and (2) that such a truth has no correspondence with reality without an appropriate external term. The first is clear, because a divine person as divine is immutable; the second is also clear, because there can be no contingent truth without a contingent reality. However, regarding the constitution of these contingent truths, there are three principal divisions among theologians. To the first group belong those who hold that such a contingent truth is constituted not by the unchanged divine reality but by the appropriate external term – that is to say, inasmuch as this term regards in a special way the divine person about whom a true contingent predication is made. Thus, concerning the incarnation, the followers of Scotus and Tiphanus posit a special relation in the assumed nature to the assuming Word alone. Similarly, concerning the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit, many authors hold that this gift is constituted as given by the fact that there is in sanctifying grace a special relation to the divine gift, which gift is in fact either the Holy Spirit himself or is said to be the Holy Spirit by appropriation. Others, however, are of the opinion that each and every thing is constituted by its own proper reality and that therefore the relation alone of the term does not suffice. Hence, to this second group belong those who say that these contingent 13 Ibid. 130–55.

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est qui dicant haec vera contingentia constitui per quandam unionem infiniti et finiti; sicut enim uniuntur materia et forma, vel essentia et esse, vel potentia et actus, ita etiam infinitum et finitum modo quodam eminentiori uniri docent. Ita circa Incarnationem sentiunt qui eminentem quandam actuationem essentiae humanae assumptae per esse Verbi divinum astruunt; et similiter post Petavium non pauci increatum Spiritus sancti donum qua datum quodammodo per modum cuiusdam formae nostrae sanctificationis vel saltem adoptionis concipere volunt. 14 Aliis denique videtur ideo finitum causis intrinsecis componi quia finitum est ut nulla sit vera similitudo inter constitutionem infiniti et compositionem finiti. Et cum hi etiam teneant unumquodque per propriam realitatem constitui, ad infinitam divinam realitatem qua infinitam recurrunt. Tertia ergo sententia, quam defendimus, inprimis distinguit inter id quod additur infinito, nempe, nihil, et id quod per infinitum constituitur, nempe, quod non finitur. Deinde analogiam invenit, non in creatis, sed in ipsis divinis. Sicut enim Deus contingentia esse scit per scientiam suam et non per terminum ad extra, qui tamen requiritur, sicut Deus contingentia esse vult per suam volitionem et non per terminum ad extra, qui tamen requiritur, sicut Deus contingentia esse facit per suam omnipotentiam et non per terminum ad extra, qui tamen requiritur, ita etiam Filius est omne quod est per proprium suum esse divinum et non per terminum ad extra, qui tamen omnino requiritur, 15 et Spiritus sanctus mittitur per id quod ipse Spiritus sanctus est et non per terminum ad extra, qui tamen omnino requiritur.

Secundum tertiam ergo sententiam de divinis personis qua divinis vere praedicantur tum communia et propria, tum necessaria et contingentia. Quae quidem omnia constituuntur per ipsam divinae personae realitatem, communia quidem per realitatem communem, propria autem per realitatem propriam, necessaria sine ulla conditione, contingentia denique cum conditione consequenti. Quod si nemo negare potest communia et contingentia constitui per divinam realitatem cum conditione consequenti (Deus enim contingentia esse scit per suam scientiam,16 etc.), vix assignari potest ratio cur propria et contingentia non pariter 14 Contra radicem huius sententiarum classis arguitur, ibid. 118–21.

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truths are constituted by some sort of union of the infinite and the finite. They hold that just as matter and form are united, or essence and existence, or potency and act, so also the infinite and the finite are united in some preeminent manner. Concerning the incarnation, this is the opinion of those who suppose some eminent actuation of the assumed human essence through the divine existence of the Word; and, in a similar way, a number of theologians since Petavius want to conceive the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit as given somehow by way of some form of our sanctification or at least of adoption.14 Still others consider that the finite is composed of intrinsic causes because it is finite, so that there is no true similitude between the constitution of the infinite and the composition of a finite being. And since these also hold that each thing is constituted by its proper reality, they have recourse to the infinite divine reality as infinite. The opinion of the third group, which we are defending, distinguishes first of all between that which is added to the infinite, namely, nothing, and that which is constituted by the infinite, namely, what is not finite. Next, it finds an analogy, not in created things, but in divinity itself. For just as God knows that contingent things exist through his own knowledge, and not through an external term, which is nevertheless required, and just as God wills that contingent things exist through his own volition, and not through an external term, which is nevertheless required, and just as God makes contingent things exist through his own omnipotence and not through an external term, which is nevertheless required, so also the [incarnate] Son is all that he is through his own proper divine act of existence and not through an external term, which is nevertheless absolutely required,15 and the Holy Spirit is sent through that which the Holy Spirit is and not through an external term, which is nevertheless absolutely required. According to this third opinion, then, both what is common and what is proper, and what is necessary and what is contingent, are truly predicated of divine persons as divine. All of these are constituted by the very reality of the divine person, the common by their common reality, the proper by their proper reality, the necessary without any condition, and finally the contingent with a consequent condition. But if no one can deny that common contingent truths are constituted by the divine reality, with a consequent condition – that God knows that contingent things exist by his own knowledge,16 and so on – one can hardly assign a reason 14 For the argument against the root of these opinions, ibid. 118–21. 15 Ibid. 134–55. 16 [and not through an external term; see above, pp. 443, 445.]

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constituantur per ipsam divinae personae realitatem cum conditione consequente. Postquam tres hae sententiarum classes singillatim sunt consideratae, nonnihil claritatis additur si inter se comparantur. Maxime ergo inter se differunt prima et tertia. In prima enim, praesupponitur processio divina, sed missio formaliter in termino quodam ad extra invenitur. In tertia, autem, requiritur quidem terminus ad extra tamquam conditio consequens, sed ipsa divinae personae missio per divinam originis relationem constituitur. Medium denique locum inter haec extrema tenet secunda sententiarum classis, quae missionem constitui ducit secundum remotam quandam analogiam ex rebus compositis exquisitam. Iam vero ex prima sententia sequitur cohaerens illa doctrina quam propugnat P. Galtier: processionem esse de formali ratione missionis, sed terminum esse eiusdem determinativum et constitutivum;17 missionem praesupponere et includere aeternam processionem sed formaliter esse ex productione effectus novi; 18 operationes ad extra esse communes, relationes creaturae ad Deum consequi has operationes, et cum nihil proprium Spiritui sancto sit in operatione, nihil proprium Spiritui sancto esse posse in relatione; quare, per appropriationem dici Spiritum sanctum invisibiliter mitti;19 neque ipsos Patres graecos affirmare talem propriam operationem, vel consequentem relationem. 20 Tertia autem sententia modo opposito procedit. Si enim vere et realiter mittitur Spiritus sanctus a Patre Filioque, habetur in ipso Spiritu sancto realis relatio, qui ab aliis; quae quidem realis relatio cum spiratione passiva realiter identificatur sed ratione ab ea distinguitur; realiter identificatur, quia nihil reale et intrinsecum infinitae perfectioni personae divinae addi potest; ratione distinguitur, quia passiva spiratio est aeterna et necessaria neque terminum creatum exigit, sed missio est temporalis et contingens et terminum creatum et consequentem tamquam conditionem exigit. Neve hoc mirum nimis dicas, cum idem prorsus ipse sentias circa Deum vere et realiter contingentia scientem, volentem, facientem, nempe, tale scire, velle, facere super actum purum non addere nisi relationem rationis.

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why proper contingent truths are not likewise constituted by the very reality of a divine person, with a consequent condition. We have considered the opinions of these three groups separately. Considerable clarity will be added if we compare them with one another. The greatest difference is between the first and the third. In the first, a divine procession is presupposed, but a mission is found formally in an external term. In the third, however, an external term is indeed required as a consequent condition, but the mission of a divine person itself is constituted by a divine relation of origin. The second group occupies the middle ground between these two extremes, maintaining that a mission is constituted according to some remote analogy taken from composite things. Now, from the first opinion there follows the corresponding doctrine put forth by Galtier: that while a procession belongs to the formality of a mission, still a term is what determines and constitutes it;17 that a mission presupposes and includes an eternal procession, but exists formally from the production of a new effect; 18 that external operations are common, that relations of a creature to God are consequent upon these operations, and since there is nothing proper to the Holy Spirit in an operation, there can be nothing proper to the Holy Spirit in such a relation; that therefore it is by appropriation that the Holy Spirit is said to be sent invisibly;19 and that the Greek Fathers themselves do not assert such a proper operation or a consequent relation.20 The third opinion proceeds in the opposite way. For if the Holy Spirit is really and truly sent by the Father and the Son, there is present in the Holy Spirit himself a real relation, ‘who from others.’ This real relation is really identical with passive spiration but conceptually distinguished from it. It is really identical, because nothing real and intrinsic can be added to the infinite perfection of a divine person; it is conceptually distinct, because passive spiration is eternal and necessary and needs no created term, whereas a mission is temporal and contingent and requires a created consequent term as a condition. You can hardly say that this is most strange, since it is exactly what you hold with regard to God as really and truly knowing, willing, and creating contingent things, namely, that such knowing, willing, and creating adds nothing to pure act except a conceptual relation. 17 18 19 20

Galtier, De SS. Trinitate in se et nobis 276, § 394. Ibid. 277, § 397. Ibid. 301–302, § 430. Ibid. 292–97, §§ 420–25. Galtier, L’habitation en nous des trois personnes (see above, note 1) 27–34. Paul Galtier, Le Saint Esprit en nous d’apr`es les p`eres grecs (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1946).

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Differentia autem theologica inter primam et tertiam sententiam maxima est. Secundum tertiam enim sententiam terminus missionem consequitur, et ideo si datur missio necessario datur terminus; neque a scriptura et patribus exigitur ut talem ponant terminum qualem theologus convenientem opinetur; sed sufficit prorsus quod fontes revelationis affirmant aliam divinam personam mittentem et aliam esse missam.21 Sed secundum primam sententiam missio terminum consequitur et, nisi conveniens terminus qua talis in documentis clare et distincte affirmatur, dubitare potest theologus utrum re vera de missione proprie dicta agatur. 22 Differunt denique secunda et tertia sententiae secundum analogias quas adhibent. Secunda enim analogiam quaerit in rebus creatis et compositis, ut unio iusti ad Spiritum datum concipiatur quodammodo ad modum unionis materiae ad formam vel potentiae ad actum.23 Tertia autem analogiam quaerit in ipsis divinis: sicut enim contingentia et propria de quibusdam divinis personis dicuntur, ita contingentia et communia de tribus divinis personis dicuntur; et sicut haec per actum infinitum, addita relatione rationis, constituuntur, ita etiam illa per infinitam originis relationem, addita relatione rationis, similiter constituuntur.

Argumentum Primo, arguitur non constitui missionem divinae personae sine divina originis relatione; deinde, arguitur nihil aliud requiri praeter originis relationem ut ipsa missio constituatur; tertio, arguitur missionem qua contingentem atque temporalem exigere terminum ad extra convenientem, non quidem per modum constitutivi, sed tantummodo per modum conditionis consequentis. 21 Si enim missio per realitatem divinam constituitur, tota quaestio est utrum secundum missionem sint in divinis relationes reales, a quo alius, qui ab alio; utrum vero sint eiusmodi relationes reales, ex fontibus sat facile determinatur. 22 Si enim missio per terminum constituitur, secundum terminum de existentia ipsius missionis iudicatur; et cum auctoritates ne patristicae quidem hanc constitutionis regulam novisse videantur, perdifficile est existentiam missionis probare. 23 Contra hanc sententiam communiter obicitur, primo, unicam formalem causam nostrae iustificationis esse gratiam finitam in nobis receptam (db 799), deinde, periculum adesse ne donum increatum iustis concessum ad modum unionis hypostaticae concipiatur (db 2290) vel, tertio, periculum adesse ne ipsa unio hypostatica ad modum inhabitationis Spiritus sancti concipiatur. Vide seriem obiectionum et solutionum apud H. Schauf, Die Einwohnung des heiligen Geistes, Freiburg im Breisgau 1941, pp. 225–47. Recentius De Letter, Theological Studies 18 (1957) 60–92.

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But the greatest theological difference is between the first and the third opinion. For according to the third opinion, a term follows a mission, and therefore if there is a mission there is necessarily a term. Nor is there any requirement that scripture or the Fathers posit a term that theologians consider appropriate; it is quite sufficient that the sources of revelation affirm that one divine person is the one sending and another the one sent.21 But according to the first opinion, a mission follows a term, and unless an appropriate term as such is clearly and distinctly affirmed in the documents, a theologian can doubt whether the question here is really about a mission in the proper sense.22 The second and third opinions differ in the analogies they use. The second opinion seeks an analogy in composite created things, so that the union of the just and the Spirit that is given is conceived as somehow like the union of matter and form or of potency and act.23 The third opinion, however, seeks its analogy in the divinity itself: just as proper contingents are predicated of one or other of the divine persons, so common contingents are predicated of the three divine persons; and just as the latter are constituted by infinite act with the addition of a conceptual relation, so also the former are similarly constituted by an infinite relation of origin with the addition of a conceptual relation. Argument It is argued, first, that the mission of a divine person is not constituted without a divine relation of origin; second, that nothing more is required for a mission to be constituted than a relation of origin; third, that a mission as contingent and temporal requires an appropriate external term, not as a constitutive but only as a consequent condition. 21 If a mission is constituted by the divine reality, the whole question is whether on the basis of a mission there are in God the real relations ‘from whom another’ and ‘who from another.’ Whether there are such real relations is quite easily determined from the sources of revelation. 22 If a mission is constituted by a term, the existence of the mission is judged according to the term; and since not even the patristic authorities seem to know this rule of constitution, it is extremely difficult to prove the existence of a mission. 23 It is commonly objected to this opinion, first, that the sole formal cause of our justification is finite grace received in us (db 799, ds 1529, nd 647), second, that there is a danger that the uncreated gift granted to the just may be conceived as something like a hypostatic union (db 2290, ds 3814, nd 1996), or third, that there is a danger that the hypostatic union itself may be conceived in a manner similar to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. See the series of objections and answers in H. Schauf, Die Einwohnung des heiligen Geistes [see p. 437, note 1] 225–47. More recently, De Letter, ‘Created Actuation by the Uncreated Act’ [see the same note].

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Ad primum sic proceditur. Inquantum verum est quod Pater mittit Filium, verum est Patrem esse mittentem, Patrem non esse missum, Filium non esse mittentem, Filium esse missum. Iam vero opposita de personis divinis vere et realiter non praedicantur nisi secundum relationes originis; atqui esse mittentem et esse missum sunt opposita quae vere et realiter de divinis personis praedicantur; ergo secundum relationes originis praedicantur. Maior constat ex principio quod omnia unum sunt ubi non obviat relationis oppositio. db 703. Minor clare constat ex sacra scriptura, uti supra stabilitum est. Similiter, inquantum verum est quod Pater et Filius mittunt Spiritum sanctum, verum est Patrem et Filium esse mittentes et non missos, Spiritum sanctum esse missum et non mittentem. Unde repetitur idem argumentum ac supra.

Ad secundum autem sic proceditur. Ubi adest causa seu ratio constitutiva quae perfectionis infinitae est, superfluit omnis alia causa seu ratio constitutiva. Atqui ad divinas missiones constituendas adest causa seu ratio quae perfectionis infinitae est, nempe, ipsa realis relatio originis quae cum divina essentia realiter identificatur. Ergo ad divinas missiones constituendas praeter relationem originis superfluit omnis alia causa seu ratio constitutiva. Maior constat ex ipsa ratione infiniti. Quod enim infinitum est, non limitatur ad hoc vel illud; et quod nullo modo limitatur, saltem ad omnia certo cognita sufficit.24 Minor constat ex addita ratione. Quare, sicut divina persona per divinam essentiam et est et scit et vult et operatur et per divinam originis relationem distinguitur ut generet vel gignatur, spiret vel spiretur, ita etiam per divinam originis relationem constituitur ut mittens vel ut missa. Ad tertium autem sic proceditur. Quaecumque contingenter sunt vera, adaequationem veritatis per realitatem simplicem et necessariam eamque solam habere non possunt.

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Argument for the first part Inasmuch as it is true that the Father sends the Son, it is true that the Father is the one sending, that the Father is not the one sent, that the Son is not the one sending, and that the Son is the one sent. Now, opposites are not really and truly predicated of the divine persons except according to relations of origin; but ‘to be sending’ and ‘to be sent’ are opposites that are really and truly predicated of divine persons; therefore they are predicated according to relations of origin. The major premise is clear and certain from the principle that everything is one where there is no distinction by relational opposition (db 703, ds 1330, nd 325). The minor is clear from sacred scripture, as has been already established. Similarly, inasmuch as it is true that the Father and the Son send the Holy Spirit, it is true that the Father and the Son are the ones who send and not the ones sent, and that the Holy Spirit is the one sent and not the one sending. Thus, the argument here is the same as above. Argument for the second part Where there is present a cause or constitutive reason that is infinite in perfection, every other cause or constitutive reason is superfluous. But for the divine missions to be constituted there is a cause or reason that is infinite in perfection, namely, a real relation of origin, which is really identical with the divine essence. Therefore, for the divine missions to be constituted, any other cause or constitutive reason besides a relation of origin is superfluous. The major premise is clear from the very notion of the infinite. For what is infinite is not limited to this or that; and what is in no way limited is at least sufficient for all that is known with certainty.24 The minor is clear from the reason given for it. Therefore, just as a divine person is and knows and wills and operates by the divine essence, and is distinguished as generating or generated, or as spirating or spirated, by a divine relation of origin, so also a divine person is constituted as sending or as sent by a divine relation of origin. Argument for the third part Whatever is contingently true cannot have the correspondence of truth through a reality that is simple and necessary and this alone. 24 This point is more fully explained in The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 100–105.

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Porro, quod divina persona mittit vel mittitur, contingenter verum est; liberrimo enim consilio divino omne illud est quod vel esse vel non esse potest; et absolute potuit non esse creatio, incarnatio, sanctificatio. Ergo, quod divina persona mittit vel mittitur adaequationem veritatis habere non potest per solam perfectionem divinam; et ideo terminum ad extra convenientem exigit. Praeterea, exigitur hic terminus ut conditio consequens ipsam missionem. Nam persona mittens et etiam missa nullo modo a creatura dependet et ideo, quamvis terminus sit conditio, quia necessarius est, tamen conditio vel praevia vel simultanea esse non potest. QUAESTIO XXVI Quemadmodum terminus ad extra conveniens missionem constitutam consequatur Ad intelligentiam praecedentis asserti notate quod Deus et est ens per intellectum et est agens per intellectum: est ens per intellectum quatenus eius esse est eius intelligere et velle; est agens per intellectum quia eius producere est iterum eius intelligere et velle. Quam ab causam, eo ipso quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus concipiunt25 et volunt divinam quandam personam mitti, iam habentur et ipsa missio constituta et terminus ad extra conveniens productus. 26 Habetur constitutio quia Deus est ens per intellectum et ideo, quod de se intelligit Deus, est Deus. Habetur productio quia Deus est agens per intellectum et ideo quod extra se esse intelligit Deus, extra Deum est. Quare si distinguuntur (1) constitutio active significata, (2) constitutio passive significata, (3) productio active significata, et (4) productio passive significata, tunc: (1) constitutio active significata est communis tribus personis, cum tres concipiant et velint tum Patrem mittere Filium tum Patrem Filiumque mittere Spiritum sanctum;

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But the fact that a divine person sends or is sent is contingently true; for all that can be or not be exists by a sovereignly free divine decision; and absolutely speaking, creation, incarnation, and sanctification could have not been. Therefore, the fact that a divine person sends or is sent cannot have the correspondence of truth through the divine perfection alone, and therefore requires an appropriate external term. Besides, this term is required as a condition consequent upon the mission itself. For the person sending and also the person sent in no way depend upon a creature and therefore, although the term is a condition because it is necessary, still it cannot be either a prior or a simultaneous condition. QUESTION 26 In what ways is an appropriate external term consequent upon a constituted mission? To understand the previous assertion, note that God is both being by intellect and agent by intellect. God is being by intellect since God’s being is God’s understanding and willing; God is agent by intellect since God’s creating is again God’s understanding and willing. For this reason, by the very fact that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit conceive25 and will the sending of a divine person, the constituted mission itself and the appropriate created external term are already present.26 The constitution is present because God is being by intellect and therefore what God understands about God is God. There is the creation because God is agent by intellect and therefore what God understands to be outside God is outside God. Therefore, if the following are distinguished, (1) constitution in the active sense, (2) constitution in the passive sense, (3) creation in the active sense, and (4) creation in the passive sense, then (1) constitution in the active sense is common to the three persons, since the Three conceive and will both that the Father send the Son and that the Father and the Son send the Holy Spirit; 25 [Lonergan’s word is ‘concipiunt,’ ‘conceive.’ But he quickly moves to variations on ‘intelligere,’ ‘to understand.’] 26 [‘... are already present,’ that is, sub specie aeternitatis. See Lonergan, Grace and Freedom 345–46: ‘All other predication (predication other than substantial predications) with respect to God involves extrinsic denomination and presupposes its term as actually existing sub specie aeternitatis ... Since any predication with respect to God ad extra presupposes the actual existence (sub specie aeternitatis) of the term ...’]

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(2) constitutio passive significata est propria mittenti et missae, cum tres concipiant et velint, non tres mittere et tres mitti, sed Patrem mittere Filium, et Patrem Filiumque mittere Spiritum sanctum; (3) productio active significata est communis tribus personis, cum tres concipiant et velint terminum ad extra convenientem produci, cumque ipsum concipere adiecta voluntate sit ipsum producere omnipotens; (4) quamvis constitutio active significata et productio active significata sint tribus personis communes, tamen communes sunt tribus non confusis sed distinctis: quod enim Filius intelligit et vult se mitti a Patre, hoc a Patre habet sicut et a Patre habet suam substantiam; quod Spiritus sanctus intelligit et vult se mitti a Patre et Filio, hoc ipsum habet a Patre et Filio sicut et ab eis habet suam substantiam; et simile de productione active significata dicendum est;

(5) productio passive significata est ipse terminus ad extra conveniens qua dependens a prima sua causa efficiente; (6) personis divinis intrinsece immutabilibus nihil reale et intrinsecum additur sive per constitutionem active significatam, sive per constitutionem passive significatam, sive per productionem active significatam; (7) et tamen per infinitam neque limitatam divinam perfectionem sive communem sive propriam prout res exigit, vere et realiter tres constituunt, vere et realiter mittentes et missae respective constituuntur,27 vere et realiter tres pariter personae terminos convenientes producunt; (8) sicut enim divina immutabilitas realem et intrinsecam additionem facit impossibilem ita etiam divina infinitas eandem reddit superfluam. Praeterea, incarnatio Filii et donatio Spiritus sancti similes quidem sunt quantum ad modum constitutionis et productionis, sed differunt quantum ad id quod constituitur et producitur. Quantum ad modum similes sunt quia in utraque habentur octo superius enumerata. Quantum vero ad id quod constituitur et producitur, in multis differunt omnino. In incarnatione enim, terminus ad extra materialis est natura humana non subsistens, cum unio sit in persona; sed in donatione terminus ad extra materialis est natura humana subsistens, cum unio gratiae sit inter personas. Quare, sicut

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(2) constitution in the passive sense is proper to the one sending and to the one sent, since the Three conceive and will, not that three send and that three be sent, but that the Father send the Son and the Father and the Son send the Holy Spirit; (3) creation in the active sense is common to the three persons, since the Three conceive and will that the appropriate external term be created, and since the very conceiving, together with the will, is the omnipotent act of creating; (4) although constitution in the active sense and creation in the active sense are common to the three persons, still they are common to the Three not confusedly but distinctly; for the fact itself that the Son understands and wills that he be sent by the Father he has from the Father, just as he has his substance from the Father; and the fact itself that the Holy Spirit understands and wills that he be sent by the Father and the Son he has from the Father and the Son, just as he has his substance from them; and the same must be said concerning creation in the active sense; (5) creation in the passive sense is the appropriate external term itself as dependent upon its first efficient cause; (6) nothing real and intrinsic is added to the intrinsically immutable divine persons, whether by constitution in the active sense or by constitution in the passive sense or by creation in the active sense; (7) and yet through their infinite and unlimited divine perfection, either common or proper according to the case, the Three really and truly constitute, are really and truly constituted as sending and sent, respectively, 27 and the three persons really and truly equally create the appropriate terms; (8) for just as divine immutability makes impossible a real, intrinsic addition, so also divine infinity renders such an addition superfluous. Furthermore, the incarnation of the Son and the giving of the Holy Spirit are similar as to the manner of their constitution and creation but differ as to what is constituted and created. They are similar as to the manner, because the above eight statements are verified in each; but as to what is constituted and created, they are in many respects entirely different. In the incarnation the material external term is the nonsubsistent human nature, since the union is in the person; but in the giving of the Holy Spirit the material external term is a subsistent human nature, since the union of grace is 27 [That is, when ‘constitution’ is taken in the passive sense, there is a sending and a sent among or with respect to the Three, who are really constituted as the Father sending and the Son sent, and as the Father and the Son sending and the Holy Spirit sent. The sentence as it stands could be understood as at least not excluding that the Father, like the Son and the Spirit, is sent, but clearly that is not what Lonergan means.]

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haec natura subsistit per esse proprium et proportionatum, ita illa natura non subsistit quia esse proprio et proportionato caret. Praeterea, in incarnatione per proprium esse divinum Filius est et Deus et homo; quod quidem verum contingens qua contingens adaequationem habet per esse quoddam secundarium quo assumitur natura non subsistens; et cum haec assumptio proportionem naturae excedat, pariter hoc esse secundarium proportionem naturae assumptae excedit.28 Sed in donatione per propriam suam perfectionem Spiritus sanctus est et donum et iustis datum; quod quidem verum contingens qua contingens adaequationem habet per gratiam sanctificantem qua grata Deoque sancta redditur natura subsistens; et cum donum increatum et creata sanctitas proportionem huius naturae excedant, etiam gratia sanctificans proportionem naturae excedit. In incarnatione ergo terminus ad extra formalis est esse quoddam secundarium quod ad genus substantiae reducitur; sed in donatione terminus ad extra formalis est gratia sanctificans quae in genere qualitatis invenitur. Praeterea, quamvis in incarnatione Filius qua Deus non sit solus, tamen solus Filius incarnatur. Sed in donatione, quamvis solus Spiritus secundum propriam perfectionem sit donum, tamen cum idem sit totam suam dilectionem dare et se dare, quia Pater et Filius dant totam suam dilectionem procedentem, etiam ipsi se dant et ideo venire et iustis inhabitare dicuntur. Quibus perspectis, alia in incarnatione et alia in donatione intelligunt, volunt, constituunt, faciunt Pater, Filius, Spiritus. Quod si quis de ipsa entitate supernaturali terminorum formalium quaesiverit, convenienter notantur sequentia. Primo, quattuor sunt divinae relationes reales realiter identicae cum divina substantia, et ideo quattuor modi specialissimi qui divinae substantiae imitationem ad extra fundant. Deinde, quattuor sunt entia absolute supernaturalia quae numquam informia 29 inveniuntur, nempe, esse

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between persons. Therefore, just as the latter nature subsists through its proper proportionate act of existence, so the former nature does not subsist, since it lacks a proper proportionate act of existence. Besides, in the incarnation the Son is both God and man through his own divine act of existence. This contingent truth as contingent has its correspondence of truth through a secondary act of existence by which the nonsubsistent nature is assumed; and since this assumption exceeds the proportion of nature, this secondary act of existence likewise exceeds the proportion of the assumed nature. 28 But in the giving of the Holy Spirit, it is through his own proper perfection that the Holy Spirit is gift and is given to the just. This contingent truth as contingent has its correspondence of truth through sanctifying grace whereby a subsistent nature is rendered holy and pleasing to God; and since both the uncreated gift and the created holiness exceed the proportion of this nature, sanctifying grace also exceeds the proportion of nature. In the incarnation, therefore, the formal external term is a secondary act of existence that is reduced to the category of substance; but in the giving of the Spirit the formal external term is sanctifying grace, which is in the category of quality. Moreover, although in the incarnation the Son as God is not alone, it is the Son alone who becomes incarnate. But in giving the Spirit, although the Spirit alone according to his proper perfection is gift, still, since to give one’s entire love is the same as to give oneself, and since the Father and the Son give their entire proceeding Love, they also give themselves and therefore are said to come and dwell in the just. From this we conclude that the Father, the Son, and the Spirit understand, will, constitute, and accomplish different things in the incarnation and in the giving of the Spirit. But if one asks about the supernatural character of the formal terms, it is pertinent to note the following. First, there are four real divine relations, really identical with the divine substance, and therefore there are four very special modes that ground the external imitation of the divine substance. Next, there are four absolutely supernatural realities, which are never found uninformed, 29 namely, the 28 [For a fuller discussion of the secondary act of existence of the incarnation, see Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 142–51. The issue is also discussed, and objections answered, in Lonergan, De Verbo incarnato (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964), assertion 9, pp. 259–66.] 29 ‘Only love is meritorious per se; the other virtues or their acts can be informed or uninformed. They are informed by sanctifying grace and love, and when grace departs they become uninformed and cease to be meritorious. For this reason it

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secundarium incarnationis, gratia sanctificans, habitus caritatis, et lumen gloriae. Quare, sine inconvenientia diceretur esse secundarium incarnationis esse participationem creatam paternitatis et ideo specialem relationem ad Filium habere; gratiam sanctificantem esse participationem spirationis activae et ideo specialem relationem ad Spiritum sanctum habere; habitum caritatis esse participationem spirationis passivae et ideo specialem relationem ad Patrem et Filium habere; lumen gloriae esse participationem filiationis et ideo filios adoptionis perfecte ad Patrem reducere. Quod si quis dixerit Deum operari ad extra non secundum relationes sed secundum communem naturam et ideo relationes divinas reales sic participari non posse, respondendum est per distinctionem. Vera enim esset obiectio si Deus esset agens naturale quod producere non posset nisi simile in natura, sicut ignis semper calefacit et aqua semper humectat. Sed natura divina tribus communis est intellectualis, et sicut Deus per suum intellectum cognoscit quattuor relationes reales, ita per suum intellectum, adiecta voluntate, entia finita sed similia et absolute supernaturalia producere potest.

QUAESTIO XXVII Utrum missio Spiritus sancti sit secundum dilectionem notionalem Cum Spiritus sanctus procedat ut Amor, cumque vera et realis divinae personae missio nihil aliud sit quam ipsa eiusdem personae processio cui consequenter accedat conveniens terminus ad extra, fieri nequit ut ipse Spiritus sanctus sit missus nisi secundum dilectionem procedentem seu notionalem. Ad cuius tamen intelligentiam haec notate. Distinguuntur in divinis dilectio essentialis et dilectio notionalis non realiter sed ratione tantum, cum dilectio essentialis sit ipsa divina essentia, dilectio autem notionalis sit eadem essentia cum relatione originis cointellecta. Quare, essentialis est divina dilectio tribus personis communis, et secundum eam Pater et Filius et

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secondary act of existence of the incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory. It would not be inappropriate, therefore, to say that the secondary act of existence of the incarnation is a created participation of paternity, and so has a special relation to the Son; that sanctifying grace is a participation of active spiration, and so has a special relation to the Holy Spirit; that the habit of charity is a participation of passive spiration, and so has a special relation to the Father and the Son; and that the light of glory is a participation of sonship, and so in a most perfect way brings the children of adoption back to the Father. But if one says that God operates externally not according to the relations but according to the common nature, and therefore the real divine relations cannot be participated in in this way, we must answer with a distinction. The objection would be true if God were a natural agent that could produce only something similar in nature, as fire always produces heat and water always causes moisture. But the divine nature common to the Three is intellectual, and just as God by the divine intellect knows the four real relations, so also by the divine intellect, together with the divine will, God can produce beings that are finite yet similar [to the four real relations] and absolutely supernatural. QUESTION 27 Is the Holy Spirit sent as notional love? Since the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love, and since the true and real mission of a divine person is nothing other than the very procession of that person with the addition of an appropriate, consequent external term, the Holy Spirit can only be sent as proceeding, or notional, love. For a fuller understanding of this, it will help to note the following. In God the distinction between essential love and notional love is a conceptual, not a real, distinction, since essential love is the divine essence itself, while notional love is that same essence understood with a relation of origin. Essential divine love, therefore, is common to the three persons, and it is according to this love that seems worth while to distinguish between acts that are formally supernatural and acts that are virtually supernatural. The former attain God as God is in se, while the latter do not attain God as God is in se but only in some respect, as in the case of faith and hope.’ Lonergan, ‘De ente supernaturali’ (to be published in cwl 19), thesis 3, § 55. The point of Lonergan’s remark in the present text is that the four absolutely supernatural realities are formally supernatural, and necessarily so. For the created correlate of divine communication or divine self-giving is that the creature should attain God as God is in se, and these are the created realities whereby we attain God as God is in se.]

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Spiritus diligunt omne quod diligunt. Notionalis autem dilectio est ipse Spiritus sanctus procedens cuius principium est Spirator, seu Pater et Filius dilectionem spirantes, et secundum hanc spirationem Pater et Filius Spiritu sancto et se et nos diligunt.30 Neque mira est reputanda haec dilectio notionalis, si quidem omnis creatura diligit non per ipsam suam essentiam sed per actum in propria voluntate receptum, cuius actus ipsa creatura quoddam principium existit. Praeterea, si obiecta divinae dilectionis respicimus, primum quidem est ipsa divina bonitas tribus personis communis, alterum autem est bonitas finita singulis creaturis propria, tertium autem est speciale quoddam obiectum inquantum Deus quasdam creaturas diligit in ordine ad ipsum bonum infinitum iis communicandum.31 Et secundum hanc tertiam atque specialem dilectionem divinam attenditur missio ipsius Spiritus sancti ad quam consequitur donum gratiae sanctificantis. Uti enim supra habitum est, constitutio divinae missionis est per divinam conceptionem atque volitionem; et inquantum active significatur constitutio, tribus personis est communis; inquantum autem passive significatur, aliquibus est propria. Quare, cum ipse Spiritus sanctus mittatur, secundum huius missionis constitutionem active significatam habetur specialis divina dilectio tribus communis atque essentialis. Et cum haec dilectio sit in ordine ad ipsum bonum infinitum communicandum, existit tamquam divina sui donatio secundum quam tres divinae personae se iusto dant.32 Si autem eadem constitutio passive significatur, Pater et Filius sunt diligentes et mittentes et dantes, ipse autem Spiritus sanctus est dilectio procedens et persona missa et donum datum. Et cum haec dilectio omnino specialis sit, per eam Pater et Filius Spiritu sancto iustos diligunt atque donant. 33 Cum denique ad hanc specialem dilectionem tam essentialem quam notionalem necessario sequatur terminus ad extra conveniens, praeter gratiam, quae est ipse favor divinus erga aliquem, etiam est gratia gratum faciens 34 quae est qualitas et accidens in anima iusti receptum.35 Obicitur tamen quod missio Spiritus sancti magis secundum operationem intellectus sit

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the Father and the Son and the Spirit love all that they love. Notional love, however, is the Holy Spirit proceeding, whose principle is the Spirator, that is, the Father and the Son breathing love, and it is according to this spiration that the Father and the Son love themselves and us by the Holy Spirit. 30 This notional love should not be considered strange, since every creature loves, not by its own essence, but by an act received in its will, the creature itself being a principle of this act. Moreover, if we consider the objects of divine love, the first is the divine goodness itself common to the three persons, the second is the finite goodness proper to each creature, and the third is a special object inasmuch as God loves certain creatures in order to communicate the infinite good itself to them. 31 It is with this third, special divine love that the mission of the Holy Spirit is concerned, with the gift of sanctifying grace as its consequence. As mentioned above, the constitution of a divine mission is by divine conception and volition. The constitution in the active sense is common to the three persons, whereas in the passive sense it is proper to certain ones. Therefore, since the Holy Spirit himself is sent, in accord with the constitution of this mission in the active sense there is a special divine love that is common to the Three and essential. And since this love is ordered to communicating the infinite good, it exists as a divine self-giving, by way of which the three divine persons give themselves to the just person.32 But if the same constitution is taken in the passive sense, the Father and the Son are loving and sending and giving, while the Holy Spirit is proceeding Love and the person sent and the gift given. And since this Love is altogether special, by it the Father and the Son love the just and give to them by the Holy Spirit. 33 Finally, since an appropriate external term necessarily follows this special love both essential and notional, in addition to the grace that is God’s favor towards someone, there is also gratia gratum faciens, grace that renders one pleasing to God, 34 which is a quality and an accident received in the soul of the just person. 35 It is objected, however, that the mission of the Holy Spirit is more by way of the operation of the intellect than of the will. For the Spirit has spoken through the 30 31 32 33 34 35

Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 37, a. 2. Ibid. 1-2, q. 110, a. 1. Ibid. 1, q. 43, a. 4, ad 1m; q. 38, a. 1, ad 1m. Ibid. q. 37, a. 2; q. 38, a. 1, ad 4m; a. 2, ad 3m. Ibid. 1-2, q. 110, a. 1. [See Lonergan, Grace and Freedom 35–37.] Ibid. a. 2.

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quam voluntatis. Ipse enim locutus est per prophetas (db 86); ipse pariter est Spiritus Patris qui in discipulis loquitur cum ante reges et praesides trahantur (Mt 10.20); ipse denique est qui docebit vos omnem veritatem (Io 16.13). Respondeo eatenus in ratione missionis includi divinam originis relationem quatenus aliquid operatur, non a persona divina, sed circa personam divinam. 36 Sicut ergo Pater creat quin tamen Filius et Spiritus creentur, ita Spiritus loquitur et docet quin Pater et Filius addiscant; et ideo in his non importatur relatio originis neque missio stricte intellecta. Quatenus autem ita ipse Spiritus mittitur et datur ut Pater et Filius sint mittentes eum atque dantes, eatenus habetur missio stricte dicta et relatio originis importatur. Quapropter, vere et realiter ipse Spiritus sanctus et loquitur et docet; secundum suam intelligentiam atque voluntatem loquitur et docet; cum tamen haec intelligentia atque voluntas sit ipsa divina essentia tribus personis communis, non solus loquitur et docet Spiritus sanctus, neque plus quam Pater et Filius.

Instatur. Spiritus sanctus docet ea quae audit, neque a semet ipso loquitur (Io 16.13). Ergo Spiritus sanctus in ipsa sua locutione ab aliis personis divinis distinguitur atque quodammodo dependet. Respondeo, sicut supra habitum est,37 omnem operationem ad extra a tribus divinis personis procedere, non quidem confusis sed inter se distinctis. Ipsa enim divina essentia atque intelligentia atque volitio atque omnipotentia est Filii a Patre et est Spiritus sancti ab utroque. Et ideo in omni operatione ad extra adest hic ordo originis et quasi dependentiae. Neque plus dicitur cum Spiritus sanctus affirmatur ea docere quae ipse audiverit.

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prophets (db 86, ds 150, nd 12); he is likewise the Spirit of the Father who speaks in the disciples when they are dragged before kings and governors (Matthew 10.20); and he is the one who will teach you all truth ( John 16.13). We reply that a divine relation of origin is included in the notion of mission not insofar as something is done by a divine person, but insofar as something is done with respect to a divine person.36 Hence, just as the Father creates without the Son and the Spirit being created, so the Spirit speaks and teaches without the Father and the Son learning something, and therefore neither a relation of origin nor a mission strictly understood is implied in these operations. But insofar as it is the Spirit who is sent and given and the Father and the Son who are the ones sending and giving him, a mission in the strict sense and a relation of origin are implied. Therefore, the Holy Spirit really and truly speaks and teaches; he speaks and teaches through his intelligence and will. But since this intelligence and will is the divine essence common to the three persons, the Holy Spirit does not speak and teach alone, nor does he do so more than the Father and the Son. It is further objected that the Holy Spirit teaches what he hears, and does not speak on his own ( John 16.13). Therefore, the Holy Spirit in his act of speaking is distinct from and in some way dependent upon the other divine persons. To this we reply that, as we have said,37 every external operation proceeds from the divine persons not confusedly but as distinct from one another. For the divine essence and intelligence and volition and omnipotence is the Son’s from the Father and is the Holy Spirit’s from the other two. Therefore, in every external operation there is this order of origin and quasi-dependence. Nothing more is meant when the Holy Spirit is said to teach what he has heard. 36 [The sense is that for there to be a mission in the technical sense (though not in the broad sense – see p. 453) it is not sufficient to have something done by a divine person; one must also have something done with respect to a divine person. Or, put another way, it is not enough to have one ‘doing something,’ one must also have one ‘to whom something is done.’ Thus, as the next sentence indicates, when we say that the Father creates, we do not thereby say that something is done to the Son and the Spirit; there obtains the ‘by,’ but not the ‘with respect to.’ So too, if we say that the Spirit speaks and teaches, we have the ‘by,’ but we would have the ‘with respect to’ only if the Father and the Son were learning something from the Spirit. Without both the ‘by’ and the ‘with respect to,’ there is not a divine relation of origin, and without a divine relation of origin, there is not a mission in the technical sense. The language of doing something and having something done to one is figurative language that enables us more easily to grasp the point. Nothing is really done to the Son or the Spirit. In the end the content of such language is reducible to relations of origin.] 37 Assertion 16.

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Instatur. Secundum S. Ioannem, ‘cum venerit ille Spiritus veritatis, docebit vos omnem veritatem.’38 Sed venit quia mittitur. Ergo missio Spiritus sancti est secundum doctrinam. Respondeo aliud esse donum infinitum atque increatum ipsius Spiritus sancti, aliud autem est donum inspirationis atque doctrinae quod sane finitum est. Iam vero inquantum mittitur et venit ipse Spiritus sanctus habetur donum increatum. Inquantum Spiritus missus docet habetur donum creatum. Et ideo, sicut infinitum a finito differt, ita missio vel adventus ipsius Spiritus sancti differt ab operibus ipsius Spiritus missi. Qua de causa, quamvis opera Spiritus missi sint secundum doctrinam, ipsa tamen missio, qua iustis datur donum increatum, est secundum dilectionem notionalem, cum haec dilectio sit ipse Spiritus sanctus.

Instatur. Saltem inconvenienter doctrina Spiritui sancto appropriatur, cum ipse procedat non secundum intellectum sed secundum voluntatem. Respondeo Spiritum sanctum principaliter docere, non doctrinam scientificam quae solo intellectu addiscatur, sed doctrinam fidei quae a Christo proposita a fidelibus audienda atque accipienda sit quoad omnes suas implicationes (cf. Io 14.26; 15.26; 16.12–15). Quae doctrina omnino convenienter appropriatur Spiritui sancto qui a semet ipso non loquitur sed secundum dilectionem notionalem a Patre Filioque audit et accipit.

QUAESTIO XXVIII Utrum divinae missiones inter se ordinentur Respondeo divinas missiones constitui quidem per ipsas divinarum personarum relationes originis, importare autem tamquam conditionem consequentem terminum ad extra convenientem. Iam vero tam secundum constitutionem quam secundum terminos consequentes invenitur ordo in missionibus divinis. Secundum constitutionem enim, cum in divinis detur ordo naturae seu originis,39 non habetur processio amoris nisi in ordine ad processionem verbi. 40 Unde et Filius est Verbum, non qualecumque, sed spirans Amorem. 41 Quare, cum missiones per ipsas processiones et relationes divinas constituantur, constat

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A still further objection is that according to St John, ‘When the Spirit of truth comes, he will teach you all truth’ ( John 16.13). 38 But he comes because he is sent. Therefore, the mission of the Holy Spirit is one of teaching. Our answer is that the infinite and uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit is one thing, and the gift of inspiration and teaching, which is of course finite, is another. Now, inasmuch as the Holy Spirit is sent and comes, uncreated gift is given. But inasmuch as the Spirit who is sent teaches, a created gift is given. Hence, just as the infinite is different from the finite, so is the sending or coming of the Holy Spirit different from the works of the Spirit who is sent. For this reason, although the works of the Spirit who is sent are works of teaching, the mission itself, by which the uncreated gift is given to the just, is by way of notional love, since this love is the Holy Spirit himself. Another objection is that at least it is not fitting to appropriate teaching to the Holy Spirit, since the Spirit himself proceeds not by way of intelligence but by way of volition. To this we answer that the Holy Spirit teaches principally not a scientific teaching that is learned through the intellect alone, but the teaching of the faith proposed by Christ to be heard and accepted in all its implications by the faithful ( John 14.26, 15.26, 16.12–15). It is entirely fitting to appropriate this teaching to the Holy Spirit, who does not speak on his own but as notional love hears and receives from the Father and the Son. QUESTION 28 Are the divine missions ordered to each other? Our answer is that the divine missions are indeed constituted by the relations of origin themselves of the divine persons, but that they entail an appropriate external term as a consequent condition. Now there is an order in the divine missions as regards both constitution and consequent terms. As regards constitution, then, since in God there is an order of nature or origin, 39 there is no procession of love except in an order to the procession of the Word. 40 Hence also, the Son is not any kind of Word, but the Word breathing forth or spirating Love.41 Therefore, since the missions are constituted by the divine 38 [The nrsv translation will not work here to communicate the sense of the objection: ‘... he will guide you into all the truth.’] 39 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 42, a. 3. 40 Ibid. q. 27, a. 3, ad 3m. 41 Ibid. q. 43, a. 5, ad 2m.

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missiones quoad constitutionem inter se ordinari. Secundum terminos autem constat de quodam ordine ex illo quod ‘misit Deus Filium suum . . . ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus. Quoniam autem estis filii, misit Deus Spiritum Filii sui in corda vestra clamantem: Abba, Pater.’ 42 Ex his enim verbis intelligendum videtur missionem Filii esse ut fiat adoptio filiorum; et secundum hanc adoptionem fieri missionem Spiritus sancti. At quinam praecise sit hic nexus, ulterius considerandum est. Iam vero, uti supra habitum est, mittitur Spiritus sanctus secundum dilectionem divinam specialem et notionalem. Specialis autem dilectio divina est illa secundum quam iusti diliguntur in ordine ad bonum divinum. Sed cum Deus omnia operatur secundum ordinem suae iustitiae,43 ipsa haec specialis dilectio rationem specialem supponit.44 Neque haec specialis ratio potest esse alia quam ipse suus Filius qui et mediator est et redemptor. Iam vero Filius est mediator inquantum persona divina naturam habet humanam.45 Ex hoc enim factum est ut Deus Pater, sicut Filium divinum Spiritu sancto diligit et donat, ita Filium hominem Spiritu sancto diligit et donat. Quod quidem in epiphania baptismali nobis manifestatur. Cum enim Pater dicat, ‘Hic est Filius meus dilectus, in quo complacui mihi,’ Filius de aqua ascendens ‘vidit spiritum Dei descendentem sicut columbam et venientem super se.’ 46 Ubi simul et affirmatur dilectio Patris, quae est ipse Spiritus sanctus, et manifestatur ut descendens et veniens ipse Spiritus sanctus. Proinde, baptismus Christi est exemplar nostri baptismi. Deus enim Pater propter opus mediatoris redemptivum etiam iustos diligit sicut et proprium suum Filium diligit, secundum illud, ‘dilexisti eos sicut et me dilexisti.’ 47 Age vero. Si

44 Scilicet, non quasi in Deo essent plures volitiones, sed inquantum Deus vult obiecta inter se ordinata. Sum. theol., i, q. 19, a. 5: ‘Vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult hoc.’

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processions and relations, it is clear that as to their constitution the missions have an order to each other. That there is an order as regards their terms is clear from the fact that ‘God sent his Son . . . so that we might receive adoption as children. And because you are children, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts crying, “Abba, Father!” ’42 From these words it seems we must understand that the mission of the Son is to make us children of God by adoption; and that the mission of the Holy Spirit is in accord with this adoption. But precisely what this connection is needs further consideration. Now, as we have said above, the Holy Spirit is sent as a special and notional divine love. The special divine love is that according to which the just are loved as ordered to the divine good. But since God does everything in accord with the order of his justice,43 this special love itself supposes a special reason. 44 And this special reason cannot be other than God’s own Son, who is both mediator and redeemer. The Son is mediator because as a divine person he has a human nature. 45 This means that God the Father, as he loves the divine Son and gives to him by the Holy Spirit, so he loves the Son as man and gives to him by the Holy Spirit. This is revealed to us in the baptismal epiphany. For as the Father was saying, ‘This is my Son, the Beloved, with whom I am well pleased,’ the Son coming up out of the water ‘saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove and alighting on him.’ 46 Here at the same time the love of the Father, which is the Holy Spirit himself, is affirmed and is manifested as the Holy Spirit himself coming and alighting on Jesus. In like manner, Christ’s baptism is the exemplar of our baptism. For on account of the redemptive work of the mediator, God the Father also loves the just as he loves his own Son; as it is said, ‘You have loved them even as you have loved 42 Galatians 4.4–6. 43 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 21, a. 1. 44 That is, not as though there were in God several volitions, but inasmuch as God wills objects that are ordered to one another. Ibid. q. 19, a. 5: ‘Therefore [God] wills this to be because of that, but does not will this because he wills that.’ [The Blackfriars edition explains: ‘God wills creatures to be for his goodness, but his act of willing them is not because of his act of willing his own goodness. There is no causality in God, no relationship of cause to effect.’ Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, vol. 5 (1a. 19–26), ed. Thomas Gilby, o.p. (New York: McGraw-Hill, undated, but series was published 1964–76) 22–23, note d.] 45 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 3, q. 26, a. 2. 46 Matthew 3.16–17.

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Pater nos diligit sicut Filium proprium diligit, Pater nos diligit quasi filii essemus; ad quam dilectionem sane sequitur adoptio filiorum. Iterum si Pater nos diligit sicut Filium proprium diligit, sane nos Spiritu sancto diligit et donat. Quibus perspectis, quodammodo intelligitur ordo divinarum missionum: missio enim Filii erat ut Pater nos sicut proprium Filium diligere posset; missio autem Spiritus est cum Pater nos sicut proprium Filium diligat; quae quidem dilectio, quasi divinis personis propria, ordinem absolute supernaturalem importat atque fundat. 48

QUAESTIO XXIX Quaenam sit ratio missionis divinae 49 Cum rationem divinae missionis concipere non valeamus nisi ex analogia missionis humanae, ex hac ordiendum est ut per viam affirmationis, negationis, et eminentiae ad divinam missionem concipiendam aliqualiter pertingere possimus. Iam vero in missione humana haec fere inveniuntur: peragitur (1) transitus de loco in locum ut ibi fiat vel (2) operatio quaedam particularis vel (3) nova quaedam operationum series, sive (4) a sola persona missa sive (5) a personis ad quas mittitur, et quidem (6) secundum consilium vel imperium mittentis (7) personae missae revelatum atque confisum vel impositum. Quaenam vero ex his septem elementis divinae missioni conveniant iam per singula discurrendo determinandum est. Primo, ergo, transitus de loco in locum magis limitationes corporis humani respicit quam missionis essentiam dicit. Quare, etiam in missione humana deesse

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me.’47 So then, if the Father loves us as he loves his own Son, the Father loves us as though we were his children; and our adoption as children of God is surely a consequence of this love. Again, if the Father loves us as he loves his own Son, he surely loves us and gives to us by the Holy Spirit. From all this, we gain some understanding of the order of the divine missions; for the Son was sent so that the Father might be able to love us as he loves his own Son, and the Spirit is sent because the Father does love us as he loves his own Son. Indeed, this love, which is, as it were, proper to the divine persons, is what implies and grounds the absolutely supernatural order.48 QUESTION 29 What is the formality of divine mission? 49 Since we cannot conceive the formality of a divine mission except by analogy to a human mission, we must begin from the latter in order that by way of affirmation, negation, and eminence we may to some extent be able to arrive at conceiving a divine mission. Now, the following elements fairly well sum up what is found in a human mission: (1) the movement from one place to another so that either (2) some particular operation or (3) some new series of operations may be accomplished there, whether (4) solely by the person sent or (5) by the persons to whom he or she is sent, (6) to be carried out according to the mind or command of the sender (7) revealed and entrusted to or imposed upon the person sent. We must now determine which of these seven elements apply to a divine mission, taking them one at a time. First, then, movement from one place to another has to do more with the limitations of the human body than with the essence of mission. Hence, even in the 47 John 17.23; see 17.26. See St Thomas Aquinas, Ad Ephesios, c. 1, lect. 1 and 2, §§ 9 and 16 in the Marietti edition. 48 [That is, the order is supernatural because the love in which we are caught up is the divine love that is really proper to the divine persons.] 49 [The word ‘ratio’ is particularly difficult to translate here. The question is asking about more than the specifying of the constitution and consequent term, since these have already been covered. Under the fourth point, Lonergan will say that in order to understand a divine mission one must include the personal relations inaugurated and strengthened in order that the end of the mission may be attained. Under this question, it seems, Lonergan is including not just the constitution of a mission, not just the immediate consequent term, but also the further consequences connected with the consequent term, and also, it seems, the single, total end of the missions. He seems to be asking about and seeking a comprehensive characterization of the intelligibility of divine mission.]

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potest hic50 transitus; v.g., si mittitur Nuntius a Sede Apostolica ad Gubernium Italicum, vera et realis est missio quamvis nulla sit loci mutatio. Quapropter, cum personae divinae non solum incorporales sed etiam omnipresentes sint, transitus de loco in locum ad missionem divinam intelligendam vel parum vel potius nihil affert. Quamvis enim pium omnino atque nobis utilissimum sit Filium vel Spiritum sanctum de caelesti altitudine descendentem imaginatione repraesentare, de praesenti tamen quaeritur non missionis imaginatio sed intelligentia. 51 Deinde, tam Filii quam Spiritus missio respicit non particularem quandam operationem sed totam quandam atque novam operationum seriem. Missus enim est Filius ad omnia instauranda52 atque reconcilianda53 ut Deus sit omnia in omnibus.54 Mittitur autem Spiritus sanctus non circa hanc illamve operationem particularem sed ut toti vitae christianae in singulis iustis praesideat. Tertio, aliter se habet Filius aliter Spiritus sanctus ad operandum. Cum enim Filius naturam humanam sibi assumpserit, per hanc naturam assumptam opera sibi propria peragere potest. Qua de causa, cum Filius sit missus ut mediator et redemptor et reconciliator et ecclesiae caput et rex et iudex, ipsa incarnatio ad missionem Filii pertinere videtur, cum omnia haec munera opera Filio propria exigere videantur. E contra, cum Spiritus sanctus aliam naturam praeter divinam non habeat, ipse nihil operatur quod Pater et Filius non pariter operentur; ex quo concluditur non ideo mitti Spiritum sanctum ut ipse solus quidquam operetur.

Quarto, cum finis missionis aliorum cooperationem includat, missio fit non tam ad opera patranda quam ad novas relationes personales ineundas atque confirmandas. Iam vero finis missionum divinarum non sine cooperatione hominum attingitur: ‘Qui enim creavit te sine te, non te iustificabit sine te.’ 55 Qua de causa, ut divina missio intelligatur, non solum opera personae missae propria sunt consideranda sed etiam relationes personales quas init vel confirmat ut per cooperationem aliorum attingatur missionis finis.

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case of a human mission this50 local movement may be absent. If, for example, the Papal Nuncio is sent to the Italian government, there is a true and real mission without any change of locale. Therefore, since the divine persons are not only incorporeal but also omnipresent, movement from one place to another contributes little or nothing to our understanding of a divine mission. For although it is quite devotional and most useful for us to imagine the Son or the Holy Spirit coming down from the heights of heaven, our present quest is for an understanding, not an image, of a divine mission.51 Second, both the mission of the Son and the mission of the Spirit regard not some particular operation but a whole new series of operations. For the Son has been sent to gather up52 and reconcile53 all things, that God may be all in all.54 And the Holy Spirit is sent, not for this or that particular operation, but to preside over the whole of Christian living in every one of the just. Third, the Son and the Holy Spirit are related to their respective operations in different ways. Since the Son has assumed unto himself a human nature, he is able through this assumed nature to perform works that are proper to himself. Therefore, since the Son has been sent as mediator, redeemer, reconciler, head of the church, king, and judge, incarnation evidently belongs to the mission of the Son, since all these functions are envisaged as requiring works that are proper to the Son. On the other hand, since the Holy Spirit has no nature other than the divine, he does no works that the Father and the Son do not likewise do, and from this we conclude that the Holy Spirit is not sent in such a way as to do anything by himself alone, without the other divine persons. Fourth, since the end of a mission involves cooperation on the part of others, a mission is carried out not so much that works be done as that new personal relations be initiated and strengthened. The end of the divine missions is not attained without the cooperation of human beings: ‘He who created you without you will not justify you without you.’55 Hence, in order to understand a divine mission, one must consider not only the works proper to the person sent but also the personal relations that that person initiates or strengthens in order that the end of the mission may be attained through the cooperation of others. 50 [Reading hic for his. – Translator] 51 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 43, a. 1, ad 3m: ‘... that objection is based upon a mission that involves local movement, which has no place in God.’ 52 Ephesians 1.10. 53 Colossians 1.20. 54 1 Corinthians 15.28. 55 Augustine, Sermo 169, c. 11; ml 38, 923.

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Ad missionem ergo Filii pertinet illa amicitia quam commendat: ‘Sicut dilexit me Pater, et ego dilexi vos. Manete in mea dilectione. Si praecepta mea servaveritis, manebitis in dilectione mea, sicut et ego Patris mei praecepta servavi et maneo in eius dilectione.’56 Similiter, ad missionem Spiritus sancti pertinent intimae illae relationes quibus non sumus nostri: ‘An nescitis quoniam membra vestra templum sunt Spiritus sancti, qui in vobis est, et non estis vestri?’57 ‘Et nolite contristare Spiritum sanctum Dei, in quo signati estis in diem redemptionis.’58 Quinto, ab ipsa divina missione omnis sane anthropomorphismus amovendus est, et ideo nihil aliud in divinis est sive consilium mittentis sive consilii revelatio quam id quod dictum est de constitutione divinae missionis. Sexto, cum divinae missiones inter se ordinentur, unus est utriusque finis totalis. Mittitur enim Filius ‘cum inimici essemus’59 ut per opus mediatoris et redemptoris et reconciliatoris novae instaurentur relationes personales inter Deum Patrem et personas humanas omnes. Mittetur autem Spiritus sanctus ut ‘pignus hereditatis’ 60 quando ‘non ex operibus iustitiae quae fecimus nos sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit per lavacrum regenerationis et renovationis Spiritus sancti, quem effudit in nos abunde per Iesum Christum Salvatorem nostrum, ut iustificati gratia ipsius heredes simus secundum spem vitae aeternae.’ 61 Septimo, cum unus sit utriusque missionis finis totalis, cumque ipse hic finis sine cooperatione personarum humanarum non attingatur, diversi distingui possunt missionum termini secundum diversa stadia quibus missionum finis efficitur. Incipit ergo missio Filii in incarnatione, non quod Filius ad naturam humanam assumendam mittatur,62 sed quia per incarnationem constituitur Filius ut mediator ad nos missus. Peragebatur missio Filii durante vita sua mortali, dum Filius 57 1 Cor 6.19. Sicut autem iusti non sui sed Spiritus sunt (non estis vestri), ita ipse Spiritus iustorum est cum iis datus sit (Rom 5.5).

62 Cum missio sit ad subsistens, natura autem assumenda non sit subsistens nisi in haeresi Nestoriana, Filius non dicatur mitti ad illam naturam quam assumpsit. Billot, De Deo Uno et Trino, Romae 1935, p. 652.

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There pertains to the mission of the Son, therefore, that friendship which he commends: ‘As the Father has loved me, so I have loved you; abide in my love. If you keep my commandments, you will abide in my love, just as I have kept my Father’s commandments and abide in his love.’56 Similarly, there pertain to the mission of the Holy Spirit those intimate relations whereby we are not our own: ‘Do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you . . . and that you are not your own?’ 57 ‘And do not grieve the Holy Spirit of God, with which you were marked with a seal for the day of redemption.’58 Fifth, all anthropomorphism must be excluded from a divine mission, and therefore in God both the mind of the sender and the revelation of that mind are nothing other than what we said concerning the constitution of a divine mission. Sixth, since the divine missions are ordered to each other, there is a single, total end to both missions. For the Son is sent ‘while we were enemies,’ 59 to initiate through his work as mediator and redeemer and reconciler new interpersonal relations between God the Father and all human persons. And the Holy Spirit will be sent as ‘the pledge of our inheritance,’ 60 when God has ‘saved us, not because of any works of righteousness that we had done, but according to his mercy, through the water of rebirth and renewal by the Holy Spirit. This Spirit he poured out on us richly through Jesus Christ our Savior, so that, having been justified by his grace, we might become heirs according to the hope of eternal life.’ 61 Seventh, since there is one overall end to both missions, and since this end is not attained without the cooperation of human persons, the different terms of the missions can be distinguished on the basis of the different stages whereby the end of the missions is brought about. Therefore, the mission of the Son begins with the incarnation, not because the Son is sent in order to assume a human nature,62 but because through the incarnation the Son is constituted as the mediator sent to us. The mission of the 56 John 15.9–10. 57 1 Corinthians 6.19. As the just are not their own but the Spirit’s (‘you are not your own’), so the Spirit himself is the Spirit of the just, since he has been given to them. See Romans 5.5. 58 Ephesians 4.30. 59 Romans 5.10. 60 Ephesians 1.14. 61 Titus 3.5–7. 62 Since a mission is to a subsistent, whereas the nature to be assumed is not subsistent except in the Nestorian heresy, the Son is not said to be sent to the nature that he assumed. Billot, De Deo Uno et Trino 652. [A mission is of a person, from a person, to a person or to persons.]

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hominis cum filiis hominum relationes personales inibat. Consummatum est principale quoddam suae missionis cum in cruce moriens factus est omnibus obtemperantibus sibi causa salutis aeternae.63 Continuatur vero missio Filii per apostolos eorumque successores: nam ‘sicut misit me Pater, et ego mitto vos’; 64 ‘qui recipit vos me recipit, et qui me recipit recipit eum qui me misit’; 65 ‘qui vos audit me audit et qui vos spernit me spernit. Qui autem me spernit, spernit eum qui misit me’;66 ‘Saule, Saule, quid me persequeris?’67

Perficitur autem aliud principale missionis Filii quotiescumque iustificatur iniustus et iustus iustificatur adhuc, nam ‘ego veni ut vitam habeant et abundantius habeant.’68 Ad ultimum autem huius missionis terminum pervenitur in beata visione civium caelestium, ‘cum tradiderit regnum Deo et Patri.’ 69 Sicut autem Filius ad omnes missus est cum pro omnibus mortuus sit, ita ad singulos iustos mittitur Spiritus sanctus. ‘Quoniam autem estis filii, misit Deus Spiritum Filii sui in corda vestra clamantem: Abba, Pater. Itaque iam non es servus sed filius. Quod si filius, et heres per Deum.’ 70 ‘Nescitis quia templum Dei estis et Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis? Si quis autem templum Dei violaverit, disperdet illum Deus. Templum enim Dei sanctum est, quod estis vos.’ 71 ‘Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis.’ 72 ‘Qui autem in carne sunt Deo placere non possunt. Vos autem in carne non estis sed in spiritu, si tamen Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis.’ 73 ‘Quod si Spiritus eius qui suscitavit Iesum a mortuis habitat in vobis, qui suscitavit Iesum Christum a mortuis vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra propter inhabitantem Spiritum eius in vobis.’74 Ipse enim, cum sit pignus hereditatis, in ordine ad vitam aeternam

68 Io 10.10. Quae a Christo homine sive in terris per influxum historicum sive de caelis perficiuntur, ad missionem Filii visibilem pertinent.

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Son was carried on throughout his mortal life, during which time the Son of Man entered into personal relationships with the children of men. A principal objective of his mission was accomplished when in dying on the cross he became the source of eternal salvation for all who obey him.63 The mission of the Son is continued through the apostles and their successors: ‘as the Father has sent me, so I send you’;64 ‘whoever welcomes you welcomes me, and who welcomes me welcomes the one who sent me’;65 ‘whoever listens to you listens to me, and whoever rejects you rejects me, and whoever rejects me rejects the one who sent me’; 66 ‘Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?’67 Yet another principal objective of the mission of the Son is accomplished whenever one who is unjust is justified and a just person is further justified; for ‘I came that they may have life and have it abundantly.’68 The ultimate end of this mission, however, is attained in the beatific vision of the citizens of heaven, ‘when he hands over the kingdom to God the Father.’69 Just as the Son has been sent to all people, since he died for all, so is the Holy Spirit sent to each of the just. ‘And because you are children, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts crying, “Abba, Father!” So you are no longer a slave but a child, and if a child then also an heir, through God.’ 70 ‘Do you not know that you are God’s temple and that God’s Spirit dwells in you? If anyone destroys God’s temple, God will destroy that person. For God’s temple is holy, and you are that temple.’71 ‘. . . God’s love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit that has been given to us.’72 ‘. . . those who are in the flesh cannot please God. But you are not in the flesh; you are in the Spirit, since the Spirit of God dwells in you.’73 ‘If the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ from the dead will give life to your mortal bodies also through his Spirit that dwells in you.’74 For the Spirit, since he is the pledge 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Hebrews 5.9. John 20.21, 17.18. Matthew 10.40; see 18.18. Luke 10.16. Acts 9.4. John 10.10. Whatever is being done by Christ as man whether on earth through his historical influence or from his place in heaven is part of the visible mission of the Son. 1 Corinthians 15.24. Galatians 4.6–7. 1 Corinthians 3.16. Romans 5.5. Romans 8.8–9. Romans 8.11.

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datur, ut in eundem finem ultimum tendat missio Spiritus ac missio Filii. Quae cum ita sint, non una est divinae missionis ratio. Quamvis enim utraque sit cuiusdam personae divinae, tamen missio Filii est a Patre, missio autem Spiritus est a Patre Filioque. Quamvis etiam utraque sit in eundem finem ultimum, qui est civitas caelestis in gloriam Patris, prior tamen est missio Filii ad omnes homines Deo Patri reconciliandos, et consequens missio Spiritus ad singulos iustos reconciliatos. Quamvis praeterea utraque missio sit ut novae relationes personales inter Deum et homines instaurentur atque confirmentur, Filius tamen, cum aliam naturam praeter divinam assumpserit, non solum novas init relationes personales sed etiam per naturam assumptam et deinde per eos quos ipse misit, opera propria facit; sed Spiritus sanctus, cum aliam naturam praeter divinam non habeat, nihil proprium operatur sed cooperationum fundamentum ponit cum novas relationes personales per ipsam sui donationem confirmet. Denique tandem cum ad tantum opus in toto mundo per se vel per alios efficiendum mittantur ipsae divinae personae, non brevi quodam vocabulo terminus missionum assignatur, sed maximi operis stadia successiva distinguendo.

QUAESTIO XXX Utrum convenienter divinae personae mittantur, et Filius quidem visibiliter, invisibiliter autem Spiritus sanctus Respondeo convenientiam actionis aestimari secundum ordinationem ad finem, finem autem esse bonum, et ideo ex ratione boni ordiendum est ut deinde finis missionum divinarum clarius cognoscatur, et tertio, aptitudo earundem in hunc finem quoddamodo intelligatur. (1) Bonum ergo dupliciter dicitur: primum enim est bonum per essentiam, quod est ipsa divina perfectio; et hoc bonum nisi analogice hac in vita non cognoscimus; alterum autem est bonum per participationem, quod etiam bifariam dividitur. Sicut enim supra habitum est,75 in ipsa una divina perfectione duplex est perfectionis ratio, alia secundum actum, alia secundum ordinem; et similiter in rebus creatis una divina perfectio dupliciter participatur, uno modo secundum actum, alio modo secundum ordinem. Quare, distinguenda sunt bona particularia, quibus

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of our inheritance, is given with an ordination to eternal life, so that the mission of the Spirit tends to the same ultimate end as the mission of the Son. This being so, there is not one formality of divine mission. For although each mission is the sending of a divine person, the mission of the Son is from the Father while the mission of the Spirit is from the Father and the Son. Also, although each mission has the same ultimate end, which is the heavenly city for the glory of the Father, the first mission is that of the Son for the reconciliation of all human persons to God the Father, and the consequent mission of the Spirit is to each one of the just, who have been reconciled. Besides, although the two missions are for the sake of initiating and strengthening new personal relationships between God and human beings, the Son, having assumed another nature beside the divine, not only enters into new personal relationships but also through the nature he assumed, and then through those whom he has sent, performs works that are proper to himself; but the Holy Spirit, not having another nature besides the divine, does not do anything proper to himself, but provides the foundation for cooperation in that it is through the Spirit’s self-donation that the new personal relationships are strengthened. Finally, since the divine persons are sent to accomplish such a great task throughout the world by themselves or through others, the [external] term of the missions is assigned not in a brief statement, but rather by distinguishing the successive stages of this, the greatest of all works. QUESTION 30 Is it appropriate that the divine persons be sent, the Son visibly and the Spirit invisibly? We answer that the appropriateness of an action is determined according to its ordination to an end, that an end is a good, and therefore that we must begin from the notion of the good, so that we may then have a clearer knowledge of the end of the divine missions and, third, have some understanding of their aptness for this end. (1) ‘Good’ refers to two different things: the first is good by its very essence, and this is the divine perfection itself; in this life we do not know this good except analogically. The second is good by participation, and this in turn has a twofold division. For as we said above,75 in the one divine perfection there are two formalities of perfection, one that concerns act and the other that concerns order; and similarly among created things there is a twofold participation in the one divine perfection, one concerning act and the other concerning order. On this basis 75 Assertion 14.

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entia particularia secundum se perficiuntur, et bona ordinis, quae sunt totalitates quaedam concretae, dynamicae, ordinatae tum appetibilium, tum appetentium, tum operationum et fruitionum. Ita, verbi causa, distinguuntur singula bona oeconomica alicuius regionis et, alia ex parte, ipse ordo oeconomicus totius regionis; quem quidem ordinem esse bonum quoddam maximum omnino patet, cum particularia bona oeconomica valde augeantur vel minuantur prout ipsa tota oeconomia melius ordinetur vel in peius commutetur. Proinde, ipsum bonum ordinis dividi convenit: aliud enim est bonum ordinis quod in inanimatis et plantis et animalibus cernitur; aliud autem est bonum ordinis humanum, quod ab intelligentibus et volentibus efficitur, puta, societates domesticas, technologicas, oeconomicas, politicas, culturales, scientificas, religiosas. Porro, ad constituendum bonum ordinis humanum conspirant quinque: (1) multae personae, (2) habitus apprehensivi et appetitivi, (3) multae multorum operationes inter se ordinatae, (4) successio seriesque bonorum particularium, et (5) relationes interpersonales. Cum enim singulae personae multis perpetuo fere indigeant, requiritur successio seriesque bonorum particularium quibus bene vivitur. Cum singulae solae sibi vix sufficiant, requiruntur multae multorum operationes inter se ordinatae quibus fit series bonorum particularium. Cum homines sint potentiales et, vi naturae, indeterminati, 76 requiruntur habitus apprehensivi et appetitivi, ut fiant multae multorum operationes inter se ordinatae. Cum denique scientes et volentes tum habitus acquirant, tum operationes inter se ordinatas perficiant, tum bona particularia provenientia inter se distribuant, ipsum ordinis bonum tum sibi tum aliis volunt; sed velle bonum alicui est amare; 77 amoris autem effectus est illa unio atque mutua inhaesio,78 quae est optima inter relationes personales; et ideo bonum ordinis humanum relationes interpersonales inducit.

Cum tamen omne ordinis bonum sit quoddam intelligibile quod sensibus innotescere non possit, cumque homines ad intelligendum sint tardiores, haud mirum aestimari potest quod ad bonum ordinis perspiciendum atque volendum nisi pedetentim non pervenimus. Parvuli enim bona particularia appetimus; pueri autem ad seriem bonorum particularium (unde vita fiat bona) animadvertimus et ideo artes practicas libenter addiscimus; adolescentes necessitatem cooperationis

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we distinguish particular goods, by which particular beings are perfected in themselves, and goods of order, which are certain concrete, dynamic, and ordered totalities of desirable objects, of desiring subjects, of operations, and of results. So, for example, there is a distinction between the particular economic goods of a certain region and, on the other hand, the economic order of the region as a whole. It is quite clear that this order is a supreme good, since particular economic goods are greatly increased or diminished according to whether the overall economy is becoming better ordered or is deteriorating. Similarly, the good of order itself is appropriately divided as follows: there is the good of order that is found in inanimate things, in plants, and in animals; and there is the human good of order, which is produced by people understanding and willing. Thus, there are produced domestic, technological, economic, political, cultural, scientific, and religious organizations. Again, five elements come together to constitute the human good of order: (1) a certain number of persons, (2) cognitive and appetitive habits, (3) many coordinated operations among many persons, (4) a succession and series of particular goods, and (5) interpersonal relationships. For since every individual needs many things in a more or less steady stream, a succession and series of particular goods are required for living well. Since each person alone is hardly self-sufficient, many coordinated operations on the part of many individuals are required to produce a series of particular goods. Since human beings are potential and, by nature, indeterminate,76 cognitive and appetitive habits are required in order to have many coordinated operations involving many persons. Lastly, since persons who know and will acquire habits, perform coordinated operations, and distribute among themselves the particular goods being produced, they will the good of order itself both for themselves and for others; but to will good to someone is to love,77 and the effect of love is that union and mutual intimacy 78 which is the most excellent of personal relationships, and so the human good of order leads to interpersonal relationships. However, since every good of order is something intelligible, something that is not knowable by the senses, and since human beings are rather slow to understand, it cannot be thought strange that we only gradually arrive at understanding and willing the good of order. For as infants we want particular goods; as children we turn our attention to a series of particular goods (whereby life becomes good), and so we gladly learn practical skills; as adolescents we see the need for cooperation, 76 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 49. 77 Ibid. 1, q. 20, a. 1, ad 3m. 78 Ibid. 1-2, q. 28, aa. 1, 2.

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videmus et novas relationes personales conscii inimus; iuvenes ipsa ordinis bona concipimus, ordines meliores cogitamus, abusus deordinationesque impugnamus, reformationes et forte res novas desideramus; philosophi denique eo perveniunt ut, praeter bona particularia particularibus convenientia, etiam bonum ordinis agnoscant, quod quidem bonum est propter ipsam suam intelligibilitatem et propter participationem boni divini, quod a voluntate appetitur quia voluntas est appetitus intellectum sequens, quod a voluntate appeti potest etiam ubi ordinis bonum non appetenti sed aliis tantummodo bona particularia causat. 79 Praeterea, quamvis quinque quae enumeravimus elementa omnia quasi organice inter se cohaereant, attamen prioritatem quandam sibi vindicant relationes interpersonales. Quos enim diligimus, cum iis bona communicare volumus; ut bona fiant, libenter cum iis cooperamur; quo efficacior sit cooperatio, necessarios habitus acquirimus et defectus oppositos odio habemus; et ideo supposita dilectionis unione, caetera sequuntur quae bonum ordinis faciunt, uti maxime in matrimonio conspicitur. Quibus accedit quod praeter intellectum et voluntatem rationalem etiam in ipsa nostra sensibilitate per quandam intersubiectivitatem ad relationes interpersonales disponimur, uti patet ex ipsis phaenomenis praesentiae, sympathiae, transferentiae, etc. (2) Quibus de ratione boni perspectis, iam ad finem divinarum missionum transeundum est. Et finis ultimus quidem est ipsum bonum divinum per visionem immediatam communicandum, proximus autem est illud ordinis bonum quod, secundum varias analogias cum bonis ordinis humanis, vel regnum Dei, vel corpus Christi, vel ecclesia, vel mysticum Christi matrimonium cum ecclesia, vel oeconomia salutis, vel civitas Dei nominatur. Proximus enim finis dicitur regnum propter similitudinem cum bono ordinis politico, dicitur corpus propter similitudinem cum bono ordinis quod in organis unius corporis viget, dicitur ecclesia et civitas propter similitudinem cum bono ordinis sociali, dicitur matrimonium quoddam propter similitudinem cum bono ordinis domestico, dicitur oeconomia propter similitudinem cum bono ordinis in rebus materialibus exquirendis, producendis, administrandis. Quo quidem in ordinis bono inveniuntur omnia quae ad bonum ordinis constituendum conspirant. Sunt enim multae personae, cum pro omnibus mortuus 79 Neque obstat quod bonum dicitur sibi conveniens; convenit enim appetitui rationali rationem sequi; et rationem sequitur ubi ratio bonum obiectivum apprehendit. De bono obiectivo seu valore, cf. nostrum Insight, pp. 624–26.

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and consciously enter into new personal relationships; as young men and women we conceive the goods of order, we think of better orders, we protest against abuses and disorder, and we long for reform and perhaps even for revolution. Finally, philosophers reach the point where, besides recognizing particular goods that are appropriate for particular persons, they also recognize the good of order, which is good on account of its own intelligibility and its participation in the divine good, which is desired by the will because the will is an appetite that follows the intellect, and which can be desired by the will even when the good of order produces particular goods not for the one desiring them but for others only. 79 Furthermore, although the five elements we have listed all mutually cohere, as it were, organically, nevertheless interpersonal relationships claim a certain priority. For we want to communicate what is good to those whom we love; we gladly cooperate with them to bring about what is good; to make our cooperation more effective, we acquire the necessary habits and detest the contrary defects; and so, supposing the union of love, all the other things follow that make for the good of order, as is most plainly seen in marriage. In addition to this there is the fact that, besides a rational intellect and will, there is in our very sensibility an intersubjectivity that disposes us to interpersonal relationships, as is clearly evident from the phenomena of presence, sympathy, transference, and the like. (2) With these considerations about the nature of the good well understood, we must now go on to consider the end of the divine missions. The ultimate end is of course the divine good itself communicated immediately in the beatific vision, while the proximate end is that good of order which, according to various analogies with human goods of order, is called either the kingdom of God, or the body of Christ, or the church, or the mystical marriage of Christ with the church, or the economy of salvation, or the city of God. The proximate end is called a kingdom because of its similarity to a good political order, a body because of its similarity to the good of order that obtains among the organs of a single body, a church and a city because of its similarity to a social good of order, a marriage because of its similarity to a domestic good of order, and an economy because of its similarity to the good of order in acquiring, producing, and managing material things. In this good of order are found all the elements that come together to constitute a good of order. It includes many persons, since Christ died for all. There 79 The fact that the good is said to be appropriate to itself does not stand in the way of this last point. For it is appropriate for a rational appetite to follow reason; and it follows reason when reason apprehends an objective good. On objective good or value, see Insight 624–26.

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sit Christus. Sunt habitus apprehensivi et appetitivi, cum ex gratia sanctificante profluant virtutes infusae et dona Spiritus sancti. Sunt multae operationes inter se ordinatae, cum Christiani veterem hominem deponant, novam vitam vivant, invicem diligant. Sunt successio seriesque bonorum particularium, tum secundum fructum quem perpetuo affert nova in Christo vita, tum secundum ministerium verbi quo praedicatur evangelium omni creaturae, tum secundum ministerium vitae quod in sacrificio, sacerdotio, sacramentis cernitur, tum secundum hierarchiam quae ecclesiam ordinat atque perficit. Sunt denique relationes personales, cum Christiani invicem diligant sicut Christus eos dilexit, 80 et invicem diligentes Christum diligant,81 et Christum diligentes a Patre diligantur,82 et iis a Patre per Christum Spiritus sanctus mittatur.83 (3) Iam vero ad hoc ordinis bonum constituendum atque perficiendum convenienter mittuntur divinae personae. Quamvis enim caetera ordinis bona imitentur ad extra supremum illud ordinis bonum quod in ipsa SS. Trinitate deprehendatur, conveniens tamen fuit ut oeconomia salutis, quae in ipsam beatitudinem divinam participandam ordinatur, non solum SS. Trinitatis ordinem imitetur sed etiam ipsum hunc ordinem quodammodo participet. Qua de causa, ipsae divinae personae quae ab aeterno a Patre procedunt etiam ex tempore a Patre mittuntur ut novas relationes personales reconciliationis et dilectionis cum personis humanis instaurent atque confirment. Cui convenientiae accedit quod per missiones et clarius divinae personae revelentur et ardentius singulae diligantur. Praeterea, conveniebat ut alia divina persona visibiliter et alia invisibiliter mitteretur. Missionis enim duplex est finis: mittitur enim persona a persona ad personas tum ut quoddam bonum perficiatur tum ut novae relationes personales ineantur atque confirmentur. Iam vero, cum tam perfecta sit divinarum personarum cooperatio ut una et simplex et communis sit trium operatio, sequitur divinam personam qua divinam novas quidem relationes personales inire posse sed opera sibi propria facere non posse. Quare, cum missus sit Filius ut opus mediatoris et redemptoris perficeret, ei conveniebat aliam sibi assumere naturam eamque humanam secundum quam opera sibi propria facere potuit. Cum autem mittatur Spiritus sanctus ut novas relationes per Filium initas dono increato confirmet et vitae aeternae pignus existat, convenit ut invisibilis cordibus intimis inhabitet.

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are cognitive and appetitive habits, since from sanctifying grace flow the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. There are many coordinated operations, since Christians put off the old man, live a new life, and love one another. There are successions and series of particular goods, flowing from the benefits that the new life in Christ constantly produces, from the ministry of the word by which the gospel is preached to every creature, from the ministry of life that is seen in sacrifice, in the priesthood, and in the sacraments, and from the hierarchy that regulates and develops the church. Finally, there are the personal relationships that are formed when Christians love one another as Christ has loved them, 80 when in loving one another they love Christ,81 when in loving Christ they are loved by the Father,82 and when the Holy Spirit is sent to them by the Father through Christ.83 (3) Now, it is appropriate that the divine persons are sent to constitute and develop this good of order. For although the other goods of order externally imitate that supreme good of order that we observe in the Holy Trinity, nevertheless it was appropriate that the economy of salvation, which is ordered to participation in divine beatitude itself, should not only imitate the order of the Holy Trinity but also in some manner participate in that order. For this reason the very divine persons who from eternity proceed from the Father are also in time sent by the Father to initiate and strengthen new personal relations of reconciliation and love with human persons. In addition to this appropriateness is the fact that through the missions the divine persons are more clearly revealed, and each more ardently loved. Moreover, it was appropriate for one divine person to be sent visibly and the other invisibly. For a mission has a twofold end: a person is sent by a person to persons both so that a certain good might be accomplished and so that new personal relations might be initiated or strengthened. Now, since the cooperation among the divine persons is so perfect that there is one simple common operation of the Three, it follows that a divine person as divine can indeed enter into new personal relations but cannot perform works that are proper to himself. Since, therefore, the Son was sent to accomplish the work of mediator and redeemer, it was appropriate for him to assume a human nature in accord with which he was able to do works proper to himself. But since the Holy Spirit is sent to confirm by uncreated gift the new relations initiated by the Son and to be a pledge of eternal life, it is appropriate that he dwells invisibly in our inmost hearts. 80 81 82 83

John 15.12, 13.34. Matthew 25.31–46. John 14.21, 16.27. John 14.15–17.

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Quibus convenientiis multae et aliae accedunt. Mediatori enim conveniebat ut persona sit divina in natura humana ut homo homines doceret, et novae vitae exemplum daret, et in reconciliationem et dilectionem et aeternam vitam conduceret. Redemptori conveniebat ut ipse pro iis mori posset quos sibi mori et Deo vivere volebat. Mediatorem et redemptorem conveniebat esse Filium, qui secundum veritatem a Patre procedit et secundum sanctitatem spirat Amorem qui sanctus Spiritus est. Qui autem a Verbo Amorem spirante procedit, illi conveniebat propter Filium nobis mitti. Qui ab aeterno Donum est, ei conveniebat nobis dari ut hospes et pignus. Nobis pariter conveniebat ut per visibilem Filium et ad Patrem trahamur et a sensibilibus retrahamur et in invisibili Spiritu aeternam vitam desideremus et speremus.

QUAESTIO XXXI Utrum Filius etiam invisibiliter et Spiritus sanctus visibiliter mittantur Respondeo alios gratiae effectus magis intellectum, alios autem magis voluntatem respicere. Quae autem intellectum respiciunt, similitudinem quandam Filii exprimunt, qui est in divinis Verbum spirans Amorem. 84 Quae autem voluntatem respiciunt, similitudinem Spiritus sancti prae se ferunt, qui est in divinis Amor procedens. Inquantum ergo tres divinae personae hos effectus in creatura producunt, quae intellectum respiciunt per appropriationem Filio attribuuntur; 85 quae autem voluntatem respiciunt per appropriationem Spiritui sancto attribuuntur. 86 Et secundum hoc Filius etiam invisibiliter mitti dicitur. 87 Cum autem vita christiana, cui intus praesit Spiritus sanctus, sit ‘abscondita cum Christo in Deo,’88 conveniebat quibusdam signis exterioribus sensibiliter manifestari invisibilem Spiritus sancti missionem.89 Quae quidem manifestationes per speciem columbae et nubis lucidae et flatus et linguae igneae, in quibus est Spiritus sanctus tamquam signatum in signo,90 missiones visibiles dicuntur.

87 Quae quidem appropriatio respicit Filium qua Deum.

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To this appropriateness of the missions themselves many other instances of appropriateness can be added. It was appropriate for the Mediator that a divine person be in a human nature to teach human beings as a human being, to give them an example of the new life, and to lead them to reconciliation and love and eternal life. It was appropriate for the Redeemer that he was able to die for those whom he wished to die to themselves and live for God. It was appropriate for the Mediator and Redeemer to be the Son, who proceeds as truth from the Father and breathes as holiness that Love which is the Holy Spirit. It was appropriate for the one who proceeds from the Word spirating Love to be sent to us because of the Son. It was appropriate for the one who from eternity is Gift to be given to us as a guest and a pledge. It was likewise appropriate for us that we be drawn to the Father through the visible Son, and that we be drawn away from the realm of the senses, and that in the invisible Spirit we should desire and hope for everlasting life. QUESTION 31 Is the Son also sent invisibly and the Holy Spirit visibly?

Our answer to this question is that some effects of grace regard more the intellect and others more the will. Those that regard the intellect express a certain likeness to the Son, who in God is the Word spirating Love.84 Those that regard the will bear a likeness to the Holy Spirit, who in God is proceeding Love. Therefore, inasmuch as the three divine persons produce in a creature those effects that regard the intellect, these are attributed to the Son by appropriation, 85 while those that regard the will are attributed to the Holy Spirit by appropriation. 86 In this sense the Son is said to be sent invisibly.87 Since, however, the Christian life, which the Holy Spirit interiorly directs, is ‘hidden with Christ in God,’88 it was appropriate for the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit to be manifested sensibly by certain exterior signs. 89 These manifestations in the form of a dove, of a bright cloud, of wind, and of tongues of fire, in which the Holy Spirit is symbolized in a sign,90 are said to be visible missions. 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 43, a. 5, ad 2m. Ibid. ad 1m. Ibid. ad 3m. This appropriation refers to the Son as God. Colossians 3.3. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 43, a. 7. Ibid. ad 5m.

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QUAESTIO XXXII Utrum secundum caritatem divinae personae iustis insint atque inhabitent Respondeo circa hanc quaestionem duo esse consideranda, nempe ipsum factum et facti intelligentiam. Et circa ipsum factum, clara videtur Novi Testamenti doctrina. 1 Io 4.16: Deus caritas est, et qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Ibid. 13: In hoc cognoscimus quoniam in eo manemus et ipse in nobis, quoniam de Spiritu suo dedit nobis. Cf. Gal 4.6; Rom 8.14–17. Ibid. 8: Qui non diligit, non novit Deum, quoniam Deus caritas est. Io 15.4: Manete in me, et ego in vobis ... 5: Ego sum vitis, vos palmites; qui manet in me et ego in eo, hic fert fructum multum ... 9: Sicut dilexit me Pater, et ego dilexi vos. Manete in dilectione mea. Si praecepta mea servaveritis, manebitis in dilectione mea, sicut et ego Patris mei praecepta servavi et maneo in eius dilectione. Io 14.15: Si diligitis me, mandata mea servate. 16: Et ego rogabo Patrem, et alium paraclitum dabit vobis ut maneat vobiscum in aeternum, Spiritus veritatis, quem mundus non potest accipere quia non videt eum nec scit eum. 17: Vos autem cognoscetis eum quia apud vos manebit et in vobis erit. 20: In illo die vos cognoscetis quia ego sum in Patre meo, et vos in me, et ego in vobis. 21: Qui habet mandata mea et servat ea, ille est qui diligit me. Qui autem diligit me, diligetur a Patre meo; et ego diligam eum et manifestabo ei me ipsum. 23: Si quis diligit me, sermonem meum servabit, et Pater meus diliget eum, et ad eum veniemus, et mansionem apud eum faciemus.

Io 17.21 :... ut omnes unum sint sicut tu, Pater, in me et ego in te, ut et ipsi in nobis unum sint; ut credat mundus quia tu me misisti. 22: Et ego claritatem quam dedisti mihi dedi eis, ut sint unum sicut et nos unum sumus. 23: Ego in eis et tu in me, ut sint consummati in unum, et cognoscat mundus quia tu me misisti et dilexisti eos sicut et me dilexisti ... 26: Et notum feci eis nomen tuum, et notum faciam ut dilectio qua dilexisti me in ipsis sit et ego in ipsis.

Rom 7.17–18, 20: circa peccatum inhabitans atque operans. Rom 8.8: Qui autem in carne sunt Deo placere non possunt. 91 9: Vos autem in carne non estis sed in spiritu, si tamen Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis. Siquis autem Spiritum Christi

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QUESTION 32 Is it by way of love that the divine persons are in the just and dwell in them? With regard to this question, two points must be considered, namely, the fact itself and the understanding of the fact. As to the fact itself, the teaching of the New Testament seems quite clear. 1 John 4.16: ‘God is love, and those who abide in love abide in God, and God abides in them.’ Ibid. v. 13: ‘By this we know that we abide in him and he in us, because he has given us of his Spirit.’ See Galatians 4.6; Romans 8.14–17. Ibid. v. 8: ‘Whoever does not love does not know God, for God is love.’ John 15.4: ‘Abide in me as I abide in you . . .’; v. 5: ‘I am the vine, you are the branches. Those who abide in me and I in them bear much fruit . . .’; v. 9: ‘As the Father has loved me, so I have loved you; abide in my love. If you keep my commandments, you will abide in my love, as I have kept my Father’s commandments and abide in his love.’ John 14.15: ‘If you love me, you will keep my commandments’; v. 16: ‘I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Advocate, to be with you for ever. This is the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it neither sees him nor knows him’; v. 17: ‘You know him, because he abides with you, and he will be in you’; v. 20: ‘On that day you will know that I am in my Father, and you in me, and I in you’; v. 21: ‘They who have my commandments and keep them are those who love me; and those who love me will be loved by my Father, and I will love them and reveal myself to them’; v. 23: ‘Those who love me will keep my word, and my Father will love them, and we will come to them and make our home with them.’ John 17.21: ‘. . . that they all may be one. As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be one in us, so that the world may believe that you have sent me’; v. 22: ‘The glory that you have given me I have given them, so that they may be one as we are one, [v. 23] I in them and you in me, that they may become completely one, so that the world may know that you have sent me and have loved them as you have loved me’; v. 26: ‘I made your name known to them, and I will make it known, so that the love with which you have loved me may be in them, and I in them.’ Romans 7.17–18, 20: concerning sin as inhabiting and working [in us]. Romans 8.8–11: ‘. . . those who are in the flesh cannot please God. 91 But you are not in the flesh; you are in the Spirit, since the Spirit of God dwells in you. 91 See Romans 8.1.

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non habet, hic non est eius. 10: Si autem Christus in vobis est, corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum, spiritus vero vivit propter iustificationem. 11: Quod si Spiritus eius qui suscitavit Iesum a mortuis habitat in vobis, qui suscitavit Iesum Christum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra propter inhabitantem Spiritum eius in vobis. Cf. 1 Cor 2.16 s.; 6.15–20; 13; 2 Cor 5.14–21; 2 Tim 1.13 s.

Iam vero ex his et aliis fere innumeris92 constat de mutuo quodam inesse, quod importat non solum donum Dei increatum sed etiam actus nostros quibus habitualiter mandata Christi servamus secundum caritatem. Quod quidem inhabitare, dari, habere, frui interpretatur S. Thomas secundum quod per gratiam gratum facientem Deus iustis inest sicut cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante. 93 Quod quid significet, ex sensibilibus incipientes et paullatim ad altiora procedentes determinare debemus. Primo ergo aspectu praesentia videtur esse propinquitas localis. At lapis lapidi propinqua esse potest quin tamen lapidem lapidi praesentem vel absentem concipiamus. Deinde, praesentia videtur esse adaptatio quaedam psychica quae propinquitatem localem sequitur. Ita cum animal animali obviam fit, ex signis exterioribus ad totam quandam adaptationem sensitivam et internam concludere possumus. Quod si praesentia in tali adaptatione ponitur, ipsa propinquitas localis non est nisi conditio praesentiae. Tertio, quamvis alia animalia nulla phantasmata formare videantur nisi ea quae in sensibilibus immediatis fundentur, homo, cum per intellectum in totum ens cognoscendum procedat, maxima quadam imaginationis libertate utitur. 94 Quare praeter rei propinquitatem, propter solam memoriam praeteriti vel imaginationem futuri haud parum commoveri potest atque solet. Quapropter, si praesentia in adaptatione quadam psychica consistit, in homine duplicem praesentiam distinguere debemus, aliam nempe quae propinquitatem localem consequitur et aliam quae in ipsa libertate partis sensitivae et humanae fundatur.

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Anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him. But if Christ is in you, though the body is dead because of sin, the Spirit is life because of righteousness. If the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ from the dead will give life to your mortal bodies also through his Spirit that dwells in you.’ See also 1 Corinthians 2.16–17, 6.15–20; 13; 2 Corinthians 5.14–21; 2 Timothy 1.13–14. From these and almost countless other texts,92 there is clearly a mutual ‘being in’ that implies not only the uncreated gift of God but also our acts, by which we habitually keep Christ’s commandments through love. St Thomas interprets this indwelling, gift, possessing, and enjoying in accord with the fact that through the grace that renders us pleasing God is in the just as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover.93 We must determine what this means by beginning from objects of sense and gradually proceeding to higher realities. At first glance, then, presence would seem to be spatial proximity. But one stone can be close to another, and yet we do not think of stones being present to or absent from one another. Second, presence would seem to be a certain psychic adaptation resulting from spatial proximity. Thus, when one animal meets another we can conclude from external signs that a total internal sensitive adaptation has occurred. But if presence is seen as this sort of adaptation, then spatial proximity is only a condition for presence. Third, although other animals apparently form only those phantasms that are grounded in immediate sense experience, humans, since they proceed by intellect to the whole of being as the to-be-known, employ the utmost freedom of imagination.94 Therefore, even apart from the proximity of an object, they can be and generally are greatly moved merely by remembering the past or by imagining some future possibility. Hence, if presence consists in a certain psychic adaptation, we must distinguish two kinds of presence in humans, one that results from spatial proximity and another that is based upon the very freedom of human sensibility. 92 See the encyclical ‘Mystici corporis,’ 29 June 1943; Sebastian Tromp, Corpus Christi, quod est ecclesia, 3 vol. (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1946–60; English translation by Ann Condit, The Body of Christ, Which Is the Church, New York: Vantage Press, 1960); Emile Mersch, Le Corps mystique du Christ, 2 vol. (2nd ed., Louvain: Museum Lessianum, 1936; 3rd ed. rev. and augm., Paris: Descl´ee de Brouwer, 1951; English translation of 2nd ed. by John R. Kelly, The Whole Christ, Milwaukee: Bruce, 1938, 1956); and so on. 93 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 43, a. 3. 94 [See above, p. 407, note 24.]

