The strategy of the Lloyd George coalition, 1916-1918 9780198205593, 9780191676680

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
Abbreviations (page viii)
Introduction: Geography and Time: The Debate on British Strategy, 1916-1918 (page 1)
1. 'Restitution, Reparation, Guarantee against Repetition': The Lloyd George Government and its Objectives, December 1916-January 1917 (page 13)
2. The Collapse of Kitchener's Strategy, December 1916-May 1917 (page 40)
3. The British Crisis, May-August 1917 (page 67)
4. The War Policy Committee and the Origins of the Flanders Offensive (page 94)
5. 'Boche Killing' (page 124)
6. Caporetto, Cambrai, and the Supreme War Council (page 148)
7. Victory in 1918 or 1919? (page 171)
8. The British Peace Offensive, December 1917-March 1918 (page 193)
9. The Defeat of the Spring Offensive, March-July 1918 (page 213)
10. The Campaign of 1919 (page 236)
11. 'Victory is Essential to Sound Peace': The Armistice Negotiations, September-November 1918 (page 260)
Conclusion (page 286)
Bibliography (page 299)
Index (page 319)

Citation preview

THE STRATEGY OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION 1916-1918 David French

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The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) Reprinted 2002 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer ISBN 0-19-820559-7 Jacket illustration: The Imperial War Cabinet in 1917. Courtesy of the Trustees of Imperial War Museum, ref. Q27968A.

Acknowledgements

I am most grateful to Ian Beckett, William Philpott, Gregory Martin, Tim Travers, and John Turner for allowing me to read unpub-

lished manuscripts of their books and articles. My colleague Kathleen Burk permitted me to read transcripts of manuscript material she had collected. Once again the members of the military history seminar at the Institute of Historical Research, especially my colleagues Brian Bond, Michael Dockrill, and Brian HoldenReid, provided some much-needed encouragement. I have given drafts of parts of this book as seminar papers and lectures at colleges and universities in Britain, the USA, and Switzerland. I am most grateful to those who took the time and trouble to comment

on my ideas. Keith Neilson again cast a friendly but critical eye over my manuscript and insisted that I tried to write what I meant. However, he is not responsible for what appears in this book, and all errors of fact or judgement are my own. The following individuals and institutions have kindly given me permission to quote from material to which they own the copyright: Mr Robin Denniston; Earl Derby; Earl Haig; the Master and Fellows, Churchill College, Cambridge; the Warden and Fellows, New College, Oxford; the Clerk of the Records, House of Lords Record Office; Lord Robertson; the Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for

Military Archives, King’s College, London; the Trustees of the Imperial War Museum. Crown copyright material appears with the kind permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.

It would have been impossible to write this book without the help and courtesy of numerous archivists and librarians, and I would especially like to thank the staff of the following institutions

for their assistance: the Library of University College, London; Senate House Library of the University of London; the Institute of Historical Research, University of London; the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London; the Department of Western Manuscripts of the Bodleian Library, Oxford; the Department of Documents, the Imperial War Museum; the Public

vi Acknowledgements Record Office; the House of Lords Record Office; the Archives of Churchill College, Cambridge. This book is dedicated to my father, for his constant and unfailing support.

Contents

Abbreviations Vill Introduction: Geography and Time: The Debate

on British Strategy, 1916-1918 1 1. ‘Restitution, Reparation, Guarantee against Repetition’: The Lloyd George Government

and its Objectives, December 1916—January 1917 13 2. The Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy,

December 1916—May 1917 AO

3. The British Crisis, May—August 1917 67

Flanders Offensive 94 5. ‘Boche Killing’ 124

4. The War Policy Committee and the Origins of the

6. Caporetto, Cambrai, and the Supreme War Council 148

1918 193

7. Victory in 1918 or 1919? 171 8. The British Peace Offensive, December 1917—March

9. The Defeat of the Spring Offensive, March—July 1918 213

10. The Campaign of 1919 236 11. ‘Victory is Essential to Sound Peace’: The Armistice

Conclusion 286 Bibliography 299 Negotiations, September—-November 1918 260

Index 319

Abbreviations ADM Admiralty

AEF American Expeditionary Force ASE Amalgamated Socicty of Engineers BEF British Expeditionary Force Brig. Gen. Brigadier General

CAB Cabinet

CCC Churchill College, Cambridge C.-in-C. Commander-in-Chief CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff DID Director of the Intelligence Division DMI Director of Military Intelligence DMO Director of Military Operations DNI Director of Naval Intelligence EEF Egyptian Expeditionary Force

FO Foreign Office

GHQ General Headquarters : GOQG Grand Quartier Général

HLRO House of Lords Record Office

IWM Imperial War Museum LHCMA Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London

LRO Liverpool Record Office Lt.-Col. Lieutenant-Colonel Lt.-Gen. Lieutenant-General Maj.-Gen. Major-General

NID Naval Intelligence Department NLS National Library of Scotland

OHL Oberste Heeresleitung

PID Political Intelligence Department

PRO Public Record Office

RECO Ministry of Reconstruction

RFC Royal Flying Corps

T Treasury WO War Office

Introduction Geography and Time: The Debate on British Strategy, 1916-1918 On 31 October 1940 Winston Churchill told his War Cabinet that ‘The question might be asked, “How are we to win the war?” This question was frequently posed in the years 1914-1918, but not even those at the centre of things could have possibly given a reply as late as August of the last year of the war.’! The Prime Minister’s reminiscences, designed to encourage his ministers to see a bright strategic future when they had little cause for such optimism, were bad history. Between 1914 and 1918 ‘those at the centre of things’, the British policy-making élite, had several replies to the question of how Britain might win the war. The notion that the debate within the policy-making élite was an almost gladiatorial contest between ‘frock coats’ (politicians/‘easterners’) and ‘brass hats’ (generals/‘westerners’) permeates much of the historiography of the war.* The wide currency of these ideas is not surprising, for they have a venerable pedigree, dating back to the battle of the memoirs which commenced as soon as the guns stopped firing. They were lent weight by the prestige of writers like Lloyd George, Churchill, Robertson, and Hankey, who had themselves been members of the policy-making élite, and by historians as distinguished as Sir Basil Liddell Hart and Sir James Edmonds.? ! Quoted in E. A. Cohen, ‘Churchill and Coalition Strategy in World War II’, in P. M. Kennedy (ed.), Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, Conn., 1991), 66.

? I have adopted the concept of the policy-making élite from D. C. Watt, “The nature of the Foreign-policy-making Elite in Britain’, in id., Personalities and Policles: Studies in the Formation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (London, 1965), 1-15. 3 See e.g. B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the First World War (London, 1930; 2nd edn. 1972), 136-7, 166; M. Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918 (London, 1961), ii. 466-70; D. R. Woodward, Lloyd George and the Generals (Newark, NJ,

1983), passim; R. Blake (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1918 (London, 1952), 30-2; D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 2 vols. (London, 1938), passim, W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1918, 2 vols. (London, 1968); G. A. B. Dewar and J. H. Boraston, Sir Douglas Haig’s Command December 19,

2 Introduction One of Asquith’s most distinguished biographers penned perhaps the most succinct definition of this view when he wrote that “The great conflict was between “Easterners” and “Westerners”, those on the one hand who were constantly seeking an escape from the

Flanders impasse, and those on the other who thought that the decisive battle must inevitably be fought in the West and who were consequently hostile to any deflection of resources from the vital theatre.” The attraction of such arguments to the politicians and soldiers who penned their memoirs in the 1920s and 1930s are obvious. Over 700,000 British servicemen were killed and over 1,600,000 were wounded during the war. Losses on such a scale needed some explaining, especially as by the late 1920s the ideas that the war was fought to make the world safe for democracy and to pave the way for a land fit for heroes were looking threadbare. None of Britain’s wartime leaders was willing to shoulder the burden of responsi-

bility for such losses, preferring instead to lay the blame elsewhere. Lloyd George and Churchill portrayed themselves as the prisoners of unimaginative soldiers who failed to see that there was a cheaper way of winning the war by concentrating resources against Germany’s lesser allies rather than by mounting a series of futile frontal attacks in France and Flanders. Robertson, and Haig’s

supporters, replied that those same frontal assaults would have succeeded if only the men and munitions sent elsewhere had been concentrated on the western front. Subsequent historians, denied

for too long access to the contemporary records of the private deliberations of policy-makers, had perforce to follow the interpretation of events left by the memorialists.. The popular image of the 1915, to November 11, 1918, 2 vols. (London, 1922); J. Terraine, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier (London, 1963), 135-6; W. Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen 1914-1918, 2 vols. (London, 1926); W. Jackson and E. Bramall, The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (London, 1992), 65. 4 R. Jenkins, Asquith (London: Collins, 1964), 350; see also J. Marshall-Cornwall, Wars and Rumours of Wars (London, 1984), 34. > Recent analyses of ‘the battle of the memoirs’ 1s provided by I. F. W. Beckett, ‘Frocks and Brasshats’, in B. Bond (ed.), The First World War and British Military History (Oxford, 1991), 89-112; R. Holmes, ‘Sir John French and Lord Kitchener’, in Bond (ed.), The First World War, 113-40; K. Simpson, “The Reputation of Sir Douglas Haig’, ibid. 141-62; D. French, ‘Sir Douglas Haig’s Reputation 1918-1928: A Note’, Historical Journal, 28/4 (1985), 953-60; P. Fraser, ‘Cabinet Secrecy and War Memoirs’, History, 70 (1985), 397-409; G. W. Egerton, ‘The Lloyd George War Memoirs: A Study in the Politics of Memory’, Journal of Modern History, 60/1 (1988), 55-94; R. Prior, Churchill’s ‘World Crisis’ as History (London, 1983).

Introduction 3 war, exemplified by Joan Littlewood’s Oh! What a Lovely War, was that it had been a gigantic exercise in futility in which incompetent

upper-class generals callously sacrificed an entire generation of young men to no good purpose. In 1986 I published a book which explored the connections between British war aims and British military policy in the period from August 1914 to December 1916, and found many of the arguments outlined above wanting.® I suggested that to understand

the real meaning of the war it was necessary to look beyond the mind-numbing casualty lists of Gallipoli, Loos, and the Somme, and to analyse the contemporary records created by policy-makers. Seen from this perspective it was apparent that for those who were

directing the British war effort, the war was not an exercise in futility. On the contrary, they fought the war for two reasons. Their publicly proclaimed objective was to preserve their country’s independence and status as a great power by preventing Britain and its

empire from being subjugated by the Central Powers. But their second purpose, one sometimes obscured by their public rhetoric but made plain in their private deliberations, was to secure a peace

settlement which would enhance the security of Britain and its empire against not just its enemies, but also against its allies. I also suggested that during the first two years of the war the real division among British policy-makers did not lie between ‘easterners’ and ‘westerners’. ‘Strategy’, wrote Carl von Clausewitz, ‘decided the time when, the place where, and the forces with which the engagement ts to be fought ...’.’ British policy-makers shared Clausewitz’s priorities. They were more concerned with time than they were with geography. Since August 1914 they had recognized that co-operation with France and Russia was essential if they were to stop the Central Powers from winning the war, but they wanted to give that co-operation on their own terms. Their initial goal was to render just sufficient assistance to Britain’s continental allies to prevent them from collapsing under the enemy’s onslaught. Beyond that, they recognized that there was little harmony between

their aims and those of France and Russia. The men who made British strategic policy during the First World War belonged to a generation which had reached maturity and formed their vision of 6 D. French, British Strategy and War Aims, 1914-16 (London, 1986). ’ C. von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton, NJ, 1976), 194.

4 Introduction the world in the late 1870s and early 1880s when they had learned to see Russia and France as Britain’s most bitter imperial competitors. They did not forget that lesson even after Germany usurped that role, and even after the signing of the Ententes of 1904 and 1907 made them partners with France and Russia in a common

effort to contain German expansion. Throughout the war their suspicions of the ambitions of their allies were a powerful force in shaping British war aims. British policy-makers sought a peace settlement which would weaken Germany but which would also ensure that neither Russia nor France became so much more pow-

erful that they could threaten to upset the European balance of power or the security of Britain’s extra-European possessions.

In 1914, guided by Lord Kitchener, the Asquith government believed that the war would reach its climax early in 1917. Britain

could achieve its objectives at least cost to herself by allowing Russia and France to assume the major burden of the continental

land war while Britain restricted its contribution to the land fighting by sending the BEF to northern France as a token of Britain’s commitment to the Entente. The Royal Navy would strangle the economies of the Central Powers and Britain would extend economic and financial assistance to its allies. In the meantime Kitchener raised the New Armies in the expectation that by late 1916 the land forces of all of the continental belligerents would be exhausted. But Britain’s army would be unbloodied and in early

1917 it would be able to intervene decisively on the continent. After the British army had inflicted a final and crushing defeat upon the Central Powers, British statesmen would be able to grasp

the lion’s share of the spoils, and dictate terms not just to their enemies but also to their allies.® This policy was unrealistic. It assumed that the French and Rus-

sians would be content to fight for two years without significant British military support. They were not, and in 1915-16 they made their dissatisfaction with the British abundantly clear. By the autumn of 1915 the Asquith coalition government had reluctantly recognized that if they did not render their allies large-scale and visible support on the continent, defeatism might take hold in Paris and Petrograd. Politicians might come to power in France and Russia who were convinced that it was preferable to make a nego8 D. French, ‘The Meaning of Attrition, 1914-1916’, English Historical Review, 103/407 (1988), 385-405.

Introduction 5 tiated peace with the Central Powers rather than see their countries

used as Britain’s continental cat’s-paw. But it was also apparent that for the British the cost of increasing their commitment to the continental land war might be so high as to become self-defeating.

Politicians like the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald McKenna, and the President of the Board of Trade, Walter Runciman, argued that if the British acceded to their allies’ demands and if the New Armies participated in a grand allied offensive in France in the summer of 1916, the losses they would suffer could be sustained only if conscription was introduced. But if still

more men were taken away from the civilian economy, Britain might be bankrupt before the Central Powers had sued for peace. McKenna’s preferred strategy was for Britain to remain aloof from

the continental land war and to continue to sustain France and Russia with munitions and food, for as long as ten years if necess-

ary.” Britain might be able to continue fighting until 1925, but Robertson and Lloyd George thought it unlikely that France and Russia could do so. In early 1916 they persuaded the cabinet to cast

aside McKenna’s fears that bankruptcy would arrive before victory. Conscription was introduced and the commitment of the New Armies to the battle of the Somme on 1 July 1916 marked the start

of an enormous gamble. The Asquith coalition wagered that the Central Powers, under the weight of the Entente’s military pressure, would sue for peace before Britain had gone bankrupt. The gamble failed. By December 1916 both the British and German armies had lost heavily on the Somme. But the Germans were still in possession of most of Belgium and much of northern France and they were about to occupy Bucharest, the capital of the newest of the Entente allies, Rumania. Intelligence reports warned that the Germans were about to intensify their own efforts as they

signalled their determination to continue the war into 1917 by adopting the Hindenburg Programme and the Auxiliary Labour Law. If these were successful, they would enable the Germans to double their shell production and treble their gun production in time for the opening of the next campaign in the spring of 1917. Disquieting reports were also reaching the government that the Germans intended to try to undermine the stability of the British war economy by launching unrestricted U-boat warfare in an effort * T. Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott 1911-1918 (London, 1970), 137.

6 Introduction to starve Britain into submission. Britain appeared to be in a poor position to reply, for McKenna’s fears seemed to be justified as the Treasury was warning the government that Britain would soon run out of the dollars and gold she needed to purchase essential supplies in the USA. This was the unpromising strategic situation which the Lloyd George government inherited when it came to power in December 1916. This volume will continue the story from Lloyd George’s entry into 10 Downing Street in that month to the armistice with Germany in November 1918. An analysis of the copious contemporary records, both private and official, created by the members of the policy-making élite in 1917-18 reveals that the essence of the

Strategic debate in Britain was not between ‘easterners’ and ‘westerners’. Two such clear-cut groups did not exist within the policy-making élite and few if any of its members even used these terms.'° The new government’s objectives were the same as those of its predecessor: to preserve Britain’s status as an independent great power and to emerge from the war with its security enhanced against its allies as well as its enemies. But it was more acutely aware than its predecessor that, if it wished to achieve these objectives, it would have to work hard to sustain popular support for the war. By 1917 war weariness was rife in Britain, as it was amongst all

of the European belligerents. No one was more aware than Lloyd George of the need to retain domestic support for the war. In the light of what happened in Russia in 1917, and in Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1918 when such support collapsed, he was right. '0 For a brief period in the winter and spring of 1917/18 some policy-makers did

use these terms, although without any regularity, as a convenient shorthand to signify those who favoured or opposed closing down offensive operations on the western front during 1918 and attempting to knock the Turks out of the war. Examples of the use of ‘easterners’ and ‘westerners’ in this context can be found in Leo Amery’s diary and writings. See J. Barnes and D. Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 1896-1929 (London, 1980), 177, and HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/2/1/14: Amery to Lloyd George, 27 Jan. 1918. In a memorandum written for the War Policy Cabinet Committee on 20 Oct. 1917 Sir Henry Wilson wrote: ‘I shall always remain... an ardent “westerner”, for the simple reason that it is along the west front that the bulk of the forces of our principal enemy is disposed . . .’. He then went on to advocate concentrating British forces in Palestine to knock out Turkey in 1918. (PRO CAB 27/8/WP61: Wilson, The present state of the war, the future

prospects and future action to be taken, 20 Oct. 1917.) On 3 Feb. 1918 Coll. Repington, the military correspondent of The Times, noted at second hand that at a meeting of the Supreme War Council Lloyd George ‘had told Clemenceau that he and the Westerners had no plan’. (C. a Court Repington, The First World War 19141918 (London, 1920), ii. 207.)

Introduction 7 Sustaining such support was inextricably entwined with the need to preserve Britain’s economic ‘staying power’."! The army and navy

which Britain deployed in 1917-18 represented a huge drain on Britain’s economic resources, for they had to be fed, clothed, transported, and supplied with equipment and munitions. Nothing was more likely to undermine domestic support for the war, or to cause discontent amongst troops at the front, than shortages of food, fuel, and housing at home, especially if such shortages gave rise to the

socially corrosive belief that some people—‘profiteers’—were making unfair gains from the prolongation of the war. The govern-

ment therefore had to do its utmost to retain the support of key social groups, notably organized labour, the troops at the front, and their families at home.

However, morale depended upon more than just an adequate supply of bread and potatoes. Lloyd George repeatedly insisted that the British people had to be convinced that their sacrifices were reaping tangible victories. If they could not be won in France

and Flanders, they had to be secured elsewhere. One, but by no means the only, reason why Lloyd George was enthusiastic about offensive operations in northern Italy, Palestine, Mesopotamia, or at Salonika was his hope that a victory gained on one of those fronts would provide a much-needed fillip to British morale. The new government, like its predecessor, did not believe that Britain alone could force the Central Powers to sue for peace. Between 1914 and 1916 British strategy was guided by two priorities: the need to protect Britain and its empire from attack and the need to deploy British forces in such a way as to hold the Entente alliance together. These priorities did not change under Lloyd George, but the need to pursue them became more urgent. Since 1914 British policy-makers had assumed that, with a modicum of British support, France and Russia would at least be able to outlast the Central Powers. But in the spring of 1917 the foundation

upon which British strategy had rested since the start of the war

was called into question. Initially the March revolution in Petrograd was greeted with cautious enthusiasm in London by policy-makers who hoped that Russia in 1917 would emulate 41 This phrase was used by Robertson in a memorandum which Lloyd George read to the Asquithian War Committee on 3 Nov. 1916. See PRO CAB 42/23/4: 128th meeting War Committee, 3 Nov. 1916; see also PRO CAB 42/22/14: Hankey, The general review of the war, 31 Oct. 1916.

8 Introduction France in 1794, and that from the collapse of the old regime would emerge a revitalized military colossus. News of the disintegrating discipline of the Russian army soon meant that this facile optimism was replaced by a growing fear that, if Russia collapsed and left the

war, the Germans would be able to transfer large numbers of divisions to the western front and nullify the impact of the Entente blockade by gaining access to Russian foodstuffs and raw materials.

To make matters worse, in May and June the patience of a large part of the French army snapped. Widespread strikes and mutinies occurred amongst troops who, although they remained willing to defend their trenches, were adamant that they would not participate in further futile offensives. And at sea German U-boats were making such dangerous inroads into the dwindling stocks of merchant tonnage of Britain and its allies that Britain was within measurable distance of starvation. In the spring and summer of 1917, as the pillars of Kitchener’s strategy came tumbling down, the only cause for optimism in the Entente camp was that President Wilson had abandoned neutrality and declared war against Germany. But any hope that the USA would rapidly be able to make its weight felt on the battlefields of Europe was quickly dashed. The USA had a tiny regular army and it would be months, if not years, before the Americans could deploy more than a toKen military force in Europe. Consequently, the strategic debate within the British policy-making élite in the summer of 1917 revolved around one question: what should be the new timetable for administering the knock-out blow against Germany which Lloyd George had promised the British people he would deliver? Should the British emulate the policy of the new French Commander-in-Chief, General Pétain? He planned to remain on

the defensive in the west for the remainder of 1917, and allow French industry to increase its production of guns, aircraft, and shells, so that he could use technology to conserve manpower. By 1918, when the American army had arrived in strength, the Entente would have a sufficient superiority in men, guns, and munitions to

guarantee that it could defeat the Germans in a final offensive. And, in the meantime, should they, as Lloyd George urged, divert resources from the BEF to either northern Italy or Palestine? If the Italians captured Trieste it might cause Austria-Hungary to make peace and thereby put an end to Germany’s ambition of establishing a great middle-European empire stretching from Hamburg to

Introduction 9 Baghdad. If the British occupied Jerusalem or Damascus, might it give the British public a much-needed morale boost whilst they waited for the arrival of the Americans?

The alternative was to allow the Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, Sir Douglas Haig, to have his way and mount an offensive in

Flanders. Success there, by driving the Germans away from the Belgium coast, would remove the constant threat of invasion, safeguard communications between Britain and the BEF, deprive the Germans of the airfields from which their Gotha bombers were mounting air-raids against London, and possibly inflict a

considerable defeat upon the German army and take German pressure off France and Russia at their moment of greatest weakness.

After much agonizing, the members of the War Policy Committee imitated their predecessors in 1916 and opted for a major offensive in the west. Haig believed that his offensive would cause

Germany to sue for peace by the end of the year. His political colleagues were sceptical, but permitted him to continue. They did not expect much assistance from the French army, but they feared

that if the BEF stood idle during the summer, defeatism would spread amongst the populations of the Entente. They also hoped that Haig might present them with just the morale-boosting victory they wanted. The Flanders offensive was a failure, and, in its aftermath, the offensive at Cambrai, after promising so much, ended in fiasco. To make matters worse, the build-up of the American army was even

slower than the British had anticipated, Italy suffered a major defeat at Caporetto in October, and in November the Bolshevik revolution marked Russia’s exit from the war. Lloyd George remained convinced that the war could only be won on the western front, but by October 1917 he was also convinced that, if the British mounted another large-scale offensive in France in 1918, its army

would be exhausted, the military and political balance within the Entente would swing towards the USA, and America, not Britain, would dictate the peace treaty to all-comers. Consequently, he decided that Britain must husband its army and its economic staying-power in 1918. The effort to inflict a knock-out blow on Germany would be postponed until 1919, when the arrival of the AEF in force would give the Entente a decisive superiority, guarantee that the Americans suffered their fair share of the casualties, and

10 Introduction ensure that Britain still had enough soldiers left alive to retain sufficient diplomatic leverage to secure its interests when the time came to talk peace. In the winter and spring of 1917/18, with Russia out of the war, both France and Italy still recovering from defeat, and the USA not yet mobilized to fight, Britain’s relative power within the Entente was at its apogee and Lloyd George was able to impose his ideas on

his partners, despite the vehement opposition from the General Staff and GHQ in France. In January 1918 the Supreme War Council agreed that Britain and its allies would remain on the defensive in France, northern Italy, and at Salonika throughout the year. Each member of the alliance would increase its production of artillery, aircraft, tanks, and other mechanical devices in order to multiply the firepower of its dwindling military manpower. In the meantime Britain would gain a much-needed morale victory for the Entente—and help to safeguard its own imperial interests in Egypt and India—by mounting an offensive in Palestine to knock Turkey out of the war.

Exponents of the view that British policy-makers should have concentrated all of their resources on the western front in 1917-18, and left only the bare minimum necessary to ensure the security of their possessions in the Middle East, betrayed a Eurocentric view of the war. Turkey’s entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers in November 1914 made the conflict an Asiatic as much as

a European war, and one in which Britain might lose its Asiatic empire and its status as a world power. In 1917-18 no responsible policy-maker believed that the conquest of the Ottoman empire would lead to the immediate downfall of the German empire. All of them feared that if the Turks were left unmolested their empire would provide a springboard from which Germany could threaten Britain’s possessions in Egypt and India. The Germans believed that Britain’s colonial empire was one of the bases of Britain’s world-power status but also a potentially crippling source of weak-

ness.’2 Even before the war, some German policy-makers were convinced that parts of the British empire would revolt if Britain were to become involved in a European war. Once that war had started they lost little time in trying to assist that process. '2 Tam most grateful to Dr Gregory Martin for allowing me to read the unpublished text of a chapter of his forthcoming work on German policy towards the British empire and its military forces, which will throw much light on this issue.

Introduction 11 The British were not blind to this threat, and in 1915-16 they had

taken steps to block the German Drang nach dem Osten in both Mesopotamia and on the frontiers of Egypt.’ By March 1917, the fall of Baghdad, the Arab revolt, and Sir Archibald Murray’s advance to the frontier of Palestine appeared to signify that they had barred the path of the German—Turkish threat to Britain’s eastern empire. But, starting in the spring of 1917, the progressive collapse of Russia and the consequent crumbling of the Entente’s military position in the Ukraine, Transcaucasia, and Persia, confronted the British with the same threat in a more dangerous form. The British

regarded the pan-Islamic and pan-Turanian threat to India with deadly seriousness. British operations in the Middle East were not designed to knock the props from under Germany but to bolt the door on its Drang nach dem Osten. The British did not fight the First World War simply to safeguard their security in western Europe, nor did they fight it simply to safeguard their possessions in the Middle East and India. The war was a struggle for the division of world power. The Germans sought to supplant Britain as a world

power by creating a middle-European empire stretching from

Hamburg and Belgium to the head of the Persian Gulf and Palestine. It was a war in which British policy-makers measured victory or defeat by the extent to which they were able to frustrate

German ambitions and to maintain Britain’s security in both western Europe and in the Middle East and India.

The British alone did not have sufficient forces to defeat

Germany’s attempted expansion in both the east and the west, but they did have allies—France, Italy, and the USA—who were willing to co-operate in containing German imperial ambitions in the west. Following the Russian collapse, they had no such allies in the east—indeed their own ambitions clashed with those of Italy and France in the Ottoman empire. It therefore behoved the British to

concentrate a modicum of their own forces in the east and to reduce the influence of their allies in that region. The outcome

British policy-makers wanted was an Entente victory in France and Flanders and a British victory in Palestine and Mesopotamia. The British timetable for victory in 1919 failed to take account of one thing, that in the spring of 1918 the Germans would make their 3 French, British Strategy and War Aims, passim; id., “The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut: Prestige as a Factor in British Eastern Strategy, 1914-1916’, War and Society, 5/1 (1987), 45-62.

12 Introduction own supreme effort to win the war before they became exhausted. Between March and July 1918 the very survival of the Entente was called into question by the tactical victories the Germans gained in their spring offensive. But by June the last German offensive had been stopped, and in July the Entente’s armies began a counteroffensive which drove the Germans back beyond their start-lines in March. Even so it was far from apparent that Germany was about to collapse, and as late as August the Cabinet Committee of Prime

Ministers and the Supreme War Council were preparing plans on the assumption that the war would not be won until 1919 or perhaps even 1920. As late as mid-October Haig still did not believe that the German army was sufficiently beaten for the German government to accept the armistice terms which Foch was proposing. In the meantime, the French had excluded the British from the Bulgarian armistice negotiations. That only encouraged the British

to take care that they secured their own interests in the Ottoman empire against all-comers by excluding the French from the Turkish armistice talks. But it was the armistice with Germany which presented the British with the greatest challenges, for they had to balance a number of competing factors. Was it desirable to continue to fight into 1919 so as to invade Germany and inflict a Carthaginian peace upon the German people, or would such a

settlement produce a vengeful Germany and an over-mighty France? In any case, would the British people be willing to continue fighting for another year? Would the economic and political cost of doing so be a devastated western Europe dominated by an over-mighty USA? How could they devise armistice terms which

would prevent Germany from gaining a breathing-space after which she could resume fighting, but which would not be so harsh

that its government would reject them out of hand? When the German armistice was signed in November 1918 the war had ended a year earlier than most British policy-makers had expected. Peace

had come, as one of them wrote, ‘like a thief in the night’. 4 PRO FO 800/329/Rus/18/15: Lindley to Drummond, 13 Oct. 1918.

1

‘Restitution, Reparation, Guarantee against Repetition’: The Lloyd George Government and its Objectives, December 1916-January 1917 IN September 1916 Lloyd George had promised to deliver the knock-out blow against Germany.! When he became Prime Minis-

ter his mandate to govern rested on two things: the fact that a minority of Liberal MPs and a majority of Unionist MPs believed that he was more likely to achieve victory than Asquith, and the fact that the political divisions of the House of Commons made it impossible for the Unionists to find a leader from amongst their own ranks who could draw sufficient support from the Liberal and Labour parties.” Lloyd George was thus a Prime Minister without a party while the Unionists were a party without their own Prime

Minister. With the benefit of hindsight it is apparent that their mutual dependence made each the prisoner of the other and that Lloyd George was indeed the only possible Prime Minister. But, lacking his own secure power base, he was averse to testing the

precise degree of his support. So uncertain was he of his own political standing that when he finally dismissed the CIGS, Sir William Robertson, in February 1918, he warned one of his aides that ‘we may be out next week’~

Although senior Liberal ministers, with the exception of Christopher Addison, refused to serve under Lloyd George, most The quotation in the chapter title is Lloyd George, cited in Hansard, HC Debs., Sth ser., vol. 88, col. 1335, 19 Dec. 1917.

| D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs (London, 1938), i. 509-10; J. Grigg, Lloyd George: From Peace to War, 1912-1916 (London, 1985), 424-8. 2 The best study of British domestic politics during the war is J. Turner, British Politics and the Great War: Coalition and Conflict 1915-1918 (London, 1992). 3 G. Riddell, Lord Riddell’s War Diary 1914-1918 (London, 1933), 314.

14 Restitution, Reparation, Repetition Unionists and Labour ministers were more amenable. But none of them would enter the new government unconditionally, and in the process of bargaining for their support Lloyd George made promises which were to haunt his administration. Austen Chamberlain, Lord Robert Cecil, and Walter Long received assurances that the

new government would be under no obligation to the Irish Nationalists, that the Prime Minister would not offer a ministry to Winston Churchill or Lord Northcliffe, and that Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig, the Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, would remain in place.* To win the support of organized labour Lloyd George

promised them victory, a seat in the War Cabinet for Arthur Henderson, the control of two new ministries, Pensions and Labour, two under-secretaryships, and an agreement that he would not introduce industrial conscription. Instead he would try to direct labour to where it was most needed by a civilian ‘Derby scheme’.

Lloyd George’s ability to bring together such disparate colleagues into his ministry underlined what everyone already knew: he was a skilful and experienced politician.® But not all those who worked with him were blind to his faults. Sir Maurice Hankey, who served as his cabinet secretary, agreed that he had many gifts, but

also recognized that he had compensating faults, for with him: ‘“nothing succeeds like success” and honesty and good faith don’t matter. Success is the only criterion.’’? The Unionist leader Andrew Bonar Law believed that once Lloyd George had made up his mind he could only see one side of a question and that he was sometimes dangerously prone to wishful thinking.® The obverse of his ability to pick other people’s brains was his reluctance to read anything if he could avoid it.’ These facets of his character, together with his 4 HLRO, Bonar Law MSS 81/1/36: Curzon, Memorandum of conversation between Mr Lloyd George and certain Unionist ex-ministers, 7 Dec. 1916; J. M. Bourne, Britain and the Great War, 1914-19178 (London, 1989), 125~7; R. Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister: The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law, 1858—1923 (London, 1955), 340; R. Murphy, ‘Walter Long, the Unionist Ministers, and the Formation of Lloyd George’s Government in December 1916’, Historical Journal, 29/3 (1986), 735-45. > HLRO, Bonar Law MSS 81/1/36: Curzon, Memorandum of conversation between Mr Lloyd George and certain Unionist ex-ministers, 7 Dec. 1916. 6 A. J. P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George: A Diary by Frances Stevenson (London, 1971), 21.

’ CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 17 June 1917. 8 J. M. McEwen (ed.), The Riddell Diaries: A Selection 1908-1923 (London, 1986), 238-9. ° P. Williamson (ed.), The Modernization of Conservative Politics: The Diaries and Letters of William Bridgeman 1904—1935 (London, 1988), 110.

Restitution, Reparation, Repetition 15 ignorance of geography and logistics, often made his relations with

soldiers like Robertson difficult. The Prime Minister was well aware that he was not universally popular, but he confronted those who intrigued against him with the cheerful certainty that he could beat them at their own game.!° A successful wartime Prime Minister needed to be more than a master of the political arts. He also had to be a master of strategy. Leopold Amery, who combined the roles of Unionist back-bencher and Assistant Secretary of the War Cabinet, thought that, although Lloyd George had flashes of strategic insight, he distrusted his own

judgement and so hesitated to overrule the advice of Haig and Robertson or to sack them." This is unlikely. Men who doubt their

own judgement do not usually become Prime Minister. Soldiers like Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, the Director of Military

Operations at the War Office, thought that the Prime Minister’s careful attention to public opinion only showed that he put political ambition before patriotism.” That was too simple. Lloyd George’s

attention to what the British people thought about the war had other roots. He saw more clearly than any other British policymaker the intimate connection between strategy and national mor-

ale. As the war progressed, first at the Treasury, then at the Ministry of Munitions, and finally at the War Office, he became

increasingly impatient with what he believed was the drift of government policy. Lloyd George was willing for Britain to bear a terrible burden in human lives to win the war, but since 1915 he had recognized that the willingness of the British people to suffer the

hardships demanded by the war was not limitless and had to be sustained by tangible successes. On 1 January 1915, after the regular British army had been all

but destroyed, he reminded his colleagues that the armies which Kitchener was raising were not only far larger than Britain’s prewar army but were drawn from a much wider cross-section of its people. The civilian population, parted from their loved ones, would be forced to suffer real sacrifices and would take a very close

interest in the course of the war: ‘So that if this superb army is thrown away upon futile enterprises, such as we have witnessed 10 McEwen (ed.), The Riddell Diaries, 227. LL. S. Amery, My Political Life, i. War and Peace 1914-1929 (London, 1953), 96; LHCMA, Liddell Hart MSS 11/1928/18: Liddell Hart, Talk with L. S. Amery, 1

wR Blake (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1918 (London, 1952), 195.

16 Restitution, Reparation, Repetition during the last few weeks, the country will be uncontrollably indignant at the lack of prevision and intelligence shown in our plans.’ As a politician who prided himself on interpreting the popular will, he was keenly aware that ‘a clear definite victory which has visibly

materialised in guns and prisoners captured, in unmistakable retreats of the enemy’s armies, and in large sections of enemy territory occupied, will alone satisfy the public that tangible results are

being achieved by the great sacrifices they are making...’." Attrition, as practised by Haig on the Somme in 1916, offered negligible gains bought at a terrible cost. In November 1916 Lloyd George

wrote a memorandum for Asquith, who was about to attend an allied conference to discuss allied strategy in the following year. Lloyd George predicted that if the British and allied peoples were called upon to make further sacrifices, if casualties mounted, if food

became scarcer, and if taxation became heavier, there was the pressing danger that defeatism might take root or that one or more of Britain’s allies might make a separate peace.'* But, to Lloyd

George’s chagrin, the British and French generals meeting at Chantilly persuaded their political masters that their policy in 1917 should be much the same as it had been in 1916 and recommended

that they should again mount a combined offensive on the main fronts.’ [t was that decision which persuaded him that the control of British strategy had to be wrested from Asquith’s hands. Lloyd George and Robertson may have disagreed about many things, but they did agree in late 1916 that the war could not be won before 1918. When Lloyd George addressed the Commons for the first time as Prime Minister, he warned his audience against expect-

ing a speedy victory.'’© He had a set of priorities to which he re-

mained wedded until November 1918. The willingness of the British people to continue the war was not unlimited, and if another major offensive was a costly failure it might ‘produce that sense of discouragement which might very well rush nations into 3 PRO CAB 42/1/8: Lloyd George, The war: Suggestions as to the military position, 1 Jan. 1915.

4 PRO CAB 28/1: Statement drafted by Mr Lloyd George as a basis for the

Prime Minister’s statement at the Paris Conference on 15 Nov. 1916. ' PRO CAB 28/1: Note by the Secretary of the War Committee on the results of the Paris Conference, 15 and 16 Nov. 1916; LHCMA, Kiggell MSS VI/2: [Kiggell] Conference at Chantilly, Nov. 1916; LHCMA, Clive MSS II/3: Clive diary, 14 and 16

ay ‘Hansard HC Debs., 5th ser., vol. 88, col. 1338, 19 Dec. 1916; T. Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott 1911-1918 (London, 1970), 257.

Restitution, Reparation, Repetition 17 premature peace’.'’ He therefore had to maintain Britain’s economic staying power and morale so that the country did not seek an ignominious peace.'® Because civilian ministers, not the generals, would be answerable if the government’s military policy went awry,

he wished to exert a greater measure of control over his generals than Asquith had done.’ He also knew that, as Britain alone could not defeat the Central Powers, it was vital to act in concert with the allies. But concerting strategic policy with the allies did not mean that he was willing to sacrifice Britain’s post-war interests to them. On the contrary, in a direct echo of Kitchener’s strategy, he wanted the allies to carry a still heavier share of the burden of fighting the war so that Britain would ‘be able to last. He did not want to have to face a Peace Conference some day with our country weakened while America was still overwhelmingly strong, and Russia had perhaps revived.””°

The War Cabinet was at the heart of the machine which Lloyd George created to formulate British strategy. He invested it with the responsibility for running the war to give his regime the dynamism which the Asquith cabinet had lacked. It met nearly every

day, and for the first time at cabinet meetings an agenda was circulated before each sitting and minutes were kept of its conclusions. These were promptly sent to the departments concerned for information or action. It originally consisted of five ministers: Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Curzon, Henderson, and Milner. In the middle of 1917 their numbers were increased by Sir Edward Carson and the South African Defence Minister, General J. C. Smuts. In

August 1917 Henderson was replaced by George Barnes, in January 1918 Carson resigned, and in April 1918 Austen Chamberlain replaced Milner, who moved to the War Office.

They were men of varying aptitudes, abilities, and concerns. Bonar Law was unique in that he was both a member of the War Cabinet and held a departmental portfolio as Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons. His support for Lloyd George was crucial for the survival of the government, and fortunately for the latter their relations were generally harmonious. 17 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 11. 1280. 18 Hansard, HC Debs., 5th ser., vol. 88, col. 1338, 19 Dec. 1916. 19 Riddell, War Diary, 214; Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George, 139. 20 PRO CAB 27/6: Minutes of 7th meeting of the War Policy Cabinet Committee, 19 June 1917.

18 Restitution, Reparation, Repetition Bonar Law recognized that Lloyd George’s function was to provide

the dynamic force the government needed. He supported him because he believed there was no possible alternative Prime Minister, and that if his energies were properly harnessed they would bring victory. They usually met daily and Lloyd George used him as a sounding board before he put forward any major proposal to the War Cabinet. Lloyd George rarely attended the Commons and left the conduct of routine business there in Bonar Law’s hands. Bonar Law was not an unqualified admirer of the professionals, but he was more ready than Lloyd George to leave naval and military questions to the government’s professional advisers.”! Perhaps the pressure of departmental and House of Commons business left him with little time to ponder such questions. The War Cabinet included two ardent imperialists. Lord Curzon never forgot that he had once been the ruler of 200 million Indians, and often displayed a humourlessness and tactlessness which made him a difficult colleague. But he displayed enormous industry as the chairman of numerous cabinet committees, and he had a vast store of knowledge concerning Russia, central Asia, and the Indian empire. According to one of his admirers, Lord Milner’s ‘balanced

sanity’ meant that he became one of the mainstays of the War Cabinet, for he acted as ‘an invaluable corrective to the imaginative and often flighty genius of the Prime Minister’.“W He was equally

adept at working with some of Britain’s allies, and when he replaced Lord Derby at the War Office in April 1918 he spent a great deal of time liaising with the French.”* Other War Cabinet ministers

had less influence on strategic policy. Henderson and Barnes counted for little, beyond the fact that they represented the patriotic section of the Labour movement. But Henderson won Haig’s favour by his willingness to let the General Staff have a free hand to decide military policy.“* Smuts displayed little initiative although, as befitted a lawyer, he was ‘wonderfully good at getting up and condensing a difficult subject if it was referred to him’.* But he

did bring to the War Cabinet a clear sense of the relationship “1 Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister, 342—5, 358—60. 22 Amery, My Political Life, 1. 97-9. 23 LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (17) 28/1/1: Derby diary, 4 June 1918. *4 PRO WO 256/14: Haig diary, 27 Dec. 1916. 25 J. Ramsden (ed.), Real Old Tory Politics: The Political Diaries of Sir Robert Sanders, Lord Bayford, 1910-35 (London, 1984), 108.

Restitution, Reparation, Repetition 19 between what was politically desirable and what was militarily practical. Three ministers who were not members of the War Cabinet but who often attended its meetings were Arthur Balfour, the Foreign

Secretary, Lord Derby, the Secretary of State for War, and Sir Edward Carson, the First Lord of the Admiralty until his elevation to the War Cabinet in July 1917. Lloyd George placed Balfour at the Foreign Office because he recognized his political value to him as the last Unionist Prime Minister, had a genuine regard for his intellect, and valued his pliability. In any case Balfour’s age, ill health, and absences from the Foreign Office made it difficult for

him to pursue an independent policy and, like Bonar Law, he believed that in the last resort Lloyd George was the only possible Prime Minister.*° When Balfour was absent, Lord Robert Cecil, the Minister of Blockade, deputized for him.

Both of the ministers who headed the service departments in December 1916 agreed that their role was to lend support to their professional subordinates. Derby went to the War Office, partly as

a reward for backing the rebels against Asquith and partly as an insurance that Lloyd George would Keep his word and not interfere

with the military hierarchy.”’ Haig thought he was ‘a nice kind gentlemanly fellow’, but Lord Hardinge, the Permanent UnderSecretary at the Foreign Office, more accurately dismissed him as having ‘the brains of a tomtit’.?* That was a charge which no one ever made against Carson. He was a clever lawyer with a powerful personality, but insisted that as he lacked technical knowledge of the navy he had no intention of interfering in questions of strategy or tactics. Like Derby, he saw his function as being to protect his professional advisers against political attacks.”

Lloyd George also established a number of new ministries to mobilize British resources more effectively. He made the Glasgow

shipowner, Sir Joseph Maclay, the Shipping Controller, and a

successful food retailer, Lord Devonport, became the Food 26 R. Warman, ‘The Erosion of Foreign Office Influence in the Making of Foreign Policy, 1916-1918’, Historical Journal, 15/1 (1972), 149-51. 27 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS E/1/1/5: Robertson to Lloyd George, 6 Dec. 1916. 28 PRO FO 800/191/17/9: Hardinge to Bertie, 21 Feb. 1917; Blake, Haig, 232.

2? A. Temple Patterson, Jellicoe (London, 1969), 156; A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, iv. 1917: Year of Crisis (London, 1969), 54—S.

20 Restitution, Reparation, Repetition Controller. Maclay was one of Lloyd George’s successes, perhaps because from the outset he insisted that he would only accept the

job if he were permitted to define his own powers. But Lloyd George’s appointment of Austen Chamberlain’s half-brother, Neville, as Director of National Service was a failure, and left a legacy of bitterness between Lloyd George and Neville which persisted into the post-war era. In December 1916 the government had four senior service advisers. Sir John Jellicoe had become First Sea Lord in November 1916 after nearly two years as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet. He was poorly equipped to become a Whitehall warrior. He was tired, temperamentally cautious, inclined to over-centralize authority in his own hands, and lacked the debating skills necessary to prosper in Lloyd George’s company.*® His enemies also suspected that, lacking sufficient strength of character, he surrounded

himself with subordinates who shared his own views rather

than trying to work with men who might question his ideas.*! His

relationship with Robertson was good, probably because they agreed that “There is no question that, from a naval point of view,

the most economical locality in which to employ the troops is France.” Almost as soon as the government was in office Jellicoe

warned the War Cabinet that the Royal Navy and the merchant service were stretched to their limits in their efforts to contain the

German High Seas Fleet and secure Britain’s maritime lines of communication. Lloyd George eventually found his pessimism concerning the outcome of the U-boat war intolerable. The government’s other main naval adviser, Sir David Beatty, who had succeeded Jellicoe as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, was

temperamentally very different. He was known for his dash and self-confidence, his ability to think quickly on his feet and to evoke great loyalty from his subordinates.» But, stationed at Scapa Flow, 30 J. Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet 1914-1916: Its Creation, Development and Work (London, 1919), 422.

31 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, iv. 56-8; Temple Patterson, Jellicoe, passim; Beatty to his wife, 13 May 1917, in B. McL. Ranft (ed.), The Beatty Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty (London, 1989), i. 430. 32 PRO CAB 24/2/G100: Jellicoe, The naval position in regard to our overseas military forces, 14 Dec. 1916. 33 §. Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty: The Last Naval Hero—An Intimate

Biography (New York, 1981), passim; Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa

Restitution, Reparation, Repetition 21 he had difficulty in making his voice heard in Whitehall and never became an independent source of strategic advice for the war at sea.

After the war Lloyd George dismissed Robertson as having been

‘merely the echo of ’aig’..* That was untrue. Robertson was a competent professional soldier with a dominating personality—for no man could have risen from the ranks to be CIGS without one.» He had a clearer appreciation than did Haig that Britain was engaged in an alliance war and that victory would depend on a con-

certed effort by all the allies to defeat the Central Powers. In November 1916 he told the Asquithian War Committee that, while

he could not predict when the war would end, ‘we shall be well advised not to expect the end at any rate before the Summer of 1918. How long it may go on afterwards I cannot guess.”**° His main

faults were his insistence that politicians ought to leave the conduct of the war in the hands of their professional advisers, his unwillingness to accept that strategy had to take account of the morale of the British public, and his failure to see that Lloyd George’s freedom of

action was limited by shortages of manpower and economic resources. Robertson was not inarticulate but sometimes pretended to be, so as to extinguish the schemes of politicians whom he regarded as amateur strategists.*’

But the biggest bone of contention between the CIGS and the Prime Minister in 1917 was the former’s refusal to abandon the policy of attrition he had embraced in 1916. In the spring of 1917 Robertson warned the War Cabinet that offensive operations in the west in 1917 were bound to be very costly and that even if the allies did break the German line that would not immediately lead to victory. Britain would not win a rapid victory in the Napoleonic style which would culminate in the utter crushing of the enemy’s army. The war would only be decided when the entire German war machine had been ground down and when the willingness of the 4 C. Cross (ed.), Life with Lloyd George: The Diary of A. J. Sylvester 1931-45 (London, 1975), 80. 35 M. Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918 (London, 1961), ii. 446. 36 PRO CAB 42/23/4: Robertson to Lloyd George, 3 Nov. 1916. 37 C. a Court Repington, The First World War 1914—1918 (London, 1920), i. 449; LHCMA, Robertson MSS I/15/7: Robertson to Murray, 30 Nov. 1915; LHCMA,

Robertson MSS 1/35/12: Robertson to the Duke of Connaught, 5 Apr. 1916; V. Bonham-Carter, Soldier True: The Life and Times of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 1860-1933 (London, 1963), 149-52.

