The structure of Love 0300045662

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
PREFACE
CHAPTER 1 Two Views of Love
CHAPTER 2 Love at Second Sight
CHAPTER 3 The Uniqueness of the Beloved
CHAPTER 4 Coming First
CHAPTER 5 Aristophanic Love
CHAPTER 6 The Satisfaction of Desire
CHAPTER 7 Hate, Love, and Rationality
CHAPTER 8 Defending and Refining Erosic Love
CHAPTER 9 Exclusivity
CHAPTER 10 Constancy
CHAPTER 11 Reciprocity
CHAPTER 12 Concern and the Morality of Love
CHAPTER 13 The Object of Love
NOTES
PREFACE
CHAPTER ONE: TWO VIEWS OF LOVE
CHAPTER TWO: LOVE AT SECOND SIGHT
CHAPTER THREE: THE UNIQUENESS OF THE BELOVED
CHAPTER FOUR: COMING FIRST
CfiAPTER FIVE: ARISTOPHANIC LOVE
CHAPTER SIX: THE SATISFACTION OF DESIRE
CHAPTER SEVEN: HATE, LOVE, AND RATIONALITY
CHAPTER EIGHT: DEFENDING AND REFINING EROSIC LOVE
CHAPTER NINE: EXCLUSrVITY
CHAPTER TEN: CONSTANCY
CHAPTER ELEVEN: RECIPROCITY
CHAPTER TWELVE: CONCERN AND THE MORALITY OF LOVE
CPiAPTER THIRTEEN: THE OBJECT OF LOVE
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX

Citation preview

Tale University Press

New Haven

THE STRUCTURE OF

Love ALAN SOBLE

& Londojt

©

Copyright

1990 by Yale University.

not be reproduced,

in

whole or

All rights reserved.

This book

in part, including illustrations, in

may

any form

(bevond that copving permined bv sections 107 and 108 of the U.S.

Law and

Copyright

except

b\'

rcxiewers for the public press), without written

permission from the publishers.

The author

acknowledges permission to reprint from the following

gratefully

copyrighted works: Excerpt from "Sonnet 43" from 100 Love Sonnets by

Pablo Neruda. Copyright

©

Pablo Neruda 1959 and Fundacion Pablo

Neruda. Excerpt from "Sormet #24" from Berryman's Sonnets by John

©

Berr\'man. Copyright

1952, 1967, by John Bern'man. Reprinted by

permission of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., and of Faber and Faber Ltd.

The

last six lines

from "For Anne Gregory'" by William Buder Yeats

reprinted with permission of Macmillan Publishing

Poems ofW. B. Teats: Copyright

©

A

are

Company from The

Nen^ Edition, edited by Richard

J.

Finneran.

1933 by Macmillan Publishing Company, renewed 1961 by

Bertha Georgie Yeats.

Designed

Room

b\'

Nana'

and

0\'edo\'itz

of Michigan. Printed

in the

set in Galliard

type by the

Composing

United States of America bv Book

Crafters, Inc., Chelsea, Michigan.

Librar\'

of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Soble, Alan,

The

structure of love p.

/

Alan Soble.

cm.

Bibliography: p. Includes index.

ISBN 0-300-04566-2 Love.

1.

BD436.S59

I.

(alk.

paper)

Title.

1990

89-16571

128'.4-dc20

CIP The paper

in this

book meets the guidelines

the

Committee on Production Guidelines

on

Library' Resources.

10

for

for

permanence and

Book

durability'

of

Longevity' of the Council

987654321

For Mom and Dad (and Nunches)

CONTENTS

Preface, xi

1

Two Views

ofLove, 1

Love Ostcnsivelv Defined. Propertv'-Based and ReasonDependent Love. Object-Centric and Subject-Centric Loves.

The Two

Love. The

Traditions. Derivative Features of

Human Love

for

God. Reconciling Eros and

Agape. Mill's Dedication.

2.

Love at Second Sight, 31 Gellner's Paradox.

The The 3.

Impossibilit)'

Knowledge and Love

at First Sight.

of Love. Nongeneral Love- Reasons.

Substitution Problem.

The Uniqueness of the Beloved, 48 Strange Music Lover. Counterfactual Meetings.

A

Defending Uniqueness. Shared

Histor)'.

Dynamic

Love. Metaphysical Uniqueness. Uniqueness and Exclusivity.

4.

Coming!

First,

68

The Democratization of Love. 5.

Why Primacy Must

Fail.

Aristophanic Love, 78

Aristophanes' M)lJi.

The

Structure of Aristophanic

Love. The First Generation. Later Generations.

Matching the Lover's Nature.

Contents

viii

6.

The Satisfaaion of Desire, 91

The Missing

Link. Implications of the Model. Giving in

A

Order to Get. Desire in

7.

Normative Concept. The Roles of

Love.

Hate, Love, and Rationality, 107

The

Erosic Emotions. Hate at First Sight. Explanations

and

Justifications. Irrational Lo\'e.

Anomalous Emotion.

Love

A Euthyphro

as

an

Problem. Loving the

Unlovable. Distinguishing Love from Hate. 8.

Defending and Refinin£[ Erosic Love, 138

Love Without Any

Sights.

The

Indescribable Beloved.

Love and

Lo\'e and Self- Respect.

Will.

Reasons. Destroving Love. Reasons

Ex Post Facto

Not

to Love.

Conditional Unconditionalit\\

169

9. Exclusivity,

Two

Notions of Exclusivity.

Loves.

The

Difficulties in Multiple

Lover's Self-Concept. Joint Interests.

Intimaa^ and

Exclusivit)'. Exclusive Triads. Erosic

Exclusivit\\

The Desire

Exclusivit\'.

Loving Properties. Sexual

10. Constancy,

for Exclusivit)'.

Agapic Exclusivity.

203

A New Paradox.

Varieties of Constancy.

Defending

a

Doctrine of Constancv. Love for the Person. Loving for Identity' Properties.

Types of Properties. Agapic

Constancy. 11. Reciprocity,

237

Defining Reciprocity. Defending the Doctrine of Reciprocit)'.

The Desire

Mutualit\'. Reciprocity

Agapic

for Reciprocity'. Convolutions.

and Constancy. Erosic and

Reciprocit}'.

and the Morality of Love, 257 Hooking Humbert. Self-Love. Egocentric

12. Concern

and

Sacrifice.

Carte Blanche Concern.

Philia?

Good

in

Love

Whose

Sense.^ Identif\'ing with the Beloved. Special Concern.

Love, Justice, and Morality.

Contents

13.

ix

TheObjeaofLove,286 The Blonde's Complaint. Nonfungible Attachment. Phenomcnological

Irrcplaccabilit}'. Irreplaccabilitv

by

"Whole" Person. Loving Love. Persons as Properties. Persons Are Not Properties. Ending a Regress. Small Causes. Individuation. Loving the

Notes,

321

Bibliography,

Index,

367

357

PREFACE man were

An

ancient philosopher has said that,

his

experiences, then he would be, without knowing

philosopher.

I

have

now

I

have considered gathering

Contribution

to the

to record accurately a

word of the

a relationship

ought then to bear some

the material into a book, entitled:

all

Theory of the Kiss.

— Soren

In the final pages of Pornography,

I

I

Kierkegaard

asked whether photographs and films

could represent and communicate the lovingness, than a year after

of

all

subject, a

for a long time lived in close association with the

communitv' of the betrothed. Such fruit.

if a

if

any, of sexual acts.

More

began to write The Structure of Love, I noticed that I had and I wondered whether love's being

finished Pomo£iraphy by discussing love,

the final topic in a

book devoted to

sexuality

was an unconscious sign of my

or prejudices. But many books develop, either coincidentally or

true interests

intentionally, the author's final thoughts in an immediately preceding book.

Discussing love, even

briefly, in a

book on sexuality and sexual images is hardly on love is scarcely more so. That I

surprising; subsequently writing a treatise

have turned

my

attention to love (in a

does not indicate that

I

book

that barely mentions sexualit)')

think the theoretical problems in sexualit)' have been

show that concerns with the nature and significance of love have concerns with sexuality' in my intellectual life. The investigation of

solved. It does

replaced

one

set

of

social

or scientific problems

is

often temporarily suspended, or

permanendy abandoned, even though they have not been solved, in favor of another set, for all sorts of reasons. The new questions may be more exciting because they are fresh and relatively unexamined, or because they are of more general interest, or because they present themselves as more urgent or merely as

more manageable. In the introducton' note to his anthology' Prefaces

mous Books, Charles Eliot proclaims book's preface:

is

his reader as

sympathy for

Prolojjues to

over, the author descends

man

his diftlculties."'

to

Fa-

commonsensical view of the purpose of

"No part of a book is so intimate as the Preface.

long labor of the work speaks with

a

and

man, disclosing

This view

is

by

his

from

a

Here, after the

his platform,

hopes and

fears,

now discredited. The

and

seeking

preface

is

XI

Preface

xii

very

much

whole

part of the

text,

and the author can

at best

pretend to put

aside his or her dictatorial tone. There are, of course, difficulties

about here, but most arc too mundane for cle I

print.

The major

could talk

intellectual obsta-

encountered was organizational: the concepts that surround love form

complex web, which makes dividing topics and constant headache. the reader will

The

final architecture

chap. 8, sect. 3.) personal.

I

personal difficulties

only that

sexuality elicits reactions

what was amazing was

is, I

think, adequate, but

encountered are

I

just that:

devoted to the philosophy of

a scholarly life

from people that

are

by

now

routinely predictable;

that writing about love, instead, hardly changes mat-

a ps\xhologist testing his latest idea in

their postcoital conversation: ic life

of the book

I employ frequent cross-references. (Crossand section numbers; for example, "8.3" refers to

The major

will sav

Imagine

a

issues into neat packages a

understand why

references include chapter

ters.

I

bed with

a

beloved during

"The most striking distinction betw^een the erot-

of antiquity and our own, liebchen, no doubt

lies in

the fact that the

ancients laid the stress upon the instinct itself, whereas we emphasize its object. The ancients glorified the instinct and were prepared on its account to honor even an inferior object; while we, including you and I, liebliche, despise the instinctual activit)' in

object."^ Liebchen

and find excuses for

itself,

it

only in the merits of the

must want to clobber, and not for the historical error about

the Greeks. Nevertheless, the perceptive or ingenious psvchoanalyst should be able to read between the lines of mv text to ferret out hidden details of my least

"No

according to Peter Gay:

their svstem, philosophers

matter

how

of love inevitably import

into their theorizing."^ If Kierkegaard

is

life

—

at

abstract or apparently rational their

right, further, I

own

erotic history

should not even

tr\'

to

mv life in the pages of The Structure ofLove; a genuine philosoph\' of love would be a jargonless diar\' of my experiences with my betrothed. Some tiny details of my life, I admit, do infect the text, but I'll bet a dollar to a avoid exposing

donut that no one will recognize them. They are too universal. (Or thev will be recognized, but without

charge Ivst's

I

am of course

curiosit)',

defenseless.

because they are universal.) Against Gav's I

am

discerning anal-compulsiveness in

dious literature review than

I

am about

less

my a

worried, however, about an anaphilosophical

method or mv tethis book

pundit re\'iewefs calling

The Love of Structure. I

What

do not

offer a

grand theory of love, or of anything

the reader will find

(philosophers and others)

is

else, in this

book.

detailed scrutinv of various claims that people

make about

love,

of the

logical relations

among

these claims, and of the arguments that are or could be used to defend them.'*

As

a result, the

book contains many

small contributions to our understanding

Preface

xiii

of love, tinv conclusions about

rationality

its

and morality. The major ques-

ground of love (that is, its structure), the nature of of desires and beliefs in love, and whether love permits

tions concern the basis or

what

is

loved, the roles

justifications as well as explanations. If feeling, so

be

it; I

my

approach seems to

will let the poets describe the inner

slight love as a

phenomenology of love.

Analytic philosophv (in the broad sense) speaks to a different ear, the ear that

welcomes sustained is

logical

probing of our

to stimulate the reader into thinking

value of love. Hence, the

happy

book will

faces to smile into the void.

beliefs

more

and

their grounds.

carefully

My goal

about the nature and

neither help x catch and keep y nor inspire

Much of the book,

I fear,

will

seem

terribly

many of its sentences seemed to me as dry as sentences about love could be.) But when reread, these dry sentences reveal breathing truths about love. Like some beloveds, these sendry on

first

reading. (Indeed,

on

first

writing

tences require perseverance to change

I

them

into vital beings.

wish to thank many people for their help on

this project.

Most impor-

who labored, day in and day out, to do essential things: Jeannie Shapley, who typed the manuscript; and Jessie Hedman, Debbie Guidry (later Anderson), and Huey Henoumont, who ran to and through the tant are the people

library

and photocopied

until their eyes turned green.

Carolyn Morillo,

and then some.

My

colleagues in the

Edward Johnson, Norton Nelkin, and did everything that good colleagues are supposed to do,

Department of Philosophy,

especially

Many others contributed in various ways:

teaching

me Kierke-

gaard, reading chapters in progress, discussing tangles, corresponding at

length about disagreements, sending efforts

me to books and articles.

I

appreciate the

of Celine Leon, Robert Perkins, Stephen Evans, Sylvia Walsh, Ronna

Burger, Russell Vannoy, Irving Singer, James Nelson, Hilde Robinson, Neera Badhwar, Ursula Huemer, Stef Jones, Diane Michelfclder, Mark Fisher,

Jean Braucher, and

Nancy MuUer. Jeanne

Ferris, at Yale University Press,

encouraged the project from the very beginning, and manuscript editor Karen

Gangel did her job superbly

in the face

of my

insuffcrability.

thanks to Szabo Sara for her uplifting correspondence. those attending presentations of sections of the

book

A special word of

My students as well as

(at

the Central Division

meetings of the American Philosophical Association, April 1985; John's University, October 1985;

1986; and

at

at the

UNO

at Saint

Philosophy Club, October

four Tulane University' Philosophy Research Seminars, 1987

through 1989) asked questions and made comments that improved

my think-

on many issues. The congenial people who work in the following establishments took some interest in my writing and did not rush me out: in New Orleans, Tastee ing

xiv

Preface

Donut and Burger King (both on sant D'Or, Canal Pub,

La Madeleine, Croisand the Yen Philadelphia, Burger King

Elvsian Fields), and

Maison Blanche

Deli,

Holmes

Cafeteria,

Ching Restaurant (all in the French Quarter); in (Welsh Road) and Popeye's (Goodnaw St.); in St. Joseph, Minnesota, Bo DiddJev's, Fierk's, and Kay's Kitchen; and in Innsbruck, Max Kade Saal (Studentenhaus), Unicafe, and Gasthaus Innrain.

—

The University of New Orleans including, but not restricted to, my chair, Edward Johnson, and the Dean of Liberal Arts, Dennis McSeveney more than anv other university' at which I ha\'e taught, has given mv research both moral and practical support. In the spring semester of 1988 load was reduced to

1988

I

make time

available for writing,

received the financial assistance

of a

UNO

and

my teaching

in the

summer of Award

Research Council

The National Endowment for the Humanities summer of 1985 I attended Sylvia Walsh's Summer Seminar for College Teachers, on Kierkegaard, financially supported bv the NEH; and in the summer of 1988 1 received an NEH Summer Stipend (FT-30486-88) precisely to work on this book. and

a

Summer

Scholar Award.

also plaved a crucial role. In the

THE STRUCTURE OF LOVE

CHAPTER To

Two Views

1

the beloved and deplored

the author, of all that

is

exalted sense of truth

and

my

approbation was written for

many

memon' of her who was

the inspirer, and in part

my writings — the friend and wife whose right was my strongest incitement, and whose

best in

chief reward

vears,

of Love

—

belongs as

it

dedicate this volume. Like

I

much

all

to her as to me; but the

that

I

work

have as

it

stands has had, in a ver\' insufficient degree, the inestimable advantage of her revision;

some of the most important portions having been

more

careful re-examination,

Were

I

which thev

are

now

reserved for a

never destined to receive.

but capable of interpreting to the world one half the great thoughts

and noble

feelings

greater benefit to

which

it,

than

are buried in her grave, is

I

should be the

medium of a

ever likely to arise from anything that

unprompted and unassisted bv her

all

I

can write,

but unrivaled wisdom.

— John Stuart Mill, On Liberty

1.

LOVE OSTENSIVELY DEFINED

More on

than eight centuries ago, Andreas Capellanus wrote in his treatise

love that "love

inborn suffering derived from the sight of and

a certain

is

excessive meditation

upon

the beaut)' of the opposite sex."^

Something not

Rene Descartes five centuries later: "Love is an of the soul caused a emotion bv movement of the spirits, which impels the soul to join itself willinglv to objects that appear to be agreeable to it."^ Today we

very different was expressed by

are inclined to think

contingent at all,

we

of Capellanus' "suffering" (inborn or otherwise)

symptom or effect of love, not as

itself,

as

restricted to heterosexuals.

But

other attractive or admirable love. (I

lo\'e, it is

qualit\'

a defensible claim that beauty,

is

"caused" by a

we

its

or some

of the beloved, has something to do with

with the beaut\' per se or with a person joins "willinglv" with

if

Nor do

suffering, or the rcspc:)nse to beaut}' are

wonder, however, whether Capellanus means that the

writes that love

only a

and usually present,

onlv in the early sexual or romantic stages of a love relationship.

take seriously the idea that

today

love

who

is

beautiful.)

movement that "impels"

beloved object,

I

lo\'er is in

When

the soul, yet the soul

worr\' about his consistency.

are not impressed with the idea that the soul

is

love

Descartes

And

the seat of love, or of

Tiiw Views of Lore

an)thing

Nevertheless, Descartes's claim that love

else.

at things that are

"agreeable"

is

alerting us to the intentionality

need not be actualh' agreeable agreeable. Moreover, even

about

little

I

the\' ha\'e in

long

as

at least appears,

it

is

loved)

is

believed, to be

though Capellanus and Descartes disagree about

mind, despite the

we know what human have so

fact that they

make this point as a mild warning, and ostensiveh'; but

if the

for

I

will indicate

reader

is

or Descartes, he or she should not be confused by

love.

or

far said

xQvy

it.

onl\' negati\elv

study

an emotion directed

of love: the object of love (that which

as

the details, thev are dealing with the same thing;

phenomenon

is

His definition also has the merit of

plausible.

is lo\'e,

but that statement

is

my object of study

not confused by Capellanus

my procedure.

M)' object of

many

unre\'ealing, for there are

kinds of

Mv object of studv is not the loxe of chocolate or of birds, parental love,

filial lo\'e,

sibling love, or love

of countn,', although the love

I

am studying may

have some of the features of these other loves. The loves that are most relevant to m\' studv are,

on the one hand, those within

the eros of Plato's Symposium, sexual

lo\'e,

the eros tradition, comprising

courth' love, and romantic love, and,

on the other hand, those within the a^ape tradition, including God's lo\e for humans and Christian neighbor-love. The love I am concerned with is similar to these loves and might be a combination of several either from the same tradition or from both traditions. It is probably a historical development of the loves in the eros tradition, but I do not want to rule out in advance that it displa\'s

some features of the

mv object of studv not

a

blood

(which

is

is

loves in the agape tradition. Ostensively defmed,

the love that one person has for another person (usually

relation); that

may exist between two

people

when

it is

reciprocal

often, but not always, the case); that toda)' often leads to or occurs in

marriage or cohabitation (but obviouslv need not); that often has a compo-

nent of sexual desire

(in

vanning degrees); and that occasionally, for heterosex-

uals, eventuates in procreation.

To

clarify this ostensive

defmition of the love

I

am

concerned with,

could mention examples of love from histon' and literature

—

say, the lo\'e

John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor, or that of Hack and Ray

(in

I

of

Marilyn

Hacker's Love, Death, and the Changing of the Seasons). Referring to examples

from

life

defining

phy or

and

literature will

be helpful, but relying on them

mv object of studv is dangerous,

literarv' criticism,

which Mill and Tavlor

practice). If I

are a paradigm,

particular relationship (as Phyllis speare's love

life is

I

am

but philosophv (by which

moral analysis of an idea and a for

for

paradigmatic,

I

I

mean

hea\'ily

histor\',

while

biogra-

the conceptual and

wanted to study the kind of love would proceed bv dissecting that

Rose did I

not doing

in Parallel Lives).

Or

would proceed by rereading

if

Shake-

the sonnet

Two Views of Love sequence and doing close textual analysis

bound

time and place; therefore, what

in

anci mc:)rallv

And we

have too

from this embarrassment of riches, These examples from a

paradigms are firmly

literar}'

we can

learn

from them conceptually

about our concept and practice of love mav be limited

dictable wa\'s.

than as

manner of Barthes on

(say, in the

Balzac in S/Z). However, these historical and

life

foundation for

and

unpre-

in

many paradigms; emphasizing some at the

can serxe as illustrations rather

literature, then,

a definition

Lewis half-heartedly apologizes for

cases

expense of others, would be arbitrary.

or theor\' of love. In The Four Loves, C.

his habit

S.

of referring to King Lear and the

am dri\'en to literar\' examples because you, the reader, and I do not live in the same neighbourhood; if we did, there would ... be no difficult\' about replacing them with examples from real life."^ But I am able to define mv object of study ostensively because my reader and I do live in the same neighlike: "I

borhood, and because, therefore, our experiences and obser\'ations about love agrees; he can use

examples only because

are similar. (Lewis, after

all,

he and his reader

the same literary neighborhood.)

Mv

live in

purpose

literar)'

my

served well enough by saying that

is

familiar, garden-variet\' love that

we

concern

our ever\'dav

practice in

is

the

nothing

lives,

Anthony Weston puts it, "a somewhat settled condition, which romance may of course play a part."* I mean the love that we imagine the couple upstairs has, based on their behavior in public; the love that in our happier moments we think we have and that we think the upstairs esoteric; as

though one

.

couple, behind closed doors, could never have.

mind

as "personal love"

— but do not

let

.

I

The problem with

will refer to the love

have in

I

an\^hing hang on that phrase.

the expression "people love" ugly; otherwise, tralit)'.

.

in

would

I

the term "personal love"

is

that

prefer it is

it

for

(I

its

find

neu-

often a technical

term describing "love for the person" rather than love for the properties of a person.

It

but

definition the love

b\'

I am studying is "love for the person" in my use of the term "personal love" does not imph' that am concerned with is "love for the person.") I am not

might be true that the love

this technical sense;

I

going to define love any further; the ostensive definition

am

not even aiming

at a general definition

of love.

I

have to

will

suffice. I

assume that the reader

knows what I am talking about. If, when reflecting on mv claims, a reader cannot make any sense of my assertions, then my assumption will be proven false.

How

often this does not happen

is

the measure of

mv

concept and practice of love, of its underlving structure and

One in

philosophical view of the love

I

am

moralitN'.

concerned with characterizes

terms of a central thesis of the eros tradition;

\'iew

grasp of our

I

will call this

view "the

it

first

of personal love," "view one," or simplv "the eros tradition." In contrast

to view one, there

is

a

view of personal love that

I

will call "the

second

\'iew,"

Two

Vini's of Love

'View two," or

''the

agape tradition."

den\ing that the central account of personal lo\c.

of the

thesis

What

I

define "second view" as any \'iew gives an accurate or complete

first \'iew

logical

coherence there

is

in the

second

viev\' is

pro\ided bv a central thesis of the agape tradition. In working out the details of these

two different characterizations of personal love, I am interested in several

questions: WTiat are the advantages and limits of these views in understanding

the lo\e

am concerned

I

What would personal loxe look like if the first What do these two views presuppose

with?

or the second, happened to be true?

\'iew,

human

about

nature and our abilirv to

philosophical tangles that purportedly

quate and that personal love Personal

Io\'e,

is

In particular, there are certain

lo\'e?

show

that the eros tradition

poorly understood

some have argued, can succeed

"agapized," that

if analyzed

is

inade-

by that tradition.

(or be genuine) only if

it is

transformed bv agape into a second-view ("agapic") love.^

is,

Much of the book defends the eros tradition the agape tradition

may succumb

and argues that

(or "erosic" lo\e)

to similar tangles or objections

when

it is

emplo\'ed to characterize personal love. Does personal loxe need a dose of

Or

agape?

at the theoretical level:

Does conceiving of personal

lo\'e in

foreign to the eros tradition provide a better understanding of it?

conclusion

2.

PROPERTY-BASED AND REASON-DEPENDENT LOVE

what result

first

view of personal love (that derived from the eros tradition),

in principle

is

and

oft:en in practice

will call "propert)'- based":

I

My eventual

"no."

is

In the lo\e

terms

of

having, or

\^s

x's

comprehensible. In particular, love

When x lo\'es y, this can

perceiving that y has,

some

is

be explained as the set

S of attractive,

admirable, or \'aluable properties; x loves v because v has S or because x perceives or believes that

of x's love and hence, personal lo\e

is

loves

— that

brought

it

has

a crucial part

centric."*^ In principle, x \'

\'

is,

S.

These properties of y are the

in the first \'iew,

of the explanator\' source of loxe; love

and v (and outsiders)

of knowing which

about that x loves

basis or

v.

ground

something about the object of one's

attracti\'e

are capable

is

"object-

of knowing

why x

properties of y, the object, have

Further, personal love

is

"reason-dependent":

when X loves v, x (gi\en enough self-in\estigation) will be able to answer "Whv do you love y?" h\ supphing reasons for lo\ing v in terms of y's having S. Because the

and

attracti\'e

properties of \' figure both in the explanation of x's love

in the reasons x will gi\'e for lo\'ing \%

I

will use "propert\'-based"

"reason-dependent" interchangeablv. The central claim of the

something about y

is

first \'iew is

central in accounting for x's lo\'c for y; the

emphasis

and that

is

on

Two Views

of Love

the perceived merit of the object as the

ground of love. Such

is

the structure of

erosic personal love.

Several corollaries follow about personal love from the claim that

properrv- based and reason-dependent. First, personal ble to various kinds

intentional

S

— then

example, case, is

— that

is,

of

if x

irrationalitv', is

not inherently

is

loves y in virtue of x's believing or perceiving that y has

lo\'e is voilnerablc

to cognitive or psvchological mistakes. X, for

may

thinking that y has S; x might

be deluded

in

even though the foundation of x's love

core;

it is

suscepti-

irrational. If love

suspicious.

is

it is

still

But

in principle explainable in terms of y's having S, then love

its

though

lo\'c,

love y in this

if personal

love

not irrational

at

not unpatterned, unprincipled, or unpredictable. Personal love

is

is

not one of the great mvstcrics of the universe. Second, the object's possessing properties that are unattractive ("defects")

must play some

role in

determining

the duration or intensiU' of personal love. Defects are not theoretically dispensable or ignorable; love exists,

and

is

expected to

exist,

only up to a point. Third,

that y loves x cannot ever suffice as a reason for why x loves y ; that y loves x

contribute to the reasons in virtue of which x loves original or the full reason. If ^^'s loving x y,

is

y,

allowed as the

but

hill

it

may

cannot be the

reason that x loves

and this particular reason can operate generally, then x might love y because

y loves x

—

The

in turn because x loves y. This love

distinction

not the same

between the

first

is

inexplicable.

and the second \iew of personal lo\e

the mind, as described by Pausanias in Plato's Symposium. This

within the eros tradition

what

X

mav

is

benveen "vulgar" love of the body and "heavenh^" love of

as that

itself,

which

in principle places little

consider a valuable propert)' of y; this

is

is

a distinction

or no limit on

not what differentiates

and agapic personal love. The second view of personal love (remember that the second view is rot equivalent to agape but asserts the central erosic love

thesis

of that tradition) denies that personal love

X for y

is

not grounded

is

in y's attractive properties

tion that y has S. If anvthing, the opposite

is

propert\'-bascd: the love of

S or

true: that

in x's belief or

is,

percep-

x finds the properties

that V has attractive, or x considers y to be attractive, because x loves y.

ground of personal love about

x,

something

is

The

not the perceived merit of the object but something

in the nature

of the lover; thus, personal love

is

subject-

is not that the woman loved is the origin of the emotions apparentlv aroused by her; they arc merely set behind her like a

centric rather than object-centric. "It

light."^ Since x values y's properties in virtue ties

cannot explain

why

of lo\ing

x loves y. Lx)ve, then,

is

y, y's

valuable proper-

incomprehensible, insofar as

the best candidate for the explanation of x's loving y (namely, that y has S) has been eliminated. If personal love is comprehensible at all, the explanation for

Two Vienv

of Love

x's loving y might be that y already loves x. (George Sand wrote in a letter, "If [T]hcn you want me to love you, you must begin by loving me. annhing vou tell mc will seem divine."^ So x might find S in v to be valuable because x loves \', where x loves y because y loves x.) Alternatively, the explanation for x's loving y might be the nature of x (x is filled with love) or x's desire or .

capacit\' to love regardless

of the

.

.

.

object's merit. Further, personal love

is

.

.

not

reason-dependent: x should not be called upon to explain or justif\' loving v by giving reasons in terms of v's attractive properties, or any reasons at

own

its

reason and love

is

Love is

all.

taken as a metaphysical primitive.^ Such

is

the

structure of agapic personal love.

The

of personal

intentionalit)'

tant feature. Since love

is

properties of its object, love

or perceives

understood

no

play

is

love, in the

much

less

second view,

is

not an impor-

of the subject to the

a response

dependent on what x

attractive

bclie\'es

(One exception

is

x's

loving y because y loves

x,

which must be

as x's loving

role in

y because x believes that y loves x.) Similarly, defects personal love. Because x's love for v is not grounded in \^s

attractive properties, )^s

having unattractive properties carries no weight; a

personal love that does not arise as a response to attractive properties love that

S

is

attitude

is

not a

extinguished or prevented bv unattractive properties. That x finds

in y valuable because x loves

between

about,

hence, cognitive mistakes play no role in this picture of

in, v;

personal love.

not

\^s attractive

toward

y even implies that there

and unattractive properties

(Analogously,

y.

x's

is

no

distinction

until x develops a loving

hating v would explain, instead of being

explained bv, the fact that x finds properties of v to be disagreeable or obnox-

why

personal love in this view

incomprehensible, even

ious.)

This

tional.

But in this view love's being a mvstery is no strike against love or against

is

any theon' that conceives of love

An

this

v^'s

having S

first

view of personal love

as the cause

of

x's lo\'ing

having S being the explanation of x's loving v) and for loving y.

1

This

1

y's

is

the rela-

v (and thereby

having S

y's

as x's reason

We might appeal here to the notion that the distinction betA\'een

causes and reasons 4).

irra-

wav.^^

important issue regarding the

tionship between

is

is artificial: x's

reasons to

move does not entirely work. Even

do

are the causes of x's doing

if x's

reasons for loving y can be

adequately conceived of as the cause of x's loving y (in which case love's being reason-dependent is primar\% while its being propert\'-based is secondary), is still room to think of nonreason-causes as the explanation of x's loving which case love's being property-based is primary and reason-dependence

there

y

(in

is

secondarv). Even

if all

reasons are causes (hence that

the reason-cause explanation), not

all

mostly explained by nonreason-causes).

x's

reason for loving v

causes are reasons

(when

x's

love

is is

Two

Views of Love

The

first \'iew

of personal love claims that

in "ideal" cases either

(

x

)

1

accurately believes that y has S, x provides without self-deception "y has S" as x's

reason for loving

and

\\

this reason

the sole cause of x's loving y (no other

is

reason-causes or nonrcason-causes are involved); or (2) x reason-causes) to love y by

mechanism

causal x's

reason for loving

causes operating

way

on

v.

and

x,

x,

and x acknowledges

(For example,

'-^

allowing them to operate without resistance,

x's

x's

reasons.) In the

is

a

properties of y that x invokes as the reason for

propert\' P, but that

(unknown

in addition that x

Q. There are

is

pri-

x's

x's

love for y and the

is

that y has attractive

to x) y does not in fact have P; nevertheless,

caused to love y by y's having some other property'

is

in this scenario

has P (the reason-cause) and x's

a

loving y can occur in several

stated reason for loving y

x's

is

convergence of x's reasons and the causes.

Divergence between the properties of y that cause wavs. Suppose that

as

case

first

primar\\ while in the second property'- basedness

is

mary'; but in both cases there

suppose

S also

v's ha\'ing

being aware of the nonrcason-

x's

X acknowledges the nonreason-causes as

reason-dependence

caused (bv non-

accurate perception or belief that v has S, this

x's

transparent to

is

is

two causes y's

for x's loving y: x's (false) belief that y

having Q, which operates behind the scenes of Hence x's love is both reason-depen-

consciousness as a nonreason-cause.

dent and propert\'- based, but

x's love.

The

x's

love

is

nonideal because x makes two mis-

P and that 1 can be altered to make

takes: X belie\'es falselv that

scenario

v has

)

(

(2) y's ha\'ing it

P totally explains

monocausal: suppose that x

loves y because x believes (falsely) that y has P, that x's believing that y has reallv

is x's

reason for loving

v,

and that there are no nonreason-causes

Now x's love for y is explained by x's belief that y has P, Here

and

this

P

work.

at

reason

is

the

another monocausal scenario: suppose that x

total cause

of x's

beheves

y has P, that x offers y's having P as the reason for x's love, wrong about ha\'ing this or any reason for lo\'ing y the real cause

love.

is

(falsely) that

—

but that X

is

being

having Q, which generates

y's

love for y

x's

from behind the

These loves are reason-dependent and/or property- based, terized

h\'

Now

the let

first

as love

is

scenes.

charac-

view, even though x falsely believes that y has P.

us assume that x correctly perceives or believes that y has the

attraaive property P. further clarifies the

The matrix below

first

(in

which "xLy" means "x loves y")

view of personal love and shows how it differs from the

second. Categor\' (A) includes one of the ideal cases of crosic love, in which

ha\ing P causes xLy and x offers "y has P" realizes that v's cases.

P"

as x's

y's

reason for xLy (because x

having P causes xLy). But (A) also includes several nonideal

Without knowing

that v's ha\ing

as the reason for xL\', in

which case

P causes y's

x to lo\'e y, x

may offer

ha\ing P figures separately

the reason-cause and the nonreason-cause of xLy. (The case

is

"y has

in

both

nonideal since

it

8

Two involves

reason

Views of Love

some

""y

has

lack

ha\'ing

Q as

self- awareness

we have

while

y's

on

x's part.)

Further,

having P operates

as the

if

x provides the

nonreason-cause,

of dual causation of xLv (caused both by y's the reason-cause and by y's having P as the nonreason-cause), and

then either (1)

again x lacks

of

Q" for xLy,

some

a case

self- awareness,

or (2)

y's

and X has made tu'o mistakes: thinking that

and missing the

fact that y's

having P

is

having P v's

is

having

the only cause of xLy,

Q

is x's

the nonreason-cause.

reason for

xLy

Two Views

of Love

not a nonrcason-causc of xLv, agapic.

For categor)' (D)

this case

may appear

it

to x that x's love for y

also includes the ideal

is

entirely

form of second-view

love. In

/s having the attractive P is not a nonreason-cause of xLy, and x really

does not

ha\'e

in\ reason that mentions an attractive propert\' of \' for xLy.

Categor\' (D), then, not onh' clarifies the difference between the ideal form of

agapic personal love and the ideal forms of erosic love [found in categories (A)

and (B)] but also suggests agapicallv

when

x

how x could be mistaken in believing that x is loving loving erosically.

is reall\'

In the second view of personal love the attractive properties of y play no role in either the reason or the nonreason-causes of xLy (that is, personal love is

no The second view does not require that x have

neither propert\'- based nor reason-dependent), but this does not entail that

causes or reasons figure into love.

any reasons for

but

lo\'ing y;

if

x does offer reasons, x need not mention y's

attractive properties. Perhaps x loves y for the reason that y loves x, or because x

believes that x has an obligation to love y. Similarly, the second

require that x's love for y be caused; perhaps

love for y

is

love

is

a

For example,

\''s

view does not

pure act of will. If x's

caused, these causes are not y's having the attractive

that V has P. lo\'ing y,

x's

P or x's

belief

loving x could be the nonreason-cause for

or perhaps something

special in x's nature causally explains

x's

why

x

loves y.

OBJECT-CENTRIC

3.

We

AND SUBJECT-CENTRIC LOVES

need to consider an objection to one way

tinguished the

first

from the second view of personal

first

view love

first

view, a crucial source of x's love for y

is

object-centric, while in the is

second

y,

and

But there may be no firm distinction between its

being subject-centric.

are talking only

and whose presence

in y

is

is

have

dis-

subject-centric; in the is x.

being object-centric and as a

dilemma:

some

y's

if

If,

on

first

a

we

indepen-

sense inherent in y,

publiclv and empiricallv \'erifiable), then there

between an object-centric and

treated unfairly).

I

stated that in the

second the source

We can formulate the objection

sonal love, although the second view at

hence

I

about the objective properties of y (those that are

dently of y's being evaluated by anyone, that are in

clear distinction

it is

in the

love's

which

in

love.

is

a

subject-centric view of per-

seems bizarre or implausible (and

the other hand,

we

are talking only

about

y's

subjective properties (those that are not inherent in v because their existence

depends altogether on an evaluation by the perceixer), then the second view looks

much

centric

better (and

is

and subject-centric

treated fairly), but the distinction

between object-

largelv collapses.

The details of the objection need to be filled in. Consider the first horn of

:

Two Views

10

of Love

the dilemma: assume that there wit, intelligence, or

coherent to say

an objective propcrt)' P (for example, beaut)',

(as in the first \'iew) that x loves

y in virtue

This would be an object-centric love

centric lo\'e in

which P

is

easily distinguishable

it

seems strange to say

to in the second \iew) that because x loves y, x attributes

undergoing some

suspicious psychological process;

love for v leading x to beliexe that y possesses

about

that v

x's belie\'ing

is

not vvhv x

we

properties,

from

is

five feet tall

belie\'es that

some if

But

to y. For x

must be

how else to understand x's objective

because x loxes

v has P. Thus,

P

(as

a subject-

if we arc we would ha\'e

irrelevant to the existence of x's love.

considering an objecti\'e propert)' P,

that

it is

of responding to y,

when x correcth' perceives P in y or when x mistakenh' beliexes that y has

either P.

is

moral virtue) that y has or does not have. ^'^ In this case,

we

talk

properrv? Think

Y might have

y.

P, but

onlv about objective

preserve the anal)T:ic distinction between object-centric and

subject-centric at the cost of making the second view of personal love implausi-

when God

humans, God confers objective \'alue on would not save the second view. Although humans mav be able to confer objective value on other humans, we are considering not the conferral of objective vslIuc simpliciter but the attribution of some specific valuable objective property P to the beloved.) ble. (It

is

said that

His beloveds. Even

loves

if true, that fact

Now examine the second horn: assume that there is a subjectixe property

Q

(for example, beaut)', wit, intelligence, or

moral

virtue). In this case the

second view has no problem claiming that because x loves y, x attributes because x loves y, x comes entertaining.

"To

to value y's appearance or to believe that )^s

the lover the loved one

imaginable, even though to a stranger she

order of smelts. Beaut)'

is

phenomenon does not

strike us as

in the eye

is

Q to y

humor is

always the most beautiful thing

may

be indistinguishable from an

of the beholder." ^^ The psycholog)' of this unusual because the attributed property

is

mereh' subjective (attributions of these properties varv tremendouslv, according to taste, from person to person; the question of their possession cannot be resoK'cd by straightforu-ard empirical debate). Thus, the second view of personal love

is

not eliminated unfairly, in advance. But

subjective properties, difference

we

lose the sense

between the two views of personal

\'

are talking about

love.

For

if x

loves y because (or

property

way. The ground of love

not simply y (if it is y to any extent) but rather nature that leads x to evaluate y in this way. Hence the first view must admit

cratic x's

to x's loxing

we

Q to y, then "equal contributions" are b\' v's possessing Q and bv x's e\'aluating y in x's idiosvn-

after) x attributes subjective

made

if

of object-centric that underlies the

that love

is

propertw

it

subject-centric.

is

Note

that if x loves y in virtue of a subjective

makes no sense to sav that

believing that y has

x

might love y because x

is

mistaken in

Q; mistakes can be made only about objective properties.

If

1

Tivo Vien^s of Lore

so, part

of the

1

intcntionalit)'

of

lo\'c,

an important feature of the

first \icvv,

drops out of the picture

— which confirms the conclusion that no firm

tion exists between the

rv\'o

One

response to the objection would define the two views in such a

that in the

view only objective properties figure into

first

second only subjective properties count. This move

of each view eros love

is

given

lo\'e

merit.

^*^

the

distinc-

views of personal love.

as

is

while in the

consistent with the spirit

descendants of the eros and agape traditions, rcspectivelv:

by the objective merit of the object, while agape

elicited

that creates xalue in

The solution, however,

its is

is

in

a freely

object regardless of the object's objective

too timid: allocating objective properties to

and subjective properties to the second,

first \'iew,

lo\'e,

way

exiscerates these views.

The trick is either to make room for objecti\'e properties in the second view or to make room for subjective properties in the first. I prefer the latter solution. The distinction between the two \'iews does not collapse if the first xievv allows that the lover may be responding to subjective properties. For the lover does not necessarily attribute any subjective propert)' to the x's

beloNcd because the lover already loves the beloved; only

attribution of a subjectixe propert)' to v

second view phenomenon. Further, jectively first

in the

or subjectively, about the object

is

on the

basis

of alreadv loving y

is

a

second \'iew nothing valuable, obthe

ground of love; whereas

in the

view, whether the lover responds to the objective or to the subjecti\'e \'alue

of the hc\o\cd^ something \'aluable about the beloved figures into the ground of love.

Even

beloved,

The

if x loves

some raw

first

y in virtue of subjective property' Q, something about the

material, encourages the lover to find value in the beloved.

view permits the lover to claim that

subjective, valuable property

loving y, the

first

of y; and

as

his reason for lo\'ing

long as x can offer

this

that

is

reason for

view does not collapse into the second, which makes no room

for that reason. Thus,

we might

think of erosic personal love as partially

subject-centric or partially object-centric, while agapic personal love

is

totally

subject-centric or never object-centric. This tcrminolog)' acknowledges that

something about the basis

lover, either preferences or evaluations, plays a role in the

of erosic love along with the Moreoxer,

x's

characteristics

of the beloved.

attributing subjective, \'aluable property'

loves y can occur even within the

first

view of personal

Q to y because x

love. In the

view, sometimes x finds a property' of v's valuable just because x first

x's

view,

x's

finding

love for y

is

Q

in

\'

to be valuable because x loves v

ties

is

exactly

the

possible onh' if

already propert)- based or reason-dependent, as long as the

love-grounding properties do not include Q.

view

is

second

lo\'es v; in

what the second

because x loves

y,

What

is

ruled out by the

first

allows, namely, that x finds value in v's proper-

and the love

itself is

not property- based (see 7.6). In the

Two Views of Love

12

view, as long as x loves y because y possesses S, x's finding other value in y, merclv because x loves y, is neither impossible nor unlikely. (Here is an infirst

teresting case to think about: suppose that because x loves v, x attributes subjecti\'e \'aluable

case

easily

is

But

propert)'- based.

case

is

Q to

handled

and then

\',

as a

if x's

x's

complex

love for v

because

reinforced because v has Q.

is

The

originallv

is

not originallv propert\'- based, then the

God loves valueless humans, He bestows objective value on them; and

now

4. I

is

an internally contradictor)' agapic personal love. Similarly, suppose that

suppose that God's love for humans they

love

erosic love if x's love for v

is

reinforced by His response to the value

have.)

THE TWO TRADITIONS

am more concerned with the two views of personal love than I am with

eros and agape themselves. ^^ Plato's eros and God's agape are important

because what extracted

central to each

is

of the tu'o views

I

described abo\'e

from these paradigms: one view claims that love

a thesis

is

propert}'- based

is

and reason-dependent, while the other view denies that love can be adequately understood if conceived that way. Plato's eros and Paul's agape serve in the sense that

more

our major question might be formulated:

like the love a

God

person has for

(eros) or

more

Is

as

models

personal love

God

like the lo\'e that

has for persons (agape)? (Compare this question with the variants proposed

below.) In this section eros

and agape

I

discuss to

what extent the loves

I

have assigned to the

traditions exemplif\' these central themes.

For loves within the agape

and unattractive

tradition, the attractive

properties of the object, the object's value, are entirely irrelevant. This irrele-

vance of merit

is

clear in

not love that which

which

in itself has

is

agape

as

God's (or lesus') love for humans:

"God does

on the contrary', that becoming the object of

already in itself worthv of love, but

no worth

acquires worth just bv

Agape has nothing to do with the kind of love that depends on the its object; Agape does not recognise value, but creates it."^^ Why, then, does God love humans? "The 'reason' why God loves men is that God is God, and this is reason enough."^^ As Nygren says, 'There is only one right answer. Because it is His nature to Love. The only ground for it is to be found in God himself'^o But some Christians were drawn to the rationalit\' of propert\'- based love. Richard of St. Victor, for

God's

love.

recognition of a valuable qualit\' in

.

.

.

.

example, could not imagine that "the Divine person could est love

.

.

.

.

.

have the high-

towards a person who was not \\'orth\' of the highest love."^ ^ Humans,

having no worth, could not therefore be the recipients of God's love; ergo the Trinit)', a

device that, for Richard, supplied

God

with objects worthy of His

Two

Views of Love

love.

Should

God

love

\\c ask: Is

humans

13

God's nature to love

it

agapically only because

forced to love us agapically

if

He

is

erosically or agapically?

we have no worth

to love us at

as Christian love

Does

is, is

He

all?

Love's not being based on the merit of its object

agape

— that

is

also characteristic

of

of one's neighbor, which demands that humans love

the sinner, the stranger, the sick, the ugly, and the enemy, as well as the

righteous and one's kin. Given this N'idual attractiveness ob\'iously plays

neighbor-love

is

of appropriate objects of

list

no

love, indi-

role in neighbor-love. Nevertheless,

interpretable not as agape but as an erosic love (see 9.9).

For

humans are not worthless precisely because God has bestowed objectixe value on them, then neighbor-love could be construed as a propert\'example,

if

based response to this value. ^^ piece or spark

of God that

Or

perhaps neighbor-love

exists in all

humans.^^ Here

is

a response to the

we should

the claim (about the basis of love) that x's neighbor-love for y

distinguish

is

property-

based, in that x loves y because y possesses the Naluable propert)' "contains a piece of God," from the claim (about the object of love) that in neighbor-love what one loves is not the human per se but that piece of God in the human. ^^

Even the

this latter claim,

human

therefore, the love

however, implies that neighbor- love

God

Ionc for

is itself

of the piece of God

properties of that piece. Perhaps love of humans for

based on God's

humans

(a

in

humans

we should

an erosic love,

is

attracti\'e

based on the attractive

is

neighbor-love more

ask: Is

heavenly eros) or more

if

properties and,

like the

like a

agape of God for

humans? Erich father lo\'e

the child is

is

is

has argued that mother love

an erosic love

Weberian

love as a

child

Fromm

(or, better, that the idea

"ideal tvpe,"

fits

into the agape

loved

when or because

love, the child's merit

claims that the

she

fulfills

is

New Testament God

of God's love

ly

of mother

love, or

tradition). -^^

mother

In mother

lo\'e

the father's expectations, obeys his

is

in his eyes (that

irrelevant; in father love, merit

Old Testament God

of human parental love

Ir\

an agapic love, whereas

loved unconditionally, just because she exists; in father love, the

moral demands, and achieves worldlv success

and the

is

is

modeled

a projection

is

a projection

is

is,

central).

in

mother

Fromm also

of this idea of father

of mother

love.-^^

love,

Thus, the theory

not derived from the idea of God's love, but the idea after recognizable features

ing Singer has claimed that

Fromm's

of human parental

social psychology'

of religion

is

love.

"hard-

defensible" because "the distinction between mother's love and father's love

cannot be upheld": mother love can also be conditional (she needs her dren, and an "actual mother" also "imposes

while in

some

cases a father's love

parable of the prodigal son). 2''

is

demands and

chil-

expectations"),

unconditional (Singer mentions the

However, these points do not undermine

Two Vinvs

14

Fromm's view.

of Love

rcligioii, since

and fathers do not love in accordance with the no rclcxancc to Fromm's social psvcholog\' of

First, if mothers

"ideal t\'pes," that fact has

what people

God is their idea of the perfect mother

project onto

or father, or the observed behavior of

rare, exemplar)^

mothers and

Second, to point out that some fathers love unconditionally the distinction between (ideal)

mother love and

is

fathers.

not to destroy

father lo\e but only to chal-

lenge the claim (which might not be Fromm's) that styles of parental love arc gender-linked. Nevertheless, Singer's suspicion that mother love, or a genderless parental

love,

is

e\'en in its ideal

the child not

on the

form more

might

tion. First, parental love

basis

fall

erosic than agapic deserxes considera-

within the eros tradition

if the

parent loves

of the child's mere existence but because the child has

the propert\' "is a child of mine," which

is,

from the parent's subjective per-

spective, a meritorious property'. Because the parent loves the child in virtue this property, the all

parent might then (consistendy with the

first

of

view) attribute

manner of other properties to the child (beauty, intelligence, and so on). common phenomenon of "seeing" these valuable properties in one's child

This

does not, then, have to be explained parent's reason for loxing the child

the parent

lo\'es

is

as a

second-view process. Second, the

both general and

selective; if this

is

why

child x, the parent has equal reason for loving child y, yet has

for lo\ing someone else's child. That is, parental love is preferential way that God's agape and neighbor- love could never be. Further, parental

no reason in a

parents do not love all their children equallv: if a parent loves more than child y, even though both have the property^ "is a child of mine," then some other (probably meritorious) properties possessed by child x are involved. (An example might be lo\ing child x more than child y because lo\'e is erosic if

child X

the former has the property^ "first-born.") Parental love, then, differs signifi-

candy from agape

in structure:

of His children (God's love

is

God loves all His children,

but everyone

general but not selective), and

is

one

God loves all His

children equally (other meritorious properties are irrelevant). But does this

imply that God's love

is

erosic after

all.^

— God loves humans

in virtue

of their

possessing the property^ "is a child, or creation, of mine," and that property

an attractive property. Perhaps, however, register in

loves

God's eyes

as a

feature

and

creation of

meritorious property' or

is

is

mine" does not

not a reason

whv God

humans. Finally, consider friendship-love. In

X

"is a

)'

of eros, arising in

\'irtue

it

exhibits the

of the attractiveness of the friend.

are friends because they have

\'aluable

one version

main

For example,

common interests or goals that both see as

or because they respond to each other's excellence and character

(more broadly, for Aristode, "we do not

feel affection for

everything, but only

Two

tor the lovable,

opposed to properties

this

and that means what is

is

good, pleasant, or usefUI").^^ But

Montaigne's friendship with Etienne dc La Boctie, whose

Montaigne claimed were

irrelexant to,

and afforded no explanation

Montaigne wrote of his beloved:

for, their love.

It is

15

Views of Love

not one special consideration, nor two, nor three, nor four, nor a thousand:

know not what quintessence of all this mixture. why I loN'cd him, I feel that this cannot be expressed, is I

.

Because

was

it

he, because

Whether Montaigne

it

was

however, arguably does capture the

and

is

for that reason illuminating.

view about friendship,

"A

which

in

.

If

you

press

except

me

to

it

tell

answering:

b\'

I.^^

describing friendship

is

.

spirit

The

is

not important; what he wrote,

of the second

of personal love

\'icw

Puritan Daniel Rogers held a similar

two

a "secret instinct" ties

friends together:

reason cannot be given bv either partie, wh\' thev should be so tender each

to other."^^

Edmund Leites comments that for some Puritans, the same

terv [was] at the heart

of marital

love. Its causes are largely

"mvs-

hidden and un-

known, and hence bevond our control."''' The scorching reply to Montaigne, Rogers, and St. Bernard (who said about charit)', "I love because I love")''^ is

"To

you know not why, is more beseeming Children or mad two people contemplating marriage).''''

szy you Love, but

folks" (than, for example,

For the loves of the eros

tradition, the attractive properties

account for the existence of love and determine perfectly clear in Plato's eros

itself,

of the object

course. This

its

is

almost

where the beauty or goodness of an object

(body, soul, law, theorem) grounds the subject's love (although a case can be

made

that Plato considers beaut\' to be love's object, not merely

courtly love, the lover chooses "one virtues

and

woman

as the

[uses] that as the reason for loving her.

lence of her total personalit\'

.

.

.

elicits his love,"^^"*

its

basis). In

exemplar of all significant .

.

.

[T]he inherent excel-

rather than his love

elicit-

ing her excellence. In sexual loxe, the properties of the object obviously play an

important

role,

even

if sexual desirability is subjective

mv

discriminating than others. (Note that "erotic," even

though the structures of both loves

love of humans for

God, the

manifests perfection,

Romantic love historical

is is

the

fine qualities

a special case.

have the main features of the the object

is

generated

b\'

first

it

And

less

from

ver\' far

are the same.)

in the

God

(see sect. 6).

Because romantic love

love,

is

of the object, or the belief that

ground of love

development of courtly

and some lovers are

term "erosic"

is

often seen as a

may fall within the eros tradition and

view of personal love: powerfiil passion for

an accurate perception of its goodness or beaut\', and

the lover realizes that these properties are responsible for the passion. But

romantic love

may

also exhibit features

of the second view:

it

arises

(and

Two Vim^s

16

of Love

not alvvavs expected

disappears) mvstcriouslv, incomprehensibly; the lover

is

to ha\'e reasons for his or her passion; and the lover

only under an illusion

is

Whether romantic

that the beloved has attractive properties.

love

is

classified with the eros or the agape tradition depends not on the mere

X has an illusion about v's having P, but illusion

and

x's

loving

then romantic love basis

of this

\'ie\\^

of personal

is

y. If x's

x's

whether the

then

is

no

false belief is

Gay

apparently

second view: "[For Stendhal] that

it is

x's

between

love even the wisest

confirm

in particular

would put Stendhalian

not that

all

later

new

propert\'- based

earlier

perfections,^''

wav,

love within the

it

would be

not generate

all

too,

is

open the

secured in a property-based fashion and

When

Stendhal wrote that the lover

he seems to mean that

find additional value in

y.

x,

already loving y in a

Furthermore, he also

"how

de-

to kiss her") precede love,^^ in which case love itself does

of the beloved. ^^ Admiration

positive appraisals

based emotion, and

as

moment he

claims that admiration and other positive appraisals (for example, lightful

to be

man no longer sees anything as it really ir"^*^ would

was

\N'ill

is

by which Gay means that x sees y

encouraged "overxaluation."

will discoN'er

loving y

beautiful creatures are loved, but

Gax-^s impression, except for the fact that the passage leaves

possibilir\' that the love

only

x's

loving y because x believes falsely

beautiful because x loves y.^^ Stendhal's statement that "from the falls in

the

erosic. In the first

the result of deliberate deception by y or

lo\'ed creatures are beautiful,"

all

it is

structural difference

need or desire to believe that y has P. It is not clear how Stendhalian romantic love

understood. Peter

P and, on

agapic; but if x has the illusion that y has

falselv attributed property', x loves v,

love, there

between the

relationship

loving y leads x to have the illusion that y has P,

because x believes truly that y has P, and that y has P,

on the

to be

fact that

if it

propert)^-based.'*^

Another

issue

of new perfections by the lover deluded imagination or of wish that once x lo\'es y, x

is

a property-

plays a role in the genesis of romantic love, then love,

is

is

whether, for Stendhal, the discovery

unsound (the result of no denying his remark she "really" is. Although Irving

psychologically

fiilfillment).

"no longer sees" y

as

There

is

Singer recognizes that this statement suggests psychological infirmit)' in the lover,** ^

he argues that Stendhal had something

else in

mind: 'The lover

experiences no illusion in the sense of mistaken judgment: he merely refiases to limit his appreciative responses to tifiil.

.

.

.

attributes

what the

rest

of the world declares beau-

[T]he lover's act of imagination consists in bestowing value upon

of the beloved that he knows are not

to be valuable just because x loves y does not

beautiful. "^^

mean

x

That x finds P

is guilt)'

in y

of a cognitive

mistake or psychological foul-up. As a result of loving y, x may merely imagine that y has attractive properties

and be blind to

y's defects

(perhaps x

ra-

7

Two Views

of Love

1

tionalizcs, seeking an ex post facto justification for loving v). But,

more

so-

may deliberately bestow value on y or on y's properties because x loves V, without being driven bv neurotic processes. After all, if God bestows value on otherwise unworth)' creatures, in xirtue of His lo\'e for them, God would berly, X

not be accused of making a cognitive mistake or of being the victim of a vicious psvchological mechanism. Hence, as Singer argues, a Stendhalian lover

confer value the love

5.

is

upon

or

is

the beloxed unsuspiciously.

And

this ma\'

may

happen whether

not propert\'-based.

DERIVATIVE FEATURES OF LOVE

While arguing that personal love eros tradition, that

we need not

salvage personal love,

I

is

adequately understood within the

appeal to elements of the agape tradition to

shall also

argue that personal love should not be

pictured as constant, exclusive, and reciprocal. Conceiving of personal love as axiomatically, constitutively, or by definition constant, exclusive, or reciprocal,

or insisting that onlv genuine personal love features

must be viewed

as derivative.

By

is

anv of these,

this I

mean

is

a mistake; these

three things. First,

constancy, exclusivity^ and reciprocity are contingent features of personal love;

some

cases

of love

be constant, exclusive, or reciprocal, others not. Sec-

will

ond, one goal of a theon' of love

when

they are present.

is

to explain

Constancy,

why

exclusivity',

these features arc present,

and reciprocity

are

the

explananda of a theory of love, not the fundamental explanans. Third, these features are to be derived logically

from more basic features of love; they

not part of the definition of love. ^^^

Of course, we shall investigate exactly what

and reciprocity

constanc)', exclusivity,

are,

and explore the

are

logical relations

among them. To argue that constancy', exclusivity', and reciprocit)' are not axiomatic of love

is

to defend the

first

view of personal love against

\'arious objections.

A

common charge made against the eros tradition is that it does not secure any of these features of love.

Briefl\', a

propert\'-based love, so the ston' goes, will

exist

only as long as the beloved possesses her attractive properties; an erosic

lover

who responds to P in y will also respond to P in z and thus will not love y

exclusively; tees that

and if

and

when

if both

x and y are concerned only with merit, nothing guaran-

x loves v, v also loxes

rcciprocit)'

is

a disadvantage

x.

Failing to secure constancv, exclusivity',

of an account of personal

these features are constitutive. Further, there

erosic love so that

personal loxe

it

may

lo\'e,

however, only

be ways of construing

does secure some constanc}' and so on. Finally, agapic

may not

exhibit

much

exclusivit\'; if so, the

second view of

personal love will not fare any better in this regard than the

first

view. For

Two Views of Love

18

example, Kierkegaard claims that

God

God. But

is

""Christianitv^'s

love; therefore

we can

.

.

.

task

God

resemble

is

man's likeness to

only in loving.

.

.

.

you love [only] your beloved, you are not like unto God, for in God there is no partiality."'*^ If God's agape extends to all humans, and if Christian neighbor-love, as a copy of God's agape, extends to all people without parInsofar as

tialit\^

then any attempt to

fit

personal love within the agape tradition will have

difficulty securing exclusivity.

None of this and the agape

has anv bearing

traditions.

object-centric,

and

said

I

on another disagreement between the eros in the first view personal love was

above that

second view subject-centric.

in the

on

describe the relative emphasis these views put

the

ground of love. But

that the former

is

it is

I

used these terms to

the object and the subject as

often claimed, against eros and in favor of agape,

subject-centric in a different sense:

one who loves erosically is

who

egocentric or loves because doing so benefits her, while one agapically

is

concerned with benefiting the beloved (hence agape,

loves

in this differ-

must be taken seriously (see chap. 12). Does personal love include concern or benevolence in some form? If so, should

ent sense,

is

object-centric). This charge

concern be treated axiomatically or as derivative? Does the first view of personal

love have sufficient resources to

overcome the accusation that

it

portrays

love as egocentric?

6.

THE HUMAN LOVE FOR GOD

Suppose that by our psychological nature personal love was propertybased and reason-dependent:

we could love

in

of attractive properties. Or suppose that even

no other way than on the

if loving this

wav

is

basis

not psycho-

logically determined,

people preferred to love, and to be loved, on the basis of

attractive properties.

Also suppose that people desire that the most important

love experience in their

life

be reciprocal, constant, and exclusive. The problem

do not mean that humans cannot hope both that their lo\'es be propert\'- based, on the one hand, and constant, exclusive, and reciprocal, on the other. Rather, it may not be possible to satisfx' both desires. Let us imagine the worst. If x loves v on the is

that these suppositions

basis

of y's

do not

S, the love will

fit

comfortablv together.

be reciprocated onlv

if v

perceives valuable

whether that occurs may be a matter of x's dumb luck. y's S,

then

life is

that

I

If x loves y

T in x;

on the basis of

why should v expect anv constancy' in x's love? A plain fact of human we are alwavs changing. The constancv of a property'- based love is

continuallv threatened not onlv bv \^s losing S, but also bv

finding S valuable.

And

if

x loves y

on the

basis

of

y's S,

x's

why

no longer expect any

— Two

19

Vien^ of Love

exclusivity

from x when

even have S to

it is

plain that other candidates for x's love have S or

a higher degree?

Perhaps these

difficulties explain

whv

in the eros tradition

admonished to turn our attention awav from the

human

goodness or

Hence, Pausanias

their souls.

Symposium distinguishes "\Tilgar" from "heaxenly" not radical enough, for no lost

are often

of

beings and toward their supposedly permanent, valuable properties

for example, their

is

we

transient, physical aspects

God

bot upone

abandon

human

is

God as its object eros focus exclusively

love's

God may

for

is

lo\'e.

"All

is

lu\'

we are going to we should go whole hog and

allone,"^^ the point being that if

God,

attend instead to

Plato's

in

this solution

an adequate object of erosic

'Sialgar" eros for "heavenl/' eros,

humans have

But

eros.

only suitable object.'*^ Indeed, the love that

be the paradigm case of erosic love, because with

relatively problem-free.*'' In loving

on one

object in virtue of

God, humans can

incomparable objective value.

its

God has no defects that interfere with His attractiveness. God does not change or lose His perfections, and

He

is

always available as an object of love. "It

is

wrong

that

anvone should become attached to me," writes

though

the\'

do so gladlv and of their own accord. I should be misleading those

in

Pascal, "e\'en

whom I aroused such a desire, for I am no one's goal nor ha\'e I the means of

satisfk'ing

anyone.

will die.""*^ Pascal

Am

I

not ready to

die.>

Then

the object of their attachment

draws the conclusion: love God,

who never dies.'*^

Further,

when God is the object, love is constandy reciprocated,^" and all the emotional turmoils and psychological disasters of loving humans are avoided. Listen to St.

Augustine:

went to Carthage. ... I had not yet fallen in love, but I was in love with the idea this feeling that something was missing made me despise mvself for not being more anxious to satisfx' die need. I began to lcK>k around for some object for my love, since I badlv wanted to love something. [A]lthough mv real need was for you, m\' God, ... I was not aware of this hunger. ... To lo\c and to have my love returned was my heart's desire, and it would be all the sweeter if I could also enjoy the body of the one who loved me. [I] fell in love. Mv love was returned and finallv shackled me in the bonds of its consummation. In the midst of my jov I was caught up in the coils of trouble, for I was lashed with I

of it, and

.

.

the cruel,

fier\'

rods of jealousy and suspicion,

fear,

.

The

lover of

God, however, must make

.

.

.

.

.

anger, and quarrels. ^i

Although Robert Graves does not draw the conclusion object suitable for erosic love, he repeats Augustine's century: "Lx)ve is a universal migraine. "^^

.

that

God

is

the only

wisdom for the twentieth

a concession in return for the

unconditionalirs\ constana', and reciprocit\' of this love relationship: she must

20

of Love

Tii'o Vini^s

not hope for being loved exclusively or with special affection by the object of her

she

lo\'e;

returned bv

mav

God

God

lo\'c is

with

all

her heart and soul crosicallv, but the love

nonpartial agape. Another problem

is

that because

God

is

not merelv the object most worthv of love, but the only object worthv of love, the

and

human has for God could entice humans awav from meaningfiil,

that a

lo\'e

even

if imperfect,

relationships with other

rejoice in that consequence.

But

humans. Pascal seemed to recognize

this rivalry

between humans and

the erosic loving attention of a person cuts both ways.

commonlv given

God

for

that eros for

is

Being powerfully

The other reason that is

abandoning the love for humans

humans succeeds too

in love

in favor

for a

soon

as

human being does not it

if one's erosic

it does not li\'e up to its mind can tempt us away from God (as

God

is fiilly

satisfied as

agapicallv, loves one's neighbor. ^^

Would

it

suggested that loving

convenient wav of resolving the

somehow

Even

fare well, e\'en if

brings to

Some have

tells us).

one genuinely,

enough.

with another person substitutes one devoted love in

promise, the anticipated joys

Augustine

of the love for

well, rather than not well

the place of a love for the only proper object of devotion. lo\'e

God for

exhausted what

it

rivalr\' if

loving

humans

not be a

erosically, instead,

meant to love God?

Note that if loving the Christian God is the most satisfying erosic love humans can experience, that satisfaction cannot be attained through Plato's eros. The desire to possess the Good and the Beautiful eternally is fulfilled at the highest stage of the Ascent; the Forms in their constancy' and perfection pro\'ide the most worthv objects of love, and the bliss of apprehending this that

perfection

personal

is

infmite. Yet

God

drew Greeley sounds Lange

is

something

of Christianit}':

not that

is

missing that comes with loving the

how much AnGod and Jessica

reciprocit\\ Nevertheless, note

like Plato:

"The

God is less sensuous

difference

between

(less attractive

more. Ms. Lange's appeal, impressive

as

it is, is

to the

human senses) but

but a hint of the appeal of

Ultimate Grace. "^^ Thus, the similarity between a heavenly eros for God and a heavenlv eros for a Platonic a total

Form suggests that if Christianity' wanted to make

break with pagan philosophy, postulating that

God

(in contrast to the

Forms) loves humans agapically may not be enough. WTiat might be needed in addition

is

the doctrine that not even the love of humans for

most radical mo\'e

is

God is erosic. The

to jettison eros altogether in anv relation between

humans

and God. Conceiving of the human love for for the reasons that Pascal erosicallv, in virtue

to direct a

it is

recommended an

of the perfections that

is

objectionable exactly

erosic love for

God

has but

God. Loving God

humans

lack,

is

merely

God because that lo\'e cannot be satisfied a love directed at God just because it will be satisfied. This is a

human -t\'pe

by humans;

God as erosic

love toward

1

Two

Vien^s of Love

2

poor reason for loving God, but what

make

human

is

the alternative? Abelard,

God a species of agape:

I

think, tried

God for his sake meant lo\'ing him regardless of rewards, Abelard argued that to love God properly one had to renounce even the desire for beatitude. God must not be loved because of any desire for beatitude. Loving God should enable us to to

the

love for

"Since loving

.

.

renounce every thinjj for

his sake

— including the search

odor of egocentricit)'. Yet there

its

the love of humans for

God

enormous problems

are

No

for goodness. "^^

longer motivated by any anticipated happiness, the love for loses

.

in

in

Abelard

thinking of

God as agape, as was recognized by Abelard's predeces-

example, "shr[a]nk from applying the term Agape" to man's God; "to do so would suggest that man possessed an independence and spontaneity over against God, which in reality he does not."''*^ How, further, is a human able to bestow value on God, which is a central feature of sors. Paul, for

love for

agape? Finally,

if

agape involves

self-sacrificial

others (for example, the Crucifixion),

God

that

is

benevolence for the good of

how could a human act for the good of a

self-sufficient?^^

For these reasons, Nygren developed an

human

love for

him

human

the

God. Nvgren's view love for

God

the second view of love.

which "includes to

God and

is

interesting because, even

not exactly agape (nor

is it

cros),

The concept employed by Nygren

in itself the

of the

though for

it falls

within

is pistis (faith),

whole devotion of love,"^^ for example, surrender

obedience "without any thought of reward."''^ But the most

important aspect ofpistis

is

Man

because

is

is

alternative account

not to love

God

that

other objects of desire. ... desire whatsoever. "'^^

Nor

He is

"a response, ...

it is

He

is

great, that

lo\'e

man

for him.

reciprocated love."^^'

"more

desirable than

all

simply not to be classed with anv objects of

is

to love

satisfying "than anything else." Pistis, as

response to God's

it is

is,

.

.

.

Man

God

because doing so

man's love for God, lo\'es

God

.

.

.

"is

is

more

onlv his

because God's un-

motivated love has overwhelmed him and taken control of him, so that he

cannot do other than love God."*^^

How is this a second-\'iew interpretation of

human love for God? The obvious point is that the human being loves God just because God loves the human, not because the human responds to God's merit. Further, since God loves the human not for any reason invoking human the

God is love or because God's nature is to love, the reciprocal God and human exemplifies the full inexplicable circle permitted

merit, but because loN'e

between

only by the second view. Note that Nygren claims that the human's love for

God is caused by God's love for the human, not that God's loving the human is the

human's reason for loving God. Since God's love

is

the nonreason-cause of

human love for God, the following scenario is possible. While God's love causes the human to love God, the human may falsely believe that she loxes God the

Two

22

because lo\'ing

Vien's of Love

God

is

great,

God. Since

and the human

this reason

is

not

offers

reallv

His greatness

as

her reason for

why she loves God, her love for God

the nonideal version of second-view love described under categor)' (B) in

is

section 2.

Paul Tillich, perhaps with Nvgren in mind, defends our

initial

crosic

human love for God: "Without the eros towards truth, would not exist, and without the eros towards the beautiful no ritual expressions would exist. Even more serious is the rejection of the eros quality of love with respect to God. The consequence of this rejection is that love towards God becomes an impossible concept to be replaced by obedience to God."*^^ interpretation of the

theolog)'

He

adds, contrary to Nygren, that "obedience

posite of love." Earlier

the love that a

human

human for God light

(eros)

I

said that

is

not love.

It

can be the op-

our central question might be formulated:

human

Is

more like the love of a or more like the love of God for humans (agape) But in has for a

(personal love)

}

of this dispute among Augustine, Pascal, Nygren, and

were

Tillich, if I

book the central question might be formulated: Is the human love for God more like the love of a human for another human (eros), more like the love of God for humans (agape), or is it something else? Nevertheless, this excursion into theolog\' does more than illuminate the differences between the two traditions; it also suggests a question relevant to personal ," love. When Nvgren uses the expression "Man is not to love God because he (unintentionally) stimulates us to wonder whether humans could choose to writing a different

.

.

.

God either erosicallv or agapicallv (or pistiscallv), and whether only one of these is the best wav of loving God.*^^ Accounts of the human love for God may not be describing the love for God; rather, they might be laying down what the love for God should be, in a moral or nonmoral sense of "should." We must love

keep

in

mind, then, that accounts of personal love may similarly be evaluative

(see 6.4).

