The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758: Britannia’s Tarnished Laurels 9781474229968, 9781474230001, 9781474229999

Table of contents :
Cover
Half-title
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction
1. The Newcastle Ministry and the Origins of Failure in North America
2. Legislative Turmoil: Governors, Assemblies and the Struggle for Colonial Support
3. The Colonial Americans: Necessary but Problematic Allies
4. How Important Were the Native Americans?
5. A Logistical Problem: Roads, Transportation and Adequate Provisions
6. The Army: An Inadequate, Frightened and Sickly Force
7. The Performance of the Navy: The Effects of Nature and the Death of an Admiral
Conclusion
Abbreviations Used in Notes
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

Bloomsbury Studies in Military History Series Editor: Jeremy Black Bloomsbury Studies in Military History offers up-to-date, scholarly accounts of war and military history. Unrestricted by period or geography, the series aims to provide free-standing works that are attuned to conceptual and historiographical developments in the field while being based on original scholarship. Published: The 56th Infantry Brigade and D-Day, Andrew Holborn The RAF’s French Foreign Legion, G.H. Bennett Empire and Military Revolution in Eastern Europe, Brian Davies Reinventing Warfare 1914–1918, Anthony Saunders Fratricide in Battle, Charles Kirke The Army in British India, Kaushik Roy The 1711 Expedition to Quebec, Adam Lyons Britain, Germany and the Battle of the Atlantic, Dennis Haslop Military Transition in Early Modern Asia, 1400–1750, Kaushik Roy The Role of the Royal Navy in South America, Jon Wise Scotland and the British Army 1700–1750, Victoria Henshaw War and State-Building in Modern Afghanistan, edited by Scott Gates and Kaushik Roy Conflict and Soldiers’ Literature in Early Modern Europe, Paul Scannell Youth, Heroism and Naval Propaganda, Douglas Ronald William Howe and the American War of Independence, David Smith Postwar Japan as a Sea Power, Alessio Patalano The D-Day Landing on Gold Beach, Andrew Holborn Forthcoming: Reassessing the British Way in Warfare, K. A. J. McLay Australasian Propaganda and the Vietnam War, Caroline Page Australian Soldiers in the Boer and Vietnam Wars, Effie Karageorgos English Landed Society and the Great War, Edward Bujak General Lord Rawlinson, Rodney Atwood The Royal Navy in the Age of Austerity 1919–22, G. H. Bennett

The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758 Britannia’s Tarnished Laurels George Yagi

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

LON DON • OX F O R D • N E W YO R K • N E W D E L H I • SY DN EY

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

1385 Broadway New York NY 10018 USA

www.bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2016 Paperback edition first published 2017 © George Yagi, 2016 George Yagi has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB: 978-1-4742-2996-8 PB: 978-1-3500-4207-0 ePDF: 978-1-4742-2999-9 ePub: 978-1-4742-2997-5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Yagi, George, author. The struggle for North America, 1754–1758 : Britannia’s tarnished laurels / George Yagi. pages cm. – (Bloomsbury studies in military history) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4742-2996-8 – ISBN 978-1-4742-2999-9 (ePDF) – ISBN 978-1-4742-2997-5 (ePub) 1. United States–History–French and Indian War, 1754–1763–Campaigns. 2. Seven Years’ War, 1756–1763–Campaigns. 3. Great Britain. Army–History–French and Indian War, 1754–1763. I. Title. E199.Y34 2016 973.2’6–dc23 2015022838 Series: Bloomsbury Studies in Military History Typeset by Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd.

For Mom and Dad

Contents Acknowledgements Introduction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

The Newcastle Ministry and the Origins of Failure in North America Legislative Turmoil: Governors, Assemblies and the Struggle for Colonial Support The Colonial Americans: Necessary but Problematic Allies How Important Were the Native Americans? A Logistical Problem: Roads, Transportation and Adequate Provisions The Army: An Inadequate, Frightened and Sickly Force The Performance of the Navy: The Effects of Nature and the Death of an Admiral

Conclusion Abbreviations Used in Notes Notes Bibliography Index

viii 1 9 27 53 73 101 129 159 187 194 196 243 258

Acknowledgements In the course of completing this study, I have benefited from the assistance of many people. First and foremost, I would like to thank Jeremy Black for his constant guidance throughout the duration of this project. I am truly grateful for his unfailing support and friendship. I owe a great debt of gratitude to the late Caroline Cox, a dear friend and fellow ‘Colonialist’ who was a pillar of support in all my literary projects since I first began my writing career at the age of 19. I would also like to extend my thanks to Michael Duffy, Richard Harding, Ken Albala and Gesine Gerhard, for their comments and contributions which led to the completion of this work. Among the numerous archives which I owe my gratitude, I would like to offer a special thank you to the Library and Archives Canada, which consistently supplied me with so much extra help. Of the numerous people who assisted me there, I would like to thank Patricia Kennedy, who made my research a much easier task. Among those at Bloomsbury, I am very grateful for the efforts of Claire Lipscomb and Emma Goode for all their help in making this book a reality. Finally, I would like to offer my most heartfelt thanks to my parents. Denying me nothing and encouraging my love of history since I was a child, this work would not have come into existence without them.

Introduction At the end of 1758, Britons could proudly boast of the numerous victories achieved against the forces of King Louis XV. Although the Seven Years’ War, or French and Indian War, was far from over, 1758 marked a significant turning point. The Annual Register summarized the year’s events: Notwithstanding the unhappy affair at Ticonderoga, the campaign of 1758 in America was very advantageous, and very honourable to the English interest. Louisbourg, St. John’s, Frontenac, and du Quesne reduced, remove from our colonies all terror of the Indian incursions, draw from the French those useful allies, free our frontiers from the yoke of their enemies forts, make their supplies precarious, and all their defensive or offensive operations ineffective; whilst their country uncovered of its principal bulwarks, lies open to the heart, and affords the most pleasing prospects of success to the vigorous measure which we may be assured will be taken in the next campaign.1

Such optimism was not unwarranted, for until that time Britain suffered repeated humiliations both on land and at sea. In 1755, Major General Edward Braddock met with defeat on the banks of the Monongahela with the loss of two-thirds of his forces, himself among the casualties.2 At sea, the British navy failed miserably in its gamble to prevent an outbreak of war in Europe by intercepting a squadron of French ships carrying much needed supplies and reinforcements to Canada. Had the mission succeeded, France would have been deprived of 3,650 soldiers, fourteen ships of the line and several officers who would play a prominent role in the defence of the colony.3 In 1756, Britain lost the island of Minorca owing to the pessimism of Vice Admiral John Byng, and the key outpost at Oswego in New York due to the poor state of its garrison.4 The fall of Oswego was particularly unfortunate, and its importance was not lost by Lieutenant Colonel James Wolfe, who considered it one of the ‘two most important points in America’.5 Wolfe’s reasoning was correct, as the capture of the outpost ensured French control of the Great Lakes. By 1757, the British war effort reached a nadir. In North America, after a desperate siege, Fort William Henry was captured and part of its garrison massacred despite a formal capitulation guaranteeing their safe passage. On the Gulf of St Lawrence, due to bad weather and a sizeable French fleet, a joint effort

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

by the British army and navy met with failure outside Louisbourg. In Europe, despite repeated efforts to maintain its neutrality, George II’s beloved Hanover was invaded by French forces. The Army of Observation under the command of the king’s favourite son, William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, met with the enemy at Hastenbeck, only to suffer defeat. This was quickly followed by a retreat northwards to Stade, and the disgraceful signing of the Convention of Klosterzeven, which removed Hanover from the war and subjected the Electorate to foreign occupation.6 By the 1758, however, the fortunes of war shifted in favour of Britain. The great fortress at Louisbourg, referred to as the ‘American Dunkirk’ and the ‘Gibraltar of the North’, had fallen.7 Not a matter of insignificance, the consequences of this loss was well understood in France as early as 1714, when Minister of the Marine, Jérôme Phélypeaux, comte de Pontchartrain, ominously remarked, ‘If France were to lose this Island the loss would be an irreparable one, and it would involve the loss of all her holdings in North America.’8 Although Massachusetts provincials captured Louisbourg during the previous conflict, the War of the Austrian Succession, it was quickly returned in exchange for Madras.9 During the Seven Years’ War, there would be no such political compromise again as the conquest of Canada became the principal aim. As Major General Jeffery Amherst informed Lieutenant Colonel Louis Antoine de Bougainville during a truce before Montréal in 1760, ‘Tell Monsieur de Vaudreuil, I have come to take Canada and will take nothing less.’10 In order to achieve this, the conquest of Louisbourg was essential, as it was the final obstacle to overcome before offensive operations could be conducted against Québec and ultimately, Canada.11 In addition to the capture of Louisbourg, the reduction of Fort Frontenac was also of great importance. Since the fall of Oswego in 1756, France had maintained dominance over Lake Ontario, which was essential to both British and French military interests. To the French, it was a vital lifeline for supply and trade. For the British, the command of Lake Ontario was as important as that of the Gulf of St Lawrence, being the backdoor to Montréal and Canada.12 As a result, an arms race ensued on its shores in 1755, with both parties attempting to create the dominant fleet. Unfortunately for the British, when Oswego fell, the entire naval contingent was captured along with the outpost’s fortifications and stores. In 1758, however, Lieutenant Colonel John Bradstreet reversed this loss. Travelling along the shores of Lake Ontario in bateaux and whaleboats, Bradstreet’s force of 3,100 men succeeded in capturing Fort Frontenac.13 With the success of the operation,

Introduction

3

Bradstreet not only destroyed vital supplies of food and ammunition but also the entire French fleet.14 A crushing blow to the French war effort, it was one from which they would never fully recover. The most dramatic conquest of 1758 was that of Fort Duquesne. It was over this outpost that hostilities began in 1754, with Major George Washington’s attack on a French detachment and his later defeat at nearby Fort Necessity.15 In 1755, it was again the scene of a major defeat, as Braddock’s army of regulars were repulsed within several miles of the fort.16 The demise of expedition had profound effects upon both contemporaries and historians as it led to the belief that European-style warfare was ill suited for the American wilderness.17 In addition, it had tremendous influence upon Braddock’s successor, Brigadier General John Forbes, who was determined not to suffer the same fate.18 During the construction of his road towards Fort Duquesne, Forbes warily remarked, ‘the only thing I dread the French will do is that they will persuade the West Country Indians in conjunction with the Shawenese to come and attack the head of my Army’.19 Such concern was not unwarranted, for the hundreds of bones strewn about Braddock’s field were a grisly reminder.20 Fortunately for Forbes, there was no repeat of the 1755 disaster, although Major James Grant’s ill-fated assault almost deteriorated into a small reenactment.21 When Forbes’s main army finally arrived at the fort, no battle was fought, and the only explosions heard were the French destroying the fortifications prior to their departure.22 The capture of Fort Duquesne was a highly symbolic event. Much blood had been shed in wresting it from the French, and finally the impregnable fortress which had defied the attacks of three armies was no more. Upon its occupation, Forbes renamed the fort Pittsburgh, in honour of the man who helped make victory possible. In 1754, the Newcastle ministry designed its policy clearly outlining the manner in which the war was to be fought until 1758. Determined to confine the fighting to North America, Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke of Newcastle, fashioned policy which was far too weak to achieve this aim and grossly inadequate when the war became a global conflict.23 This policy was weak due to the ministry’s belief that peace was still a possibility, and that more aggressive measures would have ruined all prospects for negotiation.24 Additionally, it was hoped that by limiting the war to the colonies, George II’s Hanoverian domains would be secured from a French invasion, and peace would be maintained in Europe by a system of alliances.25 In attempting to fight the war in such a manner, it was, as Lord Chancellor Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke commented, ‘too little and too much’.26

4

The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

As a result of the decisions made at Whitehall, successive commanders-inchief until 1758 were given unwieldy instructions which prevented them from bringing the war to a successful conclusion. Encumbered by the ministry with numerous responsibilities, each containing complicated issues of their own, the commander-in-chief was overwhelmed with massive administrative duties. In particular, they were charged by the government to organize a colonial union, conduct negotiations with various tribes of Amerindians, manage the logistics of war in the wilderness, attend to the affairs of the army and coordinate strategy with the navy. In the struggle to establish a colonial union, commanders-in-chief found themselves in the midst of combat, not with the enemy, but with the colonial governments. In general, colonial governors were at the forefront of this battle and conveyed the requests from commanders-in-chief for supplies and men to their assemblies, which were often refused. Endless arguments became so heated that direct intervention by the commander-in-chief was sometimes necessary to bring bitter disputes to an end. In a few instances, however, even the commanderin-chief could not halt the fighting. In addition to governmental quarrels, the commander-in-chief was also responsible for organizing colonial manpower for both the army and general war effort. In regard to the army, despite their expense and lack of professionalism, colonials were necessary when serving as provincial troops and militia, which freed increasing numbers of regulars to conduct the war. At the same time, the colonial populace proved problematic as they also charged the British army exorbitant prices for all goods and services, encouraged drunkenness in the ranks and also supplied provisions to the French, much to the frustration of the British navy who were trying to prevent their arrival from Europe. Amerindian affairs proved another complicated matter. While the commander-in-chief was supposed to be assisted in negotiations by two Superintendents of Indian Affairs, with one stationed in the north and the other tending the southern department, their results proved disappointing. Consequently, this also forced the commander-in-chief to undertake direct negotiations with various tribes, sometimes while on the march. This proved problematic, as cross-cultural issues emerged in these discussions, often leading to misunderstandings and failures. While conducting the war in the wilderness, numerous problems arose in logistics, as not only the French military needed to be conquered but also the backcountry. New roads had to be opened, vehicles for transport found and adequate provisions gathered. Each of these issues created further dilemmas

Introduction

5

for commanders-in-chief as road construction proved to be a slow debilitating process, wagons and bateaux were difficult to organize and food was always in short supply. This created a situation in which arriving on the battlefield was merely half the struggle. Concerning the body of troops expected to carry on the war, commandersin-chief had to contend with inadequate recruits, the effects of psychological warfare and a shrinking pool of manpower due to the ravages of disease. During the initial stages of the war, regulars were recruited predominantly in the colonies. Consequently, lacking experience and a sufficient core of veterans to bolster them, they performed poorly on the battlefield, especially when subjected to France’s successful campaign of psychological warfare. At the same time, although efforts were made in the practice of public health and preventive medicine, disease continued to slowly erode the ranks, diminishing numbers available for combat. With the army in such a state, it was difficult for the commander-in-chief to conduct an offensive war. The implementation of naval policy also proved problematic. Throughout the duration of the war, commanders-in-chief were ordered to maintain regular contact with their naval counterparts. While conducting operations at sea, in the vicinity of the Great Lakes and even on land, the Royal Navy always attempted to provide assistance to the army. However, poor weather hindered their performance, and naval officers were often prone to caution. As a result of this timidity, there was little success until naval commanders embraced a more aggressive fighting spirit. Faced with these numerous obstacles, it is not surprising that commandersin-chief experienced failure. While they struggled to overcome these problems, and experienced some success in their efforts, the amount of work in which they laboured exceeded acceptable levels. Consequently, with such little time available to tend to all issues, some matters might receive immediate attention while others were left neglected. Only when the Pitt-Newcastle ministry swiftly altered the situation in 1758, and assumed a number of these responsibilities, was it possible for the commander-in-chief to focus solely on military affairs and succeed in winning the war. The principle object of this book is to provide further insight into the initial stages of the war and seek to explain why Britain failed despite the many advantages which it enjoyed. Indeed, Canada was vastly outnumbered by the British colonies, with a population amounting to only 55,009 in comparison to that of 1,042,000.27 In addition, Braddock’s force of 1,450 soldiers was numerically superior to those of the French, who could only muster 855 men.28

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

With such odds against them, one could have easily assumed at the time that the French would be defeated. Indeed, while the British army approached Fort Duquesne, Captain Daniel-Hyacinthe-Marie Lienard de Beaujeu advanced with what meagre forces he could gather, merely to stall Braddock as the fortress prepared for evacuation.29 Among the various studies of the Seven Years’ War, the majority primarily focus on the latter period, while very few attempts have been made to analyse the initial stages. Wolfe has remained the subject of numerous works, with the most recent being published by Stephen Brumwell and Stuart Reid. Although several books have been written on Braddock’s Defeat, the Conquest of Acadia and Fort William Henry by historians such as Lee McCardell, Geoffrey Plank and Ian K. Steele, very little has been done to look at the years of defeat collectively. While Fred Anderson and Daniel Baugh have written extensively on the course of the entire war, the only study that has attempted to address the early period of conflict is Stanley Pargellis’s invaluable work, Lord Loudoun in North America, published in 1933. Analysing the position of commander-in-chief, Pargellis identified some of the specific problems which Loudoun encountered in attempting to perform his duties, in particular, his efforts to promote a colonial union. As Pargellis argued, ‘Loudoun’s task was to persuade them to work in unison, and he had to concentrate his attention as much on that as on fighting the French.’30 Loudoun’s dilemma with the colonials, however, is merely only one factor which led to failure. Regarding the structure of this book, Chapter 1 addresses the roots of British failure in the development of policy, and how decisions made at Whitehall had serious repercussions for the war effort in North America. It examines the initial plans for policy in 1754, the expansion of policy in 1755 and 1756 and its effects until 1758, when it was again altered with successful results by the PittNewcastle ministry. Subsequent chapters then address the issues which arose as a direct result of the Newcastle ministry’s policy. Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the problems encountered in dealings among the colonial Americans. Particular attention is given to the struggles which occurred between governors and assemblies as commanders-in-chief requested assistance for the support of the war. The contributions of the colonial Americans in aiding the British army are also investigated, as well as the conflicts of interests that arose in the process. The importance of Amerindian allies is questioned in Chapter 4. The chapter illustrates how the Amerindians were not innocent pawns used and exploited by the British and the French but were a third party in the conflict who had interests of their own. By examining their shrewd handling of the rivalry

Introduction

7

between Britain and France, actual contributions to the British war effort, and the performance of other irregulars in their stead, the chapter seeks to explain how Amerindians did little to alter the course of the war in favour of Britain. The difficulties of logistics in the wilderness are analysed in Chapter 5. Focus is placed primarily upon the obstacles which needed to be overcome: the building of roads, the management of transportation and the procurement of provisions. The performance of the army is investigated in Chapter 6, with attention given to the inadequate numbers of troops dispatched by the ministry, a campaign of psychological warfare waged by the French and poor living conditions with fatal consequences. The navy is unique in Chapter 7, as it was primarily the interference of weather, not policy, which led to its failure. The chapter considers how weather worked in favour of the French, and how an increase in risk-taking was necessary in order to overcome the natural barriers that protected them. Among the numerous sources consulted, voices are given from a wide spectrum of participants. From politicians, to soldiers, to ordinary colonial Americans, these accounts have provided a rich resource in accessing the issues which affected failure during the initial stages of the war. Of the many collections reviewed, two in particular have been highly invaluable in providing insight into the period between 1754 and 1758, those of Sir John St Clair and Colonel Israel Williams. Both St Clair’s and Williams’s correspondence are complete for this period, and more importantly, provide contrasting views, as one is a British officer and the other a Massachusetts colonial. Such sources, when used with the official dispatches from the National Archives, have been particularly enlightening, contrary to Tony Hayter’s argument that ‘there is little else available to supplement the bald official version of events’.31 The varied sources consulted have provided an immense amount of primary material, which are used throughout this study in order to present a comprehensive explanation of British failure during the initial stages of the Seven Years’ War in North America. In doing so, it aims to dispel the belief that commanders-in-chief from Braddock to Loudoun were incompetent, and that the reasons for failure are much more complex than initially thought.

1

The Newcastle Ministry and the Origins of Failure in North America

Firm, as Mount Atlas, has great Holles stood, Anxious for Britain’s, and for his Sovereign’s good. When Brunswick’s line succeeded to the crown, Who like young Pelham, awed the mobbing town, And kept the Jacobitish Hydra down? Shall, now vile slander dare to point a dart At old Newcastle’s well-tried loyal heart? As well might fame report our glorious King Gave shameful orders to retiring Byng. Charles Jones, 2 August 17561 Among studies of the initial stages of the Seven Years’ War in North America, British failure at the ministerial level has been largely attributed to Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke of Newcastle. Branded as a fool, he has suffered from the infamous reputation of being both incompetent and ill-versed in American affairs.2 Among contemporary opinions, as displayed in Charles Jones’s poem written after the fall of Minorca to the French in 1756, many looked unfairly upon Newcastle and personally blamed him for Britain’s military misfortunes. Unfortunately for Newcastle, this view also continued among historians, leading some to argue that he was more interested in sending pineapple trees to Madame de Pompadour rather than focusing on the unfolding crisis in North America.3 Such an interpretation, however, does not take into consideration that Newcastle’s communications with Pompadour, as well as the exchange of

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

gifts and letters, were part of a diplomatic effort to maintain peaceful relations between the two countries.4 Although both contemporaries and historians have presented valid arguments against Newcastle, the Duke confided in a letter to a friend that in regard to ‘the conduct of the war by sea and land … there can be no greater injustice than to blame me or to make me responsible for either’.5 In writing this letter, Newcastle proclaimed his innocence. Although he was partially accountable for the decisions which the ministry made in planning the war, he is not completely to blame for its initial failure. The reason the Newcastle ministry’s policy failed in North America was due to its dependence upon the orchestration of a short-term war. At first, the duty of implementing this policy was placed upon the colonials, who were in no condition to undertake the task. When it was obvious that the policy was a failure, the original plan was altered and its execution was shifted to include additional support from Britain while maintaining its distinction of being primarily a colonial affair. As a result, commanders-in-chief received substantial powers to achieve this end. Although bolstered with professional troops, adequate support for advancing through the wilderness and a formidable armament, this alteration failed due to the enormous amount of responsibility invested upon the commander-in-chief. Not until 1758, when secretary of state, William Pitt, finally orchestrated changes were the duties of the post lessened, allowing the commander-in-chief at the time, Amherst, to focus his energies on conducting the war.

Initial preparations Since the end of the War of the Austrian Succession in 1748, Britain was determined to avoid a reopening of hostilities with France. Having viewed the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle as merely a temporary ceasefire, Newcastle personally undertook and supervised the development of what he referred to as his ‘system’ of alliances, which was an attempt to isolate France as well as detach her from her most powerful allies, Prussia and Spain. With these alliances in place, it was hoped that they would prevent France from starting another general war.6 In addition, it was also expected that this plan would provide protection for the Electorate of Hanover, a major concern for George II. Newcastle believed that the outbreak of a Continental war was impossible as Austria, the Republic and later Prussia, were expected ‘to come to the King’s assistance’ should the French attack Hanover.7

Newcastle Ministry and Failure in North America

11

Although the alliances had the potential to preserve peace, the system could only be sustained so long as none of the Continental powers involved became belligerent. Unfortunately for Britain, Austria, supposedly its most intimate ally, did not wish to maintain the peace. When hostilities commenced between Britain and France in 1754, Austria, still enraged over the loss of Silesia during the previous war, desired an opportunity to declare war on France’s ally, Prussia, in order to regain its lost province.8 Such an action was contrary to British interest as it was believed the greatest French threat was poised at North America. When the Austrian alliance collapsed in 1756, and the Diplomatic Revolution transpired, aligning Britain and Prussia against France and Austria, Newcastle remarked of the Austrians, ‘they were determined to abandon us unless we fought for Silesia, when we should be fighting for America’.9 Until that time, Newcastle based his decisions about North America on his Continental system, which resulted in the ministry’s plans for a short-term war limited to the colonies. At the centre of this policy was the decision that Britain should not appear the aggressor. Britain and Hanover were supposedly protected by Newcastle’s system, and under the circumstances, it was not in Britain’s best interest to issue a formal declaration of war. As Newcastle summarized, ‘no advantage would arise from it and many inconveniences might possibly attend it, particularly with regard to our allies and the obligation they are under to come to the King’s assistance’.10 Consequently, ministerial policy for evicting the French from the Ohio was extremely weak, and the onus of enforcing it fell upon the colonials. In accomplishing this task, great responsibility was placed upon the colonial governors. Robert D’Arcy, Earl of Holdernesse and secretary of state, dispatched a circular letter to the governors in North America, instructing them ‘to resist any hostile attempts that may be made upon any parts of His Majesty’s Dominions’. Holdernesse further directed that if any trespassers were discovered on British territory, the governors were to demand their departure. If they refused, the governors were then authorized to ‘repell force by force’.11 Lieutenant Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia, however, received special instructions: You have now his Majesty’s orders for erecting forts within the King’s own territory. If you are interrupted therein, those who presume to prevent you from putting into execution an order, which his Majesty has an undoubted, (nay hitherto an undisputed) right to give, are the aggressors and commit an hostile act. And this is one case in which you are authorized to repel, force by force. Another is, if you shall find persons not subjects to His Majesty nor acting under his royal commission, presuming to erect fortresses upon the King’s

12

The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758 land, and shall not upon your requiring them to desist from such proceedings, immediately forbear the continuance of them, the preserving in such unlawful act, in disobedience of the requisition made by the King’s authority, is an hostility and you are required by your instructions to enforce by arms, (if necessary) a compliance with your summons.12

As Virginia claimed the Ohio Valley, the duty of expelling the French belonged to Dinwiddie and the Virginians. By specifically defining an act of aggression on the part of the French, Holdernesse explained on what terms Dinwiddie was to initiate the ministry’s policy for a short-term war. Under the conditions outlined by Holdernesse, a hostility had already occurred. All that was required of Dinwiddie was to dispatch an emissary to the French demanding that they depart and at the same time begin preparations to attack if they refused. In anticipation of the Ohio offensive, the board of ordinance also received orders to supply Dinwiddie with thirty cannon.13 Clearly explaining how France would be portrayed as the aggressor, Holdernesse set the initial stages of the war into motion. Although the ministry had taken minor military precautions for the security of North America, tension between London and Versailles continued to escalate. A frustrated Newcastle remarked to Sir Benjamin Keene, ‘[The French] presume so much upon our desire of peace, and resolution to avoid war, in all events, that they think, they may now safely encroach upon us, every where; in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America; without any ill consequences from it.’14 Ultimately, Newcastle believed that France assumed it could assert its claims in North America without fear of retaliation. Such a conviction was not unreasonable, as the French not only persisted in their encroachments upon the Ohio and Acadia, but also in New York and New England.15 With reports simultaneously arriving at the ministry, informing them of intrusions on multiple fronts, the situation appeared increasingly grim. Newcastle feared that the French would ‘confine our great, valuable, and extensive dominions, in North America to a bare Liziere of country towards the sea’.16 Such concern was not irrational as the French dispatched Captain Céleron de Blainville in 1749 along with a force of 265 men to reassert France’s claim over the Ohio region by burying lead plates.17 As the situation worsened, Newcastle declared, ‘The Colonies must not be abandoned, that our rights and possessions in North America must be maintained, and the French obliged to desist from their hostile attempts to dispossess us.’18 Newcastle understood that eventually Britain would recommence hostilities with France. While contemplating the prospects of a lasting peace, he lamented, ‘nothing would long preserve it’.19

Newcastle Ministry and Failure in North America

13

Newcastle’s pessimism proved true for the colonies. A state of war would erupt – the direct result of ministerial policy. Consequently, governors were invested with the authority to act against the French if a hostility, as defined by Holdernesse, occurred. In addition, the colonials were bolstered by arms and money to ensure the success of the ministry’s plans. Ultimately, this was to be a short-term operation to prevent both the outbreak of a war in Europe and the loss of Britain’s North American colonies.20 The initial preparations for this short-term war began when Holdernesse dispatched his circular letter to the governors in North America. Although London determined policy, it was the responsibility of the colonials to enforce it.

The failure of the colonials The implementation of the ministry’s policy for a short-term war was easier conceived than executed. Failure at this stage was largely the result of the ministry placing unrealistic goals on the colonials. The first phase of the ministry’s plan required a summons of the French to depart from the Ohio. Accordingly, Dinwiddie dispatched Major George Washington with a message for the French to withdraw to Canada.21 While delivering the message, as it was unlikely that the French would abandon their posts, Washington was further instructed to gather intelligence on French fortifications and military strength for the forthcoming campaign.22 When the French refused to adhere to Dinwiddie’s request, Washington was then ordered to begin the second phase of the ministry’s policy. Phase two called for the combined use of the Virginia Regiment and the independent companies of regulars stationed in the colonies. Both forces, however, were unfit for the task the ministry had placed upon them. The provincials were ‘as illy provided as can well be conceiv’d’ and the regulars comprised of men ‘who only do occasional duty’.23 In addition to the bad state of the men in the rank and file, there was a serious deficiency of arms among both the provincials and regulars. Compounding problems further, officers among the regulars were or had been absent for extended periods of time.24 Those who were present, however, were detrimental to the campaign as they generated discord by refusing to cooperate with the provincials and by establishing a separate command.25 Poorly equipped, disunited and comprised of men who did not make the best soldiers, it is unsurprising that Washington’s forces were defeated at Fort Necessity.

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

The failure of Washington’s expedition proved to the ministry that greater efforts were required in order to drive the French from the Ohio. Lessons had been learned from the defeat, and the problems which had hampered the colonial enterprise were identified. Dinwiddie informed the Lords of Trade: I fear we shall not be able to dislodge the French from the Fort without assistance from B[ritain]. This Dom’n has always been in Peace and not accustom’d to War, therefore, their Magazines are Quite empty, no Bombs, Coehorns, or Granade Shells, without them [we] cannot carry on a Siege against a Fort; no Ingineer in this Co’t’y, w’ch is much wanted, and in my private Opinion, with’t a regime’s or two from Home, and proper Supplies of the above Articles, we shall not be able to force them from His M’y’s Fort and Lands. And, as the Money granted by our Assembly is now near expended, I have by Proclamat’n called them to meet the 22d of next Mo., w’n I hope to prevail with them for a further supply; but this, if obtain’d, will be of little Service if the other Colonies do not join in a mutual Supply, and then, with’t assistance of Forces, & c., from Home, I shall fear [want of] Success, as I think it will not be proper to march out any Forces, till we can send such a Number as may be able to defeat them.26

As indicated by Dinwiddie, additional supplies, the assistance of engineers, the dispatch of regulars from Britain and the development of a colonial union were essential to success. Certainly, the situation required direct intervention from Britain, much in the same manner as the 1711 Walker Expedition, which comprised of fourteen ships of the line, thirty-one transports and 5,300 regulars.27 However, unlike the Walker Expedition, more was required in 1754, particularly the appointment of a commander-in-chief. Perhaps Dinwiddie’s most influential suggestion to the ministry was his intimation of the necessity of a commander-in-chief. Dinwiddie informed secretary at war, Henry Fox: The officers of these Ind’t Compa’s refuse doing duty with, or receiving orders from the Officers appointed by me; they are not Militia, but properly enlisted, and paid out of His M’y’s revenues rais’d in this Colony. There can be but one Com’d’r in Chief. A mixt Com’d may hurt any Expedit’n, and I think the Officers of the Independ’t Compa’s will submit to your Determinat’n on this Affair, w’ch I hope you will furnish me with as soon as possible. I have wrote to the Sec’ry of State for one or two regimts for this Exped’n, for our neighboring Colonies are very backw’d; nay, have actually refus’d their Assist’ce.28

Fox was an intimate friend of William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, who was also Captain General of the British Army. By making such a recommendation

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to Fox, Dinwiddie was clearly indirectly influencing Cumberland and military policy.29 Indeed, upon receiving word of Washington’s failure at the Ohio, Cumberland was in favour of immediate military action. Dinwiddie, by informing Fox, who in turn informed Cumberland, did much to influence the expansion of Britain’s North American policy. After being approached for advice in September 1754, Cumberland quickly assumed an active role in the ministry’s plans. He understood that Britain’s military forces were unfit for a Continental war and as a result advocated a swift campaign both on land and at sea.30 Washington’s campaign was a failure of the traditional colonial policy of salutary neglect. With the flaws of the original Newcastle plan exposed by Dinwiddie, the ministry attempted to execute policy on a much grander scale. Cumberland and Fox favoured such action, and accordingly, aid arrived from Britain on a scale similar to that of the Walker Expedition.31 However, unlike the efforts made in 1711, those of 1755 were even more ambitious.

The broadening war effort As proven by Washington’s failure, the ministry’s plans for North American policy required substantial change. This was necessary if the central aspect of policy continued to depend upon the execution of a short-term war. Although such reforms were appropriate, the decision to send a significantly large military force to North America carried a major disadvantage as it unofficially recognized a state of war.32 Consequently, the ministry’s attempt to reorganize its North American policy was far more aggressive and grandiose than its previous plan. Strategy for a short-term war remained untouched, and due to increased efforts, it was believed that the conflict would be resolved quickly. The French had for their defence a mixed force of Canadians, Amerindians and a small number of regulars.33 It was reasoned they could not withstand the massive British assault which comprised of two regiments of regulars from Ireland, a trained corps of engineers, a formidable supply of war materiel and a sizable fleet. In addition, the 50th and 51st Regiments, which had served in North America during King George’s War, were ordered to be reactivated.34 Clearly, by mobilizing such a force, the ministry felt that a quick victory was ensured. The decision to send regular troops to North America played a key role in the implementation of the ministry’s newly altered policy. After Washington’s defeat, Dinwiddie requested that the ministry dispatch two regiments of regulars from Britain for service in North America to assist in expelling the French. Such

16

The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

a change in policy was crucial to Britain’s war effort. Although regulars were theoretically stationed in North America, the independent companies were not the best in quality, as proven by their conduct under Washington.35 Initially, the ministry considered dispatching companies of Highlanders to the colonies. However, the idea was quickly deemed impractical and the ministry decided to send two regiments from the Irish Establishment instead, both numbering 310 men and staffed with an excess of officers.36 Sir Thomas Robinson believed that not only would it be easier to recruit men in the colonies, but that ‘the officers of the two Irish regiments … would be sufficient with their men to discipline any new recruits’. Sending the Highlanders, he reasoned, ‘would be but losing the corps, were the men to remain in America, and the raising new independent companies of Highlanders would be so much loss of time’.37 The Irish regiments appeared to be the more practical choice, and orders were issued for them to be recruited to a strength of 700 and later 1,000 men each once they arrived in the colonies.38 Another major advantage of using the Irish regiments was that there would be fewer men to transport and less to fall victim to disease during the crossing of the Atlantic. Such a plan appeared advantageous in theory, as it placed an effective professional military force in North America for immediate use against the French. In addition to the regulars, the ministry also decided to dispatch engineers to assist the army. Engineers were extremely vital to Britain’s war effort as they built many roads through the American wilderness, designed and constructed proper fortifications, such as Fort William Henry, and assisted in sieges such as those conducted at Louisbourg in 1758 and Québec in 1759. Heeding Dinwiddie’s advice again, the ministry sent a total of five engineers to North America under the command of Chief Engineer, James Montrésor ‘to make fair and exact draughts of all Harbours & their soundings & accurate surveys of all Countries & Places you come to of Attacks, Trenches, Intrenchments, Batteries, Incampments, or any thing else wherein you may employ’d or concerned’.39 It is not surprising that after the defeat at the Monongahela, Montrésor, along with his son, John, went on to carry out additional services at Forts Edward and William Henry, Louisbourg and Québec.40 This alteration in policy, which remained in effect until the colonies declared their independence from Britain, marked a significant change. Not only were soldiers and arms necessary but also proper new fortifications and roads serving vital lines of communication. To ensure the success of the campaign, an impressive assortment of supplies were gathered for the expedition. The ministry provided all the items that Dinwiddie requested and also some which he did not. Listed among the

Newcastle Ministry and Failure in North America

17

numerous stores were ten cannon, fifteen brass mortars, four howitzers, a total of 3,400 muskets complete with bayonets, 1,500 empty mortar shells, 1,000 hand grenades, 560 barrels of gunpowder and almost 3,000 swords.41 Special attention must be given to the especially large number of swords. Although swords were generally considered a secondary weapon and sometimes an encumbrance, their use was not abandoned in North America. On arriving at Winchester, Sir Peter Halkett discovered some soldiers only armed with swords.42 Likewise, Braddock’s Rangers were equipped with ‘a Short Carbin, Case of pistols and Cutting Sword’.43 More surprisingly, even the Amerindians were at times armed with the deadly blades.44 On one occasion, Sir William Johnson received 1,000 swords to distribute as gifts.45 Although swords were later abandoned in favour of the tomahawk, the dispatch of such a large number with the expedition was clearly an attempt to better arm the soldiers.46 In addition to men and supplies, the ministry’s altered strategy for expelling the French was extremely ambitious. Calling for simultaneous assaults against Forts Duquesne, Niagara, Crown Point and Beauséjour, a general state of war could only be avoided if the attacks were successful and delivered a crippling blow to France. When analysing the redevelopment of the ministry’s policy, it was at this time that failure began. From the initial outbreak of hostilities, Cumberland had favoured aggressive measures.47 For this reason, Newcastle refused to confer with Cumberland until he had no alternative.48 Once Cumberland was consulted, Newcastle no longer maintained control over North American policy and was transformed into a helpless observer.49 In addition to Cumberland, Fox played a key role in forcing policy. When Newcastle was reluctant to commit to Cumberland’s grandiose scheme, Fox forced the issue by preventing the division of the expeditionary force and also by publicly announcing the army’s departure to North America in The Gazette.50 Although Fox’s announcement compelled Newcastle to yield to Cumberland, it also ensured that the French would take countermeasures of their own. Consequently, Fox’s actions dictated further expansion in North American policy as a naval strategy was now necessary. Naval planning was primarily focused on preventing the arrival of French reinforcements in Canada. In order to achieve this aim, a sufficiently large fleet was needed to intercept the French transports bound for North America. On 17 April, orders were issued to Vice Admiral Edward Boscawen to ‘seize and secure’ any French ship carrying ‘troops or warlike stores’.51 Originally, Boscawen’s squadron was to consist of seven ships of the line; however, it was soon decided to add ‘three more ships of the line, and a frigate of fifty guns’.52 Five days later, the ministry placed an additional ship of the line under his command.53 Still

18

The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

unsatisfied with the strength of Boscawen’s forces, the ministry then issued orders to Rear Admiral Francis Holburne to join Boscawen with his entire squadron.54 Upon his arrival in North America, Boscawen was to be joined by another squadron under the command of Commodore Augustus Keppel.55 Once united in North American waters, Boscawen’s fleet would pose a formidable threat to the French transports, of which only four were fully armed.56 By seizing the reinforcements for the French army in Canada, it was believed that the army’s overland campaign could still be won before France was even aware that its ships had been captured during a time of peace. The ministry had every reason to expect that with both a strong army and navy in the field, the success of its policy would be assured. Braddock’s soldiers arrived in North America ‘without the loss of one single man, except one drowned’, and Boscawen’s formidable fleet was en route to the Gulf of St Lawrence.57 As the military situation appeared to favour the British, Newcastle optimistically remarked, ‘we are at present superior in North America’.58 Upon discovering that the French dispatched reinforcements for Canada after Boscawen’s fleet had already sailed, a delighted Newcastle confided to Holdernesse, ‘every thing has happened not only, as we imagined it would, but, as we could have wished’. Believing that Boscawen would be able to attack before the French could rendezvous at Louisbourg, Newcastle further added, ‘If the eight ships armies en guerre should return to Brest, after they have escorted the transports to a certain distance; those transports must fall an immediate sacrifice to the King’s Fleet in America.’59 Everything appeared to be going according to the ministry’s plan. If Boscawen arrived in North America ahead of the French fleet, he would be able to organize his command and prepare a trap to capture the French transports as they sailed towards Louisbourg. In addition, if the French warships escorted the transports for only a portion of the voyage and returned to Brest, Boscawen would have an advantage. With a superior naval force guarding the St Lawrence, the French faced a difficult task in reinforcing Canada. The ministry’s policy appeared to have immense potential for success. Newcastle hopefully remarked, ‘If it should please God to give His Majesty’s Fleet such a signal victory over the French in North America; as may at once give a great blow to their naval force; that may discourage them, and I hope will from making war at all; and dispose them to reasonable, and proper conditions of peace in North America.’60 Although Newcastle was confident that the new policy would succeed, there were lingering doubts. Reflecting on the possibility of another failure, Newcastle confided to Holdernesse, ‘if Braddock or Boscawen are beat, I must answer for it, who had no hand in

Newcastle Ministry and Failure in North America

19

appointing either of them but extremely approving the latter’.61 The words proved to be a foreboding omen.

Why did the ministry’s policy fail? When news of Braddock and Boscawen’s failure reached London, Newcastle’s fears had come true. The war effort plunged into chaos as it became obvious that hostilities would commence on the Continent. Britain itself was threatened with the possibility of invasion, and even the Jacobites, although a shadow of their former selves, were effectively used by the French to terrify the ministry.62 Consequently, reinforcements for operations in North America were unavailable at this time due to the necessity of maintaining the British army for homeland defence. In addition, when it became evident that the army was unable to fulfil this task due to numerical deficiencies, the ministry was forced to rely upon the protection of Hessian and Hanoverian soldiers.63 As a result, the defence of Britain and her possessions on the Continent became a priority, and North American policy was altered very little until 1758. Disgusted with the state of affairs, Cumberland described the proceedings of the ministry as ‘An infamous council of war infected with terrors and void of obedience.’64 Reflecting upon the ministry’s failure after its fall in 1756, Hardwicke scribbled some notes entitled ‘The Weak Points of Conduct in ye Duke of N’s Administration since Mr. Pelham’s Death.’ Among the many reasons Hardwicke attributed failure were the mismanagement of the House of Commons, the exclusion of William Pitt, the lack of information on the situation in North America and that no attempts were made to unite the colonies before the outbreak of hostilities.65 Hardwicke’s observations are partially correct. The exclusion of Pitt, in general, was unfortunate. Had he been included in the development of policy, efforts against the French in 1755 would have been more ambitious. Indeed, when presented with the Cumberland Plan, Pitt believed that further measures were required in order to ensure success.66 In addition, as Pitt felt excluded by the ministry, he commenced a direct attack against it in the Commons.67 This was extremely dangerous, as a united opposition during the opening of Parliament had the potential to overthrow the ministry.68 It was for this reason that Hardwicke attributed failure to ‘not settling the Management of the H of C. in able hands, but having a Notion, that it could be conducted without a Minister at the head of it’.69 Without control of the Commons, Pitt was free to threaten

20

The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

and severely harm the ministry. As a result, by excluding Pitt, the ministry had brought failure upon itself. Regarding North America, the reasons for failure were more complicated. Although Hardwicke’s points are valid, the key reason for British failure fell upon the policy regarding the commander-in-chief assigned to North America. Cumberland advocated the appointment of a viceroy, styled after the Spanish, in order to unify the colonies.70 By 1756, Cumberland succeeded in this endeavour with the appointment of his protégé, John Campbell, Earl of Loudoun.71 When Loudoun received his official commission as commander-in-chief, it stated: We reposing especial trust and confidence in your prudence courage and loyalty HAVE constituted and appointed and by these presents do constitute and appoint you to be General and Commander in Chief of all and singular our Forces employed or to be employed in North America, TO HAVE HOLD EXERCISE and ENJOY the said office during Our pleasure together with all the powers authorities Rights and Privileges thereunto belonging SUBJECT however to such restrictions Limitations and Instructions as We have Given or shall hereafter give under Our Royal Sign Manual AND We do hereby charge and require all the Governors Lieutenant Governors Deputy Governors and Presidents of Council of Our respective Colonies and Provinces of North America and all other Officers Civil or Military within the same to be aiding and assisting to you in the exercise of this command And in case the said John Earl of Loudoun should by death or in any other manner be disabled from exercising the said command Our Will and Pleasure is that the same with all authorities rights and privileges contained in this Our Commission should devolve on Our Major General Abercrombie or on such other officer bearing Our Commission as shall be next in Rank to the said Major General Abercrombie.72

As indicated by the commission, such careful wording by the ministry provided Loudoun with the opportunity to administer his post according to what he assumed to be within the parameters of his power. Although Loudoun was the only commander-in-chief empowered with such extensive authority, commanders-in-chief from Braddock to Loudoun found themselves overwhelmed with similar responsibilities. The appointment of a commander-in-chief was necessary in order to conduct the war. As proven by Washington’s expedition and failure at Fort Necessity, a centralized command was essential in order to unify both regulars and colonials. What had transpired between Washington and Captain James McKay of the regulars could not continue.73 The presence of a commander-in-chief brought order to this matter, but unfortunately during the initial stages of the war, colonial

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21

field officers were reduced to serving as youngest captains and subalterns as a result of ministerial policy.74 Detrimental to the war effort, this decision was not reformed until 1758, when Pitt informed the governors that ‘all Officers of the Provincial Forces, as high as Colonels inclusive, are to have Rank, according to their several respective Commissions, in like Manner, as is already given, by His Majesty’s Regulations, to the Captains of Provincial Troops in America’.75 Until that time, the disunity caused by rank would be one of many problems commanders-in-chief faced as they attempted to halt the French. As exemplified by the issue concerning rank, ministerial policy made the job of commander-in-chief quite cumbersome. A commander-in-chief could become easily distracted from his military duties, for example, by fighting colonial governors and their assemblies for funds and supplies, negotiating Amerindian affairs and maintaining a correspondence with numerous individuals.76 When the Newcastle ministry dispatched the very first set of official instructions to Braddock, it included many of these responsibilities which would torment every successive commander-in-chief until 1758, the year Pitt assumed a number of them himself. Braddock’s experience as commander-in-chief was fraught with many difficulties as a result of policy. His worst was that the ministry placed great dependence upon the colonies to support the war effort. According to instructions, everything from men to provisions was to be supplied by them and organized for his arrival by the Deputy Quartermaster General, Sir John St Clair.77 This system of supply proved inadequate from the beginning, and soon after his arrival in Virginia, Braddock was greeted by an extremely frustrated St Clair.78 Additionally, Braddock was ordered to maintain a correspondence with his counterpart at sea, Commodore Augustus Keppel, the colonial governors and the ministry. Braddock also found himself responsible for conducting Amerindian affairs, combating colonial smuggling and promoting a colonial union along with the establishment of a common fund, which was expected to finance the expedition.79 Ultimately, confronted with numerous obstacles, Braddock focused his primary attention on merely arriving at the Ohio. Amid the chaos which he encountered in carrying out his duties as commander-in-chief, Braddock believed that his army only needed to appear before Fort Duquesne in order to defeat the French. This is clearly supported by three separate accounts from the campaign. During the march towards the fort, a seaman of the detachment dispatched by Keppel to assist Braddock recorded in his journal on 20 May that ‘An Indian came in 6 days from the French Fort, and assured us they have only 50 men in the Fort, however they

22

The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

expected 900 more soon, yet they purpose blowing it up whenever the Army Appears. As this Indian was one of the Delawars, who never were our Friends he was suspected to be a Rogue.’80 Although the intelligence had come from an unreliable source, by July it was a general belief that the French would destroy the fort upon Braddock’s arrival. Captain Robert Orme recorded that at a council of war held on 3 July ‘it was conjectured they [the French] had not many Indians or great strength at the Fort, as they had already permitted us to make many passes which might have been defended by very few men’.81 This also explains why on 9 July, Braddock had not taken full precautionary measures. As summarized by an unknown officer that day, ‘The General now thinking ye dangerous passes were over did not suffer ye advanced party to proceed any farther than ye distance of a few Yards from the main body.’82 Believing the French to be weak, as they did not attack his forces at vulnerable moments, Braddock assumed they would blow up the fortress and flee at his appearance. Preoccupied with other responsibilities, such as the carpenters constructing the road, it is easy to understand why Braddock focused primarily on the arrival of his forces before the fort. Ultimately, Braddock was distracted by the numerous duties the ministry placed upon him and failed as a result. After the battle was over, it was noted that ‘The 2 Companies of the Grenadiers and Carpenters sufferd most.’83 At the time of the attack, the carpenters were busily employed by Braddock in constructing the final length of road towards Fort Duquesne. After Braddock, the responsibilities of the commander-in-chief remained unchanged. Upon assuming his command, Governor William Shirley encountered the same problems as Braddock. Unlike Braddock, however, Shirley primarily focused on campaigning. On the Great Lakes alone, Shirley planned operations against many outposts including Forts Frontenac, La Galette and Niagara. In addition, he also devised attacks against Fort Duquesne and Crown Point, as well as raids into Canada. Such ambitious planning is unsurprising, as Shirley was largely responsible for Britain’s conquest and capture of Louisbourg during the previous war.84 Unfortunately, as Shirley was principally engaged in preparing military expeditions, he delegated many tasks to others, even the writing of letters.85 One written to Colonel Israel Williams stated, ‘Governor Shirley has the favour of your letter dated the 4th of this Instant which he read but is so extreme busy has not time to write to you himself.’86 Despite Shirley’s efforts, none of the operations materialized, and the campaign of 1756 is not remembered for a massive offensive against French positions on the Great Lakes, but for the fall of Oswego instead.87

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In 1756, changes introduced by Cumberland increased the responsibilities of the commander-in-chief considerably. Upon the appointment of Loudoun, the position was that of a viceroy. To consolidate power further, Loudoun was also appointed Governor of Virginia to grant him equal rank in his dealings among the colonial governors.88 At the same time, Loudoun also had other duties concerning the administration of the 30th and 60th Regiments.89 During a visit to New York, Benjamin Franklin had the opportunity to observe Loudoun at work, of which he remarked, ‘whoever waited on him found him always at his desk, pen in hand, and concluded he must needs write abundantly’.90 As a result of the numerous burdens placed upon him, much like his predecessors, Loudoun too was overwhelmed. While the commander-in-chief was busy taking part in the ill-fated attempt against Louisbourg, Colonel Israel Williams understood his difficult situation. Noting the dangerous exposure of the frontier and the possibility of the expedition’s failure, he commented, ‘Certainly it ought to be ye care of the ministry to take all Suitable precaution for ye Safety of the Colonys, & of his Safe retreat, Should not Success attend him.’91 As indicated by Williams, Loudoun required assistance from the ministry, which needed to be more involved in supporting the war effort. Until such a change was made, commanders-in-chief would continue to encounter immense difficulty in conducting the war. Through no fault of his own, Loudoun unfortunately bore the brunt of a mean spirited joke, in which it was said, ‘he is like St. George on the signs, always on horseback, and never rides on’.92 Much like Braddock and Shirley, Loudoun placed great effort into one aspect of his command, the establishment of a colonial union. Throughout the duration of his tenure as commander-in-chief, Loudoun met with both the colonial governors and assembly members in an attempt to secure support for the war effort.93 Travelling to each assembly eventually became such a chaotic task that prior to the 1757 campaign, Loudoun requested that the colonial governments send representatives to meet with him in Manhattan.94 Exerting great effort, Loudoun’s goal of a colonial union was almost achieved. However, when he was recalled in 1758, this system immediately ceased only to be replaced by one based on requisition.95 While this change in policy had a significant impact on the course of the war, it was not new to the colonies and was originally used during the previous war in the campaign against Louisbourg. In 1745, North American policy for the war effort was not the result of ministerial planning but had come into existence due to relations between Shirley and Newcastle. Prior to the organization of the expedition, Shirley had drawn unauthorized bills on the British Treasury in order to send

24

The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

reinforcements to protect Nova Scotia, which was in grave danger of being overrun by the French. As Shirley was a protégé of Newcastle, the ministry honoured the expenditures for the relief force, and Shirley received praise for his actions. Soon after, Shirley received intelligence on the weakness of Louisbourg from recently released prisoners who were held at the citadel after being captured during the French attack against Canso. Wasting no time, Shirley immediately began pressing the Assembly for an attack against the fortress without any formal authorization from London. As Newcastle and his brother, Henry Pelham, had reimbursed Massachusetts for its efforts in Nova Scotia, Shirley promised the Assembly that he would once again seek repayment from the ministry for the costs of the expedition. Indefatigable in his efforts, Shirley enlisted the support of neighbouring colonies under the same assurances. However, following the capture of Louisbourg, the ministry did not dispense full reimbursements. Despite this shortcoming, the money was welcomed in Massachusetts, as the colony faced bankruptcy without it.96 Although the Newcastle ministry had previous experience in implementing successful policy in North America, it did not attempt to conduct the war in the same manner as it had done in 1745. This was primarily due to the influence of Cumberland, who pressed for a colonial union under the direction of a viceroy, rather than a system of requisition. However, it was not a standard policy to promote such a union, and the ministry was only making this attempt at unification due to the distress of Virginia and the inactivity of the other colonies to come to its assistance.97 However, while Cumberland favoured a strong colonial union, others believed that damage might be done to the prerogative. Indeed, Newcastle feared ‘ill consequences to be apprehended from uniting too closely the northern colonies with each other’.98 Ultimately, under such circumstances, it appeared more appropriate to unite the colonies under a viceroy, which would ensure colonial dependence on Britain.99 Returning to Newcastle’s profession of innocence at the beginning of this chapter, failure cannot be attributed to him alone. If blame can be accredited, it is to Cumberland, who was the principal architect of the instructions given to Braddock, Shirley and Loudoun.100 The ministry’s initial policy in 1754 had called for a short-term war waged by poorly organized colonials who lacked a centralized military command. When the deficiencies of this policy became evident, changes were made, however the wrong ones. Instead of strong direct support from Britain, a commander-in-chief was dispatched, and the war remained primarily the charge of colonials under his supervision.

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Ultimately, this policy failed due to the unrealistic burdens placed upon the commander-in-chief. Hampered with numerous responsibilities, the commander-in-chief could not focus his attention to any one particular issue, which led to nothing being accomplished. This explains why contemporaries compared Loudoun to St George on a sign, ‘always on horseback, and never rides on’.101 Using symbolism, Loudoun was ‘on horseback’ and prepared to engage the French, but he could not ‘ride on’ because of the numerous duties placed upon him. Although it can be argued that Pitt could have done more for Loudoun in 1757, Pitt was not fully in command of his first government, and the Interministerium did little to help ease the situation.102 As General John Forbes summarized, ‘the Defference and dissentions of our ministry, are terrible things for any Expedition’.103 However, upon being firmly re-established later that year, Pitt and his fellow ministers resolved to break the Convention of Klosterzeven and pursue the next campaign season vigorously.104 No doubt, the need for a conquest to exchange for an evacuation of Hanover led to the assault against Louisbourg in 1758. As it was not obvious at the time that Cape Breton Island would be retained, the fortress was demolished so that if it were exchanged once again, France would receive only ruins.105 For all the abuse heaped upon them, Braddock, Shirley and Loudoun unfairly suffered injurious reputations for attempting to carry out the ministry’s orders. Failure at the ministerial level can therefore be placed upon the manner in which the post of commander-in-chief was created by the Newcastle ministry. As a result, the war effort proceeded at a sluggish rate until 1758, when the PittNewcastle ministry reintroduced the requisition system, which rapidly unified the colonies according to another model. In addition, under the new system, Pitt relieved the commander-in-chief from the responsibility of corresponding with colonial governors and wrote to them himself, requesting men and other forms of aid. Under these circumstances, Pitt’s role was merely that of a spokesman for the ministry and an assistant to the commander-in-chief. However, by taking responsibility for these tasks, Pitt allowed the commander-in-chief the opportunity to focus his primary attention to conducting the war. Until that time, commanders-in-chief faced troublesome issues, each of which contained complicated problems of their own.

2

Legislative Turmoil: Governors, Assemblies and the Struggle for Colonial Support

The Province of Virginia have given 40,000£ for the Support of 1,000 men the Comand of which is give to Colo. Washington, the other Provinces of Maryland and Pensylvania seem little inclinable to do anything for their own security. I make no doubt but they will soon be awaken’d out of their Lethargy by the Incursions of the French and Indians which they will Certainly make upon the back settlements. Sir John St Clair to the Earl of Hyndford, 3 September 17551 When Britain dispatched its armed forces to North America, administrators in Whitehall placed great expectations upon the colonies to support them. Prior to his departure for Virginia, Braddock was issued orders specifically stating that colonial support was essential to the war effort. According to the ministry’s plans, the colonists were not only expected to assist his expedition logistically, but also to unite militarily against their common enemy, France.2 Unfortunately, such assistance was not readily forthcoming, and the colonists proved difficult allies. As indicated by St Clair’s remarks to Hyndford, they contributed very little, much to their own peril. Although both Braddock and St Clair have been maligned as being haughty and ill-tempered, with a complete disregard for colonials, such arguments do not take into consideration how the colonists frustrated British strategy and assisted the French in prolonging the conflict.3 While British and French military forces fought for the possession of North America, the governors and assemblies were equally engaged in a parallel struggle, which had the potential to either aid or hinder the British army. As quarrels overwhelmed the colonial governments and generated disunity, the French benefited immensely and were free to maintain an offensive campaign.4 While governors and assemblies quarrelled, successive commanders-inchief found their plans thwarted as they awaited aid from the colonies, which

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

sometimes never materialized. By refusing to unite in support of Britain, the colonials provided France with a major advantage.

