The Syrian Land: Processes Of Integration And Fragmentation. Bilad Al Sham From The 18th To The 20th Century 3515073094, 9783515073097

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
Highways, Railroads, Telegraphs, and Seaports: The Physical Means of Integration
Highways and Sea Lanes in Southwest Syria in the 18th Century
The Beirut-Damascus Road: Connecting the Syrian Coast to the Interior in the 19th Century
Changements dans les Routes et les Flux Commerciaux du Désert Syrien 1870-1920: Le Sort Incertain des Oasis du Nord de la Palmyrène
The Introduction of Railroads in the Eastern Mediterranean: Economic and Social Impacts
Railway Networks of the Middle East to 1948
Railways In the Political Economy of Southern Syria 1890-1925
Instant Communication: The Impact of the Telegraph in Ottoman Syria
The City, the Coast, the Mountain, and the Hinterland:
Beirut's Commercial and Political Rivalries in the 19th and Early 20th Century
Sewerage and City Quarters: The Infrastructure of the Urban Space
The Traditional Water and Sewer System in the Old City of Aleppo and its Changes in the Mandatory Period
The Urban Fabric of an Extramural Quarter in 19th-Century Damascus
The Historic Fabric of Damascus and its Changes in the 19th and at the Beginning of the 20th Century
The Role of Administration & Education
The ''Lebanon Schools" (1853-1873): A Local Venture in Rural Education
State Civil Education in Late Ottoman Damascus: A Unifying or a Separating Force?
The Genesis of Midhat Pasha’s Governorship in Syria 1878-1880
Nablus versus Haifa, 1870-1914: Administrative Developments and their Impact on Social Stratification
Economic and Social Consequences of the Opening of New Markets: The Case of Nablus, 1870-1914
Integration & Resistance
Wartime Regional and Imperial Integration of Greater Syria during World War I
The Disintegration of Ottoman Rule in the Syrian Territories as Viewed by German Observers
State(s) Power and the Druzes: Integration and the Struggle for Social Control (1838-1949)
Shishakli and the Druzes: Integration and Intransigence
Index

Citation preview

THOMAS PHILIPP & BIRGIT SCHAEBLER (eds.) THE SYRIAN LAND: PROCESSES OF INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION

BERLINER ISLAMSTUDIEN BAND 6

HERAUSGEGEBEN VOM INSTITUT FÜR ISLAMWISSENSCHAFT DER FREIEN UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN

THE SYRIAN LAND: PROCESSES OF INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION BILÄD AL-SHÄM FROM THE 18TH TO THE 20TH CENTURY

EDITED B Y THOMAS PHILIPP & BIRGIT SCHAEBLER

FRANZ STEINER VERLAG STUTTGART 1998

Gedruckt m it Unterstützung der G ad a Henkel Stiftung

D ie D eutsche B ibliothek • C IP -E inheitsaufnahm e T he S y ria n la n d : p ro cesses o f in te g ra tio n a n d fra g m e n ta tio n : B ilad A l-ShSm from th e 18th to th e 20th century / cd. by T hom as P h ilip p f t B irg it S chaebler. - S tu ttg art : S tein er, 1998 (B erlin er Islam studien ; B d. 6 ) ISB N 3-515-07309-4

ISO 9706 Jed e V erw ertung d es W erkes außerhalb d er G renzen d es U rheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzuläs­ sig u nd strafb ar. D ies g ilt insbesondere fü r Ü bersetzung, N achdruck, M ikroverfilm ung o der verg leichb are V erfahren sow ie fUr d ie S peicherung in D atenverarbeitungsanlagen. G edn ick t a u f alterungsbeständigem P apier. 0 1998 by F ran z S teiner V erlag W iesbaden G m bH , S itz S tu ttg a rt D ruck: D ruckerei P eter P ro ff, E urasburg. P rin ted in G erm any

Contents

P reface

ix

Highways, Railroads, Telegraphs, and Seaports: The Physical Means of Integration

1

Thom as P h ilipp Highways and Sea Lanes in Southwest Syria in die 18th Century

3

L eila Fawaz The B eirut-D am ascus Road: Connecting the Syrian Coast to die Interior in the 19th Century

19

Françoise M itra l Changem ents dans les Routes et les Flux Com m erciaux du D ésert Syrien 1870-1920: Le Sort Incertain des Oasis du N ord de la Palm yrine

29

M ichael E . B onine The Introduction o f Railroads in the Eastern M editerranean: Econom ic and Social Im pacts

53

Shorten Khai raUah Railway Netw orks o f the M iddle East to 1948

79

Linda S . Schilcher Railways in the Political Econom y o f Southern Syria 1890-1925

97

Eugene Rogan Instant Com m unication: The Im pact o f the Telegraph in O ttom an Syria

113

M ahm oud H addad The C ity, the C oast, the M ountain, and the Hinterland: B eirut's Com m ercial and Political Rivalries in the 19th and Early 20th C entury

129

VI

The Syrien Land

Sewerage and City Quarters: The Infrastructure of the Urban Space

755

H einz G aube The Traditional W ater and Sewer System in the Old City o f Aleppo and its Changes in the M andatory Period

757

cA bd ai-Razzaq M o n The U rban Fabric o f an Extram ural Q uarter in 19th-Century Damascus

165

D orothée Sack The H istoric Fabric o f Damascus and its Changes in the 19th and at the Beginning o f the 20th Century

185

The Role of Administration & Education

203

A bdtd-R ahim Abu-H usayn The "Lebanon Schools" (1853-1873): A Local Venture in R ural Education

205

R andi D eguilhem State C ivil Education in Late Ottom an Damascus: A U nifying o r a Separating Force?

221

B u tn u Abu-M anneh The Genesis o f M idhat Pasha’s G overnorship in Syria 1878-1880

251

M ahm oud Yazbak Nablus versus H aifa, 1870-1914: Adm inistrative Developments and their Im pact on Social Stratification

269

G adG . G ilbar Econom ic and Social Consequences o f die Opening o f New M arkets: The Case o f N ablus. 1870-1914

281

vii

Integration & Resistance

293

H asan Kayah W artim e Regional and Im perial Integration o f G reater Syria during W orld W ar I

295

Johann S tn a u s The D isintegration o f O ttom an Rule in the Syrian Territories as Viewed by G erm an O bservers

307

B irg it S ch aebler State(s) Pow er and the D nizes: Integration and die Struggle for Social C ontrol (1838-1949)

331

Joshua L andis Shishakll and the D ruzes: Integration and Intransigence

369

Index

397

Preface This volume comprises the papers given at the second conference on BUM al-Shim in Erlangen, summer 1993. While the first such B ilid al-Shim conference in 1989 had a broad and general scope, this second one specialized on "Processes o f Integra­ tion and Fragmentation from the 18th to the 20th century." More precisely, it was "infrastructure and communication" that we asked the participants to concentrate on and to evaluate the role o f infrastructure and communication in the processes o f integration and fragmentation in B ilid al-Shim . In the realm o f realpolitik, policies o f integration and fragmentation were carried out by the Ottoman, French colonial and Syrian nationalist governments. In many cases, policies intending integration turned out, in fact, to be policies o f fragmenta­ tion. Integrative measures could, if carried out insensitively, alienate large groups of the population. Or they could favor certain groups and regions over other such groups and regions and thereby create fissures where there had been none before. In another kind o f paradox, the French colonial government used the metaphor o f the "mosaic de sectes et de races" to describe and legitimize its policies of carving up Syria and Lebanon into little "states," with the alleged aim o f educating the population towards national unity and integration. The idea that things like roads, highways, railways, seaports and the telegraph promote the integration o f a geographically and ethnically fragmented territory and society is o f course one o f the tenets o f faith of modernization theory. In Karl W. Deutsch’s paradigmatic terms: A "revolution in mass communications’ and "social m obilisation, "new means and paths o f transportation and communication would lead to increased m obility in terms o f space, psyche and job. Urbanisation, education and the increase of services rendered by the state would integrate society and create loyalties outside o f the tribe, ethnic group or sect that traditionally made up Islamic society. A counter view to this theory was put forward at the time with the anthropolo­ gical approach o f Carleton S. Coon, who posited that the Middle East was a "mo­ saic-system . The metaphor was used to describe a social structure fragmented into closed and largely autonomous entities, like kinship groups, sects, m illets, cityquarters, village communities, guilds and the like, which he analyzed as "resistant to m odernity." Needless to say, this model was highly static and did not allow for much change in the M iddle East. To do it justice, however, it must be said that the metaphor o f the "mosaic" polemicized against yet another, older model, Karl W ittfogel’s "Oriental despotism," which had described the Middle East as subjected to the arbitrary rule o f an allmighty central power structure, based on the necessity to provide centralized irrigation. All these models were starting from or using what we call "infrastructure and communication. " W hile the old hydraulic "Oriental despotism" theory, the static

X

Prefect

anthropological "mosaic"-system and the social mechanics o f modernization theory have come under severe criticism , and rightly so, the questions about the role o f highways, roads, railroads, seaports and telegraphs in unifying or further fragment­ ing a region and a society have remained largely unanswered for B ilid al-Shkn. The same is true for the role of administration and education. The question o f how unified or fragmented city structures were has maybe drawn more attention, but what do we know about the role o f urban infrastructures? And finally, how do we evaluate the role of the state and its policies, more often than not more fragmentiz­ ing than integrating, sometimes explicitly so, sometimes paradoxically so. In fact, the question if better infrastructure and increased communication lead to the homogenization o f the "global village" we live in nowadays or rather to its heterogeneousness, i.e. to its integration or fragmentation, is a crucial point at issue in the globalization debate. Seen from this perspective, the introduction o f the railway and the telegraph, but also of more centralized administration and education, are but a historical phase in the long process of globalization. The superior new technologies o f Europe were not only drawing the rest of the world into a Europeandominated world market, they were also introduced and used by ruling elites all over the world to enhance their control over their own populations. These communi­ cation-based processes led to the "webbing" o f the world at the end o f the 19th century. The story o f resistance against homogenizing forces, finally, can tell us a lot about the inner workings o f a society (or a segment of society) and the ideas o f order and integration it features. Resistance against integration more often than not only meant that people had their own assumptions about how their relations with the state should be. The following papers address these questions in explicit and implicit terms and from the perspectives o f history, anthropology and architecture. We have tried to cover as many regions of B illd al-Shâm as possible and we thank all who partici­ pated in the conference and contributed to this volume. All of this, o f course, would not have happened without financial support. Here we wish to express our gratitude to the Gerda Henkel Stiftung, Düsseldorf, which has helped generously in paying for the travel and the stay of the participants in Erlangen, and which later also bore uncomplainingly the cost connected with the publication of the volume. The distinct character o f a volume on infrastructure and communication is owed in many ways to its charts and maps, which were painstakingly redone and prepared for publication under supervision o f Professor Hopfinger in Eichstätt for which we are very grateful. Thanks go also to M rs. Appelt for patiently typing and retyping final and not so final versions o f the articles. Last but not least our thanks go to Guido Schwald who worked at editing the volume far beyond the call o f duty - and that not for the first tim e. To all o f them our gratitude. Eriangen/Cambridge

Thomas Philipp/Birgit Schaebler

Highways, Railroads, Telegraphs, and Seaports: The Physical Means o f Integration

Highways and Sea Lanes in Southwest Syria in the 18th Century Thomas Philipp The changes in the physical web o f communications in southwest Syria during the 18th century and until the Egyptian invasion o f 1831 reflected closely the changes in political conditions and economic circumstances of the area. New technical needs or technological and material improvements, however, hardly played a role. At the beginning o f the century the few long distance highways, fulfilled two ™»in functions, religious and commercial, carrying pilgrims and commodities. Coming from the north a major route connected Aleppo to Damascus, traveled by m e rc h a n ts as well as pilgrims. Beyond Damascus the highway bifurcated, one branch continuing directly south to die Hejaz carrying the same sort o f traffic, and the other one turning southwest, crossing the Jordan at the Bridge of Jacob’s Daughters, continuing to Janin, from there to Jaffa and Ramla, and finally overland via Ghaza to Egypt or, occasionally, by sea to Damietta. The route from Damascus to Egypt served mainly commercial interests. A minor route branched off at Nablus to Jerusalem and then connected via Hebron to Ghaza. No major traffic went through the western Galilee, nor were there coast roads. Local shipping (cabotage) carried the traffic. Over the century the infrastructure o f the area became more complex in pattem as well as functions, reflecting the growth o f new political and commercial centers. The routes o f the Pilgrimage were perhaps least influenced by such changes as their functions and destination remained the same. The two Pilgrimage routes, of interest to us here, are well established and documented and need no more discussion. The Pilgrimage route from Cairo led via Suez to cAqaba and down the eastern coast o f the Red Sea to Jidda and Mecca. The Pilgrimage route from Damascus lead via Maan inland to the south to Medina and Mecca. As routes with a specialized function they also had certain specific features: such as well spaced rest stations and fortifications to ensure the safety of the pilgrim s.1 For our general discussion about the infrastructure and integration o f Bil3d al-ShSm it is o f interest to note how the sancaks o f Ghaza and Ramla were integrated into the Syrian province: A lthoughcAqaba was regularily transited by the Egyptian Pilgrimage caravan, the sancaks had to send financial contributions to the Pilgrimage caravan starting from Damascus and even provide men to guard it.2

1 Barbir, C .: O ttom an R ule in D am ascus 1708-1758, Princeton 1980; in d Jo m k r, Jacques: Le m ahmai e t la carm ane égyptienne des pèlerines de la M ecque, Cairo 19S2. 2 Cohen, A .: P alestine In the 18th C entury, Jerusalem 1973, pp. 130-131.

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Thomas Philipp

Though the m ajor purpose o f the Pilgrimage route was religious it always played an important role in international trade. Only once, with the Wahhabi advances toward Syria at the beginning o f the 19th century, was the Pilgrimage route south o f Damascus used as a major m ilitary avenue. A certain curiosity value can be attributed to the attempt o f the Copts to establish a regular pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 17S3. Since they hired beduins, they presum­ ably wanted to cross the Sinai to Ghaza. But the pilgrimage which started with much pomp was interdicted by the 'id a m i’ who feared that the Copts would compete with the Pilgrimage.3 A more regular feature was the arrival o f ships at Jaffa with European Christians on pilgrimage to Jerusalem. From Jerusalem they would venture on short excur­ sions, such as Bethlehem or Jericho, depending on security conditions. Occasionally they would travel from Acre via Nazareth to Nablus and Jerusalem. M ore fre­ quently, however, was it to return from Nazareth to Acre, take a boat to Jaffa and proceed from there to Jerusalem, or vice versa. After the Ottoman conquest o f Egypt the m ilitary highway from the Syrian coast via Sinai to Egypt fell into disuse for the next 250 years. Only with die weakening o f central power in the Ottoman Empire and the consolidation of Neo-Mamluk power in Egypt did Egypt’s traditional interest in Syria as a rampart for its own power position reawaken. In the years between 1770 and 1831 four large scale invasions were started from Egypt. They all followed the same path via Ghaza to Jaffa and on to Acre (Fig. 2). Jaffa was put under siege at least six times and Acre was besieged or bombed as frequently. Already in the early 18th century the Ottoman authorities began to fortify Jaffa. This was aimed, however, not so much against overland attacks as against raids by pirates from the sea.4 Fortification works were started at Acre by mid-century and were executed by Z ihir al-'Um ar. Control over both cities was decisive for the conquest o f the rest o f Syria. Difficult sieges o f Jaffa and Acre usually preceded the easy surrender o f Damascus and the m ardi north toward Aleppo. In Syria, just as in Egypt, local centers o f power had been consolidating during the 18th century. Acre had become the foremost such new base o f local power and the most important port on the Syrian coast. No invader could ignore Acre or Jaffa, the latter often serving as an extension of the power base o f the former. The coastal cities further north, such as Sidon, Beirut, and Tripoli were either no longer or not yet of economic or strategic importance just as was the coast with the inland cities in die south: Hebron, Jerusalem, and to a degree, Nablus. After securing Acre the armies had to turn inland to Damascus, the "Gate to the Pilgrimage" and the seat o f the most powerful representative o f Ottoman power, the governor o f Damascus, and his troops. Damascus was the key to the m ilitary highway to the north, to Aleppo and beyond.

3 al-labeifl, cAbd al-R ahm la: e4 /ä 'lb al-âthO rf l ’H a rtem w a'l-akhbO r, Cairo 1884, vol. I, p. 188. 4 Cohen, pp. 134-133.

Highway* and Sea Lane* in Soubw nt Syria...

5

Just as Acre was decisive for die conquest o f Syria so was control over Jaffa essential for the rulers o f Acre if they wanted to protect themselves against an Egyptian invasion. During those six decades Jaffa was conquered at least n in e times. Apart from throe more or less peaceful surrenders, sieges lasted from four days to several months and usually brought considerable bloodshed. The coastal plain o f Palestine was convenient for the movement o f large bodies o f troops. Sufficient water could be found, and predatory beduins were no threat to troops numbering in the thousands. No mountain passes endangered the passage o f the troops. There were, however, no paved roads, no vehicle could pass. Even light artillery had to be disassembled and carried on camels. "Thousands o f beasts” were part o f every m ilitary campaign. Heavy guns and bulk materials were shipped from Damietta to the Syrian coast. But naval warfare was of secondary importance. Neither the Mamluks nor the rulers in Acre had many ships available for this purpose. The port o f Jaffa offered no shelter against storms, and even when supplied by the sea, Jaffa could not withstand a siege from the land side. Acre turned out to be a much more formidable obstacle from sea as well as from land. If Hasan Kapudin Pasha succeeded in conquering Acre after a naval bombardment in 1775, it was because the octogenarian ZShir al-cUmar had already lost control over Acre, and his artillery refused to return fire. Even the 22, presumably new, navy ships o f Ibrâhîm Pasha were in 1831 o f no use for the conquest o f Acre which was then protected by massively improved fortifications and heavy guns. Only the British navy, in die early 19th century, could efficiently blockade the Egyptian and Syrian coast, intercept the local ships Bonaparte used for supplying his troops in Palestine, defend Acre from the sea against conquest from the land in 1799, and conquer it from the sea in 1840. Attempts to conquer Acre by land were either unsuccessful (in 1789 when al-JazzSr’s rebellious mamluks besieged him in Acre, in 1799 the French siege, and in 1821-1822 when Darwish Pasha besieged cAbdalfifa Pasha), or succeeded only after a long siege (1831-1832 Ibrâhîm Pasha), after withdrawal o f the defenders (Z ihir al-cUmar in 1775), or after treachery (Sulaymln Pasha in 1804). Acre remained the pivotal point o f all m ilitary campaigns. Following the reestablishment o f Ottoman central power in Syria after 1840 Acre tank into oblivion, and the m ilitary highway between Egypt and Syria played no further role until British troops set out to conquer Syria during W orld W ar I. W hile these long-distance m ilitary highways were clearly marked - from die north via Aleppo to Damascus and from the south via Ghaza and Jaffa to Acre the region between the coast and Damascus provided multiple trails for m ilitary expeditions, and the m ajor m ilitary clashes occurred here; with Damascus repre­ senting local and imperial interests and Acre representing its own local and/or Egyptian interests. Perhaps the best way to describe die local m ilitary staging areas and highways is to start with fortifications and walled cities (Fig. 3). Small fortified places existed in the northern Galilee and the Metuali Mountains and served local bosses as retreats in case o f emergency. Their value was very lim ited, their importance only

6

Thomas Philipp

local. Early in the century only Damascus and Jerusalem were effectively fortified cities and only the former played a m ilitary role. At the very time the Ottomans were building fortifications around Jaffe, Z ihir al-eUmar was repairing the fortifica­ tions o f Tiberias. In the 1770s Beirut was fortified by Ahmad Pasha al-JazzSr. During the same time Slnfir was made a formidable fortress, protecting the northern access to Nablus. But the single most important development was the fortification o f Acre begun by Z ihir al-'Um ar in mid-century and carried on by Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzir and Sulaymin Pasha. Sieges were as decisive as open field battles and more frequent. As long as Z ihir al-'Um ar was based in the eastern Galilee, the governor o f Damascus would move along the southwestern highway from Damascus, cross the Jordan at the Bridge o f Jacob’s Daughters and try to break his power by besieging him in Tiberias. Once Acre had become Z ihir al‘Umar’s power base a march on Acre used either Sidon as a staging area or took the route from Damascus via the Bridge o f Jacob’s Daughters and via Nazareth approaching Acre over the Maij ibn ‘Amir. Frequently the rulers in Acre could intercept such attempts well before there, be it with battles in the Maij ibn cÂmir or on the highway to Damascus. Battles in die vicinity o f Lake Hule were fought for control o f the bridge over the Jordan, other battles were carried out in the plains southwest o f Damascus giving direct access to the city. Frequently it was, however. Acre which attempted to define the teach of its perim eter. To the north, along the coast, Tyre, but more importantly Sidon, constituted not only a commercial competitor but could serve as a staging area for attacks on Acre. Z ihir al-cUmar tried to establish his control over Sidon and alJazzlr never gave it up. Either alliances with or defeat of the M etualis, and constant diplomatic and m ilitary meddling in the Druze area determined the northern lim its o f the parameter o f Acre. Especially during the time o f Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzir repeated attempts were made to raid the Biq¥ Valley, either to steal grain or destroy the fields thus denying the governor of Damascus or the Druze benefit from the harvest. But Acre could never exercise consistent control over the region. To the east, Tiberias always remained in the hands o f the rulers o f Acre; battles took place usually further east at the Bridge of Jacob’s Daughters or on the road to Damascus. The control o f Nablus over Nazareth and the Maij ibn 'A m ir was rolled back, but the rulers o f Acre never broke Nablus m ilitarily because they could never win control over the SinQr fortress. Sulaymin Pasha exerted influence over Nablus by means o f diplomacy. Under his successor, ‘Abdallih Pasha, Nablus was officially attached to the vilayet o f Sidon and ‘Abdallih Pasha finally succeeded in conquering SlnOr in 1830. Ironically, he himself was ousted from power only a year later and Acre’s role as the power center o f an autonomous region was irretrievably lost. In the southwest, toward Egypt, Jaffa remained o f paramount importance for Acre and was frequently contested in regional as well as local m ilitary conflicts. The marching route from Acre to Jaffe remained for a long time the one leading from Acre down the M aij ibn cÄmir, to Meggido where it crossed the Muqtac River

Highway« and Sea Lane« in Southwest Syria...

7

and passed through the mountains, reaching the coast roughly at Caesarea. It seems that AbQ ’l-Dhahab’s army, at least at the second occasion in 177S, marched from Jaffa directly up the coast to Acre, accompanied by one warship.* The French and later Ibrihim Pasha followed the same route. One can conclude that the local m ilitary highways depended not just on the geostrategic conditions o f the area, but also to a large degree upon the existence o f fortified places. Fortifications played a surprisingly large role in the warfare o f the period. Their efficiency is probably best explained by the terrible quality o f the roads which prevented the transport o f any heavy artillery or siege equipment. The sea lanes had a rather limited function in regional or local warfare. The sea route from Damietta to Jaffa and Acre played at best a supportive role for overland troop movements. The actual number of ships involved was usually very small. The use o f trans-M editerranean sea routes was a great power activity. But even appearances o f the Russian and the Ottoman fleet on the Syrian coast between 1770 and 1776, remained rather tentative. Only the British navy was from 1798 on able to project naval power successfully to the region. Trade routes overlapped to a certain degree with m ilitary highways and Pilgrim­ age route. Merchandise was transported either by beasts o f burden or by ship. Sea routes played a much more important role for trade than they did for military purposes. Very active coastal shipping connected all the ports from Damietta to Jaffa, Acre, Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, Tripoli, and Cyprus. The shipping business was in the hands o f individual entrepreneurs o f various religious and ethnic background.* As long as Maltese pirates constituted a threat, French cabotage along the coast had an edge over others. So, too, shippers o f the Greek Catholic Arabic speaking community: Their certified Catholicism secured a certain measure o f protection from the M altese.3*67 The coastal trade was one o f the major north-south trade links in the area. Wood from Mount Lebanon was shipped via Beirut and Jaffa to Jerusalem; silk via Beirut to Sidon or Acre, and from there exported to M arseille. Wood and soap went to Egypt via Jaffa and Damietta, while rice from the latter port was shipped to Acre. Trade with Europe shifted during the 18th century. Originally most trade went via Alexandretta or Tripoli to Aleppo and fed directly into long distance trade routes connecting to Iran, the Hejaz, and beyond. By mid-century Acre became the focal point o f European, almost exclusively French, trade in the eastern M editerra­ nean. Increasing trade in raw materials linked M arseille directly with Acre and the immediate hinterland in Galilee and Mount Lebanon from where locally cultivated

3 al-Sabbigh. 'A .: al-R aw dal-zâhirflU lrikh ZOhlr, Bibliothèque Nationale Paris, ms arabe, no. 4610. S hihlb, H aidar Ahmad: Tärfkfi Ahm ad Pasha al-Jazzdr, Beirut 1933, p. 66, would suggest that be used the route via Caesarea to Nazareth or the one via Rim la to lahln and then having first conquered Safed in the eastern Galilee before approaching A cre. 6 E .g. the great grandfather o f M iahiqa; M iahiqa, M ikhiH : M untakhabOt m in al-Jawäb 'a id hsirOh abahbdb. Beirut 1933, p. 9. 7 Philipp, T .: The Syrians in E gypt 1725-1975, Stuttgart 1985, pp. 23-24.

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Thomas Philipp

cotton and silk were brought to Acre for export. With the limited exception o f rice shipped from Damietta, hardly any other trade routes fed into this overseas trade. This dominant trade link disappeared only in the 1780s when cotton prices started falling and a dissatisfied al-Jazzär finally expelled the French merchants. The Pilgrimage route constituted also the major north-south overland trade route. The other route branched off in Damascus and ran southwest over Janln and/or Nablus, Ramla, Jaffa, and Ghaza to Egypt, with a minor branch going from Nablus via Jerusalem and Hebron to Ghaza. East-west links between the inland trade routes and the coastal shipping lanes existed at several points: From Damascus a road went via the Biqtf to Sidon and also to Beirut. Damascus was also linked to the coast via Tiberias and Nazareth to Acre. ZShir al-cUmar had started his career as a trader between Tiberias and Damascus. Further south, Nablus was connected via Nazareth to Acre and via Ramla to Jaffa. There is hardly any evidence that commercial traffic ran directly between Jerusalem and the coast, the link between Hebron and Ghaza also seems to have been tenuous. Remarkable also is the fact that apart from Damascus no trade connections existed with points east of the Jordan, unless one counts the occasional plundering o f pilgrim caravanes by beduins and the sale of that merchandise smuggled into die G alilee.' Since the middle of the 18th century there existed three major trading networks (Fig. 4): (a) the traditional one linking long distance international trade from the Indian Ocean via the Hejaz to Damascus and Aleppo, the latter being also the entrepot for merchandise from Iran; (b) local trade connecting the Syrian coast with Egypt and trading traditional items such as wood, soap, tobacco from southwest Syria for rice, skins, wheat from Egypt; (c) the newly developed export trade o f raw materials from the immediate coastal region via Acre to France. Apart from some items such as alkali from the Haw rin, or rice from Damietta neither the traditional local trade nor the traditional long distance trade meshed with this new export trade o f cotton and silk from the coastal hinterland. Silk and cotton were brought directly from the villages to Acre, Sidon, or Beirut and shipped from there. Thus the above mentioned east-west trading links from the inland were not signifi­ cantly strengthened. This disconnection of the trading networks might also explain, at least partially, why connecting highways between Damascus and Acre, Nablus, Jerusalem, Jaffa, etc. remained in such abysmal shape. Armies, pilgrim s, and merchants usually travel along known highways. Their movements follow certain recurring patterns; well defined by purpose and destina­ tion o f their journey. In some ways the movements o f individual travelers, be they tourists, government agents, individual pilgrims or all o f the above, are more difficult to summarize in patterns. Individual traveling adapts fast to changing circumstances and road conditions. Factors such as safety, expenditures, road8

8 See for instance, al-SabM fb, M .: TOrOch ai-shaykh Z ähir al-U m ar, H ansa 1933. p. 79.

Highways and Sea Lanes in Southwest Syria...