One

fmal point. If the problems in the eros tradition mentioned above

(for example, the tension

between propert\'-basedness and constancy') have

suggested that remaining within the eros tradition entails lo\'ing

of humans, they have also suggested that

if

we want humans

God instead

to be the objects

of personal love, our loves must be fashioned to be consistent with the agape tradition. .

.

.

"Would

it

not be sadder

should be onh' a curse because

none of us bviriff

is

its

still, and still more confusing, if love demand could only make it evident that

worth loving, instead of love's being recognized

enough

to

be able to find

Kierkegaard. '^^ This love

is

some

loveableness in

precisely

by

its

of us," writes

possible, he tells us, only because the lover

"bring[s] a certain something with him," that lover himself.

all

Given that "no one

is

source of love

is

the

worthy to be loved" (Oscar Wilde,

De

is,

only

if the

Two Views

23

of Lore

Profundis), an erosic love uill never get off the ground, or if it does

will

it

soon

come crashing down. Or e\'en if humans have sufficient merit to warrant being lo\'ed,

the fact that loxe occurs in \'irtue of changeable and repcatable merit

implies a corresponding

goes,

must be added

fragilit\' in

our

loves.

to erosic love to keep

repudiated altogether in favor of the agape

more ambitioush', the

ideal love that

is

it

A

dose of agape, so the storv

must be

flying; or the eros st\'le

style, if

we want a satisfying love or,

constant, exclusive, and reciprocal.

I

intend to refute this view about personal love.

7.

RECONCILING EROS AND AGAPE

Accounts of personal love

among

agape tradition are prevalent

in the

contemporary philosophers. For example, three-volume histon' of the idea of love,

at the

Irx'ing

beginning and end of his

own theorv

Singer presents his

of love. ^^ In arriving at his view about the nature of love. Singer embraces the metaphilosophical principle that "explaining the occurrence of love

same

as explicating the concept.

love itself

mentioned while "explicating the concept" of philosophically at odds with Singer: b\'

their different outlooks

ground of love

is

not the

is

same

for love are not the

as

Hence, the causal antecedents of love are not to be

13).

(\'ol. 1, p.

The conditions

on the

I

Clearly,

lo\'e.

am

I

meta-

have distinguished the two views of love

basis

of love;

central to these accounts

a thesis

about the explanatory

of personal love and must

figure,

therefore, into their respective concepts. Eros-style loves are not merely con-

tingentlv based

on the

merits of the object; love's being propert}'- based

of the concept of erosic

love. Similarly, love's

of the concept of agapic

The point

love.

is

not being propert\'- based

is

part

is

part

that Singer's metaphilosophical

principle rules out the eros tradition in advance as an adequate theor\' of

personal love.

must be kept

How could erosic love ever be defined if the conditions of love distinct

from love

In Singer's analysis,

all

itself)

love includes, as a necessary condition, the be-

stowal of value (vol. 3, p. 390). "In the love of persons," Singer writes,

"people bestow value upon one another value" (vol.

1, p. 6).

And

o\'er

and beyond

their

.

.

.

objective

even more strongly, "love bestow[s] value without

no matter what the object is worth" (vol. 1, means bestowing value upon his overis not virtuous" (vol. 1, p. 94); "love is a way of

calculation. It confers importance p. 10).

Further, "loving another as a person

personalit\'

even

coming negative

if it

.

appraisals" (vol.

'^^ This love 1, p. 10).

neighbor-love: for Singer, x bestows value X bestows value

on

a

on y even

sounds

if y is

like

.

.

agape or

not meritorious, or

meritorious v but not in virtue of that merit. Indeed,

Singer writes, "That love might be a way of bestowing

\'alue

when

upon the object.

— 24

.

T)vo Vinvs of Love

taking an interest in tion

is

it

regardless of how

Aristode as

as foreign to

it

good or bad

was to Plato"

it

may be

—

(vol. 1, p. 90),

this

he

is

concepin effect

repeating Gregory' Vlastos' cridcism of the erosic loves of Aristotle and Plato,^^ the Vlastos

One

who advances agapic love as the correct alternative (see

might suspect that Singer

is

account of personal love. But he

1

3 5) .

simply explicating agape and not offering an is

certainly attempting primarily to shed light

phenomenon: "Through [love] one human being affirms the signifiBut the beloved ... is not static: she is fluid, changing, alive'^ (vol. 1, p. 8). "To love a woman ... is to desire her for undefinable

on

that

cance of another.

.

.

.

the sake of values that appraisal might discover, and yet to place one's desires

within a context that affirms her importance regardless of these values"

(vol. 1,

p. 6).

The preceding not

sentence suggests that Singer

is

analyzing personal love

purelv agapic, but as a reconciliation of eros and agape: personal love

as

involves both a response to perceived value and a bestowal of value that occurs

independentlv of perceived value.

He

writes,

[bestowal and appraisal]; they interweave in

not bestow

a value that

would be no

love" (vol.

bestowal, and

it.

exist

How

is

1, p. 9).

both

we could

But to claim that appraisal

is

necessar\' for

can appraisal be necessary

if love,

no matter whatxhc object is by including bestowal, can

the object has

claim that love

The

related to

appraised

therefore for love, seems to contradict Singer's assertion that

of appraisal," he says

attitudes

13), but

is

no merit or when the object's merit is irrelevant? a bestowal of value which supplements, and sometimes overrides, our

when

"Love

we

goes beyond appraisal; and without bestowal there

the lover bestows value "without calculation [and]

worth."

"Love

Unless

this

issue

is,

is

in

is

(vol. 3, p.

393). In another passage Singer does

"primarily bestowal and only secondarily appraisal" (vol.

vague and hardly looks

what way

is

like a reconciliation

1, p.

of eros and agape.

appraisal, for Singer, operative in love?

There

are,

based on what Singer has written, three different interpretations. Singer comments on the song "Because You're

You" by Henry

Blossom:

Not that you are fair, dear Not that you are true. Not vour golden hair, dear, Not your eyes of blue. When we ask the reason. Words are all too few! So I know I love you, dear. Because you're you.

Singer rejects the reason offered in the

last line

(reminiscent of Montaigne's):

25

Tivo Views of Love

"[The song] seems to

And

into being.

this,

I

assert that the sheer identity

think,

"the lady because she's she"

bevond appraisal"

is

sound

it

Loving

as if the delicacy

eomponent of lo\'e. For

a necessar\'

is

our purposes. Singer's remark about the

"makes

150).*^^

1, p.

"quite different" from the "bestowal over and

149) that

(vol. 1, p.

of the beloved brings love

highly implausible" (vol.

is

last line

of the song

of her complexion

.

.

.

is

important:

it

had nothing to do

most unlikely." He continues: "If all these endearing young charms were to xanish and fade away, would not the greatest of

with his loving her, which

human

is

We

loves \'anish with them!"

lover cultivated

new needs and

interpretation) that appraisal

have

everx'

reason to think so, unless the

amounts to saying

desires." This

— finding valuable properties humans

essential for personal love, a necessar)' condition for

"Wholly nonappraisive love

human

foreign to

is

(the first

in the object

to

nature" (vol. 3,

p.

insists

(among these

again

concept of lo\'e must not mention

is

391).

Apparently, Singer agrees with the eros tradition about the ground of

even though he

—

bestow value:

lo\'e

passages) that the explication of the

this fact. Yet, as

we ha\'e seen, claiming that x

bestows value on y only if x already perceives value in y contradicts the claim that the bestowal of value is independent of such evaluations. The ver\' idea of

agape

is

the idea of a love that

is

hence claiming that appraisal reconcile the

two

Perhaps

not grounded

is

in the attractixeness

necessar}^ for

human

of its object;

personal love

is

not to

traditions.

this

is

why

Singer occasionally claims (the second interpreta-

tion) that positive appraisal plays a facilitator}' role in the genesis

of bestowal:

"For most men

than an ugly

woman" it

it is

easier to

(vol. l,p. 23);

bestow value upon a

beautifiil rather

"by disclosing an excellence

.

.

easier for us to appreciate" the other person (vol.

might be that bestowal does not

strictly require

bestowal after such an appraisal

is

.

appraisal

1, p.

.

.

.

makes

10).^" His point

antecedent positive appraisal;

merely psychologically "easier," and be-

stowals without positive appraisal are not impossible but only "unlikely" (vol. 1, p.

149). But to attempt to reconcile agape and eros by claiming that ap-

but not essential role

praisal plays a facilitatory

appraisal

sometimes plavs

a role this

means

in love

at best that

is

not convincing. If

some

cases of personal

love are erosic while other cases are agapic, not that personal ciliation in

The

all its

third interpretation

positive appraisal. "In

more

easily

is

recon-

that the bestowal of value occurs without

some circumstances

the bestowing of value will

than in others; but whenever

creation of value and exceeds to

lo\'e is a

cases.

elicit it" (vol. 1, p. 13).

all

attributes

it

happens,

it

happens

happen

as a

new

of the object that might be thought

The "whenever"

here suggests that love can arise

independently of any positive appraisal. Indeed, Singer seems to advance

Two Vinvs

26

of Love

seriously this radical thesis:

"Nothing can

continues, "Either [bestowals] love, as

it

come or they

Both defy our

in persons.

is

interpretation. Singer's account of love

we can suppose,

personal love. God, sheer

gift.

And

this

is

elicit

preciselv

don't. This

is

1, p.

154).

He

the spontaneity in

rational calculations." In this third

is

squarely within the second view of

humans for no

loves

what

bestowals" (vol.

love's

reason; His love

bestowal of value

done bv humans: "Love is sheer gratuit}^" (vol. 1, erosic basis. "It issues from the lover like hairs on

p. 15),

is,

even

hence love has no

his head." If so, love

"sheer gratuit)^" and "spontaneous" in whatever sense hairs

a

is

when a

is

grow gratuitously

and spontaneouslv. Nothing, apparently, about either the subject or the object figures into the ground of love, except that the lover's nature is to grow hair. Does this help us to understand these statements: "We instinctively bestow value

upon persons

of bestowing

is

.

.

.

regardless of their

instinctual" (vol. 3, p. 158)? Consider

similar terms:

utilit}'" (vol. 2, p.

neither rational nor irrational.

"Agape

sun or the universe l,p.275).7i

is

.

.

.

at large,

how

spontaneous.

It

339), and "the act

nonrational, and probably

It is

Singer describes God's love in

simply radiates,

giving forth energ}' for

like the

glorious

no apparent reason"

(vol.

However, because Singer so often insists that appraisal plays a role in love ("appraisal may lead on to a further bestowal" [vol. 1, p. 10]), perhaps we should propose an account of love within the eros tradition that incorporates Singer's notion

of bestowal. Love,

propert}'- based bestowal

which

of value

in this proposal,

consistent with Singer's claim that "love

is

would be defined

(this love is erosic,

as the

not a reconciliation),

would not be

appraising were accompanied by the bestowing of value"

(vol.

love unless 1, p.

10).

Singer should be open to the suggestion that "a property-based bestowal of value"

is

superior (as an account of personal love) to "an

of value," given

his frequent assertions

about the

ungrounded bestowal

human psychological tenden-

cy to bestow value only after positive appraisal. Indeed, because he eventually

major ingredient within

assertsthat "appraisal

[is]

causal condition.

[T]heappraisive element

of love"

.

(vol. 3, p.

stood erosically

.

.

a

[is]

love,

and not merely ...

a

an ever-present constituent

394), Singer apparendy agrees that love should be under-

as "a property- based

to recognize the implications of his

personal love, for he

still

bestowal of value."

now

insists that "in its

any degree of worth in the object"

He refuses, however,

calling appraisal a "constituent"

of

mere definition love is not bound by 402). But remember that Singer's

(vol. 3, p.

metaphilosophical principle leads him to exclude only causal conditions from the anah'sis of love, but not appraisal

is

its

constituents; and he has just claimed that

"not merely ... a causal condition."

from including

this constituent

of love, appraisal,

What would keep in

its

Singer

defmition? His argu-

Two

27

Vieivs of Love

mcnt seems

"human

to be that even though

ne\ertheless "it

logicaUv possible for love to

is

do not have this eapacit\\" bestow itself on an object that

beings

no other worth" (vol. 3, p. 402), for we can imagine a being (the Christian God) that bestows value independently of appraisal/^ Rut, then, appraisal is has

not a "constituent" of love

There

after

or

all,

a constituent only

it is

of personal

a deeper point to be made about Singer's claim that "in

is

definition love

is

not bound by any degree of worth

insistence that appraisal

is

loxe.

mere

its

in the object," that

his

is,

not part of the definition of love because

"it is

logicaUv possible" to bestow independently of appraisal. His account of love

amounts,

common

as a result, to the thesis that all love involves, as a necessary

denominator, the bestowal of value (and not necessarily anything more than this).

Hence,

not unreasonable to think of God's agape for humans

it is

the paradigm case of love in Singer's view. Further, the claim that

of

necessarilv involves bestowal can be seen, because

umbrella account of love that applies to

all

— the —

from the definition of love

love that motivates Singer to exclude appraisal

cases.

its

all

as

love

generality', as

Thus, we could employ

an

this

umbrella account to analyze other loves, for example, parental love, the love of chocolate, patriotism;

if these

are

genuine loves, they will

all

exhibit a bestowal

of value even though they will be distinguishable by difterent causal conditions and, perhaps, by difltrent effects. (In loving chess, the chess lover bestows

on the game beyond

value

human loN'ing

for

lo\'e

man

God

perceived merit.) Singer's treatment of the

its

Man

despite his imperfections.

God and

nizing the infinite goodness of

within a community' of bestowals"

who

"God bestows

confirms this interpretation:

bestows value [on God]

They 215). Again: "The

delighting in

(vol. 1, p.

it.

value in in recog-

reciprocate Christians,

God is perfect, believe that his being the creator gives a suftkient reason for man to love him. But creativity is no more reason than anything else. as If the pious man loves God, he does so by bestowing a gratuitous value say

—

love alwavs does" (vol.

1, p.

Singer, having analyzed

all

must claim

246). "As love always does" demonstrates that

love as necessarily including the bestowal of xalue,

human

that even the

Singer, then, runs into the

Plato usuallv goes

like this: Plato's

to possess eternally the

Good and

Form of the Good or the must analvze Plato,

when

God

Beautifiil

is

is

the Beautifijl. That

—

is

from loving

concei\'e

of personal loxe

is is,

The stor^' about

that love

is

the desire

love for a thin0

— the

the paradigm case of love. Hence, Plato

of

lo\'ing

only a thing. Thus, for

loving only the beautifiil properties (things) of y.

assimilated to the

different

includes bestowal.

that Plato does.

umbrella definition

e\'en personal love as a case

x loves y, x

Personal love

love for

same trouble

beautifiil in this

lo\'e

of things,

laws and theorems.

way

is

to

make

as

being not essentially

The

stor\'

concludes: to

a ghastly mistake. Singer,

by

28

T^ro Views of Love

analogy,

stuck with the disastrous result that the

is

human love for God must God by humans. But is

be conceived of as including the bestowing of value on it

coherent to speak of humans bestowing value on God? (Recall

"Man bestows

above.) Consider again:

in

God

in recognizing his infinite

God" becomes,

the infmite goodness of

sect. 6,

recognizing the

God." Shouldn't Singer have written

infmite goodness of positively appraises

God]

value [on

here,

"Man

goodness"? "Recognizing

for Singer, not an appraisal but a

bestowal. But this expands unmercifully the notion of bestowal.

Singer eventually claims that he has driven too wide a wedge between

bestowal and appraisal: "All appraisals must ultimately depend on bestowal since [appraisals] presuppose that

human

beings give importance to the

satis-

fying of their needs and desires. Without such bestowal nothing could take value of any sort. 3, p.

393) Thus, .

As

a result, the

two categories

in personal love, x

y normally being

bestows value on

of

positive appraisal

x's

y;

and

y,

the cause of x's love for

x's positive

—

y.

of y satisfiable by

appraisal

depends on x's antecedent bestowal of value on x's desires that are these positively appraised properties in

on

are not wholly separable" (vol.

Hence, the bestowal of value occurs

two places in love x bestows value on y (the top level), and x bestows value on x's desires (the deep level) with appraisal sandwiched between.''^ Note at

that in this

complex

—

picture, the top-level bestowal

while the deeper bestowal

bestowal

is

is

I

believe Singer

must occur somewhere

erosically

grounded,

ungrounded. (Singer never claims that the deeper

somehow dependent on

spontaneous.)

is

in love,

is

a

it must be ungrounded bestowal of value argue (13.9) that 1) x's bestowal of

deeper appraisal. Hence,

right that an

but

I

will

(

on y is not the ungrounded bestowal of love, and (2) at the deepest level x bestows value on y's properties, not on x's desires. Claim (1) denies that personal love is best understood as an agapic phenomenon; the goal, then, is to

value

explain

8.

how claim

(2)

is

consistent with the eros tradition.

MILL'S DEDICATION

Let us return to John's praise of Harriet (see the epigraph).

We can ask

whether: truly that she possessed the

a.

John loved Harriet because he believed qualities mentioned in the dedication;

b.

John loved Harriet because he believed qualities;

falsely that

fme

she had those fme

Two

c.

John found some of Harriet's virtue

d.

29

Views of Love

of her possessing other

John found valuable

qualities valuable because he io\

ed her

in

attractive properties; or

qualities in Harriet only because

he loved her (peri-

od), or because she loved him.

Which

is

true?

According to Gertrude Himmelfarb,

"could onlv suppose that Mill was so besottedly

Mill's

in lo\'e

contemporaries

with [Harriet] as to

mistake her intellectual pretensions for intellectual distinction" gests either (d) or a dismal version

remembered

[Harriet] as

'full

of (c). Himmelfarb

of unwise

intellect,

— which sug-

also tells us that "Carlvle

asking and re-asking stupid

questions,'"^* which suggests (b). But was not Mill acquainted with Shakespeare's Sonnet 17?

Who will If

it

were

believe filled

my verse

in

time to come

with your most high deserts?

to come would say "This poet lies. Such heavenh' touches ne'er touched earthly faces." So should my papers, yellowed with their age, Be scorned, like old men of less truth than tongue, And vour true rights be termed a poet's rage And stretched meter of an antique song.

The age

Yet Himmelfarb, though no fan of Harriet, did not

belittle Mill as well;

he

"could attribute to his wife a large share in [On Liberty s] conception and

composition, knowing that that attribution, however often and explicitly stated,

would be

largelv discounted

to realize that, perhaps there

is

bv

more

his readers."''^ If Mill

had enough wits

truth in claim (a) than historians are

pleased to admit.

do not know which alternatix'c is correct; but the example of Millwhy I would rather do philosophv. We cannot understand what stake in necessarily ambiguous examples until we do philosophy. HistorI

Taylor shows is

at

ical

research into the Mill-Taylor relationship

Harriet in such fana' terms in the dedication.

may

explain

why

Mill praised

We might learn something from

the fact that John never wrote "I love Harriet because she's Harriet." (But did it?) The problem is not only that in Mill-Taylor several of the altermay have been true at different times or that real examples are messy because they are real. The problem is also that, given an\' bod\' of knowledge about Mill-Taylor, we could perceive John as loving Harriet either erosically or

he think

natives

and this "underdetermination" of psychobiographical truth by the means ue cannot relv heavih' on examples to answer our intellectual

agapically, facts

Two Views of Love

30

questions.

Even

if John

did write, in a

still

well-hidden diary, "I love Harriet,

but I know not why. Probabh' because she's she, that

would not

anyone else's

necessarily

love.

tell

as

Montaigne would have

it,"

us anM:hing about his love for her, or about

Nor would it help us to make the distinctions relevant to the

philosophy of love or to sort out the concepts that require

analysis.

CHAPTER2

Love at Second Sight wc found

ourselves so taken with each other, ... so

At our

first

bound

together, that from that time

meeting,

.

.

.

on nothing was so

close to us as each

other.

— Montaigne, "Of Friendship" Martha

who I

is

mine, the sweet

despite

feared to

all

my

girl

of whom ever)'one speaks with admiration,

resistance captivated

my

heart at our

first

meeting, the

girl

want and who came towards me with high-minded confidence.

— Freud

(letter to

Martha Bemays, 1882)

GELLNER'S PARADOX

1.

In a paper devoted to comparing existentialist and Kantian ethics, E. A.

Gellner begins b\ asking, "Is love at

sight possible?''^

room perusing women's magazines,

dentist's waiting cles

first

While

sitting in his

Gellner found diat

arti-

on love at first sight assumed it existed, the major question addressed being

empirical:

How

wholly logical"

often does (p.

it

occur? But for Gellner the issue

constructed an a priori argument designed to impossible (pp. 158-163). at first sight

is

is

"in part or

158) rather than empirical; to support his suspicion he

I

will lay

out

like

that love at

in detail Gellner's

as logically impossible as a

contingently nonexistent,

show

first

it

was

argument that love it is

only

throws into sharp

relief

round square (not that

the unicorn). Because

sight

the problems attributed to erosic loves, Gellner's argument will haunt us

almost

on

ever\' page.

a person x has an encounter with a person \', the first contact of anv kind between them. (Gellner does not specif\' the length of this meeting or what transpires betu'cen x and y.) We might even suppose that the encoun-

Imagine that

ter

is

and that

at a distance

x only catches sight

Alter or during this encounter, x experiences attitude

toward

that x's

emotion

properties.

We

v.

of y without talking with

some emotion,

a feeling, or

y.^

an

(Gellner uses these terms interchangeabh'.) Also assume

arises in \irtue

of

x's

"noticing" a set S of

y's attractive

can understand this in several ways. Does "x notices S in y"

mean that x correcdy

perceives S in y; that x falsely believes that y has S, either

31

32

Love at Second Siqht

because x hopes that \ has S or because v pretends to have S; or that x perceives S in y only unconsciously?

(Gellner does not sav conscious!}'

To get to the

what he means h\ "x

heart of Gellner's argument

notices S in

x''')^

let

us assume that x

and correctly percei\es that y has S, and x realizes that S is x's emotion. The unnamed emotion that x has, then, is proper-

responsible for

t\'-based or reason-dependent.

set

Once we assume that x has an attitude toward v (xAv) because x notices a "first encounter" can be understood in two ways: we

S of v's properties,

might be talking about (A) the emotion x has notices S.

after x's first

encounter tout court

encounter with y at which x first Alternative (B) allows that x had earlier encounters with y during

with v or (B) the emotion x has

after the

which X did not notice S and so did not experience any emotion toward v. But I am sure that Gellner means (A), in which "first sight" is meant literally. Alternati\'e (B)

knows

is

more complex and suggests

loves \ or suddenly notices that v has S

Suppose that some time another person

about

z:

a different

phenomenon: x

perhaps e\'en loves y for some time, and x suddenly realizes that she

v,

z.

We

after

and

is

quite lovable.

meeting and responding to

by Gellner to assume something interesting

are asked

he or she also has the set S that v has. Persons y and

not altogether identical;

x meets

y,

we assume onlv that x notices

in z the

z,

however, are

same set S that x

noticed in y and in \'irtue of which x has the emotion toward y. (We might be tempted to assume that z has no additional propert)^ P (beyond S), a property so annoying to x that S in z cannot have

about z

is

emotion.

its

wrong. Both v and z must lack

We can include

both V and

z have.)

The

"lacks

all

z.

other feelings toward

all,

z,

S that

x noticed S in y during onlv

emotional response that x had toward y (perhaps x has

or none at

toward y cannot be

all).

lo\'e

Gellner proceeds to argue that the

and hence cannot be love

The argument

is

a classical

dilemma and has two horns.

toward z that x has toward y, then

x's

emotion

X does not have the same experience toward for \ cannot be

lo\'e.

z,

Since there are onlv

emotion

for y

is

at first sight,

z.

First, if

hax'ing the encounter with the relex'antlv similar z, x does have

x's

elicit x's

set

Or x does not have that experience again

whether or not x has the same emotion toward

implies that

to

likelihood that x will have an encounter with this

exclusi\'e possibilities. Either the

x has

is

Now that x has met this similar z, there are only two, mutually

occurs again toward

emotion

v or S in z

such annoying properties" in the

relevantly similar z cannot be ruled out; after

one encounter.

on x; but to assume this only

effect

this P, if S in

tjie

upon

emotion

for y is not love. And, second, if then (nevertheless! ) x's emotion

two

possibilities,

and each one

not love, Gellner's argument shows that

it is

impossible that the emotion experienced by x after the one encounter with y

is

Love at Second

33

Sifjht

lo\'c. (Note that GcUncr must assume that whether or not x has the same emotion toward z, x is still experiencing the emotion toward y upon meeting z. For if X before meeting z no longer has that feeling toward y, or if during xs encounter with z the feeling evaporates, we might already be able to conclude

emotion

that x\s

for v was not love,

and the

rest

of Gellner's argument would be

superfluous.)

Our task is to substantiate the claims that if xAy and later xAz (x's unnamed attitude toward y is repeated toward z), then -xLy (the attitude is not love); and that if xAy and later -xAz, then still -xLy. Symbolically, Gellncr wants to establish the following, when x notices S in both y and z: 1.

& xAz) ^

-xLy -(A = L); and (xAy & -xAz) -^ -xLy -(A = L). or (xAy & -xAz) (xAy

or (xAy

2.

& xAz) ^

^

The first horn states that if x's attitude love. Gellner's reason

y cannot be exclusive;

attitude

same

it

repeated toward

can have "only one object"

toward both y and cannot love both y and z

z,

—

159).

(p.

then x

as a

z, x's

straightforward. Lxjve

toward another person shows that

attitude

love; X

is

is

it is

The

attitude is

"very recurrence" of the

not love. If x claims to have the

wrong to think that the

is

toward

conceptually

attitude

is

matter not of morality but of conceptual

neccssit\\

Gellner's

argument to establish the first horn seems awfully heavy-handand uses this definition to

ed, as if Gellner defines love in advance as exclusive

proclaim that

toward

z.

exclusive

it

could not possibly be true that xLy

Do we is

not

feel inclined to say that

an empirical issue? After all,

if x's

whether

x's

attitude

is

repeated

love turns out to be

many x's claim to love two people, and

defining love as exclusive begs the question against them. Further, Gellner

does not indicate clearly what the exclusivity of love means;

and "onlv one object" do not

sufficiently nail

down

"ver\'

recurrence"

this idea (see chap. 9).

what Gellner is getting at makes good sense. If x meets y at tj and experiences A, and then x meets a relevantly similar z at some time t2 after tj, again experiencing A, we have good reason to doubt that xLy. (Tr)' t^ - noon, Nevertheless,

t2

=

12:15 P.M.)

Note

that Gellner's assumption that

z,

establish the first horn. If the "verv recurrence"

that X does not love v, the exclusivity

of love

too, has S

is

not needed to

of the attitude toward z shows

rules

out

x's

loving both y and z

xAy in virtue of y's having S and xAz in virtue of z's having some other set of properties T. Perhaps assuming that z also has S makes it more likely that even

if

X develops the attitude toward

z.

But assuming that z also has S allows the

first

34

Love at Second Siqht

horn to be defended independently of a claim about exclusivity defense not considered bv Gellner. For

grounded

in v's

and

tokens of the same (13.5). Rather

if x's attitudes

having the same

z's

t\'pc (9.10)

S,

we could appeal to what it means to Having argued

to establish the second horn. After

it is

all, if

itself

and not either y or z

of love to estabhsh the

"lo\'e the

that if xAz, then

alternative

then perhaps x merelv loves two

or loves only S

than appeal to the exclusivity

— an

toward both y and z are

first

horn,

person" in some technical sense.

false that

xLy, GeUner seems unable

the exclusivit)^ of love entails that if x

does have the same emotion toward z and v, then

this

emotion

the fact that x does not experience the emotion again

is

not love, then

when encountering

z

emotion toward y being love. Our friend x has met the z who also has S and has remained attitude-faithful toward y. So why does GeLLner claim that even in this case x does not love y? Here is the argument (pp. seems compatible with

x's

159-160): The

altemaa\'e

is

that

X

does twt ha\'e the same attitude

.

.

.

towards the

new

possessor of S as he had towards Y. But this equally constitutes conclusive

evidence for X not

loving Y. For S is all he knows of Y; if ... on reencounemotion ... is not reevoked, this shows that it had not reaUv been conneaed with its apparent stimulus and object, that it had been accidental, arbitrary', and without anv of the significance which one normally reall\'

tering S the original

attributes to [love].

We

assumed that ys having S (or

meets z and z also has

produce the same

effect.

S,

then

The

z's

x's

noticing S in y) explained xAy.

having S (or

fact that x

x's

So

if

x

noticing S in z) should

does not experience the same feeling

toward z when presented with the same situation contradicts that assumption.^

Hence, ys having S was not responsible for xAy

after

all.

Further, since

whv believe that during x's encounter with z the fact that y has S continues to e\'oke xAy? Or that S will e\'oke xAy well after x's encounter S

fails

to evoke xAz,

z, or during x's second encounter with y? The fact that S failed to evoke xAz impUes that S is not the groimd of xAy initially or on a continuing basis. So what? Whv conclude that if xAv in virtue of something other than ys having S, x's emotion toward v is not love? The point is that x's emotion

with

toward y is due not to anvTiiing about y but to something about x.* If the ground of xAv is not v's having S, then v, it turns out, is incidental to the occurrence of x's emotion; and

if so, x's

emotion

is

whimsical "arbitran^') in a (

way incompatible with its being love. There is no sense, for Gellner, in saying that X loves y unless some tight connection exists between y, or y's having S, and x's emotion. And it is the failure of z's having S to elicit xAz that shows that the required tight connection between y's having S and xAy is lacking. In a

word: the second horn

is

established by assuming that lo\'e

is

propert\'-based

Love at Second

35

Sijfht

and reason-dependent,

in

which case Gellner's paradox derives from, or first view of personal love.

pre-

impossible that xLy after their

first

supposes, the central thesis of the This, then,

is

Gellner's paradox:

encounter, whether or not this

xAz when

wav: if the connection between

it is

x meets the similar

z.

We might express

having an emotion and S

x's

tight,

is

it

then x

does not love v because the tightness guarantees that x will also have the

emotion toward others tion and S

having S

not tight

is

who

(as

have S; and

not responsible for

is

if

the connection between

shown by -xAz), then x's

emotion.

x's

emo-

x docs not love y because y's

No

third alternative can be

squeezed between a "tight" and a "not tight" connection between x's emotion and S. Either v's having S accounts for xAy, as in the eros tradition, or it docs not.

And if we assume,

be tight, then love

2.

as

we did

at first sight

second horn, that the connection must

impossible.

KNOWLEDGE AND LOVE AT

Gellner's

that love

is

argument

is

that love at

return to Gellner. lo\'c is necessarilv

generally

first

FIRST SIGHT

sight

is

fail

first

One argument

is

reciprocal (11.2)

sight that deserve consideration before

that this

is

that love at

x's

emotion

will

sight does not exist

when the phenomenon is occurring it has not yet proven itself to have is

very convincing; relying

claims about the reciprocit\' and constancy' of love (or, as in Gellner,

exclusivit)') is like hitting a

are

first

arguments based on

of y and

we

unlikely because

is

and during one encounter

Another

in this regard.

phenomenon

the constancv required for love. Neither argument

on

impossible on the grounds

both exclusive and property-based. But there are other arguments

against the existence of love at

because

in the is

x's

cockroach with a sledgehammer.

a claim

emotion toward

y.

More

about the relationship between

There may be no such thing

x's

its

interesting

knowledge

as love at first sight

for any the following reasons: during x's first encounter with y

(

I) x

is

not in a

position to believe anything about y, (2) x cannot reliably believe anything true about y, or (3) x cannot be believing anything significant (as opposed to trivial)

about

y.

These arguments nip love

Gellner begins, by raising doubts about

at first sight in the

x's

"noticing" S in

bud

at the place

y.

Montaigne might be a counterexample to the argument relying on claim for ( Montaigne said that his love for Boctie was both "at first sight" and not ) I reason-dependent: not only was his lo\'c not based on his belo\'ed's properties, but also not possibly based on them. Claim (1), then, does not show that agapic love at first sight, in particular, is impossible; at most it shows that love ,

at first sight

cannot be

crosic.

On the other hand, Montaigne's experience may

confirm the argument; he was wrong to

call his

emotion "love"

at that early

36

Loi^e at

Second Siqht

stage of his relationship with Boetie, just because

could not be based on anything about Boetie.

does not plausible.

I

know

because x could not

exist

find

it

difficult to

some of \^s

perceive

An argument

if x

occurred

at first sight

argue that love

anything about

y,

and

at first sight

however,

is

im-

encounter x has no

a first

encounters y only at a distance, x will

properties.

on

reh'ing

when he wrote that lo\'e

1

(

)

might be what Philip

at first sight

analnic sense, since there point, however,

it

suppose that during

about y or y's properties; even

beliefs

To

mind

in

"can only be transference, in the psycho-

nothing ... on which

is

had

Slater

might not be that love

it

at first sight

can be based. "^

Slater's

cannot be based on

x's

knowledge of v because x could not have any knowledge of this unknown y; rather, he might mean that love at first sight cannot be based on x's knowledge of V because x's emotion

But

emotion, for .

.

out of proportion to the information x has about y.*^

us assume that Slater means that loxe at

let

know

because x could not

ent

is

.

Slater,

not

is

an\thing about

first

y.

y; the "real object

sight

is

only transference

is

but a fantasv image of that parent which has been retained, ageless and

being transference,

hence that lo\'e

is

"Oedipal love," that

at first sight exists

"really^" its object. Alternatively^

possible, if not fueled,

about

V.

bv the

But neither account

we could

fact that x is

a kind

is, still

of

say that love at

is

at

all.

first

and

sight does not

This transference

not in a position to

at first

love,

who is not

even though disconnected from y,

only transference, not a kind of love

exist; it is

stand

x's

not [even] the actual par-

unchanging, in the unconscious."^ Slater concludes that romantic love sight,

of

If so, the real object

made

is

know

anything

way

to under-

compelling; the most sensible

whv X has the emotion now as a result of an encounter with y is to say that

X notices

some

Oedipal love

properties S of v, either consciously or unconsciously. Slater's

at first sight is

matches (or conjures

why X

in x's

not disconnected from

y; y^s

having the S that

mind) the properties of the parent image

is

exacdy

has the emotion toward y If y did not haxe properties approximating .

the "ageless and unchanging" image of the parent, not even the psychoanalyst

could comprehend nation of

x's

x's

emotion.

emotion:

it tells

Slater's psychoanalysis

us

why

S

is

provides a deep expla-

attracti\'e for

x and

why

x will

experience love toward persons having S.

On the other hand, x's not being in a position to know anything about y might allow

x to imagine that y has S,

and

x's

strong need to find a parent

replacement induces x to do what is possible, so that x merely imagines that y has S.

Ining Singer

interprets the psychoanalytic

one can bring back the goddess of

his

view

this

childhood; and since that

Freudian lo\er must envisage his beloved, love can only involve delusion."^

One might

argue against love

at first sight, then,

(falsely)

"No how the

way: is

illusion,

even

by relying on

37

Love at Second Sujbt

emotion occurs after one encounter, x cannot believe much which case x's emotion is not love. But this argument, too, is unconvincing. First, x's having onlv one encounter with y does not entail that claim (2) since :

that

is

x's

true of v, in

the beliefs and perceptions x does have about y are mostly course, might be true but incomplete; x sees

false.

some good but not

X's beliefs, of yet the

bad

in

But x's not having the emotion toward y when x fmally sees the bad does not entail that earlier x's emotion was not love (chap. 10). Second, neither the eros

y.

nor the agape tradition

insists that

xLy entails

that x has only true beliefs about

In the eros tradition, the intentionality of love logically permits that xLy in

y.

virtue

of

believing falsely that y has P; x's loving y

x's

thinking that v has P, and the point.

but

x thinks that y has

The love that x has for y, love (7.4).

it is still

then V

why

on

if based

And if x's love

is

P

is

is

explained by

x's

(in this context) beside

might be

false beliefs,

irrational,

based altogether on illusions about

mav not be the emotion's object (or x may not be loving y

y,

"as a person";

emotion is still love. In the agape tradition, x's believing falsely no impediment to love; since x's love is not based on y's having P, believing falsely that v has P is irrelevant. Further, x might know little or

13.5), but the

that V has x's

P

is

nothing about v assist

in the special case

the stranger

of agapic love for the stranger.

When we

who asks for help, we love her agapically "at first sight," even

though we know nothing about her, may even falsely imagine that she is dangerous, or might be deliberately decei\'ed by her as to her actual need.

However, we can interpret agapic love for the stranger not as loving despite having no knowledge about the strange person, but as loving when we

We know

do have knowledge.

these particularities are is

that he

is

trivial.

a person, which

to know. Erosic love at

is

first

might know much about

nothing in particular about the stranger, but

What we know immediately about the

the only significant thing about

sight

v, x

might not exist, then, because even though x

does not usually

know

anything significant.

Lxjve, in this \'icw, requires that x have not merely true beliefs

deep knowledge of This argument

y;

raises

and

we

about y but

will address: Is there a plausible

distinguish between the beloved's significant and trivial properties?

based on significant properties superior to a love based on the 12.9)? This question presupposes that love can be based

indeed, that

is

a clear empirical fact

about personal

Plato's Pausanias. Hence, to argue that love at

love are

is

no

grounded

in

attractive

enough

"good" love

first

to

ground

weak

love,

ones,

on is

trivial

to

love

(10.6;

trivial properties;

lo\'e, as

sight

way

Is a

recognized by

not love, because

is

too hea\y-handed. If there

on what

properties the lover finds

deep knowledge of the object,

a priori limits, or very

a

knowledge takes time to obtain.^

this significant

questions

stranger

him that we need

we may

be able to distinguish "bad" from

(for example, vulgar versus heavenly eros)

by distinguishing

Love at Second Siqht

38

significant

and not

from trivial properties. But that is not the difference between loving

loving.

When which

.

.

.

Descartes wrote to Chanut (June 6, 1647)^° about "the reasons

impel us to

one person rather than another before we know

lo\'e

one can love without perfect ioiowledge; but did Descartes intend "before we know their worth" to mean that x their worth," he was

can love

\'

clearly asserting that

without anv

beliefs

about y, without true

without knowledge of ^s significant (that

beliefs

about y's worth, or properties? Re-

worthfiil)

is,

more Skinnerian than Freudian: "When I was a child, I loved a little girl of mv own age, who had a slight squint. The impression made ... in mv brain when I looked at her cross eyes became so closely approach

gardless, his

is

connected to the simultaneous impression arousing in that for a long time afterward inclination to love them.

.

.

.

me the passion of love,

when I saw cross-eyed persons So, when we are inclined to

a special

I felt

someone worth, which

love

knowing the reason [that is, before knowing their this is because he has some similarity' to something would be a reason], \\ithout

.

.

.

an earlier object of our love, though Descartes,

it

seems,

is

we may

not be able to

a proponent of the first view

have both reason-causes (the object's worth) and in virtue

love.

and vou

To Montaigne

will find reasons

Lx)ve can

^ ^

nonreason-causes that exist

of being psvchologicallv associated with properties that

"the passion of love." thvself,

of personal

in

identif)' it."

ha\'e

aroused

Descartes might have said: examine

and causes

plent\' for

your loving Boetie.

Further, Descartes claims not only that nonreason-causes need not remain

unconscious (he figured out the influence of squints on

his choice

but also that nonreason-causes are controllable: "At that time that

was the reason for mv

longer affected bv

on the

basis

3.

The

and

soon

as

implication

is

on

it

.

.

.

,

I

know

was no

as squints,

he was not locked into

Whether one can unencumber oneself of Freudian transference as

of Skinnerian associations

is

another question.

THE IMPOSSIBILFTY OF LOVE

What,

exactlv, has Gellner

There are three candidates:

one encounter); and

(c)

shown to be logically impossible,

love (that

is,

love (period).

To defend the first horn of his dilemma,

is

it is

exclusive.

about love, period) might establish that

does not establish that

if anything?

(a) love-at-first-sight; (b) love, at first sight (after

Gellner appealed to a claim about love:

that (b)

as I reflected

of belo\'eds),

did not

that if Descartes did not wish to love

of such a trivial nonreason-cause

that pattern. easilv as

it."

lo\'e;

I

(a) is

I

think this claim about

(b)

is

impossible, but

it

impossible; and to the extent GeUner establishes

impossible, he also shows that

(c) is

impossible.

Wc Many

39

at Second Sipfht

Loi^e

do

refer to certain experiences

with the words "love

have been instandy impassioned by

x's

y's

at first sight."

with arousing

S's,

are hardh' reluctant to call this experience love or love at first sight.

with Gellner's reiving on a claim about love (period) asking whether love at is

not genuine love.

such

first

And

sight

is

might ne\ertheless be

that

prevents us from

it

form of love, even

a

argument misleadingly implies that there

his

is

if it

no

phenomenon as that reported bv all these x's; he seems to get an empirical

conclusion

(like the

nonexistence of unicorns) from a priori considerations.

(Both these problems also infect the argument that love exist

and they

One trouble

because love requires deep knowledge.)

about love (period) touches onlv the possibihtv of "love, If we use the

hvphenated expression

is

conclusion

is

tence of the

because

it

a

misnomer; we should

after

does not

on

a claim

one encounter."

impossible, only that the

or

"(l)-at-first-sight."

That

permits us to concede the exis-

it

to inquire whether

v|/

is

(vicariously) called love

often becomes love.

Because Gellner uses a claim about love after

(a) is

call it "il;"

conceptual and not empirical;

phenomenon and

relying

"love-at-first-sight" to refer to x's experi-

ence, Geliner's argument does not show that

expression

at first sight

An argument

one encounter,

is

(c),

love (period), to

impossible, his argument also

show

that (b),

shows that

(c) is

impossible. Inspect the basic pattern of his dilemma: i.

ii.

iii.

iv.

V.

ergo,

vi.

Nothing

xAy

in virtue

xMz who

of S

has S

(

A=

(M =

has an emotion toward)

has an encounter with)

xAz or — xAz if xAz, then — xLy (L = if — xAz, then — xLy — xLy

either

loves)

in this pattern relies essentially

their first encounter. If so, Gellner has love, period.

This

is

on

x's

emotion toward y

uncovered

a full-blown

an interpretation of his argument

would endorse. For when Gellner attempts proposes encompasses not only love

I

arising after

paradox about

think he intended and

to solve the paradox,

at first sight

what he

but also love, period.

no way to prevent the extension of the paradox to love, period. For Gellner has not told us what difference there is between xAy after one encounter and xAy after a second encounter. What is special about a second encounter with y that helps x avoid the catch-22 when xMz? How Furthermore, there

is

might love at second sight be possible while love at first sight is not? Geliner's dilemma depends only on assuming that x notices S in y and then again in z; whether x and v have had manv encounters, or only one, seems irrelevant. Perhaps during a second encounter with

y,

x notices a larger or different set

T

40

Love at Second Siqht

of y's properties that occurs. But e\'en

that

if

though is,

T

z has onh' the smaller set S

X will meet some z with the

sav, instead, that

with is

V,

xAv

z,

and therefore and

initially

and not the

full

T,

still

xMz never

does so, then

xMz will still occur; To

rele\'ant emotion-eliciting properties.

T docs not include S, is to say that after x's second encounter it

was

person z who, by haxing

encounter between x and

S, relevantly

xMz will

if so,

there

not occur.

resembles y after the

be a person

y, there will also

but

initially;

to suppose that, after the second encounter,

if there is a

rele\'anth'

xAy

based on different properties than

is

no warrant

For

be matched by

unlikcl\' to

is

includes S, and S elicited

w who,

first

by having T,

resembles v after the second encounter. This sort of answer, then,

must sa\' not only that T does include

S,

but also that the additional properties

R in T are pardy responsible for xAy after the second encounter (in which case T is sufficient for xAv; S is no longer sufficient but, like R, necessarv), and that the additional properties R rule out xMz. Of course, with time x might acquire additional reasons for loving

But this answer asserts that merely between the

v.

and the second encounter of x and y, y's having S has (mysteriously) lost power, having been demoted from sufficient for x's emotion to only neces-

first its

sar)'.

We therefore have grounds for thinking (see Gellner's second horn) that

S never had that power during the

But the larger set

not

spirit

of this answer is

S after

x's first

empirical possibility^ S.

This result

is

x's

if

meeting some

xAv on the basis of a

w who also has T

is

but only more unlikch' than x's meeting some z who has

encounter with

x's first

applied to

encounter.

wrong. For even

T after the second encounter,

logically ruled out,

when

first all

v.

Whether

Gellner's

dilemma succeeds even

encounter with v depends, then, on murk\' matters of

— that

is,

on how likely it is that x meets the z who also has

embarrassing to an argument purporting to establish an a

priori conclusion.

Now,

since

we have found no meaningful

difference at-

tributable to x's second encounter with v, the paradox applies equally to "love at

second sight." Bv a sort of mathematical induction we can modif)' Gellner's

argument against the

possibilit}'

of love

after

one encounter into an argument

against the possibilit}' of love, period. ^^

4.

NONGENERAL LOVE-REASONS

Gellner's solution to the paradox

Some

attitudes

and emotions

is

that love

is

an "E-t\pe" attitude.

(for example, love, patriotism, religious

com-

mitment), according to Gellner, are "puzzling" in the way they attach to objects in a nongcneralizable ("nonuniversalizable") manner.

"An agent

act-

ing in accordance with an E-t\'pe preference" for an object will not act or

respond

in the

same way "with regard to another instance if one turned up"

(p.

— Love at Second

41

Sijfht

161). Suppose X notices S in v and

xLv

on

that basis xAy; later x encounters z

— xAz. Gellner claims that xLy after all:

again notices S, but

and

— xAz and

the facts

are compatible because the reason that x has for loving v (namelv, that v

has S)

is

not generalizable to other persons. The lover operates according to a

nongeneral reason, not according to a reason he would apply to relevandy

Thus

similar cases.

For Gellner,

lo\'e is

dilemma

the

solved by escaping along the second horn.

is

reason-dependent, as in the

first

xiew of love, vet lo\'c

is

not

the sort of emotion for which reasons are generalizable. Gellner does not,

however, claim that lovc-rcasons are perfecdy nongeneral;

xLv continues on the

basis

time-generalizable, e\'en

of v's having S means

if

reason-cause for

xLv

all,

as in the

in

we

terms of /s having S being the non-

rather than x's reason. Since nonreason-causes are per-

given the same

xAz, there b\' violating the

and -xAz,

his supposition that

him, love-reasons are

thev are not object-generalizable. Note that

could have stated Gellner's dilemma

fecth' general

that, for

initial

conditions, S should induce both

exclusi\'it\'

requirement of the

second horn, would show that

y's

first

xAy and

horn; while xAy

having S was not, after

the nonreason-cause of xAv. Gellner's solution, that love inxohes non-

general reasons,

if transformed

into a thesis about nonreason-causes,

the dramatic assertion that love (or exclusive love) a disruption

is

becomes

possible only by a miracle,

of the regularity of causation.

Claiming that love-reasons are not general might seem to be an awful price to pay for a solution to the paradox, for E-t\'pe attitudes are irrational

consider the incoherence of "nongeneralizable reason" irrational if

it

exists at

all.

On

—

in

which case love

the other hand, perhaps the solution

able, gi\'en the result achieved.

Denving the

preserves the exclusivit\' of love at the

generalizabilit)'

same time

that the basis

is

is

accept-

of love-reasons

of love remains

the attractiveness of the object. Hence, the solution solves a major difficult)' in the eros tradition bv explaining

how

exclusive love

concessions have been made; the problem entails that exclusive love irrational.

is

irrational

is

is

possible.

However,

not merely that Gellner's solution

but that

it

entails that love

is

necessarily

The blame for love's irrationalit)' falls squarely on the shoulders of x, it is x who lo\'es y on the basis of S and who fails to respond to z,

the lover, for

or

who

refuses or

is

unable to love a similar

z,

despite having a quite adequate

reason (as x himself has proven with respect to y) for doing so. ^^ Lxjvers single out one person who has S to love, while not loving others who also have S, quite because lovers single out love-reasons as nongeneral, even though the logic

of reasons requires that

also has an E-t\'pe attitude

all

reasons be treated as general. That

toward

lo\'e-reasons. (Solving the

is,

the lover

paradox by

jettisoning the rationalitv' of lovers yields this nice advice for beloveds:

remain rational

as

long

as

you do not reciprocate the

love.)

you

42

Love at Second Siqht

There

two

are

which

senses in

might be nongeneral or non-

a reason

generalizable. First, a nongeneral reason could be a reason that

applied in a general

is

simplv not

way by an agent. Nothing in the reason or in the situations

encountered by the agent prevents the agent from reapplying the reason; the agent merely does not apply

applying

resist

it

again in a relevandy similar situation or

it

again. In moral contexts, this failure or resistance

taken as a blameworthy fault; in practical contexts, If this

is

salizable,

it is

a sign

would often

is

of inconsistency.

the sense in which Gellner means that love-reasons are nonuniver-

then either lovers are irrational or the standards governing reasons

are gready relaxed for personal relations (versus morals

and pragmatics). Sec-

in light of the form or content of the reason, be generalized to apply to more situations than the one in which it has been used; the reason is temporally or spatially indexed

ond, a nongeneral reason could be a reason that logically cannot,

or

moral contexts, offering a reason of this

refers to a particular person. In

it

sort

either

is

blameworthy or

discourse, lathis salizable,

is

a violation

then either the lover

including a proper reasons. Gellner,

I

of the

logical requirements

of moral

the sense in which love-reasons are for Gellner nonuniver-

name

is guilt)'

of a different kind of fault

(for example,

in a reason) or love, unlike moralit\', permits indexed

and forth between these two senses of some of his remarks imply that he favors the meaning is more consistent with his treatment of

think, slides back

nonuniversalizable. Although

second meaning, the love. Since in

has S, that including

"ys having S"

is x's

\^s

first

it is

"having S," and not the faa that

reason for loving

name; and "has S"

is

y, x's

reason

is

v

who

second sense)

as generalizable (in the

reason could be. GeUner never hints that Montaigne's "because sort

it is

not nonuniversalizable by

it

as a

was he" is the

of love-reason he has in mind. In explaining

how

love

is

an E-t\^pe emotion, Gellner draws an analogy

patriot of country' C that has property set T (a great, freedom-loving country), x will not be a patriot of another country

with patriotism

were

it

(p.

160)

if x is a loyal

:

also to have T; likewise, if x loves y

another person

who also has S.

This analog}'

on is

the basis of S, x will not love

supposed to

feature of E-t\'pe attitudes: the reason x has for the attitude ble in the sense that x object.

The

analog}'

is

not prepared to apply

it

rex'eal is

the essential

nonuniversaliza-

to another, relevanth' similar

between personal love and patriotism seems right to the

point because patriotism

is

often conceived of as a kind of love. But notice that

the patriot's reason might be, instead, nonuniversalizable in the second sense; the X

who

loves her countr\'

might give the reason

analogy, then, the lover's reason for

beloved," which

is

either

no reason

"it is

xLy would be 'V

at all

Gellner later (pp. 161-162) makes

is

my

countr\'."

mine" or

"\' is

By

my

or a poor one.

some remarks about the E-type

pa-

— Love at Second

43

Siffht

obscure the analog)'. If x

triot that further

another countr\' C2

w

allow

triotism, that patriot, X

which X

(

.

If x

is

a patriot

of C because j

to defend her patriotism toward

a

Cj

a

C2

patriot even

patriot; patriotism

tion, patriotism

w

is

"it is

C2 with

is

is

mv countrv," x will not mv countr\'."") Pa-

"it is

though C2 might haxe the

subject-nonuniversalizable: that x has reason

w

being a C2 patriot rather than

Now,

Cj

patriot.

R

for being a

R

can rightly have reason if

we

for

maintain the analogy

between personal love and patriotism, we should say two things about First, if X loves

Cj

a

is

T in virtue of

object-nonuniversalizable. But in addi-

Cj patriot means that x cannot admit that a

of

justifiably a patriot

exhibits another sort of nonuniversalizabilitv. If x

is,

cannot be

is

of country Cj, says

a patriot

is

GcUncr, then x cannot admit that some person

love.

y on the basis of S, then x not only refuses to applv this reason xLz too but also cannot admit that w might have that or any

generallv so that

reason for lo\'ing z. (The Cj patriot will not be a patriot of C2 and wants no one else to

be a patriot of C2.) Second,

ought

else

if x loves y,

then x must claim that ever\'one

and for the same reasons. (The C^ patriot thinks

also to love y,

ever\'one should be patriotic toward Cj, for the

— not merely

same good reasons he

has,

we do not want to say about the lover that if xLy, then x wants wLz to be false. The man who says "my wife is the best in the world" would not fight another man who says "wy wife is the best in the world"; but the C^ patriot will not remain silent when a patriot of C2 says "wv countr\' is the best." Nor do we want to say that if xLy, x wants everyone to love y, or x believes that others should have the same good namelv,

it is

a great countr\'

would deny the

reasons for loving y; this

"it's

role

mine.") Yet

of subjectively valuable proper-

ties in love.

most

Gellner's

explicit definition

accordance with an E-type preference rule

from which

of E-type

[is

his preference follows as an instance, for

accordance with that rule with regard to another instance

sounds

as if Gellner

161).

It

rule

involved at

is

rule."

But the

"An agent

states:

all;

rest

is

acting in

not] acting in accordance with

some

he would not act

if one

turned up"

in

(p.

no some

defining an E-type attitude as one for which

the definition savs "[not] acting in accordance with

of the sentence confuses matters;

it

speaks of "that rule"

which suggests that an

E-t\'pc attitude inxolves a nongencral rule rather than

Of course, we

could equalh' characterize the E-type lover as acting

no

rule.

according to no

nongencral rule thing

is

rules at

issue

is

amiss; x all.

rule, or

\'cr\'

fails

according to

likely

a

nongeneral

does not even count

rule, if

to recognize that rules are general, or x

Whichever

is

onlv because

as a rule. In cither case fails

a

some-

to abide by

true, x displays arbitrariness or irrationalit)'.

But

this

not a quibble. If Gellner means "nongencral rule," then his solution to

the paradox

is

that love

is

reason-dependent but love-reasons are not general,

44

Love at Second

which

is

solution

Si£iht

compatible with the eros tradition; and is

that love

is

love,

which

rules

and those which

is

not reason-dependent

"mv

distinction

are not" (p. 164), there

for

between actions based on

is

that he thinks

And he characterizes E-

all.

involving a Kierkegaardian leap. But other passages imply

means "nongeneral rule" rather than "no rule." (Kierkegaard's leap can

be accomplished quite well with a nongeneral rule

which

rule again in a situation to

my

"Roughly speaking,

begins,

not force us to take

literally

it

applies.)

distinction

—

just refuse to apply the

The sentence 1 quoted just above is

.

.

.

," a

qualification that does

the claim that follows. Further, Gellner claims that actions are based

on

a rule" (p. 158). If so, the

it is

"anal\ticallv true that

onlv

way to characterize the E-t\'pe lover is to say that he

a

no reasons

there are

is,

some evidence

is

as acting according to no rule at

E-t\'pc lo\'er

rs'pe attitudes as

that he

he means "no rule at all," his

incompatible with that tradition.

Because Gellner writes that

of the

if

— that

nongeneral

rule.

And what

according to a rule"

make about the reasons: x

is

all

is

"acting according to reasons."

The

E-t\'pe lover should be cast not in terms

acting

on the

is

acting according to

Gellner means throughout his paper bv "acting

basis

significant point to

of rules but

of a nongeneral reason, and the

in

terms of

fact that x has

reasons for lo\'ing y that are not applied to the similar z makes us doubt

x's

consistency'. Finally, Gellner claims at the ver\' beginning of his paper (p. 157)

that there are

One

forms.

we

two kinds of reasons

kind of reason

expect reasons to be.

is

for acting, distinguished

by their logical

"impersonal, general, abstracted," exactly what

The other kind of reason,

then,

must be nongeneral,

the sort Gellner eventually attributes to E-t\'pe lovers. Gellner's description of this

to

second kind of reason

some

is

imprecise: these reasons "include a

.

.

.

reference

privileged person, thing or event, privileged in the sense that quite

persons, things or events would not by the agent be counted as good grounds for the relevant action." I would have said: "These reasons pick out some privileged person, privileged in the sense that these reasons would not by the agent be counted as grounds for acting in the same vva\' toward a similar person." At least, I would have put it that way if I wanted to make it verv' clear that I was thinking of "nongeneral reason" (in the first similar

.

.

.

equally

sense) rather than

The

"no reason."

"blind self-assertion"

(p.

165) of the E-t\'pe lover, then,

a failure to recognize that reasons arc general

that

is

consistent with the agape tradition

)

.

is

lumped together

as

modern

a kind

Gellner, however,

He

is

probably

of irrationalit}'

failure to

a different kind

the appropriateness of calling E-t\'pers "irrational."

"often

is

compatible with the eros tradition) rather than a

for one's behavior or preferences (which is

(which

have reasons

of irrationalit)' that is

not convinced of

says that E-t)'pers are

irrationalism" (p. 165),

most notably by

Lor>e at

45

Second Siqht

contcmporarv "liberalism," toward which Gcllncr has a mocking attitude. he sN-mpathizes with existentialists

of the

indiN-idual's

freedom

(p.

who claim that E-type action is an assertion One might conclude that E-t\'pers, given

176).

the truth of some bold metaphysical theses about the world and are actually rational in a

tween wanting to be tion,

and wanting to be

that reasons be general.

when one

more meaningful way. But

free

there

is

human nature,

a difference be-

from nonreason-causes, or from causal determinabeing free from the

demand

from causes, perhaps

satisfied

free tout court, including

The

desire to be free

discovers and acknowledges their existence and tries to control

them, seems laudable. (Recall Descartes to Chanut.) idea,

And

I

cannot make sense of the

however, that we should take another step and

free ourselves

from the

generality of reasons, not even for the sake of exclusive love.

5.

THE SUBSTITUTION PROBLEM

After Gellner's paper was published in 1955, other versions of the para-

dox ("the substitution problem") appeared independentlv of his

article).

^"^

in the literature (as far as

Typically, the substitution

problem

I is

can

tell,

used to

show that personal love is not propert)'-based or reason-dependent. One of the most bizarre versions is Mark Bernstein's: I ha\'e a wife. Nana', whom I lo\'e \'er\' much. Let us suppose that I were informed that tomorrow, my wife Nana' would no longer be part of my life, that she would leave and forever be unseen and unheard of by mc. But, in her stead, a Nana'* would appear, a qualitatively indistinguishable individual from Nana\

Nancy and Nana'* would look precisely alike, act precisely alike, think precisely alike, indeed would be alike in all physical and mental details. ^^

Nana' and Nancy*

are not numerically identical, but qualitatively indis-

tinguishable (which includes memories); Bernstein asks us not to "overesti-

mate" any differences between them that follow from rateness (for example, that father

Mike was

of Nancv*). Bernstein claims that he would be

of Nancv, even though Nanc\'* least

not immediatelv,

love Nancy,

Nancy*

the question;

if

is

right by his side,

love Nanc)'*. '^

^

Nancy, so

I

their numerical sepa-

the father of Nancy and

His argument

Mike* was the

grief-striken

by the

loss

and that he would not, is

at

simple: "I love and only

don't love Nancy*."^

''

The argument begs

Bernstein assumes that he loxes only Nanc\', he will of course

not lo\'e Nancy*, or anyone else for that matter. He should instead be asking what follows from (1)1 love Nancy and (2) Nancy* = Nancy (qualitatively). Regardless, Bernstein concludes from this thought-experiment that "no informative

list

since he

of necessar\' and

would not

sufficient conditions for 'x loving y' can

love the identical Nancy*.

'*^

be given,"

Further, he explains his grief

46

Loir at Second

by invoking the

Sijjht

effect that the loss

For "loving someone

identit\'."

of Nancy has on

is

of uniqueness or

his "sense

... an expression of our

identit\',

of our

uniqueness in the world." ''^ But to argue that "if the object of our love vanishes

.

.

our

.

own

status as a

imagine onlv that Nancy

Nancv* if I

dies,

not that she

not onlv quite beside the point,

copy of Nancy threatens

perfect

even

is

unique individual

Nancy does not want to focus on

is

is

threatened," one need

replaced by Nancv*. Bringing in

it is

also queer, for the existence

e\'er\'one's status as "a

of a

unique individual,"

die.

Bernstein's assumption that x encounters not merelv a

who duplicates the S that x's first beloved has (Gellner's strateg)') but a perfect copy who replaces x's beloved in the furniture of the universe. If x does not know that the y he went to sleep with is not the y* he wakes up with the person

next morning, Bernstein's thought-experiment does not permit the conclusion that lo\'e x's y.

is

not property- based. In Gellner's version

we

w^ere not considering

meeting y, her later meeting z, and falsely believing that z is none other than

That scenario

that z

is y,

illustrates

should

onlv the intentionalit\' of love. (If xLy and x believes

we expect xLz.^

Yes. ) If x does not

know about the

Bernstein

replacement of y by the indistinguishable y*, x will feel no grief and will love y* as she

had loved

y.

who

is

I am making woman whom

(Suppose

blackness of midnight with a

an imposter, yet

I

enjoy the events

precisely, x's loving y* because x loves

love in the garden during the I

believe to be

as I ordinarily

my

belo\'ed but

would. )2^ More

y and because she does not know that y* list of necessan' and

replaced y actually refutes the claim that "no informative sufficient conditions for 'x loving v' can

personal love

is

propert\'-based. In

be given" and confirms the thesis that

Mark

Fisher's version

of the substitution

problem, y* has replaced y for five years without x's knowledge;^^ but that x has loved v* for so long as if y* were v is flillv explainable and expected in the first

view of personal

love.

Now,

if x is

informed that her beloved

(Bernstein) or if x fmally discovers she has been living with

imposter (Fisher),

y*

—

x's

reactions

—

grief, anger,

is

really

y*

and loving an

withholding affection from

are readily explainable as reactions to one's being tricked, manipulated, or

deceived and therefore do not entail anything about the ground of

love.^-^

not knowing that y* has replaced y leads x to love y* as if x were and that confirms that love is property- based, then why take seriously

If x's

loving

V,

the claim that

x's

not loving y*,

replaced y, shows that love substitution

is

when

x's

loving y*

actually confirms that love

adequately explained

is

is

informed or

disco\'ers that

not property-based? Those

problem against the

acknowledged that

x

thesis that love

when

x does not

is

v* has

who employ

the

pro pcrtv- based have not

know that y*

has replaced y

propert\'-bascd, and as a result they have not

why the fact that x

does not

lo\'e

y*,

when

x

knows

that

Love at Second

47

Sifjht

y* has replaced y, shows that love

is

the challenge to the view that love

assume that x or not loving,

fiotices

that

z,

not propcrt)'-based. In Gellner's dilemma, is

wc need

assumed that x knows that y* has replaced noticing and

x's

kno\\'ing

is

not a ver\' good one.

why Gellner's paradox

is

x's

paradox, x does

propert\'-based,

is

posing the theoretical problem.

when he supposes that x encoun-

second person z and notices that z has the small propert\' set S

which X loves

v.

knows

know that y*

could X

in virtue

But the Bernstein-Fisher \'ariant asks too much of us

to imagine that x

I

in Gellner's

damage the view that love

a better vehicle for

Gellner makes a reasonable assumption

ble?

If,

z,

Bernstein-Fisher variant does not

ters a

it is

But the analogy between

X does not

reason to

or

y.

when

too, has S, we have no reason to expect that x will love z. But know about the Bernstein- Fisher replacement, we have every expect x to love y*. This dissimilarit}' explains, I think, why the

not notice that

when

to worr\' about x's loxing,

In the Bernstein- Fisher variant, the challenge arises

z.

when we

property-based arises exactly

too, has S; then

that a qualitati\'eh' identical

y.

is,

How

has replaced y when they are qualitatively indistinguisha-

can think of no reliable

test that

permits x to

know

of fingerprints, no questioning y* about the intimate

no confrontation with Mike* (about pro\'ide evidence

— that

y* has replaced

of

this;

details

whom the same

no examination

of x's sex with

problem

of the replacement. Bernstein claims that x

is

y,

could

arises),

"informed" that

who informs x that he has lost v and now has v* instead? If x is not in a position to know about the replacement, then for the same reasons no one else could know and inform x. But perhaps y* knows (how? her memories are identical to y's) and informs x: "See here, x, I am Nancv* and not Nancy." What would x's reaction be to being informed by y* that y* has

V* replaces

y.

But

replaced y? Undoubtedly, utter disbelief; x will think his beloved y has gone off

her rocker. Should

whom

we

just

assume that x

is

informed by an authority (God)

X considers infallible? Further, even if x were to suspect, or

believe, that

y* has replaced

reaction

y, his

would not be grief over the

but profound cognitive dissonance. In the meantime, an\thing about love destroy

x's

when wc

come loss

to

of v

we are not likelv to learn

dcliberatclv proceed, as Bernstein does, to

world. Suppose that x watches as

)'

killed after serxing as the

is

source of clone y*.23 Here x does know, by observation rather than by being

informed, that v* has replaced

draw conclusions about e\'ervda\' cloning,

love

would look

possibilit\'

(as

still

like;

lo\'e.

we it

y.

But

this situation

While wc

ha\'e

no

idea

is

now what our

might be quite different

of cloning. Would

too weird to permit us to

arc imagining that

we

li\'c

precisely because

x suffer terriblv as v dies,

y* emerges from the dust?

of

of the

even though v*

Bernstein would say, extrapolating his claim into the future), or

rejoice as the identical

age of

in the

(or their) conception

exists

would x

CHAPTER

The Uniqueness

3

of the Beloved I

hunt for

in the rapid

I

light, the

of vou

in

all

the others,

of women

ri\'er

no one

searched, but

your

a sign

undulant

had vour rhythms,

else

shadv day you brought from the

nobody had your

tinv ears.

—Pablo Neruda, 100 Love Love

is

forest;

the delusion that one

woman

Sonnets (XLIII)

differs

from another.

— H. L. Mencken

A STRANGE MUSIC LOVER

1.

In Sexual Desire,

Roger Scruton presents

as a solution to Gellner's

a thesis that can

be interpreted

paradox; he uses an analog)^ with aesthetic apprecia-

An

tion to argue that love can be reason-dependent yet exclusive.^ interest in Beethoven's Violin

based" enjoy

(his

it?"

term): someone who enjovs

by referring to

music and even this

Concerto (BVC), claims Scruton,

dislike

all

its

the

Hence, there

is

properties. Yet this person

ma\' love y, answer why by referring to

in

lent reasons for enjoving the

strates its absurdit)'.

y's

Christmas is

possibility

of

neither are love-

properties,

vet enjoys

and love only

y.

odd person who has

no other music.

I

excel-

think Scru-

BVC fanatic is pathologically obsessed; the D-major

of her beloved concerto

personal love

if so,

of confirming Gellner's picture of the lover, demon-

The

strains

shrimp

48

BVC,

even

at

enjoy no other

an exclusive, reason-based love: x

Gellner's E-type lover reappears as Scruton's

ton's analog)', instead

may

other compositions. For Scruton, the

no contradiction

"reason-

BVC must answer "Why do you

person shows that aesthetic reasons are not general;

reasons.

aesthetic

is

float

morning, noon, and night from her

flat,

when the neighbors would welcome Handel. But a theor\' of

deficient if the lover

is

modeled

after a

person

who

relishes

cocktail, has impeccable reasons for this preference, yet obstinately

49

The Uniqueness of the Beloved

rctiiscs to

the

understand that scallops or lobster might be

same reasons. Portraying the lover

as a

as enjoyable, in part for

monomaniac

is

too high a price to

pa\' for explaining exclusi\'it\'.

show that love-reaIndeed, Martha Nussbaum argues

Scruton's thought-experiment, however, does not

sons or aesthetic reasons are not general. that because aesthetic reasons are general,

lo\e

from

his analog)' (that

is,

what Scruton must conclude about is the opposite of what he

nonexclusivit}')

wanted to conclude. ^ Scruton overlooked that after we ask the BVC lover why she enjoys it, we want to ask a second question: "Why do the reasons given for enjoN'ing the

BVC not implv that you should also enjoy Beethoven's Quartets BVC lover

or Sibelius's Violin Concerto?" Assume, with Scruton, that the

does not enjoy any other music. Even

must say why not, especially after

so, she

she has given reasons for enjoying the

with a piece of music that apparently

BVC.

If the

BVC

Or

she lacks

self- awareness:

are not actuallv her reasons.

The

lover

is

confronted

her reasons for loving the

satisfies

she must point out a difference. If she cannot, she irrationalit\'.

BVC

guilty

is

BVC,

of some sort of

her stated reasons for enjoying the

truth

that she does not, after

is

all,

understand why she enjoys the BVC. These features of her appreciation of the BVC are brought to light only if we supplement Scruton's "Why this?" with

"Why

not others?"

Note

that Scruton's

well respond to our second

odd person might very

BVC and the Sibelius; and if the BVC lover can fmd a difference when comparing the BVC with all other music, her love of the BVC has been vindicated. In other words, the BVC lover can claim that her reasons for lo\'ing the BVC exclusi\'ely are general but happen to apply to only one case; she enjoys the BVC in virtue its properties, which no other composition has. She enjoys the BVC exclusively because is question bv pointing out

a difference

between the

it

unique, and she does not abandon reason-dependence or the generality' of reasons. Scruton never assumes that the

uniquelv. But

if

the

BVC

BVC lover's reasons pick out the BVC BVC is a

lover believes, truly or falsely, that the

unique piece of music, her exclusive enjoyment becomes much often asserted that ever\' person

It is

is

unique, and the uniqueness of the beloved

dence and

exclusivit\'

of love

— that

this solution looks, ultimately

the beloved

why love. is

is

in

is,

it falls

unique.

may

"^

If so,

I

will

queer.

beloveds are

reconcile the reason-depen-

solve Gelhier's paradox.

short.

all

less

As promising as

argue that the uniqueness of

an important sense a derivative feature of love: love explains

the lover treats the beloved as unique, rather than uniqueness explaining

Note

that

I

denv that the beloved's uniqueness

compatible with claiming that the object of love

is

is

the basis of love, which a

unique person.

The Uniqueness of the Beloved

50

2.

COUNTERF ACTUAL MEETINGS

The proposal is that if x loves y in virtue of ys possessing a property-set S that

makes y unique (no one

lo\'e is

reason-dependent implies that

if x

who also has S;

exclusively.'*

That

loves y in virtue of S, then x has equal

is no such z, x loves only But some tension remains between reason-dependence and exclusivity, for

reason for loving anv z y.

then x will love y

else has S),

exclusi\'it\'

implies that x

would not

but since there

love a similar (or different) z if z existed,

and reason-dependence implies that x would love a similar z the

if z existed.

Hence

B VC lover must admit that if someone were to write another piece ofmusic BVC, she would also enjoy that now

having the relevant qualities of the

nonexistent composition. Analogouslv,

from

x's

never meeting persons

who

not necessarily, because they do not that their belox'eds are unique

is

x's

loving y exclusivelv will result only

are relevandy similar to y (perhaps, but

exist).