Colonial governors and the support of the war effort Throughout the duration of the war, governors, or their acting subordinates, played a crucial role in supporting British military strategy. Although they could prove dilatory to the service at times by surrendering themselves to colonial interests or by interfering militarily with operational plans, the governors were nonetheless vital to the war effort.5 Results were varied due to the different personalities of the governors, which ranged from the patriotic who exerted themselves to the utmost of their ability, to those who expressed very little desire to assist at all.6 When Colonel John Bradstreet sought to replace the ineffectual Governor Jonathan Belcher of New Jersey, Bradstreet clearly understood the powerful influence of a governor as he remarked, ‘The principal reason I have for desiring it is from the Rank his Majesty has thought proper to give Governors when they Act with the Army as it will put me in a way of being infinitely of more use against the Kings Enemies than I am to be otherwise by heading the Forces rais’d by that Coloney.’7 For the purposes of the army, the King’s enemies were the colonial assemblies who would not permit the governors to provide aid as they controlled the power of the purse. In this capacity, the colonial assemblies quarrelled with the governors over requests for supplies, money and men for the support of the military. Until 1757, the governors were at the forefront of this struggle, and those who did confront their assemblies assisted the commanderin-chief to the best of their ability. In gathering necessary supplies for the army, colonial governors played a crucial role during the early stages of the war. Braddock clearly understood their importance in this capacity, as well as the potential problems which might arise, when he transmitted the following in his initial report to Sir Thomas Robinson: Immediately after my Arrival, I dispatched Letters to the several Governors upon the Continent desiring ‘em to use their best Endeavours in their respective Governments for obtaining Levies of Men and Supplies of Money, conformable to the Orders they had received from His Maty, recommending to each of them at the same time, to lay an Embargo upon the Exportation of Provisions, in order to prevent Supplies being sent to the Enemy; which has already been done in this Province by Govr: Dinwiddie. In obedience to His Majesty’s Instructions

Legislative Turmoil

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to me, I likewise recommended to ‘em to constitute one common Stock of the Money granted in the several Colonies, to serve as a Provisional Fund for the general Service of the Expedition, and that it might be subject to my orders, offering to be accountable to each of ‘em for my Employment of it. Tho’ such a Method would greatly facilitate the Service I am engaged in, & promote the Success of it, I almost despair of their complying with it, from the Jealously of the People, & the Disunion of the Several Colonies, as well among themselves, as one with another. Indeed I am sorry to say, that in all appearance, I shall have much Difficulty in obtaining from ‘em, in their own way, such Assistance, as His Majesty expects & their general Interest requires.8

As Braddock understood, securing men and materiel from the colonies would not be an easy task. Without their support, the expedition to Fort Duquesne would be impossible. Braddock summarized, ‘With the Assistance required from the Colonies, I shall have good Hopes of answering his Majesty’s Expectations from me, by securing His Dominions, and the Possessions of His Subjects in these Parts; Without their Assistance it may not be in my Power.’9 To ensure that the expedition was supplied, Whitehall had dispatched orders earlier instructing the governors to assist Braddock, who was directed to apply to them for aid ‘upon all such Exigencies’. Bound to their orders from the ministry, the governors were the primary access to colonial support. In providing provisions for the army, the success of the governors in organizing them varied. Prior to the arrival of the first regular forces in North America, the governors were expected to gather them for the expedition. As early as 1754, the ministry requested ‘a sufficient Quantity of fresh Victuals, for the Use of Our Troops, at their Arrival’.10 This order, however, went unfulfilled, and Braddock was left to subsist his men on the ‘1,000 Barrels of Beef & 10 Tons of Butter, sent from England for a provisional Supply’.11 Although Braddock immediately ‘applied to Governor Sharpe … for Provision and Waggons’, none could be gathered by Maryland for the use of the army. Frustrated with the encounter, Captain Robert Orme remarked, ‘So little is the Authority of a Governor in that Province, that he afforded the General no Assistance; Upon which the General was obliged to send round the Country to buy Cattle for the Subsistance of the Troops.’12 Although Sharpe desired to assist Braddock, he was unable to do so and later informed St Clair, ‘Our Assembly is yet sitting, but I despair of persuading them to grant any supplies.’13 Pennsylvania proved a similar problem, as necessary aid requested from that province barely arrived in time for the army to advance.14 Even the enthusiastic Dinwiddie gloomily remarked on one occasion, ‘Our Assembly is

30

The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

full as backward in granting Supplies, as the people have been in assisting the Expedition; I know not what to do.’15 Despite the lack of cooperation from the colonial assemblies, governors did find ways to assist the military. In an attempt to bypass the obstinate Assembly of Pennsylvania, Braddock sought the personal assistance of Deputy Governor Robert Hunter Morris and the Secretary of Pennsylvania, Richard Peters. Fortunately for Braddock, Morris and Peters were successful in making a ‘a Contract in his Name for a Magazine of Provisions to be formed at Shippensburgh, sufficient to subsist Three Thousand Men for three Months, and to be Completed by the beginning of July’.16 Despite the failure of the majority of the governors to supply the army, Dinwiddie was particularly successful and was described by St Clair as having ‘been extremely active and diligent in gathering together all kinds of provisions’.17 Orme recounted Dinwiddie’s contributions: Mr. Dinwiddie laid before the General Contracts made for Eleven Hundred Head of Cattle, Eight Hundred of which were to be delivered in June and July, and three hundred in August, he said that he had also written to Governor Shirley, for a large Quantity of Salt Fish, that a great Deal of Flour was already at Fort Cumberland, and that the Assembly of Pensylvania had promised to deliver Flour, to the Amount of Five thousand Pounds of their Currency at the Mouth of Conegogee, in April, which was to be Carried up the Potomack to Fort Cumberland. He had also Ordered a great Quantity of Bacon to be made at the Fort.18

Although colonial assemblies could pose a hindrance, as indicated by the efforts of Dinwiddie and Morris, governors took it upon themselves to assist the military to the best of their own personal ability. Under these circumstances, however, aid was limited.19 What ultimately alleviated the issue of provisions was when news arrived in 1757, informing the assemblies that they would be financed by the Crown.20 Governors also encountered similar problems in their efforts to gather sufficient funds to finance the war. The initial orders dispatched with Braddock from Whitehall stated, ‘We have further directed Our said Governors to endeavour to prevail upon the Assemblies of their respective Provinces, to raise forthwith, as large a Sum as can be afforded, as their Contribution to a common Fund, to be employed provisionally, for the general Service in North America.’21 Although the governors received the instructions, such a fund proved difficult to establish. Soon after Braddock arrived, he immediately dispatched a circular letter to the colonial governors ‘recommending to them

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the constituting of a common Fund’. Upon meeting with them at a council held at Alexandria, Braddock encountered disappointment when he learned that ‘they had severally applied to their respective Assemblies to establish a common Fund, but could not prevail’. Virginia and South Carolina were the only exceptions, although the results were not encouraging. The Virginia assembly voted £20,000; however, it ‘was to be employed in the purchasing Provisions, and the Payment of their own Troops’. South Carolina emerged as the lone financier and contributed £4,000 directly to Braddock’s war chest. It was ‘the only Money raised by the Provinces, which ever passed through the General’s Hands’.22 Fortunately for Braddock, his secret instructions stipulated that if the colonists refused to cooperate, the expedition would be financed by the royal exchequer.23 Until the latter end of 1757, the colonies remained obligated to contribute to this common fund in support of the war and the governors continued their struggles to collect the required sums. Much in the same manner as provisions, Pitt made an alteration of policy in December of 1757, which considerably transformed the situation in North America. Pitt composed the following message, addressed to the governors: The Whole, therefore, that His Majesty expects and requires from the several Provinces, is, the Levying, Cloathing, and Pay of the Men; And, on these Heads also, that no Encouragement may be wanting to this great and salutary Attempt, The King is farther most Graciously pleased to permit me to acquaint You, that strong Recommendations will be made to Parliament in their Session next Year, to grant a proper Compensation for such Expences as above, according as the active Vigour and strenuous Efforts of the respective Provinces shall justly appear to merit.24

This change in policy had a tremendous effect as the commanders-in-chief were no longer dependent upon direct financial contributions from the colonies for the support of the war. In doing so, Pitt treated the colonists as allies, providing subsidies in return for military aid.25 Until Pitt’s change in policy, governors struggled to gather funds, which were ultimately insufficient to meet the demands of the army. Despite the obstinate behaviour of their assemblies, governors were able to enjoy some success in supporting the commander-in-chief through the use of their provincial forces. The governors were after all ‘Captains General and Commanders in Chief in their Own Provinces’ and in this capacity enjoyed some freedom from their assemblies in comparison with the struggles for funds

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

and provisions.26 The main factor which determined if colonial troops would be made available to the commander-in-chief was if they were to be used in the defence or interest of their own colony. After receiving a request for the Virginia provincial forces to serve in New York, Dinwiddie cautioned, ‘to raise men here to march to Albany I fear is impracticable, but I shall use my Endeavours with our Assembly’. Dinwiddie advised that it would be much easier for Virginia to assist in another assault against Fort Duquesne, but the first attack in 1754 had proven a problematic affair.27 Before dispatching Washington, Dinwiddie informed the Lords of Trade that it was ‘impossible to oblige the Militia to march to the Ohio, as it is uncertain whether these Lands are under his Government, or belong to Pensylvania’.28 Throughout the duration of the war, colonials preferred to defend their own frontiers rather than that of their neighbours. After receiving requests from Loudoun for reinforcements to defend Fort Edward, Connecticut’s Assembly fought with the commander-in-chief for the duration of a month.29 Following the fall of Fort William Henry, Massachusetts heeded Loudoun’s call and quickly dispatched its militia under Colonel Israel Williams. As the Massachusetts men marched towards their rendezvous point, they received intelligence that the French had withdrawn. Eager to return home, Williams dispatched a message to Lieutenant Governor James De Lancey stating, ‘There being so many Troops arriv’d at Fort Edward, there can be no danger of their making any further Attempts in that Quarter at this time. And having left a very defenceless Frontier being apprehensive also that it will be soon attack’d, Should gladly return for the relief of our own People.’30 As indicated by Williams, many colonials felt that their province’s militia should be used in the defence of their own borders. Such an opinion was not unwarranted; for example, after Braddock’s defeat, Virginia’s frontier was under constant attack. Further complicating the situation for the Virginians, Washington had only enough men to garrison outlying posts, which were erected to halt intruders and provide a safe haven for settlers.31 Under such conditions, it was not in Virginia’s best interests to dispatch forces to another colony. Working under such circumstances, governors exerted great effort in order to garrison outlying forts. During the 1758 campaign against Fort Duquesne, General John Forbes approached Maryland’s Lieutenant Governor Horatio Sharpe for a detachment of colonial troops to be posted at Fort Cumberland.32 Sharpe agreed to Forbes’s request and organized a force of ‘250 Volunteers’ under his own command to ‘take possession of Fort Cumberland for three Weeks or a Month’. Displaying his own personal

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desire to assist the expedition, Sharpe declared, ‘If approved of I purpose to be there on Friday or Saturday next.’ However, Sharpe further added, ‘As it will not be in my power to keep these people together after the expiration of the time agreed upon, I am well satisfied Your Excellency will order Us relief accordingly.’33 Although the arrangement provided only temporary assistance, a grateful Forbes informed Pitt, ‘The Governr. of Maryland I am greatly obliged to, having personally acted with the greatest zeal for the Service, first by sending 50 Voluntiers all good Woods Men to join me, and now by marching 200 of his Militia (I believe contrary to his Assembly’s inclination) to Garrison Fort Cumberland for one month or to the 12th. of October.’34 Upon relieving Sharpe in October, Forbes remarked, ‘I am this moment favored with yours and am very much obliged to you, for the Care you have taken of our good Fort Cumberland.’35 Other governors such as Dinwiddie and Arthur Dobbs of North Carolina made similar attempts to strengthen their colony’s defences as well, but Sharpe’s actions clearly demonstrate the capabilities of a governor, despite the behaviour of an uncooperative assembly.36 Not surprisingly, frontier borders were reluctantly garrisoned at times, particularly if the troops were beneficial to another colony. For example, when a Massachusetts provincial officer dispatched an urgent request to Governor Benning Wentworth of New Hampshire requesting reinforcements, the arrival of any relief was uncertain. A hapless Wentworth could only reply, ‘I am to meet the Assembly this Day [and] I shall use my best Endeavours to prevail on them to afford his Majestys Subjects on Connecticut River proper & Suitable Protection in which I am hoping to Succeed & Shall with the Greatest Dispatch Convey them up If ye Grant be made.’ Although Wentworth wished to aid the garrison, his attempt with the assembly was unsuccessful. Previous applications for military assistance on the Connecticut River had been made earlier, and they too had met with failure.37 Appeals made by the commanders-in-chief to the governors for colonial troops were generally more successful than those of ordinary officers. At a meeting with the governors in Philadelphia during the campaign of 1757, Loudoun succeeded in establishing a fixed quota of men to be supplied by each province for their mutual defence. The governors promised ‘to use their best Endeavours’ in raising their quotas and supporting the regulars.38 At the same time, Loudoun informed the governors of the Carolinas and Georgia, ‘I must recommend it to You, in the most earnest Manner, That you will immediately in Consequence of His Majesty’s Orders signify’d to You sett about raising &

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

getting in Readiness, a considerable Force, to be ready to join and Support the Troops already agreed upon to be raised for the Public Service.’39 Loudoun’s efforts were successful, as the governors fulfilled his requests, although slowly.40 Stationed in the South, Colonel Henry Bouquet commented, ‘Georgia is in a quite different Situation, and tho’ extremely poor, they have done a good deal, influenced by their Governor, who is still indefatigable in providing for their Safety and Welfare.’41 Bouquet further remarked on the character of the lieutenant governor, Henry Ellis, that ‘the Affairs of that Province cou’d not be in better hands’.42 As exemplified by the efforts of Georgia, for the defence of their own provinces, colonials were less reluctant to oppose attempts by the governors to raise military forces. On a much larger scale, while the army was on campaign, the assistance of the governors in securing the service of colonial forces was essential to operational plans. Before departing for the ill-fated expedition against Louisbourg in 1757, Loudoun wrote to the governors of the Carolinas and Georgia requesting that they ‘apply to your Councils & Assembly in the Strongest Manner to gain with the utmost Expedition as large a Number of Provincial Troops as may be, for the Service of the ensuing Campaigne over & above what they shall judge necessary for the defense of their own Province’. Aware of the difficulties his voyage to Louisbourg would cause for communications, he further added, ‘I shall leave Major General Webb to command at Albany & the Forts with a Body of His Majesty’s Regular Forces, together with the Troops raised by the Northern Colonies, who will have the principal Command during my Absence.’43 As stated by Loudoun, the defence of the northern provinces depended primarily upon the colonial forces which were to be raised by the governors. In addition to the provincial forces, when word of Fort William Henry’s demise reached Webb, the militia too played a crucial role in defending the north from a French invasion. Following the massacre, calls were quickly dispatched for the militias to rendezvous at Albany for its defence. In Massachusetts, the new governor, Thomas Pownall, immediately released orders for the militia ‘to be ready to March at a Minutes Warning’. He then transmitted additional orders to their commander, Colonel Israel Williams, ‘to March for the Service aforesaid’ and to ‘continue them so long as the exegences of such service shall require’.44 Pownall was evidently eager to assist Webb, as he dispatched Williams, along with two other regiments from his province, illegally. By 12 August, Webb had amassed a force of 4,239 militiamen at Fort Edward, the direct result of the governors who heeded his pleas for reinforcements.45

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In addition to the assistance provided by the governors in procuring supplies and men, they also attempted to serve the army in other ways. For instance, soon after his arrival in North America, St Clair requested maps from the governors for the planning of the 1755 campaign. Some, such as Belcher of New Jersey, claimed to know nothing of the colony which they governed and rendered no aid.46 Others proved more helpful, such as Shirley, who busied himself ‘enquiring after such Charts or Drawings as may be of use’, William Greene of Rhode Island, who transmitted ‘the most Exact plan of this Colony that can be had’, and Dobbs of North Carolina, who immediately dispatched all the maps he had on hand.47 Although failing in his attempts to secure the support of the Pennsylvania Assembly, Morris eagerly responded to St Clair’s call for help and forwarded ‘a Map of this Province, and of part of the Country back of It, including Part of the Lake Erie and of the River Ohio a Considerable way below the Monongahela’. In addition, he promised additional maps as soon as they could be finished and also dispatched a provincial officer familiar with the backcountry who could provide a first-hand account. On this, Morris remarked, ‘Capt. Rutherford who has been a Considerable Way back in the Province of New York will explain to you not only this but the others that I shall have the honour to send You. You will find him a man of sense and extremely well Acquainted with American Affairs in general and those of the Indians in Particular.’48 On other occasions, the governors made further contributions as they assisted the army in gathering items such as wagons, horses, hay and sloops.49 So long as the requests required no financial contributions from the assemblies, they were generally fulfilled with little difficulty, as the governors repeatedly offered their personal services.50 In conflict with the assemblies, the governors were at the forefront of the struggle lobbying for the support of the army. In this capacity, they repeatedly solicited aid despite recurring denials. Loudoun summarized the general experience, ‘I immediately wrote to the several Governors and Demanded an aid suitable to the state of their affairs – what success I had you very well know.’ Although there might be members of the assemblies willing to assist the commander-in-chief, on numerous occasions the attempts ‘to carry these votes into Execution were Defeated & Proved ineffectual’.51 Although the governors may have ardently desired to support the war effort, due to the obstinate behaviour of the assemblies, repeated exertions on behalf of the commandersin-chief, or others, did not guarantee success. When troops sent to South Carolina discovered they were without proper quarters, beds and straw,

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

Governor William Henry Lyttelton approached the Assembly with the intention of securing funds to erect proper barracks for the men.52 On his efforts, Bouquet remarked, ‘Mr. Littleton does every thing in his power to see us furnished with all Necessarys, & as he has a great Influence and Ability, I hope that we shall be properly provided, with Time & Patience.’53 Unfortunately for Bouquet and his soldiers, Lyttelton could not persuade the assembly to provide barracks for the winter. Bouquet lamented, ‘A Resolution seems not to be agreeable here, notwithstanding all the Endeavours of the Governor who has done his utmost in this Last Session.’ Despite Lyttelton’s persistence, the soldiers would not receive proper accommodation until the latter end of February. Disgusted with the proceedings, Bouquet further added, ‘Such are the Delays occasioned by the unwillingness of this People.’54 In the struggle with the assemblies, governors not only had to fight for the support of the army, but also in enforcing orders transmitted directly from Whitehall. When Holdernesse dispatched the circular letter to the governors, requesting their collective support in resisting the French, the results were varied.55 While Shirley reported from Massachusetts that he was ‘persuaded they will furnish their just Quota’, and Dinwiddie communicated that Virginia was making preparations for the first expedition on the Ohio, other colonies proved reluctant to heed Holdernesse’s instructions.56 De Lancey initially announced that New York’s Assembly promised ‘to make a suitable Provision in case any of the Colonies are invaded in a hostile manner’.57 Although the New York Assembly did vote £5,000 ‘for the Assistance of Virginia’, when another letter arrived from Holdernesse’s successor, Sir Thomas Robinson, De Lancey reported that he ‘had made use of it to stir up the Assembly; all that could be obtained was a Vote to repay the Expence of a Fort to be built on Hudson’s River, to the North of Albany, provided it does not exceed £600’.58 The only other successful contribution came from Sharpe in Maryland, who managed to secure ‘£6,000 for the Assistance of Virginia’.59 From the governors of New Hampshire, the Carolinas, Georgia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Connecticut, little or nothing had been supplied.60 As demonstrated by Holdernesse’s experience, even orders directly transmitted from London proved difficult for the governors to enforce. Throughout this struggle, the governors endeavoured to obtain what they could from their assemblies to sustain the war effort. This was, unfortunately, a very difficult undertaking as repeated attempts did not guarantee success. Morris bluntly informed St Clair of his situation in Pennsylvania, commenting, ‘My Assembly met yesterday and I have Recommended it to

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them to take part in the Operations concerted for the next Summer but cannot yet say what they will Enable me to do.’61 In Virginia, Dinwiddie described a common experience as he lamented, ‘Our Assembly is full as backward in granting Supplies … I know not what to do, they are so obstinate and infatuated that I cannot bring them to a proper way of thinking for their own safety: the house is still sitting, and I am daily endeavouring to bring them to Reason, how it will end I know not.’62 Under such conditions, the majority of the governors did what they could to forward military expeditions. If circumstances prevented them from fulfilling requests, they would attempt to compensate by offering or providing aid in other ways, excluding the assembly if possible. When the situation left no alternative but a direct confrontation with the assembly, the governors on most occasions strongly represented the interests of the Crown. Despite such efforts, there were considerable limitations placed upon them and pleas for assistance ultimately rested upon the mercy of the assemblies.

Colonial assemblies and the power of the purse As the governors struggled to support the army, the assemblies enjoyed one major advantage over the royal prerogative which they maintained at all times, control of the power of the purse. As financial assistance was necessary to provide the governors with provisions, troops and funds for the collective war chest, the assemblies held considerable control over military affairs. In this manner, military operations were greatly hindered when assemblies refused to grant requests for succours. As a result, governors, commanders-in-chief and officers were often forced into direct confrontation with the assemblies. In this struggle, the assemblies proved effective allies to the French, as they caused numerous delays for the army and created additional obstacles, which generated further turmoil. By refusing requests for provisions, funds, troops, fortifications and general cooperation, the assemblies provided the French with a considerable advantage. Regarding provisions, the assemblies were unwilling to organize them for the army. Before the first British regulars arrived in Virginia in 1755, Dinwiddie attempted to gather sufficient stores and negotiated contracts with various suppliers. Unfortunately for Braddock and the men of the expedition, the Virginia Assembly refused to honour one of the contracts soon after his arrival. Informed in person by the merchant, Braddock learned that a supply of 500

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

beeves would not be delivered to Fort Cumberland because ‘the Committee of the Virginia Assembly would not Confirm the Contract, and that it was consequently Void’. Although part of the bill had already been paid, and Braddock offered to settle the balance, the merchant declined to furnish the much needed provisions.63 When confronted by Braddock, Dinwiddie provided the Assembly’s reasons for the cancellation of the contract, which ranged from their accusation that the beeves were not weighed properly, to the excuse that sufficient funds were not available to pay for them without defrauding the province. Dinwiddie, however, did not comprehend the gravity of the situation and believed the loss of the supplies would not hinder the expedition. Reflecting on the situation, Dinwiddie remarked to Braddock, ‘I sh’d be sorry the Expedit’n sh’d suffer for Trifles.’64 Such actions by the assemblies did have a tremendous impact in halting the advance of the army. As exemplified by Braddock’s encounter with the Virginia Assembly, the cancellation of the supplies delayed the expedition as provisions had to be found and purchased elsewhere by the Deputy Quartermaster General, St Clair.65 Pennsylvania proved no different from Virginia, as the assembly promised to deliver a much needed supply of flour to Fort Cumberland, which never arrived. Disappointed by the Pennsylvania Assembly and desperate for provisions, St Clair informed Sir Peter Halkett, ‘I am under a Necessity of going to Frederick in Maryland to General Braddock to see if he will March a party of the 2d Brigade into that Province to press Wagons loaded with Flour, otherwise our expedition must be at a Stop.’66 Both Virginia and Pennsylvania caused considerable delay for the Braddock expedition. As the northern provincial forces prepared for the expedition against Crown Point, they too experienced a lack of support from their assemblies, which also prevented their departure. Colonel Ephraim Williams lamented, ‘for want of Stores from Boston – we have been Retarded Ever Since’.67 When Colonel Seth Pomeroy complained of the delay of provisions, he was advised by Colonel Israel Williams ‘to acquaint the Several Governments by Express, that they may immediately proceed to some Method soon to Supply You’. Further reflecting on the situation, Williams commented, ‘I cant think ye Govts. Who have ordered Such a reinforcement will fail you in that Article, tho When I reflect upon Some past Stupid Conduct, I am doubtful.’68 The assemblies continued to provide an unreliable support system until 1757, when Pitt began the process of ‘laying up Magazines of Stores and Provisions of all kinds, at the Expence of the Crown’ to be used by both regulars and provincials.69 In the end, only when Pitt altered policy was the army better supplied.

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In establishing a common fund to finance the war effort, the colonial assemblies provided minimal support, insufficient to conduct a war. Dinwiddie informed Newcastle of the situation in the colonies: This Dominion has granted 30,000 for the Service of the Expedition, and I propose calling our Assembly the First of May to endeavour to yet a further Supply. Our neighbouring Colonies have been very remiss in their Duty and neglectful of the Commands of the best of Kings. North Carolina have voted about Four Thousand five hundred Pounds Ster. Maryland about Four Thousand, But Pensylvania the Richest and most Populous Colony has not voted one Farthing – South Carolina Nothing – New York near Three Thousand Pounds Str: but these petty sums are trifling, for conducting this necessary Expedition; and how they will answer for their neglect of Duty, and what is now absolutely necessary for the Protection of their Lives, Fortunes, and every Thing else valuable to Mankind, I know not.70

Ultimately, monetary contributions from the colonial governments were inadequate to maintain the expedition. For all of Braddock’s efforts to establish a common fund, only South Carolina provided direct aid. However, despite the vote of £6,000 by the assembly, the entire sum was not forwarded, and only £4,000 actually arrived to bolster his war chest.71 As the war progressed, this practice became commonplace as the colonial governments retained portions of voted sums for their own use and very little made its way to the commander-in-chief.72 During Braddock’s tenure as commander-in-chief, with the exception of South Carolina, the majority of the assemblies refused to contribute to the common fund. This was unfortunate, as Braddock clearly understood its utility declaring, ‘such a Method would greatly promote Our Success’. Again, in the same manner as provisions, the lack of financial contributions from the colonies hindered the success of the expedition. Attempting to influence the Pennsylvania Assembly to grant a disbursement of funds, Braddock informed Morris, ‘if it should be objected to, I must, at least, desire, that what is raised may not be particularly appropriated, but granted in general Terms for the Service of the Expedition’.73 In the end, the Assembly did nothing to help him. From the beginning of the establishment of the common fund, the majority of the sums voted by the assemblies were used for provincial defence, not to supply the war chest of the British army. When De Lancey requested to use the money voted on by the New York Assembly to build forts on the frontier rather than forwarding it to the common fund, Braddock remarked, ‘As such a

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

Proposal appears to me at present to be very ill-timed, I have informed him, that the present Exigency, in my Opinion, requires all the Assistance the Colonies can give, in raising Levies & Supplying the Forces with Necessaries.’74 Although the funds were sorely needed by Braddock, this decision was largely due to the Assembly, which had complete control over the province’s expenditures.75 Much in the same manner as New York, the Virginia Assembly posed a similar problem, for although Dinwiddie boasted of Virginia’s support for the common fund, he had little room to speak as the funds voted were specifically used for the colony’s military forces.76 When Virginia contributed an additional £40,000 at the latter end of 1755, the funds again were provided solely for the use of the province in support of Washington’s Virginia Regiment.77 Such self-interest among the colonials was not an uncommon practice. When Holdernesse dispatched his circular letter to the governors in 1753, requesting that the colonies ‘should be aiding and assisting each other’, funds for military expenditures were gathered principally for the benefit of individual provinces.78 New York, for example, voted £5,000 in support of Virginia; however, £348 was withheld for supplying the two independent companies which had been ordered from New York to assist the Virginians.79 Massachusetts raised an additional force of 500 men to forward an expedition up the Kennebeck River, promised ‘to provide for the Pay & Subsistance of the said Troops’, and also ordered the construction of a fort.80 In Virginia, even Dinwiddie had little to claim, as the £30,000 voted by the Virginia Assembly for the common fund, reported to Whitehall in 1755, had actually been raised in 1754.81 From the initial stages of the conflict, colonial financial support for the war was primarily self-centred. In addition to the unwillingness of the colonials to provide for a common fund, the assemblies contributed poorly even when bolstering the defences in their own provinces. From Pennsylvania, Morris reported to George Montagu Dunk, Earl of Halifax: I sent your Lordship a Map of the Settled parts of this Province from the River Delaware to the temporary Line of Maryland, upon which are laid down all the forts and blockhouses, that have been erected for the defence of the province, beyond which we have now no Settlements. These Forts are at present garrison’d by troops in the pay of the Province, Subjected to the Articles of War by an Act of our Legislature, which with much difficulty I prevailed on the Assembly to pass. But as the money applied to this service is near expended, I shall be obliged to disband these Troops, and either destroy, or abandon the Forts, if the Assembly do not grant further Supplies, which I have already recommended, and shall do

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it again at their next meeting, and hope the Necessity of the Service will induce them to Act properly.82

In an attempt to prevent such events occurring in Pennsylvania, Halifax suggested dispatching a letter to the new Deputy Governor, William Denny, ‘requiring the Assembly of Pensylvania instantly to make Provision for the Pay of the Troops that have been raised for their Defence upon Pain of his Majesty’s highest Displeasure’. As it was known that with the loss of the provincial troops and the forts, ‘infinite Mischief would Ensue’ on the Pennsylvania frontier, Halifax further advised that Denny should ‘apply immediately to Lord Loudoun to advance the necessary Sum’.83 Although the Massachusetts Assembly was much more dutiful than their counterparts in Pennsylvania, they too provided poorly for their own defence. On the Massachusetts frontier, posts were at times garrisoned by as little as five to fifteen men, hardly a sufficient force to provide proper protection.84 Fort Dummer, for example, reached such a state of inadequacy that the commanding officer, Captain Nathan Willard, departed for Boston to request reinforcements. Passing through Deerfield, Elijah Williams remarked of Willard’s plight, ‘I cant See how it is possible for them to Defend the Fort with So few men as are allowed them.’85 With scant numbers of men deployed along the frontier, when attacks occurred in the vicinity of Fort Number 4, the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver Partridge, did not request reinforcements from the provincials but immediately applied to Loudoun, who dispatched a force of 500 regulars, a much larger reinforcement than could have been expected from the Assembly.86 In addition to the small number of soldiers stationed on the frontier, the Massachusetts Assembly also interfered with the construction of frontier forts, further hindering defensive measures. Partridge, who was also a member of the Assembly, informed Colonel Israel Williams, ‘The House are endeavouring to Stop the building the Forts & yesterday Voted the Several Committees Should desist for the present which is not as yet Concurred by the Council & I hope will not but if they should I shall Stop it with the Governour.’ Although Partridge hoped to stop the Assembly’s endeavours to halt the construction of the fort, he understood that the only other action which could be approved was the dispatch of a small contingent of troops.87 While it is difficult to understand why the assemblies refused to aid the war effort, they provided a variety of excuses. In Massachusetts, for example, financial problems prevented the Assembly from supporting the war. Williams

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

summarized, ‘I am morally certain, This Govt, as to beg our Present Assembly, wou’d not be persuaded to Engage in another Expedition ye next year, We are not Able to pay ye present expence, and no reason to expect new Engagements, unless their was in Assurance or high probability of ye Crown’s Reimbursing ye Govts, ye Charges of ye Present Expedition.’88 Although the Assembly initially proved reluctant to support the 1756 campaign, as indicated by Williams, this was an issue which could easily be resolved by Shirley, who knew from experience during King George’s War that expenditures would be repaid by the Crown. Consequently, he was able to overcome opposition from the assembly and proceed with military operations. Indeed, the Assembly placed so much trust in Shirley that they granted him powers which they alone had the right to exercise.89 Owing to Shirley’s efforts, the Massachusetts Assembly consistently supported the British war effort with little opposition. Other colonies, however, proved less helpful. In Pennsylvania, support for the war suffered due to several issues that led to the refusal of the Assembly to cooperate with the governor. Progress was hindered due to the efforts of an Assembly dominated by pacifist Quakers, who were also engaged in a power struggle with the governor concerning proprietary rights.90 As a result of these issues, all business between the two had reached a deadlock, and instead of complying with the governor’s request for assistance, the Assembly sent a memorial addressed to George II stating that ‘Proprietary Restrictions are of Dangerous Consequence to the British Interest’.91 In an attempt to bring an end to the conflict, and remind them of their duty to the King, Braddock conveyed a message to Morris, who forwarded it to the Assembly: Upon this Occasion the Province of Pensilvania, by far the most populous, & the most opulent of any upon the continent, as well as most nearly interested in the Event of the Expedition, instead of making the earliest, and largest contribution, is endeavouring to take Advantage of the Common Danger, in order encroach upon His Majesty’s Prerogative in the Administration of His Government. In what Light such Behaviour must appear to His Majesty, may be easily conceived. As I am directed by Him to advise & assist his several Governors upon the present Occasion I would propose to you, Sir, to call your Assembly together, & endeavour once more to bring Them to a Sense of their Duty to His Majesty & their own Interest, by representing to Them, in the strongest Manner, the consequences that must attend their Neglect of it.92

As Braddock indicated, the Pennsylvania Assembly was more interested in challenging the King’s prerogative rather than ousting French encroachments

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on their frontier. Although this letter was accompanied by another from Halifax, which addressed the same issue, both had little effect.93 Dinwiddie summarized the disgust against Pennsylvania as he remarked, ‘The Behaviour of Y’r Quakers and Germans is intolerable.’94 As the Quaker-dominated Assembly struggled with the governor, they did nothing to ensure the safety of the inhabitants on the Pennsylvania frontier. While the Assembly waged its own private war against proprietary government, over 500 settlers were brutally murdered by French Amerindian war parties.95 In a state of desperation, and disaffection with the Assembly, a group of colonists sent a memorial to the Secretary of State, Henry Fox, begging for direct intervention from Britain. In the memorial, the petitioners stated that the situation along the frontier was deteriorating daily, and that they were willing to ‘defend their own Lives and Familys, and his Majesty’s Empire in those Parts, Yet they find it absolutely vain to expect any Real Assistance whatever, thereto, in that Province; while a Handfull of Men continue in the Assembly, and profess so dangerous an Opinion, as that Self Defence is unlawful’.96 Identifying the problems which the Quaker-dominated Assembly brought to Pennsylvania, the inhabitants were fully aware of the reasons they were left to the mercy of France’s Amerindian allies. No provisions were made for the defence of the frontier because the conflict over ‘royal and proprietary instructions’ between the governor and Assembly had ended in a stalemate.97 Adding further to the miseries of Pennsylvania, the pacifism of the Quakers led them to believe that the Amerindians would not attack the colony. In a memorial addressed to King George, the Quakers voiced their opinion on Amerindian affairs: That upon the Encouragement of the Said Charter and in hopes of enjoying the Liberties and Immunities thereby granted to the Adventurers a Considerable Colony came over hither, and made great Improvements in a Wilderness among the Natives and other of Customs, Manners, and Languages widely Different or entirely unknown to the Generality of those Adventurers; Who, Nevertheless, under all these disadvantages, by their Hospitality, Benevolence & Justice soon gained the Esteem of all, and the entire Confidence and love of the Indians, which hath Subsisted without the least Interruption to this Day. And we are well assured as well from the Transactions of the late Treaty at Albany, as from the large Experience we had during the last War and at all other Times that the Six Nations of Indians whatever dispositions they may entertain towards other English Colonies, entertain for us in particular a Cordial & Sincere Affection.

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

Although the Quakers had believed the Amerindians would remain peaceful neighbours, this was an illusion, which ultimately led them to confront the governor while neglecting the defence of the frontier. As the Assembly indicated in their address, they believed Pennsylvania was not in any immediate danger from the Amerindians, and that it was not necessary to comply with Whitehall’s, as well as Braddock’s, calls for swift assistance. Believing the province to be safe, the Assembly placed the issue of proprietary rights ahead of conducting the war with France and defending the province. As the Amerindians engaged in warfare for profit, which will be discussed in a later chapter, the belief that they would not attack Pennsylvania out of ‘a Cordial & Sincere Affection’ was erroneous. The Quaker Assembly itself admitted that they had secured ‘the Love and Affection of the Indians, at very considerable Expence’.98 The expense, of course, was in reference to the enormous sums expended upon presents for them. Tragically for Pennsylvania, only when 600 settlers from the frontier marched through the streets of Philadelphia carrying the mangled corpses of their friends, neighbours and relatives in wagons did the Assembly comprehend the folly of their judgement.99 As indicated by the behaviour of the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania Assemblies, polar opposites in the struggle with the governors, the colonial assemblies could easily support or hinder military operations. Massachusetts, perhaps the most loyal of the colonies during the Seven Years’ War, required only a little coaxing from the governor in order to provide military support. In Pennsylvania, the most uncooperative colony, it was the governor who was eventually made to submit to the will of the Assembly in order to support the war effort. Unfortunately for the British, the financial situations in the other colonies resembled Pennsylvania.100 New Jersey and Maryland were very much like Pennsylvania as they also were both heavily dominated by Quakers.101 In the same manner as Pennsylvania, the New Jersey Assembly granted £6,000, ‘provided his Majesty allow’d of the raising it in the way and Manner projected in a Bill they sent Home, with a Petition to the King for his Approbation of the said Bill’.102 In their struggle with both the governors and commanders-in-chief, the assemblies exerted immense influence in their control of the power of the purse. By the end of the war, colonial assemblies would enjoy more control over finances than the House of Commons.103 The fact that the assemblies exerted such dominance over the disbursement of funds made matters very difficult for the governors, commanders-in-chiefs and officers who requested assistance from them. Ultimately, these authority figures became

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embroiled in a bitter struggle to secure colonial cooperation. When aid from the assemblies was crucial to successfully waging the war, such unsupportive behaviour only bolstered the French. Facing such setbacks, it is not surprising that since the colonial governments could not unite internally for the support of the war, the formation of a colonial union proved even more problematic.

The issue of colonial unity During the initial stages of the war, prospects regarding the formation of a colonial union appeared very low. Conversely, the great advantage which the French enjoyed was that their collective resources were unified at the outbreak of the conflict, largely due to the established parishes, through which the Canadian inhabitants were controlled. 104 St Clair understood this advantage, as he compared the British colonials to their French counterparts: There is another Circumstance with regard to General Shirley’s plan which I must take notice of that is, that the Extensiveness of it will probably give his Majesty and the Ministry a higher Notion of our Strength upon this Continent than it deserves: it is true, we have a great number of People, a Number vastly Superior to anything the french can pretend to; but this number is far separated and difficult to be brought together, and the Provinces perhaps divided in some measure in their Sentiments and Interests, and apt to fancy themselves unconcern’d if their own Province is out of danger and for this reason I must give it as my Opinion that tho they are and will be very necessary and useful, and many of them of a Military turn, yet they are by no means to be relied on entirely.105

Although St Clair has been maligned as being ‘irritable and haughty’ in his behaviour towards the colonials, his observations regarding their conduct were correct.106 He did not claim that the colonials were unnecessary for success. On the contrary, he believed they were; however, he also noted that they were fickle allies which could not be relied upon. In short, the colonials were greatly divided unlike their Canadian counterparts. Braddock was also aware that a union of the colonies was necessary in order to defeat the French. Commenting to Morris, he remarked, ‘it must be attributed principally to a Want of Union among the Colonies, that the French have had it in their Power to make so great Encroachments upon The King’s Territories in America’.107 Unfortunately,

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

such a union at the time was considered an impossibility, as the colonials were unwilling to provide more than what they considered their fair share for imperial defence. Initial attempts to establish a union among the British colonies at the Albany Congress in 1754 proved unsuccessful. Although the colonies received encouragement from Whitehall to form such a union as early as 1753, they were reluctant to do so due to the suspicions and jealousies they held against one another.108 One frustrated MP remarked, ‘Is it not amazing that our Colonies at the time they see the advanced settlers forced to Abandon their settlements, murder’d, Scalpt, and the most fortunate of them drove back into the heart of the Country, that they … shou’d look on with so stupid an unconcern and not Stretch out their hand to keep the evil from their own door.’109 Only in Massachusetts were serious attempts made to establish a colonial union. Shirley received a letter from Sir Thomas Robinson ‘Applauding the zeal & prudence of this Government in giving So large instructions to Our Commissioners at the Albany Congress and blaming the Supineness of the other Governments at least some of them, that their Commissioners were so limited that they were not able to put Any Scheme into execution.’110 Among the colonies taking part in the congress, only Massachusetts and Connecticut specifically allowed their representatives to discuss the establishment of a colonial union. Although Benjamin Franklin illustrated the necessity of such a union in his famous cartoon, which depicted the disjoined colonies as a decapitated serpent, captioned with the phrase, ‘Join or Die’, the colonists refused to comprehend their potential by unifying as one to oppose the French. Their capabilities were further illustrated in another version of the cartoon with the serpent uttering the phrase ‘unite and conquer’.111 Had the colonists followed through and formed a union, such an action would have expedited the fall of New France. Unfortunately, the possibilities of an agreement were not realized at the time, and due to jealousies and suspicions among the colonials, a coalition was impossible. As a result of such inter-colonial disunion, both governors and assemblies proved unwilling to provide more assistance than what was required by their province. Believing this to be a significant hindrance in the development of a unified opposition against France, Shirley informed Holdernesse: I am fully persuaded, that this Province (as the Assembly undertakes for it in their Message) will at all times with great cheerfulness furnish their just and reasonable quota of Men or money towards the assistance of any other of His Majesty’s Colonies upon this continent, in case of an invasion or hostile

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attempt; and can’t but hope from the necessity of an union among all the Colonies for their mutual defence against the common Enemy, that the others may be likewise disposed to do the same; yet, unless it shall be determined by His Majesty, what is each Colony’s just quota of Men or Money which it shall raise or contribute in the common cause, when any one or more of them shall be invaded, or harras’d by the French or Indians, whether in a time of open declared Warr or not and they shall be obliged in some effectual manner (as his Majesty shall think most proper) to conform to that determination upon every emergency.112

Shirley’s observations were correct. Although the colonies had made contributions in manpower, provisions and funds for the war effort, they continuously fell short of their quotas or did not provide the assistance which they had promised. Even when organizing supplies for the provincial forces gathered at Oswego during the 1755 campaign, the colonials failed to supply their own men adequately.113 The reason for such poor logistical support was due to the colonial governments wanting to do as least as possible, so that they would not contribute more than their neighbours.114 As a result of such behaviour, colonies such as Massachusetts, which enthusiastically supported the war effort, often bore a greater burden. After William Johnson’s victory at Lake George in 1755, Thomas Clarke summarized Massachusetts’s sentiments when he remarked, ‘We are all at present fired with our Success and a just Resentment against our perfidious Neighbours.’115 In reality, Massachusetts had much to resent as they had provided the majority of the troops present at the battle, supported only by additional soldiers from Connecticut, Rhode Island and New York.116 Colonel Israel Williams lamented that, while other colonies enjoyed the military protection offered by Massachusetts, their own frontiers lay exposed to Amerindian raids. Commenting on the situation, Williams further added, ‘This Govt have Spent their blood & Treasure for their own defence with little or no aid from others, and are now doing it for their Neighbours, to their own great unspeakable damage, and as has been ye case, so fear it will be now, we shall be left to care for our Selves.’117 Williams was not exaggerating Massachusetts’s contributions to the war effort. At both the Battle of Lake George in 1755 and the fall of Oswego in 1756, a great number of Massachusetts provincials were engaged. In addition, casualty rates were substantial. After the contest at Lake George, Massachusetts forces counted their losses at 122 men, while those of Connecticut, Rhode Island and New York suffered a total of sixty-nine.118 Reflecting upon the loss of the provincial forces,

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

Williams further described Massachusetts’s sentiments towards its neighbours when he remarked, ‘The Mathers for almost a Century have been pouring out their blood like Water, and giving out dead Bodies to be meat for ye Fowls of heaven and the Beasts of ye Land – and who has pitied us.’119 Under such circumstances, the situation proved problematic as the colonies refused to provide more aid than what they deemed sufficient. Dinwiddie summarized, ‘I much fear the supineness of the other Colonies will be a great Hindrance to me; Our People declaring their backwardness to grant any further Supplies as the other Colonies will look on them as Dupes to the Whole by assisting the Expedition with Chearfulness when other remain indolent and passive though in Danger with us.’120 In order to instil some sense of order, Whitehall dispatched quotas for the colonists to fulfil, along with the short-lived Governor of New York, Danvers Osborne.121 Unrealistically, the quotas were an alteration of an earlier one created during the reign of William III, which Shirley remarked was unfair during both William’s era and in 1754, as the circumstances in the colonies had changed significantly. For example, Shirley brought to Robinson’s attention the fact that the quota of men which Massachusetts was obliged to send to the assistance of New York was fixed at 350, while Pennsylvania was required to supply only eighty men. This was an arrangement viewed as extremely unfair to Massachusetts because Pennsylvania’s population had increased substantially since William’s era. In addition, Massachusetts had recently lost both territory and numbers of its population to New Hampshire and Rhode Island.122 The detrimental effects of the fixed quotas were further described by Governor Charles Hardy of New York who asserted, ‘[they] heighten the jealousies and private piques, (founded perhaps upon private Interest) and produce Still heavier charges and recriminations, than answer any good purpose’.123 Despite such negative connotations associated with quotas, they were the only means available to compel the colonials to support the war effort. Notwithstanding the difficulties arising among the colonies, a very delicate union began to develop under the administration of Loudoun. His authority as viceroy was recognized by the colonial governments despite the opposition shown by colonists in Massachusetts. His influence was undeniably great, as governors sought his assistance in conflicts with their own assemblies and corporate colonies submitted for fear of losing their charters.124 Commenting on Loudoun’s achievements in establishing a colonial union, Bradstreet remarked, ‘My Lord Loudoun is Returnd from hence to New York & from thence he goes to the Jerseys & Pensilvania and I doubt not but he will Succeed as well with them

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Governments in his demands for the ensuing Campaign as he has done in the, New Hampshire, Connecticut & Rhode Island who have promis’d to Comply with every thing he has demanded.’125 Despite Loudoun’s success, at this time Massachusetts came under the leadership of a new governor, Thomas Pownall, and had become an extremely uncooperative colony. Although Massachusetts no longer enthusiastically supported the war, efforts were made to comply with Loudoun’s requests. A committee was appointed to receive his proposals and empowered to confer upon them with commissioners from neighbouring colonies.126 In this regard, Massachusetts is an interesting example of colonial support, as the colony in both the 1755 and 1756 campaign seasons had provided significant contributions for the war effort.127 However, after the uncooperative Pownall assumed the governorship in 1757, only 1,800 men were raised by the Assembly to serve with Loudoun.128 Such were the effects of having an enthusiastic governor, embodied by Shirley, in comparison to an obstructionist like Pownall. Despite numerous obstacles, by 1757, Loudoun succeeded in creating a unified colonial military force, highly evident with the fall of Fort William Henry, as it was the colonies who immediately rushed to the defence of Fort Edward.129 In spite of the gradual success enjoyed by Loudoun in developing a colonial union, what succeeded in quickly unifying the colonial governments were the efforts of the new Secretary of State, William Pitt. As the colonists had proven uncooperative allies throughout the struggle to procure funds, men and supplies for the war effort, a change in policy was necessary. Bradstreet succinctly described the most effective solution to this dilemma when he confided to his friend, Charles Gould in London, that ‘nothing will save this Continent but the interposition of Parliament’.130 Although Loudoun had been employed in the capacity of a viceroy, and enjoyed considerable power in the colonies, he could not bring about the change in attitude among the colonists which Pitt achieved.131 By dismissing Loudoun and ending the viceroyalty of North America, commanders-in-chief were freed to conduct the war in a more efficient manner without the interference of colonial governments. In addition, this change also ensured that the colonies would maintain control over their own finances and would be reimbursed by the Treasury for any expenses incurred in raising provincial troops.132 Returning to the problem posed by Massachusetts, with the opposition presented by both Pownall and the Assembly, it is not surprising that when Pitt’s letters arrived announcing the recall of Loudoun and urging the colonies

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

to recruit as many men as possible for the forthcoming campaign, resistance immediately ceased.133 Pownall described the effects of Pitt’s correspondence: On March the 10th, I was honor’d with Your two Letters dated Decr. 30 1757. I had been then eight daies labouring to induce the General Court to make Provision for the Raising 2,128 Men as a Quota of 7,000 proposed for all the Northern Governments upon a Plan which the Earl of Loudoun had proposed. The matter labour’d greatly, the House seemed to advance in nothing but Difficulties and Objections, Diffidence in the Plan, Objections against the Number as a Quota. Dissatisfaction against a Junction with the Regulars as the Matter of Rank then stood. I was enabled by the Receipt of His Majesty’s Commands signifyed by you to take quite different measures as I did instantly that very Night and have the Pleasure to acquaint You that the House of Representatives came into a unanimous Vote next morning to raise a Sufficient Number of Men and determined the Number that they alone wou’d provide for should be 7,000 men.134

Such were the results of the changes in policy made by Pitt. As Massachusetts had been unwilling earlier to provide men for the 1757 campaign, the province was now prepared not only to furnish their quota, but the entire force which was to defend the northern theatre.135 No longer would the colonists be suspicious or jealous of one another as they now wholeheartedly joined the conflict with the assurance that they would be reimbursed by the Treasury for their expenses. Perhaps this should not be surprising as Massachusetts had fervently supported the war during the 1755 and 1756 campaigns believing, largely due to the efforts of Shirley, that the colony would be reimbursed as it had been during the previous war.136 As the change in policy allowed the colonies to spend as they wished, with the promise of reimbursement, instead of obstinate subjects, Pitt gained eager allies. Successive commanders-in-chief from Braddock to Loudoun all had to wrestle with colonial governments in order to gain support for the war effort. In this struggle, the governors were at the forefront, placing before their assemblies the requests of the commanders-in-chiefs, as well as the instructions they had received directly from London. In most instances, the governors championed them against unwilling assemblies, which on occasion led to intense power struggles, sometimes requiring the intervention of the commander-in-chief in order to end the deadlock.137 The assemblies on the other hand offered a variety of reasons for not complying with the appeals of the governors, and as the two struggled, the French enjoyed a considerable advantage as the British

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colonists were not united against them. Only until 1758, when news arrived of the recall of Loudoun and reimbursements from the Treasury were promised for expenditures did the colonials stop their quarrelling and finally united in their efforts to defeat the French. Until that time, the commanders-in-chief, governors and assemblies were engaged in a bitter struggle in which a unified resistance against the French was impossible.

3

The Colonial Americans: Necessary but Problematic Allies

I arrived here after a tedious passage of 9 or ten days. I found the Artillery embarking as fast as possible & four ships (out of eleven) loaded; They were obliged to employ people of the Town to assist them, as Webb’s Regt. did not begin to march in till last Saturday, & is not yet all arrived. The Transport ships are all ready, & the Sloops & Schooners will take four or five days more. The only thing we have reason to fear any delays from is, The Provincial tardyness; however I hope Col: Burton’s assiduity on that head will have a proper effect. Major Isaac Barré to Brig. Gen. Robert Monckton, 9 April 17591 Throughout the duration of the struggle with France, the colonial Americans played a crucial role. In their capacity as allies to the British, through their deeds and actions, they either assisted or hindered the war effort. As indicated in the report sent by Barré to Monckton from Boston, where preparations were underway for the attack against Québec, the colonials had great potential to assist in forwarding expeditions. For example, although Webb’s regiment was delayed, such a setback did not create a serious problem as colonials could take the place of regulars and help in the loading of ships bound for Québec. Their importance is further highlighted by Barré’s fear of ‘provincial tardyness’, which also had the potential to delay operations. Employed in this capacity, the colonials were essential in bolstering the manpower available to assist the British army. Prior to 1758, when there was a dearth of regulars, the participation of specially recruited provincial forces and militias was significantly important. In contrast, however, there were colonials who had agendas of their own and through their actions adversely affected the course of the war. At times, the desire to accumulate personal wealth at the expense of victory over France

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proved extremely troublesome. To achieve this end, colonials on occasion supplied the French, not the British, with provisions and also financially exploited the demands of the British army. Ultimately, despite such selfinterested practices, the colonial Americans proved themselves to be necessary but problematic allies.

The colonial troops As British regulars suffered from a dearth in manpower during the initial stages of the war, the army required additional support from the colonials, either in the presence of the provincial troops specifically raised by each colony or the militia. Although they were by no means as equally effective as the regulars brought over from Europe, they were nonetheless vital to Britain’s war effort. Notwithstanding that they were expensive, and generally poor in both quality and military effectiveness, colonial troops provided necessary support for the regulars by performing tasks such as garrison duty, transporting provisions and providing escorts. In doing so, they freed regulars for the more important enterprise of conducting the war. Until the situation was altered by Pitt in 1758, a dearth in manpower existed among the forces of both the regulars and colonials. For the colonials, with the changes in policy implemented by Pitt towards the latter end of 1757, assemblies increased spending in support of the war.2 As a result, the colonies enthusiastically enlarged their quotas of troops for the 1758 campaign, and additional numbers of regulars were then freed to conduct an offensive war.3 For all the scorn placed upon them, colonial troops were essential. In comparison to the regulars, colonial troops were a much greater expense to the Crown. While a British private could expect the meagre pay of 8d a day, and a small enlistment bounty of a guinea and a crown, their colonial counterparts enjoyed greater financial advantages.4 Generally, a colonial soldier received double the amount of a regular. In addition, not only did colonial troops receive, as Massachusetts troops did in 1756, £1 12s. per month as their salary, they were also allotted a daily subsistence of 8s.5 To entice additional recruits, the Massachusetts Assembly provided bonuses such as three months pay in advance starting from the date of enlistment, billeting once recruits had left their homes, no deductions for food or clothing and a blanket for each man.6 As indicated by the actions of the Massachusetts

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Assembly, generous inducements were offered to attract volunteers. Further benefits included that a colonial soldier also permanently maintained ownership of his blanket, knapsack, hatchet and musket.7 Placing no limitations upon generosity, when troops were urgently needed, bounties were further increased. For example, when Major General John Winslow required swift reinforcements, Massachusetts ‘Voted also that there be allowed three Dollars to each Man that shall be draughted out on this Occasion, who shall provide himself with a good Musket to carry with him.’8 Remarking upon the reasons for offering such high payment, Colonel Israel Williams commented, ‘The bounty in hand, will Encourage Some that are needy to Enlist.’9 Not surprisingly, soon after enrolling, some soldiers immediately forwarded their pay to their families.10 What made enlistment among the colonials more financially beneficial in comparison to the regulars was that the terms of service were much shorter. Colonials raised in North Carolina, for instance, expected to serve for only a period of six months, while those from Massachusetts, a duration of six to eight.11 Although attempts were made to increase the terms of service to two or three years, such schemes had little hope for success.12 Additionally, a colonial private could receive as much as £15 at the end of enlistment. Unlike the regulars, the colonials did not receive their pay until their discharge, and many would go on to purchase small landholdings with their hard earned bounties.13 In contrast to the regulars, the colonials emerged in a much more positive scenario, as a regular had to enlist for a longer period of time in order to receive any possible profit from their period of service. When offering bounties to recruit men for his regiment, the 50th, Shirley instructed Major Ephraim Williams, ‘for those Who Inlist for Three Years I will allow you as Bounty money 20£ Sterling For 5 years 30£ and for 7 years 40£ and for those who List at Large 50£ one quarter part to be paid at the Time of Their Inlistment the other Three parts at their arival at the Head Quarters’.14 Although the 50th was not an ordinary regiment, it nonetheless was classified as a regular regiment, and the typical colonial practices of recruitment had to be abandoned. Acting as a recruiting officer for Shirley, Williams attempted to recruit the men in the same manner as a colonial regiment, with conditions for terms of service, which included the knowledge of where the regiment would be posted. As a result, Shirley bluntly informed Williams, ‘such Conditional Inlistments, as you mention, in your letter, are not allowed in his Majesty’s Service’.15 To entice further recruits, land grants were offered as another incentive, but sometimes

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were not delivered. Bryan Sheehan, a private in the 40th Regiment, enlisted for four years under the promise that he would receive 200 acres and wages at the end of his service. After surviving his enlistment, Sheehan not only received no pay due to stoppages, but was also robbed of his land patent by his own officers who sold them.16 As indicated by the fate of Sheehan, joining the colonial forces was the better option. From the perspective of a colonial, enlisting in the colony’s military forces was more rewarding. However, from the standpoint of the British government, colonial troops were expensive. Colonel John Bradstreet summarized the army’s opinion: I will conclude the publick will by this conveyance be amused with the mighty preperations of the British Americans to drive the French from Crown Point, who probably will flatter themselves with success; but in a word, their conduct is worse (if possible) this Year than last, and without a change, as little, if not less, in my judgment may be expected – Ten thousand men they talk of sending, attended with immoderate expence and delays, which will allow time to the French to give them such a reception as they most probably will not like. All proceedings on this side the water confirm me more & more in my first opinion, that whilst the Americans are left to themselves in Military operations nothing more will come of it than immense expence with loss & dishonor to his Majestys Arms.

Although one might dismiss Bradstreet’s comments as prejudicial towards the colonials, his statement that they were an ‘immense expence’ to the Crown is correct.17 In order to ensure that the colonials remained content in the service, British officers found themselves having to provide extra benefits, much in the same manner as the colonial governments.18 In addition, as they were in competition with colonial recruiting parties, bounties as high as £6 were offered with an additional bonus for short-term enlistments.19 Regular officers quickly realized the hindering effects of colonial generosity. St Clair summarized, ‘this Evil affected the King’s Troops a good deal for how can we expect ever to get Recruits where Ten pounds premium is given to a man of any Sort to serve Eight or ten months in the place of another’.20 Despite the lucrative bounties and incentives offered by the assemblies, colonial soldiers were poor in quality. Commenting on the state of recruits in Virginia, Captain Robert Orme remarked that ‘they performed their Evolutions and Firings as well as could be Expected, but their languid, Spiritless, and un soldier like Appearance considered with the Lowness of Ignorance of most of their Officers, gave little Hopes of their future good Behaviour’.21 Further

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commenting on the pitiful condition of the Virginians, St Clair informed Dinwiddie of the reasons he discharged so many men: The first thing that your Assembly did was to pass a Vagrant Act, which included no less than three hundred men who were Rendered incapable of gaining their Bread, by old sores, and whom I was obliged to discharge for the good of the service. Whether the Gentm of your Assembly will think proper to Continue that Act, will depend upon them. If they do it to save money they had much better disband the Troops they now have and throw themselves at the Mercy of the Indians. Your Excellency can expect no man will Continue in your service, who visibly sees he has no provision made for him after he is disabled in the service of his Country nor has he Cloaths to defend himself from the Inclemency of the weather during the Winter. This latter part you cou’d not Posibly avoid.22

As indicated by both Orme and St Clair, the colonial forces were deficient in both military performance and appearance. Such inadequacy was largely the result of most recruits having originated from the militia. Throughout the duration of the war, continuous demands were placed upon militiamen for additional troops. In Massachusetts, for example, the militia consisted of all able-bodied men from ages 16 to 60, and requests for enlistments and impressments were repeatedly made upon this pool of available manpower.23 By 1758, it was reported that in both Massachusetts and Connecticut a quarter of the colony’s militia were employed in the provincial regiments.24 With militia forces dwindling under such unceasing demands, it is unsurprising that one officer from Massachusetts lamented that the majority of the colonial forces gathered at Fort Edward were either ‘too old or too young’.25 In addition to the problem presented by age, St Clair also observed a significant difference among the recruits by region. On the Virginians, St Clair commented, ‘The Country people are the least Adapted for military service of any that I have seen, they are both delicate and Timirous.’ In contrast, he had nothing but praise for the New Englanders, remarking, ‘we shou’d have avoided most of these disadvantages to the Northward, where the Country is plentiful, the roads much better, and the People of a bold Warlike Genious’.26 Further raising difficulties with this issue, as early as 1754 complaints were already being made among militia officers that their regiments were beginning to suffer from shortages of manpower.27 As a result, a continued decline in quality was inevitable. Adding to the dismal condition of the colonials, they were also poorly equipped for service. Although some colonies such as Massachusetts had made

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arrangements for their men to be provided with blankets, other colonies such as Virginia supplied their forces with ‘few or none at all’.28 Intensifying the hardships endured by their men on campaign, the Virginia Assembly also neglected to supply proper clothing. Eventually, the soldiers in the 2nd Virginia Regiment voiced their anger, ‘complaining of being naked’.29 Adding to their problems, colonial troops found themselves inadequately armed at times. On one occasion in Massachusetts, the militia was forced to arm itself with substandard quality gunpowder and an insufficient supply of flints.30 Such deficiencies should not be surprising as soldiers received an additional bounty if they furnished their own musket.31 However, this created further problems in the distribution of standardized ammunition. Besides the poor quality of the colonials, their performance as soldiers was highly irregular. This, however, does not mean that colonial troops were militarily useless. In Massachusetts, the militia were expected to be ready to march and confront the enemy ‘at a Minutes Warning’.32 Such Massachusetts ‘minutemen’ would prove their worth during the initial battles of the American Revolution, particularly at the Battle of Concord in 1775.33 During the Seven Years’ War, the bravery of the colonial troops was highly evident at the Battle of the Monongahela where Washington lamented, ‘Our poor Virginians behaved like men & died like Soldiers, for I believe out of three Company’s that were there that day Scarce 30 were left alive’.34 In contrast to Braddock’s Defeat, at the Battle of Lake George during the Bloody Morning Scout, the majority of the Massachusetts troops immediately ran for their lives back to the safety of William Johnson’s camp, while 100 of their comrades covered their retreat, assisted by a number of Mohawks.35 After the battle, Colonel Seth Pomeroy remarked that ‘had it not been for that (which was done by but about 100 of our Men) He [Baron Dieskau] shou’d have cut them all off ’.36 Indeed, if not for their efforts, the battle would have ended in another British defeat. What ultimately secured victory at Lake George was not colonial bravery, but construction efforts, as they used the breastworks they erected to successfully halt the French advance.37 Despite occasional moments of valour, the colonials nonetheless lacked the discipline of the regulars. For this reason, regular officers looked upon colonial soldiers with scorn. The lack of discipline was a key issue which led many regular officers to view colonial troops as amateurs. On their character, St Clair remarked, ‘I hope you will not inferr from thence that I think there is no possibility of making good Soldiers of them: were they to be enlisted in our Troops there is Stuff enough to make good men of them, or if the Militia of the Country were to march they

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might serve to harass the Enemy for a short time.’ However, he noted they had one flaw, that ‘they can never be tyed down to Obedience’. This was problematic as obedience was a distinctive trait of the British regular.38 Although, the colonials won the Battle of Lake George, the defeated Baron Dieskau remarked that had it not been for the 100 men who had maintained order and covered the flight of the regiment back to Johnson’s camp, he would have ‘cut them all off ’.39 Owing to such behaviour displayed on the battlefield, even the colonial officers themselves sometimes doubted the reliability of their own troops. Contemplating the outcome of the planned expedition against Crown Point, Colonel Israel Williams declared that there was ‘the probability of the Expedition failing for want of ye British Troops’.40 Despite such opinions, without the discipline of the regulars, colonial troops defied French military efforts. As St Clair stated earlier, they could ‘harass the Enemy for a short time’ and did so when the service required.41 During the 1755 campaign, Benning Wentworth reported to St Clair, ‘The Militia of the more Northern and Eastern Governments, at this time, are fully employ’d in Removing the Encroachments made by the French on Lake Champlain and a great many Forces Assembled in that quarter under the Comand of Major General Johnston.’42 Although the conduct of the colonial forces under Johnson had been irregular during the initial stages of the Battle of Lake George, they achieved a major victory over a highly professional French military force.43 The efforts of the colonial troops in resisting the French cannot be easily dismissed, as further exemplified by their conduct at Fort William Henry. When word of the fort’s fall had first reached Massachusetts, Elijah Williams remarked, ‘I fear the main Loss at Wm. Henry will fall on ye province forces.’44 Williams’s fears were well founded, for of the fort’s 2,372 defenders, 823 were Massachusetts colonials.45 Although the siege ended with the infamous massacre, colonial troops nonetheless played an important role in the defence of Fort William Henry as their efforts bolstered those of the regulars. Such behaviour should not have been surprising, as colonial soldiers proved their effectiveness against the French during the previous war when an army of 4,270 provincials attacked and captured Louisbourg.46 In addition, it should also be noted that the capture of Louisbourg in 1745 was Britain’s only territorial victory.47 Clearly, colonial troops were useful in combat. Although they were capable of assisting on the battlefield, colonial troops played a major role in the support of the British army. During the 1758 campaign against Fort Duquesne, General John Forbes felt that ‘no great trust can be reposed in them’. However, he believed ‘the best that can be expected

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of them, is the making some of their ablest men Rangers, and the remainder (if any) Woodsmen or leaving of them as Guards to your Posts and Convoys with a proper mixture of the regular troops for your own honour and safety’.48 Although Forbes had little regard for colonial troops, he understood that they would be useful in guarding posts and convoys along his supply line. In that capacity, their assistance was vital, as they freed additional regulars to partake in the campaign. Indeed, on one occasion, Forbes found himself with only a small regular force consisting of fifty men while waiting for a reinforcement of 200 Highlanders. As there were very few men available for garrison duty at Fort Cumberland, Forbes sought the assistance of Lieutenant Governor Horatio Sharpe to provide reinforcements.49 Sharpe not only dispatched a force of 250 men, but also took personal command over the fortress.50 In doing so, Sharpe allowed Forbes to free more regulars for the advance on Fort Duquesne. In addition to garrison duty, colonial troops also played a key role in logistical support. Employed in pressing both horses and wagons, as well as manning the bateaux which transported supplies, colonial troops freed additional numbers of regulars for combat duty.51 While serving alongside regulars, however, problems arose between the two parties. In particular, the primary issue which caused a great deal of disaffection was that of rank. Indeed, even before the first British regulars were dispatched to North America with Braddock, problems had already appeared during the ill-fated campaign against Fort Duquesne in 1754. Throughout the duration of the expedition, the officers of the Independent companies refused to acknowledge the authority of the colonial officers. Washington described the situation: Since writing the foregoing, Captn McKay with the Independant Company has arriv’d, who I take to be a very good sort of a Gentlemen. For want of proper Instructions from your Honour I am much at a loss to know how to act, or proceed in regard to his company: I made it my particular study to receive him (as it was your Honour’s desire) with all the Respect and politeness that was due to his Rank, or that I was capable of shewing: and don’t doubt from his appearance and behavr but a strict intimacy will ensue, when matter’s are put in a clearer light. but at present I assure your Honour they will rather impede the Service than forward it, for having Commissions from the King they look upon themselves as a distinct Body, and will not incorporate and do duty as our Men – but keep seperate Guards, Incamp seperate & ca. I have not offer’d to controul him in anything, or shewd that I claimd a superior Command, but in giving the Parrole & Countersign which must be the same in an Army

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consisting of 10 Different Nation’s to distinguish Friends from Foes – He knows the necessity of this, yet does not think he is to receive it from me. Then who is to give it? am I to Issue these order’s to a Company? or is an Independent Captn to prescribe Rules to the Virginia Regiment? this is the Question, but how absurd is obvious.52

As the question of command posed a considerable problem, Dinwiddie immediately informed his superiors in London that ‘An unhappy Difference subsists between the Officers of the Ind’t Compa’s, and those appoint’d by me; the former refuse to rank or do duty with the others.’53 As this was an issue which demanded a prompt resolution, it was decided by the ministry that all colonial field officers, when serving with regulars, would rank as captains.54 To the colonials, this solution was unacceptable. It fostered great uneasiness and carried negative repercussions. Among the colonial officers, the change was as an insult. Personally reflecting upon how this decision affected him, Washington commented: You make mention in your letter of my continuing in the service, and retaining my Colo.’s Commission. This idea has filled me with surprise: for if you think me capable of holding a Commission that has neither rank or emolument annexed to it; you must entertain a very contemptible opinion of my weakness, and believe me to be more empty than the Commission itself. Besides Sir, if I had time, I could enumerate many good reasons, that forbid all thoughts of my Returning; and which to you, or any other, would, upon the strictest scrutiny, appear to be well-founded. I must be reduced to a very low Command, and subjected to that of many who have acted as my inferior Officers. In short, every Captain, bearing the King’s Commission; every half-pay Officer, or other appearing with such commission, would rank before me.55

As exemplified by Washington, a very dreary realization for many colonial officers was that although they might be a colonel or major by their commissions from a governor, they were nothing more than an eldest captain when serving alongside regulars.56 In addition, with the loss of rank, it was also ‘universally agreed’ that this decision would cause ‘A Dissolution of the greater part of The Army and prevent all future Inlistments of Provincials for his Majesty’s Service.’57 This settlement remained in effect until Pitt altered military policy in December of 1757, informing the governors in North America that ‘all Officers of the Provincial Forces, as high as Colonels inclusive, are to have Rank according to their several respective Commissions’.58 By introducing this change in policy, Pitt made them junior only to officers of the same rank. No longer threatened with

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the humiliation of taking orders from a regular officer of lesser rank, support for the 1758 campaign dramatically improved as provincial officers enjoyed a newfound sense of equality.59 Although colonial troops were by no means professional, they were necessary to the British war effort despite that they were not comprised of the best quality of men, improperly armed and at times irregular in behaviour. In carrying out garrison duty, transporting provisions and fighting when the service required, the colonials freed additional numbers of regulars to campaign against the French. During the initial stages of the war, not long after his arrival in North America, Loudoun realized the dilemma which his forces encountered as he remarked, ‘the Provincials and we are not so well settled, as to be able to Join, without creating Confusion; nor are they strong enough to Act’.60 Although the colonials were not strong enough to act without the support of regulars, they were important. While great numbers of regulars began to arrive in North America in 1757, due to a dearth of colonial troops that year, the regulars found themselves employed simultaneously in garrison duty, transporting provisions and conducting the war.61 In 1758, Pitt’s reversal of policy greatly encouraged the colonials to rejoin the fight enthusiastically. With the promise of reimbursement, as well as the compromise regarding the question of rank between officers of the regulars and colonials, a great number of colonial troops became readily available to assist in operations. As there were substantial numbers of soldiers gathered for the 1758 campaign, with the colonials numbering a total of 22,800 men and the regulars over 23,000, it is not surprising that three simultaneous offensives were launched at Louisbourg, Fort Duquesne and Fort Carillon.62 Although the attack on Carillon failed, due to ‘the power of one blunderer’, the advances made upon the other two were both successful.63 With the conquests of Louisbourg and Fort Duquesne complete, 1758 was the turning point of the war in North America. Such an achievement could never have been accomplished without the support of colonial troops.