22 Restitution, Reparation, Repetition German government and people to continue the war had been extinguished.**

Haig commanded the largest British army ever raised. His conduct of operations on the western front was guided by the lessons he had learnt as a student at the Staff College in the late 1890s.°*? His

objective was the destruction of the German army. He thought that

he could encompass it by mounting a decisive offensive which would fall into four phases: the manceuvre to bring the enemy to battle, the preparation for the decisive offensive, the conduct of the

offensive, and finally the pursuit of the beaten enemy. Because Haig expected the enemy to behave in exactly the same manner, victory would go to the side with the higher morale, the general with the stronger will, and the army with the bigger battalions. Lloyd George’s propensity to urge the dispatch of British troops to fronts other than France was only one reason why the Field Marshal and the Prime Minister often disagreed. More fundamentally, Haig believed that he could achieve a Napoleonic-style victory and that he would not have to wait until 1918 to do it. In 1917 he was convinced that the German army had been so badly mauled on the Somme that the BEF could inflict a final defeat upon it after only

another six weeks’ hard fighting, even if he received little allied support.” In June 1917 he emphasized to the CIGS that ‘the German was now nearly at his last resources’, and that it would be wrong to wait for the arrival of the Americans in 1918, for the allies might collapse before they arrived." With the exception of Lord Haldane, Haig held most politicians

in disdain, convinced that they could not rise above the level of petty personal intrigues. Like Robertson, he had little faith in their

Strategic judgement.” But he was more keenly aware than Robertson that he needed support in the highest political quarters in London if he was going to survive, and he took care to cultivate 33 PRO CAB 24/8/GT229: General Staff, War Office, A general review of the situation in all theatres of war, 20 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 24/6/GT49: Robertson, Germany’s intentions, 23 Feb. 1917; M. E. Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War (London, 1989), 356-7. * 'T. Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918 (London, 1987), passim; G. de Groot, Douglas Haig, 1861-1928 (London, 1988), passim. 40 TWM, Wilson MSS, microfilm reel VII: Wilson diary entries, 4, 5, and 12 June, 1917; on Haig’s mind-set see T. Travers, ‘A Particular Style of Command: Haig and GHOQ, 1916-1918’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 10/3 (1987), 363-76.

41 Blake (ed.), Haig, 236, 238. 2 Ibid. 244.

Restitution, Reparation, Repetition 23 sympathetic politicians and newspapermen.* Had he been left unfettered in 1917, Haig would have tried to carry on where he left off at the end of the Somme. But because Lloyd George would not let him, Haig fought two wars, one against the Germans on the west-

ern front and the other against Lloyd George in London. Until February 1918 he was aided and abetted by Robertson. The generals’ disagreements with the Prime Minister sprang from Lloyd George’s clearer appreciation of the long-term costs of the war to Britain and his determination to seek a strategy which would minimize them. To Haig and Robertson, casualties had to take second

place to victory. To Lloyd George, too many casualties would preclude victory.

To facilitate the conduct of business, Lloyd George established a secretariat to service the War Cabinet. It was based on the system developed by Sir Maurice Hankey to serve the cabinet committees Asquith had established.“ Hankey occupied a position of considerable influence at the heart of the government. He saw the Prime Minister more frequently than any minister, he attended every

important cabinet and cabinet committee meeting, he kept the minutes of all the most secret meetings, and many of his strategic preferences coincided with Lloyd George’s. He was industrious, discreet, widely trusted, and could act as a mediator between war-

ring parties on the frequent occasions when tempers became frayed.*® Hankey’s role as an unofficial adviser to Lloyd George excepted, the War Cabinet secretariat was not a ‘thinking’ department like the General Staff or the Admiralty War Staff. In order to provide himself with his own independent source of advice, Lloyd George established his own prime ministerial secretariat. Housed in a number of temporary wooden huts in the garden of 10 Downing Street, the ‘Garden Suburb’ was presided over by an Oxford

don and temporary civil servant at the Ministry of Munitions, W.G.S. Adams. Its other members were David Davies; a statisti43 J. M. McEwen, ‘“Brass-Hats” and the British Press during the First World War’, Canadian Journal of History, 18/1 (1983), 43-67. 44 PRO CAB 23/1/WC10: War Cabinet, 18 Dec. 1916; J. F. Naylor, “The Establishment of the Cabinet Secretariat’, Historical Journal, 14/4 (1971), 783-804; J. Turner, ‘Cabinets, Committees and Secretariats: The Higher Direction of War’, in K. M. Burk (ed.), War and the State: The Transformation of British Government 1914-1919 (London, 1982), 69-76. 4% S. Roskill, Hankey, Man of Secrets, i. 1877-1918 (London, 1970), passim.

24 Restitution, Reparation, Repetition cian, Joseph Davies; and two of Milner’s close associates, Waldorf Astor and Philip Kerr.” The War Cabinet had the right to call for information from every government department, and the latter were expected to keep the War Cabinet informed of their work. The War Cabinet secretariat

was the only institutional link between the War Cabinet and the departments. The minutes which the secretariat produced were signed by the Prime Minister and had the force of War Cabinet instructions.*’ But that did not mean that War Cabinet ministers were told everything. Some senior officials and ministers, who knew that in the bureaucratic warfare of Whitehall knowledge and power were synonymous, preferred to transmit some information through unofficial channels. Both Robertson and his successor, Sir Henry Wilson, maintained an extensive personal correspondence with various commanders.* Lloyd George himself was not without guile in this respect, for he controlled the flow of especially secret diplomatic information by restricting the distribution of some For-

eign Office telegrams to certain especially favoured recipients.” The only ministers who received copies of all of the War Cabinet’s

printed minutes and briefing papers were its own members, the Foreign Secretary, and the political heads of the service departments. In addition, Hankey kept copies of especially secret meetings in manuscript, and these ‘A’ series minutes were circulated, if

at all, on an even more restricted basis.°° Other ministers had to make do with such information as reached them through official channels, gossip, and with what they could glean from the Wednesday morning breakfast meetings which Lloyd George held to give them his own account of political developments.°! But compared to back-bench MPs even the lowliest Parliamen-

tary Under-Secretary was well informed. Both government and opposition back-benchers were reduced to gathering what information they could concerning the conduct of the war from the press 46 J. Turner, Lloyd George’s Secretariat (Cambridge, 1980), 1-26. 47 PRO CAB 37/161/14: War Cabinet, Revised draft for consideration, 11 Dec.

re See e.g. LHCMA, Robertson MSS I/4/89: Robertson to Maude, 24 Sept. 1917; see also LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/34/10: Robertson to Milne, 7 Nov. 1916; LHCMA, Spears MSS 1/15: Wilson to Spiers, 6 Aug. 1918. ” PRO FO 371/3434/32763: Reading to FO, 19 Feb. 1918. °° PRO CAB 37/161/14: War Cabinet, Revised draft for consideration, 11 Dec. oO. Williamson (ed.), The Modernization of Conservative Politics, 129-30.

Restitution, Reparation, Repetition 25 and from gossip. They were isolated from their constituents thanks to the suspension of normal party activities, the enlistment of many

of their party agents, and the population movements which accompanied the war. Operating as they did very much in the dark when they attempted to gauge public opinion, it was hardly surprising that many MPs believed that the strikes of May 1917 meant a

lack of popular support for continuing the war.” The quality of the War Cabinet’s work was not only determined by the personalities and aptitudes of its members and the efficiency of its secretariat. It was also dependent upon the calibre of the information which reached it. By 1917 a burgeoning bureaucracy existed to supply the policy-making élite with up-to-date information and analysis about events in allied, enemy, and neutral countries. Before 1914 the Foreign Office had been the cabinet’s premier adviser on events abroad, but by late 1916 it had lost much influence. Lloyd George’s preference for summit, rather than ambassadorial, diplomacy did nothing to help it to regain its former status, and other departments, like the Ministry of Information which was established in February 1918, were allowed to encroach on its traditional domains.>?

But whatever the limitations on its influence in London, the Foreign Office was well served by most of its senior ambassadors.

Lord Bertie, ambassador to France, and Sir George Buchanan, ambassador to Russia, had been in post since 1905 and 1910 respectively and were probably better informed about the politics of their

host countries than any other Englishmen. But in 1917 Bertie’s knowledge of French politics was not matched by his influence. He

was the target of an intrigue to replace him, organized by Lord Esher, the éminence grise of Edwardian politics, and his own military attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Le Roy Lewis.** By the spring of

1917 the Bertie—Esher feud had so poisoned relations between ambassador and attaché that, although Bertie’s dispatches gave a comprehensive picture of French politics, they contained little 2 Turner, British Politics and the Great War, 197. °3 Warman, ‘Erosion of Foreign Office Influence’, 134-43; E. Goldstein, Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920 (Oxford, 1991), passim.

4 R. Williams, ‘Lord Kitchener and the Battle of Loos: French Politics and British Strategy in the Summer of 1915’, in L. Freedman, P. Hayes, and R. O’Neill (eds.), War, Strategy, and International Politics: Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard (Oxford, 1992), 121-5.

26 Restitution, Reparation, Repetition military information.-> Buchanan enjoyed better relations with his

attachés and was on good terms with the Tsarist administration. The Foreign Office could find few faults with his work, but by January 1917 he was tired and in need of rest.°° After the March 1917 revolution the value of his reports was reduced because his identification with the old regime meant that he was less persona grata with the Provisional Government.°’ The one senior ambassador who was poorly informed about the

government of his host country was Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British ambassador to the USA. He had never enjoyed warm relations with the Wilson administration, both because of his own poor health and because of his close friendship with the former Republican President, Theodore Roosevelt.> Before December 1916, Spring-Rice’s shortcomings had been compensated for by the close relationship which had developed between the Foreign

Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, and President Wilson’s confidant, Colonel E. M. House. Fortunately for the War Cabinet, a new channel of communications opened thanks to the friendship which emerged between House and a British intelligence officer in Washington, Captain Sir William Wiseman.» In 1917, much to his cha-

erin, Spring-Rice was effectively superseded by three special missions which were sent to Washington: the first, led by Balfour himself; the second by Lord Northcliffe, the owner of The Times, who was outspokenly critical of the ambassador; and the third by Lord Reading, who finally superseded the ambassador in January 1918.

The diplomatic service was not the only source of information. Since 1914 the War Office had maintained military missions with

the allied general staffs to supplement the work of the military attachés and to exchange intelligence and information about op> H. W. Steed, ‘Bertie, Francis Leveson’, Dictionary of National Biography 1912-1921 (London, 1927), 44. PRO FO 800/191/17/27: Bertie to Hardinge, 22 Apr. 1917; PRO FO 800/191/17/31: Bertie to Hardinge, 2 May 1917; PRO FO 800/191/17/ 33: Bertie to Hardinge, 5 May 1917; PRO FO 800/191/17/40: Bertie to Hardinge, 19

we PRO FO 800/383: Clerk to Russell, 30 Jan. 1917; K. Neilson, Strategy and Supply: The Anglo-Russian Alliance, 1914-1917 (London, 1984), 24-6. 5’ §. Hoare, The Fourth Seal: The End of a Russian Chapter (London, 1930), 243. 8M. R. Kohl, ‘A Failure of Ambassadorial Diplomacy’, Journal of American History, 57/3 (1970), 636-52. °° W. B. Fowler, British-American Relations, 1917-1918: The Role of Sir William Wiseman (Princeton, NJ, 1969), 8-16.

Restitution, Reparation, Repetition 27 erational matters.© The mission to the Italian army was commanded by Brigadier General Sir Charles Delmé-Radcliffe, who was disliked by the Italians, distrusted by Robertson, and who failed to liaise with the British embassy so that the ambassador, Sir J. R. Rodd, was as ill informed about Italian military affairs as Bertie was about the French army.*! The head of the mission to Russia, Sir John Hanbury Williams, did not speak Russian and was dependent on what little information the Russians gave him. Fortunately his linguistic shortcomings were more than made up for by the talents of the military attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Knox, who spoke fluent Russian and who had many friends in the Russian officer corps.” Knox’s propensity to visit the front regularly to see things for himself meant that his reports were circulated to the War

Cabinet and he was frequently commended for their fullness and accuracy. In March 1917 the British military mission to the French army was reorganized and placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Wilson. Wilson was articulate, quick-witted, and possessed a whimsical sense of humour, qualities which won Lloyd George’s favour but which either alarmed or bemused Haig

and Robertson.” He spoke fluent French, was a friend of General Foch, and had the reputation of being a Francophile. Between 1910 and 1914 he had served as DMO at the War Office, where he did

more than anyone else to concert military planning with the French. That experience, together with a spell as chief liaison officer between GHO and the French GQG in 1915, made him the British army’s acknowledged expert on the French army. Initially, Wilson’s mission was subordinated to GHQ, but in April 1917, after the failure of the Nivelle offensive, the War Cabinet insisted that Wilson report to them directly.© The Secret Service had been established in 1909 to enable the Foreign Office to maintain its distance from the sordid work of

espionage. Its head, Sir Mansfield Cummings, had a triple al6° LHCMA, Spears MSS 1/15: Cox to Spiers, 3 July 1917; PRO WO 106/5130: Buckley to Lassiter, 5 Apr. 1917. 61 PRO FO 800/202/262: Rodd to Balfour, 1 Nov. 1917; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/3/3/7: Rodd to Hardinge, 23 June 1918. 6 A. Knox, With the Russian Army: Being Chiefly Extracts from the Diary of a Military Attaché (London, 1921), i. 57. 6 Neilson, Strategy and Supply, 24-32. 64 TWM, Wilson MSS microfilm reel VI: Wilson diary, 11 Mar. 1917. 6 TWM, Wilson MSS microfilm reel VII: Wilson diary entries, 26 and 31 Mar. and 18 Apr. 1917.

28 Restitution, Reparation, Repetition legiance: to the Foreign Office, the War Office, and the Admiralty. For practical and administrative purposes, he was placed under the

DMO. Before 1914 the Foreign Office had exhibited a marked distaste for espionage, but during the war the British legations in Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, and Norway became listeningposts collecting every scrap of information they could gather from

the Central Powers. Consular officials were forbidden to act as spies, but could recommend likely agents and transmit their reports. By December 1916 the British had several, often competing,

networks of secret agents, for Cummings’s organization ran in parallel with similar networks organized by GHQ. Their major function was to report on the movement of German troops and on German plans.

As the war developed, the British supplemented intelligence provided by spies with an increasing amount of information derived from no less than six separate signals intelligence organizations: the Admiralty’s Room 40, a section under the Postal Censor, a branch of the intelligence department of the Indian Army, two organizations at the War Office (MI1b and MI1e), and

agencies at the GHQs of armies in the field. The greatest successes of MI1b lay in decrypting messages transmitted by the German wireless station at Nauen to German forces and agents outside western Europe.®’ Initially Room 40 was concerned with the inter-

ception and decoding of German naval messages, and its most important contribution to the British war effort was that, except for a brief period in 1918, it made it impossible for the German High

Seas Fleet to launch a surprise attack on the British Isles.® But in April 1914 Room 40 also began to attack neutral and enemy diplomatic traffic and, by December 1916, it had broken into American, Swedish, and German diplomatic traffic as well as the private code which President Wilson used to communicate with Colonel House.® So confident were intelligence analysts of the 6 J. Ferris, “The British Army and Signals Intelligence in the Field during the First World War’, Intelligence and National Security, 3/4 (Oct. 1988), 23-31; id. (ed.),

The British Army and Signals Intelligence during the First World War (London, 1992), passim. 67 C. Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London, 1985), 88.

68 P. Beesly, Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-1918 (London, 1982),

m9 CCC. Denniston MSS 1/2 Denniston, Account of the establishment of Room 40 [n.d.]; CCC, Denniston MSS 1/3: Denniston, Draft history of Room 40 [n.d.];

Restitution, Reparation, Repetition 29 veracity of information gleaned from wireless intercepts that they euphemistically referred to it as derived from an ‘absolutely reliable source’.” British code-breakers might have yielded even more information had their work not been marred by professional jealousy. Between October 1914 and the spring of 1917 the War Office and Admiralty code-breakers did not co-operate at all and even after that they exchanged only a number of decrypts.”! Co-operation with allies in this most sensitive area of intelligence gathering was sporadic.” The Foreign Office and the intelligence departments of the Ad-

miralty and War Office did their best to exchange information, although sometimes bureaucratic channels became clogged.” But what they failed to do was to establish a single body, below the level

of the War Cabinet, responsible for analysing the material they collected. Intelligence analysis therefore remained the function of individual departments. Political information was analysed by the small staff of the Foreign Office’s War Department, military intelligence was analysed by the staff of the DMI, and naval information by the NID.” One department’s hypotheses and conclusions were rarely, if ever, challenged by other professional analysts.” The task of producing a fuller picture of enemy intentions and capabilities might have been performed by the Intelligence Branch of the Department of Information, which in February 1917 began to provide the War Cabinet with reports about political developments in allied and enemy countries. But it was never able to provide comprehensive net assessments, because the DMI and NID refused to supply the branch with information on the grounds that civilian departBeesly, Room 40, 129-33, 189-90; PRO WO 106/1516: General Staff, War Office, Notes on the postal censorship, Nov. 1917. ” PRO WO 106/1511: DMI to Caucasus Military Agent and Major Rowlands, 4 Jan. 1917, and GHO Cairo to DMI, 5 Jan. 1917. " Ferris, “The British Army and Signals Intelligence’, 34. ” LHCMA, Spears MSS 1/18: Spiers to Storr, 9 Feb. and 4 Mar. 1918. 3 PRO ADM 116/1807: Hardinge[?] to Geddes, 11 Apr. 1918; PRO FO 371/3086/ 222430: DMI 3 to Hardinge, 21 Nov. 1917. 4 PRO ADM 1106/1809: Hardinge to Geddes, 28 Nov. 1918; V. H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1971), 14; Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate, 390-1; P. Beesly, ‘British Naval Intelligence in Two World Wars’, in C. Andrew and J. Noakes (eds.), Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945 (Exeter, 1987), 253-4. ® R. Jervis, ‘Improving the Intelligence Process: Informal Norms and Incentives’, in A. C. Maurer, M. D. Tunstall, and J. M. Keagle (eds.), Intelligence: Policy and Process (Boulder, Colo., 1985), 118-19.

30 Restitution, Reparation, Repetition ments could not keep secrets.” The government therefore had no bureaucratic apparatus to produce a net assessment of the political, military, naval, and economic capabilities and intentions of the Central Powers. War Cabinet ministers had to act as their own

intelligence analysts and that was perhaps one reason why, in Churchill’s opinion, ‘the War Cabinet never do anything until forced by circumstances to do it’.” It is debatable whether the War Cabinet enhanced the efficiency of central government to any great extent. Lloyd George hoped that the War Cabinet and its secretariat would eliminate the delays which he believed had been inherent in the relationship between

the full cabinet and the Asquithian War Committee. In reality, those delays had been caused more by clashes of personalities and

policies than by the institutional framework within which they operated. It was the ejection of politicians like Asquith, McKenna, and Runciman which did more than anything else to give the new government an air of dynamism. But differences over policy did

not disappear with the ejection of Asquith and his coterie. The institutional framework which Lloyd George created, and especially the multiplication of new ministries, provided ample scope for ministers and their officials to bicker over policy options, and much of the War Cabinet’s energy was devoted to settling inter-

departmental disputes.’ Indeed, that became the War Cabinet’s major function. In theory the War Cabinet had supreme executive responsibility for the conduct of the war. Departmental ministers ran the war under its aegis and were supposed to bring to it only the most vital questions. By the spring of 1917 it was devolving an increasing amount of its business to a growing number of subcommittees and began to act as a supervisor regulating their decisions

rather than as a plenary body taking decisions itself.” But in December 1916 those developments lay in the future. After his first essay at cabinet-making, the Prime Minister was tolerably pleased with the result. Robertson did not agree. They were, he grumbled, ‘Quite as bad as the old lot.’® 7% PRO FO 800/212: Drummond to Balfour, 19 Nov. 1917. 7 LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (17) 28/1/1: Derby diary, 4 June 1918. *® Williamson, The Modernization of Conservative Politics, 126. ® ‘Turner, ‘Cabinets, Committees and Secretariats’, 63-7. 8 PRO WO 256/14: Robertson to Haig, 10 Dec. 1916.

Restitution, Reparation, Repetition 31 The Central Powers also had much to grumble about, for the war

had not gone well for them in 1916. On the credit side, by Christmas they had defeated Rumania, the newest member of the Entente, and occupied Bucharest. On the debit side, the Turkish army was weary and was being pressed backwards in the Caucasus.

On the eastern front, a large part of the Austro-Hungarian army had collapsed in June 1916 under the weight of the Brusilov offensive. On the western front, the German plan to persuade France to make a separate peace by exhausting its manpower at Verdun had

failed, and on the Somme the unexpected superiority of British artillery and air power had depressed the German high command. It was the steady attrition of both their manpower and their economic staying power, combined with the knowledge of the waning strength of their allies, which dominated the thoughts of the German high command when they pondered their strategic policy for 1917. In 1916 the German army lost approximately half a million men on the Somme, another 282,000 at Verdun, and 350,000 on the eastern front.2) Their response was the Hindenburg Programme and the Patriotic Auxiliary Service Law. Convinced that the armies of the Central Powers would probably grow numerically weaker compared to those of their enemies, the German high command

determined to compensate for their numerical inferiority by militarizing the German economy so as to produce sufficient munitions to counterbalance the materia] superiority of their enemies. But by themselves these measures would not secure a German victory, and Hindenburg and Ludendorff were as concerned about

the relationship between time and strategy as were their British counterparts. Doubting Germany’s ability to outlast its enemies in a prolonged war of attrition, they wanted to win the war quickly. It did not appear that the surface fleet could do so, for a month after Jutland Admiral Scheer, the Commander-in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet, had informed the Kaiser that his battleships could not force 31 H. H. Herwig, “The Dynamics of Necessity: German Military Policy during the First World War’, in A. R. Millett and W. Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness, i. The First World War (Boston, Mass., 1988), 95; L. L. Farrar, Jr., Divide and Conquer: German Efforts to Conclude a Separate Peace, 1914-1918 (New York, 1978), 49-71; N. Stone, The Eastern Front 1914-1917 (London, 1975), 232-63.

8 G. Hardach, The First World War 1914-1918 (London, 1977), 63-70; M. Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916-1918 (London, 1976), 67-85.

32 Restitution, Reparation, Repetition a decision on the British. But he believed that his U-boats could do so if they were permitted to sink merchant ships without warning, even if that meant that the USA entered the war on the Entente’s side. Unrestricted U-boat warfare could sink 600,000 tons of British shipping per month and frighten away 1.2 million tons of neutral shipping which worked on behalf of the allies. After five months

nearly 40 per cent of the shipping which serviced Britain would have been eliminated and Britain would be compelled to make peace before effective American assistance could arrive. Once Britain had collapsed, Italy and France, who were already so hard pressed that only Britain’s economic assistance continued to sustain them, would soon follow suit. Germany would have won the war.®?

Throughout 1916 the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, had resisted the Admiralty’s demands, but by the autumn the navy

was being supported by a growing chorus of industrial leaders, Conservatives, pan-Germans, and National Liberals.** When they took office in August, Hindenburg and Ludendorff had supported the Chancellor. They were not alarmed at the prospect of the USA entering the war, but they were afraid for their undefended borders

with Holland and Denmark. Accordingly, they insisted that the question must be postponed until the end of the Rumanian campaign freed troops to protect the frontiers.® That gave BethmannHollweg an opportunity to use diplomacy to disrupt the Entente

| alliance. On 18 October Austrian and German leaders agreed that, when Rumania had been conquered and they had demonstrated to their enemies that the military balance had swung once again in

their favour, the Central Powers should issue a call for a peace conference. They were not seeking to negotiate a general peace, but rather to divide their enemies by encouraging defeatism in France and Russia which might incline them towards a separate peace.* 83 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, iv. 4, 50-1; A. Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford, 1989), 355-8. 8 K. H. Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann-Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven, Conn., 1972), 295-6.

8 R. B. Aspery, The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct World War One (New York, 1991), 266-7. 86 Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship, 116; G. E. Torrey, “The Rumanian Campaign of 1916: Its Impact on the Belligerents’, Slavic Review, 39/1 (1980), 33-5; W. B. Fest,

‘British War Aims and German Peace Feelers during the First World War (December 1916—November 1918)’, Historical Journal, 15/2 (1972), 288-9.

Restitution, Reparation, Repetition 33 The British government received the German note on 12 December.*’ It gave no indication of the terms the Central Powers sought, but the British were right to harbour deep suspicions about their ambitions. In private Admiral von Holtzendorff, the Chief of Naval Staff, saw the German démarche as a step towards securing a victor’s peace which would enable Germany to annex the Belgian

coast, the Courland coast, the Faeroes, the Azores, Madagascar, and to regain its Far Eastern colonies. Germany would thus supplant Britain as Europe’s leading naval power and be in an excellent position to attack the trade and colonies of its enemies in any future war.® In the summer of 1916, British policy-makers had believed that they might soon be in a position to impose their terms on the Central Powers, but their ambitions were not fulfilled. Far

from the Entente being able to impose its peace terms on the Central Powers, by early December 1916 it was the latter that appeared to have the advantage. Germany had blunted the allied offensives on both the eastern and western fronts, and the British gamble to win the war by attacking on the Somme before the onset of national bankruptcy had failed, and by November they were dangerously dependent on the USA for economic assistance. On the day that the Lloyd George government was formed one Unionist MP found widespread pessimism amongst his fellow back-

benchers and the permanent officials of his acquaintance. The military situation was stalemated, the War Office appeared incom-

petent, the financial situation seemed hopeless, Germany’s re-

sources looked inexhaustible, Turkey held a million men in reserve, the Russians contemplated a separate peace, and nothing could stop German submarines from preying on allied ships.” As a summary of Britain’s strategic situation it was indeed pessimistic, but it contained more than a grain of truth. However, no senior British policy-maker wanted to open peace

negotiations following the German offer. After two years of war, and the sacrifices of the Somme, it was emotionally unendurable for the Lloyd George government to accept that the appalling casualties Britain had suffered had bought no tangible 87 J. B. Scott (ed.), Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918 (Washington, DC, 1921), 2-3. 88 H. Herwig, ‘Admirals versus Generals: The War Aims of the Imperial German Navy, 1914-1918’, Central European History, 5/3 (1972), 214-17. 8 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/46/6/1: Sykes to Sir Edward [Carson?], 7 Dec. 1916.

34 Restitution, Reparation, Repetition gains.” Furthermore, an agent working for the British Consul General in Rotterdam, Ernest Maxse, had provided them with an accurate report of the Austro-German conference of 18 October.

At this the German and Austrian leaders had agreed that ‘the Central Powers were now at the apogee of their victories and force

and from now onwards provided the Allies hung together and pressed them the result would be a steady downward curve for them’.”! Hence, British policy-makers knew that the Central Pow-

ers’ position was weaker than it appeared to their uninstructed back-bench supporters. The report helped to convince Lloyd George that the Germans had issued their note because they ‘are beginning to feel the pinch’.” On 14 December Robertson provided the War Cabinet with an analysis of the strategic implications of the German offer which formed the basis of the British response. Germany had been trying

to create a middle-European empire ‘stretching across Europe from the North Sea and Baltic to the Black Sea and the Aegean,

: and perhaps even to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean’. Following the Rumanian collapse, Germany was at the peak of its power and its rulers now wanted a settlement which would perpetuate that predominance. The danger for the western allies was that: ‘In order to found this Central Empire she may well afford to propose gen-

erous terms in the West, such as the evacuation of Northern France, and Belgium, and even the cession of the whole or part of Alsace and Lorraine.’ In August 1916 Robertson had argued that Britain was fighting to re-establish a balance of power in Europe which would not leave any single power, be it Russia, France, or Germany, predominant. In December the failure of the Somme to

bring Germany to the conference table as a supplicant, and the collapse of Rumania, did not cause him to change his mind: ‘although we need a reasonably strong Germany, our position will become intolerable if she is left too strong.’ Peace on the basis of the status quo would represent a defeat for Britain, because ‘Such a scheme would make the Central Empire the strongest State in the history of the world, and tend to subjugate all other Western king°° Bodleian Library, Milner MSS dep. 44: Robertson to Milner, 18 Dec. 1916. *t HLRO, Lloyd George MSS 57/3/2: Maxse to Campbell, 13 Dec. 1916.

% Riddell, War Diary, 234, A. G. Lennox (ed.), The Diary of Lord Bertie of Thame, 1914-1918 (London, 1924), ii. 83.

° HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/116: Robertson, German peace proposals, i. Memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 14 Dec. 1916.

Restitution, Reparation, Repetition 35 doms to that empire.’ No policy-maker questioned Robertson’s analysis, and the reaction of the allied governments suggested that they were also unwilling to enter into negotiations. The issue facing

the War Cabinet became how best to reject the German approach without inflaming war weariness amongst their own people or alienating powerful neutrals.

A blank refusal was impossible. It would place the Entente governments in the wrong in the eyes of many of their own peoples,

and might strengthen support for the Central Powers in the USA. The Foreign Office were concerned about what might happen if the Germans made further approaches to France and Belgium for a separate peace. If they offered to restore Belgium’s independence,

to evacuate all occupied allied territory in the west, and to exchange part of Alsace-Lorraine for a slice of the French Congo, the Radical and Socialist majority in the French Chamber might force their government to accept. If France and Belgium deserted Britain, Italy and Russia would not be far behind. Britain would be bereft of allies and stand condemned in the eyes of American opinion as an obstacle to world peace.” On 18 December the War

Cabinet agreed that the Entente should reply that the German offer was a sham because it did not include specific proposals and rejected calling an allied conference to discuss the note for fear that to do so might raise false hopes amongst the allied peoples that peace was at hand.” Lloyd George explained the British position to the Commons on

19 December. His commitment to the knock-out blow did not mean that he wanted to eliminate Germany as a great power. Like Robertson, he believed that its existence was a necessary counterbalance to an over-mighty Russia.”’ But he hoped to inflict such a defeat upon Germany that it would no longer wish to menace its

neighbours’ security. This could be achieved by changing the nature of the German government, for the Junkers’ domination of * Ibid. * PRO FO 800/197: Drummond to Cecil, 13 Dec. 1916; PRO CAB 23/1/WC10, appendix II: Reply of the allies to German peace proposals, 14 Dec. 1916; PRO CAB 37/161/23: Balfour to Buchanan, 14 Dec. 1916; PRO CAB 37/161/28: Balfour to Villiers, 15 Dec. 1916; PRO CAB 23/1/WC10: Cecil, Note on the German offer of peace, 15 Dec. 1916. 7° PRO CAB 23/1/WC10: War Cabinet, 18 Dec. 1916; PRO CAB 37/161/37: Cecil to Bertie, 18 Dec. 1916; S. Kernek, ‘The British Government’s Reaction to President Wilson’s “peace note” of December 1916’, Historical Journal, 13/4 (1970), 728-30. 7 Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, 119.

36 Restitution, Reparation, Repetition German politics was the fundamental cause of German aggression and the elimination of their power was the surest way of curbing

that aggression. However, in public he did not draw the logical conclusion from his own argument, that Britain and its allies would be ready to discuss peace terms with Germany only after the overthrow of ‘the Prussian military leaders’ and their replacement by a democratic, and presumably peacefully inclined, government responsible to the German people.” In public he contended that his government was fighting for three objectives. First, they were in-

tent on defeating Germany’s bid to fasten its hegemony over Europe, and that would only be achieved when the Germans had granted full restitution of all occupied allied territory. Secondly, the Germans had to make reparations for all damage done to the allies,

and, thirdly, Germany was to remain a great power but only on certain conditions. ‘[W]e welcome their [Germany’s] development’, he emphasized, ‘as long as it was on the paths of peace.’ To

ensure this, the final setthkement had to contain guarantees that Germany would not behave in the same aggressive manner in the future.” If the War Cabinet hoped that matters might rest there, they were disappointed. Even before Lloyd George uttered his speech, the Entente governments received a request from the American President, Woodrow Wilson, that all the belligerents should make public the terms upon which they would be willing to conclude peace.'® Wilson, who had just been re-elected President, believed that the war had reached a stalemate and that the time had come for the USA to demonstrate its moral leadership by promoting a negotiated peace. It would create a new international order based on national self-determination, equal treatment for all nations,

freedom from aggression, and ‘a universal association of the nations to preserve freedom of the seas and to prevent war’.!” °8 PRO CAB 800/197: Drummond to Lloyd George, 15 Dec. 1916. ° Hansard, HC Debs., 5th ser., vol. 88, cols. 1334-7, 19 Dec. 1916; Kernek, “The British Government’s Reaction to President Wilson’s “Peace Note” of December 1916’, 732-3; L. S. Jaffe, The Decision to Disarm Germany: British Policy Towards Postwar German Disarmament, 1914-1919 (London, 1985), 6-13. 100 PRO CAB 23/1/WC13, appendix I: Note communicated by the US Ambassador, 20 Dec. 1916.

0 Quoted in D. F. Trask, “The American Presidency, National Security, and Intervention from McKinley to Wilson’, Revue internationale d’histoire militaire, 69

(1990), 301-8; A. S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies (Baltimore, Md., 1957), 3-72.

Restitution, Reparation, Repetition 37 Wilson’s high-mindedness carried with it the danger that his pronouncements sometimes failed to take sufficient account of political realities. The wording of his note, which suggested that ‘the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually identical’, hardly endeared his

proposals to the British government.'” But, because of Wilson’s prestige amongst the peoples of the Entente, because of Britain’s economic dependence upon the USA, and because intercepted American diplomatic telegrams suggested that there had been collusion between Wilson and the German government, the War Cabinet took great care in formulating their reply.’ Cecil, deputizing for Balfour who was ill, advised that it would be a mistake to tell

Wilson that they were not prepared to state their terms. Silence would encourage the ‘military party in Germany’, anger public opinion in the USA, and enrage many war-weary people in the Entente countries who would suspect that allied war aims were anything but moderate. ‘In this country any irreconcilable attitude

is apt to be unpopular. Englishmen do not mind doing violent things, but they like to persuade themselves that they are all the while models of moderation.’ The first Anglo-French conference to be attended by Lloyd George in his capacity as Prime Minister met in London on 26 December to discuss the German and American notes.’ The conference’s task was made immeasurably easier on 27 December when the Germans rejected Wilson’s mediation.'!° The Entente could now be equally curt. In their reply to Berlin they placed the

blame for the war on the Central Powers, and condemned the

German note as a crude attempt to promote war weariness amongst the allied peoples.” 102 PRO CAB 23/1/WC13, appendix I: Note communicated by the US Ambassador, 20 Dec. 1916; PRO FO 800/181/US/16/25: Bertie to Hardinge, 20 Dec. 1916; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/3/2/1: Hardinge to Lloyd George and enc., 14 Dec. 1916; Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, 253; G. R. Conyne, Woodrow Wilson: British Perspectives, 1912-192] (London, 1992), 86-90. 103 PRO CAB 23/1/WC16: War Cabinet, 21 Dec. 1916. 104 PRO CAB 23/1/WC16: Cecil, Memorandum by Lord Robert Cecil: Proposed action in regard to American note, 22 Dec. 1916. 105 D. Stevenson, French War Aims against Germany, 1914-1919 (Oxford, 1982), 45-6; id., ‘French War Aims and the American Challenge, 1914-1918’, Historical Journal, 22/4 (1979), 882. 106 Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 66. 107 Scott (ed.), Official Statements of War Aims, 28.

38 Restitution, Reparation, Repetition Their reply to Wilson was fuller and superficially more conciliatory. It was drafted by Balfour, Cecil, and two Frenchmen, Albert Thomas, the Under-Secretary for Armaments, and Paul Cambon,

the ambassador to London, accepted by the conference on 28 December, and published on 10 January 1917. It was an appeal to democratic sentiments wherever they might be found, but it also echoed many of the themes which British policy-makers had articulated in private in the summer of 1916. The Entente denied seeking ‘to encompass the extermination of the German peoples and their political disappearance’. They refrained from making any specific references to the future government of Germany, but insisted that they would not make peace until the Central Powers had evacuated all occupied allied territory and provided indemnities for the damage they had done. They argued that they sought a stable peace based upon national self-determination, which guaranteed the independence of small nations and which would include the ‘liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Roumanians and of Czecho-Slovaks from foreign |i.e. Austro-Hungarian] domination; the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the

expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire’'” and an independent Polish state under Russian suzerainty. To hide the reality of their imperial objectives in the Middle East, the British cloaked their ambitions beneath a rhetorical commitment to free the oppressed Jewish, Armenian, and Arab inhabitants of the Ottoman empire from the tyranny of Turkish rule. And, for the first time, they publicly associated themselves with Wilson’s hitherto vaguely formulated desire for a League of Nations, although they carefully insisted that such an organization could only follow a satisfactory settlement, and could not be a substitute for one. Lloyd George summarized the terms Britain sought as ‘restitution, reparation, guarantee against repetition’.!'° His government never contemplated making a negotiated peace in December 1916. After two years of fighting, it had come to power committed to continuing the war and to intensifying Britain’s efforts to secure victory.

Too many men had been killed and too much treasure had been 108 PRO CAB 28/2/IC13(d): Anglo-French conference, 28 Dec. 1916; PRO CAB 23/1/WC21: War Cabinet, 28 Dec. 1916. 10 PRO FO 371/3075/8104: Allies’ reply to President Wilson’s note, 10 Jan. 1917. 10 Hansard, HC Debs., 5th ser., vol. 88, col. 1335, 19 Dec. 1917.

Restitution, Reparation, Repetition 39 expended to allow the new administration to end the war on the basis of the status quo. If the Central Powers were left in occupation of the territory they occupied, then they would pose a permanent threat to British security. ‘No one can contemplate’, Cecil

had recently warned the previous government, ‘our future ten years after a peace on such conditions without profound misgivings.”!"! If the Entente were able to turn their wishes into reality, the Austrian and Turkish empires would disappear and Germany would lose its opportunity to establish its middle-European empire. Britain’s post-war security would be enhanced against not only its enemies but also its allies. However, the Entente would be able to turn these aims into reality only if they achieved a victory of such magnitude that they could dictate, rather than negotiate, peace. How the new British government could help its allies to achieve that goal—indeed whether it could do so—and how it might decide to modify its aims if the prospect of overwhelming victory receded, remained to be decided. 11 PRO CAB 37/160/21: Cecil, Memorandum, 27 Nov. 1916.

2

The Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy, December 1916May 1917 AFTER working with the new Prime Minister for three weeks, Robertson believed that ‘L. G. wants a victory quickly, a victory while you wait. He does not care where.’! He was correct. Lloyd George did want a victory somewhere and quickly, both to bolster

the prestige of his new government and to boost the morale of Britain and its allies. His dilemma was that in the spring of 1917 the possibility of achieving such a victory became ever more remote. Since August 1914 British strategic policy had rested on four pillars. The Royal Navy was sufficiently powerful to keep open the Entente’s maritime communications. Britain was sufficiently rich to act as paymaster to the Entente. And the French and Russian armies could fight to contain the armies of the Central Powers on the continent of Europe with only minimal direct British assistance until, Kitchener had predicted, a point would be reached in early 1917 when the armies of all of the belligerents were exhausted. Britain’s New Armies could then intervene decisively in the land war, inflict a final defeat on the Central Powers, and enable the British government to dictate the peace settlement. When he came to power, Lloyd George did not intend fundamentally to depart from Kitchener’s strategy. But between December 1916 and May 1917 each of these pillars began to crumble. The collapse of the exchange rate in New York called into question Britain’s continued

ability to act as paymaster to the Entente. The declaration of unrestricted U-boat warfare threatened the Entente’s ability to continue to control the world’s oceans. The Russian Revolution, the failure of the Nivelle offensive, and the subsequent mutinies in the French army called into doubt whether Britain’s major continental allies would be able to contain the armies of the Central ' C. a Court Repington, The First World War 1914-1918 (London, 1920), i. 420.

Collapse of Kitchener's Strategy 41 Powers for much longer. And when the British looked to their empire and their newest partner, the USA, for assistance, they discovered that the former had little more to give, and that significant assistance from the latter would not arrive until 1918 or 1919 at the earliest.

Before 1914 the British had invested huge sums of money and a great deal of national pride in the Royal Navy. When the next war came they expected that it would rapidly destroy Britain’s enemies in a second Trafalgar. They were disappointed. The numerically inferior German High Seas Fleet had no intention of encountering

the Grand Fleet until, by the use of mines, submarines, and ambushes, it had reduced the latter’s numbers. When the two fleets did meet at Jutland on 31 May 1916, the Germans avoided annihilation and inflicted greater material losses on the British than they suffered themselves. British opinion—both naval and lay—was dissatisfied by the outcome.” But what had seemed a tactical triumph for the Germans was actually a strategic defeat. Although the High

Seas Fleet sortied into the North Sea on three occasions after Jutland, in August and October 1916 and again in April 1918, it never again went in search of the Grand Fleet. British command of the surface of the oceans remained secure and the Germans were

no closer to breaking the allied naval blockade. Even so, senior officers at the Admiralty and afloat continued to fret at their in-

ability to bring the High Seas Fleet to battle and worried that Britain remained vulnerable to a direct attack from across the North Sea.? In January 1917 the Admiralty and the General Staff informed the War Cabinet that, as a German invasion was not out of the question, a force of 500,000 men was required to provide for the air defence of Great Britain and repel an invading force.* And the extent to which the Grand Fleet might be a decisive weapon was a matter of contention. In January 1917 Sir David Beatty still insisted that the Tenth Cruiser Squadron—the force which policed 2 B. McL. Ranft, ‘The Royal Navy and the War at Sea’, in J. Turner (ed.), Britain and the First World War (London, 1988), 62—3; A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, ii. Jutland and After (Oxford, 1966), 188-213. 3 PRO CAB 24/18/GT1272: Jellicoe, British naval policy, 1 July 1917.

4 PRO CAB 23/1/WC40: War Cabinet, 22 Jan. 1917; A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, v. Victory and Aftermath (January 1918—June 1919) (Oxford, 1970), 158-9.

42 Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy the blockade in the North Sea—was ‘the one unit that could win us the war, if up to the fullest strength’. But Jellicoe was sceptical. The blockade might cause the Germans great discomfort, but the war

would not be won until the German army and navy had been defeated.°®

The prohibition on trade with the Central Powers added to Britain’s already worsening overseas debt. Since 1914 Britain had acted as the banker to the Entente and by April 1917 the Treasury had advanced £684,000 to the Provisional Government in Greece, £2,000,000 to Portugal, £12,000,000 to Serbia, £12,500,000

to Rumania, £50,000,000 to Belgium, £157,000,000 to Italy, £243,000,000 to France, and £405,000,000 to Russia.’ By October

1916 two-fifths of total British spending on the war was being expended in the USA, and the British were running dangerously short of foreign exchange to meet their bills. Therefore, when on 28

November the United States’ Federal Reserve Board advised Americans not to lend any more money to the belligerents, British credit was devastated.’ If Britain could not raise sufficient funds in the USA, it would be tantamount, according to J. M. Keynes, who was shortly to become head of the Treasury division which oversaw foreign exchange, to ‘the abdication of our position as the world’s banker’.’ In the opening months of 1917 the Treasury was compelled to find money from whatever sources it could. British credit

had not entirely disappeared, but it could only be mobilized by offering very generous terms to investors. At the end of January they launched a $250,000,000 loan offering 5.5 per cent interest maturing within one to two years. Although it was quickly oversubscribed, the monies it brought in would only suffice for a little more than a month.’® Such hand-to-mouth expedients could not be con> A. Temple Patterson (ed.), The Jellicoe Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe (London, 1968), ii. 141; Beatty to wife, 30 Jan. 1917, in B. McL. Ranft (ed.), The Beatty Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty (London, 1989), 393-4. 6 Patterson (ed.), The Jellicoe Papers, ii. 143-4; A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, iv. 1917: Year of Crisis (Oxford, 1969), 40-1.

7 PRO T 172/422: Keynes, Note on the financial arrangements between the United Kingdom and the allies, 9 Apr. 1917. 8 K. M. Burk, Britain, America and the Sinews of War 1914-1918 (London, 1985), 80-6. ? PRO T 172/643: Keynes, Memorandum on the probable consequences of abandoning the gold standard, 17 Jan. 1917. 0 Burk, Britain, America and the Sinews of War, 90-2.

Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy 43 tinued indefinitely, and Britain’s finances in the USA never recovered from this crisis.

The blockade did indeed cause the Germans great discomfort, and the impotent anger which it evoked in Germany underpinned the German Admiralty’s insistence that unrestricted U-boat warfare would prove Germany’s salvation.'' On the eve of the offens-

ive, which began on 1 February, Jellicoe predicted that the Germans could sink 320,000 to 400,000 tons of merchant shipping per month. Three weeks later, the Ministry of Shipping predicted that total losses would be 200,000 tons per month in March and April, 150,000 tons in May, and 100,000 tons per month thereafter.’2 They were optimistic. Losses rose from 153,512 tons in January (of which 109,954 tons were sunk by U-boats), to 313,486 tons in February (256,394 tons from U-boats), to 353,478 tons in March (283,647 from U-boats), and 545,282 in April (516,394 tons from U-boats).’* Moreover, overall carrying capacity was reduced, as many vessels that survived attack had to be taken out of service for repair, and as large numbers of neutral merchant ships were reluctant to sail to allied ports. The British did not suffer these losses because the campaign took them by surprise, for they had ample warning of the German plans. As early as November 1916 their intelligence had detected signs that the Germans were preparing a new and more ruthless U-boat campaign which they hoped would force Britain to sue for peace within six months.'* But despite this they were sluggish

in reacting. The Admiralty’s slowness in developing effective counter-measures against the U-boat menace was due to their ‘1 A. Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford, 1989), 25-65, 361-2; M. Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916-1918 (London, 1976), 120-2; R. B. Aspery, The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct World War One (New York, 1991), 291-4; K. H. Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann-Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven, Conn., 1972), 298-302. 2 PRO CAB 1/24/3: Watson and Elderton, Position of shipping during 1917, 19 Feb. 1917. 13 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, iv. 103. The figures collected by the Admiralty War Staff differed slightly from those presented here. See e.g. the figures for Feb. 1917 given in PRO CAB 24/7/GT159: Admiralty War Staff, Trade Division, Monthly supplement: British merchant vessels captured or destroyed by the enemy, 1 Mar. 1917. 14 PRO FO 371/2939/30373: Howard to FO, 6 Feb. 1917; PRO FO 371/3078/ 32997: Rumbold to FO, 10 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 42/23/12: Hankey to War Committee, 9 Nov. 1916.

Ad Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy tardiness in recognizing the offensive potential of submarines, itself a product of the fact that the Admiralty did not possess a competent Naval Staff. Indeed, it was not until December 1916 that the Admiralty established an Anti-submarine Division, and then the new division did no more than continue the existing policies of arming merchant ships, sponsoring technical research on ways to detect and attack submerged U-boats, and trying to re-route merchant ships away from U-boats. By February 1917 a

sense of fatalism gripped both Carson and his professional advisers.» In December 1916 Britain had stocks of wheat sufficient to last for fourteen weeks. By mid-March imports of foodstuffs and stocks of food in Britain were declining to worryingly low levels. By mid-

April stocks had fallen to only nine weeks’ supply and there was every likelihood that they would dwindle further. The shipping crisis had disturbing implications for British strategic policy. The War Cabinet concealed these from the public by suppressing the

publication of reports about losses, but they could not conceal them from themselves.’* “The submarine danger is very acute, and as someone put it very tersely—it 1s a question whether the Army can win the war before the Navy loses it!’ Derby wrote to Haig on 11 February.” Since 1914 the British had assumed that command of the seas was theirs as a right. But on 27 April, as Jellicoe informed

the War Cabinet, ‘we are carrying on this war... as if we had the absolute command of the sea. We have not—and have not had for many months... or anything approaching it.’®

The third pillar of British strategy that began to crumble in the spring of 1917 was the Russian army. In November 1916 the British

and French generals had agreed that in 1917 they would repeat their strategic plan of 1916. Each of the allies would again try to mount a series of simultaneous offensives to place concerted pressure on the Central Powers, and their political masters had agreed to hold a conference with the Russians to deal with Russia’s military, 1 'T, Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott 1911-1918 (London, 1970), 259; Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, iv. 69-92; M. W. Dash, ‘British Submarine Policy, 1853-1918’, Ph.D. thesis, London, 1990, fo. 287. 1 PRO CAB 23/1/WC63 and WC64: War Cabinet, 12 and 13 Feb. 1917. 17 PRO WO 256/15: Derby to Haig, 11 Feb. 1917. '8 PRO CAB 24/12/GT611: Jellicoe, Submarine danger: Naval situation as regards, 27 Apr. 1917.

Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy 45 financial, and supply problems.” The Petrograd conference was the

last major attempt to co-ordinate Anglo-Russian strategy. Lloyd George was convinced that “The only chance of a really great success in 1917 was completely effective co-operation with Russia’,

and it was an indication of the high priority which he gave to the conference that one of his first acts as Prime Minister was to ask Milner to lead the British delegation.”” Milner was to determine whether Russia could make use of more supplies of guns, aircraft, and munitions, and whether, in exchange, the Russians would be

willing to dispatch infantry to France. Sir Henry Wilson, the mission’s military representative, was to determine the aid that Russia and Rumania needed to improve the efficiency of their armies and to reach an agreement on how to co-ordinate the common efforts of the Entente’s armies.?! That Russia and Rumania were in need of allied assistance was growing plainer by the day. The Rumanians were, according to one British officer who spent six weeks with their army in early 1917, ‘imperturbably idle. Time does not exist for them, save as to approximately fix a beginning and an end to their pleasures. These,

incidently, are of two kinds only. Pleasures of stomach, and pleasures of sex.’ The Rumanian railway system was incapable of supporting its army because railway officials were pro-German and corrupt. ‘Each and every station master in Rumania, like an auto-

matic chocolate machine, requires a penny in the slot in order to produce movement.’ The Tsarist army did not seem to be in a much better condition. In the opinion of Knox’s deputy, Lieutenant-Colonel Blair, it was inferior to its opponents in artillery and machine-guns, was supported by too few reserves, and communications behind it were so poor that it was impossible to move reinforcements from one part of the line to another in an emergency.” In the autumn and winter it suffered severe inflation 19D. R. Woodward, Lloyd George and the Generals (Newark, NJ, 1983), 122-3; PRO CAB 23/1: Note by the secretary of the War Committee on the results of the Paris Conference, 15-16 Nov. 1916.

2 PRO CAB 28/2/IC13(d): Anglo-French conference, 28 Dec. 1916; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/1: Hankey diary, 10 Dec. 1916. 21 K. Neilson, Strategy and Supply: The Anglo-Russian Alliance, 1914-1917 (London, 1984), 226-8; PRO CAB 37/162/15: The Russian mission: Instructions for General Sir Henry Wilson, 26 Dec. 1916. 22 PRO CAB 24/10/GT406: Maj. J. F. Neilson, Report on the general situation in Rumania, 24 Feb. 1917. 3 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/59/1/2: Blair to Buchanan, 13 Dec. 1916.

46 Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy and food shortages, and a collapse in morale which was worse than

that which it had experienced during the retreat from Poland in 1915.4

Reports reaching London pointed to a growing crisis of legitimacy facing the Tsarist regime, combined with increasing criticisms of Britain for doing too little to help its ally.” In November the British consul in Moscow reported that many Russians felt that too much was asked of them by the British: ‘that Russia is fighting

this war to pull English chestnuts out of the fire, that Russia has made the greatest sacrifices, whereas England will reap the greatest

reward....It 1s further pointed out that England gives money while Russia gives men.’ British observers of Russian politics looked with growing apprehension as pro-British ministers were steadily replaced by reactionary colleagues who might, they feared,

be sympathetic towards German inducements to make a separate peace.”’ Defeatism was rumoured to have reached the highest pinnacles of the Russian state. The Tsarina, a German princess, was reported to be anxious to take Russia out of the war and to be the protectress of politicians who thought likewise.” In the face of such reports, it took a great deal of wishful thinking, coupled with a knowledge of just how dependent British policy was upon the Tsarist army, to assume that Russia would not soon

undergo a great crisis which would weaken its war effort. Most British observers managed it. By late January Robertson was almost alone in thinking that a revolution was imminent in Russia. But most British observers believed either that there would be no revolution until after Russia had been victorious, or that even if there was a palace coup to rid the country of the Tsar and his wife, 44 A. K. Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army: The Old Army and the Soldiers’ Revolt (March-April 1917) (Princeton, NJ, 1980), passim. 25 PRO FO 800/196/57: Howard to Cecil, 12 Dec. 1916. 26 PRO CAB 37/160/2: Buchanan to Grey and enc., 7 Nov. 1916. 27 G. Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and other Diplomatic Memories (London, 1923), 1. 3, 15-25; H. H. Waters, Secret and Confidential: The Experiences of a Military Attaché (London, 1926), 360; PRO FO 371/2746/21068: Buchanan to FO, 2 Feb. 1916; PRO FO 371/2746/23490: Buchanan to FO, 6 Feb. 1916; PRO FO 371/ 2746/143483: Buchanan to Grey, 23 July 1916; PRO FO 371/2746/145612: Buchanan to Grey, 25 July 1916; PRO FO 371/2746/19624: Buchanan to FO, 29 Sept. 1916; PRO FO 371/2746/197548: Sir E. Howard to FO, 3 Oct. 1916; PRO FO 800/75: Buchanan to Grey, 4 Aug. 1916; PRO CAB 37/155/4: Buchanan to Grey and enc., 8 Sept. 1916; PRO FO 800/383: Clerk to Russell, 30 Jan. 1917. 28 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/59/1/1: Buchanan to Hardinge, 5 Dec. 1916.

Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy 47 it would not diminish the commitment of the Russian people to see the war through to a successful conclusion.” Milner’s mission ar-

rived in Russia on 25 January, and two weeks later he reported confidently that ‘I think there can be no doubt of Emperor, Army or people to fight to a finish’.°° There was perhaps some excuse for

observers new to Russia to look at what they saw through rosetinted spectacles. There was less reason for those who were long acquainted with the country to agree with them. And yet Knox reported to the War Office on 22 January, in a letter which mixed complacency and bloodthirstiness, that all that was required to overcome ‘the disorganization in the interior [which] is crippling the army’ was for the King to write a personal letter to the Tsar urging him to appoint a government with the confidence of the people. “The mass of the people’, he insisted, ‘are with us and they

hate the Hun as we do. We only require a dictator who would choose a strong ministry and do a little hanging.”*! The need for a militarily strong Russia blinded the great majority of British observers to the realities of Russia’s crisis.

The final plenary session of the conference was held on 20 February. When the British mission reported to the War Cabinet on 6 March they were divided about the military prospects on the

eastern front but united in their understanding of the political situation inside Russia.** Paradoxically the civilians had a more realistic appreciation of Russia’s military situation than had the soldiers, although both were overly sanguine.** All members of the mission had seen serious signs of political unrest in the country and

had been startled by the quite open way in which both senior officers and professed opponents of the regime talked of the need to remove the Tsar and his wife. But they agreed with Milner that a revolution was not imminent, that if it did come it would not be 22 PRO FO 800/383: Drummond, Memorandum, 17 Jan. 1917; IWM, Wilson MSS microfilm reel VII: Wilson diary, 18 Jan. 1917; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F59/1/9: Buchanan to Hardinge, 8 Feb. 1917. 30 PRO FO 371/3078/30457: Milner to FO and Lloyd George, 7 Feb. 1917. 31 PRO WO 106/5128: Knox to Buckley, 22 Jan. 1917. 32 PRO CAB 23/2/WC88: War Cabinet, 6 Mar. 1917. 33 PRO CAB 28/2/IC16(d): Milner, Allied conference at Petrograd, Jan.—Feb. 1917: Further confidential report by Lord Milner, 13 Mar. 1917; IWM, Wilson MSS microfilm reel VII: Wilson diary, 5, 12, and 18 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 24/8/GT225: Knox, Reorganization of the Russian forces, 20 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 28/2/IC16(e): Report by Lt.-Gen. Sir H. Wilson, 13 Mar. 1917.

48 Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy until after the war had been won, and that even if the Tsar were assassinated ‘it will not make for a separate peace’.* Their most pressing fear was that simple administrative incompetence would vitiate Russia’s war effort by allowing the country to sink into anarchy.*

Hardly a week after Milner and his colleagues presented their resolutely optimistic report to the War Cabinet, the revolution which they had predicted would not happen until after the war took

place. It did not take the form of a palace coup, but of a spontaneous popular rising in Petrograd accompanied by a mutiny in the city’s garrison. By 16 March the tsarist regime had collapsed,

and its authority had passed to a new Provisional Government, which was recognized by the War Cabinet.°° The question which

now obsessed the British was what would be the impact of the revolution on Russia’s ability to wage war, but it was a difficult question for them to answer. The Liberal leaders of the Provisional Government pledged that Russia would continue the war, but even

they overestimated the enthusiasm of the Russian peasants and workers to do so. Reports prepared by the Russian police and secret service showed that since the autumn of 1916 most ordinary

Russians had believed that the war could not be won and that Russia should make peace.

Reports from Russia mirrored the confusion into which the revolution had flung the country and its armed forces. Under the new regime military discipline collapsed. Hanbury Williams reported growing division emerging between many senior generals who had declared their intention of continuing to prosecute the war, and ordinary soldiers in Petrograd and elsewhere who were far less willing to follow their lead.*’ On 18 and 19 March Knox asked a number of members of the Provisional Government for their opinion of Russia’s ability and will to continue the war. Each gave him a different answer. Knox’s own observations convinced 4 TWM, Wilson MSS microfilm reel VII: Wilson diary, 5, 12, and 18 Feb. 1917.

3 PRO CAB 28/2/IC16(g): Report to Lord Milner by Mr G. R. Clerk, 1 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 28/2/IC16(d): Milner, Allied conference at Petrograd, Jan.—Feb. 1917. Further confidential report by Lord Milner, 13 Mar. 1917. 36 R. Pearson, The Russian Moderates and the Crisis of Tsarism 1914-1917 (London, 1977), 140-73; PRO CAB 23/2/WC98: War Cabinet, 16 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 24/8/GT190: Hanbury Williams to Robertson, 16 Mar. 1917. 37 PRO CAB 24/7/GT177: Hanbury Williams to Robertson, 15 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC98: War Cabinet, 16 Mar. 1917.

Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy 49 him that at the front, as opposed to behind the lines, ‘the spirits of officers and men are good, but the continual sitting passive affects them and they would be improved by active operations’ .* Having been taken so much by surprise by the revolution, policy-

makers in London lacked an adequate frame of reference with which to understand what was happening in Russia. Milner and Wilson were comforted by reports that the Duma and the army

were at one in wishing to continue the war.’ Lloyd George welcomed the apparent flowering of Russian liberalism, telegraphing to the new Russian Premier, Prince Lvov, that ‘I do not doubt

that as a result of the establishment of a stable Constitutional Government within their borders the Russian people will be strengthened in their resolve to prosecute this War until the last stronghold of tyranny on the Continent of Europe is destroyed...’.“° But, beset by so many contradictory reports, Lloyd George was thrown back upon an inappropriate historical analogy to understand what was happening. He was apprehensive about the possible impact of the revolution on Russia’s ability to continue fighting, but hoped that Russia might emulate the French revolutionaries of 1793-4. After a few months of chaos, he looked for ‘a military revival through which the country becomes a greater

military power than ever, as happened in France during her Revolution’.*! Others, like Robertson, were more pessimistic, and they were soon proven correct.* On 26 March the new Russian Commander-in-Chief, General Alexiev, informed Russia’s allies that the morale and discipline of his army had collapsed so badly that they would not be able to mount any offensive before June or July. By doing so, he ended any possibility that the allies would

be able to carry out the plan for a series of concerted allied 33 PRO CAB 24/8/GT279: Knox to DMI, 22 Mar. 1917; PRO FO 371/2995/ 63082: Knox to DMI, 24 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 24/11/GT524: Neilson to WO, 31 Mar. 1917. »? TWM, Wilson MSS microfilm reel VII: Wilson diary, 16 Mar. 1917.

” D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs (London, 1938), ii. 971. 4t PRO CAB 23/43/IWCI15: Imperial War Cabinet, 11 June 1918; Lord Riddell, Lord Riddell’s War Diary 1914-1918 (London, 1933), 245; K. Neilson, ‘Wishful Thinking: The Foreign Office and Russia, 1907-1917’, in B. J. C. McKercher and D. J. Moss (eds.), Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy 1895-1935: Memorial Essays Honouring C. J. Lowe (Edmonton, Alb., 1984), 169-70. * Neilson, Strategy and Supply, 252; Repington, The First World War, i. 489; PRO CAB 24/8/GT229: General Staff, WO, A general review of the situation in all theatres of war, 20 Mar. 1917.

SO Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy offensives which the British and French had prepared in November 1916.*

The next pillar of Kitchener’s strategy which began to crumble in

the spring of 1917 was the French army. In November 1916, although the British and French governments had endorsed the intentions of their generals, it soon transpired that the generals themselves could not agree upon either the timing or the location

of their projected western front offensive. General Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, fearful that the Germans might strike first as they had done at Verdun in February 1916, pressed

for an early start to forestall them. He wanted the French and British armies to mount two simultaneous attacks, the British oper-

ating between Bapaume and Vimy and the French between the rivers Somme and Oise. Two weeks after the beginning of these assaults the French would mount a second offensive on the river Aisne.“ For the sake of inter-allied harmony, Haig agreed, even though he would have preferred to wait until May before attacking, and to have mounted the British offensive in Flanders.*® He had been toying with such an offensive since he took command of the BEF in December 1915. The impetus to revive it now came from the Admiralty who, on 16 November, informed the War Com-

mittee that the navy lacked sufficient light craft to protect the British merchant fleet from U-boat attacks and pressed the government to mount land operations in the spring of 1917 to capture the U-boat bases on the Belgian coast.*° The War Committee took the

warning to heart, and on 21 November insisted that ‘there is no operation of war to which the War Committee would attach greater

importance than the successful occupation, or at least the depri4 PRO CAB 24/9/GT311: Hanbury Williams to Robertson, 26 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC107: War Cabinet, 28 Mar. 1917. 4 W. J. Philpott, ‘British Military Strategy on the Western Front: Independence or Alliance, 1904-1918’, D.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1991, fos. 343—4. 45 LHCMA, Kiggell MSS VI/2: Kiggell, Conference at Chantilly, Nov. 1916 [n.d., but c.12 Oct. 1919]; NLS, Haig MSS Acc. 3155/109: Haig, Date of beginning offensive in 1917: For Chantilly Conference, Nov. 1916, 13 Nov. 1916; NLS, Haig MSS Acc. 3155/109: Kiggell to army commanders, 18 Nov. 1916; NLS, Haig MSS Acc. 3155/109: Kiggell, Record of army commanders’ conference held at Third Army headquarters on Saturday, 18 Nov. 1916. 4© PRO CAB 42/24/9: Jackson and Oliver, Combined strategy in connection with submarines: Note by the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Admiralty War Staff, 16 Nov. 1916.

Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy 51 vation to the enemy, of Ostend and especially Zeebrugge’.*’ Robertson asked Joffre to include a British offensive in Flanders in

the allied plan of campaign for 1917, and on 10 December he agreed.*® Haig and Robertson’s determination to carry out this offensive was at the centre of civil—military conflict in Britain in the winter of 1916 and the spring and summer of 1917. But within a few days this unanimity collapsed. In Britain Lloyd

George’s accession to the premiership called into question the degree of political support Haig could expect for an offensive which might bring with it the same appalling human cost as the Somme. In France Joffre’s replacement by General Robert Nivelle

on 13 December called into question the commitment of the French high command to a plan which promised to be of more direct strategic benefit to Britain than to France.” Joffre’s supersession also had wider implications for the Entente, for it removed the one soldier on the western front with the prestige to act as an unofficial co-ordinator of the allied armies. The result was

that throughout most of 1917 there was even less co-ordination amongst the allies’ armies in the west than there had been in 1914— 16.°°

Robertson tried to impress on the Prime Minister why both political and logistical considerations demanded that the British should concentrate all possible forces on the western front in the spring of 1917, insisting that as it was ‘absolutely true to say that only by beating Germans shall we win. We must therefore put our men and munitions where they can be used against Germans ...’, and arguing that by concentrating their efforts on the western front they would minimize the submarine threat.’ But Lloyd George

remained adamant that the Germans could not be defeated in France in 1917, insisting that ‘although he recognized the West as the principal theatre, he “could not believe that it was possible to 47 PRO CAB 42/24/10: [Hankey] to Robertson, 22 Nov. 1916; PRO CAB 42/24/ 13: Minutes of the War Committee, 20 Nov. 1916. 4 PRO WO 158/22: Précis of meeting held in CIGS room, 23 Nov. 1916; Philpott, ‘British Military Strategy on the Western Front’, fos. 345-6; R. Blake (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1918 (London, 1952), 184; LHCMA, Kiggell MSS II/8: Haig to Kiggell, 10 Dec. 1916.

D. Dutton, ‘The Fall of General Joffre: An Episode in the Politico-military Struggle in Wartime France’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 1/3 (1978), 338-51. °° B. Bond, ‘Soldiers and Statesmen: British Civil—Military Relations in 1917’, Military Affairs, 32/2 (1968), 63. >t LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/19/9: Robertson to Lloyd George, 8 Dec. 1916.

52 Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy beat the German Armies there—at any rate, not next year”’.* But if Germany could not be defeated in 1917, he was determined both

to weaken it and to obstruct its drive to create a great middleEuropean empire. Like many British policy-makers in late 1916, Lloyd George favoured the maintenance of the Austro-Hungarian empire as a barrier to a German Drang nach dem Osten, but it had to be an Austro-Hungarian empire which had broken decisively

with Germany. His attention was drawn to the Italian front by Hankey, who suggested transferring heavy guns from France to support an Italian offensive to take Pola, and by Delmé-Radcliffe, who suggested the Italians would welcome such help. A successful

Italian offensive would reap handsome strategic benefits for Britain at minimal cost, at least in British lives. “Germany .. . is formidable’, he suggested, ‘so long as she can command an unbroken Austria, but if Austria is beaten Germany will be beaten too.’ Germans could be killed as easily on the Italian front as they could in France and Flanders, with the added advantage from the British point of view that Italian, rather than British, infantry would die in the process.” At the beginning of January 1917 Lloyd George travelled to the next inter-allied conference at Rome in high hopes that the French

and Italians would welcome his suggestion for a powerful concerted attack against Austria-Hungary on the Isonzo front with the objective of gaining Trieste and the Istrian peninsula. The Italians

would support it because it promised them so much; the French would do so both because it would relieve pressure on Russia and Salonika and because he was not asking the western front generals to cancel their offensive in the west, merely to delay it until the time

was more favourable. But he was wrong. General Cadorna, the chief of staff of the Italian army, feared that, while his troops attacked, the western allies would remain inactive and the Central Powers would be able to concentrate all their reserves against him. That was an unappealing prospect. By November 1916 the Italian army had tried and failed nine times to break through on the Isonzo

front in an attempt to reach the Lubljana plain and to march on Vienna. Since the start of the war they had lost over 600,000 men, 2 Blake (ed.), Haig, 186. °3 PRO CAB 42/19/2: Hankey to Lloyd George, 8 Dec. 1916. 4 PRO CAB 28/2/IC15(a): Lloyd George, Memorandum circulated by the Prime Minister to the delegates, 5 Jan. 1917.

Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy 53 and their morale was understandably low.*> Robertson played cleverly on Cadorna’s fears by impressing on him that the guns Lloyd

George proposed to lend to Italy would have to be returned to France by May, just when the snows were melting in northern Italy and when the Central Powers would be able to mount a counteroffensive in the Trentino.°°

His Italian option stymied, Lloyd George was predisposed to look elsewhere for a plan which promised to achieve spectacular results at minimal cost to the British army. Nivelle held out just such a promise. As soon as he became Commander-in-Chief he began to recast the plans to which Haig and Joffre had tentatively agreed. Claiming that he had discovered the secret of breaching the German line within one or two days by using massive artillery bombardments, he expanded Joffre’s plan for an Anglo-French offensive between the Oise and Vimy and wanted to switch the main offensive front to the Aisne. The Anglo-French offensive in the north was to be a holding operation designed to draw in German reserves so that the twenty-seven divisions of the Armées de Rupture could break through the German front on Aisne. To free the French divisions required to form this force, Nivelle wanted Haig to extend his front to Roye, using eight divisions which were to be in place by 15 January.’ It is easy to understand why Nivelle’s

promise that he had found a means to win the war in the west quickly and cheaply appealed so much to the French Premier, Aristide Briand, and his colleagues. At the end of November Briand’s government responded to the Hindenburg programme by beginning the call-up of the 1918 class of conscripts. The Chamber approved this policy, but insisted on going into a secret session to give vent to their feelings ‘that France is bearing more than her fair share of the war, and that her allies should be called upon to make °> PRO CAB 37/162/24: Extract from private letter from George Trevelyan, circulated to War Cabinet, 28 Dec. 1916; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS E/3/17/1: Rodd to Hardinge, 30 Sept. 1916; PRO CAB 37/159/23: Rodd to Grey, 9 Nov. 1916. °° CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/2: Hankey diary, 5 Jan. 1917; IWM, Wilson MSS microfilm reel VII, Disc/Misc/80: Sir H. Wilson diary, 8 Jan. 1917; PRO CAB 28/2/ IC15(b): Secretary’s notes of allied conferences held at the Consulta, Rome, 5—7

Jan. 1917; J. E. Edmonds and H. R. Davies, History of the Great War: Military Operations, Italy 1915-1919 (London, 1949), 25-6. >? Philpott, ‘British Military Strategy on the Western Front’, fos. 348-9; E. L. Spears, Prelude to Victory (London, 1940), 40--3; A. Clayton, ‘Robert Nivelle and the French Spring Offensive, 1917’, in B. Bond (ed.), Fallen Stars: Eleven Studies of Twentieth-century Military Disasters (London, 1991), 54-6.

54 Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy greater Sacrifices in the common cause’.** Their concern was under-

standable, for France’s manpower reserves were running out. By 20 December the French government had approved Nivelle’s plan in principle and the general had presented it to Haig. Haig was not entirely happy with this change of plan. In mid-1916 Joffre had

intimated that, because of the growing weakness of the French army, the BEF would have to bear the brunt of the allied offensive on the western front in 1917.° That had suited Haig because it left him free to attack in Flanders, but Nivelle’s plan threatened to rob him of the troops he needed for a sustained offensive and to rel-

egate the BEF to conducting a mere subsidiary offensive. But Nivelle reassured Haig that, if his offensive succeeded, the Flanders coast would fall into allied hands in any case, as the Germans would

undertake a general retreat. If it failed the BEF could attack in Flanders later in the year when the weather was more suitable, and he promised that French troops would take over more of the line to relieve the British for this offensive.” ‘When we look back on the G.Q.G. proposals of last year, this seems highly satisfactory’, Haig wrote. Before the two Commanders-in-Chief met the War Cabi-

net on 15 January, they had agreed that Haig would launch a preliminary offensive to draw in German reserves, and that the French army would mount the main breakthrough offensive. The War Cabinet were equally acquiescent, which was just as

well, because they were under considerable pressure from the French government to co-operate. On 26 December the French Finance Minister, Alexander Ribot, hinted that a refusal would have adverse political repercussions for the alliance, for “There was

a serious feeling in France, which had shown itself markedly in the recent secret sessions, that the efforts of the two countries were

not equal.’ Nivelle’s charm and eloquence—he spoke fluent English—helped, because he ‘made a very favourable impression on the War Cabinet ...’. Lloyd George was not completely con8 PRO FO 371/2677/237074: Bertie to Grey, 22 Nov. 1916. » Repington, The First World War, 1. 402. 6° Blake (ed.), Haig, 187-91; Woodward, Lloyd George and the Generals, 137; Philpott, ‘British Military Strategy on the Western Front’, fos. 349-50; PRO CAB 23/1/WC34: War Cabinet, 15 Jan. 1917. 6! LHCMA, Kiggell MSS II/9: Haig to Kiggell, 18 Jan. 1917; Blake (ed.), Haig,

a PRO CAB 28/2/IC13(a): Anglo-French conference, 26 Dec. 1916. 6 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/1: Hankey diary, 15 Jan. 1917.

Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy 55 vinced that Nivelle had indeed found the key to swift and certain

victory, telling his cabinet colleagues that ‘for his part he was inclined to take Field-Marshal Haig’s rather temperate view as to

its prospects’. But three things predisposed him to accept Nivelle’s plan. Although the Prime Minister had told Haig that the

British people would not stand a repetition of the losses that the BEF had suffered on the Somme, as Nivelle intended to allocate only a subsidiary role to Haig’s troops, British casualties would be minimized.© Secondly, he welcomed the prospect of an early end to the war because he doubted ‘whether the French would be willing to go through another winter of war, and this made it very important to try and settle the business this year’.© And finally, the plan left plenty of scope to try something different later in the year if it failed.°’

On 16 January the War Cabinet agreed that the offensive should

begin no later than 1 April. Haig still wanted to postpone the offensive until May, by which time the weather on the Russian and

Italian fronts would enable the allies to assist the French and British armies, but the War Cabinet grew impatient with him when

he claimed that the poor state of the French railways made it impossible for him to hasten his preparations.” Lloyd George can have been in no doubt about the reality of the transportation crisis in France, for it was confirmed to him by Sir Eric Geddes, the man he had himself chosen in September 1916 to control the railways supporting the BEF. But that did not prevent the Prime Minister

from suspecting that Haig was using the transport crisis as an excuse to delay the opening of the offensive. The only way he could

see to overcome Haig’s apparent prevarication was to place him directly under Nivelle’s command.” This was the start of a con64 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/103, WC 35A: Minutes of War Cabinet, 16 Jan.

ws A. J. P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George: A Diary by Frances Stevenson (London, 1971), 138; Blake (ed.), Haig, 192. 6° HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/103, WC 35A: Minutes of War Cabinet, 16 Jan.

e Blake (ed.), Haig, 193. 6 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/1: Hankey diary, 16 Jan. 1917. 6° LHCMA, Robertson MSS I/23/2: Haig to Robertson, 22 Jan. 1917. Blake (ed.), Haig, 194; PRO CAB 23/1/WC36: War Cabinet, 17 Jan. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/1: Hankey diary, 17 Jan. 1917. ® PRO CAB 23/1/WCS59: Geddes, Railways in France, 8 Feb. 1917; Spears, Prelude, 546.

56 Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy spiracy between Lloyd George, Nivelle, and the French government on the one hand and Haig and Robertson on the other, which was to sour relations between Lloyd George and his senior military commanders for the rest of the war.

On 16 February Haig and Nivelle had agreed to postpone the start of the offensive until Haig’s transport needs had been met, but four days later the War Cabinet still decided to hold a conference with the French, not only to discuss the railway crisis but to sign an agreement binding the two governments to co-operate during the forthcoming operations.’' On 24 February, in the absence of Derby and Robertson, they authorized Lloyd George to work with Briand to resolve any differences and to promote unity of command in the preparatory stages and during the conduct of the offensive. These decisions were taken on the grounds that: ‘Haig is the best man we

have, but that is not saying much and that, as between Haig & Nivelle, LI. G. should support the latter.’ The offensive was to be

the allies’ supreme effort on the western front, and, as French numbers and morale were both declining, it was vital to leave them

no excuse for arguing that any failures were due to the British.” But at the Calais conference Lloyd George far exceeded his brief. He presented Haig and Robertson with a plan, suggested by the French, which fell only a little way short of amalgamating the two armies, and which placed Haig under French command.” The British soldiers were furious, believing that Lloyd George had lost sight of the primary purpose of the war, to further British national interests. As Haig’s chief of staff, Sir Lancelot Kiggell, wrote, it would place the BEF ‘at the disposal of men ardently desiring glory and profit for France combined with economy of French soldiers’ lives’. Both Haig and Robertson were ready to resign if the Prime

Minister insisted on having his own way, and a bitter argument ensued during which the Prime Minister asserted that the War Cabinet had given him full authority to take this decision and ‘was 1 PRO CAB 23/1/WC67 and WC75: War Cabinet, 15 and 20 Feb. 1917; Blake (ed.), Haig, 195-6. 2 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/1: Hankey diary, 24 Feb. 1917. ® PRO CAB 23/1/WC79: War Cabinet, 24 Feb. 1917; Woodward, Lloyd George and the Generals, 146-7. ™ PRO CAB 28/2/IC17(b): Projet d’organisation de 'unité de commandement sur le front occidental, 26 Feb. 1917. ® LHCMA, Kiggell MSS VI/2/3: Kiggell, Notes, n.d.

Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy 57 extraordinarily brutal to Haig’ and ‘treated him with a good deal of contumely’.’”° But the Prime Minister had exaggerated the strength

of his position. Although the Unionists might be ready to place Haig under Nivelle for the forthcoming offensive, they were not willing to hand the BEF over to the French lock, stock, and barrel. The next morning Hankey produced an acceptable compromise formula which subordinated Haig to Nivelle only until the end of the offensive, and gave Haig the right of appeal to the War Cabinet if he believed that Nivelle’s instructions endangered the safety of his army or the chances of allied success.”

The main result of the Calais conference was to put back the cause of a unified command on the western front for many months. The War Cabinet accepted the Calais agreement on 28 February, but the whole episode prejudiced Haig and Robertson against any further attempts by the Prime Minister to promote ‘unity of command’ and left Robertson anxious to avoid any further allied conferences for: “They always lead to evil.’”’ Lloyd George’s evasions

before the War Cabinet on his return caused Robertson to label him ‘an awful liar’. At Derby’s insistence ministers delivered a rebuke to the Prime Minister by sending Haig a letter expressing their confidence in him.” More immediately, Hankey’s formula produced the worst of both worlds. It left Nivelle with temporary command of both the British and French armies but responsible only to his own government.

The War Cabinet’s fear that if Britain and France did not act early in 1917 the Germans might steal a march on them as they had done in February 1916 when they mounted the Verdun offensive was justified, although not in the way they expected. By the beginning of December 1916 the DMI was convinced that the Germans would remain in their present positions on the western and eastern fronts until May 1917, when they might resume their advance on

Petrograd. In the meantime, they would rely on their U-boats to 7% CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/1: Hankey diary, 26 Feb. 1917. 7” PRO CAB 24/6/GT66: Agreement signed at Anglo-French conference held at Calais, 26 and 27 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 28/2/IC17(b): Notes of an Anglo-French conference, 27 Feb. 1917. 78 LHCMA, Robertson MSS I/23/8: Robertson to Haig, 28 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 23/1/WC82: War Cabinet, 28 Feb. 1917; Blake (ed.), Haig, 202; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/1: Hankey diary, 27 Feb. 1917. ?™ PRO WO 256/15: Robertson to Haig, 28 Feb. 1917.

58 Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy win the war and might launch offensives in either Macedonia or northern Italy.®° But OHL did not intend to remain in their present

positions in the west. Instead, in an attempt to disrupt the allies’ spring offensive and to economize their own manpower, on 4 February they reluctantly sanctioned a voluntary withdrawal to the position that the allies called the Hindenburg line, thus shortening their line by twenty-five miles.*'! The Germans disguised their intention to withdraw with a highly successful deception campaign. They

played on British fears for the security of the Channel ports by spreading rumours that they were about to attack them.” So successful were the Germans in concealing their intentions, that as late as 23 February Robertson told the War Cabinet that the Germans would not voluntarily shorten their line in the west unless the allies compelled them to do so. Two days later the first indications that they were indeed making a voluntary withdrawal reached GHQ.®

The German retreat transformed the prospects for the Nivelle offensive. Haig and the General Staff in London now feared that once the BEF had been committed to the Nivelle offensive the Germans would use the reserve of divisions they had amassed, variously estimated at between twelve and twenty, to attack Ypres and cut the BEF’s communications with the Channel coast. It was this danger, at least as much as the genuine irritation which he felt at the ‘very commanding tone’ which Nivelle now adopted towards him, which caused Haig to complain to the War Cabinet about the

implementation of the Calais agreement.* His complaints fell on receptive ears in London. The only senior Unionist who was pre89 PRO WO 106/1511: Memo by MI, German plans for the winter of 1916/17 [n.d., but c.1 Dec. 1916]. 81 FE. Ludendorff, My War Memoirs, 1914-1918 (London, 1919), i. 305-8; G. C.

Wynne, If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West (London, 1940), 133-4.

8 J. Charteris, At GHQ (London, 1931), 189-90; PRO CAB 23/1/WC32: War Cabinet, 11 Jan. 1917; PRO CAB 23/1/WC22: War Cabinet, 29 Dec. 1916; PRO FO 371/3078/10449: Sir F. Villiers to FO, 13 Jan. 1917; PRO FO 371/3078/11943 and 16412: Rumbold to FO, 15 and 20 Jan. 1917; PRO FO 371/3078/27817: Paget to FO, 4 Feb. 1917; PRO FO 371/3078/28677 and 28801: Rumbold to FO, 5 Feb. 1917; C. Falls, History of the Great War: Military Operations France and Belgium, 1917—The

German Retreat to the Hindenburg Line and the Battle of Arras (London, 1940), 88-9; H. A. Jones, The War in the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force (Oxford, 1931), iti. 305. 83 Charteris, At GHQ, 197; PRO CAB 24/6/GT49: Robertson, Germany’s intentions, 23 Feb. 1917.

8! PRO CAB 24/8/GT229: Robertson, A general review of the situation in all theatres of war, 20 Mar. 1917; PRO WO 256/15: Haig diary, 28 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB

Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy 59 pared to accept the agreement was Bonar Law. Balfour described it as ‘probably contrary to the general spirit of its [Britain’s] inhabitants’ and the nationalistic passions it aroused rallied Cecil, Long, Derby, Milner, Curzon, Chamberlain, and Carson to the soldiers’ support.®

Milner and Derby suspected that the agreement was part of an attempt by Lloyd George to engineer Haig’s removal, and by early March Nivelle had become so disgruntled with Haig’s reluctance to fall in with his wishes that the French government insisted that the War Cabinet order him to do so. Nivelle, in fact, wrote secretly to Lloyd George, asking him to sack Haig and replace him with Sir Hubert Gough, the commander of the Fifth Army.®® But Lloyd George hesitated, for, as Hankey reminded him, Haig still had the confidence of a majority of War Cabinet ministers, and if he were

dismissed the government would fall. Asquith would be able to rally enough of his own followers, plus the Irish Nationalists, and enough Tories to topple the government.®’ Any lingering doubts that Lloyd George might have entertained were crushed when the War Cabinet insisted on another Anglo-French conference, and demanded that Lloyd George demonstrate that Haig had their full confidence.** Lloyd George had no option other than to tell the French that the British would not permit the BEF to be amalgamated with the French army. In the meantime Haig and Nivelle

had succeeded in reaching an agreement about the operational conduct of the offensive.°*’ 24/1/GT98: Haig to CIGS, 3 Mar. 1917; LHCMA, Kiggell MSS II/10: Haig to Kiggell, 6 Mar. 1917; Bodleian Library, Milner MSS dep. 23/1: Thornton diary, 4 and 5 Mar. 1917.

85 LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (19) 27/1: Derby to Davies, 11 Mar. 1917; C. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries (London, 1927), i. 324; PRO CAB 24/6/GT93: Robertson, Note by the CIGS on the Calais agreement, 2 Mar. 1917; LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (19) 27/1: Derby to Lloyd George, 6 Mar. 1917.

8° Woodward, Lloyd George and the Generals, 151; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/3/2/14: Communicated by the French embassy, 7 Mar. 1917. 87 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/1: Hankey diary, 2 Mar. 1917. Blake (ed.), Haig, 207-8; LHCMA, Robertson MSS [/23/11: Robertson to Haig, 6 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 63/19: Hankey to Lloyd George, 7 Mar. 1917. 88 PRO CAB 23/2/WC91 and WC92: War Cabinet, 8 and 9 Mar. 1917; LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/23/12: Robertson to Haig, 8 Mar. 1917; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/23/1/4: Balfour to Cambon, 9 Mar. 1917. 8 PRO CAB 28/2/IC18 and 18(a): Notes of an Anglo-French conference, 12-13 Mar. 1917; Blake (ed.), Haig, 209-11; LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (19) 27/1: Derby to Davies, 11 Mar 1917.

60 Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy But the mutual confidence that is needed between soldiers and politicians was not only lacking in Britain; it was also difficult to find it in France. Even before Alexiev’s telegram of 26 March intimating that the Russians would not be able to attack simultaneously with their western allies had been received, some voices were being raised in France against Nivelle’s plan. Most notable amongst them was that of General Philippe Pétain, commander of one of the three French Army Groups. Pétain believed that the German defences were so powerful that it would be foolish to hurl France’s armies against them, especially as the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg line not only left them with greater reserves but also meant that part of Nivelle’s offensive would fall on fresh air.” In late March Pétain had the opportunity to air his criticisms, for on

19 March Briand, Nivelle’s most powerful supporter, fell from power and was replaced as premier by Ribot. The new War Minister, Paul Painlévé, shared Pétain’s doubts, and after Painlévé had

consulted several of Nivelle’s senior subordinates, the French President, Poincaré, summoned a conference on 6 April, of Nivelle

and his Army Group commanders to settle the issue. But, confronted by their Commander-in-Chief, all but Pétain swallowed their doubts and the government agreed to permit Nivelle to proceed.”!

They would have done well to take counsel of their fears. The

Anglo-French offensive began on 9 April when the Canadian Corps stormed Vimy ridge in one of the most successful assaults so

far mounted by the British army on the western front.” It marked the start of the battle of Arras, an operation intended to absorb a large part of the German army’s reserves in the west so that the French army could rapidly break through the German line. But when the French offensive, mounted by the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Armies, began on 16 April, it quickly revealed the hollowness of Nivelle’s promises: within a few days the French had lost about 100,000 men. It was, as Haig noted, ‘a pity that Nivelle was so very

optimistic as regards breaking the enemy’s line’.” It was a pity because the resulting disappointment caused the morale of a large * PRO FO 800/169/FR/17/21: Bertie to Hardinge, 4 Mar. 1917. "1 LHCMA, Spears MSS 1/8: Spears to Kiggell, 6 Apr. 1917. Spears, Prelude, 3-80. oO i Williams, Byng of Vimy: General and Governor General (London, 1983), 140-72; B. Gardner, Allenby (London, 1965), 97-108. ° Blake (ed.), Haig, 218.

Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy 61 part of the French army to collapse. Between 20 May and 10 June nearly half the divisions of the French army on the western front were swept by protests, disturbances, and mutinies. Discontent over inadequate leave, poor food, and uncomfortable rest camps crystallized following the disappointment caused by Nivelle’s failure. Most of the protestors were willing to return to the trenches to resist German attacks, but they refused to take part in further futile French attacks.” The unrest was eventually brought under control, but the demoralization of such a large part of the French army was a reflection of

a much wider crisis in French society in the summer of 1917. Nivelle’s failure had major implications for Lloyd George and for British strategy. It meant that Lloyd George’s hopes of a moraleboosting victory in France had been dashed. It also meant that the next time Lloyd George quarrelled with Haig and Robertson about military strategy his views would be at a discount because he had supported such an obvious loser. But perhaps of even greater sig-

nificance was the fact that, shortly before the offensive, Albert Thomas, the French Under-Secretary for Armaments, had warned Lloyd George that if Nivelle failed, the French army might remain

on the defensive until the arrival of a large American army in 1918.” His prediction was quickly proven correct. On 10 May Nivelle was superseded by Pétain. His goals were to restore the morale of the French army, to cease mounting wasteful offensives which only produced large numbers of casualties the army could now ill afford, to maintain the pre-eminence of his army within the alliance despite France’s dwindling manpower reserves, and to shift the centre of France’s war effort towards the clearly French objective of liberating Alsace-Lorraine.* On 19 May he issued Directive Number One, explaining his strategy for 1917. He refused to mount any further large-scale offensives in 1917, but instead wished to

launch a series of limited offensives, employing surprise, large 4 G. Pedroncini, Les Mutineries de 1917 (Paris, 1967), passim; D. Englander, “The French Soldier, 1914-1918’, French History, 1/1 (1987), 49-67; J. G. Fuller, Troop

Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1990), 26-7. °° Blake (ed.), Haig, 218; PRO CAB 23/40/IWC9: Imperial War Cabinet, 12 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC119: War Cabinet, 16 Apr. 1917. °° TD. Porch, “The French Army in the First World War’, in A. R. Millett and W. Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness, i. The First World War (Boston, Mass., 1988), 201; G. Pedroncini, ‘Les Rapports du gouvernement et du haut-commandement en France en 1917’, Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 15/1 (1968), 130-1.

62 Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy quantities of artillery, and every possible mechanical contrivance in

order to reduce casualties. They could not, as one of his staff officers candidly admitted to the War Cabinet in December 1917, ‘bring about a decision, but enable[d] him to gain time and prepare for future offensives’.”’ The final decision would have to be post-

poned until 1918 and the arrival of a large American army in France.

In one of the first of many memorandums Hankey wrote for the new Prime Minister, he told Lloyd George that ‘as I ventured to suggest in June 1915, the War has become one of exhaustion and attrition, and among the elements of attrition Man-power stands first. Of all the assets on the side of the allies, the man-power of Russia is one that ought to come first.’** The other assets which the

Entente had hitherto enjoyed were the command of the seas afforded them by the Royal Navy, the French army, and Britain’s

ability to finance the alliance’s foreign purchases. Between December 1916 and May 1917 British policy-makers were confronted with the possibility that the efficacy of each of these assets, upon which they had based their war policy since 1914, was rapidly waning. By May 1917 Kitchener’s strategy was collapsing; the di-

lemma which faced the War Cabinet was to find something to replace it. At the same time as they attempted to mobilize more of Britain’s own resources, they carried out an audit of the empire’s contribution to the war. They tried to draw more heavily on the resources of their overseas possessions and simultaneously made strenuous efforts to ascertain what resources their newest partner,

the USA, could throw into the scales and how quickly it could do so. They were disappointed. Australia and Canada had already each raised or were in the process of raising five divisions, New Zealand

had raised one, and India had raised eighteen, although three of these had already been broken up.” Between March and May 1917

the first session of the Imperial War Cabinet met in London and *7 PRO CAB 27/14/MPC23: Manpower Cabinet Committee, Notes of an AngloFrench discussion at War Cabinet 301, 18 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 27/14/MPC724: French General Staff, Note on attacks with limited objective, 16 Dec. 1917; PRO WO 158/48: Pétain to Army Group Commanders, Directive No. 1, 19 May 1917; R. Griffiths, Marshal Pétain (London, 1970), 49. °8 PRO CAB 42/19/2: Hankey to Lloyd George, 8 Dec. 1916. » Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence, Divisional Distribution Chart (London, n.d.), passim.

Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy 63 gave the British the opportunity to ask the Dominion and Indian governments to increase their military efforts..°° On 20 March Lloyd George warned them that victory would not be cheap. Germany had more troops in the field than ever before and was in occupation of thousands of square miles of allied territory. The allies were becoming increasingly dependent on British economic, military, and moral support. ‘To be ready for 1918’, he concluded, echoing the determination of the Asquith government to secure a

peace settlement which would ensure its security against allcomers, ‘means victory, and it is a victory in which the British Empire will lead. It will easily then be the first Power in the world.” On 23 March the assembled leaders accepted the British timetable for victory. They agreed that the empire should make the biggest possible effort in 1917 to force Germany to accept their

peace terms, but as they were unlikely to succeed they would repeat the process in 1918, when victory would be more certain.”

But they offered little tangible extra assistance. Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa each agreed to do little more than attempt to maintain their existing forces at their present strength, and only India could provide a significantly larger supply of manpower. She had already recruited 574,000 soldiers and auxiliaries, and the Viceroy now agreed to raise another 101,000 men by the spring of 1918.'%

In return the Dominion governments, assisted by some of the

imperialists close to Lloyd George like Curzon, Milner, and Leopold Amery, tried to commit the Prime Minister more heavily than he preferred to the pursuit of their own imperialist war aims in Asia, Africa, and the Pacific. These men were not imperial isolationists who believed that Britain could exist safely if Germany was left dominating Europe. But they believed that Germany had two objectives: to establish a middle-European empire embracing

Central Europe and the Near East, and to create an overseas empire by taking over the British empire. Britain’s overriding objective should be to forestall Germany’s second aim, and to do so it 100 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 11. 1026; N. Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, i. The Durham Report to the Anglo-Irish Treaty (London, 1969; 2nd edn. 1982), 198; PRO CAB 23/1/WC67: War Cabinet, 10 Feb. 1917. 101 PRO CAB 23/40/IWC1: Imperial War Cabinet, 20 Mar. 1917. 1022 PRO CAB 23/40/IWC3: Imperial War Cabinet, 23 Mar. 1917. 03 PRO CAB 23/40/IWC6: Imperial War Cabinet, 30 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 24/ 9/GT317: Chamberlain to Viceroy, 28 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 24/10/GT443: Viceroy to Chamberlain, 11 Apr. 1917.

64 Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy was necessary to block its path towards a middle-European empire, for if Germany established the latter it would have the wherewithal

to proceed to rob Britain of its overseas possessions. Britain’s immediate objective, therefore, should be to deprive Germany of control of those parts of the globe—France, Belgium, Syria, Pales-

tine, Mesopotamia, South and East Africa, and the Pacific— whence it could menace Britain’s imperial communications. These were the irreducible minima required to safeguard Britain’s own security. Other objectives, such as the reduction of German power in Central Europe, the satisfaction of the national aspirations of the

subject nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and the achievement of French aims in Alsace-Lorraine were of secondary importance. Even though the Entente’s efforts might fall short of the total victory that Lloyd George sought, Britain could rest con-

tent if it secured a ‘just equilibrium’ on the continent and if it wrested control of both the Channel coast and the Turkish empire from Germany.'™

Britain’s territorial objectives remained remarkably extensive, both inside and outside Europe. If Britain were to achieve them, Germany would be greatly weakened. But these objectives also threatened to throw Britain into conflict not only with the USA but with those of her own peoples who favoured a Wilsonian peace

settlement. That was doubly unfortunate because on 6 April Wilson had persuaded Congress to declare war on Germany. Like Lord Kitchener in 1914, Wilson was determined to give his new partners only just enough help to prevent their defeat until such time as he could mobilize a large army and so secure a dominant voice at the peace conference. In July 1917 he explained to House the purpose behind his plan: England and France have not the same view with regard to peace that we have by any means. When the war is over we can force them to our way of thinking because by that time they will, among other things, be financially 104 PRO CAB 24/10/GT448: Amery, Notes on possible terms of peace, 11 Apr. 1917; L. Amery, My Political Life, ii. War and Peace 1914-1929 (London, 1953), 104—5; G. L. Cook, ‘Sir Robert Borden, Lloyd George and British Military Policy, 1917-1918’, Historical Journal, 14/2 (1971), 375-7; G. Smith, “The British Government and the Disposition of the German Colonies in Africa, 1914-1918’, in P. Gifford and W. R. Louis (eds.), Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule (New Haven, Conn., 1967), 288; PRO CAB 21/77: Minutes of the Committee of the Imperial War Cabinet on territorial desiderata in the terms of peace, 17 Apr. 1917.

Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy 65 in our hands: but we cannot force them now, and any attempt to speak for them or to our common mind would bring on disagreements which would

inevitably come to the surface in public and rob the whole thing of its effect.'°

Wilson’s war aims conflicted with Britain’s in several key respects. Although he shared the British distaste for Prussian militarism and

feared that a German victory would end his hopes for the future

reconstruction of the world community, he also had a large measure of distaste for allied imperialism and British ‘navalism’. Wilson did not commit the USA to the restoration of a European balance of power, nor did he express any sympathy towards the Entente’s territorial war aims. ‘We have’, he told Congress on 2 April, ‘no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion.’ Rather, he insisted, the war should be fought “Io make the world safe for democracy.’ Wilson deliberately refrained from signing the Pact of London, and the USA became an Associated

Power, not an ally of the Entente. That left the President in a powerful bargaining position for, without any formal diplomatic ties, he could threaten his partners with a withdrawal of US assistance if they did not comply with his wishes. Sir William Wiseman believed he had considerable support for his position and that ‘the sentiment of the country would be strongly against joining the Allies by any formal treaty. Sub-consciously they feel themselves to

be arbitrators rather than allies.” The British wanted merchant ships, money, munitions, and American volunteers willing to enlist in the British and French armies.‘ But Wilson soon made it plain that the USA was not prepared to fulfil the role which the British hoped to assign to it, that of the uncomplaining milch cow of the Entente. In April the British sent a mission to the USA under Balfour to ascertain the exact assistance the Americans could offer them.’” Balfour came 5 Quoted in D. F. Trask, The United States in the Supreme War Council:

1,

American War Aims and Inter-Allied Strategy, 1917-1918 (Middletown, Conn.,

tw 1. Flotto, ‘Woodrow Wilson: War Aims, Peace Strategy and the European

Left’, in A. S. Link (ed.), Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 1913-1921 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1982), 135-6. 107 PRO CAB 1/25/12: Cecil to War Cabinet and enc., 21 Aug. 1917. 108 PRO FO 800/208/224: Maclay to Balfour, 3 Apr. 1917; PRO FO 800/208/220: Percy to Balfour, 4 Apr. 1917; PRO WO 106/1511: General Staff, WO, Note on the military forces of the US, 5 Feb. 1917. 109 PRO CAB 23/2/WC116: War Cabinet, 10 Apr. 1917.