"unique

What some in

mv

people

mean by saying

experience," not "absolutely

unique." But this implies an inverse relationship between the likelihood that one's love

is

exclusive

and the extent of one's experiences. Hence, invoking the

beloved's uniqueness to explain an exclusive love solves the paradox by claim-

ing that exclusive lovers are contingendy never in a position to apply their reasons for loving to another person. Gellner,

who has the relevant properties,

in

assumes that x meets

recall,

z,

order to generate the paradox; the unique-

ness solution solves the paradox by simply denying one of its conditions.

But Gellner need not assume that x does meet the about lo\'e to which he

is

alerting us has nothing to

similar z; the

do with x's

problem

actuall)-

meeting

y in virtue of S, then x has reason, both in advance of meeting z and in the absence of meeting z, for loving z. Reasons operate not onlv at the

z.

If X loves

moment of contact with

a similar case but also dispositionally.

are timeless in this wa\', the

problem of reconciling

And

if

reasons

exclusivity with reason-

The problem is posed when we ask x, who loves on the basis of S, what x would feel upon meeting z. The lover must be able to imagine his reaction even if he is convinced that the dependence does not turn on

x's actuallv

meeting

z.

\'

meeting

will

not occur because y

is

unique. Since assuming that

xMz

is

not

required to lay out the theoretical problem, the fact that the uniqueness solution depends

on

den\'ing

xMz implies

that

and reason-dependence. Suppose a lover cautiouslv conducts

it

cannot be a

full

reconciliation

of

exclusivity

his dailv activities in

order to avoid

encounters with persons he knows have the relevant S; or imagine ing spouse

who

locks

up v

in the

house

in

a

domineer-

an attempt to ensure their

preventing y from having such encounters.^ These maneuvers preserve the appearance of exclusivit)', but they miss the point.

lo\'e

by

may work to To claim that

The Uniqueness of the Beloved

51

when xMz make a claim about x's mental state, about what x thinks he would do, even if xMz never happens. The man who locks up his wife underestimates her mental life, which might love some z had she the opportunirs'. The man who deliberately avoids conversation with attractive persons might do so precisely because he realizes that he cannot satisfy' what the exclusivity' of love

is

exclusive

occurs, but

is

not only to make a claim about what x does

is

also to

love demands. (This a

married

man who

The unique mav be: adultery.)

feel

is

the grain of truth, differentlv expressed, in the idea that

lusts after

woman

another

has committed

in his heart

psychological attraction of thinking that one's beloved if x

does not meet z just because v

responsible for prexenting

never occurs "naturally."

xMz or for

is

is

unique, x does not have to

foolishly tr\'ing to pre\'ent

Neruda can hunt and search

for

more

it;

tiny ears

xMz all

he

wants, secure in the thought that he will not find anv. In this way, thinking of the beloved as unique makes self-deception possible.

or

b\'

The

lover x might pre\'ent

xMz by falseh' attributing uniqueness to y

unconsciously overlooking that

because she

is

not sure what she would

question about

behavior

when

x's

love

— or

she meets

herself about her attitudes

z,

z,

too, has S,

feel

or do were she to meet

specifically its exclusivitv

then x

and she might do so z.

If the

— depends onh' on

x's

allowed to avoid a confrontation with

is

toward that

situation, because x can either

hope or

arrange that a meeting with z never occurs; x can therebv postpone indefinitelv this soul-searching. If x thinks that

uniqueness, x has

her exclusive love for

\'

is

secured by

\''s

no inducement for engaging in reflection about her attitudes

toward exclusi\'it\'. But patiently probing one's thoughts about exclusixirv mav

much a mark of love as when (or why not and when be as

exclusivity

itself;

getting clear about

not) one will love exclusively

is

whv and

not merely a

preparation for love.

3.

DEFENDING UNIQUENESS

The uniqueness solution works only if people are unique. are trivially

and

unique

in

being numerically

historical properties. In a substantive sense,

as different as the

found

little

asserted so frequently

course, Jesus

was

own

genetic

howc\er, people are not ncarlv

them out to be. At least I haxe The doctrine of universal uniqueness is

doctrine of uniqueness makes

reason to suppose they

ordinan' folk that

Clearly, people

distinct, in ha\'ing their

b\'

are.

philosophers, poets, theologians, psychologists, and

we might

be tempted to think there

nontrivially unique,

is

something to

it.

Of

and so were Ghandi, Moses, Cvrano,

Othello. Alcibiades loved Socrates, and onlv Socrates, because "he

is

like

no

The Uniqueness of the Beloved

52

other

human

being, living or dead. If you are looking for a parallel for Achilles,

vou can find it in Brasidas and others; if Pericles is your subject you can compare him to Nestor and Antenor" {Symposium 221c-d). But substantive uniqueness is not ver\' common. Most of us draw on the same stock supply of merits and defects, characters

good

— whether we

and bad

traits, in

building our personalities or

are persons creating ourselves or writers creating

Our mannerisms, physiognomy, ways of

protagonists.

humor, and

traits

linguistic habits are close copies

siblings, peers,

and other models.

A

is

walking, sense of

traits

reasonable hypothesis

places X has traveled to, the older x gets, tered, the less x

of the

of our parents, is

that the

convinced of uniqueness. Facial and personalit)' t\'pes

emerge and repeat themselves, and uniqueness semblance.*^ Perhaps

we should

achieve exclusivitv through

artificial

enough people

lo\'es.^

for multiple

start to

replaced by family

is

small towns. But, then,

live in

more

and the more people x has encoun-

re-

would we

uniqueness or through there not being

Indeed, worries about the homogenization of personalitv and the conformit\' fostered

bv the media and schools presuppose that substantive

uniqueness

enough to be

we

are

rare

is

a matter

operation of pretending

alreadx' exists. Recall that

it

plained over a hundred vears ago (in vidualit}';

sort

of social concern. The doctrine that

unique might be only an attempt to create something by the bootstrap

On

contemporar\' talk of uniqueness

John Stuart Mill com-

Liberty) about the lack

may be

of

of discourse takes when the promises of individualism have worn

Another

Fromm, looking

social critic, Erich

found no genuine

individuality'.^ Since

at

indi-

the exaggerated form this

more

thin.

recent Western culture,

Fromm claimed that "a part of love" is

being aware of the beloved's "unique individuality,"^ he might have drawn the conclusion that Western societv contains

little

love because there are few appro-

priate objects.^ Similarh', if people are not substantivelv unique, there should

not be

much

exclusive love

— unless

lovers deceive themselves that their be-

loveds are unique.

Let us examine three arguments

in defense

of the doctrine of uniqueness:

A) William Galston writes that "we xiew human beings .

.

.

[because] even though every qualit)' an individual has

others to sized ...

is

as

unique

possessed by

some extent, the manner in which qualities are combined and emphais

distincti\'e."^^

But

I

find

little

evidence for sufficiently different

combinations or emphases, but only evidence for a set of family semblances.^

^

Galston's argument

sional space, each discrete values.

is

re-

mathematical: "Imagine a many-dimen-

dimension of which can take on

The number of combinations

a ver\' large

number of

specifying distinguishable single

The Uniqueness of the Beloved

points will be

Given

vcr\' large."

53

a set

of properties (dimensions), and given

fine gradations within each propcrt}' (different kinds or degrees

of wit or

beauty are the discrete values of those dimensions), the number of combinations will be huge.

But the defender of uniqueness should not jump for

many combinations

First,

are only tri\ially different

assertion that these points will be ""distinguishable" false

when

model

the

is

human

applied to

is

from

jov.

others. Galston's

mathematically true, but

beings; persons near each other

on

the xarious dimensions will not be significantlv distinguishable. Second, Galston's

assumption that each dimension takes on "a

crete N-alues"

is

there? If the

number of

properties to begin with

number of combinations

is

not

"ver\' large."

number of dis-

is

onlv

a do7.en

are

or so, the

Third, and most important, the

tells us only what possible: given D dimensions, each V discrete values, we can calculate the maximum number of

mathematical model

dimension ha\ing

ver\' large

How manv different icinds of wit or beaut\'

questionable.

is

among people approaches this maximum onlv if properties and their values are distributed randomlv. Galston

combinations. But the number of combinations

forgets that social factors operate to destroy

congregate

Fromm,

at specific locations.

effecti\'ely

prevent

These

randomness and make people

factors, as

recognized bv Mill and

humans from reaching the variabilit\' permitted by

the mathematics.

B) C.

S.

untrulv, that lences

—

Lewis suggests another argument.

we have chosen

.

for beaut)', frankness,

.

.

the

woman we

"We may sav, and love for

goodness of heart, wit,

[

not quite

her] various excel-

intelligence.

.

.

.

But

it

had to be the particular kind of wit, the particular kind of beaut\% the particular kind of goodness that ters."

^-^

we

like,

and we have our personal

What is beautiful for me is not what is

tastes in these

beautiflil for

guy. Since the properties of beloveds in virtue of which

we

mat-

you, or for the next love

them

are only

subjectivelv valuable, beloveds varv to an extent even greater than Galston

imagined. But invoking differences

does not work, even lo\'e.

if

we

(beaut\'-for-x, beaur\'-for-w)

grant that subjective properties play a large role in

For the argument assumes the uniqueness of persons qua lovers

to demonstrate the uniqueness

question. If there

unique, there

show

among lovers

is

is little

little

in

reason to think that individuals as beloveds are

reason to think that indi\'iduals as lovers are unique.

that lovers are unique requires

syncratic in their tastes that thev are

showing

I

more than

trivially

unique.

"We

judge is

have never pretended that most of my preferences were unique to

and not shared widely by others. "Bcaut\^

is

To

that lovers are sufficiently idio-

another's value in terms of preferences that are uniquely our own"*'* strong;

order

of persons qua beloveds, therebv begging the

in the

eye of the beholder"

too

me

may be

The Uniqueness of the Beloved

54

but

true,

it

does not entail diversity in what counts

as beautiful if the various

molded bv the same social influences. C) A third argument is suggested by R. Meager.''* Imagine that John Rosie and wants to understand his love rationally, \'et he does not like the

eyes have been

loves

reason "because she has S" since proN'ides the reason "because she

particular

form

xLv not

that

in

it

implies nonexclusivit)'. John therefore

Rosie," which

is

Meager unpacks:

in virtue

of y's having S but

in virtue

refers to

and

"perfecd\' rational" even

is

is

the

of y's having S-as-man-

ifested-by-v or S-as-embodied-in-y (for short, S-in-y).

John's reason

"It

which Rosie manifests" S that makes her lovable. The idea is

though

it is

Meager claims

that

nongeneral; "S-in-y"

logically applicable only to y.

is

The proposal

is

that instead

of distinguishing properties with respect to

we should distinguish them with respect to beloveds (P-in-y). between \ and z, when both have P, is that y reallv has P-in-y

lovers (P-for-x),

The

difference

and

z rcall\' has P-in-z,

which indexed properties make each of them unique

and give x reason to love

but not

\'

z.

But indexing properties with respect to

beloveds either begs the question or establishes only

become the new or

does P

when embodied

why is

P-in-y different from P-in-z?

in y

are qualitativelv indistinguishable,

uniqueness.

tri\'ial

How

different property P-in-y?

One answer is

that the

and merelv the

fact that

two

Or

instances of P

one instance of P

appears in y and the other appears in z creates distinct properties P-in-y and Pin-z.

In this case, the indexed properties are different only because y and z are

numerically distinct; hence, in

\'irtue

of these indexed properties y and z are not

more than trivially unique. Y is unique because only v logically can have P-in-y. The other answer is that P is qualitatively different from P-in-y; when P interacts with y and z two new properties exist, P-in-y and P-in-z. Having P-iny makes v unique, since the property' distinct

interacts

must

is

qualitativelv (not merelv numericallv)

from any instance of P in another person. But why think that because P with

y, P-in-y will

be: P-in-)'

different

from

z.

be qualitatively different from P-in-z? The answer

from P-in-z because y is alreadv qualitatively Invoking the difference between P-in-y and P-in-z to explain is

different

the uniqueness of y and z

is

backward, for the other differences between v and z

account for the difference between P-in-y and P-in-z.'^

The uniqueness just

because y

is

then X would

solution cannot claim merely that x loves y exclusively

unique, for

if

the doctrine of universal uniqueness

have the same reason for loving z and others.

is

correct,

The proposed

xLv exclusively because xLy in virtue of a propeny-set S The problem with claiming that this uniqueness of the beloved grounds exclusive love is that many properties are unique to a person but not valuable or admirable, and many properties are valuable but not unique. The solution must be that that only v has.

The Uniqueness of the Rclm^ed solution works only

if

55

some properties,

the ones that ground love, are indepen-

dently both valuable and uniqueness-making. But finding such a class ot properties

The

fiitile.

is

properties \vc find lovable arc wideh' shared: beaut\',

kindness, humor, moral xirtue, intelligence, and courage. Properties that a person

unique

—

fingerprints, teeth

and

moles and

bite patterns,

make

scars, small

—

face, most of a person's biographv are not properties that Anthony Quinton claims that "persisting character and memon' complexes" (as opposed to body t)'pes, which ''haxe a large number of instances") confer uniqueness on everyone, and he implies that the object of love

of the

details

ground

is

this

love.

"unique cluster of character

traits

and

of his

recollections."^*^ In defense

claim about what makes us unique, he writes: "The memories of individual

persons cannot be cxactlv similar, since even the closest of identical twins must see things

from

same time"

(p.

slighth' different angles; they

cannot be in the same place

404). This kind of uniqueness

mav be

at the

sufficient for discrete

personal identit)' and hence might constitute the uniqueness of the object of love; but

it is

a tri\ial

uniqueness and surely not a kind of valuable uniqueness

that serves as the basis of love.

Further, even

if

we

did love on the basis of a host of

properties (for example, being born in

Muncie on March

triviallv

1950,

4,

at

unique

12:03

in

the morning) and not because of valuable widely shared properties, one could still

argue:

we should love

for moral virtue

fme

consist of his exhibiting

and

intelligence,

Nor does

properties are not uniqueness-making.

even though these

the beloved's uniqueness

high degree; excellence

qualities to a

statistically

unusual but not rare enough to generate the required

properties.

Moreover,

fitness priests) statistical

were heeded, moral (and physical) excellence would be the less effective

that onlv y loves

x.

Then

or

less

for y

might love y exclusively

is

in virtue

of this

explained in terms of a property' that

To

because x

achicN'c that, is

we must be

the only person

yLx because only

x loves

y

who

—

able to

lo\'es v.

(let

cally suspicious: x's

emotion for v

is

of love.

us grant) valuable, in

satisfies

which

The exclusive love of x our desiderata. Can this

a general

account of exclusive

assume that v might Ionc

Then xLy because only y

their reciprocal love

circular. Further, x's loving y altogether

a basis

propcrt\'.

uniqueness-making, valuable property' provide love.^

worthy

y has the propcrt\' "the onh' person

who lo\cs X," which is uniqueness-making and case X

of

the remonstrations of moralists (and the phvsical

if

norm, yet not any

Suppose

may be class

is

and

incomprehensible and

because (only) y loves x

totally di\'orccd

x also

loves x

from

is

psvchologi-

\^s character.

This

version of the uniqueness solution abandons the attempt to solve the paradox

within the eros tradition. Nevertheless, that relational properties

might

satisf}'

it is

interesting insofar as

our desiderata.

it

suggests

56

The Uniqueness of the Beloved

4.

SHARED HISTORY

Some important

relational properties

For example, in Gellner's scenario

xMy

encounter") and

is

uniqueness on

v,

but "coming

exclusive love

might be explainable

meaningful shared

The shared

time.

which she

is

might derive from

loN'e's histor\'.

xMz

occurred before

("primacy of

part of the love's histor\'. This historical property' confers

histor)'^

histon'

first" is a

"thin" propert)' (see chap. 4). Instead,

terms of the "thick" pleasurable or

in

and y have had together over some period of not stricth' a propert)' of the beloved in virtue of

that x

is

lo\cd. Rather, she

is

loved for her "second-order" relational

properties of having contributed to, and having the capacity and willingness to

continue to contribute

to, that

shared histor^^

X loves y not only in virtue of /s

"first-order" properties (beautv, wit, charm, virtue) that elicited nall\'

and ha\e made the shared of \''s

x'irtue

abilit\'

histor\' pleasurable

and intention to extend that

x's

and meaningful but

histor\'

—

first-order properties for

same

which x

X

pleasurable shared histor\'.

originalh' lo\'ed y

account for

as the first-order properties that

might come to love y

properties because x realizes that thev underlie

Because the shared ness of

\'

to contribute to

only v could

ha\e. ^^

historx' its

Thus, the proposal

our desiderata and explain erties are

might

of x and y

continuation

exclusivit\'.

I

is

is

is

y^s

More exact-

might not be the

contribution to their

also in virtue

n^'s

also in

perhaps, in part, by

changing, maintaining, or improving her first-order properties. ^^ ly, y's

love origi-

of the

latter

second-order properties.

unique, the

and willing-

abilit}'

a valuable property that

apparendy

that second-order properties

satisf}'

do not doubt that second-order prop-

an important factor in maintaining love; these relational properties

also help to explain love's constancy. Further,

we can now understand

wh\' lovers wronglv attribute first-order uniqueness to beloveds: sensing that

something unique about v explains her cxclusi\c

love, x overlooks uniqueness-

making second-order properties and assumes that y's first-order properties make v nontriviallv unique. That we arc not significantlv first-order unique but share the same stock supph' of valuable first-order properties order, contract, and arranged marriages can

marriages: both end

up

at the

same

work

is

be loving y exclusively before loving V could emerge;

if

is

of shared histon'. lo\'e,

their

limited. Notice that x probably

had to

this specific

foundation for

x has been losing both y and

tionship might not be, from

x's

mail-

as well as self-selecting

place, love in virtue

Despite the role that second-order properties play in usefulness in sohing Gellner's paradox

why

x's

z,

now

exclusively

then the x-y

perspective, sufficiently unique to

rela-

make

y's

second-order properties both valuable and uniqueness-making. Thus, there

room

to argue that the shared histor\' of

two

is

lovers has been pleasant or

57

The Uniqueness of the Beloved

meaningful because they have been loving each other exclusively, rather than \

Let us proceed, however, to a different problem.

ice \'ersa.

properties willing

— having

and able to continue to contribute

glance the answer y,

and y

is

— make the beloved unique? At

therefore in fact the only person

contributed to that

But

histor\'.

it

not

is

who

has the property' of having

strictly true that

of having contributed to the x-y shared

propert\'

both

propert\'. Indeed,

might explain the protest that

if

\''s

x's

and

rcciprocit\'

having

this

y's

first

unique relationship with

yes, for x has shared a historicalh'

is

Do second-order

contributed to a pleasurable shared histon' and being

only y has the

histor\'; x, too,

has that

having the same second-order property

of their love (or

mutuality';

its

second-order property

is

then X has equal reason for loving x himself? Should

1.5).

Should we

reason for lo\'ing

x's

we

1

object that

if

y,

both x

and y have this second-order property, then this property makes neither x nor y unique? No. The fact that

unique

as x's

reason to

beloved.

x,

too, has this propertv does not

And why complain

mean

that while loving y, x

is

that y

is

not

also given a

himself)

lo\'c

Nc\'ertheless, people other than x

and v can have the propert)' of having

contributed to the x-v shared historx' and of being able and willing to continue to contribute. histor\'

A person z might financially support x and y so that their shared

can be extended; or z might remove herself from the company of x and

V because her passion for x would disrupt the x-v shared histor\'; or z might babvsit for x and

^'

so thev can enjoy intimate dinners out.

say of these people, in virtue of their having the as y, that thev are for x equallv as loNablc as

\ and that, therefore,

not been preser\'ed; for x might appreciate these the x-v shared historv', while x Im^es v for ha\'ing history.

whv X

But

z's

exclusivity'

has

for their contributions to

made her contributions to their

how can we avoid this unwelcome implication? We might explain

loves V in virtue of that second-order property while only appreciating z

in virtue

not

We do not want to

same second-order properties

of that same property, by referring to first-order properties that y, but

z, has.

But

this

move concedes

that

/s uniqueness does not

consist in y's

second-order properties and thrusts us back into Gellner's paradox. Alternativelv,

we could distinguish between direct and

x-v shared

histor\',

indirect contributions to the

or between contingent and necessary contributions,

order to assert that x loves y for a more

makes v unique. But to sav that y

is

unique

in

possessing the property' "is

willing to contribute directly to the x-y shared histor\'" will

same objection.

If the x-y shared histor\'

succumb

contribution

is

as direct or necessar\' as y's.

describe y's second-order properties

to the

were to be dashed on the rocks by

withdrawal of financial support or dramatic expression of passion for z's

in

specific second-order property that

more

I

x,

z's

then

suspect that any attempt to

specifically in

order to make y

The Uniqueness of the Beloved

58

unique

relative to z will

amount

masquerade) to the claim that x values /s

(in

contribution to the x-v shared histon' in a different vvav (or more) than contribution because x loves y and because x only appreciates

z.

z's

Either x values

/s contribution to their shared history because x loves y for no reason having to do with )''s first-order properties (which means the solution falls within the second view of personal

which

is

exactly

what

love), or x loves v for his first-order properties alone,

this solution

Even if we ignore these shared histor\'," there

is

wanted to avoid.

analytic tangles

posed by "contributed to the x-y

another reason second-order properties do not solve

W. NewT:on- Smith's proposal that x exclusively loves y of "what y has done for x,"^^ a historical propeny^ referring to x's interaction specifically with y and apparently making y unique. But the properthe paradox. Consider in virtue

t\' is

y.

ambiguous;

One

is

it

can figure into three distinct reasons x might have for loving

that certain things

were done for x and that x

The point

pleasurable or meaningful states.

done or these

things were

for their occurrence

is

states

is

experienced

as a result experiences

that x values the fact that these

being responsible

simpliciter. Y's

irrelevant; the reference to y's

having done them

is

only

contingent. Second, the reason x loves y might be that x experienced these states

enced

and that y in particular was responsible for them. Finally, the experistate might not matter at all to x; x loves \ just because y produced the

states, as if x's

only desire

is

manner y

to be attended to by y in whatever

chooses. If the fact that x experienced certain states simpliciter lox'ing V,

then

ha\'e the basis

as

long

of x's

these states, y

is

"produced h\

\'."

as these states are

producible by

unique because no z can produce

But this is

is

the

is

a state that

is

produced

defmed

it

mentions

when

it is

sav (which states

as

y.

Further,

why does

produced for x by y?

x prefer the state-produced-by-v to the state-produced-b}^-z?

produce the explain

reason for

an unsatisfactorx' \\'a\' to resolve Gellner's paradox:

nongeneral, since

the experienced state have significance onl\'

we cannot

is x's

y does not uniquely

love. If x loves v, instead, because y in particular

the reason invoked by x

Why does

z,

would be

perfectly natural) that x

because x loves v and does not love

z;

for

Here

wants only y to

what we want to

why x loves y but not z. The third interpretation of x's reason falls to

same objection. Identical considerations apply to the proposal that y's uniqueness con-

sists in r\^

the second-order property "having contributed to the x-y shared histo-

and being able and

\\'illing

to continue to contribute to

for loving v could be either that

(

1

)

it."

The reason x has

x has experienced a pleasurable or

mean-

ingful shared histon' contingent!)' contributed to by y or that (2) x has experi-

enced a pleasurable-shared-histor\'-contributed-to-by-\'. In the

first case,

x

59

The Uniqueness of the Beloved could have had, and can now have, a

shared history pro-

qualitati\'cly similar

duced by z if z has y's first-order properties that account for y^s second-order properties. Indeed, the pleasurable shared histor\' x has

continue

if

z replaced y

produced by

y,

— for the

states

of this

histor}'

had with y could

were only contingendy

and z might be happy to contribute to the extension of

x's

Z can even plausiblv claim that he or she would do a better And since x had earlier given y the opportunit\' to produce a

pleasurable states.

job of it than

v.

pleasurable shared histor\'

on the

consists in her ^''proven abilirs'

depending on

histon'," for z's will

of y's

basis

reason to give z this opportunit)'.

Nor

first-order properties, x has equal

will

do

it

to say that

uniqueness their shared

how the "proof of such a thing is construed, some

have the same propertv'. So on reading (1) of x's reason for loving

not significantlv unique and exclusively other hand,

is

y,

On

therefore not preserved.

y

is

the

x loves v for having contributed to the pleasurable-shared-

if

histor\'-as-produced-by-y, then y's second-order properties

we have no

but

\^s

and willingness to contribute to

explanation for

why

x loves y exclusively.

do make y unique,

Why does

x prefer

pleasurable-shared-histon'-with-v to pleasurable-shared-histor\'-with-z? Be-

cause X loves

understood

5.

y.

That x wants only the shared

as the

histor\'

explanandum of xLy rather than

as-produced-by-y its

is

better

explanans.

DYNAMIC LOVE

This sophisticated uniqueness view does not solve Gellner's paradox, but it

The point of this \'iew is a static phenomenon, because

provides insight into one role plaved h\ time in

that lo\'e

must be understood

historically,

properties develop in love that sustain

by discussing another

it.

not It is

as

lo\'e.

worthwhile to

clarif}' this

A person's uniqueness might consist of (as Quinton suggested) set

lesson

role for time.

of mental properties, broadly conceived to include character

a

unique

traits,

that x

Over the years, \ reveals more and more of this "deep selP' to x, or x is eventually able to perceixe it. As x

discovers only after interaaing with y for a long time.

and V continue they

come

their relationship

and extend

their

exclusively loves y in virtue

known onlv

after

manv

of y's deep

vears.

self,

The proposal

is

that x

which makes y unique and can be

But the solution

fails. First,

might not confer uniqueness on anyone; perhaps

deep-self properties

Fromm

is

right that "in

human beings are identical"^^ at that level of being. Second, deepproperties mav confer onlv trivial uniqueness; there is little reason to

essence, self

knowledge of each other,

to appreciate each other's richness of being. ^^

all

assume that the depth of a erties

trait

makes

it

interesting. ^^ pinally, deep-self prop-

might not be the kind of valuable or admirable properties that could

60

The Uniqueness of the Beloved

ground

— a deposit of repressed violence

What we

love.

find in the deep self

and

perx'crse sexual urges

that

it is

— mav repulse and revolt

difficult to find a class

properties,

us. If what

I

argued

earlier,

of attracti\e and uniqueness-making, first-order

was convincing, an appeal to the deep

self will

not work. The

properties of the deep self arc simplv first-order properties that are temporarily

undisclosed. In a long relationship, x will

of y's unique character, but there

is

come

no reason

to

know

the minute details

all

sum of these details

to think the

constitutes a significant, lovable, unique basis for love.

In this view time affords x the opportunit\' to perceive, or v to reveal, \^s

hidden first-order properties. -^-^ This

is

different

from attributing to time the

role of affording x and y the opportunit}^ to create a shared histor)' so they can

de\'eIop xaluable second-order properties

order properties. That

is,

dvnamic view of love.

A process

and improve

the "richness-of-being" \'iew

of coming to know

their manifest first-

is

y's

only superficially a

deep

presupposes that \^s deep self remains the same. But the deep

over time

self

self of the lover

or

the beloved in a long-term relationship has likely undergone changes (even as a result

of lo\'c

In contrast,

itself).

if

time permits the development of first- and

second-order properties, then coming-to-be, rather than coming-to-know, the dx'namic

component of lo\e. Time

ment of second-order deep

properties, only a contingent role in

deep

self In principle,

Indeed, those people

selves

is

plays an essential role in the develop-

coming

know

to

a

need not take years to reveal or perceive.

who believe that the deep self exists and is the ground (or

of loNT might attempt to get to the deep self posthaste, exposing their most intimate thoughts over a beer at the local taxern. The continual search for

object)

the other's deep self is, moreover, a comprehensible project if (perhaps only

X alread\' loxes

v.

motixation required for revealing or discovering the deep self

Knowledge of the deep it

if)

Gixen the prior dexelopment of second-order properties, the

self,

then,

might represent the profound

is

the fruit of love, not

intimac\'

of love

in

its

its

is

present.

ground; knowing

advanced stages, but it is

not the relationship's origin. 2* (See 9.5.) If both x and v change, in part as a result

of their

loxe,

and these changes permeate the deep

these serial deep selves

is

self,

then discoxering

possible given the constancy implied by unwavering

second-order properties. Reknowing the other depends on time, not knowing

more

deeply.

METAPHYSICAL UNIQUENESS

6.

The sense

ence

.

.

.

biologist Peter ha\'e

Medawar

writes that "philosophers and

long agreed about the uniqueness of individual man.

now makes

it

a trio

common .

.

of concordant voices, for the uniqueness of

.

Sci-

indi-

61

The Uniqueness of the Beloved vidual

.

.

men

.

force, perhaps

much

which science can demonstrate with equal

a proposition

is

with cieeper cogency, and certainly with

precision."^''

The medical studv of skin

hundred times

a

grafts teaches us that

is

and "the combinations

an almost continuous range of variations. "^6

unique

in this physical sense,

are so diverse that there

Qf

course,

all

persons are

but immunological properties are not the basis of

properties, such as personality

Other empirical

love.

and character, do not

confer substantive uniqueness, and appealing to an empirical deep self

How,

as

humans

immunological

are immunologically unique (except identical twins), because

differences are combinational

all

A

then, can a philosopher defend universal uniqueness?

philosophical account of uniqueness

fails.

distinctively

would avoid empirical objections by elab-

orating a metaphysics of the person, aiming at an absolute truth about

uniqueness, not a likelihood (or unlikelihood).

While arguing that agape posed a problem for the paradox.

^-^

is

viability

the only genuine love,

of romantic

W.

G. MacLagan

love, a variant

In romantic passion x loves y exclusively,

which

of Gellner's

possible only

is

if

the lover conceives of the beloved as "unique and therefore irreplaceable." But, claims

MacLagan, the

lover can conceixe of the beloved as irreplaceable only if

the lover refuses to reflect particular person

is

on the grounds of her preference, to ask why this Romantic love, as a result, is

the object of her attention.

some level the lo\'er realizes that were she to inquire about her would find only an unsatisfactorv' answer, and in order to save her love she must go through e\'asi\'e mental g\'mnastics. The only answer to the repressed question is unsatisfactor)' because it provides no warrant for asserting the irreplaceabilit\' of the beloved and for loving exclusively. The irrational: at

preference, she

answer

is

is

not unique and the lover should

romantic lover, according to MacLagan, reason for her preferential love

ence

— which

is

is

But the romantic lover brated the sonalirv'

is

who

seems to

"It

if so,

passion toward others.

The

forced to admit that she has no

contradictory, given

what

a prefer-

that

.

.

.

along with

being."-^^ This metaphysics

slightly less obscurely

.

.

we

ha\'e

is

prepared to

re-

not sufFiciently cele-

more than

a

that

But what is

is

different

often ignored

from

of personal uniqueness

is

formulated

values, he has in addition a distinctive value

mere

resultant

is

ever)' single

by the philosopher Robert Ehman: "Given

universal attributes and is

.

heredit)'.

X factor. Something within the vow o^you

human

Leo Buscaglia

has read

me

wondeHul uniqueness of ever}' indixidual. I would agree that perthe sum total of all the experience that we have known since the

moment of conception

that

feel

is.

spond to MacLagan:

an

of attractive properties; but

that the beloved instantiates a set

the beloxed

all

of

of his

his

own

of the sum of his universal traits. Apart from

62

The Uniqueness of the Beloved

his virtues

and general

might have virtues. "^^

And Mark

might be worthless, but he nevertheless

excellences, he

a personal value that

more than the sum of the

is

solved only by postulating the existence of a "transcendental

beyond

(the

summation of) empirical

like the soul, are

we

all are,

which we

and

lovable)

is

or have, a transcendental

unique), the transcendental

that in virtue of

self, as

unique to each

is

such selves,

self, all

either the object

unique transcendental

)''s

something

of love or

our desiderata. But to sav that x

love, satisfies

exclusively loves y because x loves

self,"

qualities. ^^ If the transcendental self is

the seat of the beloved's value (and hence

person (even though

values of his

Fisher argues (in effect) that Gellner's paradox can be

simply to say

self is

nothing more illuminating than that x exclusively loves v because y has the propert)' "is v'" and that no one else has that property.

Few

lovers ignore altogether the beloved's empirical properties in favor

of a metaphysical abstraction, and beloveds selves as

are not pleased to think

of them-

being loved qua transcendental self Both lover and beloved, con-

fronted with a philosophical proof that love entails a transcendental self as

mav very well

object or ground,

interpret that proof as a reductio

Despite the fact that our romantic lover quickly,

if

its

ad absurdum.

not in desperation,

embraced Buscaglia's Cartesian "something within the you oi you'''' to protect himself from MacLagan's charge of camel-bird irrationality, he now regrets

becoming an accomplice

promoting

in

view that

a

is

difficult

not only for him

but also for the philosopher to express. Listen to Ehman: "There order and meaning in the personalit\' of the individual that unique, original, in some measure creative.

tinctive,

focuses

upon

.

.

.

the ineffable individuality of the individual."^ ^

is

is

a certain

his alone, dis-

[Personal love]

Even

if

we forget

the vagueness of "certain" and the tautological "individualitv^ of the individual,"

Ehman's

"ineffable"

is

revealing. This

is

Buscaglia's "something within the you of you.''

uniqueness

ineffable

is

know that the

individual

should think that

if

to

is

is

abandon

the philosopher's rendition of

But to say that metaphysical

ship, or to flee

we cannot

say so,

we should

"We how can we say so?"^^ j

from eros to agape.

unique," says Sartre, "but

be reluctant to use meta-

physical uniqueness as a solution to a philosophical puzzle and be quick to

doubt that we do know that eseryone philosophers

who

that this collapse

fall is

back on the

a virtue, not a defect,

elusive mystery, then

it is

fitting that at

attempts to get a rational grip on

Solomon bit

is

believes that "to sav love

unique. Yet

ineffabilit\'

it

is

of

fall

in

our

back on

'ineffable'

(necessarily

ineffabilit\'.^^

or a 'myster}''

of nonsense,"^^ but he does not explain why. The answer,

conceiving of love in this

way

some

suspect that

their philosophy. If love

some point

we

I

of personal uniqueness believe

prevents self-knowledge;

it

is

I

a

is

an

fiitile)

Robert

dangerous

think,

ser\'es as

is

that

an excuse

The Uniqueness of the Beloved

on

for not reflecting

63

the grounds of our preferences, in the

manner of Mac-

Lagan's irrational lover (see 8.4 and 8.6). I

wanted to know, however, not onlv what sort of doctrine of uniqueness

a philosopher

Ehman

might offer but

also

how

that doctrine could be defended.

upon which

argues for the "ineffable individuaht\' of the individual,"

the lover focuses, in part bv appealing to an analog\' between art and persons:

we

"In personal love,

.

.

.

with an openness and

art,

approach other persons sensitivit}'

what

to

is

as

we approach works of

unique and noNcl in them."^^

Works of art are unique and, by analog)', so are people. The argument begs the question; at most

of

art arc

it

unique

of personal uniqueness:

establishes the possibilit\'

Not much

uniqueness, in which case persons might be unique in the same wav.

more convincing creator

must

tinctive

and

catch

Ehman 's

work of art

other defense; since a

also be unique: "In his act, the artist creates

indi\'idualized as he himself."^*^ This

only that an unique;

is

artist

if works

an interesting sense, then the world contains some

in

— one who does or could

unique,

is

something

argument shows,

as dis-

if an\thing,

work of art

create a unique

—

does not establish a general metaphvsics of personal uniqueness.

it

Ehman

"The

originality'

simplv manifestations of the

originalit\'

art the self rcxeals

more

clearly

and and

than in

is

We

more general conclusion when he

illegitimately sliding into the

repeats the argument:

its

individualit\'

of works of

individualit\' o'[the

an\'

art are

human self.

other product ...

own

its

In

dis-

Maybe the artist's self therebv reveals its uniqueness; show that human selves in general are unique?

tinctive individuality'."^''

but

how

does

this

Arguments

Mark

for the existence

of a transcendental

Fisher offers three novel ones, based

argument reasons

is

a response to a version

why one

pirical qualities,

person

lo\'es

then another

.

.

.

self are usuallv exciting.

claims about

of Gellner's paradox: "If it

is

have the same

to be

found

His

first

true that the

qualities.

.

.

.

On

the

in the beloved's empirical

would love [such a] substitute just the same. She would love this would undoubtedlv not be [true] cannot ... be some odd quirk in human psychological nature, some odd

she

them both. That written off as

.

irrationality in us that

we

like the first. "^^^ Fisher's

in virtue

lo\'e. is

another are to be found in the beloxed's em-

man might

assumption that the reason for lo\e qualities,

upon

is

.

arc unable to love a second person,

solution

is

that the assumption

of empirical properties. Yet we lo\e

remaining candidate

.

in virtue

is false:

no matter how we do not love

of something, and the

the nonempirical transcendental self Fisher has not

hereby solved Gellner's paradox in rejected Gellner's first horn: exclusive, even serially. "^^

its

pure form, for earlier

"Love often

His point

empirical S, then x cannot love any z

is

is,

in his

but need not bv

not that

if

who also has

x loves y S,

its

on the

paper he

nature be, basis

but rather that

x's

of an

loving

.

64

The Uniqueness of the Beloved y for S will not guarantee that x loves any z who also has S. The fact that it would not be ''psvchologicallv odd" if x did not love the similar z shows, for

must be nonempirical, something

Fisher, that the basis or the object of love

not repcatable

in z

— that

the transcendental self that

is,

This argument will not do.

First,

some

because x loves v for S, in which case this particular logicall\' similar

to x, does not lo\e a transcendental

me, too,

strikes

it

y

or any person psycho-

x,

self.

Or such

a case

shows

not always the object or the basis of love. Second,

that the transcendental self is

even though

is

might love z for S just

particular x

"human

as plausible (given

nature") that x will not necessarily love a person z

who

psychological

has the same S as the

person y that x loves, the additional psychology implicit in Fisher's claim that basis or the object of love seems far-

something nonempirical must be the

How does x come to know, to touch, or to feel passion for a transcen-

fetched.

when

dental self? If X loves v but not z

selves? Recall that x

of

\'ersion

how

then

cally indistinguishable,

is

y and z are in the relevant ways empiri-

x able to distinguish their transcendental

had been deceived into thinking that y* was y

Gellner's paradox

— x confused

in Fisher's

their transcendental selves just be-

cause he "confused" their empirical qualities (see 2.5).*° In his second defense of the transcendental di\'orces the empirical

these"

—

b\'

from

which Fisher means

lovc]."*^ Fisher's point

is

self,

all

— "empirical

changes

that if x loves y, then x will

matter what empirical changes y undergoes

Fisher again radically

of love

love: "Surely the nature

is

to transcend

continue to love y no

agape tradition?).

(as in the

of

[in the object

And if

x lo\'es an\' empirical xersion of v, nothing empirical about y can be the basis of

The argument, however, overlooks

x's love.

at least this: if y

undergoes severe

empirical changes (for example, metanoia), then y has become a different person. In such a case, claiming that x loves y only if x's love continues is

unconvincing y, x's

so,

— for there

is

now no y for x to love.

If x

love for y has not failed to be constant through

entails a

change

that x

in identity, for

persisting transcendental asserted, not

argued

Another constant.

fault

Whv

underlying

all

Perhaps. But

self.

such empirical properties

now

does Fisher,

through

would

.

.

.

be

.

all .

ditional love ...

.

who

existence

is

is

the

merely being

that

it

assumes that love

concedes that love

is

not "by

is

His argument

empirical changes in the beloved, "for

conditional

is

its

for.

with the second argument

exclusive, retain this equally suspicious thesis? persist

If

must have loved something nonempirical. One no empirical change, not even a drastic one like metanoia,

we cannot conclude

might respond that

does not love the "new"

fs empirical changes.

not what

upon

it

is:

if it

its

proclaims

itself to be.""*^

The weak

nature"

love

must

did not

certain requirements being met.

is

it

But con-

link in the

The Uniqueness of the Beloved

argument,

think,

I

is

65

Fisher's claim that lo\e

shall sec later (8.8; 10.2), the conditionality its

Any

being love.

is

pert'ectlv

unconditional. As \vc

of an emotion does not contradict

reasonable view of love must allow that the ending of an

emotion because of certain changes

beloved does not preclude love

in the

as the

emotion. Fisher's third

conclusion. There

power

.

is

second person however

"By another route we can reach the same

this:

between loving

a difference

and loving that person

.

.

argument

is

himself.

like the first

.

.

a person's beaut\'

or wealth or

[T]he absurdit\' of lo\'ing a

.

suggests that the idea of loving

for his [empirical] qualities involves mistaking love for

.

.

someone

things that can

.

precede or go along with

it,

the argument,

x loves y's propcrt)' S, then x does not love v "the

it sa\'s:

if

such as expectation of benefit."'^'' As

I

understand

person"; to achieve love "for the person" (rather than love of properties or

"instrumental" love, which are impostors), one must be loving the transcendental self Let

me

suggest that

we have

and

properties;

Surely

it

e\'en if (a)

Since (b)

does not follow that not genuine love,

is

is

it

(c),

(b), too,

some

but because is

of

in virtue

loving someone "as a person" in

seems incompatible with

(a)

different,

(c)

three notions here: (a) loving some-

someone

one's empirical properties; (b) loving

their empirical

technical sense.*^

and

(a)

incompatible with

does not follow that (b)

not necessarilv incompatible with

(c),

is

(b) are quite (c).

Similarlv,

not genuine love.

we have no

reason so far to

think that only loving a transcendental self amounts to "loving the person" (see 13.5).

7.

UNIQUENESS AND EXCLUSIVITY

There

is

a final reason

why

appealing to the uniqueness of the beloved

cannot solve Gellner's paradox. Even

if

the beloved

some

in

is

nontrivial

way

unique, that fact could not reconcile the reason-dependence and exclusivit\' of loxe. Gellner

summarizes

exclusive yet there

his

paradox

saving that

b\'

"no guarantee"^^ the beloved

is

seems to assume, that

is,

that the puzzle

if x

loves y in virtue

love z

if z,

in the

z

is

substantively unique. if

there were such a thing, is

S,

and

would

time to challenge that

if

love-reasons are general, then x will

Yet Gellner's second horn

implied, by the fact that x lo\'es

when z does not have

S.

He

second horn of his dilemma, Gellner claims that

of v's having

S.)

is

the beloved were

too, has S. (The uniqueness solution escapes along the second

by claiming that only y has

what

if

exclusivity^ in a property- based love. It

assumption. Recall that

exposes a puzzle: love

would disappear

unique; that the uniqueness of the beloved,

account for

is

it

The second

\'

in \irtue

is

horn

altogether silent

on

of S, about x's attitude toward

horn's assumption that

lo\'e is propert)'-

66

The Uniqueness of the Beloved

compatible with

based

is

virtue

of z's hax'ing T, even

The

thesis that love

properties

loving y in virtue of y's having S, while x loves z in

x's

if Gellner is right that

reason-dependent

is

is

love-reasons are not general.

not that one particular set of

both necessary and sufficient for x to

is

X loves y, x's love

anyone

lo\'e

at

Rather,

all.

if

explainable by pointing out those properties of y in virtue of

is

which X loves y. That x will love

lo\'es y in virtue of these properties does not mean that x only someone haxing the same set. Love's being propert\'-based

allows that

having

y's

sufficient for x to love sets,

but

this limit

is

S

set z.

anyone

and

a fixed

z's

having

set

T is

number of sufficient

not placed bv the reason-dependence of love. Further-

more, a beloved's possessing for x's loving

sufficient for x to love y,

is

For a gi\'en x there mav be

at all

a specific property' if every

only

P will be

a necessary condition

property-set that

is

sufficient for x to

no specific propertv will be necessary, which allows properties A, B, and C and to love z for D, E, and F. It follows

love includes P; otherwise,

x to love y for

that unless the possession necessar\'

and

of a

P or

specific property'

sufficient for x to love

anvone

at

a specific set

S

is

both

the fact that \^s having S

all,

xLy has no bearing on whether xLz when z does not have S. The upshot is that even if v is unique, and even if the basis of x's love is y's

secures

unique

S, this

does not guarantee the exclusivitv of

secured by the uniqueness of the beloved onlv when

having

by

a

person

Most

all.'

1

Exclusivity

is

x loves v in virtue of y's

of S makes y unique, and (3) the possession of S necessary for x to love anyone at all. How likely is it that the

S, (2) the possession is

possession of a specific property at

(

x's love.

)

unlikelv.

maliciously killed

my

An

P

is

absolutelv necessar}^ for x to love anyone

exception would be a property' such as "has never

cat,"**^

but these properties are widelv shared and rule

out few potential beloveds. Uniqueness, then, cannot be appealed to generally in

accounting for exclusive love. This result

of \^s second-order properties, for x

is

not avoided

will love

y order properties are necessary for x to love anyone

willing

if x loves

exclusi\'ely at

all.

only

if

anyone

at all? If

it

is

second-

But how could "being

and able to contribute to the continuation of the x-y shared

necessar)' for x's loving

y in virtue

\''s

histor\'"

be

a necessarv' condition, x, in

considering that property necessar\', was probablv an exclusixe v-lover already; that this property

is

necessar)' for x to love

than explains, the fact that x saying that "being that

is

why

x loves only

If there

may still be

y"' is

is

lo\'es

anyone

v exclusi\'elv.

at all is

It is

explained by, rather

no more illuminating than anyone at all and

a necessar\' condition for x's lo\'ing y.

no foundation

for a belief in substantive uniqueness, the belief

a ps)'chologically usefijl self-deception. If x

beloved's uniqueness, x might have to replaceable or the belief that she

is

abandon the

could not believe in his feeling that she

is

not

lovable in virtue of her prized properties.

The Uniqueness of the Beloved

67

We do not want to hear that we are loved exclusively, for example, because our lovers have a queer notion of what "having reasons" means. We want to be lo\'ed

we stand out from the crowd and are considered especially Or we know at some level that we are members of the homogeneous

because

lo\ablc.

mass and still want our lovers to assert Thus, the belief in uniqueness lo\e.

Such

lox'crs

our uniqueness and superiority.

(falsely)

may sustain our self-respect and help to preserxe

and belo\'eds

are not hilly rational, but perhaps that

is

not to

be condemned, given the love they secure through their mental g)'mnastics. Lovers, however, can avoid ative.

There

"You're not that \'

is

is

like

by treating uniqueness

irrationalit)'

nothing incoherent

any other man" because "youVe

unique only insofar as y has the propert)'

my

"is

man."

no pretensions

But saying that

loving y exclusively makes y unique

are

made

that y

claiming that x loves y exclusively because y explanandum, not the explanans.

As

a criticism

properties,

of men

who

is

is

unique is

acknowledges

in an\'

other wav.

quite different from

unique. Uniqueness

woman

search for the

X

loved by x" and no one else

has that propert)'; x's

as deriv-

in x's saying to y (as a greeting card does):

Shulamith Firestone writes (sounding,

is

with the perfect ironically,

like

the

set

of

H. L.

Mencken in the epigraph to this chapter) that these men never realize "there isn't much difference between one woman and the other."'*'' Instead, "it is the lo\'ing that creates the difference." In this view, in

having a nonreplicable

set

loves only y. Rather, \^s status as unique y.

y"'s

uniqueness does not consist

of properties, nor does is

a gift

it

consist in the fact that x

bestowed by x because x loves

X may assent to the uniqueness of y counterfactuallv but not self-deceptivelv.

X knows

that y

uniqueness

is

not unique, but x

is

acts as if y were.

not automatically overestimation or the

tion to the beloved

This bestowal of

wish-fiilfilling attribu-

of excellences she does not ha\e. Nor must

of pedestalism or of denigrating other possible belo\'eds highly of one's actual beloved. express the special

The

it

take the

form

order to think

lover embellishes the beloved's merits to

meaning the beloved has

beloved as unique manifests

in

itself as treating

in the lover's

life.

Treating the

the beloved as the special object of

one's concern (see 12.8). This bestowal of value need not represent an agapic

tendency in personal love; preferentially.

of love. result

why

Such

But whether

after

all,

to treat the beloved as special

preferential treatment this preferential

mav even be

treatment

of love, the question remains open

as to

X bestows this preferential treatment

on

is

part

whv

v,

is

to treat

him

partiallv constitutive

of love or onlv

a causal

x loves v or, equi\alentlv,

and perhaps onlv on

y.

CHAPTER4 It

was

he realized with

true,

Coming a terrible

new

First

pain, that if he

had met Lisa

first

he would have married her.

— wretched unbelief abroad. ...

There

is

lovers

win one another,

a

hundred other and

whom

women

It

thinks

accidental that they love

with

whom

he could have loved

Iris

it

Murdoch, Bruno's Dream an accident that the

one another; there were

a

the hero might have been equallv happy,

as deeply.

— Kierkegaard, Either/Or

1.

THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF LOVE

We attempted to solve Gellner's paradox by invoking uniqueness, looking for properties that were both love-grounding or valuable, yet not widely shared. That solution failed, however, in part because valuable properties are

not rare enough to produce uniqueness, and rare properties are not the valuable ones.

explain

But given

some

certain contingent facts, the uniqueness solution can

exclusivitv. If people

have an overlv narrow conception of what

counts as a valuable property and respond to such a property only

if it is

possessed to a high degree, then there might be a set of lovable, uniqueness-

making

properties.

The uniqueness of beloveds

derives not

from

a prohfera-

tion of properties or fine gradings within property' groups (3.3) but

from

a

reduction of lovable properties.

Imagine an "aristocratic" beaut\', untainted

eros-st\'le

courdy love

in

which unblemished

moral virtue, the ownership of land and jewels, the perfor-

mance of heroic deeds, and political or clerical power are the only properties considered valuable enough to ground loxe. In this courtly love beloveds could be unique and receive the exclusive attention of lovers, but few would be few would therefore be the object of love, and few love would exist. ^ Many lovers would not achieve reciprbcit)'. Unrequited love would be an expected occurrence; it might even be transformed ideologically from a disadvantageous necessity' into an ideal. If this aristocratic love were the norm, yet those unqualified for it embraced its standards, these masses would have good reason for turning their erosic attention to God: the

worthy of

love,^

relationships

68

Coming

69

First

high standards of aristocratic love would be satisfied (God

is

more worthy of

love than the most worthy human), while the nonreciprocity of the aristocratic

pattern

would be overcome. The but a superior

alternati\'e

Imagine

love for

God would

be not a second-rate

article.^

now that social,

political,

and economic upheavals have democ-

The qualities of the object are still the basis of love, but love becomes more widelv distributed because standards have been lowered. Some beautv, or some beautiful feature, suffices, rather than stunning beaut)'; some ratized love.

measure of

or moral excellence

intellectual

brilliance or saintliness.

At the same time,

found

is

a

new

than

attractive, rather

individualist philosophy

proclaims the subjectivit)' of value judgments, which contributes to the proliferation

qualities. Many people become worthy of love, and unreno longer the expected course of events. Further, there is much

of lovable

quited love

is

reason for people to prefer loving

less

humans

God

— who languishes and then

dies as

increasingly love only each other. (Note that a wider distribution of

love can be achieved also by eliminating altogether the role of meritorious properties, as in agapic love, rather than

by lowering the standards of merit.)

But along with the lowering of standards that increases the number of potenbeloveds comes a leveling

tial

among

people that destroys substantive

uniqueness. This embarrassment of riches makes choosing a beloved from

among

so

many

qualified candidates difficult.

what

valuable qualities,

is

When

there to latch onto in

people share the same

making

distinctions?

To

say

no basis for distinguishing among potential beloveds exists and, therefore, selection must be arbitrary is (as Gellner suggested) to trivialize love. What is that

to be done?*

One answer

provided by another solution to Gcllner's paradox. Sup-

is

pose that X loves y in virtue of y's possessing S. Later x meets a person z who also has S (verv likely after the democratization of standards). Gcllner's para-

dox can be solved by escaping along the second horn: x does not love the relevantly similar z simply because x met y before meeting z. "In practice," Gellner claims, people sidestep the paradox bv appealing to "primacy."^

time of x's meeting y in

explaining

whv

is

crucial not only in bringing

x loves y but not

whether a historical propert\' x-v shared historx' will discuss

we

z.

x,

else

The

love for y but also

we examined

or y's contribution to the

— could make v both lovable and unique. In chapter 6 we

another historical propert\': the satisfaction of x's desires by

consider one

— what

x's

In chapter 3 (sect. 4)

— what y has done for

more

historical property'

y.

Here

— namely, the spatiotemporal pa-

rameters of the encounters that x has with y and z

about

z.*^

That x met y before x met

could the solution be for democratic love?

The time and

place of x

and

y's first

encounter

may have

a mysterious

70

Comiujj First

quality.

In contrast to encounters deliberately arranged by third parties

who decides the

(matchmakers, mutual friends, the person part)'), accidental life as

seating at a dinner

meetings'' that lead to something as significant in a person's

love can be seen as the result of the inexplicable, supernatural manipula-

tion of fate or an incredibly felicitous chance event; but both are

deep mysten'. Love

arises like the discover}'

that if mv date with the other

woman

of penicillin:

hadn't been broken at the

wouldn't have been eating dinner alone. If it hadn't been raining,

walked another block instead of stopping hadn't been sitting at the corner table,

I

start a conversation.

last I

at the first restaurant.

would have sat there,

book. If someone hadn't accidentally brushed the window,

had an excuse to

imbued with

"How wondrous it is

And we wouldn't now

minute,

isolated with I

I

would have If someone

my

wouldn't have

be experiencing

this bliss (or horror)."

Some relationship

these early moments of their love weak memor)'. Consider these lines from

lo\'ers ha\'e difficulty recalling

and regret

their

Christina Rossetti's "The First Day": I

wish

could remember the

I

First hour, first

first

day,

moment of your meeting me;

So unrecorded did it slip away. So blind was I to see and to foresee. If only a

I

could recollect

day of days!

I let it

it!

Such

come and go

As traceless as a thaw of bygone snow. It seemed to mean so little, meant so much!^

Other lovers engage didn't like

me"

in c\'nical or

(see Jane

gamelike postmortems: "I thought you

Austen, Pride and Prejudice, chapter 60). But

lovers joyfully relive their first meeting,

making

it

many

special, embellishing its

lovely details.^ Thev cherish the narrative, even reiving on its power to get them through rough moments. Thev talk about first impressions, about when

they

first

realized thev

had

a loving interest,

and about which statements,

mannerisms, and characteristics of the other produced these

feelings.

Children, curious about such things, persistentlv ask questions about

how and

actions,

when

their parents met,

history progressed.

But

I

what they did on their first date, how their joint doubt that answering these questions or reliving in

detail the first davs gets to the heart

other, the reasons for their love.

of the matter: namely, why they love each

As Gellner claims,

lovers

that x encountered y before z, or that x developed an

do often

cite the fact

emotion toward y first,

in

Cominq explaining

First

why

which X loves

71

x lo\'cs

\'

but not z (whether or not z has the S in

How seriously should we

y).

\'irtuc

of

take this?

In the worst-case scenario, the fact that x loves v rather than z (or that x loNcs y at

because x met y

all)

hating

arbitrar)'. If x is in a

merely because y wanders into

y's

first, x's

Because

y.

ha\'ing a hate-inducing propert)', is

sight

x's

with X and nothing to do with

or even irrational. If this

time or place

at a certain

objectionablv

is

mood and expresses this hatred toward y but not z x's

hating v has e\'er\thing to

hating v

do

independent of \''s

is

we are not reluctant to judge x unreasonable

what is going on when x loves v because x met v first,

properties are quite beside the point. X's love exhibits the subject-centricity

of the second \iew of personal

love;

and to the extent that the primacy solution

makes love more a matter of the right time than of the makes love a psychologically suspicious agapic phenomenon.

to Gellner's paradox right person,

it

Since the beloxed

is

only the recipient of a love

does not soke the problem of how to

select,

lotter\',

on

the primac)' solution

a reasonable basis, a beloved

from the mass of indistinguishable candidates. But perhaps, because either metaphysically or democratically

matter one whit

whom we

we

are

all

basicallv the same,

love or marr}'; tossing a coin

does not

it

or

as reasonable

is

unreasonable as any other method. ^^

On the other hand, in other scenarios the primacv solution seems acceptFor example, x and v meet by chance at a coftee shop and are attracted to each other in xirtue of their respective properties. It is not necessarilv true that able.

X

would have been

table, let alone

attracted to any person

interested in the person z

quicker

on her

who happened

simplv because she was sitting

feet.

to

sit at

Nor

at that table.

the next

who u'ould ha\'e sat at that table had she been

Thus, appealing to

v's

coming along

be

will x

a little

might reconcile

first

the exclusivirs' and reason-dependence of love, for the second horn of Gellner's

paradox, bv maintaining a tight connection between xLy and

while explaining wh\'

z's

ha\'ing S does not lead to xLz.

y's

The

having

S,

fact that x

encountered y before z is not a characteristic of y and cannot be included in the set S of y's attracti\'e properties that account for xL\'; time and place arc therefore a t}'pe of reason for or cause of xLv countenanced only h\ the second

view of personal love.^^ But suppose that "met x historical propert\' that the

reasons for xLv.

A

beloved y could

ha\'e

at tj"

is

a relational or

and counts

as

one of

x's

later-encountered z does not have this propertv and

thereby distinguishes v from

who

it

otherwise relevantlv similar to y; moreover, this historical property' makes y unique.

Of course, "met x t)',

and

it is

an\' z

before z met x"

is

is

a trivial

not valuable or lovable. Nevertheless,

uniqueness-making properif y's

having

this propert\'

is

72

Comirifl First

one reason

for x to love y but not z, x

t\'pe lover.

At

loving y

perfecth*

is

reason for xLv rather than y

not

is

is

of the

guilt)'

what the BVC-lover general even though it now

irrationality

of the E-

said (3.1), that x's reason for

least x can sav

applies to only

one

case. X's

would have loved z reason for loving someone

perfectly general as long as x says that x

had x met z before meeting y. X's

might be "has S and

is

the

total

person having S that

first

I

encounter." This reason

contains no proper names and mentions no particular time or place. Hence it does not rule out in advance z or anyone else who has S as a beloved. Never

mind

that as

anvone

soon

no one

as v satisfies these conditions,

in particular

does

them, anyone

satisf\'

them. Thus the primaa' solution

is

else can; for

before

S could

satisfy

at all ha\'ing

an interesting reconciliation of the two love

y include /s having S (from the first view) (from the second view). The element of chance need

traditions: x's reasons for loving

and v's coming along first

not undermine the significance of the emotion or the reasonableness of the choice, for the

emotion and the choice

both tied to

are

\'^s

having

SM

Gellner rejects the primaa' solution by denying that x can rightly say that

X would ha\e loved z rather than v had x encountered z

would

lover cannot admit that his love

had

ha\'e

first:

"The genuine

a different object

order of his encounters been different."^ ^ Similarly, one

Roman

Catholicism cannot sav that her religious commitment

fiinction

of the accidents of time, place, and

assert that she

is

birth; the

a Catholic because her beliefs

had the

who truly believes is

in

merely a

genuine Catholic cannot

were learned before and instead

of some other religious doctrines. The Catholic

conceptually forbidden from

is

saying that she would properlv be committed to Taoism had that religion

come

into her

same

as Gellner's

.

.

.

this counterfactual substitution

done just

The

Roger Scruton, whose solution to the paradox is the (3.1), agrees: "Love [is] characterized by the fact that

life first.

as well' as the object

logic

of

.

.

love, or the logic

entertain the thought that x

along

.

first; it is a

is

ruled out.

would

of E-type emotions,

would have loved

conceptual point that

v's

z,

with that object."^"*

entails that x

rather than v,

cannot

had z come

being the object of x's love can have

no connection with when x encountered v and If people believe,

Anv object that 'would have

also be identical

z.

with Gellner, that genuine love rules out the counter-

factual substitution, that

would

explain

the emotion they ha\'e today toward y

year toward z was not the genuine

is

whv manv

lovers

love, while the

article,

tell

themselves that

emotion thev had

last

but instead infatuation or some

other emotion (for example, sexual desire) pretending to be lovc.^^ (See the

romanticism described bv Doris Lessing in 9.8.) The phenomenon psychologically comprehensible. There

is

a mental tension

is

also

between our

real-

Coming

73

First

ization that spatiotemporal factors have played a large role in the histor\'

love and our

The

inability'

of lo\'e might not prevent x from saying that x could

logic

loved z had z

of our

to admit that fact (psychologicallv, not conceptiiallv).

come along

first;

well have

\er\'

but psvchological factors do impede that

admission. Callous lovers might quite easilv proclaim that xLv just because x

met v

first,

perhaps to remind v of her vulnerable position. But ordinarilv,

lovers have difficult)' saying to themselves,

and to

reason for xLy was the timing of x's meeting

from

meeting y before z explains why x does not love

their lovers that x's

derives

no

security

from

their beloveds, that a crucial

Beloxeds do not want to hear

v.

z;

v

that explanation. Saving face, expressing respect, and

being convincing require that lovers mention only other reasons for loving, primarily that y has S.

2.

W^Y PRIMACY MUST FAIL

Even

wrong

if it is

to insist that for either conceptual or psychological

reasons the counterfactual substitution

loves y but not

z,

ruled out, the primacv solution z

cannot

simply because there are too

second and loves z rather than roughh' the same time and onlv

though both might have tant as the point at that,

is

meeting v before meeting

unsatisfactory'. X's

S.

y.

later

many

likely,

cases in

is

for

which

x meets both

one or the

irrelevant.

To

is

x meets z

\'

otlier began. In

not

is

why x

and z

comes to love one and not the other,

In this case, the order of meeting

which x's love

primacy of encounter

Or, more

in general explain

as

at

e\'en

impor-

understanding

sav that x loves y and not z just

—

emotion toward y occurred before x's emotion toward z taking it one stage beyond the physical encounter itself is not to answer the question

because

x's

—

but to pose

it

again.

(Note that primacy

this solution as violating the

factors, despite Gellner's rejection

of

conceptual ban on counterfactual substitution,

own solution. For Gellner, why does x lo\'e v but not z? X is an E-tvpe lover who fails to applv his reasons for loving y (who came first) to figure into Gellner's

the later-encountered yet relevantly similar his

not applying his love-reasons

z.

in a general

How can x make comprehensible wav, unless x says that

y's ha\'ing

come first makes the difference or that because x has already applied his reasons to y, they can no longer be applied to the later-appearing z?) Further, temporal priority' per se cannot explain for

much

irrelevant.

that

you

why xLy

but not xLz,

the same reason that time and place per se are, in moral contexts,

""What makes

it

one rather than the other of a pair of identical twins no more than this: it was one of them and not

are in love with? ...

the other that you have met."^^ But what

if vou

do eventually meet the second?

74

Cominpi First

Can \'ou appeal to primacy per se to explain why you love the first? To have any effect on the course of your love, temporal priority' must have some consequences; these mediating consequences, which explain the power of temporal prioritA', are realh'

the ingredients of the intended solution to Gellner's para-

dox.'" Favoring the firstborn son makes no sense

if the

son

is

favored merely

because of birth order; something else about this son, which he has because he is

firstborn, accounts for his special position.

before meeting

z,

x begins to love y

earlier-made promise. it

has

no

Temporal

else.

Here x

but because of

x's

work through something;

has to

priority'

first,

x meets y

effect.

Suppose that x loves y

who

and promises to love no one

and not z not merely because y came along

loves y

alone

Another example:

in virtue

of y's having S and that x then meets

also has S. If x loves only y but not z,

even though z has

S,

then S in z

z, is

not having the effect on x that S in y has. If reasons and causes are general, the failure of S in z to elicit x's love must be because of some difference in the total situations confronted

by

x.

By

hypothesis, there

is

no

relevant difference be-

tween y and z; yet the difference in time per se cannot explain why the reason or cause works with respect to v but not z. Some difference in x, therefore, makes the situation

xMy

different

not xLz. Temporal priority

and

from is

xMz and

contributes to this change through

it

accounts for xLy because of S but

relevant only if it contributes to this change in x,

Whatex'er this mediating factor

is,

some mediating

factor.

the fact that time and place

virtue of it has important theoretical implications. First, the

work

in

acknowledgment

of mediation avoids the arbitrariness of selecting on the basis of temporal priori t\' per se.

Something about the mediating

factor

might make the choice

among similar potential beloveds more rational or reasonable than it would be if time per se led to the choice. Second, the mediating factor may be such that this solution to Gellner's

paradox

is

no longer

agape traditions: the mediating factor based.

One

chapter

mediating factor

is

a reconciliation

may entail that love

discussed

now;

a

more

is

of the eros and

entirely property-

interesting factor, in

6.

W. Newton -Smith

has proposed a solution to Gellner's paradox about

The generality of reasons, he claims, does not require that xLz, when xLy because y has S and z, too, has S, if xLy also because "it was [y] loN'e at first sight. '^

that

first

excited this passion in [x]."The solution

in x's reasons for

loving v but not z

primac)' of encounter has

its effect.

is

is

plausible because included

a mediating factor

one encounter xLy (but not xLz) because y "first excited ambiguous, admitting of four interpretations. Consider these readings:

(i)

through which

Yet Newton-Smith's solution, that after this passion" in x,

is

y excited in x a passion that x never experi-

75

C.omhiq First

enccd before; x

experiencing

is

do

excited a passion in x, before z could that

is

now

Since "first love"

"first love."

exclusive, the later-encountered z cannot

elicit it in

x

logically

is

once y has done

so.

(ii)

who

directed at v as the person

is

currently eliciting

it;

Y

but

so, that x has experienced before

x

is

experiencing a particular passion-token, one occurrence of a repeatable passion-type that

xMz

is

compatible with the

produced duced,

contingently tied to

is

Y

pro-

experiencing one occurrence of a repeatable feeling con-

is

tingently tied to elicit a

\'

excited in x this passion-token, this specific instance of the

passion-t\^pe; x

time

That y elicited this passion in x before had z come before v, z could have

passion-token qualitatively identical to the one that

in x a

(iii)

y.

fact that

But x

\'.

especially values this passion-token; z could at a later

passion-token of the same

t)'pe,

but x would not especially

\'alue

it.

had come before y, there are two possibilities. One, that the passion-token elicited by z would ha\'e had this special value for x; two, that it would not, but If z

the later passion-token produced by y

out the second Finally, (iv)

Since this

possibility'; in his

view,

y excited in x the passion-for-y, a passion for a particular person. encounter with \', x is experiencing something logically

is x's first

similar to "first loN'e." X's experience tied to y; for x is

would have. Newton-Smith is ruling xLy but not xLz because v came first.

is

is

essentially, rather

a repeatable passion, but v

is

necessarily

might be able to

elicit in x

its

object. Because the passion

is

At least, z cannot elicit it toward z the passion-for-y, toward y, through a devious or

indexed, z could never elicit this passion in (z

than contingently,

experiencing a passion-token of the type "passion-for-y." This

x.

complex causal mechanism).

Do any of these readings solve the paradox? immediately. first,

It is

when even

elicit in x

can be eliminated

come first z could not have elicited the indexed The fact that the passion is indexed means that the betu'een the two encounters is irrelevant. Furthermore,

z.

the passion-for-y, z can

that y elicits the passion-for-y

first

elicit in

sion-for-y to the passion-for-z

passions this way? For

which

is

some

x the passion-for-z; the fact

does not explain

vents the qualitatively different passion-for-z, or

passion-for-y,

(iv)

z had

temporal relationship y can

think

superfluous to claim that xLy but not xLz because y came if

passion-for-y toward

if

I

when both

how

why

x

different

from the passion-for-z, I

occurrence pre-

y and z have S. Finally,

philosophers, that there

to conceptualize these things. But

its

might prefer the

pas-

index

a distinct feeling, a

is is

why

the most natural

way

doubt that the phenomenal nature of the

passions provides clear evidence that the passion elicited in x by y qualitatively different

ering emotions "at

Reading

(

i

)

from the passion elicited by z, especially

first

if

is

we are consid-

sight."

does not solve Gellner's paradox because

it

covers only those

Coming

76

which xLy

cases in first

First

is

sight," not "first love,"

docs

at first sight"

experience of love; the paradox

x's first

fall

which may not occur at

But

first sight.

of cases?

is,

can be directed

it

The

fact that first love

only one person;

at

it

is

in a qualitatively identical fashion to z or that

describe

xAz

because

will

not

we cannot

xAz docs not occur at all. Gellner's paradox rephrased: if xLy in virtue of /s having S, where xLy is the

as "first love"

mains, dilfercntly

why won't x experience

time x has experienced love,

encountering the z

We

call

logically exclusive entails

does not entail that x

respond

first

we should

though we cannot

a qualitatively similar response to z even

that response "first love." that

"first love,

think not. If xAy because y has

I

then the gencralit\' of reasons implies xAz, because z also has S;

expect, that

at

within the scope of the paradox. Does this reading

pro\'ide a solution for this smaller set S,

about "love

is

who

"second love"

when

also has S?

might sav here that because xLv

is x's

first

love experience, x

"overwhelmed" and cannot respond the same way toward

z.

X

is

has changed

between meeting y and meeting z, so we do not expect the later exposure to S in z to have the same effect. Because the initial conditions have changed, we can escape along the second horn without violating the generalit)' of reasons or causes. Perhaps this solution will

works for

cases

of "first

not work generally for cases in which xLy

There

is

is is

elicited

the

it

love experience.

x's first

significantly

changed

z.

A general point pose X

not

no guarantee that x is so overwhelmed that x has

before meeting

which

is

love, at first sight," but

made

can be

here that applies to readings

most natural interpretation

overwhelmed, either bv

by )^s having

S,

of Newton- Smith's

"first love," as in

before z could

elicit this

reading

(i),

passion in

(i)

and

(ii),

solution. Sup-

or by the passion

x, as in

reading

(ii).

Why is it that /s S elicited a passion in x, but the later exposure to S in z does not do so? The answer must have ha\'ing experienced

this

form: x has changed in such a

one instance of the passion elicited by

to experience another instance of the passion elicited by S.

instance of that passion prevent the

kind of change in x explains x's

experiencing

it

time

tj

x

is

that

no longer able

But why should one

same passion from occurring again? What

whv x's

having experienced

this passion prevents

not merelv a second time, but a second time in response to a

cause (namely, S) that has already proven a feeling at

S,

way

itself efficacious?

does not prevent having

physiolog)' of the emotions

makes

it

emotion implies that x

is

t2

likelv to

bly that temporal priority'

toward z

In general, having

again at the later

likely that

prevents a later instance of the emotion. (X experience hate soon again at

it

may hate y

who

x.2\

not even the

one instance of an emotion at tj in virtue

also has

of T and

T; nothing about the

be hate-exhausted.) In order to argue plausi-

works through the

fact that x's

passion for y was

77

Cotnitipi First

elicited before x

met z, one must show

But to say that x

is

phrase only restates that experiencing

it

that x has

"overwhelmed"" by the x's

first

changed

experience of the passion at

Unless some specific mechanism

at t2.

in

whelmed" only means "unable

some specific way.

passion explains nothing: that

is

ti

prevents x from

mentioned, "over-

to respond again." Further,

it is

false that x's

experiencing the passion in response to the earlier encounter wixh a person

changed

ha\'ing S has

exposure to

For x

S.

such a way that x can no longer respond to

x in

experiencing the passion in response to

is still

one instance of the passion due to S instances of the passion

passion in

way

to S in

To

S,

a later

and so

not preventing the occurrence of later

S in y still has the power to invoke this to S has not changed and x should respond the same

due to

x, x's sensitivit)'

is

v's

S. If

z.

claim that

xLz

is

ruled out because y

first elicited a

passion in x

is

therefore to leave mysterious wh\' temporal priorit\' makes a difference. Read-

ing

(iii)

no

fares

better:

it

will

particular passion-token elicited it is

priorit\'

makes

still

by

futile to rely y, if one

special merely because

say that

special,

be

a difference.

