The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West [2014 ed.] 1137353864, 9781137353863

Table of contents :
Cover
Half-Title
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Epigraph
Contents
Preface and Acknowledgments
1. Introduction: The Arab Spring in Global Perspective
World Politics Twenty-Five Years after History “Ended”
A Return to Grand Theory in the Study of World Politics
Part I The Arab Spring and Global Democratization
2. The Arab Spring and Democratic Socialization: Transnational Influences
Democratic Socialization in World Politics
The Arab Spring and Transnational Democratization
Economic Modernization
Moderate Religious Movements
Communications Technology
3. The Arab Spring and Democratic Socialization: International Influences
The Arab Spring and International Democratization
Prospects for Democracy in the Middle East
Part II The Triumph of Democracy
4. The Worldwide Crisis of Authoritarianism
Modernization and the Growth of the Global Middle Class
Low-Grade Authoritarianism
High-Grade Authoritarianism
Extremism and Diversionary Tactics
5. The Expansion of the Global Democratic Community
Emerging Democracies in World Politics
The Spread of Democracy in the Non-Western World
A Fourth Wave of Democratization
The Developing World’s “Second Struggle for Independence”
Part III The Eclipse of the West
6. A Post-Western Democratic Global Order
The Convergence of Civilizations
Overtaking the West: The Role of Institutions
The World the West Made: “Everyone’s World”
7. Global Democratic Futures: The Clash of Democratizations
Inter-Democratic Conflict in World Politics
The Politics of Global Democratization
Reforming Global Governance: The “Reverse Colonization” of International Society
8. Conclusion: A Global Spring
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West

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The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West

Ewan Harrison and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell

THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY AND THE ECLIPSE OF THE WEST

Copyright © Ewan Harrison and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, 2014. All rights reserved. First published in 2014 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–1–137–35386–3 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress. A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: January 2014 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To our children

The peoples of earth have . . . entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere. —Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, 17951

1.

Kant 1991, p. 107.

Contents Preface and Acknowledgments

ix

1. Introduction: The Arab Spring in Global Perspective World Politics Twenty-Five Years after History “Ended” A Return to Grand Theory in the Study of World Politics

1 8 20

Part I

The Arab Spring and Global Democratization

2. The Arab Spring and Democratic Socialization: Transnational Influences Democratic Socialization in World Politics The Arab Spring and Transnational Democratization Economic Modernization Moderate Religious Movements Communications Technology

27 28 36 36 39 44

3. The Arab Spring and Democratic Socialization: International Influences The Arab Spring and International Democratization Prospects for Democracy in the Middle East

53 54 64

Part II The Triumph of Democracy 4. The Worldwide Crisis of Authoritarianism Modernization and the Growth of the Global Middle Class Low-Grade Authoritarianism High-Grade Authoritarianism Extremism and Diversionary Tactics

75 75 81 88 97

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Contents

5. The Expansion of the Global Democratic Community Emerging Democracies in World Politics The Spread of Democracy in the Non-Western World A Fourth Wave of Democratization The Developing World’s “Second Struggle for Independence”

101 103 106 112 117

Part III The Eclipse of the West 6. A Post-Western Democratic Global Order The Convergence of Civilizations Overtaking the West: The Role of Institutions The World the West Made: “Everyone’s World”

129 129 137 142

7. Global Democratic Futures: The Clash of Democratizations Inter-Democratic Conflict in World Politics The Politics of Global Democratization Reforming Global Governance: The “Reverse Colonization” of International Society

149 149 153

8. Conclusion: A Global Spring

177

Notes

201

Bibliography

233

Index

257

162

Preface and Acknowledgments

T

his year, it is the 25th anniversary of the end of the Cold War. Following the Arab Spring, the larger questions about the fundamental nature of the global order that surfaced dramatically in 1989 have powerfully reemerged. Many people thought these questions had faded away, the mere by-product of a peculiar set of circumstances in the late 1980s and 1990s. This widespread assumption is wrong. When several Arab dictatorships fell in 2011, the fact that almost a quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War scholars had not satisfactorily explained why the Soviet Union suddenly and unexpectedly collapsed came back to haunt the discipline of International Relations. Just because scholars ignored this question (perhaps because they were embarrassed about not being able to answer it properly) did not mean that the dynamics which caused the Soviet collapse went away. Indeed, the revolutions of the Arab Spring showed that the global forces leading to the end of the Cold War had not only intensified but had spread from the communist to the developing world. The result was that, as at the end of the Cold War, the field was once again left with egg all over its proverbial face when the Arab Spring erupted. It is time to acknowledge that Francis Fukuyama was essentially correct when he argued in 1989 that the dominant trend in world politics was a global process of socialization spreading democracy through the international system.1 He was also correct to highlight the contributions of Hegel’s and Kant’s philosophical writings, and their importance for understanding the dynamics of the international system over the past few centuries. Moreover, the global spread of democracy was not derailed by 9/11, the Iraq War, the Bush administration, or the Western financial crisis of 2008. Processes of globalization and democratization unleashed by the emergence of a critical mass of capitalist and democratic states in the international system have continued to gather momentum. However, what events over the last decade have made clear is that Samuel Huntington was correct when he argued that the West was in relative decline, and that

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future dynamism in world politics would come from Islamic, Chinese, Hindu, African, and Latin American civilizations.2 In contrast to the 1990s, globalization today is being led by the rest and not by the West. History did not “end” in 1989. Instead, the world was at the cusp of the emergence of a new, post-Western democratic global order. This generates a new global paradox. What we call a “clash of democratizations” will define the future of world politics and patterns of world conflict and cooperation. The defining conflicts of the future will not occur between the democratic community and the autocratic community as Robert Kagan has argued.3 On the contrary, the major conflicts of the future will be political conflicts between democracies. In particular, conflicts will arise between the established democracies of the West and the emerging democracies in the developing world. At the heart of these conflicts will be new democracies’ desire to share the material benefits and moral recognition associated with membership of the democratic community, pitted against the resistance of established democracies clinging to their monopoly over these possessions. The established democracies will find it extremely difficult to share these privileges more broadly, and the politics of global democratization in a post-Western world will be deeply contentious and acrimonious. However, the democratic community does have the potential and ability to be inclusive and share power and legitimacy. The West’s Cold War dream is coming true, and the spread of democracy and capitalism to the developing world has historic implications for peace, prosperity, cooperation, and freedom on a global scale. The challenge of the West is to embrace the post-Western democratic future which is now emerging. This is a self-consciously antiestablishment book. Our aim is to put the cat amongst the pigeons, and say something new, controversial, different, and ultimately profound. We want this book to be the intellectual equivalent of drinking a Pan-Galactic Gargle Blaster from Douglas Adams’ Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy. The Hitchhiker’s Guide famously described the effect of drinking this cocktail as “like having your brains smashed in by a slice of lemon wrapped round a large gold brick.” We hope to shake political science out of its self-obsession with internal scholarly debates. The defunding of political science from the National Science Foundation by the US Congress in 2013 was profoundly wrong, but should be a wake-up call to the profession to engage, inform, and also lead broader policy and public debates by producing big new ideas. We also aim to stoke the debate well beyond the Western world, and indeed, especially within non-Western societies. Our aim is to present a bold and provocative new

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vision of the emerging global order. The 25th anniversary of 1989 represents the perfect vantage point to survey the big picture of global political change since the monumental series of events that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall. We also put forward a genuinely worldwide perspective that all too often is sorely lacking. In doing so, we hope to build upon Kishore Mahbubani’s important recent attempt to start a global conversation.4 It is long overdue. The manuscript for this book was submitted to the publisher on June 1, 2013. However, over the remainder of the summer, events germane to our analysis continued to unfold with remarkable frequency. The major antigovernment demonstrations in Turkey and Brazil and their significance for our argument are discussed in this manuscript at the start of Chapter Five in the context of our prior analysis of the “Indian Spring.” Egypt saw the overthrow of Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood government through largescale protests and a coup by the military. Chapter Three of the pre-June 1 manuscript dealt extensively with the possibility of a reversion to military rule in Egypt, and the long-term constraints such a regime would face. We have therefore opted to maintain the manuscript in its original form. At the time of writing, the 1848 scenario seems to be unfolding in Egypt in which the ancien regime reasserts itself in the chaos of the postrevolutionary period. However, within a decade of 1848 autocracies across Europe came under pressure to make concessions, and within a generation Europe was transformed. If 2011 in the Middle East turns out to be the equivalent of 1848 in Europe, the region will have undergone a fundamental transformation and the fate of autocrats there will have changed forever. Moreover, as we identify, there is good reason to expect that change in the Middle East today will be considerably faster and more pervasive than it was in the mid-nineteenth century. Meanwhile, political, social, and economic development in most other regions continues on a scale and extent much further advanced than that in the Middle East. Appropriately enough, given our argument about the role of changes in global communications technology, this book began its life on Facebook. As part of the St. Louis Area Methods Meeting (SLAMM) conference in the spring of 2011, Sara was visiting Saint Louis where I was working at Washington University. Over drinks on a lovely sunny April evening in the Central West End, Sara mentioned that she liked what I’d been posting about the Arab Spring. She suggested that we write a paper on this topic together in the light of our earlier work on democratic socialization. While we had previously worked together on a paper,5 the idea of a new collaboration on the Arab Spring had not occurred to me. Sara further suggested

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that we present the paper at the International Studies Association Midwest conference in Saint Louis that fall, and again the following June at the joint ISA/British International Studies Association conference in my favorite city and former home—Edinburgh, Scotland. I had previously considered offering a response to Gartzke and Weisiger’s prizewinning 2008 Midwest Political Science Association conference paper on inter-democratic conflicts.6 When I started work on writing an abstract for the new paper on the Arab Spring soon after, I had a “eureka moment.” I had realized that the two separate themes could be linked together if debates about the rise of the rest and the spread of democracy to the developing world were brought into the argument. However, this book has a longer history. Both Sara and I completed our PhDs in the late 1990s, the decade that followed the 1989 revolutions. Our work explored the idea that the peace existing between democratic states might start to generate socialization effects and spread through the international system once a democratic critical mass was reached. We both argued that the end of the Cold War could be viewed as such a critical tipping point, extending earlier work by Wade Huntley.7 We subsequently developed this analysis further.8 However, the idea we generated did not make the impact we had hoped initially. The events of the Arab Spring have allowed us to see our previous argument about democratic socialization in a new light, and extend it by linking it up to debates about the rise of the rest. We came to realize that our basic approach was actually growing in relevance over time, something even we had perhaps failed to fully appreciate. Shortly after we first presented the pilot paper that became the basis for this book, I overheard an interview with Steve Stoute on National Public Radio about the record producer’s favorite pieces of music. Explaining his admiration for Sting’s An Englishman in New York, Stoute observed that “sometimes I feel like that at times, that I see the world one way and people look at me differently. And, you know, I realize, I come to realize that any time you have a great idea that you’re passionate about, you pretty much know that it’s going to be a great idea when most people don’t get it immediately.”9 It has taken well over a decade since our PhDs were completed, and we have often since felt that we faced a wall of skepticism about our argument. We sincerely hope that this book will finally bring greater prominence to the system-level analysis of the spread of democracy in world politics. Quite a few people have helped us with this book along the way. First and foremost among these has been Pat James, who managed to introduce

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us in 2002, concluding Sara’s efforts to track down Ewan ever since the ISA convention in 1998! In a hypercompetitive field, Pat has stuck by us through highs and lows, always being there like a rock to depend upon for help, guidance, and support. This is despite his manifold and always evident commitments and responsibilities. Remarkably, we know he is also doing this for dozens of others. It is our view that no other senior International Relations scholar can remotely match this kind of dedication to younger academics. This distinguishes Pat as truly special within the field. International Studies has some great scholars and great teachers, but how many of them also have Pat’s evident and genuinely selfless passion for helping others? Kelly Kadera also deserves particular thanks for organizing the fantastic University of Iowa conference on “A Global Democratic Peace?” in spring 2004, an intensive workshop which brought together many of the leading scholars interested in pushing debates about the democratic peace to the system level. The experience took our understanding of, and enthusiasm for, this line of inquiry to a totally new plane, and allowed Sara and me to cement our working relationship. Cooper Drury and John Vasquez deserve mention for their very positive feedback at the ISA Midwest conference in Saint Louis in November 2011. Their interest and encouragement was vital in getting this book off the ground. We would also like to thank the other participants on the panel on “Global Democratization” at the joint ISA/BISA conference in Edinburgh in June 2012: Erik Gartzke, Kristian Gledistch, Marianne Dahl, and Scott Gates. William Thompson provided valuable feedback as the panel discussant. Anne-Marie Slaughter very kindly took time out of her extremely busy schedule to answer emails related to the panel, and in joining us as chair, provided detailed comments on each paper at the panel. Her enthusiasm for our paper was a great source of encouragement which we appreciated tremendously. The experience of presenting our paper at the Edinburgh conference launched the broader book project. We also thank Michael Colaresi for inviting a submission related to this project for a conference on the Arab Spring that he hosted at Michigan State University in the spring of 2012. Palgrave has been the perfect publisher. We are honored to be published by the same press that published Hedley Bull’s seminal The Anarchical Society, which has been such a profound influence on both of our thinking. Steven Kennedy at Palgrave deserves particular thanks. He took the trouble to track Ewan Harrison down in the United States via email prior to the BISA conference, and suggested (apparently off the top of his head!)

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the perfect title for the book. He saw the promise of the original conference paper, and encouraged us to turn that into something much bigger. We are extremely grateful for that. At Palgrave USA, Farideh Koohi-Kamali showed great patience and understanding in allowing us extra time to complete the manuscript after my move to Rutgers University in the summer and fall of 2012. This allowed us to provide a much more mature and fully developed analysis than otherwise would have been possible. Isabella Yeager provided excellent (and friendly!) assistance with the technical aspects of the production and writing of the manuscript. We would like to thank our talented proofreader, whose assistance was provided through Tiger Writing services. Kathe Zaslow did a truly remarkable job, helping to polish the manuscript and recommending improvements for bringing our ideas to a broad readership. Kathe also showed incredible forbearance in understanding our ever-shifting schedules and accommodating very short deadlines. Sara became interested in working on the democratic peace in graduate school. While most scholars of my generation were studying dyadic conflict, I had this crazy idea of looking at the systemic-level relationship between democracy and war. I thought about the relationship as both endogenous (democracy and war cause changes in each other) and evolutionary (the strength of the democratic peace changes over time). Several things inspired that initial project. First, I read Scott Gates’s MA thesis on the democratic peace; Scott was one of my PhD advisors along with Gretchen Hower. In that thesis, Scott talked about the democratic peace at multiple levels of analysis, probing my interests in thinking about the global dynamics of the Kantian peace. I also enjoyed Zeev Maoz’s paper (with Abdolali) on the democratic peace from multiple levels of analysis and I began thinking about the theoretical structure of the systemic democratic peace. I started reading more philosophical work on the topic (especially by Immanuel Kant) and came across Wade Huntley’s ISQ paper on the topic, a piece that played an important role in my theoretical thinking.10 After defending my dissertation in 1997, I attended the ISA conference in Minneapolis the following spring and came across a paper by Ewan in the paper room (a relic of the past!). It was quite fascinating because Ewan’s theoretical ideas were very similar to my own, even though we were trained on different continents with very different epistemological toolkits. A few years later, I was publishing a piece from that project in AJPS and tried to contact Ewan to get his permission to cite that conference paper, an effort that failed. I cited the paper anyway, and as noted above, Patrick James later connected the two of us at an APSA conference after recognizing the

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similarities in our research. That first encounter led to a very fruitful coauthorship relationship with many interesting ideas exchanged in person and online for years to come. This book is a milestone of sorts because doing systemic work on the democratic peace was a tough sell in the 1990s. I recall Jim Ray at a Peace Science Society conference in 1996 asking me why I was doing this kind of work and Alastair Smith later taking me to task as a discussant in 1998 with broad skepticism about my ideas. Not only were the theoretical ideas different, but the methodologies of time-varying parameter models were quite foreign to scholars as well. As editor of JCR, Bruce Russett was willing to take a chance on our ideas at a time when most scholars were looking at the relationship between dyadic democracy and militarized conflict. The publication of Alexander Wendt’s book Social Theory of International Politics in 1999 helped to reinvigorate the systemic approach in IR and gave Ewan and I a renewed sense of purpose in articulating our ideas on these liberal systemic processes. I am grateful to John Vasquez for soliciting a book chapter from me for the second edition of What Do We Know About War? That chapter helped me to pull together my views on the systemic democratic peace. It also rejuvenated my interest in the topic at the same time Ewan and I were having interesting discussions on Facebook and email about the events transpiring in the Middle East. Ewan and I had the same reaction to these events, seeing them as the continuation of the dynamics we had described in our earlier democratic peace research. This book helped to cement those ideas and place them more convincingly in the theoretical IR literature. I am grateful for my collaborations with Kelly Kadera and Mark Crescenzi which pushed forward my ideas on the systemic democratic peace and helped me realize the importance of material capabilities for the democratic community. I also want to recognize Brandon Prins as a fabulous coauthor and friend. Our desire to figure out what democracies fought about (fish!) fostered my interest in studying maritime and river conflicts and produced some very interesting ideas about the relationship between regime type and third-party conflict management. I am also grateful to my good friend, Paul Hensel, for our collaborative work on the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project, an enterprise that has been truly invaluable for me in my thinking about democracies and conflict processes more broadly. I also want to thank Paul Diehl, Ashley Leeds, Emilia Powell, Caroline Tolbert, and Will Moore for their wisdom, friendship, and advice. This project reflects the supportive academic community that I have been fortunate to work in. I would also like to thank my

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husband, Steve, my daughter, Vivian, and my parents, Jim and Margaret, for being strong pillars of support throughout my academic career. I am truly blessed by your love and encouragement. Ewan would first of all like to thank his coauthor Sara for her original proposal to write a paper together on the Arab Spring, her enthusiasm for working with me, and more generally for sticking by me through everything since my time in Oxford. Like Sara, I had come across Huntley’s fascinating article on Kant’s “Third Image” while studying for my PhD and found it a rich vein of inquiry.11 This gave us much to talk about when we first met. Since then, it has been my extreme good fortune to have such a friendly and reliable “intellectual soul mate,” and I hope that we’ll continue to work together in the future! Our language for thinking about world politics has become so deeply connected that I have completely lost track of who thought of what idea! I would also like to thank Erik Gartzke who has shown an interest in my work since we first met at APSA in 2005. I have greatly appreciated his support, and his interest in responding in a constructive yet critical fashion to the attempt to push the democratic peace argument to the system level. Hopefully this book represents a worthwhile response to the important argument that Erik has been developing with Alex Weisiger about inter-democratic conflict in a world where the democratic community is strong.12 Nick Rengger was a wonderful teacher who encouraged my early interest in Kant. Richard Little’s interests in neorealism, socialization in international systems, English School approaches to IR, world history, and the expansion of international society all show in this manuscript. I increasingly realize how much I owe him intellectually! Roger Eatwell was the professor whose inspirational second year “Political Ideologies” course and textbook introduced me to Fukuyama’s thesis in a sustained way.13 It is a mark of the tremendous admiration, respect, and esteem in which I have always held my former undergraduate professor that it took me twenty years to realize that I actually disagreed with him about Fukuyama’s argument. Nigel Bowles at Oxford, over lunch at St Anne’s College early in spring 2002, gave me the suggestion that (eventually!) led to this book. He also taught me how to teach well, showed me what top-quality education can offer a young person, and offered invaluable guidance during my time as the Hedley Bull Junior Research Fellow. My outstanding former MPhil and DPhil student at Oxford, Kudrat Virk, went on to surpass her own very high standards and produce a truly exceptional DPhil thesis on developing countries and humanitarian

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intervention after the Cold War.14 The thesis was successfully defended in October 2010, but remarkably anticipated many key developments during the Arab Spring. I am honored to have played a small role in helping guide Kudrat’s thinking on these matters, and her thesis should be regarded as a key point of reference in the literature. At Colgate University, Fred Chernoff, John Farrenkopf, and Morgan Marietta were excellent colleagues and much that I learned from them informs this book. After a hiatus from writing, this manuscript was drafted in less than seven months. Fred’s 2006 admonition that “while writing sometimes occurs quickly, it reflects decades of reading and thinking” was never far from my mind during this period! At Washington University in Saint Louis, all my great college office colleagues deserve thanks for being easily the most pleasant and intelligent people I have ever worked with. Sharon Stahl took my writing to the next level. Jim McLeod and Delores Kennedy went out of their way to give me the time necessary to write the original pilot paper for this book, for which I am eternally grateful. The Honorary Scholars provided me with enormous fun and constant intellectual stimulation. In particular, I thank three truly exceptional Scholars: Morgan Grossman-McKee, Emily Feder, and Madeleine Daepp. It was a privilege to support their education and to work with them closely during their time as undergraduates. I know they are going on to great things in life. The students on the Masters in International Affairs Program in University College at Washington University were the best I have ever taught. I valued tremendously their passion and enthusiasm for the study of world politics, which matched my own. I sincerely hope that in return I provided excellent classes and sustained attention to them as students. The IA students also honed my ability to present complex ideas in plain English to an interested and intelligent but nonspecialist audience, and to realize the importance of doing this well. For me, this was an overdue lesson! Colleagues on the IA program, especially Marvin Marcus, Jim Wertsch, Repps Hudson, Imdat Ozden, and Mike McCabe offered abundant collegiality, support, and interesting discussions about world affairs. My favorite Washington University professors Henry Schvey and Len Green also provided encouragement about the project after my extended interview about the Arab Spring on Saint Louis on the Air in December 2011. This was greatly appreciated. Len’s memorable encouragement, “You’ve got to get this out!” was just the push I needed. I also enjoyed and benefited greatly from several appearances on Charles Jaco’s “Jaco Report,” and one at Saint Louis’s “Science on Tap” in April 2012.

xviii Preface and Acknowledgments Over the years, Matthew Rendall, John Macmillan, Quddus Snyder, and especially Amrita Narlikar also provided ideas and encouragement that fed directly into this project, for which I am profoundly grateful. My parents Frances and John Harrison kindly read the entire manuscript and offered their usual invaluable support throughout the writing process. Fiona Harrison somehow put up with her crazy academic brother with remarkable tolerance and understanding! Without the unconditional love, dedication, tolerance, and support of my family over the years, this book would not have been possible. Tony Gent also deserves thanks for being a great friend and moral support at all times. My wife Mona Lena Krook deserves special thanks. She rescued me back in late 2004 and early 2005, and has stuck with me ever since. Her global outlook and her insights about the importance of gender for the study and practice of politics have shaped the analysis of this book. More importantly, however, we have a fantastic relationship, an absolutely adorable son Lars, and as my 40th birthday approaches, “baby number two” is now only a month away! Our family makes a great team and—whatever the pressures—I know we have wonderful times ahead for us all in our lives. Thank you for making my new life possible, and as always, I promise I will do everything possible to help support you and our lovely family in the years ahead. Thanks also to the Krooks and the Fugarinos for their affection and kindness. In his important study, The New Asian Hemisphere, Kishore Mahbubani explains that he believes his children will have a much better future, and that this is why he dedicated his book to them.15 Sara and I share this profound sense of optimism about the global political future, and so we too dedicate this book to our children with love, appreciation, and above all in hope about the world that their generation will inherit from ours. EWAN H ARRISON AND SARA MCL AUGHLIN MITCHELL Princeton and Iowa City, June 1, 2013

1. Introduction: The Arab Spring in Global Perspective In one of the first public speeches I made in 1988, I suggested that we were launching out on our second struggle for independence. The first . . . had brought us freedom from colonial rule. The second . . . would bring us freedom from . . . dictatorship. —Aung San Suu Kyi, BBC Reith Lectures, July 5, 20111

T

he Arab Spring has reopened fundamental questions about global political change that have been salient since the end of the Cold War. The events of 2011 in the Middle East were strikingly reminiscent of the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe. Like the 1989 revolutions, they were almost entirely unanticipated and occurred in a region assumed to be a bastion of unshakable authoritarianism. Like the 1989 revolutions, commentators had been so focused on questions of military security that they failed to notice how deeper changes in technology and the global economy were undermining authoritarian states. Like the 1989 revolutions, the Arab Spring spread rapidly through regional contagion and toppled a series of brutal regimes. Moreover, as with the revolutions of 1989, the Arab Spring triggered a swathe of democratic transitions which will have major ramifications for the future of the region and of the world. Just as Francis Fukuyama criticized commentators in 1989 for failing to relate unfolding developments in Eastern Europe to a larger historical pattern, the same argument can be leveled at discussions of the revolutions of 2011.2 This book revisits Francis Fukuyama’s controversial “End of History” thesis in light of the momentous events in the Middle East. It is argued that the Arab Spring vindicates the essence of Fukuyama’s claim that an evolutionary dynamic is occurring in world politics that favors liberal democratic regimes over authoritarian models. The revolutions of 2011 reflect

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The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West

a powerful process of socialization through which democracy is spreading in the international system. With the end of the Cold War, a critical mass of democratic states emerged at a global level, creating a potent mix of moral and material pressures encouraging the spread of democracy. This establishes a virtuous cycle or positive feedback loop in which the spread of democracy further strengthens the democratic community, thereby increasing pressures for democratization. The international system has thus achieved reflexivity, a condition in which knowledge about the spread of democracy itself becomes a major factor further encouraging the spread of democracy. These historical forces related to the presence of a cluster of stable democratic and capitalist states in global politics explain what Huntington called the “third wave” of democratization that peaked with the end of the Cold War.3 The same dynamics that lay behind the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe caused the revolutions in the Middle East in 2011. Through a convergence of global forces, authoritarian states across the Arab world have come under pressure to liberalize. These global forces are transnational (arising from globalization) and international (arising from the states system). Economic modernization initially strengthened authoritarian rulers by providing growth, but also created demands for political reform from the emerging middle class. Changes in communications technology delegitimized Arab regimes, and enabled revolutions to spread quickly both within and between states. Pressure from the Western powers weakened autocracies facing protests in the Middle East, particularly in the form of UN Security Council resolution 1973 authorizing international action against Libya’s former leader, Muammar Qaddafi. Finally, regional contagion and neighborhood effects facilitated the international diffusion of demonstrations, corroded the position of the authoritarian regimes close to Europe, and increased the prospects for the export of democracy to North Africa. Overall, the events of 2011 made it increasingly clear that through outside forces from the democratic and capitalist world, dictators in the Middle East have found it hard to stay afloat given the rising democratic tide. The pressure that Bashar Al-Assad is facing in the ongoing Syrian civil war is the latest manifestation of this broader trend in the region. The lack of systematic alternatives to democracy, combined with the “pull” generated by a strong global democratic community, has irreversibly changed the politics of the Middle East. However, the Arab Spring itself is the reflection of a larger historical process associated with “the rise of the rest.”4 By 2030, up to two billion people are anticipated to enter the global middle class.5 While individual

Introduction 3 democratic transitions will fail, in the aggregate, this will lead to a massive consolidation of democracy on a worldwide basis. Like 1989, 2011 represents an intense moment of global reflexivity or growing global consciousness about the international spread of democracy. This zeitgeist intensifies the pressures on authoritarian states, which are increasingly seen as being “on the wrong side of history.” Given this, there are two routes forward for developing countries. The first is “high-grade” authoritarianism, such as that existing in Russia or China.6 These states utilize a sophisticated blend of concessions and repression, and they understand it is critical to provide for economic growth. However, the longer-term problem these regimes face is handling their emerging middle class. Once growth slows, as is inevitable under capitalism, they will face the same legitimacy deficit that has plagued the countries affected by the Arab Spring. High-grade authoritarianism merely stores up today’s legitimacy problems for tomorrow. A second and more viable route forward for developing countries is to become emerging democracies. For this alternative, a spectrum of models exists: Brazil, India, Mexico, Indonesia, South Africa, Nigeria, and Turkey.7 What is unfolding in world politics today is what Aung San Suu Kyi aptly referred to in her 2011 BBC Reith Lectures as the developing world’s “second struggle for independence.”8 After a long and miserable experience with authoritarianism and underdevelopment, developing countries are adopting, by their own initiative, the democracy and capitalism that propelled the Western powers to ascendancy. Emerging democracies differ from the established democracies of the West in that they have a higher probability of backsliding. However, they hold broadly free and fair elections, they provide for a regular transfer of power, they adopt capitalism in some form, they are nonaggressive in their international relations, and their people enjoy a reasonable degree of domestic freedom and pluralism. They are therefore capable of becoming established democracies in the future. Emerging democracies are increasingly important in world politics. Developing and postcolonial countries will move in this direction given the structural legitimacy problems faced by authoritarian regimes. Paradoxically, however, the global spread of democracy is occurring at the juncture the West has gone into decline, as manifested by the 2008 financial crisis. Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis was therefore correct in predicting that the West had not triumphed, and that future dynamism in world politics would come from the rest.9 Yet he was wrong that this dynamism would be associated with the rejection of capitalism and democracy by the developing world. On the contrary, the rise of the

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The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West

rest is being driven by the developing world’s embrace of these historically Western institutions. The non-Western world is succeeding because it is downloading the “killer apps” of Western civilization10 What these changes herald is therefore not the “End of History” or the triumph of the West, but the beginning of a post-Western future for the global democratic project. As the democratic community expands and strengthens, divisions within it will emerge.11 One possibility is disputes between the established democracies of the West. We have seen prominent examples of this in the form of the crisis in trans-Atlantic relations over the Iraq War, and more recently in the Euro crisis. While such conflicts will be increasingly prominent, they are likely to remain nonmilitarized and to be contained within manageable levels, as was the case over the Iraq War. The global democratic “critical mass” will be sustained, and pressures for democratic socialization will continue even as divisions within the democratic community emerge. A more important axis of conflict in the international system will therefore be conflicts between the established democracies of the West and the emerging democracies in the developing world. These will occur as emerging democracies seek the material benefits and moral recognition associated with membership of the exclusive “gentleman’s club” represented by the democratic community. The most important political conflicts of the future will not be between autocracies such as Iran, Russia, and China, and democracies, as Robert Kagan has forecasted.12 Instead they will be between the established democracies of the West and the emerging democracies in the developing world. Such conflicts represent what we term “the clash of democratizations,” and will define the trajectory of the emerging international system. Sharing the spoils and status associated with membership of the democratic community will be extremely difficult for the established democracies of the West, which are used to having a near-monopoly over these benefits, and which are facing steep relative decline. The global spread of democracy actually poses greater challenges for the West than surviving the Cold War or the nineteenth century when the democratic community was weak and the autocratic community was strong. This book addresses questions about the fundamental dynamics in world politics since the end of the Cold War in light of the momentous events of 2011 and the “rise of the rest” more generally. It answers these questions with an original synthesis of Fukuyama’s “End of History” and Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” theses, both hugely influential, but

Introduction 5 regarded as antithetical. It engages with these theoretical debates in simple, nontechnical language to make the argument easily comprehensible to policy makers and, more importantly, to the global public. This is important because the book seeks not just to document but also to contribute to the global reflexivity it identifies in the form of growing global consciousness about the worldwide spread of democracy. Moreover, the book seeks to serve as a wake-up call to Western leaders and peoples, and to educate them about the enormous new challenges a post-Western democratic order will, paradoxically, bring for them. This is not a risk-averse contribution to scholarship. We do not provide a “safe bet,” or an incremental contribution to the literature. Instead, this book directly tackles the very biggest themes in world politics—namely the fundamental nature of the global order and its central long-term dynamics. These issues relate directly to the momentous events of 2011 in the Middle East and the “rise of the rest” writ large. Yet this is resolutely not a book about current affairs. Indeed, debates in political science have been far too driven by recent events, with the result that 9/11 and its aftermath distracted commentators from analyzing the persistent trend toward the spread of democracy. The Arab Spring did not come “out of the blue,” but manifested a larger global systemic pattern. Debates about the End of History, the Clash of Civilizations, the socialization of states, and the spread of democracy and human rights have been a prominent and ongoing feature of international relations since at least the end of the Cold War, and have attracted enormous attention even among policy makers and within the general public. This book engages with these classic contributions and major debates and seeks to further extend these discussions through a bold new synthesis. This book consciously “ruffles feathers,” says the unsayable and violates disciplinary taboos such as the presumption that the postcolonial world has rejected democracy and/or capitalism, or that the End of History and the Clash of Civilizations theses are irreconcilable and inherently contradictory. It will also encourage crosscutting debate between subfields within political science, and—more importantly—between the scholarly community, policy elites, and the global public, especially in the non-Western world. The book sets out a provocative but original vision of an emerging post-Western democratic order. It provides the first account of both the historic opportunities this presents for the West to realize its most cherished ideals on a global scale, and the major new inter-democratic conflicts that this order will bring in its wake.

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We also provide a forthright riposte to the pessimism that has afflicted the study of international relations in the post-9/11 and Iraq War era, particularly with respect to the prospects for democratization around the world. Debates about American dominance, the Bush Doctrine, global terrorism, Islamic extremism, and problems promoting democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan have missed the much deeper trends brought about by modernization and the “rise of the rest.” These are changes that have occurred quietly and behind the scenes while commentators were distracted by 9/11 and its aftermath, but that have had much more far-reaching consequences that have surfaced dramatically in the Middle East in 2011. We stress the colossal benefits that the global spread of capitalism and democracy brings, including to the West since these are the values and institutions that we have adopted for ourselves. We aim to shake up the field with a return to “grand theory,” and offer a radical, different, and fundamentally optimistic vision for the future of global politics. Central to this book’s argument is that a long-term time frame is important to adopt if the forces propelling change in global politics are to be effectively analyzed. This book is published with 25 years’ perspective on the events of 1989. The time frame dealt with by this book is the next twenty-five years —or a generation—in world politics. We are not interested in current or contingent events. Important and legitimate though those might be as the subject of scholarship, they do not concern us here. What does concern us is the larger systemic pattern in world politics. For example, during the civil war in the former Yugoslavia in the early to mid1990s, much attention was given to the way democratic transitions could fuel extremism. While these conflicts were managed extremely poorly by the West, eventually a modicum of stability returned to the region and the prospects for stable democratization and EU membership for the Balkans is today a reality. The Balkans case shows what Fukuyama originally argued in 1989—that democracy will often emerge as a long-term product of failed attempts at alternatives to it. One is reminded of Immanuel Kant’s eighteenth-century observation: “(w)ars, tense and unremitting military preparation, and the resultant distress which every state must eventually feel . . . are the means by which nature drives nations to . . . take the step that reason might have suggested to them even without so many sad experiences” and establish peaceful, democratic relations.13 Current skepticism about the Arab Spring is too focused on the short to medium term, without considering the options realistically facing Middle Eastern societies.14 Similarly, over the next 25 years there will be periods in which large-scale terrorist attacks on Western societies occur. That Osama

Introduction 7 Bin Laden was discovered living so close to Pakistan’s military establishment ominously raises the prospect of Al-Qaeda acquiring weapons of mass destruction. While 3,000 or so people tragically died on 9/11, the World Trade Center could have been holding tens of thousands of workers. There will also be periods, probably prolonged, where American or Western power reasserts itself and the developing world’s rise seems to be in reversal. As occurred after 9/11, this reassertion of Western military or political dominance may follow large-scale terrorist attacks. In 1998, the East Asian financial crisis seemed to end the rise of Asia for many commentators. Yet Asia has rebounded strongly.15 By examining the future over a 25-year-time horizon, we want to avoid parochial debates and issues and focus the reader’s attention on the aggregate patterns in global affairs. How will debates about the divisions between the NATO allies over the Iraq War or the Euro look another decade hence? Given the last quarter of a century in world politics, what will world politics look like in 2039, 50 years after the end of the Cold War? The book is organized into three parts and six chapters. Part I examines the global forces of democratic socialization that caused the Arab Spring. The model of democratic socialization upon which our account of world politics is predicated is first established. Chapters 2 and 3 then consider, respectively, the transnational and international forces lying behind the Arab Spring in the form of economic modernization, changes in communications technology, forces arising from the strength of the global democratic community in the states system, and regional contagion and neighborhood effects. Chapter 3 concludes by considering the prospects for democracy in the Middle East, as compared to autocracy and theocracy. Part II examines the global spread of democracy and how the Arab Spring manifested a larger pattern. Chapter 4 considers the worldwide failure of authoritarianism in places like Belarus, Venezuela, Cuba, Iran, Burma, and North Korea, as well as the future of more sophisticated or high-grade authoritarian regimes in China, Russia, and the Middle East. Chapter 5 then reflects on emerging democracies in world politics. It argues that the Arab Spring heralds a fourth wave of democratization, and that this manifests what Aung San Suu Kyi called the developing world’s “second struggle for independence.” Part III considers how, paradoxically, the global spread of democracy and capitalism is occurring while the West is in decline. Chapter 6 considers the rise of the developing world. A convergence of civilizations is taking place in which the developing world is starting to succeed by adopting the West’s own institutions of democracy and capitalism.

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Given its extraordinary natural and human resources, with the right institutions the developing world has the ability to catch up with and overtake the West in terms of their economic and political strength. Chapter 7 establishes our clash of democratizations thesis. The major global conflicts of the future will be between the established democracies of the West and the emerging democracies of the developing world, as newer democracies seek to join the democratic fraternity or establishment. The challenge for the West is to nurture and embrace a postWestern democratic future. The rest of this introduction considers two issues. Firstly, it situates the analysis of trends in world politics offered by this book in the larger literature on international relations since the end of the Cold War. It reflects in more depth upon debates about the end of history, the clash of civilizations, democratic diffusion, and the rise of the rest that this book seeks to reconcile. In doing so, we situate the distinctive arguments of our book in relation to works by others. Secondly, our methodological contribution to debates in International relations scholarship is analyzed. We position our book as a “return to grand theory” in the study of world politics, and as an attempt to reconvene interest in the sweeping conceptual visions about the future of the global order that followed the end of the Cold War for the post-Arab Spring era.

WORLD POLITICS TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER HISTORY “ENDED” It is 25 years since Francis Fukuyama famously declared the “End of History.”16 In June 1989, some five months before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Fukuyama anticipated the events that occurred later that year, and the collapse of the Soviet empire itself. His article and subsequent book has become one of the most widely cited in post-Cold War political science. With the end of the Cold War, liberalism defeated its twentiethcentury ideological competitors, fascism and communism. All that was necessary was for democracy and capitalism to spread on a global scale and be universalized. The century that began full of self-confidence in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: not to an “end of ideology” or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, as earlier predicted, but to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism.17

Introduction 9 What the end of the Cold War represented was not merely the end of the particular period of post-War history, but the end of humankind’s ideological evolution. While this process was incomplete in the empirical world, liberalism had won in the realm of ideas. The historical competition between ideologies had ended. Fukuyama recognized that he was not the first to declare history was over. He was influenced heavily by the turn of the nineteenth-century German philosopher Georg Freidrich Hegel. Hegel had argued that history was driven by the resolution of contradictions. These contradictions exist in the realm of ideas and human consciousness. This contrasts with Marx’s view of the “historical dialectic,” which gave priority to material forces (especially capitalism) in driving historical progress. Drawing on Alexandre Kojeve’s interpretation of Hegel, Fukuyama noted that Hegel had become known primarily as a precursor to Marx’s thinking, whereas he was an important thinker in his own right. In the Phenomenology of the Mind, Hegel declared history had ended in 1806 after the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon at the Battle of Jena.18 Prussia’s defeat at Jena represented to Hegel a victory of the ideals of the French Revolution over the aristocratic monarchies of the day. Fukuyama applied Hegel’s ideas to interpreting the failure of Soviet communism in Eastern Europe. Liberal democracy had won out over its ideological rivals because it was free of the contradictions that troubled its competitors. Only the liberal democratic capitalist state was capable of fulfilling human needs and aspirations. Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis was widely heralded as indicating a belief in the triumph of the West in world politics. However, the bulk of his empirical analysis focused on the spread of democracy to non-Western countries, beginning with Japan after 1945, and spreading to South Korea and elsewhere, including possibly to China. Writing before the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and 9/11, he discussed the way neither virulent nationalism nor religious fundamentalism provides a systematic alternative to capitalist liberal democracy. Nationalism stands only for a negative desire for independence, and as such remains compatible in its moderate forms with the liberal democratic state. More extreme forms of nationalism will face a dilemma or a “fork in the road”—either pursue the Western path toward economic and political freedom and openness, or be outperformed by democratic societies.19 Equally, the resurgence of religious fundamentalism cannot have universal significance because it does not present a viable long-term alternative to liberalism as a way of organizing society. Fundamentalist movements may make it harder for liberal democracy to spread, but they will not stop the march to modernity.

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Decades later, and despite voluminous criticisms of his argument, and intervening developments such as the 9/11 attacks and the 2008 financial crisis, Fukuyama adheres to his argument. He observed 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall: [t]he basic point that liberal democracy is still the final form of government is still . . . right. Obviously there are alternatives like the Islamic Republic of Iran or Chinese authoritarianism. But I don’t think that many people are persuaded that these are civilizations that provide their citizens with a higher level of prosperity and personal freedom.20

That Fukuyama has stuck to his position for so long draws attention to an important feature of his argument. Fukuyama was certainly not, as many of his critics unfairly accused him of saying, claiming that democracy was going to spread through the international system overnight. Instead, it was a claim about the aggregate evolution of the international system. Fukuyama’s analysis allows for the possibility that some and indeed many democratic transitions will fail, and that liberal democracy will face challenges from capitalist autocracies, religious fundamentalism, and extreme nationalism.21 However, Fukuyama’s claim was not that these problems will vanish. Instead he held that they can impede but cannot stop the gradual spread of capitalism and democracy. The emphasis here is on the long term. In the short run there will be setbacks and backsliding. However, the systemic trend will be toward the consolidation of liberal democracy. Far from raising fundamentally new issues for the study of world politics, the Arab Spring has therefore reopened debates about global democratization that have been taking place for two decades. Fukuyama’s thesis was controversial, and was criticized from every conceivable angle. However, Fukuyama’s critics have almost universally asserted that his basic argument was flawed. Indeed, it has become an intellectual taboo to argue otherwise, not least because his analysis was seen as reflecting post-Cold War Western triumphalism. We invite controversy by turning this approach on its head, arguing that Fukuyama’s account of historical development is correct, a testimony to the enduring power and originality of Hegel’s political philosophy. A process of historical evolution and cultural change is taking place in world politics through which liberal democracy is spreading on a global scale. Nevertheless, Fukuyama’s account of history lacks theoretical precision and would benefit from conceptual elaboration. Such an approach to criticizing Fukuyama accepts but refines his rather woolly Hegelian

Introduction 11 argument. In particular, it is necessary to flesh out the holistic properties of Fukuyama’s theory and the various mechanisms through which positive feedback cycles operate to lock in the global spread of democracy and capitalism. We do this by drawing on research about democratic socialization which has been published in the period since Fukuyama’s end of history thesis.22 Interestingly, this literature has been inspired by Immanuel Kant. Kant was, of course, Hegel’s intellectual precursor. Fukuyama credits Kant as a key influence on Hegel’s thinking.23 Unsurprisingly, therefore, this literature remains compatible with the thrust of Fukuyama’s Hegelian analysis. The utility of resurrecting Fukuyama’s thesis to explain contemporary global political change is apparent when considering the most influential accounts of the Arab Spring. Robin Wright’s Rock the Casbah was the first definitive analysis of the Arab Spring, arguing that the revolutions represent a democratic “counter-jihad” that is taking hold across the Islamic world.24 Wright offers a fascinating account of the modernizing influences that have swept the Middle East since 9/11, marginalizing Al-Qaeda and laying the cultural, social, economic, and political foundations for the upheavals of 2011. However, the book does not discuss Fukuyama’s thesis, even though the analysis underscores the relevance of its assessment of how modernization affects societies over time. Similarly, Vali Nasr’s brilliant The Rise of Islamic Capitalism has been widely acknowledged to have anticipated the events of 2011.25 Nasr similarly traces how economic modernization has generated social changes centered on the rise of an indigenous middle class across the Middle East. As capitalism is taking hold, civil societies are developing and corroding the foundations and legitimacy of authoritarian rule across the region. As with Wright’s book, Nasr’s argument about social and economic modernization in the Arab world is compatible with the thrust of Fukuyama’s argument. Yet Fukuyama’s end of history thesis is mentioned only once, and then in passing.26 We fill these gaps in accounts of the Arab Spring, link discussions of the Arab revolutions up to arguments about global rather than just Middle Eastern democratization, and establish how the Arab Spring is part of a more general process of historical evolution. Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, Fukuyama’s end of history thesis is more important and relevant than when it was first published. Contrary to those who have assumed that the end of history debate is now dated and passé, it must be recognized as a classic and enduring contribution. Fukuyama himself has been cautious about the Arab Spring, wisely emphasizing the problems that the lack of a well-developed pluralistic

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civil society will pose for countries experiencing democratic transitions.27 However, the logic of Fukuyama’s arguments about the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 is equally applicable to the causes of the Arab Spring in 2011. Just as 1989 reflected the systematic failure of communism in Eastern Europe, so 2011 reflects the systematic failure of authoritarianism across the Middle East. The interesting question, therefore, is how the situation will evolve as the paucity of alternatives to capitalism and democracy becomes increasingly apparent. Moreover, Fukuyama has remained adamant that the real question for global politics will be the future of China, which will face severe obstacles in resisting democratization in the longer term.28 Therefore, Fukuyama’s assessment of global politics today is compatible with the account of the trajectory of global democratic socialization that we put forward. However, it is necessary to refine Fukuyama’s account of democratic diffusion, and build on it by synthesizing it with Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis and debates about the rise of the developing world. Interestingly, Fukuyama’s writings about the Arab Spring and China’s future have been developed separately from his most recent work, The Origins of Political Order, which perhaps unfortunately for our project was written prior to the events of the Arab Spring.29 The focus of Fukuyama’s most recent book is the era before the French Revolution. Nevertheless, it is intended as the first in a two-volume series, and it will be interesting to see how Fukuyama develops his analysis in application to the era after 1789, in light of the 2011 revolutions. It is also important to link Fukuyama’s analysis of the global spread of democracy to debates in international relations and comparative politics. In international relations, debates about the so-called “democratic peace” or the absence of conflict between democracies have become a cottage industry.30 However, these debates have generally not considered that the spread of democracy could become the dominant tendency in the international system.31 Similarly, there have been debates about international socialization, the spread of cultural norms, and the international diffusion of human rights.32 However, these have been tangential to debates about the democratic peace and the spread of democracy in world politics.33 Within comparative and international politics, discussions of waves of democratization have highlighted the role of international factors in causing this trend.34 However, the connection between the growing importance of the external factors driving democratization and the emergence of a strong global democratic community since the end of the Cold War has not been properly investigated.35

Introduction 13 Similarly, modernization theory, which posits a connection between economic development and democratization, has been strangely neglected. This has been so despite calls after the end of the Cold War for its revival and the manifest spread of modernization to the developing world over the last two decades.36 Analyses of modernization that do exist have been at arm’s length from debates about the end of history, the study of the democratic peace in IR, and democratization in comparative politics.37 What is required is a general theory of democratization in world politics that systematically links both domestic and international levels of analysis, and focuses on how these two levels interact. Kenneth Waltz argued that a theory focusing on domestic and international interactions would be desirable, but it does not exist.38 We seek to fill this theoretical gap and get scholars of the democratic peace and norm diffusion talking with their counterparts in comparative politics.39 Equally, debates about the End of History in IR and about democracy and democratization in comparative politics would benefit from greater interchange with political philosophy. The relevance of the classical liberal philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is only growing. The writings of Kant, Hegel, Hume, Smith, Tocqueville, and Mill powerfully anticipate key themes in world politics at the start of the twenty-first century, as democracy and capitalism take root globally. The importance and utility of these theoretical statements are emphasized throughout this book, but an entire research agenda awaits for political theory. Changes that the West experienced in previous eras are now occurring across the developing world. As a result, millions and billions of people are being lifted out of poverty and are acquiring a taste of—and for—liberty. Similarly, the importance of John Rawls’ The Law of Peoples has been massively underappreciated.40 Rawls’ book has been widely criticized within political philosophy and largely ignored by empirical researchers. Our view, in contrast, is that Rawls’ analysis offers perhaps the most important statement of democratic peace theory since Kant’s original eighteenth-century formulation.41 Our analysis of emerging democracies in world politics is deeply indebted to Rawls’ discussion of “decent hierarchical societies,” and we benefit from his extension of the social contract tradition to examine the dynamic expansion of the community of democratic peoples.42 The unfortunate tendency of political science to place an artificial divide between empirical and moral theory is leading to lost opportunities for cross-fertilization among its subfields. At the same time, Rawls fails to engage with debates about the end of history. This is a weakness in his framework, especially since Fukuyama’s book was essentially a work of political philosophy.

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A final set of relevant debates has been discussions of globalization, which again have been a feature of international relations since the end of the Cold War.43 Two key themes emerged from this scholarship, each of which is strongly compatible with Fukuyama’s arguments about the effects of modernization. First, globalization increases the importance of nonstate actors relative to states. This does not lead to a demise of states and the states system, but does powerfully shape the context within which states exercise their authority. Thus the revolutions of 2011, like those of 1989, have shown how weak autocratic states can be in the face of vocal civil societies and transnational networks. Second, accounts of globalization emphasize the decline in the utility of violence. Far more effective as a political tool is protest and persuasion. In order to achieve political goals effectively, actors increasingly have to be perceived as legitimate.44 These discussions were influenced by the Velvet Revolutions of 1989, but resurfaced in 2011. Demonstrations in Tahrir Square achieved more in two weeks than Al-Qaeda’s violent tactics did in two decades. Overall, the end of history thesis intersects with a raft of important points of reference in the post-Cold War literature on world politics, yet these are not being exploited to the extent that they should be. Writing in the pessimistic era of the early 1990s that followed Yugoslavia’s descent into civil war, Huntington offered a riposte to Fukuyama’s vision with his famous “Clash of Civilizations” thesis.45 Huntington stood Fukuyama’s argument on its head, arguing that fragmentation rather than integration was the dominant cultural trend. In contrast to the territorial conflicts that had characterized the Cold War, future conflicts would be over fundamental values and beliefs. Dividing the world into “civilizational blocs” or cultural groupings based on religious affinity, Huntington held that the key conflicts of the future in world politics would arise between the West and Islam and the West and Confucian civilization (i.e., greater China). Far from triumphing as Fukuyama’s vision appeared to imply, the West was in decline and was being challenged by non-Western civilizations. As controversial as Fukuyama’s thesis, Huntington’s analysis gained salience to some after the September 2001 attacks. The “Arab Winter” that followed attacks on the US consulate in Benghazi in September 2012 was equally heralded as vindicating Huntington’s pessimism. While both Fukuyama and Huntington emphasized the primacy of culture as a force for change in world politics, there were major differences between their two theses.46 Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s ideas are generally viewed as polar opposites and mutually exclusive. We challenge this tacit consensus. Instead, we synthesize the two approaches and show that

Introduction 15 they should be recognized as complements. Fukuyama was correct that democracy is becoming universalized because of the ideological advantages and coherence offered by liberalism. However, Huntington was also correct about potential clashes because democracy is spreading globally at the very moment that the West has gone into decline. Thus it is possible that both the end of history and clash of civilizations theses simultaneously captured vital trends and that both are useful. What the world is experiencing is not an end of history, the triumph of the West, or a clash of civilizations, but the beginning of a post-Western democratic global order. Recent critiques of the clash of civilizations thesis have emphasized the tolerance and pluralism that exists within and between civilizations, and demonstrated that Huntington was wrong to presuppose that civilizational conflicts would be violently confrontational.47 While such contributions draw attention to a key weakness of Huntington’s framework, we focus on Huntington’s positive contribution, namely his prescience in describing the rise of the developing world. Here, Huntington operated within a larger tradition. It is 30 years since the publication of Hedley Bull and Adam Watson’s The Expansion of International Society.48 This classic study was the first to take seriously the rise of the rest in world politics. While remaining influential, it has languished on the margins of debates. Our book seeks to restore Bull and Watson’s seminal contribution to its rightful place at the center of debates about world politics. We update and extend Bull and Watson’s analysis, and introduce into their framework a discussion of how international society is adapting itself to the rise of a strong global democratic community. More recently, Fareed Zakaria has offered a wide-ranging assessment of the rise of the developing world.49 His influential book coined the terms “the rise of the rest” and “post-American world,” which our notion of a post-Western order adapts. However, Zakaria is ambiguous about whether the rise of the rest will facilitate the global spread of democracy. We are more unequivocal. The rise of the rest will produce a secular trend toward the global spread of democracy. However, distinctive inter-democratic conflicts will be associated with the politics of global democratization. Published around the same time as Zakaria’s book, an equally important analysis of the rise of the developing world is Kishore Mahbubani’s The New Asian Hemisphere.50 We agree wholeheartedly with Mahbubani’s optimism about a post-Western world, and with his view that the real challenges in the emerging global order are for the West rather than for the rest (as commentators in the West often wrongly assume). However, following

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Zakaria, we emphasize that the rise of Asia is part of the broader and genuinely global trend toward the rise of developing countries. Moreover, we disagree with Mahbubani that the authoritarian Chinese model is the wave of the future, and that economic modernization need not necessarily produce democratization in the long term. Contrary to Mahbubani who writes in the postcolonialist tradition, the defining feature of world politics today is precisely that the developing world is buying systematically into not only capitalism, but also democracy. However, we hope that the strong influence of Mahbubani’s work and our profound indebtedness toward his argument is evident. A further important analysis of the rise of the rest has been provided by the acclaimed Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill, whose team coined designations for the BRICs and Next-11, and produced the report predicting the massive expansion of the global middle class by 2030.51 O’Neill’s The Growth Map fleshes out these trends and contains a powerful analysis of the need to reform the world’s major international organizations given the geopolitical changes that this will inevitably bring.52 O’Neill’s pioneering work has made the rise of the developing world broadly appreciated. However, O’Neill is an economist and his work focuses on the adoption of capitalism by the developing world. It is weaker about what the implications of these economic changes for the spread of democracy. O’Neill has challenged powerfully what he terms the “lazy consensus” that exists in the West around the idea that developing countries cannot modernize and catch up with the West.53 We seek to do what O’Neill and his colleagues have done for the study of economics and development for the study of politics and democratization. Developing countries can and are adopting democracy in a wholesale fashion. The question for the West is not can developing countries succeed in this, but how will the West adapt to this new world. Robert Kaplan is a major commentator who has recognized the increasing importance of the developing world. Moreover, his emphasis on this trend was explicitly influenced by Huntington’s work. Monsoon explores how the Indian Ocean region is becoming the locus of twentyfirst-century geopolitics.54 The rise of countries like India, Pakistan, China, Indonesia, Burma, Oman, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Tanzania represents a key global shift. More recently, his Revenge of Geography self-consciously responds to the end of history and clash of civilizations debate.55 Kaplan shows how geography becomes more not less important in a globalizing world. A major theme in Kaplan’s analysis is economic, social, and political spillover, and how spillover is shaped by physical

Introduction 17 geography. The Arab Spring was triggered in North Africa partly because of its proximity to Western Europe. Turkey and Iran have huge economic growth and potential because of their geographic location between Europe and Asia. Eastern European development is gradually encroaching into Russia’s sphere of influence and Central Asia. China’s economic development is pulling up Southeast Asia and influencing Central Asia. In future, Burma’s location between India and China could make it a major center for economic dynamism, especially given its natural resources. Kaplan also emphasizes aspects of human geography. Demographic change, urbanization, overpopulation, and resource scarcities will play a major role in the geopolitics of the future. Here Kaplan picks up on themes also emphasized by O’Neill and Paul Kennedy.56 The emphasis placed by Kaplan, O’Neill, and Kennedy on the importance of geography and demography has provided a key point of departure for our study. In addition to analyses of the rise of the rest, there have been studies of the decline of the West. Niall Fergusson discusses this subject from a historical perspective.57 His fascinating study has been very influential, and Ferguson has picked up the theme of the decline of the West again in his 2012 BBC Reith Lectures.58 Ferguson’s work has made a strong impression on our analysis. However, in the tradition of Spengler,59 Ferguson is pessimistic about the decline of the West. By contrast, we celebrate the decline of the West. We see this process as the natural product of modernization coming to fruition, and the adoption of democracy and capitalism by the non-Western world as representing the West’s Cold War dream come true. Rather than bemoaning and seeking to reverse Western decline, which in any case is inevitable, the West must embrace the post-Western democratic order which is emerging as the fulfillment of its ideals and aspirations for world politics. Discussions of the rise of the rest and the decline of the West have produced other more pessimistic assessments about the future of the global order.60 Of these, Charles Kupchan’s recent No-One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn stands out.61 Kupchan envisages a world of “multiple modernities” in which Western values no longer prevail. America and Europe are in decline and face growing international difficulties and internal divisions. However, the rest have not displaced the West. The result is an uneasy equilibrium between competing values and interests in a fluid multipolar system. A related perspective is Benjamin Barber’s Jihad versus McWorld argument.62 “McWorld” is the world of the global capitalist marketplace pushing for integration and cultural homogenization. This is symbolized by McDonald’s, Disneyland, and iPads.

