The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 0393020258, 2001030915

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The Tragedy of Great Power Politics JOHN

J. MEARSHEIMER

University of Chicago

w. W, NORTON & COMPANY NEW YORK

•

LONDON

Copyright© 2001 by John J. Mearsheimer All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America First Edition For information about permission to reproduce selections from this book, write to Permissions, W. W. Nanon & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue. New York, NY 10 1 10. The text of this book is composed in Meridien with the display set in Fumra Manufacturing by the Maple-VaiJ Book Manufacturing Group Book design by BTDnyc Producrion manager: Leela Marjamaa-Reintal Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mearsheimer. John J. The tragedy of Great Power politics I John J. Mearsheimer. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-393-02025-8 I . World politics-19th century. 2. World politics-20th century. 3. Great powers. 4. International relations. I. Title.

0397 .M38 2001 327. l 'Ol---dc2 l

2001030915

W. W. Nanon & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York. N.Y. 10110 www.wwnonon.com W. W. Nonon & Company Ltd., Castle House, 75/76 Wells Strcel, London WIT lQT 1

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CONTENTS

List of Maps

ix

Preface

xi

Acknowledgments

ONE

Introduction

TWO

Anarchy and the Struggle for Power

THREE FOUR FIVE

vii

List of Tables

xiv

29

Wealth and Power

55

The Primacy of Land Power

83

Strategies for Survival

138

Great Powers in Action

168

SEVEN

The Offshore Balancers

234

EIGHT

Balancing versus Buck-Passing

267

NINE

The Causes of Great Power War

334

Great Power Politics in the Twenty-first Century

360

Notes

403

Index

535

SIX

TEN

LIST OF

MAPS

MAP 6.1

Targets of Japanese Expansion in Asia, 1868-1945

175

MAP 6.2

Europe in 1914

185

MAP 6.3

Soviet Expansion in Eastern Europe during the Early Cold War

MAP 6.4

200

Targets of Italian Expansion in Europe and Africa, 1861-1943

204

MAP 7.1

North America in 1800

240

MAP 7.2

Westward Expansion of the United States, 1800-1853

243

MAP I.I

Europe at the Height of Napoleon's Power. 1810

275

MAP 8.2

Central Europe in 1866

MAP 1.3

Europe in 1935

290 312

LIST OF TAB LES

I. I 3.1

The Major Realist Theories

22

Indicators of British and Russian Wealth and Population, 1830-1913

64

3.2

Indicators of French and Prussian/German

3.3

Relative Share of European Wealth, 1816-1940

71

3.4

Relative Share of European Wealth, 1941-44

73

3 .5

Relative Share of Superpower Wealth, 1945-90

74

6.1

Manpower in European Armies, 1875-95

187

6.2

Relative Share of World Wealth, 1830-1940

220

Wealth and Population, 1830-1913

66

7.1

Population in the Western Hemisphere, 1800-1900

241

7.2

The United Kingdom and the United States, 1800-1900

248

8.1

Populations of European Great Powers, 1750-1816

282

8.2

Manpower in European Armies, 1789-1815

284

8.3

Manpower in European Armies, 1862-70

295

(Wars of German Unification)

1.4

Manpower in European Armies, 1900-1918 (World War

l)

303

l.S

Manpower in European Armies, 1920-30

305

•••

Manpower in European Armies, 1933-38

317

1.7

Size of French and German Armies after Mobilization,

1938-40

319

•••

Manpower in European Armies, 1939-41

320

9.1

Manpower in European Armies, 1820-58

352

9.2

Manpower in European Armies, 1853-56 (Crimean War)

352

9.3

Summary of European Wars by System

Structure, 1 792-1990 1 0.1

The Asian Balance of Power, 2000

1 0.2

The European Balance of Power, 2000

10.3

China's Economy in Perspective

357 383 384 398

PREFACE

T

he twentieth century was a period of great international violence. In World War I ( 1 9 1 4- 1 8), roughly nine million people died on European battlefields. About fifty million people were killed during

World War II ( 1 939-4 5 ) , well over half of them civilians. Soon after the end of World War II, the Cold War engulfed the globe. During this con­ frontation, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies never directly fought the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, but many millions died in proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, El Salvador, and elsewhere. Millions also died in the century's lesser, yet still fierce, wars. including the Russo-Japanese con­ flicts of 1 904-5 and 1 9 39, the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War from 1 9 1 8 to 1 920, the Russo-Polish War of 1 920-2 1 , the various Arab­ Israeli wars, and the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88. This cycle of violence will continue far into the new millennium. Hopes for peace will probably not be realized, because the great powers that shape the international system fear each other and compete for power as a result. Indeed, their ultimate aim is to gain a position of dominant power over others. because having dominant power is the best means to ensure one's own survival. Strength ensures safety. and the greatest strength is the greatest insurance of safety. States facing this incentive are

xi

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T H I T R A G I D Y OF G R E AT P O W E R P O L I T I C S

fated t o dash a s each competes for advantage over the others. This is a tragic situation, but there is no escaping it unless the states that make up the system agree to form a world government. Such a vast transformation is hardly a realistic prospea, however, so conflia and war are bound to continue as large and enduring features of world politics. One could challenge this gloomy view by noting that the twentieth century ended peacefully-with the end of the Cold War-and that rela­ tions among the great powers are quite peaceful as we begin the twenty­ lirst century. This is cenainly true, but predicting the future by simply extrapolating forward from the present does not make for sound analysis. Consider what that approach would have told a European observer at the stan of each of the previous two centuries. In 1 800, Europe was in the midst of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, which lasted twenty-three years (1792-18 1 5 ) and involved all of that era's great pow­ ers. Extrapolating fotward from that bloody year, one would have expect­ ed the nineteenth century to be lilied with great-power conflict. In fact, it is among the least conflictual periods in European history. In 1900, on the other hand, there was no warfare in Europe that involved a great power, and little evidence ponended that one was in the offing. Extrapolating fotward from that tranquil year, one would have expected little conflict in Europe during the twentieth century. As we know, the opposite was the case. General theories of international politics offer useful tools for anticipat­ ing what lies ahead. The most useful theories of this sort would describe how great powers normally behave toward each other and would explain their conduct. Useful theories would also account in good pan for how the great powers have behaved in the past, including explaining why some historical periods were more conflictual than others. A theory that satisfies these requirements and helps us look backward to understand the past should also help us look fotward and anticipate the future. In this book I try to offer a theory with these attributes. My theory,

which I label "offensive realism,· is essentially realist in nature; it falls thus in the tradition of realist thinkers such as E. H . Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz. Its elements are few and can be distilled in a handful of

Preface

xiii

simple propositions. For example, I emphasize that great powers seek to maximize their share of world power. I also argue that multipolar systems which contain an especially powerful state-in other words, a potential hegemon-are especially prone to war. These and other propositions in this book will be controversial. In their defense I try to show that the logic that underpins them is sound and compelling. I also test these propositions against the historical record. For evidence I look mainly at relations between the great powers since 1 79 2 . Finally, I u s e t h e theory to forecast t h e likely future shape of great-power relations . This book was written to speak both to my fellow academics and to citi­ zens who are interested in understanding the central forces that drive the behavior of the great powers. In pursuit of that goal, I have tried to make m y arguments clear and easy to understand for those unsteeped in the jargon and debates of the scholarly world. I have tried to keep in mind the advice that the literary scholar Lionel Trilling once gave to the eminent sociologist C . Wright Mills: "You are to assume that you have been asked to give a lecture on some subject you know well, before an a u dience of teachers and students from all departments of a leading university, as well as an assortment of interested people from a nearby city. Assu m e that such an a udience is before you and that they have a right to know; assume that you want to let them know. Now write. " 1 I hope readers con­ clude that m y efforts to follow this advice bore fruit.

ACKNOW LEDG MENTS

A

lthough I am responsible for the arguments in this book, I received a great deal of help along the way from a small army of individuals and institutions.

Numerous colleagues were willing to spend their valuable time reading

and commenting on the manuscript, and their fingerprints are all over this book. Almost every reader caused me either to abandon a wrongheaded argument, add a new argument, or qualify an existing argument. Indeed, I shudder to think how many foolish ideas and errors of fact would still be in this book were it not for the comments I received. Still. I did not accept all of

their suggestions, and I bear lull responsibility for any remaining problems. I owe a profound debt of gratitude to Colin Elman, Michael Desch, Peter Liberman, Karl Mueller, Marc Trachtenberg, and especially Stephen Walt, all of whom not only read and commented on the entire manuscript once but also read and commented on some parts of it more than once. I am also grateful for comments provided by Robert Art, Deborah Avant, Richard Betts, Dale Copeland, Michael Creswell, Michael Doyle, David Edelstein, Benjamin Frankel. Hein Goemans, Jack Goldsmith, Joseph Grieco, Arman Grigorian. David Herrmann, Eric Labs, Karl Lautenschlager, Christopher Layne, Jack Levy. Michael Mandelbaum, Karen Mings!, Takayuki Nishi. Robert Pape, Barry Posen. Daryl Press, Cynthia Roberts, Robert Ross, Brian

xiv

Acknowled9menta

xv

Schmidt, Jack Snyder. Stephen Van Evera, and Alexander Wendt. My apologies to anyone I forgot. Thanks are also owed to a host of research assistants who worked for me over the many years it took to write this book. They include Roshna Balasubramanian, David Edelstein, Daniel Ginsberg. Andrea Jett, Seth Jones, Keir Lieber, Daniel Marcinak, Justine Rosenthal, John Schussler, and Steven Weil. A special word of thanks is owed to Alexander Downes, who is largely responsible for producing the charts in this book, and who extensively researched a variety of subjects for me. As the penultimate draft of the book was being completed, the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City selected me as its Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow for 1 998-99. This wonderful fellowship is designed to help authors complete book projects in progress. Toward that end, the Council convened a study group that met three times in New York City to discuss different chapters from the book. Richard Betts did a superb job as chair of the group, which included Robert Jervis, Jack Levy, Gideon Rose. Jack Snyder. Richard Ullman. Kenneth Waltz. and Fareed Zakaria among its members. They were never short of criticism, but almost all of it was invaluable when I wrote the final draft. The Council also arranged for me to present chapters from the book to audiences in San Francisco and Washington. D.C. They, too, provided excellent comments. After each session in New York with the Council study group, I took a taxicab to Columbia University, where I presented the same chapters to a workshop run by two graduate students. Arman Grigorian and Roiger Schmidt. The Columbia students who attended each session offered many excellent comments, which helped me improve my arguments in a variety of ways. The University of Chicago played a pivotal role in helping me write this book by providing a rich and exacting intellectual environment, as well as generous research support. A scholar could not ask for a better home. I have been especially fortunate at C hicago to have worked with a long list of talented graduate students who not only forced me to sharpen my arguments but taught me a lot about the theory and history of interna­ tional politics. I also wish to thank the office staff in the Political Science

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T H I T R A G I D Y OP G R E AT P O W I R P O L I T I C S

Department ( Kathy Anderson, Heidi Parker. and Mimi Walsh) for provid­ ing me with logistical support over the years. I would also like to acknowledge long-standing debts to four individu­ als who were my principal mentors when I began my career. William Schwartz introduced me to the study of international security when I was a n undergraduate at West Point; Charles Powell nurtured me when I was a graduate student at the University of Southern California; and George Quester and Richard Rosecrance were my dissertation advisers at Cornell University. I would not have made it as a scholar, and thus would never have written this book, without their backing and without the support of the institutions where they taught and I studied. For all that help, I am forever grateful. Roby Harrington. my editor at Norton, came up with the idea for this book and has worked with me on the project for longer than either he or I anticipated. His patience and wisdom are greatly appreciated. Traci Nagle did a splendid job of copy-editing the manuscript, while Avery Johnson and Rob Whiteside did a fine job overseeing the production of the book that is before you. Finally, I thank my family for providing me with invaluable moral sup­ port. Writing a book is usually a protracted and painful process. I liken it to having to get up day after day to wrestle with a bear for hours on end. To finally whip the bear, it helps immensely to have strong support at home as well as in the arena of intellectual combat. I was fortunate to have both. Most important, I thank my wife. Pamela, to whom I owe so much. This book is dedicated to her.

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

0 NE

Introduction

M

any in the West seem to believe that "perpetual peace" among the great powers is finally at hand. The end of the Cold War, so the argument goes, marked a sea change in how great powers

interact with one another. We have entered a world in which there is little chance that the major powers will engage each other in security competi­ tion. much less war, which has become an obsolescent enterprise. In the words of one famous author, the end of the Cold War has brought us to the "the end of history."' This perspective suggests that great powers no longer view each other as potential military rivals, but instead as members of a family of nations. members of what is sometimes called the "'international community. " The prospects for cooperation are abundant in this promising new world, a world which is likely to bring increased prosperity and peace to all the great powers. Even a few adherents of realism, a school of thought that has his­ torically held pessimistic views about the prospects for peace among the great powers. appear to have bought into the reigning optimism, as reflect­ ed in an article from the mid-l 990s titled "Realists as Optimists. "2 Alas, the claim that security competition and war between the great powers have been purged from the international system is wrong. Indeed, there is much evidence that the promise of everlasting peace among the

T H E T R A G E D Y OF G R E AT P O W E R P O L I T I C S

great powers was stillborn. Consider, for example, that even though the Soviet threat has disappeared, the United States still maintains about one hundred thousand troops in Europe and roughly the same number in Northeast Asia. It does so because it recognizes that dangerous rivalries would probably emerge among the major powers in these regions if U .S . troops were withdrawn. Moreover, almost every European state, includ­ ing the United Kingdom and France, still harbors deep-seated, albeit muted, fears that a Germany unchecked by American power might behave aggressively; fear of Japan in Northeast Asia is probably even more profound, and it is certainly more frequently expressed. Finally, the possi­ bility of a clash between China and the United States over Taiwan is hard­ ly remote. This is not to say that such a war is likely, but the possibility reminds us that the threat of great-power war has not disappeared. The sad fact is that international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way. Although the intensity of their competition waxes and wanes, great powers fear each other and always compete with each other for power. The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gain­ ing power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a wel­ come outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon-that is, the only great power in the system. There are no status quo powers in the international system, save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential rivals. Great powers are rarely content with the current dis­ tribution of power; on the contrary, they face a constant incentive to change it in their favor. They almost always have revisionist intentions, and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they think it can be done at a reasonable price . 3 At times, the costs and risks of trying to shift the balance of power are too great, forcing great powers to wait for more favorable circumstances. But the desire for more power does not go away, unless a state achieves the ultimate goal of hegemony. Since no state is likely to achieve global hegemony, however, the world is condemned to perpetual great-power competition.

lntrocluction

This unrelenting pursuit of power means that great powers are inclined to look for opportunities to alter the distribution of world power in their favor. They will seize these opportunities if they have the necessary capa­ bility. Simply put, great powers are primed for offense. But not only does a great power seek to gain power at the expense of other states, it also tries to thwart rivals bent on gaining power at its expense. Thus, a great power will defend the balance of power when looming change favors another state, and it will try to undermine the balance when the direction of change is in its own favor. Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other. Three features of the international system combine to cause states to fear one another: 1) the absence of a central authority that sits above states and can protect them from each other, 2) the fact that states always have some offensive mili­ tary capability, and 3) the fact that states can never be certain about other states' intentions. Given this fear-which can never be wholly eliminat­ ed-states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals. the better their chances of survival. lndeed, the best guarantee of survival is to be a hegemon, because no other state can seriously threaten such a mighty power. This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, is gen­ uinely tragic. Great powers that have no reason to fight each other-that are merely concerned with their own survival-nevertheless have little choice but to pursue power and to seek to dominate the other states in the system. This dilemma is captured in brutally frank comments that Prussian statesman Otto von Bismarck made during the early 1 860s, when it appeared that Poland, which was not an independent state at the time, might regain its sovereignty. "Restoring the Kingdom of Poland in any shape or form is tantamount to creating an ally for any enemy that chooses to attack us, " he believed, and therefore he advocated that Prussia should "smash those Poles till, losing all hope, they lie down and die; I have every sympathy for their situation, but if we wish to survive we have no choice but to wipe them out. "4

T H I T R A G I D Y OF G R E A T P O W I R P O L I T I C S

4

Although i t i s depressing t o realize that great powers might think and act this way, it behooves us to see the world as it is, not as we would like it to be. For example, one of the key foreign policy issues facing the United States is the question of how China will behave if its rapid economic growth continues and effectively turns China into a giant Hong Kong. Many Americans believe that if China is democratic and enmeshed in the global capitalist system, it will not act aggressively; instead it will be con­ tent with the status quo in Northeast Asia. According to this logic, the United States should engage China in order to promote the latter's inte­ gration into the world economy, a policy that also seeks to encourage China's transition to democracy. If engagement succeeds, the United States can work with a wealthy and democratic China to promote peace around the globe. Unfortunately, a policy of engagement is doomed to fail. II China becomes an economic powerhouse it will almost certainly translate its economic might into military might and make a run at dominating Northeast Asia. Whether China is democratic and deeply enmeshed in the global economy or autocratic and autarkic will have little effect on its behavior, because democracies care about security as much as non­ democracies do, and hegemony is the best way for any state to guarantee its own survival. Of course, neither its neighbors nor the United States would stand idly by while China gained increasing increments of power. Instead, they would seek to contain China, probably by trying to form a balancing coalition. The result would be an intense security competition between China and its rivals, with the ever-present danger of great-power war hanging over them. In short, China and the United States are des­ tined to be adversaries as China's power grows.