9

quality, etc. are quickly noted. Fortunately for our period many European travelers arrived in what usually was called "Syria and the Holy Land." Most often they were tourists and pilgrim s who were keen to put down their experiences in writing. Their reports - plus our knowledge of travels by scholars from Egypt or Damascus, or by government representatives and messengers from Istanbul - tell us a great deal about the changing conditions o f die road network. The first observation we can make is that they traveled with certain definite purposes in their mind. Most o f the European but also some o f the Ottoman travelers tried to combine their traveling with a visit to the holy places. This meant in any case Jerusalem and often also a visit to Nazareth and surroundings. Most European travelers would land in Jaffa, arriving either directly from overseas or via Damietta, Acre, or Cyprus (Fig. 5). From Jaffa the road lead via Ramla to Jerusalem. Excursions from there to Jericho, Bethlehem, etc. depended on the existing safety conditions. At safe times the traveler might continue from Jerusalem via Nablus to Nazareth and Acre. Usually, though, he would return the same way he came to Jaffa, take a boat from there to Acre and venture from there to Nazareth and back. The route Ram la-Jenisalem as a rule served tourists and pilgrim s, the poor quality of the road apparently not allowing any other traffic. A further reason for limited individual tourism was the concern with safety. Especially in the early 18th century tourists or pilgrims would attach themselves to caravans or form larger groups, seeking safety in numbers. Travelers would wait for groups or caravans to join them.9 They would cancel travels if they could not find such groups in tim e.10 They would change their routes.11 They would take detours to avoid dangerous areas. Rare the traveler, who would venture overland between Nazareth and Jerusalem. Jerusalem was usually approached from Jaffa and Nazareth from Acre, which was reached by boat. Consider, for instance, KOsi K ahyi, katk/uM o f the government. On Ids way back from the Pilgrimage to Mecca he turned from Damascus west to go to Acre, took a boat from there to Jaffe and continued to Jerusalem. Returning from Jerusalem he departed by ship from Jaffe for Istanbul. To turn off, for instance, at the Pilgrimage station o f eAyn Zarqi* and to proceed directly to Jerusalem, was apparently impossible.12 Safety seems to have been good in the first century of Ottoman rule. Around 1550 a traveler stated explicitly "I often moved around just by myself in Bethle­

9 d'A rvieux, d e v .: M erkw ürdigeR eisen. usw ., Leipzig 1753, vol. I,p . 241;TroU o, F .: O rientalische R eisebeschreibung, D resden 1733. p. 101; R. Pococke: Beschreibung des M orgenlandes, Erlangen 1773, vol. IH; J. K onen: R eise nach dem w eiland G elobten Land, Altona 1741, p. 36; al-Jabartl, voi. m . p. 125. 10 J. Som m er W asser-und Landreise, Amsterdam 1665; N iebuhr, C . : R eisebeschreibung nach Arabien and anderen um liegenden L in d em , Kopenhagen 1774, p . S3. 11 T roilo, p . 456; M aundiell, H . : R eisebeschreibung nach dem G elobten Land, Hamburg 1706, p. 160. 12 al-'A w ia, L: Tdrtkh w H üfte Sulaym bn B äshd, Sidon 1936, p. 266.

Thomas Philipp

10

hem, Ghaza, Cairo, Alexandria, but I never was attacked or taken prisoner."11 Even in the early 17th century traveling to Nazareth, Nablus, and Jerusalem did not provoke any particular safety concerns.14156D’Arvieux, however, frit in 1658 the need to travel always with groups or under protection.13In the following 100 years traveling became increasingly unsafe: fear o f kidnapping for ransom, unrest, highway robbery, extortionist protection money, etc. weighed heavily on the mind o f every traveler. But since the middle o f die 18th century travelers began to differentiate. Korten had gone to Jerusalem in 1740 where he had planned to stay a year. In view of the insecurity though, he soon left and took a boat from Jaffa to Acre. Traveling in the Galilee be commented: "It should be known that travel there is much safer than around Jerusalem." The greater security in the Galilee he attributed to the open landscape and the feet that the region was thinly settled.14 Though his observation was correct his explanation was not. The greater security was probably a result o f Zfihir al-eUmar’s rule in the Galilee who had already by 1736 achieved a considerable pacification o f the Galilee, so that "a woman could travel with gold in her hand, without anyone confronting her on the road and without her being afraid in the least."17189Ten years later Hasselquist had a "horrible" journey to Jerusalem but wrote about his trip from Acre to Nazareth that he had " a pleasant journey in a land where one travels safely and on good roads."1* After the French invasion and the death o f Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzir a very high level o f internal security in the realm of Acre was achieved under SulaymSn Pasha. Even the coastal highway was now safe. Sulaymàn’s m utasallim in Jaffa made it a point to move very fast between Acre and Jaffa. Often he would take a fest camel and a few companions and travel lightly armed reaching Acre in one day or one night directly along the coast.1* In 1813 SulaymSn Pasha took measures also to improve the security o f the coastal highway to the north o f Acre by having watchtowers built and manned with guards. In 1817 Irby and Mangles traveled overland from Cairo to Jaffa and marched from there to Caesarea, Tantura, cAthBt, Haifa, and Acre. After some traveling to northern Syria they came back to Damascus proceeding from there to Jacob’s Daughters’ Bridge. "In some places there were traces o f an ancient paved way, probably the Roman road leading from Damascus to Caesarea."20 They traveled to Tiberias, crossed to the YarmQk River, crossed back to BaysSn, back to Jarash, al-Sah, and back again to Nablus. From there they

13 Fabri, F .: E igentliche Beschreibung der H in- und W iderfahrt zum H l. Land, Ulm 1557, p. 97. 14 Ranzow, H .: R eise a u f Jerusalem , Cairo in Ägypten und C onstantinopel, Hamburg 1704. 15 d'A rvieux, vol. I, p. 241; vol. D, p. 20 e t passim . 16 17 18 19

K onen, pp. 206, 225. al-Sabblgh. p. 50. H asselquist, F .: R eise nach P alästina 1749-1752, Rostock 1762, p. 177. al-cAwra, pp. 329-330.

20 M d ., p. 87.

Highway! and Sea

in Southwest Syria ...

11

traveled to Jerusalem, Hebron, Karak, and back to al-Sak, Jarash, Nazareth, and finally Acre. Here they embarked to Istanbul. Not only the coastal highway but even crossing to the east bank o f the Jordan had become safe. That the route Nazareth, Janln, Nablus, RimalHh, Jerusalem was perfectly safe was confirmed by another traveler during the same year.21 The view that only Ibrâhîm Pasha and his Egyptian troops brought security and accessibility to the traveler, especially the foreign one, in Syria should be corrected. Certainly in southwest Syria and in particular as far as the influence o f Acte reached security on the highways had been already established. The less travelers were concerned with safety the more they complained about the quality o f the roads. Roads were "execrable," "excessively steep and rugged," "very ragged and bad."222345Or: "The whole distance between Jerusalem to Jaffe... could be travelled normally in 13 hours, but the rugged and pathless rocks, which the traveller has to cross extend die journey to a day and a half."21 As late as 1821 the road Acre-Damascus was so bad that no cannons could be dragged over it.2* All heavy equipment, cannons, ammunition, wood, was, if at all possible, shipped along the coast. We hear of a very limited and relatively late attempt by Sulaym ta Pasha to have the coastal road from Acre to Beirut improved by widening the path in the rock at Ra’s al-Naqûra, building a bridge over the Z ahrihl River, providing a water fountain, etc.22 But this was clearly exceptional. While considerable efforts were made to construct fortifications and large invest­ ments were made in the reconstruction o f cities and the port o f Acre, it seems that not the slightest effort was made to upgrade the transportation system by leveling roads, building bridges, or strengthening the road bed. The first explanation that comes to mind is the one valid for the whole Ottoman Empire: Goods were transported by beasts of burden, hence roads did not have to be paved and straight­ ened. This holds certainly true for southwest Syria during the period.26 Two other reasons were pointed out in this paper: The poor quality o f the roads prevented the transport o f siege equipment, thus providing a further defense for fortified places. Good roads might only have attracted better armed enemies. Finally, though trade intensified during the 18th century, the new trade connections were, as we had seen, juxtaposed to traditional ones but not linked to them. The commercial wealth

21 Jollifer, T . R .: R eise In P alästina, Syrien und Ägypten im Jahre 1817, Leipzig 1821, p. 252. 22 Irby, Ch. d t M angles, J.: Travels in E gypt, N ubia, Syria and the H oly Land, London 1852, pp. 61-82. 23 Jollifer, p . 253. 24 M iahlqa, p. 133. 25 al-'A w n. pp. 180,202-211. 26 Though there it tom e evidence that at least in the 17th century carriages were traveling between Jaffa and Ramla; d ’A rvieux, vol. D, p. 83.

12

Thom s Philipp

o f Acre originated from the villages in the immediate hinterland not from long distance overland trade routes such as from Damascus. Thus the upgrading or new construction o f roads really was o f no interest to the rulers of Acre.

Highway* aod Sea Lane* in Southwest Syria

F ig . 1: T ra d e an d p ilg rim ag e ro u tes in d ie 18th C entury

13

The Beinit-Dam ascus Road: Connecting the Syrian Coast to the Interior in the 19th Century Leila Fawaz From the perspective o f our time, there is no question that progress, including improved technology, infrastructure, and communication, has revolutionized social conditions in the Middle East, not only in urban areas, but in varying degrees also in the countryside. Nothing makes one more aware o f how indispensable the advantages o f modem infrastructure and communication are than to lose them, as the Lebanese did during the war o f 1975-1990. The destruction of the infrastructure and communications during that period and the difficulties in restoring them since have been reminders of how liberating technology is, as the conditions of civil war and urban violence turned simple daily chores - making a phone call, cooking, doing the laundry, or moving around - into oppressive hardships that required days instead o f minutes or hours o f effort. The example of war-tom Lebanon is also a reminder that the legacy o f technological change, insofar as it makes people dependent upon facilities and conveniences, may be liberating, but also creates dependency and bondages o f its own. This mixture has also been a legacy o f modem transportation. The story o f how the Beirut-Damascus road connected the Syrian coast to the interior in the 19th century will show that, although it represented a great breakthrough in communica­ tion and although it brought the people of Mount Lebanon and the Syrian interior as well as people and their government closer together, it also helped highlight differences. Though travel in Syria and throughout the Middle East was facilitated by the building o f roads by die Seleucids and later the Romans, these ancient highways had been neglected by regional rulers beginning with the Abbasid caliphs. The decrepitude of the road system made travel within Greater Syria often difficult and frequently impossible. Travel from the coast to the interior was arduous and timeconsuming. The disrepair and neglected state o f the road system served to isolate communities in the region, as interaction, both social and economic, was costly and inconvenient. This failing infrastructure thereby seemed to enhance the already rather rigid compartm entalizationof ethno-religious groups in Syria. Virtually selfsufftcent social and ethnic enclaves developed, having little contact with other groups. M oreover, the inadequacies of the region were, at least in part, also responsible for the often lax administrative control exercised much later; after the Ottomans conquered the distant and inaccessible hinterland, direct control proved so difficult and burdensome that Ottoman administrators preferred to use local notables

20

Leila Fawaz

to govern. The lack o f an efficient system o f toads contributed to the fragmentation o f Syria and Lebanon as groups, whether willingly or by necessity, maintained a degree o f isolation from one another and from the central government. H ie construction o f the Beirut-Damascus road and other infrastructural improvements made this isolation a thing o f the past. The difficulty o f travel between the cities o f Beirut and Damascus before the creation o f the Beirut-Damascus carriage road cannot be overstated. Pack animals were the most useful and reliable mode of transportation. To go from Beirut to Damascus required three to four days and two to three nights for caravans and two days and a night for less encumbered travelers. It also involved the discomforts and fears associated with travel by pack animal, dealing with the weather and highway robbers, and crossing the valleys, plains, gorges, and peaks o f the Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon ranges which - with the highest peak at 3,083 meters in the Lebanon - are the highest mountains in Greater Syria.1 The poor state o f the roads before the Damascus road was completed was noted by both foreign travelers and Syrians. Henri Guys, the French consul in Beirut between 1824 and 1838 (and on two earlier occasions), commented on the poor state o f the mountain roads, "if we can call by that name paths that are more or less narrow, always winding, rocky, uneven, which one follows out o f habit, because one knows they are paths.” He also wrote that these trails were so bad that it was impossible to move along them without suffering some accident, that these accidents happened almost daily, which was why newcomers to the town were always congratulated whenever they arrived safe and sound.23A little over a decade later, in January 1830, J. L. Porter, a newly arrived English missionary set off from Beirut to Damascus. He writes about his little caravan "winding through the narrow cactus-lined lanes," and making its way to the foot o f the mountains to start on "a bleak and rugged slope" until he reached the "caravan road, which, however, is little better than a goat-path."2 In the same decade, J. Lewis Farley, chief accoun-

1 Farley, Lewis: Two Y ean In Syria, 2nd ed ., London 1859, pp. 34-35; F iance, M inistère de la D éfense, Archives M ilitaires, Vincennes (VAM ). 'Expédition de Syrie 1860-1861,* O sm ont-Randon, Beirut, 2 August 1860; Tresse, R .: 'H istoire de la route de Beyrouth i Damas (1857-1892),* in: La G éographie, 64 (1936), pp. 227-252; Fawaz. Leila Tarazi: M erchants and M igrants In N ineteenth-C entury B eirut, Cambridge, Mass. 1983, p. 67; K hairallah, Sbereen: Railw ays in the M iddle E ast 1856-1948: P olitical and Econom ic Background, Beirut 1991, p. 37; Labaki, Boutros: Introduction à l ’histoire économ ique du Liban: soie e t com merce extérieur e n fin de période ottom ane 1840-1914, Beirut 1984, p. 179. See also Issawi, Charles: The Econom ie H istory o f the M iddle E ast 1800-1914: A Book c f R eadings, Chicago 1966; and Kark, Ruth: Jaffa: A O ty in E volution 1799-1917, Jerusalem 1990, pp. 220f. For a general survey o f caravan travel across the Syrien desert, consult G rant, Christina Phelps: The Syrian D esert: C aravan, Travel and E xploration, London 1 9 3 7 .1 would like to thank Charles Davidson, my research assistant, for his help with this paper. 2 Guys, H enri: B eyrout e t le Liban: R elation d 'un séjour de p iu sieu n années dans ce p a ys, Paris 1850, pp. 272-273. 3 P otier, J. L .: F ive Years in D am ascus. Londoo 1855, vol. L p. 5.

21 t u t o f the Beirut branch o f the O ttom an B ank between 1856 and 1858, complained about bow neglected the roads were in and around the city and noted that the only means o f communication between Beirut and Damascus was "a wretched mule path, which passes over Lebanon, and is impracticable during two months of the year." He went on to illustrate his point by remarking, that for the last six weeks (no date is given, but clearly it was in winter) "no loaded animal has been able to pass between the two places, owing to the danger of the route in certain places when covered with snow, as is now die case. Every winter this difficulty causes a good deal of annoyance to die native traders of both towns." Farley blamed the Ottomans and showed his bias: "Turk-like, die Ottoman government has never done anything towards either mending die old or making a new road, and within five miles of this town die route is something like Cheapside when all the pavement is pulled up, only about one-tenth as wide, and as steep as die path up Ben Lomond. "4* Criticism o f the conditions o f roads in the Lebanon was common in the correspon­ dence o f French officers as well; they were forced to cope with them as part o f a French expedition sent to Syria between August 1860 and June 1861, in the aftermath o f a civil war in Mount Lebanon and Damascus in June and July I860.1 The trip was arduous even under the best o f circumstances, that is, when travelers were prosperous and the new road already under construction and improved over what it had been. One such traveler was Comtesse de Perdrais who, in her accounts of her travels in Syria in the 1850s and 1860s, provides a rare record o f a moment in the history of the road, in its transition from old trail to modem highway. She was perfectly placed to appreciate the new road, for she was the mother of Edmond de Perdrais, a retired French naval officer and entrepreneur­ ial resident o f Beirut who represented the French steamship line, the M essageries M aritim es, and had him self helped initiate several projects, including the construc­ tion o f the Beirut-Damascus road. In May 1862, during one of her visits to her son, she set out from Beirut to Damascus, and left us a detailed and lively account o f the hardships and small joys o f the journey.6 Her description begins on Monday, 12 May, at 6:00 in the morning, when she set out from Beirut accompanied by her husband, son, step-daughter, small grandchildren, and her chambermaid. Their luggage had been sent ahead on pack animals the day before, so they and their baggage could fit into two carriages. Following the path o f countless other travelers before them, they left Beirut by the pine forest at the edge o f the city and along the torrents and wadis in its suburbs,

4 Parley, pp. 33-34. 3 VAM. C anon 0 4 /1 . Beaufbit-Randon, no. 1 7 .2 0 O ctober 1860. 6 De Penbuls, Comtesse: "Carnet de voyage en O rient* la m very gn teftil to M r. Fouad Debbas wbo made the m anuscript available to me.

22

Leila Fawaz

climbed up Mount Lebanon until they reached Ruwaysit at the edge o f the elegant resort o f Sawfar, where they had lunch, through the Mudayrij Pass from where they admired the valley of HammSna and the Biqäf Plain. They continued along the main route which, thanks to new construction, the Comtesse found very wide. The travelers then used "our" new bridges (i.e ., those built by her son) over the Litani and the ZahrftnT rivers, crossed the plain o f Baalbek and began climbing the western side o f the Anti-Lebanon along what she described as the gentle slopes o f WSdl alHarir, a narrow cut known as the "silk path" because so many caravans had been robbed o f their silk and so many travelers had ended up dead there. That this was so "seems unbelievable when one climbs the pass on the most beautiful road possible on a day o f such sweet and serene weather." The travelers left the pass for a large plain just before the W idI al-Qaro, which was as far as the new road had been built and as far as the carriages were able to go. Everyone disembarked; the carriages were also emptied o f luggage and equipment. Temporary shelters were set up for the night, and everyone ate at an improvised restaurant in the jolliest o f moods. The Comtesse noted that at this stop they were at the 70th kilometer o f their journey, and that they had arrived there at 7:00 in the evening, or 13 hours after their departure, having spent two hours at Ruwaysit and "wasted much time because these gentlemen [of the traveling party] inspected the road work all along the way." An Ottoman regiment with their women and Persian caravans with camels that they had encountered along the way also caused delays. After a cold night - for they were close to the snows o f Mount Hermon - the traveling party resumed its journey on 13 May at 3:00 in the morning. The Comtesse now traveled on her "faithful white mule" which she had used for other trips from Beirut to Dayr al-Qamar and Baalbek. She noted that men and women from the villages bordering their route arrived to begin their day’s work on the road’s construction, and that they sang and seemed cheerful at their tasks. The travelers entered another pass, the W idI al-Qam, known for its difficult terrain and its thieves. She found it die most arduous part o f the journey, but it would not be for long: "In that pass where there is now only an invisible path, in a few months there will be a wide road or broad highway, completely European, that will lead to Damascus." The pack animals moved around rolling stones and fallen rocks which, on occasion, seemed to offer insurmountable obstacles. Nothing, however, could dampen the enthusiasm o f our traveler: "This horror o f WSdf al-Qaro - the nightmare o f all travelers - has its charm." Exhausted, the travelers emerged from the pass into a much easier but barren terrain. They left the road and halted in a small green valley on the edge o f a stream. There, they started a small fire to make coffee, have lunch, and rest during the hottest time of the day. By 3:00 in the afternoon they were back in their saddles, and they rejoined the plateau o f Dimas and the valley o f the B anda River with its rich vegetation. Damascus was within reach.

The Beirat-]

Road...

23

Given the state o f the travel route, as illustrated by Mme. de Perthuis’ journey, it comes as little surprise that many saw the need for an improved inter-city thoroughfare. M oreover, as commercial interests burgeoned in the region, the necessity o f improving the Beirut-Damascus road became even more evident. However, the idea o f improving the carriage road was hardly a new one; fully twelve years before Mme. de Perdrais’ adventurous voyage to Damascus, her son had already undertaken die project o f rebuilding the road. Building the Beirut-Damascus highway through the hard and hilly terrain of the mountains o f the Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon was a deliberate decision by Edmond de Perthuis. When he first considered building such a road, he had looked at two possible routes: the first followed the customary route between Beirut and Damascus, which entailed departing from Beirut by the pine forest to traverse the Lebanon range and the B iq ï Plain and entering the Anti-Lebanon from the WSdl al-Harir, arriving at Damascus from the plateau o f Dimas and the B anda Valley. The second option de Perthuis considered required following a longer but less steep path. This option would have required going first to Sidon and then crossing the B iq¥ Plain from east to west. Though this latter route would have made an easier trip, since it followed the eastern Mediterranean seashore from Beirut to Sidon in the south and only then turned east towards the Biqäf, it had one grave drawback. It would have favored Sidon as a stopping off place before, if not the starting point for, the climb through the mountains, which risked making Sidon central to the commerce that building the road was expected to generate. To avoid that risk the Beirut-based European and local entrepreneurs who backed the enterprise decided to pass over that option and choose one which was physically more difficult but commercially safer.7 De Perthuis then was granted the concession by the Ottoman authorities to construct the road between Beirut and Damascus. Construction began in 1857, but was early on beset by difficulties. Perhaps because the road cut through the heart of the Lebanon M ountain ranges into the interior beyond them, or perhaps inevitably, its construction suffered from the effects of the tribulations o f Syria in the troubled middle decades o f the 19th century. In addition to the usual delays of construction caused by man or nature, there were delays caused by the general deterioration of the political climate between 18S8 and 1860. In 18S8 violence broke out between M aronite peasants and landlords in die north o f Lebanon in the district of Kisrawin. Although this had no direct impact on the construction o f the road because it was built further south, its aftershocks did have consequences. In the preceding decades, sectarian clashes had already erupted in those parts of Mount Lebanon with mixed populations, and in the late 1850s once again those districts, as well as Beirut and other coastal areas, awaited the spread o f violence with dread. Sectarian violence erupted in full force in the Mountain’s mixed districts in the spring and summer of

7 T ran e, pp. 227-232; P av es, 1983, pp- 76-48.

24

Leila Fawaz

1860 and in Damascus in July o f the same year; it also unsettled the Syrian coast and parts o f the interior. The economy suffered, as the economically vital silk crop went unharvested or was destroyed, and infrastructure projects such as the construc­ tion o f the Beirut-Damascus road came to a standstill, as workers left their jobs to fight or to flee the violence.1 Only after the civil war ended and a peace settlement was put in place in 1861 did construction resume. Even then, progress on the road, as well as the travelers’ safety once it was finished and open for traffic, depended on m a in ta in in g peace among the inhabitants o f the areas through which it went.* Still, though fraught with risks, the road was completed, and on 1 January 1863 was opened for traffic from Beirut to Damascus. The length o f the completed route was 110 kilometers between the two cities; though the distance between Beirut and Damascus is only 82 kilom eters, the effect o f topography and de Perthuis’ bias in favor o f Beirut had added another 28. A daily service was inaugurated which allowed travelers to make the trip in a mere 13 hours, a vast improvement over the three days the trip had required a year or two before.8910 The story o f the construction o f the road is indicative of the growing role o f Europe in the economy o f Syria. In 1837, after the Ottoman government granted de Perthuis the concession to build the road, he formed a French company under Ottoman jurisdiction called the Compagnie Im periale Ottomane de la Route de Beyrouth à D am as, with offices in Beirut and Paris. Recognizing die potential profitability o f the road, important French concerns such as the Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de Paris-Lyons-M editerranée and the Credit Lyonnais, invested in de Perthuis’ company. The company had a 50-year lease and a monopoly on ail transport by wagon. Despite some initial setbacks due to harsh winter weather and the flooding o f the road that followed, die company immediately began to record a profit. The establishment o f a reliable direct service between Beirut and Damascus filled a long-standing need o f the region’s commercial enterprises as a brief look at the early usage demonstrates. Three years after the completion o f the road, the transport o f travelers and goods required the use o f

8 Fawaz, Leila Tarazi: An O ccasion fo r W ar, London 1994, p. 35, citing United Kingdom. Public Record O ffice, Foreign Office Archives (FO), 195/601, B iatt-B ulw er, no. IS , May 1860. 9 FO 195/601, B rant-Bulw er, no. 13, 30 May 1860; de Perthuis, ‘C arnet de voyage,* June 1862. 10 The road was 110 kilom eters long according to Archives du Port (AP). Dumast, Baron Maxime de: *Le port de Beyrouth: Développement historique,* (Conférence donnée au Centre d’études géographiques du Proche et M oyen-Orient, 23 November 1951, et au Rotary Chib de Beyrouth, 17 January 1952); 111 kilometers long according to E ieftériadis, Eleuthère: Les chem ins d efo ren S yrte e t au Liban: Étude historique financière e t économ ique, Beirut 1943, p. 39; 112 kilometers long according to Tresse, p. 236, and K hairallah, p. 37. See also Thoumin, Richard: G eographie hum aine de la Syrie centrale, (Ph.D . thesis, l’U niversité de G renoble), Tours 1936.

Road...