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“Jihad” is the world of tribes, of ethnic nationalism, and religious fundamentalism unleashed on Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, and Rwanda. Barber holds that what appear as opposites not only coexist but are caused by one another. The unregulated forces of global capitalism encourage a reaction that takes the form of violent balkanization. Yet the 2013 Boston Marathon bombers wore baseball caps, while fundamentalists rely on the Internet to plot virtual conspiracies.63 Neither force wins out, producing a cycle of moral decline and violence. Like ours, the books by Kupchan and Barber synthesize the end of history and clash of civilizations theses. However, our synthesis differs from theirs. We accept that cultural integration and cultural fragmentation coexist. However, there is not an uneasy equilibrium between them, nor do they produce endless creative destruction. Instead, there is a powerful progression toward cultural integration. Forces pushing toward fragmentation are not as severe as they are sometimes perceived or portrayed. Movements described as tribal or fundamentalist are often actually motivated by specific political interests, and reflect short-term social and economic circumstances.64 While globalization can be associated with the rise of fundamentalism, the forces of cultural integration are winning out because extremist policies do not present sustainable or viable alternatives to pluralism and democracy.65 Moreover, the problem the world faces is not that the developing world resists converging around democracy and capitalism. The problem for the West is that the developing world is starting to beat the West at its own capitalist and democratic game. Hence the most important conflicts in the future will not be due to opposing values or political or economic institutions. Instead they will be conflicts between the new and old capitalist liberal democracies—a clash of democratizations. Our new synthesis is the basis for also disagreeing with Robert Kagan.66 Kagan predicts that the key conflicts of the twenty-first century will be between the democratic community and the autocratic community, with the West confronting capitalist autocracies like China and Russia and theocracies in the Middle East. In a world where the democratic community is strong but the autocratic community is weak, the autocratic community has incentives to band together. However, the very strength of the democratic community creates incentives for divisions and disunity within it.67 Moreover, the autocratic community will remain relatively weak compared to the democratic community, characterized by mistrust and divisions, and autocracies are internally fragile because of their growing legitimacy crisis. The real challenge for the West will not be dealing with the autocratic

Introduction 19 community as was the case during the Cold War and the nineteenth century. It will be dealing with emerging democracies in the developing world. Paradoxically, “the world the West made” will be both capitalist and democratic, but the West will not dominate it.68 The challenge for the West is accepting and embracing this historic shift within the democratic community, and making the psychological and material adjustments that accompany loss of primacy. These problems facing the democratic community have not gone unnoticed. Two of the most influential commentators on the nature of the liberal international order, Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, argued that the democratic community has socialized and accommodated new members because of the inclusive nature of its international institutions, webs of global interdependence created by capitalism, and the domestic and foreign policy advantages of democratic systems of government.69 However, in an important new Council on Foreign Relations paper, they have recognized that the global success of the American and Western democratic projects has become a problem for the democratic community.70 Previously “the obstacles to the universal realization of the liberal vision were almost insurmountable and located outside the democratic world. Today, the realization of the worldwide triumph of the liberal vision is within reach and the obstacles are located primarily within the democratic world.” 71 Our analysis seeks to complement and extend the line of inquiry that Deudney and Ikenberry have initiated. We agree that the toughest foreign policy challenges for the West will lie in embracing the rise of emerging democracies in the developing world. However, we make both a theoretical and empirical contribution to this research agenda. Theoretically, we explicitly attempt a reconciliation of the end of history and clash of civilizations theses. Our notion of a “clash of democratizations” not only provides a convenient label for the issues that Deudney and Ikenberry identify, but also neatly captures the grand synthesis of influential post-Cold War theories of world order that we offer. Secondly, at an empirical level, we analyze some of the reforms that will become increasingly salient for established democracies to make. From overhauling the UN Security Council, to agricultural trade liberalization in the WTO, and from immigration to dealing with climate change, we illustrate how the global success of democracy and capitalism will paradoxicallyraise the biggest and most vexing historical challenges the West has ever faced. While it will certainly not be without problems, especially for the West, the emerging global order is bursting with opportunities for human progress. The global spread of democracy and capitalism represents the

20 The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West West’s Cold War dream becoming reality. In his recent book The Great Convergence, Kishore Mahbubani points out that an incredible feature of world politics today is the improvement in the human condition happening globally.72 The world has experienced greater change in the last 30 years than it did in the previous three hundred. Global poverty is disappearing. The global middle class is booming. Interstate wars have become a sunset industry.73 Never has so large a percentage of the world’s population been as well educated and well traveled. The world is becoming more integrated and interconnected, and the potential for a single peaceful new global civilization exists today. Like Mahbubani, we want our book to leave the reader “drowning in optimism.” The rise of the developing world presents a victory of the West’s best ideals and its positive vision for global order. The world is finally—and genuinely—at the cusp of achieving that vision for the majority of humanity. The spread of democracy and capitalism will not lead to a condition of “boredom” as Fukuyama speculated at the end of his famous article, but instead to a flowering of human civilization on a scale never before witnessed. The opportunities for the expansion of global peace, prosperity, cooperation, and ultimately human freedom itself are literally unprecedented. Moreover, to reach this goal all the West has to do is remain true to its own democratic ideals, values, interests, and fundamental institutions. It is profoundly ironic that doing so may prove to be the West’s greatest ever historical challenge.

A RETURN TO GRAND THEORY IN THE STUDY OF WORLD POLITICS This book is intended as a return to grand theory. It seeks to reconvene interest in the sweeping visions of global order that followed the end of the Cold War. Recent scholarship has bemoaned the decline of theory in IR and lamented the paucity of works of grand theory that establish themselves as classic points of reference.74 We respond to these discussions in this final section. Rather than complain about the lack of major theoretical works, we offer a positive new theoretical statement that builds on classic contributions of the past to offer a provocative new synthesis. Like the end of the Cold War, the Arab Spring has provided a historic window of opportunity to reflect in a wholesale fashion on the changes in world politics of the last 25 years. Moreover, actually doing grand IR theory is the ultimate retort to those who claim that IR theory is in decline. Finally, offering a new grand theory of international relations does not contradict

Introduction 21 or undermine empirical analyses of world politics. Indeed, offering a plausible new theoretical vision is precisely what is required to revitalize empirical and historical debates. In a controversial Harvard Kennedy School working paper, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have criticized the decline of IR theory and its replacement by the testing of hypotheses.75 They note that virtually all of the classic books in the study of international relations, such as Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations, Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics, Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical Society, Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony, and Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics, are theoretical statements.76 Moreover, a body of grand theories that constitute the field’s major paradigms such as realism and liberalism have shaped the study of international politics. Yet, paradoxically, the attention that scholars of international relations give to theory, especially in the United States, is declining and this trend is likely to continue. Instead, they insist that there has been a triumph of methods over theory, and that contemporary debates focus on “the relative merits of quantitative versus qualitative approaches or on elaborating new methodological techniques.”77 This has resulted in a decline in the quality of the research and knowledge produced by the discipline. Substantive inquiry into world politics has become obsessed with “dreary hypothesis testing.”78 Mearsheimer and Walt further hold that simplistic hypothesis testing is receiving undue emphasis in the field not for any intellectually defensible reason, but because of “academia’s incentive structure.” 79 First, new theories, especially new grand theories, are hard to generate and emerge only rarely. Hence more routine research focuses on testing hypotheses and middle-range theory.80 Second, the increasing availability of quantitative data and computer technology means that hypothesis testing is easier, quicker, and simpler to do than developing new theories. Third, theory involves creativity, which is hard to teach graduate students, in contrast to modest mathematical abilities.81 Competitive pressures on graduate students and political science departments also incentivize them to test hypotheses rather than seek a flash of theoretical inspiration “that may never occur.”82 Finally, hypothesis testing provides the most risk-averse path to tenure and promotion for political scientists because it is easier to produce a high volume of publications from data sets relatively quickly.83 Overall, a powerful array of structural incentives within academia is working to discourage theoretical inquiry in IR, replacing it with a focus on testing narrow empirical hypotheses, and

22 The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West leading increasingly to only incremental contributions. Mearsheimer and Walt conclude pessimistically that not much, if anything, can be done to reverse this trend.84 We agree with Walt and Mearsheimer that theory has a special position of importance within IR. However, we disagree with their pessimism about the state and future trajectory of inquiry for three reasons. First, there have never been more works of grand theory than in recent decades. By larger historical standards, IR theory in general and grand theory in particular has not been in better shape. As Duncan Snidal and Alexander Wendt have observed, there has been more international theory in the last four decades than in the preceding four centuries.85 Second, the profession is too large and diverse for any single structure or set of incentives to stop new ideas from emerging. The size and diversity of the community of IR scholars provides opportunities for original thinking. Third, Mearsheimer and Walt underestimate the importance of individual freedom and creativity in generating fresh insights and perspectives. Someone, somewhere, will always come up with a new idea. Generating grand theory is certainly not a mechanistic process and depends ultimately on human imagination. However, while it is difficult, it is also a natural, intrinsic, and ultimately unavoidable part of scholarship. Sooner or later, the right question will be stumbled across, and a genuinely new line of theoretical inquiry has the potential to be explosive. Mearsheimer and Walt themselves note that “external events” and unexpected global changes might spur new theoretical thinking, as might the fact that scholars in the field are “free agents.”86 However, they conclude that these things are unlikely to be enough to produce a fundamental change in the declining status of theory. We argue to the contrary that big new ideas are not only likely but inevitable over time, whatever the disciplinary incentives. This is exactly what happened after the end of the Cold War, with Fukuyama’s end of history and Huntington’s clash of civilizations theses. There is absolutely no reason to suppose that these bold theoretical conceptualizations are not possible today, and the Arab Spring has reignited interest in the same fundamental questions that triggered such classic contributions. The study of IR is essentially and irredeemably theoretical, and this truth cannot—and will not—be hidden for long. This is why all the enduring contributions to IR since Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War have been deeply theoretical. A return to grand theory will also reinvigorate substantive and empirical debates. Mearsheimer and Walt’s argument might be read as postulating a zero sum competition between theory and testing. Regardless of Mearsheimer and Walt’s own position, our view is that good theory

Introduction 23 complements and stimulates vigorous empirical and historical discussion. Following Huntington, our book does not seek to directly test hypotheses, but instead opens up a research agenda.87 However, our argument is highly amenable to social scientific scrutiny, especially using quantitative methods. While a huge literature has emerged on relations between pairs of democratic states, there has been much less literature exploring how the effects of democracy on international relations vary with the changing strength of the democratic community.88 Yet this newer systemic literature builds logically and cumulatively from earlier empirical research on pairs of democratic states.89 Moreover, analyzing the systemic impact of democracy has already produced a series of important studies using quantitative techniques.90 Equally, we draw on qualitative and nonpositivist insights into the role that democracy plays to emphasize the role of cultural norms, socialization, and perceptions in the systemic diffusion of democracy. We have previously argued that these different methodological insights can complement and learn from one another.91 Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the growing tendency of scholars to emphasize testing over theory is due in part to the influence of analyses of the democratic peace. This has produced a cottage industry of large-scale statistical analyses about empirical correlations between democracy and various aspects of state behavior.92 Yet we see this as an asset of the democratic peace research program. The consistency between philosophical predictions made hundreds of years ago and empirical patterns of behavior between democratic states today attests to the power of both theory and empirical hypothesis testing in this literature. However, we think that research into the democratic peace would have the potential to make more than merely incremental impact if it asked basic questions about the properties of the international system. Doing so would open up larger issues which have not received sufficient attention, but have the ability to produce a whole “second generation” of democratic peace inquiry.93 In one of his earliest articles, Kenneth Waltz observed that “[i]f we look at the world and see discrete events, we are overwhelmed by chaos, each event without cause and all events without meaning. But if we look at the aggregate of events with a proper organizing principle in our minds, we may see in the chaos, order; in the welter of events, a plan of nature.”94 Waltz was discussing Immanuel Kant’s contribution to thinking about world politics, and this vein of inquiry led Waltz to produce one of the most influential statements of IR theory ever. Waltz showed through his own work the potency and power of good theory.95 Mearsheimer and Walt echo Waltz when they write that a “single article that advances a new theory or makes sense of a body of disparate findings will be more valuable than

24

The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West

dozens of empirical studies with short shelf-lives.”96 Waltz’s own systemic analysis strongly reflected the bipolar Cold War global order associated with the late 1970s when he was writing. The democratic community was weak, and democracies remained in a minority in the international system. Today, we need a Theory of International Politics for our times. Sadly for the profession, Kenneth Waltz died in May 2013. The field is crying out for a sweeping new conceptualization of the global order to make sense of the Arab Spring and locates it within larger trends. What thinkers such as Fukuyama and Huntington did to fill the vacuum of ideas after 1989 can and must be done in the wake of the momentous developments of 2011. Twenty-five years after the Cold War ended, it is high time to think big about global order. Indeed, given the colossal changes that have taken place over the last generation, it is necessary to think even bigger and bolder than ever. International relations and political science more generally today needs to stand on the shoulders of its giants and offer radical new ways of thinking about world politics. This is a tall order, but doing so promises the richest of rewards, not least of which is the prospect of contributing to the realization of the West’s own aspirations for the enrichment of the human race. As Lucian Pye observed in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 1989, “events in the world have presented us with a great challenge and we are the discipline with a responsibility to enlighten the world about the current crisis of authoritarianism.”97 Similarly, international relations today has the potential to fulfill the architectonic destiny that Kant perceived for it in the eighteenth century.98 Thinking big about twenty-first-century global politics is precisely what we set out to do. Notwithstanding current debates about the decline of theory, our guiding philosophy has been to “just do it.” Grand theory is out there. The task is to find it. This is a difficult and creative process. Yet the response should not be pessimism about the prospects for theory, but the definition of a challenge. We have put forward a bold new synthesis and a positive new theoretical statement, rather than criticizing the current state of the field or expressing a hollow optimism about the possibility of grand theory. We present our work as a gauntlet being thrown down to the field, and more generally to the Western world. Political science and the West as a whole need to stop asking the familiar and easy questions it has been asking, and start to ask itself the really difficult ones that it has not been asking. Our aim in this book is to grab a large theoretical stick, rattle it vigorously around in the intellectual hornets’ nest for a good long while, and see if anything happens.

Part I

The Arab Spring and Global Democratization Did you really imagine that the thousands of years that make up Egypt’s past could have vanished without a trace, as if in a dream? —Tawfiq al-Hakim, Egyptian novelist, quoted by Michael Wood Legacy: A Search for The Origins of Civilization, Program 2—“Egypt: The Habit of Civilization”1

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2. The Arab Spring and Democratic Socialization: Transnational Influences

T

he Arab Spring was not a unique historical event to be understood in relation to circumstances within individual countries or the Middle East. Instead, it reflects a larger systemic trend. The fundamental dynamic in the international system is a process of socialization through which democracy is spreading worldwide. This process of socialization has been taking place since the American and French revolutions, and it is far from new. With the end of the Cold War, however, the pace and intensity of global democratization has accelerated. What began with a small cluster of states in the West has now become a globally salient force. Before 2011, the Middle East remained the only region of the world unaffected by the spread of democracy. The Arab Spring demonstrated that this is no longer the case. The revolutions of 2011 are the most recent manifestation of a global pattern through which authoritarian systems are being delegitimized. To understand the Arab Spring, it is necessary to situate it within this general trend. The model of global democratic socialization upon which the account of the Arab Spring is predicated is first established. The causes of the Arab Spring are then analyzed in relation to the forces postulated. Democracy has begun to “spill over” within the international system through a global process of socialization. Pressures for democratic socialization are gathering momentum through positive feedback. Two key transnational mechanisms for democratic socialization are identified, both of which are related to the intensification of globalization generated by the presence of a strong community of capitalist and democratic states. The first is economic modernization and the changes this process has triggered across the Middle East. The second concerns changes in communications technology, which undermined the legitimacy of the Arab dictatorships and facilitated protests.

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The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West

DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIZATION IN WORLD POLITICS

Proportion of Countries that are Democratic

The Arab Spring reflects global forces. The fundamental dynamic in the international system is a process of socialization through which democracy is spreading. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a critical mass of democracies came to dominate world politics. After the tipping threshold represented by the end of the Cold War, democracy began to “spill over” through the international system due to socialization pressures generated by the democratic community.2 In turn, democratization generates a virtuous cycle in which the spread of democracy gathers momentum. A condition emerges in which growing consciousness of the global spread of democracy becomes self-reinforcing. Emphasizing the external or systemic causes of the Arab Spring differs from traditional approaches in which democratization is viewed as the outcome of domestic processes. The process of democratic socialization remained gradual until recently. After World War II, democracies remained in a minority and the democratic community and the autocratic community were of relatively equal strength.3 This changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union (Figure 2.1). One commentator suggests that the end of the Cold War be viewed as an “exogenous shock” to the international system, analogous to a meteor strike in paleontology.4 However, like the Arab Spring, the collapse of .5

.4

.3

.2

.1

0 1815

1840

1865

1890

1915

1940

1965

1990

Year

Figure 2.1 Proportion of democratic states in the international system.8

2010

The Arab Spring and Transnational Socialization

29

the Soviet Union reflected a long, slow process through which authoritarian political models were selected out as successful actors. The Soviet system could not keep pace with the more flexible societies of the West.5 Moreover, the end of the Cold War may be viewed as a turning point for the global spread of democracy. After 1989, a critical mass of democracies came to dominate world politics. A strong global and regional network of democracies encourages the spread of democracy.6 Thus after the tipping threshold represented by the end of the Cold War was reached, democracy began to “spill over” because of socialization pressures generated by the democratic community.7 Before this point, socialization effects generated by the democratic community remained weak and localized. After it, pressures for democratization increased rapidly and become global. The tipping threshold occurring at the end of the Cold War manifested a global third wave of democratization.9 This followed two earlier waves of democratization.10 The first wave was a long slow wave running through the nineteenth century until 1926, followed by the reverse wave associated with the depression era. The second wave ran from 1943 to 1962, and was associated with allied victory in World War II. It was followed by a second reverse in the postcolonial world in the 1960s and the 1970s. The third wave was the most intense, affecting over 60 countries. It began in 1974 with Portugal’s democratic transition, and peaked in 1989 with the revolutions in Eastern Europe. One way to account for these growing waves is to see them as reflecting the way democratic socialization which is gathering momentum.11 When the democratic community is strong, this entrenched cluster of democratic regimes generates effects worth more than its parts. Emphasizing the external causes of democratization differs from traditional approaches which view it as the outcome of domestic factors.12 Initial studies of democratization focused on individual countries, with the result that the particularities of these cases received emphasis.13 Collectively these studies identified a variety of factors associated with democratic transitions. These included factors such as wealth, equality, a strong middle class, literacy and education, Protestantism, the development of a civil society, the end of civil conflict or colonial rule, and the nature of political elites and institutions.14 From this research, it was concluded that democracy in each country is the product of a combination of different causes, and that the combination of causes producing democracy varies.15 However, domestic explanations became problematic as the number of democratic transitions proliferated, and as waves of transitions were identified. The clustering of democratic transitions indicated that common causes were affecting many countries, or they were occurring in parallel, or they reflected the impact

30 The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West of earlier transitions.16 Thus more recent scholarship highlights common external rather than internal factors to explain democratization.17 A strong democratic community places pressures on authoritarian states. Authoritarian states face incentives to economically liberalize because they are outperformed by more open societies.18 Fukuyama refers to this as “the weakness of strong states.”19 Communism failed to keep pace with capitalism. Commercial ties connecting the capitalist core have created network effects. Countries which eschew economic openness lag. Fear of losing out on the benefits associated with investment and market access have motivated developing countries to integrate into the capitalist world economy.20 Autocratic regimes may be pressured economically and diplomatically by democratic states.21 Whether exerted unilaterally or multilaterally, these pressures create incentives for authoritarian states to bandwagon toward the democratic community.22 International institutions, especially regional institutions or international institutions in which democracies have a greater influence, are important sites for these pressures.23 There is a virtuous circle involving democracy, trade, and international institutions: democracies have more trade and join international institutions with other democracies, while membership in international institutions improves states’ democracy levels and intra-member trade.24 Institutions dominated by democratic states are also better equipped to manage conflicts between member states and to prevent the onset of militarized conflict.25 Advantages accrue to democracies that have more durable alliances with other democracies.26 Democracies have a strong record in their ability to fight wars.27 Moreover, authoritarian states lack the power, individually or collectively, to challenge the democratic core militarily.28 Authoritarian states also feel moral pressure because their existence is challenged by democratic alternatives. This moral pressure reinforces the material factors encouraging democratic bandwagoning.29 Elites may be persuaded of the value of democracy and voluntarily adopt it with national leaders encouraging democratization.30 Equally, pressure from social movements leads to revolution or reform.31 Over time, states and peoples can “contract into” the democratic community.32 Autocratic states are also influenced by the democratic community, adopting democratic norms such as third-party conflict management and improved human rights practices.33 Normalization is a second moral pressure encouraging democratic socialization. Democracy acquires a taken for granted status within the international system because of its general prevalence or legitimacy.34 As

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31

Fukuyama observes, authoritarian regimes are typically corrupt, manipulative, and economically stagnant, but their greatest weakness is moral. They do not recognize the dignity of their citizens and therefore treat them with contempt. The fear of being excluded from a morally legitimate community should not be underestimated as a motivation for democratization.35 States that violate this normal practice are excluded from the moral community of peoples and suffer peer pressure and approbation. This pressure can be applied by democratic states. Probably the clearest example of this was the UN sanctions imposed on the South African apartheid regime.36 Equally, transnational flows of information can delegitimize authoritarian regimes among entire populations. Fukuyama observed that the USSR’s economic crisis had to be understood in relation to the larger crisis of legitimacy within the Soviet system. The desire for economic prosperity was accompanied by a demand for democratic rights and political participation as ends in themselves.37 Different routes to democratic transition have been described.38 In the “Serbian route,” an unstable democratic transition brings to power an aggressively nationalistic regime as occurred in Serbia under Milosevic in the 1990s. In this scenario, troubled diplomatic relations with the democratic community persist but do not challenge the existence of the democratic community. This was the case with Serbia before the Kosovo War. Alternatively, an aggressively illiberal state is coerced into submission by the democratic community. This paves the way to transition to democracy, as today seems possible in Serbia. A second path is the “Polish route” to democratization, in which a variety of incentives, combined with the moral appeal of the democratic community, facilitate a peaceful, successful, and voluntary democratic transition. “Carrots” in the form of cultural attraction and material incentives explain the democratic bandwagoning by the state. A third route to democratic transition is the “Ukrainian” model. In this hybrid scenario, the state might follow either the Serbian or Polish models, depending on internal and external forces. There is a period of uncertainty about the country’s future, as has occurred since Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. These designations reflect European experiences, but their applicability is generic. Thus Venezuela and North Korea are following the Serbian route, Mexico and Indonesia the Polish route, and South Africa and Egypt the Ukrainian route. Different combinations of material and moral forces facilitate the process of democratic transition and explain why states pursue different models or paths. A significant proportion of democratic transitions have historically followed the Polish model.39

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Overall, there is a potent mix of material and moral forces encouraging authoritarian states to join the democratic community or acquiesce to it. These forces broadly complement one another.40 The bandwagoning effect increases the democratic community’s influence. Democratization creates a self-reinforcing positive feedback loop.41 As Immanuel Kant observed: [i]f by good fortune one powerful and enlightened nation can form a republic . . . this will become a focal point for . . . association amongst other states. These will join up with the first one . . . and the whole will gradually spread further and further through a series of alliances of this kind.42

Positive feedback manifests itself in various ways. As noted earlier, one is the “triangular” relationship between democracy, economic interdependence, and international institutions. Each of these factors correlates positively with peace. Moreover, in combination they create a mutually reinforcing system that fosters the dynamic expansion of the democratic community.43 Another feedback cycle exists between peace and democracy. While democracy often emerges in a peaceful “niche,” democracy also helps promote and sustain peaceful relations. This creates a mutually reinforcing process.44 These mechanisms for positive feedback are complementary, magnifying the virtuous cycle.45 This process is partly structural because even authoritarian states that resist will face pressures to democratize.46 However, if elites or peoples become aware of the spread of democracy, this encourages them to push for reform. A Hegelian “Zeitgeist” has been a factor. [When] . . . a country is part of an international ideological community where democracy is only one of many strongly contested ideologies, the chances of transition to and consolidating democracy are substantially less than if the spirit of the times is one where democratic ideologies have no powerful contenders.47

These forces are referred to as contagion, diffusion, demonstration, snowballing, or domino effects.48 Thus “[s]howing that democratic change could happen, how it would happen and what mistakes to avoid” have been potent forces behind the spread of democracy, particularly within regions or culturally similar states.49 Once a virtuous democratic cycle has been locked into place, the international system achieves “reflexivity.” This is a condition of growing global consciousness about the worldwide spread of democracy.50 At this stage,

The Arab Spring and Transnational Socialization

33

knowledge of the global spread of democracy itself becomes a major factor encouraging further democratization. In the era of the American and French Revolutions, Kant observed that “[t]he peoples of earth have . . . entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.”51 This represents probably the first articulation of emerging consciousness about the spread of democracy. Other moments of intense reflexivity occurred after 1848, 1919, 1945, and 1989. After each of these junctures, democracy became the zeitgeist. Reflexivity intensifies with the growing strength of the democratic community. Reflexivity reinforces positive feedback and magnifies “the psychological process . . . [of] moral learning” in the international system.52 Cultural change within states accelerates the material processes through which democracy diffuses. Moreover, the virtuous cycle is entrenched as democracy cascades through the system.53 Thus depending on the intensity of reflexivity, the pace of democratization varies. Overall, reflexivity creates an “announcement effect” in which knowledge of the spread of democracy becomes a major factor causing further democratic contagion.54 We have seen this as democratic states have increased from 19 percent of all states in 1900 to 58 percent in 2010.55 The trend shows an increase in the rate of democratization and the growing size of democratic waves. This fits Kant’s prediction that “[w]e may hope that the periods within which equal amount of progress are made [towards the spread of republicanism] will become progressively shorter.”56 Demonstration effects became more important in democracy’s third wave due to advances in communications technology. By the mid-1980s, . . . the image of a ‘worldwide democratic revolution’ . . . had become a reality in the minds of political and diplomatic leaders in most countries. . . . Because people believed it to be real, it was real in its consequences. People could and did ask about the relevance for themselves of political events in far off countries. Solidarity’s struggle in Poland and Marcos’s downfall in the Philippines had a resonance in Chile that would have been most unlikely in earlier decades.57

Awareness of the spread of global democracy also penetrates to whole societies.58 Reflexivity has these effects even absent political reform in autocratic systems. Thus when . . . many Western observers look at China, they cannot see beyond the lack of a democratic political system. They miss the massive democratization of the

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The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West human spirit that is taking place in China. Hundreds of millions of Chinese who thought they were destined for endless poverty now believe they can improve their lives through their own efforts. . . . The real value of free market economics is not just improvements in productivity. It is about how it . . . liberates the minds of hundreds of millions of people who now feel they can . . . take charge of their destinies.59

Shifts in attitudes drive democratization. Small material improvements can lead to changes in the beliefs of millions of people about their lives. Economic growth, rising levels of education, access to information, and a more diverse range of human interactions bring cultural shifts. People adopt “self-expression values” prioritizing freedom of expression and selfrealization.60 Once unleashed, these changes generate powerful momentum. The global forces promoting democratic socialization are transnational, arising from globalization, and international, arising from the states’ system. Transnational and international forces combine synergistically.61 Transnational and international forces originate in an international system dominated by interdependent democracies.62 The causes of the Arab Spring parallel those of the third wave of democratization.63 Authoritarian regimes faced a legitimacy crisis due to their poor economic and political performance. Secondly, autocratic states came under pressure due to economic changes producing a middle class. Thirdly, religious reforms within Catholicism emphasizing opposition to authoritarian rule are paralleled by shifts within Islam, and trends highlighting the dysfunctional nature of theocracy. Fourthly, regional contagion occurred, and finally, Western powers encouraged democracy. In this chapter, we focus on transnational forces, and in the next chapter, we provide more detailed information about the international forces influencing democratic socialization. Autocratic regimes from the 1970s onward faced a legitimacy crisis that reflected a “performance dilemma.”64 Other things being equal, the performance of regimes declines over time. In a democracy, this problem is resolved when leaders are replaced, thus renewing a legitimacy that is based on procedures and not performance. In autocratic systems, however, poor performance undermines the legitimacy of the whole system.65 The societies of the Middle East faced this problem acutely in 2011. This was because of the length of time dictators had been in power, their increasing reliance on dynastic authority, and their overtly corrupt and repressive nature. Secondly, authoritarian regimes came under pressure due to economic changes producing an indigenous middle class, urbanization, changing gender roles, and the spread of education. Economic growth creates “rising

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expectations, exacerbates inequalities, and creates stresses and strains in the social fabric that stimulate political mobilization and demands for political participation.”66 Both rapid economic growth and economic crises can bring these issues to a head.67 Before the Arab Spring dictators pursued development, but this fueled domestic dissatisfaction. Thirdly, reforms within Catholicism emphasizing opposition to authoritarian rule were important in Southern Europe, Latin America, and parts of Asia and Eastern Europe. The Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) modernized the church and brought it into conflict with established political structures.68 These changes are paralleled by modernizing and reforming elements within Islam, the declining authority of religious leaders as interpreters of the Koran, and trends highlighting the dysfunctional nature of theocracy.69 The Second Vatican Council might be considered a “Catholic Arab Spring,” modernizing and democratizing religious thinking, making it amenable to interpretation by individuals, and repositioning it to undermine the status quo.70 A fourth factor driving the third wave of democratization was that Western powers encouraged democracy. The European Economic Community (EEC) played a key role in promoting transitions in Spain, Portugal, and Greece. After 1975, the Helsinki Process provided a critical opportunity for dissidents. The United States used a variety of political, economic, and military levers to promote democracy, particularly in Latin America.71 Finally, the third wave was fueled by contagion among countries that were proximate or culturally similar. The most obvious manifestation was in Eastern Europe, but a similar pattern occurred elsewhere. Thus Portugal’s transition had an impact on Spain, Greece, and Brazil, and democratization in the Philippines increased pressures for reform in South Korea.72 In the Arab Spring, support from the Western powers for a number of the revolutions and regional contagion processes were apparent. Studies of the third wave explained it with reference to these five separate causes.73 Yet all five factors driving democratization became increasingly prominent from the mid-1970s onward because of the consolidation of a cluster of interdependent democracies. These core properties of the international system became pervasive as the end of the Cold War approached. The five factors identified by Samuel Huntington to explain the third wave should therefore be understood as part of a single, general process of democratic socialization. Moreover, these systemic forces have continued to intensify. Specifically, they are crucial in explaining the Arab Spring. While events manifested themselves differently in various countries in 2011, the causes

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of the Arab Spring were driven by parallel dynamics to those identified by Huntington as causes of the third wave. Overall, the Arab Spring manifested a global trend. A process of evolution has occurred through which authoritarian states have been selected out. After 1989, an international order dominated by a core of capitalist democracies emerged. Since the end of the Cold War, democratic socialization has gathered momentum. States and peoples are bandwagoning toward the democratic community. This produces reflexivity or growing global consciousness about the worldwide spread of democracy, in turn strengthening the democratic community and increasing pressures for democratic socialization. This model of democratization integrates the various different transnational and international forces identified as lying behind the third wave. As such, it offers a coherent and parsimonious alternative to a more descriptive “list of external factors” approach. Moreover, the influences that lay behind the third wave were evident in the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring reflects a global process of democratic socialization.

THE ARAB SPRING AND TRANSNATIONAL DEMOCRATIZATION The process of democratic socialization behind the Arab Spring was driven partly by transnational influences related to social and economic change. These will now be examined in depth. The transnational influences behind the Arab Spring were triggered by the intensification of globalization.74 Globalization has produced two changes in the Middle East. The first has been economic modernization. This produced unintended consequences which triggered growing dissatisfaction with dictatorial regimes. Secondly, changes in global communications technology delegitimized the Arab regimes, and allowed protest to spread more quickly and easily within and between states.

Economic Modernization Following a worldwide trend, authoritarian states across the Middle East liberalized to boost their economic performance.75 Initially this strengthened rulers, allowing them to boost their legitimacy through growth. However, dictators did not anticipate how modernization produced an expanding middle class, a growing civil society, a “youth bulge,” urbanization, rising education levels, changes in the status of women, and shifts in

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attitudes toward Islam. It consequently generated demands for political reform.76 The Middle East is not a region noted for its capitalist proclivities. Western stereotypes, however, belie the colossal changes across the Islamic world.77 Economic liberalization and the rise of Turkey, Dubai, and other capitalist powerhouses have produced a middle class.78 This “critical middle” is motivated by material betterment, which refers not people falling prey to consumer culture, but to the desire to become responsible stakeholders in the modern world seeking peace and prosperity.79 As David Hume observed, affluence breeds moderation, and encourages people to seek their own improvement.80 The flourishing commercial spirit in the Middle East has led influential elements in society to embrace modernization. Today their wants and desires are the same as those of middle class peoples everywhere—economic and political security, educational opportunities, affordable health care, and value for money.81 Economic development has fostered social changes. It has driven the emergence of a complex civil society. In England after the Glorious Revolution, the bourgeoisie made demands for the rule of law, property rights, accountability, and limited government.82 The same influences have undermined autocracies across the Middle East. The self-immolation of Tarek Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia, which triggered the Arab Spring, is the perfect symbol of a larger process through which entrepreneurs revolt against corrupt and unaccountable regimes.83 The instigators of the Arab uprisings were educated Tunisians and Egyptians whose expectations for jobs and participation were stymied by dictatorships.84 The changes sweeping the Middle East are the product of the hold that capitalism is taking there.85 Economic modernization also produced a youth bulge, urbanization, rising education levels, and a cosmopolitan outlook. More than half the Arab population is under the age of 25.86 Improvements in health led birth rates to decline faster than death rates.87 The “shabab generation” embraces a sense of self-determination and self-fulfillment alien to their parents.88 This generation is willing to question and challenge the authority of the state, the family, and religion and is more acceptant of diversity, and more willing to question the older generation.89 [The young] are better educated and more connected with the outside world. . . . Many . . . understand a foreign language. The females are often as ambitious as their male counterparts. Both genders eagerly question and

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The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West debate. Most are able to identify and even shrug off propaganda. . . . [They do] not share the patriarchal culture of. . [their] elders, and the majority . . . reject patronizing dictators. Many are attracted more to ideas of good governance and freedom than to charismatic leaders.90

These demographic changes were reinforced by urbanization and education which increased mobility and aspirations. “For the first time in history the majority of Arabs had some degree of education or literacy that moved them beyond . . . daily subsistence. Most were . . . aware of conditions outside their villages or national borders.”91 Yet this generation’s raised expectations were dashed. Arab countries have the highest youth unemployment in the world. As education increased, the sense of having no meaningful future become pervasive. University graduates were hit especially hard.92 Development also triggered changes in the status of women. Economic modernization: compels systematic, predicable changes in gender roles: industrialization brings women into the workforce and dramatically reduces fertility rates. Women become literate and begin to participate in the representative government. . . . Thus, relatively industrialized Muslim societies such as Turkey share the same views on gender equality and sexual liberalization as other new democracies.93

These shifts, which as recently as 2003 were largely absent from the Middle East, have now taken hold across the region. Turkey pioneered a broader trend. Increased gender equality is being brought by the expanding middle class, which has improved women’s education, health, employment, and political representation. Turkey, Iran, Egypt, and Indonesia exemplify these trends.94 Literacy, especially among younger women, has increased and younger women’s literacy rates are not far behind those of men. Female labor force participation has increased as men’s has declined, giving women financial independence. Women’s life expectancy rates have risen, fertility has tumbled, and the average number of children per woman has declined by 30–60 percent.95 Women’s political representation at local and national levels has increased. Legal obstacles to this participation are eroding as women’s status increases in areas such as property and inheritance laws, divorcee rights, and equal access to capital. The age of marriage is rising, especially among educated women. Female roles within the family are more egalitarian and attitudes toward women are changing, especially as a result of the exposure to television in rural areas. Women’s bargaining

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power has increased and has altered family expenditures. While saving is higher among women, they are spending their new wealth on food, health care, financial products, education, childcare, consumer durables such as dishwashers and washing machines, and on apparel.96 These changes had political consequences. Women played a critical role in the Arab revolutions, reflecting changes in gender relations. “Every Muslim country now faces some form of feminist revolutionary. Many . . . reject the ‘feminist’ label as . . . Western . . . but their aspirations— equal rights . . . social advancement, and political participation—are the same as their Western . . . counterparts.”97 Women took on a key role in the protests surrounding the Arab Spring, and more generally have played a part in the development of civil societies operating independently of the state.98 From a Western perspective, “these advances have come at a snail’s pace. But . . . newer, more progressive laws, attitudes and social mores in many Arab countries can feel like epic transformations to someone . . . accustomed to a much more conservative culture.”99 In combination, a tsunami of social changes unleashed by economic modernization challenged the foundation of authoritarian rule across the Middle East. It was never the intention of the ruling elites that this should happen, but it was the consequence of their attempt to increase economic performance. The pattern fits the “spiral model” in which authoritarian rulers, after sustained outside pressure, adopt liberalization instrumentally. However, this mobilizes domestic opposition and leads to regime change.100 As Tocqueville observed about the French Revolution, the moment of danger for authoritarian regimes is not when they are at their most repressive, but when they begin to make reforms.101 It is a classic pattern that afflicted Franco’s Spain and Gorbachev’s Soviet Union. Without reform society stagnates, but reform challenges the system.

Moderate Religious Movements A related product of modernization is more moderate religious movements. Rather than producing secularization, economic modernization across the Middle East has produced a revival of Islam.102 However, the perception that this heralds a fundamentalist revival is erroneous.103 The trend is toward using Islam to adapt to social change. Thus “[m]any Arabs now want to use their faith . . . as a way to find answers rather than being the answer.”104 Religions have historically served as a refuge during repression and as a resource to define political alternatives. Hence a quotation from Thomas Jefferson on the wall of his memorial reads “God who gave

40 The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West us life gave us liberty. Can the liberties of a nation be secure when we have removed the conviction that these liberties are the gift of God?”105 Similarly, the Anatolian Tigers leading the economic development of Turkey echo Calvinist ideas about the protestant work ethic.106 They are drawn from the social group—the aspirant petite bourgeoisie—that fuels the Tea Party in America.107 The goal of Islamic governments in Indonesia and Turkey is to strengthen their Islamic heritage while modernizing their economies.108 [The] Islamic Movement . . . has drawn conclusions from the last twenty years. First, Islamic revolutions don’t . . . work. The model of Iran is precisely not a model. Secondly, if they want to be a part of the power, they have to go into coalitions . . . make alliances . . . and take into account the request for democracy from the population. . . . They know that . . . mottos like ‘the Koran is a solution’ . . . do not work.109

Islam as a political ideology has failed, and the idea of an “Islamic state” has lost credibility. It has not provided solutions to the problems afflicting Muslim societies.110 Iran is the paradigm through which the failure of political Islam has manifested itself. It provides a “crystal ball” through which people can see into a theocratic post-Arab Spring future. Arguably, the Arab Spring did not begin in Tunisia, but with Iran’s Green Revolution. By 2009, 30 years of stagnation produced by theocracy had come to a head.111 This produced disaffection, especially among Iran’s large young population.112 Protests were suppressed, but the “world’s only modern theocracy . . . was discredited amongst millions of its own people— and even more in the Islamic world.”113 The legitimacy dilemma facing Iran’s regime has intensified with the Arab Spring, pressure on Assad’s Syria, and tightening Western economic sanctions. By contrast, successful models of Islamic societies have emerged.114 Under Erdogan’s leadership, the Party for Justice and Development (AKP) has turned Turkey into a thriving capitalist hub, and a striking example of a democratic Muslim society. The AKP has built its power base not among fundamentalists, nor secular liberals, but in the Eastern Anatolian heartland. It appeals to religious and family values.115 Traditionally, money and power have been concentrated in Western Turkey, but in Anatolia, a new business class of lower middle class small business owners has emerged that is conservative yet free market oriented.116 For the AKP, the secular state guarantees religious freedom, a point which Prime Minister Erdogan emphasized on his tour of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya in September 2011.117

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Under Erdogan, Turkey has shown a promising way forward for the region.118 Elsewhere, Indonesia has also embraced economic and political liberalization.119 Turkey and Indonesia show the Arab world what modern, democratic, and capitalist Muslim societies look like. Another model has been Dubai. Dubai has imitated Singapore and China by liberalizing economically while maintaining authoritarianism.120 It has become a center of regional commerce and finance, exploiting its location on the “new Silk Road.”121 Dubai has “overturned a long history in the Middle East of state control and distain for . . . capitalism,” and demonstrated that an Arab government can build business infrastructure.122 This created a “Dubai effect” around the region in which governments seek to improve public administration.123 Even more significant are extensive ties between Dubai and Iran. As many as half the native population of Dubai is Iranian in origin. Dubai has become Iran’s gateway to the world.124 The “ties between Dubai and Iran are a vital means by which Dubai’s capitalist fervor, liberal outlook, and openness to the world are being fostered in Iran. . . . Dubai is where the Iranian private sector breathes and prospers.”125 Dubai shows Iranians what their society might look like if it embraced modernity. It is a Western fifth column whose effects on Iran far outweigh those created by Western sanctions.126 Overall, the contrast between Iran’s theocracy and the models provided by Turkey, Indonesia, and Dubai have increased awareness about the benefits associated with capitalist economic development and more laissez-faire social and political systems across the Islamic world. Also important for Islamist movements has been the recognition in the Arab world that pluralism and democracy have appeal after decades of repression. The challenge of the Arab Spring to religious, social, and political authority is echoed in the views of a member of the “Costa Salifists.” This group of younger Salifist Muslims adopts a literal approach to the Koran, but rejects the faith’s traditional leaders. A young Egyptian man dressed in traditional garb sitting in a Costa coffee shop observed: “People! Please—you have to think for yourselves and make your own decisions. You can discuss everything. People are strictly following one school, one scholar, one sheik, and were like, no, you should follow whatever, you should follow the truth.”127 Many religious scholars were tainted by their association with the old regime. Other scholars became a mirror of the state, requiring dogmatic adherence. A marketplace of ideas is emerging. Social and religious questioning was strengthened by political revolutions, and vice versa, especially among the young. Pluralism and a culture of irreverence have become part of Arab societies, representing a stark change.128

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Predictably, Islamist parties have been successful in postrevolution elections. Yet when in power Islamists will have to listen to voters, who will evaluate them on their ability to meet their needs.129 Islamists have to choose, or they will shortly have to, no matter how hard they try to postpone the moment of truth. . . . They are involved in a process of transition and negotiation with a wide range of parties, institutions and associations, each requesting a specific response that has to be programmatic to become sustainable. And this pluralistic process will compel Islamists to accept their own plurality.130

Exactly this process led to the rise of the AKP in Turkey. Critics of Islamism among Muslim groups in Turkey argue that given Islam’s emphasis on the importance of cleanliness, it is inappropriate to debate the place of Sharia while its cities struggle to dispose of garbage. Mistakes by Islamist rulers open Islam itself to criticism. Putting God’s name into a state’s flag sacralizes the state. Finally, utopianism invoked by Islamists has failed in places like Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan.131 The pragmatic discourse of Turkey’s AKP would also enable Muslim parties to reassure liberals and to sideline extremists in a way that does not compromise religious values.132 A “counter-jihad” within Islam has marginalized extremists and made it more open, tolerant, and better able to accommodate democracy.133 Between 2001 and 2011, Al-Qaeda became sidelined within the Islamic world. It did not offer a viable alternative means of organizing society that was attractive and appealing.134 While the West hampered this process through its clumsy response to the terrorist threat, this mattered less than the fact that extremists lacked an agenda that could offer improvement to Islamic societies. [Al-Qaeda] is not finished . . . [and will try again]. But the movement’s remaining leaders and believers have few options. They cannot simply acknowledge a new era and come in from the cold, as the Soviets did . . . when communism proved impractical. Al Qaeda’s leaders are cornered, politically and psychologically . . . [and] extremists looked like pathetic thugs and losers.135

Disillusionment is driving loss of support for Al-Qaeda. Idealistic zeal is eroded by harsh realities. Members split over ideology, tactics, or targets. Leaders are corrupted and followers fall off. . . . . For young men, jihad often . . . provided an exciting novelty, . . . . employment or a sense of purpose—all of which can wear over time.136

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Al-Qaeda’s violent tactics have been a key source of disillusionment, especially since the victims of attacks have mainly been Muslims. It is ironic that Ayman al-Zawahiri became the Al-Qaeda leader after the collapse of the Mubarak regime. Al-Zawahiri joined Al-Qaeda to overthrow authoritarianism in Egypt. Yet Mubarak’s downfall was not achieved through violence, but by peaceful protest.137 Indeed, when the uprising in Egypt began, Al-Qaeda was conspicuously silent because peaceful and secular demonstrations were out of tune with its message.138 Yet the revolutions achieved more in Tunisia and Egypt in one month than Al-Qaeda had in any Arab country over the previous ten years.139 Democratizing trends sidelined Al-Qaeda in the Arab Spring, showing that violent tactics are misdirected. For decades, autocrats in the Middle East used Palestine to distract attention from domestic opposition. Palestine remains important. However, the claim that Palestine needs to be dealt with prior to domestic reform is no longer acceptable to many Arabs.140 Perhaps this issue is ripe for the use of diversionary tactics by leaders in the face of ongoing postrevolutionary problems. Yet this would not solve any of these problems, and instead would intensify them. Strategic realities and domestic priorities provide reasons for new Islamic governments to pursue moderate foreign policies.141 The revolutions of the Arab Spring were not about Islam, Arab nationalism, anti-Americanism, or Middle Eastern conflicts. They were about dignity, good governance, and human rights.142 Since “the Arab Spring is a series of indigenous upheavals . . . democracy is seen as both acceptable and desirable” rather than as a Western imposition.143 Changes within Islam have also been apparent in the relationship of women to religious faith. A “gender counter-jihad–both an end to male domination of Islam and to reinterpret the religion’s rigid tenets– has . . . been coming for a generation.”144 Women are reclaiming Islam, and using it to challenge patriarchal structures. Symbolic of this is the “pink hejab generation”: young, often educated, and middle class women who are committed to both Islam and their rights.145 These women have redefined their wearing of the hejab as emancipatory, and as a symbol of their individuality and activist intent.146 For them the hejab, “provides a kind of armor . . . [for them] to chart their own course, personally or professionally. [It] . . . is no longer assumed to signal acquiescence. It has instead become an equalizer.”147 Divorce rates across the Arab world have risen sharply due to debt, career pressures, lack of premarital interaction, rising education levels among women, the growth of dual-income households, and the growing

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acceptability of divorce. Education and career ambitions have not turned women away from marriage, but brides want their own place to live rather than staying in their husband’s home.148 The most repressive societies have produced the strongest feminist backlash.149 In Saudi Arabia, the majority of university graduates are young women, yet the female workforce is under 15 percent. Since 2006, a campaign using YouTube and Facebook has been underway to allow women to drive within the law.150 Moreover, through entrepreneurship, inheritance, or divorce, women have become business leaders across the Middle East. The sums of money involved can be vast, and women who acquire this money “don’t want to spend it all on eye shadow.”151 Women in the Arab world are today much less constrained by religious authority. Overall, economic modernization and the social, political, and religious shifts this has produced demonstrate the growing “commonality of civilizations” between the West and the Islamic world.152 This is not to say that the people of the Middle East are now acceptant of Western policies toward their region. The peoples of the Middle East do not stand against the West, but neither do they stand with the West.153 They remain highly critical of the West’s policies on Palestine and its support of repressive regimes in the region. Western policy is seen as placing interests above values.154 Turkey, not America or Europe, is regarded as a model to follow.155 Yet that does not mean that the emerging middle class will not welcome political reforms, and that there is no desire among them to fight for their rights.156

Communications Technology Changes in communications technology have been a second transnational influence on the Arab Spring. Through the Internet, cell phones, and satellite television stations, populations in the Middle East have become aware of the freedom others take for granted.157 On the eve of the uprisings, the overwhelming majority of young Arabs believed their leaders had failed them.158 The decline in the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes reflects a dynamic, vibrant, and regionally pervasive transnational civil society in the Middle East.159 Only two decades ago, Arab information ministries tightly and ruthlessly controlled the flow of information and opinion. State television stations offered a monotonous, toxic brew

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of official pronouncements and glorification of presidents and kings. Editorials were often written directly by intelligence agencies or were rigorously censored so as to uphold government talking points.160

This state monopoly on information has been smashed. Governments compete for trustworthiness with a broad range of alternative sources of information. These transnational networks have rapidly undermined the authority of state media.161 Access to information about the outside world has made populations less willing to tolerate repression. When repression has occurred, it has been viewed as “illegitimate repression.” Coercion often deters protest activity. However, exposure “to what people perceive to be illegitimate repression . . . is likely to make them disillusioned with the established order. . . . Hence repression indirectly escalates protest.”162 Illegitimate repression moves social actors away from consequentialist reasoning toward absolutist reasoning driven by moral outrage.163 This galvanizes protest and intensifies psychological motivations driven by a sense of indecency, as well as valorizing and increasing the sense of righteousness of demonstrations. This is particularly so at the level of collective action, because the public nature of protest allows individuals to reestablish their moral standing in the eyes of others.164 The use of concessions and an inconsistent mixture of concessions and repression encourage further protest because it makes regimes look weak. Concessions can diffuse criticism. However, they risk appeasing demonstrations.165 Autocrats may utilize a mixture of concessions and repression, seeking the “best of both worlds” by making tokenistic or cosmetic reforms while deterring core demonstrators. However, if the balance is not right, “dissidents conclude that the prospects for successful collective action are better than ever.”166 Finally, “critical events” galvanize support for regime change.167 From December 1977 to February 1979, the Iranian Shah was undermined through these mechanisms. Initially, repression deterred protests. However, over a period corresponding with the Shi’a mourning cycle, protests spiked.168 The overall trend was a fifteen-month pattern of stepwise increases in protest.169 A combination of repression and accommodation exacerbated this pattern because the Shah was inconsistent. The appointment of a reform-minded prime minister who made concessions to the opposition sparked huge demonstrations. The Shah responded by imposing marshal law. This produced “Black Friday,” a critical turning point.

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Finally, concessions increased strikes, which led to further concessions and encouraged protests.170 Exactly these dynamics contributed to hesitation by regimes in Tunisia and Egypt to use the military, and follows events in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Access to information about life in the outside world delegitimized the Arab regimes. In Egypt in 2011 up to twenty-five million citizens (out of eighty million) had Internet access. In Tunisia, Internet penetration reached one-third of the population in 2009.171 In Tunisia, demonstrations in Sidi Bouzid sparked by Bouazizi’s self-immolation in December 2010 were repressed. However, this “infuriated other Tunisians [and] . . . protest quickly spread across Tunisia’s southern cities” under the influence of social media.172 As the protests spread, indiscriminate repression fueled the revolution. Ben Ali offered reforms, but this appeased demonstrations. On January 14, he fled.173 The Tunisian Revolution proved a critical moment. Egypt was primed for revolt by the protests surrounding the death of Kahled Said, a 28-year-old Internet activist who had been beaten to death by police in June 2010. A gruesome picture of his body prompted the “We are all Kahled Said” Facebook page by Wael Ghonim, a 30-year-old Google executive.174 Large protests had occurred over the summer. The success of the Jasmine Revolution led protests to reignite on January 25. The “We are All Khaled Said” site urged many more Egyptians to demonstrate.175 Mubarak responded with a speech pledging compromise and accompanied by a crackdown. This exacerbated demonstrations. Egyptian police arrested Wael Ghonim, resulting in massive protests. Yet his release emboldened protestors. Mubarak had no choice but to step down after eighteen days.176 Regimes in Tunisia and Egypt faced a dilemma. Both repression and concessions were counterproductive. Protestors were willing to die and the “wall of fear” in the Arab world was broken.177 In Yemen, Libya, and Syria, the regimes understood the consequences of failure to use coercion. However, every time they used force, resistance was strengthened. The spike in protest was especially intense “when the funerals of the casualties themselves became the target of renewed violence.”178 Syria’s government has taken longer to topple than the Shah’s Iran in 1979, but the pattern of intensifying violence is similar. Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh lasted 13 months because he still had significant political and military support. Libya’s Moammar Qaddafi held on for eight months because he had a mix of the military, tribes or clans, and the

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oil-corrupted. Assad lasted the longest, but also at the greatest cost to his base of support.179

Without NATO’s intervention, this pattern would probably have been repeated in Libya. Additionally, the advent of social networking technology makes it easier for protests to intensify and spread. The line from The Social Network, “Bosnia—they don’t have roads but they have Facebook,” vividly captures the way these technologies are globally available.180 Technology that hardly existed before 2004 has already brought massive upheavals. Autocratic regimes underestimated the extent to which their authority could be undermined by this mundane technology. In Tunisia, “Facebook, which was seen as a nonthreatening and popular social outlet rather than a political threat, remained unblocked . . . Tunisia had one of the highest Facebook membership rates in the world.”181 In her analysis of Iran in 1979, Rasler found that “social networks . . . through formal and informal associations” resolved collective action problems faced by revolutionaries.182 If people believe that others will protest, they are more likely to do so.183 Moreover, protesting begets more protest, creating a self-reinforcing cycle. In the late 1970s, social networking relied on personal contacts. However, social networking websites have massively decreased the difficulty of establishing, maintaining, and growing these social networks. During the Tunisian revolution, two million Tunisians changed their Facebook icons into a revolutionary one in one day.184 By January 25, 2011, the day the revolution in Egypt began, the “We are All Kahled Said” website had more than 350,000 followers. When its creator asked followers to protest, more than 50,000 clicked yes.185 When people communicate with someone close in ideological outlook, they are more likely to be persuaded. Communication with someone holding very different views confirms differences.186 During the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, a relatively apathetic population gave way to largescale protests. Its appears that “[f]or some citizens, the small change in attitudes as a result of campaigning might have been just that little bit needed to bring people over a threshold from not protesting to protesting.”187 Social networking technology enhances this galvanizing effect. Participants in social networks have self-identified as having a common predisposition. Thus there is a fast way for those with similar opinions to influence one another. Moreover, the numbers of followers of a group’s websites are public. This facilitates individuals being “pulled into” protest.

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Moreover, social networking communications technologies have decreased the difficulty of maintaining social networks on a widespread scale. Rasler’s analysis of the Iranian revolution in 1979 documents the geographic contagion of protests.188 While the Internet is potentially a universal space, most social networks connect people who are proximate. Thus “communications take place most intensively between citizens of the same country, and to a lesser extent between . . . citizens of neighboring countries.”189 This is compatible with the regional contagion associated with the Arab Spring. Social networking technologies have catalyzed protests in the Middle East and allowed them to spread easily and quickly within and between states. Other new media have reinforced Internet technology. The “Al-Jazeera effect” refers to the role played by satellite television in facilitating the Arab Spring.190 Al-Jazeera, started in 1996, offers a source on news largely independent from state control. By 2011, it was one of over 500 independent satellite channels across the region.191 Social networking websites “were neither necessary nor sufficient for organizing protests. . . . Al-Jazeera picked up on and carried the framing of the protests developed online, working with rather than against the social media narrative.”192 Satellite television complemented social networking technologies, but also substituted for them when they were repressed.193 Collectively the technologies behind the new Arab public sphere have intensified reflexivity across the Middle East. Growing consciousness about democracy has facilitated protest and encouraged its contagion. Indeed, Western political scientists have been slower to appreciate these insights than more sophisticated autocratic regimes. It is no coincidence that China bans social networking websites. The Chinese government realized long before the Arab Spring how dangerous they could be. Economic modernization and changes in communications technology were the same forces that brought about the collapse of communism in 1989.194 The Communist economies had fallen behind those of the West, and a complex civil society was forming behind the Iron Curtain. This included the reemergence of religious networks.195 Combined with outside pressure, the Eastern Bloc countries faced a choice between entropy and opening up. In light of the Arab Spring, one commentator observed that an account of Mubarak’s Egypt published in 1995 provided “an indelible portrait of the Mubarak regime in all its Brezhnevite torpor.”196 Like the Soviet Union in the 1970s, decades of authoritarian rule had produced wholesale social stagnation.

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Secondly, changes in communications technology such as the advent of faxes and televisions meant that people became aware of life elsewhere. There are parallels between the mechanisms through which the Soviet empire maintained its legitimacy and those the Arab dictators used. [The] anti-colonial rhetoric of the Arab leaders played a similar role to the anti-capitalist rhetoric of the communists—it promised liberation, dignity, and self-government. The Arab nationalism provided an element of international solidarity and a sense of belonging, much like the principle of “proletarian internationalism” did for Communism. It also made it possible to draw a picture of “the other,” be it the former colonial powers, the . . . imperialist America, or the Zionist enemy. The vague ideology of Arab socialism enabled the rulers to . . . abuse vast economic powers . . . under the guise of nationalization and socialization.197

However, over time peoples came to see through these excuses. By the early 1980s, the Soviet authorities themselves realized that using force only fueled grievances. This was precisely the dilemma of “illegitimate repression” faced by the Arab dictators. Just as the 2011 revolutions were the world’s first “Facebook revolutions,” the 1989 revolutions were the world’s first “television revolutions,” with the media encouraging the spread of protests from country to country.198 One of the first systematic accounts of the 1989 revolutions identified four causes.199 First, the consequences of forty years of comprehensive and multifaceted failure became clearly apparent. Second, the essential illegitimacy of communism became inescapable. Third, societal opposition emerged. Finally, the ruling elite lost confidence in its ability to rule. What we have seen in the Arab Spring is a resurfacing of exactly this pattern of autocratic failure. Moreover, the causes of this lie in the same transnational processes of economic and technological change. Globalization was the common driving force behind the revolutions of 1989 and the revolutions of 2011. Through globalization, modernizing influences spread from the West to the Communist world. These forces are now reshaping the developing world, a process which has found a powerful expression in the Middle East. The historian Michael Wood’s book Legacy: A Search for the Origins of Civilization was published shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union.200 It discussed the five independently developing centers of civilization in world history. Wood tempered the Western hubris of the time with a larger historical perspective, and offered a reminder that the West’s dominance

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has been recent and short lived. In its moment of self-proclaimed “triumph,” the West would be wise to learn from the legacy of non-Western civilizations. Egypt’s contribution to that legacy was “the early Egyptian state, the first comprehensive attempt in human history to satisfy the needs of men and women to live together in an ordered state with a degree of happiness and material well-being.”201 The front cover of Wood’s book presents a remarkable painting of a rich young man who died in his twenties soon after AD 100 in Hawara, Egypt, as portrayed on his coffin lid.202 The inscription “Artemidorus’ Farewell” is written in Greek on the mummy case. The artifact merges cultural influences by using a Greek personal name, a Roman-style portrait, and traditional Egyptian practices. Scans of Artemidorus show injuries that indicate an assault to the head.203 Artemidorus calmly looks the viewer in the eye and provides a haunting glimpse of life in Egypt’s past civilization. Artemidorus “looks out on us from another world.”204 There are striking parallels between the portrait of Artemidorus, and the picture from the “We are All Kahled Said” Facebook page that produced the demonstrations in Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011.205 Kahled Said was the Egyptian Internet activist in his twenties who had studied in America and who was beaten to death by Mubarak’s police. The picture of his brutalized face appeared on a memorial Facebook page which attracted hundreds of thousands of followers.206 It takes little imagination to see Artemidorus’ portrait as a first century Facebook profile picture. Just as Artemidorus’ portrait fused Greek, Roman, and Egyptian influences, Kahled Said’s Facebook page shows him dressed in American clothes. Like Artemidorus, Kahled Said was beaten to death. Artemidorus’ image provides us with a vivid look into Egypt’s civilized past. Kahled Said’s picture provides us with an equally tantalizing glimpse into Egypt’s possible future. It showed the world what life might look like in an economically vibrant Egypt that becomes an outward looking hub for technology and communications. It symbolizes the way the Middle East is being reshaped by globalization. Perhaps the thousands of years that made up Egypt’s civilized history are resurfacing despite the tragic legacies of colonialism and authoritarianism on its proud people. Egypt and the broader Middle East will struggle with these legacies. Yet modernity is coming to the region, and it has the potential to reignite the energies that its peoples have previously demonstrated. In Cairo in the late fourteenth century, the greatest of all Islamic historians Ibn Khaldun pondered the nature of civilization. He concluded that under favorable conditions, culture could acquire “the habit of civilization,” and

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that Egypt was the best example of that habit.207 The Facebook picture of Kahled Said is a tangible reminder that the habit of civilization is today reemerging in Egypt and across the wider Middle East. In Tahrir Square in 2011, the culture that pioneered the political institution of the state has reawakened a quest for democracy across the developing world. Whatever difficulties Egypt now faces in realizing that goal, it is fitting that it has found itself at the vanguard of this historic global shift.