If,

have no explanation

elicit

why the first is

second only a special passion-token. this fact

it is first

bv having

then z (who also has S) can

S,

on the

special value

cannot explain why

it is

does not explain

y can

elicit a

temporal

passion-token that

another special passion-token, and a special special passion-token

If the passion-token elicited

in virtue

of S. But

this

is

wc

and the

by y is special,

Of course,

influences x to discount, ignore, or be

blind to the manifestation of S by z (that being the change in x), while x

responds to y

To

special.

how

seems an explanandum, rather than the explanans, of xL\'.

we could say that r's coming along first

of the

move abandons

still

the generalit\' of reasons

or the rationality of the lover, exactly what Newton-Smith wanted to

a\'oid.

CHAPTER Man

had become ...

Aristophanic Love

5

He had come

a thinking being.

to

know enough about

permutations and combinations to realize that with millions of

choose from, the chances of his choosing the

ideal

—Thurber and White, Somewhere our body.

.

Instead, he

he

.

.

in the .

is

later

.

.

The

world each of us has trouble

is,

man does

a partner

.

females to

.

who

Is

zero.

Sex Necessary?

once formed part of

not find the other part of himself

sent a Tereza in a bulrush basket.

meets the one

.

mate were almost

who was meant

But what happens

for him, the other part

if

of himself?

— Milan Kundera, The Unbearable L^htness ofBeing

1.

ARISTOPHANES'

MYTH

Exclusivity, constanq', reciprocity,

and "love

for the person," as

I

have

a view of love

mentioned, present difficulties for the eros tradition. But there is that mav solve these problems at a single stroke: by cutting whole persons into half persons, Zeus created love as well as the conditions that

make

constant and reciprocal. In Plato's Symposium, Aristophanes originall\',

and nvo

humans were circle-people, having four arms, four of

sets

females had

two

genitals. sets

Male

of female

circle-people genitalia,

had two

sets

it

exclusive,

tells this

legs,

of male

and androg;\'nes had a

two

story: faces,

genitalia,

set

of each.

These people were strong and vigorous and had the hubris not to think highly of the gods (original

sin).

Zeus therefore

sliced

them

in half Thereafter,

bodv having been cut in two, each half yearned for the half from had been severed. When they met they threw their arms round one another and embraced, in their longing to grow together again. ... It is from this distant epoch, then, that we may date the innate love which human beings man's

.

which

.

.

it

one another, the love which restores us to our ancient state by attempting one and to heal the wounds which humanity- suffered. and each of us is perEach of us ... is the mere broken tally of a man, petuallv in search of his corresponding tally, i

feel for

to weld n\'o beings into

.

.

.

Aristophanes' mvth reappears, in different versions, throughout Western love hterature and popular culture. ^ Paul Tillich e\'en surmises that "love in

forms

78

is

the drive towards the reunion of the separated."

all its

Under this umbrella

79

Aristophanic Love

definition,

both "infinite passion for God" and "sexual passion" are "a conse-

quence ... of the

state

of separation of those

who

belong together and are

driven towards each other in lovc."^ Originally, x

rated

and y were the circle-person

Thev now desire to unite, or reunite, with each

fission.

when

"primitive condition

each other, that

is,

[they]

bv Zeus'

parts,

other, to return to their

were whole" (192e).

desire to join together?

were sepa-

xy, but then thcv

from each other, and from the whole of which thev were

Whv

do

x

and v love

X desires y because y is x's other half;

y desires x because x is y's other half The property in virtue of which they love each other is "mv other half," which makes each of them unique. In this case the uniqueness of the beloved does yield cxclusivit)'. Recall that x will love y exclusively if (i) xLy because y has S, (ii) only y has S, and (iii) a person's

having S

is

anyone

necessar\' for x to love

about X and y originally being a single satisfied.

sary

and

Indeed, given this

(3.7).

Given Aristophanes' ston'

circle- person, all three

storv' y's propcrt)' "is x's

sufficient for x to love

y and guarantees that no one

Reciprocity' occurs automatically: if xLy because y necessarily y's other half,

which

is

sufficient for yLx.

conditions are

other half

is

both neces-

else loves v.

other

is x's

Constancy

is

half, x

is

also secured:

if xLy because y is x's other half, x will always love y because y always has the property sufficient for xLy. Further, there seems to be no room to criticize

Aristophanic love for involving only love for

problem

in Plato's cros

y's

properties themselves. That

avoided because "the objects of these creatures'

is

passions are whole people"

— not

a set

of valuable properties, but "entire

beings."^ (Note the ironv of saying that x loves \ the "whole" person loves y because y

of the eros

when

x

other half ) Thus, Aristophanic love solves the problems

is x's

tradition.

But

is

Aristophanic love even an erosic love, or

is

it

agapic?

THE STRUCTURE OF ARISTOPHANIC LOVE

2.

There are manv reasons to think that Aristophanic love Aristophanes' speech praise eros.

is

delivered during a banquet at which

The Symposium,

written around 385 B.C.,

agape. Aristophanes' account of love ("the

whole" 192c] [

)

is

not

far

name

is

all

is

erosic.

the speakers

hardly a treatise

on

for the desire ... of the

from Diotima's account of cros ("love

is

desire for the

perpetual possession of the good" [206a], a different sense of "wholeness").

And

Aristophanes' desire for union

is

a precursor

of

a

main

feature of the

romantic view of love. But none of these reasons for placing Aristophanes'

myth within the eros tradition is compelling. Aristophanes' use of the word "eros" means nothing; he may be informing the banquet guests that eros is

80

Aristophanic Love

quite a dift'ercnt kind of thing than they are accustomed to think ("I shall

.

.

.

initiate

vou

of love [189d]). Aristophanes' account

into the secret"

of love mav be an unintended anticipation of the agape tradition. The main reason for thinking of Aristophanic love as agapic is that one's other half "has no specific qualities of goodness or badness, beaut\' or ugliness,

brown or she

red hair.

.

.

.

We do not desire union with

beautiful"^ but simply because he or she

is

not love V in

\'irtue

is

the other because he or

our other

half.

Thus, x does

of \^s outstanding properties; moreover, x loves y even

if y is

The point is not that y's propert)' "x's other half' outweighs, in a comparison of the good and bad properties of v, v's defects; if that were so, Aristophanic love would be erosic. Rather, defects do not count objecti\elv unattracti\'e.

at all against x's lo\'ing v:

grotesque."^ There

is

Aristophanic lovers "o\'erlook

no balancing, but

that

all

and defects compatible only with the second view of personal because x

is

(

wonderful just because thev are \''s, transforming even

flaws into beautiful things.'' If so, Aristophanic love

y to be valuable because xLy

—

since

valuable properties. Aristophanic "love for the person" because

abandons

it is

xLy

is

y who

is

is

agapic

—x

finds

P

in

not in turn a response to /s other

lo\'e is exclusive,

constant, reciprocal, and

not erosic; the myth does not defend eros but

it.

Nevertheless, Aristophanic love

halP

love. Further,

overwhelmed with joy when reuniting with y 192b, c), x probably

finds v's properties to be y's

ugh' and

is

rather an insensitivit\' to both merits

a meritorious

is x's

is

erosic

other half?

because

aft:er all,

second-order or historical property.

X has been wounded by the fission

of which x had been a part has been wounded, and

"my

other

Whv does x seek the (

19 Id), or the whole

as a result

x suffers (as does

X had been happv as a part of a whole, because the whole circle-person had been happy. But now x is a "broken tally," seeking her other half in order to recreate the happy whole. Y, in virtue of being x's other half, is the onl\' one who can restore x to prelapsarian bliss. X therefore desires y because y can heal x and

y).

make

x

other

half~"

happv

again. In other words, x desires v as having the propert\'

because x desires y as ha\'ing the propert\' "can restore

happiness." If this First,

is

is

is

propert\'-based; "has the

certainly a valuable propert\'

from

abilit\'

to

x's perspective.

either x finds y's other properties attractive because x loves y,

grounded

to

what grounds x's love, we have a whole new can of worms.

Aristophanic love

happy again"

"my

me

which

make me Second, in turn

is

most important valuable property, or y's property "can restore me to happiness" always outweighs v's defects. Third, even though this erosic love for y will be exclusive and constant (only y has, and will alwavs have, the in y's

properrv' "can restore x to happiness"), Aristophanic love introduces another

problem: egocentricity. Aristophanic love

is

exclusive, constant,

and reciprocal

Aristophnnic Love

81

because x and y desperately need each other to heal their wounds. X wants to join with y because that union will benefit x. Surelv, when x and y reunite, y

just

is

to

made happy bv being healed, but x does not join with v precisch' in order make y happy. Y, not y's happiness, is necessan' for x's happiness. And v's

also

happiness

is

produced automatically, without

doing annhing

intentionally) to

promote

of the dual benefits derived bv tvvo

result

doing anything (and vsithout

x's

Aristophanic reciprocit^'

it.

self-interested parties

together by circumstances.^ And, fourth, even though x does not love

order properties, Aristophanic love in

anv robust sense.

reestablished

X

still

but desires the union

y,

wants to be again a

x

\''s

first-

does not involve "love for the person"

does not desire

whole of which

the

is

who are forced

itself,

the

part; x loves v only

qua

What I earlier said was ironic is the whole person but only y the half, as the other piece with X comprises the whole circle- person that x wants to reestablish.

contributor to what x ultimately wants. truth: X does not love y the

that

3.

THE FIRST GENERATION

Reading the myth, we might conclude that the halves luck\' if they

encounter each other and

the y

who

half?

"The encounter

is x's

Saxonhouse;

it

rejoin.

other half and that x ioiows, on meeting

"is

and v

x

y, that

v

is x's

we may spend our whole lives Nussbaum also attributes the encounter's happen-

lover's "other half

somewhere, but

is

it is

"mysterious

still

if at all."

hard to see what reason and

it is

planning can do to make that half turn up." Further, even half,

other

not predetermined and

ing to "luck"; love "comes to the cut-up creatures bv sheer chance,

other

be

our true mate occurs bv chance," writes Arlene

\\'ith

searching in vain."^ Martha

The

will

What guarantees that x will meet

how you come

to

if one

know

encounters his

that."^^

But exen

though Aristophanes does speak of the "good fortune" of finding one's other half and hints that the two halves recognize each other merely by an "o\erwhelming" feeling (I92b, c), Aristophanic love is not a rare or luck\' event radically contingent First,

on time and

world and must be found? immediately

after fission

If x

and y are halves of a circle-person

they will be

Aristophanes never says that

afi:er

dust into the wind. Second, even fission

place.

whv agree with Nussbaum that x's other half is "somewhere" in the sitting,

fission if

Zeus dispersed the halves

and know (unmvsteriouslv) they have done

will so.

like twins;

as if tossing

probably find their other half

At the

from the same circle-person thev have

resemble each other

by Zeus,

the hah'es are immediately scattered after

and must search for each other, they

originate

split

or standing, next to each other.

ver\' least,

certain traits in

because they

common and

Aristophanes even says (190a) that

the\'

have

Aristophanic Love

82

"identical faces." (Hence, x has another reason to find y's properties beautiful: in a sense

\'

simph' another

is

x,

and

loving y

x's

is

a t\'pc

of narcissistic

self-

The main point, however, is that the tuo halves knew each other intiwhen thev existed as the circle-person xy; x and y know each other by acquaintance and therefore should, when they later meet, recognize each other on the spot. I do not mean this mctaphoricallv, as if to suggest that thev will love.)

matelv

recognize each other bv haxing afeelirig that the person

Their recognizing each other

Mavbe

is

a result

the halves of a circle-person that

coming

trouble

together,

Aristophanic love

rarelv

is

of remembering

up when

cut

is

is

consummated. To think otherwise

plications into the myth that have

little

textual support.

knowledge.

earlier

it is

we should not conclude

but

their other half

young

have

will

that in general is

to insert

com-

^ ^

Let us not forget the sequel to Zeus' splitting the circle-people: he then created sexual intercourse as a

mechanism both

for physically uniting the

severed halves and (in halves originating from androgy^nes) for the reproduction of the species (191c, d).

engaged

in

bv

half- persons

The humans

of the

first

resulting

from sexual intercourse

generation were not at any time

circle-

people; thev were, like their parents, onlv half-persons. But these second-

generation half-persons are different: thev are half-persons by their nature,

born

as "halves."

Thev

are half-persons onlv in form.

severed from another part, they have no "other halP

Never having been

at all,

and hence they

are

not genuine half-persons.^-^ (Aristophanes never suggests that the genuine half-person nature of first-generation halves

second generation or that

somehow mvth

thev

still

e\'en

biologicallv transmitted to the

is

though thev did not originate

have other halves.

Nor

is

"Each of these halxes

is

and

.

.

.

.

.

the parts

do not meet nor

fractures. In this case the

again to hunt for

is

as

inaccurate:

continually searching through the whole species to find

was broken from it; [taking] for their half what

the other half, which .

whole,

progeny of first-generation heterosexual halves are born

that the

wholes that Zeus cuts into two.)^^ Thus, Hume's interpretation

mistaken in

in a

there any hint in Aristophanes'

union

is

.

.

.

[in]

it

often

happens, that they are

no way corresponds

join in with each other, as

soon dissolved, and each part

lost half "^* If we are talking

to them;

is

usual in

is

set loose

about first-generation

half-

persons, mistakes as to the identity of one's other half are not likelv (given

what

I

said above);

its

and

if

we

are talking about second-generation "halP- persons,

such mistakes are not possible, since no one in

this

generation has an other half

to begin with. Similarly, to claim that lo\'e will be a lucky or rare event for

second-generation Aristophanic humans because fmding one's other

half,

and

knowing that one has found it, are difficult is to overlook that these "halP'persons do not have any other halves that it would be difficult for them to find.

A ris top hart ic Love

83

who ha\ c no other hal\ cs might them or realize they do not. If they are aware of not having other halves, thev will not embark on nccessarilv unsuccessful searches. On the other hand, if they believe they do ha\'e other halves, thev will surely have difficulty knowing they have encountered what does not exist and ma\' wander throughout the world in a perpetual search for it. Hence, consumSecond- and later-generation humans

either falsely belie\'c they have

mation of lo\e might

\er\'

well be rare, although

But the

to speak of ""mistakes."

fact that

it is still

Aristophanes

is

conccptuallv incorrect initiating his audience

into the secret of love implies that contemporary "halP-persons

know

humans were

that

later-generation persons

clude that

originallv circle-people.

know

them

also applies to

it

the

stor\',

is

More

do not even

to the point: even

if

to suppose that the\' incorrecth' con-

farfetched.

Why should

they believe that

thev have (and are) genuine other halves, just because there had been one

generation

like that;

do not conclude from apes. I

4.

and

that

is it

not plain to them that thev are full-born

as halves?

was parented by apes because humans long ago came

I

LATER GENERATIONS

A plausible reading of Plato's Aristophanes must keep separate his claims (or their implications) about the

first

generation and those about subsequent

generations. Indeed, because Aristophanes

about their

loves,

our task

is

to

is

speaking to his contemporaries

make sense of his account of love

to post- first-generation "half-persons. In doing so,

it is

usefijl

as

it

pertains

to reconstruct

Aristophanes' account of first-generation love as a set of five claims:

and y were severed from the original xy whole;

a.

X

b.

y has the property "x's other half";

c.

y

is x's

ideal

mate

d. X desires to join

(that

with

y;

is,

the one and onlv person for x);

and

y makes x happy.

e.

For first-generation half-persons, claims explain

(c), (d),

and

(e).

But when claims

generation "halP'-persons, that which longer available.

(a)

(a)

and and

(b) entail

(b) are

ties (c), (d),

and

each other and

dropped (e)

no

(c), (d),

or

emphasized. First, if

tion

is

We are thus able to fashion three different accounts of later-

generation love from Aristophanes' mvth, depending on whether (e) is

for later-

together

we were

to continue talking about other halves for later-genera-

humans who do not

elliptical for the

actually have other halves, such talk could only be

doctrine that one absolutely right person exists for each of us.

Aristophanic Love

84

This "ideal mate" theory drops claim

(a)

but retains claim

that only

(c),

one

our perfect partner. ^^ Consider two strategies for finding love, both of which illustrate the chanciness of love if (c) is true. In the first, one patiendy person

is

waits for the right person to appear, preparing oneself for that

occasion by

One

tionships.

momentous

educating oneself, remaining chaste, forsaking superficial rela-

by deliberately not searching, beheving love

passivelv searches

happen without prodding. In the second, one actively searches by forming many relationships, and perhaps by engaging in promiscuous sexual activity, until one finallv fmds the ideal. Both strategies are unreliable. The one who

will

knows

waits never

not waited for

knows

she has waited long enough; the next person

if

— ma\' be the

that the ideal

is

ideal.

— the one

The one who examines and examines never

not the next unexamined person. The problem

not

is

"right.

"^*^

person having the best

set

exactlv the methodology' but the assumption that only one person

is

In this case, love will be a rare or lucky event. Nevertheless,

of properties, then

if the ideal is

understood

as the

a perpetual waiting or search almost necessarily follows, for

outside the circle of one's acquaintances there likely

who

ideal,

is

a person, closer to the

has better properties. If the ideal mate theorv' were construed,

instead, as falling within the agape tradition (in

which case "ideal" has no

connection with superlative properties), then neither waiting nor searching

makes

cannot be identified by properties, then

sense. Since the ideal person

Nussbaum

said about Aristophanic first-generation love) "it

what reason and planning can do to make mate theon^

is

[the ideal] turn up."

demands

ideal,

are never

fiilly satisfiable.

and conduct her love

that Aristophanes'

cause she as in

is

mvth

since

life

accordingly? Perhaps because she believes

applies per force to later-generation

humans or

be-

entranced bv some other metaphysical delusion (for example, x and

Schopenhauer

Regardless,

I

find

— experience

no reason

for later-generation

a

unique animal magnetism for each

Second, (a) is

we can,

to think that (c)

humans.

generations, and that

Whv

much room,

Because the next person might be the

other and only each other, which mechanism

when

if the ideal

much if anv exclusivit\' or constancy,' is secured. The eros tradition, of is under no compulsion to embrace claim (c). And why would anyone

believe (c)

—

But

not

course,

V

(as

hard to see

construed erosicallv, the reason and planning involved in wait-

ing and searching have lots of room to operate, indeed too their

is

when

He knows

(a) is

is

dropped

difficult,

it

Aristophanes' account of love

(c) is

dropped

(a) for later

untenable.

Whereas finding support for

claim (d) mav be defensible without

does x want to merge with y? ("This

everybody would regard

the product of evolution).

that he has

instead, retain claim (d).

abandoned

is

is

is

(c)

(a).

what e\'crybody wants, and of the desire which he had

as the precise expression

85

Aristophanic Love

long

[192c].)

felt"

Even though having

sufficient for a first-generation x to feel

been separated from y is incomplete and unhappy, or to judge actually

himself deficient, and hence sufficient for his desire to merge, that motivating

judgment could

feeling or

arise in a latcr-gcncration x in

some other way.

first-generation half-persons feel incomplete because they really are

Genuine

incomplete; later-generation "halP'-persons, not being halves of a whole, must feel deficient for

some other

suggests that "nature has

which bring deficient

—

as

about that

it

in

.

reason,

if

they

feel deficient at all.

implanted certain impressions

.

at a certain

forming only one half of

person of the opposite

merge

.

age and time a

Perhaps x

scx."^''

we

Descartes

in the brain

regard ourselves as

whole, whose other half must be a feels deficient

and hence desires to

order to overcome this unpleasant feeling, because x notices the

anatomical or psychological differences between himself or herself and persons

of the other sex (penis- or vagina-envy?) or because sexual

desire,

cannot quiet without the cooperation of another person, makes x the captain of his

own

Or

ship.^^

full

measure of arms,

x

than

perhaps in virtue of being born "halP-

persons in form, later generations are "permanently incomplete" the original

which

feel less

legs, genitals.

in

not having

^'^

The first explanation (we want to merge with others because we feel deficient upon noticing sexual differences) does not explain what was obvious to Aristophanes that some males desire to merge with males and some females with females. ^o The second explanation (the experience of sexual

—

desire

makes us

engage

in sex,

feel deficient)

which

is

tent with the spiritual nature

(191c, d).

The

reduces the desire to merge to the desire to

not onlv phenomenallv questionable but also inconsis-

of the union sought by Aristophanic lovers

third explanation

(we arc deficient

in

form and therefore

feel

might seem to be what Aristophanes claims about later-generation humans. But even though this deficiencv can account for the desire of first-

deficient)

generation half-persons to merge,

it

docs not work for

later generations.

A

human, given his nature, is complete; or he is as complete as he could be, for he has no more complete state to which he could aspire. By contrast, a first-generation human, given his nature, is incomplete; or he is not as complete as he could be, for he does have a more complete state to which he later-generation

can aspire.

Not

originating from a larger whole, later generation "halP'-per-

sons are alrcadv whole. (The notion that Socrates, later in the Symposium, takes

up and improves the

"desire as lack" view of love

therefore be qualified. If he takes first-generation love, not

it

from Aristophanes must

from Aristophanes, it is from the account of

from the account of later-generation

love.)

Theorists of a liberal bent might claim either that people by and large

not judge themselves deficient

do

— and hence desire to merge with others for

Aristophanic Love

86

other,

more

cultural artifact

who

reasons

f>ositive

member of the

(as a

— or that

if

people do

feel deficient, this is a

having no essential connection with love. Yet Erich

expected to take such a stance, contends that "the awareness of rateness"

a timeless truth, "the

is

of this "separateness"

is

Fromm,

Frankfurt School in his early days) might have been .

.

.

sepa-

problem of human existence." The experience

humans can

"the source of all anxiet\%" and

"leave the

prison of [their] aloneness" only "in the achievement of interpersonal union,

of fiision with another person, in /ow."^^ Theodor Reik develops this psychoanalnic explanation: "We have discovered some strange things concerning the origin of love: the preliminary state of discontent

.

tension resulting therefrom, the attempts to remove

person

in lo\'e the distress.

but

is

.

.

.

is

with oneself, the inner

.

it

or ease

it.

.

that our deficienc\^

search

.

.

.

.

possible,

Robert N. Bellah and

his colleagues

who

search for

who is going to stop making them feel alone," thev write that "this desire

[Their]

sustaining.

who claim

Reik and Fromm,

povert}'."-^^ In contrast to

makes love

cannot succeed because

.

fell

not in an enviable psychical condition but in emotional

claim that deficienc\' prevents love. Lighdy chastising people the "person

Before he

[L]ove does not spring from abundance and richness of the ego,

way out of

a

.

for

it

comes from

relatedness

a self that

a

really

is

is

not

full

reflection

completeness."-^^ Bellah concludes that "before one can love others, learn to love one's self."^"* In a sense,

and

self-

of

one must be "whole" to love others

contrast to Aristophanes' claim that wholes, that

is,

circle-people,

in-

one must (in

do not love

anyone). Defenders of the agape tradition would reply to Bellah with their

own

platitude: "Self-love

is

man's natural condition," not something to be

nurtured in order to attain the

vanquished in developing that

ability.^^

Experimental social psvchologists are can explain

love.^*^

merge with y vicariously.

2 '^

herself with y

backhanded

in

but something to be

abilitv to love others

In the meantime, there

order to share in

y's

still

is

debating whether deficiency

another

possibility':

x wants to

admirable properties, even

Although some admiration might

result

from

x's

if

only

comparing

and judging herself not to measure up, admiration need not be

criticism

of the

within the eros tradition,

self

or a sign of a defect in one's ego. Thinking

we could say that \''s properties

are highly valued

by

or attractive to x and that x desires that these properties be her own; to achieve this feat, x joins herself to

On

y by conversing with

y,

sleeping with y, emulating

y.

merge may be consistent with the agape tradition. In a nonideal case of second-view love, x has such low self-esteem that X needs the companionship and support of y; there is nothing special about y, beyond the fact that y is a human being, that figures into x's desire to the other hand, the desire to

spend her

life

with y.^^ If Aristophanes' account of later-generation love

in-

— Aristophanic Lore

\'ol\'es falls

87

the desire to merge, then, this

within the

interpretation of the desire to

no longer

feels deficient

is

itself indicate

whether

it

merge imph' that loxc might not be constant.

If x

(perhaps because y has supplied x with the support x

needed) or no longer admires this desire

would not by

or second view of personal love. Both the erosic and agapic

first

y,

then x will no longer desire to merge.

no longer

necessan' for love, x will

And

if

love.

Third, recall that for genuine, first-generation half-persons, an object's

"my

having the property condition

other half

is

necessar\' for x to lo\'c

anvone

at

all.

If

retained, then later-generation "half- persons will love

no no other halves. Lx)ve is impossible for later-generation humans, since they have no suitable objects, and therefore the onh' thing left for humans is sex. Sexual activity' becomes a substitute merging that takes the place of the merging of love.^^ There is some support for this reading of Aristophanes. At 191d, Aristophanes savs that evervonc, including later-generation humans, carries on a perpetual search for his other half; but whv this

is

one, since they have

"perpetual," unless the search ately follows this

necessarily

is

And Aristophanes immedimen and women.

ftitile?

with descriptions of sexually promiscuous

Nevertheless, what Aristophanes says at 193c pertains directlv to

generation humans: impossible,

"it

if the ideal is

follows that

it is

to join with a

best for us to

literal

come

circumstances allow; and the wa\' to do that congenial object for our affections."

What

is

other

half,

as near to

it

later-

but doing so as

to find a sympathetic

Aristophanes

doing

is

is

our present

in

and

193c

is

dropping the assumption, for later-generation humans ("our present circumstances"), that

propert\' y

"my

other half or "can restore

must have

for x to love y or

me

anvone

to

my

Aristophanes' remark about first-generation half-persons:

ber of a pair died and the other was

another partner" ( 191b).

X

is

is

a

to note

"When one mem-

the latter sought after and embraced

What Aristophanes does not sav here is revealing. He

does not say that because later-generation

left,

earlier state"

else. It is crucial

x's

other half has died

— and therefore

x, just like

humans, has no actual other half (that is, no longer has one)

cut off forever from love, must replace love with sex, or cannot achieve

happiness. Rather, he allows that x will find another beloved, presumablv one

who

is

"svmpathetic and congenial" and

happiness x had with his actual other later generations, then,

is

half.

captured bv claim

not be able to find the nonexistent person

who

can bring x as close to the

The

core of Aristophanic love for

(e).

Since a later-generation x will

who has the

propertN' "the onlv

one

me to my original condition of happiness," x does best to who has the property "can make me as happy as anyone else bring me as close to happiness as realistically possible."

capable of restoring

look for a person

could" or "can

Aristophanes

is

not saying, however, that later-generation humans

settle

Aristophcinic Love

88

for such a person

other half with

and for that

"lesser" degree

whom they could,

sav that later generations

must

to imply that they could

do

by comparison, find perfect happiness.

settle for

first-generation

To

something other than an actual half is

better than that.

between a later-generation x

difference

of happiness; they have no actual

But they cannot. There

is still

a

who has never had an other half, and a

human whose other half has died. The latter must settle for less

than perfect happiness because she had her ideal mate, and no one else can totally replace

ideal mates,

him

(see chap. 13). Later-generation

cannot be thought of

nature, the best they can

do

as settling for

humans, never having had second

fmd some happiness with

is

best.

a

Given

their

sympathetic and

we abandon the assumption that x will love property "my other half," the exclusivity, constan-

congenial mate. Note that once

onh' someone c\%

who has the

and reciprocity of love are no longer secured. Love

any of these things (but not because sexual desire

will

not necessarily be

now looms larger than love).

Indeed, Aristophanic later-generation love looks quite mundane, not like

something

5.

as esoteric as

implied by his myth.

MATCHING THE LOVER'S NATURE

Aristophanes advises a later-generation

and congenial object for

mind

[his] affections"

to oneself" (Groden), or a person

human

to "find a sympathetic

(Hamilton), a beloved

"who matches

"who is of like

his nature" (Larson).

These descriptions of suitable beloveds are not equivalent. "Like mind" suggests that one's beloved will be

ment, and

someone

interests (perhaps because

same circle-person, were

similar to oneself in beliefs, tempera-

genuine half-persons, coming from the

similar ).^° If this

is

Aristophanes' point, his model of

may be a predecessor of Aristotle's view that friendship occurs between good men of similar character (although Aristophanic love, unlike Aristotelian aristocratic friendship, is democratic). Or perhaps Aristophanes is claiming that some type of equality (see 1 1.5) is essential for love.^^ The term matches is ambiguous; it might mean "similar to," but it also suggests a beloved who loN'e

completes the nature of the lover (perhaps because genuine

more

like

phanes

is

half- persons

were

yin-yang complements than replicas of each other). If so, Aristo-

asserting that "opposites attract," rather than "birds of a feather flock

together," and his thesis confirms Pausanias' ideal

— that of love between an

man and a boy. But "matches" might be tautological: y matches the nature of x when y is a fitting or appropriate object for x's affections. For

older

similar reasons, to say that one's beloxed should be "sympathetic

genial"

is

and con-

not very helpful. Other than telling us to find someone with

whom

Aristophanic Love

89

u c can be happy, Aristophanes apparently provides

little

guidance for

select-

ing a beloved.^-

makes

If "x loves y because y

x happ\'^'

is

all

that his account of love

amounts to, whv does Aristophanes meticulouslv lay out the prefaton*' material about the circle-people? Consider Aristophanes' claim

(at

192e) that we, or his

comrades, desire to merge with our beloveds because "this was our primitive condition

when we were wholes." This must be reinterpreted as sa\'ing that a human can attain happiness b\' joining with a person who, by

later-generation

matching her particular nature, could

And Aristophanes seems to be other halves even

ha\'e

been her other half ?/she had one.

to suggest that our beloveds

though thev couldn't

myth about "our" distant origin as some signs as to what now counts as

now will

at least

actuallv be other hahes.

appear

Thus

the

circle- people

might be meant to give us

a sympathetic

and congenial mate. This

Aristophanes' unromantic message: we do not have other hahes or

is

ideal mates,

we often feel and behave as if we do. If we belicxe that we we only create problems for ourselves. And if we recognize

despite the fact that

have ideal mates, that

we

don't have them (bv listening

difference

between

first-

Now

ing happiness an\^vav.

8).

first

the

myth and noticing

whom one

can be happy; for later-generation

generation, have freedom in selecting a belo\ed (see

But later-generation humans have no guarantee that they

that

it

many accidents, manv surprising coincidences

(and perhaps

Image which, out of a thousand, suits my writes Roland Barthes.'^'' "Herein a great enigma, to which I shall

efforts), for

desire,"

n.

will find love or

out to be wonderful.

will turn

"It has taken

manv

the

find-

"reason and planning" do plav a role in lo\e, in

seeking a congenial mate with

humans, unlike the

carefull)- to

and later-generation humans), we can go about

me

never possess the key:

to find the

Why

is it

that

I

desire So-and-so?" Aristophanes gives

Barthes the kev to the puzzle. Indeed, Aristophanes promises to answer, with

one bold,

unif\'ing principle, a

whole slew of questions: why anyone

desires

why x why x lo\'es the kind of person y is (that is, x's sexual-object preference) whv x feels joy when encountering y (the spurt of happiness upon reuniting); why x believes that y is die only person for x (they are two halves of the same whole); why x does not consciously account another person

at all (ever)'

loves y in particular (y

is x's

person used to be tied to someone

other half)

else);

;

;

for loving v in ordinar\' terms (for example,

by mentioning y's properties that x

finds valuable). In retrospect, however, Aristophanes cannot explain these

things, for there

is

no metaphysical or

half-person nature of the

first

biological transmission of the genuine

generation to later generations. In response to

the question, "Is love exclusive, constant, and reciprocal?," Aristophanes can

90

Aristophanic Love

answer

"\cs, because lovers are

for the

first

be.''

When

would be

two halves of the same whole"

generation. For later generations later-generation love

is

all

exclusive, constant,

.\ristophanes' explanation?

X and

y

— although only

Aristophanes can say

is

"may-

and reciprocal, what

make each other

sufficientlv

happw In the other cases thev do not. This truism is not \er\' illuminating: some loves are exclusive and constant because thev work out well; other loves are not because they do not work out well. Yet an intuitivelv acceptable solution to Gellner's paradox builds on claim (e). To this solution we now turn.

CHAPTER6 The woman her

own

will

.

.

mind

is

Satisfaction of Desire

trv to believe herself indispensible

.

value from that.

scrupulous

The

Her

bound

joy

is

to serve him.

.

.

.

.

.

and she derives

.

[But] a

to ask herself: does he really need

he not have an equally personal feeling for someone

else in

woman

me?

.

.

.

with a

would

[mv] place?

— Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex

THE MISSING LINK

1.

From several directions, we have arrived at a commonsensical solution to Gellner's paradox.

but not

I

earlier discussed

when both have

z,

Newton- Smith's proposal

that x loves v

the attractive S, in virtue of v's historical propert\'

We

now

more

"what V has done

for x" (3.4).

specifically in light

of Aristophanes' account of love for later-generation hu-

can

interpret this property'

mans: X loves V because y makes x happy. I also argued that v's coming first cannot, bv itself, explain why x loves y but not z when both have S; some mediating factor must allow time to make a difference (4.2). Aristophanes' claim

(e) supplies

A modification of

the connection: x loves the earlier-encoun-

tered V rather than the latecomer z because y already satisfies fulfills x's

needs, thereby

making

This solution to Gellner's paradox

model,

x's

desires or

x happy. (call it

the

D-S

solution, or the

D-S

can be understood in two logicallv distinct

after "desire-satisfaction")

We could sav, first, that x loves y but not z, when both have S, because y has the additional property' "makes x happv" that z does not have. In this case, x

ways.

loves y exclusively

both S and T), S and T)

is

(ii)

when

x loves y in virtue of T, that is, "makes x happy" (or only y has T (or both S and T), and (iii) having T (or both (i)

necessar)' for x to lo\'c

this version

of the D-S solution

anyone is

propert\' that z lacks. In the second

v,

who

undergoes various changes countering

V,

in

all.

is

The

logically central feature

a propcrt)'

T

that

has S, and encountering

having had his desires

makes v unique. Bez,

who

satisfied.

who has S, and later encountering z who has S

of the "same situation," and there

of

construed as having a valuable

way of understanding the D-S solution, no

mention must be made of y's having tween encountering

at

that y

is

no expectation

is

also has S, x

Hence,

x's

en-

not a repetition

that S in z should have the

91

Satisfaction of Desire

The

92

same

effect

on

x.

(If I

have a headache and take an aspirin,

take another qualitatively indistinguishable aspirin;

and

I

have no reason to

if I

do

take

it,

the

Both y and z ha\'e the relevant first-order properties in virtue of which x loves y, but once these properties in y have had time to do their work on x, by satisfying x's desires and making x happy, there is aspirin will not have

any

effect.)

no room for those

properties in z to be effective.

since x's lo\'e for v

is

The D-S

partially subject-centric

solution claims that

ys

Love

and

in this case

is still

erosic,

partially object-centric (1.3).

satisfying x's desires or fulfilling x's

an additional reason that x has for loving y (or is alone sufficient); that unless x's desires and needs are satisfied by a beloved, x will not lo\'e anyone;

needs

is

and that x exclusivelv loves y because y in particular has the abilit}' to satisfy x's desires (perhaps this is what it means for y to "match" x's nature). Consider an analog)'.

Suppose that x needs an automobile or

desires to

around, looking for automobiles having an S suitable to

among the candidates x makes

The

a selection.

encounters an automobile that also possesses

no

effect

on

x; x's desires

have already been

own one. X shops

x's

needs, and from

fact that at a later

S, e\'en

time x

S to a higher degree, has

satisfied,

and

are

still

being

satis-

by the automobile x has purchased. Even though this later-encountered auto could have satisfied x's desires and might have been purchased had x encountered it first, no unsatisfied desires remain in x that S in this auto can fied,

satisf\';

x has changed, and a

new appearance of S

"automobile" with "beloved," what paradox.

X need not discount S

imagine that S makes therefore, ther, the

is

that

it

his

makes

x's

is

the

no effect. If we replace D-S solution to Gellner's

has

in z, refuse to treat love-reasons as general, or

beloved unique.

One

virtue of the

D-S

solution,

exclusive love for y look perfectly rational. Fur-

D-S model of love can

ties valuable: y's

results

explain

why x finds certain first-order proper-

properties that x xalues are those that enable y to

fulfill x's

needs.

2.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE

The D-S

MODEL

solution, however, does not succeed in

showing

that erosic

love will be, or even tends to be, exclusive. Suppose that our automobile

consumer has strong needs for the advantages and comforts provided by automobiles. Then, even though the consumer cannot afford another auto, she might feel tempted to make a second purchase. In cases of extremely strong and diverse needs

and

desires, the

consumer might buy a second car (one having if doing so means postponing the

the S of the original, or one having T), even

pavment of other debts. The D-S model does both y and

z.

not, therefore, rule out x's lo\'ing

If x's desires that are satisfiable

by persons

who

have S are

The

93

Satisfaction of Desire

powerful, X might require a double dose of S and love two people

Or

if x's desires are dixerse,

S

in y will satish'

who have it.

T

some of them while

in z will

Thus, the D-S model countenances the popular justification (or excuse) appealed to by nonexclusive lovers: "No one person can completclv satisf}'

others.

my

satisfy all

needs." (Exclusi\'e lovers must be those ha\'ing comparatively

weak and few powerful X

might

desires, or

as to make x

needs that are easy to

insatiable, there will

love. In lo\'ing nonexclusively, x

fulfill.)

If x's desires are so

be no limit on the number of people

may

be acting rationally insofar as x

applies his lo\'e-reasons perfectly general!)', yet x ma\' also be deviously cal-

how many loves he can maintain at once without a net decrease in Or suppose that x's specific need one that can be satisfied

culating

—

desire-satisfaction.

only by a large number of people nonexclusive lover others have in

is

—

is

the need to be loved (see 8.3). This

driven by this one need; the S that y and z and

all

the

common is simply the ability and willingness to provide x with

the love x needs.

To model

the extent that the nonexclusive lover

as

someone who

is

is

D-S model of the multiple lover. The conceptualized by the

strongly needful or difficult to satisfy, the

provides a too-narrow and unflattering picture consumer might buy three autos mostly because she is wealthy; the limit placed on the number purchased may be a function of the consumer's capacirs' to buv and have less to do with the satisfaction of urgent needs. By analogy, the multiple lover may be someone having a large capacit\' to lo\'e others. (G3nsider the

mother and

nonexclusively.)

whose

husband and father, who manages to love no room in the D-S model for the multiple lover

wife, or the

But there

relationships are

is

due to

generosit\'

and not to her needs being

satisfied.

This generous multiple lover does not necessarily love nonexclusiveh' because

doing so satisfies desires or needs she has just because her capacity to love

—

demands

have to view the generous multiple loNcr

who

buys

selects the

se\'eral

as if she

were loving nonexclusi\'cly

satisfaction or an outlet. as lo\'ing agapicallv.

automobiles does not buy

c\'er}'

Nor do we

The consumer

auto axailable, and she

ones she does buy on the basis of their particular properties. This

consumer buys

several automobiles not because she needs

them but because

she likes or admires them for their characteristics. By analog)', a multiple erosic lover need not select beloveds purely

and needs.

It is

needs y because x loving y

is

Io\'es

grounded

The D-S model the

t\'pical

item,

on the

basis

of the

satisfaction

of desires

not logically incompatible with the eros tradition to say that x

consumer

in

\',

rather than x loves v because x needs v, as long as x's

other properties of y.

has similar problems with the constancy of love. First, attitude

worn out or broken,

toward

will

a

purchased item

is

that eventually the

haxe to be replaced. Therefore, unless the D-S

)

94

The

Satisfaction of Desire

model draws the durable good start

analog)' only

like a

between selecting

a

beloved and purchasing a

house, the model entails that the lover's attitude

of the lo\c relationship

is

that the lo\'c will not endure.

The

at

the verv

lover has

no

intention that their love be constant; the lover might e\'cn intend that the

might change, in which case x enough (or x is fortunate enough? Or y may change in such a wav that the new

relationship not be constant. Second, x's desires will

no longer love \

to be able to

— unless y

fortunate

is

new desires.

satisfs' x's

no longer satisfy' x's desires. Hence, the constancy of love is D-S model only under fairly restrictive conditions: either x and V remain the same (x's desires do not change, and v is alwavs able to satisfy' them) or x and y change in tandem (x's desires change, but y can accommodate). In the D-S model, whether x will love anyone at all depends on x's meeting someone who can satisfy x's desires. Even if that does not make love properties v has

secured by the

and v must remain the same or change

chancv', the fact that x

making

love chana' by

There Earlier

is

a third reason that love will

said that

I

once x meets v

noticing S in z will have

no

effect

encountering another auto with

an

effect

effect

on him. But

who

on

has S and has his desires satisfied,

x, in

S, after

the same wa\' that the consumer's

having purchased one, will not have

was too quick. (The second

that

on m\' headache, but

it

longing or regret. Similarly,

more

fullv

than

tandem makes

be inconstant in the D-S model.

aspirin

may have no

mav damage mv stomach.) The consumer might

not have a reason to buv the second auto, but

x's desires

in

constancy' chanq'.

its

x's

\''s,

it

can

still

have an effect on him:

meeting z, whose properties promise to will cause x at least to feel regret,

satisfy

and because

beloveds are in some ways easier to replace than large-investment consumer

goods,

x's

regret

may motivate him to abandon y and seek z as a beloved. (See Finally, many consumers who purchase an item

Woody Allen's "Manhattan.") because thev believe

them

it

as expected; the

stored in the

attic,

will

item

prove is

suffering

satisf\'ing

discover later that

it

does not satisfy'

not yvhat the consumer imagined he wanted.

It is

no better a fate than the y that x no longer loves for

the same reason.

This

t\'pe

of inconstancy'

is

entailed, in particular,

eros in the Symposium, although Plato does not view

lower

levels

it

bv

Plato's

as a

account of

problem. At the

of the ladder of love, the Platonic lover discovers that he

genuinely satisfied bv the love objects available

at

is

not

those levels (beautiful

bodies, even beautiful minds). Unsatisfied by these imperfect beauties that he

thought would be

satisf\'ing, his

love for

them wanes, and he begins

true satisfaction at the highest level of the Ascent

and Goodness themselves.^

Similarly,

to seek

where he can possess Beautv

Augustine (see 1.6) discovered that he

The

95

Satisfaction of Desire

could not be satisfied with the worldly items he believed he wanted and that

God could make him happy; this is what he had been seeking all along, unbeknownst to him.^ But only accounts of love incorporating a Grand Vision (moNcmcnt toward God or the Forms, for example) see it as a.^ood thing that

only

earthly loves are short-lived because unsatisfying. If

we

dispense with the

highest level of Plato's Ascent, inconstancy in personal love, due to discovering that

one

is

not

which one hoped would be

satisfied b\' that

blessing but a curse.

The D-S model

us

gi\'es

satisf\'ing, is

no reason to think

not a

that incons-

And the D-S model does not include anv Forms or Augustine's God as a rationale that could make this

tancy of this sort will be unlikely. device like Plato's

consequence the

even

at least palatable

D-S model could embrace

a

if

not the redemption of the model.

Grand Vision

with Luther, a doctrine of original sin according to which selfish

or corrupt.^

Then

necessarilv

Now,

to serve this purpose: assume,

humans must

love

human

D-S

st\'lc

nature

and

is

will

always be disappointed in their loves, since the corruption infects both lover

and beloved. In

fact,

would accomplish need not

presupposing the doctrine of psychological egoism

D-S model. But

the same thing for the

the eros tradition

assert this thesis.

Because love

may not be by its

nature or conceptually either exclusive or

D-S model does not secure the exclusivit\' and no powerful strike against it. As an account of personal love, however, the D-S model still leaves much to be desired; it seems not to have a firm grasp on why loves that are not exclusive or not constant (or are constant, the fact that the

constancy of love

is

exclusive or constant) are the

way

they

are.

And

it

seems plainly

beloved's possessing specificallv those properties that essarv for x to love y or to select v as a beloved.

valuable not because

x's

rub off on me,

want to share

in y's P,

hoping

it

will

it is

we might even

say

Reading Plato from

that ''the higher

form of eros

is

a perfectionist perspective, .

.

.

love of the 'better'

to complete itself through the highest values."^

more

nec-

might want to improve mvself for the sake of others or because

I

mv

properties

is

find v's properties

I might be attracted to y because P can make me a better person. mean that my ultimate goal is to satisfy a desire for self-improve-

ment, for duty.

X might

false that the

desires

needs are satisfied by them but because x enjoys these

properties or wants to share in thein. If I

This does not

satisfx' x's

— even admiration

for v in virtue

significant than the abilit)'

Or

self,

x's

the self that strives

admiration for

of those properties

of these properties to

y's

— might be

satish' x's desires.^ If x

admires and loves y for having S, x's admiration need not "reall\'" be satisfying some desires of x, nor must x be judged irrational if x assesses S as admirable rather than as need-fiilfilling.

96

The

Satisfaction of Desire

GIVING IN ORDER TO GET

3.

Russell

what he

Vannoy

calls ''erotic

is

quite candid about understanding love

—

love"

The owner of a new

.

.

.

consumer terms.

in

He

—

especially

writes:

car devotes endless hours to polishing

it

or

.

.

.

keeping

He does these things not out of any devotion to the car When the car begins to but onl\' because [of] the thrill and ego-fulfillment. require sacrifices that outweigh the benefits it gives, he trades it in. He has it

working condition.

in

.

"given" but onlv in order to "get".

.

.

.

.

.

This example of the car applies perfectly

Thev give in order to get and if they think thev aren't getting as hopefullv, more than thev arc giving, they trade the once-loved in on

to lo\'ers as well:

much as or, a new model.

is

of properties." ^^ This condition -

iji's

()>.

.

never irrational in sense (b); consider, again,

because v mistreats

is

(b) irrationalit\' for love,

lovable. Indeed, if x's believing that v

because v has P could be true and rational for

is

First,

never irrational in sense (b), that should not make us overlook the

does not follow that love violates Taylor's condition that

love

"tiillcr"

of other emotions. There are three points to make, however.

who claims that x's

find a set of wants

then this will put

which

a constraint

the beliefs concerning particular qualities in virtue of which a; can love v"

153; note

At

"t^'pically").

those that satisfy

on

for each x,

succumbs to

\\f

x's

we might

first

offer a desire-satisfaction account

of

the

suspect that Taylor

going to

is

that x finds valuable in v are

v|;'s

antecedent desires; hence antecedent desires place a

(see

Robinson, 6.5).

Pitcher's problem, that

constitutive of love

i|/:

and wants

embrace the D-S model, and

I

Or we might wonder whether

limit,

Tavlor

of failing to distinguish between wants But Ta\'lor

as causal effects.

as

does not

clearlv

think she can sidestep the constitutive-causal

effect distinction. If x loves y, says Taylor, x

wants to be with y and wants to

"Such wants allow us to impose constraints on a-'s beliefs that onlv those [beliefs about v's i|i] are now relevant which can explain his

benefit y (and so on). in

wants"

154).

(p.

Now,

if

these wants are constitutive of love, then

strained in the sense that x's belief that y has loves v.

If,

il is

what

[y]

in [y],

is.

is

loving

x's

Thus

One problem person

Kosman, show that it

person.-'''^

where are y's identity properties, x's love is both erosic and lo\'e for y

,

"as a person." X's loving v for

of

no

x's lo\'e

not a function of

is.

howe\'er, wants to improve our understanding of Platonic eros, to

does make

and

v's attractive properties,

I

is

still

means

that x

loving ^, but since v

is

is

identical to x's loving y: "If I love [v] because

should not be said to love something other than

to love [y] for

[] is

[y]

to love [y] for [him]self" (p. 64).

with the \'iew that either genuine love or love for the

loving in virtue of identit)' properties,

that

is

it

gets caught in a

dilemma: either x loves y for all y's identity properties 4>, or x loves y for some subset ^ of ; in either case, the view runs into trouble. Suppose that x loves y for

all y's

identit}' properties 4>.

y because y

y,

this

is

do you

x

love

Then

the view reduces to the claim that x loves

or x loves y for being v.

— and — hence would

that y is

is

is

X loves y simply because y is the person

singularly unilluminating.^^ Every'one

meV x might tr\' to answer,

be especially attractive." But because y

number of empt\' tautologies: attractive," "I love

the person he

is

ha\'e equal reason for loving ever\'one else. If v asks x,

you

(y)

"I find

because

I

"because vou have is

vou

love

is

and

identical to

^, x has

(v) attractive

because

you

(4>),"

part of v's identity.

if x

loves

But

it

say to y, "I love

you

for

of y.^'^^'

It is

your courage and charm, and

I

find

all

is

vou ($) the cost

of 4>, then x

seems

false to say

and equally

no contradiction I

"Whv

find 4) to

just uttered a

that if X loves y, then x does (or should) love ever^'thing about v, false that x loves ever)' identity propert)'

I

and so on. Such

of conflating the basis and the object of love. Further, turns out to love every defect that

,

for x to

even love your courage

and charm, but I dislike the way you characteristically become defensive when someone compliments your appearance." The alternative that x loves y for a subset of (say, some of the

—

attractive parts

of y's

the specific subset

identit)')

—

is

also inadequate.

Suppose that x loves y for

^ of y's identit\' properties; then if some other subset \ of

is

an intrinsic propertv.

122)

is

emotion toward y in virtue of \^s having P, (ii) ^s (iii) x's emotion ending for that reason

ends, and

emotion had not been love

an extrinsic propertv of

\';

otherwise

(y's

losing

it is

P

is

intrinsic.

an Rj reason), then P This

is

sureh' a novel

approach to distinguishing the essential from the incidental, but notice In

Newton-Smith's approach, we

and R2 reasons

in

rely

on

incidental properties (or to the distinction

Which end of

R^

between properties that can and

We thus have a t\'pical philosophical quand-

the string should

intuitions about the intrinsic intuitions about

cost.

order to give content to the distinction between essential and

those that cannot ground love). ar\':

its

intuitions ("our attitude") about

and the

Rj and R2 reasons?

we

pull to tighten the knot.^

extrinsic

It

more

Are our

(or less) reliable than

our

might be precisely this tangle that lends

232

Constancy

the views of those

crcdibilitA' to

who

den\' the distinctions

both between the

and the incidental and between Rj and R2 reasons

essential

proponents of the doctrine of strict constancy' and those

no time

that loN'c has

— namely, the

who defend the thesis

constraints.

AGAPIC CONSTANCY

7.

John McTaggart claimed that 'if love has once arisen, there is no reason ought to cease, because the belief has ceased which was its cause. could have resisted, and ought ought to yield. But love Admiration

whv

it

.

.

.

.

.

to ha\e resisted. "^^ If there are

.

.

.

.

no reasons wh)' lo\'e should end,

reason-dependent; for erosic personal love ends in response to

love cannot be x's belief that

y

become unattractive or that y has lost his attractive properties. But how can reason-independent, agapic personal love endure? Not because of anything has

about its object.

When McTaggart says that love resists changes in its object, he

that the lover resists changes in the object.

means

The "permanence" of neigh-

bor-lo\e "involves persistence in the face of obstacles.""**^

Of

course,

it

is

inadequate to sav that neighbor-love will be constant, despite the obstacles,

because "difficult does not imply impossible." So, will agapic personal love fare an\' better

depends on

which does not depend on

that [lo\'c] last] for

than erosic? The Ethics of the Fathers thinks so: "All love which thing passes away the love passes away; but

a material thing, if the

ever."^'' To

based on

a material thing will not pass

be more precise, the argument

its

a

non

sequitur.

object's properties

does not follow that constant as

its

the object changes.

From the fact that agapic personal love and it

will

not end merely because

of agapic personal

mean

your neighbour being

made

onlv then

is

vw'Qcn \o\c love,^

^

argu-

will

be only

it

as

agapic personal love will endure.

love.

fast.""*^

"When duty,

it

.

crucial to the constancy

.

.

—

The

love has

has

is

can take your neighbour from you, "No change who holds you fast it is your love which holds

not vour neighbour

constanth':

The

not based on

object changes,

Agapic personal love

will endure.

Kierkegaard recognizes that the lover's nature

it is

its

is

own basis.** True, God's love is unconditional and constant, by

virtue of His nature, but this does not

for

it is

not grounded in the beloved's

it is

much

remains unchanged however

qualities, is

away [but

erosic love, since

the beloxed's attractive properties, will pass away if those properties

pass awa\'; but agapic personal love, since

ment

is:

lover's nature

is

called

upon by

dut}' to love

undergone the transformation of the

won

continuity'.

.

.

.

[0]nly

when

it is

eternal

by

dut\' to love,

lo\e eternally secure. "^^ For Kierkegaard, the agapic order be-

and evaluation

(7.6) holds for

both neighbor-love and marital

so both are subject-centric. Thus Kierkegaard means that the "transfor-

233

Constancy

mation" of lo\c by duty also occurs

genuine personal love: "AlreadN'

in

and religious factors [conjugal lo\e] has

ethical

appears before

it, it is

not as

a stranger, a

dut\' in

shameless intruder,

in die

and when

it,

who

this

nevertheless

has such authorit\' that one dare not bv virtue of the mvsteriousness of love

show him

whom

No, duty comes

the door.

as

an old friend, an intimate, a confidant,

the lovers mutually recognize in the deepest secret of their love."^^

But the addition of "dut\'" to the reason-independence of agapic person-

make anv difference: love will be constant only if one's do one's duty is constant. ^^ Erosic love will change in response to

love could not

al

resolution to

changes

in the properties

of its object, but agapic personal love

lover varies in her will, determination, or ability to

There

is

little

reason to

belie\'e,

obey

a

will van' as the

commandment.^'*

then, that erosic personal love will be less

constant than agapic. But other comparisons are possible. If love's constancy a

matter of keeping a promise or following a

personal

being

lo\'e

to

source

the lover's nature, "if it

is

mvster\', unehcited b\' the object; "if

can do to create

of v's

effort to

continuity'

not exactly

cannot "be acquired, produced, controlled" bv

object's properties, its

is

Further, agapic personal love, not being a function of

v.

it."^^

it is

is

there,

not there,

it is .

.

.

its

or a

nothing

is

its

object.

like a blessing"

there

is

does agapic

achie\e loxe for the person.^ X's obe\'ing a moral law

faithfiil

Because

how

then

dut\',

[y]

No amount of improvement of the beloved, no amount

develop herself for the delight of x, can have anv

of x's agapic

love.

But

if

an erosic love ends

when

effect

on the

the belo\'ed loses

her attractiveness,

it

can also be maintained by the beloved's efforts to improve

herself This tactic

is

not guaranteed to succeed, but the beloved can

at least feel

some power o\'er her fate. And the beloved can understand wh\' x's love has gone, if it has gone; but since y's properties do not ground x's agapic personal love, and y lacks input into the course of x's love, y has no way to make

that she has

sense of x's either loving her or not loving her. that "a love

of

.

will

.

is

no

[erosic]

misleading, however, to say

lacerating insecurity."^*^ Agapic personal love

.

unable to pull up his love by

capacirv' to carr\' its

It is

grounds of which can be described

own

it

out

mav

its

own

who is

.

.

.

will

inconstant

be a source

if the lover's

bootstraps, and whether x has the

continually worn'

substantial insecurity': the y

is

But erosic love

y.

plagued by

is

loved for P vNorries about losing P,

about the existence of other people who have P, about x's continuing appreciation of P, and about

whv

x finds

P

valuable.

On

this score agapic

and erosic

personal love are equallv bad.

Kierkegaard does not appeal only to love's being a duty; he also changes the relationship

from

a

dvad to

a triad:

'The

relationship of the lover, the beloved, love

of

God

as the

love-relationship

— but love

Third cements the relationship:

is

"When

is

God."-''''

a triangular

The

addition

a relationship

is

only

234

Constancy

between two, one always has the upper hand But when there

God

required for

is

all t\'pcs

misunderstanding many

.

.

.

one person cannot do

are three,

.

.

.

by being able to break it. this."^^

And

.

.

.

the presence of

of love, says Kierkegaard: "Through a strange think they need God's help to love their neigh-

bour, the least lovable object, but, however, that they can get along best by

themselves in

.

.

erotic love

.

and friendship,

as

if,

alas,

God's intermingling

here were a disturbing and unfortunate factor. But no love

.

.

may

.

secularly

and merely humanly be deprived of the relationship to God."^^ The constancy of love

is

secured bv nonexclusive loving, or in an exclusive triad (9.6).

In the triad x-God-v, however, t\'

.

.

.

God

"not only becomes the third parit is

not the

God."*^^ Kierkegaard's

making

but essentiallv becomes the only beloved object, so that

husband

who

the wife's beloved, but

is

it is

God not onlv the Third but the only object of love seems odd; the rationale for the presence of the Third other. If the injection

is

no longer that it cements the love of x and y for each "first and foremost belong to God,"*^^ the

husband and wife

of God has

a different

be worried that the x-y love prevents

— quite opposite —

is

them from recognizing

their

need for

neighbor. Erotic love, says Kierkegaard, for God

Kierkegaard

may

is

God and from

the water to the

fire

loving their

that

is

the love

and neighbor. "^^ Even "the hearty twaddle of family life constitutes the

worst danger for not so opposed

Christianit}',

and not wild

lusts,

debaucher)^

.

.

.

They

are

to Christianity as this flat mediocrity^ this stuff)' reek, this

nearness to each other.

x and

rationale.

getting along too well, that their happiness

y, for their

God is required not in order to cement the nearness of God from their lives. The God into marriage, then, is that doing so may be the

''''^^

nearness threatens to exclude

rationale for injecting

only alternative to getting rid of marriage altogether. Marriage transformed into a triad in

which God

is

the only beloved

is

superior to a twaddle-marriage

without God, and perhaps also to Paul's marriageless

state in

which x and y

devote themselves only to God.*^*

But God's being the cementing Third

in the x-y relationship

and being

the only object of love are compatible, since part of what Kierkegaard means by

loving

God is loving the neighbor. Then in the x-y relationship, x's loving God

amounts to x's loving y with neighbor- love: your "wife shall first and foremost be vour neighbour. "*^^ The injection of neighbor-love into the x-y relationship achieves constancy bv protecting x and v from disappointment

eventually see their defects and faults with perfect

"nearness."

However,

clarit}', as

when

a result

they

of their

how constancy is achieved bv the Third, it is no obedience to the commandment to love is still the

if this is

more powerful than dut\'; factor on which constancy depends. Agapic personal

love, then,

is

no more

235

Constancy

constant than neighbor- love

itself.

what cements

the Third to cement x to y,

Kierkegaard hints relationship:

"When

To put it another way:

she thanks

God is

Third protects the x-y

God

able to

draw

is

secured

man she Thanking God

she removes the breath. "^'^

an essential part of the relationship; and the

as

spouses joyfully realize they do not have to depend merely on each

other.*^'' stifle

God

acknowledges

for lo\'e

human

from her that she

as the

for the beloved her love

against suffering; by the fact that she thanks loves just so far

God is required as

x to the Third?

God

another way

at

if

We can secularize this

autonomv and

insight: the intimacy' ("nearness")

individualitv'.

A

Third

of love can

required not only to cement x

is

and V together but also to keep x and y from getting too close. The delicate balance between interdependence and independence is orchestrated by something that situates x and v at exactly the right distance. Hence, a point

made about intimaa'

total

stroving individuality' clusivitv

total

and constancv

are again

opposed; that which tends to make love

exclusive, the sharing involved in intimacy,

undermines constancy

loN'crs is

(that

is,

love

itself).

each other, there

is

is

unstable, alwavs

rattle

that, if

mav not be much of

taken too

far,

of Woody Allen's

iro-

all

that

interest. "'^^

Freud said that the two most important things

dvad

that which,

"The

Bernard Williams, "reminds us

nies," says

we

sharing cannot be required on pain of de— that sharing threatens constancy. Ex— applies here:

if

is

interesting to

Perhaps

in life are lo\'e

this

is

why

and work. The

on the verge of exploding, and it needs a Third stability. The Third need not

(work, friends, separate vacations, hobbies) for

be inanimate or supernatural.

clusivity.*^^

But

it is

x-\'

dvad."*^

might be that

no panacea. The

stable, despite the wishful

bones

It

arrangement

Kierkegaardian

a person: the x-y-z triad

achieves triad

constancy

of mommy-baby-daddy

prepregnancy thinking of x and

And how

could be a

through

y,

is

nonex-

no more

than the bare-

could the x-y-z triad overcome the problems of

on God as the Third, Him is no easy trick, there may be no constancy

the separate x-y, y-z, and x-z dyads? If we cannot count since

cementing ourselves to

forthcoming from x and

The

theory'

y's

cementing themselves to

z.

of erosic love also makes room for

structural difference

a Third. Indeed, the

between erosic and agapic personal love can be stated

these terms. If x loves v in virtue of v's S, S

is

in

the Third that cements x to y in the

erosic triad x-S-y. Since v's properties are irrelevant for agapic personal love,

something

else (determination,

God

God) must be

the Third that cements x to y.

one object of love in the agapic triad x-God-y, in the erosic triad x-S-v S mav be an object of x's love (in addition to y). So if God as the object of love in the agapic triad is called upon to prevent x and y from getting Further,

if

is

236

Constancy

too close to each other,

we can construe x's loving S

as a

way for x to offset the x's focusing on

smothering closeness to y by the detachment made possible by

Hating P in z, rather than z X and z. Detachment is useful S.

autonomy.

herself,

is

an advantage;

in love for

its

own

it

places a wall

between

reason: to help x protect her

CHAPTER There

nothing sadder than to

is

serxing

Reciprocity

11

Him,

case lo\e

or, if

ser\'e a

master

must be strong because

it

I

could ne\er I

my

tell

died

the Io\c which

is

this

for this girl. It

.

.

.

reciprocated,

if

\'

is

relati\'ch' easily

also lo\'es

lo\'e is a special

Iris

smaller categorx', in

and

If X

defined:

x's

Of course, we must

reciprocal

at

some other time

love for y

at a

t2, their

love

y's

love

is

\'Lx,

and

\'

not reciprocal.

reciprocal, they have the

has ne\'er loved

is

is

erosic

Trivially, x

are love. Love, however,

and agapic personal

ha\ing the same emotion

lo\'e;

there

is

I v\'ill

comes

and y's love in

many

erosic love based

their ha\'ing personal lo\'e

other. In ''narrow" reciprocit\',

many

details

is

a

x.

y's ha\'ing

is

\'ari-

on the

the same

different things. In ''broad" reciprocity, x is

the

same emotion toward each

and erosic based on the mental. Hence, x and

and

y's

o^ any kind toward the

of their respectiNc loves are the

use "mutual" to refer to loves that are narrowly reciprocal, reser\-

ing "reciprocal" for loves

on which

there are

of the two emotions. All mutual

reciprocal lo\es are mutual.

claim that

is

x loves y

if

given time xLv but not vLx; but a nonrecipro-

which xLv but not

emotion can mean two

details

reciprocal, or

is

t\pe of nonreciprocal love. Nonreciprocal love

when both emotions

there

same.

Murdoch, The Black Prince

be more precise:

But what does having the same emotion mean?

physical,

the purit\\ of

lo\'e her.

ma\' have been reciprocal at an earlier time. Unrequited love

loN'e

other.

ipso facto

loving y and vs lo\'ing x at the same time. Unre-

x's

is

wider categor\', in which

eties:

x.

and y loves x only

onl\' at ti

Thus, reciprocal love

cated

is

was enough happiness to

DEFINING RECIPROCITY

Reciprocin'

quited

are

such a

did not immediately produce a pain

—

1.

wc

not that

satisfied. In

Francis de Sales, The Love of God

St.

proof of the immense power, that

felt

I

That

love.

is

stands alone, unsupported by an\' pleasure.

— of which

who knows

he knows, gives us no sign that he

if x

'

The

no

restrictions regarding the

loves, then, are reciprocal, but not

thesis that lo\'e

is

a reciprocal

emotion

is

all

the

has an emotion toward y, and y does not have the same (broadly

237

238

Reciprocity

emotion toward

concci\'ed)

x,

then neither

x's

necessan' condition for an emotion to be love has the same emotion toward psychologically able to love v

its

if

\'

nor

emotion

y's

that the object

is

subject.-^

The

does not

lo\'e x,

thesis

is

love: a

is

of the emotion

not that x

but that

in virtue

not

is

of the

concept or nature of love an emotion can be loxe only when reciprocated. Love not unilateral; either x and y love each other, or neither x nor y love each

is

other.

This thesis b\'

strange.

is

No other emotions

(except Aristotle's phiha) are

many

nature reciprocal: x can unilaterallv hate, admire, or resent y. Further,

varieties

do not

of love are not reciprocal:

God;

love

(b) x

(a)

God loves all humans, but some humans

may love chess,

the Beethoven Violin Concerto, or y's

(c) x may may love his or her young child, who does not yet have the ability to love anyone; (e) x may love a cat, and

and of course chess and

properties,

\^s

courage cannot reciprocate;

love an irreversibly comatose or dead y; (d) a parent

x's

love

(f) x's

is

not bogus just because a cat has a different kind of affective

neighbor- love for v

The response

is

love even

when y

hates

reciprocit\% or to love like the

love them, because (c) x's

(a)

we

piece-

God's love generates

God a human needs onlv to believe

Beethoven Violin Concerto or find courage

own sake;^

The

to this objection can be piecemeal or general.

meal response explains away each counterexample:

and

life;

x.

in

God;

attractive,

we may we cannot

(b)

but

cannot be concerned about inanimate things for their

loving a comatose or dead y

is

a limiting case

of a previously

reciprocal love, or this y (like chess) cannot be loved; (d) parental love

another limiting case, since

it

aims toward

reciprocity'; further, infants

exhibit a rudimentary love for their parents; (e) either x's is

onlv affection, or animals

love

— remember,

turned; and

(f)

(like infants) exhibit

may work

Clearly, the piecemeal response

The

emotion for animals

emotions close enough to

onlv the same emotion, broadly conceived, must be

neighbor-love

general response

is

is

like

is

might

re-

God's love to evoke reciprocity.

not compelling.

that personal love, in the neutral sense,

is

an

anomalous emotion. Hence, most of the counterexamples

are irrelevant to the

thesis that personal love conceptually requires reciprocity.

But this will not do.

Manv

at least briefly,

cases

reciprocal;

of reciprocal personal

it is

personal love

beginnings.

same time

unlikely that is

not

xLy and yLx begin simultaneously. The thesis that

One might handle the problem of xLy and yLx not starting at the

this

wav: either

fully" loves y), or x's X.

must have been,

by nature reciprocal, however, prohibits nonsimultaneous x's love,

until y reciprocates (and \^s

loves

lo\'e

which begins before

loving x

is

y's, is

not

"flillv^'

love

not "fully" love unless x already "non-

emotion can be love,

as

long as shordy

after

it

begins y also

The former route rests on a tenuous distinction between x's "not fully"

239

Reciprocity

and

uc oxcrlook

"fully" loving y; the latter (c\'cn if

that "shortly"

is

\'ague)

blurs the distinction bct%\'ccn unrequited loxe and not yet reciprocal love. The thesis that an

emotion must be reciprocal

in

order to be love seems a

nonstarter.

DEFENDING THE DOCTRINE OF RECIPROCITY

2.

The

thesis that love

by obser\ation nor

is

by

nature reciprocal seems supportable neither

its

finding y attracti\e

b\' theor\'; x's

entail that \ finds x attractive.

enough

to love does not

Yet some writers claim that love

is

reciprocal.

Robert Ehman

savs,

person

nevertheless a condition ofgenuinelove."^Ehman's argument

is

the

.

.

it is

.

same

as his

"While

is

x's

as lo\'e, since x

could not love."

know enough about v

lo\'er

The

no

idealization),

at first sight

never

(2.2). Similarh% "there

Never having had "the opportunit\' to share

his

once most unique and most permanent." Instead, "the unrequited

mav make a show of lo\'ing,

unilateral lover "in the

but in fact he loves a mere unrealized

same manner

as

an insane person

imaginar)' an even higher emotional value than the real."

argument compelling. E\'en

if x's lo\'ing

\'

follow that X cannot loxe y unless y loves love V might be available only

condition

is

if y

without

satisfiable

x.

.

.

.

ideal. "^

give[s] the

do not find Ehman's

know v well,

it

does not

The knowledge that x must hax'e to work

x (say, x and v

v's lo\'ing

"knowing well"

x,

but

this

together).

necessarily a re-

is

From 1 x loves y only if x knows y and (2) x knows y only if Ehman derives his conclusion that x loves y only if y loves x and \'ice

ciprocal relation.

)

(

—

lo\es X,

\ersa.

requires x to

I

spends a good deal of time with

Further, Ehman's argument entails that

X,

is,

lo\'e at first

not only must x

with his beloved," x cannot base his emotion on "the qualities of the person

that are at

\'

no

in the strict sense

belo\'ed's character;

beliefs

no pureh' unrequited

life

is

knowledge of the

not a condition of our desiring a

about y that are formed rationally (that knowledge of v must be extensive. Hence, love

have true but

is

argument that "there

sight." Lx)\'e requires

counts

reciprocit)'

But from claims

which

(

1

)

and

(2)

absurd. (Note that

is

nurtures his

lo\'e

bv

it

also follows that x

Ehman

conflates the unrequited loxer

deliberately feeding

ordinar\' unilateral lover

who

does not

knows v onlv if v knows

it

gi\'e

"the imaginary'

.

.

.

who

more higher emo-

with idealization, and

a

tional value than the real.")

Karol Wojt\'la also claims that personal love unilateral but bilateral.""^ Like

Ehman, Wojt\4a

"is

by

its \'er\'

nature not

thinks that unrequited love

is

not "genuine" and psvchologicallv unsound: "onesided" love does not have "the objective fullness which reciprocity' persists,

.

.

.

this

is

would give

it.

.

.

.