25

”348 hones and noies, a stagecoach, 14 omnibuses, 10 light carts for tent, 104 haulage carriages, and 4 city wagons. Traffic was maintained for yean afterwards at around 11,000 travelen a year.”11 Perhaps more important, in die 27 yean between 1863 and 1890 the transportation o f goods increased from 4,730 tons to 21,400 tons. The opening o f the road by de Perthuis' company acted as a catalyst for other Preach and European commercial activities in the region. The isolation o f the hitherto separated areas o f the region was diminishing as both domestic and international trade developed. The opening o f the road encouraged the establishment o f European shops and commercial enterprises in Beirut and Damascus and promoted tourism to these cities and to the interior. The overwhelming response to the road soon prompted its backers to consider building a railroad, which could handle more traffic and cargo than a highway could, as a British company was already planning to build a Damascus-Haifa railroad, which, like the idea o f incorporating Sidon into the Beirut-Damascus route, threatened the economic prominence o f Beirut. In 1894 a French-Beiruti consortium was able to open the Beirut-Damascus railway line, thwarting the British plan which was temporarily abandoned. This railway line, built with French fonds, further served to unify the coast and the interior o f the country. These infrastructural improvements were not to the road/rail system. French initiatives also led to the improvement o f the Beirut port in the 1890s, which directly contributed to Beirut's positioning as one o f the most important commercial centers o f the region.12 The Europeans, particu­ larly the French, were instrumental in the economic life o f Syria in the late 19th century. Their role was such that one could argue that the establishment of the Beirut-Damascus road and its progeny led to the commercial importance that Syria and later Lebanon were to enjoy for many years to come. Although the role o f foreign entrepreneurs in the building o f Syria’s transporta­ tion system is well known by now, only occasionally can sources bring to life for us what such a role meant in the status and special treatment reserved for these ’very important personalities.” Reading Comtesse de Perthuis' memoirs and traveling in our imagination with her affords us a rare glimpse into the privileges enjoyed by European entrepreneurs like Edmond, her son: "The em ir o f the road,” she writes, "this is what people call Edmond.” No wonder, one might conclude, reading about his numerous traveling party, with its carriages, horses, donkeys, retinue o f faithful servants, dragomans, family members, and other retainers. But in addition to his style o f traveling and his place in Beirut society, he was occasion­ ally asked to settle personal disputes away from the metropolis where he played local politics and participated in economic ventures. He had blended into the local scene sufficiently to perform some of the leadership and mediation functions o f a

11 Pa w as. 1983, p. 49; FO 193/866, H dridae-Lyoos, no. 3 9 ,9 June 1866; Trasse. 12 Faifcy, p. 34.

26

Leila Fawaz

shaykfa. Building a new road had made it possible for an entrepreneur who lived in Beirut and came from France to be an arbiter of sorts in the countryside.11 During an excursion o f the de Perdrais family to Araja in Mount Lebanon, for example, a dispute arose between a Druze and two Christians leading their pack animals. Some villagers were drawn into the quarrel, caught the culprit who asked to defend him self in front of Edmond. The latter was away, however, so his nephew heard the case, as translated to him by a friend o f de Perdrais who knew enough Arabic for the purpose, while the various parties sat in the meeting in a sort o f impromptu m ajlis. After some arguments back and forth between the two parties to the dispute, they all agreed to make peace and - what is particularly interesting "to respect the [Beirut-Damascus] road." Despite all the problems generated by building a road in the midst o f what was the most serious sectarian strife in the history o f Ottoman Syria, the Beirut-Damascus road brought many fundamental changes to the region. After it opened, it moved thousands of travelers and thousands of tons o f goods each year. Tlie new road brought profits to its shareholders, guaranteed Beirut’s place as the leading trading and economic center of the region, and helped the growth of associated industries in Beirut and Damascus. So prosperous was the B eirutDamascus road company that it encouraged French, Belgian, and Lebanese entrepreneurs to invest in a Beirut-Damascus-Hawrin railway as well as the new harbor for Beirut in 1890-1893, another vital improvement for the circulation of goods from the coast to the interior. The economy o f the Mountain and the interior also prospered. The construction o f the road facilitated the collection o f raw silk and other products cultivated in Mount Lebanon for export, and it expedited the distribution o f manufactured goods to and from the Syrian coast and the interior.1314 The effects o f the Beirut-Damascus road were by no means only economic. European power went hand in hand with European economic penetration, and the combination propelled seaports on the eastern M editerranean to the forefront o f the commercial and political life o f the region. Better transportation contributed to the distribution o f European goods but also of European power; it even helped bring European ideas into the area, first through the spread o f mission schools and later through the diffusion o f learning and a minor revolution in publishing. In all of this, better transportation played a dual role. On the one hand, it contributed to the diffusion o f new ideas through the movement of people, books, journals, and other goods, and it helped bring areas o f die region closer together. On the other hand.

13 De Perthuis, 'C arn et de voyage,* June 1862. 14 FO 195/760, R ogers-Eiskine, Damascus, IS January 1863; Q eftériadès, pp. 39-40; Beirut, AP, G énital de Dumast: 'U n e réalisation française au Levant, le port de Beyrouth,* communication i l’Académie de M arine, Paris, 25 January 1857; Beirut, AP, Anonymous report, ’Notes et circulaires relatives à l’émission des obligations,* 'N ote sur la conversion de l’emprunt de 1892,* B eirut, AP, Anonymous report, 'R aisons qui «ntHtwa en faveur de l’aggrandisaement du P ort de Beyrouth,* présenté au Général Gouraud, Beirut, 25 August 1920; Itsaw i, p. 248; LabaM.

The Betaut-]

Road ...

27

it allowed the contrasts between these areas to become more apparent: ignorance was no longer possible, and bliss was not a choice. As differences sharpened between prosperous and less prosperous towns and between Westernized and less W esternized urban and rural groups, greater gaps developed among them. Eventu­ ally, this led to a split in Syrian society between those more at home in French or other European languages and cultures than their own and those deeply rooted in their traditional worlds. Technology had opened the region to external penetration and brought it more firmly under European and Ottoman centralizing forces. However, it had also made more visible differences and divisions among areas and groups which, without better transportation and communication, might have been left alone. Dormant social differences had been awakened, and it would never again be possible to set them to rest.

Changements dans les Routes et les Flux Commerciaux du Désert Syrien 1870-1920: Le Sort Incertain des Oasis du Nord de la Palmyrène Françoise M étrai Trois images résument la vie du désert pendant les siècles que durent l’ire du chameau: celles du bédouin, de la caravane et de l’oasis. Les deux premières évoquent le mouvement et la troisième une sédentarité permise par la présence d’une source d ’eau mais étroitement liée à ces mouvements. Jusqu’au m ilieu du 19ème siècle, dans le Bilâd al-Shâm, la bûdiya, pays du b a d u \ se trouve sous la domination des grandes tribus chamelières. Sa traversée souvent périlleuse, exige organisation, technique et savoir-faire de spécialistes. Zone de marge échappant au contrôle du pouvoir central, le désert n’en est pas moins un espace de circulation traversé par les grands courants d’échanges inter­ continentaux, tels que la route de la soie ou la route de l’Inde et un trait d ’union entre les grandes cités marchandes de l’Empire ottoman qu’étaient Basra, Bagdad, Alep, Mossoul et Damas. La politique d’expansion de La Porte vers les zones périphériques du Bilâd alShâm d’une part, la transformation des modes et des voies de communication de l’autre, l’évolution, enfin, des échanges internationaux et régionaux pendant les dernières décennies de l’Empire, vont avoir des répercussions jusque dans les zones les plus reculées de la bûdiya. En 1870, deux événements m arquait un tournant dans l’histoire du désert syrien: la création du "sandjak du désert" avec Dayr al-Zür comme capitale a l’inaugura­ tion du canal de Suez; ces événements symboliques annoncent les changements ultérieurs auxquels auront à faire face les peuples du désert au début du 20ème siècle. Pendant plusieurs décennies les effets n’en sont ni assurés, ni durables mais ils s’accélèrent de manière radicale à partir de la première guerre mondiale a pendant les premières décennies de la période mandataire; au point que lorsqu’il fait la synthèse des études de l’entre deux guerres sur les nomades de Syrie, dans son ouvrage sur "la civilisation du désert," R. Montagne conclut: "Tout cela n’est plus qu’un legs du passé." Il évoque "la voiture, l’avion, les puits de pétrole a les pipelines" autant d’innovations qui, venues de l’Occident, ont causé la mort de toute une civilisation liée au chameau.1 Le constat de R. Montagne sur les pasteurs

1

t, Robert: la civilisation du disert, Paris 1932, p. 266.

30

Françoise Métrai

nomades rejoint celui établi par A. de Boucheman sur Suhné, une p etite cité caravanière du Nord de la Palmyrène dont il dresse la monographie dans les années trente.23Les bédouins sont "pacifiés" et la sécurité régne dans le désert intégré au nouvel Etat syrien, mais ces oasis, dont il décrit le déclin économique, semblent alors condamnées à disparaître. Que s’est-il passé donc entre 1869 et 1939? Comment les gens du désert ont-ils fait face aux grandes transformations qui ont accompagné la fin du chameau et des grandes caravanes? Les recherches anthropologiques que j ’ai menées sur le terrain entre 1985 et 1989 "revisitant" Sukhna, cinquante ans après Boucheman m’amènent à prendre cette oasis, située au carrefour des pistes joignant la Mésopotamie à la Méditer­ ranée, comme point d’observation des changements qui ont affecté le désert syrien et plus précisément le Nord de la Palmyrène, au cours des dernières décennies de l'E m pire.2 Les réalités observables dans les années 1980 démentent les prévisions pessimis­ tes de Boucheman. Certes, le chameau ne relève plus que du folklore touristique; pourtant, les bédouins exsangues et la cité moribonde des années trente sont aujourd’hui, là, bien vivants.4 Les changements politiques et les innovations technologiques n'ont pas produit de rupture définitive. Le dynamisme actuel dont font preuve les populations de cette région périphérique me contraint à être plus attentive aux continuités, aux ressources qu’elles ont su mettre en oeuvre pour répondre aux défis de l’histoire. Lors des séjours sur le terrain, tout en dressant un tableau sur l’état du présent, notre équipe a interrogé les Sukhniotes sur les évènements qui avaient marqué la vie économique de leur cité depuis les années trente. J’ai pour ma part recueilli généalogies et histoires de familles. L’histoire de ces sédentaires profondément attachés à leur cité est faite de migrations. Leur citadinité est inséparable de la m obilité. Les repères chronologiques que font surgir leur mémoire, les lieux où

2 Boucheman, A lbert de: Une p etite d ti caravanière, Suhné, Damas 1939, pp. 121-122. 3 Cette recherche a été menée en équipe avec J. M étrai et J. Hannoyer entre 1983 et 1989; e t. H annoyer, Jean: 'L 'hospitalité, économie de la violence,* dans: M aghreb, M achrek. Espaces e t sociétés du M onde arabe, 123 (1989), pp. 173-183. M étrai, Françoise f t M étrai, Jean: 'U ne ville dans la steppe, la tribu dans la ville: Sukhna (Syrie),* dans: Le nom ade, l ’oasis e t la ville, URBAMA, 20 (1989), p. 133-172. M étrai, Françoise: 'Com m ercants de la Palmyrène: interm édiaires entre citadins et bédouins,’ (Colloquium: 'Palm yra and the Silk Road,* 1992), dans: A nnales archéologiques arabes Syriennes, LXD (1996), pp. 233-241. M étrai, Françoise: 'E levage et agriculture dans l'oasis de Sukhna (S y rie),' dans: Bocco, R. f t Jaubert, R. & M étrai, F .: Steppes d'arables, E tats, pasteurs, agriculteurs e t com m erçants: le devenir des to n es sèches, Piris/G enève 1993, pp. 193-223. 4 Camions et moulons ont rem placé le chameau. Depuis une quinzaine d'années la population est en pleine expansion. Bédouins et sédentaires se sont motorisés et ont développé l’activité pastorale. La route trans-désertique Dayr al-ZOr-Dam as, inaugurée en 1982, se prolonge jusqu'au Golfe Persique et les petits-fils des anciens caravaniers de la Palm yrène, aujourd'hui équipés de poids-lourds, sont les nouveaux routiers du d ésert

le* Rouet et Ici Flux

31

nous projettent les histoires de famille m’ont entrainée bien en deçà des ewnfee trente et bien loin de Sukhns. Pour compléter, contextualiser et mieux comprendre les mémoires locales, j ’ai alors interrogé les écrits des historiens. J'a i été incitée à replacer ce demi siècle dans une durée plus longue et à remonter jusqu’au siècle dernier. Mais j ’ai été aussi conduite à inscrire l’histoire de ces oasis dans un espace régional plus vaste, celui de la mouvance d ’Alep. Je livre ici, sous forme d ’hypothèses, le résultat de cette recherche. L ’activité des oasis du Nord de la Palmyrène s’inscrit dans un vaste espace. Sukhna et ses satellites (Tayba, al-Kawm)3 regardent vers le Nord. Avec Safîra, dernière escale avant la ville, elles étaient les "portes d’Alep" pour tout le com­ merce caravanier en provenance de l’Orient et de l’Arabie. De la même manière que leurs voisines du Sud, Dmayr et Qaryatayn se tournent vers Homs et Damas et que QubaysT, plus à l’Est, est liée à Bagdad, c’est vers Alep (mais aussi vers Hanoi) qu’elles tournent leur activité commerciale. Elles fournissaient à la ville chameaux et chameliers nécessaires au transport et au commerce régional et interrégional. Leurs commerçants et caravaniers y ont établi de longue date56 des quartiers urbains, à l’extérieur des portes, dans les faubourgs Est, au débouché des pistes de la steppe. L'autre pôle de leur activité, beaucoup plus diffus, est constitué par la mouvance d’Alep c’est à dire par les zones d ’estivage des tribus des deux grandes confédéra­ tions cAnaza et Shammar ou des tribus moutonnières, qui séjournent dans la Palmyrène au printemps et que les Sukhniotes suivent dans leurs migrations saisonnières. Ces sédentaires conjuguaient traditionnellement trois types de ressources et de fonctions: Des ressources locales, diverses mais limitées. En dehors de leurs jardins irrigués, de quelques champs de céréales cultivés en sec et d’un peu d’élevage pour leurs besoins quotidiens, ils exploitaient le sel de la sebkha à Palmyre, l’huile de térébintheet, surtout tapotasse, ou qalt, fabriquée à partir d ’une herbe cueillie dans la steppe, le ushnûn. Ces productions alimentaient un commerce caravanier à destination régionale. La potasse était vendue aux savonniers d’Alep et le savon ensuite acheminé dans les régions rurales d’Anatolie. Le destin de ces oasis étaient cependant largement tributaire de deux autres fonctions: celles d’escales caravanières sur les routes transdésertiques et de marché bédouin pour les pasteurs nomades. Leurs habitants étaient chameliers et commer­ çants; leur survie ou leur prospérité dépendaient des flux du commerce à grande

5 A n k quant à elle, e*t liée à Pabnyre. 6 Un q u arter du nom de SakhSna figure déjà sur les plan* du 18ème tite le publiés par M arcus, Abraham: The M iddle B ast on th e Eve e f M odernity. A leppo In the Eighteenth C entury, New York 1989.

32 distance empruntant la voie du désert, et du passage de la caravane du Pèlerinage qu'ils pourvoyaient en guides et en chameaux. Dans les deux cas, les relations tissées avec les tribus bédouines étaient détermi­ nantes. Ces dernières possédaient la force, et pillaient ou rançonnaient les sédentai­ res et voyageurs qui n ’avaient pas obtenu leur protection. Les tribus bédouines ne se livrent pas au commerce. Pour acheter et vendre d ies passent par les oasiens qui riches ou pauvres commercent avec elles soit comme colporteurs soit comme intermédiaires dans toutes les transactions avec les mar­ chands citadins. Les Sukhniotes leur achètent chameaux, moutons, laine, beurre, peaux, et leurs vendent tissus, blé et tout le matériel de la vie bédouine, si bien que dans la steppe le terme de "Sukhni," comme ailleurs cd u i de "Q ubayst,"1 est synonyme "d’épicier du désert” ou de "marchand en tribus." Cette vie traditionnelle a connu des transformations qui s'esquissent vers la fin de la période ottomane et s'accentuent au cours des premières décennies du Mandat.

Fin de la Période Ottomane - Début de Contrôle du Désert Norman Lewis* nous montre que le sort des villages de la Palmyrène, dont l’histoire est faite d ’abandons répétés suivis de réoccupations de plus ou moins longue durée, ne peut être compris que dans le contexte de l’histoire des tribus du désert qui les entourent et dans celle des rapports du pouvoir central avec ces tribus. A la période de relative stabilité qu’a connue le Nord de la Shâmiyya sous la domination des princes M aw ilï qui, contre le versement de la khuwwa, apportaient leur protection aux sédentaires de la Palmyrène, succède, à partir du 17ème siècle, une période de guerres tribales. La montée successive vers le Nord des tribus chamelières des grandes confédérations du Nadj, Shammar, puis cAnaza (H asana, Ruw ala, Sibef, Fcufân) s’accompagne de redistributions de territoires et de pouvoirs. Les conflits se m ultiplient. L’ordre tribal est sans cesse remis en cause. Les MawiÜ sont vaincus par les Shammar qui sont à leur tour repoussés vers le Nord par les cAnaza dont la puissante confédération est ensuite fragilisée par une guerre interne entre Hasana et RuwilL* Les Hasana vaincus se replient plus à l’Ouest. Au m ilieu du 19ème siècle, la Palmyrène est dominée au Sud par les7*9

7 M usil, Alois: The M am ers a id Custom s o f the Rwala B ed a d iu , New York 192S. g Nous em pruntons l'essentiel des informations historiques concernant Alep et U Palmyrène à Lewis. Norman: ’O ssis and Caravan Villages o f the Syrian D esert 1500-1980, * BRISMES Conference 1987 (unpublished). Lewis. Norman: Nomads and Settlers in Syria and Jordan 1800-1980, Cambridge 1988; et à Boucheman, 1939; et Boucheman, A lbende: 'L a sédentarisation des nomades du désert de Syrie,* dans: L 'A sie fra n ça ise, 320 (1934). pp. 140-143; mais aussi à Carameau. Jacques: L e dialecte arabe de Paim yre, 2 vote., Beyrouth 1934. 9 V oir la description qui en est feite dans Le d ise rt a la gloire. L es m ém oires d 'u n agent syrien de NapoUon p a r Fadhallah Sâylgh, (tn d . de l'arabe et annoté par Chelbod, J.). 1991, p. 106.

ka Routes et le* Flux

33

RuwSlà et au Nord par les Pacfin. Entre les deux, entre Pslmyre et le Jabal Bishrï, se trouvent les deux branches de la tribu Çibaf. Mais cet ordre instable est plusieurs fois troublé par les raids wahabites,101par l’arrivée et le départ des troupes d ’Ibràb3m Pasha. Alors, le désordre s’installe, les pillages se multiplient; les villages s’épuisent à payer la khuwwa à de multiples fractions rivales sans qu’aucune ■protection" réelle ne puissent leur être assurée et les populations qui ne peuvent se défendre efficacement à l’intérieur de leurs murs, sont contraintes de trouver refuge ailleurs. Alep recueille ainsi la population de Sukfana au moment de la poussée wahhabite, au début du 19ème siècle. Entre le 17ème et le 19ème siècle Sukfana est la plus peuplée de ces localités (d ie pouvait m obiliser et armer 400 hommes)." Ibrâhîm Pasha, en 1833, y installe un détachement et assure quelques années de calme relatif, mais lorsque, en 1839, ses troupes se retirent les populations s’enfuient à nouveau vers Alep. Les abandons sont momentanés et suivis de retour dés qu’un calme relatif revient: trois ans plus tard, un voyageur trouve le village réoccupé.

Le S anjak du Désert Dans la deuxième moitié du 19ème siècle, la Sublime Porte dans ses efforts de modernisation manifeste un nouvel intérêt pour les steppes du Moyen-Orient. Par l’intermédiaire de ses wdUs ou gouverneurs de province,12 elle essaie d’étendre son autorité sur les régions périphériques du B ilid al-Shàm. Dans la province d ’Alep, reprenant la politique menée quelques années plus tôt par Ibrâhîm Pasha à l’égard des tribus bédouines, le w ûlt s’efforce de prendre le contrôle de la vallée de l’Euphrate. La pénétration vers l’Est s’opère par des campagnes militaires suivies d ’implantations administratives. L ’objectif est de contenir les tribus, d’assurer la sécurité des routes du com­ merce, de protéger les populations sédentaires, qui sont un point d’appui indispen­ sable au transit caravanier, et les paysans et les semi-nomades qui commencent à développer l’agriculture. De 1834 à 1870, les campagnes militaires se succèdent. Dès 1834 est créé un "nuttasarrifa du Zûrm (de la vallée de l’Euphrate) mais sa mise en place est problématique et le contrôle du w ûll ne s’exerce guère au delà de Meskena. Ces tentatives sont trop éphémères, souvent suivies de repli. Les Facfïn repren­ nent le contrôle des territoires dès que l’armée se retire, guettant le moindre affaiblissement du pouvoir d ’Alep où les wd/fs se succèdent. Dayr al-Zür est pris en

10 M d„ p. 143. 11 La * — «— Palmyre n 'est phn qu’un petit village dont la population fluctuante varie de 13 ou 18 fam illes à 70 ou 80 Am ides; Lewis, 1987. 12 Le processus d ’expansion décrit par N. Lewis pour l'Euphrate et la région d’Alep est sim ilaire à celui que retrace Rogan, Eugen L .: Incorporating the P eriphery: the Ottoman Extension c f D irect R ule over Southeastern Syria, (Tranÿordanie) 1887-1914, Cambridge, M ass. 1991, (microfilm): pour la région de Sak au Sud de la Shdndyya, voir pp. 63-133.

34

Françoise Métrai

1863, abandonné et repris en 1864, par Suraya Pasha, iMtfr d’Alep qui y installe un détachement,13 suivi d’un autre à Raqqa en 1865.14 Mais ces avancées m ilitaires et administratives ne soumettent pas les grandes tribus, qui résistent ou se retirent dans la steppe, d ’où elles ressortent dés que les conditions leur sont favorables. Ainsi le w ait ne peut garantir la protection des Shawâya15 qui commencent i cultiver dans la vallée de l'Euphrate et qu’il soumet à l'im pôt. Il ne peut même pas garantir la sécurité des caravanes qui ravitaillent les postes m ilitaires. Attaques et représailles génèrent l’insécurité. Pour y m ettre fin, les w aits d ’Alep et de Damas16 décident d’unir leurs efforts afin de contrôler la steppe non plus seulement à ses périphéries mais dans ses profondeurs. Ds obtiennent de La Porte les moyens m ilitaires et administratifs. En 1868, une force de cavalarie légère du désert (muletiers) est créée, avec des détachements à Dayr, Palmyre, Sukhna et Qaryatayn. Équipée de winchesters, elle possède la supériorité m ilitaire. La même année une nouvelle entité administrative est constituée, directement rattachée à La Porte, "le sandjak du désert." Dayr al-Zür en est le centre (cf. Fig. 1). Le sandjak couvre la vallée de l'Euphrate, la Jazïra et le nord de la Shimiyya. Dans les oasis de la Palmyrène les changements ne sont perceptibles que progressivement. Dès 1863, de petits postes militaires sont établis dans les villages et aux abords des puits.1718Tayba et al-Kawm qui avaient été désertés sont alors réoccupés et leurs jardins remis en culture. Mais pendant la guerre russo-turque, en 1877, l’armée ottomane mobilise ses troupes, réduit la garnison de Dayr et abandonne les postes du désert. Les mar­ chands de Mossoul et d’Alep fraîchement installés à Dayr repartent. Les familles de Tayba et al-Kawm se réfugient à Safifa et Sukhna1* tandis que celles d’Arak, au Sud, se replient à Palmyre. Tayba et al-Kawm, que Musil trouve habités en 1908, sont à nouveau pillés en 1917 par les S ib ï et leurs habitants doivent une fois encore trouver refuge auprès de leurs parents établis à Dayr al-Zfir, Safira et Sukhna. Ils reviendront progressi­ vement s’y réinstaller après 1921 et l’établissement du Mandat.

13 En 1864, S uriya Pasha, wùU d'A lep reçoit des pouvoirs étendus de La Porte et décide avec le commandement m ilitaire d*Alep de pousser jusqu*à Dayr. Après une campagne m ilitaire de trois mois (Septembre à Novembre) il prend Dayr et y installe un détachement; Lewis, 1988, p. 28. 14 En 1865, Sibac et F acftn attaquent une caravane destinée à l'approvisionnem ent de la garnison de Dayr. Le n d/f jouant des oppositions tribales envoie alors Shammar et Maw ill contre eux mais ceuxci se voient infliger une défaite. Le MtiJTd'Alep renforce alors la garnison de D ayr et installe un autre détachem ent dans les ruines de l'ancienne ville de Raqqa; Lewis, ibid. 15 Tribus moutonnières partiellem ent sédentarisées et pratiquant l’agriculture dans la vallée de l’Euphrate. 16 A la suite d 'u n accord pris en 1966. 17 Selon Boucheman, 1939, pp. 2 0 -2 2 ,1 0 4 . A l'arrivée des T ûtes, les populations de Palmyre et de Sukhna avoisinent 600 à 700 habitants. 18 Sukhna n 'a plus été désertée depuis le départ des troupes d 'Ibtihfm Pasha.

le* Rouie* et le* Flux Commerciaux ...

35

L a P olitique des Chefs A partir des aimées 1880 La Porte va changer sa politique de contrôle de la steppe. O le comprend qu'elle ne peut assurer ce contrôle par ses propres forces. qu’U lui faut sans cesse m obiliser sur d ’autres fronts, en particulier dans les Balkans. Au lieu de faire la guerre aux tribus, elle cherche à s’en faite des alliées en agissant auprès de leurs chefs. Elle établit l’impôt collectif sur les troupeaux et concède à leur chef la charge de le collecter auprès des gens de leurs tribu. Elle tente de leur imposer la conscription mais, forts de leur m obilité, les bédouins la refusent et émigrent à plusieurs reprises en masse vers le Nadj quand la pression est trop forte.19 Elle gratifie les chefs d’honneurs et leur distribue des terres. Les réformes administratives inspirées par le nouveau code foncier de 1858 et l’enregistrement des terres par le tapu suscitaient un certain intérêt chez les chefs bédouins. Le gouvernement utilise alors la terre comme instrument efficace pour obtenir la soumission des tribus à l’ordre ottoman. D espérait que la mise en culture les pousserait à la sédentarisation et, par là même, faciliterait leur contrôle. C ’est ainsi que déjà en 1871, Jad*in ibn Muhà’id, cheikh des Fadc’in , recevait du w dll d ’Alep une gratification de terres à cultiver sur vingt villages désertés, dans le Jabal Shubayt. Au cours d’une cérémonie officielle, le même cheikh Jad*àn, se voyait reconnu chef des FacF’Sn et investi du titre de "cheikh du désert." Le mode de vie des cheikhs change rapidement et se distingue fortement de celui du reste de leur tribu. Ds fréquentent les villes au printemps afin de négocier avec les autorités le versement de l’impôt, l’accès aux marchés, l ’entrée des troupeaux dans la zone cultivée après les récoltes. Enfin, cherchant à intégrer les notabilités tribales dans l’Empire, le gouverne­ ment ottoman ouvre en 1892 à Constantinople une école des tribus, A gira M ektebi, placée sous la direction honoraire du Sultan et destinée à recevoir les jeunes fils des chefs bédouins éminents. Les jeunes gens admis étaient totalement pris en charge pendant les cinq années que duraient leurs études secondaires au cours desquelles ils se fam iliarisaient avec la vie citadine et les principes de l’ordre ottoman. L’école devait faire émerger une nouvelle génération de bédouins aptes à participer à la vie publique de l’Empire. M uhjim, le petit fils de Jad*àn, reconnu à son tour, plus tard, chef des Fad'Sn Muha’id, et Birjis ibn Hudayb des Sibîf cA bida, tout comme SajtSm al-Sha'tàn des Ruwàlà y firent leurs études. L’écart se creuse entre cette élite dtadinisée qui développe de nouveaux modes de consommation, se fait construire en ville de belles demeures et le reste de la tribu qui ne connaît que les campements.