OF F E N S I V E R E A L I S M

T

his book offers a realist theory o f international politics that challenges the prevailing optimism about relations among the great powers. That

enterprise involves three particular tasks.

Introduction

I begin by laying out the key components of the theory, which I call "offensive realism." I make a number of arguments about how great pow­ ers behave toward each other, emphasizing that they look for opportunities to gain power at each others' expense. Moreover, I identify the conditions that make conflict more or less likely. For example, I argue that multipolar systems are more war-prone than are bipolar systems, and that multipolar systems that contain especially powerful states-potential hegemons-are the most dangerous systems of all. But I do not just assert these various claims; I also attempt to provide compelling explanations for the behaviors and the outcomes that lie at the heart of the theory. In other words, I lay out the causal logic. or reasoning, which underpins each of my claims. The theory focuses on the great powers because these states have the largest impact on what happens in international politics. 5 The fortunes of all states-great powers and smaller powers alike-are determined prima­ rily by the decisions and actions of those with the greatest capability. For example, politics in almost every region of the world were deeply influ­ enced by the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States between 1945 and 1990. The two world wars that preceded the Cold War had a similar effect on regional politics around the world. Each of these conflicts was a great-power rivalry, and each cast a long shadow over every part of the globe. Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative mili­ tary capability. To qualify as a great power, a state must have sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world.6 The candidate need not have the capability to defeat the leading state, but it must have some rea­ sonable prospect of turning the conflict into a war of attrition that leaves the dominant state seriously weakened, even if that dominant state ulti­ mately wins the war. In the nuclear age great powers must have a nuclear deterrent that can survive a nuclear strike against it. as well as formidable conventional forces. In the unlikely event that one state gained nuclear superiority over all of its rivals. it would be so powerful that it would be the only great power in the system. The balance of conventional forces would be largely irrelevant if a nuclear hegemon were to emerge.

6

T H I T R A G I D Y OF G R E A T POW E R POL I T I C S

My second task in this book i s to show that the theory tells us a lot about the history of international politics. The ultimate test of any theory is how well it explains events in the real world, so I go to considerable lengths to test my arguments against the historical record. Specifically, the focus

is

on great-power relations from the start of the French

Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in 1 792 until the end of the twenti­ eth century. 7 Much attention is paid to the European great powers because they dominated world politics for most of the past two hundred years. Indeed, until Japan and the United States achieved great-power sta­ tus in 1895 and 1 898, respectively, Europe was home to all of the world's great powers. Nevertheless, the book also includes substantial discussion of the politics of Northeast Asia, especially regarding imperial Japan between 18 9 5 and 1945 and China in the 1 990s. The United States also figures prominently in my efforts to test offensive realism against past events. Some of the important historical puzzles that I attempt to shed light on include the following: 1 ) What accounts for the three longest and bloodiest wars in mod­

ern history-the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars ( 1 792-1 8 1 5) , World War I ( 1 9 1 4 -1 8 ) , and World War II ( 1 939 -45)­ conflicts that involved all of the major powers in the system? 2) What accounts for the long periods of relative peace in E urope between 1 8 1 6 and 1 8 52, 1 8 7 1 and 1 9 1 3, and especially 1 94 5 a n d 1 990, during t h e C o l d War? 3) Why did the United Kingdom, which was by far the wealthiest state in the world during the mid-nineteenth century, not build a powerful military and try to dominate Europe? In other words, why did it behave differently from Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union, all of which trans­ lated their economic might into military might and strove for E u ropean hegemony?

4) Why was Bismarckian Germany ( 1862- 90 ) especially aggressive between 1862 and 1870, fighting two wars with other great powers

Introduction

and one war with a minor power, but hardly aggressive at all from 1 8 7 1 until 1 890, when it fought no wars and generally sought to maintain the European status quo? 5) Why did the United Kingdom, France, and Russia form a balanc­ ing coalition against Wilhelmine Germany before World War I, but fail to organize a n effective alliance to contain Nazi Germany? 6) Why did Japan and the states of Western Europe join forces with the United States against the Soviet Union in the early years of the Cold War, even though the United States emerged from World War II with the most powerful economy in the world and a n uclear monopoly? 7 } What explains the commitment of American troops to Europe and Northeast Asia during the twentieth century? For example, why did the United States wait until April 1 9 1 7 to join World War I, rather than enter the war when it broke out in August 1 9 1 4? For that matter, why did the United States not send troops to Europe before 1 9 1 4 to prevent the outbreak of war? Similiarly, why did the United States not balance against Nazi Germany in the 1 9 30s or send troops to Europe before September 1 9 39 to prevent the outbreak of World War II? 8 ) Why did the United States and the Soviet Union continue build­ ing up their nuclear arsenals after each had acquired a secure sec­ ond-strike capability against the other? A world in which both sides have an "assured destruction" capability is generally consid­ ered to be stable and its nuclear balance difficult to overturn, yet both superpowers spent billions of dollars and rubles trying to gain a first-strike advantage. Third, I use the theory to make predictions about great-power politics in the twenty-first century. This effort may strike some readers as foolhardy, because the study of international relations, like the other social sciences, rests on a shakier theoretical foundation than that of the natural sciences. Moreover, political phenomena are highly complex; hence, precise politi­ cal predictions are impossible without theoretical tools that are superior to

7

8

T H E T R A G E D Y OF G R E AT P O W E R P O L I T I C S

those w e now possess. A s a result, all political forecasting i s bound to include some error. Those who venture to predict, as I do here, should therefore proceed with humility, take care not to exhibit unwarranted con· fidence, and admit that hindsight is likely to reveal surprises and mistakes. Despite these hazards, social scientists should nevertheless use their theories to make predictions about the future. Making predictions helps inform policy discourse, because it helps make sense of events unfolding in the world around us. And by clarifying points of disagreement, making explicit forecasts helps those with contradictory views to frame their own ideas more clearly. Furthermore, trying to anticipate new events is a good way to test social science theories, because theorists do not have the bene· fit of hindsight and therefore cannot adjust their claims to fit the evidence (because it is not yet available ) . In short, the world can be used as a labo· ratory to decide which theories best explain international politics. In that spirit, I employ offensive realism to peer into the future, mindful of both the benefits and the hazards of trying to predict events.

The V i rtues and L i m its of Theory It should be apparent that this book is self·consciously theoretical. But out· side the walls of academia, especially in the policy world, theory has a bad name. Social science theories are often portrayed as the idle speculations of head·in·the·clouds academics that have little relevance to what goes on in the ""real world. " For example, Paul Nitze, a prominent American foreign· policy maker during the Cold War, wrote, "Most of what has been written and taught under the heading of 'political science' by Americans since World War II has been . . . of limited value, if not counterproductive, as a guide to the actual conduct of policy."' In this view, theory should fall almost exclusively within the purview of academics, whereas policymak· ers should rely on common sense, intuition, and practical experience to carry out their duties. This view is wrongheaded. In fact, none of us could understand the world we live in or make intelligent decisions without theories. Indeed, all students and practitioners of international politics rely on theories to

Introduction

9

comprehend their surroundings. Some are aware of it and some are not, some admit it and some do not; but there is no escaping the fact that we could not make sense of the complex world around us without simplify­ ing theories. The Clinton administration's foreign policy rhetoric, for example, was heavily informed by the three main liberal theories of international relations: 1) the claim that prosperous and economically interdependent states are un likely to fight each other, 2 ) the claim that democracies do not fight each other, and 3) the claim that international institutions enable states to avoid war and concentrate instead on build­ ing cooperative relationships. Consider how Clinton and company justified expanding the member­ ship of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the mid-i 990s. President Clinton maintained that one of the chief goals of expansion was "'locking in democracy's gains in Central Europe,"' because "democracies resolve their differences peacefully." He also argued that the United States should foster an "open trading system," because "our security is tied to the stake other nations have in the prosperity of staying free and open and working with others, not working against them. "9 Strobe Talbott, Clinton's Oxford classmate and deputy secretary of state, made the same claims for NATO enlargement: "With the end of the cold war, it has become possible to construct a Europe that is increasingly united by a shared commitment to open societies and open markets."' Moving the borders of NATO east­ ward, he maintained, would help "to solidify the national consensus for democratic and market reforms"' that already existed in states like Hungary and Poland and thus enhance the prospects for peace in the region. 10 In the same spirit, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright praised NATO's founders by saying that "[t]heir basic achievement was to begin the construction of the . .

network of rule-based institutions and

arrangements that keep the peace . " "But that achievement is not com­ plete,"' she warned, and "our challenge today is to finish the post-war con­ struction project

. [and] expand the area of the world in which

American interests and values will thrive." 1 1 These examples demonstrate that general theories about how the world works play a n important role in how policymakers identify the ends

lO

T H I T R A O I DY O P O R I AT P OW I R POLI T I C S

they seek and the means they choose t o achieve them. Yet that i s not to say we should embrace any theory that is widely held, no matter how popular it may be, because there are bad as well as good theories. For example, some theories deal with trivial issues. while others are opaque and almost impossible to comprehend. Funhennore, some theories have contradictions in their underlying logic, while others have little explana­ tory power because the world simply does not work the way they predict. The trick is to distinguish between sound theories and defective ones. 1 2 My a i m is t o persuade readers that offensive realism is a rich theory which sheds considerable light on the workings of the international system. As with all theories, however. there are limits to offensive realism's explanatory power. A few cases contradict the main claims of the theory, cases that offensive realism should be able to explain but cannot. All theo­ ries face this problem, although the better the theory, the fewer the anomalies. An example of a case that contradicts offensive realism involves Germany in 1 90 5 . At the time Germany was the most powerful state in Europe. Its main rivals on the continent were France and Russia, which some fifteen years earlier had formed an alliance to contain the Germans. The United Kingdom had a tiny army at the time because it was counting on France and Russia to keep Germany at bay. When Japan unexpectedly inflicted a devastating defeat on Russia between 1 904 and 1 90 5 , which temporarily knocked Russia out of the European balance of power, France was left standing virtually alone against mighty Germany. Here was an excellent opportunity for Germany to crush France and take a giant step toward achieving hegemony in E urope. It surely made more sense for Germany to go to war in 1 90 5 than in 1 9 1 4 . But Germany did not even seriously consider going to war in 1 90 5 , which contradicts what offensive realism would predict. Theories encounter anomalies because they simplify reality by empha· sizing certain factors while ignoring others. Offensive realism assumes that the international system strongly shapes the behavior of states. Structural factors such as anarchy and the distribution of power, I argue, are what matter most for explaining international politics. The theory pays little

Introduction

11

attention to individuals or domestic political considerations such as ideol­ ogy. It tends to treat states like black boxes or billiard balls. For example, it does not matter for the theory whether Germany in 1 90 5 was led by Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm, or Adolf Hitler, or whether Germany was dem­ ocratic or autocratic. What matters for the theory is how much relative power Germany possessed at the time. These omitted factors, however, occasionally dominate a state's decision-making process; under these cir­ cumstances, offensive realism is not going to perform as well. In short, there is a price to pay for simplifying reality. Furthermore, offensive realism does not answer every question that arises in world politics, because there will be cases in which the theory is consistent with several possible outcomes. When this occurs, other theo­ ries have to be brought in to provide more precise explanations. Social sci­ entists say that a theory is .. indeterminate" in such cases, a situation that is not unusual with broad-gauged theories like offensive realism. An example of offensive realism's indeterminacy is that it cannot account for why the security competition between the superpowers dur­ ing the Cold War was more intense between 1 94 5 and 1 9 63 than between 1 9 63 and 1 990." The theory also has little to say about whether NATO

should have adopted an offensive or a defensive military strategy to deter the Warsaw Pact in central E u rope.14 To answer these questions it is neces­ sary to employ more fine-grained theories, such as deterrence theory. Nevenheless, those theories and the answers they spawn do not contra­ dict offensive realism; they supplement it. In short, offensive realism is like a powerful flashlight in a dark room: even though it cannot illumi­ nate every nook and cranny, most of the time it is an excellent tool for navigating through the darkness. It should be apparent from this discussion that offensive realism is main­ ly a descriptive theory. It explains how great powers have behaved in the past and how they are likely to behave in the future. B u t it is also a pre­ scriptive theory. States should behave according to the dictates of offensive realism, because it outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous world. One might ask, if the theory describes how great powers act, why i s it necessary to stipulate how they should act? The imposing constraints of

12

T H I T R A O I D Y OF G R E AT P O W I R P O L I T I C S

the system should leave great powers with little choice but t o act a s the theory predicts. Although there is much truth in this description of great powers as prisoners trapped in an iron cage, the fact remains that they sometimes-although not often-act in contradiction to the theory. These are the anomalous cases discussed above. As we shall see, such foolish behavior invariably has negative consequences. In short, if they want to survive, great powers should always act like good offensive realists.

The Pursuit of Power Enough said about theory. More needs to be said about the substance of my arguments, which means zeroing in on the core concept of "power." For all realists, calculations about power lie at the heart of how states think about the world around them. Power is the currency of great-power politics, and states compete for it among themselves. What money is to economics, power is to international relations. This book is organized around six questions dealing with power. First, why do great powers want power? What is the underlying logic that explains why states compete for it? Second. how much power do states want? How in uch power is enough? These two questions are of para­ mount imponance because they deal with the most basic issues concern­ ing great-power behavior. My answer to these foundational questions, as emphasized above, is that the structure of the international system encourages states to pursue hegemony. Third, what is power? How is that pivotal concept defined and meas­ ured? With good indicators of power. it is possible to determine the power levels of individual states, which then allows us to describe the architec­ ture of the system. Specifically. we can identify which states qualify as great powers. From there, it is easy to determine whether the system is hegemonic (directed by a single great power), bipolar (controlled by two great powers ), or multipolar (dominated by three or more great powers ) . Furthermore, w e will know the relative strengths of t h e major powers. We are especially interested in knowing whether power is distributed more or less evenly among them, or if there are large power asymmetries.

Introduction

13

In particular, does the system contain a potential hegemon-a great power that is considerably stronger than any of its rival great powers? Defining power dearly also gives us a window into understanding state behavior. I[ states compete for power, we learn more about the nature of that competition if we understand more fully what power is, and there­ fore what states are competing for. In short, knowing more about the true nature of power should help illuminate how great powers compete among themselves. Fourth, what strategies do states pursue to gain power, or to maintain it when another great power threatens to upset the balance of power? B lackmail and war are the main strategies that states employ to acquire power. and balancing and buck-passing are the principal strategies that great powers use to maintain the distribution of power when facing a dan­ gerous rival. With balancing, the threatened state accepts the burden of deterring its adversary and commits substantial resources to achieving that goal. With buck-passing. the endangered great power tries to get another state to shoulder the burden of deterring or defeating the threatening state. The final two questions locus on the key strategies that states employ to maximize their share of world power. The fifth is, what are the causes of war? Specifically, what power-related factors make it more or less likely that security competition will intensify and tum into open conflict? Sixth, when do threatened great powers balance against a dangerous adversary and when do they attempt to pass the buck to another threatened state? I will attempt to provide clear and convincing answers to these ques­ tions. It should be emphasized, however, that there is no consensus among realists on the answers to any of them. Realism is a rich tradition with a long history, and disputes over fundamental issues have long been commonplace among realists. In the pages that follow, I do not consider alternative realist theories in much detail. I will make clear how offensive realism differs from its main realist rivals. and I will challenge these alter­ native perspectives on panicular points. mainly to elucidate my own argu­ ments. But no attempt will be made to systematically examine any other realist theory. Instead, the locus will be on laying out my theory of offen ­ sive realism a n d using i t to explain t h e past a n d predict t h e future.