If a

kne of this kind

because of some inner obstinacy." Wojtyla's argument

is

7

240

Reciprocity

"Love

quite different:

is

not just something

in [x]

and something

— but

would properh' speaking be two loves them" (p. 84). Love is a (third) thing to which

in that case there

common to it

in [v]

is

— for

something

x and y contribute; not their separate loves for each other, but "something 'between' two

is

two "F's merge into a single "we," "we can hardly speak of 'selfishness' in this context." But it is not clear to me why the love "between" x and y is not merely x's loving v and v's loving x. We would not sav that when x and v hate each other, there is onlv one hatred rather than two. And if we find odd the metaphvsics that creates one lo\'e out of two, we will find odd the corresponding creation of one item, the 'Sve," out of two separable "I"s. persons, something shared." Further, since

Wojt)'la concludes that

But Wojt\'la

is

not alone in entertaining such thoughts. Consider the

view of the secular philosopher Charles Fried: Perhaps the central conception of love between persons involves a notion of in terms of mutual shar[R]eciprocity must be formalized

reciprocitN'.

.

.

.

.

ing of interests.

.

.There

.

is

.

.

a creation

.

of love,

a

.

.

middle term, which

is

a

new

pattern or svstem of interests which both [persons] share and both value. ... In

kind of resolution of the paradoxes of self-

this wa\' reciprocal love represents a

interest

How

and altruism.

does joint interest provide a "kind" of solution to the problem of self-

interest in love? Joint interests

together (10.3)

do

can be broken

— and may be broken when

— they

it is

are not logically

welded

profitable for either party to

no more illuminating than claiming that selfishness drops out because two "F's become a single "we." Are we supposed to imagine the literal re-formation of an Aristophanic circle-person? "The pleasure of the This solution

so.

lover ...

is

not

is

selfish

with respect to the loved one," savs Kierkegaard, pre-

When

tending for a second to be Leo Buscagha.

"But

in

he continues

union they are both absolutely selfish, inasmuch as

one self"^ Whereas Wojt}4a love, for Kierkegaard the ate preference" x

relies

on the union

union magnifies

"is

.

.

we

are jolted:

thev constitute

to eliminate selfishness

selfishness.

and y have for each other

.

from

The reciprocal "passion-

another form of self-love."^ If x

—

more than metaphorically united "the more securely the two Fs come together to become one F'^^ then in loving v, x is just loving himself: "The beloved [is] therefore called, significandy enough, the otherand \

are

—

.

self,

the

.

.

.

.

other-I.'''

In arguing that love-as-union

done

.

better than Wojt\da

stroys selfishness.

What

is

is

selfish, I

and Fried have interesting

is

in

do not think Kierkegaard has

arguing that love-as-union de-

the contrast between Wojtv^la and

Kierkegaard, both of whom invoke Christian considerations to support their views. For Kierkegaard,

who

takes his cue

from agape, love

is

not by nature

241

Reciprocity

one

reciprocal. Indeed,

of x's love

test

is

reciprocated, for then x can get nothing

whether

from

x's

y.'^

when not

love persists

Neighbor-love

is

not by

nature reciprocal (one turns the other cheek and continues to love); one would

never

of neighbor- love,

sa\'

as Wojt\'la says

of unrequited personal

that

lo\'e,

it

inner obstinacy." Given the role that agape plays in personal love for

has "some

would appear to be impossible for him to argue that love is by x's kne is expected to endure beyond the point of /s surclv x's love must be expected to endure if y no longer loxes x.

Wojtyla,

it

nature reciprocal. If sinning,

Wojtyla's thesis that love

is

constant (10.2) seems incompatible with

strictly

about reciprocity.

his claims

However, the doctrine

that love

with the doctrine that love

strictly

is

reciprocal.

is

same emotion toward

procity', a necessar)'

then ex hypothesi

we

is

not incompatible

y.

But

if

love

is

strictly

have no right to assume that y no longer loves if x's

and equivalentlv,

and

if x's

v's

or

emotions are

v's

is

strictly

if

condition for x to love

ing to strict constancy, will end,

x

is

y no longer loves x; hence y's not, contrary' to the doctrine of reci-

constant, x's love for y will continue even ha\'ing the

constant

just said that if love

I

constant,

x.

Accord-

really love, neither

emotion

emotion does end, the emotion had not

of enduring when y no longer reciprocates; the constancy of love prevents the situation, xLy but not been

Hence,

love.

\'Lx, that

x's

love

would show

Equivalently,

if y's

now

never faced with the

that strict constancy

is

emotion toward x ends,

but by the doctrine of

reciprocity, if y's

had not been

tion, too,

is

love.

Thus

test

incompatible with

y's

reciprocity'.

emotion had not been

emotion had not been

love, x's

had never been any love that

there

be persisting even though not reciprocated; there

to endure in the face of nonreciprocation. If love

is

by

is

its

no love

love;

emomight

that

fails

nature reciprocal,

it is

conceptually impossible for x to stop loving y because y has stopped lov-

ing

x.

Wojtvla gives another reason that love

is

by nature reciprocal, implicitly

acknowledging the notion that humans might love love for is

no

humans

(1.6).

When x

makes

loves y, x

five-and-dimc trinket but a "surrender

God

a gift

in response to

of x's

self to y.

God's

This

gift

of the innermost selP; the "mag-

nitude of the gift" represents the value of the person as such. X's love

is

reciprocated by y because the "realization of the value of the gift awakens the reciprocate in wavs which would match its value." ^^ Y can match need to .

this value

.

.

only by making a

gift to x

of

three things about this argument. First,

xLy and yLx occur nonsimultaneously, ond, love generates it

its

own

y's self, that is, it

by loving

x.

Notice

allows (indeed, presupposes) that

since

yLx

is

a response to xLy. Sec-

reciprocity' unilaterally. If

xLy brings about yLx,

could not have been the case that yLx brought about xLy, for yLx occurs

242

Reciprocity

Hence,

after xL\'.

lo\ing

love for

argument

tions. Third, the

of

x's

Both loves involve

X.

a giving

both

is

reciprocity. Conceptualh',

psychologically,

self;

power

it

it

a

of the

self

y's

but have different founda-

conceptual and a psychological defense

of the

asserts that love involves a surrender

of such magnitude (always) has the

asserts that a gift

to induce love.

Fromm

Erich

holds a similar view: "In giving he cannot help bringing

something to

life

receiving that

which

in the is

duces love; impotence thesis,

must come about some other way than by

\'

Fromm

other person

.

.

is

the

inability'

in truly giving,

;

.

given back to him.

.

.

.

[L]ove

is

he cannot help

power which pro-

a

to produce love."^^ In support of his

quotes Karl Marx:

assume man to be man, and his relation to the world to be a human one, can be exchanged onlv for love, trust for trust, and so on. If \'ou lo\'e unrequitedlv, i.e. if your lo\e as love does not call forth love in return, if through the ntal expression of yourself as a lo\ing person \'ou fail to become a loved person, then vour love is impotent, it is a misfortune, i'* If we

then

lo\'e

But Fromm's

.

.

thesis

is

partialh' contradicted

.

by Marx: love that does not induce

my

love does not induce love, / am my love is impotent in not having the power Fromm thinks all Were Fromm to respond that impotent love is not genuine love, his

return love

Marx,

for

is,

love. If

still

"impotent," or lo\e has.

Fromm's invoking

claim that love begets love becomes tautolc^ous. sage

— which mentions "exchanging" love

that

when

for love

—

is

x gives to y, x "cannot help receiving that

him," and Wojt\4a claims that

when

also ironic.

which

x gives herself to y, y

back equal value. If so, the idea that what x gives

is

a^i/t

this love looks like Aristode's imperfect friendship, in

is

is

this pas-

He claims

given back to

induced to give

becomes suspicious;

which use or pleasure

is

exchanged homogeneously for equal use or pleasure.

The point

is

not that reciprocal love must reduce to two self-interested

exchanges, but that arguing that love

grounds that love

by

e\'okes love, gives us as

Kierkegaard again

it.

is

homogeneous with

is

relevant:

"There

love: requited love.

its

nature reciprocal,

much

is

on the

reason to believe

it

specific

as to

deny

... a repayment for love which

And

there

so

is still

much good

is

in the

majority of men that as a rule they will regard this repayment ... in the form

of

.

.

.

requited love, as the most significant, although

not admit that

it is

repavment."^^ Wojt\da and

.

.

Fromm

.

they will perhaps

will protest:

"This

is

not what we meant. In genuine love, x and v give with no thought of receiving; the gi\'ing in love gix'ing, if true, is

is

a gift,

not a business deal." But the thesis that giN'ing begets

undercuts this protest.

not motivated by getting

the

power

is

x's

What would make

it

not being able to count

clear that x's gi%'ing

on

x's

giving having

to induce v to give back; in that case x can view giving as a

gift.

243

Reciprocity

Further, onh'

can x

gi\'ing,

from the

x's

is

is

not o\crwhclmcd into giving back by the power of

feel that v's

giving

is

not merely

feel that x is

x's

loving x results

loved in virtue of y's nature autonomously moving y to

x.

component of Wojt\da''s argument, that love begets dubious. True, x's lo\'ing y ma\' show \' what love is and invoke love by psvchological

And perhaps y cannot lo\'e anyone unless y

setting an example, but not always.

has at

tit-for-tat. If y's

\', then x's lo\e for v produces y's lo\e for x in much potion would produce yLx (8.4). If love begets love, x

\va\' as a

The lo\c,

\'

lo\ing or gi\'ing to

same

cannot

it

some time been

loved.

But

this provides

no reason

to think x's loving y huge gift to y may

will e\'oke v's loving x in particular. Further, x's giving a

Thus an already existing which giving can be

e\'oke onlv gratitude or, oppositely, resentment.

reciprocal love

welcomed

might be

comes

way this tactic

to love x onh'

if x

withdraws from

But

y.

in a

involves love's begetting love. If x loves y and wants

still

x should hide the fact that x loves y; causally situated between

X,

loving y and eventually if

—

And there are those Stenmv dentist — who philosophize that x's gixing to y is a sure way to

pre\'ent v's loving x; y

y to love

framework

than as threatening.

as fitting rather

dhal, Proust,

devious

precisely the

within

y's

loving x

is

not Wojt)'la's

gift,

but

x's

x's

not giving. But

love does not always evoke love, neither does playing hard to get always

work. The x who wants y's love must figure out in advance (aha! by knowing y)

whether showing or hiding

3.

x's

if

personal love

not by

is

entails that x desires that x's love

claims that "to love

someone

is

its

nature reciprocal, perhaps

necessarily ... to

x's

And

it

of reciprocal love because they are

"self-lacerating."'

in x's genuinely loving y and x's not desiring reciprocity does not entail that x's emotion

— except and

loves himself,

''

If there

being "self-lacerating,"

would seem strange

cannot love

loving y

hope for return love."^*^ some lo\'ers "do not want

no contradiction

then

x's

be reciprocated. Annette Baier, for example,

Fisher, howe\'er, provides a counterexample:

[the] happiness" is

effect.

THE DESIRE FOR RECIPROCITY

Even

Mark

wiU have the desired

love

to say that simply because x

is

is

not love.

"self-lacerating," x

conceptual truth that x can love others only

if it is a

"self-laceration"

is

if x

incompatible with self-love (5.4).

W. Newton- Smith offers another example of a lover who does not desire reciprocit)': x loves y,

would harm this case: (a)

but y

married to

is

z;

believing that were y to love

x,

that

y of his love.'^ There are two ways to interpret x does desire that y reciprocate, or (b) x does not desire that y

y, x

does not

tell

reciprocate. Interpretation (a) seems natural; x desires that y reciprocate, but x

does not act to

satisfy that desire. Interpretation (a)

is

consistent with the claim

— 244

Reciprocity

that

xLv

entails that x desires that yLx. Interpretation (b),

which

refutes the

human psvcholog)'; x might Some medieval courtly lovers did not expect and

claim, seems neither incoherent nor foreign to

simph' not desire reciprocity'

.

hence did not desire reciprocit\% precisely because their beloveds were married.

What is surprising is that Newton- Smith argues that love does entail the desire for reciprocity', vet claims that in his example x does not desire reciprocixy e\'en

though x

loves y.

He writes that x "would wish [reciprocit)'] if all things

were equal. But given the circumstances

as they are,

he does not wish

it."

The

point seems to be that x wishes that y were in a position to reciprocate, that the

world were different to reciprocate

in \'arious wavs,

but

not identical to desiring that y reciprocate. Even if we grant how does his own example avoid refiiting the thesis

is

Newton-Smith,

this to

He

that love entails a desire for reciprocitv.^ thesis

desiring that v were in a position

x's

is

we

asserts that

can see that this

a conceptual truth about love b\' recognizing that any situation in

which the lover did not his example, x

desire reciprocity

does not desire

result, at\picallv, in

reciprocity'

"an unhappv love."

is

bound

odd

to be

only because

y's

Or if the lover x

some way. In reciprocating would

is

in

a "masochist" bent

on "self-abasement," x might not desire reciprocit)'; this, too, is an odd situation. If even' situation in which x loves v but x does not desire reciprocity is

we

odd, then

are entitled (bv an indirect sort

"loving entails,

ceteris paribus,

of argument) to conclude that

the desire for reciprocated love." Thus

Smith argues that "in the absence" of some oddness does entail a desire for

reciprocit)', in contrast to Fisher,

who

(odd) cases to refute the thesis that love entails a desire for

Newton-Smith

is

wrong,

I

Newton-

in the situation, loving

think, in claiming that in his

relies

on

these

reciprocit\'.

own example

But

x does

not desire reciprocity. X's desiring that y were in a position to reciprocate that is, desiring that v could reciprocate is too close to desiring that y does

—

reciprocate for interpretation (b) to be plausible. In his example, exacth'

does X not does not

tell

tell

y that x loves y? "Being magnanimous," says Newton-Smith, x y. He claims that x is

y because x believes harm would befall

concerned for

x's

welfare because x

is

morally virtuous. If so,

think that x does desire reciprocit)' and

from acting on that x's

desire.

goodness toward v

x loves

v,

why

is

is

it

makes sense to

dissuaded by moral considerations

But we need not assume with Newton-Smith that

due to x's moral

and love implies concern

virtue or magnanimit\'. Rather, since

for the well-being

of the beloved,

love itself that provides x with the moti\'ation not to act

on the

it is

x's

desire for

reciprocity.

The point ment

is

that right under

Newton- Smith's nose was

a direct argu-

that love entails, ceteris paribus, the desire for reciprocit}': the concern

245

Reciprocity

fcamrc of love may out

this

argument

itself

imply the desire for

looking

b\'

at

one might have thought that xLv (

1

)

love by

its

love ... by

nature

reciprocit\'.

We can

entails that x desires

begin to lav

He claims

that

vLx on the grounds

that

another part of Fisher's view.

always includes sexual desire), and (2) "sexual nature involvefs] a desire for reciprocation. "^^ Fisher

is

its ver\'

sexual

(it

claim (1) by citing parental love and love for "one's sovereign."

rejects

not quibble

o\'er this,

I

will

even though one could respond that personal love, our

topic, necessarilv includes sexual desire (see Wojt\'la; chap. 10, n. 14); but

I

do

not think that personal love must involve sexual desire or be grounded on sexual attractiveness. Instead, (2).

He

surely be because

of its nature

get sexual pleasure." N'irtue

I

have doubts about Fisher's treatment of claim

asserts that if sexual love involves a desire for reciprocit\', "that will

of which

it

as sexual, that

is,

as inx'oKing a desire to gi\'e

and

The question now arises, What does sexual desire have,

in

includes a desire for reciprocit\', that love lacks, so that love

docs not include the desire for

(in Fisher's \'iew)

reciprocit\^?

Sexual desire involves two desires, a desire to give and a desire to get sexual pleasure. Presumablv, the desire for reciprocity^ derives

to get sexual pleasure

from the object of one's sexual

from the

desire

desire; for if in sexuallv

desiring y, x desired only to give pleasure, that desire alone does not entail a further desire for reciprocity (Fisher: x

might be

"self-lacerating";

Newton-

Smith: X might be "magnanimous"). Hence, what sexual desire has that love lacks

is

a desire to get

apparently

how

something from the object of one's attention. This

is

Fisher reasons in distinguishing sexual desire from love. If so,

what he overlooks

is

that

one need not appeal to

a desire to get sexual pleasure

in order to derive a desire for reciprocity^; the desire to give pleasure itself

implies, ceteris paribus, a desire for reciprocity'. If x desires to gi\'e y sexual

pleasure, x will not be able to satisfy that desire unless y sexually desires

x.

For

example, y normally will not allow x to do those sexual things that v finds pleasurable unless

\'

maximized when y

also desires x. If the onlv or best

desires x, or the pleasure that x can gi\'e to v will be

to give y pleasure is by y's reciprocating, x desires to give v pleasure.

must

wav x can

satisf\' x's

desire

desire y to reciprocate if x

Since a desire to give can be sufficient (ceteris paribus) for a desire for reciprocity, in this regard sexual desire has

account for the former but not the

latter's

nothing that love lacks that would

including a desire for reciprocitv'. If x

v, the satisfaction of x's desire to benefit v mav be maximized when y loves x and thereb\' allows herself to be benefited bv x. The concern of love, its desire to give to the beloved, implies a desire for reciprocit\'

loves y

and desires to benefit

to the extent that

x's abilit\'

to carr\' out whatever

is

demanded

b\' love's

246

Reciprocity

concern

is

hampered

severely

not a willing recipient of x's love. This does

if y is

not mean that x desires reciprocity' because x believes that \^s loxing x per se will

That may be true

God,

make

y happy.

loves,

he only desires to be loved, knowing that love

loN'e

Him

happv."^^

I

for

Bernard

as St.

doubt that we should take "only"

''When

said:

will render

all

those

literally, as if

God who

God's

humans reduced without remainder to God's desire to be loved. Nor should wc think that what holds for God holds for humans. Instead of arlo\'ing

rogantly thinking that x loves v,

is

a

person

gift to y,

open to and returning

benefit by being

If this account

well-being of v, and

why

God's

is

is

only thinking that

x,

because x

x's affection.

of the connection among x's

desiring reciprocity

might be conditional on

x's loN'c

x

who is especially concerned for y^s welfare, and that v would

concern might be conditional on

v^'s

concern for the

we can understand and, therefore, why x's

— a sympathetic explanation that

self-interest

cerned for v. If v does not lo\e x and, as a

y, x's

sense,

reciprocating

y's

loving x

does not merely accuse x of tit-for-tat

loving

x's

makes

result,

or of not really being con-

does not gi\e x the opportunit\'

knows must remain no hope have already come across

to benefit y, x will be saddled with a desire to give that x frustrated. In the

of success

— abandoning

— X benignly abandons her love

the idea that

not count

name of rationality

x's

We

for y.

no longer loving v when x

desires that have

cannot benefit y does

realizes that x

what Aristode claims when he

as a fault in x's love; this is precisely

points out that x's withdrawing love from y, because y has changed from being

good to e\'il, is neither objectionable nor indicates that x is being selfish. X can do nothing for this v. (See 10.5.) Be sure not to conflate two arguments. One is that if x's emotion leads x emotion cannot be

to desire that y love x, x's

betrays x's self-interested attitude. that if x's love

is

conditional

on

I

\^s

love; x's desire for reciprocity

have rejected loving

x,

then

argument. The second

this x's

love

since (again) this conditional ty implies that x's attitude

might think that grounds that

x's

x's

love

loving y cannot

sequitur: x's desiring reciprocity^

lo\'e

v

if

y does not love

X, this fact

x.

by

if x's

y's

loving x

loving y

does not necessarily mean that x

blamed

for

is

cases conditional

on

is

conditional

y.

a

on y's way

x's

is

too

much

love for y and

self-interest. X's lo\'e

reciprocity not because x

but because x was hoping to give to

is

self-interested in a

abandoning

cannot be quickly accused of moralh' significant

some

One

on the

— but that

incompatible with love. If the frustration of x's desire to benefit y for X to bear, x cannot always be

real thing,

does not entail that x will not

itself

Further, even

not the

self-interested.

that x desires reciprocity

would then be conditional on

non

loving

mean

is

is

is

is

in

was hoping to get from y

—x 247

Reciprocity

4.

CONVOLUTIONS

We can strengthen the connection between x's concern for the welfare of V and

x's

by investigating exactly what the desire for

desire for reciprocity'

reciprocity'

One distinction to be made immediately is between the desire for

is.

and the desire to be loved. One can desire to be loved by anyone at to eat) without lo\'ing anyone; and anything desiring something

reciprocity all

(like

—

one can desire to be loved by

—

a particular person without loving that person.

But the desire for reciprocity, already loves lo\'es.

Note

somebody;

that if love

bv

is

as a

matter of logic, can exist only

nature reciprocal, the desire for reciprocity'

its

the desire to be lo\'ed h\ the person one loxes

one cannot love another

since

nature reciprocal,

is

—

is

conceptually impossible,

is

possible, if love

What

unilaterally.

the desire for food) need not be selfish even

being loved confidence

(like

person,

having food)

a basic

may be

But the desire for

Suppose that

is

is

good

—

say,

(ii) x's

v,

self-interested; if

it is

it is

required for

self-

be loved by a particular

reciprocit)', to

it is

unlikely that being

essential for one's well-being. is

concerned for

y's

well-being. If

can be unpacked to yield a reductio argument that

loving y cannot entail that x desires reciprocity. X loves

its

not self-interested in any morally

loving v entails that x

x's

so, the desire for reciprocit\'

(i)

by

mere desire to be loved

when

self-interested in a stronger sense, if

loved by a specific person

x's

is

— then wanting to be loved

oftcnsive sense.

is

onlv the desire to be loved, period, or the desire that one's

belo\'ed continue to love in return. Finally, note that the (like

when one

the desire to be loved by the particular person one

it is

Assume

that

and

loving y entails that x desires that y love

x.

Now, if love implies concern for the welfare of the beloved, then were y to love X,

V

would be concerned

From

(i)

(iv)

and from

and

(ii) it

concerned for

is

x.

follows that

X desires that y love x (iii)

and

(iv)

(v) X desires that

But

for x:

loving x entails that y

(iii) y's

in desiring to

we

derive

y be concerned for

be the object of

thereby has a self-interested attitude, x loves V. It

is

no help here

y's

x.

concern

which

is

— to

to point out that under

desires reciprocit\' in order to be benefited

by

be benefited by y

x.

our assumptions

is

y, too,

For then reciprocal love

dvadic exchange characteristic of Aristotle's imperfect friendships. sion reached by this reductio argument

—

incompatible with assuming that

is

the

The conclu-

not that love does entail the desire for

248

Reciprocity

reciprocity fake) or

and therefore

denying that

either love

desire something,

I

it

and

So

in drag,

desires that v love x

concern,

and the

it

it

from the

fact

am not compelled by logic

to kiss the girl in the blue dress

blue dress

is

(unknown

guy

to

me)

a

guy

in drag. Similarly, if x

does not follow that x desires to be the object of x,

v would be concerned for

share experiences, in which case in desiring that y love that v desires to share experiences with belie\'es that in

always

saved bv

does not follow that x desires to be

desire to kiss a

I

First,

Perhaps the only component of love that x considers important

and X

is

is

desire everything about that

I

fleas, I

x does not beheve that in loving

if

concern

x desires to be loved by y and a

if I desire

girl in the

does not follow that

it

if

concern for x,

the object of v's concern. Second, across the dance floor,

have

cats

flcabites.

lo\'e is v's

argument.

this reductio

does not follow that

thing. If I desire to have a cat,

or psychology' to desire

component of v's

exist (since its

desire for reciprocit}'.

lo\'c entails a

There are two problems with that

does not

ultimatclv self-interested. Rather, genuine love

all lo\'c is

loxing

x,

x.

Further, even

is

y's x.

the desire to

x,

x primarily desires

if x

desires that v love x

v would be concerned for

x, it

might

still

be no

contradiction to deny that x desires to be the object of y's concern; something's

being foreseen does not entail that

Of course, from

steps

and

(iii)

(iv)

it is

Even

to (v).

desired.

may not

these problems

sufficiently

if x's

desiring

desires everything included in A, x's desiring

thing that I

do

is

central to A. If

I

desire to have a pet or a

companion or is

damage the

entail desiring

some-

may not desire the fleas, but

I

a showpiece. Similarly, if x desires

central to love,

namely

v's

And if I am likely

concern.

knowing that she is a he, I "Look here. What vou really want to do is to kiss a guv, whether you

desire to kiss the girl in the blue dress, not

to be told,

inference

does not entail that x

A might

desire to have a cat,

that y love x, x desires whatever

A

or not." Similarly,

realize

it

what X

really

that concern

wants is

is

it

can be said about

x's

desire for reciprocity that

to be the objea of y's concern; whether or not x believes

an element of love,

the reductio by ^[ranting that

if

it still is.

But we can continue to confound

x desires to be loved by

\',

x desires to be the

objea of \^s concern. The reductio turns out to unpack the desire for reciprocity'

incompletely.

Suppose, then, that love includes a desire for y entails that x desires that y love

x,

and

y's

reciprocity'. If so, x's

loving

loving x entails that y desires that x

love y. Hence, if x desires that y love x, and \^s loving x entails that y desires that X love y, then x desires that y desires that x love y. That

is,

x^s desire for

not only x's desire to be loved by y, but also x's desire that y desires to be loved by x. The part of x's desire for reciprocity that is x's desire to reciprocity' includes

be loved by y

entails that x desires to be the recipient

of )^s concern. But the

249

Reciprocity

part that

desire that y desires to be

is x's

x's

desire to be benefited

kned bv

of x's concern. Thus,

desires to be the recipient

by y and

x's desire

x entails that x desires that v

desire for reciprocitv

x's

is

that y desires to be benefited by

Now, to show that loving cannot entail the desire for reciprocity on of contradicting

x's

claim to

be benefited

x

b\'

lo\'e y,

one needs to show that

bv v (to get from

desire to be benefited

and from

y)

x's

wanting v to want to get from

(x's

both

follows from

it

x.

pain x's

desire that v desires to x), that x's

concern

is

objectionabh' self-interested

— that x wants y to want to get from x because x

wants to get from

does not follow. X's desire to get from v and

y.

But

desire that y desires to get for reciprocit\'.

So we

it

from x were derived independentlv from

most

are permitted to conclude at

there will be a constant conjunction of x's desire to get

receive.

Hence,

does X want v to want to be benefited bv

which receive \'.

from x because y's wanting to

The other answer

is

a desire that

One

is

two answers,

facilitates

v

both x

Whv

neither of

want to getting from

that x wants v to

from x facilitates x's want to receive from x because

receive

that x wants v to

wanting to be benefited by x

is

answer to the question,

x?, there are

ruled out by the reductio argument.

is

in

x loxes

from \ and x's desire that

y desires to get from x. X's unilateral desire for reciprocity

and V give and that both x and v

when

that

x's

x's desire

\''s

the satisfaction of x's desire to benefit

v.

does not mean that x

is

If love entails a desire for reciprocity, that alone

ultimately proposing a self-interested tit-for-tat exchange with y.

5.

MUTUALITY

Reciprocal loxes are "nonmutual"

if

thev are in various wavs disparate.

1) x and y do not love each other with the same intensit)'; (2) do not have the same causal effects, that is, their loves lead them to have different desires or to place a different emphasis on the same desire (x's love may induce x to want to live with v, while v's lo\'e has no such conse-

For example:

(

their loves

quence); (3) their loves are not constituted identically, for example,

x's

love

emphasizes concern more than the desire to share experiences, while

y's

love

fa\'ors intimacA'

over concern; (4) one person loves the other exclusively while

the other loxes

two persons

basis

at the

same time; and

(5) the persons love

on the

of different things

a different sort),

important

is

(x loves y in virtue of one sort of property, y loves x for or one loves erosically while the other loves agapically. How

mutualitv in love?

of the soul, love

is

the onlv one by

which the creature, though not on equal terms,

is

able to

''Of

all

the

.

.

.

affections

God] something resembling what

God and

His creatures can achieve

has been given to reciprocit\',

but

it,"

.

.

.

means of

give back [to

said St. Bernard.-^

^

we might wonder about

250

Reciprocity'

things. First, if humans

n\o

God has

edge

in

power

—

of this power

qualirv? In \irtue

God arc

and

"not on equal terms"

— consider the something

will their love, despite reciprocity', lose

differential

which suggests that their lo\'e for God

humans have reason But

tainted.

is

to fear

in

God,

in the Christian universe,

God's being perfectly good means that humans need not worry about His power; God nexer uses it for c\'il purposes and, unlike humans, is not corruptible b\' ha\'ing

it.

Second, the lo\e that humans return "resembles" the love

humans

they receive;

return to

God,

bv surrendering their

loxes

humans with His agape, where

selves.

as well as

But

\'alue

if

they can, something of equal

humans

loxe

God erosically and God God loves humans

the resemblance?

is

Humans love God because, for example, they stand in awe of His perfection. Thus, the reciprocal love between humans and God is not lo\e between equals; indeed, the reciprocal lo\'e between humans and God is not mutual because God and humans arc unequal. because that

is

If God's

and

His nature.

goodness means that the

God does not

inequality' in

power between humans

spoil their reciprocal loxe, that sa\'ing grace

is

unavailable to

the personal loves of humans. Various inequalities between x and y ical,

psN'chological, or

ciprocal love. ^2 It

beaut)',

— ma\' reduce the

often claimed that

both

agapicalh'; or that

of ph\'sical

is

economic power

men and women

while

women

men

qualit\'

and

love erosically

lo\'e erosically

but

men

—

in phys-

of their

women lo\'e in

re-

love

virtue

love in virtue of prestige, intelligence, and

economic success; that men tend to love nonexclusive Iv and with fickle inconstancy, while women tend to love exclusi\'ely and with obsessive constana' (see 7.7).

Given the complaining that men and

women do

about love, their

tionships, and each other, inequalities outside of love apparently

reciprocal love unhappy.

who

advises us to seek a

cultixate loxe with

our

We

mate

social

rela-

make even

might, then, want to understand Aristophanes,

who

"matches" our nature (5.5),

as telling us to

and economic equals, since we thereby avoid the

unhappiness of nonmutual love. If reciprocal love, to

serious differences

be successful, requires mutuality', and

between men and women,

it

if

there are

seems that only homosexual

love could work. Plato and Aristotle assumed that equalit)' outside love was an

important factor in determining the

between two men because

men

conclusion

is

between two that,

is

qualit\'

better than loxe

are superior to

women

of love; both concluded that love

between

a

in rationality'

man and

a

and moral

woman, virtue.

in part

A similar

reached bv some contemporarx' feminists, who claim that love women is better than love between a woman and a rhan; or even

whether bv biolog\' or by

for philosophers as diverse as Nietzsche,

between men and

men are incapable of lox'c.^^ But Fromm, and Wojtx'la, the differences

socialization,

women do not prevent love, but make it possible, because in

251

Reciprocity

x'irruc

men and women are vin-vang complements. 2"* What common, which distinguishes them from Plato and

ot these ditTercnces

these writers ha\'e in Aristotle,

is

their

what

lo\e, not

kills

it.

Of course,

that a precondition

whv

often explains

is

leave

its

makes that

precondition of

from

love;

Aristotle.

But the claim

things (the environment,

God)

only partially right; x and /s love for each other

thev become interested in the same things.

on the

on one

ever)'one were a

side,

and Fromm,

other, suggests that although mutualit\'

essential for love, in other

that the desire-satisfaction if

similarit\' in the

is

contrast between Plato and Aristotle,

Nietzsche, and Wojt\'la,

because

sexual desire can take

— which brings us closer to

of love

the lovers are interested in

some ways

love; if one

will look, like a

fact that

therefore are not friends^^

The

men and women

we should conclude that heterosexual love is primarilv threatmen and women arc not interested in the same things and

perhaps, then,

ened bv the

m

emphasis on the role of scxualit)'

mo\'e, the differences between

ways nonmutualitv'

is

in

is

essential. Recall

model cannot be a general account of love (6.3) D-S lover there would not be much love; if x is a

D-S lover, x does best to seek a mate who is not a D-S lo\'er. Thus love on the D-S model must be nonmutual. Similarlv, if ever\'one were a Balint-lover (8.3) who demanded perfectlv unconditional love, no one would exist to proN'ide this selfless loxe; Balint-love

must be nonmutual. But if reciprocal and

mutual love between an egocentric x and an egocentric y is impossible, so is love between tuo altruists. Fromm savs that "lo\'e is primarily ^nw^, not receix'ing,"^*^

loves,

but

this

cannot be right

if he

means

that

be satisfied needs;-^^ if

if

v abandons

all v's

needs and desires

is

no

giving. ^^

loves are impossible,

The

facts that

lo\'e is

is

in

order to

no one to

and that the reciprocal, nonmutual, but

important because

it

within a mutual love (which does not to get). InequalitN' outside love

is

fiilfill

fiilfill

receive

mutually egoistic and mutually

egoist and an altruist seems objectionable,

outside

attempting to

in

both x and v abandon their needs and desires

needs and desires of the other, both give but there there

when anyone genuinely

he or she mostlv gives and does not receive. X's desire to benefit y cannot

may

x's

the

— so

altruisic

stable love

of an

underlie the idea that equality'

permits equality in giving and getting

mean

that both parties give just in order

not necessarilv disruptive

if

the inequalities

balance each other or provide the substance for equal giving and getting. Further, e\en

if

love between a permanent egoist and a permanent altruist

moralh' indecent,

lo\'e

between two persons

who

synchronically between the egoist and the altruist role

There mereh' that y's

beliefi

is

x's

another

way

concern for v

in is

which

is

both pass back and forth is

not horrif\'ing.

reciprocal love can be nonmutual: not

different

from

y's

concern for

about the kind of concern in\olved

in

x,

but that

x's

and

love are different. For

252

Reciprocity

Nietzsche, reciprocal heterosexual love

is

possible not only because of

its

nonmutualit\' (the vin-yang complementarity' of male dominance and female

submission), but also because ent by the term love,

— and

it

one sex does not presuppose other

sex."-^^

"man and woman understand something differbelongs to the conditions of love .

.

the

.

same conception of

.

'love'

.

.

that the

... in the

Nietzsche suggests that nonmutualit\' in beliefs about love

essential for at least heterosexual love. It

ments over what love

is

is

seems to me, however, that disagree-

commonly disrupt the reciprocity of love. ^^ Indeed,

a

mark of troubled love is the frequencv of arguments about love itself: "If you loved me, vou would blank"; "I do love vou, even if I don't blank, and if you loved me you wouldn't insist on my blanking."^ ^ The scenario often goes like this: "You don't really love me"; "yes I do"; "on my definition you don't." Yet the histor\' of love, were it faithfully recorded, would also include: "You do love me, after all"; "I most emphatically do not"; "on my definition you do." Thus, when Alastair Hannay writes, "The suggestion that you could imphes in whatever way only love another if the other loved you

—

—

a

.

.

conditionalit\^ that

.

other,"^^ he conflates

surely incompatible with a genuine concern for the

is

two

claims.

One is

that if x's love for y

is

conditional

on

ys loving X in jv's sense of love, x's love is not genuine; the other is that ifx's love for V is conditional on v's loving x in v's sense of love, x's love is not genuine. In the first case, x may want y to love x in x's sense because y does love x, but not in a sense that x countenances; x might only desire that the reciprocal love x and y already have be, in addition, mutual. But x's love for y being conditional on /s loving X mutually does not entail that x's love for y

might derive

from

is

not genuine. For x's desire

x's belief that if their love does not achieve mutualit}',

doomed. The second

it is

which x would not love y unless y loved x in ys more clearlv illustrates Hannay's point. For here x

case, in

(unspecified) sense of love,

may

be demanding reciprocity' itself In this case, too, there is an ambiguity: Does Hannay mean that if x's love for y depends on \^s love for x at least starting at some point, then x does not really love y, or that if x's love for y depends on \''s love for x continuinff, then x's emotion is not genuine love?

6.

The statement two

AND CONSTANCY

RECIPROCITY

that x's love for

in

is

conditional

quite different claims: the thesis that love

the empirical claim that for love

\'

X.

Both

one case y's loving x is

by

its

)''s

loving x embodies

nature reciprocal, and

some particular x, x's love will not exist if y does not

assert that \^s loving x

in the other y's loving x

is

on

is

a necessary' condition for x's loving y.

conceptually necessary and pertains to is

all

But

lovers, while

psychologically required and pertains only to

some

— 253

Reciprocity

lovers

— unless the claim Ehman

Thus, when

not

x's

claims that "reciprocity

is

Howe\'er,

not

.

.

.

when Hannay writes,

[

reciprocit)']

gestion that you could only .

.

conditionalit\' that

.

is

[is]

of genuine

a condition

a psychological condition

upon

if v

does

''Unrequited loxe, or parental loxe

returned as such, are familiar phenomena, so no one could

reasonablv assert that

a

loving x

y's

love depends but that x for conceptual reasons cannot love v

lo\'e X.

which

intended to state a universal psychological truth. ^^

he does not mean that

love,"-^^

which

is

is

.

.

.

was

necessar\' for love. Indeed, the sug-

another

lo\'e

if

the other loved

vou

.

.

implies

.

incompatible with genuine concern,"^ ^

we are

not quite sure that he keeps distinct the conceptual and the psychological. His latter

— the continuation of xLv depends on vLx, x does not genuinely about — trades on psychological while former claim

claim

love y

if

fact

a

his

x,

unreciprocated loves exist and therefore reciprocity cannot be necessary for love

—

is

a conceptual point.

Hannay continues by claiming

that "love, even if

it

can be discriminat-

ing,

cannot be conditional in the sense that one loves another only on condi-

tion

of being loved by the other," because that conditionality

with

x's

X

means

being genuinely concerned for y. But,

as I ha\'e

argued,

is

incompatible

if

y s not lo\ing

that x will not be able to benefit y, the fact that x's love includes this

concern for y implies that x's no longer loving y, if y does not reciprocate, does not negate x's earlier love. Further, remember what we often say to the obsessed unrequited lover,

who

persists in loving v despite the fact that

should be, clear to him that his beloved will never love him.

it is,

or

We tr\' to help this

person by getting him to abandon his love quite because his beloved will never begin to reciprocate. For the sake of mental health (to pre\'ent his crossing over the edge of doom), ty'.

we condone abandoning loves

in the absence

of reciproci-

The general point is that Hannay's view presupposes that if x's emotion is to

be genuine love, then not only must x be concerned for be unconditionally constant.

We

y,

but

x's

concern must

have already rejected that assumption as

being too strong (8.8 and 10.1).

Questions about reciprocity, then, are closely tied to questions about constancy. If

it

x

no longer

is

is it

the question

is

is

this

x's love ending an R, or an R2 reason? That is, no longer loves x, does this bring into doubt x's

reason for

loves y because y

love for y, or

it

love for v ends because v's loxe for x has ended (rather than

x's

never starting),

compatible with

that

we

are

x's

having loved y?

not constant in the face of

impulse might be to reach

y's

emotion not being constant. Our

a decision

about

x's

R, or R2 reason.

whether

v's

way:

no longer loving y because y no longer

x's

What is interesting about

wondering what to say about x's emotion gi\en

love itself ends for an

that

initial

emotion independenth' of If so,

loves x

is

we might

reason this

an Rj reason for the

254

Reciprocity

end of x's love, (Hannay); or

since love conditional this

is

an R2 reason

on

reciprocity does not deserve the

name

love ends because x realizes that

if x's

x's

no longer bear fruit. But now take into account why y's love for X ended. Suppose that \''s love for x ends for an R^ reason; for example, v was attached to x in \'irtue of x's wealth and this attachment dissipates when x's fortune evaporates. Here wc want to sav that if x no longer loves desire to benefit v can

y because y

no longer

lo\'es x, this is

R^

generalize: if y's love ends for an

loves X

an R2 reason.

is

an

R2

because v no longer loves x

Rj or

plausible,

for an

always an flaw in

R2

R^

is

not loving y an R^ reason. If that conclusion does not strike

reason,

love for v ending because v

x's

x's love.

problematic.

in

which

When

emotion toward x ends for an Rj reason,

\'^s

emotion had been ill-grounded and was not

emotion ends

v's

love because y does not lo\'e

x,

for that

R^

all

along

onlv in some philosophers sense of love that v never loxed

attachment to

x,

The other explanation

One explanation

beheving

is

that x,

that \ loved x according to x's

x.

x and that

For some Rj

anyone that v reallv did love x. Yet I

is

that x

falselv that \^s

knowing

was unaware of \^s reasons

emotion was well grounded.

accurately \^s reasons, believed truly

own notion of love. Thus, x agrees with y that the

disappearance of \''s grounds for loving x counts as an \^s love.

lo\'e

is

x's

How did it happen that before \^s emotion ended for that R^ reason,

wonder:

X believed that v loved x? \''s

love,

reason, and x withdraws

v ma\' protest that y did

reasons, v will have a hard time convincing

to

no longer loves x is on y's love is not a

reason. In this sense, x's love being conditional

But the case

for

x's

we would have to say that whether y's love for x ends for an

thereb\' sho\\'ing that y's

it is

no longer ends for an R2

A case can also be made that if \^s love

reason (sav, x reveals his abusive and deceitful side), then

anyone as

To

reason for the end of x's love.

reason, x's love ending because v

What is

how X and v themseh'es conceive of love.

of beliefs about

7.

lo\'e

EROSIC

first

for the

end of

This

is

another

way the mutualit)^

plavs an important role in love.

AND AGAPIC RECIPROCITY

Recall that e\'en though

both the

R2 reason

an Rj and an R2 reason mav, therefore, ha\'e to be relativized

\''s

loxing x can be a reason for

and second view of personal

love, the theorv^

lo\e rules out x's loving v only because y loves x, while that

x's

loving y in

of erosic personal is

possible within

x loves y primarily for y's properties, and these properties do not disappear just because y does not love or no longer agapic personal love (1.2). But

loves

X,

if

then erosic personal love should not be especially conditional on

reciprocity (which should please Hannay).

For the same reason,

x's lo\'e

wiU

255

Reciprocity

long

persist as

as

)'

has P c\'cn

itit is clear

to x that y

prone to the obsessions of the unrequited

is

personal

permits x to

lo\'e

lo\e for y

sorts

all

a

on

loxing

x's

that

love

given the power of these obsta-

nature reciprocal. For

b)' its

x's love for y can never be tested by

neat maneuver, the agapic personal lover

e\'er

agapic personal

No wonder

x.

to develop the ability to sustain

And no wonder,

constant and

constant and reciprocal,

by

on

theory of agapic

x, x's

determination of ordinary mortals, Wojt\'la claims that genu-

strictly

is

called

is

of obstacles.

cles to defeat the

ine lo\'e

y solely because y loves

lo\'e

(paradoxically) vulnerable to y's not loving

is

within agapic theory x against

nc\'cr love x; erosic love

N^ill

lover. Since the

is

love

is

stricdy

protected from the charge of

is

the condition that love be returned.

But suppose that erosic love

if

/s failure to love x;

-"^^

understood more

in Platonic terms,

such

that y's attractive properties are either the actual object of x's love (rather than y,

who

merely bears the properties) or both the basis of x's love for v

and themselves an object of x's there

is

no question of x's loving P being conditional on

Why, however, might means

that x

for P, X

is

preserve

concerned for y

P

if y also

being loved by P.

x's

by the y who bears P? X's loving P and wants to preserve it; in being concerned

x desire to be loved

happy that P exists

is

as object

Properties, being things, cannot love, so

lo\'e.

of P; and

as the bearer

x

can best

satisfy x's desire to

requires the cooperation of the bearer of P. Reciprocal love between

when what

persons

properties

is

loved (in part or altogether) are the other's valuable

a dyadic undertaking to preserve

is

and enhance the value that each

finds in the other. Indeed, if properties are the object self-interest loN'c X is

of love, then the odor of

eliminated from the desire for reciprocit\^ For

x's desire that y not the desire that x be the object of y's love or that x be the direct

beneficiarv' is

P two

loves x (or the valuable properties in x), since preserving

is

of \^s concern, since

the focus of y's concern.

The

if y

loves x for the value in x

attitude that x

same way that P

as the

that value that

and y have toward each other can

be disinterested (not self-interested) and detached properties, in the

it is

when

they love each other's

Third allows detacliment (10.7).

And

neither x nor y can be accused as readily of giving in order to get, because neither

is

giving to the other in the

experience they

do not

first place;

get, but dieir valuable properties get.

voiced objection to the love for properties fore

falls flat.

To

be sure, x

but, in effect, to P. receive,

But

is

same time and

and does not expect to

interest: X

wants to

is

— that

it is

The commonly

self-interested

— there-

concerned not for y but for P and gives not to y

at the

One might say that x, that X finds valuable,

and any getting that x and y

in

for the

same reason

x

does not

receive.

attempting to

satisf\' x's

desire to preserve the

P

"ultimately" motivated by an objectionable kind of self-

satisfy

one of x's

desires. Indeed,

one might

sa\'

that x's

256

Reciprocity

wanting to

y is similarly self-interested and, hence, concern for y, are after all self-interested.

satisfy x's desire to benefit

that x's desire for reciprocity',

But mcrelv wanting to

and

satisfy' a

any morally suspicious sense.

whose only desire

is

x's

desire docs not count as being self-interested in If

it

did,

what could we say about the

to help others? That this altruist

is

onlv an egoist in disguise? No. The thesis that no self-interest

not seem to follow from the logic of '"'"desire" or metaphysics

it is

altruist

logically impossible or

'"'"satisfaction,"

perhaps coherent but unconvincing. That

it

is

benign does

and

as a piece

of

makes me happy

made you happv docs not mean that I have made you happv just in order to make me happ\'. The reason that I am happy when I have made you to have

happy

not that

is

I

Let us turn,

Ascent

on

—

x's

have

loving v

the road to

x's

satisfied a desire simpliciter.

finallv, to Plato's theor\' is

onlv

x's

of cros

loving beaut}' in

of beaut\'.

if successful,

al

human and

it

x does not

It is x's

idealize y)^'^ that

x confronts the nonpersonal Beaut)' alone, not hand-in-hand

does not occur at the highest level of the Ascent, since imperson-

x's earlier

interested.

but one step

beloved. Reciprocal love, then, plays a very small role in this

Beaut\' (unlike

then

is

Form of Beaut\'.

abandoning love for y and progressing to purer instantiaPlato's (or Diotima's) eros is basically a trip of one, not a trip of

tions

picture;

is,

which includes the

this love

x's

two:

with a

itself,

and

eventual contemplation of the Ideal

clear-sighted failure to find perfection in y (that

contributes to

y,

God) does not

attachment to y

But there

is

love. If x's seeking Beautx'

may

is

self-interested,

very well have been instrumentally

a curious implication:

it

is

quite because x

is

selfself-

interested that X does not especially desire a reciprocal love with y or to be

loved by

v.

Rather than

militates against

self-interest yielding the desire for reciprocit)',

making too much of reciprocal human

love.

it

CHAPTER

Concern and the

12

Morality of Love W'c need to be exposed to more role models like

At

the Bunkers. ...

lo\ed ones with as

much

politeness

— D. Bvrne and

1.

.

.

and fewer

.

to treat

Murnen, "Maintaining Loving Relationships"

S.

right. If we

treat strangers, then Archie

ishes us to be nicer to

neighbors), as tion.

Huxtables

le\'el,

HOOKING HUMBERT

The epigraph cannot be

we

like the

we should be able to learn and kindness as we do strangers.

the simplest

if

is

should treat loved ones

as nicely as

an adequate role model. Further,

our bcloNcds

(as

Kierkegaard says, thev are

it

admon-

"first"

our

love did not express itself naturaliv as concern but as destruc-

But anyone who needs to be told to be

WTiat would make more sense

is

this:

the task

nice to a beloved is

is

not a lover.

to be nicer to those

whom we

do not lo\e but who lo\'e us; we ought to be nice to them despite the resentment we feel at their constant and obnoxious concern for our well-being. This recommendation would have us exhibit the concern of morality^ which replaces our missing concern

of love, or perhaps

it

appeals to our self-interest:

the unhappiest are not those who pine unrcquitedl)', but those who are loved but do not love in return. Were we to love the ones who love us, we would out of love's concern be happv to accept their concern. But the ones who love us ^

also have a task: to realize that their concern brings us pain, to

concern for us out of concern for ones with

as

much

indifference as

"I loved vou," savs

Thev should learn they do strangers.

us.

Humbert

renounce their

to treat unwilling loved

to himself about Lolita. "I

was

a

pcntapod

was despicable and brutal, and turpid, and c\er\'thing, maisje faimais, je faimais! And there were times when I knew how you felt, and it was hell to know it, my little one."^ We hesitate to agree with Humbert that he loved her. He was enchanted with her, he worshipped her monster, but

I

loved vou.

I

sweet bodv, but something was missing insensitivit\' ma\'

—

his

wanting her to

flourish.

His

be compatible with overwhelming sexual desire or with

obsessive romantic lo\e. But his emotion seems not to be even a mediocre

personal lo\e. Robert

Brown

claims that

"it is

not possible for one person to

257

258

Concern and the

lo\e another and

Moi'cilit^'

of Love

never have goodwill toward the beloved." This

\'ct

ceptual, not a psvchological, truth:

ward

his consort

would be ...

"A

lover

who

.

.

is

a con-

\\'ishcd only ill-will to-

.

But

a definitional absurdit\'."^

this criterion

Humbert and other monsters off the hook. As insensitive as he was, Humbert uas not insensitive to the effect of his insensitivity on his darling; because "it was hell to know" he was harming her, Humbert ^cXisome goodwill toward her. Brown also sa\'s, howe\'er, that the lo\'er ''must embody recognizable goodwill toward the beloved," which does exclude Humbert. The fact that stating preciseh' how much or what kind of concern constitutes the "recognizable goodwill" of love is difficult should not make us settle for the weak lets

"no goodwill

criterion bert,

will

it

at all

means no

love." If that net will not catch

Hum-

not catch anvone.

The thesis that concern is a central feature of love controversial.

For

lo\e

if

is

if not '/en'

important,

is

from hate

to be distinguished

(7.8),

imoking

concern for the welfare of the beloved as a necessary condition of love, as a

mark of "ideal" love, or as one of love's t\'pical causal consequences seems the \\2x to do it. But what exactlv is the concern of personal love?

SELF-LOVE

2.

"Self-love" love.

a queer thing, if we understand

is

Imagine what

time with a;

x's

emotion would be toward

it

analogouslv to personal

herself:

x

prefers spending

rather than with other people; x looks forward with excitement to

sharing intense experiences with x; x sexuallv desires sexual pleasure; x reveals to

a:

the delicacies of x's

x and wants

life stor\';

x

to give

the well-being oix even at the expense of x. If we replace the italicized "v,"

what

makes thing

is

described

is

familiar.

But hax'ing this

If

we understand logicallv

must

refer to

some-

self-love analogously to neighbor-love, there

odd

in self-love: x neigh bor-lo\'es

reason that x neighbor- loves others

— thatx

concerned for the well-being of a:

tionall\'

with

x's

of love for oneself hardly

logical or ps\'chological sense. "Self-lo\e," then, else.

would be nothing

at

sort

x

concerned for

is

is

a

human

as for the

x

being; x

for the

is

as

same

uncondi-

well-being of others. "* Or,

the opposite end of the spectrum, self-love may be construed as selfishness: x

preferentiallv fa\'ors the well-being self-lo%'e

of a: even to the detriment of others. But

can also be understood as a composite of \'arious reflexive attitudes:

self-respect, self- admiration, self- acceptance.^ Self-love in this sense

is

not

equivalent to selfishness. That both personal love and neighbor-love involve

concern for

concern

—

its

object might have suggested that self-love

— and, hence, that

for the self

it is

selfishness.

is

alwavs a matter of

Of course,

selfishness

259

Concent and the Morality of Love

exists in it

our world, and

this

is

one sense

whieh

in

might be

x

said to lo\e.v, but

does not exhaust the meaning ofselt-love. Self-love in the sense

talents

and powers

is

of respect for oneself and confidence about one's

not objectionably self-interested

at least

because there

is

no question of x's loving .v, in this sense, in order to get from.v by gixing to a:. But it might be argued that the desire for self-respect is objectionably selfinterested. Similarly, if we want to be loved crosically (that is, in virtue of our

way

attractive properties) because being loved that

(7.3),

our attimde

is

most ardent defender of

E\'cn the

builds our self-respect

objectionably self-interested. So claims Russell \'annoy: love's unselfishness

to arise out of mere charity or duty.

.

.

.

damaged

does not want erotic love

This demand

itself

is

based on

self-

one wasn't chosen for one's merits and appealing qualities and was only worthy of love that is gi\en to just But if one wants to be chosen for one's appealing qualities, one is anyone. committed to the selectivirv and e.xclusiveness that reveal the egoism of one's [lover]. For he or she will be chosen on the basis of qualities that appeal to the [lover's] needs and self-interests.*^ interest.

For one's self-esteem

.

is

if one feels

.

.

.

.

.

There are two claims

here.

One is that when x lox'es y, the properties in virtue of

are specifically properties that satish' x's needs; x's love

which x loves y

therefore "egoistic." But note the difference between attractive because

because x finds

it

without finding

it

\''s

The

latter

is

compatible with

its

model bv claiming that .x's finding a

connection with

pleasure.

indicate

x's

loving y erosically

properties primarily useful: x Ioncs y because x admires y's

properties that are a joy for x to behold. nov's

finding a property

needs, and a propert\^s bringing x pleasure

satisfies x's

attractive.

x's

is

x's

needs,

is

But finding properties

still

One

is

that v

Vanof

and being pleased by them no more

attractive

is

this case into

egoistic because the propert)' brings x

a valuable propert\' (see 11.7).

egoism than wanting to preserve

The second claim

could force

propert)' attractive, independently

an accomplice

in x's egoistic love:

y wants to

be loved for v's attractixe properties because that contributes to y's self-respect, and the desire for self-respect is objectionably self-interested. Erosic love, then, is

egoistic in the sense that

wanting erosic love

kind of self-love. Wanting to

feel

good about

interested in any exciting way. Self-respect

is

wanting to achieve

oneself,

however,

and self-confidence

is

a certain

not

self-

are basic goods;

people want these things, no matter what else they may want, because without

them

life

is

hardly worth living.^

What we

genuine threat to the concern of love,

is

have to pay attention

self-interest in

some

to, as a

exciting sense.

Humbert's claim to love Lolita was negated not by the pleasure he found contemplating her face or undergarments, but by

in

his willingness to interfere

260

Concern and the Morality of Love

with her "normal" development and flourishing, since that interference was

own

not essential for his

when

it

becomes

flourishing. Self-interest

is

selfishness.

EGOCENTRIC PHILIA?

3.

Perhaps erosic personal love

is

suspected of being self-interested in an

exciting sense because sexual love, romantic love, easilv seen as egocentric.

Nvgren (who

labeled

it

The

criticisms

and especially Plato's eros

of x's love for y

is

and Gregor\^ Vlastos ("spiritualized"

"acquisitiN^e")

that y

is

are

of Plato's eros voiced bv Anders

egocentrism) are well known. ^ But Aristotle's philia basis

objectionable at least

Does

virtuous.

is

this

also

an erosic love: the

mean

that even philia

is

egocentric'

George Nakhnikian argues that Aristode's perfect friendship between two virtuous men is egocentric. "When Aristotle speaks of loving individuals for their own sake, he does not mean wishing for their good and .

.

.

.

.

.

acting accordinglv, without any expectation or thought of getting something in return

from them."^ This claim

is

surprising, because Aristotle partiallv

defines perfect friendship as desiring the

good of another

for that person's

sake; perfect friendship excludes the give-to-get attitude that characterizes use

and pleasure friendships and that makes them objectionably

What is wrong with Aristotle's philia, wishes the

good

.

.

.

good

of )'

.

for y for .

.

/s

is

down

sake, this boils

out of appreciation for

So? Aristode's philia

self-interested.

according to Nakhnikian,

egocentric because

\''s

it is

is

that

when x

to "x's wish[ing] for the

goodness

as a

erosically based

human on

being."

v^S£[Oodness:

X and y therefore (according to Nakhnikian) love each other in part because

they "have characteristics" that

make "them

beneficent to the one

who

loves

them." As a correction of Aristotle, Nakhnikian proposes an agapic conception

of loving a person for that person's sake:

"It involves perfect

good will with no

thought of expected returns and no requirement that the person loved be

good human being." Nakhnikian

is

despite the conjunction "and." In his view,

on the

object's

a

offering onlv one criterion, not two, it is

precisely because philia

is

based

goodness that x could not have "perfect good will" toward

y,

no exchange attitude. If x is to be concerned for y for v's sake, the single condition that x must satisfy is loving "without having to think that [y] is a good human being." Then x could not be expecting any return. The way to defend Aristotle is not to say that philia is a personal love, that

is,

while Nakhnikian

is

describing neighbor-love, and that

dard applicable to the concern

is

latter to

no one expects

a stan-

apply to the former. For Nakhnikian's claim that

never property-based

is

meant to apply not only to neighbor-love.

Concern and the Morality of Low

261

but also to self-love, parental love, and personal

lo\ e. Instead, erosie

personal

love can be defended by pointing out that Nakhnikian confuses questions

about the basis of love and concern with questions about the expressed in

of y\s

basis

lo\'e.

There

is

no contradiction

attractive properties, that x

concerned for v

is

t\'pe

of concern

on the

in asserting that x loves y

of (or

as a result

as a

and that x's concern for y takes the form of x's desiring y's not for x's. What follows from v's attractixeness being the

part of) x's love for v,

welfare for

v\s sake,

of x's desiring v's welfare for y's sake

basis

either prcferentiallv for v (that

happens to be equally attractive X

— for example, for

Vlastos writes: "Discerning the possibilit)' another's ha\'e

it

.

.

.

good

all

virtuous

who men with whom

Aristotle's philia,

of a kind of love which wishes for

thought only men could To uni\'ersalize that kind of lo\'e, to extend it

for that other's sake, Aristotle

and onlv few men for few.

to the slave, to impute

surd."^"

that x will have this sort of concern

While contrasting agape to

able to sustain friendship.

is

is

nonuniversally) or for anyone else

is,

The purported

it

to the

would have struck him

deit\',

with philia

fault

is

not that

it

for the other for the other's sake, but that in being property-based

the

number of

Thus, philia t\'pe

is

objects this concern

is,

Similarlv, what follows from is

— the

basis

fact that erosie love t\'pe

of love

scope (or

its

sexerely limited.

loving y in virtue of y's attractixe prop-

is

limits the

is

conditional

on y's maintaining those

temporal scope of its concern. But the

not in principle constant

from the

logically distinct

is

That x lo\es both y and z attractiveness does not mean that x cannot be concerned for both for

of concern x has for v while x

for their

is

"not proportion [ed] ... to merit."

x's

that x's concern for v for v's sake

properties

extended toward)

unlike God's agape and neighbor-love, which extend the same

of concern universally, that

erties

is

as quite ab-

does not involve concern

is

concerned for

v.

on the basis of S, and no longer loves y when y loses does not mean that x had not been concerned for y for y's sake.

their sake; that x loved y S,

by

itself

Erosie personal love, to be sure, can be selfish: x might promote

onh'

when doing

so does not

interfere with x's pursuit

because x believes that receiving from y serious defects in x's concern for erosie. Further,

dependent love

nothing

in the

entails that

\''s

is

welfare

x's

welfare

unlikely unless x does so.

do not follow from

x's

These

loxe being

concept of nonpropert)'- based, nonreason-

such love necessarily involves a superior type of

concern for the other's welfare. X's ha\'ing an agapic personal compatible with

y's

of x's welfare or only

promoting

y's

for y

is

welfare because doing so contributes to

welfare, as x's having an erosie personal love for y

concerned for y for y's sake. Nakhnikian argues that

lo\'e

x's loN'ing

is

x's

x's

being

means

that x

compatible with

y in virtue of y's goodness

as

loves y in virtue of properties that enable y to be "beneficent" to x, and hence

Concern and the Morality of Love

262

Aristotle's philia fails to achieve

why Nakhnikian

thinks that

concern for y for

x's

loving y for

y's

y's sake.

But

it

puzzles

me

goodness must have that

consequence; "x loves y because y is good, and y has properties that can benefit x" simply does not entail "x is concerned for y not for y's sake but for the benefit X can receive

from

y."

There might be an entailment were Nakhnikian to

assume psychological or metaphysical egoism; but

if that thesis is

true

would

it

apply equally to erosic and agapic personal love. Alternatively, Nakhnikian

might claim that x's merelv knowing that y is good and has the abilit)^ to benefit concern for y egocentric. But if that is what Nakhnikian has in x must be concerned for y "without having to think that [y] is a good human being" turns out to be too weak for his own X makes

x's

mind, Nakhnikian's criterion

—

—

good undermines the quality of x's )'^s sake only when either 1 x is totally ignorant of y's character (a Rawlsian veil-of- ignorance must operate in real life) or (2) x believes or knows that y is not good, or is unattractive, or otherwise has no properties capable of benefiting x. In either case, most acts of concern done out of neighbor-love will fail to achieve what Nakhnikian wants; and in case (2) an object's being humanly unlovable (7.7) becomes a necessary purposes. If merely

knowing

that y

is

concern, then x could be concerned for y for

condition for

being concerned for her for her sake.

x's

Kierkegaard's insight

genuine, since twisted

person

it

is

4.

x's

into: x

(

—

x's still

loving v

when y

is

on y's making someone for their

love cannot be based

can be concerned for

a

we took

x's

repayment

sake only

love

is

— and

when

that

dead.

LOVE AND SACRIFICE

Let us assume with Aristotle, then, that

if x loves

cerned for y, X desires the good for y and acts to promote desire

It is as if

dead proves that

)

}''s

and

it. ^ ^

welfare for v^s sake, not for x's sake. For example,

our beloved "change for the

better,"

beloved's deficiency' "produces in us

.

.

we must .

is

therefore con-

Of course, x must

when we desire that

desire this not because

our

malaise, discomfort, hostilitv, resent-

ment, or fear" but simply because changing

is

good

beloved might want to change for the better to

for our beloved. ^^

alleviate

Our

our discomfort, but

that cannot be, ceteris paribus, our reason for desiring that our beloved

we do means to our own good, that we do not give in order to receive, and that we do not desire the other's good only insofar as it is compatible with our own good. Promoting the other's good onlv when it change. Being concerned for another for that person's sake means that

not desire that person's good

as a

does not threaten or reduce one's beloved:

own good

is

a stinginess that says to the

my good comes first. This is not identical to x's being concerned for y

Concern and the Morality of Love

for x's sake, but

must mean

it is

263

nonetheless not being concerned for y for

sometimes and to a certain extent,

that x, at least

is

v's sake: that

willing to put y's

welfare ahead of x's. I

doubt

this claim will

be seen

as controversial.

how much and what sort of sacrifice to undertake in order to be a lover.

concerned for

and x's

itself It

v's

A

good.^

x

is

must

x, if x is trulv

terriblv large area exists

may be

Phaedrus says {Symposium 179b), that "only

true, as

to die for their beloveds," but x's going over the edge of doom

on from the perspective of the concern of lo\e, supererogatoand not as supererogatory as doing the same thing for a stranger, from the

behalf of y

—

At what expense to

out of love, pursue

controversial

must be willmg

x's

lo\'ers desire

ry

is

being concerned for y only as far as y's good is compatible with x's, being concerned for y to the point of crossing over the edge of doom to

bet\veen

doom

\'

What

for the beloved the lo\'er

is still,

The concern of love implies onh' that x good for \''s good; hence, x may sometimes favor x's good over the good of y. (At what expense to y? Not if X secures a nonbasic good for x at the cost of y's basic goods.) We do not expect that when x loves v, x in virtue of x's love alwa)'S favors the good of \'; and if the love of X and v is reciprocal, not both x and y can always put the other's good first (2.5). Nor would they expect that from each other. It is possible, after all, perspective of the concern of moralir\'. is

sometimes (not always) willing to

that X can desire for x's sake that

great a threat to

x's

good.

other and favoring the

The unending

\'

sacrifice x's

change for the

better, if v's

is

characteristic

when

of lo\'e and concern

of them) cannot do more than indicate the rough boundaries.

to avoid

thinking that because there must be

is

between the other's good and one's

phenomenon. For the

to-get

too

of love's concern?

disputes between lovers over this question (for example,

(or our concepts

is

What is the balance between favoring the good of the

good of oneself that

careers conflict with marriage) suggest that the concepts

The mistake

not doing so

some balance

own good, reciprocal love is merely a give-

fact that x

sometimes favors v and sometimes

favors X does not imply that x has that attitude or that x

is

not concerned for y

for y's sake.

"LoN'e and friendship," savs Charles Fried, "in\olve the

initial

respect for

the rights of others which moralit}' requires of e\cr\'one."^'^ Kierkegaard

makes the point

in a

more

radical

way when he

insists that one's

and foremost one's neighbor, the point being that

tary

.

.

.

of

moralirv'.

\'er\'

spouse

is first

least lo\ers

must

two persons must in accordance with the general

treat each other as an\'

principles

at the

But for Fried love

"fiirther involve[s]

relinquishment of something between

.

.

.

lover

the volun-

and lover." In virtue

of their love for each other x and v give up some of their general moral rights against each other (which

is

itself permitted

by the general principles of morali-

Concern and the Morality of Love

264

Further, the concern of love goes beyond the concern of morality.

t\').

loves y, y will

is

a special, preferential object

promote v's good

at greater

When x

of x's concern; hence we expect that x

expense to x than that required by the concern

of moralit)'. What some lovers overlook, unfortunately,

that just because x's

is

lo\e-concern for y goes beyond the concern of morality, y is not free to violate all the general demands of moralirv' toward x. Taking for granted, or misunder-

standing the nature of,

x's

relinquishing

some moral

rights against y, y ends

up

hurting the one y loves by violating the demands of morality that x has not relinquished. But because love means going bevond the concern of moralit\',

we

also expect x,

out of love, to forgive v more readilv than

onh' b\ moralit\', and this includes

Our

quished moral rights.

must more

outline: x

x's

if x

were motivated

when y violates unrelinno more than this rough

forgiving y

concepts, however, yield

readily forgive v, but not necessarilv to the point

of

doom.

To sa\' that if x loves y, it, is

then x desires the good for y and acts to promote

to say not only that x desires to benefit

}'

by x's

own hand but also that x is

when \^s welfare is enhanced by other persons or processes. If x does desire the good for v for \''s sake, \^s flourishing will bring x pleasure regardless of its cause. (Similarly, when x hates y, x derives great pleasure when someone pleased

else

damages

v,

even

if

would

x

also

be

damage.) Construing the concern of love

who

brings about

and sexual

\^s

mav

be the one doing the y flourish no matter

pro\ ide a neat distinction between love

desire; in the latter, x desires that v experience sexual pleasure

that X be the precise

would be

flourishing

ecstatic to

as x's desire that

one

satisfactory' for

who

happv

fails

about

)^s

Not

necessarilv. X's

receiving sexual pleasure

others in which

x's

it

being hurt bv,

from someone

else

does

to desire \^s flourishing simpliciter\ for x might reasonably

not believe that y's sexual relations with z are essential to asking x to desire

and

— x hardlv ever thinks that

to

at this prospect? ^^

and complaining about, not mean that x

it

do it. Does it follow that if x loves y, pleasure for y no matter who brings it about, and

someone else

then X should desire sexual that X should be

brings

\''s

good

at

too great a cost to

beloved y flourishes

at the

x's

y's

good, or y may be this case, and

good. But

hand of z,

are difficult. Instead

of

happy when \^s welfare is enhanced by other persons, perhaps the concern of love means onlv that x's unhappiness should not lead x to interfere with z's benefiting v and that x need not desire to assist entailing that x will always be

evew

z

whose goal is v's welfare. Much depends on whether \^s allowing z to knowing that this will cause x pain, is y's favoring y's good at too

benefit y,

great an expense to

But possible)

if

x's.

X desires to be the

and

is

always upset

one and only person

who

benefits y (were that

when some z acts to promote y's welfare, then x's

Concern atid the Morality of Love

concern seems incompatible with is

a difference, that

in x's

life,

is,

between

x's

265

desiring the

x's

good

for

such that the largest part of x's concern

is

for

\''s

sake.

directed at v, and

leading x to desire that even' bit of v's welfare be due to desiring reciprocit\'

\'

There

love for y leading x to put y in a special place

from y means

love

x's

Similarlv, even if x's

x.

that x desires that v be concerned for

x

x,

must not be so self-centered as to desire that qxctx ounce of v's concern be spent on x. But x's desire to be the one who predominantlv benefits v need not indicate that x

is

ultimately egoistic. Alastair

parental love for a

young

"what

child

is

love be bestowed by this person," that

hence not opposed to concern for nanth' benefits

y, if x's

One might be respond that if x, y,

the child,

but the X x's

it is

y, x

benefiting v

Hannay

the parent. ^^

is,

mav desire

particularlv

is

has pointed out that in

in the loved one's interest

to be the

one who predomi-

conducive to

as a parent, desires to

because x plausibly believes that

x's

that the

is

Out of concern and y's flourishing.

be the one

benefiting v

who benefits is

best for v;

who has a personal love for y cannot claim that just because x Ioncs v,

benefiting y

is

best for y.

However,

the parent's loving the child, and not

it is

the bare fact of parenthood, that allows the parent to think that he or she the best position to benefit the child. (Bare parents children cannot be trusted to care for

who do

is

in

not love their

them as well as they could be cared for.

)

If

who has a personal love for y can similarly defend the desire to be the one who predominantlv benefits y, without necessarilv bringing into doubt so, the X

the qualit)' of x's concern or

its

motivation. This will be especially true

and y love each other and y thereby

5.

by x

x

in particular.

CARTE BLANCHE CONCERN

The problems soh'able

desires to be benefited

when

if concern

revolving around the concern of personal love are neatly

means taking on the task of leading the belo\'ed to God. "In

point of fact," asserts Karol Wojtyla, "to desire 'unlimited' good for another

person

God for that person: He alone is the objectixe fiillness fill every man to overflowing. T

really to desire

is

of the good, and only His goodness can

want happiness but

.

.

.

for you'

means

'I

.

want

only people of profound faith

that

.

which makes vou happv'—

themselves quite clearly that

tell

.

'this

means God'."^*^ Wojtyla apparently means that x's love-concern for y, and not some other concern (say, the concern of religious dut\'), is what requires x to lead y to God. For once, Kierkegaard agrees with the pontift': "To be loved bv another

human being

love-relationship

...

do not

is

the most blissful and jovous attachment,

X should

lead y to

God

even

God. ... As soon as I in a God, this love, even if it were

to be helped to love

lead another person to

if

.

.

.

nevertheless

y prefers whatever

it is

on

is

not true

earth that

love."^'^

is

incom-

266

and

Coficeni

the Morality of Love

patible with, stops short of, or reallv

no reason

x

X

— because God

should x attempt to lead y to God?

to spare an\' expense; besides, in giving

ever\thing.