66 Collapse of Kitchener’s Strategy home disappointed, having made two major discoveries. The first

was that the Wilson administration had its own foreign policy agenda. It was intent, for example, on securing the ‘freedom of the

seas’, which threatened to destroy the efficacy of British naval power in a future war by depriving it of the right of blockade. Its Opposition to European imperialism therefore clashed directly with British war aims. And, secondly, the US administration and

its General Staff had no intention of surrendering control of American military manpower to France and Britain. They were determined to train and equip their own army before dispatching troops to France. Like the British in 1914, the Americans sought not only to win the war, but also to win the peace. America’s influence over the final peace terms would depend to a very large extent on the size of its contribution to the land war. If the western allies were short of men, they should remain on the defensive to husband their resources until the Americans arrived.”° That might not have been so bad for the British but for one fact. Although the US government had extensive industrial capacity and manpower reserves, a lack of prior planning meant that it would not be able to transform that potential into divisions capable of taking their place in the line until 1918 at the very earliest.'™!

Henceforth the British faced a dilemma. Their need for

American assistance to defeat the German threat to the security of Britain and its empire grew. But they also recognized that the cost of gaining American help might be the emergence of a new and potentially even more powerful rival across the Atlantic. For the remainder of the war the British government embarked upon the delicate task of extracting the greatest possible quantity of manpower and resources from the USA, while making the fewest possible concessions to those parts of Wilson’s programme which ran contrary to British interests. 4° Burk, Britain, America and the Sinews of War, 123—4; D. R. Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 1917-1919 (Lincoln, Nebr., 1966), 39-48; PRO CAB 24/13/GT717: Bridges to Robertson, 29 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 24/13/GT785: Bridges to Robertson, 3 May 1917; PRO CAB 24/13/GT786: Bridges to Robertson, 19 May 1917; J. J. Pershing, My Experiences in the Great War (Blue Ridge Summit, Pa., 1931; repr. 1988), i. 31-3.

41 PRO CAB 24/13/GT744: General Staff, The present situation in regard to military assistance by the USA, 17 May 1917.

3

The British Crisis, May-—August 1917 Russia and France were not the only members of the Entente to experience a domestic crisis in the spring and summer of 1917. Britain underwent its own crisis. It culminated in a series of strikes in the engineering industry in May which called into question the willingness of organized labour to continue to accept the leadership of Britain’s traditional governing classes. However, thanks to the

ability of the Lloyd George government to find the appropriate expedients, war wearimess did not spill over into widespread defeatism. But the blow which the May strikes delivered to the government’s self-confidence cannot be underestimated. A government which had come to power pledged to win the war now had a

second task thrust upon it, to act as a barrier to a British revolution.' Fear that excessive casualties, if they were not coupled with visible victories, might produce defeatism was yet another factor

which had to be weighed in the balance when the government devised a military strategy to replace Kitchener’s now discredited option.

When the Lloyd George government came to power it was confronted by an economy suffering from labour shortages, falling imports, a worsening balance of payments, and inflation. Large numbers of fit young men had left their civilian occupations and enlisted in the armed forces.” Imports had fallen to 46 million tons in 1916, compared to 54.5 million tons in 1913, due in part to the

sinking of some merchant tonnage and the diversion of much of what remained to war-related tasks.* In the closing days of the | J. Turner, British Politics and the Great War: Coalition and Conflict 1915-1918 (London, 1992), 191-3. 2 P. E. Dewey, ‘Military Recruiting and the British Labour Force during the First World War’, Historical Journal, 27/1 (1984), 205. 3 PRO CAB 24/38/GT3140: Stanley, Eleventh report of the Board of Trade on imports in relation to shipping, 21 Dec. 1917.

68 The British Crisis Asquith government, ministers had come to face the uncomfortable fact that Britain was becoming dependent upon supplies purchased in the USA but no longer had sufficient gold and dollars to buy them. Finally, the economy was suffering from inflation because the government was spending vast sums of money on the war without withdrawing comparable sums from the public’s purchasing power. Some employers were enjoying profits far above those

they had reaped in peacetime, and were the object of growing resentment amongst workers whose standard of living was being undermined by inflation.‘ Lloyd George’s speech to the Commons on 19 December was a heady rhetorical brew in which he promised to bring a new dynamism to the conduct of the war on the home front.> He agreed to establish a Ministry of Labour to ‘take a leading part in assisting in the mobilization of labour’. The new minister would assist the Director of National Service, who was ‘to be in charge of both the military and the civilian side of universal national service’. Shipping, which Lloyd George described as ‘the jugular vein, which, if severed would destroy the life of the nation’, would be placed on the same footing as the railways ‘so that during the War shipping will be nationalized in the real sense of the term’ and the inflated profits which shipowners were reaping would be curbed. The Food Controller would restrict over-consumption so that the poor did not go hungry. The Board of Agriculture was to ensure that ‘every available square yard [of ground] must be made to produce food’. And, because it was intolerable that a minority should make exceptional profits in a national emergency, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would curb profiteering.°®

But in its first months in office the achievements of the govern-

ment fell far short of Lloyd George’s promises, for despite its rhetoric the government proceeded cautiously. It preferred to follow a policy of incremental rather than revolutionary change and took care to ensure that it retained the support and assistance of organized labour and of key producers, like shipowners and mu-

nitions manufacturers. At the Ministry of Shipping, although Maclay requisitioned nearly 90 per cent of British tonnage, he 4 §. Pollard, The Development of the British Economy, 1914-1967 (London, 1970), 46-7; PRO T 170/105: Board of Inland Revenue, Note on the subject of profiteering during the war, 12 Dec. 1916; J. Horne, Labour at War: France and Britain 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1991), 236-8. > Hansard, HC Debs., 5th ser., vol. 88, col. 1338, 19 Dec. 1916. 6 Ibid., cols. 1345-53, 19 Dec. 1916.

The British Crisis 69 would have no truck with nationalization. Shipowners’ profits were dealt with generously by a ministry which knew that it had to buy the support of vital producer groups.’ Similarly, in February 1917 a committee established by the Asquith government recommended that home grain production could be increased if the state offered farmers a guaranteed price for wheat and oats and if district wage boards were established to fix minimum wages for their labourers. But opposition from landowners delayed the passage of the Corn Production Act until August, by which time it was too late to have any impact on the food situation in 1917.8 Lloyd George’s promise to organized labour that he would eschew industrial conscription

sounded the death-knell of the Directorate of National Service’s call for national service volunteers even before the appeal was made. Neville Chamberlain’s efforts to mobilize more labour for the war effort by voluntary means failed because, by the third year

of the war, little patriotic goodwill remained in the industrial workforce, and most people capable of working to support the war effort were already doing so.’

In other areas the government had doctrinaire objections to taking vigorous action. The first Food Controller, Lord Devonport,

shunned rationing. He preferred instead to continue his predecessor’s policy of doing everything possible to maintain existing channels of supply to retailers and consumers.” Similarly, the new Chancellor, Bonar Law, did all he could to avoid using taxation as

a tool to promote greater domestic harmony. He accepted the advice of Sir John Bradbury, the Joint Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, that although it might be desirable to increase taxation as 7 PRO CAB 24/3/G122: Maclay, Nationalization of shipping, 25 Jan. 1917; PRO T 171/140: Maclay to Bonar Law, 30 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 23/1/WC46: War Cabtnet, 26 Jan. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC62: War Cabinet, 12 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 24/ 9/GT393: Maclay, Limitation of shipping profits, 7 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 24/10/ GT426: J. Davies, Limitation of shipowners’ profits [n.d., but c.12 Apr. 1917]; PRO CAB 24/10/GT413: Bower and Fisher, Limitation of shipowners’ profits: Note by the Board of Inland Revenue, 11 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC121: War Cabinet, 17 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC128: War Cabinet, 1 May 1917. 8 L. M. Barnett, British Food Policy during the First World War (London, 1985), 196-7; Turner, British Politics and the Great War, 173-6, 214. 7 PRO CAB 24/10/GT404: E. V. Hiley, National Service Department: Weekly report no. 11, week ending 5 Apr. 1917; K. Grieves, The Politics of Manpower, 19] 41918 (Manchester, 1988), 90-119. 10 J. Harris, ‘Bureaucrats and Businessmen in British Food Control, 1916-1919’, in K. M. Burk (ed.), War and the State: The Transformation of British Government 1914-1918 (London, 1982), 139-40; Barnett, British Food Policy, 94-100; PRO CAB 23/1/WC42 and WC45: War Cabinet, 23 and 25 Jan. 1917.

70 The British Crisis a way of demonstrating Britain’s financial soundness to the lending

public, it would be dangerous to do so because Britain was at the limit of its taxable capacity.!! Bonar Law preferred to rely on his predecessor’s policy of debt creation to reduce private spending power, and he increased taxation only enough to pay the extra interest payments on the swollen National Debt." It was not until the onset of unrestricted U-boat warfare, the obvious breakdown of social peace at home, and the visible weakening of Britain’s major allies in the spring and summer of 1917, that the government introduced major innovations in its organization of the home front. In January 1917 the German Admiralty predicted that

their U-boats would defeat Britain by August, long before the USA could make its military presence felt in Europe. In the spring

and summer of 1917 the Lloyd George government adopted a fivefold solution to this threat. The best-known stratagem, if only because Lloyd George claimed so much credit for it in his memoirs, was the introduction of the convoy system. This was coupled with

a greatly expanded programme of merchant shipbuilding. Although in the medium term these policies ensured that Britain could continue fighting into 1918, in the short term they did little to

prevent the U-boats’ forcing Britain to accept a German peace in the summer of 1917. In the short term less spectacular policies counted for more. They included making the most efficient use of existing tonnage. Unnecessary imports were reduced and the shipping that remained was concentrated in the North Atlantic, where the comparatively short distances to North America maximized its carrying capacity. Thanks to this, stocks of imported wheat could

be increased at the expense of raw materials needed to make munitions. As late as the beginning of April, the War Cabinet was not overly concerned at the shipping situation. Within a few days of the start of the campaign, the War Cabinet had accepted a recommendation

put forward by a committee chaired by Curzon to reduce nonessential imports by six million tons in 1917.3 On 4 April ministers ' PRO T 171/138: Bradbury to Hamilton, 3 Apr. 1917; R. Rhodes James (ed.), Memoirs of a Conservative: J. C. C. Davidson’s Memoirs and Papers, 1910-1937 (London, 1969), 52. 2 PRO T 171/138: Nott Brown to Bonar Law, 11 Apr. 1917, and Bradbury to Bonar Law, 3 Apr. 1917. ‘3 PRO CAB 24/3/G105: Curzon, Restriction of imports: Preliminary report of a

The British Crisis 71 concluded that, although the situation was threatening, provided their policy of restricting imports and increasing shipbuilding was pursued successfully, Britain would not be compelled to make

peace because of a shortage of tonnage.“ But their optimism was shattered when Maclay told them that in the first nine days of April Britain and its allies had lost 192,000 tons of shipping.'° The Admiralty’s attempts to reduce losses by re-routing merchant ships away from the known positions of U-boats and by creating a series

of defended zones on the approaches to the major ports had failed.*°

One solution, which was proposed with increasing force by Beatty and Maclay, was the introduction of convoys. However, Jellicoe, Sir Henry Oliver (the Chief of the Admiralty’s War Staff)

and Captain R. Webb (the Director of the Trade Division) dismissed them as impractical and dangerous. They argued that nearly 5,000 vessels of over 100 tons entered British ports each week and

that the Admiralty lacked the escorts to convoy such a mass of shipping. Convoys, as Jellicoe had told the War Committee in November 1916, ‘offered too big a target’ and merchant ships were so bad at keeping station that ‘they would want a destroyer for each ship ...’.!’ Lloyd George also preferred to look elsewhere, believing that the only satisfactory answer was ‘a genius who can discover some method of destroying the submarines’. Like Jellicoe, he failed

to understand that some method of preventing the submarines from sinking the merchant ships would suffice.!®

Convoys were neither impractical nor dangerous. Since midFebruary shipping in the French coal trade had been convoyed with great success, and it was the two men who planned these convoys, committee appointed by the War Cabinet to report on the question of restriction of imports, 9 Jan. 1917; PRO CAB 23/1/WC57 and WC70: War Cabinet, 8 and 16 Feb. 1917.

'4 PRO CAB 23/2/WC113: War Cabinet, 4 Apr. 1917. 6 PRO CAB 24/10/GT403: Maclay, Loss of British and allied tonnage during the first nine days of Apr. 1917, 9 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 23/40/IWC10: Imperial War Cabinet, 13 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC118: War Cabinet, 13 Apr. 1917. 16 A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, iv. 1917: Year of Crisis (Oxford, 1969), 91-7. 7 PRO CAB 42/23/3: War Committee, 2 Nov. 1916; PRO CAB 23/1/WC73: War Cabinet, 19 Feb. 1917; A. Temple Patterson (ed.), The Jellicoe Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe (London, 1968), 1. 149-51; PRO CAB 23/2/WC91: War Cabinet, 8 Mar. 1917. '8 Lord Riddell, Lord Riddell’s War Diary 1914-1918 (London, 1933), 247.

72 The British Crisis Commander Henderson of the Admiralty’s Anti-submarine Division and Norman Leslie, the liaison officer between the Admiralty and the Ministry of Shipping, who first realized that the statistics upon which the Admiralty rested their case against convoys were bogus. They discovered that only 140 to 160 ocean-going vessels used British ports each week, a figure sufficiently small to make convoys practical.'? In mid-February, they passed their conclusions to Hankey, who lobbied the Prime Minister on their behalf. But Jellicoe remained sceptical, and because, according to Hankey,

Lloyd George was ‘so full of politics’, that he had no time to , consider the shipping situation, nothing was done for another six weeks.” As late as 23 April, despite Lloyd George’s suggestion that convoys might provide a greater degree of protection, Jellicoe was

still insisting that they would prove ineffective and that the navy lacked sufficient escorts.”! But with losses showing no sign of abating, the War Cabinet lost

patience with the First Sea Lord, and on 24 April agreed that the Prime Minister should make a personal visit to the Admiralty to gather information about anti-submarine warfare.” The Admiralty was now under such pressure that Jellicoe felt compelled to offer

the War Cabinet a sop. On 26 April he told them that Atlantic convoys would be introduced as soon as escorts were available and the next day orders were issued for the first trial convoy to sail from

Gibraltar.” Privately he doubted whether the experiment would succeed.” Thus, although it would be too much to say that Lloyd George compelled a reluctant Admiralty to adopt the convoy system when he visited the Admiralty on 30 April, it is unlikely that Jellicoe would have agreed to do so without the Prime Minister’s overt pressure. Lloyd George’s visit was also significant because, in

response to growing criticisms in the press that faulty Admiralty organization was causing the navy to be insufficiently offensive-

minded, he took the opportunity to reorganize the Board of Admiralty. To reduce over-centralization and to free Jellicoe and his senior staff from too much routine administration, Jellicoe was

made Chief of Naval Staff and Oliver and Vice-Admiral Sir 19 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 1v. 150-4. 20 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/1: Hankey diary, 11 and 13 Feb. and 30 Mar. 1917. 21 PRO CAB 23/2/WC124 and WC125: War Cabinet, 23 Apr. 1917. 22 PRO CAB 23/2/WC126: War Cabinet, 24 Apr. 1917. 23 PRO CAB 23/40/[WC12: Imperial War Cabinet, 26 Apr. 1917. 74 Temple Patterson (ed.), The Jellicoe Papers, ti. 157-60.

The British Crisis 73 Alexander Duff became Deputy Chief of Naval Staff and Assistant Chief of Naval Staff respectively. The former oversaw the work of the Operations, Mobilization, and Intelligence Divisions and the new Signals Section of the staff while the latter oversaw the work of the Trade, Anti-submarine and Minesweeping Divisions and the

Convoy Section. They were also given executive authority and could act in the name of the Board.” The Admiralty’s decision to run an experimental convoy did not

end the debate on the relative efficacy of convoys. In June Sir Norman Hill, the secretary of the Liverpool Shipowners Association, declared that the Admiralty’s policy of requiring vessels entering or leaving British ports to concentrate at certain fixed points was tantamount to asking them to sail through death traps.” Jellicoe’s reply did nothing to mollify Hill and his colleagues, and on 12 and 13 July the War Cabinet therefore conducted a major investigation into the control of merchant shipping movements in the presence of the Shipping Controller, representatives of the owners, and the Admiralty.?’ They discovered that in the month beginning 20 May three ocean-going convoys had arrived in British

ports without having suffered a single loss. But despite this evidence, which had persuaded the Admiralty to organize a convoy from the USA every four days beginning on 20 July, Jellicoe was not convinced that convoys would provide ‘even a partial remedy against submarine attack in open waters’.** But the owners preferred Jellicoe’s ‘partial remedy’ to the protection that they had been given. They insisted that the Admiralty abandon its policy of protected sea lanes in order to free more destroyers and light craft to act as convoy escorts, sail convoys with smaller numbers of escorts, and institute a bigger destroyer-building programme.” But

Jellicoe dragged his feet. The Admiralty still overestimated the 25 PRO CAB 24/12/GT604: Note by the Prime Minister on his conference at the Admiralty, 30 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC130 and WC136: War Cabinet, 2 and 11 May 1917. *° PRO CAB 24/17/GT1130: Hull, Submarine losses, Apr. and May 1917, 21 June

> PRO CAB 24/18/GT1273: Jellicoe, Reply to Sir N. Hill’s memorandum, 1 July 1917; PRO CAB 24/19/GT1308: Hill to Hankey, 6 July 1917; PRO CAB 24/19/ GT1347: Hill to Hankey, 9 July 1917; PRO CAB 23/3/WC180: War Cabinet, 10 July

os PRO CAB 24/18/GT1272: Jellicoe, British naval policy, 1 July 1917; PRO CAB 24/18/GT1215: Naval War Staff, Naval weekly appreciation, no. 5, 27 June 1917. 2? PRO CAB 23/3/WC183 and WC184: War Cabinet, 12 and 13 July 1917.

74 The British Crisis figures for weekly sailing of ocean-going vessels, and the number of

escorts required by each convoy; they still wanted to keep light craft employed patrolling routes and hunting U-boats instead of using them as close escorts. In the Admiralty’s eyes convoys were an experiment which might fail.°° Their tardiness in adopting the convoy system was one reason why Lloyd George eventually decided to replace Carson. The introduction of the convoy system did significantly reduce merchant ship losses, but its real impact only began to be felt in the second half of the year. From a peak of 545,000 tons in April, losses fell to 350,000 tons in May, 305,000 tons in June, and 240,000 tons in the first three weeks of July.*’? But, because of Jellicoe’s reluc-

tance to adopt the convoy system more rapidly, it was not until mid-August that all outward-bound vessels were convoyed. The result was that British tonnage lost fell from 358,000 tons in July to

268,813 tons in October, and to only 173,462 tons in December.

The number of attacks made on merchant ships per day also dropped by nearly one-third between July and December, even though in September the Germans had more U-boats at sea than ever before.** The convoy system therefore played a significant but

belated part in defeating the U-boat offensive. A similar lack of urgency characterized the government’s shipbuilding programme. By the end of February Maclay had approved designs for four standard merchant ships and had placed orders for 112 new merchant ships totalling 1,280,000 tons. This programme was inaugurated on the assumption that the war ‘will last through the year 1918’, and was carried out at the expense of suspending work on three battle cruisers and five light cruisers.* But the total for new tonnage launched in Britain in the first quarter of 1917 was

246,000 tons, sufficient to replace only about a quarter of the 820,630 tons lost.** The main bottlenecks impeding shipbuilding 3° PRO CAB 24/20/GT1408: Jellicoe, Destroyer situation, 14 July 1917. 31 PRO CAB 24/20/GT1495: Admiralty, The submarine situation, 24 July 1917. 32, PRO CAB 23/4/WC235: War Cabinet, 18 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 24/23/GT1744: Naval Staff, Naval weekly appreciation, no. 12, 15 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 24/32/ GT2645: Naval Staff, Naval weekly appreciation, no. 25, 15 Nov. 1917; PRO CAB 24/42/GT3641: Naval Staff, Naval weekly appreciation, 14 Feb. 1918; Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, iv. 258-88. 33 PRO CAB 23/1/WCS58: War Cabinet, 8 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 24/6/GTS80: Maclay, Building of merchant ships at home and abroad, 28 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC85 and WC113: War Cabinet, 2 Mar. and 4 Apr. 1917. 344 PRO CAB 24/7/GT122: Anderson to Hankey, 8 Mar. 1917; J. Terraine, Business in Great Waters: The U-boat Wars 1916-1945 (London, 1989), 766.

The British Crisis 75 were shortages of labour and steel, and the situation threatened to become worse in March when the War Cabinet agreed to a new convoy escort-building programme.» The War Cabinet did not begin to get a firm grip on the situation until late April and it was not until September that they agreed to a major acceleration of merchant shipbuilding. On 23 April the

Ministry of Shipping informed the War Cabinet that, whereas Britain and the Dominions had possessed 16,788,000 tons of shipping on 1 January 1917, that figure would fall to 15,467,000 by 1 May and to 12,862,000 by 31 December. As 8,000,000 tons of ship-

ping were earmarked for the armed services, the tonnage left to carry imports to Britain would drop by half by the end of the year.

Monthly imports into Britain would fall from 3,000,000 tons in January to 2,030,000 tons in December. As it was necessary to import at least 1,425,000 tons of cereals per month, that would leave only 800,000 tons per month available for all other cargoes. Thoroughly alarmed, three days later Lloyd George told a meeting of Admiralty and Ministry of Shipping representatives that their shipbuilding programme was insufficient and that he wanted to set a target of 1,000,000 tons to be launched by British yards by the end of 1917. That was nearly double the 550,000 tons which had been

launched in 1916.°° In May Lloyd George appointed Sir Eric Geddes as Controller of the Navy, to oversee this programme.*’ By the end of May 1,718,058 tons of merchant tonnage was under construction, but Maclay, who predicted that by the end of the year

Britain would have lost 4,500,000 tons, thought this was madequate. He insisted that Britain needed a programme to produce 3,000,000 tons by the end of the year.** Geddes was willing to go a 35 PRO CAB 24/6/GT60: A. E. A. Grant, Merchant shipping in 1916, 10 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 24/6/GT41: F. C. Tudor, Memorandum on the War Cabinet’s recent decision about recruiting, 16 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC99: War Cabinet, 19 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 24/7/GT105: Admiralty, Torpedo boat destroyers, 5 Mar. 1917.

36 PRO CAB 23/2/WC125: War Cabinet, 23 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 24/11/GT567: Merchant shipping: Report of a meeting held at 10 Downing St., 26 Apr. 1917. 37 PRO CAB 24/12/GT651: Shipbuilding: Note by the Shipping Controller, 4 May 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3. Hankey diary entry, 11 May 1917; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/17/6/1(a): Maclay to Lloyd George, [15] May 1917; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/17/6/1(b): Geddes to Maclay, 16 May 1917. 33 PRO CAB 24/16/GT1071: Jellicoe, Total number of vessels and estimated tonnage under construction, 31 May 1917; PRO CAB 24/15/GT982: Ministry of Shipping, Notes on the tonnage position and the necessity for a greatly extended building programme, 31 May 1917; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/35/2/15: Maclay to Lloyd George, 18 June 1917.

76 The British Crisis long way to oblige him and on 5 July he submitted to the War

Cabinet a programme which promised to begin to produce 3,100,000 tons of merchant shipping per annum by the end of 1918. But to achieve this target he required 36,667 tons of steel per week,

compared to the 16,000 tons he was currently receiving, another 80,000 shipyard workers in addition to the 400,000 workers already in the yards, and thirty-six new slipways.””

The Geddes programme had two purposes. In the short term it

would at least postpone the date when imports fell below the irreducible minimum. In the longer term it would help to ensure Britain’s prosperity in the post-war world. Before 1914 Britain had been the world’s carrier and Geddes and Maclay were determined that the USA, which was trying hard to enlarge its own merchant

marine, must not rob Britain of that role.” Although the War Cabinet accepted the Geddes programme in principle on 10 July, it

did little to provide the extra steel and labour Geddes required. The merchant yards received less steel than they required, their labour force was 20,000 men short of what they needed, and a large proportion of the shipyard labour force was engaged on Admiralty rather than on merchant work.*! The War Office’s bland insistence

that it could release few former shipyard artificers because most

who had volunteered in 1914-15 had already been killed was hardly helpful.*? Even so, by November 1917 new construction was

at a record level, almost equal to the average monthly output for 1913. But in the short term Britain’s shipbuilding efforts in 1917 did little to stave off defeat. The government’s tardiness in recognizing

the seriousness of the U-boat threat until it was upon them meant that by August the shipbuilding programme had made only a lim%° PRO CAB 24/19/GT1312: E. Geddes, Report on shipping situation, 5 July 1917; K. Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes: Business and Government in War and Peace (Manchester, 1989), 42-3; PRO CAB 24/17/GT1133: Halsey, Memorandum on new programme, 22 June 1917. *® PRO CAB 24/19/GT1348: Maclay, Proposed new programme of merchant shipbuilding, 9 July 1917; PRO CAB 24/20/GT1407: Maclay, Future status of the merchant marine, 11 July 1917. See also HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/1/3/13: Addison to Lloyd George, 10 Apr. 1917. 41 PRO CAB 24/38/GT3289: E. Geddes, Merchant shipbuilding, 8 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 23/5/WC312: War Cabinet, 3 Jan. 1918.

2 PRO CAB 24/12/GT666: Hankey, The shipbuilding situation: Note by the Secretary, 8 May 1917; PRO CAB 24/12/GT684: Addison, The shipbuilding situation and the control of steel, 9 May 1917; PRO CAB 23/3/WC180 and WC181: War

Cabinet, 10 and 11 July 1917; PRO CAB 24/20/GT1410: Hankey, Labour and shipyard and marine engineering works, 16 July 1917.

The British Crisis T/ ited impact in defeating the U-boat offensive. In the first half of 1917 Britain launched 495,000 tons of merchant shipping, and, although this rose to 668,000 tons in the second half of the year, the total tonnage launched in 1917 was well below the 3,729,785 tons which was sunk.*

The contributions made by the convoy system and by the Geddes

shipbuilding programme to ensuring that the German plan to starve Britain into surrender by August 1917 failed were therefore limited. Far more significant in the short term was the impact of the government’s systematic attempts to reduce unnecessary imports

and to maximize the carrying capacity of the merchant fleet by concentrating it on the shorter North Atlantic routes rather than employing it on longer voyages to Australasia and India. On 19 February the Ministry of Shipping predicted that the total shortfall

of tonnage in 1917 would be 8,000,000 tons, rather than the 6,000,000 tons upon which they had based their earlier estimates. This would necessitate a further reduction in imports of 500,000 tons per month in the last eight months of 1917.4 The War Cabinet

hastily reconvened the Curzon committee on the restriction of imports.* After surveying the import requirements for timber, paper, distilling, and food, they persuaded the War Cabinet that, although some further savings could be made, large savings could be secured only if the Ministry of Munitions reduced its demands for imported metals and exploited indigenous iron ore deposits more fully.*° Addison was willing to co-operate, for by March 1917 his ministry had stockpiled 15,000,000 heavy shells. He

therefore reduced output between March and July to free supplies of steel for shipbuilding.*” He was also ready to forgo 200,000 tons of imports between March and April, but insisted that in return

his ministry must be allotted an extra 40,000 tons of imports in 4 PRO CAB 24/38/GT3289: E. Geddes, Merchant shipbuilding, 8 Jan. 1918; A. Fitzroy, Memoirs (London, n.d.), i. 666; Riddell, War Diary, 300; PRO CAB 24/35/ GT2908: Naval Staff, Admiralty weekly appreciation, 6 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 24/39/ GT3217: Naval weekly appreciation, 10 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 24/43/GT3765: Liverpool Steamship-owners Association, The submarine menace, 25 Feb. 1918. 4 PRO CAB 1/24/3: Watson and Elderton, Position of shipping during 1917, 19 Feb. 1917. ‘S PRO CAB 24/6/GT40: Stanley, Petrol consumption, 2 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 23/1/WC74: War Cabinet, 19 Feb. 1917. © PRO CAB 23/1/WC77: War Cabinet, 21 Feb. 1917. 47 PRO CAB 23/2/WC87: War Cabinet, 5 Mar. 1917.

78 The British Crisis May.*® These sacrifices were made without any appreciable impact on the munitions programme. Shell production actually reached its wartime peak in 1917 and the number of artillery pieces produced

by the ministry in 1917 was 75 per cent higher than in 1916. The ministry also attempted to exploit indigenous supplies, not only of iron ore but of zinc, wolfram, and shale oil. But import substitution had its price. Increasing domestic iron ore production by one-third required the services of an extra 12,000 miners and the wherewithal

to build more blast furnaces and converters.” Although these measures did lead to a reduction 1n unnecessary imports, they could not suffice, because they did not keep pace with

the accelerating rate at which tonnage was being lost. In May the Board of Trade therefore recommended still further reductions in timber imports. This gave rise to a prolonged interdepartmental tussle between the Ministry of Shipping, the Board of Trade, and

other departments regarding who should control the flow and quantity of imports. The War Cabinet had to adjudicate and decided that further restrictions should be placed on timber and pulp imports but not on oil, which was not only in short supply but was brought to Britain in tanker vessels which could carry no other kind of cargo.! The British also attempted to restrict their allies’ imports. Even

before the onset of unrestricted U-boat warfare, coal deliveries from Britain to France and Italy were already far below their requirements. In mid-March Maclay wanted to reduce them still further.’ The War Cabinet agreed, but in an effort to place a thin 48 G. Hardach, The First World War 1914-1918 (London, 1977), 87; War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War 1914-1920 (London, 1922), 484. ” PRO CAB 24/6/GT89: Addison, Development of home production of various

ores and raw material other than iron ore, 26 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 24/6/GT91: Addison, Increased home production of iron ore, 22 Feb. 1917. ° PRO CAB 24/13/GT735: Relations of imports to shipping: Fourth report of Board of Trade, 15 May 1917. 1 PRO CAB 24/16/GT1048: Board of Trade, Memorandum, 15 June 1917; PRO CAB 24/12/GT675: Stanley, Motor spirits, 8 May 1917; PRO CAB 24/13/GT707: Pretyman, The oil situation, 11 May 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC142 and WC145: War Cabinet, 22 and 24 May 1917; PRO CAB 24/14/GT818: Money, Overseas Supply Committee, 23 May 1917; PRO CAB 24/15/GT955: Money, Tonnage Priority Committee, 30 May 1917. 2 PRO CAB 24/7/GT147: Stanley, Imports of coal into France and Haly, 13 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 23/1/WC74: War Cabinet, 19 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 24/6/GT44: Maclay, French and Italian coal position, 20 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 24/6/GT52: Notes

The British Crisis 79 coating of sugar on the pill opted to divert colliers from France to Italy.°> Lloyd George maintained that if the French wanted Britain

to increase its coal shipments to France, France would have to restrict its own exports to Britain.“ At the same time, the War Cabinet also established a committee to vet allied requests for supplies of steel, copper, brass, and tin-plate to ensure that they were only used for war-related purposes.° It was not surprising that this caused considerable resentment in France.°° The only sop the War Cabinet offered was a small increase in the quota of French

wines and brandies and Italian and French silks imported into Britain.°’

Beginning in May the War Cabinet also began to stretch the carrying capacity of the British mercantile fleet by concentrating as much of it as possible on the shorter North Atlantic routes. They

were reluctant to do this because they recognized that it might destroy Britain’s position in the post-war era as the world’s main carrier..° But, caught up in a crisis which needed an immediate solution, and urged to act by both Maclay and the Admiralty, the War Cabinet had little option.°’ Britain was ready to mortgage its

future as a trading nation and its economic ties with its empire rather than accept immediate defeat. of the conclusions of a meeting between the Prime Minister and representatives of the French government, 22 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 24/8/GT211: Coal for Italy: Letter from Sir A. Stanley to Sir M. Hankey, 19 Mar. 1917. 3 PRO CAB 23/2/WC102: War Cabinet, 22 Mar. 1917. 4 PRO CAB 23/1/WC77: War Cabinet, 21 Feb. 1917; PRO FO 800/169/Fr/17/19: de Bunsen to Bertie, 24 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 28/2/IC17(b): Notes of an AngloFrench conference, 27 Feb. 1917; PRO FO 371/3080/47813: Amery, Western and general report no. 5, 28 Feb. 1917. 55 PRO CAB 23/1/WC52: War Cabinet, 2 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 24/7/GT123: E. Phipps to the secretary of Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement, 5 Mar. 1917.

56 PRO FO 800/169/Fr/17/28: Bertie to Balfour, 12 Mar. 1917; PRO FO 800/169/ Fr/17/21: Balfour to Bertie, 7 Mar. 1917. 57 PRO CAB 24/8/GT260: Summary of blockade intelligence, 16-23 Mar. 1917. 8 PRO CAB 24/8/GT284: Statement by the Shipping Controller on the mercantile marine and the shipping programme, 20 Mar. 1917. °° PRO CAB 23/2/WC137 and WC150: War Cabinet, 14 and 30 May 1917; PRO CAB 24/12/GT698: Money, Shipping strategy and the submarine menace, 7 May 1917; PRO CAB 24/12/697: Anderson to Hankey, Proposals to meet submarine attack, 10 May 1917; PRO CAB 24/13/GT711: Money, Shipping strategy and the Atlantic, 11 May 1917; PRO CAB 24/13/GT773: Shipping strategy in the Atlantic, 17 May 1917; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/35/2/11: L. C. Money to Lloyd George, 14 May 1917; PRO CAB 24/10/GT660: Money, Proposal to secure absolutely the national safety by concentrating shipping in the Atlantic, 4 May 1917.

80 The British Crisis The result of this systematic attempt to reduce unnecessary imports and to concentrate shipping where it could be most effective was that in June 1917 imports on the restricted list were only 20 per cent of the corresponding figure for June 1916, but those on the

unrestricted list or imported on government account had been maintained at 80 per cent of the corresponding figure for June 1916. ‘This suggests’, the Board of Trade concluded, ‘that the contraction in restricted goods is approaching its limit and that the main part of

any further reduction in imports will have to be borne by unrestricted goods.’ By July any further restrictions could only be made at the expense of reducing imports needed to fight the war or of cutting down vital food supplies. The War Cabinet employed the tonnage they had freed to create larger food stocks.® At the beginning of February, the Royal Com-

mission on Wheat Supplies estimated that Britain had stocks of wheat sufficient for 12.25 weeks and that to avoid the possibility of local famines stocks should never fall below enough for six weeks.

Lloyd George wanted to double existing stocks by June. In the Commission’s opinion that could not be done because it would require the services of over 300 vessels, and the near-simultaneous sailing of so many ships would cause hopeless congestion at the ports and on the railways.” But in late March imports of foodstuffs and stocks of food in Britain began to decline sharply. On 21 March the Ministry of Food reported that wheat stocks were sufficient for only 10.75 weeks, that total imports of wheat for the first eleven weeks of 1917 were lower than for the comparable period in 1916, and that total imports of all foodstuffs were 15 per cent down on

the same period in 1916. Three days later the War Cabinet was informed that current and prospective losses were so heavy that unless immediate steps were taken, by July wheat stocks would sink to only seven weeks’ supply.“ On 29 March the War Cabinet took the momentous decision to withdraw over 500,000 tons of shipping from other services over the next six months and to use it to carry wheat from North America. Their immediate objective 6° PRO CAB 24/20/GT1425: 6th report of the Board of Trade on imports and industry in relation to shipping, 13 July 1917. 6! PRO CAB 23/1/WCS7: War Cabinet, 8 Feb. 1917. & PRO CAB 24/6/GT36: Hankey, The possibility of increasing stocks of wheat, 19 Feb. 1917. & PRO CAB 24/8/GT265: Ministry of Food report for week ending 21 Mar. 1917. 4 PRO CAB 24/8/GT276: Shipping resources: Interim report, 24 Mar. 1917.

The British Crisis 81 was to purchase enough wheat to increase stocks in Britain to thirteen weeks’ supply at once and, in the longer term, to create a reserve sufficient for six months.© Their decision was timely, for by early May stocks had fallen to less than seven weeks’ supply, close to the danger point which the Royal Commission had identified in

February. However, in June the corner was turned and the War Cabinet’s policy of giving food imports priority over the needs of other departments began to succeed. By 1 July stocks were at their normal level and by 1 August there was a stockpile equivalent to thirteen weeks’ supply in Britain. By August the U-boat offensive had failed to starve Britain into submission and some German politicians had already acknowledged that fact. On 6 July the leader of the Catholic Centre Party, Matthias Erzberger, told the Central Committee of the Reichstag that the U-boats had not defeated Britain and added fuel to a crisis which led to Bethmann-Hollweg’s resignation.® The U-boat offensive failed because, by their own calculations, the German navy did not employ enough of them to do the job. In May 1914 a German naval staff study suggested that the German fleet would need 222 U-boats to defeat Britain, but at the beginning of the campaign the German navy had approximately only 100 operational submarines, and throughout 1917 they never managed to keep more than onethird of them on operational patrols at any one time. The German Admiralty’s expectation that their submarines would be able to sink an average of 600,000 tons of shipping per month was therefore highly optimistic, especially as they were also slow to make any concerted attempt to increase the size of their fleet. Between January 1917 and January 1918 eighty-seven boats were launched but seventy-eight were lost, and it was not until the second half of 1917 that the government began its first large-scale U-boat production programme.® The rather tardy British counter-measures 6& PRO CAB 23/40/IWCS: Imperial War Cabinet, 29 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 24/11/ GT541: Devonport, Note by Food Controller on wheat supplies for the UK, 20 Apr.

6 Barnett British Food Policy, 103-5. 67 M. Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916-1918 (London, 1976), 131. 6&8 P. K. Lundberg, “The German Naval Critique of the U-boat Campaign: 19151918’, Military Affairs, 27 (1963), 105-18; H. H. Herwig, ‘The Dynamics of Necessity: German Military Policy during the First World War’, in A. R. Millett and W. murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness, i. The First World War (Boston, Mass., 1988),

82 The British Crisis therefore sufficed. In the short term the War Cabinet’s decisions to reduce unnecessary imports, to concentrate tonnage in the North

Atlantic, and to give priority to creating larger food stocks were crucial in defeating the U-boat offensive. Their other policies failed

to show an effective return until after the initial danger period, which lasted from February to August 1917, had been traversed. Attempts to increase the quantity of new tonnage launched and to introduce convoys at the end of April helped in the long run. But they were either introduced so late or were acted upon so slowly, that by themselves they would have been ineffectual.

Britain avoided starvation in the spring and summer of 1917, but did not avoid a social crisis. The civilian population was becoming weary of the war. Growing numbers of families had been bereaved, and the sight of maimed men, who had returned to Britain in large numbers, was commonplace.” Late 1916 and early 1917 witnessed the emergence of a variety of ex-servicemen’s organizations, like the National Association of Discharged Soldiers and Sailors and the National Federation of Discharged and Demobilized Soldiers and Sailors. Both organizations agitated for a better deal for their members and were not afraid to direct verbal violence against the government.” The maimed, the bereaved, and many workers and their families who were neither had plenty of cause to complain. In March 1917 the Board of Trade estimated that the cost of living for a working-class family had risen by 65 per cent since the start of the war, but that the price of food alone had risen by 92 per cent.” Rising prices and local food shortages had a detrimental impact on civilian morale, causing hardship for consumers on fixed

incomes and a sense of betrayal amongst those enjoying higher

wartime earnings who could not buy enough with their extra income.”

In March, although potatoes and sugar were in short supply, Devonport opted for a nonsensical programme of voluntary ration-

ing coupled with meatless and potato-less days in public eating & T. Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1986), 507-8. 7 D. Englander, “The National Union of Ex-Servicemen and the Labour Movement, 1918-1920’, History, 76/246 (1991), 24-8. ™ PRO CAB 24/7/GT155: Adams, The food question [n.d., but c.13 Mar. 1917]. 2 Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War, 513.

The British Crisis 83 places.” In May, when he put a scheme for compulsory rationing before the War Cabinet, they were dismayed at the likely cost to

the taxpayer of £760,000 per annum and referred it to a small subcommittee. In the meantime Lloyd George tried to reassure a secret session of the Commons that all was well.” The only direct concession to public discontent that the government offered came in April. Since import reductions had placed a premium on the price of home-grown cereals, they placed a maximum price on home-produced wheat, barley, and oats to stem public criticism

that farmers were taking advantage of the national need by profiteering.” Food shortages and inflation were not the only causes of war weariness in the spring and summer of 1917. Shortages of railway wagons, locomotives, and imported pit props contributed to a growing shortage of coal. Bonar Law’s first budget

brought little cheer to the working classes. As a result of rising earnings and McKenna’s decision to lower the tax exemption limits in September 1915, large numbers of working-class men had begun to pay income tax for the first time. Although many of them did pay up, there was considerable opposition to doing so from many strategic groups within the trade union movement.”

On 25 May, in an attempt to shake the resolve of the British people and their government, the Germans launched the first of a series of air raids on Britain using heavier-than-air machines, the Gotha IVs.” The first bombs fell on Folkestone, but subsequent

raids reached London. They caused great indignation. They seemed to violate the accepted distinction between soldiers in uniform, who were properly liable to be killed, and civilian women and 2B PRO CAB 23/2/WC97: War Cabinet, 15 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 24/7/GT175: Devonport, Summary of proposed meals orders, 16 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/ WC99: War Cabinet, 19 Mar. 1917. ™ PRO CAB 24/3/G148: Devonport, Machinery for compulsory rationing, 2 May 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC133: War Cabinet, 7 May 1917; A. J. P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George: A Diary by Frances Stevenson (London, 1971), 157; Barnett, British Food Supply, 110-11. ® PRO CAB 24/9/GT345: Devonport, The price of home-grown wheat, 2 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 24/9/GT362: Devonport, The price of barley and oats, 4 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC114: War Cabinet, 5 Apr. 1917. 7° R.C. Whiting, ‘Taxation and the Working Class 1915-1924’, Historical Journal, 33/4 (1990), 895-6; PRO CAB 23/2/WC128: War Cabinet, 1 May 1917. 7” C. M. White, The Gotha Summer: The German Daylight Raids on England, May to August 1917 (London, 1986), 38-44, 52; J. H. Morrow, Jr., German Air Power in World War One (Lincoln, Nebr., 1982), 116.

84 The British Crisis children, who were not.”* On 2 July the War Cabinet agreed that in

order both to strengthen the RFC in France and to provide more aircraft for home defence, the strength of the air service ought to be increased from 108 to 200 squadrons.” The Lloyd George government had been attempting to increase aircraft production almost since the day it entered office, but with

scant success. One of the major bottlenecks was a shortage of suitable engines, a shortage which was made worse by the fact that the army wanted similar engines for its expanding tank programme.” But the fundamental problems facing aircraft pro-

duction in early 1917 were the same as those facing other war-related industries: raw materials and factory space were in short supply; each call for more manufacturing resources could be met only at the expense of other industries and required the creation of fresh plant; and, above all, there was a shortage of labour. Indeed, labour shortage was now the most crucial bottleneck impeding war production and, in the spring of 1917, it was this problem, and the government’s policies to overcome it, which finally

brought to a head a major crisis on the home front which was to have a profound impact on British strategic policy for the remainder of the war. The army’s insatiable demand for men did not abate in the spring of 1917. On 6 March the Army Council told the War Cabinet that the drafts due to reach Haig were quite inadequate and demanded to know what the War Cabinet proposed to do about it.*! They also reminded ministers that, whereas in France the army authorities 8 J. Sweetman, ‘The Smuts Report of 1917: Merely Political Window Dressing?’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 4/2 (1981), 152-3; Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War, 508-9; PRO WO 106/1512: Maj.-Gen. F. C. Shaw to CIGS, 26 May 1917.

™ PRO CAB 24/15/GT937: Memorandum, 31 May 1917; PRO CAB 24/15/ GT939: Memorandum by the Air Board, 2 June 1917; PRO CAB 24/18/GT1241: Sir A. Mond, Air reprisals: Suggestion to fire the Black Forest, 22 June 1917; PRO CAB

24/17/GT1169: Harvey, Air Board, Report to War Cabinet, 23 June 1917; PRO CAB 24/17/GT1198: Derby, Aerial Policy, 26 June 1917; PRO CAB 23/3/WC173: War Cabinet, 2 July 1917; M. Cooper, The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air Policy in the First World War (London, 1986), 97. 89 PRO CAB 23/1/WC15: War Cabinet, 22 Dec. 1916; PRO CAB 24/6/GT59: Haig, State of the air service with BEF, 15 Feb. 1917; PRO CAB 24/10/GT476: Air Board to War Cabinet, 17 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 24/7/GT109: War Office, Memorandum on output of tanks, 5 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 24/8/GT239: Addison, Output of tanks, 21 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC102: War Cabinet, 22 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 24/14/GT809: Stern and d’Eyncourt, Memorandum, 18 May 1917. 81 PRO CAB 24/7/GT148: Brade, Supply of men for the army: Further memorandum by the Army Council, 6 Mar. 1917.

The British Crisis 85 decided how many men could be spared for munitions production after the army’s needs had been met, in Britain the reverse was the case.” Any possibility that the army might find large numbers of willing volunteers had long since passed. The enthusiasm for military service which so many working-class men had exhibited in 1914-15 had evaporated. News of heavy casualties, the belief that the ideals which had animated all classes in 1914-15 had now been forgotten by the upper classes and the government, and the knowledge that upon joining the army men lost many of their rights as citizens meant that many of the men being conscripted were coming forward unwillingly.® But it was not inflation, food and coal shortages, or the perceived

harshness of the system of military service which ignited the May crisis. It was the War Cabinet’s decision to abolish the trade card scheme and to extend dilution to private work which did so. The trade card scheme, operated by the official union leaders themselves, guaranteed exemption from military service to members of craft unions engaged on munitions work. It had been negotiated in November 1916 and became operative in February 1917. But even before it began to function the Ministry of Munitions wanted to replace it with a more flexible schedule of protected occupations. The ministry objected that the scheme bred inter-union jealousies and that it protected some workers who were not needed for munitions production and failed to protect others who were.* On 21 March Lord Rhondda, the chairman of a small committee asked

to report on the supply of men for the army and the working of

the trade card scheme, endorsed the Ministry of Munitions’ policy.» The War Cabinet also permitted Addison to introduce a bill amending the Munitions of War Act to apply dilution to 8 PRO CAB 24/7/GT118: War Office, Munitions workers in France, 7 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 24/8/GT229: General Staff, War Office, A general review of the situation in all theatres of war, 20 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 24/6/GT49: Robertson, Germany’s intentions, 23 Feb. 1917. 83 Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War, 527-8; PRO RECO 1/700: J. L. Hammond, After the war: Intentions of the rank and file of the army, 28 Mar. 1917; PRO RECO 1/700: J. L. Hammond, Report on visit to the camps and YMCA centres at home, 20 June 1917. 84 J. Hinton, The First Shop Stewards’ Movement (London, 1973), 196; K. Morgan

and J. Morgan, Portrait of a Progressive: The Political Career of Christopher, Viscount Addison (Oxford, 1980), 62; PRO CAB 24/6/GT42: Addison, The trade card scheme and the recruiting of munitions workers, 21 Feb. 1917. 8 PRO CAB 24/8/GT244: Rhondda, Military service exemptions, 21 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC84: War Cabinet, 1 Mar. 1917.

86 The British Crisis private work in an attempt to free skilled labour for munitions manufacturing. Addison began negotiations with the national union leadership at the start of April. On 5 May the national leadership of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) agreed to the abolition of the trade card scheme with the proviso that no skilled men would be called up before all dilutees of military age had been enlisted.®’

But during these negotiations Henderson had remarked to his cabinet colleagues that ‘there was undoubtedly grave unrest in the country, which had been deepened by the Russian Revolution, and as Labour Day (the 1 May) was approaching the situation was one which would need careful handling’.** His fears proved correct. The agreement of the National Executive of the ASE was repudiated by local shop stewards in several major munitions manufacturing cen-

tres. They were incensed by the abolition of the trade card scheme and they were opposed to any attempts to extend dilution to pri-

vate work because it flew in the face of previous government pledges. Between 30 April and 12 May strikes in opposition to the new agreement were held in over twenty towns, including Manchester, Sheffield, Rotherham, Coventry, and London and involved some 200,000 workers.*?

Even before the May strikes some policy-makers feared that quasi-revolutionary sentiments were permeating civil society. Their fears showed themselves in the War Cabinet’s refusal to provide a refuge for the deposed Tsar. Following his arrest and abdication in March the War Cabinet, although anxious that Nicholas II should leave Russia, were equally concerned that he should not come to Britain. Not only might his presence complicate relations with the Provisional Government, but George V was not eager to see his cousin in Britain.” According to Cecil, “There are 86 PRO CAB 24/7/GT167: [Addison], Munitions of war: Memorandum, [n.d., but c.13 Mar. 1917]; PRO CAB 23/2/WC102 and WC103: War Cabinet, 22 and 23 Mar.