14

T H I T R A G I D Y OP G R I A T POW I R POLI T I C S

Of course. there a r e also many nonrealist theories of international poli­ tics. Three different liberal theories were mentioned earlier; there are other nonrealist theories, such as social constructivism and bureaucratic poJitics, to name just two. I will briefly analyze some of these theories when I look at great-power politics after the Cold War ( Chapter 1 0), mainly because they underpin many of the claims that international poli­ tics has undergone a fundamental change since 1 990. Because of space limitations, however, I make no attempt at a comprehensive assessment of these nonrealist theories. Again, the emphasis in this study will be on making the case for offensive realism. Nevenheless, it makes good sense at this point to describe the theories that dominate thinking about international relations in both the academic and policy worlds, and to show how offensive realism compares with its main realist and nonrealist competitors.

L I B E RA L I S M V S . R E A L I S M

L

iberalism and realism are the two bodies o f theory which hold places of privilege on the theoretical menu of international relations. Most of the

great intellectual battles among international relations scholars take place either across the divide between realism and liberalism, or within those paradigms.15 To illustrate this point, consider the three most influential realist works of the twentieth century: 1) E. H. Carr's The 1Wenty Years' Crisis. 1919-1939, which was pub­ lished in the United Kingdom shonly after World War II staned in Europe(1939) and is still widely read today. 2 ) Hans Morgenthau's Politics among Nations. which was first pub­

lished in the United States in the early days of the Cold War (19 48) and dominated the field of international relations for at least the next two decades. 3) Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics, which has dominat­ ed the field since it first appeared during the latter pan of the Cold War(l979).16

lntrocluction

15

All three of these realist giants critique some aspect of liberalism in their writings. For example, both Carr and Waltz take issue with the liberal claim that economic interdependence enhances the prospects for peace.17 More generally, Carr and Morgenthau frequently criticize liberals for holding utopian views of politics which, if followed, would lead states to disaster. At the same time, these realists also disagree about a number of imponant issues. Waltz. for example, challenges Morgenthau's claim that

multipolar

systems

are

more

stable

than

bipolar

systems.11

Furthermore. whereas Morgenthau argues that states strive to gain power because they have an innate desire for power, Waltz maintains that the structure of the international system forces states to pursue power to enhance their prospects for survival. These examples are just a small sam­ ple of the differences among realist thinkers." Let u s now look more closely at liberalism and realism, focusing first on the core beliefs shared by the theories in each paradigm, and second on the differences among specific liberal and realist theories.

Li be rali s m T h e liberal tradition h a s i t s roots in t h e Enlightenment, that period in eighteenth-century E u rope when intellectuals and political leaders had a powerful sense that reason could be employed to make the world a better place.20 Accordingly, liberals tend to be hopeful about the prospects of making the world safer and more peaceful. Most liberals believe that it is possible to substantially reduce the scourge of war and to increase inter­ national prosperity. For this reason, liberal theories are sometimes labelled "utopian" or .. idealist." Liberalism's optimistic view of international politics is based o n three core beliefs, which are common to almost all of the theories in the para­ digm. First, liberals consider states to be the main actors in international politics. S econd, they emphasize that the internal characteristics of states vary considerably, and that these differences have profound effects o n s t a t e behavior." Funhermore. liberal theorists often believe t h a t some internal a rrangements ( e . g .. democracy) are inherently preferable to oth­ ers (e.g., dictatorship ) . For liberals. therefore. there are "good" and "bad"

16

T H I T R A G E D Y OF G R I A T P O W E R P O L I T I C S

states i n the international system. Good states pursue cooperative policies and hardly ever start wars on their own, whereas bad states cause con­ flicts with other states and are prone to use force to get their way.22 Thus, the key to peace is to populate the world with good states. Third, liberals believe that calculations about power matter little for explaining the behavior of good states. Other kinds of political and eco­ nomic calculations matter more, although the form of those calculations varies from theory to theory, as will become apparent below. Bad states might be motivated by the desire to gain power at the expense of other states, but that is only because they are misguided. In an ideal world, where there are only good states, power would be largely irrelevant. Among the various theories found under the big tent of liberalism, the three main ones mentioned earlier are panicularly influential. The first argues that high levels of economic interdependence among states make them unlikely to fight each other." The taproot of stability. according to this theory. is the creation and maintenance of a liberal economic order that allows for free economic exchange among states. Such an order makes states more prosperous. thereby bolstering peace, because prosperous states are more economically satisfied and satisfied states are more peace­ ful. Many wars are waged to gain or preserve wealth, but states have much less motive to initiate war if they are already wealthy. Funhermore. wealthy states with interdependent economies stand to become less pros­ perous if they fight each other. since they are biting the hand that feeds them. Once states establish extensive economic ties, in short, they avoid war and can concentrate instead on accumulating wealth. The second. democratic peace theory. claims that democracies do not go to war against other democracies.24 Thus, a world containing only democratic states would be a world without war. The argument here is not that democracies are less warlike than non-democracies, but rather that democracies do not fight among themselves. There are a variety of explanations for the democratic peace, but little agreement as to which one is correct. Liberal thinkers do agree, however. that democratic peace theory offers a direct challenge to realism and provides a powerful recipe for peace.

Introducti o n

17

Finally. some liberals maintain that international institutions enhance the prospects for cooperation among states and thus significantly reduce the likelihood of war.15 Institutions are not independent political entities that sit above states and force them to behave i n acceptable ways. Instead. institutions are sets of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other. They prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior. These rules are not imposed on states by some leviathan, but are negotiated by states, which agree to abide by the rules they created because it is in their interest to do so. Liberals claim that these institutions or rules can funda­ mentally change state behavior. Institutions. so the argument goes. can discourage states from calculating self-interest on the basis of how their every move affects their relative power position. and thus they push states away from war and promote peace.

Realism I n contrast to liberals, realists a r e pessimists w h e n it comes to internation­ a l politics. Realists agree that creating a peaceful world would be desirable, but they see no easy way to escape the harsh world of security competi­ tion and war. C reating a peaceful world is surely an attractive idea, but it is not a practical one. "Realism," as Carr notes, "tends to emphasize the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of exist­ ing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies i n accepting. and adapting oneself to these forces and these tendencies. "26 This gloomy view of international relations i s based on three core beliefs. First, realists, like liberals, treat states a s the principal actors in world politics. Realists focus mainly on great powers, however. because these states dominate and shape international politics a n d they also cause the deadliest wars. S econd, realists believe that the behavior of great pow­ ers is influenced mainly by their external environment, not by their inter­ nal characteristics. The structure of the international system, which all states must deal with, largely shapes their foreign policies. Realists tend n o t to draw sharp distinctions between •good" and "bad" states, because

18

T H I T R A O I D Y OP G R E A T P O W E R P O L I T I C S

all great powers act according t o the same logic regardless o f their culture, political system, or who runs the government.27 It is therefore difficult to discriminate among states, save for differences in relative power. In essence, great powers are like billiard balls that vary only in size." Third, realists hold that calculations about power dominate states' thinking, and that states compete for power among themselves. That com­ petition sometimes necessitates going to war, which is considered an acceptable instrument of statecraft. To quote Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth-century military strategist. war is a continuation of politics by other means.29 Finally, a zero-sum quality characterizes that competition, sometimes making it intense and unforgiving. States may cooperate with each other on occasion, but at root they have conflicting interests. Although there are many realist theories dealing with different aspects of power, two of them stand above the others: human nature realism, which is laid out in Morgenthau's Politics among Nations. and defensive realism. which is presented mainly in Waltz's Theory ofInternational Politics. What sets these works apan from those of other realists and makes them both imponant and controversial is that they provide answers to the two foundational questions described above. Specifically, they explain why states pursue power-that is, they have a story to tell about the causes of security competition-and each offers an argument about how much power a state is likely to want. Some other famous realist thinkers concentrate on making the case that great powers care deeply about power, but they do not attempt to explain why states compete for power or what level of power states deem satisfac­ tory. In essence, they provide a general defense of the realist approach, but they do not offer their own theory of international politics. The works of Carr and American diplomat George Kennan fit this description. In his seminal realist tract, The 1\venty Years ' Crisis. Carr criticizes liberalism at length and argues that states are motivated principally by power consider­ ations. Nevenheless. he says little about why states care about power or how much power they want.'° Bluntly put, there is no theory in his book. The same basic pattern obtains in Kennan's well-known book American Diplomacy, 1900-1950. " Morgenthau and Waltz, on the other hand, offer

lntrocluctlon

19

their own theories of international relations, which is why they have dominated the discourse about world politics for the past fifty years. Human nature realism, which is sometimes called "classical realism, " dominated t h e study of international relations from t h e late 1 940s, when Morgenthau's writings began attracting a large audience, until the early 1 970s. 32 It is based on the simple assumption that states are led by human beings who have a "will to power" hardwired into them at birth. n That is, states have an insatiable appetite for power, or what Morgenthau calls "a limitless lust for power, " which means that they constantly look for opportunities to take the offensive and dominate other states.i 4 All states come with a n "animus dominandi, " so there is no basis for discriminating among more aggressive and less aggressive states, and there certainly should be no room in the theory for status quo states.15 Human nature realists recognize that international anarchy-the absence of a governing a uthority over the great powers---ca uses states to worry about the balance of power. But that structural constraint is treated as a second-order cause of state behavior. The principal driving force in international politics is the will to power inherent in every state in the system, and it pushes each of them to strive for supremacy. Defensive realism, which is frequently referred to as "stru ctural real­ ism." came on the scene in the late 1 970s with the appearence of Waltz's Theory of International Politics. i6 Unlike Morgenthau, Waltz does not assume

that great powers are inherently aggressive because they are infused with a will to power; instead he stans by assuming that states merely aim to survive. Above all else. they seek security. Nevertheless, he maintains that the structure of the international system forces great powers to pay careful attention to the balance of power. In particular, anarchy forces security­ seeking states to compete with each other for power, because power is the best means to survival. Whereas human nature is the deep cause of secu­ rity competition in Morgenthau's theory, anarchy plays that role in Waltz's theory. " Waltz does not emphasize, however, that the international system pro­ vides great powers with good reasons to act offensively to gain power. Instead, h e appears to make the opposite case: that anarchy encourages

20

T H E T R A G E D Y OF G R E AT P O W E R P O L I T I C S

states t o behave defensively and t o maintain rather than upset the balance of power. "The first concern of states, " he writes, is "to maintain their position in the system. "'38 There seems to be, as international relations the­ orist Randall Schweller notes, a •status quo bias• in Waltz's theory." Waltz recognizes that states have incentives to gain power at their rivals' expense and that it makes good strategic sense to act on that motive when the time is right. But he does not develop that line of argument in any detail. On the contrary, he emphasizes that when great powers behave aggressively, the potential victims usually balance against the aggressor and thwan its effons to gain power.40 For Waltz, in shon, bal­ ancing checkmates offense." Funhermore, he stresses that great powers must be careful not to acquire too much power, because "excessive strength" is likely to cause other states to join forces against them, thereby leaving them worse off than they would have been had they refrained from seeking additional increments of power.42 Waltz's views on the causes of war further reflect his theory's status quo bias. There are no profound or deep causes of war in his theory. In particular. he does not suggest that there might be imponant benefits to be gained from war. In fact, he says little about the causes of war, other than to argue that wars are largely the result of uncenainty and miscalcu­ lation. In other words, if states knew better, they would not stan wars. Roben Jervis, Jack Snyder, and Stephen Van Evera buttress the defen­ sive realists' case by focusing attention on a structural concept known as the offense-defense balance." They maintain that military power at any point in time can be categorized as favoring either offense or defense. If defense has a dear advantage over offense, and conquest is therefore diffi­ cult, great powers will have little incentive to use force to gain power and will concentrate instead on protecting what they have. When defense has the advantage, protecting what you have should be a relatively easy task. Alternatively, if offense is easier, states will be sorely tempted to try con­ quering each other, and there will be a lot of war in the system. Defensive realists argue. however, that the offense-defense balance is usually heavily tilted toward defense, thus making conquest extremely difficult.44 In sum, efficient balancing coupled with the natural advantages of defense over

I ntroduction

21

offense should discourage great powers from pursuing aggressive strate­ gies and instead make them "defensive positionalists. "45 My theory of offensive realism is also a structural theory of internation­ al politics. As with defensive realism, my theory sees great powers as con­ cerned mainly with figuring out how to survive in a world where there is no agency to protect them from each other; they quickly realize that power is the key to their survival. Offensive realism parts company with defensive realism over the question of how much power states want. For defensive realists. the international structure provides states with little incentive to seek additional increments of power; instead it pushes them to maintain the existing balance of power. Preserving power, rather than increasing it, is the main goal of states. Offensive realists, on the other hand, believe that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opponunities to gain power at the expense o! rivals, and to take advantage o! those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. A state's ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system.46 It should be apparent that both o!!ensive realism and human nature realism portray great powers as relentlessly seeking power. The key differ­ ence between the two perspectives is that offensive realists reject Morgentha u's claim that states are naturally endowed with Type A per­ sonalities. O n the contrary, they believe that the international system forces great powers to maximize their relative power because that is the optimal way to maximize their security. In other words, s u rvival man­ dates aggressive behavior. Great powers behave aggressively not because they want to or because they possess some inner drive to dominate, but because they have to seek more power ii they want to maximize their odds o! survival. (Table I. I summarizes how the main realist theories answer the foundational questions described abov e . ) No ankle or b o o k m a k e s the c a s e f o r offensive realism in the sophisti­ cated ways that Morgenthau does for human nature realism and Waltz and others do for defensive realism. For sure, some realists have argued that the system gives great powers good reasons to act aggressively. Probably the best brief for offensive realism is a shon. obscure book writ-

22

T H I T R A G E D Y OF G R I A T P O W I R P O L I T I C S

T A. I L i 1 . 1

The Major Realist Theories

Human Nature

Defensive

Offe nsive

Realism

Realism

Realism

What ca uses states to

Lust for power

Structure of

Structure of

compete for power?

inherent in states

the system

the system

How much power

All they can get.

Not much more

All they can get.

do states want?

States maximize

than what they have.

States maximize

relative power.

States concentrate

relative power,

with hegemony as

on maintaining the

with hegemony as

their ultimate goal.

balance of power.

their ultimate goal.

ten during World War I by G. Lowes Dickinson, a British academic who was an early advocate of the League of Nations.47 In The European Anarchy, he argues that the root cause of World War I ·was not Germany nor any other power. The real culprit was the European anarchy,· which created powerful incentives for states "to acquire supremacy over the others for motives at once of security and domination. "48 Nevertheless, neither Dickinson nor anyone else makes a comprehensive case for offensive real­ ism." My aim in writing this book is to fill that void.

P OW E R P OL I T I C S IN L l l E R A L A M E R I C A

W

hatever merits realism may have a s a n explanation for real-world politics and as a guide for formulating foreign policy, it is not a pop­

ular school of thought in the West. Realism's central message-that it makes good sense for states to sellishly pursue power-does not have broad appeal. It is difficult to imagine a modem political leader openly ask­ ing the public to light and die to improve the balance of power. No European or American leader did so during either world war or the Cold

I n troduction

23

War. Most people prefer to think of fights between their own state and rival states as clashes between good and evil. where they are on the side of the angels and their opponents are aligned with the devil. Thus, leaders tend to portray war as a moral crusade or an ideological contest, rather than as a struggle for power. Realism is a hard sell. Americans appear to have an especially intense antipathy toward bal­ ance-of-power thinking. The rhetoric of twentieth-century presidents, for example, is filled with examples of realism bashing. Woodrow Wilson is probably the most well-known example of this tendency, because of his elo­ quent campaign against balance-of-power politics during and immediately after World War 1.50 Yet Wilson is hardly unique, and his successors have fre­ quently echoed his views. In the final year of World War II, for example, Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared, "In the future world the misuse of power as implied in the term 'power politics' must not be the controlling factor in international relations. " 5 1 More recently, Bill Clinton offered a strikingly similar view, proclaiming that "in a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute. It is ill-suited to a new era. "' 52 He sounded the same theme when defending NATO expansion in 1 997, arguing that the charge that this policy might isolate Russia was based on the mistaken belief "that the great power territorial politics of the 20th century will dominate the 2 1 st century. • Instead, Clinton emphasized his belief that •enlightened self­ interest, as well as shared values, will compel countries to define their great­ ness in more constructive ways . . . and will compel us to cooperate. " 5 3

Why Americans D i s l i ke Realism Americans tend to be hostile to realism because it clashes with their basic values. Realism stands opposed to Americans' views of both themselves and the wider world." In particular, realism is at odds with the deep-seated sense of optimism and moralism that pervades much of American society. Liberalism. on the other hand, fits neatly with those values. Not surprising­ ly, foreign policy discourse in the United States often sounds as if it has been lifted right out of a Liberalism I O I lecture.