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3. The Arab Spring and Democratic Socialization: International Influences

T

he Arab Spring is symptomatic of a process of socialization through which democracy is spreading. With the emergence of a critical mass of democracies since the end of the Cold War, this process is gathering momentum. The existence of a strong and interdependent democratic community creates a virtuous cycle that produces democratic “spillover.” As discussed in chapter 2, transnational forces associated with the intensification of globalization have been critical in driving this pattern of global political change. In the Arab Spring, economic modernization and changes in communications technology delegitimized dictatorships and facilitated the regional diffusion of protests just as they did during the revolutions of 1989. In addition, transnational mechanisms of democratic socialization have been reinforced by international ones in the presence of a core of powerful democracies within the system of states. International pressures generated by the states’ system have operated at global and regional levels. The global and regional international forces behind the revolutions of 2011 are considered more fully in this chapter. We show how the same international forces influencing the Arab Spring were at work in the revolutions of 1989. The prospects for the consolidation of democracy in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Arab Spring are then evaluated. While the region remains somewhat inhospitable for democracy, it is remarkable that some states in the region today may have the prospect of following the path blazed by Turkey. More fundamentally, the Arab Spring demonstrated the systematic failure of authoritarianism across the Middle East in the same way that the collapse of the Soviet empire reflected the systematic failure of communism in Eastern Europe after 1989. Over the longer term, the paucity of alternatives to democracy and the “pull” of the global and

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regional democratic community generate pressures for states in the region to become emerging democracies.

THE ARAB SPRING AND INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIZATION The international forces driving the Arab Spring were triggered by strong networks of democratic states in the international system.1 Pressures for democratic socialization arising from the system of states operate at two levels. First, there have been forces operating in the global international system. Here the strength of the Western powers and the permissive environment this fostered within the Middle East were critical. Second, regional dynamics within the system of states also played a key role. Various contagion and neighborhood effects facilitated the international spread of protest, which enhanced the prospects for stable democratic transitions. These global and regional forces arising from the strength of the democratic community are analyzed in relation to the Arab Spring. Their importance in the revolutions in Eastern Europe that triggered the end of the Cold War is emphasized to indicate how the Arab Spring is part of a larger evolutionary process. At a global level, the strength of the democratic community favored revolutionary movements in the Middle East. The diplomatic weight of the Western powers played a central role in the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and has intensified pressure on Syria. Ben Ali and Mubarak had to be wary of acting in a way that upset access to Western aid and they knew repression of demonstrations would lead to approbation. Western powers also marshaled the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, NATO, the European Union (EU), and the Arab League to sanction repressive regimes. Sanctions were not applied uniformly, however. Western opposition to regimes in Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria has been weaker, constrained by concerns about the regional balance of power and post-9/11 terrorism. There was also considerable vacillation in the West, reflecting decades of support for dictatorial regimes in the region, and widespread skepticism questioning Western motives implicated in colonial history and the Iraq War.2 Nevertheless, the pattern contrasts with the Cold War era, when Western support for revolutions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 was out of the question. Similarly, there is a contrast with the 1848 revolutions, when the democratic community was in its infancy, and the autocratic community was proximate.

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Democracies do not always support democratic protest movements within autocracies. In South Korea in 1979, weak opposition leadership and minimal middle class support convinced the United States to support a new authoritarian regime after the assassination of President Park Chung Hee.3 Democratic states are more likely to remove defeated leaders following victory in interstate war, and they often prefer to install more autocratic puppet regimes who face fewer threats to their longevity. The United States did not permit free elections in the post-World War II regimes in Japan or West Germany for several years.4 However, if a protest movement assuages fears about a potential democratic state’s policies by signaling moderation and competence, the movement is more likely to gain support from a democratic patron.5 This was seen in the pattern of communication between the protest movements in Tunisia, Egypt, and the major democratic powers during the Arab Spring. Overall, the international environment facilitated the 2011 revolutions. Emerging democracies in the South further contributed to this international environment. Due to their own economic interests, and demands from their own populations and elites, developing countries have become proponents of democratization.6 Leaders and activists around the world also view them as models of political and economic success.7 The IBSATI states (India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and Indonesia) acted as “straddlers” between the Western powers and Southern states, playing ambiguous, passive, or moderately pro-democracy roles in the Arab Spring. Turkey has moved to a more robust stand for democratic change in its neighborhood. Indonesia and Turkey have been particularly important, because they have large Islamic populations and offered assistance to democratic transitions in the Arab world.8 Turkey’s AK party has convinced Western countries that it can be a reliable ally. This facilitated a more tolerant attitude toward Islamism during the Arab Spring.9 A battle for global public opinion is taking place between the democratic community and the autocratic community. The former “broadcasts,” seeking to stimulate positive attitudes toward democracy in nondemocratic countries. Autocratic states counter with “blocking” activities designed to insulate citizens from foreign influences.10 The existence of successful capitalist states and emerging democracies in the developing world, especially regional examples like Dubai and Turkey, indicates that there are alternative routes to modernity.11 A strong democratic community has also created a shift in the global soft power environment that, on balance, favors democracies. Democratic governments may lose moral ground when actions of citizens harm democracy’s image. For example, the controversial

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YouTube video insulting Mohammed produced in California in the fall of 2012 reduced the moral appeal of democracies. However, public diplomacy is harder for autocracies because the more creative elements in society are repressed, and their human rights records negatively affect their image.12 In this soft power “arms race” between the democratic and autocratic communities, the Arab Spring reflects the greater legitimacy of the democratic community.13 The clearest manifestation of pressure arising from the global states system occurred in March 2011 when UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973 authorized all necessary means except ground forces in Libya to protect civilians. This context is unlike the Gulf War; it cannot be argued that UNSC Resolution 1973 reflects a unique period when both the Soviet Union and China were in the throes of domestic crises. Moreover, unlike the Kosovo War, UNSC Resolution 1973 gave NATO intervention a mandate in international law. The argument that in the wake of the Iraq War the Security Council has returned to Cold War paralysis was overstated.14 In 2011 the international community witnessed an inversion of the Iraq War scenario. UN-authorized military sanctions against an oil-producing Middle Eastern dictator were implemented by NATO and led militarily by France. As in the Kosovo War, NATO’s use of air power prevailed. This was a clear win for the alliance, and the Libya conflict reprised the 1999 Kosovo War with UN authorization. Attitudes toward humanitarian intervention in the developed world have evolved. Western powers are more willing to consider humanitarian action.15 It took three weeks for the West to back UN action in Libya compared to three years in Bosnia. Moreover, UNSC Resolution 1973 was explicitly couched in terms of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Contrary to prevailing post-Iraq War assumptions, the R2P norm made it easier to enforce military action against extreme human rights abuses.16 Finally, Western elites now see, as they did not in the 1990s, that there is political capital in responding successfully to humanitarian crises. The fiasco over Syria demonstrates how wise the West was to act decisively in Libya. The rate of civilian casualties in Syria today is far higher than in Iraq at its worst point after the US intervention. The situation in Syria parallels the Spanish Civil War, where isolationist polices of the Western powers forced the Republicans into the hands of extremists. Developing countries’ attitudes toward humanitarian intervention have also shifted. Support for and ambivalence about UNSC Resolution 1973 from developing countries contrasts with their traditional position

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of noninterventionism. There have been three post-Cold War trends.17 First, diversity rather than uniformity is the pattern. Like developed countries, developing countries vary in the trade-offs they make among security and economic and humanitarian interests.18 Second, attitudes of developing countries toward humanitarian intervention have entered a gray area.19 There has been evolution toward acquiescence and acceptance. Developing countries shifted from principled objection to concern about the means and conditions for intervention.20 Third, regional or cultural affinities facilitate developing countries’ support for intervention. For example, support by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for intervention in Sierra Leone in 1997 encouraged other African nations to follow suit. Malaysia was pushed to reject condemnation of NATO’s actions in Kosovo as an expression of sympathy with Muslims.21 These trends were apparent in the Arab Spring. UNSC Resolution 1973 was tabled by Lebanon, not known for being a Western stooge, and was supported by the Arab League. Arab leaders were pressured by demonstrations into supporting action. When the rights of fellow Arabs were violated, Arab publics were inclined to support intervention. A number of developing countries on the Security Council, including South Africa and Nigeria, voted for UNSC Resolution 1973. Bosnia, a Muslim country with relevant experiences, also supported the resolution on the Council. Although not on the Council, Turkey supported NATO’s campaign.22 Brazil, Russia, India, and China abstained, reflecting the desire of Russia and China not to upset allies in the Arab League. Arab League support also compelled emerging democracies like Brazil and India to not block intervention.23 This represents an unprecedented level of acquiescence in humanitarian intervention by developing countries. Developing country deference to regional institutions acting as gatekeepers to intervention serves to limit Western involvement, and reinforces emerging powers’ positions as leaders in their regions. Deference to regional institutions was also evident in interventions in Ivory Coast led by France in 2011 and Mali in 2012, which were backed by ECOWAS and the African Union, and received UN authorization.24 This growing acceptance of humanitarian intervention by developing countries has most strongly affected emerging democracies in the South. Tensions in the Security Council between developing country democracies and great power autocracies are apparent. In relation to Syria, India and South Africa cited Arab League sponsorship of the Security Council resolution against Syria as important to their support. Brazil, had it been

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on the Council, would have likely supported the resolution. While the veto by Russia and China prevented action, it also shows that Russia and China are increasingly isolating themselves from a widening consensus that human-rights violations demand an international response. In one corner, established and newer democracies, more attuned to their voters at home, are under pressure to support movements for universal rights. In the opposite corner, China and Russia are silencing domestic dissent at home while trying to prop up comparable autocrats abroad.25

Finally, support for repressive regimes by Russia, China, and Iran has led to challenges for them. Russia and China recognized the transitional authority in Libya after Qaddafi’s death. They feared further alienating the new government, and damage to their economic interests became increasingly painful. In December 2012, the Russian deputy foreign minister publically acknowledged that “the trend now suggests that the regime and the government in Syria are losing more and more control and . . . territory.”26 Russia’s and Iran’s prospects for influence in a post-Assad Syria are being undermined. The Arab League allowed Syria’s opposition leader to fill its seat at the organization’s March 2013 summit, against vocal Russian and Iranian protests. China wisely kept a lower profile. During the Arab Spring the autocratic community has found itself “on the wrong side of history.” Meanwhile, established and emerging democracies have placed pressure on autocracies. NATO’s UN-authorized actions in Libya manifests a more general pattern. Global dynamics have been reinforced by regional pressures within the states’ system.27 Regional forces magnify global ones within geographic contexts.28 A strong global democratic community has regional democratic communities within which democratic spillover is intensified. The expansion of regional democratic communities strengthens the global democratic community. Since democracies are interdependent, and interdependence increases global and regional democratic spillover, positive feedback is encouraged.29 A network of international institutions within a regional democratic community promotes the spillover of democracy and economic interdependence.30 Finally, networks may link countries that share colonial, cultural, economic, or political ties.31 In the context of the Arab Spring, colonial history and societal and elite linkages with Europe are significant. Strong connections between societies and governments enhance regional integration and democratic spillover.32 Transnational flows are more likely between contiguous states.33 Transgovernmental networks can be either

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horizontal (connecting government bureaucracies in different states) or vertical (connecting governments to regional or global organizations).34 High levels of linkage (the density of elite or societal ties between two countries) and leverage (the vulnerability of a country to outside pressure) encourage democratization.35 Geographic ties are reinforced by the presence of cultural, economic, or historical ones. Additionally, where countries experience smooth democratic transitions, there is increased likelihood that others will follow.36 These factors create a “neighbor emulation effect,” encouraging neighboring countries to converge around democracy.37 As the proportion of democratic neighbors in a state’s geographic neighborhood increases, the chances for transition from autocratic to democratic governance increases substantially.38 One hypothesis holds that regional diffusion effects are stronger when the difference in levels of democracy between adjacent states is greater.39 Emulation is a nonissue between the United States and Canada or Ba’athist Syria and Iraq, but becomes more likely between the United States and Cuba, North and South Korea, East Germany and West Germany, or Franco’s Spain and Western Europe. This seemingly contradicts the argument that high levels of linkage and leverage are needed to encourage stable democratization.40 In fact, these hypotheses are complementary because geographic relationships are dynamic not static. Large disparities in levels of development or democracy between proximate regions create huge incentives for linkage and leverage to grow. This is what happened between Eastern and Western Europe during the Cold War.41 Arnold Toynbee observed in relation to Rome and the barbarians that when a frontier between a highly and less highly developed society “ceases to advance, the balance does not settle down to a stable equilibrium but inclines, with the passage of time, in the more backward society’s favor.”42 Frontier zones are zones of flux, constantly shifting through uneven development. Three regional diffusion dynamics were evident in the Arab Spring.43 First, revolutions make other revolutions more likely in nearby states. This occurred in the Arab Spring through regional contagion of demonstrations within the Arab world. It is no coincidence that the Arab Spring began in Tunisia. Due to its physical proximity to Europe, Tunisia was the hub of ancient civilization in Northern Africa.44 Neither is it coincidental that the next country affected by mass demonstrations in the Arab Spring was Egypt, which is separated from Tunisia by just one country and which is the regional cultural leader. Once regimes to the West and East had fallen, it was more likely that Libya would be next. Similarly, NATO’s intervention in Libya encouraged the spread of revolution to Syria. More generally,

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elites skeptical of undertaking reform may be encouraged to do so by events in nearby countries.45 For example, Morocco has allowed political and economic concessions in order to ward off protests. These populist measures store up difficulties for the regime.46 Second, transitions are more likely in democratic neighborhoods than autocratic ones. On the autocratic side, Bahrain’s autocracy was propped up by Saudi Arabia, and Syria’s by Iran and Russia.47 Similarly, Yemen is relatively distant from the West. The fact that Bahrain is also home to the US fifth Fleet complicated US support for protests, a situation the regime has exploited.48 By contrast, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya are closer to the West and more vulnerable to external pressure. Third, a democratic neighborhood increases the likelihood of successful democratic transitions and an autocratic neighborhood increases the likelihood of democratic failure. If nearby examples show that democracy is possible, opposition will be emboldened. The proximity of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya to Europe and Turkey exposed them to growing connections with democracies. This increased the leverage of democratic states, tipping the internal balance away from established regimes and enhancing prospects for postconflict democratic transitions. [The] map of Europe is about to move southward, and once again encompass the entire Mediterranean world, as it did not only under Rome, but under the Byzantines and the Ottoman Turks. For decades . . . North Africa was effectively cut off from the northern rim of the Mediterranean . . . But as North African states evolve into messy democracies the degree of political and economic interactions with nearby Europe will, at least over time, multiply . . . The Mediterranean will become a connector, rather than the divider it has been during most of the post-Colonial era. Just as Europe moved eastwards to encompass the former satellite states of the Soviet Union upon the democratic revolutions of 1989, Europe will now expand to the south to encompass the Arab revolutions. Tunisia and Egypt are not about to join the EU, but they are about to become shadow zones of deepening EU involvement.49

The best example of a democratic neighborhood enhancing the prospects for successful democratic transitions has been NATO’s intervention in Libya. The Kosovo War provided a model for the Libyan conflict, where the international community implemented lessons learned about humanitarian intervention in the 1990s.50 First, interventions that respond quickly protect the most lives. Second, military power makes interventions more credible when there is an urgent humanitarian crisis. Third, successful interventions must limit casualties to the intervening forces so that support

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is sustained. Finally, to be legitimate, interventions must be backed by a broad coalition of international, regional, and local actors. The Kosovo War provided an ideal template whereby these lessons were carried forward into the Arab Spring. Like the war against Serbia, NATO’s action in Libya is an example of “intervention in a good neighborhood” or a region close to a network of democracies.51 Regional democratic communities have networks of cooperative and stabilizing institutions like NATO and the EU. Instability thrives where institutions are weak, and institutions develop in institutionalized soil. In a region where democratic stability is high, it may be possible to export it. This redefines the boundaries of the neighborhood through democratic spillover. The Balkans was one such neighborhood in the 1990s. Instability in the Balkans combined with humanitarian emergency gave Western countries incentives to reconstruct the region.52 Regional organizations can also use minimum requirements for democracy and human rights protection as a condition for membership, a tool that has been very effective for promoting liberalization in Europe. Good neighborhoods provide a fertile context for successful military action. Authoritarian states often lose wars against democracies, providing an opportunity for democratic transition.53 This, for example, happened to Germany and Japan after 1945, and Argentina after the Falklands War.54 As with Serbia in 1999, Libya’s proximity to Europe made it easier for NATO to intervene. Libya’s flat desert terrain and demographic concentration along the coast made it particularly suited to the use of air power. While military mistakes led to unnecessary civilian casualties, as with the Kosovo War, an ugly operation is not the same as a failed operation.55 Skeptics anticipating a stalemate or a Somalia-style quagmire were proved wrong.56 Regional democratic density enhances prospects for stable postwar democratic transitions.57 Two decades ago, the Balkans was mired in war. Yet due to its location, today its nations seek EU membership. In May 2011, the Serbian war criminal Ratko Maldic was handed over for trial in The Hague by Serbian authorities pursuing EU accession. Public reaction to his arrest was muted. When Novac Djokovic won the Men’s Singles Wimbledon title just over a month later, the celebrations contrasted starkly with nationalist displays in Belgrade in the 1990s.58 This was a demonstration of the way in which the peoples of Serbia are now attracted to the regional democratic community. Distance from a strong regional democratic community is also an argument against the Iraq War in 2003. The notion of intervention in a good neighborhood does not provide a blanket

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endorsement of liberal interventionism. Instead, it favors selective interventionism given political and geographic preconditions.59 Except in cases of massive and systematic human rights abuses, such as those in Syria, the probability of success should be the arbiter in determining whether the democratic community intervenes. The democratic spillover that is occurring in the Balkans eventually could happen in North Africa. The assassination of US Ambassador Christopher Stevens on September 11, 2012, highlighted state weakness as a major issue facing Libya. However, this should not obscure the fact that the larger story is positive. Libya in transition held successful elections, and a moderate, liberal, and pro-Western regime came to power. This was a remarkable turnaround.60 Moreover, Libya’s lack of institutional development may actually prove advantageous. Unlike Egypt and Tunisia where deeply entrenched institutions must be grappled with by new regimes, Tripoli’s leaders have a blank slate.61 Much has been made in American domestic politics of the four American casualties tragically lost in the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi. However, in the larger perspective, the democratic community has achieved a colossal amount in two years at a cost of four casualties. The contrast with Iraq is striking. Moreover, if Libya’s transition can be stabilized, this would help anchor those states to its west and east. Reconstructing neighborhoods implies that “[s]pecial efforts should be made to reinforce democratic institutions in . . . countries that could serve as the basis for the emergence of good neighborhoods, where they do not currently exist.”62 Serbia might be understood as one such state in the Balkans. Due to its location between Tunisia and Egypt, Libya too might be viewed this way. This gives the regional democratic community in Europe, and the democratic community broadly, large incentives to provide the extensive long-term aid and resources required to facilitate Libya’s democratic transition. Alternatively, if Libya fails, refugee flows could become a major problem. There are also incentives and costs related to maintaining oil supplies. In the Middle East, it remains possible that a negative neighborhood effect might emerge. For example, a failed democratic transition in Egypt or an escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict might make democratic transition in Libya harder. NATO’s intervention generated instability in Mali and Algeria in 2012, and this may create “spillback” into Libya. Yet 20 years ago, the Balkans hardly looked a promising prospect for democratic spillover. Wars in Croatia and Bosnia were followed by conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia. Today the possibility of a democratic Balkan region is a reality. As with the Kosovo War, in Libya, air power combined with support

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from the democratic community toppled a despotic regime, paving the way for potential democratic consolidation in the post-War period. Success is not guaranteed, but it is probable enough to strive for. There are striking parallels between the international causes of the 2011 revolutions in the Middle East and postcommunist Eastern Europe after both 1989 and 1999. At a global level, the strength of the West and its strong support for the revolutions in Eastern Europe increased the pressure on the Soviet empire, and later on nationalist Serbia. By the late 1980s, the Soviet system faced such difficulties that outside security pressure played a minimal role in its demise. The “peace through strength” argument is analogous to the rooster crowing in the morning thinking that it makes the sun rise.63 Yet, overall, containment worked. The United States successfully hemmed in Soviet power, until it mellowed and eventually collapsed. Regarding Serbia, Milosevic’s nationalism provoked a war with the democratic community that he was destined to lose. Analyses of the revolutions in Eastern Europe of 1989 identified a number of important external driving forces.64 These complement the domestic failures that were triggered by globalization. First, the West proved flexible and accommodative to Gorbachev’s reforms. There was improvement in East–West relations from the late 1960s onward, and détente softened and undermined communist rule. Second, the failure of the Soviet system changed the balance of power and weakened communism’s position. Gorbachev then exacerbated this situation. Glasnost and Perestroika galvanized opposition, and reforms demoralized conservatives within the regime. Just as Metternich said in 1848 that “We bargained on everything except a liberal Pope,” so Eastern European conservatives bargained on everything except a reformist Soviet leader.65 Finally, Gorbachev proved willing to let the Brezhnev Doctrine expire peacefully. These changes triggered regional dynamics and allowed the communist dominos to fall. Over the two decades that followed, regional neighborhood effects led the countries of Eastern Europe to become democracies. After the 1999 Kosovo War, the Balkans joined the democratic bandwagon.66 Overall, international forces played a key role in the Arab Spring. Global pressures arising from the strength of the worldwide democratic community were important. Western powers created a permissive environment that facilitated the revolutions, and this pressure was reinforced by emerging democracies in the developing world and changes in the global soft power environment. UNSC Resolution 1973 authorizing all necessary means to protect civilians in Libya reflects an emerging norm of humanitarian intervention among both developed and developing countries. Global pressures

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were reinforced by regional dynamics. The proximity of North Africa to Europe made it more likely for protest to occur and diffuse, and increases the prospects for the spread of democracy. The appropriate model for the Libya conflict is the 1999 Kosovo War, and North Africa has a meaningful chance to follow the path that the Balkans is pursing toward membership of the regional democratic community. The international influences that triggered the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe were at work in the Arab Spring, and subsequent East European history is suggestive about longterm prospects for stable democratization in North Africa.

PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST The Middle East remains a region where democratic transitions are fraught. However, something fundamental has changed. Any future military and Islamic dictatorships will face obstacles. Moreover, the differences between postcommunist transitions in Eastern Europe and the post-Arab Spring transitions in North Africa should not be overstated. Effective engagement by the global and regional democratic community could exert meaningful influence, and one successful Arab democratization would powerfully reinforce Turkey’s success. More fundamentally, the Arab Spring has highlighted the systematic failure of authoritarianism across the Middle East. Democratization in the Middle East might languish in the short run, but worldwide democratic socialization will continue to intensify. Over time, the pull generated by the established and emerging democracies, including Islamic ones, provides powerful long-term incentives for democracy to eventually take hold. Three significant differences between 1989 and 2011 reduce the prospects for successful democratic transitions in the Middle East. First, elements of the state apparatus remain intact in key states in the Middle East, whereas with the exception of states such as Russia and Belarus, after 1989 the new countries of Eastern Europe saw their state institutions disintegrate. Especially in Egypt and Tunisia, the military remains an important source of power. One argument is that the Middle Eastern revolutions were not popular uprisings but were driven by elites. The generals in Egypt came to view Mubarak as expendable and they acted tactically so they could preserve military power. A similar argument has been put forward about postcommunist transitions in Eastern Europe.67 For example, ex-communists in the Soviet Union switched to support to Yeltsin when the Soviet system become untenable. “People have short memories”

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and within a few years of the revolutions, the old regime starts to look much better for many. This occurred in Yeltsin’s Russia, and may also occur in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East.68 To use a metaphor from Animal Farm, people begin to want Farmer Jones back.69 A related claim is that the model for the revolutions of 2011 in the Middle East is the revolutions of 1848, in the sense that autocrats reasserted themselves afterward.70 Second, the internal preconditions for democracy are weaker in the Middle East than in Eastern Europe.71 Communism sought to control all aspects of life. By contrast, the autocracies of the Middle East permeated only areas of life concerning politics, security, and social change. In Arab societies, Islam exists as an ideological alternative to liberal capitalism. The weakening of the state after the revolutions may lead to organized crime, violence, economic hardships, and disappointments. This offers fertile grounds for extremists to offer the easy solutions of collective identity and “traditional values,” and promises to draw upon their superior organization and resources.72 Islamic theocracies such as Iran provide one possible template for the Arab Spring. Conflicts between the West and Islamic theocracies will provide a major source of insecurity.73 A relatively small and weakly developed middle class, lower levels of economic development than in Eastern Europe, and high levels of inequality reduce the prospects for stable democratization. They increase prospects for “rotten door” transitions in which mass protests quickly sweep aside a leader but in which autocracy persists. Typically such transitions lead not to democracy but to “competitive authoritarianism” in which elections exist and there is competition for power, but an uneven playing field biases their outcome toward incumbents.74 Third, it is held that the external context for the Arab Spring is different from that in Eastern Europe. Way argues that the “single most important factor facilitating democratization [in Eastern Europe] was the strength of ties to the West.”75 Especially in Albania, Romania, and Serbia, where domestic conditions (underdevelopment or severe ethnic tensions) were unfavorable to democratic development, the promise of EU accession has played a critical role. By contrast, the external environment in the Middle East and North Africa is less conducive to democracy. There is no equivalent of the EU, and the region’s relations with the West “are, to put it mildly, rather fraught.”76 This indicates that, in contrast to transitions in Eastern Europe, democratization in North Africa will hinge almost entirely on the tenuous balance of power between pro- and antidemocratic forces within individual countries.

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Additionally, it is held that states in the Middle East and North Africa are not ethnically or religiously viable, and are prone to collapse and civil war. Huntington identified “cleft societies” and “torn states” as problems. In a cleft country, a majority group belonging to one civilization attempts to define the state as its political instrument and make its language, religion, and symbols those of the state. Cleft countries bestride the fault lines of civilizations. Huntington gives as examples Muslims and Christians in Sudan and Nigeria, Muslim and Hindu India, the former Yugoslavia, and Ukrainian-speaking versus Russian-speaking Ukraine.77 Torn states have a predominant culture in one civilization, but its leaders want to shift to another. Russia was one such society under Peter the Great, and other examples are Kemalist Turkey and Mexico.78 Egypt and Tunisia might be regarded as potential cleft societies. Islamists who have been swept to power after the revolutions are in conflict with secularists who favor Westernization. Libya is perhaps in line to become a torn society, with a Westernized secular elite in conflict with a population that violently resists this trajectory. Turkey may also ultimately pursue this route, as well as Egypt if the military reasserts itself. Both cleft and torn societies are prone to be ripped apart by extremist conflict, as Yugoslavia was. However, doubts about successful transitions in the Middle East can be answered with evidence to the contrary. First, the claim that the 1989 or the 2011 revolutions were propelled by elites rather than the people fails to examine why elites relinquished power. They did so because they faced widespread public opposition and repression was proving counterproductive. Thus there was a structural legitimacy problem at the core of the political system. While the establishment in Egypt or Tunisia may have ceded power tactically, this legitimacy dilemma will continue to confront any new authoritarian leaders. Unless the new regime is able to provide for growth and order, it will face difficulties garnering support. Moreover, even if a new autocracy can provide these things, the moment it fails to do so the legitimacy dilemma will reemerge. Globalization makes it more difficult for state leaders to insulate themselves from global economic recessions. Memories may be short and elites may cling to power, but nostalgia does not solve political and economic problems. To deal with these issues, more accountable political institutions are required. It may take ten years or longer, but it is likely that people eventually will realize that any postrevolutionary autocratic regime has failed them as its predecessor did. At that point, democracy will seem even more desirable. As Immanuel Kant argued, the experience of warfare brings citizens to this realization more quickly. If autocracy does reassert itself, therefore, it will

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not be stable. Moreover, autocrats will find it considerably harder over the long term to reassert their authority than after the 1848 revolutions. The global and regional democratic communities are far stronger than in the nineteenth century, and globalization’s ability to delegitimize autocrats is much greater. After the Arab Spring, something fundamental has changed in the Middle East. Populations have higher expectations of their leaders and will be watching them to make sure they deliver.79 Second, the idea that Islam provides a coherent ideology whereas communism did not overestimates Islam’s political effectiveness. As Yafi observes, “[f]or all intents and purposes, God appears to be not too interested in managing the daily political and economic affairs of people. If Iran is taken as an example, it will tend to affirm this simple fact.”80 A number of moderating commonalities unite Islamist parties.81 Most of them do not embrace theocratic rule. Neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia provides attractive models, especially in contrast to Turkey and Indonesia. Most Islamic parties have now engaged in politics and have renounced terrorism. Islam today is defined by an increasingly wide spectrum with no single vision dominant, in contrast to postrevolution Iran.82 Moreover, Islamic parties have a greater willingness to work with secular and centrist parties, some as partners. Finally, Islamic groups are under pressure to give priority to reality over religion. The younger generation often does not buy into intolerant, inflexible, or impractical positions; Islamist parties risk fracturing if they fail to deliver; and economic realities have forced pragmatism. Additionally, trade, tourism, and the Internet make it harder for Islamic parties to isolate themselves from the rest of the world. None of these things imply that the way ahead for Islamic politics will be easy, but they do point to constraints that will be a moderating influence. Beer was invented in ancient Egypt,83 and Stella Artois has been sold there for over 135 years. The Muslim Brotherhood dates back to just 1928. Theocracy faces pragmatic limitations. Moreover, the lack of the domestic preconditions for democracy in the Middle East should not be overemphasized. It is too easy with hindsight to argue that successful transitions in Eastern Europe were likely. This was not how these situations were viewed at the time. An assessment in 1994 noted that Eastern Europeans are trying to do in one or two decades what has taken . . . [many generations] in the West. Some Western observers . . . and . . . a growing number of East Europeans are concluding that the task is impossible. Eastern Europe has bitten off too much; going for both liberal democracy and the market will mean ending up getting neither.84

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There is a difference between the collapse of an authoritarian regime and the emergence of a stable democracy.85 It will take time for the countries that have experienced the Arab Spring to develop their civil societies and their economies, for external actors to leverage change, and for Arab elites to evolve. Yet this does not mean that these changes are impossible. Like the Balkans in the 1990s, the North African countries are perhaps a generation away from stable democratization. As time passes, however, democracy will seem inexorable. Failed experiments, with more military autocracy or extremism, will only reinforce this trend. Finally, the external context for the Arab Spring should be acknowledged as not so different from Eastern Europe’s. Some hold there is no equivalent of the EU for North Africa.86 Yet after the Arab uprisings, the “international community in general and the European Union in particular have a choice of helping democracy to succeed.”87 As Olivier Roy observes, “Wariness . . . is not a policy. Pragmatic engagement . . . at least has the potential to help support democratization in the Arab world.”88 Tunisia is roughly as close to the EU as many of the Balkan countries were to the EU in the 1990s. The Kosovo War and its consequences for Serbia provide a template for Libya. Both the EU and NATO could have considerable leverage over North Africa if they choose to exercise it. The United States could reinforce that leverage because of its alliance with and significant military aid to Egypt. The argument that the West cannot shape Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt reflects parochial Western attitudes more than political reality. Precisely such an “ostrich approach” led to the fiasco in the Balkans in the 1990s. The West’s isolationism led to the appeasement of Serbia’s behavior and brought an intolerable crisis to Europe’s back doorstep. Only when this became untenable did the West belatedly use its considerable external influence to bring about change. It is to be hoped that these lessons do not have to relearned, with equally tragic consequences, in post-Arab Spring North Africa. The EU will not be able to remain aloof from brooding problems in its direct vicinity. Equally, the Arab Spring has been a powerful reminder that even in a post-Iraq War world, the United States will not simply be able to walk away from the issue of democracy promotion.89 For forty years, the West has been able to delude itself into thinking it can ignore its Mediterranean neighborhood with impunity. It is abundantly clear that the West will not be afforded this luxury in the post-Arab Spring period. NATO and the EU urgently need a serious long-term plan to consolidate democracy and moderate Islamist governments in North Africa that has been lacking.90

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Elements of the old regimes remain intact in Tunisia and Egypt, and the regional neighborhood effect will be weaker in North Africa than in Eastern Europe. However, these are not necessarily fundamental impediments to democratization. In the more immediate future, it is remarkable that a number of countries in the region have even a chance at democratic transition. The probable long-term outcome of the Arab Spring is partial success, with a number of countries in the region making steps toward democracy. Tunisia has made the best progress in this regard, and is perhaps the most likely country for democracy to take root.91 If just one North African state follows Turkey toward democracy, it would provide an inspiration for the region. Egypt is a pivotal state for North Africa because of its size, large population, location, and status as a cultural and political leader.92 Yet even Tunisia could also have a huge impact through the power of moral example. This would be especially striking if Iran or Syria holds out against reform, leading to continued isolation and stagnation. Similarly, if extremist groups or military dictators come to power, their competence and ability to govern transparently and provide for economic growth will be monitored by their populations. Failure to satisfy the aspirations of the people by delivering improvements over the previous era would erode their power base considerably and would reduce the regional appeal of their systems. Regardless of how many countries actually emerge as democracies, the old era in which autocracies could govern the Middle East with impunity has come to an end. Moreover, while the path to a well-functioning democracy will not be straightforward, the Arab Spring does suggest that the desire for freedom and participation is strong in the Arab world. Arab publics can clearly be mobilized against dictatorship just as readily as those in Eastern Europe and Latin America were.93 An exception to the democratizing trend in the Arab world might relate to the Arab monarchies. “The Arab Spring might just as well be called the Arab Republics’ Spring,” since the region’s autocratic monarchies were largely bypassed.94 Excepting Bahrain, which relies on Saudi backing, all these states including Morocco, Jordan, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have at least two or three pillars that are critical to sustaining them: broad-based domestic coalitions, hydrocarbon rents, and one or more foreign patrons (often the United States or Saudi Arabia).95 A combination of domestic concessions and legitimacy, economic growth and largesse (often fueled by oil revenue), and outside help sustains the regimes. These regimes generally represent high-grade authoritarian states that govern through a sophisticated mixture of growth, repression, and appeasement. Even here, however, these regimes are rapidly losing legitimacy because of economic

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change and access to communications technology, and are increasingly vulnerable.96 As time has passed, a mood of pessimism about democratic prospects in the region has replaced the postrevolutionary period of optimistic euphoria. Events have heightened fears in the West about Islamic extremism, and fueled Huntington’s concerns about postrevolutionary sectarian conflict. However, as Sheri Berman has observed, it is important to situate this postrevolutionary skepticism in historical context: Skepticism about the Arab Spring is as predictable as it is misguided. Every surge of democratization over the last century—after World War I, after World War II, during the so-called Third Wave in recent decades—has been followed by an undertow, accompanied by the widespread questioning of the viability and even desirability of democratic governance in the areas in question. As soon as political progress stalls, a conservative reaction sets in as critics lament the turbulence of the new era and look back wistfully to the supposed stability and security of its authoritarian predecessor. One would have hoped by now people would know better —that they would understand that this is what political development actually looks like, what it has always looked like, in the West just as much as in the Middle East, and that the only way ahead is to plunge forwards rather than back.97

Berman argues that skeptics ignore how many of the turbulent dynamics associated with democratic transitions are inherited from authoritarianism, rather than reflecting the dysfunctionality of the democratic regime. Authoritarian systems repress dissent and block the development of institutions needed to mediate conflict and produce compromise. Consequently, citizens in new democracies often express their grievances in a volatile and disorganized, and often violent way.98 Skeptics also set absurdly high benchmarks for success that lack historical perspective, and interpret post transition violence, corruption, and impotence as the unsuitability of particular countries or regions for democracy. In fact, stable liberal democracy emerges only at the end of long, often violent struggles, with many twists, turns, false starts and detours. Historically, most initial transitions have been the beginning of the democratization process not the end.99 [Thus] problems so evident in Egypt and other transitioning countries are entirely normal and predictable. . . . they are primarily the fault of the old authoritarian regimes rather than new democratic actors, and . . . the demise of authoritarian regimes and the experimentation with democratic rule will almost certainly be seen in retrospect as major steps in these countries’ political development, even if things get worse before they get better.100

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Furthermore, neither extreme Islamism nor a return to one or another form of authoritarianism is likely to improve the lot of the ordinary people. Like the 1989 revolutions that led to the overthrow of communist regimes, the 2011 revolutions reflect regime entropy and the impossibility of continuing the status quo.101 Like the Soviet case, the Arab autocracies snuffed out any semblance of private initiative and produced stagnation. This dynamic will remain as long as the incumbent regime or a similar replacement is in place. Replacing one dictator with another cannot prevent entropy continuing. Theocracy would not afford any better outcomes. Moreover, any reversal of entropy will require structural changes that involve liberalization and eventual democratization. The Arab regimes, like the Soviet empire, are now well down this entropic path and have reached a tipping point beyond which return to the previous order is not possible.102 Anyone who has read John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty will immediately understand that liberalism’s great nineteenth-century spokesman appreciated that societies that systematically suppress human freedom will experience such entropy. Alternative ideas then resurface, giving them an opportunity for a second chance. When an opinion is true, it may be extinguished once, twice or many times, but in the course of ages there will generally be found persons to rediscover it, until some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from favorable circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it.103

The demonstrators in the Middle East in 2011 experienced the profound truth and striking contemporary relevance of Mill’s observation. Individual diversity and creativity ensure that the spirit of human freedom is impossible to suppress for any extended period. Liberty gradually seeps through the cracks in the walls containing it, until such pressure has been created that they collapse. Even if the Arab Spring fails and no stable democracies emerge to replace dictators, the 2011 revolutions have revealed the systematic failure of authoritarianism across the Middle East in the same way that the revolutions of 1989 revealed the failure of communism in Eastern Europe.104 The year 2011, like 1989, has revealed that authoritarian systems have merely been patching up their legitimacy deficit on an ad hoc basis. What autocratic and theocratic systems lack, as Fukuyama argued in relation to communism, is a coherent and viable long-term model for organizing society. If so, it is only a matter of time before any such systems which emerge in

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the wake of failed democratic revolutions come under further pressure. If repressive regimes can only win battles but not the war, they remain on the wrong side of history and will fall by the wayside. National variation will remain important, with Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt more likely to benefit from neighborhood effects than Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria. Yet all autocratic regimes in the region will ultimately face the same dilemma which will work against them. This reflects a process of cultural selection and socialization driven by a cluster of democratic states at the international system’s core. The events of 2011 made it clear that through a convergence of global forces, authoritarian states are under pressure to democratize. Autocratic regimes face a crisis of legitimacy for which they have no coherent answer, and they are vulnerable to growing outside pressures and influences arising from the democratic community. This pattern varies from country to country, but represents an overwhelming systemic trend. The Arab Spring of 2011 has brought to a sudden end the postcolonial era in the Middle East, because authoritarianism has not produced results for the peoples of the region. Arab peoples are increasingly finding that democracy is an attractive model that they themselves want to adopt. These lessons were learned in 1989 in Europe. Today the forces of change are no longer confined to the communist world. After 1989, the democratic lamp was retrieved from the cave where it was hidden. The Arab Spring symbolizes that it is now being rubbed by the peoples of the Middle East. The region that produced the Sumerians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Hebrews, Phoenicians, Christians, Arabs, and Muslims and endowed the world with philosophy, religion, and science is awakening to the realization that it can today do much better for itself. The difficulties are monumental. The good news is that the Arab world is now pulsating with Let’s Go “Yalla” energy that is driving it into the future. To that, as one commentator has observed, it is only possible to say one thing: Yalla Arabia!105

Part II

The Triumph of Democracy The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident . . . in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism. —Francis Fukuyama, The End of History, June 19891

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4. The Worldwide Crisis of Authoritarianism

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he Arab Spring is merely the tip of a colossal iceberg in world politics. If the Middle East—which provides relatively infertile ground for democracy—is experiencing change, this reflects a pervasive process of democratization that has gathered momentum worldwide. As Carl Gershman, the President of the National Endowment for Democracy, notes: “the Middle East revolutions have already had a larger global impact than the . . . revolutions of 1989. This is because they were carried out by non-Western peoples who were once colonial subjects, so people throughout the world can identify with them.”2 Like 1989, 2011 represents an intense moment of global reflexivity or growing consciousness about the spread of democracy. In turn, this is a major factor encouraging further demands for democratization. Even if the Arab Spring fails to produce a single new stable democracy in the Middle East, which is unlikely, it has massively intensified already strong pressures encouraging democratization on every continent. Growing reflexivity has been associated with a worldwide crisis of authoritarianism. This crisis is driven by modernization and the expansion of the global middle class. Modernization brings into focus the absence of systematic alternatives to democracy as a means of organizing society. Fukuyama identified this trend in relation to communism. Today it has spread to the developing world. Crude or “low-grade” authoritarian regimes everywhere are struggling to stay afloat. More sophisticated “high-grade” authoritarian regimes that satisfy some of the basic aspirations of their peoples are faring better. However, they are merely storing up today’s legitimacy problems for tomorrow.

MODERNIZATION AND THE GROWTH OF THE GLOBAL MIDDLE CLASS Fukuyama refers to reflexivity as the “moral element” driving democratization, noting that it is an intangible, unpredictable, and unquantifiable

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factor in the success of democracy globally.3 Yet while it cannot be quantified precisely, growing consciousness about the spread of democracy has now become probably the largest factor encouraging democratic diffusion. The revolutions of 2011, like those of 1989, were not merely empirical developments, but had moral significance. As Gershmann observes, the impact of the Arab revolutions “became clear to me recently when I was visited by . . . an exiled democratic dissident from Cambodia. He looked at me with a glow in his eye and said, ‘They showed that it can be done. Now people have the idea that change is possible, and that’s the most important thing of all.’”4 When democracy is spreading, it is being taken up not just in emulation of materially successful regimes, but as the internalization of ideas about the moral basis of government. The Middle East is the region least affected by the global forces promoting democratization. That the “uprisings occurred in the one region that was untouched by . . . [previous waves] of democratization carries a powerful message of the universality of democracy.”5 Peoples everywhere now find democracy attractive. This is why the Arab Spring had global and not just regional ramifications. Again, there is a parallel with the 1989 revolutions, which also occurred where democratic revolutions were least expected. Political science research has not adequately forecasted major clusters of democratic revolutions, tending to underestimate global pressures for democratization. When systemic factors are analyzed, scholars tend to focus on large events such as World War I and World War II, the end of the Cold War, or system-wide economic recessions. In his Presidential Address to the American Political Science Association in September 1989, Lucian Pye argued that the events of that year reflected “a crisis of authoritarianism.”6 The legitimacy of authoritarian systems had been severely undermined, thus vindicating modernization theory. Economic growth, changes in communications, and rising education levels were producing difficulties for autocrats to an extent not previously imagined. The information revolution was rapidly escalating the risks and costs of repression. Awareness was growing about the liabilities of authoritarian rule.7 In the USSR, the decline of the peasantry, urbanization, rising education levels, and the growth of a middle class led to Gorbachev’s reforms. In China, the failure of Mao led to the agricultural reforms that produced Tiananmen Square. These changes overturned the consensus that authoritarian systems had advantages in terms of generating development and maintaining authority.8 The scholarly challenge was to address the causes and consequences of this worldwide crisis in authoritarianism.9

The Worldwide Crisis of Authoritarianism 77 The Arab Spring is symptomatic of the way the crisis of authoritarianism has deepened and spread globally over the last 25 years. Moreover, this crisis will only intensify. By 2030 up to two billion additional people are anticipated to enter the global middle class.10 This figure is roughly six times the current population of America, four times the EU population, twice that of India, and twice that of the West. The number of people earning between $6,000 and $30,000 a year is growing by seventy million per year. This is the largest recorded economic and demographic expansion, and dwarfs anything witnessed in the nineteenth century. By 2030, 50 percent of the world population will be middle class, up from 30 percent today. By 2020, 70 percent of China’s population will be middle class, with India ten years behind. Moreover, “by 2020, one third of the new entrants to the world middle class will come from outside China and India. And this percentage could reach half by 2030.”11 It is possible that by 2025 for the “first time in history the number of people in the consuming class will exceed that struggling to meet their most basic needs” as a proportion of global population.12 Countries that have a per capita GDP between $500 and $25,000 are most likely to democratize. A massive global democratic wave is set to occur over the next generation. These figures probably underestimate the expansion of the global middle class. Jim O’Neill, who heads a research unit at Goldman Sachs, notes that “[b]etween 2001 and 2010 the BRIC [Brazil, Russia, India, and China] economies’ GDP rose more sharply than [predicted by] the most optimistic scenario. Moreover . . . their GDP per capita, the best indication of individual wealth, collectively tripled.”13 Kishore Mahbubani anticipates a middle class of 1.75 billion people in Asia alone by 2020.14 Growth has continued in developing countries since 2008. Indeed, the ongoing financial crisis has made developing countries a better investment. Even if modernization theory is only partially correct, and predictions about the global middle class are overestimates, change will still be colossal. Yet remarkably Goldman Sachs’ analysis of the expanding global middle class has received little—if any—commentary in political science. The events of September 11, 2001, increased the transactions costs of globalization by raising the price and inconvenience of travel.15 However, terrorism never interrupted the trend toward modernization. Democratic publics tend to overestimate terrorist threats, a dynamic that was facilitated by the Bush administration’s overreaction to the 9/11 attacks. Neglecting Afghanistan and occupying Iraq turned both states into magnets for terrorism, diminished America’s moral stature, and tarnished democracy promotion. Nevertheless, these developments have not stopped globalization from intensifying.16

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The most important development in world politics of the last decade occurred virtually unnoticed while commentators focused on 9/11 and America’s response. This was the emergence of Brazil, Russia, India, and China as major economic players, with other developing countries following them. The result was a renewed wave of globalization on an unprecedented scale. However, today’s globalization is being led by “the rest” rather than “the West” in a reversal of the 1990s.17 Globalization is essentially decentralized and not controlled by any state or set of states. It cannot be reduced to Americanization or Westernization.18 Indeed, the next phase of globalization is what happens when the BRICs start to overtake the Western economies. The combined GDP of the BRICs will exceed that of America by 2015.19 September 11th did, however, distract commentators from the crisis faced by authoritarian regimes. Problematic interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq skewed debates about the global spread of democracy. During the Cold War, commentators similarly focused on problems besetting democratic transitions while overestimating the resilience of authoritarian regimes.20 Pye’s argument that modernization theory has been vindicated and political science must focus on the global failure of authoritarianism is more relevant today than when he articulated it. Political science today is back in the situation that it found itself in in 1989—and for the same reasons. The world in September 2011 looked more like the world of September 1991 when the Soviet Union was in its death throes, than it did on September 11, 2001. In his influential Mansion House Speech in London in May 2011, the British Foreign Secretary asserted that “[t]he eruption of democracy movements across the Middle East . . . is, even in its early stages, the most important development of the early twenty-first century, with potential long term consequences greater than either 9/11 or the global financial crisis.”21 He was substantially correct. With hindsight, 9/11 was not the major juncture that commentators claimed; 9/11 had an important effect on global affairs that continues, and the same is true about the financial crisis. Yet compared to the larger changes being brought by modernization, their importance was limited. Their biggest impact was distributive, making it harder for America and the West to maintain dominance. There is not a simple relationship between the expansion of the middle class and democracy. Huntington argued that the middle class could embrace religious and ethnic extremism.22 With modernization, [l]ong standing sources of identity . . . are disrupted. People move from the countryside to the city, become separated from their roots, and take new jobs

The Worldwide Crisis of Authoritarianism 79 or no job. They interact with large numbers of strangers [and] need new sources of identity, new stable forms of community and new moral precepts to provide them with a sense of meaning and purpose.23

The people most active in fundamentalist movements have not been the poor and the unemployed, but young, educated professionals. Mohammed Atta, a ringleader in the 9/11 attacks, was from a middle class Egyptian family and had been working as an architect. Nationalism and social conservativism can substitute for religious fundamentalism. In Russia in 2010, 78 percent of the middle class expressed strong support for Putin. In Brazil, the middle classes are more worried about freedom from hunger than freedom of speech.24 Similarly, it is possible to combine economic development with authoritarianism.25 One of the key decisions accounting for China’s economic success has arguably been to not engage in political liberalization—to modernize without Westernizing. Mahbubani extols the wisdom of Deng Xiaoping for introducing free market policies to China while preserving stability. If he had followed Gorbachev’s attempt to emulate the West through both political and economic liberalization, the result would have been similar to Russia under Yeltsin.26 There is “reason to believe that the middle class in China may fear . . . democracy . . . because it would unleash huge demands for redistribution . . . from those who have been left behind.”27 Similarly, the Chinese government is relieved that it has chosen not to copy America’s unregulated capital markets. In November 2009, 20 years after the Berlin Wall came down, Barack Obama headed to Beijing cap in hand to meet one of America’s bankers—the Chinese Communist government.28 The failure of Yeltsin’s experiment with political liberalism arguably explains today’s revival of Russian authoritarianism.29 However, there is a distinction between individual cases and the systemic trend. In the short to medium term, the expansion of the middle class can give voice to social conservatives. Similarly, authoritarianism combined with free market policies may at times outperform democratic capitalism. Yet, over the long term, and in the aggregate rather than in individual cases, the expansion of the middle class pushes toward democracy.30 As Fukuyama observes, “[t]he issue is not whether liberal democracy is a perfect system, or whether capitalism does not have its problems . . . [Democracy] provides a mechanism for government accountability. It provides a way for society to get rid of bad leaders. This is a huge advantage [that] . . . China doesn’t have.”31 Indeed, the fragility of authoritarian regimes was exposed in the Arab Spring, as political systems that had previously seemed unshakable disintegrated. The arbitrary

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and unaccountable nature of political authority in such states is ultimately incompatible with demands of a complex civil society. Individual cases of democratic transition may fail, and there is a possibility of a cultural backlash, but the systemic trend is toward democracy. The effects of the global trend toward democratization are variable. Fukuyama distinguishes between “low”- and “high”-grade authoritarianism.32 Low-grade authoritarian states, such as Belarus, Cuba, and Venezuela, have crude regimes which directly and narrowly serve the interests of the rulers. High-grade authoritarian political systems, such as China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, work harder to sustain a degree of legitimacy and consent.33 While not directly accountable, they are responsive to discontent and often react through concessions rather than repression. They govern through a sophisticated mixture of consent and coercion. They satisfy the population through economic growth and maintain military backing. The distinction between high-grade and low-grade autocracies is subtly different from one between “hard” and “soft” authoritarianism. Like highgrade authoritarian regimes, soft authoritarian regimes govern not just through coercion, but by framing the political agenda. They therefore rely on consent not just coercion. However, some soft authoritarian regimes are low-grade authoritarian political systems, either because they use soft authoritarian techniques ineffectively, or because they fail to achieve sustained growth. Authoritarianism should be evaluated not on the methods it uses to rule, but on the outcome its rule generates for its population. Only high-grade authoritarian states are capable of sustaining broad-based legitimacy. Similarly, the distinction between high-grade and low-grade authoritarianism is more salient than that between competitive and noncompetitive authoritarian systems.34 Unlike traditional authoritarianism, competitive authoritarian regimes utilize elections, but skew the playing field toward the incumbent. However, the key issue is whether competitive authoritarian systems are high grade or low grade. Many competitive authoritarian systems are ramshackle and prone to breakdown, possibly resulting in further competitive authoritarianism. However, high-grade competitive authoritarian regimes might have better prospects for longevity. It is the outcome not the process of authoritarianism that matters. Low-grade autocracies are facing structural problems and are at serious risk. High-grade autocracies are better positioned, but are merely postponing the legitimacy crisis they face. Both types of autocratic regimes face a dilemma. Around the world, the global crisis of authoritarianism is intensifying as a result of modernization.

The Worldwide Crisis of Authoritarianism 81

LOW-GRADE AUTHORITARIANISM The fate of crude authoritarian regimes is becoming clear. Lukashenko’s decision to crack down in Belarus was taken to head off a popular challenge to the (2010) election result . . . Chavez assumed decree powers to neutralize the National Assembly, where the opposition has a far greater presence after its victory in [September 2010’s] . . . election . . . Castro has conceded that ‘the Cuban model doesn’t work for us anymore’ . . . The Iranian regime succeeded in repressing the Green Revolution, just as the military in Burma crushed the Saffron Revolution two years earlier. But both uprisings had mass popular support and exposed the inherent illegitimacy of each regime. The inexorable erosion of the grotesque dictatorship in North Korea continues apace, with South Korea discretely preparing for eventual reunification even as . . . attention remains focused on the nuclear threat.35

The death of North Korea’s Kim Jong-Il rounded off a bad year for autocrats in 2011. If Assad’s regime in Syria survives, its future will be entropy. The option of growing its way out of stagnation, as China did after Tiananmen Square, will not be open to the Syrian government. Belarus—Europe’s last dictatorship—has underdone dramatic changes.36 Between 2000 and 2006, its GDP increased by more than 40 percent, spurring new ties with Western Europe. Belarus has become “the new Eastern Europe.”37 It borders three EU and NATO members (Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland), all of which are active on Belarus issues. The EU has offered Minsk benefits for reforms, which quickened after Moscow began its “gas war” with Belarus in 2007.38 The loss of Russian largesse forced Lukashenko to build EU ties further. By 2008, the EU had replaced Russia as Belarus’ leading trading partner. Access to Western media expanded concurrently. By 2010, 19 percent of the population had the opportunity to watch satellite television.39 Thus linkage with the West grew massively since 2006. Lukashenka’s regime remained well organized. Ties with the EU helped offset its economic difficulties after 2007. However, Belarus’ debt rose rapidly.40 Meanwhile the EU fostered contacts with Belarusian society. The number of broadband Internet subscribers exploded from 11,400 in 2006 to 1.8 million in January 2011, and the West is using or threatening sanctions while encouraging the opposition. Addressing the ongoing economic crisis requires additional borrowing, but loans will be conditional. State spending and domestic living standards will have to decline. This threatens the regime’s “bread for peace” bargain.41 Russia’s role has shifted.

