The Third Rome: National Bolshevism In The USSR
 0813301394, 9780813301396

Table of contents :
Contents
Illustrations
Foreword to the First Russian Edition
Preface
1. The Russian-European Revolutionary Contest Before 1871
2. The Russian-European Revolutionary Contest, 1871-1914
3. The Bolshevik Revolution as a Culmination of the Russian-German Contest
4. The Third International: World Revolutionary Center Moves from Russia to Germany
5. Socialism in One Country: Triumph of Russian Etatist Nationalism
Notes
Bibliography
Protocols and Official Documents
Collections
Selected Russian and Soviet Periodicals and Serials
Books and Articles
Index

Citation preview

The Third Rome

About the Book and Author Soviet Russia manifested a fervent revolutionary nationalism, even mes* sianism, immediately after the October revolution in 1917. The old concept of Russia as the Third Rome now acquired a new ideological dimension: that world revolution would emanate only from Russia and only as Russia dictated. At the same time, leaders of the European revolutionary movement, led originally by Marx and Engels in the mid'1800s, feared that a Russian revolution would bring Russian influence into the heart of Europe. The social revolution, both in Europe and in Russia, therefore acquired a nationalist context: To whom does the leading role belong? This book presents an entirely new interpretation of the Bolshevik révolution by examining its geopolitical context in addition to its domestic aspect Dr. Agursky argues that in the early 1900s Lenin’s revolutionary strategy was to outpace the “competitive” German revolution; German social democracy had its own formula to bring social revolution to Russia, and Lenin wanted to consolidate Bolshevik power in order to bring “his” revolution to Germany. The author concludes that by 1917 Russian intel­ lectuals well understood the deep-rootedness of Bolshevik nationalism, and, although Bolshevism had ostensibly been loyal to Marxism, on a political level it was now in fact a rebellion against it. The author makes wide use of many entirely new Russian, German, and Jewish sources and also suggests a new interpretation of a number of historical figures, including Marx, Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky, and Bogdanov. Mikhail Agursky earned a Ph.D. in cybernetics in 1969 in Moscow and a second doctorate, in Slavic studies, in 1983 in Paris. He has been a scientific adviser to the Soviet military industry and is currently a political analyst for the Israeli media and senior lecturer at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Among his many publications are From Under the Rubble (with Alexander Solzhenitsyn and others, 1975), Soviet Golem (in Russian, 1982), and Gorky: From the Literary Heritage (with Margarite Shklovskaia, in Russian, 1986) as well as chapters in The Many Faces of Communism (edited by Morton Kaplan; 1978) and When Patterns Change: Turning Points in International Relations (edited by Nissan Oren; 1984).

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The Third Rome National Bolshevism in the U SSR Mikhail Agursky Foreword by Leonard Schapiro

Westview Press / Boulder and London

To the memory of my parents, Shmuel and Bunya Agursky, and to a world destroyed by the developments this book attempts to interpret

All rights reserved N o pert o f this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical. Including photocopy, recording, or any Information storage and retrieval system, without permission In writing from the publisher. Copyright O 1967 by Westview Press, Inc. Published in 1967 in the United States o f America by Westview Press, Inc.; Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher; 5500 Central Avenue. Boulder, Colorado 80301

Library o f Congress Cataloging-tn-Publlcarion Data Agursky, Mikhail. T h e third Rome. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Nationalism and socialism—Soviet U nion—History. 2. Soviet U nion—Politics and government— 19173. Comm unism—Soviet U nion—History. 4. Comm unism— Germany—History. 5. Soviet U nion—Relations—Germany. 6. Germ any—Relations—Soviet Union. I. Title. H X550.N3A37 1987 320.5'32t)947 86-9264 ISBN 0-8133-0139-4

Printed and bound in the United States o f America

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Th e paper used in this publication meets the requirements o f the American National Standard for Permanence o f Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

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Contents List of Illustrations...............................................................................................x Foreword to the First Russian Edition, Leonard Schapiro.......................... xi Preface................................................................................................................... xii 1