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Quarto, homo persona est, non quia animal sit et parte sensitiva utatur, sed quia naturam intellectualem habet et secundum eam operatur. Quare, si de praesentia personae ad personam sermo fiet, sane non excludendae sunt operationes personis propriae. Praeterea, id quod cognoscitur, secundum esse quoddam intentionale in cognoscente est; et id quod amatur, amanti coniungitur atque unitur, secundum quod poeta amicum affirmavit dimidium animae suae. Quapropter, id ipsum quod est cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante etiam praesentia quaedam est; et cum hae operationes, quatenus in parte intellectiva perficiantur, personis sint propriae, haec praesentia personalis dici potest. Ulterius, nisi per multos actus non pervenimus ad personam quandam vere cognoscendam; neque per multos actus acquiritur cognitio quin eo ipso habitus cognoscendi acquiratur; et ideo in habitu fundatur illa cognitio secundum quam persona vere cognita cognoscenti inest. Praeterea, quamvis unus alterve actus voluntatis impulsionem quandam ad unionem constituere possit, tamen sine habitu amoris non habentur illi actus amoris quibus manifestatur amantium unio; et ideo in habitu fundatur ille amor secundum quem persona amata amanti inest tamquam alter ipse. Praesentia ergo personalis ita secundum actus consideratur ut tamen actus in habitibus fundentur. Quod si praesentiam personalem ab obsessione distinguimus, etiam dicendum est hanc praesentiam non actus continuos exigere sed eam frequentiam quae ex habitibus oriri solet. Sicut enim qui domum quandam habitat semper in domo inclusus non manet, ita qui alium sibi praesentem habet nihilominus de multis et diversis cogitat, vult, operatur. Quod quidem melius intelligitur si ad rationem boni ordinis reditur. Uti enim supra habitum est,95 quasi organice inter se connectuntur (1) personae, (2) relationes interpersonales, (3) habitus apprehensivi et appetitivi, (4) multae multorum operationes inter se ordinatae, et (5) series successioque bonorum particularium. Quae quidem omnia simul sumpta bonum ordinis intelligibile constituunt. At cum eadem sint quae praesentiam personalem constituant, dicendum est, qua perfectione habeatur bonum ordinis, eadem haberi praesentiam personalem, et similiter qua perfectione habeatur praesentia personalis, eadem perfectione haberi bonum ordinis. Praesentiam ergo multiplici sensu distinximus: alia enim consideratur secundum propinquitatem localem, secundum quam lapis lapidi esset praesens vel

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Fourth, human beings are persons not because they are animals and use their senses, but because they have an intellectual nature and operate in accordance with it. If, therefore, we are speaking about the presence of one person to another, surely we must not leave out of the discussion the operations that are proper to persons. Besides, that which is known is in the knower with an intentional existence, and what is loved is joined and united to the lover, as the poet says about his friend being ‘half of my soul.’ Therefore the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover are also instances of presence; and since these operations of knowing and loving, insofar as they are performed in the intellectual part of our being, are proper to persons, this presence can be called personal presence. Further, only through many acts do we arrive at true knowledge of a person; and we do not acquire knowledge through many acts without thereby acquiring also a habit of knowing; and so it is a habit that provides the foundation of that knowledge by which a person who is truly known is in the knower. Again, although one or other act of the will can constitute an impulse towards union, still without a habit of love there will not be those acts of love that manifest the union of the lovers; and so it is a habit that provides the foundation of that love by which a person who is loved is in the lover as another self. We understand personal presence, therefore, on the basis of acts, but in such a way that the acts have their foundation in habits. But if we distinguish personal presence from obsession, we must also say that this presence requires not continuous acts but only that frequency that generally results from habits. Just as someone who lives in a house does not stay in the house all the time, so someone who has another person present to himself or herself still thinks about and wills and does many different things. For a better understanding of this, we return to the idea of the good of order. For as we said above,95 (1) persons, (2) interpersonal relationships, (3) cognitive and appetitive habits, (4) many coordinated operations among many persons, and (5) a succession and series of particular goods, are, as it were, organically interconnected. All these elements taken together constitute an intelligible good of order. But since these are the same elements that constitute personal presence, it must be said that the degree of perfection by which the good of order is achieved is the same as that by which personal presence is achieved, and similarly, that the degree of perfection by which personal presence is achieved is the same as that by which the good of order is achieved. We have, then, distinguished several meanings of ‘presence.’ One sort of presence is a matter of spatial proximity, and on this basis one stone would be present 95 Question 30. [Note that the order in which the five elements are mentioned here is not the same as the order in which they were mentioned in question 30.]

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absens; alia, secundum adaptationem sensitivam quae propinquitatem localem consequitur; alia animalibus rationalibus propria quae solummodo memoriam praeteriti vel imaginationem futuri supponit; alia denique personalis, secundum quam personae, commune ordinis bonum prosequentes, mutuo insunt ad modum cogniti in cognoscente et amati in amante. Quibus perspectis, ad Deum trinum ascendamus ut deinceps oeconomiam salutis aliqualiter intelligere nitamur. Primo, ergo, ipse Deus sibi inest ad modum cogniti in cognoscente et amatum in amante. Omne enim verbum mentis est, secundum esse intelligibile, id ipsum quod per verbum cognoscitur. Iam vero Deus se per verbum dicit, et ideo illud verbum est Deus secundum esse intelligibile. Sed in Deo idem est esse quod intelligere; et ideo esse Dei naturale est idem quod esse Dei intelligibile. Quod ergo in Deo est per modum cogniti Dei in Deo cognoscente, non solum secundum esse intelligibile sed etiam secundum esse naturale Deus est. Verbum ergo Dei Deus est. Praeterea, eo ipso quod amicus amatur efficitur quaedam quasi identificatio amici cum amante; unde et amicus dicitur alter ipse, et a poeta nominatur dimidium animae suae. Amici enim bonum ordinis commune prosequentes et ordinate cooperantes et successione bonorum particularium fruentes, adeo non singuli seorsum sibi vivunt ut potius unam pluribus communem vitam habeant. Iam vero Deus se diligit; quae quidem divina Dei dilectio non solum quandam quasi identificationem importat sed etiam omnimodam identitatem; divinum enim velle est ipse Deus; et ideo Spiritus sanctus, qui in Deo procedit ut dilectio, Deus est. Praeterea, Deus Pater est in Filio, et Filius est in Patre, tam ut cogniti in cognoscentibus quam ut amati in amantibus. ‘Et nemo novit Filium nisi Pater; neque Patrem quis novit nisi Filius, et cui voluerit Filius revelare.’ 96 ‘. . . quia dilexisti me ante constitutionem mundi.’97 ‘. . . sicut et ego . . . maneo in eius dilectione.’ 98 Quorum enim unum est esse et intelligere et scire et diligere, quod quidem ipsi sunt, ii perfectissime mutuo insunt.

Praeterea, omnia alia quae praeter Deum sunt a Deo et cognoscuntur et amantur. Quae etiam Deo insunt ut cognita in cognoscente et amata in amante, non quidem ad consubstantialitatem divinae naturae, sed secundum esse intentionale et secundum illam quandam quasi identificationem amoris. Attamen alios quidem

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to or absent from another. Another sort of presence has to do with the adaptation of sensibility resulting from spatial proximity. A third sort of presence, proper to rational animals, supposes only a remembrance of the past or the imagining of some future possibility. Finally, there is personal presence whereby persons, pursuing a common good of order, are mutually in one another as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover. From these considerations let us ascend to consider the triune God in order from there to strive for some understanding of the economy of salvation. First, then, God is in himself as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover. For every mental word is, in the order of intelligible existence, the very thing that is known through that word. Now, God expresses himself through a word, and therefore that word is God in the order of intelligible existence. But in God to be is the same as to understand, and therefore God’s natural existence is the same as God’s intelligible existence. Hence, what is in God, in the way God the known is in God the knower, is God, not only in the order of intelligible existence but also in the order of natural existence. Thus, the Word of God is God. Further, by the very fact that a friend is loved there results a quasi-identification of the friend with the lover. Thus, a friend is said to be a second self, or as the poet says, ‘half of my soul.’ For friends who pursue a common good of order, work together in an orderly way, and enjoy a succession of particular goods, are so far from living each one for himself or herself that they may rather be said to have one life in common. Now, God loves himself. This divine love of God implies not only a quasi-identification, but even a total identity. For divine willing is God himself, and therefore the Holy Spirit, who proceeds in God as Love, is God. Moreover, God the Father is in the Son, and the Son is in the Father, both as the known in those who know them and the beloved in those who love them. ‘. . . and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him.’ 96 ‘. . . because you loved me before the foundation of the world.’ 97 ‘. . . just as I . . . abide in his love.’98 Those whose being and understanding and knowing and loving are one and the same and are indeed that which they themselves are, are in one another in the most perfect way. Besides, all other things apart from God are known and loved by God. These also are in God as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover, not, of course, in the consubstantiality of the divine nature, but according to intentional existence and the quasi-identification of those in love. Still, God knows and loves 96 Matthew 11.27; see John 10.15. 97 John 17.24. 98 John 15.10.

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cognoscit et diligit Deus secundum quod convenit perfectioni eorum naturae; alios autem ‘praescivit et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus.’99 Et qui sic specialiter cognoscuntur et diliguntur specialiter etiam Deo inesse perspiciuntur tamquam cogniti in cognoscente et amati in amante. Specialiter ergo insunt Verbo divino quo Deus Pater et se et omnia alia dicit;100 et specialiter insunt Dilectioni divinae procedenti qua Deus Pater et Deus Filius et se et omnia alia diligunt. 101

Deinde, ad Dominum et Mediatorem, Verbum divinum hominem factum, convertamur. Qui quidem non omnes cognoscit qui clamant, ‘Domine, Domine’; 102 sed ‘ego sum pastor bonus et cognosco meas et cognoscunt me meae.’ 103 Neque suos cognoscit quin eos diligat; imo ‘sicut dilexit me Pater, et ego dilexi vos’; 104 et ‘maiorem hac dilectionem nemo habet, ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis.’105 Neque oves pastorem cognoscunt quin eum diligant. Sicut enim ipse pastor scivit, ‘Et ego, si exaltatus fuero a terra, omnia traham ad me ipsum.’ 106 Sicut et exclamavit apostolus, ‘Ego enim per legem legi mortuus sum ut Deo vivam. Christo confixus sum cruci. Vivo autem iam non ego, vivit vero in me Christus. Quod autem nunc vivo in carne, in fide vivo Filii Dei, qui dilexit me et tradidit semet ipsum pro me.’107 Sicut et pro aliis orat apostolus, ‘ut det vobis secundum divitias gloriae suae virtute corroborari per Spiritum eius in interiorem hominem, Christum habitari per fidem in cordibus vestris, in caritate radicati et fundati, ut possitis comprehendere cum omnibus sanctis quae sit latitudo et longitudo, et sublimitas et profundum; scire etiam supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi, ut impleamini in omnem plenitudinem Dei.’108 Sicut et pro aliis conclusit apostolus, ‘Caritas enim Christi urget (continet) nos; aestimantes hoc, quoniam si unus pro omnibus mortuus est, ergo omnes mortui sunt, et pro omnibus mortuus est Christus, ut et qui vivunt iam non sibi vivant, sed ei qui pro ipsis mortuus est

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others in accordance with what suits the perfection of their nature; but there are still others whom ‘he foreknew [and] predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn among many brothers and sisters.’99 And those who are known and loved in this special way are also seen to be present in God in a special way as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover. Therefore in a special way they are in the divine Word in which God the Father utters himself and all other things;100 and in a special way they are in the divine proceeding Love in which God the Father and God the Son love both themselves and all other things as well.101 Next, let us turn to the Lord and Mediator, the divine Word incarnate. He does not know all of those who cry, ‘Lord, Lord,’102 but, ‘I am the good shepherd. I know my own and my own know me.’103 Nor does he know his own without loving them; indeed, ‘As the Father has loved me, so I have loved you’; 104 and, ‘No one has greater love than this, to lay down one’s life for one’s friends.’ 105 And the sheep do not know their shepherd without loving him. For, as the shepherd himself knew, ‘And I, when I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all things to myself.’106 As also the apostle Paul exclaimed, ‘For through the law I died to the law, so that I might live to God. I have been crucified with Christ; and it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me. And the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself up for me.’107 And as the apostle prays for others, ‘that, according to the riches of his glory, he may grant that you may be strengthened in your inner being with power through his Spirit, and that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith, as you are being rooted and grounded in love. I pray that you may have the power to comprehend, with all the saints, what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge, so that you may be filled with all the fullness of God.’108 And as the apostle concludes for others, ‘For the love of Christ urges us on, because we are convinced that one has died for all; therefore all have died. And he died for all, so that those who live might live no longer for themselves, but for him who died and was raised for them. From 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108

Romans 8.29. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 34, a. 3. [See above, question 3, pp. 212–17.] Ibid. q. 37, a. 2. Matthew 7.23. John 10.14. John 15.9. John 15.13. John 12.32. [‘All things,’ Vulg., omnia, Gk. panta, a variant reading.] Galatians 2.19–20. Ephesians 3.16–19.

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et resurrexit. Itaque nos ex hoc neminem novimus secundum carnem. Et si cognovimus secundum carnem Christum, sed nunc iam non novimus. Si qua ergo in Christo, nova creatura; vetera transierunt: ecce facta sunt omnia nova.’ 109 Quos ergo cognoscit et diligit Christus homo, et qui Christo homini credunt eumque diligunt, neque sibi sed ei vivunt, mutuo sane insunt atque inhabitant ut cogniti in cognoscentibus et amati in amantibus. Tertio, sicut mediatoris erat non suam doctrinam docere neque suam voluntatem quaerere sed eius qui misit eum, ita etiam Christus membra sui corporis non sibi unit quin ea Deo Patri uniat. Ipse enim Pater prior dilexit nos; 110 et ipse erat in Christo mundum reconcilians sibi;111 et ‘qui videt me, videt et Patrem’;112 et ‘qui autem diligit me, diligetur a Patre meo’;113 et ‘dilexisti eos sicut et me dilexisti’;114 et ‘si diligitis me, . . . alium paraclitum dabit vobis . . . apud vos manebit et in vobis erit.’115 Quae omnia, simul sumpta, dicunt: ‘sicut tu, Pater, in me et ego in te, ut et ipsi in nobis unum sint.’116 Quem sane unitatis finem non assequimur nisi, mandatum Christi servantes, invicem diligimus sicut et ipse Christus dilexit nos; imo qui proximum diligit, eo ipso Christum diligit; et qui proximum esurientem vel sitientem vel hospitem vel nudum vel infirmum vel in carcere non diligit, Christum non diligit, sicut et testatus est ipse iudex venturus. 117

Quibus perspectis, concluditur et ipsas divinas personas et beatos in caelo et iustos his in terris mutuo inesse sicut cogniti in cognoscentibus et amati in amantibus. Quod quidem cognoscere et amare attenditur tum circa finem ultimum, quod est ipsum bonum per essentiam, tum circa finem proximum, quod est commune ordinis bonum et regnum Dei et corpus Christi et ecclesia. Consequens autem mutuum inesse differt pro uniuscuiusque natura atque statu: divinae enim personae mutuo insunt secundum consubstantialitatem; iusti autem Deo et invicem insunt secundum esse intentionale et secundum illam quandam quasi identifica-

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now on, therefore, we regard no one from a human point of view; even though we once knew Christ from a human point of view, we know him no longer in that way. So if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation: everything old has passed away; see, everything has become new!’109 Those, therefore, whom Christ the man knows and loves and who believe in Christ the man and love him, live not for themselves but for him, and Christ and they surely live and dwell in one another as those who are known are in those who know them and those who are loved are in those who love them. Third, as it was the function of the Mediator not to teach a doctrine of his own but that of the one who sent him, nor to seek his own will but that of the one who sent him, so also Christ does not unite the members of his body with himself without uniting them with God the Father. For the Father first loved us, 110 and he was in Christ reconciling the world to himself. 111 ‘Whoever has seen me has seen the Father’;112 ‘those who love me will be loved by my Father’;113 ‘you . . . have loved them even as you have loved me.’114 ‘If you love me, . . . he will give you another Advocate ... he abides with you, and he will be in you.’ 115 All of these are summed up in the words, ‘. . . as you, Father, are in me, and I am in you, may they also be one in us.’116 We surely do not arrive at this ultimate unity unless, by keeping Christ’s commandments, we love one another as Christ has loved us. Indeed, one who loves one’s neighbor, by that very fact loves Christ; and one who does not love one’s neighbor who is hungry or thirsty or a stranger or naked or sick or in prison does not love Christ, as the future Judge himself has testified. 117 From all of this we conclude that the divine persons themselves and the blessed in heaven and the just on this earth are in one another as those who are known are in those who know them and those who are loved are in those who love them. This knowing and loving is directed both to the ultimate end, which is the good itself by essence, and to the proximate end, which is the general good of order, the kingdom of God, the body of Christ, the church. This consequent mutual ‘being in,’ however, differs according to each one’s nature and status: the divine persons are in one another through consubstantiality; the just are in God and in one another by way of intentional existence and the quasi-identification of love. 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117

2 Corinthians 5.14–17. 1 John 4.10, 19. 2 Corinthians 5.19. John 14. 9. John 14.21; see 16.27. John 17.23; see 17.26. John 14.15–17. John 17.21. Matthew 25.31–46.

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tionem amoris; in Verbo autem sumus ut cogniti et amati tum secundum naturam eius divinam tum secundum naturam eius humanam; et Verbum nobis inest ut, hominem sensibilem cognoscentes et diligentes, in Deum, qui lucem inhabitat inaccessibilem,118 cognoscendum atque diligendum perveniamus; et quia prior cognitio et dilectio nobis facilior est cum sensitivam nostram praeteriti memoriam et imaginationem futuri includat, per eam in altiorem manuducimur in qua nunc iam non secundum carnem Christum novimus, sed intus in nobis intelligibiliter secundum emanationem veritatis dicitur verbum nostrum Verbi divini, et secundum emanationem sanctitatis spiratur dilectio nostra divinae Dilectionis. Mittuntur enim divinae personae secundum ipsas earum processiones aeternas ut nobis obviam fiant atque inhabitent secundum similes processiones in nobis per gratiam productas. Qui autem a Patre procedunt et mittuntur, sine Patre non veniunt, cui per Filium in Spiritu sit omnis gloria. ASSERTUM XVIII Divinarum personarum inhabitatio, quamvis in actibus magis sit atque cognoscatur, per statum tamen gratiae constituitur.119

Primo, est haec inhabitatio quod personae divinae et iusti mutuo insunt tamquam cogniti in cognoscentibus et dilecti in diligentibus. De praesentia enim agitur non

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We are in the Word, however, as known and loved through both his divine and his human nature; and the Word is in us in order that in knowing and loving a visible human being we may arrive at knowing and loving God, who dwells in unapproachable light.118 And because this prior knowledge and love is easier for us, since it includes our sense memory of the past and our imagination of the future, we are led through it to that higher knowledge and love in which we no longer know Christ from a human point of view, but our inner word of the divine Word is spoken in us intelligently according to the emanation of truth, and our love of divine Love is spirated according to the emanation of holiness. For the divine persons are sent in accordance with their eternal processions, to encounter us and dwell in us in accordance with similar processions produced in us through grace. Those who proceed from and are sent by the Father do not come without the Father, to whom be all glory through the Son in the Spirit. ASSERTION 18 Although the indwelling of the divine persons exists more in acts and is better known in acts, still it is constituted through the state of grace. 119 First, this indwelling is the fact that the divine persons and the just are in one another as the known are in those who know them and the beloved are in those 118 1 Timothy 6.16. 119 [Two points are worth mentioning here. First, Lonergan has a meaning for the phrase ‘the state of grace’ that is different from common usage. Except in one instance (see p. 515), he does not speak here of individual persons, as individuals, being in a state of grace. Rather, the ‘state’ or ‘situation’ of grace refers to many different subjects together. See below, under Sixth, where a distinction is made between a habit of grace and the state of grace. Second, Lonergan is not saying that the state of grace is somehow the cause of the divine indwelling; to translate ‘per statum ... gratiae’ as ‘by the state of grace’ might imply such a misunderstanding more than does the translation ‘through the state of grace.’ What is constituted through this state is a divine-human interpersonal situation; and here Lonergan is using ‘constitution’ in a less precise sense than earlier. He had said that ‘constituted’ is used by analogy to the constitution of a finite being: just as a finite being is composed of and constituted by intrinsic principles, so infinite being is constituted by the infinite and absolutely simple perfection. The state of grace, in Lonergan’s sense, is neither a finite being nor infinite being, but a divine-human interpersonal situation, the divine indwelling. He does not say that it is constituted by infinite and absolutely simple divine perfection. Rather, if there is the Father’s love because of the Son, if there is the Spirit as sent, if there are the consequent terms sanctifying grace and the habit of charity, and the other virtues and gifts that flow from sanctifying grace, then there is constituted a divine-human interpersonal situation.]

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lapidis lapidibus sed personae personis. Deinde, haec inhabitatio in actibus magis est et magis cognoscitur. Magis est, nam ratio cognitionis et dilectionis magis verificatur in actu quam in potentia vel in habitu. Magis cognoscitur, nam unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est actu. Tertio, per intermissionem actuum non eo ipso tollitur vel interrumpitur inhabitatio. Hoc enim satis superque suadent voces sacrae scripturae, ut ‘manere,’ ‘vivere,’ ‘inhabitare,’ ‘esse in Christo,’ ‘esse in Spiritu’; neque dubitant theologi. Quarto, sicut potentia vel habitus per actum cognoscitur, ita per actum optimum maximum optime maxime cognoscitur. Quamvis enim parvuli et dormientes et morbo laborantes et insanientes et moribundi vere et realiter sint homines, tamen eos neque unice neque praecipue adimus ut naturam humanam qualis sit determinemus. Pariter, quamvis in statu gratiae esse possint vel parvuli vel dormientes vel venialiter peccantes vel mox mortaliter peccaturi, neque unice neque principaliter eos considerare debemus ut rationem inhabitationis perspiciamus. Quare, in unoquoque eo magis inhabitationis ratio perspici potest quo magis non sibi sed Christo vivit, in Christo manet, in spiritu est; neque tamen factum inhabitationis ideo est negandum quia ab oculis humanis non videtur, tum quia introspectiva analysis valde difficilis est, tum quia de supernaturalibus internis non datur scientia stricte dicta, tum quia iudicium est non penes subiectum neque alios homines sed penes Dominum. Quinto, distinguenda sunt tria quae sub nomine gratiae veniunt, nempe, (1) favor alicuius erga aliquem, (2) donum ab illo huic collatum, (3) huius gratitudo animi. 120 Et ideo circa gratiam divinam pariter distinguuntur quod (1) Pater propter Filium suum hominem iustos Spiritu sancto diligit atque donat, (2) hanc dilectionem atque donationem consequitur gratia sanctificans, quae est habitus entitativus absolute supernaturalis in essentia animae receptus, 121 et (3) ex hoc habitu quasi naturaliter profluunt virtutes et dona unde inferior pars animae subditur rationi et ratio subditur Deo, et ideo habetur illa interna rectitudo atque iustitia qua iusti prompte a Deo moventur in ordine ad vitam aeternam. 122

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who love them. We are not speaking here about the presence of a stone to stones but of a person to persons. Second, this indwelling exists more in acts and is better known in acts. The reason it exists more in acts is that the formality of knowledge and of love is verified more in act than in potency or habit. The indwelling is better known in acts, for each thing is known insofar as it is in act. Third, the discontinuity of acts does not automatically terminate or interrupt the indwelling. There is more than enough emphasis on this point from such words in scripture as ‘abide,’ ‘live,’ ‘dwell in,’ ‘being in Christ,’ ‘being in the Spirit.’ And there has never been any doubt about this on the part of theologians. Fourth, as a potency or a habit is known through act, so it is known in the very best way through the very best act. For although children and the sleeping and the sick and the insane and the moribund are really and truly human persons, still we do not go only or mainly to them in order to determine what human nature is. Similarly, although children or the sleeping or those who sin venially or those who are about to sin mortally can be in the state of grace, we must not consider only or mainly such persons in order to understand the nature of the indwelling. Hence, the nature of the indwelling can better be understood in each person the more he or she lives not for himself or herself but for Christ, abides in Christ, and is in the Spirit. Still, the fact of indwelling is not to be denied on the grounds that it is not seen by human eyes, because introspective analysis is very difficult, because there is no science in the strict sense about the interior supernatural life, and because it is not for its subject or for other persons to judge it, but for the Lord. Fifth, there is a distinction to be made among three things that are called ‘grace.’ They are (1) one person’s favor toward another, (2) a gift given by the former to the latter, and (3) the gratitude felt by the latter.120 Therefore, with regard to divine grace we similarly distinguish (1) that the Father loves and gives to the just by the Holy Spirit because of his incarnate Son, (2) that there follows upon this love and giving sanctifying grace, which is an absolutely supernatural entitative habit received in the essence of the soul,121 and (3) that from this habit there flow, naturally as it were, virtues and gifts whereby the lower part of the soul is subordinated to reason and reason is subordinated to God, whereupon there results that inner rectitude and justice by which the just are readily moved by God towards eternal life, to which they are oriented.122 120 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 110, a. 1. [This distinction may work for the Latin gratia, but it does not hold for the English ‘grace.’] 121 Ibid. a. 3. 122 Ibid. a. 2; q. 113, a. 1.

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Quae tamen tria non ideo distinguuntur ut quasi separentur. Quamvis enim tria sunt dilectio donumque increatum, et habitus gratiae sanctificantis, et orientatio animae iustificatae, uno intelligibili ordine inter se alligantur. Quia enim contingens est dilectio atque donatio, requiritur terminus ad extra conveniens tamquam conditio consequens; et ideo ad primum sequitur alterum. Quia vero virtutes et dona ex gratia sanctificante profluunt sicut potentiae ex essentia animae, eo quod ponitur gratia sanctificans etiam ponuntur et orientatio animae iustificatae et promptitudo ad agendum sub motu divino; unde non solum ad secundum sequitur tertium, sed etiam ex primo sequitur divina motio ad actus secundum virtutes donaque exserendos. Sexto, distinguendum est ulterius inter habitum gratiae et statum seu situationem gratiae. Habitus gratiae est accidens quoddam physicum in anima iusti receptum. Status vero seu situatio gratiae simul multa et distincta subiecta respicit. Ita ad statum gratiae constituendum requiruntur (1) Pater qui diligit, (2) Filius propter quem Pater diligit, (3) Spiritus sanctus quo Pater diligit atque donat, et (4) ipsi iusti qui a Patre propter Filium Spiritu sancto diliguntur atque donantur, qui consequenter gratia sanctificante ornantur unde fluunt virtutes et dona, unde sunt iusti et recti et prompti ad actus in ordine ad vitam aeternam recipiendos eliciendosque.123 Septimo, per hunc statum ergo constituitur situatio quaedam interpersonalis divino-humana. Secundum hunc statum divinae personae atque iusti mutuo insunt tamquam cogniti in cognoscentibus et dilecti in diligentibus. 124 Qui sane status in actibus magis est magisque cognoscitur, quin tamen per solam actuum intermissionem tollatur. Qualis autem sit hic status seu situatio, eo clarius elucet quo perfectiores considerantur habitus actusque.

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Still, these three are not to be so sharply distinguished as to be separated. For although love and uncreated gift, the habit of sanctifying grace, and the orientation of the justified soul are three realities, they are linked to one another in a single intelligible order. Since the love and giving are contingent, they require an appropriate external term as a consequent condition, and so the second follows the first. But since the virtues and the gifts flow from sanctifying grace as potencies flow from the essence of the soul, from the very fact that there is sanctifying grace there is also both the orientation of the justified soul and its readiness to act under divine influence. Thus, not only does the third follow the second, but also divine influence follows from the first in order to elicit actions that flow from the virtues and gifts. Sixth, a further distinction is to be made between the habit of grace and the state or situation of grace. The habit of grace is a physical accident received in the soul of the just. But the state or situation of grace refers to many distinct subjects together. Thus to constitute the state of grace there are required (1) the Father who loves, (2) the Son because of whom the Father loves, (3) the Holy Spirit by whom the Father loves and gives, and (4) the just, whom, because of the Son, the Father loves by the Holy Spirit, and to whom the Father gives by the Holy Spirit, and who consequently are endowed with sanctifying grace, whence flow the virtues and gifts, and who are thereby just and upright and ready to receive and elicit acts ordered towards eternal life.123 Seventh, through this state, therefore, there is constituted a divine-human interpersonal situation. In accordance with this state the divine persons and the just are in one another as those who are known are in those who know them and those who are loved are in those who love them.124 This state, of course, exists more in acts and is better known in acts, yet it does not cease to exist solely because of a temporary cessation of the acts. Moreover, what the nature of this state or situation is will emerge ever more clearly the more perfect the habits and acts are that are examined. 123 Romans 8.32. 124 [In the previous paragraph, Lonergan said that the state or situation of grace is constituted by the interconnected realities (1) to (4). Then here he says that through this state there is constituted a divine-human interpersonal situation. This ‘divine-human interpersonal situation’ is simply the interconnected fact of (1) to (4). So too, the indwelling spoken of here is another way of stating what is more exhaustively specified by the interconnected (1) to (4), and affirming that the interconnected (1) to (4) obtain. The state or situation of grace, the divine-human interpersonal situation, the mutual indwelling, are nothing over and above the interconnected (1) to (4).]

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Hoc enim statu non sumus nostri, quia sumus templum Spiritus sancti. 125 Hoc etiam statu ipse Spiritus sanctus pariter suus non est, cum nobis datus sit. 126 Hoc statu pariter Christiani non sibi vivunt sed ei qui pro ipsis mortuus est et resurrexit;127 quare vita eorum abscondita est cum Christo in Deo; 128 quis enim eos a caritate Christi separabit?129 Neque caecus quidam animi impulsus est caritas si quidem in fide vivunt Filii Dei130 et Christus per fidem habitat in cordibus eorum;131 quare ab illis differunt qui aemulationem Dei habent sed non secundum scientiam.132 Manentes ergo in caritate, in Deo manent et Deus in eis;133 quod quidem mutuum manere non ex sua caritate sed ex dono Spiritus cognoscunt; 134 non enim ipsi priores Deum Patrem dilexerunt, sed ille prior eos dilexit et misit Filium suum propitiationem pro peccatis eorum.135 Secundum hunc statum, ergo, divinae personae in iustis et iusti in divinis personis sunt tamquam cogniti in cognoscentibus et dilecti in diligentibus. Qui quidem status ex parte personarum divinarum semper actu secundo est, sed ex parte iustorum ita semper actu primo est ut in actum secundum sub motione divina pro perfectione iusti prompte exeat.136 Quare, qui iustus est, iustificetur adhuc,137 quo abundantius vitam habeat in Spiritu per Filium in gloriam Dei Patris. Gloria enim Patris est quod, sicut ipse aeternaliter secundum veritatem dicit Verbum et per Verbum secundum sanctitatem spirat amorem, ita etiam in plenitudine temporis secundum veritatem misit Verbum suum carnem factum ut Verbo credentes vera

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In this state we are not our own, for we are temples of the Holy Spirit.125 In this state the Holy Spirit also is not his own, since he has been given to us. 126 Similarly, in this state Christians live not for themselves but for him who died and was raised for them;127 therefore their lives are hidden with Christ in God.128 And who will separate them from the love of Christ?129 Their charity is not some blind psychic impulse, since they live by faith in the Son of God, 130 and Christ dwells in their hearts through faith.131 Because of this they are not like those who have zeal for God but without sound knowledge.132 So, abiding in love, they abide in God and God in them,133 and they know this mutual abiding not because of their own charity but by the gift of the Spirit.134 For they did not first love God the Father, but he loved them first, and sent his Son as the atonement for their sins.135 In this state, therefore, the divine persons are in the just and the just are in the divine persons as the known are in those who know them and the beloved are in those who love them. On the part of the divine persons this state is always in second act, but on the part of the just it is always in first act so that under divine influence it may readily issue into second act, according to the degree of perfection of the just person.136 Hence, ‘let one who is just be justified still,’137 according to the abundance of the life which that person lives in the Spirit through the Son to the glory of God the Father. For the glory of the Father is this, that just as he eternally speaks the Word in truth and through the Word breathes forth Love in holiness, so also in the fullness of time he sent his incarnate Son in truth so 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134

1 Corinthians 6.19. Romans 5.5. 2 Corinthians 5.15. Colossians 3.3. Romans 8.35. Galatians 2.20. Ephesians 3.17. Romans 10.2. 1 John 4.15. 1 John 4.13; see Romans 8.15. [They know this mutual abiding not by any elicited love independent of the gift of the Spirit; none can claim charity as ‘their own,’ for it is an absolutely supernatural virtue beyond the natural proportion of any human being; it is the gift of the Spirit.] 135 1 John 4.10. 136 [On first and and second act, in the sense of form and operation, see Lonergan, Insight 459, note 1. See also below, appendix 1, § 2, p. 537.] 137 db 803, ds 1535, nd 1937. [The reference is to Revelation 22.11, translated in nrsv as ‘Let ... the righteous still do right.’]

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verba intus dicamus atque intelligamus, et per Verbum secundum sanctitatem misit Spiritum Verbi ut Spiritui dilectione coniuncti et corporis Christi membra viva facti clamemus: Abba, Pater.

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that by believing the Word we might speak and understand true inner words; and through the Word he sent the Spirit of the Word in holiness so that joined to the Spirit in love and made living members of the body of Christ we might cry out, ‘Abba, Father!’

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Epilogus

Partem theologiae trinitariae considerabamus eam, nempe, quae certorum intelligentiam respicit; eoque ordine usi sumus, non quo gignuntur certitudines, sed quo intelligentia augetur. Quare, iam ante per viam analyticam explorata, determinata, probata, neque hic repetenda praesupposuimus quaecumque ex docente Christo et ecclesia, ex scripturis, ex patribus, ex consentientibus theologis concluduntur. Nostrum ergo non erat stabilire Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum sanctum (1) realiter inter se distinctos (2) unum numerice esse Deum ideoque (3) consubstantiales (4) solisque relationibus inter se distingui (5) quae originibus seu emanationibus fundentur (6) generatione, nempe, secundum intellectum et (7) spiratione secundum voluntatem. Neque nostrum erat eum sequi ordinem qui ex missionibus in Novo Testamento narratis incipit ut ad analogiam psychologicam perveniat. Alium enim intendebamus finem, ut ea supponentes quae inter catholicos non disputarentur, fructuosam illam quaereremus intelligentiam a concilio Vaticano laudatam eoque ordine procederemus quo posterius consideraretur quodcumque alterius intelligentiam praerequireret.

Quod si iam totum opus per modum unius conspicere volumus, unam fere in omnibus fundamentalem notionem invenimus. Sicut enim in ipsis rebus materialibus atque sensibilibus cernitur ordo, ita etiam intra conscientiam nostram intellectualem atque rationalem ordo existit. Qui quidem ordo conscie rationalis quo ordinantur volitiones per iudicia intellectus et ipsa intellectus iudicia per perspectam rerum evidentiam, si ab imperfectionibus naturae finitae abstrahitur et analogice

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We have been considering the part of trinitarian theology that aims at an understanding of truths that are certain. Thus, the order we have followed is not one that generates certainties but one that enlarges our understanding. Hence, we have presupposed as having been investigated, determined, and proven in the way of analysis, and needing no repetition here, whatever conclusions have been arrived at from the teaching of Christ and the church, from scripture, from the Fathers, and from the common opinion among theologians. Our task, therefore, has not been to establish that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are (1) really distinct from one another, (2) numerically one God and therefore (3) consubstantial, and (4) distinct from one another by their relations alone, which (5) are founded on origins or emanations (6) by generation, that is, in accordance with intellect, and (7) by spiration, in accordance with will. Nor has it been our procedure to follow the order that begins from the missions as related in the New Testament so as to arrive at the psychological analogy. We have had another objective, that is, taking for granted those doctrines that are not disputed among Catholics, to seek that fruitful understanding of them commended by the [First] Vatican Council, proceeding according to an order in which we deferred consideration of whatever would have required a prior understanding of something else. If we wish now to view the work as a unified whole, we discover that there is one fundamental notion in virtually all of it. Just as in the material objects of sense perception there is a discernible order, so also there is an order within our intellectual and rational consciousness. After abstracting from it the imperfections of a finite nature and transferring it by analogy to God, this consciously rational

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ad Deum transfertur, aliquam parit intelligentiam duarum in Deo processionum et quattuor relationum realium, quarum tres realiter inter se distinguuntur. Quibus si additur nihil realiter Deo inesse quin Deus sit, constat has relationes esse subsistentes, ideoque tres esse divinas personas quarum unaquaeque et sui et alterius cuiusque conscia sit. Praeterea, cum multa ordine et unum et bonum constituant, ulterius concluditur tum ad perfectionem tribus personis divinis propriam tum etiam ad perfectionem quam ipsae nobis communicant in illo ordinis bono quod est regnum Dei, et Christi corpus, et ecclesia, et oeconomia salutis.

Quae quidem intelligentia, etsi imperfecta, analogica, obscura, viae syntheticae fructus principalis est. Facit quidem ut doctrinam catholicam de divinis personis ita firmiter tenere possimus ut prompte, facile, delectabiliter de iis disseramus. Facit etiam ut ea quae de SS. Trinitate cognoscamus tum cum philosophicis de Deo conclusionibus tum cum aliis tractatibus theologicis in unitatem quandam intelligibilem reducamus. Facit praeterea ut obstaculum subiectivae tarditatis non interponamus cum ad mentem scripturae, patrum, theologorum pervenire conemur. Facit denique ut in iudicandis motibus intellectualibus et contemporaneis tum citius falsa detegamus tum facilius vera deprehendamus.

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order, in which volitional acts are ordered through intellectual judgments and these intellectual judgments are ordered through grasping the evidence for things, produces some understanding of the two processions in God and the four real relations, three of which are really distinct from one another. And if to this we add the fact that there is nothing real in God that is not God, it is clear that these relations are subsistent, and therefore that there are three divine persons, each of whom is conscious both of himself and of each of the others. Besides, since many things in an order constitute a unity and a good, we further conclude both to the perfection proper to the three divine persons and also to the perfection they communicate to us in that good of order which is the kingdom of God, the body of Christ, the church, and the economy of salvation. This understanding, however imperfect, analogical, and obscure, is the principal fruit of the way of synthesis. Indeed, it enables us to hold the Catholic doctrine on the divine persons so firmly that we speak about these persons with alacrity, ease, and delight. It enables us also to bring what we know about the Holy Trinity into an intelligible unity both with philosophical conclusions about God and with other theological treatises. Moreover, it frees us from interposing the obstacle of subjective slow-wittedness when we are attempting to reach up to the mind of scripture, of the Fathers, and of theologians. Lastly it enables us, in judging contemporary intellectual movements, to detect more quickly what is false and apprehend more easily what is true.

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Appendices

At the Gregorian University in Rome in the spring semester of 1955, Bernard Lonergan was teaching a course on the Trinity to the second- and third-year students, concentrating on the text of St Thomas’s Summa theologiae, 1, qq. 27– 43. The textbook for the course was Charles Boyer’s Synopsis Praelectionum de SS. Trinitate, and in addition to this Lonergan produced a set of mimeographed notes on 50 legal-sized pages, which he called a Supplementum de SS. Trinitate, to go with his lectures on the Trinity. The title page has the notation (in Latin), ‘Rome, on the feast of St Thomas Aquinas, [7 March] 1955.’ This ‘supplement,’ following the method of the Summa itself, consists of a question, ‘The Divine Processions,’ containing three articles: (1) ‘Some Common Notions,’ (2) ‘The Image of God in Man,’ (3) ‘From the Image to the Eternal Exemplar.’ The whole question is divided into 27 numbered sections, each dealing with a separate matter. Two years later, Lonergan brought out his own treatise on the systematics of the Trinity, entitled Divinarum Personarum conceptio analogica. This was followed by a second edition in 1959. He took the first article of the Supplementum and added it to the body of the book as appendix i, and added §§ 10 to 16 of article 2 as appendix ii. When Lonergan brought out a revised third edition of the text in 1964 under the title De Deo Trino II. Pars systematica, these two appendices were reprinted. In this present edition we have kept these two appendices as they are and have decided to add the rest of article 2 (§§ 17–20) as appendix 2a and the whole of article 3 as appendix 2b. In all the above editions there is a third appendix, a short treatise on relations, which appears in this edition as appendix 3. To this we have added in appendix 3a a letter that Lonergan wrote to Rev. Gerard Smith, s.j., of

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Marquette University, on the question of relations. This letter serves as Lonergan’s own mini-commentary on appendix 3. For example, it is useful to know that his ‘internal relations’ correspond with ‘primary relativity’ in Insight, but that they would not be named ‘relation’ by Aquinas but rather as the cause or root of a relation whence it has all its reality. When Lonergan was revising Divinarum Personarum as De Deo Trino II, there were several passages in the former edition that did not appear in the latter, as indicated in a note at the end of the preface to the latter. For the sake of completeness we have decided to resurrect these passages here as appendix 4.

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APPENDIX I

De Operatione Immanente 1

Neque unus neque constans nominum verborumque usus in scriptis S. Thomae reperitur. Suo enim tempore alius erat loquendi modus ex Avicenna, uti videtur, deductus; alius ex novis studiis Aristotelicis recenter invectus; neque deerant complicationes ulteriores, cum diversae voces graecae per eandem latinam, eademque

1 [Quae olim de verbo mentis ex operibus S. Thomae collegimus et apud Theological Studies (Woodstock md, USA, vii (1946) 349–92; viii (1947) 35–79, 404–44; x (1949) 3–40, 359–93; cf. L.-B. Geiger, O.P., Bulletin thomiste viii (1952) 477–79, paragr. 740) publici iuris fecimus, hac fere lege nunc auditorum usui accommodamus ut qui pleniorem rei expositionem desiderent articulis supra citatis adeant, qui vero conclusiones materiam theologicam propius respicientes breviter indicatas velint hisce foliis contenti esse possint. Finem vero nostrum, si exquisieris, quodammodo esse multiplicem fatemur. Principaliter sane habitum scientiae promovere intendimus. At cum in aliis quisque scientiam consecutus videatur qui iam per se operari possit, in re Trinitaria illum aestimarim scientia ornatum qui scripta Aquinatis et exacte legere et cum gaudio intelligere quaeat. Qua de causa, cum scholae ipsa sua natura ad intelligentiam communicandam magis quam ad rerum historicarum notitiam augendam ordinentur, cumque inter lectiones qui multum scribat ad nomina et verba potius quam ad sensum intellectumque attendere soleat, visum est his foliis auditorum mentes liberare quo facilius quantulum eis afferemus fructum et percipiant et conservent.]

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Immanent Operation 1

You will find that in his writings St Thomas was not consistent in his use of words. At one time he used terminology derived, apparently, from Avicenna, but later he used a terminology that came into use through the recent study of the works of Aristotle. And this was further complicated when different Greek words were 1 [In the earlier supplement most of what appears in this appendix is contained in article 1, ‘De Quibusdam Notionibus Communibus’ (‘Some Common Notions’). The three articles of the supplement are preceded by two paragraphs that do not appear in De Deo Trino, and which are translated here as follows. ‘Some time ago we collected various passages on the inner word in the works of St Thomas, which we published in a series of articles in Theological Studies. [Reference is made to the verbum articles, now available as volume 2 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas.] We are adapting this material here for the use of students, so that while those who want a fuller explanation of this matter can go and read those articles, students who prefer to have a brief exposition of those conclusions that are more relevant to theology may find this little treatise sufficient for their needs. ‘If you ask what our objective is in this, we must confess that we have, in a way, several objectives. The primary one, of course, is to foster the habit of scientific knowledge. In other disciplines, anyone who is able to operate on his own is regarded as having acquired scientific knowledge, but when it comes to the Trinity, I should consider as having such knowledge one who is able to read with accuracy what Aquinas wrote and delight in understanding it. Accordingly, since lectures by their very nature are designed to communicate understanding rather than increase one’s knowledge of historical matters, and since those who take copious notes during lectures generally pay more attention to the words themselves than to understanding what they mean, we felt that this brief treatment might free the minds of the students to gather and store up more easily the modest fruit we are providing to them.’]

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graeca vox per diversas latinas, redderentur.2 Quod si praetermittitur, ipsa littera Aquinatis caligine quadam obtecta atque obvoluta maneat necesse est, cum eadem diversis vocibus dici, diversa autem iisdem, non perspiciatur. At ex hac obscuritate vespertina in atram noctem proceditur si omissa investigatione linguistica per speculationem metaphysicam exquiruntur notionum clarificatio et sententiarum specie tenus oppositarum reconciliatio.

Quam ob causam, ad brevissima quaedam capita nunc reducimus quae olim longiori dissertatione exposuimus, videlicet, quid apud Aquinatem significent tam actio quam operatio, actus et potentia, actus perfecti et imperfecti, natura et potentia tum activa tum passiva, pati et agere, quid denique sentiendum sit de actu

2 [Quod si praetermittitur, duplex sequitur inconveniens. Primo, enim, ipsa littera Aquinatis caligine quadam obtecta atque obvoluta maneat necesse est: qui enim nescit quo sensu voces sint adhibitae, veram auctoris sententiam apprehendere nequit. Secundo, in mentem discipuli vel acutissimi transit nebula quaedam conceptuum atque terminorum unde opiniones oriuntur confusae et disputationes sine fructu vel fine. Quid enim in aliis fieri soleat, inde coniecturare licet quod Caietanus, vir maximi ingenii et inter commentatores optimus, haec scribere potuit: ‘Intelligere ergo non est formaliter pati; quamvis, proprie loquendo, non sit etiam formaliter agere, sed potius active passiveque vitaliter operari. Et idem iudicium est de sensatione.’ In Sum. theol., i, q. 79, a. 2, par. xx; ed. Leon., v, 263. Quid sit active non agere? Quid passive non pati? Quid denique passive et non agendo operari vitaliter? Sane haec omnia clare atque cohaerenter explicari posse non infitior. Illud solum dico: veram vereque utilem esse explicationem quae viam aperiat ad textum S. Thomae intelligendum; ideoque non speculatione metaphysica sed linguistica investigatione opus esse. Qua de causa, primo hoc articulo quid actio operatioque significent (2), quaenam sint actus ad potentiam proportiones diversae (3), quid actus perfecti et actus imperfecti dicant (4), quonam differant natura (5), et potentia sive activa sive passiva (6), quid sit pati (7), quid agere (8), quid denique de actu vitali senserit Aquinas (9), paucis adhibitis documentis declaramus ne parvus error in principio in fine fiat magnus.]

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translated by the same Latin word, and the same Greek word by different Latin words.2 If this fact is ignored or overlooked, the writings of Aquinas inevitably remain veiled and shrouded in obscurity, since one does not notice that the same things are being referred to by different expressions and, on the other hand, diverse things are being referred to by the same expression. Moreover, this twilight obscurity gives way to the darkness of night if, while neglecting linguistic investigation, one earnestly seeks by means of metaphysical speculation the clarification of notions and the reconciliation of opinions which at least appear to be in opposition. For this reason we reduce now to the briefest space certain issues which we explained at greater length in earlier treatments, namely, what in the writings of Aquinas is meant by ‘action’ as well as ‘operation,’ by ‘act’ and ‘potency,’ by ‘act of what is complete’ and ‘act of what is incomplete,’ by ‘nature’ and by ‘active potency’ and ‘passive potency,’ by ‘to receive’ and ‘to act,’ and finally what one 2 [The first article in the supplement begins with a section entitled ‘Articuli necessitas’ (‘Why This Article Is Needed’). Its first paragraph corresponds to the first paragraph in the appendix in De Deo Trino, but the next three are unique to the supplement. They are translated here as follows. ‘If this fact is ignored or overlooked, the writings of Aquinas inevitably remain veiled and shrouded in obscurity, since one who does not know the sense in which words are used will not be able to know their author’s true meaning. Next, this nebulous apprehension of his concepts and terminology will enter into the minds of even the most intelligent students, resulting in a welter of opinions and controversies that are both fruitless and endless. ‘A good illustration of this may be found in the example of Cajetan, a most intelligent man and the very best of commentators, who wrote the following: “The act of understanding, therefore, is not formally a passion, a reception, a being-changed (pati); although, properly speaking, it is not an action (agere) either, but rather an active and passive vital operation. And the same is true of sensation” (In Sum. theol., i, q. 79, a. 2, par. xx; ed. Leon., v, 263.) What is this active non-action? What is passive non-reception? Again, what is meant by a passive non-acting vital operation? Certainly, I am not denying that all this can be clearly and coherently explained. All I am saying is that there is a true and truly useful explanation that opens the way to understanding St Thomas’s text, and therefore that what is needed is not metaphysical speculation but linguistic investigation. ‘For this reason, then, lest a minor error at the beginning end in a major one, in this first article we intend, by appealing to a few texts, to clarify the following points: the meaning of “action” and “operation” ..., the various proportions of act to potency ..., the meaning of “act of what is complete” and “act of what is incomplete” ..., the difference between nature ... and potency, both active and passive ..., the meaning of “to be affected” or “to receive” ..., and “to act” ..., and finally, Aquinas’s opinion about vital act.’ The following two paragraphs in the appendix replace these paragraphs from the supplement.]

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vitali, et quemadmodum haec omnia ad immanentem intelligendi operationem applicentur. 1 De vocibus ‘actio,’ ‘operatio’ Tam vox graeca energeia (‘actus’) quam vox poi¯esis (‘factio’) per voces latinas ‘actio,’ ‘operatio,’ reddebantur. Qua de causa in legendis S. Thomae operibus semper ex contextu determinari oportet utrum vox ‘actio,’ vel vox ‘operatio,’ actum significet an exercitium causalitatis efficientis. Multa et diversa exempla invenies apud Theological Studies 8 (1947) 416 s., 434 s. V.g., operatio est actus: ‘Omnis enim animae operatio vel est actus potentiae activae vel passivae.’ In II de Anima, lect. 6, § 305. Operatio est causalitatem exercere: ‘operatio enim alicuius effectus attribuitur non mobili sed moventi.’ Sum. theol., i-ii, q. 111, a. 2 c. Actio est actus: ‘Omnis enim actio vel est potentiae activae vel passivae. Obiectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passivae ... Ad actum autem potentiae activae ...’ Sum. theol., i, q. 77, a. 3 c. Actio est causalitatem efficientem exercere: ‘in actione importatur respectus ut a quo est motus in mobili.’ Sum. theol., i, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1m.3

2 De duplici proportione inter actum et potentiam 4 Duplex maxime attenditur proportio secundum quam cognosci possunt actus et potentia. ‘Potest enim sic accipi proportio, ut dicamus, quod sicut hoc est in hoc, ita hoc in hoc. Utputa visus sicut est in oculo, ita auditus in aure.’ In IX Metaphys., lect. 5, § 1828. ‘Alius modus proportionis est, ut dicamus quod sicut se habet hoc ad hoc, ita hoc ad hoc; puta sicut se habet visus ad videndum, ita auditus ad audiendum.’ Ibid. § 1829.

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ought to think concerning vital act and how all this can be applied to the immanent operation of understanding. 1 The Words ‘Action’ and ‘Operation’ The Greek words energeia, ‘act,’ and poi¯esis, ‘making,’ were both rendered into Latin by the words actio and operatio. Hence in reading St Thomas one must always determine from the context whether the word actio or the word operatio refers to act or to an exercise of efficient causality. You will find a number of examples of this flexibility in usage in Theological Studies 8:3 (1947) 416–17, 434–37 [Verbum 119–21, 138–43]. For example, ‘operation’ in this text means act: ‘Every operation of the soul is the act of either an active or a passive potency’ (In II De anima, lect. 6, § 305). But, here ‘operation’ means to exercise efficient causality: ‘The operation of some effect is attributed not to the movable thing but to the mover’ (Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 111, a. 2 c.). ‘Action’ in this case means act: ‘Every action belongs either to an active potency or to a passive potency. But an object is to the act of a passive potency . . . But (an object is) to the act of an active potency . . .’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 77, a. 3 c.). But ‘action’ means here to exercise efficient causality: ‘In action there is implied a reference “as that from which there is movement in the movable thing . . .” ’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 28, a 3, ad 1m.)3 2 The Two Proportions between Act and Potency 4 There are two proportions according to which act and potency can especially be known. ‘One kind of proportion is that whereby we say that just as this is in this, so that is in that; as, for example, just as seeing is in the eye, so hearing is in the ear’ (In IX Metaphys., lect. 5, § 1828). ‘Another kind of proportion is that whereby we say that just as this is for this, so that is for that; as, for example, just as eyesight is for seeing, so the faculty of hearing is for hearing’ (In IX Metaphys., lect. 5, § 1829). 3 [Lonergan cites this text not in the pages of Verbum mentioned above, but in Grace and Freedom 268.] 4 [See Lonergan, Verbum 56–57 and 125–26.]

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Qua de causa duplex distinguitur actus et duplex pariter potentia. Actus primus est forma, e.g., visus qui recipitur in oculo, vel auditus qui recipitur in aure. Actus secundus est operatio, actio, energeia, puta actum videndi qui visum perficit vel actum audiendi qui auditum perficit. Potentia vero prima est sicut oculus qui perfici debet tum per formam (visum) tum ulterius per actum secundum (videre). Potentia vero secunda coincidit cum forma seu actu primo. Cf. De potentia, q. 1, a. 1 c. Quae duae proportiones fundamentales non solum pro accidentalibus sed etiam pro substantialibus valent. ‘... sicut oculus est aliquid compositum ex pupilla sicut materia et visu sicut forma, ita animal est compositum ex anima sicut forma et ex corpore sicut materia.’ In II de Anima, lect. 2, § 241. ‘... sicut enim esse consequitur formam, ita intelligere sequitur speciem intelligibilem.’ Sum. theol., i, q. 14, a. 4 c. ‘... intelligere, quod ita se habet ad intellectum in actu sicut esse ad ens in actu.’ Ibid. q. 34, a. 1, ad 2m.

3 Actus perfecti et actus imperfecti Omnis definitio per se et directe aliquam essentiam respicit sive simpliciter dictam (substantialem) sive secundum quid (accidentalem). At ipsa rerum realitas perfectionem essentiae excedere vel ab ea deficere potest. Ita in substantialibus esse addit perfectionem ultra perfectionem essentiae. Pariter in accidentalibus habetur essentia secundum quid inquantum oculus informatur per visum vel auris per auditum vel intellectus per speciem vel habitum. Sed videre est ulterior quaedam perfectio quae oculo et visui superadditur; audire est ulterior quaedam perfectio quae auri et auditui superadditur; intelligere est ulterior quaedam perfectio quae intellectui possibili et speciei vel habitui superadditur. Quae perfectiones superadditae nominantur actus perfecti.

E contra, perfectio rei a perfectione essentiae deficere potest. Quod maxime in generatione viventium perspicitur. Oculus enim in foetu videre non potest sed poterit. In tali oculo habetur praeter meram potentiam ad visum actus quidam et perfectio quae tamen a perfectione visus adhuc deficit. Qui actus nominatur actus imperfecti. Est actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi. Iterum est esse incompletum, scilicet, habet realitatem visus non complete ut videre possit sed incomplete ut futurum sit ut videre possit.

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Accordingly, there are two kinds of act and two kinds of potency. First act is form, for example, eyesight [the faculty of seeing] that is received in the eye, or the faculty of hearing that is received in the ear. Second act is operation, action, energeia, such as the act of seeing which perfects one’s eyesight, and the act of hearing which perfects the faculty of hearing. First potency is like the eye, which needs to be perfected initially by form (eyesight) and then by second act (seeing). Second potency is the same as form or first act. See De potentia, q. 1, a. 1 c. These two basic proportions are valid for both accidents and substances. ‘... just as the eye is made up of the pupil as its matter and sight as its form, so an animal is composed of a soul as form and a body as matter’ (In II De anima, lect. 2, § 241). ‘For just as existence follows upon form, so understanding follows upon an intelligible species’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 4 c.). ‘. . . understanding, which is related to intellect in act in the same way that existence is related to being in act’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 34, a. 1, ad 2m). 3 Act of What Is Complete and Act of What Is Incomplete Every definition per se and directly regards an essence, either simply so called (substantial) or with some qualification (accidental). But the reality of things can either exceed the perfection of an essence or fall short of it. Thus, in the case of substances the act of existence adds a perfection beyond that of the essence. Likewise in the case of accidents there is a qualified essence inasmuch as the eye is informed by eyesight or the ear by the faculty of hearing or the intellect by a species or by a habit. But actual seeing is a further perfection added to the eye and eyesight; actual hearing is a further perfection added to the ear and the faculty of hearing; actual understanding is a further perfection added to the possible intellect and to a species or a habit. These added perfections are called acts of what is complete. On the other hand, the perfection of a thing can fall short of the perfection of an essence. You see this especially in the generation of living beings. The eye in a fetus cannot see but one day will be able to. In such an eye there is in addition to mere potency to vision an act and perfection which, however, still falls short of the perfection of vision. This act is called an act of what is incomplete. It is an act of what exists in potency insofar as it is in potency. It is an incomplete act of existence, that is, it possesses the reality of vision, not completely so as to be able to see, but incompletely in such a way that it will eventually be able to see.

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Ratio actus imperfecti in omni motu stricte dicto adesse demonstratur ab Aristotele. Vide In V Phys., lect. 2–4; VI, lect. 5, lect. 8, § 5, lect. 12; VIII, lect. 4–6. Loca S. Thomae de his rebus indicantur, Theological Studies 8 (1947) 408–13.

4 Natura Ab Aristotele definitur natura tamquam principium motus vel quietis in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens. Phys., ii, 1, 192b 24 ff.; In II Phys., lect. 1, § 5. Quo sensu, natura non est ipsa res sed principium rei, nempe aut forma aut materia et magis forma quam materia. Ibid. lect. 2. In scriptis S. Thomae adhibetur vox ‘natura’ non solum sensu Aristotelico sed etiam sensu essentiae vel substantiae. Ita supernaturalia sunt quae excedunt proportionem naturae, id est, proportionem substantiae vel essentiae finitae. Vide, v.g., Sum. theol., i-ii, q. 110, a. 1 c. Circa habitudinem naturae (sensu Aristotelico) ad supernaturalia, haec notari possunt. Primo, ‘infundit [Deus] aliquas formas seu qualitates supernaturales secundum quas suaviter et prompte ab ipso moveantur [homines] ad bonum aeternum consequendum.’ Sum. theol., i-ii, q. 110, a. 2 c. Secundo, inter intellectum creatum et essentiam divinam existit quaedam proportio potentiae ad actum; ita Sum. theol., i, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4m. Tertio, qualis sit haec proportio disputatur maxime in quaestione de potentia obedientiali. Quemadmodum vero haec obedientialis potentia concipienda sit aliquatenus dependet ex notionibus sequentibus de potentia activa et passiva.

5 Potentia activa et passiva Circa vocabula ‘activum’ et ‘passivum,’ duplex adhibetur terminologia in scriptis S. Thomae. Alia Aristotelica secundum quam potentia activa est principium motus vel mutationis in alio secundum quod aliud, et potentia passiva est principium motus vel mutationis ab alio secundum quod aliud. Et secundum hanc terminologiam adaequate distinguuntur natura (principium motus in eo in quo est) et potentia activa vel passiva (principium motus in alio vel ab alio). Alia est terminologia quae ab Avicenna derivari videtur secundum quam potentia passiva est potentia prima seu simpliciter dicta (v.g., materia prima, intellectus possibilis) et potentia activa est forma. Ita De potentia, q. 1, a. 1 c. Et secundum hanc terminologiam coincidit natura (sensu Aristotelico) cum potentia passiva et potentia activa.

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Aristotle has shown that an act of the incomplete is present in every motion in the strict sense of the word. See [St Thomas] In V Phys., lect. 2–4; In VI Phys., lect. 5, lect. 8, ¶ 5, § 1621, and lect. 12; In VIII Phys., lect. 4–6. Passages in St Thomas on these points will be found in Theological Studies 8:3 (1947) 408–13 [Verbum 110–16]. 4 Nature Aristotle defines nature as the principle of motion and rest in that in which it exists primarily and per se and not by accident. Physics, ii, 1, 192b 21–32; In II Phys., lect. 1, ¶ 5, § 289. In this sense, nature is not the thing itself but a principle of a thing, namely, either form or matter, and form more than matter. Ibid. lect. 2. St Thomas uses the word ‘nature’ not only in the Aristotelian sense but also in the sense of essence or substance. Thus, supernatural realities are those that exceed the proportion of a nature, that is, the proportion of a finite substance or essence. See, for example, Summa theologiae, 1–2, q. 110, a. 1 c. Concerning the relation of nature (in the Aristotelian sense) to supernatural realities, the following points should be noted. First, ‘[God] has infused some supernatural forms or qualities by means of which [we] might be gently and readily moved by him to attain eternal good.’ Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 110, a. 2 c. Second, between a created intellect and the divine essence there exists a certain proportion of potency to act; thus, ibid. 1, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4m. Third, the nature of this proportion is a vexed question, especially with respect to obediential potency. But the way in which this obediential potency is to be understood depends to a considerable extent on the following notions of active and passive potency. 5 Active and Passive Potency St Thomas uses the words ‘active’ and ‘passive’ in two different ways. Following Aristotle, he defines active potency as the principle of motion or change in another as other, and passive potency as the principle of motion or change by the other as other. According to this terminology, then, nature, the principle of motion in that in which it is, is adequately distinguished from active and passive potency, the principle of motion from another or in another. But there is another usage derived, it seems, from Avicenna, according to which passive potency is first potency, potency simply so called, such as prime matter or the possible intellect, and active potency is form; thus, De potentia, q. 1, a. 1 c. According to this terminology, nature (in the Aristotelian sense) is the same as passive and active potency.

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Praeterea, in terminologia quae ex Avicenna est, duplex distinguitur aspectus in potentia activa seu forma. Inquantum forma refertur ad actum secundum (actionem, operationem, energeian) dicitur principium actionis vel operationis, vel principium formale actionis vel operationis. Inquantum forma ulterius refertur ad aliquid aliud praeter actum secundum quod mediante hoc actu producitur, dicitur principium effectus, vel principium operati. Praeterea, cum forma sit et principium actionis et principium effectus, perpetuo recurrit distinctio inter duplicem actionem, duplicem operationem, duplicem motum, vel operationem et motum, vel actionem et factionem, ubi semper agitur de actu secundo et de ulteriori quodam effectu. Cf. C. Gent., ii, 1, §§ 3–6. Praeterea, ex eodem fonte oritur distinctio inter processionem operationis et processionem operati (al., processum operationis et processum operati), De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m. Operans enim qui in actu primo per formam perfectus est, est principium tum ulterioris perfectionis quam recipit, nempe, operationem, tum etiam ulterioris perfectionis quam producit, nempe, operatum. 5 Notate tamen hanc duplicem terminologiam nullo modo ipsum S. Thomam decipisse. In Scripto super Sententias et in Q. D. de Potentia terminologia ex Avicenna praevalere videtur. In Summa contra Gentiles et in Summa de Theologia magis usurpatur terminologia Aristotelica. Qui usus satis illustratur si De pot., q. 1, a. 1, et Sum. theol., i, q. 25, a. 1 comparantur: in corpore enim articuli De potentia ponitur terminologia Avicennae, in obiectionibus autem terminologia Aristotelica; contra, in corpore articuli in Summa ponitur terminologia Aristotelica et recurrit terminologia Avicennae in obiectionibus solvendis. Loca S. Thomae atque fontes indicantur apud Theological Studies 8 (1947) 418–29; etiam cf. ibid. 437–41. 6 Pati, passio Novem diversi sensus vocabuli ‘pati’ distinguuntur In III Sent., d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 1 et 2. Brevius et sufficienter distinguuntur pati proprie et pati communiter.

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Moreover, in the Avicennan terminology there are two aspects to active potency or form. As referring to second act (action, operation, energeia), form is called the principle of action or operation, or the formal principle of action or operation. As further referring to some other reality besides second act that is produced by means of this act, form is said to be the principle of the effect, or the principle of the product. Again, since form is both a principle of action and a principle of the effect, the distinction continually recurs between the twofold action, the twofold operation, the twofold motion, or between operation and motion, or action and production, where there is always a question of second act and of some further effect. See Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 1, ¶¶ 3–6, §§ 853–55. From this same source arises the distinction between a procession of an operation and a processio operati (elsewhere, a process of an operation and a processus operati), as in De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m. For the operator that is complete in first act through its form is a principle both of the further perfection which it receives, namely, operation, and of the further perfection which it produces, namely, the product or work.5 Note, however, that this double terminology did not at all lead St Thomas astray. In his Scriptum super Sententias and in the Quaestio disputata de potentia, the Avicennan terminology seems to prevail, while in the Summa contra Gentiles and in the Summa theologiae the Aristotelian terminology is more common. This is well illustrated if one compares De potentia, q. 1, a. 1, and Summa theologiae, 1, q. 25, a. 1: in the body of the article in De potentia he uses Avicenna’s terminology, while in the objections he uses Aristotle’s; contrariwise, in the body of the article in the Summa theologiae he uses Aristotelian terminology, and Avicenna’s terminology comes up in the solutions to the objections. The relevant Thomistic passages and sources are indicated in Theological Studies 8:3 (1947) 418–29 [Verbum 121–33]; see also ibid. 437–41 [Verbum 143–48]. 6 To Receive, Passion In Super III Sententiarum, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 1 and 2, St Thomas distinguishes nine different meanings of the word ‘to receive.’ It will be sufficient here simply to distinguish to receive in the proper sense and to receive in a general sense. 5 [Processio operati was left untranslated in chapter 2, where talk of ‘product’ might have been confusing, since there is no causality in the ‘per modum operati’ of the divine processions.]

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Pati proprie includit vel proprietates passionis materialis quae in Physicis ab Aristotele determinantur vel motus vehementes animae sensitivae vel dolorem. Pati communiter supponit subiectum et dicitur de quolibet effectu qui in subiecto recipitur atque subiectum sive in melius sive in peius movet vel mutat. Ita De veritate, q. 26, a. 1; Sum. theol., I, q. 79, a. 2; i-ii, q. 22, a. 1. Multa et diversa loca invenies indicata, Theological Studies 8 (1948) 413–17.

7 Actio (poi¯esis, factio) Nunc consideranda venit actio quae est non actus (energeia) sed praedicamentum et forte, magis generaliter, exercitium causalitatis efficientis. Qua in re distinguere oportet (1) terminologiam ipsius Aristotelis, (2) terminologiam Aristotelicam prout paulo immutata a S. Thoma adhibetur, et (3) terminologiam aliam quae maxime in Scripto super Sententias et Q. D. de Potentia invenitur. Primo, ergo, distinxit Aristoteles motivum, movens, mobile, motum, et motus (kin¯etikon, kinoun, kin¯eton, kinoumenon, kin¯esis). Motivum est potentia activa; mobile est potentia passiva; et uno eodemque actu tum motivum fit movens tum mobile fit motum; qui actus est motus in mobili quidem receptus sed a movente productus. Probat Aristoteles nihil per se recipi in motivo quando fit actu movens quia sequeretur omne movens moveri, quod est impossibile si ullus existit motus.

Iam vero ille unus idemque actus qui a movente producitur et in mobili recipitur duplicem habet relationem: aliam nempe ad movens a quo est, aliam vero ad motum in quo est. Unde oriuntur definitiones actionis et passionis. Actio enim est actus huius ut ab hoc, nempe, actus moventis ut a movente. Passio vero est actus huius ut in hoc, nempe, actus moti ut in moto. In III Phys., lect. 4 et 5. Notate6 hoc theorema Aristotelicum a S. Thoma adhiberi in solvenda notissima difficultate in re trinitaria. Sum. theol., i, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1m.

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To receive in the proper sense includes either the properties of material receptivity as determined by Aristotle in the Physics, or [in the sense of ‘passion’ or ‘to suffer’] strong movements of a sentient soul, or pain. To receive in a general sense supposes a subject and is said to be any effect that is received in the subject and that moves or changes the subject either for better or for worse. See De veritate, q. 26, a. 1; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 2; ibid. 1–2, q. 22, a. 1. You will find various other texts referred to in Theological Studies 8:3 (1947) 413–17 [Verbum 116–21]. 7 Action (poi¯esis, factio) Let us consider now that action which is not act (energeia) but the predicament or category of action, and perhaps, speaking more generally, the exercise of efficient causality. Here one must distinguish three things: (1) Aristotle’s own terminology, (2) Aristotelian terminology as modified somewhat by St Thomas, and (3) another terminology found mostly in the Scriptum super Sententias and in the Quaestio disputata de potentia. First, then, Aristotle distinguished motive or motor (kin¯etikon/motivum), mobile or movable (kin¯eton/mobile), mover (kinoun/movens), moved (kinoumenon/motum), and motion (kin¯esis/motus). The motive or motor is active potency, the motive force; mobile or movable is passive potency; and in one and the same act the motor becomes the mover, and the mobile or movable becomes the moved. This act is the motion, which is received in the movable but produced by the mover. Aristotle proves that nothing is received per se in the motor when it becomes an actual mover, because otherwise it would follow that every mover would itself be moved, which is impossible if there is any motion at all. Now this one same act that is produced by the mover and received in the movable has a twofold relation, one to the mover from which it proceeds and the other to the moved in which it exists. Hence arise the definitions of action and passion. Action is the act of this as proceeding from this, that is, the act of the mover as from the mover, while passion is the act of this as being in this, that is, the act of the moved as present in the moved. See In III Phys., lect. 4 and 5. Note6 that St Thomas makes use of this Aristotelian theorem in solving a famous difficulty in trinitarian theology. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1m. 6 [In the supplement this paragraph (translated) reads, ‘Note that action and passion, although both are really identical with one and the same act or motion, nevertheless are really distinct from each other. St Thomas makes use ...’ It is clear that the

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Notate etiam hanc analysin Aristotelicam non restringi a S. Thoma ad res materiales seu ad motum stricte dictum. Sicut enim unus idemque est actus tum motivi tum mobilis, ita etiam unus idemque actus est sonantis et audientis, et generaliter sensibilis et sentientis; secus enim omne movens moveretur. In III de Anima, lect. 2, §§ 592 s. Deinde, interdum haec terminologia Aristotelica paulo immutata a S. Thoma adhibetur. Secundum Aristotelem enim actio et passio cum ipso motu identificantur. Secundum modificationem S. Thomae, actio est denominatio agentis a patiente, et passio est denominatio patientis ab agente. Ita in ipso commentario In III Phys., lect. 5, § 15; cf. § 13. Unde fieri potest ut in creatione, ubi nullus est motus, adsint tamen relationes creationis activae et passivae. Sum. theol., i, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2m; a. 3 c. Tertio, existit et alia terminologia prorsus diversa secundum quam concipitur actio tamquam ‘ut ab agente’ vel ‘ut ab agente in aliud procedens.’ Quae terminologia verbis sed non rebus a terminologia Aristotelica differt, prout loco sequenti patet: Quod autem attribuitur alicui ut ab eo in aliud procedens non facit compositionem cum eo, sicut nec actio cum agente ... sine aliqua mutatione eius quod ad aliud refertur, potest desinere ex sola mutatione alterius; sicut etiam de actione patet quod non est motus secundum actionem nisi metaphorice et improprie sicut exiens de otio in actum mutari dicimus; quod non esset si relatio vel actio significaret aliquid in subiecto manens. De pot., q. 7, a. 8 c.; cf. q. 7, a. 9, ad 7m.

Vide Theological Studies 3 (1942) 377 ss.7 Tandem denique verum est Aristotelem theoriam suam de actione ita elaborasse ut directe de motu stricte dicto loqueretur. Verum etiam est S. Thomam

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Note also that St Thomas does not restrict this Aristotelian analysis to material things or to motion in the strict sense of the word. For just as one and the same reality is the act both of the motor and of the movable, so also one and the same act is that of the sounding bell and of the one who hears it, and in general of the sensible and the sentient; for otherwise every mover would itself be moved. See In III De anima, lect. 2, §§ 592–93. Second, this Aristotelian terminology is sometimes slightly modified by St Thomas. According to Aristotle, action and passion are identical with the motion itself. According to St Thomas’s modification, action is the denomination of the agent from the patient or receiver, and passion is the denomination of the patient from the agent; see his commentary, In III Phys., lect. 5, ¶ 15, § 614; see also ¶13, § 612. Hence, it is possible that in creation, wherein there is no motion, there are nevertheless the relations of active and passive creation. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2m; a. 3 c. Third, there exists also another quite different terminology according to which action is conceived ‘as being from the agent,’ or ‘as proceeding from the agent into the other.’ That there is only a verbal and not a real difference between this terminology and the Aristotelian is clear from the following passage: That which is attributed to something as proceeding from it to something else does not enter into composition with it, as neither does action [enter into composition] with the agent ... [In the case of a relation of one thing to another,] without any change in that which is related to another, a relation can cease to be through the mere change alone of the other; as also is clear about action, that there is no movement as regards action except metaphorically and improperly; as we say that one passing from leisure to act is changed; which would not be the case if relation or action signified something remaining in the subject. (De potentia, q. 7, a. 8 c.; see also ibid. a. 9, ad 7m.)

See Theological Studies 3 (1942) 377–81 [Grace and Freedom 68–73]. 7 Finally, it is true that Aristotle in working out his theory of action is speaking directly about motion in the strict sense. Now it is also true that St Thomas wrote, change was deliberate, and it is possible that the change was made because of Aquinas’s slight modification of Aristotle’s terminology, as noted two paragraphs below. Relevant here perhaps is Verbum at 158–59, where Lonergan speaks of a ‘shift from identity to assimilation’ in the meaning of the axioms ‘the sensible in act is the sense in act’ and ‘the intelligible in act is the intellect in act,’ a shift, he says, that was perhaps due to the terminological imbroglio of ‘action.’] 7 [See also Grace and Freedom 258–60.]

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scripsisse: ‘actio secundum quod est praedicamentum dicit aliquid fluens ab agente et cum motu.’ In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3m. Sed etiam verum est S. Thomam hanc analysin applicasse tum actibus cognoscitivis tum donis gratiae divinae, eamque adhibuisse ad doctrinam tum creationis tum SS. Trinitatis illustrandam. Uti enim optime novit, fit actio cum motu stricte dicto et fit actio sine motu stricte dicto; et de hac actione sine motu scripsit: ‘quod quidem difficile est ad intelligendum non valentibus abstrahere considerationem suam ab actionibus quae sunt cum motu.’ Quodl., iv, a. 9 c. Cf. Sum. theol., i, q. 41, a. 1, ad 2m. Circa quaestionem de praemotione physica, cum ad nostram materiam non attineat, sufficit indicare quae collegi, Theological Studies 3 (1942) 381–402. 8

8 Actus vitalis Secundum Aristotelem quidquid movetur ab alio movetur. Secundum Platonicos vero anima fere definitur tamquam id quod se movet. Qua de causa, theologi mediaevales et augustiniani, postquam distinctionem inter animam eiusque potentias agnoscere cogebantur, saltem ipsas animae potentias se movere docuerunt. Sicut enim anima non viveret nisi se moveret, ita actus animae non essent vitales nisi producerentur ab ipsis animae potentiis. Quam doctrinam vehementissime propugnavit Petrus Ioannes Olivi, o.f.m., In II Sent., q. 58 (Quaracchi, 1924). Vide ob. 13am, pp. 400–403, ob. 14am, pp. 403–408, corp., pp. 412–14, ad 13m, pp. 437–61, ad 14m, pp. 461–515.

Petri sententiam mitigavit Gonzalvus Hispanus, Quaest. disp., q. 3 (Quaracchi, 1935), pp. 27–49, ita ut obiectum non esset mera conditio actus vitalis sed quandam dispositionem in potentia produceret unde ipsa potentia vitalem actum efficere posset. Partes Aristotelis sustinuerunt Gotefridus de Fontibus (modo exaggerato), Thomas de Suttona, Nicholas Trivet. Mediam viam invexit Scotus qui asseruit tum obiectum tum potentiam esse concausas quae ad actum vitalem producendum concurrebant.

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‘Action as a predicament, or category, refers to something flowing from an agent and with motion.’ Super I Sententiarum, d. 8, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3m. But it is also true that St Thomas applied this analysis both to cognitive acts and to the gifts of divine grace, and used it to illustrate his teaching on both creation and the Trinity. As he knew perfectly well, action takes place with motion in the strict sense and also takes place without motion in the strict sense; and concerning this latter action without motion he writes: ‘This is hard to understand for those who are unable to abstract their consideration from actions that take place with motion.’ Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9 c. See also Summa theologiae, 1, q. 41, a. 1, ad 2m. Concerning the question of physical premotion, since it is not pertinent here, it will suffice to refer you to what I have written in Theological Studies 3 (1942) 381–402 [Grace and Freedom 73–93].8 8 Vital Act According to Aristotle, whatever is moved is moved by something else. According to the Platonic philosophers, however, the soul is generally defined as that which moves itself. Hence medieval Augustinian theologians, after they had been forced to admit the distinction between a soul and its potencies, taught that at least these potencies of the soul moved themselves. For just as a soul would not be alive if it did not move itself, so the acts of a soul would not be vital if they were not produced by those very potencies of the soul. Peter John Olivi, o.f.m., was a most vigorous proponent of this doctrine. See his Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, vol. 2, Quaestiones 49–71, ed. Bernardus Jansen, s.i. (Ad Claras Aquas [Quaracchi]: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1924) q. 58 c., pp. 409–14; ibid. ob. 13 and ad 13m, pp. 400–403, 437–61; ob. 14 and ad 14m, pp. 403–408, 461–515. Gonzalvus Hispanus, o.f.m. (Quaestiones disputatae et Quodlibet, ed. cura Leonis Amoros, o.f.m. [Ad Claras Aquas, Florentiae: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1935] q. 3, pp. 27–49) mitigated Peter’s opinion in this way, that the object would be not a mere condition of a vital act but would produce in a potency a certain disposition whereby that potency could perform a vital act. The Aristotelian side was upheld by Godfrey of Fontaines (in an exaggerated way), by Thomas Sutton, and by Nicholas Trivet. Scotus steered a middle course in maintaining that both the object and the potency were co-causes which came together to produce a vital act. 8 [See also ibid. 277–87.]

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S. Thomam cum Aristotele sensisse vix dubitari potest. Docet enim non tantum praeviam quandam dispositionem vel speciem ab obiecto in sensum produci sed etiam ipsum sentiendi actum. In IV Sent., d. 50, q. 1, a. 4: ‘cognitio sensus perficitur in hoc ipso quod sensus a sensibili movetur.’ C. Gent., ii, 57, § 8: ‘anima igitur sensitiva non se habet in sentiendo sicut movens et agens, sed sicut id quo patiens patitur.’ C. Gent., ii, 76, § 15: ‘si vero operatio illa consistit in passione, adest ei principium passivum, sicut patet de principiis sensitivis in animalibus.’ In II de Anima, lect. 10, § 350: ‘sentire consistit in moveri et pati.’ In II de Anima, lect. 13, § 393 : ‘sentire consistit in quodam alterari et pati.’ Sum. theol., i, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1m: ‘sensum affici est ipsum eius sentire.’ Sum. theol., i, q. 27, a. 5 c.: ‘sentire perficitur per actionem sensibilis in sensum.’ Sum. theol., i, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3m: ‘... duplex operatio. Una secundum solam immutationem, et sic perficitur operatio sensus per hoc quod immutatur a sensibili ...’ Quodlib. v, a. 9, ad 2m: ‘cognitio sensus exterioris perficitur per solam immutationem sensus a sensibili.’ Praeterea, notissimum est intellectum possibilem esse potentiam passivam, et intelligere esse quoddam pati. Quod tamen cum multos non convincat, exquisitiora addere iuvat. De Ver., q. 22, a 5, ad 8m: ‘... forma recepta in aliquo non movet illud in quo recipitur: sed ipsum habere talem formam, est ipsum motum esse; sed movetur ab exteriori agente; sicut corpus quod calefit per ignem, non movetur a calore recepto, sed ab igne. Ita intellectus non movetur a specie iam recepta, vel a vero quod consequitur ipsam speciem; sed ab aliqua re exteriori quae imprimit in intellectum, sicut est intellectus agens, vel phantasia, vel aliquid huiusmodi.’ Sum. theol., i-ii, q. 26, a. 2 c.: ‘Agens autem naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patiens: nam primo quidem dat formam, secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam.’ Quare si paritas supponi potest, intellectus agens et phantasma non solum imprimunt speciem intelligibilem (quae est forma in intellectu possibili recepta) sed

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There is no doubt that St Thomas held Aristotle’s opinion. His teaching is that the object produces not only the prior disposition or species in the sense but also the very act of sensing. [The following passages express this doctrine.] Super IV Sententiarum, d. 50, q. 1, a. 4 sol.: ‘sense knowledge is completed in this, that the sense is moved by a sensible thing.’ Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 57, ¶ 8, § 1333: ‘Sensitive soul, therefore, does not function in sensing as mover and agent, but as that by which the receiver of an influence receives it.’ Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 76, ¶ 15, § 1574: ‘[B]ut if the operation consists in receiving an influence, there is available to it a passive principle, as is evident for sensitive principles in animals.’ In II De anima, lect. 10, § 350: ‘sensing consists in being moved and receiving an influence.’ In II De anima, lect. 13, § 393: ‘sensing consists in a certain reception of an influence and undergoing change.’ Summa theologiae, 1, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1m: ‘for a sense to be affected is the very sensing of the sense.’ Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 5 c.: ‘sensing is completed by the action of the sensible thing on the sense.’ Summa theologiae, 1, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3m: ‘. . . two operations. One consisting in alteration alone, and in this way the operation of a sense potency is achieved in this, that it is changed by the sensible thing.’ Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9, ad 2m: ‘knowledge in an external sense is constituted by this alone, that the sense is changed by the sensible thing.’ Furthermore, it is well known that the possible intellect is a passive potency and that to understand is a certain being-affected. However, since many are not convinced of this, it may help to add a few more detailed passages: De veritate, q. 22, a. 5, ad 8m: ‘. . . the form received in something does not move the thing that receives it; but just as to have that form is itself to have been moved; but the thing is moved by an external agent; just as a body which is heated by fire is not moved by the heat it receives but by the fire. So too intellect is not moved by the species it has already received, nor by the truth which is the result of that species; but by some external thing which leaves an impression on the intellect, as the agent intellect, or phantasm, or something else of that nature.’ Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 26, a. 2 c.: ‘A natural agent produces two effects in the receiver. The first effect gives it a form, and the second effect gives it the movement that follows upon the form.’ Therefore, if we may suppose a parity here, the agent intellect and the phantasm not only imprint the intelligible species (which is the

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etiam dant motum consequentem istam formam (qui motus est intelligere). At si paritas cum agente naturali negatur, manet quod operatio (intelligere) est perfectior quam forma (species) ideoque motorem proportionatum in specie habere non potest.

In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 3, a. 2 sol.: ‘Ultimum autem et perfectissimum in unoquoque est sua operatio; unde omnis forma inhaerens comparatur ad operationem quodammodo ut potentia ad actum; propter quod forma dicitur actus primus ut scientia; et operatio actus secundus, ut considerare, ut patet in ii de Anima’ (lect. 11, §§ 359 ss.). De Pot., q. 5, a. 5, ad 14m: ‘... obiectio illa procedit de actu secundo qui est operatio manens in operante, qui est finis operantis, et per consequens excellentior quam forma operantis.’ Cf. In I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4m; De Malo, q. 1, a. 5 c.; Sum. theol., i-ii, q. 3, a. 2; q. 49, a. 3, ad 1m; iii, q. 9, a. 1 c.; a. 4 c. Etiam vide loca supra citata: De duplici proportione inter actum et potentiam.

Cum his concordant quae de voluntate docentur. In operibus prioribus usque ad partem primam Summae de theologia, non videtur esse sermo de voluntate se ipsam movente, sed regit principium Aristotelicum ‘appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum,’ et libertas in eo fundatur quod ‘ratio circa contingentia habet viam ad opposita’ (Sum. theol., i, q. 83 a. 1 c.). Dicitur quidem ‘quod liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus quia homo per liberum arbitrium se ipsum movet ad agendum’ (i, q. 83, a. 1, ad 3m). Dicitur etiam quod voluntas movetur ex se (i, q. 105, a. 4, ad 2m et 3m). At deesse videtur expressio haec ‘voluntas se movet.’ Vide Theological Studies 3 (1942) 533–37. Explicite tamen in Q. D. de Malo, q. 6, et Sum. theol., i-ii, q. 9, a. 3 c., ponitur quod voluntas se movet, non quia in voluntate habentur agens et possibile sicut in intellectu (i, q. 83, a. 4, ad 3m), sed quia voluntas in actu circa finem se reducit de potentia in actum circa medium. Actus autem circa finem est ex exteriori principio (i-ii, q. 9, a. 4) quod principium est solus Deus (ibid. a. 6), qui hominem movet tum ad bonum universale tum per gratiam ad bonum particulare (ibid. a. 6, ad 3m). Patet ergo voluntatem esse motam et non moventem in actu quo finem vult; et hoc explicite dicitur circa gratiam operantem (i-ii, q. 111, a. 2 c.).

Quae omnia nullam faciunt difficultatem dummodo S. Thomae non imponatur sententia aliena de actu vitali, nempe, potentias viventium se movere ad omnes

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form received in the possible intellect), but also produce the movement that follows upon that form (this movement is the act of understanding). But if there is no parity with a natural agent, it remains that the operation (the act of understanding) is more perfect than the form (the species) and therefore it cannot have in the species a proportionate mover. Super IV Sententiarum, d. 49, q. 3, a. 2 sol.: ‘What is ultimate and most perfect in anything is its operation; wherefore every form inherent in a thing is to its operation somewhat as potency is to act; on this account form is called first act (for example, knowledge); and operation (for example, to consider) is called second act, as is evident in the second book of the De anima’ (see lect. 11, §§ 359–72). De potentia, q. 5, a. 5, ad 14m: ‘. . . that objection is based on second act, which is an operation remaining in the one operating, which is the end of the one operating, and consequently more excellent than the form of the one operating.’ See also Super I Sententiarum, d. 35, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4m; De malo, q. 1, a. 5 c.; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 3, a. 2; q. 49, a. 3, ad 1m; 3, q. 9, a. 1 c.; a. 4 c. Also, see the places cited in § 2 above: ‘The Two Proportions between Act and Potency.’ What St Thomas taught concerning the will is consistent with this doctrine. In his writings up to the first part of the Summa theologiae, there seems to be no mention about the will moving itself, but the Aristotelian principle holds, that ‘the desirable when apprehended moves the appetite,’ and freedom is based upon the fact that ‘concerning contingent beings, reason is open to opposites’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 83, a. 1 c.). Indeed, he writes that ‘the free will is the cause of its movement because a human being through his or her free will moves himself or herself to act’ (ibid. ad 3m). He also writes that the will of itself is moved (ibid. q. 105, a. 4, ad 2m and 3m). But the expression ‘the will moves itself’ does not appear. See Theological Studies 3 (1942) 533–37 [Grace and Freedom 94–98]. Yet in De malo, q. 6, and in Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 9, a. 3 c., it is explicitly stated that the will moves itself, not, however, because in the will there is an active and a passive element as there is in the intellect (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 83, a. 4, ad 3m), but because the will when in act concerning the end brings itself from potency to act concerning the means. But the act concerning the end comes from an external source (ibid. 1-2, q. 9, a. 4), which source is God alone (ibid. a. 6), who moves human beings both to good in general and, through grace, to a particular good (ibid. a. 6, ad 3m). Clearly, then, the will is moved and does not move in the act whereby it wills the end; and this point is explicitly made concerning operative grace (ibid. q. 111, a. 2 c.). All this presents no difficulty so long as one does not impose upon St Thomas a doctrine that he never taught, that of vital act, to wit, that the potencies of living

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suos actus. Sine tali opinione S. Thomas optime explicat tum vitam in genere (i, q. 18, a. 2) tum vitam in Deo (ibid. a. 3), qui certe est motor immobilis. Apparentes vero difficultates duplicem habent fontem quorum primus est oblivio naturae. Secundum Aristotelem motor vel movens per se est quid extrinsecum; definitur enim principium motus vel mutationis in alio secundum quod aliud. E contra, principium motus vel quietis, in eo in quo est motus, ponitur tamquam definitio naturae. Cumque omnes potentiae sunt principia motus in eo in quo est motus, patet omnes habere rationem naturae easque ex principio intrinseco atque naturaliter tum formas recipere tum actus secundos. Alius fons difficultatum apparentium est usus frequens terminologiae cuiusdam non-Aristotelicae. Intellectus specie vel habitu informatus est potentia activa, principium actionis, formale principium actionis, et praeterea principium effectus. Quae tamen omnia dicuntur secundum terminologiam quae ab Avicenna derivari videtur, neque ullo modo caeterae doctrinae thomisticae contradicunt. Uti expresse docetur, processio operationis perficit operantem et ideo admitti non potest talem processionem in Deo esse realem (De ver., q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m). Imo, quamvis in operibus prioribus secundum hanc terminologiam forma gravitatis in gravibus dicatur principium activum et potentia activa, nihilominus negatur hoc motus principium esse motorem. Textus enumerantur, Theological Studies 8 (1947) 418. 9 Applicatio ad actum intelligendi Quae dicta sunt, si ad actum intelligendi applicantur, in unum quoddam reduci possunt. Intelligere, ergo, est perfectio, actus secundus, actus perfecti, motus late dictus. Dicitur actio vel operatio, non sensu factionis (poi¯esis) sed sensu actus (energeia). Aut infinitus actus est aut finitus. Si infinitus, est ipsum intelligere et simpliciter idem quod ipsum esse. Praeterea, cum pariter de Patre, de Filio, et de Spiritu sancto praedicatur, est actus non notionalis sed essentialis. Si autem finitus est actus, est accidens quoddam et se habet ad intellectum in actu sicut esse se habet ad ens in actu. Praeterea, sicut esse consequitur formam substantialem, ita intelligere consequitur speciem intelligibilem. Sed species intelligibilis est in genere qualitatis. Sicut ergo esse reducitur ad genus substantiae, ita intelligere reducitur ad genus qualitatis.

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beings move themselves to all their acts. He had no need of such a notion to explain quite satisfactorily both life in general (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 18, a. 2) and life in God (ibid. a. 3), who certainly is an unmoved mover. These apparent difficulties have two sources, the first of which is forgetting what nature means. According to Aristotle, the motor or mover per se is something extrinsic; for it is defined as the principle of motion or change in another as other. On the other hand, nature is defined as the principle of motion or rest in that being in which there is motion. And since all potencies are principles of motion in that being in which there is motion, it is clear that they all possess the formality of nature and that from an intrinsic principle and naturally they receive both forms and second acts. Another source of the apparent difficulties is Aquinas’s frequent use of a non-Aristotelian terminology. The intellect when informed by a species or a habit is an active potency, a principle of action, a formal principle of action, and also a principle of an effect. All these belong to a terminology that seems to be derived from Avicenna and in no way contradict the rest of Thomist doctrine. As Aquinas expressly teaches, the procession of an operation perfects the operator and therefore it cannot be admitted that such a procession in God is real (De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m). In fact, although in his earlier works using this terminology he spoke of the form of heaviness in heavy objects as being an active principle and an active potency, nevertheless he denied that this principle of movement was a motor. Relevant texts are listed in Theological Studies 8:3 (1947) 418 [Verbum 121, note 88]. 9 Application to the Act of Understanding We can resolve what we have said into some unity if we apply it to the act of understanding. To understand, then, is a perfection, a second act, an act of what is complete, a motion in the broad sense. It is called an action or operation, not in the sense of a production, poi¯esis, but in the sense of an act, energeia. It is either an infinite or a finite act. If it is infinite, it is the very act of understanding itself and is simply identical with the very act of existence itself. Also, when predicated equally of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit it is an essential, not a notional, act. But if it is a finite act, it is an accident, and is to the intellect in act as existence is to being in act. Besides, just as the act of existence follows upon substantial form, so does the act of understanding follow upon the intelligible species. But the intelligible species is in the category of quality. Therefore, just as existence is resolved into the category of substance, so understanding is resolved into the

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Denique, omne ens finitum est ab alio tamquam a causa efficiente; et ideo intelligere finitum est ab alio et est pati quoddam, scilicet pati non proprie sed communiter; unde et intellectus possibilis est potentia passiva. In terminologia quae ex Avicenna derivari videtur, intellectus possibilis, per speciem impressam informatus, est principium actionis vel operationis, et quidem principium formale actionis vel operationis. Quae actio vel operatio est intelligere. Et quamvis in hac terminologia intellectus possibilis per speciem informatus sit potentia activa relate ad actum, actionem, operationem intelligendi, tamen processio ex hac activa potentia ad actum intelligendi non est processio operati sed operationis; nam intelligere se habet ad intellectum per speciem informatum, non ut effectus ad causam efficientem, sed ut perfectio ad perfectibile. E contra, verbum quod est terminus actionis, operationis, actus intelligendi, et ab hac actione, operatione, actu producitur, est quoddam operatum seu effectus; unde relate ad verbum, intellectus per speciem informatus est principium effectus vel principium operati, et processio verbi dicitur processio operati.

In terminologia Aristotelica tum intellectus possibilis tum species qua intellectus informatur sunt principia actus intelligendi. Quae tamen principia, cum actum principiant in eo in quo est actus, neque potentia passiva neque potentia activa nominantur sed natura. Potentia enim passiva est principium motus vel mutationis ab alio inquantum ab alio; potentia vero activa est principium motus vel mutationis in alio inquantum aliud. Quare, intellectus possibilis est potentia passiva per comparationem ad intellectum agentem; et intellectus agens est potentia activa per comparationem ad intellectum possibilem. Agit vero intellectus agens et patitur intellectus possibilis inquantum phantasma est instrumentum quo intellectus agens imprimit speciem intelligibilem in intellectu possibili. Praeterea, sicut quod generavit grave vel leve etiam ea movet secundum locum, ita generaliter agens non solum dat formam sed etiam motum qui formam consequitur; et secundum hoc intellectus agens est movens quandocumque intelligere sequitur speciem intelligibilem.

Cave tamen ab errore vulgari secundum quem movens est solum principium actus. Nam per se movens est aliquid extrinsecum, et eo plus ad actum facit quo minus perfectum est subiectum. Ita si homo per solum intellectum possibilem ad actum intelligendi inclinatur tamquam per principium naturale huius actus, maxime laborant et intellectus agens et magister. Sin autem homo non solo intellectu possibili sed etiam specie intelligibili tamquam

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category of quality. Finally, every finite being is from another as from its efficient cause, and therefore finite understanding is from another and is a being-changed, a reception, that is to say, a pati not in the proper sense but in the general sense [see § 6 above]. Hence, the possible intellect also is a passive potency. In the terminology apparently derived from Avicenna, the possible intellect, informed by an impressed species, is a principle of action or operation, and indeed the formal principle of action or operation. This action or operation is the act of understanding. And although in this terminology the possible intellect informed by a species is an active potency with respect to the act, the action, the operation, of understanding, nevertheless the process from this active potency to the act of understanding is not a processio operati but a procession of an operation [see § 5 above]. For understanding is related to the intellect informed by a species not as an effect to its efficient cause but as a perfection to a perfectible. On the other hand, the word that is the term of the action, the operation, the act of understanding, and is produced by this action, operation, act, is a product or effect; hence, in relation to the word, the intellect informed by a species is the principle of an effect or the principle of a product, and the procession of the word is said to be a processio operati. In the Aristotelian terminology, both the possible intellect and the species by which the intellect is informed are principles of the act of understanding. These principles, however, since they produce the act in that being in which the act is, are referred to not as passive potency or active potency but as nature. For a passive potency is the principle of motion or change from another as from that other; active potency is the principle of motion or change in another as in that other. Accordingly, the possible intellect is a passive potency in comparison with the agent intellect, and the agent intellect is an active potency in comparison with the possible intellect. But the agent intellect acts and the possible intellect is acted upon inasmuch as a phantasm is the instrument by which the agent intellect impresses an intelligible species upon the possible intellect. Moreover, just as whatever has produced a heavy or a light object also moves it locally, so in general an agent gives something not only a form but also the motion that is consequent upon the form. In this way the agent intellect is a mover whenever an act of understanding follows upon an intelligible species. Beware of the common error of thinking that the mover [movens] is the sole principle of an act. For a mover as such is something extrinsic, and the more it contributes to an act the less perfect is the subject. Thus, if one is moving towards an act of understanding through one’s possible intellect alone as the natural principle of this act, both the agent intellect and the teacher have the most work to do. But if one is moving towards the act not by one’s possible

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principiis naturalibus ad actum inclinatur, magistro non indiget et quandocumque vult operatur. Et quo maior est in eo ordinata specierum collectio (quae est habitus intellectualis), eo magis ad intelligendum inclinatur et eo facilius intelligit vetera novaque addiscit.