19 Selon Lewis, 19S8, p. 34. en 1892, 3.000 ‘A n e s ém igrent en M an vers le Nadj pour échapper à la conecflpdoB. Le même phénomène *e reproduit en 1899.

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M aintien de la Vie Nom ade - Déplacem ent des Parcours La m obilité des tribus préservait leur autonomie. Comme bien d’autres chefs par la suite, Jad'ân fit venir sur ses terres des paysans comme métayers tandis que sa tribu continuait à nomadiser. Devant l’avancée des labours, les Fad'in déplacèrent peu à peu leurs parcours. Les bédouins qui passaient l’hiver en Shùmiyya se retirèrent progressivement de la zone cultivée à l’Ouest et commencèrent à franchir l’Euphrate, préférant établir leurs campements d ’été en Jarira où se trouvaient d ’immenses steppes non cultivées qui offraient des pâturages abondants. C ’est ainsi que les F a d ln Khursa, suivis dans les années 1890 par les Fad'in W uld, s’imposè­ rent au Sud-ouest de la Jazîra jusqu’au Balikh, poussant les Shammar plus au Nord et plus à l ’Est. Pendant toute cette période le marché du chameau reste prospère et l’économie pastorale assurée. Sollicitées par les marchands alépins et une conjoncture économique très favorable, les tribus chamelières développent aussi, nous le verrons plus loin, l’élevage du mouton. La steppe est abandonnée aux grandes tribus qui, grâce à l 'enrichissement de leurs chefs et au trafic d’armes, parviennent à s’équiper, elles aussi, d’armes nouvelles. Elles maintiennent ainsi leur pression sur les petites tribus, les villageois et les marchands de la steppe.

Routes et Itinéraires du Commerce L’extension du contrôle politique de La Porte vers les régions périphériques de la bâdiya visant à garantir la sécurité des routes caravanières s’opère au moment où des innovations techniques successives transforment les communications. Nous avons peu d’indications précises sur les cités de la Palmyrène au cours de ces dernières décennies de l ’Empire ottoman.10 L’inventaire des nouvelles voies de communication et des modifications qui apparaissent me permet de présenter quelques conclusions-hypothèses sur les effets locaux des innovations concernant les modes de transport et les voies de communication. Les Pistes C aravanières de la Palm yrène (Fig. 2) Il finit rappeller que trois groupes différents de pistes caravanières traversaient le désert syrien à hauteur de la Palmyrène et reliaient traditionnellement l’Euphrate mésopotamien à la M éditerranée, en passant par l’une des deux grandes villes intérieures syriennes, Damas et Alep.20

20 En dehors de celle« fournie* par les voyageurs e t réunies par Lewis, 1987, sur U population. Si l’on te fie aux estim ations des voyageun, le rapport de population entre les deux cités s’est inversé à la fin du 19ème siècle. La population de Sukhna n 'est plus que de *600 habitants* (1893) ou autour *de 100 familles* en 1900, tandis que celle de Palmyre devenue chef lieu d'une circonscription du Sandjak du désert a largem ent augmenté (360 maisons en 1912,2.200 habitants en 1920).

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Vers Damas, venant de Bagdad et de la Basse Mésopotamie, les grandes caravanes évitaient la piste méridionale directe utilisée par le courrier,21 et prenaient la route plus septentrionale passant par Palmyre.2223Pour un chef de caravane,22 la Palmyiène était en effet la partie la plus aisément traversable du désert syrien. L'eau y était toujours p ro d » et le sol, relativement doux et égal, convenait au pied des chameaux. La piste la plus connue, sinon la plus empruntée au 19ème siècle, était la voie romaine Hit, Q ubayd, Palmyre, très pratiquée au Moyen-Age. Comme nous le verrons, les pillages répétés de caravanes aux environs de Qubaysl, poussèrent les caravanes, à partir du lôèm e siècle, à passer plutôt par le Nord de la Palmyiène et à traverser le "petit désert" entre cÀna et Sukhna. Venant de la Haute Mésopotamie, des pistes très anciennes traversaient la Palmyrène du Nord au Sud: après avoir franchi l ’Euphrate à Raqqa,24*Rahba ou cÂna, elles rejoignaient Damas par Sukhna, Palmyre, Dmayr ou Qaryatayn. Enfin, vers Alep, venant de Basra et Bagdad, la grande diagonale empruntée par la route de la soie franchissait l’Euphrate à Hty, ou ‘Àna passait par Sukhna, Tayba, Safira. De Sukhna partait une autre branche vers Damas (cf. plus haut) Du lôèm e au 19ème siècle, la route par eÂna, Sukhna, Tayba a été la grande voie de la route de l ’Inde, les caravanes préférant éviter les rives de l’Euphrate infestée de pillards.22 Dans les dernières décennies de l'Em pire ottoman la caravane se voit concur­ rencée progressivement par le bateau, puis le chemin de fer. Prem ière C oncurrence, le B ateau: L a Voie M aritim e et la Voie flu v ia le A partir des années 1870, le percement du canal de Suez, s’ajoutant aux progrès de la navigation dus à la machine à vapeur, puis à l’introduction de l ’hélice, raccour­ cissent les distances et réduisent la durée des voyages. Pour les marchandises comme pour les voyageurs la route de l’Inde est de plus en plus une route mari­ time. Le bateau offre une alternative, parfoits plus sûre et moins coûteuse, à la traversée du désert syrien en caravane.

21 D a rt a l-s /fl. Cede pine (H it, Qubayyl, Bi’r M aNsa, P o a y r), ne pouvait être empruntée par les caravanes commerciale* en raison de la rareté des points d ’eau et de la proximité du H am id. Elle sera rem ise en service et deviendra la voie essentielle entre Bagdad et Damas, à partir de 1923, dès que le désert sera traversé en autom obile, en autobus et en camion. 22 Celle route était par les Arabes du nom de 'D arb al-K irfr’ ("route des infidèles*), les Romains y avaient creusé des puits et construit des fortins tous les 40 kilometres. 23 O rant, C hristina: The Syrian D esert, C aravans, Travel and E xploration, London 1937, p. 40. 24 Passant par R esifa, Tayiba. Sukhna, Palm yre, Pm ayr cette route était une portion de la Strata D iodedana joignant Trebizonde i P étn et "Aqaba. 29 Pour les caravanes venant du Nord de la Mésopotamie en direction d'A lep, la traversée se ftiaak à Rahba ou Raqqa mais d ie s évitaient de longer les rives de l’Euphrate de peur des pillarde e t pluiOt que de couper tout droit à travers la zone cultivée rejoignaient "la diagonale" à Tayba.

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Des lignes de vapeurs régulières relient désormais la Grande Bretagne et la France aux ports orientaux de la M éditerranée. D 'autres empruntent le canal de Suez, pour rejoindre le Golfe Persique et l’Inde. Les voies du transit commercial intercontinental reliant l'O rient, notamment la Perse et l’Inde, à l ’Europe, se diversifient. Concurrencée par la voie maritime, la voie terrestre de la grande route de l ’Inde, qui, de Bagdad à Alep, traversait en diagonale le désert an Nord de la Palmyrène pour rejoindre la M éditerranée à Alexandrette ou Smyme, perd de son importance dans les échanges inter-continentaux. Elle continue cependant à être utilisée. Le transit s’accroît même avec le développement des échanges entre l’Europe et les provinces orientales de l’Empire. Cependant, pour les échanges de marchandises entre la Perse et la Grande Bretagne, le développement de la navigation sur le Tigre26278fidt parfoits préférer la voie fluviale et un transbordement à Basra sur les cargos de la ligne de l’Inde. C ’est une voie qu’emprunte également les exportations de la province de Mossoul77 à destination de la Grande Bretagne. La voie terrestre demeure d ’usage courant jusqu’à la fin de l’Empire pour tous les échanges inter-régionaux. Bien que contournée à l ’Ouest par le trafic côtier et à l’Est par la voie fluviale sur le Tigre, la Palmyrène reste un lieu de passage. C hangem ents dans les Routes C aravanières Quelques changements interviennent également dans les pistes empruntées par les caravanes qui assurent le transit entre la Perse, l ’Irak et la Méditerranée. - A partir des années 18702* et l ’établissement des postes m ilitaires turcs le long de la vallée de l’Euphrate, les voyageurs circulant entre Bagdad et Alep, ou la haute Mésopotamie et Alep purent en sécurité suivre la route longeant l’Euphrate jusqu’à Meskena. Us franchissaient le fleuve à Rahba, passant par Dayr al-ZQr, (ou Raqqa pour ceux venant du Nord) et rejoignaient ensuite Alep en droite ligne, à travers la zone cultivée. Cette voie, qui fut alors qualifiée de "route im périale,” contournait la Palmyrène par le Nord et offrait une alternative bientôt préférée à la diagonale cÂna, Sukhna, Safira. Les grandes caravanes, notamment la caravane annuelle de la soie en provenance de Bagdad qui comptait 2.000 à 3.000 chameaux, continuèrent toutefois à emprun­ ter la diagonale par Sukhna et Safira, préférant éviter les terrains labourés.

26 Pascual, Jean Paul: *Du chameau à la chaudière. La route de l'Euphrate au 19e tièd e,* dans: Vetud, C . f t G eyer, B. A Pascual, J. P. (eds.): Une m ission de reconnaissance de l'E uphrate en 1922. Les enjeux économ iques, politiques e t m ilitaires d ’une conquête, 2e partie, Damas 1995, pp. 43-45. 27 Shields, Sarah D .: 'R egional Trade and the 19th-Century Mosul: Revising the R oleof Europe in the M iddle East Economy,* dans: International Journal o f M iddle E ast Studies, 23 (1991), p. 31. 28 E n 1870, M idhat Pasha, wäO de Bagdad, selon une initiative parallèie à celle du w att d ’A lep, établit des postes sur la portion du fleuve relevant de ta circonacription e t la voie de l'B uphrate fin dès Io n considérée comme voie im périale; Lewis, 1988, p. 30.

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- Dans la deuxième m oitié du 19ème siècle et surtout après 1890, le développe­ ment du port de Beyrouth détourna vers Damas une partie du trafic à destination de l’Europe qui transitait habituellement par Alep. Les cités du Nord de la Palmyrène ne durent guère pâtir de ce détour car les grandes caravanes allant de Bagdad à Damas préféraient alors continuer à traverser le Petit Désert, mieux pourvu en points d’eau et passer par eÀna, Sukhna et Palmyre plutôt que par la route Hit, Qubaysi, Dmayr, alors considérée comme peu sûre.1* Au total, jusqu’au début du 20ème siècle et l ’établissement du chemin de fer, le transit caravanier lié au commerce à grande distance et passant par la Palmyrène semble se m aintenir, bien que diminué. Nous ne trouvons nulle trace dans la mémoire collective d’un déclin important à cette époque. Ce qui reste dans les histoires de famille (déjà relevé par Boucheman) c’est, comme nous le verrons plus loin, l’ouverture de nouvelles possibilités à Alep, à Dayr al-Zür et le long de l ’Euphrate, pour commerçants et caravaniers.

Le Pèlerinage et le Chemin de Fer Une nouvelle innovation, le chemin de fer, vint au début du 20ème siècle concur­ rencer le chameau, les routes de la Palmyrène et mettre en péril ce qui était la grande affaire des Sukhniotes: le Pèlerinage. Qu’ils soient de Sukhna ou de Palmyre,2930 les Palmyiéniens n’étaient pas éleveurs de chameaux mais transporteurs, guides, chameliers. Les chameaux assuraient leur subsistance. Ils étaient achetés aux bédouins à l’occasion du marché aux chameaux qui s’établissaient dans la steppe au printemps à l’arrivée des grandes tribus.3132Ceci moins pour les revendre que pour en faire des animaux de bât pour leur propres caravanes ou pour les louer aux pèlerins. La fourniture de chameaux pour la caravane du Pèlerinage de Damas conjointe­ ment avec les autres oasis (Palmyre, Qaryatayn) assurait une prospérité à la petite cité étudiée par Boucheman. Les chefs successifs de la cité qui servaient d ’inter­ médiaire entre leurs compatriotes et les autorités s’appuyaient sur la fonction de m utasallim al-hajj, pourvoyeur du hajj, pour asseoir leur pouvoir. Le Pasha de Damas31 centralisait les demandes des pèlerins et les répercutait sur les oasis de la Palmyrène (les Manâzir). Vers le milieu du 19ème siècle, le cheykh de Sukhna, Çâlih al-Talâf, envoyait jusqu’à 2.000 chameaux ce qui, nous dit

29 G rant, p. 170. 30 Candneau. I. p. 22. 31 Cf. U description k ite au détout du 19ème siècle par PadUUXh Slyigh du marché aux chameaux qui accom pagnait l’arrivée des R uw ili et qui se poursuivait pendant lu it jo u is, Cbelhod, p. 106. 32 Sur l'organisation du Pèlerinage de Damas voir Battoir, K arl: The D ynam ics o f Ottom an R ate in D am ascus during Ihe F irst H a ffo f the E ighteenth C entury, Pinert 1977, pp. 109-199; et G rant, p. 219-234.

40 Boucheman33 dépassait de beaucoup ce que fournissait Palmyre et même Qaryatayn.34*De chaque chameau qu’il louait, le propriétaire tirait en moyenne de cinq à sept livres or et le m utasalüm al-hajj un bénéfice important. Le Pèlerinage était également une source d ’emploi pour les Sukhniotes les plus pauvres qui accompagnaient la caravane comme chameliers, guides, ou membres de l’escorte, selon les exigences du Pasha de Damas.13 Le voyage aller-retour durait trois m ois.36 D n’était pas rare de trouver des chameliers qui avaient ainsi fait plus de trente fois le voyage jusqu’à la Mecque.37389 Enfin, Sukhna se trouvait sur la route de la caravane du Pèlerinage de Perse e t d ’Irak qui y faisait escale. Le passage de la caravane était l’occasion d’un m arché improvisé pendant les huit jours où il s’échelonnait,3* Sukhniotes et Palmyréniens vendaient alors aux pèlerins l’équipement nécessaire à leur voyage, et achetaient e n retour aux pèlerins les marchandises qu’ils apportaient avec eux et qui devaient le u r servir à financer le reste de leur voyage. En 1880, la fourniture de chameaux passa à des Damascènes. Les profits devinrent alors beaucoup moins importants pour les Sukhniotes qui ne furent plu s que les sous-traitants des nouveaux adjudicataires {muqawmm )* damascènes. Déjà le Sultan songeait au chemin de fer pour remplacer la caravane et achemi­ ner les pèlerins d ’Anatolie vers les lieux saints au travers de la Syrie. Plusieurs projets furent discutés avec les puissances européennes. En 1873, le Sultan proposa un projet de chemin de fer trans-désertique à travers la Palmyrène (AbO K am il, Dayr al-ZQr, Palmyre, Homs), mais celui-ci fut refusé par les financiers qui craignaient qu’il ne soit pas rentable et qui le jugèrent irréalisable

33 Boucheman, 1939, p. 87. 34 Boucheman, 1939, p. 22, ajoute: *U communique directement avec La Pone, panant par dem is la tête du 'B ashat a l H agg. ’ 33 'P a r force beaucoup devaient accom pagner la caravane. Les riche* l ’en rachetaient; mais oo raconte que, pour le A ire, les pauvres vendaient parfois leu n filles .... * ibid., p. 87. 36 G rant, p. 230, nous donne une description précise de l’organisation du voyage. Les muqaw^km, maîtres cham eliers de Damas imposaient le rythme: 40 jours pour l’aller, 3 semaines sur place et 40 jours pour le retour. 37 Comme par exemples les deux informateurs dont Boucheman rapporte les itinéraires professioaneis Nous avons encore rencontré un de ces cham eliers, en 1983, à al-Kawm. D résumait ainsi le mutations dom il avait été le témoin: ‘Avec la caravane, le voyage durait 40 jo uis, puis vint le n i cela ne durait phis que 4 jours et la dernière fois en avion, je n’ai mis que 4 heures.* 38 *On voyait passer jusqu’à 3000 mulets ou chameau*, chargés souvent de cacolets, sam compter h bêtes de somme pour les tentes et les provisions. Le chef du convoi, sur sa jum ent ou « r sa nail précédait le passage et préparait le campement. Jusqu’en 1913, le Pèlerinage enrichit Suitné. Pende les huit jours sur lesquels il s’échelonnait, on n’y trouvait paraît-il plus un oeuf. (C'était en méi temps une occasion de contact avec des étrangers. V en 1890, les pèlerins persans firent cornai le thé à Sukhna. Delà, il se répandit au désert. On le ftita k influer dans des cafetières avec tht por et du pim ent.),’ Boucheman, 1939, p. 87. 39 Pour passer contrat en vue du Pèlerinage un propriétaire, ou un groupe de propriétaires chameaux, agissant comme une unité devait pouvoir fournir une participation odrisam de chameaux; G rant, p. 229.

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te ile de ressource en e u . C ’est le projet concurrent Berlin-Bagdad, passant par la Haute Mésopotamie qui fut retenu.40 Plus au Sud à partir de Damas, le chemin de fer du Hejaz fut mis en chantier. Entré en service en 1903, achevé en 1908, il tarit pour les Sukhniotcs le marché du chameau lié à la caravane de Damas. Jusqu’en 1913, les Sukhniotes continuèrent cependant à servir les pèlerins de la caravane de Perse entre Dayr al-Zûr et Damas. Es leur louaient leurs montures ou des animaux de bâts et les accompagnaient pour le trajet entre Dayr al-ZQr et Damas. La guerre de 1914 interrom pit le passage des grandes caravanes qui ne reprirent plus le chemin de la Palmyiène. Pendant les troubles, les pèlerins empruntèrent le bateau de Basra à Jedda. A la fin de la guerre, avec l’avancée de la construction du Bagdadbahn et la réalisation des premiers tronçons de son prolongement vers Basra, ils préférèrent désormais le chemin de fer; puis bientôt, avec l’arrivée des Ford, la route carrossable qui passant par Kerbels empruntait l ’ancienne voie du Darb Zubaida41 ou encore, la piste Sud qui de Bagdad à Damas leur permettait de rejoindre le bateau à Beyrouth.42 Avec la fin de la caravane du Pèlerinage la cité perdait une de ses assises économiques essentielles. Les lignes de chemin de fer réalisées par les diverses puissances s’étaient construites au Sud (le chemin de fer du Hejaz), à l’Ouest Oignes côtière ou intérieures), au Nord ou à l’Est 0« chemin de fer de Bagdad ou Bagdadbahn). La Palmyrène se retrouvait à l ’écart des flux liés à ces nouvelles voies de communica­ tion qui, au lieu de la projeter dans la modernité, lui enlevèrent peu à peu ses ressources et sa fonction de transit. L’ancienne grande voie de passage devenait une impasse, un cul de sac, un angle m ort. Que devinrent alors les chameliers et caravaniers Palmyrèniens? Sur quelles ressources s’appuyèrent les Sukhniotes pour faire face à cette nouvelle situation?

Alep et le Commerce Régional Le Com m erce des Productions A gro-pastorales Depuis le milieu du 19ème siècle, Alep connaît une forte expansion économique. La politique de contrôle des régions de l’Est et des populations bédouines qu’entre­ prend, La Porte a aussi pour objectif d ’étendre la zone cultivée, et de développer les productions agricoles pour alimenter le commerce extérieur. Ce développement du commerce extérieur connaît, d’abord avec le blé, pendant la guerre de Crimée en 1835, puis avec le coton, pendant la guerre de sécession aux États-Unis, une expansion sans précédent encouragée par une envolée des cours

40 G rant, p. 265. Ce projet « en repris en 1930 per les Fiançais mais lui aussi abandonné. 41 G rant, pp. 2 8 8 .2 9 6 . 42 Dés 1925, une caravane de pèlerine de 160 voitures (Usait ainsi rouie entre Bagdad et Beyrouth.

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de ces dentées sur le marché.41 N. Lewis note la rapidité avec laquelle les popula­ tions locales, des marchands aux paysans, ont su alors répondre à la conjoncture.4344456 Les cours retombent par la suite; mais en dépit des périodes de récession et des irrégularités de la production dues au climat, les productions de céréales (blé et orge) et celle de coton continuèrent à augmenter et la zone cultivée à s'étendre vers l’Est. Cette progression semble avoir été particulièrement forte dans les années 1890-1910 où les voyageurs constatent une multiplication des villages dans la région.41 Nous avons vu que cette expansion des labours s’accompagne d’une sédentarisation des petits tribus dans la vallée de l’Euphrate. A partir de 1890, elle intéresse aussi quelques grands chefs des tribus cAnaza notamment le cheikh M uhjim des Facfln qui fit mettre en culture non seulement les vingt villages donnés à son grand père par le Sultan mais les anciennes to re s d’estivage de la tribu au Sud-est d’Alep44 et des terres qu’il avait achetées sur le bord de l’Euphrate aux environs de Meskena et qu’il fit travailler par les Afadla.4748 L’agriculture s’ajouta alors aux ressources des chefs de tribus et fit prospérer le commerce des marchands alépins alimentant un commerce régional et inter-régional qui prend le relais du commerce international. Les exportations de céréales continuent en effet à fluctuer en fonction du climat et de la demande étrangère. Après 188S, la tendance est à la baisse des cours et du tonnage;41 ces exportations deviennent négligeables à partir des années 1890. Mais la production ne fléchit pas; d ie s’oriente vers la demande intérieure de la province et des districts voisins qui est en constante augmentation et qu’elle a peine à satisfaire. Les échanges se développent entre les provinces de l’Empire. Pour le coton par exemple, qui alimente l’artisanat textile de Mossoul et d’Alep, les échanges qui s’intensifient entre ces deux villes permettent de pallier les irrégularités de

43 S. Shields note que les années de guerre ont coïncidé avec des conditions climatiques favorables et des récoltes exceptionnelles. Le phénomène se reproduira à l’identique avec une phis grande ampleur un siècle phis tard, au moment de la deuxième guerre mondiale, en 1940 (pour le blé), puis pendant la guerre de Corée en 1952 (pour le coton), relançant une nouvelle expansion des cultures vers l’E st 44 Lewis. 1988, p. 47. 45 Cf. M usil; et Bell, G ertrud: Syria, the D esert and A e S o m , 2nd ed ., London 1919, pp. 254-200. Celle-ci note dans son journal en 1905 l’existence de nombreux villages ne figurant pas sur la carte établit une dizaine d'années (dus tôt par R. K iepert (1893). 46 Le chef des SibT fit de même quelque années plus tard sur ses terres de parcourt d’été dans la région d’AsriyyS, Kudaym. 47 Tribu Shaw iya de l'E uphrate. Khalaf, Suleyman: 'C heikhs, paysans et membres du parti Baath, changem ents politiques en Syrie du nord,* dans: Bocco f t Jaubert f t M étrai, pp. 178-185; nous donne i travers l'histoire de sa famille le récit de la création d’un de ces nouveaux villages aux environs de Raqqa. 48 Lewis, 1988, pp. 46-48.

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l’approvisionnement dues aux conditions climatiques locales. "Les années de mauvaise récolte, Mossoul importait du coton d ’Alep."*9 Pendant toute cette période et notamment dans les années 1870-1890, les productions pastorales sont également en expansion et contribuent de manière importante aux revenus du commerce. Le marché du chameau se maintient et les tribus chamelières g a rd â t leur spécificité en déplaçant leurs parcours estivaux vers la Jazüra. Mais elles possèdent également des troupeaux de mouton qu’elles confient (comme leurs terres) à des Shawâya ou gens des tribus moutonnières. Les troupeaux de mouton connaissent une forte augmentation de 1840 à 1890.® Le marché du mouton est en pleine expansion. Les cours de la laine grimpent en 1863. Alep49*51 qui domine un vaste arrière-pays est le grand centre pour toutes les transactions liées au commerce du mouton pour la Syrie et l’Égypte. Elle importe des bêtes d ’Anatolie, du Kurdistan, de la province de Mossoul ou les achète aux tribus syriennes. Elle exporte les peaux mais surtout la laine vers la France et la Grande Bretagne (Manchester et Liverpool) qui en ont besoin pour alimenter leur industrie et elle fournit la viande à Beyrouth, aux autres provinces syriennes et à l’Égypte. L’importance grandissante de ces produits dans l’économie de la cité apportent une richesse croissante tant aux tribus qu’aux citadins. Au fur et à mesure qu’ animaux vifs et toisons deviennent les articles les plus importants des exportations, le mouton acquit soudain une valeur aussi importante pour la ville qu’elle l ’était pour les bédouins. Il suscite l’intérêt des marchands citadins pour l’élevage et les pousse à développer leurs relations avec les tribus. C rédits, M archands et Interm édiaires Pour toutes ces productions agro-pastorales, le rendement, dans ces régions périphériques, est extrêmement aléatoire en raison des conditions climatiques.52 Vers le milieu du siècle, la demande en matières premières des industries européen­ nes avait du mal à être satisfaite. La production était entre les mains des tribus qui contrôlaient aussi les pâturages.

49 Shield*, p . 24. 90 En 1840, I. Bowring dans to n rapport notait que le* troupeaux ne suffisaient pas à nourrir la population syrienne; cité par Shields, p. 26. SI Le phénomène se produit de la même manière dans l a provinces qui ont un arrière pays pastoral, dans celle de Mossoul (Shields, p. 24; ’entre 1874 et 1912, l'exportation d a produits pastoraux i partir de M ossoul fait plus que doubla*) ou phis au Sud dan* tes districts de Kerak et Sait et la province de Napiouse (Rogan, pp. 191-203). 92 Rareté et extrêm e irrégularité inter annuelle et locale, d a plûtes. C f. Sanltvilte, Paul: "Dévelop­ pem ent e t environement," dans: Boceo f t Jaubert f t M étrai.