T H E R U SSIA N EU R O PEA N REV O LU TIO N A RY C O N TEST BEFO R E 1 8 7 1 .................................................................... 1 Russian G eopolitics.......................................................................................1 Russian Nationalism.......................................................................................6 Slavophilism and Pta'Slavism ...................................................................... 9 Westernism and Pkn^Slavism.................................................................. 11 Marxism as German Revolutionary Nationalism ................................. 16 Russian Revolutionary Nationalism Versus German Revolutionary Nationalism .................................................................... 20 Fui'Slavism Receives Official Support in R ussia.................................. 27 Russian Populism: The Worship of the Russian People.....................29 Ferdinand Lassalle and His Etatist-Nationalist Influence on Russia.................................................................................31 Petr Tkatchev: The Revolutionary Reeducation of a Degraded People............................................................................ 33 The Russian Machiavellian: Sergei Netchaev......................................... 36

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T H E R U SSIA N EU R O PEA N REV O LU TIO N A RY C O N TEST, 1 8 7 1 - 1 9 1 4 ........................................................................ 40 Russia and Germany After 1871..............................................................40 Fedor Dostoevsky: His Quest for Russian World D om ination................................................................................ 48 The Jewish Peril.......................................................................................... 55 Russian G nosticism .................................................................................... 57 German Social Democracy and R ussia....................................................61 L en in ............................................................................................................. 72 Bolshevism as a Political Movement........................................................80 Maxim G orky...............................................................................................82 “Forward”—Left-Wing Bolshevism ..........................................................83 VH

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Contents The Jews and Bolshevism.......................................................................... 92 The Russian Authorities Versus Bolshevism ......................................... 98 S ta lin ........................................................................................................... 107 Russian Radical Right Versus Bolshevism ............................................ ID Foreign C apital........................................................................................... 120 The 1905 Revolution and Its International Implications................... 123 Debates on National Self-Determ ination.............................................. 128

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T H E BO LSH EV IK R EV O LU TIO N A S A CU LM IN A TIO N O F T H E RU SSIAN -GERM A N C O N T E ST ................................................................................................. D3 World War I ............................................................................................... D3 The March (February O.S.) Revolution................................................ 147 The Bolshevik R evolution...................................................................... 157 National Catastrophe................................................................................. 168 World M ystery........................................................................................... 170 Sectarian Nihilism—An Ally o f Bolshevism ........................................ 179 Supraorganical Solution.............................................................................184 Brest-Litovsk D ebates...............................................................................187 The New A rm y.........................................................................................195 War Communism—Communism in One Country..............................199 The Long-awaited German Revolution..................................................201 Red Patriotism ...........................................................................................203 Self-Determination in Practice................................................................ 212

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T H E T H IR D IN TER N A TIO N A L: W ORLD REV O LU TIO N A RY C EN TER M OVES FROM R U SSIA TO G E R M A N Y ...................................................... 214 The Communist International.................................................................214 The Polish W ar......................................................................................... 217 The Asiatic Strategy................................................................................ 224 World Recognition and Coexistence......................................................227 The Jewish Problem.................................................................................. 229 Defeat as V ictory...................................................................................... 238 C an o ssa.......................................................................................................247 Smenovekhism in Bulgaria...................................................................... 255 Smenovekhism in Soviet R u ssia............................................................257 Lenin’s Intervention.................................................................................. 263 Gorky’s Attack Against Jewish Bolsheviks........................................... 266 Cultural Continuity.................................................................................. 268 “Russia” ....................................................................................................... 281 Jewish National Bolsheviks...................................................................... 282 Counterattack Against Smenovekhism..................................................292 The End of Revolutionary Hopes in Europe— The Triumph of Fascism .................................................................... 300