24

T H I T R A G I D Y OF G R E A T P O W I R P O L I T I C S

Americans are basically optimists.55 They regard progress i n politics, whether at the national or the international level, as both desirable and possible. As the French author Alexis de Tocqueville observed long ago, Americans believe that •man is endowed with an indefinite faculty of improvement. "56 Realism, by contrast, offers a pessimistic perspective on international politics. It depicts a world rife with security competition and war, and holds out little promise of an "escape from the evil of power, regardless of what one does."57 Such pessimism is at odds with the power­ ful American belief that with time and effort, reasonable individuals can cooperate to solve important social problems.58 Liberalism offers a more hopeful perspective on world politics, and Americans naturally find it more attractive than the gloomy specter drawn by realism. Americans are also prone to believe that morality should play an important role in politics. As the prominent sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset writes, "Americans are utopian moralists who press hard to institu­ tionalize virtue, to destroy evil people, and eliminate wicked institutions and practices. "'59 This perspective clashes with the realist belief that war is an intrinsic element of life in the international system. Most Americans tend to think of war as a hideous enterprise that should ultimately be abolished from the face of the Earth. It might j ustifiably be used for lofty liberal goals like fighting tyranny or spreading democracy, but it is morally incorrect to fight wars merely to change or preserve the balance of power. This makes the Clausewitzian conception of warfare anathema to most Americans. 60 The American proclivity for moralizing also conflicts with the fact that realists tend not to distinguish between good and bad states, but instead dis­ criminate between states largely on the basis of their relative power capa­ bilities. A purely realist interpretation of the Cold War, for example, allows for no meaningful difference in the motives behind American and Soviet behavior during that conflict. According to realist theory, both sides were driven by their concerns about the balance of power, and each did what it could to maximize its relative power. Most Americans would recoil at this interpretation of the Cold War, however, because they believe the United States was motivated by good intentions while the Soviet Union was not.

lntrocluction

25

Liberal theorists do distinguish between good and bad states, of course, and they usually identify liberal democracies with market economies as the most worthy. Not surprisingly, Americans tend to like this perspective, because it identifies the United States as a benevolent force in world pol­ itics and ponrays its real and potential rivals as misguided or malevolent troublemakers. Predictably. this line of thinking fueled the euphoria that attended the downfall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. When the •evil empire• collapsed, many Americans (and Europeans) con­ cluded that democracy would spread across the globe and that world peace would soon break out. This optimism was based largely on the belief that democratic America is a virtuous state. If other states emulated the United States, therefore, the world would be populated by good states, and this development could only mean the end of international conflict.

Rhetoric vs. Proctice B ecause Americans dislike realpolitik, public discourse about foreign poli­ cy in the United States is usually couched in the language of liberalism. Hence the pronouncements of the policy elites are heavily flavored with optimism and moralism. American academics are especially good at pro­ moting liberal thinking in the marketplace of ideas. Behind dosed doors. however, the elites who make national security policy speak mostly the language of power, not that of principle, and the United States acts in the international system according to the dictates of realist logic.61 In essence, a discernible gap separates public rhetoric from the actual conduct of American foreign policy. Prominent realists have often criticized U . S . diplomacy on the grounds that it is too idealistic and have complained that American leaders pay insufficient attention to the balance of power. For example, Kennan wrote in 1 9 5 1 . •1 see the most serious fault of our past policy formulation to lie i n something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to interna­ tional problems. This approach runs like a red skein through our foreign policy of the last fifty years . • ., According to this line of argument. there is n o real gap between America's liberal rhetoric and its foreign policy

26

T H I T R A G I DY or G R E A T P O W E R P O L I T I C S

behavior, because t h e United States practices what it preaches. But this claim is wrong, as I will argue at length below. American foreign policy has usually been guided by realist logic. although the public pronounce­ ments of its leaders might lead one to think otherwise. It should be obvious to intelligent observers that the United States speaks one way and acts another. In fact, policymakers in other states have always remarked about this tendency in American foreign policy. As long ago as 1 939, for example, Carr pointed out that states on the European continent regard the English-speaking peoples as "'masters in the an of concealing their selfish national interests in the guise of the gen­ eral good,· adding that "this kind of hypocrisy is a special and characteris­ tic peculiarity of the Anglo-Saxon mind. " 6 1 Still, the gap between rhetoric and reality usually goes unnoticed in the United States itself. Two factors account for this phenomenon. First, realist policies sometimes coincide with the dictates of liberalism, in which case there is no conflict between the pursuit of power and the pursuit of prin­ ciple. Under these circumstances, realist policies can be j ustified with lib­ eral rhetoric without having to discuss the underlying power realities. This coincidence makes for an easy sell. For example. the United States fought against fascism in World War II and communism in the Cold War for largely realist reasons. But both of those fights were also consistent with liberal principles, and thus policymakers had little trouble selling them to the public as ideological conflicts. Second, when power considerations force the United States to act in ways that conflict with liberal principles, "spin doctors· appear and tell a story that accords with liberal ideals." For example. in the late nineteenth century. American elites generally considered Germany to be a progres­ sive constitutional state wonhy of emulation. But the American view of Germany changed in the decade before World War I, as relations between the two states deteriorated. By the time the United States declared war on Germany in April 1 9 1 7, Americans had come to see Germany as more autocratic and militaristic than its European rivals. Similarly. during the late 1 9 30s, many Americans saw the Soviet Union as a n evil state. panly in response to Josef Stalin's murderous internal

I ntroduction

27

policies and his infamous alliance with Nazi Germany in August 1 9 39. Nevertheless, when the United States joined forces with the Soviet Union in late 1 94 1 to fight against the Third Reich, the U.S. government began a massive public relations campaign to clean up the image of America's new ally and make it compatible with liberal ideals. The Soviet Union was now portrayed as a proto-democracy, and Stalin became "Uncle Joe . " H o w is it possible to g e t away with this contradktion between rhetoric and policy? Most Americans readily accept these rationalizations because liberalism is so deeply rooted in their culture. As a result, they find it easy to believe that they are acting according to cherished principles, rather than cold and calculated power considerations.65

T H E P L A N OF T H E B OOK he rest of the chapters in this book are concerned mainly with

T answering the six big questions about power which I identified earlier.

Chapter 2, which is probably the most important chapter in the book, lays

out my theory of why states compete for power and why they pursue hegemony. In Chapters 3 and 4,

1

define power and explain how to measure it. I do

this in order to lay the groundwork for testing my theory. It is impossible to determine whether states have behaved according to the dictates of offensive realism without knowing what power is and what different strategies states employ to maximize their share of world power. My start­ ing point is to distinguish between potential power and actual military power, and then to argue that states care deeply about both kinds of power. Chapter 3 focuses on potential power, which involves mainly the size of a state's population and its wealth. Chapter 4 deals with actual mil­ itary power. It is an especially long chapter because I make arguments about "the primacy of land power· and "the stopping power of water" that are novel and likely to be controversial. In Chapter 5, I discuss the strategies that great powers employ to gain and maintain power. This chapter includes a substantial discussion of the

28

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G R IAT P O W I R P O L I T I C S

utility o f war for acquiring power. I also focus o n balancing and buck­ passing, which are the main strategies that states employ when faced with a rival that threatens to upset the balance of power. In Chapters 6 and 7, I examine the historical record to see whether there is evidence to suppon the theory. Specifically. I compare the con­ duct of the great powers from 1792 to 1 990 to see whether their behavior fits the predictions of offensive realism. In Chapter 8, I lay out a simple theory that explains when great powers balance and when they choose to buck-pass. and then I examine that the­ ory against the historical record. Chapter 9 focuses on the causes of war. Here. too, I lay out a simple theory and then test it against the empirical record. Chapter IO challenges the oft-m a de claim that international politics has been fundamentally transformed with the end of the Cold War. and that great powers no longer compete with each other for power. I briefly assess the theories underpinning that optimistic perspective, and then I look at how the great powers have behaved in Europe and Northeast Asia between 1 99 I and 2000. Finally, I make predictions about the likelihood of great-power conflict in these two important regions in the early twenty­ first century.

T W O

Anarchy and the Struggle for Power

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reat powers, I argue, are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal. This perspective does not allow for status quo powers, except for

the unusual state that achieves preponderance. Instead, the system is pop­ ulated with great powers that have revisionist intentions at their core . 1

This chapter presents a theory that explains this competition for power. Specifically, I attempt to show that there is a compelling logic behind my claim that great powers seek to maximize their share of world power. I do not, however, test offensive realism against the historical record in this chapter. That important task is reserved for later chapters.

W H Y S T AT E S P U R S U E P O W E R y explanation for why great powers vie with each other for power

M and strive for hegemony is derived from five assumptions about the international system. None of these assumptions alone mandates that

states behave competitively. Taken together, however, they depict a world in which states have considerable reason to think and sometimes behave aggressively. In particular, the system encourages states to look for oppor­ tunities to maximize their power vis-.3 -vis other states. 29

JO

T H I T R A G E DY O F G R E A T P O W l l P O L I T I C S

How important i s i t that these assumptions b e realistic? Some social sci­ entists argue that the assumptions that underpin a theory need not con­ form to reality. Indeed, the economist Milton Friedman maintains that the best theories "will be found to have assumptions that are wildly inaccu­ rate descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more signif­ icant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions. "2 According to this view, the explanatory power of a theory is all that matters. If unrealistic assumptions lead to a theory that tells us a lot about how the world works, it is of no importance whether the underlying assumptions are realistic or not. I reject this view. Although I agree that explanatory power is the ulti­ mate criterion for assessing theories, I also believe that a theory based on unrealistic or false assumptions will not explain much about how the world works. 1 Sound theories are based on sound assumptions. Accordingly, each of these five assumptions is a reasonably accurate representation of an important aspect of life in the international system.

Bedrock Assumptions The first assumption is that the international system is anarchic, which does not mean that it is chaotic or riven by disorder. It is easy to draw that conclusion, since realism depicts a world characterized by security compe­ tition and war. By itself, however, the realist notion of anarchy has noth­ ing to do with conflict; it is an ordering principle, which says that the system comprises independent states that have no central authority above them.4 Sovereignty, in other words, inheres in states because there is no higher ruling body in the international system.' There is no "government over governments. "6 The second assumption is that great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hun and possibly destroy each other. States are potentially dangerous to each other, although some states have more military might than others and are therefore more dangerous. A state's military power is usually identified with the panicular weaponry at its disposal, although even if there were

Anarchy and the Struggle for Power

31

no weapons, the individuals in those states could still use their feet and hands to attack the population of another state. After all, for every neck, there are two hands to choke it. The third assumption is that states can never be certain about other states' intentions. Specifically. no state can be sure that another state will not use its offensive military capability to attack the first state. This is not to say that states necessarily have hostile intentions. Indeed, all of the states in the system may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be sure of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine with 1 00 percent cer­ tainty.7 There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them.8 Furthermore, intentions can change quickly, so a state's intentions can be benign one day and hostile the next. Uncertainty about intentions is unavoidable, which means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go along with their offensive capabilities. The fourth assumption is that survival is the primary goal of great pow­ ers. Specifically, states seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. Survival dominates other motives because, once a state is conquered, it is unlikely to be in a posi­ tion to pursue other aims. Soviet leader Josef Stalin put the point well during a war scare in 1 927: "We can and must build socialism in the [ Soviet Union ] . But in order to do so we first of all have to exist."' States can and do pursue other goals, of course, but security is their most impor­ tant objective. The fifth assumption is that great powers are rational actors. They are aware of their external environment and they think strategically about how to survive in it. In particular, they consider the preferences of other states and how their own behavior is likely to affect the behavior of those other states, and how the behavior of those other states is likely to affect their own strategy for survival. Moreover, states pay attention to the long term as well as the immediate consequences of their actions. As emphasized, none of these assumptions alone dictates that great powers as a general rule should behave aggressively toward each other. There is surely the possibility that some state might have hostile intentions.

)2

T H I T R A G I D Y OP G R I A T P O W I R P O L I T I C S

but the only assumption dealing with a specific motive that i s common to all states says that their principal objective is to survive, which by itself is a rather harmless goal. Nevertheless, when the five assumptions are married together, they create powerful incentives for great powers to think and act offensively with regard to each other. In particular, three general patterns of behavior result: fear, self-help, and power maximization.

State Behavior Great powers fear each other. They regard each other with suspicion, and they worry that war might be in the offing. They anticipate danger. There is little room for trust among states. For sure, the level of fear varies across time and space, but it cannot be reduced to a trivial level. From the per­ spedive of any one great power, all other great powers are potential ene­ mies. This point is illustrated by the reaction of the United Kingdom and France to German reunification at the end of the Cold War. Despite the fact that these three states had been dose allies for almost forty-five years, both the United Kingdom and France immediately began worrying about the potential dangers of a united Germany. ' ° The basis of this fear is t h a t in a world where great powers have the capability to attack each other and might have the motive to do so, any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious of other states and reluc­ tant to trust them. Add to this the " 9 1 1 " problem-the absence of a cen­ tral authority to which a threatened state can tum for help-and states have even greater incentive to fear each other. Moreover, there is no mechanism, other than the possible self-interest of third parties, for pun­ ishing an aggressor. Because it is sometimes difficult to deter potential aggressors, states have ample reason not to trust other states and to be prepared for war with them. The possible consequences of falling victim to aggression further ampli­ fy the importance of fear as a motivating force in world politics. Great pow­ ers do not compete with each other as if international politics were merely an economic marketplace. Political competition among states is a much more dangerous business than mere economic intercourse; the former can

Anarchy ancl the Struggle for Power

))

lead to war. and war often means mass killing on the battlefield as well as mass murder of civilians. In extreme cases, war can even lead to the destruction of states. The horrible consequences of war sometimes cause states to view each other not j ust as competitors, but as potentially deadly enemies. Political antagonism, in short, tends to be intense, because the stakes are great. States in the international system also aim to guarantee their own sur­ vival. Because other states are potential threats, and because there is no higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 9 1 1 , states can­ not depend on others for their own security. Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own sur­ vival. In international politics, God helps those who help themselves. This emphasis on self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances.u But alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: today's alliance partner might be tomorrow's enemy, and today's enemy might be tomorrow's alliance partner. For example, the United States fought with China and the Soviet Union against Germany and Japan in World War II, but soon thereafter flip-flopped enemies and partners and allied with West Germany and Japan against China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the inter­ ests of other states, or to the interests of the so-called international com­ m unity. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world. This is true in the short term as well as in the long term, because if a state loses in the short run, it might not be around for the long haul. Apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of other states. and aware that they operate in a self-help system, states quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system. The stronger a state is relative to its potential rivals, the less likely it is that any of those rivals will attack it and threaten its survival. Weaker states will be reluctant to pick fights with more powerful states because the weaker states are likely to suffer military defeat. Indeed, the bigger the gap in power between any two states, the less likely it is that the weaker

14

T H E T R A G I D Y OP

G R I AT P O W I R P O L I T I C S

will attack the stronger. Neither Canada nor Mexico, for example, would countenance attacking the United States, which is far more powerful than its neighbors. The ideal situation is to be the hegemon in the system. As Immanuel Kant said, "It is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to arrive at a condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world, if that were possible. "12 Survival would then be almost guaranteed. u Consequently. states pay close attention to how power is distributed among them, and they make a special effon to maximize their share of world power. Specifically. they look for opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals. States employ a variety of means-economic, diplomatic, and military-to shift the balance of power in their favor. even if doing so makes other states suspicious or even hostile. Because one state's gain in power is another state's loss, great powers tend to have a zero-sum men­ tality when dealing with each other. The trick, of course, is to be the win­ ner in this competition and to dominate the other states in the system. Thus, the claim that states maximize relative power is tantamount to arguing that states are disposed to think offensively toward other states, even though their ultimate motive is simply to survive. In short, great powers have aggressive intentions. 1 4 Even when a great power achieves a distinct military advantage over its rivals, it continues looking for chances to gain more power. The pursuit of power stops only when hegemony is achieved. The idea that a great power might feel secure without dominating the system, provided it has an "'appropriate amount" of power, is not persuasive, for two reasons. 1 5 First. i t i s difficult t o assess how much relative power o n e state must have over its rivals before it is secure. Is twice as much power an appropriate threshold? Or is three times as much power the magic number? The root of the problem is that power calculations alone do not determine which side wins a war. Clever strategies. for example, sometimes allow less pow­ erful states to defeat more powerful foes. Second, determining how much power is enough becomes even more complicated when great powers contemplate how power will be distrib­ uted among them ten or twenty years down the road. The capabilities of