Qua de causa cum S. Thomas rationem vitae investigarit, inter ipsam vitam et exterius vitae signum distinxit. ‘Nam vitae nomen sumitur ex quodam exterius apparenti circa rem, quod est movere se ipsum: non tamen est impositum hoc nomen ad hoc significandum, sed ad significandam substantiam cui convenit secundum suam naturam movere se ipsam, vel agere se quocumque modo ad operationem.’ Sum. theol., i, q. 18, a. 2 c. Deinde, cum de gradibus perfectionis in viventibus tractarit, non illa magis vivere aestimavit in quibus plura inveniantur principia moventia et mobilia, sed hanc statuit regulam: ‘cum vivere dicantur aliqua secundum quod operantur ex seipsis, et non quasi ab aliis mota; quanto perfectius competit hoc alicui, tanto perfectius in eo invenitur vita.’ Sum. theol., i, q. 18, a. 3 c. Unde per omnes gradus vitae procedens et inferiorem quemque ideo excludens quia quantum ad aliquid ab alio movetur, pervenit ad illud ‘cuius sua natura est ipsum eius intelligere, et cui id quod naturaliter habet non determinatur ab alio’ (ibid.). Quod intelligere definitioni vitae satisfacit, nempe, agere se quocumque modo ad operationem. Intelligere enim est operatio et motus late dictus; Deus autem se intelligit; ‘et id quod se intelligit, dicitur se movere’ (ibid. ad 1m). Quod tamen non est intelligendum quasi ullam vel minimam dualitatem in Deo ponit; adeo enim unum idemque est esse divinum et intelligere divinum ut veritas in Deo inveniatur non secundum conformitatem (quae dualitatem supponit) sed secundum absentiam dissimilitudinis (Sum. theol., i, q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m). Unde concludes quod processiones in Deo probari non possunt ex eo quod Deus vivit, et vivens movet et movetur. Perfectissima enim vita est actus purus sine admixtione ullius potentialitatis.

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intellect alone but also by an intelligible species as by the natural principles [of the act of understanding], then that person has no need of a teacher and operates whenever he or she wishes. And the larger a collection of well-ordered species one possesses (which is an intellectual habit), the more does one tend to understand, and the more easily does one understand and add new insights to what one has already understood. It was for this reason that St Thomas in investigating the essential notion of life made a distinction between life itself and the external sign of life. ‘For the use of the word “life” is based upon an external feature of the [living] thing, the fact that it moves itself; but this word does not signify this feature but rather the substance to which self-movement belongs by its nature or to move itself to operation in any way at all’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 18, a. 2 c.). Then, when he was treating the question of the degrees of perfection among living things, he did not consider those beings to be more alive in which more principles of motion and mobility were to be found, but stated this rule: ‘Since things are said to be alive insofar as they operate by themselves and not as if moved by something else, it follows that the more this feature belongs to a thing, the higher is the degree of perfection of the life to be found in it’ [ibid. a. 3, c.]. Accordingly, proceeding through all the levels of life, and excluding the very lowest level as that which is moved to something by something else, St Thomas arrived at that being ‘whose act of understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another’ [ibid.]. This act of understanding fits the definition of life, that is, to move oneself to operation in any way at all. For understanding is an operation and a motion in the broad sense; but God understands himself, and ‘that which understands itself is said to move itself’ [ibid. ad 1m]. Yet, it must not be understood from this that there is any, even a minimal, duality in God; for God’s existence and understanding are so much one that in God truth is present not according to a conformity (which supposes duality) but through the absence of dissimilarity (ibid. q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m). Hence, it follows that the processions in God cannot be proved from the fact that God is alive and that a living thing moves and is moved. For the most perfect life is pure act without the least admixture of potentiality.

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APPENDIX II

De Actu Intelligendi 1

Ut verbum interius seu conceptus intelligibiliter emanare possit, omnino necesse est ut ante intelligamus quam verbum seu conceptum intus formemus. Quo in actu priori aliquid sane intelligimus. Neque huius actus obiectum potest esse verbum quod nondum formatum sit. Relinquitur ergo ut intellectus noster non solum conceptualia sed etiam praeconceptualia obiecta perspiciat. Secus non quia

1 [Quod in Concilio Vaticano docetur atque decernitur, rationem fide illustratam aliquam Deo dante mysteriorum intelligentiam eamque fructuossimam consequi posse (db 1796), iam pridem novit traditio catholica. Nam S. Augustino duce omnes fere theologi intellectum humanum atque voluntatem scrutati sunt ut ex imagine illa ad quam homo factus est per analogiam ascendentes ad Deum Trinum quodammodo speculandum procederent. Cuius investigationis primus gressus hoc altero articulo continetur, nempe, qualis sit mens humana. Nisi enim clare atque exacte perspicitur rationalis pars naturae humanae, frustra ad imperfectam atque obscuram mysterii intelligentiam consequendam proceditur. Qua de causa, nunc quaerimus quae nobis insint principium verbi et verbum et amor procedens (Sum. theol., i, q. 93, a. 6 c.) et ea utamur methodo quam introduxit Aristoteles (In II de Anima, lect. 6, parr. 304 ss.) et perfecit Aquinas. Cum enim potentiae et habitus per actus cognoscantur, actus vero per obiecta, ab obiectis ordiendum est. Primo, ergo, de generali obiecti notione ..., deinde de obiecto intellectus ut fine et termino ..., tertio de obiecto intellectum

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APPENDIX 2

The Act of Understanding 1

For an inner word or concept to emanate intellectually, it is absolutely necessary that we understand before we form within ourselves a word or concept. We certainly understand something in this prior act, but the object of this act cannot be a word that has not yet been formed. It remains, therefore, that our intellect grasps not only conceptual objects but preconceptual objects as well. Otherwise we would 1 [In the earlier supplement, most of what appears in this appendix is contained in article 2, ‘De imagine Dei’ (‘The Image of God’). That article began with two paragraphs that did not appear in the appendix. They are translated here as follows, with the ellipses introduced where Lonergan had specified section numbers: ‘Catholic tradition has long known what the [First] Vatican Council taught in its decree (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132), that human reason enlightened by faith is able, with God’s help, to acquire some very fruitful understanding of the mysteries. From St Augustine onwards, virtually all theologians have studied the human intellect and will in order that, rising by way of an analogy drawn from that image and likeness in which we have been made, they might proceed to speculate in some way about the triune God. ‘The first step in this investigation is to be found in this second article, namely, the nature of the human mind. Unless one has a clear and accurate grasp of the rational part of human nature, one will proceed in vain to acquire an understanding, however imperfect, of this mystery. At this point, therefore, we ask what in us is the principle of the inner word, what is the inner word itself, and what is the love proceeding from them (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 93, a. 6 c.), and in doing so we are following the method introduced by Aristotle (see Thomas Aquinas, In II De anima, lect. 6, §§ 304–308) and further developed by Aquinas. Since potencies and habits are known through their acts and acts through their objects, we must start from a consideration of objects. To begin, therefore, we shall examine first the general notion of object ..., next the object of intellect as its end and as its term ..., and

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intelligamus conceptiones formaremus sed, ut docent Scotistae, quia conceptiones inconscio quodam modo formatae essent, intelligere possemus. 2 Quid ergo de hac quaestione senserit S. Thomas breviter nunc exponendum est. Neminem enim fugere potest quanti sit momenti haec quaestio, cum inconscia verbi formatio illam emanationem intelligibilem tolleret quam SS. Trinitatis analogiam psychologicam esse duximus. 1 Obiectum Obiectum definitur a S. Thoma secundum habitudinem causalem ad potentiam et actum. Quare obiectum aut est movens quod in potentia actum efficit, aut est terminus qui ab actu producitur, aut est finis in quem potentia per actus tendit. Sum. Theol., i, q. 77, a. 3 c.: ‘Omnis enim actio vel est potentiae activae vel passivae. Obiectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passivae sicut principium et causa movens: color enim inquantum movet visum est principium visionis. Ad actum autem potentiae activae comparatur obiectum ut terminus et finis: sicut augmentativae virtutis obiectum est quantum perfectum quod est finis augmenti.’ Pariter: De Ver., q. 16, a. 1, ad 13m; In II de Anima, lect. 6, § 305; Q.D. de Anima, a. 13 c.; Sum. theol., i-ii, q. 18, a. 2, ad 3m. Theological Studies 8 (1947) 433 ss.

Unde concludes notionem obiecti non esse primitivam sed in notiones potentiae, actus, moventis, et finis seu termini reduci. Qua de causa noli loqui de attingentia obiecti quin cogites quamnam habitudinem bene definitam dicere velis.

movente agemus ... Cum autem obiectum quod nostrum intellectum ad primam eius operationem moveat quibusdam obscurum videatur, post multa et diversa testimonia ex Aquinate allata ..., quid sit quidditas rei ..., quotupliciter dicatur species ..., quaenam sit verbi necessitas ... dicemus. Quibus stabilitis, non solum elucet distinctio inter actum intelligendi, qui ab obiecto movente specificatur, et operationem dicendi, qui ab obiecto ut termino speciem sumat ..., sed etiam patet iter ad intelligendam emanationem intelligibilem ... atque spirationem amoris ...]

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not form conceptions because we understand, but rather, as the Scotists teach, we are able to understand because in some unconscious manner conceptions have been formed.2 Therefore, we must now explain briefly what St Thomas thought regarding this question. No one can be unaware of the great importance of this question, since the unconscious formation of the word would destroy that intellectual emanation which we have considered to be the psychological analogy of the Holy Trinity. 1 The Notion of Object Object is defined by St Thomas in terms of a causal relation to potency and to act. Therefore an object can be either a mover that brings about an act in a potency, or a term produced by an act, or the end to which a potency tends through acts. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 77, a. 3 c.: ‘Every action belongs either to an active potency or to a passive potency. But an object is to the act of a passive potency as principle and moving cause; for color is the principle of vision insofar as it moves the faculty of sight. But an object is to the act of an active potency as term and end; as the object of the faculty of growth is achieving its due quantity, which is the end of growth.’ See also De veritate, q. 16, a. 1, ad 13m; In II De anima, lect. 6, § 305; Quaestiones disputatae De anima, a. 13 c.; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 18, a. 2, ad 3m; Theological Studies 8:3 (1947) 433–37 [Verbum 138–43]. It follows, then, that the notion of object is not a primitive notion but is reducible to the notions of potency, act, mover, and end or term. Therefore, do not talk about attaining an object without having thought about which clearly defined relation you are referring to.

thirdly the object that moves the intellect ... However, since some find the object that moves our intellect to its first operation rather obscure, we shall adduce a variety of quotations from Aquinas on this point ..., then determine what is meant by the quiddity of a thing ..., how many species there are ..., and why an inner word is necessary ... Having established these points, not only will the distinction become clear between the act of understanding, specified by the object moving it, and the operation of speaking (an inner word), which takes its species from the object as term ..., but also the way will be open to understanding intellectual emanation and the spiration of love ...’] 2 [This and the next paragraph do not appear in the supplement.]

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2 De obiecto intellectus ut fine et termino Obiectum intellectus ut finis est ens in tota sua latitudine. Intellectus enim est quo est omnia facere et fieri, neque omnia ad genus quoddam restringi potest. Sum. theol., i, q. 79, a. 7 c. Obiectum vero intellectus ut terminus intra ipsum intellectum productus est verbum cordis seu verbum interius; et quia duplex est operatio intellectus, duplex etiam est terminus immanenter productus, nempe, verbum incomplexum seu definitio, et verbum complexum seu enuntiatio3 seu verum vel falsum. Ita De Ver., q. 4, a. 2; q. 3, a. 2; De Pot., q. 8, a. 1; q. 9, a. 5; Quodl. v, a. 9; In Ioan., cap. 1, lect. 1.

Existentia verborum interiorum ex significatione verborum exteriorum probatur. Loquimur enim de ‘homine’ vel de ‘triangulo,’ et ita loquentes aliquid sane significamus. Nisi ergo quis credit universalia subsistere a parte rei, necessario ponit universalia in mente concepta quae directe et immediate per voces exteriores significantur. Iterum, sermo humanus aut verum aut falsum proponit. Quid ergo est id quod significatur directe et immediate per sermonem falsum? Nisi cum neopositivistis ponis sermones falsos nihil significare, necessario agnoscis verbum complexum intus in mente formatum et a sermone exteriori directe et immediate significatum. Tandem denique credimus omnes quod sermo humanus etiam res significat, et tamen hoc non credimus nisi sermo sit verus. At verum et falsum sunt in mente, immo veritas in solo iudicio formaliter est. Iterum ergo concludendum est voces exteriores significare res, non quidem immediate, sed mediantibus verbis interioribus atque veris.

Primo ergo et per se voces exteriores sive ore prolatae sive scriptis consignatae sive imaginatione repraesentatae et significant et non significantur. E contra, res significantur sed primo et per se non significant. Verba vero interiora et significantur et significant: significantur quidem per verba exteriora; significant autem ipsas res. Qua de causa, caveas ne confundas verba interiora sive cum actu intelligendi sive cum actu cogitandi, definiendi, supponendi, considerandi, affirmandi, negandi. Verbum enim interius est id ipsum quod intelligitur, cogitatur, definitur, supponitur, consideratur,

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2 The Object of the Intellect as End and Term The object of the intellect as its end is being, in the widest sense of the word. For the intellect is that which can make and become all things, and ‘all’ is not restricted to any genus. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 7 c. But the object of the intellect as the term produced within the intellect itself is the ‘word of the heart’ or ‘inner word.’ And since there are two intellectual operations, there are also two terms produced immanently, namely, the simple word or definition and the compound word or proposition, 3 that is, the true or the false. De veritate, q. 4, a. 2; q. 3, a. 2; De potentia, q. 8, a. 1; q. 9, a. 5; Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9; Super Ioannem, c. 1, lect. 1. The existence of these inner words is proven from the meaning of outer words. We speak of ‘man’ or ‘triangle,’ and we surely mean something by these words. Unless, therefore, you believe that universals subsist as real entities, you will necessarily conclude that universals are conceived in the mind and signified directly and immediately by external words. Again, human speech states what is true and what is false. What, then, is signified directly and immediately by a false statement? Unless along with the neo-positivists you maintain that false statements signify nothing, you will necessarily acknowledge a compound word formed inwardly in the mind and signified directly and immediately in an external statement. Finally, we all hold that human speech also signifies things, and yet we do not accept anything unless it is true. But the true and the false are in the mind; truth, in fact, is formally only in a judgment. Again, therefore, one must conclude that outer words signify things, not immediately, of course, but through the medium of inner words that are true. Hence, primarily and per se outer words, whether spoken or written or present in the imagination, signify and are not signified. Things, on the other hand, are signified, but primarily and per se do not signify. Inner words, however, both signify and are signified: they are signified by outer words, and signify things themselves. For this reason one must be careful not to confuse inner words either with the act of understanding or with thinking, defining, supposing, considering, affirming, or denying. An inner word is that which is understood, is thought, is defined, is 3 [The translation of enuntiatio as ‘proposition’ refers not to an object of thought, the content of an act of conceiving, but to an act of judging. For these two senses of ‘proposition,’ see Insight 296–97.]

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affirmatur vel negatur, non sane secundum esse naturale sed secundum esse intentionale. Quod esse intentionale est medium in quo res cognoscitur. Iterum, verbum interius est non no¯esis sed no¯ema, non la pens´ee pensante sed la pens´ee pens´ee, non intentio intendens sed intentio intenta, non intentio intelligentis sed intentio intellecta. 4 Textus vide apud Theological Studies 7 (1946) 351 s. De differentiis inter Scriptum super Sententias et alia opera inde a De Ver., q. 3, a. 2, cf. ibid. 360, nota 51.

Quantum ad opusculum De Natura Verbi Intellectus, haec notari sufficit: (1) R.P. Mandonnet illud spurium iudicavit; (2) criteria a R.P. Mandonnet de valore catalogorum stabilita iam pridem eruditis non placent; (3) Msgr. Grabmann ex criteriis externis seriem quandam opusculorum (inter quae invenitur De Natura Verbi Intellectus) probabilius authenticam aestimavit; (4) cui tum alii tum nuperrime R.P. Pelster consensit, ita tamen ut probabilitatem ex criteriis externis certitudinem vero ex criteriis internis hauriri censuerit (Gregorianum 36 [1955] 21–49); (5) satius mihi videtur testimonia ex hoc opusculo de praesenti omittere. Nam argumentum ex criteriis internis, etiamsi omnibus numeris absolutum fuisset (quod R.P. Pelster non praestitit), magis est aptum ad chronologiam determinandam quam ad authenticitatem evincendam. Ipsa deinde authenticitas minime est conceptus univocus: alia enim sunt opera a S. Thoma conscripta et ab eodem edita; alia vero ab eo composita et ab alio reportata; alia vero aliquo sensu authentica dici possunt quae ab eo quocumque modo emanaverunt. Quae cum ita sint, et tutius et utilius duxi quaestiones forte supervacaneas evitare et doctrinam exponere quae in operibus certo authenticis invenitur.

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supposed, is considered, is affirmed, is denied —not, of course, according to its natural existence but according to its intentional existence. Intentional existence is the medium in which a thing is known. Furthermore, an inner word is not no¯esis but a no¯ema, not la pens´ee pensante but la pens´ee pens´ee, not an intending intention but an intended intention, not the intention of the one understanding, but the intention understood. 4 For the relevant texts, see Theological Studies 7:3 (1946) 351–59 [Verbum 14–24]. On the discrepancy between the Scriptum super Sententias and Aquinas’s other writings beginning from De veritate, q. 3, a. 2, see Theological Studies 7:3 (1946) 360, note 51 [Verbum 25, note 52]. With regard to the minor work, De natura verbi intellectus, the following observations will suffice. (1) Fr Mandonnet has judged it to be spurious; (2) the criteria proposed by Mandonnet on the value of the catalogues have long since been rejected by experts; (3) from external criteria Msgr Grabmann judged as more probably authentic a series of minor works, including the De natura verbi intellectus; (4) more recently Fr Pelster, among others, has agreed with Grabmann, holding that external criteria make for probability while internal criteria make for certitude (‘Die Thomas von Aquin zugeschriebenen Opuscula De instantibus, De natura verbi intellectus, De principio individuationis, De genere, De natura accidentis, De natura materiae, De quatuor oppositis und ihr Verfasser,’ Gregorianum 36 [1955] 21–49); (5) it seems to me better for the time being to omit these testimonies from this treatise. For the argument from internal criteria, even if it had been peremptory on all points (which Fr Pelster did not claim it to be), is better suited to determine chronology than to evince authenticity. Then again, authenticity is by no means a univocal concept: there are some works written by St Thomas and edited by him, there are others written by him and reported by someone else, and there are still others that can in some sense be called authentic, which have come from him in some way or other. This being the case, I have deemed it safer and more useful to eschew needless questions and explain the teaching that is found in works of certain authenticity. 4 [On the ‘intention understood’ see Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11, ¶ 6, § 3466: ‘Now, I mean by the “intention understood” what the intellect conceives in itself of the thing understood. To be sure, in us this is neither the thing which is understood nor is it the very substance of the intellect. But it is a certain likeness of the thing understood conceived in the intellect, and which the exterior words signify.’ Translation by Charles J. O’Neill, in Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, Book Four: Salvation (Notre Dame, in: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975) 81.]

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3 De obiecto quod intellectum movet Cum duplex sit operatio intellectus, duplex pariter ei adest obiectum movens. Ut enim intellectus verbum sive incomplexum sive complexum dicere possit, intelligere debet; ut autem intelligat, cum potentia passiva sit, ad actum intelligendi moveatur necesse est; nec quidquam de potentia in actum reducitur nisi ei adest motor qui quatenus movere potest nominatur motivum, quatenus autem actu movet movens dicitur.5 Quae res circa secundam intellectus operationem valde manifesta est. Sit iudicium prolatum, ‘Folia lego.’ Cur hoc iudicium protuli? Quia evidentiam sufficientem qua sufficientem perspexi. En tria haec: ipsa evidentia sufficiens; perspicientia evidentiae sufficientis ut sufficientis; et iudicium propter perspectam evidentiam prolatum. At iudicium est verbum complexum. Perspicere sufficientiam evidentiae est actus intelligendi reflexus unde dicitur verbum complexum. Ipsa denique evidentia sufficiens quatenus quemlibet intellectum movere potest ad sufficientiam perspiciendam est motivum, quatenus vero actu intellectum movet est obiectum movens. At eadem prorsus est analysis circa primam intellectus operationem. Qui enim primo definitionem invenit vel inventam addiscit, non caeca quadam spontaneitate fertur sed ingenii acuitate et intelligendi facilitate. Sit definitio circuli: locus punctorum quae in eodem plano iacentia aequaliter a centro distant. Cur ita definitur? Quia manifestum est tum lineam necessario esse perfecte rotundam si omnes radii sunt aequales tum etiam eam rotundam esse non posse si ulli radii inaequales sunt. At ubi manifestatur? An perspicitur nexus inter conceptus abstractos? Minime, nam unicus est radius abstractus, unicum pariter est punctum abstractum; in definitione vero agitur de quadam infinitate punctorum et radiorum. Praeterea, necessaria illa rotunditas quae definitionem circuli fundat et explicat, in ipsis aequalibus radiis perspicitur. En tria iterum distinguenda; radii aequales imaginatione repraesentati; perspicientia necessariae rotunditatis in ipsis radiis aequalibus; et definitio circuli quae ex perspecta rotunditate procedit. At definitio est verbum incomplexum. Perspicere necessariam rotunditatem est actus intelligendi directus. Radii vero aequales, imaginatione repraesentati et lumine intellectus agentis illuminati, quatenus quemlibet intellectum movere possunt ad naturam circuli intelligendam sunt motivum, quatenus vero hunc vel illum intellectum actu movent sunt obiectum movens.

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3 The Object That Moves the Intellect Since the intellect has two operations, it has likewise two objects that move it. In order that the intellect be able to speak either a simple or a compound word, it must first understand; but since it is a passive potency, in order to understand it must be moved to an act of understanding. Nothing is moved from potency to act unless it has something to move it; and this, as capable of moving something, is called a motive or motor, and as actually moving something is called a mover. 5 In the case of the second intellectual operation, this is very obvious. Take, for example, the spoken judgment, ‘I am reading a book.’ Why do I utter this judgment? Because I have grasped sufficient evidence as being sufficient. So there are three elements here: the sufficient evidence itself, the grasp of the sufficient evidence as sufficient, and the judgment uttered on the grounds of the sufficiency of the evidence. Now, a judgment is a compound word. Grasping the sufficiency of evidence is a reflective act of understanding whence there is spoken a compound word. Sufficient evidence itself, insofar as it can move any intellect to grasp its sufficiency, is a motive, and insofar as it actually moves an intellect, it is the object moving it. But this same analysis holds in the case of the first operation of the intellect. One who first discovers the definition of something or one who learns it is not impelled by some blind spontaneity but by his mental acuity and quickness to understand. Here, for example, is the definition of a circle: ‘a locus of coplanar points equidistant from a center.’ Why is it so defined? Because it is obvious that a line must necessarily be perfectly round if all the radii are equal, and also that it cannot be round if any radii are unequal. But where is this obvious? Is it in grasping a nexus between abstract concepts? Certainly not, for there is only one abstract radius and only one abstract point, whereas the definition involves an infinity of radii and points. Besides, that necessary roundness which grounds and explains the definition of a circle is grasped in those equal radii themselves. Here too are three distinct elements: the equal radii represented in the imagination, the grasp of the necessary roundness in these equal radii, and the definition of a circle that proceeds from the grasp of this roundness. Now, a definition is a simple word. Grasping the necessary roundness is a direct act of understanding. The equal radii, represented in the imagination and illumined by the light of the agent intellect, as being capable of moving any intellect to understand the nature of a circle, are the motive, and as actually moving this or that particular intellect, are the object moving it. 5 [See Appendix 1, § 7.]

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Quae accuratius sunt declaranda. Radii aequales facile imaginantur, at necessitas rotunditatis nequaquam imaginari potest. Solo enim intellectu capitur necessarium vel possibile. Et tamen sine radiis multis in continuo sensibili contentis numquam perspicitur rotunditatis necessitas; quam nisi perspicimus ad definitionem circuli pervenire non possumus nisi forte ad modum puerorum qui nomina et verba memoriter teneant sed ipsam rem nullatenus intelligant. Qua de causa distingui oportet inter intelligibile potentia et intelligibile actu. Sicut enim colores nocturni sunt potentia visibiles diurni vero visibiles actu, ita phantasmata secundum se sunt actu sensibilia et potentia intelligibilia. Per illuminationem vero intellectus agentis fiunt actu intelligibilia, et tunc non solum aequales radios imaginamur sed etiam in radiis imaginatis rotunditatis necessitatem intelligimus.6 Qua necessitate perspecta, verbum incomplexum seu definitionem circuli interius dicimus. Ulterius distinguendum est inter obiectum proprium intellectus nostri pro hoc statu, obiectum ut terminum primae operationis, et obiectum indirectum. Dum enim sensu videmus vel imaginatione repraesentamus aequales radios, primo et directe per intellectum rotunditatis necessitatem intelligimus seu circuli formam vel speciem vel quidditatem vel naturam vel quod quid erat esse, 7 quae multa nomina unum dicunt, nempe, intelligibile actu in phantasmate relucens et ab intellectu directe conspectum. Eiusmodi ergo est proprium obiectum nostri intellectus pro hoc statu quo anima corpori coniungitur et, quia hoc proprium obiectum sine phantasmate consistere non potest, nihil prorsus intelligere possumus nisi intellectus noster ad phantasmata se convertit. Deinde vero quatenus in radiis aequalibus necessitas rotunditatis iam perspicitur, definitionem circuli formamus et sic obiectum quod est terminus primae huius operationis producimus. Tertio denique ut singulare, iam sensu et imaginatione cognitum, etiam per intellectum cognoscamus, indirecte per quandam reflectionem super phantasma in quo species elucet notitiam particularem notitiae universali iam acquisitae addimus.

4 Testimonia S. Thomae circa obiectum movens In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 3 sol.: ‘Oportet quod in definitione huius actus qui est intelligere, cadat phantasma, quod est obiectum eius ut in III de Anima, text. 39, dicitur, quod per

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This needs further clarification. Equal radii are easy to imagine, but the necessity of roundness cannot at all be imagined. Necessity and possibility can only be apprehended intellectually. Nevertheless, without a multiplicity of radii in a visible continuum the necessity of roundness would never be grasped; and unless we grasp this necessity, we cannot arrive at the definition of a circle, except, perhaps, like children who memorize words without understanding what they refer to. For this reason we must distinguish between the intelligible in potency and the intelligible in act. Just as at night colors are potentially visible while in the daytime they are actually visible, so the phantasms in themselves are actually sensible but potentially intelligible. Through the illumination of the agent intellect they become actually intelligible, and then not only do we imagine equal radii but also we understand the necessity of roundness in those imagined radii. 6 Upon grasping this necessity, we speak inwardly the simple word that is the definition of a circle. We must further distinguish between the proper object of our intellect in our present state of existence, its object as the term of the first intellectual operation, and its indirect object. In seeing with our eyes or in imagining equal radii, we first and directly understand through our intellect the necessity of roundness, the form or species or quiddity or nature or formal cause 7 of a circle. All of these words refer to one thing, namely, the actually intelligible as luminous in the phantasm and directly discerned by the intellect. This is the nature of the proper object of our intellect in our present state of existence in which our soul is joined to our body; and since this proper object cannot be had without a phantasm, we cannot understand anything unless our intellect turns its attention to phantasms. And then, as it now grasps the necessity of roundness in the equal radii, we form the definition of a circle and thus produce the object that is the term of this first operation. Finally, in order to know intellectually a singular thing already known by our senses and imagination, we add particular knowledge indirectly to our already acquired universal knowledge by reflecting upon the phantasm in which the species shines forth. 4 Passages in St Thomas on the Object as Mover Super I Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 4, a. 3 sol.: ‘In the definition of the act of understanding we must include the phantasm, which is its object (as is said in the third book of 6 [Lonergan is simplifying things here. For a more adequate statement of the set of distinctions, see Verbum 184–85 and Understanding and Being 415, note d.] 7 [Translating quod quid erat esse, the medieval translation of Aristotle’s ‘to ti e¯ n einai.’ See § 5 below.]

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actum imaginationis repraesentatur intellectui ...’ In II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1m: ‘... oportet enim ut species phantasmatum, quae sunt obiecta intellectus nostri, efficiantur in actu intelligibiles, quod ad agentem pertinet ...’ In III Sent., d. 14, a. 3, sol. 2 c.: ‘Et quia Christus cognovit intellectu possibili, cuius est obiectum phantasma, ideo cognovit ea cum continuo et tempore, utens phantasmatibus quasi obiectis intellectus, non quidem sicut ab eis species accipiens, sed sicut species circa eas ponens; sicut in eo contingit qui habet habitum et actu aliqua considerat.’

Ibid., sol. 5, ad 3m: ‘... per lumen intellectus agentis in Christo non fuit aliqua species de novo recepta in intellectu possibili eius, sed fuit facta conversio nova ad species quae erant in phantasia, sicut est in eo qui habet habitum scientiae eorum quae imaginatur vel videt.’ Notate quod in Sum. theol., iii, q. 12, a. 2 c., S. Thomas docet Christum etiam habitum scientiae naturalis acquisivisse per actionem intellectus agentis et phantasmatis.

De Ver., q. 10, a. 2, ad 7m: ‘... nulla potentia potest aliquid cognoscere non convertendo se ad obiectum suum, ut visus nihil cognoscit nisi convertendo se ad colorem. Unde, cum phantasmata se habeant hoc modo ad intellectum possibilem sicut sensibilia ad sensum, ut patet per Philosophum in iii De Anima (comm. 39), quantumcumque aliquam speciem intelligibilem apud se habeat, numquam tamen actu aliquid considerat secundum illam speciem nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. Et ideo, sicut intellectus noster secundum statum viae indiget phantasmatibus ad actu considerandum antequam accipiat habitum, ita et postquam acceperit. Secus autem videtur de angelis, quorum intellectus obiectum non est phantasma.’

De Ver., q. 18, a. 8, ad 4m: ‘... secundum Philosophum in iii De Anima, intellectiva comparatur ad phantasmata sicut ad obiecta propria. Unde non solum indiget intellectus noster converti ad phantasmata in acquirendo scientiam, sed etiam in utendo scientia acquisita; quod patet ex hoc quod si laedatur organum imaginativae virtutis, ut fit in phraeneticis, scientia prius acquisita homo tunc uti non potest dum anima est in corpore. Dictum autem Avicennae intelligitur de anima a corpore separata, quae habet alium modum intelligendi.’ N.B. Comparantur conversio ad phantasmata in statu praesenti et conversio ad intelligibilia simpliciter in statu animae separatae, Sum. theol., i, q. 89, a. 1 c. Cave ne hanc conversionem

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the De anima, text. 39 [431a]), the object that through the act of imagination is represented to the intellect . . .’ Super II Sententiarum, d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1m: ‘. . . for it is necessary that the species of the phantasms, which are the objects of our intellect, be rendered actually intelligible, which is the function of the agent [intellect] . . .’ Super III Sententiarum, d. 14, a. 3, sol. 2 c.: ‘And because Christ had knowledge through his possible intellect, whose object is the phantasm, therefore he had knowledge of those things continuously and at various times, using phantasms as objects of his intellect, not indeed as receiving species from them, but rather as positing species concerning them, like one who has habitual knowledge of something and then actually considers it.’ Super III Sententiarum, d. 14, a. 3, sol. 5, ad 3m: ‘. . . by the light of the agent intellect in Christ there was not some species received anew in his possible intellect, but a new turning was made to the species that were present in his imagination, as that made by someone who has some habitual knowledge of things that he imagines or sees.’ Note that in Summa theologiae, 3, q. 12, a. 2 c., St Thomas teaches that Christ also acquired a habit of natural knowledge through the action of his agent intellect and phantasms. De veritate, q. 10, a. 2, ad 7m: ‘. . . no potency is able to know anything if it does not turn itself toward its object, as sight knows nothing except by turning itself toward color. And therefore, since phantasms are related to possible intellect in the same way as sensible things are to a sense, as is clear from the Philosopher in the third book of the De anima (comm. 39 [431a]), no matter how well equipped (intellect) is with some intelligible species it has within itself, nevertheless it does not actually consider anything in relation to that species except by turning its attention to phantasms; and therefore, just as our intellect in its present pilgrim state needs phantasms if there is to be any actual consideration before it has acquired a habit, so also it needs them after it has acquired the habit. It would seem to be otherwise in the case of the angels, the object of whose intellect is not the phantasm.’ De veritate, q. 18, a. 8, ad 4m: ‘. . . according to Aristotle in the third book of the De anima, the intellect is related to phantasms as to its proper objects. Hence, our intellect needs to turn to phantasms not only in acquiring knowledge but also in using the knowledge already acquired. This is shown from the fact that if there is any injury to the organ of the imaginative faculty, as in the case of the insane, a person cannot then use knowledge previously acquired, as long as his soul is in the body. Avicenna’s statement is to be understood as referring to a soul separated from the body, which understands in a different way.’ Note that St Thomas in Summa theologiae, 1, q. 89, a. 1 c., makes a comparison between the conversion to phantasms in our present state and the conversion to pure intelligibles in the state

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confundas quae ad obiectum proprium cognoscendum requiratur (vide supra et Sum. theol., i, q. 84, a. 7 c.) cum illa reflectione quadam super phantasma ad singulare cognoscendum (Sum. theol., i, q. 86, a. 1 c.). Sine conversione enim nihil prorsus intelligitur; sine reflectione illa deest tantummodo indirecta intellectus cognitio singularitatis. (Vide Theological Studies 10 [1949] 20 ss.). In Boet. de Trinitate, q. 6, a. 2, ad 5m (al. Lect. 2, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5m):8 ‘... phantasma est principium nostrae cognitionis ut ex quo incipit intellectus operatio, non sicut transiens sed sicut permanens, ut quoddam fundamentum intellectualis operationis sicut principia demonstrationis oportet manere in omni processu scientiae, cum phantasmata comparantur ad intellectum ut obiecta in quibus inspicit omne quod inspicit vel secundum perfectam repraesentationem vel secundum negationem. Et ideo quando phantasmatum cognitio impeditur, oportet totaliter impediri cognitionem intellectus etiam in divinis ...’ Cf. Sum. theol., i, q. 84, a. 7, ad 3m; De Malo, q. 16, a. 8, ad 3m. C. Gent., ii, 73, § 38: ‘Si autem dicatur quod, pari ratione, non indigeremus phantasmate ad considerandum ea quorum species intelligibiles sunt in intellectu conservatae, etiam si intellectus possibiles sint plures in diversis: quod est contra Aristotelem, qui dicit (De Anima iii, 7, 431a 16) quod “nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima”: – patet quod non est conveniens obviatio. Intellectus enim possibilis sicut et quaelibet substantia operatur secundum modum suae naturae. Secundum autem suam naturam est forma corporis. Unde intelligit quidem immaterialia, sed inspicit ea in aliquo materiali. Cuius signum est quod in doctrinis universalibus exempla particularia ponuntur in quibus quod dicitur inspiciatur. Alio ergo modo se habet intellectus possibilis ad phantasma quo indiget ante speciem intelligibilem: et alio modo postquam recepit speciem intelligibilem. Ante enim indiget eo ut ab eo accipiat speciem intelligibilem: unde se habet ad intellectum possibilem ut obiectum movens. Sed post speciem in eo receptam, indiget eo quasi instrumento sive fundamento suae speciei: unde se habet ad phantasmata sicut causa efficiens: secundum enim imperium intellectus formatur in imaginatione phantasma conveniens tali speciei intelligibili in quo resplendet species intelligibilis sicut exemplar in exemplato vel imagine. Si ergo intellectus

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of a separated soul. Be careful not to confuse this conversion to phantasms needed in order to know the proper object (see the previous quotation and ibid. q. 84, a. 7 c.) with that reflection upon the phantasm needed in order to know a singular object (ibid. q. 86, a. 1 c.). Without this conversion nothing at all is understood; without this reflection there will be lacking only the indirect intellectual knowledge of singulars. See Theological Studies 10:1 (1949) 20–34 [Verbum 169–85]. In Boet. De Trin., q. 6, a. 2, ad 5m (or, lect. 2, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5m): 8 ‘The phantasm is a principle of our knowledge as being that from which the operation of the intellect begins, not as something transient but as a permanent basis for intellectual operation, just as the principles of a demonstration must remain in an entire scientific procedure, since phantasms are related to intellect as objects in which it inspects everything that it inspects, either according to a complete representation or according to negation. And therefore when the knowledge of phantasms is impeded, our intellectual knowledge totally ceases, even in matters pertaining to God . . .’ See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 7, ad 3m; De malo, q. 16, a. 8, ad 3m. Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 73, ¶ 38, § 1523: ‘To say that by the same token we would not need phantasms in order to consider things whose intelligible species are already stored in our intellect, even if there are as many possible intellects as there are different persons, is contrary to Aristotle’s statement [in the third book of De anima, 7, 431a 16] that “without a phantasm the soul understands nothing whatsoever”: – that is obviously not a good rejoinder. For the possible intellect, like any substance, operates in accordance with its nature. Now, according to its nature it is the form of the body; hence it understands non-material things, but inspects them in something material. An indication of this is the fact that in teaching about things in general terms, particular examples are given in which what is being taught can be discerned. Therefore, the possible intellect is related in one way to the needed phantasm before receiving the intelligible species, and in another way after its reception. Before the reception the intellect needs the phantasm in order to receive the intelligible species from it, and thus the phantasm is related to the possible intellect as the object moving it. But after the reception of the species the intellect needs the phantasm as the instrument or basis for its species, and in this the intellect is the efficient cause of the phantasm; for it is by command of the intellect that there is formed in the imagination a phantasm that is proper to a particular intelligible species, the phantasm in which the intelligible species shines forth as an exemplar in the illustration or in the image. If, therefore, the possible intellect had always possessed 8 [Lonergan is referring to two different editions of the text, the second being the Marietti.]

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possibilis semper habuisset species, numquam compararetur ad phantasmata sicut recipiens ad obiectum motivum.’ Sum. theol., i, q. 84, a. 7 c.: ‘... impossibile est intellectum nostrum, secundum praesentis vitae statum quo passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. Et hoc duobus indiciis apparet ... Videmus enim quod, impedito actu virtutis imaginativae per laesionem organi, ut in phraeneticis; et similiter impedito actu memorativae virtutis, ut in lethargicis; impeditur homo ab intelligendo in actu etiam ea quorum scientiam praeaccepit. Secundo, quia hoc quilibet in seipso experiri potest quod quando aliquis conatur aliquid intelligere, format aliqua phantasmata sibi per modum exemplorum in quibus quasi inspiciat quod intelligere studet. Et inde est etiam quod quando alium volumus facere aliquid intelligere, proponimus ei exempla ex quibus sibi phantasmata formare possit ad intelligendum ... Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens ...’

Sum. theol., i, q. 85, a. 1, ad 5m: ‘... intellectus noster et abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus inquantum considerat naturas rerum in universali; et tamen intelligit eas in phantasmatibus, quia non potest intelligere etiam ea quorum species abstrahit nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata ...’ Q.D. de Anima, a. 15 c.: ‘Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod potentiae sensitivae sunt necessariae animae ad intelligendum, non per accidens tamquam excitantes, ut Plato posuit; neque disponentes tantum, sicut posuit Avicenna; sed ut repraesentantes animae intellectivae proprium obiectum, ut dicit Philosophus in iii De Anima (comm. 39): “intellectivae animae phantasmata sunt sicut sensibilia sensui.” ’ In I de Anima, lect. 2, § 19: ‘Sciendum est igitur quod aliqua operatio animae aut passio est, quae indiget corpore sicut instrumento et sicut obiecto. Sicut videre indiget corpore sicut obiecto quia color, qui est obiectum visus, est in corpore. Item sicut instrumento; quia visio etsi sit ab anima, non est tamen nisi per organum visus, scilicet pupillam, quae est ut instrumentum; et sic videre non est animae tantum sed est organi. Aliqua autem operatio est quae indiget corpore, non tamen sicut instrumento, sed sicut obiecto tantum. Intelligere enim non est per organum corporale, sed indiget obiecto corporali. Sicut enim Philosophus dicit in tertio huius, hoc modo phantasmata se habent ad intellectum sicut colores ad visum. Colores autem se habent ad visum sicut obiecta: phantasmata ergo se habent ad intellectum sicut obiecta ...’ Cf. De Anima, iii, 7, 431a 14; 16; 431b 2; iii, 8, 432a 5–10. In III de Anima, lect. 12, §§ 770, 772, 777; lect. 13, § 791 s.

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species, it would never be related to phantasms as a recipient to the object that moves it.’ Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 7 c.: ‘. . . it is impossible for our intellect in this present life, in which it is joined to the passible body, actually to understand anything without turning to phantasms. There are two clear indications of this . . . First, we see that in the case of an insane person whose organ of imagination is injured, and likewise in the case of a somnolent or drugged person whose memory is affected, such persons are prevented from understanding in act even those things of which they had previously acquired knowledge. Second, we can all experience in ourselves that, when we try to understand something, we form for ourselves images, by way of examples, in which, as it were, we look for what we desire to understand. That is also why, when we want to get someone to understand something, we give him examples from which he can form for himself phantasms for understanding . . . The proper object of the human intellect, as joined to the body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter . . .’ Summa theologiae, 1, q. 85, a. 1, ad 5m: ‘. . . our intellect both abstracts intelligible species from phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things as universals; and nevertheless understands them in phantasms, because it cannot understand even those things the species of which it abstracts, except by directing its attention to phantasms . . .’ Quaestiones disputatae de anima, a. 15 c.: ‘Therefore we must conclude that sensitive potencies are necessary if the soul is to understand, [and that they are necessary] not per accidens as stimulating it, as Plato said, nor as only disposing it, as Avicenna said, but as representing to the intellective soul its proper object, as the Philosopher says in iii De anima (text 38 [431a]): “Phantasms are to the intellective soul as sensible objects are to the senses.” ’ In I De anima, lect. 2, § 19: ‘It is clear, therefore, that there are some operations or passions of the soul that need a body as an instrument and as an object: to see, for example, needs a body as its object, because color, which is the object of vision, is in a body. But also as an instrument, because vision, although it is from the soul, exists only through the organ of sight, the eye, which is as its instrument, and thus seeing belongs not to the soul alone but also to the corporeal organ. There is, however, another operation, one that needs a body not as an instrument but only as an object. For understanding is not had through a corporeal organ, but it needs a corporeal object. As the Philosopher says in Book iii of De anima, phantasms are to the intellect as colors to sight. But colors are to sight as its objects; phantasms, then, are to the intellect as its objects . . .’ See also De anima, iii, 7, 431a 14; 16; 431b 2; 8, 432a 5–10; In III De anima, lect. 12, §§ 770, 772, 777; lect. 13, §§ 791–92.

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Quantum intercedat inter sensibile in actu et sensatum in actu iterumque inter intelligibile in actu et intellectum in actu, declaratur in C. Gent. ii, 59, § 14. De specie quae in phantasmate resplendet, vide Caietanum, In Sum. Theol., i, q. 79, a. 3 § IX s., edit. Leon., v, 266; et Ferrariensem, In C. Gent., ii, 73, § xv s., edit., Leon., xiii, 467.

5 De quidditate Multoties repetit S. Thomas obiectum proprium intellectus humani secundum statum viae esse ‘Quod quid est’ vel ‘Quidditas.’ Quid ergo sit ‘quid sit’ inquirendum est. Aristoteles duo quidem agnovit et aliquatenus distinxit, nempe to ti esti et to ti ¯en einai. Praeterea, magis particulariter dicebat to ti ¯en einai tini, v.g., to ti ¯en einai t¯oi toi¯oidi s¯omati (412b 11), et etiam brevius einai cum dativo, ut pelekei einai, megethei einai, sarki einai, euthei einai. Qui Aristotelem latine vertebant, ‘quod quid est,’ ‘quod quid erat esse,’ ‘quod quidem est esse eiusmodi corporis’ (sic Pirotta edit, Marietti, p. 63), ‘dolabrae esse,’ ‘magnitudini esse,’ ‘carni esse,’ ‘recto esse,’ scribebant. His additur in scriptis S. Thomae ‘quidditas,’ quae quidem ideo commoda fuit quia declinari variis casibus potuit. Circa usum horum terminorum, cf. Theological Studies 7 (1946) 364–72; 10 (1949) 18 ss. Ad sensum vero et significationem quod attinet, iam tria distinximus, nempe, radios aequales imaginatos, intellectam rotunditatis necessitatem, et tandem prolatam seu dictam circuli definitionem. At cuiuslibet est imaginare radios aequales. Intelligentis est in ista aequalitate necessitatem rotunditatis perspicere. Definientis denique est omni et soli circulo attribuere punctorum seriem seu locum quae in eadem plana superficie iacentia aequaliter a centro distant. Tria ergo sunt obiecta: obiectum imaginationis (radii aequales), obiectum intelligentiae (necessitas rotunditatis), et obiectum interioris dictionis (definitio circuli). Quae non solum sunt distincta sed etiam inter se relata. Obiectum enim imaginationis se habet ad obiectum intelligentiae sicut materia ad formam intelligibilem. Obiectum vero intelligentiae se habet ad obiectum dictionis interioris sicut ratio et causa et propter quid. Quod obiectum imaginationis se habet ut materia docetur Sum. theol., i, q. 84, a. 6 c.: ‘non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa

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For the difference between the sensible in act and the sensed in act, and again, between the intelligible in act and the understood in act, see Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 59, ¶ 14, § 1366 [‘Patet autem . . .’]. On the species shining in the phantasm, see Cajetan’s commentary on Summa theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 3, §§ ix–xi, Leonine edition, v, 266; also Ferrariensis, In C. Gent., 2, 73, §§ xv–xvi, Leonine edition, xiii, 467. 5 Quiddity St Thomas time and again repeats that the proper object of the human intellect in its present state is quod quid est, ‘what a thing is,’ or quidditas, ‘whatness’ or ‘quiddity.’ Now we must ask, What is this ‘what a thing is’? Aristotle recognized two realities and made a certain distinction between them, namely, to ti esti and to ti ¯en einai. Moreover, he used a more nuanced expression, to ti ¯en einai tini, that is, to ti ¯en einai t¯oi toi¯oidi s¯omati (De anima, ii, 1, 412b 11), and even more briefly, einai with the dative case, as pelekei einai, megethei einai, sarki einai, euthei einai. For these expressions the medieval translators wrote, respectively, quod quid est, quod quid erat esse, quod quidem est esse eiusmodi corporis (sic, the Pirotta edition, Marietti, p. 63), dolabrae esse, magnitudini esse, carni esse, recto esse. In addition to these, the word quidditas is found in the writings of St Thomas, which had the advantage of being able to be declined through the various cases. On the use of these terms, see Theological Studies 7:3 (1946) 364–72 [Verbum 29–38]; 10:1 (1949) 18–25 [Verbum 168–75]. With regard to their meaning and signification, we have already made a distinction between the imagined equal radii, the understood necessity of roundness, and, finally, the spoken or uttered definition of a circle. Now, anyone can imagine equal radii. It is a matter of intelligence to grasp the necessity of roundness in that equality of radii. Finally, the act of defining is a matter of attributing to a circle and only to a circle that series or locus of points which lie in the same plane surface equidistant from a center. Thus there are three objects: the object of the imagination (equal radii), the object of the understanding (the necessity of roundness), and the object of the interior utterance (the definition of a circle). These are not only distinct but are also interrelated. The object of the imagination is to the object of understanding as matter to intelligible form, and the object of understanding is to the object of an interior utterance or word as its reason or cause or ‘because of which’ (propter quid). That the object of the imagination stands as matter is stated in Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 6 c.: ‘Sense knowledge cannot be said to be the total and com-

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intellectualis cognitionis sed magis quodammodo materia causae.’ 9 Quod obiectum intelligentiae se habet ut forma intelligibilis ex ordinario nomine docetur. Forma enim graece dicitur vel morph¯e vel eidos; eidos communiter redditur per nomen ‘species’; et intellectus non solum abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus sed etiam eas intelligit in phantasmatibus (Sum. theol., i, q. 85, a. 1, ad 1m). Quod obiectum dictionis interioris habet rationem et causam et propter quid in obiecto intelligentiae tum ipsa intellectuali experientia constat (nam definire possumus quia intelligimus) tum auctoritate S. Thomae: ‘Quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit procedit aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei intellectae, ex vi intellectiva proveniens et ex eius notitia procedens. Quam quidem conceptionem vox significat; et dicitur verbum cordis significatum verbo vocis.’ ‘. . . secundum processionem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente quod manet in ipso. Et sic fides catholica ponit processionem in divinis’ (Sum. theol., i, q. 27, a. 1 c.).

Quod si quis ipsam rem intellexerit, iam ad modum loquendi Aristotelicum et Thomisticum considerandum procedere poterit. In Post. Anal., ii, 1 et 2, affirmavit Aristoteles omnes prorsus quaestiones ad quattuor typos reduci posse, nempe, An sit A? Quid sit A? Utrum A sit B? Propter quid A sit B? Quos quattuor ulterius in duos solos resolvit. Prima enim et tertia de existentia quaerunt; altera vero et quarta de ‘propter quid.’ Quod quidem in prima, tertia, et quarta patet. Prima enim de existentia cuiusdam A quaerit. Tertia pariter de existentia proprietatis B in subiecto A quaerit. Quarta denique expresse de ‘propter quid A sit B’ agit. At mirum forte videtur quod quaestio, Quid sit A, de ‘propter quid’ inquirere dicatur; expresse enim non ‘propter quid’ sed ‘quid’ quaerit. Attamen, uti notavit Aristoteles, saepissime nullo negotio transformatur quaestio ‘quid’ in questionem ‘propter quid.’ Si enim quaero quid sit eclipsis lunae, sensus quaestionis est, ‘Propter quid luna sic obscuretur?’ Et re vera sive intelligo quid sit eclipsis sive intelligo cur luna sic obscuretur, idem intelligo, nempe, tellurem inter solem et lunam ita moveri ut illuminatio lunae interrumpatur.

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plete cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather, as it were, the matter of the cause.’9 That the object of understanding is as an intelligible form can be seen from its ordinary name. In Greek the word ‘form’ is either morph¯e or eidos; eidos is generally translated into Latin as species; and the intellect not only abstracts intelligible species from phantasms but also understands them in the phantasms (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 85, a. 1, ad 1m). That the object of an interior utterance has its reason and cause and its ‘because of which’ in the object of understanding is clear both from our intellectual experience – we are able to define a thing because we have understood it – and also on the authority of St Thomas: ‘Whenever we understand, by the mere fact that we do understand, something proceeds within us, which is the conception of the thing understood, issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from its knowledge. A spoken word signifies this conception; and this conception is called “the word of the heart,” signified by the spoken word.’ ‘. . . according to intellectual emanation, such as that of the intelligible word from the speaker, which remains within the speaker. Thus does the Catholic faith affirm procession in God’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 1 c.). If you have understood this, you will now be able to go on to consider the Aristotelian and Thomistic way of speaking. In Posterior Analytics, ii, 1 and 2, Aristotle states that all questions can be reduced to four types: Whether there is an A? What is an A? Whether A is B? Why A is B? And these four can be further reduced to two; for the first and the third are about existence, while the second and the fourth are about ‘why,’ ‘because of what.’ This is easy to see in the case of the first, third, and fourth questions. The first asks about the existence of some A, the third asks about the existence of a property B in a subject A, and the fourth deals expressly with why A is B. But it seems odd, perhaps, that the question, What is an A? is regarded as asking about a why. For it expressly asks What? rather than Why? Yet, as Aristotle remarked, the question What? very often without any difficulty changes into Why? If I ask, for example, ‘What is a lunar eclipse?’ the question really means, ‘Why is the moon covered over like this?’ And in fact, whether I understand what an eclipse is, or whether I understand why the moon is covered over, I am understanding the same thing, namely, that the earth moves in between the moon and the sun, thus preventing the moon from being illuminated. 9 [On the ‘matter of the cause,’ see below, p. 593, where ‘matter of the cause’ is contrasted with ‘cause of the matter.’]

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In quibusdam tamen non tam facile demonstratur quod qui ‘quid’ quaerit, re vera ‘propter quid’ quaerit. Quod problema Aristoteles in Post. Anal. insolutum relinquens, in Metaphysicis iterum est aggressus. Ubi concludit quaestiones, ‘Quid sit homo?’ ‘Quid sit domus?’ revera quaerere, ‘Propter quid hoc (hominem indigitando) sit homo?’ ‘Propter quid hoc (domum indigitando) sit domus?’ (Metaphys., z, 17, 1041a 6 – b 32; In VII Metaphys., lect. 17, §§ 1648–80). 10 In his tamen quaestionibus transmutatis ambiguitas quaedam in vocabulo ‘hoc’ latet. ‘Hoc’ enim supponi potest pro sensibilibus vel materialibus, et tunc dicendum est quod forma vel causa essendi est illud propter quod ‘hoc’ ad esse hominem vel ad esse domum pertingit. Iterum, ‘hoc’ supponi potest pro supposito, et tunc dicendum est quod quidditas est illud propter quod hoc est homo vel hoc est domus; hoc enim homo est propter humanitatem, quae est quidditas hominis; et iterum hoc est domus propter quidditatem domus. Unde in Commentario scripsit S. Thomas: Et similiter cum quaerimus quid est homo, idem est ac si quaereretur propter quid hoc, scilicet Socrates, est homo? quia scilicet inest ei quidditas hominis. Aut etiam idem est ac si quaereretur propter quid corpus sic se habens, ut puta organicum, est homo? Haec enim est materia hominis, sicut lapides et lateres [sunt materia] domus. Quare manifestum est quod in talibus quaestionibus quaeritur ‘causa materiae,’ id est propter quid materia pertingat ad naturam eius quod definitur. Hoc autem quaesitum quod est causa materiae est ‘species’ scilicet forma qua aliquid est. Hoc autem est ‘substantia,’ id est ipsa substantia quae est quod quid erat esse. (In VII Metaphys., lect. 17, §§ 1667 s.)11

Circa quod quid erat esse, notate quod in sensu suo primario est ‘neque genus neque species neque individuum sed horum omnium formale principium.’ In VII Metaphys., lect. 2, § 1275. Utrum vero sit forma an quidditas, non clare determinatur propter ambiguitatem iam indicatam. Materia enim ad esse hominem pertingit propter animam humanam, quae est forma, suppositum vero propter humanitatem, quae est quidditas hominis. Admiramini deinde subtilitatem Aristotelis. Communiter quidem dicitur eum transposuisse ideas Platonicas ex caelo quodam noetico in res materiales. At ideae Platonicae erant universalia; Aristoteles vero minime arbitratus est universalia rebus materialibus inesse, cum hunc hominem ex hac materia et hac forma compositum esse docuerit.

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In certain cases, however, it is not easy to show that a person who asks What? is really asking Why? In Posterior Analytics Aristotle left this problem unsolved, but took it up again in the Metaphysics. There he concluded that the questions What is a man? and What is a house? are really asking, Why is this (pointing to a man) a man? and Why is this (pointing to a house) a house? (Metaphysics, vii, 17, 1041a 6 to 1041b 32; In VII Metaphys., lect. 17, §§ 1648–80.)10 In these reformulated questions, however, there is an ambiguity in the word ‘this.’ ‘This’ can stand for sensible or material things, and then one must say that the form or cause of being of the thing is that because of which ‘this’ pertains to the being of a man or to the being of a house. But again, ‘this’ can stand for a supposit, and then one must say that the quiddity is that because of which this is a man or that is a house; for this is a man because of humanity, which is the quiddity of man, and that is a house because of the quiddity of house. Hence St Thomas writes in his commentary: Similarly, when we ask, ‘What is a man?’ it is the same as if we were to ask why this being, namely Socrates, is a man, the answer being that there is in him the quiddity of a man. And it is also the same as if we were to ask why a certain organic body is a man. For this is the matter of a man, as stones and bricks are the matter of a house. Thus it is clear that in such questions we are asking about ‘the cause of the matter,’ that is, why the matter pertains to the nature of that which is being defined. What we are looking for in asking about the cause of the matter is the species, that is, the form by which something is. But this is substance, that is, that substance which is quod quid erat esse. (In VII Metaphys., lect. 17, §§ 1667–68) 11

About this quod quid erat esse, note that in its primary meaning it is ‘neither genus nor species nor an individual, but the formal principle of all of these’ (In VII Metaphys., lect. 2, § 1275). But whether it is a form or a quiddity is not clearly determined on account of the ambiguity we mentioned. For matter pertains to the existence of a man because of a human soul, which is his form, while the supposit pertains to him because of his humanity, which is the quiddity of man. One can only marvel at Aristotle’s subtlety. It is commonly said that he transposed Plato’s Ideas from some noetic heaven into material things. But the Platonic Ideas were universals, and Aristotle did not at all think that there are universals in material things, since he taught that this individual man was composed of this matter and this form. 10 [See Lonergan, Verbum 26–28.] 11 [See ibid. 28–29.]

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Admiramini acumen ingenii. Duxit enim Kant fieri non posse ut quis ex categoriis conceptualibus in ipsa intellectus principia generativa penetraret. At penetravit Aristoteles. Ex una enim parte initium omnis scientiae atque philosophiae posuit in admiratione quae quaestiones moveret et, cum omnes quaestiones ad duos typos reducerentur, duas pariter esse intellectus operationes conclusit. Ex alia vero parte, cum ex logicis constaret omnem docendi atque addiscendi laborem in termino medio inveniendo atque verificando consistere, terminum medium quaesivit qui sensibilia et conceptus primos inter se coniungeret. Sicut enim in syllogismo scientifico terminus medius est ratio propter quam praedicatum subiecto accedat, pariter in genesi primorum conceptuum, qui de aliis non praedicantur, medius quodammodo terminus est forma vel causa essendi vel quidditas propter quam huic materiae accedat esse talis substantiae.

Admiramini inventionem psychologiae rationalis. Intelligere enim est animae nostrae ‘actus proprius perfecte demonstrans virtutem eius et naturam’ (Sum. theol., i, q. 88, a. 2, ad 3m). Actus tamen animae non cognoscuntur nisi per eorum obiecta (ibid. q. 87, a. 3 c.). Obiectum vero actus intelligendi proprium est ‘propter quid’ quod in phantasmate conspicitur et conceptionem fundat. Admiramini inventionem hylemorphismi. Sicut enim species intelligibilis se habet ad phantasma in quo resplendet, ita forma substantialis se habet ad materiam primam. Neque Aristoteles statuit omnes res materiales materia et forma componi quia in singulis sensibilibus atque omnibus formam vel quidditatem perspexerit sed, cum naturam humanae inquisitionis et intelligentiae compertam habuerit, ad hanc pervenit conclusionem, nempe, res materiales eatenus esse homini scibiles quatenus duplici constarent elemento, alio quidem materiali quod sensu cognosceretur, alio vero formali quod per intellectum innotesceret. Qua de causa, quantumcumque profectum scientia humana acciperet, semper tamen per sensum atque per intellectum progrederetur et ideo semper rem materia atque forma constitutam cognosceret. Admiramini denique modum quo substantias separatas conceperit. Nam quid sit substantia separata et quid sit homo, quaestiones prorsus diversas esse agnovit. Quidditas enim hominis est illud propter quod ‘hoc’ ad esse hominis pertingat, ubi ‘hoc’ vel sensibilia hominis vel aliquid sensibilibus manifestum denotat. At eiusmodi ‘hoc’ in substantia separata inveniri non potest, quippe quae nec sensibilis nec materialis sit (In VII Metaphys., lect. 17, § 1669). Cumque nihil universale subsistere iam pridem demonstrasset, substantiam separatam esse formam sine materia conclusit. Ulterius, sicut aliter quam homo cognoscitur substantia separata, etiam aliter cognoscit. Nam cum sensibilis non sit, sensus habere non

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One can only marvel at the acuity of his mind. Kant thought that it was not possible for anyone to penetrate to the very generative principles of intellectual knowledge from conceptual categories. But Aristotle did. On the one hand, he located the beginning of all knowledge and philosophy in that wonder that asks questions, and since all questions can be reduced to two types, he concluded to two intellectual operations. On the other hand, since it is clear from logic that all teaching and learning consists in finding and verifying a middle term, he sought the middle term that would bring together sense data and primary concepts. For just as in an explanatory syllogism the middle term is the reason why a predicate is added to a subject, similarly in the genesis of primary concepts, which are not predicated of anything else, a middle term is the form or the cause of being or the quiddity because of which the existence of such a substance is attributed to this particular matter. One can only marvel at his discovery of rational psychology. Understanding is our soul’s ‘proper act, perfectly demonstrating its power and its nature’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 88, a. 2, ad 3m). But acts of the soul are known only through their objects (ibid. q. 87, a. 3 c.), and the object proper to the act of understanding is the ‘because of which’ that is discerned in the phantasm and grounds a concept. One can only marvel at his discovery of hylomorphism. Just as the intelligible species is to the phantasm in which it shines forth, so is substantial form to prime matter. Aristotle did not state that all material things were composed of form and matter because he had perceived a form or quiddity in each and every sensible object; rather, because he had thoroughly understood the nature of human inquiry and intelligence, he came to the conclusion that material things were humanly knowable insofar as they consisted of two elements, one material, known by the senses, and the other formal, known through the intellect. For this reason, no matter how much human knowledge advances, it will always progress by means of sense and intellect and therefore always know a thing constituted by matter and form. Finally, one must marvel at the way he conceived the notion of separate substances. He recognized that the nature of separate substances and the nature of man were two quite different questions. The quiddity of man is that because of which ‘this’ pertains to the existence of a man, where ‘this’ denotes either the sensible properties of a man or something manifested through them. But such a ‘this’ cannot be found in a separate substance, since a separate substance is neither sensible nor material (In VII Metaphys., lect. 17, § 1669). And since he had already proven that nothing universal subsists, he concluded that a separate substance was a form without matter. Further, just as a separate substance is known differently from the way a man is known, it also knows in a different way. For since it

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potest neque phantasiam neque specierum in phantasmatibus resplendentium intelligentiam. In immaterialibus ergo idem est intelligens et intellectum et eorum intelligere est intelligentia intelligentiae (In XII Metaphys., lect. 11, §§ 2613, 2617, 2620).

Cavete tamen illusionem. Neque enim sine longa inquisitione neque sine gravi labore ab homine cognoscitur quidditas rei. Non enim mirabili quodam intuitu sed cogitando et ratiocinando ad intelligendum verbumque proferendum pervenitur. Audi S. Thomam: ... cum volo concipere rationem lapidis, oportet quod ad ipsam ratiocinando perveniam: et sic est in omnibus aliis quae a nobis intelliguntur: nisi forte in primis principiis, quae cum sint simpliciter nota, absque discursu rationis statim sciuntur. Quamdiu ergo sic ratiocinando intellectus iactatur hac atque illac, necdum formatio perfecta est nisi quando rationem rei perfecte conceperit: et tunc primo habet rationem rei perfectae, et tunc primo habet rationem verbi. Et inde est quod in anima nostra est cogitatio, per quam significatur ipse discursus inquisitionis, et verbum, quod est iam formatum secundum perfectam contemplationem veritatis. (In Ioan., cap. 1, lect. 1)

Quali sane ratiocinio S. Thomas ad intelligentiam lapidis pervenerit, nescimus. At pariter docuit difficultatem intelligendi quid sit anima humana (Sum. theol., i, q. 87, a. 1 c.). Et quemadmodum ad hanc quidditatem cognoscendam laborarit, patet ex C. Gent., ii, 46–90. Ulterius, quanti definitionem aestimarit, ex his elucet:

‘... qui cognoscit definitionem, cognoscit enuntiabilia in potentia quae per definitionem demonstrantur.’ (De Ver., q. 2, a. 7, ad 5m) ‘Tunc enim unaquaeque res comprehenditur quando eius definitio scitur ... Cuiuslibet autem virtutis definitio sumitur ex his ad quae virtus se extendit. Unde si anima Christi sciret omnia ad quae virtus Dei se extendit, comprehenderet omnino virtutem Dei; quod est omnino impossibile’ (De Ver., q. 20, a. 5 c.).

Quibus perspectis, intelligis cur S. Thomas identificarit visionem beatam et cognoscere essentiam Dei (Sum. theol., i, q. 12) et quemadmodum concludere potuerit hominem naturaliter visionem beatam desiderare quia naturaliter quaerit quid sit Deus (Sum. theol., i-ii, q. 3, a. 8 c.).

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is not sensible, it cannot have either senses or phantasms or an understanding of species shining in phantasms. Therefore, in immaterial beings the understander and the understood are one and the same, and their act of understanding is an understanding of understanding (In XII Metaphys., lect. 11, §§ 2613, 2617, 2620). But beware of an illusion. Not without a lengthy inquiry and wearisome labor do we come to know the quiddity of a thing. For it is not by some marvelous intuition but by thinking and reasoning that we arrive at understanding and uttering an inner word. Thus St. Thomas: ... when I want to conceive the intelligibility of a stone, it is necessary that I come to it by a process of reasoning; and so it is in all other things that are understood by us, except perhaps in the case of first principles, which, since they are known simply, are known at once without any discursive reasoning process. Therefore as long as the intellect is thrown this way and that in a process of reasoning, its formation is not yet finished, not until it conceives the intelligibility of the thing perfectly; and only then does it have the intelligibility of the complete thing, and only then does it have the intelligibility of the word. And that is why in our soul we have thinking, by which is meant the discursive process of inquiry, and we have a word, which is now formed according to the perfect contemplation of the truth. (Super Ioannem, c. 1, lect. 1)

We certainly do not know by what sort of reasoning St Thomas arrived at the understanding of stone. But he spoke in the same way about the difficulty of understanding the nature of the human soul (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 87, a. 1 c.), and it is evident from Summa contra Gentiles, 2, cc. 46–90, how he labored to come to know its quiddity. Also, how highly he valued a definition is clear from the following texts. De veritate, q. 2, a. 7, ad 5m: ‘. . . whoever knows a definition knows potentially the statements that are demonstrated through the definition.’ Ibid. q. 20, a. 5 c.: ‘Any given thing is understood when its definition is known . . . However, the definition of any power is taken from those things to which this power extends itself. Thus, if the soul of Christ knew everything to which the power of God extended itself, he would comprehend completely the power of God; and this is quite impossible.’ From this you can understand why St Thomas identified the beatific vision with knowing God’s essence (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12), and how he was able to conclude that man has a natural desire for the beatific vision because he naturally seeks to know what God is (ibid. 1-2, q. 3, a. 8 c.).

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Quod vero multos fallit est opinio dicentium quod per solum intellectum cognoscitur universale; et ideo quandocumque universale quoddam cognoscunt, statim se intelligere arbitrantur. At duplex est universale: aliud enim est quod dicitur ex eo quod ‘propter quid’ perspicitur; aliud autem est universale in particulari quod potentia quadam sensitiva apprehenditur.

Manifestum est enim quod singulare sentitur proprie et per se, sed tamen sensus est quodammodo et ipsius universalis. Cognoscit enim Calliam non solum inquantum est Callias sed etiam inquantum est hic homo; et similiter Socratem inquantum est hic homo. Et inde est quod tali acceptione sensus praeexistente, anima intellectiva potest considerare hominem in utroque. Si autem ita esset quod sensus apprehenderet solum id quod est particularitatis, et nullo modo cum hoc apprehenderet universale in particulari, non esset possibile quod ex apprehensione sensus causaretur in nobis cognitio universalis. (In II Post. Anal., lect. 20. Vide Sum theol., i, q. 78, a. 4 c., ubi aestimativa in animalibus comparatur cum cogitativa in homine.)

Vehementer ergo errant qui ideo se intelligere autumant quia quomodocumque universale percipiunt. V.g., ultra operationes sensitivas non processit qui exteriorem circuli figuram seu Gestalt optime novit sed propter quid circulus necessario sit rotundus numquam consideravit.

6 Quotuplex sit species Nomen graecum, eidos, latine ‘species,’ dicebatur et duo maxime significat, nempe, vel formam vel universale. ‘Sciendum tamen est quod nulla materia, nec communis, nec individuata, secundum se, se habet ad speciem prout sumitur pro forma. Sed secundum quod species sumitur pro universali, sicut hominem dicimus esse speciem, sic materia communis per se pertinet ad speciem, non autem materia individualis, in qua natura speciei accipitur’ (In VII Metaphys., lect. 9, § 1473).

Notissima est distinctio inter speciem intelligibilem impressam et expressam quae, quamvis explicite a S. Thoma non sit proposita, in eius tamen scriptis fundatur. Species enim impressa est illa de qua agitur Sum. theol., i, q. 84, aa. 3, 4, 7; q. 85, a. 2. Haec enim in intellectu possibili recipitur et conservatur; quae receptio est ex phantasmate

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What leads many astray is the opinion of those who hold that universals are known only through the intellect, and therefore whenever they come to know a universal, they immediately think they have understood something. But there are two universals: one is that which is uttered because a ‘why’ has been grasped; the other is the universal in a particular individual, which is apprehended by some sensory faculty: It is clear that the singular is sensed properly and per se, but sense is in a certain way also of the universal. For it knows Callias, not only as Callias, but also as this man; and similarly it knows Socrates as this man. And so it is that given such preceding sense knowledge, the intellective soul can consider man in each of them. But if it were the case that sense apprehends only what pertains to particularity and that it in no way along with this apprehends the universal in the particular, it would not be possible that from sense apprehension there would be caused in us a knowledge of universals (In II Post. anal., lect. 20; see also Summa theologiae, 1, q. 78, a. 4 c., where the evaluative ability in animals is compared to the cogitative power in a human being.)

Those, therefore, who claim to understand because somehow or other they perceive a universal are absolutely wrong. Take, for example, the case of the circle: those who know perfectly well the external shape, the Gestalt, of a circle yet have never thought about why a circle is necessarily round have really not progressed beyond the operations of their senses. 6 Various Meanings of ‘Species’ The Latin for the Greek word eidos is species, whose two principal meanings are ‘form’ and ‘universal.’ ‘It must be noted, however, that no matter, whether common or individual, in itself pertains to “species” taken as form. But insofar as “species” is taken as the universal – for example, as when we say that ‘man’ is a species – the common matter pertains per se to the species, but not the individual matter in which the nature of the species is received’ (In VII Metaphys., lect. 9, § 1473). There is a well-known distinction between the impressed and the expressed intelligible species which, though not explicitly made by St Thomas, nevertheless is based on his writings. In Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, aa. 3, 4, and 7, and q. 85, a. 2, he is referring to the impressed species. This is the species that is received and conserved in

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tamquam instrumento intellectus agentis; ipsa vero species recepta est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit; unde in terminologia Avicennae habet rationem potentiae activae, et est principium actionis (intelligere) et praeterea principium alicuius operati seu effectus seu termini (verbum); quae quidem minime excludunt quod ad modum loquendi Aristotelicum haec eadem species sit natura et actus primus et potentia passiva ad actum secundum (intelligere) recipiendum; quae actus secundi receptio est etiam quoddam pati, scilicet, pati non proprie sed communiter.12 ‘... sicut enim esse consequitur formam, ita intelligere sequitur speciem intelligibilem’ (Sum. theol., i, q. 14, a. 4 c.). ‘... intelligere, quod se habet ad intellectum in actu sicut esse ad ens in actu’ (Sum. theol., i, q. 34, a. 1, ad 2m). Qua de causa, sicut esse finitum est non a forma qua limitatur sed ab alio, pariter intelligere finitum fit non a forma quam consequitur sed ab alio, puta, ab intellectu agente et phantasia. Denique tandem haec impressa et conservata species non est id quod intelligitur nisi in quantum intellectus super se et suum actum reflectitur (Sum. theol., i, q. 85, a. 2; cf. q. 87).

Quae iam pridem a posteris species expressa nominatur, a S. Thoma dicitur (1) verbum, (2) conceptio, (3) definitio vel enuntiatio, (4) intentio intellecta, (5) ratio, 13 (6) idea, (7) forma excogitata14 per actum intelligendi. Verbum est quatenus a vocibus exterioribus immediate significatur (Sum. theol., i, q. 34, a. 1 et passim), quamvis ex verbo interiori voces exteriores potentiam significandi habeant (De Ver., q. 4, a. 1, ad 7m).

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the possible intellect. It is received from the phantasm as an instrument of the agent intellect, and once received is the form according to which the intellect understands. Hence, in Avicenna’s terminology it has the nature of an active potency and is a principle of action (understanding) and also a principle of the product or effect or term (inner word). But this does not in the least prevent this same species from being, according to Aristotelian terminology, a nature and first act and passive potency to receive the second act (understanding); and this reception of second act is also a passion, not in the proper sense but in a general sense.12 Thus, ‘. . . as existence follows upon form, so understanding follows upon an intelligible species’ (ibid. q. 14, a. 4 c.). ‘. . . understanding, which is related to intellect in act in the same way that existence (esse) is related to being in act’ (ibid. q. 34, a. 1, ad 2m). Therefore, just as a finite act of existence does not come from the form which limits it but from something else, similarly a finite act of understanding comes not from the form which it follows but from something else, namely, the agent intellect and phantasm. Finally, this impressed and conserved species is not that which is understood, except when the intellect reflects upon itself and its act (ibid. q. 85, a. 2; see also q. 87). What later authors termed ‘expressed species’ St Thomas calls (1) word, (2) concept, (3) definition or proposition, (4) the intention understood, (5) meaning, what is meant (ratio),13 (6) idea, (7) form arrived at and conceived and formulated 14 by an act of understanding. It is ‘word’ inasmuch as it is directly signified by outer words, as in Summa theologiae, 1, q. 34, a. 1 and passim, although outer words derive their ability to signify from inner words (De veritate, q. 4, a. 1, ad 7m). 12 [See Appendix 1, § 6.] 13 [Ratio is notoriously difficult to translate. The Collected Works edition of Verbum translates ratio as ‘concept’ in the passage from In IV Metaphys., lect. 16, § 733, which Lonergan also cites here, but that will not do here, since ‘concept’ and ‘conception’ are already listed under item 2 in what Thomas means by ‘expressed species.’ Lonergan is listing here the terms that Thomas uses, indicating that each has its own slightly different nuance of meaning. On pp. 163–64 of Verbum, Lonergan leaves Thomas’s ratio, precisely in this context, untranslated, but says (163): ‘In the Sentences it is explained that a ratio is what intellect apprehends of the meaning of a name. No ultimate difference arises whether the meaning be primitive or derived. In either case to attribute a ratio to a reality is to attribute not the active meaning (which is an act of the mind or the intention of an act) but the passive meant; it is to affirm that in the thing there is what corresponds to the concept, as what is signified or meant corresponds to sign or meaning.’] 14 [On the translation of ‘excogitata’ as ‘arrived at and conceived and formulated,’ see above, p. 53, note 28.]

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Conceptio, conceptus, conceptum dicitur quatenus originem ex actu intelligendi habet. ‘Ipse autem conceptus cordis de ratione sua habet quod ab alio procedat, scilicet a notitia concipientis’ (Sum. theol., i, q. 34, a. 1 c.). ‘... ipsa enim conceptio est effectus actus intelligendi ... aliquid expressum a notitia mentis’ (De Ver., q. 4, a. 2). ‘Non tamen verbum oritur ex intellectu nostro nisi prout existit in actu: simul autem cum in actu existit, est in eo verbum conceptum’ (C. Gent., iv, 14, § 3). ‘... est enim hoc intelligibile (Deus) idem cum intellectu intelligente, cuius quaedam emanatio est Verbum conceptum’ (C. Gent. iv, 11, § 14, etc.).

Definitio et enuntiatio15 dicunt divisionem tum verbi (De Ver., q. 3, a. 2; q. 4, a. 2; De Pot., q. 8, a. 1; q. 9, a. 5; Quodl. v, a. 9; In Ioan., cap. 1, lect. 1) tum etiam conceptionum (e.g. De Ver., q. 11, a. 1 c.: ‘primae conceptiones intellectus, quae statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur ... sive sint complexa, ut dignitates, sive incomplexa, ut ratio entis’).

Intentio intellecta distinguitur contra rem intellectam (C. Gent., iv, 11, § 6). Verbum est ‘id quod intellectum est,’ ‘ipsum interius intellectum,’ ‘id quod actu consideratur per intellectum’ (De Ver., q. 4, a. 1), ‘id ad quod operatio nostri intellectus terminatur, quod est ipsum intellectum, quod dicitur conceptio intellectus’ (De Ver., q. 4, a. 2), ‘... quoddam operatum ipsius; per quod tamen intellectus venit in cognitionem rei exterioris ...’ (De Ver., q. 3, a. 2 c.). ‘Hoc autem est primo et per se intellectum, quod intellectus in se concipit de re intellecta, sive illud sit definitio, sive enuntiatio ...’ (De Pot., q. 9, a. 5), ‘propter hoc enim intellectus conceptionem rei in se format ut rem intellectam cognoscat’ (De Pot., q. 8, a. 1); ‘... intellectus ... format verbum ad hoc quod intelligat rem’ (Quodl. v, a. 9, ad 1m); ‘in ipso expresso et formato videt naturam rei intellectae’ (In Ioan., cap. 1, lect. 1), etc.

Ratio: nam ‘ratio quam nomen significat est definitio rei’ (In IV Metaphys., lect. 16, § 733). ‘Album enim et nigrum sunt extra animam; sed rationes horum sunt in anima tantum’ (In VI Metaphys., lect. 4, § 1230). ‘... scientia est de aliquo dupliciter. Uno modo primo et principaliter, et sic scientia est de universalibus super quas fundatur. Alio modo est de aliquibus secundario et quasi per reflexionem quandam, et sic est de rebus illis quarum

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It is called ‘conception,’ ‘concept,’ ‘conceived’ inasmuch as it originates from the act of understanding. ‘It is of the essence of the concept of the heart that it proceed from another, that is, from the knowledge of the one conceiving’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 34, a. 1 c.). ‘[T]he conception is the effect of the act of understanding . . . something expressed by the knowledge of the mind’ (De veritate, q. 4, a. 2 c.). ‘But neither does the word arise from our intellect except insofar as it exists in act; but as soon as intellect exists in act, the word is conceived in it’ (Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 14, ¶ 3, § 3499). ‘For this intelligible reality [God] is the same reality as the understanding intellect, an emanation of which is the conceived Word’ (ibid. 4, c. 11, ¶ 14, § 3474); and in other places. ‘Definition’ and ‘proposition’15 refer to the division of both words (De veritate, q. 3, a. 2; q. 4, a. 2; De potentia, q. 8, a. 1; q. 9, a. 5; Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9; Super Ioannem, c. 1, lect. 1) and conceptions (for example, De veritate, q. 11, a. 1 c.: ‘. . . the first conceptions of intellect, which are known immediately by the light of agent intellect . . . whether they be compound, as first principles, or simple, such as the concept of being . . .’). The intention understood is distinguished from the thing understood (Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11, ¶ 6, § 3466). A word is ‘that which is understood,’ ‘interiorly understood,’ ‘that which is actually considered by intellect’ (De veritate, q. 4, a. 1), ‘that at which the operation of our intellect terminates, which is what is understood, what is called the conception of the intellect’ (ibid. a. 2), ‘. . . the product of the intellect, but through it the intellect comes to knowledge of the external thing’ (ibid. q. 3, a. 2 c.). ‘This is what is first and per se understood, namely, what the intellect conceives within itself concerning the thing it has understood, whether that concept be a definition or a proposition . . .’ (De potentia, q. 9, a. 5). ‘. . . the reason that the intellect forms in itself the conception of the thing is this, that it might know the thing understood’ (ibid. q. 8, a. 1 c.). ‘. . . the intellect . . . forms a word for this purpose, that it might understand the thing’ (Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9, ad 1m). ‘ . . . in [the word] expressed and formed it sees the nature of the understood thing’ (Super Ioannem, c. 1, lect. 1); and in other places. ‘Meaning, what is meant’ (ratio): ‘The meaning that a noun signifies is the definition of the thing’ (In IV Metaphys., lect. 16, § 733). ‘White and black are outside the mind; but what is meant by these terms is only in the mind’ (In IV Metaphys., lect. 4, § 1230). ‘There are two ways in which scientific knowledge is of something. In the first and principal way scientific knowledge is of universals upon which it is established. In another, secondary way, and, as it were, by a kind of reflection, scientific knowledge is of those things to which these meanings belong . . . 15 [See above, note 3.]

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sunt illae rationes ... Ratione enim universali utitur sciens et ut re scita et ut medio sciendi’ (In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 2, ad 4m; al. lect. ii, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4m).16 Idea: nam quod ratio est in speculativis, idea est in practicis. ‘Ideam operati esse in mente operantis sicut quod intelligitur; non autem sicut species qua intelligitur, quae est forma faciens intellectum in actu’ (Sum. theol., i, q. 15, a. 2 c.). Et vide sequens quod etiam de ideis est. Forma: ‘Forma enim in intellectu potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, ita quod sit principium actus intelligendi, sicut forma quae est intelligentis inquantum est intelligens; et haec est similitudo intellecti in ipso. Alio modo, ita quod sit terminus actus intelligendi, sicut artifex intelligendo excogitat formam domus; et cum illa forma sit excogitata per actum intelligendi, et quasi per actum effecta, non potest esse principium actus intelligendi, ut sit primum quo intelligatur; sed magis se habet ut intellectum quo intelligens aliquid operatur’ (De Ver., q. 3, a. 2).

Tertia proinde species, praeter impressam atque expressam, agnoscenda videtur quae in phantasmate dicatur resplendere, inspici, intelligi (vide testimonia numero 4 allata). Quod quidem non simpliciter sed secundum quid est verum. Formaliter enim nulla species intelligibilis, utpote stricte spiritualis, phantasmati inest vel inesse potest. Virtualiter vero species phantasmati inesse dici potest tum quatenus phantasma est instrumentum quo species in intellectu possibili imprimatur tum quatenus phantasma praebet fundamentum in quo species reluceat atque intelligatur. Ad cuius intelligentiam consideranda est habitudo quae inter phantasma rite dispositum et speciem intelligibilem vigeat. Phantasma enim ad speciem se habet non ut totalis et perfecta causa sed magis quodammodo ut materia causae (Sum. theol., i, q. 84, a. 6 c.). Species e contra ad phantasma se habet ut causa materiae, scilicet ut forma vel quod quid erat esse quo materia pertingat ad esse quid seu ad esse substantiam (In VII Metaphys., lect. 17, § 1668). Quare sicut dispositiones naturales formam naturalem in materia inducunt, ita dispositiones in phantasmate secundum esse intentionale repraesentatae instrumentaliter se habent ad speciem intelligibilem in intellectu possibili producendam. Praeterea, sicut homo ex consideratione dispositionum quae in materia fiunt formam ex istis dispositionibus

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For a knower uses a universal meaning both as a thing known and as a medium of knowing’ (In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 2, ad 4m; or lect. 2, q. 1, a. 2 ad 4m). 16 ‘Idea’: What the meaning (ratio) is in speculative matters, the idea is in practical matters. ‘The idea of the thing done is in the mind of the doer as that which is understood; but not as the species by which it is understood, which is the form bringing the intellect to act’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 15, a. 2 c.). See the next paragraph, which is also about ideas. ‘Form’: ‘There are two ways in which form can be in the intellect. In the first way, it is that which is the principle of the act of understanding, as the form of the one understanding inasmuch as he understands; this is the likeness of the thing understood in the one understanding. In the second way, it is the term of the act of understanding, as an architect through understanding devises the form of a house. And since this form is devised through an act of understanding and is, as it were, produced through that act, it cannot be a principle of the act of understanding as something pre-existing by which understanding takes place, but is rather that by which, when it is understood, the one understanding operates’ (De veritate, q. 3, a. 2). Further, it seems that in addition to the impressed species and the expressed species there is a third species which is said to shine and be inspected and understood in the phantasm (see the passages quoted above in §4). Still, this is true only in a qualified sense. For no intelligible species, as strictly spiritual, is or can be formally in a phantasm. But a species can be said to be in a phantasm virtually, both inasmuch as a phantasm is an instrument by which a species is impressed upon the possible intellect and inasmuch as the phantasm furnishes the ground in which a species shines forth and is understood. To understand this, consider the relation that exists between a phantasm that is properly disposed and an intelligible species. A phantasm is to the species not as its total and complete cause but rather, in a way, as the matter of the cause (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 6 c.). On the other hand, the species is to a phantasm as cause of the matter, that is, just as the form or the quod quid erat esse by which the matter comes to be something or to be a substance (In VII Metaphys., lect. 17, § 1668). Therefore, just as natural dispositions induce a natural form in the matter, so the dispositions represented in a phantasm in the order of intentional existence are as instruments in the production of the intelligible species in the possible intellect. Moreover, just as from a consideration of the dispositions that emerge in matter a person can understand the form induced from those dispositions, so in like manner 16 [See above, note 8. ‘Scientia’ in this paragraph seems to mean ‘science’ or ‘scientific knowledge.’]

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inducendam intelligere potest, pariter in suo phantasmate rite disposito homo intelligere potest speciem rei similem speciei ad quam producendam phantasma disponitur. Quae virtualis et dispositiva praesentia speciei in phantasmate omnino sufficit. Primo, enim, sufficit ut phantasma sit instrumentum ad speciem producendam: instrumenti enim est effectum producere ultra propriam proportionem. Deinde vero sufficit ut phantasma sit fundamentum in quo species resplendeat atque intelligatur: intellectus enim est intus legere, i.e., in exterioribus, per sensus apprehensis, interiorem rei formam atque essentiam perspicere. Quod et aliter declarari potest. Sicut enim colores actu visi sunt unum cum visu facto in actu, et tamen non in visu sed in pariete videntur, pariter species actu intellectae sunt unum cum intellectu possibili facto in actu, et tamen non in intellectu sed in phantasmate intelliguntur. Vide In III de Anima, lect. 2, §§ 592, 593, 595; et C. Gent., ii, 59, § 14.

Quibus perspectis, tria sunt notanda. Primo, cave ne confundas hanc speciei in phantasmate intelligentiam cum cognitione speciei in intellectu possibili receptae atque conservatae. Species enim in phantasmate relucens, seu intelligibile in sensibilibus, seu quidditas in materia corporali existens, est obiectum proprium nostri intellectus; qua de causa nisi intellectus noster ad phantasmata se convertit, nihil prorsus intelligit. Species autem in intellectu possibili recepta non cognoscitur nisi intellectus super se reflectitur (Sum. theol., i, q. 85, a. 2 c.) et ex obiecto in actum, ex actibus in habitum, ex habitibus in potentiam, et ex potentiis in essentiam animae inquirendo procedit (ibid. q. 87). Animadverte deinde intellectum esse infallibilem, primo et per se circa quidditatem seu speciem, secundario circa alia prout plus minus proxime ad quidditatem se habent (De Anima, iii, 6, 430a 26 – b 30; In III de Anima, lect. 11, §§ 746–63). Illud enim quod in phantasmate intelligitur indivisibile atque simplex est; quare aut vere intelligitur aut nullo modo, sicut et de substantiis separatis dicitur (In III de Anima, § 763; In IX Metaphys., lect. 11, §§ 1904 ss.). Ex hac vero infallibilitate sequitur infallibilitas (1) in definiendo, modo re vera conceptio ab intelligente procedat, (2) in applicando, modo concordent quae imaginantur et quae sentiuntur, (3) in principiis primis intelligendis, modo duo intelligibilia seorsum intellecta in unum intelligibile (pariter in sensibilibus intellectum) coalescant. Vide Theological Studies 8 (1947) 36 ss.; R.P. Hoenen, Gregorianum 14 (1933) 153–84.

Tertio, evitandus est error vulgaris qui conversionem ad phantasma et reflectionem quandam super phantasma confundat. Conversio ad obiectum proprium cognoscendum

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one can understand in one’s duly disposed phantasm the species of a thing similar to the species for whose production the phantasm is disposed. This virtual, dispositive presence of a species in the phantasm is entirely sufficient. First of all, it is sufficient that the phantasm be an instrument in the production of the species, for an instrument is such that it produces an effect beyond its proper proportion. Also, it is sufficient that the phantasm be the ground in which the species shines forth and is understood; for ‘intellect’ is from intus legere, ‘to gather inwardly,’ that is, to grasp the inner form and essence of a thing in externals apprehended by the senses. This can be illustrated in another way. Just as colors on a wall that are actually being seen are identical with the faculty of sight rendered in act and yet are not seen in one’s eyes but on the wall, so in a similar way species that are actually understood are one with the possible intellect rendered in act and yet are understood not in the intellect but in the phantasm. See In III De anima, lect. 2, §§ 592–93, 595; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 59, ¶ 14, § 1366. With regard to the above, three points should be noted. First, do not confuse this understanding of the species in the phantasm with knowing the species received and conserved in the possible intellect. For the species shining in the phantasm, the intelligible in the sensible, the quiddity existing in corporeal matter, is the proper object of our intellect, and therefore our intellect understands nothing whatever unless it turns to the phantasm. But the species received in the possible intellect is not known except when the intellect reflects upon itself (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 85, a. 2 c.) and in its inquiry proceeds from its object to its act, from acts to habits, from habits to potencies, and from potencies to the essence of the soul (ibid. q. 87). Second, note that the intellect is infallible primarily and per se with respect to a quiddity or species, and secondarily with respect to other things as more or less closely related to a quiddity (Aristotle, De anima, iii, 6, 430a 26 – 430b 30; In III De anima, lect. 11, §§ 746–63). For what is understood in the phantasm is indivisible and simple, and therefore it is either truly understood or not at all, as is the case with separate substances (In III De anima, lect. 11, § 763; In IX Metaphys., lect. 11, §§ 1904–09). From this infallibility there follows infallibility (1) in defining, as long as the concept really proceeds from the understanding, (2) in predicating, as long as what are imagined accord with what are sensed, and (3) in understanding primary principles, as long as two intelligibles that have been separately understood coalesce into one intelligible likewise understood in the sensible (see Theological Studies 8:1 [1947] 36–46 [Verbum 61–71]; P. Hoenen, ‘De origine primorum principiorum scientiae,’ Gregorianum 14 [1933] 153–84). Third, one must avoid the common error of confusing the intellect’s turning to the phantasm with its reflection upon the phantasm. Turning to the phantasm

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requiritur, quod obiectum est quidditas vel natura in materia corporali existens (Sum. theol., i, q. 84, a. 7 c.). Reflectio autem ad obiectum indirectum intellectus cognoscendum occurrit, nempe, singulare quod iam per sensum vel imaginationem cognoscitur, per intellectum vero non cognoscitur nisi indirecte et per quandam reflectionem (ibid. q. 86, a. 1 c.). Possibilitas vero et fundamentum huius indirectae atque reflexae cognitionis in eo est quod species intelligibilis cum phantasmate singulari coniungitur et quasi continuatur quia ipsa species in phantasmate intelligitur. Unde directe intellectus speciem in phantasmate relucentem intelligit, indirecte autem singulare per phantasma repraesentatum cognoscit. (Lege Sum. theol., i, q. 86, a. 1; De Anima, iii, 4, 492b 10–21; In III de Anima, lect. 8, §§ 705–18; Theological Studies 10 (1949) 20 ss.).

7 De necessitate verbi Cum aliud sit obiectum quod in hoc statu nostrum intellectum moveat et aliud latius pateat obiectum in quod intellectus noster tendat, ideo nobis necessarium est interiora verba formare. Quod enim hoc in statu intellectum movet est obiectum eius proprium, quidditas vel natura in materia corporali existens (Sum. theol., i, q. 84, a. 7 c.), quod est primo et per se cognitum (ibid. q. 85, a. 8 c.), quod primo cognoscitur (ibid. q. 87, a. 3 c.), primum est quod a nobis intelligitur secundum statum praesentis vitae (ibid. q. 88, a. 3 c.). Ubi notare oportet hoc primum obiectum non esse speciem in intellectu possibili receptam (ibid. q. 85, a. 2 c.), neque actum intelligendi, neque definitionem seu verbum, sed aliquid extrinsecum scilicet naturam materialis rei (ibid. q. 87, a. 3 c.). Et quia restringitur obiectum movens ad illud ad quod phantasma se habet ut materia causae, ideo ‘secundum statum praesentis vitae, neque per intellectum possibilem, neque per intellectum agentem, possumus intelligere substantias immateriales secundum seipsas’ (ibid. q. 88, a. 1 c.) et ‘multo minus ... intelligere essentiam substantiae increatae’ (ibid. a. 3 c.).

Obiectum vero in quod intellectus tendit ut in finem non est genus quoddam entium sed ens in tota sua latitudine. Intellectus enim est quo est omnia fieri, et ‘omnia’ restrictionem non patitur (ibid. q. 79, a. 7 c.). Quod obiectum cum in ipsa intellectus natura fundatur, naturaliter et per se a nobis cognoscitur (C. Gent., ii, 83, § 31) neque a nobis ignorari potest (De Ver., q. 11, a. 1, ad 3m) sed statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscitur (ibid. c.).

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is necessary for it to know its proper object, the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 7 c.). But reflection upon the phantasm is done in order to know the indirect object of the intellect, which is the singular already known through sense and imagination but not known by the intellect except indirectly and by this sort of reflection (ibid. q. 86, a. 1 c.). The possibility and basis for this indirect reflective knowledge lies in the fact that the intelligible species is linked to and has a certain continuity with the singular phantasm, since the species itself is understood in the phantasm. Accordingly, the intellect understands directly the species illuminated in the phantasm, while indirectly it knows the singular represented through the phantasm. (See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 86, a. 1; Aristotle, De anima, iii, 4, 429b 10–21; Aquinas, In III De anima, lect. 8, §§ 705–18; Theological Studies 10:1 [1949] 20–23 [Verbum 169–73].) 7 The Necessity for the Word There is one object that activates our intellect in this present state of existence and another more extensive object to which our intellect tends, and this is why it is necessary for us to form inner words. That which moves our intellect in the present state is its proper object, the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 7 c.), which is known primarily and per se (ibid. q. 85, a. 8 c.), which is known first (ibid. q. 87, a. 3 c.), and is the first thing understood by us in our present state (ibid. q. 88, a. 3 c.). Note here that this first object is not the species received in the possible intellect (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 85, a. 2 c.), nor the act of understanding, nor a definition or inner word, but an external reality, the nature of some material thing (ibid. q. 87, a. 3 c.). And since this object moving [the intellect] is restricted to that to which the phantasm stands as the matter of the cause, therefore ‘in this present state of life, neither through the possible intellect nor through the agent intellect can we understand immaterial substances in themselves’ (ibid. q. 88, a. 1 c.) and ‘much less can [the human intellect] understand the essence of the uncreated substance’ (ibid. a. 3 c.). But the object to which the intellect tends as to its end is not any genus of things but is being in its widest extension. The intellect is that which can become all things, and ‘all’ is unrestricted (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 7 c.). This object, since it is founded upon the very nature of the intellect, is known by us naturally and per se (Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 83, ¶ 31, § 1678) and cannot be unknown to us (De veritate, q. 11, a. 1, ad 3m), but is known immediately by the light of the agent intellect (ibid. c.).

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Quid vero significet illud ‘naturaliter cognosci’ tum ex principiis naturaliter notis tum ex propria experientia innotescit. Principia enim naturaliter nota in ratione entis fundantur (C. Gent., ii, 83, § 31; Sum. theol., i-ii, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4m) et eorum habitus ‘est quodammodo innatus menti nostrae ex ipso lumine intellectus agentis’ (In II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3 sol.; De Ver., q. 8, a. 15 c.) et magis habitui infuso quam habitui acquisito comparatur (In III Sent., d. 23, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1m). Quod ex experientia etiam constat. Neque enim docentur neque addiscunt parvuli de omnibus quaerere, An sit, et Propter quid sit; quae si quaerunt, ens secundum esse et essentiam quaerunt.