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SO CIA LISM IN O N E C O U N TR Y : TR IU M PH O F R U SSIA N ET A T IST N A T IO N A L ISM .......... 305 Socialism in One Country as Consolidation of Power...................305 Ustrialov: A Litmus Paper of Soviet Political D eb ates...................309 Turkestan Socialism Versus Basel Socialism....................................... 3D Stalin Resorts to A nti-Sem itism .......................................................... 318 The Destruction of National Trends Among Minority Com m unists...........................................................................................327 The Destruction of Independent Foreign Communism.....................329 The Sinister Shadow o f Ustrialov..........................................................330 The Fifteenth Party Congress—Stalin's Trium ph............................... 334 Epilogue.......................................................................................................340

N otes................................................................................................................... 343 Bibliography.......................................................................................................384 Index................................................................................................................... 406

Illustrations Alexander H erzen.......................................................... Mikhail Bakunin............................................................ Petr Tkatchev.................................................................. Fedor D ostoevsky.......................................................... Vladimir Soloviev.......................................................... Georgy Plekhanov.......................................................... Vladimir Lenin............................................................... Alexander Bogdanov..................................................... Joseph Stalin.................................................................... Alexander B lo k .............................................................. Andrei B e ly .................................................................... Nikolai K liu ev................................................................ Sergei Esenin.................................................................. Alexei Brusilov................................................................ Lev T rotsky.................................................................... Alexei Tolstoi.................................................................. The meeting of solidarity with the Hungarian and Bavarian revolutions, 1919....................................... Konstantin Fedin........................................................... Vladimir Maiakovsky..................................................... Isai Lezhnev.................................................................... Dia Ehrenburg...............................................................

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Foreword to the First Russian Edition The author of this book is one of the most vigorous and original representatives of the intelligentsia to have left the Soviet Union in the last few years. Even before his departure, Mikhail Agursky won a reputation for his articles on religious and social subjects, including his participation in the collection From Under the Rubble. In the West, he has consolidated his reputation by his participation in international symposia and conferences. This is his first book, and it demonstrates all the qualities we could legitimately expect from its author. It is also the first detailed examination of National Bolshevism, particularly in its display of Smenovekhism. Agursky follows the emergence of a unique left-wing nationalist trend just after the revolution, and then he investigates Smenovekhism in Russia itself. In one of the most innovative and valuable chapters of the book, the author demonstrates how the attitude of the Soviet leadership toward Smenovekhism is interwoven with interparty struggle. Agursky believes that National Bolshevism paved the way for the Stalinist slogan, Socialism in one country. There is no doubt that Agursky*s book will provoke lively discussion. But that is good. It is useful for historical science when there is discussion on such a serious research background. The early history of Soviet Russia is far from having been covered thoroughly. It is possible to make a serious assessment of the more recent period, particularly of the meaning of nationalist elements in the time of Stalin, only if based on meticulous research into the early years. Agursky’s work therefore sheds light on current events as well. Let us hope that Agursky’s book will receive a wide response and will be translated into various languages. Leonard Schapiro London School of Economics and Political Science 1979 Translated from the Russian

Preface The Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset wrote in 1930: In every instance of historical camouflage we have two realities superimposed; one genuine and substantial, underneath; the other apparent and accidental, on the surface. So, in Moscow, there is a screen o f European ideas—Marxism— thought out in Europe in view of European realities and problems. . . . That Marxism should triumph in Russia, where there is no industry, would be die greatest contradiction that Marxism could undergo. But there is no such contradiction, for there is no such triumph. Russia is M arxist more or less as the Germans o f the Holy Roman Empire were Romans. . . . I am waiting for the book in which Stalin's Marxism will appear translated into Russian history. For it is this which is Russia’s strength, what it has o f Russian, not what it has of Com m unist (The Revolt of the M asses (London, 1972), p. 105]