Moran Portrait of a Progressive, 63; Hinton, Shop Stewards, 197; PRO CAB 23/2/WC127: War Cabinet, 27 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC113: War Cabinet, 4 Apr. 1917; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/14/4/39: Derby to Lloyd George, 26 Apr.

ss PRO CAB 23/2/WC127: War Cabinet, 27 Apr. 1917. ® Hinton, Shop Stewards, 199-200. °° PRO CAB 23/2/WC100: War Cabinet, 21 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 24/8/GT262: Hanbury Williams to Robertson, 22 Mar. 1917; PRO FO 800/205/63: Stamfordham

The British Crisis 8/ indications that a considerable anti-monarchical movement is developing here’, provoked by the King’s supposed support for the Tsar and King Constantine of Greece.?! The May strikes persuaded some ministers that Cecil’s fears were not exaggerated. Milner suspected that underlying the legitimate grievances of the working

classes was an agitation promoted by ‘mischief-makers’. He claimed to have information suggesting that the Independent Labour party and the Union of Democratic Control were conspiring to start strikes and riots in the hope that troops would then fire upon the rioters and so provoke a general strike which would halt Britain’s war effort. Lloyd George told the War Cabinet of plans by some sections of the labour movement to call a conference in Leeds on 3 June to establish a Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council in Britain similar to those in Russia, and Cecil concluded that the conference intended to start a revolution in Britain. Although their colleagues decided not to suppress the conference despite its revolutionary overtones, that members of the War Cabinet could take such fantasies seriously was an indication of how badly the strikes shook the government’s morale.” Convinced that the leadership of the strike resided in the hands

of a small minority, the War Cabinet refused to negotiate with unofficial strike leaders, ordered the interception of communications between the strike areas, and threatened to prosecute strike leaders under the Defence of the Realm Act.” The strikers also came under pressure from unskilled workers who were members of general unions and who were resentful that the ASE strikers had flung them out of work in order to defend their own craft privileges and exemption from military service. This public hostility, plus the government’s firmness, encouraged the ASB’s official leadership to repudiate the strike. Beginning on 14 May strikers in Lancashire to Balfour, 30 Mar. 1917; PRO FO 800/205/80: Stamfordham to Balfour, 6 Apr. 1917.

2 PRO FO 800/205/88: Cecil to Buchanan, 13 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC118: War Cabinet, 13 Apr. 1917; PRO FO 800/178/Rus/17/3: Hardinge to Bertie, 17 Apr.

"tt PRO CAB 23/2/WC147: War Cabinet, 25 May 1917; PRO CAB 24/16/GT1049: B.E.B., Report on the Russian Revolution conference at Leeds [n.d., but c.15 June 17].

oe PRO CAB 23/2/WC135, WC138, and WC139: War Cabinet, 9, 15, and 16 May 1917; PRO CAB 24/13/GT742: Proceedings of a conference, 17 May 1917.

88 The British Crisis began to trickle back to work, and on 17 May the government issued warrants to arrest ten of the leading shop stewards. That served to intimidate their colleagues, and on 18 May the remaining leaders of the strike decided to call on their followers to return to work. The ASE’s executive and the leaders of the shop stewards met Addison on 19 May to state their grievances. The shop stewards agreed to recommend a return to work, and Addison agreed to release the arrested men pending their trial and not to victimize strikers. Nothing was settled about the two issues in dispute—the trade cards and dilution—but by August the government had aban-

doned its attempt to extend dilution to private work.” , So alarmed were they at the extent of the unrest which the strikes

had revealed, that the War Cabinet quickly established a Commission to Inquire into Industrial Unrest. Its report, which was presented in July, suggested that the government’s manpower policy was only one of a number of causes for popular discontent. Others included the high price of food compared to earnings, the

conviction that shipping and trading companies were guilty of profiteering, and the belief that the government was taking insufficient steps to stop this. War weariness was also fed by bereavements and overcrowded housing. Skilled workers were indignant that many dilutees were earning more than they did. The Munitions of War Act, the Defence of the Realm Act, and the Military Service Acts were resented by trade union members. Many ordinary members of craft unions like the ASE had turned to the shop stewards for leadership because they were convinced that the national leadership of their unions no longer represented their real interests.”

The Commission proposed a number of recommendations to mitigate the causes of this discontent. The government had to lower the retail price of food even if that required a Treasury subsidy, take control of all essential foodstuffs, and limit traders’ profits. District commissioners should be appointed and each workshop should have its own committee of workers’ representatives

and managers to avoid delays in settling disputes about labour * Hinton, Shop Stewards, 201-6. °° Cd. 8663: The Commission of Inquiry into Working Class Unrest, Parliamentary Papers, 1917-18, vol. xiv [dated 12 July 1917]; B. Waites, “The Government of the Home Front and the “Moral Economy” of the Working Class’, in P. H. Liddle (ed.), Home Fires and Foreign Fields: British Social and Military Experience in the First World War (London, 1985), 175-7.

The British Crisis 89 practices. A bonus system should be introduced for time-workers in order to bring their earnings up to those of pieceworkers. The Ministry of Munitions was asked to issue a new and precise list of protected occupations and permit the trade unions to issue exemption cards for their members engaged on vital war work. Less prosaically, they also recommended that the government had to act to persuade the population that their sacrifices were being made in a good cause. Some witnesses who came before the Commission ‘referred to “Russia” and openly declared the one course open for Labour was a “general down tools” revolutionary policy to secure reforms that constitutional action was failing to effect’.*© In Russia the revolution had brought to the surface latent divisions over Russia’s war aims when on 11 April the all-Russian

conference of Soviets insisted that the Provisional government must persuade the allies to issue a declaration comparable to the statement it had issued the day before, which had renounced a policy of annexations or indemnities. ‘Revolutionary defencism’ quickly became the policy of both the Soviets and the Provisional government.” In April the Dutch and Scandinavian socialist parties had also issued a summons to attend an international socialist conference in Stockholm. To dispel allegations that Britain’s war

aims were imperialistic and illiberal, the Commissioners recommended that the War Cabinet show that they were committed to fighting the war to make the world safe for democracy and that they announce that at the end of the war they intended to introduce a far-reaching social reform programme. [t was a measure of the War Cabinet’s concern that they began to

act along the lines suggested by the Commission almost before it had reported. Devonport’s resignation on 28 May cleared the way for changes in food policy. His successor, Lord Rhondda, did not share his predecessor’s doctrinaire reluctance to see the govern-

ment interfere in the market-place. In the wake of the strikes Rhondda began to implement a food policy designed to conciliate the consumer.” The price of a quartern (41b.) loaf had risen to 1s. by March and the key to Rhondda’s policy was a bread subsidy 6 Cd. 8663: The Commission to Inquire into Industrial Unrest. 7 R. W. Wade, The Russian Search for Peace, February—October 1917 (Stanford, Ca., 1969), 30-S. 140 parnett British Food Policy, 125-33; Harris, ‘Bureaucrats and Businessmen’,

90 The British Crisis designed to reduce its price to 9d. On 19 July, despite opposition

from the Treasury, who baulked at providing a subsidy of £30,000,000 per annum, he persuaded the War Cabinet to agree on

the grounds that ‘For the vigorous prosecution of the war a contented working class was indispensable.’” The subsidy came into operation a month later, barely two weeks after he had begun to requisition certain basic foodstuffs and to issue a list of fixed whole-

sale and retail prices for them. Less spectacularly, but no less important given Britain’s growing dependence upon the USA for imported foodstuffs, he also persuaded the War Cabinet to centralize the purchase of all foodstuffs abroad under his ministry.'”! Educating the public to believe that Britain was fighting for a more just world both at home and abroad was more difficult. Two days before they agreed to the bread subsidy, the War Cabinet tried to demonstrate their determination to pursue a vigorous postwar social reconstruction programme by upgrading the existing

Reconstruction Committee, which had been established by Asquith in March 1916, to a full ministry and appointing Addison as its head.’ Milner’s solution to the threat of a British revolution was to counteract pacifist tendencies amongst the working classes by supporting patriotic labour organizations like Victor Fisher’s

British Workers’ League.'* Other measures to promote propaganda at home to counter war weariness had been taken even before the strikes. In February 1917 the novelist John Buchan had been appointed to head the Department of Information, created to

take charge of the dissemination of propaganda in enemy and neutral countries and in Britain.’% Until May his department carried out little propaganda at home, but in the middle of the strikes he asked the War Cabinet to allow him to sponsor tours throughout the major industrial areas by labour delegations whom his depart-

ment had sent to visit the reoccupied zones of France. He also wanted to enlist the services of MPs to speak at public meetings in ?” PRO CAB 24/20/GT1419: Rhondda, Regulation of the price of bread, 16 July 1917; PRO CAB 23/3/WC190: War Cabinet, 19 July 1917. 100 Barnett, British Food Policy, 134-6. 101 PRO CAB 24/20/GT1419: Rhondda, Unification of food control, 16 July 1917; PRO CAB 23/3/WC188 and WC190: War Cabinet, 17 and 19 July 1917. 12 Morgan, Portrait of a Progressive, 70. 103 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/38/2/5: Milner to Lloyd George, 26 May 1917. 104 PRO CAB 23/1/WC24 and WC60: War Cabinet, 24 Jan. and 9 Feb. 1917; M.

Sanders and P. Taylor, British Propaganda during the First World War (London, 1982), 60-4.

The British Crisis 91 support of the war.’ The War Cabinet had already agreed that the King should visit some of the strike-bound areas, and they endorsed his plan, which bore fruit in August in the shape of the National War Aims Committee.’ But the committee’s immediate impact was less than it might have been, for not only was the minister deputed to guide it, Sir Edward Carson, a poor administrator, but it was also handicapped by the War Cabinet’s reluctance to issue a coherent public declaration of war aims.'°’ On 10 May, during a secret session of the House of Commons, Lloyd George had insisted, in contrast to his statements to the War Cabinet, that under no circumstances would Britain return Meso-

potamia, Palestine, or the German colonies to their former rulers./°%8 But in view of the suspicion being voiced by many labour leaders that the war was being prolonged to add more territory to the British empire, he had to tread more carefully when he spoke on the same subject in public at Glasgow on 29 June. His oration

was to be an answer to those socialists who insisted that a satisfactory peace could be concluded immediately. The War Cabinet had decided that the best way to avoid the difficulties raised by the Provisional Government’s formula of a peace based on no indemnities or annexations was to insist that the ultimate disposal of the disputed territories should be left to the eventual peace conference. He strengthened Britain’s claims in the Middle East and Africa by insisting that Turkish misrule in Armenia and Mesopotamia precluded returning those provinces to the Turks, and that

as German East Africa had never been inhabited by Germans, it was proper to consult the wishes of the indigenous population. He found a formula to overcome the difficulties raised by his determ1-

nation to continue fighting until Germany was democratized by

suggesting that whether Germany adopted a democratic constitution was a matter for the German people themselves to decide,

but encouraged them to do so by saying that the British would regard it as one of the guarantees of the stable peace which they > PRO CAB 24/13/GT774: Buchan, Propaganda at home, 18 May 1917. 106 J. Ramsden (ed.), Real Old Tory Politics: The Political Diaries of Sir Robert Sanders, Lord Bayford, 1910-35 (London, 1984), 86-7; PRO CAB 23/2/WC136 and WC142: War Cabinet, 11 and 22 May 1917; PRO CAB 23/3/WC154: War Cabinet, 5 June 1917. 107 Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, 67-70. 08 J. Barnes and D. Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 1896-1929 (London, 1980), 155; Ramsden (ed.), Real Old Tory Politics, 845.

92 The British Crisis sought.” He truthfully argued that German offers to grant Belgium its independence were no more than a sham designed to camouflage its continued vassalage to Germany, but his suggestion that Britain was fighting for the same aims as President Wilson, while appealing to organized labour, was at best disingenuous.'"°

Derby’s analysis of the government’s situation was bleak. “The government is really scared at the last strike, and with the general condition of the country—and really I sympathise with them’, he informed Haig. “The state of affairs is very bad & there is no doubt that the Russian revolution has created an unrest which is revolutionary and dangerous.”!"! Since January 1915 Lloyd George had recognized that excessive casualties, if they were not accompanied by tangible victories, could breed defeatism. The May strikes, coinciding as they did with the Russian Revolution and the French

mutinies, only heightened his fears. Henceforth, each time the General Staff requested a new draft of manpower or wanted to launch a major offensive, he could argue that heavy losses and the consequent dispatch of yet more men to France was fraught with dangerous political consequences and would cause war weariness to develop into defeatism.!” But Haig drew the opposite conclusions. He agreed that the war was being fought to protect the established order both in Britain and in the international state system. Following the Russian Revolution, he shared the War Cabinet’s concern that Britain might be threatened by the spread of socialism. But he believed that the best way to undercut its appeal and to demonstrate the legitimacy of the established order was to secure a military victory. On 13 August he

told Robertson that: ‘if the war were to end tomorrow, Great Britain would find herself not merely the greatest power in Europe, but in the World. The chief people to suffer would be the socialists, who are trying to rule us all, at a time when the right minded of the Nation are so engaged in the country’s battles that they (the socialists) are left free to work mischief.’ When Robertson chided him on 17 September not to overlook the fact that morale in Britain was 09 PRO CAB 23/3/WC171: War Cabinet, 27 June 1917. 110 J.B. Scott (ed.), Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918 (Washington, DC, 1921), 114. Ht PRO WO 256/18: Derby to Haig, 27 May 1917. 112 LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/23/27: Robertson to Haig, 26 May 1917. 43 LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/23/44: Haig to Robertson, 13 Aug. 1917.

The British Crisis 93 declining, Haig insisted that ‘success on this front where even the masses, by instinct, know it to be all important will do more than anything else to cure the doubts and the restlessness you mention’.!4 At the end of March Balfour had predicted that, if Britain failed

to overcome the U-boat threat, ‘all the war plans of the Cabinet will have to be modified and we must play for an early peace, as honourable as we can make it’.! By the beginning of August it was

apparent that, although the U-boats had not been defeated, the threat they posed to Britain’s maritime communications was being

contained. But the U-boat offensive and the government’s attempts to accelerate the mobilization of the war economy had provoked Britain’s own domestic crisis. That, too, was contained. The War Cabinet therefore had no immediate cause to ‘play for an early peace’. But in the face of war weariness at home, the collapse of Russia, the French mutinies, and the expected slow arrival of American military assistance, they still had to decide if they could, or even should, ‘play’ for an early victory. 14 LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/23/52: Haig to Robertson, 17 Sept. 1917. "5 PRO FO 800/199: Balfour to Lloyd George, 29 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 23/40/ IWC4: Imperial War Cabinet, 27 Mar. 1917.

4

The War Policy Committee and the Origins of the Flanders Offensive In February 1917 the Entente had a plan to win the war. But by the beginning of June, as Milner explained, “The defection of Russia has completely destroyed these prospects. On the other hand, the entrance of America into the war has introduced a new factor, of

great ultimate promise but little immediate value.”' At the same time as Britain’s command of the seas was being challenged by the U-boat offensive, the effectiveness of the Russian and French armies seemed to be dissolving. It appeared that Nivelle’s successor,

Pétain, would place the French army on the defensive for the remainder of the year and await the arrival of a powerful American army in France before seeking a decision on the western front in

1918. Released from the Calais agreement by Nivelle’s failure, Haig wanted to revert to his plan to mount a major offensive from the Ypres salient to clear the Flanders coast. However, the faltering

efforts of their two major allies gave the War Cabinet pause for thought. The relative decline of French and Russian power made Britain the dominant member of the Entente, at least until the USA was able to deploy its great latent strength in France. This presented the British with a window of opportunity during which they might be able to shape the Entente’s strategy and secure their own war aims. But it also meant that the Entente’s power vis-a-vis

the Central Powers had declined. That implied that if Haig mounted a major offensive without significant allied military sup-

port, the Germans would be able to mass the whole of their reserves against the BEF and perhaps blunt its offensive capacity for

good. In early June the War Cabinet established the War Policy Committee to weigh up Britain’s strategic options in the light of the crises in France and Russia, Britain’s own economic and manpower

problems, and the military and diplomatic options in the Middle East, the Balkans, and on the Italian and western fronts. ' PRO CAB 1/24/16: Milner, War Policy, 7 June 1917.

Origins of the Flanders Offensive 95 Haig and Robertson had consented to co-operate with Nivelle on

the understanding that if his offensive failed the War Cabinet would allow them to switch the main thrust of the BEF’s efforts to Ypres and that Haig would launch a preliminary operation to clear the Messines ridge in May.” Their attention continued to be drawn to the north by persistent rumours that the Germans were massing troops and destroyers for a large-scale offensive in Flanders. This offensive might sever Haig’s communications with England and the Germans might achieve a peace settlement, leaving them in occu-

pation of Belgium.’ But the two generals were not in complete agreement about the prospects of a Flanders offensive. Haig and GHQ still believed that the BEF could break through the German line in a decisive battle. Robertson was a more subtle and astute strategist. He urged Haig to abandon any idea of attempting to break through the enemy’s line, advising him instead to repeat the success of Vimy ridge and, by careful preparations and the pursuit of limited objectives, to inflict greater numbers of casualties on the

enemy than his own forces suffered. The cumulative impact of attrition at the front, combined with the growing privations which the blockade was imposing on the German people, would bring Germany to terms.°

On 1 May the War Cabinet considered their future military options in the light of the possibility that neither France nor Russia would be able to give them significant active help in 1917. Lloyd George gave a lengthy recitation of the case in favour of Pétain’s strategy of waiting for the Americans in 1918 and ‘felt bound to admit that they made some appeal to him’.® But virtual inactivity on the western front was anathema to most of his colleagues. Every time the Entente had allowed the Germans to seize the initiative— 2 R. Blake (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1918 (London, 1952), 212.

3 PRO WO 256/16: Haig diary, 22 Mar. 1917; PRO WO 256/17: Robertson to Haig, 6 Apr. 1917; PRO WO 158/898: Macdonogh to Charteris, 5 Apr. 1917; LHCMA, Benson MSS B1/10: Robertson to Clive, 24 Mar. 1917. These fears were shared by the Admiralty War Staff: see PRO CAB 24/8/GT277: Admiralty, General review of the naval situation, 24 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC104: War Cabinet, 26 Mar. 1917. 4 W. J. Philpott, ‘British Military Strategy on the Western Front: Independence or Alliance, 1904-1918’, D.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1991, fos. 371-2. > LHCMA, Robertson MSS I/23/21: Robertson to Haig, 20 Apr. 1917, PRO CAB 24/11/GT599: Robertson, Operations on the west front, 30 Apr. 1917. 6 PRO CAB 23/13/128A: War Cabinet, 1 May 1917.

96 Origins of the Flanders Offensive in August 1914 when they had launched the Schlieffen Plan, in May

1915 when they had broken through on the eastern front at Gorlice-Tarnow, in September 1915 when they had invaded Serbia,

and in February 1916 when they began to bleed the French army dry at Verdun—they had inflicted grievous losses on the allies. Haig and Robertson deplored maintaining a passive attitude in the

west in 1917, Robertson because it would enable the Central Powers to crush either Russia or Italy and Haig because it would allow the German army to recover from the losses it had suffered in 1916.’ The CIGS also reminded the War Cabinet that, although it might be in France’s interests to await the Americans, it might not

be in Britain’s. French and British interests were not the same. ‘Our object is not primarily the direct defence of French soil, but to win the war and secure British interests.” Milner agreed. ‘We may not be able to win the war anyway’, he argued, ‘but I am sure we

cannot win it if we relapse into inactivity now in the principal theatre.’”’ Jellicoe had already reiterated his belief that it was vital that German U-boats and destroyers be deprived of their bases on the Flanders coast.'!° Hankey wanted the best of both worlds: to ape the French and conserve British resources for a decisive conflict in 1918 when US troops would be in France in strength, but also to launch an Anglo-French offensive in Flanders in 1917 to conserve

tonnage and secure Britain’s cross-Channel communications by taking Ostend and Zeebrugge."! But the decisive voice in persuading the War Cabinet to induce the French to agree to a Flanders offensive was that of Smuts. Like Robertson he was irked by the fact that, despite its military, naval, and economic contributions to the Entente, British policy on the western front was subordinated to that of France. Smuts insisted that if the French adopted Pétain’s policy, they should be asked to take over more line, thus freeing British forces to form a strategic reserve and to mount an offensive in Flanders.’? On 1 May the War 7 PRO CAB 24/11/GT599: Robertson, Operations on the west front, 30 Apr. 1917; Blake (ed.), Haig, 218-19. 8 PRO CAB 24/10/GT477: Robertson to War Cabinet, 17 Apr. 1917. ° LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/21/65: Milner to Robertson, 1 May 1917; IWM, Wilson MSS microfilm reel VI: Wilson diary, 28-9 Apr. 1917; LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/14/77: Robertson to Haig, 30 Apr. 1917. 0 PRO CAB 24/10/GT497: Jellicoe to War Cabinet, 18 Apr. 1917. 1! PRO CAB 63/20: Hankey, Memorandum, 18 Apr. 1917. 122 PRO CAB 24/11/GT549: Smuts to Robertson, 13 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/ WC126: War Cabinet, 25 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 24/11/GT597: Smuts, The general

Origins of the Flanders Offensive 97 Cabinet agreed to adopt Robertson’s concept of attrition. Even if the allies could not break the German line in France by hammering at it in 1917 ‘we might bring them to a frame of mind in which they would agree to a peace on terms acceptable to the Allies’.’? In the wake of his support for the now-discredited Nivelle, Lloyd George had no option other than to acquiesce, and on the eve of the Paris conference held on 4 and 5 May the Prime Minister told Haig that he was ready ‘to press whatever plan Robertson and I decide on’.* When the British and French governments met, the politicians endorsed the recommendations of a separate conference between Haig, Robertson, Pétain, and Nivelle to continue offensive oper-

ations on the western front. Failure to do so would allow the Germans to recover from the losses the allies had inflicted upon them and to attack Russia or Italy, and would serve to sustain German civilian morale while the U-boats bit still deeper into

allied tonnage. However, they also agreed that future operations should not be aimed at breaking the German line but at ‘wearing down and exhausting the enemy’s resistance’.’ The conference marked the moment at which military predominance on the western front shifted from the French to the British. The BEF was to mount the main attack and the French were to support Haig by taking over more of the line and by continuing to attack the Germans facing them. These recommendations were acceptable to Lloyd George, Painlévé, and Pétain because the generals agreed

that ‘our object can be obtained by relentlessly attacking with limited objectives, while making the fullest use of our artillery. By this means we hope to gain our ends with the minimum loss possible.’° Lloyd George was later to lambaste Haig for committing the BEF to a futile offensive in Flanders in the summer of 1917.

But Lloyd George only had himself to blame, for he accepted the conference’s conclusion that the politicians should leave it to and military situation and particularly that on the western front, 29 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 24/11/GT599: Robertson, Operations on the west front, 30 Apr. 1917. 5 PRO CAB 23/13/128A: War Cabinet, 1 May 1917; IWM, Wilson MSS microfilm reel VI: Wilson diary, 1 May 1917. 4 Blake (ed.), Haig, 227. PRO CAB 24/12/GT657: Anglo-French conference, 4 and 5 May 1917. Resolutions proposed by the PM, 5 May 1917.

1 PRO CAB 24/12/GT657: Robertson, Statement by General Sir William Robertson, 5 May 1917; PRO CAB 28/2/IC21: Summary of the proceedings of the Anglo-French conference held at Paris, 4-5 May 1917; Blake (ed.), Haig, 227-8.

98 Origins of the Flanders Offensive their military advisers to determine how and when these offensives were to be mounted."” In return for agreeing to co-operate with a British offensive in

Flanders, the French secured a much larger measure of control over allied policy in Greece. The Anglo-French force which had landed at Salonika in October 1915 in an attempt to rescue the Serbian army had failed, but remained in place throughout 1916.

The commander of the allied army was the French general, Maurice Sarrail. His senior British subordinate, Sir George Milne, described him as ‘conceited, excitable, ambitious, impetuous and

unscrupulous’.'® In October 1916, with Sarrail’s connivance, Eleftherious Venizelos, the Greek liberal leader, established a pro-allied Provisional Government at Salonika in opposition to Constantine, the pro-German King of Greece. The British suspected that this was part of a French plot to trigger an anti-royalist revolution in Athens in order to install a pro-French government and so allow France to dominate the Levant at the end of the war. The British, who already had a base in Egypt from which to influence the eastern Mediterranean, were suspicious of French aspir-

ations, which they thought were inimical to post-war British interests. They wanted to preserve a united Greece by bringing about a rapprochement between Venizelos and Constantine.” In December 1916 it seemed as if the British and French might

be on the verge of war with the Greek royalists. Robertson and Jellicoe resisted French importunities that the British reinforce Milne.”° In addition to their opposition to French political aspirations, the British feared that if they agreed it would place an insupportable burden on their already overstretched merchant fleet.2! Lloyd George had once been a strong supporter of the 1 PRO CAB 28/2/IC21: Summary of the proceedings of the Anglo-French conference held at Paris, 4-5 May 1917; B. Bond, ‘Soldiers and Statesmen: British Civil—-Military Relations in 1917’, Military Affairs, 32/2 (1968), 64. 18 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS E/1/6/1: Milne to Robertson, 20 July 1916.

9D. Dutton, ‘The Balkan Campaign and French War Aims in the Great War’, English Historical Review, 94/370 (1979), 97-113; id., ‘The Deposition of King Constantine of Greece, June 1917: An Episode in Anglo-French Diplomacy’, Canadian Journal of History, 12/3 (1978), 325-31; PRO FO 800/202/17: Milne to Robertson, 28 Jan. 1917; PRO CAB 24/10/GT419: H. G. N[icolson], Memorandum, 21 Jan. 1917. 20 PRO CAB 23/1/WC18: War Cabinet, appendix IV: Dessino to War Cabinet, 23 Dec. 1916; HLRO, Bonar Law MSS 81/1/71: Robertson to Bonar Law, 27 Dec. 1916. 4t_C. a Court Repington, The First World War 1914-1918 (London, 1920), i. 414;

A. Temple Patterson (ed.), The Jellicoe Papers: Selections from the Private and

Origins of the Flanders Offensive 99 Salonika campaign, but he began to change his mind in late 1916. An offensive from Salonika towards Sofia to knock Bulgaria out of

the war would succeed only if it coincided with a simultaneous offensive mounted by the Russian and Rumanian armies. The collapse of the Rumanian army in late 1916 made that unlikely, and,

even before the Russian Revolution, the British and French governments had agreed that Sarrail’s mission should be confined to containing those enemy divisions on his front.” By April 1917 the War Cabinet wanted the allies to withdraw to a smaller perim-

eter around the port of Salonika and then to transfer part of the British garrison to reinforce their own forces in Palestine, where they were anxious to assert Britain’s own post-war interests.”

The final straw came when an offensive which Sarrail had planned to coincide with the Nivelle offensive miscarried at considerable cost to Milne’s troops. The case for transferring some of Milne’s forces to Palestine was now overwhelming.” At the Paris conference Lloyd George agreed to give the French virtual carte blanche in Greece. Their representative was henceforth to be the main channel of communications with the Greeks, and Sarrail was permitted to occupy Thessaly and to seize the harvest to prevent

the Greek royalists from breaking the blockade which they had imposed on Constantine.” Three weeks later, when the War Cabinet discovered that the French had decided to make a pre-emptive strike to depose Constantine and install a Venizelist government; they were powerless to prevent it.”° It was only Constantine’s caOfficial Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe (London, 1968), ti. 129; PRO CAB 23/1/WC1 and WC2: War Cabinet, 9 and 11 Dec. 1916. 22 PRO WO 256/14: Robertson to Haig, 12 Dec. 1916; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/1: Hankey diary, 26 Dec. 1916; PRO CAB 28/2/IC17(b). Notes of an Anglo-French conference, 27 Feb. 1917. 23 PRO CAB 24/9/GT347: Robertson, Situation at Salonika, 2 Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 24/10/GT433: Admiralty War Staff, French proposal to invade Thessaly, 12

Apr. 1917; PRO CAB 24/10/GT430: Robertson, Note on a proposal to occupy Larisa, 13 Apr. 1917. 24 PRO CAB 24/12/GT606: Robertson, Withdrawal of the British from Salonika, 1 May 1917; PRO CAB 23/13/128A: War Cabinet, 1 May 1917; IWM, Wilson MSS microfilm reel VI: Wilson diary, 1 May 1917; PRO CAB 23/40/[WC14: Imperial War Cabinet, 2 May 1917. 25 PRO CAB 28/2/IC21: Summary of the proceedings of the Anglo-French conference held at Paris, 4-5 May 1917; Dutton, “The Deposition of King Constantine of Greece’, 337-8. 26 PRO CAB 23/2/WC144, WC142, WC148, and WC149: War Cabinet, 22, 23, 28,

and 29 May 1917; PRO CAB 24/14/GT840: Robertson, French proposal for the

occupation of Greece, 25 May 1917; PRO CAB 24/13/GT775: Jellicoe and

100 Origins of the Flanders Offensive pitulation on 12 June that prevented a war between Greece and the

Entente; it also led to the installation of Venizelos as premier in Athens.?’

The Paris conference had agreed that the Anglo-French armies would secure their objectives only by fighting ‘with all available forces with the object of destroying the enemy’s divisions’. But just

how willing were the French to subscribe to what Hankey described as ‘our point of view viz. to continue the policy of remorse-

less hammering’? It was not difficult for the British intelligence community to gather information about the strikes and civilian unrest which affected France in the early summer of 1917, for they were reported in the French press and relayed to the War Cabinet by the Foreign Office and the Intelligence Bureau of the Depart-

ment of Information. But the French high command was more successful at concealing the unrest in their army. Consequently, the War Cabinet had considerable difficulty in determining whether the French army was capable of attacking the Germans and drawing their reserves away from Flanders.” However, although they could conceal the real extent of the mutinies, the French could not hide the fact that the morale of many of their troops had slumped.° On 2 June Pétain’s chief of staff, General Débeny, told Haig that

Pétain would have to cancel an offensive planned for 10 June because his troops were tired and needed leave. Although Débeny did not use the word mutiny, he could not have left Haig in any doubt that something was amiss, an impression which Pétain himself reinforced five days later.*!

By then the War Cabinet had begun to hear similar rumours. Pétain had left Haig with the misleading impression that the unrest Robertson to War Cabinet, 18 May 1917; Dutton, “The Deposition of King Constantine of Greece’, 340-1. 27 Dutton, “The Deposition of King Constantine of Greece’, 343-4; PRO CAB 23/ 3/WC159 and WC162: War Cabinet, 8 and 13 June 1917. 28 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 4 May 1917. 2? PRO CAB 21/122: Hankey to Curzon et al., 23 Apr. 1918 and enc.: Extracts from report on French offensive of Apr. 1917, 4 Oct. 1917; PRO CAB 23/3/WC194: Minutes of the War Cabinet, 24 July 1917. 30 PRO FO 800/191: Bertie diary, 22 May 1917; D. French, ‘Watching the Allies: British Intelligence and the French Mutinies of 1917’, Intelligence and National Security, 6/3 (July 1991), 573-92. 31 LHCMA, Benson MSS B1/107: Résumé de lentrevue du 2 juin a Bavincourt entre le Major General et le Maréchal Haig; Blake (ed.), Haig, 234, 236.

Origins of the Flanders Offensive 101 had been confined to only two divisions. On 6 June the DMO, Sir Frederick Maurice, transmitted to the War Cabinet a report from one of the British liaison officers that ‘there was serious trouble,

practically amounting to mutiny, in a number of French regiments...’ Two days later Sir Henry Wilson told ministers that, following the Russian collapse, he had ‘grave doubts as to whether we could count on the continued resistance of the French army and

nation until such time as effective military assistance could be received from the United States of America’.** He advised that, unless the allies won some major military or diplomatic success in

the next year, France would make peace.* Such a victory was possible only in Flanders, but without active French support Haig’s chance of winning it was greatly diminished.» Wilson brought to a head a growing feeling amongst ministers

that it was time to undertake a full review of British policy and prospects.°*° This task was performed by the War Policy Committee,

consisting of Lloyd George, Curzon, Milner, and Smuts with Hankey in attendance as its secretary. It met sixteen times between 11 June and 18 July, and conducted the most wide-ranging consideration of British domestic, military, and diplomatic policies since the establishment of the Lloyd George coalition. Any lingering hopes that the Russian army might play a major

role in 1917 quickly evaporated. The Provisional Government, knowing that it needed a military victory to consolidate its power, opted to take the offensive.*’ On 4 June Alexiev was sacked and

replaced by General Brusilov, who on 9 June promised that he would launch an offensive on the south-west front no later than the beginning of July.** But the offensive, which began on 1 July, was easily repulsed by the Germans. By 23 July the War Cabinet knew 32 PRO CAB 23/3/WC156/5: Minutes of the War Cabinet, 6 June 1917; LHCMA, Spears MSS 1/13/1: Spiers to Maurice, 4, 5, and 6 June 1917. 33 PRO CAB 23/16/WCI159A: War Cabinet, 8 June 1917. 344 TWM, Wilson MSS microfilm reel VII: Wilson diary, 4, 5, 6, and 17 May and 1 June 1917; M. J. Carley, “The Origins of French Intervention in the Russian Civil War, January—May 1918: A Reappraisal’, Journal of Modern History, 48 (1976), 414; G. Riddell, Lord Riddell’s War Diary 1914-1918 (London, 1933), 249. > PRO CAB 23/16/WCI159A: War Cabinet, 8 June 1917. %6 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/2/1/4: Amery to Lloyd George, 5 June 1917; J. Barnes and D. Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, 1. 1896-1929 (London, 1980), 157-61. 37 R.S. Feldman, ‘The Russian General Staff and the June 1917 Offensive’, Soviet Studies, 19/4 (1968), 534-7. 33 PRO CAB 24/16/GT1016: Barter to Robertson, 9 June 1917.

102 Origins of the Flanders Offensive that the Russians were in headlong retreat. The Russian army never recovered from its failure and in the ensuing months its remnants melted away.’”’

When Curzon had reported to the War Cabinet in mid-May on the strategic repercussions of the Russian collapse, he had concluded that the assistance of the US army would be essential if the

British wished to liberate occupied France and Belgium.” But the committee now discovered that there was little possibility that the American army would be able to take the place of the Russians in the foreseeable future. When the commander of the AEF, Gen-

eral John Pershing, arrived in London in mid-June, he told Robertson that the US army would not be able to deploy more than twelve divisions in France by the start of 1918, even if the British supplied them with guns and munitions. A report to the committee by Major-General Bridges, who had just returned with the Balfour mission, painted an even bleaker picture. Bridges did not believe that the US army would be able to deploy more than six divisions in France by December 1917 and that even a year later they would only have eighteen.** Curzon described his forecast as ‘the most depressing statement the Cabinet had received for a long time’.” Lloyd George promptly urged Woodrow Wilson to hasten the day

when American military manpower would become a significant factor on the western front by allowing US infantry to be drafted into French divisions.** Any possibility that the Committee might delay an offensive on the western front until the arrival of a large American army was killed by these forecasts, for it appeared that 39 PRO CAB 24/16/GT1089: Barter to Robertson, 17 June 1917; A. A. Brusilov,

A Soldier’s Note-Book 1914-1918 (London, 1930), 310-11; PRO CAB 24/28/ GT1293: Blair to DMI, 3 July 1917; PRO CAB 24/19/GT1320: Blair to DMI, 4 July

1917; PRO CAB 24/19/GT1341: Blair to DMI, 6 July 1917; PRO CAB 24/19/ GT1387: Knox to DMI, 9 July 1917; PRO CAB 24/21/GT1553: Dispatch B3, Brig.Gen. Knox, south-west front, 10 July 1917. 40 PRO CAB 24/13/GT703: Curzon, Policy in view of Russian developments, 12 May 1917; D. Woodward, ‘David Lloyd George, a Negotiated Peace with Germany and the Kiihlmann Peace Kite of September 1917’, Canadian Journal of History, 6/ 1 (1971), 80. 41 PRO CAB 23/3/WC164: T. Bridges, Forecast of the arrival of the American land forces in France, 14 June 1917; J. J. Pershing, My Experiences in the Great War (Blue Ridge Summit, Pa., 1931; repr. 1988), i. 51-2. ” Repington, The First World War, 1. 581. 4, HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/23/1/12: Hankey to Lloyd George and enc., 16 June 1917.

Origins of the Flanders Offensive 103 even in 1918 the AEF would be too weak to tip the military balance

in favour of the Entente.

One way in which the balance might be tipped in the Entente’s

favour would be if Britain could persuade one or more of Germany’s allies to make a separate peace. On 9 May Lloyd George told the War Cabinet that if Russia made a separate peace

‘the best chance for the Allies would appear to lie in a separate peace with Austria, in which Italy might have to be compelled to acquiesce’.“* The French mutinies made him even more keen to

redress the strategic balance in this fashion.* Robertson and Jellicoe did not share the Prime Minister’s apocalyptic vision that if Russia made a separate peace ‘the whole situation would be trans-

formed’.*© But Robertson did agree that the impact of Russia’s defection would be mitigated if it encouraged Turkey, Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary to make a separate peace. Since March he had been willing to ease their passage by compelling Russia, Rumania, and Italy to reduce their war aims on the grounds that they had not been pulling their weight within the alliance.*” But promises made to Britain’s allies were only one set of obstacles which stood in the way of negotiating a separate peace with any of the Central Powers.

The Russian collapse improved the cohesion of the German coalition and the British never discovered reliable partners with whom to negotiate. The Foreign Office were sometimes willing to listen to peace feelers emanating from Germany’s allies, but, for fear of alienating

their own allies, they were not willing to enter into active negotiations. The moment that the Serbian government heard rumours that the British might be negotiating with Bulgaria they warned the Foreign Office that Serbia was not prepared to sacrifice territory in

the cause of peace.** Thus when Admiral Hall, the Director of “ PRO CAB 23/13/WC135A: War Cabinet, 9 May 1917; V. H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1971), 85. 45 PRO CAB 23/16/WC159A: War Cabinet, 8 June 1917. 46 PRO CAB 23/13/WC135A: War Cabinet, 9 May 1917. 47 PRO CAB 24/9/GT329: Robertson, Addendum to note by the CIGS dated 12 Feb. 1916, 29 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 24/12/GT678: Robertson, Military effect of Russia’s seceding from the war, 9 May 1917. * PRO FO 371/3081/88106: Cecil to de Graz and War Cabinet, 1 May 1917.

104 Origins of the Flanders Offensive Naval Intelligence, suggested using two agents and a Bulgarian prisoner of war to open communication with Bulgarian politicians, Cecil crushed the suggestion with the retort that the Foreign Office did not entrust diplomatic negotiations to secret agents.” When an attempt by President Wilson to use Henry Morgenthau, the former US ambassador to Constantinople, to sound Turkish leaders about

the possibility of making a separate peace, failed, the Foreign Office expressed satisfaction..° When in June 1917 it received the programme of the leaders of the Liberal opposition party in

Turkey, the latter were merely thanked for providing this information.*!

Nowhere was the Foreign Office’s reluctance to take active steps

to seek a negotiated peace with one of Germany’s allies more

apparent than in their policy towards Austria-Hungary. In November 1916 the Emperor Franz-Joseph, a committed adherent to the Austro-German alliance, died. His successor, Karl, was much

less committed and wanted to end the war as soon as possible provided he could do so in a way compatible with Austria-Hungary’s interests in and relations with Germany.” The War Cabinet first seriously discussed the possibility of a separate peace with

Austria-Hungary on 10 January 1917. This discussion resulted from a report from Norway that the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Czernin, was seeking a separate peace.°> The Foreign Office

was not blind to the advantages of detaching Austria-Hungary from Germany. It might lead to the disintegration of the Central Powers’ alliance. It would also amount to a major defeat for Germany’s imperial ambitions, because ‘it would create everlasting 4 PRO FO 800/198: Hall to Cecil, 15 May 1917. °° F, W. Brecher, ‘Revisiting Ambassador Morgenthau’s Turkish Peace Mission

of 1917’, Middle Eastern Studies, 24/1 (1988), 357-68; Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers 1914-1920 (Washington, DC, 1940), 17-19; I. Friedman, The Question of Palestine 1914-1918: British-Jewish-Arab Relations (London, 1973), 211-17; PRO CAB 1/25/24: Drogheda, Memorandum on Turkish peace overtures, 20 Nov. 1917.

2! PRO CAB 23/3/WC164: War Cabinet, 15 June 1917; PRO CAB 1/25/24: Drogheda, Memorandum on Turkish peace overtures, 20 Nov. 1917.

2 W. B. Fest, Peace or Partition: The Habsburg Monarchy and British Policy 1914-1918 (London, 1978), 48-50.

3 Fest, Peace or Partition, 51; K. J. Calder, Britain and the Origins of the New Europe, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 1976), 111; PRO FO 371/3079/7661 and 11312: Findlay to FO, 10 Jan. 1917. See also PRO FO 371/3079/19534: John Baird to Cecil, 11 Jan. 1917.

Origins of the Flanders Offensive 105 enmity between Germany & Austria, and the latter country might eventually become a permanent block & obstacle to the German policy of “Drang nach dem osten”.’*4 Most Foreign Office officials wanted to impose peace terms on Austria-Hungary which would leave the Dual Monarchy largely intact and able to act as a counterpoise to Germany in Central and southern Europe.” If Karl could be persuaded to reign over a federal empire of Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, and Yugoslavia, this could be squared with the allied declaration of 10 January concerning the liberation of the subject nationalities of the Dual Monarchy.» Even so, Foreign Office officials remained cautious. They be-

lieved that Germany now exercised so much control over the Austrian army and administration that it would in practice be impossible for Austria to desert its ally.’ And they knew that any attempt to negotiate Austria-Hungary out of the war would require the British to persuade Rumania and Italy to reduce territorial claims against Austria-Hungary. Such a policy would be

fraught with dangers. The Italians might be satisfied with the Trentino if they received compensation in Asia Minor or Albania.

And, given their precarious military position, perhaps the Rumanians would be content with some frontier rectifications and autonomy for Transylvania.°* But in the meantime the Foreign Office recommended that the British should do no more than listen

to Austria-Hungary and refrain from entering into actual negotiations. The solidarity of the Entente alliance had to come before any attempt to inveigle Austria-Hungary into a separate peace. Robertson, convinced that the military gains of a separate peace with Austria would more than counterbalance the possibility of Italy withdrawing from the war, deplored such passivity. On 18

January the War Cabinet compromised. On the one hand they

agreed to seek further information by sending Sir Francis Hopwood, a Civil Lord of the Admiralty, to Scandinavia. On the 4 PRO FO 371/3079/13580: Paget to FO and minute by Hardinge, 17 and 18 Jan.

Keb teh CAB 24/6/GT43: Balfour to War Cabinet and minute by Hardinge, 17 ree Rothwell British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 81, 83; Fest, Peace or Partition, 54-5. °° PRO CAB 24/43/IWC2: Minutes of the Imperial War Cabinet, 22 Mar. 1917. 7 PRO FO 800/384: Drummond to Balfour, 17 Jan. 1917. °° PRO CAB 24/6/GT43: Balfour to War Cabinet and enc. by Drummond, 20 Feb. 1917.

106 Origins of the Flanders Offensive other hand they decided to tell their allies that they had done so.°° Hopwood had orders to refrain from taking the initiative with the Austrians lest German or Austrian propagandists use it to depict Britain as seeking to begin peace talks with the Central Powers behind the backs of their allies. But his mission only confirmed the Foreign Office’s fears. The Germans soon learnt of his mission and the Kaiser hurried to Vienna to insist that the Austrians must

bide their time until the U-boat blockade had undermined the Entente’s resistance.®' And when Lloyd George was confronted by

the possibility that the Germans might try to use Hopwood as a conduit to open peace negotiations, he lost interest: ‘We have no desire to negotiate with Germany’, he insisted.” What Lloyd George did want to do was to weaken Germany by detaching Austria-Hungary. The Foreign Office’s insistence that this was not possible ensured that when the Austrians launched a second initiative in the spring, Lloyd George bypassed the Foreign Office and dealt with it himself. On 11 April Ribot showed Lloyd George a letter written by Karl which was given to him by Karl’s brother-in-law, Prince Sixte of Bourbon.© Karl offered to use his good offices in Berlin to ensure that France’s just claims in AlsaceLorraine were met, that Belgium’s independence was restored, that Serbia would receive an outlet to the Adriatic if it abandoned its

relationship with those forces seeking the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy, and that the Slavs of his own empire would be treated with greater equality. But, despite indications to the contrary, Lloyd George leapt to the unwarrantable conclusion that Karl wanted a separate peace. Because Sixte had insisted on secrecy, Lloyd George was not able to discuss the details of Karl’s letter with either the War Cabinet or the Foreign Office, where the °° PRO FO 371/3079/27665: Hardinge to Findlay, 2 Feb. 1917; PRO FO 371/3079/ 33141: Paget to Hardinge, 11 Feb. 1917. 6 PRO CAB 23/13/37A: War Cabinet, 18 Jan. 1917; PRO FO 371/3079/35430 and 19534. Memoranda by Balfour, 24 Jan. and 12 Feb. 1917. 6! PRO CAB 1/24/9: Some observations and notes by Sir Francis Hopwood on his mission to Scandinavia to investigate certain peace proposals alleged to have been made on behalf of the Austrian government, 17 Mar. 1917; PRO FO 371/3079/ 27665: Hardinge to Findlay, 2 Feb. 1917; PRO FO 371/3079/32203, 33141, 35529, and 40300: Paget to Hardinge, 9, 11, 14, and 19 Feb. 1917. & PRO FO 371/3080/36539: Paget to FO, 15 Feb. 1917; PRO FO 371/3080/36932: Balfour to Hopwood, 17 Feb. 1917; PRO FO 800/199: Lloyd George to Balfour, 17 Feb. 1917. 63 Fest, Peace or Partition, 64—5.

Origins of the Flanders Offensive 107 obvious discrepancy between Karl’s letter and the meaning which Lloyd George had assigned to it might have been brought to light.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, finding himself in an increasingly dangerous strategic situation, Lloyd George was clutching at straws. The wish that Austria-Hungary would make a separate peace was the father to his conviction that it was willing to do so.

Once again the Foreign Office and Britain’s allies impeded further negotiations. The Sixte letter made no mention of Italy’s claims, and it was notable that Karl’s terms called for Germany, rather than Austria—Hungary, to make the major territorial sacri- '

fices. As soon as the Italians heard rumours of the Austrian

démarche they threatened that, if the expected Austrian offensive against Italy was successful, Italy might be willing to make its own

separate peace.© Lloyd George tried to bribe the Italians to be more accommodating. On 19 April Lloyd George and Ribot met the Italian Foreign Minister, Sidney Sonnino, at Saint-Jean-deMaurienne and offered him compensation in Asia Minor in exchange for reducing his claims against Austria—Hungary.© But the inducement was not enough. Bribery having failed, Lloyd George

then resorted to threats, warning that ‘we can make peace with Austria tomorrow’, but Sonnino refused to be bluffed. The confer-

ence lamely concluded that it was not an opportune moment to enter into conversations with Austria-Hungary, and Sonnino continued to block any attempts to do so.®’ The Italians may have been, according to Hardinge, ‘a most grasping and unreasonable people’

but, both before and after the Russian collapse, the British placed the continued adherence of Italy to the Entente above separating Austria-Hungary from Germany by negotiations.® TD. Lloyd George, War Memoirs (London, 1938), ii. 1185; A. J. P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George: A Diary by Frances Stevenson (London, 1971), 150; G. de Manteyer (ed.), Austria’s Peace Offer, 1916-1917 (London, 1921), 51-4, 83-4; PRO FO 371/ 2863/71717: Rumbold to FO, 5 Apr. 1917. 6& PRO FO 371/2863/68110: Rumbold to FO, 31 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 24/10/ GT467: Hardinge, Appreciation by Lord Hardinge of the note by the CIGS, dated 20 Mar. 1917, 12 Apr. 1917. 6 J. Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East 1914-1920 (London, 1969), 54; PRO CAB 23/2/WC124 and WC126: War Cabinet, 23 and 25 Apr. 1917. 67 PRO CAB 28/2/IC20: Memorandum on the Anglo—French-—Italian conference,

19 Apr. 1917; Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George, 153; PRO CAB 23/44B/151A: War Cabinet, 31 May 1917. 68 PRO FO 800/173/It/17/3: Hardinge to Bertie, 17 Jan. 1917; D. Stevenson, “The Failure of Peace by Negotiation in 1917’, Historical Journal, 34/1 (1991), 68-9.