Qua differentia inter obiectum movens et obiectum ut finem perspecta, elucet quadruplex verbi necessitas. Cum enim Deus et substantiae separatae sub ente in tota sua latitudine cadant et tamen secundum statum praesentis vitae intellectum nostrum non moveant, requiruntur verba interiora tamquam media in quibus analogice eos cognoscamus. Unde Deum hac in vita cognoscimus in quantum ex effectibus eius scimus ‘quod haec propositio quam formamus de Deo cum dicimus, “Deus est,” est vera’ (Sum. theol., i, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2m). Deinde illud est intellectui proprium quod multa per unum apprehendit. At multitudo rerum materialium simul per phantasma repraesentari non possunt. Ideoque ut synthesin philosophicam vel scientificam consequi possimus, verbis interioribus ad multa simul dicenda indigemus. Tertio, ipsae res materiales non solum forma vel essentia vel quidditate constant sed etiam alio quodam principio quod esse vel existentiam audit; quod principium in secunda intellectus operatione cognoscitur cum ad quaestionem, An sit, respondetur. Sed inconvenienter ponitur quaestio, An sit, nisi per prius definitur id de quo quaeritur; et ideo ad ipsas res materiales secundum quidditatem et esse cognoscendas necessaria est verborum interiorum formatio. Quarto, proprium intellectus obiectum est quidditas vel natura in materia corporali existens. At nisi verbum interius formamus, per intellectum nobis directe innotescit sola quidditas vel natura, per sensum vero vel phantasiam materia corporalis. Sed oportet rem, quae est una per se, per unam cognitionem intellectualem innotescere. Et ideo iterum est necessaria verborum formatio; quod innuit S. Thomas scribens: ‘Hoc ergo est primo et per se intellectum quod intellectus in se concipit de re intellecta, sive illud sit definitio, sive enuntiatio ...’ (De Pot., q. 9, a. 5 c.).

Quibus perspectis, statim concluditur demonstrari non posse ex solo rationis lumine existere Verbum in Deo. Ideo enim necessitas verbi in nobis stabilitur quod latius patet

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We can come to understand the meaning of ‘known naturally’ both from principles that are known naturally and from our own experience. For principles that are known naturally are grounded upon the meaning of being (Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 83, ¶ 31, § 1678; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4m); a habit regarding them ‘is, in a way, innate in our minds by the light of the agent intellect’ (Super II Sententiarum, d. 24, q. 2, a. 3 sol.; De veritate, q. 8, a. 15 c.) and is more comparable to an infused than to an acquired habit (Super III Sententiarum, d. 23, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1m). This is confirmed by experience. Children are neither taught nor do they learn to ask, Is it? and Why? about everything; when they do so, they are asking about being with respect to its existence and its essence. From this difference between the object moving the intellect and the object as its end, a fourfold necessity for the word becomes clear. First, since both God and separate substances fall within being taken in its broadest extent and yet do not move our intellect in our present state of life, we need inner words as means in which to know them analogically. Hence, we do know God in this life inasmuch as from his effects we know ‘that this statement which we form about God when we say, “God exists,” is true’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2m). Second, it is proper to the intellect to apprehend many things as a unity. But a multitude of material objects cannot be represented simultaneously in a phantasm, and therefore in order to achieve a philosophic or scientific synthesis we need inner words to express many things together. Third, material things consist not only of form or essence or quiddity but also of another principle called esse or existence. This principle is known in the second intellectual operation when we answer the question, Is it? But the question, Is it? is not properly put unless we first define what it is we are asking about, and therefore the forming of inner words is necessary for us to know material things as to their quiddity and their existence. Fourth, the proper object of our intellect is the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter. But unless we form an inner word, only the quiddity or nature will be known to us directly through our intellect, and only the corporeal matter through our senses or through a phantasm. But the requirement is that a thing, a unity in itself, become known through one intellectual knowing, and for this the forming of a word is necessary. St Thomas indicates this: ‘Therefore what is primarily and per se understood is that which the intellect conceives within itself about the object understood, that is, either a definition or a proposition . . .’ (De potentia, q. 9, a. 5 c.) From all that we have been saying, it is immediately evident that by the light of reason alone we cannot demonstrate the existence of the Word in God. For we

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obiectum ut finis quam obiectum movens. Sed Deus neque ab ullo movetur neque in finem tendit. Ipse enim per identitatem et ipsum esse est et ipsum intelligere; et quia perfecte se ipsum intelligit, perfecte intelligit tum virtutem suam tum omnia ad quae se extendit sua virtus; neque ullus in eo est discursus sed unico actu unicoque intuitu et se et omnia alia comprehendit (Sum. theol., i, q. 14). Qua de causa, sola fide tenemus esse Verbum in Deo (De Ver., q. 4, a. 2, ad 5m; De Pot., q. 8, a. 1, ad 12m; Sum. theol., i, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2m).

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have established the necessity of a word in us because of the fact that the object of our intellect as its end is broader than the object that moves it. But God is neither moved by anything nor tends to an end. He himself is by identity both existence itself and understanding itself. And because he perfectly understands himself, he perfectly understands both his power and all that lies within the scope of his power. Nor is there within him any discursive reasoning, but in one act and one intuition he comprehends both himself and all other things (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14). For this reason, then, we say that only by faith do we hold that there is a Word in God (De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 5m; De potentia, q. 8, a. 1, ad 12m; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2m).

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17 Intelligere et dicere Cum operationes animae per obiecta distinguantur (De Anima, ii, 4, 415a 20; In II De An., ii, lect. 6, §§ 304 ss.; Sum. theol., i, q. 77, a. 3 c.; q. 87, a. 3 c.), eatenus differunt intelligere et dicere quatenus et eorum obiecta.

Obiectum vero aut est movens, aut est terminus immanenter productus, aut est finis. Duplex porro est obiectum movens: ad actum enim intelligendi directum movemur per phantasma illuminatum et in ipso phantasmate resplendentem perspicimus speciem vel causam essendi vel quidditatem, prout supra declaratum est; ad actum vero intelligendi reflexum movemur per evidentiam sufficientem qua sufficientem; ad quem actum pervenimus cum conceptum in principia reduximus, nempe, in sensum, in principia per se nota, et in ipsum lumen intellectuale (Vide Theol. Stud., viii (1947) 36 ss.).2

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17 The Act of Understanding and the Uttering of an Inner Word The operations of the soul are distinguished by their respective objects (De anima, ii, 4, 415a 14–22; In II De anima, lect. 6, §§ 304–308; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 77, a. 3 c.; q. 87, a. 3 c.). Accordingly, the act of understanding, or insight (intelligere), and the uttering of an inner word (dicere) are different from each other inasmuch as their objects are different. An object can be either that which moves something else, or an immanently produced term, or an end or goal. There are two objects that move us. We are moved to eliciting a direct act of understanding by the illumination of a phantasm, and in that phantasm we grasp a species that shines forth, or a cause of being, or a quiddity, as we explained above in appendix 2, § 3. We are moved to eliciting a reflective act of understanding by sufficient evidence as sufficient; and we arrive at this act when we have resolved what we have conceived to its principles, namely, sense, self-evident principles, and the light of the intellect itself (see Theological Studies 8:1 (1947) 36–52 [Verbum 61–78]).2 1 [See above, pp. 527–28, where the numbering of sections is explained.] 2 [In Verbum, Lonergan remarks that the naturally possessed habitus principiorum has a determination from sense, but ‘results strictly from intellectual light alone’ (69; see 73, 77). It follows that if sense, self-evident principles, and the light of the intellect can each properly be said to be a principle of ‘what we have conceived,’ each of them functions as a principle in its own distinctive manner, in accordance with their interconnections among themselves.]

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Duplex praeterea est terminus immanenter productus: cum enim directe speciem vel causam essendi vel quidditatem rei perspeximus, definitionem vel rationem rei intus concipimus seu dicimus; cum vero reflexe evidentiam sufficientem qua sufficientem perspeximus, enuntiationem concipimus seu dicimus. 3 Denique tandem cum definiamus ut iudicare possimus, cumque iudicemus ut verum et ens cognoscamus, finis totius operationis intellectualis est ens, quod est obiectum formale intellectus. Circa distinctionem horum obiectorum, alia patent et alia explicatione quadam indigent. Patet enim distinctio inter primam operationem circa quaestionem, Quid sit, et secundam operationem circa quaestionem, An sit. Patet praeterea distinctio inter terminos immanenter productos et finem propter quem producuntur; definitiones enim et enuntiationes intus formamus ut per ea tamquam per media-in-quibus ad ens cognoscendum perveniamus. At quibusdam forte difficile videtur quod circa eandem intellectus operationem, primam nempe vel secundam, aliud dicitur obiectum intelligendi et aliud obiectum dicendi.

Inter quae tamen haec est differentia quod obiectum intelligendi est illud ex quo et propter quod oritur obiectum dicendi. Et circa secundam intellectus operationem hoc est manifestum. Cur enim iudicamus? Quia evidentiam sufficere ad tale iudicium proferendum perspeximus. Per prius sane perspicimus evidentiae sufficientiam quam iudicamus. Et aliud sane est evidentia sufficiens quae perspicitur, et aliud est iudicium ad quod proferendum sufficit evidentia. At par omnino est ratio circa operationem intellectus primam. Quid sit eclipsis lunae? Est obscuratio lunae facta per tellurem quae inter solem illuminantem et lunam illuminatam movetur. Aliud sane est haec eclipseos definitio interius concepta et dicta; aliud vero est intellectu conspicere lunam necessario obscurari si illuminatio eius a sole interrumpatur. Quid sit homo? Animal rationale. At cur ‘animal rationale’ dicimus? Sit quod ‘animal’ sensibus videmus et audimus; ‘rationale’ tamen neque videtur neque auditur; quod vero sensibus cognoscere non possumus nisi illud intellectu perspiceremus, numquam verbo interiori dicere possemus. Quae perspicientia qualis sit, iam satis diximus. In ipsis enim sensibilibus

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Again, there are two terms that are produced immanently. When we have directly grasped a species or cause of being or quiddity, we inwardly conceive, or utter, the definition, the meaning [ratio], of a thing; and when we have by reflection grasped the sufficiency of evidence as such, we inwardly conceive or utter a proposition.3 Finally, since we define in order to judge and judge in order to know truth and being, the end of our entire intellectual operation is being, the formal object of the intellect. With regard to the distinction of these objects, some things are quite clear while others need some explanation. The distinction between the first operation, which has to do with the question, What is it? and the second operation, which answers the question, Is it? is quite clear. Also quite clear is the distinction between terms that are immanently produced and the end for which they are produced; for we inwardly formulate definitions and propositions in order that through them, as means-in-which, we may come to know being. But it may perhaps not be so easy to see why the same intellectual operation, whether the first or the second, has two different objects, the object of the act of understanding and the object of an act of uttering an inner word. The difference between these two is that the object of an act of understanding is that from which and because of which the object of the act of uttering emerges. In the case of the second intellectual operation this is easy to see. Why do we judge? Because we grasp that there is sufficient evidence to make such a judgment. We surely grasp the sufficiency of the evidence before we make our judgment. But the sufficient evidence that is grasped is certainly different from the judgment that the sufficiency of evidence enables us to make. But the reason is exactly the same in the case of the first intellectual operation. What is a lunar eclipse? It is the darkening of the moon caused by the shadow of the earth, which has come between the light of the sun and the moon which it illumines. But the interiorly conceived and uttered definition of an eclipse is surely not the same as the realization by the intellect that the moon will necessarily be darkened if its light from the sun is blocked. What is man? A rational animal. But why do we say ‘rational animal’? Granted that animal is something we see and hear; rational, however, is something that is neither seen nor heard. But what we cannot know by our senses we could never express by an inner word unless we somehow grasped it by our intellect; and what this grasp is, we have sufficiently explained. Present in the sensible data through which we come to know man there 3 [See above, p. 563, note 3. Uttering a proposition on the basis of a grasp of the sufficiency of evidence is more than conceiving. It involves positing the synthesis that is conceived in the proposition.]

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quibus homo nobis innotescit insunt indicia rationalitatis; quae indicia secundum se sunt ‘materia causae,’ rationalitas vero quam indicant est ‘causa materiae,’ nempe, formale principium unde haec sensibilia sunt sensibilia hominis, et causa essendi unde haec materia ad esse hominem pertingat. Iam vero aliud est rationalitatem in indiciis exterioribus perspicere, et aliud est dicere animal rationale; iterum aliud est in corpore tali animam intellectivam intelligere, et aliud est compositum ex anima et corpore definire seu dicere. At alia est difficultas metaphysica potius quam psychologica, immo grammatica potius quam metaphysica. Nam alio sensu intelligere est actio vel operatio, alio autem sensu dicere est actio vel operatio. Intelligere enim est actus, actus secundus, actus perfecti, energeia, sicut et videre, audire, velle. Dicere vero est factio quaedam; dicendo enim formamus atque producimus verbum interius sive incomplexum, ut definitio, sive complexum, ut enuntiatio. In terminologia Avicennae species intelligibilis in intellectu possibili recepta se habet ad intelligere ut principium actionis seu principium formale actionis; et eadem species se habet ad verbum dictum sicut principium operati seu principium effectus. In terminologia vero Aristotelica, potentia activa non distinguitur contra actum sed fundatur in eo (Sum. theol., i, q. 25, a. 1, ad 1m); qua de causa potentia dicendi non distinguitur contra actum intelligendi sed fundatur in eo. Praeterea, in eadem terminologia, cum factio sit ipse effectus productus inquantum a faciente est, passio autem inquantum in facto est, ideo dicere est ipsum verbum inquantum est ab actu intelligendi et dici est ipsum verbum inquantum est in intellectu possibili. Praeterea, in terminologia Aristotelica prout a S. Thoma paulo immutatur, dicere erit ipsius actus intelligendi quatenus ad verbum productum refertur; dici autem erit verbi quatenus verbum ab actu intelligendi fit. Denique, haec habitudo inter intelligere et verbum in terminologia Avicennae sic declaratur quod verbum est terminus actionis intelligendi.4

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are indications of rationality. These indications are the matter of the cause, while the rationality which they point to is the cause of the matter, that is, the formal principle by reason of which these sensible data are the sensible data of a human being, and the cause of being by virtue of which this particular matter comes to exist as human. And yet it is one thing to discern rationality in external indications, and quite another to say ‘rational animal’; and again, it is one thing to understand an intellectual soul being in such a body, and quite another to define or utter that composite of soul and body. There is, however, another difficulty, one that is metaphysical rather than psychological, in fact, more semantic than metaphysical. For understanding is an act or operation in one sense, whereas defining or uttering an inner word is an act or operation in another sense. Understanding is an act, second act, an act of what is complete (actus perfecti), energeia, like seeing and hearing and willing. But defining is a kind of making; when we utter interiorly we form and produce an inner word, either a simple inner word, such as a definition, or a compound inner word, a proposition. In Avicenna’s terminology the intelligible species received in the possible intellect is to the act of understanding as the principle of an action, the formal principle of action; and the same species is to the uttered word as the principle of something done (principium operati), the principle of an effect. But in Aristotle’s terminology active potency is not contrary to act but rather is grounded in it (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 25, a. 1, ad 1m); hence, the potency to utter an inner word is not contrary to the act of understanding but is grounded in it. Besides, in the same terminology, since a making is the effect produced considered as being from the maker, whereas a passion is this effect considered as being in the product, it follows that uttering is the inner word itself considered as being from the act of understanding, and being uttered is that word considered as being in the possible intellect. Moreover, according to Aristotle’s terminology as slightly modified by St Thomas, to utter would regard the act of understanding itself as related to the word produced, while being uttered would regard the inner word inasmuch as the word results from the act of understanding. Finally, in Avicenna’s terminology the relationship between understanding and the inner word is that the word is the term of the action of understanding.4 4 [Elsewhere Lonergan suggests the following convention regarding how to render ‘potentia activa’ and ‘potentia passiva’ when these are used in an Aristotelian and in an Avicennist sense. Verbum 121: ‘... in the writings of Aquinas there are two distinct definitions of potentia activa. There is an Aristotelian definition, “principium transmutationis in aliud inquantum aliud,” which attains a certain dominance in later works. There is what may be called, though with diffidence, an Avicennist definition, “principium operationis” or “principium actionis,” which is dominant in earlier works and far from disappears in later ones. Since these definitions are not

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Dixerit tamen quispiam obiectum formale intellectus esse ens, et cum motus ab ente fiat, ideo ens esse obiectum movens et non obiectum ut finis. Nequaquam sane negarem omne quod movet sive sensum sive intellectum esse ens. At ens quod movet sensum non est ens in tota sua latitudine, sed tantummodo genus quoddam uti color vel sonus vel sapor vel aliud eiusmodi. Pariter ens quod movet nostrum intellectum in hoc statu quo corpori coniungitur non est ens in tota sua latitudine sed tantummodo ens corporale; qua de causa substantias separatas nunc cognoscere non possumus nisi per quasdam analogias (Sum. theol., i, q. 88); et proprium obiectum nostri intellectus dicitur quidditas vel natura in materia corporali existens (ibid., q. 84, a. 7 c.). Qui tamen ad visionem beatam pertingunt, ipsum esse vident et in eo omnia alia pro perfectione visionis; et tunc forte dici potest quod ens in tota sua latitudine se habet ad intellectum creatum non solum ut finis sed etiam ut movens.

18 Emanatio intelligibilis Circa emanationem intelligibilem duo maxime sunt attendenda: primo, quod ‘quanto aliqua natura est altior, tanto id quod ex ea emanat magis ei est intimum’ (C. Gent., iv, 11, § 1) ita ut, si in divinis emanatio fieret, id quod emanat consubstantiale esset ei a quo emanat; secundo, quod licet is qui emanat et is a quo emanat non sint alia et alia substantia sed una eademque, nihilominus vera et propria ratio emanationis non tollitur. Et primum quidem suadet S.Thomas loco citato (C. Gent., iv, 11; cf. Sum. theol., i, q. 27, a. 1, ad 2m); alterum autem eatenus habetur quatenus differentia inter emanationem intelligibilem et emanationem materialem vel sensibilem intelligitur. Ad quam intelligentiam consequendam nunc laborandum est. 5

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Here one might raise the objection that the formal object of the intellect is being, and that since there is motion from being, therefore being is a motive object and not an object as an end. Now, certainly I would by no means deny that what moves the senses or the intellect is being. But the being that moves a sense faculty is not being in its full extension but only a certain kind of being, such as color or sound or flavor, and the like. Likewise, the being which moves our intellect in its present state of union with a body is not being in its full extension but only corporeal being; hence, we cannot know separate substances except by way of certain analogies (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 88), and the proper object of our intellect is defined as a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter (ibid. q. 84, a. 7 c.). Still, those who reach the beatific vision behold the very act of existence itself and in it all other things, according to the degree of perfection of their vision; then, perhaps, it could be said that being in its full extension is not only the end but also the mover of the created intellect. 18 Intellectual Emanation There are two points that should be especially noted with regard to intellectual emanation: first, the fact that ‘the higher a particular nature is, the more that which emanates from it will be intimately (one) with it’ (Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11, ¶ 1, § 3461), so that if there is an emanation in God, that which emanates would be consubstantial with that from which it emanates; second, that although the one who emanates and the one from whom he emanates are one and the same substance, nevertheless there is still an emanation in the true and proper sense. The first point is made by St Thomas in the passage just quoted (Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11, ¶ 1, § 3461; see also Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 1, ad 2m). The second will become clear insofar as the difference between intellectual emanation and material or sensible emanation is understood; so our task now is to try to acquire that understanding.5 equivalent, it will be convenient to translate potentia activa, used in an Aristotelian sense, by “efficient potency,” with the corresponding potentia passiva translated by “receptive potency”; further, it will be convenient to translate potentia activa, used in the Avicennist sense, by “active potency,” with the corresponding potentia passiva translated by “passive potency.” ’] 5 [As noted above, ‘emanatio intelligibilis’ is translated here as ‘intellectual emanation.’ The reference to the two meanings of ‘intelligibile’ in the next paragraph is a clarification of the Latin expression. The translation adopted here makes clear that the meaning of ‘intelligibilis’ that is intended is the second of the meanings of ‘intelligibile’ that Lonergan mentions in that paragraph.]

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In primis ergo animadverte ‘intelligibile’ dici dupliciter: uno modo, ut etiam materialia et sensibilia quodammodo intelligibilia reputentur, quippe quae a scientia Dei producantur (Sum. theol., i, q. 14, a. 8 c.) et a nobis intelligendo cognoscantur; alio modo, ut intelligibilia contra materialia et sensibilia dividantur. Hoc enim modo dicitur quod ‘intellectus humanus se habet in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia tantum, sicut et materia prima se habet in genere rerum sensibilium’ (Sum. theol., i, q. 87, a. 1 c.). Et hoc modo exclusivo sumi oportet emanatio quae dicitur intellectualis (C. Gent., iv, 11, § 8) vel intelligibilis (Sum. theol., i, q. 27, a. 1 c.), cum ‘imago Dei sit in homine solum secundum mentem’ (ibid., q. 93, a. 6). 6

Deinde, distinguendum est inter id quod in creatis commune sit tum emanationi intelligibili tum emanationi materiali vel sensibili et, alia ex parte, id quod sit emanationi intelligibili proprium. Iam vero in creatis illud est omni emanationi commune quod aliud realiter est emanationis principium et aliud realiter est ipsum quod emanat. Alius enim est calor calefacientis et alius realiter est calor calefacti; alius pariter est actus intelligendi et aliud realiter est verbum procedens. Praeterea, nisi haec dualitas, principii nempe atque principiati, existeret, fieri non posset ut principium causa esset, principiatum vero effectus; cum enim nihil causa sui esse possit, sine dualitate non existit causalitas proprie dicta. Ideoque ut aliquam intelligentiam divinarum processionum assequamur, aliud praeter causalitatem inveniendum est; etsi enim in divinis Filius a Patre et Spiritus ab utroque procedant, tres tamen personae unus Deus, una substantia, una res sunt. Quare illud emanationi intelligibili proprium adverte quod verbum non solum effectus quidam est ab actu intelligendi productus, sed etiam eatenus effici potest et eatenus efficitur quatenus ratio cur efficiatur ab actu intelligendi perspicitur. 7 Eatenus enim definitionem concipere possumus et eatenus eam re vera concipimus

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Note, first, that the Latin word ‘intelligibile’ can be taken in two ways: in the first way, even material and sensible realities are in some way considered intelligible, inasmuch as they are produced by God’s knowledge (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 8 c.) and are known by us through understanding; in the second way, intelligible realities (intelligibilia) are contradistinguished from material and sensible things. It is in this latter sense that ‘the human intellect is in the order of intelligible things (intelligibilium) as a being that is only in potency, just as prime matter is in the order of sensible things’ (ibid. q. 87, a. 1 c.). It is in this exclusive sense that we speak of an emanation as ‘intellectual’ (Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11, ¶ 8, § 3468) or (in Latin) ‘intelligibilis’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 1 c.), since the image of God is in a human being only with respect to the mind (ibid. q. 93, a. 6). 6 Next we must distinguish between what among created things is common to both intellectual emanation and material or sensible emanation and, on the other hand, what is proper to intellectual emanation alone. Now, in created things, an element common to all emanation is that the originating principle of emanation is really different from that which emanates from it. The heat of a heater is really different from the heat of that which is heated; in the same way the act of understanding is really different from the proceeding inner word. Besides, if this duality between the principle and the resultant did not exist, the principle could not be a cause and the resultant could not be an effect; for since nothing can be a cause of itself, no causality in the proper sense exists without duality. Hence, if we are to get some understanding of the divine processions we shall have to go to something other than causality; for although in God the Son proceeds from the Father and the Spirit proceeds from both, the three Persons are one God, one substance, one reality. Note, therefore, that it is proper to an intellectual emanation that the inner word is not only an effect produced by the act of understanding but also that it can only result and does only result insofar as the reason why it should be produced is grasped in an act of understanding.7 We can only conceive a definition and only 6 [Lonergan provides quotation marks in the Latin, but the quotation does not appear as such in the Summa theologiae, 1, q. 93, a. 6, but is part of an editorial title to the article. What we have in the article itself is ‘nec in ipsa rationali creatura invenitur Dei imago, nisi secundum mentem’ ( ‘the image of God is not found in the rational creature except with respect to the mind’).] 7 [Lonergan does not mean, of course, that clear knowledge regarding the existence of acts of understanding and of inner words and of the relation between them is required. The point is that adequate inner words come from acts of understanding spontaneously and consciously when certain conditions are fulfilled; one can operate in accordance with the structure, and in that sense grasp consciously the why of the production of an inner word, without having clarity regarding the structure.]

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quatenus rei definiendae ‘propter quid’ iam intelligimus. Iterum, eatenus aliquid esse vel affirmare vel negare possumus, quatenus evidentiam affirmationi vel negationi sufficientem perspicimus; neque aliter rationaliter iudicare possumus. Denique, cum voluntas definiatur appetitus rationalis seu intelligibilis, pariter omnino velle non possumus nisi rationem cur velimus, bonitatem nempe, intellectu affirmamus. Quantum vero distant hae emanationes intelligibiles ab aliis materialibus vel sensibilibus, in ipsa emanandi ratione et modo elucet. Quaecumque enim creata sunt, divinam perfectionem ad extra imitantur. Et caetera quidem particularem quendam aspectum divinae excellentiae manifestantes, secundum leges particulares sibique proprias sponte operantur. Intellectus vero creatus est participata quaedam similitudo luminis increati. Quod increatum lumen cum omnium naturarum omniumque legum fons sit atque origo, etiam creatus intellectus quaedam omnipotentia est, qua de causa dicitur ‘potens omnia facere et fieri.’ Neque intellectus creati operatio per legem quandam particularem sive naturaliter inditam sive ab extrinseco impositam gubernatur; sed ipso intellectus sibi lex quaedam transcendentalis est. Quae enim leges intellectus reputantur, utputa identitatis, noncontradictionis, medii exclusi, vel rationis sufficientis, nullam regulam sive particularem sive specificam sive genericam dicunt, sed conditiones possibilitatis cuiuslibet regulae vel legis statuunt. At quamvis intellectus creatus quodammodo sit omnia potens, quamvis nulla lege determinata reguletur, non tamen pro lubitu vel casu operatur. Illa enim ei est lex suprema ut non operetur nisi propter perspectam intelligibilitatem; immo tota efficacia totaque vis operationis et emanationis intelligibilis in eo est posita quod ex perspecta intelligibilitate et secundum eam procedunt et verba in intellectu et volitiones in voluntate. Ex perspecta quidditate procedit verbum; ex perspecta evidentia procedit iudicium; ex perspecta bonitate procedit actus amoris.

Quae habitudines inter principium et principiatum, alterius prorsus rationis sunt quam habitudines inter causam materialem et materialem effectum. Hae enim intelligi quidem possunt, unde potentia intelligibilia dicuntur. Illae vero intelligentis sunt qua intelligentis, unde intrinsece sunt actu intelligibilia. Hae secundum legem particularem intelliguntur; illae vero ad modum primi principii omnis legislationis oriuntur. Hae in rebus materialibus vel sensibilibus verificantur, non quia ipsae res quicquam intelligant sed quia ab intelligente sunt factae. Illae autem ideo fiunt quia eorum principium actu intelligit.

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do actually conceive it insofar as we understand the because of, the why, of the thing to be defined. Again, we can only affirm or deny that something is inasmuch as we grasp that there is sufficient evidence for that affirmation or negation; there is no other way to make a rational judgment. Finally, since the will is defined as a rational or intellectual appetite, we can similarly in no way will something unless we affirm the reason why we are willing it, namely, goodness. The disparity between these intellectual emanations and the other material or sensible emanations can be seen in the nature and manner of their emanating. Every created being is an outward imitation of divine perfection. Other created things manifest some particular aspect of the divine excellence and operate of their own accord according to particular laws that are appropriate to each. But the created intellect is a participated likeness of uncreated Light. Since this uncreated Light is the source and origin of all natures and all laws, even the created intellect has a certain omnipotence about it, whence it is said to be potens omnia facere et fieri – able to make and to become all things. Nor is the operation of the created intellect controlled by any particular law, whether implanted in it by its very nature or imposed upon it from without: the intellect itself is, as it were, a transcendental law unto itself. What are generally regarded as laws of the intellect, such as the principles of identity, of noncontradiction, of the excluded middle, or of sufficient reason, express no rule, whether particular or specific or generic, but rather state the conditions of possibility of any rule or law. But although the created intellect is in some sense capable of everything, and although it is not controlled by any determinate law, nevertheless it does not operate by whim or by chance. Its supreme norm is that it operate only in accordance with an intelligibility that it has grasped; indeed, the whole force and efficacy of intellectual operation and emanation lies in this, that it is from this apprehended intelligibility and in accordance with it that both words in the intellect and acts of the will proceed. An inner word proceeds from grasping a quiddity; a judgment proceeds from grasping the evidence; an act of love proceeds from grasping goodness. These relations between principle and resultant are of an altogether different nature from the relations between a material cause and a material effect. These latter relations can be understood, and so are said to be intelligible in potency; the former, however, belong to one who understands precisely as understanding, and so are by their very nature intelligible in act. The latter are understood according to a particular law; the former emerge as the primary principle of all law. The latter are verified in material or sensible realities, not because these realities themselves understand anything but because they were made by some intelligence; the former, on the other hand, come into being because their principle actually understands.

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Quibus perspectis, ad optatum curre finem. ‘Quanto aliqua natura est altior, tanto id quod ex ea emanat magis ei est intimum.’ Considera ergo naturam quae undique est maxime perfecta, et conclude idem realiter esse in ea et emanationis principium et id quod emanat. Ex hac identitate ulterius conclude illam emanationem non esse per modum causalitatis efficientis quae quidem aliud causam et aliud realiter esse effectum supponit atque exigit. Illud denique conclude illam emanationem posse esse vere et proprie dictam modo intelligibilis sit. Quod enim verbum et verbi principium sunt una eademque realitas, tollit quidem causalitatem efficientem sed tollere non demonstratur verbum esse propter intelligere sui principii. Iterum, quod verbum amorem spirans et ipse amor procedens sunt una eademque realitas, tollit sane causalitatem efficientem sed tollere non demonstratur quod ille amor est propter perspectam bonitatem principii.

Quod si aliquatenus intelligitur, iam eluxit cur homo secundum mentem suam dicatur SS.Trinitatis imago. 19 De spiratione Amorem procedere ex verbo mentali, saepissime testatus est Aquinas. In I Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4m: ‘ . . . a Verbo procedit Spiritus Sanctus, sicut a verbo mentali amor.’ Ibid. d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, sol.: ‘. . . quia potest esse duplex intuitus, vel veri simpliciter, vel ulterius secundum quod verum extenditur in bonum et conveniens, et haec est perfecta apprehensio; ideo est duplex verbum: scilicet rei prolatae quae placet, quod spirat amorem, et hoc est verbum perfectum; et verbum rei quae etiam displicet . . . aut non placet.’ Cf. In III de Anima, lect. 4, parr. 634 s. C. Gent., iv, 24, § 12: ‘Nam amor procedit a verbo: eo quod nihil amare possumus nisi verbo cordis illud concipiamus.’ Ibid. IV, 19, § 8: ‘Quod autem aliquid sit in voluntate ut amatum in amante, ordinem quendam habet ad conceptionem qua ab intellectu concipitur . . . non enim amaretur aliquid nisi aliquo modo cognosceretur.’ De Pot., q. 9, a. 9, ad 3m (2ae ser.): ‘nihil enim potest amari cuius verbum in intellectu non praeconcipiatur; et sic oportet quod ille qui procedit per modum

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Let us now press on to our goal! ‘The higher a particular nature is, the more that which emanates from it will be intimately (one) with it.’ Think of a nature that is most perfect in every way and you will come to the conclusion that in it the principle of emanation and that which emanates are really identical. And from this identity you may further conclude that that emanation does not take place in the manner of efficient causality, since this supposes and requires a cause and an effect that are really distinct. Your final conclusion will be that it can be said truly and properly to be an emanation provided it is intellectual. For although the real identity here between the word and the principle of the word rules out efficient causality, one cannot argue that it denies that the inner word exists because of the act of understanding on the part of its principle. Likewise, although the real identity between the word that spirates love and that proceeding love itself rules out efficient causality, it cannot be demonstrated that it denies that that love exists because of the apprehended goodness of its principle. Now if all this is more or less understood, it is clear why human beings are said to be in the image of the Holy Trinity precisely with respect to their minds. 19 Spiration There are many texts in which Aquinas states that love proceeds from a mental word. Super I Sententiarum, d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4m: ‘. . . the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Word the way love proceeds from a mental word.’ Super I Sententiarum, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, sol.: ‘. . . since there can be two apprehensions, either of truth by itself or of truth as expanded to take in the good and the fitting – and this latter is a complete apprehension – hence there are two words, namely, of something pleasing that is set forth, a word that spirates love – and this is a complete word – and the word of something also that displeases . . . or does not please.’ See In III de anima, lect. 4, §§ 634–35. Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 24, ¶ 12, § 3617: ‘For love proceeds from a word, inasmuch as we cannot love anything unless we conceive it in a word of the heart.’ Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c.19, ¶ 8, § 3564: ‘But that something is in the will as what is loved is in the lover (means that) it has a certain relation to the conception by which intellect conceives it . . . for nothing would be loved unless it were in some way known.’ De potentia, q. 9, a. 9, ad 3m (2nd ser.): ‘. . . for nothing can be loved whose word is not first conceived in the intellect; hence, the one who proceeds by way of the

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voluntatis sit ab eo qui procedit per modum intellectus, et per consequens distinguatur ab eo.’ Cf. ibid. q. 10, a. 2 c., ad 2m, ad 7m; a. 4 c. Ibid. q. 10, a. 5 c.: ‘Non enim potest esse nec intelligi quod amor sit alicuius quod non est intellectu praeconceptum; unde quilibet amor est ab aliquo verbo, loquendo de amore in intellectuali natura.’ Sum. theol., i, q. 27, a. 3, ad 3m: ‘. . . de ratione amoris est quod non procedat nisi a conceptione intellectus.’ Ibid. q. 36, a. 2 c.: ‘Necesse est autem quod amor a verbo procedat; non enim aliquid amamus nisi secundum quod conceptione mentis apprehendimus. Unde et secundum hoc manifestum est quod Spiritus sanctus procedat a Filio.’ Comp. theol., cap. 49: ‘Similiter etiam id quod amatur est in amante secundum quod amatur actu. Quod autem aliquid actu amatur, procedit et ex virtute amativa amantis et ex bono amabili actu intellecto. Hoc igitur quod est esse amatum in amante, ex duobus procedit, scilicet ex principio amativo et ex intelligibili apprehenso, quod est verbum conceptum de amabili.’ De rationibus Fidei ad Cantorem Antiochenum, cap. 4: ‘Manifestum est autem quod nihil amare possumus intelligibili et sancto amore nisi quod actu per intellectum concipimus. Conceptio autem intellectus est verbum, unde oportet quod amor a verbo oriatur. Verbum autem Dei dicimus esse Filiun, ex quo patet Spiritum sanctum esse a Filio.’ En doctrina S. Thomae explicite affirmata inde a Scripto super Sententias usque ad Compendium Theologiae. Concordant vero Augustinus (loco citato ab auctore, pag. 112),8 Anselmus, Gotefridus a Fontanis, Joannes a Napoli (locis citatis. Theol. Stud., x [1949] 379), Caietanus (In Sum. theol., i, q. 27, a. 3, par. ix; edit. Leon., iv, 312). Imo Scotus, cum doctrinam suam de concausis concurrentibus voluntati applicasset, hanc conclusionem affirmavit; si obiectum conceptum se habet ad amorem tantummodo ut conditio sine qua non, Verbum se habere ad Spiritum sanctum tantummodo ut conditionem sine qua non. Vide Theol. Stud., x (1949) 379. Quaeri tamen potest utrum processio amoris ex verbo sit processio operati. Et affirmative respondendum videtur. Distinctio enim quae facta est De Ver., q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m, in eo consistit quod processio operationis sit processio perfectionis ex vel in perfectibili, processio vero operati sit processio perfectionis ex perfectione; iterum

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will must be from the one who proceeds by way of the intellect, and consequently is distinguished from that one.’ See ibid. q. 10, a. 2 c.; ad 2m; ad 7m; a. 4 c. De potentia, q. 10, a. 5 c.: ‘For it cannot be, nor can it be understood, that there is a love for something that has not first been conceived by the intellect; therefore, every love is from some word, when one is speaking of love in an intellectual nature.’ Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 3, ad 3m: ‘. . . it belongs to the very essence of love that it does not proceed except from a conception of the intellect.’ Summa theologiae, 1, q. 36, a. 2 c.: ‘It is necessary that love proceed from a word; for we do not love anything except inasmuch as we apprehend it in a mental conception. Accordingly, from this too it is clear that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.’ Compendium theologiae, c. 49: ‘Similarly too, what is loved is in the one loving inasmuch as it is actually being loved. The fact that an object is actually loved proceeds from the lover’s capacity to love, and also from the lovable good actually understood. Accordingly, the fact that the beloved is in the one loving proceeds from two principles: from the loving principle, and from an apprehended intelligible, which is the word that has been conceived concerning the lovable.’ De rationibus fidei ad Cantorem Antiochenum, c. 4: ‘It is clear that we are able to love nothing with an intellectual and holy love that we do not actually conceive by means of the intellect. But the conception of the intellect is the word; hence, it is necessary that love come forth from the word. Now, we say that the Word of God is the Son; it is clear, then, that the Holy Spirit is from the Son.’ Here, then, is the clear teaching of St Thomas, from his Commentary on the Sentences to his Compendium of Theology. In agreement with this teaching are Augustine (in the passage referred to in the textbook, p. 112), 8 Anselm, Godfrey of Fontaines, John of Naples (see Theological Studies 10 [1949] 379 [Verbum 212]), Cajetan (In Sum. theol. 1, q. 27, a. 3, §§ ix–xi; Leonine edition, vol. iv, 312). Scotus in fact, having applied his doctrine of concurrent coordinate causes to the will, stated this conclusion: if the object conceived is related to love only as a necessary condition, then the Word is related to the Holy Spirit only as a necessary condition (Theological Studies 10 [1949] 379 [Verbum 212–13]). One may ask, however, whether the procession of love from a word is a processio operati. To this the answer would seem to be in the affirmative. The distinction made in De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m, consists in this, that a procession of an operation (processio operationis) is a procession of a perfection from or in that which is 8 [The ‘textbook’ to which Lonergan is referring is Carolus Boyer, Synopsis Praelectionum de SS. Trinitate (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1949).]

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processio operationis est processio actus ex potentia, quae in Deo excluditur, et processio operati est processio actus ex actu, quae saltem non tam clare a Deo sit excludenda. Quare si actus volendi fit sive ex ipsa potentia volendi sive ex potentia disposita vel habitu informata, processio est operationis; si autem actus volendi fit ab alio actu secundo, nempe verbo, processio est operati; est enim processio perfectionis ex perfectione, et actus ex actu.

Quantum ad modum processionis amoris ex verbo, incidit perplexitas inquantum alii causalitati finali, alii causalitati efficienti deputent influxum appetibilis apprehensi in appetitum. Caietanus (In Sum. theol., i, q. 27, a. 3, par. x; edit. Leon., iv, 312) affirmat hunc influxum esse per modem efficientiae et citat Averroem. Ioannes a S. Thoma docet ‘causalitatem finis esse realem, prout ly reale distinguitur contra ens rationis, non prout distinguitur contra ly intentionale . . . quae motio intentionalis est, vere tamen in re existens et verum effectum habens in voluntate . . .’ (Phil. Nat., i, q. 13, a. 2, ad 3m; Taurini, 1933, ii, 281). Aristoteles (De Gen. et Corr., i, 7, 324 b 14) distinguit finem contra factivum (poi¯etikon) et dicit finem esse factivum tantum secundum metaphoram; unde nota expressio de motione metaphorica ex appetibili apprehenso; quae quantum significet inde concludes quod effectus primi motoris Aristotelici est ista motio (In XXII Metaphys., lect. 7, §§ 2519 s.; C. Gent., i, 13, par. 29) quae si ad meram metaphoram reducatur, nisi metaphoricum primum movens non exigit.

Sicut Aristoteles finem et factivum distinxit, eodem, uti videtur, sensu Aquinas duplicem in voluntatem influxum agnovit, alium per modum agentis, et alium per modum finis. Influxus per modum agentis a solo Deo exercetur; creatori enim voluntatis, competit formas in voluntatem imprimere, virtutes ei infundere, dispositiones eius mutare, exercitium actus efficere (C. Gent., iii, 88, par. 5; De Ver., q. 22, a. 8; Sum. theol., i-ii, q. 9, a. 6; q. 111, a.2; cf. Theol. Stud., iii [1942] 537 ss.). Influxus vero per modum finis est ex appetibili apprehenso, qui appetitum movet ad specificationem actus, inquantum voluntati praesentat obiectum (e.g. Sum. theol., i-ii, q. 9, a. 1 c.).

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perfectible, while a processio operati is a procession of a perfection from a perfection. Again, a procession of an operation is a procession of an act from a potency, which cannot be admitted in God, but a processio operati is a procession of an act from an act, and it is at least not so clear that this is to be excluded from God. Therefore, if an act of willing comes either from the potency of willing or from a potency that has been disposed or informed by a habit, the procession is that of an operation; if, on the other hand, the act of willing comes from another second act, namely a word, the procession is a processio operati, for it is the procession of a perfection from a perfection, of an act from an act. As to the manner in which love proceeds from a word, there is considerable confusion, since some assign the influence of the apprehended object of desire upon the appetite to final causality while others assign it to efficient causality. Cajetan (In Sum. theol., 1, q. 27, a. 3, §§ ix–xi; Leonine edition, vol. iv, 312) holds this influence to be by way of efficient causality and refers to Averroes. John of St Thomas states, ‘Final causality is real, as the real is contradistinguished from a conceptual being [ens rationis], not as the real is contradistinguished from the intentional . . . which is an intentional motion, but which nevertheless truly exists in reality and produces a true effect in the will . . .’ (Joannis a Sancto Thoma Naturalis Philosophiae, 1, q. 13, a. 2, ad 3m [ed. Beato Reiser] Taurini [Turin]: Marietti, 1933, vol. 2, p. 281). Aristotle in De generatione et corruptione (i, 7, 324b 14–15) distinguishes between an end and an agent (poi¯etikon) and says that an end is an agent in a metaphorical sense only; hence his well-known statement about metaphorical motion from an apprehended object of desire. The significance of this statement may be gathered from the fact that it is this motion that is the effect of Aristotle’s prime mover. (See In XII Metaphys., lect. 7, §§ 2519–22; Summa contra Gentiles, 1, c. 13, ¶ 29, § 108.) And if this motion is reduced to a mere metaphor, it needs nothing more than a metaphorical prime mover. As Aristotle distinguished between an end and a maker, so also Aquinas, along the same lines it seems, recognizes two influences upon the will, one by way of an agent and one by way of an end. The influence by way of an agent is exerted by God alone: it belongs to the creator of the will to impress forms upon the will, to infuse virtues in it, to change its dispositions, and to bring about an exercise of its act (Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 88, ¶ 5, § 2641; De veritate, q. 22, a. 8; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 9, a. 6; q. 111, a. 2. See also Theological Studies 3/4 [1942] 537–41 [Grace and Freedom 98–104]). The influence by way of an end is exerted by the apprehended object of desire, which moves the appetite to a specification of its act by presenting an object to the will. (See, for example, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 9, a. 1 c.)

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Appetibile apprehensum esse veram causam et non meram conditionem multipliciter constat. Sola enim ratio dubitandi est ex opinione augustiniana, omnem potentiam animae se ipsam ad omnes suos actus movere; uti iam vidimus opinio falso imponitur S.Thomae (supra numero 8). Constanter repetitur apud Aquinatem doctrina Aristotelica, appetibile apprehensum movere appetitum, et appetibile apprehensum esse movens non motum, voluntatem vero movens motum. Nulla alia causa specificationis actus voluntatis in scriptis S. Thomae reperitur praeter appetibile apprehensum. Pro nihilo non est reputandum quod causat specificationem actus; inter potentias enim animae sola voluntas causat exercitium actus tum sui tum caeterarum potentiarum (Sum. theol., i-ii, q. 17, a. 1; cf. i, q. 82, a. 4). Praeterea, finis est maxime causa et prima causarum; et tamen ‘finis non est causa, nisi secundum quod movet efficientiem ad agendum’ (De Pot., q. 5, a. 1 c.). Quod vero ad nostram materiam attinet, illud maxime circa modum processionis amoris ex verbo est attendendum quod est emanatio intelligibilis. Voluntas enim est appetitus rationalis, intelligibilis. Amor vero bonus est propter bonitatem obiecti intellectu apprehensam. Quae dependentia intelligibilis excedit meram habitudinem inter causam materialem et effectum materialem vel sensibilem, neque constat quod tollitur quando amor adeo intimus est dicenti et verbo ut idem absolute actus sit.

20 De processione amoris Dupliciter intelligi potest processio amoris: uno modo, quod amor procedit ex verbo spirante; alio modo, quod ex actu amandi seu ex amore procedit aliquid aliud. Primo modo intelligitur processio amoris in numero praecedenti (19) et a Caietano (In Sum. theol., i, q. 27, a. 3, §§ ix s., edit. Leon., iv, 312) et a Ferrariensi (In C. Gent., iv, 19, § iv s., edit. Leon., xv, 76 s.). Alio modo intelligitur processio amoris a Ioanne a S. Thoma, qui asserit ‘est expressa sententia S. Thomae per actum voluntatis produci aliquem terminum quo res amata dicatur esse in voluntate non per modum similitudinis sed per modum ponderis et inclinationis’ (Curs. Theol., In Sum. theol., i, q. 27, Disp. xii, a.7, § 4;

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It is abundantly clear that an apprehended object of desire is a true cause and not a mere condition. The only reason for hesitation on this point is Augustine’s opinion that all the powers of the soul move themselves to all of their acts, an opinion which, as we have seen [appendix 1, § 8], has been wrongly foisted upon St Thomas. Aquinas constantly repeats Aristotle’s doctrine that the apprehended object of desire moves the appetite, and that this apprehended object is an unmoved mover while the will is a moved mover. Nowhere in the writings of St Thomas will you find any other cause for the specification of the act of the will than the apprehended object of desire. What causes the specification of an act is not to be disregarded as being unimportant. For among the powers of the soul, only the will causes the exercise of both its own act and that of the other powers (Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 17, a. 1; see also 1, q. 82, a. 4). Moreover, an end is in the highest degree a cause, and the first of causes; and yet, ‘an end is not a cause except insofar as it moves an agent to act’ (De potentia, q. 5, a. 1 c.). For our present purpose, however, concerning the manner in which love proceeds from a word, the most important point to be attended to is intellectual emanation. The will is a rational, an intellectual, appetite. But love is good on account of the goodness of the object apprehended by the intellect. This dependence upon the intellect is more than just the relation between a material cause and a material or sensible effect; and it is not at all clear that there is no such dependence when the Love is so intimately related to the Speaker and the Word as to be in reality absolutely the same act with them. 20 The Procession of Love The procession of love can be understood in two ways: (1) love proceeds from the spirating inner word; (2) from the act of loving, from love, something else proceeds. In the preceding section, the procession of love is understood in the first sense both by Cajetan (In Sum. theol., 1, q. 27, a. 3, §§ ix–xiii, Leonine edition, vol. iv, 312–13) and by Ferrariensis (In C. Gent., 4, c.19, ¶¶ iv–x, Leonine edition, vol. xv, 76–79). The procession of love is understood in the second sense by John of St Thomas, who says, ‘It is the express opinion of St Thomas that through an act of the will a term is produced by which the object loved is said to be in the will not as a likeness but as a pull or inclination’ (Cursus theologicus, In Sum. theol., 1, q. 27; Disp. xii, a. 7,

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Parisiis 1884, vol. iv, 142). Et intentio eius est quod, sicut in intellectu actio intelligendi producit terminum, nempe verbum, ita in voluntate actio amandi producit terminum, nempe amatum in amante. Quam opinionem invenio neque fundatam in littera S. Thomae neque aptam ad doctrinam S. Thomae de processionibus divinis illustrandam. Quamvis enim clare atque expresse doceat S. Thomas cognitum esse in cognoscente et amatum in amante, neque expresse neque implicite docet ideo amatum esse in amante quod ex actu amoris procedit aliquis terminus ab ipso amore distinctus. Non expresse, quia non citatur locus in quo hoc dicitur. Non implicite, quia saepe implicite dicit per ipsum amorem amatum esse in amante. C. Gent., iv, 19, § 7: ‘Est autem amatum in amante secundum quod amatur; amare autem quoddam velle est; velle autem Dei est eius esse . . . esse igitur Dei in voluntate sua per modum amoris . . .’ Ubi tota deductio procedit sine mentione alicuius termini distincti ab actu amandi producti. De Malo, q. 6, a. 1, ad 13m: ‘. . . amor dicitur transformare amantem in amatum, inquantum per amorem movetur amans ad ipsam rem amatam.’ Comp. theol., c. 49: ‘Similiter etiam id quod amatur est in amante secundum quod amatur actu. Quod autem aliquid actu ametur, procedit ex virtute amativa amantis, et ex bono amabili actu intellecto. Hoc igitur quod est amatum esse in amante, ex duobus procedit: scilicet ex principio amativo et ex intelligibili apprehenso, quod est verbum conceptum de amabili.’ Iterum procedit deductio sine mentione et cum implicita exclusione alicuius termini ab actu amandi producti.

Praeterea, fundamentalis intentio Ioannis explicite a S. Thoma excluditur. Haec enim intentio est ut, sicut in intellectu habetur processio operati, similiter intra ipsam voluntatem habeatur processio operati. Scripsit autem Aquinas, De Ver., q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m: ‘Haec autem est differentia inter intellectum et voluntatem: quod operatio voluntatis terminatur ad res, in quibus est bonum et malum; sed operatio intellectus terminatur in mente, in qua est verum et falsum, ut dicitur in VI Metaphys. (lect. 4, § 1240). Et ideo voluntas non habet aliquid progrediens a seipsa quod in ea sit nisi per modum operationis; sed intellectus habet aliquid progrediens ab eo, non solum per modum operationis, sed etiam per modum rei operatae.’

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§ 4 [Ed. Ludovicus Viv`es; Parisiis, 1884], vol. iv, 142). John’s point is that just as in the intellect the act of understanding produces a term, namely the inner word, so in the will the act of loving produces a term, namely the beloved in the lover. I find this opinion to be without foundation in the works of St Thomas and quite useless in elucidating his doctrine on the divine processions. Although St Thomas clearly and expressly teaches that the object known is in the knower and the beloved is in the lover, he neither explicitly nor implicitly holds that the beloved is in the lover because from the act of loving there proceeds a term that is distinct from that love itself. Not explicitly, for there is no passage in which this is stated; nor implicitly, because he often implies that it is through love itself that the beloved is in the lover. Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 19, ¶ 7, § 3563: ‘But what is loved is within the one loving inasmuch as it is loved; love is an act of will; God’s act of willing is God’s own act of existence . . . God’s act of existence (esse), therefore, [is] in God’s will through love.’ In this passage the whole deduction proceeds without any mention of a distinct term produced by the act of loving. De malo, q. 6, a. 1, ad 13m: ‘Love is said to transform the one loving into the beloved inasmuch as the one loving is moved by love toward the very thing that is loved.’ Compendium theologiae, c. 49: ‘Similarly too, what is loved is in the one loving inasmuch as it is actually being loved. The fact that an object is actually loved proceeds from the lover’s capacity to love, and also from the lovable good actually understood. Accordingly, the fact that the beloved is within the one loving proceeds from two principles: from the loving principle, and from an apprehended intelligible, which is the word that has been conceived concerning the lovable.’ Once again the deduction proceeds without any mention and indeed with an implicit exclusion of any term produced by an act of loving. Besides, John’s basic point is explicitly ruled out by St Thomas. John’s point was that just as in the intellect there is a processio operati, there is likewise one within the will. Aquinas, however, wrote: ‘There is this difference between intellect and will: the operation of the will terminates at things, in which there is good and evil; but the operation of the intellect terminates in the mind, in which there is the true and the false, as is said in Metaphysics vi [lect. 4, § 1240]. Consequently, the will does not have anything going forth from itself, except what is in it after the manner of an operation; but the intellect has in itself something that goes forth from itself, not only after the manner of an operation, but also after the manner of a reality that is the term of the operation’ (De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m).

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Notate erroneum esse delere illud ‘nisi’ quamvis in quibusdam editionibus hoc factum sit. Vide Chevalier, Div. Thomas (Plac.), xli (1938) 63–68; Robillard, Bull. thomiste, v, 136.

Denique inepta est opinio Ioannis ad illustrandam doctrinam S. Thomae de processione Spiritus sancti. Nam secundum hanc opinionem Spiritus sanctus non esset ipse amor procedens sed terminus quidam ab amore procedens. Clara vero doctrina S. Thomae est Spiritum sanctum esse amorem procedentem. Sum. theol., i, q. 37, a. 1, Sed contra: ‘Ipse Spiritus sanctus est Amor.’ Ibid. c., ad fin.: ‘Inquantum vero his vocabulis (amore, dilectione) utimur ad exprimendam habitudinem eius rei quae procedit per modum amoris ad suum principium et e converso; ita quod per amorem intelligatur amor procedens . . . sic Amor est nomen personae . . .’ Cf. ad 3m, ad 4m. Ibid. a. 2 c., ad fin.: ‘Pater et Filius dicuntur diligentes Spiritu sancto vel Amore procedente . . .’ Cf. ad 3m. Ibid. q. 38, a. 1 c.: ‘. . . particeps divini Verbi et procedentis Amoris.’ Ibid. a. 2 c.: ‘. . . cum Spiritus sanctus procedit ut Amor . . .’ Ibid. ad 1m: ‘Spiritus sanctus, quia procedit a Patre ut Amor . . .’ Neque illud est omnino omittendum quod non sufficit processio operati ut habeatur analogia ad processiones divinas. Phantasma a virtute imaginativa procedit per modum operati (Quodl., v, a. 9, ad 2m) sed imago Dei invenitur non in processione phantasmatis sed in sola rationali creatura secundum mentem (Sum. theol., i, q. 93, a. 6). Cuius rei ratio est quod analogia ad divinas processiones haberi potest solummodo in processione operati quae est emanatio intelligibilis; et eiusmodi est processio amoris a verbo; eiusmodi autem non est processio miri et ignoti illius termini quem Ioannes tuetur. Textus pleniores circa amatum in amante sunt: C. Gent., iv, 18; Sum. theol., i-ii, q. 28, a. 2 .

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Note that it is wrong to leave out the word ‘except’ in this passage, although this is done in several editions; see Ir´en´ee Chevalier, ‘Notule de critique textuelle thomiste: De veritate, Q. iv, Art. ii, Ad 7,’ Divus Thomas (Piacenza) 41 (1938) 63–68; J.-A. Robilliard, review of Penido, ‘Gloses sur la procession . . .’ Bulletin thomiste 5 (1937–39) 135–39. Finally, John’s opinion is not at all helpful for elucidating St Thomas’s teaching on the procession of the Holy Spirit. For according to that opinion, the Holy Spirit would not be proceeding Love itself but rather a term proceeding from love. But St Thomas clearly teaches that the Holy Spirit is proceeding Love. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 37, a. 1, sed contra: ‘The Holy Spirit himself is Love.’ Summa theologiae, 1, q. 37, a. 1 c., ad fin.: ‘Insofar as we use these words (amor, dilectio) to express the relationship to its own principle of that reality which proceeds after the manner of love, and vice versa, so that by “love” [amor], proceeding love is understood . . ., and so Love is the name of a person.’ See ibid. ad 3m and ad 4m. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 37, a. 2 c., ad fin.: ‘The Father and the Son are said to be loving through the Holy Spirit or through proceeding Love.’ See ad 3m. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 38, a. 1 c.: ‘. . . partaker of the divine Word and of proceeding Love.’ Summa theologiae, 1, q. 38, a. 2 c.: ‘. . . since the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love . . .’ Summa theologiae, 1, q. 38, a. 2, ad 1m: ‘The Holy Spirit because he proceeds as Love from the Father . . .’ Here we must not fail to point out that a processio operati does not of itself suffice for there to be an analogy to the divine processions. A phantasm proceeds from the imagination by way of a processio operati (Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9, ad 2m), but the image of God is to be found not in the procession of the phantasm but only in a rational creature with respect to its intellect (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 93, a. 6). The reason for this is that an analogy to the divine processions can be had only in that processio operati that is an intellectual emanation. The procession of love from an inner word is such a procession, but not the procession of that strange and unknown term which John of St Thomas defends. For a fuller exposition on the beloved being in the lover, see Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 19, and Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 28, a. 2.

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Ex Imagine ad Exemplar Aeternum 1

Tertio hoc articulo ex mente nostra ad emanationes Deo intraneas ita proceditur ut primo de ipsa intellectus analogia (21–23), deinde de analogia verbi (25), tertio de analogia amoris (26), quarto de ipsa analogia eiusque defectu (27) tractetur. Cum tamen, uti ait quidam poeta, qui pauca didicerit in erroris periculo versetur, ad comparationem intellectus divini et humani (21–23) appendicem de naturali intellectus creati desiderio addidimus (24) ne quis S. Thomam vel falso interpretetur vel eum hac in re sibi contradixisse credat.

21 Analogia intellectus Antequam mysteriosas verbi et amoris analogias aggrediamur, analogia ipsius intellectus clare distincteque concipienda videtur. Est ergo haec analogia comparatio quaedam quae inter ens et diversos gradus intellectus instituitur. Concludit vere tria: intellectun divinum se haberi ad totum ens ut actus; intellectum angelicum se haberi ad totum ens ut forma quaedam; intellectum denique humanum se haberi ad totum ens ut potentia. Haec conclusio explicite proponitur, Sum. theol., i, q. 79, a. 2; sufficienter indicatur, C. Gent., ii, 98, § 9; at implicite in se continet totam de intellectu theoriam,

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From the Image to the Eternal Exemplar 1

In this third article we go from a consideration of our own mental processes to the emanations within God. We shall deal first with the analogy of intellect itself (§§ 21–23), next with the analogy of word (§25), third with the analogy of love (§ 26), and fourth with the trinitarian analogy and its limitations (§ 27). However, as the poet says, ‘A little learning is a dangerous thing,’ and so to our treatment of the comparison between the divine and the human intellect (§§ 21–23) we have appended a section (§ 24) on the natural desire of the created intellect, lest anyone should misinterpret St Thomas or think that he contradicted himself in his treatment of this topic. 21 The Analogy of Intellect Before going on to consider the mysterious analogies of word and of love, it seems necessary to have a clear and distinct concept of the analogy of intellect itself. This analogy, then, is a comparison that is drawn between being and different grades of intellect. St Thomas arrives at a threefold conclusion: the divine intellect is to the totality of being as act; the angelic intellect is to the totality of being as form; the human intellect is to the totality of being as potency. This conclusion is explicitly set forth in Summa theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 2, and is sufficiently indicated in Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 98, ¶ 9, § 1835; but it implicitly contains within itself the whole theory of intellect, and so it will be useful in this 1 [See above, pp. 527–28. This third article consists of a brief introductory section followed by seven sections numbered from 21 to 27, these numbers being continuous with those of the first two articles.]

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ideoque utiliter leguntur C. Gent., i, 44–71; ii, 46–101; iii, 25–63; Sum. theol., i, qq. 14, 15, 54–58, 79, 84–89; i-ii, q. 3; iii, qq. 9–12; De Ver., qq. 1–4; 8–12; 14–20, etc., etc. Ad eius intelligentiam duo maxime sunt consideranda, nempe, intellectus et ens. Quantum ad intellectum, notandum est analogiam incipere ab intellectu humano secundum actum intellectus principalem. Non ergo sufficit metaphorica illa conceptio quae intellectum humanum tamquam oculum quendam spiritualem considerat. Neque sufficit ad actus derivatos attendere, nempe, conceptus seu verba interiora: sic enim nihil attingitur nisi analogia intellectus platonica quae ex universalibus in mente nostra ad universalia aeterna et subsistentia processerit. Neque sufficit ad genesin actus intelligendi animadvertere: eiusmodi enim genesis magis ratio nominatur quam intellectus.2 Sed quantum fieri potest, ad terminum omnis ratiocinii convertendum est cum inquisitio atque discursus iam cessaverint et multa per unum intellectus contempletur. Rationis enim est ex sensibilibus ad quidditates cognoscendas inquirere; ex quidditatibus seorsum intellectis ad principia formanda laborare; ex principiis ad conclusiones discurrere; ex causis ad effectus arguere. Cf. Sum. theol., i, q. 14, a. 7. Sed cum desiverit ratio, intellectus incipit qui effectus in ipsis causis, conclusiones in ipsis principiis, et quidditates in ipsis sensibilibus unico quodam intuitu perspicere contendit. Et quo perfectior est intellectus, eo plura per pauciores magisque syntheticos actus comprehendit. Cf. ibid. q. 55, a. 3. Quantum vero ad ens attinet, invocanda est illa sapientia quae de notionibus primis iudicat (Sum. theol., i-ii, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4m). Non enim agitur de ente quod est nomen commune, ad mentem Henrici Gandavensis. Neque agitur de ente quod est ratio quaedam univoca, extensione quidem maxima, intensione autem minima, quae ad mentem Scoti ‘non nihil’ dicat. Neque agitur de ente quod est ratio quaedam analogica, nota nempe proportio inter quamlibet ignotam essentiam et pariter ignotum esse; quamvis enim haec entis notio sit vera, ad analogiam intellectus perspiciendam non sufficit. Sed agitur de ente quidditative sumpto. Agitur de ente quod proprie intelligitur cum satis huic quaestioni fiat, Quid sit ens? Agitur de ‘propter quid’ entis. Agitur de eo quo intellecto totum ens comprehenditur.

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connection to read Summa contra Gentiles, 1, cc. 44–71; 2, cc. 46–101; 3, cc. 25–63; Summa theologiae, 1, qq. 14–15, 54–58, 79, 84–89; 1-2, q. 3; 3, qq. 9–12; De veritate, qq. 1–4, 8–12, 14–20; and so forth. For an understanding of this, the two most important things to consider are intellect and being. As to the intellect, note that the analogy begins from the human intellect with respect to its principal intellectual act. Consequently, that metaphorical conception which regards the human intellect as a kind of spiritual eye will not do. Nor does it help to consider its derived acts, that is, concepts or inner words; all this leads to is a Platonic analogy of intellect which proceeds from universals in our mind to universals that are eternal and subsistent. Nor will it help to go to the origin of the act of understanding, since that origin is called reason rather than intellect.2 But one should attend as carefully as possible to the term of any process of reasoning, when inquiry and discursive reasoning have ceased and the intellect comprehends many things as a unity. For it is the function of reason (1) to inquire into sensible data in order to come to know quiddities; (2) to work from quiddities that are understood separately in order to formulate general principles; (3) to proceed discursively from principles to conclusions; and (4) to argue from cause to effect. (See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 7.) But when reasoning has finished, the intellect begins its work and attempts to apprehend in a single intuitive grasp effects in their causes, conclusions in their principles, and quiddities in their sensible data. And the more powerful the intellect, the more things it comprehends in fewer and more synthetic acts. (Ibid. q. 55, a. 3.) Now as to being, here we must appeal to that wisdom which makes judgments about primary notions (Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4m). For what is in question here is not being as a common name, as Henry of Ghent supposed. Nor is it being as a kind of univocal idea, having maximum extension but minimum content, meaning ‘not nothing,’ as Scotus conceived it. Nor is it being as an analogous concept, that is, a known proportion between some unknown essence and its equally unknown act of existence (esse). Although this notion of being is true, it does not suffice for understanding the analogy of intellect. The question here is rather about being taken quidditatively. It is about being that is properly understood when the question, What is being? is satisfactorily answered. It is about the why of being; it is about that by which, when understood, all being is 2 [See Lonergan, Verbum 66–68. ‘... reason is to understanding as motion is to rest. Reason is not one potency, and understanding another potency; on the level of potency the two are identical; they differ only as process to a term differs from achievement in the term.’ Ibid. 66.]

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Agitur de obiecto omnis intellectus secundum quod obiectum illud proprie intelligitur. En quinquies diversis nominibus et verbis idem prorsus diximus. C. Gent., ii, 98, § 9: ‘Est autem proprium obiectum intellectus ens intelligibile: quod quidem comprehendit omnes differentias et species entis possibiles; quicquid enim esse potest, intelligi potest. Cum autem omnis cognitio fiat per modum similitudinis, non potest totaliter suum obiectum intellectus cognoscere nisi habeat in se similitudinem totius entis et omnium differentiarum eius. Talis autem similitudo totius entis esse non potest nisi natura infinita, quae non determinatur ad aliquam speciem vel genus entis, sed est universale principium et virtus activa totius entis . . . Relinquitur ergo quod solus Deus per suam essentiam omnia cognoscat.’ Sum. theol., i, q. 79, a. 2 c.: ‘Invenitur enim aliquis intellectus, qui ad ens universale se habet sicut actus totius entis: et talis est intellectus divinus, qui est Dei essentia, in qua originaliter et virtualiter totum ens praeexistit sicut in prima causa . . . Nullus autem intellectus creatus potest se habere ut actus respectu totius entis universalis; quia sic oporteret quod esset ens infinitum. Unde omnis intellectus creatus per hoc ipsum quod est, non est actus omnium intelligibilium, sed comparatur ad ista intelligibilia sicut potentia ad actum.’ 22 Analogiae consectaria quae Deum respiciant Quae intellectus analogia quam sit profunda ex consectariis elucet. Primo, est analogia ad mentem Aristotelis. Plato enim ex conceptibus universalibus ad universalia subsistentia seu Ideas processit; unde Platonici, ne Ideae ab aeterno ignorarentur, in secundo quodam ordine Intelligentias ponebant (vide De subst. separatis, c. iv). Aristoteles vero ex ipso intelligendi actu analogiam sumpsit, ideoque ex intellectu nostro qui a phantasmate movetur ad intellectum separatum qui a nullo moveri possit conclusit. Cumque in nobis intellectus in actu sit intelligibile in actu, in his quae sunt sine materia, inquit, idem est intelligens et intellectum; quare intelligere substantiae separatae dixit esse no¯esin no¯ese¯os quod accuratius, ut opinor, reddebant mediaevales ‘intelligentiam intelligentiae’ quam moderni ‘cogitationem cogitationis.’ Secundo, reicitur principium platonicum, nempe, cognitionem necessario et ex sua natura dualitatem supponere; et acceptatur principium aristotelicum, nempe, cognitionem in identitate radicari. Quod tanti est momenti in nostra materia ut explicitam S. Thomae doctrinam citari oporteat.

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comprehended; it is about the object of every intellect as that object is properly understood. There now, we have expressed the very same thing in five different ways! Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 98, ¶ 9, § 1835: ‘Intelligible being is the proper object of intellect: that which embraces all differences and all possible kinds of being; for whatever can be, can be understood. Since, however, all knowledge is by way of similitude, an intellect cannot know its object in its totality unless it has within itself a similitude of all being and of all its differences. Such a similitude of the totality of being can only be an infinite nature, one which is not delimited to any species or genus of being, but is the universal principle and active power of all being . . . It remains therefore that only God knows all things through his essence.’ Summa theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 2 c.: ‘For there is an intellect which is to universal being as the act of all being; this is the divine intellect, which is God’s essence, in which originally and virtually all being preexists as in its first cause . . . No created intellect can be as act with respect to the totality of being, for if it were it would have to be infinite being. Hence every created intellect, by the very fact that it is, is not the act of all intelligible realities, but is to those intelligibles as potency is to act.’ 22 Implications of the Analogy with Respect to God From its implications we may clearly see how profound is this analogy of intellect. First of all, it is an analogy that accords with the thought of Aristotle. Plato went from universal concepts to subsistent universals, or Ideas; hence, the Platonists placed the Intelligences in a second order, lest the Ideas be eternally unknown (see De substantiis separatis, c. 4). Aristotle, on the other hand, drew the analogy from the act of understanding itself, and accordingly from our intellect that is moved by a phantasm he concluded to the existence of a separate intellect that cannot be moved by anything. And since in us the intellect in act is the intelligible in act, ‘in non-material beings,’ he said, ‘understanding and the understood are identical.’ Therefore, he declared the act of understanding of a separate substance to be no¯esis no¯ese¯os, a phrase which, in my opinion, was more accurately translated by medieval philosophers as ‘understanding understanding’ than as ‘thinking about thinking,’ as some moderns have rendered it. Second, we reject the Platonic principle that knowledge necessarily and by its very nature supposes duality, and accept the Aristotelian principle that knowledge is rooted in identity. This principle is of such paramount importance in our present study that we must now quote St Thomas’s explicit teaching on this point.

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Sum. theol., i, q. 14, a. 2 c.: ‘. . . sensibile in actu est sensus in actu, et intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu . . . Et secundum hoc tantum sensus vel intellectus aliud est a sensibili vel intelligibili, quia utrumque est in potentia. Cum igitur Deus nihil potentialitatis habeat, sed sit actus purus, oportet quod in eo intellectus et intellectum sint idem omnibus modis.’ Vide definitionem ‘obiecti,’ supra . . . [app. ii, § 1]. Unde simpliciter identificantur a S. Thoma essentia Dei, esse Dei, intellectus divinus, species qua Deus intelligit, et intelligere divinum (ibid. et a. 4). Imo rationem veritatis in Deo non invenit in conformitate inter intellectum divinum et esse divinum (conformitas enim dualitatem supponit) sed in absentia cuiuslibet dissimilitudinis (ibid. q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m). Denique, ex hac identitate intelligentis et intelligibilis sequitur quod, cum Verbum Dei sit esse Dei intelligibile, Verbum Dei est Deus (ibid. q. 27, a. 2; q. 34, a. 2, ad 4m; C. Gent., iv, 11, § 11).

Quod theorema etiam radicitus adversariorum sententias evellit (1) J.-P. Sartre, qui ita distinguit en-soi et pour-soi ut Deum-simplicem-et-sui-conscium esse contradictorium affirmet; (2) G¨unther, qui necessarias supponit distinctiones inter subiectum, obiectum, et cognoscendi actum (L. Orb´an, Theologia G¨untheriana et Concilium Vaticanum, Analecta Greg., Romae 1942, pp. 98ss.); (3) Rosmini, qui ex Deo Patre cognoscente alium subsistentem ut cognitum deducit (F. Bruno, Div. Thom. Plac. lv [1952] 183s.); (4) Scotus, cui si concedis obiectum saltem ratione prius esse quam actum cognoscentis, distinctionem suam formalem a parte rei demonstrat (In I Sent., d. 2, q. 7; d. 8, q. 4; Rep. Par., In I Sent., d. 45, q. 2; vide B. Jansen, Zeit. f. kath. Theol. 53 [1929] 317–44, 517–44; etiam infra, numero 25.

Tertio, analogia thomistica analogiam aristotelicam longe superat. Nam (1) vix intelligitur aristotelica ‘intelligentia intelligentiae’ (C. Gent., iii, 26, ¶ 10); (2) neque ex ea erui potest divina aliorum scientia atque providentia; (3) neque fundat distinctionem inter intellectum divinum et intellectum angelicum. Quae gravissima inconvenientia a S. Thoma tolluntur cum diversos intellectus ad ens quidditative seu comprehensive comparet. Ita enim divini intellectus obiectum primarium est ‘universale principium et virtus activa totius entis’ seu ‘ipsum esse’; obiectum vere secundarium est omne ad quod se extendit virtus divina; angelici vero intellectus obiectum primarium est ipsius angeli essentia.

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Summa theologiae, 1, q.14, a. 2 c.: ‘. . . the sensible in act is the sense in act, and the intelligible in act is the intellect in act . . . And it is only because of the fact that both are in potency that a sense or intellect is really different from a sensible or an intelligible object. Since, therefore, God has no potency but is pure act, it necessarily follows that in God intellect and what is understood are one and the same in every way.’ See the definition of ‘object’ in appendix 2, § 1, above. Hence for St Thomas God’s essence and existence and intellect and the species by which God understands and the divine act of understanding are absolutely one and the same (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 4). Indeed, he does not find the formality of truth in God to lie in a conformity between the divine intellect and the divine existence, for conformity supposes duality, but rather in the absence of any dissimilarity whatsoever (ibid. q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m). Finally, it follows from this identity between the understander and the intelligible that since the Word of God is the intelligible act of existence of God, the Word of God is God (ibid. q. 27, a. 2; q. 34, a. 2, ad 4m; Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11, ¶ 11, § 3471). This theorem destroys the very roots of the opinions of its adversaries: (1) J.-P. Sartre, who uses a distinction between en-soi and pour-soi to declare ‘God-simpleand-conscious-of-himself’ to be a contradiction; (2) G¨unther, who supposes the distinctions between subject, object, and the act of knowing to be necessary (see L´aszl´o Orb´an, Theologia G¨untheriana et Concilium Vaticanum. Analecta Gregoriana, vol. 28 [Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1942] 98–110.); (3) Rosmini, who deduces from a knowing God the Father a second subsistent as known (see Francesco Bruno, ‘Le dimostrazioni trinitarie di Antonio Rosmini,’ Divus Thomas [Piacenza] 55 [1952] 183–85); (4) Scotus, who if you concede to him that an object is at least conceptually prior to the act of the knower, proves his formal distinction a parte rei (In I Sent., d. 2, q. 7; d. 8, q. 4; Rep. Par., In I Sent., d. 45, q. 2; see B. Jansen, ‘Beitr¨age zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung der Distinctio formalis,’ Zeitschrift f¨ur katholische Theologie 53 (1929) 317- 44, 517–44; see also § 25, below). Third, Thomas’s analogy goes far beyond that of Aristotle. (1) Aristotle’s ‘understanding understanding’ is itself scarcely understandable (Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 26, ¶ 10, § 2080); (2) one cannot derive from it the knowledge God has of other things and God’s providence over them; (3) it does not furnish a basis for distinguishing between the divine intellect and an angelic intellect. These very serious obstacles are removed by St Thomas by his comparison between different intellects and being quidditatively, or comprehensively, understood. Thus, the primary object of the divine intellect is ‘the universal principle and active power of all being,’ that is, ‘Being itself’ (ipsum esse); its secondary object is everything to which the divine power extends. The angelic intellect, however, has as its primary object the essence of the angel itself.

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Quarto, accurate est concipienda haec divina aliorum cognitio. Plotinus enim cum in uno simpliciter unum et multa reconciliare non valeret, primo Unum posuit deinde vero Intelligentiam seu Mentem (Noun). Apud Clementem Alex. erronea detegitur distinctio inter Patrem et Filium quasi Pater esset Unum ut Unum, Filius vero Unum ut Omnia (vide textum apud R. Arnou, De “Platonismo” Patrum, text. et Doc., ser. theol. 21, Romae 1935, p. 19, ubi alia indicantur loca; cf. pp. 8, 40). Rosmini denique ex multiplicitate rerum aliquam in Deo multiplicitatem, nempe SS. Trinitatem, demonstrare conatus est (F. Bruno, Div. Thom. Plac. 55 [1952] 181 s.).

Clare ergo docuit S. Thomas multas esse in Deo ideas (Sum. theol., i, q. 15, a. 2) quae in cognitione speculativa rationes nominantur, in practica vere exemplaria (ibid. a. 3). Haec multitudo virtualiter (i.e., ut in causa) continetur in divina potentia, eminenter in divina essentia quae multipliciter ad extra est imitabilis, formaliter vero in divino intellectu. Sum. theol., i, q. 14, a. 5 c.: ‘. . . ipsum esse causae agentis primae, scilicet Dei, est eius intelligere. Unde quicumque effectus praeexistunt in Deo sicut in causa prima, necesse est quod sint in ipso eius intelligere, et quod omnia in eo sunt secundum modum intelligibilem: nam omne quod est in altero, est in eo secundum modum eius in quo est.’ At multas ideas Deus non videt in se ipsis, cum ideae non subsistant, sed in se ipso (ibid.). Neque sunt species quibus Deus intelligit, nam haec species est unica et ipsa Dei essentia (ibid. q. 15, a. 2). Neque sunt multa verba a Deo dicta, cum in Deo unicum sit Verbum (ibid. q. 34, a. 3, ad 4m). Neque sunt entia rationis nisi in nostro modo concipiendi, nam Deus vere scit multas ideas quae, si in ipso Deo entia rationis essent, etiam verba essent. Sed sunt obiecta secundaria ipsius divini actus intelligendi. Sunt enim ‘sicut quod intelligitur,’ ‘plures ideae sunt in mente divina ut intellectae ab ipso’ (ibid. q. 15, a. 2 c.), ‘plures ideas esse in intellectu eius ut intellectas’ (ibid. ad 2m) per modum obiecti secundarii quod non specificat actum (ibid. q. 14, a. 5, ad 3m).

Prima ergo multiplicitatis origo est divina intelligentia. Eiusmodi enim actus est intelligere ut in uno intellecto multa alia intelligantur. Cumque ipsum esse sit universale principium totius entis, fieri non potest ut Deus vere se ipsum intelligat quin per eundem intelligendi actum (sine ulla realitatis multiplicatione) formaliter

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Fourth, this knowledge that God has of other things must be very carefully understood. When Plotinus was unable to reconcile the one and the many in one simple reality, he first posited the One and then Intelligence, or Mind (Nous). Clement of Alexandria erroneously distinguishes between Father and Son as if the Father were the One as the One and the Son were the One as the All. (For the text, see R. Arnou, De ‘Platonismo’ Patrum: Textus et collegit et notis illustravit. Series theologica 21 [Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1935] 19, where other passages are referred to; see also pp. 8, 40–41). Rosmini tried to demonstrate some multiplicity in God, namely, the Trinity, on the basis of multiplicity in things (see Francesco Bruno, ‘Le dimostrazioni trinitarie di Antonio Rosmini.’ Divus Thomas [Piacenza] 55 [1952] 181–83). Now Thomas clearly taught that there are many ideas in God (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 15, a. 2), which in [God’s] speculative knowledge are called ‘ideas’ (rationes) and in [God’s] practical knowledge are called ‘exemplars’ (ibid. a. 3). This multitude is contained virtually (i.e., as in its cause) in the divine power, eminently in the divine essence as being in a multitude of ways outwardly imitable, and formally in the divine intellect. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 5 c.: ‘. . . the very act of existence of the first efficient cause, which is God, is his act of understanding. Thus, whatever effects preexist in God as in their first cause must be in his act of understanding, and all that are in it must be there in an intelligible manner; for whatever is in something else is in it in the manner of that in which it is.’ But God does not behold the many ideas in themselves, since ideas do not subsist, but sees them in himself (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 5 c.). Nor are they species by which God understands, for the species by which God understands is unique and is God’s essence itself (ibid. q. 15, a. 2). Nor are they many words uttered by God, since in God there is but one unique Word (ibid. q. 34, a. 3, ad 4m). Nor are they conceptual beings (entia rationis) except according to our way of thinking, for God truly knows many ideas which, if they were in God as conceptual beings, would also be [inner] words. But they are secondary objects of the divine act of understanding itself, for they are ‘as that which is understood’; ‘there are many ideas in the divine mind as things understood by him’ (ibid. q. 15, a. 2 c.); ‘many ideas are in his intellect as understood’ (ibid. ad 2m) as its secondary object, which does not specify its act (ibid. q. 14, a. 5, ad 3m). Therefore, the first source of multiplicity is the divine intelligence. For it is of the nature of its act to understand in such a way that many other things are understood in one understood content. And since the very act of existence is the universal principle of all being, it is quite impossible for God to know himself without formally knowing many things through the same act of understanding,

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multa intelligat (ibid. q. 14, a. 5; cf. a. 6; q. 15, a. 2). Dices essentiam vel potentiam esse originem multiplicitatis primam. At multitudo in essentia non formaliter sed eminenter invenitur; in potentia non formaliter sed virtualiter est; sed in actu intelligendi se ipsum Deus clare et distincte et proprie multa, imo infinita, intelligit. Dices dari non posse claram et distinctam multorum intelligentiam nisi multa verba formentur. Respondetur quod omne verbum ex notitia intelligentis procedit ideoque, ut multa verba formentur, praerequiritur multorum intelligentia. Quae quidem intelligentia in nobis non occurrit nisi per multos intelligendi actus et multas verborum formationes. Deus autem, sicut omnia unico intelligendi actu comprehendit, ita omnia unico verbo dicit (Sum. theol., i, q. 34, a. 3). Praeterea, nullum est argumentum legitimum ad demonstrandum verbum divinum ex eo quod nos pro debilitate nostri intellectus et multis intelligendi actibus et multis verbis indigemus. Vide supra . . . [app. ii, § 7] de necessitate verbi in nobis, et infra numero 25. Quinto, illud perspice quod Deus est naturae intellectualis. Nam nulla divina perfectio est Deo ignota, et omnis cognitio in identitate radicatur. Quatenus ergo Deus se ipsum cognoscit, idem est intelligens et intelligere et quod intelligitur ita ut omnis divina perfectio cum divino intelligendi actu identificetur. Cum tamen cognitio in identitate tantummodo radicetur, obiecto primario secundarium obiectum accedit unde Deus omnia alia eminenter in sua essentia et virtualiter in sua potentia contineri unico eodemque intelligendi actu clare, distincte, et proprie cognoscit. Ubi notandum est quod idem in Deo est sive ‘intelligi ut obiectum secundarium’ sive ‘intelligi in essentia’ sive ‘intelligi in potentia’ sive ‘eminenter in essentia contineri’ sive ‘virtualiter in potentia contineri’: quod enim in Deo est unum, a nobis multipliciter concipitur secundum diversos eiusdem realitatis conceptus analogicos.3

23 Analogiae consectaria quae hominem respiciant Ad aliam analogiae partem nunc transeundum est. Sicut enim intellectus divinus se habet ad ens tamquam actus totius entis, ita intellectus creatus se habet ad totum ens tamquam potentia. Potentia vero multipliciter dicitur.

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without any multiplication of reality. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 5; see also a. 6 and q. 15, a. 2. You may interject here that God’s essence or his power is the ultimate origin of multiplicity. But the multitude is in his essence eminently, not formally, and in his power virtually, not formally; whereas in the act of understanding himself, God clearly and distinctly and properly understands many, indeed an infinity, of things. You may further object that there cannot be a clear and distinct understanding of many things unless many inner words are formed. Our answer to this is that every inner word proceeds from the knowledge of the one who understands and therefore an understanding of many things is a prerequisite for the formation of many words. Now in us, to be sure, such an understanding occurs only through many acts of understanding and the formation of many words; but in God’s case, as he comprehends all things in a single act of understanding, so does he utter all things in a single word (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 34, a. 3). Besides, there is no legitimate argument to prove the existence of the divine word from the fact that we, with our weak intellects, need many acts of understanding and many words. See appendix 2, § 7, above, on the necessity of the word in us, and § 25, below. Fifth, let it be clearly understood that God is of an intellectual nature. No divine perfection is unknown to God, and all knowledge is rooted in identity. In God’s self-knowledge, therefore, the one who understands and the act of understanding and what is understood are one and the same, so that all divine perfection is identical with his act of understanding. Since, however, knowledge is rooted only in identity, to the primary object is added a secondary object whereby God in the one and the same unique act of understanding clearly, distinctly, and properly knows all other things to be contained eminently in his essence and virtually in his power. Note here that in God ‘to be understood as a secondary object’ and ‘to be understood in his essence’ and ‘to be understood in his power’ and ‘to be contained eminently in his essence’ and ‘to be contained virtually in his power’ are all the same. That which in God is one, in us is conceived in many different ways according to various analogous concepts of the same reality. 3 23 Implications of the Analogy with Respect to Man Let us go now to another part of the analogy. As the divine intellect is to being as the act of all being, so the created intellect is to all being as potency. But there are several different kinds of potency. 3 [See Lonergan, Insight 672–74.]

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Alia enim est potentia eius qui iam habet formam vel habitum ita ut, quandocumque voluerit, statim operari possit. Et haec potentia, quae dicitur secunda vel accidentalis, invenitur tum in hominibus qui quasdam scientias iam didicerint tum in angelis quatenus per species connaturales sive alios angelos sive res materiales cognoscere possint. Alia vero est potentia eius qui neque formam neque habitum possidet sed tamen ab agente creato ad informationem reduci potest. Et haec potentia, quae dicitur prima seu essentialis, invenitur in hominibus quatenus scientiam quandam nondum didicerint sed addiscere possint. Tertia denique est potentia eius qui neque formam neque habitum possidet neque ab ullo agente creato ad informationem moveri potest. Et haec est potentia obedientialis quae per solam divinam virtutem in actum reducitur (Sum. theol., iii, q. 11, a. 1 c.), et in omnibus intellectibus creatis invenitur quantum ad totum ens cognoscendum (ibid. q. 9, a. 2, ad 3m). Nam totum ens per intellectum non cognoscitur nisi Deus per suam essentiam cognoscitur; Deus autem per suam essentiam non cognoscitur nisi ipse Deus intellectui creato tamquam species intelligibilis coniungitur (Sum. theol., i, q. 12, aa. 4 et 5); quod quidem donum ipsius Dei excedit proportionem cuiuslibet substantiae finitae et ideo absolute supernaturale est. Proinde sicut inter diversas potentias distinguitur, ita de exigentiis est ratiocinandum. Alia enim est exigentia determinata et, cum omnis determinatio ex forma sit, sola potentia secunda seu accidentialis determinatam exigentiam exserere potest; ita quodcumque formam humanam non habet, exigentiam determinatam ad opera humana exercenda habere non potest. Alia ergo est exigentia indeterminata quae in potentia prima vel essentiali invenitur; ita materia prima aliquam informationem exigit at exigere non potest ipsa indisposita materia ut per animam humanam informetur. Denique tandem ubi potentia est obedientialis, nulla prorsus exigentia sive determinata sive indeterminata existere vel excogitari potest. Non enim Deus est propter ordinem universi, sed ordo universi est propter Deum; neque ordo universi est propter creaturas intellectuales, sed creaturae intellectuales sunt propter ordinem universi (Sum. theol., i, q. 103, a. 2 c. et ad 3m; C. Gent., iii, 112, §§ 8–10) quem liberrimo consilio Deus elegit (Sum. theol., i, q. 19, a. 3; q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m). Secundo, veram tamen atque realem habitudinem intellectus creati ad totum ens agnovit S. Thomas. Intellectus enim vere et realiter refertur non solum ad id quod naturaliter cognoscit vel naturaliter cognoscere potest sed etiam ad id quod cognoscere desiderat. Iam vero, cognita existentia causae primae, sponte quaerimus quid sit illa causa; et sicut factum quaestionis manifestat appetitionem intellectus, ita ipsa quaestio obiectum desideratum determinat; qui enim quaerit

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One kind of potency is the potency of that which already possesses a form or a habit so that, whenever it wills, it can immediately go into operation. This potency, which is called second or accidental potency, is found both in human beings who have acquired some knowledge and in angelic beings inasmuch as through species connatural to them they can know other angels and material reality as well. A second kind of potency is that of one who does not possess a form or habit but yet can receive such a form through some created agent. This potency, which is called first or essential potency, is found in persons who have not yet acquired knowledge but are capable of doing so. A third kind of potency is that of one who possesses neither a form nor a habit and cannot be brought to becoming informed through any created agency. This is obediential potency, which only the power of God can actuate (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 11, a. 1 c.), and is found in all created intellects with respect to knowing all being (ibid. q. 9, a. 2, ad 3m). For the totality of being is known by an intellect only if God is known by his essence; but God is known by his essence only if God himself unites with a created intellect as an intelligible species (ibid. 1, q. 12, aa. 4 and 5). This, of course, is a gift of God that exceeds the scope or proportion of any finite substance and so is absolutely supernatural. Further, as we have distinguished between different potencies, so we must carefully examine the matter of exigencies. First there is a determinate exigency, and, since every determination comes from a form, only second or accidental potency can exert a determinate exigency; thus, whatever does not have a human form cannot have a determinate exigency to perform human activities. A second kind of exigency is an indeterminate exigency, which is found in first or essential potency; thus, prime matter calls for any kind of informing, though matter that is not properly disposed cannot require that it be informed by a human soul. Finally, with obediential potency no exigency of any kind, determinate or indeterminate, can exist or even be thought of. For God does not exist for the sake of order in the universe, but the order of the universe exists for God. And the order of the universe does not exist for the sake of intellectual creatures, but intellectual creatures exist for the sake of the order of the universe (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 103, a. 2 c. and ad 3m; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 112, ¶¶ 8–10, §§ 2863–65), an order which God has chosen in an utterly free decision (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 19, a. 3; q. 21, a.1, ad 3m). Second, St Thomas did acknowledge a true and real relationship of the created intellect to the totality of being. For the intellect is really and truly related not only to what it does know or can know naturally but also to what it desires to know. So, having learned about the existence of a first cause, we automatically wonder what that cause is; and as the fact of questioning manifests intellectual desire, so the question itself determines the object of that desire, since one who asks

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‘quid,’ rei essentiam intelligere appetit. Eo usque se extendit ergo appetitio intellectualis ut non quiescat donec Deus per essentiam cognoscatur (Sum. theol., i, q. 12, a. 1; i-ii, q. 3, a. 8; C. Gent., iii, 50; systematicam huius doctrinae indolem vide in C. Gent., iii, 25–63; supernaturalitatem visionis statim addidit Aquinas, Sum. theol., i, q. 12, aa. 4 et 5; i-ii, q. 5, a. 5; C. Gent., iii, 52; confusiones vero evitandas in appendice huic articulo addidimus).

Quibus perspectis, concludes quod sicut intellectus divinus ad totum ens se habet ut actus, ita intellectus creatus se habet ad totum ens ut potentia. Quae quidem potentia non est secunda seu accidentalis, nam non in forma seu habitu fundatur; qui enim quaerit, habitum seu formam intellectualem nondum accepit. Neque est potentia prima seu essentialis quae per agens creatum informationem recipere potest; nam solus Deus proportionatur ad ipsam essentiam divinam intellectui creato coniungendam. Sed est potentia obedientialis quae in perfectibilitate intellectus fundatur et quidem in ea perfectibilitate quae per solam divinam omnipotentiam perfici potest. Tertio, concludes quod soli beati intelligunt quid sit Deus; idem enim est intelligere quid sit res ac rem per essentiam cognoscere (Sum. theol., i, q. 1, a. 7, ad 1m; q. 12, a. 12, ad 1m; a. 13, ad 1m; i-ii, q. 3, a. 8). Ulterius concludes quid intercedat inter ens analogice et ens quidditative. Nam cum in utroque dicatur ‘ens,’ in utroque idem respicitur secundum extensionem seu denotationem seu ex parte obiecti, nempe: omne quod est, sive necessario ut Deus, sive contingenter ut creaturae, tum secundum totam eorum realitatem actualem sive praeteritam, sive praesentem, sive futuram, tum etiam secundum omne quod iacet sive in potentia creaturae sive in potentia ipsius Dei. Sed cum addatur aut ‘analogice’ aut ‘quidditative,’ modus respicitur quo totum ens apprehenditur. Intellectus enim est multa per unum apprehendere. Quod si illud unum est ipsa Dei essentia quae est universale principium totius entis et quodammodo ‘propter quid’ tum esse divini tum omnis entis possibilis, tunc ens quidditative consideratur.4 Sin autem illud unum sit aliquod ens creatum, vel species vel genus entium creatorum, habetur quidem initium atque fundamentum unde aliquid de omni ente cognoscatur sed, cum omnis creatura ab infinita

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the question What? desires to understand the essence of the thing in question. Intellectual desire, therefore, is such that it does not rest until it knows God by his essence (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 1; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 50; for the systematic character of this doctrine, see ibid. cc. 25–63. Aquinas immediately goes on to note the supernaturality of this vision, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, aa. 4 and 5; 1-2, q. 5, a. 5; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 52; we have pointed out the confusions to be avoided in this matter in a section appended to this section: see § 24, below). From the foregoing we conclude that as the divine intellect is to the totality of being as act, so the created intellect is to the totality of being as potency. Now this potency is not second or accidental potency, for it is not founded upon a form or habit, since one who asks a question has not yet received the intellectual form or habit. Nor is it first or essential potency, which can receive its form through a created agent; only God is equal to uniting the divine essence to a created intellect. It is, rather, obediential potency, which is founded upon the perfectibility of the intellect, and, indeed, on a perfectibility which only the omnipotence of God can perfect. Third, we conclude that only the blessed understand what God is; for to understand what a thing is is the same as to know it by its essence (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 1, a. 7, ad 1m; q. 12, a. 12, ad 1m; a. 13, ad 1m; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8). We may further conclude to the difference between being taken analogously and being taken quidditatively. For in both cases we use the word ‘being,’ and in the same respect in both according to its extension, what it denotes on the part of the object, namely: all things that are, whether existing necessarily as God or contingently as creatures, both with respect to their total actual reality past, present, or future, and even with respect to all that lies within the power of a creature or in the power of God himself. But when we add ‘analogously’ or ‘quidditatively’ we do so with respect to the manner in which the totality of being is apprehended. For it belongs to the intellect to apprehend many realities in one. But if that ‘one’ is the very essence of God, which is the universal principle of all being and, in a way, the ‘because of which’ (propter quid) of the existence of God and of every possible being, then we are considering being quidditatively. 4 If, however, that ‘one’ is some created being, or a species or genus of created beings, then we have, it is true, the beginning of and basis for knowing something about all beings; but, since all creatures fall short 4 [Presumably, Lonergan says ‘in a way’ (quodammodo) because this ‘because of which’ (propter quid) is really a connection in our ideas; it is one way in which we conceptualize the fact that God exists of necessity and without any conditions.]