44 Pour s'assurer un approvisionnement plus régulier, les grandes compagnies européennes injectent de l’argent dans le circuit selon le procédé de la traité et des pratiques très anciennes dans le commerce méditerranéen avec le Proche O rient." "La pratique habituelle était en effet d’acheter les récoltes locales en payant comptant et de vendre les biens importés manufacturés à crédit ce qui impliquait pour les nouveaux marchands européens des fonds considérables pour installer un comptoir local.34 Le rôle des intermédiaires locaux comme charnière entre 1e marché mondial, te commerce à grande échelle et la production agricole ou artisanale à petite échelle était essentiel... Ces hommes connaissaient la langue, te marché et les pratiques commerciales moyen-orientales qui leur permettaient de trouver des revendeurs d'imposer ou de négocier tes contrats et de recouvrer tes créances.”33 D . Chevallier souligne ainsi le rôle essentiel des préteurs d'argent de Syrie qui utilisaient leurs propres ressources en capital ou l’argent obtenu des Européens, pour générer le crédit requis pour étendre le commerce local et acheter les produc­ tions. En cette période d’expansion commerciale, le système du paiement à l’avance des récoltes est une pratique générale (pour les céréales comme pour les produc­ tions agro-pastorales); le crédit se répercute à tous les maillons du circuit de la traite de la laine ou du mouton qui se trouvent étroitement liés. Les méranianu»« ne sont pas nouveaux, ni propres à la province d’Alep. Ils nous sont décrit par Guys dans une lettre au M arquis de M oustier, du 8 Juin 1862.3* "Le commerce de la laine, qui est te principal article d’exportation du pays, est organisé de telle sorte, qu’on ne peut s’y livrer qu’à l’aide de grands capitaux et en courant des risques considérables. Dès tes premiers jours de Février, à l’époque où tes Arabes remontent vers la Haute Mésopotamie pour y chercher les pâturages nécessaires à leurs troupeaux, tes courtiers des négociants de Mossoul se répandent dans 1e désert et procèdent à l’achat des toisons dont la tonte n’aura lieu qu’au mois d’Avril suivant. Ce sont de véritables marchés à livrer dont te prix est toujours payé5346

53 D . F u m e , traitant de la "caravane m aritim e,’ noua montre comment cela a fonctionné entre le 16ème 18ème aiècle pour la culture des oliviers et le commerce de l'huile avec les savonneries de M arseille. V oir son 'A ffréteurs ottomans et capitaines fiançais à A lexandrie. La caravane maritime au M editerranée au milieu du 18ème," dans: ROMM, 34 (1982), pp. 23-38; P a u se , D . (ed.): L a v illa de l'em pire ottom an: a ctiva is e t so ciétés, 2 vola.. Paria 1991. 54 Owen, Roger: The M iddle E ast in the W orld Econom y, 1900-1914, London 1981, p. 89. 55 C hevallier. Dominique: "De la production lenae à l'économ ie dynamique en Syrie," dans: A n n o ta , XXI (1966), p . 67. 56 FO 195/717, cité par Shields, p. 37.

45 d’avance et dont l’exécution n’est garantie que par la bonne foi du vendeur, garantie de mince valeur. ",7 Les grands marchands alépins procèdent de même au moment de l’arrivée des troupeaux dans la Palmyrène et dans tout l’Est syrien. Au début du 20ème siècle ils traitent de 400 à 500.000 têtes par an; ils contrôlent un vaste marché régional qui s’étend, nous l’avons vu, du Kurdistan à l’Égypte. Ces grands négociants alépins spécialisés dans les produits agio-pastoraux font fortune. Ils se construisent de belles maisons en ville, mais investissent aussi et surtout dans le foncier, acquièrent des terres de villages, et financent la production. Le commerce rural en bénéficie. De nombreux marchands et intermédiaires impliqués dans l’achat, la vente ou la revente de produits agio-pastoraux s’enrichis­ sent à leur tour. Les profits génèrent la concurrence. Pour lutter contre la concurrence, les négociants alépins fidélisent leur clientèle par le crédit, et s’appuient sur les réseaux à base tribale, villageoise ou communau­ taire. Le commerce rural et celui de la petite cité en bénéficie. Les khânjls alépins d’origine sukhniote installés à Bàb NirSb tiennent une bonne place dans ces réseaux. Les Réseaux Sukhniotes La tradition m igratoire est ancienne chez les Sukhniotes suscitée aussi bien par la spécificité de leur commerce basé sur la mobilité et leur rapport avec les tribus que par la nécessité périodique de foire face aux mauvaises années et aux aléas d’un métier à risque. Elle s’accompagne, chez eux, d’un maintien des liens avec la cité d’origine, et avec les compatriotes qui en sont issus ou y demeurent encore. Les khönjls9 établis à Alep s’appuient ainsi sur le réseau des colporteurs sukhniotes qui sillonnent la steppe, puis des boutiquiers et semi-grossistes de Sukhna qui les commanditent, de multiples courtiers qui pratiquent les marchés ruraux, traitent les affaires des bédouins et enfin des caravaniers qui apportent le qall de la Palmyrène et distribuent blé, tissus ou produits manufacturés dans tout l’arrière pays alépin. A l’extérieur des portes de la ville, au débouché des pistes de la steppe, dims le faubourg Est de Banqusa, marchands, courtiers et caravaniers sukhniotes se sont regroupés depuis déjà plus d’un siècle dans le quartier de Sakhàna désignant leur origine et leurs fonctions. Ils tenaient en mains le commerce du chameau. "A peu près tous le chameaux vendus dans la ville par les Arabes Anézé ou moutonniers passent par leurs intermédiaires. ”w5789

57 Ce* principe« m o i loujoun en vigueur actuellement dans lee transactions agro-pastorales nous ne bisons que lee rappeler car nous tee avons décrits plus en détail ailleurs. Les formes de contrats sont connus de tous. L 'acheteur se payant du risque encouru en achetant I un prix de 10-20 pour-cent inférieur à celui du marché. 58 khâi\fT. Commerçant, grossiste, dépositaire, propiétaire, au khan. 59 Boucheman, 1939, p . 113.

Françoise Métrai

46

Le développement du marché, la densité de leurs réseaux et leurs relations avec les chefs bédouins permettent à quelques "brasseurs d’affaires" d’origine sukhniote de se hisser au niveau des grands marchands d’origine alépine et de leur faire concurrence. Leur commerce s’élargit et se diversifie avec la fortune, les ressour­ ces des chefs bédouins. Sur la base de la "connaissance" et de la "confiance" que garantissent la circulation de l’information à l’intérieur du réseau sukhniote et leur position de quasi monopole à l’égard des tribus de la Palmyrène et du Moyen Euphrate, ils leur avancent de l’arg en t... "... Pour mettre les Bédouins & leur aise, les propriétaires des Khans pratiquent à leur égard l’hospitalité du désert. Us leur avancent de l’argent avant qu’aucun marché ne soit conclu et leur fournissent un agent qui facilitent leurs acquisitions. ... Ce que les nomades prennent aux caravaniers dans le désert est largement compensé par ce que récupèrent dans les grandes villes les frères de ces carava­ niers."“ Boucheman nous donne l'exem ple de Rashid al-Tayyâr, marchand sukhniote, qui percevait le b a jj, l'im pôt sur les caravanes au nom du chef des FatFân Khursa, ibn Jafâs, bénéficiaire de la charge. U contrôlait en outre le commerce du q a ll et par la suite, celui des Antiquités.*1 C’est ainsi que quelques uns de ces émigrés, drainant vers leurs Khan les produits de la steppe enlèvent aux entrepositaires d ’origine alépine, au tournant du siècle, le commerce des ânes et du petit bétail et de presque toute la production de la Palmyrène. D u C oté de la Palm yrène, Ém igration e t M obilité Tandis qu’à Sukhna le transit local diminue, Alep et Dayr al-Zür en pleine expan­ sion aspirent une partie de la population des oasis. Nous avons souvent entendu dire: "La roue de la fortune est à Alep," "A Alep l’argent tourne plus vite.” Le mythe de l’eldorado fonctionne encore aujourd’hui. Il a offert une issue à nombre de sukhniotes de la Palmyrène au tournant du siècle. L’histoire orale des quelques khdnjls alépins sukhniotes qui fonctionnent à présent à Bâb Nirâb ou à Raqqa renvoie à une émigration entreprise, dans les années 1900, par leur "ancêtre." Elle passe pour certains par une étape à Salira dans les années I860 ou encore par Tall Abyad. Ils y arrivent comme courtiers, et, avec la réussite, construisent des entrepôts à Bâb Nirâb, des khans du mouton à Banqusa, de grandes maisons en pierre de taille et achètent des terres "de village" dans les environs. M ais, leur quartier, conserve un aspect rural et une mauvaise réputation et leur réussite commerciale ne leur donne guère accès au süq.a 6012

60 Ib id . 61 M d ., p . 114. 62 V oir Thieck, Jean Piene: "D écentralisation ottomane et affirm ation urbaine à Alep à la fin du

Changements dam In Room et le* Fku

47

V ille relais sur la route de 1’Euphrate, nouveau chef lieu adm inistratif de la suppe, Dayr al-Zör se développe. Des marchands de Mossoul et d'A lep viennent s’y installer dès les années 1870. Des Sukhniotes les y rejoignent entre 1890 et 1910,“ période pendant laquelle la ville grandit beaucoup; une partie d'entre eux s'em ploient dans la construction comme tailleurs de pierre mais les autres y poursuivent leur rôle d ’intermédiaires auprès des tribus bédouines et des tribus Shawiya de l’Euphrate. Les commerçants qui réussissent remontent la filière commerciale. Colporteurs pendant leurs années de jeunesse, puis boutiquiers, ils deviennent courtiers ou commissionnaires des marchands alépins ou dayrotes pour traiter avec les tribus qu’ils ont appris à connaître et dont ils parlent la langue. Ils connaissent les campements, l’état de leurs troupeaux, les besoins et les exigences de leurs chefs, etc. Ces derniers les protègent tout en les exploitant, car ils en ont besoin. La khuwwa prend désormais la forme de "cadeaux" offerts au chef; le système s’institutionnalise, permet de circuler en sécurité à travers la steppe mais il représente une ponction importante sur les revenus des caravanes. Pour acheminer le q a ll, les caravanes sukhniotes payaient l&khuwwa à plus de 10 chefs de tribus ou de sous-tribus différents entre Palmyre et Alcp. La mobilité** de ces sédentaires de la steppe, toujours prêts à prendre la route et à saisir les opportunités U où elles se trouvent leur permet de s’adapter à la conjoncture. Elle s’appuie sur la possession des moyens de transports que sont alors les chameaux . Caravanier*, Cham eliers, Transporteurs En cette fin de siècle, les Sukhniotes bénéficient du développement des échanges régionaux et inter-régionaux. Ils participent au convoiement des moutons entre Mossoul et les provinces syriennes (Alep et Ham i) ou accompagnent les caravanes qui assurent le transit inter-régional, notamment celles de la laine et de la soie entre Mossoul et Alep. La plupart de ces marchandises, en particulier les produits agro-pastoraux, circulent par voie de terre bien que le transport par caravane soit à l’époque bien plus coûteux que le transport maritime. En 1884, il en coûtait en effet cinq fois plus634

X V m èae siècle,* dans: Passion d ’O rient, Paris 1993; e t M arcus sur le rôle économique e t la fonction politique et la place particulière des quartiers de l'E st dans la vie et l'histoire de la cité au 18ème siècle. La réputation de trafiquants, contrebandiers et de quartiers tumultueux souvent en rébellion contre le pouvoir n 'a guère variée. Elle s'est vérifiée dans les événements de 1980 è Alep. 63 Sur l’histoire de D ayr al-Z0r à cet époque voir Hannoyer, J.: ‘Politique des notables en Syrie: La w »««.«.» d'un e ville, 1830-1921,* dans: B ulletin d'E tudes O rientales, XLI-XLD (1993), pp. 113-142. 64 C f. I . M étrai, 1994, pp. 90-99.

48

Françotae M toal

de transporter une livre de laine de Mossoul à Alexandrette que de l ’envoyer de là, vers la France.0 La voie ferrée n’arriva à Mossoul qu’apiès la guerre de 1914. De la même manière chameliers et caravaniers assurent le transport de la laine, ou des graisses collectés dans la Palmyrène pour le compte des semi-grossistes de la petite cité ou de khûnjts alépins, leurs compatriotes. Ils continuent à servir Alep, son arrière pays anatolien, l'Euphrate et la Jarira.14 Parmi les productions de la steppe dont ils avaient la m aîtrise, la plus importante était comme nous l’avons vu plus haut, celle de la potasse, ou qall, qu'ils vendaient aux savonneries d’Alep. Ils organisaient leurs propres caravanes (120 à 200 chameaux), jusqu’à 10 fois dans l’année nous dit Boucheman. Delà, Us se répan­ daient ensuite en Anatolie, en Mésopotamie, régions à travers lesquelles Us assuraient comme transporteurs, chameliers de louage, la distribution des produits des industriels alépins (la caravane du savon). Cette ressource se tarira dans les premières années du Mandat.*7 Enfin, nous l’avons vu les fonctions d’intermédiaires et leurs activités de colporteurs, numchandn itinérants, courtiers qu’ils exercent auprès des tribus se diversifient et se déplacent de la région au Sud Est d’Alep, vers la vallée de l ’Euphrate et la Jazïra en parallèle avec les activités des tribus et des chefs bédouins de la mouvance d’Alep. Au total, pendant cette fin de siècle, les périodes où la conjoncture peut être difficile et où le commerce périclite sont suivies de reprise rapide.41 En conclusion, on peut se demander si l’histoire économique et sociale de cette période n’a pas été trop longtemps écrite quasi exclusivement à partir des échanges commerciaux intercontinentaux et des relations internationales. L ’insistance sur la décadence de l’Empire, sur sa mise en dépendance par les puissances européennes assurées de leur supériorité technologique et économique, a peut-être conduit à minimiser les capacités de réponse et les facultés d’adaptation des populations locales sur lesquelles les recherches plus récentes d ’une nouvelle*678

69 Shields, p . 31. 66 Après une montée des tarife de transport par chameau pendant la guerre, les prix chuteront branlem ent dans les années 20 avec la rem ise en service du transport ferroviaire et s'effondreront dans les années trente au fer et à mesure de la généralisation du camion et de l'autom obile et de la construction de voies carossables. Le chameau n’est plus alors utilisé que pour le transport des récoltes dans les zones rurales dépourvues de routes. 67 L ’établissem ent des frontières, à la fin de l’Em pire, en coupant Alep de son arrière pays, provoquera la perte de ce marché rural à un moment où la clientèle citadine se tournent vert les produits d ’im portation européens. Les savonneries ferm eront peu I peu. Celles qui résistent tendront à fonctionner avec de la soude im portée. Les cours du q a ll s’effondrent dans les années 20. Les Sukhniotes ne le fabriqueront plus que pour leur consommation personelle et l’approvisionnemem des tribus de l'E uphrate. 68 Ce qui peut expliquer les descriptions parfois contradictoires de voyageurs brève distance dans le

In

el In Flux

49

génération d’historiens et des travaux de terrain mieux localisés, nous engagent désormais à porter notre attention.* Les ressources qui permettent à ces populations de frire face au changement se comprennent mieux lorsqu’on prend en considération la moyenne durée. Au cours des ISO dernières années, les bouleversements politiques, et l’accéléra­ tion des transformations économiques ont, à plusieurs moments, sévèrement affecté l’équilibre économique précaire des populations de ces zones périphériques. Eleveurs bédouins et commercants de la steppe ont connu des périodes particulière­ ment difficiles lorsque, fragilisés par les incidences de ces changements, ils devaient en outre frire free à des années répétées de catastrophes climatiques (gel, sécheresse). C’est ainsi que la steppe a connu une crise (dus grave, plus longue (1923-1940),6970 dans les années qui suivent l’installation du Mandat en Syrie, et une autre plus récemment, entre 19S8 et 1973,71 lors de la mise en place de l’Union avec l’Egypte puis du régime Baathiste. L’une et l’autre crises ont entrainé des vagues de migrations qui semblaient sonner définitivement le glas des activités des gens de la steppe. Elles ont pourtant été suivi chaque fois de reprises tout aussi spectaculaire. Comment expliquer cette résistance face à l’adversité ? On peut esquisser une double réponse sous forme d’hypothèses. L’histoire des familles nous montre que les Sukhniotes ont trouvé remède aux crises grace à la diversification de leurs ressources et à la délocalisation de leurs activités. La m obilité des hommes est un trait permanent des populations de la steppe. Elle se déploie au tournant du siècle dans le vaste espace régional des provinces arabes de l’Empire ottoman. Restreinte par l’établissement des frontières nationales.

69 Concernant la steppe et ses populations, nous constatons aujourd’hui de la part du monde technique scientifique et des politiques la même méconnaissance des populations locales et une mésestimation de leur capacité d ’adaptation aux nouvelles technologies et aux soubresauts de la conjoncture économique; cf. les articles de W. Lancaster et F. M étrai dans Bocco & Jaubert & M étrai. 70 Ce sont alors l’ensem ble des ressources de la steppe qui sont atteintes. En effet, la généralisation de la m otorisation, l’établissem ent des frontières qui coupe Alep de son arrière-pays anatolien et cloisonne la steppe, le contrôle bédouin qui lim ite le mouvement des troupeaux s’accompagnent de sécheresse sévères et répétées en 1923-1924, puis en 1927, et encore en 1931-1933. Le cheptel est décim é. Les bédouins so tt menacés de famine (Boucheman, 1934). D syr et Palmyre connaissent, par contre, un développement rapide en tant que centres administratifs e t villes de garnison - où s'installe le contrôle bédouin dès 1921. La construction du pont sur l’Euphrate à D ayr et le lancement des chantiers de fouilles à Palmyre dynamisent l’activité des deux cités. Les Sukhniotes, quant à eux, ne trouveront un substitut i leurs anciennes activités comm erciales en déclin que dans le trafic des Antiquités. 71 Une succession d'années sèches accompagne à nouveau pendant cette période. Les m esures sévères prises i l’encontre des bédouins, des chefs de tribus et des kh â ttfb alépins, par un régime qui visait à casser les structures traditionelles et i couper les relations de clientèle existant entre les producteurs du monde rural e t les commercants citadins. L’ère du pastoralism e sem blait révolue et l’on parie alors de la 'fin du troupeau.*

50

Fnnçofae Métnl

des protections douanières et par la perte de leur moyens de transport lorsque le rhamfam cède définitivement le pas devant la voiture et le camion, leur mobilité retrouve une intensité et une extension avec la construction des routes transdéserti* ques et les politiques d’ouverture économique. Elle touche aujourd’hui tout le Proche Orient et s’étend jusqu’au Golfe. Cette résistance des populations de la steppe ne réside t-elle pas aussi dans leur capacité à m obiliser les ressources comunautaires (lignagères, tribales, locales ou confessionelles) et à jouer sur des systèmes de multi-appartenaces locales? Leur flexibilité, leur faculté à saisir les opportunités là où elles se présentent, à s’adapter aux aléas d ’une conjoncture économique nationale et internationale qu’ils ne m aîtrisent pas, va de pair avec un grand conservatisme social. La permanence de ces structures communautaires leur est une assurance contre les risques et la précarité.

dan* les Routes et les Flux Commerciaux

Fig. 1: Les vilayets et sandjaks syriens en 1910 (d'aprts Winh, Syrien, p. 30)

Fig. 2: Roules caravanières du désert syrien au début du 19è siècle, d’après Grant, C., The Syrian Desert, 1937

52 Françoise Méml

The Introduction of Railroads in the Eastern Mediterranean: Economic and Social Impacts M ichael E. Bonine 'Railways have long been regarded as among die most important, if not rhe most important advance in technology, that affected entire economies in the nineteenth century.”1 H ie introduction o f railroads did have major impacts on regions and countries, and the conventional view has been that the railroads stimulated industrialization and rapid development. The United States in particular has been seen as being affected by railroads, for they were built across a largely unpopulated continent'and helped transform the country into an economic power.23Railroads provided the transporta­ tion systems which allowed agricultural produce and other goods to be shipped to far markets where there were major population centers. Agricultural regions often were developed by these transportation systems, making production economically feasible and which frequently resulted in specialization in particular grains, fruits, or vegetables. Settlement growth was stimulated with the introduction o f railroads. Existing villages and towns grew as jobs accompanied the railroad and the increased economic activities. In 19th century America the railroad town sometimes came with the introduction o f the "Ironhorse," for entirely new settlements were founded and/or encouraged by the railroads.1 In Europe, with its greater population densities and established towns and cities, railroads resulted more in encouraging economic growth rather than the foundation o f new towns and villages. Railroads became important in the 19th century for the colonial interests and possessions o f the European Powers. Railroads not only allowed easier access to extract and ship raw m aterials, but they also provided a means to move troops

1 Liang, Ernest P .: C hina: Railw ays and A gricultural D evelopm ent, 1875-1935, Chicago 1982, p. 1. 2 In contrast k> these belieft, the new economic history (cliom etrics) developed in the 1960s applied economic theory and quantitative methods to the study o f history and came up with different views, the idea that the United States would have developed similarly even without the railroads. See especially the classic w ork, Fogel, Robert W .: R ailroads and Am erican Econom ic G row th, Baltimore 1964. For a recent discussion o f the issues o f the new economic history see Goldin, Claudia: ’Cliom etrics and the Nobel,* in: Journal o f Econom ic P erspectives, 9 (1995), pp. 191-208. 3 For an im portant study about the formation o f new towns and agricultural regions by the railroad, see H udson, John C .: P lains C ountry Towns, Minneapolis 1985.

54 rapidly if there were disturbances or rebellions. For instance, the British opened the first line in India in 1854 (a section o f die East India Railway),456and the railroad lines increased rapidly, their m ilitary need soon justified by their use in the Great Mutiny o f 1857. At least in the case o f India, within only a decade o f their introduction, passengers began to use the railroads in great numbers. Special thirdclass and even fourth-class carriages (passenger cars) were built to cany the increasing number o f passengers.1

The Introduction of Railroads into the Middle East Railroads were introduced relatively early in the Middle East, in the 1850s in Egypt and the 1860s in western Anatolia for a line from Izmir (Smyrna) to Aydin. Yet, the construction then slowed considerably in the Ottoman Empire because the state reneged on its payments to foreign investors for the guaranteed rate o f return on their capital outlay, and so investors declined further interest in the railroads.* For the railroads which were built, their impact was generally quite local and, perhaps except for Egypt, it is not until the end of the 19th arid beginning o f the 20th century that a number o f different connecting lines were built, and that a system o f railroads was beginning to be planned and developed (Fig. 1). Egypt The first railroad constructed in the Middle East was between Alexandria and Cairo. Muhammad eAIi Pasha had attempted to build such a railroad as early as 1834, which also was to continue on to the G ulf o f Suez to connect the M editerra­ nean and Red Sea. Railroad materials were actually brought in to build the line, and several kilometers of track were laid. But then the venture folded, owing to the lack o f funds.78The first successful line to Cairo was not started until 1853 under 'A bbis Pasha, being completed in 1856. Subsequently, SaTd Pasha (1854-1862) began doubling the track between the two cities (finished in 1864) as well as building an extension to Suez which was completed in 1858.' And then between 1863 and 1875 over 2,000 kilometers o f new track were added.

4 Satow, M ichael f t Desmond, Ray: R ailw ays o f the R ef. London 1980. p. 13. 5 Ib id ., p . 41. 6 Q uataert, Donald: "Part IV: The Age o f Reforms, 1812-1914.* in: Inalcik, H alil (w ith Donald Q u itten ) (eds.): An Econom ic and Social H istory c f th e O ttom an Em pire, 130Ù -1914, Cambridge 1994. pp. 759-943. here p. 806. 7 Isssw i, Charles: ‘Asymmetrical Development and Transport fat Egypt. 1800-1914,* in: Polk, W illiam P. f t Chambers, Richard L. (eds.): Beginnings c f M odernization in the M iddle E ast: The N ineteenth C entury, Chicago 1968. pp. 383-400, here p. 395, fo. 30; D ay, John R .: R ailw ays o f N orthern A frica, London 1964, p. 59. 8 Owen, Roger: The M iddle E ast In the W orid Econom y 1900-1914, London 1981, p. 123; D ay. p. 61.

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"Many of die large towns in die Delta, including die important cotton centre of Zagazig, were added to die system while by 1874 the track had been extended as far as Asyüt in Upper Egypt.*9 The continued expansion o f die Egyptian railroad system was, in pan, because "unlike other parts of die Middle East there was little competition from other forms of land transport and the Egyptian railways were able to capture much of the traffic in bulk goods even when charging relatively high tariffs.”10 In fact, the Nile actually was not a viable competitor, for "river navigation was severely restricted by natural obstacles, such as sandbars, piracy, tolls, and other manmade impedim ents."11 By 1913 there were 4,314 kilometers of trades in Egypt, and as Issawi notes, "relative to its inhabited area, Egypt in 1913 was as well provided with railways as any country in the world and that, relative to its population, it was better off than most."1213 In 1914 the Egyptian railroads had 588 locomotives, 897 p assag er cars, and 11,500 freight cars.11 The British were the principal backers and builders o f Egypt’s railroads, which meant that the standard (1.4 meter) gauge was mostly used. The railroads also were initially s e a as a alternative to the projected Suez Canal (completed in 1869). However, w h a the canal proved to be viable and profitable, die interest by the British in railroad schemes in other parts o f the Middle East was lessened considerably.14

The second earliest railroad in the Middle East was in Anatolia, the line from Izmir (Smyrna) to Aydin (Fig. /). A concession was obtained in 1856 by a British company, g iv a by the Ottoman goveram at in recognition o f the British support during die C rim e a W ar. The Ottomans guaranteed a interest of six p e rc a t on the capital ouday with a maximum annual payment o f 72,000 Turkish pounds, although this concession was subsequady altered. In 1888 the guaranteed interest was dropped with a stipulation d û t the O ttoman goveram at would purchase the railroad for 3,000,000 pounds sterling at the end o f the concession in 1906 (which did not

9 Owen. pp. 128-129. 10 M d ., p. 129. 11 Im w i. 1968, p. 396. 12 Ib id ., p. 394; see his com pensons o f Egypt with other countries in his Table 4. 13 D ay, p. 68. 14 Issawi. 1968, p . 396.