God

irrelevant to loving

is

\\ good. At what expense to

up

is

X has

everv'thing x attains

should not even spare the expense of /s coming to hate x for

ignoring v\ worldl)' preferences, says Kierkegaard. Should x desire to be the

who leads \ to God? Sureh\ x has reason to believe x can do it better than who does not have x's profound faith, but x should also seek the assistance of those who are experts. Wo)t\'la insists that x's concern must express itself as x's leading y to God one one

opposition to

in

x's

promoting v's welfare

specifically in

well-being. Lovers lacking profound faith say, "I

happy," but they "leave a blank to be this thesis

—

if x loves y, x's concern

filled in

want

\''s

sense of y's worldly

that

which makes you

... by the beloved." Let us

—

what y wants the carte blanche view. For Kierkegaard, holds in only one context: for y

A man should love God in unconditional obedience. if

man

any

dared love

.

.

.

call

must take the form of desiring and doing

another person in

... this

It

carte blanche

would be ungodliness

wav. ... If vour be-

loved asked something of you which out of honest love and in concern vou had decided was harmful to him, then you must take responsibility' if you express love by complying instead of expressing lo\'e by denving the fulfillment of the desire. But God you are to love in unconditional obedience, even if what he demands of you mav seem to you to be to your own harm.i^ .

Thus,

it

.

.

makes sense that Wojt\'la emphasizes

being concerned for v carte blance;

x's leading y to God in contrast going to do anv carte blanching,

to

x's

it

had better be toward God. People must "surrender" themselves to God's

desires (they

must do His

will);

if x is

thev must not have this attitude toward

mortals. ^^

There are two versions of the whatever y wants, and v.

These are not

good for y; to.

(

ii)

x wants the

equi\'alent.

to stop

carte blanche thesis:

(i)

and

(ii).

for y in v's eyes.

that y's getting

x wants for y

Y might want a Big Mac, vet readily admit it is not

smoking might be good for y in v^'s eyes, yet v does not want

In these cases, x will not be able to

both

(i)

good for y in y's sense of what is good for

show concern

for v consistently with

Of course, y might want something exactly because it is good And the fact that v wants something means, ceteris paribus, it is

good

for y; the satisfaction

show concern

of desire

is,

good. In these

cases, x

carte blanche.

But the question remains: Should x pursue

can

within

limits, a

consistently with both versions this thing for

of y

good for v in v's eyes? Should x maximize the satisfaction of y's desires even when y admits that in \^s perfect life y would not have some of those desires, or should x benefit y in v's notion of what is good because y wants

it

or because

it is

Concern and the Morality of Lore

tor y, even

though y

resists?

Note

267

that both versions

must be

qualified; x

cannot be expected to do ever\thing that y wants or is good for v in v's sense, since some of these things are too harmful to x. We already have, therefore, one

argument x's

sake,

it

is

is

superior to the

willing to sacrifice at least

makes more sense to think that

(in v's sense)

V

of carte blanche

that the second xersion

loving \ implies that x

this sacrifice

and not merely for what

\'

done

is

first.

some of x's good for

what

difficult to

construe version

desires v's

good

concerned for

(i)

and

for y's sake

y, in a

as

if one

version

is

we should

true, the other

an account of concern

x's

loving

y,

version

says, x desires the (i)

of carte blanche

is

good

if x

for y.

For it is

that x

is

is

desires that y

specimen of a human being y

—

is.

If x loves y, x

all.

only

of being, and that v be happy, content, and self-confident formula

at

acts accordingly; the core idea

way compatible with

flourish, that y develop into the finest

isjjood for

wants.

Because the two \ersions of carte blanche are quite distinct,

not make the mistake of thinking that

For if for v's

is

capable

in a nutshell, as the

However, to be concerned

for v in

not exactly to desire the^ood for y. X's desiring for

y what V wants amounts to desiring the good for y only under certain conditions (\''s desires being satisfied, aU things considered, is good for y; or v desires

good for y), but e\'en when these conditions hold, x's concern is directed at y's good and only derivatively at what y desires. Because something because version

with y's

(i).

is

not an account of love's concern, conflating

only obscures the main issue:

sense of "good" or in

To if

of carte blanche

(i)

(ii)

it is

x's

if x

loves y, should x

sense?

say "x desires whatever y desires"

This make

X loves y,

it

sound as

and y

if x

it

promote y's good in

not the best way to state version

is

incorporates into

psychological

x's

life y's

desires:

desires to eat a peach, then x desires to eat a peach merely

because y does. No doubt, this sort of thing happens in (and outside) love, but it has nothing to do with love's concern. Thus, version (i) must mean that if v desires a peach, x desires a peach for y

peach be

satisfied.

In

some cases,

to x's incorporating \^s desire: x's

desiring for v

what y

if v

x's

— that

desires that the

satisfied.

This

is

what y desires does amount

Democrats win

desires entails that x desires that the

Utah. The formula that covers both cases be

x desires that y's desire for a

is,

desiring for y

how

version

thing even about "x desires that

(i)

is

in

simplv that x desires that

should be stated. But there

v's desires

which might imply that x

is

a curious

x's

desires be

desires that x's desires be satisfied.

appears to become egocentric exactly

in

v's desires

be satisfied." If x and y love each

other, then x desires that y's desires be satisfied and y desires that satisfied,

Utah, then

Democrats win

when

it is

reciprocated.

We

Love

therefore

have another argument that the concern of love requires that x desire the good for y at least in y's sense

of "good." For

if x

desires the

good

for v

and v desires

Concern and the Morality of Love

268 the

good

for x,

a hint that lo\'e

"My one

does not follow that x desires the good for x. There

it

becomes egocentric simply because or when

fundamental thought," writes Mark Fisher,

"is that

not even

is

reciprocated.

it is

to love some-

to desire whatever he desires for the reason that he desires it,"^°

is

version

of carte blanche. In

(i)

mav be important

things: "It

a footnote, Fisher

which

is

immediately contrasts two

to distinguish between

love, as I

have defined

it,

and altruism, defined as desiring something for another because it will he for his it not necessarilv what he wants. "^^ Fisher seems to realize that

—

£lood as / see

version

does not embodv concern for the beloved, since for him desiring

(i)

whatever the beloved desires does not count

as "altruism."

Fisher means, for later he explicitly equates versions blanche, therebv showing that version

although not "altruism"

as

has no concept of love.

It

he defined never does

view to securing someone

someone

desire that

else

else's

(i),

.

good,

it

.

.

same

(ii)

and that both embody

as (i),

y,

a

IN

WHOSE

Suppose that y wants Big

Mac

is

good for y;

"good," X

is

it is

in a

a

it is

a

it is

To

not,

when

x

connect with the lover's

is

clear, then, that

Fisher underis

the

(i),

should

y's

we agree with Fisher that if

sense rather than in

x's

sense?

SENSE?

Big

Mac

in \^s sense

predicament:

self]

to act with a

concerned for y for /s sake, since

directly

because in /s sense of "good" having a

of "good" the pleasure of eating

ranked higher than eating nutritiously. If

because

transcendental

kind of concern for the beloved. But even

then x desires the good for y in

GOOD

6.

of carte concern,

and

of carte blanche, which he assumes

though we have dispensed with version X loves

is

needs, longings, plans, ideals. "^^ It

.

(ii)

embody

to act."^^ Further, for Fisher,

what y desires because y desires it, x desire for what y desires does "not

stands love in terms of version

not what

conceived by that other person.

as

desires

own

is

have what s/he desires because s/he desires

for such a being, a possible reason for

x's

[a

understand what

.

.

(i)

for him, does

"Suppose that

it:

But this

x's

choice

is

x,

who

loves y, rejects

fast

\''s

between fetching a Big

food

is

sense of

Mac

for y,

good thing for y in y's sense, and not fetching it, because it is bad

for y in x's sense. "In such a case," says Fisher, "there will be a conflict between viewing what the beloved wants as bad for him and wanting it because he

wants

it."^"*

Now,

if Fisher is

the specific form of version

conceptualized in this way: identical to x's love for y

right that if x loves v, then x's concern for v takes

(ii)

of carte blanche, then

x's conflict is

betu^een

x's

x's

predicament must be

concern for y,

as part

of or

(which love-concern leads x to desire for y what

is

good for y in y's sense) and x's concern for y that is independent of x's love for y, ,

or as Fisher calls

it,

x's

"altruism" (which nonlove-concern leads x to desire that

Concern and the Morality of Love

269

not ha\c what is bad for y in x's sense). Hence, x's conflict is between the demands of x's love for y and the demands of another system of values that also \'

involves concern for others.

To be sure, it is possible for x to find that a desire required bv x's love for v is

incompatible with desires that derive from other values x holds. "I could not (

—

much, / Lov'd I not Honour more" Richard Lovelace, Going to the Warres.") But to conceptualize x's conflict as

love thee, dear, so

"To

Lucasta.

necessarih'

between

x's

lo\'e-concern

and

x's

nonlove-concern for )'

is

implausi-

on is that x is pulled in two directions by x's love itself; x's lo\'e for v leads x to want for y what is good for v in y^s sense, at the same time that x's love for y, not some other system of \'alucs, leads x not to want for y what x thinks is bad for y. Further, if x, when faced with the decision whether to promote what is good for y in y's sense or to prevent y from having what X thinks is bad for v, opts for the latter, version (ii) of carte blanche entails ble.

For what

is

often going

that X does not lo\'e y, since x's love-independent values have overridden the

type of concern required by love.

X might have made a poor choice, or a wise

one, in preventing y from having what x thinks selecting that option does not

version

(ii)

mean

x does not

is

bad for

lo\'e y.^^ I

y,

but

x's

merely

am not arguing that

contributes nothing to our understanding of love's concern or that

good for y in x's sense is defmitive of love's concern. Rather, the lo\'e is an uneasv mixture of x's seeking the good for v in v's sense and x's seeking it in x's sense. After all, by promoting y's good in y's sense, X shows respect for y's values. Further, x's promoting \^'s good in v's sense contributes to y's autonomv, which is a good for as part of \''s flourishing: not onlv x's doing things for v but also x's manner of deciding what things to do for x's

desiring the

concern of personal

\'

y helps y to flourish.

But x's desiring for y what y's sake,

cannot be a

attempted to discern what sense.

y,

is

The reason Wojtyla's

his claim that if x loves y,

wants or thinks period

discern

— that

what

is

is

good

is,

is

good for v in x's sense, and pursuing this for

strike against the qualit\'

objectixelv

position

is

is

in principle plausible

also

by disregarding

what

is

v's

good

sense of

objectixeh'

good

is

for y

objecti\'ely

means x's

v.

good

that x

own

good when y

for

as x has

that undcrlving

God instead of doing

detached viewpoint, in part bv disregarding

discern

long

the idea that in loving v, x desires

whatever happens to be

objectively

x's love, as

\'

then x helps y to

for \\

of

good for and has embraced that as x's

is

for

must

\'.

tr\'

what y the good for for y

X's tr\'ing to

to occupy a

preference and wants but

not similarlv moti\ated to

Because while trying to fashion

x's

sense

of what is objectively good for v, x detaches x's perspective from x's own wants,

good

x's

seeking the

y's

sake and not for

for v therebv contributes to x's seeking the x's.

What

x

is

attempting to do

is

good

for v for

to achieve for y

what

is

Concern and the Morality of Love

270

truly

good

overriding

when

for y; hence, sense, x

\''s

is

x promotes y's

good

not necessarily doing so for

contrcl oxer v, or because x

is

in x's sense, possibly

trivial

reasons, to assert

insensitive to y's desires. Furthermore, recall that

loving y implies that x must be v^illing to sacrifice some of x's good for the benefit of y. But the necessitv of this sacrifice can be understood best if it is

x's

is genuinely or objectively good for y, not merely what good for v. And since x is expected to make these sacrifices, surely x should have some say as to what counts as y's good. Indeed, were v to attempt systematically to discern what is objectively good for y, x would haxe little reason to promote y's good in x's sense. This does not mean, however, that x would be conforming to version (ii) of carte blanche; x is still motivated to achieve for y what is objectively good for y, but what that is can now be identified by looking seriously at y's sense of what is good for v. In principle, then, there is no conflict between x's doing for y what is good for v in y's sense and x's doing for y what is good for y in x's sense; the whose sense of y^s good is a better mark of what is conflict is epistemological objectiveh' good for v.' For that matter, if y does attempt to discern what is

required to secure what

\'

thinks

is

—

might very well express concern for y (on the surface, bv doing for v precisely what y desires; for under these conditions even

objecti\'ely at least)

what V

good

desires

concern

for y, x

might be

is still x's

of what

a reliable sign

desiring for y

what

good

good for y. But x's

fov y.

IDENTIFYING WTTH THE BELOVED

7.

Fisher actuallv interprets

x's conflict

differendy:

desiring something for y and x's not desiring

something is

objectively

is

objectively

is

good

as

bad for v,

in x's sense,

for v in v's sense.

^"^

is

it is

it

as

not between

between

for y, but

and viewing

X's conflict

cognitive. "In order to desire

it

x's

x's

viewing

good for y just because

not in the realm of desire, but

what the other

it

is

desires," says Fisher, "the lover

oP her beloved,

were"; the

must

see the desired objects 'through the eyes

lover

"must to some degree come to share his beliefs about it."^'' Thus, because

as

it

y views as good what is good for y in y's sense, and x (if x loves y) desires for y what y views as good for v, x also views this as good for y. X's predicament is that X

is

believes

forced bv is

bad

x's

for y

love into believing that something that x independendy is

also

good

for y.

To

get to the heart of Fisher's view,

consider the following account of "identification." We can feel the pain (or pleasure) of another person

we can

identif\'

with a person by thinking of her

the other's pain (or pleasure) because

were we to be

in the other's situation.

as if she

we would be

in

two

were

senses. First,

ourself:

we

feel

feeling pain (or pleasure)

To put oneself into someone else's shoes

271

Concern and the Morality of Love

would ha\'e

feeling the other person's pain, to put the other

manner of

rcallv, in t±iis

is

person

our shoes, to imagine what they

in

mav

feel. I

my

been assimilated to

Hence, x could

feel

Second,

situation.

other, but

we

/s pain

we can

were that person. senses: not onlv

what we

are feeling by noticing

be wearing the other's shoes, but the other person's feelings

We

in

feelings:

some

identif\'

a

were to

feel

hat.

pain in that

person bv thinking of ourself as

it

we

put ourselves in the other person's situation in two

do we imagine

also look

situation only if x

with

my

have made the other wear

I

that

we

are in the brute circumstances

of the

from the perspective of the other person.

at things

When

wear the shoes and the hat of the other.

We

x puts x into y's place in this

what y would be feeling, not bv in\'oking what x would teel but bv in\'oking y's beliefs and values. Hence, x could know that y will feel pain in a situation even if x were not independentlv to feel pain in that situation. The second sense, I take it, describes what happens at least sometimes when x loves sense, x imagines

The

V.

bv contrast, involves an insulation of x from much of what

first,

central to y's personality Fisher's insight

good, X

is

and seems incompatible with

might be put:

appropriate for parental love; but wa\', x's personal love for v

assimilate x to v is

if x is

concerned for v only

overly assimilating y's perspective to

is

bv taking on

good for v. Indeed,

this

if x is

x's.

of y's

may be

always and only concerned for y in this

sense of what

means

in x's sense

This kind of concern

X must

brought into doubt.

v's

is

love.

good

is

that x will at least

to a certain extent

for y as x's sense

sometimes take on

of what

y's

sense

of what is good^A: as part of x's sense of what is good for x. If so, x's being concerned for v in reciprocal love means that x will desire for y a mixture of

what

is

good for v in

v's

sense and

what

is

good

for y in x's sense, since if y also

loves X, y will assimilate v to x and at least partially take

on

sense of what

x's

is

good for V as \^s sense of what is good for y Hence, the conflict x experiences is between x's maintaining x's independent beliefs and the assimilation of x's beliefs to y's beliefs. The tough question x has to face in some situations is whether x should hold fast to x's independent belief that something is bad for y or jettison that belief by taking on y's belief that this thing is actually good .

for y.

Fisher

is

right,

of course, that

x's

viewpoint to

\^s, is

ing

all x's

good a

to

\''s

for the sake

of y's good

requirement of love:

poses a threat to beliefs,

x's

x's

y's x's

x's

also suspicious. X's always assimilating x's beliefs to y's

unacceptable criterion of the concern of love,

cannot be

viewpoint to

always assimilating

never assimilating

loving y, but the opposite extreme,

nullifies x's

x's

(that

is,

abandoning

own flourishing.

Further,

including x's views as to what

is

same way

in the

x's

x's

x's

is

an

that x's sacrific-

sparing no expense to x)

sense of what

is

good

always assimilating

for x

x's beliefs

good for x, means that were y also

272

Concern and the Morality of Love

to loN'c X,

\''s

good for X

concern for x would always take the form of doing for x what

in v^s sense

— which contradicts

(those that ha\'e to

unclear. If x

important to

x's identit\'

larger sacrifice

bv love to

do with

sense of what

y's

not required by love to jettison

is

or

jettison x's

is

important

if x is

is

good

beliefs

not

for y) but not others

is

or values that x considers

because jettisoning those beliefs

integrity',

of x's good than

But

why x should assimilate some of x's beliefs to

expected to assimilate totally to y, V''s

Fisher's carte blanche.

is

is

a

required by love, then x cannot be required

beliefs

about what

concern of love would seem to require the opposite:

is

good

if x

for v. Indeed, the

stronglv believes (not

good reason) that promoting v^s good in \^s sense would be a disaster for v, x would be violating, with weak knees, x's concern for v were X to assimilate x's beliefs to y's. X's ability to promote what is objectively good for V depends on x's remaining at least partiallv detached from \^s perspective. It is true that if x loves y, x comes to believe much that y believes. But this does not happen, either at all or predominandy, because x's wanting for v what is good for v in \''s sense requires x to take on y's beliefs. X's taking on y's beliefs, whimsicallv, but with

and

vice versa if the love

is

reciprocal,

and esteem commonly found

on

naturally have an effect love.

One might

is

partially the result

in love. Further,

of the admiration

when people

their respective beliefs

— both

interact they

inside

and outside

even argue that since x and v (can be expected to) know, in

advance of any love that

arises

between them, that the intimacv of their

rela-

tionship (for example, sharing experiences) will affect their respective beliefs,

they must be able to foresee with pleasure having their beliefs modified by interacting with this particular person. ^^ Further,

I

am doubtful about Fisher's

claim that a necessan' condition of x's desiring for y what y sees as that X believes

what v

believes.

whatever v desires (version

[i]

Remember

good for y,

is

that Fisher equates x's desiring

of carte blanche) with x's desiring for v whatever

is good for y in y's sense (version [ii]). If we take version (i) seriouslv, we would have some reason for subscribing to the thesis that if x is concerned for y, x will assimilate x's beliefs to \^s in such a way that x will view as good for y what y sees as good for y. For on version (i), x's desiring what y desires sometimes means that x literally incorporates \^s desires into x's s\'stem of

desires. Since x

now has these desires for the things that y desires, x can hardly

avoid incorporating

\^s

values that attach to the things y desires:

these things implies that y believes they are good,

implies that x

now

x's

now

if )^s

desiring

desiring

them

believes the)' are good.

Perhaps Fisher thought that

x's

being concerned for y in version (ii) of \''s or incorporate

carte blanche also implies that x will assimilate x's beliefs to y's values.

But x's desiring the good for y in y's sense does not entail that x must

Concern and the Morality of Love

moditA'

know

x's values. X's

273

being able to imagine

how

y feels requires onK' that x

\ well, not that x psychologically incorporate

\iewing

bad what

as

is

good

for y in y's sense does not force x to ha\'e

contradictor\' beliefs, because x's

wanting for y what

does not automatically translate into hate as well.

ha\ing

this

X must

perspective. Hence, x's

\'\s

x's

believing

be able to understand

how

is

x's

good

for v in y's sense

good. (This applies to

it is

behated v sees things, but

understanding does not require that x psychologically incorporate

and values. Notice that if x wants to do

for y what is good for y in x's must again ha\'e an accurate understanding of y's nature; x must still be to understand how y sees things. But x's needing to understand how v

y's beliefs

)

sense, x

able

experiences things in

some

situation docs not entail that x

qualitatively identical experiences in the

desires to benefit

values and

how

\'

in y's sense

the}'

of what

is

same

situation. Similarh',

good for v,

cash out in practical

life;

must have

but

x

when

x

need only understand \^s

x's

needing to understand

them does not mean that x must incorporate them into x's own mental life. To assert otherwise would be to claim that x could never empathize with y, and be well-being, without in part becominjj

concerned for

y's

confirmed an

earlier

y.

we

In a sense,

ha\'e

conclusion (9.7 and 10.7): absolute openness and the

sharing of all experiences cannot be requirements of love.

8.

to

SPECIAL

CONCERN

The lover's concern for the beloved's well-being is not expected to extend the point of the lover's obliteration. This does not mean that the lo\'er is

ultimateh' self-interested in any exciting sense, for the loNcr's concern

is still

expected to extend beyond the point of doing only for the beloved what

compatible with the lovers

own

for the beloved's well-being

is

good. At the same time, the

fairness, that y's

more

if y, especially in a reciprocal

deserves to be treated with special concern by all

good

is

concern

limited by other considerations, in particular the

well-being of persons the lover does not love or,

of morality. Even

loNcr's

x,

generally, the

demands

love relationship with

x,

cannot think,

in

nevertheless

takes priorit)' over everv' other

\'

good

that x could

promote. Kierkegaard goes even further. His notorious statement that "your spouse

must

is first

treat the

neighbor ed

and foremost your neighbor" might not mean that the beloxed

among

at least as well as

indefinitely

many

in a discriminatorx' fashion

concern for one's beloved

is

lo\'er

required by moralitx'. Instead, as one

neighbors, one's belo\'ed

but as one equal

morally wrong. Even

among

is

not to be

treat-

other equals: special

if Kierkegaard

should not be

read as saying that the ethics of neighbor-love always trump the preferential

274

Concern and the Morality of Love

concern of personal love, the view that the preferential concern of love al\\'a\'s

in conflict

is

with the requirements of moralitv' has not escaped the atten-

tion of philosophers.

W. Newton- Smith

someone has the unhappy choice of saving either his putative beloved or an arbitrary stranger from drowning."^'^ About this case Newton-Smith says, "If the putative lover elects the relation is not one of love." For, which is to save the stranger, then plausible, if x loves y and is therefore concerned for y's well-being, x must favor asks us to "suppose that

.

\''s

.

.

well-being over the well-being of other persons

(This

is

whom

x docs not love.

not to say that x favors \^s well-being over others' well-being ultimately

for egoistic reasons.)

ways. First,

But Newton-Smith's case can be analyzed three

different

we could say that x's loving y does require x to save y, that x's saving

the stranger negates

x's

claim to love

y.

Thus, what

is

required bv love conflicts

is required by morality^ which would have x decide whom to save at random procedure that acknowledges the equal worth of all persons.

with what least

by

a

Second, y,

we could sav that moralitv' itself permits or obliges x to choose to save

because moralit)' countenances special concern directed

we

have close

moralitN'. Third, \'

Thus,

ties.

in this case there

no

is

at

conflict

those with

whom

between love and

we could say that x's saving the stranger, or deciding bctu'een

and the stranger bv using

love V. There

is

no

a

random procedure, does not negate

x's

claim to

between love and morality because the concern of

conflict

love does not require x to treat y preferentially; love requires that x be concerned for V, but it does not demand that x favor y's good over anyone else's

good. Perhaps

when

x's

we should

choice

is

say about

between

x's

Newton- Smith's hypothetical

case that

beloved and a solitarv stranger, no interesting

question arises because x can save onlv one person, no matter what x decides to

do; no view of the requirements of morality could plausibly expect x to over-

come x's inclination to save y merely to give one stranger a fair break by tossing a coin. The obvious interpretation of this case, then, is that x's saving y is required

b\'

love and permitted by moralit\^ For this reason

asks us to "suppose the a

sa\',

ten others.

cult;

.

.

.

lover has to choose

group of strangers"; the dilemma

and

both

Were y

utilitarian

just

is

Newton-Smith

between saving

another stranger,

x's

decision

would not be

none

if

not

easily handled.

all

diffi-

and Kantian moral theories require or permit x to save the

ten and allow the one to die (except the deontological view that save

his beloved

between saving only y and saving,

can be

Again there

sa\'ed).

But when v

is

x's

are three interpretations: love

with each other, love requiring x to save

y, moralit)'

would have x

beloved the case

is

not

as

and moralit)^ conflict

requiring x to save the ten

strangers; morality permits x to save x's beloved y, because special relationships

275

Concern and the Morality of Love

lia\c their

own

significant \'aluc; or there

moralit\', since love

people.

It is

when

interesting that

no

is

does not require x to favor

the beloved's

conflict

between love and

good over the good of other

y's

opposed to the

life is

ten strangers, the apparently right answer for the "'one-stranger" case

required by love and permitted by morality

saving v

is

the

and the third interpretations gain

first

li\es at stake increases:

expense, there if saving

less

reason to bring

Newton-Smith remarks preference over

remains: ma\'

all

a large

Both

x's

x's

y into doubt; and e\'en

claim to love

commitment

other commitments."-^"

y,

makes more

it

beloved for their sake.

that ''these examples are not

thesis to the effect that in 'true' love,

less plausible.

number of other number of people at v's

x's lo\'e for

the group of strangers does negate

sense here to sav that x ought to jettison

is

of x's

credibilit\' as the

were x to choose to saxe

would be

—

lives

— that

meant to imply any

to the beloved

Of course

must take

not. Yet the question

To what extent do the demands of moralit\' limit the loN'ing concern x

show toward

v?

Newton-Smith's conclusion

"the significant conceptual point tensions,

and

.

.

is

that these examples

that in the case

.

this displays the extent to

make

of love there are these

which love involves

a

commitment," as

opposed to "liking," which does not generate any "tension." But this is not convincing; even if x only likes y and has to choose between y and one stranger, X

is

in the

same dilemma. And depending on the strength of x's liking for y, x's might very well be to save y. So the

inclination in the "ten-strangers" case

number of strangers required to generate a dilemma for the x who loves y more so than we have to in the case of the x who only likes y, but this fact does not mark a conceptual "tension" remains. Perhaps

we have

to increase the

distinaion bervveen loving and liking. Both loving and liking in\'olve commit-

ments

as well as inclinations. Actually, the point

be that

the tension shows

enough

that

it

of these examples might not

that we take the committed concern of love seriously

challenges moralitv', but instead that the lack of tension in these

— our reluctance, except when the number of strangers very to sav that x ought to abandon y to the deep — shows how unseriously we take

examples

is

large,

when it conflicts with our personal lives and loves. The thesis that love always conflicts with moralit)' has been advanced by Robert Ehman. "The fiindamental requirement of love is to raise the beloved

moralitx'

above others and to give her claim

is

incredible.

Does

love

a privileged status in

our

life,"

he writes. This

demand that x's beloved spouse y be raised above

even the children of x and y? If so, love conflicts with one principle of morality

— that one must show responsible concern

Ehman

for one's offspring.

conceptualize this conflict as between the

demands of x's

Or would

love for his

spouse y and the demands of x's love for his children? Regardless, I do not immediately see how Ehman's claim gives us reason to think that "there is

Concern and the Morality of Love

276

always something immoral in the privilege and attention that the lover gives to the beloved."

Making mvself

privileged in

mv

life, if

carried to extremes,

is

morallv suspicious as a significant kind of self-interest; but what moral objection could there be to

making someone

fimdamental requirement of moralit}'

worth and to

justif\' all

Ehman explains: "The

else pri\'ileged? .

special treatment

Thus,

valid principles."^ ^

ment

.

.

is

to treat

persons as having equal

all

of a person bv reference to universally

treating y as special violates the moral require-

x's

that each person be treated as having equal worth.

assume that treating

must be

it is

in

Are we supposed to

persons as ha\'ing equal worth means that each person

That assumption

treated the same.^

what Ehman has because

all

mind. Rather,

x's

is

implausible, and

treating y as special

dissimilar treatment that cannot be justified

principles"; the lover "singles

is

it is

not exactly

morally

wrong

by "universally valid

out an individual for special concern simplv on

the basis of her personality' and of the delight [he] take[s] in being close to her."

Treating

persons as ha\'ing equal worth does not require that each be

all

treated the same,

when morallv

special treatment (this

principle)

.

But the

is

relevant differences

consistent with appealing to

fact that x

is

delighted by

among people some

/s presence

morallv relevant difference between v and other people; justif)' x's special

with

x treats v as special only because y has the irrelevant

property^ "delights x." x's special

But Ehman has not considered other ways to under-

concern for \. If x loves v not merelv because x takes delight in

Ys presence but because x for V

is

lacks

treatment of y. Thus, on Ehman's view, love always conflicts

moralitv', since

stand

Ehman, a the power to

not, for

is it

justify'

universally valid

finds value in y via \^s properties,

and

if x's

concern

directed at preserving and enhancing this value, x cannot so quickly be

accused of focusing on morallv irrelevant differences between v and others.

Wanting to presen'e the value one finds in the world is not to make an arbitrary distinction. And self-interest in some significant sense does not necessarily underlie x's valuing \^s properties, so that reason for charging x with immoral discrimination does not hold. It might be true that all people have the same value as people, but x finds in y not only this value but additional value that distinguishes v

from others and that

ment. Further,

if

lo\'ed

x

shows

is

worth preserving by

special concern for v because

preferential treat-

v has the propert\'

"is

bv x" (and not merelv "delights x"), does this automatically mean that no

"universallv valid principle"

is

at

work? There might be no contradiction

supposing that preferential concern for beloveds

is

permitted

in

b\' moralit)',

ceteris paribus.

The second point is made rather strongly by Edward Sankowski in his Ehman: "Certain sorts of love constitute such a ponderable

discussion of

277

Concern and the Morality of Love

human value that

it

that

one criterion for an adequate account of morality

humans could not do without

ential treatment involved in love

made of significant loN'C

precisely

moralitx'."''^ What is human good, something

does not sav or imply such aftections conflict with

this ''ponderable" value? If personal love

that

is

self-interest.

a basic

for a minimalh' decent

But there are other moral it

in\'olves.

unchanged to

then the prefer-

life,

and no mention need be

easily justified,

is

preferential concern

and the

friendship can be applied

were

justifications for

Elizabeth Telfer's account of

love:

promotes the general happiness by providing a degree and kind Friendship of consideration for others' welfare which cannot exist outside it, and which compensates bv its excellence for the 'unfairness' of the unequal distribution of .

.

.

For even those who have no friends are better off than they were no friendship, since the understanding de\'eloped bv and the mutual criticism involved in it will improNC the way friends deal with

friendship.

would be it

.

if there

.

.

.

.

.

people outside the relationship. ^3

The

preferential concern

concern

itself

world and

preferentiallv; the

w ithout

love.

there can be

of

love, then,

is

morally permissible because this

could not exist without love or without love's being focused

The

many

indefinitely

justification

people would be

of preferential concern, that

no powerHil general moral objection

good

by the world and

benefit obtained

beloveds

who

inhabitants

its

when

x

limits to the

provides

little

concern x should show toward y

by the beneficial

And

it is

In particular, to

effects

not convincing

it

at the

at all if x's

a t\'pical

being

is,

quandary for

of love

utilitarians:

in particular situations,

native, others have

choice

is is

on other people.

expense of the concern

the stranger who

tell

has for other people,

strangers; here the special concern is

is

between

is

drowning, while

of love

who

sa\'ing y

justified in

a

bad

their object.'''*

joke.

and sa\ing ten

unlikely of benefit to others. This

behavior that usually maximizes well-

counterproductive of well-being. As an

sought deontological

is

is

worse than

justifications

But because

it is

alter-

of friendship and love;

for example, their "ponderable" xalue lies in their recognizing the

of the person

indi-

help in setting appropriate

X preferentially sa\'es x's belo\'ed y, that the special concern

part

the

and y love each other and promote each other's

this justification

shown toward others.

And

not restricted to the

welfare, their flourishing will have morally valuable effects

But notice that

special con-

its

things.

of love's concern but extends

are the direct beneficiaries

rccdy to others:

is

lies in itself:

is,

to love and

cern precisely because the beneficial works of love arc

much poorer

"deep" value

precisely the fact that

all

persons have the same deep value as persons that conflicts with the special

concern of love,

this deontological justification

ing consistency as does the utilitarian.

And

needs as

much work in

achiev-

any deontological argument that

— Concern and the Morality of Love

278

lo\'e

must

be, for

moral reasons, exclusive (since only then can x recognize

y's

deep value as a person) must be reconciled with the claim that the moral obligation to recognize deep value in

all

persons prohibits

x's

focusing on y to

the exclusion of others.

We have, then, reached a precarious situation. The weakness of both the utilitarian

and the deontological

justifications

of love and

bined with Ehman's denial that x's delighting in v x's preferential

to justif\' a

moral

concern, com-

a reason powerful

enough

treatment of y, imply that the special concern of love

My suggestion — that

fault.

is

its

not x's delighting

it is

in

is

y but x's fmding y

valuable and, as a result, wanting to preserve this value, that justifies special

concern bv pointing out a morallv relevant difference between v and others

probably cannot by y's

on

strictions

concern.

9.

I

x's

the trick. Merely the fact that x finds value in y or

we must

will

one

soon return to

able),

this task.

a personnel director (p.d.) has reviewed the applications

available position

(multiple,

re-

justifies preferential

AND MORALITY

LOVE, JUSTICE,

whose resumes

be able to place some

valuing v in order that such valuing

Suppose that for

itself do

properties could not be sufficient;

and has eliminated

are equivalent.

The

p.d.

all

but two of the applicants,

cannot offer the job to both fmalists

cotemporaneous hirings are impossible, since only one

although the p.d. might be able to hire both

position to one finalist

but not the other, the p.d.

slot

is

avail-

serially. If the p.d. offers

the

(like Gellner's E-t}^pe lover)

might have to denv the generalitv of reasons: while hiring one fmalist on the basis of qualifications Q, the p.d. must ignore these same qualifications in the other.

The p.d.

ing

but the

all

to select p.d. to

one

already deliberated in a property-based

final

two

fmalist implies that

on

to.

Race and

irrelevant properties (as wealth basis

some

difference in their resumes allows the

judge one superior to the other. But there

for the p.d. to latch

is arbitrar\'.

is

sex, for

for the job earlier, or

finalists

Nor

as

is

make one

trivial

also arbitrary fact that

was interviewed ("encountered")

(because people are unique)

it is

is

of the outcome. The

claim that there must be

are the properties that

mance. Yet,

no job-relevant difference

Tossing a coin, or relying on randomly

surate with the significance

To

is

example, are ordinarily job-

irrelevant to love), so a decision

differences (for example, height or zip code),

difference.

manner while eliminat-

applicants. Thus, the p.d. realizes that having a reason

some

made on this or superficial

and not commen-

one fmalist applied

first, is

difference

not a relevant

between the two

to retreat from, not solve, the problem. finalist

unique relevant to job perfor-

morally permissible for the p.d. to hire only one person as

it

279

Concern and the Morality of Love

seems to be for x to recipient

persons, e\cn only one person, to be the

some

select

of x's love and preferential concern.

There arc disanalogies between the situation of this personnel director and the lover x who encounters t\vo (potential) beloveds, both of whom have attractive properties S; but these disanalogies do not amount to much. The p.d.

forced into making an exclusive appointment, not as a matter of logic or

is

Hence, the

moralit\' but as a practical matter.

because the p.d. can admit that

would

hire

both

finalists.

love

must

p.d.

not

is

like

an E-t)'pe lover,

another position were available, the p.d.

We always have the option, in Gellner's paradox, of

rejecting the claim that love are absoluteh' tied.

if

But the

bv nature exclusive, while the hands of the

is

be, for conceptual or

forced into exclusivit\' bv

hands are also

lover's

p.d.

tied if the lo\'er believes that

moral reasons, exclusive.

practical considerations

if,

And the lover may be

for example, the lover's

other commitments and non-negotiable responsibilities prevent multiple love or

if x's

beloveds, out of a desire to be loved exclusively, issue ultimatums.

Perhaps the lover,

if

affection

primarily under the sway of nonreason-

is

causes, does not (unlike the p.d.) deliberate about rush, x

lo\'e at first sight: all in a

is

whom

to love. Consider

passionately enchanted.

Even though x

might later look back on the experience and be able to explain in virtue of what properties v (and not z) was the object of x's attention, while it is happening the

phenomenon seems not

to involve a decision based

on

reasons.

Such

thoughts might underlie the resistance to conceiving of love as reason-dependent. But if we leave aside love at

The

deep. scales,

p.d.

weighs various

and decides

whom

the disanalogy does not run \cry

first sight,

factors,

comparing the applicants on

go through

to hire. Lovers

different

a similar process

of

comparing possible beloveds, weeding out those that will not do for some reason or another (8.7), even if they do so less systematically. In surxeying the field, lo\'ers

make

the p.d. decides

decisions about

whom

mines whom they will love lover in

whom to get to know better or at all (just as

to inter\iew), and this reasoned choice in part deter-

— and they know

one sense has more power than the

it

will

p.d.:

have that consequence. The

once the lover has identified

and acknowledged the nature of those preferences that causally determine choice, the lover can allow the preferences to be influential, can refuse to act

them, or can change them (8.4). The description and

is

be able to

others in the firm, to the rejected is

justify'

finalist,

who

has Q.

the selection of an employee

even to the hired

forced to select onlv one of two equally qualified

finalist.

finalists,

one

finalist

— to

When the

the p.d. has a

mess of intellectual and psychological problems to deal with. Lacking nite reason for hiring

on

however, cannot change the job

stuck looking for an applicant

Further, the p.d. must

p.d.

p.d.,

a

and rejecting the other, the

p.d.

a defi-

might

280

Concern and the Morality of Love

imagine that there

is

some

between the two or

real difference

major difference. The

small, insignificant difference into a

rationalize p.d.

some

might even

claim that the decision was easily made, because one finalist turned out to be

upon to justif}' loving this "why w^?" and must provide not loved something more con\'incing than

uniquely qualified. Similarly, the lover particular beloved

when

both to beloveds and to those "that's just the

wav

I

feel."

job applicant respond

if

called

is

pressed by the question

How would a rejected potential beloved or rejected

told that the lover's or p.d.'s decision

had been made

by tossing a coin or was otherwise reason-independent? Indeed,

The

the actual beloved or employee respond?

happv

if the\'

could announce to

how would

lover and the p.d.

might be

concerned that they had tossed

ail

a coin,

thereby taking the blame from their shoulders. But those selected and rejected, expecting some rational explanation based on merits or demerits, would be

dumbfounded if the lover or p.d. But "Which person should

tossed a coin. I

hire?"

is

a straightforward question and,

exceptional circumstances aside, a relatively simple one to answer, whereas

"Whom

should

removed

in logical space

I

seems incomprehensible. The question seems

lo\'e?"

from "Should

to the movies with y or z?" are similar to

"Whom

I

have sex with v or z?" "Should

go

I

"Whom should I marry?" — all of which

and even

should

I

far

These

hire?"

activities

have a specifiable pur-

pose that indicates the properties of persons to be taken into account. The question

"Whom should I hire?" is, when unpacked, "Given that the task to be

performed

is

J,

that having

Q

is

required to perform

performed well, which applicant has

J,

and that

Q to the highest degree?" If

I

want

J

want the job choosing a movie I

done efficiendy, I hire a person who has Q. Similarly, companion, a sex partner, even a spouse, depends on ascertaining the properties relevant to the purposes of these activities; there are no technical job descriptions for

poses that

we

movie companions or spouses, but these

give to

For example,

them or have by

that a person's having S

Many

have pur-

"Whom should I marry?" can be unpacked "Given that the

meaning or purpose of marriage has S?"

activities

their nature.

is

(for

people today answer

lifelong relationship

me)

is

M,

that

I

want

to be married,

and

required for the achievement of M, which person this

question by saving that marriage

between two people

who want

goals (raising children, writing a histon^ of Europe). necessar}' condition for fulfilling this

purpose

is

is

a

to achieve certain shared

And

thev believe that a

that both persons have the

property "loves the other person." In different times and places die important S might have been "can contribute to

milk the

cow

mv famiVs fortune and power" or "will

every morning," either because marriage was given a different

purpose or because

it

had roughly the same purpose

(the achievement

of

1

28

Concern and the Mof-ality of Love shared goals), but different properties were beliexed to be essential for tiilfillment. Toda\',

together

when

go

the Sinatran philosophy ("love and marriage

horse and carriage")

like a

its

is

popular

West, we can

in the

hear

still

whispers of "she only married him for his money" and "he only married her to

adxance his career." The "only" xariet)'

of purposes

in

is

marrying,

(The whispers mav have

rexealing, as if people never

as if

a ditferent point:

not to

alert us to de\iations

Sinatran philosophv but to suggest that deception really

did

it

from

married him for his out

of love.) In

Louis

St.

just to

money

had a wide

marriage should mean only one thing.

while he

is

from the

occurring within

— or she — believed

it;

she

falsely that

she

1800, would anyone have gossiped, "he brought her

And in Europe a

milk the cow"?

did not "he acuiallv married her for

love''

speak of scandal? The conclusion

not that marriage has no purpose and therefore no "job description." sure, the properties rele\'ant in

in

few hundred years ago,

To

is

be

choosing bet\\'een y and z as a spouse are limited

onh' by the purposes one has in marr\'ing; but they are limited and

the\'

follow

from these purposes.

"Whom should I love?," bv contrast, resists this kind of analysis. ^^

Love

no purpose, either by its nature or by our assigning one to it, but is something whose point resides in itself. If we cannot specih' any purpose of love, that method of ascertaining the relevant properties of beloveds is not available. "Wh\' do I want love?" unlike "Why do I want to marr\'?" has no clear answer that tells us what properties to look for. Or if we want love seems to

ha\'e

we think that love contributes to a full life lived well, this reason is still

because

not powerfiil enough to generate a course,

we

prefer

partner with

One

happv to unhapp\'

list

of

Of

specific relc\ant properties.

love; but that

v\'e

should seek

a lo\'c-

whom we can be happv, as Aristophanes says (5.5), is trite advice.

understands, then,

why

anv logical limits on what beliefs the loxer

philosophers have claimed that there are few

sort of person can be the object of loxe or

must have about the beloxed's properties— although it is

sequitur to conclude that love

is,

if

on what a

non no

therefore, reason-independent. If love has

purpose, or onlv a ven' amorphous purpose, this does not rule out an answer to

"Whom should I love?" An activit\''s having a discrete or assignable purpose is sutTicient, I

hate?"

is

but not necessar\', for ascertaining relevant properties. "Wh\' should as

queer a question

as

"Whv should I love?" — yet that does not make I hate y or z?" and "Is my hate for y

incomprehensible the questions "Should in virtue

of P justifiable?" We do not know exactly why we should practice

punishment (to deter? to put the universe back in order? to control yet desire for revenge?), but

we know whom we ought to

punish: those

legal

satisfy' a

who have

the propert\' "is guilt\' of the crime."

Moral judgments, moreover, can be made about

x's selecting a

beloved

— 282

Concern and the Morality of Love

on the

(or a bchated)

basis of

some

properties; the logical "anything goes"

does not entail a moral "anything goes."

It is difficult

to decide for which

properties people ought to love others, and in this area one can easily slide

from doing philosophy into blandly moralizing. But there gestions worth considering. that constitute \^s identity love, x's lox'ing y as a

Even

if x's

loving y in virtue of those properties

person in

this sense

might be

stringent, either Kantian or perfectionist ethics

a

moral

reason)

is

emotion to be

Or if this is too

might imply that loving people

for their trivial or superficial properties (like hiring an ficial

x's

ideal.

not a logical requirement for

is

morally objectionable. Even

employee for a super-

if moralit}^

requires recognizing

the equal \'alue of all persons, and the special concern of love if

are several sug-

is

justifiable

only

there are morally relexant differences between one's beloved

and other

per-

sons, the valuable properties x finds in y, besides y's value as a person, could be if the properties that x values in y are not but are genuine values worth preserving and enhancing. The worry

such a morally relevant difference superficial

that x's special concern for y violates moralit\^s injunction against arbitrarily

discriminatory treatment might only be the worry that

grounded on ties

the superficial or silly properties

are morally irrelevant and cannot

properties might

with

silly

seem to

fit

the

bill,

I

person

is

is

our characters are

Of course, some

literally

agape

is

filled

agapists

and metaphorically

— of

persons have

all

on this nonsuperficial value could not have never seen it explained adequately how,

right, x's focusing

preferential concern.

after this

it;

or her "deep" value as a person and which

his

equally; ^^ but if this justif\'

—

loves are

which proper-

preferential concern. Identity

doubt

properties from the moral point of view.

maintain that the only nonsuperficial value a

of love's object,

justify'

but

some

I

infused into personal love, the agapized love

justifiably

is

preferential (see 9.9).

In addition, x's

we can

appeal to the fact that the best erosic love

autonomously chosen or formed preferences

(8.4); instead

is

based on

of justifying the

concern of love only in terms of x's loving y in virtue of y's properties that are not superficial, it can be justified if x also loves y in virtue of y's special

properties that unreflectively

mesh with x's preferences that are not superficial,

and

that

uncritically allowed to operate in x's choice. ^^

is,

The

are not

moralit}'

of the preferential choice flows from the value of autonomy, not only from the value of the object of that choice.

The suggestion

is

that as long as lovers have

some control over their preferences and over their ability to distinguish worthy from unworthy objects of love, the responsibilit)' for making justifiable distinctions

between the beloved and others

is

the lover's. This, however,

is

not

merely a matter of inner strength; social and economic conditions must be such as to encourage lovers to develop and modify their preferences freely as

283

Concern and the Morality of Love

well as to allow belo\'cds to develop properties that are not superficial.

It is,

of

no easy matter to determine what genuine autonomy amounts to, or \\ hat social and economic arrangements arc conducive to it, but regardless of

course,

the details the analysis remains the same:

only

concern for y

x's special

justifiable

is

y in virtue of properties that are not superficial and that x finds

if X loves

we might

\aluable as a result of x's autonomouslv formed preferences. Thus, sa\'

that a propert\' that

would

propcrt\' that x

moralh' permissible for x to love v

it is

lo\'e

y

of if both

in virtue

in viraic of,

and y were

x

free to

is

a

dexelop

nonsuperficial properties and nonsuperficial preferences.

Hence, love becomes tion

is

alread\'

a

problem of distributive

justice. ^^

broadlv a moral problem within distributive

that the choice of beloveds

is

a similar issue, since social

Applicant selec-

justice.

To

and economic

claim

factors

impinge on, or can be arranged not to impinge on, the development of preferences and qualities,

economic items talk

is

to tighten, not loosen, the analog)' with applicant selec-

One argument against doing so

tion.

about

a just

(jobs) or

is

hard goods

that distributive justice applies onh' to

(dollars, wheat).

But we can coherently

(and unjust) distribution of health, even though

standard hard good, and this talk

not merely

is

elliptical for talk

distribution of its foundation, namely health-care provision plies.

And

a

major question of John Rawls'

A

and

it is

not a

about the

surgical sup-

Theory of Justice

is

how

to

guarantee, as well as such things can be guaranteed, an equal distribution of self-respect,

which

is

also not a hard

good. The question of this distribution

again, not merely elliptical for questions about the distribution

nomic goods that are the foundation

for self-respect, for

the distribution of that hard foundation only because

which other goods

(libert)'

distribution of the latter that

and then

it

must make sense to

the

abilit\'

talk

we are concerned with

it is

the means, in part, by

self-respect) are secured,

we are really concerned with. of justice, the

adjust, according to the precepts

is,

of the eco-

social bases

If it

and

it is

the

makes sense to

of self-respect, then

about the social conditions that promote or hinder

of persons to engage

in

well-grounded love relationships.^'^ This

would hold especialh' within Rawls' framework, with its emphasis on the basic good of self-respect, if there are (as I have claimed; see 8.3 and 9.8) important links

between erosic love Reflecting

in particular

on the reasons

and

self-respect.

for or causes

of one's attachments, loving on

the basis of autonomouslv formed preferences and focusing

on the

significant

properties of beloveds are not the only requirements for avoiding defective,

shallow love. has S

is

A love may be irrational, as I have argued (7.4), if x's belief that y

irrational, that

is,

not well founded on the evidence. This

irrationalit)'

fault.

Hence, loving

the person, in the sense of having well-grounded and accurate

knowledge of

is

not merely a cognitive fault of love;

it

can also be

a

moral

284

Concern and the Morality of Love

one's beloved, to

make

both an ontological and

is

this idea

more

a

moral dimension of love. Let us try

precise. Pausanias, in Plato's Symposium, says that

it is

"discreditable" for a pursued beloved to give in too quicidy to his lover (

184a5).

is

The beloved must discern, with adequate evidence, whether the lover

motivated by vulgar or by heavenly eros and whether the lover

is

even

feigning the heavenly to hide his vulgar eros. If the beloved gives in too quickly, he has only himself to blame; he has allowed himself negligently or recklessly to be

rational

someone's beloved

in

not waiting to make sure that he has

and true beliefs about the lover's motivation. Aristode, too, thinks that

the beloved

is

to blame if "a person has erroneously assumed that the affection

he got was for his character, though nothing anything of the sort" {Nicomachean Ethics

1

in his friend's

conduct suggested

165b7-9).

Pausanias also says that if y, the beloved, gives in to x, the lover, because y is rich, y is proceeding incorrectly whether /s belief is rational or

believes that x

irrational, true

sort

or false; y in this case

of shallow person attracted to

is

"disgraced" in showing himself to be the

superficial properties.

On the other hand, if

y gives in to x believing that x is wise and virtuous, "it does him credit," regardless of the rationality and truth of the belief ( 184e-185a). But Pausanias here contradicts his earlier claim about

should say giving in

is

negligent

y's

irrationality'.

that if y believes falsely but

on good evidence

praiseworthv, since

giving in reveals

is still

y's

motivation (to become virtuous); but that

if

y believes

that x y's

is

a "discreditable" beloved.

sort out the genuine heavenly erosic lovers

What

wise, y's

commendable

falsely,

negligence in not waiting long enough for the evidence, that x despite y's motivation y

What he

is

is

due to the wise, then

For y has not attempted to

from the pretenders.

Pausanias and Aristotle assert about the beloved applies mutatis

mutandis to the

lover,

and

this suggests the additional sense in

which

a lover

can be morally superficial. Suppose that x loves y believing that v has S and that this belief was

formed carelessly. In some cases of this sort, x knows (or can

be expected to know) that x has not had enough opportunity to gain the

knowledge of y required outweighs

moral

\^s

fault.

In doing so, x leads y to believe that x loves

commitments to (even

for a rational belief that y has S (or that y's S

D). X's loving y on the basis of negligent beliefs about v

if love is

y,

and

creates expectations in y

only indefinitely constant).

certain love-related desires: to

X

y,

about

x's

y, to share

a

future behavior

now

has

delicacies

and

leads y to believe that x

spend time with

is

makes conditional

some

experiences exclusively with y, and so forth. Further, x creates in y the expectation that y all

is

and

will

be an object of x's special, preferential concern. Creating

these beliefs in y on the basis of negligentlv false beliefs

is

a

moral injurv to y,

since x will likely discover later that x's beliefs that y has S are false,

and the

285

Concern and the Morality of Love

and concern will dissipate. Indeed, it is plausible to claim want to be able to justif\' x's special, preferential concern for y, x is

love-related desires that if X does

under an obligation to ascertain without negligence that v does

grounds

Surely, the fact that the

loN'cds

know

love.

Love

S that

is

not,

and ordinarilv be-

risky business,

is

advance that they might get hurt. So creating not-to-be-

in

expectations by loving, or by declaring one's love,

is

not

in itself

Not even when x

loves y because x believes falsely that y necessarilv a moral fault if x hurts y when x's love ends upon the

moralh' questionable. has S,

end of love might cause the beloved pain

moral defect of

in general, a

fulfilled

ha\'e the

x's lo\'e.

is it

disco\'er\' that

y does not ha\'e

Consider two cases.

S.

First, if x lo\'es

because

\'

X believes falsely that y has S, and x has this belief as a result of \^s deliberate deception, then of course beliefs

cannot be

But compare S.

X

This situation

is

is

that x

falselv that

\'

if y

is

somewhat different;

is

of x's love,

knows

It is

y.^

If this

is

right,

is

is

\',

Even though \

whv x loves y

pain that v experiences

if x's

rationality

(8.6)

of love

— then

y, as

that

x's lo\'e

love for y

is

for v

is

will

be distressed

x

at the

in this

\'

has S, then

if y also

knows

x's lo\'e seriously. If \' is

— discovering not only why

much

as x,

is

to blame for any

love ends. In this case, too, a rational y might be is full\'

to

blame for y's pain. Thus,

y because x recklessly believes falsely that y has S

not onlv does not

that x believes

declaration of love seriously.

x's

again \ has reason not to take

distressed but cannot think that x

\'

knows

v cannot even think that y has been hurt by

demanded by the

V loves X but also

recklcssh' that v has

we have to be more careful about the second case. For if x

whv x loves

doing what

x's

on herself

makes sense to say that

that y

\ because x believes falselv and recklesslv that

that this

and it

it

that y should not have the expectations

y knows that v should not take

case, since

lo\'cs

a rational

the correction of

What is it about the first case that justifies the

v.

ordinarilv associated with being loved. loss

falselv

here, at least,

blameless for hurting

has S, and so v

upon

lo\'e

thereby hurt; y has brought

with another: x believes

moralh' for hurting

at fault

judgment

criticized,

this case

withdrawing

x's

even

is

a

x's

know but

also could not be reasonablv expected to

grounded

this wa\'.

well grounded, even

lo\ing

moral fault only of x, when

know

Perhaps y has good cxidencc that x's not. Or perhaps x's demeanor is

if it is

mislcadingh' suggestive or deliberatelv deceptive; in these cases the moral defect resides precisclv in the deception, a sort of thing that exists in a loving relationship

is

especially objectionable.'*'*

when

it

arises

or

—

CHAPTER "I

The Object of Love

13

heard an old religious

man

But yesternight declare

That he had found

a text to

prove

That only God,

mv

Could love vou

for vourself alone

And

dear.

not vour vellow hair."

— W.

"For Anne Gregor)'"

B. Yeats,

In an authentic recognition of her individualit\', her blondeness would be loved, but in a different way: She totalin',

of that

would be loved

and then her blondeness would be loved

an irreplaceable

first as

as

one of the

characteristics

totality'.

— Shulamith Firestone, The

1.

Dialectic of Sex

THE BLONDE'S COMPLAINT

Does Firestone

belie\'e that

Yeats' theologian proves only

someone for properties, and if x's loving

human personal lo\'e might accomplish what

God can do?

herself alone lo\'ing

—

is

^

If what

to lo\'e

v "as an irreplaceable

loving V for herself, then Firestone

is

God is capable of doing

humans not

in virtue

totalit\"" is

equivalent to

claiming (plausiblv) that

it is

conceptual truth nor a fact of human psvcholog\' that personal love

based and (implausiblv) that in authentic love x values because x loves

someone

v.

is

x's

neither a

propertv-

properties only

These expressions, loving someone "for himselP' and loving

"as an irreplaceable totalit)^" even if not equivalent, have in

the implicit claim that x's loving y because y

is

and Firestone do not mean that blondeness

is

If that

\^s

of their

blonde a sillv

is

common

second-rate love. Yeats

love-grounding propert\'.

were the point, then Yeats would be praising God

(falselv) for

being the

only one capable of loving humans in xirtue of their significant properties; and Firestone

would mean onh'

someone

as a "totalit\'." Yeats'

that loving for significant properties

intended contrast, instead,

is

the basis of properties simpliciter and loving agapically.

between

286

x's

loving

}^s

properties and x's loving

\'

is

loving

between loxing on

And

Firestone's

is

the totality and only deriva-

:

287

The Object of Love

is

Whereas

properties.

ti\ cl\' v's

making

Yeats'

a point about the object

poem

is

about the basis of love, Firestone

of love.

Several expressions are often used to describe first-rate or genuine per-

sonal love: X loves v "as person," x loves v

''for herself," x's

person," x loves \ "the whole person." "Personal sense)

is

claimed to be,

when genuine,

role in love as either

its

is

"love for the

nontechnical

"love for the person." These expressions

are also often used in asserting that the attracti\'e properties

no

love

lo\'e" (in its

basis or object.

Of course,

of the beloved plav

people sav that thev want

to be loved "for themselves." They frequentlv use that expression,

which

is

part

of our natural language and not merely philosophical jargon. The question, howe\'er,

is

whether love for the person must be understood

properties are neither the basis nor object.

begin

someone

2.

"irreplaceably."

In discussing love,

all

vou

bill. I

vour

do not have

rare U.S.

Then

place.

a dollar,

to give

I

turn to "as a loidMvf

is,

I is

(sect. 5).

De Sousa

is

can erase bill

my

debt by returning

you gave me;

a face value I

I

"offcr[ing] an 2Ldcc\u2Xc substituted^

of one dollar) and

if I

no other dollar bill will do in

might be able to discharge sa\',

But

later give

have not made proper restitution; in

nonflingible since

notes that

atiy

in this context

dollars are fungible or interreplaceable.

Reserve Note,

your Bank Note

I

you the same

Bank Note (with

a one-dollar Federal

this context, its

which

Ronald de Sousa emplovs the notion of "non-

you loan me

dollars are identical, that

steal

as lo\'e in

be analvzed erosicalh?

NONFUNGIBLE ATTACHMENT

fungibilit)'."^ If

dollar

it

examining a view suggested by Firestone: "loving the person"

b\'

loving

Can

mv

debt bv

by giving you several hundred Federal

Reserve notes. But these are "mere" substitutes that are not commensurate, for \'ou,

with the original.

De Sousa claims that in our culture, the nonfungibilit)' of the beloved "is part of the ideology of love." To

show that in some cultures the concept of love

does not include nonfungibilit\', he provides

this

example (borrowed from

J.

A. Lee via Morton Hunt) Dr. Aubrey Richards, an anthropologist

em

who lived among the Bemba of North-

once related to a group of them an English folk tale about a voung prince who climbed glass mountains, crossed chasms, and fought dragons, all to obtain the hand of a maiden he loved. The Bemba were plainly

Rhodesia

in the 1930's,

bewildered, but remained

silent. Finally

an old chief spoke up, voicing the

ings of all present in the simplest of questions:

"Whv

feel-

not take another girl?" he

asked.

The

prince's loving just this maiden, being either unable or not willing to

288

The Objea of Love

more accessible maiden, illustrates the beloved's The Bemba, de Sousa implies, do not have a concept of love in which the beloved is not fungible; a Bemban prince, faced with these obstacles, could easilv replace one belo\'cd with another maiden. Or the Bemba ha\'e no transfer his affections to a nonfungibilit\'.

concept of love

The

at

but onlv a concept of "fungible sexual satisfaction."

all,

illustration,

however, does not clearly show that the

Bemba have no

"Whv not

concept of nonfungibilit\'. The perplexed and unromantic question

Bemba

take another girl?" might indicate, instead, that the value of love for the

does not justif\' taking large sees

through the folk

into

it;

reallv

risks. Better,

the old chiePs question

and the assumption that the anthropologist packs

tale

wh\' describe the prince as moti\'ated

b\' love in

the

going on, the old chief hints to the anthropologist,

under the

spell

of purely

itself nonflingible,

the dragon ha\'e

Bemban

erotic desire,

and even

if the

first

place?

What is

that the prince

is

object of sexual desire

is

taking large risks for sexual pleasure

its

shows that he

is

plain stupidit\'. Let

is

meal and fmd another maiden. Indeed, we often ask the

when

chiePs question

x loves v but

not because y

a lost love,

it is

is

mountain but because v does not welcome x's attention and does not reciprocate: "Exer)' one is apt to sa)^ if he cannotobtain the affections stashed awav

on

of one person,

a

whv doth

he not apph' his to another which

Let us refine the notion of nonfungibilit\' with or nonfungible attachment.

placeabilit\'

onlv (})'s

if two

conditions are met:

(I)

An

item

d) is

x deeply values

4)

place. Both conditions are necessary. For even

something thing

else.

for

X

(|),

analysis

is

else

could take

And even

its

place, x's attachment

if nothing

could take

of

uniqueness

is

irre-

irreplaceable for x if and

and if

(II)

nothing can take

x deeplv values

transferable to the

place, vet x has

(j)'s

more kind?"^

4),

vet

some-

no appreciation

not nonfungibh^ attached simph' because x has no attachment. In

^^ in end love is not a separate phenomenon that results from the belo\ed's not being loved as a means but is entirely exhausted by her not being placeable>^,

ha\'c to treat

loved as a means. If this that irreplaceabilitv^^^-

is

(which

right, the

I

think

notion of irreplaceabilitN^j^j

is

empt)': to say

"most obviously" marks offend love from means love

what marks offend lo\c from means lo\e not loved as a means while in the latter one is.

to utter the tautology that

the former one

4.

is

is

is

that in

IRREPLACEABILITV BY INDIVIDUATION

Thomas Nagel argues that a desire for an omelet is conceptually different from sexual replaceable.

desire: the object

of omelet-desire, but not of sexual

and anv other "omelet with the

w cll."^

In contrast,

distribution"

"would do

— and

as well."

now we

crucial characteristics

expect Nagel to complete the sentence with

But Nagel savs instead: "can be substituted

particular sexual desire that has

been

elicited

by those

"cannot be substituted" equivalent, for Nagel, to

second person? No. As

I

will

"would not do

mav be

is

Now,

is

as well," so

happy with, or even

show, Nagel means "logically" cannot

be substituted, which does not amount to an interesting

Nagel

as object for a

characteristics."

that X will scarf down the second omelet but will not be refuse, the

is

would do as "it is not similarly true that any person with the same flesh

aspect," '

desire,

X might desire an omelet for its "combination of aroma and visual

irreplaceabilitv'.

concerned to make a point about the individuation of desire: "It

that" the crucial tlcsh characteristics "will arouse attraction wherever

.

294

The Object of Love they recur, but

it

will

be a

new

individuated bv desire,

object

its

desire for the second omelet

(x's

but the same desire transferred), but sexual desire

cannot agree that there

desire). I

and sexual

second omelet

is

desire. It

may

individuate these desires

Hence (mv

sexual desires

first

is

not a

new

is

not

new omelet-

individuated by

exist, is a

it

necessarily this difference

historically or spatiotemporally a

new

its

sexual

between omeletx's desire for

desire;

and

x's

the

sexual

simply be a continuation of x's desire for y a ftinction not merely of the nature of their

is

respective objects but also of what ject.

is

not obviously wrong to say that

is

desire for the second person

How we

is

particular object,

Omelet-desire

else."

object (hence, x's desire for the second person, should

desire

new

sexual attraction with a

not merely a transfer of the old desire to someone

is

happening, psychologically, in the sub-

shown that we must count two

objection), Nagel has not

and only one omelet-desire.

Furthermore (my second objection), even second person

is

happy with the

a

new desire,

satisfaction

that does not

of that desire

if x's

sexual desire for the

mean would be with the satisfaction of that x will not be equally as

as x

one sexual desire from y to

x's

original desire. True, x has not transferred

we

individuate sexual desire as Nagel recommends; yet x has transferred sexual

z, if

from v to z, has transferred the goal of achieving satisfaction with y to achieving it with z. Since x might be just as happy satisfying x's sexual desire attention

would have been satisf\dng x's sexual desire for y, the individuation of no limit on what might "do as well." Yet if there is going to be an interesting distinction between omelet-desire and sexual desire, it would for z as x

sexual desire places

have to be that the second omelet well," that

is,

that the object

will,

but the second person will not, "do as

of sexual desire

is

irreplaceable.

And

that cannot

be shown by individuating desire as recommended by Nagel. (This,

what

is

wrong

also

implving "distinct" gains and

and means loves but

it is

I

think,

with Badhwar's attempt to analyze irreplaceabilityp losses.

She would

like to

is

as

individuate end loves

Not only is such a task probably hopeless, we might count end loves and means loves differ-

in different ways.

also irrelevant: that

ently does not entail any difference

between the two kinds of love

in terms

of

the fungibility of their objects.)

Mv first objection to Nagel is expressed by Roger Scruton as a question: "Is

not merely a convention that leads us to say that,

it

appetite

two

from

this dish

of carrots tc that

successive objects, while,

Jane,

when

I

[dish], there

transfer

my

is

when

I

transfer

my

only one appetite, with

attention

from Elizabeth to

there are two desires, differentiated precisely by their successive objects.'"

Scruton immediately proceeds to respond to the objection: "Sexual desire unlike

mv

is

appetite for these carrots, in being founded upon an individuating

295

The Objea of Love thought.

It is

conceived as

part of the vcn' dircctedness of desire that

:i

particular person

is

object." To defend this claim Scruton points out that there can

its

be "mistakes of identit\" about the object of sexual desire, but not about the object of carrots-desire.^^ Suppose that x sexually desires

evening

how

is

in

bed with z believing that z

desire [z], but the other" person. desire for z, since x has

X believed z

but spends the

y,

A desire of x's has been satisfied, but

be described? "In a crucial sense," says Scruton, x "docs not

this to

say either that

is v.

(

1

was

)

Hence,

x's

evening with z has not

satisfied x's

no such desire. But x does have a desire for y, and we can

z has helped x satisfy x's desire for y (since during the evening was not satisfied by x's e\'ening

v) or that (2) x's desire for y

y). If we assume some desire of x's has been we should take route 1 ) Route (2) claims that x's desire for y has not been satisfied, and we already know that x has no desire for z that could have

with z (since x did not sleep with satisfied,

been

satisfied,

so (2) forces us to say that

Scruton does opt for night with

with

.

(

[z],

whom

(

1

)

:

x's

instead of v,

}wt satisfied

when

x

is

in x's

knows

partner.

Bv

desire for y

x's

of x's has been

seemed to be

is

bed (or x believes z

that z

retrospect say that x's desire for y x's

desire

only to the extent that, and for as long as,

he was Iving." Thus,

know that z,

was

no

"desire for [y]

is

[x]

by

his

imagined it was

[y]

satisfied is

y);

when

and

x's

slipping into bed with

had not been

satisfied

satisfied.

satisfied

x,

x does not

desire for y

when x finds out that z

contrast, "the desire for a dish of carrots

is

not similarly

dependent upon an individuating thought, and does not therefore give errors it is

of identit\\

not

a

consumed,"

rise

To eat the wrong dish of carrots may be a social howler,

mistaken expression of desire

—

I

reallv

while x did not desire the z that x

[the]

to

but

did desire the dish of carrots

by mistake

slept with.

claims that the possibilit\' of mistaken identit)' in sexual desire, and

from carrots-desire, can "dispel

is

or x will in

its

I

Scruton absence

immediate force" of my first objection to

Nagel. Scruton's argument, however, does not

show

that

when

x sexually

we should individuate x's states in such a wav that x's sexual desire for z is a new desire. For in Scruton's mistaken identit\' example, x never sexually desires z at all. X has only one sexual desire to for v; x ne\'er has a sexual desire toward z about which we could begin with ask, "Is this the same or a new sexual desire?" Scruton's question was about how to individuate (count) x's sexual desires when x knowinjjly is first attracted desires y

and then

later sexually desires z,

—

to Elizabeth and later to Jane, but in the mistaken idcntit)' case x never desires z,

so there

is

nothing to count. Hence, since Scruton's example does not must be individuated by its object, it does not

establish that sexual desire

confirm the

"particularit\'"

of the object of desire or

establish that an "indi-

296

The Object of Love

viduating thought" tion"; he uses

it

plan's a role.

both to

Note

refer to the

that Scruton cquixocatcs

on

"individua-

counting of desires and to express a thesis

about the "particuiaritv" of the object of desire. Perhaps

he has established his thesis about the individua-

satisfied that

tion of desire, Scruton also claims that "the person in love wishes his beloved

to

want him

is," '^

unique irreplaceable individual that he

as the

and

and not

particular "is wanted,

pursuit of Mar\', there

is

just

any person.

.

something inapposite

.

If John

.

is

in the advice

another

in

passage he rejects, consistentlv, the Bemba's response to the folk

y in

tale:

frustrated in his

Take

Elizabeth,

do just as well'."^^ But whv "inapposite"? Perhaps immediatelv giving is irrele%'ant to what John is experiencing, but eventuallv the advice is excellent (with "she will do just as well" tactfull)' omitted) if John, lonelv and depressed, is still pining away for the unattainable Marv. Sure, John's desire she will

that ad\'ice

for Elizabeth, if it develops,

that

new

it is

But

not the same desire

is

it

"Of course,

has been replaced

— along with

Elizabeth can console John

but

.

.

.

its

object. Scruton con-

[which] consolation con-

preciselv in extinguishing John's present desire in the flood of another." it is

not correct to say that Elizabeth has merely "consoled" John

extinguished his desire for Mar}^ (pro\'ing

attachment) Elizabeth .

but

as John's desire for Mar\',

new desire means not that the old desire has not been replaced by the

one, but that

tinues: sists

a

now

is

It

comes

as

some

if she

has

a fungible

.

.

.

surprise to discover that Scruton thinks that the belief is

are in each case central to

[Tjhose thoughts have a large

thoughts are

Elizabeth, she will

do

an irreplaceable particular

is

a

"We regard each other as irreplaceable in arousal, just as

and individualising thoughts

in love,

\'idualising

resists,

it,

not merelv holding his hand and offering sympathy

of sexual desire or of love

metaphvsical illusion.

endeavor.

making

the full-blown object of John's attention.

that the object

we do

is

to be, by

it

.

.

.

as well"

illusorv^

mvstifications."^^

component.

.

.

is

beneficial. "It

our

Indi-

But then the adxice "Seek

should be quite acceptable to Scruton.

arguing that the illusion

.

is

He

still

by such mystifications that

In so far as we live. They are the necessary salve to the pain of incarnation. we could give an explanator\' account of what one person gains from another .

in love

and desire,

it is

clear that he

is

attentions.

enterprise

But is

it is

jeopar-

not claiming that x loves y primarily because x gains some-

thing from y or that

of having

.

might have gained that benefit equally from

someone other than the person to whom he directs his imperative that we do not think of this. If we do so, our dised." Scruton

.

x's

love involves a give-to-get attitude, and that as a result

this questionable

motivation x (and y) must "not think of this" to what must not be thought is that the beloved

protect their love (6.3). Rather, is

replaceable, that

someone

else

could do

as well.

"By such thoughts we

The Objea of Love

297

threaten the possibilit)' of any lasting instead, that

all

sorts

human

of things threaten

recognition of replaceabilit}'

is

whv

not claim,

and that

a rational

attachment." But

love's constancy'

abandonment or

the salve to the pain of

lost

love?

Scruton claims that believing the other

irreplaceable

is

for love but also for relationships with those

who

is

crucial not onh'

are onlv, for example,

X selects v as a movie companion, savs Scruton,

movie companions.

has certain "relcxant properties"; as a result

x's

"attitude

is

our

because v

transferable."