82 The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West Instead of propping up the regime, it has pushed for economic reform and privatization to suit its own economic interests.42 “With the crackdown that began on December 19 [2010], the regime has backed itself into a corner. Its economic model is broken, its social contract is failing . . . and its ability to play East against West is not what it was.”43 Belarus has become “Europe’s Cuba,” or “Venezuela with deficits.”44 Actually, however, Venezuela faces worse problems than Belarus. Hugo Chavez’s (former) “Bolivarian socialist” regime “has become a . . . case study for studying what happens to competitive authoritarian regimes when they become less electorally competitive.”45 Chavez’s support dwindled to a rural base, with the urban poor and rich both moving heavily away from him.46 The cause of Chavez’s electoral decline was driven by “the government’s mismanagement of the 2003–2008 oil price boom [which] has devastated the economy.”47 It used the economic windfall to replicate past economic failures, including nationalization, price and exchange controls, subsidies, and pro-cyclical demand management. It also experienced the “Dutch disease” where imports expand, nonpetroleum exports shrink, and the number of industrial firms declines.48 In 2010, Venezuela was one of the few developing countries experiencing stagflation.49 Consequently Chavez turned to more autocratic methods, albeit within bounds. Legal and illegal measures ensure an electoral playing field biased increasingly in its favor.50 However, “these moves only further contribute to the incumbent’s decline in competitiveness. The assault on checks and balances not only alienates moderates, but also causes policy failings that fuel anti-incumbent sentiment.”51 This forces the regime to further rely on patronage to support its base, creating a self-reinforcing trap of poor performance and declining legitimacy. With Chavez’s death in March 2013, Venezuela faces a crossroads. One route is continued stagnation and increasingly overt authoritarianism, but without Chavez’s charismatic leadership. Alternatively, the opposition seeks to pursue the “Brazilian model.” Chavez’s anointed successor Nicolás Maduro narrowly won the April 2013 elections by exploiting a wave of sympathy for the former leader. The opposition’s long-term prospects will increase as the regime ails. If Belarus is Venezuela with deficits, then Cuba is Venezuela without oil. After the Soviet collapse, “Cuba entered a deep, systemic crisis” which is only deepening.52 With the loss of the Soviet subsidy, the economy went into a tailspin. A combination of austerity and modest economic reforms combined with a tightening of state repression allowed the regime to maintain power. However, things are changing. While “the Cuban system’s many dysfunctions do not necessarily mean that it will soon collapse . . . they

The Worldwide Crisis of Authoritarianism 83 do mean it is inherently unstable.”53 Since the 1990s, a civic opposition movement has emerged. The Christian Liberation Movement (CKLM) led by Oswaldo Payá is a group of young Catholics whose faith community survived efforts to suppress Catholicism. Payá circulated a petition calling for a referendum in favor of civil rights. In May 2002, he delivered it to the National Assembly signed by 11,000 Cubans. By 2009 signatures exceeded 40,000. Payá called his movement “The Cuban Spring.”54 The regime responded with arrests and other measures.55 Since 2002, the opposition has become stronger. Young Cubans express their opposition through blogging communities and rock music, and discontent among the Afro-Cuban community and labor groups has grown. Payá died in a car accident in July 2012, and there is reason to believe that the regime had him killed.56 Economic and demographic trends reinforce the regime’s stagnation. Raúl Castro has announced economic reforms. However, these are modest and simply legalize what is occurring informally. Furthermore, on four previous occasions market reforms were reversed. Cubans no longer trust the state, so the ability of these reforms to deliver is limited.57 Cuba’s population is aging because of universal healthcare and emigration. This trend increases the financial burden on the state. Tourism, a vital source of foreign currency, also has an impact. Hotels allow easier access to Internet connections and information about life outside. In short, Cuba is finding it impossible to maintain the isolation that was essential to Fidel Castro’s closed model. As it is gradually forced to open up, so it has started to slide toward instability.58 The zigzagging of the regime reflects these dilemmas. When Fidel Castro announced in September 2012 that the Cuban model does not work, he asserted days later that he did not really mean it.59 His meeting with Pope Benedict in March 2012 equally highlights desperation. Even if Raúl Castro manages a smooth succession, he is in his mideighties. The problem of a further succession cannot be far away. Barring the discovery of oil, the regime looks increasingly tenuous. Iran also faces a massive legitimacy crisis. It was due to the . . . mounting pressures for both economic and political reform that the clerical leadership . . . threw its support behind Ahmadinejad in the election of 2005, and again in 2009, considering him the perfect vehicle for stirring up . . . revolutionary fervor . . . and beating back a rising tide of reformist sentiment.60

However, populism has intensified Iran’s economic problems. The regime’s position was further undermined by Iran’s young population. By 2009

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it could only generate 300,000 of the one million jobs needed annually to absorb young people entering the job market.61 In summer 2009, an overconfident Ahmadinejad miscalculated in the first ever televised presidential debates. He shocked viewers “by leveling personal attacks at his rivals and their relatives (including their wives) before following up with . . . statistics purporting to show that Iran’s economy, well known to be badly ailing, was . . . in top form.”62 This triggered massive demonstrations in which Neda Agha Soltan’s shooting by authorities was captured by cell phone video, posted on YouTube, and viewed by millions.63 Neda’s death became the rallying point for the Green Movement which engaged in protests for six months.64 The Green Revolution failed, but its significance should not be underestimated. There is reason to be optimistic about the Green Wave’s future. It is indisputably the largest and broadest opposition gathering in the Islamic Republics’ . . . history, and it has galvanized Iran’s massive younger generation like nothing before it . . . Most important of all, the Wave’s impetus has swept it past the comparatively narrow issue of who is running the country, and has focused it instead on the future of the country itself.65

The Green Revolution has also revealed fissures in the regime. Many in its security apparatus sympathize with the reform movement, or do not believe the regime’s “Western conspiracy” theory of the protests. One of the elite purged in 2009 was Saeed Hajarian, an Iranian “Andropov” who warned over fifteen years earlier that the regime had to reform.66 The Green Revolution also won support from religious leaders. “There have been many signs not merely of rifts within the clerical leadership, but open challenges to the authority and . . . basic qualifications of Khamenei.”67 Overall, “Iran is wading through a . . . political limbo: the order that existed before June 12 [2009] is a dead man walking, but those who represent a more democratic future still have not mustered enough powers.”68 If Assad in Syria falls, Iran could face further protests. In October 2012, crowds gathered in Tehran as its currency went into free fall. In response, the regime closed economic ranks. Independent advice has been set aside in favor of politicized decision making. One senior economic official speaking anonymously was quoted as saying: “How much do you think the Minister of Intelligence understands about fiscal and monetary policy? That’s exactly why . . . [those in government] keep changing their minds and . . . their policies overnight. Their decisions are never sustainable and they are just making things worse.” The

The Worldwide Crisis of Authoritarianism 85 government’s decisions smack of panic and populist measures are exacerbating its economic woes.69 Iran’s merchant class is now weary of the regime’s incompetence. This “is where the . . . growing economic ties between Dubai and Iran . . . [reveal] how vibrant the capitalist energies of Iranian society are, despite . . . years of autocratic smothering.”70 An alternative future for Iran could be on the table. “Iran is . . . the descendent of . . . Persian civilization . . . Given the sophistication of Persian culture, it would be unnatural for Iranian society not to be affected by the . . . March to Modernity that has been undertaken by China [and] India.”71 Were the Greens ever to take power, Iran might capitalize on its prime location on trade routes between East and West and on its demographic size. This could provide “political expression for a new bourgeoisie with middle class values that has been quietly rising throughout the . . . Middle East.”72 Political change in Burma has attracted attention. Within six months of Thein Sein’s inaugural address as President in March 2011, the government freed most political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and engaged in other significant reforms. While the country remains a dictatorship, “something profound is changing.” 73 Various factors are driving change.74 The first is the regime’s roadmap for reform. It “increasingly appears that the government’s goal is to set up a system—run by a military-backed dominant party—that will bring all political and ethnic forces within a single constitutional framework and pursue economic development . . . in the style of Malaysia or Singapore.”75 Second, the regime has realized it has become too dependent on China. After the 1988 uprising, Burma’s military rulers turned to China. The new generation of rulers has begun “to steer away from overreliance on China, which they believe has taken advantage of Burma’s isolation.”76 Fear of another uprising is a third factor encouraging reform. While the military repressed the Saffron Revolution, “Burma’s rulers appear to have understood—even before the Arab Spring . . . that they could no longer simply lash out with force against protest.”77 In 2008, Cyclone Nargis killed over 130,000 people and left 1.2 million homeless. After initially refusing outside assistance, the regime allowed it to flow into the country. It “seems likely that these episodes bred tension within top military circles.”78 Fourthly, the junta recognized that it needed Western economic engagement. However, it could only engage the West if it also engaged the opposition.79 Finally, there were acute worries about falling behind economically. Burma’s admittance to ASEAN has exposed it to 1,000 meetings a

86 The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West year with its other members.80 Officials became “painfully aware . . . [that] Burma lags even the poorer Southeast Asian countries, and trails especially badly . . . compared to . . . Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.”81 An advisor to Thein Sein noted in December 2011, “[t]he president . . . saw where the global stream was heading.”82 The 2015 elections loom as a potential turning point for Burma. Burma “provides a code for understanding the world to come . . . [and is] a prize to be fought for” by China, India, and the West.83 It is less than 500 miles from Burma’s Eastern seaboard to China’s Yunnan Province with 568 million people. Burma has a location linking all the dynamic countries of Indo-China. Combined with its size and resources, Burma stands to be a beneficiary of the development occurring all around it.84 Notwithstanding its ethnic tensions and the risk of balkanization,85 it has unexpectedly become a country of enormous promise. Burma’s Cold War with the West is thawing, and the result is what The Economist has termed a “Burmese Spring.”86 Aung San Suu Kyi’s acceptance of her 1991 Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo in June 2012 symbolizes this future. North Korea is the low-grade authoritarian regime facing entropy most acutely. Under Kim Jong-Il, North Korea “used tactics familiar in other closed authoritarian societies, but . . . has taken them to extremes.”87 Two million North Koreans have died of starvation and related diseases since 1995. In 1992, 18 percent of Koreans were malnourished. By 2005, the figure was 37 percent.88 Kim Jong-Il realized that any move whatsoever toward openness would trigger an avalanche that the regime would not survive. However, this creates a catch-22 because North Korea cannot sustain itself indefinitely without economic help.89 The country looks set to follow Vietnam, Germany, and Yemen and reunify in sudden, tumultuous fashion.90 China recognizes North Korea will eventually collapse. When this happens it will be better for China to be inside the country and in a position to influence events. North Korea also desperately needs China’s help and is sometimes willing to trust it. Furthermore, China provides the only vaguely realistic model for Korea. However, the loser in this scenario is the Korean regime. As the population becomes exposed to outside influences, the slide to instability may come quickly as large number of North Koreans become aware of the lies to which they have been subjected. The analogy is with Ceausescu’s regime in Romania in 1989.91 Hence Kim Jong-Il was extremely “wary of imitating Chinese ways.”92 North Korea’s situation has worsened with the death of Kim Jong-Il and his replacement by Kim Jong-Un. One option would be greater

The Worldwide Crisis of Authoritarianism 87 dependence on Chinese largesse, but this reduces the regime’s independence. Moreover, the regime rightly suspects that China uses its engagement to bolster its own position. This gives Kim Jong-Un incentives to consider experimenting with reform in a way his father avoided. There are signs this is occurring. A recent pilot program allowed some farmers to keep 30 percent of their crops and shrunk collective farms to three or four people. This made families the official production unit. As in Cuba, this formalizes the economic system which has already emerged. However, this has led to soaring inflation and a collapse in the currency’s value. As in Iran, it is not clear that rudimentary principles about prices are understood. There have also been signs of more charismatic leadership under Kim Jong-Un, such as the appearance of Mickey Mouse at state events and his young, fashionable wife.93 Under previous leaders, Western culture “was considered an embodiment of decay and immorality.”94 Given his age and experience living in the West, it is not clear that Jong-Un realizes the danger to his rule of these seemly innocuous signs of the outside world in the way his father instinctively appreciated. If Kim Jong-Un is experimenting with reform, he “has little chance of succeeding.” One scenario is a conservative backlash. However, reversal would put the regime back where it started, facing entropy and increasing reliance on China. The alternative scenario is a collapse “similar to recent events in Tunisia or the events of 1989 in Romania and East Germany.”95 Unification will be dangerous, messy, and costly. However, in the longer term, it “makes North Korea the true pivot of East Asia, [because of its location which] commands . . . maritime traffic in Northern China.”96 As happened before 1917, Chinese trade and demographic infiltration could trigger a renaissance in Russia’s North East.97 Moreover, while China fears unification it would actually be its beneficiary. A unified Korea would be under Seoul’s control, and South Korea is China’s largest trading partner. A reunified Korea tilting toward China would have no need for a US troop presence.98 Overall, all of these crude authoritarian regimes are on course to implode. One or two might survive for a generation. Those that do will face even greater problems. The parallels between these diverse cases indicate the generic nature of their challenges. Their governments are incoherently flailing around for solutions to their problems. The possible outcomes of this process of entropy are illustrated by Burma and North Korea. Burma indicates the inevitable reality for regimes that recognize the need to come in from the cold. North Korea shows that the more isolated countries make themselves, the faster and harder their collapse will be.

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HIGH-GRADE AUTHORITARIANISM An alternative route for developing countries is to adopt “high-grade” authoritarianism such as the regimes in China or Russia. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Monarchies have also adopted this approach, as has Singapore. High-grade authoritarianism is of a better quality than the regimes toppled by the Arab Spring. It has been economically successful, retains the backing of the military, and has managed dissent through a sophisticated mixture of concessions and repression. However, this requires sustained economic growth. In turn, this necessitates interdependence with the West, and facilitates the emergence of the middle class. High-grade authoritarianism thus delays and intensifies the legitimacy dilemma faced by cruder authoritarianisms. Once growth slows, the middle class will demand reforms.99 This dilemma acutely affects both China and Russia. Fukuyama identifies four ways in which authoritarianism in China is of high quality.100 First, it makes sophisticated use of concessions to the demands of its population, and is genuinely responsive to its concerns.101 The regime provides its population with economic growth. Additionally, the government deals with income disparities by shifting new investments to the interior, and manages flagrant cases of corruption and abuse by holding officials brutally accountable.102 The Communist Party has staved off atrophy by adaptation. It learned from the Soviet experience that “a certain recipe for collapse is an ossified party-state.”103 From industrializing states in Asia, it learned that “the task of government . . . is to provide a range of core public goods—health care, safety, education, environmental protection.”104 Thus “[d]oing nothing or simply strengthening the coercive powers of the state are insufficient.” The trick is to balance coercive measures with targeted accommodations.105 Second, leadership turnover has been a key element of China’s authoritarianism. Since Mao, the Chinese government has adhered to leadership terms of a decade. This appeases criticisms of leaders, provides quasiaccountability, and promotes policy innovation.106 In 2002, there was a wholesale turnover of the party’s Central Committee and top leadership. China’s ability to rotate its leadership is noteworthy given that communist systems have been notoriously incapable of doing so absent purges.107 China also permits some democratic competition in local elections, allowing non-Communist party candidates to compete for local offices. Third, China has combined concessions with coercion. Thus the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) “is . . . more clever and more ruthless in its approach to repression [than the countries affected by the Arab Spring].

The Worldwide Crisis of Authoritarianism 89 Sensing a clear threat, the authorities never let Western social media in in the first place . . . China based social media is screened by an army of censors.”108 Yet under China’s “networked authoritarianism,” its Internet users are “managing to have more fun, feel more free and be less fearful of their government.”109 New information technology can boost regime legitimacy. “Soft” but not hard regime criticisms are allowed. This marginalizes more radical elements as outside the mainstream.110 Three generations of Internet censorship have evolved. The first is filtering and surveillance. Second-generation techniques include a legal environment legitimizing information control, informal requests to companies, shutdowns, and cyber-attack. Thirdgeneration techniques include state-sponsored information campaigns and physical intimidation.111 As in Russia, blending these techniques strengthens authoritarianism where there is a weak rule of law, no independent judiciary, weak freedom of speech, nontransparent regulation of industry, and a weak opposition.112 Finally, China’s military is cohesive and loyal. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “is a huge and increasingly autonomous organization with strong economic interests that give it a stake in the system. As in the Tiananmen uprising in 1989, it has plenty of loyal units around the country that it would bring into Beijing or Shanghai, and they would not hesitate to fire on demonstrators.”113 Through military support, economic growth, and use of a sophisticated blend of concessions and repression, the regime is attempting to move from a closed system to an open system without instability.114 Yet China “could easily face problems down the road.”115 Fukuyama identifies three longer-term structural problems for the Chinese regime. First, “it could easily face economic problems . . . If the country’s property bubble busts and tens of millions are thrown out of work, the government’s legitimacy, which rests on its management of the economy, would be seriously undermined.”116 Thus “China faces a great moral vulnerability . . . Every week, there are new protests about land seizures, environmental regulation, or gross corruption on the part of some official. While the country is growing rapidly, these abuses can be swept under the carpet. But rapid growth cannot continue forever, and the government will have to pay a high price for pent-up anger.”117 The rule of the CCP has not yet been tested. It has become “the world’s largest chamber of commerce.”118 While this is a strength, it is also a weakness: “China’s political leaders are as frozen and feckless on the grand question of long-term political reform as they are brisk and decisive in

90 The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West making . . . decisions on spending and investments.”119 By embracing capitalism, the regime boosted its performance. However, under capitalism, things go down as well as up. When China drops the capitalist ball, the regime will be vulnerable. Second, “[r]ising but unfulfilled expectations amongst the middle class may still play out.”120 China’s middle class may outnumber the population of America.121 There is a glut of graduates, and “[s]everal million unemployed college graduates are far more dangerous to a modernizing regime than hundreds of millions of poor peasants.”122 Moreover: direct access [through travel and satellite television] to political news from . . . Taiwan is serving as an additional stimulant to the growth of democratic norms and aspirations in China . . . China’s . . . push for closer integration with Taiwan . . . may . . . generate political convergence—but not in the way (its) . . . leaders imagined.123

Hong Kong has the same effect inside China.124 In 1989, Fukuyama observed that there were “over 20,000 Chinese students studying in . . . Western countries, almost all of them the children of the Chinese elite. It is hard to believe that when they return home to run the country they will be content for China to be the only country in Asia unaffected by the larger democratizing trend.”125 In 2012, 200,000 Chinese undergraduates were enrolled in North American universities, an increase of 23 percent from 2011. Every one of these students has access to Facebook. This trend will continue. Middle class Chinese families have one child and can afford tuition, and the recession has intensified competition among universities for funds.126 In the battle between the “sperm whale” of China’s state and the “giant squid” of social networking technology, the giant squid will win. Allowing soft criticism is more sophisticated than outright censorship. However, it creates a gray area which is hard to police, and slippage occurs. People also acquire a taste of freedom and come to resent censorship. Minor incidents produce cumulative dissatisfaction. Combining concessions and repression to maintain regime legitimacy “is easier said than done.”127 The regime’s constant adaptation is a “treadmill.”128 A crisis could throw it off-kilter. At some stage, it will face a serious test, perhaps due to economic difficulties. When it does, no amount of sophisticated censorship will compensate for the millions of Chinese who know about life elsewhere. There has been “an implicit deal . . . that rulers would ensure prosperity so long as the ruled did not demand too much freedom. Now

The Worldwide Crisis of Authoritarianism 91 many people seem to be reneging on that deal. They’ve got the prosperity and they want the freedom too.”129 Third, the Communist Party faces what the Chinese themselves call the “bad emperor” problem . . . When authoritarian rulers are competent and reasonably responsible . . . decision making is often more efficient than in a democracy. But there is no guarantee that the system will always produce good rulers . . . We can’t know what future tyrant, or corrupt kelptocrat, may be waiting in the wings.130

Quasi-ideological divisions exist within the Communist party which manifested themselves in the 2012 leadership transition.131 The Chinese leadership is locked into a battle for supremacy. This could either foster a bad emperor, or intensify the problems of China’s muddling through. Neither of these scenarios presents a stable end point. A “New Right” favors the post-Tiananmen status quo of free market policies and authoritarianism.132 Geographically it is associated with Guangdong province in the coastal South. The New Right prevailed in the 2012 succession with the accession of Xi Jinping. The “New Left” rejects unreformed Communism while also rejecting economic growth over inequality and social and environmental dislocations.133 Its heartland is in Chongqing in inland Western China. It is popular with the poor, rather than China’s middle class. It draws on Chinese nationalism and Maoist iconography. The key figure within the New Left was Bo Xilai, who was party chief in Chonqing. Bo Xilai’s downfall in the 2012 leadership struggle has sidelined the New Left.134 The New Left represents “second-generation indigenization.”135 A developing country’s first modernizer, or post-independence, generation of leaders receives its training in the West. They study abroad as teenagers and absorb Western values. However, the larger second generation is educated domestically. Aspirant leaders no longer look to the West as a model. The first generation of reformers was educated in America during the 1980s and idealized it. The next generation of leaders, however, is larger in number and more self-confident. Most have been educated within China. Those who did study abroad have seen drawbacks of the West through the Iraq War and the financial crisis.136 The American model came to reflect “self-hatred,” and these nationalists argue that China needs its own route toward modernity.137 The New Right was victorious in the 2012 leadership transition. One factor pushing for continuity was recent history. As Shambaugh observes,

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“We’re not going to see any political reform because too many people see it as a slippery slope to extinction . . . [The elite] see it entirely through the prism of the Soviet Union, the Arab Spring, and the Color Revolutions in Central Asia, so they are not going to go there.”138 However, continuation of current policies leaves the regime vulnerable to economic downturn. Into the medium term, therefore, the New Left has better prospects. When the New Right falls or is damaged, the New Left will be in a position to gain power. This could happen through internal reforms. Alternatively the New Left’s mass appeal could allow it to rise to power through democratic elections in a postrevolutionary situation in a parallel fashion to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Today “it’s highly unlikely that you would have the sort of democratization now that you had . . . [in 1989] where . . . the Statue of Liberty would be the symbol for what China should strive for.”139 Nevertheless, the New Left faces greater problems than the New Right. It represents populist nationalist authoritarian rule. Such a regime would find it hard to sustain economic performance. It would pursue policies that favor the poor over the middle class. This would lead to problems generating growth, and consequently weaken support from the powerful middle class. Second, any such regime would depend on a high level of coercion. Bo Xilai’s rule in Chongqing was heavily reliant on repression.140 The New Left’s Maoist rhetoric underscores the potential for its rule to become brutal and lead to a “bad emperor.” Finally, populist nationalism would damage China’s relations with the world. This would make it harder to sustain growth and regime legitimacy. If a populist nationalist regime were moderate, it might coexist with the West before eventually succumbing to democratic reform. If it were extreme, it would face the problems of crude authoritarian states. Given the New Left challenge, some of China’s New Right realize that the status quo is not tenable. Thus the CCP now faces the classic contradiction that troubles all modernizing authoritarian regimes. The party cannot rule without contributing to deliver rapid economic development . . . To the extent that the CCP succeeds, however, it generates the very force—an educated and demanding middle class and a stubbornly independent civil society—that will one day decisively mobilize and end CCP rule for good. The CCP . . . . is damned if it does not and damned if it does.141

China has reached a tipping point at which forces for change now merely require a critical event to trigger a revolutionary bandwagon.142 During the

The Worldwide Crisis of Authoritarianism 93 2012 leadership transition, an open letter calling for more transparency and more intraparty democracy appeared on the Internet.143 Any step in this direction would necessitate further democratic reforms, as happened in Taiwan.144 Neither New Right nor New Left autocratic models offer a viable path for China. A bad emperor scenario might be produced by the New Right (economic downturn) or the New Left (extreme nationalism). This failure would eventually lead to reform. Alternatively, democracy could come about through the repeated failures of pragmatic muddling through. Either way, the eventual outcome would be democracy. This dilemma for China’s elite is reflected in the paralysis within Xi Jinping’s new administration. The Arab Spring made the regime resistant to reform. Yet there is growing awareness that without reform, the system is not stable. It “would be far better for the . . . system to change gradually and in a controlled manner, rather than through violent revolution . . . Not many autocratic regimes get this kind of opportunity; the CCP should not squander it.”145 Like China, Russia represents a high-grade authoritarian regime. The difference is that the Russian system has elections. However, the regime uses engineered elections as a political tool to maintain power. Elections perform four vital functions for the government.146 First, they dramatize Putin’s majority and the lack of plausible alternatives. Hence results ensure very large margins for victory, even though it would be possible to win through less heavy-handed interventions in the electoral process. Popularity as measured at the polls is therefore an effect and not a cause of Putin’s grip on power. State-managed elections also provide opportunities for the party of power to rebrand itself and present itself as one of both stability and change.147 Second, rigged elections serve as an instrument for governing. Elections are not just a decorative façade to make the regime appear democratic to the world.148 They help Putin exercise and maintain power. Manipulated voting helps Moscow to distinguish between effective and ineffective local officials. Underlings who fail to perform can be publically removed. This encourages party cadres to redouble their efforts to fabricate the aura of invincibility. Thus there is a mechanism for feedback and even accountability from society.149 Third, elections demonstrate and exaggerate Russia’s national unity and dramatize perceived national solidarity. The regime’s need to simulate coherent Russian nationhood is greater than its need to imitate democracy. The state remains fractured, disunited, and feudalized. Elections are perhaps the only genuine sign of centralization. They give the appearance of

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unity to the otherwise dubious unity of the nation. On election day, voters from Russia’s far-flung regions demonstrate their loyalties to the leader. For those haunted by memories of the Soviet collapse, rigged elections in Chechnya giving 95 percent of the vote to Putin provide reassurance. Elections therefore play to Russian nationalism.150 Fourth, elections serve not to mimic democracy, but to imitate authoritarianism. Like Stalin’s show trials, they produce a demonstration effect. They display Putin’s authoritarian credentials as someone who can get things done. It is important that elections are known to be rigged. This functions like the pictures of Putin flooring judo opponents and swimming bare chested. They allow a regime incapable of addressing the country’s problems to present itself as omniscient. They conceal the reality that rather than being misgoverned, Russia is governed hardly at all. Elections also make it unnecessary to resort to high levels of physical intimidation.151 Contrary to popular belief, Putin’s autocratic state is weak, not strong. The conventional account of Putin’s popularity holds that Putin has rolled back political freedoms to restore order and growth. However, this uncritically accepts the myth put forward by the Putin regime. “In terms of public safety, health, corruption, and the security of property rights Russians are worse off today than . . . a decade ago.”152 Similarly, the economy has grown despite rather than because of the regime’s policies.153 Members of Putin’s government are doing very little except staying in power and lining their pockets. Putin’s Russia is a classic petro-state, using oil money rather than good governance, to deliver for the population. The protests across Russia in 2011 reflect the fragility of relying heavily on elections to support the regime’s position. In late 2011, Russia was the only country among the BRICs affected by the Euro crisis. The Decembrist movement emerged when citizens protested balloting in elections to the Duma. The situation was inflamed when the March 2012 presidential election returned Putin to the country’s highest office.154 Putin had “capriciously and rudely offended Russia’s middle class . . . [by making] an insider’s joke of his promise to offer up a choice as to who was to lead the regime he created.”155 The younger generation was free of Soviet nostalgia and fear, and the Internet mobilized demonstrations.156 At first the Kremlin stuck to its usual harsh tactics. However, this only fueled protests because educated urbanites were so alienated. A system that had seemed resilient was revealed as brittle. Used to an apathetic society, the Kremlin initially chose the worst possible way to react.157

The Worldwide Crisis of Authoritarianism 95 After initial shock, the regime regained its composure. It targeted repression more carefully, while offering handouts and co-opting opinion leaders. It also tried to split the opposition, discredited their leaders, and deemphasized force in favor of a “soft kill.” Medvedev sent the Duma a package of cosmetic “liberalizing” bills, and bussed in state workers for pro-Kremlin events. Throughout all this the Kremlin insisted that the Decembrists were paid for by the West. It also championed the provinces against Moscow.158 The same sophisticated soft authoritarian tactics were also used against Pussy Riot, the feminist punk band that staged an antiPutin protest on February 21, 2012, at a Moscow cathedral. These tactics enabled Putin to survive, but he is damaged goods.159 Putin can no longer count on rigged elections being followed by a legitimating absence of public protests. He could not count on show elections reliably reducing the opposition to silent resignation. Changing governors was not enough to maintain control over the regions. National elections no longer painted a picture of a united Russia. Instead they made it embarrassingly clear how polarized and fragmented the nation had become.160

Lurching toward the provinces for support is extremely dangerous. It further alienates the educated, urban middle class. Moreover, the provinces are increasingly unhappy. In contrast to the desire for freedom and democracy demonstrated by urban protestors, those in the provinces reflect desires for honest police officers, well-run health clinics, pensions and social services, as well as greater accountability.161 Yet these are things that the regime is manifestly not delivering, and is unable to deliver. Moreover, there are strong indications among opinion surveys in the provinces that people are becoming impatient with nationalist and leftist slogans when the regime repeatedly fails to deliver improvements in services.162 These shifts in attitudes track with Russia’s . . . modernization. In the decade before the global financial crisis real household incomes rose 140% . . . In other countries, such dramatic spurts of modernization have generally been accompanied by a shift in the public’s concerns from economic survival to . . . ‘self-expression values’. No longer pre-occupied with the need to feed and clothe their families, individuals . . . care more about . . . freedom of expression and . . . political participation. Russia’s big city liberals are walking illustrations of this trend. Most provincial Russians, and also many in cities, have not yet reached this point [but] they have clearly moved beyond their daily struggle for existence in which . . . political support

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The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West can be bought quite easily. Russians outside the elite do not yet clamor to participate in the state, but they want a state that works.

Putin’s approval rating will no longer rise in line with economic performance.163 The skill of Putin’s regime in managing opinion should not be overestimated. Roxburgh recounts his experiences as a consultant for a Western firm hired by the Russian government at considerable cost to improve its image. He documents its farcical understanding of public relations. The regime assumed that it was able to pay for better coverage in the West, and that public relations could soften the damage of photographs of riot police beating up old ladies. Not only did the Russian government waste large amounts of money, but it paid a former journalist to observe its inner workings, only to have him make public the laughable nature of his experiences.164 As the Russian population becomes more sophisticated, the effectiveness of soft authoritarian tools will diminish. Internationally, Putin has followed China’s attempt to play the soft power game to attract international support for his rule. Yet, as Joseph Nye notes, both autocratic regimes have frequently “stepped on their own message” by repressing human rights at home. Moreover, the best propaganda is not propaganda. Hence there is little international audience for China Central Television or Russian Television.165 Putin faces the familiar autocratic catch-22. The Kremlin appreciates that reform will lead to the fate of Mubarak.166 However, the status quo is reinforcing the system’s decline. Public largesse is one possibility, but places pressure on the budget, damages economic growth, and further reduces the performance of the state. A second possibility is to trade soft authoritarianism for coercive autocracy. However, the regime lacks the skilled and ruthless apparatus to make this work, and extremely repressive regimes have not succeeded in societies as developed, educated, and rich in communications technology as Russia.167 Even though Russia’s authoritarian regime is high grade, like Belarus, it faces three problems: radicalization of the opposition, increasingly sophisticated underground democratic forces, and limitation of the regime’s ability to restrict access to information, especially through Internet technology.168 The likely outcome is a long downward slide. Another economic deterioration or a mistake by the regime could galvanize further protests. Absent this, slow decay is probable.169 Overall, while China and Russia adopt a higher caliber of authoritarianism, both continue to face a legitimacy dilemma. By combining sustained growth with more sophisticated techniques for managing dissent, these

The Worldwide Crisis of Authoritarianism 97 regimes are able to meet some of the demands of their peoples. However, they are merely delaying the day that their populations fundamentally question their underlying authority. In the meantime, they are on a constant treadmill and resentments are building.

EXTREMISM AND DIVERSIONARY TACTICS Autocrats could use extreme nationalism or religious fundamentalism to divert attention from domestic crises. Diversionary tactics have been common historically, and were adopted by Milosevic’s Serbia.170 Autocratic regimes are more likely to initiate militarized disputes against other states when inflation is high, more so than their democratic counterparts experiencing poor economic conditions.171 Arguably, diversionary tactics are being used now by Russia and China (e.g., the 2008 Georgian conflict or China’s claims to islands in the East China Sea). Yet Serbia’s fate is illustrative. Weak autocracies employing diversionary strategies risk heavy costs, including isolation from the global economy and military defeat leading to regime change. Great powers are more likely to experience containment rather than go to war with the democratic community because of deterrence.172 However, due to interdependence any new “Cold War” would be unlike the old one. The effects of economic isolation on Russia or China would be far greater than previously felt by the USSR. Competition “works exceedingly well on powerful actors. Even powerful actors are moved by the prospect of falling behind.”173 Precisely the Soviet Union’s failure to respond to these pressures from the capitalist world economy facilitated its collapse. Unlike previous eras, states that challenge the status quo today will not be able to translate assertiveness into beneficial changes. Even a coalition of autocratic states would face a coalition of liberal capitalist states over which it would not be able to prevail.174 As Barry Buzan and Mick Cox observe, China’s rise is occurring in a context in which great power war is largely ruled out, and in which the institutional order is relatively well developed. . . . Although foolishness leading to war can never be ruled out, the main question for China is what kind of peaceful rise, cold or warm, and in relation to which circumstances : neighbours, other great powers, and the . . . US.175

Additionally, growing transnational social networks among individuals reduce the effectiveness of autocratic diversionary tactics. “As individuals

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are socialized into the values and orientations of these networks, stark ‘us’ versus ‘them’ cleavages become more difficult to sustain.”176 This explains the growing tendency of populations in developing countries to see through and discredit nationalist propaganda.177 The capitalist democratic community has available two mechanisms through which to influence and constrain rising autocratic powers. First, a rising power like China or Russia will challenge the status quo only under certain circumstances. If it perceives a low probability of conflict and a willingness by the democratic community to make concessions, the challenger will tend toward cooperation.178 Similarly, if the aims of a “rising power are limited then the declining state will . . . appease its demands.”179 Domestic factors also matter. Economic interests, popular nationalist demands, and a history of conflict may also shift the balance toward cooperation or conflict.180 However, the tendency of new powers to change the status quo is not inevitable, incentivizing both emerging and established powers to avoid confrontation.181 Second, confrontational strategies by capitalist autocracies are self-limiting. Nationalism is used to distract attention from domestic problems. However, regimes recognize that their legitimacy depends on engagement with the West and so are careful not to take “saber rattling” too far.182 China is a “fragile superpower.” Its “economic might makes its leaders appear to loom over us [but] China’s current leaders feel like midgets, struggling desperately to stay on top of a society roiled by economic change.”183 Moreover, leaders know that protests may become a monster that regimes cannot control, as Milosevic found to his detriment when the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen Plan. Overall, diversionary strategies are of limited use, and if China or Russia do take this approach, they will run into a brick wall as Serbia did in 1999. Russia and China therefore face a “fork in the road”—pursue integration and moderate nationalism or fall by the wayside.184 Overall, authoritarian regimes face a wholesale crisis of legitimacy because they have no systematic means of organizing society. Unlike communist and fascist political systems of previous eras, authoritarian systems today do not even have ideological principles, however unrealistic, to fall back on as a legitimating framework. Instead, each regime is patching up its position on an ad hoc basis. The result is a series of culturally and historically specific models which have limited shelf-life, have little relevance to other countries or regions, and provide no attractive or sustainable template for other states. Twenty-five years after the Cold War, low-grade authoritarian states are failing chronically. High-grade authoritarian

The Worldwide Crisis of Authoritarianism 99 regimes are in a stronger position. Through growth and using a blend of concessions and repression, they are responsive to some of the aspirations of their peoples. However, the legitimacy of these regimes is corroding as the expectations of the growing middle class increase. High-grade authoritarian systems are therefore storing up resentments, not diffusing them, and this will worsen. They are sitting on a ticking legitimacy time bomb. Fukuyama’s claim that liberalism had won out over its primary ideological competitors as the Cold War ended has garnered even more support in the post-Cold War era.

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5. The Expansion of the Global Democratic Community

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uthoritarian regimes around the world face a wholesale and systematic crisis of legitimacy. However, a second route for developing countries is for them to become emerging democracies. Examples exist today on every continent, most prominently Brazil and India. In emerging democracies, there is less need for a bourgeois revolution against the government by the emergent middle class.1 The growing salience of emerging democracies in world politics is producing the expansion of the global democratic community. Asia is at the epicenter of this trend, and Africa has taken great strides. In Latin America, democracy has consolidated its strong position, and democracy is seeping further into Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The Arab Spring heralds a fourth wave of democratization. The expansion of the global middle class produces pressures for accountable government in authoritarian states. The same pressures have different effects, however, on developing countries which are already emerging democracies. Here middle class mobilization energizes the political system. Dilma Rousseff’s declaration that she wants “a middle class Brazil” reflects the way the middle class is now shaping politics in emerging democracies.2 These dynamics have powerfully been on display in India. In 2011 and 2012, India witnessed large-scale demonstrations against corruption. In December 2012, the gang rape of a 23-year-old woman on a bus brought widespread protest. The event was not atypical for India, which has an appalling record of violence against women. Yet the incident caught the imagination of the middle class because the victim could have been their own daughter or neighbor. Indian democracy has reached an inflection point. Fareed Zakaria has interpreted the wave of middle class protests in India as an “Indian Spring.”3 Zakaria notes that previously, mass demonstrations in India have been about religious nationalism or caste identity. More recent protests, however

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“ask the government to perform its basic duties” and enforce existing law. In contrast to democracy in America, politicians in India have pandered to the village rather than the urban middle class. However, this is changing. By some measures, the Indian middle class is more than 250 million strong, and 35 percent of India’s population lives in urban areas. Moreover, these numbers are growing quickly. As a result, [t]his large and awakened middle class . . . is beginning a push to the center of political life . . . People are demanding more of the system . . . In China the great question is whether the new president, Xi Jinping, is a reformer . . . [in India] the question is different: Are Indians reformers? Can millions of people mobilize and petition . . . for change?4

In emerging democracies, the institutions required to change the system exist. What they require is that middle class gasoline ignites the engine of reform. The Indian Spring is unlike the Arab Spring because in India, protest energizes the system rather than undermines it. While democracies in the developing world face challenges, there is a mechanism for accountability that autocratic systems lack. The same principles also apply to the widespread antigovernment protests across Turkey and Brazil that occurred over the summer of 2013. Like the Arab Spring, these revolts were driven by the emergent middle classes. They were in a sense ironic because in economic terms the people of these countries have never been more prosperous. Demonstrations reflected what might be termed the “Ikea Theory” of protest—that once development reaches a certain level, expectations rise. In Turkey this manifested itself as a counterreaction to Erdogan’s authoritarian tendencies, and in Brazil complaints were about the failure to provide basic public services. The “Turkish Spring” and the “Brazilian Spring” show that as with authoritarian states, emerging democracies face many serious social, economic, and political problems. However, the key point is that their political systems are more flexible and better able to accommodate reform than authoritarian systems. This does not foreclose the possibility of backsliding into authoritarianism in these countries. However, it does place them in an advantageous position in terms of the long-term consolidation and maturation of their democracies. Hence demonstrations in Turkey were much closer in nature to those in India and Brazil than those in Egypt and Tunisia in terms of both their causes and consequences. Protests are able to use the democratic logic of the political system as an effective long term instrument to push for political change and reform.

The Expansion of the Global Democratic Community 103

EMERGING DEMOCRACIES IN WORLD POLITICS A remarkable feature of world politics today is that numerous non-Western states are democracies. As a result, “the democratic world encompasses democracies in every region, of every civilizational type, and of every level of socio-economic development.”5 The variety of democratic systems poses problems for definitions of democracy, and there is a gray area between democracy and authoritarianism.6 Different categorizations of democracy serve different purposes. However, a key distinction is that between “established” and “emerging” democracies. “Established democracies” are the consolidated democracies of the West. Examples include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. There is a risk of these countries backsliding into autocracy, but it is small. “Emerging democracies” are not consolidated democracies, and their chances of backsliding are greater. However, they have free and fair elections and a regular transfer of power. While not fully stable, they have made huge progress, are generally nonaggressive externally, adopt capitalism, and allow a reasonable degree of pluralism. They are capable of becoming established democracies in the future. While not necessarily secular, they tolerate religious dissent. These states assert their independence from the West when their interests are not aligned. Yet broadly they pursue accommodation and integration.7 More and more states approximate to this ideal, and they are increasingly influential. Examples include Brazil, India, Argentina, Mexico, Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and South Africa. China and Russia might become emerging democracies, but should not be regarded as such today. Emerging democracies demonstrate there is an attractive alternative to confrontation with the West. Thus Egypt, Tunisia, or Libya might become like Turkey.8 Indonesia’s success is especially important because prospects for democratic transition after its 1999 revolution seemed tenuous in the wake of economic collapse and ethnic and religious tensions. Conversely, becoming like Iran will not yield benefits, and high-grade authoritarianism, even if possible, will generate another legitimacy dilemma. The concepts of established and emerging democracies are ideal types. Newer democracies such as Hungary, Spain, or Greece today face the risk of backsliding. These countries are on the spectrum between the established and emerging democracies. The point is that many countries might backslide, but emerging democracies approximate consolidated democracies in terms of their institutions and behavior.

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The concept of emerging democracies adapts John Rawls’ notion of “decent hierarchical societies.”9 Decent hierarchical societies are authoritarian countries that are worthy of moral respect and toleration by democratic peoples. They have two features: they are nonaggressive, and they respect fundamental human rights and have a “decent consultation hierarchy” that allows for pluralism. Dissenting voices are taken seriously by the government and are given a conscientious reply.10 Rawls gives the hypothetical example of “Kazanistan,” where only Muslims can hold upper positions of authority and influence the government’s main policies, but other religions may be practiced without fear or loss of most civic rights, and non-Muslim religions and associations are encouraged.11 The hierarchical order is also changed periodically to make it more responsive, and the fundamental interests of all groups within society are taken into account.12 Kazanistan is strikingly similar to Malaysia. While Malaysia is a competitive authoritarian regime in which there are distinct limits to civil and political rights . . . the government largely rules on the basis of a broad-based legitimacy, rather than repression. There are regular elections, which create political debate and quite widespread participation. There is a reasonably vibrant civil society, which is able to debate and criticize government policy. There is clear evidence that the ruling coalition has responded to expressions of relative electoral discontent by modifying its policies.13

While Islam remains a barrier to democracy, there is “a strong tradition of accommodation that makes radicalization of Islamic policies an unlikely scenario.”14 The difference between Malaysia and an emerging democracy like Indonesia is not large. Both are nonaggressive, adopt some form of capitalism, allow a reasonable degree of domestic pluralism, and might become established democracies. However, while emerging democracies like Indonesia are not consolidated democracies, they have free and fair elections. Decent hierarchical societies like Malaysia might have free elections, but they are not fair ones. Moreover, while decent hierarchical societies exist, emerging democracies are far more common. Nevertheless, both decent hierarchical societies and emerging democracies exist in a “gray area” between democracy and authoritarianism.15 Both indicate that states which are not established democracies but which are nonaggressive and allow sufficient internal freedom may voluntarily choose to be a part of the community of democratic states. The notion of emerging democracies

The Expansion of the Global Democratic Community 105 therefore utilizes Rawls’ idea of an expanding “international social contract” between peoples which act as a mechanism through which democracy spreads.16 Turkey’s response to the Arab Spring reflects the strategies adopted by emerging democracies.17 Turkey supported Western policy in the Middle East to safeguard its interests and accommodate Western states. Turkey also acted as a responsible regional power. Yet it maintained autonomy from Western policy, tried to mediate regional conflicts, and has not shied away from placing pressure on Israel over Palestine.18 This “presents a model of how a Muslim-majority country can engage with the West in a friendly but critical way.”19 Indonesia, which is also an Islamic country, pursued policies similar to Turkey’s in its response to the Arab Spring.20 Other emerging democracies also bandwagon toward the West, while disagreeing with specific Western policies. The IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) forum exists alongside the BRICs grouping. It “explicitly endorses democracy and human rights [and] offers a potentially important platform for coordinated diplomacy” on these issues. Piccone and Alikioff include Turkey and Indonesia in this grouping, calling them the “IBSATI” states.21 Disagreements that emerge between established and emerging democracies tend to be over the means and methods of promoting democracy.22 Emerging democracies are adopting this mixture of accommodation and confrontation as they promote their values and interests while engaging the West.23 Emerging democracies feel constrained by their strong ties to the West. Yet China and Russia behaved similarly during the Arab Spring through their abstention on UN Security Council resolution 1973 and their recognition of Libya’s Transitional National Council (TNC). On balance, most states are bandwagoning toward the democratic community most of the time, and this produces a self-reinforcing trend.24 It is important to distinguish between emerging democracies, and previous experiments with liberalization and Westernization. The paradigm is Kemalism, pioneered by Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and Reza Shah in Iran after World War I.25 Kemalists learned from colonial humiliation that new nations must adopt modern military and administrative tools.26 While these leaders brought important advances, their commitment to state-driven development created problems. A true bourgeoisie comprised of middle class merchants and professionals failed to develop independent of state sponsorship.27 Moreover, Kemalist reformers insisted that secularism was vital to achieving modernity. This led to intense resentment of the elite by the masses.28 By the 1970s, Kemalism deteriorated into merely a

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form of postcolonial authoritarianism, repressive and economically reliant on statism. In Iran, this Kemalist experiment culminated in the backlash of 1979. In Turkey, Kemalism stagnated. Today it has been superseded by the advent of a middle class that is independent of the state, rather than a product of the state. This has occurred since 2002 with the rise to power of Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP in Turkey. This period coincided with the explosion of economic development in the traditionally poor and backward Western region of Anatolia.29 Thus “[t]he great irony of Turkey’s push . . . for economic development and entry into the European Union is that it is the conservative ‘provincials’ who strongly supported the Islamic resurgence and began voting in droves for Islamic parties [and] have been leading the charge for political pluralism and economic globalization.”30 The result has been a broad-based embrace of Westernization. Peoples are embracing democratic and capitalist values because they want them rather than through state imposition. Nasr cites Barrington Moore’s famous observation: “No bourgeoisie, no democracy.” In Europe, capitalism and then democracy were the result of the way in which the government became dependent on revenues from the middle class. By contrast, under Kemalism, the middle class was a product of the state and opted for patronage.31 Kinzer observes a parallel between the vivacious young Turkish woman in her mid-twenties that he knew who still lived with her family and changes in Turkey. In 2002, the year that Erdogan came to power, she finally left home and moved into her own apartment. In 2002, Turkey’s embrace of the West similarly came of age. The country is today thriving by making its own decisions.32 This powerfully captures the authentic embrace of democracy and capitalism that distinguishes emerging democracies from previous attempts at imposed Westernization.

THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY IN THE NON-WESTERN WORLD Democracy is on the march in the postcolonial world. In every continent, pressures for democratization are mounting, the number of democracies is increasing, and existing democracies are consolidating. East Asia is ripe for a wave of democratization, and Africa too is making progress. In Latin America, democracy has consolidated and the “Bolivarian Wave” is coming to a close. Democracy is also gradually moving further east in Europe, and is even creeping into Central Asia. This unprecedented “enlargement

The Expansion of the Global Democratic Community 107 of the democratic world has brought hundreds of millions of people closer to the realization of the democratic vision.”33 In fact, some scholars have described an emerging legal “right to democracy.”34 Larry Diamond observes that recent discussions of the Arab Spring’s implications for democratization have been misplaced. Instead, “if a new regional wave of transitions to democracy unfolds over the next five to ten years, it is more likely to come from East Asia.”35 Asia is at the vanguard of the expansion of the global middle class. Today Asia accounts for onequarter of the global middle class, and that figure could double by just 2020, at which point it would account for 40 percent of global middle class consumption, and numerically would be larger than the middle class in North America and Europe combined. This rapid increase is set to happen because a large mass of Asian households have incomes today that position them just below the middle class threshold.36 In contrast to the Arab world, East Asia already has a critical mass of democracies . . . Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are all consolidated liberal democracies. East Timor, Indonesia, Mongolia and the Philippines are at least electoral democracies with some resilience . . . Thailand is progressing back toward democracy; Malaysia and Singapore show signs of entering a period of democratic transitions; Burma, to the surprise of many, is liberalizing . . . and China faces a looming crisis of authoritarianism.37

If China falls or even comes under pressure, the result will be increased pressures for democratization in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. In July 2012, Hillary Clinton was the first US Secretary of State to visit Laos since John Foster Dulles in 1955. South East Asia became the focus of Eisenhower’s domino theory of the spread of communism. It is ironic that forty years after the Vietnam War ended, a “reverse domino effect” is gathering in the region. Laos is eyeing neighboring Vietnam’s 40 percent surge in trade with America and America’s sudden rapprochement with Burma.38 Singapore, like China, has been hailed as a model for authoritarian development. However, “Singapore is by any standard a massive anomaly . . . and is the most economically developed non-democracy in the history of the world.”39 It is already a competitive authoritarian state, the class of autocracies most likely to experience democratic transition.40 Lee Kuan Yew and the founding generation of leaders are passing from the scene. Singapore’s single-party dominance is entering a vulnerable phase

108 The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West as opposition parties find new energy, and young people use social media to express themselves.41 Malaysia is also a competitive authoritarian state. Only Taiwan had a higher GDP per capita when it completed its democratic transition, and Malaysia now surpasses Brazil, Chile, and Mexico with its score on the UNDP’s Human Development Index as well as per capita income. Moreover, Malaysia’s government faces a more serious challenge than Singapore’s leadership. Half a century of de facto rule by one party, a better educated and more pluralistic society, the growth of independent organizations, and the use of social media have placed a strain on the regime.42 “A transition to democracy could happen any time in the coming years through the electoral process.”43 Thailand is less developed than Malaysia, but has more democratic experience and more freedom and pluralism. The military seems to have learned from the last decade that its own intervention will not solve the country’s problems. Thailand already has a per capita income and human development score roughly equivalent to Poland’s in 1990. Combined with democratizing trends in both Burma and China, “within a generation or so . . . it is reasonable to expect that East Asia will be democratic. And no regional transformation will have more profound consequences for democratic prospects globally.”44 Africa too has experienced tremendous political and economic progress.45 Despite the outside world’s perceptions, [s]ince the mid 1990’s—for fifteen years —seventeen [emerging African] countries have achieved steady economic growth . . . stronger leadership, and falling poverty . . . The old negative stereotypes of sub-Saharan Africa don’t apply to these countries.46

Collectively these 17 emerging African countries comprise more than 300 million people.47 These countries share important trends dating back to the mid-1990s: economic growth sustained at more than 5 percent per year; the percentage of the population in poverty is sharply falling; trade and investment have more than doubled; school enrollment, completion, and literacy rates have all doubled and education for girls especially is rising; health indicators (e.g., child mortality) are improving; and lastly, population and fertility rates are falling.48 While these trends are certainly reversible, they cannot be considered a temporary blip.49 Underlying these patterns are five key changes.50 First is the rise of more democratic and accountable governments. In the 1980s, Africa’s economic crisis deepened and protestors began to call for change in a process accelerated by the end of the Cold War and apartheid. As a result, the number

The Expansion of the Global Democratic Community 109 of democracies jumped from three in 1989 to 23 in 2008. A wide range of associations independent from the ruling party are a great force for accountability in many cases in Africa.51 Second, more sensible economic policies have been implemented. While economic policies today are far from perfect, they are a vast improvement over those of the past. Africa has benefitted from the “demonstration effect of other emerging market success stories around the world” by copying their recipe.52 Third, the debt crisis has been mitigated over time for many African counties. Debt burdens have fallen and relations with donor countries have changed. Fourth, the spread of new technologies such as cell phones and the Internet has created new opportunities for business and political accountability. There are now more than 130 million Africans with cell phones, and Africa is the fastest growing cell phone market in the world.53 This technology has introduced banking services into many areas for the first time.54 Finally, there has been the rise of a new generation of leaders known as the “Cheetah’s” which is well educated, savvy, and entrepreneurial. They are “fed up of unaccountable governments and the economic stagnation of the past and are bringing new ideas and new vision.”55 Africa is the world’s fastest growing continent. Over the next decade, its GDP is expected to rise at 6 percent a year on average. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has risen from $15 billion in 2002 to $46 billion in 2012.56 The African region has the tenth largest economy in the world. This places it ahead of India, Brazil, and Russia as a total market.57 The largest eleven African economies are equivalent in size to India’s or Russia’s. Africa has the “world’s biggest democratic demographic dividend.”58 As China’s population enters middle income and its population ages, Africa stands to be a major beneficiary. It will have a large working-age population for the next forty years. As such, it will be an ideal location for labor-intensive industries and export-oriented services and factories.59 Asian governments and companies are recognizing that Africa is rising. China’s trade with Africa rose from $10 billion in 2000 to more than $55 billion in 2006, more than double its trade with India. Brazil’s trade with Africa has risen from $4.2 billion in 2002 to $27.6 billion in 2012.60 India and China have seen the rise of their markets, and they expect the same in Africa.61 Africa’s modernizing trends have not been confined to any single region. As Robert Kaplan has observed “[t]echnology, along with monetary inflows . . . is finally allowing Africa to escape from its geographic isolation, which has always been a principle culprit behind its poverty.”62 Egypt with a young and growing population of 80 million people has vast economic potential. As China’s manufacturing costs rise, Egypt’s

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geographic location next to Europe positions the state advantageously.63 In West Africa, Nigeria has emerged as an economic hub. It is also being led by “a group of politicians who seem determined to weed out the . . . corruption that has restricted its growth for so long.”64 South and East Africa are increasingly integrating into the Chinese and Indian economies.65 The “scale and pace of trade and investment flows between Africa, India, and China are now exceptional . . . and could be an unprecedented opportunity for the region’s growth and its integration into the world economy.”66 A robust network of economic activity is developing around the Indian Ocean, a pattern reinforced by large and growing investment in Africa from the Gulf economies.67 Importantly, the majority of Africa’s most successful economies are democracies, including South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya. More generally, the Arab Spring has offered a beacon of hope for reform across the continent.68 Latin America, already with a strong cluster of democratic states, nevertheless has been affected by the democratizing trend. Existing democracies have consolidated, and there has been a shift toward pragmatic, centrist politics.69 This trend has been driven by the region’s rising economic prosperity, sound macroeconomic performance, its developing economic ties with the rest of the world, and a marked decline in poverty levels.70 Brazil leads this regional trend. In its 2010 election, “the policy differences between the two leading candidates—Dilma Rousseaff of the Workers Party (PT) and José Serra of the Social Democratic Party (PSDB) were mostly negligible.” Both candidates promise broad continuity with the policies of Cardoso and Lula.71 In Columbia’s May 2010 elections, Juan Manuel Santos, a proponent of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair’s “third way,” won overwhelmingly.72 Chile, one of the region’s few consolidated democracies, has strongly shifted toward pragmatism and centrist ideology, breaking from the ideological experiments of Allende and Pinochet. Pi ñera has also developed a good working relationship with President Evo Morales of neighboring Bolivia, despite a wide ideological divergence between them.73 Peru has experienced an economic boom from trade and exports expansion, levels of poverty have dropped markedly, and the middle class has grown. These economic advances auger well for Peru’s democratic prospects.74 To the north, “Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean for the most part appear to share South American’s growing penchant for pragmatic centrism.” 75 Mexico and Latin America are increasingly benefiting from political, economic, and cultural spillover from the United States.76

The Expansion of the Global Democratic Community 111 The “Bolivarian shift” to the radical left in Latin American policies that appeared in the first decade of the twenty-first century has been undercut. Countries have emphasized economic equality, and established political distance and independence from America. However, there is an important distinction between the moderates led by Lula’s Brazil and the pragmatic left, and the populist and authoritarian left led by Chavez’s Venezuela.77 The trend toward leftism is heavily shaped by pragmatism. Moderates in pragmatic leftist countries such as Brazil have been more successful, while autocratic and ideological variants have failed to deliver.78 In Bolivia, for instance, Morales’ government exercised fiscal discipline and witnessed higher levels of political participation from the majority indigenous population. Finally, it is unclear whether the wave of leftists leaders during this period occurred “because of an ideological shift, or because the traditional political institutions had collapsed, discrediting the incumbents.”79 Overall, the region seems likely to continue moving toward more pragmatic, centrist polices. Chavez’s popularity was a unique phenomenon, and with “no viable leader to take up his mantle, the future portends disarray for the Latin American left.”80 The post-Communist world has experienced a remarkable period of democratic consolidation. The engagement of the European Union in 2004 anchored the region firmly to the West. Democratization in the Balkans continues to advance. It is not unrealistic to envisage the whole of the Balkans becoming democratic and seeking EU membership over a 15-year period. Georgia’s Rose Revolution (2003), Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (2004), and Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip revolution (2005) each proved problematic.81 Moreover, Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008 dashed hopes of NATO and EU membership for Ukraine and Georgia. However, there are good reasons for optimism over the next generation. Russia has played the role of black knight in the region, but “Russia’s authoritarianism is vulnerable today, and in that lies the hope for renewed democratic development throughout the region. Michael McFaul’s speculation of several years ago remains apt . . . ‘As Russia goes, so goes the region.’”82 If Russia follows Belarus’ route toward growing authoritarian decay, so the prospects for democratic consolidation further eastward will expand. Kaplan discusses the ideas of Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, who argues that: a truly reformed Russia would be in a better position to project influence throughout its Eurasian peripheries . . . In this way of thinking liberal democracy is the only ideal that could allow Russia to once again achieve what in

112 The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West its eyes is its geographic destiny . . . Russia (on this account) should put more emphasis on its extremities—Europe and the Pacific—than on its European heartland [and] politically attach itself to Europe and economically attach itself to East Asia. This would solve Russia’s problem in the Caucuses and Central Asia—by becoming truly attractive to those former Soviet republics, whose people are themselves desirous of the freedoms and living standards that obtain at the western and eastern edges of Eurasia.83

For example, Kazakhstan, today a prosperous middle income country by Central Asian standards, is geographically the size of Western Europe and rich in natural resources. Western multinationals are making major investments in the country.84 As the Russian and Kazak economies become increasingly interwoven, “Demitri Trenin . . . could well be right: Russia’s real best hope is to liberalize its economy and politics, in order to make Russia attractive to the Kazaks and other former subject peoples.”85 Through processes of economic and political spillover, democracy is diffusing through Eastern Europe into Central Asia. Moreover, the resurgence of “Mitteleuropa” which has occurred as a result of the shift of the EU and NATO eastward, is creating further regional contagion. With Eastern enlargement, the EU’s center of gravity has shifted. A new Berlin–Warsaw axis is emerging to partly displace the old Berlin–Paris axis.86 With Germany and Poland growing rapidly, this makes likely a scenario in which: Central Europe would fully reappear and flower for the first time since World War I; and a tier of states between Germany and Russia would equally flourish . . . leaving Europe in peace . . . In this scenario, Russia would accommodate itself to countries as far east as Ukraine and Georgia joining Europe.87

Jim O’Neill points out that the economic case for Russia becoming part of an EU economic zone is already “substantial.”88 The post-Communist world seems frozen along the Soviet–European border of 1939. However, this status quo will break down over time as economic modernization and then political development spreads east.

A FOURTH WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION Combined with the Arab Spring, these regional trends collectively amount to a fourth wave of democratization. Huntington offered four explanations for the occurrence of democratization in clusters: parallel development,

The Expansion of the Global Democratic Community 113 prevailing nostrum, snowballing, and single cause.89 To these a fifth cause, institutional instability, may be added.90 All these various factors stem from the strength of the global democratic community. Parallel development occurs when similar causes acting independently produce the same effect in different countries. Prevailing nostrum operates when different countries face different problems (a recession, military defeat, breakdown of order), but independently adopt the same solution. Snowballing is the process by which change or events in one country accumulate and accelerate as they spread to other places. A single cause, for example, the end of a major war, might explain a number of different democratic transitions. Major changes in global communications technology, such as the advent of social networking through the Internet, might have an equivalent effect. Finally, institutional instability explains democratization clusters in countries that are neither fully autocratic nor fully democratic. Countries having inconsistent institutions, such as autocratic regimes that have partially reformed, are more vulnerable to change. In the language of evolutionary game theory, autocracy and democracy both represent evolutionarily stable strategies, but mixed systems which contain elements of both institutions are unstable.91 Mixed or semidemocratic regimes are more likely to experience regime change, often in the direction of democratization. The chief cause of parallel development is economic modernization. Economic development or economic crises tend to happen (in parallel) in neighboring or interdependent countries, producing waves of democratic transitions and reversals. Parallel development is being fostered by the economic modernization occurring in developing countries today. Countries with per capita incomes between $500 and $25,000 are most likely to experience regime change. Autocratic institutions are sustainable in lowincome, illiterate societies, and dependent on natural resources, whereas democracy thrives in high-income countries dependent on skilled labor and financial capital.92 The unprecedented scale of the expansion of the global middle class in world politics points to a fourth wave of democratization. The bourgeois revolutions which rippled through the Middle East in 2011 are merely the tip of a larger global trend.93 In terms of prevailing nostrum, the Arab Spring had genuinely worldwide ramifications. As Carl Gershman has observed, events in the Middle East offer powerful evidence supporting the idea that democracy is a universal value. The Arab Middle East was the only major region of the world untouched by the third wave. Arguments about Arab democratic exceptionalism “have now been refuted by millions of Arab citizens ready to

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risk their lives for freedom and affirms with remarkable force the message that all people have dignity and should be treated with respect. This message has certainly been heard in countries far beyond the Middle East.”94 Democracy has become a universally applicable prevailing nostrum, the zeitgeist put forward in different countries around the world facing different problems. This reflects heightened reflexivity and a growing awareness of the global spread of democracy and its benefits for societies. There are fertile grounds for global and regional democratic snowballing in the wake of the Arab Spring. Thus the Middle East events have the potential to mushroom [because of] popular attitudes towards democracy . . . [As] Larry Diamond [has] observed . . . ‘Public opinion surveys in Asia, Africa Latin America, the post-Communist states, and the Arab states all show majorities of the public within each region prefer democracy as the best form of government. Strikingly this is true even in the poorer countries of Africa and Asia, and in Arabian countries with no direct experience of democracy.’ Thus the demand for democracy . . . in the Middle East could easily spread in other regions that are still ruled by authoritarian governments.95

Both regional and global snowballing would reinforce the trend toward democracy. A systemic shock or single cause of democratization is also applicable today. Unlike 1989 and the end of the Cold War, after 2011, no great power wars have occurred to spur postwar democratization.96 However, the advent of social networking technology is a functional equivalent, akin to changes in “world time” or periods in which social networks develop rapidly.97 Thus the: principal new factor responsible for the vulnerability of autocratic regimes today is the rapid growth of new communications technologies and social networks . . . Of course not every networked movement is successful . . . Nonetheless, [this] cannot change the underlying reality, which is that there is a sharpening contradiction today between closed and repressive states and increasingly networked, informed and awakened populations.98

Finally, institutional instability is also promoting a fourth wave of democratization. With the exception of North Korea, there are few autocracies that remain genuinely closed. As a result, they “are all to one degree or another vulnerable and unstable.”99 Autocratic regimes as diverse as Belarus, Venezuela, Cuba, Iran, Burma, Singapore, Malaysia, China,

The Expansion of the Global Democratic Community 115 and Russia all find themselves increasingly exposed to outside influences through a variety of global pressures. Historically, a confluence of such pressures has tended to produce a “norm cascade” whereby a series of states are encouraged to make tactical adaptations to, and gradually internalize, domestic reform.100 The fourth wave of democratization brings with it the possibility of backsliding. Third wave democratizations were associated with fewer regressions than previous waves of democratization.101 However, reversals are more likely in the fourth wave for two reasons. First, this wave will encompass a larger and more diverse group of states. Many of those affected by democratization after 1989 were post-Communist states with fair prospects of anchoring to the democratic community through NATO and the EU. This is less likely today. Second, given the post-2008 financial crisis, even some established democracies might backslide. However, this will not undermine the existence of a global democratic critical mass. Among emerging democracies, there are a number of possible candidates for backsliding. Most obviously, Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya will all face this risk, as could the states in the Balkans region. South Africa faces difficulties. More than a decade after the fall of Apartheid, most black South Africans are still waiting for their reward. If they don’t get it, and if the continuing divisions between blacks and whites are not narrowed, South Africa’s stability is likely to be comprised.102

In Latin America, while Argentina remains a “robust” democracy, its “political and economic institutions remain strikingly . . . vulnerable . . . Good times notwithstanding, the specter of another crisis remains.”103 Mexico’s problems tackling drugs cartels could conceivably lead to disorder.104 More generally, developing countries have largely been unaffected by the 2008 financial crisis. When they eventually experience a downturn, the stability and durability of democratic institutions will be tested. That established democracies are at greater risk than emerging democracies for backsliding is a distinctive feature of the fourth wave of democratization. Prior to 2008, established democracies were considerably less likely to backslide than emerging democracies. However, in the fourth wave, it is possible and indeed likely that a small minority of established democracies may experience partial, temporary, and perhaps even complete reversal. During the fourth wave, the established democracies are experiencing structural economic difficulties and pressures on the middle

116 The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West class are increasing.105 This potentially creates a situation similar to second wave transitions after World War II which experienced reversals as a result of economic difficulties after democratization.106 Backsliding could occur in the event the West loses its status as the dominant cultural grouping in world politics, and cultural backlash ensues. For example, the True Finns achieved 19 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections in Finland in 2011. Anti-immigrant sentiment fed into this success. Thus even, and perhaps especially, in the wealthiest democracies, there may be a psychological resentment about sharing the West’s previous monopoly on prosperity and status. Indeed, there has already been backsliding by established democracies. While emerging democracies such as Brazil, Indonesia, and India have done very well following the 2008 economic downturn, a number of central European countries including Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia have met authoritarian challenges.107 Since 2004, these countries have all been EU members and might be regarded as established, not emerging democracies. In Hungary and Poland, the challenge has come not from the fringe radical right, but from center right parties who argued that their proposed transformations would represent the realization of the promises of 1989.108 The Hungarian case represents a more fundamental challenge to liberal democracy because leaders have actually changed, rather than merely bent or broken the rules of democratic institutions.109 Backed by a 2010 election victory that gave it a two-thirds constitutional majority in Hungary’s parliament, the Orbán government has rewritten the constitution. Moreover, Hungary’s democratic opposition parties are in disarray.110 The Hungarian case also highlights the fact that the EU has no mechanism for handling backsliding in countries that have already obtained membership.111 More generally, the democratic community currently has surprisingly little leverage in such cases, other than sanctioning or removing members from regional organizations. Other potential candidates for democratic backsliding are, not least, Greece, Spain, and Portugal. It is easy to imagine scenarios in which authoritarian populist leaders on the left or right come to power in the face of austerity measures. This might trigger one or more of these countries leaving the EU or reverting to authoritarianism. Perhaps only the memories of life under authoritarianism on the part of the older generation in Greece prevented such a scenario after the 2012 election in Greece, which became a referendum on membership of the Euro. A number of the factors salient to postwar second wave democratization may again become applicable. These include the weakness of democratic values among key elite groups

The Expansion of the Global Democratic Community 117 and the public, economic crisis or collapse, social and political polarization, the determination of middle and upper class groups to exclude populist and leftist movements and lower class groups from political power, and the breakdown of law and order.112 Anti-EU and anti-immigration extreme right groups have done well in elections in Holland, the United Kingdom, and a number of Nordic countries.113 Outside Europe, probably the most serious and likely risk would be Japan. If Japan’s economic and demographic stagnation continues, its middle class will face mounting woes. It is not difficult to think of scenarios in which the Japanese public loses faith in the democratic path. Overall, the fourth wave of democratization will generate a more dynamic relationship between the core of established democracies, a semiperiphery of emerging democracies, and the periphery of autocracies of the international system.114 Some countries may move quite rapidly from the periphery or semi-periphery to the core. Kenya or Nigeria, for example, might prove able to move through the semi-periphery to the core quickly if current trends continue. Turkey or Brazil could move from the semiperiphery to the core.115 Others will move “back” from the core or the semi-periphery. On balance, however, and despite periodic reversals and setbacks (perhaps even major ones), the overall trend in the fourth wave of democratization will favor continued democratic consolidation. A significant proportion of emerging democracies will survive and consolidate as a result of the fourth wave. Following the trends in the previous three democratic waves, backsliding will not completely undo the overall trend toward democratic consolidation.116 Backsliding by established democracies will be occasional, and the global democratic critical mass will be sustained. For the countries undergoing it, backsliding will pose major challenges, and the democratic community will be challenged in responding to such cases.