Anarchy a n d the Struggle for Power

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individual states vary over time, sometimes markedly, and it is often diffi­ cult to predict the direction and scope of change in the balance of power. Remember, few in the West anticipated the collapse of the Soviet Union before it happened. In fact, during the first half of the Cold War, many in the West feared that the Soviet economy would eventually generate greater wealth than the American economy, which would cause a marked power shift against the United States and its allies. What the future holds for China and Russia and what the balance of power will look like in 2020 is difficult to foresee. Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibili­ ty of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive. " But even if a great power does not have the wherewithal to achieve hegemony (and that is usually the case), it will still act offensively to amass as much power as it can, because states are almost always better off with more rather than less power. In shon, states do not become status quo powers until they com­ pletely dominate the system. All states are influenced by this logic, which means that not only do they look for opportunities to take advantage of one another. they also work to ensure that other states do not take advantage of them. After all, rival states are driven by the same logic, and most states are likely to rec­ ognize their own motives at play in the actions of other states. In short, states ultimately pay attention to defense as well as offense. They think about conquest themselves, and they work to check aggressor states from gaining power at their expense. This inexorably leads to a world of con­ stant security competition, where states are willing to lie, cheat. and use brute force if it helps them gain advantage over their rivals. Peace, if one defines that concept as a state of tranquility or mutual concord, is not like­ ly to break out in this world. The • security dilemma, · which is one of the most well-known concepts in the international relations literature, reflects the basic logic of offensive

)6

T H I T R A G E D Y O F G R E AT P O W I R P O L I T I C S

realism. The essence o f the dilemma i s that the measures a state takes to increase its own security usually decrease the security of other states. Thus, it is difficult for a state to increase its own chances of survival with­ out threatening the survival of other states. John Herz first introduced the security dilemma in a I 950 anicle in the journal World Politics. " After dis­ cussing the anarchic nature of international politics, he writes. "Striving to attain security from . . . attack. [states] are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This. in tum, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of secu­ rity and power accumulation is on. " 1 8 The implication of Herz's analysis is clear: the best way for a state to survive in anarchy is to take advantage of other states and gain power at their expense. The best defense is a good offense. Since this message is widely understood, ceaseless security com­ petition ensues. Unfonunately. little can be done to ameliorate the securi­ ty dilemma as long as states operate in anarchy. It should be apparent from this discussion that saying that states are power maximizers is tantamount to saying that they care about relative power, not absolute power. There is an important distinction here, because states concerned about relative power behave differently than do states interested in absolute power. 1 9 States that maximize relative power are concerned primarily with the distribution of material capabilities. In panicular. they try to gain as large a power advantage as possible over potential rivals. because power is the best means to survival in a danger­ ous world. Thus. states motivated by relative power concerns are likely to forgo large gains in their own power. if such gains give rival states even greater power. for smaller national gains that nevenheless provide them with a power advantage over their rivals.20 States that maximize absolute power. on the other hand, care only about the size of their own gains. not those of other states. They are not motivated by balance-of-power logic but instead are concerned with amassing power without regard to how much power other states control. They would jump at the opponunity for large gains. even if a rival gained more in the deal. Power. according to this logic, is not a means to an end (survival ) , but an end in itself."

Anarchy a n cl the Struggle for P o w e r

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Calculated Aggression There is obviously little room for status quo powers in a world where states are inclined to look for opportunities to gain more power. Nevertheless, great powers cannot always act on their offensive inten­ tions, because behavior is influenced not only by what states want, but also by their capacity to realize these desires. Every state might want to be king of the hill, but not every state has the wherewithal to compete for that lofty position, much less achieve it. Much depends on how military might is distributed among the great powers. A great power that has a marked power advantage over its rivals is likely to behave more aggres­ sively, because it has the capability as well as the incentive to do so. By contrast. great powers facing powerful opponents will be less inclined to consider offensive action and more concerned with defending the existing balance of power from threats by their more powerful oppo­ nents. Let there be an opportunity for those weaker states to revise the balance in their own favor, however, and they will take advantage of it. Stalin put the point well at the end of World War II: · Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise. "' 22 States might also have the capability to gain advantage over a rival power but nevertheless decide that the perceived costs of offense are too high and do not justify the expected benefits. In short, great powers are not mindless aggressors so bent on gaining power that they charge headlong into losing wars or pursue Pyrrhic victo­ ries. On the contrary. before great powers take offensive actions, they think carefully about the balance of power and about how other states will react to their moves. They weigh the costs and risks of offense against the likely benefits. If the benefits do not outweigh the risks. they sit tight and wait for a more propitious moment. Nor do states start arms races that are unlikely to improve their overall position. As discussed at greater length in Chapter 3, states sometimes limit defense spending either because spend­ ing more would bring no strategic advantage or because spending more would weaken the economy and undermine the state's power in the long run." To paraphrase Clint Eastwood, a state has to know its limitations to survive in the international system.

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T H I T R A G I D Y OP G R I AT P O W I R P O L I T I C S

Nevertheless, great powers miscalculate from time t o time because they invariably make imponant decisions on the basis of imperfect informa­ tion. States hardly ever have complete information about any situation they confront. There are two dimensions to this problem. Potential adver­ saries have incentives to misrepresent their own strength or weakness, and to conceal their true aims.24 For example, a weaker state trying to deter a stronger state is likely to exaggerate its own power to discourage the potential aggressor from attacking. On the other hand, a state bent on aggression is likely to emphasize its peaceful goals while exaggerating its military weakness, so that the potential victim does not build up its own arms and thus leaves itself vulnerable to attack. Probably no national leader was better at practicing this kind of deception than Adolf Hitler. But even if disinformation was not a problem, great powers are often unsure about how their own military forces, as well as the adversary's, will perform on the battlefield. For example, it is sometimes difficult to determine in advance how new weapons and untested combat units will perform in the face of enemy fire. Peacetime maneuvers and war games are helpful but imperfect indicators of what is likely to happen in actual combat. Fighting wars is a complicated business in which it is often diffi­ cult to predict outcomes. Remember that although the United States and its allies scored a stunning and remarkably easy victory against Iraq in early 1 99 1 . most experts at the time believed that Iraq's military would be a formidable foe and put up stubborn resistance before finally succumbing to American military might." Great powers are also sometimes unsure about the resolve of opposing states as well as allies. For example, Germany believed that if it went to war against France and Russia in the summer of 1 9 1 4, the United Kingdom would probably stay out of the fight. Saddam Hussein expected the United States to stand aside when he invaded Kuwait in August 1 990. Both aggres­ sors guessed wrong, but each had good reason to think that its initial judg­ ment was correct. In the 1 9 30s, Adolf Hitler believed that his great-power rivals would be easy to exploit and isolate because each had little interest in fighting Germany and instead was determined to get someone else to assume that burden. He guessed right. In short, great powers constantly

A n a r c h y ancl the Struggle for Power

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find themselves confronting situations in which they have to make impor­ tant decisions with incomplete information. Not surprisingly, they some­ times make faulty judgments and end up doing themselves serious harm. Some defensive realists go so far as to suggest that the constraints of the international system are so powerful that offense rarely succeeds, and that aggressive great powers invariably end up being punished.26 As noted, they emphasize that I ) threatened states balance against aggressors and ultimately crush them, and 2 ) there is an offense-defense balance that is usually heavily tilted toward the defense, thus making conquest especially difficult. Great powers, therefore, should be content with the existing bal­ ance of power and not try to change it by force. Alter all. it makes little sense for a state to initiate a war that it is likely to lose; that would be self­ defeating behavior. It is better to concentrate instead on preserving the balance of power.21 Moreover, because aggressors seldom succeed, states should understand that security is abundant, and thus there is no good strategic reason for wanting more power in the first place. In a world where conquest seldom pays, states should have relatively benign inten­ tions toward each other. If they do not, these defensive realists argue, the reason is probably poisonous domestic politics, not smart calculations about how to guarantee one's security in an anarchic world. There is no question that systemic factors constrain aggression, espe­ cially balancing by threatened states. But defensive realists exaggerate those restraining forces. 28 Indeed, the historical record provides little sup­ port for their claim that offense rarely succeeds. One study estimates that there were 6 3 wars between 1 8 1 5 and 1 980, and the initiator won 3 9 times, which translates into about a 6 0 percent success rate.29 Turning t o specific cases, Otto v o n Bismarck unified Germany by winning military victories against Denmark in 1 864, Austria in 1 866, and France in 1 870, and the United States as we know it today was created in good part by conquest in the nineteenth century. Conquest certainly paid big dividends in these cases. Nazi Germany won wars against Poland in 1 9 3 9 a n d France in 1 940, but lost to the Soviet Union between 1 94 1 and 1 94 5 . Conquest ultimately did not pay for the Third Reich, but if Hitler had restrained himself after the fall of France and had not invaded the Soviet Union,

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T H I T R A G I D T O F G R E AT P O W E R P O L I T I C S

conquest probably would have paid handsomely for the Nazis. In short, the historical record shows that offense sometimes succeeds and some­ times does not. The trick for a sophisticated power maximizer is to figure out when to raise and when to fold. 30

HEGEMONY'S LIMITS

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reat powers, as I have emphasized, strive t o gain power over their rivals and hopefully become hegemons. Once a state achieves that

exalted position, it becomes a status quo power. More needs to be said,

however, about the meaning of hegemony. A hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system. 3 1 No other state has the military wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it. In essence, a hegemon is the only great power in the system. A state that is substantially more powerful than the other great powers in the system is not a hegemon, because it faces, by defini­ tion, other great powers. The United Kingdom in the mid-nineteenth cen­ tury, for example, is sometimes called a hegemon. But it was not a hegemon, because there were four other great powers in Europe at the time-Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia-and the United Kingdom did not dominate them in any meaningful way. In fact, during that period, the United Kingdom considered France to be a serious threat to the balance of power. Europe in the nineteenth century was multipolar, not unipolar. Hegemony means domination of the system, which is usually interpret­ ed to mean the entire world. It is possible, however, to apply the concept of a system more narrowly and use it to describe panicular regions, such as Europe, Nonheast Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. Thus. one can distinguish between global hegemons, which dominate the world, and regional hegemons,

which dominate distinct geographical areas. The United

States has been a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere for at least the past one hundred years. No other state in the Americas has suffi­ cient military might to challenge it, which is why the United States is widely recognized as the only great power in its region.

Anarchy anti the Stru91I• for Power

41

My argument, which I develop at length in subsequent chapters, is that except for the unlikely event wherein one state achieves clear-cut nuclear superiority, it is virtually impossible for any state to achieve global hege­ mony. The principal impediment to world domination is the difficulty of projecting power across the world's oceans onto the territory of a rival great power. The United States, for example, is the most powerful state on the planet today. But it does not dominate Europe and Northeast Asia the way it does the Western Hemisphere, and it has no intention of trying to conquer and control those distant regions, mainly because of the stopping power of water. Indeed, there is reason to think that the American mili­ tary commitment to Europe and Northeast Asia might wither away over the next decade. In short, there has never been a global hegemon, and there is not likely to be one anytime soon. The best outcome a great power can hope for is to be a regional hege­ mon and possibly control another region that is nearby and accessible over land. The United States is the only regional hegemon in modem his­ tory, although other states have fought major wars in pursuit of regional hegemony: imperial Japan in Northeast Asia, and Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Nazi Germany in Europe. But none succeeded. The Soviet Union, which is located in Europe and Northeast Asia, threat­ ened to dominate both of those regions during the Cold War. The Soviet Union might also have attempted to conquer the oil-rich Persian Gulf region, with which it shared a border. But even if Moscow had been able to dominate Europe. Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf, which it never came dose to doing, it still would have been unable to conquer the Western Hemisphere and become a true global hegemon . States that achieve regional hegemony seek to prevent great powers in other regions from duplicating their feat. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not want peers. Thus the United States, for example, played a key role in preventing imperial Japan, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union from gaining regional supremacy. Regional hegemons attempt to check aspiring hegemons in other regions because they fear that a rival great power that dominates its own region will be an especially powerful foe that is essentially free to cause trouble

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i n the fearful great power's backyard. Regional hegemons prefer that there be at least two great powers located together in other regions, because their proximity will force them to concentrate their attention on each other rather than on the distant hegemon. Furthermore, if a potential hegemon emerges among them, the other great powers in that region might be able to contain it by themselves, allowing the distant hegemon to remain safely on the sidelines. Of course, if the local great powers were unable to do the job, the distant hegemon would take the appropriate measures to deal with the threatening state. The United States, as noted, has assumed that burden on four separate occasions in the twentieth century, which is why it is commonly referred to as an •offshore balancer.· In sum, the ideal situation for any great power is to be the only region­ al hegemon in the world. That state would be a status quo power, and it would go to considerable lengths to preserve the existing distribution of power. The United States is in that enviable position today; it dominates the Western Hemisphere and there is no hegemon in any other area of the world. But if a regional hegemon is confronted with a peer competi­ tor, it would no longer be a status quo power. Indeed, it would go to con­ siderable lengths to weaken and maybe even destroy its distant rival. Of course, both regional hegemons would be motivated by that logic, which would make for a fierce security competition between them.

P OW E R A N D F E A R

T

hat great powers fear each other i s a central aspect o f life i n the inter­ national system. But as noted, the level of fear varies from case to case.

For example, the Soviet Union worried much less about Germany in I 930

than it did in I 939. How much states fear each other matters greatly, because the amount of fear between them largely determines the severity of their security competition, as well as the probability that they will fight a war. The more profound the fear is, the more intense is the security com­ petition, and the more likely is war. The logic is straightforward: a scared

A n a r c h y a n d the Stru99le for Power

4J

state will look especially hard for ways to enhance its security, and it will be disposed to pursue risky policies to achieve that end. Therefore. it is imponant to understand what causes states to fear each other more or less intensely. Fear among great powers derives from the fact that they invariably have some offensive military capability that they can use against each other. and the fact that one can never be cenain that other states do not intend to use that power against oneself. Moreover. because states operate in an anarchic system, there is no night watchman to whom they can tum for help if another great power attacks them. Although anarchy and uncenainty about other states' intentions create an irreducible level of fear among states that leads to power-maximizing behavior, they cannot account for why sometimes that level of fear is greater than at other times. The reason is that anarchy and the difficulty of discerning state intentions are constant facts of life, and constants cannot explain variation. The capability that states have to threaten each other. however. varies from case to case. and it is the key factor that drives fear levels up and down. Specifically. the more power a state possesses, the more fear it generates among its rivals. Germany. for example, was much more powerful at the end of the 1 9 30s than it was at the decade's beginning, which is why the Soviets became increasingly fearful of Germany over the course of that decade. This discussion of how power affects fear prompts the question, What is power? It is important to distinguish between potential and actual power. A state's potential power is based on the size of its population and the level of its wealth. These two assets are the main building blocks of mili­ tary power. Wealthy rivals with large populations can usually build formi­ dable military forces. A state's actual power is embedded mainly in its a rm y and the air and naval forces that directly support it. Armies are the central ingredient of military power, because they are the principal instru­ ment for conquering and controlling territory-the paramount political objective in a world of territorial states. In short, the key component of military might, even in the nuclear age, is land power. Power considerations affect the intensity of fear among states in three main ways. First, rival states that possess nuclear forces that can survive a

44

T H E T R A G E D Y Of

O R IAT P O W E R P O L I T I C S

nuclear attack and retaliate against i t are likely t o fear each other less than if these same states had no nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, for example, the level of fear between the superpowers probably would have been substantially greater if nuclear weapons had not been invented. The logic here is simple: because nuclear weapons can inflict devastating destruction on a rival state in a short period of time, nuclear-armed rivals are going to be reluctant to fight with each other, which means that each side will have less reason to fear the other than would otherwise be the case. But as the Cold War demonstrates, this does not mean that war between nuclear powers is no longer thinkable; they still have reason to fear each other. Second, when great powers are separated by large bodies of water, they usually do not have much offensive capability against each other, regard­ less of the relative size of their armies. Large bodies of water are formidable obstacles that cause significant power-projection problems for attacking armies. For example, the stopping power of water explains in good part why the United Kingdom and the United States {since becoming a great power in 1 898) have never been invaded by another great power. It also explains why the United States has never tried to conquer territory in Europe or Northeast Asia, and why the United Kingdom has never attempted to dominate the European continent. Great powers located on the same landmass are in a much better position to attack and conquer each other. That is especially true of states that share a common border. Therefore, great powers separated by water are likely to fear each other less than great powers that can get at each other over land. Third, the distribution of power among the states in the system also markedly affects the levels of fear." The key issue is whether power is dis­ tributed more or less evenly among the great powers or whether there are sharp power asymmetries. The configuration of power that generates the most fear is a multipolar system that contains a potential hegemon-what I call ·unbalanced multipolarity. • A potential hegemon is more than just the most powerful state in the system. It is a great power with so much actual military capability and so much potential power that it stands a good chance of dominating and

Anarchy ancl the Stru99le for Power

4'

controlling all of the other great powers in its region of the world. A potential hegemon need not have the wherewithal to fight all of its rivals at once. but it must have excellent prospects of defeating each opponent alone. and good prospects of defeating some of them in tandem. The key relationship, however. is the power gap between the potential hegemon and the second most powerful state in the system: there must be a marked gap between them. To qualify as a potential hegemon, a state must have­ by some reasonably large margin-the most formidable army as well as the most latent power among all the states located in its region. Bipolarity is the power configuration that produces the least amount of fear among the great powers. although not a negligible amount by any means. Fear tends to be less acute in bipolarity. because there is usually a rough balance of power between the two major states in the system. Multipolar systems without a potential hegemon, what I call "balanced multipolarity. • are still likely to have power asymmetries among their members, although these asymmetries will not be as pronounced as the gaps created by the presence of an aspiring hegemon. Therefore. balanced multipolarity is likely to generate less fear than unbalanced multipolarity, but more fear than bipolarity. This discussion of how the level of fear between great powers varies with changes in the distribution of power, not with assessments about each other's intentions, raises a related point. When a state s u rveys its environment to determine which states pose a threat to its survival, it focuses mainly on the offensive capabilities of potential rivals, not their intentions. As emphasized earlier, intentions are ultimately unknowable, so states worried about their survival must make worst-case assumptions about their rivals' intentions. Capabilities, however, not only can be meas­ ured but also determine whether or not a rival state is a serious threat. I n shon, great powers balance against capabilities, n o t intentions. n Great powers obviously balance against states with formidable military forces, because that offensive military capability is the tangible threat to their survival. But great powers also pay careful attention to how much latent power rival states control. because rich and populous states usually can and do build powerful armies. Thus. great powers tend to fear states

T H I T R A G I D Y OF O R I AT P O W I R P O L I T I C S

46

with large populations and rapidly expanding economies, even if these states have not yet translated their wealth into military might.