I have no ambition to say that this book is the first and only one devoted to the generous wish to satisfy the request of the great Ortega; the Bibliography is sufficient demonstration of the abundance of such attempts. History is inexhaustible, since every historian—and especially a historian of modem times—is able to extract new historical material from the stock unused by previous historians. He or she is also able to suggest a new interpretation for known historical facts, or to fit the subject into a larger historical or geographical framework. What may have seemed insignificant before may acquire a new and vital meaning for a new generation of historians. As philosophers, especially Raymond Aron, have said, the present depends on the future. We do not yet know the ends of many great historical events and cannot therefore pass final judgment upon them: The processes launched by the first appearances of great religions such as Christianity or Islam are not yet complete. Do we know all the implications of events such as the discovery of nuclear energy, or more generally, are we now capable of making a final judgment as to whether rapid technical progress and industrial revolutions are a blessing or a curse? Indeed, we also do not know the end of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. It is not yet finished, and one cannot yet tell whether it was a success or a failure. The Marxist and socialist components of the great historical process launched by the Bolshevik revolution seemed dominant to the people who XII

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believed that Marxism had triumphed in Russia. Such historians, regardless of their attitude toward Marxism, positive or negative, tried to ignore the non-Marxist elements of Soviet history as marginal. They accepted the official Soviet statements at face value. Many historians were virtually trapped by these official declarations, and sometimes they transformed Western Soviet studies into a branch of official Soviet historiography—the main difference being that these studies were abundantly supplied with footnotes, as is academically accepted in the West. The more time separates us from the Bolshevik revolution, the more clearly one can see that the Marxist (theoretical!) and socialist components of Bolshevism were indeed a “historical camouflage/' to quote Ortega, for deeper historical and geopolitical processes—as was true in the aftermath of the French Revolution. There were serious politicians who came to this realization early on, but historians disregarded their opinion, in spite of the fact that it served as a background for many far-reaching political decisions that led to international recognition of Soviet Russia. New Soviet developments demonstrate more and more that one can no longer ignore what was previously mistakenly regarded as marginal: for example, the political and cultural events connected with Russian emigration after 1917; the problem of the so-called fellow travelers in Soviet Russia in the 1920s; the formative period of Soviet leadership, which exposed it to various non-Marxist influences; the merging of Bolshevism with other Russian political movements on the eve of the revolution; Russian religious thought and the history of religion in Russia, and so on. What is necessary is a new reading of what was said by Bolshevik leaders, especially Lenin and Stalin, which badly needs a system of interpretation. In this way, one can easily discover how, for example, Lenin, who never took issue with Marx and Engels publicly, in fact rebelled against them in a very important subject: the attitude toward the Russian revolutionary tradition. As is well known, Marx and Engels were extremely hostile to Alexander Herzen; they called him a Pan-Slavist “landlord" and did not regard him as a revolutionary. The reason for their hostility was Herzen’s rejection of the West en bloc, including its revolutionary movement, and his appeal for a Slavic (Russian) invasion of Europe. When Lenin published his famous eulogy of Herzen in 1912, in which he declared that Herzen was the main founding father of Russian socialism and the predecessor of Bolshevism, without even mentioning Marx and Engels’ hostility toward him, Lenin was in fact openly rebelling against the former in his own quest for world revolutionary leadership, a quest that was rooted in Herzen’s position. In his writings, Lenin never disclosed his real intentions, which were far from his declared goals. He wanted to be the absolute world political leader who would open up a new era of human history, and Russia was the “electoral constituency" that would aid him in achieving this objective. He was ready to make any political concessions, even give up his declared theoretical principles, to carry out his grande désigné. His absolute value was power—power on a world scale, as quickly as possible, and in his life span.