THE DEVELOPING WORLD’S “SECOND STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE” Since 1945, the developing world has bought into a package of international principles that historically were Western. These include the rights of states to sovereignty, self-determination, and racial equality, and to standards of social and economic welfare.117 Today, developing countries are beginning to consciously buy into a fifth historically Western principle, namely democracy. Aung San Suu Kyi’s notion of a “second struggle for

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independence”—the first being freedom from colonial rule, the second being freedom from authoritarian rule—vividly captures the nature of this trend.118 After World War II, the developing world adopted four key institutions of international society. Among developing countries, the right to equal sovereignty was the struggle of states which retained their formal independence but had a subordinate or inferior status. This was manifested through mechanisms such as “unequal treaties” concluded under duress, which conferred conspicuously asymmetrical benefits on the parties, and which impaired the sovereignty of non-Western states. Self-determination was adopted through the anticolonial revolutions by which Asian, African, Caribbean, and Pacific peoples achieved their independence. The principle of racial equality was embraced in the form of the struggle of nonwhite states and peoples against white supremacism. The old Western-dominated international order was associated with the privileged position of the white race. After 1945, decisive changes against this were achieved through the independence of so many nonwhite states that the white have become a minority, the reduction of Apartheid South Africa to pariah status, and the 1966 Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Lastly, developing countries adopted the struggle for economic justice. The anticolonial movement from its inception maintained that imperialism was bound up with economic exploitation. The idea that non-Western peoples had certain social and economic rights was therefore a natural corollary of their struggle for political independence.119 While adopting certain core principles from the West, developing countries sought to maintain their cultural and political autonomy. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson famously referred to this as the developing world’s “revolt against the West.”120 The attempt by non-Western peoples to throw off the intellectual or cultural dominance of the Western world manifested itself most prominently in terms of the postcolonial world’s rejection of democracy as a Western political construct. Bull and Watson recognize that the revolt against Western dominance was conducted, ironically, at least in the name of ideas or values that are themselves Western. Sovereignty, self-determination, racial equality, and social and economic rights are all notions grounded in Western thought, even if it is not clear in all cases that these ideas are exclusively or uniquely Western.121 Cultural and political autonomy may itself be a Western value. However, since 1945, democracy came to be viewed as unsuited to the traditional or indigenous cultures of the non-Western world. On this account, “human rights and political democracy are not just Western in origin but Western in

The Expansion of the Global Democratic Community 119 character, and their realization is incompatible with the core values of nonWestern civilizations.”122 This, as Bull and Watson observed in their classic examination of these issues, “has raised the question of whether what has been widely interpreted as a revolt against Western dominance . . . is not a revolt against Western values as such.”123 Today, however, developing countries are self-consciously abandoning the revolt against the West. Around the world, and in every geographic region, the democratic tide is rising, and is set to rise still further in future. As a result, international society is changing profoundly. Developing countries are beginning to willingly embrace a fifth historically Western principle, namely that of democracy. In her July 2011 BBC Reith Lectures, the Burmese democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi gave an intellectual articulation of this general trend in world politics. Drawing parallels between democracy struggles in the Middle East in 2011 and liberalizing reforms taking place within Burma, she referred to the notion of a “second struggle for independence” in the developing world. The developing world’s first struggle for independence sought freedom from colonial rule, but the second struggle for independence seeks freedom from authoritarian rule.124 Suu Kyi’s notion of a second struggle for independence captures the way in which developing countries are beginning to adopt democracy as an end that is important in its own right to the local population. Democracy is coming to be understood as relevant to the needs and aspirations of postcolonial peoples. This reflects the internalization of the political values of the democratic community by non-Western peoples.125 Suu Kyi’s notion of a second struggle for independence reconciles the aims of the postcolonial liberation movement for independence from the West with indigenous demands for democratization. Her Reith Lectures noted that there are many parallels between demonstrations against the Burmese junta today and the demonstrations for independence in the 1930s against Britain’s colonial rule. Yet there were key differences between the two protest movements: [w]hile our parents had fought against foreign power, we were engaged in combat with antagonists who were of the same nation, the same race, the same color, the same religion. Another difference, pivotal though seldom recognized as such, was that while the colonial government was authoritarian, it was significantly less totalitarian than the Junta that came to power in 1988.126

Thus in 1989 the challenges were greater than during the struggle for postcolonial independence. It was harder for postcolonial societies to recognize

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the causes of their own problems as being indigenous than it was to blame outsiders for the imposition of problems. Only once this realization occurred was it possible for Burmese society to move forward.127 Yet doing so required a degree of critical introspection and self-reflection that itself was psychologically painful and traumatizing, both for individuals and collectively for the nation. It has been traditionally argued that postcolonial societies have indigenous cultures which are not suited to Western liberalism. They “define the individual in communal terms and do not regard the . . . individual as the basic unit of society.”128 It follows that their definitions of freedom, equality, rights, property, justice, loyalty, power, and authority are also fundamentally different from Western liberal conceptions of these terms.129 While this does not mean that liberal democratic institutions have no value for non-Western societies, “it does mean that non-Western societies have to determine the value themselves in the light of their cultural resources, needs, and circumstances, and they cannot mechanistically transplant them.”130 It has been the prevailing view, however, that developing countries’ experiments with democracy failed because traditional and indigenous cultures have not been suitable for it to take root.131 As “non-Western peoples have assumed a more prominent place in international society, it has become clear that in matters of values the distance between them and Western societies is greater than . . . in the early years of national liberation . . . it was assumed to be.”132 However, over time, the peoples of the developing world are voluntarily seeking democracy for themselves. They increasingly view democracy not just as compatible with their own indigenous or national cultures, but as reflecting their own culture. Indeed, this is precisely what Aung San Suu Kyi’s notion of a second struggle for independence so eloquently captures. As Bull and Watson wisely cautioned 30 years ago, cultures are not monolithic and unchanging.133 If developing countries freely contract into the democratic community on a voluntary basis, then this choice must be respected and embraced by other democratic societies and peoples.134 Indeed, historically, sovereignty has been a powerful mechanism through which democracy and human rights have spread through the international system.135 In this context, it is important to recognize the self-serving nature of claims by authoritarian leaders that the peoples they rule over are not suited to democracy. Rather than reflecting a genuine and authentic

The Expansion of the Global Democratic Community 121 incompatibility between democracy and indigenous cultures, these claims reflect the political interests of incumbents. As Suu Kyi observes: [there] is nothing new in Third World governments seeking to justify and perpetuate authoritarian rule by denouncing liberal democratic principles as alien. By implication they claim for themselves the official and sole right to decide what does or does not conform to indigenous cultural norms.136

Given that the developing world took up the other four historically Western principles for organizing political life, it is perhaps not surprising that it would eventually adopt democracy because it offers the greatest benefits. After half a century resisting democracy, the developing world is embracing it because it has found that authoritarianism is simply not working. Over the postwar period, autocratic regimes have done little for their peoples except line their own pockets while repressing their subjects. Postcolonial leaders have used the rhetorical fig leaf of political independence to shore up their own power base and divert attention from the deficiencies of their rule. For over 50 years, these pitiful and self-serving excuses worked. Today, however, the developing world is waking up to the fact that these claims are simply not true. The peoples of the developing world are coming together around their proud histories and rich cultures knowing that their colonial experiences do not exclude them from seeking their democratic freedom, but are a reason why they are all the more urgent and compelling. That they have been denied their freedoms on a false pretext has made peoples in the postcolonial world more aware of the essential compatibility between their own indigenous culture and democracy. Suu Kyi observes that one might have expected that repression dulled the sensitivity of the peoples of developing countries to freedom. The opposite, however, is the case. In Burma, perhaps not all that surprisingly their appetite for discussion and debate, for uncensored information and objective analysis, seems to have been sharpened . . . It is natural that a people who have suffered from the consequences of bad government should be preoccupied with theories of good government.137

These observations, however, apply more generally and throughout the developing world today. Indeed, sophisticated analyses of anti-Westernism have identified as an historical oversimplification the claim that ideas about democracy have been exclusively Western, and that the non-Western world universally

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rejected these ideas as imperialist.138 There have always been critics of Western imperialism within Western societies. These critics have sought to use Western notions of civilization to criticize the subjection of nonWestern peoples by the Western powers.139 In the developing world, many have opposed Western colonialism on the basis of Western ideals about equality and fairness.140 Consciously influenced by Western critiques of imperialism, non-Western critics such as Ôkawa Shûmei in Japan and Rabindranath Tagore in India put forward a “vision of the universal West [that] was closely linked with a desire to become equal members of the perceived civilized international society and to benefit from the security and prosperity this globalizing international society promised.”141 The notion that democracy is an intrinsically Western concept is the product of particular historical circumstances associated with the age of high European imperialism.142 During this period there was a large imbalance of power between the West and “the rest” in world politics. Under these circumstances, it became natural to appeal to the cultural and political solidarity of the non-Western world as a means of checking Western domination.143 By extension, however, as the balance of power between the West and the rest changes, these ideas will lose their political utility as a means of resisting Western primacy. Today, therefore, the response to both [contemporary Western] imperialism and anti-Western ideologies should rely on affirming shared universal values and strengthening international institutions that can implement global norms, not blaming one of the parties in the imagined civilizational geographies of the East or West.144

The present therefore represents a critical, plastic historical moment.145 The “massive new middle classes all over the world have begun to accept many of the values and aspirations of the Western middle classes.”146 What the developing world is experiencing is growing reflexivity or rising global consciousness about the desirability and attractiveness of democracy as a form of government. There is growing understanding that the principles of democracy are not all of Western origin; they are found in many societies around the world, and even if these principles are “Western” their validity is not connected to their origin.147 This involves reconciling diverse national cultures with the abstract and universal demands of democracy as a set of political institutions. Suu Kyi traces this process of reconciliation in the experience of Burma. Her argument relates democracy to Burma’s Buddhist religious tradition. In the Buddhist view of Kingship, a ruler “is expected to observe the Ten Duties of Kingship [which are] liberality,

The Expansion of the Global Democratic Community 123 morality, self-sacrifice, integrity, kindness, austerity, non-anger, non-violence, forbearance, and non-opposition [to the will of the people].”148 After considering these qualities, she concludes that it is: a strong argument for democracy that governments regulated by principles of accountability . . . are more likely than an all-powerful ruler or ruling class to observe the traditional dictates of Buddhist kingship. Traditional values serve to justify and to decipher popular expectation of democratic government.149

Suu Kyi’s reconciliation of indigenous values and democracy is taking place not just in Burma but across the whole of the developing world. As Pye has observed, there is: a fundamental clash between the culture of modernization [or] world culture and the various national political cultures. This is always . . . psychologically disturbing . . . because it brings into confrontation universal standards and parochial values. The former are essential for . . . performance and effectiveness, and the latter are critical for creating national loyalties and distinctive national political styles.150

How the crisis of authoritarianism is resolved will depend on the extent to which national or political culture either moderates the conflict between national and universal requirements, or exacerbates it. These differences will be crucial in determining the character of nationalism that accompanies political development. Moreover, later-developing societies typically have more difficulty in managing this contradiction because political modernization in such societies tends to be viewed as a foreign imposition rather than as an indigenous development.151 The outcome of this process will vary. In some countries, experiments with democracy may fail. However, awareness of this psychological shift is further increasing reflexivity by heightening worldwide consciousness about the desirability and possibility of moving from authoritarianism to democracy. In the past, the material preconditions for the spread of democracy were missing from many and indeed most parts of the postcolonial world. The expansion of the global middle class has changed that situation, requiring the national consciousness in developing countries to shift in line with material conditions. In relation to a discussion of global capitalism, Jim O’Neill has suggested that economic development is not as difficult as it is portrayed. The two key changes that are necessary for governments are to keep inflation low and to open up the economy to the outside world, especially through trade.152 If governments of developing countries do this,

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then as the examples of South Korea, Brazil, and Turkey demonstrate, they are often able to bring about a massive turnaround in their country in a remarkably short time. FDI has a similar effect, improving economic performance in developing countries and reducing escalation of territorial disputes to war, issues that have been the leading cause of war historically.153 Moreover, this is not a new trend. Japan’s victory in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War demonstrated that it was relatively easy for a nonWestern society to rapidly overtake Western powers by copying Western practices.154 However, O’Neill also identifies a reluctance to make the changes that can unlock development. For example, “[a]mong Indian elites, I often find a resentment of Western practices, development amongst them. Some simply don’t want this vast change.”155 He ends his discussion of India’s future by noting that “the more I travel to India, the more I find myself concluding that . . . [i]ts problem is one of state of mind . . . It is perhaps as simple and as difficult as this.”156 India is of course, a democracy, and O’Neill’s point was intended to be economic not political. However, the theme about developing countries having a residual psychological reluctance to follow the Western route to modernity is also apparent in the political domain. Nasr gives the example of a senior Turkish parliamentarian’s contribution to a heated international discussion among Muslims about Islam and democracy. The debate revolved around dueling Koran quotes. When it was his turn to speak, the Turkish parliamentarian “slowly leaned forward and, with . . . a touch of patronizing indulgence . . . said ‘here in Turkey, we are fortunate that we don’t have debates like this . . . We have a democracy and we are in the government, and our voters judge us by our economic achievements.” Nasr cautions that Turks remain passionate about Islam. However, the call to focus on the practical, daily issues of governing was exactly right.157 In an international system experiencing heightened reflexivity, choices matter. In the past, there was a tendency for postcolonial nations to view democracy as a Western imposition not suitable to their societies. Today they increasingly realize that democracy is the way and that they can make it work for them. Never has this been more evident than in 2011, when the transformations that shook the Arab world were merely a taste of what is to come.158 Rather than seeing democracy and national identity as contradictory, Arab protestors viewed them as implying one another. While outside influences such as social networking communication technology were crucial in encouraging the revolutions, the protestors claimed these forces as means to their own ends. Hence, in the words of a senior Al-Jazeera correspondent,

The Expansion of the Global Democratic Community 125 “The Arab Spring is exclusively Arab.”159 Yet it is vital to recognize that the Arab Spring has also had global ramifications. The Arab Spring symbolized “the end of post colonialism.”160 It was the moment the peoples of the developing world ceased to view democracy as a Western imperial imposition and adopted it as the culmination of their own struggle for national liberation. As Aung San Suu Kyi observed in her 2011 Reith Lectures, the universal aspiration to be free has been brought home to us by the stirring developments in the Middle East. The Burmese are as excited by these events as peoples elsewhere. Our interest is particularly keen because there are notable similarities between the December 2010 revolution in Tunisia and our own 1988 uprising . . . A friend once said she thought the straw that broke the camel’s back became intolerable because the animal had caught a glimpse of itself in the mirror . . . In Tunisia and in Burma, the deaths of two young men were the mirrors that made the people see how unbearable were the burdens of injustice and oppression they had to endure.161

Across the world, developing countries are taking a hard look at their own authoritarian governments, and they do not like what they see. In Suu Kyi’s words, the “similarities between Tunisia and Burma are the similarities that bind people together all over the world who long for freedom.”162 Aung San Suu Kyi’s identification of the way in which Burma’s struggle resonates with other democracy movements itself further heightens awareness about the spread of democracy. In exercising her freedom of speech in the global public forum provided by the BBC Reith Lectures, Suu Kyi consciously sent a message to the world that it is possible to turn dreams of freedom into reality.163 It is difficult to conceive of a more powerful expression of growing worldwide democratic consciousness. The 2011 Reith Lectures reflect a more general process through which the developing world is adopting democracy for the intrinsic benefits it offers. From its fragile beginnings in the American and French revolutions, democracy has become a genuinely worldwide phenomenon for the first time in history. This is the true legacy and significance of the revolutions of the Arab Spring. It is why the Arab revolutions did not just rock the Middle East, but rocked the world.

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Part III

The Eclipse of the West Gradual, inexorable and fundamental changes . . . are . . . occurring in the balances of power among civilizations, and the power of the West relative to that of other civilizations will continue to decline. —Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 19961

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6. A Post-Western Democratic Global Order

P

aradoxically, democratization has taken hold in the developing world at the moment that the West is experiencing decline. The balance of power is shifting in favor of newer nations. Samuel Huntington was therefore correct in his prediction that with the end of the Cold War, the West had not triumphed, and that future dynamism in world politics would come from the non-Western world.2 The West “failed to see that the moment when . . . [it] was basking in the glow of Cold War triumph was also the moment when Confucian, Islamic, and Hindu civilizations (among others) were . . . stirring.”3 However, Huntington was wrong in thinking that this dynamism would be associated with the rejection of capitalism and democracy by developing countries. On the contrary, “the rise of the rest” is being driven by the embrace of these historically Western institutions by the rest of the world. Rather than the universal spread of capitalism and democracy representing the “triumph of the West,” these changes represent the beginning of a post-Western future for the global democratic project.

THE CONVERGENCE OF CIVILIZATIONS The twenty-first century is returning to the old norm in which the two largest economies in the world were China and India.4 This claim is said to be misleading because population was the main component of GDP. Since China and India had four times the population of Western Europe in 1600, their GDP was larger. Even in 1913, China could claim a greater total GDP than Britain. Hence economic growth and GDP per capita offer better indicators of usable output. Between 1350 and 1950, GDP per capita remained constant in India and China while Western GDP grew

130 The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West 600 percent.5 This is what economic historians have called “The Great Divergence”—the period in which the West rose to ascendancy.6 Since it lasted over 500 years, the rise of the West should not be viewed as a historical anomaly.7 However, there are two reasons to understand the past five-hundred years as exceptional. First, in terms of a country’s economic potential, size is critical. Paul Kennedy put forward the notion that countries have a “natural share” of gross world product based on population and territory.8 Due to uneven development, for considerable periods the world might diverge from this pattern. Yet as countries develop, they utilize their resources. Jim O’Neill has developed this idea, noting that “the BRICs countries are home to close to . . . half the world’s population. In some ways it shouldn’t be much of a surprise that . . . they would be potentially the largest economies: the world’s largest populated nations probably should have the biggest economies.”9 Demographic advantages are reinforced by the size of these countries, which has endowed them with immense resources. They are continents masquerading as nation-states. Geography and demography are a large part of economic destiny.10 Second, India and China have large populations because they were premodern civilizations. The study of world politics has been ethnocentric and myopic.11 It has focused on relations among Western states since 1648, a period when the West was in its ascendency. This gave the misleading impression of the potential of the non-Western world. Until the thirteenth century, the heartland of world civilization embraced Islam, India, and China, and the East was ahead of the West by almost every measure.12 In 1411, Western Europe was a backwater.13 None of the five independently emerging centers of human civilizations were Western. When their institutions were in tune with their times, the achievements of the non-Western world were, by the standards of their day, greater than achievements of Western civilization.14 From a larger perspective, The Great Divergence is the outlier. Ethnocentrism and myopia have been reinforced by hubris and parochial attitudes in the West.15 Thus: [T]he end of the Cold War brought . . . complacency and . . . intellectual smugness in many Western minds . . . [The] ‘End of History’ thesis . . . allowed Westerners to believe that the West had ‘arrived’ at the final destination of human history. All that the West had to do was wait for the rest of the world to catch up.16

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Fukuyama himself reflected on the boredom that would be associated with the passing of history, concluding that “the end of history will be a very sad time.” [t]he struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history.17

Yet the striking feature of world politics is that developing countries are overtaking the West. With this the world will witness not boredom, but a flourishing of civilization on a scale never experienced. In this renaissance, non-Western cultures will not only materially prosper, but they will rediscover their heritage.18 The rise of the rest is therefore fundamentally a cultural rather than an economic development, both in its causes and its consequences. The rise of the developing world is producing not a clash but a flowering of civilizations. This is associated with an unprecedented explosion of human liberty and the creativity this unleashes. Mahbubani offers the example of a young Muslim Indian exchange student who went on to win prestigious science competitions in Canada and New York. Until recently, this student would never have left his village.19 Similarly, Ek Sonn Chan, who lost his family in the Cambodian genocide, modernized the Phnom Penh Water Authority to the point where it outperformed its British counterparts and transformed supply to the poorest.20 As John Stuart Mill observed, with individual liberty human life becomes rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing more abundant ailment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to.21

When Mill wrote, most of the world’s population lived in poverty and servitude. Today there is a realistic prospect that the majority of the global population will be able to experience the benefits of liberty in our lifetimes. In the past 30 years, The Great Divergence has become The Great Convergence.22 Starting with a population of nine million in 1870, it took Britain 150 years to double GDP per capita. The United States and

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Germany needed 30–60 years and had populations of a few tens of millions of people. India and China are doing this with 100 times as many people as Britain in one-tenth of the time.23 During the industrial revolution, for the first time standards of living rose so rapidly that there were noticeable changes of as much as 50 percent over a human lifetime. At current rates, in Asia, standards of living may rise 10,000 percent within a human life.24 Global poverty levels will fall to 15 percent by 2023, far exceeding the target of 23 percent set by the UN Millennium Goals. Global absolute poverty could be eliminated by 2030. The biggest improvements are occurring in the poorest countries.25 An important part of this trend is the rise of the BRICs. It was anticipated in 2003 that by 2040, the BRICs will outweigh the G6 by share of world GDP, and by 2025 account for over half the GDP of the G6.26 China would overtake Japan by 2015, and the United States by 2039. By 2050, only the United States and Japan of the current G6 would still be among the world’s six largest economies. However, even prior to 2008, the BRICs exceeded projections.27 In the wake of the financial crisis, these predictions have been revised. The BRICs will represent a larger share of the world economy (just under 25 percent) than the United States by 2015.28 O’Neill notes that “[l]ooking back, those earliest predictions, shocking to some at the time, now seem rather conservative. The aggregate GDP of the BRIC countries has close to quadrupled since 2001, from around $3 trillion to between $11 and $12 trillion.”29 The world economy has doubled in size since 2001, a third of the increase coming from the BRICs. Their combined GDP increase since 2001 has created the GDP equivalent to a new US economy, and in 2012 they created a new Italian GDP.30 Of the BRIC economies, China contributes at least 5 percent of global GDP; Brazil is close behind and growing, and India and Russia are each likely to achieve or surpass this mark over the next decade. Each BRIC member has different characteristics. Brazil is the most popular of the BRICs for investment, and made a quick recovery after 2008. Previously, Brazil would have been seriously affected by the crisis, but policies pursued by the country’s leaders allowed it to adopt expansionist measures. Political change underpinned Brazil’s economic success.31 Russia faces unfavorable demographics, dependence on energy, and poor governance. However, it has the potential for a higher GDP per capita than the other BRICs, and even than European countries.32 It could rise from $10,000 today to $20,000 by 2020 and close to $60,000 by 2050. Its demand for consumer products could grow to match that of many developed countries today.33 Based on conservative demographic assumptions,

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Russia’s GDP could grow to $7 trillion by 2050, around four times where it is today. To reach the potential outlined in the 2003 Goldman Sachs report, Russia need only grow at around 3 percent annually. If it avoids crisis, its GDP could overtake Italy’s by 2013 and Germany’s by 2030– 2035.34 Moreover, “Russia has one of the best national technology policies in the world and with the raw intellectual talent to make it happen.”35 India’s biggest strength is its demographics, with a population that could reach 1.7 billion by 2050. This would make India’s labor force almost as large as the combined labor forces of China and America. India also has a credible legal system, English language speakers, homegrown technology, and companies that are expanding globally. By 2050 India’s economy could be 30 times bigger than today.36 China is in a league of its own. It has grown tenfold in fifteen years to become the second largest economy in the world in 2010, five years ahead of the Goldman Sachs predictions. O’Neill jokes that when he first predicted that by 2039 China would be the world’s biggest economy, Harvard historian Niall Ferguson “said our projections were one of the silliest things he had read.” Ferguson’s recent Civilization cites O’Neill’s current prediction that China will overtake the United States by 2027.37 Power transition theorists, such as A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, made similar predictions about the potential GDP overtaking of the United States by China or India a decade earlier.38 When developing countries as a whole are considered, the rise of the rest is even more striking. Zakaria observes that: over the past few decades, countries all over the world have been experiencing rates of economic growth that were once unthinkable . . . [E]conomic success was once most visible in Asia but is no longer confined to it . . . For the first time ever we are witnessing genuinely global growth.39

The Goldman Sachs team associated with the BRICs concept has introduced the concept of the “Next-11” (N-11). The N-11 economies are the next largest countries by population. They are: Mexico, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, and six Asian countries: Bangladesh, Indonesia, South Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Goldman Sachs projects that by 2050, Mexico’s GDP could make it the world’s sixth largest economy. Indonesia, Nigeria, and South Korea could overtake Italy. In terms of income per capita, South Korea would overtake every member of the current G7 except the United States; Mexico would join Russia in converging on developed country income; and Turkey, China, and Brazil would have per capita incomes similar to America’s today. Korea and Mexico even have the potential to have an impact like

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the BRICs.40 By 2050, Goldman Sachs foresees three economic groupings: a rich club with per capita incomes over $65,000 (Russia, South Korea, the G7 except Italy); a middle income group between $40 and $60,000 comprising Italy, Mexico, China, Brazil, and Turkey; a lower income group between $20 and $40,000 comprising Vietnam, Iran, Indonesia, Egypt, the Philippines, and India; and finally, a low-income group with income below $20,000 comprising Nigeria, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.41 The huge populations of Nigeria, Pakistan, and Bangladesh mean they will present very significant market opportunities. A related concept is that of the “Growth Markets.” These are the BRICs along with Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey. Goldman Sachs introduced the term to distinguish highly developed markets from emerging markets.42 Each of the growth markets accounts for 1 percent of global GDP, and has superior economic infrastructure.43 Between 2010 and 2019, these markets have a combined potential GDP growth of $16 trillion, a figure that is between four and five times the increase expected in the United States. Three-quarters of this will come from the BRICs, and the other four will produce GDP equivalent to America or the Eurozone.44 The BRICs, N-11, and Growth Markets concepts, however, do not fully capture global development. Eleven African nations grew at 7 percent in the last decade.45 Ethiopia, which previously symbolized famine, is consistently growing at 5 to 7 percent, and infant mortality rates have fallen 40 percent since 2000.46 Sri Lanka’s civil war is over, and a growth rate of 7 to 8 percent over the next decade is well within reach.47 The Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia are experiencing a reversal of the process that triggered the financial crisis in 1998.48 Saudi Arabia accounts for close to 1 percent of world GDP. The Gulf monarchies are diversifying, having been affected by the 2008 crash. The Gulf is uniquely positioned to take advantage of the explosion of East–West commerce. Dubai is the twenty-first century successor to Aden, the trade entrepôt for the British Empire.49 In Latin America, Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Columbia have developed since 1950, when South American’s GDP was less than a fifth of US GDP. Today it is approaching a third.50 Even Burma and Kazakhstan under governance of inept autocracies grew at better than 10 percent for the decade since 2000.51 What used to be called “The Third World” is changing. Emerging nations have achieved the economic critical mass to withstand the financial crisis, thus intensifying the power shift.52 The 2008 economic crash was not a global crisis but a Western one.53 In the past, when the American economy sneezed the rest of the world caught cold.

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After 2008, however, the recession in the West accelerated the rise of the rest.54 After the great depression in the 1930s, both capitalism and democracy saw major setbacks. In 2008, many predicted a similar period would follow, but it failed to materialize. The financial crisis “has not caused an overturning of democratic regimes . . . , a sea-change in fundamental economic approaches, or a wholesale shift in global opinion about how to reorganize economic and political life.”55 Globalization is here to stay, but the crisis marked the end of Western economic dominance.56 Business cycles in the developed and developing world have become delinked. The likely outcome of ongoing financial difficulties is more of the same. America and Germany will do just enough to avoid a collapse, and growth elsewhere will continue. At the margin, big future global changes will come from the developing world. China alone produces a new Greece every 12 weeks, and the BRICs produce a new Italy roughly every 15 months. Even if Greece and Italy were wiped out overnight by the crisis, their loss could be offset.57 The economic and political decline of the West and the rise of nonWestern powers has occurred gradually over the twentieth century. European dominance reached its apogee around 1900 and ended just prior to the First World War. At that time, Western impact on the world was less far reaching than it was to become after the First and Second World Wars. However, at the turn of the century the dominance of European or Western powers expressed a sense of self-assurance both about the durability of their position in international society and about their moral purpose that did not survive the First World War. In non-Western societies also the ascendency of the West was still widely regarded as fact of nature rather than something that could or should be changed. The spiritual or psychological supremacy of the West was at its highest point, even if its material or technological supremacy was not.58

Indeed, in this period Oswald Spengler produced first analysis of the decline of the West.59 American dominance was undermined after the 1960s by five factors.60 First, there was a psychological awakening of the non-Western world. The Western-dominated order came to appear to the non-Western world not as a fact of nature but as something changeable. This led Third World countries to adopt a politically active role and form active coalitions such as the Group of 77. Second, there was a weakening of the will of Western powers to maintain their position of dominance and to accept the costs necessary to do so. After the Vietnam War, this issue became acute for America.

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Moreover, Western peoples became more sensitive to the aspirations of non-Western peoples. There came to be many for whom the emancipation from foreign domination represented the fulfillment of their own political ideals. Third, by the 1970s, the Soviet Union helped developing countries in their struggle against Western dominance. Fourth, the existence of centers of power in Western Europe, Japan, and China provided Third World countries with diplomatic options.61 Finally, there was a transformation of the legal and moral climate on international relations. Third World countries began to ally with one another against the major powers through the Non-Aligned Movement. They also asserted equal rights to sovereignty, national self-determination, racial equality, economic justice, and cultural identity and autonomy.62 As a result of these shifts, Hedley Bull observed in the 1980s, “if we compare the position occupied by non-Western states . . . today with the position in which they found themselves at the turn of the century, it is difficult not to feel that the revolt against Western dominance has had some measure of success.”63 During the Cold War, this trend went largely unnoticed. With hindsight, Bull pinpointed a key trend. The rise of the rest intensified with the end of the Cold War.64 Huntington observed in the mid-1990s that the West’s victory in the Cold War led not to triumph but exhaustion. The West became increasingly concerned with its internal problems, and confronted slow economic growth, stagnating population, unemployment, huge deficits, declining work ethic, low savings rates, and social dislocation. Economic power was shifting to East Asia, and military and political power started to follow. India and the Islamic world were on the move too. The willingness of non-Western societies to accept the West’s dominance was evaporating, as was the West’s self-confidence and will to dominate. Thus while the West would remain the number one civilization, fundamental changes in the balance of power among civilizations were occurring.65 These changes would be slow in coming, and punctuated with reversals.66 Nevertheless, decline was the West’s trajectory. The “West’s share of most . . . important power resources peaked early in the twentieth century and then began to decline.”67 In terms of population and territory, at its peak in 1920 the West directly ruled half the earth’s land surface. By 1993 this went back to its original European core plus North America, Australia, and New Zealand. In 1900, Western countries comprised 30 percent of the world’s population and ruled over 45 percent of that population. In 1993, Westerners amounted to only 13 percent of humanity and there were virtually no colonies.68 Moreover, there have been

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shifts in terms of health, education, and urbanization. By the 1990s infant mortality rates were one-third to one-half what they had been 30 years earlier in most of the developing world. Literacy rates in developing countries in 1970 averaged 41 percent, but by 1992 averaged 71 percent. In 1960, urban residents made up less than one-quarter of the developing world’s population. Between 1960 and 1992, however, the urban percentage of population rose from 49 percent to 73 percent in Latin America, 34 percent to 55 percent in Arab countries, 14 percent to 29 percent in Africa, 18 percent to 27 percent in China, and 19 percent to 26 percent in India. This created mobilized populations with increased capabilities and higher expectations.69 Economically, Western share of global economic product peaked in the 1920s and has been clearly declining since 1945. Huntington noted projections indicating that by 2020 the top five economies will be in five different civilizations and the top ten economies would include only three Western countries. This would be exacerbated by technological diffusion.70 Huntington’s analysis appears strikingly prescient. In terms of military capability, Huntington identified five trends favoring developing countries. First, the armed forces of the Soviet Union ceased to exist, increasing the relative military capabilities of developing states. Second, the end of the Cold War produced a decline in Western military spending, although the United States continued to outspend a large portion of the remaining countries in the world. Third, trends in East Asia were toward increased military spending. Fourth, the diffusion of military technology favored developing countries. Finally, regionalization was the dominant trend of military strategy.71 For example, China’s offshore missile capabilities today could make America think twice about its role in Asia. Overall, the key development of the last hundred years has been the end of Western economic hegemony. Gradually, developing countries caught up with the Western powers. Over the last 30 years, “The Great Divergence” has been replaced with “The Great Convergence.” The world is returning to the traditional pattern which in the non-Western world played a key role in the global economy.

OVERTAKING THE WEST: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS Non-Western powers are now pulling ahead of the Western powers to become the dominant states. The West is in decline, “the rest” is overtaking

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the West, and Islamic civilization is rising.72 The financial crisis has accelerated the long-standing trend toward relative Western decline.73 Growth in the West fits an S-curve in which rates of development decrease.74 This follows from diminishing returns and scarcity. Growth is easier from a low base. The advanced economies are entering a “stationary state.” Niall Ferguson argues that the West is experiencing an “inglorious revolution” or an undoing of the achievements of half a millennium of Western institutional evolution.75 It is not, however, that Western institutions need to be renewed. The West’s decline is the result of these institutions having run their course. Any attempt to squeeze high growth out of these institutions will produce an unsustainable bubble, as appreciated since 2008. The decline of the West is relative rather than absolute. Indeed, the rise of the rest offers unprecedented economic opportunities for the West. While many Western observers are alarmed by the BRIC and N-11 countries, one basic trend of . . . economic theory holds true: overall, international trade is good for everyone . . . Anyone who struggles to see the benefits of the BRICs story should spend some time with the executives of BMW, Bosch, Mercedes, Siemens and countless other German companies.76

Similarly, “never before have we had as much potential as we have today to create a better world for the 6.5 billion people who inhabit our planet.”77 The difference between today and previous eras is that billions of nonWestern peoples have the opportunity to share in the West’s prosperity. Their “ideal is to achieve what American and Europe achieved. They want to replicate, not dominate, the West. [This represents the] . . . universalization of the Western dream.” 78 As the West is reaching the top of the S-curve, the rest are riding out its middle. Developing countries are copying or “downloading” the political and economic institutions that led to the West’s success.79 Ferguson argues there are six such institutions: competition, science, property rights and the rule of law, medicine, consumerism, and the work ethic.80 However, these can be further distilled to the two institutions of Western liberalism identified by Fukuyama: democracy and capitalism.81 The West’s ascendency cannot be explained with reference to the innate superiority of Europeans, Europe’s geographic advantages, or imperialism: [t]he gene pool was surely not so different in the year 500, when the Western end of Eurasia was entering a period of nearly a thousand years of relative stagnation. Likewise, the climate, topography and natural resources of Europe

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were much the same in 1500 as they had been in 500. It cannot have been imperialism either. The other civilizations did plenty of that.82

If societies get their institutions right, they will successfully utilize their resources. Indeed, Ferguson documents how the institutional advantages enjoyed by the Western powers were previously noted by astute nonWesterners. In 1732, Ibrahim Müteferrika presented the Ottoman Sultan with his Rational Bases of the Politics of Nations, which posed the question: “Why do Christian nations which were so weak in the past compared with Muslim nations begin to dominate so many lands and even defeat the once victorious Ottoman armies?” His answer was that while the Ottoman Empire was subject to sharia law, Europeans had “laws and rules invented by reason.”83

Müteferrika appreciated that traditional means of organizing society were holding the Ottoman Empire back. An institutional analysis of the success of societies is further demonstrated by the examples of Germany and Korea. Ferguson points out that the twentieth century ran a series of experiments, imposing two different institutions on two sets of Germans (in West and East) [and] two sets of Koreans (in North and South) . . . [T]he results were very striking, and the lesson crystal clear. If you take the same people, with more or less the same culture, and impose communist institutions on one group and capitalist institutions on another, almost immediately there will be a divergence in the way they behave.84

While West Germany gave the world the Mercedes-Benz and South Korea the Samsung smart phone, East Germany contributed the Trabant and North Korea mass starvation.85 When societies adopt effective institutions, they thrive. Non-Western societies: are not succeeding because of a rediscovery of some hidden or forgotten strength of . . . [non-Western] civilization. Instead they are rising now because through a very slow and painful process they have finally discovered the pillars of Western wisdom that underpinned Western progress, and enabled the West to outperform . . . [the rest in the] past. The surprise is not that China and India are rising so fast, but that they (together with many other . . . [non-Western] societies) discovered these pillars so late.86

It oversimplifies to argue that geography and demography are destiny. However, once developing countries have their institutions in order, they

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often rapidly progress. Ferguson cites Adam Smith’s discussion of China’s potential. In 1776, Smith observed that “China . . . probably long ago acquired that full complement of riches which is consistent with the nature of its laws and institutions. But this complement may be much inferior to what, with other laws and institutions, the nature of its soil, climate and situation might admit of.”87 Given the results of China’s adoption of capitalism since 1976, Smith’s observation is remarkable. With the right institutions, geography and demography can become destiny. By extension, by downloading democracy and capitalism, the rest has the ability not just to catch up, but overtake Western societies. This is because their natural and demographic riches have been underexploited. What “North America and the European Union have achieved today can also be achieved by the rest of the world tomorrow . . . [This] is not a pipe dream. We have seen how it can be done.”88 Islamic societies are not excluded from this trend, and contrary to widespread misperception are in numerous instances leading the way. If the Western mind finds it difficult to conceive of Chinese civilization emerging in an open and cosmopolitan way, it is now actually impossible for the Western mind to conceive of Islamic civilization as an open and cosmopolitan civilization . . . Yet a similar process to that in China is likely to be replicated in many Islamic societies.89

Ibrahim Müteferrika’s insights are being independently rediscovered. Huntington was prophetic when he noted that Islamic civilization was increasingly dynamic, and that its rise would be one of the striking features of world politics. However, he was wrong to equate the dynamics of Islamic civilization with identity politics.90 The economic rise of Asia needs to be defined broadly to include the Middle East to South East Asia.91 It seems implausible that extraordinary economic growth in parts of the Middle East will not come to affect the broaderregion. If so, its status as one of the centers of the world economy will have been restored.92 Moreover, the resurgence of Islam has an important democratic component reflected in the political counter-jihad of the Arab Spring.93 Similarly, Huntington was wrong to view the global religious revival as a rejection of Western liberalism.94 Huntington suggests that the clearest expression of this trend has been the revival of religious fundamentalism. However, the growth of religion is not incompatible with capitalism and democracy. Indeed, it is the natural corollary of the spread of economic and civic freedom. After the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, the

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revival of religion was the natural consequence of the lifting of decades of repression.95 Much the same is happening in China where Christianity is exploding. This is “the living embodiment of the link between the spirit of capitalism and the Protestant ethic, precisely as Max Weber described it.”96 As Ferguson notes in the final program of his television series Civilization, “just when you thought the world was turning Chinese, the Chinese turn around and westernize themselves.” This trend has also affected the Middle East. The Islamically conscious entrepreneurial class that constitutes Turkey’s Anatolian Tigers mirrors early modern Calvinist ideas about work, saving, and reinvesting, and mid-Western American evangelicals’ work ethic today.97 The global revival of religion is more a reflection than a rejection of Western values. It oversimplifies to argue that Islam and other non-Western civilizations will challenge the economic and political values originating in the West. Zakaria recognized that the rise of the rest should not be interpreted as a “West versus the rest” mentality taking hold. The ideological watchdogs have spent so much time with the documents of jihad that they have lost sight of actual Muslim societies. Were they to step back, they would see a frustration with the fundamentalists, a desire for modernity (with some dignity and cultural pride for sure), and a search for practical solutions—not a quest for mass immortality through death.98

Similarly, in Latin America “Venezuela is a troublemaker,” but what has that meant on the ground? The broad trend . . . —exemplified by the policies of the major countries like Brazil, Mexico and Chile—has been towards open markets, trade, democratic governance, and an outward orientation. And that trend, not Hugo Chavez’s insane rants, represents the direction of history.99

More fundamentally, to overtake the West, non-Western societies will need to have internalized both capitalism and democracy.100 This trend is already well established. The world is experiencing a major period of historical transition. As Mahbubani observes, [t]he willingness of the rest of the world to absorb and use Western concepts is one of the strongest foundations for global optimism. The vast majority of societies who want to succeed and prosper in the modern world do not want to do so by rejecting the West or its values. Instead, they prefer to work with the West.101

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The world has reached a stage where emerging democracies are becoming more dynamic and successful than the established democracies of the West. This represents the beginning of a post-Western future for democracy.

THE WORLD THE WEST MADE: “EVERYONE’S WORLD” A post-Western democratic future will not mean the demise of the West. As with Mark Twain, rumors to this effect have been greatly exaggerated.102 Thus “we have reached the end of the era of Western domination of world history (but not the end of the West, which will remain the single strongest civilization for decades more).”103 Jim O’Neill’s distinction between wealth and size of GDP is instructive. Even if China becomes a much larger economy than the United States, the United States will remain much wealthier in terms of GDP per capita. Even in 2050 China’s GDP per capita will be just half that of America’s GDP, and India will be only one-quarter as wealthy.104 The West will remain attractive and influential despite relative decline. The West will be further strengthened by the bandwagoning of emerging democracies that have internalized or accepted the democratic community’s dominant practices. Robert Kagan has argued that many in the West wrongly assume that democracy’s innate attraction and benefits have led to its global spread. Instead, democracy’s worldwide success has been dependent on American power.105 Thus America’s decline would be a major factor corroding the global democratic order. A post-American order, Kagan postulates, would be a world in which democracies and autocracies wield equal power. This would mean that the external context would be less favorable to the spread of democracy.106 However, this view of American decline is misleading. First, Kagan is too sanguine about Western leadership which has been far from perfect. The failure of Western powers to support agricultural trade liberalization and America’s botched intervention in Iraq are prominent examples.107 Second, America and Europe will continue to play a crucial role in maintaining international order. They have too many global interests to retreat into isolationism. Democratic victors are also more effective at building postwar institutional orders that can be sustained as their material capabilities decline.108 They use hierarchical economic and security relationships to extract policy concessions from other states in exchange for military and

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economic benefits.109 Third, as Fukuyama observes, “societies rooted in different cultural origins come to accept [democratic] values not because the US does it, but because it works for them.”110 Similarly, polls show that people in developing countries “want democracy not so much because it is the governing formula of the West, but because it provides basic political goods—political freedom, voice, accountability, popular sovereignty and rule of law—that authoritarian regimes cannot.”111 Other societies are—unsurprisingly—discovering what America discovered. They realize that democracy is a means of achieving national goals and values. The American project is succeeding around the world like never before.112 Kagan considers how bandwagoning by the non-Western world might help strengthen the democratic community. Yet even if rising democratic powers pick up some of the burden, “not all of them have the desire or the power to do it.”113 However, the decline of the West is relative not absolute, and the autocratic community remains weak, internally vulnerable, dependent on outside engagement, and divided. Emerging democracies will not always support the Western powers, and at times will ally against it.114 Nevertheless, bandwagoning is the overall trend. If a powerful, strongly revisionist autocratic state did appear, emerging democracies would balance against it. The historical record shows many more instances of states bandwagoning with democratic major powers rather than balancing against them, especially if they are sea powers, while countries prefer to balance against rising land powers.115 Most importantly, Kagan underestimates the importance of reflexivity and the power of example. As one commentator notes in relation to a discussion of India, “India’s own success will do far more for democracy promotion than any overtly ideological push in that direction could ever hope to accomplish.”116 To paraphrase the title of Robert Kagan’s own book, a major advantage that America will have despite its relative decline is that a post-Western democratic global order will be “The World the West Made.”117 The rest of the world is now adopting the institutions and ideology that America and Europe pioneered in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The institutions that the world will inherit were created by the West. Thus while in terms of relative material resources, the West is in decline, its ideological power and ability to influence the global agenda will perhaps be greater than ever before.118 The situation is analogous to the one that Britain found itself in after 1945. While Britain was no longer at the top of the international hierarchy, the world’s superpower was a former colony, English was the world’s language, and everyone enjoyed The Beatles and the BBC. The 2012 Olympics opening ceremony was more popular in

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China than the 2008 Beijing one, for one-third of the price. Mr Bean along with the Queen jumping out of a helicopter with James Bond were simply things that the world appreciated. In a post-Western democratic global order, the established democracies will retain ideological advantages. The paradox of our times is that the global spread of democracy is occurring at the juncture that the West has gone into decline. Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis was not that the end of the Cold War represented the triumph of the Western powers. What triumphed was the Western idea— that capitalism and liberal democracy were the best basis on which to organize society.119 Fukuyama’s argument has been widely interpreted as reflecting Western triumphalism in light of the end of the Cold War. Yet Fukuyama’s analysis focused on the global spread of democracy and his argument does not exclude the possibility of non-Western powers “doing” capitalism and democracy better than the West. This begs the question of whether Fukuyama intended his argument to be about the triumph of the Western powers as well as the Western idea, or whether his argument was strictly about the triumph of the Western idea. Gideon Rachman notes that Fukuyama’s article was the product of an invitation to present at a seminar at the University of Chicago on “The Decline of The West” in February 1989. This might indicate that Fukuyama recognized that it was the Western idea that had triumphed, while the Western powers were in decline. Yet in May 2009, Fukuyama recalled that in response to the invitation he said “I’ll give a talk, but it’s not going to be about the decline of the West, it’s going to be the victory of the West. And they said, okay, fine, whatever. So I gave the talk.”120 This perhaps gives us reason to be cautious about interpreting Fukuyama’s argument as endorsing the decline of the West. Interestingly, in the wake of the financial crisis, Fukuyama has identified the emerging “post-Washington Consensus” in the world economy.121 This represents a rejection of the Anglo-American model by developing countries, while they continue to pursue capitalism. Developing countries limit capital flows, pursue policies to bolster domestic welfare and industrial competitiveness, often decline to accept Western advice, and assert an independent leadership role.122 The project of development includes a significant element of reflexivity. It has been a product of the liberal international order and yet has reshaped that order.123 Since the financial crisis, developing countries have begun to modify the dominant liberal consensus on how development is defined. Thus while there seems to be an emerging global consensus around capitalism, there is a consensus that within capitalism “there is no unequivocally ‘right’ way and no accepted

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‘leading’ nation.”124 Instead, there are different approaches that compete for effectiveness and legitimacy. This parallels the mixture of bandwagoning and autonomy utilized by developing countries to engage Western democracies diplomatically. Charles Kupchan argues that we are entering “No-One’s World” in which multiple versions of modernity coexist.125 The major centers of power such the United States, Europe, India, China, and Brazil will have conflicting interests and conflicting values, and no single vision for global civilization will win out. However, the world is experiencing not a divergence but a convergence of both global interests and global values.126 Analyses of transnational ideological networks have concluded that shifts in the global cultural environment occur when states that exemplify an ideology are obviously failing on their own terms, and states that exemplify the opposing regime are clearly succeeding.127 This is the world that has been created by expanding reflexivity and growing consciousness about the spread of democracy and capitalism. The Arab Spring and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe may be considered examples of societies that adhered to ideological positions (socialism; postcolonialism) and experienced stark failure that contradicts ideological expectations. This opens a window of self-critique, and provides an opportunity for new ideas to come to the fore.128 Everyone around the world at some level today appreciates that authoritarian states have failed to deliver, and that democracy as a form of government is, on balance, preferable. A post-Western democratic order has created, for the first time, a single unified global political space. This “cosmopolitan global society” or “global public sphere” operates through transnational networks of communication.129 Owing to the growing worldwide consciousness about the spread of democracy and capitalism, participants increasingly follow the same set of norms. Some commentators have referred to the idea of a “dialogue between civilizations.”130 However, this dialogue presupposes agreement on institutions that either approximate or reflect liberalism.131 In a “soft” formulation, these norms are sufficiently similar to democratic and capitalist institutions that there is a fusion of the “cultural horizons” of peoples.132 A stronger formulation is that these norms embody democracy and capitalism.133 As Mahbubani observes, the phrase “a convergence of global norms” sounds exquisitely dull, but it may well provide the best description of one of the most powerful forces ever seen in human history.134 We live not in “No-One’s World” but in “Everyone’s World.” All peoples have a massive stake in the global capitalist and democratic order, whether they like it or

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not. The logic of Everyone’s World is therefore the logic of One World.135 There is only one version of modernity. The West’s challenge will not be that rejection by the rest will lead to an uneasy multipolar civilizational equilibrium. Instead, the challenge arises as the West starts to be beaten at its own capitalist and democratic version of modernity. Ironically, this might be more difficult for the West than facing different and competing versions of modernity. After all, it will be much harder for the West to protest its outperformance if the rest is adopting the West’s own principles and institutions. Moreover, because the rest are adopting the institutions and values that so successfully propelled the West to global ascendency, the West should recognize that it really can be overtaken. A less Western-centered world is experiencing a shift in negotiating behavior by developing countries in international institutions. Traditionally, developing countries have established distinctive strategies. They formed blocks to resist the Western powers, framed negotiations in terms of fairness over efficiency, and been reluctant to lead in multilateral institutions.136 However, new powers have shifted their negotiating strategies. Developing countries today do not want to always accommodate the West, but neither do they want to always oppose them.137 Shifts in negotiating strategies within international institutions, however, reflect psychological change. An explosion of cultural self-confidence is occurring in the non-Western world. This represents a huge transformation, but it is often unnoticed in the West because it is going on in people’s minds.138 One Western commentator to perceptively notice this shift was Samuel Huntington.139 However, contrary to Huntington’s interpretation, this growing assertiveness has actually led to greater critical self-reflection by the developing world which has increased its willingness to borrow and utilize successful Western ideas. The “self-confidence” of a fundamentalist actually betrays deep insecurity. Genuine self-confidence comes from an ability to question oneself. Thus it is “a huge sign of the new cultural confidence of many . . . [nonWestern] societies . . . that they are prepared to learn from and absorb Western best practices in developing their societies.”140 This increase in self-confidence and self-critical attitudes was clearly evident in the revolutions of the Arab Spring, but also reflects a global trend. Where their institutions are failing, non-Western peoples are becoming aware that there are alternatives. Non-Western peoples are recognizing that while their colonial history disadvantaged them, blaming all their problems on the colonial legacy oversimplifies, is not likely to prove their lot, and reduces their ability to tackle them. Where they are succeeding, there is a growing

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willingness to stand up to the West, take on new leadership roles, assert their continued cultural and political autonomy, and utilize the West’s own standards to hold a mirror up to it. The “past twenty years have probably seen some of the greatest changes in human history. The biggest shift is that the 88 percent of the world’s populations who live outside the West have stopped being the objects of history and have become subjects. They have decided to take control of their own destinies.”141 The world the West made is a world where the non-Western world is finally starting to succeed by adopting the West’s own institutions. By buying into the core Western package of capitalism and democracy, developing countries are not just catching up with but are overtaking the Western powers. The irony is that even though this was the West’s stated goal during the Cold War, apparently no one expected it to actually happen. Indeed, it is happening but hardly anyone has noticed because the West has become self-absorbed with its own problems. This has created a new global paradox because until recently, the most optimistic societies have been Western societies, while pessimism reigned in the developing world. Today, however, Western societies are losing their optimism at the very point in time when they should be celebrating the global spread of their institutions and values.142 At the same time, developing countries are looking with renewed sense of self-determination to the future. This paradox is profoundly revealing. That the West is lacking in self-confidence while the rest exudes it is perhaps the surest sign that a post-Western capitalist and democratic future beckons. The peoples of the non-Western world are realizing that if they can reform their societies, the global order is theirs for the taking.

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7. Global Democratic Futures: The Clash of Democratizations

T

he emerging order represents a dream come true for the West. The global spread of democracy opens unprecedented opportunities for the expansion of peace, cooperation, prosperity, and freedom. However, as the democratic community expands and prospers, frictions are likely to develop within it.1 Conflicts between established democracies will occur, as during the Iraq War and the Euro crisis. However, these conflicts will be contained at manageable levels, and will not undermine the democratic critical mass. As a result, pressures for democratization will continue. As the balance between established and emerging democracies shifts, conflicts between them will become important as emerging democracies seek the power and moral status associated with the democratic fraternity. Rather than the global spread of democracy representing the “triumph of the West,” a post-Western future for democracy will generate a distinctive type of inter-democratic politics—a “clash of democratizations.” History has in a sense ended with the global ideological triumph of Western liberalism, but no good story finishes without a twist. The twist at the end of history is that the clash of democratizations will come to define world politics.

INTER-DEMOCRATIC CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS The global order does not represent an “end of history” in which harmony exists between democracies.2 Nor will it mean that the key international conflicts will be between autocracies and democracies, as they were in the Cold War and nineteenth century.3 Instead, the most important future conflicts will be between democracies. Losing their dominance to emerging democracies may prove harder for established democracies than surviving in a world where authoritarian states prevailed.