Problematic allies Although colonial troops played an essential role in supporting the British army, the colonials themselves greatly hindered the war effort. In particular, the drive to increase private wealth, and to an extent, the desire to preserve the finances of the colony, played a key role in colonial disloyalty. In general, the colonials

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greatly injured the war effort by carrying on illicit trade with the French, taking advantage of the consumer demands of the British army, exploiting the monetary exchange and refusing to supply the army with proper lodgings. In addition, their quest for wealth also increased the number of drunken soldiers and Amerindians, which created a volatile situation which had great potential to backfire dangerously upon them. Behaving in such a manner, the colonials proved themselves to be problematic allies. One of the primary issues which greatly hindered the British war effort was the illegal trade conducted by the colonials with the French. While supplies were scare in the colonies, and commanders-in-chief were forced to pay excessively high prices, the French enjoyed the use of British exports.64 As a result, colonial trade with the enemy presented a serious problem, and for this reason, Braddock was ordered to ‘diligently take all possible Measure to prevent the continuance of all such dangerous Practices, particularly that the French should not upon any Account whatever, be supplied with Provisions & c’.65 Unsurprisingly, while Braddock struggled to supply his army, the French enjoyed the use of stores provided by the colonials.66 In New York, for example, it was reported ‘that arms and Amunition had been daily sold by the people of the County of Albany to the french at Albany and Oswego – which arms and Amunition the french now made use of against the English at Ohio’. Although the parties implicated in the accusations declared their innocence, there remains some suspicion, as the Mayor of Albany was listed among them.67 While headquartered in Albany, St Clair had the opportunity to observe the mayor, whom he directly confronted, calling him ‘an Old disaffected Rascal’. When offering an explanation for the incident, St Clair remarked, ‘I did tell him so, and his Behaviour has plainly shewn he is the man I have described him.’68 As St Clair worked for the good of the service, such an action can only make one speculate what he may have discovered regarding the mayor’s activities. Although maritime trade with the enemy posed a difficult problem, overland trade though Albany was particularly troublesome. While colonial ships traded with the French by the use of open ports such as Monte Cristi and the alleged neutral islands in the Caribbean, the merchants at Albany attempted to establish a state of neutrality for the city so that trade could be conducted there in a similar manner.69 Colonel Israel Williams remarked of the situation: There is no Scruple, but the Ill Practices of the Dutch, together with the applications of the Enemy, has Influenc’d them to agree a Neutrality – How far

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758 the Dutch or the Mohawks have concernd themselves, and what their views & designs, if they have Interested themselves in the Negotiations, I will not take upon me to determine. There is no doubt to be made of their having agreed a Neutrality wt. ye Enemy, how far ye Dutch have Interested themselves in ye Negotation, on ye Mohawks, I will not take upon me to determine, the Ill practices & Example of their Neighbours, has had no Small Influence upon em – Its certain the People of Albany are determin’d at all adventures, to maintain a good Agreement with ye Canada Indians, in order to carry on their Trading.70

In reality, Albany provided a significant amount of supplies to the French. It was an arrangement which was extremely detrimental to the British war effort. Dinwiddie described the manner in which trade was conducted with the city: I also rec’d a Let’r from Capt. Rutherford, Com’d’r of one of the Ind’t Compa’s, Copy thereof You have here enclosed and as he ment’s a Neutrality being entered into between our Comiss’rs at Albany and the Caghnawaga Ind’s, the Chief Ind’n Nat’n belong’g to the Fr. Out of a lucrative View of conduct’g a Trade from Albany to Canada. This I conceiv’d to be a monstrous inconsist’t Neutrality and Trade, w’n the Fr. are at open War with us, made me resolve to write to the Gov’r of N. York to make strict Enquiry into the Conduct of the Albany Com’rs and recommended a Treaty with the Six Nat’s at Onondago and to engage the building some Forts in the Country for Y’r Protect’n and to engage them to take up the Hatchet ag’st the Fr. I have not yet rec’d an Answer from Mr. DeLancey. I think it my Duty to acqu’t You y’t all the Provis’s the Fr. have for conduct’s this unjust Invas’n on the Ohio is, as I am credibly inform’d, by a Supply from N. York and Phila’a. They carry large Qu’tys of Flour, Bread, Pork, Beef, &c., to Lewis’s (formerly called Cape Briton), where they sell it for Rum, Molasses, and Sugar, the Produce of their Islands. These Provis’s are convey’d from Lewisburg to Quebeck for the Support of their Forces, and sent to their different Forts on the Ohio.71

Ordered to put an end to such practices, Braddock immediately requested the governors ‘to lay an Embargo upon the Exportation of Provisions, in order to prevent Supplies being sent to the Enemy’. Reflecting upon the proceedings which were being carried on in Albany, Braddock commented, ‘I know not what Reasons Mr. DeLancey has to give for so extraordinary an Indulgence, but as it appears to me to be attended with very bad Consequences, I propose representing them to him in the strongest Manner.’72

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In addition to Albany, rumours circulated that Philadelphia was also heavily involved in trafficking supplies to the French. Reacting in a similar manner as done for New York, Braddock informed Deputy Governor Robert Hunter Morris to use his ‘utmost Endeavours for the present Service, particularly for exerting the Power of the Government in punishing, according to their Deserts, all, if any such are found, who shall be guilty of carrying on a traitorous Correspondence with the Enemy, by supplying Them with Provisions’.73 What made initial attempts at halting the trade problematic was that such proceedings were only illegal during a state of formal war. As both Britain and France were officially at peace, but technically at war, the colonials could exploit the law and legally trade with the French.74 Only when Britain formally declared war on 18 May 1756 was it officially illegal to continue such practices.75 During this time, however, Massachusetts attempted to set an example for the other colonies to follow. Oliver Partridge of the Assembly summarized, ‘we have put a Stop to that practice in this Government & have desired the Governour to write to all the Colonies in North America to do the Same’.76 Despite such efforts, smuggling continued well until the end of the war. Although overland trade was no longer possible after May 1756, when Britain officially declared war against France, the sea remained open. In this manner, the colonials seriously jeopardized the war effort in the pursuit of profit. In addition to supplying the French with provisions, the colonials were determined to use every possible venue available to make a profit at the expense of the British. For example, as preparations were underway for the relief of the near famine stricken garrison at Oswego, twenty days pay was advanced to the men at New York and Philadelphia ‘to hinder the People of Albany from raising the price of every thing the Battoemen may want’. It was further noted that such an action was something ‘which the Traders will certainly do’.77 It did not take long for this to happen and as St Clair attempted to secure wagons to transport provisions from Albany to Schenectady, the inhabitants in the vicinity quickly ‘raised the former Price of Waggonage from the usual price of 9 shillings a day to twelve’. Making matters worse, prices were increased further, amounting to a total of ‘Sixteen shillings a day’.78 Disgusted with the proceedings at Albany, St Clair remarked that the populace ‘were making a bold push to raise the prices of every thing to an exorbitant height’.79 Despite such negative perceptions of Albany, Perez Marsh of the Massachusetts provincials recorded, ‘I like The City & the People in generall, much better than I expected,: and believe them to be as hearty in the present Expedition, as Any of us.’ However, Marsh further added,

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this was ‘excepting two or three Gentlemen’, who were no doubt merchants involved in trade with the French.80 Although Albany merchants exploited the British army’s consumer demands, such practices occurred elsewhere on a similar scale. While stationed in Halifax, an outraged Lieutenant Colonel George Williamson recorded that he was charged ‘30 shillings a week for an empty room in an house no bigger than my Barrac room. 6 pence for a cucumber, 12 pence a pound veal. 6 pence mutton’.81 Interestingly, Williamson noted in an earlier letter that the same room was available at a price of 32 shillings, which means that it is possible that the landlord was arbitrarily assigning rent.82 On departing from Halifax, another officer, Lieutenant Francis Browne summarized, ‘I can’t say I am much concern’d at leaving Halifax, as it is a disagreeable place in itself and at the same Time extravagantly dear and expensive in every particular.’83 The colonials spared nothing in the search for profit and even drinking water became a charged commodity. Soon after his arrival in Virginia, Commodore Augustus Keppel was forced to order to his captains to ‘purchase Water from Time to Time while here, on the cheapest Terms possible’. This was due to the fact that ‘the several Watering Places’ were located on private property, and the navy was not permitted by the owners ‘to Water at them without being paid for the same’.84 Such an account is unusual, for not even in occupied Québec, where great care was taken to accommodate the French population, did the army pay for the use of a well.85 Under such circumstances, it may be assumed that the owners of the wells at Alexandria sought to take advantage of the concept of supply and demand as they controlled access to the precious well water. Faced by such profiteering, St Clair commented, ‘this difficulty daily encreases, and unless the Legislature provides against the Evils I complain off, I do not know what part to Act, nor indeed how to answer to my Country for what they may lay to my Charge on that Score’.86 Another area in which the colonials sought to obtain a profit at the army’s expense was in the distribution of alcohol. As William Hogarth captured in his satirical print, The March to Finchley, the army was notorious for drunkenness. Soon after Braddock’s forces arrived in Virginia, orders were issued that the men who had been enlisted or had been drafted into the regiments from Ireland would receive twenty shillings ‘for their Incoregment that they may do their Duty like good Soldiers’. However, soon afterwards orders were repeatedly issued regarding the treatment of intoxicated soldiers. Although some of the alcohol was produced and distributed by soldiers in collaboration with their wives, the colonials provided a significant amount themselves, which further

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explains the large numbers of inebriated soldiers found upon the march towards Fort Duquesne.87 Colonial suppliers of alcohol proved a nuisance to the army. Not only did they cause soldiers to become drunk, they also encouraged other harmful activities, such as desertion. General orders issued to the 44th Regiment at Albany recorded, ‘a Hutt under grownd near the General Hospital to be pulld down for Harbouring Soldiers & selling Them Liquor in the Night’. It was also added that ‘The Inhabitance to have Warning from the Regiment in Camp to Remove their Effects forth with.’ Evicting colonials from camp did little to stem the flow of alcohol, and further orders stated, ‘As some of the Women does sell them Rum after the Repeated orders given Against it They Are to be Warnd that the first Detected will be Confind & tryd.’ Despite such efforts to curtail the sale and consumption of alcohol, the situation became so serious that patrols were sent ‘round the Encampment Every half hour after Nine o Clock, for to see that all the lights are out in the Suttlers Tents’.88 In addition to the soldiers, colonials also sold alcohol to Amerindians. This was a very dangerous trade to both distributor and consumer, as the Amerindians believed that a person was not responsible for their behaviour while under the influence of ‘fire water’.89 So potent were the effects of alcohol, that St Clair issued orders stating, ‘if any person is found selling or giving strong Liquors to the Indians or buying their Provision they shall incur Military Execution, that is to say they shall have their houses razed as unworthy to live under His Majesty’s Government’. If the destruction of their homes was not enough to convince the colonials to stop, he further added that, ‘if any Indian is seen drunk every cask of Rum in Town shall be stove’.90 Although such punishments appear severe, and it is doubtful if they were enforced, St Clair nonetheless illustrates how important it was to keep the beverage away from Amerindians. Following the massacre at Fort William Henry, Colonel Louis Antoine de Bougainville immediately attributed the bloodshed to alcohol which had been left in the flasks belonging to the soldiers.91 As Sir William Johnson succinctly summarized its effects on Amerindians to the magistrates of Schenectady, ‘[Its distribution] may be of the utmost ill Consequence to the Welfare & safety of this Province.’92 While profits were made in the exchange of goods and services, the colonists also sought financial gain in the exchange of currency. Soon after Braddock’s forces arrived, such transactions were necessary for the advance towards Fort Duquesne. St Clair understood the necessity of procuring provincial banknotes as he informed Braddock, ‘I need not put your Excellency in mind that money is

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Wanting for every thing. If nothing else can be done, paper money of Maryland must be had, otherwise all our Carriages will be at a stop.’93 As these transactions were costly, Braddock wrote to Newcastle appealing for a large supply of ‘small coin’d Silver … for the payment of the Troops’. In need of the species as soon as possible, he sought ‘four or five thousand pounds in Piastrines and Half piastrines’, and added that this was all ‘the more necessary, as all the Money already brought over by the Regimental Paymasters is in Spanish Gold and Dollars’.94 Such a request was not unreasonable, as it is possible that the exchange rate for piastrines and half piastrines was more favourable. This, however, also illustrates that in currency exchange, it was also possible for a profit to be made at the expense of the British army. Regarding the Spanish gold and dollars which accompanied Braddock’s regimental paymasters, upon investigation by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, it was discovered that in Pennsylvania, ‘The disproportion between Spanish Gold at £4–£7¼ per Ounce, and Spanish Dollars at 5s 4½ per Ounce or 4s 8d each is very considerable.’ Likewise, it was also observed that ‘The disproportion of Value between Gold and Silver if received by weight in the Province of New York is still more unequal than in Pensilvania.’95 When British forces were deployed to South Carolina in 1757, the difficulties of the currency exchange were further highlighted by the experiences of Colonel Henry Bouquet. Soon after his arrival, Bouquet reported to Loudoun, ‘I have informed Mr. Hunter of the difficulty of Selling Bills in this Place, and desir’d him to send some Money in case of any further Supply, to keep up the Exchange, which is actually at 700 Pct.’ Although the exchange rate was favourable due to a ‘large Quantity of Rice and Indigo exported to England’, that had ‘brought the Exchange so low’, Bouquet was required to undertake the conversion at the higher rate of ‘4 & 8’ instead of ‘4 & 6’. He added, ‘I have some complaints about it, but I shall make no Change till it may be possible to receive your Ldships orders.’96 Until Loudoun intervened, the set rates remained in place as they were a device to prevent Deputy Paymasters and Contractors Agents from defrauding the army for profit.97 Fraud did occur, and among the various profiteers engaged in the monetary exchange, colonials were included. In carrying out a conversion with local money changers, Bouquet was convinced that they were attempting to exploit the army as they ‘asked 2 PCt. For the negotiating of the Bills, with the Condition to give the Bills beforehand’. Adding further suspicion to the transaction, instead of converting the full amount in one payment, the money changers would only pay Bouquet a quarterly sum. Believing the negotiation to be unfavourable,

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and having sufficient funds for the time being, Bouquet refused their offer and requested that cash be sent to him in the form of Dollars or Pistoles. Bouquet stated that his reason for this decision was because, ‘The Dollar goes for 31 Shilgs, & the Pistole for £5, 15. this Currency.’98 Returning to Braddock’s request to Newcastle for ‘four or five thousand pounds in Piastrines and Half piastrines’, it appears that Braddock was attempting to conduct a similar transaction as Bouquet.99 Despite such efforts, the British army was at the mercy of the colonial money changers. Bouquet recorded an encounter with local merchants in Charlestown: I am sorry Mr. Hunter had not received the Letter I wrote to him in June last, before he desired yr. [Lordship] to order Bills instead of Species. This put me to some Inconveniences as I find no body here who will negotiate the Bills for Less than 2 PCt. Which would not be the case if I had received part in Specie, having reasons to suspect that the chief Merchts. Have agreed to force me to comply wth. Their Terms. I have kept up to this day the Exch.a, at 700 PCt. But with so much Trouble, and in such a precarious way, that there is no dependance upon it for the future. Mr. B. Smith the speaker is the only Man I could find who would engage even at 2 PCt. to find constantly the Money. After 4 Month’s Experience I do not see any other Way for the Contractors than to allow the said 2 PCent, or to send half of the Sums in Specie to give time to sell the Bills occasionally. If they would write themselves to some Merch.ts here, they might perhaps indice them to undertake it at 1 PCent, but I declare that I can find no body that will do it. I mention all this to Mr. Hunter, who must be sensible that if the Bills could be negotiated for 1 PCent. I would not take upon me the trouble and Risk of receiving & keeping Money.100

Not only was it possible to be cheated in the exchange of bills, but also in the receipt of funds, a problem which Bouquet mentions. While engaged in a similar transaction, St Clair received ‘A great No. of the Pieces of Eight’ which were described as having ‘a Very bad look’. Much in the same manner as Bouquet with Smith, St Clair was forced to accept the coins ‘else no one wou’d have taken them’. As the army was clearly being cheated, St Clair remarked that such practices were ‘a most horrid imposition’.101 Not only did the colonials exploit the army financially, they also failed to provide proper quarters for the soldiers. In New York, for example, Loudoun was directly involved in securing barracks for a battalion of his troops with little success. Neither the officers or private men received proper quarters, which gave him ‘great uneasiness’. Reflecting on the behaviour of the inhabitants of New

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York, Loudoun referred to them as ‘most undutiful Subjects’ and remarked, ‘I wish those Gentlemen who dispute the Point of Quarters, would Consider, that altho, in time of Peace, Quartering of Troops is Confined to Publick houses, yet that in time of War, the Practice has always been, in every Country without Exception, that no house has been exempt from Quartering the Troops.’ On this point he further added, ‘from this Rule the People of the first Fashion in England, have not been exempted’.102 Loudoun’s experience was not uncommon. In South Carolina, a frustrated Bouquet reported, ‘I met here with the same difficulty as in Philadelphia, but not the same unwillingness. We have no Quarters fitted out, and if they do not build Barracks, we shall be very badly accommodated, having no beds, nor Straw, nor any thing to lie upon.’103 Ideas were entertained about restricting the quartering of troops to public houses, however, this was impracticable as it was reported that in New York ‘Nineteen in Twenty of the Publick Houses in this Country, are no more than Gin Shops, where Men cannot be Quarter’d.’104 Adding further difficulties for the army, Secretary at War, Henry Fox, insisted that the colonies provide both quarters and bedding for the troops, while the colonists disagreed.105 As officers struggled to secure quarters for their men, Bouquet remarked ‘that too great a Tenderness for the people, & too strict an adherence to forms in such Circumstances might be of great prejudice to the Troops’. Bouquet further added, ‘if the Men had been divided among the inhabitants, till other Quarters could have been provided for them, nobody would have suffer’d much by it, and we should naturally have saved half of the Men lost by Death or Desertion’.106 In the struggle against France, the colonial Americans were necessary but problematic allies to the British. Braddock’s orders clearly demonstrated their importance, as they were essential in bolstering his under-strength regiments from Ireland.107 During the aftermath of the siege and massacre at Fort William Henry, the colonials again proved their worth, as they quickly and efficiently mobilized to assist in the defence of Albany. With the change in policy orchestrated by Pitt in 1758, the colonies enthusiastically entered the struggle against France.108 Unsurprisingly, by contributing such significant numbers of troops, colonials played an important role in bringing the war to a successful conclusion.109 Despite such praise for the colonials, they were also guilty of assisting the French both directly and indirectly. In supplying the French, for the sake of profit, merchants severely jeopardized the war effort as they maintained a supply of provisions for the French army, while the British navy attempted to prevent their arrival from Europe. In addition, the exorbitant prices charged to the British

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by the colonials meant that although they supplied the army, they received an additional profit by exploiting the fundamental ideas of capitalism, supply and demand. Capitalizing upon every possible scenario, the colonials understood that they enjoyed the benefits of a captive consumer, the British army. Despite such unscrupulous behaviour, the colonials were vital to the British war effort, even if they were at times problematic allies.

4

How Important Were the Native Americans?

Certain people are talking a lot about going home. They never made war in Canada before 1755. They never had gone to camp. To leave Montreal with a party, to go through the woods, to take a few scalps, to return at full speed once the blow was struck, that is what they called war, a campaign, success, victory. Now war is established here on the European basis. Projects for the campaign, for armies, for artillery, for sieges, for battles. It no longer is a matter of making a raid, but of conquering or being conquered. Colonel Louis Antoine de Bougainville, 29 July 17581 When discussing the utility of Amerindian allies in the North American wilderness, it is inevitable that the comparison between American and European-style warfare emerges. At the outbreak of the war, battles were primarily conducted in the American fashion, or la petite guerre, and it was for this reason that both the British and French sought to rally Amerindian support. As will be discussed in a later chapter, France relied primarily upon Amerindian manpower for the defence of Canada, as well as their campaign of psychological warfare. While France enjoyed an overwhelming majority of Amerindian support during the initial stages of the war, Britain continuously sought their services in an attempt to counterbalance the situation. To achieve this aim, governors, assemblies, soldiers and even ministers in Whitehall placed great emphasis on securing tribes to the British interest.2 However, despite their considerable efforts, Amerindians did not play a crucial role in the turn of events which led to the victories of 1758. Until then, the vast sums of money and valuable time spent in conducting conferences with Amerindians proved a poor investment. Ultimately, funds were better used in securing more reliable irregulars, who were subject to military discipline. Although Amerindians were vital to the defence of Canada, as Bougainville observed, the manner in which war was waged in North America changed dramatically during this conflict.

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Frontier skirmishes, though bloody, brutal and frightening, did little to alter the outcome of the war, which was determined by battles fought in the conventional European mode. As it was unknown during the initial stages of the war that European-style warfare would decide the fate of North America, both the British and French placed great emphasis on the abilities of Amerindian allies. Indeed, Captain Robert Stobo believed that Amerindians alone could capture Fort Duquesne without the assistance of any British regulars. In a message smuggled to the commandant at Wills Creek out of the French fortress, Stobo advised, ‘Strike this fall as soon as possible make the Indians ours, prevent intelligence, get the best, and it’s done. One hundred trusty Indians might Surprise this fort they have access all Day & night Lodge themselves so that they might secure the Guard with their tomahawks shut the Sally gate & the Fort’s ours.’3 Perhaps Stobo later viewed his suggestion with indignation, as Amerindians exposed him and his plans to the French fort’s commandant.4 As indicated by Stobo’s fate, Amerindians provided the French with vital intelligence, in addition to scouts and numerous warriors. For this reason, tremendous efforts were made by the British to secure their services for scouting and intelligence purposes. In reality, as France maintained considerable influence over the majority of the Amerindian tribes, which was further enhanced by Braddock’s defeat, the most the British could hope to secure were peaceful neighbours.5 While the French enjoyed dominance over the Amerindians, the British had to seek an alternative replacement. As a result, Amerindians did little to assist British military forces during the initial stages of the war and were substituted by other irregulars such as Highlanders, colonial scouts, rangers and light infantry. With the exception of the light infantry, which made its debut on the battlefield in 1758, it was largely left to these other irregulars to counter Amerindian war parties until then. As Amerindian diplomacy was unreliable due to profiteering and broken promises by unfriendly tribes, it was necessary for the British to take such measures. Ultimately, with British substitutes conducting themselves effectively in the wilderness, Amerindians contributed little in turning the war in favour of Britain and were not as vital to success as they have been portrayed.

The results of Amerindian diplomacy Throughout the duration of the war, both the British and the French sought to gather significant numbers of Amerindian allies by means of diplomacy. In

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this contest, however, the Amerindians were not unaware of their importance and acted much in the same manner as mercenaries who sought the employer who would provide them with the most pay, which was for their purposes, trade goods and gifts. As this was the key to Amerindian diplomacy, both sides spent exorbitant sums of money in an attempt to secure their services. In addition, not only was profit a decisive factor in securing Amerindian allegiance, but also martial success and the faction that provided both would be ensured of their support. As a result, only when the French began suffering defeats on the battlefield, and were unable to supply customary presents and food, did the British receive any significant Amerindian support. The Amerindians were not pawns played by Britain and France but were players themselves who fought for their own interests, which included the protection of their lands and peoples, as well as vital supplies.6 Since it was desirous to have Amerindians as allies rather than enemies, great emphasis was placed upon securing them to the British interest. In order to achieve this aim, Braddock was dispatched to North America with orders to ‘cultivate the best Harmony & Friendship possible’ with the Amerindian chiefs. He was further instructed to create the position of ‘Superintendent of Indian Affairs’ with two separate departments divided between the northern and southern colonies.7 By establishing two separate posts, Amerindian affairs were supposed to be more organized and effective in securing allies for Britain. Ultimately, of the two superintendents, only the Northern Department under the direction of Sir William Johnson proved somewhat successful in its endeavours with the Mohawks of the Six Nations of Iroquois. This was largely due to Johnson’s ability to function as a cultural broker. Throughout his dealings with the tribe, he not only respected their customs and rituals, but also distributed gifts in the spirit of mutual friendship, demonstrating his commitment to the Covenant Chain.8 In addition, two factors which assisted Johnson in securing Mohawk loyalty were that he was a sachem of the Six Nations and had as his consort Molly Brant, the daughter of another prominent sachem. However, Molly’s role as an additional mediator between the British and Mohawks did not take effect until towards the latter end of the war, as Johnson met her in 1755. Nonetheless, her influence, no doubt, played an important role in obtaining Iroquois support for the 1758 campaign.9 During the initial stages of the war, Johnson met with some success in securing Mohawk allies. In July of 1755, it was reported that ‘About five Hundred of the Six Nations have taken up the Hatchet.’10 As the war continued, it became increasingly difficult to secure Amerindian aid, due to the interference of Shirley

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and the defeat of Braddock. As a result, at his headquarters on Lake George, Johnson received only 200 warriors, led by Chief Hendrick of the Mohawks, for the expedition against Crown Point. At this time, Johnson could rely only upon Hendrick and the Anglican missionary, John Ogilvie, who had some influence over a small number of Oneidas.11 Unfortunately for the British, following Hendrick’s death during the Bloody Morning Scout, Amerindian assistance momentarily ended. Such displays of support would not reappear until the campaign season of 1758, when Johnson himself led a sizeable contingent of Mohawks to join Major General James Abercromby’s disastrous campaign against Fort Carillon.12 In contrast to the North, the Southern Department under the direction of Edmond Atkin performed poorly. While Johnson could afford to conduct business primarily through his Mohawk relations in order to influence the Six Nations, Atkin negotiated with various separate tribes. Additionally, unlike Johnson who had the support of Hendrick, and later his wife Molly, Atkin could rely only on the assistance of his deputy, Christopher Gist.13 Further coupling this problem, Loudoun distrusted Atkin and refused to provide funds on the same scale as furnished to Johnson.14 In performing his duties as Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Atkin failed miserably. Despite General John Forbes’s urgent request that Atkin attend to a large gathering of Amerindians at Winchester, he dispatched his deputy instead, who spent ‘great summs of money to no manner of purpose’. Reflecting on the outcome, Forbes remarked, ‘I had bad hopes of his manadgment, which the return of the whole Indians plainly evinces.’15 Atkin achieved very little, and the majority of the Southern Amerindians were secured by the efforts of William Byrd III, who was appointed unofficial Superintendent by Loudoun. Although officially Atkin’s assistant, Byrd was instructed to operate independently, excluding the real Superintendent as much as possible.16 Such measures were not inappropriate as Atkin was a hindrance to military operations. Byrd reported to Loudoun soon after his arrival in Charlestown: I immediately waited on Governor Littleton with the dispatches. He received me very politely & assur’d me he would do every thing in his power to forward the business I came on. He had just received a letter from Mr. Atkins dated at Willmington on Cape Fear, in which he told him he had been extremely ill, but was recovering & hoped next day to be able to come down stairs & in a short time to get to Charles Town, however he has not yet come, neither would he be able to undertake a journey to Keauee if he was here. I apprehend all difficulties in regard to him are removed by his absence & indisposition. The Indian goods your Lordship order’d to be deliver’d to Mr. Atkins at York were shipp’d from

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thence by that gentleman to his correspondent here as private property. They are lodg’d in his house with his other effects & can by no means be got at till he comes. However if he was here, ’tis the governor’s opinion & mine it would delay the expedition too long.17

Although Atkin was criticized for his failure to secure Amerindian allies, Byrd’s mission to Keowee was unsuccessful. Despite numerous efforts to secure allies for Forbes’s expedition, all that Byrd could organize were a mere fifty-nine Cherokees.18 In contrast to 1755, George Croghan supplied Braddock with an initial force of fifty Mingos.19 Reflecting on the results of his efforts, Byrd lamented, ‘I have done all in my power to forward it, but fear I shall not at least be able to carry a sufficient body of savages to be of any great service.’20 While the Superintendents of Indian Affairs struggled to secure allies, results were disheartening. Criticizing the behaviour of both Johnson and Atkin, Forbes remarked, ‘Sickness may have prevented their personal attendance, but surely they might have sent some person versed in Indian Affairs to have assisted in the manadgement of the savages, or they might have sent their opinion in writing how we were to proceed but we have not had the scrape of a pen from either.’21 As indicated by Forbes, British officers were left with the responsibility of conducting Amerindian diplomacy. As Johnson occupied himself with his Mohawk relations, and Atkin accomplished almost nothing, the majority of Amerindians were generally neglected. Commenting on the disregard which had been shown to a large party of Cherokees, Forbes declared how astonishing it was ‘to see the greatest body of Indians ever assembled in our Interest, totally neglected by two Gentlemen employed by Government for the manadgment of those Indians’.22 Ultimately, as the Superintendents of Indian Affairs performed their duties poorly, Amerindian diplomacy became a responsibility of the British army. Throughout the duration of the war, the British army played a key role in the management of Amerindian affairs. Both their arrival and performance on the battlefield had a tremendous effect upon securing Amerindians to the British war effort. This was a lesson well understood by Louis de Buade, comte de Frontenac, who employed this tactic successfully during the Five Nations War with the expedition against the town of Onondaga in 1696. Although Frontenac’s forces did not engage in any battle, the appearance of a formidable army at Onondaga was enough to break Iroquois supremacy in the region.23 Braddock clearly understood the impact of such martial displays and knew that the presence and performance of his regulars would significantly influence

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Amerindian relations. Soon after his arrival in Virginia, Braddock informed Sir Thomas Robinson of the situation: It is likewise impossible for me, Sir, to give You any certain Account of the French Force upon the river Ohio; if any Thing can be collected from the various Reports of ‘em, it is that their numbers exceed 3,000, the greatest Part of which are Indians; It is universally agreed that all the Tribes of the Iroquois are gone over to their Interest except the Mohawks; Govr. Dinwiddie has great Expectation that these will join Us, as well as the Catawbas a Warlike Nation, tho’ few in Number; & Some of the Cheroquse; All the other Southern Nations seem to be at present in Alliance with the French, but as their Attachment is attributed to the late Superiority of the Enemy, it may be hoped that the Appearance of Our Army, or at least any Advantage gained over them; may make a great Alteration in their Dispositions.24

Not surprisingly, it was believed that the massive influx of troops from Britain, along with a quick victory, would shift Amerindian support from the French to the British. As Dinwiddie asserted, ‘I do not despair of their declaring themselves (when they see our regular Troops) in our Favour.’25 However, Braddock’s defeat at the Monongahela miscarried this plan, and the failure of his army to capture Fort Duquesne ensured that the French would continue to enjoy Amerindian support. As Braddock had foreseen, the performance of the British army had a tremendous impact on Amerindian affairs and proved the deciding factor which prompted many tribes to flock to the white flag of the Bourbons after the defeats at the Monongahela in 1755 and Oswego in 1756. Reflecting on the disastrous effects of Braddock’s campaign, Colonel Ephraim Williams lamented, ‘the defeat of Braddock has had Such Effect on them that their has not yet above sixty Join’d us’.26 After the fall of Oswego in 1756, Amerindian affairs reached a nadir, and tribes from as far away as Iowa began flocking to join the forces of LouisJoseph Gozon de Saint-Véran, marquis de Montcalm, who had been described among them as ‘this famous man who, on putting his foot on the ground, has destroyed the English ramparts’.27 Owing to the reputation Montcalm acquired for himself through his previous victories, from the onset of the 1757 campaign season, he commanded a total of 2,000 Amerindians from thirty-three different tribes for his offensive against Fort William Henry.28 For this reason, as Forbes awaited news of the siege of Louisbourg in 1758, he remarked, ‘a little good news from thence might be of great service to us at present to Counterballence the many great lies that the French have already spread among the Indians, of the Advantages they gained at Lake George’.29

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Although great emphasis was placed upon the success of the army, officers were required to conduct Amerindian diplomacy as they marched through the wilderness. A seaman accompanying the expedition against Fort Duquesne in 1755 described one of Braddock’s encounters: Orders for a Council of War at the Head Quarters when the Indians came and were received by the Guard with Rested Arms, and Interpreter was directed to tell them that their Brothers, the English, who were their friends, were come to assist them, that every misunderstanding in past times, should now be buried under that great Mountain (which was close by) And Accordingly the Ceremony was perform’d in giving them a string of Wampum or Beads, and the following speech was made to Assure them that this string or Belt of Wampum was a suriety of our Friendship; and likewise a Declaration that every one who were Enemies to them were consequently so to us. The Interpreter likewise assured them, that we had a Considerable Number of Men to the No. Ward under the Commands of our great War Captains Generals, Shirley, Pepperel & Johnson that were making preparations for War to settle them happily in their Countries, and make the French both ashamed & hungry however, should any Indians absent themselves they would be deemed our Enemies & treated as such; The Generals moreover told them, he should have presents for them soon, and would then make them another Speech, after which he parted with giving a Dram round.

Although the ceremony was not as elaborate as those conducted at Albany, Fort Johnson or even in Canada, without any knowledge of Amerindian affairs, Braddock attempted to preside over negotiations to the best of his ability. On receiving word that the Amerindians agreed to join his forces, in a gesture to honour them, Braddock ordered some of his artillery to be fired as a salute, which was accompanied by fife and drum music.30 Clearly Braddock had the best intentions, and even when suffering from a shortage of wagons to carry sufficient provisions for the expedition, he maintained at all times, ‘one Waggon of Indian Presents’. Indeed, the gifts were necessary, as Braddock conferred with various tribes while his column marched towards Fort Duquesne.31 Although Braddock has been accused of giving his potential allies a ‘frosty reception’, it must be remembered that he was unfamiliar with the practices of Amerindian diplomacy.32 While engaging in diplomacy with the Amerindians, great care needed to be exercised in order to conduct negotiations properly. From the perspective of the French, Bougainville recorded how delicate encounters could be: The Ottawa Indians having learned that M. Marin had left Carillon to make a raid with the Menominees, were discontented. They said that they had arrived

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758 first at Montreal, that they remained there peacefully only to obey the orders of the Governor, that of all the Indian nations [they were] the most tractable, that they made of their father’s wishes a sacred duty, and that it was not fair that other Indians, arrived later than they, should make the first steps in the career of honor, while obedience alone had held them from action ever since the spring thaw. The commandant at Michilimackinac had scarcely left them time to put their cabins in order before, told by him that the French had need of their aid, they immediately rolled their blankets and hastened to Montreal, the first to get there. Thus they should be the first to drink the broth. These moves make one appreciate the ticklishness of [dealing with] these Indians. It is a point of honor with them that anyone who offends them or appears to offend them is forever an object of reproach among them, and here is what causes murders by drunken Indians.33

Familiar only with British culture, and attempting to engage in deliberations with people of a different background, Braddock’s attempt is a perfect example of a culture clash, which ended with the Amerindians feeling mistreated. As indicated by Bougainville’s observations, it was easy to offend the Amerindians. Braddock was not a cultural broker, unlike Captain Pierre Pouchot who maintained an open mind towards the culture of his Amerindian allies while stationed at the French outpost at Niagara.34 Among the British, officers such as Colonel John Bradstreet, who was open to Amerindian culture and could boast of being ‘a Sacheme of the Six Nations of Indians’, were capable of conducting Amerindian affairs in a similar manner as Pouchot.35 Unlike Pouchot, Braddock had little time to immerse himself in Amerindian culture, as he had other duties to fulfil as commander-in-chief, which explains why he failed in his dealings with them. His behaviour was misunderstood and despite his efforts, many Amerindians promised to join him and never returned.36 Although Braddock has been vilified for his behaviour towards potential allies, the Amerindians were equally responsible for what was more than likely a cultural misunderstanding.37 Ultimately, behaviour such as Braddock’s provided an excuse for the Amerindians to hide their true intentions, which was to gain the utmost profit from both the French and British. As the Amerindians knew that both parties desired their services, they were perfectly comfortable exacting the highest price while opposing government officials provided them with a vast assortment of presents at conferences in order to secure their support. Some smaller tribes, such as the River Indians and Schaghticokes were dependent on these conferences for survival.38 It was not uncommon for Amerindians to confer with British officials, accept the presents which were provided for them and then depart for Canada

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in order to secure additional gifts from the French. In this exchange of goods for services, some Amerindians outwardly boasted of French generosity. On receiving presents from the British during a conference held at Albany in 1754, one Oneida boldly remarked, ‘Had We But gon to Canada, there We Would have got handsome Presents, the french Understands the Indian Affairs Better than Your People Does, they are more generous; and that Draws the Affections of the Indians (from You) to them.’ Displaying further contempt he added, ‘Consider What Quantity of Goods We Would have Got if We had Gone to Canada.’39 Although the French provided the Amerindians with the goods they desired, a disgusted Bougainville complained, ‘Council upon council with the Indians; mosquitoes a thousand times more troublesome then the real ones. Cruel war by them on sheep, poultry, wine, spirits, and on all such things.’40 For British officers on campaign, efforts to engage the Amerindians in conferences proved an unproductive enterprise. After an ill-fated attempt to secure their services during the march towards Fort Duquesne in 1758, Forbes bemoaned, ‘[The Indians] have left us in a most Scandalous manner, at the very time when they might have been of Service, after having had all kinds of good usage, Cloaths, presents, &c. given to them, and so strictly I made adhere to all promises that I even gave them their stipulated presents, after they had left and abandoned us.’41 Forbes had much reason to complain as enormous expense and effort went into the gathering and distribution of presents, contrary to Amerindian claims that the French provided them in abundance.42 Among the numerous items organized were 50,000 wampum, 5,500 gunflints, 1,235 shirts, 1,000 tomahawks, 500 powder horns, 433 guns, 104 kettles and 100 bracelets.43 Additionally, prior to a conference with a contingent of 1,000 Cherokees, an estimated £8,000 worth of goods were demanded.44 The Amerindians used the practice of gift giving for their own benefit. It was a custom that was open to exploitation and considerable abuse. Governor James Glen of South Carolina observed: As for Indian Affairs I saw that those with Byrd were entirely spoil’d and ruined and therefore I avoided intermeddling with them from the beginning. Mr. Campbel came hither with 2 or 10 of them three or four dayes ago their pretext of coming was to get some necessaries altho they needed none having already received Blankets Shirts leggings some Silver Gorgets Armplates paint Gunnes powder Bullets they behaved with the greatest insolence insisting to have over and above the 40 wt. of Leather for staying with us the Campaign 156 silver Gorgets as many silver Armplates as many wristbands 56000 Wampum near 300 Match coats &c &c and that as [If] twelve of their people were ill they were immediately

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758 to go home and if they had got this they would have asked 50 times more but all the while They were debauching and caballing with the Indians here the best and most orderly ones that ever I saw they have prevailed on thirty to leave us but they refused to go to Cumberland but propose to proceed to Fort Loudoun below and try to get the Presents that are laid up for them and then go off.45

Appearing to negotiate with British forces on the march, the Amerindians took full advantage of the situation because they knew how badly their services were desired. Such treatment was not limited to the British, even the French received similar usage. Upon his arrival at Fort Carillon in June 1758, Bougainville discovered that only fourteen Amerindians were present at the fortress. On their conduct, Bougainville bemoaned that they were ‘extremely insolent’, attempted ‘to kill all the General’s hens’ and helped themselves to barrels of wine and the small number of cattle that were at the fort. Disgusted with their disrespectful behaviour, Bougainville exclaimed, ‘and we must put up with it. What a country! What a war!’ The gravity of Bougainville’s comments is further understood by the state of the French army at the time of this incident. Provisions were extremely scarce, and French soldiers were reduced to a ration of a half-pound of either beef or horse meat.46 Fully aware of the exploitation that was taking place at the hands of the Amerindians, one British officer succinctly summarized, ‘They join your standard with the sole View of Profit.’47 Disgusted with the behaviour of the Amerindians who had joined his expedition, unlike his predecessors, Forbes resorted to a more direct approach to diplomacy. When the Cherokees who had accompanied his forces began to commit outrages similar to those experienced by Bougainville, Forbes conducted negotiations in a different manner: Colo Byrd’s Indians left him at Fort Cumberland 10 days ago, and are gone home, those Indians at Raystown are following them fast 50 of them having left Colo Bouquet the day before yesterday; he writes me they were to come to Fort Loudoun to demand the presents designed for them and laid by there for them till the latter end of the Campaign, where if they were refused they would undoubtedly commit some outrage, and therefore advises the giving of them those Presents – As I have no mortal about me that understands Indian affairs or their Genius, I therefore immediately Detached Major Grant with 200 Highlanders to Fort Loudoun to represent to them in moderate terms how Grosly they had abused and imposed upon us for so many months and now to leave us at the only time they could be of any Service to us, that the Value of their presents was nothing to the King of England and that altho we had both the power and justice on our side to have retained those presents yet we freely gave

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them in order to Show their nations that every promise made on our part would have been fulfilled and any services done us would over and above have met with suitable rewards, he is likewise to try if they will still stay with us, but if he finds they will not he is to caution them against all outrage and Violence against the Inhabitants of the Countrys they may pass thro.48

By dispatching Grant with a detachment of Highlanders to deliver such a message, Forbes was attempting to compel the Amerindians to obey. Additionally, the presence of the Highlanders was also an attempt to confront savages with savages. On this tactic, Forbes commented, ‘if the seeing of our Cannon and their Cousins the Highlanders has no Effect upon their stay with us, we shall lose the best part of our strength’.49 The use of threats, accompanied with a sufficient military force which could enforce them, was a last recourse. Certainly, the threat of military action would have been considered an affront to the Amerindians, as was Montcalm’s intervention during the massacre at Fort William Henry.50 However, because it was obvious that the Amerindians had taken advantage of the British, Forbes’s actions are unsurprising. Frustrated, he referred to such proceedings as nothing more than ‘foolish Indian Affairs’.51 Ultimately, the management and outcome of Amerindian affairs was disappointing to the British. As the few Amerindians that joined proved extremely troublesome, British officers maintained a low opinion of them.52 Unsurprisingly, this attitude was not uncommon among officers of both sides. Pouchot remarked, ‘the principal reason for their conduct derives from the fact that they understand very well the advantage of adhering to the stronger side, for, although some of them are genuinely fond of us, they only like Europeans in relation to their own self-interest’.53 During the initial stages of the war, the majority of Amerindians believed that it was in their best interest to ally themselves with the French. As St Clair informed Braddock soon after his arrival in Virginia, ‘I am afraid the French have drawn most of them over to their Interest, espesually the 6 Nations. We may expect to see a great number of them, but never to feel them.’54 In reality, the British would never benefit as the French did from the support of large contingents of Amerindians. Lacking Amerindian support, an alternative source of irregulars needed to be found elsewhere.

Attempts to substitute Amerindian manpower During the War of the Austrian Succession and the ’45 Rebellion, British officers gained considerable experience in dealing with the use of irregulars as allies and

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adversaries during campaigns on the Continent and in Scotland. At this time, it was quite common to encounter a striking assortment of irregulars, such as Pandours, Hussars, Croats, Grassins and Highlanders. Although they differed greatly in appearance, what these forces had in common was the perception that they were all savages.55 During the 1743 campaign in Flanders, a British soldier remarked, ‘[The] irregular Troops … Croats, Hussars, Pandours etc … are encamped by themselves … and their looks represent a wild and Savage Fierceness. All Night they lie on the Ground without Tents or Straw; in the Day they Dance and exercise themselves with running and throwing Stones of 20lb. Weight.’ On their conduct on the battlefield he added, ‘They openly declare that when they once get on French Ground, they will give no Quarter either to Man or Child … Yesterday a Body of about 1000 … cut in pieces [in a skirmish] some Frenchmen … and brought away their Heads.’56 In comparison to France’s Amerindian allies, such a description of the behaviour of the European irregulars greatly resembles the observations and interpretations of Amerindian practices during the Seven Years’ War. After the siege of Fort William Henry, Père Joseph Antoine Roubaud witnessed an Amerindian emerge from one of the fort’s casemates carrying a human head, similar to what the British soldier observed in Flanders.57 Likewise, when Braddock’s troops encountered Amerindians for the very first time, much like the Hussars, Croats and Pandours described in 1743, they too danced ‘making the most hideous noise’.58 With such a general conception of the idea of savagery existing at the time, it is unsurprising that during the initial stages of the war, suggestions were made to employ Croats to fight the Amerindians.59 Ultimately, as Scottish Highlanders were more readily available than Croats, they proved to be Britain’s solution to fight savages with savages in the North American wilderness. Additionally, there were attempts to create other forces to substitute the Amerindians. Colonial militia were used in the capacity of scouts, rangers were organized to fight in the manner of la petite guerre and regulars were given some training in irregular warfare which eventually led to the development of the elite light infantry. In the end, without the support of Amerindians, the British army relied upon these irregulars to successfully counter those of the French. From the outbreak of hostilities, ideas were entertained of using Highlanders to oppose the Amerindians. Although they were regulars, the idea of employing them as irregulars immediately arose due to their unique culture of warfare. Writing to a friend stationed in Acadia in 1751, Lieutenant Colonel James Wolfe remarked, ‘that two or three independent Highland companies might be of use’

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to combat Amerindians harassing the garrison at Halifax. In addition, Wolfe further added that ‘they are hardy, intrepid, accustomed to a rough country, and no great mischief if they fall’. Although Wolfe’s views were unquestionably seen through the eyes of a veteran of the ’45 Rebellion, he clearly understood the benefits of using Highlanders as he believed that ‘great attempts’ would be made against the British outpost.60 His foresight was not mistaken, for upon viewing a regiment soon after his arrival in Halifax in 1758, Wolfe commented, ‘The Highlanders are very useful serviceable soldiers, and commanded by the most manly corps of officers I ever saw.’61 When hostilities began in 1754, the potential of the Highlanders was immediately recognized. Soon after receiving pleas from Dinwiddie for British troops to serve in North America, ministers in London considered sending the 42nd Highland Regiment, or Black Watch, along with several independent companies of Highlanders. However, the idea was abandoned due to George II’s unwillingness to part with any British regiment for service in North America.62 Consequently, this led to the dispatch of the two under-strength Irish regiments which met with disaster at the Monongahela, while facing an adversary who primarily employed irregulars. As a result, it was not until the summer of 1756 that the first contingents of Highlanders began to appear in North America.63 Upon their arrival in the colonies, officers were confident in the military capabilities of the Highlanders. Reflecting upon their state, Loudoun remarked to Cumberland, ‘The Highland Regiment will be a good one next Year, but they have not near two hundred Men left of their old Ones.’64 The lack of a core group of veterans, a problem which effected the 50th and 51st Regiments, was not an issue to Cumberland who replied ‘As to the Highland Regiment, they have an excellent officer at their head: and, if they have but a Couple of Hundred of old Flanderkins in the Battalion, I shall look upon it as a pretty good one.’65 During the 1758 campaign against Fort Duquesne, Forbes looked favourably upon his Highlanders.66 Additionally, in 1760, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Murray was so pleased with the Highland Regiment under his command that he remarked he ‘would not Exchange it for the Royal’. Interestingly, while Highlanders at that time were commonly perceived as savages, Murray declared, ‘You would be pleased to see the harmony and decency in appearance of the Stirling Bodys, so clean, sober and neat, and do their Manoeuvres like Clock work.’67 In appearance alone, the Highlanders portrayed a strong image of martial masculinity.68 Such confidence in the abilities of the Highlanders was well founded. Militarily, they were extremely effective and were well known and feared among the French as Les Sauvages d’Ecosse. In the same manner as the Highlanders

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terrified British troops at Prestonpans and Falkirk, the French found themselves equally unnerved at Carillon, Louisbourg and Québec.69 At Carillon, Bougainville noted that during the ill-fated assault, the ‘English grenadiers and Scottish Highlanders, returned unceasingly to the attack, without becoming discouraged or broken, and several got themselves killed within fifteen paces of our abatis.’70 Such resoluteness under such heavy fire, which was described by one observer as ‘prodigiously hot’, possibly alarmed a number of Montcalm’s men.71 Indeed, the punishment which the Highlanders endured at Carillon was very similar to conditions experienced at the Battle of Culloden in 1746. During the course of that battle, while British soldiers executed a murderous fire of grapeshot and musketry, the Highlanders continued to advance, with some succeeding in reaching the British lines to use their broadswords with grisly effects.72 Returning to the war in North America, an officer of the 55th Foot who witnessed the Highlanders on the battlefield of Carillon recorded, ‘Impatient for orders they actually mounted the enemy’s entrenchments, which, when advancing, and effected, they appeared like roaring lions breaking from their chains.’ Reflecting on their conduct, he added, ‘I shall forever fear the wrath, love the integrity, and admire the bravery of Scotsman.’73 Despite the failure of the attack, a small number of Highlanders still managed to use their broadswords as they did at Culloden.74 Such displays of persistence and unrelenting determination secured victories against both regular and irregular foes. At Louisbourg, the Highlanders proved more successful, as the terrain was favourable to their methods of fighting, allowing them to dispatch the French defenders with the use of their broadswords.75 At Québec, the effects of the Highlanders on French regulars were very similar to those endured by British regulars at Prestonpans and at Falkirk.76 After the platoons fired their muskets, and the Highlanders threw down their guns to unleash the Highland charge, the French fled the field so quickly that they were ‘Pursued within Musquet shot of their walls and scarce look’d behind till they had got within them.’77 Although lacking Amerindian allies, the British deployed the Highlanders in a similar manner as the French did their Amerindians, effectively causing chaos amongst regulars. In countering the Amerindians, the Highlanders were effective substitutes. During the 1758 campaign against Fort Duquesne, Forbes attempted to intercept a considerably large force of Amerindians who were in the vicinity of Shippensburg by deploying 300 Highlanders to lay an ambush for them.78 Although the Highlanders were unsuccessful in this attempt to entrap the Amerindian war party, they were nonetheless employed in the same manner

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as they had been by the Jacobites in Scotland during the ’45. Placing a force of Highlanders to ensnare a group of skulking Amerindians was a feasible idea, as this was a tactic already tried and tested in the previous war against other irregulars, both in Scotland and on the Continent.79 When engaged in combat with Amerindian forces, the Highlanders proved themselves to be brave and effective fighters. Such behaviour is best exemplified by an account of a Highlander in comparison to two Pennsylvania provincials. Without orders, the party ventured out of camp to hunt for wild game. During the course of their expedition, they were ‘attacked by four Indians. The Highlander stood his ground and fired three shots, but he was killed and scalped. The two others fled like cowards, throwing away their weapons’.80 Although the Highlander was killed, such conduct is consistent with the steadfastness displayed at the disaster at Carillon and during the previous war at Culloden. Although the Highlanders were unsuccessful in their first major engagement with the Amerindians at Fort Duquesne in September 1758, they performed differently in comparison to Braddock’s regulars. During the battle, 100 Highlanders under the command of Captain William McDonald found themselves outnumbered and surrounded by a vastly superior force. However, instead of becoming victims of another grisly slaughter, McDonald’s men managed to fight their way out the encirclement. Although Major James Grant’s raid against Fort Duquesne ended in failure, it was not due to the conduct of his troops, but rather his ‘notion that the garrison was too weak to dare risk a sortie’.81 Perhaps the best example which illustrates the effectiveness of Highlanders against Amerindians is the Battle of Bushy Run, fought in August 1763. Although it is true that Bushy Run was not a typical wilderness encounter, as the Amerindians fought at close quarters like Europeans, it nonetheless emphasizes the potential of Highlanders when employed against Amerindians.82 Bouquet described the key moment which determined the outcome of the battle: The Savages growing every moment more audacious it was thought proper Still to increase their Confidence; by that means, if possible to intice them to come close upon us, or to Stand their ground when attacked. With this View two Companies of Light Infantry were ordered within the Circle, & the Troops on their right and lefft opened their Files and filled up the Space; that it might Seem they were intended to cover the Retreat. The third Light Infantry Company, and the Grenadiers of the 42d were ordered to Support the two first Companies. This manoeuvre Succeeded to our Wish, for the few Troops who took Possession of the ground lately occupied by the two Light Infantry Companies, being brought in nearer to the Center of the Circle, The Barbarians mistaking these motions for a Retreat hurried headlong

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758 on, and advancing upon us with the most daring intrepidity galled us excessively with their heavy Fire; but at the very moment that certain of Success, they thought themselves Master of the Camp, Major Campbell at the head of the two first Companies Sallied out, from a Part of the Hill they could not observe, and fell upon their right Flank. They resolutely returned the Fire, but could not Stand the irresistible Shock of our Men, who rushing in among them, killed many of them, and put the rest to Flight.83

The charge, conducted by Highlanders from the 42nd Regiment, proved highly effective in driving the Amerindians from the battlefield.84 In the aftermath of the struggle, among the 110 casualties endured by the British, the 42nd suffered the most with a total of fifty-two killed and wounded.85 In this contest, it was the Highlanders who had decided the outcome of the battle. In displaying their characteristic persistence while facing overwhelming odds, Highlanders proved necessary in the American wilderness. In addition to Highlanders, the British employed colonials to act as scouts in lieu of Amerindian guides. Although colonials suffered from the infamous reputation that they were terrible soldiers, such a generalization is incorrect.86 While colonial soldiers were deficient in martial skill and recruited among the dregs of society, they were nonetheless effective.87 Indeed, colonial scouts did prove somewhat efficient, and although they could not match the prowess of their Amerindian foes, they were not unsuccessful either. Since the late 1600s and early 1700s, Massachusetts colonials had long been accustomed to Amerindian raids along their frontiers. Consequently, they developed strategy to counter such incursions which involved the dispersal of small detachments of soldiers among the outlying forts and villages along the frontier, with orders to scout from post to post and monitor hostile Amerindian activity.88 Positioned in such a manner, the scouts were ordered ‘to range the Wilderness & Explore the hidden Retreats of those Miscreant Dogs’.89 With the scouts tracking Amerindian war parties, it was possible to conduct ambushes or dispatch scalping parties to intercept them.90 In the event of an attack against a village where scouts were stationed, Massachusetts boasted a number of heavily fortified garrison houses for the use of both soldiers and civilians.91 In the end, colonial scouts achieved mixed results. They were very effective in tracking Amerindians; however, they suffered from a very high number of casualties.92 With a mere total of 130 colonials posted along the entire Massachusetts frontier in 1755, it is unsurprising that many were killed.93 Elijah Williams understood the gravity of the situation as intelligence reports informed him that Amerindians were regularly sighted in the vicinity of Fall Town,

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Colerain and Charlemount. At Fort Massachusetts, war parties, or signs of them, were sighted on a daily basis. One specific report, however, brought news of great concern. Williams recorded, ‘From Albany last Evening by John Arm and others that Colo Lydias Informs that there are Large Numbers of Indians out Some Say three Hundred, Some four or five Hundred, and that one party of them Design for Deerfield.’94 Much in the same manner as the British army found itself lacking in manpower, so did the colonial scouts. As Colonel Israel Williams remarked, under such conditions, ‘it is next to Impossible to Join a Sufficient Number to follow ye Enemy, when discovered’.95 When small scalping parties were dispatched to intercept bands of Amerindians, at times they fared no better than the colonial scouts and were scalped themselves.96 However, when sufficient numbers of colonials were available to counter raiding parties, Amerindians were successfully repulsed. For example, during an incident at Fort William Henry in 1756, Amerindians killed and scalped several men who had left the safety of the fort in search of the garrison’s cattle. Upon witnessing the fate of their comrades, 100 Rhode Islanders sallied out of the fort, and succeeded in killing some of the assailants.97 Although, colonials have been looked upon as poor soldiers, their worth as scouts was obviously known to officers in the British army. When a Massachusetts scouting party under the command of Lieutenant John Church arrived at Fort Edward, the men were detained by the fort’s commanding officer. Upon enquiring when his detachment would be allowed to return to Massachusetts, Church recorded, ‘the 5th day I went to the Genll to get Liberty to Return upon our Journy Homeward but he told me that Rogers was gone out a Scout and he would have me tary untill he returned’.98 As Church’s men were detained in place of the renowned Robert Rogers and his rangers, it is obvious how vital colonial scouts were to the British war effort. On their utility, Bougainville remarked, ‘The poor success of most of these detachments and the great number of our Indians do not discourage them in this petty warfare; advantage to them of having companies of volunteers, an example we should follow.’99 Although colonial scouts were effective, they have been greatly overshadowed by another group of irregulars, the rangers. Formed after the arrival of Braddock in North America, the rangers were perceived as a vital addition to Britain’s North American irregulars.100 The reason for this judgement was that rangers were viewed as an obvious alternative to Amerindians. Loudoun remarked, ‘as really in Effect we have no Indians, it is impossible for an Army to Act in this

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Country, without Rangers and there ought to be a considerable body of them, and the breeding them up to that, will be a great advantage to the Country, for they will be able to deal with Indians in their own way’.101 Indeed, the rangers carried out many of the same practices of the Amerindians, such as scalping, taking prisoners and raiding.102 In reality, the rangers differed little from the colonial scouts. However, unlike the colonial scouts, the majority of the rangers were recruited from frontier settlements, which meant that they had previous experience in dealing with Amerindian raids.103 Even if they were unfamiliar with the methods of la petite guerre, they were at least skilled in the use of firearms, ‘being much used to hunting in the Woods’.104 The primary reason rangers have overshadowed colonial scouts is largely due to their colourful leader, Major Robert Rogers.105 Rogers, who formed the renowned Rogers’ Rangers, acquired such a reputation that, even among the Abenaki today, he is still remembered as ‘The White Devil.’106 When facing French regulars or Amerindians, rangers played a vital role in the advance of the British army. As the army lacked sufficient numbers of Amerindian guides, rangers were extremely important in serving as an advanced guard.107 During the attack on Louisbourg in 1758, rangers played a key role in the army’s disembarkation. Under the guns of the British fleet, rangers and light infantry landed to assault the French breastworks, which were quickly abandoned upon their approach. Reflecting on the outcome of the operation, Captain Philip Townshend noted that the ‘Landing [was] very easy’ and that ‘the Rangers & Light Infantery distinguished themselves before the grenadiers Could Land to their Assistance’.108 During the campaign against Québec in 1759, the rangers again performed admirably, as they ‘were landed the preceeding Night’ in order to protect soldiers who would disembark from their transports the next day, as well to prepare an ambush for any enemy troops which might arrive to oppose them. On their performance in this capacity, it was reported that ‘There was some skirmishing between some Indians, Canadians and this Detachmt. The Loss very inconsiderable, the Enemy Dispers’d.’109 In both instances, it is clear that the rangers were dispatched in order to prevent ambushes and were very effective in driving the French from the field. Additionally, when confronting a force comprised of primarily French regulars, the rangers also had the potential, much in the same manner as the Highlanders, to strike fear among their adversaries as they fought in the Amerindian fashion. When not employed as advanced guards, scouts and guides for the army, the rangers also conducted ambushes and raids. The results of such actions

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were very similar to those conducted by Amerindian war parties. Following the surprise and capture of six marines during the Québec Campaign in 1759, Brigadier General James Murray authorized a reprisal raid against the perpetrators of the attack. Orders were issued to the various contingents taking part in the expedition to destroy all the buildings they encountered, with the exception of churches, as well any crops of corn. Edward Coats recorded, ‘One of these Detachments from Mountmorancy fell in with a Party of Canadians headed by a Priest, 18 of which they took Prisoners & Killed Several in Return for many Acts of Cruelty. The Priest & the rest of the Prisoners were Murder’d and Scalpt by our Rangers.’110 Equally disturbing was an incident recounted by Colonel Malcolm Fraser upon the return of a party of Goreham’s rangers: A party of our Rangers having been sent out on this side of the river (the south) on the 9th they took one man prisoner and two boys (his children) having followed him a little way, making a great noise, were in a most in human manner murdered by those worse than savage Rangers, for fear, as they pretend, they should be discovered by the noise of the children. I wish this story was not fact, but I’m afraid there is little reason to doubt it; – the wretches having boasted of it on their return, tho’ they now pretend to vindicate themselves by the necessity they were under; but, I believe, this barbarous action proceeded from that cowardice and barbarity which seems so natural to a native of America, whether of Indian or European extraction.111

Rangers could be as ruthless as the Amerindians, burning villages, killing women and children, scalping both French and Amerindians, and also organizing raids for the sake of securing prisoners.112 In conducting raids, at times Amerindians purposely attacked settlements while the inhabitants were attending Sunday church services.113 Maintaining the same practices as his Amerindian adversaries, Rogers on one occasion carried out a raid to capture an entire family ‘within Gun Shot of the Fort of Crown Point’ while the garrison was attending Mass. Fortunately for the family, they were not murdered but taken prisoner in an attempt to gather intelligence on French activity within the fort.114 Those who were less fortunate, and had been wounded and taken prisoner by the rangers, were ensured an unpleasant demise. After capturing several small vessels during a scouting mission, the rangers discovered that some of their prisoners were severely injured. Much in the same manner as the Amerindians murdered prisoners who were unable to travel, Rogers reported, ‘one of the wounded Could not March therefore put an end to him to Prevent Discovery’.115

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In establishing such a reputation, it is not surprising that during the siege of Québec, General James Murray recorded that a French battery was hesitant to surrender to the British, as they ‘fear’d falling into the hands of our Rangers’.116 As indicated by their behaviour, rangers did not follow what were considered the civilized rules of European-style warfare. By the latter end of the war, there was a new addition to the assemblage of irregular military forces available to the British, the light infantry. A combination of old and new world tactics, the light infantry could perform the duties of both the regular and irregular. Loudoun described the circumstances upon which these troops were formed: On this Occasion, Lieut Colonel Gage made an offer, of raising and cloathing, at his own Expence, [a] Regiment of 500 Rangers, at the same Pay with the Troops, if His Majesty should be graciously pleased, to appoint him Colonel of that Corp. As by this Plan, I should both, make so great a Saving to the Publick, in reducing the Pay of the Rangers, from Seventeen Pence halfpenny Sterling, to Sixpence, and their Cloathing; and at the same time, have a Corp of Rangers that would be disciplined, and have Officers at their head on whom I can depend, which, except a very few, is not the Case at present; And as by this Plan, if it Succeeded, I should be Independent of the Rangers, and from thence be able to reduce their Expence, besides which, as I am obliged to encrease the Rangers, it is necessary to have an Officer, at their head, by whom I can communicate the Orders to them, and to be answerable for their being Executed.117

Although the rangers had proven themselves to be an effective force, they left much wanting in terms of military professionalism.118 Among the officers, Rogers was a capable commander, but many others were not.119 In addition, much like their Amerindian counterparts, the rangers were unaccustomed to military discipline and at times had to be persuaded to follow orders.120 Initially, Loudoun devised a plan for volunteers from the regular regiments to join Rogers’s Rangers for a period of seven weeks in order to learn the methods of la petite guerre.121 While the volunteers did succeed in learning how to conduct themselves as rangers, this method of creating an effective corps was insufficient to meet the army’s demands. During the winter of 1757–1758, the first regiment of light infantry was organized under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage, with drafts from various regiments, and organized under proper officers. In addition, it was specifically requested that the drafts from the regiments be ‘active, young, Strong, And Healthy’.122 Describing the light infantry after its formation, Sir John Ligonier commented, ‘a Regiment like This which Col. Gage now has, is of a peculiar nature’.123

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When encountering French regulars, the light infantry proved itself to be a formidable force. At their debut performance at Louisbourg, along with the expedition’s rangers, they succeeded in driving the French from the field. In doing so, they cleared the way for the rest of the army to commence siege operations against the fortress.124 At Québec, when Wolfe landed his army at L’Anse au Foulon, the assault was spearheaded by the light infantry under the command of Colonel William Howe, who ‘gain’d the Heights with little loss’. Pleased with Howe’s success, Wolfe remarked that he ‘wish’d that Mr Howe might out live the Day, that He might have an opportunity of stamping his merit to the Government’.125 As indicated by their performance at Québec, the light infantry demonstrated that they were highly efficient against regular forces. This success was largely due to the efforts of their commander, Howe, who one officer feared, ‘will shear the fate of his Heroic Brother by constantly exposing himself ’.126 By swiftly dispersing French regulars, the light infantry made it possible for Wolfe to assemble his army on the Plains of Abraham and surprise Montcalm. Their effectiveness is further evident during the recapture of Newfoundland in 1762 where two companies of light infantry succeeded in driving off ‘three Companies of the French Grenadiers and two pickets’ from what was described as the ‘most advantageous ground’.127 The rapidity with which the light infantry moved made them the ideal shock troops in any engagement against regulars.128 In their performance as irregulars, the light infantry succeeded in frustrating Amerindian assaults. Lying in ambush for French irregulars, or conducting raids, the light infantry operated in the same manner as rangers, colonial scouts and Amerindians.129 Additionally, as the light infantry were regulars themselves, when Amerindians assaulted regular army units, they were usually present to offer vigorous opposition. During the siege of Québec, as the French attempted to prevent the fall of the city, bands of Amerindians launched repeated sorties against the regulars. However, due to the presence of the light infantry, the attacks generally were unsuccessful.130 Colonel Laurence Halloran described one such desperate encounter: This Morning Mr. Cammeron a Voluntere in Lasscelles with a party of 29 light Infantry was Attack’d by 200 Indians, he retired to a house where he defended himself with great Bravery, repulsed the Enemy, of whom he Kill’d several, & kept possession until a Party came to his Assistance, the Indians were seen to carry of their Dead, one Indian Chief was left wound’d in the field, whom our people killed & scalpt, the General gave 12 Guineas to the light Infantry for their Gallant behaviour and in Publick orders promised the Voluntere the first vacant commission in the Army.131

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Although the number of attackers may have been an exaggeration, Cameron’s party was outnumbered and in great danger of being annihilated. Fighting with the determination typically displayed by Highlanders, the light infantry successfully fought off the assault. Not surprisingly, at the Battle of Bushy Run, Bouquet commanded a number of light infantry, in addition to detachments of Highlanders and rangers.132 When analysing the outcome of the engagement, it is clear why unlike Braddock, Bouquet won. Bouquet enjoyed a much greater advantage than Braddock, as the majority of his forces were irregulars who had the potential to wage war on equal terms with the Amerindians. For all their usefulness, however, light infantry had little to do with British military campaigns prior to 1758. Until then, British commanders relied only upon the services of Highlanders, colonial scouts and rangers to counter the efforts of the Amerindians. Regarding the Amerindians, the British army enjoyed little or no support from them and did not receive any substantial aid until the action at Carillon in 1758. Ultimately, the defeat at Carillon was not due to a lack of their presence, but the decisions of an incompetent commander.133 Throughout the duration of the war, and until 1764, the majority of the Amerindians remained staunchly pro-French, and Britain’s irregulars were successful in substituting their services.134 As a result, the war reached a decisive moment in 1758 without the assistance of warriors who were believed to be indispensable in the American wilderness.

How vital were Amerindians to Britain’s war effort? Ultimately, Amerindians were not vital to Britain’s war effort. They were unwilling to be pawns fought over by both the British and the French and took it upon themselves to exploit the situation to their benefit by accepting gifts from the British and promising support, which often never materialized.135 Throughout the war, and continuing with Pontiac’s Rebellion, the majority of Amerindians maintained French loyalties.136 Indeed, Pouchot believed that the Amerindians preferred the French rather than the British ‘because of their easygoing attitude towards life & their cheerfulness’.137 This loyalty was reputedly so firm that Pontiac’s War was launched in an effort to awaken Onontio, the French Governor General, whom the Amerindians believed had fallen asleep.138 As a result, British efforts to secure Amerindian allies proved unsuccessful. From the beginning of the conflict, France enjoyed widespread Amerindian support due to several reasons. Since the seventeenth century, the French had

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established Jesuit missions among the Amerindians, which assured substantial military aid in the event of a war. In addition, there were also the Upper Nations, among whose members the French had established a vast network through trade and marriage. Finally, there were also the group of Amerindians who believed the British colonists would deprive them of their lands.139 Conversing with a Seneca spy named Silver Heels, Sir William Johnson attempted to discover why the Amerindians favoured the French. Johnson recorded, ‘the Indians looked upon it that the English (by extending their settlements so far back) intended to dispossess them of all their Land and the French assured them that that was their resolution, and that led them to build forts in their Country on the Ohio & elsewhere to Stop the English from overrunning them’.140 In choosing to side with the French, the Amerindians acted not only in their own self-interest, but also for self-defence. From the perspective of the Amerindians, the French appeared to be the more preferable side to support in this conflict. Boasting a population of only 52,000 colonists in 1755, New France appeared less threatening in contrast to the approximately 1,051,000 British colonists who were eager to invade their lands.141 In addition, unlike the British colonies, the French Empire had been built by commerce, not settlement.142 Under such circumstances, it is unsurprising that Britain enjoyed very little Amerindian support. Despite this setback, Britain was successful in finding alternatives to Amerindian allies. In their performance as irregulars, Highlanders, colonial scouts, rangers and light infantry proved an equal match to the Amerindians, repulsing their attacks as well as causing havoc among French regulars.143 By the latter end of the war, the success of the irregulars influenced the behaviour of the regulars, as they too also began to counter Amerindian raids successfully.144 An unknown officer observed during the siege of Québec, ‘The Enemy allway’s observing when our parties cut fascines every third or fourth day used to lay ambuscades for them of large Parties of Indians and Canadians: we had often a good many people killed and wounded, but They allways drove the Enemy.’145 With France’s campaign of psychological warfare now effectively over, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, redcoats by 1758 no longer looked upon Amerindians with terror. Attitudes towards the Amerindians had dramatically changed since 1755, and orders were issued to soldiers stating ‘that They not put themselves in the power of a Sculking Cowardly Enemy, who Dare not face you when Armed But will watch for Days to Scalp a Single man that they find Unarm’d and Off his Guard’.146 Not only were soldiers taking precautions against

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Amerindian attacks when involved in skirmishes, some began the practice of scalping their victims, which was largely due to Wolfe having offered a reward of five guineas per scalp.147 Soldiers were so eager to collect the bounties that orders had to be issued specifically stating that scalps could only be taken from ‘Indians or Canadians dressed as Indians’, but none others.148 This change in attitude not only affected battlefield practices, but also soldiers on sentry duty. In maintaining vigilance, one sentinel not only managed to avoid being scalped, but captured his would-be assailant in the process.149 No longer feared as they had been during Braddock’s campaign, British soldiers increasingly displayed resilience against their Amerindian adversaries. In addition to the change in attitude among the regular troops, during the latter end of the war, Amerindian support for the French began to wane. The key issue which led to this decline was the lack of material goods available to the French for distribution. Owing to the loss of a large proportion of its merchant fleet, along with experienced sailors in 1755, France was unable to transport sufficient supplies to Canada, which were necessary for the maintenance of alliances.150 As a result, the lack of presents significantly strained Amerindian relations. When the new French commander, Captain Jean-François de Vassan, arrived at Niagara, his attempts at Amerindian diplomacy drew much criticism from his predecessor Pouchot, who remarked that he ‘increased their discontent’ by greeting ‘several raiding parties that had been out on campaign’ very coldly. In addition, the Amerindians were further ‘upset by the thrifty sort of presents he gave them’. Understanding the customs of Amerindian diplomacy, Pouchot summarized, ‘Among them, it is a great failing in a chief to be miserly.’151 Although Pouchot’s criticisms are valid, they do not take into account that Vassan was at a disadvantage as he did not have a great assortment of gifts for distribution. While the French suffered from a dearth of goods, Johnson reminded potential allies, ‘the miserable Condition those of the Delawares & Shawanese were in, who joined the French being in a naked & Starving Condition’.152 The lack of available gifts among the French reached such dire proportions that a former British prisoner reported that the Governor of Canada ‘promises them great presents as a reward but never gave them any’.153 Ultimately, the situation among the Amerindians allied to the French proved advantageous to the British. Owing to the loss of French shipping, Amerindians were forced to apply to the British, who were the only party available to supply them with the necessary goods and gifts they required. On one occasion, Johnson was approached by ‘An Onondaga Indian & his Wife w[i]th a Cayuga

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Man, & five Women’ who, being destitute without French support, ‘came to their Brother for Rum to purchase some Corn’ as well as ‘Some Clothing for themselves, & Children’. These visitors were soon followed by a much larger group comprising of Onondagas, Tuscaroras and Oneidas, who were primarily women. Appealing to Johnson, ‘They pleaded a Scarcity of Corn & ca & begged I would let them have Some Rum wherewith to purchase Corn, fulfill some Dreams their People had, & some for Christenings, Weddings & ca Which I ordered for them wth some trifles Such as Knives, paint, provisions on their journey.’ As indicated by both scenarios, the Amerindians who approached Johnson did so out of dire necessity. This situation proved beneficial to the British, for by supplying goods to the Amerindians, they were made neutral in the conflict. To achieve this aim, Johnson repeatedly informed formerly hostile tribes that he would only provide assistance ‘if they would promise to act as Friends’.154 In regard to the few Amerindians who joined the British during the war, for all the effort expended to secure them, they performed poorly in comparison to other irregulars. Just as colonial scouts failed to intercept raiding parties, so too did the Amerindians. For example, after a raiding party attacked Fort Hendrick, Johnson ‘Sent Out Indians Scouts Who Met ye Tracks of this scalping party Which they followed some Miles but to no purpose’.155 Similarly, while pro-French Amerindians harassed ‘parties going with provisions to Oswego and to Lake George’, tribes supposedly allied to the British achieved nothing. Reflecting on the situation, Sir Charles Hardy lamented to the Earl of Halifax, ‘what our Indians are about I do not comprehend, I have repeatedly urged Sir William Johnson to press them to keep those passages clear, and they have as often promised him without effecting it’.156 By making such promises, only to break them later, the Amerindians came to be known as notoriously unreliable allies. When reporting possible French military activity against Oswego, James Grey informed Colonel Israel Williams, ‘Coll. Mercer who Sent us the Exspress had his information from the Indians that Live near Oswego & it is So Seldom that they Speake the truth unless it is for Self Interest.’157 Under such circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the British to suspect their Amerindian allies. During Braddock’s expedition, Captain Robert Orme noted that despite the distribution of presents and attempts at cordial relations, the Amerindians ‘nevertheless went off that Night, and with them One of our Indians, whom we had very long suspected. This Fellow had frequently endeavoured to conceal himself upon the Flanks on the March, but was always discovered by the Flank Parties’.158 As the behaviour

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of this Amerindian was very suspicious, it is not surprising that he was responsible for some of the grisly murders that occurred as Braddock’s column marched towards the Monongahela. Identified as ‘Jerry’, he was reported to have ‘deserted from them, and Scalpt several of their People; he was afterwards taken, by the few Indians who remain’d with that Army’.159 Such actions were not isolated incidents. On another occasion, ‘a Cayuga who was serving as a guide from one post to Another with a trader, murdered the man, & marched off with his scalp to the french’.160 Although dishonourable according to European standards, such actions would have been considered a sufficient service to the French by the Amerindians. On these practices, Bougainville remarked, ‘were there a thousand in a war party, if four scalps were taken, they all would go home’.161 During the initial stages of the war in North America, the majority of Amerindians aligned themselves with the French out of self-interest. This arrangement only faltered when France could no longer cater to their needs, which forced them to seek necessary aid from the British. Until that time, the British army came to rely heavily upon other irregulars to counter those of the French. While engaged on the battlefield, facing French regulars, Canadians or Amerindians, the British irregular troops proved their effectiveness, sometimes committing equally horrid acts of brutality comparable to those of their opponents. Throughout the early stages of the war, France enjoyed the continued support of various tribes; however, after 1758, a number of them temporarily became peaceful neighbours to the British. Although Amerindians began to join the British after 1758, the war had reached a turning point without any significant assistance from them. Ultimately, they were vital to France’s war effort, but not Britain’s. The only positive outcome of the numerous sums spent and hours lost in negotiations was that they had briefly deprived France of a vital source of manpower. However, such effort was unnecessary as the Amerindians were eventually forced to seek assistance from the British when the French could no longer support them. The Amerindians were a New World variety of irregulars. As Charles Lennox, Duke of Richmond, remarked on their similarities to those of the Old World, ‘I am told they go by parties in the Woods and like Hussars (only on Foot) Attack Stragglers and with such agility than one can never take them. I shou’d Imagine that fellows that shoot well with Arquebuses like the German Chassaurs would do well in that kind of War.’162 Although it was desirable to have their services, they were not as necessary as it was believed. The majority of the fighting throughout the war was conducted by other irregulars: the Highlanders, colonial

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scouts, rangers and light infantry. At both the siege of Louisbourg and Québec, no Amerindians accompanied the British army.163 At Carillon, they merely observed the outcome of the battle from the safety of Rattlesnake Mountain.164 Throughout the duration of the Seven Years’ War, they contributed very little to the British war effort and remained staunchly pro-French, even when the conflict ended – after which, under Pontiac, they began their own.