56 occur because o f lade o f foods and so die concession was extended).13*15 Completed to Aydin in 1866 the railroad was built principally to ship agricultural produce from the rich Büyük Menderes River Valley. The line was soon extended, reaching Sarayköy in 1882 and Dinar in 1889. A final extension to Egridir was completed in 1912, a distance o f 470 kilometers from Izmir. With all o f its branches, by 1914 the Izm ir-Aydin line had a total o f 684 kilometers of track. There was an interest in extending this line to the Anatolian Railroad (see below) at Afyonkarahisar, but a French company, who had acquired the Izmir-Kasaba line (see below) and then extended it to Afyonkarahisar, was able to prevent this connection.1* Another British concession resulted in a 93-kilometer line from Izm ir to Manisa and Kasaba (Turgutlu), completed in 1866. The Ottoman government guaranteed five percent on the capital, totalling 800,000 Turkish pounds. In 1872 a line was built a further 75 kilometers to Alagehir by the Ottoman government, but which was handed over to the British company for control and management.17189In 1893 the railroad was bought by a French company, the Chemin de Fer Sm ym e-Cassaba et Prolongem ent, and by about 1900 the line had reached Afyonkarahisar. The railroad as far as Alagehir served the fertile Gediz Valley and agricultural products were the principal exports. A brandi o f the line was built north o f Manisa to Soma and Balikegir in the 1890s, which reached the Sea o f Marmara in 1912. Another small railroad ending at the Sea o f Marmara, and the only narrow gauge line built in Anatolia ran 42 kilometers from Mudanya to Bursa. In an attempt to curtail foreign railroad concessions, the Ottoman government began construction in 1875. The work could not be completed because o f financial problems, and finally in 1891 a concession was given to a French company, who completed the line in 1894. The railroad was particularly important for transporting agricultural products from the region." The only railroad that reached the southern coast o f Anatolia was the M ersinAdana Railroad, built in the 1880s and 67 kilometers in length. Originally a concession given in 1883 to two Ottoman subjects, it was soon purchased by an Anglo-French syndicate. Completed in 1886 the railroad was used for shipping the produce o f the rich plain of Cilicia from the port o f M erain." In 1906 most o f the shares o f the company were purchased by the D eutsche Bank on behalf o f the Baghdad Railroad (see below). The last section o f the trade, from Yenice to Adana,

13 Naval Intelligence D ivision, G reat Britain: Turkey, vol. 2 , London 1943, pp. 242-243. For one o f the m ost detailed discussions o f the railroads in Ottoman Anatolia see H ecker, M .: "Die Eisenbahnen in der asiatischen Türkei, " in: A rchiv f i r Eisenbahnw esen, 1914, pp. 744-SOO, 1037-1087, 1283-1321, 1339-1384. 16 17 18 19

Naval Intelligence D ivision, Turkey, p. 243. Ib id ., pp. 243-244. Ib id ., pp. 244-243. K arkar, Yaqub N .: R ailw ay D evelopm ent ln the O ttom an Em pire. 1856-1914, New York 1972, pp. 66-67.

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became part o f the main line o f the Baghdad Railroad and die rolling stock and locomotives were soon entirely German.20 The Anatolian Railroad provided a link from Istanbul and the European railroads to the heart o f Anatolia. Originating at UskQdar on the Bosphorus, the line was begun in 1871 by the Ottoman government and completed to Izmir in 1873. The 95-kilometer line was acquired by a British group in 1880 because o f Ottoman financial difficulties, and the line was continued to Eskigehir. The Ottoman government repurchased the railroad in 1888 and gave a new concession in 1889 to a company incorporated as the Société du Chemin de Fer Ottoman d ’A natolie and financed by a syndicate o f German banks. The line was then built on to Ankara, being completed in 1892. Another line was built south from Eskigehir to Konya in 1896 and one proposed eastward from Ankara to Kayseri (but not built until after the establishment o f the Republic o f Turkey). The guarantees were different than those previously given to the British and French. Instead o f the guaranteed rate of interest on capital expenditure, an annual payment per kilometer of track was paid, supplementing the railroad's income only when the revenues feil below a specific agreed amount. To finance the guarantee, revenues were set aside which were not under the control o f the Public Debt Commission, particularly tithes and sheep taxes collected in the regions which were benefiting from the railroads.212 "As a result of diese arrangements, die number and extent of railroads operating in die empire increased enormously, along with treasury revenues, during the balance of AbduUuunit's reign [1876-1909]. Total trackage increased 5,883 kilometers by 1907-1908, over three times what it had been when he came to die throne. At the same time, government revenues from railroad operations increased almost tenfold, from 80.5 million kurug in 1887-1888 to 740.04 million kurug in 1907-1908. ’0 These arrangements were at the beginning o f the major German interest and control o f many o f the principal railroads in Anatolia, which led to other concessions, such as the control o f the port o f Haydarpaga on the Bosphorus in 1899 and the right to irrigate the Konya Plain in 1909.23 The Germans were particularly interested in building the Baghdad Railroad, a line that would reach from Europe to Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Two routes were possible, one from Ankara to Kayseri, Sivas, Diyarbaltir, and then Mosul and Iraq versus one from Konya to Adana and then eastward via Aleppo to Mosul and Baghdad. The Russians opposed the former route, and even though this line was

20 Naval Intelligence D ivision, Turkey, p. 245. 21 Shaw, Stanford J. A Shaw. Bzel Kmal: H istory o f the Ottom an Em pire and M odem TUrkey, vol. 2: R eform , R evolution, and R epublic: The R ise o f M odem Turkey, 1808-1975, Cambridge 1977, p. 227; Naval Intelligence D ivison, TUrkey, pp. 246-247. 22 Shaw A Shaw. p. 227. 23 Naval Intelligence D ivision. TUrkey, p . 247.

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favored by the Ottomans, the southern route which entailed higher construction costs was selected.14 The concession for the Baghdad Railroad was given to the Anatolian Railw ay Company in 1902, which was subsequently modified in 1903 for a newly reformed company which called itself the Société Im périale Ottomane du Chemin de Fer de Baghdad.* A number o f the French interests were taken over, as well as the purchase o f the M ersin-Adana line. Originally given rights to construct ports at Baghdad and Basra and to terminate the line on the Fenian Gulf, the opposition o f the British led to modifications and several agreements between the Germans and the British. The Baghdad Railroad was then to end at Basra, and only the British could control a line to Kuwait and the Gulf. Also, under the new agreements only a Turkish company could build and control ports in Baghdad and Basra.16 Construction continued during W orld W ar I, but the difficult section through the Taurus requiring considerable rock-cutting and tunnelling and connect­ ing the line from Konya to the Adana trades and rest of the Baghrfwt Railroad was not completed until 1918. Finally, there were many railroads being built in the Ottoman (and post-Otto­ man) Balkans in the last half of the 19th century. The Oriental Railroad ran 362 kilometers from Istanbul to Edirne and Sofia, with a branch from Edirne to Dedeagac (Alexandroupolis) on the way to Salonica (completed in 1874). "But travelers coming from Europe still could come by train only as far as Varna, thereafter going to Istanbul by sea until the Oriental line was completed via Belgrade to the Austrian border and direct service to Paris opened in 1888."24*262728 Similar to much o f Europe, some Balkan and Eastern European areas already had a rather extensive railroad network by the late 19th century (even as early as the 1860s in the case of Hungary, for instance).1* Syria and Palestine The first interest in building a railroad in Bilhd al-Shlm began as early as the 1830s, when a Captain F. R. Chesney proposed the possibility o f a railroad from the Syrian coast to the Euphrates River, and then on to the Persian Gulf. Opposed

24 M d . 23 Naval Intelligence D ivision, G reat Britain: Syria, London 1943, p. 362. 26 For an analysis o f the G ennan-British relations over the building o f the Baghdad Railroad and the various agreements between them and with the Ottomans, see Kennedy, Chapman Maybelle: G reat B ritain and the Bagdad Railw ay. 1888-1914, Northhampton, Mass. 1948 (Smith College Studies in H istory, vol. 31); W olf, John B .: The D iplom atic H istory o f the Bagdad R ailroad, Colum bia, M iss. 1936 (The University o f M issouri Studies, vol. 11/2); and M anzenreher, Johann: D ie Bagdadbahn. M s B eispiel f i r die E ntstehung des Finanzim perialism us in Europa (1872-1903), Bochum 1982 (Bochumer H istorische Studien, Neuere Geschichte, N r. 2). 27 Shaw 8 t Shaw, p. 121. 28 Kalla-Bishop, P. M .: H ungarian R ailw ays, Newton Abbot 1973. Note especially the extensive railw ays at the end o f 1868, as shown on the map on p. 22 o f the work.

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by Muhammad CAB Pasha, this railroad was never seriously considered.2* In 1869 there was an interest by some notables o f Damascus in building a line into the grain-rich H aw iin. A delegation o f these notables visited the British consul for discussing this possibility, although nothing resulted from these efforts.2930 In fact, it would not be until the end o f the 19th century that railroads would finally be constructed in the Levant. In 1892 a small narrow gauge line from Jaffa to Jerusalem was completed (fig . 2). Although there were numerous British attempts at planning such a railroad, dating to 1838, 1856, 1857, 1862, 1872, and 1880, it was a French company which finally began planning the successful railroad in 1888.31 The line was only 75 kilometers long, but it reduced the travel time from one entire day to only three and a half hours by train.32 Many European pilgrims visiting Jerusalem arrived at the port o f Jaffa and used the railroad, although it was also used for freight. In 1913, for instance, the freight reached 47,500 tons and the number o f passengers totaled 182,700.33 Another French company, constituted in 1892 and what became in 1900 the Société Ottomane du Chemin de Fer Damas-Hama et Prolongements (DHP), built and operated a standard gauge line between Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo (Fig. 2). First, however, a 1.05-meter narrow gauge line was constructed in 1894 between Damascus and Muzayrib in the Haw rin, a distance of about 100 kilom eters.3435In 1895 the DHP completed a 145-lcilometer narrow gauge line from Damascus to Beirut, some o f it a rack railroad which begins at Beirut and continues at an average gradient o f about 1 in 27 to about 1,500 meters, the summit in the Lebanon M ountains.33 In 1902 a 182-kilometer standard gauge line was built between Ham i and R iyyiq, a town in the Biq3f and which also was located on the BcirutDamascus narrow gauge line. This main line in 1906 was then extended another 137 kilometers to Aleppo. A further line was built in 1911, a 97-kilometer standard

29 K arkar, p. 64. 30 Schatkow ski-Schikher, L indt: "Violence in Rural Syria in the 1880s and 1890s: State C entralization, Rural Integration, and the World M arket,” in: Kazemi, Farhad & W aterbury, John (eds.): P easants and P olitics in the M odem M iddie E ast, Miami 1991, pp. 50-84, here p. 79, fh. 23. 31 H ath, Eliahu: "A British Project for the Construction o f a Railway Between Jaffa and Jerusalem ," in: M a'oz, Moshe (ed.): Studies on P alestine during the Ottoman P eriod, Jerusalem 1975, pp. 415-422; K irk, Ruth: "Transportation in Nineteenth-Century Palestine: Réintroduction o f the W heel," in: K irk, Ruth (ed.): The band (hat Becam e Israel: Studies in H istorical Geography* New Haven 1990, pp. 57-76, here pp. 62-63. 32 Ibid.. p. 75. 33 Ib id ., p. 75, fh. 36. 34 Issawi, Charles: The F ertile C rescent 1800- 1914: A D ocum entary Econom ic H istory, New York 1988, p. 220; Schatkow ski-Schikher. p. 65. 35 W hitehouse, P. B. 8l A llen, Peter: Round the W orld on the N arrow G auge, New York 1966, p. 115.

60 gauge line between Homs and the port o f Tripoli (and hence connected w ith the Riyyäq-Aleppo line at Homs). By W orld W ar I the DHP was operating a network o f 644 kilometers o f track in Syria (Fig. 2).* In 1912 the line from Aleppo was extended north to connect with the Baghdad Railroad which was under construction. Although a system o f railroads was developing in B in d al-Shim by W orld W ar I, two different gauges (standard and narrow) limited its optimal usefulness (and a third size, a 0.6-m eter gauge track, was built 45.5 kilometers from Izraf to al-Suwaydi’ in the 1920s - built specifically because o f die Druze rebellion in 1925). The different gauges is in contrast, for instance, to die standard gauge track being used throughout Ottoman Anatolia, except for the 42-kilometer narrow gauge M udanya-Bursa Railway.3637389It is true that the Beirut-Damascus line had to negotiate many steep gradients and sharp bends through the rugged Lebanon and AntiLebanon M ountains, and so a narrow gauge line was not only cheaper but also more technologically feasible in such topography (which included the 30 kilometers o f rack rail). Perhaps one o f the most renown railroads that was at least partly in Syria is the Hejaz Railroad, the only system, in feet, which was mostly built, financed, and operated by the Ottoman government itself, the story o f which has been so well documented and examined by Ochsenwald.3* Connecting with the Damascus-Aleppo line built by the DHP, the Hejaz Railroad ran from Damascus to Medina, covering a distance o f 1,302 kilometers (Fig. 3). Sultan cAbdülhamid 0 proposed building the Hejaz Railroad in 1900, originally planned to reach Mecca. It was important m ilitarily for moving Ottoman troops into die Hejaz (supposedly to protect it from foreign attacks), as well as "at die same time, since it had die character of a holy railroad and would serve pilgrims on their way to Mecca, it would increase his FAhdfllhamid's] reputation for piety and his claim to be die caliph of all Muslims.m* About three-fourths o f the financing was by the Ottoman treasury, with the remaining coming from donations. Appealing to all Muslims, the construction of the railroad became a Pan-Islamic endeavor, and it "was presented to the Ottoman People as a work of religious charity. It was dedi­ cated to improving die pilgrimage and to die protection and economic betterment of

36 K ukar. p. 70. 37 Q uataert, 1994. p. 808. 38 Ochsenwald, William: The H ÿaz R ailroad, Charlottesville 1980. O ther m ajor studies o f the H ejaz Railroad include Landau, Jacob M .: Tike H ejaz Railw ay and d u M uslim Pilgrim age: A Case o f O ttom an P olitical Propaganda, D etroit 1971; Fiedler, U lrich: D er Bedeutungsw andel der H edschasbahn. E ine historisch-geographische U ntersuchung, Berlin 1984 (Islam hundliche Untersuchungen, Bd. 94). 39 Ochsenwald. p . 23.

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the Holy Cities of Islam ... Only Muslims should construct a railroad to Mecca and M edina.’40 A brandi o f die Hejaz Railroad was built from the main line at Dai'S to the port city o f Haifa (Fig. 2 and 3), complicated by the fact that most o f the line was outside o f the w ildya o f Syria. Also, the YarmQk Valley was difficult to traverse, and being narrow gauge made it easier and cheaper to build in such topography. Originally a British concession from 1890, die Ottomans bought the rights in 1902. The construction o f this 162-kilometer line was prompted by problems and expenses in using the DHP from Beirut to RiyySq to bring in construction materials. The branch line was completed in 1905, although it was used for regular commercial traffic only beginning in June 1906.41 Another small extension completed in 1906 was an one-kilometer track into the center of Damascus, when ’it became d ear that a station in the inner city would gain new freight and passengers for the railroad."42 The main branch o f the Hejaz Railroad basically followed the pilgrim route from Damascus to Medina. Instead o f using standard gauge as was used throughout most o f the Ottoman Empire, the 1.05-meter narrow gauge was used, principally to cut down on costs. The rails, engines, and rolling stock were all considerably cheaper, "perhaps one-half what a wide-gauge line would have entailed."43 Completed to M edina in 1908, there were several further short branches over the next several years. Haifa and Acre were connected with an 18-kilometer line in 1913, while a 39-kilometer extension was built from Dai'S to B usri in 1912, the latter being in die heart o f the wheat growing area o f the Haw rin and providing greater access from Ottoman troops to be moved quickly to Jabal al-Durüz, a center o f frequent rebellions by the Druzes. The Ottomans also began to build some extensions to the H aifa-D art line in Palestine. By the end o f 1914 the Hejaz Railroad consisted o f 1,585 kilometers o f track.44* During W orld W ar I the brandies from die Dai'S-Haifa line in Palestine were expanded, and Bi’rhabaf was readied in 1916. In fact, because of the war steel rails were not available, and so track from the French DHP (which had been confis­ cated) was taken up from the Damascus-Muzayifb and Tripoli-Hom s lines. Also, rails from the Hejaz Railroad’s D ar'i-B usra and Haifa-Acre branches were taken up and used for the more strategic Palestinian extensions to the south.43 Besides a small spur line at Medina that went from the station to the citadel within the city

40 O ld ., pp. 60. 79. 41 M d ., pp. 2 8 ,4 5 -4 7 . 42 JM rf.,p .4 S . 43 Ib id ., p . 43. 44 Ib id ., pp. 44-49. 43 M d ., pp. 143-144.

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walls, a 40-kilometer line was built in Jordan between Unayza and Shawbak in 1916." Although beginning mostly after 1890, the Ottoman territories o f the eastern M editerranean (excluding Egypt) had about 7,500 kilometers o f track by World War I. M ore railroad lines were planned, which were beginning to build a system o f railroads (Fig. 7). Yet, the outbreak o f World W ar I prevented the fulfillment of most o f these plans, many lines were never to be built and others only later by new governments under different circumstances.

The Impact of Railroads in the Eastern Mediterranean Railroads have had a major commercial impact in every region in which they have been introduced, enabling the rapid transport o f bulk raw materials and agricultural products over vast distances. They have served as means o f transporting people as well as m ilitary troops, enhancing the control o f peripheral and frontier areas from the center. W ithin the Ottoman Empire, because of the nature of the concessions to foreign companies, railroads resulted in "the increase of foreign economic control over the state and the separation of the empire into economic spheres of influence along the tracks of the railroads controlled by different European companies.”4647 Hence, railroads were used as the spearhead o f European penetration into the interior.4* The foreign presence was induced by the later 19th century by a guaran­ teed minimum income per kilometer o f track, which was applied to most (but not all) of the railroads, and which "helped secure both the construction of lines that were economically precarious and the permanent presence o f foreign financial interests.”49 Also, "there is some evidence to suggest that where die lines passed through wide tracts of cultivated land the guarantees were higher than necessary and that where they passed through empty areas of country die guarantees tended both to encourage wasteful expenditure on construction and to discourage die proper development of goods traffic ...”» With different foreign companies and concessions, the various lines in Syria, for instance, were often isolated from one another, as well as having different gauge tracks and hence not being able to use the same equipment from one system to another. In the typical colonial transportation model, a number o f lines ran from the

46 Ib id ., p. 144. 47 Ib id ., p. 19. 48 Owen, p. 113. 49 O chtenw ald, p. 20. 30 Owen, p. 197.

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M editerranean to the interior but were not necessarily linked together within the region. The foreign railroad concessions sometimes included certain ancillary rights, such as the ownership o f mineral rights found within a certain distance o f the railroad line. For example, such mineral rights (including for oil) were within 20 kilometers on each side o f the Baghdad Railroad from Konya to the Iraqi provinces. Owen notes that such concessions were not so relevant under the Ottomans, but became important for the successor states.*1 Im pact on A griculture and T rade "It is for their role as conduits for the export of agricultural commodities that Ottoman railways have been most noted. Foodstuffs, frequently cereals, and raw materials formed the overwhelming majority of exports, more than 90 percent, on most railroads.’*1 Certainly, exports exceeded imports on most Ottoman railroads, exports being 70-85 percent on a number o f lines, including the Damascus-Hami track.** Owen also has noted the great impact which a number o f railroads had on agricultural exports - and, hence, production - in the Middle East in this period.*4 The western Anatolian lines o f Izm ir-Aydin (completed in 1866) and Izmir-Kasaba-Aydin (1866, 1872) provided major competition for the camel caravans, for "by the end of the 1860s the Kasaba line was said to have captured something like 90 per cent of the camel traffic coming down the Gediz valley while its rival had managed to take SO per cent of the regular traffic to the south.’** Owen states that the costs o f transport by camel caravan had prevented the shipping of grain from more than 100 miles, but with reduced transport rates the railroads extended that growing area considerably. And, as the Anatolian Railroad reached Ankara and Konya, more grain was exported from these areas near the railroad, even with the very low world prices o f the 1890s.*6 Quataert advocates that the grain exported from the Ankara area was specifically a net addition to the local output.*7 W ith the completion o f the railroad from the Hawrin to Damascus in 1894, grain and other agricultural products could now be sent more easily and cheaply to 512*467

51 Ibid. 52 Q uataert 1994, p. 814. 33 54 55 56 57

JW rf..p. 815. Owen. Ib id ., p. 113. Ib id ., pp. 113.202. Q uataert. Donald: 'L im ited Revolution: The Impact o f the Anatolian Railway on Turkish Transportation and the Provisioning o f Istanbul. 1890-1908.” in: B usiness H istory R eview . 52/2 (1977). pp. 144-148, here p. 148.

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Damascus for export (and after 1895, to Beirut). Yet, even after the completion o f the line to Damascus there were still 4,000-6,000 camels daily taking grain from the H aw rin to the ports o f Haifa and Acre on the Palestinian coast in early summer.11 W ithin Syria at the end o f the 19th century and even until W orld W ar I because o f rather depressed international prices, the production o f grain was barely feeding the population o f the region. Only in the Hawrän because o f the railroad was there an increase in cultivation for export. Nevertheless, by the turn o f the century the railroads in Syria began to handle more and more freight and make m ajor inroads into the animal and carriage transport. By W orld W ar I the Syrian railroads were carrying perhaps half o f Syria’s internal goods traffic, which included considerable freight which was being generated by the railroads them­ selves." One further point needs to be emphasized regarding the competition between railroads and caravans. Whereas the caravans in some instances lost out to the railroads, especially where the railroad and caravan routes coincided, in many cases "caravaneers found new work and prosperity transporting goods, particularly grain, short distances from developing agricultural districts to the railhead.”*0 The Hejaz Railroad carried substantial freight in its first years o f operation (1908-1914), ranging from 65,757 tons in 1910 to 112,007 tons in 1913. Much o f this freight, in fact, was Haw rin grain, carried on the H aifa-D art line.*1 There was immediate competition between the Hejaz Railroad and the French-owned DHP, particularly over transporting the wheat from the Hawrän to the M editerra­ nean coast (the DHP branch from Damascus to Muzayrib taking the grain to the port o f Beirut). The Hejaz Railroad, in fact, was so successful that the French government insisted on and gained financial subsidies and concessions from the Ottoman government so the DHP could be more competitive with the Haifa-Dai*i line. The French also managed to get approval for a French director for the Hejaz Railroad, as well as for French companies to control the port facilities in Haifa, Jaffa, and Tripoli, although the outbreak of W orld War 1 prevented the implementa­ tion o f many o f these measures.*1 Ochsenwald notes how the Hejaz Railroad competed: "Starting in 1910 die railroad attempted to secure additional markets and to change its commercial practices to attract smaller shippers. The Ottoman Bank in Haifa was used as a middleman between merchants and die railroad. The bank bought enough merchandise that was landed at Haifa to constitute a foil wagonload, thus saving T.L. 5 from the railroad’s charges for partial or mixed loads. Once the goods arrived in 5896012

58 W ink, Eugen: Syrien. E ine geographische Landeskunde, D am utadt 1971, p. 347. 59 Owen. pp. 246, 259. 60 Q uataen, 1994, p . 821. 61 O duenw ald, p. 132. 62 U M ., pp. 107-108, 139-142.

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Damascus merchants took delivery and paid the bank the advance and tfae railroad the freight charges. The railroad then paid 15 percent of the freight bill to the bank."43 Special rates were given to merchants who shipped wheat from Damascus to Benghazi, utilizing ships which had carried salt from Libya to Palestine and had been returning empty. By July 1912 new rates were introduced by the Hejaz Railroad, which were considerably lower than the prices charged by the DHP: a wagonload (10 tons) o f salt cost 9.74 Turkish pounds on the Hejaz line from Haifa to Damascus, compared to 14.74 Turkish pounds on the DHP from Beirut to Damascus. "By 1913 small shippers were beginning to buy wheat brought to Haifa from die HawrSn on the Hejaz Railroad and take it in sailing vessels to Beirut, where it was cheaper than that coining directly to Beirut by the D.H.P."*4 Ochsenwald notes that the main economic impact o f the Hejaz Railroad was the increase in the export o f agricultural products: "There was apparently a doubling of exports of Hawrfn wheat to Haifa between 1903 and 1910. Wheat that had been processed was also shipped in bulk on the railroad. Flour milled in Damascus was sent to Haifa.’*5 The cost o f the railroad was about five-sixths less than shipping the grain by camel caravan, and the wheat constituted slightly less than one-half o f the total freight of the railroad.** The extension o f the main line o f the Hejaz Railroad encouraged agriculture in the area around Amman and Karak in Jordan, by enabling Ottoman garrisons to be more permanently established and the beduin tribes hence more effectively controlled in the vicinity of the railroad.*' It should be mentioned, however, that the impact o f the railroad for exporting produce, specifically grains, was not always positive. For instance, in the depressed world prices for grain in the early 1890s the completion o f the railroad from Damascus to the Hawrfn in 1894 only worsened the situation for the provincial capital. "Now large quantities of Hawran grain flooded the city’s market, depressing prices even further and distressing the producers and merchants from die surrounding villages who normally dominated the market."***6478

43 Ib id ., p . 108. 64 IN tf.. p . 109. 63 Ib U ., p. 137. 66 Ibid. 67 Owen, p .2 4 3 . 68 SchU kow iki-Schikher. p. 69.

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There were a few lines in which inports predominated, such as the Jaffa-Jerusalem and M udanya-Bursa lines (and where exports accounted for only about one-third o f the freight).* In general, even though the railroad was beginning to have some economic impact in the Levant, the Ottomans had limited resources to further develop the railroads in their Arab provinces. The European rivalries o f the 19th and early 20th centuries also inhibited development in B ilid al-ShSm. For instance, because of the German-influenced Baghdad Railroad in Anatolia, there were delays in the granting o f concessions to the French to extend some o f their rail lines in Syria. The French, in fact, abandoned their projected lines from Aleppo to Alexandretta and to the Euphrates because o f this opposition.10 Beirut did receive some attention, and this was the only port (besides Salonica, Izmir, and Istanbul) in which foreign companies constructed and operated larger and more efficient facilities.69701 However, the Ottomans did refuse to extend the tracks o f the Jaffa-Jerusalem line to the port itself.7273Quataert notes that sailing vessels remained important in the Ottoman Empire well into the late 19th century, and that camel caravans, wagoneers, and other Don-mechanized transport often effectively competed with the railroads.71 In fact, in Syria "in many sections the railways could not compete with camels or carts."74*76 It is true, however, that by the beginning o f W orld W ar I the Ottomans had begun to plan for creating a more extensive rail system in the Arab provinces, including linking Egypt with Palestine (a line from Jaffa to Port Said) and a track from Jaffa to Beirut, for instance. These were never built by the Ottomans because o f the war, and it was only during the British Mandate that such expansion took place (including a track to die port o f Jaffa).71 Passenger and M ilitary T raffic Besides their commercial importance railroads provided the means for much faster transport of individuals, and they "vasdy increased the circulation o f people within the [Ottoman] em pire."74 In 1911, for instance, the Ottoman railroads carried 7 m illion passengers (excluding the Balkans, which amounted to another 7 m illion).77

69 Q uataert. 1994, p. 81S. 70 Issawi. 198«. p. 223. 71 Q uataert, 1994, p . 802. 72 Karle, Ruth: T h e Contribution o f the Ottoman Regime to the Development o f Jerusalem and Jaffa, 1840-1917,’ in: Kushner, David (ed.): P alestine in the Late Ottoman P eriod, Jerusalem 1986, pp. 46-38, here p. 34. 73 Q uataert, 1994, p. 799. 74 Issawi. 1988, pp. 223-224. 73 Karte, Ruth: le jfa : A d ry in E volution, Jerusalem 1990. 76 Q uataert, 1994, p. 813. 77 Ibid.