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perfectione divinae essentiae infinite deficiat, neque initium neque fundamentum habetur unde tota realitas totius entis cognosci possit. Qua de causa, ubicumque ipsa divina essentia per se ipsam non apprehenditur, fieri non potest ut totum ens cognoscatur nisi secundum analogiam deficientem; secundum analogiam, quia ex ente creato per proportionem quandam ad totum ens proceditur; secundum analogiam deficientem, quia ens creatum est fundamentum deficiens ad totum ens cognoscendum. Vide v. g. Sum. theol., i, q. 88. Quarto ulterius concludes: (1) Deum se ipsum comprehendere (Sum. theol., i, q. 14, a. 3); (2) beatos Deum per essentiam ita videre ut eum non comprehendant (ibid. q. 12, a. 7); (3) esse veritates ita in Deo absconditas ut ne beati quidem eas cognoscant; (4) esse veritates ita in Deo absconditas ut per analogicam cognitionem numquam innotescere possint; (5) ex facto revelationis veritates quasdam in Deo absconditas a Deo nobis revelari posse et de facto revelatas esse; (6) per revelationem atque fidem certo constare revelata vera esse; (7) per rationem fide illustratam fieri posse analogicam quandam mysteriorum intelligentiam (db 1796); (8) quam intelligentiam, etsi fructuosissimam, non esse nisi per analogias deficientes; (9) quos defectus auferri non posse quamdiu per fidem et non per speciem ambulemus; nam circa mysteria fides docet quemadmodum respondendum sit ad quaestionem, An sit, sed sola visio Dei dat fundamentum ad perspiciendum, Quid sit. Quibus perspectis duplicem fallaciam circa ens notate. Cum enim quarundam rerum essentias cognoscat homo et earum proprietates ex ipsis earum essentiis demonstrare possit, fieri potest ut erronee credat se ens per ipsius esse essentiam cognoscere et ideo totius entis proprietates quasi ex nota entis essentia demonstrare debere. Ita Parmenides de ente ratiocinatus est sicut legitime de circulo vel de homine ratiocinari solemus.5 Ita etiam A. Rosmini aliquem entis intuitum nobis

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of the infinite perfection of the divine essence, we have neither the beginning of nor the basis for being able to understand the total reality of all being. Therefore, whenever the divine essence is not apprehended through itself, it is impossible to know all beings except according to an imperfect analogy – by way of analogy, because by reason of a certain proportion among them, we can go from knowing created things to knowing all being; by way of an imperfect analogy, because created being is an imperfect basis for knowing all being. See, for example, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 88. Fourth, we draw these further conclusions: (1) God knows himself comprehensively (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 3); (2) the blessed see God in his essence but do not know God comprehensively (ibid. q. 12, a. 7); (3) there are truths so deeply hidden in God that not even the blessed know them; (4) there are truths so deeply hidden in God that they can never be known through analogical knowledge; (5) from the fact of revelation there are truths hidden in God which can be revealed to us by God and in fact have been revealed; (6) through revelation and faith it is certain that these revealed matters are true; (7) through reason enlightened by faith an analogical understanding of mysteries is possible (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 131); (8) this understanding, fruitful though it is, is attained only through analogies that are imperfect; (9) these limitations cannot be removed while we are walking by faith and not by vision; for concerning the mysteries, faith teaches us how to answer the question, Is it so? but only the vision of God provides us with the grounds for understanding what God is. With all this well understood, there are two fallacies to advert to concerning being. Having discovered the essences of some things and being able to demonstrate their properties from these essences, it is possible for us to make the mistake of thinking that we know being through the essence of existence itself and so ought to be able to demonstrate the properties of all being as if from the known essence of being. Thus did Parmenides reason about being the way we legitimately reason about a circle or about man.5 So also did A. Rosmini hold that there is within 5 [See Lonergan, Insight 388–89: ‘(Parmenides) did not advert to the fact that being admits no more than a definition of the second order. He treated the notion of being as though it were a concept like “man” or “circle.” He supposed that it was a determinate essence with determinate suppositions and determinate consequences. Because being is, it cannot be not-being, nor becoming, nor ceasing to be. Inversely, neither not-being nor becoming nor ceasing to be is being, and so all three must be nothing. Again, being cannot be differentiated; what differs from being is not being; and what is not being is nothing. Again, since there are no differences within being, there can be no motion or change within being. Finally, emptiness, the void, is nothing; being is not nothing, and so it cannot be emptiness; therefore, it is full. Etc.’]

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inesse docuit et ex tribus formis entis ad SS. Trinitatem demonstrare contendit (db 1916). Iam vero quantum ad intuitum entis attinet, concedi potest quod nobis inest quoddam potentiale, indeterminatum, maxime fundamentale quod totum ens respiciat; nobis enim inest intellectus, qui est potens omnia facere et fieri, et creata quaedam participatio luminis increati; at intellectus noster se habet ad totum ens non per aliquem intuitum sed per solum intuendi desiderium; quod desiderium neque est conceptus neque est cognitio neque quicquam in ratione obiecti ponit, sed totum se habet ex parte subiecti inquantum non cognoscit et tamen cognoscere appetit. Proinde sublato illo intuitu, radicitus etiam tollitur omne argumentum quod de ente ratiocinatur ad ipsius esse proprietates sive formas. Ignota enim essentia, proprietates ex essentia concludi non possunt. Quod si proprietates ex essentia non concluduntur, non aliter cognoscuntur quam per analogias quasdam deficientes sive certas, ut in theologia naturali, sive probabiles et convenientes, ut in theologia dogmatica, sive erroneas, ut in tribus formis a Rosmini inventis; unica enim est Dei essentia seu forma; et haec essentia est forma ipsius esse.

24 Appendix: De naturali desiderio intellectus Cum doctrina S. Thomae ita sibi cohaereat ut intelligi non possit ab eo qui modo syncretistico aliam partem acceptet aliam vero reiciat, per transennam quaerendum videtur utrum S. Thomas sibi contradixerit cum docuerit hominem visionem Dei naturaliter appetere et supernaturaliter consequi. Quam quaestionem non in tota sua latitudine tractamus, cum probabile videatur mentem S. Thomae hac in re evolutam esse, sed ad loca determinata restringimus, nempe, C. Gent., iii, 50 et 52; Sum. theol., i, q. 12, aa. 1 et 4; i-ii, q. 3, a. 8, et q. 5, a. 5; iii, q. 9, a. 2, ad 3m. Quattuor enim his locis in operibus maxime systematicis apparens contradictio continetur. Circa mentem omnium, uti videtur, theologorum mediaevalium vide: V. Doucet, Antonianum 4 (1929) 167–208; E. Elter, Gregorianum 9 (1928) 269–306. Quae sequuntur adnotationes nihil respiciunt nisi rei intelligentiam.

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us a certain intuition of being and tried to demonstrate the Trinity from three forms of being (db 1916, ds 3226). Now with regard to the intuition of being, we may grant that there is in us something potential, indeterminate, and most fundamental that has to do with all being. For there is within us an intellect that is able to make and become all things, and is a created participation of uncreated Light. But our intellect is related to all being not through some intuition but only through the desire for an intuition; and this desire is neither a concept nor a knowledge of being, nor does it contain anything by way of an object, but is totally on the side of the subject inasmuch as it does not know and yet desires to know. Accordingly, the removal of such an intuition also radically eliminates any process of reasoning that would argue from being to the properties or forms of existence itself. For when an essence is unknown, one cannot deduce properties from it. But if one cannot deduce the properties of something from its essence, there is no other way of knowing them except through some imperfect analogies, either ones that are certain, as in natural theology, or ones that are probable or fitting, as in dogmatic theology, or ones that are erroneous, as in the case of Rosmini with his ‘three forms.’ God has but one essence or form, and this essence is the form of existence itself. 24 Excursus: The Natural Desire of the Intellect Since St Thomas’s doctrine is so coherent that it cannot be understood by one who would syncretistically accept one part while rejecting another, it would seem desirable at this point to inquire whether he contradicted himself in teaching that man desires the vision of God naturally yet obtains it supernaturally. We shall not treat this question in its full extent, since it appears likely that the mind of Aquinas on this matter underwent development; we shall restrict ourselves to certain definite passages, namely, Summa contra Gentiles, 3, cc. 50 and 52; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, aa. 1 and 4; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8 and q. 5, a. 5; 3, q. 9, a. 2, ad 3m. For it is in these four passages from his most systematic works that the apparent contradiction is to be found. For the thought of the medieval theologians (all of them, it seems), see Victorinus Doucet, ‘De naturali seu innato supernaturalis beatitudinis desiderio iuxta theologos a saeculo XIII usque ad XX,’ Antonianum 4 (1929) 167–208; E. Elter, ‘De naturali hominis beatitudine ad mentem Scholae antiquioris,’ Gregorianum 9 (1928) 269–306. The following observations have to do only with an understanding of this matter.

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Primo ergo agitur de facto quodam psychologico, nempe, homini inesse admirationem quandam quae (1) cognitionem intellectualem antecedat et in eam conducat, (2) quaestionibus, An sit, Quid sit, non constituatur sed manifestetur, (3) adeo universalis sit ut non quiescat donec Deus per essentiam videatur, et ideo (4) implicite in se contineat illam tendentiam in visionem Dei quam brevi argumento explicavit Aquinas tum in C. Gent., tum in Parte Prima, tum in Prima Secundae, locis supra allatis. Secundo, hoc in facto psychologico discernitur appetitus naturalis. Appetitur enim cognitio intellectualis. Quae appetitio cum neque ex cognitione sensitiva neque ex cognitione intellectuali profluat, naturalis nominatur (Sum. theol., i, q. 80, a. 1 c.). Tertio, naturalis hic appetitus etiam natura quaedam est sensu Aristotelico (supra . . . [app. i, § 4]). Est enim principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est primo et per se. Per hunc enim appetitum, qui ipsi intellectui inest, primo et per se et intelligere desideramus et, cum intellexerimus, quiescimus. Quare alius prorsus est hic appetitus qui in intellectu subiectatur et ad intelligendum ducit, et alius est appetitus naturalis qui in voluntate invenitur et modo indeterminato in beatitudinem tendit (Sum. theol., i-ii, q. 1, a. 7). Ex appetitu intellectus naturali ad determinandum obiectum perfectae beatitudinis arguit Aquinas in Sum. theol., i-ii, q. 3, a. 8. Quarto, principium intellectui intrinsecum quo intelligere desideramus non est habitus quidam acquisitus sed naturaliter nobis inest et sponte manifestatur. Non enim parvuli docentur neque addiscunt perpetuis fere quaestionibus parentes fatigare. Quinto, multo minus est hoc principium intellectui intrinsecum habitus supernaturaliter infusus. Sublato enim hoc principio, omnes tollerentur quaestiones et ne naturalis quidem scientia acquireretur. Tripliciter ergo naturalis est ille appetitus qui non quiescit donec Deus per essentiam videatur. Primo modo, quia non est appetitus sensitivus apprehensionem sensitivam consequens, neque est appetitus voluntarius apprehensionem intellectualem consequens. Secundo modo, quia est principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est motus vel quies et quidem primo et per se. Tertio, quia naturaliter nobis inest et neque per acquisitionem neque per infusionem superadditur naturae. Sexto, principium intrinsecum alicuius actus multipiciter ad ipsum actum se habere potest. Uno modo, ut principium actus productivum. Alio modo, ut principium actus receptivum, sive receptivum proximum, ut forma, sive receptivum remotum, ut nuda potentia.

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First, then, there is the psychological fact that man has an innate tendency to wonder, which (1) precedes intellectual knowledge and leads to it, (2) is not constituted but is manifested by the questions, Is it? and What is it? (3) is so far-ranging that it does not rest until it sees God by his essence, and thus (4) contains implicitly in itself that drive towards the vision of God which Aquinas briefly explains in the Summa contra Gentiles and in the Prima pars and the Prima secundae of the Summa theologiae, in the passages referred to above. Second, in this psychological fact can be discerned a natural desire. For what is desired is intellectual knowledge; and since this desiring results neither from sense knowledge nor from intellectual knowledge, it is said to be natural (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 80, a. 1 c.). Third, this natural desire is also a ‘nature’ in the Aristotelian sense of the word (see above, appendix 1, § 4). For it is a principle of motion and rest in that in which it primarily and per se resides. It is through this desire, which is in the intellect, that we primarily and per se desire to understand and, once we have understood, rest in that understanding. Hence this desire, which is in the intellect as its subject and leads it towards understanding, is totally different from that other natural appetite which is in the will and in an indeterminate way tends towards beatitude (Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 1, a. 7). In Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 3, a. 8, Aquinas argues from this natural desire of the intellect to determine the object of perfect beatitude. Fourth, the principle, intrinsic to the intellect, by which we desire to understand, is not an acquired habit but is innate within us and spontaneously manifests itself. Wearing their parents out with a virtually endless stream of questions is something that children neither are taught nor learn. Fifth, much less is this principle intrinsic to the intellect a supernaturally infused habit. For without it all questioning would cease and we should not acquire even natural knowledge. There are, therefore, three ways in which this desire that is not satisfied with anything short of the vision of God can be called natural. In the first place, it is neither a sense appetite consequent upon sense knowledge nor a volitional appetite consequent upon intellectual knowledge. In the second place, it is the principle of motion and of rest which is primarily and per se in that in which there is the motion or rest. And in the third place, it is in us by our very nature, and is neither something learned nor superadded to our nature by some special infusion. Sixth, an intrinsic principle of any act can be related to that act in several ways: as a productive principle of the act, or as a receptive principle of the act, either proximately receptive as a form, or remotely receptive as mere potency.

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Iam vero haberi non potest principium nobis naturale ad producendum actum supernaturalem quemcumque. Producens enim et quod producitur eiusdem proportionis sunt; naturale autem et supernaturale proportionis sunt simpliciter diversae. Et notate opinionem eorum qui ita de actu vitali sentiant ut sola principia productiva agnoscant (vide supra . . . [app. i, § 8]), eo tendere ut appetitus naturalis ad visionem supernaturalem sit contradictio interna. Praeterea, nihil naturale potest se habere ad supernaturale tamquam forma ad actum secundum. Eadem enim est definitio utriusque, sicut eadem est definitio tum visus tum videre. Sed alia prorsus est definitio entis naturalis et supernaturalis. Praeterea, nihil naturale potest se habere ad supernaturale tamquam nuda potentia quae ab agente creato ad actum reduci potest. Supernaturale enim excedit proportionem cuiuslibet substantiae finitae; sed quod per agens creatum produci potest, non excedit proportionem istius agentis. Relinquitur ergo quod principium intrinsecum et naturale se habet ad visionem Dei sicut nuda quaedam potentia quae a solo Deo in actum reduci potest. Vide Sum. theol., iii, q. 9, a 2, ad 3m; q. 11, a. 1 c. Et hoc eo magis elucet quod forma qua Deus per essentiam videtur est ipsa divina essentia, et dispositio ad Deum in intellectu recipiendum est lumen gloriae. Sum. theol., i, q. 12, aa. 4 et 5. Septimo, principium intrinsecum dupliciter ad aliquem actum referri potest. Uno modo, directe et explicite. Alio modo, indirecte et implicite. Primo modo, appetitus intellectui naturalis refertur ad totum ens. Alio modo, idem appetitus refertur ad Deum videndum, inquantum appetitus non quiescit nisi quid sit Deus videat. Quare ne confundas hunc naturalem appetitum cum actu specifice supernaturali. Actus enim supernaturales intra genus quoddam continentur et per obiecta sua propria specificantur. Universalis vero tendentia sive intellectus in ens sive voluntatis in bonum, non est specifice supernaturalis. Neque demonstratur supernaturalitas ipsius tendentiae eo quod intra ens implicite continentur entia supernaturalia vel intra bonum implicite continentur bona supernaturalia. Sed illud tantum ex tendentia demonstrari potest quod supernaturale non est totaliter impossibile; et ita in Sum. theol., i, q. 12, a. 1, ad possibilitatem visionis conclusit Aquinas. Octavo, alius est appetitus naturalis qui in ipsa rei perfectione fundatur, et alius est appetitus naturalis qui non in perfectione sed tantum in perfectibilitate rei fundatur. Primo modo, naturaliter immortalitatem appetimus (C. Gent., ii, 55, § 13; ii, 79, § 6; Sum. theol., i, q. 75, a. 6 c.). Immortalitas enim non est nova quaedam perfectio

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Now, no principle that is natural to us is capable of producing a supernatural act of any sort. Producer and product are proportionate to each other; but the natural and the supernatural are simply disproportionate. And note that those who recognize a so-called vital act as the sole productive principle (see appendix 1 above, § 8) tend to see an internal contradiction in a natural desire for a supernatural vision. Besides, nothing that is natural can be related to something supernatural as form to second act. For both form and second act have the same definition, as, for example, the definition of sight and seeing. But the definitions of natural and supernatural being are totally different. Again, nothing that is natural can be related to the supernatural as mere potency that can be actuated by a created agent. For what is supernatural exceeds the proportion of any finite substance whatsoever; but nothing produced by a finite agent can exceed the proportion of that agent. We are left, therefore, with the conclusion that an intrinsic natural principle is related to the vision of God as mere potency which only God can actuate. See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 9, a. 2, ad 3m, and q. 11, a. 1 c. And this is all the more clear from the fact that the form by which God is seen in his essence is the divine essence itself, and the disposition for receiving God in the intellect is the light of glory (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, aa. 4 and 5). Seventh, an intrinsic principle can be related to an act in two ways: directly and explicitly, or indirectly and implicitly. The natural desire of the intellect is related to the totality of being in the first way. This same desire is related to the vision of God in the second way, inasmuch as this desire does not rest unless and until it sees what God is. Be careful, therefore, not to confuse this natural desire with a specifically supernatural act. Supernatural acts belong to a certain genus and are specified by their proper objects. But a universal tendency, whether of the intellect towards being or of the will towards good, is not specifically supernatural. Nor can the supernaturality of such a tendency be deduced from the fact that being implicitly includes supernatural beings and good implicitly includes supernatural goods. All that can be deduced from the tendency is that the supernatural is not utterly impossible; and thus does Aquinas conclude to the possibility of the beatific vision in Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 1. Eighth, there is one kind of natural appetite that is founded upon the perfection of its subject, and another that is founded not upon its perfection but only upon its perfectibility. Our natural desire for immortality belongs to the first kind (Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 55, ¶ 13, § 1309 and c. 79, ¶ 6, § 1602; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 75, a. 6 c.). For

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animae spirituali superaddita sed tantum perpetua quaedam continuatio eiusdem perfectionis, quae quidem continuatio ex notione animae concluditur et naturali quadam resultantia ex essentia animae procedit. Alio modo, naturaliter visionem Dei appetimus. Illa enim visio neque logice ex perfectione intellectus creati concludi potest neque naturaliter ex essentia intellectus creati resultat. Quare totum appetitus fundamentum est in perfectibilitate intellectus creati. Perfectio enim intellectus non in ignorantia et quaestionibus consistit sed in scientia et responsis. Perfectibilitas vero in ignorantia consistit et quaestionibus demonstratur. Nono, dupliciter intelligi potest exigentia. Primo modo, exigentia proprie est necessitas quaedam alicuius ad aliud; et ita finis exigit media, causa efficiens necessaria necessitat effectum suum, causa formalis necessitat effectus formales primarios, et relativum correlativum necessario inducit. Alio modo, exigentia improprie dicitur de rebus creatis inquantum necessitas derivatur in eas ex exigentiis divinae sapientiae vel divinae bonitatis. Vide Sum. theol., i, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m; C. Gent., ii, 28–30. Primo modo, appetitus naturalis nullo modo exigit visionem Dei. Non ratione finis, nam appetitus non est finis sed medium, et idem medium ad diversos fines adhiberi potest. Aliis verbis, si finis est visio, necessario id quod est ad finem est intellectus, sed si id quod est ad finem est intellectus, non necessario sed tantum possibiliter finis est visio. Neque ratione causae efficientis, quia appetitus naturalis non efficit, et multo minus necessario efficit, visionem. Neque ratione causae formalis, quia appetitus non est causa formalis. Neque ratione relativi, nam correlativum non est actus videndi sed appetibilitas quaedam implicita et indirecta visionis. Neque alio modo appetitus visionem exigit. Quamvis enim Deus si agit necessario agat secundum infinitam suam sapientiam et infinitam suam bonitatem, minime sequitur eum actu destinare creaturam intellectualem ad visionem tamquam finem. Nam Deus infinita bonitate facere potest quidquid infinita sapientia concipere potest: bonitas enim voluntatis in eo consistit quod intellectum sapientem sequitur; et infinita bonitas voluntatis in eo consistit quod intellectum infinite sapientem perfecte sequitur. Praeterea, Deus infinita sapientia facere potest quidquid absolute facere potest. Non enim Deus est potentior quam sapientior ita ut latius pateat sua potentia quam sua sapientia sed, cum sua potentia et sua sapientia sint eadem realiter ac divina essentia, ‘divina sapientia totum posse potentiae comprehendit’ ita ut ‘nihil

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immortality is not some new perfection added to a spiritual soul but only the perpetual continuation of the same perfection, a continuation which is deduced from the notion of the soul and results naturally from the essence of the soul. Our natural desire for the vision of God belongs to the second kind. For that vision can neither be deduced logically from the perfection of a created intellect nor result naturally from the essence of a created intellect. Hence this desire is based entirely upon the perfectibility of the created intellect. The perfection of the intellect does not consist in being ignorant or asking questions, but in knowledge and answers; but its perfectibility does consist in its ignorance and is manifested in its questioning. Ninth, exigency can be understood in two ways. In the first sense, exigency is properly speaking a certain need that a thing has for something else. Thus, an end has an exigency for means, a necessary efficient cause necessitates its effect, a formal cause necessitates its primary formal effects, and a relative necessarily calls for a correlative. Understood in the second sense, an exigency is improperly speaking predicated of creatures inasmuch as a need results in them from the exigencies of divine wisdom or divine goodness. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m, and Summa contra Gentiles, 2, cc. 28–30. In the first sense, a natural desire has no exigency whatsoever for the vision of God. It has no exigency by reason of an end, for an appetite is not an end but a means, and the same means can be used for different ends. In other words, if the end is [an intellectual] vision, intellect is necessarily a means to that end; but if intellect is a means, the end is possibly, but not necessarily, such a vision. Nor does it have an exigency by reason of efficient causality, for a natural desire does not cause the vision, much less necessarily cause it; nor by reason of a formal causality, for a desire is not a formal cause; nor by reason of its being a relative term, for its correlative is not the act of seeing but the implicit and indirect desirability of the vision itself. Nor does the desire have an exigency for this vision in the second meaning of exigency. For although, when God acts, he necessarily acts in accordance with his infinite wisdom and goodness, it by no means follows that he actually destines an intellectual creature to that vision as to its end. God in his infinite goodness can do whatever his infinite wisdom can conceive: for the goodness of the will consists in following a wise intellect; and the infinite goodness of his will consists in perfectly following his infinitely wise intellect. Besides, God can do with infinite wisdom whatever absolutely speaking he is able to do. For God is not more powerful than he is wise, as if his power were more extensive than his wisdom; but, since his power and his wisdom are the same reality with his divine essence, ‘the divine wisdom embraces the whole range of

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sit in Dei potentia quod non sit in ordine divinae sapientiae’ (Sum. theol., i, q. 25, a. 5 c.). Praeterea, Deus absolute facere potest quidquid contradictionem internam non contineat (ibid. a. 3 c.). Sed creatura intellectualis sine gratia non dicit contradictionem internam: secus gratia non gratuito sed necessario omni creaturae intellectuali daretur. Absolute ergo Deus potest creaturam intellectualem condere quin eam actu ad visionem Dei tamquam finem destinet. Sed, uti dictum est, quidquid Deus absolute facere potest, etiam cum infinita sapientia et cum infinita bonitate facere potest. Ergo nulla est exigentia ex divina sapientia vel ex divina bonitate ut creatura intellectualis actu ad visionem Dei tamquam finem destinetur. Vide litt. Encycl. ‘Humani generis.’ Quibus perspectis, obiectiones resolvuntur. Obicitur primo quod contradictorium statuit qui de appetitu naturali supernaturalis visionis loquitur. Respondetur. Si appetitus naturalis vel constituit visionem vel est principium ex quo naturaliter fluit visio vel visionem exigit, concedo. Secus, nego. Instatur. Actus per obiecta specificantur. Obiectum appetitus naturalis est prorsus supernaturale, nempe, Deus per essentiam videndus. Ergo appetitus naturalis est actus supernaturalis, quod contradictionem implicat. Respondetur. Obiectum appetitus naturalis directum et explicitum non est Deus per essentiam videndus sed ens; quia sub ratione entis cadit etiam Deus per essentiam videndus, consequitur quod appetitus naturalis non quiescit donec Deus per essentiam videatur; at haec consequentia manifestat obiectum non explicitum sed tantummodo implicitum; et quia consequentia est non positiva sed negativa (nempe, non quiescit donec), manifestat obiectum non solum implicitum sed etiam quodammodo indirectum. Praeterea, ad hoc obiectum, ens, appetitus naturalis non se habet ut actus. Solum enim intelligere divinum potest se habere ad ens ut actus, sicut solum velle divinum potest se habere ad bonum ut actus (Sum. theol., i, q. 79, a. 2; q. 54, a. 2). Omnis autem intellectus creatus se habet ad ens ut potentia et quidem ut potentia, non proxima ut forma, sed remota et nuda et obedientialis. Instatur. Eiusmodi potentia non potest esse obedientialis. Nam eiusmodi potentia dicit aliquem ordinem seu relationem ad actum; potentia obedientialis autem se habet ad actum tantummodo per negativam habitudinem non-contradictionis. Respondetur. Haec negativa conceptio potentiae obedientalis convenienter in quibusdam systematibus ponitur, concedo; in omnibus, nego.

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his power,’ and so ‘there is nothing within the power of God that is not within the order of divine wisdom’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 25, a. 5 c.). Moreover, God can absolutely speaking do whatever does not involve an internal contradiction (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 25, a. 3 c.). But an intellectual creature without grace is not self-contradictory; otherwise grace would not be a free gift but would be given of necessity to every intellectual creature. Absolutely speaking, therefore, God can create an intellectual creature without actually destining it to the beatific vision as its end. But, as we have said, whatever absolutely speaking God can do, he can also do with his infinite wisdom and infinite goodness. There is therefore no exigency on the part of divine wisdom or divine goodness for an intellectual creature to be actually destined to the vision of God as its end. See the encyclical of Pius xii, Humani Generis (db 2318, ds 3891). Let us now proceed to answering the following objections. A first objector says that to speak of a natural desire for a supernatural vision is to make a self-contradictory statement. To this we reply that if a natural desire either constitutes such a vision or is the principle from which the vision naturally results or which requires the vision, then we grant the objection; but if not, we deny it. But the objector rejoins: Acts are specified by their objects. But the object of this natural desire is absolutely supernatural, namely, the vision of God through his essence. This natural desire, therefore, is a supernatural act, which implies a contradiction. To this we reply that the direct and explicit object of this natural desire is not to behold God in his essence; it is being. Since God as something to be seen in his essence falls within the formality of being, the consequence is that this natural desire does not rest until it beholds God in his essence. Yet this consequence reveals not an explicit but only an implicit object; and because this consequence is not an affirmation but a negation (namely, ‘it does not rest until . . .’), it indicates an object that is not only implicit but also, in a way, indirect. Besides, to this object, being, this natural appetite is not related as act. Only the divine act of understanding can be related to being as act, just as only God’s will can be related to good as act (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 2; q. 54, a. 2). Every created intellect is to being as potency, and indeed not proximate potency as form, but as mere potency, remote and obediential. The objector further rejoins: But this sort of potency cannot be obediential. For this potency implies an ordination or relation to act, while obediential potency is related to act only by the negative relation of noncontradiction. To this we reply that this negative conception of obediential potency fits in with some systems, but not with all.

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Essentialistae enim arbitrantur nihil in rebus inveniri nisi essentias sive ea quae per definitiones cognosci possunt. Et cum inter definitiones simpliciter diversas nulla intercedat habitudo praeter non-contradictionem, necessario concludunt naturam se habere ad dona gratiae tantummodo per habitudinem negativam non-contradictionis. Sed sicut supra expositum est (. . . [app. i, §§ 2, 3]) eadem definitio in rebus verificari potest sive ut actus perfecti, ut intelligere, sive ut forma seu actus primus, ut habitus scientiae, sive ut potentia essentialis seu remota, ut intellectus possibilis, sive ut actus imperfecti, ut in foetibus. Praeterea, potentia essentialis et remota potest se habere ad formam dupliciter: uno modo ut per agens naturale in formam recipiendam moveri potest; alio modo ut per solam omnipotentiam divinam in formam recipiendam moveri potest. Quod si sola omnipotentia divina potentiam ad formam movere potest, potentia a S. Thoma nominatur obedientialis; vide Sum. theol., iii, q. 11, a. 1 c. Convenientia vero doctrinae S. Thomae est duplex. Primo, non solum ore sed etiam mente affirmandum est quod gratia naturam perfecit. Sum. theol., iii, q. 9, a. 2, ad 3m. Secundo, sapientis est ordinare, et sapientiae infinitae est omnia ordinare. Unde docere potest S. Thomas quod Deus potest facere cum infinita sapientia quidquid absolute facere potest. Qui vero sententiam oppositam tenent de potentia obedientiali, etiam necessario tenent divinam sapientiam non posse positive inter se ordinare naturam et gratiam. Obicitur secundo quod ex appetitu naturali exoritur exigentia visionis Dei. Nam nisi datur beatitudo, non solvitur debitum naturae. Nisi appetitus quiescit, non datur beatitudo. Nisi datur visio Dei, appetitus non quiescit. Respondetur. Nisi datur beatitudo imperfecta, non solvitur debitum naturae, transeat. Nisi datur beatitudo perfecta, non solvitur debitum naturae, nego. Nam ‘soli Deo beatitudo perfecta est naturalis.’ Sum. theol., i, q. 62, a. 4. Distinctio inter beatitudinem perfectam et imperfectam exponitur, ibid. i-ii, q. 5, a. 5; q. 3, a. 6.

Nisi appetitus quiescit, non datur beatitudo perfecta, concedo: non datur beatitudo imperfecta, nego. Vide ibid. q. 3, a. 8. Circa uniformem theologorum sententiam de hac re a medio aevo usque ad medium saeculum xvii, vide E. Elter, Gregorianum 9 (1928) 269–306.

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Essentialists think that there is nothing in things but essences, that is, what can be known through definitions; and since there is no relation between definitions that are simply different except that of noncontradiction, they necessarily conclude that nature is related to the gifts of grace only by the negative relation of noncontradiction. As we explained above (appendix 1, § 2 and § 3), the same definition can be verified in reality either as an act of what is complete (actus perfecti), such as the act of understanding, or as a form or first act, such as the habit of knowledge, or as essential or remote potency, such as the possible intellect, or as an act of what is incomplete (actus imperfecti), as in a fetus. Besides, remote essential potency can be related to form in two ways: as capable of being moved to receiving a form by a natural agent, or as capable of being moved to receiving a form by the omnipotent power of God alone. If only God’s omnipotence can move a potency to form, that potency St Thomas calls ‘obediential’; see Summa theologiae, 3, q. 11, a. 1 c. There are two ways in which St Thomas’s doctrine is very apt. First, the saying that ‘grace perfects nature’ is not just a tag, but also an affirmation to be understood (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 9, a. 2, ad 3m). Second, it is characteristic of wisdom to set things in order, and it belongs to infinite wisdom to order all reality. Thus, St Thomas is able to say that whatever God can do absolutely speaking, he can do with infinite wisdom. Those who think otherwise regarding obediential potency are forced to hold that divine wisdom cannot establish a positive order between nature and grace. A second objector states: This natural desire results in an exigency for the vision of God. Without beatitude, something owed to nature is denied it; unless the desire is satisfied, there is no beatitude; and without the vision of God, the desire remains unsatisfied. To this objection we make the following reply. Whether without imperfect beatitude nature is denied something owed to it is a question we may leave aside here; but we deny that nature is denied what is its due if it is not granted perfect beatitude; for ‘perfect beatitude is natural to God alone’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 62, a. 4). For the distinction between perfect and imperfect beatitude, see ibid. 1-2, q. 5, a. 5; q. 3, a. 6. We grant that if this desire is unsatisfied there is no perfect beatitude; but we deny that if this desire is unsatisfied there would be no imperfect beatitude. See Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 3, a. 8. On the constant opinion of theologians on this point from the Middle Ages down to the middle of the seventeenth century, see E. Elter, ‘De naturali hominis beatitudine ad mentem Scholae antiquioris,’ Gregorianum 9 (1928) 269–306.

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Instatur. Ergo naturaliter beati essent tristes. Respondetur. Naturaliter beati non haberent omnia quae volunt, nego. Non haberent omnia quae divina omnipotentia iis conferre posset, concedo. Aliud est implicite et indirecte appetere visionem Dei inquantum intellectus tendit in ens. Aliud prorsus est velle visionem Dei, nam hic esset actus specifice supernaturalis ab obiecto absolute supernaturali specificatus; qui actus non existeret in ordine rerum possibili in quo nullus occurrit actus specifice supernaturalis. Tertio obicitur: saepissime loqui videtur Aquinas quasi ordo rerum actualis esset solus possibilis. Respondetur. Ita loquitur, nego. Ita loqui videtur, distinguo: si quis Aquinatem interpretatur quasi principia methodologica scotistica acceptasset, concedo; si quis Aquinatem interpretatur secundum principia methodologica propria, nego. Ad cuius intelligentiam sciendum est quod Scotus, cum actum intelligendi conceptibus priorem negasset, ipsos conceptus tamquam fundamentum scientiae habuit inquantum aut necessario inter se connecterentur aut mutuo sibi repugnarent; et ideo theologiam eatenus scientificam reputavit quatenus veritates determinaret quae, cum absolute necessariae atque universales essent, pro omni rerum ordine possibili valerent. Qua de causa, qui principiis Scoti imbuitur, theologum semper de ordinibus mere possibilibus loqui credit vel, si per accidens de ordine actuali fit sermo, hanc exceptionem qua exceptionem explicite notandam esse supponit. At S. Thomas, cum actum intelligendi conceptibus priorem perspexisset, diversos scientiae gradus pro diversis intelligendi actibus distinxit. Unde secundum S. Thomam ipse Deus, cum divinam essentiam comprehendat, omnia prorsus possibilia perfecte cognoscit. Christus vero homo per scientiam suam beatam ita divinam essentiam videt ut eam non comprehendat; et ideo Christus homo ommia actualia cognoscit et omnia quae in potentia creaturae sunt, non autem omnia quae sunt in potentia creatoris, quia hoc praesupponeret comprehensionem essentiae divinae (Sum. theol., iii, q. 10, a. 2). Theologus denique, cum quid Deus sit nesciat (ibid. i, q. l, a. 7, ad 2m), ad eam tantummodo scientiam pertingere potest quae scientiae Dei et beatorum subalternetur (ibid. a. 2). Qua de causa, theologia Deum per analogias deficientes cognoscit, res vero actuales ad Deum refert quatenus liberam Dei voluntatem manifestant et divinae sapientiae ordinationem supponunt (C. Gent., ii, 24; ii, 26; iii, 97, §§ 13 et 16), res denique mere possibiles

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The objector rejoins: Therefore naturally speaking the blessed would be unhappy. In reply, we deny that naturally speaking the blessed would not have everything they want. We concede, however, that they would not have everything that the divine omnipotence could bestow upon them. To desire implicitly and indirectly the vision of God inasmuch as the intellect tends to being is one thing; but it is quite another thing to want to see God, for this would be a specifically supernatural act specified by an absolutely supernatural object. Such an act would not exist in a possible order of reality in which no specifically supernatural act occurs. A third objector says that Aquinas seems to speak quite often as if this present order of reality were the only possible one. Our reply is simply that he does not so speak. He may seem to say this when interpreted as if he had adopted the principles of Scotus’s methodology, but not if he is interpreted according to his own methodological principles. The point we are making here is that Scotus, denying the priority of the act of understanding over concepts, takes concepts themselves as the foundation of knowledge as they would be necessarily either connected to one another or opposed to one another. Hence, he considers theology to be scientific only insofar as it determines truths which, being absolutely necessary and universal, would be valid for every possible order of reality. Accordingly, anyone who is steeped in Scotistic principles thinks that theologians always talk about merely possible orders or, if they happen to be speaking about the actual order of things, supposes this to be an exception that should be noted as such. St Thomas, on the other hand, having understood that the act of understanding is prior to concepts, distinguishes different degrees of knowledge according to different acts of understanding. Thus, according to him, God, in comprehending the divine essence, knows perfectly absolutely all things that are possible. But Christ as man, by reason of his beatific vision, beholds the divine essence but does not know it comprehensively; thus, he knows all actual reality and all that lies within the power of creatures, but not all that is within the power of the Creator, for this presupposes a comprehension of the divine essence (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 10, a. 2). Finally, a theologian, since he does not know what God is (ibid. 1, q. 1, a. 7, ad 2m), is capable of attaining only that knowledge which is subalternate to the knowledge possessed by God and the blessed (ibid. q. 1, a. 2). Hence, theology knows God through analogies that are imperfect. It relates actual beings to God inasmuch as they manifest God’s free will and suppose an ordering on the part of his wisdom (Summa contra Gentiles, 2, cc. 24, 26; 3, c. 97, ¶ 13, § 2735 and ¶ 16, § 2738); but it treats of merely possible reality only incidentally in its discussion of

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per transennam tractat ubi de Dei omnipotentia agitur (v. g., Sum. theol., i, q. 25). Quod quamvis principiis scotisticis repugnet, mirum esse non potest cum theologus insanire videretur qui, quae Christum hominem nescire diceret, ipse se scire arbitraretur. Quibus perspectis, concludes tum quantum inter se differant methodus scotistica atque methodus thomistica tum quantum a veritate aberrent qui S. Thomam secundum methodologica scotistarum placita interpretentur. Fieri enim non potuit ut Aquinas semper de actualibus fere tractans semper se de actualibus tractare dictitaret; quod tamen ii volunt quibus, sicut obicienti, videtur saepissime loqui Aquinas quasi ordo rerum actualis esset solus possibilis.

25 Analogia verbi Prima differentia inter verbum in mente nostra et Verbum divinum in eo est quod verbum quidem nostrum, non autem Verbum divinum, prius formabile est quam formatum. Cum enim omne verbum sit ex notitia intelligentis et noster intellectus potentia quaedam sit, sicut prius intelligere possumus quam actu intelligamus, ita prius verbum in nobis formari potest quam actu formatum sit. Intellectus autem divinus est actus totius entis neque umquam potentia fuit aut esse potuit; et pariter Verbum divinum semper actu est neque umquam in potentia fuit aut esse potuit. Qua de causa processio Verbi divini dicitur processio actus ex actu seu processio operati; non enim est actus in potentia quadam receptus vel ex potentia eductus, neque est perfectio quae perfectibile perficit; neque est operatio quae a forma realiter distinguitur et formam consequitur; et ideo dici non potest processio operationis.6 Altera est differentia quod verba nostra sunt multa, Verbum autem divinum est unum et unicum. Sicut enim intellectus noster pedetentim aliam rem post aliam intelligit, et proprietates post essentias, et circa singula de existentia, iudicat, ita etiam multa dicimus verba.

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God’s omnipotence (see, for example, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 25). Contrary though this may be to Scotistic principles, it is surely not unreasonable to consider as mad any theologian who firmly believes that he knows things that he says Christ as man was ignorant of. One may conclude from this just how great the difference is between Scotistic and Thomist methods, and how mistaken are those who would interpret St Thomas according to the methodological notions of the Scotists. It was out of the question that Aquinas, who practically always dealt with actual things, should have been continually declaring that what he was dealing with were actual things. Yet this is what is expected by those who, like our objector, seem to think that Aquinas very often spoke as if this present order of reality were the only one possible. 25 The Analogy of the Word The first difference between the inner word in our mind and the divine Word is this, that our word can be formed before it actually is formed, while the divine Word cannot. For since every word arises from the knowledge of one who understands, and since our intellect is potency, it follows that, just as we are able to understand before we actually do understand, so a word can be formed in us before it actually is formed. The divine intellect, however, is the act of all being and never was nor ever could have been potency; and the divine Word is likewise always in act and never was nor ever could have been in potency. For this reason the procession of the divine Word is said to be the procession of an act from act, processio operati; for it is not an act received in some potency or educed from potency, nor is it a perfection which perfects something perfectible. Neither is it an operation that is really distinct from and consequent upon form, and so cannot be said to be the procession of an operation, processio operationis. 6 The second difference is that our words are many, but the divine Word is one and unique. For just as our intellect step by step comes to understand one thing after another, and properties after essences, and makes particular judgments about the existence of every individual thing, so we utter a multitude of inner words. 6 [On processio operati and processio operationis see above, pp. 145–59. See there also Lonergan’s later qualification that the procession of the divine Word is per modum operati.]

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Sed sicut esse divinum est idem quod essentia divina, eodem actu Deus intelligit et quid ipse sit et an ipse sit. Praeterea, sicut essentia divina eminenter et potentia divina virtualiter omnia alia in se continet, ita eodem actu quo Deus se intelligit tamquam obiectum primarium etiam omnia alia intelligit tamquam obiecta secundaria. Et cum unico actu et se et omnia alia intelligit, unico pariter Verbo et ipse se concipit atque affirmat et omnia pariter alia prout ipse ea in se continet ita se dicendo dicit. Sum. theol., i, q. 34, a. 3.

Tertia est differentia circa esse naturale et esse intelligibile. Omne enim verbum quodammodo est id ipsum quod per verbum dicitur; secus verbum non esset medium in quo sive rei essentia sive eius esse cognosceretur. Et quidem si res analogice intelligitur, verbum ab intelligente conceptum seu dictum partim est rei simile et partim est a re diversum. Si vero res quidditative intelligitur et exacte concipitur, verbum ab intelligente conceptum est omnino simile rei.

Illud vero inter Deum et creaturas intercedit quod in nulla creatura idem est esse et intelligere (Sum. theol., i, q. 54, a. 2), in Deo autem nulla prorsus est distinctio inter esse et intelligere (ibid. q. 14, aa. 2 et 4; q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m). Ex quo sequitur quod aliud in creaturis sit esse naturale et aliud esse intelligibile, in Deo autem idem prorsus sit esse intelligibile quod esse naturale. Qua de causa, cum nos aliquid perfecte intelligamus perfecteque concipiamus, verbum in intellectu nostro dictum est omnino simile rei intellectae ita tamen ut verbum sit esse rei intelligibile non autem esse rei naturale. Sed cum Deus se comprehendat perfecteque concipiat, Verbum Dei non solum est perfecta similitudo divinae essentiae sed etiam est ipsa Dei essentia secundum esse naturale. Verbum ergo Dei Deus est. Sum. theol., i, q. 27, a. 2 c. et ad 2m; q. 34, a. 2, ad 1m; C. Gent., iv, 11, § 11; De pot., q. 8, a. 1 c. ad fin. Quarta differentia est quod verbum nostrum est causatum et proprie productum, Verbum autem divinum non est causatum neque proprie productum. Illud enim causatur vel proprie producitur quod est aliud ab eo quod causat seu producit. Verbum autem nostrum est aliud ab actu intelligendi a quo procedit et ideo causari et proprie produci dicitur. Sed Verbum divinum cum sit Deus a Deo procedens, nullo modo aliud est sed eadem numerice essentia seu substantia divina.

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But as the divine existence is the same as the divine essence, God in one and the same act understands both what he is and that he is. Moreover, as all other things are contained eminently in the divine essence and virtually in the divine power, so in the selfsame act by which God understands himself as primary object he understands all other realities as secondary objects. And since in one unique act he understands both himself and everything else, so also in one unique Word he both conceives and affirms himself, and in thus uttering himself he likewise utters all other things just as they are contained within him. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 34, a. 3. The third difference concerns the natural mode of existence (esse naturale) and the intellective mode of existence (esse intelligibile). Every word is in a way the very thing that is expressed by that word; otherwise a word would not be the medium in which either the essence or the existence of a thing is known. And indeed, if a thing is understood by analogy, the word conceived or uttered by the one who understands is partly similar to that thing and partly different from it. But if a thing is understood by its quiddity and is exactly conceived, the word conceived by the one who understands is in every respect similar to the thing. Now there is this difference between God and creatures, that in no creature are existence and understanding the same (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 54, a. 2), whereas in God there is no distinction whatsoever between existence and understanding (ibid. q. 14, aa. 2 and 4; q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m). Hence, it follows that in creatures there is a difference between the natural mode of existence and the intellective mode of existence, while in God these two modes of existence are absolutely identical. When, therefore, we perfectly understand and perfectly conceive anything, the word we utter in our intellect is entirely similar to the thing understood, but only in such a way that the word is the intellective existence of the thing and not its natural existence. But since God comprehends and perfectly conceives himself, the Word of God is not only a perfect likeness of the divine essence but also is that essence itself according to its natural mode of existence. Therefore the Word is God. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 2 c. and ad 2m; q. 34, a. 2, ad 1m; Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11, ¶ 11, § 3471; De potentia, q. 8, a. 1 c. ad fin. The fourth difference is that our word is caused and produced in the proper sense, while the divine Word is not caused nor properly speaking produced. What is caused or, properly speaking, produced is distinct from that which causes or produces it. Now, our inner word is distinct from the act of understanding from which it proceeds and so can be said to be caused and, in the proper sense, produced. But the divine Word, who is God proceeding from God, is in no way distinct from the divine essence or substance, but is numerically one with it.

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Quae tamen identitas substantialis Dei concipientis et Dei concepti non ita est concipienda quasi nulla esset processio. Vere enim communicatur essentia divina a Patre ad Filium. At haec communicatio non est causatio seu productio proprie dicta sed emanatio quaedam intelligibilis. 7 Sicut enim verbum nostrum non solum ab actu intelligendi producitur sed etiam est intrinsece propter intelligibilitatem in actu intelligendi intellectam, ita etiam Verbum divinum quodammodo est propter perspectam intelligibilitatem divinam. ‘Quodammodo’ dixi, nam in nobis aliud est intelligere et aliud est verbum, sed in divinis principium Verbi non solum est perspecta Dei intelligibilitas sed totus Deus et similiter Verbum principiatum non solum est Deus conceptus sed totus Deus.

Quinta differentia est quod processio verbi in nobis generatio non est sed processio Verbi divini vere et proprie est generatio. Unde idem est Verbum quod Filius Dei. Generatio enim proprie dicta est origo viventis a vivente principio coniuncto in similitudinem naturae (Sum. theol., i, q. 27, a. 2). Et dicitur origo viventis ut excludatur generatio late dicta mineralium. Est origo viventis a vivente principio coniuncto ut excludatur origo viventium a Deo creante. Est origo viventis a vivente principio coniuncto secundum similitudinem; capilli enim et ungues vivunt, originem ex nobis ducentes; sed non sunt nobis similes. Est origo viventis a vivente principio coniuncto in similitudinem naturae seu similitudo habetur vi naturae ipsius originis et processionis, ut excludatur origo Evae ex costa Adam.

Iam vero Verbum vivit; est enim Deus vivens. Verbum est a principio vivente; est enim ex ipso Dei intelligere quod est Dei vivere (Sum. theol., i, q. 18, a. 3). Verbum est a principio vivente coniuncto et secundum similitudinem: est enim consubstantiale.

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Nevertheless this substantial identity between God as conceiver and God as conceived is not to be understood as if there were no procession at all. The divine essence is truly communicated from the Father to the Son. But this communication is not a causation or a production in the proper sense, but an intelligible emanation.7 Just as our word is not only produced by an act of understanding but also intrinsically is because of the intelligibility understood in the act of understanding, so also the divine Word in some way is because of divine intelligibility as understood. I say, ‘in some way,’ because in us the act of understanding and the word are two different things, whereas in God the originating principle of the Word is not just the understood intelligibility of God but God whole and entire, and similarly the Word that is originated is not only God as conceived but is God whole and entire. The fifth difference is the fact that in us the procession of the word is not a generation, whereas the procession of the divine Word is truly and properly speaking a generation. Hence the Word is the Son of God. In its proper sense, generation is the origin of something alive from a conjoined living principle, with a resulting likeness in nature (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 2). It is said to be the origin of a living thing so as to exclude the production of mineral substances, which could be termed generation in a broad sense. It is further said to be the origin of a living thing from a conjoined living principle in order to exclude the origin of living things from God’s creating act. Again, it is said to be the origin of what is living from a conjoined living principle that is similar to it; for our hair and nails are living and originate from us, but they are not similar to us. Finally, it is said to be the origin of what is living from a conjoined living principle with a resulting likeness in nature; that is, the similarity results by reason of the nature of the origin and of the procession, so that the origin of Eve from Adam’s side is excluded. Now, the Word is alive: it is the living God. The Word is from a living principle; for it is from God’s act of understanding, which is God’s life (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 18, a. 3). The Word is from a living principle that is conjoined and similar to it; for it is of one and the same substance with it. 7 [Although generally emanatio intelligibilis is here translated as ‘intellectual emanation’ rather than as ‘intelligible emanation’ (on this issue, see chapter 1, note 35, p. 67, and chapter 2, note 11, pp. 143, 145), here it seems preferable to translate it as ‘intelligible emanation,’ so as to fit better with Lonergan’s wording in the next sentence, in which he says that just as with us an inner word is an active emanation because of the intelligibility understood in an act of understanding, so ‘in some way’ the divine Word is an emanation because of the divine intelligibility as understood.]

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Verbum est simile vi ipsius processionis: nam emanatio intelligibilis Verbi eiusmodi est ex ipsa sua natura ut Verbo exacte concipiatur id quod intelligens intelligit; iterum emanatio Verbi ex ipsa sua ratione est emanatio eius quod formaliter est verum; et de ipsa veri ratione est quod non differat ab eo de quo dicitur.

Patet autem verbum nostrum non proprie generari cum verbum nostrum sit rei simile solum secundum esse intelligibile non autem secundum esse naturale. Sexta est differentia quod necessitas verbi nostri demonstrari potest sed necessitas Verbi divini, quamvis sit scibilis quoad se, a nobis tantum creditur. Uti enim supra dictum est (. . . [app. ii, § 7]) ideo in nobis existit quadruplex verbi necessitas quod aliud est obiectum quod intellectum nostrum movet, nempe, quidditas seu natura in materia corporali existens, et aliud est obiectum in quod intellectus noster tamquam in finem tendit, nempe ens in tota sua latitudine. Deus autem sicut a nullo alio moveri potest ita in aliud tamquam in finem tendere non potest. Qua de causa, in Deo idem est intelligens et intelligere et id quod intelligitur. Obiectum enim primarium divini intellectus est ipsa divina substantia quae cum divino esse et cum divino intelligere identificatur. Obiectum vero secundarium divini intellectus est eadem divina substantia secundum quod alia in se eminenter contineat, vel ipsa divina potentia secundum quod alia in se virtualiter contineat. Ideoque in divinis demonstrari non potest existentia Verbi eo quod Deus se cognoscit. Nam per eundem actum purum verificantur in Deo tum quod est cognoscens tum quod est cognitum. Pariter in divinis demonstrari non potest existentia Verbi eo quod Deus multa aliaque cognoscit. Omne enim intelligere in uno intellecto apprehendit multa. Quae multorum apprehensio multiplicitatem importat neque in ipso intelligendi actu neque in specie qua intelligitur neque in obiecto primario neque per se in aliis rebus praeter ipsum intelligendi actum. Non importatur multiplicitas in ipso intelligendi actu, quia una est multorum intelligentia. Non importatur multiplicitas in specie qua intelligitur, nam haec species se habet ad actum intelligendi sicut actus primus ad actum secundum et ideo, quia actus secundus est unus, etiam actus primus est unus. Non importatur multiplicitas in obiecto primario, nam multa non in multis sed in uno et per unum intelliguntur. Non per se importatur multiplicitas

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The Word is similar by reason of the procession itself; for the intellectual emanation of the Word by its very nature is such that in the Word there is conceived exactly what the one understanding understands. Again, the emanation of the Word by its very formality is the emanation of that which is formally true; and it is of the very formality of truth that it not be different from that which it expresses. It is obvious, however, that our inner word is not generated in the proper sense of the term, since our word is similar to a thing only according to its intellective mode of existence but not according to its natural mode of existence. The sixth difference is that we can prove the necessity of our inner word, but can only accept on faith the necessity of the divine Word, although it is knowable in itself. For as we said above (appendix 2, § 7), in our case there is a fourfold necessity for an inner word because the object that moves our intellect, namely, a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter, is not the same as the object to which our intellect tends as to its end, that is, being in its fullest extent. In the case of God, however, as he cannot be moved by anything else, so also he cannot tend to anything else as to an end. In God, therefore, the one who understands and the act of understanding and that which is understood are all one and the same. The primary object of the divine intellect is the divine substance itself, which is one with the divine act of existence and the divine act of understanding. But the secondary object of the divine intellect is this same divine substance as eminently containing other things within itself, and the divine power as virtually containing other things within itself. So, then, in God the existence of a Word cannot be demonstrated from the fact that God knows himself; for through the same pure act there are verified in God both what is knowing and what is known. Similarly, in God the existence of a Word cannot be demonstrated from the fact that God knows many other things. For every act of understanding apprehends many things as one. This apprehension of many realities together implies multiplicity neither in the act of understanding itself, nor in the species by which understanding occurs, nor in its primary object, nor, per se, in other things besides the act of understanding. No multiplicity is implied in the act of understanding itself, because it is a single intellectual apprehension of many things. No multiplicity is implied in the species by which understanding occurs, for this species is to the act of understanding as first act is to second act and therefore, since the second act is one, so also is the first act. No multiplicity is implied in the primary object, for in it many things are understood not in a multiplicity but in and through a unity. No multiplicity per se is implied in other things besides the

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in aliis rebus praeter ipsum intelligendi actum, nam intelligendi actus per se est prima origo multiplicitatis neque necessario sed liberrimo consilio multiplicitatem producit. Dices: importatur multiplicitas in obiecto primario quatenus multa et alia eminenter in essentia divina et virtualiter in potentia divina contineantur. Respondetur: hoc ipsum quod est ‘eminenter in essentia contineri vel virtualiter in potentia contineri’ nihil aliud dicit quam hoc quod intellectus in una simplicissima essentia vel potentia multa et alia intelligit. Aliis verbis, secundum nostrum concipiendi modum, quae eminenter in essentia vel virtualiter in potentia continentur, non addunt relationes reales sed relationes rationis supra nudam essentiam vel potentiam (Sum. theol., i, q. 15, a. 2, ad 4m). Dices cum Scoto: istae relationes non essent rationis sed reales. Nam cognitio divina est perfecte obiectiva. Si ergo istae relationes sunt in essentia divina ante omnem actum mentis divinae, a Deo quidem videntur sed sunt relationes reales quia actum mentis antecedunt. Si autem non sunt in essentia divina ante omnem actum mentis divinae, plane sunt relationes rationis sed a divina cognitione perfecte obiectiva videri non possunt. In I Sent. (Op. Ox.), d. 35, q. 1, n. 7 (Viv`es x, 544). Respondetur: valet sane obiectio Scoti si conceditur principium platonicum quod in omni cognitione ex ipsa cognitionis natura quaedam invenitur dualitas ita ut obiectum sit quodammodo praevium ad cognitionem. E contra, si ponitur principium aristotelicum, nempe, omnem cognitionem in identitate quadam radicari, tota obiectio evanescit. Si enim idem est intelligens et intelligere et quod intelligitur, applicari non potest criterion quo distinguuntur relationes reales et relationes rationis secundum quod omnem mentis actum antecedunt vel consequuntur. 8

Notate eandem esse solutionem circa argumentum ad probandam distinctionem formalem a parte rei. Dicit Scotus quod obiectiva Dei intuitio aut videt paternitatem cum divinitate prorsus identicam a parte rei aut eam videt aliquomodo distinctam a parte rei. Si hoc concedis, Scotus habet suum intentum. Si hoc

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act of understanding, for the act of understanding per se is the ultimate source of multiplicity and produces multiplicity not of necessity but by a wholly free decision. One may object that multiplicity in the primary object is implied insofar as many other realities are contained eminently in the divine essence and virtually in the divine power. To this we would reply that ‘to be contained eminently in the essence and virtually in the power’ means simply that the intellect understands many other things in one absolutely simple essence or power. In other words, according to our way of conceiving things, what are contained eminently in the divine essence or virtually in the divine power add to the mere essence or power not real relations but conceptual relations (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 15, a. 2, ad 4m). One may further object, with Scotus, that those relations would not be conceptual relations but real relations. For God’s knowledge is perfectly objective. If, then, those relations are in the divine essence prior to every act of the divine mind, they are indeed seen by God but they are real relations because they precede the act of his mind. If, on the other hand, they are not in the divine essence prior to every act of the divine mind, they are obviously conceptual relations but cannot be seen by God’s perfectly objective knowledge. See [Duns Scotus] In I Sent. (Opus Oxoniense), d. 35, q. unica, n. 7 (Viv`es x, 544). Our answer to this objection of Scotus is that certainly it is valid if one grants the Platonic principle that in all knowledge, and indeed by the very nature of knowledge, there is a duality, so that an object is somehow prior to knowledge. If, on the contrary, one affirms Aristotle’s principle that all knowledge is grounded upon an identity, the whole objection vanishes. For if the one who understands and the act of understanding and that which is understood are one and the same, the criterion for distinguishing between real relations and conceptual relations depending on whether they precede or follow every act of the mind cannot be applied.8 Note that this is the same solution to the argument in favor of a formal distinction on the side of the reality. Scotus maintains that God’s objective intuition either sees paternity as totally identical with divinity on the side of the reality or sees it as in some way distinct on the side of the reality. Well, if you grant this, 8 [See Lonergan, Verbum 19, note 28, where Lonergan comments on Scotus’s position: ‘Scotus argues that the divine ideas cannot be accounted for by adding notional relations to the divine essence; for the object precedes the knowing, and relations that precede knowing are not notional but real. The argument does not touch Aquinas’s real position, which is that the object as known is not prior and that the relations pertain only to the object as known.’]

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negas, tunc a parte rei paternitas est omnino identica cum divinitate ita ut Filius non possit videri ut Deus quin eo ipso videatur ut Pater. Solutio habetur per negationem suppositi: non enim aliud est divinum intelligere et alia est divina essentia; et tam Pater quam Filius perfecte hoc mysterium intelligunt quod uterque est cum divina essentia identicus quin alius cum alio identicus sit. Dices: nos non possumus multa intelligere quin multa verba dicamus; cum ergo Deus infinita perfecte intelligat, saltem unum Verbum dicat, necesse est. Respondetur: nos multa per multa verba intelligimus, quia per multos actus quibus singula intelligimus ad multa per unum intelligenda pervenimus. Cum tamen iam multa per unum intelligamus, etiam unicum verbum dicere solemus, v. g., geometriam, historiam, Catholicismum, romanticismum. At sive unum verbum sive multa dicimus, non ideo magis intelligimus; cum enim omne verbum ex notitia intelligentis procedat, per prius unumquodque est intelligendum quam concipiendum vel dicendum, neque plus in verbo continetur quam in ipso intelligendi actu iam intelligitur (quod sane in iis quodammodo elucet qui parum intelligant et tamen sesquipedalia proferant verba). Iam vero Deus unico intellectus intuitu et se et omnia alia perfecte intelligit; sine hac intelligentia et se et omnia alia unico Verbo dicere non potuisset; et posita hac intelligentia, cum iam omnia perfecte intelligantur, nulla nobis apparet ratio cur ullum diceret Verbum.

Dices: demonstrari potest existentia Verbi in Deo. Nam in Deo, prout naturaliter cognoscitur, agnoscenda est omnis perfectio pura. Sed emanatio intelligibilis est optima maximaque perfectio quae in creaturis invenitur. Ergo emanatio intelligibilis est in Deo agnoscenda. Ad maiorem: omnis perfectio pura esse naturaliter in Deo cognoscitur, distinguo, omnis perfectio quae naturaliter cognoscitur ut pura, concedo, omnis perfectio quae ex sola fide cognoscitur esse pura, nego. Ad minorem: emanatio intelligibilis naturaliter cognoscitur ut perfectio pura, nego, ex fide cum aliqua probabilitate concluditur, concedo. Sub datis distinctionibus negantur consequens et consequentia. Tandem denique ut solutio tum harum difficultatum tum aliarum omnium perspiciatur, distinguendum est inter quidditativam Dei cognitionem qua Deus per suam essentiam cognoscitur et analogicam Dei cognitionem qua Deus ex

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Scotus has won his point. If you deny it, then on the side of the reality paternity is totally identical with divinity, so that the Son cannot be seen as God without by the same token being seen as Father. The solution to this is to deny the supposition: God’s act of understanding and his essence are not two different things; and both the Father and the Son perfectly understand the mystery that each is identical with the divine essence without being identical with each other. A further objection might be raised that we are unable to understand a multiplicity of things without uttering a multitude of inner words; and therefore since God perfectly understands an infinity of things, he must utter at least one Word. In reply we would say that we understand many things through many words because we proceed through several acts in which we understand particular things to an understanding of these several things in a unity. And yet when we have understood several things in a unity we also are wont to utter a single word, words like ‘geometry,’ ‘history,’ ‘Catholicism,’ ‘romanticism.’ But whether we utter one word or many, we do not on that account understand more; for since every word proceeds from the knowledge of the one who understands, every single thing must be understood before being conceived or uttered, and nothing more is contained in the word than is understood in the act of understanding itself – something that can be seen in a way in people who do not understand very much but spout a great deal of sesquipedalian verbiage. Now, God in a single intellectual intuition perfectly understands both himself and all other things. Without this understanding he could not utter both himself and all else in a single Word; and given this understanding, since he already has a perfect understanding of all things, it is not apparent to us why he should utter any Word. A further objection might be that the existence of a Word in God can be demonstrated; for every pure perfection must be acknowledged to be in God as we know God by our natural knowledge. But an intellectual emanation is the best and greatest perfection to be found among creatures; therefore an intellectual emanation must be acknowledged to exist in God. Our answer to this objection is that a pure perfection must be acknowledged to be in God if it is known by natural reason to be pure, but not if it is known to be such by faith alone. Now by our human reason we do not know intellectual emanation to be a pure perfection, although from what we know by faith we may conclude with some probability that it is. On the basis of this distinction we deny the objection. Finally, in order to understand the solution to these and all other difficulties, one must keep in mind the distinction between a quidditative knowledge of God by which he is known in his essence and the analogical knowledge of God by which

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suis effectibus per proportionem et remotionem et excessum concipitur et esse demonstratur. Si ergo Deus per suam essentiam scitur, utique processio Verbi in Deo etiam scitur. Sed ex hoc non sequitur nisi quod processio Verbi in divinis sit necessaria quoad se, nam hac in vita quid Deus sit nescimus. Si autem Deus analogice tantum cognoscitur, tunc (1) constat Deum et intelligere et intellectum esse unde tamen non potest demonstrari processio Verbi divini, (2) constat Deum alia et multa intelligere sed neque ex hoc demonstrari potest processio Verbi divini, (3) citra revelationem non constat intelligibilem Verbi emanationem esse perfectionem puram tum (a) quia omnia in Deo modo eminentiori quam in nobis sunt, tum (b) quia non possumus positive reconciliare simplicissimam Dei unitatem (quae demonstratur) cum pluralitate per emanationem orta, tum (c) quia ex emanatione ad notionem personae ut relationis subsistentis solo rationis lumine non proceditur, sed (4) facta divinitus revelatione post longam saeculorum seriem in qua ratio per fidem illustratur pedetentim ad aliquam huius mysterii intelligentiam imperfectam atque mere analogicam pervenitur.

26 Analogia amoris procedentis Cum amare sit bonum alicui velle (Sum. theol., i, q. 20, a. 3), a bono quod est amoris obiectum ordiendum videtur. In primis, ergo, omne bonum est concretum. Verum enim et falsum, cum in mente existant, abstracta et universalia esse possunt quatenus entia non actu sed potentia, non complete sed incomplete cognoscuntur (Metaphys., m, 10, 1087a 15–19). Bonum vero et malum non in mente sed in rebus sunt (In VI Metaphys., lect. 4, § 1240) et ideo omne bonum est concretum. Bonum enim et ens et verum ontologicum convertuntur. Deinde, sicut ens nisi analogice non cognoscimus, ita bonum analogice tantum hac in vita cognoscere possumus. Qua de causa, sicut ex entibus finitis per proportionem quandam ad ipsum esse quodammodo concipiendum procedimus, ita de bonis particularibus ad bonum universale procedere oportet. ‘Bonum autem universale est quod est per se et per suam essentiam bonum, quod est ipsa essentia bonitatis; bonum autem particulare est quod est participative bonum’ (Sum. theol., i, q. 103, a. 2 c.). Sicut ergo divina essentia est principium universale totius entis, ita divina bonitas est principium universale totius boni. Ex quo sequitur omnia Deum appetere eo ipso quod quicquam quocumque modo appetunt (ibid. q. 44, a. 4, ad 3m); quatenus enim appetunt, propter bonum appetunt; et si propter

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from his effects, by way of proportion, negation, and excess, God is conceived and his existence proven. If God is known in his essence, then certainly the divine procession of the Word is also known. But all that we can conclude from this is that the procession of the Word in God is necessary with respect to itself, quoad se, for in this life we do not know what God is. But if God is known only by way of analogy, then (1) it is certain that God both understands and is understood, and yet from this the procession of the divine Word cannot be proven; (2) it is certain that God knows many other things, but neither from this can the procession of the Word be proven; (3) without revelation it is not certain that the intellectual emanation of the Word is a pure perfection, (a) because all realities are present in God in a more eminent way than in us, (b) because we cannot positively reconcile the utter simplicity of God (which is demonstrable) with the plurality introduced by an emanation, and (c) because one cannot argue from an emanation to the notion of person as a subsistent relation by the light of reason alone; but (4) given divine revelation, human reason, enlightened by faith, has gradually over the course of many centuries arrived at some understanding of this mystery, albeit imperfect and merely analogical. 26 The Analogy of Proceeding Love Since to love is to will good to someone or something (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 20, a. 3), it seems we ought to start from good as the object of love. First, then, every good is concrete. The true and the false, since they are in the mind, can be abstract and universal inasmuch as things are known not in act but in potency, and not completely but incompletely ([Aristotle] Metaphysics, xiii, 10, 1087a 15–19). But good and evil, on the other hand, are not in the mind but in things (In VI Metaphys., lect. 4, § 1240), and hence every good is concrete. For good and being and ontological truth are convertible. Second, as being is known only analogically, so also can we in this life know good only analogically. And so just as we go from finite beings by way of a certain proportion to arrive at some sort of conception of being itself, in the same way we must proceed from particular goods to the universal good. ‘The universal good is that which is good in itself and by its essence, because it is the very essence of goodness itself; but a particular good is good by participation’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 103, a. 2 c.). Hence, as the divine essence is the universal principle of all being, so the divine goodness is the universal principle of all good. It follows, therefore, that all things desire God by the very fact that they desire any thing in any way (ibid. q. 44, a. 4, ad 3m). For insofar as they desire something, they desire

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bonum participative appetunt, multo magis propter bonum universale appetunt, nam propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis.

Tertio, praeter ipsa bona particularia quae ordinatione indigent, existit bonum ordinis quo ordinantur. Ita homines bona oeconomica appetunt et ad ea possidenda toto corpore totaque mente laborant; sed multo magis bonum ipsius ordinis oeconomici, sine quo desinit cuncta activitas industrialis atque commercialis, desiderant atque anhelant. Unde et Aquinas, propter ordinis excellentiam affirmavit quod ‘perfectius participat divinam bonitatem, et repraesentat eam, totum universum quam alia quaecumque creatura’ (ibid. q. 47, a. 1 c.) et ‘finis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso existens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi’ (ibid. q. 103, a. 2, ad 3m) et creaturae intellectuales, quamvis propter se gubernentur, nihilominus ulterius ordinantur in perfectionem universi quod ad Deum ut finem ultimum ordinatur (C. Gent., iii, 112, § 10), et ipsa denique Incarnatio Verbi ad ordinem universi restaurandum ordinatur (Sum. theol., iii, q. 1, a. 3).

Quarto, sapientis est ordinare. Sicut ergo Deus in sua essentia ipsam ideam totius ordinis actualis perspicit ita ut omnium rerum secundum omnes suas determinationes atque habitudines proprie cognoscat (ibid. i, q. 15, a. 2 c.), pariter dicendum est Deum ideas omnium ordinum possibilium cum omnibus suis determinationibus in sua essentia perspicere; ‘nam divina sapientia totum posse potentiae comprehendit’ (ibid. q. 25, a. 5 c.). Ex quo colligere possumus adeo bonam esse bonitatem divinam ut totius boni tum actualis tum quod esse posset principium atque fundamentum sit. Quinto, sicut ex bono ad ordinem et ex ordine ad sapientiam, ita ex sapientia ad voluntatem procedendum est. Quae enim esse naturale habent etiam secundum hoc esse ad operandum naturaliter inclinantur. Quae autem esse intentionale habent sive in sensu sive in intellectu, non per se sed per appetitum annexum sive sensitivum sive rationalem ad agendum inclinantur (ibid. q. 80, a. 1). Qua de causa, ipsa voluntatis ratio in eo consistit quod inclinatio quaedam est intellectum sequens ita ut non solum obiectum velit quod per intellectum praesentatur sed etiam propter motivum seu finem velit propter quem intellectus obiectum volendum iudicat. Quae voluntatis ab intellectu dependentia intrinseca sequentibus illustratur: ‘Secundum hoc enim effectus procedunt a causa agente, secundum quod praeexistunt

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it on account of some good; and if they desire something on account of some good-by-participation, all the more do they desire it on account of the universal good, since that which gives to a thing a certain perfection, itself possesses that perfection all the more. Third, in addition to particular goods which need to be put into some order, there exists the good of order itself whereby they are ordered. Thus, men seek economic goods and devote all their physical and mental resources to securing them; but much more do they desire and eagerly strive for the good of the economic order itself, without which all industrial and commercial activity grinds to a halt. Hence Aquinas’s remarks about the excellence of order, (1) that ‘the universe [Greek: cosmos, ‘order’] as a whole is a more perfect participation and manifestation of the divine goodness than is any individual creature whatsoever’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 47, a. 1 c.), (2) that ‘the end of the universe is a good existing within it, namely, the order of the universe itself’ (ibid. q. 103, a. 2, ad 3m), (3) that intellectual creatures, although governed [by divine providence] for their own sake, are nevertheless further ordered for the sake of the perfection of the universe which itself is ordered to God as its ultimate end (Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 112, ¶ 10, § 2865), and (4) that the Incarnation of the Word is ordered to the restoration of the order of the universe (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 1, a. 3). Fourth, to set things in order is the work of wisdom. And so just as God grasps in his own essence the idea of the entire actually existing order in such a way as to have a proper knowledge of all things according to all their determinations and relations (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 15, a. 2 c.), so likewise must God be said to grasp in his own essence the ideas of all possible orders with all their determinations; ‘for divine wisdom comprehends absolutely all that God’s power can do’ (ibid. q. 25, a. 5 c.). From this we may conclude that the divine goodness is so good as to be the principle and foundation of all good both actual and possible. Fifth, as we proceed from good to order and from order to wisdom, so we must proceed from wisdom to will. Beings that have a natural mode of existence also have a natural inclination to operate in accordance with their mode of existence. But those that have an intentional mode of existence, either in sense or in an intellect, are inclined to action not by themselves but by a conjoined appetite, sentient or rational as the case may be (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 80, a. 1). Therefore, the essential notion of will consists in this, that it is an inclination that follows the intellect, so that it not only wills the object presented to it by the intellect but also wills it on account of the motive or end for which the intellect judges that the object ought to be willed. The following will illustrate this intrinsic dependence of the will upon the intellect: ‘Effects proceed from a causal agent inasmuch as they preexist in it; for every

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in ea: quia omne agens agit sibi simile. Praeexistunt autem effectus in causa secundum modum causae. Unde cum esse divinum sit ipsum eius intelligere, praeexistunt in eo effectus eius secundum modum intelligibilem. Unde et per modum intelligibilem procedunt ab eo. Et sic, per consequens, per modum voluntatis: nam inclinatio eius ad agendum quod intellectu conceptum est, pertinet ad voluntatem’ (ibid. q. 19, a. 4 c.). Quare cavendum est ne voluntas concipiatur quasi appetitus naturalis esset qui obiectum suum nescit vel quasi appetitus animalis esset qui obiectum quidem cognoscit et cognitum appetit sed de motivis seu finibus non curat. Eiusmodi enim est voluntas ut non solum bonum intelligibiliter ordinatum appetat sed etiam propter principium ipsius ordinis seu finem seu, uti dicitur, valorem appetat. Praeterea, sicut voluntas ab obiecto propter motivum movetur, ita verbum conceptum voluntatem movet non solum alliciendo per praesentationem obiecti boni sed etiam appetitum rationalem rationaliter obligando per determinationem motivi seu finis. Quae emanatio intelligibilis dicitur spiratio, activa quidem ex parte intellectus, passiva vero ex parte voluntatis. Sexto, omnium actuum qui in voluntate fiunt maxime fundamentalis est amor. Amor enim est simplex in bono complacentia; caeteri vero voluntatis actus in amore fundantur et eatenus ab amore differunt quatenus aliquid obiecto amoris adiunctum vel oppositum respiciunt. Ita desiderium est de bono absente, spes de bono futuro, gaudium de bono praesente, odium de malo quod bono opponitur, tristitia de malo praesente, et similiter de aliis. Sum. theol., i, q. 20, a. l c. Septimo, amor est quoddam unitatis principium tum ratione obiecti tum ratione ipsius actus. Ratione quidem obiecti amor est unitivus quatenus, cum omne bonum sit bonum alicui, amor in duo tendit, scilicet, in bonum quod vult et in eum cui illud bonum vult (ibid. q. 20, a. 3). Iterum, cum ipse bonorum ordo bonum quoddam maximum sit, amor bonus iis bona singula vult quibus illa bona competant secundum sapientem rerum ordinationem. Unde et ordo observatur in divino creaturarum amore (ibid. et a. 4) et ipsa caritas creata ordine regulatur (ibid. ii-ii, q. 26). Ratione autem actus amor est unitivus quatenus ipse amor in amante quodammodo est amatum in amante. Quod quidem partim simile et partim diversum est relate ad illud quod cognitum est in cognoscente. Et simile quidem est secundum conditiones adaequationis veritatis. Verum enim est hoc quod ‘hic homo cognoscitur’ si in aliquo existit actus cognoscendi hunc hominem. Similiter verum est quod ‘hic homo amatur’ si in aliquo existit actus

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agent produces some likeness to itself. Effects preexist in their cause, however, according to the manner of the cause. Hence, since the divine act of existence is its act of understanding, its effects preexist in it in an intellective manner, and accordingly they proceed from it in an intellective manner. Consequently they also proceed in a volitional manner; for its inclination to do what the intellect has conceived pertains to its will’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 19, a. 4 c.). Be careful, therefore, not to think of the will as if it were a natural appetite ignorant of its object, or as if it were an animal appetite that knows its object and desires it as known but without any concern about motives or ends. For the will is such that it not only desires good ordered in an intelligible way but also desires it because of the principle of that order, that is, the end – in other words, it desires value. Besides, as the will is moved by its object because of a motive, so an inner word or concept moves the will not only as attracting it by presenting it with an object that is good, but also as obliging this rational appetite in a rational way by determining a motive or end. This intellectual emanation is called spiration, and is active on the part of the intellect but passive on the part of the will. Sixth, of all the acts that the will performs, the most fundamental is love. Love is a certain contented quiescence (complacentia) in what is good; all the other acts of the will are grounded in love and are different from love insofar as they are concerned with something that is connected with or opposed to the object of love. Thus, longing is concerned with a good that is absent, hope with a future good, joy with a present good, hatred with an evil that is opposed to good, sadness with a present evil, and so forth. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 20, a. 1 c. Seventh, love is a principle of unity both by reason of its object and by reason of the act itself. Love is unitive by reason of its object because, since every good is a good for someone, love looks to two things, namely, the good which it wills and the one for whom it wills that good (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 20, a. 3). Also, since the good of order itself is the greatest good, a love that is good wills particular goods for those to whom those goods properly belong in accordance with the wise ordering of things. Thus order is observed in God’s love for his creatures (ibid. and a. 4), and created charity itself is regulated by order (ibid. 2-2, q. 26). Love is unitive by reason of its act inasmuch as the love in the lover is in a way the beloved in the lover. This is partly like and partly different from the way in which what is known is in the knower. It is similar with respect to the conditions for the correspondence of truth. The statement, ‘This man is known,’ is true as long as there exists in someone an act of knowing this person. It is similarly true that ‘This man is loved’ as long as there

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amandi hunc hominem. Et sic ‘cognosci’ vel ‘amari’ alicuius est aliquid non in cognito vel in amato sed in cognoscente vel amante. At diversum est secundum modum quo ‘cognosci’ alicuius in cognoscente est et ‘amari’ alicuius in amante est. Nam ‘homo cognitus’ in cognoscente est secundum quoddam esse intelligibile seu intentionale. Sed ‘homo amatus’ in amante est, non secundum intentionalem quandam repraesentationem, sed secundum realem quandam inclinationem et quasi identificationem. Amicus enim ab amico dicitur ‘dimidium animae suae’; et amans non sibi soli vivit sed etiam et forte magis alteri (ibid. i-ii, q. 28). Quibus perspectis, ex analogia nostri amoris ad amorem divinum considerandum procedimus. Et prima differentia in eo est quod amor noster pedetentim et cum difficultate ad bonum summum elevatur, sed amor divinus ab aeterno in ipsam divinam bonitatem perfecte comprehensam fertur. Altera differentia est quod motiva nostri amoris saepius sunt mixta sed amor divinus tum in ipsam divinam bonitatem tum in alia bona unice propter ipsam divinam bonitatem tendit. Tertia differentia est actus amoris in nobis contingenter et defectibiliter ex dictamine rectae rationis oritur, sed actus amoris divini per emanationem intelligibilem atque absolute necessariam ex divino intellectu verboque procedit. Quarta differentia est quod actus amoris in nobis sunt multi et passionibus partis sensitivae implicati (ibid. i, q. 20, a. 1, ad 1m et 2m), sed actus amoris divini est unicus et simplex et ab omni materia separatus. ‘Deus autem, sicut uno actu omnia in essentia sua intelligit, ita uno actu omnia vult in sua bonitate’ (ibid. q. 19, a. 5 c.). Quinta est differentia quod amor noster secundum quandam inclinationem et quasi identificationem ponit ipsum amatum in amante, sed amor divinus secundum plenam realitatem atque identitatem ponit ipsum Deum amatum in amante. Sicut enim intelligere divinum est ipsum esse divinum, ita pariter velle divinum est ipsum esse divinum. Cum ergo Deus se amat, hic amor non tantum est ‘Deus amatus’ secundum aliquam inclinationem sed est id ipsum quod est Deus (Sum. theol., i, q. 27, a. 3, ad 2m; C. Gent., iv, 19, § 7). Et ideo sicut Verbum Dei est Deus, ita Amor divinus procedens etiam Deus est. Quibus perspectis, corollaria quaedam adduntur. Primo enim videri potest quod haec processio amoris, cum in nullo respectu a processione verbi differat, omnino una eademque sit. Distinctio enim sumi non potest sive ex principio sive ex termino harum processionum, cum in utroque

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exists in someone an act of loving this man. And so ‘being known’ and ‘being loved’ are not in the one known or loved but in the one who knows or loves. But there a difference according to the way in which being known is in the knower and being loved is in the lover. A man being known is in the knower according to an intellective, an intentional, mode of being. But a man being loved is in the lover, not by way of an intentional representation, but by way of a real inclination and a quasi-identification. For a friend is said by his friend to be dimidium animae meae, ‘half of my soul’; and a lover lives not for himself alone but also, and perhaps more so, for the other person (Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 28). We are now in a position to proceed to a consideration of divine love on the basis of an analogy with our human love. The first difference is that our love only gradually and with considerable difficulty reaches up to the supreme good, while from all eternity divine love is directed to divine goodness, which it perfectly comprehends. A second difference is that we very often love with mixed motives, whereas divine love extends both to the divine goodness itself and to all other goods solely on account of that same divine goodness. A third difference is that in us an act of love arises contingently and imperfectly from a dictate of right reason, whereas the act of divine love proceeds from the divine intellect and word by way of an emanation that is intellectual and absolutely necessary. A fourth difference is that in us acts of love are multiple and are bound up with the sentient part of our nature (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 20, a.1, ad 1m and ad 2m); but the act of divine love is unique and simple and separated from all material reality: ‘God, however, as in a single act he understands all things in his essence, so in a single act he wills all things in his goodness’ (ibid. q. 19, a. 5 c.). A fifth difference is that our love places the beloved in the lover by way of a certain inclination and a quasi-identification; but divine love is God himself as loved in himself as lover with the fullness of reality and identity. For just as the divine act of understanding is the divine existence itself, so equally is divine willing the divine existence itself. When, therefore, God loves himself, this love is not only God being loved by way of some inclination, but is that very reality that is God (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 3, ad 2m; Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 19, ¶ 7, § 3563). Therefore, just as the Word of God is God, so is divine proceeding Love also God. To all the foregoing we may add some corollaries. First, it may seem as if the procession of the Word and the procession of Love are absolutely one and the same, since they do not differ in any respect. For they cannot be distinguished on the basis of either their principle or their term, since

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Deus ex Deo procedat, neque ex actu, cum in Deo idem sit intelligere quod velle, neque ex potentia, cum in Deo intellectus non est alius ac voluntas, neque ex eo quod saltem ratione distinguuntur intellectus et voluntas, cum distinctio rationis non fundet realem distinctionem. Quae omnia cum vera sint admitti atque concedi oportet. Remanet tamen duas has processiones realiter inter se distingui secundum realem ordinem alterius ad aliam. Sicut enim ‘attenditur quidam ordo verbi ad principium a quo procedit, licet in divinis sit eadem substantia intellectus et conceptio intellectus; ita, licet in Deo sit idem intellectus et voluntas, tamen, quia de ratione amoris est quod non procedat nisi a conceptione intellectus, habet ordinis distinctionem processio amoris a processione verbi in divinis’ (Sum. theol., i, q. 27, a. 3, ad 3m).

Cave tamen ne dicas aliam processionem aliam praecedere vel alia esse priorem. In divinis enim ‘Nihil prius aut posterius’ (db 39) et tamen datur ordo quidam cum multiplicitas sine ordine sit confusio (Sum. theol., i, q. 42, a. 3). Deinde videri potest quod sicut processio Verbi etiam processio Amoris sit generatio. In utraque enim Deus ex Deo procedit. Sed contra est quod ad rationem generationis pertinet non solum quod simile in natura procedat sed etiam quod vi ipsius processionis procedens simile sit. Iam vero processio verbi ex ipsa sua ratione est eiusmodi ut id quod verbo concipitur sit id ipsum quod intellectu intelligitur. Sed processio amoris ex sua ratione est, non ut obiectum in mente reproducat, sed ut obiecto mens se coniungat atque affective uniat. Unde processio verbi est in similitudinem naturae, sed processio amoris in divinis est processio eius qui in natura est similis. Vide Sum. theol., i, q. 27, a. 4.

Tertio, notandum venit quod amor in divinis dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo essentialiter, secundum quod esse divinum est velle divinum et velle divinum est amor; et sic tam Pater et Filius quam Spiritus sanctus sunt ipse amor divinus; et omnes tres personae divinae pariter amant quodcumque Deus amat. Alio modo dicitur amor notionaliter, secundum quod amor est amor procedens; et sic solus Spiritus sanctus est amor quia solus Spiritus ut amor procedit; et secundum hunc amorem notionaliter, Pater et Filius amant, non quia amor sint, sed quia amoris principium sunt; et sicut nos dicimur amare amore cuius principium sumus, ita

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in both cases God proceeds from God, nor on the basis of their act, since in God understanding and willing are the same reality, nor on the basis of a power, since in God intellect and will are the same, nor on the basis of a conceptual distinction between the divine intellect and will, since a conceptual distinction cannot serve as the foundation for a real distinction. Now, all this is true, and so must be admitted and granted. Yet it remains that these two processions are really distinct according to the real order between them. For, ‘as there is an order between the word and the principle from which it proceeds, even though in God intellect and the conception of his intellect are the same reality, so, even though in God intellect and will are the same, nevertheless, because it is of the nature of love not to proceed except from a conception of the intellect, therefore it follows that in God the procession of Love is distinct from the procession of the Word on the basis of this order between them’ (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 3, ad 3m). One must be careful, however, not to say that one of these processions precedes or is prior to the other. In God, ‘there is nothing that precedes or is subsequent to anything else’ (db 39, ds 75, nd 16); and yet there is an order, since multiplicity without order is just confusion (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 42, a. 3). Second, it may seem as if the procession of Love, like the procession of the Word, is also a generation, since in both cases God proceeds from God. But against this is the fact that it is of the nature of generation that there not only proceeds that which is similar in nature [to its principle], but also that that which proceeds is similar by reason of the procession itself. Now, by its very nature the procession of an inner word is such that what is conceived in the word is the very same thing as what is understood by the intellect. But by its very nature the procession of love is such that it does not reproduce its object in the mind but rather that the mind joins and unites itself affectively with the object loved. Therefore, the procession of the word is for a resulting likeness in nature, whereas the procession of Love in God is the procession of that which is similar in nature. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 4. Third, note here that love in God can be understood in two ways. First, it can be understood essentially, in that divine existence is divine willing and divine willing is love, and in this sense the Father and the Son as well as the Holy Spirit are divine love itself; and all three divine persons equally love whatever God loves. Second, it can be understood notionally, in that love is proceeding love; in this sense only the Holy Spirit is Love because only the Spirit proceeds as Love. In this notional sense of love, the Father and the Son are said to love, not because they are love, but because they are the principle of Love; and just as we are said to love by a love whose principle we are, so the Father and the Son are said to love

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Pater et Filius dicuntur amare Spiritu sancto seu amore procedente; et hoc amore, cum Deus sit, Pater et Filius omnia amant quaecumque amat Deus. Vide Sum. theol., i, q. 37. Quarto, modo generaliori dici potest quod nomina et verba in divinis vel personaliter vel essentialiter dicuntur secundum quod in sua ratione relationem originis includunt. Personae enim divinae per relationes originis inter se oppositas distinguuntur (Sum. theol., i, q. 28, a 3; q. 40, a. 2) et ideo, si nomen vel verbum relationem originis includit, de una vel ad summam de duabus personis divinis dicitur, si autem nullam relationem originis includit, pariter de tribus personis dicitur. Ita ens et esse, intelligentia et intelligere, amor et amare, et omnia similia, essentialiter dicuntur, h.e., pariter de tribus personis propter essentiam divinam tribus communem praedicantur. Sed dicere et dici, generare et generari, Verbum et Imago, spirare et spirari, Amor procedens et Donum, cum relationem originis sive ex parte principii sive ex parte principiati importent, personaliter dicuntur sive de solo Patre, sive de solo Filio, sive de Patre Filioque solis, sive de solo Spiritu sancto secundum relationem quae importatur.

Quinto, sicut generatio Verbi, ita processio Amoris in divinis, quamvis quoad se scibilis sit atque necessaria, tamen a nobis creditur tantum. Et rationes sunt eaedem ac antea de Verbo sunt expositae. Quamvis enim demonstrari potest Deum amare se, demonstrari non potest Deum spirare se. Immo, qui hac in re demonstrationes afferre conentur, quid spiratio significet intellexisse non videntur; non enim spiratio dicit quod ex mutuo amore Patris et Filii procedit ulterius quid, sed dicit quod Pater et Filius sunt principium ex quo procedit mutuus eorum amor (Sum. theol., i, q. 37, a. 1, ad 3m).

27 De ipsa analogia trinitaria De mysteriis in Deo absconditis tria in concilio Vaticano docentur, nempe: (1) quod nisi divinitus revelata sint, innotescere nobis non possunt; (2) quod supposita revelatione et fide, per analogiam eorum quae naturaliter cognoscit, ratio per fidem illustrata aliquam Deo dante mysteriorum intelligentiam eamque fructuosissimam consequi potest; (3) quod numquam hac in vita mysteria a nobis perspici possunt instar veritatum quae proprium rationis obiectum constituunt.

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by the Holy Spirit, proceeding Love. And this Love, since it is God, is that Love by which the Father and the Son love whatever God loves. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 37. Fourth, speaking more generally, one may say that in reference to God nouns and verbs are predicated either personally or essentially depending upon whether they include in their essential idea a relation of origin. The divine persons are distinguished by reason of mutually opposed relations of origin (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 28, a. 3; q. 40, a. 2). Accordingly, if a noun or verb includes in its notion a relation of origin, it is predicated of one or at most two divine persons, while if it does not include such a relation, it is predicated equally of the three persons. Thus being and existing, intelligence and understanding, love and loving, and all similar notions are predicated essentially, that is, are predicated equally of all three persons on account of the divine essence which they share. But to utter and to be uttered, to generate and to be generated, Word and Image, to spirate and to be spirated, proceeding Love and Gift – since all of these imply a relation of origin either on the part of the originating principle or on the part of the originated, they are said to be predicated personally of the Father alone, or of the Son alone, or of both Father and Son together, or of the Holy Spirit alone, depending upon the relation implied. Fifth, just as the generation of the Word, so the procession of Love in God, although knowable in itself and necessary, is something that we can know only by faith. The reasons for this are the same as those given above concerning the Word [§ 25]. We can demonstrate that God loves himself but we cannot demonstrate that God spirates himself. Indeed, any who try to do so would seem not to have understood the meaning of spiration; for spiration does not mean that from the mutual love between the Father and the Son something else proceeds; it means that the Father and the Son are one principle from which their mutual love proceeds (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 37, a. 1, ad 3m). 27 The Trinitarian Analogy Concerning the mysteries hidden in God, the [First] Vatican Council teaches three things: (1) that they cannot be known by us without divine revelation; (2) that, given revelation and faith, human reason, enlightened by faith, can with God’s help acquire some understanding, and indeed a most fruitful understanding, of these mysteries by way of analogy with what it knows naturally; (3) that never in this life can we have an understanding of these mysteries comparable to the understanding we have of those truths which constitute the proper object of our human reason.

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Ad quorum intelligentiam notanda sunt: (1) cum hac in vita quid sit Deus nesciamus, per analogias deficientes eum cognoscimus; (2) aliae sunt analogiae philosophicae quibus Deus citra omnem revelationem concipi atque demonstrari potest; et aliae sunt analogiae theologicae quibus mysteria de Deo revelata aliquatenus intelligere nitimur; (3) quod analogiae philosophicae entis et intellectus et amoris per analogias theologicas verbi et amoris procedentis complentur atque perficiuntur; et (4) quamvis analogiae theologicae pleniorem atque intimiorem Dei cognitionem praestent, tamen magis deficientes magisque obscurae sunt.

Ratio primi assserti est quod, nisi Deus per suam essentiam cognoscitur, per medium quoddam minus perfectum cognoscitur. Cognoscere vero perfectum per medium quoddam minus perfectum est cognoscere per analogiam deficientem. Ratio secundi asserti est quod sicut fides addit super cognitionem naturalem, ita theologia addit super cognitionem philosophicam. Sed fides non est cognitio Dei per essentiam, et ideo theologia in fide fundata non potest addere nisi alias analogias deficientes. Ratio tertii asserti est quod analogia theologica in eadem fere linea est ac analogia philosophica. Si enim ea praetermittimus quae in naturali Dei cognitione sunt negativa (puta, Deum non esse materialem, non esse in tempore, non esse mutabilem, non posse non esse, non posse multiplicari), caetera invenimus attributa ad haec reduci quod gradu infinito et modo ineffabili Deus est ens, unum, verum, bonum per actum illimitatum essendi, intelligendi, et amandi. Quibus accedit analogia theologica, non ut simpliciter nova addat, sed ut de ipso eorum modo ineffabili fari audeat. Nam de divino intelligendi modo asserit ipsum intelligere, sicut et nostrum, verbum dicere; et de divino amandi modo affirmat ipsum amare, sicut et nostrum, ex intelligentia verboque procedere. Quibus adiectis, non solum confirmatur analogia philosophica sed etiam mirabiliter perficitur. Nobis enim nihil magis est intimum quam rationalis illa necessitas qua concipimus et iudicamus nec quicquam nobis magis personale est quam rationalis responsibilitas qua volumus atque eligimus. Cum ergo in Deo intelligibiles eiusmodi emanationes ponantur, quem infinita perfectione remotum demonstravit philosophia, familiari atque intima perfectione propinquum credit intelligentia theologica.

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For a better understanding of this, the following should be noted: (1) although in this life we do not know what God is, we do have a knowledge of him through analogies that are imperfect; (2) some analogies are philosophical, by which, apart from any revelation, we can form some conception of God and demonstrate his existence, while other analogies are theological, by means of which we try to acquire some measure of understanding of the mysteries revealed by God; (3) the philosophical analogies of being and intellect and love are complemented and perfected by the theological analogies of word and proceeding love; and (4) although the theological analogies afford a fuller and more intimate knowledge of God, they are more imperfect and obscure than philosophical analogies. The reason for the first observation above is that if God is not known by his essence, then he is known through some less perfect medium. But to know what is perfect through a less perfect medium is to know by way of an imperfect analogy. The reason for the second observation is that as faith is something superadded to our natural knowledge, so does theology add something to our philosophical knowledge. But faith is not a knowledge of God by his essence, and therefore theology, which is based on faith, can only contribute additional imperfect analogies. The reason for the third observation is that theological analogies proceed along generally the same lines as philosophical analogies. Apart from the negative predications in our natural knowledge of God (for example, that God is not material, not in time, not mutable, cannot not be, cannot be multiple), we find that all the other divine attributes come down to this, that to an infinite degree and in an ineffable manner God is being, one, true, and good by reason of his unrestricted act of being, understanding, and loving. To these a theological analogy is added, not in order to make assertions that are quite novel, but to venture to say something about this ineffable manner itself. For concerning the divine manner of understanding, it asserts that the infinite act of understanding utters a word, as does our understanding, and concerning the divine manner of loving it asserts that the infinite act of loving proceeds, like ours, from understanding and an inner word. The philosophical analogy is not only confirmed by such additions but is also marvelously perfected by them. There is no more profound characteristic within us than the irresistible drive of our reason to form concepts and judgments, and there is nothing more personal to us than the rational responsibility to will and choose. When, therefore, such intellectual emanations are ascribed to God, the one whom philosophy has shown to be so remote from us in his infinite perfection, theological understanding believes to be very near to us in this familiar deep-seated characteristic.

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Quantum vero ad quartum assertum attinet, distinguendum est inter defectum qui tum philosophicae tum theologicae analogiae est communis et ulteriorem defectum qui theologicae analogiae est proprius. Et communis quidem defectus in eo consistit quod cognitio Dei hac in vita est analogica. Exclusa enim quidditativa Dei cognitione quae per essentiam divinam est, tam philosophi quam theologi Deum per similitudines concipiunt quas quidem deficere certo cognoscunt, quantum vero deficiant dicere non possunt antequam ad visionem Dei pertingant. Qua de causa sicut philosophus ignorat quid sit Deus, pariter theologus ignorat quid sit processio divina vel relatio intranea vel persona; realiter enim identificantur in Deo essentia et processio et relatio et persona. Ex quo fit ut, ignota quidditate, etiam quantum analogia deficiat ignoratur. Cui accedit quod conclusiones ex analogiis sequuntur (et citius et apertius ex analogia theologica) quas eatenus tantum compossibiles scimus quod certo ex certis derivantur neque manifestam important contradictionem.

Proprius autem analogiae theologicae defectus in eo est quod stricte non demonstratur. Et quod solo rationis lumine non certo stabilitur, iam pridem in aperto est. At etiam revelatione praesupposita atque fide, ad analogiam trinitariam per rationes stricte necessarias non concluditur. Verum quidem est quod supposita hac analogia multa sequuntur quae vel fide teneantur vel ex fide certo deducantur. Sed argumentum eiusmodi quamvis intelligentiam aliquam mysterii, eamque fructuosissimam, pariat, longe a demonstratione deficit. Uti enim omnis in arte logica tiro compertum habet, invalida est illatio haec: Si A est, B est; sed B est; ergo A est. Vide Sum. theol., i, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2m.

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With regard to the fourth observation, there is a limitation that is common to both philosophical and theological analogy, and a further limitation that belongs only to theological analogy. The limitation common to both consists in the fact that in this life our knowledge of God is analogical. Not having a quidditative knowledge of God through the divine essence, both philosophers and theologians form concepts of God by way of comparisons which they know quite well to be imperfect, though they won’t know just how imperfect until they reach the beatific vision. Therefore, just as philosophers do not know what God is, neither do theologians know what a divine procession is or a divine immanent relation or a divine person; for in God essence and procession and relation and person are one and the same reality. So it is that without quidditative knowledge the degree to which analogies are imperfect is also unknown. And there is the further fact that conclusions follow from these analogies (more readily and more clearly from the theological) which we know to be compatible only insofar as they are derived with certitude from premises that are certain, and imply no obvious contradiction. The limitation peculiar to theological analogy is the fact that it is not strictly demonstrable. And for a long time now it has been quite clear what cannot be established with certitude by the light of reason alone. Yet even presupposing revelation and faith, one cannot conclude to the trinitarian analogy by a strict process of reasoning. It is true, of course, that on the basis of this analogy many conclusions follow which are either matters of faith or are deduced with certitude from faith. But this sort of argumentation, however productive of an understanding – and indeed of a most fruitful understanding – of the trinitarian mystery, falls far short of being a demonstration. As even a beginner at logic knows quite well, the following inference is invalid: If A exists, then B exists; but B exists; therefore A exists. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2m.

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De Relationibus

Adeo clara atque certa est doctrina theologica de relationibus realibus et divinis ut omnia essentialia perspici possint quin subtilius in generalem relationum theoriam inquiratur. At praeter essentialia, ulteriores quaestiones sponte quadam sua oriri solent quae, nisi solvantur, mentem sollicitent atque distrahant. Quam ob causam, haud superfluum duximus non nullas adiungere disputationes quae relationum analysin, realitatem, et divisiones respiciant.