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This goal is why Lenin’s writings were part of a consistent public relations campaign in order to justify his tactical moves. He was a lawyer by education, and he used his professional skills very efficiently—for example, in the rapid change of his dramatic appeal to save the imminent German revolution in order to justify the October revolution, to the claim a few months later during the Brest-Litovsk debates that the German revolution was not yet ripe and the peace treaty with imperial Germany must be signed as soon as possible. Therefore, the people who look at Lenin’s writings as genuine expressions of his views are grossly mistaken. This statement does not mean that his writings have no cognitive value, only that they need interpretation. The real Lenin, the real Stalin, cannot be discovered only from the face value of their declared statements. The history of Bolshevism cannot be studied only through the Bolsheviks’ own documents, as is sometimes done by historians. Bolshevism developed an esoteric political culture that is still terra incognita to many people who regard themselves as experts in Soviet affairs. Soviet studies need deep and bold revisionism, but not of the kind that tries to treat the Soviet system simply as the result of an evil ideological creation ex nihilo. Soviet Russia was not created ex nihilo only according to utopian rules. Another important aspect of this book is my attempt to regard the Bolshevik revolution as an event caused by geopolitical development, and I must stress that the use of the term geopolitical differs in the present work from that of Halford Mackinder or Karl Haushofer. Not only geography is taken into consideration but also all the natural factors of this or that country, including anthropological, demographical, and so on. In spite of the personal ambitions of this or that leader, the revolution was largely tempered by the Russian-German geopolitical confrontation. The Bolshevik revolution had immensely disastrous consequences, causing untold human suffering and swallowing tens, if not hundreds, of millions of lives in many countries as a result of wars, political tyranny, and extraordinary inefficiency. But it would be difficult to pinpoint the main historical villain, and it is rather misleading to speak in such terms at all. However, if one would like to entertain such intellectual games, he or she should first of all investigate many suspicious cases, including not only Russian political leaders (Bolshevik and non-Bolshevik) but primarily German leaders. Contemporary humanity and world politics are far from perfect They are a battleground of unbridled human selfishness, which is why any human quest for social justice and progress quickly becomes a powerful instrument in the mortal geopolitical struggles between great powers. I do not believe in historical determinism, in spite of all geopolitical pressures that might dictate it The Bolshevik revolution was only a historical option: The same geopolitical situation might have been solved in many different ways. It is difficult to say what Russian and world history would have been like without Lenin’s unique political genius and his extraordinary political boldness and quick reactions.

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Throughout the book I use extensively the term National Bolshevism. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, I should like to explain my definition of this term. National Bolshevism is the Russian etatist ideology that legitimizes the Soviet political system from the Russian etatist point of view, contrary to its exclusive Marxist legitimacy. Etatism can be (listin' guished from cultural nationalism, as Lev Kopelev insists in his book Derzhava i narod. Nevertheless, I would like to define etatism as a powerful form of nationalism. Contrary to Kopelev’s claim, National Bolshevism does not reject Communist ideology, though it strives to minimize its importance to the level necessary for legitimacy. However, its objectives are different from those of Communist ideology. National Bolshevism in its original form strove for world domination, conceived as the universal Russian empire cemented by Communist ideology. It is not excluded that in some circum* stances National Bolshevism might limit itself to the etatist concept of a Russian superpower. The concept of the Third Rome as such does not play a significant role in this work, since it is merely the most expressive manifestation of the very old Russian geopolitical quest for world centrality and domination. Nevertheless, this idea was publicly expressed at top levels of Soviet Russia. In 1945, a month and a half after victory over Nazi Germany, the Russian minister for education and a favorite of Stalin, Vladimir Potemkin (1874— 1946) , referred to “the haughty idea of Moscow as the Third Rome” in the official newspaper Izvestia. Potemkin did not conceal his opinion that this idea was not an intellectual conception only of the spiritual centrality of Russia. He linked it to the territorial expansion of the Russian state. “The Russian people,” Potemkin said, “not only waged a defensive struggle, securing their freedom and independence and also guarding Western civ~ ilization from Asian barbarians. In its mighty growth it expanded the boundaries of the Russian state, bringing to it new, vitally necessary lands with the nations that populated them ” (V Potemkin, Stat’i i retchi [Moscow 1947] , p. 237). Methodologically, the present work does not belong to the history of ideas. I believe in the power of ideas, but ideas become powerful only in favorable circumstances. Circumstances, therefore, select successful ideas. I subscribe to what was said by the German historian Dieter Groh about his own excellent book, that it belonged to the history of ideas in a specific sense since it did not follow the innate development of ideas but placed historical-philosophical concepts in actual political and social contexts (Russ' land und das SelbstverstAndnis Europas, p. 15). In the same way, this book is an interrelation between the history of ideas and political and social history, with a special accent on geopolitics and demography. My first comprehensive attempt to treat this problem is to be found in my book, Ideologia natsional-holshevizma [The ideology of National Bol­ shevism], finished at the beginning of 1979 and published in 1980 in Russian. The book received several favorable reviews, and in 1981 I prepared a new version of it as my doctoral thesis in French for the École des Hautes