5

A Logistical Problem: Roads, Transportation and Adequate Provisions

You do well apprehend that good order and military discipline are the chief essentials in an army. But you must be ever aware that an army cannot preserve good order unless its soldiers have meat in their bellies, coats on their backs, and shoes on their feet. All these are as necessary as arms and munitions. I pray you will never fail to look to these things as you may do to other matters. John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough, December 17031 Among the annals of military history, Marlborough’s march to the Danube in 1704 remains a momentous event, as it illustrates the importance of maintaining an effective and organized logistical supply system. By ensuring his army was consistently supplied, Marlborough succeeded in marching 250 miles from the United Provinces towards Blenheim without the loss of a single man to either sickness or fatigue.2 Indeed, the success of Marlborough’s campaign lay in the meticulous detail given to every aspect of administration. By erecting supply depots along the line of march containing ample stores of provisions and forage, as well as providing new pairs of boots for the soldiers midway through their journey, Marlborough ensured that his troops were spared unnecessary hardship. Ultimately, Marlborough understood that it was important for soldiers to be well fed and clothed in order for them to remain healthy and fit for battle. In demonstrating such concern for his men, Marlborough not only preserved their health and high level of morale, but also earned their affection as the ‘Old Corporal’.3 In contrast to Marlborough’s success, the situation in North America proved paradoxical. Braddock clearly aspired to imitate Marlborough, as he not only granted his men rations without stoppages, but even wore a coat of mail at times during his march, just as Marlborough had done.4 Conversely,

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while Marlborough’s six-week journey to the Danube has been referred to as the march of the ‘Scarlet Caterpillar’, Braddock and his successors were referred to as ‘a Parcel of Old Women’ as they trudged through the dense North American wilderness.5 Despite numerous efforts, it was difficult to establish a logistical support system in North America similar to that accomplished by Marlborough in Europe. Roads needed to be cut through the wilderness, vehicles gathered to transport supplies and provisions collected from among the colonials. Ultimately, all these factors combined created a logistical support system that functioned well below Marlborough’s standards. Faced with such difficulties during the initial stages of the war, soldier’s experienced further hardship as rations were reduced at times.6 During the latter years of the war, the most effective solution was provided by the Royal Navy, which directly transported both troops and the necessary stores to support them from Britain.

Conquering the wilderness When the initial plans for the North American offensive of 1755 were agreed upon among the ministers at Whitehall, it was believed that the British army would encounter very little opposition in driving the French from the Ohio. Calling for consecutive attacks against French forts erected in the region, the ministers overlooked the difficulties of transporting an army through a territory which was virtually wilderness.7 In planning such an enterprise, the ministers should have considered the importance of the construction of General George Wade’s roads in Scotland after the 1715 Jacobite rising. Before their construction, the Highlands were almost inaccessible to military operations. However, after the construction of 250 miles of road, which effectively linked the government’s scattered outposts together, the process of maintaining firmer control over the Jacobites began. Although the Young Pretender, Charles Edward Stuart, later used them against the army they were created to assist, the roads facilitated the process of conquering the Highlands.8 As a contemporary couplet exclaimed, ‘Had you seen these roads before they were made You would lift up your hands and bless General Wade.’9 Returning to the situation encountered in North America, no roads were available to expedite the movement of British troops towards military objectives. Much like Wade, Braddock, and later Forbes, had the responsibility of building them. Conversely, unlike Wade, both Braddock and Forbes constructed their

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roads under different conditions, during an ongoing conflict, and had to take defensive measures in order to ensure the safety of their workmen. Under such circumstances, conquering the wilderness proved a difficult task. St Clair summarized his experience during the 1755 campaign as he remarked, ‘The march we made was 400 Miles from hence 200 of which I made the Roads over Mountains, thro Woods and Rocks and at the end of my Journey was rewarded by a shot I Received thro my Body.’10 Confronted by natural barriers such as mountains, woods, rivers and rocks, in addition to enemy fire, British soldiers had a daunting obstacle course to overcome before they could overtake their French adversaries. Among the numerous obstructions soldiers encountered, forests proved the most formidable. While transporting provisions through the wilderness by bateaux, Lieutenant John Grant noted that as his detachment sailed down the Oneida River, it was a place ‘where solitude reigned and large pines, and magnificent forest trees’. Although Grant described his surroundings as peaceful, he knew from experience that domineering forests could be dangerous. During an earlier portion of the voyage, the detachment had encountered a fierce storm which toppled many trees, injured some men and nearly killed the expedition’s adjutant.11 It was trees such as those observed and evaded by Grant that many soldiers throughout the war were required to clear in order to establish the first roadways. In addition to hindrances presented by forests, the redcoats also struggled to construct the first roads through extremely rugged terrain. As Braddock’s forces advanced into the wilderness, St Clair bemoaned, ‘The Land Carriage is long, the Country very mountainous many of the Mountains, high, Steep, Rocky, and Stony, the Plains between are Swampy, generally full of Close thick woods, and troublesome runs of water.’12 Comparing the situation to Europe, St Clair added that the country ‘Resembled much that from Vella Franca to Genoa, the mountains every bit as Rugged and Steep.’13 Further enhancing this image of a desolate frontier, Captain Robert Cholmley’s batman recorded that the weeds the expedition encountered were so high that they concealed him up to a distance of 20 yards while on horseback.14 Confronted by such natural barriers, it is not surprising that when describing the construction of his first road, St Clair remarked, ‘I had the pleasure of Cutting a Road for the space of 200 Miles by very hard Labour.’15 Throughout this process, the condition of the ground determined the quality of the road. Fearing that the workmen were seven days ahead of the expedition’s main column, Braddock sent orders to St Clair directing him ‘to

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make no more haste than good Speed’.16 Upon receiving this order, St Clair replied, ‘Your Excellency need not be Apprehensive of us getting too far ahead, I wish with all my Heart that the ground wou’d Permit it.’17 The state of the ground often dictated the course of a new road. If the army had to choose either to cross or go around a mountain, it was normally considered much more expedient to avoid the mountain and locate an alternative route.18 River crossings were also treated in a similar manner and avoided when possible. For example, when Forbes contemplated the decision to use Braddock’s Road or create a new one through the Allegheny Mountains, the former was rejected as it included five river crossings. In addition, one of these rivers, the Monongahela, was reputed to be impassable during the spring.19 Although great attention was given to topography, it unfortunately did not guarantee good roads. Despite tremendous efforts, the newly constructed roads were generally poor in quality. Pressed by time constraints to keep the army on schedule, work was conducted as quickly as possible.20 On one occasion, such haste was necessary, as soldiers were literally waiting for roadwork to be completed in order to continue their march.21 Remarking upon the speed of construction, St Clair admitted, ‘We have taken a great deal of pains upon the Road over it, but some Parts of it cannot be made very good in so short a time.’22 On describing the state of the road, a seaman from the naval contingent commented that at one location it was ‘very indifferent’, at another ‘excessive bad’ and towards the end of the journey ‘tolerable’.23 An unknown British officer further added, ‘the March was attended with many difficulties owing to ye road & carriages being bad’.24 The effects of such a poorly constructed road could be extremely detrimental to operations. During the 1758 campaign against Fort Duquesne, Colonel Henry Bouquet described one such route: We were deceived, my dear general, about the road I am taking. It is almost impassable from Loudoun to Littleton. Of all the roads where it is possible for a wagon to go, this is the worst, and it cannot be repaired. It is of rock, partly solid, partly loose and sharp stones. The rains have carried away all the earth and there is none in the vicinity to cover them again, not even wood for making fascines. Our wagons are breaking down; our horses are losing their shoes. It is a wretched state of affairs.25

As indicated by Bouquet’s experience, faulty roads could cause considerable damage to the army’s precious wagons and horses. When attempts were made

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to pass through one such road, Bouquet lamented, ‘Of the 73 wagons I had at Littleton, there are 33 to be repaired.’26 As the journey progressed, only half of the wagons completed the trip.27 A disgusted Forbes summarized, ‘Waggons and roads are the Devil, and cross hott headed Madmen worse.’28 In comparison to Forbes’s expedition, Braddock encountered similar problems. As the column came to a portion of road in the Allegheny Mountains described as ‘being excessively mountainous and rocky’, the army halted for a day ‘for the Refreshment of the Men and Horses’. During that time, on observing that the road might destroy a number of wagons, orders were issued stating, ‘In Case any Waggon should break down, it is immediately to be drawn out on one Side of the Road, and a Report of it with its Loading to be sent to the WaggonMaster-General, who is to Order it to be repaired and fall on the Rear, or the Load to be divided among the other Waggons.’ In addition, instructions were also given to the field officers, with the exception of those in the vanguard of the column, to have their men ‘Assist in getting up the Waggons at any Steep Ascent, or difficult pass’. The order was prophetic, for several days later Captain Robert Orme recorded, ‘We this Day passed the Alegany Mountain, which is a rocky Ascent of more than two Miles, in many Places extremely Steep. Its Descent is very rugged, and almost perpendicular, in passing which we intirely demolished three Waggons, and Shattered Several.’29 As indicated by both the Braddock and Forbes expeditions, the poor quality of the newly constructed roads rendered many horses and wagons useless. Although attempts were made to find routes which were more appropriate for travel, at times, no other alternatives were available.30 Further intensifying the situation, while traversing these roads, the soldiers themselves endured great hardship. While travelling towards the Canadian village of Mont Louis, Lieutenant Francis Browne recorded: It’s impossible to give you a just Idea of the Fatigue and distress we all underwent the whole way every difficulty I have yet met with in America is but a trifle to it. The first fifty Miles we marchd tho’ it was thro’ a thick wood and no other road in it but an Indian Path, yet even that (comparatively speaking) was a fine Turnpike to the remaining part of the March which the entire way after was over vast Precipices and sharpe pointed Rocks along the Seashore, tho’ most of our Men had two pair of shoes at setting out, the badness of the road soon wore them out and thereby reduc’d to ye terrible circumstance of being barefoot before we arrived at Mount Louis.31

Although Browne’s account is of a Canadian route, it nonetheless describes conditions which were encountered by both Braddock and Forbes. Journeying

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through dense forests, mountainous regions and enduring bad roads, soldiers of both expeditions had much in common with Browne. Indeed, as Forbes’s army struggled towards Fort Duquesne, Bouquet recorded, ‘The dew and the roads full of sharp stones, will very soon wear out the 3 pairs of shoes that each soldier is to have.’32 In addition, as the march progressed, much like Browne experienced, the men became increasingly fatigued.33 Ultimately, despite these numerous shortcomings, the roads were necessary. Commenting on their utility, Bouquet acknowledged, they ‘are bad but experience proves that they are practicable’.34 In order to alleviate the problems presented by bad roads, frequent attempts were made to repair them when possible. During Braddock’s march, the large number of heavy carriages that accompanied the expedition repeatedly damaged the road, obliging St Clair to send workmen back to fix them.35 Consequently, once new roads had been opened, regular maintenance was necessary, which was provided periodically by both regulars and colonials.36 However, as demonstrated by Bouquet’s plight during his journey from Loudoun to Littleton, some roads could not be repaired and continued to cause significant destruction to the convoys which passed through them.37 In addition to roads, waterways were also used to facilitate transportation. At times, their use proved a safer alternative in contrast to overland routes. While attempting to erect a fort at Shamokin in 1756, the project took much longer than Deputy Governor Robert Hunter Morris initially expected. Morris explained the delay was caused by the necessity of having ‘to build a number of flat-bottom’d Boats upon the river Susquehanna to transport up it the necessary provisions and stores, the path by land being so very narrow and difficult, that a very few Indians would have been able to have cut off our whole Body, had they attempted to carry their provisions by land’.38 Although inland navigation was not entirely safe, as indicated by the fate of Colonel John Parker’s detachment prior to the siege of Fort William Henry, the use of waterways occasionally proved beneficial when travelling though forests teeming with hostile Amerindians.39 No better example of transporting supplies under such dangerous conditions exists than that of Colonel John Bradstreet, who successfully directed the relief of Oswego during the 1756 campaign. A competent officer, Bradstreet succeeded in fulfilling his mission despite being persistently shadowed by a Franco-Amerindian force. Throughout the duration of the voyage, Bradstreet was continually harassed but refused to engage the enemy as he believed the odds were not in his favour. In addition, responsible for the supply of Oswego, Bradstreet remarked ‘they [the French] having nothing to lose & what I was

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entrusted with of infinite consequence & great Value & I did not think proper to engage on such unequal terms’. After successfully delivering the precious stores to the fort, Bradstreet was attacked during his return voyage to Schenectady but succeeded in repelling his assailants.40 In this particular engagement, Bradstreet’s bateaux men proved that they were dual purpose troops, effective both in transportation and battle.41 In developing a supply system based on the construction of roads and the use of waterways, the British army in North America continued in the tradition of Wade. Much in the same manner as Wade had begun the process of suppressing the Highlands by constructing his roads, so too did Braddock and his successors begin the process of conquering the North American continent.42 Overcoming hostile terrain and dense forests, the British army created a transportation system which had the potential to work efficiently. Despite facing numerous dangers, British soldiers succeeded in creating vital routes through the wilderness, enduring storms, swamps and continuous hard labour along the way.43 Although the army succeeded in this endeavour, the establishment of a transportation network did not ensure that soldiers would be well supplied. Conquering the wilderness was only a portion of the struggle for adequate logistical support. Without the means to convey supplies, the roads proved only partially effective in alleviating the army’s distress.

Horses, wagons and a crippled supply Throughout the eighteenth century, large contingents of horses were a necessary requirement for an army on campaign. Not only was their presence essential for the use of cavalry and the transportation of guns, they were crucial in maintaining the army’s supplies.44 For that reason, an army furnished with inadequate numbers could suffer substantially due to a lack of stores, which would result in an increase in illness with devastating consequences. On the importance of maintaining supplies, Dr Donald Monro stated, ‘All military Authors have recommended to Commanders always to have Straw for their Men when they come to their Ground, if possible; and to have the Army well supplied with Provisions; giving proper Encouragement to the Country People, and to Sutlers and Merchants of all Sorts, to bring in every Kind of Provisions and other Necessaries to Camp.’ Although such advice was essential in preserving the health of soldiers, it was difficult to put into practice. Monro observed that while troops were quartered in towns and garrisons ‘In Time of

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Peace’, they enjoyed ‘regular Meals of wholesome Provisions’. However, during the campaign season, he also noted that ‘Provisions are sometimes scarce, and frequently on long Marches they [the soldiers] have no Opportunity of dressing what they can get.’ A lack of provisions, combined with other factors related to the practice of public health and preventive medicine, which will be discussed in a subsequent chapter, seriously crippled British military capabilities. As Monro further observed, these factors, ‘All which, joined to the other Hardships and Inconveniences unavoidably attending a military Life in Time of Service, often give Rise to numerous Diseases, which weaken an Army in a most surprising Manner; and therefore Commanders ought to use every Means in their Power, consistent with the necessary military Operations, to preserve the Health of the Soldiers.’45 In North America, the maintenance of the supply system was a difficult undertaking, as officers encountered a severe deficiency of horses and carts, which were essential for the transportation of provisions. Further complicating the situation, forage was also in scant supply.46 Confronted by such obstacles, the army initially suffered from a woefully inadequate supply system. Only until Shirley appointed Bradstreet to direct the transportation of provisions from Albany to Oswego in 1756, which was a combination of both overland trails and waterways, did the problem with supplies slightly improve.47 Ultimately, the most reliable method to ensure that soldiers were properly furnished with provisions was to send them directly from Britain along with the military forces destined for North America. The lack of a sufficient number of horses to carry supplies proved a great hindrance to the British army during the initial stages of the war. While gathering horses for Braddock’s expedition, St Clair ‘believed he could provide otherwise two Hundred Waggons, and Fifteen Hundred Carrying Horses to be at Fort Cumberland by the first of May’.48 However, this did not occur and their shortage presented a serious problem. As a result, Orme pleaded to St Clair, ‘For God’s Sake my dear Sir John prepare every thing as fast as possible for our March I own I fear nothing but the want of horses and Forrage, I wish you may be able to provide a Sufficient number, I am Convinc’d if there is any Deficiency we shall owe it to the impossibility of procuring horses & Forrage.’49 Although St Clair did succeed in securing additional horses, which gave Braddock ‘much Satisfaction’, they were insufficient to satisfy the demands of the army. Orme bemoaned that this was a situation which ‘Retards the service very much’.50 As circumstances worsened, officers joined in a general search for horses in order to expedite the campaign.51 In addition, a detachment of soldiers from the

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44th was also ordered to impress ‘all the Able Horses’ which could be found.52 After all these efforts failed to achieve desirable results, Braddock requested his officers ‘to send to Fort Cumberland all Such Baggage as was not absolutely necessary’, and further enquired ‘if any of them had able Horses which they could spare to the publick Cause’. Setting an example, Braddock contributed twenty of his own, which were soon followed by those of his officers. As a result of this action, the expedition gained almost 100 additional horses. However, despite all attempts, Braddock’s forces never succeeded in gathering sufficient numbers. Consequently, the army advanced in three divisions to make up for this deficiency and built a small number of depots and magazines en route to the Ohio.53 As indicated by Braddock’s expedition, the gathering of horses was a difficult task for the British army. By 1756, rumours of the shortages began to circulate among soldiers awaiting service for North America. Prior to his departure from London in 1756, Henry Fletcher informed his father that he had ‘provided every thing, for the Voage, excepting Horses, which wee are to buy in America & which am told are very dear & but indifferent’.54 Not only was it known that horses were scarce in the colonies, they were also reputedly poor in quality. Such rumours were not untrue, and the horses which the army succeeded in obtaining were generally defective. However, this was the direct result of the colonials. Orme lamented, ‘Every Horse was by the Contract to have Carried two Hundred Weight, but the Contractors were so well acquainted with our Situation (Which did not permit us to reject anything) that most of the Horses furnished by them were the Offcasts of Indian Traders, and Scarce able to stand under One Hundred Weight.’55 Taking advantage of the army, the colonials provided horses which were incapable of carrying out the services required of them. This practice continued during the second expedition against Fort Duquesne, where Bouquet observed that the colonials provided ‘nags unable to drag themselves along’.56 In an attempt to improve the situation, Bouquet suggested that the army purchase its own pack horses, remarking that ‘It would be better to buy these horses, because if they are taken on contract, we shall fare the same as with the wagons, by getting all the worst ones that the province can furnish.’57 Eventually, the shortage of able-bodied horses became so serious that as Forbes’s expedition advanced towards Fort Duquesne, they began gathering survivors from Braddock’s defeat to ‘be used for expresses when needed, and for pack horses on occasion’.58 The dearth of horsepower continued to be a major problem even after the fall of Québec, and soldiers were ordered to seek out and seize them from Canadians who remained in arms with the French.59 The

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shortage of horses was not something limited to the British, as the French shared in the experience. During the siege of Fort William Henry, Montcalm did not transport any horses from Canada but relied upon those captured from the British.60 In addition to horses, wagons proved equally elusive to the British army. As horses provided the necessary strength to transport the army’s supplies, wagons were required to convey them. When Braddock’s forces departed from Britain, sixteen wagons were dispatched along with the rest of the supplies for the expedition.61 Unfortunately, they were designed for use in Europe, not America. As a result, Orme recounted, ‘All the King’s Waggons were also Sent back to the Fort, they being too heavy and requiring large Horses for the Shafts, which could not be procured, and Country Waggons were fitted for the Powder in their Stead.’62 Fashioned with heavy ironwork, the wagons proved too burdensome for the American horses. Their loss was regrettable, for not only were they more durable than country wagons, they were specifically designed to carry provisions and ammunition for the troops.63 The reliance upon country wagons to transport provisions and stores proved problematic for Braddock’s expedition. Initially, country wagons were not easily acquired as the colonials were unwilling to provide them for the use of the army. In desperation, St Clair resorted to using threats to force the colonials to meet his demands. Dispatching several agents to secure them, St Clair instructed, ‘Shou’d any one of the Inhabitants Refuse to go on this Service, You are to let me have their names, that I may apply to Sir Peter Halkett for a Detachment of our Soldiers to be Quartered on them.’ Aware of the mission’s importance, St Clair further remarked, ‘I have this moment Received an Express from his Excellency General Braddock Complaining that the Country people are very Dilatory in sending their Waggons and Teams of horses for our Artillery & Stores which are lying at Alexandria this is the only thing that Retards all our operations.’64 The effects of the shortage did not escape Washington, who soon after joining Braddock was forced to remain at Winchester, ‘till the arrival of the 2d Division of the Train, (which we hear left Alexandria on Tuesday last); after that, we shall continue our March to Wills Creek, from whence it is imagined we shall not stir till the latter end of this Month for want of Waggons, and other conveniences to Transport our Baggage &ca over the Mountn’.65 As Braddock berated the colonial governors for their inefficiency, only Benjamin Franklin succeeded in saving the expedition. By obtaining 150 wagons from Pennsylvania, and delivering them to Fort Cumberland by 10 May, Franklin ensured Braddock remained on schedule.66

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After Braddock, the wagon shortage significantly increased in the colonies. While attempting to gather sufficient numbers for the 1756 campaign season, St Clair encountered several notable problems in Albany: I find by a Letter from Mr. Stevenson one of the Commissaries of Provisions at Albany, that the Waggons and Carriages at that Place and above the high Lands are for the most part broke and destroy’d with last years service, and that all the Carpenters in that Country being now employ’d in building Battoes, the Owners of the Waggons Pretend that there is no possibility of getting them repair’d and the few that are left have taken the Advantage of these Circumstances, and have raised their hire from 9 Sh. To 12 Sh. Per day, and even at that Price there can scarse be Carriages enough found to Transport Provisions to Schenectady sufficient for the troops now Quarter’d there, and this difficulty must Still increase as the Troops move forward.67

Not only did the inhabitants claim that most of their wagons were destroyed, and feigned inaction due to the lack of carpenters who were constructing bateaux for another method of transportation, they also attempted to make a profit at the army’s distress. Even more demoralizing was the reality that even if the colonials were paid the prices they demanded, there would still not be enough wagons available to meet the requirements of the army. In these negotiations, the colonials were not completely dishonest either, as a great number of wagons did break down during their treks through the wilderness, largely due to the bad quality of the roads.68 Upon approaching one such poorly constructed road, Bouquet observed that it was ‘strewn with broken wagons’.69 As with the dilemma encountered with horses, impressments eventually became the only solution to secure sufficient numbers of serviceable wagons. During Forbes’s expedition, unhelpful colonials attempted to supply the army with wagons of inferior quality ‘made up with old & poor Horses’ which were ‘found unfitt for Service’. With no other alternative available, orders were issued to the magistrates of Lancaster, Northampton and Philadelphia counties stating, ‘[This] Lays me under an Absolute Necessity to Demand you wou’d immediately impress or Raise Such Numbers of good able Waggons as Adam Hoops agent Victualer or His Deputy May think Necessary for the transportation of provisions from your Different Countys to Raystown.’70 As with horses, impressments were a last resort, used only when the expedition could not advance and there was no alternative. As Bouquet remarked to the magistrates of Berks County, ‘his Majesty’s Service [was] being entirely Stoped by want of these Carriages’.71 St Clair further added during another plea for impressments, ‘I expect you

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loose no time in sending those Waggons to Albany, for on them depends the beginning of our Operations.’72 In an attempt to compensate for the shortage of wagons, an effort was made to transport provisions by the use of packhorses. Employed during both the Braddock and Forbes expeditions, packhorses did alleviate some of the problems encountered in overland transport.73 Packhorses were a practical solution, as supplies were regularly carried in this manner by fur traders in the backcountry.74 In addition to their utility in the mountains, packhorses purchased directly by the army were of much better quality than those supplied by colonial contractors, who regularly brought forward the worst in their possession.75 In addition, packhorses proved financially beneficial in comparison to wagons. On their performance, Bouquet explained, ‘A wagon cannot go from Loudoun to Littleton in less than a day and a half, and two days from Littleton to Juniata, which makes, at twenty-five shillings per day, three pound; and it carries only 1500 pounds.’ In comparison, he added, ‘Eight pack horses will carry 1600 pounds and would easily make the same journey in two days. Even if the saddles are furnished, it will not cost, at two shillings per day, more than thirty-two shillings per day.’76 Presenting such advantages, and being of superior quality in comparison to contracted wagons and horses, packhorses appeared a viable solution. Bouquet’s remarks on the transportation of provisions from Littleton to Juniata were further reinforced, by a convoy ‘under the command of Captain Callendar, who in spite of his exertions has been two days on the road’. Upon receiving word of Callendar’s fate, Bouquet declared, ‘That confirms my opinion on the subject of pack horses.’77 In order to maintain the numerous horses required for transportation, substantial amounts of forage were necessary. Although the army gathered forage for other animals, such as its cattle, horses required special attention. Customarily, after completing a long training course during the fall and winter months and subsisting on a diet of dry forage during that period, cavalry horses required to be placed out at grass during the spring. In this practice, horses grazed freely in green pastures and had their constricting iron shoes removed. The removal of the shoes allowed free growth of the hooves, while the pasture provided a necessary source of vitamins A and D.78 In North America, during the fall and winter, forage primarily consisted of hay, oats, corn and rye.79 During the spring and summer months, it was hoped that the wilderness would provide ample nourishment for the horses as if they were placed out at grass.80 In practice, however, army horses did not receive regular amounts of forage due to logistical deficiencies.81

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Throughout the duration of Braddock’s campaign, the army encountered numerous problems in gathering forage. Initially, St Clair attempted to gather ample supplies of corn, corn blades, oats and hay. As he struggled to prepare depots at Winchester and Alexandria for the expedition, he vaguely informed Braddock, ‘I have ordered all kinds of provender for horses to be laid in at these two places, in as great quantities as the Country can afford which is but small.’82 Despite the amount of effort expended in search of forage, very little could be gathered from the surrounding countryside. One of St Clair’s agents, John Carlyle, reported, ‘Since you left this, I have taken every Method I cou’d think of, to purchase the Hay and Corn fodder you desired, but have not been able to buy above Ten Thousand Weight.’ Remarking on the experience of his fellow agent he added, ‘I have not yet had any accot. from Mr. Diggs of his success in Maryland, I am doubtful he will be able to purchase much, the People that make quantitys not knowing of a Certain Market have given the most and best to their Horses, and Cattle.’83 As time progressed, further attempts to gather adequate amounts of forage continued to bring discouraging results. By April, in a state of desperation, Orme was pleading not only for horses, but also the forage to maintain them.84 In a move to improve the situation, St Clair proposed that the army march from Winchester to Frederick, as early as 10 May, when grass would be available in the wilderness.85 It was an attempt to take advantage of the tradition of grazing horses during the spring and summer months. Ultimately, the wilderness did provide assistance by contributing some forms of nourishment. While endeavouring to keep the horses well fed during the second expedition against Fort Duquesne, James Coultas informed Forbes that he knew from experience that horses could be ‘sustained the year round’, ‘situated among Rocks & Barrows’ with a mixture of rye, cut straw and wood pasture. However, regarding the state of the rye to be used, Coultas warned, ‘Rye unground is Subject to founder Horses and therefore a dangerous food being of a hot Nature, but where ground & mixed with Straw a Little wetted is Cooling.’86 Officers were not ignorant of such knowledge as the army had relied upon the wilderness to sustain its horses since Braddock’s arrival. During the first expedition against Fort Duquesne, Orme noted that the horses ‘must be turned into these Woods for their Subsistence, and feed upon Leaves and Young Shoots of Trees’. Although the wilderness provided some relief, it could not to be relied upon. On one occasion during Braddock’s march, Colonel Thomas Gage found himself with ‘neither Pasture nor Forage on the Road, not even at those Places where it had been said to have been provided’.87 In such an unfortunate scenario, the horses weakened, and the army’s transportation suffered further.

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Faced with numerous obstacles overland, the army sought to employ waterways for the transportation of supplies by use of whale boats and bateaux. Much in the same manner as the army encountered delays and setbacks in gathering horses and wagons, problems also occurred in securing sufficient numbers of boats. While attempting to assemble vessels for the 1756 campaign season, St Clair met with the same difficulties he encountered while organizing wagons the previous year. Frustrated with the proceedings, St Clair informed Shirley, ‘all the Battoes (old and New) which will be ready by the 25th of March Amount to no more than 203, and that by the 10th of April next there will be 46 more in Readiness, this Dilatoriness, and the insufficiency of the Contractors will almost put an entire Stop to the Transport of our Provisions’.88 Once again the colonials hampered the British offensive as the army could not advance without its 1,000 bateaux, which were necessary for the transportation of its stores.89 Utterly disgusted, St Clair summarized to one of his agents, ‘I have by this Express wrote Colo. Bradstreet Concerning the Battoes, which I am sorry are in such Backwardness.’90 Ultimately, the reason adequate numbers of bateaux were unavailable was because the colonials made no efforts to assemble them quickly. From Albany, St Clair received the following excuse: If no rain fall soon, no Battoes can be made, at least but a very few unless they may be made of pine boards for which I have no Orders. The Mills have no water to turn their Wheels. There may be tomorrow about 19 Battoes made at Schenectady, only four here, but if we cou’d get oak boards they would soon make a good number of Battoes. I wish directions had been given to building battoes as soon as for the Whale Boats there cou’d have been now 1000 ready if wanted.91

Although the lack of water appears to be a legitimate issue, by placing the blame on St Clair for not submitting his order earlier, as well as declaring that Schenectady produced nineteen bateaux, which it did not, the colonials were attempting to hide their inactivity.92 When Bradstreet visited Schenectady to inspect the progress of the carpenters, he remarked, ‘I find as little done to forward this matter as If nothing of Consequence had depended upon it.’ In addition, he stated that he hoped all the bateaux would be standardized in size, and ‘well built’ noting ‘those built there last year were of little use’.93 Returning to the larger issue of transportation, all these factors combined, greatly impeded the army. Without sufficient numbers of horses, wagons, bateaux and whaleboats, in addition to the lack of available forage, logistical

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support was inadequate. Although Braddock arrived at the Monongahela, despite the numerous obstacles the expedition encountered, his men would not have had ample provisions to continue if he had won. Speaking to a survivor of the Monongahela, Bouquet recounted, ‘Braddock’s army went 3 days without finding grass for the horses, which made them unfit to carry provisions; and he would have been likely to die of hunger, if he had beaten the enemy.’94 This view was further reinforced by another survivor, who came forward after learning that Forbes had chosen to construct a new route, rather than follow Braddock’s. Governor James Glen informed Forbes that, ‘A Virginia Gentleman who was in Braddocks expedition, when he heard you had fixed your rout, came to me, honestly expressing his satisfaction, assuring me that if that General had succeeded at du Quesne, he had been undone as his Army must have perished for want of Provisions.’95 Such a scenario would have been devastating to operations and to available manpower. In an earlier war, during the initial stages of King William’s 1689 campaign in Ireland, 6,300 out of 14,000 men perished due to the lack of necessary supplies.96 Although Braddock’s command was not seriously affected by an extreme dearth of provisions, operations at Oswego suffered tremendously. Owing to conditions that the garrison endured during the winter of 1755–1756, plans for the 1756 campaign were severely crippled. Not only was a considerable amount of time lost in restocking the fort, the troops stationed there were dangerously weakened, due to the famine-like conditions they had experienced over the winter.97 The poor state of the garrison was largely due to a variety of factors, which included low tides, a deficiency of wagoners and bateaux men and the lack of transportation.98 Without sufficient manpower and means of transport, the conveyance of an adequate supply of provisions could not occur. Unaware of these disadvantages, Shirley departed from the outpost, leaving the garrison with ‘only, 40 Days Bread, two Months Meat and three weeks Spirits’.99 Although Shirley had ordered William Williams to supply Oswego twice, once in October and again in November, Williams was unable to effectively carry out Shirley’s instructions. As a result, the garrison was left in a perilous state.100 Sustained ‘all winter at ¾ Allowence’, Lieutenant Colonel James Mercer, the fort’s commander, was distressed over the plight of his men. Informing Williams of his situation, Mercer lamented, ‘I cannot reduce them to less & preserve their Healths.’101 As conditions at the outpost deteriorated further, scurvy began to spread among the soldiers, bringing not only death, but also a decrease of effective manpower.102 The fall of Oswego was not completely the result of a failure in British logistical support. One factor which led to the fall of the outpost was that the

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French enjoyed a much more efficient method of transport, provided by the natural waterways of Canada. As a result, they did not have to construct roads through the American wilderness, unlike their British adversaries.103 Regarding operations against Oswego, this advantage also assisted in the transportation of a formidable artillery train, which wrecked havoc on the outpost’s poor fortifications.104 Owing to these two factors, Oswego succumbed to the French offensive. A lack of provisions was not responsible for the defeat, as Bradstreet’s effective management of the supply convoys ensured that there were sufficient supplies not only for the garrison, but also the planned offensive against Niagara.105 When the outpost fell, Captain Pierre Pouchot recorded, ‘we found one hundred twenty pieces of artillery, ammunition, tools, copious quantities of food & trade goods and 9 war vessels’. On the fate of the provisions, Pouchot further added, ‘A proportion of the flour & the pork was sent to Frontenac & to Niagara; those two posts owed their subsistence to these provisions for nearly two years.’106 Following the fall of Oswego, the supply system of the British army continued to improve. After Loudoun assumed the role of commander-in-chief, three large depots were immediately established at key points to be directly supplied from Britain. In addition, an army wagon corps was also created in order to provide a dependable method of transport, as opposed to the unreliable and uncooperative colonials.107 As a result of Loudoun’s success in achieving some improvement in the army’s supply system, military disasters which occurred during the 1757 campaign were not due to any logistical deficiencies. Fort William Henry fell due to Montcalm’s superior forces and Webb’s timidity, while failure at Louisbourg was the result of the presence of a larger French naval force and bad weather.108 Although the army’s supply system experienced some improvement, soldiers remained poorly furnished throughout the war. Difficulties in transport continued to occur on overland routes and waterways, as there remained shortages of horses, wagons, forage and bateaux. Lacking these, transportation could not occur, and without adequate logistical support, the army at times suffered from a deficiency of stores. In the end, an effective solution appeared in 1758, when supplies were directly dispatched from Britain along with the soldiers destined for military operations in North America. David Gordon, an officer of the Highland Infantry present at the siege of Louisbourg in 1758, remarked, ‘A sufficient Quantity of provisions and Stores of All kinds are come in the Fleet; no care or attention will be wanting for the subsistence and preservation of the troops.’109

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By sending a sufficient quantities of supplies from Britain in such a manner, the government ensured that its soldiers would be adequately fed, and commanders could focus more attention on military operations and less on logistics. Although this practice provided short-term relief, it did not guarantee that the men would remain healthy. For example, when the British garrison at Québec no longer had ample stores of fresh provisions available during the winter of 1759–1760, conditions became similar to those endured at Oswego in 1756, as the men developed scurvy.110 As a diet comprised of entirely salt provisions was unhealthy for the soldiers, problems arose with the rations themselves.

Provisions The maintenance of adequate stores of provisions proved to be the British army’s greatest problem. Without them, an army could easily find itself in great peril. Writing to a contractor responsible for supply of his army, Forbes remarked, ‘I fancy I need Urge this subject no more because you ought to know that the want of one days provision to an Army is of more consequence than the value of 3 months.’111 Forbes’s statement was very true, as exemplified by the fate of the garrison of Oswego in 1756. While the army struggled to maintain its customary supplies of flour and salt provisions, it encountered a variety of problems, such as rotten stores, expensive prices and an alleged shortage of provisions in the colonies.112 While quartermasters strove to sustain a steady flow of supplies, soldiers took the initiative and gathered whatever provisions they could locate in the wilderness, cultivated their own gardens and searched for colonials willing to sell them.113 On some occasions, desperate soldiers also resorted to theft. However, they did so because they were aware of the possibility of their own death, either from starvation, or from their rations of salt provision, which were lethal if nothing else was consumed.114 The struggle to gather provisions was a fight for survival, and as proven by the fate of Oswego, without adequate stores, an army could be decimated. Throughout the duration of the war in North America, the British army was highly dependent upon the use of salt provisions. Forbes remarked that salt provisions were ‘the Sole and real dependence of an Army’.115 From the initial outbreak of hostilities, Forbes’s statement proved accurate for soldiers destined for service in North America. When Braddock first arrived in Virginia in 1755, the colonies were expected to organize the expedition’s stores. However, upon

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inspection of those which had been gathered, Braddock found them inadequate to meet the army’s demands.116 Although faced with such shortcomings, he could find some relief in knowing that the ministry had dispatched a quantity of salt provision as a precautionary measure.117 Braddock quickly informed Sir Thomas Robinson, ‘As I don’t find that a sufficient Supply of Provisions has been made in the Colonies for the Subsistance of the Troops, I shall be obliged to take the 1,000 Barrels of Beef & 10 Tons of Butter, sent from England for a provisional Supply.’118 Originally dispatched as a ‘provisional supply’, salt provisions remained the army’s primary source of nourishment throughout the duration of the war. Although salt provisions formed the greater part of the soldier’s diet, it was known that their continuous consumption was unhealthy. Writing home to his father, Major Henry Fletcher remarked, ‘I mentioned to you in my last That I had been of late in a very indifferent state of health, chiefly owing I imagine to the few Vegetables wee have had for these two years past and very often no other Food than Salt provisions, which was particularly the case this last Campaigne.’119 Additionally, Colonel Ephraim Williams stationed at Albany noted that a ‘Great part of ye men are obligd to Eat their Victuals almost as Salt as Brine.’ A doctor present with his forces warned him that should this continue, ‘in a very little time (Except fresh provisions Can be had) the men will be so Sickly yt the Expedition will be at an End’.120 As revealed by the observations of both Williams and Fletcher, soldiers were aware of the detrimental effects of salt provisions. As a result, they struggled to supplement their diet with fresh provisions in order to preserve both their health and lives. Not surprisingly, attempts were made to make salt provisions less lethal by restoring their freshness. At the garrison in Québec, general orders stated, ‘As it is imposible to Gett Fresh Provision for the Troops in Our present Situation for the preservation of the Soldiers Helths it is Absolutely Necessary to give the Utmost Attention to freshening and Boileing of the pork.’ In order to achieve this, they advised ‘the pork or beef to be Steepd 24 Hours Chainge the watter 3 Times Scrapeing the Salt of Each Time the watter is Renew’d then Boile it with their Pease as Usual’.121 The removal of the salt which preserved the meat was not an unreasonable solution. Pickling practices at the time not only required a proportion of salt, but also saltpetre, a primary ingredient in the production of gun powder. Saltpetre was not the most appetising preservative, as it was described as ‘a bitterish salt, and of a sulphurous nature’. Meat poorly preserved with too much saltpetre was disgusting in both taste and smell.122 If salt provisions arrived in such a state in North America, this would explain why some soldiers

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were willing at times to dispose of them in the wilderness and sought out fresh provisions from the colonials instead.123 Medical theory at the time supported the idea that a diet comprised entirely of salt provisions was unhealthy. On this subject, Monro argued, ‘Where there is a Want of fresh Provisions, and they are obliged to live on salted Meat, and cannot have Greens, Pot Herbs, Roots, or other fresh Vegetables, nor be properly supplied with Beer Cyder, Wine, or other generous fermented Liquors, they as well as Sailors, are subject to the Scurvy.’124 Unfortunately for soldiers serving in North America, the majority of the rations they received were of the same standard as those distributed in the Royal Navy.125 As a result, this created conditions much like those experienced at sea. Not surprisingly, many men were afflicted with scurvy, which seasonally appeared in the early spring months due to the lack of fresh provisions available during the winter.126 In addition to the danger presented by scurvy, pork itself was believed to be unhealthy. This posed a difficult problem, as the majority of salt provision was pickled pork. Sir John Pringle remarked that pork in general was ‘looked upon as unwholesome food… as it corrupts sooner than beef or mutton’. Reflecting on this idea further he added, ‘it may be presumed to afford a less proper nourishment than either, when there is danger from putrification. It is suspected also, that the meat is generally too little blooded, and thereby more disposed to corrupt, and to concur with other causes in breeding putrid diseases’.127 Contributing to Pringle, Monro argued that both salted beef and pork were unhealthy because they ‘always tend to the putrescent’.128 As a result, they were supposedly responsible for outbreaks of flux, or dysentery, due to the ‘putrid effluvia’ which they released into the air.129 Consequently, pork was at times banned during the summer months. For instance, while campaigning in Germany in 1758, Lieutenant Colonel James Adolphus Oughton noted that orders were issued stating, ‘fresh Pork forbid to be sold in Camp to prevent Fluxes which began to rage much among the men’.130 While the opinions of physicians slightly differed, pork was generally considered harmful. Although the army heavily relied upon salt provisions, a sufficient supply was not always available for the men. On many occasions, while opening the barrels in which they were stored, soldiers could expect to encounter either a meal or a decomposing mess. Orme described one such incident: About the latter End of May, the Pensylvania Waggons came up to us, but brought very little Flour from Conegogee, occasioned by the infamous Neglect of Cresop the Agent at that Place, who Suffered almost all the Waggons to pass without giving them the Order before mentioned. Much about the same time

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this man’s Father who was employed by Governor Sharpe to salt a Quantity of Beef for the use of the Maryland Troops, which Beef had been reckoned in the Estimate of those Provisions designed for the March, it was no sooner brought to Camp but it was Condemned to be buried by a Survey. The Surveyors reported that it had no Pickle, and that it was put into dry Casks, which could never have contained any.131

As the provisions rotted due to the neglect of the commissary in charge of them, Thomas Cresap, who was described by one of Keppel’s seamen as ‘a Rattle Snake Colonel, and a D.[amn]d Rascal’, it is not surprising that he was immediately summoned by Braddock, who no doubt angrily fired him.132 A careless commissary such as Cresap would have been enough to bring military operations to a halt. As Lieutenant Governor James De Lancey summarized, ‘Our Troops can never want Provisions, as this Country abounds with them, but by the Neglect of those who are intrusted to procure them.’133 As neglect was a serious issue, both officers and civilians needed to be educated in the proper handling of supplies and stores.134 At times, those employed in the transportation of the provisions used the oil cloths, which were provided for ‘covering the provisions ashore and afloat’, for other purposes.135 Ignorant in regard to the proper use of the oil cloths, and without training for the care and preservation of the provisions, it is not surprising that those entrusted with their transportation often delivered rotten barrels of food that were condemned upon arrival. Surprisingly, the condemnation of stores did not lead to their immediate disposal. On some occasions, condemned provisions were sold ‘for the Use of the Crown’.136 Whether or not soldiers purchased any of the spoiled supplies, it was known at the time that impoverished families in Britain knew how to salvage ‘stinking Meat’ for consumption.137 As the rank and file were generally from the poorer classes, it may be assumed that some of the soldiers managed to prepare meals from the condemned stores.138 Such a feat would not have been extraordinary. One of Braddock’s own cooks was reputed to have the culinary skills to transform an old pair of army boots into a ragout.139 In regard to the supply of flour, similar difficulties which occurred with salt provisions arose in their transport. Owing to improper packing and handling, as well as exposure to the elements, flour easily spoiled. One extreme case illustrating the consequences of such negligence occurred at Saratoga in 1757, where General Daniel Webb condemned a thousand barrels as unfit for use. Upon further inspection of the stores, Webb found only 250 barrels fit for consumption, which were partially mildewed.140 Nevertheless, although faced

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with such obstacles, the army struggled to supply, at least on a few occasions, live cattle, flour and bread to the soldiers. When circumstances made it possible, fresh provisions were procured for the men. During Braddock’s expedition, as the column neared Fort Duquesne, an officer recorded, ‘This day a Party came in from Coll: Dunbar with 100 Oxen & a large quantity of flour, a very seasonable supply, [we] having lived on salt provisions the whole time.’141 In addition to live cattle, Braddock’s men also received occasional rations such as bread, beans and fresh meat to compliment their allocations of salt provisions and flour.142 Similarly, in an attempt to restore the health of soldiers which had recently crossed the Atlantic for the attack against Québec, general orders issued at Louisbourg stated, ‘As the regiments arrive they are to have fresh beef delivered to them, and in the general whilst the troops remain in this harbour, they are to be furnished with as much fresh provisions as can be procured.’143 Indeed, throughout the duration of the war, considerable efforts were made to maintain sufficient stores of fresh provisions for the preservation of the army. As a result, soldiers at times received a combination of both fresh and salt provisions.144 Even at Québec, during the winter of 1759–1760, before the garrison’s supplies were exhausted, soldiers received a consistently diverse assortment of rations which consisted of bread, flour, pork, beef, peas, oatmeal, butter cheese, oil, suet and fruit.145 However, when the garrison eventually ran out of fresh provisions, they experienced faminelike conditions. Although supplies of fresh provisions were irregular, they were vital for the survival of the troops. Medical theory at the time stressed their necessity to an army. Pringle advised that once ‘The messing being established… the men be well supplied with bread; and that the markets be so regulated, that the traders have encouragement to come to the camp, and the messes have good provisions at a moderate price: in particular, vegetables, which, in the hot months, ought to make a great part of the diet.’146 As Pringle’s recommendations were available prior to the outbreak of hostilities, it is highly possible that Braddock, along with other officers, may have been influenced by him as they sought out fresh provisions from the colonials. In particular, this knowledge might also have led to the establishment of the colonial markets for the soldiers, a plan first adopted by Braddock. Obtaining supplies of fresh provisions from the colonials proved a difficult task for the officers. During the 1755 campaign, Braddock attempted to encourage the colonials to supply his men with fresh provisions as they marched

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towards Fort Duquesne. In this endeavour, Braddock met with disappointing results. Orme described the outcome of Braddock’s scheme: We had been promised the greatest Plenty of all Kinds of Provision at this Place, but none fresh could be procured. The General was greatly concerned to See the Want of all Refreshments begin so Early, fearing it would disable the Men from undergoing the Fatigues and Hardships they were to meet with on their March to the Ohio. They had already marched Two hundred Miles through an uninhabited Wilderness without any other but the Salt Provision that they had Carried with them, or that had been laid in for them Upon the Road. The General offered large Rewards, and lent Several people his own Money to Enable them to provide the Camp, and gave all manner of Encouragement to Such as would bring Provision. Every thing brought to Camp was to be sold at a particular place, and any person was to Suffer Death who should dare to intercept or molest any Body bringing Provision, or should offer to buy them before it was Carried to the Publick Market, which was put under the Care and Inspection of the Captains of the Picket, and a Serjeant with a Small Guard of the Picket attended the Market to prevent all Quarrels or Confusion. As a farther Encouragement, the Price of Provisions was raised a penny in the Pound, and no good Meat was to be sold at less than the fixed Price, lest the Peasants should be distress’d when they had brought it many Miles. Those Regulations and Encouragements produced some Supplies, tho by the Nature of the Country inadequate to the Wants of the Camp.147

Throughout the duration of the war, the British army attempted to gather supplies for its soldiers from the countryside in the same manner as Braddock by erecting markets, even during sieges such as Louisbourg.148 However, as experienced by Braddock, subsequent attempts by other officers to organize supplies in a similar manner produced only limited results. Under such circumstances, some officers took it upon themselves to supply their men with fresh provisions by other means. For example, Captain Philip Townshend attempted to procure them for his men directly from willing colonials. On one occasion, while sailing down the Hudson River on a military transport, Townshend went ashore during a brief stop at Philipsburg to purchase cabbages and apples. At another time, after his troops arrived in Albany, Townshend again attempted to purchase fresh provisions but could obtain ‘nothing but Houshold Bread & a very few Turnips’.149 Unlike Townshend, others resorted to violence, seeking out and seizing live cattle and sheep from the French and Canadians.150 Some even attempted to trade for food with the French and Amerindians, despite contrary orders, and received supplies of bear, maize and venison.151

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Ultimately, a less hazardous solution was provided by gardens which had been cultivated around forts.152 Not only were vegetable gardens necessary to complement salt provisions, they were particularly important in combating scurvy.153 However, during the winter, large quantities of vegetables were required to maintain the health of a garrison. At Fort Edward, for example, one ration comprised of sixty-five onions and as the winter progressed, the garrison received over 100 barrels of vegetables.154 While such generous dispensations could place extensive demands upon a fort’s gardens, when the number of scurvy-stricken soldiers increased significantly, an even better solution to expedite their recovery was to send them to the Jerseys where fresh vegetables were abundant.155 Unsurprisingly, the Jerseys were considered an ideal location for troops to remain in winter quarters.156 Additionally, in an attempt to provide a substitute for vegetables, the army also began the manufacture of spruce beer in order to serve as an antiscorbutic.157 In the end, despite such efforts, the demands of the army for fresh vegetables were only partially met. The maintenance of fresh supplies of meat proved even more problematic as transporting live cattle through the wilderness involved substantial risks. Forbes described the difficulties in attempting to bring them with an expedition: They have no notion but that live stock is to supply every thing and therefore for my blood I can get no Salt provisions, Altho representing to them in the strongest terms that 3 or 4 frosty mornings (which you may expect about the latter end of this month) will destroy all the pasture and the price of carrying up forage for their maintenance will by no means answer, were it to be got and further that a Sckulking party of Enemy Indians may Hamstring their whole stock in one night, altho kept in different parties, and a good deal asunder one from another.158

As securing adequate stores of forage for the use of the army’s horses proved a challenging task, it was impracticable to make such attempts for cattle. Additionally, Amerindians posed a dangerous threat and could easily steal cattle away during the night, further intensifying the sufferings of the soldiers. In light of these obstacles, it is easy to understand why on most occasions the army relied upon salt provisions. They were a much cheaper, easier and more reliable means of ensuring that the men were supplied with meat. The transportation of live cattle was at the mercy of frost, the location and timely delivery of forage and Amerindian raids. If problems arose involving any one of these scenarios, the army might find itself without any provisions and, as a result, suffer deadly consequences.

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In contrast to forces serving in Europe, the British army in North America was not supplied in the same manner. At the same time across the Atlantic, British soldiers stationed in Germany enjoyed the services of a butcher to provide them with fresh meat throughout the year. If such a practice had materialized in North America, it might have alleviated the mortality rate among the troops as fresh meat contains vitamin C.159 Monro observed that, ‘The Regiments in Germany who kept their Butchers in Winter, and made Stoppages of the Mens Pay, and obliged them to take a certain Quantity of Meat daily, were much more healthy than those who used no Precaution of this Kind.’160 If a similar accommodation had been made in North America, it may have achieved almost identical results. As the army’s regular supply of salt provisions was lethal, and other more appetizing victuals scarce, soldiers turned towards the wilderness to supplement their meagre rations. During Braddock’s march towards Fort Duquesne, redcoats found themselves at times dining upon bear, wild turkeys, venison, elk and even rattlesnake.161 In addition, some of the officers accompanying Braddock hired huntsmen in order to maintain a regular supply of ‘wild’ provisions.162 This was a practice which continued well until the end of the war.163 As this created a dependence upon the wilderness for supplies, officers were keen to observe what wild provisions were readily available. One such discovery was made by St Clair while reconnoitering ahead of Forbes’s road during the 1758 campaign against Fort Duquesne. Governor James Glen informed Forbes of St Clair’s revelations: But at length on he went, making every difficulty disappear describing plentiful pastures, fine springs and [Rivers] which naturally led him to talk of the fish, Cat fish, white salmon, Buffalo Fish, Carp and Crawfish, he swears they had of all sorts in one afternoon 300 [wt]. Bear and Deer, Cubbs and Fawns, were things of course, & course fare, young Turkeys could hardly find room upon his table, for Isslenotts, Gooseberry tarts, and other rarities. This moment Capt. Monroe who escorted him arrived and confirms every word, Loyalhanning he sayes is a perfect Paradise.164

Such a find had the possibility of greatly alleviating the problem of procuring fresh provisions. As a result, it is not surprising that Forbes took an interest in St Clair’s discovery. In his papers, Forbes listed, not only the wild provisions mentioned by St Clair, but also other animals such as rattlesnakes, pheasants, turtle, mussels and water lizard, all which were also at Loyalhanning, and available for the army’s immediate consumption.165 One can only assume that the other animals Forbes listed were sighted by soldiers assigned to St Clair’s escort.

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The gathering of provisions in the wild was not limited to hunting as fishing proved another alternative. While soldiers embarked on the ill-fated campaign against Louisbourg in 1757, many fished from their transports before arriving in Halifax. Captain Philip Townshend recorded one morning that the men commenced fishing at four o’clock and ‘by Seven the Decks were Covered With fine Codd which were catched many in pairs in about 30 fathom water ye Land about four Leagues we suppose ourselves to ye E ward of Hallifax. I Tried for Codd Two or three different Times & no sooner ye bait was down than we were sure to hook a Codd’.166 Soldiers did not pass an opportunity to fish in order to complement their rations. While conveying provisions from Fort Stanwix to Oswego, Lieutenant John Grant noted that the men sometimes fished off their bateaux, occasionally catching salmon.167 Archaeological evidence at Rogers Island and Fort William Henry certainly reinforces the argument that fishing was important, as fish hooks and fish vertebrae were among the artefacts excavated at both sites. As fish bones were found to a lesser extent among the bones of other animals butchered at both encampments, such as cattle and pork, the evidence concludes that fish was a supplementary item in the soldier’s diet.168 Although the wilderness provided some provisions for soldiers, it could not be depended upon at all times. This was primarily due to restrictions which were placed upon the men, such as the prohibition of using cartridges for hunting purposes. Orders given at an encampment at Vanantwerp stated that soldiers would be responsible for a charge of 3p per cartridge if any were found missing. Additionally, those which were caught by their commanding officers might also be condemned as ‘Embezzlers of ye Kings Stores’.169 One soldier, John Ward Cooper, was actually tried ‘for Imbassling the Kings powder & Stores’ and sentenced to receive 1,000 lashes. A member of the train of artillery, Cooper enjoyed easy access to the ammunition.170 However, for what purpose he took them, whether for personal use or sale, the details of his court martial does not state. Despite orders against using the King’s ammunition for hunting, both members of the rank and file, as well as a number of non-commissioned officers, continued such practices.171 Besides the difficulty of securing ammunition, permission also needed to be obtained in order for any soldier to go hunting. General orders issued at Fort Edward stated that ‘No person to be Allowed to go hunt or kill game without a Pass Signed by ye Genlls. A.D. Camp in which is to be Specifyd ye Number of ye Party & ye Regts they belong too.’172 Although tickets were required to go hunting, sentries on occasion let their comrades pass without notice. Further difficulties in securing permission arose due to the use of passes for other

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purposes, such as desertion.173 As soldiers ventured into the woods to supply their meagre rations, there remained another problem which determined if they could secure permission to hunt – the presence of the enemy. This was a dangerous enterprise under such conditions, as exemplified by the fate of a French officer who was attacked and scalped by Braddock’s Amerindians while hunting in the vicinity of Fort Duquesne.174 Owing to the possible presence of the enemy, musket fire had the potential to set off false alarms. Upon hearing a lone musket shot, soldiers were expected to immediately form ranks, unsure if it had come from a body of enemy troops or a careless hunter. Unsurprisingly, the situation proved extremely problematic.175 In order to prevent such occurrences, hunting was prohibited from within a mile of both camps and garrisons. However, if a careless hunter happened to set off an alarm by firing his musket, contrary to orders, he could expect to receive a punishment of ‘500 Lashes with a Cat of nine tails without a Court Mareshcal’.176 Although such penalizing might appear severe, the carelessness of one soldier had the potential to cause major disruption, stopping vital work such as the transportation of supplies or the construction of roads. Throughout the duration of the war, there was a constant struggle to keep the army adequately supplied with provisions. In this endeavour, numerous obstacles such as transportation and food preservation, a dearth of supplies among the colonials, the laborious task of locating fresh provisions and difficulties encountered in obtaining victuals from the wilderness needed to be overcome. All these factors combined resulted in fatal consequences for soldiers. Ultimately, without provisions they would starve. Supplied with only salt provisions but no fresh provisions, they faced the threat of scurvy. In attempting to hunt, they might be punished for using the King’s ammunition, fall into an Amerindian ambush or trigger a false alarm. With such odds against them, it is not surprising that many men died due to the lack of adequate supplies, as exemplified by the fate of the garrisons at Oswego and Québec. Ultimately, logistical support tremendously effected the outcome of military operations. As with Marlborough and his six-week march towards the Danube, success was the result of an organized and efficient supply system. In North America, logistical support was extremely fragile until stores were transported directly from Britain in 1758. Although soldiers then subsisted principally on a diet of salt provision, after 1760, large gardens were regularly established at every outpost, which rendered their consumption less lethal. This was primarily a reaction to the deadly outbreaks of scurvy, which had decimated the garrison at Québec, as well as other frontier posts, during the winter of 1759–1760.177

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The best example which illustrates the importance of maintaining a functioning logistical system comes from the French garrison at Québec in 1759. Incidentally, the French found themselves suffering under similar conditions which the British army had endured during the initial stages of the war. Owing to a lack of provisions and the flight of Governor Vaudreuil, the officers left in command after Montcalm’s death decided to capitulate.178 As one officer remarked of this event, ‘Famine the severest of all military Terrors open’d the Gates.’179 Although Wolfe had defeated the French army on the Plains of Abraham, it was the lack of provisions which ensured that the city fell into British hands.

6

The Army: An Inadequate, Frightened and Sickly Force

We Marchd onto that place witht any considerable loss, havg only now and then a stragler pickd up by the French Scoutg Indns. When we came there, we were attackd by a body of French and Indns whose number (I am persuaded) did not exceed 300 Men; our’s consisted of abt 1,300 well armd Troops; chiefly Regular Soldiers, who were struck with such a panick, that they behavd with more cowardice than it is possible to conceive; The Officers behav’d Gallantly in order to encourage their Men, for which they sufferd greatly; there being near 60 killd and wounded; a large proportion out of the number we had. The Virginia Troops shewd a good deal of Bravery, & were near all killd; for I believe out of 3 Companys that were there, there is scarce 30 Men left alive; Capt. Peyrouny & all his Officer’s down to a Corporal was killd; Capt. Polson shard near as hard a Fate, for only one of his was left: In short the dastardly behaviour of thos they call regular’s, exposd all other’s that were inclind to do their duty to almost certain death; and at last, in despight of all the efforts of the Officer’s to the Contrary, they broke, and run as Sheep pursued by dogs; and it was impossible to rally them. Washington to his Mother, 18 July 17551 Throughout the initial stages of the war, the British army encountered numerous obstacles which greatly contributed to their string of humiliating defeats. In this regard, the period between Braddock’s Defeat and the loss of Fort William Henry is of great significance. During that time, France employed their Amerindian allies in a successful campaign of psychological warfare. Indeed, Père Joseph Antoine Roubaud recorded following the aftermath of Fort William Henry, ‘They [the French] were preparing an expedition against the enemy and relying on the disposition of the Indian nation, they anticipated from it great success.’2 As observed by Washington, this was a strategy which

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the French effectively employed. While Braddock’s men marched towards the Monongahela, soldiers who had wandered from the safety of the convoy were regularly found mutilated. In addition, Amerindian war parties recurrently posted crudely inscribed threats on trees which lay within the expedition’s path.3 As a result, the regulars became terrified of the Amerindians over time, and when confronted by Fort Duquesne’s defenders, they unsurprisingly conducted themselves as ‘Sheep pursued by dogs’. Following Braddock’s defeat, failure was principally attributed to the rank and file, who were denounced as being poor in quality. Upon receiving word of the disaster, Wolfe remarked, ‘I have but a very mean opinion of the Infantry in courage. I know their discipline to be bad, and their valour precarious. They are easily put into disorder, and hard to recover out of it. They frequently kill their officers through fear, and murder one another in their confusion.’4 For this reason, while preparations were underway for the 1756 campaign, Newcastle confided to Devonshire, ‘As to North America (the great object of the war,) I own, I have my fears. The supplies to be sent thither will come late, and the force now there, I doubt, is not much to be depended upon.’5 Although it is easy to assume, as both Wolfe and Newcastle did, that British failure was the result of the behaviour of the soldiers, such an observation is only partially correct as the army also encountered a lack of sufficient manpower and suffered from the effects of disease. Ultimately, all these factors combined created an army which was ineffectual in carrying out its expected duties.