T H E H I E R A R C H Y OF S TAT E G OA L S

5

urvival i s the number one goal o f great powers, according t o m y theo­ ry. In practice. however. states pursue non-security goals as well. For

example, great powers invariably seek greater economic prosperity to enhance the welfare of their citizenry. They sometimes seek to promote a panicular ideology abroad, as happened during the Cold War when the the United States tried to spread democracy around the world and the Soviet Union tried to sell communism. National unification is another goal that sometimes motivates states, as it did with Prussia and Italy in the nineteenth century and Germany after the Cold War. Great powers also occasionally try to foster human rights around the globe . States might pursue any of these. as well as a number of other non-security goals. Offensive realism cenainly recognizes that great powers might pursue these non-security goals. but it has little to say about them, save for one imponant point: states can pursue them as long as the requisite behavior does not conflict with balance-of-power logic, which is often the case. w Indeed, the pursuit of these non-security goals sometimes complements the hunt for relative power. For example, Nazi Germany expanded into eastern Europe for both ideological and realist reasons, and the superpow­ ers competed with each other during the Cold War for similar reasons. Funhermore, greater economic prosperity invariably means greater wealth, which has significant implications for security, because wealth is the foundation of military power. Wealthy states can afford powerful mili­ tary forces, which enhance a state's prospects for survival. As the political economist Jacob Viner noted more than fifty years ago, "there is a long­ run harmony· between wealth and power. " National unification is anoth­ er goal that usually complements the pursuit of power. For example, the unified German state that emerged in 1 8 7 1 was more powerful than the Prussian state it replaced.

Anarchy and the Stru99I• for Power

47

Sometimes the pursuit of non-security goals has hardly any effect on the balance of power. one way or the other. Human rights interventions usually fit this description, because they tend to be small-scale operations that cost little and do not detract from a great power's prospects for sur­ vival. For better or for worse, states are rarely willing to expend blood and treasure to protect foreign populations from gross abuses. including geno­ cide. For instance. despite claims that American foreign policy is infused with moralism, Somalia ( 1 992-9 3 ) is the only instance during the past one hundred years in which U.S. soldiers were killed in action on a humanitarian mission. And in that case, the loss of a mere eighteen sol­ diers in an infamous firefight in October 1 99 3 so traumatized American policymakers that they immediately pulled all U . S . troops out of Somalia and then refused to intervene in Rwanda in the spring of 1 994, when eth­ nic Hutu went on a genocidal rampage against their Tutsi neighbors. )6 Stopping that genocide would have been relatively easy and it would have had vinually no effect on the position of the United States in the balance of power." Yet nothing was done. In shon, although realism does not pre­ scribe human rights interventions, it does not necessarily proscribe them. But sometimes the pursuit of non-security goals conOicts with balance­ of-power logic, in which case states usually act according to the dictates of realism. For example, despite the U.S. commitment to spreading democra­ cy across the globe, it helped ovenhrow democratically elected govern­ ments and embraced a number of authoritarian regimes during the Cold War. when American policymakers felt that these actions would help con­ tain the Soviet Union . " In World War II, the liberal democracies put aside their antipathy for communism and formed an alliance with the Soviet Union

against

Nazi Germany.

"f

can't

take

communism,•

Franklin

Roosevelt emphasized, but to defeat Hitler ·1 would hold hands with the Devil . . ,. In the same way, Stalin repeatedly demonstrated that when his ideological preferences clashed with power considerations, the latter won out. To take the most blatant example of his realism, the Soviet Union formed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany in August 1 9 3 9-the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact-in hopes that the agreement would at least temporarily satisfy Hitler's territorial ambitions in eastern Europe

48

T H I T R A G E D Y OF G R E AT P O W E R P O L I T I C S

and turn the Wehrmacht toward France and the United Kingdom.40 When great powers confront a serious threat, in short, they pay little attention to ideology as they search for alliance partners.41 Security also trumps wealth when those two goals conflict, because "'defence," as Adam Smith wrote in The Wealth ofNations, "is of much more importance than opulence. "41 Smith provides a good illustration of how states behave when forced to choose between wealth and relative power. In 1 651 , England put into effect the famous Navigation Act protectionist legislation designed to damage Holland's commerce and ultimately cripple the D utch economy. The legislation mandated that all goods imported into England be carried either in English ships or ships owned by the country that originally produced the goods. Since the Dutch produced few goods themselves, this measure would badly damage their shipping, the central ingredient in their economic success. Of course, the Navigation Act would hurt England's economy as well, mainly because it would rob E ngland of the benefits of free trade. "The act of navigation, " Smith wrote, "is not favorable to foreign commerce, or to the growth of that opulence that can arise from it." Nevertheless, Smith considered the legislation "the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England" because it did more damage to the Dutch economy than to the English economy, and in the mid-seven­ teenth century Holland was "the only naval power which could endanger the security of England. "43

C R E AT I N G W O R L D O R D E R

T

he claim i s sometimes made that great powers can transcend realist logic by working together to build an international order that fosters peace

and j ustice. World peace, it would appear, can only enhance a state's pros­ perity and security. America's political leaders paid considerable lip service to this line of argument over the course of the twentieth century. President Clinton, for example, told an audience at the United Nations in September 1 993 that •at the birth of this organization 48 years ago . . . a generation of

gifted leaders from many nations stepped forward to organize the world's efforts on behalf of security and prosperity. . . . Now history has granted to

A n a r c h y ancl the Stru99I• for Power

49

us a moment of even greater opponunity. . . . Let us resolve that we will dream larger. . . . Let us ensure that the world we pass to our children is healthier, safer and more abundant than the one we inhabit today."44 This rhetoric notwithstanding, great powers do not work together to promote world order for its own sake. Instead, each seeks to maximize its own share of world power, which is likely to clash with the goal of creat­ ing and sustaining stable international orders.45 This is not to say that great powers never aim to prevent wars and keep the peace. On the con· trary, they work hard to deter wars in which they would be the likely vic­ tim. In such cases, however, state behavior is driven largely by narrow calculations about relative power. not by a commitment to build a world order independent of a state's own interests. The United States, for exam· pie, devoted enormous resources to deterring the Soviet Union from stan· ing a war in Europe during the Cold War, not because ol some deep·seated commitment to promoting peace around the world, but because American leaders feared that a Soviet victory would lead to a dangerous shift in the balance of power.46 The panicular international order that obtains at any time is mainly a by-product of the self-interested behavior of the system's great powers. The configuration of the system, in other words, is the unintended conse· quence of great·power security competition, not the result of states acting together to organize peace. The establishment of the Cold War order in E u rope illustrates this point. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States intended to establish it, nor did they work together to create it. In fact, each superpower worked hard in the early years of the Cold War to gain power at the expense of the other, while preventing the other from doing likewise." The system that emerged in E u rope in the aftermath of World War II was the unplanned consequence of intense security compe­ tition between the superpowers. Although that intense superpower rivalry ended along with the Cold War in 1 990, R ussia and the United States have not worked together to create the present order in Europe. The United States, for example, has rejected out of hand various Russian proposals to make the Organization for Security and Cooperation in E u rope the central organizing pillar of European security ( replacing the U.S. -dominated NATO ) . Funhermore,

50

T H I T R A G I D Y OF G R E AT P O W I R P O L I T I C S

Russia was deeply opposed to NATO expansion, which i t viewed a s a serious threat to Russian security. Recognizing that Russia's weakness would pre­ clude any retaliation, however, the United States ignored Russia's concerns and pushed NATO to accept the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as new members. Russia has also opposed U.S. policy in the Balkans over the past decade, especially NATO's 1 999 war against Yugoslavia. Again, the United States has paid little attention to Russia's concerns and has taken the steps it deems necessary to bring peace to that volatile region. Finally, it is worth noting that although Russia is dead set against allowing the United States to deploy ballistic missile defenses, it is highly likely that Washington will deploy such a system if it is judged to be technologically feasible. For sure. great-power rivalry will sometimes produce a stable interna­ tional order, as happened during the Cold War. Nevenheless, the great powers will continue looking for opportunities to increase their share of world power, and if a favorable situation arises. they will move to under­ mine that stable order. Consider how hard the United States worked dur­ ing the late 1 980s to weaken the Soviet Union and bring down the stable order that had emerged in Europe during the latter pan of the Cold War.48 Of course, the states that stand to lose power will work to deter aggression and preserve the existing order. But their motives will be selfish, revolving around balance-of-power logic, not some commitment to world peace. Great powers cannot commit themselves to the pursuit of a peaceful world order for two reasons. First, states are unlikely to agree on a general formula for bolstering peace. Certainly, international relations scholars have never reached a consensus on what the blueprint should look like. In fact. it seems there are about as many theories on the causes of war and peace as there are scholars studying the subject. But more imponant, poli­ cymakers are unable to agree on how to create a stable world. For exam­ ple, at the Paris Peace Conference alter World War I, imponant differences over how to create stability in Europe divided Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, and Woodrow Wilson.49 In panicular, Clemenceau was determined to impose harsher terms on Germany over the Rhineland than was either Lloyd George or Wilson, while Lloyd George stood out as the hard-liner on German reparations. The Treaty of Versailles, not sur­ prisingly, did little to promote European stability.

Anarchy ancl the Struggle for Power

51

Furthermore, consider American thinking on h o w to achieve stability in Europe in the early days of the Cold War.50 The key elements for a sta· ble and durable system were in place by the early 1 9 50s. They included the division of Germany, the positioning of American ground forces in Western Europe to deter a Soviet attack, and ensuring that West Germany would not seek to develop nuclear weapons. Officials in the Truman administration, however, disagreed about whether a divided Germany would be a source of peace or war. For example, George Kennan and Paul Nitze, who held important positions in the State Department, believed that a divided Germany would be a source of instability, whereas Secretary of State Dean Acheson disagreed with them. In the 1 9 50s, President Eisenhower sought to end the American commitment to defend Western Europe and to provide West Germany with its own nuclear deterrent. This policy, which was never fully adopted. nevenheless caused significant instability in Europe, as it led directly to the Berlin crises of 1 9 58-59 and 1 96 1 .5 1 Second, great powers cannot p u t aside power considerations a n d work to promote international peace because they cannot be sure that their effons will succeed. If their attempt fails. they are likely to pay a steep price for having neglected the balance of power, because if an aggressor appears at the door there will be no answer when they dial 9 1 1 . That is a risk few states are willing to run. Therefore, prudence dictates that they behave according to realist logic. This line of reasoning accounts for why collective security schemes. which call for states to put aside narrow con· cems about the balance of power and instead act in accordance with the broader interests of the international community, invariably die at birt h . 52

C OO P E R AT I ON A M O N G STAT E S

0

n e might conclude from the preceding discussion that m y theory does not allow for any cooperation among the great powers. But this

conclusion would be wrong. States can cooperate. although cooperation is sometimes difficult to achieve and always difficult to sustain. Two factors inhibit cooperation: considerations about relative gains and concern about

52

T H I T R A G I D Y O f G R I AT P O W I R P O L I T I C S

cheating." Ultimately. great powers live i n a fundamentally competitive world where they view each other as real. or at least potential, enemies, and they therefore look to gain power at each other's expense. Any two states contemplating cooperation must consider how profits or gains will be distributed between them. They can think about the division in terms of either absolute or relative gains (recall the distinction made earlier between pursuing either absolute power or relative power; the concept here is the same) . With absolute gains, each side is concerned with maximizing its own profits and cares little about how much the other side gains or loses in the deal. Each side cares about the other only to the extent that the other side's behavior affects its own prospects for achieving maximum profits. With relative gains, on the other hand, each side considers not only its own individual gain, but also how well it fares compared to the other side. Because great powers care deeply about the balance of power, their thinking focuses on relative gains when they consider cooperating with other states. For sure, each state tries to maximize its absolute gains; still, it is more important for a state to make sure that it does no worse, and perhaps better, than the other state in any agreement. Cooperation is more difficult to achieve, however, when states are attuned to relative gains rather than absolute gains. 54 This is because states concerned about absolute gains have to make sure that if the pie is expanding, they are get­ ting at least some portion of the increase, whereas states that worry about relative gains must pay careful attention to how the pie is divided, which complicates cooperative efforts. Concerns about cheating also hinder cooperation. Great powers are often reluctant to enter into cooperative agreements for fear that the other side will cheat on the agreement and gain a significant advantage. This concern is especially acute in the military realm, causing a •special peril of defection." because the nature of military weaponry allows for rapid shifts in the balance of power." Such a development could create a window of opponunity for the state that cheats to inflict a decisive defeat on its victim. These barriers to cooperation notwithstanding. great powers do cooper­ ate in a realist world. Balance-of-power logic often causes great powers to

Anarchy a n d the Struggle for Power

'J

form alliances and cooperate against common enemies. The United Kingdom, France, and Russia, for example, were allies against Germany before and during World War I. States sometimes cooperate to gang up on a third state, as Germany and the Soviet Union did against Poland in 1 939.56 More recently, Serbia and Croatia agreed to conquer and divide B osnia between them, although the United States and its European allies prevent­ ed them from executing their agreement.57 Rivals as well as allies cooperate. After all. deals can be struck that roughly reflect the distribution of power and satisfy concerns about cheating. The various arms control agreements signed by the superpowers during the Cold War illustrate this point. The bottom line, however, is that cooperation takes place in a world that is competitive at its core-one where states have powerful incentives to take advantage of other states. This point is graphically highlighted by the state of European politics in the forty years before World War I. The great powers cooperated frequently during this period, but that did not stop them from going to war on August

I,

1 9 1 4. " The United States and

the Soviet Union also cooperated considerably during World War II, but that cooperation did not prevent the outbreak of the Cold War shortly after Germany and Japan were defeated. Perhaps most amazingly. there was significant economic and military cooperation between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during the two years before the Wehrmacht attacked the Red Army.59 No amount of cooperation can eliminate the dominating logic of security competition . Genuine peace, or a world in which states do not compete for power, is not likely as long as the state system remains anarchic.

CONCLUSION

I

n sum, m y argument i s that the structure o f the international system, not the particular characteristics of individual great powers. causes them to

think and act offensively and to seek hegemony. 60 I do

not adopt

Morgenthau's claim that states invariably behave aggressively because they have a will to power hardwired into them. Instead. I assume that the prin-

$4

T H E T R A G E D Y OF G R E A T P O W E R P O L I T I CS

dpaI motive behind great·power behavior is survival. In anarchy, however, the desire to survive encourages states to behave aggressively. Nor does my theory classify states as more or Jess aggressive on the basis of their eco· nomic or political systems. Offensive realism makes only a handful of assumptions about great powers, and these assumptions apply equally to all great powers. Except for differences in how much power each state con­ trols, the theory treats all states alike. I have now laid out the logic explaining why states seek to gain as

much power as possible over their rivals. I have said little, however, about the object of that pursuit: power itself. The next two chapters provide a detailed discussion of this important subject.