QUAESTIO XXXIII Utrum sint relationes internae Ad terminos relatio: ordo unius ad aliud;1 opponitur absoluto; circa relationem distinguuntur:

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The theological doctrine of the real relations in God is so clear and certain that all its essential elements can be understood without undertaking a more subtle investigation into the general theory of relations. But over and above the essentials, further questions almost spontaneously, it seems, tend to arise, which, unless they are dealt with, leave the inquiring mind uneasy and unsettled. For this reason we feel that it would not be otiose to add some further discussions concerning the analysis, the reality, and the divisions of relations. QUESTION 33 Are there internal relations? Terminology relation: the order of one to another;1 its opposite is absolute; and as regards a relation, we distinguish: 1 [In an archival document, File a201 (Batch ii, folder 28, item 1), Lonergan has the following clarification regarding ordo: ‘Quid est ordo [Heading]. Est notio fundamentalis quae in notiones priores non reducitur sed per genesin suam psychologicam explicatur et determinatur. Sensus quodammodo cognoscit res absolute, sed sapientis est ordinare; scilicet, cognoscere ordinem est opus intellectus et rationis cuius principalis perfectio est sapientia.’ (‘Order is a fundamental notion that is not reducible to prior notions, but is explained and determined through its psychological origins. The senses, in a way, apprehend things absolutely, while it is the work of wisdom to set things in order. In other words, to apprehend order is a function of the intellect and reason, whose highest perfection is wisdom.’)]

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subiectum: id quod ad aliud refertur; unde ad rationem subiecti sufficit ut ad aliud referatur, neque quicquam de praesenti refert utrum sit ens-quod an ens-quo, terminus: id ad quod subiectum refertur, tertium comparationis: id secundum quod subiectum ad terminum refertur. Praeterea, interna est relatio quae subiecto ita est intrinseca ut tolli non possit quin ipsum etiam subiectum tollatur, externa est relatio quae adesse vel abesse potest salvo subiecto. Denique, ens reale est quod vere affirmatur esse sive ut id quod est sive ut id quo constituitur id quod est, ens rationis est quod concipitur quidem et concipi vere affirmatur quin esse vere affirmari possit.

Argumenta 1 Si sunt accidentia realia, sunt relationes internae reales. Atqui sunt accidentia realia. Ergo sunt relationes internae reales. Maior probatur per partes, nempe, (1) si sunt accidentia, sunt relationes internae, et (2) si accidentia sunt realia, relationes internae sunt reales. Ad primum: accidens definitur id cui competit esse in alio; sed ‘competere alicui esse in alio’ est relatio ad aliud; et cum haec relatio in definitione ponatur, est relatio interna; nam tolli non potest pars definitionis quin tollatur ipsum definitum.

Ad alterum: realitas accidentis est realitas eius quod ponitur in definitione accidentis; ergo realitas accidentis necessitat realitatem relationis internae. Minor alibi probatur et communiter admittitur. 2 Si sunt naturae finitae reales, sunt relationes internae reales. Atqui sunt naturae finitae reales. Ergo sunt relationes internae reales. Ad maiorem: omnis natura finita definitur per suam relationem ad aliud, nempe, ad accidentia quae naturaliter ex ea resultent, ad operationes quarum est principium remotum vel proximum. Proinde, patet quod nulla natura potest esse realis quin pariter sit realis illa relatio quae in ipsa naturae definitione ponitur. Minor est evidens et alibi probatur.

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subject : that which is related to another; hence to fulfil the definition of subject it suffices to be related to some other, and for now it does not matter whether it be a being-which or a being-by-which, term: that to which a subject is related, third term of comparison [also called the foundation, fundamentum]: that with respect to which the subject is related to the term. Further, an internal relation is one that is so intrinsic to the subject that it cannot be negated without negating the subject also, and an external relation is one that may be present or absent without affecting the subject. Finally, real being is that which is truly affirmed to exist, either that which exists or that by which an existent being is constituted, while conceptual being is that which is conceived and is truly affirmed to be conceived but which cannot be truly affirmed as existing. Arguments 1 If there are real accidents, there are real internal relations; but there are real accidents; therefore there are real internal relations. The major premise is proved in two steps: (1) if there are accidents, there are internal relations; (2) if accidents are real, internal relations are real. As to the first step: an accident is defined as that whose mode of being is to be in another; but to have the mode of being of being in another is to have a relation to that other; and since this relation is part of the definition of accident, it is an internal relation, since no part of a definition can be negated without negating the thing defined. As to the other step: the reality of an accident is the reality of what is stated in the definition of an accident; therefore, the reality of an accident necessarily includes the reality of an internal relation. The minor premise is proved elsewhere, and is commonly admitted. 2 If there are real finite natures, there are real internal relations; but there are real finite natures; therefore there are real internal relations. As to the major premise: every finite nature is defined by its relation to something else, namely, to accidents that naturally result from it, and to operations of which it is the remote or the proximate principle. Also, it is clear that no nature can be real without that relation that is in its very definition also being real. The minor premise is evident and is proved elsewhere.

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Corollarium: cum omnis substantia finita etiam sit quaedam natura finita, sequitur omnem substantiam finitam relationibus internis et realibus ornari. Notare tamen oportet substantiam finitam dupliciter posse considerari: primo modo, generice, et sic definitur absolute tamquam id cui competit esse per se; alio modo, specifice, et sic natura quaedam specifica neque definiri potest nisi secundum relationes suas ad accidentia et operationes. Ita homo est et substantia et natura quaedam; sed inquantum substantia dicitur, generice tantum consideratur uti ens per se; inquantum vero natura quaedam est, definitur animal rationale, ubi ipsum ‘rationale’ neque definiri neque declarari potest nisi secundum relationem ad intellectum.

3 Si sunt animae reales, sunt relationes internae reales. Atqui sunt animae reales. Ergo sunt relationes internae reales. Maior lucet ex utraque definitione aristotelica. Sive enim dicitur anima esse actus primus corporis potentia vitam habentis, sive dicitur primum quo vivimus, sentimus, intelligimus, in ipsa animae definitione ponitur relatio sive ad corpus sive ad opera vitae, sensus, intellectus. Iam vero relatio in definitione posita tolli non potest quin tollatur definitum; et realitas definiti necessitat realitatem eorum quae in definitione ponuntur. Minor alibi probatur et communiter admittitur. 4 Si realia et realiter inter se distincta sunt principia metaphysica rerum, ut potentia et actus, materia et forma, essentia et esse, potentia operativa et habitus, habitus et operatio, reales etiam sunt relationes internae. Atqui verum est antecedens. Ergo verum etiam est consequens. Ad maiorem: quamvis principia metaphysica rerum definiri non possint, tamen per proportionem quandam declarantur. Quae quidem proportio est mutua quaedam relatio et quidem interna, cum tolli non possit quin tollantur ipsa principia. Quare, si realia et realiter inter se distincta sunt haec principia, etiam reales sunt relationes internae secundum quas mutuo sibi proportionantur. Minor alibi probatur et satis communiter admittitur. 5 Si sunt principia analytica cum praedicato relativo, sunt subiecta relationum internarum; et si talia subiecta sunt realia, etiam eorum relationes internae sunt reales. Atqui sunt principia analytica cum praedicato relativo et vere applicantur subiectis realibus. Ergo sunt relationes internae reales. 2

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Corollary: Since every finite substance is also a finite nature, it follows that every finite substance possesses real internal relations. Note, however, that a finite substance can be considered in two ways: first, generically, and in this way it is defined absolutely as that whose mode of being is to be per se, in its own right; second, specifically, and in this way a specific nature can be defined only in relation to its accidents and operations. Thus, a man is both a substance and a nature; but inasmuch as he is said to be a substance he is considered only generically as a being per se, while inasmuch as he is a nature he is defined as a rational animal, where the word ‘rational’ can be neither defined nor explained except in relation to an intellect. 3 If souls are real, there are real internal relations; but souls are real; therefore there are real internal relations. The major premise is clear from both of Aristotle’s definitions of the soul. Whether the soul is said to be the first act of a body capable of life, or is described as that principle whereby we live and sense and understand, the very definition of soul includes a relation either to the body or to vital, sentient, and intellectual operations. Now a relation that is part of a definition cannot be negated without negating the thing defined; and the reality of the thing defined necessarily includes the reality of whatever is part of its definition. The minor premise is proved elsewhere and is commonly admitted. 4 If the metaphysical principles of things – potency and act, matter and form, essence and existence, operational potency and habit, and habit and operation – are real and really distinct from each other, internal relations are also real. But the antecedent is true; therefore the conclusion is also true. As to the major premise: although the metaphysical principles of things cannot be defined, they are explained in terms of a certain proportion. This proportion is in fact a mutual relation and is also internal, since it cannot be negated without the principles themselves being negated. Therefore if these principles are real and really distinct from each other, the internal relations by way of which they are mutually proportionate are also real. The minor premise is proved elsewhere and is quite commonly admitted. 5 If there are analytic principles with a relative predicate, there are subjects of internal relations; and if such subjects are real, their internal relations are also real. But there are analytic principles with a relative predicate, and they are truly applied to real subjects. Therefore there are real internal relations. 2 2 [On analytic principles, see Lonergan, Insight 329–34, and Understanding and Being 126–31.]

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Ad maiorem primam: praedicatum principii analytici potest esse vel absolutum vel relativum at in omni casu tale est ut tolli non possit quin tollatur subiectum, cum analyticum sit principium in quo praedicatum est de ratione subiecti; quare si sunt principia analytica cum praedicato relativo, sunt subiecta relationum internarum. Ad alteram maiorem: si sunt subiecta realia relationum internarum, sunt relationes internae reales; nam non tollitur relatio interna quin tollatur subiectum eius; et ideo si datur subiectum realiter, datur relatio realiter. Ad minorem: principia causalitatis efficientis et finalis (1) sunt analytica, (2) referunt causatum ad causam, et (3) vere applicantur entibus contingentibus.

6 Si sunt quantitates reales, sunt relationes reales internae. Atqui sunt quantitates reales. Ergo sunt relationes reales internae. Ad maiorem: qui dicit ‘quantum’ ponit quaestionem cui non respondetur nisi per relationem proportionis; quare omnia quanta ex ipsa sua ratione stant in aliqua proportione cum omnibus aliis quantis; et cum haec proportio sit de ipsa ratione quantitatis, reales esse non possunt quantitates quin pariter reales sint hae proportiones. Minor patet.3 7 Si sunt leges naturales quae (1) ex ipsa rerum natura secundum necessitatem quandam physicam profluunt et (2) entia realia et realiter distincta inter se religant, sunt relationes internae reales. Atqui sunt tales leges. Ergo sunt relationes internae reales. Maior evidens videtur cum primum membrum relationis interioritatem manifestet et alterum eiusdem realitatem. Minor constat ex chimia et physica, saltem si hae scientiae ad mentem philosophiae perennis intelliguntur. 8 Si in viventibus inveniuntur partes organicae, etiam inveniuntur relationes internae reales. Atqui verum est antecedens. Ergo verum etiam est consequens.

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As to the first major premise: the predicate of an analytic principle can be either absolute or relative, but in either case it is such that it cannot be negated without negating the subject, since an analytic principle is that in which the predicate belongs to the definition of the subject; therefore, if there are analytic principles with a relative predicate, there are subjects of internal relations. As to the second major premise: if there are real subjects of internal relations, there are real internal relations; for an internal relation cannot be negated without negating its subject, and therefore if there is really a subject, there is really a relation as well. As to the minor premise: the principles of efficient causality and of final causality (1) are analytic, (2) relate the caused to the cause, and (3) are truly applied to contingent beings. 6 If there are real quantities, there are real internal relations; but there are real quantities. Therefore there are real internal relations. As to the major premise: to say ‘how much’ is to ask a question to which no answer can be given except in terms of a relation of proportion. Therefore, all quantified things by their very nature stand in some proportion to all other quantified things; and since this proportion pertains to the very formality of quantity, quantities cannot be real without there likewise being real proportions. The minor is evident.3 7 If there are natural laws that (1) from the very nature of things result according to some physical necessity and (2) link things that are real and really distinct from each other, then there are real internal relations. But there are such laws. Therefore, there are real internal relations. The major premise seems evident, since the first point above indicates the internality of the relation and the second point its reality. The minor premise is clear from physics and chemistry, at least if these sciences are understood according to the mind of philosophia perennis. 8 If organic parts are found in living things, real internal relations are also found in them. But the antecedent is true, and therefore the conclusion is also true. 3 [In Insight (at p. 515) the notion of quantity is shifted out of descriptive knowledge, which is what it is in Aristotle’s list of categories, and defined as ‘anything that can serve as a term in a numerical ratio,’ and, inversely, a proportion in this context is defined as ‘a numerically definable ratio between quantities.’]

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Maior ex eo constat quod omnis pars organica ideo est talis quia determinata opera atque munera perficit relate tum ad caeteras partes tum ad totum vivens. Unde Aristoteles recte aiebat pedem ab animali seiunctum non esse pedem nisi aequivoce; et idem valet de caeteris partibus. Iam vero subiectum quod cessat esse univoce tale quia ab aliis seiungitur, relationibus internis cum aliis coniungitur; et ideo si vere sunt partes organicae, vere etiam et realiter sunt relationes internae reales. Minor est evidens. 9 Abundant denique relationes internae reales in psychologia rationali, uti patet ex definitionibus potentiarum et habituum, ex specificatione actuum ab obiectis, ex compositione sensuum cum organis, ex dependentia nostri intellectus a sensibus, ex dependentia partis appetitivae ab apprehensiva, ex ordinatione quaestionum ad actus intelligendi, actuum intelligendi ad verba dicenda, verborum dictorum ad actus voluntatis, et vice versa ex dependentia actuum intelligendi a quaestionibus, verborum ab actibus intelligendi, volitionum a verbis interius dictis. Quae relationes omnes ideo sunt internae quia vel ad ipsas definitiones pertinent vel ex definitionibus profluunt vel a natura humana in praesenti statu determinantur.

Obiectiones 1 Videntur relationes internae esse entia rationis tantum, nam inveniuntur non in ipsis rebus sed tantummodo in theoriis forte falsis quae a philosophis et scientiarum cultoribus proponantur. Respondetur. Si reale ducitur id quod cognoscitur ante omnem operationem intellectus, relationes internae sunt entia rationis tantum, conceditur. Si reale est ens, id quod est, id quod intelligendo et diiudicando innotescit, subdistinguitur: relationes internae sunt entia rationis tantum, si intelliguntur et concipiuntur quin esse vere affirmentur, conceditur, si non solum intelliguntur atque concipiuntur sed etiam esse vere affirmantur, negatur. Iam vero non solum intelliguntur atque concipiuntur relationes internae sed etiam vere affirmantur. Nam in primis haereticum est negare animam intellectivam esse per se et essentialiter formam corporis; sed anima non est forma corporis quin referatur ad corpus; neque est essentialiter forma corporis nisi ad corpus referatur per relationem internam;

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The major premise is clear from the fact that every organic part is the way it is because it performs determined works and functions with regard both to the other parts and to the organic whole. Hence, Aristotle rightly held that the severed foot of an animal is no longer a foot except in an equivocal sense; and the same holds for all the other parts. Now a subject that ceases to be univocally what it is as a result of being separated from other things is conjoined with those others by internal relations; and therefore, if there truly are organic parts, there really and truly are real internal relations as well. The minor premise is evident. 9 Finally, there is an abundance of real internal relations in rational psychology, as is clear from the definitions of faculties and habits, from the specification of acts by their objects, from the close connection between the senses and their organs, from the dependence of our intellects upon the senses, from the dependence of appetition upon apprehension, from the ordering of questions to acts of understanding, of acts of understanding to inner words to be uttered, of inner words uttered to acts of will, and vice versa from the dependence of acts of understanding upon questions, of inner words upon acts of understanding, and of acts of the will upon inner words. All these relations are internal because they either belong to the very definitions, or flow from the definitions, or are determined by human nature in its present state. Objections 1 Internal relations seem to be merely conceptual beings, for they are found not in things themselves but only in the possibly false theories proposed by philosophers and scientists. To this we reply that if by ‘real’ you mean that which is known prior to all intellectual operation, we grant that in that case internal relations are merely conceptual beings. But if the real is being, that which is, that which is known by understanding and judging, then internal relations that are understood and conceived without being affirmed would be merely conceptual beings, but not those that are not only understood and conceived but also truly affirmed to exist. Internal relations are not only understood and conceived but are also truly affirmed. For above all it is heretical to deny that the intellectual soul is per se and essentially the form of the human body. But the soul is not the form of a body without a relationship to that body; it is not essentially the form of a body unless related to that body by an internal relation; and this internal relation is

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neque haec relatio interna est merum ens rationis, cum temere diceretur concilia Viennense et Lateranense V (db 480, 738) non de rebus sed tantummodo de conceptibus decrevisse.

2 Instatur. Nullum ens reale est indeterminatum. Atqui omnis relatio interna est indeterminata. Ergo nulla relatio interna est realis. Maior est evidens et minor exemplis constat. Nam relatio interna proportionis inter quaelibet quanta non est specifica et arithmetica, sicut duplum ad dimidium, sed est generica et algebraica, sicut a ad x. Respondetur. Illud intercedit inter absolutum et relativum quod realitas absoluta totam suam rationem in se contineat, sed realitas relativa suam rationem non complet nisi per comparationem ad aliud. Et ideo maior est distinguenda: nullum ens reale et absolutum est indeterminatum, conceditur; nullum ens reale et relativum est indeterminatum, subdistinguitur, inquantum determinationem a subiecto accipit, conceditur, inquantum determinationem a termino accipit, negatur. Unde et contradistinguitur minor: omnis relatio interna est indeterminata, distinguitur, indeterminata ex parte subiecti, negatur, indeterminata ex parte termini, subdistinguitur, in multis, conceditur, in omnibus, negatur. V.g., relatio rei finitae ad primam causam et ultimum finem est interna sed omnino determinata. Et ideo ad conclusionem, conceditur relationes internas non habere eam determinationem quae absolutis competit, et negatur hanc indeterminationem ex parte termini tollere illam realitatem quae competit relationibus. Relatio enim, ut communiter dicitur, est ens quoddam minimum atque debilissimum. 3 Instatur iterum: Nullum ens reale est universale. Sed omnis relatio interna est universalis. Ergo nulla relatio interna est realis. Maior constat inter aristotelicos et minor probatur ex eo quod relatio interna concluditur ex ratione universali qua definitur subiectum. Respondetur. Maior conceditur et minor distinguitur. Relatio interna est universalis quoad id quod intenditur, negatur; quoad modum quo intenditur, conceditur. Sicut enim universaliter absoluta cognoscimus quin absoluta universalia in rebus ponamus, ita pariter universaliter relativa cognoscimus quin relativa universalia in rebus ponamus.

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not a mere conceptual being, for it would be rash to say that the decrees of the Council of Vienne [1311–12] and the Fifth Lateran Council (db 480, 738; ds 900–901, 1440–41, nd 410) were dealing only with concepts and not with realities. 2 No real being is indeterminate. But every internal relation is indeterminate, and therefore no internal relation is real. The major premise is evident, and the minor premise is clear from examples. For the internal relation of proportion between any quantified beings is not specific and arithmetical, such as the double to the half, but is generic and algebraic, such as a to x. To this we reply as follows. The difference between an absolute and a relative consists in this, that an absolute reality possesses its entire meaning within itself, whereas a relative reality has its complete meaning only by comparison to something else. We would therefore make the following distinction regarding the major: we grant that no real absolute being is indeterminate; but that no real relative being is indeterminate is true insofar as it receives its determination from the subject, but not insofar as it receives its determination from the term. We contradistinguish the minor premise accordingly. That every internal relation is indeterminate on the part of its subject, we deny; that it is indeterminate on the part of its term we concede to be true in many cases, but not in all. For example, the relation of a finite being to its first cause and ultimate end is internal and wholly determinate. As to the conclusion, then, we grant that internal relations do not have the determination that is proper to absolutes, while denying that this indetermination on the part of the term negates the reality that is proper to relations. For a relation, as is commonly observed, is the smallest and weakest of beings. 3 No real being is universal. But every internal relation is universal; therefore no internal relation is real. The major premise is common doctrine among Aristotelians, and the minor is proved from the fact that an internal relation is concluded to from the universal idea by which a subject is defined. We reply by granting the major premise and distinguishing the minor. We deny that an internal relation is universal as to what it intends, while conceding that it is universal as to the manner in which it is intended. For just as we know absolute beings universally without positing absolute universals in things, so in the same way we know relatives universally without positing relative universals in things.

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QUAESTIO XXXIV Utrum relatio externa aliam realitatem subiecto intrinsecam addat super realitatem relationis internae Quaestionis intentio Generatim fit ut relatio externa magis sit determinata quam relatio interna. Relatio enim interna ex ipsa subiecti ratione et intelligibilitate habetur; sed relatio externa non ex solo subiecto sed ex subiecto et termino inter se comparatis oritur. Ita de ratione accidentis est ut alicui substantiae insit, et de ratione quanti est ut secundum aliquam proportionem ad omne aliud quantum referatur; sed de ratione accidentis non est ut huic substantiae insit, et de ratione quanti non est ut tali proportione specifica et arithmetica ad hoc quantum referatur.

Quibus perspectis, cum omnino salvanda sit adaequatio veritatis inter intellectum et rem, ubicumque maior quaedam determinatio in veris detegitur, etiam in entibus aequalis determinatio est agnoscenda. Et ideo cum magis determinata sit externa quam interna relatio, alia sane est agnoscenda realitas per veritatem relationis externae praeter eam quae iam agnoscitur per veritatem relationis internae.

Attamen illud statim exsurgit dubium utrum alia illa realitas relationi externae propria sit intrinseca subiecto relationis internae an forte subiecto extrinseca et in termino invenienda. Et sic ponitur praesens quaestio utrum relatio externa aliam realitatem subiecto intrinsecam addat super realitatem relationis internae.

Elucidationes praeviae Iam vero cum quaestiones eiusmodi inde a medio aevo disputentur neque solvi videantur, omnino praemittendae sunt eae elucidationes quae ambiguitatem atque confusionem ab hac quaestione nostra amoveant. 1 In primis, ergo, illa non ponitur quaestio quae communiter agitari solet utrum relativum realiter addat super absolutum. Nam realitas relationis internae sane relativa est. Et ideo illud nunc unice quaeritur utrum relatio externa et realis super relationem internam realem ulteriorem quandam realitatem addat.

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QUESTION 34 Does an external relation add another reality intrinsic to the subject besides the reality of the internal relation? Meaning of the Question Generally speaking, an external relation is more determinate than an internal relation. For an internal relation results from the very notion and intelligibility of the subject. But an external relation arises not from the subject alone but from the comparison between subject and term. Thus, it is of the very nature of an accident that it inhere in some substance, and it is of the very nature of a quantified object that it relate to every other quantified object in some proportion. But it is not of the nature of an accident that it inhere in this substance, nor is it of the nature of a quantified object that it relate to this quantified object in such or such a specific arithmetical proportion. Accordingly, since the truth-correspondence between the intellect and the thing must be adamantly maintained, wherever some greater determination in truths is noticed, an equal determination must be acknowledged in things. Hence, since an external relation is more determinate than an internal relation, then, by reason of the truth of the external relation another reality must surely be acknowledged in addition to that which is acknowledged by reason of the truth of the internal relation. Nevertheless, there immediately arises a doubt whether that other reality that is proper to an external relation is intrinsic to the subject of an internal relation, or perhaps extrinsic to the subject and to be found rather in the term. Hence the present question of whether an external relation adds another reality intrinsic to the subject over and above the reality of the internal relation. Preliminary clarifications Since questions of this kind have been discussed since the Middle Ages and apparently never settled, it is quite necessary to present first some clarifications in order to obviate any ambiguity or confusion in our treatment of this matter. 1 First of all, then, the question is not the one that is usually discussed, namely, whether a relative really adds something to an absolute. For the reality of an internal relation is certainly something relative. Therefore, the only question now is whether a real external relation adds some further reality onto a real internal relation.

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2 Neque de qualibet ulteriori realitate quaeritur sed unice de ea quae subiecto est intrinseca. Patet enim maiorem determinationem ideo in relatione externa inveniri quod praeter subiectum reale etiam realis terminus consideretur. Neque de eo quod patet ponitur quaestio sed de eo quod dubitatur, nempe, utrum alia realitas subiecto intrinseca praeter realitatem termini agnoscenda sit.

3 Proinde, clare et distincte intelligi oportet in quo conveniant et in quo differant praedicata absoluta et relativa. Conveniunt enim in hoc quod utrumque praedicatum, absolutum nempe et relativum, vere subiecto attribuitur. Ita vere Petrus est homo, et vere Petrus est Pauli amicus. Differunt autem in hoc quod praedicatum absolutum ipsam subiecti realitatem eamque solam dicit, sed praedicatum relativum et externum ita subiecti realitatem dicit ut aliam realitatem simul intendat. Ita ‘esse hominem’ solam Petri realitatem dicit, sed ‘esse amicum Pauli’ non solam Petri realitatem sed etiam realitatem Pauli considerat.

4 Sequitur aliam in absolutis et aliam in relativis externis esse adaequationem veritatis. In absolutis enim veritas subiectum per se solum respicit, et ideo in absolutis non habetur adaequatio veritatis nisi in realitate subiecto intrinseca. V.g., nulla res vere est homo per aliam realitatem quam suam. In relativis autem externis veritas non subiectum solum sed etiam terminum respicit, et ideo in relativis externis non habetur adaequatio veritatis nisi in duplici realitate quarum alia est subiecto intrinseca et alia est subiecto extrinseca. V.g., sicut nulla res per se sola vere est duplum, ita etiam hoc verum, A esse duplum B, adaequationem veritatis habere non potest in sola realitate A.

5 At ulterius minime sunt confundendae comparatio et compositio. Utraque sane est quaedam synthesis. Sed comparatio relativa subiecti ad terminum relinquit subiectum et terminum inter se distincta et realiter duo. Compositio autem duorum ex duobus facit unum simpliciter. V.g., comparantur potentia et actus, et etiam componuntur potentia et actus; sed comparantur per relationem, componuntur autem inquantum duo in unum reale coalescunt. Et ideo non est censendum novam quandam realitatem ex comparatione exsurgere quia nova quaedam realitas ex compositione exsurgat.

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2 The question is not about just any additional reality but solely about that which is intrinsic to the subject. For it is clear that a greater determination is present in an external relation because in addition to a real subject, a real term is also taken into consideration. The present question is not about what is clear but about what is in doubt, namely, whether in addition to the reality of the term another reality intrinsic to the subject is to be acknowledged. 3 Further, it must be clearly and distinctly understood in what respects absolute predicates and relative predicates agree and in what respects they differ. They agree in this, that both predicates, absolute and relative, are truly attributed to the subject. Thus, Peter is truly a man, and Peter is truly a friend of Paul. They differ, however, in this, that an absolute predicate expresses the reality of the subject and that alone, whereas an external relative predicate expresses the reality of the subject and at the same time points to another reality. Thus, ‘to be a man’ expresses only Peter’s reality, but ‘to be a friend of Paul’ considers not only the reality of Peter but also the reality of Paul. 4 From this it follows that there is one truth-correspondence in the case of absolutes and another in the case of external relatives. In absolutes, truth regards only the subject by itself, and therefore in absolutes there is no truth-correspondence except in the reality intrinsic to the subject. For example, no being is truly a man by any other reality than his own. In external relatives, however, truth regards not only the subject but also the term, and therefore in external relatives there is no truth-correspondence except in the two realities, one of which is intrinsic to the subject and the other extrinsic to the subject. For example, just as no thing by itself alone is truly twice, so also this truth, ‘A is twice B,’ cannot have its truth-correspondence in the reality of A alone. 5 But further, comparison and composition must by no means be confused. Both, it is true, consist in a certain synthesis. But the relative comparison of a subject to a term leaves the subject and the term distinct from each other and really two. A composition of two things, however, makes those two to be simply one being. For example, potency and act can be compared and potency and act can be compounded; but they are compared through a relation, whereas they are compounded inasmuch as these two coalesce into one real being. One must not think that a new reality results from a comparison simply because a new reality does result from composition.

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6 Praeterea, cum comparatio proprie sit actus intellectus et tamen communiter subiectum relationis modo quodam obiectivo ad terminum comparari dicatur, ne entia realia et entia rationis inter se confundantur, distinguendum est inter comparationem formalem, quae in solo intellectu fit, et comparationem obiectivam, quae nihil est aliud quam ipsa subiecti habitudo seu respectus ad terminum.

7 Sequitur similem distinctionem esse agnoscendam inter determinationem formalem et determinationem obiectivam. Formalis enim determinatio est in intellectu qui subiectum et terminum apprehendit, comparat, et ad relationem determinatam affirmandam pervenit. Obiectiva autem determinatio non in mente fit sed iam in rebus adest: nam et obiective adest determinabile, nempe, subiectum quod ex ipsa sua ratione per relationem internam realiter respicit totalitatem quandam terminorum saltem possibilium; adest pariter obiective determinans, nempe, terminus qui inquantum inter ea invenitur quae a subiecto necessario respiciuntur, fundamentum reale praebet quo obiective determinabile fiat obiective determinatum.

8 Denique tandem quamvis relatio dicatur respectus, quamvis subiectum dicatur terminum respicere, minime tamen haec metaphora ita ad litteram sumenda est ut subiectum credatur terminum aspicere et perspicere. Et ideo quamvis determinatio obiecti perspecti necessario in subiecto perspicienti etiam sit, minime concludi potest determinationem quam relatio ex termino habet parem quandam determinationem necessario inducere in subiecto quod per relationem terminum respiciat.

Quaestionis solutio Quibus perspectis, ad quaestionem respondetur relationem externam non addere aliam realitatem subiecto intrinsecam super realitatem relationis internae. 4 Et ut etiam concrete loquamur, si vere et realiter A est duplum relate ad B, tunc illud ‘duplum’ habet adaequationem veritatis et per realitatem relationis internae qua A omnia quanta realiter respicit, et simul per realitatem B quae obiective determinat indeterminatam relationem internam.

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6 Again, since comparison properly speaking is an act of the intellect, and yet the subject of a relation is commonly said to be compared to its term in an objective way, in order that real beings not be confused with conceptual beings one must distinguish between a formal comparison, which is made only in the mind, and an objective comparison, which is nothing other than the order or respect of the subject to its term. 7 From this it follows that a similar distinction must be acknowledged between a formal determination and an objective determination. A formal determination is in the intellect which apprehends the subject and the term, compares them, and arrives at an affirmation of their determinate relation. Objective determination, on the other hand, does not take place in the mind but is already in things; for a determinable is objectively present, namely, a subject which by its very nature really through an internal relation ‘regards’ the totality of at least possible terms; similarly, a determinant is objectively present, namely, the term which, inasmuch as it is found among those things that are necessarily ‘regarded’ by the subject, provides a real foundation by which the objectively determinable becomes objectively determined. 8 Finally, although a relation is called a ‘respect’ or ‘regard,’ and although a subject is said to have respect or regard to its term, this metaphor should not be taken literally as if the subject looks at or perceives its term. And therefore although a determination of the object perceived is necessarily also in the perceiving subject, one can by no means conclude that the determination that a relation has from its term necessarily produces an equivalent determination in the subject that has a respect or regard to its term by way of a relation. Solution to the question In light of what we have said, our answer to the question is that an external relation does not add to the reality of an internal relation another reality intrinsic to the subject.4 To put it in concrete terms, if A is really and truly twice what B is, then that ‘twice’ has its truth-correspondence through the reality of an internal relation by which A really regards all quantified beings and, at the same time, through the reality of B which objectively determines that indeterminate internal relation. 4 [Lonergan treats the same issue in Insight 518–19.]

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Iterum, si vere et realiter A est duplum relate ad B, tunc illud ‘duplum’ non habet adaequationem veritatis per realitatem quandam quae in ipso A recipitur et super realitatem relationis internae additur. Argumenta 1 In entibus realibus multiplicandis, salvanda est adaequatio veritatis. Atqui sententia negans superadditam realitatem salvat adaequationem veritatis, sententia autem affirmans superadditam realitatem tollit adaequationem veritatis. Ergo sententia negans est amplectenda et sententia affirmans est reicienda. Maior: Nam nisi per verum non innotescit ens. Minor: Nam uti constat ex quarta elucidatione praevia, in relativis externis non habetur adaequatio veritatis nisi in duplici realitate quarum alia est subiecto intrinseca et alia est subiecto extrinseca. Atqui sententia negans non habet adaequationem veritatis nisi per duplicem realitatem, aliam subiecto intrinsecam, nempe relationem internam, et aliam subiecto extrinsecam, nempe ipsum terminum. Sed sententia affirmans superadditam realitatem subiecto intrinsecam, per hanc solam superadditam realitatem veritatis adaequationem habet. Et confirmatur minor: In veritate, A non est duplum relate ad B nisi per realitatem A et realitatem B. In sententia negante, A non est duplum relate ad B nisi per realitatem A et realitatem B. Sed in sententia affirmante, A est duplum relate ad B per superadditam realitatem A intrinsecam. 2 Praeterea, illa sententia non est admittenda quae absoluta et relativa adeo non distinguit ut potius ea confundat. Atqui sententia affirmans est eiusmodi. Ergo. Ad minorem: Uti ex praevia elucidatione tertia constat, absoluta dicunt realitatem subiecti intrinsecam, sed relativa externa non solam realitatem subiecti intrinsecam sed etiam aliam subiecto extrinsecam. Iam vero qui propter relationem externam qua externam vult novam realitatem subiecto intrinsecam, sane ille adeo non distinguit absoluta et relativa externa ut ea potius confundat. Atqui sententia affirmans propter relationem externam qua externam vult novam realitatem subiecto intrinsecam. Ergo.

3 Praeterea, sententia affirmans superadditam realitatem in gravissima inconvenientia conducit.

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Again, if A is really and truly twice B, then that ‘twice’ does not have truthcorrespondence through a reality that is received in A itself and is added to the reality of its internal relation. Arguments 1 In multiplying real beings, truth-correspondence must be preserved. But the opinion denying an additional reality preserves the truth-correspondence, whereas the opinion affirming an additional reality denies it. Therefore, the negative opinion is to be accepted and the affirmative rejected. As to the major premise: being is known only through what is true. As to the minor premise: as is clear from the fourth preliminary clarification, there is no truth-correspondence in external relatives apart from two realities, of which one is intrinsic to the subject and the other extrinsic to the subject. Now the negative opinion has no truth-correspondence apart from these two realities, one that is intrinsic to the subject, namely, an internal relation, and the other extrinsic to the subject, namely, the term. But the opinion affirming an additional reality intrinsic to the subject has its truth-correspondence through this additional reality alone. We substantiate the minor as follows. In truth, A is not twice B except through the reality of A and the reality of B. In the negative opinion, A is twice B solely through the reality of A and the reality of B; whereas in the affirmative opinion, A is twice B through an additional reality intrinsic to A. 2 Again, no opinion is admissible that so fails to distinguish clearly between an absolute and a relative that it tends rather to confuse the two. But such is the affirmative opinion. Therefore it is not admissible. As to the minor premise: as has been explained in the third preliminary clarification, absolutes express a reality intrinsic to a subject, but external relatives express not only a reality intrinsic to a subject but also another reality extrinsic to it. Now, one who because of an external relation as external opts for a new reality intrinsic to a subject surely so fails to distinguish between absolutes and external relatives as rather to confuse them; but the affirmative opinion opts for a new reality intrinsic to a subject because of an external relation as external. Therefore, the affirmative opinion cannot be admitted. 3 Furthermore, the opinion affirming an additional reality leads to very serious difficulties.

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Nam unumquodque quantum ad omnia alia quanta per totum universum dispersa realiter refertur relationibus realibus, externis, specificis. Similiter ad unumquodque quantum omnia et singula alia quanta relationibus realibus, externis, specificis referuntur. Qua de causa, in sententia affirmante superadditam realitatem subiecto intrinsecam, mutato quolibet quanto, necessario realiter mutantur omnia alia quanta per universum dispersa. Neque ulla assignatur causa naturalis omnium harum mutationum quae secundum leges arithmeticas et exactissimas necessario atque instantanee perficiuntur. Quod est inconveniens.

S. Thomae doctrina Quid hac in re S. Thomas docuerit, ex locis infra citatis patet. De Potentia, q. 7, a. 8, ad 5m: ‘... non oportet, ad hoc quod de aliquo relatio aliqua de novo dicatur, quod aliqua mutatio in ipso fiat, sed sufficit quod fiat mutatio in aliquo extremorum: causa enim habitudinis inter duos est aliquid inhaerens utrique. Unde ex quacumque parte fiat mutatio illius quod habitudinem causabat, tollitur habitudo quae est inter utrumque.’ De Potentia, q. 7, a. 8 c.: ‘Dicendum quod relatio in hoc differt a quantitate et qualitate: quia quantitas et qualitas sunt quaedam accidentia in subiecto remanentia; relatio autem non significat, ut Boetius dicit, ut in subiecto manens, sed ut in transitu quodam ad aliud ... Quod autem dicitur de aliquo ut ab eo in aliud procedens non facit compositionem cum eo, sicut nec actio cum agente. Et propter hoc etiam probat Philosophus v Phys. quod in ad aliquid non potest esse motus: quia, sine aliqua mutatione eius quod ad aliud refertur, potest relatio desinere ex sola mutatione alterius, sicut etiam de actione patet, quod non est motus secundum actionem nisi metaphorice et improprie, sicut exiens de otio in actum mutari dicimus; quod non esset si relatio vel actio significaret aliquid in subiecto manens.’

De Potentia, q. 7, a. 9, ad 7m: ‘... nihil prohibet quod esse desinat huiusmodi accidens [relatio, actio] sine mutatione eius in quo est, quia sua ratio non perficitur prout est in ipso subiecto, sed prout transit in aliud; quo sublato, ratio huius accidentis tollitur quidem quantum ad actum, sed manet quantum ad causam; sicut et subtracta materia

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Each and every quantified being is really related to all other quantified beings in the entire universe by relations that are real, external, and specific. Likewise, all other quantified beings are related to each and every quantified being by relations that are real, external, and specific. For this reason, according to the opinion affirming an additional reality intrinsic to the subject, when any quantified being changes, all other quantified beings in the entire universe would also necessarily change. But no natural cause can be found for all these changes, which necessarily and instantaneously would occur in accordance with extremely exact numerical laws. Therefore, this opinion is inadmissible. St Thomas’s Doctrine What St Thomas taught on this matter is clear from the following quotations. De potentia, q. 7, a. 8, ad 5m: ‘. . . it is not necessary, in order that any new relation be predicated of something, that there be any change in that thing; it suffices that there be a change in any of the terms, for the cause of an order between two things is something inherent in each of them. Hence, any change on the part of that which caused the order nullifies the order between the two.’ De potentia, q. 7, a. 8 c.: ‘It must be said that in this respect a relation differs from quantity and quality in this, that quantity and quality are accidents of some kind that remain in the subject; but, as Boethius says, “relation” does not mean “as remaining in the subject,” but “as in a certain transit to another” . . . But what is attributed to something “as proceeding from it to something else” does not enter into composition with it, as neither does action enter into composition with the agent. And on this account the Philosopher too proves in the Physics, Book v, that there cannot be motion in “(the being related) to something”; because without any change in that which is related to another, a relation can cease to be only through the change of the other; as also is clear about action, that there is no movement as regards action except metaphorically and improperly; as we say that one passing from leisure to act is changed; which would not be the case if relation or action signified something remaining in the subject.’ De potentia, q. 7, a. 9, ad 7m: ‘. . . there is nothing to prevent an accident of this kind [relation, action] from ceasing to be without causing any change in its subject; for it does not have the perfection of its being in that subject, but through transition into another; and with the cessation of that transition, the being of this accident ceases with respect to its act but remains with respect to its cause – as

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tollitur calefactio, licet maneat calefactionis causa.’ In V Phys., lect. 3 (ed. Leon., ii, 237; sect. 8): ‘In illis igitur relationibus quae non ponunt rem aliquam nisi in uno extremorum, non videtur difficile quod mutato illo extremo, in quo relatio realiter existit, de novo dicatur aliquid relative de altero absque sui mutatione, cum nihil ei realiter adveniat. Sed in illis in quibus relatio invenitur realiter in utroque extremorum, videtur difficile quod aliquid dicatur de uno per mutationem alterius absque mutatione sui: cum nihil de novo adveniat alicui absque mutatione eius cui advenit. Unde dicendum est quod si aliquis per suam mutationem efficiatur mihi aequalis, me non mutato, ista aequalitas primo erat in me quodammodo, sicut [codd. scilicet] in sua radice, ex qua habet esse reale: ex hoc enim quod habeo talem quantitatem, competit mihi quod sim aequalis omnibus illis qui eandem quantitatem habent. Cum ergo aliquis de novo accipit illam quantitatem, ista communis radix aequalitatis determinatur ad istum: et ideo nihil advenit mihi de novo per hoc quod incipio esse alteri aequalis per eius mutationem.’

Etiam vide : In I Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a 1, ad 3m. In VII Phys., lect. 6; ed. Leon., ii, 344. Sum. theol., iii, q. 16, a. 6, ad 2m.

Quibus in locis, sequentia notari possunt: (a) Adest distinctio inter praedicata absoluta et relativa: absolutum enim est ‘ut in subiecto manens’; relativum et externum est ‘ut in aliud transiens vel procedens.’ (b) Ad mutationem relationis realis non necessario requiritur mutatio in ipso relationis subiecto, sed sufficit mutatio in termino. Neque valet quodlibet effugium quod inter mutationem impropriam et mutationem proprie dictam excogitetur, cum expresse dictum sit, ‘et ideo nihil advenit mihi de novo per hoc quod incipio esse alteri aequalis per eius mutationem.’ (c) Exemplo innuitur distinctio inter absolutum, relationem internam, et relationem externam. Ubi enim dicitur, ‘ex hoc enim quod habeo talem quantitatem,’ ponitur absolutum. Ubi deinde additur, ‘competit mihi quod sim aequalis omnibus illis qui eandem quantitatem habent,’ innuitur relatio interna. Quando postea concluditur, ‘cum ergo aliquis de novo accipit illam quantitatem, ista communis radix aequalitatis determinatur ad istum,’ additur determinata relatio externa quin ulla nova realitas subiecto intrinseca ponatur.

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when the material [being heated] is removed, the heating also ceases, although the cause of the heating remains.’ In V Phys., lect. 3 (Leonine edition, vol. ii, 237, § 8): ‘In the case of those relations, therefore, whose reality is found in only one of the extremes [subject or term], there is no difficulty in saying that when that extreme changes some new relationship is predicated of the other extreme without its being changed, since nothing real is added to it. But in the case of those relations whose reality is found in both extremes, there seems to be this difficulty, that something is predicated of one of them by reason of a change in the other without any change in the former, since nothing new is added to anything without that thing being changed. Hence, we must conclude that if someone becomes equal to me through a change in him and without any change in me, that equality was first in me in some way, as in the basis upon which it possesses real existence; for from the fact that I have such or such a quantity, I am in a position to be equal to all those who have the same quantity. When, therefore, someone acquires this quantity, that common basis of equality applies to him, and so nothing new comes to me from the fact that I begin to be equal to him as a result of the change in him.’ See also Super I Sententiarum, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3m; In VII Phys., lect. 6, Leonine edition, vol. ii, 344; Summa theologiae, 3, q. 16, a. 6, ad 2m. In the above passages, note the following points: a) There is a distinction between absolute and relative predicates: an absolute predicate is ‘remaining in the subject’; a relative and external predicate is ‘directed or proceeding towards another.’ b) For a change in a real relation a change in the subject of the relation is not a necessary requirement; a change in the term is sufficient. It is not a valid escape to invent a distinction between improper change and change properly so called, since St Thomas expressly says, ‘and so nothing new comes to me from the fact that I begin to be equal to him [someone else] as a result of a change in him.’ c) St Thomas’s example suggests a distinction between an absolute, an internal relation, and an external relation. Where he says, ‘from the fact that I have such or such a quantity,’ he states an absolute. When he adds, ‘I am in a position to be equal to all those who have the same quantity,’ he indicates an internal relation. When he concludes, ‘when, therefore, someone acquires this quantity, that common basis of equality applies to him,’ there is added a determinate external relation without there being any new reality intrinsic to the subject.

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Obicitur 1 Nisi conceditur superaddita illa realitas subiecto intrinseca, tolluntur omnes relationes reales. Sed falsum est consequens. Ergo falsum est antecedens. Distinguitur maior: tolluntur omnes relationes reales, si negantur relationes reales et internae, conceditur, si affirmantur relationes reales et internae, negatur. 2 Instatur. Atqui non sufficit relatio interna realis. Nam magis determinata est relatio externa quam interna. Quae maior determinatio exigit maiorem quandam realitatem, secus tollitur adaequatio veritatis. Distinguitur haec praemissa: exigit maiorem realitatem subiecto extrinsecam, conceditur, subiecto intrinsecam, negatur. 3 Instatur. Atqui exigitur maior realitas subiecto intrinseca. Quod vere praedicatur de aliquo est ei intrinsecum. Atqui relatio externa vere de subiecto praedicatur. Ergo realitas relationis externae est subiecto intrinseca. Distinguitur maior: Praedicatum absolutum dicit realitatem subiecto intrinsecam, conceditur, praedicatum relativum et externum dicit realitatem subiecto intrinsecam, subdistinguitur, quae realitas est relationis internae, conceditur, quae realitas superadditur realitati relationis internae, negatur. 4 Instatur. Atqui non sufficit realitas relationis internae. Nam relatio interna respicit quoslibet terminos secundum rationem quandam genericam; relatio autem externa respicit hunc terminum secundum rationem specificam; et ideo sunt duo respectus qui, qua respectus, inter se vere et realiter distinguuntur. Respondetur. Sunt duo respectus inter se distincti inquantum respectus sunt, distinguitur, quatenus sunt in mente, conceditur, quatenus sunt in rebus, subdistinguitur, sunt duo per realitatem subiecto intrinsecam, negatur, per realitatem subiecto intrinsecam et extrinsecam, conceditur. 5 Instatur. Atqui realitas extrinseca non potest facere duos respectus reales ex uno. Respondetur. Per realitatem extrinsecam constitui non potest obiectiva determinatio alicuius respectus, negatur; per realitatem extrinsecam constitui non potest superaddita realitas subiecto intrinseca, conceditur. 6 Forte sunt relationes externae quibus desint relationes internae quas determinent.

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Objections 1 Unless an additional reality intrinsic to the subject is admitted, there are no such things as real relations; but the consequence is false, and therefore the antecedent is false. To this we reply that this objection would hold only if one denies that there are real internal relations. 2 But a real internal relation is not enough. For an external relation is more determinate than an internal relation, and this greater determination demands some greater reality, or otherwise there is no truth-correspondence. Our reply is that it demands a greater reality extrinsic to the subject but not a greater reality intrinsic to the subject. 3 But it does demand a greater reality intrinsic to the subject. For what is truly predicated of anything is intrinsic to that thing. But an external relation is truly predicated of the subject; therefore, the reality of an external relation is intrinsic to the subject. We admit that an absolute predicate indicates a reality intrinsic to the subject. An external relative predicate, however, indicates a reality that is simply the reality of an internal relation, not a reality added to an internal relation.

4 But the reality of an internal relation does not suffice. For an internal relation has a respect to any of its terms according to some general reason, whereas an external relation has a respect to this term according to a specific reason; therefore, there are two respects which, as respects, are really and truly distinct from each other. We agree that these two respects are distinct conceptually as respects, and we also agree that they are two in extramental reality by reason of the reality that is intrinsic to the subject and the reality that is extrinsic to the subject; but we deny that they are two through the reality intrinsic to the subject. 5 But an extrinsic reality cannot make two real respects out of one. We agree that an extrinsic reality cannot constitute an additional reality intrinsic to the subject, but we deny that an extrinsic reality cannot constitute an objective determination of any respect. 6 Perhaps there are external relations that lack internal relations which they determine.

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Respondetur. A parte rei desunt relationes internae quae ab externis determinentur, negatur. In mentibus nostris deest illa completa rerum intelligentia ut in singulis casibus cum certitudine et sine admixtione erroris assignari possit relatio interna externam fundans, conceditur.

Quare omnino notandum est ad relationem externam cognoscendam sufficere meram nominum intelligentiam et factorum contingentium et singularium ohservationem; e contra, ad relationem internam realem cognoscendam requiritur ipsarum rerum intelligentia; quam ob causam, et omnia nostra exempla relationum internarum ex scientiis sunt desumpta, et ipsa relationis internae notitia non ante habetur quam scientiae ita sint evolutae ut obiectum reflectionis et investigationis analyticae praebere possint. At quamvis omnes relationes reales et internae assignari non possint antequam omnes res penitus intelligantur, non ideo dubitandum est omnes res esse penitus intelligibiles quia nos non omnia intelligamus. Caeterum, ad scopum praesentem sufficere videtur quod relationes internas et reales adesse probavimus in accidentibus et substantiis finitis, in animabus et principiis rerum metaphysicis, in causatis et quantis, in rebus naturalibus, viventibus, et intellectualibus.

QUAESTIO XXXV Utrum in rebus creatis existant (1) realitas simpliciter absoluta, (2) realitas simpliciter relativa, (3) realitas absoluta secundum quid, (4) realitas relativa secundum quid Ad terminos in rebus creatis: praescinditur ergo a Deo. existant: quaeritur non de conceptibus sed de rebus. realitas: sive eius quod est sive eius quo constituitur id quod est. absolutum: opponitur relativo. relativum: quod ad aliud ordinatur. simpliciter: sub omni aspectu; secundum totam suam realitatem. secundum quid: sub quodam aspectu sed non omni; secundum partem suae realitatis sed non omnem.

Argumenta 1 Omnis relatio est aut interna aut externa.

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That in reality there are lacking the internal relations that external relations determine, we deny. But in our minds there is lacking that complete understanding of reality that would enable us in each individual case to assign with certitude and without any fear of error the internal relation that grounds an external relation. It is most important to note, therefore, that the mere understanding of words and the observation of individual contingent facts are sufficient in order to know an external relation. On the other hand, knowledge of a real internal relation requires an understanding of the things themselves. For this reason all our examples of internal relations are taken from the sciences, and that knowledge of an internal relation is not had until those sciences are sufficiently developed as to be able to furnish an object for reflection and analytical investigation. But although all real internal relations cannot be assigned until all things are completely understood, we should not doubt that all things are completely intelligible simply because we do not understand them all. At any rate, it seems sufficient for our present purposes to have proven that there are real internal relations in accidents and in finite substances, in souls and in the metaphysical principles of beings, in things that are caused and quantified, and in natural, living, and intellectual beings. QUESTION 35 Do there exist in creation (1) a simply absolute reality, (2) a simply relative reality, (3) a reality that is absolute in a qualified sense, (4) a reality that is relative in a qualified sense? Terminology in creation: hence, prescinding from God. exist : not a question of concepts but of things. reality: either of what is, or of that by which what is is constituted. absolute: opposite of relative. relative: that which has an order to another being. simply: in every respect; according to its total reality; without qualification. in a qualified sense: in some respect, but not in every respect; according to part of its reality but not to the whole of it. Arguments 1 A relation is either internal or external.

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Nam omnis relatio aut est aut non est subiecto ita intrinseca ut tolli non possit quin tollatur ipsum subiectum. 2 Omne subiectum relationis realis est absolutum. Cum enim relatio sit ordo unius ad aliud, aut est ordo absoluti ad aliud aut est ordo relationis ad aliud. Sed relatio relationis est ens rationis tantum; et ordo relationis ad aliud est relatio relationis. Ergo omne subiectum relationis realis est absolutum. 3 Subiectum relationis internae et realis non est absolutum simpliciter. Illud non est absolutum simpliciter de cuius ratione est relatio; sed relatio est de ratione omnis subiecti relationis internae; ergo subiectum relationis internae non est absolutum simpliciter. 4 Relatio realis et interna non ponit in rebus realitatem quandam simpliciter relativam. Cum enim relatio interna est de ipsa ratione sui subiecti, ponitur in rebus eo ipso quod suum subiectum ponitur; et omne subiectum relationis realis est absolutum. 5 Relatio realis et externa non ponit in rebus realitatem quandam simpliciter relativam. Iam enim constat relationem externam non addere aliam realitatem subiecto intrinsecam super realitatem relationis internae. 6 In rebus creatis ea existunt quae secundum quid sunt absoluta et secundum quid relativa. Eiusmodi enim sunt subiecta relationum internarum, quae sunt absoluta secundum quod sunt subiecta, et sunt relativa inquantum relationes sunt de ipsa eorum ratione. V.g., accidentia, naturae, animae, principia rerum metaphysica, subiecta principiorum analyticorum cum praedicato relativo, quanta, res quae legibus naturalibus subsunt, partes organicae, potentiae, habitus, et operationes psychologicae. 7 In rebus creatis non existit quod sit simpliciter relativum. Si enim existeret, esset relatio. Sed relatio aut est interna aut externa; et neutra ponit in rebus realitatem simpliciter relativam. Caeterum, quidquid reale est affirmari potest; quidquid affirmari potest absoluti rationem participat cum iam stet extra causas et in se ipso; et ideo omne relativum, inquantum est reale, secundum quid est absolutum. 8 In rebus creatis non existit quod sit simpliciter absolutum.

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For a relation either is or is not so intrinsic to a subject that it cannot cease to be without the subject ceasing to be. 2 Every subject of a real relation is absolute. For since a relation is the order of one to another, it is either the order of an absolute to another or it is the order of a relation to another being. But a relation of a relation is only a conceptual being, and the order of a relation to another is a relation of a relation. Therefore, every subject of a real relation is absolute. 3 The subject of a real internal relation is not simply absolute. Anything whose essence includes a relation is not simply absolute. But a relation is part of the essence of every subject of an internal relation, and therefore the subject of an internal relation is not simply absolute. 4 A real internal relation does not posit in things a reality that is simply relative. Since an internal relation is part of the essence of its subject, it is posited in things by the very positing of its subject; and every subject of a real relation is absolute. 5 A real external relation does not posit in things a reality that is simply relative. It is already proven that an external relation does not add to the reality of an internal relation a further reality intrinsic to the subject. 6 Among created things there exist those that are absolute in a qualified sense and relative in a qualified sense. Such are the subjects of internal relations. They are absolute inasmuch as they are subjects, and relative inasmuch as they are relations in their very essence: accidents, natures, souls, the metaphysical principles of beings, the subjects of analytic principles having a relative predicate, quantified things, things subject to the laws of nature, organic parts, faculties, habits, and psychological operations. 7 Among created things there is nothing that is relative in every respect. If one such did exist, it would be a relation. But a relation is either internal or external, and neither posits in things a reality that is relative in every respect. Also, whatever is real can be affirmed; whatever can be affirmed participates in the formality of the absolute since it already stands outside its causes and in itself; and therefore every relative, inasmuch as it is real, is in some respect absolute. 8 Among created things there is nothing that is absolute in every respect.

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Quod est simpliciter absolutum non habet causas reales sive extrinsecas sive intrinsecas. Sed quod non habet causas extrinsecas non est creatum; et quod non habet causas intrinsecas non est finitum. Praeterea, omnis res creata est quaedam natura; et omnis natura est principium intrinsecum operationum; et omne tale principium creatum realiter refertur ad aliud realiter distinctum. Praeterea, si quidquam in rebus creatis esset absolutum simpliciter, saltem substantia esset absoluta simpliciter; sed, uti supra conclusimus, non concreta substantiae entitas sed generica substantiae ratio est absoluta simpliciter, cum omne quod est substantia etiam natura sit. Praeterea, nihil cognoscimus nisi affirmamus; nihil affirmamus nisi idem concipimus; et nihil concipimus sine relationibus; nihil ergo cognoscimus sine relationibus. Quod nihil concipimus sine relationibus constat tum a priori tum a posteriori; a priori quidem quia omnis finitus intelligendi actus est syntheticus ut multa per unum apprehendantur; a posteriori autem quia per singulos conceptus primos discurrendo semper invenitur analogia, proportio, comparatio, uti essentiae ad esse, potentiae ad actum, materiae ad formam, naturae ad operationem, partis ad totum, accidentis ad substantiam, sensibilis ad sensum, appetibilis ad appetitum, intelligibilis ad intellectum. Et similiter in mathesi regulae determinant operationes, operationes autem generant numeros omnis generis; in physica definiuntur obiecta per leges quibus obiecta inter se religantur; in chimia definiuntur elementa per relationum series in tabula periodica contentas; in physiologia definiuntur organa per functiones quas intra totum exerceant; etc., etc. Quod autem nihil sine relationibus cognoscimus, ita verum est ut hae relationes aut reales aut rationis sint. Ita Deum esse simpliciter absolutum ad extra agnoscimus, non quia sine relationibus Deum cognoscamus sed quia relationes Dei ad creaturas non reales sed rationis esse affirmamus. Similiter, inquantum res creatas causis adhuc ignotis praescientifice cognoscimus, non sine relationibus eas cognoscimus; at hae relationes sunt rationis tantum, cum pertineant ad nexus mere linguisticos seu, generalius, psychologicos. 5 Cum autem ad intelligentiam

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What is simply absolute has no real causes, either extrinsic or intrinsic. But that which has no extrinsic causes is not created, and that which has no intrinsic causes is not finite. Besides, every created thing is a certain nature. But every nature is an intrinsic principle of operations, and every such created principle is really related to another really distinct from it. Also, if any created thing were simply absolute, it would at least be a simply absolute substance. But, as we concluded above, no concrete substantial entity but only the generic formality of substance is simply absolute, since everything that is a substance is also a nature. Furthermore, we know nothing unless we affirm it; we affirm nothing unless we conceive it; but without relations we conceive nothing, and therefore we know nothing without relations. The fact that we conceive nothing without relations is clear on both a priori and a posteriori grounds: a priori, because every finite act of understanding is synthetic as apprehending many things as one; a posteriori, because in going through every primary concept you will always find analogy, proportion, and comparison, such as of essence to existence, potency to act, matter to form, nature to operation, a part to the whole, accident to substance, the sensible to the sense, the appetible to the appetite, the intelligible to the intellect. Similarly, in mathematics rules determine operations, and operations generate numbers of every kind; in physics objects are defined through the laws by which they are connected to one another; in chemistry elements are defined through the various series of relations that are found in the periodic table; in physiology organs are defined by the functions they have with regard to the whole body; and so on. As it is true that we know nothing without relations, so these relations are either real or conceptual. Thus, we speak of God as being simply absolute as to what is outside of him not because we know God without relations, but because we affirm the relations of God to creatures to be not real but conceptual. Likewise, in knowing created things prescientifically, when we still do not know their causes, we do not know them without relations; but these relations are but conceptual relations, since they pertain to connections that are merely linguistic or, more generally, psychological.5 But when we come to understand them, we know them 5 [It is not easy to know exactly what Lonergan means by ‘linguistic or ... psychological.’ It is clear that, for Lonergan, real internal relations are known by the sciences, which know created things ‘through their causes,’ that is, through their formal intelligibility. Prescientific knowledge of things does not know their real internal relations. But that does not mean that it knows things without their relations. It does mean, though, that the connections or relations are not scientifically established.]

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rerum perveniamus, iam per causas cognoscimus; et cum causae reales sint, relationes etiam reales sint necesse est. Dixerit tamen quispiam quantitatem esse simpliciter absolutam. At quantitas est accidens; ei ergo competit in alio esse; ideo qua accidens ad aliud refertur. Praeterea, quantitas dicitur a quaestione, Quantum? Cui quaestioni numquam respondetur nisi per comparationem unius quantitatis ad aliam. Cognita ergo quantitas sine relatione non datur; et ideo obiciens de incognita quantitate cogitare videtur. At ulterius obicitur quod ‘ad se’ et ‘ad aliud’ sunt rationes simpliciter diversae; ergo absolutum et relativum sunt realitates simpliciter diversae. Respondetur quod ‘ad se’ est relatio alicuius ad se ipsum et ideo est ens rationis tantum; sed inconveniens videtur de realitate iudicare secundum entia rationis tantum. Proinde ‘non ad aliud’ et ‘ad aliud’ sane sunt rationes simpliciter diversae; praeterea, de eodem secundum idem praedicari non possunt; at nihil impedit quominus de eodem secundum aliud et aliud praedicentur; ita res secundum genericam substantiae rationem ad aliud non est, et tamen secundum specificam naturae rationem ad aliud est.

QUAESTIO XXXVI Utrum relationes convenienter in praedicamentales et transcendentales dividantur Praenotamen Cum scientia sit certa rerum per causas cognitio, quae neque facillime neque celerrime ab hominibus acquiritur, aliud est stadium in scientia evolventi initiale, in quo causae penitus ignorantur, aliud autem est stadium finale, in quo causae certo sciuntur, alia denique et multa sunt stadia intermedia, in quibus causarum cognitio pedetentim augetur. Proinde, cum definitiones cognitionem exprimant, pariter distinguendum est inter definitiones initiales, finales, et intermedias. Initiales enim definitiones, si plus quam nominales sunt, nihil de ipsis rebus dicunt nisi ea quae exterius appareant. Finales autem definitiones ipsas rerum essentias seu causas intrinsecas atque constitutivas manifestant.

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through their causes; and since their causes are real, their relations must necessarily be real as well. Someone might say that quantity is simply absolute. But quantity is an accident, and therefore its mode of being is to be in another; and so as an accident it is related to another. Besides, ‘quantity’ comes from the question, ‘Quantum?’ ‘How much?’ There is no answering this question except by comparing one quantity to another. There is no known quantity, therefore, without a relation, and so the objector would seem to be thinking of some unknown quantity. But it might be further objected that ‘to itself’ and ‘to another’ are absolutely diverse formalities, and that therefore an absolute and a relative are two absolutely different realities. Our answer is that ‘to itself’ is the relation of something to itself, and hence is only a conceptual being; but it seems improper to make a judgment about reality according to what are merely conceptual beings. Again, ‘not to another’ and ‘to another’ are surely utterly diverse formalities. Besides, they cannot both be predicated of the same thing in the same respect, although there is nothing to prevent them from being predicated of the same thing according to different respects. Thus, a thing is not ‘to another’ according to the generic formality of substance, and yet it is ‘to another’ according to the specific formality of nature. QUESTION 36 Is the division of relations into predicamental and transcendental appropriate? Preliminary Note Since science is the certain knowledge of things through their causes – something that is not very easily or very quickly acquired by human beings – there is an initial stage in the development of a science in which the causes are completely unknown, a final stage in which the causes are known with certainty, and many intermediate stages in which the knowledge of causes gradually increases. Accordingly, since definitions express knowledge, we distinguish in the same way between initial, final, and intermediate definitions. Initial definitions, if they are more than nominal definitions, indicate nothing about things except their external appearance. Final definitions express the very essences of things, their intrinsic constitutive causes.

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Intermediae denique sunt definitiones quae partim in causarum declaratione et partim vel in nominibus vel in descriptione eorum quae exterius apparent fundantur. Porro, cum divisiones rerum definitiones necessario sequantur, non aliter circa divisiones quam circa ipsam cognitionem atque definitiones distinguendum est. Initiales ergo sunt divisiones quae in stadio scientifico initiali fiunt et in definitionibus initialibus fundantur. Finales sunt divisiones quae in stadio scientifico finali fiunt et in definitionibus finalibus fundantur. Intermediae denique sunt divisiones quae in stadio scientifico intermedio fiunt et in definitionibus intermediis fundantur.

Ad terminos relatio: ordo unius ad aliud. convenienter: scilicet, secundum stadium quoddam scientificum; uti ex praenotamine elucet, nihil prohibet quominus eadem divisio et alteri stadio scientifico conveniat et alteri non conveniat. praedicamentum: quodlibet ex decem illis generibus quae Aristoteles in opusculo quodam logico posuit, nempe, quid, quantum, quale, ad quid, actio, passio, ubi, quando, situs, et habitus. relatio praedicamentalis: relatio quae non invenitur nisi in praedicamento quarto. relatio transcendentalis: relatio quae ad quartum praedicamentum non restringitur.

Theoremata 1 Quod relationes transcendentales non cognoscuntur nisi causae rerum ultimae cognoscuntur. Nam inter relationes transcendentales enumerantur relatio potentiae ad actum, materiae ad formam, essentiae ad esse, naturae ad operationem, accidentis ad substantiam. Et inter ultimas rerum causas intrinsecas atque constitutivas enumerantur potentia et actus, materia et forma, essentia et esse, natura et operatio, substantia et accidens. Ergo saltem non omnes relationes transcendentales cognosci possunt quin cognoscantur ultimae rerum causae. Et ideo cum causae ignorentur in stadio scientifico initiali, in illo stadio aut nulla aut valde incompleta est consideratio relationum transcendentalium.

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Intermediate definitions are those that are based partly on some clarity about causes and partly on names or on a description of external appearances. Again, since the divisions of things necessarily follow their definitions, distinctions about divisions must be made in the same way as distinctions about knowledge itself and about definitions. Initial divisions, then, are those that are made in the initial stage of a science and are based upon initial definitions. Final divisions are those that are made in the final stage of a science and are based on final definitions. Intermediate divisions are those that are made in an intermediate stage of a science and are based on intermediate definitions. Terminology relation: the order of one to another. appropriately: in accordance with a certain stage of a science; as is clear from the preliminary note, there is nothing to prevent the same division from being appropriate to one stage of a science and inappropriate to another stage. predicament [also category]: any of the ten categories that Aristotle listed in a short treatise on logic [The Categories]: substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, place, time, posture, and accessory. predicamental relation: a relation that is found only in the fourth category. transcendental relation: a relation that is not restricted to the fourth category. Theorems 1 Transcendental relations are not known unless the ultimate causes of things are known. Among transcendental relations are the relation of potency to act, of matter to form, of essence to existence, of nature to operation, of accidents to substance. And among the ultimate intrinsic constitutive causes of things are potency and act, matter and form, essence and existence, nature and operation, substance and accidents. Therefore, at least not all transcendental relations can be known without knowing the ultimate causes of things. And therefore, since in the initial stage of a science the causes are not known, there can be at that stage no or at best only a very incomplete consideration of transcendental relations.

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2 Quod praedicamenta non sunt causae. Nam praedicamenta dicunt genera rerum ultima, et genera ultima non sunt causae ultimae. Praeterea, praedicamenta apud Aristotelem sunt decem quae supra enumeravimus, sed causae apud Aristotelem sunt quattuor, nempe, finis, agens, materia, et forma. Praeterea, praedicamenta decem non ponuntur ab Aristotele nisi in opusculo logico; sed causae inquiruntur in Metaphysicis, Physicis, De Caelo et Mundo, De Generatione et Corruptione, De Anima, etc. Praeterea, in scientiis et serio de causis disputatur et serio de definitionibus nominalibus vel descriptionibus apparentium non disputatur. Iam vero sine disputatione seria per plus viginti saecula manent immota atque immutata decem praedicamenta. E contra, de causis extrinsecis et maxime de causis intrinsecis multae atque graves sunt quaestiones disputatae. V.g., an realiter distinguantur potentia et actus, materia et forma, essentia et esse, substantia et accidens. Praeterea, ex praedicamentis in causas cognoscendas proceditur. Ita in vii Metaphysicorum reducitur substantia in formam tamquam in causam essendi; in viii, substantia materialis reducitur in materiam et formam; in xii, ponuntur substantiae separatae quae sunt formae sine materia. Ulterius, Aquinas quia inter essentiam et esse distinxit, inter Deum et angelos etiam distinguere potuit secundum causas intrinsecas, nam angelum posuit formam quae non esset suum esse, et Deum formam quae esset suum esse. Praeterea, in iii Physicorum Aristoteles reduxit actionem et passionem in motum et relationem; actio enim definitur motus huius ut ab hoc, et passio motus huius ut in hoc. Iam vero motus non restringitur ad unum praedicamentum cum in ubi, quale, et quantum inveniatur; et relatio motus sive ad agens sive ad patiens non videtur praedicamentalis cum de motu et non de substantia dicatur. Praeterea, in iv Physicorum reducitur locus ad terminum immobilem primum continentis, et reducitur tempus ad numerum et mensuram motus secundum prius et posterius. Praeterea, novem praedicamenta in unam causam realem atque intrinsecam reducuntur, nempe, in accidens seu in id cui competit esse in alio. Praeterea, substantia quae est praedicamentum primum non idem dicit ac substantia quae definitur id cui competit esse per se. Nam praedicamentalis substantia dividitur in primam ‘hic homo,’ ‘hic bos’ et secundam ‘homo,’ ‘bos.’ Iam vero substantiae secundae nullo modo competit esse per se; nam substantia secunda est quoddam universale, et universali non competit esse nisi in alio, scilicet, in mente.

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2 The predicaments are not causes. The predicaments express the ultimate kinds or categories of beings, and ultimate categories are not ultimate causes. [Our reasons for this are the following.] [a] In Aristotle there are the ten predicaments which we listed above, but also four causes, namely, final cause, agent, matter, and form. [b] Again, Aristotle treated the ten predicaments only in a work on logic, while he investigated causes in his Metaphysics, Physics, De caelo et mundo, De generatione et corruptione, De anima, and so on. [c] In science there is a serious disagreement about causes, but no such disagreement about nominal definitions or descriptions of appearances. For more than twenty centuries the ten predicaments have remained unchallenged and unchanged. On the contrary, extrinsic causes and especially intrinsic causes have been the subject of great controversy – for example, whether there is a real distinction between potency and act, between matter and form, between essence and existence, between substance and accidents. [d] There is a progression from the predicaments to a knowledge of causes. Thus, in Metaphysics, Book vii, substance is reduced to form as to a cause of being; in Book viii, material substance is reduced to matter and form; in Book xii, Aristotle posits separate substances, which are forms without matter. In addition, Aquinas made a real distinction between essence and existence and therefore was able to distinguish between God and angels in terms of intrinsic causes, for he affirmed that an angel is a form that is not its existence, whereas God is a form that is his existence. [e] In Physics, Book iii, Aristotle reduced action and passion to motion and relation. He defined action as a motion of this thing as being from it, and passion as a motion of this thing as being in it. Now motion is not restricted to only one predicament, since it is found in place, in quality, and in quantity; and the relation of motion either to the agent or to the patient does not seem to be predicamental, since he is discussing motion, not substance. [f] In Physics, Book iv, place is reduced to the immobile first boundary of the container, and time is reduced to the number and measure of motion in terms of before and after. [g] Nine of the predicaments are reduced to a single real intrinsic cause, namely, to accident, that is, to that to which it is proper to be in another. [h] Substance that is the first predicament does not mean the same as substance defined as that to which it is proper to be per se. For predicamental substance is divided into first (this man, this ox) and second (man, ox). Now it does not at all belong to second substance to be per se; for second substance is a universal, and it does not belong to a universal to be per se but only in another, that is, in the

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Neque soli substantiae primae competit esse per se; nam substantia prima est suppositum quod iam est per se; et essentiae substantiali et individuali, quae non est suppositum, competit esse per se. 3 Quod relationes non dividuntur in praedicamentales et transcendentales nisi in stadio scientifico intermedio, neque valde convenienter ita dividuntur etiam in illo stadio. Primo, enim, cum relationes transcendentales cognitionem causarum supponant, sane non considerantur in stadio initiali in quo causae ignorantur. Deinde, cum in stadio finali ita perfecta sit scientia ut res certo per causas cognoscantur, iam omittitur omnis praedicamentorum consideratio cum praedicamenta non sint causae. Tertio, in stadio intermedio in quo res definiuntur partim secundum causas et partim secundum nomina vel exterius apparentia, sane fieri potest divisio relationum secundum quod in praedicamento determinato inveniuntur vel per diversa praedicamenta circumeunt. Quarto, etiam in stadio intermedio non valde convenit ista divisio. Scientia enim definitur certa rerum per causas cognitio; sed data divisio relationum secundum praedicamenta supponere videtur scientiam esse certam rerum cognitionem non per causas sed per praedicamenta. Obicitur 1 Rerum essentiae sunt causae quaedam intrinsecae atque constitutivae. Sed per genus et differentiam definiuntur essentiae. Ergo praedicamenta, quae sunt genera ultima, ad ipsam causarum cognitionem pertinent. Respondetur. Definitio per quodlibet genus et quamlibet differentiam est essentialis, negatur. Definitio per genus quod causam manifestat et per differentiam quae causam manifestat est essentialis, conceditur. Praedicamenta sunt genera quae causas manifestant, subdistinguitur, per se, negatur, per accidens, inquantum sunt initium ex quo ad causas investigandas proceditur, transeat.

2 Intrinsecae sunt causae in quas alia ultimatim reducuntur. Atqui alia ita reducuntur in praedicamenta. Ergo praedicamenta sunt causae quaedam intrinsecae. Et minor exemplo constet: omnis operatio immanens reducitur non in praedicamentum actionis sed in praedicamentum qualitatis; et eiusmodi reductio est in aliud tamquam in ultimum.

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mind. Nor does it belong only to first substance to be per se; for first substance is a supposit, which already is per se, and it belongs to a substantial individual essence, which is not a supposit, to be per se. 3 Only in the intermediate scientific stage are relations divided into predicamental and transcendental, and even in that state such a division is not very suitable. First, since transcendental relations suppose a knowledge of causes, they are surely not considered in the initial scientific stage, in which the causes are unknown. Second, since in the final stage a science is so completely developed that the realities are known with certitude through the causes, all consideration of the predicaments is now omitted, since the predicaments are not causes. Third, in the intermediate stage, wherein the realities are defined partly according to their causes and partly by nominal definitions or by external appearances, there certainly can be a division of relations according to which they are found in a particular predicament or over several predicaments. Fourth, this division is not very suitable even in the intermediate stage. Science is defined as certain knowledge of things through their causes; but the aforesaid division of relations according to the predicaments seems to suppose that a science is a certain knowledge of things not through causes but through the predicaments. Objections 1 The essences of things are intrinsic constitutive causes. But essences are defined by genus and [specific] difference. Therefore predicaments, which are ultimate genera, belong to the knowledge of causes itself. Reply: That a definition by any genus and any difference is a definition of an essence, we deny; that a definition by a genus that expresses a cause and by a difference that expresses a cause is an essential definition, we grant. We deny that predicaments are genera that per se express causes, although they might per accidens express causes, inasmuch as they are the starting point from which the search for causes could begin. 2 Intrinsic causes are those to which other things are ultimately reduced. But other things are reduced in this way to predicaments. Therefore, predicaments are intrinsic causes. The minor premise is proven by the following example: every immanent operation is reduced not to the predicament of action but to the predicament of quality; and this sort of reduction is a reduction to another as ultimate.

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Maior distinguitur: causa intrinseca est in quam aliud ultimatim reducitur, tamquam in melius notum quoad nos, negatur, tamquam in melius notum quoad se, conceditur. Minor contradistinguitur: alia reducuntur in praedicamenta tamquam in melius nota quoad nos, conceditur, tamquam in melius nota quoad se, negatur. Ad exemplum: difficultas oritur ex eo quod in latinitate mediaevali ‘operatio’ et ‘actio’ significabant modo aequivoco quod Graeci per voces energeia et poi¯esis sine ulla confusione dicebant. Porro, differentia illa quae per reductionem ad praedicamenta exponitur etiam clarius per reductionem ad causas manifestatur. Nam operatio vel actio ut poi¯esis dicunt exercitium causalitatis efficientis; sed actio vel operatio ut energeia dicunt actum secundum; et actus secundus exponitur secundum proportionem fundamentalem, nempe potentiae ad actum. V.g., sicut intellectus possibilis se habet ad speciem intelligibilem tamquam potentia prima ad actum primum, ita species intelligibilis se habet ad intelligere sicut potentia secunda ad actum secundum. Cf. De Potentia, q. 1, a. 1 c.

Scholion Secundum A. Krempel,6 S. Thomas docuit nullam esse relationem realem nisi substantiae ad terminum actu existentem;7 quare non reales sed rationis esse tum relationes in sex ultimis praedicamentis contentas,8 tum relationem potentiae ad actum,9 tum relationem essentiae ad esse,10 tum relationem ipsius materiae ad formam;11 unde concludit relationes reales transcendentales non solum tardius sed etiam contra mentem S. Thomae in scholam thomisticam esse intrusas.12 Agnoscit tamen idem auctor contra suam thesin relationem realem accidentis ad accidens esse positam in Sum. theol., i, q. 28, a. 1, ad 4m.13 Sed ad hoc factum explicandum recurrit ad duplicem hypothesin, vel hos articulos de relationibus trinitariis per amanuensem esse factos, vel ipsum S. Thomam mente defatigatum fuisse.14

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[Reply]: We distinguish the major premise as follows: that an intrinsic cause is that to which something else is ultimately reduced whereby it is better known with respect to us, we deny; but whereby it is better known with respect to itself, we grant. And we distinguish the minor premise accordingly: other things are reduced to predicaments to know them better with respect to us, we grant ; but to know them better as they are in themselves, we deny. As to the above example: the difficulty arises from the fact that the medieval Latin words operatio and actio were used indifferently to signify what the Greeks without any confusion indicated by the words energeia and poi¯esis. Also, that difference which is expressed through a reduction to predicaments is even more clearly manifested through reduction to causes. For operatio or actio as poi¯esis refer to an exercise of efficient causality; but actio or operatio as energeia refer to second act, and second act is explained by way of a fundamental proportion, namely, that of potency to act. For example, as the possible intellect is to an intelligible species as first potency to first act, so the intelligible species is to the act of understanding as second potency to second act. See De potentia, q. 1, a. 1 c. Excursus According to A. Krempel,6 St Thomas taught that there was no real relation except that of substance to an actually existing term;7 that therefore relations present in the six last predicaments,8 the relation of potency to act,9 the relation of essence to existence,10 and the relation of matter to form11 were not real but only conceptual relations. Hence he concluded that real transcendental relations were introduced into Thomism not only later on but even contrary to the mind of St Thomas. 12 This same author, however, did acknowledge as being against his thesis that a real relation of one accident to another was affirmed in Summa theologiae 1, q. 28, a. 1, ad 4m.13 But in order to explain this fact, he resorted to two hypotheses: either that those articles on the trinitarian relations were composed by a secretary, or that St Thomas himself was mentally fatigued.14 6 La doctrine de la relation chez saint Thomas: Expos´e, historique et syst´ematique (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1952). 7 Ibid. 147–66; 185–89. 8 Ibid. 426–50. 9 Ibid. 348–50. 10 Ibid. 350–55. 11 Ibid. 583–609. 12 Ibid. 645–70. 13 Ibid. 161–66. 14 Ibid. 165, note.

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At duplex haec hypothesis minime nobis probabilis videtur, cum hic in quaestionibus trinitariis nova quaedam atque acutissima inveniatur materiae ordinatio quae neque amanuensi parum perito neque defatigationi mentis S. Thomae attribui possit. Et ideo thesis auctoris, inquantum est negativa atque exclusiva, etiam falsa est iudicanda. Praeterea, quos supra citavimus locos qui negant subiectum necessario realitatem quandam acquirere vel amittere eo quod relationem realem acquirat vel amittat, auctor ita interpretatur15 ut distinctio inter ‘mutari’ et ‘fieri’ aliunde exquisita textui ingeratur ad thesin systematicam salvandam, et ut illud ‘nihil’ in v Physicorum (lect. 3) alto silentio praetermittatur.16 Qui interpretandi modus iterum nos conducit ad negandam thesin auctoris qua negativam atque exclusivam. Attamen, cum fumus non fiat sine igni, omnino concedendum credimus multa esse apud S. Thomam quae thesi auctoris faveant. Quemadmodum vero intelligenda sint, ex quaestione praesenti quodammodo indicari ducimus, nempe, in omni scientia existere stadia initialia, intermedia, et finalia tum quoad causarum cognitionem tum quoad systematicam huius cognitionis expressionem; et quo magis quis ad scientiam perficiendam contulerit, eo magis ipse causas cognoscit et eo minus17 systematica huius cognitionis expressione uti potest.

QUAESTIO XXXVII Utrum relationes reales creatae convenienter dividantur, secundum essentiam in internas et externas, et secundum esse in entium-quae et entium-quibus Ad terminos relatio: ordo unius ad aliud. creata: ergo non agitur de relationibus divinis.

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But these two hypotheses seem to us to be scarcely probable, since here in dealing with the trinitarian relations you will find a new and extremely astute ordering of the material such as could be attributed neither to an inexperienced secretary nor to a mentally fatigued Aquinas. Therefore, this author’s thesis, insofar as it is negative and exclusive, must be judged to be false. Besides, the passages we have referred to above which deny that a subject necessarily acquires or loses a certain reality by the fact that it acquires or loses a real relation, the author interprets as follows, 15 saying that the distinction between ‘to be changed’ and ‘to become’ has been imported from elsewhere and inserted into the text in order to save the systematic thesis; and the word ‘nothing’ in In V Phys. (lect. 3) is passed over in silence.16 This sort of interpretation once again leads us to deny the author’s thesis in its negative and exclusive aspect. Nevertheless, since there is no smoke without fire, we feel that we must by all means grant that there are many things in St Thomas that favor this author’s thesis. As to how they are to be understood, however, we think it is in some way indicated from the present question, namely, that in every science there are initial, intermediate, and final stages both with respect to a knowledge of causes and with respect to a systematic presentation of this knowledge. And the more one has contributed to the development of a science, the more one knows the causes and the less17 one is able to make use of a systematic presentation of this knowledge. QUESTION 37 Are real created relations appropriately divided into internal and external as regards essence, and into beings-which and beings-by-which as regards existence? Terminology relation: the order of one to another. created: no reference, therefore, to the divine relations. 15 Ibid. 259–71. 16 [See Question 34, p. 709 above.] 17 [In his use of ‘less’ in the last part of the sentence, Lonergan is referring, it seems, to a frequent historical pattern associated with advance in knowledge. The pattern is indicated in Lonergan’s description of St Thomas’s thinking as being on a moving front, with the front being not a single straight line but a jagged line with outposts and delayed sectors. (See appendix 3A.) The point of Lonergan’s remark in the last part of the sentence is to explain why Krempel, interpreting by deduction from the text of St Thomas, and so disregarding the ‘jagged-line’ character of St Thomas’s moving front and ‘the tensions created by advance that is not always complete,’ can find many things in St Thomas that favor his thesis.]

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realis: quae vere affirmatur esse. convenienter: scilicet, relate ad stadium scientificum finale in quo res per causas certo cognoscantur. divisio: veritas comparativa et negativa, v.g., hoc non est illud. essentia: quae per primam intellectus operationem innotescit inquantum satisfit quaestioni, ‘Quid sit.’ esse: quod per secundam intellectus operationem innotescit inquantum satisfit quaestioni, ‘An sit.’ interna: quae ita subiecto est intrinseca ut tolli non possit quin tollatur subiectum. externa: quae subiecto non ita intrinseca est ut tolli non possit quin tollatur subiectum. ens-quod: id quod est; id quod vere affirmatur esse. ens-quo: id quo constituitur id quod est; id quod vere affirmatur esse, non tamen ut quod, sed ut quo.

Argumenta 1 Convenienter consideratur divisio secundum essentiam et secundum esse, nam omnis nostra cognitio in primam et secundam intellectus operationem ultimatim resolvitur. 2 Convenienter dividuntur relationes secundum essentiam in internas et externas. Nam omnis relatio est ordo subiecti ad terminum; relatio interna est relatio secundum quod est de ipsa ratione subiecti; et relatio externa est relatio secundum quod a termino obiective determinatur. 3 Convenienter dividuntur relationes secundum esse in entium-quae et entiumquibus. Nam scientia est certa rerum per causas cognitio: sed res sunt entia-quae; et causae rerum intrinsecae sunt entia-quibus. Porro, alia est realitas entis-quod et alia est realitas entis-quo; nam entia-quae sunt ea quae sunt; entia-quibus autem ipsa non sunt sed eis aliquid est. Denique, cum in rebus creatis non existat sive absolutum simpliciter sive relativum simpliciter, constat realitatem omnis relationis realis esse realitatem vel alicuius entis-quod vel alicuius entis-quo.

Proinde haec divisio relationum in entium-quae et entium-quibus est quae per divisionem in praedicamentales et transcendentales in stadio scientifico intermedio adumbratur.

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real: that which is truly affirmed to be. appropriately: that is, with respect to the final scientific stage in which things are known with certainty through their causes. division: true negative comparisons; for example, ‘This is not that.’ essence: that which is known through the first intellectual operation in answering the question, What is it? existence: that which is known through the second intellectual operation in answering the question, Is it? internal: that which is intrinsic to a subject in such a way that it cannot be negated without negating the subject. external: that which is not intrinsic to a subject in such a way that it cannot be negated without negating the subject. being-which: that which is; that which is truly affirmed to be. being-by-which: that by which that which is is constituted; that which is truly affirmed to be, not, however, as what is, but as that by which something is. Arguments 1 The division into essence and existence is appropriate, for all our knowledge is ultimately reducible to the first and second intellectual operations.

2 In terms of essence, the division of relations into internal and external is appropriate. For every relation is an order of a subject to a term; an internal relation is a relation that belongs to the very definition of the subject; an external relation is a relation as objectively determined by a term. 3 In terms of existence, the division of relations into beings-which and beingsby-which is appropriate. For science is the certain knowledge of things through their causes. But things are beings-which, and the intrinsic causes of things are beings-by-which. Moreover, the reality of a being-which is not the same as the reality of a being-by-which; for beings-which are those things that simply are, and beings-by-which are those things that themselves are not but that by which something is. Finally, since neither a simply absolute nor a simply relative being exists among created things, it is clear that the reality of every real relation is the reality of either some being-which or of some being-by-which. This division, then, of relations into beings-which and beings-by-which is what is foreshadowed in the intermediate stage of science by the division into predicamental and transcendental relations.

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Obicitur Inconvenienter ponitur divisio in internas et externas relationes, cum externa non addat aliam realitatem super realitatem relationis internae. Respondetur: convenientia divisionis secundum essentiam non mensuratur secundum realitatem divisi; et caeterum, quamvis relatio externa non addat aliam realitatem subiecto intrinsecam, nihilominus obiective determinatur per aliam realitatem subiecto extrinsecam.

QUAESTIO XXXVIII Utrum plures relationes reales uni eidemque absoluto internae esse possint; utrum realiter ab absoluto distinguantur; utrum realiter inter se distinguantur Ad primam quaestionem Quod plures relationes reales uni eidemque absoluto internae esse possint exemplis constat. Nam anima realiter refertur tum ad corpus tum ad opera vitae, sensus, et intellectus; et hae relationes sunt internae, nam ponuntur in ipsis animae definitionibus. Praeterea, unus idemque actus est et actio et passio, quae relatione differunt inquantum actio est actus huius ut ab hoc sed passio est actus huius ut in hoc; vide In III Phys., lect. 5; Sum. theol., i, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1m. Caeterum, cum omnis effectus a creatura productus necessario est realiter ab agente et realiter in patiente, hae relationes et reales et effectui internae sunt. Praeterea, relationes trinitariae sunt et reales et Deo internae cum quidquid in Deo est etiam necessario sit. Ad secundam quaestionem Distincta sunt quorum unum non est aliud. Ratione sunt distincta quorum unum quatenus concipitur non est aliud quatenus concipitur. Realiter sunt distincta quorum unum qua reale non est aliud qua reale. Iam vero ex iis quae superius sunt determinata (q. xxxv) constat (1) realitatem absoluti simpliciter et realitatem relativi simpliciter non posse esse eandem realitatem, (2) realitatem absoluti secundum quid non posse realiter distingui ab omni realitate relativa, (3) realitatem relativi secundum quid non posse distingui realiter

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Objection It is not proper to divide relations into internal and external, since external relations do not add another reality to the reality of an internal relation. Reply: the appropriateness of the division of relations in terms of essence is not measured according to the reality of that which is divided. Besides, although an external relation adds no further reality intrinsic to the subject, nevertheless it is objectively determined by another reality extrinsic to the subject. QUESTION 38 Can several real relations be internal to one and the same absolute? Are they really distinct from the absolute? Are they really distinct from one another? As to the first question It is obvious from examples that there can be several internal real relations of one and the same absolute. For the soul is really related to the body as well as to vital, sentient, and intellectual operations; and these relations are internal, for they are in the very definitions of soul. Also, action and passion are one and the same act, differing by relation in that action is the act of this as from this, while passion is the act of this as in this. See In III Phys., lect 5; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1m. Further, since every effect produced by a creature is necessarily really from the agent and really in the patient, these relations are both real and internal to the effect. Besides, the trinitarian relations are both real and internal to God, since whatever is in God also exists necessarily. As to the second question Those are distinct of which one is not the other. Those are conceptually distinct of which one as conceived is not the other as conceived. Those are really distinct of which one as real is not the other as real. From what we determined above (question 35), it is clear (1) that the reality of what is simply absolute and the reality of what is simply relative cannot be the same reality, (2) that the reality of what is absolute in a qualified sense cannot be really distinct from every relative reality, (3) that the reality of what is relative

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ab omni realitate absoluta, et (4) realitatem relationis internae esse realitatem relativi secundum quid. Quibus perspectis, constat relationes reales internas non posse realiter distingui ab absoluto cui sunt internae. Ad tertiam quaestionem Ad huius quaestionis solutionem distinguendum est inter relationes quae mutuo sibi opponuntur et relationes quae diversos terminos respiciunt. Iam vero, relationes reales quae sibi mutuo opponuntur necessario realem distinctionem inducunt; secus et ipsae reales relationes tollerentur. V.g., si idem secundum idem esset pater qui filius, et pater esset pater sui ipsius, et filius esset filius sui ipsius; et cum relatio alicuius ad se ipsum sit relatio rationis tantum, tum realis paternitas tum realis filiatio tollerentur. Similiter, si idem secundum idem esset et agens et patiens, idem secundum idem esset in actu (qua agens) et in potentia (qua patiens); quod contradictionem implicat. Contra, relationes reales uni absoluto internae quae sibi mutuo non opponuntur, non distinguuntur nisi ratione cum fundamento in re. Nam distinguuntur ratione: nam alia relatio alium terminum respicit; ita anima respicit corpus ut forma, sed respicit opera vitae, sensus, intellectus inquantum est natura seu operationum principium; similiter effectus respicit agens ut a quo est et patiens ut in quo est. Distinguuntur ratione cum fundamento in re: nam termini quos respiciunt relationes sunt realiter inter se distincti. Non distinguuntur realiter: nam quo perfectius est unumquodque, eo maior est virtus eius; et quo maior est eius virtus, eo plura sunt ea ad quae virtus eius se extendit. Ita unus idemque intelligendi actus simul respicit (1) intellectum agentem a quo est ut a causa principali, (2) phantasma a quo est ut causa instrumentali, (3) phantasma in quo inspicit suam speciem relucentem, (4) actus sentiendi unde phantasmata derivata sunt, (5) sensibilia quae per actus sentiendi innotescunt, (6) verbum interius incomplexum quod ab actu intelligendi procedit, (7) verbum interius complexum quo de obiectivitate verbi incomplexi iudicatur, (8) entia realia quae in verbo cognoscuntur, (9) bona quae per iudicia

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in a qualified sense cannot be really distinct from every absolute reality, and (4) that the reality of an internal relation is the reality of a relative in a qualified sense. From this it is also clear that real internal relations cannot be really distinct from the absolute to which they are internal. As to the third question For the solution to this question we must distinguish between mutually opposed relations and relations that regard different terms. Real relations that are mutually opposed necessarily involve a real distinction; otherwise these relations themselves would cease to exist. For example, if a father were the same in every respect as his son, the father would be his own father and the son would be his own son; and since the relation of anything to itself is only a conceptual relation, there would be no real paternity and no real sonship. Likewise, if an agent and a patient were identical in every respect, the same thing in the same way would be both in act, as agent, and in potency, as patient, which implies a contradiction. On the other hand, real relations internal to one absolute which are not mutually opposed are distinct only conceptually, but the distinction has a foundation in reality. They are distinct conceptually: each relation regards the other as its term. Thus, the soul relates to the body as form, but relates to vital, sentient, and intellectual operations in that it is a nature, a principle of operations. In like fashion an effect is related to the agent as that from which it exists and to the patient as that in which it exists. These relations are distinct conceptually with a foundation in reality: the terms which the relations regard are really distinct from each other. These relations are not really distinct: the more perfect each one is, the greater is its power; and the greater its power is, the more things there are to which its power extends. Thus, one and the same act of understanding relates simultaneously (1) to the agent intellect from which it exists as from its principal cause, (2) to the phantasm from which it exists as from its instrumental cause, (3) to the phantasm in which it beholds its species illumined, (4) to the acts of sensing from which the phantasms were derived, (5) to the objects of sensation which were known through the acts of sensing, (6) to the simple inner word which proceeds from the act of understanding, (7) to the compound inner word by which the objectivity of the simple word is judged, (8) to the real beings that are known in the word,

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valoris innotescunt, (10) actus voluntatis qui intellectum sequuntur, (11) operationes quae ab intellectu et voluntate diriguntur et perficiuntur; denique tandem (12) quo perfectior est actus intelligendi, eo plura per modum unius comprehendit, et ideo ad plura sensibilia, actus sentiendi, phantasmata, verba incomplexa et complexa, bona, actus voluntatis, et operationes sese extendit. Quae relationes sunt internae cum sint de ratione intelligentiae quae corpori coniungitur atque voluntatem operationemque dirigit. Quae relationes etiam reales sunt cum ipse intelligendi actus sit realis, nihilque reale esse possit quin ea realiter includat quae sunt de ratione eius. Unde et S. Thomas: ‘. . . non est contra rationem simplicitatis alicuius multitudo relationum quae est inter ipsum et alia; immo quanto simplicius est, tanto concomitantur ipsum plures relationes.’ De Potentia, 7, a. 8 c.

QUAESTIUNCULA Utrum relatio identitatis sit transitiva Symbolum, xRy, legatur: x refertur relatione R ad y. Relatio R dicitur transitiva si, positis aRb et bRc, necessario sequitur aRc. Unde concludes: relationem aequalitatis vel fraternitatis esse transitivam; relationem inaequalitatis vel filiationis non esse transitivam. Quaeritur utrum relatio identitatis sit transitiva. Respondetur eatenus haberi identitatem quatenus excluditur realis distinctio. Sed dupliciter habetur realis distinctio: primo modo, per positionem et non-positionem eiusdem attributi realis, nam idem P non potest esse et Q et non-Q; altero modo, per relationes reales et mutuo oppositas, uti supra (p. 248) demonstratum est. Eatenus ergo habetur identitas quatenus excluditur uterque modus distinctionis realis. Iam vero identitas excludit primum modum distinctionis realis: si enim a et b sunt realiter idem, quodcumque ponitur ab a realiter etiam a b realiter ponitur; et vice versa. Sed identitas non excludit alterum modum distinctionis realis: nam idem b absolutum ponere potest duas relationes reales et mutuo oppositas, a et c. Quibus perspectis, concluditur relationem identitatis esse transitivam in absolutis, sed non esse transitivam ubi cum uno absoluto realiter identificantur relationes reales mutuo oppositae.

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(9) to the goods that are known through judgments of value, (10) to the acts of the will that are consequent upon the intellect, (11) to the operations that are directed and carried out by the intellect and will; finally (12), the more perfect the act of understanding, the more it comprehends as a unified whole, and thereby extends to more sensible objects, more acts of sensing, more phantasms, more simple and compound words, more goods, more acts of the will, and more operations. These relations are internal, since they belong to the very formality of an understanding that is joined to the body and directs the will and operations. These relations are also real, since the act of understanding itself is real, and there can be no real thing which does not really include whatever belong to its essence. Hence also St Thomas: ‘. . . it is not contrary to the simplicity of anything for it to have a multitude of relations between other things and itself; indeed, the more simple a reality is, the more relations accompany it’ (De potentia, q. 7, a. 8 c.). A BRIEF QUESTION Is the relation of identity transitive? The symbol xRy means x is related by the relation R to y. The relation R is said to be transitive if, given aRb and bRc, it necessarily follows that aRc. Hence we conclude: the relation of equality or fraternity is transitive; the relation of inequality or sonship is not transitive. Our question here is whether the relation of identity is transitive. In reply, we say that identity obtains inasmuch as real distinction is excluded. But there can be a real distinction in two ways: first, by the affirmation and nonaffirmation of the same real attribute, for the same P cannot be both Q and not-Q ; second, by real and mutually opposed relations, as we demonstrated above (see [chap. 3, Assertion 6], p. 249). There is identity insofar as each of these ways of real distinction is excluded. Now, identity excludes the first way of there being a real distinction; for if a and b are really identical, whatever is affirmed as real of a is also affirmed as real of b; and vice versa. But identity does not rule out the second way of there being a real distinction; for the same absolute b can have two real and mutually opposed relations, a and c. From this, therefore, we conclude that the relation of identity is transitive with absolutes, but is not transitive when real and mutually opposite relations are really identical with one absolute.