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Pilgrims on the Hejaz Railroad provided for about half o f the income o f the railroad in the period 1909-1914. The total number o f passengers rose from 246.000 in 1908-1909 to 361,000 in 1912-1913,71 as well as substantial numbers of soldiers. Yet, poorer pilgrim s still could not afford the train, since the ticket cost the equivalent o f at least a month’s wages of a skilled laborer. In 1911-1913 about 30.000 pilgrim passengers used the railroad each year (either traveling one o f the directions by rail and utilizing ships for the other, or in other instances, both directions).7879801234 The Jaffa-Jerusalem Railroad also was important for pilgrim s, because many Jews and Christians, especially from Europe, used the line to visit the Holy Land and travel to Jerusalem. It first ran only once a day in each direction, although during the pilgrimage season, such as Easter, additional trains were added as needed. By 1900 the passenger traffic warranted two trains in each direction.10 The H aifa-D ar'i branch line was quite significant for passenger traffic. Haifa and Tiberias were centers for tourists, and partly because of substantial first-class ticket revenues, the line was the most profitable one of the Hejaz Railroad. In 1913 three-fourths o f the profits o f the Hejaz Railroad were from the H aifa-D art branch line, coming from both passenger and freight income.*1 Transport o f m ilitary troops was another role o f railroads everywhere, and for the Ottomans "the railroads opened up interior regions to political c o n tro l... and they helped the state to shuttle troops quickly within the em pire."12 The Hejaz Railroad frequently was used to move troops. In 1903-1906 soldiers were trans­ ported mostly via rail from Damascus to Yemen in only two weeks. And even though an intended branch to cAqaba on the Red Sea was never built and the main line ended at Medina, "the railroad brought the Arab Provinces of Yemen and the Hejaz much closer to major Ottoman centers of military strength."*2 The railroad also enabled the Ottomans to move troops much faster to put down any disturbances or rebellions, such as in the Jabal al-Durüz areas of Syria. In other instances troops moved rapidly by rail could control more effectively the beduin tribes near the railroad itself.*4 One further interesting impact related to passengers occurred on the Jaffa-Jeru­ salem line (and perhaps on other lines?). With the railroad came the European clock and a new official tim e, replacing an "Oriental" system o f time-keeping.

78 Iuaw i, 1988. p. 222. 79 O chtenw ald, pp. 101-104. 80 K ark, 1990. 81 O chtenw ald, pp. 132-133. 82 Q uataert, 1994. p. 812. 83 O chtenw ald, p. 106. 84 JN rf.. pp. 106-107, 118-126.

68 which had consisted o f dividing the daylight and nighttime periods each into twelve equal time sections.*3 Im pact on Town Location and Settlem ent M orphology Railroads impacted cities in a number o f ways in most regions o f the world. First, they led to the founding o f towns, especially as rails were laid across frontier territories, as in the western United States. Secondly, the economic impact o f the railroads led to the growth o f population, for both direct employment by the railroads and the myriad o f other economic activities which increased or began with the coming o f the rails. Thirdly, the morphology o f a town may be influenced by the railroad. Certainly the foundation o f new towns had a distinctive morphology focused around the tracks, but existing settlements were impacted physically by the rail systems as well. For instance, Kellett has examined the impact o f the British railways on "Victorian Cities, while Appleton has analyzed their extensive impact specifically on the morphology o f the British cities.17 He shows how the railroads had to fit into an existing street plan, or, more commonly, how the street plan and urban morphology adjusted to and were subsequently influenced by the n il lines, especially the impact of special facilities such as railroad yards and workshops. W ithin the M iddle East and particularly for BilSd al-ShSm there is scant information about the impact o f railroads on the population and settlements. There appears to have been few new settlements founded by the railroads, and the major impact was probably principally economic, affecting the prosperity o f the local population as well as the growth o f the population itself. It has been recognized that the population o f railroad districts in the Ottoman Empire grew rather faster than other areas, "in p a rt... due to their greater safety, their potential for market agriculture, internal migration and the government settlement of refugees that took place, for example along the Anatolian and Rayak-Aleppo railroads and northern portions of die Hejaz line."** Yet, Ochsenwald notes that "the Ottoman political goal o f centralization was not accompanied by a clear program for using freight and passenger operations to achieve economic growth."1*83*679

83 A vitsur, Shmuel: "The Influence o f W ettern Technology on the Economy o f M estine during the Nineteenth C entury," in: M t’oz, M otbe (ed.): Studies on P alestine tim ing the O ttom an P eriod, Jenisalem 1973, pp. 483-494, here p. 492. 86 K ellett, John R .: The Im pact o f Railw ays on Victorian C ities, London 1969. 87 A ppleton, J. H .: 'R ailw ays and the Morphology o f British Towns,* in: BecHnsaie, R. P. A H ouston, J. M . (eds.): U rbanisation a n ti its P roblem s, Oxford 1968, pp. 92-118. 88 Q uataert, 1994, p. 813. 89 O chsenwald, pp. 117-118.

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The impact on settlements by the Hejaz Railroad, for instance, was unplanned and generally not great; it "varied directly with their distance from die railroad’s tracks. The settled peoples received the mixed blessings of security, taxes, decreased autonomy, and economic change.’*0 Some settlements certainly were impacted economically. Damascus, on both the DHP and Hejaz Railroad (and connecting to the H aifa-D art line) was a center for freight and passengers, and economic growth would have promoted some popula­ tion and physical growth. It was Haifa, however, which was impacted most dramatically by the railroad in the Levant. With a population o f 4,000-6,000 in the 1870s, by 1914 it had reached about 22,000, quadrupling in size and becoming the fastest growing town in Palestine.*91923Ochsenwald notes the growth and characteristics o f Haifa’s external trade: "The chief export was HawrSn wheat. The growth in external trade can be seen in die change between 1904, when 296,855 tons were shipped from Haifa, and 1913, when this figure had increased to 808,763 tons. Imports were mostly European goods bound for Damascus and other towns in the interior. One new import was coal for the Hejaz Railroad. About 30,000 tons of it were landed in 1908. "** Haifa’s rapid population increase was due mainly to the influx o f Europeans, especially Germans. There were a few cases in which the railroad construction or operation had a major impact on a settlement, even if it might have been temporary. In southern Jordan the town o f Maffn grew considerably because o f the Hejaz Railroad, providing an outlet for consumer goods and commodities shipped from Damascus. It had become a boom town during the construction of the railroad to the south. Housing increased and the economy grew, also fuelled by tourists traveling to M aftn on the railroad to go to nearby Petra. Yet, after the railroad was completed to M edina in 1908, the town was no longer used as a railroad center, and over 1,000 people left the settlement.*9 As for the morphology o f towns being affected by railroads in the Ottoman M iddle East, this seems to have been minimal. Most railroads did not attempt to pass through m ajor settlements, using existing roadways and being at the periphery o f settlements or even several kilometers away.94 The lines did promote some suburbanization, however, for some affluent residents o f Ottoman cities began using

so Ib id ., p . n s . 91 Ib id ., p. 133. 92 Ibid. 93 O ld ., p . 136. 94 Ib id ., p . 134.

70 the railroads to reach newly acquired villas built in the countryside." Also, as cities began to expand, especially throughout the 20th century, railroad lines could indeed affect the urban morphology. They created barriers which could separate neighbor­ hoods, sometimes based on incomes such as was so common in the United States and Europe. In Aleppo, for instance, the DHP line went on the western side o f the old city, where suburbs had already grown beyond the old walled city in the later 19th century." A number o f these neighborhoods were some o f the more affluent suburbs, such as the IsmäTliyya and JamQiyya Quarters, which had begun in 1882. The railroad, which reached Aleppo in 1906, used in part the riverbed of the Quwayq River for its alignment. Further affluent neighborhoods have grown on the western side o f the city in the later 20th century, where the railroad line (and the river) create an effective barrier and division from the rest of the city (Fig. 4). Northwest o f the old city the Quwayq River area is now being developed, made into a culvert, covered over, or even moved as urban land use encroaches on the river.*7 Southwest o f the old city, where the tracks run along the riverbed, the railroad and river create an effective barrier, and development is only beyond the railroad (Fig. 4). The Hejaz Railroad in Amman also follows a riverbed for some o f its route, running along the W idl cAyn GhazSl several kilometers east o f the older parts o f the city. Similar to Aleppo, the river and railroad create a barrier for separate neighborhoods (e.g. the cAyn GhazSl District). Farther south the railroad is no longer part o f the w ddl, but separate neighborhoods still are bounded by the railroad. Another rather unusual impact on the city by a railroad is documented by Ochsenwald. He notes that at the end o f W orld W ar I the Ottoman commander o f the garrison at Medina was tearing down many o f the town’s houses for fuel wood for the railroad!" Im pact o f th e R ailroads on th e Environm ent The impact o f railroads on the environment has been controversial. During the era o f steam in the 19th and first half o f the 20th century "coal smoke ... was ... the m ain environmental impact o f railw ays.”" Steam locomotives emit smoke particu-93*78

93 Q u itte n , 1994. p . 813. 96 N akab ty u hi, Ittuld: 'Som e N otts on Urban Planning for the Traditional City in Bab Al-Hadid,* in: T etisak a, Akinobu f t N aho, Maaanori (eds.): G eographie Views In the M iddle E astern O des, D: Syria, Ibaraki/Ryugasaki (Japan) 1990, pp. 73-91. 97 M atsuda. Iw are: *A Topographic View in the Middle Eastern Cities,* in: T eraiaka, Akinobu f t N aito, M asanori (eds.): G eographic Views In the M iddle Eastern O des, B: Syria, Ibaraki/Ryugasaki (Japan) 1990, pp. 23-34. 98 Ochsenwald, p. 146. 99 C arpenter, T . G .: The E nvironm ental In p a ct o f R ailw ays, Chichester 1994, p. 174.

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tales, contributing sulphur and nitrogen oxides and carbon dioxide to the atmo­ sphere. Such smoke had m ajor impacts in densely populated Europe in particular. Except for rather localized impacts (including noise), it is probably true that with the few railroads, low population densities, and vast distances, smoke had a rather minimal adverse effect in the Middle East. On the other hand, although less efficient than coal, many o f the early steam engines in the M iddle East, as earlier in the W est, had to rely on the burning o f wood for their fuel. Substantial wood also was needed for the many railroad ties used for the eventual thousands o f kilometers o f track in the region. This use of wood certainly could lead to overcutting o f the few wooded areas in the Middle East. However, whether or not this need for wood caused the extensive cutting of forests and hence increased erosion and desertification is not entirely clear. In the case o f the United States, for instance, Olson, in her The D epletion M yth advocates that the railroad use o f timber and its detrimental impact in America has been overemphasized, often being a case of alarmism.10010234 Yet, there is the belief that the railroads’ need for wood did impact parts of the Middle East and North Africa. For instance, Thirgood believes that "die depletion of die Moroccan forests was extended and intensified after the Spanish occupation in 1928. Oak forests were heavily exploited for railroad ties, and die cedar forests for timber. ”,0> And Rolley notes that the forests in the Syrian Kurd-Dagh Mountains northwest of Aleppo, located near the railroad from Aleppo to Ankara, were "practically denuded as the result o f unrestrained cutting carried out during W orld W ar I." 1* The Cedars o f Lebanon have been depleted over the millennia, and "even in the Twentieth Century die exploitation of the cedars continued, for during the First World War many of the remaining stands were destroyed by the Turks to provide fuel for the Hejaz railroad."109 Mikesell also advocates that much wood was cut from the Lebanon and AntiLebanon ranges as fuel for the Ottoman period railroads.10* He further notes that

100 O lson, Sherry H . : The D epletion M yth: A H istory o f R ailroad Use o f Tim ber, Charlottesville 1971. 101 Thirgood, 1. V .: M m and the M editerranean F orest: A H istory o f Resource D epletion, London 1981, p . S I. 102 Rolley. 1.: 'F o rest Conditions in Syria and Lebanon,* in: U nasytva, 2/2 (1948), pp. 77-80, here P* 77. 103 Beals, E. W .: "The Remnant Cedar Forests o f Lebanon,* (in: Journal o f E cology, S3 [196S], pp. 679-096), quoted in Beaumont, Peter: "The Middle East - Case Study o f D esertification,’ in: M abbutt, I. A. & Berkowicz. S. M. (eds.): The Threatened D rylands: R egional and System atic Studies o f D esertification, Kensington, N .S.W . 1980, pp. 4S-S6, here p. 48. 104 M ikesell, M arvin W .: *The Deforestation o f M ount Lebanon,* tat: The G eographical R eview , 39 (1969), pp. 1-28, here p . 26.

72 'th e last major assault on die forests of Lebanon occurred during World War II, when firs and oaks in the northwestern part of Mount Lebanon, especially Jabal Qammuha, were cut for use as ties on the railroad built by British forces to connect Tripoli and H aifa."'“ Karschon notes that there is a common (unfounded) belief that die Turkish army had cut most o f the trees in the Holy Land to resist the advance o f the British forces in 1917-1918.'“ The Tabor oak (Quercus ithaburensis), especially in the Sharon Plain and the foothills o f Samaria (West Bank), is the principal tree o f the region. He states that there is some evidence that some of this ancient oak forest "was cut down systematically to provide sleepers [ties) and fuel for the Turkish m ilitary railways in the country.”10516071089Even a special trunk line was built during W orld W ar I, "from T ulkarm ... to the environs o f Qannir in die hills o f Samaria, with a branch to Hadera, for die extraction and sawing o f tim ber."1“ Karshon, however, believes that much o f the destruction of the Tabor oak forest in the Sharon Plain actually occurred earlier in the 19th century, especially due to cutting by Ibrâhîm Pasha in the 1830s.1“ Another example o f forests being used for fuelwood during W orld W ar I has been noted for the Hejaz Railroad. In 1916 a 40-kilometer line was built between Unayza and Shawbak in Jordan, specifically "designed to transport wood cut in forests there to the main line for use as fu e l.'" 0 The British had blockaded coal imports into the M editerranean and so the steam engines had to use wood as fuel. "Thousands o f trees in the 'AjlQn, Salt, and Yarmük areas were cut d o w n ."" Ochsenwald notes that the wood was not nearly as good as coal and that the burning o f the wood even caused fires on the trains in some instances.112

Conclusion: The Role of Railroads in Biläd al-Shäm Compared to the United States and Europe, the introduction o f railroads into Bind al-Shim and the rest o f the Middle East has had less o f an impact. The economic transformation which had begun by the mid-19th century in the West partly because o f the railroads was not to be duplicated, even at a later period, in the Ottoman Empire. Although railroads certainly did influence specific regions, such as the

105 Ib id ., pp. 26-27. 106 K an cho n ,R .: *Wbo D eforested the Plain o f Sharon?,* in: Israel: Land and N ature, 10/1(1984), pp. 24-26, here p . 24. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid . 109 M d „ p p . 24-26; Karschon, R .: "In Defense o f the T urin: A Study o f the D estruction o f Tabor Oak Forest in the Southern Plain o f Sharon," in: L a -Y a 'a rm , 32 (1982), pp. 59-64. 110 Ochsenwald, p. 144. 111 Ibid. 112 M d„ p . 146.

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grain growing areas o f die H aw rin or die Büyûk Menderas River Valley in western Anatolia, these transportation systems did not create - or become part o f - the infrastructures that would facilitate rapid economic growth and development as in die W est. Similarly, railroads had a rather minimal impact on the morphology of settlements in the Middle East. In fact, it is in the later 20th century that expanding cities begin to be impacted by the location o f the railroad, principally by the barrier created by the rail line itself. H ie immnHian» question is why did the railroads o f the Ottoman Empire and specifically in B in d al-ShSm not have a greater impact? Issawi notes that "the railways o f ‘Greater Syria* present a striking example o f an inadequate and uncoordinated system .”111 In another instance he states that "a look at Syria’s railways reveals grave defects."11314*16H ie reasons for this situation according to Issawi include the nature o f the topography, the lack o f government interest in developing the area, the intense international rivalries, and the disintegration o f the region after 1918.1,1 Further possibilities for the minimal impact o f the railroads in B ilid alShim (and restating in part some o f Issawi’s ideas) include the following: (1) Except for Egypt and parts o f western Anatolia, railroads were introduced extremely late in the Ottoman Middle East, including B ilid al-Shäm, beginning only in the last decade of the 19th century. (2) W ith such a late introduction of railroads. W orld W ar I not only slowed further coordinated development but also various lines were tom up to quickly build strategic railroads for m ilitary purposes. And then with the end o f the Ottoman Empire new political structures and priorities were created for the transportation systems. (3) H ie Ottoman Empire’s general financial and economic problems prevented any adequate investment in railroads in BilSd al-ShSm. (4) H ie rivalries o f the European Powers inhibited any concerted, coordinated development o f railroads, and even prevented some railroad lines from being built by specific European Powers (mainly by the French in BilSd al-ShSm). (5) Although the French and British powers (or individuals and companies from these countries) built, managed, and reaped the profits from the first railroads, unlike, for instance, (British controlled) India,11* or (Russian controlled) Central Asia,117 the fact that one single colonial power did not have similar dominance over the Ottomans meant that less financial investments from foreigners and foreign

113 Im w i, C hutes (ed.): The Econom ic H istory o f flu M iddle E ast, 1800-1914: A Book o f R eadings, Chicago 1966, p . 248. 114 Im w i, 1988. p. 223. 113 Im w i, 1966, p. 248. 116 Satow & Desmond. 117 T t»fk,fU ito cn :lta ilT rm sp o n a tio ita H d lfieE co n o m lcD evtlo p m eM a fS o vietC etttn lA sla ,C hicago 1960 (The University o f Chicago, Department o f Geography, Research Paper no. 64).

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governments went into the railroad systems in B illd al-Shim and the Ottoman Empire in general. (6) The use o f several different gauges by the railroads minimized the coordina­ tion and cooperation, also impeding the usefulness and development of a real system in B ilid al-Shim . This is partly a reflection o f the separate outside imperial­ ist powers, although the DHP, for instance, built both standard and narrow gauge lines in the same region and the Ottoman-built Hejaz Railroad was narrow gauge while the systems in Anatolia, the Ottoman core, were standard gauge. The problems o f coordinating the different systems is emphasized by sim ilar difficulties during the French Mandate period: "The D.H.P. administers the Syrian railways as a whole, but the component systems are largely worked as individual undertakings. This was necessary owing to the different gauges, and the varying strength of permanent-way structure, which tend to confine locomotives and rolling-stock to the section of line for which they were constructed."11* (7) The population densities were low and many areas so arid, difficult in terrain, or "unproductive" that there was no economic justification for building railroads in many areas o f the Ottoman Empire and especially B ilid al-Shim. On the other hand, railroads were quite important for certain local areas, even in Syria, and the railroads were beginning to form major systems by W orld W ar I. As Issawi notes (despite his often negative assessment of the railroad development), "the benefits [of the railroads in the Middle East) should not be ignored. Greater and greater volumes of goods and passengers were carried. Traveling times were sharply cut, and comfort and safety increased. New areas were served, and the Baghdad and projected French railways promised a much brighter future."11819 Railroads in B ilid al-Shim and the Ottoman Empire certainly bad the potential to be an integrative, unifying force. They enabled Ottoman troops to be dispatched more quickly to many parts o f the empire, effectively creating greater response and control by the government. Railroads made it possible for thousands o f passengers, including government officials and businessmen, to travel more quickly, enhancing contact and communication in the Empire. Grain and other agricultural exports destined for population centers o f the Empire were increased, for the railroads extended these hinterlands considerably, creating a greater economic and trade network than previously existed. With the cheaper transport rates by railroad, bulk goods could be shipped much greater distances (whereas extremely long-distance caravan trade had been used only for luxury and other expensive goods). Most o f the railroad network o f B ilid al-Shim had been in existence less than two decades by the outbreak of W orld W ar I. The Syrian (DHP) line reached the

118 Naval Intelligence D ivision, Syria. p. 344. 119 Issaw i. 1988, p. 224.

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Baghdad Railroad from Aleppo in 1912, and that railroad was finally completed to Baghdad only at the end o f die war. A true railroad network was on the verge of being created in B in d al-Shâm with connections to a wider system, despite the problems o f two different gauges. But the Ottoman Empire ended. W hether or not the railroads could have finally become a major factor in the economic development o f Ottoman Bilhd al-Shâm will of course never be known. The political map o f post-W orld W ar I created new situations and priorities. National railroad systems were developed on the foundations inherited from the Ottomans. But then die age o f the automobile - and highways - soon took precedence.

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The Introduction of Railroads in the Eutern Medüenanean...

Fig. 2: Based on various sources. Dates indicate years of completion

Fig. 3: Based on Fiedler, U., Der Bedeutungswandel der Hedschasbahn, Berlin 1984; and other sources

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Michael B. Bonine

Fig. 4: Source: Terasaka, Akinobu ft Naito, Masanori (eds.): Geographie Views in the Middle Eastern Cities, O: Syria, Ibaraki/Ryugasaki (lapan) 1990

Railway Networks of the Middle East to 1948 Shereen Khairallah This paper attempts to give a general picture o f the development o f railways in the Ottoman Empire, and carries the study to 1948, when the region was once again dismembered. Up to that date, one could ride from Europe to Istanbul, then to Aleppo, Tripoli, Beirut, Haifa, Qantära, Port Said, Cairo. This is no longer possible. Alternately, one could travel by rail from London to Istanbul to Baghdad, via the Simplon Express, connecting with the Taurus Express at Istanbul. Granted, owing to the different gauges (narrow and normal), travelers were inconvenienced by having to change trains. It was all in a day’s work. Railways in the Ottoman Empire were at first built haphazardly. These early concessions were granted to British and French firms along the coast of Asiatic Turkey. Russia did not want railways approaching her frontiers. Out of these early efforts grew three main systems: the Baghdad Railway, over which so much ink was spilt, which began as a commercial venture but entered the political sphere in the 1890s, when imperialist rivalry with Germany in the Middle East sharpened. It was the only railway system to undergo such strained diplomatic and political struggles; the Damas, Hama et Prolongem ents, a French concern, had few prob­ lems o f a political nature, and was the only railway to be preceded by a road; the Hejaz Railway was an Ottoman project in which Europe could not interfere. With the exception o f the Baghdad Railway and the French system north of Riyyäq (in Lebanon’s Biqâc Valley), which were normal gauge (1.4S3 meter), narrow gauge (1.OS meter) was used. With the dismemberment o f the Ottoman Empire after W orld War I, these railways were divided according to which o f the newly nascent states (under French or British mandate) they fell into: now there are Turkish railways, Syrian railwdyST Lebanese railways (now defunct), Iraqi railways, Jordanian railways, Saudi railways. And despite the spate of railway building during the latter half of the 19th century and the beginning o f the 20th, which for a time appeared to be the only means o f transport, these have been replaced by the highly competitive motor vehicle and air transport systems. As each state had its own railway, so each now has its own airline. Although modernization has caught up with us, with its fast means o f communication, its pollution, its ecological rape, politics have not changed. In different guises and with different names, power politics continue to upset the area, spheres of influence and raw materials are sought after. The strategic importance has not lessened with the air age- Rather, it has grown more acute.

80 At the beginning o f the 19th century land and water transport was what it had been for m illenia, namely caravans and caiques. Yet on the eve o f W orld W ar I, steam navigation had supplanted other means o f sea and river navigation, railways were carrying the greater part o f landbome goods, a network o f roads was built to connect die towns and villages, while telegraph lines covered the region, the telephone came into operation, and motor vehicles made their appearance. Railway lines in the Ottoman Empire had been built in the 1860s and 1870s, but were lim ited to the Anatolian coast. As early as 1857 a Euphrates Valley railway had been proposed, but the Suez Canal turned British eyes to Egypt, continuously seeking to protect the route to India. In the second half o f the 19th century increasing debts convinced the Ottoman government to mortgage its finances in return for concessions o f raw m aterials, in the hope that this would solve the problem of finances. Railways were the answer. Hence, the first "proper" railway in the heart o f Anatolia was realized through the Anatolian Railway Company (founded 1889), established through the efforts o f Alfred Kaulla o f the W ürttem bergische Bank (Stuttgart) and Georg von Siemens, director o f the D eutsche Bank, who contracted the "Fisheries” loan, securing the fisheries revenues.1This was the start o f a spate o f railway building, opening up the country. Anra was reached in 1892, heralding the beginning o f the Baghdad Railway. For the Anatolian Railw ay Company was to be responsible for the line from Haydar Pasha to Konya, and die Baghdad Railway Company (constituted 1903) for the Konya-Basra section. There were soon rivals for the Baghdad section o f the railway. Britain, France, and Russia decided to compete,2 although unsuccessfully. Kaulla was well received by the sultan, and eventually obtained the "Act o f the Anatolian Railway Com­ pany,"3 which foreshadowed the firm an o f 1893 allowing the company the right to study the route to Baghdad. For the next four to five years, little interest was shown by the European Powers in Ottoman railways. The existing lines were not paying well and money was tight. Von Siemens followed a policy o f "wait and see." He was later goaded into action by rival interests. On 23 December 1899 dut Anatolian Railway Company, financially supported by the D eutsche Bank, received a preliminary concession to build a railway from Konya to Baghdad and Basra. This was later confirmed by firm an. The Baghdad Railway project as such was launched.

1 Enclosure no. i in docum ent FO 371/133, memorandum by M r. Block regarding Franco-German economic penetration, 3 July 1906. Gooch, G. P. St Temperiey, H arold: B ritish D ocum ents on th e O rigins o f the W ar 1898-1914, London, vol. V . p . 118. 2 See Ism ail, Adel: D ocum ents diplom atiques e t consulaires rela tifs à l'h isto ire du Liban e t des pays du Proche O rient du XVIIe s lid e à nos Jours, Beyrouth 1973; vols. 14-20 for French reports on railw ays, concessions, and rivalry. For the Baghdad Railway see vols. IS and 19. 3 H urewitz, J. C .: D iplom acy in the N ear and M iddle B ast, Princeton n .d ., vol. I, pp. 165-188; Young, George: Corps de d ro it ottom an, Oxford 1906, vol. I, pp. 139-134.