Ne\'ertheless, 'Vou would be insulted to learn that you were \\ anted as a companion merely as the instantiation of a universal. It is quite important that I hide from you (and from mvself) the idea that someone else might 'do just as

Not much

welJ'."^^

companions: the belo\ed

an illusion;

is

both cases

in

their being the subjects

we

those

wc must

Movie companions and beloveds

replaceable.

mon

difference remains, then, between beloveds and mo\'ie

latter are surely replaceable,

but the

and objects of personal

domain

in particular,

ing the illusion that people are irreplaceable

employees, for example, are replaceable

performed

well, or

little

carried into the public

how

as well.

of the

in

com-

relations, in contrast to

domain.

but not

One might

in the public,

think,

maintain-

important. Yet even though

is

(ceteris paribus), jobs

satisfaction derived

domain

have

(friends, too) also

interact with impersonallv in the public

then, that in the personal

irreplaccabilit\'

"hide" the fact that people are

might not be

from them, unless the

illusion

is

No one likes to be told or to belie\e, no

economic machine. Job-reno attempt to urge the illusion on us could erase the thought from consciousness. No wonder the personal domain is conceixed of, or billed, as a haven from the public domain, the one area in matter

placeabilin.'

u'hich

we

true,

is

that thev are gears in the

so obvious, however, that

can sustain the illusion of irreplaceabiliry.

There

is

something strange, howe\'er,

in Scruton's tellinff us that

he must

"hide from you (and from myself)" the fact that as a movie companion you really are replaceable,

and that

"it is

imperative that

we do not

destructive thought that our beloveds are replaceable. For

if there

think" the

are thoughts

must not be thought (which Scruton himself thought), these thoughts must not be spoken or written: maintaining the illusion requires silence. Of that

course, Freud's The Future ofan Illusion did not destroy religion, but he cat

out of the bag for anyone willing to

defend them

as necessan',

that irreplaceability

anx'uav? Like

all

is

an

is

listen.

risky business.

Exposing

How can

illusion, vet press us

illusions,

let

the

even to

Scruton think and write

— and himself— to believe

it

illusions, the belief in the beloved's irrcplaceabilit\' requires

self-deception or other mental tricks.'''

As

I

suggested

earlier: there are

grounds, or very few, for a rational belief in permanent nonfungibilit)'.

no

The Objea of Love

298

The proposal that we should think of replaceable persons as irreplaceable of lasting human attachments is quite different from Plato's program. One might become enraptured with, and nonflingiblv attached to, a particular person in virtue of her superior human merits. But, for Plato, becoming attached to people is to be avoided, since it impedes one's progress toward Beaut\' and Goodness; loxing imperfect humans is hardly an adequate for the sake

substitute for infmitc bliss.

Humans

arc only replaceable depositories

of Beaut\' and not irreplaceable items

(like

According to Martha Nussbaum, a Platonic lover

realizes that "it

of hints

own

the Forms) in their

right.

prudent to

is

consider these related beauties [in various people] to be 'one and the same', that is

homogeneous."^^ Nussbaum's Platonic reason, however,

qualitatively

is,

not precisely that in seeing people

makes

his

the pain

way up

as replaceable, the lover

from turbulent human attachments. "This of mental health, because

in part for reasons

become too

more

readily

the Ascent; rather, viewing persons as replaceable removes

risky or difficult to bear.

strategy^

is

a certain sort

adopted

at least

of tension has

A kind of therapy alters the look of the

world, making the related the same, the irreplaceable replaceable," writes

Nussbaum. that

Ascent. it

doubt, howe\'er, that Plato believes people are irreplaceable and

I

we have

to deny or suppress this truth in order to

When Nussbaum asks, "Why does he

foolish not to see things in a

way that

ordinarv' intuitions about the object

[that

is,

make

progress in the

the Platonic lover] think

appears, prima facie, to be false to our

of

love.>"

she implies that the Platonic

lover knows (and Plato, too) that beloveds are irreplaceable, or at least as well as

any "ordinar\' intuition" can be known. But Plato

reverse; Plato does not argue that irreplaceabilit)'

an illusion that

illusion, vet

viewing persons prudent. ology'

The

about

5.

is

is

is

knows it

not Scruton in

the truth, replaceabilit)' the

necessary for the sake of the Ascent. For Plato,

as replaceable

ordinarx' intuition

is is

prudent because

true,

not "true" because

merely an ordinary' intuition, a

bit

of ide-

lo\'e.

LOVING THE "WHOLE" PERSON

We have investigated irreplaceabilit}' at length because one proposal for what

it

means

for x to love y as a person or for herself claims that

loving v irreplaceably. Except under special circumstances, irreplaceabilit)' (that

love; hence, if

something

we

else.

is,

nonhingible attachment)

often

There

do is

first

is

just x's

not an element of personal

we should

Irreplaceabilit\'

it is

ha\'e argued,

love another "as a person," that milst

another reason

account of loving the person. circumstances;

is

I

amount

to

look elsewhere for an

the result of love in special

x loves y, and then perhaps y becomes irreplaceable. Since

The Objea of Love

x's

a

loving y precedes

299

the issue

y's irreplaccability,

t)f v\s irreplaccabiliu'

tenuous connection with the issue of the basis or object of x's love:

X loves y, the basis

and object of x's love

soon

are alreadv in place (even if thev

change), before the histor\' of the love makes v irreplaceable.

might be loving y

has onh'

as

And

as

might

alreadv

if x is

person prior to loving y irreplaceablv. Further, the notion "loxing the person" is usually used to express a thesis about

lo\ing

y, X

either the basis or object

Even though

x's

as a

of love.

loving y exclusively

not equivalent to

is

x's

loving y as a

person, the problems of exclusivit\' and loving the person can arise in similar

Suppose that

\\'a\'s.

must "love w^."

w^"

"lo\'e N'irtuc

Y's

of v's having S but v

demand can be understood

short for "love only me, not him," v

is

of S means that x

demand for

x loves v in virtue

"love w/f"

is

in is

insists to x that x

two wavs.

demand

If y's

worried that

loving y in

x's

else who also has S. But if v's my S" or "love me for mvself, not

someone

will love

short for "love me, not

my S," y is worried about being loved as a person. ^^ As I mentioned earlier

(9.10), the

first

horn of Gellner's paradox might be defended either with a

claim about exclusivity or with a claim about loving the person. If x loves v for

and

ha\'ing S

also loves z for having S, then x actually loxes neither, goes the

argument, either because love by

its

nature

is

exclusive or because in such a

The

tension betu'een

exclusi\'it\'

and reason-dependence does not destroy the eros

tradition, at least

because

loving y agapically no

situation the object

x's

of

love

x's

is

not y but S

itself

more reliably secures exclusivity; but perhaps

—

the tension between reason-dependence and loving the person does the person

is

a

not show that

mark of genuine if x

loves y erosically, then x cannot be loving y the person. If it

true that the object erosic love takes in virtue

if loving

But note that the present argument does

love.

of x's love

no person

as

(that

its

which a

is

loved)

is

y's properties,

wrong to

But

it is

non

sequitur.

object.

of S" that "x loves S"; that

is

infer

Plato's love in the

Symposium

is

from "x loves v (or both only S,

lo\'ing

often taken to be a prime example of an

on properties

Singer, for example, claims that

is

x's

When x loves v

y and z) for having S, as a matter of x's psychology x might be but not necessarily and not simply because x's love is erosic.

erosic love that focuses

then

as object rather

when

than on persons.

x Platonically loves y, y

is

Ir\'ing

onlv the

apparent object of x's love. The Platonic lover does not "love another person for

himself,

Good. is

in

.

.

.

but onlv

Plato

as

would say,

a

vehicle

and

to love anyone

partial

is

him. "2° Singer claims that Plato arrives

embodiment of

really to love the at this

.

.

.

the

goodness which

view about the object of

love (at Symposium 206a) bv committing a "glaring"

non

sequitur:-^'

from

"men love only what is good" Plato illegitimately infers that "love is exclusively directed toward the Good."-^^ Singer protests, "It might be true that love

300

The Object of Love never happens unless one person discovers goodness in anodier; but this gives us

no

basis for

right,

is

goodness

itself."

Singer

is

is some sort of mistake here, but he is right for the The passage Singer quotes {Symposium 206a) does not begin

think, that there

I

wrong

concluding that the object of love

reason.

with any statement about the basis of love, but with "the only object of men's lo\'e is

what

is

good."23 Indeed, there

"perpetual possession."

The

Diotima

does not love

asserts that (a) x

actual

no argument

is

passage only asserts that the object of love

argument

The its

contained in 205e, where

is

other half y unless y

x's

206a.

at all in

goodness and that lovers desire

is

is

good, and (b)

men do not love what is theirs unless what is theirs is good. Diotima persuades Socrates to agree with her that, given these premises, what men love is the good. Now, if assertions (a) and (b) are about the basis of love (x loves y because y

is

good), then Diotima commits the non sequitur mentioned above.

But to point out that x does not love what is

x's

unless

be to say only that in this case the objea of x's love

argument of 205e

is

what is x's

is

good might

that goodness.

Hence, the

onlv an overgeneralization or a weak abduction; from

is

some examples of x's loving goodness, Diotima concludes that men alwavs and only love goodness.

The most well-known this feature.

What we

are to love in persons

the persons so

too

fe\\'

criticism

of Platonic eros derives from precisely

Gregory Vlastos claims that

far,

human

and onh'

in Plato's

view

the "image" of the Idea in them.

is

insofar, as thev are

good and

We are to love Now since all

beautiful.

beings are masterworks of excellence, and not even the best of

those ... are wholly free of streaks of the ugly, the mean, the commonplace, the

our love for them is to be onlv for their \'irtue and beautv, the and integrity' of his or her individualit)', will never be the objea of our love. This seems to me the cardinal flaw in Plato's theor\\ It ridiculous, if

individual, in the uniqueness

does not provide for love of whole persons, but onlv for love of that abstract version of persons which consists of the complex of their best qualities. ^4

Persons have good qualities, but also bad ones; x might find attractive properties

S in

y,

best of us,

of x's love

is

is

savs Vlastos, not even the

'Svholly free" of D. If we assume with Plato that the actual object

ys goodness ("our love

for

then automatically x loves only part of y,

which consists of the complex of criticism

No one,

but also "defect" properties D.

[\^'s]

them )^s

is

.

.

.

only for their virtue"),

goodness, or that "version of

best qualities."

Note

[v]

that Vlastos'

seems to allow that x could love y the 'Svhole" person were v entirely good qualities; if so, only the contingent fact that no person y

constituted by fits

the

bill

undermines

Plato's view. Also note that Vlastos

is

of x's

from the

love. Rather,

is

not claiming that

the basis of x's love for y, onlv S, and not v,

for Plato, because S

fact that x loves

S in

v,

it

is

the object

follows for Plato that v

is

301

The Object of Love

the object ot

x\s love, albeit

not y the whole person or is composed of S.

as a "totality,"

but only

the incomplete version of y that If Vlastos'

\iew

complaint

is

must be an

to be damaging, there

alternative

of love that avoids Plato's error. Since, for Vlastos, x's Platonically loving

onlv the good part of v means that x does not

we

the whole person y,

lo\'e

expect Vlastos to assert that x would be loxing the whole person were x to love

not onh' the good part but also the defective part of person, then,

This alternative

erties. lo\'e

whole person even when y has

does not require y to be

like

this alternative

For

is

uncon\'incing.

should not imply that x must love fs defects; for

impatience and corns does not negate

if

were

everything about

x's

/s having

y, including D.

The

into valuable (or neutral) aspects of y

grounded in S. Even though Vlastos begins

x's

claim to love y.

correct, erosic love could

X lo\'es v in virtue of

defects; this

God or perfectly virtuous in order to be

loved as a whole person. But the alternative view lo\'e

an adequate theor\' of

satisfies Vlastos' criterion that in

X should be able to love the

alternative

Loving the whole

y.

would be loving ever)T:hing about one's beloved or all her prop-

meet

its

A theor\' of

onh' tolerating

And

y's

note that e\en

if

stringent requirement.

might come to loxe

S, as a result x

beloved's defects can be transformed

by

love's eye

— by

a love that

already

is

rationallv well

conception of love repudiate

is

not his

his essay

— does not even notice — what

Platonic love."^^ Vlastos'

with praise for

philia, Aristotle's

own alternative to Plato, since Aristotle

own

I

have called

alternative derives

.

.

.

''does not

'the cardinal flaw' in

from "the image of the

diet)'

Hebraic and Christian traditions: that of a Being whose perfection

in the

empowers

it

to love the imperfect." Vlastos does not

mean

that

when

x loxes

the whole person y, x loves the imperfections of the imperfect y. Rather, x lo\'es v the whole person when x loves the imperfect y despite y's imperfections or

when

X "does not proportion afl:ection to merit. "^^ "I love you, corns

reflects

Vlastosian love for the whole person, but the corns are not loved.

loved with and despite the corns, because attracti\'e

Plato's

x's

love

all"

Y

independent of both

is

is

y's

and unattractive properties.

Vlastos criticizes Plato

on

and

on the grounds that the ontological object of love

view turns out to be only part of y. Yet Vlastos' account of love for do with the ontolog\' of the object of lo\'e. To

the whole person has nothing to

claim that x loves the whole person

when x agapicalh'

lo\es y despite

\\ detects

is to analyze love for the whole person in terms of the basis of love, not in terms of its ontological object. Thus, "whole" in Vlastos' account is in a diflcrcnt

categon' from "whole" in Vlastos' criticism of Plato; Vlastos of equivocation. Further, loxe's basis, agapic love

is

if

love for the

we

can therefore accuse

whole person

is

a matter

not the only kind in which x can love y despite

of y's

302

The Object of Love defects ("I love you, corns

and

For x can

all").

that V, being imperfect, has defects;

all

that

is

erosically love y despite the fact

required

is

that x judge that y's

valuable properties outweigh v's defects. Indeed, even Platonic eros has

As long

for x's loving v despite y's defects.

as x finds sufficient

room

goodness or

beaut)' in y, x has adequate reason to loxe v; the fact that y has imperfections

makes no

And were

difference.

person only

if

x

lo\'es

Vlastos to respond that x loves v the whole

regardless of how greatly \^s defects (for example, y's

)'

abusiveness) outweigh y's attractiveness, then loving the whole person cannot

be a requirement of genuine personal love (8.8). A.

W.

Price has also argued that erosic love

ble with loxing the person.-^

be

him

set against loving

for these qualities,

and

for

it is

He writes,

-^

some

P

in

y and

at least partly

(b) x values

P

not necessarily incompati-

"Lo\'ing another for himself is not to

qualities

of his ... so long

because of this that

having them." X's loving y for ha\'ing P can be V, too, values

is

x's

I

as

he too cares

care about his

loving y for himself only

in y partially because y values P.

if (a)

Thus, x

fails

to love v for himself if x loves v for having P, but either y does not value

or X

\'alues

P independentlv of \''s valuing

Clause

P.

has

(a)

some

afFmit}'

P

with

about the properties in virtue of which x appropriately loves y which y wants to be loved, or ( love properties that are part of y^s self-concept. Making the X should v for several theses

10.6) X should love y in virtue of properties for :

satisfaction

of this kind of condition necessary^ for x to love y the person is an y the person only if x loves y in virtue of that part of y

interesting idea: x loves

that V considers the best part. In this way, even x's loving onlv a part of y, in the st\'le

of Plato, does not look

version of the person y that

as

is

bad

as Vlastos

claimed

the object of x's love

is

the reason

x's

is

rejected, clause [b]

seeking the

good

goes

is

too strong (and note

The reason

as well).^^

for y only in y's sense

was; the truncated

simply that version of y

blessed by himself. Nevertheless, Price's condition (a) that if clause [a]

it

is

is

similar to

not exacdy the concern

of love (12.6): that which y values in v might not, from a more detached perspective, be what is actually best about v. We are often as blind to our own \irtues as

we

are to

our

vices.

Consider

humble about \'our accomplishments"

—

am

"I

said

her own humilit\' or even does not think she

is

fond of vou because vou are

when the beloved is not aware of accomplished.

X might very well

oblivious to and loxe v in x'irtue of properties that y

find xalue in \ that v

is

herself does not \'alue.

Hence, x can love the best part of v without y^s knowing

or agreeing that this

the best part; and

is

x's

doing so

is

no reason to deny that x

loves y the person or for herself If x's loving \ the person

believes

is

best in y e\'cn

perception of v

is

is

not ruled out bv

though \ might not

x's

valuing that which x

agree, that will be true only if x's

not only detached but also accurate.

It will

detract fi-om x's

303

The Object of Love loving V the person or for himself if x falsely detects a

does not person true.

exist.

This suggests that

\'irtue in

condition for

a necessar\'

that x's beliefs about the properties of y in virtue

is

y that y

knows

x's lo\'ing

y the

of which x loves y are

Of course, x loves y whether x beliexes truly or falsely that y has the S that

grounds

x's

emotion. But one difference bet\veen

x's

believing truly and believ-

has S might be that only in the former case could x be lo\'ing y the person: when x's belief that y has S is false, the object of x's love is not y but

ing falselv that

a

\'

person that x imagines

S, v V.

is still

But

exists. ^^

another sense, y

in

showers attention on

is

when x believes falsely that y has

In one sense,

the object of x's love: x

showers

not the object of x's love; the person x actually

from the person x believes x

significantly different

is

showering attention on.

and concern on

affection, attention,

is

If x beliexes truly that y has S, or if x generally has

knowledge of v's properties and histor}', there is no difference between the person x actually loves and the person x believes that x loves; there is one and onh' one person on which x showers attention. For this reason it may accurate

not be too bold to propose that v person, precisely

edge about

and there attention

v.

is

when

is

the object of

x's lo\'e,

or x loves y the

x has sufficiently comprehensive and accurate knowl-

X fails to love v the person when x's knowledge of y is

deficient

therebv a sizeable discrepancy' between the person x showers attention on. That

on and the person x thinks x showers

true beliefs about y

is

is,

x's

ha\ing

not merely necessary but also sufficient for x to be loving

y the person.

People hope thev will be loved "for myself," loved for are,

and accepted

"just the

way" they are.^°

It is

who thev

''really"

wrong, however, to think that

is itself selfish. "^^ That claim demand that we be loved for ourselves would be true if the demand to be lo\ed for oneself was motixated by a Balint-

"this

.

.

.

desire to be loved unconditionally (see 8.3), but not

be

lo\'ed erosicallv for S,

clearlv.

Thus the hope

that

if motivated

which outweighs D, when x one be

lo\'ed "for mx'selP'

sees

by

a desire to

both S and

D

might amount to want-

ing to be lo\'ed without ha\ing to decei\'e one's loxer about one's \irtues and faults

and without one's lo\er showering attention only on a product of her Wanting one's "real" self to be loved is wanting the lover not to

imagination.

touch some deep metaphysical

level

or to focus on

identit)' properties

but to

— and to continue to love while

have true and extensive knowledge of oneself

having that knowledge. But there lo\'ing V the

person

is

in this sense.

nothing in erosic love that prevents x from

As long

as x

judges

y's attracti\cness

to

y need not worn' that the mere presence of faults will bring love to an end (and x thereby succeeds in loving the whole person). And as

outweigh

y's faults,

long as X perceives

y's

properties accurately, y need not worr\' that x

fantasv (and x therebv succeeds in loving y for himself). If this

is

is

lo\ing a

right, Vlastos

304

The Object of Love will ha\'c to

concede that Plato's theon' of love

is

not as flawed

one regard.

hi fact, Vlastos does praise Plato's theorv' in

as

he thought,

Plato's theon'

one of those romantic views that countenance or excuse

x's

is

not

having illusions

about the attractiveness of y in order to secure love for the "whole" person imagines that ever\' part

For Plato, "there

By

is

perfect

and the beloved therebv becomes

no magnification of

is

truthfiil vision falsif)'

[^''s]

of love,

rejecting idealization as a part

moral or

we

love for the person,

If this

is

most tempted ... to do in allowing

the best that erosic loxe can

are not too cynical in thinking that that

Although Robert Solomon thinks we love peculiar animosit\'

is

enough.

for erosic reasons,^^ he has a

toward the philosophical concepts that

tradition. In the first is

all

"makes for a more

LOVING LOVE

6.

that

(x

God).

intellectual virtues. "^^

Plato's theor)'

of that part of the world which we are

— the part we love."

like

view of personal love,

x's

loving y

is x's

arise in the eros

having an emotion

directed at y (the object of x's emotion), and this emotion

is

grounded in

y has certain attractive properties. Solomon dislikes this wav of characterizing love. It is wrong, he says, to think of "love [as] an attitude x's belief that

toward someone," the emotion's "object."^^ For Solomon,

when x

loves y, y

the picture.

An

is

if

one

says that

one mistakenly "leaves out half of component of the loveworld is oneself '^^^

the "object" of x's love,

equally essential

What is the upshot of Solomon's forcing us to acknowledge the trivial when x loves y, the existence of two people is presupposed.^ "Love is not just an emotion directed toward another person. ... I am not just the person who has the emotion; I am also part of it." Love is "a world with two fact that

people. "^*^

and

lover

too

who

is

find this bewildering. If love is

loves v;

a

world composed of two people x

it

makes no sense to say

is

part of this love-item, then

part of this

when he as

I

and x

y,

that x

is

a

and the "beloved" y cannot be the object of love, because v love-item. Perhaps this is preciselv Solomon's point. Thus,

says that lo\'e "is not an

... a world," the implication

is

emotion 'about' another person so much that y

is

not the object of love because y

is

part of the love itself This conception of love as a shared entit\' (embraced also

by Karol WojtN^la;

1

1.2) runs into

problems with

"Love

is

which,

at least hopefiilly, is shared with

this just

reciprocit\'.

not just an attitude directed toward another person;

means

that

when

Solomon writes, it is

an emotion

him or her."^'' Interpreted innocuously,

x lo\'es v, x hopes that v also

lo\'es, x.

But

it is

composed of x and y. All x can hope for is that \ joins with x in creating a shared loveworld; x cannot hope out of love for y that \' lox'es x. For there is no lo\'e until that loveworld is created. inconsistent with Ionc's bein^ a world

305

The Object of Love Further, if Solomon (like the rest of us) does want to speak of x as a lo\'cr

who

loves y, yet y

itself,

love

or

—

is

at least the part acti\'elv

is

of

that

it

is v.

ad\'anced by Robert

Brown claims

love.

part of the love-item, then x actually loves the love-item

that

we can

This awkward consequence

Brown

in his

account of the object of

love a person yet "dislike some, or even many,

of the properties that the person exemplifies. "^^^ Hence, he X loves V the

Brown

outweigh

rejects the

whole person when x loves ever\'thing about

denies that love

loves the

is

whole person y v's defects.

view that

And

y.

because

the view that x

reason-based (8.8), he must reject if

— x loves

x loves y in virtue of y's attractive properties that

Nor does he claim that loving the whole

an especially important set of y's properties, for example,

person

is

y's identity'

to love

proper-

What, then, does Brown invoke in characterizing the object of love? the "In part," savs Brown, "when the agent loves another person "-"^^ But agent is cherishing ... a particular complex of instantiated qualities. ties.

.

.

.

is more to a person than committed to the object regardless of love of what properties it might come to have.'*^ In order to "contrast some of a person's qualities with love of that person as an individual,""*^ Brown

this

complex

not the object of love, because there

is

and because the lover

these properties

is

.

proposes that the additional item that comprises the object of love relationship

"In claiming to love the whole person

itself:

actually claiming also to love .

.

.

[

.

their

.

love's object

—

in

it is

what sense

is

the love

is

the lover ...

as the

Brown

solves the

as

the relationship

is

relationship.

part of y. Indeed,

and

y's

proper-

is

Brown can try

part of the object

when Brown

(b) the relationship

This remarkable view

part of what x loves. (c) x

their

loves the relationship

and

is

(d) y

different is

is

part of y, that

is

also different

is,

from saying that x loves

part of the relationship

from saying that x loves y and x

v

— which

inconsistent with the relationship's being only "part of what he loves."

remarkable claim

of

says that

"part of what he loves," he might be claiming that x loves the

relationship because (a) x loves y

because

is

is

an object of love. The task was to give an

whole object of love within the

love insofar as the relationship

is

problem about

y the object of x's love, rather than

to handle this objection bv claiming that the relationship

is

.

unique relationship with each other.

strange that

— by invoking the relationship

account of y

x's

.

W]hat helps to constitute his love, and is also part of what he loves,

unique relationship." But

ties

.

.

.

.

The

also Io\'es

the

relationship, where v and the relationship are two separate items; this is another sense in which the relationship could be "part of what he loves" (that is, one of the two things loved). Deciding whether Brown means that the relationship is part of V, or vice versa, is not easy, for what he says is obscure: "[Y's] life is

entwined with

[x's];

any attempt to individuate her

as

one of the partners

in that life will result in characterizing their relationship in contrast to other

306

The Object of Love relationships." The idea seems to be that the history of the x-y relationship its

details

lo\cd.

— individuates not only the relationship

—

all

but also the be-

Y cannot be picked out as v, as a distinct person, without referring to the

histon' of v's relationship with

To

sav that v

howe\'er,

is

is

In this sense the relationship

x.

v

is

this

histor\'

is

in part

if loving

the whole person

is

it

composed of the relationship, is no more satisfyBrown's proposal is also weak

necessary for genuine love, invoking the

x-y relationship as part of love's object reciprocal: x logicallv is

is

ontology to soh'e the problem of love's object

ing than conceiving of y as a transcendental self

because

which

life,

even partially constituted by the relationship. In the

absence of other reasons to think that y

invoking

part of v.

of the x-y relationship,

individuated bv the pieces of y's

is

being indi\'iduatcd bv the

does not follow that y

is

individuated by the history of the x-y relationship,

just to sav that

From y's

irrelevant.

there

(trivially)

cannot love y

if y

is

to assert that love

does not love

x,

is

necessarily

since if v does not love x

no complete object for x to love, there is no unique relationship that in what x loves. This is too high a price to pay for a solution to

part comprises

Vlastos' puzzle.

7.

PERSONS AS PROPERTIES

Martin Warner claims that the Platonic and the Christian conceptions of love derive

from the difference between conceiving of a person

as properties

more than this,

as a transcen-

(the eros tradition)

and conceiving of a person

dental self (the agape tradition). "^^ erosic love

may have

any logical connection

exists

the object of love, the person,

fact,

proponents of

just his properties, while agapists

of love and an account of the

a theorv'

follow from love's being erosic (agapic) that

it

is

his properties (a transcendental self)?

foUow from a person's being must be erosic (agapic)?

it

self) that love

Assume

is

The interesting issue, however, is whether

between

ontology of the person. Does

does

soul.

of historical

a matter

held that a person

have embraced a notion of the

versely,

As

as

that x's loving y erosically

Con-

his properties (a transcendental

and

x's

loving y agapically are ex-

haustive and mutually exclusive; and that \^s being only her properties and )^s

being, instead of or in addition, a transcendental self are also mutuallv exclusive

and exhaustive. Then the answer to both questions about the

logical connec-

tion betu'een the structure of love and the nature of the person possible that (A) x loves y erosically even if y

(B) X loves y agapically even if y

is

is

her properties. Situation (B)

because x might love v for reasons having nothing to do with

even

if y is

her properties. Situation (A)

is

is

no.

It is

a transcendental self and that is

possible just

y's properties,

possible just because x

might love y

The Objea of Love

307 even

irtuc (if y's attractive properties,

in

\

to

what y

fully

is.

The reason

that (A)

properties are not equivalent

if these

and (B)

connection between the structure of

person,

that the theories

basis

is

and that there

arc possible

nccessar\'

lo\'c

then, should

account of the

we understand Warner's claim that

the Christian

self,

son, and not for his qualities'

object of love

is

person

we

is

.

.

.

simply incoherent," that

is,

are loving

to be Diotima's view,

Warner

is

'for the per-

contradictory?'*^

presents this argu-

to the person than his qualities, then in loving a

(some

at least of) his qualities" (p. 339).

to claim that the object of love

is

object.

to assert that the

The

into "incoherence" because to claim that the object of love

and not her qualities

its

"given Diotima's

conception of love's being

the person and not the person's qualities

Working out what he takes ment: "If there is no more falls

no

of erosic and agapic personal lo\e are about the

of love, while theses about the nature of the person are about

How,

is

and the nature of the

is

the

first

is

Christian

the person

rather than the

second; yet the two are equivalent, given Diotima's conception of the person.

Hence, the Christian must postulate

wedge between loving

a

a transcendental self in order to drive a

person and loving properties. Hence,

also,

Warner's

claim that theories of love are logically connected to conceptions of the person: if

a person

only a

if a

person

there basis

is

is

her properties, then the object of love must be properties, and

person

is

a transcendental self is there logical

room for the object being

from properties. Warner has not established, howe\'er, that connection between the ontological nature of the person and the

as distinct

a

of love; the

logical connection, instead,

is

between the ontology of the

person and the ontolog\' of the object of love. Warner's argument vields the conclusion that x loves "some at least of y's qualities," but this does not entail that X loves y in virtue love's

ground being

of y's

qualities; indeed, the

argument

is

compatible with

either erosic or agapic.

Warner's argument suggests that choice about love's object:

when

properties y reduces to, or x

is

we

are faced with an unappetizing

x loves y, either x

is "reall\^'

lo\'ing onh' the

loving the transcendental self that y expands to.

In neither case does x love y the person in anv satisfying sense; if x loves y's properties, y the person

who

has these properties drops out, and

if x

loves the

embodied person drops out. The impression we get from Warner is that x's loving y amounts only to x's loving y's eyes, y's beautifiil feet, and y's courage; otherwise, x must be loving something emphemeral. There seems to be no room, in particular, to claim that x loves y the person in virtue of /s attractive properties, even if x must be loving, out of ontological necessit}', "some at least of y's qualities." But Warner has not bequeathed us an insoluble dilemma. If x loves v and transcendental

y

is

self,

her properties,

y the

it

does follow that x loves properties. But what follows

The Objea of Love

308

about the object of lo\c must be stated the collection of properties that v object is

is.

Having

one thing, and having that same

is

carefully;

a relation (love) to a collection as

relation to the items in that collection

quite another thing. Hence, x can love y in virtue of y's attractive properties

outweigh

that ties

that v

v's defects,

is, \'et

In this sense

x.

properties,

and the object of x's love

none of these properties x's

the collection of proper-

loving y erosically, where the object y

compatible with

is

is

necessarily also an object

is

the person's properties,

is

after

all

of love for

a collection

is

of

loving y the person. At the same time, even

x's

on Diotima's conception of a person, admonishing is

does not follow that x

it

of /s properties, but only that x loves

necessarily loves individually any or each

not incoherent,

not between loving a transcendental

x to love the person, not

long as the contrast drawn

as

self and loving properties,

but between

loving a collection of properties and only loving individually any or each

property in that collection."^ I

am

when

not claiming that

x loves

y,

x never loves

individually; to the contrary, x's erosic love for y

of S and love for

tionablv, both loxe for v in virtue S. I

have been arguing, instead, that

follow from

being a

x's

of properties.

set

From

emotions? properties,

Would anyone

the facts that

I

vidual properties.

To

be sure,

we

irresponsibilit\'."

or

some members of

nor does

it

follow from

fear or hate

you and

I "reallv^'

that

you

are a set

fear or hate are

your

dangerous.

y's

of

indi-

speak of a person's "dangerous temper" and

We

do so not onh' because it is

person are erosic and

properties can be

shorthand for saying that our

we

displace the dangerousness

of the person onto the properties. But properties are not

fearftilness

ally

at the

properties

and unobjec-

accept Warner's argument for other

the objects of emotions, but also because

emotions directed

at least

\''s

direcdy loving properties does not

(sect. 5),

does not follow that what

it

"loathesome

x's

loving y in virtue of S

ordinarily,

is

Not even Diotima

asserts that necessarily

loves only y's properties. For Diotima,

coming

when

liter-

x loves y, x

to love only the goodness

and

beauty of a person, and then loving these properties wherever they are found, is

an achievement. Diotima urges us to progress from loving a particular

person in virtue of his attractive properties to loving the properties themselves.*^

This progression requires that

gical attitude

might interpret the progression \'ision. like,

The

we

be able to

fluid or

as

On

ambiguous underlying

ing a mistake:

the other hand,

we

our phenomenolo-

On

the

one hand, we

involving merely a Gestalt switch in our

and we learn or decide to see persons

placeable.

alter

toward things, persons, and properties.

we might

realit\'

can be seen however

as replaceable,

goodness

we

as irre-

interpret the progression as involv-

turn genuinely irreplaceable people into the replaceable,

thereby demeaning them and our relations to them, while enthroning a meta-

309

The Object ofLm^e

Good or God) and enshrining our relationship to it as the pinnacle of human experience. Plato's (or Diotima's) view, however, is different: we should transfer our love from people, who reallv are replaceable, physical illusion (the

and turn to that which

is

irreplaceable, the

reserve

our affections for

in lo\e

or ontology forces that on

8.

Good. But

a thing, or for properties,

that

we

urged to

are

presupposes that nothing

us.

PERSONS ARE NOT PROPERTIES

One of Pascal's

Pensees

is

relevant to the issue of

what

it is

to

the

lo\'e

person. In Brunschvicg no. 323 he wrote:**^

What

is

the w^?

A man is at his window watching the passers-by: if I go by, am

I

entitled to

me? No; for he was not specifically thinking about me. But does the one who loves someone on account of her bcaut\' love her? No; since small pox, which will kill beaurv' without killing the person, will make it so that he will no longer love her. What if someone loves me for my judgment, my memory, docs that person say that he put himself in this position in order to see

No; since I can lose these qualities without losing myself Where then is me if it is neither in mv bodv nor in my soul.^ And how is one to love the body

love me'i this

or the soul,

if it is

not for these qualities, which arc not that which constitutes the

would it be possible for one to love a person's no regard for its qualities? This is not possible,'*'' and moreover would be unfair. Thus, one does not ever love anybody, but qualities me, since thev are perishable? For soul in abstraao, and with

only.48 Let's not therefore ors, since

Is

we

poke fun of those

who seek public functions and hon-

only love another for borrowed qualities.

Pascal defending a thesis about the ontology of the person by appealing to

claims about love ( in the

argument

in

manner of Mark Fisher, who relies on the substitution

arguing that a person

is

a transcendental self; 2.5

and 3.6) or

defending a thesis about love by invoking an ontology of the person

(in the

manner, but not the substance, of Warner's Diotima)? Note that the passage begins with the supposition that x loves y erosically and ends with what

no one ever loves another person, but only properties. So it seems as if Pascal commits the nOn sequitur of arguing that X loves S if x loves y for having S. But Pascal does not make this mistake; he arrives at his view that we love only properties some other way. apparently

is

Pascal's conclusion, that

Pascal begins by asking: If x loves y for /s physical beaut)', does x love y It is

important to

emotion is

love?

realize that Pascal

is

not asking: Does x bve y?

To that question we might answer that physical

— that

is, is

beauty by

.>

x's

itself

logically irrelevant to love or that if x loves y for only this reason, x

is

a

310

TheObjeaofLove superficial lover. object

But Pascal

is

of x's love? His answer

asking, instead: If x loves y for y's beaut)',

phvsical beaut\' and remain v and (2) if y loses her beaut\% x will y.

But docs

follow from claims

it

is

v the

no, in light of these claims: (1) y can lose

is

(

1

)

and

y's

no longer love

does not love y but only y's beauty is gone but y remains can

(2) that x

is gone when y's beauty? No. mean either that the beaut\' had been the object of x's love or that the beaut\' had been its basis. Pascal would have to add that v is the object of x's love only if x's love for y is constant, but there is no reason to think that he assumes this. Actually, as we shall see, claim (2) is superfluous to Pascal's argument, while

That x's love

claim

(

1

does

)

all

the work.

Pascal immediately asks another question, but not: If x loves y for y's

judgment question

answer

(a

is:

is

mental rather than

If x loves

no, but

and remain

longer loves

now

his

is

y; Pascal

love v?

y the object of x's love?

grounds involve only

here does not rely

(1*): y

when y

Pascal does not sav here that

y.

does x

a phvsical quality),

v for v's judgment,

on

x's

can lose

loses y's

Rather, his

As above, his \^s judgment

judgment, x no

love dying to derive the

What the two arguments have when y loses a propert)'; Pascal is "What is the meV He argues that the the "me" remains even when anv of its

conclusion that x loves onlv \^s mental propert\'. in

common

is

the claim that v remains exen

tn^ing to answer his opening question

"me"

is

—

not any of its properties, since

properties are imagined to be absent. (Note the Cartesian methodologv'. Is Pascal claiming that co£jitans

we

can imagine that v remains without even being the

of the Meditations}

I

wonder why,

Descartes's conclusion about the self

in this passage, Pascal

Or does

he?) All of

\''s

res

does not draw properties are

perishable even as y would remain through anv of these changes, so the self that is

y

is

something beyond

this thesis

\''s

properties.

Having

established to his satisfaction

about the ontologs' of the person, Pascal then derives

that X never loves y but onlv

x^'s

properties."*^^ If

v

is

is

conclusion

something bevond

properties, then y cannot be the object of x's love if (this step

or transcendental self that is y

his

is

\''s

crucial) the soul

beyond the reach of the emotions. ( 'This is not

possible.") Therefore, x could onlv be loving \^s properties

when

x loves

v.

Note several things about Pascal's argument. First, it is a cute twist on the argument of Warner's Diotima, who argues that x loves y's properties because y is nothing but ys properties; for Pascal, x loves \^s properties because v is something beyond \^s properties. (Does this mean that Pascal can love only

God's properties, and not {pace Wojtyla; 10.2)

genuine love

is

God

Second,

if

we add

that genuine love

must be love for y the person qua transcendental self, then

impossible. Genuine love would be loving the "me," but that

not possible. Hence either there its

directl}-?)

is

no genuine

object. Third, Pascal's conclusion has

loxe, or if there

is,

is

properties are

nothing to do with whether

x's

love

The Object of Love

for y dies

constant

when

y loses one of y's properties. Even

— x loves y

tologically

311

love for

is

\'

perfectly

—

inaccessible to the emotions. Thus, Pascal

of love to

if x's

y grows ugly and becomes senile x is still onpre\'ented from loving y's real self, since the soul, he claims, is after

is

not arguing from the vicissitudes

about the object of love or the ontolog\- of the person. defends a thesis about the person and on that foundation argues that

He first

a conclusion

the object of love

not the person, but onlv properties.

is

of course, occurs preciselv where he argues that since y property P^ and remain y, and also lose (instead!) the

Pascal's mistake,

can lose the specific particular property'

remain

That

v.

ble property'

v's

P2 and remain

y,

existence does not

and so on, y can lose all v^s properties and depend on \^s retaining anv one perisha-

does not mean that y can lose

all v^'s

that

if

properties and

still

exist (or

y can lose some set of them and remain y ) it is a non sequitur to argue y is not Pj and not P2 (and so on) individually, then v is something

e\'en that

;

beyond properties

altogether.

Of

argument: Pascal never explains transcendental

That

self.

is

course, there

why

is

another weakness in his

the emotions cannot latch

on

to the

merely assumed. Yet, without including some

reason for thinking that the metaphysics of the transcendental self makes inaccessible, Pascal's

argument threatens to beg the question bv assuming

it

that

emotions can attach only to properties. But our question about the object of love

is

precisely

whether that

is

true.

ENDING A REGRESS

9.

If X loves y erosically, x loves y the attractive properties S that

when

outweigh

"whole" person when x loves \ for defects

v's

D, and x loves v "for himself

about S and D are accurate. X might ha\'e good reason to D quietly because x considers D insignificant in comparison with the

x's beliefs

tolerate

\alue of S, while hoping that itself,

y's

that

tolerate

D

might outweigh

S.

no new \'ice arises, or no old \'ice finally shows Or x might tolerate D in y less well than x would

in a stranger, just

because x loves y and

is

concerned that y be

as

good or virtuous as possible; so x might attempt to eliminate D not onlv to make x's love more secure but also to help y improxe himself Or x might come to cherish some of D simply because x loves y in virtue of S or, less rationally, come to see D as good even though at some level x regards it as bad. All these erosic possibilities indicate that x has not lost sight e\'en if x dislike

does not love ever\'thing about

some of

\''s

y.

They

of \' the "whole" person,

also suggest that x

properties without disliking y; and

if it is

possible for x to dislike, even hate, individual properties of y,

conceptually possible for x to

like,

might

conceptually it

even love, individual properties.

must be

312

The Object of Love

Could

it

be argued diat loving a person's properties

is,

nevertheless, not

conceptually possible? Since a property (the blondeness of

inanimate thing, properties can be loved only

A common from

argument against the

interests

possibilit}'

[NE 1155b26-32] and

Aristotle

of their

own

if inanimate

cannot be concerned for the welfare of a thing for

only instrumentally. to

I

cherish). ^*^

I

that things have

is

its

love things.

sake, if love necessarily

doubt, however, that this argument

But there

is

no

of them. Since we

Or we could

overcome our tendena' to think that we do love things

coin

an

of loving mere things (derived

often repeated)

we cannot

is

things can be loved.

to take into account in our treatment

includes that sort of concern,

y's hair)

is

love

them

powerful enough the 1902 gold

(recall

when x loves y,

another argument. Suppose that

X does so in virtue of v'^s attractive properties; that

is, x's loving y (the object) based on something other than y himself, namely, some of y's properties. Y

the object of x's love just because there

which

x loves y; x's

emotion

is

is

a valuable tertium

tied to the object

quid

in virtue

is is

of

of that emotion by something

other than the object. Similarly, x loves x's gold coin just because the coin too has attractive properties; these are propert\',

its

tertium quid.

beloved propert\% a valuable tertium quid, grounds

and

this

must be

claim that x can love a

make them

make them

lovable

— but

attractive properties that

If we

suppose that valuable,

propert\' that

is

not only that

we

x's

love for the property,

a valuable propert}' that the property has.

tive properties that

that

To

however, then amounts to asserting that something other than the

lo\'able,

attrac-

attractive properties

not absurd to think that properties have

is it

make them a propert\'

we

and persons have

Things have

is

lovable?

valuable bv virtue of its having another

are thrust into an infinite regress.

The problem

is

therebv presuppose a neverending hierarchv of properties of

when explaining why x finds Pj why x finds P2 attractive, we have to appeal to P2's having P3, and so on. Hence, we can never fiilly understand x's finding the original P^ attractive. The conclusion seems to be that properties are not the sort of thing that can be loved. Or love properties of properties of .... In addition, attractive,

we

if

appeal to P^'s having P2, then in explaining in turn

for properties cannot be accounted for erosicall)';

properties

must

exist if they are to

some other

basis

be objects of love. Actually,

this

can be construed as exposing yet another incoherence in the personal

Io\'e.

explaining

For

why

if

of love for

argument

first

view of

x loves v because v has attractive properties S, then in

x finds S valuable

we now have

to mention S's

own

valuable

The regress arises not only when properties are the object of love, but also when a person is the object and the person is loved in virtue of her properties. This is embarrassing to an account of love that prided itself on

properties.

picturing love as comprehensible rather than a myster}^

The Object

313

ofLox'e

Both Plato and

and argued that

Aristotle recognized this regress

it is

avoided by positing the existence of things that could be loved or desired for their

own

sake (for example, Symp. 205a). ^''' Thus,

loving something, or

x's

some point lead to x\s valuing something else for itself, which something must be valuable in its own right. The implications of this way of avoiding the regress are enormous. If x loves a propert\' P or finds it finding

it

must

valuable,

at

but not because P has valuable Q, then

attractix'e,

more an agapic than an

erosic

phenomenon.

point at which the regress ends.

but that

or that

all

personal love

all

is

erosic love for a person

is,

or reduces

becomes more plausible to claim agapic: since agapic love

not suppose that

it

some point the no erosic love at

is

ver\'

at

some point

to

is

for itself and not in virtue

not suppose that valuing something for is,

terminolog)^

end the

distinction

own

on

v's

between the

somewhere

is

basis

valuable in

its

we

some point

qualities,

then

x

why

sake occurs at the very begin-

Using Irving Singer's

(10.5). Since y

is

collapses; there is)

own

its

is

basis.

no distincThat love

of the basis-object distinction should not come

have already encountered

posal that X loN'es v the person

means

why

own right, then for this thing the

and object of love

a collapse

as a surprise; indeed,

ties

regress,

properties.

that if something

tion precisely because the object provides (or in\'olves

it

straightaway

1.7), we might say that in love x immcdiatelv bestows value on v

rather than (only)

Note

its

of further

that x loves a person v simply for himself? (

if all

beginning and prevents the regress from

getting under way? If the theor\' of erosic love must posit that at

ning, that

And

agapic love for a propert}', then

to,

that x's love for a person v

must occur

occurs at the

must value something

agapic love;

is,

mixture of reconciled eros and agape.

a

to be

—

at

The upshot is not that there

depends on, and hence "ultimatelv"

erosic love

P seems

can be no erosic love

without agapic love existing

for persons or properties

all,

valuing

x's

If so, there

this idea. Recall the pro-

when x loves v in virtue of v's

identit\' properties

identical to her identit)' properties, loving v for those proper-

that the basis

and object of love

for herself This erosic view,

I

have argued,

are the same, is

and v

is literally

unacceptable, but

not mean that the eros tradition cannot accommodate

in this

its

loved

failure

does

one context the

collapse of the basis-object distinction.

Persons are attractive precisely because they are composites, composed

of and having valuable properties. Any properties of persons that arc composites are

attracti\'c also in virtue

similarly

of the valuable properties they have.

Thus, both persons and composite properties feed the regress. But noncompositc properties (perhaps goodness their properties; hence, erties are

and

beaut\')

cannot be xalucd

noncomposite properties end the

regress.

in \'irtue

of

These prop-

valued for themselves in the sense that they cannot sustain the

314

The Object of Love

distinction

between

basis

and

object. If this picture

philosophical motivation for understanding directlv for himself: since y erosically

properties, there

assuming that \

The

crosic picture

cnough"^^ for the beginning,

b\'

is

no reason

is

is

a

coherent, there

is

less

and since the regress can be ended with noncomposite

possible;

is

is

love for a person y as loving y a composite, comprehending x's love for y x's

to pre\'cnt

it

from beginning by implausibly

noncomposite particular straightawav loved for himself

makes more sense than saving

that "the beloved

is

reason

Wc are not forced to put a mvstcrx' into love at the verv

love.

supposing that the beloved

when we have

posite particular (8.2),

is,

strangely enough, a

noncom-

the alternative of appealing to the be-

loved's properties as the reason for love. If it

is

mysterious that some properties

are valuable in themselves, or that they are "reason enough" for their being it is a mvsten' that occurs at a place where there are bound to be The metaphvsics underlying love might be mysterious, but not love

valued, at least mvsteries. itself

10.

SMALL CAUSES

If mysteries at the surface

come

of love are what we want, they are not hard to

by. In love, Kierkegaard tells us,

with cause and

effect.

.

.

"There seems to be something wrong

[T]hey do not rightlv hang together. Tremendous

.

and powerful causes sometimes produce small and unimpressive effects, sometimes none at

all;

coUosal effect."^^ lea\'ing

and

it

heavT rock

only a scratch; the same

shatters

it

then again

A

happens that a brisk is

heaved

at a

litde cause

window, but

window is tickled with the

— mysterious occurrences (even miracles)

beat of a

that

make

of the laws of nature as baffling as the geometrv of round squares. in love

all

eyes. ...

the time.

A

.

.

Didn't take much, either.

.

flower in the

occurrence based on so

hair."^"*

little

The

produces a

bounces

it

"I

flv's

off,

wings

the world

used to fall

A smile, something about the

myster)' of sweet

about the beloved that

lo\'e: a

momentous

impossible (or just

it is

embarrassing.^ ) for the lover to retrieve these reasons; the causes are so tiny that

the lover believes there are none except the beloved herself.

In his account of love, John McTaggart takes verv' seriously the idea that love

may be

based on very

litde

about the beloved: "Love

is

not necessarily

proportional to the dignit}' or adequacy of the qualities which determine trivial all

cause

may determine the direction of intense love.

that love can be.

.

.

.

.

.

it.

A

And yet it may be

.To love one person above all the world for all one's life when she is young, is to be determined to a very

because her eyes are beautihil

great thing by a very small cause. "^^ McTaggart's scenario timelessly exclusively

and

stricdy constandy just because

is

weird; x loves y

of the young

\^s

The Object of Love

315

beautiful eyes. Sure, this

is

mentous; the whole Yet McTaggart

mon

young

— the cause and on

relies

where

a "\cv\ small cause," but

thing"? X's loving y because the

this

effect

its

is

the "\en' great

eyes are beautiful

y's

— seems

hardly

is

not

sillv, if

mo-

irrational.

discrepancy between cause and effect ( as a com-

of love) to support

major

about love, that

it is anoma"more independent than any other emotion of the qualities of the substance towards which it is felt."^^ Using his special terminology', McTag-

feature

his

thesis

lous in being

gart expresses his thesis that love qualities this

way: "Love

may be

is

"more independent" of the beloved's

because of those qualities, [but]

respect

of them. "^^^ Hence, for McTaggart, love

in the

"because of" sense but in the "in respect

it is

not in

independent of qualities not

is

of

sense.

McTaggart's meaning is ver\' clear when he says that emotions (including love) can exist because of qualities: the qualities

of the object are part of the

causation ("determination") of the emotion. For example, belie\e that y has P, for

McTaggart,

belie\'ed

and

this belief in turn causes x to love (admire, resent) y;

is

holds that love

erosic in the

is

grounds is

causes x to

P is the ultimate cause of x's emotion, while y's property "is have P" is its immediate cause. Or if v does not have P, x's

by x to

McTaggart

P

\^s

emotion toward y causally

v's

caused by

v has P. Thus, McTaggart

x's false belief that

narrow sense

that x's beliexing v to have

P

Then in what sense is love independent of qualities? clear when he says that other emotions, but not love,

x's love.

much

less

are also "in respect of~" qualities.

One interpretation is that x's emotion toward y is x's

emotion

is

directed at

P

itself,

so that P

Thus, the distinction between "because difference

between the causal

admiration, then, to say that that

P causes

contrast, love its

x's is

basis

is

and "in respect oP' marks the

and the object of an emotion. In the case of

admiration for v and that P

however,

is

in respect

also the

is

not in respect of properties, so P

object. This interpretation,

P when

the object of x's emotion, not v.^^

oP

both because of and

it is

"in respect oP'

is

of P

is

to say

admired object. In

the cause of x's lo\e but not

not very

satisfv'ing.

Since

x's

being

determined to admire y by x's belief that y has P does not entail that x admires P itself (recall the non sequitur), I find little reason to suppose that for erosic

emotions other than love P

is

usually the actual object. Hence, love could

hardly be alone in being "because oP' and not "in respect of" qualities. Further,

McTaggart summarizes

view with "love

his

for his qualities," immediatelv adding, "«" means that the person x asserts the sentence/), while "x argues that/)" means that x possibilities,

could be obtained

3.

4.

defends

p,

argument.

ments are

—

or gives a reason for claiming

do not use "argues" in the more interesting than claims. I

p.,

by providing

a formal or

semiformal

many

cases, argu-

loose sense "asserts." In

CHAPTER ONE: TWO VIEWS OF LOVE 1.

Capellanus, The Art of Courtly Love,

p. 2. (Full

information on works cited in the

endnotes can be found in the Bibliographv.) 2.

Descartes, The Passions of the Soul (Philosophical Writings, vol.

3.

The Four Loves, p. 63. Weston, "Toward the Reconstruction of Subjectivism," p. 182. See C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves, pp. 81-82, 124, 154, 160-166; Smedes, Love Within Limits, pp. 6, 92-93; and de Rougemont, Love in the Western World, p.

4. 5.

1, p.

356).

31 If 6.

See Martha

Nussbaum on

the distinction between the "basis" and the "object" of

love (The Fragility of Goodness, p. 355). 7.

Robert Musil, "Tonka," in Five Women, p. 113. He continues: "But whereas in dreams there is still a hair's-breadth margin, a crack, separating the love from the beloved, in waking life this split is not apparent; one is merelv the victim of doppel0dn£ier-tncV.cr\' and cannot help seeing a human being as wonderful who is

321

322

Notes

not so

to Paries

at all."

6-10

Sec also George Eliot, Daniel Deronda,

the order of word-making, wherein love preceded!

8.

9.

p.

in V N'aluable only because x loves v is also mildh' suggested in Carson McCuUers's The Ballad of the Sad Cafe, pp. 26-27. Birrw French Lovers, p. 195. One might read Pascal's remark (Pensees no. 423, p. 1 54) the lover's "heart has its agapically. It is apparendy a retraction reasons of which reason knows nothing" of an earlier claim of his: "We have unapdv taken away the name of reason from Let us love, and have opposed them to each other without good foundadon. not exclude reason from love, since they are inseparable. The poets were not right in painting Love blind" ("Discourse on the Passion of Love," pp. 522-523). A modem version of this "inseparability" thesis is defended by Nakhnikian, "Love in Human Reason." Niklas Luhman claims that the second view of personal love historically postdates the first view. In the theory of courdy love, "A knowledge of the object's characteristics was essential." Later, "in the field of paradoxical codification" [romantic love], "love [was] justified ... by means of imagination" (that is, x's perceiving S in y, even falsely imagining S, sufficed for love). But "once the autonomy of intimate relations had finally been established, it was possible to justif}- love simply now no .The beaut}' of the beloved by the inexplicable fact that one loved. longer had to be in evidence, nor did it have to be imagined; this had ceased to be a reason for lo\'e, and rather was seen by the lovers as a consequence of their love" (Love as Passion, p. 44, italics deleted; see also p. 166: "The lover himself is the source of his love"). But also, of course, Plato preceded Paul.

—

—

.

10.

"We may learn from The view that x finds S

658:

lovable.^''

.

.

11. See

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Davidson, "Reasons as Causes."

"The

N. Findlay claims that the object of cause x's emotion; it is caused, instead, by x's beliefs about y. Sureh' this holds when the object of love does not exist, since a nonexistent object cannot cause anything, while beliefs about this nonexistent object can be efficacious. (See William Lyons' discussion of x's love for a dead grandmother, which he says has no "material" object but is not "illusory"; Emotion, p. 109.) And in general, Findlay is right; for objects that do exist, it is not exacdy \''s having S that causes the emotion but x's mediating belief that y has S. Nevertheless, \^s having S is the cause of x's love one step removed, if \''s having S

12. In

love

(y,

Justification

or even

of Attitudes"

y's property' S)

(p.

148),

does not

J.

itself

why X believes that y has S. Further, what Findlay claims about the causal role of may not apply to x's perceiving that y has S. If x's loving y is caused by x's perception that y has S, we need not always invoke a mediating belief (x's belief is

beliefs

that y has S) that

comes between

y's

having S (the cause) and

x's

loving v (the

effect).

D. Broad ("Emotion and Sentiment," pp. 206-207) considers a matrix that and "actually unmotivated" emotions with "ostensibly motivated" and "ostensibly unmotivated." Broad's point is that there might be divergence between the reasons one consciously believes are operative and the

13. C.

crosses "actually motivated"

(unconscious) reasons that are really operative. 14.

1

am not committing myself (or my

view that these properties assume they are. The issue here is

interlocutor) to the

are objective; to understand the objection, just

.

Notes

Pa^es 10-15

to

323

not about the distinction between objective and subjective but about prop)crties

15.

Wcxidy

16.

For

into the

fit

how

such

two views of love.

Allen, Without Feathers, p. 110.

this

reason John Brentlinger claims that

''the issue ot

whether

eros

or a0ape

is

the correa conception of love reduces to the question of whether \alues arc objec-

1

7.

tive or relative" ("The Nature of Love," p. 126). Qjmparisons of eros and agape have been enormouslv influential in m\' thinking; for example, Kierkegaard's Works of Love, Anders Nvgren's A^iape and Eros, and Gene Outki's Ajjape: An Ethical Analysis. Robert Solomon, in contrast, believes that this literature is dispcnsible: "Much of the histor\' of Western love, written primarily b\' theological scholars and German philologists, has consisted in the mock battle between these two Greek words. But all of this has nothing to do with love. [I]t is rather a technique to indulge in scholarship and avoid looking .

.

.

at

anv actual experience.

19.

20. 2

1

is

itself

.

another

22. See Outka, 4^fl/>A pp.

.

.

Indeed, rather than

political

move,

clarif\'

the issues, this scholarlv

a

158-160.

96-98, and Morgan, Love, p. 123, n. 74. and a neighbor-love that loves God-in-theShirley Let-in ("Romantic Lo\'e and Christianir\'," p. 133): "The object of Diotima's love is real, not an illusion. But this real object of love is neither a human being nor a human qualirv. It is the divine spark in all men."

23. See Nygren, 24.

.

way of making an ordinar\' emotion sound impressivelv profound" (Love: Emotion, Myth and Metaphor, p. 9). Nvgren, .A^fl/?f and Eros, p. 78. Sec also Helmut Thielicke, The Ethia ofSex, p. 33. Douglas Morgan, Loir: Plato, the Bible, and Freud, p. 74. "Syg^rcn, A^iape and Eros, p. 75. Quoted bv Nvgren, A£iape and Eros, p. 654. piddling

18.

.

.

yl/7fl/jf

and

The similarirv' between human is suggested by

This spark

is

Eros, pp.

Plato's eros

not a piece of the Christian

God but the "participation" of a human in

Form of Beaurv. Fromm, TheArtofLovin£i, pp. 33-37. See Judith Van Herik, Freud, Femininity, and the

25. 26.

Faith, for a discussion

of similar

theses in Freud. 1, pp. 300—301. lI55bl5-20. In this translation, Martin Ostwald reluctantly uses "lovable"; see p. 217, n. 11. Both Gregory' Vlastos ("The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato," p. 4, text and n. 4) and Nussbaum {The

27. Singer, The Nature of Love, vol. 28. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics,

Fragility of Goodness, p. 354) think

xhdtX.

philia

is

best translated as "love," not

"friendship."

book I, chap. 28, "Of Friendship," p. 139. Even Montaigne as claiming that personal love has no reasons, other readings are possible: (1) Montaigne does have reasons, of which he was unconscious; or (2) Montaigne is claiming that all Boctic's properties, taken together, provided his reason for loving. "Because it was he," then, means "because he was the sum of all his properties." See notes 69 and 71, below. Rogers, Matrtmoniall Honour (1642); quoted bv Leites, The Puritan Conscience and Modern Sexuality, p. 101. Leites, The Puritan Conscience, p. 101.

29. Montaigne, Complete Essays,

though

30.

31.

I

am

interpreting

324

Notes

32.

to

Quoted

Pa^es 15-20

b\'

Aldous HuxJey, The Perennial Philosophy, p. 83. ( 1678); quoted by Leites, The Puritan Conscience,

33. Baxter,yl Christian Dictionary

176,

p.

n. 82.

34. Singer, The Nature of Love, vol. 2, p. 49. 35. Gav, The Tender Passion, p. 65. 36. Stendhal, Love, p. 60. 37. Ibid., p. 59:

"Why does one enjov and delight in each new beauty discovered in the

beloved?" 38. Ibid., pp. 45, 50. 39. See Russell

40. See

Vannov, Sex Without

Love, p. 157, n. 3.

mv article, "The Unit\' of Romantic Lxive," pp. 388-395. George Eliot wrote

that admiration was, fortunately, only a necessary condition for love: "Care has

been taken not onh' that the trees should not sweep the stars down, but also that [N]ature's man who admires a fair girl should not be enamoured of her.

everv'

order

.

is

certainK' benignant in not obliging us

with the most admirable mortal read this serious passage in a

we have

e\'er

one and

all

.

.

to be desperatelv in love

seen" {Daniel Deronda, p. 85). If we

way unintended by

Eliot,

it

will

sound

like

"Not onl\' is there no God, but tr\' getting a plumber on weekends"

Allen's

Woody {Getting!

Even, p. 25). 41. Singer, The Nature of Love, vol. 2,

42. Ibid.,

p.

p.

361.

365.

some features of love from more fiandamental features, "Unirv of Romantic Love." Nakhnikian derives five features of "undemanding love" from its two defining features in "Ix)ve in Human Reason" (p.

43. For an example of deriving see

mv

301). 44. Kierkegaard, Works of Love, p. 74.

45. William Dunbar, The Merle and the Nychtingail,

1.

16.

Nvgren suggests (A^ape and Eros, p. 157) that for John the distinction between the lower and the higher eros was not between lower and higher human objects of love, as in Pausanias, but between love of an\thing worldly and the love for God. 47. Freud wrote that some people direct "their love, not to single objects but to all men 46.

alike" (that

is,

exhibit neighbor- lo\'e) preciselv to avoid "the uncertainties

disappointments of genital love" {Civilization and

Its Discontents, p.

and

49). These

people replace erosic love with agapic rather than with a higher erosic love. 48. Pascal, Pensees, no. 396, p. 145. 49.

An

we should love God but not humans "Wliv love what vou will lose.' / There is

obvious rebuttal to Pascal's view that

(because thev die)

nothing

must

else to love"

deflate

in love

is

J.

M.

Louise

Gliick's:

p. 56). That there might be no God of relief that "instances of people claiming to be

{The Triumph ofAchilles,

Stafford's sigh

with non-existent individuals are fortunately very rare" ("On Distinguish-

ing Between Love and Lust," p. 300). 50. Capellanus {The Art of Courtly

Lox>e, p.

thev will not reciprocate as surely as

52) warns young

God

men

not to love

women;

will.

51. Confesswns, p. 55 (book 3, para. 1).

"Symptoms of Love," in Stallworthy, yl Book of Love Poetry, p. 45. some brief remarks on this idea, and on the "rivalrN\" see Outkn, A^ape, 44-45, 52-53.

52. Graves, 53. For

pp.

Notes

to Poffes

20-31

325

54. Greeley, Bottom Line Catechism for Contemporary Catholics, quoted bx Peter Gardella.

55.

Innocent Ecstasy, pp.

Quoted bv

50- 151.

1

Singer, The Nature of Love, vol.

56. Nygrcn, Afjape

and Eros,

p.

God

57. Lewis suggests that "by a high paradox,

towards Himself." fi-om

We

and Eros,

59. Ibid., p. 95. There "faith" for the

human

is

human

God

love for

p.

to have a Gift-love

p. 177).

127.

mv

a question, in

love for

as pistis.

1.6, to p. 48, 1.5, in hxs

60. Nygrcn., Affape

men

enables

can "withhold," or not withhold, "our wills and hearts,

God" {The Four Loves,

58. Nygrcn, Affape

195.

1, p.

213.

and Eros,

God

mind, whether Nvgren

is

substituting

(which drops out altogether) or analvzing the

Outka

glosses over this distinction; contrast p. 47,

Agape. p.

127.

61. Ibid., p. 213.

213-214.

62. Ibid., pp. 63. Tillich, 64.

LoT'f,

Nvgren

and Justice, p. 31. humans must love God: "All choice on man's part is and Eros, p. 213). See mv discussion of Woju'la and Fromm on

Power,

actually claims that

excluded" {Ajjape

Nvgrenian reciprocirv

in

human personal love

65. Kierkegaard, Works of Lore, pp.

156-157,

66. Singer, The Nature of Love, vol.

"Toward

1,

1

1.2)

:

x's

loving \ causes v to love

x.

added.

"Appraisal and Bestowal," pp. 3-22; vol. 3,

Modern Theory of Lxjve,"

a

(

italics

pp.

389-406.

made bv Emil Outkz^ Agape, pp. 81-83, 157-

67. Singers distinction between appraisal and bestowal had earlier been

Brunner

(Justice

and

the Social Order, 1945). See

158.

"The Individual

68. Vlastos,

as

an Object of Lx)ve

in Plato," p. 33.

69. Singer, then, here distances himself in this regard from the second view of personal lo\'e.

He

rejects

Montaigne's reason also on

p.

14 of vol.

1

:

"For what then does

a

man love a woman? For being the person she is, for being herself? But that is to say that he loves her for nothing at all. Everyone is himself. Having a beloved who is what she

does not reveal the nature of love." (See

is

70. See also vol. 3, p. 399: "Persons

71. If bestowal

is

we

n.

71, below.)

appraise highly ... are easier to love."

ungrounded, then love

is,

after

all,

"for nothing at all" (see n. 69,

above). Indeed, in vol. 3 Singer asserts, rather than repudiates, Montaigne's reason:

"A person acquires this gratuitous value [of bestowall by being whatever he is.

Therein 72. See vol. 73.

lies 1,

the rich absurdity of love; for ever\'one ...

what he

is

The Divine Bestowal." the human love for God, then,

The bestowal

that occurs in

deep-level bestowal. Hence,

x's

bestowing value

—

from x's bestowing value on a human which is 74. Himmelfarb, On Liberty and Liberalism, p. 225.

in loving

is

is

quite different

a top-level bestowal.

CHAPTER TWO: LOVE AT SECOND SIGHT 1.

393).

apparently only the

God

75. Ibid., p. 209.

2.

is" (p.

chap. 13, "Agape:

Gellner, "Ethics and Logic" (page references are in the text). Newton-Smith, "A Conceptual Investigation of Love," p. 124.

)

.

326

Notes

3

to

Pa^es 34 -45

One might interjea here that x is not faced with "the same situation," and therefore z's

having S need not have the same

situations are in

one

burden of proof, to

would later.

4.

salient

state

way

how

effect

on

But given that the same (both y and z have S), the

x as )^s having S.

precisely the

the situations are different,

solve Gellner's paradox this way.

We

6.

7.

carried by those

who

(See 3.4, 4.2, and 6.1.)

As Nvgren wrote about agape, "When it is said that God loves man, this is not a judgment on what man is like, but on what God is like" (Agape and Eros, p. 76). Thus Gellner in the second horn rejects the subject-centricit)' of the second view of personal love in favor of the object-centricity of the

5.

is

consider solutions of this sort

shall

first

view

(1.3).

The Pursuit of Loneliness, p. 87. The thesis that love is out of proportion to the properties of the object Slater,

is

advanced

by John McTaggart; see 13.10. Slater, The Pursuit of Loneliness, p. 87. Does this apply also to Freud's love for Martha Bemavs, 'Svho despite all mv resistance [!] captivated my heart at our first meeting"? (See epigraph.)

8.

9.

Singer, The Nature of Love, vol. 1, p. 32.

Robert

Ehman

argues that

sight," because the basis

"we can never

of love

is

in the stria sense love a

person

the beloxed's unique character and that

available to the lover ("Personal Lx)ve," p. 123).

10. DcsoLTXcs^ Philosophical Letters, pp.

Ehman

discuss

1

is

at first

not yet

in 3.6.

224-225.

of love, p. 1. dilemma shows that love is impossible, it might be seen as the reductio adabsurdum of the thesis that love is propert)'-based. I think Bernard Mayo would interpret Gellner that wav; he claims, barely providing a shred of argument, that love "has nothing to do with reasons" (Ethics and the Moral Life, p. 199; see 8.7). For Plato, the E-tx'pe lover is irrational. "Then he must see that the beauty in any xt'isgreat mindlessness one bodv is familv-related to the beaut\' in another bodv; not to consider the beaut}' of all bodies to be one and the same" (Symposium 210a5ff; italics added to Martha Nussbaum's translation. The Fra^fility of Goodness, 179). Other translations: "great folly" (Hamilton), "utterly senseless" p.

11. See Descartes's defmition 12. If Gellner's

13.

.

.

.

(Groden), "altogether mindless" (Stanley Rosen, Plato's Symposium,

p.

265).

and Selfhood"; Fisher, "Reason, Emotion, and Love." Outside philosophv, see Emilv Bronte's Wutherin£i Heights (the passage just before Catherine declares "1 am Heathcliff "), Balzac's Sarrasine, and Mozart's "Cosi Fan Tutti." Kierkegaard plays with substitutions in "First hove,^^ Either/ Or, vol. I. The problem has an analogue in aesthetics. A good forger)' has the properties in virtue of which the original elicits aesthetic approval, so it should elicit the same approval. See Francis Sparshott, "The Disappointed Art Lover," pp. 254—255. Bernstein, "Love, Particularit}', and Selfhood," p. 287. For Nanc\'^'s reply (in a sense) to Mark, see her letter to the editor. Proceedings oftheAPA 62, 4 (March 1989), pp. 718-720. Job suddenly and inexplicablv lost his wife, but was quite happv with the noniden-

14. Bernstein, "Love, Particularit\',

15.

16.

tical

replacement

identical

God

later

Nancy* means

gave him. Perhaps Bernstein's unhappiness with the

that he has a

much more

refined notion of personal love

than the Hebrews. (Note that Job's replacement wife might have been identical for him.

Notes

to

Paqes

45-50

327

17. Bernstein, "Love, Particularity, 18.

Yet Bernstein admits that

Ibid.

cause ... she

is

dependent, but

288.

p.

why he

reasons arc nongeneral?

its

If so, this

is

'

19.

asked

loves Nanc\', he

kind, sensitive, intelligent, and beautifiil."

Nana*?

identical

and Selfhood," if

Is this

nongenerality at

would

Is love,

say "be-

then, reason-

whv Bernstein would not love the its

worst.

291.

Ibid., p.

W.

B. Yeats, "The Three Bushes," The Collected Poems, p. 294; see also Gen. 30:23-25: "In the evening [Laban] tcx^k his daughter Leah and brought her to And in the morning, behold, it was Leah," not Rachel. Jacob. 21. Fisher, "Reason, Emotion, and Love," p. 201.

20.

.

.

.

22. Fisher argues that

not loving the empirically indistinguishable y*, even though

x's

X loved y, entails that the object of love is a transcendental self (3.6). In a later paper ("Love as Process," p. 7), Fisher provides a reinterpretation of his earlier argu-

"A lover who discovered that for his

ment: copy]

.

.

.

would be

far

more

beloxed had been substituted

likely to feel bitter at the

that he did love the substitute

.

.

.

,

love were property- based. Surely, x

which

is

would be

Fisher does say, in

"Love

[perfea

what he would ha\'e to concede" if bitter. But whether or not x "con-

cedes" that he loved v* for five years, x did love y* for five X justifiably feel bitter, if not because x

a

deception than to concede

was tricked

\'ears.

Further,

whv does

for five vears into lo\ing \'*?

as Process," that his earlier substitution

argument was

"bad," but for a different reason: "the basis of the resentment and the non-ap-

pearance of love of the substitute [when discovered] can be

23.

.

.

.

the shared histo-

(See 3.4.)

ry'."

Another

variant, suggested

by Norton Nelkin.

CHAPTER THREE: THE UNIQUENESS OF THE BELOVED 1.

2. 3.

Scruton, Sexual Desire, pp. 96, 98-99, 232. (See 8.5 and 13.4.) Nussbaum, The New York Review of Books, Dec. 18, 1986, p. 50. "Ever\'one propertv'

is

unique"

no one

is

not self-contradictor)'

Ux - (3P)[Px "Everyone identit}',"

is

unique"

and no one

even a contradiction that

if

"x

is

unique" = "x has

at least

one

else has":

is

then

else

(y)(y

#

X -^ -Py)].

because every x has the property'

unique"

"self-

not unique" = "x has onlv properties no other person has,"

is

if "x is

&

triviallv true,

identical to that person. "Ever\'one

is

is

is,

(P)[Px->(y)(y^x^-Py)], as 4.

long as a theor\' of tvpes distinguishes "unique" from lowcr-lc\'cl predicates.