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APPENDIX 3A

Letter to Fr Gerard Smith, s.j.1

July 13, 1958 Dear Father Smith, P[ax] C[hristi], You will hardly be surprised if I have no simple solution to your problem of relations. I think, however, that the following two clues may be found helpful. The first is terminological. What is named an internal relation in Divinarum Personarum conceptio analogica, p. 272 ff. [De Deo Trino: Pars systematica, pp. 291–315; see appendix 3, pp. 687–737 above] and primary relativity in Insight [1957], p. 491 ff. [cwl 3: 514–520], would not be named a relation by St Thomas but rather the cause or radix of a relation whence it has all its reality. See De potentia, q. 7, a. 8 c. & ad 5m; q. 7, a. 9, ad 7m; In V Phys., lect. 3 (ed. Leon. ii, 237, § 8), which are quoted in Divinarum Personarum conceptio analogica, p. 281 s. [De Deo Trino: Pars systematica, p. 300; see appendix 3, pp. 706–709 above]. The second is historical. St Thomas dealt with questions at a determinate stage of their development and, in a large number of instances, contributed to their advance. Hence his thinking is on a moving front, and the front is not a single straight line but rather a jagged line with outposts and delayed sectors. For example, he went beyond Aristotle to acknowledge a real distinction between essence and existence long before he drew the conclusion that what subsists in a material thing is not just the compound of substantial matter and form. In the Contra Gentiles and the Prima Pars, that compound is id quod est ; but in the Tertia Pars, q. 1 See above, pp. 527–28.

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17, at last it is recognized that body informed by soul is just quo est. Accordingly, I contend that interpretation by deduction from the text of St Thomas is a merely subjective projection of one’s own logical ideal on the text, that correct interpretation has to take into account the tensions created by advance that is not always complete, and that Thomism, as distinct from a historical account of St Thomas, has to complete such advances. Now this historical or dynamic consideration seems to me to be very relevant to an account of St Thomas’s views on relations. Aristotle’s preliminary account of relations (based on quantity, action and passion, and knower and known) does not take into account the relations Aristotle himself acknowledged in the last six predicaments and still less the relations contained in the metaphysical elements such as matter and form, substance and accident. It is in terms of that preliminary view that St Thomas regularly discusses relations. It is this inadequacy of treatment that led the Thomist school to introduce its transcendental relations, and it is this later addition that gives Krempel his archaistic thesis. Krempel is perverse in many ways, but he also has plenty of texts. But if I cannot agree with Krempel’s interpretation (see Divinarum Personarum conceptio analogica, p. 292 [De Deo Trino: Pars systematica, pp. 310–11; see appendix 3, pp. 726–29 above]), neither can I agree with the Thomistic school’s division of relations into transcendental and predicamental. That division is based on the predicaments; some relations fall under the predicament ad quid, others are postpredicamental (actio is motus plus the relation ut a quo), and others are transcendental (in any predicament, or between the entia quibus). But the predicaments do not pertain to metaphysics as science, for science is certa rerum cognitio per causas and the causes are end, agent, matter, and form. Science is not knowledge of things through the ten predicaments but through causes. Hence my treatment of relations is a matter of going to their causes, and the cause in every case is the primary relativity of Insight or the internal relation of Divinarum Personarum conceptio analogica. The distinction between predicamental and transcendental relations is, for me, more or less [an] otiose classification. How does this fit in with De potentia, q. 7, a. 11? St Thomas begins by acknowledging two types of notional relations: relations between second intentions, such as genus and species; and relations between objects of first intentions, where the relation is based, not on the object, but on our mode of understanding. Four instances of the second case are considered: (1) the objects of first intention do not actually exist (future events); (2) the objects of first intention are not really distinct; (3) one of the objects of first intention is itself a relation (relatio relationis est ens rationis); and (4) there are two real objects of first intention but only one of them is really related to the other. This list of four cases determines the meaning of the

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phrase: ‘what results from our mode of understanding.’ The whole position follows from the notion of real relation that St Thomas worked out on the basis of the Aristotelian preliminary survey. But I do not believe that it is to be generalized in the name of a mistaken ideal of logical consistency; and I do not believe that it is to be invoked against the reality of the relation of a habit to its future operations, though I would agree that St Thomas’s more explicitly defined usage of the name ‘relation’ would not permit me to talk about a real relation in that instance. I am afraid that you will find this neither clear nor simple, but at least you will admit that something simple and clear could hardly have blocked you in your efforts to get a Metaphysics written. With every good wish for the success of that undertaking, and again thanking you for your many kindnesses to me while at Marquette, I am, Yours sincerely in our Lord, Bernard Lonergan s.j.

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APPENDIX IV

Divinarum Personarum

1 Chapter 1, Sections 3 and 41 Sectio Tertia: Ulteriora quaedam de eodem actu Postquam de ipsa intelligentia theologica egimus, iam ulterius considerari oportet quemadmodum ad verum comparetur. Quae quidem comparatio est duplex, cum intelligentia theologica referatur tum ad verum quoddam antecedens tum etiam ad verum quoddam consequens. Hanc enim intelligentiam antecedit verum divinitus revelatum cuius intelligentia quaeritur; et eandem consequitur verum quoddam theologicum ex ipsa intelligentia ortum. In primis ergo illud omnino retinendum est quod intelligentia theologica secundum se neque vera est neque falsa.2 Nam, uti dictum est, haec intelligentia ad primam intellectus operationem pertinet, sed veritas vel falsitas formaliter nisi in secunda operatione non invenitur. Qua de causa, qui solam intelligentiam considerat, eam dicere potest perfectam esse vel imperfectam, proportionatam vel analogicam, claram vel obscuram, aliaque eiusmodi; qui autem quaerit utrum vera an falsa sit intelligentia, non solam intelligentiam considerat sed etiam ad subsequentem

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1 Chapter 1, Sections 3 and 41 Section 3: Further Observations concerning the Same Act After dealing with the nature of theological understanding, we must go on to consider how it is related to truth. This relationship is twofold, since theological understanding is related both to antecedent truth and to consequent truth. The truth that precedes this understanding is the truth revealed by God that we are seeking to understand, while the truth that is consequent upon it is the theological truth that emerges from this understanding. First, then, one must by all means bear in mind that theological understanding is in itself neither true nor false.2 The reason is that theological understanding is, as we explained above, an instance of the first operation of the intellect, while truth and falsehood are found formally only in the second operation. Therefore, if we are considering only understanding, we can say that it is complete or incomplete, proportionate or analogical, clear or obscure, and so on. But as soon as we ask whether an understanding is true or false, we are no longer considering only 1 [Sections 3 and 4 of the first chapter of Divinarum Personarum were significantly changed in De Deo Trino, sections 4 and 5. There is nothing in Divinarum Personarum corresponding to section 3 of the first chapter of De Deo Trino, Pars systematica (above, pp. 20–31). Sections 3 and 4 of Divinarum Personarum are provided here.] 2 [This and the next three paragraphs are for all practical purposes simply repeated in De Deo Trino. See above, pp. 30–33.]

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intellectus operationem accedit, qua quaeritur an sit, ponderaturque evidentia, atque profertur iudicium. Deinde, omne quod intellectu conspicimus, etiam verbo quodam interiori dicimus, exprimimus, manifestamus. At aliud est causam seu rationem conspicere, aliud vero evidentiae sufficientiam. Quare duplex est verbum interius. Aliud enim incomplexum dicitur quo res per conspectam causam seu rationem definitur; aliud autem complexum dicitur quo id, quod definitum est, existere affirmatur vel negatur. Et ideo sicut et ipsa intelligentia primae operationis de se neque vera neque falsa est, ita etiam verbum interius incomplexum, quo haec intelligentia exprimitur, de se neque verum est neque falsum. Tertio, quod verbo interiori concipimus, etiam exterioribus vocibus exprimimus; et cum illud verum vel falsum esse possit, etiam per metonymiam ipsae voces dici solent verae vel falsae; qui tamen usus in abusum vergere potest, si magis ad voces ipsas quam ad intentionem loquentis attenditur. Si enim deest interius verbum complexum, quo vel affirmatur vel negatur, voces exteriores nihil manifestant nisi verbum incomplexum, quo consideratur vel definitio vel hypothesis, vel etiam recitatur alterius cuiusdam sententia; et tunc quamvis multae sint voces, quamvis simul sumantur, quamvis adsint ‘est’ et ‘non est,’ tamen neque verae neque falsae sunt ipsae voces, cum non assertionis sed considerationis vel recitationis intentionem manifestent. Quibus perspectis, concluditur voces exteriores, quae intelligentiam theologicam qua talem exprimant, ne per metonymiam quidem veras esse vel falsas. Quarto, sicut ipsa intelligentia theologica est imperfecta, analogica, obscura, pedetentim evolvens, etc., ita etiam consequens verbum interius et consequentes voces exteriores sunt imperfecte intellectae et analogice et obscure. Quinto, eiusmodi est intellectus humanus ut ad primam intellectus operationem naturaliter consequatur secunda operatio; perspecta enim quidditate, statim quaeritur utrum talis res existat; et perspecta causa, statim quaeritur utrum hoc illudve ex tali causa oriatur; et multis simul quidditatibus vel causis consideratis, oriuntur principia, demonstrationes, et hypotheses. Quare cum intelligentia theologica sit quaedam prima intellectus operatio, quaeri potest quemadmodum se habeat ad operationem secundam atque consequentem. Iam vero intelligentia theologica conducere non potest in veritates per se notas quoad nos sive, uti recentius dicitur, in principia analytica. 3 Eiusmodi enim veritates seu principia ideo sunt omnino certa quia ex ea intelligentia procedunt,

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understanding but have moved on to the next operation of of the intellect, where we ask, ‘Is this so?’ and weigh the evidence and make a judgment. Second, whatever we intellectually grasp we also utter or express or manifest in an inner word. But it is one thing to grasp a cause or a reason, and something else to grasp the sufficiency of evidence. So there are two inner words. The first, by which something is defined in terms of its grasped cause or reason, is called the simple inner word. The second, by which what has been defined is affirmed or denied to exist, is called the compound inner word. And so, just as the understanding in the first operation is in itself neither true nor false, so also the simple inner word in which this understanding is expressed is in itself neither true nor false. Third, what we conceive in an inner word we also express in outer words; and since a simple inner word is true or false potentially, the outer words themselves also are often said to be true or false by metonymy. But this can be misleading: one can pay more attention to the words themselves than to the intention of the speaker. If the compound inner word of affirmation or negation has not occurred, then outer words express only a simple inner word, whereby a definition or a hypothesis is considered, or some other person’s idea is repeated; then of course even if there are many outer words, even if all are taken together, even if they contain the words ‘is’ or ‘is not,’ still those outer words cannot be either true or false, since they do not carry an intention to assert something, but only to consider or repeat an idea. Thus, the outer words that express theological understanding as such are not true or false even by metonymy. Fourth, as theological understanding itself is imperfect, analogical, obscure, gradually developing, and so on, so also the consequent inner word and the consequent outer words are imperfectly, analogically, and obscurely understood. Fifth, it is the nature of the human intellect that its second operation naturally follows upon the first. Once a quiddity is grasped, the question immediately arises whether such a thing exists, and when a cause has been grasped, the question immediately arises whether this or that thing results from such a cause; and from considering many quiddities or causes taken together, principles, demonstrations, and hypotheses emerge. Hence, since theological understanding is a first operation of the intellect, one may ask how it is related to the second, consequent operation. Now, theological understanding cannot lead to truths that are self-evident to us, or, in modern terminology, to analytic principles. 3 For truths or principles of this sort are absolutely certain because they proceed from an understanding that 3 [For Lonergan’s position on analytic propositions and analytic principles, see Insight 329–34 and Phenomenology and Logic 75–77.]

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quae et perfecta et rei proportionata et clara sit, ulterioremque evolutionem non admittat. Sed intelligentia theologica est imperfecta et analogica et obscura et pedetentim evolvens. Ergo intelligentia theologica fundare non potest veritates per se notas quoad nos seu principia analytica. Praeterea, intelligentia theologica conducere non potest in demonstrationes, quae ex intrinsecis rerum rationibus vel causis certo procedunt. Nam vis syllogismi non intensiva est sed tantummodo extensiva: non intensiva est, quia conclusio semper sequitur praemissam debiliorem; extensiva est, quia quod per praemissas cognoscitur, ad conclusiones extenditur. Quare, cum intelligentia theologica fundare non possit praemissas quae sint per se notae quoad nos, pariter fundare non potest conclusiones quae ex intrinsecis rerum rationibus vel causis certo demonstrentur. Praeterea, intelligentia theologica conducere non potest in hypotheses, quarum intrinseca possibilitas clare atque perfecte perspiciatur. Nam hypothesis nihil est aliud quam verbum quoddam interius et incomplexum, quo intus dicitur quod intelligendo conspicitur. Quapropter, cum intelligentia theologica sit imperfecta, analogica, et obscura, fieri non potest ut verbum ex ipsa procedens non sit et imperfecte intellectum et analogice intellectum et obscure intellectum. Denique tandem, quod ita intelligitur, eius sane possibilitas intrinseca neque clare neque perfecte perspicitur. Relinquitur ergo ut ex intelligentia theologica qua tali oriatur neque verum per se notum quoad nos, neque verum mediate ex intrinsecis certo demonstratum, neque hypothesis cuius intrinseca possibilitas clare perspiciatur, sed hypothesis cuius intrinseca possibilitas et imperfecte et analogice et obscure coniicitur. Sexto, quamvis intelligentia theologica de se non in verum sed in hypothesin eamque imperfecte intellectam conducat, tamen aliunde rationem veri acquirere potest, et quidem tripliciter. Nam, primo, cum theologia sit scientia circa Deum et caetera quae ad Deum referuntur, cumque de Deo et de aliis multa naturaliter sciamus, magnum quoddam initium atque fundamentum ex naturaliter notis habet theologia. Quod tamen fundamentum, cum incompletum sit neque quidquam ex veritatibus supernaturaliter credendis in se includat, per se solum minime sufficit. Deinde, in ipsis revelationis fontibus atque in earundem declarationibus ab ecclesia infallibiliter propositis, multa atque certissima continentur tum de Deo tum de caeteris prout ad Deum referuntur. Et ideo ex his tamquam praemissis concludi potest sive cum certitudine sive saltem cum probabilitate, utrum veri ratio hypothesi theologicae concedi possit.

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is perfect, is proportionate to its object, and is clear, and admits of no further development. Theological understanding, on the other hand, is imperfect, analogical, obscure, and gradually developing. Therefore, theological understanding cannot ground truths that are self-evident to us, that is, analytic principles. Again, theological understanding cannot lead to demonstrations that proceed with certitude from the intrinsic reasons or the causes of things. For the force of a syllogism is not intensive but only extensive; it is not intensive, because its conclusion always follows the weaker premise; it is extensive, because what is known through its premises extends to the conclusions. Therefore, since theological understanding cannot ground premises that are self-evident to us, it is likewise incapable of grounding conclusions that are demonstrated with certitude from the intrinsic reasons or causes of things. Moreover, theological understanding cannot lead to hypotheses whose intrinsic possibility is clearly and perfectly grasped. For a hypothesis is but a simple inner word that inwardly says what is grasped by an act of understanding. Therefore, since theological understanding is imperfect, analogical, and obscure, it is impossible for a word that proceeds from it to be other than imperfectly understood, analogically understood, and obscurely understood. Hence, when something is understood in this way, its intrinsic possibility can surely be neither clearly nor perfectly grasped. It remains, then, that neither a truth that is self-evident to us nor a truth that is mediately demonstrated with certitude from intrinsic reasons nor a hypothesis whose intrinsic possibility is clearly grasped arises from a theological understanding as such, but only a hypothesis whose intrinsic possibility is imperfectly, analogically, and obscurely conjectured. Sixth, although a theological understanding of itself does not lead to a truth but to a hypothesis, and one that is imperfectly understood, it can still acquire the formality of truth from elsewhere, and that in three ways. First, since theology is knowledge of God and of all other things in relation to God, and since there is much that we know by our natural reason about God and other things, this natural knowledge is an important starting-point and foundation for theology. This foundation, however, since it is incomplete and includes none of the truths of supernatural faith, is not sufficient in itself. Second, in the sources of revelation themselves and in their infallible interpretation by the church, there are contained many absolutely certain truths about both God and all other things as related to God. From these truths, therefore, as from premises, one can determine with certitude, or at least with probability, whether the formality of truth may be granted to a theological hypothesis.

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Tertio denique modo, ex ipsa hypothesi theologica incipi potest ut ex ea fiant deductiones; quarum conclusiones quo plenius atque accuratius cum omnibus congruant quae aliunde vel credimus vel scimus, eo sane probabilior haberi potest ipsa hypothesis theologica. Septimo, ex hypotheseos fragilitate ad dignitatem theoriae proceditur, si intelligentia theologica ita est synthetica ut omnia vel fere omnia revelata simul intelligantur, si haec synthetica intelligentia per integrum quoddam systema concipiatur, si hoc systema tum ex naturaliter notis exsurgat tum cum supernaturaliter notis congruat, si denique accedat explicita atque repetita docentis ecclesiae approbatio, imo et ecclesiae regentis praeceptum. 4 Octavo, cum tamen etiam systematis veritas sit derivata neque in omnibus pariter certa, semper distinguendum est inter ea quae sunt revelata et fide divina creduntur, ea quae ab ecclesia definita creduntur fide catholica, et ea quae variis notis inferioribus inter theologos recipiuntur. Nono, sensus alicuius veri ab eius mensuratur intelligentia ex quo verum illud procedit. Quare, cum verum revelatum ex ipsa divina intelligentia procedat, a sola divina intelligentia mensuratur. Praeterea, cum his in terris nulli alteri nisi ecclesiae tradidit Deus suam revelationem fideliter custodiendam atque infallibiliter declarandam, non ex systemate theologico quod ex imperfecta intelligentia humana procedit, sed ex solo ecclesiae magisterio determinatur sensus tum ipsius veri revelati tum sacrorum dogmatum (db 1788, 1800, 1818). Decimo, minime repugnat ut saeculorum decursu ita augeatur theologica intelligentia, scientia, sapientia, ut tamen idem prorsus maneat veri revelati sensus, idem dogma, eademque fidei sententia (db 1800). Augmentum enim theologicae intelligentiae, scientiae, sapientiae consistit, non in eo quod ad verum adhuc ignotum per theorias semper probabiliores propius acceditur, sed in eo quod idem verum iam pridem creditum magis magisque comprehensive intelligitur, scitur, sapitur. Nam scientiae naturales, cum ex sensibilibus incipiant, ita per augmentum intelligentiae theorias semper probabiliores atque utiliores inveniunt, ut tamen verum non cognoscant donec omnia perfecte intelligant. Quibus scientiis minime aequiparari potest theologia, quae ita ex vero credito incipit atque augetur, ut eidem vero semper inhaereat; quae sane inhaesio

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Third, one can begin from a theological hypothesis itself to make deductions. The more fully and accurately their conclusions agree with what we believe or know from other sources, the more probable the theological hypothesis itself can be judged to be. Seventh, there will be progress from the tentativeness of a hypothesis to the dignity of a theory if a theological understanding is the sort of synthesis that encompasses all or virtually all revealed truths together, if this synthetic understanding is conceived through an integral system, if this system both arises from natural knowledge and is consonant with supernatural knowledge, and if, finally, it enjoys the explicit and reiterated approval of the teaching church, or indeed, is even prescribed by church authority.4 Eighth, since, however, even the truth of a system is derivative and not equally certain in all particulars, one must always distinguish between those things that have been revealed and are believed by divine faith, those that are defined by the church and are believed by Catholic faith, and those to which theologians attach lower theological qualifications. Ninth, the meaning of any truth is measured by the understanding from which that truth proceeds. Hence, since revealed truth proceeds from God’s understanding, it is measured by God’s understanding alone. Besides, since in this world God has given divine revelation to no one but the church to be faithfully preserved and infallibly interpreted, it is not for a theological system which proceeds from imperfect human understanding but solely for the teaching office of the church to determine the meaning of both the revealed truth and the sacred dogmas (db 1788, 1800, 1818; ds 3007, 3020, 3043; nd 217, 136, 139). Tenth, it is not at all contrary to this that in the course of time theological understanding, knowledge, and wisdom should increase, while nevertheless keeping the same meaning of the revealed truth, the same dogma, and the same content of faith (db 1800, ds 3020, nd 136). For the increase of theological understanding, knowledge, and wisdom consists, not in a closer approximation to a still unknown truth by way of increasingly probable theories, but in an ever more comprehensive understanding, knowledge, and wisdom regarding the same truth that has long been believed. The natural sciences, beginning as they do from sense data, find ever more probable and useful theories as their understanding grows, but without knowing the truth until everything is perfectly understood. Theology can by no means be equated with such sciences, since theology begins from a truth of faith and increases in such a way that it always adheres to the same truth; and this adherence is certainly 4 Codex Iuris Canonici [1917] (Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1956) 1366 § 2 [p. 372].

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adeo necessaria est ut, si aliud verum praeter revelatum intelligeretur, ista intelligentia non esset theologica. At quaeris quemadmodum fieri possit ut idem verum eodem sensu intellectum nunc minus nunc plus intelligatur. Ideo sane quia variatur non obiectum quod intelligitur sed ipse intelligendi modus. Sicut enim angeli superiores plura per pauciores species intelligunt, ita etiam qui in revelatis veris intelligendis proficiunt, non aliud et aliud sed idem magis magisque comprehensive intelligunt. Quod exemplis manifestari oportet.

Primo, ergo, supponamus aliquem qui totam scripturam perlegerit et singula eloquia rite intelligat. Multa omnino rite intelligit sed, cum singula seorsum intelligat, simpliciter deest modus intelligendi comprehensivus. Alterum ergo supponamus qui non solum totam scripturam perlegerit et singula eloquia rite intellexerit sed etiam gressum quendam ulteriorem inceperit. Diversa enim scripturarum loca inter se comparat; a differentiis mere accidentalibus praescindit; idem essentialiter in multis locis dictum fuisse invenit; quod essentialiter idem ducit, accurate concipit et termino technico exprimit; et cum totam scripturam comparando, praescindendo, inveniendo, exprimendo percurrerit, denique tandem terminis novis et technicis idem verum revelatum eodem sensu intellectum exprimit.

Quo in casu, etsi idem omnino verum exprimatur, etsi eodem sensu idem verum intelligatur, nihilominus aliter intelligitur. Qui enim prius multa seorsum intellexit, nunc multa simul et per modum unius intelligit. Qui prius non solum essentialia intellexerit sed etiam omnia accidentalia (puta quis in singulis eloquiis scripturisticis loquatur, quibuscum, qua occasione, quibus adiunctis, quo fine determinato, quasnam enarraverit actiones, quibusnam imaginibus, figuris, parabolis usus sit, quasnam excitaverit emotiones, sentimenta, affectus), nunc ab accidentalibus fere omnibus praescindit et ad sola essentialia attendit. Qui prius nisi vocabulis et conceptibus biblicis non utebatur, nunc nisi terminos novos et technicos et nisi conceptus remotos atque essentiales non adhibet.

At tertius iam ante oculos mentis sistatur, qui et ulterius inquirit. Hic enim non solum totam scripturam perlegit et singula intellexit et diversa comparavit et ab accidentalibus praescindit et essentialia invenit, concepit, technice expressit, sed etiam profundius scrutatus est. Ipsa enim vera revelata, etiam cum ad essentialia sint reducta, quemadmodum sibi

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necessary, so that if some other truth besides the one that was revealed were to be understood, then that understanding would not be theological. But you may wonder how it can be that the same truth, understood in the same sense, can be less well understood at one time and better understood at another. The answer, of course, is because it is not the object but the very mode of understanding that varies. Just as the higher angels understand more things through fewer species, so also those who are proficient in understanding revealed truths do not understand one thing after another, but understand the same thing more and more comprehensively. This is best illustrated through examples. First, then, let us suppose that someone has read all of scripture and correctly understands each and every one of its statements. He understands many things quite well, but, because he understands each thing separately, he simply lacks a comprehensive way of understanding. Now let us suppose someone else who has not only read all of scripture and correctly understood each of its statements, but has also begun to take a further step. This person makes comparisons between various scriptural texts, prescinds from purely accidental differences, and discovers essentially the same meaning in a number of texts. What she deems to be essentially the same she accurately conceives and expresses in technical terms; and when she has gone over the whole of scripture, comparing, prescinding, discovering, and expressing what she has found, she comes finally to formulate in new technical terms the same revealed truth understood in the same sense. In this example, even though the very same truth is expressed, and even though the same truth is understood in the same sense, still it is understood in a different way. For in the first example many things were understood separately, whereas in this they are understood together and as a unity. In the first example not only the essential elements were understood but also all the accidental ones – who is speaking in each of the scriptural utterances and with whom, on what occasion, in what circumstances, for what purpose, what actions were described, what images, figures of speech, or parables were reported, and what emotions, sentiments, and feelings were aroused. But in the second example the focus is on the essentials alone, prescinding from practically all accidental features. And whereas previously only biblical expressions and concepts were used, now only new technical terminology and abstract and essential concepts are employed. But let us imagine a third person, one who undertakes a further inquiry. This person has not only read all of scripture, understood all of its diverse texts and compared their differences, prescinded from its accidental elements and discovered, conceived, and technically expressed its essentials, but also has delved more deeply into it. For it is not easy to understand how the truths of revelation, even

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constent, non facile perspiciuntur. Ita unus est Deus ut tres sint personae. Ita Christus est Deus ut tamen sit homo. Ita omnia ex gratuita Dei voluntate dependent ut nisi nostris meritis non concedatur corona caelestis. Et sescenta alia5 quae novum quoddam intelligendi genus postulant. Alia enim est exegesis systematica eorum quae in scripturis dicuntur; alia autem est intelligentia ipsarum rerum atque actionum, quae in scripturis affirmantur. Qui essentialia eorum quae in scripturis dicuntur intelligit, exegesin systematicam facit et problemata theologica invenit. Qui intelligentiam ipsarum rerum quaerit, quae in scripturis verae esse docentur, viam theologicam ingressus est. Quae quidem via qualis et quotuplex sit, in sectione subsequente et quarta dicemus; sed illud statim perspiciendum est quod, quamvis theologus aliud intelligendi genus introducat, idem verum revelatum intelligere studet; neque per intelligentiam theologicam sensus veri revelati mutatur, sed ipsum verum revelatum, eodem sensu intellectum, plenius, clarius, ordinatius perspicitur.

Quartus denique modus, quo idem verum intelligitur, novum quendam comprehensionis gradum facit. Secundum enim Aristotelem duplex est scientia: alia enim scientia est in potentia, cum tantummodo universalium sit; alia autem scientia est in actu, cum iam particularibus applicetur.6 Praeter exegesin systematicam ergo existit exegesis historica, quae ipsa accidentalia adeo non omittat ut ea synthetice includat. Praeter theologiam systematicam existit theologia et magis concreta et magis comprehensiva, quae oeconomiam salutis historice evolventem consideret atque intelligere studeat. Qui novus comprehensionis gradus iam pridem permultis investigationibus biblicis, conciliaribus, patristicis, mediaevalibus, liturgicis, asceticis, aliisque, ita praeparatur, ut aspectus syntheticus nondum in clara luce appareat, cum nostrae aetatis eruditi magis compilatoribus saec. xii quam proprie dictis theologis saec. xiii assimilari videantur. Sicut tamen diligens Petrus Lombardus aliique sententiarum collectores initium atque fundamentum subsequentis theologiae posuerunt, ita etiam qui tam erudite quam solide rem biblicam, patristicam, aliamque hodie investigent, sane futuram aliquando theologiam magis simul et concretam et comprehensivam exspectare possunt. At alia est legitima expectatio rei futurae, alia est audacior atque praematura adeptae assertio. Si enim aliis in scientiis omnis verus progressus ita nova addit ut

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when reduced to their essentials, are consistent with one another. God is one, yet there are three persons. Christ is God and yet is man. Everything depends upon the gratuitous will of God, yet only by our own merits are we granted the heavenly crown. And there are 600-odd further points5 that call for a new kind of understanding. For the systematic exegesis of the words of scripture is not the same as the understanding of the facts and deeds that are related in scripture. One who understands the essential elements of what is stated in scripture is doing a systematic exegesis and comes upon theological problems. One who seeks an understanding of truths taught in the scriptures has set out upon the road of theology. In the next section, the fourth, we shall tell what this road is like and how multifaceted it is. But right now this point must be well understood, that although a theologian introduces another kind of understanding, he is intent upon understanding the same revealed truth. The meaning of a revealed truth is not changed by theological understanding; rather, that very truth itself, understood in the same sense, is grasped more fully, more clearly, and in a more ordered way. Finally, the fourth way in which the same truth is understood is a new step in comprehension. According to Aristotle, science has two meanings: it is science in potency when it is merely of universals; it is science in act when it is applied to particular things.6 Besides systematic exegesis, therefore, there is historical exegesis, which, far from omitting the accidentals, includes them synthetically. Besides systematic theology, there is a theology that is more concrete and more comprehensive, which deals with and seeks to understand the economy of salvation as it evolves historically. This new step in comprehension has over a lengthy period of time been gradually prepared by copious studies in the biblical, conciliar, patristic, medieval, liturgical, ascetical, and other areas of research, but in such a way that its synthetic character is not yet clearly apparent, since today’s scholars seem to resemble more the twelfth-century compilers than they do the thirteenth-century theologians in the proper sense. Still, just as the diligence of Peter Lombard and other collectors of ‘sentences’ initiated and laid the groundwork for the theology that followed, so also those today who are engaged in learned and solid research in scripture and patristics and other fields can surely look forward to a theology at some time in the future that is at once more concrete and more comprehensive. But a legitimate expectation of a future reality is one thing, while a bold premature assertion that it has already arrived is quite another. For if in other sciences all true progress consists in adding new elements while exactly including the old 5 [Obviously an expression for an indefinitely large number. Lonergan used it in his review of a book by L.W. Keeler in Gregorianum 16 (1935) 158: ‘... besides the 600-odd topics ...’ See also above, p. 131.] 6 Aristotle, Metaphysics, xiii, 10, 1087a 16–20.

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omnia vetera exacte includat (rerum enim physicarum periti antiquas mensurationes de novo non faciunt, quamvis novam theoriam acceptent), neminem latere arbitror quanto magis haec conservativa progressus lex theologiam regat, quae numquam aliud intendat quam idem verum plenius intelligere. Quattuor ergo modos exposuimus, quibus idem verum revelatum magis magisque comprehensive intelligi potest. Quibus cum accedant tum modus quo Deus vera revelata intelligat tum modus quo beati divinam intelligentiam participent, satis constare videtur idem verum multis et inter se distinctis modis intelligi posse.

Haec ergo sufficiant de actu quo finis attingitur. Est enim mysteriorum intelligentia prima quaedam intellectus operatio, imperfecta, analogica, obscura, pedetentim evolvens, synthetica, fructuosa. Quae intelligentia, quamvis secundum se neque vera neque falsa sit, quamvis ex se in verum necessario non conducat, tamen aliunde vera est tum quia ex ipsis revelatis concluditur vel saltem cum iis cohaeret, tum quia ipsius veri revelati intelligentia est. Neve dicas has distinctiones subtiliores esse quam utiliores. Idem sane est ens quod et essentiam et esse habeat. Eadem est propositio qua exprimatur sive intelligibile (quod tamen est verum) sive verum (quod tamen est intelligibile). Sed aliud formaliter est obiectum quod est verum intelligibile qua intelligibile, et aliud formaliter est obiectum quod est verum intelligibile qua verum. Illud obiectum qua tale per primam intellectus operationem attingitur; hoc obiectum qua tale per secundam intellectus operationem attingitur. Quam ob causam, etsi obiecta formalia nisi per subtiliorem reduplicationem non distinguantur, tamen realiter inter se differunt operationes quibus haec formalia obiecta attinguntur. At praeterea, uti mox apparebit, non solum ipsae operationes realiter inter se distinguuntur, sed etiam longe inter se differunt viae seu methodi quibus proceditur vel in intelligentiam fidei per primam operationem vel in certitudinem conclusionum per secundam operationem. Non ergo sine ratione gravissima distinxit Aquinas argumenta ex auctoritatibus et disputationes magistrales.

Sectio Quarta: De triplici motu quo ad finem proceditur Postquam de fine dictum est et de actu quo finis attingitur, iam accuratius considerari oportet motum quo ad finem proceditur. Iam vero in omni scientia paulo evoluta, facilis est distinctio inter analysin et synthesin seu inter viam resolutionis et viam compositionis. Cum enim in-

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(physicists do not repeat measurements made long ago, although they accept new theories), no one, I think, will fail to notice how much more this conservative law of progress is operative in theology, which is intent solely upon attaining a fuller understanding of the same truth. We have presented, therefore, four ways in which the same revealed truth can be more and more comprehensively understood. When to these is added the way in which God understands revealed truth and the way in which the blessed participate in the divine understanding, it seems quite obvious that the same truth can be understood in many different ways. These observations on the act by which the goal is attained should suffice. For understanding the mysteries is the first operation of the intellect, is imperfect, analogical, obscure, gradually developing, synthetic, fruitful. This understanding, although in itself it is neither true nor false, and although of itself it does not necessarily lead to truth, nevertheless it gets its truth from other sources, both because it follows from the revealed truths themselves, or is at least consistent with them, and because it is an understanding of the revealed truth itself. Let it not be said that these distinctions are more subtle than they are useful. It is surely the same being that has both essence and existence. It is the same proposition that expresses either the intelligible, which is also true, or the true, which is also intelligible. But the object that is an intelligible truth as intelligible is formally different from the object that is an intelligible truth as true. The former object as such is attained through the first operation of the intellect, and the latter object as such is attained through the second operation of the intellect. Therefore, although the formal objects are distinguished only through a rather subtle reduplication, still the operations by which these formal objects are attained are really different. But furthermore, as we shall soon see, not only are these operations really distinct from each other, but also the ways or methods that lead to an understanding of the faith through the first operation and those that lead to the certitude of the conclusions through the second operation are vastly different. With good reason Aquinas took very seriously the distinction between arguments from authority and the magisterial disputations. Section 4: The Threefold Movement to the Goal After having discussed the goal and the act by which it is attained, we must now consider more carefully the movement that proceeds to that goal. In any science that is little developed, it is easy to distinguish between analysis and synthesis, that is, between the way of resolution and the way of composition.

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quirendo atque investigando ad causas cognoscendas perveniatur, necessario existit quaedam rerum cognitio communis et praescientifica, qua res quidem apprehendimus quamvis causas earum adhuc ignoremus. Et ideo primus motus quo ad scientiam acquirendam proceditur, ex communi quadam et praescientifica rerum cognitione incipit, et ad causas cognitas terminatur: qui primus motus dicitur (1) analysis, quia ex confuse apprehensis ad causas seu rationes bene definitas conducit, et (2) via resolutionis, quia ipsas res in causas resolvit, et (3) via inventionis, quia per eam causae hactenus ignoratae inveniuntur, et (4) via certitudinis, quia nobis manifestissima est communis et praescientifica rerum cognitio, et ideo argumenta nobis maxime certa ex hac communi cognitione incipiunt ut remotiora nobisque obscuriora demonstrent. Cum vero scientia sit, non tantum causarum cognitio, sed rerum per causas intelligentia, primo motui scientifico accedit alter quo ex causis inventis incipitur et ad res in causis intellectas terminatur; qui quidem motus dicitur et (1) synthesis, quia rationes fundamentales adhibentur tum ad res definiendas tum ad proprietates earum deducendas, et (2) via compositionis, quia causae adhibentur ad res producendas vel constituendas, et (3) via doctrinae seu disciplinae, quia ex conceptibus fundamentalibus et maxime simplicibus incipit ut, aliis pedetentim adiunctis, ad intelligentiam totius scientiae ordinate procedat.

Quorum exempla qui quaerit, inter se comparet historiam scientiae physicae vel chimicae et manuale quoddam quo talis scientia docetur. Nam ex historia constat has scientias ex sensibilibus initium sumere, in sensibilibus examinandis proficere, de sensibilibus quam maxime manifestis probationes efficere. Et tamen si manuales libros adeas, aliud non invenis initium nisi tabulam elementorum periodicam unde ter centena millia compositorum derivantur vel, apud physicos, leges motus Newtonianas, geometriam quandam Riemannianam, mirosque ‘quantorum’ operatores. Qui enim inquirit vel investigat vel probat, ex manifestis incipit; qui autem docet, ex iis incipit conceptibus quorum intelligentia intelligentiam aliorum non praesupponit. Cui duplici motui accedit tertius. Non enim semel pro semper perficitur duplex motus supra descriptus sed vicibus repetitis. Neque idem duplex motus repetitur, sed qui tempore posteriores investigant, remotiores atque veriores inveniunt causas, unde et primus motus anterior corrigitur et alter motus anterior interdum reformatur penitus. Quae cum ita sint, tertius quem diximus motus scientificus nihil est aliud quam ipsa scientiarum historia, quae unitate sua concreta totam eorum successionem comprehendit, quae saeculorum decursu sive in via resolutionis

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For, since we attain a knowledge of causes through inquiry and investigation, there necessarily exists some ordinary, prescientific knowledge by which we apprehend an object without as yet knowing its causes. Therefore, the first movement by which we proceed to acquire scientific knowledge begins from ordinary prescientific knowledge of things and terminates in knowing their causes. This first movement is called (1) analysis, because it leads from what is apprehended indistinctly to well-defined causes or reasons, (2) the way of resolution, because it resolves things into their causes, (3) the way of discovery, because through it are found hitherto unknown causes, and (4) the way of certitude, because the ordinary prescientific knowledge of things is most obvious to us, and therefore the arguments that are most certain to us begin from this ordinary knowledge to bring to light what are more remote from us and more obscure. Since science is not only the knowledge of causes but the understanding of things through their causes, consequent upon the first scientific movement there is a second movement that begins from the causes that have been discovered and terminates at things understood in their causes. This movement is called (1) synthesis, because fundamental reasons are used both to define things and to deduce their properties, (2) the way of composition, because causes are used to produce or to constitute the things, and (3) the way of teaching or of learning, because it begins from fundamental and very simple concepts in order that, with the gradual addition of other elements, it may proceed in an orderly fashion to an understanding of the science as a whole. For examples of the two ways, you may compare the history of physics or chemistry with the textbooks used for teaching these sciences. For from the history it is clear that these sciences begin from sensible data, go on to examine these data, and produce proofs from the most obvious data available. And yet if you go to the textbooks, you will find that they begin [in chemistry] with the periodic table of the elements from which 300,000 compounds are derived, or in physics, Newton’s laws of motion, Riemannian geometry, and those strange ‘quantum’ operators. For inquiry or research or proof begin from what is obvious; but teaching begins with those concepts that can be understood without presupposing an understanding of other things. In addition to these two movements there is a third. For the two movements described above are not performed once for all but are continually repeated. Nor is it the same two movements that are repeated, but later research discovers more remote and truer causes, so that the first prior movement is corrected and the second prior movement is sometimes completely revised. In this case what we have termed the third scientific movement is simply the history of the sciences, which embraces within its concrete unity the entire series of all that down through

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sunt inventa sive in via compositionis ordinate sunt docta. Iam vero sicut theologia ipsa analogice se habet ad scientias naturales, ita ad triplicem scientiae naturalis motum analogus invenitur triplex motus theologicus. Nam in primis, sicut in naturaliter notis existit prior quaedam atque communis rerum apprehensio, qua res ipsae manifeste cognoscuntur quamvis causae earum nos lateant, ita etiam in supernaturaliter notis existit prior quaedam et omnibus fidelibus communis cognitio, qua omnia divinitus revelata esse vera certissimi credimus, quamvis nullam adhuc intelligentiam theologicam assecuti simus. Deinde, sicut ex communi atque manifesta rerum cognitione incipit motus scientificus ad causas inveniendas, definiendas, atque probandas, ita etiam ratio humana per fidem illustrata ex ipsis fidei veritatibus incipit et, cum sedulo, pie, sobrie quaesierit, aliquam mysteriorum intelligentiam assequitur (db 1796). Tertio, sicut qui theoriam scientificam proponit, omnes causas iam ante inventas systematice definit, atque ordinate ex simplicioribus magisque fundamentalibus incipiens, per intermedia atque composita ita procedit, ut denique tandem ipsas res, prout concrete existunt atque operantur, secundum omnes earum rationes causasve coniunctas clare distincteque cognoscat efficaciterque regere possit: ita etiam qui non solum singula vera revelata aliquatenus intelligit sed etiam ad syntheticam quandam omnium intelligentiam pervenit, omnes omnium quasi rationes causasque systematice definit, atque ordinate ex simplicioribus magisque fundamentalibus incipiens ita per quaestiones intermedias progreditur, ut denique tandem omnia quae ipsum Deum Deique creaturas respiciunt quasi secundum intimas eorum rationes causasve ultimas, systematice exponere possit. 7 Quarto, cum homo sit in genere intelligibilium ut potentia tantum, haud fieri potest ut integra scientia hominibus possibilis ita summam perfectionem in una quadam aetate pertingat, ut caeteri homines, per reliqua saecula terrestria, nihil aliud esse possint quam humiles antecessorum discipuli. Qua de causa, et in naturaliter notis alias aliis succedere hypotheses theoriasque videmus, et in supernaturalibus inter omnes constat non solum theologiae sed etiam dogmatum evolutionem quandam extitisse. Neque ipsi nos iam ad summum perfectionis theologicae apicem pervenisse credimus, neque vanum aliquando fore atque 7 Quo sensu theologia rationes causasve investiget, alibi exposuimus, De Constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica. Roma, 1956, pp. 42–49.

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the centuries has been discovered in the way of resolution or set forth in an orderly way in the way of composition. Now, just as theology itself is analogous to the natural sciences, so also are there three movements in theology that are analogous to the three movements in a natural science. First, just as in our natural knowledge there is a prior ordinary apprehension of things by which the things themselves are clearly known although their causes are not, so also in our supernatural knowledge there is a prior knowledge common to all the faithful by which with utmost certitude we accept as true the things that have been revealed by God, even though we have not yet acquired a theological understanding of them. Next, just as the scientific movement begins from the ordinary and manifest knowledge of things to discover, define, and demonstrate causes, so also human reason enlightened by faith begins from the truths of faith and, having inquired into them diligently, reverently, and judiciously, acquires some understanding of the mysteries (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). Third, one who proposes a scientific theory defines systematically all the causes previously discovered and, beginning in an orderly way from the more simple and more basic elements, proceeds through those that are intermediate and complex so as to be able at last to know distinctly and manage effectively the things themselves, as they concretely exist and function, according to all their interconnected reasons or causes. In a similar way, one who not only has some understanding of each of the revealed truths individually but has also arrived at some synthetic understanding of them all, defines systematically all their quasi-reasons and causes and, beginning in an orderly way from the more simple and more basic elements, proceeds through intermediate questions so as to be able at last to give a systematic exposition of everything that concerns God himself and God’s creatures, according, as it were, to all their deepest reasons or ultimate causes. 7 Fourth, since in the intelligible order human beings are as potency only, it cannot be that an entire science possible to us should attain the summit of perfection in one particular period, so that the rest of humanity in future centuries can merely be humble disciples of their predecessors. Hence, in our natural knowledge we see one hypothesis and one theory after another, and in our supernatural knowledge all agree that there has been development not only in theology but also in dogmas. We do not believe that we have already arrived at the summit of theological perfection, nor do we expect that it will ever be futile and superfluous to 7 We have explained the way in which theology investigates causes in The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 76–91.

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supervacaneum exspectamus una cum concilio Vaticano orare et optare ut ‘crescat . . . et multum vehementerque proficiat, tam singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis quam totius ecclesiae, aetatum ac saeculorum gradibus, intelligentia, scientia, sapientia . . .’8 Quorum exempla qui quaerit, patres theologosque legat. Nam primus motus analyticus praecipue patres occupabat tum in veris et revelatis singillatim intelligendis tum in haereticis refellendis. Alter autem motus syntheticus ita medio aevo evolvebatur, ut primo sacrae scripturae testimonia patrumque sententiae ordinate colligerentur et deinde, ministrante ancilla philosophica, summae de theologia, ordine doctrinae seu disciplinae constructae, finem syntheticum prosequerentur. Recentiori denique aetate invaluisse videtur motus quidam commixtus qui omnium simul necessitatibus consuleret atque subveniret; unde in manualibus theologiae libris motum analyticum invenies in argumentis ex conciliis, ex sacra scriptura, ex patribus, ex theologorum consensu, motum autem syntheticum in ipsa thesium serie, in terminis definiendis, in argumentis ex ratione theologica, et in difficultatibus solvendis.

2 Chapter 2, from the Definition of Emanatio Intelligibilis through Assertion 1 9 Emanatio ergo intelligibilis est conscia origo actus tum intra conscientiam intellectualem tum vi ipsius conscientiae intellectualis actu determinatae.10 Quae sane emanatio non ens rationis est sed reale, neque ens reale et intentionale sed ens reale et naturale. Est ens reale: non enim ita concipitur ut esse negetur, sed et concipitur et esse affirmatur. Est ens naturale: non enim affirmatur in intellectu ita realiter esse ut sit medium ad aliud cognoscendum; sed ita in intellectu realiter esse affrmatur ut ad ipsam intellectus naturam pertineat. Quaecumque enim cognoscimus realiter nobis insunt, non tamen secundum esse naturale sed secundum esse intentionale; et sic nunc, cum emanationem intelligibilem concipiamus et esse affirmamus, intentioni8 db 1800. Cf. Acta Apostolicae Sedis 42 (1950) 568: uterque revelationis fons ‘tot tantosque continet veritatis thesauros, ut numquam reapse exhauriatur.’

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pray and desire in concert with the [First] Vatican Council that ‘there be growth and great progress in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom, both on the part of each and all and on the part of every person and of the church as a whole . . .’ 8 If you are looking for examples of this, read the Fathers and theologians. The Fathers were mainly engaged in the first, analytic movement in understanding individual truths of revelation as well as in refuting heretics. The second, synthetic movement developed in the Middle Ages, as first the testimonies of scripture and the opinions of the Fathers were collected and collated, and then, with the help of philosophy, theological summas were constructed in the way of teaching or learning, with the goal of furthering synthetic understanding. Finally, in recent times a certain mixed movement seems to have come into use that sees to and addresses the needs of everyone together. Thus, in theological texbooks you will find the analytic movement in the arguments from the councils, from sacred scripture, from the Fathers, from the common consent of theologians, and the synthetic movement in the series of theses, in the definition of terms, in the arguments from theological reason, and in the solution of difficulties. 2 Chapter 2, from the Definition of Emanatio Intelligibilis through Assertion 1 9 Intellectual emanation, then, is the conscious origin of an act both within intellectual consciousness and by virtue of intellectual consciousness itself as determined by the act. 10 This emanation is certainly not a conceptual being but real, nor is it an intentional real being but a natural real being. It is a real being: it is not conceived such that it is said not to be, but it is both conceived and affirmed to be. It is a natural being: that is, it is not affirmed to be really in the intellect as a medium through which something else is known; rather, it is affirmed to be really in the intellect as belonging to the very nature of the intellect. For whatever we know is really within us, not, however, by way of natural existence but by way of intentional existence; and so right now, when we are conceiving intellectual 8 db 1800, ds 3020, nd 136. See Acta Apostolicae Sedis 42 (1950) 568: each source of revelation ‘contains such rich treasures of truth that it will never really be exhausted.’ 9 [Compare above, pp. 140–81.] 10 [‘... vi ipsius conscientiae intellectualis actu determinatae.’ See below, p. 766, where the Latin is ‘vi ipsius conscientiae intellectualis actu quodam determinatae.’ In De Deo Trino, the corresponding Latin phrase is ‘vi ipsius conscientiae intellectualis actu priori determinatae’ (emphasis added). See above, p. 140.]

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aliter conceptui et iudicio inest emanatio intelligibilis. Sed ipse noster intellectus, et species, et actus, et verba, et voluntas, et habitus, et volitiones ad ipsam naturalem realitatem nostrae partis intellectivae pertinent; et ad eandem realitatem naturalem pertinent intelligibiles illae emanationes alterius actus ex alio; et sic antequam de emanatione intelligibili quidquam vel conceperimus vel iudicaverimus, non intentionaliter quidem sed realiter et naturaliter nobis inerant emanationes intelligibiles. Praeterea, quamvis emanatio intelligibilis sit aliquid valde perfectum, naturali tamen rationis lumine non demonstratur eam esse perfectionem puram; et ideo demonstrari non potest ex naturali rationis lumine in Deo esse ullam emanationem intelligibilem (db 1816). Praeterea, etiamsi ratio per fidem illustrata duas emanationes intelligibiles in Deo ponat, ut Filius oriatur secundum processionem veritatis et Spiritus oriatur secundum processionem sanctitatis, numquam tamen potest ratio etiam illuminata perfecte perspicere has emanationes divinas (db 1796). Attamen, si in Deo ponuntur emanationes eiusmodi, iam multum proficimus ut intelligamus quemadmodum Filius sit et a se et non a se, quemadmodum Spiritus sit a se et non a se, quemadmodum aliter Filius et aliter Spiritus sit non a se.

Sit enim11 in Deo emanatio intelligibilis realis. Iam vero id quod emanat, necessario est infinitum. Si enim finitum esset, non esset Deus; si non esset Deus, esset creatura; si esset creatura, esset extra Deum; si esset extra Deum, fieri non potest ut sit id quod emanat intra ipsam conscientiam divinam. Ergo infinitum est. Porro, infinitum est unicum. Ergo id quod emanat et id ex quo emanat sunt unum. Quare, ex Deo emanat Deus, ex lumine increato emanat lumen, ex Deo vero emanat Deus verus. Praeterea, quamvis id quod emanat et id ex quo emanat sint unus idemque Deus, non ideo tollitur emanationis ratio vel realitas. Nihil sane est causa sui; sed non posuimus causalitatem; imo, aliud praeter causalitatem iam pridem quaerebamus, ne Filius vel Spiritus esset creatus vel factus, ut uterque et Deus esset et ideo a se esset.

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emanation and affirming that it exists, an intellectual emanation is present intentionally in this conception and judgment. But our intellect itself, and our species, acts, words, will, habits, and volitions all belong to the natural reality that is our intellectuality, and to the same natural reality belong those intellectual emanations of one act from another. And so before we either conceived or asserted anything about intellectual emanation, there were intellectual emanations present within us, not indeed intentionally but really and naturally. Besides, although an intellectual emanation is something that is very perfect, still by the natural light of reason it cannot be shown to be a pure perfection; hence, by the natural light of reason it cannot be demonstrated that there is any intellectual emanation in God (db 1816, ds 3041, nd 137). Moreover, even if reason illumined by faith affirms two intellectual emanations in God, so that the Son originates by way of the procession of truth and the Spirit by the way of the procession of holiness, nevertheless reason, even when illumined by faith, can never perfectly grasp these divine emanations (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). Still, if we posit such emanations in God, we are already making significant progress in understanding how the Son is both a se, from himself, and not a se, not from himself, how the Spirit is both a se, from himself, and not a se, not from himself, and how the way in which the Son is not a se, not from himself, differs from the way in which the Spirit is not a se, not from himself. For,11 let us assume that there is in God real intellectual emanation. Now that which emanates is necessarily infinite. If it were finite, it would not be God; if it were not God, it would be a creature; if it were a creature, it would be outside of God; if it were outside of God, it is impossible for it to be that which emanates within the divine consciousness. Therefore, it is infinite. Again, the infinite is unique. Therefore, that which emanates and that from which it emanates are one and the same. Therefore, God emanates from God, light emanates from uncreated light, true God emanates from true God. Furthermore, although that which emanates and that from which it emanates are one and the same God, this does not negate the formality or the reality of emanation. Certainly, nothing is the cause of itself; but we have not posited causality. In fact, we have for some time now been seeking something other than causality, so that the Son or the Spirit would not be created or made, and each would be both God and therefore a se, from himself. 11 [‘For’ (Latin ‘enim’) has as predecessor the phrase ‘we are already making significant progress ...’ and refers ahead to the entire argument which begins with this one-sentence paragraph and ends just before Assertion 1.]

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Amplius, non solum causalitatem non posuimus, sed aliud causalitate longe superius adduximus. Nihil enim aliud est causalitas quam imperfecta quaedam et inconscia imitatio ordinis intelligibilis, qui in mente creatoris intentionaliter adest. Sed emanationes intelligibiles, sicut fundantur in creata nostra participatione luminis increati, ita constituunt in nobis celebrem illam imaginem Dei trini ex qua procedit analogia psychologica. Ulterius, quod in nobis per tres actus finitos fieri potest, in Deo per unum actum infinitum esse potest. Sed nos per tres actus finitos et evidentiam sufficere perspicimus, et vi perspectae evidentiae iudicamus, et vi affirmatae bonitatis diligimus. Ergo per unum actum infinitum Deus infinitam suam perfectionem et intellectu perspicit, et vi perspectae perfectionis affirmat, et vi affirmatae perfectionis diligit. Quod si haec perfecte intelligere non valemus, adeo non mirandum est ut exspectari debeat. De supremo enim SS. Trinitatis mysterio agitur. Quod tamen ipsi nos non decipimus, suadet S. Thomas qui affirmavit: ‘id quod procedit secundum processionem quae est ad extra, oportet esse diversum ab eo a quo procedit. Sed id quod procedit ad intra processu intelligibili, non oportet esse diversum: imo, quanto perfectius procedit, tanto magis est unum cum eo a quo procedit.’ 12 Filius ergo a se est, quia Deus est. Et Filius a se non est, quia emanatione intelligibili veritatis procedit. Spiritus pariter a se est, quia Deus est. Et Spiritus a se non est, quia emanatione intelligibili sanctitatis procedit. Aliter Filius et aliter Spiritus a se non est, quia alia est emanatio qua procedit veritas, et alia est emanatio qua procedit sanctitas. Quae si aliquatenus intellecta sunt, cum ex actu intelligendi emanet conceptus, ad divinas processiones rite concipiendas procedamus.

ASSERTUM I Processiones divinae sunt concipiendae per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis. Ad terminos processio: origo unius ab alio.

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Moreover, not only have we not posited causality, we have put forward something far more excellent than causality. For causality is simply an imperfect and unconscious imitation of the intelligible order, which is present intentionally in the mind of the creator. But intellectual emanations, as they are grounded upon our created participation in uncreated light, so do they constitute in us that celebrated image of the triune God from which the psychological analogy is derived. Further, what can take place in us in three finite acts can be present in God through one infinite act. But through three finite acts we grasp the sufficiency of evidence, by virtue of this grasp of evidence we judge, and by virtue of our affirmation of goodness we love. So through one infinite act God by his intellect grasps his infinite perfection, by virtue of this grasp of his perfection affirms it, and by virtue of this affirmation of his perfection loves. Yet we should not be surprised at our inability to understand these things perfectly, but should rather expect it. After all, we are dealing with the supreme mystery of the Holy Trinity. Still, the fact that we are not deceiving ourselves is suggested by St Thomas: ‘That which proceeds by an external procession must be different from that from which it proceeds. But what proceeds internally by an intellectual process does not have to be different. Indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more is it one with that from which it proceeds.’ 12 Therefore, the Son is a se, from himself, because he is God. And the Son is not a se, not from himself, because he proceeds by the intellectual emanation of truth. Likewise, the Spirit is a se, from himself, because he is God. And the Spirit is not a se, not from himself, because he proceeds by the intellectual emanation of holiness. The way in which the Son is not a se, not from himself, differs from the way in which the Spirit is not a se, not from himself, because the emanation whereby truth proceeds is not the same as the emanation by which holiness proceeds. Now if these things have been understood to some extent, then, since a concept emanates from an act of understanding, we may proceed to a correct conception of the divine processions. ASSERTION 1 The divine processions are to be conceived through their likeness to intellectual emanation Terminology procession: the origin of one from another. 12 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 1, ad 2m. Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11.

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divinae processiones: generatio, qua Filius est unigenitus (db 54), et spiratio, qua Spiritus sanctus procedit (db 691). conceptus, conceptio, verbum interius: id quod procedit vi conscientiae intellectualis per actum intelligendi determinatae; ita in prima operatione intellectus procedunt definitiones et hypotheses, in secunda autem procedunt affirmationes et negationes. In usu recentiori nomen, conceptus, conceptio, restringitur ad terminum qui in prima operatione procedit; in usu S. Thomae idem nomen usurpatur de utroque termino.13 Denique, Verbum divinum est verbum utroque sensu: sicut enim in Deo idem est esse et essentia, ita etiam in Deo idem est prima et secunda intellectus operatio, et ideo in Deo idem est verbum qua definitio et verbum qua affirmatio. per similitudinem: analogice, ideoque neque essentialiter neque nominaliter tantum. emanatio: quaecumque origo; etiam dicitur processio, processus. emanatio intelligibilis: conscia actus origo intra conscientiam intellectualem et vi ipsius conscientiae intellectualis actu quodam determinatae. 14

Nota theologica Quod sunt processiones divinae, de fide divina et catholica, v. c., ex symbolo Nicaeno-Constantinopolitano, db 86. Quod processiones divinae sunt concipiendae, theologice certum. Quod enim non concipitur, credi non potest. Sed processiones divinae ab ecclesia credendae proponuntur. Quod processiones divinae non sunt concipiendae per suam essentiam, si rite intelligitur quid sit concipere per essentiam, theologice certum, cum conceptio per essentiam demonstrationem reddat possibilem, et demonstratio mysterii sub anathemate damnetur in Vaticano concilio (db 1816). Quod processiones divinae analogice concipi possunt, theologice certum; nam secundum Vaticanum datur analogica quaedam mysteriorum intelligentia (db 1796) et, data intelligentia analogica, sequitur conceptio analogica.

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divine processions: generation, by which the Son is the the only-begotten (db 54, ds 125–26, nd 7), and spiration, by which the Holy Spirit proceeds (db 691, ds 1300–1302, nd 322). concept, conception, inner word: that which proceeds by virtue of intellectual consciousness determined by an act of understanding. Thus, in the first operation of the intellect definitions and hypotheses proceed, and in the second operation affirmations and negations proceed. In more recent usage, the noun ‘concept’ or ‘conception’ is restricted to the term that proceeds in the first operation; St Thomas uses the same word for both terms.13 Finally, the divine Word is word in both senses: for just as in God existence and essence are identical, so also in God the first and the second operations of the intellect are identical, and therefore in God the word as definition and the word as affirmation are identical. through their likeness: analogously, hence, neither essentially nor only verbally. emanation: any sort of originating; also called procession, process. intellectual emanation: the conscious origin of an act both within intellectual consciousness and by virtue of intellectual consciousness itself as determined by the act.14 Theological Note That there are divine processions is of divine and catholic faith; see, for example, the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, db 86, ds 150, nd 12. That the divine processions are to be conceived is theologically certain. What is not conceived cannot be believed. But the church proposes the divine processions as to be believed. That the divine processions are not to be conceived through their essence, if conceiving something through its essence is rightly understood, is theologically certain, for to conceive something through its essence makes demonstration possible, and demonstrating a mystery of the faith is anathematized by the [First] Vatican Council (db 1816, ds 3041, nd 137). That the divine processions can be conceived analogically is theologically certain; for according to Vatican i there is some analogical understanding of the mysteries (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132); and once there is analogical understanding, analogical conception ensues. 13 [A footnote reference is made to appendix 2, section 6. See above, pp. 586–97.] 14 [See above, note 10.]

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Quod processiones divinae concipiendae sunt secundum analogiam psychologicam, sententia communis theologorum cui accedit fundamentum quoddam in scriptura et traditione.15 Quod in hac analogia psychologica tertium comparationis (seu id in quo invenitur similitudo inter Deum trinum et mentem nostram) est emanatio seu processus intelligibilis, sententia S. Thomae esse videtur.16 Asserti intentio Quaeritur utrum in analogia psychologica elementum centrale seu tertium comparationis sit emanatio intelligibilis. Quae quidem quaestio supponit (1) omnia a Deo revelata, ab ecclesia proposita, fide suscepta; (2) omnia quae in tractatu de Deo uno tradi solent de cognoscibilitate Dei et de ratione mysteriorum; (3) omnia quae in tractatu de Deo Trino per viam analyticam stabiliuntur, nempe, per deductionem ex its quae sunt priora, notiora, manifestiora quoad fideles. Quae omnia sicut aliunde nota vel determinata supponuntur, hic non sunt repetenda.

Ponitur ergo praesens quaestio tamquam initium viae syntheticae, videlicet, tamquam primum quod intelligi oportet ut caetera intelligi possint.

15 Recentiores libros de imagine Dei breviter exponit, P.-Th. Camelot, ‘La th´eologie de l’image de Dieu,’ Revue des sciences philosophiques et th´eologiques xl (1956) 443–471. 16 Quaestionis complexitatem ex appendicibus i et ii colliges. Indicationes generales ex sola Summa de theologia, breviter infra in Asserto II ponuntur. Notate S. Thomam, quamvis ad mentem recentiorum et actu quasi signato psychologicam introspectionem non exercuerit, nihilominus ex ipsa experientia interna multas quaestiones resolvisse easque omnino fundamentales. Verbi gratia, principale quoddam argumentum contra Averroistas erat quod ‘hic homo intelligit.’ Contra Avicennistas arguit ‘lumen intelligibile nostrae animae connaturale’ esse idem quod Aristoteles nominavit intellectum agentem (C. Gent., ii, 77, § 5). Acute atque exacte distinguit inter conscientiam stricte dictam (animam sibi praesentem) et subsequentem investigationem circa naturam seu quidditatem animae (Sum. theol., i, q. 87, a 1). Probat ex universali experientia necessitatem phantasmatis ad actum intelligendi exercendum (ibid. q. 84, a. 7). Caeterum, uti ex appendicibus satis manifestum erit, qui ad propriam conscientiam non attendant, litteram S. Thomae intelligere non possunt.

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That the divine processions are to be conceived according to the psychological analogy is the common opinion of theologians with some foundation in scripture and tradition.15 That in this psychological analogy the tertium comparationis, in which the likeness between the triune God and our mind is found, is intellectual emanation or procession seems to be the opinion of St Thomas.16 Meaning of the Assertion The question is whether in the psychological analogy the central element or tertium comparationis is intellectual emanation. This question presupposes (1) everything that has been revealed by God, proposed by the church, and accepted by faith; (2) everything that is generally dealt with in the treatise on God as one concerning the knowability of God and the meaning of the mysteries; (3) everything that is established in the treatise on the triune God in the way of analysis, that is, through deduction from what are prior, better known, more manifest with respect to the faithful. As all these are presumed to be known or to have been determined from other sources, they need not be repeated here. The present question, therefore, is placed as the starting point of the way of synthesis, that is to say, as that which must be understood first so that everything else can be understood. 15 There is an overview of recent books on the image of God by P.-Th. Camelot, ‘La th´eologie de l’image de Dieu,’ Revue des sciences philosophiques et th´eologiques 40 (1956) 443–71. 16 The reader will gather the complexity of the historical issue from appendices 1 and 2. General indications of that complexity from the Summa theologiae alone are presented briefly in Assertion 2 [not included in appendix 4; see above, pp. 180–89]. Note that although St Thomas may not have employed introspective psychology in the explicit, contemporary way, he did nonetheless resolve many questions, among them the most fundamental, from his own internal experience. For instance, the principal argument against the Averroists was that ‘this human being understands.’ Against the Avicennists he argued that ‘the intellectual light connatural to our soul’ is the same reality that Aristotle named the agent intellect (Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 77, ¶ 5, § 1584). He drew a sharp and exact distinction between consciousness in the strict sense (the soul present to itself) and subsequent investigation concerning the nature or quiddity of the soul (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 87, a. 1). He proves from universal experience the necessity of a phantasm for eliciting an act of understanding (ibid. q. 84, a. 7). For the rest, it will be sufficiently clear from our appendices that those who do not attend to their own consciousness will not be able to understand the words of St Thomas.

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Praeterea, cum finis viae syntheticae sit intelligentia, cum intelligentia ad primam intellectus operationem pertineat, ponitur quaestio de conceptione. Praeterea, utrum conceptio quae proponitur re vera sit primum in via synthetica, hic determinari non potest; determinatur autem ex sequentibus, si quidem tota via percurritur quin aliud prius inveniatur. Argumentum Processiones divinae sunt concipiendae per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis, si ita et non aliter conceptio aliqua habetur. Atqui ita et non aliter conceptio aliqua habetur. Ergo concipiendae sunt processiones divinae per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis. Maior est evidens, iis suppositis quae viam syntheticam antecedunt. Quia enim existunt processiones (db 86), saltem a theologo sunt concipiendae. At hac in vita concipi non possunt nisi mediate et per similitudinem: nam cum divina essentia realiter identificantur (db 391), et hac in vita nisi mediate et per similitudinem ipsa divina essentia non cognoscitur (db 530, 1659; Sum. theol., i, q. 12). E contra, cum conceptio intelligentiam consequatur, quia mysteria imperfecte et analogice intelligi possunt (db 1796), etiam processiones analogice seu per similitudinem concipi possunt. Vide quaestiunculam, p. 784.

Minor per partes probanda est, et primo quod per similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis processiones divinae concipi possunt, deinde autem quod per similitudinem cuiuscumque alterius emanationis concipi non possunt. Ad primam minoris partem sic proceditur: Concipitur divina processio, si in Deo ponitur illud ad quod consequuntur tum realitas emanationis tum consubstantialitas emanantis tum utriusque simul imperfecta nostra intelligentia. Sed posita in Deo emanatione intelligibili consequuntur tum realitas emanationis tum consubstantialitas emanantis tum utriusque simul imperfecta nostra intelligentia. Ergo posita in Deo emanatione intelligibili concipitur divina processio. Maior constat ex iam peracta analysi problematis fundamentalis; quaeritur enim imperfecta intelligentia eius quod tum Filius tum Spiritus sanctus sunt et a se et non a se; et inquantum consequitur realitas emanationis, habetur conceptio

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Besides, since the aim of the way of synthesis is understanding, and since understanding belongs to the first operation of the intellect, the question is about conception. Also, we cannot determine here whether the conception that is proposed is really the first in the way of synthesis; this is determined later, if in fact we get to the end of this way without finding anything else to be first. The Argument The divine processions are to be conceived through a likeness to intellectual emanation if this is the only way to conceive them. But there is no other way to conceive them. Therefore, the divine processions are to be conceived through a likeness to intellectual emanation. With the antecedents of the way of synthesis being presupposed, the major premise is evident. Since processions exist (db 86, ds 150, nd 12), they ought to be conceived, at least by theologians. But in this life they cannot be conceived except mediately and through a likeness; for they are really identical with the divine essence (db 391), and in this life the divine essence is known only mediately and through a likeness (db 530, 1659; ds 1000–1001, 2841; nd 314; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12). However, since conception is consequent upon understanding and since the mysteries can be understood imperfectly and analogically (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132), the processions also can be conceived analogically or through a likeness. See the brief question [below], p. 785. The minor premise is to be proved in two parts: first, that the divine processions can be conceived through a likeness to intellectual emanation, and second, that they cannot be conceived through a likeness to any other emanation whatsoever. The first part of the minor is proved as follows: A divine procession is conceived when there is posited in God that from which there follow the reality of the emanation, the consubstantiality of that which emanates, and our imperfect understanding of both of these taken together. But when intellectual emanation is posited in God, there follow the reality of the emanation, the consubstantiality of that which emanates, and our imperfect understanding of both of these taken together. Therefore, when intellectual emanation is posited in God, a divine procession is conceived. The major premise of this syllogism is clear from our analysis of the fundamental problem. For we are seeking an imperfect understanding of the fact that both the Son and the Holy Spirit are from themselves and not from themselves. In concluding to the reality of an emanation, we arrive at the conception of the Son

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Filii et Spiritus quatenus non sunt a se; inquantum consequitur consubstantialitas emanantis, habetur conceptio Filii et Spiritus quatenus sunt a se; inquantum denique utrumque simul elementum imperfecte tantummodo a nobis intelligitur, habetur obscura illa conceptio quam docet concilium Vaticanum (db 1796). Minor autem per partes probatur. Et primo quod, posita in Deo emanatione intelligibili, consequitur realitas emanationis. Quia enim ponitur, non tantum in mente nostra, sed in ipso Deo, consequitur illam emanationem esse a parte rei seu ens reale et non tantum ens rationis. Praeterea, quia in Deo ponitur emanatio intelligibilis, consequitur illam emanationem realiter in Deo esse, non tantum intentionaliter per modum obiecti a Deo cogniti, sed etiam naturaliter ex parte ipsius divinae conscientiae quae, quia intelligit, verbum verum dicit et, quia et intelligit et verbum verum dicit, amorem spirat. Deinde, posita in Deo emanatione intelligibili, consequitur consubstantialitas emanantis. Nam id quod emanat aut finitum est aut infinitum. Si finitum est, creatura est, extra Deum est, intra divinam conscientiam non est, et ideo nulla ponitur emanatio intelligibilis. Si autem infinitum est, cum infinitum sit unicum, Deus est. Tertio, imperfecta quaedam divinae processionis habetur intelligentia, inquantum et excluditur emanatio causalis et affirmatur emanatio intelligibilis. Quia enim divina processio non est emanatio causalis, id quod in divinis procedit non habet causam et ideo est a se. Praeterea, cum nihil sit causa sui, eatenus vere dicitur Deus ex eodem Deo, quatenus emanatio causalis excluditur. Quia autem divina processio est emanatio intelligibilis, id quod in divinis procedit habet principium intelligibile ex quo procedit, et ideo non est a se; et tamen intra divinam conscientiam procedit, et ideo est infinitum, et Deus et, ratione causae exclusa, a se. Praeterea, ex ipsis his differentiis elucet quantum inter se differant emanatio intelligibilis et emanatio causalis. Intelligibilis enim emanatio est principium rationis sufficientis intra ipsam conscientiam intellectualem. Causalis autem emanatio est idem principium quatenus participatio eius atque imitatio quaedam remota extra conscientiam intellectualem actu intelligentem haberi potest. 17

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and of the Spirit as not being from themselves; in concluding to the consubstantiality of that which emanates, we arrive at the conception of the Son and of the Spirit as being from themselves; and lastly, inasmuch as both of these elements taken together are but imperfectly understood by us, we arrive at that obscure conception that the [First] Vatican Council mentions (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 132). The minor premise of this syllogism is proven in three parts. First, once an intellectual emanation is posited in God, the reality of the emanation follows. For because it is posited, not only in our mind, but in God himself, it follows that that emanation is in reality, as real being and not just conceptual being. Besides, from the positing of intellectual emanation in God, it follows that that emanation really is in God, not only intentionally as an object known by God but also naturally on the side of God’s consciousness, which, in virtue of understanding, utters a true word, and in virtue of understanding and uttering a true word, spirates love. Second, from the positing of intellectual emanation in God, the consubstantiality of that which emanates follows. For that which emanates is either finite or infinite. If it is finite, it is a creature, it is outside God, it is not within the divine consciousness, and so no intellectual emanation is posited. But if it is infinite, then, since the infinite is unique, it is God. Third, there is an imperfect understanding of divine procession inasmuch as causal emanation is excluded and intellectual emanation is affirmed. For because a divine procession is not a causal emanation, that which proceeds in God has no cause and therefore is from itself. Besides, since nothing is the cause of itself, God is truly said to be from the same God to the extent that causal emanation is excluded. However, because a divine procession is an intellectual emanation, that which proceeds in God has an intellectual principle from which it proceeds, and so it is not from itself; and yet it proceeds within the divine consciousness, and therefore it is infinite, it is God, and, since the formality of a cause has been excluded, it is from itself. Besides, these very differences clearly show how great is the difference between intellectual emanation and causal emanation. Intellectual emanation is the principle of sufficient reason within intellectual consciousness itself; causal emanation is the same principle insofar as there can be a participation and remote imitation of it apart from an intellectual consciousness that is actually understanding. 17 17 [A major difference in content between the two versions appears in their respective treatment of causality. In Divinarum Personarum the difference even in us between the emanation and an exercise of causality is stressed, while in De Deo Trino mention is made of a causality in us that is peculiar to consciousness. In Divinarum Personarum causality is ‘imperfecta quaedam et inconscia imitatio ordinis intelligibilis qui in mente

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Praeterea, nullo modo repugnat ut eodem actu et ens intelligatur, et verum affirmetur, et bonum diligatur. Eatenus enim necessario distinguuntur actus quatenus obiecta specifice diversa respiciunt. Sed ens, verum, et bonum adeo non specifice differunt ut inter se convertantur.18

18 Agitur sane de ente per essentiam, de vero per essentiam, de bono per essentiam. Quae quid sibi velint, vide De Constitutione Christi, pp. 9–13.

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Moreover, it is not at all impossible for being to be understood, the true affirmed, and the good loved in the same act. For acts are necessarily distinguished insofar as they regard specifically different objects. But being, the true, and the good are so far from being specifically different as to be convertible with one another. 18 creatoris intentionaliter adest’ (a certain imperfect and unconscious imitation of the intelligible order that intentionally exists in the mind of the creator) that is not found in the created image of the Trinity, that is, in our emanatio intelligibilis; whereas in De Deo Trino the notion of causality is extended to include a peculiar kind of causality proper to conscious acts. No help is given, though, to indicate just what that ‘modum causalitatis proprium conscientiae’ might be. More help is provided in the earlier work now available as the book Verbum, where a distinction is presented between the Aristotelian restriction of efficient causality to the exercise of an influence that proceeds from one being to another, on the one hand, and ‘a more general notion’ found in Aquinas, on the other hand. The following is from Verbum 205–206. Aquinas developed a more general notion of efficient causality than that defined by Aristotle. Thus principium operati, principium effectus, processio operati include the idea of production but do not include the Aristotelian restrictions of in alio vel qua aliud. The act of understanding is to the possible intellect, the act of loving is to the will, as act to potency, as perfection to its perfectible; the procession is processio operationis and cannot be analogous to any real procession in God. But the inner word is to our intelligence in act as is act to act, perfection to proportionate perfection; in us the procession is processio operati; in us dicere is producere verbum, even though it is natural and not an instance of Aristotelian efficient causality. Even more helpful is the following, from ibid. 207, reflected a bit, but not this clearly, in De Deo Trino’s explanation of the phrase ‘actu priori determinatae.’ There are two aspects to the procession of an inner word in us. There is the productive aspect; intelligence in act is proportionate to producing the inner word. There is also the intelligible aspect: inner words do not proceed with mere natural spontaneity as any effect does from any cause; they proceed with reflective rationality; they proceed not merely from a sufficient cause but from sufficient grounds known to be sufficient and because they are known to be sufficient. I can imagine a circle, and I can define a circle. In both cases there is efficient causality. But in the second case there is something more. I define the circle because I grasp in imagined data that, if the radii are equal, then the plane curve must be uniformly round. The inner word of defining not only is caused by but also is because of the act of understanding. In the former aspect the procession is processio operati. In the latter aspect the procession is processio intelligibilis. Similarly, in us the act of judgment is caused by a reflective act of understanding, and so it is processio operati. But that is not all. The procession of judgment cannot be equated with procession from electromotive force or chemical action or biological process or even sensitive act. Judgment is judgment only if it proceeds from intellectual grasp of sufficient evidence as sufficient. Its procession also is processio intelligibilis.] 18 We are speaking, of course, of being by essence, of truth by essence, of good by essence. What each of these means is presented in The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 8–19.

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Praeterea, nullo modo repugnat ut ita eodem actu et ens intelligatur et verum affirmetur et bonum diligatur, ut tamen vere et realiter affirmatio sit ex intelligentia et dilectio sit ex utraque. Repugnaret sane si illud ‘ex’ diceret emanationem causalem. Repugnaret pariter si alia et alia essent obiecta quae intelligentiam, affirmationem, et dilectionem specificarent. Repugnaret iterum si omnibus modis idem esset emanationis principium et id quod ex principio emanat. At ponitur non emanatio causalis sed emanatio intelligibilis. Neque ponuntur obiecta specifice diversa, sed quae convertuntur, ens, verum, bonum. Et quamvis non alius actus ex alio emanet, tamen alia persona subsistens ex alia persona subsistente procedit.

Quibus perspectis, perspicitur vis analogiae psychologicae. In finita enim unius personae conscientia alius actus accidentalis ex alio accidentali intelligibiliter emanat. Sed in infinita puri actus conscientia, ubi accidentia esse non possunt, alia persona subsistens ex alia intelligibiliter emanat. Quod si aliquam intelligentiam probavimus, iam in partem oppositam et faciliorem procedendum est, ut stabiliatur hanc intelligentiam esse imperfectam. Et prima imperfectio est quod clare et distincte non perspicimus rationem emanationis intelligibilis; in nobis enim non existit emanatio intelligibilis, nisi alius actus accidentalis ex alio procedit; et ideo vix concipimus divinam emanationem intelligibilem, in qua tum vera et realis est emanatio tum unus idemque prorsus est actus; quae quidem duo adeo inter se opponi nobis videntur, ut ea seorsum concipere sed vix simul considerare possimus. Secunda autem imperfectio est differentia radicalis inter emanationem intelligibilem creatam et increatam. In creata enim procedit alius actus accidentalis ex alio. In increata autem procedit alia persona subsistens ex alia. Quod quamvis ex subsequentibus aliquatenus illustretur, maxime tamen demonstrat defectum analogiae psychologiae. Quamvis enim utrimque habentur unum et tria, tamen in imagine inveniuntur una persona et tres actus accidentales, in Deo autem e contra unus est actus et tres sunt personae subsistentes. Neque tanta est vis in numerorum similitudine, ut diversa prorsus numerata ex diversis clare et distincte intelligi possint. Tertia denique imperfectio est quod non solum processiones divinae naturali rationis lumine demonstrari non possunt sed etiam, ipsis processionibus per fidem affirmatis, longa et difficilis et obscura est argumentatio quae ad emanationes intelligibiles affirmandas conducat.

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Furthermore, it is by no means contradictory for being to be understood, the true affirmed, and the good loved in the same act in such a way that this affirmation is nonetheless really and truly from understanding and this love really and truly from both affirmation and understanding. This would certainly be contradictory if ‘from’ indicated causal emanation. Likewise, there would be a contradiction if there were different objects specifying the understanding, the affirmation, and the love. Again, there would be a contradiction if the principle of emanation and that which emanates from the principle were the same in every way. But we are positing not causal, but intellectual emanation. Nor do we posit specifically different objects, but objects that are convertible: being, the true, the good. And although it is not the case that one act emanates from another, still one subsistent person proceeds from another subsistent person. Once this is well understood, the force of the psychological analogy becomes evident. For in the finite consciousness of one person, one accidental act intellectually emanates from another accidental act. But in the infinite consciousness of pure act, where there can be no accidents, one subsistent person intellectually emanates from another subsistent person. But if we have demonstrated some understanding, we must must now take the easier road on the opposite side, to determine that this understanding is imperfect. The first imperfection is that we do not clearly and distinctly grasp the formality of intellectual emanation. The only intellectual emanation in us is the procession of one accidental act from another; therefore we can scarcely conceive divine intellectual emanation, in which the emanation is both true and real while the act is completely one and the same. These two appear to be so contrary to each other that, while we can conceive them separately, we can scarcely consider them together. The second imperfection is the radical difference between created and uncreated intellectual emanation. In created emanation one accidental act proceeds from another. But in uncreated emanation one subsistent person proceeds from another. Although what follows throws some light on this, at the same time it most clearly reveals the limitations of the psychological analogy. For although in both cases there are one and three, still in the image there is one person and three accidental acts, while in God there is one act and three subsistent persons. Nor is the numerical similarity so significant that the totally diverse enumerated realities can be understood clearly and distinctly on diverse grounds. Finally, the third imperfection is that not only is it impossible to demonstrate the divine processions by the natural light of reason, but also, after these processions are affirmed in faith, the process of reasoning that leads to affirming intellectual emanations is lengthy, difficult, and obscure.

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Ad secundam minoris partem proceditur per disiunctiones completas et successivas ad excludendam omnem aliam emanationem praeter intelligibilem. Cum ens dividatur per potentiam et actum, emanatio aut est de potentia in actum, aut est de actu in actum. Sed in Deo nulla est potentia. Ergo processio divina est de actu in actum.19 Actus vero aut est idem aut alius, et ideo emanatio aut est de alio actu in alium, aut est de eodem actu in eundem.20 Sed processio divina non est de alio actu in alium, nam Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt idem Deus et ideo idem actus purus ac Deus Pater. Ergo processio divina est de eodem actu in eundem, secundum concilium Nicaenum, ‘Deum ex Deo, lumen ex lumine, Deum verum de Deo vero’ (db 54). Porro, ratio emanationis aut est ad modum agentis aut ad modum naturae; nam agens est principium actus in alio, natura autem est principium actus in eo in quo est. Sed processio divina non est ad modum agentis. Nam, primo, Filius non est factus vel creatus, et Spiritus non est factus vel creatus (db 39). Et praeterea omnis emanatio per modum agentis est secundum causalitatem; sed nihil est causa sui; et ideo emanatio eiusdem actus ex eodem non potest esse per modum agentis. Ergo relinquitur quod processio divina est ad modum naturae.

Proinde, natura aut est materialis aut spiritualis. Sed Deus nullo modo est materialis. Et ideo processio divina est ad modum naturae spiritualis. Ulterius, inquantum natura spiritualis a nobis ignoratur, nulla habetur similitudo ad processiones divinas concipiendas; et ideo considerari oportet naturam spiritualem secundum quod a nobis cognoscitur, scilicet, secundum quod intellectu et voluntate consistit. Concipiendae sunt ergo processiones divinae ad modum naturae intellectualis et voluntariae. Iam vero non solum haec ultima conclusio sed etiam omnes anteriores sunt considerandae. Non ergo est quaerenda analogia ex natura intellectuali et voluntaria, vel inquantum per coniunctam naturam materialem limitatur, vel inquantum ipsa se perficit per modum agentis, vel inquantum ex potentia sive remota sive proxima ad actum transit, vel inquantum alius actus ex alio emanat.

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We proceed to the second part of the minor through complete successive disjunctions in order to exclude every other emanation except intellectual emanation. Since being is divided into potency and act, an emanation is either from potency to act or from act to act. But in God there is no potency, and so a divine procession is from act to act.19 But the act is either the same or different, and so the emanation is either from one act to another or from the same act to the same act.20 But a divine procession is not from one act to another, for the Son and the Holy Spirit are the same God, and therefore the same pure act, as God the Father. Therefore, a divine procession is from the same act to the same, in the words of the Council of Nicea: ‘God from God, light from light, true God from true God’ (db 54, ds 125, nd 7). Again, the formality of emanation is either in the manner of an agent or in the manner of a nature; for an agent is the principle of an act in another, whereas a nature is the principle of act in that in which the nature is. But a divine procession is not in the manner of an agent. For, first of all, the Son is not made or created, and the Spirit is not made or created (db 39, ds 75, nd 16). And besides, every emanation in the manner of an agent is based on causality; but nothing is the cause of itself, and therefore an emanation of the same act from the same act cannot be in the manner of an agent. It remains, then, that a divine procession is in the manner of a nature. Further, a nature is either material or spiritual. But God is in no way material; therefore a divine procession is in the manner of a spiritual nature. Moreover, to the extent that a spiritual nature is not known to us, no likeness is available to us for conceiving the divine processions. Hence, we have to consider a spiritual nature with respect to what is known to us, namely, what consists in intellect and will. Therefore, the divine processions must be conceived in the manner of an intellectual and volitional nature. Now, not only this last conclusion but also all the preceding ones must be taken into consideration. Hence, we are seeking an analogy from an intellectual and volitional nature neither in its being limited through a conjoint material nature, nor as perfecting itself as an agent, nor as going from potency, whether remote or proximate, to act, nor in that one act emanates from another. 19 [In an archive copy of Divinarum Personarum, Lonergan underlined the words ‘actu in actum’ and wrote in the margin, ‘processio operati.’] 20 [In the same copy, he underlined ‘de alio actu in alium’ and ‘de eodem actu in eundem’ and wrote in the margin, with reference to the latter, ‘per modum operati.’]

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Neque sufficit mera negationum cumulatio. Sic enim certo scitur quid non sit similitudo secundum quam concipi possunt processiones divinae. At docta haec ignorantia non fundat mysteriorum intelligentiam neque vel unum gressum facit secundum viam syntheticam. Et ideo invenienda est positiva illa ratio quae non causalis est sed naturalis, non ad modum naturae materialis sed ad modum naturae intellectualis et voluntariae, non circa transitum de potentia remota vel proxima in actum sed circa ipsum actum est. Imo, quamvis propter defectum nostrae imaginis alium actum ex alio emanantem considerari oporteat, ne hoc quidem est faciendum nisi ut inveniatur illud quod de ipsa sua intrinseca ratione multos actus non exigat. Quibus perspectis, omnis alia emanationis ratio praeter processiones conscientiae intellectualis excludi videtur. Corollarium Quae cum ita sint, superfluunt in theologia trinitaria quaestiones de variis principiis metaphysicis sive potentialibus sive agentibus e quibus procedunt actus nostri finiti sive intelligendi sive affirmandi sive diligendi. Ex dictis, enim, haec nihil simpliciter faciunt ad ipsam analogiam trinitariam, quae tota in emanatione intelligibili consistat. Qua de causa, ad appendicem i remisimus omnia quae mentem S. Thomae hac in re respiciant. 3 Chapter 2, the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Paragraphs of Question 121 Praeterea, aliud est definitio seu hypothesis, et aliud est quidditas seu natura in materia corporali existens. Quae quidem distinctio, quamvis subtilior videatur, facilius ex ipso processu scientifico elucet. Scientia enim est certa rerum per causas cognitio. Sed ante certam per causas cognitionem praerequiritur rerum per causas conceptio; quae quidem conceptio in definitionibus et hypothesibus invenitur. Attamen, antequam res per causas suas concipi possint, praerequiritur quaedam causarum notitia; et haec est notitia ad quam movemur per quidditatem seu naturam in materia corporali existentem. Ad cuius intelligentiam animadvertendum est quod aliud est res et aliud est quidditas rei. Res enim dicit quoddam totum ex materia corporali et quidditate

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But a mere accumulation of negations does not suffice. For in that way we should certainly know only what a likeness for conceiving the divine processions is not. But such ‘learned ignorance’ is not a basis for understanding the mysteries, nor does it progress even one step along the way of synthesis. Therefore, we must discover that positive formality which is not causal but natural, not in the manner of a material nature but of an intellectual and volitional nature, not about a passage from remote or proximate potency to act, but about act itself. In fact, although on account of the deficiency in our image it is necessary to consider one act emanating from another, we must not even do this except to discover that which by its own intrinsic formality does not require a multiplicity of acts. With all this clearly understood, it is apparent that every other formality of emanation except the processions of intellectual consciousness is excluded. Corollary Accordingly, questions about various metaphysical principles regarding either potentiality or action, from which our finite acts of understanding, affirming, or loving proceed, are superfluous in trinitarian theology. For from what we have said they simply do nothing to contribute to a trinitarian analogy that consists entirely in intellectual emanation. For this reason we have put into appendix 1 everything regarding the thought of St Thomas on this subject. 3 Chapter 2, the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Paragraphs of Question 1 21 Besides, a definition or a hypothesis is not the same as the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter. This distinction, although it may seem rather subtle, easily becomes clear from the scientific process itself. For a science is the certain knowledge of things through their causes. But prior to certain knowledge through causes, a conception of the things through their causes is required, and this conception is to be found in definitions and hypotheses. And yet, before things can be conceived through their causes, some knowledge about the causes is required, and this is the knowledge to which we are moved by a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter. To understand this, one must take note of the fact that a thing and its quiddity are not the same. ‘Thing’ means a certain whole that is composed of corporeal 21 [Compare above, p. 205.]

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compositum; ipsa autem quidditas non totum est sed pars, cum a corporali materia distinguatur eique inexistere dicatur. Quare, sicut aliud est res et aliud est rei quidditas, alius etiam est actus quo res definitur, et alius est actus quo rei quidditas innotescat ut per eam res quidditative definiri possit. Et iterum hi duo actus emanatione intelligibili connectuntur, cum ideo rem per causam seu quidditative definire possimus, quia causam seu quidditatem perspexerimus.

4 Chapter 2, Question 422 Si ‘amatum in amante’ constituitur per amorem, tunc (1) ‘amatum in amante’ nihil est aliud quam ipse amor, (2) ‘amatum in amante’ producitur non per amorem sed per verbum, (3) eadem formaliter est processio amoris et processio eius quod dicitur ‘amatum in amante,’ (4) processio amoris non fit intra voluntatem sed ex intellectu in voluntatem, ideoque (5) processio amoris differt a processione verbi quae fit totaliter intra eandem potentiam et non ex alia in aliam, (6) Spiritus sanctus est amor, ideoque (7) Spiritus sanctus est ‘amatum in amante,’ (8) Spiritus sanctus procedit immediate ex Verbo, (9) Spiritus sanctus non procedit ex amore.

Si autem ‘amatum in amante’ producitur per amorem, tunc (1) ‘amatum in amante’ est realiter aliud ac amor, (2) ‘amatum in amante’ producitur non per verbum sed per amorem, (3) alia formaliter est processio amoris et alia formaliter est processio eius quod dicitur ‘amatum in amante,’ (4) processio secundum voluntatem fit totaliter intra voluntatem, (5) processio secundum voluntatem est omnino similis processioni verbi quae fit totaliter intra intellectum, (6) Spiritus sanctus non est ipse amor sed id quod ab amore realiter distinguitur et per amorem producitur, (7) Spiritus sanctus est ‘amatum in amante,’ (8) Spiritus sanctus non procedit immediate ex Verbo, (9) Spiritus sanctus procedit ex amore. Novem ergo sunt consectaria utriusque sententiae, et omnia quidem praeter septimum mutuo sunt contradictoria. Tot ergo tantisque differentiis perspectis, sat facile determinatur quid senserit S. Thomas de processione amoris, nempe, utrum nobiscum dicat ‘amatum in amante’ constitui per amorem an cum Ioanne

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matter and a quiddity. The quiddity itself is not the whole but a part, since it is distinguished from corporeal matter and is said to exist in it. Therefore, just as a thing and its quiddity are not the same, so also the act by which a thing is defined is not the same as the act by which the quiddity of the thing becomes known in order that through it the thing can be quidditatively defined. And again, these two acts are connected by an intellectual emanation, since we are able to define a thing through its cause, or quidditatively, precisely because we have grasped its cause or quiddity. 4 Chapter 2, Question 4 22 If ‘the beloved in the lover’ is constituted by love, then (1) ‘the beloved in the lover’ is nothing other than the love itself, (2) ‘the beloved in the lover’ is produced not by love but by the word, (3) the procession of love and the procession of what is termed ‘the beloved in the lover’ are formally the same, (4) the procession of love does not take place within the will but from the intellect into the will, and therefore (5) the procession of love differs from the procession of the word, which takes place entirely within the same potency and not from one thing to another, (6) the Holy Spirit is love, and therefore (7) the Holy Spirit is the ‘beloved in the lover,’ (8) the Holy Spirit proceeds immediately from the Word, and (9) the Holy Spirit does not proceed from love. If, on the other hand, ‘the beloved in the lover’ is produced by love, then (1) ‘the beloved in the lover’ is really distinct from love, (2) ‘the beloved in the lover’ is produced not by the word but by love, (3) the procession of love is formally one thing and the procession of what is called ‘the beloved in the lover’ is formally something else, (4) the procession by way of the will takes place entirely within the will, (5) the procession by way of the will is altogether similar to the procession of the word, which takes place entirely within the intellect, (6) the Holy Spirit is not love itself but that which is really distinct from love and is produced by love, (7) the Holy Spirit is ‘the beloved in the lover,’ (8) the Holy Spirit does not proceed immediately from the Word, and (9) the Holy Spirit proceeds from love. Thus, each opinion has nine consequences, all of which except the seventh are mutually contradictory. By understanding these many important differences, we can easily determine St Thomas’s opinion on the procession of love, that is, whether he sides with us in affirming that ‘the beloved in the lover’ is constituted 22 [‘Is the “Beloved in the Lover” Constituted or Produced by Love?’ Compare above, pp. 218–29.]

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a S. Thoma23 et Thomistis generatim doceat ‘amatum in amante’ produci per amorem.24 Caeterum adeo clara est littera S. Thomae de processione amoris ex verbo ut nedum dubium sed ne obscurum quidem dici possit quid ipse senserit circa ‘amatum in amante.’ Quaestiuncula Occasione argumenti, quod superius . . . exponitur, quaeri potest qualis sit inter fideles et rudes processionis divinae notitia. Ad cuius intelligentiam distinguenda sunt: (1) seorsum processionem concipere et seorsum divinam; (2) haec duo per affirmationem fidei componere; (3) hanc fidei affirmationem quodammodo intelligere, unde una quaedam conceptio divinae processionis oriatur. Primum et alterum faciunt fideles; tertium autem facere saltem theologorum est; quemadmodum vero pedetentim per theologos fiat, colligi potest ex iis quae infra . . . de evolutione notionis ‘personae’ ponuntur.

5 Corresponding to the Section The Council of Rheims, A.D. 1148, in Chapter 325 Ad quam confusionem tollendam, occasione doctrinae Gilberti Porretae, decrevit concilium Remense quod divinitas est Deus et Deus divinitas; et similiter alia attributa etiam abstracta nominant ipsam summam rem quae est Deus et simplex (db 389). Et ideo quamvis secundum modum significandi proprie utimur ablativo,

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by love or with John of St Thomas23 and Thomists generally in teaching that ‘the beloved in the lover’ is produced by love.24 St Thomas’s writings passim concerning the procession of love from the word are so clear that there can be not only no doubt but not even the slightest obscurity about his opinion on ‘the beloved in the lover.’ A Brief Question In connection with the argument [on page 64 in Divinarum Personarum; see above, p. 771], the question may arise concerning the nature of the knowledge about the divine processions that the faithful and the uneducated would have. To answer this question the following should be distinguished: (1) conceiving ‘procession’ and ‘divine’ separately from each other; (2) bringing these two together in an affirmation of faith; (3) having some understanding of this affirmation of faith, from which some one conception of divine procession might emerge. The faithful perform the first and second of these operations; the third is at least for theologians to perform. How it is performed step by step by theologians can be seen from what we will say below . . . about the development of the notion of ‘person.’ 5 Corresponding to the Section The Council of Rheims, A.D. 1148, in Chapter 3 25 In order to eliminate confusion, on the occasion of dealing with the teaching of Gilbert de la Porr´ee the Council of Rheims decreed that divinity is God and God is divinity; and similarly, other, even abstract, attributes are names of that supreme being which is God and is simple (db 389). Therefore, although according to the way of signifying it is correct to use the ablative case, so that we say that God is 23 Joannis a Sancto Thoma, Cursus theologicus in summam theologicam D. Thomae, i, q. 27; disp. xii, a. 7, § iv (Paris: Ludovicus Viv`es, 1884) 142. 24 [At this point in Divinarum Personarum Lonergan moves to material that begins with the quotation from Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 19, that appears above on p. 223. The remainder of question 4 is the same down to but not including the paragraph beginning ‘Nevertheless’ on p. 229 above. The question concludes in Divinarum Personarum with the short paragraph and ‘brief question’ that occur in the text above.] 25 [Compare above, pp. 242–45. The subheading in Divinarum Personarum named not only the Council and its date but also db 389–92. The reason the section was changed in De Deo Trino is that it was subsequently discovered that what had been attributed to the Council was really not a conciliar teaching at all but the teaching of Pope Eugene iii. See above, p. 243.]