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German initiative so far had not alarmed die Powers. During this period Britain and France were mainly interested in their own particular spheres o f influence. Russia objected as she frit Germany would eventually challenge her interests in Persia. Britain was pleased at the thought that the Ottoman Empire would be strengthened at the expense o f Russia. In 1892 the British ambassador in Beilin actually urged the Germans to develop a commercial interest in the Arabian G ulf to counteract the Russians there.456The situation o f course changed at the beginning of die 20th century, since Germany became a world power and challenged Britain. Russia and France followed the British lead. Meanwhile, a secret treaty had been signed between Britain and Shaykh M ubirak o f Kuwait (nominally under Ottoman suzerainty), which, in effect, meant the establishment o f a British protectorate over Kuwait. Arguments were to arise over where the terminus for the railway was to be, whether Basra or elsewhere, the British insisting that this was their sphere o f influence. On 16 January 1902 an irOde was issued confirming the preliminary concession o f 1899, and granting the Anatolian Railway Company, for a period o f 99 years, the concession to build a railway to Basra. Branch lines were to connect with Alexandretta, Tall Habash, Aleppo,1 and Khanlqm. From Basra a branch line was to reach the G ulf with rights to build a harbor there. But the convention of 1903* was never wholly executed. The award was to occupy foreign chanceries for the next decade, and intensified European rivalries in the area. The signing o f the convention woke the Powers to the political importance o f the undertaking. Controlled by Germany, it threatened French interests in Syria, Russian interests along the Russo-Turkish frontier and the Russo-Persian frontier and the Straits; it questioned Britiain’s commercial primacy in the Ottoman Empire and her strategic primacy in the Gulf; above all, it raised fears for the route to India. Nevertheless, the convention confirmed the irOde o f 1902. The concessionnaires were to form a joint stock company, called the Im perial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company, which would take the place o f the Anatolian Railway Company in the building o f the line from Konya to the Arabian Gulf. Investors were the Anatolian Railway Company, the D eutsche Bank, and French capital. The duration o f the concession was for 99 years, and provided for the extension o f the railway from Konya to and Basra, passing through, or as near as possible to, Karaman, Eregli, Adana, Hamidiyya, Osmaniyya, Tall Habash, Nusaybïn, M osul, Takrit, Baghdad, Zubayr, and Basra. Branch lines were to be built from Tall Habash to

4 K irk, G eorge E .: A Short H istory o f the M iddle E ast, London 1952, p. 92. 5 Aleppo w « m ppooed to be a branch line to Tail H abaih. In 1910 the route was changed on the petition o f (he inhabitants for Aleppo to be on the main line. 6 For the lull text o f the convention, aee Hurewhz, pp. 252-263; Young, pp- 163-180.

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Aleppo and U rft, from Sadija to Khanlqln, and from Zubayr to a point on the Arabian Gulf. Since the enterprise was to be one o f public utility, when it was not possible to come to an agreement with the owners o f the land, the property through which the railway was to run could be acquired by the law of expropriation. The company had the right to work gravel pits, quarries, and forests. Government-owned lands were to be handed over free o f charge to the concessionnaires. The company also had the right to exploit any mines, quarries, and such, within 20 kilometers on each side o f the track and was allowed to establish tile and brick works, hydro-electric plants, warehouses, and depots which were necessary to the railway. One track was to be built until the gross kilometric receipts had reached the sum o f 30,000 francs, at which time the government had the right to demand the construction o f a second line. The company was exempt from paying customs duties on any materials necessary. There were also harbor rights, whereby the concessionnaires undertook to build three harbors, at Baghdad, Basra, and the terminus o f the branch line from Zubayr, which ports were to form an integral part o f the railway. At the same tim e, negotiations between the German group, who was afraid of not having enough capital, and Britain, who was afraid of Germany’s financing the railway alone, were reopened. And in the first months o f 1908 negotiations were carried on between Britain and Russia concerning railways in Persia. Germany proposed that Russia link Persia with the Baghdad Railway through Khanïqïn.78 When the Young Turks overthrew Sultan cAbdQIhamid’s regime (1908), it appeared as though the railway were to proceed no further, for they tended to lean towards Britain and France, connecting Germany with the old regime. But Britain expected too much o f them, and their attitude changed so that by 1909 Germany had regained her position in the Ottoman Empire. On 18 March 1911 a convention was signed between the Baghdad Railway Company and the Ottoman m inister o f public works providing for the continuation o f the railway to Baghdad. The convention o f 28 March o f the same year compen­ sated for the non-continuation o f the line to the G ulf by giving the company the right to prolong the railway from Toprak-Kala to Alexandretta and to build the port o f Alexandretta. Prior to this, in November 1910, Tsar Nicholas II had visited Emperor W illiam II at Potsdam, and among the issues discussed were those relating to the Ottoman Empire. This meeting resulted in the "Potsdam Convention on the Baghdad Railway and Russian Interests in Persia” (August 1911).* Germany recognized the division

7 Linking o f Iraq and P en ta was to occur after W orld W ar I. 8 'C onvention (Potsdam) on die Baghdad Railway and Russian Interests in P en is: Russia and G ermany, 6/19 August 1911.* in: Hurewhz, pp. 267-268.

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o f Persia into spheres o f influence as defined in the Anglo-Russian Agreement o f 1907, and pledged not to request any concessions on railways or navigation in Persia. Russia recognized the rights o f the D eutsche Bank in the Rn£hH«H Railway, and promised to obtain a concession to build a railway in Persia to be connected with the Baghdad Railway at Khanlqln. Actually, this agreement was to be the first o f a series o f conventions among the Powers which were to settle the Baghdad Railway question on the eve o f World War I. A draft agreement was signed between the Ottoman Bank and the railway company on 14 February 1914, whereby they agreed to extend their railway lines and link them. The German group recognized Syria as a French sphere of influence and renounced all rights to build a railway there. The French group was to liquidate its interests in the Baghdad Railway for a cash settlement. While a draft convention o f 13 June 1914 was signed with Britain.9 By 2 August 1914 the following sections o f die Baghdad Railway were in operation: Konya-Bulgurlu (200 kilometers), Bulgurlu-Ulukishla (38 kilometers), Ulukishla-Karapinar (54 kilometers), Dorak-Osmaniyya (130 kilometers), KoprakKala branch line (59 kilometers), RadjQ-Aleppo-Jaräbulüs (203 kilometers), Baghdad-Samarra (120 kilom eters).10 As for the running o f the society, there was in 1914 a council o f administration composed o f 27 members: 11 Germans, 8 French, 4 Ottomans, 2 Swiss, 1 Aus­ trian, 1 Italian. After W orld W ar I the company ceased all activity. Employers and officials by law had to wear a uniform and the fez, and be selected from among Ottoman subjects. Five years after the date o f opening o f each section to traffic, the executive working staff, except for higher officials, had to be Ottoman subjects. O f course, labor was Ottoman. Construction on the Amanus range was terminated in 1917, and in the Taurus Mountains a year later. By September o f 1918 one could travel from Haidar Pasha to Nusaybfn. W ith the extension o f the British occupation o f Mesopotamia, the British army of occupation constructed railway lines for easier access. These were from Basra to Baghdad; a meter gauge line went from Basra to Nâçiriyya, a narrow gauge line from Qurna to ‘AmSra (later converted to meter gauge), one from Kfit to Baghdad. These lines, with the exception of the Basra-NSsiriyya line, were dismantled at the end o f the war. And in the early part of 1918 the Baghdad-Gulf line was finished. Unlike the growth of other railways in the Ottoman Empire, the origins o f the Damas, Hama et Prolongem ents (DHP) were closely connected with the concession

9 'Anglo-Oennaii Diaft Convention «w the pp. 281-286.

Railway 15 June 1914,* in: Hurewitz,

10 B ieftériadis, E teuthire: L es chem ins d e fe r en Syrie e t au U ban. Em de historique, flnanc& rt, e t économ ique, Beyrouth 1944, p. 239.

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to build a carriage toad between Beirut and Damascus; thus, die road preceded the railway. In 18S6 a retired French naval officer, a long-time resident o f Beirut, Count Edmond de Perdrais, asked for the concession for SO years to build and exploit a carriage road between Beirut and Damascus. The only means o f communication until then was a beaten path, a caravan route used for centuries; people traveled with dragomans, servants, mules, donkeys, boxes, and packages, and the journey took four days. It was an impractical and expensive way to travel. De Perdrais obtained the concession by flrmOn o f 20 July 1857, and so the Compagnie Im périale Ottomane de la Route Beyrouth à Damas came into being. In October 1858 the Beirut-Pine Forest" stretch was opened to traffic, in 1861 the Beirut-Zahla passenger service was inaugurated, a year later that o f BeirutJudayda, and after some financial difficulties, the first convoy o f goods entered Damascus on 1 January 1863." The road was 111 kilometers in length, starting from the coast, and crossed mountains and valleys to reach Damascus. In 1863 a daily coach service was established. The journey took 14 hours instead o f the four days by caravan, and stage coaches met at a halfway point at ShtQra, where there were connections to Zahla. The beginnings o f the company were not easy for, besides financial problems, it had to contend with brigands as well as the opposition o f the local authorities. By 1871, however, matters improved. The road not only served to transport passengers and goods, but also stimulated the growth o f commerce and industry along the way, such as the growth o f tourism to Damascus, and the antiquities and inlaid wood furniture trade. It also gave the port o f Beirut precedence over Haifa, Sidon, and Tripoli, since goods could be transported directly to Damascus. The shareholders o f the Compagnie de ia Route founded the Compagnie Ottomane du Port, des Quais et des Entrepôts de Beyrouth, and the port was enlarged and completed in 1894. One o f the side effects o f the building of the road was that it was probably at the origin o f the settling in ShtQra o f a French agricultural community, among them the Brun family. This family established the well-known Domaine des Tourelles, with its excellent wines and spirits. The road was maintained in good repair until 1893, when the company was dissolved, and it became impracticable before W orld War I, and the mountain parts completely caved in. It was rebuilt during the French Mandate, to become the main Beirut-Damascus highway, leading to points east.*12

i t The Pine Forest, which was plained by Fakhr al-Dfii D in the 17th century, was totally destroyed during the bombing in the events which b egin in 1973. The French have replanted it. 12 H eftériadès, pp. 40-42. For the road, see Young, vol. IV . pp. 211-223. Also see Cbebat, Anis: L a com m unications en Syrie, Damas 1968. Also see Ism ail, vola. 16 and 17, for the concession to de Perthuis.

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The macadam road became insufficient for the traffic it bore. Moreover, a British group obtained the concession to build a railway from Damascus to Haifa, and the Compagnie de la Route began in turn thinking o f building a railway. Eventually the railway was built along the existing route. M eanwhile, a notable from Baalbek in the Biq¥, YOsuf Habib M utrin,1314 obtained a concession not only fin- the port o f Beirut, which he later ceded to the Compagnie du Port, des Quais et des Entrepôts de Beyrouth, but also the conces­ sion for Damascus tramways, with the right to build a steam railway line from Damascus to Muzayrib in the qadd o f H aw rin (103 kilometers). This was the beginning o f the Damascus network. He later transferred this line to the Société des Tramways de Damas et Voies Ferrées Economiques de Syrie, which in turn became, in 1891, the Société Ottomane de la Voie Ferrée de Beyrouth à Damas. Eventually, after several adjudications, the Société Ottomane de la Voie Ferrée de Beyrouth à Damas decided to build a rack railway (chemin de fe r à crém aillère) o f narrow gauge (1.05 m eter), reducing the length of the proposed railway to 147 kilom eters. The concession was granted to a Beirut notable, Hasan BayhOm, on 7 June 1891. At this point, the Société des Tramways de Damas and the Société Ottomane de la Voie Ferrée decided to m erge, not only because o f common interests, but also because o f tire threat by a British company to build the Damascus-Haifa line. This merger was authorized by firm dn o f 22 November 1891, under the name o f Société des Chemins de Fer Economiques de Beyrouth-D am as-H auran en Syrie. The statutes were approved on 22 December 1891, and the company definitely set up on 4 January 1892.14 BayhOm retroceded his concession for the Beirut-Damascus line against shares in the new company. Efforts were made to build the Damascus-Muzayrib and the Beirut-Damascus railways at the same tim e, but the entrepreneur o f the former ran into difficulties and left die completion o f die line to the company. Still, the Damascus-Muzayrib line was inaugurated on 14 July 1894. The 103 kilometers took three hours to cross, instead o f the two and a half days formerly needed. It took three years to lay the Beirut-Damascus track, owing to the topography of die land. The line was officially inaugurated on 3 August 1895. The first train took less than nine hours to cross 147 kilometers of narrow gauge line (1.05 m eter), with a rack railway Abt system o f 32 kilometers and four tunnels, the longest o f which was 350 meters.

13 Concessions could only be grained to Ottoman subjects, who would later sell them to companies, usually foreigners, who had the know-how. Nothing is known about these persons except their names. Labor was provided by the local population. 14 On 28 May 1900 it became the Société O ttom ane des Chem ins de Fer D am as, H anta e t Prolongem ents ulusl family. Other factors that prompted the expansion o f soap manufacture were the accumulation o f capital in the city, and the growing commercial ties with other regions in the M iddle East. The expansion o f trade ties between the Palestinian market and the W estern European markets, especially Britain, during the period following the withdrawal o f Muhammad cAITs armies from the country in 1839 harmed many o f the traditional crafts in Palestine. Nablus and the surrounding villages, where weaving was an important craft, was particularly affected. Not only did cheap textiles from England enter the market during this period, but local raw cotton became scarcer as a result o f reduced cultivation after die American Civil W ar. Still, weaving did not die out completely. Textiles produced in Nablus and the villages o f the sancak at the end o f the 19th century amounted to a value o f 20,000 ghurOsh annually and met part o f the demand for textiles in the city ." Economic growth in the city was also reflected in considerable investment in construction undertaken by the private sector, by the government and by several foreign institutions operating in Palestine. The Ottoman authorities built barracks, a prison and residences to the east o f the old city in 1875, and a railway station and additional buildings were constructed nearby in 1906. At the turn of the century, the municipality building, a British hospital, two hotels, a khan, and a group of residential buildings went up to the west o f the old city ." The broadening o f economic links between rural and urban areas and the increasing use o f cash by the peasants strengthened the monetary ties o f the villagers to the city, resulting in the growing importance o f banking in the Nablus16789

16 For data on (be three m»tn item* exported through Jsff* port during 1879-1913, leeG ilb ar, Gad O .: "The Growing Economic Involvement o f Palestine with the W est, 1863-1914,* in Kushner, David (ed.): Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political, Social and Economic Transformation, Jerosalem /Leiden 1986, pp. 196-197, Table 5. 17 For a partial list o f Nablus soap exporters, see al-Rlm U I, p. 112. 18 Md.. p. 111. 19 E bert, Georg & G uthe, Herman: Palästina In Bild und Wort, Stuttgart/Leipzig, n.d. (1882), vol. 1, p. 262: al-N im r, Nablus n.d. (1973?). vol. 3 . pp. 6 2 -6 3 ,7 8 . 89-90.

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economy. Nevertheless, European b a k in g institutions had not been established in Nablus by the end o f the 19th century, although brandies o f British, French, and G e rm a banks (the Im perial Ottoman Bank, Crédit Lyonnais, and D eutsche Palästina Bank, respectively) were established in Jerusalem and Jaffa.” Only around the outbreak o f W orld W ar I did the D eutsche Palästina Bank open a brandi in Nablus.2021 The Ottoman government, for its part, inaugurated a brandi o f the A gricultural Bank (al-bank a l-zirtft) in Nablus at the end o f the 19th century, which arranged sm all, low-interest loans for the peasants to help them buy seed and work anim als.22 However, this activity was lim ited in scope, and up to the end o f Ottoman rule it was local private banking that performed the important fonction o f providing credit in the city. Big merchants and landowners loaned money to the residents o f the city as well as to peasants in the villages o f the sancak and residents in the new qadd’ al-Sah.23 W ith the acceleration o f the monetization process in the area, the demand for credit increased, thereby enabling creditors in Nablus, in the absence o f government control, to charge very high interest rates (over 20 percent per annum).2*

Social Change Reforms in Ottoman administration during the second half o f the 19th century combined with economic developments in the Palestinian and S y ria markets, led to significant changes in the economic and social relations between the urban elite and the rural population and its leaders. E v a though the iltizäm system was legally abolished in 1856, the Nablus tfyO n continued to control land tax collection well into the second half o f the century. This practice had begun decades before the establishment o f the m eclis-i idare in die city, but it expanded in scope and took on a different character as a result o f the integration o f several aon-tfydn urban families into the Nablus elite, which allowed for their appointment as tax farmers, and the simultaneous loss o f power and social standing by some o f the rural shaykhs who had not migrated to the city.25 In certain areas o f die district, however, tax collection remained in the h o d s o f rural

20 W eakley, p . 22; R appln, A rthur: Syria: An Econom ic Survey, New York 1918, pp. 66-09. 21 Ruppin, ib id . 22 al-N im r. vol. 3. pp. 30-31; vol. 4 . Nablua 1973, p. 214. See alao al-R Im M , p . 110. 23 »l-RimTni, ib id . See alao R ofan. Eugene L .: "M oneyleadins and Capital Flows from Nablus, Damascus and Jerusalem to Qadd ’al-Salt in the Last Decades o f Ottoman Rule, * in: Philipp, Thomas (ed.): The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th C entury, Stuttgart 1992, pp. 231-232. Rogan, Eugene L .: 'B ringing the State Back: The Limits o f Ottoman Rule m Iordan, 1840-1910,* in: Rogan, Eugene L. f t T ell, T ariq (cds.): V illage, Steppe and Suae. The S a d a t O rigins e f M odem Jordan, London 1994, pp. 31-33. 24 D ickson. DCR, AS 3223, p . 9. 23 al-N im r, vol. 2 , pp. 261-262; aM Unffidl, ib id .

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fam ilies, such as the J a n in , an example o f a ratal m uitazim that managed to retain economic power and social influence.11 The fact that tax collection was largely concentrated in die hands o f a few Nablus families was facilitated by two factors: the liquid capital at their disposal, and their political power and social standing. The first factor must be viewed against the background o f the change that took place in the nature o f the iltizûm during the second half o f die 19th century. Whereas in an earlier period, the iltizûm was granted according to an essentially political consideration - local power, in the period under review it was offered tender and won by the party that put up the highest sum above the prim e nominal value.2627 This system gave the cfyün in Nablus an advantage over the rural shaykhs in the competition over farming land taxes. The "map" o f leased tax collection areas under the iltizûm system encompassed most o f the cultivated land in the district, each area controlled by one o f the cfyOn families. The villages in west WSdl al-Shafir and west JammSfti were the iltizûm lands mainly controlled by the TQqSn family; MashSriq Jabal Nablus and east W idI al-Shaffr were the collection areas of the al-Nimr family; the al-Shacr& (al-Shafrhwiyya) villages were in the hands o f cAbd al-HMI; and the Safflhfn and QalqUiyya area was controlled by the al-Tanfinff family. Certain families o f shaykhs, particu­ larly the Jarrirs, managed to retain their m uitazim status and controlled a tax collection area extending throughout al-HSrttha and what later came to be known as the "MasMifq al-JanSr D istrict."2* Toward the end o f the century, a new group o f m uitazim families became prominent in the city, consisting o f merchants who had accumulated liquid assets during the second half o f the century and who had thereby acquired extensive tax collection areas from the Ottoman government. This group began to dislodge some o f die established cfyOn families from their tax-collecting niche. For example, the *Abd al-Majfd family replaced the al-Nimr family as tax collectors in several of the al-M ashänq villages, while the Shalva family replaced the TQqins and the Rayyins in several o f the JammäTn villages.29 In addition to the capital factor, the concentration o f land in the hands o f the tfyO n and the "new" elite families was made possible by strong patronage relation­ ships between the peasants and the urban notables as well as by the special standing o f the Nablus elite with the Ottoman administration. The formation o f a m eclis-i idare in Nablus did not, apparently, lead to any substantial change in these relation­ ships, but rather institutionalized the existing political and social order.

26 On the la r r in , te e M am i’, cAdü: AfUtm FU asttH ßaw dkhlr a l-a h d a l-'u ttvn â n l (1900-1918), B eirat 1995. 27 C f. J tfo . OCR. CBS 26, p . 1010. 28 al-N in r. vol. 2 . pp. 417-427; al-R lm M . p. 109. 29 al-N im r, ib id .

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A change in the distribution o f political and economic power did, however, occur in Nablus in the second half o f the 19th century. This change was not one o f urban leadership vis-à-vis rural leadership, but rather a change within the urban leadership itself. Late in 1858 or early in 18S9 the governor o f the Nablus m utasarriflik, D iyi’ Bey, ordered the m ultazim s to register the lands in their iltizûm areas in the names o f the persons who cultivated them, in accordance with cAbdQlmecid’s Land Law enacted in April 1858.30 This development and others that followed in the 1870s, namely the Land Law Amendments o f 1870 and 1872, resulted in the registration o f a sizable portion o f state lands (m frt) in the district in the names o f members o f the city's (fyûn fam ilies.31 Thus, by the beginning o f the 20th century Nablus was the domicile o f owners o f large estates in addition to the m ultazim s o f the d istric t- in many cases the very same cfyOn families. These estates seem to have been acquired in two stages. At first, it was mainly the urban m ultazim s and the rural Jarrar family who managed to transfer increasingly large areas o f their iltizûm to their ownership. Ironically, DiyS’ B ey's order to register lands in the names o f the cultivators had aroused fierce opposition among the cfyOn m ultazim s, who viewed it as a preparatory step toward the transfer of tax collection to collectors employed directly by the govern­ ment and the abolishment o f the existing tax-farming system. As in sim ilar in­ stances in the past, when it seemed to the leading families that the government intended to curtail their social and economic power, they responded swiftly, organizing a rebellion against DiyS’ Bey.32 Fortunately for the local elites, with time it became apparent that although the intention o f the Land Law had been to reinforce state supervision over m lrt lands, and although the 1856 decree abrogating the iltizûm regime was in effect, no real steps were taken to discontinue the existing system. Hence, not only did the city m ultazim s cooperate with the governor in registering the lands, but some o f them perceived it as an opportunity to expand their property on a grand scale. Several factors facilitated the takeover o f agricultural lands by the Nablus notables in their iltizûm areas. In the first stage, social and political factors domi­ nated, namely the patronage relationship between the urban notables and the peasants, along with the desire o f the peasants to evade conscription, which enabled the m ultazim s and other families of notables in Nablus to register lands in their own name.33 For example, part of the land in the villages o f Ballta and Kafr Qalfil was registered in the name o f the al-Nim r family; lands in the villages o f ‘A riba, YaTjad, and others were registered in the name o f the eAbd al-Hàdt family; and

30 al-N im r. vol. 1, p. 300. 31 al-R im lnl. p . 106. 32 al-N im r. vol. 1. p. 300-303. C f. Bergbeim, S .: ’Land Tenure in Palestine.* in: P alestine E xploration Fund Q uarterly Statem ent, 1894, pp. 191-199. 33 Raflq A Bahjat, vol. 1. pp. 121-122; al-R im lnl. p. 109.

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some o f the land in B urqi, Kafr QaddOm, Jit, and other villages were registered in the name o f the Tuqin fam ily.14 The second stage o f land acquisition was marked by the emergence o f a new type o f large landowner - the wealthy mendiants o f the city. This group acquired large estates prim arily as a result of increased specialization in manufacture and commerce as well as the growing ties o f the urban Nablus economy to markets in B ilid al-Shim and Egypt. Large amounts o f liquid assets am m uilated in the hands o f this small group o f urban merchant "industrialists," while many peasants sank deep into debt to city moneylenders - usually the very same merchants - and had to transfer the de facto ownership right o f the land they tilled to their creditors.11 This development accelerated after 1871 as a result of several successive years o f drought as well as more efficient conscription to the Ottoman army. The central government, displeased with this agrarian trend, issued several decrees and orders in the 1870s prohibiting moneylenders from expropriating the lands o f debtor peasants who were unable to keep up with their debt payments.16 However, market forces overpowered government orders. Peasants who wished to make additional loans from the moneylender to whom they were already indebted were obliged to forego their rights to the land.1" Another method by which the large merchants accumulated extensive property, especially at the end o f the century, was land purchase from the old tfyâ n families. Some o f these families decided to sell off land in order to diversify the composition o f their assets once it became clear that the return on investment in commerce was higher than that in land ownership. Such families as the Nimrs and the TQqins sold a portion o f their agricultural land in the vicinity o f the city to merchant families such as the cAbd al-M ajids, who acquired considerable land in al-M ashiriq from the Nimrs; the Shakfas, who bought Jam m äln land from the TQqin and al-Rayyin families; and to a lesser extent the cAshûr, NibulusT, al-Ham id, and Shähln fam ilies.1* The allocation o f liquid assets to the acquisition o f real estate by the merchants may seem surprising, since the return on such investments was lower than in commerce, soap manufacturing, or moneylending. The return on land ownership in Syria and northern Palestine at the end of the 1870s was estimated at an average annual ram o f 15-20 percent,1* while capital gains on agricultural land at the end o f the 19th century were minimal. Nevertheless, there were two important economic and social considerations in diverting capital to land acquisition. First, since most34567*9

34 al-N im r, vol. 2, p. 262. 35 Rafiq f t Bahjat, vol. 1. pp. 122-123. 36 Jago, DCR, CRS 26. pp. 1004-1005. 37 Raffq f t Bahjat. vol. 1. p . 122. 30 al-N im r, vol. 2 , pp. 417f. 39 Jago. DCR. CRS 26. p. 1006.

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o f the big merchant», such as the NibulusI, S halft, and 'AshOr families, were engaged in one way or another in the olive oil and sesame industries and not only in marketing the raw products, they were interested in purchasing land in order to assure a steady and cheap supply o f raw materials for their industries. This became particularly important in the last decades o f the century when, as a result o f die development o f soap industries in Syria and Lebanon, merchants from those regions would compete with the local merchants for the olive crops in bad seasons and die price o f the crop would clim b.40 Second, membership in the uppermost urban d ite still required a direct and a strong link with the countryside, namely ownership o f large areas o f landed property. Significantly, such wealthy merchant families as al-M apf and al-cAshQr, whose landed property was still limit«*! at the end o f the 19th century, were not regarded at that time as d ite families. In summary, the composition o f the group o f efyàn families in Nablus during die 19th century underwent two major changes. First, several powerful rural families became integrated into the elite during the first half o f the century. This process, which continued to some extent into the second half o f the century, gave way to the second change, namely, the economic, and subsequently social and political, rise o f a number o f merchant and ’industrialist* families. These merchants, having accumulated liquid assets, managed to acquire large areas o f real estate and consequently gained recognition by the Nablus notables, and involved in managing the affairs o f the city and district. As a result o f these developments, the composition o f the