108 Origins of the Flanders Offensive Only a complete military victory over Austria-Hungary would enable Sonnino to gain all of the spoils which he sought. On his way to Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, Lloyd George had broken his journey

in Paris where Sixte told him that: ‘If Italy took by her arms the territory she claims, there would not be anything to object to.’® At the War Policy Committee, the Prime Minister therefore suggested that the British and French should assist Cadorna by switching 300 of their heavy guns to the Italian front to enable him to advance the eight miles necessary to take Trieste. He believed that Austria was willing to surrender the Trentino to Italy, but ‘Trieste she cannot give up unless the Italians actually conquer it. But if Trieste were

captured then it would be easier for Austria to concede it.’ If Austria—Hungary deserted Germany, Turkey and Bulgaria would be cut off from German supplies and would have no option but to

make peace. The Russians would be able to concentrate their entire army against a single enemy and the Germans would be overwhelmed. The operation would also have the not incidental advantage that the casualties would be Italian, rather than British.

‘The Italian casualties have been comparatively slight, and the Allies have not up to the present used Italian man-power to the best advantage. Is it not now the turn of the Italians to take their share of heavy fighting?’ If they did so the French army would receive the rest it needed ‘and our Army, instead of exhausting its limited reserves, will have time to accumulate’.” These were glittering prizes, but the committee rejected them. Robertson had a low opinion of the offensive capabilities of the Italian army and thought that it was failing to make good use of the resources it already possessed. Other members of the committee

agreed that the offensive would only ‘lead to the same sort of results as had been achieved on the Somme ...’.”’ Like Pétain and Foch, the most they were willing to do was to offer the Italians a few batteries of guns as a token of moral support.” Efforts to switch 6° Manteyer (ed.), Austria’s Peace Offer, 113-17; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/1: Hankey diary, 18 Apr. 1917; Fest, Peace or Partition, 66-7. ® Lloyd George, War Memoirs, ii. 1284—6; Fest, Peace or Partition, 125-7, PRO CAB 27/6: 10th meeting of the Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 21 June 1917. 7 PRO CAB 27/6: 2nd meeting of the Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 12 June 1917.

4 PRO CAB 27/6: Proceedings of the Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 11 June 1917; LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/14/68: Delmé-Radcliffe to Robertson, 18 Mar. 1917; PRO CAB 24/9/GT309: Note by the CIGS on his visit to Italian headquarters,

22-4 Mar. 1917. Lest Robertson might be thought to have been unreasonably

Origins of the Flanders Offensive 109 large numbers of troops from one front to another would require the establishment of a supranational body to determine allied strategy but neither Foch, Pétain, Cadorna, nor Robertson were willing to delegate their powers to such a body.” Even if such a body were established, the movement of some seventy-five batteries of heavy artillery would take at least six weeks, giving the Germans, with their superior railway communications, ample time to reinforce the Austrians.” And finally, no one except Lloyd George believed that Austria-Hungary would make peace if the Italians took Trieste.” There were plenty of signs of war weariness in Austria-Hungary but, as the General Staff warned, it would be wrong to make too much of such reports, for ‘the desire for an early peace is, in fact, general in every belligerent country ...’.” If waiting for the Americans seemed to be unwise and negotiating with Austria was deemed undesirable, there was one thing which the committee could agree upon. When they contemplated another offensive on the western front what they were determined ‘to avoid was a series of costly operations as the result of which we would have no more to show than after the Somme last year’.” After the war Haig and his apologists suggested that the Commander-inChief had agreed to attack in Flanders because the French begged him to do so to prevent the Germans from exploiting the disorders

within their own army.” There is no contemporary evidence to support these contentions. When the two commanders-in-chief met biased, it should be noted that his conclusions were shared by a number of Russian officers in Italy; see PRO FO 800/202/198: Rodd to Balfour, 1 Apr. 1917. 3 PRO CAB 28/2/IC24(a). Notes of an allied conference held in the President of the Council’s room at the Foreign Office, Paris, 26 July 1917; PRO CAB 24/21/ GT1529: Allied conference at Paris, 25—6 July 1917. 74 PRO CAB 27/6/WP9: Robertson, Memorandum, 20 June 1917. > PRO CAB 27/6: 2nd meeting of the Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 12 June 1917.

7% PRO CAB 24/19/GT1319: General Staff, Evidence of war weariness and desire for a separate peace in Austria-Hungary, 7 July 1917; PRO CAB 27/7/WP37: R. W. Seton-Watson, War feeling in Austria-Hungary, 9 July 1917; PRO CAB 24/20/ GT1482: Notes on Mr Buxton’s letter by Capt. L. S. Amery, 15 July 1917; PRO CAB 27/7/WP40: Drummond to Balfour, 9 July 1917; PRO CAB 27/71 WP39: Amery, Austria and a separate peace, 10 July 1917. ™ PRO CAB 27/6: 2nd meeting of the Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 12 June 1917.

7% PRO WO 256/21: Haig to Charteris, 5 Mar. 1927; LHCMA, Maurice MSS 4/5/

78: N. Lytton to Maurice, 12 Nov. 1934; J. Charteris, Field-Marshal Earl Haig (London, 1929), 266; J. Davidson, Haig: Master of the Field (London, 1953), 16-19.

110 Origins of the Flanders Offensive on 18 May Pétain did not beg Haig to attack the Germans in order to take pressure off his army. Senior French commanders, in fact, deprecated the idea of an offensive in Flanders. On 2 June Foch

asked Wilson ‘who was the fool who wanted Haig to go on a “duck’s march through the inundations to Ostend and Zeebrugge”’.

He thinks the whole thing futile, fantastic and dangerous’.” Foch wanted the BEF to take over more of the line so that Pétain could rest his troops, and on 23 June Foch threatened that ‘if we don’t do this the present Government will treat with the Bosche for a peace, as both the Army and France are tired out’.®° But Haig was determined to exploit the decisions taken in Paris on 4 and 5 May to mount an offensive in Flanders. Although he would have welcomed vigorous French help, the news that they would be able to afford him little direct assistance did not diminish

his enthusiasm. Haig, convinced that the power of the German army was already waning, wanted to attack in Flanders because he

believed that he could inflict a final and crushing defeat on the German army.*! On 5 May he explained to Pétain and Nivelle that in order to disguise his preparations at Ypres he intended to con-

tinue local attacks at Arras. By 7 June he wanted to concentrate sixteen divisions to seize the Messines—Wytschaete ridge, an area

of high ground which overlooked the main axis of his intended

advance from Ypres. In early July he would then seize the Passchendaele ridge before advancing to cut the Roulers— Thourout railway. By thus threatening their communications he

hoped to force the Germans to withdraw from the coast. He wanted the French to carry out a series of reliefs to free his own troops for this offensive and to mount three offensives of their own, on 1 June, 1 July, and 1 August ‘conducted on the lines agreed on at the PARIS conference, namely, on a broad front for limited objec-

tives. It is essential that these objectives be sustained as long as possible.’®? ? IWM, Wilson MSS microfilm reel VII: Wilson diary, 22 May and 2 June 1917;

see also C. E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries (London, 1927), 1. 355; PRO WO 256/18: Wilson to Haig, 20 May 1917. 8° TWM, Wilson MSS microfilm reel VII: Wilson diary, 23 June 1917; PRO CAB

27/7/WP32: Bertie to Balfour and enc., 3 July 1917; PRO FO 800/169/Fr/17/S5: Bertie, Memorandum, 4 July 1917; PRO FO 371/2934/137012: Bertie to Balfour, 7 ar PRO WO 256/17: Haig to Robertson, 15 Apr. 1917. 8 PRO WO 158/48: Haig to Nivelle and enc., 5 May 1917; LHCMA, Benson MSS B1/100/2: Haig to Nivelle, 5 May 1917; PRO 158/48: Haig, Plan of operations to be undertaken north of the River Lys after the capture of Messines ridge, 18 May 1917.

Origins of the Flanders Offensive 111 In mid-May Lloyd George had left Haig in no doubt that the War Cabinet ‘could never agree to our incurring heavy losses with comparatively small gains which would obviously be the result unless French cooperate whole-heartedly’.& Haig tried to assuage Lloyd

George’s fears by insisting that the French would co-operate and by explaining that he intended to act with the utmost caution by dividing his offensive into two phases. The first phase would involve a limited operation ‘which will aim only at capturing certain dominating positions in my immediate front’. The implication was that the offensive could be stopped there if German reinforcements arrived from Russia. But if they did not, he would go on to clear the

Belgian coast. His plan would, Haig assured the War Cabinet, ‘commit me to no undue risks, and can be modified to meet any developments in the situation’.* The Prime Minister’s fears about French unwillingness to co-

operate were soon proved correct. When they met on 18 May Pétain promised Haig that he would fulfil his side of the Paris agreement, but he was vague about the precise details of the attacks Haig hoped he would mount.® Haig chose to be satisfied, but

Wilson, who was present at the meeting, was right to doubt the reality of Pétain’s commitment.® In the ensuing weeks the French

Commander-in-Chief hastily back-pedalled from his ill-defined commitment.’ But Haig was not unduly worried. French assistance might be useful, but in his opinion it was not essential.°* His reac-

tion to the news that French civilian and military morale had slumped following the failure of the Nivelle offensive was to insist that this made it all the more imperative that the BEF win a major victory in Flanders in 1917. As he told Winston Churchill on 1 June, ‘I doubted whether our French Allies would quietly wait and suffer

for another year’. Haig’s conviction that he could defeat the German army in the west grew in inverse proportion to the apparent decline in French morale. Given adequate drafts and guns his army could defeat the Germans on the western front and ‘victory 8 PRO WO 158/48: Robertson to Haig, 14 May 1917; PRO CAB 23/2/WC137: War Cabinet, 14 May 1917; PRO FO 371/3079/94566: Paget to FO, 9 May 1917; LHCMA, Robertson MSS I/23/26: Robertson to Haig, 17 May 1917. 84 PRO CAB 27/7: Memorandum by Sir Douglas Haig, 16 May 1917. ®& PRO WO 158/48: Record of a conference held at Amiens at 3 p.m. on Friday, 18 May 1917. 8% PRO WO 256/18: Haig to Robertson, 18 May 1917; IWM, Wilson MSS microfilm reel VII: Wilson diary, 18 May 1917. 87 Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 1. 356.

88 Blake (ed.), Haig, 233-4. Tbid. 234.

112 Origins of the Flanders Offensive on the Western front means victory everywhere and a lasting peace’. When he dined with Haig on 5 June Wilson ‘told him of the

condition of the Army and France & said I thought they were getting serious & wanted most careful watching’. But Haig, whose confidence was bolstered by reports of Germany’s growing weakness provided by his chief intelligence officer, Brigadier-General

Charteris, believed that he could win the war by the end of the year.” The Commander-in-Chief told Wilson that ‘he was quite sure that another 6 weeks’ fighting & the heart of the Bosches would be broken ...’. He left Wilson with the impression that ‘he thinks he can smash up the whole Bosche Army’.”!

On 12 June Haig sent a lengthy memorandum, drafted by Kiggell, to the War Policy Committee. The memorandum condemned the Pétain option of waiting for 1918 and the Americans. A passive attitude in the west might be the final straw which shattered French and Russian morale. The hope of American assistance was too far distant to sustain them and they were ‘living a good deal on the hope of further British successes’. A window of opportunity existed in the summer of 1917 during which the British might be able to inflict a decisive defeat on the German army. For the time being both the French and Russian armies were at least

capable of containing the German troops facing them. All the evidence suggested that German morale both at home and at the front might finally crack if the allies maintained their pressure. But if the allies adopted a passive attitude, it would both hearten the

Germans by persuading them that it was the allies who were exhausted, and give them time to replenish their waning stocks of

food and ammunition. Haig would do nothing reckless. The Germans would not be able to mass all of their reserves against the BEF because Pétain had agreed to mount a series of offensives to pin their forces to the French front. He did not intend to launch an ambitious and costly breakthrough attempt by driving towards distant objectives. Instead, he would clear the coast by the end of the summer ‘by stages so arranged that, while each stage will give a definite and useful result, it will be possible for me to discontinue the advance if and when it appears that the means at my disposal are insufficient to justify further effort’.” ° J. Charteris, At GHQ (London, 1931), 217-18. °t TWM, Wilson MSS microfilm reel VII: Wilson diary, 5 June 1917. 7 PRO CAB 27/7: Haig to Robertson, 12 June 1917.

Origins of the Flanders Offensive 113 Warned by Robertson about Lloyd George’s preference for dispatching heavy guns and troops to Italy, Haig quickly submitted another memorandum further explaining the advantages of his

careful step-by-step advance in Flanders. Operations there ‘threaten our main enemy, on whom the whole Coalition against us depends’. Given the proximity of Flanders to Britain, the logistical

difficulties involved would be far less than those of operations anywhere else. And, an advantage Jellicoe also emphasized, the occupation of the coast would assist the navy in its quest to keep open Britain’s sea lanes.” Jellicoe was not greatly concerned about

the threat posed by the small number of U-boats based on the Channel ports, but he was afraid that if the Germans reinforced their flotillas based in the Belgian ports they could deny the Royal

Navy the use of the Channel and force him to divert precious destroyers from the Grand Fleet or from anti-submarine operations. That was an uncomfortable prospect as ‘he felt it to be improbable that we could go on with the war next year for lack of shipping’.* Like Haig, Jellicoe was also conscious that the oper-

ation promised to bring special strategic benefits to Britain. If peace came before the Germans had been driven from the ports they would never surrender them. That would mean that the Germans would constitute a permanent threat to Britain’s maritime

security, and impose an unsustainable burden on the post-war naval estimates.” By mid-June British liaison officers had gathered a reasonably accurate picture of the real extent of the disturbances which had overtaken the French army. But Haig and Robertson realized that, if they were to persuade the War Policy Committee to agree to the Flanders plan, they had to convince ministers that the French army was sufficiently battleworthy to play an active role. They therefore withheld the most accurate reports of the disturbances.” Conscious ° PRO CAB 27/7/WP9: Haig to Robertson, 17 June 1917; PRO CAB 27/6: 9th meeting of the Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 20 June 1917; PRO CAB 27/7/ WP10: Jellicoe, Remarks on the occupation of the north coast of Belgium by the Germans, 18 June 1917. % PRO CAB 27/6: 9th meeting of the Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 20 June es PRO CAB 27/7/WP10: Jellicoe, Remarks on the occupation of the north coast of Belgium by the Germans, 18 June 1917. *% LHCMA, Spears MSS 1/13/1: Spiers to Maurice, 19 June 1917; LHCMA, Benson MSS B4/1 and B4/4: Benson to the British Military Mission and GHQ, Report, Groupe Armées du Nord, 4 and 16 July 1917; D. French, ‘Who Knew What

114 Origins of the Flanders Offensive that ministers doubted that Germany could be beaten into surrender in 1917, Robertson also hid from the committee the fact that Haig, in an appendix to his memorandum of 12 June, had asserted

that Germany was within four to six months of exhausting its manpower reserves, and had argued that if the allies continued their efforts Germany might be compelled to sue for peace by the end of the year.”

At the Paris conference Haig and Robertson had persuaded their political masters to mount a major offensive by assuring them that they would minimize British casualties by using massive quantities of artillery in the pursuit of limited objectives. But the tactical

planning of the battle, the details of which were not revealed to the committee, casts doubt on whether Haig really did accept Robertson’s insistence that a breakthrough was unlikely and that instead he would mount a step-by-step operation to minimize his losses.2 Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir Herbert Plumer, two of

Haig’s army commanders, had suggested that the first day’s advance should be confined to reaching the Germans’ second line,

a matter of about one mile. Any movement towards the coast should be postponed until the Gheluvelt plateau, which would overlook the right of any British advance, had been taken and until

German reserves had been depleted. But Haig wanted a breakthrough and did not like the Rawlinson—Plumer plan. The navy also encouraged him to think in terms of a rapid advance by advis-

ing that it would only be possible to carry out the amphibious landing on the coast which he wanted to mount as part of the offensive at certain periods of high tide, and that the landing could not take place unless the Fifth Army had reached Thourout.” On 30 May Haig replaced Rawlinson by Gough, almost certainly because the latter was more willing than Rawlinson to contemplate with enthusiasm a plan designed to break the German line rapidly.!™ and When? The French Army Mutinies and the British Decision to Launch the Third Battle of Ypres’, in L. Freedman, P. Hayes, and R. O’Neill (eds.), War, Strategy, and International Politics: Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard (Oxford, 1992), 148-51. 7 J. Terraine, The Road to Passchendaele: The Flanders Offensive of 1917—-A Study in Inevitability (London, 1977), 135.

°8 Robertson to Haig, 3 Apr. 1917, in D. R. Woodward (ed.), The Military Correspondence of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, December 1915—February 1918 (London, 1990), 166-7. °° A. Farrar-Hockley, Goughie (London, 1975), 216. 100 Blake (ed.), Haig, 222; Farrar-Hockley, Goughie, 212; R. Prior and T. Wilson,

Origins of the Flanders Offensive 115 On 16 June Gough submitted a plan which proposed that the British advance 4,500 yards on the first day.'” Haig approved the plan, but his DMO, Sir John Davidson, then

tried to persuade him to revert to a step-by-step operation.’” Davidson thought that he had succeeded, but on 28 June Haig held

another conference with Plumer and Gough and agreed that Gough’s original plan should stand.’ Gough later claimed that Plumer had sided with him, an unlikely occurrence given Plumer’s experience at Messines.’“ The result was that Gough was left wondering just what the Commander-in-Chief wanted, and later com-

plained that there had been insufficient discussion between his headquarters and GHOQ over the planning of the battle.’ When the battle began on 31 July, both army commanders believed that they had two missions, to wear out the German forces facing them and to break through the German line.’ Ministers, however, were only told of the first of these objectives. The ambiguity surrounding the tactical planning of the offensive meant that Haig and Robertson could withstand the cross-examination to which Lloyd George subjected them at the committee on 19 and 21 June. Lloyd George used all his considerable forensic skills to undermine Haig’s case that he could defeat the Germans in 1917.'° The Prime Minister lectured his generals on the inter-

connections between allied strategy, domestic politics, and the need for Britain not just to defeat Germany but to conserve sufficient strength to win the peace. He looked beyond the immediate military advantages which might accrue from a successful offensive

to the repercussions which failure might have on the home front. Owing to the Russian Revolution, the French mutinies, and the Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 19141918 (Oxford, 1992), 270.

101 Davidson, Haig, 26-7; Farrar-Hockley, Goughie, 214, PRO CAB 45/140: Gough to Edmonds, 18 Mar. 1944. 102 Davidson, Haig, 29-30. 103 Davidson, Haig, 31; T. Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918 (London, 1987), Or G. Powell, Plumer: The Soldier’s General (London, 1990), 205; H. Gough, The Fifth Army (London, 1931), 198. 1065 PRO CAB 45/140: Gough to Edmonds, 27 May 1945. 106 'T. Travers, How the War was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917-1918 (London, 1992), 14-15. 107 PRO CAB 27/6: 8th meeting of the Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 19 June 1917.

116 Origins of the Flanders Offensive slowness with which the USA was developing its manpower resources ‘on the Allied side we were sustaining the whole burden of the War’. But Britain was fast exhausting its own manpower reserves. The May strikes showed that further attempts to comb out men from industry meant that ‘there was no place from which we could take men in large quantities without facing serious trouble’.

The Russian Revolution ‘had a very unsettling effect in all countries, and there was a good deal of talk of revolution everywhere’. If the operation failed, and the government once more had to try to find more men for the army, it would face ‘a tremendous row in the country’. Far better ‘to reserve our strength till next year’ for a Pyrrhic victory in 1917 would mean facing ‘a Peace Conference some day with our country weakened while America was still overwhelmingly strong, and Russia had perhaps revived

her strength’.! By 21 June the arguments before the committee had resolved themselves into whether to mount an offensive in Flanders in 1917 or to follow the French example. The British could await the arrival of the Americans, postpone the climax of the war until 1918, and in

the meantime try to knock Austria-Hungary out of the war.'” After three years of war the Prime Minister was sceptical when generals promised him that they had learnt the lessons of past failures and that their next offensive would be a success. But he also recognized that, after the débacle of the Nivelle offensive, he was in no position to enforce his own strategic preferences and that, if the generals insisted on proceeding, they would have their way.'! Haig was dismissive. ‘L. G.’s oration was of the lawyer type; its object seemed to me to be to show black as white.”""' Nothing he heard had persuaded him to alter his mind.'”” Robertson was more conciliatory, but just as adamant.'* The dilemma confronting the members of the Committee was sum-

marized by Milner: Britain would reap greater strategic benefits 1088 PRO CAB 27/6: 8th meeting of the Cabinet Committee on War Policy. 10° PRO CAB 27/6: 10th meeting of the Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 21 June 1917. 0 Tbid.; T. Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War 19141918 (Oxford, 1986), 463. 41 LHCMA, Kiggell MSS II/11: Haig to Kiggell, 23 June 1917. 12 PRO CAB 27/7/WP18: Minute by Field Marshal Sir D. Haig, 22 June 1917. 43 PRO CAB 27/7/WP19: Robertson, Note by the CIGS on the Prime Minister’s memorandum regarding future military policy, 23 June 1917.

Origins of the Flanders Offensive 117 from clearing the Belgian coast than from any of the other proposals they had discussed, “but it was a grave question whether it

was worth the risk involved, and the losses which would be incurred’.!4 On 25 June, although few ministers believed that Haig’s plan would succeed in its entirety, they permitted him to continue his preparations. The final decision on whether to launch the Flan-

ders offensive was postponed until after a conference with the French. Lloyd George still wanted assurances that Pétain would indeed attack in support of the BEF.' Robertson was not unduly worried that Lloyd George ‘is more keen than ever on the Italian plan’ for, as he informed Haig, ‘before long you will be on the point of going off and I cannot conceive that the French will listen to any

such proposal as the transfer of the major operations to Italy and the practical stoppage of operations on the West Front’.'° Haig took the hint, and on 7 July signed a convention with Pétain and the

Belgian chief of staff, General Ruquoy, agreeing to co-ordinate their efforts during the offensive.'!’ But by early July the War Policy Committee was no longer just concerned with the state of the French army. They believed that the crisis in the army was a reflection of a more Serious crisis in French political life. It was these concerns which finally persuaded

ministers that they had to support an offensive in Flanders even though they did not share Haig’s faith in it. Since 1914 the British had been well informed about German attempts to negotiate a separate peace with France and believed that there were some French politicians, notably the former Premier Joseph Caillaux, who might be ready to bargain with them. Although Caillaux had been somewhat discredited both by the outbreak of the war and his wife’s trial for murder, he remained a conspicuous member of the Chamber of Deputies. In 1915 evidence came to light suggesting that his wife was receiving money from the Germans and that he believed the French people would accept any reasonable terms the Germans offered.!"® In late 1916 and early 1917 it was rumoured 44 Bodleian Library, Milner MSS dep. 23/1: Thornton diary, 19 June 1917. "5 PRO CAB 27/6: 11th meeting of the Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 25 June 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 30 June 1917. Me LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/23/34: Robertson to Haig, 6 July 1917. 7 LHCMA, Benson MSS B1/112: Convention entre Général Pétain, le Maréchal Haig et Général Ruquoy, 7 July 1917. N8- PRO FO 371/2505/155148: Rodd to FO, 21 Oct. 1915; PRO FO 800/167: Bertie

to Rodd, 21 Oct. 1915; A. G. Lennox (ed.), The Diary of Lord Bertie of Thame, 1914-1918 (London, 1924), i. 245.

118 Origins of the Flanders Offensive that he wanted to engineer acceptable peace terms for France and Italy."" Bertie thought that Caillaux saw himself as a latter-day

Napoleon, willing to make peace with Germany so that France could fight its real enemy, Britain.’ In the winter and spring of 1916/17 Bertie kept the Foreign Office and War Cabinet informed of the growing crisis of morale in France. High food and fuel prices, congested railways, the collapse

of Russia and Rumania, and the fact that there was no end to the

war in sight meant that the French public were becoming war weary.'”’ He also made it plain that, although the French were resolved to continue fighting, they expected the British to give them more assistance.'” The collapse of the Briand government in March ushered in a period of instability in French domestic politics which lasted until

Clemenceau became Prime Minister in November, and which caused British ministers and officials increasing concern.!” It gave

added weight to the rumour, propagated by Lord Esher, that Caillaux might soon gain office as the head of a government committed to a separate peace.’* One official at the British embassy in Paris wrote of ‘all the panicky rumours which are current’ in the city, and another forwarded a report that one of Caillaux’s close associates had insisted that within three months France would have ‘a peace directed not against Germany but against England. We shall not continue to fight for England’s absurd ideas of conquest in

Mesopotamia or Palestine.’ In late June Bertie warned of the precarious position of the Ribot government in the Chamber, charted Caillaux’s improving political fortunes, and called atten119 PRO FO 800/197: Mouncy to Drummond, 23 Dec. 1916; PRO FO 371/2805/ 25914: de Salis to FO, 21 Dec. 1916; PRO FO 371/2934/8741: Rodd to Balfour, 22 Jan. 1917; PRO FO 800/169: Bertie to Haig, 11 Jan. 1917; PRO FO 800/173/IT/17/2: Bertie to Hardinge, 12 Jan. 1917; PRO FO 371/2934/8741: Rodd to FO, 22 Jan. 1917. 20 PRO FO 800/60: Bertie to Crewe, 12 Dec. 1915; PRO FO 800/60: Bertie to Drummond, 20 Dec. 1915; K. A. Hamilton, Bertie of Thame: Edwardian Ambassador (London, 1990), 347, 350. "21 PRO CAB 37/161/7: Bertie to Grey, 2 Dec. 1916. 22 PRO FO 800/169/Fr/17/18: Bertie to Balfour, 21 Feb. 1917. 123 T), Dutton, ‘Paul Painlévé and the End of the Sacred Union in France’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 4/1 (1981), 46-59. 4 PRO FO 800/173/It/17/6: Bertie to Hardinge, 8 Apr. 1917; Repington, The First World War, 1. 514-15; PRO FO 371/2934/51287: Rumbold to FO, 1 Mar. 1917; PRO FO 371/3076/115374: Rumbold to FO and War Cabinet, 9 June 1917. 5 PRO FO 800/191/17/58: Phipps to Bertie, 13 June 1917; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/3/2/28: Graham to Hardinge, 23 July 1917.

Origins of the Flanders Offensive 119 tion to the fact that he had just formed a new political party as a vehicle for his ideas for a negotiated peace.’*° Lancelot Oliphant of

the War Department minuted ominously on one of Bertie’s telegrams that ‘M. Caillaux would be a most sinister influence at the present time’.!”’ Indications that Caillaux’s message might strike a receptive chord in France were easy to find. During a secret session

of the Chamber, some deputies pointed to the disparity in the losses suffered by the French and British armies, and demanded that their ally do more.’” The War Policy Committee drew the portentous conclusion from these reports that they must avoid anything which threatened the stability of the existing government in Paris, for the only alternative ‘was M. Caillaux, and his advent to power would mean peace’.!”’ They were wrong, for there was an alternative, although one they failed to recognize in the summer. They did not take Clemenceau’s

claims to govern seriously, partly because of his age and partly because of his political reputation as an enemy of the left. France had been governed by a species of Union Sacré almost since the start of the war and, although it had become unstable by 1917, some

vestiges remained. It seemed inconceivable to British observers that anyone could form a stable government unless he could attract

support from both the left and right, and Bertie for one believed that Clemenceau had made so many political enemies that he

would not be able to win a majority in the Chamber.’ When British politicians observed French politics, they assumed that in France, just as in Britain, political power could be legitimized only by parliamentary majorities. But the foundation of Clemenceau’s

power was to be different. By the end of 1917 France had exhausted its available political leaders. Less than a month after becoming Prime Minister, Clemenceau forced the Chamber to sus-

pend Caillaux’s parliamentary immunity and then arrested him. After winning that trial of strength, Clemenceau established what 26 PRO FO 800/201: Bertie to Balfour, Hardinge, Cecil, and Lloyd George, 24 June 1917; PRO FO 800/169/Fr/17/52: Bertie to Balfour, 26 June 1917; PRO FO 371/ 2934/127563: Bertie to FO, 27 June 1917; PRO FO 371/2934/130077: Bertie to FO, 29 June 1917. 227 PRO FO 371/2934/129321: Minute by Oliphant on Bertie to FO, 29 June 1917. 28 PRO CAB 23/3/WC181: War Cabinet, 11 July 1917.

29 PRO CAB 27/6: Proceedings of the Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 11 June 1917. 0 PRO FO 800/169/Fr/17/105: Bertie to Balfour, 29 Oct. 1917.

120 Origins of the Flanders Offensive amounted to a ministerial dictatorship. His real power rested on the fact that he embodied the willingness of the French people to bring the war to a victorious end.*! The decisive manner in which he moved against Caillaux finally put at rest the fear which had haunted the British for so long, that a defeatist government might come to power in Paris.

But that lay in the future. In the meantime the committee considered reports of growing political instability in France along-

side others pointing to spiralling social unrest. There had been strikes in France before 1917, but in that year they escalated. The first wave occurred in January and was followed by another in May and June.'** When the British looked at France in June and July 1917 they saw a situation which looked all too reminiscent of the

situation in Russia in March. Esher warned the Prime Minister that, if the British acquiesced in Pétain’s policy of waiting for the arrival of a large American army in 1918, French soldiers would follow the example of their Russian allies and desert in droves. ‘It may be necessary’, he concluded, ‘for military reasons, to wait for America. But the transition months will have to be occupied by effective displays of force, as no presentiment can be too sinister.’ It was reports like that which convinced Smuts ‘that the really important situation in France was political. This was much more important than the military situation.’ On 16 July the War Policy Committee, with only the Prime Minister demurring, agreed to the Flanders offensive. But they made two provisos. They insisted that Haig keep his promise that he would mount a step-by-step advance and not ‘allow it to degenerate into a drawn out, indecisive battle of the “Somme” type’.!* The committee saw the Flanders offensive as a tap, which they could turn off at will. Robertson was quick to identify the flaw in their reasoning. How were they to decide when 51 PRO FO 800/169/Fr/17/132: Bertie to Lloyd George, 4 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 24/32/GT2642: Anon., Dept. of Information, Intelligence Bureau, Weekly report on France, 16 Nov. 1917; J. Horne, ‘A Parliamentary State at War: France 1914-1918’, in A. Cosgrave and J. I. McGuire (eds.), Parliament and Community (Dublin, 1983),

Ye LI . Becker, The Great War and the French People (New York, 1986), 205-34; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/116: Report to the Director of the Department of Information by Mr W. A. Gill, 25 July 1917. 133 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/16/1/14: Esher to Lloyd George, 5 June 1917; see also HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/6/2/38: Capt. Kelly to Carson, 13 July 1917. 54 PRO CAB 27/6: 14th meeting of the Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 4 July

vie CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 16 July 1917.

Origins of the Flanders Offensive 121 the offensive had stalled? One minister argued that it would ‘be when it appeared that our resources were not sufficient to justify a continuance of our effort’, but that begged the further question of how they would decide when that point had been reached.'*° And, secondly, if by the time Cadorna was ready to mount his offensive in August Haig’s operation had stalled, they would switch some of

his heavy artillery to northern Italy. Haig thought this would be ‘the act of a lunatic’ and he was not satisfied until he had extracted a formal, albeit grudging, statement from Lloyd George in support of his plan.'*’

The reasons why the War Cabinet’s senior naval and military advisers supported an offensive in Flanders were transparent. Haig believed that he could defeat the German army and win the war in

1917. Robertson did not agree, but supported him because he believed that the Flanders offensive would make a major contribu-

tion towards his policy of wearing down Germany’s ability and willingness to continue fighting. Jellicoe backed the offensive because he wanted to eliminate both the German naval threat to cross-Channel communications and the possibility that after the war the Germans might remain in possession of the Channel coast and permanently threaten Britain. The reasons why their political masters allowed them to proceed

were far more complex. When Lloyd George gave that assent he did so in the full knowledge that Haig would receive at best _ only minimal French assistance. The French high command, aided by Haig and Robertson, succeeded in concealing the extent of the unrest in the French army. The War Policy Committee’s report indicated that ministers believed that only one French regiment had mutinied. Even so, ministers did not believe that Haig would receive significant French support and the committee’s report stated explicitly that it would be wrong to rely on the French army to attack on a scale sufficient to draw the German reserves away from Flanders. They had no doubts that if Haig attacked he would be opposed by the bulk of the German army on the western front.'® 86 LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/23/38: Robertson to Haig, 18 July 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 18-19 July 1917. 137 Blake (ed.), Haig, 246, PRO CAB 23/3/WC188: War Cabinet, 17 July 1917; PRO CAB 24/21/GT1532: Robertson to Hankey, 24 July 1917. '38- PRO CAB 27/6/G179: Report of the Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 10 Aug. 1917.

122 Origins of the Flanders Offensive In the light of that conclusion, their decision to permit Haig to launch his offensive might seem perverse. It was not. In agreeing to

Haig’s plan they did not believe that they were giving him permission to mount a costly battle of attrition on the model of the Somme. They had insisted, and he had apparently agreed, that his

operation would proceed cautiously. They knew nothing of the confusion and ambiguity which riddled the tactical planning of the

battle. They planned to review progress and, if casualties were excessive, they would stop the offensive. And, if it were not too late

in the year, they would transfer guns to Italy. But even more important was the fact that the committee was composed of politicians, not soldiers or sailors. They looked beyond the assessments

of the naval and military situation presented to them by their service advisers, for after three years of war the advice of military

men was at a discount. As Lloyd George explained, ‘in a large number of instances all through the war the advice of the experts proved to be wrong’.’’? When they analysed the information at their disposal they gave

great weight to their understanding of the political situation in France. The crucial information which determined their decision was not their understanding of what had happened to the French army but their understanding of the wider crisis in French society. The men who analysed the situation in France and then decided to launch the third battle of Ypres were themselves politicians. They had no great military expertise, but, being politicians, they thought that they understood better than anyone what had happened and what might happen to French politics if the British army did not act vigorously to sustain French national morale. Ultimately, it was the committee’s anxieties about the fragility of French morale and the volatility of French politics which were crucial in their decision to countenance the Flanders offensive. The possibility that France might go the same way as Russia, they concluded, ‘can only be entirely averted by a great success, which may be either military or

diplomatic’. In the light of Germany’s success on the eastern front, a great diplomatic victory in the shape of a negotiated peace with one of Germany’s allies seemed unlikely. It was equally unlikely that the French would take much notice of a great military 139 PRO CAB 23/16/WCI159A: Minutes of the War Cabinet, 8 June 1917.

A ue toy CAB 27/6/G179: Report of the Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 10

Origins of the Flanders Offensive 123 victory in a far-away place like Palestine, even if the British could deliver it. The Italian option was ruled out not only by Haig and Robertson but by the French themselves. Flanders was the only option remaining unless they were willing to copy Pétain and wait for the Americans. They were not, both because of slowness in the American military build-up and because to do so would pass the initiative to the Germans.

A week after the battle began, Lloyd George told an allied conference that ‘although the people of France, Great Britain, and Italy had already shown very great tenacity and endurance in this war, there were undoubtedly symptoms of war weariness’. The best antidote to this was victory, for ‘It was impossible to ignore victory as a factor in the moral of the people. He considered that we should organise some military means of securing a victory sufficient to encourage our people to continue.’*! Lloyd George did not think that Haig could deliver the knock-out blow in Flanders in 1917 and he remained convinced that the Entente could not win the war until

1918. But he hoped that Haig might just present him with the morale-boosting victory he thought that the Entente needed. 41 PRO CAB 28/2/IC25(e): Procés-verbal of a meeting between representatives of the British, French, and Italian governments, at 10 Downing St. on 8 Aug. 1917.

5

‘Boche Killing’ AT the War Policy Committee, Robertson had insisted that he did ‘not advocate spending our last man and our last round of ammunition in an attempt to reach that coast if the opposition which we

encounter shows that the attempt will entail disproportionate loss’.! The committee had agreed to launch the Flanders offensive

in the belief that if at any stage it proved to be too costly, they would be able to call a halt. But they did not. Despite a mounting casualty list and little tangible progress towards the Belgian coast, they permitted Haig to continue his offensive until the middle of November. After the war Haig and his apologists claimed that he

had persevered in order to wear down the German army and because the French had begged him to do so. Lloyd George claimed that he had allowed Haig to continue because the generals

had misled him about the reality of the battle in Belgium. Both claims were disingenuous.

It began to rain heavily on 31 July, the day the assault started, but bad weather was only one reason why Haig failed to achieve an initial rapid breakthrough in Flanders. In May GHQ had had some

success in deceiving the Germans about where their offensive would take place, but in July, when they tried to persuade the Germans into believing that their objective was Lille and not Ypres, they failed.* Following the Arras offensive the Germans had

no doubt where the next British offensive would occur. They strengthened their defences and, despite switching six divisions to Russia to counter the Kerensky offensive, they retained adequate reserves in the west.’ The tactical planning for the initial attack was LHCMA, Kiggell MSS V/114: Kiggell to Gough, 7 Aug. 1917. 1 PRO CAB 27/7/WP19: Robertson, Note by the CIGS on the Prime Minister’s memorandum regarding future military policy, 23 June 1917. 2 PRO WO 256/20: Kiggell to Army Commanders, 6 July 1917; LHCMA, Benson MSS B1/104: Anon., Scheme for dissemination of information, 18-23 May 1917. 3 PRO WO 158/898: Charteris to Macdonogh, 11 Aug. 1917; G. C. Wynne, Jf Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West (London, 1940), 282-93; G. de

‘Boche Killing’ 125 also flawed. Haig had made it clear to Gough on 28 June and on 5 July what line of advance the Fifth Army should take, how wide the advance should be, and, above all, that Gough must capture the whole of the Gheluvelt plateau.* But Gough failed to recognize the significance of the plateau, and feared that if he committed too many troops to take it he would only create another salient. Before the battle Milner at least had recognized that there was little chance that Haig or Robertson would willingly abandon the offensive once it had begun.° His doubts were justified, for Haig did not give up. Gough did cancel another attack on 4 August because of the rain, but mounted two more major efforts on 10 August (the

battle of Gheluvelt plateau) and 16 August (the battle of Langemarck). Neither succeeded in driving the Germans off the plateau.’ On 28 August Haig accepted the fact that the breakthrough had eluded him and that it was time to return to a step-bystep operation. He took control of the operation out of Gough’s hands and gave it to Plumer, who mounted no less than four setpiece assaults designed to capture the whole of the semi-circular ridge line around Ypres. The first operations, the battle of the Menin Road ridge, launched on 20 September, and the battle of

Polygon Wood, mounted nine days later, produced small advances.* But the third offensive (the battle of Broodseinde), mounted on 4 October, cost Plumer 26,000 men and led to gains of no more than one mile. Heavy rain had now reduced the battlefield to a quagmire, but

Haig insisted on continuing, and on 9 and 12 October Plumer assaulted Poelcapelle and Passchendaele. The state of the ground meant that Plumer’s troops made almost no progress. Haig therefore called a pause in the hope that it might dry out, but heavy rain Groot, Douglas Haig, 1861-1928 (London, 1988), 331; PRO WO 256/20: Haig diary, 5 July 1917; PRO FO 371/3079/113376: Townley to FO, 7 June 1917; PRO CAB 23/ 3/WC177: War Cabinet, 6 July 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC204: War Cabinet, 3 Aug. 1917.

4 J. Terraine, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier (London, 1963), 339; PRO WO 158/48: Haig to army commanders, 5 July 1917. ° J. Davidson, Haig: Master of the Field (London, 1953), 26-7; A. Farrar-Hockley, Goughie (London, 1975), 214. 6 Bodleian Library, Milner MSS dep. 23/1: Thornton diary, 25 June 1917. 7’ 'T. Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1986), 466; Terraine, Haig, 352-3. 8 G. Powell, Plumer: The Soldier’s General (London, 1990), 214-18; de Groot, Haig, 340.

126 ‘Boche Killing’ began again on 26 October. Three more attacks, mounted on 30 October and 6 and 11 November, finally ended with the capture of

Passchendaele village.’ When Haig ended the offensive on 12 November, after 35 months of fighting, his troops had advanced a

maximum of 10,000 yards and had not even captured all of the objectives set for them on the first day. The Belgian ports remained safely in German hands. Gough claimed that after his offensive on 16 August had failed he had suggested to Haig that the operation should be shut down.'°

There is no reliable contemporary evidence to suggest that Haig rejected this idea and continued the offensive because the French, fearful that the Germans might concentrate their troops against them, begged him to do so."! On 10 July, three weeks before the battle began, Lieutenant-Colonel Spiers, one of the British liaison officers with the French army, had informed the War Office that the French Ministry of War did not expect the Germans to attack in

the west in 1917." Foch continued to believe that the Flanders offensive was a mistake, and by mid-September Pétain was convinced that Haig’s ‘resumption of the offensive can’t lead to much. The weather has spoilt it and makes the future too uncertain.’ Far from attempting to shield the French army, on 1 August and 28 September Haig asked Pétain to attack.4 By August Pétain had made such progress in nursing the morale of his army that it was able to launch three limited attacks. One, north of St Quentin, was not, in Ludendorff’s opinion, ‘a serious affair’, but the second, ? Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War, 473-80. 10 H. Gough, The Fifth Army (London, 1931), 205; id., Soldiering On: Being the Memoirs of General Sir Hubert Gough (London, 1954), 142.

4 In 1928 Charteris claimed that Haig had wanted to stop the offensive after three days, but that Pétain had urged him to continue (see LHCMA, Liddell Hart MSS 11/1928/1b: Liddell Hart, diary, 13 June 1928). Haig had written to Charteris in

a similar vein in 1927 (see PRO WO 256/21: Haig to Charteris, 5 Mar. 1927). Davidson claimed that during a visit to GHO on 19 Sept. Pétain again begged Haig

to continue the offensive to divert German troops away from the French front because ‘he had not a man upon whom he could rely’ (see Davidson, Haig, 43). There is no evidence that the two generals met on 19 Sept., although Haig’s diary does indicate that he believed that Pétain had told him that the discipline of his army

was so bad that it could not resist a determined German offensive (see R. Blake (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1918 (London, 1952), 255). 2 LHCMA, Spears MSS 1/13/1: Spiers to Cox, 10 July 1917. 3 LHCMA, Clive MSS IT/4: Clive diary, 14 Sept. 1917; LHCMA, Spears MSS 1/ 13: Spiers to Maurice, 24 Aug. 1917. 4 Blake (ed.), Haig, 250, 258; LHCMA, Benson MSS B1/62: Haig to Pétain, 28 Sept. 1917.

‘Boche Killing’ 127 launched at Verdun on 20-1 August, penetrated the German line and showed that “The French Army was once more capable of the offensive.’ What Pétain was not prepared to do was to place an unreasonable strain on the morale of his troops by mounting hasty and ill-prepared attacks.'© This caused some ill-feeling on Haig’s part, because the French general postponed a promised offensive at Malmaison in late September until he was completely ready.!”

Although Plumer’s two attacks at the end of September might be accounted tactical successes, they concealed the fact that by the

end of the month Haig recognized that he would not be able to occupy the Belgian ports by the end of the year. On 23 September he tacitly acknowledged that fact and abandoned the amphibious

landing at Ostend.'® However, he never lost sight of the idea that his ultimate objective was to drive the Germans from the coast, and as late as 5 October he was still considering the direction that his advance should take after Passchendaele had been occupied.’”

On the evening of 7 October both Gough and Plumer suggested to Haig that the offensive should be ended.”? But Haig had both military and political reasons for wishing to continue. The allies needed a victory in the west to undercut the appeal of socialism, and an early victory would enable Britain to dominate the peace.*!

On 3 September he had written to Robertson that his position in the low-lying ground beneath Passchendaele would be so difficult to hold during the winter that it might be necessary to abandon it.7 But the most important reason why he continued was his con-

viction that every attack contributed to the attrition of German manpower and morale.” From August onwards, he hoped to attract the German reserves to Flanders, to destroy them, and then to

mount another breakthrough attempt.“ On 7 August Kiggell FE. Ludendorff, My War Memoirs, 1914-1918 (London, 1919), ii. 479. '6 LHCMA, Clive MSS II/4: Clive diary, 28 Sept. 1917. 17 LHCMA, Clive MSS II/4: Clive diary, 24 Sept. 1917.

8 Terraine, Haig, 360. 9 PRO WO 256/23: Haig diary, 5 Oct. 1917. 20 Farrar-Hockley, Goughie, 237; Powell, Plumer, 223; J. Charteris, At GHQ (London, 1931), 259. 2 LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/23/44: Haig to Robertson, 13 Aug. 1917. 22 Terraine, Haig, 357-8. 23 PRO WO 256/21: Haig diary, 5, 20, and 27 Aug. 1917; PRO WO 106/1514: Charteris, Note regarding German manpower and morale, 21 Aug. 1917; Charteris, At GHQ, 249-50; Blake (ed.), Haig, 256.

4 'T. Travers, “The Evolution of British Strategy and Tactics on the Western

128 ‘Boche Killing’ warned Gough against attempting another breakthrough and argued that ‘Boche killing is the only way to win. To effect that we want (a) to force the Boche to fight and (b) to force the fight under conditions most favourable to us and least favourable to him.”

Once the initial attempts at a breakthrough had failed ‘Boche killing’ became Haig’s main reason for continuing the battle. On 19 August he told his army commanders that, if they maintained their efforts, they might force the Germans to make peace by December. On 29 August he informed Robertson that the Germans had never

before been so short of reserves.*° By mid-October, Haig recognized that his offensive would not end the war by Christmas, but insisted that it had been so successful in wearing down German manpower that ‘the enemy’s manpower will be running out next May or June at the latest’.2” Haig’s conviction that he was close to exhausting German manpower reserves was fed by his chief intelligence officer, Brigadier General John Charteris, and when both Sir George Macdonogh, the Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office, and GQG grew scornful of Charteris’s optimism, Haig dismissed their criticisms with contempt.” The morale of the German army in Flanders did suffer under the enormous weight of the British offensive.”” But this undermining of German morale was only bought at the cost of an undermining of

British morale. Unlike the French or Russian armies, the British army in 1917 did not suffer the mutiny of a single formed military unit on active service.*? But from August onwards there were indications of increasing war weariness amongst troops, both in Britain and behind the lines in France. In September, in the most notorious incident, drafts at the base camp at Etaples rioted against the harsh Front in 1918: GHQ, Manpower, and Technology’, Journal of Military History, 54/2 (1990), 173. I am most grateful to Prof. Travers for allowing me to see a copy of this article before it was published; Terraine, Haig, 311-13, 354-5; Charteris, At GHQ, 247-8; Blake (ed.), Haig, 256. *% LHCMA, Kiggell MSS V/114: Kiggell to Gough, 7 Aug. 1917. 6 de Groot, Haig, 336; LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1I/23/48: Haig to Robertson, 29 Aug. 1917. 27 PRO CAB 24/28/GT2242: Haig to Robertson, 8 Oct. 1917. 28 LHCMA, Clive MSS II/4: Clive diary, 24 Oct. 1917; LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/23/44: Haig to Robertson, 13 Aug. 1917; PRO WO 256/23: Haig diary, 15 Oct. 1917; LHCMA, Clive MSS II/4: Clive diary, 29 Sept. 1917; Charteris, At GHQ, 260; PRO FO 800/175/Misc/17/19: Johnstone to Bertie, 8 Sept. 1917. * Ludendorff, My War Memoirs, i. 480. 30 J. G. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1990), 51-2.

‘Boche Killing’ 129 regime of the camp commandant.*! The army authorities tried to keep news of this not only from the enemy but also from the War Cabinet. In the midst of the disturbances, the Director of Special Intelligence at the War Office solemnly informed ministers that a

sample of soldiers’ letters indicated that ‘the British troops in France are very cheerful and determined, and that the love of fighting has eradicated the peace-time habit of grumbling’.” Haig told the War Cabinet on 8 October that ‘Our troops are elated and confident’, but by the end of the year such dissimulation became impossible to sustain.* In December the military censor reported that, although the majority of troops were convinced that military victory was still possible and that a premature peace would be a mistake, there were real signs of war weariness amongst the troops in France, especially those of the Second Army, which was bearing the brunt of the Flanders offensive.*4 After the offensive Haig’s supporters suggested that the BEF

would have achieved more if Lloyd George’s infatuation with Nivelle had not forced Haig to postpone mounting his offensive until the summer, by when the weather had broken. Their contention is unprovable but unlikely. Robertson grasped the essence of the problem in September. Haig required great concentrations of heavy artillery to destroy the machine-guns which formed the backbone of the German defences, ‘but unfortunately this entails the

entire destruction of the surface of the ground and renders it almost impassable, especially in Flanders’.* That destruction would have taken place at whatever time of year the offensive was mounted, and, given the poor drainage of Flanders, it was bound to reduce the ground to a swamp. The extent to which Haig realized

the way in which the rain impeded movement on the ground is debatable. On 1 August he described the ground as being ‘like a bog in this low-lying country’, but subsequently brushed aside the 31 G. Dallas and D. Gill, The Unknown Army: Mutinies in the British Army in World War One (London, 1985), 63-81; PRO CAB 24/25/GT1979: Bishop of Oxford, Alleged disaffection existing among British troops at home, 8 Sept. 1917. 2 PRO CAB 24/26/GT2052: Director of Special Intelligence, Note on the moral [sic] of British troops in France as disclosed by the censorship, 13 Sept. 1917. 33 PRO CAB 24/28/GT2443: Haig to Robertson, 8 Oct. 1917. 34 PRO CAB 24/36/GT3044: Robertson, The British armies in France as gathered from censorship, 18 Dec. 1917; S. P. Mackenzie, Politics and Military Morale: Current Affairs and Citizenship Education in the British Army 1914-1950 (Oxford,

199 ~9,

SC HCMA, Robertson MSS 1/23/51: Robertson to Haig, 15 Sept. 1917.