T H R E E

Wealth and Power

P

ower lies at the heart o f international politics, yet there is consid­ erable disagreement about what power is and how to measure it. In this chapter and the next, I define power and offer rough but

reliable ways to measure it. Specifically, I argue that power is based on the particular material capabilities that a state possesses. The balance of power, therefore, is a function of tangible assets-such as armored divi­ sions and nuclear weapons-that each great power controls. States have two kinds of power: latent power and military power. These two forms of power are closely related but not synonymous, because they are derived from different kinds of assets. Latent power refers to the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power; it is largely based on a state's wealth and the overall size of its pop­ ulation. Great powers need money, technology, and personnel to build military forces and to fight wars, and a state's latent power refers to the raw potential it can draw on when competing with rival states. In international politics, however, a state's effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces and how they compare with the military forces of rival states. The United States and the Soviet Union were the most powerful states in the world during the Cold War because their mili­ tary establishments dwarfed those of other states. Japan is not a great

55

56

T H I T R A G E D Y OF G R I A T P O W E R P O L I T I C S

power today. even though it h a s a large a n d wealthy economy. because it has a small and relatively weak military. and it is heavily dependent on the United States for its security. Therefore, the balance of power is largely synonymous with the balance of military power. I define power largely in military terms because offensive realism emphasizes that force is the ulti­ ma ratio of international politics . 1

Military power is based largely o n the size a n d strength of a state's army and its supporting air and naval forces. Even in a nuclear world, armies are the core ingredient of military power. Independent naval forces and strate­ gic air forces are not suited for conquering territory, nor are they much good by themselves at coercing other states into making territorial conces­ sions. They certainly can contribute to a successful military campaign, but great-power wars are won mainly on the ground. The most powerful states, therefore, are those that possess the most formidable land forces. This privileging of military power notwithstanding. states care greatly about latent power, because abundant wealth and a large population are prerequisites for building formidable military forces. During the Cold War. for example. American leaders worried about Soviet economic growth and were especially alarmed by Soviet scientific achievements (such as the Sputnik satellite launched in 1 9 5 7 ) , which they saw as signs that the Soviet Union's latent capabilities might one day exceed those of the United States. Today. the United States is increasingly worried about China. not because of its military. which is still relatively weak, but because China has more than 1 .2 billion people and a rapidly modernizing economy. Should China become especially wealthy, it could readily become a military superpower and challenge the United States. These examples show that states pay careful attention to the balance of latent power as well as the balance of military power. The next section discusses why it makes sense to define power i n terms of material capabilities rather than outcomes. an approach favored by some scholars. I also explain why the balance of power is not an especially good predictor of military victory. The three sections that follow it focus on latent power. first, I discuss the fundamental imponance of wealth for building powerful military forces. and then I describe the measures of wealth that I employ to capture latent power. Second, I use some histori-

Wealth a n cl Power

57

cal cases to show that the rise and fall of great powers over the past two centuries has been due in good part to changes in the distribution of wealth among the major actors in the international system. Third, I explain why wealth and military power, although closely connected, are not synonymous. and I show that wealth cannot be used as a substitute measure for military might. Accordingly, I argue, we need separate indica­ tors for latent power and military power.

T H E M AT E R I A L B A S I S OF P O W E R

A

t its most basic level, power can b e defined i n two different ways. Power, as I define it, represents nothing more than specific assets or

material resources that are available to a state. Others, however, define power in terms of the outcomes of interactions between states. Power. they argue. is all about control or influence over other states; it is the ability of one state to force another to do something. 2 Robert Dahl. a prominent pro­ ponent of this view, maintains that "A has power over B to the extent that [A] can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do."' According to this logic, power exists only when a state exercises control or influence, and therefore it can be measured only after the outcome is determined. Simply put, the most powerful state is the one that prevails in a dispute. It might seem that there is no meaningful difference between these two definitions. After all, when two great powers get into a conflict, should not the side with greater material capabilities prevail? Some students oi international politics seem to believe that in war the state with greater resources should win almost all of the time, and that, therefore, the bal­ ance o[ power should do an excellent job o[ forecasting victory in war. There is a large body of quantitative studies, for example, that employs different measures of power to try to account for the outcome of interstate conflicts.4 This belief also underpins Geoffrey Blainey's famous argument that war breaks out in good part because states cannot agree on the bal­ ance of power, but the subsequent fighting then establishes " a n orderly ladder of power between victors and losers. "'5 U the rival states had recog­ nized the true balance beforehand, he argues, there would have been no

58

T H E T R A G E DY OP G R E AT P O W I R P O L I T I C S

war. Both sides would have foreseen the outcome and been motivated to negotiate a peaceful settlement based on existing power realities, rather than fight a bloody war to reach the same end. But it is impossible to conflate these definitions of power, because the balance of power is not a highly reliable predictor of military success.• The reason is that non-material factors sometimes provide one combatant with a decisive advantage over the other. Those factors include, among others, strategy, intelligence, resolve, weather, and disease. Although material resources alone do not decide the outcome of wars, there is no question that the odds of success are substantially affected by the balance of resources, especially in protracted wars of attrition in which each side is trying to wear down the other by virtue of material superiority.' States cer­ tainly want to have more rather than less power over their rivals, because the more resources a state has at its disposal, the more likely it is to prevail in war. Of course, this is why states seek to maximize their share of world power. Nevertheless, increasing the likelihood of success does not mean that success is virtually certain. Indeed, there have been numerous wars where the victor was either less powerful or about as powerful as the loser, yet the victor prevailed because of non-material factors. Consider strategy, which is how a state employs its forces against an opponent's forces, and which is probably the most important of the non­ material factors. Clever strategies sometime allow states that are less pow­ erful or no more powerful than their battlefield rivals to achieve victory.8 The Germans, for example, employed a blitzkrieg strategy i n the spring of 1 940 to defeat the B ritish and French armies, which were roughly of the same size and strength as the Wehrmacht.9 The famous Schlieffen Plan, however, failed to produce a German victory against the same opponents in 1 9 1 4, although a case can be made that the original version of the plan, which was more daring than the version that was finally executed, pro­ vided a blueprint for defeating France and the United Kingdom . " Strategy sometimes matters a lot. 1 1 Russia's decisive defeat o f Napoleon's army i n 1 8 1 2 highlights how these non-material factors can even help an outgunned defender win a war. 1 2 T h e French forces that spearheaded t h e invasion of Russia on J u n e 2 3 ,

Wealth a n d Power

''

1 8 1 2, outnumbered the Russian front-line armies by 449,000 to 2 1 1 .000." Counting reserve forces, Napoleon had a total of 674,000 troops at his dis­ posal for the Russian campaign, while the entire Russian army numbered 409,000 regular soldiers at the start of the conflict. Moreover, the French forces were qualitatively superior to the Russian forces. Yet the Russians completely destroyed Napoleon's army during the next six months and won a decisive victory. By January

I.

1 8 1 3, Napoleon had only 9 3,000 sol­

diers left to fight the Russians. A stunning 470,000 French soldiers had per­ ished in Russia and another I 00,000 were prisoners of war. The Russians, by contrast, lost a total of only 1 50,000 soldiers. Weather, disease. and a smart Russian strategy defeated Napoleon. The Russians refused to engage the invasion force along their western border and instead withdrew toward Moscow, implementing a scorched-earth policy as they moved eastward.14 The French army tried to catch the retreating Russian army and decisively defeat it in battle, but bad weather thwarted Napoleon's game plan. Torrential rain followed by blistering heat in the early weeks of the invasion slowed the attacking armies and allowed the Russians to escape. Disease and desertion soon became major problems for the French forces. Napoleon finally managed to engage the retreating Russian army in major battles at Smolensk ( August 1 7 ) and B orodino ( September 7). The French army won both battles, but they were Pyrrhic victories: French losses were high. the Russians refused to surrender, and the French army was drawn deeper into Russia. Napoleon occupied Moscow on September 14 but was forced to retreat in mid­ October when the Russians still refused to quit the war. The subsequent retreat westward was a disaster for the French army, which disintegrated despite holding its own in battles with the pursuing Russian force s." Weather again played an important role as winter se t in on t he retreating forces. Despite never winning a major battle in the 1 8 1 2 campaign, the less powerful Russian army routed the more powerful French army. It should be apparent that Blainey is wrong to argue that there would be no war if states could accurately measure the balance of power, because less powerful states can sometimes defeat more powerful state s . 1 6 Therefore weaker states are sometimes going to initiate wars against stronger states.

60

T H I T R A G I DY Of G R I A T P O W I R P O L I T I C S

The same logic also applies t o states o f roughly equal might. Funhermore, weaker states are sometimes going to stand up to stronger states that threaten to attack them, because there are often good reasons for defend­ ers to think that they can fight, although outnumbered, and win. In essence, then, it is not possible to equate the balance of tangible assets with outcomes, because non-material fad.ors such as strategy some­ times profoundly affect outcomes. When defining power. therefore, one has to choose between material capabilities and outcomes as the basis for definition; the latter effeaively incorporate the non-material as well as material ingredients of military success. There are three reasons not to equate power with outcomes. First, when focusing on outcomes it becomes almost impossible to assess the balance of power before a conflict, since the balance can be determined only after we see which side wins. Second, this approach sometimes leads to implausible conclusions. For example. Russia might have decisively defeated Napoleon's armies in 1 8 1 2, but Russia was not more powerful than France. Defining power in terms of outcomes, however. would effec­ tively force one to argue that Russia was more powerful than France. Moreover. few would deny that the United States was a vastly more pow­ erful state than North Vietnam. yet the weaker state was able to defeat the stronger in the Vietnam War ( 1 96 5-72) because non- material factors trumped the balance of power. Third, one of the most interesting aspects of international relations is how power, which is a means, affeas political outcomes, which are ends . " But there is little to say about the matter if power and outcomes are indistinguishable; there would be no difference between means and ends. We are then left with a circular argument.

P O P U LAT I O N A N D W E A LT H : T H E S I N EWS O F MI LITARY POWER

L

atent power constitutes the societal resources that a state has available to build military forces. " Although there are always a variety of such

resources, the size of a state's population and its wealth are the two most

Wealth ancl Power

61

important components for generating military might. Population size mat­ ters a lot, because great powers require big armies, which can be raised only in countries with large populations." States with small populations cannot be great powers. For example, neither Israel. with its population of 6 mil­ lion, nor Sweden, with its population of 8.9 million, can achieve great­ power status in a world in which Russia, the United States, and China have populations of 147 million, 281 million, and 1 .24 billion, respectively.20 Population size also has important economic consequences. because only large populations can produce great wealth. the other building block of mil­ itary power.2 1 Wealth is important because a state cannot build a powerful military i f it does n o t have t h e money a n d technology t o equip, train, a n d continual­ ly modernize its fighting forces.22 Furthermore, the costs of waging great­ power wars are enormous. For example, the total direct cost of World War I ( 1 9 1 4- 1 8 ) for all the participants was about $200 billion." The United States alone spent roughly $306 billion lighting the Axis powers between 1 94 1 and 1 94 5-roughly three times its gross national product ( GNP) in 1 940.24 Accordingly, the great powers in the international system are invariably among the world's wealthiest states. Although population size and wealth are essential ingredients of mili­ tary power, I use wealth alone to measure potential power. This emphasis on wealth is not because it is more important than population, but because wealth incorporates both the demographic and the economic dimensions of power. As noted, a state must have a large population to produce great wealth. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the states with abundant wealth will also have large populations. In short, I am not ignoring population size, just assuming that it will be captured by the indi­ cators I use to measure wealth. It would be easier to use population size by itself to measure latent power, because a state's population is simpler to measure than its wealth. But it is not feasible to use population size to measure latent power, because population numbers often do not reflect wealth differences among states. Both China and India, for instance, had much larger popu­ lations than either the Soviet Union or the United States during the Cold

62

T H I T R A G I D Y OF G R E A T POW I R PO L I T I C S

War, but neither China nor India achieved great-power status because they were nowhere near as wealthy as the superpowers. In essence, a large population does not ensure great wealth, but great wealth does require a large population. Therefore. only wealth can be used by itself as a measure of latent power. The concept of wealth has various meanings and can be measured in dif­ ferent ways. For my purposes, however, it is essential to choose an indica­ tor of wealth that reflects a state's latent power. Specifically, it must capture a state's mobilizable wealth and its level of technological development. "Mobilizable wealth" refers to the economic resources a state has at its dis­ posal to build military forces. It is more imponant than overall wealth because what matters is not simply how wealthy a state might be. but how much of that wealth is available to spend on defense. It is also imponant to have industries that are producing the newest and most sophisticated tech­ nologies. because they invariably get incorporated into the most advanced weaponry. The development of steel in the mid-nineteenth century and jet aircraft in the mid-twentieth century, for example. profoundly changed the arsenals of the great powers. It behooved the great powers of the day to be on the cutting edge in those industries. as well as in other industries that contributed to building formidable military forces. GNP, which represents a state's entire output over one year, is probably the most commonly used indicator of a state's wealth. In fact, I use it to measure wealth after

I 960,

as discussed below. But GNP is not always a

good indicator of latent power, and employing it in the wrong circum­ stances can give a distorted picture of the balance of latent power. The essence of the problem is that GNP is primarily a measure of a state's over­ all wealth, and it does not always capture imponant di!!erences i n the mobilizable wealth and technological sophistication of di!!erent states. Nevenheless. GNP does a reasonably good job of measuring these two dimensions of wealth when the relevant great powers are at similar levels of economic development. For example. two highly industrialized economies-such as the United Kingdom and Germany in 1 890 or Japan and the United States in 1 990-are likely to have similar leading-edge industries and roughly the same ratio of overall wealth to mobilizable

Wealth ancl Power

63

wealth. The same logic applies when comparing two largely agrarian soci­ eties, such as Prussia and France in 1 7 50. But GNP is a poor indicator of latent power when the states being com­ pared are at different levels of economic development. Consider what can happen when GNP is used to assess the potential power of a semi-indus­ trialized state and a highly industrialized state. GNP, which represents the market value of all the goods and services that a state produces in a fixed period of time. is a function of both the size and the productivity of a state's labor force. The size of a state's labor force is directly related to its population size, while the productivity of its labor force is directly linked to the state's level of economic development. It is therefore possible for two states to have similar GNPs but substantially different population sizes and markedly different levels of industrialization. For example, one state might have a weak industrial base, but a relatively large population, a substantial portion of which is employed on farms, while the other state is highly industrialized, but has a considerably smaller population.25 The United Kingdom and Russia fit this profile for the hundred-year period between the fall of Napoleon in 1 8 1 5 and the start of World War I in l 9 1 4. Their GNPs were similar over that period, although the United Kingdom far outdistanced Russia in terms of industrial output, as Table 3 . 1 makes clear. But Russia was able to hold its own in terms of GNP, because its huge peasant population grew at a robust pace over the nine­ teenth century. Differences in industrial might like those between the United Kingdom and Russia, however, have imponant consequences for the balance of latent power. First, highly industrialized states invariably have consider­ ably more surplus wealth to spend on defense than do semi-industrialized states, mainly because much of the physical product of the peasantry is consumed on the spot by the peasants themselves. Second, only states with the most advanced industries are capable of producing the large quantities of sophisticated weaponry that militaries need to survive in combat.26 Focusing on GNP alone, however, might lead one to think that the United Kingdom and Russia had the most powerful economies in Europe

TA B L E 3 . 1

Indicators of British and Russian Weahh and

Papulatian, 1830-1913

1 860

1 880

1 900

1913

8.2

16.l

23.6

36.3

44. l

10.6

14.4

23.3

32.0

52.4

68

59

37

28

10

II

1 830

GNP (billions of dollars) United Kingdom Russia

Relative share of European wealth (percent) United Kingdom

53

Russia

15

Energy consumption (millions of metric tons of coal equivalent) United Kingdom Russia

73.8

125.3

1 7 1 .4

1 95.3

1 .0

5.4

30.4

54.5

Iron/steel production (thousands of tons) United Kingdom

690

3,880

7,870

4,979

7,787

Russia

1 90

350

450

2,201

4,925

Relative share of world manufacturing output (percent) United Kingdom

9.5

19.9

22.9

18.5

1 3 .6

Russia

5.6

7.0

7.6

8.8

8.2

Total industrial potential (United Kingdom in 1 900 = 100) United Kingdom

17.5

45.0

73.3

1 00.0

1 27.2

Russia

10.3

1 5 .8

24.5

47 . 5

76.6

United Kingdom

23.8

28.8

34.6

4 1 .2

45.6

Russia

57.6

76.0

1 00.0

1 3 5.7

175.I

Population (millions)