An inadequate force The British army repeatedly found itself suffering from a severe shortage of manpower during the early stages of the war. This presented a difficult problem for those entrusted within the army to carry out ministerial policy in the field. At the outbreak of hostilities, it was assumed that recruits for the army could easily be supplied by the colonies. However, although they possessed a much larger population than New France, they were less cooperative than their French counterparts in organizing their collective manpower. Impaired by such behaviour, the British army continually suffered both in terms of quantity and quality when attempting to enlist colonials. As a result, such a state continued to exist until 1757, when Pitt began the process of sending significant reinforcements of regulars to North America. In doing so, Pitt greatly improved the condition of the army and changed it

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from being comprised of primarily raw untrained recruits to that of a highly trained, professional and deadly force. Ministerial planning during the initial stages of the war dictated that Braddock was to depend heavily upon enlistments in the colonies. Arriving from Ireland with two depleted regiments, Braddock was ordered to raise them to the strength of 1,000 men each.6 In addition, orders were also issued for the reactivation of two regiments, the 50th and 51st, Shirley’s and Pepperell’s, which had been disbanded at the end of the War of the Austrian Succession. Placing further demands on colonial manpower soon after his arrival, Braddock determined to raise ‘two Companies of Carpenters, four or more of Rangers … and also one Troop of Light Horse’ from among the volunteers gathered in Virginia.7 Although Dinwiddie hoped that such a measure would prove ‘very prudent’ and be of ‘great use’, the additional diversion of colonial manpower may have increased the number of military units available, but at the same time decreased their numerical strength and striking ability.8 Complicating matters further, both provincials and regulars were in direct competition for recruits. Prior to the arrival of the regulars from Britain, colonial officers had already begun to encounter difficulties, as demonstrated by Washington’s failure to enlist 200 men for the 1754 campaign.9 As a result, the situation continued to intensify until only few recruits for the regulars could be secured at very great expense and almost none by the end of the war. While attempting to gather volunteers for the Royal Americans in 1757, Bouquet observed that ‘Men are very scarce and generally averse to the Service’ and could only be secured through ‘great trouble & Expenses’. Despite employing two officers to carry out this task, only twelve recruits could be found. On their experience, Bouquet remarked, ‘they met with so many Obstructions from the people & Magistrates that I dont expect any Success, unless the Parliament pass an Act calculated entirely for this Continent’.10 Ultimately, colonists not only began to refuse to serve within the ranks of the regulars but also harassed recruiters, rioted against them and on one occasion, an armed mob even went as far as to chase a recruiting party for four miles.11 Consequently, colonial recruits dominated regiments raised in the colonies, or those that had arrived before 1757.12 Indeed, among the soldiers of Braddock’s two Irish regiments, only one-quarter were drafts from Britain, while one-third were colonials.13 Prior to 1757, the British army struggled to enlist a sufficient number of men from the colonies in order to put the ministry’s plans into action. This was a dangerous problem for British military operations, which depended highly

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upon significant numbers of colonials to reinforce the newly arrived regulars from Britain. With such increasing pressure being placed upon colonial manpower, it is not surprising that none of the regular regiments ever fully reached their quotas. In addition to recruitment in the colonies, there were also problems regarding the quality of the men. Upon viewing the state of Braddock’s forces, Colonel John Bradstreet bemoaned, ‘If Sir Peter Halkets Regiment (Who is Still at Kinsale) is no better than Col. Dunbars I fear his Majestys European Regulars will not answer the great & many good purposes for which they are intended when they get to America.’14 Although the 44th and 48th Regiments were reputed to be in poor condition, with soldiers who were ill-disciplined, insubordinate and drunk, their ranks comprised of a large number of raw recruits and drafts, with only a small number of seasoned veterans. Of the 500 men observed by Bradstreet, only 340 were originally enlisted in Dunbar’s regiment.15 This was largely due to the practice of transferring undesirable recruits to other units, while maintaining a permanent core of seasoned veterans. Ideally, this group of veterans existed in every regiment.16 However, regarding those of the 44th and 48th, the majority of the men were raw recruits, who were not the most effective and reliable soldiers in battle. In addition to the poor state of the regulars recently arrived from Britain, the independent companies stationed permanently in North America were in an equally dismal situation. Although officially regulars, the independent companies left much wanting in terms of professionalism. This was largely due to the terrible management of their regimental agent in London, John Calcraft, who profited from their neglect and abuse. One of many unscrupulous agents exploiting the system at the time, he amassed his fortune by taking it from common soldiers and half-pay officers. Criticized as one of a number of state vultures, Calcraft provided the French with an additional advantage by inadequately maintaining these troops.17 Unsurprisingly, at the outbreak of hostilities, the independent companies were incapable of offering any opposition to the French. Soon after his arrival at Will’s Creek, St Clair described the condition in which he discovered them: I found the Governour of Maryland at Wills’s Creek, who had been at that place but a few days, not long enough to make any considerable Alteration nor to Reconoitre the Country. He had with him at the fort (or more properly a small piece of ground enclosed with a Strong Palisade joined pretty close) three Independent Companys, the one of South Carolina and the other two of New

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York, the latter seem to be Draughted out of Chelsea, the excuse they make for having so many old men does very little honour to those Companys that are left behind at New York, for they say that they are draughted from them.18

Upon further examination, the majority of the men were declared unfit for service. On viewing the official muster, Orme noted that there ‘were several men from Sixty to Seventy Years of Age, Lame and every Way disabled, many were Inlisted, only for a Term of One, Two, or Three Years. Some were retained to stand a Muster, and the Whole old, without Discipline and very ill appointed’. Summarizing the gravity of the situation, he further added, ‘in Short, they were Invalids with the Ignorance of Militia’.19 As the independent companies were regulars according to the ministry, the fact that they were incapable of performing their duties, ‘on Account of a deficiency in their Numbers and a great number of old men’, proved problematic. As a result, massive reorganizations took place to salvage the situation. In New York, officers of the independent companies were immediately ordered to discharge those declared unfit for duty and dispatch recruiting parties ‘so that the Company may be Completed with good able Bodied men to Its Establishment’.20 Although such methods provided immediate relief, much like the regiments dispatched from Britain, the independent companies became dominated by raw recruits. As raw recruits were not effective, an entire regiment comprised of them was impractical. Unsurprisingly, the reactivated 50th and 51st Regiments performed poorly. Although successful during the previous war, the men assembled in 1755 bore no resemblance to those which had captured Louisbourg a decade earlier. Bradstreet, who had accompanied both regiments in 1745, remarked cynically, ‘Tis said Shirleys & Pepperrells regiments are almost rais’d, but are made up of all sorts of people. The troops may be ready to march in a month, & I believe the people of England will find it an expensive affair, & the former a troublesome one.’21 Upon his arrival at Oswego in 1755, Bradstreet discovered that his predictions had come true. Lamenting the state in which he found the outpost, Bradstreet confided to a friend: If you knew how much business I have at this time in Building four Vessells, putting the place in some sort of defence, endeavouring to make the worst of troops upon earth useful, cajoling and talking politicks with all sorts of Indians and trying to counter-plot the French with respect to them, and the anxiety and indignation I feel at seeing the French pass this place with colours flying and Drums beating to oppose my General You would pitty me.22

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Indeed, the colonials posted at Oswego conducted themselves similarly to the raw colonial forces commanded by Washington during the siege of Boston at the outbreak of the American Revolution. Both at Oswego and later Boston, soldiers consorted with the enemy, maintained poor living conditions and starved due to a lack of provisions.23 Consequently, the 50th and 51st were never proper regiments. Comprised entirely of raw recruits, and no different than Samuel Bashawe’s 93rd Foot, they were nothing more than a source of manpower for other units.24 As a result, it is not surprising that after the fall of Oswego, the men were disbanded and incorporated into other regiments serving in North America, such as the Royal Americans. Commenting on the state of the army, St Clair remarked, ‘I hope our Situation at home will be such as to enable them to give us a Fleet and four good Regiments more to effect this Service; for in reality it is only adding two more to the force his Royal Highness judged sufficient for America as the 50th & 51st Corps never were Regiments.’25 Although St Clair appears harsh in his judgement, the 50th and 51st were irregular, as they lacked an essential corps of veterans, as well as ordinary discipline.26 As St Clair correctly advised, regulars sent from Britain were required in order to improve the military situation. Placing colonials in redcoats was not an appropriate solution, especially following the arrival of 78 companies of French regular infantry in Canada, which were equivalent to eight British regiments.27 In addition, as discussed in Chapter 4, France also enjoyed the support of numerous Amerindian allies. As the British army heavily relied upon raw recruits to fill its ranks, such a dependency greatly affected military capabilities. While making preparations for the 1758 expedition against Fort Duquesne, Forbes expressed some doubt in the performance of his troops: The Regular forces destined for this service, are as I am informed to be only Colonel Montgomery’s Battalion, and five Company’s of the first Battalion of the Royal Americans, which ought to make 1,500 men, but what will not turn out 1,400 in the field. All of those new levied troops, and altho under good Officers, yet not to be so much depended upon, as troops who have had more Experience, Add to those the 3 additional Companys of Colonel Montgomery’s, who may in time prove serviceable, but at this present writing are surely of less use for service than the same Number of Militia as none of them as ever as yet burnt powder, or been any way’s used to fire Arms.28

Ultimately, Forbes’s uncertainties were not unreasonable. Raw recruits could not be relied upon to withstand an attack conducted by seasoned veterans, even

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if led by good officers. Although Forbes dealt primarily with newly arrived soldiers from Europe, not colonials, the problem remained essentially the same. Also, colonials were more adapted to campaigning through the use of axes, shovels and picks, a tactic skilfully employed during the American Revolution at Bunker Hill, Harlem Heights and Yorktown.29 In contrast to the regulars from Britain, colonial dominated regiments lacked the discipline of their European counterparts. Additionally, at the outbreak of hostilities, the French had at their disposal a total of 3,000 regulars, twenty-eight companies of colonial regulars, 12,000 trained militia and numerous Amerindian allies.30 Although British North America was not entirely defenceless during the initial stages of the war, the forces which had been assembled were inadequate to conduct successful offensive operations.

Psychological warfare and the legacy of defeat When the British army first arrived in North America in 1755, it was not the first time that it had encountered a foe which was regarded as nothing more than a band of ‘wild savages’. In 1745, Charles Edward Stuart invaded Britain in an attempt to reclaim the throne for his father, the exiled King James III and VIII. Throughout the duration of the ’45 Rebellion, Charles relied primarily upon Scottish Highlanders for the support of his army. To the British regulars who were expected to oppose them, the Highlanders were viewed as ignorant troublesome thieves who were superstitious, violent, untrustworthy and extremely fierce warriors. Ultimately, they were perceived as savages. This image was further reinforced due to the inability of some Highlanders to speak English and their use of Highland dress and weaponry.31 On the battlefield, the performance of the Highlanders was unnerving, particularly when conducting a Highland charge, a tactic which involved overwhelming foes with tremendous speed and impact by using a preliminary volley of musketry followed by a ferocious charge with drawn swords.32 For a newly recruited British soldier, such an experience could be very frightening. In the end, outnumbered by Hanoverians, the Jacobites employed an effective campaign of psychological warfare in order to exploit the reputation of their Highland warriors. At the Battle of Prestonpans, the British army under the command of General Sir John Cope collapsed in less than ten minutes, with the army’s flight turning into a complete rout. This was largely due to the swift advance of the Highlanders, coupled with blood-curdling cries and

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the grisly use of their broadswords which left the battlefield strewn with body parts. The army surgeons who later tended the wounded remarked that they had never seen more gruesome wounds than those inflicted by the Highland broadswords.33 When an investigation was made to determine why the encounter at Prestonpans ended disastrously, blame was principally attributed to the rank and file. In contrast, Cope and the officers under his command were completely exonerated.34 However, this verdict was unfair to the common soldiers, as they had received no training in irregular warfare.35 Consequently, the psychological impact of facing a foe who appears to be different, hence a savage, can be very powerful if soldiers are not drilled properly. As the raw recruits were poorly trained, unsure of their capabilities and facing an enemy whose ferocious reputation was enhanced by a combination of reality and imagination, fear was used as an effective and deadly weapon. In regard to the Seven Years’ War, Prestonpans and Braddock’s Defeat are closely related. The most interesting connection being that one of the regiments dispatched to North America, the 44th, was present at both disasters. In addition, its colonel, Sir Peter Halkett, was present on the battlefield at Prestonpans where under chaotic conditions he managed to maintain discipline over a company of soldiers who continued to fire upon the Highlanders from the protection of a ditch until offered terms for surrender.36 At both encounters, British regulars were confronted by adversaries who were strikingly similar in behaviour and battlefield practices. Observing the Highlanders at Prestonpans, a British officer remarked, ‘Most of them seemed to be strong, active, and hardy men; … and if clothed like Lowcountry men, would appear inferior to the King’s troops; but the Highland garb favoured them much, as it showed their naked limbs, which were strong and muscular; … their stern countenances, and bushy uncombed hair, gave them a fierce, barbarous, and imposing aspect.’37 In contrast to the observations made at Prestonpans, a seaman accompanying Braddock’s expedition described the Amerindians who had arrived at Will’s Creek: The Men are tall, well made and Active, but not strong; The Women not so tall yet well proportion’d, & have many Children; they paint themselves in different Manners; Red, Yellow & Black intermixt, the Men have the outer Rim of their Ears cut; and hanging by a little bit at Top and bottom: they have also a Tuft of Hair left at Top of their Heads, dress’d with Feathers … Their Match Coat, which is their chief Clothing, is a thick Blanket thrown round them; and instead of Shoes wear Mekosins, which laces round the foot and Ankle.38

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Further enhancing the depictions of savagery, both Highlanders and Amerindians generally did not understand English and carried an assortment of exotic weapons which ranged from the broadsword and Lochaber axe in Scotland, to the tomahawk and scalping knife in North America.39 Even more frightening, while Highlanders were prone to remove body parts with the stroke of their broadswords, Amerindians purposely removed the scalps of their enemies. Additionally, a common practice among both parties was the plundering of corpses immediately following a victorious battle.40 Despite these similarities, Highlanders and Amerindians conducted their campaigns of psychological warfare differently. While the Highlanders only terrified regulars on the battlefield, the Amerindians continually harassed and frightened Braddock’s column as it marched through the wilderness.41 As a result, constant exposure to the threat of an irregular Amerindian attack, along with the knowledge of their possible fate if captured, continually eroded the courage and confidence of the soldiers. Once the proper level of terror had been achieved, the French along with their Amerindian allies used this advantage to strike with devastating results. In contrast, the practice of psychological warfare witnessed an expansion in North America, as it was used on a greater scale than in Scotland during the ’45 Rebellion. Prestonpans provided the British army with some experience in dealing with psychological warfare. However, as it was utilized more effectively in North America, not even the hero of Prestonpans, Halkett, could organize his men again to resist another attack by irregulars and perished in his attempt.42 Consequently, after Braddock’s defeat, with the exception of the Battle of Carillon, the French maintained at every victorious engagement a significantly large contingent of Amerindians, a frightening sight for the British soldiers who were attempting to resist them.43 The image of the Amerindian was enough to provoke feelings of fear among the men in Braddock’s army. Openly, the regulars showed only contempt; however, the Amerindians were viewed as somewhat mysterious. A seaman accompanying the expedition remarked, ‘These people have no Idea of a Superior Being or of Religion and I take them to be the most ignorant as to the Knowledge of the World and things of any Creatures living-when it becomes dark, they Return to their Camp which is in ye Woods, and Dance for some Time with making the most hideous Noise.’44 Associating the image of the Amerindian with the dark when they made ‘hideous noise’ appears to be an attempt to equate the fear of them with the fear of the unknown,

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or the supernatural. Indeed, to those who lived during the early modern period, darkness remained the realm of the Devil and evil dwelled within the shadows.45 Such a view is further reinforced by those of the Puritans who founded the Massachusetts Bay Colony, who were convinced they were helping the Amerindians by removing them from darkness and heathenism, and introducing them to Protestant Christianity and its brilliant light.46 As to the dark foreboding woods surrounding their small settlement, the Puritans truly believed that Satan roamed through it at night, stealing away unwary souls to suffer eternal torment.47 Returning to the seaman’s account, frightful perceptions that the Amerindians lived in the dark forest, lurked in it, attacked straggling soldiers and lone sentries, and went home at night to howl at the moon, could be easily made. If the officers who accompanied the expedition entertained any fears, they certainly concealed them for the sake of the men. As St Clair optimistically remarked, ‘their way of fighting I do not apprehend to be formidable’.48 Throughout the campaign of 1755, Braddock along with his troops were continually harassed by colonials who informed them that formal European methods of warfare were unsuited for the American wilderness. Immediately following the disaster at the Monongahela, Colonel Adam Stephens boasted, ‘his Excellency found to his woeful Experience what had been frequently told Him, that formal Attacks & plattoon firing never wou’d answer against the Savages & Canadians’.49 In addition to Braddock, the rank and file also received despairing comments concerning the manner in which they were trained and expected to fight. Reflecting upon the effects of such utterances, Colonel Thomas Gage remarked, ‘I can’t ascribe their Behaviour to any other Cause than the Talk of the Country People ever since our Arrival in America. The Woods Men and Indian Traders were continually telling the Soldiers, that if they attempted to fight Indians in a regular Manner they would certainly be defeated.’ Although attempts were made to dissuade such conversations and morale appeared unaffected, Gage further added, ‘I fear they gaind too much upon them.’ As a result of such demoralizing tales from the colonials, once the regulars confronted a considerably large force of Amerindians, they lost confidence in their ability to perform their firings as trained. For this reason, during the battle, ‘Not one Platoon could be prevail’d on to stirr from its Line of March.’50 Paralysed with fear, the regulars did not move, as they were informed by the colonials that the Amerindians would easily slaughter any platoon which dared to form in the open road.51 Although such unhelpful remarks were hurtful to the army, they only partially contributed to Braddock’s defeat.

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Throughout the duration of the expedition’s march, Braddock took precautionary measures for the defence of his forces. As his army advanced towards Fort Duquesne, Braddock had ‘apprehended frequent Annoyance’ from the Amerindians. As a result, an elaborate plan of defence was designed which called for the deployment of small parties on the front, rear and flanks of the column while the wagons, artillery and horses were divided into three separate divisions, which were subdivided again. In establishing encampments, ‘the Waggons were to draw up in Close Order in one Line’ while their respective companies ‘face outward’ and ‘Serjeants Flank Parties were to divide, facing to the Right and Left, and to open a free Communication by Cutting down Saplings and Underwood till they met the Divisions of the other Serjeants parties.’ While soldiers cleared the ground between the divided forces, troops which were not employed in any tasks maintained vigilance. Once erected, ‘a Chain of Centinels [were then posted] round the Camp’.52 Similar plans were also developed for maintaining security while striking camp.53 Braddock’s security measures were highly successful. They were so effective that a French officer who accompanied an Amerindian war party attempting to harass the column remarked, ‘his party had fired on ye Enemy & had killd some of them; but ye Indians (according to their cruel Custom) had not been able to scalp them: ye English always keeping in good order’.54 Braddock’s plan worked well to preserve his forces from being assaulted and ambushed by Amerindians concealed in the woods. In addition, Braddock’s men understood that the numerous daily tasks they performed were for the safety of the army. Orme noted that the soldiers became accustomed to these procedures ‘which they at first looked upon as unnecessary Fatigue’ but ‘were now convinced to be their only Security’. As a result, they ‘went through it with the greatest Chearfulness’.55 Owing to the safety measures employed by Braddock, it seemed that the soldiers had little to fear. So long as orders were obeyed, the impregnability of the column appeared to be ensured. Although the Amerindians could not directly attack Braddock’s forces due to the high level of security which it maintained, they successfully conducted a subtle campaign of psychological warfare. On 24 June, Cholmley’s batman recorded that the column ‘drove great many of the French Indiens before us’.56 As the expedition entered their abandoned camp, which accommodated ‘about One hundred and Seventy’ Amerindians, it was observed that ‘They had Stripped and painted some Trees, upon which they and the French had written many Threats and Bravados with all Kinds of Scurrilous Language.’57 The abandonment of the

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camp, however, was not a sign of weakness. The messages painted on the trees were a primitive form of propaganda and were meant to terrify and demoralize the men who viewed them. Indeed, the disappearance of the Amerindian inhabitants should have been viewed as a matter of concern, as it was impossible to know if an ambush awaited the British further down the road. Consequently, increased vigilance among the soldiers was necessary. Ultimately, the Amerindians immediately carried out their threats. The following day, several people left the safety of the camp to fetch a number of horses that had strayed into the woods and were attacked. Cholmley’s batman recorded, ‘We being Alarmd at four in the Morning by some Indiens fireing at our Wagonars fetching in their horses and wounded two in three places, and Scalped one man, a Servt to Major Halket.’58 Orme stated that ‘at Daybreak three Men who went without the Centinals, were shot and Scalped’.59 In the end, four men and a horse were reported as casualties. In addition, soldiers dispatched to intercept the raiders discovered three mutilated bodies – a foreboding omen of things to come.60 Several days after the incident, the column encountered another abandoned camp. The experience was even more ominous, as soldiers stumbled across a more gruesome discovery than images painted upon trees. Orme observed, ‘At our Halting place we found another Indian Camp, which they had abandoned upon our Approach, their fires being yet burning. They had marked in Triumph upon trees, the Scalps they had taken two Days before, and a great many French had also written on them their Names and many insolent Expressions.’61 In addition, an unknown British officer further added, ‘Our encampment was under a rocky hill where 150 or 200 french & Indians had encamped ye Night before. They had drawn many odd figures on ye trees expressing with red paint, ye scalps and Prisoners they had taken with them; there were three French Names wrote there, Rochefort, Chauraudray, & Picauday.’62 A taunting gesture to the British, the displays were left to exploit the effects created by the previous attack and intensify fears among the regulars. On this practice, a French soldier travelling with the Amerindians remarked, ‘it is shameful for the human race to use such barbarous methods’.63 In an attempt to bolster the morale of his men, Braddock issued orders that any soldier who succeeded in obtaining an Amerindian scalp would receive £5.64 Ironically, only Braddock’s Amerindian scouts secured the bounty by presenting the scalp of a slain French officer.65 Although Braddock’s scheme had the potential to instil confidence in the men, soldiers did not regularly engage in scalping until the latter end of the war.66

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As the column continued its march towards Fort Duquesne, Amerindian attacks intensified. Describing the general situation, Washington remarked, ‘They have had frequent Alarms and several Men have been Scalp’d, but this is done with no other design than to retard the March; and to harass the Men.’67 On 6 July, ‘Three or four People loitering in the Rear of the Grenadiers were killed.’68 Particularly unnerving was that one of the victims was a woman who ‘Belonged to the genll[’s] Cows’. Such an act, no doubt, only added to perceptions of the Amerindians as savages among Braddock’s men. However, Amerindians considered the scalping of a woman or child to be an act of bravery, because it was proof that the warrior had penetrated deep into enemy territory.69 It is highly evident that by the time the attack had occurred at the rear of the column, the regulars were effectively terrified of the Amerindians. This explains why when Braddock’s few Amerindian allies pursued the assailants responsible for the raid, they were fired upon by the rangers despite that they had displayed ‘the agreed Countersign, which was holding up a Bough, and grounding their Arms’.70 While this incident occurred three days before Braddock’s disaster, it is clear why panic ensued once the column encountered a large Amerindian force. As early as 27 June, nervous soldiers had already begun firing at imaginary Amerindians, which were allegedly lurking in the woods.71 Not limited to attacks on soldiers, psychological warfare was also effective when employed against civilians. Assaults against settlements and isolated frontier cabins could also send terrifying messages, especially around Fort Cumberland, where some of Braddock’s men had been left behind. On 10 June, a midshipman who accompanied the expedition was hospitalized at the outpost.72 While there, he was informed of several gruesome attacks carried out against civilians, news that would have reached Braddock’s column during its march. Maintaining a journal during his stay, on 25 June, the midshipman recorded, ‘it was reported that a party of Indians had Surprized, Kill’d, and Scalp’d 2 families to the Number of 12 within 4 Miles of ye Fort’. The following day, events were even more disheartening. The midshipman noted, ‘Accounts of another family’s Scalp’d within 3 miles of us. The Governor detach’d a party to bury the Dead, and to look for the Indians, they found a Child standing in the Water scalp’d, which had 2 holes in its Scull, they brought it to the Doctor, who Dress’d it but Died in a Week.’73 In conducting such brutal raids, the Amerindians were attempting to convey a message to Braddock’s soldiers, which was that if women and children were subjected to such violent deaths, the regulars could expect no better.

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Ultimately, the French bore the responsibility of organizing the campaign of psychological warfare, not the Amerindians. On their role in the conflict, St Clair remarked, ‘The Indians indeed are a formidable Enemy, they scatter themselves all over the back Settlements in small parties from five to nine men each, and burn and Murder whereever they go, so soon as they Strike the Stroke they run home.’ However, they were not alone in this enterprise as he added, ‘in each of these Scalping partys there is one Frenchman to see that the Indians do their duty, This Baron Diskeau (who is prisoner here) confess’d himself ’.74 Admitted by no one less than the French commanderin-chief, Major General Jean-Armand, baron de Dieskau, such a statement proves the desperation of the French to stop the British advance upon the Ohio. Until the arrival of Dieskau and his reinforcements, the French had very little hope of successfully repelling Braddock’s forces as they suffered from a serious deficiency of manpower. At Fort Duquesne, the French could only muster a force of seventy-two regulars, hardly sufficient to halt 1,200 professional British soldiers.75 As a result, irregular tactics were employed in order to harass and stall the British expedition.76 In addition, to ensure that the raids were conducted properly, French soldiers were regularly attached to the raiding parties. This explains why three French names were found scribbled among trees at the second abandoned encampment, as well as the discovery of commission which stated that they were ‘under the Command of the Sieur Normanville’.77 With such close surveillance of both the British and their Amerindian allies, the French ensured that the Braddock’s regulars were effectively terrified. This worked greatly to their advantage, as the principle defenders of Fort Duquesne were 637 Amerindian warriors.78 By terrorizing Braddock’s soldiers on the march, and instilling a fear of Amerindians among them, the French made certain that when the column encountered a large force of Amerindians, panic would ensue. When seeking answers for the failure of the expedition, many officers attributed the defeat to a general panic among the troops. Historians have argued that Braddock failed due to various reasons. These included accusations against the officers, blame placed upon the performance of raw recruits, the vanguard collapsing into the main body of the army and the most debated topic since its occurrence, that European-style warfare was unsuited to the North American wilderness.79 Reflecting upon the outcome of the battle, St Clair cryptically remarked, ‘something besides Cowardice must be Attributed to a Body of men, who will suffer the one half to be diminished by Fire without being pursued in their Retreat’.80 Constantly exposed to

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Amerindian raids, and enduring numerous daily fatigues to prevent them, the morale of the men slowly plummeted. Already softened by tales of Amerindian atrocities, when the regulars began to encounter Amerindians during the march, and witnessed the violence they committed upon their victims, including women and children, they became extremely frightened over time. While cowardice emerged on the battlefield, the French effectively bred the conditions for fear. Terrified by such an image of the Amerindian, it is easy to understand why Braddock’s men behaved the way that they did at the Monongahela. They could not see the enemy which had ‘advanced under cover of ye Woods’, although they could hear their hideous whoops as they approached.81 Under such circumstances, Braddock’s men were faced with an invisible, shrieking enemy. Once the fighting began, stories of Amerindian atrocities told by the colonials, warnings left for the soldiers along the march, the knowledge that if they were killed they would be scalped and the grotesque visuals which had been left during previous attacks on the column passed through the minds of many soldiers as they faced a considerably large force of Amerindians, not a small raiding party. Unsurprisingly, this led to the general panic which ensued and was the culmination of France’s successful employment of psychological warfare. The Amerindians’ use of terror-inducing tactics was highly effective. When the battle began, the men were so terrified that when Gage’s advanced detachment encountered ‘scarcely two of the Enemy’, they ‘made ready & notwithstanding all the Opposition made by the Officers they threw away their fire’.82 Utterly frightened, the soldiers completely lost control over themselves, and their officers were unable to restore order. As one observer remarked, ‘The men from what storys they had heard of the Indians in regard to their scalping and Mawhawking, were so pannick struck that their Officers had little or no comand over them.’83 Throughout the duration of the expedition’s march through the wilderness, the column had provided the soldiers with protection. As the situation spiralled out of control, the men sought its safety as they flocked into a large body which formed in the middle of the road, sometimes ‘twelve or fourteen Deep’. Frightened and confused, they could only think of saving their lives, as well as their scalps, and began firing without order, often shooting each other in the process.84 The level of terror which the Amerindians succeeded in creating was so great that ‘the Soldiers were totally deaf to the Commands & persuasions of the few Officers that were left unhurt’. As the battle progressed, attempts were

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made to draw the men forward in order to drive back the Amerindians and the Canadians; however, they proved in vain. After advancing only a short distance and witnessing the demise of a few unlucky soldiers, they quickly returned to the main body, much to the frustration of their officers.85 Although the men had fought poorly that day, Cholmley’s batman observed, ‘If it was not for their Barbaras Usage which we knew they would treat us, we should Never have fought them as long as we did, but having only death before us made the men fight Almost longer than they was able.’86 The Amerindians were successful in their war of inciting terror among the regulars. As indicated by Cholmley’s batman, soldiers believed that if they were killed or captured, they would receive inhumane treatment. This was a stark reality, and immediately following the flight of Braddock’s forces, twelve captured soldiers were burned to death on the banks of the Allegheny River.87 In the end, France’s campaign of psychological warfare was so successful that when news of the defeat reached Colonel Thomas Dunbar’s camp, one observer remarked, ‘upon seeing 2 or 3 of our own Indians returning, the greatest part began to run away; but were stopp’d when they were convinced of their mistake’.88 Braddock’s defeat had a tremendous impact upon how British soldiers viewed Amerindians. The fate of Braddock and his men served as a warning to others of what might be expected from a substantially large force of Amerindians. During the 1756 siege of Oswego, the fear of Amerindians greatly contributed to the fall of the outpost. Although its commandant, Colonel James Mercer, valiantly attempted to resist the French, the garrison quickly surrendered after he was beheaded by a cannonball. Amid the screams and entreaties of over a 100 women, and realizing that there were 250 Amerindians prepared to slaughter those inside, his successor felt further resistance was futile.89 However, immediately following the capitulation, the Amerindians nonetheless entered the fort and killed most of the wounded, as well as a number of the British prisoners.90 In 1757, the defenders of Fort William Henry had great reason to fear the Amerindian forces which were gathered before them. Owing to the victories at the Monongahela and Oswego, warriors from as far away as Iowa had arrived to bolster the French army. As a result, Montcalm enjoyed the support of 2,000 Amerindian warriors from thirty-three different tribes.91 Aware of this advantage, during a brief truce, Montcalm assembled all of them within full view of the besieged garrison.92 At this time, an Abenaki chief reputedly shouted towards the British in broken French, ‘You won’t surrender, eh! Fire away then, and fight your best; for if I catch you, you shall get no quarter.’93

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Before commencing with the siege, Montcalm dispatched a message to the fort’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel George Monro, suggesting that he surrender. Montcalm advised, ‘I have this morning invested your place with a numerous Army and superior Artillery, and all the savages from the higher parts of the Country, the Cruelty of which, a Detachment of your Garrison have lately too much experienced.’ Aware of what could happen following a French victory, he further added, ‘I am obliged in Humanity, to desire you to Surrender your Fort: I have it yet in my Power to restrain the Savages, and oblige them to observe a Capitulation.’94 While Montcalm was later powerless to stop his Amerindian allies, the French had employed the legacy of Braddock’s Defeat. The siege was unnerving, and particular attention was given to Amerindian activity. An unknown officer at the fort remarked that on 3 August, ‘The Indians kept firing round us all day. At Night we lighted fires all round the Camp.’95 As Amerindians were regularly sighted lurking around the walls of the fort and sniping at soldiers on the ramparts, it can be assumed that the fires were to prevent them from launching a surprise assault or murdering sentries in the dark.96 Throughout the battle, sentinels often fell victim to silent arrows while on duty.97 In order to prevent the Amerindians from maintaining close proximity to the British defences, parties were regularly dispatched to drive them back, making skirmishes a common occurrence. Fears of the Amerindians were not unreasonable, for after the garrison surrendered, the infamous massacre ensued. One survivor recalled of the general panic, ‘It was strange to see that these Men; who but the morning before, pursued these Savages into the very Woods; upon this occasion, were Scared to such a degree; that they threw away Arms, Ammunition and everything, and each man endeavored to shift for himself.’98 Again, the experience was very similar to Braddock’s expedition. Events at Fort William Henry, however, marked a turning point in perceptions of the enemy. Bradstreet summarized the general feeling towards the French following the fall of the outpost: It is really afflicting, nay alarming, to behold the shocking state North America is reduced to since this war. It would take a quire of paper to give you a particular account of our ill state & the growth of the French; probably you will hear of Fort William Henrys being taken, the Prisoners Stript & some nockd on the head by the Indians after the Capitulation & the whole murdered had they not saved themselves by flight tho under the protection of the French – in short the French hold us so cheap there is nothing they dare not doe.99

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Disgusted by the French, and holding them responsible for the massacre, the incident was looked upon as a notorious act of betrayal, the lowest point suffered by the British army in North America. Upon receiving news of the massacre, a furious Loudoun remarked, ‘I hope we shall teach them the Necessity, to comply with the Laws of Nations and Humanity; for altho’ I abhor Barbarity … the Murders committed at Oswego, and now at Fort Wm. Henry, will oblige me Contrary to human Nature, to make those Gentlemen sick of such inhuman Villainy, wherever it is in my Power.’100 Although Loudoun was soon relieved of command, his successor continued in this pursuit. As a result, while dictating the terms for the surrender of Canada in 1760, Amherst refused to grant the French army the honours of war. According to Amherst, this was punishment ‘for the infamous part the troops of France had acted in exciting the savages to perpetrate the most horrid and unheard of barbarities in the whole progress of the war’.101 After the massacre at Fort William Henry, a major change in attitude also occurred against the Amerindians. The general fear, ignited by Braddock’s demise, was quickly replaced with intense anger and a desire for vengeance. Dispatching Major Robert Rogers against the Abenaki village of St Francis, Amherst ordered, ‘Remember the barbarities that have been committed by the enemy’s Indian scoundrels on every occasion, where they had an opportunity of shewing their infamous cruelties on the King’s subjects, which they have done without mercy. Take your revenge.’102 Targeting St Francis, Amherst sought to strike a major blow against the Amerindians who lived there, as the settlement was a symbolic stronghold where hundreds of warriors assembled to carry warfare into the frontier for over half a century. In addition, it was also a place where numerous British colonists and soldiers had passed through as prisoners enroute to Canada.103 Although the raid was not conducted by regulars, the fear of Amerindians had passed. While Wolfe’s army besieged Québec, parties of soldiers regularly ventured into the woods to prepare ambushes. Wolfe had offered a reward of five guineas per scalp and orders specifically stated, ‘if any soldier kills an Indian or takes him alive, which is still more difficult, he shall be handsomely rewarded’.104 Had Braddock’s men behaved similarly to those under Wolfe, a major defeat at the Monongahela might not have occurred. Eventually, the attitude among regulars towards Amerindians shifted to one of extreme contempt. During the siege of Québec in 1759, while making an abortive attempt to assault the French lines below the city, Wolfe’s army almost

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encountered disaster. However, unlike Braddock’s command which disintegrated into panic due to the effects of psychological warfare, Wolfe’s did not. Edward Coats described the ill-fated attack: At 4 the first Line of Boats was Landed, and the Granadiers without forming themselves or waiting for Orders, rush’d on with the greatest Impetuousity for the Bank, where they Received from the Enemy such Incessent Fire of musquetry as is much Easier to Conceive than Describe. Nothing Daunted at this our Troops endeavour’d to gain the heights and I believe would all have suffer’d in the Attempt had not a Violent Squall of Wind and Rain put a stop to the Enemy’s fire; and at the same Time render’d it Impossible for our Troops to proceed further an account of the Sliperiness of the Ground. During this time General Townsend with his Brigade passe’d below the Falls and advanced to Joyn us, but the General finding the Difficulty of the Attempt, and unwilling to Sacrifice his Troops where there was so little probability of Success Order’d the Retreat to be beaten and Fortunately for us, it being low Water, and the lowest part of the Strand out of musquet Shot. After getting the Wounded into the Boats, General Wolf with the Remainder of the Grenadiers and Highlanders joynd General Townsend, and march’d in good order along the Strand towards the Falls and Imbark’d Amherst’s in the Boats.105

When Braddock’s army approached Fort Duquesne, they too were in high spirits ‘Beating the grenadiers March all the way, Never Seasing’.106 As one observer remarked, ‘Never was an Army in the World in more spirits then we where.’107 However, when the battle began, the soldiers disobeyed their officers, much like the grenadiers did under Wolfe. Conversely, during the attack at Montmorency, when it was clear that the engagement could not be won, Wolfe managed to organize his men and conduct an orderly retreat while Braddock ‘endeavoured to retreat them in good Order; but the Panick was so great, that he could not Succeed’.108 In the end, as Wolfe’s army retreated, they ‘were Saluted all the time by the infernal Clamours of the Indians, and Vive Le Roys of the French’ and instead of panicking, the ‘General Officer & Troops’ simply waved their hats in reply as they left.109 Braddock’s Defeat provided the French with a very powerful weapon which temporarily prevented their defeat from a numerically superior foe. As the British colonies boasted a population far greater than that of New France, and numerous regulars had arrived from Britain to support them, drastic defence measures were necessary. As the majority of Amerindians had always been more favoured towards France, and as the French navy was

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unable to convey adequate reinforcements across the Atlantic after 1756, the Amerindians were Canada’s last hope. Consequently, it was in France’s best interest to exploit the terror which the Amerindians struck into the hearts of the British soldiers for as long as possible. This campaign of psychological warfare worked effectively until the siege of Fort William Henry in 1757. Although the French had fully exploited the psychological effects of their Amerindian allies upon the British, they did not condone murder. As the massacre ensued, numerous French officers, including Montcalm, attempted to stop the Amerindians who were on a rampage for plunder, prisoners and scalps. However, by attempting to assist the British, the French senior officers offended the Amerindians, who perceived that they were being deprived of their just reward or rightful plunder. Consequently, many departed with no intention to return.110 In addition, a number of warriors journeyed home with scalps taken from the graves of small pox victims.111 As a result of both actions, Amerindian support for the French plummeted the following year. Ultimately, 1757 was the final year in which France’s campaign of psychological warfare effectively terrorized British regulars, a considerably long period of time, which began when Braddock first attempted the reduction of Fort Duquesne.

Disease, death and the loss of manpower Until the twentieth century, disease proved more deadly to soldiers than battlefield wounds. However, during the eighteenth century, military physicians continuously developed the idea and practice of public health and preventive medicine. Among them, no other dominated this field more than Sir John Pringle, who is often referred to as the father of modern military medicine.112 Appointed surgeon general, and travelling with the British army during the War of the Austrian Succession and the ’45 Rebellion, Pringle had the opportunity to observe the conditions which soldiers commonly endured during a campaign. Following his tour of duty with the army, he composed his textbook masterpiece, Observations on the Diseases of the Army, which was published in 1752, two years prior to the outbreak of hostilities in North America.113 In his book, Pringle established some of the fundamental practices necessary to prevent disease from decimating the manpower of the army. From his

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studies, Pringle discovered that the preservation of numerous lives rested upon nothing more than simple improvements in the soldiers’ standard of living. For example, he advised remedies such as providing the men with additional items to keep themselves warm in the winter, including blankets, under-waistcoats, strong shoes and fuel for fires. During summer, Pringle recommended that troops should be marched during the cool morning hours and sentries placed on shorter periods of duty in the hot afternoon. Basically, this was commonsense advice, which had the potential to save many lives from heat exhaustion.114 Ultimately, Pringle’s contribution to the field of preventive medicine was of great significance. By identifying the causes of the numerous ailments soldiers encountered, Pringle offered methods to prevent outbreaks of epidemics and save precious lives.115 Such good advice was known by some of the officers serving in the British army at the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War. They were aware that cleanliness in camp was necessary in order to preserve the health of their men. While inspecting the provincials soon after his arrival, Loudoun and his subordinates were appalled by the conditions they discovered. In June, it was reported that at Forts Edward and William Henry, 253 men were incapable of service. By August, the number increased dramatically to a total of 1,443 soldiers.116 Clearly a problem of sanitation, Colonel Ralph Burton informed Loudoun from William Henry, ‘the fort stinks enough to cause an infection’.117 In addition, some officers had medical knowledge. For example, Forbes, who led a successful campaign, was also a trained physician.118 As a result, officers were keen to pay attention to what illnesses were claiming the lives of their men and on occasion, requested returns from the General Hospital listing not only the ‘No of Men left Sick’ but also ‘Specifying their Several Aliments & Diseases’.119 Knowing this information would have been extremely helpful in containing the spread of illness among the ranks. As Dr Donald Monro remarked on the conduct of officers he had the opportunity to observe, ‘The Marquis of Granby, Commander in Chief of the British Troops in Germany, as well as the Rest of the General Officers employed on the German Service, always paid the greatest Attention to the Soldiers when sick in Hospitals; and were particularly ready in giving Orders for all such Things as were necessary or proper for them.’ Although Monro’s account is from observations of the British army in Germany during the Seven Years’ War, it can be safely assumed that officers serving in North America showed a similar concern for their men. However, despite the efforts of officers such as Granby, mortality rates continued to be high. The common soldier disregarded many of

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the life-saving practices advocated by Pringle, and not all officers were aware of preventive medicine. As a result, such actions cost the British army dearly in terms of manpower, something which during the initial stages of the war, it could not afford to lose. Clean living conditions were the foundation of a healthy army, but during the eighteenth century, military camps and garrisons were extremely unsanitary. Live animals defecated everywhere, food was improperly discarded, the dead bodies of animals and soldiers intermingled and the soldiers themselves lacked personal cleanliness. 120 All these factors combined led to the perfect breeding ground for harmful bacteria, not to mention a horrible stench. As the concept of bacteria was unknown, blame was placed upon four categories of putrid air which arose during the summer months.121 According to Pringle, ‘the first, arising from the corrupted water of the marshes; the second, from human excrements lying about the camp in hot weather, when the dysentery is frequent; the third, from straw rotting in the tents; and the fourth kind, is that which is breathed in hospitals crowded with men ill of putrid distempers’. Consequently, the maintenance of clean encampments was a prerequisite. Tents needed to be aired out properly in order to prevent the straw within them from rotting and latrines needed to be placed in the front or rear of the camp so that the putrid air would be carried off by the wind. Regarding latrines, Pringle was insistent that the soldiers used them and advocated punishing those who dared to relieve themselves ‘any where about the camp, but in the privies’.122 In North America, this proved problematic among the recruits from the colonies as little was known among the population about basic camp sanitation.123 Fort William Henry is a perfect example of a permanent garrison which succumbed to unhealthy living conditions. Although initially garrisoned by provincials, the fort was largely under the command of regulars from the latter part of 1756, until it was destroyed in 1757.124 In 1997, archaeological excavations revealed that the location of the primary garbage dump was only several feet from the fort’s outer wall. Within it, archaeologists found nearly 16,000 fragments of butchered bones, primarily those from cows, pigs and fish. In addition, archaeologists also discovered that there was no centralized location for the military cemetery. What makes this discovery particularly disturbing is that over a thousand soldiers and camp followers were randomly buried around the fort and among its ruins. With putrefying garbage being literally thrown over the fort’s wall, sick men crowded in the makeshift hospital

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and dead bodies being randomly buried throughout its vicinity, it is not surprising that so many men died at Fort William Henry from disease. These were after all conditions which Pringle specifically identified as unhealthy. Further archaeological research involving the skeletons of the soldiers and their dependants unearthed at the fort also provided compelling evidence that sickness was rampant.125 As proven at Fort William Henry, soldiers regularly neglected the practice of public health and preventive medicine despite the attempts of their officers to enforce its methods upon them. Soldiers continued to relieve themselves outside of the latrines despite contrary orders and the threat of punishment if they were caught.126 Adding further to this problem, some even fouled their own water supply. On one occasion, a detachment had to stand guard over a brook, their camp’s source of water, as soldiers regularly used it as an alternative to a latrine.127 The officers obviously knew such behaviour was unhealthy for their men. Monro advised, ‘Where the Stream is small, Care ought to be taken that its Course be not interrupted, and that no Filth or Nastiness, or any Thing that will spoil or corrupt the Water, be thrown in it.’128 The dispatch of a guard to watch over the camp’s water supply can only suggest that serious abuses of this kind must have regularly occurred. Water was a vulnerable asset, and such an act could also have been done by or to the enemy. In 1762, during the siege of Havana, British troops diverted the river which supplied water to the city. In doing so, they successfully caused additional distress among the inhabitants, who were already under bombardment. An unknown soldier reported, ‘this obliges the poorer kind of people to drink brackish water, & the better sort to have recourse to their Cisterns’.129 Returning to the problem presented by latrines, what made their use important was that they were believed to help prevent the spread of dysentery or bloody flux. On this subject, Pringle remarked, ‘From the middle of July, or upon the appearance of a spreading flux, let the privies be made deeper than usual, and once a day a thick layer of earth thrown into them, till the pits are full, which are then to be well covered, and supplied by others.’ As a precaution, he further added, ‘It may also be proper to order the pits to be made either in the front or rear, as the reigning wind of the season may best carry off their effluvia from the camp.’130 Officers did follow Pringle’s advice and ordered the latrines erected in the front or rear of encampments, along with instructions for them to be covered over with dirt every evening. Some even went further than Pringle suggested and required that the latrines

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be buried when they were only half full during the months when dysentery was endemic.131 Although Pringle’s advice was followed, so long as soldiers continued to relieve themselves elsewhere, continued outbreaks of illness were inevitable. Much in the same manner soldiers neglected orders regarding the use of the latrines, there was a similar disregard for burials. As indicated by Pringle’s counsel regarding latrines, it was understood that human waste was source of contagion.132 However, soldiers which were buried near the quarters of the living presented an even greater health hazard, especially if their deaths were the result of diseases such as smallpox and typhus.133 While archaeological excavations at Fort William Henry revealed that soldiers were buried randomly around the fort, similar practices were attempted elsewhere. When it was discovered at Fort Edward that soldiers were burying the dead in such a manner, orders were quickly issued stating, ‘The Quarter Masters of ye Different Corps are to Inform them Selves from Mr. Lesley A.D.Q.M.G. Where ye Ground is Mark.d out for ye New Buriing Yard, & For ye Future ye Troops are Not To Dig Graves Any Where Elce Under Panelty of Being Oblig.d To fill Them Up Again.’134 While efforts were made to stop the scattered burials, it is uncertain of they were effective. If archaeological excavations were conducted at Fort Edward today, it is highly possible that conditions similar to those found at Fort William Henry might be discovered. In regard to the state of cleanliness which existed in garrisons, soldiers did little to maintain proper sanitation levels. At Fort Cumberland, Nova Scotia, soldiers disposed of their garbage, ‘With in their Barrak Doors,’ leaving it to rot and emit a stench. Evidently, the odour became so foul and unpleasant that complaints eventually reached the fort’s commanding officer. As a result, orders were issued for the men to be provided with tubs so that they would place all their refuse within them. Once this task was completed, they were to carry the tubs out of the fort and dispose of the trash where it would ‘Be Least offensive to Either those with in or with out the Spur gate.’ Although such behaviour appears appalling, soldiers who did remove the waste from their quarters did so by throwing it ‘out about their Doors in to the Parade of Either Fort or Spur or the Backsides of the Barraks Between them and the works’.135 Much like the soldiers at Fort William Henry, who dispensed with their garbage by throwing it over the fort’s wall, soldiers at Fort Cumberland opened their doors and threw it onto the parade ground, behind the barracks or anywhere else they felt they could do so with little effort.

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Consequently, it is not surprising that when soldiers were encamped, they dispensed of their garbage in a similar manner by throwing it out of their tents. At a camp established at Fort Edward, the following order was issued: It is Majr. Fletchers Orders that ye Commanding offr of the Diferent Corps Se that ye Streets of their Respective Encampments Be Swept Clean Every Day & that an offr Of a Company Visit ye Mens Tents in Order to Se that they Are Kept as Clean as Possible & if any of ye Tents are Found after this Day with any Filth or Durt in them the Visiting offr is Emmediately to Order Sd Tent to be Struct & Cleaned-& the Men Who He Judges to Be Guilty of this Neglect are Emmediately to Be Confined for Disobedience of Orders.136

As the streets had to be swept clean daily, and the men’s tents inspected in order to discover the offenders, abuse was severe. Ultimately, with decomposing garbage lying outside of tents and barrack doors, attracting flies and creating an unwholesome odour, such conditions were considered unhealthy by physicians due to the ‘putrid effluvia’ which was being released into the air.137 Despite the unrelenting efforts of the officers, soldiers had to be repeatedly ordered to remove ‘all Filth & Nastiness’.138 In addition to the problem of maintaining clean living quarters, personal hygiene was another serious issue. Pringle as well as other physicians regarded the maintenance of personal cleanliness among soldiers as a necessary practice in order to preserve their health. On this subject, Pringle remarked that ‘officers judge rightly with respect to the health of the men, as well as to their appearance, when they strictly require cleannes in persons and clothes’.139 While officers outnumbered physicians, it was only natural that they should dominate the practices of preventive medicine and ensure that their men practiced proper sanitation.140 The primary reason good hygienic practices were necessary was to prevent a general infestation of the ‘itch’, which was the result of scabies.141 Although not a fatal affliction, it was a great discomfort to many soldiers during the eighteenth century.142 Easily spread through close physical proximity, ‘one in the same tent, mess, or barrack’ often transmitted it to his comrades.143 Not a pleasant sensation, the parasites would crawl from host to host, burrow and cut their way into their victim’s flesh, release their eggs and once the eggs hatched, the process would begin anew. As a result of cyclical breeding, some unfortunate soldiers eventually had parts of their bodies covered with a green crust.144 While the itch was the primary reason

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physicians strongly recommended cleanliness among soldiers, its practice would have also contributed to the prevention of lice infestation and the more deadly affliction of typhus. Under these circumstances, it was important for officers to ensure their men maintained adequate levels of cleanliness as poor hygiene only added further sufferings.145 Among soldiers stationed in North America, very little attention was paid to personal hygiene. This should not be surprising, as the general population neglected many of its practices throughout the eighteenth century.146 However, the disregard shown by soldiers was so great that officers had to conduct regular inspections on parade in order to ensure that they maintained personal cleanliness.147 Officers were also forced to announce detailed orders such as the following: Its Col:o Frys orders that the non Commissond officers and Private in garrison Keep their fire arms Clean and in good order that they make it their Daly Practice to wash and Keep their Face and hands clean and their weekly Practice to wash their Shirts that they may have a Clean one to put on Evry week and Every time they turn out under arms upon any occasion What Ever that they appear Personally Neat and Clean their Beards Shavd of and their fire arms as above Directed all which the Captains and other officers are to See their Respective – Companys Daly observe.148

Although such tasks were difficult to perform while travelling through the wilderness, they were vital to the preservation of health. Conversely, circumstances at times made it impossible for even the officers to present themselves in such a state. Once after reconnoitring ahead of Forbes’s road, St Clair returned to camp ‘somewhat grotesque, a long beard, a blanket coat, and trousers to the ground’.149 Despite the images of smartly dressed officers in bright red coats and powdered wigs, the American wilderness did not allow them to look their best at all times. In addition to the difficulties that arose in maintaining good hygiene, the change in seasons presented further problems. During the summer months, one of the most deadliest mistakes an officer could make, according to Pringle, was to allow their men to lay upon wet open ground. According to medical theories at the time, this was believed to cause an immediate outbreak of flux. As a result, tents were viewed as extremely vital equipment, and officers were advised to have them aired out regularly so that additional moisture would not accumulate and release ‘putrid effluvia’ into the air.150 In North America, officers did attempt to follow Pringle’s advice when possible. However, not all soldiers were fortunate

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enough to have tents. At times, some found themselves exposed to the rain and were forced to sleep on wet open ground.151 Consequently, many later became ill and died.152 Regarding the care of soldiers during their time in winter quarters and on campaign, officers attempted to use some of the methods prescribed by Pringle and others to preserve their health. When Braddock’s regiments from Ireland first arrived in Virginia, they were well prepared for the cold weather which they encountered as they were supplied with watch coats, blankets and flannel waistcoats. When the campaign season began, they were given bladders, ‘thin leather to put betwixt the Crown and lining of their Hatts to keep Them from the heat of the sun’. In addition, in order to spare his sentries from heat exhaustion, Braddock followed Pringle’s advice and shortened the sentry duty to two hour intervals. Concerned for the well-being of the workers in the advanced party, he also sent orders to St Clair stating that he ‘woul’d not have you fatigue your men by too much Labour’.153 Other officers continued to follow Braddock’s example and were reminded by their superiors that ‘During the Hot Season it is recommended to the Commanding Officers to march their Men by Day Break.’154 Officers were quick to respond to situations that posed a threat to the lives of their men. When St Clair perceived that ‘a very ugly fever’ was raging among soldiers stationed at Alexandria, he immediately requested the assistance of a ‘surgeon or surgeons mate’ believing that some of his men had already contracted it.155 Similarly, whenever well water was suspected of containing a contagion that caused the flux, officers immediately ordered another source to be used, usually a river.156 When the flux began to appear among soldiers in South Carolina, Bouquet remarked, ‘We had but 5 sick Men when we landed and their Number is near 50 now, which Is attributed to the Water generally bad in this Country, the Change of Climate and the unavoidable excesses of drinking the first days. We have taken all possible precaution to prevent an Increase But we shall still have great Numbers of Sick.’157 As indicated by Bouquet, officers could be quick in taking precautionary measures; however, this did not ensure that the men would avoid illness. Much like Bouquet, Colonel George Williamson had a difficult time acquiring new clothes for some of the survivors of Fort William Henry, who ‘were stripped of all their Coats & good hats’ as well as ‘good wastecoats’.158 While warm clothes were necessary for the coming winter, this was a matter of urgency and Williamson feared that the men would be ‘liable to starve with cold’.159 Despite Williamson’s efforts, the soldiers did not receive new clothing until December, long after they should have arrived for the cold winter in New

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York.160 As witnessed by both Williamson and Bouquet, although officers tried to adhere to Pringle’s advice, their success in doing so varied due to circumstances beyond their power. One of the deadliest situations which was out of the control of the officers was the lack of adequate provisions. Physicians generally stressed the importance of fresh provisions in preserving the lives of soldiers, and when very little, or none at all, could be procured for the men, the results were extremely fatal.161 As explained in Chapter 5, this was more a problem of logistics. Subsequently, without adequate supplies, the army was more susceptible to disease and death and vulnerable to French offensives. Although no significant improvement occurred during the Seven Years’ War in regard to the practice of public health and preventive medicine, the problem the British army faced during the initial stages of the war was a limited supply of manpower becoming even more limited due to its decimation by disease and consequently, death. As St Clair remarked after the fall of Oswego in 1756, ‘Should the Sickness continue amongst our Provincials and the french make an Incursion into our Country from Tiandaroga; I dread the Consequences; they will have it in their power to lay waste our Country on the East side of Hudsons River without any Opposition.’162 St Clair understood that the army’s reduction by disease clearly supplied the French with an advantage. Although conditions did not improve for soldiers by the latter end of the war, the available pool of manpower increased due to the massive influx of troops from Britain, as well as the willingness of provincials to fight alongside them once it was assured that the ministry would pay for their expenditures, and issues regarding rank had been resolved. Until then, British commanders would find themselves suffering from not only a shortage of manpower within their regiments due to the lack of able-bodied recruits, but also from a shortage of manpower from the enlisted men themselves. Looking collectively upon the shortcomings encountered by the British army in North America, it is possible to understand the complexities surrounding its failure during the initial stages of the war. In regard to quantity and quality, the commander-in-chief suffered from a lack of recruits for the army, and those which could be found were raw and undisciplined, not the most desirable forces to confront a foe comprised of veterans. In addition, the French carried on a successful campaign of psychological warfare against the British army, so effective that once the first war whoop was heard among the soldiers of Braddock’s column, fear gave way to panic and ultimately defeat. When analysing the effects of disease, it proved a great ally to the French by intensifying numerical

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deficiencies, claiming the lives of soldiers recruited with great difficulty and minimizing the effective manpower at the army’s disposal. Such a state continued in the British army in North America until 1758, when significant numbers of reinforcements arrived, which amounted over 23,000 men.163 By the war’s end, a total of twenty-one regiments would serve in the colonies.164 Ultimately, only when substantial numbers of reinforcements arrived from Britain, and the intense fear of Amerindians was replaced by one of equally fierce rage, was the British army able to reverse its shortcomings and achieve victory.

7

The Performance of the Navy: The Effects of Nature and the Death of an Admiral

Twelve o’Clock being the Time fixed for his Death, Capt. Montague looking at his Watch acquainted him the Time was come. The Admiral returned for Answer, it wanted some Minutes, and he would stay though to the last; however he soon came up with a becoming Steadiness, though there was a visible Trembling, as the Struggles of Nature can not be hid from an observing eye. A white Neckcloth he tied over his Eyes. A Canvas Cushion being laid, and upon that a green Velvet one which he kneeled, he gave the Signal for firing, by dropping a red and white Handkerchief. Nine Marines were appointed, six to fire first, three kneeling and three standing; five Shot went through his Body into the Ship’s Side, and so far that they could not be bored out with a Gimblet, and one lay in his Body. The reason assigned for not Blood issuing is, that his Body was wrapped round with Cotton in such a curious Manner, as that not one Drop appeared. He fell on his Left Side, and made but one Shudder in the Agonies of Death, upon which a Cloak was thrown over him till the Coffin was ready to receive him. The Boston Evening-Post, 27 June 17571 During the initial stages of the Seven Years’ War, naval commanders were generally reluctant to hazard their ships in potentially dangerous situations. If a fleet was threatened with the possibility of either capture or destruction, an officer ordinarily preferred to avoid such a scenario. One such officer, as reported by the Boston Evening-Post, was Vice Admiral John Byng. Dispatched to raise the siege of Fort St Philip on the British-controlled island of Minorca, Byng’s attitude from the commencement of naval operations had been that of a defeatist.2 Prior to his departure, Byng ominously remarked, ‘if I should fail in the relief of Port Mahon, I shall look on the security and protection of Gibraltar as my next object’.3 Immediately after arriving off Port Mahon, Byng

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engaged the Toulon squadron in an indecisive battle, after which he fled.4 Byng’s performance in this action was inadequate and his antagonist, Roland-Michel Barrin, comte de la Galissonière, remarked that it had appeared that the British preferred not to fight.5 As a result, Byng was court marshalled upon his return to Britain, and despite the efforts of many on his behalf, he was shot on board his flagship Monarch on 14 March 1757.6 Byng’s execution had profound effects upon the performance of the navy. When word of his failure reached Newcastle, the Duke immediately set out to make an example of him.7 Although members of the Newcastle ministry have been accused of using Byng as a scapegoat, it should be remembered that Byng was tried under the new government formed under Devonshire and Pitt.8 Upon receiving news of Byng’s fate, Voltaire satirically commented that the British occasionally executed an admiral in order to encourage the others.9 In reality, such a comment was not very far from the truth as Byng’s death served as an example to others and consequently revived and reinforced the navy’s culture of aggressiveness in combat.10 Indeed, after Byng’s trial and execution in 1757, naval performance improved, culminating with the engagements fought at Lagos and Quiberon Bay in 1759.11 However, another important factor during both battles was that the British enjoyed a slight numerical superiority, which was due to the Admiralty’s expansion of the fleet since the outbreak of hostilities.12 Considering both factors, it is not surprising that at Quiberon Bay Vice Admiral Edward Hawke attacked the French in heavy seas despite the dangerousness of the situation. Reflecting upon his actions to the Admiralty, Hawke reported, ‘When I consider the season of the year, the hard gales on the day of action, a flying enemy, the shortness of the day, and the coast we are on, I can boldly affirm that all that could possibly be done has been done.’ As to his losses, he added, ‘let it be placed to the account of the necessity I was under of running all risks to break this strong force of the enemy’.13 In exposing his fleet to the precarious conditions off Quiberon Bay, which caused two French ships to capsize during the course of the battle, Hawke achieved a great victory.14 In doing so, Hawke had overcome both hazardous seas and the French fleet in what culminated into a dramatic victory that ensured there would be no invasion of the British Isles.15 Returning to naval performance in North America during the initial stages of the war, commanders were prone to caution while undertaking assignments. They were perfectly willing to provide all the assistance within their power to support military operations on land, including detaching

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seamen to serve alongside regulars. Conversely, they were reluctant to risk their ships amid the environmental hazards which they encountered, such as fogs, ice and contrary winds and currents. As a result of such conduct, naval performance waned as commanders preferred to take safer alternatives rather than risk their ships. Such behaviour is exemplified by Byng, who wrote to Lord Anson: When I sailed from Gibraltar I found it was the general opinion not to leave that place when there was so little, if any hopes of relieving Minorca, and [?not] much more of hoping for the success we have had against a fleet superior to ours, but the many advantages they have of being reinforced from their camp, and landing their sick and wounded ashore, and the weight of their ships made it evident to me after a trial which I was determined to make that no further risk should [sic] of His Majesty’s fleet, lest by any irreparable accident Gibraltar should become exposed.16

Although Byng was operating in the Mediterranean, his colleagues in North America conducted themselves similarly. As a result, only when commanders adopted a more aggressive approach, and chanced the natural hazards which they encountered, was victory under such volatile conditions possible.

The effects of nature Throughout the duration of the Seven Years’ War, New France benefited from a defence system provided by nature. Although the effects of the environment in the vicinity of the St Lawrence can be overlooked as common occurrence, it cannot be ignored that it had a tremendous impact in hampering British naval efforts. Indeed, the obstacles encountered by British ships at the Bay of Fundy, off the coasts of Cape Breton Island and in the Gulf of St Lawrence were natural barriers against invaders. Likewise, British ships which belonged to the navy’s fresh water squadron posted at Oswego encountered similar problems as their counterparts at sea. Control of the waterways on both fronts was crucial to the outcome of the war. However, tormented with unsuitable conditions for navigation such as the opposition presented by contrary winds and currents, barriers of ice and dense fog, the British navy found itself at a major disadvantage. Confronted with primarily foul weather conditions, it is not surprising that naval officers were uncertain of success. Under such

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circumstances, not only was it necessary to overcome the French naval presence, but also nature. Among the obstacles encountered by the navy, the most devastating was fog. Thwarting major British naval operations, such as the interception of reinforcements bound for New France in 1755 and the attack on Louisbourg in 1757, fog proved to be France’s most effective ally.17 Extremely thick on some occasions and prone to disappear and reappear at any time, fog caused innumerable difficulties in tracking the enemy and in maintaining convoys.18 Also problematic was that fog was continuously present in the vicinity of the St Lawrence. Colonel George Williamson commented, ‘there is so much Fogg in this country all summer we have no certainty of two serene days together’.19 The abundance of fog even brought military operations to a halt at Louisbourg in 1758, when on one occasion it became so severe that the fighting ceased on both sides.20 Hindered by the poor visibility caused by fog, maintaining convoys in close formations at sea proved extremely difficult. During the ill-fated campaign against Louisbourg in 1757, Richard Humpherys, a soldier of the 28th Regiment of Foot, provided the following account of his passage to Halifax: We had pleasant weather [in part] for our Voyage, untill on the banks of New Foundland, there we lost our fleet Occasioned by a fogg (which North America is Subject to) and Continued so for Some days; after it cleared up we found we were greatly Separated which made us beat about for two days before we could get together, which some never did till in Halifax on our passage we took several prizes. Some of them gave us an Account of a French fleet being on their way for Louisbourg, and had pass’d us about this place, our fleet pursued in Order to meet with them but they passing this place too soon, Could not meet with them.21

As indicated by Humpherys, convoys were often separated by dense fog. To circumvent this problem, guns were continuously fired at times in an attempt to maintain cohesion.22 However, despite the efforts of the navy, fog continued to cause many vessels to stray. Commanding the convoy of which Humpherys was a passenger, Vice Admiral Francis Holburne recorded that fog caused such poor visibility that on one occasion, only 47 of his 79 ships were visible, while at another time only 28 to 33 could be sighted. When Holburne’s convoy eventually reached Halifax, the fog had thickened to such a degree that no ships ventured near shore, despite the offer of a pilot who was familiar with the harbour to guide them.23 Similarly, Loudoun’s convoy under the direction of Admiral Sir Charles Hardy encountered fog on its voyage to Halifax, which

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Captain Philip Townshend described as so dense, ‘that we Cannot See one of ye Fleet Tho in a Cluster’.24 As it proved difficult to glimpse friendly ships under such conditions, sighting those of the enemy’s was an even more challenging task. During the 1755 campaign, fog was largely responsible for thwarting Vice Admiral Edward Boscawen’s blockade of the St Lawrence. Although Boscawen’s orders in 1755 were relatively simple – seize all French reinforcements bound for Canada – it was a difficult task to undertake.25 While cruising off the coasts of Newfoundland, Boscawen recorded, ‘Still at sea and no sight of land, and hardly the sky or water, for we have such thick fogs that we cannot see the other ships.’26 Throughout the duration of the blockade, visibility remained considerably poor. Boscawen remarked of the fleet’s experience, ‘We live in continual fogs, and seldom can see half our own friends.’27 At one point during the blockade, the fog thickened to such a degree that Captain Richard Howe’s ship, the Dunkirk, was separated from the squadron for a week.28 Despite such miserable conditions, the French fleet was sighted. Boscawen described the encounter to Anson: You will see by my public letter the ill success I have had against the French. On the 7th instant I heard of a single ship on the banks about the size of a 50gun ship full of soldiers, by which I concluded they had pursued the scheme of sending the ships arm en flûte without a convoy, but on the eighth, seeing four large ships with two flag at the misentopmast head, I found I was mistaken, as they bore down to us making signals. I concluded they took us for their own ships, nor whilst we saw them did they ever seem to think otherwise, for they never hauled their wind, nor did they make sail, three of them only having their topsails and foresail, the other topsails only. About eleven in the forenoon, we lost them in a thick fog, which continued till the next day about ten in the morning, and when it cleared up five of the squadron had lost company, but soon after we saw them all to windward in case. I was in hope of the same (word omitted? Ships) especially as upon my making the signal to them to bear down, the Defiance made the signal that they would speak with the Chace, which proved to be two small ships from France bound to Quebec. In the evening we made three large ships, and upon my hoisting French colours they bore down to us.