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When authoritarian states were dominant, it was easy and prudent for the smaller and weaker democratic community to maintain solidarity. However, now that fascism and communism have mostly been defeated, “differences that were patched over, or overlooked, . . . surface.”4 As the democratic community expands, strengthens, and becomes more interdependent, divisions within it are likely to emerge. Thus as “democratization progresses . . . some democracies will form alignments that exclude other democracies, or . . . democratic coalitions will come into conflict with other democratic coalitions.”5 The assumption that a more democratic world will be harmonious is pervasive. Morris refers to the “Panglossian ‘Soothing Scenario’” in which the rest adopt capitalism and democracy.6 He contrasts this with the view that China’s rise will reshape the world around its Confucian values, a “Beijing Consensus,” and authoritarianism.7 Kupchan criticizes the assumption that as “they rise, the newcomers will slip comfortably into . . . the existing international order.”8 Rising non-Western powers will pursue their own path to modernity. They will adopt different cultural values and have interests that conflict with the West. China and Russia will be capitalist autocracies. The rise of Islam will increase tensions with the West. In Africa and Latin America, ethnic conflicts, inequality, and populism will cause deviations from Western democracy. Non-Western centers of modernity will compete with the West, producing an uneasy multipolar equilibrium.9 However, the West will face greater problems if these non-Western societies do become like the West than if they do not. A scenario in which democracy and capitalism spread globally poses massive challenges to the West. That commentators have assumed otherwise indicates how little attention has been given to the complex inter-democratic politics that will characterize a post-Western democratic order. Paradoxically, a world in which the democratic community is strong and growing may prove more difficult for established democracies than surviving during previous historical eras when autocratic states prevailed. When the democratic community was small and weak, democracies had strong incentives to band together against autocratic rivals. However, today the democratic community is robust. This gives the autocratic community incentives to band together, while reducing the incentives for cooperation within the democratic community.10 Ironically, the global success of democracy intensifies inter-democratic conflict. Yet the conflicts that arise between democracies are likely to be different from issues that have lead states to war in the past. Territorial disputes

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involving contested land borders are the single greatest cause of wars in history.11 Yet, democracies are less likely to contest their neighbors’ land borders than autocracies or semi-democracies. Furthermore, the settling of border disputes helps to set the stage for the development of democracy in a region.12 Democracies in the modern era often have conflicts over water or fishing resources, such as the clashes between the United Kingdom and Iceland over fishing rights or the conflicts between Canada and Spain over fishing in the Grand Banks area. While pairs of democracies have many of these types of disagreements, and while they sometimes lead states to threaten or use military force to protect their interests, they do not escalate to severe levels. In fact, most fishing disputes end with a seizure of a fishing vessel or a warning shot fired near a ship, with no fatalities for the states involved. This is not to say that conflicts over maritime or cross-border rivers might not intensify in the future, especially as resources become scarce. In today’s world, though, it is hard to envision democratic disputes escalating to high levels of violence. Gartkze and Weisiger note that states are often drawn together to counter threats or capitalize on opportunities.13 However, this leaves open question of coalition selection: who should join with whom against whom? A wide number of coalitions is possible. States face a demand and supply for affinities. In terms of the demand, nations confront their biggest or most immediate threats first. Thus the collapse of communism meant that terrorism could be viewed as the main threat for America, just as fighting fascism led to an alliance with the Soviet Union. The supply of affinities is determined by “social cues.” States find natural affinity with nations with like political systems. However, similarity is not a guarantee of friendship. Resource scarcities or a decline in the number or strength of unlike regimes will reduce the salience of affinity cues. Democracy becomes less of a distinguishing characteristic.14 This effect is enhanced because democracies cluster geographically. Enemies are distant, diminishing the need for strong security arrangements.15 Wendt discusses Freud’s notion of “the narcissism of small differences.”16 As actors become alike along some dimensions, they may differentiate themselves along trivial ones. This stems from the nature of groups. Heterogeneity can threaten one group if other groups exist pursuing interests opposed to it. Yet homogeneity can be threatening if it erodes the objective basis for the bond between one group and another, thereby calling into question the group’s d’être. Under these circumstances, “[i]nventing . . . new sources of group differentiation shores up the boundary between the group Self and the Other.”17 Hegel developed a critique

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of Kant along similar lines. Kant’s idea of a peace between democracies would be unstable because “the state is an individual and individuality essentially implies negation. Hence even if a number of states make themselves into a family, this group . . . must engender an opposite and create an enemy . . . against which to define itself.”18 These insights share the assumption that shifting identity structures affect cooperation and conflict.19 Scholars of gender are familiar with these dynamics.20 Women find themselves under pressure to downplay their gender and meet male standards of behavior to get into a political establishment. One hypothesis is that pressure from male norms is greatest in legislatures where the proportion of women is small. However, this relationship is complicated by “intrainstitutional factors.” Unless there is a strong women’s caucus, a growth in the number of women in legislatures produces greater pressure to confirm with male norms. Women become “such a sizable minority that the personal responsibility which individual women legislators feel to work on women’s rights legislation diminishes [and] . . . some women . . . turn their attention toward other concerns.”21 As a larger and more diverse cohort of women enter legislatures, the supportive environment fostered by early entrants breaks down. As Gartzke and Weisiger recognize, “other differences (ethnic, religious, linguistic, ideological, cultural) can serve to create groups with different interests.”22 This is consistent with a more general theory of conflict and cooperation. The discipline of International Relations is catching up with an insight long debated by feminist scholars. The argument about inter-democratic conflict also applies to international political economy. Democracy “has not made the world any less infinite. Resources must be distributed and prerogatives allocated, so frictions remain.”23 Thus interdependence between members of an expanding democratic community may produce conflicts. Growing interdependence will increase the demand for conflict by bringing states into intensive contact.24 Resource scarcities will increase as economic competition becomes more intense, growth slows,25 world population explodes, and ecological problems mount.26 With growing homogeneity, the salience of cues for cooperation declines. Questions of resource distribution will be perceived more acutely by members of the same group. When “being a member of the democratic club is no longer quite so exclusive,” conflict over resource scarcities will arise.27 This account of inter-democratic conflict is pertinent to recent history. An example is the Iraq War scenario of conflict between established democracies. A key contributing factor to the crisis in trans-Atlantic relations

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over the Iraq War stemmed from the lack of ideological alternatives to democracy. According to Robert Kagan (c)ommonly shared liberal democratic principles meant a good deal more in a world threatened by totalitarianism than they would in a world made safe for democracy . . . Radical militant Islam, whatever dangers it may represent when manifested as terrorism, has not and cannot replace communism as an ideological threat to Western liberal democracy.28

Worse, liberalism is ideologically ambiguous about the conditions under which democracies should tolerate authoritarian states. Divisions among democracies reflect this tension within liberalism, and cannot be resolved merely through “good policies.”29 This is similar to debates surrounding the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, especially with respect to the use of military force to pursue humanitarian goals. The Euro crisis illustrates how interdependence is a source of conflict among the established democracies. As the EU has expanded its competences, the stakes have included ever more complex packages of policies . . . [and] each time new members have joined, the effect on existing policy commitments and the likelihood of agreeing upon new ones has become less predictable.30

The Euro crisis has exposed rifts between Northern creditors and Southern debtors. The only viable solution is delegating decision-making authority to the Commission and European Central Bank (ECB), raising questions about the accountability of supranational institutions.31 This “rests on the assumption by technocrats that . . . Europeans will be so grateful for what has not happened to them (an economic calamity having been averted) that they will not ask how it was done or what it cost.”32 A “democratic community gap” is emerging in which, ironically, the growing size, strength, and interdependence of the democratic community foster divisions within it.33 These divisions have corroded relations between democratic states.

THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL DEMOCRATIZATION One response to Gartzke and Weisiger’s argument is to argue that democracies will not engage in disputes as the democratic community enlarges.34

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An alternative response acknowledges the likelihood of growing inter-democratic conflict, as reflected in the Iraq War and the Euro crisis. However, it examines further the severity and character of such conflicts.35 First, will inter-democratic conflicts be serious enough to break apart the democratic community? Second, what types of inter-democratic conflicts will be the most salient? Arguably, inter-democratic conflicts will not be sufficiently serious to stop the democratic bandwagon from rolling. As noted above, inter-democratic disputes (to date) have not involved the kinds of high salience stakes that lead to interstate wars. Yet, if the democratic bandwagon continues to roll then an important source of inter-democratic conflicts in the future will be between established and emerging democracies. These will occur as emerging democracies seek the benefits and moral legitimacy of membership in the democratic community. We propose that this “clash of democratizations” will become the central feature of world politics. Will democracies clash over fundamental issues? Gartzke and Weisiger hold that “(r)ather than an endpoint for history . . . our age may be yet another interlude before history repeats itself ‘all over again.’”36 Interstate rivalries will reassert themselves in a strongly democratic world. They make an analogy with Balkan Pan-Slavism. In 1919, national groups united in opposition to the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, and later to Germany and the USSR. After Tito’s death and the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia fractured along other identity lines. Thus if “alliances arise . . . in response to an enemy or an ‘other’, then victory is just a prelude to some new conflict along lines that have yet to assert themselves.”37 Interdemocratic conflict becomes a “firewall” to democratic diffusion.38 However, inter-democratic conflicts may not be fundamental enough to undermine peace between democracies. Conflicts between democracies involve less salient issues and escalate to severe levels infrequently. Militarized disputes between democracies avoid highly contentious issues, such as territorial disputes.39 Democracies are more likely than autocracies to use peaceful conflict management tools to settle issues that arise.40 Democratic states are reluctant to inflict casualties upon democratic opponents, with only a handful of militarized disputes between democracies ever producing any battle deaths. Democratic solidarity provides stability in an international system dealing with power transitions and economic crises.41 Democracies are also more reliable alliance partners, coming to their allies’ aid in wartime more often than their autocratic counterparts.42 A strong democratic community mitigates conflicts, providing a cooperative framework for dealing with global

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problems. The democratic critical mass will not unravel, and the interwar period is unlikely to be repeated. This was the case with the Iraq War. Intense divisions did not lead to a collapse in trans-Atlantic relations. Two powerful dynamics pushed democracies back together. First, the United States overextended itself.43 Second, Americans were hurt by criticism of their foreign policy by other democratic peoples. Thus the “liberal, democratic essence of the United States made it difficult if not impossible for Americans to ignore the fears, concerns, interests, and demands of its fellow liberal democracies.”44 With domestic electoral turnover in 2008, inter-democratic relations were renewed. Peace within the West will continue, but relations are being renegotiated, adaptation to the new security environment is occurring, and a looser community has emerged.45 Similarly, the Euro is “too big to fail.”46 “Once Germany and the ECB feel they have gotten the best possible deal, they will pay whatever it takes to hold the Eurozone together. Neither can afford the alternative. But neither can say so in advance.” 47 Thus, the Euro crisis will linger, but will fall short of a collapse of the Euro. In the longer term, the process of European integration might be strengthened by finding ways to boost the effectiveness and legitimacy of its institutions. East Asia rebounded from its 1998 financial crisis. The scale of the crisis should not be underestimated, but it should not be overestimated either. If inter-democratic conflicts are sufficiently serious to spill over into large wars between democratic states, this would forestall democratic socialization.48 However, if inter-democratic conflicts are not fundamental, the democratic critical mass is not undermined.49 Pressures for the expansion of the democratic community will mount as divisions between democracies develop. A counterintuitive situation will emerge in which divisions within the democratic community occur at the same time as the expansion of the democratic community.50 This is consistent with some emerging and even established democracies backsliding (Hungary, conceivably South Africa), and minor military conflicts between democracies. While military conflicts between democracies are unlikely, the intense disagreements over Iraq and the Euro illustrate the intensity, stakes, and severity of political conflicts. Yet membership in the democratic community will remain both desirable and attractive. This paradoxical pattern is already apparent, for example, in EU expansion where the EU is now a victim of its success. As it has enlarged, so members have become dissatisfied. Thus Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, or Turkey may seek or become an EU member, but Greece,

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Spain, Finland, Denmark, or the United Kingdom could leave. Moreover, these simultaneous patterns of states potentially joining and leaving the EU reflect the same underlying systemic dynamic. A process of democratic socialization is gathering momentum, but the expansion of the democratic community leads to divisions within it. This has been evident in the Euro crisis. The “paradox of these times is that, precisely when so many aspiring . . . [new] democracies have been emerging in the East, the . . . [older] democracies of the West have been sliding into crisis.”51 Estonia joined the Euro in 2011, Latvia will join in 2014, Lithuania in 2015, and probably Poland by 2018. This could create a critical mass of dynamic Eastern members, and mitigate the crisis.52 Rather than leading to the collapse of the Euro or the EU, the enlargement of the EU is making it increasingly “clubby.”53 Subgroups within it include: a Nordic group led by the UK, a Southern group led by France, and an Eastern group led by Germany. The new Berlin–Warsaw axis will push ahead and become the center of a “variable geometry” EU.54 European countries outside the EU/Euro risk marginalization, so may (re)join the bandwagon. Some have argued that economic development has an initially strong impact on democratization. Yet in later historical periods in which the democratic community is strong, diffusion effects are more powerful.55 Gartzke and Weisiger have made two arguments that fit uneasily with these findings. First, economic development is a better explanation than a diffusion effect in explaining the decline in inter-democratic war.56 Second, a strong democratic community leads to inter-democratic conflict. This could undercut the democratic diffusion hypothesis.57 However, these arguments are potentially complementary. Firstly, economic development and democratic spillover are mutually reinforcing.58 Secondly, interdemocratic conflict occurs alongside democratic spillover. These features of world politics both result from a strong democratic community. Divisions within the expanding democratic community will occur, but conflicts between the established democracies will not be the most significant conflicts within it. More consequential will be divisions between established democracies and emerging democracies. The clash of democratizations will become the major source of conflict in world politics. This expectation is based upon research documenting that conflicts within civilizations have historically been far more common than conflicts between civilizations.59 The number and strength of emerging democracies will grow relative to established democracies. This will require emerging democracies to internalize new norms associated with the democratic community and accept

Global Democratic Futures 157 new leadership responsibilities. However, the established democracies must be willing to accept emerging democracies as members of the democratic community. This will require established powers to share political and moral authority more broadly. This “reciprocal process of socialization” will define conflict and cooperation in the emerging international system.60 Far from representing a Panglossian scenario, accommodating the reasonable demands of emerging democracies will be extremely painful for the West, especially since the established democracies are used to being “top dogs.” Existing accounts of socialization are “too narrow in that they presuppose that some states are already socialized while others need to be adopted in to the . . . club of socialized members. In contrast today’s challenge revolves around the question of how to renegotiate the club’s underlying rules.”61 This will require the established democracies making concessions to the emerging democracies. On the other hand, there is no guarantee new powers will accept their greater responsibilities, even if the established democracies accommodate them.62 One study of the strategies of Brazil, India, and China concluded that “the most important lesson . . . [about their] negotiating behaviors is that straightforward attempts at socialization do not work.”63 The clash of democratizations therefore will require reciprocal efforts to resolve conflicts. The established democracies need to share power and authority with emerging democracies; and the emerging democracies “need to stop pretending they are still developing countries.”64 The world can be divided into three parts: old democracies, new democracies, and autocracies.65 Kagan has argued that the future of world politics will be defined by the conflicts between the democratic community and the autocratic community.66 Capitalist autocracies (e.g., Russia, China, Venezuela) are increasingly strong and provide an alternative model. As a minority, autocracies have incentives to band together.67 A strong and unified autocratic community gives the democratic community reasons to maintain solidarity.68 The divisions between the autocratic and democratic community will be further enhanced by Islamic theocracies such as Iran.69 After the Arab Spring, the democratic community might find itself with “more Iran’s” to deal with. The emerging order could be reminiscent of the Cold War and the nineteenth century when the Western liberal powers were in conflict with autocratic Eastern rivals.70 Conflict between the democratic community and the autocratic community will persist, but the autocratic community is fighting a rearguard action. A world in which the democratic community is strong gives the autocratic community incentives to club together, but encourages divisions

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within the democratic community.71 Even compared to relations within an increasingly loose democratic community, trust between autocracies will remain weak.72 The autocratic community no longer poses a serious threat to the dominance of the democratic community and cannot stop democratic socialization. While the democratic community may be divided over how to deal with autocracies, it will remain united enough to contain them. Democratic conflicts with autocracies are primarily residual, diminished in scope and significance from those of the nineteenth century and the Cold War. Gartzke and Weisiger stress the inter-democratic conflicts that will arise from unstable democratizations. Thus there is a rising sense that there exists a two-tiered system of democracy, in which elected leadership is not sufficient to qualify as liberal. (Moreover) . . . inroads of democracy into the Middle East and elsewhere have begun to reveal what popular rule might mean in societies with profoundly different traditions and interest than those of the West.73

Older democracies are more likely to settle interstate issues with peaceful conflict management tools and they are better able to avoid militarized disputes.74 However, democratizing states might engage in conflict more frequently than their established democratic peers. Incentives for diversionary conflicts with neighboring states are high in newly democratic regimes because leaders have reasons to fear being overthrown by the military.75 It is certainly the case that conflicts with unstable and illiberal democracies will become more salient. However, greater attention should be given to a category of inter-democratic conflicts that Gartzke and Weisiger consider less prominently. This category of conflicts is those that develop between stable and liberal emerging democracies and the established Western states. In the future, conflicts between established and emerging democracies will define the parameters of the international system. It will be acutely difficult for the established democracies to share with emerging democracies the material benefits and moral status associated with membership in the democratic club. The “democracy establishment” is coming under pressure from new democracies seeking entry.76 However, it is reluctant to allow them access. “Western intellectual life continues to be dominated by those who continue to celebrate the supremacy of the West, not by those who say the time has come for the West to give up its global domination and share power gracefully.”77 However, failure to share power with emerging

Global Democratic Futures 159 democracies will lead to major political conflicts within the democratic community, and seriously undermine the West’s values and stake in the global order. Such conflicts represent “the future of history.”78 A microcosm of these issues has been raised by the Arab Spring. A “postcolonial” or “post-Western Middle East” is emerging.79 The Middle Eastern order will not be determined by the former colonial powers or the United States. Although Kagan might interpret a post-Western Middle East in terms that reject Western democracy,80 a more plausible scenario is a mixed pattern. Backsliding could be accompanied by one or more states making progress toward becoming emerging democracies. Alternatives in the form of strongly revisionist theocratic or autocratic states will not measure up to Turkey’s success. Either way, the Middle East will be shaped by democratic middle powers such as Turkey and possibly Egypt or even a democratized Iran more than by an autocratic Iran, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia.81 Longer term, this shaping by moderate forces will tip the scales in favor of pro-Western movements.82 Consider a situation in which Tunisia, Libya, or even Egypt makes progress toward democratic consolidation as the Balkan states have. The EU would then face a decision about whether to admit these potential new members. This decision might have to be taken during a time of economic difficulties for the EU. Given this possibility, “the events of the Arab Spring are a much needed wake-up call for Europe. They oblige Europe to . . . answer the question: what type of partnership do we want to build with our Southern neighbors?”83 This situation presents a historic opportunity. As the British Foreign Secretary William Hague observed, (i)f the Arab Spring does lead to more open and democratic societies across the Arab world . . . it will be the greatest advance for human rights and freedom since the end of the Cold War. If it does not . . . we could see a collapse back into more authoritarian regimes, conflicts and increased terrorism . . . on Europe’s . . . doorstep.84

As was the case after 1989, this is a geopolitical upheaval that the West cannot ignore. There are compelling reasons why the EU and the West must throw their full weight behind the democratic transitions taking place in North Africa. Yet this fast moving object would run into the brick wall of established EU member state opposition. Before EU membership even became an issue, the EU would have to provide substantial assistance to these countries, which is unlikely given the economic crisis. Beyond this, the EU

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would have to address the inclusion of even more states in its decisionmaking apparatus, admitting these countries into the Single Market and possibly Single Currency, and dealing with increases in immigration from Muslim countries. Moreover, these changes would have to be introduced in the context of an EU in which elites now have little “permissive consensus” with which to pursue enlargement absent widespread support. All of this would be “political dynamite.”85 The EU might take the decision to exclude Middle Eastern countries. Hague sought to resolve this by proposing a “customs union” between the EU and post-Arab Spring regime in North Africa.86 While radical, the proposal contains a glaring problem. Specifically, the prospect of eventual full EU membership may be critical in helping Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt make the painful adjustments necessary for democratic reform. Without the promise of full EU membership, it is much less likely that Eastern Europe in the 1990s and the Balkans in the 2000s would have undergone difficult reforms.87 Moreover, Britain is one of the EU member states most favorable to enlargement and Hague was merely “floating” the proposal. The EU is faced with a contradiction: historic opportunities on its doorstep that will prove impossible to ignore, but which raise insurmountably difficult issues. The EU has faced this dilemma already. Turkey, a proven, highly successful emerging democracy, has performed far better economically and politically than Romania and Bulgaria, which are EU members. The decision to welcome Romania and Bulgaria to the Union was taken at the same 2006 summit where the EU suspended talks with Turkey.88 Turkey exemplifies “failed socialization” in which EU membership has been denied.89 A factor in failed socialization has been attitudes among European citizens. “Enlargement fatigue,” issues related to immigration, cultural diversity, and security and economic challenges have contributed to these attitudes.90 These are connected to the breakdown of the “permissive consensus” within the EU in which elites have autonomy to develop EU policies without widespread assent. Since “the permissive consensus has collapsed . . . elites must now take into account anti-Turkish mass preferences [among electorates]. The socialization logic fails when skeptical publics insert themselves into debates about enlargement policy.”91 European politicians have encouraged their electorates’ opposition to Turkish entry into the EU. Thus “negative attitudes towards Muslim religious practices and traditions were exacerbated by a perverse tendency to ‘securitize’ social issues such as immigration, particularly of Muslims, in the post-September 11 context.”92 Mass opposition to Turkish membership

Global Democratic Futures 161 is more a failure of leadership than “enlargement fatigue.” Failed socialization is also demonstrated in Turkey’s response to its treatment by the EU. While Prime Minister Erdogan shared the bitterness that his public felt about the EU’s rejection of Turkey, “in public he remained calm . . . and said simply that it was Turkey’s job to proceed resolutely on its reformist course.”93 In the face of the EU’s double standards, Turkey’s government responded with magnanimity. However, the EU’s unwillingness to admit Turkey exemplifies the problem faced by established democracies. By excluding Turkey, the EU forgoes economic opportunities which it desperately needs, and has lost the chance to increase its sphere of influence. Turkey has demonstrated that it has not needed the EU to become “the BRIC of the Middle East,” and as Greece shows, not having membership may have been more beneficial for Turkey. Turkey’s exclusion from the EU used to be more of a problem for Turkey than it was for the EU. Today it has become more of a problem for the EU than for Turkey. Projecting forward, a situation could emerge in which North Africa follows Turkey and forms a rival trade union to the EU. The EU’s inability to admit new emerging democracies would have generated an opposing club. In late 2012, Erdogan announced that the EU must admit Turkey by 2023 or “lose Turkey.”94 It is argued that given the Euro crisis, the EU cannot afford to admit Turkey. Yet the same argument could be made in reverse. Given Turkey’s economic dynamism, the EU cannot now afford not to admit Turkey. One reason Germany is doing well is because of its proximity to Eastern Europe.95 This might apply to the Southern EU countries and Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. At some point, opposition to Turkish membership will face the reality that the EU has a colossal stake in admitting Turkey. Moreover, there is an important moral dilemma for the EU if it excludes Turkey on religious, racial, or geographic criteria, despite it being a proximate and successful democracy. Turkey would rightly see this as hypocritical. Moreover, the decision has global implications, because Turkey is seen by non-Western peoples as a test case for their relations with the West.96 Democracy is only partly an institution, and there are qualitative indicators that make it subjective. Perceptions count, and if established democracies choose to be inclusive, this can co-opt members to the democratic community.97 Yet subjectivity can exclude, and peaceful intentions by states with democratic institutions is less likely if they do not view themselves as part of the democratic community.98 Discussions with moderate Islamists suggest that they are skeptical of the West’s commitment to engagement with the Middle East. Their perception is that the West views political

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Islam as a “source of instability, terrorism, and a threat.”99 The West’s stereotyping shows the potential difficulties for the West in embracing new Islamic members of the democratic community. “Listening to unfamiliar voices” in the Middle East will be extremely difficult for the EU.100 The West no longer has the option to deal with secular authoritarian elites at the expense of moderate Islamic movements. By not engaging moderate Islamic movements, the West has strengthened extremist forces and disillusionment amongst liberals.101 There is therefore a desperate need for— but a lack of—a strategy for encouraging moderate Islamic movements in the Middle East.102 The most important conflicts in the international system of the future will not be between democracies and autocracies. They will be interdemocratic ones. One type of conflict that will be increasingly salient will be conflicts which will occur between established democracies. However, a new axis of conflict is developing between established and emerging democracies. The politics of Turkish and post-Arab Spring EU succession provides a regional microcosm of the politics of global democratization. The clash of democratizations will be defined by the acute problems established democracies must solve in order to include newer democratic states in their community. Rather than embracing new members, the established democracies might take actions to exclude them. While these conflicts will be primary political, not militarized, they will be deeply acrimonious and damaging for the entire democratic community. The clash of democratizations will determine the emerging global order.

REFORMING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE “REVERSE COLONIZATION” OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY The clash of democratizations has implications for global governance. The pecking order which the West dominated is being overturned by the developing world. There is an urgent need to reform international organizations to reflect this reversal. The established democracies may resist sharing power and legitimacy more broadly, but they will not be able to stop emerging democracies from breaking down the doors to the democratic establishment. Emerging democracies’ power is growing relative to established democracies’, and it would be hypocritical of the Western powers to deny this. International society is experiencing “reverse colonization.”103 Previously, the West colonized the rest. Today, the democratic order is being colonized by the developing world.

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Mahbubani highlights non-Western competence and Western incompetence in world policies. Many in the West assume that global problems and instability are caused by the non-Western world and solved by the West. Yet the West plays a major part in many global problems.104 Examples include the financial crisis, the Iraq War, Guantanamo Bay, the West losing its faith in economic competition after China entered the WTO, the lack of US support for major human rights and environmental treaties, and the West’s insistence that nuclear disarmament does not apply to it.105 Non-Western powers themselves need to step up. They can no longer expect a free ride on global multilateral frameworks dominated by the West.106 Thus “consistent unwillingness to participate constructively in the system by a large and emerging player jeopardizes the system, and insofar the new power has acquired greater stakes in the system, also affects its own rise.”107 However, the financial crisis has highlighted that the key global issue will be whether the Western powers will remain good custodians of the global multilateral system “when their own populations no longer believe they will benefit from globalization?”108 The non-Western world needs to be prepared to offer new leadership that does not just join the established Western powers in governance, but which shows them the way. The leadership Turkey has demonstrated in response to the EU’s failure to engage it in accession negotiations is a paradigm for how developing countries can rise to this challenge. Analyses of the spread of norms about gender equality in international society have been revealing about why non-Western societies are positioned to demonstrate moral leadership, and how this might pressure Western states. The spread of quotas for female representation affects over 100 countries.109 However, unlike women’s suffrage, this trend has been pioneered by developing countries. The West has lagged, especially the United States.110 Far from reflecting Westernization, change is being led by non-Western countries. Non-Western countries have framed these measures in terms of indigenous traditions, rather than as a Western import.111 Nongovernmental organizations have also taken on greater roles in the promotion of new norms of behavior in the international system. Change in international society does not necessarily emerge out of the putative core of international society. Moreover, states that are low in rank may also become the first to change their behavior, attempting to rise in rank. This generates competition among states higher in rank, who feel a need to follow suit.112 States similar in kind or rank have tended to engage in new behavior at similar times, and justify that change as something their kind

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or rank should do. International social hierarchies through which states are morally ranked explain why new behavior emerges among states considered less advanced. However, these states can “leapfrog” others, compelling initially higher ranked states to have to “catch up” despite earlier being moral leaders.113 Jim O’Neill writes of the need to challenge the “lazy consensus” about there being poor prospects for economic dynamism in the non-Western world.114 Economists are frequently wrong, so it is healthy that consensus is challenged. If it is not, then a “powerful groupthink” emerges in which analysts blindly follow others.115 What Jim O’Neill has done for economics and the study of development needs to be done for political science and the study of democratization. In the past, the central question for analyses of democratization has been “(d)o developing countries have the ability to make stable democratic transitions?” While this remains important, the dominant question has shifted to: “are the established democracies willing to embrace emerging democracies as members of the democratic community?” The question the West must ask is not “is this happening?” but rather, “are we ready for it to happen? ”116 In the West a “lazy consensus” persists that the non-Western world does not desire democracy and will not quickly embrace it. The reality, however, is that they are doing so, and much faster than the West appreciates. This is the leapfrogging pattern observed in changing women’s political representation. The West, and especially political science, needs to wake up to this new reality. A powerful groupthink exists that developing countries face difficulties becoming democracies, and such thinking must be overturned. At the point when its dream of spreading its institutions and values globally is being realized, the West appears unaware this is happening. Examples exist of the democratic community taking both an inclusive and exclusive approach. An inclusive approach was the G8’s replacement by the G20 in 2009, a move symbolizing the post-Washington consensus.117 The rise of growth economies made the G8 redundant.118 It took the financial crisis to force the West into sharing its authority. The crisis was managed through the G20, confirming the G8’s secondary status.119 It was “hugely ironic that the last act of the most unilateralist contemporary American president, George W. Bush, was to convene a meeting of the G20 to deal with the financial crisis.”120 This represents a huge step forward for the world economy.121 Even so, it has been a shock for the established democracies, and ironically pushed Germany back toward the other Western powers after its abstention over UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973. The growing economic power of the developing world

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fostered greater political unity among the Western democracies at the May 2011 G8 summit. Only three G20 members (China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia) are not democracies, and the emerging democracies collectively hold a share of world GDP comparable to that of these three authoritarian powers.122 While the days of a Western democratic club may be over, the G20 remains dominated by democracies. Nevertheless, the G20 is too large to be an efficient body. The IMF should set eligibility criteria for promotion and relegation based on objective indicators such as GDP and wealth. This would make the G-groups relevant and manageable, and motivate countries to aspire to become part of the group. This might parallel the effect that the EU had on its aspirant neighbors.123 Obvious ways of streamlining the G20 would be to have Euro membership, dropping the UK and Canada.124 Additionally, the IMF and the World Bank need to be reformed to give developing countries a voice. Leadership of these organizations should no longer be the prerogative of the United States and Europe. Candidates should be judged on their merit.125 On merit the current head of the World Bank would be Nigerian, and the current head of the IMF Mexican.126 However, the West blocked this. It took the global financial crisis to prompt Western support for the G20. Barring a catastrophic shock, Western countries espouse only the rhetoric of sharing power.127 A second example of the “sticky” nature of the democratic community is the International Criminal Court. The Rome Statute came into force in July 2002, when 60 states ratified the treaty. This was remarkable given the potential power of the Statute.128 Despite objections by the United States, a broad coalition of states brought it into existence. Both peaceful democracies and civil strife-ridden nondemocracies displayed similar ratification propensities. States having peaceful histories consider themselves not likely to go to the court, and states burdened by a violent past find membership useful in signaling commitment to civil peace.129 The drafters of the Statute were influenced by legal traditions prevalent in democracies.130 These domestic commonalities between states enabled a strong international coalition to form behind the ICC, over opposition from America. Even when the United States acts as a spoiler, the democratic community can work with developing countries to foster global democracy and human rights. However, there are instances where the democratic community has been exclusionary. Consider debates about UN Security Council reform and the admission of India, Brazil, and possibly South Africa or Nigeria as

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veto-wielding members. Unlike the EU, the UN is not made up exclusively of democracies, and the Council correctly makes a concession to the balance of power though the veto. However, the balance of power is changing, making reform an issue.131 Given this, the only reason for the established democracies to oppose permanent status for Brazil and India would be that these states lack moral legitimacy. Yet if these countries are democracies, this is not a valid argument. If the established democracies oppose this, a double standard is exposed. One reason why emerging democracies have opposed interventions by the established democratic powers has been to protest inequality in the UN.132 The presence of Brazil, India, and Germany on the Security Council at the time of UNSC Resolution 1973 provides a window into what might happen in the event of reform.133 UNSC 1973 indicates that the Council would not always be gridlocked after expansion. Mahbubani’s “777”formula for a reformed Council is sensible in proposing a Council with seven permanent seats held by the EU, United States, China, India, Russia, Brazil, and Nigeria, with France and the UK losing their seats. Seven middle power members would compete for rotating semi-permanent seats. This would give a stake in the system to “near losers” such as Mexico and Pakistan. Seven other elected seats would be chosen via the General Assembly to give smaller states a say.134 This 21-member Council would represent a much larger percentage of the world’s peoples but retain the veto system. Additionally, the categories should be reviewed every ten years in terms of share of population and economy so the UN copes with power transitions. Any such arrangement will be strongly resisted by Britain, France, and the United States, but such resistance, over time, risks delegitimizing established democracies in the eyes of the democratic and world community.135 Moreover, preventing the Council from adjusting to changes in the balance of power would be “condemning it to irrelevance.”136 A second example of the exclusionary tendency of the democratic community is resistance to the liberalization of trade in textiles and agriculture within the WTO. It is morally and materially difficult for established democracies to justify these policies. This is an example of what Mahbubani terms a “retreat into fortresses” scenario in which the West responds to the rise of the developing world by excluding it.137 Thus he observes that “agricultural negotiations . . . vividly demonstrates a powerful political reality in the West. Given a choice of promoting larger global interest (which would eventually also benefit the West by creating a more stable and peaceful world) and protecting short-term and narrow sectorial interests, the West has increasingly shown a dismal record of dumping the world in favor of

Global Democratic Futures 167 small but powerful lobbies.”138 This represents the logic of “do as I say and not as I do,” or “liberal hypocrisy.”139 As emerging democracies become more powerful, they will be intolerant of these double standards. The post-Arab Spring Middle East is part of the clash of democratizations. Israel and Iran are the biggest losers in a post-Western Middle East.140 In Israel’s view, 2011 in Egypt recalls 1979 in Iran, not 1989 in Europe.141 However, a new political balance of power is putting greater pressure on Israel. The United States is in decline, Turkey is placing pressure on Israel, and the peace treaty with Egypt is no longer a “deal of elites.”142 Given this, “Israel . . . must recognize . . . the potential for escalation and the political realities of its neighbors and potential peace partners. Such recognition will not make the new challenges go away, but they will make Israel ready to seize the opportunities for peace and less likely to engage in dangerous escalations.”143 Due to its alliance with Israel, this poses a major challenge to US policy makers. Israel and the United States will find it extraordinarily difficult to accommodate these changes given domestic pressures.144 The clash of democratizations will profoundly affect national identities, demographics, and lifestyles in Western democracies. Western societies are rapidly aging. People in the developed world “are about to become economically dependent on workers in the emerging world.”145 This has economic implications as well as psychological consequences. Aging poses: a generational issue . . . in the sense of younger, more powerful emerging economies and policies powers clashing with older fading ones. The baby boomers in the West grew up in the aftermath of the Second World War and under the shadow of the Cold War but in a world they could confidently believe belonged to them . . . [However] their children and grandchildren . . . will not be able to feel . . . that the world is theirs alone—or even at all.146

The only solution is for the West to allow high and continuous levels of immigration. Both developed and developing countries would gain, and global inequality would be reduced.147 Yet this will produce the Islamization of Europe, the Asianization of Japan, Australia, and Canada, and the Hispanization of America.148 The question which this raises, therefore, is whether the West can adjust, especially during economic decline. Economic stagnation and growing pressures for immigration have already produced a renationalization of politics in Europe and political polarization in America.149 Earlier migrations have been from advanced to less advanced societies. In the current era, that trend has been reversed.

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Non-Western populations will over time start to outnumber the Western populations in Western states, requiring Western societies to assimilate wider cultural differences than in the past, faster, and on a larger scale.150 “Given the political and social tensions that . . . relatively limited transnational migration has . . . provoked, there is reason to be concerned should a massive surge in population occur.”151 Western societies face a stark choice—open up or fall behind the younger developing societies they are competing with.152 The choice is theirs to make democratically.153 Immigration follows from democracy in the political realm and capitalism in the economic realm. Western countries have found it difficult to restrict immigration for two reasons: First, they have had difficulty formulating any just principle of excluding foreigners that does not seem racist or nationalist, thereby violating those universal principles of right to which they as liberal democracies are committed. . . . The second reason . . . is economic, since nearly every developed country has experienced shortages of certain kinds of . . . labor.154

It is morally hypocritical and economically irrational for democracies to oppose immigration. Accepting high levels of immigration from non-Western societies is the consequence of the West’s own values and institutions. Anti-immigrant groups presuppose that by accepting immigrants “we” in the West are doing the immigrants a favor by allowing “them” to share “our” wealth and freedom. However, immigrants are now essential to the prosperity of Western democracies. It is “they” who are doing us the favor. Yet this represents a huge psychological shift. It won’t suffice for the West to grudgingly accept migrants. If they want immigrants to assimilate, the West must enthusiastically welcome workers.155 Competition for migrants will increase as middle income states face skills shortages, and as the number of developing countries with growing populations dwindles.156 If Western societies are slow movers in the global labor market, they will have themselves to blame when they can no longer afford retirement.157 Western societies must adopt policies and values that attract immigrants. They aren’t used to this, but need to change rapidly. Global warming exemplifies the clash of democratizations. For example, what will occur when two billion new members of the global middle class want a car? The world faces a “Malthusian moment.”158 Technological change will be part of the solution.159 However, it will need to be accompanied by shifts in lifestyles.160 In this context, three facts constrain political

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negotiations between developed and developing societies. First, developing societies are determined to have industrial revolutions. Second, developing countries argue that before preaching to them, the West ought to set an example. Third, the West has made a disproportionate contribution to greenhouse gas emissions.161 Thus developing countries can make a strong case that the West must “jump first.” Developing countries also understand that global warming will affect them and they are prepared to contribute to solutions.162 As Mahbubani points out, it “makes no sense to deny a poor Indian access to electricity while allowing an average middle class American family to maintain two SUVs.”163 The failure of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in 2009 is often taken as an indication that developing countries use their sovereignty to protect their economic growth.164 However, America has remained outside the climate change agreement, and the Kyoto framework encourages free riding by developing countries. Hence Europe’s attempt to show “leadership” on this issue was doomed.165 The current regime focuses on carbon production. While this is falling in Europe in accordance with Kyoto, global carbon consumption is rising rapidly. The increased carbon consumption comes from the developing world. However the developing world’s economic growth has been based on exports of energy-intensive goods to the West. One way forward is for the West to tax carbon consumption through a domestic tax on carbon and a tax on carbon imports. While this would be costly for developing economies, it would be felt much more by Western consumers. Moreover, collectively this would generate a global set of incentives to reduce carbon emissions.166 This offers a fairer system which puts the burden on the West. However, does the West have the political will to implement a carbon tax?167 The answer, sadly, is no. Before the West blames developing countries for undermining climate change negotiations, it needs to put forward an improved climate change regime. Such a regime would need to assign to the West the greater share of the burden, and avoid free rider problems. Then the West must implement this new system. Otherwise it does not have a diplomatic or moral leg to stand on. At the moment people in the developing world are not being expected to pay, although the problem is worsening. When they are asked to pay, the system will have to be a fair one in which the West carries the burden. If it does not, the rising middle classes in the developing world will reject it.168 Once regulations are in place, market solutions for global warming can emerge. However, the problem is to get these regulations into place in a democratic society. Thomas Friedman refers to the

170 The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West idea that America must become “China for a day (but not two).” This is a challenge democracies must address. Time is running out.169 Due to the competitive nature of their domestic institutions, democracies will resist sharing the benefits of the democratic community in favor of satisfying their electoral constituencies. All democratic leaders want to do is stay in office.170 This will intensify clash of democratizations greatly. It means that, paradoxically, the fact that democracies are democracies poses a big problem for the global spread of democracy. Will democratic electorates vote for costly or unpopular changes? Yet if democracies do not make adjustments, they risk damaging or undermining the democratic community. Global warming poses this problem most acutely. The tension between democracy’s universalizing and inclusive aspirations and the requirements of democratic political institutions must be resolved if the democratic community is to survive. Hegel argued that there is a tension between our particular loyalties to the state and our abstract and universal loyalties toward the human race. Each of these identities is dialectically related, and history evolves through a series of stages to reconcile these contradictions.171 Fukuyama interpreted Hegel as arguing that the liberal democratic state represents the end of this process of historical evolution.172 However, the democratic state faces a further historical contradiction which it must revolve before being universalized. That contradiction is—ironically, and in true Hegelian fashion—the liberal democratic state itself. Some might argue that global warming will occur over an extended period, and that Western democracies are simply fortunate in being better able to afford the cost of shielding themselves from climate change. This represents the “fortress” thinking discussed in relation to trade. However, the West will obviously not be able to shield itself from huge consequences of global warming. Moreover, the West is facing decline and will be increasingly dependent on immigration and economic exchange with the developing world. In reality, no fortress world exists; it is merely a reflection of Western hubris. The world community is no longer living on a 190 separate sovereign boats. It is living on one boat, and there is no captain and no crew.173 As Friedman observes, the West needs to get its “groove” back.174 The Second World War and the Cold War exacted enormous sacrifices. It will be tragic if, having made the sacrifices required to stand against serious threats posed by ideological adversaries, the free world falters now because the citizens of democracies cannot muster the resolve needed to make (by comparison) small adjustments involving mild discomfort. Winston Churchill offered the British people nothing but

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“blood, toil and tears,” and the public responding resoundingly.175 Today, the West balks at paying a carbon tax. Not only is this rank hypocrisy, it is a travesty of the West’s own ideals and aspirations. A fortress-world response by the West also forgoes the massive gains to be made from making relatively small adjustments in cooperation with emerging democracies to address common challenges. Western institutions provide the best available framework for unleashing human creativity to tackle twenty-first-century problems like global warming.176 Making these psychological and material shifts will bring enormous benefits to the West, and would allow Western societies to renew themselves and channel their energies constructively and sustainably.177 Anyone who doubts that democracies lack the creativity and political ability to overcome parochial electoral constituencies should read the account of Nigerian economic reform by its former Finance Minister, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. Entitled Reforming the Unreformable, her book reads like an economic development equivalent of the movie The Untouchables. Surrounding herself with a small cadre of like-minded and determined reformers, and refusing to compromise on first principles, she democratically oversaw the transformation of Nigeria from a virtual basket case to a country consistently growing at 7 percent. If Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala can achieve this in Nigeria, the West has no excuse whatsoever for claiming institutional gridlock. Ultimately, the problem for the West is not with its democratic institutions. To the contrary, democratic institutions have the advantage of being flexible and allowing for change, persuasion, and learning. For the West, the problem is psychological. It revolves around the pathology of whether we are genuinely committed to sharing the benefits of the global spread of democracy. Or are we merely rhetorically committed to this goal, while in reality we will try to pull up the ladder and retreat behind our state walls? In fact, established democracies will not be able to stop emerging democracies from bursting down the doors to their cozy gentleman’s club. First, established democracies will be less strong compared to the emerging democracies, and will need their diplomatic and political support and access to their markets. Colossal opportunities will be forgone and enormous costs incurred in the event that their transitions fail. More generally, democracies are too interdependent to effectively shut out the world without massive adverse consequences. Second, established democracies will be vulnerable to charges of moral hypocrisy if they exclude emerging democracies. Sharing the benefits of membership of the democratic community will be traumatic for the West. Yet eventually the established democracies

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will have to admit these countries and provide them with considerable help to allow them to join the community and its associated institutions. These political conflicts are therefore the opposite of imperial conflicts, and relate to the way international society is becoming “reverse colonized.”178 In the past “we” colonized “them,” whereas today “they” are colonizing “us” by joining the global democratic community. Feminist research into “old boys’ networks” is helpful in understanding the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion that can characterize group behavior.179 Historically politics has been male-dominated. One explanation for this is gendered clientelist behavior, defined in terms of “the exchange of personal favors for political support.” 180 In terms of gaining access to resources within organizations, men prefer working with men and women prefer working with men because of established male-dominated networks. For psychological reasons related to trust, men prefer working with men and women prefer working with women.181 Consequently women are typically excluded from political organizations because “homosocial capital” favors male dominance. However, this breaks down if the old boys’ network becomes dysfunctional. Clientelism is democratically rational in the sense that “it is linked to votes, elections and electoral support.”182 Historically, both voters and parties selected on the basis of a male bias. However, female candidates have become attractive for voters and male candidates have become an electoral liability. Yet the defeated party only reforms after catastrophic electoral failure.183 The old boys’ club remains in place through inertia, reproducing itself even after it has ceased to be rational for parties. Analyses of old boys’ networks are applicable to the international relationship between emerging and established democracies. Emerging democracies form a gentleman’s club, a democratic fraternity, or a democracy establishment.184 When established democracies are weak compared to the autocratic community, and there is a stark difference between democracies and other states, the social cues that generate affinity between established democracies may be functional in sustaining relations. However, as more countries become emerging democracies and as emerging democracies become more powerful relative to established democracies, these social networks might become dysfunctional. Even so, established and emerging democracies might persistently stick to their old behavioral traits for psychological comfort, even in the face of considerable material losses. It might take a catastrophic crisis, such as the 2008 financial crisis which led the G8 to be replaced by the G20, to generate a new, more

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open, and integrative network. This new social network will be based more heavily on heterosocial capital that engages with those perceived as different from, rather those similar to, oneself.185 Research on the diffusion of quotas for women’s representation has shown that this global trend has actually changed what it means for states to be democratic. It was acceptable in 1975 for a state to be democratic if there were few women politicians, but today that is no longer the case. A new global democratic norm has evolved. Moreover, developing countries, rather than the Western powers, have pioneered this qualitative improvement in global democracy by being the leaders in the trend toward the adoption of gender quotas.186 Mahbubani observes that, by contrast, the Western powers are running international institutions like dictators, refusing to share power and authority more broadly.187 A more inclusive approach to global governance by the West would enhance the quality of democracy within the global democratic community. Feminist insights about the importance of inclusivity have a key role to play in facilitating global democratization.188 Paradoxically, a world in which there are a large number of emerging democracies may prove harder for established democracies than the Cold War when a small number of democracies sought to survive in a sea of authoritarian states.189 The most important conflicts of the future will not be between democracies and autocracies, but between established and emerging democracies. While this contains opportunities for the established democracies to realize their interests and values globally, the expansion of democracy means sharing the benefits of membership of the democratic community in a way that democracies are not accustomed to. This will mean ceding power and legitimacy to states which are not yet established democracies, whose reasonable interests conflict with those of Western states, and which have more diverse cultural and religious traditions.190 While the world is converging around Western institutions and values, this should not give the misleading impression that the world is going to stay the same.191 The Western-dominated democratic order is being rapidly undermined. Moreover this is occurring not because of challenges by capitalist autocracies and Islamic theocracies. Instead, change is being driven by the spread of the Western institutions of democracy and capitalism to the developing world. Responding to this requires a huge psychological shift for Western publics and leaders, which are accustomed to viewing themselves at the top of the international hierarchy. The clash of democratizations involves material conflicts of interest over control of political power. Yet at root it involves a struggle for moral

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recognition. Fukuyama identified that it was the struggle for recognition which animated Hegel’s account of historical development. The modern liberal democratic state represented the triumph of the principle of equal recognition over the aristocratic relationship of lordship and bondage. Like the Arab regimes in 2011, the Soviet Union collapsed because it ultimately failed to recognize the basic dignity of its peoples.192 Previously the struggle for recognition occurred within autocratic states. Today, however, the struggle for recognition is also occurring between democratic states. It involves the established democracies of the West recognizing the moral legitimacy and equality of non-Western peoples within the democratic community. Thus moral recognition is increasingly being denied not by autocracies, but by democracies. The clash of democratizations may be so intense because it involves Western “megalothymia,” to use the Platonic terminology adopted by Fukuyama.193 Megalothymia is not the desire to be recognized as equal to others, but as superior to them. Fukuyama was right that with the triumph of democracy, megalothymia was not tamed but has merely been sublimated. Yet megalothymia manifests itself not out of a nihilistic sense of “boredom,” or because it has been channeled constructively into an allpervasive desire to be recognized as the equals of others.194 Instead, the form megalothymia is increasingly taking is a residual attitude of moral superiority by the West over the rest. The future of the international order will play out this further twist in the struggle for moral recognition in world history. Thirty years ago Hedley Bull and Adam Watson concluded The Expansion of International Society by observing that the international society that was forged in Europe . . . has not disappeared now that European sway has ended but has been embraced by the non-European . . . peoples . . . If there are dangers that the new majority of states, as they seek to reform international society to take account of their own interests, might strain its rules and institutions to breaking point, so there are dangers that the . . . Western minority might fail to see that it is only by adjustments to change that the international society they created can remain viable.195

Today that observation seems strikingly prophetic. While the issue of whether emerging democracies can make stable democratic transitions remains, a more important question will be whether the established democracies are able to embrace these states as members of the society of democratic peoples. During the Cold War, the West professed to promote

Global Democratic Futures 175 the spread of democracy and capitalism to the Second and Third Worlds. The revolutions of 1989 brought democracy to the communist world, and the Arab Spring shows that the democratic genie is loose in the developing world. Now that the West’s Cold War vision is becoming a reality, it may find that what was previously presumed would be a blessing seems to be more like a curse.

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8. Conclusion: A Global Spring The meeting of East and West on Indian soil has failed to attain fulfillment, but their great achievements are complementary, and their true co-operation will be necessary for a Universal Culture. —Rabindranath Tagore, Indian scholar and polymath, 19011

T

wenty-five years after the Cold War ended, the world is experiencing an explosion of human liberty on a scale unprecedented in world history. The revolutions of 2011 manifested not just an Arab Spring, but a Global Spring. As Kishore Mahbubani reminds us, the American and Western projects are succeeding around the world like never before. More progress has been made in the last 30 years than in the previous three hundred.2 Like Mahbubani, we want readers to finish our book “drowning in optimism” about the future. We sincerely hope for the people of the Arab World that their societies can realize the democratic demands of the protestors in 2011, and we emphasize that there is a meaningful prospect that some of them may reach their goals over the coming decades. Yet whatever happens in the Middle East, overwhelmingly the developing world has already embraced modernity. In India, Brazil, Turkey, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, and Indonesia, people are getting on with the larger and more difficult long-term challenge of reforming their societies and making their lives flourish. Today there is a real possibility that Rabindranath Tagore’s turn of the twentieth-century aspiration for a universal global civilization in which the West and the rest meet as equals is realized on a worldwide basis. Millions of people are being lifted out of poverty and are beginning to enjoy the benefits and security associated with a middle class lifestyle. In so doing, their expectations are rising and they are enjoying a greater degree of political freedom and democracy than ever before. Contrary to the expectations of many, and indeed most commentators, the trends in world politics that led to the revolutions of 1989 did not diminish after 9/11, but became

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more intense and widespread than ever. The major developments of the last 10–15 years in world politics were not 9/11 and the American-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the problems these events have been associated with. Instead, they were the rise of the rest and the wholesale adoption of both capitalism and democracy by the developing world. By adopting these historically Western institutions, developing countries have—in an astonishingly short period—transformed their livelihoods and prospects. This larger historical trend will be subject to reversals and setbacks over the generation ahead. However, the revolutions of 2011 in the Middle East showed how globally pervasive the aspiration for a better life has become, even—and indeed especially—in the Arab world. Francis Fukuyama famously argued that the revolutions of 1989 reflected a larger process of historical evolution in which democracy and capitalism had emerged victorious over their political and economic competitors. His argument was widely criticized, but with the benefit of a quarter of a century’s hindsight, everyone who said Fukuyama was wrong, was wrong. Indeed, claiming that Fukuyama was essentially right has become a scholarly taboo. Yet the awkward truth for political science is that—in essence—his argument was correct. The worldwide spread of capitalism and democracy reflects a deep-seated change in global historical consciousness. There are current exceptions to this trend, but 25 years after the end of the Cold War, it is emerging as the overwhelming historical pattern. People and societies may try and resist modernity, but they are not able to stop it from gradually taking hold. As Immanuel Kant wrote prophetically in his 1784 essay, An Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose: [i]ndividual men and even entire nations little imagine that, while they are pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature. They are unconsciously promoting an end which, even if they knew what it was, would scarcely arouse their interest.3

However, Fukuyama was wrong that the global spread of democracy and capitalism would represent the triumph of the West or the end of history. Instead, Samuel Huntington rightly predicted that non-Western civilizations would be the future sources of dynamism in world politics. The rest is rising while the West is in decline. Nevertheless, contrary to Huntington and in line with Fukuyama, the rise of the rest is occurring because the developing world has been

Conclusion: A Global Spring 179 internalizing democracy and capitalism. When developing countries have adopted effective political and economic institutions, they have finally been able to unleash the phenomenal natural and human resources at their disposal, just as Western societies were previously able to do. Meanwhile the West has ridden out the “S-curve” of growth produced by its own embrace of modernity and is running up against the economic law of diminishing returns. What the global spread of democracy and capitalism heralds, therefore, is not the triumph of the West or the end of history, but the beginning of a post-Western future for the global democratic project. The Arab Spring has revealed that rather than being diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive, the end of history and clash of civilizations theses were actually complementary. The time is ripe for a new synthesis of these grand visions of the post-Cold War order. Today we are just beginning to appreciate the perennial importance and profound nature of the sweeping theories of global politics that these two scholars put forward during the momentous changes that engulfed the international system from the late 1980s onward. When a scholarly work grows in relevance and stature rather than diminishes over time, this is the hallmark of a classic contribution. The single most powerful historical force driving this process of global political and economic change is growing awareness of these very trends. As Thomas Friedman observes, one good example is worth a thousand theories.4 When people around the world can point to societies that are succeeding by pursuing modernity, this gives them something tangible to aim for. This was a major factor in the revolutions of both 1989 and 2011. Equally, however, one good theory illuminates a thousand examples. The theoretical notion of reflexivity captures the idea that growing awareness about the spread of democracy has become a major factor—if not the major factor—facilitating the global spread of democracy. Reflexivity is the motor driving the global democratic bandwagon. It reflects the logic of “everybody else is doing it so why can’t we?” At some level or another, everyone in the world knows and understands what the key global trends are because they are obvious and manifest. It is increasingly clear that whatever their continued problems and limitations, societies around the world that are succeeding are the ones like Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Indonesia, Turkey, and India, which have moved in a democratic and capitalist direction. Even authoritarian societies which have improved their lot considerably over the last three decades have done so by embracing capitalism, and the Arab Spring has reminded the world that it remains very difficult to “partly buy-in” to the overall package of institutions that liberalism represents. Over the longer term, liberalism is an “all or nothing”

180 The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West proposition, and different elements of the package cannot be cherry-picked in a fashion that is ultimately sustainable. Examples of reflexivity abound. Activists from the Serbian youth group Otpor who had played a key role in the struggle against Slobodan Milosevic and had connections with Egyptian activists helped train protest organizers in Tahrir Square.5 Otpor was inspired by the American democracy activist Gene Sharp’s booklet From Dictatorship to Democracy, which was itself influenced by the teachings of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, and was originally intended to help Burmese protestors. When it was translated into Indonesian with an introduction by the man who became its first democratic president in 1999, it played a major role in the overthrow of Suharto’s regime.6 Reflexivity is when global celebrities Aung San Suu Kyi and Madonna call for the release of the anti-Putin postmodern feminist punk protest girl band Pussy Riot from a Russian prison. The practice of free speech and debate is essential to the spread of ideas. Reflexivity will be apparent to anyone who listens to Ros Atkins’ BBC World Service international phone-in show World Have Your Say broadcast daily to discuss a topical issue in world politics, or who watches Fared Zakaria’s Global Public Square on CNN. Reflexivity is when Baseem Youssef, the self-styled “Egyptian Jon Stewart,” has his arrest for mocking the Morsi regime satirized by the actual Jon Stewart, leading to his release and subsequent appearance on The Daily Show, which is available in Egypt on satellite television, YouTube, and micro-blogging websites.7 Reflexivity exists when Professor Larry Diamond of Stanford University, the world’s preeminent scholar of democratization, starts a free Massively Open Online Course (MOOC) on “Democratic Development” which attracts thousands of students from around the world, with the explicit goal that “students in developing or prospective democracies will use the theories, ideas, and lessons in the class to help build or improve democracy in their own countries.”8 Reflexivity is manifest when Alexis de Tocqueville’s The Ancien Regime and the French Revolution becomes fashionable reading among China’s chattering classes.9 Reflexivity is uniquely a feature of social, as opposed to natural, systems. Unlike molecules, human beings have the capacity to change their behavior in light of knowledge about patterns of behavior in society.10 Yogi Berra’s observation that “nobody goes there anymore because it’s too crowded” is an example of this reflexivity. Hence this book seeks not just to document reflexivity as a major feature of contemporary world politics. It is also a product of reflexivity, and equally importantly a further contribution

Conclusion: A Global Spring 181 to it. This book was inspired and influenced by a much broader range of sources than conventional scholarly works, including newspaper articles, television and radio programs, YouTube clips, Yahoo! News, and works accessed through Twitter feeds, blogs, and websites.11 This is a conscious and deliberate strategy to both capture and illustrate the feedback between “expert” knowledge among scholars of political science and wider debates in the global public sphere that is taking place. Similarly, by identifying the importance of reflexivity and providing a theoretical articulation of how it has manifested itself, this book aims to magnify the worldwide diffusion of ideas about democracy. Since it has lacked precise theoretical expression and articulation, the importance of reflexivity has been largely tacit or implied in academic and public debates about world politics. We aim for scholars, elites, and people at large to consciously and explicitly realize that reflexivity exists as a theoretical concept and an empirical fact about world politics, and for this to inform their own behavior and strategies for achieving global democratic reform. The time frame envisaged by this book is the next 25 years. The year 2014 represents the twenty-fifth anniversary of the end of the Cold War. Our guiding question in this book has been, what will world politics look like a generation from now in 2039? Especially since the end of the Cold War, the study of international relations has been far too driven by current affairs. Intellectual fads and fashions have changed every two to three years. Adopting a long time frame encourages commentators to consider the larger systemic or macro-historical patterns rather than get bogged down in contingent or ephemeral trends. It is well known that democratic transitions are difficult, and can often lead to internal or external war, conflict, and breakdown. However, over the longer term, such trends do not necessarily undermine the overall global spread of democracy. Moreover, there are many previous instances of initially failed transitions eventually becoming strong and stable democracies.12 Indeed, the American civil war and the twentieth-century history of France and Germany reflect this. In recent living memory, Portugal, Taiwan, South Korea, Argentina, and Brazil were all societies considered “not ready” for democracy.13 Much the same argument was made about the former East bloc countries after 1989, and today this is being said about Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria. Individual failures of democratic transition do not undermine our overall argument about the systemic or global trend toward democratization. Similarly, adopting a longer time frame allows us to place major developments like 9/11 and the US-led interventions of Afghanistan and Iraq in a larger historical perspective. Our position is that 9/11 did not represent a

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fundamental shift in world politics, in contrast to the revolutions of 1989 and 2011, which did. Thomas Friedman has observed that through a curious historical twist of fate, the Berlin Wall came down on November 11, 1989—or 11/9, rather than 9/11. He contrasts the political imaginations that led to 11/9 and 9/11. Whereas the 11/9 imagination aims to open up the world through globalization, the 9/11 imagination shuts it down and closes it off. He gives the moving example of Candace Lee Williams, the student who had interned in the World Trade Center in the summer of 2001, and whose colleagues sent a letter to her university entreating them to “Send us five more like Candace!.” She died that fall on American Airlines Flight 11 when her flight smashed into the very tower of the World Trade Center where she had worked. Airline records show that she was seated next to an 80-year-old grandmother. It does not take much to imagine a conversation they might have shared when they were taking their seats. Friedman observes that when Candace Lee Williams boarded Flight 11, she could not have imagined how it would end. Yet since 9/11 none of us can board an airplane without imagining how it could end. What happened to her could happen to any of us. Yet, Friedman says, the chances that our plane will be hijacked remain infinitesimal compared to having a car crash or being struck by lightning. So even though we can imagine what could happen when we get on a plane, we have to get on the plane anyway.14 Friedman’s discussion is not only poignant, but also relates to a profound feature of contemporary world politics. Neither terrorism nor the West’s often problematic response to it will stop globalization. The juggernaut of modernity will continue to roll, and while these developments can slow it down at the margin, global integration will continue. Thus 9/11 and its aftermath are best understood as having distributive consequences which will contribute to a longer-standing trend toward American and Western decline. Further and bigger terrorist attacks are to be expected. Yet like 9/11, they are unlikely to be of a sufficient scale to bring down the democratic community in its entirety. By contrast, 1989 and 2011 reflect qualitative shifts in the basic nature of world politics. They represent key symbolic junctures in terms of the adoption of democracy by the former communist and developing worlds. From a longer-term historical perspective, 11/9 was a far more important turning point in terms of the overall evolution of the international system than 9/11. The imagination of 11/9 can and is winning out over the imagination of 9/11. This is not an idealistic pipe dream but a practical reality for millions and billions of people around the world. The Arab Spring in many ways represented the

Conclusion: A Global Spring 183 revenge of the imagination of 9/11, and it was all the more important that it came from Muslim societies in the Middle East less than a decade after the events of 9/11 itself. In 2011, the imaginations of 11/9 and 9/11 met and confronted one another, and the spirit of 11/9 emerged victorious. This book also deliberately represents a return to grand theory in International Relations. The end of the Cold War inspired key debates about the overall trajectory of world politics. Seminal contributions were made by Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis and Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” riposte. September 11 further intensified these debates about whether cultural integration or fragmentation was the larger dominant trend in world politics, with the mood shifting in favor of Huntington’s argument. The Arab Spring in 2011 was a development on the scale of 9/11 and 1989, and similarly was virtually unanticipated by the overwhelming majority of commentators. Events on the magnitude of the Arab Spring cry out for grand theory in the tradition of global thinkers such as Fukuyama and Huntington. Yet too often these larger questions have been neglected by professional political science in favor of middle-range theories and hypothesis testing.15 We have sought to fill this gap, restoring Fukuyama’s thesis to its rightful place at the center of debates about the future, setting out an optimistic vision of the future of world politics in stark contrast to post-9/11 pessimism, and restoring a focus in IR on the big picture of global change. This is an antiestablishment book, questioning received wisdom within political science and in the West more generally. A point of inspiration for us was the interview with Scottish comedian Billy Connolly on the radio show Desert Island Discs on November 18, 2001, on BBC Radio 4. The presenter Sue Lawley asked Connolly about his first appearance on national television, when he told a joke that his manager had strictly told him not to tell: “For God’s sake Billy, don’t tell that bloody joke.” Lawley inquired whether this reflected an instinctive rebelliousness. Connolly cheekily replied in his broad Scottish accent: Just do it, you know, do it. There’s a wee devil in you that says— do it. Come on, come on. The Americans call it ‘pushing the envelope’—I don’t know why. You just shove it a wee bit forward all the time, you know, take it somewhere it’s never been, because it’s great.16