See Lyons, Emotion, pp. 74-75; Norton and Killc, Philosophies of Love, p. 1 1; and Robert Ehman, "Personal Love," p. 120: "In the measure that a person's

especially

focuses on a single person to the exclusion of others, he will feel that the something unique to his beloved and goes beyond all repeatablc qualities that the person shares with others." In Barry's French Lovers (p. 94), we learn that Moli^re rejeaed Chapelle's advice to "have Armande [M's wife] shut up in a convent, as did other husbands with love

basis

5.

.

.

.

is

unfaithful wi\'cs"; instead, Moliere gax'c her

money and

did not interfere with her

328

Notes

to

Paqes

52-55

freedom of conduct. In response to Chapelle, Moliere wrote: "I can see that vou [I]f vou knew how much I suffered, you would pit)' me. My have never loved. feeling reached such a height that I began to sympathize with her; and when I think how difficult it is for me to overcome my passion for her, I tell myself that perhaps she has the same difficult}' in vanquishing her penchant for being a coquette." "I was struck too b\' the wav in which her nose, imitating in this the model of her mother's nose and her grandmother s, was cut off by just that absolutely horizontal .[I]t seemed line at its base, that same brilliant if slightly tardy stroke of design. .

6.

.

.

.

to

me

wonderfiil that at the critical

moment

.

nature should have returned ... to

mother and her grandmother, and decisive touch of the chisel" (Marcel Proust, "Time Regained,"

give to the granddaughter, as she had given to her that significant

7.

Remembrance of Things Past, vol. 3, p. 1088). "Decisive," yet hardly unique. Fromm, The Art of Loving, pp. 11-12, 72.

8.

Ibid., p. 23.

9.

Fromm does draw the conclusion, but on the different grounds that f>eople lack the capacit)' to love (Ibid., p. 111).

10.

G^ston^ Justice and the Human Good, p. 154. we might speak of "syndromes." See Sparshott, The Structure of Aesthetics, pp. 172-173, 186-189. Lewis, The Four Loves, pp. 58-59. Singer, The Nature of Love, vol. 3, p. 391. Meager, "The Uniqueness of a Work of Art," pp. 69-70. The claim that works of art are unique is common in aesthetics; see Frail, Aesthetic Analysis, pp. 186-188, and Macdonald, "Some Distinctive Features of Arguments Used in Criticism of the Arts." For a sober appraisal, see Sparshott, The Structure ofAesthetics, p. 10; Wellek and Warren, Theory ofLiterature, pp. 5-8. Consider Mark Bernstein's substitution argument (2.5). Bernstein wonders

11. In aesthetics,

12. 13. 14.

15.

'

whether he can explain ble,

...

it's

Nana' not

his love for

He

of "intelligence-in-Nano'."

in

terms of intelligence but in terms

remarks that

this

propert\'

in-Nanc\^' ("Love, Particularity, and Selffiood," p. 289). that Bernstein has

Nana'.

"non-repeata-

is

conceptually impossible for another person to exemplify intelligence-

What

are

dreamed up Nancv'*, who

we

Remember, however,

qualitatively indistinguishable

is

from

to say about "intelligence-in-Nana'*"? Intelligence-in-N

is

from intelligence-in-N*, but only numerically; intelligence-in-N is qualitatively identical to intelligence-in-N*, because N and N* are qualitatively

different

Hence inteUigence-in-N, contrary

identical.

ligence-in-N

is

Hence, prior differences (if any) P-in-N and P-in-N*, and not vice 16.

N

to Bernstein,

repeatable. Intel-

is

N* are not qualitatively identical. betu'een N and N* explain the difference between

nonrepeatable only

if

and

versa.

Quinton, "The Soul," pp. 402-404. Consider Milan Kimdera: "What is cannot be guessed at or calculated, what must hides itself in what unique be unveiled, uncovered, conquered" (The Unbearable Lightness of Being, p. 199). "The millionth part dissimilarity is present in all areas of human existence," but for Tomas "in all areas other than sex it is exposed and needs no one to discover it. .

.

.

.

.

.

.

One woman prefers cheese nalit\'

.

.

.

demonstrates

its

.

.

.

,

own

another loathes cauliflower, irrelevance.

.

.

.

Only

.

.

.

.

.

[but this] origi-

in sexualit\'

does the mil-

Notes

to

Pa^es

56-62

lionth part dissimilarity

200). all

329

become

precious, because ...

it

must be conquered"

(p.

We understand, then, why for Tomas the anus "is the spot he loved most in

women's bodies" (p. 205): the least exposed, the most difticult to conquer. The of a woman's anus: imiqueness-making but trivial; and not even for Tomas

details

the basis of love. 1

7.

Kierkegaard thinks that if a wife "were to adorn herself merely to please" the husband, what he should take as \aluable is not her first-order property of looking preny but only her trying to please him: "If he with a single nerve of his eye were to

and admire [her beaut)'], instead of comprehending love's correct exof becoming a it was to please him, already he is on a false track connoisseur" {Stages on Life's Way, p. 157). Of course, if she tries to look pretty but fails to do so, then he can love her for the attempt. But why protest, if x loves y both because v tries to please x and succeeds in doing so? the uniqueness of the x-y relationship means that y will 18. Do not confuse this claim have uniqueness-making properties that sene as the basis of love with the claim that the uniqueness of the x-v relationship makes y unique as the objea of love (see Robert Brown, Analyzing Love, pp. 106-108; 13.6). 19. Newton-Smith, "A Conceptual Investigation of Love," p. 124. 20. Svlvia Walsh ("Women in Love," p. 360) finds this view in D. H. Lawrence, but I wonder. Birkin says, "There is ... a final me which is stark and impersonal. There we are So there is a final you. And it is there I would want to meet you. see amiss

pression, that

.

.

.

—

—

.

.

.

.

.

.

two stark, unknown beings, two utterly strange creatures." Ursula responds "in a mocking voice": "But don't you think me good-looking?" {Women in Love, pp. 137-138.) 21.

Fromm, The Art of Loving,

22.

"Only

p. 47.

God sees the most secret thoughts. But why should these be all that impor-

tant?" (Wittgenstein, Zettel, no. 560, p. 98e.)

23. Kierkegaard wrote, "Sometimes

when in my drawing room there is carried on by a

connoisseur ... a grandiloquent discourse about ers learning to

.

.

.

the importance of the lov-

know one another thoroughly, so that in choosing one can be sure of

[l]n the case of choosing a fauldess mate, ... I say 'Yes, that is the difficult)'. had them, or whether one has them, or has sure anybody to be how is corns, whether one may not get them?' " (spoken as Judge William, Stages on Life's Way, p. 1 3 1 ). This is a caricature of erosic personal love, but it does raise a serious question. .

.

.

See 8.8. 24. Early on,

what

and

"do know is genuine and enough to sustain their conviction coming to know one another better" (Letwin, "Romantic Love

lovers

that thev can bear

Christianit)'," p. 144).

Medawar, The Uniqueness of the Individual, p. 143. 26. Ibid., p. 155. Another biologist, F. Gonzales-Crussi, rejects the medical proof of uniqueness; sec Notes of an Anatomist, pp. 69-71. I," pp. 204-205. 27. MacLagan, "Respea for Persons as a Moral Principle 28. Buscagha, Love, pp. 19-20. Or she read M. Scott Peck, The Road Less Traveled (p. 151); or even worse, Dominitz, How to Find the Love of Tour Life: 90 Days to a Permanent Relationship, chap. 4, "Thrive on Your Uniqueness." 29. Ehman, "Personal Love and Individual Value," p. 92. In an earlier paper, "Person25.

—

330

Notes

to

Pt^es

62-68

Love," Ehman claimed that the beloved's uniqueness is the "basis" of love (pp. 118-120. 124 1, although he seemed to mean an empirical rather than a meta-

al

physical uniqueness.

201—202. See also Jacques Maritain: [W] hat I love is the deepest, most substantial "Love does not look to qualities. and hidden, most existential rcalirv of the bclo\ed being a metaphysical center" {Lapnsonnc etleBun comtnun; quoted bv Johann, "The Problem of Love," p. 242). Ehman. "Personal Love and Individual Value," pp. 94-95, italics added. Quoted bv John Ba\'lev, The CharaaerofLove, p. 226. "For he who would end with the inexplicable had best begin w ith it and sav not a word more, so as not to become an object of suspicion" (Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, p. 50). Look who's talking. Solomon, Love: Emotion, Myth and Metaphor, p. 94. Ehman, "Personal Love and Individual Value," p. 98. Ibid., p. 93. Ehman's argument must proceed from the uniqueness of art to the uniqueness of its creator because nothing is in the product that is not already in the producer? ), rather than from the latter to the former (as in Edmund Wilson, Av^r.? Castle, pp. 21-22); after all, the uniqueness of the person is what he needs to

30. Fisher, "Reason, Emotion, and Lx)ve," pp. .

.

.

—

31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36.

(

establish.

37.

Ehman. "Personal Love and

Indi\idual \'alue," p. 98,

italics

added.

38. Fisher, "Reason, Emotion, and Love," p. 201. 39. Ibid., p. 198.

40. Quinton's account

m

Quinton, the

self that

recollections,

and

sel\-es b\-

this is

this self

the empincal

regard

loved is

is

mav

Quinton understates the

at n.

16, above).

For

repeatedlv identified and distinguished from other

bodv with which

recognition de\'ices" ("The Soul,"

constitutes the self "I

be better (see text

the unique empirical cluster of character and

case; the

am m\

p.

it is

bodv

bodv.

associated; bodies are

402). Roger Scruton, in

.

.

is .

more than

[E]xcretion

transcendental illusions" {Sexual Desire, p. 151

).

This

claims that

a recognition device

is

is

"comenient

eflfect,

the fmal 'no' to

as

funnv

as

all

—

it

our

Samuel John-

son's "rehiring'' Berkelev b\' kicking a rock.

41. Fisher. "Reason, Emotion, and Love," p. 202.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., p. 201. 44. Fisher recognizes

all

three, but not the implication.

45. Gellner, "Ethics and Logic," 46. Thanks to

Edward Johnson

p.

161.

for the example. (See 8.7

on reasons

7iot

to love.)

47. Firestone, The Dtalecttc of Sex, p. 154.

CHAPTER FOUR: COMING FIRST 1.

Such high standards would generate

a

social

foundation for pedestalism.

Consider:

You meaner

beauties of the night. That poorlv satisfy' our eyes More b\- vour number than your light,

Notes

331

68-70

to Pcujes

You common people of the skies; What are \'ou when the moon shall rise? These are the words of Sir Henrv Wotton in his poem "Elizabeth of Bohemia," Th' eclipse and who was for Wotten "By \'irtue first, then choice, a Queen glory of her kind" (Stallworthy,^! Book ofLove Poetry, pp. 61-62). So much for a thousand points of light. See Luhmann, Loi^e as Passion, pp. 30-31. This also holds for love in aristocratic Such Athens: "The perfecT: form of friendship is that between good men. friendships are of course rare, since such men are few" (Aristotle, Nicomachean .

2.

.

.

.

The

actual historical connection

been

.

1156b6, b25).

Ethics, 3.

.

just the reverse:

"The

between courtly love and love for God might have

love religion [courtly love] can

without becoming reconciled to the

Church

it

mav be

.

.

.

her

rival

—

real religion.

Where

become more

it is

not

serious

parody of the

a

from the ardours of of a religion that was merely imagined"

a temporary' escape, a truanc)'

a religion that was believed into the delights

(Lewis, The Allegory of Love, p. 21). 4.

The problem of choice arises also regarding marriage. According to Erich Fromm (The Art ofLovinpf, p. 3), the change from arranged marriages to "free choice" in partner-selection necessitated the invention of selection principles. Parents had

used certain principles in deciding on mates for children, but these principles could not or would not be emploved by emancipated choosers. Persons living v\ithin Western capitalism devised property'- based selection principles that mirrored the

had nowhere else to turn in filling in the lacuna left by abandonment of arranged marriages. Note the irony. Freedom of choice comes at a time when, due to the homogenization of personalit}', there are insufficient differences among people to make freedom of choice meaningftil. For the view that social conventions concerning love generally limit "free choice," sec Goode, "The Theoretical Importance of Love," pp. 131-132, 135. principles of the market; they

the

5.

6.

Gcllner, "Ediics and Logic," p. 160.

Place

is

'The woman

the same sort of factor as time; they interact inseparably.

this we have before our eyes more constantly than light itself, woman who is to us unique might well have been another if we had been in another town from the one in which we met her, if we had explored other quarters of the town, if we had frequented a different salon. Unique, we suppose? She is legion"

whose

7.

face

.

.

.

(Marcel Proust, "The Fugitive,'" Remembrance of Thinjfs Past, vol. 3, p. 513). "accidental" is tricky. R. W. England ("Images of Love and

The concept of the

in Family-Magazine Fiction," p. 164) distinguishes between x and y meeting because they live on the same street, attend the same school, work for the same business, belong to the same club, or are introduced by mutual friends, on the one hand, and encountering "each other anonymously as complete strangers." The former result from "patterned social relationships," the latter from "chance." But

Courtship

all

these meetings involve chance. See Kierkegaard:

accidental,

and

this

is

.

significant

nothing

at all

is

is

always the

just as abso-

The occasion is at one and the same time the Without the occasion, precisely and the most insignificant. happens, and \'et the occasion has no part at all in what does happen"

lutelv necessarv as the necessarx'.

most

"The occasion

the tremendous paradox, that the accidental

{EttherlOr, vol.

.

.

.

1,

pp. 232, 236).

.

.

332

Notes

8. 9.

to

Pa^es 70-80

StdWwor^y^ A Book of Love Poetry, ^p. SQ-S\. construct not onh' present Bergcr and Kellncr claim that "the couple .

but reconstruct past

two

the recollections of the

.

.

common memory that

well, fabricating a

realit)' as

individual pasts ("Marriage

realit\'

integrates

and the Construction of

Realit\\" p. 15). 10. See

Fromm, The Art

of Loving, pp. 47-48. This might be what Kierkegaard, for

whom personal love is agapic, had in mind when he wrote that the world "is like a play.

.

.

.

[W]hen

the curtain

played the beggar,

in death the curtain falls

are

human

beings.

.

.

falls,

the one

they are quite

.

.

.

who

alike, all

on the stage of actuality'

.

who And when

played the king, and the one

one and the same: .

.

.

actors.

then they also are

all

one; thev

[T]he distinctions of earthly existence are only

like

an

costume" {Works of Love, p. 95). 11. Is neighbor-love, as a form of agape, restricted by time and place factors? On this question see Onxkz, A£iape, pp. 12-13; Bishop Buder, Five Sermons, p. 58; and actor's

Kilpntrick^ Ifkntity

and Intimacy,

12. In romantic love, "the symbolic entiate at the ver\' beginning

and

fate

.

.

.

pp.

227-228.

marker 'chance' was

of a love relationship.

did not affect the significance of the

.

.

.

used to socially

differ-

The combination of chance love relationship negatively; on .

.

.

the contrary, being independent of any external moulding, this enhanced the significance the relationship bore,

Love as Passion,

13. Gellner, "Ethics

making

it

absolute in and of itself"

(Luhmann,

provided by

"A Study of

143).

p.

and

Lxjgic," p. 162.

14. Scruton, Sexual Desire, p. 81. 15. Empirical evidence that this

Human Love

phenomenon

Relationships,"

p.

occurs

is

Ellis,

69.

16.

Gareth Evans, "The Causal Theor)' of Names,"

17.

you were born on December 2 be a reason for loving you.'' Certainly those who write the astrolog\' columns believe that it is" (Robert Solomon, Loi^e, p. 167). Those who write or read astrology columns believe no such thing; they do not believe that time per se is a reason for loving. Rather, date of "Could the

birth

is

p.

191.

fact that

(purportedly) nomically tied to other factors (personality'

traits) that are

the

reasons. 18.

Newton-Smith, "A Conceptual Investigation of Love,"

p.

124.

CfiAPTER FIVE: ARISTOPHANIC LOVE 191a-d

1.

Plato, Symposium,

2.

See also Gen. 2:18-24.

3.

Tillich, Love, Ponder,

4. 5.

6.

and Justice, pp. 28, 27. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, p. 173. Saxonhouse, "The Net of Hephaestus," p. 28. Ibid. This is Nussbaum's point, when she says "whole people

ity

7.

(translations Hamilton's unless indicated otherwise).

.

.

.

that Aristophanic

humans

love

withalltheiridiosyncracies, flaws, and even faults" (T/;;fFr^?7-

of Goodness, p. 173).

Diotima in efTea criticizes Aristophanes at 205e: "Love is not desire either of the half or of the whole, unless that half or whole happens to be good." She immedi-

—

Notes

81 -85

to Poffes

333

"People arc not attached to what particularly belongs to them,

atcly continues,

except in so far as they can

which is x's that which 8.

"Forced"

is

what

identify'

ambiguous. She wants to sav

is

good with what

think) that x loves that

(I

their is

own." This

x's

only

if

is

that

independently good (eros), but she can be read as saying that x judges to be

is x's

good

just

because

it is

the key. These half-persons have

is

is

which

x's

(agape).

no freedom of choice

in selecting a

beloved. But exactly because they lack this freedom, their lo\es are exclusive, constant, and reciprocal. 9.

10.

11.

Saxonhouse, "The Net of Hephaestus,"

Nussbaum, The

Nussbaum

is

p.

28.

Fragility of Goodness, pp. 172, 174.

and planning" play no

right that "reason

role in Aristophanic love,

but for the wrong reason. Reason plays no role not because reason cannot help x to find y (which it can), but because reason is not required and is, indeed, irrelevant for X to select a beloved. See n. 8, above. 12. See Stanley 13.

Rosen,

Platans

Symposium,

p.

151.

In Aristophanes, no; in Freud, yes: even.' person

is

born

as a sexually poly-

morphous and psychically androg\'nous whole. Freud's project was to explain how some people turn out heterosexual, others homosexual, in both cases losing a chunk (a "half") of natural sexual potential. Aristophanes also explains why some are heterosexual and some homosexual, not by working out die changes induced in an identical originating material but by postulating three different originating materials. In Aristophanes' view: different starting stuffs,

same

Freud's:

starting stuff, different causes, that

is,

same cause

(fission); in

different

psychogenic

histories.

14.

15.

David Hume, "Of Love and Marriage," Essays, p. 555, italics added. identifies (c) as one of "the articles of faith in the American credo of romanticism," along with the belief that we "choose the right one on the basis of feeling 'the real thing'" (The Natural History of Love, pp. 363-364). Hunt doubts

Morton Hunt

that the ideolog)' utter fools." 16.

But

is

seriously embraced: "Americans, even )'oung ones, are not

see Slater,

The Pursuit of Loneliness,

p. 86.

Kierkegaard bitingly criticized the ideal mate theor)': "Again and again we hear this Slow in poetry: A man is bound to one girl whom he once loved or perhaps never loved properly, for he has seen another girl

who is the ideal. A man makes a mistake

wrong house, for directly across the street on the second floor lives the ideal. ... A lover has made a mistake, he has seen the beloved by artificial light and thought she had dark hair, but ... on close scrutiny in

life; it

she

is

a

was the

blond

right street but the

— but her

sister

poetry" {Fear and Trembling,

p.

is

is supposed to be a subject for Thurber and White's humor is a nice contrast

the ideal. This

91

)

.

man

the suspicion that if he he would likely find a lady even more ideally suited to his taste than his fiancee. ... He was greatly strengthened in his belief by the fact that he kept catching a fleeting glimpse of this imaginary' person

to Kierkegaard's sarcasm: "Every

waited twenty-four hours, or possibly

in restaurants, in stores, in trains.

he

felt,

to

do a grave

entertained

.

.

.

less,

To deny the possibilit^' of her existence would be,

injustice to her, to himself,

and to his

fiancee.

Man's unflinch-

ing desire to give himself and everybody else a square deal was the cause of much of his disturbance" (Is Sex Necessary? pp. 96, 98).

17. Descartes,

The Passions of the Soul

{Philosophical Writings, vol. 1, p. 360).

Annette

334

Notes

to

Pages

85-88

Baier says that Descartes here "seems to endorse Plato's theory in the Symposium'''

("The Ambiguous Limits of Desire,"

p. 51).

Does Baier believe Descartes misread

Plato as speaking only about heterosexualit\'? See n. 20, below. 18. See Karol Wojtv'la, Love

and Responsibility,

p.

48.

Of course, sexual desire is hard to

quiet even with the cooperation of another person. 19.

Koscn,

20.

Hume

Plato's

Symposium,

150.

p.

myth

as being entirely about heterosexuals descended from androg\'nes: "each individual person was a compound of both sexes" ("Of Love and Marriage," p. 555). In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud wrote: "The popular \iew of the sexual instinct is beautifully reflected in the poetic fable which tells how the original human beings were cut up into two halves man and woman and how these are always striving to unite again in love" (p. 2). Freud's editor claims that this sentence is "no doubt an allusion to Aristophanes in Plato's Symposium" (p. 2, n. 1), thereby accusing Freud of Hume's

reads Aristophanes'

—

—

.

.

.

mistake. 21.

Fromm, The Art

22. Reik,

of Loving, pp. 6-8, 15.

Of Love and

Lust,

pp.w52— 53. Diotima

also says that love

is

the child of

Poverr\' (Symposium, 203b).

23. Bellah, Habits of the Heart, p.

24. See also

M.

Scott Peck, The

98 (chapter written by Ann Swidler).

Road Less

Traveled, p. 82.

Compare this Christian view with the Hebrew view endorsed by Irving Singer: "By interpreting love of self as selfaffirmation, we seethe wisdom in the psychiatric (and Hasidic) insistence that Agape and Eros,

25. Anders Nygrcn^

.

no one can

.

p.

101.

.

love another unless he loves himself" {The Nature of Love, vol. 3, p.

Is "self-affirmation" simply what the Christian calls "pride".^ The state of the art is represented by this summary: 'We have found that those high in genuine self- acceptance and self- actualization, respectivelv, reported more fre-

434). 26.

quent love experiences and derived greater personal satisfaction and enjoyment from their relationships; however, it was the persons lower on these personality

who were fonder of their partners, esteemed them more highly, and had a stronger love for them" (Dion and Dion, "Romantic Love," in Sternberg and Barnes, The Psychology of Love, pp. 284—285; see also pp. 268-270). 27. "Love as eros,^'' says Tillich, "strives for a union with that which is a bearer of values because of the values it embodies" [Love, Power, andJustice, p. 30) Note that Tillich asserts that the human love for God is a desire for union with that from which humans have been separated (see text at n. 3, above) and (here) that the human love for God is a desire for union with that which has value (pp. 30-31). Tillich thus overdetermines the desire to merge. He might as well have tossed in that when we compare ourselves with God, we feel deficient and want to merge for this third dimensions

.

reason. 28.

Another nonideal agapic scenario: the love we desire to receive is agapic, and we desire this kind of love because we had it earlier, when cared for by our mothers. Separation from her is traumatic; we attempt to ease this pain by merging with a substitute

who

in this

reunion will love us

as

she did.

29. This seems to be Rosen's reading; see Plato's Symposium, p. 158. 30. In Hamilton's translation, the similarit\' of lover and beloved

is

often asserted by

Aristophanes; see 192b (male homosexuals seek men, always cleaving "to what

is

Notes

to PiUfes

88-104

335

31.

193d (love leads "us toward what is akin what sense would heterosexuals be "akin"? See Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p. 232.

32.

Nussbaum

akin to themselves") and

to us"). But then

in

able

.

.

.

criterion

claims that "there

of suitabilin'"

is

nothing

like a

general description of a suit-

number of candidates, that could scr\e as a sufficient (The Fragility of Goodness, p. 173). But more precisely, we

lover, satisfiable

bv

a

should say that Aristophanes' description

is

too general.

33. Barthes, .4 Laser's Discourse, p. 20.

CHAPTER 1.

THE SATISFACTION OF DESIRE

SIX:

no stopping because the object pursued fat lower levels] is an illusion good which the lover's soul really craves, and therefore the lover can never be satisfied" (Letwin, "Romantic Lx)ve and Christianirs'," p. 133). "There

is

instead of the

2.

On the disappointment of loving "lower things," Annette Baier, "Caring About Caring," p. 276.

3.

See Singer, The Nature of Love, vol.

4.

Helmut Thielicke, The Ethics of Sex,

3, p.

p. 30.

in

both Plato and Augustine, see

46.

See also L. A. Kosman, "Platonic Love."

6.

we establish what an object capacity' to satisf)' needs within ourselves" (The worth on the basis of its Nature of Love, vol. 3, p. 157; see also pp. 360, 390). Vannov, Sex Without Love, p. 217.

7.

Ibid., p. 134.

8.

See Seligman et

5.

Singer claims, to the contrary, that "through appraisal

is

.

.

.

"Effects of Salience of Extrinsic

al.,

Rewards on Liking and

Loving." 9.

/s desires ( 1 ) because y will satisfy x's and (2) important. If both x and y will not give until they already get, the x-v relationship never gets off the ground. Hence, x or y must give

The difference between x's because v has satisfied

satisfying

x's desires

is

before getting, without any guarantee that the giving will lead to getting. Thus, at least

one of them must be willing to give even

why

not allow, contrar\' to the D-S model, that some people sometimes give just

for the sake

Levy, "The Definition of Love

11.

Ibid'.,

is

nexer returned. If so,

286-287. Freud's writings on

in Plato's Symposium,'' p.

286.

pp.

love illustrate this similarity'. His methodology', postulating

that libido underlies

Nature of Love, 13.

giving

of giving?

10.

12.

if the

Baier argues,

all

forms of "Liebe,"

is

exacdy Diotima's. See Singer, The

vol. 3, p. 126.

on

the

different, that love

ground

that the logic

of love and the logic of desire are is to want that desire

cannot be a desire: "To desire something

want the desired [object] to reciprocate the most desires), nor to want the desire to recur. But to love someone is necessarily to will that love to continue and to hope for return love" ("The Ambiguous Limits of Desire," p. 55). Baier is right, I think, that love is not identical to any specific desire; but love still might include desires as components. Nevertheless, her argument is t]uestionablc: some desires may entail a desire for their own continuation (see de Sousa, "Desire and Time," in Marks, The Ways to be satisfied, but not necessarily to desire (this

makes no sense

for

.

336

Notes

to Pcujes

of Desire,

91

and to love might not necessarily be "to

);

will" love's constancy or

reciprocity' (see chaps. 10, 11).

its

14.

p.

104-119

Robinson, "Emotion, Judgment, and Desire," p. 736. Murdoch, Bruno's Dream, pp. 59-60.

15. Ibid., p. 737. See Iris 16.

Robinson, "Emotion, Judgment, and Desire,"

17. Ibid.

Robinson

p.

738.

also intends this claim to counter

loves V for S, then x will lo\'e

anyone

who

William Lyons' view that

if

x

has S (Emotion, p. 73). Lyons solves

Gellner's paradox by appealing to y's uniqueness (ibid., pp. 74-75).

CHAPTER SEVEN: HATE, LOVE, AND RATIONALITY 1.

Wittgenstein, Zettel, #488, p. 86e.

2.

Ibid.,

3.

To

4.

#504,

p. 89e.

commit an

paraphrase Auden: thou shalt not

.

.

.

.

.

The

fact that

loves V

is

.

.

we might know that x lo\'es y without knowing ("identif\'ing") wh}' x

irrelevant. (See

mv

chap. 8, n. 36.)

7.

Woodv

9.

Stallworthv,

10.

Allen's film "EverxiJiing

You Wanted

A Book of Love Poetry,

p.

to

Know About

But we do not judge x's hate for v irrational merely because y does not reciprocate. This difference between our attitudes toward unreciprocated love and unrecipro1 1

12.

Sex."

65.

cated hate results either from the belief that reciprocity'

1 1

love. See

.

8.

6.

of

.

Thanks to Archie Bunker for the example. See Ortega v Gasset, On Love, p. 17. ^Town^ Analyzing! Love, p. 115.

5.

erosic analysis

Halmos, "Psvchologies of Love," p. 61. Roger Scruton suggests that the emotions (love, for example) "do not in general exhibit the coherence and rationalirs'^" oi attitudes, because emotions "are directed towards things as particulars" while attitudes "are directed towards things propert}^' ( "Attitudes, Beliefs, and Reasons," instantiations of some as pp. 41-42). But Scruton's argument for the claim that love, as an emotion, is directed at a person as a particular and is not grounded in x's belief that y has P is odd. "We can know that X loves Y without identifying any qualit}' of Y on the basis On the other hand we cannot say that X despises Y unless of which X loves him. it is possible to refer to some qualit}' of Y towards which X's emotion is directed."

)

or the belief that reciprocated love

is

is

axiomatic of love (chap.

better than unreciprocated love.

Hamlyn, "The Phenomena of Love and Hate,"

p. 9, italics

added.

Hamlvn also savs of love "fiill-stop" that "there is likely to be some explanation why the love came into being" (p. 12), but this does not mean, for Hamlvn, that love "full-stop" is erosic. First, Hamlvn immcdiatelv adds, "But there seems to be no

necessit\' that

it

should be

explanation. Second, even

like that," that

if love

is,

that love "full-stop" does have an

"hill-stop" has an explanation,

Hamlyn does not

claim that the explanation must be erosic (see n. 14, below). 13.

William Lvons handles fear without

its

characteristic belief differently:

him, not even an emotion, for "an emotion

is

it is,

for

based on knowledge or belief about

properties" (Emotion, p. 71). Lvons' definition has the interesting implication that

Hamlyn's love "full-stop"

is

neither love nor an emotion.

Of course, many

have

Notes

to

Pwfes 120-128

337

claimed (for example, Kant and Kierkegaard) that agape

not an emotion understcxid as

least

not an emotion,

itself is

entails Rirthcr that agapic personal love is neither love nor an emotion makes his view seem wrong. C. H. Whiteley ("Lx)\e, Hate and Emotion") responds to Hamlvn's claim that love and hate can be belief-independent emotions bv drawing a distinction between emotions (which are belief-dependent) and "sentiments" (hate and love); this is close to Scruton's distinction (n. 4, above) between emotions and attitudes. Here is confirmation that Hamlvn's hate "full-stop" (and love "full-stop") is

—

14.

at

or inclination. But that Lvons' account

a feeling

—

agapic: in these cases "the only place to look for an explanation

about the [hater] himself, not

makes hate appropriate"

in

any

(p. 16).

.

This

.

.

.

is

something

in

is

significance that the object

.

.

mav have that emotion

to sav that in these cases the

is

fully subject-centric (1.3).

15. Pitcher,

"Emotion,"

331; see also pp. 337, 340.

p.

may intelligibh' sa\'

16. Elizabeth Telfer writes, "a sufferer [of love] it is

about him/her that draws me, but

I

'I

don't

know what

cannot be without him/her " ("Friend-

225—226). She calls love in such a case irrational because it is not well grounded in beliefs, whereas Pitcher withholds "irrational" for the same reason. Note that when Hamlyn argued that love can be reason- independent he did not ship," pp.

17.

appeal to the subjectiyit\' of evaluations.

He claimed that because x can love v while

was worthless {not while having a different or subjective "worth"), love has no characteristic belief such as "y is valuable."

idea of

believing that y

18. Taylor, "Love," p. 147. 19.

Now we can

see

emotions having

why a 4)

claim (2) that

is

({)

untenable

is

— the claim that one feature of those on ^. Q^nsider

will place limits

fear,

("dangerous") and various ^\s (for example, "has sharp claws") and case of an emotion. restriction that

cj)

I

will

argue that for fear

("dangerous")

is

places

(}>

supposed to place on

no

^

limit is

which has a 6 is a paradigm

^

on

at

The

all.

that x's belie\'ing y to

have ^ (sharp claws) explains why x believes y to ha\e (J). But to say that some cases of x's believing v to be 4) ( "dangerous") because x belie\'es y to ha\e ^ sharp claws) are rational, while other cases of x's believing y to be (J) ("dangerous") because x (

beheves y to be

^ (cuddly) are irrational,

why X believes v to be 4). is

is

to say that ever\' (or any)

X's believing that y

is

cuddly

still

explains

^ can explain

why x

believes y

fact that this explanatory' relationship holds

dangerous, even though the

^x

we say that for some ^'s the explanatory' relationship holds, yet is irrational, there is no logical room tor nonexplanatory relationships between the belief in and the belief in ^. Any time we find a ^ that apparenth' does not explain 4), it can get handled as a ^ that shows

that x, or x's emotion,

is

irrational.

The

point: once

eaks" (ibid., p. 17). I find it strange that Wojtyla sets up this dichotomy between agape and sexualitv, as if these two exhaust the field. Is personal lo\'e part of the "all" that occurs between x and v "on the basis of the sexual urge"?

346

Notes

I

to

Pc^es 213 -226

smell a Freudo-Reichian

mouse

here.

Now we see why he says that after "sexual

values" are gone, nothinpf remains except the value "of the person." 15. Ibid., p. 135. 16.

Ibid., pp. 42, 79, 121, 133.

17.

When

Wojtvla argues that the exclusivity of marital love ("monogamy")

indissolubility (ibid., p. 211),

he apparently means that marital love

is

entails strictly

constant. 18. Ibid., p. 212.

19. Kierkegaard

commented

sarcastically

on "Christians"

relying

on the escape

clause

of Paul's dictum: the priest who gladly marries a couple on the oath of the Testament is like the policeman who blesses a crook about to commit a

New theft

{Attack on "Christendom", p. 220).

20.

"We want

continuit)' [because]

tions of others, particularlv Historicit)'

.

.

.

we

are

aware of being constituted by the percep-

of those who love or hate us" ( Amelie Rort\', "The

of Psychological Attitudes,"

p.

405).

21. ^rowx\^ Analyzin£i Love, p. S6.

"A Conceptual

22. Neuton-Smith, 23. This

Lawrence Blum's term

is

Investigation of Love," p. 132.

(Friendship, Altruism

and Morality,

p.

77) Recall the .

notion "conditional unconditionalit)'" (8.8). 24. Carole King, Tapestry

(Ode Records, 1971 ). The word

in the Ivrics (by Gerri

GofFin and Carole King, 1960).

"still" is

not in the

title

but

25. Vlastos, "Justice and Equalit\%" pp. 44-45. 26. Ibid., p. 43. 27. Ibid., p. 44.

28. For

other analvses, see 13.5.

still

29. This idea appears also in Plato; Pausanias says "the lover of a noble nature remains its

lo\er for

because the thing to which he cleaves

life,

is

constant" (Hamilton,

Symposium 183e-184a). Groden's translation is more Aristotelian. 30. A few hundred vears later Jesus' message would be: since he is unable to save him, he all the more stronglv ties his connections with him. Pace Wojtyla, he "loves all the more," or Kierkegaard, he loves the unlovable. 31.

Martha Nussbaum thinks

that "it

is

not clear whether Aristode

really

wants to

accord to character the status of an essential propert}'." But Aristode's treatment of the

good v who

turns evil upsets one of her arguments: "His discussions of char-

acter-change certainlv permit

some changes without

a

change of identity, and he

never discusses sudden and sweeping changes" (The Fragility ofGoodness,

p.

498,

n.

33).

Ends in Themselves," Kosman, "Platonic Love," pp. 56-57. See 8.2 and chap. 1, n. 69 and n. 71. ^xo^'n., Analyzing Love, p. 105; Solomon, Lovf,

32. See Badhwar, "Friends as 33. 34. 35.

36. In Burton, Written 37.

With

.

.

.

cannot be

that friendship

is

p.

359. She

first,

163.

likely to

cites NicomacheanEthia

Aristode only says "a

classified as altogether

pearance and dress."

p.

27.

Love, p. 35.

Nussbaum, The Fragility ofGoodness, 4 and Rhetoric 1381bl. But in the ugly

p. 14, n.

is

very

And in the second, he only says who are "clean and pure in ap-

happv."

be directed at those

1099b3-

man who

Notes

Pf^es 227-230

to

347

38. Aristotle expects friends to live together, so

x's noticing tliat y is not clean in appearance might warn x that the x-y household would not be neat. But this does not rule out two virtuous slobs from being friends. Perhaps Aristotle disagrees that

ugliness has nothing to defects (ys potbelly

not

do with

mav be due to charac-ter grew out of v's gluttonv). But way. Recall Alcibiades' swooning over the

ugliness can be understood this

all

Some

character.

not an incidental feature;

is

ugliness it

physically ugly yet virtuous Socrates. (Thanks to

my

39. See ten

on

this topic

known

well

is

Ed Johnson.) The nonsense

"Physical Attractiveness and Unfair Discrimination." is

astonishing. Listen to

[sic]

Roger Scruton {Sexual Desire,

may compensate

that a pretty face

much

for

p.

writ-

70): "It

bodilv ug-

body will always [sic] be rendered repulsive by an ugly face, and can certainly never compensate for it." If that isn't hilarious, consider the sequel: "While I can fall in love on seeing another's portrait, I could not have the same reaction to a photograph of sexual parts." (Is this autobiographical?) "An excitement which concentrates upon the sexual organs, which seeks, as it liness

.

.

[but] a beautiful

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

were, to by-pass the preliminary' interest in the face, ...

and Its Discontents,

mildly agrees {Civilization sight of

which

beautifijl;

.

.

.

is

always

.

perverted." Freud

"The genitals themselves, the

p. 30):

exciting, are nevertheless hardlv ever

[sic]

beauty seems, instead, to attach to

presumably including Scruton 's

teristics,"

.

is

face.

.

.

.

judged to be

secondary sexual charac-

Didn't lovers in Vienna in 1910

each other that they had a "beautiful cock" or a "beautiful cunt"? {Otkr auch, schon Schwanz.) For Scruton, the other's face grabs our attention and makes us tell

sense

him

as a subject,

Love, p. 148):

"The

but for Ortega y Gasset the face has the opposite

effect

{On

excessive perfection of a face encourages us to objectify'

its

possessor and to keep at a distance from her in order to admire her as an aesthetic object."

40.

Ann

La.), April 26, 1988, p. D-6.

41

In

instead, that love based

.

Landers, The Times-Picayune (New Orleans, "Emotion and Sentiment," C. D. Broad argues,

on

the

physical has the advantage. Regarding "emotions

persons in respect of their

another person's mind or liable to

.

hence 'Ve are very about them, and thus to have misplaced emo209). But if knowing the mental is more difficult than the physical, this

be mistaken

tions" (p.

.

.

which are felt towards other mental" properties, "one cannot literally perceive

would only

in

.

our

.

.

his dispositions or his motives";

beliefs

justify loving first

on the

basis

of the physical and

later

on the

basis

of

42.

known mental qualities. (By the way, it sometimes works the other way around.) What is odd is Broad's claim that mental qualities cannot be perceived and therefore we are very liable to be wrong about them. His Cartesianism entails that it is not merely difficult, but impossible, to know the mental. Newton-Smith, "A Conceptual Investigation of Love," p. 121.

43.

1

less easily

wonder

is

if

Newton- Smith's claim

that love

not z,

properlv grounded on the essential

elicit

who also has S, because v was the first to elicit x's passion. passion in x

is

something

extrinsic to or accidental

44. In Plato's theory, x will lose interest in (say) this in

is

consistent with his solution to Gellner's paradox (4.2): x loves v,

y's beautiful

about bod)'

beauty is an inferior sort of beauty; in this case x changes

one manifestation of The Beautiful

And notice

that x's love for die y

S,

but

v.

when x realizes

— that

— without becoming

who has

Y^s being the first to

is,

that

loses interest

a different

person w.

who has a beautiful body will end before y loses y's

348

Notes

to Paries

beaun'. There

is

232-235 no

hint in the Symposium (see

constant because the basis of x's love,

210b-c) that

\^s beaut\',

x's

love for y

has faded; rather,

x's

love

is

not

is

not

constant because x realizes that this beaut)' will fade. 45. McTaggart, TheNature of Existence, vol. 2, p. 154; see 13.10. 46. Outkz,A0ape, p. 11. 47.

Quoted bv

48.

Hamlvn even

p. 52.

argues that erosic love will be

"cpistemic factors {Perception,

and Lust,"

Lesser, "LxDve

.

.

are

.

.

.

Learning and the

more constant than

the only thing that can give love

.

Self, p.

agapic, since .

.

stabihty"

.

299).

49. Kierkegaard, Works of Love, p. 76. 50. Ibid., p. 47,

italics

deleted.

5L Compare £?f^fr/Or,

and Works ofLove, pp. 156-157. 148-149.

vol. 2, p. 141,

52. Kierkegaard, £?f/;fr/Or, vol. 2, pp.

Hannay, Kierkegaard, p. 275. must be an optimist; he thinks that the ment" in love {Love and Responsibility, p. 90). 55. Fromm, The Art of Loving, p. 33. 56. Galston^ Justice and the Human Good, p. 152. 57. Kierkegaard, Works of Love, p. 124. 53. See

54. Wojt\'la

will

is

"the most important ele-

58. Ibid., p. 283. 59. Ibid., p. 117. See C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves, p. 166.

60. Kierkegaard, Works cf Love, p. 124. 61. Ibid., p. 118.

power?

Why isn't

Taylor, ''Love and

Forms of

62. Ibid., p. 73. But should not a proponent of agape emphasize agape the water to the fire that is eros? See n. 14, above.

XP

63. Papirer,

A152,

Spirit," p. 108.

added, quoted by

italics

Mark

See Collins {The Mind ofKierkegaard,

component

married love

as that

independent,

self-satisfied sphere,

development of the

in ethical existence

and hence which

existential dialectic.

This

is

p. 76):

its

"He came to

which converts

ser\'es as

regard

into an

it

an obstacle to the

full

the basic theoretical reason behind

toward marriage and women." According to Vlastos, Symposium: "Conjugal love, however intense, would still remain in Plato's scheme a spiritual dead end" ("Sex in Platonic Love," in Platonic Studies, p. 41). In this case a permanent human relationship is inferior to, and would block movement toward, a "transcendental marriage" with Absolute his later disparaging attitude

there

is

a similar

theme

in the

Beaut)'.

64. But see Kierkegaard

65

.

on

Paul, n. 19, above.

Kierkegaard, Works ofLove,

p. 1 4 1 X's spouse .

seems contradictor)': "spouse" denotes

being

"first

and foremost" x's neighbor

a preferential relationship, while "neigh-

bor" denotes a nonpreferential relationship. 66. Kierkegaard, Either/Or, vol. 2, p. 58. 67. Kierkegaard, Works of Love, p. 314. 68. Williams, The

New York Review of Books,

69. "Love has a tendency to er. ..

.

grow

Eventuallv desire

problem

is,

how

is

.

.

.

,

April 25, 1985, p. 37.

,

while [sexual] desire has a tendency to with-

replaced by

.

.

to shut out the third part)'

trust

.

who

and companionship.

will [arouse] ... a

.

new

.

.

The

desire"

Notes

to

Popes 235 -251

(Scniton, Sexual Desire,

p.

349

244).

Why not invite the third in,

rather than shut

him

or her out?

"The Unirv of Romantic

70. Sec m\' essay

Lx)ve."

CHAPTER ELEVEN: RECIPROCITY 1.

On

"reciprocal" versus "mutual" sexual desire, see Sara

Bad and the 2.

We can

render

"lo\'e

is

reciprocal" as:

^ yLxt]

(x)(y){t)[xLn

or

Ketchum, "The Good, the

Per\'erted," p. 147.

as:

(x)(y)(A)(t)[((-xAvt V -yAxt) 3.

Aristotle, Nicotnachean Ethics

4.

Ehman, "Personal

5.

Ibid., p. 136.

6.

Wojrv'la, Love

7.

Fried,

8.

Kierkegaard, Steves on

1

&

(x 9^ y))

^A

5>^

L].

155b27-33.

Lx)ve," p. 123.

and Responsibility,

An Anatomy of Values,

p.

Way,

Life's

85; see also p. 86.

p. 79.

p. 56.

Kierkegaard, Works of Love, p. 66; see also 10. Ibid., p. 68. 9.

p.

361,

n.

44.

320-322. and Responsibility, p. 129. Fromm, The Art ofLoiHng, p. 21. See also Peck: "Love ... is invariably ... a reciprocal phenomenon. Value creates value. Love begets love" (TT/^Roa^L^if Traveled, pp. 123, 126); and Vacek: "By its very essence [love] evokes love from the loved one" ("Scheler's Phenomenology' of Love," p. 176).

11. Ibid., pp.

12. Wo']t\'h, Love 13.

.

.

.

.

14.

Marx, Early Writings,

15. Kierkegaard, early

Marx:

world.

.

.

.

p.

.

.

379.

Worb

of Love, pp. 320-321. Kierkegaard is more Marxist than the "Deception play[s] the master, just as in the commercial .

.

.

One makes a transaction of love; one

pays out his love in exchange, but

—

—

instead one gets no love in exchange ves, in this way one is deceived" (p. 223) of impotent. This is the later Marx's Moneybags, who fools wage- laborers into

thinking they are receiving equal value for their contribution to production.

"The Ambiguous Limits of Desire," p. 55. Emotion, and Love," p. 197. 18. Newton-Smith, "A Conceptual Investigation of Love," pp. 126-127. 19. Fisher, "Reason, Emotion, and Love," p. 197. 20. Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy, p. 83. 16.

Baier,

17.

Fisher, "Reason,

21. Ibid. 22. "[L]ove proper

.

.

.

exists

only between living beings

who

are alike in

power"

(Hegel, "Love," p. 304). 23. Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex, p. 152. 24. Respectively: Nietzsche, The Joyful Lovinpi, pp.

Wisdom

7 and 13; Wojt\'la, Love and

25. See Lewis, The

Four

Loves, pp.

V, pp.

321-323; Fromm, The Art of

Responsibility, pp. 81, 107,

105-107.

1

10.

.

350

Notes

to

Pages 251 -258

26. Fronim, The Art of Loving, p. 18.

27. In abandoning

all v's

needs and desires out of love for x, v does not also abandon the

would no longer be

desire to benefit x; otherwise v

longer love

28. See Nietzsche, The Joyful

would

love, there

altruistic

— nor would y any

x.

result

Wisdom

—

well,

(p.

322): "If both renounced themselves out of

don't

I

know

what, perhaps a horror

vacui?''

29. Ibid., p. 321.

Newton-Smith, "A Conceptual Investiga114-115, 132. the blank three hundred ways, but do not forget sex. One standard disagree-

30. See Armstrong, "Friendship," p. 215;

tion of Love," pp.

31

Fill in

ment

in the folklore

of heterosexualitv

is

illustrated

by

a cartoon

that appeared at least ten years ago in The New Yorker, in

"No sex, no give in

love" and a

— to power?

What

if it

were

on

conditional

by Joseph Farris

man

holds a sign

264-265. of human psychology, that everyone's love was

true, as a matter

pattern of human love

would be exactly that enwould be cases of xLy of — xLy and — yLx, but nothing else. So if love's being condi-

reciprocitv?

tailed b\' the thesis that love

The is

conceptually reciprocal: there

and vLx, and cases on reciprocitN' were a universal psychological conceptually reciprocal would look true. tional

34.

a

woman holds up "No love, no sex." One, of course, must

32. Hanniiy, Kierkegaard, pp. 33.

which

Ehman, "Personal

truth, the thesis that love

is

Lx)ve," p. 123.

H.^nmy, Kierkegaard, pp. 264-265. 36. What is implied about reciprocity by the theory of difficulties, according to which we love exclusivelv and unconstantlv because we succumb to the obstacles to loving otherwise 10.3) Which is psychologically more difficult, loving with or without reciprocity? Intuitively, it is difficult for x to love y if y does not love x; hence, our loves will tend to be exclusive, unconstant, and reciprocal. Yet it can be argued that loving with reciprocit)' is more difficult; one must deal on a daily basis with a real 35.

.^

(

person. 37. See Vlastos,

"The Individual

as

an

Objea of Love

in Plato," pp.

29-30,

n. 28.

CHAPTER TWELVE: CONCERN AND THE MORALHT OF LOVE 1.

Kierkegaard, Either/ Or, vol. 2,

2.

Nabokov, Lolita, p. 259. Erown, Analyzing Love, pp. 29, 30, italics added. See Nakhnikian, "Love in Human Reason," pp. 303-305. The inclusion of the self within the scope of neighbor-love is denied by Kierkegaard (Works of Love): x

3.

4.

p.

23.

can be expected to be (overly) concerned for a: naturallv (hence, self-concern, unlike neighbor-love, cannot be a duty) ; practicing neighbor-love therefore.demands

self-

renunciation. 5.

This self-love can be erosic or agapic: x might love (that because agapic

x has

style,

x

valuable qualities, or x might love

is,

x because

respect, like, accept)

x's

nature

is

x

to love. In

may find x's properties attractive because x loves x; or in erosic style x

.

Notes

351

Paqes 259 -269

to

may love.v for some otVs properties and find other properties oix valuable because

6.

When x agapically loves jc, x loves a; regardless oix's defects and in spite of which x might see clearly; or x's loving x may be an erosic function of a comparison between .v's attractive and unattractive properties. If the latter outweigh the former, x might dislike x. Vannoy, Sex Without Love, p. 137. I replaced "beloved" twice with "lover."

7.

See Rawls,

8.

Nvgren,

X loves X. .v's

sins,

Love

A

Theory ofJustice, pp. 396, 440.

yl^a/>f

and

value because eros 180). But value,

it

we

if

175-177; Vlastos, 'The Individual

Eros, pp.

in Plato," p. 30. is

On

Nvgren's view, Plato's eros

is

as

an Object of

directed at that which has

(more fiandamentalh') acquisitive {Apjape and Eros, pp. 176, grounded on the object's

characterize erosic love, instead, as love

does not follow from

x's

loving y erosically that x

is

acquisitive;

it is

false

to

For defenses of Plato against Nvgren and Vlastos, see Brendinger, "The Nature of Love" and Le\y, "The

sav that eros

is

acquisitive because

it is

a response to value.

Definition of Love in Plato's Symposium.^^ 9.

10.

Nakhnikian, "Love

in

Human

Reason,"

p.

294.

"The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato," p. 33. desire must be "effective," that is, not merelv one desire in

Vlastos,

11. X's

passing fancies but a desire that motivates x to

act.

Will and the Concept of a Person," pp. 9-10.)

(See Frankilirt,

Even more

prison prevents x from acting but does not negate

Nakhnikian, "Love in

13.

F tied.

An A natomy of Values,

14. See Octavius' love for 15.

Human

Hztimy,

Ann

p

Reason," .

1

p.

repertoire of

we should say why x's being in

precisely,

that X has an "effective disposition"; x would act if x could. This

12.

x's

"Freedom of the

is

x's love.

297.

42

in Shavi^s

Man and Superman

(iv, p.

195).

Kierke^iaard, p. 265.

16. Wo']X\'h, Love

and Responsibility,

p.

138.

Kierkegaard, Works of Love, pp. 113, 124. See 10.7. 18. Ibid., p. 36. (See Lindstrom, "A Contribution 17.

Kierkegaard's in

Book The Works of Love," p.

unconditional obedience, even

others. first

Abraham

is

if what

5.)

is

the

Interpretation

of

God

He demands of vou may seem harmfial to

the knight of faith {Fear

and foremost one's neighbor

to

Kierkegaard should add: love

and Trembling), and one's son being

not incompatible with intending to

kill

him.

and Responsibility, pp. 245-247, 250-252. Wojt\'la's claim that if x loves y, X makes a gift of (surrenders) x's self to y (11.2) must not, then, be interpreted to mean that x is concerned for y carte blanche.

19. Wojt}'la, Love

20. Fisher, "Reason, Emotion, and Love," p. 196. 21. Ibid.,

p.

202,

n. 8.

22. Ibid., p. 200. 23. Ibid., p. 196.

24. Ibid., p. 202, n. 8. 25. Fisher similarlv claims that hatred

is

"desiring for

him whatever he wants not

to

have, for the reason that he desires not to have if (ibid., p. 196). This analogue to will not do, because y might desire not to have someand y might desire to have something, yet it is bad for y. In the latter case, x can harm v bv promoting \^s having that which y desires but which is bad for y; and in the former, x's promoting for y what y desires not to have

version

(i)

thing, vet

of carte blanche

it is

good

for y;

352

Notes

to

Pc^es 270-283

not harm

good

might be analogous to bad for y in y's sense of "bad." But why rule out x's desiring for y, out of hate for y, what is bad for y in x's sense? Here, too, x faces a conflict: to do what is bad for y in y's sense (which might be good for y in x's sense) or to do what is bad for y in x's sense. Can x harm y only if x does what^ sees as harmfial? No. From the fact that y might not recognize that what x does to y is will

version

(ii)

:

y, since it is

if x

for y- Instead, the analysis

hates v, x desires the

it does not follow that y has not been harmed. What likely follows is that x not have the joy of seeing y recognize x's hatred. X will have to find x's joy, instead, in the silent knowledge that x has harmed y. Hence, if x does for y what is

harmful, will

good for v in x's sense but not in ys, for v, but only that v

it

does not follow that x has not shown concern

might not recognize

x's

intention to benefit

'

y.

26. Ibid., p. 202,'n. 8.

27. Ibid., p. 196.

He continues:

"The blinding power of love

be expected, and so confirms

it." I

.

.

.

on my

is

analysis to

think, however, that the expression "the blind-

power of love" refers specifically to the lover's idealizing the beloved, not to the phenomenon of the lover's incorporating the beloved's beliefs. See Nussbaum on Aristode {The Fragility of Goodness, pp. 362-363); this is a ing

different

28.

reason for loving the virtuous because they are virtuous. 29. Newton-Smith,

"A Conceptual

Investigation of Love," p. 120.

30. Ibid., p. 121. 31.

Ehman, "Personal Love,"

p.

124-125.

Jesse Kalin also claims that "love does not

recognize justice as morally central and hence the two are essentially incompatible."

His argument is identical to Ehman's ("Lies, Secrets, and Love," pp. 261-262). "Love and Moral Obligation," p. 105. See also Scheffler, "Morality's

32. Sankowski,

Demands and Their

Limits," p. 537.

33. Telfer, "Friendship," p. 238. 34. Annis,

"The Meaning, Value, and Duties of Friendship,"

p.

351.

Eamshaw

(in Emily Bronte's Wuthering Heights, pp. 118-122) reduces the poor girl to a state worse than Glaucon or Agathon, exposing her utter confusion about reasons for love and

35. Nelly Dean's Socratic questioning of Catherine

reasons for marriage. 36. See Kierkegaard (chap. 4, n. 10, above). 37. Mrs.

Newhart

grilled

Michael (the way Nelly Dean

love for the wealthy Stephanie ("The

Newhart: Michael, prett)',

whv do vou

lo\'e

grilled Catherine)

Newhart Show," May

about his

12, 1986): ''Mrs.

Stephanie? Michael: She dresses well, she's

Would you love her if she Not in this lifetime! Mrs. Newhart: If she was

she has that cute litde button nose. Mrs. Newhart:

weren't pretty? Michael: Date a dog?

poor? Michael: Sure, as long as she dressed nicely. Mrs. Newhart: Michael, you're not

a

golddigger. Just superficial." Later Michael

—

tells

Stephanie about Mrs.

—

New-

which makes Stephanie herself superficial deliriously happy. "Nothing is better evidence of a man's true inclinations than the character of those whom he loves" (Rousseau, The Confessions, book 7, p. 264; see Ortega y Gasset, On Love, p. 86-87). 38. See Diorio, "Sex, Love, and Justice," pp. 231, 234. 39. Seevl Theory ofJustice, in which Rawls discusses the goods of "personal affection and friendship" (at p. 425). hart's conclusion,

.

Notes

to Pfujes

285 -298

40. Sec Wasscrstrom,

''Is

353

Adultcrv'

Immoral?" Thanks to Norton Nclkin for discus-

sion of this issue.

CPiAPTER THIRTEEN: THE OBJECT OF LOVE 1.

"Yeats was," says Willard Gaylin, "absolutely correct.

loved for ourselves

There 122).

no inner

is

—

self

What does

.

.

.

.

.

.

He is arguing that if being loved "for ourselves" means being loved indepen-

dentlv of properties, being loved "for ourselves"

is

impossible:

love remains once our properties are dismissed. But correct," for then not even

God

could love

a

if so,

human

person for herself alone; or a

— since she

human could

no

Yeats

love

basis or object

is

of

not "absolutely

"for herself" (Note this tcx)

God could this woman

narrow and incorrect interpretation of Yeats: only

love this particular

only for her blon-

no other merit.) De Sousa, "Self-deceptive Emotions," pp. 694-695.

deness 2.

craving to be

—

from our traits what does that mean? independent of our character" {Rediscovertn0 Love, p.

as distinguished

in particular has

3.

Algernon Sidney, "Of Love,"

4.

Thus, when Robert Kraut imagines that Linus' blanket charifjes from being irreplaceable to replaceable for him ("Love De Re,''' p. 428), Kraut is imagining that Linus

is

in

de

la

Marc, Love,

p.

252.

temporarily, not absolutely, nonflingiblv attached to

5.

Raymond

6.

Car\'cr,

What We

Talk About

When We

7.

Brown, Analyzinjf Love, p. 24. Badhwar, "Friends as Ends in Themselves,"

8.

Ibid., p. 14; see also p. 3.

9.

Ibid., p. 15, n. 29.

it.

Talk About Love,

p.

145.

p. 1.

10.

Ibid., p. 14.

1 1

Nagel, "Sexual Perversion," p. 80.

12.

Scruton, Sexual Desire, p. 78. For a similar argument that distinguishes love (an intentional, cognitive phenomenon) from "lust" (a purely senson' phenomenon), on the grounds that the former more clearly invokes the possibilir\' of mistakes about its object, see J. M. Stafford, "On Distinguishing Between Love and Lust," pp. 299-301.

13. Sexual Desire, p. 163.

on p. 103 Scruton says something similar about love. 136-137; see also p. 391 our loves "contain a vast metaphysical

14.

Ibid., p. 76;

15.

Ibid., pp.

:

flaw,"

the belief in the transcendental self 16. Ibid., p. 104. 17.

About

the "metaphysical flaw" (see above, n. 15) Scruton says: "Although there

our intentional understanding, there is still a difference in between those objects which can, and those which cannot, sustain the transcendental illusions which are built upon them" (ibid., p. 391). I guess he means that there is a real difference between a person and a tree, such that deceiving ourselves into believing that a person is a transcendental self is easier than doing so are such faulrv layers in reality'

18.

for trees. (At least for contemporary'.

Western, enlightened persons?)

NusshiLum, The Fragility of Goodness,

p.

179.

354

Notes

to

Pages 299 -308 "

19.

John Brentlinger claims that the complaint "you don't love me, you just love my G is "perennial but not vers' bright," at least if meant as a demand that the lover "be indifferent to all the beloved's qualities ("The Nature of Love," pp. 122-123). To be sensible, he implies, the complaint must be only a demand that x love y for the right rather than the wrong qualities. But note that this is not what the bright blonde woman in Yeats' poem means; clearly she wants agapic love.

20. Singer, The Nature of Love, vol.

1, p.

69.

21. Singer attributes the fallacious argument to Socrates during the banquet. But in this section

of the Symposium Diotima

22. Singer, The Nature of Love, vol. 23. This

is

1,

pp.

is

instructing the

young

Socrates.

68-69.

Hamilton, the translation Singer used. Other translations agree. "The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato," p. 3 1 It is curious that for

24. Vlastos,

.

Vlastos this

is

"Plato's theor\'

"the cardinal flaw^' in Plato's view, since he had already said that is

and

not,

is

not meant to be, about personal love for persons"

(p.

26).

25. Ibid., p. 33, n. 100. 26. Ibid., p. 33. See 10.4 for

mv discussion

of Vlastos' account of love for the

"indi-

vidual" as agapic personal love.

27. Price, "Loving Persons Platonically," pp. 32-33. 28. Price derived

from his

analvsis the conclusion that if x loves y (only) for }^s physical

properties, x does not love v "for himself" since clause (b) in particular "is

met by loving another for his appearance."

(It

figure because \ values \^s figure. ) Thus, if condition ( b)

to claim that x's loving y for \^s phvsical properties

we have

to invoke other considerations

is

is

not

rejected x's

loving y "the person,"

cannot be the sole basis of love, or a love based solely on them basis shows the superficiality' of the lover and his love. first

\^s

and we still want

— for example, these properties

29. Lvons, Emotion, p. 74. Hence, x's emotion at

seldom

hardly ever happens that x values

is

logically

inferior,

or this

sight for y can be love, but not

alwavs love for "the person" (2.2).

BeUah et al.. Habits of the Heart, "Lodged in the Heart and Memory^," p. 112. Vlastos, 'The Individual as an Object of Love," p. 30, n. 88. Solomon, Love: Emotion, Myth and Metaphor, chap. 13.

30. Rubin, Intimate Strangers, p. 68, and

p. 91.

31. IgnatiefiF, 32. 33.

34. Ibid., p. 130. 35. Ibid., p. 132. 36. Ibid., p. 133. 37. Ibid., p. 131. 38.

Brown, Analyzing

Love, p. 105.

39. Ibid., p. 106'.

40. Ibid., pp. 45, 105-107. 41. Ibid., p. 108. 42. Warner, "Love, Self, and Plato's Symposium,'''' pp. 43.

337—339.

An example of what is incoherent, if Warner and Diotima are right that a person is she possesses just her properties: "Romeo loves Juliet not for the values .

.

.

.

.

.

but for herself, without determining in advance the actuality ... of any such values" (Vacek, "Scheler's Phenomenolog}' of Love," p. 163). 44.

From

(

i)

x loves y and

(

ii)

y is the single propert}' P,

it

does foUow that x, in loving y.

Notes

is

308-318

to Pcu^es

kning

355 But there

a discrete propert)'.

is

no

earthly reason to suppose

(ii).

The

inference has an unearthly version: x loves y, y is a transcendental self, so x loves a transcendental self This inference should neither console nor threaten anyone.

45. Nanc"\' Sherman, "Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life," 46. This

is

no.

688

pared the translation for

p.

602.

Leon (Grove Cirv College) preme from Oeuvres Completes, no. 306 (Paris: Editions

in Krailsheimer's edition.

Celine

p. 1 165); hers is not appreciably different from the translations of Krailsheimer and W. F. Trotter {Great Books of the Western World, vol. 33). The translation quoted by Scruton (Sexual Desire, p. 98), which he attributes tt) J. M. Cohen, is odd; it includes a line that is not in the French: "Or, if one loves the person, it must be said that it is the totalit)' of the qualities which constitute the person." This dubious addition is not entailed by what Pascal wrote; indeed, it seems to contradict the point Pascal is pressing on us in this passage. In Pensees de

Gallimard, 1954,

Leon Brunschvicg wrote:

Blaise Pascal, vol. 2 (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1904),

"This fragment was not in the edition of 1670; in publishing pressed the tide and replaced the

one loves the person, we

Port-Roval sup-

it,

paragraph bv a conciliatory thought: 'Or, if must say that it is the assemblage of qualities which makes last

the person'" (p. 242). Thanks to

Ed Johnson

for digging out

and translating

Brunschvicg. 47. Except for Pascal's God, as Yeats' theologian proved? 48. Here Scruton's translation inserts the line

I

mentioned

49. Singer thinks that "in reaching" his "dire conclusion

person

No.

is

something apart from

Pascal

(even

if

is

his 'qualities'"

.

.

46, above.

Pascal assumes that a

{The Nature ofLove,

arguing, not assuming, that a person

the argument

in n. .

is

vol. 1, p. 94).

something beyond properties

bad).

is

20-22; Lvons, Emotion, pp. 112-114. on Friendship and Altruism," p. 537; L. A. 60; Vlastos, "The Individual as an Object of Love,"

50. See Yirov^'n^ Analyzing Love, pp.

51. See Julia Annas, "Plato and Aristotle

Kosman, "Platonic p.

Lx)ve," p.

34.

52. Vacek, "Scheler's

Phenomenology of Love,"

53. Either/Or, vol.

"Diapsalmata,"

1,

54. Ralph Pape, "Girls 55.

J.

M.

We

E. McTaggart,

p.

160.

25.

p.

Have Known,"

in

Finamore, First Love,

The Nature of Existence,

vol.

2 (book

p. 31.

5, chap. 41), pp. 152,

153. 56. Ibid., p. 151,

italics

added.

57. Ibid.; see also p. 152.

and Justice," p. 233. The Nature of Existence, vol. 2, p. 154, italics added. 60. More precisely: "I propose to use the word ["love"] for a species of liking. Love is a liking towards persons, and which is intense and passionate" (ibid., pp. 147, 148). Therefore, in the rest of the passage 1 quote in the text, what McTaggart savs about liking applies to love. 58. See Diorio, "Sex, Love, 59.

.

.

.

61. Ibid., p. 144, n.

1.

62. Ibid., p. 162, n.

1.

.

.

.

McTaggarfs arguments for his thesis are only 397-401. 64. McTaggarfs example: "We do not condemn B for being determmcd to love C 63. Singer claims, righdv

I

think, that

restatements; see The Nature of Love, vol. 3, pp. .

.

.

356

Notes

to

rather than

Pa0es 318-319

D

by the

fact that

C

is

beautiful

and

that

D

is

not" (The Nature of

Existence, vol. 2, p. 152, n. 1).

65. Ibid., pp. 152-153. 66. Ibid., p. 154, n. I. 67. See Pitcher, "Emotion," p. 331; Shaffer, 68.

On

"An Assessment of Emotion,"

love as a sense of union, see The Nature ofExistence, vol. 2, pp.

p.

164.

150-151;

for

love as a feeling, see pp. 147, 148, 150, 151.

69. "The difference

olence to

all

is

.

.

.

[between love and] benevolence

not an emotion

persons"

at all,

(ibid., p. 148).

but a desire

—

is

a desire to

fundamental, since benev-

do good to some person, or

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of Attitudes."

Dialectic of Sex

Afw'

213 and heavenly

Proust, Marcel (Remembrance of

Thin0sPast), 328«6,,331n6 eros,

147, 284; irrational be-

Quinton, Anthony, 55, 330«40

284; on constancy, 346«29

M.

349«13

Scott:

on

reciprocit)',

Rj and Rj reasons, 212-14, 217, 224, 229-30, 253-54

Index

Rcik, Thcodor,

Rcinian, Jeffrey:

86 on

exclusivity,

182-

83 St. Victor,

12

Robinson, Jenefer: role of

desire,

104-06 Rogers, Daniel, 15

Romantic

love,

324«47, 341«49, 350«31; and love, 87, 200-01, 245, 251, 264, 343«29, 348«69, 353«12

240; overvaluation clusive, 72, 194,

208; and

337«20

Shaffer, Jerome,

15-16, 79, 82-84, in, 16,

preferentialit)' of, 61,

208;

304;

196; as exas constant,

irreplaceabilit)-,

287-88,

Sankowski, Edward,

276-77

Sappho ("To Anactoria

Shakespeare, William: Sonnets, 2-3,

212-13; constancy, 208, 212345«55 Sharing, absolute, 177-80 passim, 29,

13,

188, 190, 235,

241-42

Shaw, George Bernard (Man and Superman), 341«41, 351«14 Singer, Irving: on parental love, 13-

290

in Lydia"),

14;

on Stendhal,

16; love as be-

stowal of value, 16,

132 Sartre, Jean-Paul:

on uniqueness, 62;

love and self-respect, 146; love and

freedom, 149 Schelcr,

293-96, 345«55, 347«39, 353«12; and desire for union, 79, 82, 85 ScxuaIit^^ 15, 196, 214,

Richard of

Max, 107, 143, 349«13

Schopenhauer, Arthur, 84, 159, 160 Scruton, Roger: and Gellner's paradox, 48, 153-54;

on primacy, 72;

object of love a particular, 153-54,

294-95, 336«4; "reason-hungr)'" emotions, 156; on

sexuality',

294-

96, 347«39, 348«69; irreplace-

296-97; on illusions in 296-97, 321«2, 330«40, 353«17; emotions vs. attitudes, 336«4, 341«36 Self-concept, 46, 175-77, 215-16, 228, 302 Self-deception, 51, 56, 61, 66-67, 297 Self-knowledge: lack of a fault in love, 7, 8, 15, 21-22, 49, 97, 115, abilitA',

love,

160; as discovering reasons for

152-53, 157, 161, 231, 279, 340«31 Self-love, 28, 82, 112, 240, 258-59, 334«25, 350«5; and love for others, 86, 243, 334«26, 350«4 Self-respect, 67, 144-49, 192, 194, 258-59; in erosic love, 73, 110, 145-46, 193, 259, 283 Sexual desire, 200-01, 213, 245, love, 38, 45, 63,

373

23-28

passim;

on 299-300; on love for God, 27; on self-love, 28, 334«25;

on

illusions in love, 16, 36;

Plato, 24,

properties as need-satisf\'ing,

335«5; on Pascal, 355«49; on McTaggart, 355«63

36 Solomon, Robert, 62, 323«17; on the object of love, 304-05; gender differences in love, 338«31 Spencer, Herbert, 192 Stafford, J. Martin: on constancT, 211; nonexistent object of love, 324«49; sex vs. love, 353«12 Stendhal, 16, 136 Substitution problem, 45-47, 6364, 328«15 Slater, Philip,

Taylor, Charles,

340«31

Tavlor, Gabrielle: rationality' of love,

124-28 Tavlor, Harriet. See Mill, John Stuart Teifer, Elizabeth, 277,

337«I6

Tests of love, 171, 207, 208, 213,

218, 262 Theory of difficulties, 215, 350«36 Thurber, James, and E. B. White (Is SexNecessan'n, 78, 200-01, 333«16, 345«55 Tillich, Paul: love for God, 22,

374

Index

Tillich,

219-20; loving the person, 220,

Paul {continued)

334«27; love

as desire for union,

78-79

301 Vonnegut, Kurt,

Jr.,

147

Tolstov ("The Kreutzer Sonata"),

342«4 Transcendental

self: as

object of love,

62-65, 98, 230, 306-07, 309-11, 317, 330«30, 354«44

Warner, Martin, 306-07 Weston, Anthony, 3 White, E. B. See Thurber, James Whiteley, C. H., 336«13

Wilde, Oscar, 22

Unconditional love, 146, 167,

340w26; and constanq', 64-65, 164-66, 206; desire for, 148, 303; and concern, 217, 253

Williams, Bernard,

158-61 passim,

235 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 107 Wojt}'la, Karol

(Pope John Paul

II),

on constancy, 213, 219, 346«17, 348«54; on sexuality, 213, 345«14; on reciprocity, 23941 passim; on concern, 265 Wotton, Henry ("Elizabeth of 196, 250-51;

Value of love, 34, 109-10, 129, 132, 146-47, 215, 276-78, 288, 31819, 340«21, 343«14 Vannoy, Russell: desire-satisfaction model of love, 96-99; egoism, 259 Vlastos, Gregory: on Plato, 24, 260, 300-02; on Axistode, 24, 261,

301; on reason- independent love,

Bohemia"), '330wl Yeats, William

Buder ("For Anne

Gregory"), 286