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ut Deus sit divinitate, tamen secundum realem Dei simplicitatem et identitatem vere utimur nominativo, ut Deus sit divinitas et divinitas sit Deus. Quam doctrinam concilium statim ad dogma trinitarium applicat, ut vere dicatur tum quod Pater est Deus, Filius est Deus, Spiritus est Deus, tum quod Deus est Pater, Deus est Filius, Deus est Spiritus (db 390). Et eandem doctrinam ulterius applicat ad alia, quae in theologia trinitaria adhibebantur, videlicet, ‘alias omnino res, sive relationes, sive proprietates, sive singularitates, vel unitates dicantur, et huiusmodi alia’ ut quodcumque eorum quod ab aeterno sit etiam Deus sit (db 391). Quid vero his in decretis approbasse videatur Romanus Pontifex, ex testimonio Ottonis Frisingensis apud Denzinger in nota determinatur, nempe, ‘Romanus Pontifex definivit, ne aliqua ratio in theologia inter naturam et personam divideret, neve Deus divina essentia diceretur ex sensu ablativi tantum, sed etiam nominativi.’ 6 Assertion 6, Preliminary Observations, § 226 [Praemittenda] 2 Aut relationes mutuo oppositae non sunt reales aut realiter inter se distinguuntur. [1957] Mutuo enim opponuntur relationes quarum altera ad alteram terminatur. Iam vero si altera et altera sunt realiter idem, utraque est relatio eiusdem ad idem et ideo est ens rationis tantum. Si autem altera et altera non sunt realiter idem, realiter inter se distinguuntur. [1959] Mutuo enim opponuntur relationes quarum altera ad alteram terminatur. Sed altera et altera distinguuntur aut ratione aut realiter. Si ratione distinguuntur, eadem bis ad se ipsam terminatur ut sit relatio rationis tantum; et sic habetur primum. Si realiter distinguuntur, statim habetur secundum. Unde concludes: relationes reales et mutuo oppositae realiter inter se distinguuntur. 7 One of the Arguments in Assertion 7, Relationes divinae reales ratione a divina essentia distinguuntur et realiter cum ea identificantur27 Iterum, arguitur ex damnatione Gilberti Porretae: ‘Credimus (et confitemur) solum Deum Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum aeternum esse, nec aliquas omnino

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by his divinity, nevertheless by reason of the simplicity and identity of God we are right in using the nominative case, as God is divinity and divinity is God. The Council immediately applies this teaching to the dogma of the Trinity, so that it is true to say both that the Father is God, the Son is God, the Spirit is God, and that God is the Father, God is the Son, God is the Spirit (db 390). And the Council further applies this same doctrine to other terms that are used in trinitarian theology, namely, ‘all other things whatsoever, whether they are called relations, or properties, or singularities, or unities, and other things of this sort,’ so that whatever of these are eternal are also God (db 391). The footnote here in Denzinger indicates what in these decrees, according to the testimony of Otto, Bishop of Freising, the Pope apparently approved, namely, that ‘the Roman Pontiff has defined that no theological formality should divide nature and person, and that God should be said to be divina essentia not only in the ablative case but also in the nominative.’ 6 Assertion 6, Preliminary Observations, § 2 26 [Preliminary Observations] 2 Mutually opposed relations are either not real or are really distinct from each other. [1957] For those relations are mutually opposed in which each has the other as its term. If both are really the same, each is a relation of the same to the same and therefore is a being of reason only. But if they are not really the same, they are really distinct from each other. [1959] For those relations are mutually opposed in which each has the other as its term. But these are distinguished from each other either conceptually or really. If they are conceptually distinct, the same relation terminates at itself twice, so that there is only a conceptual relation, and then the first case is true. If they are really distinct, the second case is true. Conclusion: real mutually opposed relations are really distinct from each other. 7 One of the Arguments in Assertion 7, That the Divine Essence and a Real Divine Relation Are Really the Same27

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res, sive relationes, sive proprietates, sive singularitates vel unitates dicantur, et huiusmodi alia, adesse Deo, quae sint ab aeterno, quae non sint Deus.’ db 391; et vide notam ibi positam, nempe, teste Ottone Frisingensi, ‘Romanus Pontifex definivit ne aliqua ratio in theologia inter naturam et personam divideret, neve Deus divina essentia diceretur sensu ablativi tantum, sed etiam nominativi.’

8 Response to the Scotist Position on Formal Distinction on the Side of the Reality28 Respondeo aliam esse cognitionem divinam, aliam cognitionem nostram, et aliam imaginationem tum divinae tum nostrae cognitionis. In Deo enim idem prorsus est intelligere quod est esse; unde ipsa veritas cognitionis divinae non est similitudo inter cognoscere et cognitum, cum similitudo dualitatem supponat, sed in dissimilitudinis absentia consistit. 29 In nobis autem, cum ex potentia intelligendi ad actum progrediamur, cognoscimus inquantum et inquirendo intelligimus, et intelligendo verba interiora dicimus, et per verba interius dicta tamquam per media-in-quibus entia contemplamur. Attamen, cum homo non solum rationalis sit sed etiam animal, non solum in propriam naturam suae cognitionis inquirit, ut inquisitam intelligat, et intellectam verbis interioribus dicat, et per vera dicta realitatem suae cognitionis contempletur, sed etiam arduum hoc atque longius opus omittere potest, ut per imaginationem videntis et obiecti visi, quid sit cognitio se certo scire opinetur. Quae cognitionis imaginatio, si semel admittitur, ad distinctionem formalem necessario conducit. Nam cum visio visionis clare et distincte imaginatione repraesentari non possit, fieri nequit ut vel de cognitione divina cogitemus, quin inter se secernantur, et obiectum prout ex parte obiecti exhibetur, et subiectum quod ideo vere cognoscit, quia et omne videt quod ex parte obiecti exhibetur et nihil videt nisi quod ita exhibetur. Quae cognitionis imaginatio erat fundamentum evidens ex quo processit praemissa maior obiectionis primae. Ponuntur enim, quasi duo essent, et Deus Pater cognoscens et Deus Pater prout obiective exhibetur ante omnem operationem mentis. Circa hoc obiectum ponitur trilemma: aut exhibentur duae realitates aut

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and that all other things whatsoever, whether they are called relations or properties or singularities or unities or other things of this sort that are not God are present to God and are from eternity’ (db 391); and see the note put there, namely, on the testimony of Otto of Freising, ‘The Roman Pontiff defined that no theological formality should divide nature and person, and that God should be said to be divina essentia not only in the ablative case but also in the nominative.’ 8 Response to the Scotist Position on Formal Distinction on the Side of the Reality 28 I reply that God’s knowledge is one kind of knowledge, our knowledge is another, and imagining both divine and human knowledge is still another. In God understanding and being are absolutely identical; hence, the truth of divine knowledge is not a similitude between knowing and the known, for similitude supposes duality; it consists, rather, in the absence of dissimilitude. In us, however, since we progress from understanding in potency to understanding in act, we know insofar as through inquiry we understand, and through understanding we speak inner words, and through words spoken interiorly as through means-in-which we contemplate beings. 29 Still, since we are not only rational but also animal, we not only investigate the proper nature of our knowledge so as to understand what we discover, speak in inner words what we have understood, and through true words contemplate the reality of our knowledge, but we can also forgo this arduous and lengthy task, so that by picturing someone who is seeing and the object of sight we think we know for certain what knowledge is. This picturing of knowledge, once it is admitted, leads necessarily to a formal distinction. For since looking at looking cannot be clearly and distinctly pictured in the imagination, it is impossible for us to think even about divine knowledge without separating the object as displayed on the side of the object and the subject which truly knows because it sees everything that is presented to it on the side of the object and sees nothing except what is displayed there. This picturing of knowledge is clearly the basis of the major premise of the first objection. For it posits as if they were two, God the Father as knowing and God the Father as displayed objectively prior to all operation of the mind. We set up a trilemma concerning this object: either two realities are displayed or 28 [Compare above, pp. 300–305, beginning with the paragraph ‘This argument from Scotus.’] 29 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, aa. 2 and 4; q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m.

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exhibetur una tantum; et si una tantum exhibetur, aut habetur formalitatum nonidentitas ex parte ipsius rei aut non. Quibus concessis, cum cognitio nihil aliud esse supponatur quam obiecti videndi in subiecto vidente duplicatio, necessario concluditur aut ad Sabellianam, aut ad haeresin Arianam, aut ad distinctionem intermediam atque formalem. Cuius argumenti ipsa gnoseologica fundamenta sunt neganda. Realia enim cognoscimus inquantum cognoscimus entia; et entia cognoscimus inquantum vera proferimus iudicia quibus mediantibus entia nobis innotescunt; et iudicia vera sunt tum aut affirmativa aut negativa tum aut simplicia aut composita, ut necessario iudicetur aut (1) A est, aut (2) A non est, aut (3) A est B, aut (4) A non est B. Iam vero, distincta sunt quorum unum non est aliud, et ideo per sola vera iudicia et negativa et composita (seu quarti typi) innotescunt distinctiones. Praeterea, verum iudicium negativum atque compositum aut primae intentionis est ut de rebus iudicetur aut secundae intentionis est ut de conceptibus iudicetur. Quod si primae intentionis est iudicium, tunc A qua reale non est B qua reale, et distinctio realis est. Si autem secundae intentionis est, tunc conceptus A non est conceptus B, et distinctio est rationis. Denique tandem cum modus noster concipiendi non sit idem ac modus rerum essendi, fieri potest ut distinctio rationis oriatur, aut solummodo ex nostro modo concipiendi, aut etiam ex modo rerum essendi; et ideo distinctiones rationis ulterius dividuntur in distinctiones rationis tantum et in distinctiones rationis cum fundamento in re. Quibus distinctionibus si quis aliam et formalem addere conatur, exaggerato quodam realismo peccat, quasi ipsae res non solum suis principiis realibus sed etiam nostris formalitatibus conceptualibus constituerentur. Nisi enim in ipsis rebus, praeter reale, etiam aliud ponitur quod formale dicitur, certo certius praeter distinctionem realem haberi non potest distinctio alia, quae nominatur formalis ex parte rei. Iam vero si formale est praeter reale, non est reale; si non est reale, nihil in rebus est. E contra, si formale non est praeter reale, tunc reale est; et si formale est reale, sane distinctio formalis cum reali coincidit.

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only one is displayed; and if only one is displayed, either there is a nonidentity of formalities on the part of the thing itself or there is not. If this is granted, then since knowledge is supposed to be nothing else than a facsimile of the object being seen in the subject seeing it, the necessary conclusion is either the Sabellian or the Arian heresy, or an intermediate formal distinction. The gnoseological foundations of this argument must be denied. For we know real things inasmuch as we know beings; and we know beings inasmuch as we utter true judgments by means of which beings become known to us; and true judgments are both either affirmative or negative, and either simple or compound, so that judgment is necessarily either (1) A is, or (2) A is not, or (3) A is B, or (4) A is not B. Now, those things are distinct when one is not the other, and therefore it is only through true negative compound judgments (type 4) that distinctions are known. Besides, a true negative compound judgment is either of the first intention that makes judgments about things or of the second intention that makes judgments about concepts. If there is a judgment of the first intention, then A as real is not B as real, and the distinction is real. If, on the other hand, the judgment is of the second intention, then concept A is not concept B, and the distinction is conceptual. Finally, because our mode of conceiving is not the same as our mode of existing, it is possible for a conceptual distinction to arise, either solely from our mode of conceiving, or also from the mode of existence of things; and therefore conceptual distinctions are further divided into purely conceptual distinctions and conceptual distinctions with a basis in reality. To add to these distinctions another, a formal, distinction is to sin by an excess of realism, as if things themselves were not constituted by their own real principles but also by our conceptual formalities. For unless there is posited in real things themselves something else that is called formal, most certainly there cannot be in addition to a real distinction another distinction that is called ‘formal on the side of the reality.’ If formal is something besides real, it is not real; if it is not real, it does not exist among things. On the other hand, if formal is not something besides real, then it is real; and if formal is real, surely a formal distinction coincides with the real.

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Index

Abelard, 23 Absolute: and realities whose definitions are through what the realities themselves are, 357; and relative, 697, 713–19; a. simply and in a qualified sense, 713–19 Absurdity: of social situations, 409 Accident(s): ambiguity of word ‘a.’, 401; ‘are in’ rather than ‘are,’ 241, 269–71, 291, 325, 347 (see also Being in and being to); defined, 689; not subsistent, 325, 347; and real relations, 689; relation as a. and not as a., 271, 279; two meanings of a., 271–73, 279 Act: a. from a., 143, 149, 149 n. 16, 157, 159, 163, 175, 779; a. from potency, 143, 149, 157, 173–75, 777; a. of what is complete, 369, 537–39; a. of what is incomplete, 537–39; and actio/operatio, 535; in Aquinas, 533, 535; conscious a. as principle-by-which, 143; in definition of intellectual emanation, 141; first a. is form, 537; and movement, 369; and object, 203; originating and originated a., 163; and perfection, 421–35, 491–

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

93; and potency, 535–37; proportion between a. and potency, 535–37; in proportion to form and potency, 141; psychological a. as intentional and natural, 141; relative distinction of a. from a., 165; same a. from same a., 779; second a. is operation, action, energeia, 537; understanding and conceiving as different kinds of a., 607. See also Infinite act Action: in Aquinas, 533, 535; predicament a., 543–47 Action and passion: 283, 285, 543–47, 733; and mutually opposed relations, 285 Active potency: 533, 535, 539–41; according to Aristotle and Avicenna, 539–41, 553, 607 and n. 4; and object, 561, 607 Active spiration: compared with passive spiration as really distinct, 253, 261 and n. 15; defined, 235; and filiation, 255, 261 and n. 15; and paternity, 239, 253, 261 and n. 15; and procession of love, 237, 675; and sanctifying grace, 471; and Spirator, 239–47; twofold in us but one

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in God, 255; and will, 675 Actual realities: divine knowledge and affirmation and love of, 215–17 Act of what is complete (actus perfecti), 533, 607. See also Act Act of what is incomplete (actus imperfecti), 533. See also Act Adoption: and missions of Son and Holy Spirit, 481–83 Adversaries: in dogmatic and systematic ways, 73–75 Agent(s): first and second, 113 Agent intellect, 155 n. 18, 205 ‘Alone’: as used concerning divine persons, 361 Already out there now, 321 Anachronism, 97 Analogy: of actual unity, 347–49; of being, 347; and consequent truth, 47; defined, 399; and developing understanding, 43– 45, 47; and different conceptual systems, 221; drawn from experience, 221; drawn from what we know naturally, 19, 45, 55, 171; and equivocity, 337; and existential autonomy, 177–79; of intellect, 627– 45; and knowledge of God, 41, 107, 195; limitation in philosophical and theological a., 685; movement from multiplicity to unity in a., 45; in natural theology, 49–51; of person, 337–39; philosophical and theological a., 681– 85; Platonic a. of intellect, 629, 631; of proceeding love, 671–81; from a specific nature, 171, 179; from a spiritual mode of proceeding, 175, 179; from a spiritual nature, 173, 179; from a spiritual procession, 173–75, 179; systematic a., 171, 173, 179; of temporal and eternal subject, 399–413; trinitarian a., 681–85;

and univocity, 81 n. 50, 337; of ‘ways’ of inquiry, 65; of word, 659–71. See also Psychological analogy, Synthesis, Understanding of mysteries Analysis: way of, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 109 n. 62, 117, 235, 327, 757 Analytic principles: and real internal relations, 691–93, 745 and n. 3 Animal faith, 321 Anselm, St, 259, 263, 617 Apologetics: and dogmatics, 113 ‘Appropriate’: meaning of, 721 Appropriate external term: and correspondence/constitution of contingent truth, 441, 455–67; follows a mission, 463 and nn. 21 and 22, 469–73; and God’s understanding and willing, 467; of missions, 455–67 Appropriateness: of divine missions, 491– 99; and ordination to end, 491 Appropriation: of attributes, 351–53; of effects of divine persons, 453; of mission, 455; of works, 477–79 Archaism, 95, 97 Arianism, 91, 301 Aristotelianism: and Augustinianism in Middle Ages, 89, 91–94, 99 Aristotle, 11, 119, 155 n. 18, 191, 193 and n. 35, 211, 277, 283, 285, 311, 531, 539– 41, 543, 545, 547, 549, 551, 553, 559 n. 1, 569 n. 7, 571, 573, 575, 579, 581–83, 607, 619, 621, 631, 633, 667, 691, 693 n. 3, 695, 707, 721, 723, 739, 740, 753 and n. 6 Arnou, R., 233 n. 1, 635 Arrived at and conceived and formulated, 53 n. 28 A se: God is a se, 127, 195; Son and Holy Spirit are a se and (in different ways) not

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a se, 127–29, 763, 765, 771–73 Assent: a. of faith precedes understanding, 15; and object that moves to theological understanding, 15; as second operation, 15 Assumption: of human nature of Christ, 471. See also Incarnation, Secondary act of existence Athanasius, St, 69, 91 Attributes: appropriated a., 351–53; common a., 351–53; common, proper, and appropriated a., 351–63; divine a. and divine essence, 263; essential a., 351–53; essential a. and what is notional, 263, 351–53; proper or notional a., 351–53; proper a. signified abstractly not predicated of essential as signified abstractly, 363. See also Properties, Syllogism: and essential and notional Augment and improve the old with the new, 111 Augsburg Confession, 393 Augustine, St, 45, 93, 191 and n. 33, 309, 311, 313, 343, 433 n. 47, 453 n. 8, 485 and n. 55, 559 n. 1, 617, 621 Augustinianism: and Aristotelianism in Middle Ages, 89, 91–94, 99; and vital act, 185, 547 Authority: and certitude in theology, 9 Autonomy: divine a., 215; existential a., 177–79; human a. subordinate to infinite subject, 215; practical a., 177; speculative a., 177–79; and transcendental laws of spirit, 177, 179, 215, 319 Averroes, 619 Averroists, 155 n. 18, 769 n. 16 Avicenna, 531, 539–41, 553, 555, 571, 575, 607 Avicennists, 155 n. 18, 769 n. 16

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Baius, 95 Bardy, Gustave, 413 n. 28 Barth, Karl, 391 and nn. 5 and 6, 395 Beatific vision: natural desire for, 585 Beatitude: desire for, 647, 655–59; perfect and imperfect, 655 ‘Because of and in accordance with,’ 143, 605–607, 611–15, 663 n. 7 ‘Because of which (propter quid),’ 577, 581, 583 Begotten, see Generation Behaviorism, 321 Being: analogy of, 347; b. taken analogously and quidditatively, 641–43; b. and true convertible, 203 (see also True); conceptual b., see Conceptual being(s); and ‘conscious,’ 141; constitutive principles of b., see Principle(s); and intellect, 627–45; intelligible b. as proper object of intellect, 631; intuition of b., 645; not a genus, 141; and object as objective, 13 and n. 7, 101, 105, 107, 203–207, 563, 563–65, 597, 603–605; and real, 235, 689; and subsistence, 347 (see also Subsistent); unity in b. known by many acts, 13; and wisdom, 629 Being in: divine b.i. and circumincession, 507; and known in knower, beloved in lover, 505–13; mutual b.i. implying uncreated gift and our habits and acts, 503–13 Being in and being to, 231, 289–93. See also Accident(s) Being through itself and being in another, 275 Beloved in lover: 125, 135 n. 4, 219–29, 621–25, 675–77, 783–85; constituted not produced by love, 219–29, 783– 85; identical with act of loving, 219–29,

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675–77; and indwelling, 505–21. See also Love Beumer, Johannes, 19 n. 11 Biblical categories, 35 and n. 19, 63 and n. 33 Biblical question: and dogmatic question, 51; and theological question, 51 Biblical theology: contrasted with dogmatic theology, 51; contrasted with systematic theology, 37, 51 Biblicism, 67 Billot, L., 295, 375, 421, 487 n. 62 Billuart, F.C.R., 421 Boethius, 309, 311, 313, 371 Boyer, C., 295 and n. 30, 421 and n. 37, 617 n. 8 Brinktrine, J., 239 and n. 3, 393 and n. 7 Bruno, F., 633, 635 Buonpensiere, 295 Cajetan, 185–87 and n. 29, 295, 309, 311, 421, 533 n. 2, 577, 617, 619, 621 Camelot, P.-Th., 769 n. 15 Cano, Melchior, 37–39 n. 21 Cappadocians, 67, 395 Capreolus, 309, 311 Catechetical understanding, 15 Categories: biblical, 35 and n. 19; catholic, 35 and n. 19, 37, 63 and n. 33; and causes, 275–77, 723–25, 740; as predicaments, 267, 275–79, 721; and prescientific knowledge, 277; and prior for us, 77–79; special and general, 35 n. 19; treated in logic not metaphysics, 277 Catholic Evidence Guild, 113 Cause of the matter, 581, 593 Causes: and categories, 275–77; and first operation, 11; and inner word, 31; and

knowledge, 277; and metaphysics, 277; and science, 7–9, 59–61; not posited in divine emanations, 765, 773–75 and n. 17; ultimate constitutive c., 277 (see also Principle(s)); ultimate efficient and final c., 277 Censures: theological, 39 n. 21, 73 and n. 46 Certitude: and natural and human sciences, 81; and understanding, 3, 7–11, 29–31, 43, 55, 59, 95, 117, 119; way of, 61, 63, 65, 67, 73, 75, 757 Chalcedon: and dogmatic movement, 85, 89, 91, 93, 99 Charity, habit of: absolutely and formally supernatural, 471–73 and n. 29; and passive spiration, 471 Chemistry: and two ways, 61–63, 757 Chevalier, Ir´en´ee, 625 Chollet, Jean-Arthur, 413 n. 28 Christ: being in C., 509–13; C.’s natural knowledge through agent intellect and phantasm, 571; and divine indwelling, 509–13 Church: and proximate end of divine missions, 495–97 Circumincession: 377, 413–21; and being in, 507; and equality of persons, 433– 35; explained in terms of divine essence, 415–17; explained in terms of origins, 419–21; explained in terms of relation, 417; taught in scripture, 413–15 City of God: and proximate end of divine missions, 495 Clement of Alexandria, 635 Cogitative power, 587 Coherence: and early stages of science, 21; questions for, 21; and rejection of system, 27

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Communication: in created persons, 349–51; of divine essence, 275, 349, 663; and incommunicability, 345–51; and intellectual nature, 351; and real relations, 349 Compared identity: principle of, 231, 281, 289. See also Identity Comparison: and composition, 703; formal and objective c., 703 Complacentia: and love, 675 Composition: and comparison, 703; way of, 61, 63, 65, 67, 757 Conceiving: c. and understanding as different kinds of act or operation, 607 Concept(s)/Conception(s): and cognitive process, 13; and expressed species, 589– 91; and object as term of first act, 13; heuristic and proper meanings of c., 151; interconnection of in theology, 25; need for systematically formed c. in theology, 25; proceed from understanding, 183, 297, 657, 765, 771; systematic c., 151 Conceptual being(s): 235, 241, 689; not subsistent, 327, 347 Conclusions: and improvement of system, 25, 45; and judgment about theological understanding, 47–49, 55; and knowledge (science), 25, 99, 153; and principles, see Principles; proper sense of drawing c. vs. conclusions theology, 153 n. 19; pure and mixed c., 53, 55, 57; and technical formulation of problem, 153; in theology, 3 and n. 2, 55–57, 117, 153; and theories, 53 Conclusions theology, 53–57, 97, 153 Concrete universal, 103 n. 58 Condition: defined, 441. See also Appropriate external term, Consequent condition Congar, Yves, 27 n. 15

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Consciousness: and being, 141, 371, 381; circle of, 201 and n. 52; c. of divine person known through true, 321; c. studied under formality of true and being, 323; c. viewed as perception, 211 and n. 61; and conscious origination (‘by virtue of consciousness,’ ‘by virtue of intellectual consciousness’), 143, 163, 175–77; defined, 381; divine c. on basis of essential act, 381–85; divine c. on basis of notional acts, 385–87; divine c. and infinite act, 163; divine c. as intellectual, 389; divine c. through notional acts is one, 387; and divine person, 309, 311, 313, 315–23, 377–91; duality of, 139; in God (intellectual, dynamic, see also Dynamic consciousness), 163; intellectual c., 141–43; knowledge of c., 315–17; and knowledge, 315–17, 379; notion of c., 379–81; one divine c. had distinctly by distinct persons, 387, 431; predicated of subject, act, and action, 379; and reflection or introspection, 141, 315–17, 379; and self-knowledge, 315– 17, 379; as self-presence, 141, 315–17; sensitive and intellectual c. contrasted, 139, 175; and side of object, 315–17, 379; and side of subject, 315–17, 379; unity of divine c. on basis of essential act and of notional acts, 389–91 Consequent condition: and appropriate external term, 441, 455–67; defined, 441 Constitution: in active sense, 467, 469, 475; of a being by intrinsic principles, 325–27; of contingent truths, 455–67; of divine mission by divine conception and will, 455–67, 475; of God by infinite perfection, 439, 455–67; ontological c., 455 and n. 12; in passive sense, 469,

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475; of state of grace, 513–21 and n. 119. See also Appropriate external term, Consequent condition, Contingent predication, Mission Constitutive: meaning of word ‘c.’, 365; meaning of ‘c.’ in God, 365, 439 Consubstantial: 35; and dogmatic and theological movements, 85; and real distinction in Trinity, 159, 337, 367. See also Homoousion Consubstantiality: and dogmatic way, 67; and emanation, 213, 433; and procession/relation, 169 Contemporary prior, 83, 115 Contingent predication: 439–47, 457; adds nothing real and intrinsic to a divine person, 457, 461–63, 469; and appropriate external term, 441, 455– 67 (see also Appropriate external term); common and proper c.p., 459–61; and distinct common attribution, 445; and divine cognitive, volitional, and productive operation, 443–47, 457 Contradiction: principle of, 145 n. 11, 257, 265, 267, 281, 347 and n. 36 Co-presence: of divine persons through notional acts, 385–87 Corporeal matter: and object of intellect, 13, 203–207 Correspondence: truth-c. and external relations, 701, 703 Creating: God’s c. is God’s understanding and willing, 467 Creation: active c. a conceptual relation, 237; in active sense, 469, 545; and active spiration and paternity, 237; no example of identity of substance and relation in c., 285; no motion in c., 239, 545; in passive sense, 469, 545

Creatures: understanding of and procession of Word, 213–17, 399 Cultural differences, 79; and transcultural problem, 79–81, 87 Data: in natural sciences, human sciences, and theology, 33, 65; sensible d. determine as matter, 139 Decision: and intellectual emanation, 137, 139, 143 Deduction, in theology, 3 and n. 2, 55. See also Conclusions Definition, 11; and cognitive process, 13; and common matter, 205; d. of circle, 567–69; d. by what something is and d. through another, 269–71; and expressed species, 589–91; and intellectual emanation, 137, 139, 143, 149; and meaning that a noun signifies, 589–91; and object as term, 13, 203–207, 605; and quiddity, 585, 605, 781–83; and simple inner word, 31, 205, 567, 569; and solution of problems, 25 De Letter, P., 437 n. 1, 463 n. 23 De natura verbi intellectus, 565 Deneffe, August, 413 n. 28 Depth psychology: and transcultural principle, 79 Description: prescientific d. and way of discovery, 59–61, 73, 77 Desire: d. for beatitude, 647; d. to know, 645–59; natural d. to know God by essence, 411 and n. 27, 639–41, 645–59 Determination(s): formal and objective d., 703; of general intellectual light, 139; of modes of procession (external, internal, metaphysical, natural, analogical), 145– 47 Deus divina essentia, 243 and n. 8

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Development: of dogma, 77, 89, 759; effecting d. and intending d., 99–101; and God’s intention, 89, 99–101; and heresies, 89; and intellectual movements, 87–89; of theology, 89, 759 Dialectical theology, 395 Differences: cultural d., 79 Diligently, reverently, judiciously, see Reverently Discovery: way of, 61, 63, 65, 67, 757 Distinct/distinction: absolutes and relatives d. in different ways, 281; adequate(ly) d., 401 and n. 20; conceptually d., 257, 261, 271, 295–99, 301, 367; conceptually d. with foundation in reality, 303, 735; d. defined, 247, 257, 295; d. and perfection, 431; major and minor conceptual distinctions, 295–99; and negative comparative judgment, 303; really d., 247, 257, 271, 303, 327, 367; really d. in created persons by substance, existence, operation, 349–51; really d. in God by relations, 263, 349, 351, 367; really d. in God in relation to common contingent predication, 445; and Trinity, 331; verbally, conceptually, and really d., 281–83, 287, 289 Distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature, 309, 311, 313, 323, 327, 331, 337 Divided from everything else: and constitutive principles of a being, accidents, possibles, and conceptual beings, 347; and principle of contradiction, 347 and n. 36 Divine ideas: 635–37; as secondary objects of divine act of understanding, 635 Divinity: is God, 241, 245; is Father, etc., 243 Dockx, I., 219

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Doctrine: d. of Son and Spirit not their own, 447–49, 451; understanding d. and understanding history of d., 57 Dogma: development of, see Development; d. not hypothetical, 51–53; and fundamental problems of systematics, 39; and judgment about theological understanding, 51 Dogmatic movement, 85; and theological movement, 85–87 Dogmatic prior, 83. See also Prior in itself, Prior for us Dogmatic question: and biblical question, 51; and theological question, 51 Dogmatic theology: a stumbling block, 37; and systematic theology, 119 Dogmatic way, 61, 63, 65; compared with systematic way, 67–77; d.w. without systematic, 65–67; and prior in itself, 85–87; task of within historical process, 87 Dominicans: and Franciscans, 91–93 Dondaine, H., 219 Doucet, V., 645 Duality, and knowledge, 211, 303, 631 Durandus, 421 Dynamic consciousness: and God, 49–51 and n. 26, 163, 169, 213: and infinite act, 167; and pure perfection, 213; means ‘has a conscious exigence for an emanation,’ 163 Economy of salvation: and proximate end of divine missions, 497 Efficient causality: as one meaning of actio, operatio, 535, 543–47; principle of, 693 Ehrle, F., 93 n. 56 Elter, E., 645, 655 Emanation: by way of truth and by way

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Index

of holiness, 361; and consubstantiality, 213, 433, 609–15; defined, 181. See also Intellectual emanations, Processions Empiricism/empiricist(s), 317, 319 End: and appropriateness, 491; of divine missions, 487, 491–99; and multitude, 425–27; and perfection, 423–25; ultimate and proximate ends of missions, 495–99; and unity of order, 425–27; and value, 675 Energeia, 535, 537 Equality: and divine perfection, 433–35 Equivocal: and prior for us in human sciences, 81, 87 Essence: divine e. and contingent predication, 443–47; divine e. and divine attributes, 263; divine e. as nature and as intellectual, 193–99; divine e. as power by which Begetter begets, 353 n. 48, 359–61 n. 54; e. in another and to another, 271, 277; e. in the manner of a hypostasis includes relation, 365; e. without qualification and qualified e., 269–71, 279; and first intellectual operation, 731 Essence and existence: correspond to understanding and judgment, 9, 75; and internal and external relations, 729–33. See also One Essential act: cannot be basis of distinct consciousness that divine persons have of one another, 381–83; and divine consciousness, 381–85; e.a. and notional acts are one in reality but conceptually distinct, 389–91 Essential and notional: really identical and conceptually distinct in God, 231, 265– 67 Eternal subject(s): analogy to our transition

to second phase by understanding, belief, and love, 413; as distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature, 401; have only an intellectual nature fully actuated, 411; intrinsically immutable, 401; the ‘now’ of e.s., 401; and Word and Love, 411–13 Eugene iii, Pope, 243, 245 Evidence: and affirmation/judgment/ second operation, 11, 105–107, 135– 37, 139, 143, 149, 203–207, 567; and cognitive process, 13; and critical vs naive realism, 321; distinct from true, 203, 605; and intellectual emanation, 135–37, 139, 143, 149; as object that moves to second operation, 13, 203– 207, 567, 603, 605; and resolution to principles, 603 and n. 2; in theology and other sciences, 105–107 Examples: and understanding, 137 Excluded middle: principle of, 145 n. 11 Exegesis: systematic and historical e., 751– 53 Exigency/Exigencies: determinate and indeterminate e., 639; and natural desire for vision of God, 651–59; and obediential potency, 639–41, 651–59; transcendental e., 143 Existence: divine act of e. is conscious, 323; natural act and intentional act of e. in infinite are one, 197; and second intellectual operation, 731 Existential problem, 59 Existenz, 317 n. 7, 319 Experience: and cognitive process, 13, 317; and trinitarian analogy, 221 External term, see Appropriate external term Ex vi intellectiva proveniens, 133 n. 3

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Fact(s): rejection of facts understood in system, 25–29 Faith: articles of, 109; assent of, and systematics, 11, 15; Catholic f., 41; and certitude in theology, 9, 107; and conclusions theology, see Conclusions theology; differs from theology, 105, 107; divine f., 41; f. illumines reason, 9, 19, 27, 41, 47, 55, 57, 77; and object that moves to theological understanding, 15 (see also Object); understanding of f. and theological understanding, 29 Father: and divine indwelling, 511–13; and divinity, 243; and paternity, 239–47; as proper name, 353; really distinct from Son as person but not in spirating love, 255; sends Son, 447–49, 455, 465; with Son sends Holy Spirit, 449–51, 455, 461– 63, 465. See also Paternity Father, Son, and Spirit: are distinct, 327– 29; are in an intellectual nature, 327– 29; are persons, 327–29; are subsistent relations, 329; in one act are, understand they are God, and understand that one is not the other, 305 Ferrariensis, 295, 621 Fifth Lateran Council, 697 Filiation: compared with paternity as really distinct, 253; defined, 235; and generation 235; is the Son, 239–47; and light of glory, 473; not really distinct from active spiration, 253; and procession of Word, 235; really distinct from passive spiration, 255 Final causality: principle of, 693 First Vatican Council, 3, 11, 19, 29, 33, 43, 45 n. 25, 47, 49, 53–55, 85, 97, 99, 117, 131, 153, 167, 169, 319, 321, 395, 681, 761, 767, 773

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Florence, Council of, 159, 233, 259, 263, 337, 415 Folly: as multiple as wisdom is one, 27 Form: and active potency, 539–41; and species, 579, 593 Formal distinction on the side of the reality, 231, 233, 299–305, 633, 667–69, 789–91 Fourth Lateran Council, 259, 261, 265, 289, 329–31, 395 Franciscans: and Dominicans, 91–93 Franzelin, J.B., 423 Free: and voluntary, 355 Friendship: and mission of Son, 487 Fulgentius, St, 415 and n. 30 Futurism, 95, 97 Galtier, Paul, 295 and n. 31, 343 n. 33, 423 and n. 38, 437 n. 1, 453 n. 11, 461 and nn. 17–20 Generation: defined, 191, 201–203, 663; divine g. and dogmatic way, 69; divine g. and systematic way, 69, 119, 121; and divine procession, 151, 235; as emanation by way of truth, 355; and emanation of word, 125, 189–203, 235, 663–65; and filiation, 235; formality of, 191–93; internal g. only in God, 159; and likeness of nature, 193, 199–203; and origination of Son, 127, 185, 235, 397, 663–65; procession of love not g., 235, 679; and speaking/being spoken, 397–99 Gift: as proper name of Holy Spirit, 357 Gilbert de la Porr´ee, 233, 243 and n. 7, 785, 787 Giving of Holy Spirit: formal external term of, 471; and incarnation, 469– 71; and indwelling of Father and Son,

802

Index

471; material external term of, 469; and sanctifying grace, 471 Goal(s): in theology: 7–31 passim, 37; of two ways, 71, 75 God: as agent by intellect, 467; analogical knowledge of God, 195; as being by intellect, 467; conceived as person, 331; distinctions in God known by faith, 130; God emanates from God, 763; God has generated God, 363; God in himself as known in knower and beloved in lover, 507; God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, three persons, 331, 363; God’s act of understanding is God’s substance/being, 171, 195, 215, 217, 303, 305, 371, 467, 557, 633, 635, 665, 677; God’s knowledge of other things, 633–37 (see also Object: primary and secondary); God’s understanding is first in the manner of essence, 195; God’s willing is God’s act of existence, 677; infinity of, 195–97; nature of, and generation, 193–99; nature of God is intellectual, 193–99, 327–29, 637; not a fourth person, 331; not in any genus, 273; as object of theology, 105; as ‘the One who is,’ 195 and n. 36; simplicity of, 129, 189, 193; and systematic way, 67–69; and two processions on likeness of intellectual emanation, 181–89; as ultimate efficient and final cause, 277; understands all beings by understanding being itself, knows all truths by knowing truth itself, wills all good by willing good itself, 329; what God is is unknown, 193, 195, 273. See also Divinity God from God: 129, 131, 151, 159, 163 Godfrey of Fontaines, 547, 617 Gonet, J.-B., 421

Gonsalvus Hispanus, 547 Good: and appropriateness of divine missions, 491–99; g. by essence, 491– 93; g. by participation, 491–93; g. is concrete, 671; g. of order, 493–99, 505–13, 673; g. of order and personal presence, 507; human g. of order, 493– 99; known analogically, 671–73; as object of love, 671; particular g., 493– 99, 505, 673; universal g., 671–73 Goodness: divine g. as universal principle of all good, 671–73 Grabmann, Martin, 565 Grace: perfects nature, 17; and theological movement, 85; and unity of sciences, 103; various meanings of word ‘g.’, 515– 17. See also Operative grace, Sanctifying grace, State of grace ‘Grace perfects nature,’ 655 Gratia gratum faciens, 475 Gregory Nazienzen, 361 n. 55 G¨unther, Anton, 211, 633 Habit(s): and good of order, 493–99, 505– 13; h. of grace and state of grace, 513 n. 119, 517; and personal presence, 505 Henn, William, 73 n. 46 Henry of Ghent, 629 Heresy: and God’s intention, 89; and infallible definitions, 89 Heuristic structure: manifests fallenness, 313; and question, 311, 313 Historical movement, 77–101; conditions for understanding, 77; and goal of theology, 87; as prior, 77; as third movement, 77 and n. 49, 757–59 Historical reality: intelligibility of, 77 Historicism, 81–83 Holiness: and emanation of love, 355

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Index

Holy: as common term, 355; as employed for each divine person, 355 Holy Spirit: and bond of Father and Son, 421; constitution of gift of H.S., 457– 63; is beloved in lover, 229, 507; is God, 507; is the Holy Spirit a se? 21, 127–29; is proceeding Love itself, 227, 473, 625; mission of H.S., 449–51, 453–55, 479–83, 485–91; not begotten but proceeding, 127; and notional love, 473–79; and passive spiration, 239–47, 455; proceeds from Father, 127; proceeds from Father and Son together, 127; proceeds from Son, 225; proceeds from Word as love from mental word, 225, 227, 229; as proper name, 355; sent by Father and Son, 449–51, 455, 461–63, 465, 473–77; as speaking through the prophets and in disciples, 475–77; as teaching all truth, 475–77 Homoousion: and dogmatic movement, 85, 89, 91, 93, 97, 99. See also Consubstantial Horace, 419 n. 34 Human disciplines/sciences: and theology, 25, 103 Humani generis, 81 and n. 51, 111 and n. 64, 115 and n. 72, 119 Husserl, Edmund, 321 n. 19 Hylomorphism: in Aristotle, 583; gnoseological foundation of, 207 Hypothesis, 11; and analogy, 55; and consequent truth, 41–43, 51–53; defined, 43, 53; and intrinsic possibility, 747; in natural science, 33; and object as term, 13, 203–207; and probability/certitude, 43; and quiddity, 781–83; and simple inner word, 31; and technically formulated problem, 161; and theological solutions, 53, 55–57, 63, 155 and n. 17; and theory, 53, 749

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Hypothetical proposition: conversion of, 249 I and Thou: and divine persons, 397–99; and meaning of person, 309–13. See also ‘You’ Idea: in practical matters, 593 Idea of being: primary and secondary components in, 215 n. 65 Idealism, 317, 323 Ideas, divine, See Divine ideas Identical: really i., 257 Identity: and divine knowledge, 633; knowledge rooted in i., 631, 637; principle of, 145 n. 11, 265, 281, 347 and n. 36. See also Compared identity, principle of Image: free i., 407 and n. 24, 503 and n. 94; as proper name of Son, 355. See also Phantasm Image of God: deficient in human consciousness, 169, 389; in intellectual creatures, 195 and n. 39, 389, 609–15; in intellectual emanations, 765 Imagination: and definition of circle, 567; object of, 577. See also Phantasm Imitation of God: and four divine relations, 471–73; and participation, 471–73, 497 Immanent operation, 531–57 Immanentism, 317, 319, 321, 323 Immortality: of soul, 649–51 Immutability, 97 n. 57 Incarnation: and divine act of existence, 471; and dogmatic and theological movements, 85; formal external term of, 471; and giving of Spirit, 469–71; material external term of, 469; and mission, 483–85, 487–89; and secondary act of existence, 471 and n. 28

804

Index

Incommunicability: 313, 345–51; and communication, 349; in created persons, 349–51; defined, 349; and real distinction, 349; and real relations, 349 Incommunicable existence of the divine nature, 309, 311, 313 Individual substance of a rational nature: 309, 311, 313; difficulty with this definition of person, 313 Individuum vagum, 333 Indivisum in se et divisum a quolibet alio: and principles of identity and contradiction, 347 and n. 36 Indwelling: consists in and is known in acts, but constituted through state of grace, 513–21; and known in knower and beloved in loved, 513–15 (see also Presence); and love, 501–13 Infallibility (ecclesial), 87, 99; of intellect, 595 Infallible definitions: and heresies, 89 Infinite act: comprehends itself perfectly, 197; and dynamic consciousness, 167; as originated, 163; as originating, 163; relative not absolute distinction within i.a., 165; and three acts in us, 765; true quoad se, 197; understood negatively, not positively, 169 Infinity: excludes potency, 198; of God, 195–97; of intellect in act with respect to its total object, 195; of what emanates in God, 763 Influence: of first agent (vehementius imprimat ), 113 and n. 67 Innascibilitas: and fundamental notions, 353 n. 38 Inner word: analogy of, 659–71; caused in us but not in God, 661–63; compound i.w., 31, 563, 745; and definition

as uniting and as different from intelligent grasp, 205; distinct from act of understanding, 661; divine and human i.w. compared, 659–71; enables clarity and distinctness in us, 209–11; enables cultivation of sciences, 209; enables transition beyond visible universe by analogy, 209; enables transition from definition and evidence to things as existing, 209; enables transition from understanding of cause to conception of thing, 207–209; existence of i.w. proven from outer w., 563; and expressed species, 589; and generation, see Generation; and grasp of evidence, 203–205; and image of triune God, 765; as intelligible, 143–45 n. 11; i.w. many in us, one in God, 659–61; i.w. twofold, 31, 105 and n. 60, 181 n. 23, 563, 745; necessary in us, 207–209, 597– 601; necessity of i.w. in us grounded in distinction of moving object from terminal object, similar necessity not in God, 209–13, 597–601, 665–71; not no¯esis, la pens´ee pensante, intending intention, intention of the one understanding but no¯ema, la pens´ee pens´ee, intended intention, intention understood, 565; and outer word, 563; proceeds from grasp of intelligibility, 235; procession of and paternity/filiation, 235; relation of consequent i.w. to truth, 31, 117; signifies and is signified, 563; simple i.w., 31, 205, 563, 745; and theological hypothesis, 43, 745; theological i.w. imperfectly, analogically, obscurely understood, 33, 745; and understanding, 31, 125, 183, 189, 203–207, 559–61, 603–609, 661–63

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Inquiry: in systematics, 9, 19, 41, 43, 55 ‘In the same,’ 147 and n. 13 Instrumentalism, 317 Intellect: analogy of i., 627–45; angelic i., 337; angelic i. and being, 627, 633; and being, 627–45; comparison of divine and human i., 627–45; created i. as passive potency, 195, 337, 637–45; divine i. and being, 627, 631–37; human i. and being, 627, 639–41; infinity of, 195; i. in act with respect to total object infinite and a se, 195, 337–39; natural desire of created i., 645–59 (see also Desire); and tending to God, 195; and unity/multiplicity, 101 Intellect in act is intelligible in act, 197, 303 Intellectual: as what regards all being, all truth, all good, 327 Intellectual consciousness: structure of, 199 Intellectual emanation(s): 67 and n. 35, 135–43, 609–15; and active intellectual consciousness, 139; of affirmation from grasp of evidence, 203–205; and aseity, 763; and causal emanation, 165, 611– 13, 773; and consubstantiality, 213, 433, 609–15; created and uncreated i.e., 777; defined, 141, 151, 181; divine i.e., 161, 181–89; earlier definition of, 761, 767; and intelligible emanations, 137 and n. 8, 143–45 and n. 11, 183– 85, 609 and n. 5, 611; and material or sensible emanation, 609–15; necessity of i.e. arises from subject, 215; negated if word is unconsciously formed, 561; not clearly grasped by us in its formality, 777; not demonstrable in God, 763; and procession, 125, 135, 145, 151, 185, 765– 81; and procession per modum operati, 161–69; and pure perfection, 763; as real and natural, 761, 773; and relations,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

see Relations; subject as principle of i.e., 215; and systematic way, 67– 69, 119, 125; as tertium comparationis in psychological analogy, 769; and two divine processions, 181–89, 199–203; of word and of love, 199–203. See also Generation, Love, Spiration, Word Intellectual light, 155 n. 18 Intellectual nature: 195–97, 219, 225, 309, 311, 315, 323, 327–29, 331, 335, 337; actuated per accidens and spontaneously before per se and deliberately, 403– 405; actuation of is form and act, 403; and communication, 351; differences in i.n., 337–39; in eternal and temporal subjects, 399–413 passim (see also Eternal subject, Temporal subject); finite i.n., 339; i.n. regards totality of being, truth, goodness, 351; and subsistence, 339 Intellectual or intelligible, 67 n. 35, 143–45 n. 11, 663 n. 7 Intelligible: in nature and in intellect, 143– 45 n. 11; in potency and in act, 569, 577; i. truth and object as term, 105, 107, 117; and spiritual, 185; and true, 75; two meanings of, 609–11 Intelligible in act is the intelligent in act, 211 and n. 62 Intelligible in act and understood in act, 577 Intelligible species, 537, 549–51, 553, 555 Intelligibilis, 143–45 n. 11, 185 Intending: i. individual definitions and i. series, 99 Intentional: and natural, 141, 197, 203, 565 Intention understood: and expressed species, 589–91 Interconnection: of mysteries with one another and with our last end, 19, 55

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Index

Interpretation: of Thomas Aquinas, 739– 41 Intersubjectivity: and disposition to interpersonal relationships, 495 Introspection: and Aquinas, 769 n. 16 Is it? 11; and cognitive process, 13 Is it so? 11; and cognitive process, 13; and understanding of mysteries, 43, 93 Jansen, B., 299 n. 32, 633 Jansenius/Jansenists, 95, 99 Joachim of Flora, 233, 259, 261 John Damascene, St, 195 n. 36 John of Naples, 617 John of St Thomas, 221 and n. 67, 229, 295, 619, 621–25, 785 and n. 23 Judgment(s): and cognitive process, 13, 317; as compound word, 567; and evidence, 11, 105–107, 135–37, 139, 143, 149, 203– 207, 567; and intellectual emanation, 135–37, 139, 143; j. determines us as second act, 139; j. about theological understanding, 49–51; and person, 319; as second act/operation, 11, 567; and validity of all cognitive acts, 13–15; various kinds of theological j., 49–51 Just, justified: are in God as known in knower and beloved in lover, 507–21; and divine indwelling, 507–13 Justification, 427 Kant, I., 583 Kenoticism, 315 Kingdom of God: and divine missions, 495 Kittel, G., 451 n. 5 Knowledge: and conclusions, 25; degrees of, 657; and distinction of critical and naive realism, 321; immediate k., 173; is experience, understanding, and judging,

317; knowledge of k., 317; k. of real in the true, 59; omitting a part of (Newman), 29; prephilosophic k., 321; prescientific and scientific k., 275–79; rooted in identity, 631; and subject-object duality, 211, 303; viewed as looking, 211; wisdom, understanding, and k. grow, 23–25 and n. 13, 43, 45–47, 49, 57, 99, 101, 395, 749–55, 761 Known in knower: and beloved in lover, 675–77; and indwelling, 505–21 Krempel, A., 727–29, 740 Learning, way of, 61, 63, 65, 67, 757 Lebon, J., 91 n. 55 Lennerz, H., 273 n. 19 Liberalism, 97, 99, 323 Light: further determinations of, 139; general fundamental l. of intellect, 139; participation in eternal l., 139 Light of glory: absolutely and formally supernatural, 471–73 and n. 29; and filiation (sonship), 473 Likeness: and absence of unlikeness in divine knowing, 197, 303; and truth, 199–201; in God, 201–203; in nature, and generation, 191–93, 199–203 Loci: theological, 37–39 and n. 21 Logical simultaneity: way of, 61, 63–65, 65, 67 Lombard, Peter, 753 Lonergan, Bernard, 5 and nn. 3–5, 15 n. 8, 19 n. 11, 21 n. 12, 23 n. 13, 33 n. 18, 35 n. 19, 39 n. 22, 45 n. 25, 51 n. 26, 71 n. 45, 81 n. 50, 83 n. 52, 103 n. 58, 105 n. 60, 113 and n. 67, 119 n. 73, 135 n. 5, 135 and nn. 6 and 7, 143–45 n. 11, 147 nn. 12 and 14, 149 n. 15, 175 n. 22, 185 n. 27, 191 n. 34, 203 n. 55, 205 n. 45,

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207 n. 58, 209 n. 60, 215 n. 65, 239 n. 3, 241 n. 5, 263 nn. 16 and 17, 277 n. 21, 311 nn. 5 and 6, 313 nn. 7, 9, and 10, 315 n. 11, 317 n. 13, 321 n. 18, 331 n. 23, 347 n. 36, 357 n. 48, 359 n. 49, 365 n. 64, 373 n. 75, 379 nn. 1 and 2, 399 n. 18, 401 nn. 19 and 20, 405 n. 23, 407 n. 24, 409 n. 26, 447 n. 4, 455 n. 12, 513 n. 119, 535 nn. 3 and 4, 545 n. 7, 547 n. 8, 569 n. 6, 577, 637 n. 3, 641 n. 4, 643 n. 5, 667 n. 8, 687 n. 1, 691 n. 2, 693 n. 3, 703 n. 4, 717 n. 5, 745 and n. 3, 759 n. 7, 773–75 n. 17, 775 n. 18 Looking: knowledge viewed as, 211 Love: analogy of l., 671–81; and beloved in lover, 125, 135 n. 4, 219–29, 675–77 (see also Beloved in lover); as complacentia, 675; and divine indwelling, 501–13; divine l. and supernatural order, 483 and n. 48; emanation of, and word, 199– 203; essential and notional l., 355–57, 473–77; as essential term, 355–57; and goal of theology, 111–13; and intellectual emanation, 181–89, 199–203, 671–81; l. in God understood essentially and notionally, 679–81; l. unitive, 675–77; notional and proceeding l., 473–77; objects of divine l., 475; proceeds from grasp and affirmation of goodness, 237; proceeds from intellect, 137, 183, 679; proceeds from judgment of value, 355; proceeds from mental word, 225, 227, 615–21, 679; and processio operati, 619; as proper term, 355–57; as rational and good, 253; as related to speaker and word, 251 and n. 12; and will, 181, 675; and willing the good, 493–95 Luck, 61 and n. 31

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Magisterium: and understanding of mysteries, 33–35, 59, 121; and unity of sciences, 103 Mandonnet, Pierre, 565 Marriage: of Christ and church, 495 Materialism, 317 Matter: common m. and definition, 205; common m. differs from individual m., 205; m. of cause, 579, 593; m. of cause and cause of m., 607; and senses, 205 Mean: Catholic m., 99 Meaning: in data of human sciences, 33; and definition, 591; in word of God, 33 Measure: m. of revealed truth is divine understanding, 59 Mechanism, 321 Mersch, E., 503 n. 92 Metaphysics (immanent operations, relations, the subsistent, person): m. is scientific knowledge of things through ultimate causes, 277; and notion of person, 309, 311; and trinitarian theology, 3 Method: in sciences, 9; in theology, 7–11 Methodological uncertainty: after Middle Ages, 89, 95, 99 Metonymy, 31, 745 Missiology, 85, 115 Mission(s), divine: analogy with human m., 483–91; and appropriate external term, see Appropriate external term; constitution of, 455–67; divine m. ordered to each other, 479–83; and dogmatic way, 67; formality (ratio) of divine m., 483–91; and incarnation, 483–85, 487–89; and local movement, 483–85; m. of Holy Spirit, 449–51, 453–55, 479–83, 485–91; m. of Son, 447–49, 479–83, 485–91; and new

808

Index

personal relations, 487; and new series of operations, 485; and notional love, 473–77; and processions, 451–53; and relation of origin, 451–53, 455–67, 477 and n. 36; single total end to both m., 487; stages in fulfilling m., 487–89; and systematic way, 69; visible and invisible m., 491–99; word ‘m.’ understood in two ways (procession and effects), 451–53 Misunderstanding, 47 (see also Understanding: poor, Problem: and poor, System: poor) Modernism, 97, 99, 323 Modes of being: and divine persons, 377, 391–97; and relations, 395; and the subsistent, 395 Molina, L., 295, 421 Monarchy: divine m., 353 n. 38 Monophysitism, 91 and n. 55, 91, 315 Motion: and action-passion, 283, 285, 543– 47 Movement: and act of what is complete, 369; fundamental m. and further m., 109–11; intellectual m. not understood by people involved, 87; threefold m. to theological goal, 755–61; twofold m. to theological goal, 59–67, 109. See also Dogmatic way, Object, Systematic way Multiplicity: and intellect, 101 Multitude: and perfection, 425–27 Mystery: hidden in God, 151, 681; and problem, 153. See also Understanding of mysteries Mystical body: and end of divine missions, 495 ‘Mystici corporis,’ 503 n. 92 Names: divine, 243 Natural: and intentional, 141, 197, 203,

661, 665; and supernatural, 645–59 Natural law(s): and real internal relations, 693 Natural sciences: and human sciences, 77 Natural theology: and consequent truth, 41; and problem for theological understanding, 49–51, 747; and understanding of mysteries, 41 Nature: and active and passive potency, 539–41, 555; in Aquinas, 533; for Aristotle, 193; divine procession in manner of a n. that is spiritual, intellectual, volitional, 779; and doctrine of vital act, 553; as essence, 193–97, 539; as form more than as matter, 539; and grace, 655; natural desire to know is a ‘nature,’ 647; as principle of movement and rest in that in which it is primarily and per se and not by accident, 327, 369, 539; as principle of operation, 193, 197–99, 273; and real internal relations, 689–91; and spirit, 77; term ‘nature’ applied to God, 193–95; as used at Chalcedon, 91 Necessity: autonomous intellectual n., 319; and divine consciousness, 163 Nestorianism, 91, 315 Newman, John Henry, 29 Nicea, Council of, 85, 91, 93, 97, 99, 157, 287, 779 No¯esis no¯ese¯os, 631 Nominalism/nominalists, 233 Noncontradiction, principle of, see Contradiction, principle of Nonscriptural language: and symbols of faith, 91 Notes: theological, 39 n. 21, 73 and n. 46, 73, 75 Notional: n. and essential attributes, 265– 67

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Notional acts: 353, 361, 369–73; and divine consciousness, 385–87; and elements of trinitarian theology, 385; and essential act, 389–91; four principal n.a., 385; n.a. autonomous, 371; n.a. conscious, 371; n.a. eternal, 371; n.a. foundation of order in God, 371–73; n.a. intellectual, 371; n.a. natural, 369; n.a. necessary, 371; n.a. rational, 371; n.a. voluntary, 373; and personal properties, 353, 369, 373–75; and persons, 369; and systematic way, 69 Notional love, 355–57, 473–79 Notionally loving, 355–57 Notions: five fundamental n., 353 and n. 38; and making known the divine persons, 353 Now: ‘now’ of eternal and temporal subjects contrasted, 401 and n. 19; n. is to subject as time is to its motion, 401 Numbers: in God, 335; two ways of defining n., 335. See also Three Obediential potency, 539, 639–41, 645–49 Object(s): and active potency, 561; conceptual and preconceptual o., 559–61; defined in terms of causal relation to potency and act, 561; and developing understanding, 43–45; distinction of, 605; and distinction of understanding and inner word, 559 n. 1, 603–609; and faith, 103, 319; God as o. of theology in sense of goal, 105; indirect o., 569; as moving, 13, 101, 109, 117, 203–207, 561, 563–77, 603; o. of imagination, of understanding, and of inner word, 577; o. that moves mediately (through revealed truth) to theological understanding is intelligibility of God, 15; o. of under-

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

standing differs from o. of definition or inner word, 205, 597–601, 603–609; o. of understanding is that because of which o. of uttering emerges, 605; as objective/end/goal, 13, 101, 105, 107, 203–207, 561, 563–65, 597, 603–605; and operation, 13 and n. 5, 75, 203–207, 567–69, 603–609, 755; and passive potency, 561; primary and secondary o. of divine understanding, 215–17, 633–37, 661, 665; primary and secondary o. of theology, 105; process (movement) from o. as moving to o. as term, 101, 109–111; process from o. as term to o. as goal, 101, 111–17; proper o. in present life, 569, 575, 577; reducible to potency, act, mover, and end or term, 561; and specification of act, 203–207; subject and o., 211; supernatural o. of theology, 107; as term immanently produced by operation, 13, 101, 105–107, 203–207, 561, 563–65, 569, 603–605; and theory of vital act, 547–53; three meanings of word ‘object,’ 561; two meanings of word ‘object,’ 321 and n. 18; two objects that move us intellectually, 603; two terms produced immanently, 605; as what is known through the true, 319–21 Objective: o. of first and second operations the same, 13 Objectivity, 319–321 Ocular analogy for intelligence, 131–33, 629. See also Perceptionist myth Olivi, Peter John, 547 One: adds only negations to being, 347, 349; essence, existence, relation, subsistence, property, notional act of same divine person are one and the same, 315; in God everything is one

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except ..., 231, 233, 255, 259, 263, 337–39, 349, 367, 465; interchangeable with being, 347; one creator but three creating, 363; one essence, one substance, one nature, 351; one spirator but two spirating, 363; three meanings of ‘one’ (material, formal, actual), 347 and n. 36 Operation(s): in Aquinas, 533, 535; distinction of o. not based on time, 11, 15; and good of order, 493–99, 505– 13; and methods, 75; object of o., 13; and objects, 13 and n. 5, 75, 567–69, 603–609, 755; and presence of one person to another, 505; two operations of mind/intellect, 9, 11–13, 31, 43, 75, 93, 105, 203, 403, 563, 567, 583; understanding and conceiving as different kinds of o., 607; and understanding of mysteries, 15 Operative grace, 551 Opposition: and distinct relations, 159, 165, 231, 233, 247–55, 259, 263, 285–89, 291, 367 Orb´an, L., 633 Order: of discovery, 23; excellence of o., 673; as fundamental notion in book, 523–25; in God, and notional acts, 371–73; good of o., see Good; of learning, teaching, 23; and perfection, 421–35, 491–93; and processions, 679; of questions, 23; two meanings of o., 423; of two ways, 69; unity of o. and perfection, 423–27; of universe, 425; and wisdom, 23–25, 47, 63–65, 67, 99, 103, 655, 673, 687 n. 1 Origin: conscious o., 143 Original sin: and theological understanding, 57–59; and unity of sciences, 103

Originating and originated act, 163; and real emanation, 163 Other: o. person and o. thing (alius and aliud) in God, 361 Otto, Bishop of Freising, 243, 245, 787, 789 Outer word: 31–33, 745; and existence of inner word, 563; relation of consequent o.w. to truth, 31–33, 117, 745; signifies rather than is signified, 563; and theological hypothesis, 43; theological o.w. imperfectly, analogically, obscurely understood, 33, 745; and things, 563 Parmenides, 643–45 and n. 5 Participation: in divine life, 471–73, 497 Passion: and act of understanding, 533 n. 2; as pati, reception, 533 n. 2 Passive potency: 533, 535, 539–41; according to Aristotle and Avicenna, 539–41, 555, 607 and n. 4; and object, 561, 607; and possible intellect, 555 Passive spiration: compared with active spiration as really distinct, 253; defined, 235; and habit of charity, 473; is the Holy Spirit, 239–47; and mission, 455; and procession of love, 235, 675; really distinct from paternity and filiation, 255; and relation ‘who from others,’ 461; and will, 675 Pastoral: p. situation and theology, 109–11; p. theology, 85, 115 Paternity: compared with filiation as really distinct, 253; defined, 235; is the Father, 239–47; not a conceptual relation, 237; not really distinct from active spiration, 239, 253; and procession of Word/generation of Son, 235; really distinct from passive spiration, 255; and secondary act of existence of

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incarnation, 473 Patfoort, A., 219, 229 Patristic prior, 83, 89, 91, 113; as related to systematic prior, 95, 97–99, 113 Paul, St, 69 Peckham, John, 27 n. 16, 91–93 and n. 56 Pelster, Franz, 565 Penido, Maurilio, 219, 625 Per accidens: and actuation of intellectual nature, 403–405; meaning of, 403 Perceptionist myth, 301 and n. 33. See also Ocular analogy Perfection: and act, 421–35; distinction and p., 431; divine p. and contingent predication, 439–47; divine p. and dogma of Trinity, 377, 421–35; and divine relations, 421–35; and end, 423– 27; infinite p., 427; and multitude, 425–27; three degrees of p., 429; two formalities of p. (act and relation or unity of order) but one divine p., 421– 35, 491–93; and unity of order, 421–35 Perfection of understanding in theology, 43, 45 Permanence of meaning, 97 n. 57 Per se: and actuation of intellectual nature, 403–405; meaning of, 403 Person(s): and autonomous intellectual necessity, 319; and consciousness, 309, 311, 313, 315–23; constitution of finite p., 315; constitution of infinite p., 315; created p. distinguished on basis of substance, 337; created p. subsists through causes that are not subsistent, 351; defined, 327; definitions of (Boethius, Richard of St Victor, Aquinas), 309, 311, 313; essential meaning or definition of as applied to divine persons, 307–51 passim; five

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

ways of determining what ‘person’ means, 309–11, 323–25; and intellectual emanations, 321; and intellectual nature, 505; and interpersonal relations, 309– 11, 311–13, 313, 319, 323; and judgment, 319; meaning of for Augustine, 309; meaning of p. as properly divine can be either subsistent relation or essence distinct by relation, 339–45; meaning of in regard to God, 333–35; metaphysics of, 309, 311, 313; ‘person’ predicated analogously of God and creatures, 337–39; Trinity needed for definition of person as distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature, 331; unity of five ways in question, 311. See also Persons, divine Personalism: 323; exaggerated p., 323 Persons, divine: are conscious distinct subjects, conscious of themselves as subjects and as distinct from one another, 323, 323–25, 377–91; are distinguished not on basis of substance but of relations, 337, 367; are subsistent relations, 323, 325– 29, 341–42, 365; for Barth, 391–97; and communication/incommunicability, 345–51; and consciousness, 315–23, 325 (see also Person); and created persons, 349–51; distinct by relational opposition, 367 (see also Distinct, One); d.p. know one another on side of object but are conscious of one another on side of subject, 385–87; d.p. subsist as properly as God subsists, 393; as essence distinct by a relation, 341–42, 365; Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are persons in name, by definition, by metaphysical constitution, by consciousness, by relations to one another and to us, 313; formality of

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d.p., 315, 365; in relation to us, 307 (see also Missions); interpersonal relations of, 325; in themselves, 307; and relations, 71, 119, 125, 129, 309, 323; and systematic way, 67–69, 119; what is constitutive of, 367; with respect to one another, 307. See also Person(s) Pesch, C., 423 Petavius, 459 Phantasm: reflection on, 569, 573, 595– 97; relation between properly disposed p. and intelligible species, 593–95; and understanding, 155 n. 18, 205, 567–69, 571, 573, 575, 595, 603 Phenomenalism, 317 Phenomenology: transcendental p. an inversion of naive realism, 321 Philosophical knowledge of God, see Natural theology Philosophy: and system in theology, 25, 93–97 Physical premotion, 547 Physics: and two ways, 61–63, 757 Pius xii, 81 and n. 51 Plato/Platonists, 211, 547, 581, 629, 667 Plotinus, 635 Poi¯esis, 535 Posited: if relations p. persons are p., 363– 65 Positive theology: and dogmatic theology, 75 n. 47; and systematic theology, 57, 75 n. 47, 95, 121, 125–27 Positivism, 97, 317 Possible intellect: and inner word, 205; as passive potency, 555; and phantasm, 205; in terminology from Avicenna and Aristotle, 555 Possibles: and divine active power, 215– 17; and divine essence/understanding,

215–17; not subsistent, 327, 347; under formality of being, 215, 241; under formality of possible, 215–17 Potency: accidental p., 639; and act, 535– 37; active and passive p., see Active potency, Passive potency; in Aquinas, 533; essential p., 639, 655; first p., 537, 639; kinds of p., 637–45; and limitation, 423, 427; and notional acts, 361; obediential p., 539, 639–41, 645–59; and perfection, 423; as predicated in active and passive senses, 359; as predicated of God, 359–61; as predicated internally, 359; as referring to divine essence, 359 and n. 54; as referring to something proper, 359 and n. 54; remote essential p., 655; second p., 537, 639; second p. is form or first act, 537 Power of begetting: signified divine nature directly, 357 n. 48 Pragmatism, 317 Precepts: and questions, 177 Predicaments: 267, 275–79; p. not causes, 723–25, 740. See also Categories Predication: personal and essential p. in reference to God, 681 Presence: of divine persons to one another, 385–87; and free images, 503, 507; and indwelling, 505–13; and intersubjectivity, 495; and known in knower and beloved in lover, 505–13; of object to subject, 141; personal p., 505; personal p. and good of order, 507; and psychic adaptation, 503, 507; and spatial proximity, 503, 505–507; of subject to self, 141 Prestige, G.L. 415 n. 28 Principle(s): analytic p. and real internal relations, 691–93; and conclusions, 25, 45, 47–49, 53, 63, 165, 167–69, 173; as

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conditions of possibility of knowledge, 39; and consequent truth, 39–41; and evidence, 603 and n. 2; and general intellectual light, 139; intrinsic p. of being not subsistent, 325, 347; and notional acts, 361; as predicated properly or commonly, 357–59; p. of act related to act in several ways (productive, receptive either proximately as form or remotely as mere potency), 647–49; p. by which Begetter begets, 357 n. 48; p. of what we have conceived (sense, selfevident p., and light of intellect), 603 and n. 2; and real internal relations, 691; relations of p. and what originates from it, 237; specifically theological p., 57, 161 and theological understanding, 38–41, 45, 49; and transcendentals, 39; and understanding, 23–25, 45, 63–65; as what is first in some order, 23, 161, 357 Prior for us: 109–111, 113–15; equivocal in human affairs and human sciences, 77–81, 87; and transcultural principle, 79–87; univocal in natural sciences, 79, 81. See also Contemporary prior, Patristic prior, Scriptural prior Prior in itself: 83, 85, 115; confused with prior for us, 115; strengthens faith, 93. See also Dogmatic prior, Systematic prior, Theological prior Prior and subsequent: and two ways, 71 Probability: and theological understanding, 43, 61; way of, 61, 63, 65, 67 Problem: conclusions and clear statement of p., 55; fundamental trinitarian p., 127–29, 135; and mystery, 153; and poor understanding of system, 25–29, 39 (see also Misunderstanding); technical formulation of p., 151, 153, 161; for

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

theological understanding, 49; Proceeding love: analogy of, 671–81; as proper term, 357 Procession(s): defined, 145, 169, 235, 765; divine and human p., 511–13; divine p., 151, (not a making) 157, (not external) 157, (but internal) 157, (but not p. of operation or p. operati) 157, (but according to the mode of p. operati) 159, 161; divine p. are conscious, 323; external p., 147 and n. 14, 157, 159, 163; and intellectual emanation, 125, 181–89; internal p., 147 and n. 14, 149, 157, 159, 163; of love from speaker and word, 125, 181–89, 221; and missions, 451–53; mode(s) of p., 145–47, 169; p. without motion is relation, 239; and relations, 125, 129, 159, 231, 237–39; and systematic way, 71, 119, 125; unconscious p. from habit, 177, 179; two and only two, 125, 131, 181–89; within intellect and from intellect to will, 221; of word from speaker, 125, 181–89, 221 Procession according to the mode of a processio operati (per modum operati), 149, 151, 155–69, 171, 369, 659 n. 6; defined, 159; does not imply contradiction, 159; and intellectual emanation, 161–69, 171; only in God, 167 Processio operati, 145, 149 n. 17, 157, 369, 541, 555, 619, 625, 659 and n. 6 Procession of operation, Processio operationis: 149 and n. 15, 157, 369, 541, 555, 619 Properties: and notional acts, see Notional acts; personal p., 67, 351–53, 367; and relations, 247 n. 9 Proportion: between act and potency, 535– 37 Proposition: and expressed species, 591; as

814

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inner word, 605; and positing synthesis, 605 and n. 3 Pseudo: p. problems and systems, 29, 39, 47, 49, 65 Psychological analogy, 45, 67, 69, 71, 125, 287; and different conceptual systems, 211; different understandings of, and procession of Word from understanding of creatures, 213–17; drawn from experience, 221; and existential autonomy, 177–79; and order of notional acts and personal properties, 373–75; and poorly propounded opinions, 131–33, 185–87; shortcomings of, 777; and understanding of divine processions, 145, 153, 169–81 Psychology (consciousness, intellect, will): and metaphysics, 141; and trinitarian theology, 3 Quantity/quantities: and real internal relations, 693 and n. 3, 719 Quaternity: not in God, 231, 233, 259, 261, 331 Question(s): and act from potency, 143; as act in which goal is intended, 21; existential q., 177; as explicitly expressed, 21; and heuristic structure, 311 and n. 5, 313; order of, 23–25; practical q., 177; provides unity to a history of concepts, 311, 313; as scientific, 21; speculative q., 177; as spontaneous, 21, 177; two (Aristotle: four) kinds of q., 579, 583 Quicumque, 69, 151, 157, 363 Quiddity: as agent object, 203–207; and definition, 205, 781–83; general treatment of q., 577–87; and thing, 781– 83 Quietism: intellectual q., 113

Quod quid erat esse, 569 n. 7, 577, 581 Quod quid est, 577 Rational psychology: and real internal relations, 695 Rationalism, 93, 97 Real: and absolutes and relatives, 281; and already out there now, 321; and conceptual being, 235; defined, 235, 247, 325; knowledge of r. in true, 59, 321; two meanings of word ‘real,’ 321 Realism, 317; naive and critical r. distinguished, 321 Reason: and faith, see Faith; in theology, 9, 53–55, 57, 77; and understanding, 629 and n. 2 Reasons: and causes, 61 and n. 32; and coherence, 21; and fact, 21; and first operation, 11; and inner word, 31; and precepts, 177; and scientific question, 21; in theology, 9–11, 63; and understanding, 21 Redemption: not defined dogma, 35–37 Reduplication: and being in and being to, 291 Reformers: and archaism, 95 Relation(s): and absolute, 733–37; accidents and real internal r., 689; and analytic principles, 691–93; and ‘being to,’ 289– 91 (see also Being in and being to); and beings-which and beings-by-which, 729–33; categorial (predicamental) and transcendental, 277, 719–29, 731, 740; conceptually distinct from processions, 237–39; defined (the order of one to another), 235, 247, 249, 295, 325, 687; distinct from substance by minor conceptual distinction in theology but by major conceptual distinction in

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generic terms, 297–99; distinction of r. into subsistent r., r. of subsistents, and r. of constituents of subsistents, 279; distinctions regarding identity of r. and processions, 239; divine r. are conscious, 323; divine r. identical with processions, 231; divine r. intellectual, 329; divine r. not only an order to another but someone ordered to another, 365; divine r. really distinct are persons, 323, 325–29; divine r. really identical with divine substance/essence, conceptually distinct from it, 231, 233, 257–61, 263, 267, 281, 291, 295–99, 789; and dogmatic way, 67, 71; and emanations, 67–69, 349; and essence and existence, 729– 33; and essence in the manner of a hypostasis, 365; external r., 689, 699– 713; external r. does not add to reality of internal r. another reality intrinsic to subject, 703–707; and finite substance, 691; four real r. in God, 231, 233, 235– 39; how r. can be really identical with substance, 267–79; and human good of order, 493–99, 505–13; of identity, 737; as intellectual, 327–29; internal r., 687–97; internal r. and essence, 729–33; internal r. and primary relativity, 739– 41; internal r. not mutually opposed are distinct conceptually but distinction has foundation in reality, 735; internal r. and scientific knowledge, 713; and metaphysical principles of things, 691; and missions, 451–53, 455–67, 477; and modes of being, 395; multiplying conceptual relations (by multiplying terms alone), 249; multiplying real r. per se (by multiplying real orderings) and per accidens (by multiplying real

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

subjects), 249; mutually opposed r. defined, 247; mutually opposed r. as real and really distinct, 249, 279– 89, 327–29, 735; and natural laws, 693; and order, 421–35; and organic parts, 693–95; of origin, 67; and other categories, 289; and perfection, 421– 35; as personal properties in God, 367; and persons, 71, 119, 125, 129–31, 325–29, 365; predicamental r. defined, 721; predicamental (categorial) and transcendental r., 277, 719–29, 731, 740; and processions, 125, 129, 159, 231, 237– 39; and processio per modum operati, 159; and properties, 67, 247 n. 9; and rational psychology, 695; real and conceptual r., 289; and real distinction in Trinity, 159; and real finite natures, 689–91; and real quantities, 693; really distinct from one another, 279–89, 327–29, 735; r., accident, and substance, 269–79; r. in Aristotle, 740; r. of created persons do not subsist, 351; as r. distinguish persons and as subsistent constitute them, 353, 363–67; r. in God not added to supposits but bring supposits with them, 365; r. of God to creatures conceptual, 717–19; r. in Lonergan and Aquinas, 739–41; r. as r. and r. as subsistent, 247; r. of same to same is conceptual being, 249, 719; r. of single subject in single order are single r., 251 and n. 12; and souls, 691; speaker, word, and love each related to the others by a single r., 251 and n. 12; and subject, in creatures and in God, 237; subject of r., 689, 697; subsistent r., 231, 233, 239– 47, 325–29; and systematic way, 67–69, 71, 119; term of r., 689, 697, 699–713; three real r. really distinct in God,

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231, 233, 247–55; transcendental and predicamental (categorial) r., 277, 719– 29, 731, 740; transcendental r. defined, 721; transcendental r. and ultimate causes, 721; transitive r., 737. See also Opposition; and unity of order, 421–35 Relative(s): and absolute, 697, 713–19; defined, 269, 697; relative simply and in a qualified sense, 713–19 Relativism: and the human, 83 and n. 52, 87, 93; and problem of knowledge, 317, 323; and question of ‘prior,’ 115 Rengstorf, K.H., 451 n. 5 Resolution: r. to principles (sense, selfevident principles, light of intellect), 603 and n. 2; way of, 61, 63, 65, 67, 757 Revelation: and knowledge of supernatural truth, 9; and problem for theological understanding, 49, 117; sources of, see Sources of revelation; and starting point of dogmatic way, 63; and transcultural problem 83, 89 Reverently, diligently, and judiciously, 9, 19, 43, 47, 55, 57, 77, 275 Rheims, Council of, 241, 243, 785–87 Rhetorical understanding, 153 Richard of St Victor, 309, 311 and n. 6, 313 Robilliard, J.A., 219, 625 Rosmini, Antonio, 211, 633, 635, 643–45 Ruiz, 295 Sabellianism, 67, 162 Sacraments: and theological movement, 85 Same: and principle of contradiction, 257, 265, 281; relation of s. to s., 249; s. both really and conceptually, 257, 281; s. genus, dogma, meaning, view, import,

mystery (Vincent of Lerins), 45 and n. 25, 57, 63 Sanctifying grace: absolutely and formally supernatural, 471–73 and n. 29, 515; as created participation of active spiration, 473; exceeds proportion of nature, 471; follows upon God’s love, 515; and special divine love, 475; and virtues and gifts, 497, 515–17 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 211, 633 Schauf, H., 437 n. 1, 461 n. 23 Schmidt, M.A., 243 n. 7 Scholarly differentiation, 79 Scholars: today’s s. and medieval compilers, 753 Scholastic theology: and Humani generis, 121–23 and n. 74; and prior in itself, 115 Science(s): as certain knowledge of things through causes, 5, 59, 105, 107, 731; collaboration of s., 103; common features of s., 101–103; final stage of, 719–29, 731; as goal, 7–9; human s. and data, 33; natural s. and data, 33; one s. uses another, 101–103; and prescientific knowledge, 107; stages of s., 719–29, 731; theology as, 7–9; two meanings of s. (Aristotle), 753; unity of s., 101–103 Scotus, John Duns, 133, 211, 233, 299 n. 32, 301, 303, 309, 311, 457, 547, 617, 629, 633, 657–59, 667–69, 789–91 Scriptural prior, 83, 89, 91, 97, 113; as related to systematic prior, 95, 97, 113 Scripture: contains much that has not been defined, 35–37; and understanding of mysteries, 33–35, 37 Secondary act of existence: absolutely and formally supernatural, 471–73 and n. 29; as created participation of paternity, 473; exceeds proportion of nature, 471

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Second Vatican Council, 123 n. 74 Semirationalism, 29, 55, 95, 97, 99, 131, 153, 207 Sending and sent: and relations of origin, 455–67 Sense in act is sensible in act, 303 Senses: and corporeal and individual matter, 205 Sensism, 317 Sensitivity: as consciousness, 139 Sentences: and Aquinas, 23; books of, 23 Severus of Antioch, 91 Sic et non (Abelard), 23 Signify: what words s. and their way of signifying, 243, 245, 247, 333 Similarity: and absence of dissimilarity in God, 197, 303 and n. 34 Simplicity of God, 185, 241, 243, 245, 259, 371 Smith, G., 739–41 Sociology of knowledge, 27 and n. 15 Solutions: imperfect s., 25–27; in theology, 25–27 Son: and filiation, 239–47; has all that the Father has except paternity, 291; is both a se and not a se, 127–29; is onlybegotten, 127; is Word, 191, 397; as mediator, 481; mission of, 447–49, 479– 83, 485–91; really distinct from Father as person but not in spirating love, 255; as reason for special love in Holy Spirit, 481; as redeemer, 481; sent by Father, 447–49, 455, 465; the Son is God/God is the Son, 259; with Father sends Holy Spirit, 449–51, 455, 461–63, 465. See also Filiation Sonship: see Filiation Soul: Aristotle’s definitions of, 691; and real internal relations, 691

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Sources: as loci, 37–39 and n. 21 Source(s) of revelation: 21, 27, 35, 37, 747; and analogy, 55; divine s. of r. and truth of theological understanding, 59; and magisterium, 33–35; never exhausted, 35, 45; and redemption, 35–37; and Trinity, 37 Speaker: and intellectual emanation, 181– 89; only Father is s. in God, 397; as related to word and to love, 251 and n. 12 Speaking: and generating, 397–99; s. word and spirating love, 253 Species: expressed s., 589–93; impressed s., 416–17; and knowing God by essence, 639; s. shining in phantasm, 593, 603 (see also Phantasm); and understanding, 15 n. 8, 531–57 passim, 577, 579; various meanings of, 416–22 Speculative theology: 3; and dogmas, 3 Spirating/Spiration: 113 and n. 66, 119, 127, 129, 139, 615–21, 675; defined, 235; and intellectual emanation, 181– 89; and judgment of value, 181; and notionally loving, 181 n. 24. See also Active spiration, Passive spiration Spirator: and active spiration, 239–47; not distinct, 247 n. 10, 331 Spirit: as common and as proper name, 355; law of, 77; and nature, 77 Spiritual: and intelligible, and moral procession, 137; nature/procession and Trinitarian analogy, 173–77, 179–81; and relation to matter, 173; types of s. procession, 173–75. See also Decision; Will Spontaneity: intellectual s., 177, 179, 181; and sensitive consciousness, 143, 175 State of grace: 513 and n. 119; constitutes a divine-human interpersonal situation,

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517; and first and second act, 619; and habit of grace, 513 n. 119, 517; and known in knower and beloved in lover, 517, 619; refers to many subjects together, 517 Suarez, Francisco, 295, 309, 311, 423 Subject(s): as a being in the strict sense, 401; as conscious person, 401; as distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature, 401; eternal and temporal s., 377, 399– 413 (see also Eternal subject, Temporal subject); as object, 141; and object, 211; as principle-which, 143; as proper principle of intellectual emanation, 215; and relation, in creatures and in God, 247; as subject, 141; ‘s.’ a relative term, 399; three s. of one consciousness, 391 (see also Consciousness, Persons, divine) Subordinate knowledge, 33 Subordinationism, 67 Subsist: divine persons s. as properly as does God, 393; minerals, plants, animals, humans, angels, God, Father, Son, Holy Spirit s., 347 Subsistent: and being and unity in strict sense, 347–49; defined, 241, 245, 325–27, 331; in God, 243, 337–39; and modes of being, 395; and relations, see Subsistent relations; in us, 339 Subsistent relations: 231, 233, 239–47, 279, 337–39, 349, 393; and constitution of divine persons, 353; as persons, 325–29; as subjects, 239–47 Sub specie aeternitatis, 467 n. 26 Substance: and accident, 269–71; ambiguity of word ‘s.,’ 401; defined, 271, 295; divine s. and relations, see Relation(s); as nature and so as related, 273; and real internal relations, 691

Sufficient reason: principle of, 145 n. 11 Summa: and Aquinas, 23; and questions, 23 Supernatural: absolutely s., 471–73 and n. 29, 639, 641; and divine love, 483 and n. 48; exceeds proportion of a nature, 539, 645–59; formally s., 471–73 and n. 29; and natural desire, 645–59; s. character of formal terms of incarnation and gift of Holy Spirit, 471–73; virtually s., 471–73 n. 29 Supposit: as distinct subsistent, 331, 345, 359; and relations, 365 Sutton, Thomas, 547 Syllogism: epistemonic or explanatory s., 119 and n. 73; and essential and notional, 265–67, 363; force of s. is extensive not intensive, 747 Symbols: and internal communication, 79; and transcultural principle, 79 Sympathy: and intersubjectivity, 495 Synthesis: theological s. is imperfect, analogical, obscure, and gradually developing, 17; way of, 61, 63, 65, 67, 109, 117, 183, 235, 327, 757 System: growing and developing, 25; poor understanding of s., 25–29, 39 (see also Misunderstanding); rejection of facts understood by s., 25–29; rejection of s., 25–29; s. without synthesis with positive, 95; truth of s., 749 Systematic analogy, 171, 173, 179 Systematic conception: and virtual solution of all problems, 23, 43, 47, 171, 173 Systematic prior: 83, 89, 95, 99, 113, 115; as related to scriptural and patristic prior, 95–97, 99, 113. See also Prior for us, Prior in itself Systematic theology: begins from definitions of church, 35; contrasted with

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biblical theology, 37; and dogmatic theology, 121; and positive theology, 57 Systematic way, 61, 63, 65, 77, 117, 127; and dogmatic way, 67–72; and prior in itself, 87, 119; task of within historical process, 87; and that whose understanding does not require the understanding of anything else, 63, 69, 77, 119, 125 Teaching: way of, 61, 63, 65, 67, 757 Technical terminology: need for, 25 Temporal subject(s): as distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature, 401; but intellectual nature is potential, 403, and actuated per accidens before per se, 403–405; is a s.of another nature besides the intellectual, 403; mutable and material, 401; needs other t.s. to move to second phase, 405; the ‘now’ of t.s., 401; obstacles to transition to second phase of t.s., 407–409; remains the same through substantial and accidental change, 401; self-revelation and selfacceptance of t.s., 405; three ways of transition from first to second phase of t.s. (understanding, belief, love), 405– 407; two phases of t.s., 403–409 Temporal way, 61, 63, 65, 67 Teresa (of Avila), St, 113 Term, and object, see Object(s) That which and that by which: in creatures, 339; in God, 241, 243, 245, 337–39, 341 Theological movement: 85, 87; and dogmatic movement, 85, 87 Theological prior, 83. See also Prior for us, Prior in itself Theological question: and biblical question, 51; and dogmatic question, 51; and hypothesis, 51–53

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Theological science: begins not from data but from truths, 33 Theological understanding: 11–19, 97; and analytic principles, 745; as connected to antecedent truth, 33–39, 743, 749– 55; as connected to consequent truth, 39–59, 743; deductions from, 749; and demonstrations, 747; as first operation of intellect, 15, 43, 743, 745, but linked with instances of second operation, 15, 745–47; as hypothesis, 43, 51–53, 747; increases, 97; in itself and in its expression, 31–33; in itself neither true nor false, 31, 43, 117, 743; is understanding truth that God has revealed, 33; judgment about, 49–51; and natural knowledge of God, 747; properties of, 15–19; questions for, 21, 23; reduces to unity, 167, 749–55; and sources of revelation, 747; and truth, 93, 747–49; truth of, 31–59 passim. See also Understanding of mysteries Theology: and faith, 103–105, 107; as knowledge subordinated to divine knowledge, 33; and natural science, 749–51; parts of, 121; in relation to other sciences, 103 and n. 59, 107; as science, 5, 63, 107–109, 119; spirates charity, 113; and subordinate science, 109; twofold aspect of, 101–105; and two operations of intellect, 105–107; as wisdom, 103 and n. 59, 113 Theory: and hypothesis, 53, 749 ‘This’: 581 Thomas Aquinas, 9–11 and nn. 1–3, 23 and n. 13, 27 n. 15, 29, 45, 67 nn. 34– 35, 71 n. 45, 73, 75 and n. 48, 101, 113, 131, 133 and nn. 1–3, 135 and nn. 4–5, 139 and n. 9, 155 n. 18, 157, 161, 165, 181

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nn. 24 and 25, 183, 185, 187, 189 n. 31, 191 n. 32, 191 n. 34, 195 and nn. 36–45, 197 nn. 46–49, 199 nn. 50 and 51, 201 n. 53, 211 and n. 63, 213, 219, 221–29, 239, 241, 247 n. 9, 273 nn. 18 and 19, 277 n. 22, 303 n. 34, 309, 311, 313 and n. 8, 317 n. 13, 329 n. 22, 333 n. 24, 335 n. 26, 337 n. 27, 339 n. 28, 341 and nn. 29 and 30, 344 nn. 34 and 35, 353 nn. 37 and 38, 355 nn. 39–41, 357 nn. 43–47, 359 nn. 50–54, 361 and nn. 55–57, 363 and nn. 58–62, 365 n. 65, 367 n. 66, 369 nn. 67 and 68, 371 nn. 70–72, 373 nn. 73–74, 375 n. 76, 399 n. 17, 401 n. 19, 403 n. 22, 411 n. 27, 415 and n. 31, 417, 419 nn. 33 and 35, 421 n. 36, 425 nn. 39– 44, 427 n. 45, 433 n. 47, 445 nn. 2 and 3, 447 n. 4, 451 n. 6, 453 and n. 10, 475 nn. 30–35, 479 nn. 39–41, 481 nn. 43– 45, 483 n. 47, 485 n. 51, 493 nn. 76–78, 499 nn. 84–86 and 89–90, 503 n. 93, 509 nn. 100–101, 515 nn. 120–22, 531 and n. 1, 533 and n. 2, 535, 537, 539, 541, 543, 545, 547, 549, 551, 553, 557, 559 n. 1, 561, 563, 565 and n. 4, 569–77, 579, 581, 583, 585, 587, 589, 591, 593, 595, 597, 599, 601, 607 and n. 4, 609, 611 and n. 6, 615–25, 627, 629, 631, 633, 635, 637, 639, 641, 643, 645–59, 661, 663, 667, 671, 673, 675, 677, 679, 681, 683, 685, 707–709, 723, 737, 739–41, 755, 765, 769 and n. 16, 783–85, 789 n. 29 Thomists, 221, 229 ‘Thou’: see ‘You’ Three: subsist in God, 331–33; as transcendental number, 335 Tiphanus, 309, 311, 457 To act, 533 To affirm: designates essential act, 353

To be conceived: and to conceive, as implying relation, 353 To be spoken: can be taken in two ways (predicated of Word and of everything understood by God and spoken through Word), 369; and to speak, as implying relation, 353 Toledo, Eleventh Council of, 433 n. 47, 453 and n. 9 Toletus, 295 To receive (pati), 533, 541–43 ‘To something,’ 269–79 To ti ¯en einai, 577 To ti esti, 577 To understand: either infinite or finite, 553; a perfection, second act, act of what is complete, motion, action or operation as act, 553 Traditionalism, 99 Transcendental: t. exigencies, 143; t. laws, 175, 177 Transcultural movement, 85 Transcultural problem: 79–87; and absolute features of interiority, 83; and Christians/Catholics, 83, 85–87, 99– 101; and God’s solution, 89, 99–101; in New Testament, 83 Transference: and intersubjectivity, 495 Transubstantiation, 99 Trent, Council of, 85 Trinitarian dogma: and dogmatic way, 67 Trinity: and divine knowledge/being, 305; understanding of in Augustine and Aquinas, 45 Trivet, Nicholas, 547 Tromp, Sebastian, 437 n. 1, 503 n. 92 True: defined, 250; distinct from evidence, 203; as essential term, 355; and intellectual emanation, 355; and intelligible,

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75; as medium of being (and knowledge of real), 11, 13, 59, 203; and object as term of second operation, 13, 203–207; as proper term for Son, 355; and revealing of human subject, 321; t. and being convertible, 203–207 Truth: antecedent t., 33–39, 41, 43, 117, 743; consequent t., 39–59, 117, 743; consequent t. probable, 41; criteria for t. of theological undestanding, 57– 59; as essential term, 355; and faith, 319; formally only in judgment, 563; as proper term for Son, 355; revealed t. measured by God’s understanding, 749; and second operation, 43; and starting point of theology, 33, 107; and understanding, 93, 749–55 Truth-correspondence: and external relations, 701, 703 Unbegotten: and five fundamental notions, 353; as proper attribute, 353 Understanding of mysteries: 3, 9, 33; as act, 11–19 (see also Theological understanding); analogical, 17, 29, 47, 107, 117, 151, 161, 165–67, 171, 745, 747; and antecedent revealed truth, 15, 117, 743; and certitude, 3, 7–11, 29–31, 43, 55, 59, 747; and consequent theological truth, 15, 47, 117, 743 (see also Truth); developing, 17, 29, 41, 43–45, 45–47, 117, 433, 745, 747, 749; finite, 15–17; as first operation of intellect, 15, 745, 755, but linked with instances of second operation, 15, 745–47, 755; fruitful, 3,11, 17, 19, 29, 43, 47, 117, 151; as goal, 7–11; as hypothesis, 41–43, 747; imperfect, 3, 7, 17, 29, 47, 107, 117, 151, 161, 165–67, 167–69, 171, 273–74, 745, 747; mediate,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

47, 151, 161, 165–67, 169–71; obscure, 17, 29, 47, 76, 117, 161, 745, 747; and problems, 53–55; properties of, 15–19; stages of, 43–45; synthetic, 17, 117; and the true, 15, 117. See also Theological understanding, Understanding Understanding: always better than not u., 17; and conception/concepts, 183, 657, 765, 771 (see also Concept(s), Conception); conditions of u. and systematic way, 73; created u. distinct from substance, from act of existence, and from operative potency, 195; divine understanding, objects of, 215–17, 661, 665; and first principle in order of wisdom, 23; from another, 555; as grasping intelligibility in sensible data, 13; as immanent operation, 535; and inner word, 31, 125, 203–207, 559–61; and intellectual emanation, 137; is a pati, 555; and knowledge, 317; as passion, pati, reception, 533 n. 2; poor u. of system, 25–29, 39 (see also Misunderstanding); as principal intellectual act, 629; and principles, 23–25, 45, 63; as proper act of intellect (Thomas), 133; and reason, 629; relation to truth, 31; resolved into category of quality, 553–55; strictly spiritual, 151; u. a doctrine and u. history of that doctrine, 57; u. and conceiving are different kinds of act or operation, 607; u. of u., 631; and uttering of inner word, 603–609; and virtual solution of a body of questions, 25; wisdom, u., and knowledge grow, 23–25 and n. 13, 43, 45–47, 49, 57, 99, 101, 395, 749–55, 761. See also To understand Undivided in itself: and constitutive principles of a being, accidents, possibles,

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and conceptual beings, 347; and principle of identity, 347 and n. 36 Unity: actual u. and person, 347; actual u. predicated by analogy, 347 (see also Analogy); actual u. and subsistence, 347–49; numerical, natural, actual, 347; of order, 423; of science, 101–103 Universal: of sense, 587; and understanding, 587; and ‘why,’ 587 Univocal: and prior for us in natural science, 79, 81 and n. 50 Us, 79 Uttering inner word: and understanding, 603–609 Value: and end, 675 Vasquez, 295 Vienne: Council of, 697 Vincent of Lerins, 19 n. 10, 45 n. 25, 395 Virtually unconditioned, 319, 321 Virtual solution: and system, see Systematic conception Vital act, 131, 227–29, 535, 547–53, 621, 649 Volk, Hermann, 383 and n. 9 Voluntary: and free, 355, 373 Way of signifying: see Signify Ways: linkage of two w., 65–67, 95; two w. of inquiry, 59–67 Welch, Claude, 393 and n. 8, 393 n. 11 Whatever is received is received according to the capacity of the receiver, 25 What is it? 11; and cognitive process, 13; and understanding of mysteries, 15, 43, 93 What? and Why? 579–81 Why is it so? 11; and understanding of mysteries, 15

Will: does not have anything going forth from itself per modum operati, 227, but only processio operationis, 227; and intellect, 111, 181–82 n. 25, 227, 673–75; and intellectual emanation, 137, 181 and n. 25, 199–203, 675; and love, 181, 675; moves itself regarding the means, but is moved by God regarding the end, 551–53; operation of w. terminates at things, 227; and vital act, 551–53; and wisdom, 673–75 Williams, M.E., 243 n. 7 Wisdom: and being, 629; folly as multiple as w. is one, 18; infinite w., 655; method as w., 103 n. 59; and order, 23–25, 47, 63–65, 67, 99, 103, 655, 673, 687 n. 1; philosophy as w., 103 n. 59; and poor understanding, 25–27; theology as w., 103 and n. 59, 113; and unity of sciences, 101–103; and will, 673–75; w., understanding, and knowledge grow, 23–25 and n. 13, 43, 45–47, 49, 57, 99, 395, 749–55, 761 Witte, Johannes, 393 and n. 10 Wonder: and light of intellect, 139; as origin of all science and philosophy and theology, 21, 583 Word: analogy of w., 659–71; compound and simple w., 567–69; and intellectual emanation, 181–89, 199–203, 353; inner w., see Inner word; and likeness, 199– 203; outer w., see Outer word; as proper name of Son, 353, 397; as related to speaker and love, 251 and n. 12; w. that spirates love, 225, 253 Word of God (as immanent divine Word): as definition and as affirmation, 767; and demonstrability, 125; and emanation of love, 199–203; existence of cannot be demonstrated, 207–13; and generation,

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189–203; proceeds from understanding of creatures, 213–17; as Son, 191 Word of God (spoken in history): and data in theology, 33, 65; is God, 507; as object that moves to theological understanding, 107

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Yes: and cognitive process, 13; and judgment, 13 ‘You’: ‘I’ and ‘You’ and divine persons, 397–99; three in God who can be addressed as ‘you,’ 395–97