In precisely this spirit, we attack latent assumptions, consensus opinion, and sacred cows of all kinds, whether methodological, substantive, or political. Our sweeping argument deliberately seeks to defy orthodoxy,

184 The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West stoke controversy, break intellectual taboos, and say the unsayable, cognizant of the way in which big new theoretical breakthroughs often come “out of left field.” We explicitly intend this book not as an incremental contribution to debates, but as a new general theory of the overall nature of global political change. We aim to shake up political science, and even more ambitiously, the terms of broader public discourse about world politics. Our book should be read as a wake-up call to the West to recognize— and address—the unprecedented difficulties that it faces if it is to fulfill its Cold War dream of extending its most cherished institutions and ideals globally. As Kishore Mahbubani observes, “Sometimes the hardest things to see are the largest things.”17 The Arab Spring of 2011 was not just something which came out of the blue. Instead, it reflects deep-seated historical forces for change that have been building up within the international system since at least the end of the Cold War. The democratic train is now rapidly coming down the track of world politics. A process of democratic socialization is gathering momentum and is spreading on a worldwide scale. To understand the revolutions that have swept the Arab world, we must look beyond internal changes within the individual countries the revolutions have affected. The causes of the Arab Spring were also external and relate to the presence of a strong democratic community in the international system. With the end of the Cold War, a critical mass of democratic states has come to dominate the global order. This has set in motion global forces that have undermined authoritarian states, triggering a slow motion democratic avalanche or “norm cascade.” Rather than criticizing Fukuyama’s underlying argument about the spread of democracy, we have sought to refine it. A debate rages within political science about the relative importance of structural factors and voluntary choice in driving democratization.18 However, the interesting feature of contemporary world politics is the way voluntary choices interact with and reinforce the larger structural trend through reflexivity. We have put forward a general theory of democratization that links domestic and international levels of analysis, and specifies under what conditions democratic spillover is encouraged. Kenneth Waltz argued that a theory of world politics linking domestic and international levels of analysis would be desirable, but always held that no one ever figured out how to do this.19 We propose that such a theory of world politics is possible. The key to constructing it is to reconceptualize the long-term dynamics of the international system.20 The strength of the global democratic community generates socialization pressures which encourage the further spread of

Conclusion: A Global Spring 185 democracy. This in turn feeds back to strengthen the global democratic community and intensify pressures for international socialization. The international system comes to embody a virtuous cycle in which the spread of democracy becomes self-perpetuating. This global process of democratic socialization is producing a convergence of global norms that is the overwhelming and distinctive feature of world politics today.21 The causes of the Arab Spring are structurally similar to those of the third wave of democratization after 1974. Samuel Huntington offered five explanations for third wave democratic transitions: 1) economic and political deficiencies of autocracies, 2) economic modernization, 3) religious changes, 4) regional contagion, and 5) the environment created by Western powers.22 However, these five factors should not be considered separate or discrete causes of democratization. Instead, all five of these factors were the direct product of the emergence of a powerful network of capitalist and democratic states in the international system. The strength of the interdependent democratic core became prominent from the mid1970s as the international system approached and then passed the point of critical democratic mass represented by the end of the Cold War. The five factors identified by Huntington as causing the third wave should therefore be understood as part of a more general process of democratic socialization in the international system. That these basic forces have only further intensified over the last 25 years explains why even the Middle East, the only major world region not to be affected by the third wave, has been engulfed by processes of democratization since 2011. Thus the Arab Spring directly reflects global trends. The global forces that produced the Arab Spring were partly transnational (related to the intensification of globalization) and partly international (related to the strength of the democratic community in the system of states). Each of these transnational and international forces interacts to strongly reinforce pressures for democratization. A key transnational change driving the Arab Spring was economic modernization. By espousing economic liberalization to boost their economic performance, Arab dictatorships sowed the seeds of their own demise. Economic development was associated with the emergence of an indigenous middle class, rising education levels, demographic change, changes in the status of women, and shifts in attitudes toward religion. These eventually came to challenge the foundations of authoritarian rule by producing a complex and pluralistic civil society. The second transnational pressure was changes in communications technology. This delegitimized autocratic regimes in the eyes of the public to such an extent that the “wall of fear” in the Arab

186 The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West world was broken. Protestors became willing to die to achieve their ends, and repression only fueled more protest. Furthermore, it allowed protests to spread more quickly and easily both within and between states. These were exactly the forces that corroded support for the East bloc countries and facilitated the contagion of democratization after 1989. Just as 1989 provided the world its first television revolutions, 2011 provided the world with its first Facebook revolutions. The international forces behind the Arab Spring operated at both global and regional levels. At a global level, growing outside pressure was exerted by the Western powers. This created a permissive environment that allowed the revolutions to run their course, facilitated changes in the global soft power environment favorable to democratization movements, and was illustrated most directly through the UN-supported military intervention in Libya by NATO. At a regional level, the proximity of North Africa to Western Europe made revolutions more likely, and increased the longterm prospects for the export of democracy to the region. Like NATO’s war against Serbia in 1999, NATO’s action in Libya was an example of “intervention in a good neighborhood.” Just as NATO’s intervention in Kosovo has paved the way for the long-term transformation of the Balkans after 1999, so the Libya intervention could open up the same possibility for North Africa. More generally, there are striking parallels between the international causes of the 2011 revolutions and the postcommunist experience in Eastern Europe after 1989. In 2011, as in 1989, changes in the world balance of power favored the global and regional democratic community. This eventually triggered regional dynamics that allowed democratizing dominoes to fall. After 1989, the countries of Eastern Europe bandwagoned toward the West, followed after 1999 by the countries of the Balkans. Over the longer term, this fate is now a meaningful possibility for countries in North Africa. Overall, the authoritarian states of the Middle East have been squeezed by the global context in which they are operating in exactly the fashion that the communist regimes in Eastern Europe were. There is now a real and genuine prospect of exporting democracy to Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt in the same fashion that democracy was exported to Eastern Europe after 1989 and the Balkans after 1999. Citing Bernard Crick’s seminal work, Lucian Pye observes that politics is a civilizing activity. In authoritarian states there is only a limited form of politics resolved by coercion, yet in reality there can be no single, correct answer to public policy issues. This can be difficult for peoples, especially in traditional cultures, to accept. Yet with modernization, the only long-term hope for the stability of society is to learn how to manage the disorderliness

Conclusion: A Global Spring 187 of politics.23 In Egypt and elsewhere across the Middle East, this civilizing process is now beginning. Egyptians are now freer to speak their minds, but this has removed the old certainties and forces more liberal and conservative elements of society to confront their differences publically.24 Nevertheless, the maturation of politics can and has occurred in many societies. As modernization gradually and inexorably takes hold across the Middle East, it has the potential to do so there too. If even one or two of these Middle Eastern states were to become emerging democracies over the next 25 years, the consequences would be enormous. Yet even if none of the Arab Spring transitions to democracy succeeds initially, what the Arab revolutions have revealed is the systematic failure of authoritarianism across the Middle East in exactly the same way communism failed systematically in Eastern Europe after 1989.25 While autocrats may patch up their existence for a while, authoritarianism is not a coherent and viable alternative to liberal democracy. Where autocratic or theocratic regimes reassert themselves, therefore, they too are likely to eventually fail. So the larger question becomes when, rather than if, these countries will eventually move in a democratic direction. Meanwhile, people in the Middle East are likely to be much more vigilant of their rulers, and much less tolerant of failure and incompetence than they have been in the past. This is particularly since there are a growing number of emerging democracies, including Islamic ones such as Turkey and Indonesia, which are blazing a successful trail toward modernity. The observation attributed to Abraham Lincoln applies: you can fool some of the people all of the time and all of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time. Nevertheless, the revolutions of 2011 are symptomatic of a broader process of democratic socialization. After 1989, democratic consolidation affected mainly Eastern Europe. The Arab Spring reflects the way that this trend has spread to the developing world. Commentators have been skeptical about whether the Arab Spring heralds the onset of a “fourth wave” of global democratization. Yet the reality is that with the unprecedented expansion of the global middle class, this wave is already swelling on a worldwide basis. By 2030, up to two billion additional people may enter the global middle class.26 Given the accuracy of previous Goldman Sachs predictions about economic change in the developing world, it is possible that this figure seriously underestimates the scale of the expansion of the global middle class that is occurring. The revolutions of 2011 have underscored the continued relevance of Lucian Pye’s argument that the predictions of modernization theory had essentially been vindicated by the

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events of 1989.27 Around the world, social and economic changes are tending, in the aggregate, to produce democratic political reforms. Individual countries may deviate from this trend, but the overall pattern is manifest. In this sense 2011, like 1989, represents an intense moment of reflexivity or growing global consciousness about the spread of democracy. In turn, this growing global consciousness about the spread of democracy places still further pressure on authoritarian states, since peoples around the world increasingly suspect that it is only a matter of time before autocratic regimes can no longer hold out against the rising democratic tide. Almost everywhere crude or low-grade authoritarian states are under extreme pressure and are failing to meet the basic needs and aspirations of their peoples. After the Arab Spring, only a handful of such regimes remain, and they are experiencing great difficulties. There are structural parallels between the situations faced by regimes in Belarus, Venezuela, Cuba, Iran, Burma, and North Korea. These regimes are on the brink of economic and/or political collapse, and it would be surprising if in 25 years many of them were still in existence. Burma and North Korea indicate the two major options facing these societies. In the wake of the 2007 Saffron Revolution, the Burmese regime recognized the untenable nature of its position. It has sought to end its international isolation through domestic economic and political reform. However, this process seriously challenges the basis of the regime’s existence. By contrast, North Korea has eschewed international engagement at the price of further speeding up domestic stagnation. The other states are in the middle of this spectrum, muddling through successive challenges and crises through a mixture of charismatic leadership, populism, largesse, outside support, and increased coercion. Yet none of these things is likely to reduce the ruling regime’s legitimacy deficit, and indeed, longer term they are likely to intensify it. Into the future, Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba all look vulnerable because they face chronic leadership transitions, and Belarus faces the challenges of its proximity to the enlarged NATO and EU. Given the fate of low-grade authoritarianism, there are two routes available to developing countries. One is to become high-grade authoritarian states such as China and Russia that use high levels of growth combined with a sophisticated blend of repression and concessions to maintain regime legitimacy. In China’s case, this ironically keeps autocrats more “accountable” to the public than in democracies in some senses. For example, the regime has acted to reduce growth rates to below a previously unthinkably low 7 percent and ward off steep property price increases though state interventionism. This stands in stark contrast to the US

Conclusion: A Global Spring 189 government, which turned a blind eye to the property bubble because it helped boost government popularity until it inevitably burst. China’s highgrade authoritarianism is the political equivalent of driving with a large iron spike on the steering wheel instead of using a seat belt. The government becomes only too aware of the consequences if it fails, and this keeps it on its toes. In Russia, this pattern is inverted. Authoritarianism masks the basic incompetence of the regime. Putin relies heavily on largesse and petrodollars, and has combined them with soft authoritarian techniques to sustain his position. Yet the widespread perception that Putin rolled back political freedoms to restore order and growth is a myth put forward by the regime itself. The economy has grown despite rather than because of the regime’s policies, and corruption is the glue that holds a ramshackle state together.28 However, high-grade authoritarianism in both China and Russia is facing severe difficulties. Specifically it requires states to develop highly interdependent relations with the democratic community. While it may prove effective in the short run, such regimes remain vulnerable to the middle class protests that have led to the demise of the regimes across the Middle East. High-grade authoritarianism merely stores up today’s legitimacy problems for tomorrow. As The Economist noted recently in relation to a discussion of China, these autocratic regimes may have a lot of hammers and a lot of nails, but they are ultimately trying to nail jello to the wall.29 Demonstrations across Russia after December 2011 were a powerful reminder of the weakness and vulnerability of even high-grade autocracies. One seasoned Russia observer has prophesied that a reckoning is in the offing. The oil and gas prices which have underpinned state largesse are now falling, and it does not look like they will rise again soon. The regime finds itself bereft of soft power, backing a brutally repressive dictatorship in Syria, and its own creation—the new and educated Russian urban middle class—is now “at best skeptical of him and often hostile.”30 Putin’s second term will not be the easy ride he was expecting it to be, and his position is increasingly tenuous. As in the Middle East, after 2011 in both China and Russia “nothing has changed but everything has changed.”31 Winston Churchill’s famous observation that democracy is the worst available political system apart from all of the others is apposite. A more sustainable approach for developing countries is to become emerging democracies such as Brazil, India, Mexico, Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa, and Nigeria. Emerging democracies are not yet stable democracies and have a higher probability of backsliding than the Western democracies. However, they have the franchise, a regular transfer of power,

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are peaceful externally, adopt capitalism in some form, and allow domestic pluralism. Importantly also, this category of states has the potential to become established democracies in the future. Unlike the “top-down” model of reform associated with Turkey’s Kemalist paradigm in the twentieth century, these countries have a broad-based adoption of capitalism and democracy by an indigenous middle class that is autonomous from the state. Fareed Zakaria identifies the “Bollywoodization” of global culture in a post-Western world in the sense that culture becomes thoroughly modern and powerfully shaped by the West, but retains important elements of local culture.32 This cultural pattern is equally applicable to global capitalism and democracy. Over time, the category of emerging democracies is an increasingly salient one in world politics. Russia and China are not emerging democracies, but have the potential to become them as their middle classes expand and consolidate. Over the next 25 years, the world is likely to witness an unprecedented expansion in the global democratic community. East Asia is ripe for a wave of democratization. Across Africa, democracy has made enormous strides over the last two decades, with Nigeria and Kenya becoming major regional powers following the route that South Africa took in the 1990s. In Latin America, the Brazilian model has become the paradigm that states, even leftists ones, have sought to emulate. “Chavismo” is not likely to succeed after the death of the charismatic leader that held it together. Democracy and democratic influences are gradually creeping through Eastern European and into post-Soviet Central Asia. On a global scale, the democratic tide is rising. The expansion of the global democratic community has profound implications for the basic nature of international society. After World War II, developing countries adopted a package of international principles that were Western in historical origin. These were the rights of states to sovereignty, national self-determination, and racial equality and to standards of social and economic welfare. The fourth wave represents the developing world consciously adopting the fifth and final historically Western principle, namely democracy. This trend is vividly captured by Aung San Suu Kyi’s notion of the developing world’s “second struggle for independence”—the first being freedom from colonial rule, and the second freedom from authoritarian rule. Traditionally, postcolonial societies have been jealous of their hard-won political independence, and have claimed that their indigenous cultures are not suited to Western liberalism. However, the Arab Spring symbolizes the way attitudes across the developing world toward democracy are changing. The peoples of the developing

Conclusion: A Global Spring 191 world are increasingly seeking democracy for themselves. They are coming to view democracy as not just compatible with their indigenous or national cultures, but as reflecting their own culture. Publics in developing societies are also increasingly aware of the selfserving nature of claims by their autocratic rulers that the peoples they rule are not suited to democracy. After over half a century of resisting democracy, the developing world is today embracing it because of the obvious failure of authoritarianism to deliver over the post-War period. The peoples of the developing world are becoming aware of the way in which their proud histories, rich cultures, and colonial experiences do not exclude them from democracy and indeed make their claims for democratic freedom even more urgent and compelling. Moreover, that millions of people in the developing world are waking up to this way of thinking is intensifying reflexivity and encouraging millions more to join the democratic bandwagon. Ironically, however, emerging democracies are achieving ascendency exactly when the West is in decline. We are starting to see developing countries beat the West at its own capitalist and democratic game. The true implications of 1989 are today only now starting to make themselves felt. This is not the end of history, but the beginning of a post-Western future for the global democratic order. As Mahbubani has observed, the good news is that the clash of civilizations is not going to happen.33 Similarly, the global spread of democracy and capitalism is not bringing with it boredom, endless shopping, and the spread of a superficial and crass commercial culture.34 On the contrary, a “flowering of civilizations” is taking place as the non-Western world learns how to best unlock its extraordinary natural and human riches. The experiences of Eastern and Southern Europe are a guide to understanding the profound benefits of this flowering of civilizations that is taking place across the world. A 26-year-old Polish tour guide recorded on a recent BBC World Service documentary observed that “probably I am the first generation of people who don’t have to fight for Poland, and we just focus on building Poland . . . Things that Western Europe got used to are still pretty fresh for us.”35 In a similar vein, The Lonely Planet Madrid city guide discusses the flourishing of the city that occurred in a phenomenon known as La Movida Madrileña or the “Madrid scene” in the post-Franco period. This was an era, the author notes, when young madrileños discovered the sixties, seventies, and eighties all at once. The city howled and summer terraces roared to chattering, drinking, and young people from across Europe. All this was presided over by a former university professor

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who became Madrid’s mayor in 1979 and launched la movida by telling a public gathering “a colocarse y ponerse al lorco,” which loosely translates as “get stoned and do what’s cool.”36 These vignettes give us a window into the explosion of human freedom taking place more generally in world politics. The social and cultural renaissance experienced in Poland in the 2000s and before that in Spain in the 1980s provides a metaphor for and lesson about larger global trends. Human freedom is expanding around the world in a way that has simply not happened before in world history, and this is changing people’s lives for the better. The world economy is returning to the old norm where the non-Western world was dominant, reflecting its “natural share” of the world’s resources.37 There is perhaps no better symbol of this shift than the appointment in March 2013 of the first Southern Pope. As The Economist noted: Francis is an earthquake. Just as the election of a Pole in 1978 helped presage the fall of the iron curtain and the reunification of Europe, the Argentinian’s election heralds a shift in economic—and political—power from north to south. With John Paul II, the papacy stopped looking like a club for Italians; with Francis it is no longer a club for Europeans.38

This book adopts a genuinely global perspective, rather than a Western one, on world politics. Every country and every world region is being affected by the larger trend it documents. In places as diverse as China, Burma, Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria, Chile, Turkey, Indonesia, and Serbia parallel developments are occurring, and the underlying causes of these developments are the same. A recent article in Foreign Policy began: [w]hich Asian country has seen its life expectancy go up an astounding 18 years in just one decade, while turning from one of the world’s most rural countries into one of its fastest urbanizing? Oh, and the same country’s GDP increased tenfold in that same period. No, this isn’t Japan in the 1960’s, Singapore in the 1970’s, South Korea in the 1980’s, or India in the 1990’s. It is Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban.39

Whatever its continued problems, in Afghanistan, meaningful improvements are gradually being realized. As Robert Kaplan notes, we all remain prisoners of Cold War area studies. Islam should not be understood as an inward looking land-bound desert religion, but as a great cosmopolitan seafaring one spread by merchants not armies over thousands of years. We are witnessing today the reemergence of the pre-sixteenth century, pre-de Gama trading system

Conclusion: A Global Spring 193 centered around the Indian Ocean community and linking East Africa, Iran, China, and India.40 More generally, non-Western peoples and cultures are exploding into life as centers of economic, cultural, and political dynamism. To understand world politics today, it is necessary to make a much broader geographic range than that adopted by much of contemporary International Relations.41 Equally, this book deals with a broader sweep of world history than typically analyzed. Most scholars of International Relations have focused on a narrow period since the peace of Westphalia when the West was in its ascendancy. A much longer historical time frame, however, is needed to fully appreciate the rise of the rest in world politics. This book looks forward to a genuinely post-Western democratic global future. To do so, however, it looks back to the origins on human civilization in Egypt, Persia, India, China, and in the Islamic world. To understand contemporary trends, International Relations must finally today escape from the ethnocentric and historically myopic straightjacket that it has placed itself in.42 Arnold Toynbee concluded his 1952 BBC Reith Lectures “The World and the West” by suggesting that the fate of ancient Greek and Roman civilizations may have lessons that pertain to the decline of the West today. Having been conquered by force of arms, the world eventually took its conquerors captive. It converted the conquerors to a new religion (Christianity) which addressed itself to all human souls and created a universal culture in Europe.43 Toynbee’s observation is strikingly prescient over 60 years later. Just as the dominance of the West in the ancient world gave birth to a new more universalistic and inclusive culture in Europe, so the same appears to be happening on a global scale today. The West is in decline, while Chinese, Hindu, African, Latin America, and Islamic civilizations are on the rise. Yet Huntington was wrong to equate the growing dynamism of the non-Western world with identity politics. The rise of the rest is being driven by the adoption of the institutions of Western liberalism by the non-Western world. Developing countries are downloading the “killer apps” that so effectively propelled the West to success over the last two hundred years.44 While it oversimplifies to argue that geography and demography are destiny, given the right institutions, nonWestern societies are perfectly capable of flourishing. Similarly, the revival of religion that is taking place across many parts of the world is the natural product of the expansion of global freedom, and shows the extent to which freedom of expression, belief, and conscience are being adopted by most human societies as the basis of social interaction and exchange.

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A post-Western democratic global order does not mean the end of the West. Western decline is relative, not absolute. The West will continue to have the many “soft power” advantages accrued by the fact that the rest of the world is embracing its fundamental ideology. This is “the World the West made,” not in the sense that the West will continue to dominate, but in the sense that the institutions the West pioneered have become globally successful.45 The basic values of the West have taken on a life of their own that is independent of the West’s own material trajectory. Indeed, the relative decline of the West is the logical and natural consequence of a world in which non-Western societies have adopted the West’s own institutions. Fukuyama was right that the Western idea has triumphed. However, this should not be equated with the triumph of the Western powers. Fukuyama himself has conceded as much with his notion of a post-Washington consensus in the world economy in which developing countries pursue capitalism while rejecting the laissez-faire Anglo-American model.46 Equally, the emerging global order is not “No-One’s World,”47 but “Everyone’s World.” As one commentator has noted, “we no longer live in a world composed of clearly specified friends and well defined enemies, but rather one in which partnership has become a necessity. Once upon a time, this way of looking at the world was branded by its critics as liberal idealism. In the twenty first century, it has . . . become the highest form of realism.”48 There are not several versions of modernity, but only one. Peoples everywhere have a massive stake in the future of the capitalist and democratic order. The problem for the West will not be that the rest rejects the Western way, leading to an uneasy multipolar civilizational equilibrium. Instead it will be that the West starts to be beaten at its own democratic and capitalist game by the developing world. This represents the twist at the end of history. Far from representing the “triumph of the West,” this situation opens new dilemmas for the established democracies. It may prove harder to deal with than merely surviving in a world where authoritarian states predominated, and in which conflicts were between the democratic community and the autocratic community. As the democratic community strengthens, enlarges, and becomes increasingly interdependent, conflicts within it become increasingly likely.49 This conflicts with the widespread assumption that the expansion of the global democratic community will produce greater international harmony. That this sanguine assumption is so pervasive reflects how little serious attention has been given to the thorny inter-democratic politics that the expansion of the global democratic community will present. The world has seen prominent examples of inter-democratic conflict in the divisions in the Atlantic alliance over

Conclusion: A Global Spring 195 the Iraq War and more recently during the Euro crisis. These disputes have reminded the world of how intense and acrimonious inter-democratic conflicts in international society can be. However, conflicts between the established democracies are likely to remain political rather than military in nature, and will not result in the collapse of the democratic community. As a result, the democratic community will continue to expand, even as growing divisions emerge within it. A more important axis of inter-democratic conflict will therefore emerge between the established democracies of the West and emerging democracies in the developing world. What we have termed the “clash of democratizations” will come to define the future of the global order. It will be centered around the West’s difficulties in extending to an increasingly large and diverse set of new democracies the material benefits and moral recognition associated with membership of the democratic community. Symbolic of these dilemmas is the scenario—now conceivable—of future EU accession bids by Tunisia, Libya, or Egypt. In the event that this unfolds, the question for the EU will be how to respond to requests by non-Western states to enter their regional democratic club. Turkey’s failed accession to the EU suggests that even if emerging democracies make all the desired domestic reforms, they will still be excluded from accessing the privileges associated with membership of democratic clubs. The experience of 1989 in Eastern Europe taught the world the colossal benefits of the spread of democracy. As the people of Eastern Europe have come to share in the freedom, prosperity, and peace of the democratic community, so the West has benefited. Who in 1981 could have imagined that in 2011, Poland would be one of the most economically dynamic members of the EU? However, the global democratic community’s expansion to include developing countries will require the established democracies to share the status and power associated with membership of the democratic fraternity ever more widely. Until now, the West has rather patronizingly consoled itself by asking whether developing countries are really capable of making stable democratic transitions. Yet the biggest obstacle to developing countries making stable democratic transitions today is not internal conditions within these states, but the parochial attitudes in the West toward them. The West thus needs to ask itself whether it is really ready for the post-Western democratic future that is rapidly emerging. In the past, the democratic community has been successful at integrating new members, and democracies may prove able to manage this process inclusively. The expansion of the G8 to the G20 and the creation of the ICC show the “sticky” potential of the

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democratic community. Yet it will be extremely hard for the West to continue to hold out the hand of friendship as its economic decline proceeds and emerging democracies become stronger. The world is witnessing not a revival of Western imperialism as Niall Ferguson has argued,50 but its reversal. The non-Western world is seeking to “colonize” the institutions of global governance created by the established democratic powers. It is no longer tenable for Britain and France to hold permanent veto-wielding seats on the UN Security Council when India, Brazil, Germany, and Japan are similarly powerful democracies and yet lack this status. Similarly, “fair trade” is not about rich Western people buying more expensive coffee, but about granting the developing world the tariff reductions on textiles and agriculture that it was promised when the WTO was created.51 There is no reason why the head of the IMF and the World Bank should not be appointed on merit, rather than by national origins, as occurs with every other job. However, these kinds of changes will require colossal adjustments to be made by the Western democracies, which are likely to resist them tooth and nail. Major changes in global governance such as these are not likely to be realized without sparks flying. The inter-democratic disputes that these reforms engender will probably make the conflicts within NATO over the Iraq War and the Euro crisis look like small change. If these challenges for the established democracies are not enough, the clash of democratizations will have fundamental implications for the demographic makeup, identity, and lifestyle of peoples in Western societies. These issues will be even harder for the West to address than the reforms in regional and global international institutions that a post-Western democratic global order will necessitate. Western societies are ageing rapidly. This raises the prospect of large and continuous levels of immigration from the developing world being necessary to maintain prosperity in Western countries. Western societies now face a stark choice—open up or fall even more rapidly behind the developing world. Moreover, accepting high and continuous levels of immigration from non-Western societies is the direct consequence of the West’s own liberal and capitalist values and institutions. Yet Western countries have at best been reluctant to welcome new workers, even on a relatively modest scale. These attitudes will have to change quickly, and Western publics will have to not just accept high levels of immigration, but compete hard with other developed and developing countries to attract immigrants. The result will be the Hispanicization of America, the Islamization of Europe, and the Asianization of Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.

Conclusion: A Global Spring 197 The shifts in Western lifestyles that will be necessitated by global warming will be an even greater challenge for the West, and best exemplify the clash of democratizations. As Thomas Friedman has observed, “Americums” or units of energy consumption by a group of 350 million people with a per capita income above $15,000 are rapidly popping up all round the world. By 2030, we will have gone from a world of two Americums to a world of eight or nine.52 When a system is designed to deal with this problem effectively, it will have to be one in which the burden of change is carried overwhelmingly by the West. This is so as to allow the developing world to escape from poverty, and because of the disproportionate historical contribution of the West to global warming. Yet getting the necessary regulations into place for such reforms in a democratic society will be an extraordinary challenge for democratic political systems to accept. The temptation to try avoiding these adjustments, and instead try to shut out the developing world from sharing in the benefits of Western prosperity will be enormous. Yet the West should not delude itself that it can retreat into a fortress world and stop modernization from spreading. The global democratic tide is irreversibly rising, and the world is now far too interdependent for the West to effectively cut itself off from the global implications of its failure to adjust to a post-Western order. The logic of “one world” being produced by the global ideological convergence taking place in world politics is inexorable.53 The West is in decline, and it will desperately need access to workers and markets in the developing world to maintain its prosperity. Moreover, increasingly powerful developing countries will notice the double standards and liberal hypocrisy associated with the West trying to pull up the ladder to the non-Western world just as it is finally about to enter the democratic gentleman’s club. They will simply not allow this to happen. Finally, there are too many massive opportunities for the West to forgo. It will frankly be far easier and more beneficial to the West to stay true to its best ideals and values. By smashing down the doors to the global democracy establishment, the developing world is going to keep the West true to its founding principles—whether the West likes it or not. The West might not be used to having to share its privileges with developing countries, but the peoples of the developing world are unlocking their extraordinary potential. We in the West need to both practice what we have preached and also rapidly raise our game, or we will only fall further behind. In the West there is a sense of pessimism and nostalgia for the early post-War era. Charles Kupchan points to the renationalization of European politics taking place, with the Euro crisis and immigration fueling political

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alienation and rising xenophobia. In the United States, ideological polarization has taken hold. Populism and extremism are increasingly attractive to voters disappointed with the gridlock in democratic political processes.54 The middle class is under duress, and this is even calling into question democracy itself.55 Some commentators have seen a “global spring” in parallels between the Arab Spring demonstrations and the Occupy Wall Street Movement and the protestors in Europe.56 However, unlike protestors in autocracies in the developing world, few people in the West are calling for change in the basic nature of their political or economic systems. Some backsliding by established democracies may occur in the fourth wave of democratization. Yet wiser heads are calling for better democratic decisions to be made, and for them to be made more democratically—for example, ending the revolving door between Wall Street and the US government. Equally, a move away from capitalism is neither possible nor desirable. What needs to happen is for capitalism to be better regulated and sustainable. Therefore demonstrations in the West do not generally call into question the fundamental legitimacy of democracy and capitalism. Moreover, electorates and elites in Western democracies are going to have to learn to distinguish between politicians who offer genuine growth through immigration and expanding international trade, and those who promise growth by making unsustainable shortcuts like financial deregulation. Ultimately they are also going to have to accept that shifts in lifestyles and quality of life issues will become much more salient features of political and economic life. The West is moving into a postindustrial era.57 The fact that democracies are democracies paradoxically poses a big problem for the global spread of democracy.58At the turn of the century, the historian Paul Kennedy and his colleagues examined the post-Cold War challenges posed by the developing world for US interests. To justify their analysis, they asked their contributors to capture the significance of a number of “pivotal” developing countries “in a paragraph for a midwestern senator or radio station.”59 Whilst their study was forward-thinking compared to the literature of the time, this question already seems quaint. The developing world is now effectively in the “living rooms” of American families, whether they realize it or not! Electorates in the West will have to voluntarily embrace and vote democratically for the major changes necessitated by the expansion of the global democratic community. If the United States had accepted on merit the Mexican candidate to be head of World Bank instead of the Korean American that it put forward, this would have been a huge electoral liability for the administration. How will the UK public react to Britain losing its permanent seat on the UN Security

Conclusion: A Global Spring 199 Council? How would the German or Finnish publics react to Turkish and later Tunisian membership of the EU? Would Western publics vote for very high and continuous levels of immigration, and on top of that a sizable and wholesale carbon tax? Yet these are the changes that democratic societies in the West are going to have to not just to swallow, but enthusiastically embrace if the global spread of capitalism and democracy continues. Indeed, the contradiction between the universalizing trend toward global democratization and the parochial tendencies of democratic institutions responsive to electoral constituencies may be regarded as a final Hegelian contradiction that must be resolved if the democratic community is to survive. Contrary to Fukuyama’s sanguine vision, the greatest challenges for the global democratic project lie ahead, rather than in the past. The “End of History” thesis implied that the great ideological struggles of previous eras were over. Having survived the nineteenth century, World War II, and the Cold War, liberalism appeared triumphant. However, the very global success of liberalism is now generating its greatest challenge to date. The West now faces the problem of making the changes to global governance and its societies that are needed to realize its best ideals and values on a global scale. The West is up to this challenge, and we firmly believe that it will be possible to meet it. Timothy Garton Ash is therefore correct when he asserts that the crisis of the West is the opportunity of our times.60 However, it will raise the question of whether peoples in the West really believe in the global relevance of democracy, and are prepared to make the changes and sacrifices that will be necessary to realize it on a worldwide scale. Worse still, these questions are barely being asked in Western societies, because they have become so accustomed to having a monopoly over the privileges associated with membership of the democratic community. They represent “nondecisions” or “silences” in the Western political agenda.61 Like the protagonists in the final moments of the classic 1960s movie Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, the West has hardly even considered the enormous gravity of the situation it today faces. Liberalism as a political ideology remains every bit as radical in its social and political implications today as it was in the late eighteenth century at the time of the French Revolution. However, in contrast to previous eras when the challenge was to establish and entrench liberalism within the states of the West, the problem today is for the societies of the West to adapt themselves to an era in which democracy is spreading on a global scale. The radical reform this will necessitate is not generally understood, especially in the West. This is perhaps because of the way in which

200 The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West liberalism has become a taken for granted feature of Western political life. As Anthony Arblaster observed long ago, the vague unspoken consensus in the West as to the virtues of liberalism has induced complacency. Liberal principles, apparently, do not have to be fought for. Our societies, after all, are the liberal democracies. Consequently, liberal principles can in practice be steadily and stealthily undermined while the public chorus of self-congratulation rolls on. The very banality of liberalism is what weakens and endangers it. It is a small step from yawing to falling asleep. Liberalism has become, or is in danger of becoming, a ‘dead dogma’ rather than a ‘living truth’, and that is a dangerous state for any belief or truth to fall into.62

Liberalism today needs to recover the radical and universalistic impulse that inspired it in the early modern period. The alternative is that the global democratic project might stumble. When Gandhi was asked what he thought of Western civilization, his famous response was that it would be an interesting idea.63 Today, developing countries have a chance to prove that they can “do civilization” better than the West itself. Equally, the West has an opportunity to prove that it can live up to its values and interests by accommodating the non-Western world within the global democratic community. The global democratic challenge is putting the best elements of the West and the rest together to realize democratic ideals on a global scale. The task at hand is to make globalization work for everyone. A post-Western democratic global order offers extraordinary opportunities for the spread of our most cherished ideals. With the Arab Spring, these opportunities have been tantalizingly dangled before us. Yet as the developing world begins its “second struggle for independence,” the key question is how the West will choose to respond to the new democratic dilemmas presented.

Notes PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Fukuyama 1989, 1992. Huntington 1993, 1996. Kagan 2008. Mahbubani 2013. Harrison and Mitchell 2007. Gartzke and Weisger 2008. Huntley 1996; Mitchell et al 1999; Harrison 2002. Mitchell 2002; Harrison 2004a, 2004b. Stoute 2011. Huntley 1996. Harrison 2002. Gartzke and Weisiger 2013a, 2013b. Eatwell and Wright 1993. Virk 2010. Mahbubani 2008, p. 9.

CHAPTER 1 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Suu Kyi 2011b, p. 5. Fukuyama 1989, 1992. Huntington 1991. Zakaria 2011; Bull and Watson 1984. Wilson and Dragusanu 2008; O’Neill 2011. Fukuyama 2011a. Using information on various institutional features of a regime, the Polity IV project codes information about states’ polity scores on a scale from −10 (fully autocratic) to +10 (fully democracy). As of 2010 (last year of available data), Nigeria scores 4, Turkey 7, Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia have 8’s on the scale, while India and South Africa score 9’s. For more information, see http://www .systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.

202 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

Notes Suu Kyi 2011, p. 5. Huntington 1993; 1996. Ferguson 2011; Mahbubani 2013. Gartzke and Weisiger 2013a, 2013b. Kagan 2008. Kant 1991, p. 47. Yafi 2012; Berman 2013. Mahbubani 2008; Mahbubani 2013. Fukuyama 1989. Ibid, p. 3. Hegel 1952. Fukuyama 1989, pp. 17–18. Fukuyama and Mahbubani 2010, p. 7. For discussion of these challenges see Snyder 2000; Zakaria 2003; Plattner 2008; Cox et al 2010; Gat 2010; Levisksy and Way 2010; Sorenson 2012. For comprehensive analyses of this extensive literature, see Harrison 2010; Mitchell 2012; Hayes 2013; Quddus Snyder 2014. Fukuyama 1992, pp. 57–60; Huntley 1996, Mitchell Gates and Hegre 1999; Russett and Oneal 2001; Harrison 2002, 2004c; Quddus Snyder 2013a, 2013b. Wright 2011. Nasr 2009. Ibid, p. 116. Fukuyama 2011a. Fukuyama and Mahbubani 2010; Fukuyama 2011a. Fukuyama 2011b. For excellent overviews of this literature see Russett and Oneal 2001; Chernoff 2004. Harrison 2010. Most prominently, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Wendt 1999; Risse et al 1999. Harrison 2004a; Harrison and Mitchell 2007. Whitehead 2001; Pevehouse 2005. Harrison 2010, p. 161. Pye 1990; Zakaria 2011. Norris and Inglehart 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005. Waltz 1986, p. 340. Harrison 2010; Mitchell 2012. Rawls 1999. Harrison and Mitchell 2007; see also Brown 2002; Martin and Reidy 2006, especially the excellent chapter by Leif Wenar. See also Bull 1977. Rosenau 1990; Giddens 1990, 1999; Nye 1990; Held and McGrew 1999; Slaughter 2005. Rosenau 1990, p. 261; see also Nye 1990, 2004.

Notes 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84.

203

Huntington 1993, 1996. Fukuyama 2006, p. 342. Jackson 2007; Katzenstein 2011. Bull and Watson 1984. Zakaria 2008. Mahbubani 2008. Wilson and Dragusanu 2008; Wilson and Purushothaman 2003; O’Neill 2001. O’Neill 2011. Ibid, p. 8. Kaplan 2010. Kaplan 2012. O’Neill 2011; Kennedy 1993. Ferguson 2011. Ferguson 2012, 2013b. Spengler 1962 [1919]. Rachman 2011; Bremmer 2012. Kupchan 2012. Barber 1995. Adapted from Barber 1995, p. 5. Esposito 1999; Snyder 2000. Giddens 1999. Kagan 2008. Gartzke and Weisiger 2013a, 2013b. We adapt the title of Robert Kagan’s (2012) most recent book. Deudney, 2007; Ikenberry, 2001; 2011 Deudney and Ikenberry, 2012 Deudney and Ikenberry, 2012, p. 8 Mahbubani 2013. Goldstein 2011. Mearsheimer and Walt 2013. Ibid; for a counterperspective, see Lake 2011. Mearsheimer and Walt omit Fukuyama’s End of History, Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, and Rawls’ The Law of Peoples from their list. In the present book, we emphasize the critical importance of female, feminist, and nonWestern contributions to IR scholarship to our analysis. Mearsheimer and Walt 2013, p. 4. Ibid, p. 5. Ibid, p. 36. Ibid, p. 36. Hedley Bull (1966) made a similar argument in his famous debate with J. David Singer, a claim that Singer (1970) rebuked strongly. Mearsheimer and Walt 2013, p. 38. Ibid, p. 40. Ibid, pp. 42–43.

204 Notes 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90.

91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98.

Snidal and Wendt 2009, p. 4. Mearsheimer and Walt 2013, p. 43. Huntington 1996, p. 13. Kadera et al 2003. Harrison 2010. Mitchell et al 1999; Cederman 2001; Gleditsch 2002; Mitchell 2002; Kadera et al 2003; Cederman and Gleditsch 2004; Boix 2012; Gleditsch and Bormann 2012; Gartzke and Weisiger 2013a, 2013b, 2014. Harrison 2010; Mitchell 2012. Mearsheimer and Walt 2013, p. 37. Harrison 2010; Mitchell 2012. Waltz 1962; Harrison 2002, pp. 147–148. Harrison 2002. Mearsheimer and Walt 2013, p. 42. Pye 1990, p. 16. Hoffman 1960, p. 4.

PART I AND CHAPTER 2 1. Michael Wood “Legacy: A Search for the Origins of Civilization,” BBC Television Series (1992) [program 2, 3–5 minutes]. See also Wood, 1992. 2 . Huntley 1996; Wendt 1999; Mitchell 2002; Harrison 2002, 2004a, 2004b. 3. The strength of the democratic community exceeded that of the autocratic community after World War II when we consider the interaction between the degree to which countries are democratic or autocratic and their material capabilities (Kadera et al 2003). 4. Keohane 1996, p. 463. 5. Fukuyama 1989; Huntley 1996; Mitchell et al 1999; Harrison 2002. 6. Kadera et al 2003; Cederman and Gleditsch 2004. 7. Wendt 1999; Mitchell 2002; Harrison 2002, 2004a, 2004b. 8. The data on democracy comes from the Polity IV project as described in Chapter 1. The baseline number of countries is calculated using the Correlates of War Project’s definition of system membership based on population size, membership in the United Nations or League of Nations, and diplomatic recognition by major powers. See the Correlates of War Project, http://www .correlatesofwar.org/ (last visited April 12, 2012). 9. Harrison 2010, p. 161. 10. Huntington 1991, p. 16. 11. Mitchell et al 1999; Green 1999, Cederman 2001; Harrison 2010; Boix 2012; Strand et al 2012. 12. Pevehouse 2002a, p. 515; Gleditsch and Ward 2006, p. 912. 13. Whitehead 2001, p. 443.

Notes 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

205

See the longer list provided by Huntington 1991, p. 37. Huntington 1991, p. 38. Ibid, p. 44. Huntington 1991; Pridham 1991; Green 1999; Whitehead 2001; Gleditsch 2002; Pevehouse 2005; Strand et al 2012. Fukuyama 1992; Huntley 1996; Mitchell et al 1999; Harrison 2002; Snyder, Quddus 2013a, 2013b; Gartzke and Weisiger 2013a. Fukuyama 1992, pp. 28–29. Snyder, Quddus 2013a, pp. 210 and 218–226. Mitchell et al 1999; Harrison 2002, 2004a, 2010. Wendt 1999, pp. 270–272. Russett and Oneal 2001; Pevehouse 2005; Deudney 2007. Russett and Oneal 2001. Pevehouse and Russett 2006; Mitchell et al 2008. Cederman and Gleditsch 2004. Lake 1992; Mitchell et al 1999. Kadera et al 2003; Harrison 2004a. Harrison 2004a; Mitchell 2002, 2012; Hayes 2012. Thomas Risse 2000; Schimmelfennig et al 2006. Elkink 2011, p. 1653. Rawls 1999. Mitchell 2002. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Williams 2001; Harrison 2004. Fukuyama 2012, pp. 1–2. Mitchell 2002; Harrison 2004a. Fukuyama 1992, p. 29. Kozhemiakin 1998. Harrison and Mitchell 2007; Strand et al 2012. Wendt 1999. Mitchell 2002, pp. 749–759; Harrison 2002, 2004b. Kant 1991, p. 104. This is one component of Kant’s (1991, pp. 99–105) broader arguments which identify three key conditions for perpetual peace: 1) republican forms of government domestically, 2) an international federation of free states, and 3) a principle of cosmopolitanism, or universal hospitality. Russett and Oneal 2001. Thompson 1996; Gleditsch 2002; Rasler and Thompson 2005. Harrison 2004a, 2010. Dorenspleet 2005; Wendt 1999. Wendt refers to this as first- and seconddegree internalization of a Kantian culture. Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 74. Whitehead 2001; Huntington 1991; Starr 1992; Solingen 2012. For a sophisticated discussion of the similarities and differences between the various terms used to describe diffusion, see Solingen 2012.

206

Notes

49. Diamond 2010, p. 108; Huntington 1991, p. 101; Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 76. 50. Harrison 2004b, pp. 11–12; Wendt 1999, p. 375. 51. Kant 1991, pp. 107–108. 52. Rawls 1999, p. 44. 53. Huntington 1991; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Russett and Oneal 2001; Mitchell 2002, Kadera et al 2003; Harrison 2004a, 2010; Strand et al 2012. 54. Starr 1992; Starr and Lindberg 2003. 55. According to the Polity IV Project (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr /inscr.htm), 96 of 164 countries (58.5%) had democracy scores 6 or higher (on a scale from 0 to 10) in 2010. The 2011 Freedom House survey data records 87 of 194 countries (45%) free and 60 of 194 (22%) countries partially free; http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2011 56. Kant 1991, p. 130. 57. Huntington 1991, p. 102, emphasis added. 58. Elkink 2011. 59. Mahbubani 2008, p. 18. 60. Inglehart and Welzel 2005, pp. 2–3; see also Lipset 1957; Rosenau 1990. 61. Risse et al 1999; Russett and Oneal 2001; Harrison 2002. 62. Harrison 2002; Snyder 2013a, 2013b. 63. Huntington 1991, pp. 46–108. 64. Ibid, p. 50. 65. Ibid, pp. 48 and 50. 66. Ibid, p. 69. 67. Ibid, p. 72. 68. Ibid, p. 78. 69. Wright 2011. 70. Nasr 2009, p. 185. 71. Huntington 1991, pp. 87–98. 72. Ibid, pp. 102–104. 73. Huntington 1991. 74. Rosenau 1990; Held and McGrew 1999; Giddens 1999; Russett and Oneal 2001; Gartzke 2007; Gartzke and Weisiger 2012. 75. Büthe and Milner 2008; Snyder 2013a, 2013b. 76. Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Wright 2011. 77. Wright 2011. 78. Nasr 2009, p. 22. 79. Mahbubani 2008, p. 7. 80. Nasr 2008, p. 168; see also Gartzke 2007. 81. Mahajan 2012; Mahbubani 2013. 82. Nasr 2009, p. 254. 83. Ferguson 2012, p. 2; see also de Soto 2011. 84. Fukuyama 2012, p. 4.

Notes 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101.

102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123.

207

Nasr 2009, p. 254. Mahajan 2012, p. 130. Lawson and Gilman 2009. Mahajan 2012, p. 129. Bellaigue 2012. Roy 2012b, p. 16. Wright 2011, p. 26. Ibid, p. 27. Norris and Ingelhart 2003a, 2003b, p. 68. Lawson and Gilman 2009, p. 17. Ibid. The figure of 60 percent is for Iran (p. 7). Lawson and Gilman 2009; see also Mahajan 2012. Wright 2011, p. 185. Ibid, p. 167. Mahajan 2012, p. 197. Risse et al 2001. Tocqueville 2011, p. 157. This is consistent with the empirical literature on civil wars and human rights that finds more wars and human rights violations in the middle of the Polity regime scale. States that experience regime change are also at higher risk for civil wars. See Hegre et al 2001; Davenport and Armstrong 2004. Nasr 2009, p. 184. Mahbubani 2008, p. 161. Wright 2012, p. 7. Wright 2011, p. 10. Nasr 2009, p. 24. Stourton 2010. Mahbubani 2008, p. 163. Roy quoted in Stourton 2011a, p. 3; see also Roy 1994. Roy 2012, pp. 8–9; see also Roy 1994. Wright 2011, p. 94; see also Nasr 2008, pp. 5–84. Wright 2011, p. 91. Ibid, p. 111. Filiu 2011, p. 96. Nasr 2009, p. 241; Kuru 2013, p. 6. Stourton 2010, p. 3. Kuru 2013, p. 2. Nasr 2009, p. 251. Mahbubani 2008, p. 163. Nasr 2009, p. 32. Ibid, p. 36. Ibid, p. 37–38. Ibid, pp. 43–44.

208 Notes 124. 125. 126. 127. 128.

129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146.

147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160.

Ibid, pp. 45–49. Ibid, p. 49. Ibid. Bellaigue 2012, 1–2 minutes. Bellaigue 2012; see El Feki (2013) for an interesting discussion of the extent to which even attitudes toward sexuality have been called into question across the Middle East by the events of the Arab Spring. Roy 2012a, p. 14. Filiu 2011, p. 105. Kuru 2013, p. 4. Ibid, p. 8. Wright 2011; Stourton 2011a. Fukuyama 1989, 2011. Wright 2011, p. 7. Ibid, p. 55. Wright 2001, p. 5. Wright 2011, p. 6. Filiu 2011, p. 108. Wright 2011, p. 253. Roy 2012, pp. 15–16; Filiu 2011, pp. 132–133. Roy 2012, p. 5. Ibid, p. 9. Wright 2011, p. 149. Ibid, p. 139. Ibid, p. 143. In his recent television series, Civilization (program 5), Niall Ferguson visits a shop in Istanbul where colorful hijabs are being sold, giving striking visual demonstration of their beauty and expression of individual personality and independence. Few Western designers could compete with stunning display of chique of offer. Wright 2011, pp. 144–145. Mahajan 2012, p. 207. Wright 2011, p. 166. Ibid, pp. 166, 171, and 175. Mahajan 2011, pp. 213 and 216. Wright 2011, p. 10. Nasr 2009, p. 259. Bishara 2011, pp. 165–168; Nasr 2009, p. 259. Bellaigue 2012. Nasr 2009, p. 260. Rosenau 1990; Slaughter 2004. Wright 2011, p. 27. Lynch 2012. Ibid, pp. 11–12.

Notes 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202.

209

Nye 2011, pp. 101, 104, and 108. Rasler 1996, p. 133. Marietta 2008, p. 768. Ibid, p. 772. Rasler 1996, p. 134. Ibid, p. 134. Ibid, p. 135. Ibid, pp. 140–144. Ibid, p. 138 Figure 2 and p. 141 Table 1. Ibid, p. 145. Filiu 2011, p. 46; Wright 2011, p. 27. Lynch 2012, p. 76. Ibid, pp. 78–80. Wright 2011, p. 34. Filiu 2011, p. 53. Wright 2011, pp. 30–36. Filiu 2011, p. 56. Ibid, p. 64. Wright 2012, p. 2. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yE1fIn64pjI. Lynch 2012, p. 74. Rasler 1996, p. 146. Ibid, p. 146. Lynch 2012, p. 77. Wright 2011, p. 34. Elkink 2011, p. 1653. Ibid, p. 1657. Rasler 1996, pp. 135 and 137. Elkink 2012, p. 1660. Bishara 2011, p. 191. Wright 2011, p. 26. Lynch 2012, pp. 81–82. Filiu 2011, p. 53. Fukuyama 1989, 1992. Holmes 1997, p. 274. Rose 2011, p. xiv; see also Ajami 2011, p. 21. Zantovsky 2011, p. 2. Giddens 1999, p. 14. Brown 1990, pp. 3–4. Wood 1992. The book was based on a major BBC television series. Wood 1992, p. 157. A search for “mummy portrait of Artemidorus” using Google Images will allow the reader to see the portrait.

210

Notes

203. http://www.britishmuseum.org/explore/highlights/highlight_objects/ aes/m/mummy_case_-_artemidorus.aspx. 204. Wood 1992, cover jacket sleeve. 205. http://www.facebook.com/elshaheeed.co.uk. 206. The shocking image is available on Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Death_of_Khaled_Mohamed_Saeed. 207. Wood 1992, pp. 156–157.

CHAPTER 3 1. Whitehead 2001; Mitchell 2002; Kadera et al 2003; Harrison 2002, 2004a, 2004b; Boix 2012; Strand et al 2012. 2. Bishar 2011, pp. 157–172. 3. McCoy and Miller 2012, p. 921. 4. Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003, ch. 9, pp. 439–454. 5. McCoy and Miller 2012, pp. 923–924. 6. Plattner 2011b; Piccone 2012. 7. Piccone and Alinikoff 2012a. 8. Ibid, p. 39; see also Ozel and Ozcan 2011; Sukma 2011. 9. Kuru 2013, p. 6. 10. Elkink 2011, p. 1661. 11. Nasr 2009; Snyder 2013a, 2013b. 12. Nye 2011, p. 109. 13. Plattner 2011a, pp. 11–12. 14. Skepticism about the post-Iraq War world UN Security Council has been expressed, for example, by Kagan 2008, p. 77. 15. Western and Goldstein 2011. 16. Weiss 2011. 17. Virk 2010. 18. Ibid, p. 3; Piccone and Alinkoff 2012a, p. 39. 19. Buzan (2004, p. 154) notes that pluralist and solidarist accounts of international society are not necessarily opposites, but exist along a spectrum. 20. Virk 2010, p. 63. 21. Ibid, pp. 50–54, 75, and 57. 22. Piccone and Alinikoff 2012, p. 35. 23. Ibid, p. 40. 24. Western and Goldstein 2011, p. 56; Piccone and Alinikoff 2012a. Pevehouse (2005) shows how regional institutions also help facilitate the spread of democracy among member states. Some organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS) explicitly allow for sanctions against member states to protect threats to democratic regimes. In July 2009, the OAS expelled Honduras from the organization after a coup. Similarly, Paraguay was expelled from MERCOSUR in June 2012 after experiencing a coup.

Notes

211

25. Piccone and Alinikoff 2012b, p. 1. 26. Wright 2012, p. 2. 27. Gleditsch and Bormann 2011, pp. 13–16; see also Whitehead 2001; Gleditsch 2002; Pevehouse 2002a, 2002b, 2005; Kadera et al 2003; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Strand et al 2012. 28. Kadera et al 2003; Starr and Lindborg 2003; Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Elkink 2011. 29. Starr and Lindborg 2003, p. 516; Russett and Oneal 2001. 30. Russett and Oneal 2001; Pevehouse 2005. 31. Brinks and Coppedge 2006, p. 470. 32. Gleditsch 2002, pp. 143–145. 33. Elkink 2011, p. 1660. 34. Slaughter 2004, p. 135. 35. Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 41–45. 36. Starr and Lindburg 2003, p. 492; see also Thompson 1996; Kozhemiakin 1998; Gleditsch and Ward 2000. 37. Brinks and Coppedge 2006, p. 464. 38. Gleditsch and Ward 2006. 39. Brinks and Coppedge 2006, pp. 465 and 467. 40. Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 41–45. 41. Schonfeld 1972. 42. Toynbee cited Kaplan 2012, p. 334. 43. Gleditsch and Bormann 2012, pp. 14–16. 44. Kaplan 2012, pp. xx–xxi. Kaplan also notes that the town of Sidi Bouzid where the revolutions began in is today the most economically backward region of Tunisia. It lies just beyond a demarcation ditch dug by the Roman general Scipio that marked the extent of civilized territory (2012, p. xxi). 45. Gleditsch and Bormann 2012, p. 15. 46. Wright 2012, p. 98. 47. Gleditsch and Bormann 2012, p. 15. 48. Davidson 2012, pp. 205–208. 49. Kaplan 2012, p. 148. 50. Western and Goldstein 2011, pp. 57–58. 51. Keohane 2003. 52. Ibid. 53. Lake 1992; Gleditsch and Bormann 2012, pp. 17–18; Mitchell et al 1999; Strand et al 2012. 54. Gleditsch and Bormann 2012, p. 17; Virk 2010, pp. 83–92. 55. O’Hanlon 2011, pp. 301–302. 56. Slaughter 2011. 57. Keohane 2003; Gleditsch 2002; Pevehouse 2002a, 2002b, 2005; Gleditsch and Ward 2006. 58. BBC News Europe website, July 4, 2011. Djokovic is sympathetic to the Serb nationalist cause, and this is a reason for his popularity. However, that

212

59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89.

Notes nationalist protest is now expressed through sports and not ethnic cleansing is symbolic of progress. Harrison and Mitchell 2007; Mitchell and Diehl 2012. Vandewalle 2012. ibid, p. 2. Keohane 2003, p. 294; see also Kennedy et al 1999, p. 8. Nye 2003, p. 131. Brown 1990, pp. 4–5. Brown 1990, p. 4. As of 2010, for example, Serbia scored 5 on the Polity IV −10 to +10 polity scale (with +10 being the highest democracy score). Kosovo and Serbia scored 8, while Croatia and Macedonia scored 9. See http://www.systemicpeace.org /polity/polity4.htm. Kotkin 2010; Longworth 2005. Levitsky 2011, pp. 19, 21, and 22. Brown 1994, p. 5. Steinberg 2011. Zanktosky 2011. Ibid, pp. 5–6. Huntington 1996; Kagan 2008. Levitsky and Way 2009, pp. 354–355; see also Zakaria 2003. Way 2011, p. 24. Ibid, p. 24. Huntington 1996, pp. 137–138 and 166. Ibid, pp. 138–139. Roy 2012a, 2012b. Yafi 2011, p. 92. Wright 2012, pp. 2–4. Roy 2012b, p. 11. Standage 2005. Brown 1994, p. 308. Bunce et al 2010, p. 329. Way 2011. Gleditsch and Bormann 2012, p. 25; see also Vasconcelos 2012. Roy 2013, p. 19; see also Merlini and Roy 2012. As one commentator has observed, “(t)he 20th century may have been a bloody and inhumane one, but when it came to an end there were many more democratic states in the international system than there had ever been before. Furthermore, the demand for greater political participation and human rights from peoples around the world remains a constant one – and as long as it does, the United States will be compelled (often against the advice of the realists) to ‘promote’ its values, enthusiastically or not. Nothing is guaranteed. . . . (b)ut . . . . by ignoring its own convictions and ideals, the United States could very easily find itself turning up on the wrong side of history.” Cox 2013, p. 51.

Notes 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105.

213

Vasconcelos 2012; Roy and Merlini 2012. Stepan 2012. Gleditsch and Bormann 2012, p. 16; see also Kennedy et al 1999. Fukuyama 2012a, p. 5. Yom and Gause 2012, p. 74. Ibid, p. 86, Table 2. Davidson 2012. Berman 2013, pp. 64–65, emphasis added. Ibid, p. 65. Ibid, p. 66. Ibid, p. 73. Yafi 2012, pp. 90–93. Ibid, pp. 92–93. Mill 1978, p. 28. Fukuyama 1989, 1992. Yafi 2012, p. xiv; Mahajan 2012, p. 372.

PART II AND CHAPTER 4 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

Fukuyama1989, p. 3. Gershman 2011a, p. 13. Fukuyama 2011a, p. 3. Gershman 2011a, p. 13. Ibid, p. 13. Pye 1990. Ibid, p. 9. Ibid, pp. 6–7. Ibid, p. 13. Wilson and Dragusanu 2008. Ibid, pp. 11–12. Mahbubani 2013, p. 2. O’Neill 2011, p. 39. Mahbubani 2013, pp. 23–26. Fukuyama 2001, 2011b; see also Fukuyama’s contribution to Booth and Dunne 2002. Fukuyama 2001, 2011b. Mahbubani 2008; Zakaria 2011. Giddens 1999, p. 16. O’Neill 2011b. Pye 1990, pp. 6–7. Hague 2011, p. 1; Stourton 2011. Huntington 1996. Ibid, p. 97.