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Études in Paris. It was accepted in 1983. Conceptually, the French version does not differ from the Russian, though it uses more historical m aterial The present work includes the major part of the first Russian version and some new material from the French version, though these are only part of a larger concept since the problem of National Bolshevism is regarded here from a geopolitical point o f view. Nevertheless, some material used in the Russian and French versions is not included in this present version, and those versions might serve as additional sources for readers interested in more information. For example, I decided to exclude a chapter on Eurasianism since this ideology did not have a direct impact on Soviet society in its first formative period. I also excluded the history of the relationship between the Russian Orthodox church and the Soviet state. I have made extensive use of secondary sources, not in order to prove my conclusions, but in order to show how this or that issue was percetved by those historians who have already worked in this field, if they formulated such an issue more ably than I. By using the best formulations of my predecessors, I may permit myself the feeling that I belong to world historical thought and am not making a precarious pretense to create my own historical interpretation by relying only on basic historical facts. The book was written by me in English—including translations of quotations into English—and I should like to acknowledge the help given me by Susanna Shabbetai, who also typed the manuscript. Many people contributed at different stages to the elaboration of the conceptual framework o f the book by offering practical help and advice. I deeply acknowledge the late George Haupt, Michel Heller, Nikita Struve (Paris); Galina Kellerman (Jerusalem); Michael Kliaver (Tel Aviv); the late Leonard Schapiro (London); Frederick Barghoom (Yale); Robert Tucker (Princeton); and Alexander Solzhenitsyn for their help and advice during my work on the Russian version of this book. I also deeply acknowledge the help of Alain Besançon, my scientific supervisor during my work on the French version. He also chaired the jury, which included Michel Heller and Annie Kriegel, that accepted it for my Ph.D. When the Russian version appeared, several scholars commented upon it, and I am deeply thankful to Dia Serman (Jerusalem), Darrell Hammer (Bloomington), Anthony D'Agostino (San Francisco), Richard Pipes (Harvard), the late Nikolai Andreev (Cambridge), and Hermann Andreev (Mainz). I am also very thankful to Nissan Oren and Tuvia Ben Moshe (Jerusalem) for very fruitful discussions of geopolitical aspects of the Bolshevik revolution. Here, too, I must express my thanks to Gabriel Sheffer (Jerusalem), whose aid was crucial in the preparation o f the present work. I would like to thank separately Dmitry Segal and Elena Tolstaia*Segal (Jerusalem) for their extremely useful intellectual discussions of the content of my work in all its stages and Roy Medvedev (Moscow) for various discussions and for his favorable comments on my Russian version. I also acknowledge the support of the Soviet and East European Research Centre

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and the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in the preparation of this book. I would like also to express my deep gratitude to Megan Schoeck, who did an excellent job as the copyeditor of my book. Mikhail Agursky

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The Russian-European Revolutionary Contest Before 1871 Russian Geopolitics After the short-lived French continental domination under Napoleon Bo­ naparte, a new balance of European power was established Several of Europe's great powers contributed, but only in 1871 was the final constellation o f forces achieved. (That year has been called by Nissan Oren the year of pivotal change in world history due to "the imposition of Prussian hegemony over the Germanies under Bismarck.")1 Indeed, instead of the loose German Confederation, consisting of almost 300 monarchies and cities, an extremely powerful country emerged that shifted not only the European but also the world balance of power. France, which saw itself as the strongest European continental power, was humuliatingly defeated Germany was not merely another new powerful country. With Prussia as its foundation, it absorbed the most advanced world military tradition, which boasted of an unbroken sequence of victories. Prussian militarism became the German raison d'être. (Let us take into consideration that the process of German unification had not yet been completed by 1871, as many Germans lived in the Austro-Hungarian empire and elsewhere). Europe was shocked by the manifestation of German military power and German self-assertiveness, which had ruined the previous balance of power and had caused various changes in traditional European alliances. The Russian empire was the largest in die w orld larger even than that of the U SSR today, since it included Poland Finland present-day Alaska, and Turkish Armenia. Throughout its history, Russia had expanded in every possible direction, stopping only when faced by resistance. Russia already controlled the Far East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus; impinged on the borders of China, Persia, and Afghanistan; and threatened British India.