Ultimately, the three ships which Boscawen was referring to were the Alcide, Lys and Dauphin Royal. Although Boscawen did manage to capture the first two, the Dauphin Royal, which carried ‘nine companies on board of the Regiment of Burgoyne, escaped by a fog coming on, which lasted two days’.29

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As the French had dispatched a total of twenty-five ships of the line, a number of supply ships and 4,000 reinforcements, such results were disheartening.30 In a twist of irony, although Boscawen failed to intercept the bulk of the French fleet, he captured for the third time Captain Gilles Hocquart de Blincourt, commander of the Alcide, whom he had seized twice during the previous war. As exemplified by the fate of Hocquart, operating under such conditions was a game of chance.31 During the ill-fated attempt against Louisbourg in 1757, fog again intervened in favour of the French. Plagued with near continuous fog, the invasion fleet could do little except await orders at Halifax.32 In addition, ships dispatched to spy upon Louisbourg could gather no intelligence despite repeated attempts. Three vessels under the command of Captain John Rous reported that they were unable to see into the harbour at Louisbourg due to unceasing fogs. Similarly, a returning lone schooner could provide little information except that it too had experienced ‘a Continual Fog’.33 Since the invasion force had arrived at Halifax in May, the fog proved relentless and prevented any possibilities of conducting a joint operation.34 Ultimately, the attempt against Louisbourg was abandoned, and the invasion force sailed away with the navy thwarted once again by the forces of nature. Upon their departure, Colonel George Williamson bitterly remarked, ‘the French have had time enough to make themselves equal to us at Louisburg, so you see what Winds and Fogs have done’.35 In addition to fog, ice proved another hindrance for British naval operations. While cruising off the Gulf of St Lawrence in 1755, Boscawen’s fleet found itself in great danger due to its presence. Writing home to his wife, Boscawen recounted, ‘It is very cold. I little thought of bilking the summer, but yesterday we had ice floating near us, and saw a large island of it; were we to run against it, it would be as fatal as a rock.’36 Such encounters were not limited to the British, and during his voyage to Canada, Montcalm similarly recorded, ‘We have seen an iceberg three hundred feet in height. These icebergs make navigation very difficult, as in the fog it is difficult to see them, and any vessel coming in contact with them would be knocked to pieces.’37 Undeniably, such islands of ice were hazardous to passing ships, and when combined with the poor visibility affected by thick fogs, it was highly possible to mistake them for land, with fatal consequences. During the Walker expedition in 1711, nine ships and nearly 900 men were lost due to these circumstances.38 During his passage from Cork to Halifax, Richard Humpherys recorded that such an incident almost occurred when his ship ‘Espyed an Island ahead which

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we [thought] to be part of the Main Land. We found to our great surprise it to be an Island of Ice which some of our fleet in the night was in great danger of being cast away on it.’39 The fact that Humpherys’s voyage did not end with a collision with the iceberg was due largely to the measures taken to avoid them. During the 1759 campaign against Québec, Rear Admiral Philip Durell posted ships ahead of the main body of his squadron in order to keep a lookout for icebergs. However, such safeguards were not completely reliable. On one occasion, Durell found that after a fog had lifted, his fleet had sailed dangerously beside an iceberg.40 As the St Lawrence posed a significant threat to cruising ships, it is not surprising that Boscawen instructed Holburne to continue the blockade until the middle of September, after which he was ordered to the shelter of Halifax.41 Much in the same manner as fog led to Boscawen’s failure in 1755, ice interfered similarly for Durell in 1759. Directed to spend the winter on station in Halifax, Durell instructed his captains, in the event foul weather prevented his arrival at the port, ‘to come down to Louisbourg as early in the Spring as possible, and as soon as they arrive to dispatch two Line of Battle Ships with two twenty Gun Ships to cruize between the Island of St Paul and Cape Ray, in order to intercept what Succours the Enemy may attempt to send to Quebec’. In April, Durell dispatched a sloop to reconnoitre the passage towards Louisbourg. Upon the ship’s return, the officer reported, ‘That it was his opinion as well as the Pilots on board (a Man long acquainted with this Coast) it is not as yet practicable for the Ships to pass to the Eastward, without running great danger, or being obliged to go to the Southward of the Ice.’42 Believing himself to be acting in the navy’s best interests, Durell remained at anchor in Halifax to await the melting of the ice, rather than risk damaging his ships. However, this decision was unfortunate. Although the winter had been severe, upon sailing into the St Lawrence himself, Durell discovered no ice.43 This was highly problematic, for not only did Durell not act earlier, as he believed ice prevented his ships from commencing the blockade, it was also expected that the French would be unable to sail into Québec. As Brigadier General George Townshend remarked in a letter to his wife, ‘I expect we shall have ye Signal to Sail every moment & I dare say from ye Situation of ye Ice in ye River St Lawrence this last severe season that few or no Succours have got up to our Enemies.’44 Such a belief however was erroneous, and ice did not prevent any ships from sailing into the St Lawrence River. As a result, the waterway to Québec was

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open to receive supplies and reinforcements from France.45 An army officer accompanying Wolfe recorded the general attitude toward Durell’s failure: Admiral Durell and His Captains who had winter’d at Hallifax with the sole view of blocking the St. Laurence – began to see themselves in a devilish scrape, and that They shou’d be call to a severe account for not being in the chops of the River early enough to prevent supplies going to Quebec – These Gentlemen began to arraign Mr. Wolfe’s Conduct in hopes to screen themselves But all mankind join’d in an opinion that nothing cou’d be more scandalous than their proceedings, and all the Bellowing of The Troops at Hallifax cou’d not perswade them to leave that Harbour for fear of the Ice. Canada wou’d certainly have been an easy Conquest had that Squadron gone early enough into the River. Cou’d The French Court have imagin’d that 26 Transports with provision wou’d have reach’d Quebec unmolested. (Notwithstanding there was a Squadron of Ten ships of the Line at Hallifax to Enter the River as early as the season wou’d admit) They certainly wou’d have embark’d three or four Battallions aboard them = The French indeed reason’d on sounder Principles. They thought it impossible that the whole if any cou’d escape, and therefore wou’d not risk the loss of Troops – The Quantity of Provision and stores They sent was greatly more than was necessary for the Campaign allowing for the great probability of many of them being taken.46

Although the officer’s observations are correct, that Durell had permitted the enemy to receive supplies and 500 recruits, he does not seriously consider the hazards ice posed to the navy.47 As Boscawen had described to his wife during the 1755 blockade, ice could ‘be as fatal as a rock’.48 Although Durell can be criticized for being overly cautious, and condemned for not attempting to dispatch his ships much earlier, the winter was severe, and it was by mere chance that the Gulf of St Lawrence had not frozen over.49 Durell’s actions were founded on experience, as he was familiar with the conditions off Louisbourg, having attacked the fortress in the previous war as Captain of the Eltham.50 Although the passage through the Gulf of St Lawrence remained clear, at the same time, Vice Admiral Charles Saunders was unable to sail into Louisbourg Harbour due to it being congested with ice.51 In addition to the dangerous hazards which the navy had to endure, nature also directly affected navigation through its changing winds and currents, hindering the progress of ships to their destinations. Warships at the time depended on the weather in both strategy and tactics. Although good seamanship could counter problems to an extent, the angle in which ships could travel depended on the wind, and too much or too little could have dire consequences during military

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operations.52 In the context of the Seven Years’ War, a number of soldiers on board transports bound for the St Lawrence documented their voyages and the obstacles which their ships encountered, such as opposing winds and currents, as well as storms.53 Among these men, Captain Philip Townshend of the 22nd Regiment had the unique opportunity to view the conditions off Louisbourg in 1757 and 1758. During both journeys, Townshend noted that strong winds, in particular, interfered with his transport’s navigation. During the 1758 campaign, Townshend observed, ‘att Six this Evening Wind Changed to N.E. and blew very hard so that we could but barely carry courses’.54 Undeniably, wind posed a considerable problem to navigation and the maintenance of convoys. This is further illustrated by the experience of Captain Matthew Barton, of the Litchfield, who was separated from the rest of his convoy the day after leaving Halifax by ‘a hard gale of wind Easterly between the Isle of Sable and Cape Canso’.55 Interestingly, perhaps one of the most detailed examples of the difficulties which mariners had to endure to arrive in the vicinity of the St Lawrence is provided by a group of Massachusetts provincials bound for Québec during the 1759 campaign. Among those embarked on this voyage was Private Jeremiah Pearson, who documented the journey from Boston. Apparently the initial stages of the trip were difficult, for after arriving at Louisbourg, Pearson recorded, ‘we have Been 11 Days from boston & had a very Bad passage’. Soon after the convoy departed from Louisbourg, contrary winds and currents seriously started to hinder their progress. Eight days after their departure, they encountered storm-like conditions which ‘Blew very hard very cold for the Season.’ Several days later, the situation did not improve and Pearson noted, ‘We have not gained more then 8 Leagues in four days By reason of Contray Winds & a very Strong Currant.’ Confronted with such opposition, the weather deteriorated further as numerous storms appeared, causing the ships on one occasion to proceed no ‘More then four Leagues.’ Towards the end of the voyage, conditions remained turbulent and Pearson recorded, ‘a Strong Currant Against us Continues Still’. When the convoy finally arrived at Québec, Pearson summarized his journey remarking, ‘we have been 4 Weakes & 4 day on our Passage from Louisburg & had a very Loung passage’.56 The effects of wind, however, were not only detrimental to naval operations off the Gulf of St Lawrence, but also in the Great Lakes, particularly at Oswego in 1756. Soon after Braddock’s arrival, it was agreed in Alexandria that the establishment of a naval force at Oswego was essential.57 At the time

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of the fall of Oswego, a small fleet had been assembled on the shores of Lake Ontario comprised of a number of sloops, schooners, pinnaces, galleys and whaleboats.58 When Montcalm’s forces attacked, wind intervened in favour of the French, causing several serious incidents. In an attempt to make a show of force against the French naval contingent, the fleet sailed out of Oswego only to encounter strong winds which caused the Ontario to spring her boom and the accompanying brigantine to carry away her gaff.59 On another occasion, strong winds drove the fleet’s brigantine ashore at the entrance of the harbour, which led to the employment of all available naval personnel to return it to the lake. The following day, Colonel James Mercer requested the ships make another attempt to sail into the bay; however, Captain Housman Broadley refused. Had he done so, Broadley argued, ‘the same violent gale of wind at N Wt. which drove the Brigantine on shore in the entrance of the Harbour must infallibly have drove all the Vessels on shore in the Bay, where they must have gone to pieces, and the People either drown’d or fallen into the hands of the French Indians’. Broadley flatly rejected the positioning of his ships at the bottom of the bay due to the danger it posed to the fleet, ‘being very deep and flat as it approached the shore’ where ‘No. westerly winds almost constantly blow & make a very great sea.’60 Although the brigantine survived with the loss of ‘three inches of her keel’, had the entire fleet been dispatched according to Mercer’s wishes, it is possible that at the mercy of the wind, the fleet may have been severely damaged or entirely destroyed. Ultimately, wind defeated the British navy on the shores of Oswego in 1756. Although the fleet was not destroyed by the strong winds which had beached the brigantine, the lack of wind rendered the entire fleet useless to oppose the French during the battle. After Fort Ontario had fallen, Broadley described the situation: It was agreed that as the garrison had Retreated from the other Side, they would spare us a Party from the garrison & that if the wind came fair, we should Endeavour to Run out in the Night, which we intended doing, but at the same time I desired to know, if we could not get out, whether the Vessels should not be destroy’d, but was answer’d, it would be time Enough to do that, when they were Obliged to abandon the Old Fort, and the Commandg. Officer at the same time Informed me he had great Reasons to Expect Speedy Reinforcements from below, upon which we got the Party on Board and Everything Ready for Sailing. The wind Continuing Foul untill towards Day Light, when it Came About for a Short time, but so little of it and so Great a Swell upon the Bar that it was impossible to get out.61

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As a result, naval personnel could only watch haplessly in the harbour as numerous Amerindians accompanied by Canadians, crossed over the water ‘at the Rifts above Oswego’ to assist in the final assault against the outpost.62 Several ships attempted to fire upon them, but as the French irregulars were at a distance, the guns did little damage. At this time, Mercer was killed, and the soldiers quickly recalled from the ships by his successor. Left to shift for themselves, Broadley and his small contingent barricaded themselves aboard the brigantine and waited for the enemy to attack. Soon word arrived that the fort had capitulated, and as Broadley was not informed in time to set the ships ablaze, they became the property of the French crown. Interestingly, Shirley believed that the ships ‘were confin’d to the Harbour for want of the Remainder of the Cannon for the other Vessels’ and blamed the defeat on Colonel John Bradstreet’s delay, which was occasioned by the transportation of 800 soldiers of the 44th Regiment and additional supplies.63 Ultimately, blame cannot be placed upon the delayed arrival of Bradstreet, although it is possible that the presence of his bateaux men may have made a difference. Wind was responsible for ruining British naval operations during the siege of Oswego and further aided the French by providing them with additional vessels for their fleet. Weather played a significant role in frustrating British naval strategy during the initial stages of the war. In the latter course of the conflict, it was sheer determination which eventually overcame these obstacles. Even during the successful siege of Québec, bad weather occasionally put a halt to operations.64 Wolfe bemoaned during the 1758 expedition against Louisbourg, ‘The continual opposition of contrary winds, calms, or currents, baffled all our skill and wore out all our patience. A fleet of men of war well manned, unincumbered with transports, commanded by an officer of the first reputation, has been eleven weeks in it’s passage.’65 In truth, not only did bad weather affect the passage of the fleet, it frustrated the landing of the troops, with frequent fogs and rough seas.66 Captain Philip Townshend recorded one morning as the soldiers waited to disembark, ‘the day Proveing very Wett & foggy the Men Returned About Eleven o’Clock. to their Several Ships With orders to hold themselves in readiness at a moments Warning but ye Sea Continueing makes Such a Surge upon ye Rocks that until it falls I Apprehend no Boat Can land’. The next day Townshend observed, ‘att Eleven a very Smart gale att N.W. this blows off Shore & May Make The Landing tomorrow practicable’. Although the sea continued very rough, the landing was successfully accomplished; however, Townshend noted, ‘Some Drowned in ye Landing the Surge was So great.’67 It is

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not surprising that of the forty-six fatalities incurred in the operation, thirtyeight were claimed by the sea.68 Under conditions which were a common occurrence in the vicinity of the St Lawrence, Wolfe’s decision, though rash, was the proper choice. Although the sea was not as calm as one could have hoped for, it was plausible to conduct a landing, as the weather was prone to fickleness and could have changed for the worse had the expedition waited. Wolfe, in gambling, took advantage of the unfavourable chance the weather presented for his force to land and, in doing so, succeeded. This decision also appeared more appropriate, for as General George Townshend remarked to his wife, ‘I hear that the People at Louisbourgh have at least 2 months good Weather to proceed – surely They’ll follow their Blow & go to Quebec if possible this Season or will they give the French a whole Year to prepare against them.’69

Joint operations during the initial stages of the war Throughout the duration of the war, joint operations between the army and navy were crucial to the success which began in 1758. Prior to 1758, the navy provided assistance at Fort Beauséjour and Braddock’s defeat in 1755, the fall of Oswego in 1756 and the attempt against Louisbourg in 1757. Until 1758, the only joint operation successfully conducted in North America was the attack on Beauséjour in 1755.70 After 1758, successful joint operations were carried out in the same manner as the attack on Beauséjour, but on a much grander scale. For example, when British forces attacked the French fortress in 1755, the invasion force consisted of three ships of the line and 2,000 troops.71 During the attack on Louisbourg in 1758, twenty ships of the line were dispatched along with 12,000 soldiers.72 Although an attempt was made against Louisbourg in 1757, unlike other successful joint operations on the Atlantic seaboard, the British suffered not only from disadvantages affected by bad weather, but also the presence of a superior French fleet.73 During the initial phases of the Seven Years’ War, the navy had shown great potential at Beauséjour, and successful joint operations would not occur again until 1758, after which they would become characterized by the employment of the amphibious assault.74 During the years of failure, with the exception of Beauséjour, the navy was not employed in the same manner as it was during the latter end of the war at Louisbourg, Québec and Montréal. The crucial defeats which the British suffered during the early years of conflict were not in places

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easily accessible for the navy to provide assistance. Braddock could hardly expect much naval support, as operations were coordinated inland, and as a result, the most direct naval assistance he could receive in the Pennsylvania backcountry was in the form of a detachment of seamen.75 In comparison, Oswego was accessible to the navy; however, the fleet had to be constructed on site under numerous difficulties such as a lack of manpower, the murder of carpenters by Amerindians and the problem of securing timber for ships while enemy scalping parties roamed the woods.76 Ironically, despite all the effort which had been exerted in constructing the fleet, it was crippled due to the lack of wind and as a result captured in its entirety by the French.77 Although the British navy attempted to assist the army as much as possible during the initial stages of the war, successful assistance was only possible when conducting operations off the Atlantic seaboard. During the 1755 campaign, the navy provided considerable support to the army, despite the fact that military operations primarily occurred inland. Ordered to North America along with Braddock, Commodore Augustus Keppel was granted ‘liberty when it shall be judged for the Good of the Kings Service, to land any Number of Men that can be conveniently spared from the Ships with discreet Officers, to cooperate with the Land Forces, or Act in such manner as may be agreed upon at a Council of War, where You may have been present and concurred’.78 In carrying out his duties as the commander-in-chief of the naval forces, Keppel assisted the expedition to the utmost of his ability, well beyond the expectations of Whitehall. Braddock informed Sir Thomas Robinson: I am extremely happy in being joined in His Majesty’s Service with an Officer so capable and ready to concur in all Measures, which may promote the Success of it, as Mr: Keppel. There having been only four twelve Pounders sent out with the Train, & it appearing to me necessary to have a greater Number, I have applied to him for four more from his Ships, with a proper Quantity of Ammunition, & for many other Things that were necessary, which he has supplied with the greatest Expedition. He has likewise ordered thirty Sailors with proper Officers, to attend the Army in it’s March, who may be of the greatest Use in constructing Floats and assisting in the Transportation of the Artillery & heavy Baggage.79

Keppel was indefatigable in his efforts. When Braddock first arrived in Virginia, not only did he request additional cannon from Keppel, but also ‘some Pistolls and shot’, which were transferred immediately.80 Besides armaments, Keppel also provided the army with much needed provisions.

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Not only did he supply Braddock with the thousand barrels of beef and butter which had been sent by the ministry, along with ‘all the Bread remaining on board’ the transports, he also furnished: 120 gallons of beer, 196 ½ gallons of brandy, 2,382 pieces of beef, 2,676 pieces of pork, 851 pounds of flour, 15 gallons of oil, 2 bushels and 3 gallons of groats, 55 pounds of raisins and 30 gallons of vinegar.81 Keppel proved equally industrious in aiding Braddock militarily. Although naval support for the expedition was greatly limited, Keppel provided as much as was possible for inland operations. Captain Robert Orme recorded that Braddock ‘applied to Mr. Keppel for some Blocks, Cordage, and other Stores, and also for Thirty Seamen, who he thought would be very Serviceable on the March, if it should be found necessary to pass the Rivers on Floats or in Boats. He also desired a Carpenter to direct the Construction of them; with which the Commodore complied very readily’.82 Keppel was unfaltering in his efforts and issued repeated orders for the organization of the detachment.83 Orme recorded that Keppel was ‘constantly expressing an Ardent Desire to forward the Success of the Expedition’, and Braddock too remarked, ‘I have received all possible Assistance from Commodore Keppel, who is an Officer of great Capacity and Merit.’84 To accomplish this end, Keppel issued detailed orders to Lieutenant Charles Spendelow: Whereas the Rt. Honrble the Lords Commissr: for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain, have thought proper to send you upon this Expedition as an additional Lieutenant, in Order to your attending the Army in all their Marches, and for you to be assisting to them in the Navigating Floats and other Contrivances across Rivers, You are hereby required and directed to repair on board his Majesty’s Ship Seahorse or Nightingale, and proceed with them up the Potomack River as far Alexandria, where you will find his Majesty’s Land Forces Encamped under the Command of his Excellency General Braddock. As soon as you arrive at the camp you are to acquaint his Excellency that you are appointed for the Services abovementioned, and that you are ready to receive his Directions upon them or any other that he shall think Proper. And whereas I have directed the Captain of his Majesty’s Ship Centurion to send up the Potomack River Two Midshipmen One Boatswain’s Mate and Seven Seaman, the Captain of the Norwich One Midshipmen One Boatswain’s Mate and Ten Seamen, & the Captains of the Syren, Seahorse, Guarland & Nightingale Three Seamen each, You are to cause this Detachment to be landed at Alexandria as soon as General Braddock shall desire it, and take upon you the command & good Discipline of them, giving each Midshipman the care of such a Number of the Seamen as

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you shall judge most for the Service, the Intent of these Men being to facilitate as much as possible the getting the Cannon & Train over the Mountains, but they are likewise to perform all other Services that shall be thought expedient by General Braddock for the Success of his Majesty’s Forces.85

The utility of this detachment is highly evident, as it not only assisted in the crossing of rivers, and the transportation of cannon, but it was among Braddock’s picked force which saw action at the Monongahela River.86 Ultimately, the seamen also contributed to the fighting capacity of Braddock’s army, which had been greatly hampered for want of manpower. Of the thirty seamen that accompanied the expedition, seven were wounded and two perished in the midst of the fighting.87 Among those in command, casualties included one midshipman, one boatswain’s mate and Spendelow himself.88 In addition, the carpenter who had been sent from the Seahorse to assist in the construction of boats and bridges also lay among the dead.89 When a return was finally made of the sick, wounded, and those fit for duty after the forces had reassembled at Will’s Creek, only one midshipman, one boatswain’s mate and fourteen seamen were listed as fit for duty.90 For this reason, Keppel instructed, ‘you are to order Mr. Hayne’s Midshipman of the Centurion to give an exact List of the killed & wounded Seamen specifying such as are dangerously so, and such as are only slightly wounded’.91 Although the navy was unable to directly participate in the attack on Fort Duquesne with a flotilla of ships and amassed gunfire, an effort was made and the detachment proved an invaluable asset to Braddock. In a more conventional way, joint operations were attempted by the navy in 1756 and in 1759 along the waterways of the interior. Soon after Braddock arrived in 1755, it was decided that a naval presence was necessary, particularly on Lake Ontario.92 Upon viewing the lake during the 1759 campaign, Amherst remarked, ‘The Lake is a most Noble thing, all the plans of it are very incorrect there are numbers of Islands not laid down in any draft I have seen, and very luckily both shores are indented with many bays, or the batteaus I went out with would not have returned.’ Aware of the problems encountered during previous campaigns, he added, ‘An officer of Capt. Lorings would have it that the Sea was as bad as in the bay of Biscay.’93 A vast waterway which linked key military posts, Lake Ontario was strategically important to both the British and the French, and its control was necessary for conducting military operations in the vicinity.94 In order to achieve this end, the council held at Alexandria directed that ‘two Vessels of Sixty Tons should be built upon the Lake’.95 Keppel was to ‘furnish

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Draughts, and to defray the Expence’, while Shirley assumed responsibility for the construction of the fleet.96 Although Shirley was not a naval commander, he understood the importance of establishing a fleet at Oswego. Shirley argued that ‘gaining the mastery of the Lake Ontario’ was the only way to secure Britain’s claims to the ‘Great Lakes & Rivers, & in the whole southern Country behind the apalachian Mountains.’ He also added that dominance of the lake was essential in order to secure Amerindian support.97 The establishment of a naval force on Lake Ontario was necessary in order to thwart French objectives. As Sir John St Clair summarized, ‘the Vessels we have on the Lake may disturb and retard the French, and if well Conducted prevent their passing from the River St. Laurence thro the Lake Ontario to Niagara’.98 Not only was the command of Lake Ontario vital to the defence of the colonies, it was also the back door of New France and was equally important as Louisbourg for a base of operations against Niagara, Frontenac and eventually Montréal.99 This proved problematic for the French as Lake Ontario, guarded on its eastern and western shores by Forts Frontenac and Niagara, was a vital lifeline to the west.100 It is not surprising that as a result of the lake’s strategic importance, an arms race transpired in which both sides sought to establish the dominant naval force by constructing ships at Oswego, Cadaraqui and Frontenac.101 Although by 1759 British naval forces had achieved this end, during the initial stages of the war the French were in a more advantageous situation.102 Ultimately, command of the Great Lakes was as essential as that of the St Lawrence. Initial attempts to gain superiority over the lake, however, proved problematic as Amerindians murdered carpenters. The principal reason the detachment of seamen accompanied Braddock was to assist in the construction of the fleet. Keppel ordered Spendelow, ‘If General Braddock should think proper to order a Vessell or Two to be built upon any of the Large Lakes, You are to give all the Assistance that you possibly can, for the Effecting it, and for which Purpose, You have herewith delivered to you, a plan of Two Schooners of about Sixty Tons each.’ On the supplies needed, Keppel added, ‘It will be necessary to have the Timber cut a little Time before it is put together, which will give Time for the Iron Work for the building One, with the Cordage & Sails now on board the Centurion, to be sent.’103 The detachment, however, never arrived on the shores of Lake Ontario, and Spendelow, along with the carpenter, perished in the fighting.104 The fatalities did not end with this first attempt to establish a naval presence, for when works were finally established

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on Lake Ontario, the Master Builder informed Captain Joshua Loring ‘that he had been very much hinder’d and put back in building these Vessells on Account of Several of his Carpenters been Kill’d and others drove into ye Fort from their Cutting the Timber in the Woods which seems to be the greatest Difficulty they have at Present to encounter’.105 Certainly, the killing of the carpenters greatly curtailed the construction of the fleet. In addition, as these acts were conducted by Amerindians allied to the French at a time when many rallied to the white flag of the Bourbons, it is not surprising that carpenters were extremely vulnerable while constructing vessels on the frontier. As a result, Amerindians regularly killed carpenters despite the presence of guards to protect them. During one such attack, Amerindians ‘killed and scalped eight unfortunate carpenters and carried off four to be tortured’. Their effectiveness in hindering naval construction cannot be denied. Such persistent attacks resulted in the continuous erosion of manpower and decreased shipbuilding productivity. Only when additional numbers of troops arrived at Oswego did the attacks cease.106 Besides the perils the navy encountered while constructing the fleet at Lake Ontario, there were also problems arising in the quality of the ships. This was largely the result of using green timber in their construction.107 The use of such material for shipbuilding was problematic as green or unseasoned wood decayed rapidly. Unlike the facilities at Oswego, most shipyards took great care to ensure that building materials were in the best condition. During his tour of dockyards in Britain and Holland, Blaise Ollivier, Master Shipwright at Brest, observed that the British paid very little attention to the storage and care of their timber. The Dutch on the other hand, Ollivier noted, stored their timber in seawater and regularly sank ships under construction in order to prevent sap within the boards from fermenting. Such careful treatment was essential, for if green timber was not handled properly, the result would be a ship that quickly rotted.108 The carpenters at Oswego, however, did not have the benefit of reserves. Consequently, unlike their counterparts in Britain and Holland, they had no choice but to construct the fleet with green wood. With the carpenters being continuously harassed by Amerindians allied to the French, it is not surprising that very little attention went into the care of timber. On some occasions, carpenters were fortunate just to have an ample supply of boards available for use.109 Considering the circumstances in which the sawyers laboured at Oswego, the preparation of lumber was a slow and strenuous process, especially since green oak was extremely difficult to cut.110

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This problem is further illustrated by the experience of carpenters constructing bateaux at Albany, from where it was reported, ‘If no rain fall[s] soon, no Battoes can be made, at least but a very few unless they may be made of pine boards.’111 In 1983, divers conducting a survey for the Lake Champlain Maritime Society discovered the remains of the Boscawen, which had served under Captain Joshua Loring during the 1759 campaign.112 Upon examination of the ship’s ruins, archaeologists discovered that it was primarily constructed of white oak; however, they also noted the use of untrimmed pine boards for orlop deck beams. The use of pine was merely a way to speed the construction of the ship and can also be attributed to the difficulty of procuring oak, as experienced by the carpenters at Albany.113 Returning to the situation at Oswego, under adverse conditions, it may be assumed that ships were constructed much in the same manner as those on Lake Champlain. Although there was insufficient time for the ships to rot, green wood presented a different problem for the fleet on Lake Ontario. Captain Housman Broadley described the situation: On the 31st it Blowing very hard, the Ontario having sprung her boom, and the Brig Carried away her Gaff, was obliged to bear away for Oswego, to get new ones, which we got finished the same day. On the first of August, the wind being contrary could not get out, on the 2d we Sail’d again. After being out two or three days found the Magazine of the Brig so damp from her having being built of all Green Timber, that a Great Number of the Cartridges were Milldew’d, which I thought to put a stop to by Keeping them in the Sun every opportunity. Upon Examining them the Sixth of Augst. I found some of the Paper quite Rotten, and the Bottom of some of the Cartridges dropping out; the New Sloop Labouring under the same inconveniency made it necessary for me to go in to get some alteration made in the Magazine to secure our Powder.114

This incident was unfortunate for the garrison at Oswego as the fort’s commanding officer, Colonel James Mercer, had received intelligence informing him that thirty French bateaux ‘were being landed 20 miles Eastward of Oswego’ and requested that Broadley reconnoitre the lake. Defending his actions during this incident to the Lords Commissioners of Admiralty in 1757, Broadley remarked that his ‘reason for comeing in then, was that the Powder in the Cartriges of the new Brigantine and new Sloop (for we were Obliged to keep all our powder filled having no conveniency for filling in Action) through their magazines being made of green Timbers just cut from the Woods, was so

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wet that we could not have used it’.115 Returning to the issue of green timber, although the ships had not decayed, the sap which saturated the boards of newly constructed vessels rendered the supply of gunpowder useless. As a result, the fleet was in no condition to repulse a French invasion force, as its cannon were unable to fire. In addition to the deficiency of powder, the fleet also lacked a significant number of its cannon. Following the fall of the outpost, Shirley immediately attributed the confinement of the fleet to the harbour ‘for want of the Remainder of the Cannon for the other Vessells’. Although it was the lack of wind which prevented further action by the fleet, Shirley’s theory highlights the severity of this shortage, which amounted to a total of twenty-four cannon.116 This problem is clearly illustrated by an encounter between three British ships and two French ships during a patrol on the lake, which resulted in the rapid withdrawal of British naval forces. After conferring with his captains, Broadley decided to flee, as it was generally agreed that the fleet was outgunned and outranged. Undoubtedly, the decision was not inappropriate, as the sloops were each equipped with only four four-pounders, one three-pounder and ten swivels, while the schooner mounted only six swivels. Their armaments were pitifully inadequate, as the French ships carried thirty large calibre cannon and a number of swivels.117 Interestingly, during the War of 1812, the British fleet on Lake Erie suffered a similar shortage of cannon. However, unlike those at Oswego, the ships constructed at Amherstburg were equipped with a motley assortment of guns, which were taken from Fort Malden’s ramparts in an attempt to fully arm them.118 Besides the threat posed by the French naval presence, the British fleet also had to contend with possible bombardment from Montcalm’s artillery train. While reconnoitring the east end of the harbour, the sloop Ontario was fired upon by ‘three or four pieces of Cannon’ which were stationed beyond ‘a Point of Rocks’. As a result of the engagement, the Ontario ‘receiv’d three Shot, two below his Whale, one of which had carried away the clamp of his Main beam, and render’d the gun above it useless, and another Shot through his upper works’. Although there had been no significant damage inflicted on the Ontario, Montcalm’s artillery train demonstrated that it was unafraid of the British fleet. Under such circumstances, Broadley’s ‘show of force’ on Lake Ontario was merely that, and nothing more. Despite the deficiencies of his fleet, Broadley reported, ‘I thought it was for the good of his Majestys Service that we shoul’d appear out on the Lake as strong as we could, with what Officers, men, and Guns we had got.’119

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Another problem that greatly hindered the naval forces at Oswego, which was not unusual for the navy in general at the time, was the deficiency of manpower. However, this was a never-ending complication that was difficult for the navy to overcome.120 Regarding the naval forces on Lake Ontario, the problem of securing recruits was no different from that experienced by officers attempting to procure them for service at sea. Shirley described his dilemma: I found it impossible to get seamen for those Vessells the Last summer upon the King’s pay in the navy, & great Difficulties in Getting them even at the Wages allow’d in those Colonies to Sailors in the Merchants service; it will be still more difficult to get any Seamen here the Next Spring on the King’s pay & Doubtfull whether it will be possible to get any, even on ye pay Allowed by the Merchants; especially if there should be a War, as they will then be engaged in privateering; Wherefore I would submit it to you Lordship’s Consideration whether it will not be Necessary that 200 Good Seamen or more with proper Officers be sent from his Majesty’s Navy, to be at New York very early in the Spring; unless that be done, it seems impracticable to keep up the Vessells proposed on Lake Ontario.121

When Montcalm launched his attack against Oswego, naval personnel numbered no more than 100 men, officers and sailors combined.122 Ultimately, the crews which kept the fleet in operation were despairingly small. Following the construction of three new vessels on the lake, two brigs and one sloop, the brigs were each assigned twenty-five sailors, while the sloop received only twenty.123 Again, the comparison with the French was disparaging, as the two vessels which chased Broadley’s patrol carried a total of 120 men. The state of the French fleet was, as Montcalm described, ‘four vessels one of which carries twenty four and six pounders and eighty men, the others have forty men and ten four pounders’.124 Seriously outnumbered in terms of manpower, this problem was briefly alleviated after the evacuation of Fort Ontario, when a number of soldiers were assigned to assist Broadley’s fleet. However, this proved only a temporary arrangement, as they were later recalled after Mercer’s untimely death. As a result, Broadley summarized, ‘we agreed not having men Enough to defend all the Vessels from being boarded, to retire on Board the Brig and Barricade her’.125 Under such circumstances, the fleet at Oswego was incapable of offering much assistance to the garrison. Suffering from a lack of cannon, the ships were inadequate to confront Montcalm’s 3,000 men, of which 2,600 were regulars. In addition, accompanied by a large artillery train that included the captured naval

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guns from Braddock’s expedition, Montcalm’s forces posed a serious threat.126 As demonstrated by their attack from shore, Montcalm’s artillery train was also unafraid of the fleet.127 Hindered on one occasion by the effects of greenwood on their powder, insufficiently supplied with their full complements of cannon and suffering from a lack of manpower, the naval force on Lake Ontario was inadequate to intercept the French invasion force.128 Broadley’s conduct at Oswego was later called into question by the Lords of Admiralty, who briefly enquired of his actions. Not surprisingly, at the same time, preparations were well underway for Byng’s trial.129 Prior to the siege, Broadley had been requested by Mercer to position his ships in the bay in order to intercept the French, which he refused to do, arguing that such a move would have endangered the fleet. Defending his actions, Broadley declared: I convinced Collonel Mercer when I came in; as also that it would be impossible for the Vessels to cruize in the bottom of that Bay to intercept any Batteaus which might pass along the Bottom of it; they Coasting close along the shore; being able to land in ten minutes after discovering any Vessels, to haul up their boats and shelter themselves in the Woods, where if we attempted to land in our small boats to destroy them we must have sacrafised all the People we sent, that Bay being likewise very dangerous for the Vessels particularly Captain Laforeys which would neither hold her wind, nor work) it being very deep and flat as it approached the shore; situated at the Bottom of the Lake into which the No. westerly winds almost constantly blow & make a very great sea.

Although it can be argued that Broadley was guilty of timidity, he described several of the problems that hindered the fleet, including the lack of wind and a dearth in manpower.130 Ultimately, the fleet was defeated by the forces of nature, due to the absence of wind during the critical juncture of the battle, which effectively trapped it in the harbour. In addition, the harbour at Oswego was poorly situated, and as a result, the navy could not assist the garrison despite the efforts of the Ontario and Mohawk, whose guns were out of range to be effective. Owing to these setbacks, the naval fleet fell into the possession of the French along with Oswego.131 In comparison to the naval forces assembled in 1759, very little differed from those employed in 1756. The conditions under which they confronted the French, however, were much different.132 Amherst described the fateful encounter: I am yesterday retrn’d from a Cruize I set out on, on the 11th Instant so soon as I could get two Vessells built to Attack the Enemys with, which has so far

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succeeded that I forced them to sink two which I belive we shall get up again, and to run one aground which has now Joined H.M.ts Ships and they are in quest of a Schooner which I hope we shall take, so that the Enemy will have only remaining a Vessel which is not rigged but is put across the Channel at the Isle Aux Noix, as a floating Battery, & whether or not Captain Loring may Succeed in taking the Schooner, the Kings ships have now the full Command of the Lake.133

The situation proved much more favourable to Amherst in contrast to that encountered by Broadley in 1756. In particular, the bulk of the French naval force had been destroyed during Bradstreet’s attack on Fort Frontenac in August 1758, a crippling blow to the French war effort.134 This turn of events resulted with the French suffering from similar circumstances as the British did during the first naval campaign on the Great Lakes. When Captain Joshua Loring pursued three French vessels in 1759, they immediately fled at the sight of his fleet, and when it was obvious that they could not escape, scuttled two and ran one ashore. All three were later salvaged to join the British on the lake. Interestingly, during the pursuit, Loring was thwarted from firing upon the ships due to the intervention of a sand bar and also failing winds.135 However, unlike at Oswego, although these occurrences did aid the French in temporarily evading the British, on this occasion, nature proved unable to assist them further.

Increased aggressiveness and amphibious assaults In addition to the obstacles which effected naval performance, such as fog, ice and contrary winds and currents, naval success, particularly in 1758 and 1759, was due largely to an increase in risk taking. Had Loudoun attacked Louisbourg in 1757, he may have succeeded. Although the British fleet was outnumbered, French naval doctrine at the time was not aggressive, and it is doubtful that Emmanuel-Auguste de Cahideuc, comte Du Bois de la Motte, would have attempted to intercept the invasion force.136 To the French, it was considered much more important to fulfil the mission rather than obtain a decisive victory at sea. Operating under this ideology, fighting was not a priority for la Motte.137 Furthermore, la Motte was in no condition to take part in a naval engagement, with 400 sailors dead and an additional 1,200 unfit for duty, the result of an outbreak of typhus. This coupled with scurvy, malaria and yellow fever proved fatal to the fleet, which lost nearly half its crew of 12,000 men.138 However, Loudoun did not know of this weakness,

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and his decision to return to New York was based upon the numerical superiority of the French fleet.139 As Colonel Louis Antoine de Bougainville summarized soon after his arrival in 1756, ‘Maxim of the English at sea: avoid combat when only on equal or slightly superior terms on the same principle that one gives one’s purse without any resistance to any thief who demands it, even in a public place and within reach of help.’140 Although Bougainville viewed the British navy with contempt, perhaps it was better for the French that Loudoun did not attack and spared Louisbourg for another year.141 Had Wolfe been in command instead of Loudoun, things might have ended differently. Wolfe’s success at Louisbourg in 1758 and Québec in 1759 was the result of daring risks. During the attack on Louisbourg in 1758, it was generally agreed that the most difficult obstacle facing the invasion force was the task of landing the troops.142 Reflecting on the fall of Louisbourg, Wolfe remarked, ‘In general, it may be said that we made a rash and ill-advised attempt to land, and by the greatest of good fortune imaginable we succeeded.’143 Wolfe’s summary succinctly describes the reason the attack was successful. Arriving within sight of Louisbourg on 2 June, the landing had been delayed six days due to rough seas and continuous fog.144 Only when the gales which had been tormenting the fleet disappeared were the troops finally disembarked despite the presence of a heavy swell.145 Amherst described the landing: The Troops were assembled in the Boats before break of day, in three Divisions according to the Plan annexed, and Comodore Durell having viewed the Coast by order of the Admiral and given me his opinion that the Troops might land, without danger from the Surf, in the bay on our left, the Kennington and Halifax Snow, began the fire upon the left, followed by the Grammont, Diana, and Shannon Frigates in the Center, and the Sutherland and Squirrell upon the right; when the fire had continued about a Quarter of an Hour, the Boats upon the left rowed into the Shore under the Command of Br. General Wolfe, whose Detachment was composed of the four Eldest Companys of Grenadiers, followed by the light Infantry (a Corps of 550 Men chosen as Marksmen from the different Regiments, serve as Irregulars, and are commanded by Major Scott, who was Major of brigade) and Companys of Rangers, supported by the Highland Regiment, and those by the Eight remaining Companys of Grenadiers. The Center Division under the Command of Br General Lawrence was formed of Amherst’s, Hopson’s, Otway’s, Whitmore’s, Lawrence’s & Warburton’s, & made at the same time a Shew of landing at the fresh water Cove: this drew the Enemy’s attention to every part and prevented their Troops posted along the Coast from

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joining those on their right. The Enemy acted very wisely, did not throw away a Shot till the boats were near in shore, and then directed the whole fire of their Cannon and Muskettry upon them: the surf was so great, that a place could hardly be found, to get a boat on shore; notwithstanding the fire of the Enemy and the Violence of the Surf Brigadier Wolfe pursued his point, and landed just at their left of the Cove, took post, attacked the Enemy & forced them to retreat. Many Boats overset, several broke to Pieces, and all the Men Jumped into the Water to get on shore.146

Certainly, conducting a successful amphibious assault in such unfavourable conditions was not an easy task for the navy.147 Even in normal conditions, the organization of an amphibious assault was a complicated project as troops needed to be transported in battle formation.148 When examining the operations at Louisbourg, three separate divisions had to be landed under adverse conditions. In addition, the defenders opened fire as the transports approached the shore, adding further difficulties.149 With a strong tide against them as well, the attack appeared almost suicidal.150 Reflecting on the success of the operation, Wolfe remarked, ‘I wouldn’t recommend the Bay of Gabarouse for a descent, especially as we managed it.’151 Wolfe’s landing was an impressive military feat and from Louisbourg until the end of hostilities, the Royal Navy continued to conduct successful amphibious assaults which had a tremendous impact in winning the war.152 Wolfe’s landing at Louisbourg was the first amphibious assault conducted in North America. Prior to 1758, the only seaborne operation which had successfully taken place was at Fort Beauséjour. John Brewse described the joint operation: On the 2d of May we sailed from hence in three Vessels with 50 men of Captain Broom’s Company and the abovementioned Stores, and arrived at the 9th at Annapolis Royal. Colonel Monckton with the Troops and Battering Cannon arrived there the 26th, under Convoy of three 20 Gun Ships, and the 1st of June we sailed for Chignecto, where we landed the 2d and were joined by our Garrison, making in all 2000 Irregulars and 280 Regular Troops, on the 4th the whole marched from Fort Lawrence with 4 Brass Field Pieces 6 Pounders, and flung a Bridge over the Mesaguash at Pont Buot, where a Body of French and Indians were posted in an Intrenchment with some small Cannon to oppose us, but were soon dislodged, and with little loss on our side. The Troops continued their March to a riseing Ground, within a mile and a half to the French Fort, when the Enemy set Fire to the Village and Church.153

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In comparison to the latter expeditions against Louisbourg and Québec, Beauséjour was different, as an amphibious assault was not conducted. Although the naval force provided was small, consisting only of three ships under Captain John Rous, it operated in the same manner as it did later at Louisbourg and Québec. Rous was undoubtedly active during the siege of Beauséjour, as he was energetically involved in gathering intelligence during the ill-fated attempt at Louisbourg in 1757 and carried out the daring pass above Québec in 1759.154 The presence of a naval force at Beauséjour, particularly under Rous, ensured the success of the expedition. During the latter years of the war, the navy continued to assist the army by dispatching sailors to serve alongside regulars. In 1758 at Louisbourg, notwithstanding the large numbers of troops deployed, Boscawen provided a significantly large detachment to assist in operations on shore.155 On this, Wolfe commented, ‘Mr. Boscawen has given all and even more than we could ask of him. He has furnished arms and ammunition, pioneers, sappers, miners, gunners, carpenters, boats, and is, I must confess, no bad fantassin himself, and an excellent back-hand at a siege.’156 Throughout the duration of the siege Boscawen did not attempt to enter the harbour at Louisbourg. Instead, he relieved the troops stationed at Wolfe’s batteries with marines, and also landed heavy guns from the fleet to intensify the bombardment against the French fleet trapped in the harbour.157 Rather than risk his ships, the naval bombardment from shore only intensified with Boscawen landing more seamen as the fall of the citadel became imminent.158 Similarly, during the siege of Québec, Saunders received orders specifically stating that he was required to provide such assistance for Wolfe, and as a result, large numbers of marines and sailors were sent ashore to conduct siege operations and assist in laying waste to the Canadian countryside.159 The most striking difference between naval operations during the initial stages of the war, as compared to those of the latter, is an increase in aggressiveness. During the opening phases of the conflict, naval commanders had shown themselves to be more cautious than daring. At Oswego, Captain Housman Broadley had been hesitant to risk his ships on Lake Ontario due to natural hazards.160 Some could criticize Broadley severely for not showing more fighting spirit in the face of the enemy and conducting himself more in the manner of Sir Richard Grenville.161 While Broadley argued that had his fleet been posted on the bay it would have been destroyed by strong winds, one can only wonder what could have been the outcome if had he been bolder and attempted to intercept the French despite the numerous setbacks he

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faced.162 Likewise, had Holburne pressed the issue forward at Louisbourg in 1757, it is possible that Britain may have succeeded, as the French fleet was crippled in Louisbourg Harbour by typhus. In time, the outbreak reached such overwhelming proportions that when the fleet arrived at Brest, it spread to the civilian populace killing over 5,000.163 Despite the possibility of success, during the early stages of the war, naval officers remained pessimistic. Among such numerous defeatist accounts received by the Admiralty, one deserves particular attention, that of Byng. When dispatched to relieve the garrison at Fort St Philip, on the island of Minorca, Byng lamented that he expected his forces would be defeated, as did similarly Holburne before Louisbourg in 1757.164 Byng’s fate, however, did set an example for others, as his verdict was determined by the twelfth Article of War for displaying cowardice, negligence or disaffection in combat.165 Before departing for America, Holburne recorded, ‘the Captains went with 3 Boats to attend the Execution of Adml. Byng in Portsmouth Harbour on board the Monarque’.166 Although Holburne later failed at Louisbourg, unlike Byng, naval operations were being undertaken in the difficult climate of the St Lawrence, not the more stable Mediterranean. Naval performance did improve after Byng’s execution. While Holburne did not conduct operations against Louisbourg in 1757, it was not his decision alone to make, as he was merely a member of the council of war presided over by Loudoun.167 His personal character suggests that had he been given an independent command, he might have acted differently. Describing the admiral to his wife, Boscawen remarked, ‘He is sick and has contrived to insinuate himself into the good graces of Lord Anson, made an Admiral, and sent here to my assistance. You see by this I don’t like him, nor ever did, having known him from my first entering into the service.’ Confiding further details about the proceedings in North America, Boscawen added, ‘As soon as he joined me (he) was laying schemes for making a job immediately. I cut him short and told him I sent him to Halifax to fill his water and join me here as soon as possible.’168 Although Boscawen may have disliked him, Holburne certainly was ambitious, and what was truly required to overcome the obstacles in North America were naval commanders who were willing to take risks, regardless of the possible consequences. Prior to the assault on Louisbourg, Governor Augustin de Drucour was advised by his engineers that no one but a madman would attempt a landing at l’anse de la Cormorandière.169 Conditions were so terrible it was said that ‘the Devil himself would not have attempted it’.170 Reflecting on the operation’s success, Wolfe succinctly summarized, ‘our

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landing was next to miraculous’.171 Such a dramatic feat would have been impossible without the aid of Boscawen. Among the naval officers who were unafraid to risk their commands, Boscawen and Saunders are certainly good examples. A popular tale concerning Boscawen’s conduct in the previous war involved the experience of an officer of the watch who awoke the admiral one night and informed him that two large ships were swiftly approaching. Believing them to be French, the officer asked what he should do. In reply to the question, Boscawen simply remarked, ‘Do? Damn ’em, fight ’em.’172 Whether or not the story is true, it illustrates the frame of mind that was necessary in order to overcome the French in North America. During the attack against Louisbourg, Boscawen’s performance was consistent with his previous behaviour. Prior to the landing by Wolfe, ‘the Kennington and other frigates, with the sloop Halifax’, engaged in an artillery duel with offshore batteries despite the presence of fog.173 During the siege, Boscawen’s raid to burn or capture the last two remaining French ships in the harbour was also a bold enterprise. Operating in dense fog, exposed to fire from the Island Battery, Point Rochfort and the town itself, 600 sailors succeeded in capturing the Bienfaisant and burning the Prudent, effectively destroying both the French naval presence in the harbour and the morale of the defenders.174 Despite Boscawen’s success, he nonetheless received criticism for his performance at Louisbourg, in particular his decision not to force his way into the harbour after 25 June.175 However, although Boscawen’s decision to engage the fleet from batteries erected on shore may immediately appear as cautious, it must be remembered that there were three batteries erected in the vicinity of the harbour. These, coupled with the firepower of the French fleet, would have wrecked havoc upon Boscawen’s forces. Ultimately, such a decision would not have been heroic, but foolish. Boscawen was correct not to proceed into the harbour as others unwisely advised.176 At Québec, Saunders proved an enterprising commander. Being the first to convey a battle fleet safely up the St Lawrence River, he had proven himself even more daring than Boscawen. By 26 June, Saunders could boast that the majority of his fleet, which comprised of ‘22 ships of the line, 24 smaller warships, and 120 to 140 transports and supply ships’ had overcome the many navigational challenges of the St Lawrence. Although it was an impressive feat, it pales in comparison to his attempt to pass above Québec with two ships of the line, two sloops and several transports accompanied by soldiers, while under the fire of the French batteries. Placing the force under the command of the seasoned veteran

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Rous, the ships succeeded and sailed with the ‘Night Tide & fair Wind’ past the French batteries, receiving only minimal damages.177 By the success of this operation, Saunders dangerously threatened Québec’s line of communication and provided Wolfe with the opportunity of forcing Montcalm to fight, which dramatically altered the situation in favour of the British.178 There is no doubt that Saunders’s participation at the siege of Québec played a crucial role in the fall of the city and the success of Wolfe.179 When addressing the contributions of the British navy during the initial stages of the Seven Years’ War in North America, naval performance had certainly improved by 1758. This was largely due to the ministry’s punishment of Byng, leadership under Anson and the growth of the navy, which reached a maximum strength of 300 ships by 1759.180 Adding further to the naval build-up, towards the latter end of 1757, the Admiralty decided to establish a dockyard at Halifax. With part of the North American squadron wintering there, an earlier blockade of the St Lawrence could be conducted. In addition, the dispatch of larger fleets from Britain, coupled with the ships commencing the blockade, provided naval commanders with numerical superiority.181 Consequently, naval officers were able to conduct themselves more aggressively than in previous campaigns, as they operated in more secure conditions. Prior to 1758, naval officers were prone to wariness, and were less enthusiastic in risking their commands. Naval operations on Lake Ontario in 1756 and at Louisbourg in 1757 were failures due to the cautious behaviour of the commanders involved. Although reasonable arguments were provided for their actions, they were unwilling to risk their forces in situations which could prove as equally destructive as defeat. In their defence, however, nature was largely responsible for the decisions which they made, particularly in vicinity of the Gulf of St Lawrence. Hindered by fogs, ice and contrary winds and currents, the navy operated in a difficult and unpredictable environment in which it was necessary for naval commanders to act when an opportunity presented itself. Daring acts were required in order to overcome these obstacles, and by doing so, victories at Louisbourg and Québec were achieved.

Conclusion When news of Amherst’s victory at Louisbourg arrived in London on 18 August 1758, it was greeted with tumultuous celebration.1 Upon receiving word of the citadel’s capture from Amherst’s younger brother, Captain William Amherst, Pitt immediately seized and embraced the messenger exclaiming, ‘This is the greatest news!’ A delighted Lord Ligonier then presented Captain Amherst with £500 and an additional £100 to purchase a sword.2 On learning of the reduction of the fortress, Richard Grenville, Earl Temple, enthusiastically wrote to the secretary of state, ‘My dear Louisburgh Pitt, a hundred thousand million of congratulations to you upon this great and glorious event – the salvation of Europe … Nothing but congratulations to you, my dear brother Louisburgh. I shall never call you by any other name except by that of Québec in due time.’3 Temple’s words were prophetic, for by the capture of Louisbourg, the route to Québec and Canada lay open for invasion. Only several years after its founding, Pontchartrain was fully aware of this vulnerability and completely understood what the loss of Louisbourg entailed for France.4 In 1745, this threat momentarily became a reality as Shirley began making preparations for an assault against Québec following the capture of the fortress. Owing to numerous factors, the invasion force never materialized. However, the experience of waiting for an attack against Canada had left the French greatly alarmed.5 Returning to the situation in 1758, George II clearly understood the ramifications of this victory as he enthusiastically informed Newcastle that Britain would ‘keep Cape Breton, take Canada, [and] drive the French out of America’.6 While the king planned for the future, Pitt congratulated Amherst: I cannot sufficiently express the Satisfaction your Success against the important Fortress of Louisburg, gave His Majesty, and the King has commanded me to acquaint You with His full and entire Approbation of your whole Conduct, during the Course of the Siege of that Place. His Majesty has the firmest reliance, that, by the Blessing of God, the further Operations of so fine an army, which has suffered such a small Loss, will be attended with like Success in the Prosecution of the Ulterior Objects, which, by your Letter of the 10th past, the King is informed, you and Admiral Boscawen, have determined to

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pursue, and which His Majesty hopes, from your nearer view of things, and Judgement formed from further Enquiry on the Spot, may best answer the great Purposes of His Majesty’s Service in America; and the King doubts not but that all the said Operations will be pushed with the utmost Ability and Vigor. It is the King’s Pleasure, that you should, in the Manner you shall judge most proper, acquaint the Officers and Men, under your Command, with His Majtys. Satisfaction at Their brave and good Behaviour, which as you justly observe, must always insure Success. I cannot conclude without adding my most hearty Congratulations on the great Honor you have acquired, and assuring You of the sincere Part I shall take in every thing, that can contribute to the Increase thereof: I have the Pleasure to acquaint You, that the News of your Success has been received with all possible Demonstrations of Joy, throughout the whole Kingdom & that all due Justice is done to the Material Service, which you have rendered to Your Country.7

The victory at Louisbourg marked a major psychological turning point in the war. On this event, the London Chronicle remarked, ‘When we lost Minorca a general panic fell upon the nation; but now that Louisbourg is taken our streets echo with triumph and blaze with illuminations.’8 As the nation rejoiced, a grand festival was held on 7 September, reminiscent of the celebrations held in honour of England’s victory over the Spanish Armada. With great pomp and ceremony, the captured French colours were marched from Kensington Palace through the streets of London to St Paul’s Cathedral for a service of thanksgiving.9 While bells and bonfires announced the victory, the struggle for New France was far from over. Canada could still receive reinforcements from France via the St Lawrence River, and it was through this route that vital supplies arrived prior to Wolfe’s invasion in 1759.10 However, the loss of Louisbourg meant that it was no longer possible for France to maintain control over the St Lawrence River.11 The key to New France had been unlocked, and it was only a matter of time before the entire colony fell into British hands. Soon after learning of the citadel’s capture, Montcalm gloomily remarked, ‘without the peace we need Canada is lost’.12 Indeed, without French victories in Europe, which prevented the negotiation of a satisfactory peace, Canada’s future was in grave peril.13 On 8 September 1760, after six years of bloody conflict, Montréal, surrounded by three advancing armies, surrendered – Canada had at last fallen to the British. The following day, the last French regiments on Canadian soil laid down their arms, and the French and Indian War had finally come

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to an end.14 Remarking on the success of the expedition against Montréal, Captain John Knox recorded: The critical and happy junction of our three armies at this place, effected in the space of forty-eight hours with so inconsiderable a loss, must appear extremely providential to the reader, when he reflects on the immense difficulties they had every-where to encounter, from a numerous and wary enemy, still indefinitely heightened by the singular nature of the country and the dangers of an uncommon navigation, the most formidable and hazardous that can possibly be conceived: such an instance can scarcely be paralleled in any history, and will remain an everlasting monument of the conduct and intrepidity of the general and other officers who commanded on this particularly intricate service.15

With the fall of Canada, Britain had become master of an immense wilderness, which also encompassed the entire Great Lakes region. Consequently, vast resources of fur and timber, as well as coveted fishing rights, were the spoils of war for the British.16 Across the Atlantic, however, on receiving word that Canada had fallen, Voltaire remarked that France had merely lost ‘a few acres of snow’.17 In truth, France had lost much more. With the successful conclusion of the war, Britain gained an empire of enormous potential. The conquest of Canada would never have been possible without the changes in policy in 1758, which paved the way for success. At the onset of hostilities in 1754, the policy of the Newcastle ministry was designed for a limited war restricted to North America, with significant power invested into the position of the commander-in-chief.18 Consequently, the war was primarily the responsibility of the colonials, who were to provide manpower for the military, along with the supplies and funds to support them. During this time, the gathering of these and the development of a colonial union proved an extremely difficult undertaking for the commander-in-chief, who was also required to organize logistics, conduct Amerindian affairs, maintain the army and coordinate joint operations with the navy. By 1758, the situation had dramatically changed for the better. The duties of the commander-in-chief were greatly reduced by the ministry, with Pitt providing much needed support and assistance. The numerous responsibilities of the viceroy were abolished as Britain assumed a more active role in waging the war. To achieve this aim, increasing numbers of regulars arrived in North America, who were further strengthened by equally large bodies of provincial troops.19 On the matter of logistics, supplies from the colonies were no longer relied upon, and provisions were dispatched along with the troops directly

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from Britain.20 No longer subject to quarrels with the commander-in-chief over money, provisions and men, the colonial governments reversed their obstructionist behaviour and enthusiastically began supporting the war effort.21 The fragile colonial union that had begun to emerge through the efforts of Braddock, Shirley and Loudoun ceased to exist. However, the requisition system successfully used during the previous war was revived in its place, which quickly unified the colonies according to another model. The navy’s performance also improved, as admirals acted more aggressively due to the execution of Byng and the deployment of numerically superior forces.22 Finally, although policy towards Amerindians had remained relatively unchanged, Amerindian affairs were no longer crucial, as tribes allied to the French were forced to seek peace with the British or starve.23 Ultimately, these changes made it easier for Amherst to conduct the war more effectively than his predecessors. Upon the successful completion of the conquest of Canada, Pitt wrote the following congratulatory message to Amherst: I cannot sufficiently express to you the Satisfaction of His Majesty on the further Successes of His Arms under your Command, and the happy Completion of the Great work, entrusted to your Care, by the Reduction of Montreal, and all Canada under a Capitulation highly becoming, The Humanity, Magnanimity and Wisdom of His Majesty, which most important and extensive Conquest, effected with so little Loss, stands almost without Example, and justly merit’s the universal Applause, and Admiration of that well-combined, and masterly Plan, which you had, with such unwearied Application and Diligence formed, and concerted; and in the Execution whereof in all It’s Parts, you have been so ably seconded by the Zeal and Activity of the officers under your Command, and by the indefatigable Constancy, and Intrepidity of the Troops.24

Despite the role which he had played, Pitt knew that victory was ultimately the outcome of the efforts of the many soldiers, both regulars and provincials, who had repeatedly shed their blood in the pursuit of victory. In their efforts, Pitt and his fellow ministers merely provided the means necessary to attain victory. As he had informed Amherst after the fall of Louisbourg, ‘I cannot conclude without adding my most hearty Congratulations on the great Honor you have acquired, and assuring You of the sincere Part I shall take in every thing, that can contribute to the Increase thereof.’25 In affecting change, the Pitt-Newcastle ministry removed numerous obstructions which had hindered the efforts of the previous commanders-in-chief, from Braddock to Loudoun. Abercromby was the only exception and failed at Ticonderoga not as a result of any problems which were the result of policy, but because of his poor leadership, the

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conditions in which the British found the battlefield and the superior tactical skills of Montcalm.26 Reflecting upon the performance of the commanders-in-chief appointed to North America, prior to Abercromby, all carried out their duties to the best of their abilities under the circumstances which they met. They have been unfairly maligned, as they faced considerable difficulties that they struggled to overcome. Braddock was not a haughty brutal disciplinarian, who viewed all other opinions with contempt and believed his regulars were invincible.27 Shirley was not a bumbling incompetent, solely responsible for the loss of Oswego.28 Loudoun was certainly not ‘like St. George on the signs, always on horseback, and never rides on’.29 It has been relatively easy for both historians and contemporaries to attribute failure to the commanders-in-chief who served during the initial stages of the war, but upon further investigation, it is clear that they were greatly hindered by numerous obstacles, which were the direct result of ministerial policy. Although Braddock met with tragic defeat, his tenure witnessed some success. His expedition against Fort Duquesne was a triumph of logistics, considering the numerous obstacles needed to be overcome. As the colonials proved uncooperative allies, it was a great challenge to organize horses, wagons and the necessary supplies to support his army. In addition to these problems, he also had the responsibility of opening a road through dense forests during a time of war. Through great effort, Braddock did conquer the American wilderness. History, however, remembers him for the disaster he met with on the banks of the Monongahela River. While Shirley briefly served as commander-in-chief and has suffered the unfair reputation of being labelled an amateur, his appointment of Bradstreet to organize a transport system of bateaux men greatly improved the army’s struggle with logistics. Although blamed for the loss of Oswego, Shirley did not lose the outpost due to a dearth of supplies, which some have argued. As a result of Bradstreet’s many efforts, the garrison at its time of capitulation boasted a large quantity of provisions, so much that the French would later subsist on them for several years.30 Ultimately, the fort fell due to other factors including the French having the advantage of using waterways for transport and the effects of wind on Lake Ontario during a crucial point during the battle. Shirley could hardly be responsible for either of these problems. Although overwhelmed with responsibilities greater than his predecessors, Loudoun achieved the major success of establishing a colonial union. Indefatigable in his efforts, Loudoun personally met with both governors and assemblies and also maintained a voluminous correspondence with them. It

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The Struggle for North America, 1754–1758

was for this reason that Franklin observed, ‘whoever waited on him found him always at his desk, pen in hand, and concluded that he must needs write abundantly’.31 At the same time, Loudoun also maintained correspondence with many others including those involved in Amerindian affairs, as well as the army and navy. Considering the tremendous amount of work that went into the creation of the colonial union, it is an extraordinary achievement that he was still able to conduct the war. Unfortunately, due to the disasters at Fort William Henry and Louisbourg, his leadership was greatly called into question. Following his failure at Louisbourg, Hardwicke remarked, ‘he might be a very good colonel but was absolutely unfit for chief command … In short, it seems to me that they all proceeded upon the Byng principle, – that nothing is to be undertaken where there is risk or danger’.32 In Loudoun’s defence, however, the French fleet at Louisbourg gave an outward appearance of superiority. It was impossible for him to know that typhus was ravaging the ranks of the French sailors.33 At the same time, Loudoun was also criticized for leaving the New York frontier exposed to attack. However, it was due to his efforts in establishing a colonial union that the provinces immediately mobilized their forces following the fall of Fort William Henry. Faced with the gathering of a large organized body of militia, Montcalm decided against an advance towards Albany. Returning to Britain’s first major defeat at the banks of the Monongahela, Braddock’s leadership was not unprofessional. Lee McCardell summarized the traditional interpretation of the fallen general: For two hundred years historians have denounced Edward Braddock as an adventurer, a sycophant, a bully brutal in his dealings with both soldiers and civilians. They have pictured him as a proud and pompous redcoat, a martinet who scorned the advice of a prescient young colonel of Virginia militia who had died of his own pigheaded stupidity in an Indian massacre which might have been avoided.34

In truth, the reasons for Braddock’s defeat are much more complex than has been argued by past historians. Certainly, it was not Braddock’s personality which had led him to failure. Benjamin Franklin commented that Braddock was ‘a brave man, and might probably have made a figure as a good officer in some European war’.35 Washington further added: Thus died a man, whose good & bad qualities were intimately blended. He was brave even to a fault and in regular Service would have done honor to his profession – His attachments were warm – his enmities were strong – and

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having no disguise about him, both appeared in full force. He was generous & disinterested – but plain and blunt in his manner even to rudeness.36

Ultimately, Braddock and his successors were repeatedly confronted with the same recurring problems, until ministerial policy was altered in 1758. Until that time, Braddock, Shirley and Loudoun struggled to conduct the war under difficult conditions, as each problem which originated in policy expanded, complicating matters further. With the changes of 1758, unlike his predecessors, Amherst’s conquest of Canada was made much easier.

Abbreviations Used in Notes BL

British Library, London

CWP

Kimball, Gertrude Selwyn, ed. Correspondence of William Pitt When Secretary of State with Colonial Governors and Military and Naval Commissioners in America. 2 vols. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1906.

CWS

Lincoln, Charles Henry, ed. Correspondence of William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander in America, 1731–1760. 2 vols. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1912.

GWP

Abbot, W. W., Dorothy Twohig, and Philander D. Chase, eds. The Papers of George Washington. 10 vols. Colonial Series. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1983–1995.

HBP

Waddell, Louis M., S. K. Stevens, Donald H. Kent, Autumn L. Leonard, and J. L. Tottenham, eds. The Papers of Henry Bouquet. 6 vols. Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1951–1994.

HL AB

Huntington Library, San Marino, Abercromby Papers

HL LO

Huntington Library, San Marino, Loudoun Papers

LAC

Library Archives Canada, Ottawa

LC

Library of Congress, Washington D.C.

MHS

Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston

MSS

Manuscripts

NA ADM National Archives, Kew, Admiralty files NA CO

National Archives, Kew, Colonial Office files

NA WO

National Archives, Kew, War Office files

NAM

National Army Museum, Chelsea

Abbreviations Used in Notes

195

NAS

National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh

NMM

National Maritime Museum, Greenwich

PRONI

Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast

RDP

Brock, Robert A., ed. The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant-governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751–1758. 2 vols. Virginia Historical Society Collection, 3–4. Richmond: The Virginia Historical Society, 1883–1884.

UNMD

University of Nottingham Manuscripts Department, Nottingham

WCL BBP William Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Browne Brothers Papers WCL HBP William Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Howe Brothers Papers Note: Unless specified by brackets, all quotations are presented in their original form.

Notes Introduction 1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

12

13

Unknown, The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature, for the Year 1758 (London: Printed for R. and J. Dodsley, in Pall-Mall, 1764), p. 75. Lee McCardell, Ill-Starred General: Braddock of the Coldstream Guards (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), p. 261. Daniel Baugh, The Global Seven Years War, 1754–1763: Britain and France in a Great Power Contest (Harlow : Pearson Education Limited, 2011), pp. 112–117. William M. Fowler Jr., Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754–1763 (New York: Walker & Company, 2005), pp. 102–103; Fred Anderson, The War That Made America: A Short History of the French and Indian War (New York: Viking, 2005), pp. 91–94; N. A. M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815 (London: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 266. F. E. Whitton, Wolfe and North America (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1929), p. 211. Baugh, The Global Seven Years War, pp. 242–244, 254–255, 258–259. Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), p. 250. Pontchartrain as quoted in J. S. McLennan, Louisbourg: From Its Foundation to Its Fall (Halifax: The Book Room, Ltd., 1979), p. 22. John A. Schutz, William Shirley: King’s Governor of Massachusetts (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), pp. 142–143. Major General Jeffery Amherst as quoted in J. C. Long, Lord Jeffery Amherst: A Soldier of the King (New York: Macmillan Company, 1933), p. 133. A. J. B. Johnston, Endgame 1759: The Promise, the Glory, and the Despair of Louisbourg’s Last Decade (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), pp. 3–4; McLennan, Louisbourg, p. 83. Anderson, The War That Made America, p. 148; Edward P. Hamilton, The French and Indian Wars: The Story of Battles and Forts in the Wilderness (Garden City : Doubleday & Company, 1962), p. 172. William G. Godfrey, Pursuit of Profit and Preferment in Colonial North America: John Bradstreet’s Quest (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1982), p. 128.

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14 Guy Frégault, Canada: The War of the Conquest (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 223. 15 James Hadden, Washington’s Expeditions and Braddock’s Expedition (Uniontown: Unknown, 1910), pp. 25–26; Anderson, Crucible of War, pp. 5–7. 16 I. K. Steele, Guerillas and Grenadiers: The Struggle for Canada, 1689–1760 (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1969), p. 84. 17 Stephens to Hunter, 18 July 1755, BL Add. 32,857, fol. 216; Daniel J. Beattie, ‘The Adaptation of the British Army to Wilderness Warfare, 1755–1763’, in Adapting to Conditions: War and Society in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Maarten Ultee (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1986), pp. 57–59. 18 Anderson, The War That Made America, p. 163. 19 Forbes to Sharpe, 3 September 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. 20 Paul E. Kopperman, Braddock at the Monongahela (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), p. 92. 21 Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 272. 22 Lawrence Henry Gipson, The Great War for the Empire: The Victorious Years, 1758–1760 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 283. 23 Reed Browning, The Duke of Newcastle (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 207–209. 24 Sir Even Charteris, William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland and the Seven Years’ War (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1925), pp. 121–122. 25 Baugh, The Global Seven Years War, p. 95. 26 Hardwicke to Royston, 12 August 1755, Philip C. Yorke, The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke Earl of Hardwicke Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, Vol. II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1913), p. 284. 27 Frégault, Canada, p. 35. 28 Steele, Guerillas and Grenadiers, p. 84. 29 Fowler, Empires at War, p. 67. 30 Stanley Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933), p. v. 31 Tony Hayter, The Army & Crowd in Mid-Georgian England (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1978), p. 2.

Chapter 1 1 2

Charles Jones to the Duke of Newcastle, 2 August, 1756, BL Add. 32,866, fol. 359. T. R. Clayton, ‘ The Duke of Newcastle, The Earl of Halifax, and the American Origins of the Seven Years’ War’, The Historical Journal 24, no. 3 (1981), p. 574.