214 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

Notes Foroohar 2010. Huntington 1968; Bueno de Mequita and Downs 2005. Mahbubani 2008, pp. 44–45. Fukuyama 2011a, p. 3. Fukuyama and Mahbubani 2010. Longworth 2005; Sixsmith 2010. Fukuyama 1992; Rosenau 1990; Lipset 1959. Fukuyama and Mahbubani 2010, pp. 1–2. Fukuyama 2011a, p. 4; Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2005) similarly argue that some more sophisticated authoritarian regimes may prove more durable. Using these states as illustrations, the low-grade authoritarian states have Polity IV scores in 2010 ranging from 1 (Venezuela) to −7 (Belarus and Cuba), while the high-grade authoritarian states have scores ranging from 4 (Russia) to −7 (China) to −10 (Saudi Arabia). Levitsky and Way 2010. Gershman 2011a, p. 9. Potocki 2006, p. 49. Potocki 2011, p. 53. Ibid, p. 54. Ibid, p. 55. Ibid, p. 56. Ibid, p. 60. Ibid, p. 61. Ibid, p. 61. Ibid, p. 57 and p. 63, fn 14. Corrales 2011, p. 123. Ibid, p. 127. Ibid, p. 125. Corden and Neary 1982. Corrales 2011, p. 126. Ibid, pp. 127–129. Ibid, p. 133. Gershman and Gutierrez 2009, p. 36. Ibid, p. 38. Ibid, pp. 41–42. Ibid, p. 41. Gershman 2012. Corrales 2010. Bremmer 2006, p. 57. Corrales 2010. Nasr 2009, p. 51. Wright 2011, p. 91. Afshari and Underwood 2009, p. 7.

Notes 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105.

215

Wright 2011, p. 102. Ibid, p. 107. Afshari and Underwood 2009, p. 10. Milani 2009, p. 12. Ibid, p. 14. Ibid, p. 15. BBC World Service Iran’s Currency Crisis, October 13, 2012, 5–6 minutes. Nasr 2009, p. 51. Mahbubani 2008, pp. 205–206. Kaplan 2012, p. 276; O’Neill 2011. Zin and Joseph 2012, p. 105. Ibid. Ibid, p. 107. Ibid, p. 109. Ibid, p. 109. Ibid, p. 110. Ibid, p. 110. Mahbubani 2013, p. 43. Zin and Joseph 2011, p. 111. Cited Diamond 2012, p. 10. Kaplan 2010, pp. 211 and 217. Ibid, pp. 207–208. Linter 2011, p. 153. The Economist, May 25, 2013, “The Burmese Spring.” Bremmer 2006, p. 35. Ibid, pp. 36–37. Ibid, p. 40. Kaplan 2012, p. 211. Bremmer 2006, pp. 43–44. Lankov 2012, p. 1. NPR Signs of Change Emerge in Korea , September 24, 2012. Lankov 2012, p. 1. Ibid, pp. 1–2. Kaplan 2012, p. 210. Ibid, p. 203. Ibid, p. 211. Fukuyama 2011a, p. 5. Ibid. Fukuyama 2011a, p. 4. Ibid, p. 4. Shambaugh 2009, p. 4. Ibid, p. 6. Ibid, p. 5.

216 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147.

Notes Fukuyama 2011a, p. 4. Shambaugh 2009, pp. 35–36. Fukuyama 2011a, p. 4. MacKinnon 2011, p. 33. Ibid, p. 35. Ibid, p. 43. Ibid, p. 44. Fukuyama 2011a, p. 4. China has also engaged in a significant buildup and modernization of its military capabilities, especially expansion of its naval fleet. Bremmer 2006, p. 260. Fukuyama 2011a, p. 4. Ibid, p. 4. Fukuyama 2012, p. 5. O’Neill 2011, p. 96. Diamond 2012, p. 11. Fukuyama 2011a, p. 4. Ibid, p. 3. Ibid, p. 4. Diamond 2011, p. 11. Harrison 2004b, p. 109. Fukuyama 1989, p. 11. Rovnick 2012; McMurtrie 2012; see also Mahbubani 2013, pp. 26–27. Rasler 1996, p. 134. Shambaugh 2009, p. 5. The Economist January 12, 2013, p. 13. Fukuyama 2011a, p. 4. Devichand 2012, p. 11. Leonard 2008. Ibid. Devichand 2012, p. 11. Huntington 1996, p. 93; see also Dore 1984. Devichand 2012, p. 9. Leonard 2008, pp. 13–14. David Shambaugh cited Yahoo! News November 15, 2012. Daniel Bell quoted in Devichand 2012, p. 9. Devichand 2012, p. 10. Diamond 2012, p. 12. Nathan 2013, pp. 20–21. Huang 2013, p. 54. Ibid, p. 53. Ibid, p. 54. Krastev and Holmes 2012, p. 34. Ibid, pp. 34–36.

Notes 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184.

217

Ibid, p. 36. Ibid, pp. 36–37. Ibid, pp. 38–39. Ibid, pp. 38–40. Stoner-Weiss and McFaul cited Roxburgh 2012, p. 217; see also Stoner-Weiss 2010, pp. 271–273. Stoner-Weiss and McFaul 2012, p. 82. Shevtsova 2012, pp. 19–20. Krastev and Holmes 2012, p. 41. Shevtsova 2012, p. 22. Ibid, pp. 20 and 24. Ibid, pp. 24–25. Krastev and Holmes 2012, p. 40. Ibid, p. 43. Dmitriev and Triesman 2012, p. 61. Ibid, p. 60. Ibid, pp. 67–68. Roxburgh 2012, pp. 183–192. Nye 2013, p. 2. Shevtsov 2012, p. 28. Triesman 2011, p. 3. Silitski 2010, p. 299. Dmitriev and Triesman 2012, p. 72. Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Snyder 2000. Mitchell and Prins 2004. Deudeny and Ikenberry 2009, pp. 8–9. Snyder 2013b, p. 40; Harrison 2004b, pp. 37–38. Deudney and Ikenberry 2009, p. 89. Buzan and Cox 2013, p. 1. Deudney and Ikenberry 2009, p. 91; see also Snyder 2013b, pp. 42–43. Nye 2011, pp. 100–109. Sorenson 2009, p. 401. Narlikar 2010a, p. 2. Sorenson 2008, p. 402; Narlikar 2010a, p. 3. Deudney and Ikenberry 2009, p. 90. Johnston 1999; Pravda 2001; Harrison 2004; Macfarlane 2008. Shirk 2007, p. 6. Fukuyama 1989, p. 18.

CHAPTER 5 1. Ferguson 2013a, p. 4. 2. Ibid, p. 4.

218 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

Notes Zakaria 2013, p. 1. Ibid. Deudney and Ikenberyy 2012, p. 15. Collier and Levitsky 1997; Pye 1990. Piccone and Alinkoffa 2012; Stuenkel and Jacob 2010. Soutron 2011; Kuru 2013. Rawls 1999, pp. 64–69. Ibid, p. 72. Ibid, pp. 75–76. Ibid, p. 77. Thirkell-White 2006, p. 421. Ibid, pp. 438–439. Pye 1990, p. 13. Harrison 2010, p. 160; Harrison and Mitchell 2007; Rawls 1999; Wendt 1999; Bull 1977. Piccone and Alinikoff 2012a; Kuru 2013. Ozel and Ozcan 2011. Kuru 2013, p. 6. Sukma 2011. Piccone and Alinikoff 2012a, p. 40. Ibid, p. 39. Stuenkel and Jacob 2010. Narlikar 2010a. Nasr 2009, p. 94. Ibid, pp. 89–90. Ibid, p. 85. Ibid, p. 85. Stourton 2010; Kinzer 2008, p. 237. Nasr 2009, p. 236. Ibid, p. 112. Kinzer 2008, p. 235. Deudney and Ikenberry 2012, p. 16. Franck 1992; Mitchell and Diehl 2012. Diamond 2012, p. 5. Mahbubani 2013, p. 23. Diamond 2012, pp. 5–6. Mahbubani 2013, pp. 37–39; Yahoo! News July 12, 2012. Diamond 2012, p. 7. Ibid, pp. 7–8. Ibid, p. 7. Ibid, pp. 8–9. Ibid, p. 9. Ibid, p. 13.

Notes

219

45. Mahajan 2009, p. 23. 46. Radelet 2010, pp. 9 and 13; Robertson 2012. The 17 countries are: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. While backsliding from countries on this list has occurred (e.g., Mali since 2012) others such as Kenya and Nigeria have also taken great strides. 47. Radelet 2010, p. 12. 48. Ibid, pp. 13–14. 49. Ibid, p. 15. 50. Ibid, pp. 15–21. 51. Diamond 2012, p. 256. 52. Robertson 2012, p. 5. 53. Mahajan 2009, p. 45. 54. Ibid, p. 47. 55. Ibid, p. 20. 56. The Economist March 2, 2013, p. 3. 57. Mahajan 2009, p. 7. 58. Robertson 2012, p. 126. 59. Ibid, pp. 126, 128, and 141. 60. Stolte 2012, p. 3. 61. Mahajan 2009, pp. 15–17. 62. Kaplan 2010, p. 298. 63. O’Neill 2011b Interview on The Charlie Rose Show, 2011, 26–29 minutes. 64. O’Neill 2011a, p. 109. 65. Kaplan 2012, p. 200. 66. Broadman 2008, p. 1; see also Boillard 2013. 67. Kaplan 2010, pp. 296–297. 68. Diamond 2011, pp. 306–307; The Economist March 2, 2013, p. 10. 69. Shifter 2011. 70. Ibid, pp. 108–109. 71. Ibid, p. 110. 72. Ibid, p. 111. 73. Ibid, p. 111. 74. Ibid, p. 112. 75. Ibid, p. 118. 76. Kaplan 2012, pp. 333–346. 77. Shifter 2011, p. 113. 78. Ibid, pp. 114–115. 79. Ibid, p. 115. 80. Llosa 2013, p. 4. 81. Diamond 2010, pp. 200–204. 82. Ibid, p. 207.

220 Notes 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96.

97. 98.

99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117.

Kaplan 2012, pp. 178–179. Ibid, p. 185. Ibid, p. 186. Little 2013. Kaplan 2012, p. 151. O’Neill 2011a, p. 165. Huntington 1991, pp. 31–34. Strand et al 2012; Bremmer 2008. Strand 2012, p. 12. Ibid, pp. 9–10; Boix 2011. Ferguson 2013a, p. 4. Gershman 2011b, p. 2. Ibid, p. 2. Mitchell et al (1999) show that higher amounts of interstate war in the international system increase the proportion of democratic states, with large spikes occurring after World Wars I and II. Risse et al 1999, pp. 19–20. Gershman 2011b, p. 3. In the US context, Mossberger et al (2008) find many benefits of Internet access for improving the quality of life for citizens in democracies, including increased voter turnout and civic engagement in politics and improved incomes for minority group members (e.g., African Americas, Latinos). Gershman 2011b, p. 3. Risse et al 1999, pp. 264–267. Doorenspleet 2005, p. 48. Bremmer 2006, p. 160. Levitsky and Muiillo 2008, pp. 115 and 122. Kaplan 2012, p. 341. Fukuyama 2012b, p. 58. Huntington 1991, p. 290. Jenne and Mudde 2011. Ibid, p. 148. Ibid, p. 148. Ibid, p. 148. Ibid, pp. 153–154. Huntington 1991, pp. 290–291. Kupchan 2011, pp. 154 and 162. Cooper 2000; Wendt 1999; Little 1995; Buzan 1993. The Economist March 2, 2013. Strand et al 2012. Bull and Watson 1984, pp. 220–223. Many of these principles are reflected in human rights treaties ratified by a large number of states including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and

Notes

118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158.

221

the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Both treaties have been in force for over forty years. Suu Kyi 2011b, p. 5. Bull and Watson 1984, pp. 220–222. Ibid. Ibid, pp. 222–223. Deudeney and Ikenberry 2012, p. 16. Bull and Watson 1984, p. 223. Suu Kyi 2011b, p. 5. Wendt 1999. Suu Kyi 2011b, p. 6. Ibid, p. 6. Parekh 1992, p. 168. Ibid, p. 169. Ibid, pp. 171–172. Ibid, p. 172. Bull and Watson 1984, p. 224. Ibid, p. 224. Rawls 1999. Risse et al 1999. Suu Kyi 2010, p. 167. Ibid, p. 168. Kant made a similar argument in his philosophical writings. Bull and Watson 1984, p. 223. Aydin 2007, p. 2. Ibid, p. 196. Ibid, pp. 191 and 195–196. Ibid, p. 202. Ibid, p. 193. Ibid, p. 203. Nasr 2009, p. 262; see also Mahbubani 2008, p. ix. Mahbubani 2013, p. 12. Parikh 2008, p. 267. Suu Kyi 2010, p. 170. Ibid, p. 173. Pye 1990, p. 11. Ibid, p. 12. O’Neill 2011a, pp. 21–22. Jensen 2006; Lee and Mitchell 2012. Aydin 2007, p. 194. O’Neill 2011a, pp. 21–22. Ibid, p. 79. Nasr 2009, pp. 252–253. Wright 2011.

222 Notes 159. 160. 161. 162. 163.

Bishara 2011, pp. xi–xii. Dibashi 2012. Suu Kyi 2011a, pp. 7–8. Ibid, p. 9. Ibid, p. 10.

PART III AND CHAPTER 6 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

Huntington 1996, p. 82. Huntington 1993, 1996. Mahbubani 2008, p. 49. Mahbubani quoted Stephens 2007; Madison 2001. Zakaria 2011, pp. 65–67. Ferguson 2011, p. 304; Pomeranz 2000; McNeil 1963. Zakaria 2011, p. 64. Kennedy 1988, p. 690. O’Neill 2011a, p. 26. Kaplan 2012. Buzan and Little 2000; Watson 2009. Woods 1992, p. 199; Zakaria 2011, pp. 67–68. Ferguson 2011, p. 4. Wood 1992. Ibid. Mahbubani 2008, p. 49. Fukuyama 1992, p. 18. Mahbubani 2008, p. 9. Mahbubani 2013, pp. 32–33. Ibid, pp. 20–22. Mill 1978, p. 60. Mahbubani 2013. National Intelligence Council 2012, p. 2. Mahbubani 2008, p. 10. Mahbubani 2013, pp. 18–22. O’Neill 2011a, pp. 32–33; Wilson and Purushothaman 2003. O’Neill 2011a, p. 41. O’Neill 2011b. O’Neill 2011a, pp. 4–5. O’Neill 2012; BBC World Service 2013. O’Neill 2011a, p. 151. Ibid, p. 57. Ibid, p. 66. Ibid, p. 60.

Notes 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

Ibid, p. 62. Ibid, p. 6. Ferguson 2011, p. 346 footnote 21. Tammen et al 2000. Zakaria 2011, pp. 2–4. O’Neill 2011a, pp. 98–99. Ibid, p. 100. Ibid, p. 193. Ibid, p. 101. Ibid, p. 102. Sharma 2012, p. 209. The Economist 2013, March 2, pp. 11–13. Sharma 2012, pp. 193–194. Ibid, p. 131. Kaplan 2010, pp. 45–46; Meredith 2007, p. 14. Ferguson 2011, p. 139. Sharma 2012, p. 30. Zakarai 2011, p. 2. O’Neill 2011a, p. 2. Zakaria 2011, p. 2. Plattner 2011, p. 31. Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011b, pp. 2–3. BBC World Service 2013. Bull and Watson 1984, p. 219. Spengler 1962 [1919]; Farrenkopf 2001. Bull and Watson 1984, pp. 224–227. Ibid, pp. 224–226. Ibid, p. 227. Ibid, p. 228. Huntington 1996, pp. 81–121. Ibid, p. 82. Ibid, pp. 83–84. Ibid, p. 84. Ibid, p. 84. Ibid, pp. 85–86. Ibid, pp. 87–88. Ibid, pp. 89–90. Mahbubani 2008; Ferguson 2011; Mahbubani 2013. Ferguson 2011, p. 308. Tammen et al 2000, p. 17. Ferguson 2012, p. 2. O’Neill 2011a, pp. 225–226. Mahbubani 2008, p. 4.

223

224 Notes 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120.

Ibid, p. 5. Ferguson 2011. Ferguson 2011; Mahbubani 2008, pp. 51–99. Fukuyama 1989, 1992. Ferguson 2012, p. 1. Ferguson 2011a, pp. 85–86. Ferguson 2011a, p. 11. Ferguson 2011b. Mahbubani 2008, p. 52. Ferguson 2011, p. 19. Mahbubani 2008, p. 21. Ibid, pp. 150–151. Huntington 1996, p. 109. Mahbubani 2008, pp. 127–174; Nasr 2009, pp. 1–27. Ferguson 2011, p. 4; Zakaria 2011, pp. 67–68. Wright 2011, p. 19. Huntington 1996, pp. 95–96. Holms 1997, pp. 278–279. Ferguson 2011, p. 285. Nasr 2009, p. 24; Ferguson 2011, p. 275. Zakaria,2011, pp. 16–17. Ibid, p. 19. Harrison 2002, p. 204a; Snyder 2013a, 2013b. Mahbubani 2008, p. 8. Cox 2012. Mahbubani 2008, p. 9. O’Neill 2011a. Kagan 2012, p. 20. Ibid, p. 72. Mahbubani 2008, pp. 26–42 and 176–178. Ikenberry 2001. Lake 2009. Fukuyama and Mahbubani 2010, p. 2. Diamond 2011, p. 306. Mahbubani 2013. Kagan 2012, p. 73. Plattner 2011, p. 37. Levy and Thompson 2010. Mehta 2011, p. 112. Kagan 2012. Nye 1990, pp. 190–195. Fukuyama 1989, p. 3. Rachman 2011, p. 99.

Notes 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142.

225

Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011a, 2011b. Ibid, p. 46. Williams 2012, p. 8. O’Neill 2011a, p. 22; Giddens 1997. Kupchan 2012. Mahbubani 2013. Owen 2010, p. 267. Legro 2005, p. 34. Giddens 1999, p. 18; Castells 2006, p. 89. Lynch 2000. Rawls 1999. Cochran 1999; Shapcott 2001; Mahbubani 2013. Fukuyama 1992; Harrison 2004a. Mahbubani 2013, p. 47. Ibid. Narlikar 2010, pp. 8–15. Ibid, pp. 139–146. Mahbubani 2008. Huntington 1996, p. 82. Mahbubani 2008, p. 8. Ibid, p. 125. Ibid, p. 3.

CHAPTER 7 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Gartzke and Weisiger 2008, 2013a. Fukuyama 1992. Kagan 2008. Gartzke and Weisiger 2013a, p. 175. Ibid, p. 175. Morris 2010, p. 588. Jacques 2009; Halper 2010; McGregor 2010. Kupchan 2012, p. 87. Ibid, p. 88. Garztke and Weisger 2013a. Holsti 1991; Senese and Vasquez 2008. Mitchell and Prins 1999; Gibler 2012. Gartzke and Weisiger 2013a, p. 174. Ibid, p. 175. Gartzke and Weisiger 2013b, p. 33. Wendt 1999, pp. 355–356; Garton Ash (2004, p. 134) explicitly uses this term in relation to his discussion of the crisis of trans-Atlantic relations over the Iraq War.

226

Notes

17. Wendt 1999, p. 356. 18. Owen 1997, p. 235; Knutsen 1992, pp. 147–150. This reading of Hegel differs from Fukuyama’s which regards Hegel as completing Kant’s peaceful vision for global order (Owen 1997, p. 235 fn 6). We seek to reconcile these competing interpretations of Hegel. Following Gartzke and Weisger (2013a) we hold that democracies find an “other” in other democracies as democracy spreads. Nevertheless, the intense political conflicts this generates will not lead to a breakdown of peace between members of Kant’s pacific union. 19. Harrison 2004a, 2010. 20. Carroll 2001, pp. 13–14. 21. Ibid, pp. 13–14. 22. Garzke and Weisiger 2013a, p. 182. 23. Ibid, p. 174. 24. Keohane and Nye 2012. Barbieri (1996) shows that asymmetric trading relationships, in which one state is more dependent on trade than the other state, can increase the risks for militarized disputes. 25. King 2010, pp. 3–8. 26. Kennedy 1993, Friedman 2008; Kaplan 2012. 27. Gartzke and Weisiger 2013b, p. 33. 28. Kagan 2004, p. 112. 29. Sorenson 2011, pp. 2–8. 30. Schmitter 2012, p. 40. 31. Ibid, p. 43. 32. Ibid, p. 44. 33. Deudney and Ikenberry 2012, p. 7. 34. Dafoe et al 2013. 35. Harrison 2010, p. 160. 36. Garzke and Weisiger 2013a, p. 171. 37. Garzke and Weisiger 2013b, p. 34. 38. Solingen 2012. 39. Mitchell and Prins 1999. 40. Huth and Allee 2002, Dixon and Senese 2002. 41. Colaresi et al 2010. 42. Leeds 2003. 43. Kennedy 2001, pp. 77–78; Harrison 2004, pp. 142–147; see also Ikenberry and Kupchan 2004; Anderson et al 2008; Harrison 2009; Kennedy 2010; Ikenberry 2010. 44. Kagan 2004, p. 150. 45. Anderson et al 2008, p. 264; see also Cox 2010, p. 110. 46. Bergsten 2012, p. 2. 47. Ibid, p. 4. 48. Gartzke and Weisiger 2013a, p. 180. 49. Gartzke and Weisiger 2013b, p. 174.

Notes 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82.

227

Harrison 2010, p. 160. Schmitter 2012, p. 44. Little 2013; Financial Times 2013. Gartzke and Weisiger 2013b, p. 33. Little 2013. Boix 2012; Dorenspleet 2005. Garzke and Weisiger 2014. Gartzke and Weisiger 2013a, pp. 173–174. Russett and Oneal 2001, pp. 125–126; Harrison 2002, pp. 154–156, 2010, pp. 160–161. Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006, p. 57. Terhalle 2011. Ibid, p. 344. For an interesting case study of India as an emerging democracy that falls into this pattern, see Narlikar (2013b). For example, Narlikar notes that despite being a developing country India has worked against agricultural trade liberalization in the WTO in order to satisfy entrenched economic interests and lobby groups, even at the expense of its longer term economic interests. Whether this behavior is residual and will change over time as India continues to develop, or whether it provides a broader paradigm of behavior for postcolonial democracies requires further analysis. Our intuition tends toward the former hypothesis. Narlikar 2010a, p. 160. Mahbubani 2013, p. 7. Deudney and Ikenberry 2012, p. 13. Kagan 2008, p. 53. Ibid, p. 62. Ibid, p. 89. Ibid, pp. 80–85. Ibid, pp. 71–73. Gartzke and Weisiger 2013a; Kagan 2004. Gartzke and Weisiger 2013a, p. 172; see also Bennett 2006. Gartzke and Weisiger 2013a, pp. 174–175; see also Zakaria 2003; Levitsky and Way 2010. Maoz and Russett 1993. Mansfield and Snyder 1995. Bush 2011a. Mahbubani 2008, p. 125. Fukuyama 2012b. Dabashi 2012, p. 2; Vasconcelos 2012, p. 101. Kagan 2008, pp. 80–85. Kinzer 2010; Merlini and Roy 2013. Vasconcelos 2012, pp. 101–102.

228 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112 .

Notes

Ibid, pp. 7–8. Hague 2011. Stourton 2011b, p. 5. Hague 2011. Pevehouse 2005. Kinzer 2008, pp. 224–225. Scherpereel and Zierler 2011. Ibid, p. 34. Ibid, p. 31. Vasconcelos 2012, p. 21. Kinzer 2008, pp. 225–226. Financial Times 2012. Sikorski 2011. Kinzer 2008, pp. 224–225. Williams 2001; Harrison 2004. Peceny 1997; Oren 1995. Shahin 2005, p. 10; see also Vasconcelos 2012, pp. 31–32. Vasconcelos 2012. Ibid, p. 111. Shahin 2005, p. 10. Giddens 1999, p. 16. Mahbubani 2008, p. 175. Ibid, pp. 175–234. Ibid, p. xii. Narlikar 2010a, p. 143. Mahbubani 2008, p. xii. Krook 2010. Towns 2010, p. 3; see also Ellerby 2013. Towns 2010, p. 9. Ibid, pp. 10–11; Bush (2011b, p. 116) notes a double standard. Western powers often leverage quotas for developing countries when they remain “off the table” in developed countries (most conspicuously the United States). This represents a variant of the “liberal hypocrisy” discussed later in this chapter. However, it has now been well established by scholars of gender that well-designed quotas are by far and away the fastest way to increase women’s representation in democracies. We therefore agree with Towns and others that the adoption of quotas across the developing world has important political lessons for the established democracies. The lesson is that the Western powers should start to practice what they are preaching about democratic participation and gender equality. 113. Towns 2010, pp. 11–12.

Notes 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155.

O’Neill 2011a, p. 8. O’Neill 2011a, pp. 8, 14 and 15. O’Neill 2011a, p. 35. Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011, p. 52. O’Neill 2011a, p. 169; O’Neill 2001. Plattner 2011, p. 34. Mahbubani 2008, pp. xi–xii. O’Neill 2011a, p. 170. Plattner 2011a, pp. 34–36. O’Neill 2011a, p. 173. O’Neill 2011a, p. 175; Mahbubani 2013, p. 245. O’Neill 2011a, p. 178. Mahbubani 2013, pp. 120–121; Robertson 2012, p. 59. Mahbubani 2013, p. 120. Mitchell and Powell 2011, p. 101. Ibid, pp. 102–103. Ibid, p. 104. Kennedy 2006, p. 245. Piccone and Alinikoff 2012, p. 40. Welsh 2011, p. 4. Mahbubani 2013, pp. 240–242. Ibid, pp. 244–246. Kennedy 2006, p. 245. Mahbubani 2008, p. 26. Ibid, p. 32. Garztke and Weisiger 2014, p. 30; Gartzke 2013, p. 22. Vasconcelos 2012, p. 103. Byman 2011, p. 123. Ibid, p. 134. Ibid, p. 134. Mearsheimer and Walt 2008; Thies 2013. King 2010, p. 173. Magnus 2009, p. 301. Kennedy 1993, p. 43; Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011b, p. 21. Huntington 2004, p. 180. Kupchan 2012, pp. 156–166. Huntington 2004, pp. 223–230. Kennedy 1993, p. 44 original emphasis. King 2010, p. 195. Rawls 1999, pp. 38–39. Fukuyama 1992, p. 278. King 2010, p. 194.

229

230 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193.

194. 195.

Notes Magnus 2009, pp. 266–267. King 2010, pp. 172–173. King 2010; Kaplan 2012; Kennedy 1993. O’Neill 2011, pp. 117–127. Freidman 2008. Kennedy 1993, pp. 118–119. O’Neill 2011, pp. 124–125. Mahbubani 2013, pp. 136–137. Rachman 2011, p. 203. Helm 2012, p. 166. Ibid. Ibid, pp. 240–241. Mahbubani 2013, p. 137. Friedman 2008, pp. 371–412. Bueno De Mesquita et al 2003, pp. 15–23; see also Bueno De Mesquita 2012. Hegel 1961; Parekh 2008, p. 2. Fukuyama 1992. Mahbubani 2013, pp. 3–4. Friedman 2008, p. 5. Helm 2012, p. 237. Ferguson 2011, p. 324. Friedman 2008, pp. 403–404. Giddens 1999, p. 16. Bjarnegard 2010; see also Bjarnegard 2013. Ibid, p. 7. Ibid, p. 27, Table 1. Bjarnegard 2008, p. 7. Childs and Webb 2012. Narlikar 2010b; Garzke and Weisiger 2013a; Snyder 2013b; Bush 2011. Bjarnegard 2008, p. 22. Ellerby 2013, p. 26. Mahbubani 2013, p. 112. Bjarnegard 2008; Ellerby 2013. Garzke and Weisiger 2013a. Rawls 1999. Kagan 2012. Fukuyama 1992, pp. 166–170, 2012a. Fukuyama 1992, p. 182; see also Fukuyama 1992, pp. 162–166 for a fascinating discussion of the Platonic roots of the concept of “thymos.” This is truly Fukuyama at his most profound. Fukuyama 1992, p. 190. Bull and Watson 1984, p. 435.

Notes

231

CHAPTER 8 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

Cited Wood 1992, p. 211. Mahbubani 2013. Kant 1991, p. 41. Friedman 2005, p. 463. Alexander 2011, p. 35. Filiu 2011, pp. 60–61. Fisher 2013. Diamond 2013a. The Economist March 16, 2013b, p. 48. Giddens (1984) provides the classic analysis. For important discussions of this issues pertaining to international relations see Wendt (1987) and Dessler (1989). Rosenau (1990) also adopts this approach, and for the same reason. See also Nye 1990, 2011; Kennedy 1993. Berman 2013. Diamond 2013b. Friedman 2005, pp. 449–450. Mearsheimer and Walt 2013. Connolly 2001, 19–21 minutes. Mahbubani 2008, p. 127. Doorenspleet 2005. Waltz 1986, p. 340. Huntley 1996, Mitchell et al 1999; Cederman 2001; Harrison 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2010; Mitchell 2002; Quddus Snyder 2013a, 2013b. Mahbubani 2013, p. 47. Huntington 1991. Pye 1990, pp. 15–16. Khalil 2013. Fukuyama 1989. Wilson and Dragusanu 2008. Pye 1990. Lloyd 2013, p. 2; see also McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008. The Economist, March 16, 2013b, p. 48. Lloyd 2013, p. 2. Krastev and Holmes 2012, p. 40. Zakaria 2011, p. 94. Mahbubani 2013, see also Ferguson 2011, p. 313. Fukuyama 1989, 1992; Barbour 1995; Ferguson 2013. Little 2013, 22 minutes. Ham 2012, p. 32. Mahbubani 2008; O’Neill 2011a ; Kennedy 1987.

232 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

Notes The Economist March 16, 2013a, p. 18. Bergen 2013, p. 60. Kaplan 2010; Boillot 2013. Kaplan 2012. Wood 1992; Watson 2009; Buzan and Little 2000. Toynbee 1952, p. 6. Ferguson 2011. Kagan 2012. Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011a, 2011b. Kupchan 2012. Cox 2013, p. 381. Gartzke and Weisiger 2013a, 2013b. Ferguson 2002. Narlikar 2013a. Friedman 2008, p. 56. Mahbubani 2013. Kupchan 2012, pp. 156–161; for a similarly pessimistic account, see Ferguson 2013b. Dionne 2013; see also Fukuyama 2012b; Deudney and Ikenberry 2012. Schiffrin et al 2012. Inglehart and Werlzel 2005. Bueno de Mesquita et al 2004; Bueno de Mesquita 2012. Kennedy et al 1999, p. 10. Garton Ash 2004. Strange 1987, pp. 24–32. Arblaster 1984, p. 10. Wood 1992, p. 211.

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Index Africa, 101, 106, 108–10, 114, 137, 190 Al-Qaeda, 7, 42–3 America, 17, 44, 50, 77–8, 90–1, 102, 107, 111, 133–5, 137, 142–3, 151, 165, 167, 169–70 Arab countries, 38–9, 43, 137 Arab League, 54, 57–8 Arab Spring, 1–3, 5–7, 10–12, 17, 20, 22, 24, 27–8, 35–7, 39–41, 43–4, 48–9, 53–9, 61, 63–5, 67–72, 75–7, 79, 85, 88, 92–3, 101–2, 105, 110, 112–14, 125, 140, 145–6, 157, 159, 175, 177, 179, 182–8, 190, 200, 208 Asia, 7, 16–17, 77, 88, 90, 101, 107, 114, 132–3, 137, 140 authoritarianism, 3, 7, 24, 50, 70–2, 75–81, 83, 85, 87–9, 91, 93, 95–7, 99, 102–4, 107, 116, 121, 123, 150, 187, 191 high-grade, 3, 88, 103, 189 low-grade, 80–1, 188 authoritarian regimes, 2–3, 31, 34, 39, 44, 68, 70, 78–80, 92, 98, 101, 143, 159, 214 competitive, 80, 82, 104 authoritarian states, 1–3, 30, 36, 61, 72, 101–2, 145, 149–50, 153, 173, 186, 188, 194 high-grade, 80, 188, 214 low-grade, 80, 98, 188, 214 authoritarian systems, 27, 71, 76, 98, 102

autocracies, 4, 7, 18, 55–6, 58, 65–6, 69, 103, 107, 113–14, 117, 149, 151, 154, 157–8, 162, 173–4, 185, 198 regimes, 30, 34, 47–8, 72, 80, 93, 96–7, 113–14, 121, 188–9 autocratic community, 4, 18, 28, 54–6, 58, 143, 157–8, 172, 194, 204 backsliding, 3, 10, 102–3, 115–17, 159, 189, 198, 219 Balkans, 6, 61–4, 68, 111, 160, 186 bandwagoning, 36, 105, 142–3, 145 Bangladesh, 16, 133–4 Barber, Benjamin, 17–18, 203 Belarus, 7, 64, 80–2, 96, 111, 114, 188, 214 Bjarnegard, Elin, 230 Boix, Charles, 204, 210, 220, 227 Brazil, 3, 35, 55, 57, 77–9, 101–3, 105, 109–11, 116–17, 124, 132–4, 141, 145, 157, 165–6, 177, 179, 181, 189, 196, 201 Brazilian Spring, 102 BRICs, 16, 77–8, 94, 132, 134–5 Britain, 129, 131–2, 143, 160, 166, 196, 198 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, 210, 214, 230, 232 Bull, Hedley, 118–20, 201, 203, 220–1, 223, 230 Burma, 7, 16, 81, 85–7, 107–8, 114, 119, 121–3, 125, 134, 188, 192

258

Index

Burmese Spring, 86 Buzan, Barry, 210, 217, 220, 222, 232 capitalism, 3, 5–13, 16–20, 30, 37, 41, 79, 90, 103–4, 106, 129, 135, 138, 140–1, 144–5, 147, 150, 168, 173, 175, 178–9, 190–1, 194, 198–9 capitalist, 9, 18–19, 27, 41, 146, 185, 191, 194 CCP (Chinese Communist Party), 88–9, 92–3 Cederman, Lars-Erik, 204–5, 231 China, 3–4, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16–17, 33–4, 41, 57–8, 76–81, 85–93, 97–8, 102, 107–10, 114, 129–30, 132–7, 139–42, 145, 150, 157, 163, 165–6, 188–9, 192–3, 214, 216 civilizations, 5, 7, 10, 15, 25, 49–51, 66, 122, 127, 129, 131, 133, 136–7, 139, 141–2, 156, 191, 203–4, 208 clash, 5, 8, 15, 18–19, 131, 149, 151, 156, 162, 167–8, 170, 173–4, 179, 196–7 of civilizations, 3–5, 12, 14–15, 18–19, 22, 179 of democratizations, 18–19, 149, 154, 156, 162, 167–8, 170, 173–4, 195–7 coercion, 45–6, 80, 88, 92, 186 Cold War, 1–2, 4–5, 7–9, 11–14, 17, 19–20, 22, 24, 27–9, 35–6, 53–4, 56, 59, 76, 78, 86, 97–9, 108, 114, 129–30, 136–7, 144, 147, 149, 154, 157–9, 167, 170, 173–5, 177–8, 181, 183–5, 199 communism, 8, 30, 42, 48–9, 67, 71, 75, 107, 145, 150–1, 153, 187 concessions, 45–6, 80, 88, 90, 98, 157, 166, 188 conflict, 4, 6, 9, 12, 14, 18, 30, 35, 62,

65–6, 98, 123, 149–54, 156–9, 162, 181, 194–6 cooperation, 20, 98, 149–50, 152, 157, 171 countries, 3, 12, 16, 28–33, 35, 48–9, 59, 62, 68–70, 72, 77, 84–6, 88–90, 94–5, 98, 102–3, 106, 108, 111–14, 116–17, 123–4, 130, 133, 137, 143, 159–60, 163, 165–6, 171–2, 180, 186–7, 190, 192, 204, 206, 219 developing, 3, 16, 55–7, 63, 77–8, 82, 88, 91, 98, 101, 113, 115, 117–21, 123–5, 129, 131, 133, 136–9, 143–7, 157, 163–5, 167–9, 173, 178–9, 188–90, 193–8, 200, 228 crisis, 4, 75, 77–8, 90, 115, 132–3, 135, 152, 155–6, 164, 188, 199, 225 Cuba, 7, 80, 82–3, 87, 114, 188, 214 cultures, 14, 41, 50–1, 120–1, 123, 139, 190–1, 193 indigenous, 118, 120–1, 190 democracies emerging, 3–4, 7–8, 13, 19, 54–5, 57–8, 63–4, 101–6, 115–17, 142–3, 149, 154, 156–62, 164–7, 171–4, 187, 189–91, 195–6, 227 established, 3–4, 8, 19, 103–4, 115–17, 142, 144, 149–50, 152–3, 156–8, 161–2, 164, 166, 171–4, 190, 194–6, 198, 228 stable, 68, 71, 181, 189 democracy, 34–6, 158, 172 critical mass of, 28–9, 53, 107 export of, 2, 186 global, 33, 165, 173 levels, 30, 59 movements, 78, 125 new, 38, 70, 157–8, 195 promotion, 68, 143

Index democratic, 2, 11, 19, 33, 41, 53, 56, 62, 84, 93, 108, 111, 113, 143, 145, 147, 149, 155, 166, 170, 173, 179, 188, 194, 197–8, 204 bandwagon, 63, 154, 191 change, 32, 55 clubs, 152, 158, 195 consolidation, 111, 117, 159, 187 development, 65, 180 diffusion, 8, 12, 154 fraternity, 8, 149, 172, 195 global, 4, 115, 117, 200 governance, 59, 70, 141 ideals, 20, 200 institutions, 62, 115–16, 161, 171, 199 norms, 30, 90 order, 5, 17, 142, 145, 150, 162, 191, 194 peoples, 13, 104, 155, 174 post-Western, 8, 15, 142–4, 193–6, 200 reforms, 92–3, 160 regimes, 29, 70, 135, 158, 210 regional communities, 54, 58, 61–2, 64, 67, 186 revolutions, 12, 60, 72, 76 societies, 9, 120, 159, 169, 197, 199 spillover, 58, 61–2, 156 states, 2, 23, 27–8, 30–1, 33, 53–4, 60, 72, 104, 110, 153–5, 162, 184–5, 212, 220 transitions, 1, 3, 6, 10, 12, 29, 31, 54–5, 60–2, 64, 69–70, 78, 80, 103, 107–8, 113, 159, 164, 174, 181, 195 world, 19, 103, 107, 150, 154 democratic community, 2, 4, 18–19, 23–4, 28–33, 36, 54–6, 62–3, 72, 97–8, 105, 115–17, 119–20, 142–3, 149–50, 152–9, 161–2, 164–6, 170–1, 173–4, 182, 185, 189, 194–6, 199, 204

259

strong, 2, 12, 15, 55, 58, 156, 184 democratic peace, 12–13, 23 democratic socialization, 4, 7, 11, 27–9, 34, 36, 53 global, 12, 27, 36, 185 process of, 28, 35–6, 156, 184–5, 187 democratization, 2, 6, 13, 16, 18, 28–36, 55, 59, 64–5, 69–72, 75–7, 80, 92, 106–7, 111–16, 119, 129, 149–50, 156–7, 162, 164, 167–8, 170, 173–4, 180–1, 184–6, 196–7 encouraging, 30, 75 fourth wave of, 7, 101, 112–15, 117, 198 process, 70, 75 stable, 6, 59, 64–5, 68 third wave of, 34–5, 185 waves of, 12, 29, 106, 115, 190 democratizion, trends, 43, 69, 108, 110 demonstrations, 2, 32, 45–6, 50, 54, 57, 59, 61, 102, 119, 189, 198 Deudney, Daniel, 19, 203, 205, 217–18, 226–7, 232 developing world, 3–4, 7–8, 12–13, 15–16, 18–20, 49, 51, 55, 63, 75, 102, 117–23, 125, 129, 131, 135, 137, 146–7, 162, 164, 166, 169–70, 173, 175, 177–8, 182, 187, 190–1, 194–8, 200, 228 Diamond, Larry, 206, 216, 218–19, 224, 231 Dubai, 37, 41, 55, 85, 134 East Asia, 87, 106–8, 112, 136–7, 155, 190 Eastern Europe, 1–2, 9, 12, 29, 35, 53–4, 63–5, 67–9, 71, 112, 140, 145, 160–1, 186–7, 195 ECB (European Central Bank), 153, 155

260 Index Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 57 economic development, 13, 17, 37, 40–1, 65, 79, 85, 106, 113, 123, 131, 156, 171, 185 economic growth, 3, 17, 34, 69, 76, 80, 88–9, 96, 108, 129, 133, 169 economic modernization, 2, 7, 11, 16, 27, 36–9, 44, 48, 53, 112–13, 185 economic reforms, 82–3, 171 ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), 57 education, 29, 34, 38–9, 44, 88, 108, 137 Egypt, 25, 38, 40, 43, 46–7, 50–1, 54–5, 59–60, 62, 64–6, 68–70, 72, 102–3, 109, 115, 133–4, 159–60, 167, 180–1, 186–7, 192–3, 195 elections, 65, 80–3, 93–5, 110, 116–17, 172, 192 elites, 30, 32, 55, 59–60, 64, 66, 84, 92, 96, 105, 160, 181, 198 end of history, 4–5, 8, 73, 149 EU (European Union), 54, 60–1, 65, 68, 81, 106, 111–12, 115–16, 140, 153, 155–6, 159–63, 165–6, 188, 195, 199 Euro, 7, 116, 155–6 crisis, 4, 94, 149, 153–6, 161, 195–7 Europe, 2, 17, 44, 58–62, 64, 68, 72, 81, 106, 112, 117, 138, 142–3, 145, 159, 167, 169, 174, 191–3, 198 European Central Bank (ECB), 153, 155 European Union, see EU (European Union) Facebook, 44, 46–7, 50, 90 Ferguson, Niall, 17, 133, 138–40,

202–3, 206, 208, 217, 220, 222–4, 230–2 financial crisis, 3, 7, 10, 77–8, 91, 115, 132, 134–5, 138, 144, 155, 163–4, 172 Finnemore, Martha, 202, 205–6 freedom, 1, 38, 44, 69, 79, 90–1, 95, 108, 112, 114, 118–21, 125, 149, 159, 168, 190, 193, 195 human, 20, 71, 192 Friedman, Thomas, 169–70, 182, 226, 230–2 Fukuyama, Francis, 1, 4, 6, 8–12, 14–15, 20, 22, 24, 30–1, 71, 73, 75, 79–80, 88–90, 131, 138, 143–4, 170, 174, 178, 183, 194, 201–6, 208–9, 213–17, 220, 222–7, 229–32, 234, 239 arguments, 11–12, 14, 144 thesis, 10–11, 14 Gartzke, Erik, 152, 154, 156, 158, 201–6, 225–7, 229, 232 gender, 37, 152, 228 generation, 6, 24, 37–8, 43, 67–8, 87, 89, 91, 108, 116, 178, 181 geography, 16–17, 130, 139–40, 193 Gershman, Carl, 213–14, 220 Giddens, Anthony, 202–3, 206, 209, 213, 225, 228, 230–1 Gleditsch, Kristian, 204–5, 211, 227 global democratization, 4, 10, 15, 25, 27, 129, 153, 162, 173, 179, 187, 199–200 global governance, 162, 173, 196, 199 globalization, 2, 14, 18, 34, 36, 49–50, 63, 66, 77–8, 163, 182 global middle class, 2, 16, 20, 75, 77, 101, 107, 113, 123, 168, 187 global order, 5, 8, 15, 17, 20, 24, 143–4, 147, 149, 159, 184, 194–6, 200, 226

Index Global Spring, 177, 179, 181, 183, 185, 187, 189, 191, 193, 195, 197–9 Goldman Sachs, 77, 133–4 Goldstein, Joshua, 203, 210–11 government, 10, 19, 41, 45, 58–9, 76, 84–5, 87–9, 93, 101–2, 104, 106, 111, 114, 121–4, 145, 189, 205 grand theory, 6, 20–2, 24, 183 Greece, 35, 103, 116, 135, 155, 161 Green Revolution, 40, 81, 84 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 77, 81, 109, 129, 132–4, 142, 165 Harrison, Ewan, 201–2, 204–6, 210, 212, 216–18, 224–8, 231 Hegel, Georg, 9–11, 13, 151, 170, 202, 226, 230 history, 5, 8–10, 13, 15–16, 18–19, 22, 38, 72–3, 77, 84, 91, 98, 107, 125, 131, 141, 147, 149, 151–2, 154, 170, 178–9, 191, 194, 203, 212 human, 50, 130–1, 145, 147 humanitarian intervention, 56–7, 60, 63 Huntington, Samuel, 2–4, 14–15, 23–4, 36, 66, 78, 112, 129, 136–7, 140, 178, 183, 185, 193, 201–6, 212–14, 216, 220, 222–5, 229, 231 Huntley, Wade, 201–2, 204–5, 231 Ikenberry, G. John, 203, 217, 221, 224, 226 immigration, 19, 160, 167–8, 170, 198 imperialism, 118, 122, 138–9 independence, 1, 3, 7, 9, 103, 111, 118–20, 200, 208 India, 3, 16–17, 55, 57, 77–8, 85–6, 101–3, 105, 109–10, 116, 124, 129–30, 132–4, 136–7, 139, 142–3, 145, 157, 165–6, 177, 179, 189, 192–3, 196, 227

261

Indian Spring, 101–2 Indonesia, 3, 16, 31, 38, 41, 55, 67, 103–5, 107, 116, 133–4, 177, 179, 187, 189, 192, 201 Inglehart, Ronald, 202, 206, 232 instability, 61, 83, 86, 89, 162–3 institutional, 113–14 institutions, 6–7, 29–30, 42, 61, 70, 102–3, 113, 130, 137–40, 143, 145–7, 155, 161, 164, 168, 174, 179, 194, 196 regional, 30, 57, 210 of Western liberalism, 138, 193 inter-democratic conflicts, 5, 15, 149–50, 152, 154–6, 158, 194–5 international forces, 7, 34, 36, 53, 63, 185–6 international institutions, 19, 30, 32, 58, 122, 146 international relations, 3, 5–6, 8, 12, 14, 20–1, 23–4, 136, 152, 181, 183, 193, 231 international society, 15, 118–20, 122, 135, 162–3, 172, 174, 190, 195 international system, 2, 4, 10, 12, 23–4, 27–8, 30, 32–5, 54, 117, 120, 124, 154, 158, 162–3, 179, 182, 184–5, 212, 220 interventions, 57, 60–1, 78, 108, 186 Iran, 4, 7, 17, 38, 40–2, 47, 58, 60, 65, 67, 69, 83–5, 87, 103, 106, 114, 133–4, 157, 167, 188, 193, 207 Iraq War, 4, 6–7, 54, 56, 61, 91, 149, 152–5, 163, 195–6, 225 Islam, 14, 34–5, 37, 39–40, 42–3, 65–7, 104, 124, 140–1, 150, 162, 192 civilization, 138, 140, 193 movements, 162 parties, 67, 106 societies, 40, 42, 140 Israel, 105, 167 Italy, 133–5

262

Index

Jong-Un, Kim, 86–7 Kadera, Kelly, 204–6, 210–11 Kagan, Robert, 18, 142–3, 159, 201–3, 210, 212, 224–7, 230, 232 Kant, Immanuel, 11, 13, 24, 33, 152, 202, 205–6, 221, 231 Kaplan, Robert, 16–17, 111, 203, 211, 215, 219–20, 222–3, 226, 230, 232 Kennedy, Paul, 17, 203, 212–13, 222, 226, 229–32 Keohane, Robert, 204, 211–12, 226 Kosovo War, 31, 56, 60–4, 68 Kupchan, Charles, 17, 203, 220, 225–6, 229, 232 Lake, David, 203, 205, 211, 224 leaders, 2, 34, 42–4, 55, 57, 65–7, 82, 87–8, 90–1, 94–5, 98, 105, 107, 109, 111, 116, 158, 173 legitimacy, 11, 27, 30–1, 34, 36, 44, 49, 56, 69, 72, 76, 80, 98–9, 101, 145, 155, 162, 173 crisis, 34, 72, 80, 98 Levitsky, Steven, 211–12, 214, 218, 220, 227 liberal democracy, 9–10, 18, 67, 79, 111, 116, 144, 155, 168, 170, 174, 187, 200 liberalism, 8–9, 15, 21, 71, 99, 145, 153, 179, 199–200 liberty, 13, 40, 71, 92, 131 Libya, 2, 40, 46–7, 54, 56, 58–63, 66, 68, 72, 103, 105, 115, 159–61, 181, 186, 195 Mahbubani, Kishore, 16, 20, 131, 141, 145, 166, 169, 173, 177, 191, 201–3, 206–7, 213–16, 218, 221–5, 227–32 Malaysia, 57, 85–6, 103–4, 107–8, 114, 134

Mearsheimer, John, 21–3, 203–4, 229, 231 middle class, 34, 37, 76–9, 88, 90, 92, 101, 106–7, 110, 117, 190, 198 Middle East, 1–2, 5–7, 11–12, 18, 27, 34, 36–9, 43–4, 48–51, 53–4, 62–7, 69–72, 75–6, 78, 85, 105, 113–14, 119, 125, 140–1, 158–9, 161–2, 177–8, 183, 185–7, 189, 208 military, 46, 64, 80–1, 85, 88, 108, 136, 142, 151, 153, 158, 195 Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, 201–2, 204–6, 210–12, 217–18, 220–1, 225–6, 229, 231 modernization, 6, 11, 13–14, 17, 36–7, 39, 75, 77–8, 80, 95, 123, 186–7, 216 Nasr, Vali, 11, 106, 124, 202, 206–8, 210, 214–15, 218, 221, 224 NATO, 54, 56, 58, 61, 68, 111, 115, 186, 196 networks, 58, 61, 98, 172, 185 Nigeria, 3, 103, 110, 117, 133–4, 165–6, 171, 177, 189–90, 192, 219 non-Western countries, 9, 163 peoples, 75, 118–20, 122, 136, 138, 146, 161, 174, 193 societies, 120, 124, 135–6, 139, 141, 150, 163, 168, 193–4, 196 world, 4–5, 17, 106, 118, 121–2, 129–30, 135, 137, 143, 146–7, 163–4, 191–3, 196–7, 200 North Africa, 2, 17, 60, 62, 64–5, 68–9, 159–61, 186 North Korea, 7, 81, 86–7, 114, 188 Nye, Joseph, 202, 209–10, 212, 217, 224, 226, 231

Index O’Neill, Jim, 16–17, 77, 112, 123–4, 130, 133, 142, 164, 201, 203, 213, 215–16, 219–25, 229–31 OAS (Organization of American States), 210 opposition, 34–5, 45, 60, 81–3, 85, 95–6, 154, 160–1, 165, 178 Organization of American States (OAS), 210 Pakistan, 16, 133–4, 166 Palestine, 43, 105 parties, 40, 42, 88, 92–3, 108, 118, 122, 172 peace, 32, 37, 112, 149, 152, 154–5, 167, 193, 195, 226 Pevehouse, Jon, 202, 204–5, 210–11, 228 Philippines, 33, 35, 107, 133–4 pluralism, 3, 15, 18, 41, 103–4, 108 populations, 31, 40, 44–6, 55, 66–7, 69, 80–1, 86, 88, 90, 94, 97–8, 108, 129–34, 136–7, 163, 166, 168 power, 23, 30–1, 34, 39–40, 54, 62, 64–6, 69, 82, 84–5, 92–4, 97, 106, 116, 119–20, 122, 127, 136, 143, 145, 149, 162, 167, 186, 192, 195, 228 balance of, 63, 65, 122, 129, 136, 166 established democratic, 166, 196 new, 98, 146, 157, 163 share, 157–8, 173 soft, 56, 189, 194 pressures, 2–4, 27, 29–32, 34, 39–40, 48, 54, 56, 58–9, 63, 67, 71–2, 96–7, 101, 105–7, 115, 149, 152, 155, 158, 163, 167, 185–6, 188 global, 63, 76, 115 prosperity, 10, 20, 37, 90–1, 116, 122, 149, 168, 195–7 protests, 2, 14, 36, 39, 45–9, 53–5,

263

60, 64, 84–5, 94, 96, 98, 101–2, 146, 186 Putin, Vladimir, 79, 94–6, 189 Pye, Lucian, 123, 202, 204, 213, 218, 221, 231 Rasler, Karen, 47, 205, 209, 216 Rawls, John, 13, 105, 202, 205–6, 218, 221, 225, 229–30 reflexivity, 32–3, 36, 75, 143–4, 179–81, 184, 188 reforms, 16, 19, 30, 32, 35, 39, 46, 63, 69, 81, 83–5, 87–8, 93, 96, 102, 110, 147, 160, 162, 166, 172, 174, 190, 196–7 regimes, 3, 31, 34, 41, 45–6, 54, 58– 60, 63, 65, 69, 81–90, 92–9, 108, 145, 151, 169, 188–9, 201 legitimacy, 89–90, 92, 188 semidemocratic, 113 region, 1–2, 6, 11, 27, 32, 37–8, 41, 44, 48, 50, 53–4, 57, 61, 64, 69–70, 72, 76, 95, 98, 103, 107, 110–11, 114, 151, 186 religion, 37, 39, 43, 66–7, 72, 104, 119, 140–1, 185 repression, 3, 39, 41, 45–6, 49, 54, 66, 69, 76, 80, 88–90, 92, 95, 99, 104, 121, 141, 186, 188 revolutions, 1–2, 11–12, 14, 27, 29–30, 35, 43, 46–7, 49, 53–5, 59, 63–7, 71, 75–6, 103, 111, 124–5, 146, 175, 177–9, 182, 184, 186–7, 211 Risse, Thomas, 202, 206–7, 220–1 Rosenau, James, 202, 206, 208, 214, 231 Roy, Olivier, 207–8, 212 Russett, Bruce, 202, 205–6, 211, 227 Russia, 3–4, 7, 57–8, 60, 64, 66, 77–80, 88–9, 93–8, 109, 111–12, 115, 132–4, 157, 165–6, 189, 214

264

Index

Serbia, 31, 61, 63, 65, 68, 98, 155, 186, 212 Singapore, 85–6, 88, 107, 114, 192 Slaughter, Anne-Marie, 202, 208, 211 Snyder, Jack, 202–3, 205, 217, 227 socialization, 23, 27, 49, 72, 157 failed, 160–1 process of, 2, 27–8, 53 social media, 46, 48, 108 social networks, 47, 97, 114, 172 societies, 9, 11, 33–4, 37, 41–2, 56, 58, 66, 71, 75, 79, 93, 96, 98, 104, 114, 120, 122–4, 139, 141, 143–7, 158, 174, 177–81, 186–8, 199–200 decent hierarchical, 13, 104 developing, 168–9, 191 postcolonial, 119–20, 190 South Africa, 3, 55, 103, 105, 110, 115, 155, 165, 177, 179, 189–90, 192, 219 Soviet Union, 28–9, 48–9, 60, 64, 78, 92, 97, 136–7, 151, 174 system, 29, 31, 63–4 Starr, Harvey, 205–6, 211 states, 2–3, 5–6, 14, 22, 27, 30–4, 36–7, 39, 41–2, 48, 51, 53–5, 58–9, 62, 64–6, 69, 77–8, 80, 83, 88, 93, 96–8, 103–7, 110, 112, 115, 118, 124, 142, 150–2, 156–7, 159–61, 163–6, 170, 172–4, 186, 188–90, 195, 199, 201, 207, 214, 220, 226 competitive authoritarian, 107–8 post-Communist, 114–15 system of, 2, 7, 14, 53–4, 185 strength, 7, 18, 54, 63, 65, 89, 113, 133, 139, 151, 153, 156, 184–5, 204 struggle, 1, 3, 7, 50, 117–20, 125, 131, 136, 138, 173–4, 180, 200 SuuKyi, Aung, 119, 121–2, 125, 201–2, 221–2 Syria, 46, 54, 56–60, 62, 69, 72, 81, 84, 181, 189

system, 33–4, 39, 53, 58, 69, 71, 85, 89, 91, 93–4, 96, 102, 163, 166, 169, 180, 197 Taiwan, 90, 93, 107–8, 181 theory, 13, 20–4, 121, 152, 179–80, 184 third wave, 2, 29, 33, 35–6, 70, 113, 185 Third World, 121, 134–6, 175 Towns, Ann, 211, 228 transitions, 29–32, 35, 42, 59–60, 62, 65, 107–8, 171 transnational, 2, 7, 34, 36, 185 Tunisia, 37, 40, 43, 46–7, 54–5, 59–60, 62, 64, 66, 68–9, 72, 87, 102–3, 115, 125, 159, 161, 181, 186, 195, 211 Tunisian Revolution, 46–7 Turkey, 3, 17, 37–8, 41–2, 53, 55, 57, 66–7, 69, 102–3, 105–6, 117, 124, 133–4, 155, 159–61, 167, 177, 179, 187, 189, 192, 195, 201 Turkish Spring, 102 UN (United Nations), 166 United States, 21, 35, 55, 63, 68–9, 103, 110, 131–4, 137, 142, 145, 155, 159, 163, 165–7, 198, 212, 228 UNSC (UN Security Council), 19, 56, 164, 166, 196 UNSC Resolution, 56–7, 63, 166 UN Security Council, see UNSC (UN Security Council) Venezuela, 7, 80, 82, 114, 157, 188, 214 Walt, Stephen, 21–3, 203–4, 229, 231 Waltz, Kenneth, 23, 202, 204, 231 war, 61–3, 72, 97, 124, 150–1, 207 Wendt, Alexander, 151, 202, 204–6, 218, 220–1, 225–6, 231

Index 265 West, 2–10, 12–20, 22, 24, 27–30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48–50, 54, 56, 58–60, 62–8, 70, 72–3, 76–82, 84–8, 90–2, 94–6, 98, 102–6, 108, 110–12, 114, 116, 118–20, 122, 124, 127, 129–32, 134–44, 146–7, 149–50, 152, 154–75, 177–80, 182–4, 186, 188, 190–200 triumph of, 129, 149, 194 Western, 17, 39, 41, 73, 96, 117–18, 121–2, 130, 134–5, 138, 144, 174, 182, 190, 192, 194, 196, 210–11, 228 civilization, 4, 130, 200 concepts, 122, 141 countries, 90, 136–7, 168, 196 democracies, 145, 150, 159, 165, 167–8, 170, 189, 196, 198 dominance, 49, 118–19, 122, 136, 142, 173 imperialism, 122, 196 institutions, 4, 129, 138, 171, 173, 178 liberalism, 73, 120, 138, 140, 149, 190, 193

powers, 2–3, 34–5, 54, 56, 63, 122, 124, 135, 137, 139, 142–4, 146–7, 162–4, 173, 185–6, 194, 228 principles, 117, 119, 121, 190 publics, 173, 196 societies, 6, 120, 122, 140, 147, 167–8, 171, 179, 196, 199 states, 105, 130, 158, 163, 173 values, 17, 91, 118–19, 141 Western Europe, 17, 81, 112, 129–30, 136, 186, 191 West Germany, 55, 139 women, 38–9, 43–4, 50, 101, 152, 172 world history, 49, 142, 174, 177, 192–3 world politics, 1, 3–10, 12–17, 20–1, 23–4, 28–9, 75, 78, 101, 103, 116, 119, 122, 129–31, 140, 149, 154, 156–7, 177–8, 180–5, 190, 192–3, 197 contemporary, 180, 182, 184

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