In the West, Russia's progress was barred by Germany and AustriaHungary, but die Ottoman empire seemed to be a new natural prey. Whatever explanation there is for persistent expansion, Russia was regarded as a most important great power, regardless of its inefficiency. Although no Russian ruler made any public statement in favor o f Russian world domination, it was widely believed in the West that the country did in fact strive in this direction. 1

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The Russian-Euroßean Contest Before 1871

At the end o f the eighteenth century, a document known as the “Testament of Peter the Great” began to circulate in the W est2 The authenticity of this document is doubtful, but nevertheless many people, both in the West and in Russia, regarded it as authentic or even, according to Marx and Engels, as a rationalization of Russian foreign policy. In spite of its doubtful authenticity, the Testament did have a powerful impact as it listed in great detail the variety of ways by which Russia would come to dominate the world, militarily and politically. As a result, many European politicians and thinkers were persuaded that Russia posed a geopolitical threat that must be contained. An intense anti' Russian obsession, bordering even on frenzy, developed, and it reached its greatest peak of intensity in German lands.3 Both Prussia and Austria' Hungary had large Slav populations and regarded them as kin to the Russians, although this Slavic kinship was only a political chimera. Apart from a certain linguistic affinity, there was almost no link between Slav nations. However, the fear of a successful Pan-Slavic movement, which could destroy Austria-Hungary, cause the rebellion of Prussian Poles, and bring Russia into the conflict as the chief protector of the Slavs, was sufficient to create intense anti'Russian feeling in Prussia and AustriaHungary. In fact, the collapse of Austria-Hungary would have been a most serious threat to Germany as well A Pan-Slavic movement, among the Czechs, for example, could have brought the Russians as near as Bayern— where they now are, by the way. One must also keep in mind the already quite deep penetration of Russia into German political life via various dynastic intermarriages long before German unification under Bismarck. Therefore, it was vitally important for Germany to keep Austria-Hungry as a buffer to guard the Slav population from any possible Russian penetration. An intense Russophobia permeated German circles, balanced to only a very small extent by Russophilia. This Russophobia reached a height for which there was no rational explanation and was verbalized in the concept of the so-called Teuton-Slav confrontation, which was regarded as existential, even racial, rather than political.4 Prussian militarists regarded the Teuton-Slav antagonism as a basic conflict to be solved sooner or later in mortal combat. They saw no political solution to this confrontation, which was part of the concept of a larger German race-cult that emerged in Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth century and which, as Leon Poliakov said, “has no analogy in any other country. None of the varieties o f European nationalism which were beginning to compete with each other at the time assumed this biologically oriented form. Between 1790 and 1815 with practically no transition, writers moved on from the idea of a specifically German mission to the glorification of the language, and from there to glorification of German blood.”5 This was only one side of the coin. What happened in Russia? Although many Germans anticipated the Slav threat and an inevitable Teuton-Slav confrontation, there was a massive German penetration into Russia that was over and above any imagined Russian penetration into the German

The Russum-European Contât Before 1871

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world The migration was in only one direction, eastward Drang nach Osten. Since the eighteenth century, when Peter the Great had invited many German experts and advisers to modernize his empire and help him conquer the Baltic states, Russia had been inundatd with Germans, who quickly became a most influential and skilled power group. It is ironic that die previously noted Russian penetration o f German political life was mirrored by Germany to the extent that the formerly ethnic Russian ruling dynasty had become gradually Germanized: The eighteenth