198 3 4 5 6 7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21

22 23

24 25 26 27 28

Notes Patrice Louis-Rene Higonnet, ‘The Origins of the Seven Years’ War’, The Journal of Modern History 40, no. 1 (1968), pp. 57–90. Charteris, William Augustus, p. 124. Newcastle to O’Brien, 21 October 1756, BL Add. 32,868, fol. 380. Browning, The Duke of Newcastle, p. 159. Newcastle to Holdernesse, 1 July 1755, BL Eg. 3429, fol. 12; Jeremy Black, George II: Puppet of the Politicians? (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2007), p. 225. Reed Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), p. 363; Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe: The French and Indian War (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2001), p. 206. Yorke to Newcastle, 18 June 1756, BL Add. 32,865, fols. 339–340. Newcastle to Holdernesse, 1 July 1755, BL Eg. 3,429, fol. 12. Holdernesse to Shirley, 28 August 1753, CWS 2: pp. 12–13. Holdernesse to Dinwiddie, 20 August 1753, NA CO 5/211, fols. 13–14. Holdernesse to Dinwiddie, 20 August 1753, NA CO 5/211, fol. 14; Message of Governor Dinwiddie to the House of Burgesses, Undated 1753, RDP 2: p. 40. Newcastle to Keene, 24 January 1754, BL Add. 32,848, fol. 145. Higonnet, ‘The Origins of the Seven Years’ War’, p. 58. Newcastle to Keene, 24 January 1754, BL Add. 32,848, fol. 147. Ian K. Steele, Warpaths: Invasions of North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 182; R. S. Stephenson, Clash of Empires: The British, French & Indian War, 1754–1763 (Pittsburgh: Senator John Heinz Pittsburgh Regional History Center, 2005), p. 4. Newcastle to Walpole, 29 June 1754, BL Add. 32,735, fol. 597. Newcastle to Keene, 24 January 1754, BL Add. 32,848, fol. 147. Newcastle to Walpole, 29 June 1754, BL Add. 32,735, fol. 597; Clayton, ‘The American Origins of the Seven Years’ War’, p. 573. Instructions from Robert Dinwiddie, 30 October 1753, GWP 1: p. 60; David A. Clary, George Washington’s First War: His Early Military Adventures (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), p. 54; Hadden, Washington’s Expeditions, pp. 12–14. Instructions from Robert Dinwiddie, 30 October 1753, GWP 1: pp. 60–61. Washington to Dinwiddie, 9 March 1754, GWP 1: p. 74; Holdernesse to Lt. Gov. of New York, Gov. of N. Carolina, and Lt. Gov. of Virginia, 18 January 1754, NA CO 5/211, fol. 27. Robinson to Dinwiddie, 3 July 1754, NA CO 5/211, fol. 50; DeLancey to Holdernesse, 22 April 1754, BL Add. 32,735, fol. 148. Washington to Dinwiddie, 10 June 1754, GWP 1: pp. 135–136. Dinwiddie to Lords of Trade, 24 July 1754, RDP 1: p. 242. Steele, Guerillas and Grenadiers, pp. 39–40. Dinwiddie to Fox, 24 July 1754, RDP 1: p. 246.

Notes

199

29 Giles Stephen Holland Fox-Strangways, Earl of Ilchester, Henry Fox, First Lord Holland: His Family and Relations, Vol. I (London: John Murray, 1920), pp. 160–161, 221; Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, p. 22. 30 Charteris, William Augustus, p. 122; Alden, Robert Dinwiddie, p. 89. 31 Ilchester, Henry Fox, p. 220; Steele, Guerillas and Grenadiers, p. 40. 32 T. W. Riker, ‘The Politics Behind Braddock’s Expedition’, The American Historical Review 13, no. 4 (1908), p. 746. 33 Stephenson, Clash of Empires, p. 2. 34 Instructions to Braddock, 25 November 1754, NA CO 5/211, fol. 128. 35 Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and the War in the Americas, 1755–1763 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 13. 36 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, pp. 29–30. 37 Robinson to Newcastle, 22 September 1754, BL Add. 32,736, fol. 563. 38 Instructions to Braddock, 25 November 1754, NA CO 5/211, fol. 128. 39 Ordnance Book, 25 November 1754, LAC R2278-0-4-E, pp. 1, 56, 59; Douglas W. Marshall, ‘The British Engineers in America: 1755–1783’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 51 (1973), p. 155. 40 J. C. Webster, ‘Life of John Montrésor’, Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada 3d ser, no. 22 (1928), p. 1; Kopperman, Braddock at the Monongahela, p. 38; McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p. 128; Winthrop Sargent, The History of an Expedition against Fort Duquesne in 1755; Under Major-General Edward Braddock, Generalissimo of H.B.M. Forces in America (Philadelphia: J. B.Lippincott & Co., 1856), p. 362. 41 Ordnance Book, 25 November 1754, LAC R2278-0-4-E, pp. 33–44. 42 Halkett to St. Clair, 16 April 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 101. 43 Establishment for the Troop of Horse Rangers, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 45. 44 Wilbur R. Jacobs, Diplomacy and Indian Gifts: Anglo-French Rivalry along the Ohio and Northwest Frontiers, 1748–1763 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1950), p. 55. 45 List of Goods to Be Sent from London, SWJP 2: p. 899. 46 J. A. Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715–1795 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 151. 47 Anderson, The Crucible of War, pp. 69–70; Charteris, William Augustus, pp. 122, 129. 48 Ilchester, Henry Fox, p. 222. 49 Anderson, The Crucible of War, p. 70. 50 Clayton, ‘The American Origins of the Seven Years’ War’, pp. 594–595; Ilchester, Henry Fox, p. 224. 51 Secret Instructions, 17 April 1755, NA CO 5/211, fol. 194. 52 Robinson to the Lords of the Admiralty, 17 April 1755, NA CO 5/211, fol. 261. 53 Robinson to the Lords of the Admiralty, 22 April 1755, NA CO 5/211, fol. 265.

200

Notes

54 Secret Instructions for Francis Holburne, 9 May 1755, NA CO 5/211, fol. 215. 55 Secret Instructions, 17 April 1755, NA CO 5/211, fol. 193. 56 Jonathan R. Dull, The French Navy and the Seven Years’ War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), p. 31. 57 Newcastle to Holdernesse, 9 May 1755, BL Eg. 3,428, fol. 70. 58 Newcastle to Bentick, 11 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fols. 193–203. 59 Newcastle to Holdernesse, Private, 9 May 1755, BL Eg. 3,428, fols. 69–70. 60 Newcastle to Holdernesse, 23 May 1755, BL Eg. 3,428, fol. 147. 61 Newcastle to Holdernesse, 11 July 1755, BL Add. 32,857, fol. 54. 62 Frank McLynn, 1759: The Year Britain Became Master of the World (New York: Grove Press, 2004), pp. 78–83; Intelligence Report from Versailles, 5 January 1756, BL Add. 32,862, fol. 30. 63 Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 169. 64 Cumberland to Fox, 31 May 1756, BL Add. 51,375, fol. 77. 65 ‘The Weak Points of Conduct in ye Duke of N’s Administration since Mr. Pelham’s Death’, 1757, BL Add. 35,595, fols. 4–5. 66 Stanley Ayling, The Elder Pitt: Earl of Chatham (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1976), p. 154; Ilchester, Henry Fox, p. 223. 67 Jeremy Black, Pitt the Elder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 109. 68 Albert Von Ruville, William Pitt Earl of Chatham, Vol. I (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1907), pp. 366–367. 69 ‘The Weak Points of Conduct in ye Duke of N’s Administration since Mr. Pelham’s Death’, 1757, BL Add. 35,595, fol. 4. 70 Charteris, William Augustus, p. 127. 71 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, p. 278. 72 Loudoun’s Commission as quoted in Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, pp. 57–58. 73 Washington to Dinwiddie, 10 June 1754, GWP 1: pp. 135–136. 74 Hardy to Halifax, 7 May 1756, LAC R2321-0-1-E, p. 49. 75 Pitt to the Governors of Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, and New Jersey, 30 December 1757, CWP 1: p. 138. 76 Instructions to Braddock, 25 November 1754, NA CO 5/21, fols. 126–138. 77 Ibid., fols. 128–130; Orders to Sir John St. Clair, November 1754, NAS RH4/86/1, pp. 289–290. 78 McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p. 143. 79 Instructions to Braddock, 25 November 1754, NA CO 5/21, fols. 126, 131–138. 80 Journal of M. General Braddock’s March towards Fort Duquesne, LAC R2278-04-E, p. 13. 81 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 94. 82 ‘The Journal of a British Officer’, in Braddock’s Defeat, ed. Charles Hamilton (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), p. 49.

Notes 83 84 85

86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93

94

95 96

97 98 99 100 101 102

103 104

105

201

Journal of M. General Braddock’s March towards Fort Duquesne, LAC R2278-04-E, pp. 16, 19. Schutz, William Shirley, pp. 89–91, 210, 221–222. Shirley to Williams, 19 May 1755, MHS Ms. N-473; Hutchinson to Williams, 7 September 1756, MHS Ms. N-473; Theodore Thayer, ‘The Army Contractors for the Niagara Campaign, 1755–1756’, William and Mary Quarterly 3d ser. 14, no. 1 (1957), p. 32. Hutchinson to Williams, 7 September 1756, MHS Ms. N-473. Abbé H. R. Casgrain, Wolfe and Montcalm (Toronto: Morang & Co., 1905), pp. 34–36. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, pp. 61, 278. Warrant, 10 September 1756, NA WO 1/1, fol. 30. Benjamin Franklin, The Autobiography and Other Writings (New York: Penguin Putnam Inc., 1961), p. 170. Williams to Unknown, 20 July 1757, MHS Ms. N-473. Franklin, The Autobiography, p. 170. Alan Rogers, Empire and Liberty: American Resistance to British Authority, 1755–1763 (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1974), p. 110; Bradstreet to Gould, 22 January 1757, LAC MG40-K2. Harold E. Selesky, War & Society in Colonial Connecticut (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 107–108; Fitch to Loudoun, 11 September 1756, in The Fitch Papers, Vol. 1, May 1754–Dec. 1758, ed. Albert C. Bates (Hartford: Connecticut Historical Society, 1918), p. 255. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, pp. 351–352. William Wood, The Great Fortress: A Chronicle of Louisbourg, 1720–1760 (Toronto: Glasgow, Brook & Company, 1920), pp. 26–27, 30, 91; Schutz, William Shirley, pp. 85–89, 90. Charteris, William Augustus, pp. 120, 127; Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, pp. 351–352. Newcastle as quoted in Browning, The Duke of Newcastle, p. 209. Timothy J. Shannon, Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire: The Albany Congress of 1754 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 56. Charteris, William Augustus, p. 127; Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, pp. 278, 351. Franklin, Autobiography, p. 170. Frederic Harrison, Chatham (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1905), p. 84; O. A. Sherrard, Lord Chatham: Pitt and the Seven Years’ War (London: The Bodley Head Ltd., 1955), p. 195. Forbes to Loudoun, 10 March 1757, HL LO 3006. Richard Middleton, The Bells of Victory: The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and the Conduct of the Seven Years’ War, 1757–1762 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 48. McLennan, Louisbourg, p. 290.

202

Notes

Chapter 2 1 2 3

4 5

6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

St. Clair to Hyndford, 3 September 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 170. Instructions to Braddock, 25 November 1754, NA CO 5/211, fols. 130–134. Matthew C. Ward, Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years’ War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754–1765 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003), p. 38. George Louis Beer, British Colonial Policy, 1754–1765 (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1958), p. 16. ‘Extract of Another Letter’, 1757, in Military Affairs in North America, 1748–1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle, ed. Stanley Pargellis (Hamden: Archon Books, 1969), p. 369; Loudoun to Hardy, 21 November 1756, BL Add. 21,631, fols. 3–6; John Richard Alden, Robert Dinwiddie: Servant of the Crown (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973). ‘State of What has been actually done, by the several Provinces in No. America, in Consequence of the Orders to Assist Each Other’, 15 January 1754, 30 October 1754, LAC MG40-M47; ‘Extract of Another Letter’, 1757, in Military Affairs, p. 369; Belcher to St. Clair, 26 January 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 209; Robinson to Shirley, 21 June 1754, MHS Ms. N-473. Bradstreet to Gould, 12 September 1757, LAC MG40-K2. Braddock to Robinson, 18 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fols. 346–347. Braddock to Morris, 9 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fol. 357. Instructions to Braddock, 25 November 1754, NA CO 5/211, fols. 130–131. Braddock to Robinson, 18 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fol. 353. Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fols. 37–38. Sharpe to St. Clair, 15 March 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 85. St. Clair to Braddock, 9 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 19; Ralph L. Ketchem, ‘Conscience, War, and Politics in Pennsylvania, 1755–1757’, William and Mary Quarterly 3d ser. 20, no. 3 (1963), pp. 418–419. Dinwiddie to St. Clair, 4 July 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 144. Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 49. St. Clair to Braddock, 15 January 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 6. Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 12. Pitt to Lawrence, 4 February 1757, CWP 1: p. 3; Loudoun to Lyttelton, 24 April 1757, BL Add. 21,632, fol. 43. Pitt to the Governor and Company of Rhode Island, 4 February 1757, CWP 1: p. 4; Pitt to Governors of Southern Provinces in America, 4 February 1757, CWP 1: p. 6. Instructions to Braddock, 25 November 1754, NA CO 5/211, fol. 131. Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fols. 9, 14, 60–61, 89. Rogers, Empire and Liberty, p. 106.

Notes

203

24 Pitt to the Governors of Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York and New Jersey, 30 December 1757, CWP 1: pp. 138–139. 25 Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 214. 26 Loudoun to Hardy, 21 November 1756, BL Add. 21,631, fol. 4. 27 Dinwiddie to St. Clair, 4 February 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 224. 28 ‘State of What has been actually done, by the several Provinces in No. America, in Consequence of the Orders to Assist Each Other’, 12 March 1754, LAC MG40-M47. 29 Selesky, War & Society, p. 107. 30 Williams to De Lancy, 13 August 1757, MHS Ms. N-473. 31 Fred Anderson, ed., George Washington Remembers: Reflections on the French and Indian War (Lantham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2004), p. 22; Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675–1815 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), p. 24. 32 Forbes to Sharpe, 3 September 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. 33 Sharpe to Forbes, 21 August 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. 34 Forbes to Pitt, 6 September 1758, in Alfred Procter James, ed., Writings of General John Forbes Relating to His Service in North America (Menasha: The Collegiate Press, 1933), p. 204. 35 Forbes to Sharpe, 5 October 1758, Writings of General John Forbes, p. 223. 36 Alden, Robert Dinwiddie, p. 69; Desmond Clarke, Arthur Dobbs Esquire, 1689– 1765: Surveyor-General of Ireland, Prospector and Governor of North Carolina (London: The Bodley Head, 1958), pp. 124, 131. 37 Hindsdale to Williams, August 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. 38 ‘Minutes taken at a Meeting of the Governors of Nth. Carolina, Virginia, Maryland & Pensilvania, with the Earl of Loudoun Commander in Chief of His Majesty’s Forces in North America, begun at Philiadelphia March 15th & continued by several Adjournments to March __ 1757’, BL Add. 21,632, fol. 38. 39 Loudoun to the Governors of North & South Carolina & Georgia, 5 May 1757, BL Add. 21,632, fol. 45. 40 Bouquet to Dobbs, 30 June 1757, BL Add. 21,631, fol. 24. 41 Bouquet to Loudoun, 16 October 1757, BL Add. 21,632, fols. 12–13. 42 Bouquet to Loudoun, 25 August 1757, BL Add. 21,631, fol. 78. 43 Loudoun to the Governors of North & South Carolina & Georgia, 5 May 1757, BL Add. 21,632, fol. 44. 44 Pownell to Williams, 6 August 1757, MHS Ms. N-473. 45 Ian K. Steele, Betrayals: Fort William Henry & the Massacre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 125, 127. 46 Belcher to St. Clair, 3 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 53; Reynolds to St. Clair, 13 March 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 117.

204

Notes

47 Shirley to St. Clair, 18 March 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 116; Greene to St. Clair, 24 March 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 129; St. Clair to Dobbs, 18 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 32. 48 Morris to St. Clair, 17 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 55. 49 Orme to St. Clair, April 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 103; St. Clair to Braddock, 2 May 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 118; St. Clair to Belcher, November 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 307; Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 24. 50 Belcher to St. Clair, 3 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 54; Shirley to St. Clair, 18 March 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 116. 51 Loudoun to Commissioners, 29 January 1757, in The Fitch Papers, Vol. 1, p. 277. 52 Bouquet to Loudoun, 16 October 1757, BL Add. 21,632, fol. 15; Bouquet to Loudoun, 10 December 1757, BL Add. 21,632, fol. 24. 53 Bouquet to Stanwix, 23 June 1757, BL Add. 21,631, fol. 29. 54 Bouquet to Loudoun, 10 December 1757, BL Add. 21,632, fol. 24. 55 Holdernesse to Shirley, 28 August 1753, CWS 2: pp. 12–13. 56 ‘Virginia’, 29 January–16 November 1754, ‘Massachusetts Bay’, 6 January 1754, LAC MG40-M47. 57 ‘New York’, 24 November 1753, LAC MG40-M47. 58 ‘New York’, 15 December 1754, LAC MG40-M47. 59 ‘Maryland’, 8 August 1754, LAC MG40-M47. 60 ‘New Jersey’, 10 November 1753, ‘Pensylvania’, 25 November 1753, ‘South Carolina’, 30 April 1754, ‘Connecticut’, 30 October 1754, ‘New Hampshire’, October 1754, ‘North Carolina’, 21 November 1754, ‘Georgia’, LAC MG40-M47. 61 Morris to St. Clair, 5 February 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 211. 62 Dinwiddie to St. Clair, 4 July 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 144. 63 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fols. 47–48. 64 Dinwiddie to Braddock, 23 May 1755, RDP 2: p. 40. 65 Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, pp. 38–39. 66 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 12; St. Clair to Braddock, 10 April 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 94; St. Clair to Halkett, 17 April 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 105. 67 Williams to Williams, 22 July 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. 68 Williams to Pomeroy, 30 September 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. 69 Pitt to the Governor and Company of Rhode Island, 4 February 1757, CWP 1: p. 4; ‘To the Governours & Comeissioners of & from the several Governments of New England’, February 1757, MHS Ms. N-473. 70 Dinwiddie to Newcastle, 17 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fol. 325. 71 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 60. 72 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, p. 114.

Notes

205

73 Braddock to Morris, 9 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fol. 357. 74 Braddock to St. Clair, 18 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fols. 351–352. 75 Eugene Irving McCormac, ‘Colonial Opposition to Imperial Authority during the French and Indian War’, in University of California Publications in History, Vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press, 1914), pp. 26–27. 76 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 9. 77 St. Clair to Hyndford, 3 September 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 170; St. Clair to Keppel, 3 September 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 171. 78 Holdernesse to Shirley, 28 August 1753, CWS 2: p. 13. 79 ‘State of What has been actually done, by the several Provinces in No. America, in Consequence of the Orders to Assist Each Other’, 8 October 1754, LAC MG40-M47. 80 Ibid., 19 April 1754, LAC MG40-M47. 81 Ibid., 12 March, 25 October 1754, LAC MG40-M47; Dinwiddie to Newcastle, 17 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fol. 325. 82 Morris to Halifax, 27 June 1756, LAC R2321-0-1-E, pp. 71–72. 83 Halifax to Fox, 15 August 1756, LAC R2312-0-1-E, p. 86. 84 Hawley to Williams, 3 October 1754, MHS Ms. N-473; Williams to Williams, 21 November 1754, MHS Ms. N-473; Hawley to Williams, May 1755, MHS Ms. N-473; Vote for the Establishment of the Forces for the Winter Season, 30 October 1755, MHS Ms. N-473; Williams to unknown, 22 September 1756, MHS Ms. N-473. 85 Williams to Williams, 7 August 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. 86 Loudoun to Partridge, 25 April 1757, MHS Ms. N-473. 87 Partridge to Williams, 20 February 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. 88 Williams to unknown, 18 October 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. 89 McCormac, ‘Colonial Opposition’, pp. 18–19. 90 Glenn Weaver, ‘Benjamin Franklin and the Pennsylvania Germans’, William and Mary Quarterly 3d ser. 14, no. 4 (1957), p. 544; G.B. Warden, ‘The Proprietary Group in Pennsylvania, 1754–1764’, William and Mary Quarterly 3d Ser. 21, no. 3 (1964), p. 370. 91 ‘Copy of the Assembly of Pennsylva Address to ye King’, 7 January 1755, BL Add. 32,852, fol. 109. 92 Braddock to Morris, 9 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fols. 356–357. 93 McCormac, ‘Colonial Opposition’, p. 19. 94 Dinwiddie to Allen, 10 March 1755, RDP 1: p. 523. 95 McCormac, ‘Colonial Opposition’, p. 44; Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, p. 67. 96 ‘Memorial concerning Relief to Pensilvania’, 24 January 1756, LAC R2321-0-1-E, p. 22. 97 McCormac, ‘Colonial Opposition’, p. 43.

206 98 99 100 101

102 103 104

105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113

114 115 116 117 118

119 120 121

Notes ‘Copy of the Assembly of Pennsylva Address to ye King’, 7 January 1755, BL Add. 32,852, fol. 108. Weaver, ‘Benjamin Franklin and the Pennsylvania Germans’, p. 544. Rogers, Empire and Liberty, pp. 118–119. P. J. Marshall, ‘The Thirteen Colonies in the Seven Years’ War: The View from London’, in Britain and America Go to War: The Impact of War and Warfare in Anglo-America, 1754–1815, ed. Julie Flavell and Stephen Conway (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004), p. 74. Belcher to St. Clair, 3 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 53. Rogers, Empire and Liberty, p. 120. William R. Nester, The Great Frontier War: Britain, France, and the Imperial Struggle for North America, 1607–1755 (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2000), pp. 62–63. St. Clair to Napier, 22 December 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 192. Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, p. 38. Braddock to Morris, 9 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fol. 356. Holderness to Shirley, 28 August 1753, CWS 2: p. 13; Shannon, Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire, p. 105. Hughes to St. Clair, 10 November 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 267. Partridge to Williams, 21 October 1754, MHS Ms. N-473. Shannon, Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire, pp. 84–85, 108. Shirley to Holdernesse, 7 January 1754, CWS 2: p. 19. Bouquet to Loudoun, 23 June 1757, BL Add. 21,631, fol. 21; Bouquet to Stanwix, 23 June 1757, BL Add. 21,631, fol. 29; Pomeroy to Pomeroy, 5 October 1755, in The Journals and Papers of Seth Pomeroy: Sometime General in the Colonial Service, ed. Louis Effingham de Forest (New Haven: The Tuttle, Morehouse, & Taylor Co., 1926), p. 148; Williams to Pomeroy, 30 September 1755, MHS Ms. N-473; Theodore B. Lewis Jr., ‘The Crown Point Campaign 1755’, The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 13, no. 1 (1970), p. 70. Beer, British Colonial Policy, p. 70. Clarke to Williams, 16 September 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. ‘A true Acct. of those killed Wounded and missing of Colo. Williams’s Regiment In Action’, 8 September 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. Williams to unknown, no date 1756, MHS Ms. N-473. ‘A true Acct. of those killed Wounded and missing of Colo. Williams’s Regiment In Action’, 8 September 1755, MHS Ms. N-473; Robinson to Shirley, 26 October 1754, CWS 2: pp. 97–98. Williams to unknown, no date 1756, MHS Ms. N-473. Dinwiddie to Robinson, 17 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fols. 321–322. Shirley to Robinson, 7 January 1754, CWS 2: p. 20.

Notes 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129

130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137

207

Shirley to Robinson, 7 January 1754, CWS 2: pp. 20–21. Hardy to Halifax, 7 May 1756, LAC R2321-0-1-E, pp. 41–42. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, p. 278. Bradstreet to Gould, 22 January 1757, LAC MG40-K2. ‘In the House of Representatives’, 2 February 1757, MHS Ms. N-473. Fred Anderson, A People’s Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years’ War (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1984), p. 13. Phips to Williams, 23 March 1757, MHS Ms. N-473. Oliver to Williams, 11 May 1757, MHS Ms. N-473; Williams to De Lancey, 12 August 1757, MHS Ms. N-473; Williams to De Lancey, 13 August 1757, MHS Ms. N-473. Bradstreet to Gould, 9 March 1756, LAC MG40-K2. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, p. 278. Anderson, A People’s Army, p. 14. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, p. 277. Pownall to Pitt, 14 March 1758, CWP 1: p. 203. Phips to Williams, 23 March 1757, MHS Ms. N-473; Pownall to Pitt, 14 March 1758, CWP 1: p. 203. Schutz, William Shirley, p. 188; Willard to Greene, 5 March 1747, CWS 1: p. 382. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, p. 278.

Chapter 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Barré to Monckton, 9 April 1759, UNMD Acc. 594. Pitt to the Governors of Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York and New Jersey, 30 December 1757, CWP 1: p. 139. Pownall to Pitt, 14 March 1758, CWP 1: p. 203. Brumwell, Redcoats, pp. 57–60. Anderson, A People’s Army, p. 38. Partridge to Williams, 25 April 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, p. 101. ‘In the House of Representatives’, 10 September 1756, MHS Ms. N-473. Williams to Williams, September 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. Worthington to Williams, 15 June 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. Bouquet to Dobbs, 29 September 1757, BL Add. 21,632, fol. 5; Anderson, A People’s Army, p. 38. Bouquet to Loudoun, 16 October 1757, BL Add. 21,632, fol. 12. Anderson, A People’s Army, p. 39.

208

Notes

14 ‘Shirley’s enlisting Orders to Maj. Ephr. Williams’, 10 January 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. 15 Shirley to Williams, 10 March 1755, CWS 2: p. 143; Partridge to Williams, 10 February 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. 16 Margaret Kellow, ‘Bryan Sheehan: Servant, Soldier, Fisherman’, in The Human Tradition in Colonial America, ed. Ian K. Steele and Nancy L. Rhoden (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999), pp. 279, 285. 17 Bradstreet to Gould, 9 March 1756, LAC MG40-K2. 18 Forbes to Abercromby, 4 September 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. 19 Brumwell, Redcoats, p. 75. 20 St. Clair to Napier, 24 November 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 308. 21 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 43. 22 St. Clair to Dinwiddie, 1 August 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 148. 23 Shirley to Williams, 19 May 1755, MHS Ms. N-473; ‘An Act Passed by the Great and General Court or Assembly of His Majesty’s Province of the MassachusettsBay in New England; specially convened at Boston’, 5 September 1755, MHS Ms. N-473; Phips to Williams, 8 July 1756, MHS Ms. N-473; Shirley to Williams, 23 August 1756, MHS Ms. N-473; Phips to Williams, 19 February 1757, MHS Ms. N-473. 24 Selesky, War & Society, p. 166. 25 Dwight to Williams, 26 July 1756, MHS Ms. N-473. 26 St. Clair to Napier, 15 August 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 156. 27 Willard to Williams, 22 November 1754, MHS Ms. N-473. 28 Partridge to Williams, 25 April 1755, MHS Ms. N-473; Williams to Williams, 21 September 1755, MHS Ms. N-473; St. Clair to Dinwiddie, 1 August 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 148. 29 St. Clair to Dinwiddie, 1 August 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 148; ‘Governor and Council [Minute]’, 14 June 1758, in The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds of Westover Virginia, 1684–1776, ed. Marion Tinling (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977), p. 659. 30 Hawley to Williams, 9 September 1754, MHS Ms. N-473. 31 ‘Shirley Orders to Col I William for men’, 13 September 1756, MHS Ms. N-473. 32 ‘Orders for militia to hold in readiness to march’, 10 May 1757, MHS Ms. N-473. 33 David Hackett Fischer, Paul Revere’s Ride (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 203, 214. 34 Washington to Dinwiddie, 18 July 1755, BL Add. 32,857, fol. 218. 35 Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 119. 36 Pomeroy to Pomeroy, 10 September 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. 37 Selesky, War & Society, p. 185. 38 St. Clair to Napier, 24 November 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 309.

Notes

209

39 Pomeroy to Pomeroy, 10 September 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. 40 Williams to Dwight, 7 July 1756, MHS Ms. N-473. 41 St. Clair to Napier, 24 November 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 309; ‘Diary Kept by John Frost’, 17–28 August 1760, LAC R5055-0-8-E. 42 Wentworth to St. Clair, 13 September 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 181. 43 Nester, The Great Frontier War, pp. 251–253. 44 Williams to Williams, 12 August 1757, MHS Ms. N-473. 45 James L. Kochan, ed., ‘Joseph Frye’s Journal and Map of the Siege of Fort William Henry, 1757’, The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 15, no. 5 (1993), p. 346; George Yagi Jr., ‘Siege and Massacre at Fort William Henry’, Military History 22, no. 4 (July 2005), p. 49. 46 Wood, The Great Fortress, p. 31. 47 Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession, p. 330. 48 Forbes to unknown, no date [1758], NAS RH4/86/1. 49 Forbes to Sharpe, 23 August 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. 50 Forbes to Sharpe, 3 September 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. 51 ‘The Journal of Captain Samuel Cobb’, The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 14, no. 1 (1981), pp. 16, 18, 21; ‘Diary Kept by John Frost’, 10–19 June 1760, LAC R5055-0-8-E. 52 Washington to Dinwiddie, 10 June 1754, GWP 1: pp. 135–136. 53 Dinwiddie to Robinson, 16 November 1754, RDP 1: p. 403. 54 ‘Sketch of an Order about the Rank &c of the Provincial Troops in North America’, in Military Affairs, p. 44. 55 Washington to Fitzhugh, 15 November 1754, GWP 1: pp. 225–226. 56 The Earl of Loudoun, General Orders of 1757 (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), p. 78. 57 Williams to Williams, 27 July 1756, MHS Ms. N-473; Dwight to Williams, 26 July 1756, MHS Ms. N-473. 58 Pitt to the Governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, North Carolina, 30 December 1757, CWP 1: p. 141. 59 Anderson, The Crucible of War, p. 229. 60 Loudoun to Cumberland, 21 August 1756, LAC R2321-0-1-E. 61 Bouquet to Dobbs, 30 June 1757, BL Add. 21,631, fol. 24; Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, p. 354; Anderson, A People’s Army, p. 13; Middleton, The Bells of Victory, p. 55. 62 Basil Williams, The Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913), vol. 1, pp. 368–369. 63 ‘1758: Account of Capture of Ticonderoga’, NAM MSS 7803–18, p. 3. 64 Beer, British Colonial Policy, p. 130. 65 Instructions to Braddock, 25 November 1754, NA CO 5/211, fols. 135–136. 66 Partridge to Williams, 11 February 1755, MHS Ms. N-473.

210

Notes

67 ‘At a meeting of the Comissioners at the house of Robert Latteridge’, 2 July 1754, LAC R10943-0-8-E, Series 1, Lot 860, p. 43. 68 St. Clair to Napier, 30 August 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 306. 69 Beer, British Colonial Policy, pp. 89, 93, 96–97. 70 Williams to unknown, December 1754, MHS Ms. N-473. 71 Dinwiddie to Robinson, 20 January 1755, RDP 1: pp. 472–473. 72 Braddock to Robinson, 18 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fols. 346, 352. 73 Braddock to Morris, 9 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fols. 357–358. 74 Beer, British Colonial Policy, p. 77. 75 Fowler, Empires at War, p. 98. 76 Partridge to Williams, 11 February 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. 77 St. Clair to Shirley, 16 February 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 213. 78 St. Clair to Hardy, 6 March 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 231. 79 St. Clair to Napier, 14 August 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 302. 80 Marsh to Williams, 7 July 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. 81 Williamson to Desaguillers, 13 August 1757, LAC R5063-0-1-E. 82 Williamson to Michelson, 5 August 1757, LAC R5063-0-1-E. 83 Browne to Browne, 23 October 1757, WCL BBP. 84 Keppel to Mantell, Barrington, Pallisser, Hughes, Suckling and Diggs, 24 February 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fol. 278. 85 ‘Genl. Townshend’s Book of General Orders’, 4 March, 1760, NAM 6806/41.4.1. 86 St. Clair to Hardy, 6 March 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 231. 87 Daniel Disney Orderly Book, 30 March, 1–2, 6, 11, 20 April 1755, LC MSS 18,330. 88 Ibid., 18, 20–21 September, 7 October 1757, LC MSS 18,330. 89 Steele, Betrayals, p. 153. 90 St. Clair to His Majesty’s Forces in North America, 16 May 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. 91 Louis Antoine de Bougainville, Adventure in the Wilderness: The American Journals of Louis Antoine de Bougainville, 1756–1760, ed. Edward P. Hamilton (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), p. 173. 92 Johnson to the Magistrates of the Town of Schenectady, 17 September 1756, LAC R10943-0-8-E, Series 1, Lot 604, p. 2. 93 St. Clair to Braddock, 6 April 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 93. 94 Braddock to Newcastle, 20 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fols. 389–390. 95 ‘Observations on the Value and Rates of the Gold and Silver to Be Provided for the Use of His Majesty’s Forces Serving in North America, under the Command of the Right Honble the Earl of Loudoun’, 25 October 1756, in Military Affairs, pp. 245–246, 248. 96 Bouquet to Loudoun, 23 June 1757, BL Add. 21,631, fol. 22; Bouquet to Hunter, 23 June 1757, BL Add. 21,631, fol. 27.

Notes 97

98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109

211

‘Observations on the Value and Rates of the Gold and Silver to Be Provided for the Use of His Majesty’s Forces Serving in North America, under the Command of the Right Honble the Earl of Loudoun’, 25 October 1756, in Military Affairs, p. 247. Bouquet to Hunter, 23 June 1757, BL Add. 21,631, fols. 27–28. Braddock to Newcastle, 20 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fol. 390. Bouquet to Loudoun, 16 October 1757, BL Add. 21,632, fol. 11. St. Clair to Braddock, 10 April 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 95. Loudoun to Hardy, 21 November 1756, BL Add. 21,631, fols. 7–8. Bouquet to Stanwix, 23 June 1757, BL Add. 21,631, fol. 29. Loudoun to Unknown, 17 October 1757, NA WO 1/1, fol. 120. Fox to Marshall, June 1755, NA WO 1/1, fol. 32. Bouquet to Loudoun, 16 October 1757, BL Add. 21,632, fol. 14. Instructions to Braddock, 25 November 1754, NA CO 5/211, fols. 127–128. Williams, The Life of William Pitt, p. 369. Marshall, ‘The Thirteen Colonies in the Seven Years’ War’, p. 81.

Chapter 4 1 2 3 4 5

6

7 8 9

Bougainville, Adventure in the Wilderness, p. 252. Instructions to Braddock, 25 November 1754, NA CO 5/21, fol. 134; Forbes to Abercromby, 7 June 1758, HL AB 334. Stobo to Will’s Creek, 28 July 1754, LAC R6955-0-X-E. Robert C. Alberts, The Most Extraordinary Adventures of Major Robert Stobo (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1965), p. 120. Guy Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), pp. 143–144. Colin G. Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 31–32. Instructions to Braddock, 25 November 1754, NA CO 5/21, fol. 134. Shannon, Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire, p. 37. Milton W. Hamilton, Sir William Johnson: Colonial American, 1715–1763 (London: Kennikat Press, 1976), p. 45; James Thomas Flexner, Lord of the Mohawks: A Biography of Sir William Johnson (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1979), pp. 185–186; Fintan O’Toole, White Savage: William Johnson

212

10 11 12

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

35

Notes and the Invention of America (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), pp. 171–173, 202–204. Marsh to Williams, 7 July 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. Theodore Burnham Lewis Jr., ‘The Crown Point Campaign, 1755’, The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 12, no. 6 (1970), p. 421. Flexner, Lord of the Mohawks, pp. 140–146; Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, & Tribes in the Seven Years’ War in North America (London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988), pp. 363–364. Jacobs, Diplomacy and Indian Gifts, pp. 165–166. John Oliphant, Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 1756–63 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001), pp. 48–49. Forbes to Littleton, 16 August 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. Oliphant, Peace and War, p. 49. Byrd to Loudoun, 21 March 1758, in The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds, p. 640. David H. Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier: Conflict and Survival, 1740–62 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), p. 146. Jennings, Empire of Fortune, pp. 151–152. Byrd to Lyttelton, 1 May 1758, in The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds, p. 650. Forbes to Abercromby, 7 June 1758, HL AB 334. Forbes to Littleton, 16 August 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. Steele, Warpaths, p. 147; Fred Swayze, Frontenac and the Iroquois: The Fighting Governor of New France (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1959), pp. 140–141. Braddock to Robinson, 18 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fol. 351. Dinwiddie to Robinson, 17 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fol. 322. Williams to Williams, 28 August 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. Bougainville, Adventure in the Wilderness, pp. 115, 117; Bradstreet to Townshend, 20 September 1756, RH 4/98/2; Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 188. Yagi, ‘Siege and Massacre at Fort William Henry’, p. 48. Forbes to Abercromby, 11 August 1758, HL AB 527. Journal of M. General Braddock’s March towards Fort Duquesne, LAC R2278-04-E, pp. 10, 12. Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fols. 40–41, 46, 77, 84. Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, p. 41. Bougainville, Adventure in the Wilderness, p. 127. Brian L. Dunnigan, ‘Pierre Pouchot, A French Soldier Views America’, in The Human Tradition in Colonial America, ed. Ian K. Steele and Nancy L. Rhoden (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999), pp. 207–208. Bradstreet to Gould, 9 March 1756, LAC MG40-K2.

Notes 36 37 38 39

40 41 42

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

53

54 55

56

213

Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fols. 40, 46, 84. Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, p. 41. Shannon, Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire, p. 129. ‘At a Meeting of the Commission of Indian affairs at the House of Robert Laterage’, 7, 14–15 August, 13–14 September 1754, LAC R10943-0-8-E, Series 1, Lot 680, pp. 48–49, 53, 57–58, 71, 73. Bougainville, Adventure in the Wilderness, p. 245. Forbes to Atkins, no date 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. ‘At a Meeting of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs at Albany 13 September 1754’, LAC R10943-0-8-E, Series 1, Lot 680, p. 71; ‘A List of Goods Sent by Willm. West to Capt. Bosomworth by Order of His Excellency General Forbes’, no date 1758, NAS RH4/86/1; ‘A List of Goods Bot. By Capt. Bosomworth & Wm. West’, 23 May 1758, NAS RH4/86/1; ‘Invoice of Sundry Goods sent to Capt. Bosomworth & order of General Forbes & Robert Keech’s Waggon’, 25 May 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. ‘The Amount of the Two Foregoing Lists’, May 1758, NAS RH4/86/1; List of Indian Goods, HL AB 219. Forbes to Abercromby, 1 May 1758, HL AB 221. Glen to Forbes, 26 July 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. Bougainville, Adventure in the Wilderness, pp. 202, 221–222. ‘Account of Quebec Campaign’, PRONI D162/77B, p. 25. Forbes to Abercromby, 11 August 1758, HL AB 527. Forbes to Pitt, 17 June 1758, in Writings of General John Forbes, p. 117. Steele, Betrayals, pp. 119, 132–133. Forbes to Abercromby, 11 August 1758, HL AB 527. Wolfe to Wolfe, 27 July 1758, in The Life and Letters of James Wolfe, ed. Beckles Willson (London: William Heinemann, 1909), p. 385; Forbes to Abercromby, 4 September 1758, NAS RH4/86/1; Forbes to Fauquier, 16 August 1758, NAS RH4/86/1; Forbes to Dobbs, 16 August 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. Pierre Pouchot, Memoirs on the Late War in North America between France and England, ed. Brian Leigh Dunnigan (Youngstown: Old Fort Niagara Publications, 1994), p. 105. St. Clair to Braddock, 9 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 20. Peter E. Russell, ‘Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740–1760’, William and Mary Quarterly 3d ser. 35, no. 4 (1978), pp. 633–634; Robert Clyde, From Rebel to Hero: The Image of the Highlander, 1745–1830 (East Linton: Tuckwell Press Ltd., 1995), pp. 4, 13; James Michael Hill, Celtic Warfare, 1595–1763 (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1986), pp. 80–81. An unknown soldier as quoted in Russel, ‘Redcoats in the Wilderness’, p. 633.

214

Notes

57 Steele, Betrayals, p. 111; Yagi, ‘Siege and Massacre at Fort William Henry’, p. 51. 58 Journal of M. General Braddock’s March towards Fort Duquesne, LAC R2278-04-E, pp. 9–10. 59 ‘A Proposal for making a Settlement on the Ohio’, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 24; St. Clair to Napier, 15 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 30. 60 Wolfe to Rickson, 9 June 1751, in The Life and Letters of James Wolfe, pp. 140–141. 61 Wolfe to Sackville, 12 May 1758, in The Life and Letters of James Wolfe, p. 363. 62 Matthew Dziennik, ‘Hierarchy, Authority and Jurisdiction in the Mid EighteenthCentury Recruitment of the Highland Regiments’, Historical Research 85, no. 277 (2012), p. 89; Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, pp. 29–30. 63 Hill, Celtic Warfare, p. 158; Brumwell, Redcoats, p. 265. 64 Loudoun to Cumberland, 2 October 1756, in Military Affairs, p. 235. 65 Cumberland to Loudoun, 2 December 1756, in Military Affairs, p. 254. 66 Forbes to Abercromby, 4 September 1758, HL AB 610. 67 Murray to Unknown, 4 October 1760, LAC R2818-0-X-E. 68 Matthew Dziennik, ‘Whig Tartan: Material Culture and its Use in the Scottish Highlands, 1746–1815’, Past and Present, no. 217 (2012), pp. 139–140. 69 Bougainville, Adventure in the Wilderness, p. 233; Murray to Murray, 20 September 1759, LAC R2818-0-X-E; ‘A Short Account of the Expedition against Quebec in the year One Thousand, seven hundred & fifty nine’, LAC R6395-0-8-E, pp. 34–35; ‘Quebeck’, 6 September 1759, LAC R5063-0-1-E; Hill, Celtic Warfare, pp. 158, 161–162. 70 Bougainville, Adventure in the Wilderness, p. 233. 71 ‘1758: Account of Capture of Ticonderoga’, NAM MSS 7803–18, p. 3. 72 Robert Chambers, History of the Rebellion of 1745–1746 (Edinburgh: W. R. Chambers, 1869), p. 296; Jeremy Black, Culloden and the ‘45 (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1990), pp. 169–170, 174. 73 ‘Like Roaring Lions Breaking from their Chains: The Highland Regiment at Ticonderoga’, ed. Nicholas Westbrook, The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 16, no. 1 (1998), pp. 44–45. 74 Matthew P. Dziennik, ‘Cutting Heads From Shoulders: The Conquest of Canada in Gaelic Thought, 1759–1791’, in Revisiting 1759: The Conquest of Canada in Historical Perspective, ed. Phillip Buckner and John G. Reid (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), p. 248. 75 Hill, Celtic Warfare, pp. 160, 162. 76 ‘An Account of Prestonpans, 1745’, ed. Audrey Howes, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 80, no. 321 (2002), p. 34; W.A. Speck, The Butcher: The Duke of Cumberland and the Suppression of the 45 (Caernarfon: Welsh Academic Press, 1995), pp. 109–110.

Notes

215

77 Murray to Murray, 20 September 1759, LAC R2818-0-X-E; ‘A Short Account of the Expedition against Quebec in the year One Thousand, seven hundred & fifty nine’, LAC R6395-0-8-E, pp. 34–35; ‘Quebeck’, 6 September 1759, LAC R5063-0-1-E. 78 Forbes to Abercromby, 4 September 1758, HL AB 610. 79 Russell, ‘Redcoats in the Wilderness’, pp. 634–635, 639–640; Grant to Forbes, 14 September 1758, HBP 2: p. 500. 80 Bouquet to Forbes, 11 September 1758, HBP 2: p. 493. 81 Grant to Forbes, 14 September 1758, HBP 2: p. 503; Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, p. 393; Bouquet to Forbes, 17 September 1758, HBP 2: p. 519. 82 Brumwell, Redcoats, p. 222. 83 Bouquet to Amherst, 6 August 1763, HBP 6: p. 343. 84 Dale Van Every, Forth to the Wilderness: The First American Frontier, 1754–1774 (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1961), p. 183; Alexander V. Campbell, The Royal American Regiment: An Atlantic Microcosm, 1755–1772 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), p. 181. 85 ‘Casualty Return: Battle of Bushy Run’, 6 August 1763, HBP 6: p. 345. 86 F. W. Anderson, ‘Why Did Colonial New Englanders Make Bad Soldiers? Contractual Principles and Military Conduct during the Seven Years’ War’, William and Mary Quarterly 3d ser. 38, no. 3 (1981), p. 395. 87 John W. Shy, ‘A New Look at Colonial Militia’, William and Mary Quarterly 3d ser. 20, no. 2 (1963), p. 183; Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, p. 99. 88 John Demos, The Unredeemed Captive: A Family Story from Early America (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), p. 17; Jeremy Black, Britain as a Military Power, 1688–1815 (London: UCL Press, 1999), p. 120; Bidwell, Jackson, Warrin, Thomas, Chadwick, and Davis to Williams, 31 July 1755, MHS Ms. N-473; Shirley to Williams, 13 June 1755, MHS Ms. N-473; Lettie to Williams, 16 August 1756, MHS Ms. N-473; Williams to unknown, 22 September 1756, MHS Ms. N-473; Phipps to Williams, 8 October 1756, MHS Ms. N-473. 89 Worthington to Williams, 14 September 1754, MHS Ms. N-473. 90 ‘A Journal of Our March’, 12 August 1755, MHS Ms. N-473; Williams to Williams, 25 September 1756, MHS Ms. N-473. 91 Patrick M. Malone, The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics among the New England Indians (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 123. 92 ‘Journal of Operation at Fort Massachusetts in 1756’, 7, 28 June, 5 July 1756, MHS Ms. N-473; Wyman to Williams, 8 June 1756, MHS Ms. N-473; Wyman to Williams, 16 July 1756, MHS Ms. N-473. 93 ‘Soldiers on ye Frontiers’, 20 June 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. 94 Williams to Williams, 5 July 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. 95 Williams to unknown, 13 July 1756, MHS Ms. N-473.

216 96 97 98 99 100 101 102

103 104 105

106 107

108 109 110

111

112

Notes Phipps to Lyman, 19 June 1755, MHS Ms. N-473; Williams to Williams, 25 September 1756, MHS Ms. N-473. Dwight to Williams, 26 July 1756, MHS Ms. N-473. Lieut. John Church’s Journal, 9 October 1757, MHS Ms. N-473. Bougainville, Adventure in the Wilderness, p. 131. St. Clair to Dinwiddie, 6 March 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, pp. 67–68; Braddock to St. Clair, 28 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, pp. 41–45. Loudoun to Cumberland, 22 November 1756, in Military Affairs, p. 269. Williams to Williams, 4 September 1756, MHS Ms. N-473; Alexander to Morris, 18 June 1756, LAC R2321-0-1-E, p. 64; ‘Captain Rogers Report’, 29 January 1756, in The Journals of Sir William Johnson’s Scouts, 1755 & 1756, ed. Dennis Jay Hall (Panton: Essence of Vermont, 1999), pp. 62–63; Bouquet to Amherst, 6 August 1763, HBP 6: p. 343. Robin May and Gerry Embleton, Wolfe’s Army (London: Osprey, 1997), p. 44. Forbes to Denny, 20 March 1758, in Writings of General John Forbes, p. 58. David R. Starbuck, Rangers and Redcoats on the Hudson: Exploring the Past on Rogers Island, the Birthplace of the U.S. Army Rangers (Lebanon: University Press of New England, 2004), pp. 16–17; John F. Ross, War on the Run: The Epic Story of Robert Rogers and the Conquest of America’s First Frontier (New York: Bantam Books, 2009), pp. 2–3. Stephen Brumwell, White Devil: A True Story of War, Savagery, and Vengeance in Colonial America (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2005), p. 18. Robert Rogers, The Annotated and Illustrated Journals of Major Robert Rogers (Fleischmanns: Purple Mountain Press, 2002), pp. 119, 161; Daniel Disney Orderly Book, 25 November 1757, LC MSS 18,330; Jeffery Amherst, The Journal of Jeffery Amherst: Recording the Military Career of General Amherst in America from 1758 to 1763, ed. J. Clarence Webster (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1931), p. 124. ‘Diary of Captain Philip Townshend, 22nd Foot’, 8 June 1758, NAM MSS 8001–30. ‘Account of Quebec Campaign’, PRONI D162/77A, p. 3. Edward Coats, ‘A Private Journal of the Seige of Quebec with a Description of the Town. Commencing the 16th of February 1759 (being the Day of our departure from England) and ending the 18th of Septembr. Following the Day of Capitulation of the Town’, 15 August, 1759, LAC R9383-0-5-E. ‘The Capture of Quebec: A Manuscript Journal Relating to the Operations before Quebec from 8th May, 1759 to 17th May, 1760, Kept by Colonel Malcolm Fraser’, ed. R. Alexander, The Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 18 (1939), p. 142. Rogers, Journals of Major Robert Rogers, pp. 172–173; ‘Report of Capt. Rodgers’ and Co’s Scout’, 19 October 1755, in Journals of Sir William Johnson’s Scouts,

Notes

113 114 115

116 117 118 119 120

121

122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132

217

p. 47; Bouquet to Amherst, 6 August 1763, HBP 6: p. 343; Williams to Williams, 4 September 1756, MHS Ms. N-473; ‘Diary of a Naval Officer at the Siege of Quebec’, 21 August 1759, PRONI D678, p. 25; John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 115–116. Phips to Williams, 6 October 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. Williams to Williams, 4 September 1756, MHS Ms. N-473. ‘Journal of a Scout’, 7 July 1756, in Journals of Sir William Johnson’s Scouts, p. 64; Hamilton S. Putnam, Country on Fire: Israel Putnam and the Colonial Struggle for Survival, 1755–1765 (Concord: The Village Press, 1974), p. 61; Demos, The Unredeemed Captive, pp. 29–30. ‘A Short Account of the Expedition against Quebec in the year One Thousand, seven hundred & fifty nine’, LAC R6395-0-8-E, p. 30. Loudoun to Pitt, 14 February 1758, CWP 1: p. 191. Abercromby to Forbes, 29 November 1757, NAS RH4/86/1; Abercromby to Forbes, 14 December 1757, NAS RH4/86/1. Abercromby to Forbes, 29 November 1757, NAS RH4/86/1. ‘Lieut. Waterbury’s Report’, in Journals of Sir William Johnson’s Scouts, p. 58; Fowler, Empires at War, pp. 68–69; Rogers, Journals of Major Robert Rogers, p. 71. Daniel Disney Orderly Book, 1, 14–15 September 1757, LC MSS 18,330; Orderly Book Entry, Albany, 14 September 1757, NAS RH4/86/1; Rogers, Journals of Major Robert Rogers, pp. 71, 76. Orderly Book Entry, New York, 28 December 1757, NAS RH4/86/1. Ligonier to Amherst, 3 September 1758, LAC R2856-0-8-E, fol. 8. ‘Diary of Captain Philip Townshend, 22nd Foot’, 8 June 1758, NAM MSS 8001–30; Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 253. C. P. Stacey, Quebec, 1759: The Siege and the Battle (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1959), pp. 122, 128; ‘Account of Quebec Campaign’, PRONI D162/77A, pp. 7–8. Diary of Laurence Halloran, 25 July 1759, LAC R5411-0-2-E. ‘Journal of Lieut.-Colonel William Amherst’, ed. J. Clarence Webster, Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research 11 (1932), p. 198. Stephen Brumwell, ‘The British Soldier in the Americas, 1755–1763’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Leeds, 1998), p. 235. ‘Journal Kept by David Gordon’, 10 June 1758, LAC R5068-0-8-E; Wolfe to Murray, 11 August 1759, R6395-0-8-E. Diary of Laurence Halloran, 6, 9 July, 17 August 1759, LAC R5411-0-2-E; ‘Account of Quebec Campaign’, PRONI D162/77A, pp. 15–16, 22. Diary of Laurence Halloran, 17 August 1759, LAC R5411-0-2-E. Bouquet to Amherst, 6 August 1763, HBP 6: pp. 343–344.

218

Notes

133 Hamilton, Sir William Johnson, p. 233. 134 Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 545. 135 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 40; Stobo to Wills Creek, 28 July 1754, LAC R6955-0-X-E; Byrd to Lyttelton, 1 May 1758, in The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds, p. 650. 136 Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 545; Pouchot, Memoirs on the Late War, p. 105; Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, p. 86; Jeremy Black, Fighting for America: The Struggle for Mastery in North America, 1519–1871 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), p. 89. 137 Pouchot, Memoirs on the Late War, p. 105. 138 Anderson, Crucible of War, pp. 15, 545. 139 Jennings, Empire of Fortune, pp. 189–190. 140 Minute Book of Sir William Johnson, 18 February 1757, LAC R10943-0-8-E, Series 1, Lot 681, p. 9. 141 Frégault, Canada, p. 35. 142 Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, p. 86. 143 Murray to Murray, 20 September 1759, LAC R2818-0-X-E; ‘A Short Account of the Expedition against Quebec in the year One Thousand, seven hundred & fifty nine’, LAC R6395-0-8-E, pp. 34–35; ‘Quebeck’, 6 September 1759, LAC R5063-01-E; Grant to Forbes, 14 September 1758, HBP 2: p. 503; Bouquet to Forbes, 17 September 1758, HBP 2: p. 519; ‘Diary Kept by Jeremiah Pearson’, 11 August 1759, LAC R2318-0-4-E; Edward Coats, ‘A Private Journal of the Seige of Quebec with a Description of the Town. Commencing the 16th of February 1759 (being the Day of our departure from England) and ending the 18th of Septembr. Following the Day of Capitulation of the Town’, 15. August, 1759, LAC R9383-0-5-E; ‘A Short Account of the Expedition against Quebec in the year One Thousand, seven hundred & fifty nine’, LAC R6395-0-8-E, p. 30; ‘Journal Kept by David Gordon’, 10 June 1758, LAC R5068-0-8-E; Wolfe to Murray, 11 August 1759, LAC R6395-08-E; ‘Account of Quebec Campaign’, PRONI D162/77A, pp. 7–8. 144 Diary of Laurence Halloran, 26 July 1759, LAC R5411-0-2-E; Fletcher to Fletcher, 14 September 1759, LAC R4121-0-3-E; Stephen Brumwell, Paths of Glory: The Life and Death of General James Wolfe (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), p. 218. 145 ‘Account of Quebec Campaign’, PRONI D162/77A, p. 12. 146 ‘Genl. Townshend’s Book of General Orders’, 13 December 1759, NAM 6806/41.4.1. 147 Wolfe to Sackville, 30 July 1758, in The Life and Letters of James Wolfe, p. 388; ‘The Capture of Quebec’, p. 148; C.V.F. Townshend, The Military Life of Field Marshal George First Marquess Townshend, 1724–1807 (London: John Murray, 1901), p. 201.

Notes

219

148 Robert Wright, The Life of Major-General James Wolfe (London: Chapman and Hall, 1864), p. 531. 149 Diary of Laurence Halloran, 8 August 1759, LAC R5411-0-2-E. 150 Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, p. 158. 151 Pouchot, Memoirs, p. 126. 152 Minute Book of Sir William Johnson, 12 March 1757, LAC R10943-0-8-E, Series 1, Lot 681, p. 29. 153 Examination of Lieut. Barent Staats, 1758, LAC R6597-0-0-E. 154 Minute Book of Sir William Johnson, 4, 12 March 1757, LAC R10943-0-8-E, Series 1, Lot 681, pp. 26, 30. 155 ‘Diary of Captain Philip Townshend, 22nd Foot’, 25 February 1758, NAM MSS 8001–30. 156 Hardy to Halifax, 7 May 1756, LAC R2321-0-1-E, p. 59. 157 Gray to Williams, 6 February 1756, MHS Ms. N-473. 158 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 84. 159 Loudoun to Cumberland, 20 August 1756, in Military Affairs, p. 225. 160 Amherst to Ligonier, 18 January 1759, LAC R2856-0-8-E, fol. 14. 161 Bougainville, Adventure in the Wilderness, p. 248. 162 Richmond to St. Clair, 17 May 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 139. 163 Vaudreuil to Wolfe, 5 August 1759, in Viscount Alfred Harmsworth Northcliffe, Robert Monckton, Marquis George Townshend Townshend, and Public Archives of Canada, The Northcliffe Collection (Ottawa: F.A. Acland, 1926), p. 138; Fowler, Empires at War, p. 167. 164 Flexner, Lord of the Mohawks, p. 236.

Chapter 5 1

2 3 4 5

John Churchill 1st Duke of Marlborough as quoted in J.M. Brereton, The British Soldier: A Social History from 1661 to the Present Day (London: The Bodley Head, 1986), p. 23. Brereton, The British Soldier, p. 24. Black, Britain as a Military Power, p. 49; David G. Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2000), pp. 130–131. Daniel Disney Orderly Book, 27 March 1755, LC MSS 18,330; Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 7; McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p. 218. Brereton, The British Soldier, p. 24; Shingas as quoted in Matthew C. Ward, ‘Fighting the “Old Women” Indian Strategy on the Virginia and Pennsylvania Frontier, 1754–1758’, Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 103, no. 3 (1995), p. 297.

220 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

36

Notes Mercer to Williams, 24 January 1756, NA CO5/46, fol. 234. Sketch for the Operations in North America, 16 November 1754, in Military Affairs, pp. 45–47. T. M. Devine, The Scottish Nation: A History 1700–2000 (New York: Penguin Putnam Inc., 1999), pp. 41, 46. Contemporary couplet as quoted from McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p. 227. St. Clair to Brown, 3 September 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 174. ‘Journal of Lieutenant John Grant, 42nd Foot’, NAS RH4/77, pp. 46–47. St. Clair to Napier, 15 August 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 156. St. Clair to Hughes, 3 September 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 172. ‘The Journal of Captain Robert Cholmley’s Batman’, in Braddock’s Defeat, p. 24. St. Clair to Hughes, 3 September 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 172. Braddock to St. Clair, 31 May 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 132. St. Clair to Braddock, 1 June 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 134. Journal of M. General Braddock’s March towards Fort Duquesne, LAC R2278-04-E, p.14. Glen to Forbes, 26 July 1758, NAS RH4/86/1; Glen to Forbes, 8 August 1758, NAS RH4/86/1; Forbes to Littleton, 16 August 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. Instructions to Sir John St. Clair, Deputy Quartermaster General, 28 May 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 133; Orme to St. Clair, 2 June 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 136. Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 26. St. Clair to Braddock, 2 June 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 137. Journal of M. General Braddock’s March towards Fort Duquesne, LAC R2278-04-E, pp. 6, 14. ‘The Journal of a British Officer’, in Braddock’s Defeat, p. 40. Bouquet to Forbes, 11 June 1758, HBP 2: p. 73. Bouquet to Forbes, 21 June 1758, HBP 2: p. 122. Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, p. 170. Forbes to Abercromby, 27 June 1758, HL AB 319. Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fols. 73–74. Forbes to Abercromby, 25 July 1758, HL AB 474. Browne to Browne, 25 October 1758, WCL BBP. Bouquet to Forbes, 3 June 1758, HBP 2: p. 18. Bouquet to Forbes, 11 July 1758, HBP 2: p. 181. Bouquet to Forbes, 11 July 1758, HBP 2: p. 179. Braddock to St. Clair, 31 May 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 132; St. Clair to Braddock, 1 June 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 134; Stephen Brumwell, George Washington: Gentleman Warrior (London: Quercus, 2012), p. 73. Daniel Disney Orderly Book, 27 October 1757, LC MSS 18,330; St. Clair to Shirley, 16 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 213.

Notes

221

37 Bouquet to Forbes, 11 June 1758, HBP 2: p. 73. 38 Morris to Halifax, 27 June 1756, LAC R2321-0-1-E, p.70. 39 Ben Hughes, The Siege of Fort William Henry: A Year on the Northeastern Frontier (Yardley : Westholme Publishing, 2011), pp. 134–138; Yagi, ‘Siege and Massacre’, pp. 48–49. 40 Bradstreet to Gould, 14 July 1756, LAC MG40-K2; Godfrey, Pursuit of Profit and Preferment, p. 79. 41 Hamilton, The French and Indian Wars, p. 188. 42 Devine, The Scottish Nation, p. 46. 43 ‘Journal of Lieutenant John Grant, 42nd Foot’, NAS RH4/77, p. 49; ‘Diary Kept by John Frost’, 16–19 June 1760, LAC R5055-0-8-E. 44 Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason 1713–1789 (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1997), p. 11. 45 Donald Monro, An Account of the Diseases Which were Most Frequent in the British Military Hospitals in Germany, from January 1761 to the Return of the Troops to England in March 1763 (London: Printed for A. Miller, D. Wilson, and T. Durham in the Strand; and T. Payne at the Mews-Gate, 1764), pp. 309–311, 346. 46 H.M. Little, ‘Thomas Pownall and Army Supply, 1761–1766’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 65 (1987), p. 93. 47 Edward P. Hamilton, ‘John Bradstreet’, The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 23, no. 2 (1971), pp. 139–140; Godfrey, Pursuit of Profit and Preferment, p. 76. 48 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 13. 49 Orme to St. Clair, April 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 104. 50 Orme to St. Clair, 13 April 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 115. 51 Halkett to St. Clair, 16 April 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 101. 52 Daniel Disney Orderly Book, 8 May 1755, LC MSS 18,330. 53 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fols. 56–58; 67–68. 54 Fletcher to Milton, 19 February 1756, LAC R4121-0-3-E. 55 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 69. 56 Bouquet to Forbes, 11 July 1758, HBP 2: p. 180. 57 Bouquet to St. Clair, 30 June 1758, HBP 2: p. 149. 58 Bouquet to Forbes, 7 June 1758, HBP 2: p. 51. 59 ‘Instructions from His Excellency General Murray to Captain Leslie’, November 1759, LAC R6395-0-8-E, fol. 15. 60 Rogers, Journals of Major Robert Rogers, p. 69. 61 ‘Ordnance Book’, 25 November 1754, LAC R2278-0-4-E, p. 49. 62 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 68. 63 McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p. 220. 64 St. Clair to Cookes & Jones, 13 April 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 96.

222

Notes

65 Washington to Fairfax, 5 May 1755, GWP 1: p. 262. 66 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 38; Journal of M. General Braddock’s March Towards Fort Duquesne, LAC R2278-0-4-E, pp. 21–22. 67 St. Clair to Hardy, February 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 215. 68 Bouquet to Forbes, 11 June 1758, HBP 2: p. 73. 69 Bouquet to Forbes, 11 July 1758, HBP 2: p. 180. 70 Letter to the Magistrates and Gentlemen in Lancaster, Northampton, and Philadelphia Counties, 15 August 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. 71 Bouquet to the Magistrates of Berks County, 5 June 1758, HBP 2: p. 31. 72 St. Clair to the Sheriffs of Dutchess and Ulster Countys, 9 March 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 245. 73 Memorandum, 30 May–11 June 1755, GWP 1: p. 294. 74 McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p. 219. 75 Bouquet to St. Clair, 30 June 1758, HBP 2: p. 149. 76 Bouquet to Forbes, 21 June 1758, HBP 2: p. 121. 77 Bouquet to Forbes, 22 June 1758, HBP 2: p. 126. 78 Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 292. 79 Washington to Bouquet, 7 July 1758, HBP 2: p. 168; Ourry to Bouquet, 4 July 1758, HBP 2: p. 161; St. Clair to Braddock, 9 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 18; Carlyle to St. Clair, 17 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 48. 80 Ourry to Bouquet, 4 July 1758, HBP 2: p. 161; Bouquet to Forbes, 28 June 1758, HBP 2: p. 142. 81 Abercromby to Loudoun, 5 November 1756, NA WO 1/1, fol. 60. 82 St. Clair to Carlisle, 3 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 15; St. Clair to Braddock, 9 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 18; Carlyle to St. Clair, 17 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 48. 83 Carlyle to St. Clair, 17 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 48. 84 Orme to St. Clair, April 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 104. 85 Proposals for a Disposition for Advancing the Army from Winchester and Frederick in Maryland, 5 April 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 91. 86 Coultas to Forbes, 18 July 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. 87 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fols. 43, 45. 88 St. Clair to Shirley, 8 March 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 235. 89 St. Clair to Bradstreet, 8 March 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 237. 90 St. Clair to Stevenson, 8 March 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 239. 91 Stevenson to St. Clair, 12 March 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 251. 92 St. Clair to Shirley, 2 March 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 229. 93 Bradstreet to St. Clair, 23 March 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 261. 94 Bouquet to Forbes, 11 June 1758, HBP 2: p. 74. 95 Glen to Forbes, 8 August 1758, NAS RH4/86/1.

Notes 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103

104 105

106 107 108 109 110 111 112

113

114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121

223

Brereton, The British Soldier, p. 24. Jennings, Empire of Fortune, p. 289. Theodore Thayer, ‘The Army Contractors for the Niagara Campaign, 1755–1756’, William and Mary Quarterly 3d ser. 14, no. 1 (1957), p. 39. Mercer to Williams, 24 January 1756, NA CO5/46, fol. 234. Schutz, William Shirley, p. 231; Mercer to Williams, 30 March 1756, NA CO5/46, fol. 240. Mercer to Williams, 24 January 1756, NA CO5/46, fol. 234. Mercer to Williams, 14 March 1756, NA CO5/46, fol. 236. Richard Middleton, ‘The Administration of Newcastle and Pitt: The Departments of State and the Conduct of the War, 1754–1760’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Exeter, 1968), p. 328. Hamilton, The French and Indian Wars, p. 188; Hamilton, ‘John Bradstreet’, p. 141. Alexander to Morris, 18 June 1756, LAC R2321-0-1-E, p. 62; Halifax to Fox, 15 Aug 1756, LAC R2321-0-1-E, p. 87; Anderson, The Crucible of War, pp. 153–154. Pouchot, Memoirs, p. 104. Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness, pp. 133–135. Hamilton, ‘John Bradstreet’, p. 141; ‘Journal of Richard Humphrys’, BL Add. 45,662, p. 3; Yagi, ‘Massacre at Fort William Henry’, pp. 48, 51. ‘Journal Kept by David Gordon’, 3 June 1758, LAC R5068-0-8-E. Walsh to Townshend, 18 May 1760, LAC R2819-0-7-E, p. 62. Forbes to Howell, 15 August 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. Journal of M. General Braddock’s March towards Fort Duquesne, LAC R22780-4-E, p. 11; Williamson to Michelson, 5 August 1757, LAC R5063-0-1-E; ‘Genl. Townshend’s Book of General Orders’, 19 January 1760, NAM 6806/41.4.1; Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fols. 35, 36. ‘Journal of Lieutenant John Grant, 42nd Foot’, NAS RH4/77, p. 51; Daniel Disney Orderly Book, 21 July 1757, LC MSS 18,330; ‘Diary of Captain Philip Townshend, 22nd Foot’, 7 September 1757, NAM MSS 8001–30. Daniel Disney Orderly Book, 21 September 1757, LC MSS 18,330; Brumwell, Redcoats, pp. 151–152. Forbes to Howell, 15 August 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 37. Instructions for Braddock, 26 November 1754, NA CO 5/211, fol. 129. Braddock to Robinson, 18 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fol. 353. Fletcher to Fletcher, 14 December 1759, LAC R4121-0-3-E. Williams to Williams, 15 July 1755, MHS Ms. N-473. ‘Genl. Townshend’s Book of General Orders’, 9 March 1760, NAM 6806/41.4.1.