SOURCES: GNP figures, which are

in 1 960 U.S. dollars and prices, are from Paul Bairoch,

*Europe's Gross

National Product: 1 800- 1 975, w Journal ofEuropean Economic History 5, No. 2 (Fall 1 976), p. 2 8 1 . Relative shares of world manufacturing output are from Paul Bairoch, wlntemational Industrialization Levels from

1 7 5 0 to 1 980, w Journal of European Economic History 1 1 . No. 2 (Fall 1 982), p. 296. Figures for total indus­ in 1900 the baseline number of 100, are from ibid., p. 292. The energy consumption figures, the iron/steel production figures, and the population figures are from J. David Singer and Melvin Small, National Material Capabilities Data, 1 8 1 6- 1 985 (Ann Arbor, Ml: Inter·University Consonium for Political and Social Research, February 1993). The figures for relative shares of European wealth are from Table 3 . 3 . trial potential. which assign the United Kingdom

Wealth a n d Power

65

between 1 8 1 5 and 1 9 1 4, and that they had the wherewithal to build for­ midable military forces and dominate the region's politics. As a compari­ son of Table 3 . 1 with Table 3. 2 indicates, the United Kingdom and Russia led the other European great powers in terms of GNP during most of the period. In fact, this conclusion is wrong.27 The United Kingdom certainly had more latent power than any other European state during the nine­ teenth century, especially in the middle decades of that century, which are often called the "Pax Brittanica. "28 But as discussed below, the Russian economy was in an anemic state from at least the mid-nineteenth century through the 1 920s. Russia had relatively little latent power during this period, which explains in good part why its military suUered crushing defeats in the Crimean War ( 1 8 5 3-56), the Russo-Japanese War ( 1 904- 5 ) , and World War I ( 1 9 1 4- 1 7 ) ." In short, G N P fails to capture t h e poten­ tially sharp difference in latent power between industrialized and semi­ industrialized states. The same problem arises when GNP is used to compare the latent power of contemporary C hina with Japan and the United States. Despite its rapid economic development over the past two decades, China is still a semi-industrialized state. Roughly 1 8 percent of its wealth remains tied up in agriculture . )0 Japan and the United States, on the other hand, are high­ ly industrialized states; only 2 percent of their wealth is in agriculture. China, however, has almost five times as many people as the United States and about ten times as many people as Japan. Therefore, the bal­ ance of latent power among those three states will be biased in China's favor if GNP is the chosen measure. This problem is likely to go away with time, because China's agricultural base will continue to shrink (it account­ ed for 3 0 percent of wealth in 1 980) as its economy modernizes. But for now, it must be factored into any analysis that uses GNP to measure C hina's latent power. Thus, GNP is sometimes a sound measure of latent power, whereas at other times it is not. In those latter cases, one can either find an alterna­ tive indicator that does a better job of capturing latent power, or use GNP but add the appropriate qualifiers. In measuring the balance of latent power for the long historical period from 1 792 to 2000, it is impossible to find one simple but reliable indica-

TAILI 3 . 2

lndicatars o f French a n d Prussian/German Wealth and Population,

1 830-1 9 1 3

1 830

1 860

France

8.6

Germany

7.2

1913

1 180

1 900

1 33

1 7 .4

23.5

27.4

1 2 .8

20.0

3 5 .8

49.8

GNP (billions of dollars)

Relative share of European wealth (percent) France

21

Germany

14

13

11

12

10

20

34

40

Energy consumption (millions of metric tons of coal equivalent) France

1 3.2

29. l

48.0

62.8

Germany

1 5 .0

47 . l

1 1 3.0

1 87 . 8

Iron/steel production (thousands of tons) France Germany

270

900

1 , 7.30

1 , 565

4.687

60

400

2.470

6,46 1

1 7,600

Relative share of world manufacturing output (percent) France

5.2

7.9

7.8

6.8

6.1

Germany

3.5

4.9

8.5

1 3 .2

1 4.8

Total industrial potential (United Kingdom in 1 900 = 100) France

9.5

17.9

25.l

36.8

57.3

Germany

6.5

11.1

27.4

7 1 .2

1 37.7

France

32.4

37.4

37.5

38.9

39.7

Germany

12.9

1 8.0

45.l

56.0

67.0

Population (millions)

NOTE: Figures labeled "Germany· are for Prussia in 1830 and 1 860, and for Germany thereafter. SOURCES: Same as those in Table 3. 1 .

Wealth a n cl Power

67

tor of wealth. For one thing, there is little economic data available for the years between 1 792 and 1 8 1 5 . The main place this causes problems is in Chapter 8, when the question arises of whether Napoleonic France had more latent power than its great-power rivals. especially the United Kingdom. I attempt to deal with the problem by describing what histori­ ans say about the relative wealth of the United Kingdom and France, and also by looking at population size. the other building block of military power. This information provides a rough but probably accurate picture of the balance of latent power during the Napoleonic years.

I measure latent power between 1 8 1 6 and 1 960 with a straightforward composite indicator that accords equal weight to a state's iron and steel production and its energy consumption. That indicator. which e!!ectively represents a state's industrial might. does a good job of capturing both mobilizable wealth and level of technological development for that lengthy period. " From 1 960 to the present. GNP is used to measure wealth. I switched indicators in 1 960 for two reasons.32 First, my compos­ ite indicator is not useful after I 970, because the role of steel in the major industrial economies began to decline sharply around that time . " Thus, a different measure of potential power is needed for the years after 1 970; GNP was the obvious alternative. Second. the best available GNP figures for the Soviet Union and the United States. the two great powers in the system at the time. start in 1 960 and run through the end of the Cold War.'4 So I employ GNP for the last thirty years of the Cold War ( 1 9 60-90 ) and t h e first decade of the post-Cold War era ( 1 99 1 -2000 ) . taking due note of the limits of GNP as an indicator of China's latent power today. "

T H E E C O N O M I C F O U N D AT I O N O F M I L I TA RY P O W E R

A

brief look a t the rise and decline o f three European great powers dur­ ing the last two centuries buttresses my claim that wealth underpins

military power and that wealth by itself is a good indicator of latent power.

The profound change that took place in the balance of power between France and Germany ( Prussia before 1 870) during the nineteenth century.

68

T H E T R A G E D Y OF G R E AT P O W E R P O L I T I C S

a s well a s Russia's changing position i n the balance o f power between 1 800 and 2000, shows the crucial role of wealth in determining power. Napoleonic France was the most powerful state in Europe between 1 79 3 and 1 8 1 5; in fact, it came close to conquering the entire continent. Prussia was probably the weakest of the great powers at that time. It was decisively defeated by Napoleon's armies in 1 806 and was effectively knocked out of the European balance of power until 1 8 1 3, when it took advantage of France's devastating defeat in Russia to join the balancing coalition that finally finished off Napoleon at Waterloo in June of 1 8 1 5 . By 1 900, however, the tables had turned

almost

completely,

and

Wilhelmine Germany was emerging as Europe's next potential hegemon, while France needed alliance partners to help check its German neighbor. France and its allies subsequently went to war in 1 9 1 4 and 1 9 39 to pre­ vent Germany from dominating Europe. Changes in the relative wealth of France and Germany during the hun­ dred years after Waterloo largely account for the shift in military power between them. As is clear from Table 3.2, France was considerably wealthier than Prussia from 1 8 1 6 until the late 1 860s, when Otto von Bismarck transformed Prussia into Germany. In fact, Germany first gained an edge over France in steel production in 1 870, the year that the Franco­ Prussian War broke out.H• From that point until the start of World War I, the wealth gap between France and Germany steadily widened in the lat­ ter's favor. By 1 9 1 3, Germany was roughly three times as wealthy as France. This marked change in the relative wealth of France and Germany was due in part to the fact that Germany industrialized more rapidly than France in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The main cause, however. was a significant shift in the size of their respective popu­ lations, which illustrates how changes in wealth also capture changes in population. The data in Table 3.2 show that France had about a 2 . 5 : 1 advantage i n population over Prussia i n 1 8 30, but that b y 1 9 1 3 Germany had gained roughly a 1 .7: 1 population advantage over France. This demo­ graphic flip-flop was the result of two factors. The French birthrate in the nineteenth century was especially low, while the German birthrate was

Wealth a n cl Power

69

among the highest in Europe. Furthermore, the unified German state that Bismarck built around Prussia had a substantially larger population than Prussia itself. For example, Prussia had 1 9 . 3 million people in 1 86 5, whereas Germany h a d 34 . 6 million people in 1 870." Russia offers another case of a state whose position in the balance of power has been markedly affected by the fortunes of its economy. Russia was probably Napoleonic France's most formidable military rival. Indeed, the Russian army played the key role in driving Napoleon from power between 1 8 1 2 and 1 8 1 5 . There was even fear in the wake of France's col­ lapse that Russia might try to dominate Europe.38 But Russia did not make a run at hegemony after 1 8 1 5 . Instead, its position in the European bal­ ance of power declined over the next hundred years. As noted, Russia fought three wars against other great powers during that period and suf­ fered humiliating defeats in each: the C rimean War. the Russo-Japanese War. and World War I. A comparison of Russia's performance in the Napoleonic Wars. World War I, and World War II shows how weak Russia had become by 1 9 1 4 . Each conflict w a s dominated by a potential hegemon that invaded Russia. Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany were able to concentrate the bulk of their armies against Russia, although each had to maintain some forces in other theaters as well." Nevertheless, Russia decisively defeated both of those aggressors. During World War I, however. Germany deployed approximately two- thirds of its fighting forces on the western front against the French and British armies. while the remaining one-third fought against the Russian army on the eastern front.40 Although the German a rmy was fighting the Russian army with its best hand tied behind its back, it still managed to defeat Russia and knock it out of the war. a feat that neither Napoleon nor Hitler could accomplish with both hands free. Ru ssia's decline reached its nadir in the years immediately after World War I, when Poland invaded the newly created Soviet Union and scored major victories." The Red Army briefly turned the tide before the Poles regained the initiative and won a limited victory. Starting in the early 1 9 30s, however. the Soviets began to build a formidable military machine,

70

T H E T R A G E D Y OF G l l A T POWE i PO L I T I C S

which beat the Japanese army i n a brief war i n 1 9 3 9, and then defeated the vaunted German Wehrmacht in World War II. The Soviet Union was so powerful after 1 945 that only the United States could prevent it from dominating all of Europe. The Soviet Union remained a formidable mili­ tary power for more than fony years after Hitler's defeat, until it broke apart into fifteen separate states in 1 99 1 . The ups and downs i n Russian military power over the past two cen­ turies can be explained in good pan by changes in Russia's position in the hierarchy of wealth. Although we do not have much data on the wealth of the great powers between 1 800 and 1 8 1 5, it seems clear that the United Kingdom and France had the most powerful economies in Europe.42 Nevertheless, it does not appear that Russia was decidedly less wealthy than either the United Kingdom or France in those years.43 But even if that were the case, the Russian economy was still able to support the Russian military in its fight against Napoleon, although Russia received subsidies from the United Kingdom at various points in the conflict. In shon, there is no evidence that the French army had an important advan­ tage over the Russian army because France was wealthier than Russia .44 Russia's position in the balance of wealth declined sharply over the seventy-five years following Napoleon's defeat (see Table 3 . 3 ) , mainly because Russia industrialized much more slowly than did the United Kingdom, France. and Germany. Russia's lack of industrial might had important military consequences. For example, in the two decades before World War I, Russia could not afford to build large railroad networks in its western regions, which made it difficult for Russia to mobilize and move its armies rapidly to the Russo-German border. Germany, on the other hand. had a well-developed railroad system, so it could move its forces quickly to that same border. To rectify that asymmetry, France, which was allied with Russia against Germany. subsidized the building of Russian railroads.45 In essence, by the eve of World War I, Russia was a semi­ industrialized state about to go to war against a highly industrialized Germany.46 Not surprisingly, Russia's war economy could not support its army's needs. Rifle production was so woeful that in 1 9 1 5, •only part of the army

TABLE 3.3

Relative Share o f European Wealth, 1 8 1 6-1 940 1913

1 920

1 930

1 940

30%

28%

44%

27%

24%

39%

40%

38%

33%

36%

11%

12%

12%

1 3%

22%

9%

5%

10%

10%

11%

2%

14%

28%

4%

6%

7%

8%

8%

1%

1%

1%

2%

2%

3%

5%

4%

1-

1910

50%

37%

25%

34%

1 3%

3%

5% 0%

1816

1 820

1 830

1 840

1 850

1 860

1 870

43%

48%

53%

64%

70%

68%

64%

59%

8 °/o

7%

5%

5 °/o

4%

i0%

16%

20%

France

2i%

18%

21%

16%

12%

14%

1 3%

1 3%

Russia/Soviet Union

19%

18%

15%

9%

7%

4%

2%

9%

9%

7%

6%

7%

4%

-- ---- ---

United Kingdom Prussia/Germany

Austria-Hungary Italy

1 880

1 890

NOTE: ·weahh- here is a straightforward composite indicator t h a t assigns equal weight to ironfsteel produc1ion a n d energy consump1ion. Specifically, I determined the total a mount of ironfs1ccl that all the great powers produced for a given year, and then I calculated the percentage of that 101al accounted for by each greal power. I performed a similar calculation for energy consumption. Then I averaged together each state's percentages for iron/steel and energy. However, percentages for 1 8 30-50 are based on iron/steel production alone because energy consumption data is unavailable. Note that the calculations of European wealth used here and throughout this book arc based solely on figures for the relevant great powers and do not include minor powers such as Belgium and Denmark. Finally, no1e that Germany was Prussia before 1 870. SOURCES: All data are from Singer and Small, National Material Capabilities Data.

72

T H E T R A G E D Y OF G R E A T P OWE R P O L I T I C S

was armed, with others waiting for casualties io get arms. "47 Artillery was so lacking by as late as 1 9 1 7 that Germany had 6,8 1 9 heavy pieces, while Russia had only 1 .430. Jonathan Adelman estimates that at best only 30 percent of the Russian army's equipment needs were met during the war. Another way to look at Russia's problem is to consider the following com­ parisons for the period from 1 9 1 4 through 1 9 1 7 : I ) Germany produced 47,300 airplanes; Russia produced 3, 500. 2 ) Germany produced 280, 000 machine guns; Russia produced 28,000. 3 ) Germany produced 64,000 artillery pieces; Russia produced 1 1 ,700. 4) Germany produced 8, 547,000 rifles; Russia produced 3, 300,000. Thus, it is hardly surprising that less than half the German army was able to defeat the entire Russian army in World War I. Stalin ruthlessly but effectively modernized the Soviet economy in the 1930s, so that by the start of World War II Germany enjoyed only a modest advantage in wealth over the Soviet Union (see Table 3 . 3 ) .48 Thus, the Soviet war economy was able to compete effedively with the German war economy in World War II. Indeed, the Soviets outproduced the Germans in virtually

every category of military weaponry for the years from 1 94 1 through 1 945: I) The Soviet Union produced 1 02, 600 airplanes; Germany pro­ duced 76,200. 2 ) The Soviet Union produced 1 .437,900 machine guns; Germany produced 1 . 048,500. 3 ) The Soviet Union produced 1 1 ,820, 500 rifles; Germany produced 7,845, 700. 4) The Soviet Union produced 92,600 tanks; Germany produced 4 1 . 500. 5 ) The Soviet Union produced 3 50,300 mortars; Germany 68,900 .49

No wonder the Red Army defeated the Wehrmacht on the eastern lront.50

Wealth a n ti Power

7J

Although the Soviet economy suffered enormous damage in World War ff (see Table 3.4), the Soviet Union emerged from that conflict with the most powerful economy in Europe .5 1 Not surprisingly. it had the mili­ tary might in the late 1 940s to dominate the region. But the United States, which was far wealthier than the Soviet Union (see Tu.ble 3 . 5 ) . was deter­ mined to prevent the Soviets from becoming a European hegemon. In the first three decades after World War II, the Soviet economy grew rapidly as it recovered from that war, and the wealth gap with its bipolar rival nar­ rowed considerably. It appeared that General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's boast in 1 9 5 6 that the Soviet Union would "bury• the United States might prove true. 52

T A. I L i 3 . ..

Relative Share o f European Wealth,

1 94 1 -44

1 94 1

1 942

1 943

1 944

United States

54%

58%

61%

63%

Germany

22%

23%

23%

19%

Soviet Union

12%

7%

7%

9%

United Kingdom

9%

9%

9%

9%

Italy

3%

3%

NOTE: ·wealth" is measured with the same composite indicator used in Table 3.3, save for the fact that I use energy production here instead of energy consumption. Although the United States is not a European power. it is included in this table because it was deeply involved in the fighting in Europe during World War II. SOURCES:

Energy and steel figures for the

United

States are

from

8.

R.

Mitchell.

lnttrnation