224

Notes

122 William Ellis, The Country Housewife’s Family Companion, 1750 (Totnes: Prospect Books, 2000), pp. 102–105, 161–162. 123 ‘Journal of Lieutenant John Grant, 42nd Foot’, NAS RH4/77, p. 44. 124 Monro, An Account of the Diseases, p. 314. 125 Brumwell, Redcoats, p. 151. 126 Michael N. McConnell, Army & Empire: British Soldiers on the American Frontier, 1758–1775 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), pp. 111, 113; Brumwell, Redcoats, p. 151. 127 Sir John Pringle, Observations on the Diseases of the Army, in Camp and Garrison. In Three Parts With an Appendix, Containing Some Papers of Experiments, Read at Several Meetings of the Royal Society (London: Printed for A. Millar, and D. Wilson, both in the Strand; and T. Payne, next to the Mews-gate, near St. Martin’s Church, 1752), p. 138. 128 Monro, An Account of the Diseases, p. 325. 129 Lester S. King, The Medical World of the 18th Century (Huntington: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Co. Inc., 1971), p. 134. 130 Stephen Wood, ed., By Dint of Labour and Perseverance: A Journal Recording Two Months in Northern Germany Kept by Lieutenant-Colonel James Adolphus Oughton, Commanding 1st Battalion 37th Regiment of Foot, 1758 (London: The Society for Army Historical Research, 1997), p. 52. 131 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fols. 43–44. 132 Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, p. 75; Journal of M. General Braddock’s March towards Fort Duquesne, LAC R2278-0-4-E, p. 7; Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 44. 133 Delancey to St. Clair, 31 August 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 177. 134 Beattie, ‘The Adaptation of the British Army’, p. 67. 135 Alexander Moneypenny, ‘The Moneypenny Orderly Book’, Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 12, no. 5 (1969), p. 354. 136 Daniel Disney Orderly Book, 13 July 1757, LC MSS 18,330. 137 Ellis, The Country Housewife’s Companion, p. 455. 138 Brumwell, Redcoats, pp. 79–80; Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, pp. 89–90; George Yagi Jr., ‘Surviving the Wilderness: The Diet of the British Army and the Struggle for Canada, 1754–1760’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 81 (2011), pp. 70–71. 139 McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p. 188. 140 Beattie, ‘The Adaption of the British Army’, p. 67. 141 ‘The Journal of a British Officer’, in Braddock’s Defeat, p. 47. 142 Daniel Disney Orderly Book, 18, 24 June 1755, LC MSS 18,330. 143 Notebook of Lt. Hamilton, NAM MSS 6707–11, pp. 93–94. 144 Daniel Disney Orderly Book, 17, 22 June 1755, 4, 15, 26 September 1757, LC MSS 18,330.

Notes 145 146 147 148 149 150

151 152 153 154 155 156 157

158 159 160 161

162 163 164 165 166 167 168

225

‘Genl. Townshend’s Book of Orders’, 22 November 1759, NAM 6806/41.4.1. Pringle, Observations on the Diseases, p. 136. Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fols. 41–42. ‘Journal Kept by David Gordon’, 15 June 1758, LAC R5068-0-8-E. ‘Diary of Captain Philip Townshend, 22nd Foot’, 7, 29 September 1757, NAM MSS 8001–30. Murray to Hussey, 20 November 1759, LAC R6395-0-8-E, p. 10; ‘Instructions from His Excellency General Murray to Captain Leslie’, November 1759, LAC R6395-0-8-E, p. 15; Barrè to Monckton, 9 September 1759, UNMD Acc. 594; ‘Journal of Richard Humphrys’, 15 October 1757, BL Add. 45,662, p. 4. ‘The Orderly Book of Fort Cumberland, Nova Scotia, 1759–1760’, LAC R2276-0X-E, fol. 169; McConnell, Army & Empire, p. 107. Daniel Disney Orderly Book, 21 July 1757, LC MSS 18,330. Brumwell, Redcoats, p. 153. Leaks to Moneypenny, 11 December 1758, BL Add. 21,661; Moneypenny to Haldimand, 28 January 1759, BL Add. 21,661. Daniel Disney Orderly Book, 2 September 1757, LC MSS 18,330. Gordon to Gordon, 29 November 1758, LAC MG40-G6. Brumwell, Redcoats, pp. 152–154; Amherst to Bradstreet, 1 August 1759, in Amherst and the Conquest of Canada, ed. Richard Middleton (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 83. Forbes to Abercromby, 11 August 1758, HL AB 527. Baugh, The Global Seven Years War, p. 430. Monro, An Account of the Diseases, p. 323. ‘The Journal of Captain Robert Cholmley’s Batman’, in Braddock’s Defeat, p. 19; Journal of M. General Braddock’s March towards Fort Duquesne, LAC R2278-04-E, p. 6. ‘The Journal of a British Officer’, in Braddock’s Defeat, p. 44; ‘The Journal of Captain Robert Cholmley’s Batman’, in Braddock’s Defeat, pp. 18–19. ‘The Orderly Book of Fort Cumberland, Nova Scotia, 1759–1760’, LAC R2276-0X-E, fol. 158. Glen to Forbes, 8 August 1755, NAS RH4/86/1. List, NAS RH4/86/1. ‘Diary of Captain Philip Townshend, 22nd Foot’, 29 June 1757, NAM MSS 8001–30. ‘Journal of Lieutenant John Grant, 42nd Foot’, NAS RH4/77, pp. 48, 51. David R. Starbuck, Massacre at Fort William Henry (Hanover : University Press of New England, 2002), pp. 72–74; and Excavating the Sutlers’ House: Artifacts of the British Armies in Fort Edward and Lake George (Hanover : University Press of New England, 2010), p. 50; and Rangers and Redcoats on the Hudson, pp. 82, 92.

226

Notes

169 Loudoun, General Orders, p. 5. 170 Daniel Disney Orderly Book, 19 May 1757, LC MSS 18,330. 171 ‘The Orderly Book of Fort Cumberland, Nova Scotia, 1759–1760’, LAC R2276-0X-E, fols. 48–49, 125, 157–158. 172 Loudoun, General Orders, p. 75. 173 ‘The Orderly Book of Fort Cumberland, Nova Scotia, 1759–1760’, LAC R2276-0X-E, fols. 213, 220. 174 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 96. 175 ‘The Journal of Samuel Cobb: May 21, 1758–October 29, 1758’, The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 14, no. 1 (1981), p. 17. 176 Loudoun, General Orders, p. 76. 177 McConnell, Army & Empire, pp. 106–107. 178 Stacey, Quebec, 1759, p. 158. 179 ‘Account of the Quebec Campaign’, 21 June–19 September 1759, PRONI D162/77B, p. 13.

Chapter 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Washington to Washington, 18 July 1755, GWP 1: p. 336. Roubaud as quoted in Jane M. Lape, ‘Père Roubaud, Missionary Extraordinary’, The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 12, no. 1 (1966), p. 65. Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, pp. 42–43. Wolfe to Wolfe, 4 September 1755, in The Life and Letters of James Wolfe, p. 274. Newcastle to Devonshire, 10 April 1756, BL Add. 32,864 fol. 205. Instructions for Braddock, 26 November 1754, NA CO 5/211, fol. 128; Orme to St. Clair, (undated) April 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 103. Braddock to St. Clair, 28 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p.41; Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 9; Dinwiddie to Robinson, 17 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fol. 322; Establishments for Carpenters, Rangers, and Light Horse, undated February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, pp. 42–45. Dinwiddie to Robinson, 17 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fol. 322. Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 50. Bouquet to Loudoun, 25 August 1757, BL Add. 21,631, fol. 71. Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 210. Brumwell, Redcoats, p. 75. Kopperman, Braddock at the Monongahela, p. 14. Bradstreet to Gould, 2 December 1754, LAC MG40-K2. McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p. 136. Brumwell, Redcoats, p. 113.

Notes

227

17 Alan J. Guy, ‘Regimental Agency in the British Standing Army, 1715–1763: A Study of Georgian Military Administration’, Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester 62, no. 2 (1980), pp. 426–428. 18 St. Clair to Braddock, 9 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 17. 19 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 10. 20 St. Clair to Clarke, 18 March 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 80; St. Clair to Clarke, 18 March 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 82. 21 Bradstreet to Gould, 14 March 1754, LAC MG40-K2. 22 Bradstreet to Gould, 1 June 1755, LAC MG40-K2. 23 Robert Middlekauf, The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763–1789 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 302; Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, pp. 148–152. 24 Brumwell, Redcoats, p. 113. 25 St. Clair to Napier, 24 November 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 311. 26 Bradstreet to Gould, 1 June 1755, LAC MG40-K2. 27 Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 71. 28 Forbes to Abercrombie, undated 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. 29 Selesky, War & Society, p. 185; Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause, pp. 296, 350, 567–570. 30 Lawrence Henry Gibson, The Great War for the Empire: The Years of Defeat, 1754–1757 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), p. 86. 31 Clyde, From Rebel to Hero, pp. 4–5, 9. 32 Hill, Celtic Warfare, p. 1. 33 Speck, The Butcher, p. 51. 34 A. Henderson, History of the Rebellion (London: Printed for A. Miller, 1753), p. 87. 35 Jeremy Black, Culloden and the ’45 (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1990), p. 82. 36 Andrew Lang, Prince Charles Edward (New York: AMS Press Inc., 1967), p. 107. 37 An unknown officer as quoted in Hill, Celtic Warfare, p. 130. 38 Journal of M. General Braddock’s March towards Fort Duquesne, LAC R2278-04-E, p. 9. 39 D. E. Worcester, ‘The Weapons of American Indians’, New Mexico Historical Review 20 (1945), p. 231; Stuart Reid, Highlander: Fearless Celtic Warriors (London: Military Illustrated, 2000), p. 30. 40 Willson, Life and Letters, p. 57; French Account of Braddock’s Defeat, 10 July 1755, NAM MSS 6806/41.3. 41 Hill, Celtic Warfare, p. 132; Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession, p. 264. 42 McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p. 253. 43 Victor Suthren, The Sea Has No End: The Life of Louis-Antoine de Bougainville (Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2004), p. 65; Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 151; Yagi, ‘Siege and Massacre’, p. 48.

228

Notes

44 Journal of M. General Braddock’s March towards Fort Duquesne, LAC R2278-04-E, pp. 9–10. 45 Jeremy Black, Historical Atlas of Britain: The End of the Middle Ages to the Georgian Era (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Limited, 2000), pp. 2–3. 46 Demos, The Unredeemed Captive, p. 3. 47 Ed Crews, ‘Colonial Roadways: Uncomfortable, Dangerous, but Irresistible for the Adventurous’, Colonial Williamsburg: The Journal of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation 26, no. 1 (2004), p. 58. 48 St. Clair to Fox, 11 February 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 22. 49 Stephens to Hunter, 18 July 1755, BL Add. 32,857, fol. 216. 50 Gage to Abermarle, 24 July 1755, BL Add. 32,857, fols. 338–339. 51 French Account Braddocks Defeat, 9 July 1755, NAM MSS 6806/41.3. 52 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fols. 50–54. 53 McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p. 221. 54 French Account Braddock’s Defeat, 7 July 1755, NAM MSS 6806/41.3. 55 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 86. 56 ‘The Journal of Captain Robert Cholmley’s Batman’, in Braddock’s Defeat, p. 23. 57 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 84. 58 ‘The Journal of Captain Robert Cholmley’s Batman’, in Braddock’s Defeat, p. 23. 59 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 85. 60 McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p. 230. 61 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 88. 62 ‘The Journal of a British Officer’, in Braddock’s Defeat, p. 45. 63 An unknown French soldier as quoted in James Axtell and William C. Surtevant, ‘The Unkindest Cut, or Who Invented Scalping?’, William and Mary Quarterly 3d ser. 37, no. 3 (1980), p. 461. 64 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 87. 65 McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p. 236. 66 Townshend, The Military Life, p. 201. 67 Washington to Washington, 28 June–2 July 1755, GWP 1: p. 322. 68 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 97. 69 ‘The Journal of Captain Robert Cholmley’s Batman’, in Braddock’s Defeat, p. 25. 70 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 98. 71 McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p. 232. 72 Kopperman, Braddock at the Monongahela, pp. 243. 73 Journal of M. General Braddock’s March towards Fort Duquesne, LAC R2278-04-E, p. 15. 74 St. Clair to Richmond, 22 December 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, pp. 193–194. 75 French Account of Braddock’s Defeat, 9 July 1755, NAM MSS 6806/41.3; ‘Extract of a Letter from Capt. Orme (Aid de Camp to his late Excellency General Braddock) to the Honble Augustus Keppel’, 18 July 1755, BL Add. 32,857, fol. 214.

Notes 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105

229

Frégault, Canada, p. 95. Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 88. French Account of Braddock’s Defeat, 9 July 1755, NAM MSS 6806/41.3. Stanley Pargellis, ‘Braddock’s Defeat’, The American Historical Review 41, no. 2 (1936), p. 253. St. Clair to Hyndford, 3 September 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 169. French Account of Braddock’s Defeat, 9 July 1755, NAM MSS 6806/41.3. Gage to Abermarle 24 July 1755, BL Add. 32,857, fol. 338. ‘The Journal of a British Officer’, in Braddock’s Defeat, p. 50. Stephens to Hunter, 18 July 1755, BL Add. 32,857, fol. 216; Gage to Abermarle, 24 July 1755, BL Add. 32,857, fol. 338; Washington to Dinwiddie 18 July 1755, BL Add. 32,857, fol. 218. Journal of M. General Braddock’s March towards Fort Duquesne, LAC R2278-04-E, p. 17. ‘The Journal of Captain Robert Cholmley’s Batman’, in Braddock’s Defeat, pp. 29–30. Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, p. 130. ‘The Journal of a British Officer’, in Braddock’s Defeat, p. 53. Suthren, The Sea Has No End, p. 48. Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 154. Yagi, ‘Siege and Massacre’, p. 48. Steele, Betrayals, p. 105. An Abenaki chief as quoted in Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, p. 290. ‘Transactions at Fort William Henry; during its Siege, in August, 1757’, HL LO6660, p. 2. Fort William Henry Journal, 1 July–8 August 1757, LAC R5063-0-1-E, p. 11. Steele, Betrayals, pp. 100–101. Fort William Henry Journal, 1 July–8 August 1757, LAC R5063-0-1-E, p. 8. ‘Transactions at Fort William Henry; during its Siege, in August, 1757’, HL LO6660, pp. 3, 12. Bradstreet to Gould, 21 August 1757, LAC MG40-K2, 128/28. Loudoun to Webb, 20 August 1757, NA CO 5/48, fol. 323. John Knox, The Siege of Quebec and the Campaigns in North America, 1757–1760, ed. Brian Connell (London: The Folio Society, 1976), p. 289. Amherst to Rogers, 13 September 1759, in Rogers, Journals of Major Robert Rogers, p. 171. Brumwell, White Devil, p. 31. Notebook of Lt. Hamilton, NAM MSS 6707–11, p. 169; Townshend, The Military Life, p. 201. A Private Journal of the Seige of Quebec, 31 July 1759, LAC R9383-0-5-E.

230

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106 ‘The Journal of Captain Robert Cholmley’s Batman’, in Braddock’s Defeat, p. 28; ‘Extract of a Letter from Capt. Orme (Aid de Camp to his late Excellency General Braddock) to the Honble Augustus Keppel’, 18 July 1755, BL Add. 32,857, fol. 214. 107 ‘The Journal of Captain Robert Cholmley’s Batman’, in Braddock’s Defeat, p. 28. 108 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 104. 109 A Private Journal of the Seige of Quebec, 31 July 1759, LAC R9383-0-5-E. 110 Ian Castle, Fort William Henry 1755–57: A Battle, Two Sieges and Bloody Massacre (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2013), p. 87; Steele, Betrayals, pp. 119–120, 122, 132. 111 Yagi, ‘Siege and Massacre’, p. 72. 112 Sydney Selwyn, ‘Sir John Pringle: Hospital Reformer, Moral Philosopher and Pioneer of Antiseptics’, Medical History 10 (1996), p. 268. 113 Caroline Cox, A Proper Sense of Honor: Service and Sacrifice in George Washington’s Army (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), pp. 124–125. 114 Sir John Pringle, Observations on the Diseases of the Army (Birmingham: The Classics of Medicine Library, 1983), pp. 84–85. 115 King, The Medical World of the 18th Century, pp. 134–135. 116 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, p. 94. 117 Burton to Loudoun, 5 August 1756, HL LO 1424. 118 Procter, Writings of General John Forbes, p. 301. 119 Orderly Book Entry, Halifax, 3 August 1757, NAS RH4/86/1. 120 Monro, An Account of the Diseases, pp. x–xi, 344–345; McConnell, Army & Empire, p. 114. 121 King, The Medical World, p. 134. 122 Pringle, Observations, pp. 74–75, 90. 123 McConnell, Army & Empire, p. 115. 124 Steele, Betrayals, p. 70. 125 Starbuck, Massacre at Fort William Henry, pp. 54–55, 59, 66. 126 ‘The Josiah Goodrich Orderbook: May 22, 1759–July 25 1759’, The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 13, no. 6 (1980), p. 423. 127 Moneypenny, ‘The Moneypenny Orderly Book’, p. 351. 128 Monro, An Account of the Diseases, p. 348. 129 Account of the Siege of Havana, 14 July 1762, WCL HBP. 130 Pringle, Observations, p. 90. 131 The Josiah Goodrich Orderbook, p. 415; Loudoun, General Orders of 1757, pp. 34, 91. 132 Pringle, Observations, p. 92. 133 McConnell, Army & Empire, p. 115.

Notes

231

134 Loudoun, General Orders of 1757, p. 47. 135 ‘The Orderly Book of Fort Cumberland, Nova Scotia, 1759–1760’, LAC R2276-0X-E, fols. 16, 18. 136 Loudoun, General Orders of 1757, p. 25. 137 Monro, An Account of the Diseases, p. 311. 138 Loudoun, General Orders of 1757, p. 83. 139 Pringle, Observations, p. 81. 140 Cox, A Proper Sense of Honor, p. 125. 141 Pringle, Observations, p. 82. 142 Guy Williams, The Age of Agony: The Art of Healing c1700–1800 (Chicago: Academy Chicago Publishers, 1986), p. 200. 143 Pringle, Observations, p. 82. 144 Williams, The Age of Agony, pp. 195–196, 200. 145 McConnell, Army & Empire, p. 115. 146 Williams, The Age of Agony, p. 3. 147 Loudoun, General Orders of 1757, pp. 2, 30. 148 ‘The Orderly Book of Fort Cumberland, Nova Scotia, 1759–1760’, LAC R2276-0X-E, fol. 29. 149 Glen to Forbes, 8 August 1758, NAS RH4/86/1. 150 Barrington to Pitt, 21 July 1757, NA WO4/53; Barrington to Pitt, 14 November 1758, NA WO4/53; Pringle, Observations, pp. 70–71, 86–87. 151 Loudoun, General Orders of 1757, p. 9; ‘The Journal of Samuel Cobb: May 21, 1758–October 29, 1758’, p. 17; Bouquet to Loudoun, 25 August 1757, BL. Add. 21,631, fol. 71. 152 ‘The Journal of Samuel Cobb’, pp. 22, 27, 29, 31. 153 ‘Halkett’s Orderly Book’, pp. 71, 79, 123, 125; Orme to St. Clair, 12 June 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 189. 154 Orderly Book Entry, New York, 4 September 1757, NAS RH4/86/1. 155 St. Clair to Braddock, 6 March 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 71. 156 Braddock to St. Clair, 15 March 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 86; ‘Genl. Townshends Book of General Orders: For the Body of Troops Employed Against Canada in the Year 1759 Under the Command of Maj. Genl. Wolfe’, 15 October 1759, NAM MSS 6806–41.4.1. 157 Bouquet to Stanwix, 23 June 1757, BL Add. 21,631, fol. 29. 158 Williamson to the Right Honourable Gentlemen, 4 December 1757, LAC R50630-1-E, p. 21. 159 Williamson to Michelson, 5 August 1757, LAC R5063-0-1-E, p. 3; Williamson to the Board, 17 September 1757, LAC R5063-0-1-E, p. 6. 160 Williamson to Collins, 19 December 1757, LAC R5063-0-1-E, p. 24. 161 Monro, An Account of the Diseases, pp. 322–323.

232

Notes

162 St. Clair to Napier, 30 August 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 306. 163 Williams, The Life of William Pitt, Vol. 1, p. 369. 164 Unknown, The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature, for the Year 1760 (London: Printed for R. and J. Dodsley, in Pall-Mall, 1767), p. 256.

Chapter 7 1 2

3 4 5 6

7

8 9 10 11 12

13 14 15 16 17

‘Portsmouth, March 22’, The Boston Evening-Post, 27 June 1757. Sir John Barrow, The Life of George Lord Anson: Admiral of the Fleet, Vice-Admiral of Great Britain, and First Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty, Previous to, and During, the Seven-Years’ War (London: John Murray, 1839), p. 249; N. A. M. Rodger, ‘George, Lord Anson, 1697–1762’, in Precursors of Nelson: British Admirals of the Eighteenth Century, ed. Peter Le Fevre and Richard Harding (London: Chatham Publishing, 2000), p. 193. Byng as quoted in Barrow, The Life of George Lord Anson, p. 249. Rodger, ‘George, Lord Anson’, p. 193. Barrow, The Life of George Lord Anson, p. 253. Augustus Hervey, Augustus Hervey’s Journal: Being the Intimate Account of the Life of a Captain in the Royal Navy Ashore and Afloat, 1746–1759, ed. David Erskine (London: William Kimber, 1953), pp. 242–243. Newcastle to Keene, 30 July 1756, BL Add. 32,866, fols. 310–311; Newcastle to Campion, 31 July 1756, BL Add. 32,866, fols. 328–330; Browning, The Duke of Newcastle, pp. 235–236. Hervey, Augustus Hervey’s Journal, p. 235; Rodger, ‘George, Lord Anson’, p. 194. Barrow, The Life of George Lord Anson, p. 260. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, p. 272. Baugh, The Global Seven Years War, pp. 431–441. Richard Middleton, ‘Naval Administration in the Age of Pitt and Anson’, in The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International Inc., 1989), pp. 110–118. Hawke as quoted in Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, pp. 282–283. Dull, The French Navy, p. 162. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, p. 283. Byng to Anson, 25 May 1756, in Yorke, The Life and Correspondence, Vol. 2, pp. 293–294. Gerald S. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 159, 164–166.

Notes

233

18 Journal of Rear Admiral Durell, 8, 10 May 1759, NA ADM50/7, fol. 227; Vice Admiral Holburne’s Journal of a Voyage to Halifax, 30 May, 14 June 1757, NA ADM50/7, fols. 265, 268. 19 Williamson to Marlborough, 7 August 1757, LAC R5063-0-1-E. 20 ‘An Account of the Expedition against Louisbourg Anno Domi: 1758 under the Command of Admiral Boscawen’, 5 June 1758, BL Add. 11,813, fol. 83. 21 Journal of Richard Humphrys, BL Add. 45,662, p. 1. 22 Memorandum, 19 May 1756, in The Barrington Papers: Selected from the Letters and Papers of Admiral the Hon. Samuel Barrington, ed. D. Bonner-Smith (Greenwich: The Navy Records Society, 1937), p. 148; Vice Admiral Holburne’s Journal of a Voyage to Halifax, 26 June 1757, NA ADM50/7, fol. 266. 23 Vice Admiral Holburne’s Journal of a Voyage to Halifax, 31 May, 25 June, 6–7 July 1757, NA ADM50/7, fols. 266, 269–270. 24 ‘Diary of Captain Philip Townshend, 22nd Foot’, 16 August 1757, NAM MSS 8001–30. 25 Secret Instructions for Admiral Edward Boscawen, 17 April 1755, NA CO 5/211, fol. 194; Ruddock F. Mackay, Admiral Hawke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 120; Jeremy Black, Crisis of Empire: Britain and America in the Eighteenth Century (London: Continuum, 2008), p. 82; Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, p. 263. 26 Boscawen to Boscawen, 25 May 1755, in ‘Boscawen’s Letters to His Wife, 1755– 1756’, ed. Peter Kemp, The Naval Miscellany (Greenwich: The Navy Records Society, 1952), p. 185. 27 Boscawen to Boscawen, 9 June 1755, ‘Boscawen’s Letters to His Wife’, p. 187. 28 Boscawen to Boscawen, 3 June 1755, ‘Boscawen’s Letters to His Wife’, p. 186. 29 Boscawen to Anson, 21 June 1755, ‘Boscawen’s Letters to His Wife’, p. 191. 30 Barrow, The Life of George Lord Anson, p. 235. 31 Cecil Aspinall-Oglander, Admiral’s Wife: Being the Life and Letters of the Hon. Mrs. Edward Boscawen from 1719–1761 (London: Longmans, 1940), pp. 169, 183, 188; Baugh, The Global Seven Years War, p. 114. 32 Vice Admiral Holburne’s Journal of a Voyage to Halifax, 4–7, 9, 12, 14, 17, 19, 22, 30 July, 1–4 August, 1757, NA ADM50/7, fols. 270–275; ‘Diary of Captain Philip Townshend, 22nd Foot’, 17 May 1758, NAM MSS 8001–30. 33 Vice Admiral Holburne’s Journal of a Voyage to Halifax, 11, 22 July, 8 August 1757, NA ADM50/7, fols. 272, 274, 276. 34 ‘Diary of Captain Philip Townshend, 22nd Foot’, 17–18 May 1758, NAM MSS 8001–30. 35 Williamson to Desaguillers, 13 August 1757, LAC R5063-0-1-E. 36 Boscawen to Boscawen, 25 May 1755, ‘Boscawen’s Letters to His Wife’, p. 185.

234

Notes

37 Extracts from the Journal of the Marquis de Montcalm, 28 April 1756, in Meriwether Liston Lewis, Montcalm: The Marvelous Marquis (New York: Vantage Press, 1961), p. 33. 38 Steele, Warpaths, p. 158. 39 Journal of Richard Humphrys, BL Add. 45,662, p. 2. 40 Journal of Rear Admiral Durell, 7–8, 10, 13 May 1759, NA ADM50/7, fols. 227–228. 41 Holburne to Barrington, 10 September 1755, in The Barrington Papers, pp. 143–144. 42 Journal of Rear Admiral Durell, 8 November 1758, 7 April 1759, NA ADM50/7, fols. 207, 221. 43 Julian S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years’ War: A Study in Combined Strategy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1907), pp. 407, 410. 44 Townshend to Townshend, 3 June 1759, LAC R2819-0-7-E, p. 117. 45 Corbett, England in the Seven Years’ War, p. 410. 46 ‘Account of the Quebec Campaign’, 21 June–19 September, 1759, PRONI D162/77B, pp. 35–36. 47 Anderson, The War That Made America, p. 193. 48 Boscawen to Boscawen, 25 May 1755, ‘Boscawen’s Letters to His Wife’, p. 185. 49 Townshend to Townshend, 3 June 1759, LAC R2819-0-7-E, p. 117. 50 McLennan, Louisbourg, pp. 142, 158. 51 Corbett, England in the Seven Years’ War, p. 407; Journal of Rear Admiral Durell, 30 April 1759, NA ADM50/7, fol. 225; Edward Coats, ‘A Private Journal of the Seige of Quebec’, 16 April 1759, LAC R9383-0-5-E. 52 Jeremy Black, The British Seaborne Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 119. 53 ‘Diary Kept by Jeremiah Pearson’, 22 October 1759, LAC R2318-0-4-E; ‘Diary of Captain Philip Townshend, 22nd Foot’, 21, 24–27 June 1757, 1, 10 May 1758, NAM MSS 8001–30; ‘Account of the Quebec Campaign’, 21 June–19 September, 1759, PRONI D162/77A, p. 3; ‘Wolfe’s Journal of the Quebec Expedition’, 19 May 1759, R4770-0-1-E. 54 ‘Diary of Captain Philip Townshend, 22nd Foot’, 24–27 June 1757, 1, 3, 10 May 1758, NAM MSS 8001–30. 55 Barton to Lords of Admiralty, 6 October 1756, NA ADM1/1487. 56 ‘Diary Kept by Jeremiah Pearson’, 8–9, 13, 21, 25–26, 29 June, 9, 23 July 1759, LAC R2318-0-4-E. 57 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 30; Shirley to Lords of Admiralty, 27 December 1755, NA ADM1/3818; Shirley to Lords of the Admiralty, 23 June 1756, NA ADM1/3818. 58 Shirley to Lords of the Admiralty, 23 June 1756, NA ADM1/3818; Broadley to Clevland, 22 January 1757, ADM1/1488; Broadley to Clevland, 26 September 1756,

Notes

59 60 61 62 63

64 65 66

67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

75 76

77 78 79 80

235

ADM1/1487; George A. Cuthbertson, Freshwater: A History and a Narrative of the Great Lakes (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1931), p. 60. Broadley to Clevland, 26 September 1756, NA ADM1/1487. Broadley to Clevland, 22 January 1757, NA ADM1/1488. Broadley to Clevland, 26 September 1756, NA ADM1/1487. Anderson, Crucible of War, pp. 152–153. Broadley to Clevland, 26 September 1756, NA ADM1/1487; Shirley to the Lords of the Admiralty, 7 September 1756, NA ADM1/3818; Cuthbertson, Freshwater, p. 86. ‘Wolfe’s Journal of the Quebec Expedition’, 19 May, 3 July 1759, R4770-0-1-E. Wolfe to Sackville, 12 May 1758, in The Life and Letters of James Wolfe, p. 363. ‘Diary of Captain Philip Townshend, 22nd Foot’, 5, 7–8 June 1758, NAM MSS 8001–30; ‘An Account of the Expedition against Louisbourg Anno Domi: 1758 under the Command of Admiral Boscawen’, 5–7 June 1758, BL Add. 11,813, fol. 83. ‘Diary of Captain Philip Townshend, 22nd Foot’, 6–8 June 1758, NAM MSS 8001–30. W. T. Waugh, James Wolfe: Man and Soldier (Montreal: Louis Carrier & Co., 1928), p. 161. Townshend to Townshend, 26 August 1758, LAC R2819-0-7-E, pp. 16–17. Geoffrey Plank, An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign against the Peoples of Acadia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), p. 143. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic, p. 160. Aspinall-Oglander, Admiral’s Wife, p. 268; Mackay, Admiral Hawke, pp. 186–187. Dull, The French Navy, p. 79. David Syrett, ‘The Methodology of British Amphibious Operations during the Seven Years and American Wars’, The Mariner’s Mirror: The Journal of the Society for Nautical Research 58 (1972), p. 269. Braddock to Robinson, 18 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fols. 352–353; Keppel to Spendelow, 14 March 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fols. 297–298. Broadley to Clevland, 20 May 1756, NA ADM1/1487; Loring to Clevland, 21 June 1756, NA ADM1/2045; Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness, p. 110; Norreys Jephson O’Conor, A Servant of the Crown in England and in North America, 1756–1761 (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co. Inc., 1938), p. 53. Broadley to Clevland, 26 September 1756, NA ADM1/1487; Broadley to Clevland, 22 January 1757, NA ADM1/1488. ‘Extract of Commodore Keppel’s Orders’, 26 November 1754, NA CO5/211, fol. 141. Braddock to Robinson, 18 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fols. 352–353. Keppel to Mantell, 28 February 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fol. 273; Keppel to Barrington, 28 February 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fol. 274.

236

Notes

81 Keppel to Shackerly, 14 March 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fol. 248; Keppel to Shackerly, 27 March 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fol. 319. 82 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 15. 83 Keppel to Rosewell, 6 March 1755, in The Barrington Papers, pp. 118–119; Keppel to Diggs, 14 March 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fol. 306; Keppel to Pallisser, 14 March 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fol. 302; Keppel to Mantell, 6 March 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fol. 279; Keppel to Barrington, 6 March 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fol. 280. 84 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 15; Braddock to Newcastle, 20 March 1755, BL Add. 32,853, fol. 389. 85 Keppel to Spendelow, 14 March 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fols. 297–298. 86 A Return of the Troops Encamp’d at Will’s Creek, Distinguishing the Fit for Duty, Sick, and Wounded, 25 July 1755, in Military Affairs, pp. 125–127; Journal of M. General Braddock’s March towards Fort Duquesne, LAC R2278-0-4-E, pp. 4, 6–7; ‘The Morris Journal’, in Sargent, The History of an Expedition Against Fort Duquesne, pp. 368, 370–372, 382. 87 ‘A Return of the Troops Encamp’d at Will’s Creek, Distinguishing the Fit for Duty, Sick, and Wounded’, 25 July 1755, in Military Affairs, pp. 126–127. 88 Keppel to Spendelow, 14 March 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fols. 297–298; Keppel to Pallisser, 14 March 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fols. 302–303; Keppel to Arbuthorst, 24 July 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fol. 348; ‘A Return of the Troops Encamp’d at Will’s Creek, Distinguishing the Fit for Duty, Sick, and Wounded’, 25 July 1755, in Military Affairs, pp. 126–127. 89 Keppel to Pallisser, 14 March 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fol. 303; Keppel to Westhereby, 26 July 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fol. 349. 90 ‘A Return of the Troops Encamp’d at Will’s Creek, Distinguishing the Fit for Duty, Sick, and Wounded’, 25 July 1755, in Military Affairs, p. 125. 91 Keppel to Arbuthorst, 24 July 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fol. 348. 92 Shirley to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, 27 December 1755, NA ADM1/3818; Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 30. 93 Amherst to Ligonier, 22 October 1759, LAC R2856-0-8-E, fol. 28. 94 William Wood, All Afloat: A Chronicle of Craft and Waterways (Toronto: Glasgow, Brook & Company, 1915), pp. 1–5; Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 232. 95 Journal of Lt. Col. Robert Orme, BL King’s 212, fol. 30. 96 Shirley to Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 27 December 1755, NA ADM1/3818; Schutz, William Shirley, p. 197. 97 Shirley to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, 27 December 1755, NA ADM1/3818. 98 Delancey to St. Clair, 31 August 1755, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 177. 99 Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness, p. 108; Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, p. 148; Hamilton, The French and Indian Wars, p. 172; Anderson, The War That Made America, p. 74.

Notes

237

100 Hamilton, The French and Indian Wars, p. 172. 101 Halifax to Fox, 15 August 1756, LAC R2321-0-1-E, pp. 86–87; Amherst to Ligonier, 22 October 1759, LAC R2856-0-8-E, fol. 26; Williams to Williams, 27 July 1756, MHS Ms. N-473; Shirley to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, 27 December 1755, NA ADM1/3818. 102 Broadley to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, 26 September 1756, NA ADM1/1487; Shirley to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, 27 December 1755, NA ADM1/3818; Loring to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, 19 February 1759, NA ADM1/2048. 103 Keppel to Spendelow, 14 March 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fols. 299–300. 104 Keppel to Arbuthurst, 24 July 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fol. 348; Keppel to Westhereby, 26 July 1755, NMM KEP/1/A, fol. 349. 105 Loring to Cleveland, 21 June 1756, NA ADM1/2045. 106 Loring to Cleveland, 21 June 1756, NA ADM1/2045; Cuthbertson, Freshwater, pp. 72–73, 81. 107 Broadley to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, 26 September 1756, NA ADM1/1487. 108 Clive Wilkinson, The British Navy and the State in the Eighteenth Century (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2004), pp. 5, 77–78, 80–81; Daniel A. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 242–243. 109 Stevenson to St. Clair, 12 March 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 251. 110 Cuthbertson, Freshwater, p. 56. 111 Stevenson to St. Clair, 12 March 1756, NAS RH4/86/1, p. 251. 112 John W. Krueger, ‘The Fort Ticonderoga King’s Shipyard Excavation: An Overview’, The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 14, no. 6 (1985), p. 335; Arthur B. Cohn, ‘The Fort Ticonderoga King’s Shipyard Excavation: 1984 FieldSeason Report’, The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 14, no. 6 (1985), pp. 337–340. 113 Kevin J. Crisman, ‘The Construction of the Boscawen’, The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 14, no. 6 (1985), pp. 359, 363, 369; David R. Starbuck, The Great Warpath: British Military Sites from Albany to Crown Point (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1999), pp. 180–181. 114 Broadley to Clevland, 26 September 1756, NA ADM1/1487. 115 Broadley to Clevland, 22 January 1757, NA ADM1/1488. 116 Shirley to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, 7 September 1756, NA ADM1/3813. 117 Cuthbertson, Freshwater, pp. 74–76. 118 David Curtis Skaggs and Gerard T. Altoff, A Signal Victory: The Lake Erie Campaign, 1812–1813 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), p. 68.

238

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119 Broadley to Clevland, 26 September 1756, NA ADM1/1487. 120 N. A. M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (London: Fontana Press, 1988), p. 145. 121 Shirley to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, 27 December 1755, NA ADM1/3818. 122 Broadley to Clevland, 22 January 1757, NA ADM1/1488. 123 Broadley to Clevland, 14 January 1756, NA ADM1/1487. 124 Montcalm as quoted in Cuthbertson, Freshwater, p. 90. 125 Broadley to Clevland, 26 September 1756, NA ADM1/1487; Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 153. 126 Shirley to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, 7 September 1756, NA ADM1/3818; Chet, Conquering the Wilderness, p. 110. 127 Broadley to Clevland, 26 September 1756, NA ADM1/1487. 128 Broadley to Clevland, 22 January 1757, NA ADM1/1488; Shirley to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, 7 September 1756, NA ADM1/3818. 129 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, pp. 266–267. 130 Clevland to Broadley, 19 January 1757, NA ADM1/706, fol. 405. 131 Broadley to Clevland, 26 September 1756, NA ADM1/1487; Shirley to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, 7 September 1756, NA ADM1/3818; Cuthbertson, Freshwater, p. 86. 132 Loring to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, 19 February 1759, NA ADM1/2048. 133 Amherst to Ligonier, 22 October 1759, LAC R2856-0-8-E, fol. 26. 134 Godfrey, Pursuit of Profit and Preferment, pp. 129–130. 135 Loring to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, 19 February 1759, NA ADM1/2048. 136 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, p. 272; Corbett, England in the Seven Years’ War, p. 171; Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic, p. 166; Baugh, The Global Seven Years’ War, p. 113. 137 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, p. 272. 138 Dull, The French Navy, pp. 80–81. 139 Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 208. 140 Bougainville, Adventure in the Wilderness, p. 4. 141 Dull, The French Navy, p. 81. 142 Richard Garrett, General Wolfe (London: Arthur Barker Limited, 1975), p. 124; Hugh Boscawen, The Capture of Louisbourg, 1758 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), p. 155. 143 Wolfe to Wolfe, 27 July 1758, in Beckles, Life and Letters, pp. 384–385. 144 ‘Diary of Captain Philip Townshend, 22nd Foot’, 4–6 June 1758, NAM MSS 8001– 30; Louis des Cognets Jr., Amherst and Canada (Princeton: Privately Printed, 1962), p. 88. 145 Garrett, General Wolfe, p. 125.

Notes 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154

155

156 157

158 159

160 161 162 163 164

165 166 167 168 169

239

Amherst to Pitt, 11 June 1758, NA CO5/53, fols. 85–86. Journal of Rear Admiral Durell, 1–8 June 1758, NA ADM50/7, fols. 185–186. Syrett, ‘The Methodology of British Amphibious Operations’, p. 269. Amherst to Pitt, 11 June 1758, NA CO5/53, fol. 86. Gipson, The Victorious Years, p. 194. Wolfe to Sackville, 30 July 1758, in The Life and Letters of James Wolfe, p. 388. Syrett, ‘The Methodology of British Amphibious Operations’, p. 269. Brewse to the Board of Ordnance, 18 October 1755, in Military Affairs, p. 146; Gipson, The Years of Defeat, p. 229. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic, pp. 160, 166; Vice Admiral Holburne’s Journal of a Voyage to Halifax, 11, 22 July 1757, NA ADM50/7, fols. 272, 274; Saunders to Pitt, no date 1759, NA CO5/51, fol. 38. Corbett, England in the Seven Years’ War, p. 325; Lawrence Shaw Mayo, Jeffery Amherst: A Biography, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1916), p. 81; Gipson, The Victorious Years, pp. 202–203. Wolfe to Sackville, 30 July 1758, in The Life and Letters of James Wolfe, pp. 388–389. Corbett, England in the Seven Years’ War, p. 325; Gipson, The Victorious Years, pp. 202–203, 260; Admiral Sir Edmund R. Freemantle, ‘Boscawen’, in From Howard to Nelson: Twelve Sailors, ed. John Knox Laughton (London: William Heinemann, 1900), p. 261. Corbett, England in the Seven Years’ War, p. 327. ‘Secret Instructions for Our Trusty and Welbeloved Charles Saunders’, 10 February 1759, NA CO5/214, fol. 69; Journal of Rear Admiral Durell, 21 June, 1, 9, 20 July, 26 August, 1759, NA ADM50/7, fols. 235–237, 240, 244; Corbett, England in the Seven Years’ War, p. 425; McLynn, 1759, pp. 287–290. Broadley to Clevland, 22 January 1757, NA ADM1/1488. Cuthbertson, Freshwater, p. 79. Broadley to Clevland, 22 January 1757, NA ADM1/1488. Dull, The French Navy, p. 80. Rodger, The Command of the Sea, p. 266; Rodger, ‘George, Lord Anson’, p. 193; Barrow, The Life of George Lord Anson, p. 249; Holburne to Holdernesse, 4 August 1757, in Military Affairs, pp. 388–390; Loudoun to Cumberland, 6 August 1757, in Military Affairs, pp. 391–394. Rodger, ‘George, Lord Anson’, p. 194. Vice Admiral Holburne’s Journal of a Voyage to Halifax, 15 March, 1757, NA ADM50/7, fol. 256. Loudoun to Cumberland, 6 August 1757, in Military Affairs, pp. 391–394. Boscawen to Boscawen, 26 June 1755, in Naval Miscellany, pp. 194–195. Garrett, General Wolfe, p. 127.

240

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170 An unknown British soldier as quoted in Johnston, Endgame 1758, p. 219. 171 Wolfe to Wolfe, 27 July 1758, in The Life and Letters of James Wolfe, p. 384; Wolfe to Sackville, 30 July 1758, in The Life and Letters of James Wolfe, p. 387. 172 Boscawen as quoted in Freemantle, ‘Boscawen’, p. 271. 173 Journal of Rear Admiral Durell, 3, 6 June 1759, NA ADM50/7, fol. 187; Boscawen to Pitt, 27 May 1758, NA CO5/53, fol. 13; ‘An Account of the Expedition against Louisbourg Anno Domi: 1758 under the Command of Admiral Boscawen’, 3–4 June 1758, BL Add. 11,813, fols. 82–83.; ‘Diary of Captain Philip Townshend, 22nd Foot’, 3 June 1758, NAM MSS 8001–30; McLennan, Louisbourg, p. 243; William Wood, ed., The Logs of the Conquest of Canada (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 171–172. 174 Boscawen to Pitt, 28 July 1758, NA CO5/53, fol. 46; Mayo, Jeffrey Amherst, pp. 86–87; Gipson, The Victorious Years, p. 205; Freemantle, ‘Boscawen’, p. 260. 175 Waugh, James Wolfe, p. 167. 176 Stuart Reid, Wolfe: The Career of General James Wolfe from Culloden to Quebec (New York: Sarpedon, 2000), p. 151. 177 Saunders to Pitt, no date 1759, NA CO5/51, fol. 38; Stephen Manning, Quebec: The Story of Three Sieges (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), p. 37; Corbett, England in the Seven Years War, pp. 416, 433; Dull, The French Navy, p. 149. 178 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, p. 278. 179 Stacey, Quebec, 1759, p. 59. 180 Middleton, ‘Naval Administration in the Age of Pitt and Anson’, p. 123. 181 Julian Gwyn, ‘The Royal Navy in North America, 1712–1776’, in The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International Inc., 1989), pp. 139–140.

Conclusion 1

2 3 4 5 6 7

Marie Peters, Pitt and Popularity: The Patriot Minister and London Opinion during the Seven Years’ War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 125; Sherrard, Lord Chatham, p. 292. Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 297. Temple as quoted in Ruville, William Pitt, Vol. 2, p. 214. Pontchartrain as quoted in Johnston, Endgame 1758, p. 299. Wood, The Great Fortress, pp. 80–81. King George II as quoted in Sherrard, Lord Chatham, p. 293. Pitt to Amherst & Boscawen, 9 September 1758, NA CO5/213, fols. 148–149.

Notes 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

15 16 17 18

19

20 21 22

23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

241

The London Chronicle as quoted in Wood, The Great Fortress, p. 129. Ruville, William Pitt, Vol. 2, p. 215; McLennan, Louisbourg, p. 289. Dull, The French Navy, pp. 143, 148. Raymond F. Baker, A Campaign of Amateurs: The Siege of Louisbourg, 1745 (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1995), p. 5. Montcalm as quoted in Frégault, Canada, p. 227. Dull, The French Navy, pp. 104, 122. Mayo, Jeffery Amherst, p. 184; Jeremy Black, George III: America’s Last King (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 43; Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 408; and The War That Made America, pp. 216–217. Knox, The Siege of Quebec, p. 293. Long, Lord Jeffery Amherst, p. 135. Voltaire, Candide or Optimism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), p. 94. Instructions to Braddock, 25 November 1754, NA CO 5/211, fols. 126–138; Robinson to Shirley, 28 August 1755, CWS 2: pp. 241–242; Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, pp. 57–58. Noel St. John Williams, Redcoats along the Hudson: The Struggle for North America, 1754–1763 (London: Brassey’s Classics, 1997), pp. 127–131; Middleton, The Bells of Victory, p. 55. ‘Journal Kept by David Gordon’, 3 June 1758, LAC R5068-0-8-E; Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness, pp. 133–134. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, pp. 351–353. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, pp. 272–273; Journal of Rear Admiral Durell, 3, 6 June 1759, NA ADM50/7, fol. 187; Boscawen to Pitt, 27 May 1758, NA CO5/53, fol. 13; ‘An Account of the Expedition against Louisbourg Anno Domi: 1758 under the Command of Admiral Boscawen’, 3–4 June 1758, BL Add. 11,813, fols. 82–83; ‘Diary of Captain Philip Townshend, 22nd Foot’, 3 June 1758, NAM MSS 8001–30; Saunders to Pitt, no date 1759, NA CO5/51, fol. 38. Minute Book of Sir William Johnson, 4, 12 March 1757, LAC R10943-0-8-E, Series 1, Lot 681, pp. 26, 29; Examination of Lieut. Barent Staats, 1758, LAC R6597-0-0-E. Pitt to Amherst, 24 October 1760, CWP 2: p. 345. Pitt to Amherst & Boscawen, 9 September 1758, NA CO5/213, fols. 148–149. Leslie Buell, ‘In Defense of the General’, The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 12, no. 3 (1967), p. 232. Lewis, Montcalm, p. 23. Schutz, William Shirley, pp. 240–242. Franklin, The Autobiography, p. 170. Pouchot, Memoirs, p. 104. Franklin, The Autobiography, p. 170.

242

Notes

32 Hardwicke to Newcastle, 5 September 1757, in Yorke, The Life and Correspondence, Vol. 3, p. 171. 33 Dull, The French Navy, pp. 80–81. 34 McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p. 2. 35 Franklin, The Autobiography, p. 150. 36 Washington, George Washington Remembers, p. 21.

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Index Abenaki 90, 144, 146 Abercromby, General James 76, 190–1 Acadia 6, 12, 84 Aix-la-Chapelle, Peace of 10 Albany 32, 43, 63–7, 79, 81, 89, 118, 122, 192 congress 46 defence 34, 36, 70 logistical support 108, 111–12, 114, 176 alcohol 66–7 American Independence, War of 58, 134–5 Amerindians 15, 17, 73–91, 93–9, 106, 122–3, 126, 130, 136–48, 157, 169, 171, 174–5 affairs 4, 6–7, 43–4, 190 alcohol 63, 67 Amherst, General Jeffery 2, 10, 146, 173, 179–82, 187, 190, 193 Amherst, Captain William 187 amphibious operations 170, 180–3 Annapolis Royal 182 Anson, Admiral George, Lord 161, 163, 184, 186 army, British 14, 19, 102, 107–10, 116–17, 122, 124, 127, 129–31, 156–7 Amerindian affairs 77–80 colonial relations 4, 6, 27, 53–4, 59, 62–71 financing 39–40 illness 107–8, 148–57 psychological warfare 135–48, 156–7 quartering 69–70 recruits 130–5 use of irregulars 84, 90, 94, 98 army, French 18, 70, 82, 127, 144, 146 Army of Observation 2 Atkin, Edmond 76–7 Austria 10–11 Austrian Sucession, War of 2, 10, 83, 131, 148

Barton, Captain Matthew 167 bateaux 114–16, 176 battles Bunker Hill (1775) 135 Bushy Run (1763) 87–8, 94 Carillon (1758) 62, 76, 86, 94, 99, 137 Concord (1775) 58 Culloden (1746) 86–7 Falkirk (1746) 86 Great Meadows (1754) 3, 13, 20 Harlem Heights (1776) 135 Hastenbeck (1757) 2 Lake George (1755) 47, 58–9 Louisbourg (1758) 1–2, 16, 86, 90, 93, 116, 122, 162, 169–70, 181–5 Minorca (1756) 1, 159–61, 184 Monongahela (1755) 1, 58, 78, 138, 143–4, 147, 170, 173, 191–3 Oswego (1756) 1–2, 22, 47, 78, 115–16, 144, 146, 167–9, 176–9, 191 Prestonpans (1745) 86, 135–7 Quiberon Bay (1759) 160 Québec (1759) 86, 90–5, 99, 127, 146–7, 165, 183, 185–6 William Henry (1757) 1, 83–4, 110, 116, 144–6, 148, 192 Yorktown (1781) 135 Beaujeu, Captain Daniel-Hyacinth-Marie Lienard de 6 Belcher, Governor Jonathan 28, 35 Boscawen, Admiral Edward 17–19, 163–6, 183–5, 187 Boston 38, 41, 53, 134, 167 Bougainville, Colonel Louis-Antoine 2, 67, 73, 79–82, 86, 89, 98, 181 Bouquet, Colonel Henry 68–70, 82, 87, 94, 104–6, 109, 111–12, 115, 131, 155–6 relations with governors 34, 36 Braddock, General Edward 6–7, 32, 50, 74, 101–2, 109, 167, 170–4, 190–3 Amerindian relations 77–80, 83–4, 96–8, 126

Index conflict with colonials 37–40, 42, 44–5, 50, 66–70 defeat 1, 3, 19, 136 expedition 102–10, 112–13, 115, 136–48 forces 5, 17–18, 87, 89, 94, 120–2, 124, 129–32, 155–6 instructions from ministry 20–2, 23–5, 27–31, 63–5, 75, 117–18 Bradstreet, Colonel John 2–3, 28, 48–9, 56, 80, 114, 132–3, 145, 180 transport system 106–8, 116, 169, 191 Brant, Molly 75–6 Brest 18, 175, 184 Broadley, Captain Housman 168–9, 176–80, 183 Browne, Lieutenant Francis 66, 105–6 Burton, Colonel Ralph 149 Byng, Admiral John 1, 9, 159–61, 179, 184, 186, 190 Byng Principle 192 Byrd III, William 76–7, 81–2 Calcraft, John 132 Canada 5, 13, 17–18, 22, 64, 79–81, 96, 109–10, 163–4, 166 defence 1, 73, 116, 134, 148 fall 2, 127, 146, 187, 188–90, 193 Cape Breton 25, 161, 187 Céleron, Captain Pierre-Joseph de Blainville de 12 Cholmley, Captain Robert 103, 139–40, 144 Church, Lieutenant John 89 Coats, Edward 91, 147 colonial assemblies 23, 28, 30, 37–54 Connecticut 32, 36 Georgia 34, 36 Maryland 29, 33, 36, 39, 44 Massachusetts 24, 41–2, 44, 46, 49–50, 54–5, 65 New Hampshire 33, 36 New Jersey 36, 44 New York 36, 39–40 North Carolina 39 Pennsylvania 30, 35–6, 38–44 Rhode Island 49 South Carolina 31, 35–6, 39 Virginia 31–2, 37–40, 58 colonial exploitation 62–70 colonial forces 4, 31–5, 53–62 Massachusetts 2, 33, 38, 59, 167

259

militia 4, 14, 32–4, 53–4, 57–9, 84, 133–5, 192 provincials 41, 47, 49, 65, 87, 131, 149–50, 156, 189–90 scouts 88–90, 93–5, 97 service with regulars 13, 20–1, 38, 50, 53–4, 60–2 Connecticut 33, 36, 46–7, 49, 57 Cresap, Thomas 119–20 Croghan, George 77 Crown Point 17, 22, 38, 56, 59, 76, 91 Cumberland, William Augustus, Duke of 2, 14–15, 17, 19–20, 23–4, 85 De Lancey, Governor James 32, 36, 39, 64, 120 Delaware 40 Delaware tribe 22, 96 Denny, Governor William 41 Devonshire, William Cavendish, Duke of 130, 160 Dieskau, Jean-Armand, baron de 58–9, 142 Dinwiddie, Governor Robert 28–30, 32–3, 36–40, 43, 48, 57, 64, 78, 131 Ohio expedition (1754) 11–16, 61, 85 Dobbs, Governor Arthur 33, 35 dockyards 174–6, 186 Drucour, Governor Augustin de 184 Du Bois de la Motte, Admiral EmmanuelAuguste de Cahideuc, comte 180 Dunbar, Colonel Thomas 121, 132, 144 Durell, Admiral Philip 165–6, 181 1812, War of 177 Ellis, Governor Henry 34 finances 24, 28–9, 30–1, 39–40, 44–7, 67–9, 190 Fletcher, Henry 109, 118, 153 Forbes, General John 3, 25, 102, 117, 123–4, 134–5, 149 expedition 32–3, 59–60, 76–8, 81–3, 85–6, 104–6, 109, 111–13, 115 Fort Beauséjour 17, 170, 182–3 Fort Carillon 62, 76, 79, 82, 86–7, 94, 99, 137 Fort Cumberland, Maryland 30, 32–3, 38, 60, 82, 108–10, 141 Fort Cumberland, Nova Scotia 152

260

Index

Fort Dummer 41 Fort Duquesne 3, 17, 32, 74, 109, 113, 124, 126, 173, 191 expedition (1755) 6, 21–2, 29, 67, 78–9, 121–2, 130, 139, 141–2, 147–8 expedition (1758) 59–60, 62, 81, 85–7, 104, 106, 134 Fort Edward 32, 34, 49, 57, 89, 123, 125, 152–3 Fort Frontenac 1–2, 22, 116, 174, 180 Fort Hendrick 97 Fort Littleton 104–6, 112 Fort Loudoun 82, 104, 106, 112 Fort Malden 177 Fort Massachusetts 89 Fort Necessity 3, 13, 20 Fort Niagara 17, 22, 80, 96, 116, 174 Fort Oswego 47, 63, 78, 125–6, 133–4, 156, 161, 170–1, 174–6, 191 battle 1–2, 22, 78, 144, 146, 167–9, 176–80, 183 resupply 65, 97, 106–8, 115–17 Fort William Henry 6, 16, 70, 78, 89, 106, 116, 129, 155, 192 battle and massacre 1, 32, 34, 49, 59, 67, 83–4, 110, 144–6, 148 living conditions 125, 149–52 ’45 Rebellion 83–7, 135–7, 148 Fox, Henry 14–15, 17, 43, 70 Franklin, Benjamin 23, 46, 110, 192 Fraser, Colonel Malcolm 91 Frontenac, Louis de Baude, comte de 77 Fundy, Bay of 161 Gabarouse Bay 182 Gage, Colonel Thomas 92, 113, 138, 143 George II 2–3, 10, 42–3, 85, 187 Georgia 33–4, 36 Gibraltar 159, 161 Gist, Christopher 76 Glen, Governor James 81, 115, 124 Gordon, David 116 Granby, General John Manners, Marquess of 149 Grant, Major James 3, 82–3, 87 Grant, Lieutenant John 103, 125 Greene, Governor William 35 Grenville, Sir Richard 183 Gulf of St Lawrence 1–2, 18, 161, 164, 166–7, 186

Halifax 66, 85, 125, 162, 164–5, 167, 184, 186 Halifax, George Montagu Dunk, Earl of 40–1, 43, 97 Halkett, Colonel Sir Peter 17, 38, 110, 136–7 Halloran, Colonel Laurence 93 Hanover 2–3, 10–11, 25 Hanoverian soldiers 19 Hardwicke, Philip Yorke, Earl of 3, 19–20, 192 Hardy, Governor and Admiral Charles 48, 97, 162 Havana 151 Hawke, Admiral Sir Edward 160 Hessians 19 Highlanders 16, 60, 74, 82–8, 90, 94–5, 98, 135–7, 147 Hocquart, Captain Gilles de Blincourt de 164 Holburne, Admiral Francis 18, 162, 165, 184 Holdernesse, Robert D’Arcy, Earl of 11–13, 18, 36, 40, 46 horses 35, 60, 104–5, 107–16, 191 forage 101, 108, 112–14, 116, 123 Howe, General George Augustus, Viscount 93 Howe, Captain Richard 163 Howe, Colonel William 93 Humpherys, Richard 162, 164–5 illegal trade 63–5 Ireland 15, 66, 70, 115, 131, 155 Iroquois 75, 77–8 Jacobites 19, 87, 102, 135 James III and VIII 135 Johnson, Sir William 17, 47, 58–9, 67, 75–7, 79, 95–7 Keppel, Commodore Augustus 18, 21, 66, 120, 171–4 Kinsale 132 Klosterzeven, Convention of 2, 25 La Galissonière, Admiral Roland-Michel Barrin, comte de 160 Lagos Bay 160 Lake Champlain 59, 176

Index Lake George 47, 58–9, 76, 78, 97 Lake Ontario 2, 168, 173–9, 183, 186, 191 L’Anse au Foulon 93 Ligonier, General Sir John 92, 187 logistics 4–5, 7, 101–17 Loring, Captain Joshua 173, 175–6, 180 Loudoun, John Campbell, Earl of 20, 24–5, 76, 85, 89–90, 92, 146, 149, 180–1, 184 colonial affairs 6–7, 23, 32–5, 41, 48–51, 62, 68–70, 116, 149, 190–3 Louis XV 1 Louisbourg 1–2, 121, 165, 174, 187–8, 190 battle (1758) 90, 93, 162, 169–70, 181–6 blockade (1755) 18, 162, 164, 166 campaign (1758) 16, 25, 62, 78, 86, 99, 116, 122, 167 capture (1745) 2, 22–4, 59, 133, 166, 187 failed siege, (1757) 23, 34, 116, 125, 162, 164, 167, 170, 180–1, 183–4, 186, 192 Loyalhanning 124 Lyttelton, Governor William Henry 36 Marlborough, John Churchill, Duke of 101–2, 126 Maryland 27, 29, 32–3, 36, 38–40, 44, 68, 113, 120, 132 Massachusetts 24, 32, 34, 36, 40, 44, 46–50, 55, 57, 65, 138 McDonald, Captain William 87 medicine 107–8, 119 burials 150–2 disease 5, 16, 108, 119, 130, 148–9, 151–2, 156 public health and preventive medicine 107–8, 148–56 scurvy 115, 117, 119, 123, 126, 180 smallpox 152 typhus 152, 154, 180, 184, 192 Mercer, Colonel James 97, 115, 144, 168–9, 176, 178–9 Mohawk 58, 64, 75–8 Monckton, General Robert 53, 182 Monongahela, river 1, 35, 98, 104, 130 Monro, Donald 107–8, 119, 124, 149, 151 Monro, Colonel George 145 Montcalm, General Louis Joseph Gozon de Saint-Véran, marquis de 78, 83, 93, 110, 116, 127, 144–5, 148, 164, 178–9, 186, 188, 191–2

261

Montréal 2, 73, 80, 170, 174, 188–90 Morris, Governor Robert Hunter 30, 35–7, 39–42, 45, 65, 106 Murray, Colonel Alexander 85 Murray, General James 91–2 navy, British 5, 102, 119, 161, 168, 171, 181–2, 186 navy, French 1, 147, 160, 177, 185 neutral islands 63 Newcastle, Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke of 3, 9–13, 17–19, 23–4, 39, 68–9, 130, 160, 187 ministry 3, 10, 15, 21, 25, 160, 189 New Hampshire 33, 36, 48–9 New Jersey 28, 35–6, 44 New York 1, 12, 23, 32, 35, 47–8, 133, 155–6, 178, 181 colonial and army relations 36, 39–40, 47–8, 63, 65, 68–70, 192 Nova Scotia 24, 152 Ogilvie, John 76 Ohio River Valley 11–15, 21, 32, 35–6, 63–4, 78, 95, 102, 109, 122, 142 Oneida 76, 81, 97 Onondaga 77, 96–7 Orme, Captain Robert 22, 29–30, 56–7, 97, 105, 108–10, 113, 119, 122, 133, 139–40, 172 Osborne, Governor Danvers 48 Oughton, Colonel James Adolphus 119 Parker, Colonel John 106 Parliament 19, 31, 44, 49, 131 Partridge, Colonel Oliver 41, 65 Pearson, Jeremiah 167 Pelham, Henry 19, 24 Pennsylvania 29–30, 35–6, 38–44, 48, 68, 110 Peters, Richard 30 Philadelphia 33, 44, 65, 70 Pitt, William, the Elder 5–6, 10, 19–20, 25, 33, 160, 187 changes in policy 21, 31, 38, 49–50, 54, 61–2, 70, 130, 189–90 Plains of Abraham 93, 127 Pompadour, Jeanne Antoinette Poisson, marquise de 9 Pontchartrain, Jérôme Phélypeaux, comte 2, 187

262

Index

Pontiac 99 Pontiac’s Rebellion 94 Port Mahon 159 Pouchot, Captain Pierre 80, 83, 94, 96, 116 Pownall, Governor Thomas 34, 49–50 Pringle, Sir John 119, 121, 148–56 provisions 4, 7, 54, 79, 97, 114–27, 134, 156, 171, 189–91 fresh 121–5 salt 117–19 spoiled 119–21 supply 21, 28–32, 37–8, 47, 63–5, 70–1, 82, 125–6 transport 62, 101–3, 106–8, 110–12 Prussia 10–11 Quakers 42–4 Québec 2, 64, 66, 86, 99, 109, 117–18, 121, 126, 163, 169–70, 181 campaign 16, 53, 86, 90–3, 95, 99, 127, 146, 165–7, 183, 185–7 Quiberon Bay 160 rangers 17, 60, 74, 84, 89–95, 99, 131, 141, 181 Raystown 82, 111 Rhode Island 35, 47–9, 89 Richmond, Charles Lennox, Duke of 98 Robinson, Sir Thomas 16, 28, 36, 46, 48, 78, 118, 171 Rogers, Major Robert 89–92, 146 Rogers Island 125 Roubaud, Joseph Antoine 84, 129 Rous, Captain John 164, 183, 186 Royal American Regiment 131, 134 Royal Navy, See navy, British Saunders, Admiral Charles 166, 183, 185–6 Scotland 84, 87, 102, 137 Seneca 95 Sharpe, Governor Horatio 29, 32–3, 36, 60, 120, 132 ships Alcide 163–4 Bienfaisant 185 Boscawen 176 Centurion 172–4 Dauphin Royal 163 Defiance 163

Diana 181 Dunkirk 163 Eltham 166 Grammont 181 Guarland 172 Halifax 181, 185 Kennington 181, 185 Litchfield 167 Lys 163 Mohawk 179 Monarch 160 Nightingale 172 Norwich 172 Ontario 168, 176–7, 179 Prudent 185 Seahorse 172–3 Shannon 181 Squirrel 181 Sutherland 181 Syren 172 Shirley, Governor William 22–5, 30, 35–6, 42, 45–50, 55, 75, 79, 131, 187, 190, 193 Oswego 108, 114–15, 133, 169, 174, 177–8, 191 Silesia 11 South Carolina 31, 35–6, 39, 68, 70, 81, 132, 155 Spendelow, Lieutenant Charles 172–4 Stephens, Colonel Adam 138 St Clair, Sir John 27, 45, 56–9, 63, 69, 83, 132, 134, 138, 142, 155–6, 174 logistical operations 21, 29–30, 35–6, 38, 65–7, 103–4, 106, 108, 110–11, 113–14, 124, 154 St Francis 146 St Lawrence 1–2, 18, 161–7, 170, 174, 184–6 Stobo, Captain Robert 74 Stuart, Prince Charles Edward 102, 135 supernatural, fears of 137–8 Temple, Richard Grenville, Earl of 187 Theyanoguin ‘King Hendrick’ 76 Townshend, General George, Viscount 147, 165, 170 Townshend, Captain Philip 90, 122, 125, 163, 167, 169 Treasury 23, 49–51 Tuscarora 97

Index Vassan, Captain Jean-François de 96 Vaudreuil, Governor Pierre de Rigaud, marquis de 2, 127 Versailles 12 Virginia 21, 23–4, 36–8, 66, 78, 83, 115, 117, 155, 171 military contributions 11–13, 27, 31–2, 40, 56–8, 60–1, 129, 131, 192 Voltaire 160, 189 wagons 5, 35, 38, 60, 65, 79, 104–5, 109–12, 114, 116, 191 Walker Expedition 14–15, 164 warfare 3, 44, 73–4, 84, 89, 92 psychological 5, 7, 73, 95, 129, 135–48, 156 Washington, Colonel George 27, 32, 40, 58, 61, 110, 129, 134, 141, 192 Ohio (1754) 3, 13–16, 20, 60–1, 131 weather 1, 5, 7, 116, 161–70 currents 161, 166–7, 169, 180, 186 fog 161–5, 169, 180–1, 185–6

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ice 161, 164–6, 180, 186 wind 161, 164, 166–9, 171, 176–7, 179–80, 183, 186 Webb, General Daniel 34, 53, 116, 120 Wentworth, Governor Benning 33, 59 Whitehall 4, 6, 27, 29–30, 36, 40, 44, 46, 48, 73, 102, 171 Willard, Captain Nathan 41 William III 48, 115 Williams, Colonel Ephraim 38, 55, 78, 118 Williams, Colonel Israel 7, 22–3, 32, 34, 41–2, 47–8, 55, 59, 63, 89, 97 Williams, Elijah 41, 59, 88–9 Williams, William 115 Williamson, Colonel George 66, 155, 162, 164 Winslow, General John 55 Wolfe, General James 1, 6, 84–5, 93, 96, 127, 130, 146–7, 166, 169–70, 181–6, 188