130 ‘Boche Killing’ impact of the rain, claiming that 1t would make the Germans more despondent than the British.* In reality bad weather degraded the fighting ability of all of the troops in the salient, the British as they

tried to advance and the Germans as they attempted to counterattack.

The step-by-step tactics which the British pursued in Flanders were not only intended to wear down the German army. They were also designed to persuade the War Cabinet that it was practicable to do so at reasonable cost.*’ The final British casualty bill for the campaign was 250,000-300,000 men, less than Haig had foretold, but a figure far beyond the total which the War Policy Committee had

been prepared to contemplate when they gave their lukewarm assent for the battle.**> Why then, did they allow Haig to continue to attack’?

After the war, Lloyd George claimed that if he had stopped the offensive he would have been condemned by his generals for interfering in military matters and for preventing them from winning the war by the end of 1917. At least two close associates noted that he

was indeed beset by doubts about his own judgement in the summer of 1917.° Amery believed that ‘he doesn’t really know enough to go nap on his own judgement and issue orders accordingly and then impose them on the allies.’*° And Hankey noted that

he was ‘obviously puzzled, as his predecessor was, how far the government is justified in interfering with a military operation’.*!

Similar doubts assailed some of his colleagues. Haig and Robertson were able to get their own way in the summer and autumn of 1917 because most ministers still believed that, although

the War Cabinet was constitutionally responsible for all actions

taken by the government, it would lead only to disaster if, in Milner’s words, ‘it attempted to control the details of naval and 36 Blake (ed.), Haig, 250. 37 LHCMA, Kiggell MSS V/114: Kiggell to Gough, 7 Aug. 1917. 38 The official history gave a figure of 244,897 casualties: J. E. Edmonds, History of the Great War: Military Operations France and Belgium, 1917 (London, 1948), il. 361. But this was questioned by Sir Basil Liddell Hart in a letter dated 6 Dec. 1957 to the Spectator.

C. Cross (ed.), Life with Lloyd George: The Diary of A. J. Sylvester 1931-45 (London, 1975), 92.

40 J. Barnes and D. Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, 1. 1896-1929 (London, 1980), 165. 41 M. Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918 (London, 1961), 11. 693.

‘Boche Killing’ 131 military proceedings’. The lessons of the Dardanelles were engraved on the minds of many when they wrestled with the conundrum of what constituted larger policy decisions and what constituted the ‘details of naval and military proceedings’.* Cecil’s

precept was that it was wrong to force commanders to carry out ‘operations of which they really disapprove, though they may have given a formal assent to them’. If the War Cabinet found that its commanders did disapprove of a particular operation, the operation should be cancelled or new commanders who did approve of

the operation should be appointed.“ If ministers were ever in danger of departing from this rule, there were plenty of newspapermen ready to remind them of it. Press barons like Lord Northcliffe

could not make or break governments, but they could create a climate of opinion in which politicians knew that some decisions would lead to criticisms.” Lloyd George’s subsequent claim that he had been misled by his military advisers, who had supplied him with false information, was justified. Haig was wary of telling the War Cabinet too much and

Robertson echoed his reticence. On 2 August Robertson had to beseech Haig’s chief of staff to send him ‘a few lines’ about the progress of operations, but at the same time told him that ‘I do not wish to be given any secrets you do not wish to entrust to me, then

I cannot give them to the Cabinet or to anyone else...’.“° Until October, reports from both the General Staff and GHQ were remorselessly optimistic, stressing declining German morale and reserves, the numbers of enemy divisions which had been ‘exhausted’, and the possibility that a major success lay just around the corner.*’ The War Cabinet was handicapped by having few alterna-

tive sources of information against which they could test the re* Bodleian Library, Milner MSS dep. 354: Milner to Bonar Law, 10 Sept. 1917. 43 Cd. 8490: Dardanelles Commission: First Report (1917). 44 PRO FO 800/196/57: Cecil to Bonar Law, 10 Sept. 1917; Bodleian Library, Milner MSS dep. 354: Milner to Bonar Law, 10 Sept. 1917; LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (17) 27/6: Derby to Lloyd George [unsent], 13 Aug. 1917. 45 J. M. McEwen, ‘Lloyd George and Northcliffe at War, 1914-1918’, Historical Journal, 24/3 (1981), 651-72. 46 LHCMA, Kiggell MSS IV/8: Robertson to Kiggell, 2 Aug. 1917. 47 PRO CAB 24/22/GT1613: Haig to Robertson, 3 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 23/3/ WC217: War Cabinet, 17 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC222: War Cabinet, 23 Aug.

1917; PRO CAB 23/3/WC226: War Cabinet, 30 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 24/26/ GT2094: Haig to Robertson, 21 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC237 and WC240: War Cabinet, 21 and 27 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC245: War Cabinet, 4 Oct. 1917; PRO CAB 24/28/GT2242: Haig to Robertson, 8 Oct. 1917.

132 ‘Boche Killing’ ports emanating from the War Office and GHQ. At the end of September, Lloyd George tried to see for himself by visiting GHQ,

but his trip was carefully stage-managed. Having been shown a group of German prisoners, he remarked on ‘the poor condition of the German prisoners’ and ‘upon the very good spirit which prevailed among all ranks of our own army that he had seen and conversed with’.** In September the Enemy Personnel Committee reported that the Germans had recently reduced the establishment of their infantry battalions from 1,000 to 750 men, that they had probably disbanded five regiments for use as drafts, and that they

were already calling up men previously classified as unfit. But against that they also recognized that German manpower was far from exhausted, for they still had 1,270,000 in their depots or in the 1919 class upon whom they could call.”

The Admiralty also continued to lobby in favour of continuing the offensive. On 3 September Jellicoe insisted that if the army could advance only six miles along the coast the Admiralty could furnish two 18-inch guns with which the ports of Ostend, Zeebrugge, and Bruges could be shelled. Geddes added that unless this was done by winter the Germans would be able to concentrate a powerful destroyer force which could sweep away the British light forces holding the Straits of Dover and compel the navy to divert destroyers from either the Grand Fleet or from anti-submarine warfare.” But the naval and military arguments in favour of continuing the offensive were, in the eyes of the War Cabinet, of only secondary importance. There were two far more important reasons for allowing Haig to continue attacking. The first was that, try as he might, Lloyd George found it impossible to persuade either the British

generals or his allies to switch operations elsewhere. And the second was the War Cabinet’s continued determination, despite the failing powers of both Russia and France, to oppose Germany’s bid for hegemony.

The loss of Baghdad had caused both widespread disquiet throughout the Ottoman empire and the start of popular clamour 48 PRO CAB 23/4/WC240: War Cabinet, 27 Sept. 1917.

® PRO CAB 24/4/G119: Enemy Personnel Committee, Inquiry regarding the probable resources of the enemy in personnel at the present stage of the war: Second report, Sept. 1917. °° PRO CAB 24/25/GT1928: Geddes and Jellicoe to War Cabinet, 3 Sept. 1917.

‘Boche Killing’ 133 against the Young Turk regime. The Ottoman government therefore decided to form a special Army Group to retake the city and the Germans agreed to send a handful of reinforcements. While the local Turkish commander, Mustafa Kemal, recognized that the operation was impossible given the poor communications in the

region, in London the War Cabinet took the threat seriously.’ Robertson did not ‘think the Mesopotamia Campaign is a side show because as long as we keep up a good show there India and Persia will be more or less all right whereas anything in the nature of a setback there might cause trouble in those countries’.* He thought that the existing force in Mesopotamia commanded by Sir Frederick Maude, together with reinforcements already earmarked, would suffice to repel any force the Turks deployed in northern Mesopotamia. But the CIGS also wanted to forestall their offensive by reinforcing Sir Edmund Allenby, who had replaced Sir Archibald Murray in command of the EEF on 29 June, with most

of the British garrison at Salonika.’ The reinforcements would

enable Allenby ‘to give the Turks a beating on the Gaza-— Beersheba line’ and so prevent them dispatching an overwhelming force against Maude.”

The Middle Eastern campaign also touched inter-allied relations, for the French entertained the same suspicions about Britain’s involvement in Palestine and Arabia as the British did about the French involvement in Greece. Each believed that the other was using the argument of military necessity as a way of furthering their own imperial ambitions. The French colonial party

had hoped that the Briand government would lay claim to their own desiderata in the Levant by mounting an offensive in Syria, but, given France’s commitments at Salonika and on the western 1 Ludendorff, My War Memoirs, 11. 412-13; C. Kinross, Atatiirk. The Rebirth of a Nation (Nicosia, 1981), 104-5; PRO CAB 24/17/GT1127: CIGS to GOC, Mesopotamia, 13 June 1917; PRO FO 371/3079/121172: Paget to FO, 18 June 1917; PRO CAB 23/3/WC176: War Cabinet, 5 July 1917. *2 LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/32/65: Robertson to Monro, 1 Aug. 1917. °3- PRO CAB 24/20/GT1413: Allenby to Robertson, 12 July 1917; PRO CAB 24/ 20/GT1414: Robertson to Allenby, 14 July 1917; PRO CAB 24/20/GT1415: Allenby to Robertson, 15 July 1917; A. P. Wavell, The Palestine Campaign (London, 1928), 101; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/44/3/18: Robertson to Lloyd George, 1 Aug. 1917.

4 PRO CAB 24/21/GT1549: Robertson, The present military situation in Russia

and its effect on our future plans, 31 July 1917; PRO CAB 24/21/GT1571: Robertson, Military situation in Mesopotamia, 31 July 1917; PRO CAB 24/22/ GT1613: Robertson to Maude, 2 Aug. 1917, and Maude to Robertson, 5 Aug. 1917.

134 ‘Boche Killing’ front, Briand had refused.°> But the initial success Murray had enjoyed in early 1917 made the French doubly determined to main-

tain the rights in the region they thought they had established under the Sykes—Picot agreement in 1916. When Robertson’s new proposals were placed before an allied conference in London on 7 August, Ribot offered a temporary loan of a French division from Salonika until the British were able to ship a division from France to Egypt. The last thing the War Cabinet desired was a French attempt ‘to peg out claims to Palestine’.° Alarmed at growing indications that

Germany was intent on reducing Turkey to a vassal whence they could menace Britain’s eastern empire, Lloyd George was determined to create a secure bulwark for Egypt in Palestine. Shortly after the second battle of Gaza, the War Cabinet agreed that the Sykes—Picot agreement should be renegotiated, and that Palestine, far from being placed under an international administration, ought to come under British control.°’ When he sent Sir Mark Sykes to act as Murray’s chief political officer, Robertson warned the former to

remember ‘the difficulty of our relations with the French in this region’, and ‘laid stress on the importance, if possible, of securing the addition of Palestine to the British area’.® Lloyd George demurred at the French suggestion and Ribot threatened to reveal British intransigence to the Chamber. Lloyd George therefore hastily suggested adjourning the meeting while both sides reconsidered their positions.*’ After lengthy debate on 8 August, the French and Italians consented to the transfer of a single British division from Salonika to Palestine. But they drove a hard bargain which demonstrated the extent to which the Allies’ war aims remained at odds. In order to ensure that the British did not abrogate the Sykes—Picot agreement piecemeal, Ribot insisted that ‘French interests in Palestine and Syria may put upon France a military and moral obligation to make French military represen°C, Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, France Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion (London, 1981), 110-12; PRO CAB 23/1/ WCS8: War Cabinet, 15 Dec. 1916. %° PRO CAB 23/2/WC116: War Cabinet, 10 Apr. 1917. >? PRO CAB 23/2/WC126: War Cabinet, 25 Apr. 1917; I. Friedman, The Question of Palestine 1914-1918: British-Jewish—Arab Relations (London, 1973), 164-76. 8 PRO CAB 24/9/GT372: Notes of a conference held at 10 Downing St. on 3 Apr. 1917, to consider the instructions to Lt.-Col. Sir Mark Sykes. °° PRO CAB 28/2/IC25: Notes of an inter-ally conference held at 10 Downing St. on Tues. and Weds. 7 and 8 Aug. 1917, first session.

‘Boche Killing’ 135 tation in that country effective’. Driven by jealousy of their Mediterranean neighbour, Sonnino reserved the same right for Italy.° This palpable evidence of French and Italian ambitions in

the Levant, coupled with the Foreign Office’s wish to win the support of Russian Zionists, caused the British to redouble their efforts to sponsor the Zionist movement. In November it led to the publication of the Balfour declaration. Britain’s military conquest

of Palestine could be presented as a campaign of liberation, and Britain’s post-war presence could be cloaked as a necessary step towards self-determination.*

Having extracted a single division from Salonika, the War Cabinet ordered Allenby to defeat the Turks facing him on the Gaza—Beersheba line. But in view of the Russian collapse in the

Caucasus and the Turks’ presumed ability to reinforce their armies facing the British, Robertson persuaded the War Cabinet to conceive the operation as being a limited offensive without a specific geographical objective. Allenby was told to strike the Turks a hard blow in the autumn and winter and to compel them to divert troops to Palestine which might otherwise have been used

to retake Baghdad.” But, although he was ordered to begin operations by mid-September, Allenby adamantly refused to do so because his troops were not ready. His attack did not begin until 31 October. He thus ruled out the possibility that he could

win a quick victory in Palestine which might help to sustain British morale if the Flanders offensive was prematurely concluded.

But by then Lloyd George’s interest had switched elsewhere. If the British could not win the morale-sustaining victory they needed in Palestine, Lloyd George hoped that they might win it in Italy. By the end of July he had lost all faith that the Russians would ever 60 PRO CAB 28/2/IC25(c): Notes of an inter-ally conference held at 10 Downing St. on Tues. and Weds. 7 and 8 Aug. 1917, third session; PRO CAB 24/22/GT1633: Hankey, Salonika: The decisions of the inter-ally conference, 7 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 23/3/WC207: War Cabinet, 8 Aug. 1917. & PRO CAB 24/10/GT447: Ormsby-Gore, Zionism and the suggested Jewish

battalions for the EEF, 14 Apr. 1917; R. Adelson, Mark Sykes: Portrait of an Amateur (London, 1975), 217-33; PRO CAB 24/9/GT372: Notes of a conference held at 10 Downing St. on 3 Apr. 1917, to consider the instructions to Lt.-Col. Sir Mark Sykes; PRO CAB 24/30/GT2406: Curzon, The future of Palestine, 26 Oct. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC261: War Cabinet, 31 Oct. 1917; PRO FO 800/384: Drummond to Montagu, 13 Nov. 1917. & PRO CAB 23/13/WC210A: War Cabinet, 10 Aug. 1917.

136 ‘Boche Killing’ again be able to afford their allies active military assistance. And on the western front, Haig’s failure to achieve his original objectives at the opening of the Flanders offensive convinced the Prime Minister that ‘We had put our money on the wrong horse.’® Lloyd George

spent the next two months exploring how, by a combination of military power and diplomacy, he could redress the strategic balance between the two alliances by persuading Austria-Hungary to

leave the war. The success of this plan depended upon Austria—Hungary’s willingness to break with Germany and Italy’s willingness to place

sufficient military pressure upon Austria-Hungary to do so. As neither condition could be met, the plan failed. Lloyd George’s interest in the Italian option was Kept alive in August by persistent

rumours that Karl wanted peace.* But what he overlooked was the fact that Karl was seeking a general and not a separate peace. In the light of the War Cabinet’s refusal to countenance negotiations with the Germans, the comment of Sir George Clerk of the

Foreign Office that ‘All this indefinite talk leads nowhere’ was

justified. The Austrian démarches indicated that Karl was not willing to make any concessions to Italy and that if the Italians wanted to fulfil their ambitions they would have to fight for them. In July Cadorna had said that he needed another ten divisions and 400

heavy guns to crush the Austrians in the offensive which he planned to mount in late August. When Albert Thomas suggested

that the offensive might be delayed for some weeks to enable the British and French to shift some of their artillery to Italy, the Italian general staff replied that the climate ruled out delaying the

start of the offensive beyond early September. At the London conference on 7 and 8 August, Sonnino told the allies that he would welcome any material support they could give him, for the Italian army lacked the ammunition and heavy artillery ‘to press the offen6 PRO CAB 28/2/IC25(e): Procés-verbal of a meeting between representatives of the British, French, and Italian governments, at 10 Downing St. on 8 Aug. 1917. 6¢ Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, 164-5; G. Riddell, Lord Riddell’s War Diary 1914-1918 (London, 1933), 258. 6 PRO FO 371/2864/157121 and 157704: Townley to FO, 10 and 11 Aug. 1917; W. B. Fest, Peace or Partition: The Habsburg Monarchy and British Policy 19141918 (London, 1978), 137; PRO CAB 23/16: War Cabinet, 14 Aug. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 14 Aug. 1917. 6 PRO FO 371/2864/157707: Rumbold to FO and minute by Clerk, 13 Aug. 1917. 67 Fest, Peace or Partition, 137-8.

‘Boche Killing’ 137 sive to a decision... .’. Robertson had no intention of allowing Lloyd George to halt the Flanders offensive by depriving Haig of a large part of his heavy artillery. Both the CIGS and Foch insisted that it was now too late in the year to send batteries from France to Italy.” He was equally disdainful of a suggestion that heavy artillery should be sent to Russia as a token of support for the tottering Provisional Government.” Cadorna’s offensive began on 18 August. Early reports encouraged the War Cabinet to believe that he was tantalizingly close to a major victory. On 26 August, elated by the news of ‘Cadorna’s

victory on the Carso’, and convinced that Haig’s offensive had stalled in the mud of the Ypres salient, Lloyd George tried to seize

the initiative. He wanted to implement the War Policy Committee’s earlier decision to switch 300 guns to the Italian front if Haig’s offensive met with no success.”! This was not only a way of ‘“nobbling” the western front policy’ but, as he wrote to Bonar Law on 27 August, ‘Austria is anxious for peace. A great military defeat would supply her with the necessary excuse.’” Robertson, who concluded that Lloyd George’s renewed enthusiasm for reinforcing the Italians smacked too much of his ‘opportunist irresolu-

tion’, had no intention of allowing Haig to be nobbled.”? The Italians, he insisted, owed their success in part to the fact that the Germans could not support their ally because Haig’s operations & PRO CAB 28/2/IC25(a): Notes of an inter-ally conference held at 10 Downing St. on Tues. and Weds. 7 and 8 Aug. 1917. ° LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/23/42: Robertson to Haig, 8 Aug. 1917. LHCMA, Kiggell MSS IV/9: Robertson to Kiggell, 9 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 28/2/IC25: Notes of an inter-ally conference held at 10 Downing St., 7-8 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 28/2/ IC25(d): Resolutions of a meeting between representatives of the British, French, and Italian governments on 8 Aug. 1917; PRO WO 256/21: Note by Foch, 8 Aug. 1917; Bodleian Library, Milner MSS dep. 45: Robertson to Milner, 7 Aug. 1917.

” K. Neilson, Strategy and Supply: The Anglo-Russian Alliance, 1914-1917 (London, 1984), 283-5.

1 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 26 Aug. 1917; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/44/3/19: Lloyd George to Robertson, 26 Aug. 1917; Riddell, War Diary, 266-9; PRO CAB 24/23/GT1783: Delmé-Radcliffe to Robertson, 19 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 24/24/GT1816: Delmé-Radcliffe to Robertson, 20 and 21 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 23/3/WC222: War Cabinet, 22 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 24/24/ GT1818: Col. C. Lamb to DMI, 16 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 24/24/GT1857: DelméRadcliffe to Robertson, 25 Aug. 1917. ” CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 26 Aug. 1917; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/30/2/24: Lloyd George to Bonar Law, 27 Aug. 1917. ® K. Wilson (ed.), The Rasp of War: The Letters of H. A. Gwynne to the Countess Bathurst 1914-1918 (London, 1988), 232.

138 ‘Boche Killing’ had compelled them to concentrate their reserves opposite the BEF. Robertson used his mastery of logistics to emphasize all of the practical problems in the way of switching such a mass of heavy

artillery from one front to another.” Haig never shifted from his conviction that the mainstay of the Central Powers remained the German army and that, until the allies had defeated it, ‘I can see no prospect of gaining the peace we seek’.” More specifically he insisted that he needed more, not less, artillery.” The generals re-

ceived support from Carson and Smuts, and Cecil shared the scepticism of many of his officials that extra artillery would not ‘have a decisive influence towards inducing Austria to make a separate peace’.” But Lloyd George found support from the French. An AngloFrench conference on 4 September considered Foch’s suggestion that they dispatch to Italy 100 medium guns from the French First Army, which was co-operating with Haig’s forces at Ypres.”* The French general explained that they could temporarily be spared because the First Army had not attacked since 31 July and would not be called upon to do so again for some time. Robertson said bluntly of the French proposal that “I‘waddle is what Foch talks.’” Hardinge believed that if Lloyd George had insisted that Haig also

dispatch British guns, then Robertson, Derby, and Cecil would have resigned.®° In the face of their opposition, Lloyd George aereed to a compromise. On 7 September Haig assented to the release of the French guns but Pétain agreed to replace them before Haig’s next push.®! As the Prime Minister told Hankey after

the meeting: ‘I do not think this is the moment for a row with the soldiers.’® 4 PRO CAB 23/3/WC224: War Cabinet, 27 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 23/13/ WC225A: War Cabinet, 28 Aug. 1917. 7% PRO CAB 24/28/GT2242: Haig to Robertson, 8 Oct. 1917. 7% PRO WO 106/407 OAD 614: Haig to Robertson, 3 Sept. 1917. 7” PRO CAB 23/13/WC227C: War Cabinet, 4 Sept. 1917; Blake (ed.), Haig, 253.

7 PRO CAB 23/13/WC227A and WC227B: War Cabinet, 3 Sept. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/1: Hankey diary, 2 Sept. 1917; PRO WO 256/22: Robertson to Haig, 3 Sept. 1917. 77 PRO CAB 23/44B/WC229B: War Cabinet [n.d., but c.4 Sept. 1917]. 809 PRO FO 800/175/Misc/17/20: Hardinge to Bertie, 11 Sept. 1917.

81 PRO CAB 28/2/IC26: Notes of an Anglo-French conference held at 10 Downing St., 4 Sept. 1917; PRO WO 106/407: Conference at Amiens, 7 Sept. 1917; LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/23/49: Haig to Robertson, 8 Sept. 1917; Blake (ed.), Haig, 253-4. 8 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 4 Sept. 1917.

‘Boche Killing’ 139 But the decision had come too late to alter the situation on the Isonzo. Even before the Anglo-French conference, the Austrians had begun to counter-attack along the front of the Italian Third Army and by 14 September the Italian advance appeared to have halted. In the meantime, on the Russian front, the Russian army continued to disintegrate and the Germans were approaching Riga. On 20 September Cadorna informed his allies that in view of the collapse of the Russian army the Central Powers would be able to move more divisions against him. He had therefore abandoned all plans to attack again in 1917. He would await the enemy offensive and meanwhile prepare for another Italian offensive in the spring of 1918." Lloyd George’s hope—in reality a slim one—of knocking

out Austria-Hungary through a politico-military offensive had collapsed. Despite the obviously failing powers of both Russia and France and

despite Italy’s refusal to co-operate more fully in knocking out Austria-Hungary, the War Cabinet remained determined to impose British war aims on the Central Powers. It was hardly surprising that in April they had deplored the Provisional Government’s

commitment to ‘revolutionary defencism’.® Ministers received with alarm suggestions that the Entente should hold a conference to revise their war aims, for the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Information advised them that the German socialists who supported the call for a conference in Stockholm interpreted the formula of peace without annexations or indemnities to mean that Germany and Austria-Hungary should lose no territory but that Ireland, India, Morocco, and other parts of the French and British empires must be given their independence.** The War Cabinet had no intention of abandoning their annexationist programme. Thus, on 11 June, when they agreed to the Russian request for a confer88 PRO CAB 24/25/GT1951: Delmé-Radcliffe to Robertson, 5 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC229, WC230, and WC233: War Cabinet, 7, 10, and 14 Sept. 1917. 8 PRO CAB 24/27/GT2095: Delmé-Radcliffe to Robertson, 20 Sept. 1917; J. E.

Edmonds and H. R. Davies, History of the Great War: Military Operations Italy 1915-1919 (London, 1949), 42. 8 PRO FO 371/3081/87527 and 88126: Buchanan to FO and minutes by Oliphant, Hardinge, and Cecil, 28 and 29 Apr. 1917; V. H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1971), 100; PRO CAB 24/12/GT680: Translation of a telegram from the French Consul! General, Moscow, 5 May 1917.

8 PRO CAB 24/15/GT971: G. S[aunders], Dept. of Information, Intelligence Bureau, Some reflections on Germany at the Stockholm Conference, 7 June 1917; PRO FO 800/199: Curzon to Balfour, 29 June 1917.

140 ‘Boche Killing’ ence, like the French they added the rider that existing allied agreements were perfectly consonant with the Provisional Government’s formula.®’ That only further convinced the Soviets that a conference in Stockholm was vital, for without popular pressure the western allied governments would never accept their views. It

also made it all the more important that the War Cabinet retain popular support for their war effort.®®

Support for a negotiated peace was increasing in Germany. Six days after Bethmann-Hollweg’s resignation on 13 July, a majority of Reichstag deputies had voted in favour of a peace resolution supporting a war of national self-defence but demanding that it be

terminated without annexations or indemnities.” This demonstration that the German legislature was divided over the issue of war and peace encouraged the British to redouble their own efforts.° J. W. Headlam-Morley of the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Information suggested that Germany’s political cohesion was crumbling. Demands for democratic constitutional reforms by the Left were growing and there was a division between the majority socialists, who wished to use the Russian Revolution as ‘the lever for bringing about a general peace’, and their government, who hoped it would pave the way towards a separate peace with Russia. But while this might give the British cause for hope,

Bethmann-Hollweg’s replacement by the little-known Georg Michaelis was a victory for ‘the military party backed by the Crown Prince’ and indicated that the German government was placing its hopes for victory in growing war weariness in the Entente countries developing into widespread defeatism.” The continuing strength of

the ‘military party’ was demonstrated on 2 September when a variety of nationalist groups established the German Fatherland party. They supported an ambitious imperialistic programme of 87 J. B. Scott (ed.), Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918 (Washington, DC, 1921), 106-7. 88 R. W. Wade, The Russian Search for Peace, February—October 1917 (Stanford, Ca., 1969), 75-9.

8 H. H. Herwig, ‘Admirals versus Generals: The War Aims of the Imperial German Navy, 1914-1918’, Central European History, 5/3 (1972), 218. °° H.W. Koch, A Constitutional History of Germany in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London, 1984), 220-1. 1 PRO CAB 24/21/GT1543: J. W. H[eadlam], Dept. of Information, Intelligence Bureau, Weekly report on Germany, 17-26 July 1917. % PRO CAB 24/20/GT1454: J. W. H[eadlam], Dept. of Information, Intelligence Bureau, Weekly report on Germany, 17 July 1917.

‘Boche Killing’ 141 annexations in both east and west, seeking control of the Belgian

and Dutch coasts, the establishment of Mittelafrika (a Central African German empire), and expansion in Russia and Turkey as

far as India and the Pacific. The depth of the party’s support was indicated by the fact that by July 1918 it claimed 1,250,000 members.”

Lloyd George’s reply to the Reichstag resolutions, which he made on 21 July, was calculated both to exploit these rifts within the German body politic and to answer those groups in Britain like the Union of Democratic Control who welcomed the call for a peace without annexations or indemnities.“ He encouraged the British to continue fighting by insisting that they were engaged in a

war of democracy against autocracy and that peace was as yet

impossible, for Germany still had no intention of restoring Belgium. He also tried to encourage democratic groups in Germany by noting that, although it was up to the Germans to decide the form of their own government, ‘what manner of government we can trust to make peace with is our business’. And he ended by

making clear that the path to a negotiated peace lay through the democratization of Germany: ‘It is with a Germany dominated by an autocracy that we cannot make any terms of peace.’ Hitherto, only a small minority of the British labour movement had supported the call for the Stockholm conference. In June the War Cabinet sent Henderson to Russia to strengthen the Provisional Government’s determination to continue fighting. He had arrived in Russia opposed to Stockholm, but the failure of the July offensive persuaded him that it was the only way to keep Russia in the war and a Bolshevik government out of power.” On his return

from Russia Henderson persuaded the Labour party’s National Executive Committee to call a special party conference for 10 August at which he wanted to recommend that the party should send representatives to Stockholm. He then went to Paris in the company of Ramsay MacDonald, one of the leading ‘pacifists’ in °% H.-U. Wehler, The German Empire 1871-1918 (Leamington Spa, 1985), 216—

17; PRO CAB 24/19/GT1379: Intelligence Bureau, Dept. of Information, E. R. B[evan], Summary of memorandum on German war aims, 12 July 1917. 4 K. Robbins, The Abolition of War: The Peace Movement in Britain 1914-1919 (Cardiff, 1976), 138. % Scott (ed.), Official Statements of War Aims, 118-19. % J. Winter, ‘Arthur Henderson, the Russian Revolution and the Reconstruction of the Labour Party’, Historical Journal, 15/4 (1972), 766.

142 ‘Boche Killing’ the labour movement, to consult the French socialists who had declared their support for Stockholm. The War Cabinet quickly came under pressure from their allies to disown Henderson. At the beginning of June the French Chamber voted in favour of fighting for the liberation of the occupied territory, the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine, the payment of reparations, the destruction of Prussian militarism, and the establishment of a League of Nations. The Ribot government had warned the British that unless they supported the retrocession of AlsaceLorraine to France it might mean ‘a definite end to the Entente’.”’

Similar pressure also came from the Italian government, who feared that any further discussion of allied war aims would call into

question the legitimacy of their claims against Austria-Hungary and Turkey.” On 1 August Henderson was summoned to attend the War Cabinet, only to be excluded from its deliberations for an hour while his colleagues considered what to do. Ministers were less concerned

about the possibility that Henderson might go to Stockholm and

more concerned that he had gone to Paris in company with MacDonald. Lloyd George and Bonar Law did not want to eject Henderson from the government if they could avoid doing so, for they feared that his leaving would have ‘a very bad effect on Labour and might just have made the difference in turning the scale in favour of the pacifist movement’.”” They hoped that if Henderson made ‘a strong war speech’ they could keep him in the government. But when he did address the Commons he was unconvincing.'© The War Cabinet returned to the question on 8 August and agreed that,

following the collapse of the Kerensky offensive, Henderson’s policy of propping up the Provisional Government was redundant, and only embarrassment could come from the Stockholm confer-

ence. If it decided in favour of a peace without annexations or indemnities, ‘they would shake us here & would probably knock %” HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/3/2/24: Cecil to Balfour, 19 July 1917; A. G. Lennox (ed.), The Diary of Lord Bertie of Thame, 1914-1918 (London, 1924), ii. 159; PRO CAB 24/20/GT1497: H. A. L. Fisher to War Cabinet, 23 July 1917; D. Stevenson, French War Aims against Germany, 1914-1919 (Oxford, 1982), 68-9. % PRO CAB 24/18/GT1249: J. C. B[ailey], Dept. of Information, Intelligence Bureau, Weekly report on Italy, 30 June 1917. ?° PRO CAB 23/3/WC202: War Cabinet, 1 Aug. 1917; HLRO, Bonar Law MSS 84/6/99: Bonar Law to Coral, 3 Aug. 1917. 100 Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, 1. 165.

‘Boche Killing’ 143 the French & Italians over’.'°' When they heard that both the Italian and American governments had refused passports to their

delegates, they had no option other than to do the same.'” Henderson was finally dismissed from the War Cabinet following the special Labour party conference which met on 10 August and

voted in favour of dispatching British delegates.’ However, Henderson’s departure did not mark the conversion of organized labour to pacifism, nor did it mark the end of Labour’s participation in the coalition government. His place in the War Cabinet was filled by George Barnes. But it did mean that, for the first time since August 1914, the Labour party was united on the fun-

damentals of war and peace. Henceforth, both Henderson and MacDonald opposed the policy of the knock-out blow and accepted the formula of peace without annexations or indem-

nities! |

The impact of this was highlighted by the War Cabinet’s cautious

response to the next peace initiative. On the eve of his fall, Bethmann-Hollweg had encouraged the Pope to believe that Germany might be willing to restore Belgium’s independence. On 1 August the papacy called for a peace based upon the evacuation of all occupied territory in Europe and overseas and for post-war provisions for disarmament and international arbitration.’® The Foreign Office received the Pope’s terms without enthusiasm, be-

lieving, correctly, that they would be unacceptable to Britain’s allies. Cecil and Balfour suspected that the Pope and his Secretary of State, Cardinal Gasparri, were pro-German and were working hand in glove with Austria.‘ On 20 August ministers agreed that 101 PRO FO 800/206/140: Cecil to Balfour |n.d., but c.5 Aug. 1917]. 102 PRO CAB 23/3/WC207: War Cabinet, 8 Aug. 1917; D. Kirby, ‘International Socialism and the Question of Peace: The Stockholm Conference of 1917’, Historical Journal, 25/3 (1982), 713. 103 N. Mackenzie and J. Mackenzie (eds.), The Diary of Beatrice Webb, iti. 1905— 1924: The Power to Alter Things (London, 1984), 283-4; PRO CAB 23/3/WC211 and

WC212: War Cabinet, 10 and 11 Aug. 1917; D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs (London, 1938), ii. 1132-4; Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 166; T. Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott 1911-1918 (London, 1970), 297. 104 T). Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London, 1977), 218-20.

05 PRO CAB 24/23/GT1712: Cardinal Gasparri to King George V, 1 Aug. 1917; C. J. Herber, ‘Eugenio Pacelli’s Mission to Germany and the Papal Peace Proposals of 1917’, Catholic Historical Review, 65 (1979), 20-31. 106 PRO FO 371/3083/156416: Minute by Clerk, 10 Aug. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 14 Aug. 1917; PRO FO 371/3083/162468: Buchanan to FO, 17 Aug. 1917; PRO FO 371/3083/160966: Spring-Rice to FO, 16 Aug. 1917;

144 ‘Boche Killing’ the less they said in reply the better. If the allies simply restated their war aims, they would only encourage the enemy to redouble their efforts. And if they met to concert their reply, some of them would have to limit their ambitions and ‘The moment any reduction of the war aims of any particular belligerent was suggested

the danger would arise that belligerent would relax its efforts.’ But the War Cabinet’s doubts about national morale in August meant that they could not dismiss the papal initiative out of hand. They therefore informed the Pope that it was necessary for the Germans to state their war aims first and suggested that Woodrow Wilson might in the meantime restate the ideals and moral objec-

tives for which the Entente was fighting.’ When the German government made it plain that they were not yet willing to comply with British wishes, the Pope’s efforts collapsed. What the episode demonstrated was the War Cabinet’s fears for national unity and

for the unity of the Entente. Rather than make another public restatement of their objectives, they thought it more politic to say as little as possible. A public statement might widen the differences between their own annexationist programme, the defencist agenda of the majority of the organized labour movement, and the competing war aims of their allies. The War Cabinet’s response to the third major peace initiative of the summer of 1917 illustrated why they were determined to continue fighting and what they hoped to gain by doing so. The new

German State Secretary, Richard von Ktihlmann, thought that Germany must have peace in 1917 but that it could not defeat Britain by naval or military means. He hoped, therefore, that he could achieve this objective by offering to evacuate Belgium and eranting autonomy to Alsace-Lorraine. In return, he wanted the retrocession of all of Germany’s overseas colonies and a free hand

in Russia.” Although neither the Kaiser, the Admiralty, nor PRO FO 800/202/237: Rodd to Balfour, 18 Aug. 1917; Stevenson, French War Aims against Germany, 80-1; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/116: H. G. N[icolson], Pope’s peace note, 5 Sept. 1917. 07 PRO CAB 23/2/WC220: War Cabinet, 20 Aug. 1917.

8 Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 104; PRO CAB 23/2/ WC220 and WC221: War Cabinet, 20 and 21 Aug. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 20 Aug. 1917; PRO FO 371/3083/164623: Balfour to de Salis, 21

we Herber, ‘Pacelli’s Mission to Germany’, 32-3; L. L. Farrar Jr., ‘Opening to the West: German Efforts to Conclude a Separate Peace with England, July 1917March 1918’, Canadian Journal of History, 10/1 (1975), 73-6.

‘Boche Killing’ 145 Hindenburg and Ludendorff were willing to surrender the Belgian

coast, on 11 September a Crown Council gave Kuhlmann permission to discover whether Britain would be willing to enter into

peace talks in exchange for a German promise to restore Belgium.'!°

When the War Cabinet received this news on 19 September they were confronted with the stark question of whether to make peace at Russia’s expense now that it was clear that there was no hope of further Russian assistance.'"! Balfour insisted that the British must

at least express a willingness to listen to any terms the Germans offered, for if they did not, news of their obstinacy would leak out and serve to unite the Germans and divide British public opinion. But Balfour’s first priority was to keep the Entente alliance united, and, supported by Milner, Smuts, and Carson, he favoured inform-

ing each of Britain’s allies, including Russia, of the German ap-

proach, thus ensuring that the Germans could not split the Entente.'” But Lloyd George and Bonar Law wanted to take a different route. They agreed that if Robertson declared that the Entente had no hope of securing its maximum war aims proeramme if Russia made a separate peace, they were willing at least to contemplate a situation in which ‘Russia ought to pay the pen-

alty’.'% If the German terms were acceptable, they wanted to present an ultimatum to the Provisional Government threatening to make peace at their expense unless they were willing to continue fighting.'"4

But the extent to which Lloyd George really was willing to make peace at Russia’s expense in 1917 is debatable. It is more likely that

his proposal was designed to place pressure on the Provisional Government to stay in the war. He must have recognized that, by giving the generals a virtual veto over peace at Russia’s expense, he

was ensuring that the idea would go no further. Haig remained optimistic, and even when Robertson conceded that ‘We cannot 410 Farrar, ‘Opening to the West’, 79-82; Herwig, ‘Admirals versus Generals’, OE PRO FO 371/3085/192822: Sir A. Hardinge to FO, 18 Sept. 1917. 12 PRO FO 800/214: Balfour to Lloyd George, 24 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 1/25/15: Balfour, Peace negotiations, 20 Sept. 1917; C. a Court Repington, The First World War 1914-1918 (London, 1920), ii. 54. 13 PRO CAB 23/16/WC238A: War Cabinet, 24 Sept. 1917. 14 PRO CAB 1/25/15: Bonar Law to Lloyd George, 21 Sept. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 22 Sept. 1917.

146 ‘Boche Killing’ single-handed defeat the German army’ Haig retorted that the proper course ‘was to go on hammering now, and to make the French fight without delay. He believed that the Germans were in a bad way.”'!> On 26 September he asserted to the Prime Minister

that, provided the BEF was Kept up to strength, even if the Germans shifted thirty divisions to France ‘we could probably break through the German army, owing to the inferiority of the German personnel’.'’© Lloyd George’s freedom of manceuvre was also restricted by the Foreign Office. Sir Eric Drummond, Balfour’s private secretary, hoped that a public statement by Asquith would counter German propaganda that the western allies were about to desert Russia and encourage the Provisional Government to con-

tinue fighting. He therefore briefed the leader of the Opposition about the Germans’ manceuvres and Asquith duly obliged by making a speech at Leeds on behalf of the National War Aims Committee opposing peace at Russia’s expense and insisting on the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine to France. If Lloyd George had really wished to abandon his commitment to the ‘knock-out blow’ the price of doing so would have been the end of his tenancy of 10 Downing Street.1"”

At two meetings on 24 and 27 September the War Cabinet decided against a compromise peace in 1917 on the grounds, as Milner expressed it, that it would lead to ‘another war in 10 years’ time.’''* They recognized that the British people were war weary, but they also believed that they were not yet willing to accept peace terms that left Germany in a stronger position than it had enjoyed in 1914 and so better able to launch another war.'” On 6 October

Balfour told the five major Allied ambassadors of Kithlmann’s 15 PRO CAB 1/25/16: Secretary’s notes of a conference held at Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig’s General Headquarters, 26 Sept. 1917; Charteris, At GHQ, 255-7. 16 PRO CAB 1/25/16: Secretary’s notes of a conference held at Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig’s General Headquarters, 26 Sept. 1917. 17 PRO FO 800/197: Drummond to Balfour, 28 Sept. 1917. 18 PRO CAB 23/16/238A: War Cabinet, 24 Sept. 1917; Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 105-6; W. B. Fest, ‘British War Aims and German Peace Feelers during the First World War (December 1916-November 1918)’, Historical Journal, 15/2 (1978), 301-2. 19 PRO CAB 23/16/WC239A: War Cabinet, 27 Sept. 1917; D. R. Woodward, ‘David Lloyd George, a Negotiated Peace with Germany and the Kiihlmann Peace Kite of September 1917’, Canadian Journal of History, 6/1 (1971), 87-9; Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, 303-4.

‘Boche Killing’ 147 approach.’”? Once Kiithlmann realized that the British were not interested in a separate peace, his démarche collapsed. On 9 October he made an angry speech refusing any concessions over AlsaceLorraine. Two days later Lloyd George replied by insisting that

Britain would not stop fighting until Alsace-Lorraine had been liberated.'*'

The War Cabinet’s rejection of the Stockholm conference, papal mediation, and the Kithlmann peace kite indicated that they remained committed to military victory. Taken in conjunction with Lloyd George’s inability to persuade either the British generals or

the French and Italians to make a serious effort to knock out Austria-Hungary, it also meant that they had no option other than to continue with the Flanders offensive. A passive policy in the west remained unacceptable. As they concluded in mid-August, the war weariness which was perceptible in every Entente country made it doubly important that Haig achieve some significant victory, because ‘the effect of an important success by our arms in Flanders during the current offensive would have a most beneficial effect on democratic opinion’.’” 120 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 6 Oct. 1917; PRO FO 371/3085/

192822: Balfour to British ambassadors in Washington, Paris, Petrograd, Tokyo, Rome, 6 Oct. 1917; PRO CAB 24/27/GT2172: Long, Peace negotiations, 29 Sept. 1917.

"1 Scott (ed.), Official Statements of War Aims, 157-61; PRO ADM 137/3868: Memo by Director of Intelligence Division, 12 Oct. 1917. 22 PRO CAB 23/3/WC212: War Cabinet, 11 Aug. 1917.

6

Caporetto, Cambrai, and the Supreme War Council IN the autumn of 1917 Haig remained confident that the British could defeat the Germans by attacking on the western front even if

Russia left the war and the French and Italians did nothing. But Robertson had begun to entertain doubts about the wisdom of continuing the offensive. The CIGS had always believed that British military policy could be successful in achieving Britain’s political objectives if it was part of a co-ordinated Entente strategy. On 27 September he wrote to Haig: ‘My views are known to you.

They have always been “defensive” in all theatres but the West. But the difficulty is to prove the wisdom of this now that Russia is out. I confess I stick to 1t more because I see nothing better, and because my instinct prompts me to stick to it, than to any convinc-

ing argument by which I can support it... When he sent GHQ’s

optimistic estimates of German morale to the War Cabinet, Robertson warned ministers that they were ‘matters of guesswork or of opinion and therefore I do not think any useful purpose could be served by my making any observations on the comments.” Lloyd George hardly needed these warnings. By mid-September he believed that the Flanders offensive had failed, that the public were becoming uneasy at the lack of news of definite progress and that the offensive should be halted.* Lord Burnham, the owner of the Daily Telegraph, had shown him a correspondent’s report from Flanders, indicating that regimental officers were despondent and apt to blame the high command for their heavy losses.* In early September Lloyd George had retired to Criccieth to recover from an illness, but as he recovered his health he became determined to persuade his colleagues to overrule the General Staff. On 16 September he decided to recall the War Policy Committee in order to ' LHCMA, Robertson MSS [/23/54: Robertson to Haig, 27 Sept. 1917. 2 PRO CAB 27/8/WP58: Robertson to Hankey, 17 Oct. 1917. 3 G. Riddell, Lord Riddell’s War Diary 1914-1918 (London, 1933), 272-3. * CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 13 Sept. 1917.

Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council 149 end the Flanders offensive and to concentrate British resources against Turkey. Six weeks of mounting casualties and scant progress meant that

a number of his colleagues, including Milner and Bonar Law, shared Lloyd George’s scepticism about the Flanders offensive.®

But they dared not act precipitately, for Robertson and Haig could still call upon some powerful allies. Asquith had recently spent two days at GHQ, and they suspected that the ex-premier was a Supporter of the Commander-in-Chief.’ Milner persuaded the Prime Minister to refrain from mounting a frontal assault on the General Staff and GHQ, lest the soldiers ‘defend their position by engaging the sympathies of the Opposition and the Press’.® In the autumn and winter of 1917/18 the Prime Minister therefore employed all of his political talents either to replace uncongenial colleagues and advisers, or, where that was politically impossible, to reduce their powers. By February 1918, after being in power

for fourteen months, it appeared as tf the Prime Minister had at last succeeded in foisting his own strategic policy on his government.

Lloyd George began to prepare the political ground to outmanceuvre not just his military, but also his naval, advisers in the summer. Soon after his Italian plan had been rejected by the War Policy Committee in July, the Prime Minister had begun to reconstruct his government. He sought colleagues who would be willing to accept his strategic ideas and who would refuse to take

the professionals’ advice on trust. He also wanted to attract waverers from the Opposition and to strengthen his administration’s most obvious political weaknesses.? Thus in July Edwin Montagu became Secretary of State for India, and Churchill joined the government as Minister of Munitions. Both appointments attracted widespread Unionist opposition which was silenced only

when Bonar Law threatened to resign if his supporters did not > M. Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918 (London, 1961), ii. 697. © HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/30/2/25: Bonar Law to Lloyd George, 18 Sept. 1917; Bodleian Library, Milner MSS dep. 23/1: Thornton diary, 3 Sept. 1917. 7 R. Blake (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig (London, 1952), 255. ® Riddell, War Diary, 275; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 18 Sept.

oy . Ramsden (ed.), Real Old Tory Politics: The Political Diaries of Sir Robert Sanders, Lord Bayford, 1910-35 (London, 1984), 87-8.

150 Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council desist.'° The third change, Sir Eric Geddes’s elevation to the Admiralty and Carson’s elevation to the War Cabinet, caused less political furore, for it appeared as though Carson had been pro-

moted. But in reality Lloyd George moved Carson because the Prime Minister was dissatisfied with the First Lord’s failure to implement the spirit of the reforms which followed from his own visit to the Admiralty at the end of April. Jellicoe had remained reluctant to delegate executive authority or replace unsuitable senior Officers and Carson had refused to make him act."

The new First Lord impressed people as ‘the picture of broad views and energetic resolve’. He left the operational conduct of the war at sea to his professional colleagues, but brought some order to the decision-making process of the Admiralty.’ In September he inaugurated changes in the structure of Admiralty business and appointed new senior staff officers in an effort to free the First Sea Lord from administrative chores. His reforms were designed to enable Jellicoe to concentrate his energies on the operational conduct of the war."

For the time being, Jellicoe remained at the Admiralty, but it would have required some spectacular success to have salvaged his reputation in the Prime Minister’s eyes. In May 1917 a press cam-

paign had begun to insist that the Admiralty must adopt a more offensive policy. Both Jellicoe and Beatty had to give some thought

to ways in which the British might weaken the High Seas Fleet without risking their own capital ships.’ In the autumn of 1917, although the turbines of British sea power continued to grind, they 10 LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (17) 27/1: Derby to Lloyd George, 15 Aug. 1917; LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (17) 27/6: Derby to Robertson, 15 Aug. 1917; LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (17) 27/6: Derby, Record of what has passed in the last few days in regard to Mr Winston Churchill, 18 Aug. 1917; J. Turner, British Politics and the Great War: Coalition and Conflict 1915-1918 (London, 1992), 210-22; Riddell, War Diary, 257. 1 CCC, Wemyss MSS WMYS 11: Wemyss, Memoirs [n.d.]; Beatty to Tyrwhitt, 30 May 1917, quoted in S. W. Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty: The Last Naval Hero—An Intimate Biography (New York, 1981), 216; Beatty to his wife, 16 May 1917, quoted in B. McL. Ranft (ed.), The Beatty Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty (London, 19839), i. 430-1; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/28/6/1: Jellicoe to Lloyd George, 28 July 1917. 2 A. Fitzroy, Memoirs (London, n.d.), ti. 657. 13, PRO ADM 116/1805: Geddes to Beatty, 9 Oct. 1917. 4 PRO ADM 116/1804: Geddes, Memorandum on Admiralty organization, 10 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC231: War Cabinet, 12 Sept. 1917. 1S Roskill, Beatty, 227.

Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council 15] did so too slowly to provide him with such a success. A major fleet

action continued to evade the Grand Fleet. Both Jellicoe and Beatty agreed that it would be wrong to gamble with the safety of the Grand Fleet because the whole of the allied cause rested upon

it. Their proper policy was to wait for the High Seas Fleet to venture out, and not to risk the destruction of their own capital ships in attempting to lure it into a trap. Although the British had a marked superiority in numbers of Dreadnoughts, a superiority which grew with the arrival of four American capital ships in December to form a sixth Battle Squadron, the Grand Fleet did not have enough escorts. The demands of the anti-submarine war had robbed it of nearly half of its destroyers. And the poor quality of British shells and the structural weaknesses of some British vessels which had been revealed at Jutland were only slowly put right. But

that did not mean that Beatty and Jellicoe wished to refuse to engage the High Seas Fleet; merely that they were reluctant to do so except in favourable circumstances."®

Beatty’s favourite option was an aerial torpedo attack on the German fleet in harbour. In August and September he asked the Admiralty to provide him with four aircraft carriers equipped with torpedo bombers capable of attacking the High Seas Fleet. He also supported the sowing of mines in the North Sea and off the mouths

of German harbours to harass the High Seas Fleet and interrupt the passage of U-boats.'’ Progress was slow, for Jellicoe was sceptical about the efficacy of aerial torpedo attacks and the necessary aircraft could not be provided until the second half of 1918.18 Con-

sequently, the criticisms of the Admiralty continued. Ten days before entering the government, Churchill wrote a memorandum advocating the formation of an ‘Inshore Aggressive Fleet’ of eld16 Jellicoe to Beatty, 30 June and 4 July 1917, in Temple Patterson (ed.), The Jellicoe Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral

of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe (London, 1968), ii. 173, 179; A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, iv. 1917: Year of Crisis (Oxford, 1969), 41-9; W. Wegner, The Naval Strategy of the World

War, trans. H. Herwig (Annapolis, Md., 1929; 2nd edn. 1989), 61-2, 138-9; D. Woodward, “The High Seas Fleet 1917-1918’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 651 (1968), 244-5. ’ PRO ADM 116/1804: Beatty, Notes—operations and mining policy, 23 Aug. 1917; Beatty to Admiralty, 11 Sept. 1917, in S. W. Roskill (ed.), Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service, 1. 1908-1918 (London, 1969), 541-3. 18 Admiralty to Beatty, 25 Sept. 1917, in Roskill (ed.), Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service, 1. 549-54.

152 Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council erly battleships and cruisers. Once the British had occupied one of

the Friesian islands as an advanced base for their flotillas and aircraft, this force would impose a close blockade on the German coast, thus compelling the Germans to recall many of their U-boats to protect their own bases.'? But this bold proposal was vitiated by

a host of practical difficulties, not least of which was that the material requirements for the ‘Inshore Aggressive Fleet’ were massive. The Admiralty War Staff estimated that it would require no

fewer than forty battleships, forty-three elderly cruisers, and so many light craft that the convoy system would have to be abandoned. Such a force could be assembled only by using French, Italian, and American vessels.” It was not surprising that an allied naval conference at the beginning of September showed little enthusiasm for risking so many vessels in a hazardous operation under British command.?! Jellicoe’s unwillingness to risk British capital ships close to the

German coast meant that, when the Russians asked for naval assistance in the autumn, it was not forthcoming. Before the March revolution the Russian Baltic Fleet had occupied at least one Ger-

man battle squadron. But by April, with reports of growing indiscipline in the Russian navy, the Admiralty began to worry that

the Germans might soon be able to unite all their capital ships against the Grand Fleet.” The situation became dangerous in October when German troops occupied an island at the mouth of the Gulf of Riga whence they could threaten the Russian naval base at

Reval. If Reval fell so might Petrograd, and on 18 October Kerensky, the Russian premier, begged the British ambassador to ask the Royal Navy to force its way into the Baltic to save the seat of his government.” But the Naval Staff rejected the operation as impracticable unless the High Seas Fleet had first been destroyed. The most the Grand Fleet could do was to send a weak force into the Kattegat at the end of October in the vain hope of luring the High Seas Fleet into the North Sea.” 19 PRO CAB 24/19/GT1397: Churchill, Naval war policy, 7 July 1917. 20 Notes of a conference held on board HMS Queen Elizabeth, 24 Aug. 1917, in Temple Patterson (ed.), Jellicoe Papers, ti. 197-202.

21 PRO CAB 24/28/GT2211: Report of a naval conference of powers united against Germany, 4—5 Sept. 1917. 22 PRO CAB 24/9/GT351: Admiralty War Staff, The effect of the revolution on the situation in the Baltic, 1 Apr. 1917.

23 PRO FO 800/178/Rus/17/22: Buchanan to FO, circ. to War Cabinet, 19 Oct.

3 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, iv. 241-6.

Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council 153 By the autumn Jellicoe’s days were numbered, but Lloyd George could not yet afford to dismiss him, for he had a more urgent task. As there was no hope that Haig would deliver a victory to sustain the morale of the British people through a fourth winter of war, Lloyd George now wanted to give Sir Edmund Allenby, who had taken command of the EEF in June, ‘overwhelming forces to make sure of one offensive being successful’.” If Allenby took Jerusalem

and Sir Stanley Maude, who commanded the British forces in Mesopotamia, repulsed the expected Turkish offensive towards Baghdad, the time would be ripe to offer Turkey terms to make a separate peace. On 24 September the War Cabinet agreed to reconvene the War Policy Committee to consider operations in the Middle East. The committee approved the Prime Minister’s suggestion to divert the guns earmarked for Cadorna to Allenby, and recommended that two divisions should be sent from France to Egypt to act as a general reserve for either Allenby or Maude. The War Cabinet wanted to hit the Turks hard over the winter in the hope that they could then be persuaded to make a separate peace at the expense of Russia.” Neither the French, Italian, or British generals liked this sug-

gestion. Painlévé and Foch wanted to reduce the size of the French army by demobilizing men over the age of 48 so that they could sow the next harvest. But to permit this the BEF would have to take over more of the line by 1 November.’’ Cadorna insisted that he needed British guns to repulse the expected Austrian offensive and Haig deplored opening a major offensive in Palestine, arguing that the proper policy was to remain on the defensive on all fronts except his own. He and Robertson were equally reluctant to

take over more of the line in France. If they did so, the BEF’s winter training programme would be interrupted, and Haig might not be able to mount yet another offensive in the spring of 1918. > PRO CAB 27/6/WP17: Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 24 Sept. 1917. 6 Robertson to Haig, 24 Sept. 1917, in D. R. Woodward (ed.), The Military Correspondence of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial Gen-

eral Staff, December 1915—February 1918 (London, 1990), 225; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/44/3/25: Lloyd George to Robertson, 22 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/ WC238: War Cabinet, 24 Sept. 1917.

77 PRO CAB 28/2/IC27(a): Procés-verbal of an Anglo-French conference, 25 Sept. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 25 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 27/6/WP17: Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 24 Sept. 1917.

% PRO CAB 24/27/2156: Memorandum communicated by Italian chargé d’ affaires, 27 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 24/27/2157: Robertson to War Cabinet, 28 Sept.

1917; PRO CAB 1/25/16: Secretary’s notes of a conference at Field Marshal Sir

154 Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council But they were about to be brushed aside. Some members of the

General Staff itself recognized that the Flanders offensive had failed. In London Macdonogh prepared a lugubrious estimate of Germany’s staying power. He suggested that, although Germany was running short of men, it would have sufficient to continue fighting into 1918. The morale of German troops 1n the field was shaken, but the depression caused by allied successes in the west was counterbalanced by the Russian collapse. The blockade was causing serious food shortages but it would not defeat Germany in less than two years. The civilian population remained well disciplined, and ‘It may be safely said that at present no revolution can be expected in Germany.” It therefore appeared certain that the war would continue into 1918 and probably beyond. The War Policy Committee met four times between 3 and 11 October to discuss the implications of that forecast. The Russian collapse, his colleagues’ refusal to make a compromise peace at Russia’s expense, and the failure of the Flanders offensive had a

profound impact on the Prime Minister. By 3 October he had abandoned his intention of continuing the war to impose democ-

racy upon Germany. He was now, albeit unwillingly, content merely to continue fighting to defeat Germany’s current bid for hegemony. He told his colleagues that ‘the only way to bring the War to an end was by removing her Allies from Germany one by one, ultimately completely isolating Germany’.° He wanted to begin this process in Palestine where, if Allenby could occupy the Jaffa—Jerusalem line, ‘the Peace Party under Talaat would be in the ascendancy’. He was willing to offer the Turks terms which included a loan for reconstruction and protectorate status

under nominal Ottoman suzerainty for Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia.”!

Lloyd George tried to bribe Robertson by promising to support the generals in their opposition to taking over more line in France. But the generals refused to be bought.** Robertson’s refusal was D. Haig’s Headquarters, 26 Sept. 1917; PRO WO 256/22: Haig diary, 26 Sept. 1917. 2? PRO CAB 27/8/WP49: Macdonogh, The manpower and internal condition of the Central Powers—Germany, 1 Oct. 1917.

. Te, CAB 27/6/WP18: Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 3 Oct. 1917. 3 OW. Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen 1914-1918 (London, 1926), 11. 256; PRO

WO 256/23: Robertson to Haig, 6 Oct. 1917; LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/14/95:

Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council 155 not absolute. He did not reject the Prime Minister’s policy of weakening the Central Powers by detaching some of Germany’s lesser allies. On 29 September he wrote to the Prime Minister that ‘We must detach some of the enemy countries if we possibly can.’*?

But he maintained that it was the job of diplomacy to assist the military by using diplomatic means to conjure up agreements with Germany’s allies.** What he was not prepared to do was to weaken the western front by transferring more troops to other theatres to assist the diplomats. Nor did he think that the Turks would sue for

peace even if Allenby did take Jerusalem. They would simply retreat north of the city and wait for Allenby’s attenuated supply lines to force him to halt. To clinch his argument he invited MajorGeneral Lynden-Bell, Allenby’s former chief of staff, to explain the logistic difficulties of supporting an army in Palestine, and privately told Allenby not to minimize the difficulties of mounting a major offensive in his submission to the committee. Allenby followed his advice and suggested that he would need another thirteen divisions in addition to his existing force of seven infantry and three cavalry divisions.»

Haig remained convinced that unless the German army was defeated ‘I can see no prospect of gaining the peace we seek’. A compromise peace was anathema, for it would mean ‘not only the almost certain renewal of the war hereafter at a time of Germany’s choosing but the entire loss of the faith and respect of our Overseas Dominions, America and of our other allies, and indeed of the entire world, East and West’.*° Haig refuted the argument that, because of the Russian collapse, he could not defeat the German army in the west in 1918 by insisting that his operations in 1917 had left the Germans so weak that another British offensive in 1918

was practical.*’ Jellicoe added his customary argument that reinforcing secondary theatres would place an insupportable strain Robertson to Allenby, 5 Oct. 1917; Blake (ed.), Haig, 256; LHCMA, Clive MSS II/ 4: Clive diary, 4 Oct. 1917.

33 PRO WO 106/1515: Robertson to Lloyd George, 29 Sept. 1917. 4 Tbid. 2° PRO CAB 27/6/WP20: Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 8 Oct. 1917; LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/14/95: Robertson to Allenby, 5 Oct. 1917; PRO CAB 27/8/WP52: Allenby to Robertson, 9 Oct. 1917. 36 PRO CAB 24/28/GT2243: Haig to Robertson, 8 Oct. 1917. 37 PRO WO 256/23: Robertson to Haig, 6 Oct. 1917; LHCMA, Robertson MSS I/ 14/95: Robertson to Allenby, 5 Oct. 1917; PRO CAB 27/8/WP3: Robertson, Future military policy, 9 Oct. 1917.

156 Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council on Britain’s dwindling mercantile tonnage and the Shipping Controller added that, even if only two divisions were shipped from France to Palestine, imports into Britain would drop by 5 per cent.°®

The committee was divided. Milner and Smuts supported the Prime Minister, Curzon and Bonar Law vacillated, and Carson threw his weight behind Robertson and Jellicoe.*” Robertson believed that the combined opposition of himself and Haig meant that “The Palestine thing will not come off. The Prime Minister dare

not go against us.”“° But Lloyd George did dare to attempt to circumvent the military experts by proposing that the committee should seek independent professional advice from Lord French, the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, and Sir Henry Wilson, who was currently unemployed.*! Lloyd George had chosen Wilson

and French in the knowledge that they had grudges against Haig and Robertson and were dissatisfied with their policies.” Lloyd George told his two new advisers that they faced four choices. ‘They could follow Haig’s recommendations and concentrate all forces on

the western front. They could concentrate most of their forces on the western front but use those in Palestine and Mesopotamia to force the Turks to come to terms. They could pursue the policy advocated by Pétain, await the arrival of a large American army, something which would probably not happen until 1919, mount only minor attacks in the west and try to wear down the Central Powers by economic warfare. The final option was Lloyd George’s favourite. They could combine options two and three in a policy ‘which he might describe as “knocking the props from under Germany”. The underlying basis of this idea was to counter the loss of Russia, which had been knocked out by the Revolution, by depriving Germany of her allies, with a view to an eventual great concentration against an isolated Germany.’* This could be achieved by a 33 PRO CAB 24/28/GT2250: Jellicoe, Future naval policy, 9 Oct. 1917; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/35/2/25: Maclay to Lloyd George, 17 Sept. 1917. * Bodleian Library, Milner MSS dep. 23/1: Thornton diary, 11 Oct. 1917. 40 Robertson to Haig, 9 Oct. 1917, in Woodward (ed.), The Military Correspondence of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 234. 44 PRO CAB 23/13/WC247A: War Cabinet, 10 Oct. 1917. * PRO CAB 45/193: Robertson to Edmonds, 1 Dec. 1932; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 20 Oct. 1917; J. M. McEwen (ed.), The Riddell Diaries: A Selection 1908-1923 (London, 1986), 195, 220-1; R. Holmes, The Little FieldMarshal: Sir John French (London, 1981), 330-1. 8 PRO CAB 23/13/WC247B: War Cabinet, 11 Oct. 1917.

Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council 157 combined military and diplomatic offensive against Turkey and, as a sop to Robertson, a diplomatic initiative to induce the Bulgarians to come to terms. In the meantime, the allies would pursue Pétain’s policy of maintaining enough troops in the west to hold their line and to mount a series of limited offensives to contain the German troops facing them. Only after Germany’s allies had collapsed, and the Americans had arrived in force in France, would the Entente mount a decisive offensive against the Germans.” When Haig had tendered his advice, he had added, in a sentence that suggested that he had forgotten that the real object of the war was not military victory but a strengthening of Britain’s post-war security, that ‘It would be better for the future of our race to fall in

the next year’s offensive than to accept the enemy’s terms now

when after more than three years of splendid effort we have brought German resistance so near to breaking point.’* Lloyd George had no intention of leading the British empire towards Gotterdimmerung. He had not abandoned hope of being able to inflict a final military defeat on Germany. But he feared that if the British tried to do so in 1918, before the arrival of the Americans and the revival of the French, the result would be a Pyrrhic victory

for Britain and peace made on American terms. On 15 October, convinced that the final peace terms would be dictated by the

belligerent which retained the largest army at the end of the fighting, he told Hankey that What he wished to avoid in 1918 was the terrific losses that were inevitably bound up with an attack of this nature. He admitted that a continuance of Sir Douglas Haig’s attacks might conceivably result in bringing Germany to terms in 1919. But in that case it would be the United States of America who would deal the blow and not we ourselves. If our army were spent in a succession of shattering attacks in 1918, it would not be in a condition to renew the offensive in 1919. It would, indeed, be in exactly the condition that the French Army was in at this moment, with its numbers reduced and its moral weakened. He was particularly anxious to avoid a situation at the end of the War in which our Army would no longer be a first-class one. He wished it to be in every respect as good as the army of the United States, and possibly a revived Russian Army, so that this country would be the greatest military power in the world. “ Ibid. 4 PRO CAB 24/28/GT2243: Haig to Robertson, 8 Oct. 1917. 46 PRO CAB 1/42: Note by Sir M. Hankey of a conversation between the Prime Minister and himself, 15 Oct. 1917.

158 Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council The only safe course was to wait until 1919 before delivering the knock-out blow against Germany, for if Britain ended the war with its army depleted it would be unable ‘to make her voice heard and her will prevail in the momentous decisions to be come to in the Council of Peace’.*’

Robertson, who was furious at the Prime Minister’s blatant attempt to disregard him, threatened to resign, and Curzon informed the Prime Minister that if the CIGS did so it was likely that Cecil, Balfour, Carson, and Curzon himself would follow him.* But Lloyd

George had screwed up his political courage and threatened his own resignation if they did so.” French’s report was bitterly critical of Haig and Robertson’s plan

for concentrating all available resources on a spring offensive in Flanders in 1918. There were no reasons for believing that the Entente would have a significant numerical superiority in the west in 1918 and the experience of 1916-17 gave no grounds for believ-

ing that Haig would be able to break the German line in 1918. Wilson was less forthright, but agreed that the allies would be too weak to defeat the Germans in the west until the arrival of a large American army. French would have preferred to concentrate resources in Palestine, but like Wilson he believed it was now too late in the year to achieve a decisive success against the Turks in the

winter. Wilson offered no opinion about the possibility of Italy being able to knock out Austria, but French was anxious to encourage them to do so. Both soldiers concluded by highlighting the vital need for the allies to establish a committee of prime ministers and

senior generals to concert their material resources and strategic policy.° Robertson stubbornly insisted that ‘I do not much care what advice is rendered by French and Wilson as I shall not budge an inch from 47 H. Nicolson, King George V: His Life and Reign (London, 1952), 318. 48 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 10 Oct. 1917. ” PRO CAB 1/42: Note by Sir M. Hankey of a conversation between the Prime Minister and himself, 15 Oct. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 15

So PRO CAB 27/8/WP60: French, The present state of the war, future prospects and future action to be taken, 20 Oct. 1917; PRO CAB 27/8/WP61: Wilson, The present state of the war, future prospects and future action to be taken, 20 Oct. 1917;

' ; oy ee D. Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 1896-1929 (London,

Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council 159 my Paper ...’.-! And perhaps he would not have done so but for the Italian collapse. The British knew that Italy was less than united in its commitment to prosecute the war and that there existed a po-

tentially powerful neutralist faction, led by the former premier, Giovanni Giolliti..* The British embassy in Rome agreed that, as long as Sonnino remained Minister of Foreign Affairs, ‘there is no danger of backsliding of “combinazioni” designed to leave us in the lurch’. However, ‘If he were to fall, one does not feel any security in this direction.’ In December 1916 Robertson was so concerned about the stability of the Italian government and the strength of the

Giollitian party, that he warned Lloyd George that ‘if Italy were seriously threatened by German troops, this party might succeed in overthrowing the Government and coming to an agreement with

the enemy’.* The internal situation seemed to become more threatening in 1917, and in the autumn Delmé-Radcliffe reported

that the Italian government ‘fears the growing discontent in the country’ due to coal and food shortages, heavy casualties, and propaganda financed by the Germans.°°

In the same way that the British believed they had to do what they could to sustain the Italian government, the German high

command felt that they had to support the Austro-Hungarian government. Although Cadorna’s summer offensive had failed to break through, the Austrian army had suffered so badly after no less than eleven battles on the Isonzo that its generals believed that

they could not withstand another Italian attack.°° Ludendorff therefore sent six German divisions to Italy to take part in an Austro-German offensive at Caporetto. It was intended to relieve the pressure on the crumbling Austro-Hungarian empire, to topple

the Italian government, and perhaps to force Italy to leave the war.’ °' LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/23/58: Robertson to Haig, 11 Oct. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 12 Oct. 1917; Blake (ed.), Haig, 259. *2 PRO FO 800/384: Mouncy to Dormer, 1 Jan. 1917. 3 PRO FO 800/173/It/17/1: Grahame to Bertie, 6 Jan. 1917. 4 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS E/1/5/4: Robertson to Lloyd George, 3 Dec. 1916. °> PRO CAB 24/27/GT2182: Delmé-Radcliffe to Robertson, 21 Sept. 1917; LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (17) 27/6: Delmé-Radcliffe to Derby, 8 Oct. 1917. °° M. Farkas, ‘Doberdo: The Habsburg Army on the Italian Front, 1915-1916’, in B. K. Kiraly, N. F. Dreisziger, and A. A. Nofi (eds.), East Central European Society in World War One (New York, 1985), 334-5.

7 R. B. Aspery, The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and

160 Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council Italian intelligence knew the location of the offensive and that it was not simply intended to threaten the lines of communication of the Italian forces menacing Trieste but to foment a revolution in Italy spearheaded by the Giollitian socialists. The latter were reported to have told the Italian government that they meant to have peace even if it did cost a revolution.°® The Central Powers’ offens-

ive began on 24 October, and the next day Delmé-Radcliffe reported that Cadorna was fixing the blame for the collapse of the Italian Second Army on ‘intrigues in the country to undermine the loyalty of the people [which] must have had their effect on the troops, who yesterday, in some cases, abandoned positions which they ought not to have lost’.°’ “The refusal of the troops to fight’, he added, ‘is apparently an organized plot on Russian lines and prob-

ably put into operation in agreement with the enemy’.” The Germans did not invent the ‘stab in the back’ myth. Stories concerning the pernicious impact of socialist and pacifist propaganda and treachery had been much exaggerated by generals looking to find a way of excusing their own shortcomings. The real causes of the collapse of the Second Army were a combination of heavy casualties, particularly amongst the officer corps, their replacement by men who were not properly trained, and the demoralizing impact on the troops in the trenches of the hardships their families were suffering.*®!

The Italian débacle gave the French-—Wilson programme an unstoppable momentum. Haig dismissed French’s memorandum as

‘a poor production’ and rejected Wilson’s recommendation in favour of an inter-allied council, because ‘no committee ever gives prompt decisions and no Council of War has ever yet won a war’. But the War Cabinet, primed to expect a collapse in Italian morale, Ludendorff Conduct World War One (New York, 1991), 339; E. Ludendorff, My War Memoirs, 1914-1918 (London, 1919), ii. 482.

8 PRO CAB 24/30/GT2449: Delmé-Radcliffe to Robertson, 21 Oct. 1917; LHCMA, Spears MSS 1/13: Spiers to Maurice, 1 Oct. 1917; PRO FO 800/173: Le Roy Lewis to Bertie, 1 Oct. 1917; PRO FO 371/3081/195735: Rumbold to FO, 3 Oct.

> PRO CAB 24/29/GT2393: Delmé-Radcliffe to Robertson, 24 and 25 Oct. 1917. 6 PRO CAB 23/30/GT2427: Delmé-Radcliffe to Robertson, 28 Oct. 1917; PRO CAB 24/30/GT2472: Robertson to Secretary, War Office, 1 Nov. 1917; PRO CAB 24/30/GT2471: Robertson to Secretary, War Office, 31 Oct. 1917. 6. PRO CAB 28/2/IC32: Procés-verbal of a conference held at the Italian headquarters at Peschiera, 8 Nov. 1917. 6 Blake (ed.), Haig, 262; J. Charteris, At GHQ (London, 1931), 265.

Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council 161 shared Cadorna’s interpretation and felt that, unless they acted quickly, Italy might go the same way as Russia. Cadorna begged the British and French to send divisions to help the Italians shore up their crumbling lines and issued veiled threats that, if they did not, defeat at the front would be followed by revolution at home and a separate peace.®

Caporetto demonstrated what was becoming increasingly apparent, that since the spring of 1917 the Entente had been without an agreed strategic plan. The Provisional Government had sought a negotiated end to the war, the Italians had tried to hammer the Austrians, the French were determined to await the arrival of the Americans, and the British had allowed Haig to try and win the war single-handed in Flanders. Lloyd George was determined to ensure

that henceforth the Entente had a single plan to which they could all subscribe. In July 1917 Robertson, Foch, Pétain, Pershing, and

Cadorna agreed that the Russian collapse made it essential to accelerate the training, equipment, and shipment of the US army to France and to secure unity of action in the west by establishing ‘a

permanent Inter-Allied military organization, which will study and prepare the rapid movements of troops from one theatre to another’.“ Lloyd George had already begun lobbying for better machinery to co-ordinate allied strategy in late August. On 3

September the War Cabinet agreed that he should write to Woodrow Wilson suggesting the need to establish an allied supreme council which could survey all of the Entente’s resources and prepare a joint plan of campaign for 1918.° On 15 October Foch agreed that the French and British governments should take the lead in establishing a permanent military staff to study the war as a whole and to advise the heads of government on strategy.©

But this apparent measure of agreement was deceptive. The French supported an inter-allied council in the hope that it would give them a lever with which to force the British to take over more of the line in France. Lloyd George favoured it because he hoped 8% PRO ADM 116/1806: Admiralty memorandum for War Cabinet: Italy, Germany’s hope, 25 Oct. 1917. % PRO CAB 28/2/I1C24/GT1533: Policy to be adopted should Russia be forced out of the war: Report of a military conference on 26 July 1917. 6& PRO CAB 23/13/WC227B: War Cabinet, 3 Sept. 1917; D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs (London, 1938), ii. 1414-18. 6 PRO CAB 28/2/IC28: Secretary’s notes of a conversation at Chequers Court on Sunday, 15 Oct. 1917.

162 Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council it would recommend against a repetition of Haig’s strategy of attacking the German army in the west again in 1918, and in favour of attacking one or more of Germany’s allies. And Robertson was determined that, whatever its bureaucratic structure, its purpose should be to enable the British General Staff to control their allies and not the other way around.®’ Thus, when Foch had suggested in August that the Russian collapse made it imperative to establish an allied General Staff in Paris, the CIGS wanted nothing to do with it. According to Robertson’s close adviser, Sir Frederick Maurice, the DMO, this was a plot ‘on the part of the French to get control, which they now find is slipping out of their hands’.” Lloyd George knew how much Robertson and Haig disliked the idea of an inter-allied council, but Caporetto gave him his oppor-

tunity. Despite their objections, the Prime Minister insisted that British troops had to be sent to Italy. They were required not only

to support the Italian government and army but because they would serve his wider aim of securing control of allied strategy. “We

must help them’, he urged, ‘then we will have earned the right to dictate.’ On 30 October Lloyd George suggested to Painlévé that the Entente should establish an inter-allied General Staff. It was to be independent of the national general staffs, to sit permanently, and to act as the professional adviser at periodic meetings of an inter-allied council. The latter body was to consist of the allied prime ministers and one other representative from each member nation. The first task of the new body would be to consider the Entente’s plans for 1918. Painlévé, hoping that the new organization would enable him to compel the BEF to take over more of the line in France, quickly agreed.” None of the generals welcomed a new tier of command which would reduce their freedom of action, and, with Haig’s acquiescence, Pétain proposed an alternative which would increase their combined authority. The entire allied

front from the Channel to the Adriatic should be treated as a whole. Haig would command from the Channel to south of the Oise, a point much further south than the present one, Pétain 6? HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/44/3/12: Robertson to Lloyd George and enc., 13 May 1917. 68 THCMA, Robertson MSS I/23/42: Robertson to Haig, 8 Aug. 1917. ° LHCMA, Clive MSS I/2: Maurice to Clive, 18 Aug. 1917.

7” HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/44/3/28: Lloyd George to Robertson, 27 Oct. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 27 Oct. 1917. ™ PRO CAB 23/13/WC261A: War Cabinet, 31 Oct. 1917.

Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council 163 would control the remainder of the line, including the Italian army,

and the Italians would be told that they would get no allied help unless they agreed.” But the War Cabinet saw through so transparent a ploy and rejected it.”

The first allied reinforcements did not detrain in Italy until 31 October, but by then the Italians were saving themselves. The

collapse of the Boselli ministry and its replacement by a new government led by Vittorio Orlando indicated that Italian politicians were closing ranks in the face of the Central Powers’ invasion.

Sonnino’s continuation as Minister of Foreign Affairs suggested

that Italy would remain committed to its allies.“ When Lloyd George arrived in Italy on 5 November, Foch reported that, although the Second Army was broken, the remaining three Italian armies, a force of thirty-five divisions, were intact and were retreating towards the Piave where he believed they could halt the enemy advance.” Even so, on 6 November Orlando asked for no less than fifteen allted divisions and intimated that if they were not sent and the Italian army had to abandon the Piave, he could not guarantee ‘internal order’. Lloyd George and Painlévé had already allotted

eight divisions to come to Italy’s assistance, and in return they demanded that the Italian government dismiss Cadorna and refused to earmark further troops until Wilson and Foch had investigated the military situation further.” Cadorna’s replacement was

General Diaz, but, rather than being forced to face disgrace and retirement, Cadorna was made his country’s military representative on the Supreme War Council.” 2 PRO CAB 23/4/WC263: War Cabinet, 2 Nov. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/4: Hankey diary, 2 Nov. 1917; PRO WO 256/24: Haig diary, 1 Nov. 1917; PRO WO

256/24: Robertson to Haig, 3 Nov. 1917 and Haig to Robertson, 4 Nov. 1917; LHCMA, Clive MSS IT/4: Clive diary, 3 Nov. 1917. ™ PRO FO 800/199: Balfour to Lloyd George, 3 Nov. 1917; PRO CAB 21/88: Milner to Wilson, 3 Nov. 1917. 4” PRO CAB 24/30/GT2489: Dept. of Information, Intelligence Bureau, Weekly

report on Italy, 1 Nov. 1917; PRO CAB 24/31/GT2557: Dept. of Information, Intelligence Bureau, Weekly report on Italy, 8 Nov. 1917. ® PRO CAB 28/2/IC29: Meeting of representatives of the British and French governments, held [at] Rapallo, Italy, 5 Nov. 1917. 7° PRO CAB 28/2/IC30(b): Procés-verbal of a conference of the British, French, and Italian governments held [at] Rapallo, 6 Nov. 1917. 7 PRO CAB 28/2/IC30: Procés-verbal of a conference of the British, French, and Italian governments held [at] Rapallo, 6 Nov. 1917; PRO CAB 28/2/IC30(a): Procés-

verbal of a conference of the British, French, and Italian governments held [at] Rapallo, 6 Nov. 1917.

164 Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council The Supreme War Council was established by the French, British, and Italian governments on 7 November. It consisted of the

prime minister and one other representative of each member nation, and was charged with meeting monthly to ‘watch over the general conduct of the war’. Each member nation was to nominate a Permanent Military Representative to act as technical advisers to the Council. Lloyd George shared Robertson’s fear that the Council might become the tool of the French government, and to mini-

mize that possibility he insisted that the Permanent Military Representatives should be based at Versailles and not in Paris. He

appointed Henry Wilson to act as the British representative to ensure that the new arrangements would offer him an alternative source of military advice. Wilson and his colleagues were to act in

concert to prepare ‘general war plans’ and submit them to the Council, which ‘under the authority of the Governments, ensures their concordance, and submits, if need be, any necessary changes’.

The national general staffs remained responsible to their own government for the conduct of the operations of their own armies.” This left ample scope for quarrels between Versailles and the War Office, but, far from being perturbed, Lloyd George welcomed the

Council as ‘an ingenious device for depriving Robertson of his power’.” The Prime Minister now had both a constitutional military adviser able and willing to give him the advice that he wanted, and the machinery for inter-allied co-operation which might enable him to foist his strategy upon Britain’s allies. But before Lloyd George could exploit the new situation he had

to reduce the political support which underpinned Haig and Robertson. Throughout the summer and early autumn of 1917, newspapers like the Morning Post and the National Review had reiterated that the direction of the war must remain in the hands of the soldiers. Lloyd George therefore began a public campaign to swing published and, he hoped, public, opinion behind him. In late 7 PRO CAB 28/2/IC30(c): Procés-verbal of a conference of the British, French, and Italian governments [held at Rapallo] 7 Nov. 1917; PRO CAB 28/2/IC30(d): Procés-verbal of a conference of the British, French, and Italian governments [held at Rapallo] 7 Nov. 1917; D. F. Trask, The United States in the Supreme War Council: American War Aims and Inter-Allied Strategy, 1917-1918 (Middletown, Conn., 1961), 28-30.

% A.J. P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George: A Diary by Frances Stevenson (London, 1971), 164; PRO CAB 23/13/WC259A: War Cabinet, 30 Oct. 1917; Lloyd George, War Memoirs, i. 1435-7.

Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council 165 October and early November one of his private secretaries, William Sutherland, tried with some success, to influence the press

in favour of a Supreme War Council. But it was not until 12 November, after the Council had been established, that Lloyd George showed his own hand. During a lunch held in Paris at which

Painlévé announced the establishment of the Council, Lloyd George attacked earlier allied failures to co-ordinate their strategies and concluded by comparing Haig’s progress in Flanders unflatteringly with the Austro-German success at Caporetto.*! This was a carefully prepared assault on the soldiers’ control of strategy, and served further to enrage Robertson, Haig, and Derby, each of whom recognized that, if Lloyd George shaped the Council according to his own ideas, it would significantly reduce their power.” The

Prime Minister had taken care to prepare a favourable reception for his speech by sending Smuts to London to exert whatever influence he could over the press.® Papers like the Manchester Guardian, the Observer, and the Daily Chronicle, which had sup-

ported him before the speech, continued to do so, but the Northcliffe press, fearful that if Lloyd George fell Asquith would

return to power, was circumspect. It supported the Council in principle, but warned Lloyd George that he must not interfere with the soldiers’ conduct of strategic policy.** Some Asquithian papers

like the Nation were alarmed, and some strongly Conservative papers, fearing that the speech and the Council were the first steps towards the dismissal of Haig and Robertson, were bitterly hostile.®

Lloyd George robustly defended his innovation. When the Army Council formally submitted to the War Cabinet that only they had

the constitutional authority to issue orders to the British Perma8 D. R. Woodward, Lloyd George and the Generals (Newark, NJ, 1983), 223-4. st Lloyd George, War Memoirs, i. 1442-3. 8 LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/20/11: Robertson to Derby, 15 Nov. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/4: Hankey diary, 6, 12, and 14 Nov. 1917; LHCMA, Clive MSS II/4: Clive diary, 8 Nov. 1917; C. 4 Court Repington, The First World War 1914-1918 (London, 1920), ii. 131-2; LHCMA, Robertson MSS I/23/65: Haig to Robertson, 12 Nov. 1917. 83 CCC, Hankey MSS 1/4: Hankey diary, 12 Nov. 1917; T. Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott 1911-1918 (London, 1970), 311-12. 8! J. M. McEwen, ‘Northcliffe and Lloyd George at War, 1914-1918’, Historical Journal, 24/3 (1981), 668. 8 Woodward, Lloyd George and the Generals, 225; Turner, British Politics and the Great War, 237-8.

166 Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council nent Military Representative and Derby supported them by threatening to resign, Lloyd George sharply rebuked them.®* In Parliament there were MPs on both sides of the House who were afraid that the Council meant that the government had handed control of the army to foreigners. On 19 November the Prime Minister defended his position in the Commons in an oration ‘of the “platform” type but it produced a great effect on the House’.®’ Asquith’s defence of the proposition that the government ought not to interfere with the generals in the conduct of the war was lacklustre, and many MPs perhaps agreed with Carson that although they opposed

the Council, they supported the Prime Minister because of his transparent determination to win the war.*®

Lloyd George’s efforts to curb Haig and Robertson’s powers

were further assisted by events in France and Palestine. At Cambrai, on 20 November, seven divisions of Sir Julian Byng’s Third Army together with 320 tanks pierced the Hindenburg line to a depth of between three and four miles on a front of nearly six miles. When the news reached Britain, the church bells were rung in celebration. This seemed to be the victory which Lloyd George had sought so earnestly in order to bolster public morale. But ten days later morale was depressed when the Germans mounted a counter-offensive and recaptured the ground they had lost. Byng

and Haig blamed this calamity on the lack of training of their troops.” With more justice, Lloyd George blamed the generals. The Germans’ success seemed to show the hollowness of Haig’s claims that their fighting ability had been seriously degraded over the preceding months. On 5 December, after discussing an article in the Daily Telegraph suggesting that the German counter-attack had come as a surprise to the British, the War Cabinet insisted that 86 Riddell, War diary, 293-4. 87 Ramsden (ed.), Real Old Tory Politics, 91-2.

88 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/4: Hankey diary, 16 Nov. 1917; Hankey, The Supreme Command, 11. 728; PRO CAB 23/4/WC274: War Cabinet, 14 Nov. 1917; Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 11. 1445; Turner, British Politics and the Great War, 238-9. 8° J. Williams, Byng of Vimy: General and Governor General (London, 1983), 198; G. de Groot, Douglas Haig, 1861-1928 (London, 1988), 350; Blake (ed.), Haig, 269; J. Marshall-Cornwall, Wars and Rumours of Wars (London, 1984), 30; C. Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London, 1985), 168; T. Travers, How the War was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917-1918 (London, 1992), 26-31. ” W. Miles, History of the Great War: Military Operations France and Belgium, 1917—The Battle of Cambrai (London, 1948), 294—S.

Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council 167 Derby obtain a complete report from Haig.”' Even The Times, which had hitherto been amongst Haig’s most vociferous supporters, demanded an inquiry into the Cambrai affair.” Lloyd George was provided with more ammunition in his quest to control the General Staff by Allenby’s successful occupation of

Jerusalem. The offensive began on 31 October, Gaza fell on 7 November, and Allenby entered Jerusalem on 9 December. Even though a considerable portion of the Turkish forces in Palestine escaped encirclement, Allenby’s victory ended the possibility of a

Turko-German offensive against Baghdad. It also gave Lloyd George the propaganda victory that he had craved, and he made great play with it, announcing the capture of the city to the Commons himself.”* But the General Staff had predicted that Allenby’s thrust would be countered by the dispatch of eighteen Turkish and two German divisions to Palestine and that Allenby would require half a million men to take the city. In fact the Turks sent only 20,000

reinforcements. Maurice and Robertson could offer only some distinctly threadbare excuses.” The Prime Minister lost no time in exploiting the generals’ discomfort. On 11 December he suggested that it was time to remove both Robertson and Haig, not by sacking them, but by promoting them to high-sounding but powerless posts. Derby refused, hinting that he would himself resign if the Prime Minister persisted. Derby

then tried to deflect the Prime Minister’s ire by urging Haig to dismiss his chief of staff and chief intelligence officer.?° Haig reluc-

tantly agreed, but the new regime at GHQ was only a marginal improvement on its predecessor. Many facets of the old command 7 PRO CAB 23/4/WC292: War Cabinet, 5 Dec. 1917; PRO WO 256/235: Robertson to Haig, 5 Dec. 1917. See also HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/1/4/4: Addison to Lloyd George, 13 Dec. 1917. 2 McEwen, ‘Northcliffe and Lloyd George at War’, 669. 3 PRO CAB 24/30/GT2461: Allenby to Robertson, 1 Nov. 1917; PRO CAB 24/ 30/GT2470: Allenby to Robertson, 1 Nov. 1917; J. Q. C. Newell, ‘Learning the Hard Way: Allenby in Egypt and Palestine 1917-1919’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 14/3 (1991), 369-72; Y. Sheffy, ‘Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement: Allenby’s Campaigns in Palestine, 1917-1918’, in M. I. Handel (ed.), Intelligence and Military Operations (London, 1990), 173-96. 4 PRO CAB 23/4/WC296: War Cabinet, 11 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 24/35/GT2991: Robertson to Hankey, 14 Dec. 1917. °° LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (17) 27/2: Derby to Haig, 7 and 11 Dec. 1917, and 4 Jan. 1918; PRO WO 256/25: Robertson to Haig, 11 Dec. 1917; LHCMA, Clive MSS II/4: Clive diary, 6 Dec. 1917; PRO WO 256/25: Haig to Derby, 10 Dec. 1917; PRO WO 256/25: Haig diary, 13 Dec. 1917; Blake (ed.), Haig, 273.

168 Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council system, particularly the inability of GHQ properly to co-ordinate the work of individual army commanders and to issue them with clear instructions, persisted.” Haig sensed that his position was much weakened, and wrote to Robertson that if Lloyd George had no confidence in him as Commander-in-Chief he should dismiss him, but that otherwise ‘all carping criticism should cease’.”’ It did not, and Lloyd George continued to dwell on the desirability of dismissing Haig, but told his crony Lord Riddell that he could not find a suitable replacement.» But perhaps a more convincing reason was that the Prime Minister could not fight on two fronts at once. For while he was busy clipping his generals’ wings, Lloyd George was equally busy reshuffling his admirals. The Prime Minister knew that to dismiss one senior commander might smack of firm government, but to dismiss two would savour of panic. The Geddes reforms of September had made little difference to the conduct of Admiralty staff work. The repercussions of

Jellicoe’s continued refusal to delegate executive authority to his subordinates were felt in October, when the Germans successfully attacked an escorted convoy bound for Norway. Room 40 had

detected the Germans’ intentions, but the news did not reach Beatty in time because Jellicoe insisted that all signals intelligence be passed to him via the Director of the Intelligence Division, the

Director of the Operations Division, and the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. Only the First Sea Lord could decide whether and how

much of it could be transmitted to Beatty.” Lloyd George and Geddes consulted two former First Lords, Carson and Balfour, on 26 October to discuss dismissing Jellicoe, but thanks to Caporetto

and Cambrai it was not until 24 December that he was finally replaced, much to the consternation of some of his professional colleagues on the Board of Admiralty.'® Jellicoe’s successor was % T. Travers, ‘A Particular Style of Command: Haig and GHQ, 1916-18’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 10/3 (1987), 367-8, 373-4; LHCMA, Liddell Hart MSS 11/ 1935/114: Liddell Hart, Talk with Gen. Sir C. Bonham-Carter, 12 Dec. 1935. 97 LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/23/71: Haig to Robertson, 9 Dec. 1917. °° McEwen (ed.), The Riddell Diaries, 211; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 16 and 29 Dec. 1917; Blake (ed.), Haig, 276. *° Notes on visit of Director of Intelligence Division to Beatty, 19 Dec. 1917, in McL. Ranft (ed.), The Beatty Papers, i. 454; see also CCC, Wemyss MSS WMYS 11: Wemyss, Memoirs [n.d.]. 100 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 26 Oct. 1917; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/18/1/7: Geddes to Lloyd George, 8 Mar. 1918; HLRO, Lloyd George

Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council 169 Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, and under the new regime the First Sea Lord was finally freed from administrative chores and could concentrate on the operational conduct of the war. Geddes knew how to work with a staff, protected his advisers from political interference, and

supported their preference for postponing a fleet action in the North Sea.’*' Wemyss rejoiced that he ‘will back me up to the last’. Even so, the Admiralty staff still did not function with the same efficiency as the General Staff. The navy never overcame

the handicap that, unlike the army, it lacked a cadre of prewar-trained staff officers. The final Russian collapse and the failure of the Flanders offensive had a profound impact on the Prime Minister. They persuaded him to abandon any hope of democratizing Germany by force. Henceforth he continued the war merely to defeat Germany’s quest for

hegemony. By the middle of September what little faith Lloyd George had entertained for the success of the Flanders offensive had evaporated. Germany’s ability to continue fighting into 1918 convinced him that the only realistic course was to follow Pétain, to remain on the defensive in the west in 1918, and, in the meantime,

to attack the Turks in Palestine and knock them out of the war. That would provide the British people with the morale-boosting victory he thought that they needed to sustain them through a fourth winter of war. [t would also ensure that, when the climax of the war was reached in 1919, the British army would still be intact and Britain would be able to secure its own interests at the peace conference. If, however, the War Cabinet allowed Haig to mount another offensive in Flanders in 1918, the British army would be completely exhausted, the USA would deliver the knock-out blow against Germany, and President Wilson would dictate the peace.

Caporetto and Cambrai gave Lloyd George the opportunity not MSS F/18/1/7: Balfour to Geddes, 8 Mar. 1918; PRO ADM 116/1807: Geddes to Jellicoe, 24 Dec. 1917; PRO ADM 116/1807: Sea Lords to Geddes, 2 Jan. 1918; PRO ADM 116/1807: Geddes to Second Sea Lord, 4 Jan. 1918; S. W. Roskill, “The Dismissal of Admiral Jellicoe’, Journal of Contemporary History, 1/4 (1966), 69-93.

10. PRO ADM 116/1806: Discussion at Admiralty on occasion of visit by C.-in-C.

Grand Fleet, 2 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 23/5/WC325: War Cabinet, 18 Jan. 1918; Richmond diary, 15 Apr. 1918, in A. J. Marder (ed.), Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond (London, 1952), 310. 102 ‘Wemyss to Beatty, 30 Mar. 1918, in McL. Ranft (ed.), Beatty Papers, i. 524.

170 Caporetto, Cambrai, Supreme War Council only to reduce the power of Haig, Robertson, and their supporters to obstruct his control of strategy, but also to establish the machinery to co-ordinate allied strategy and which might enable him to foist his policy upon Britain’s partners.

7

Victory in 1918 or 1919”? THE implication of the War Cabinet’s rejection of the Kiihlmann peace offer, Russia’s collapse, the weakened state of the French and Italian armies, Haig’s failure, and the slow arrival of American troops in France, was that the war would continue into 1919 and perhaps beyond. The British therefore had to refrain from squan-

dering their dwindling manpower resources in another futile offensive in France in 1918, for fear that otherwise they would have

too few troops left at the end of the war to dictate the peace settlement. It was better in 1918 to hold the line in France with sufficient forces to stop any further German gains. Any troops over and above those needed to perform this vital task could be diverted to Palestine, where, Lloyd George hoped, they might win propaganda victories to sustain British and allied morale. Furthermore, such reinforcements could occupy territory that the British needed to prevent the Germans from exploiting the collapse of Russia to

attack Britain’s Asiatic empire. In the meantime they had to do everything possible to hasten the arrival of American troops in Europe in order to bring closer the moment in 1919 when it might be possible to deliver the knock-out blow against Germany. In December 1917 Lloyd George had three objectives: to persuade his

own colleagues to accept this new programme and timetable for victory, to persuade Britain’s partners to accept it, and to persuade

the British people that it was worthwhile continuing the war to achieve it.

The increasingly rapid disintegration of Russian power in the summer and autumn of 1917 was accompanied by much hand-wringing in London and amongst British officials in Russia, but there was

little they could do. By September, even the optimists no longer believed in Russia’s military regeneration, and the War Cabinet stopped all large-scale shipments of munitions to its ports.' In mid' PRO CAB 24/25/GT1980: Milner, Supplies for Russia [n.d., but c.7 Sept. 1917]; PRO CAB 24/25/GT1995: Cowdray, Dispatch of aeroplanes to Russia, 10 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC230: War Cabinet, 10 Sept. 1917; K. Neilson, “The

172 Victory in 1918 or 1919? September Lieutenant-Colonel Blair, the assistant military attaché, warned that the Soviets were rapidly passing under Bolshevik control, that the latter, supported by German money, were plotting to seize power, and that ‘the triumph of the Bolsheviks will be the first step towards a separate peace.” In November he was proven cor-

rect. The Bolsheviks took power and began to implement their revolutionary foreign policy. They sought a three-month armistice

during which a conference of all the belligerents could meet to negotiate a general peace based on a rejection of annexations and

indemnities. They abrogated the treaties made by their predecessors, and, in an effort to encourage revolutionary movements amongst the belligerents, published them, thus showing the peoples

of the world that the war was being waged by capitalist governments for imperialist ends.’ On 26 November Trotsky asked the Germans for an armistice. They agreed because they wanted to free troops for operations in the west.* The Bolsheviks knew that a peace negotiated between the Russian and German governments would be a victor’s peace imposed upon them by the Germans. They hoped to avoid this fate by spreading socialist revolutions westwards to engulf all of the belligerents.- They placed greater pressure on Britain and France by calling upon the Muslim subjects of their empires to revolt.® The Russo-German armistice was signed at Brest-Litovsk on 15 December, and a similar agreement soon followed between the Soviets and the Turks.’ Breakup of the Anglo-Russian Alliance: The question of Supply in 1917’, International History Review, 3/1 (1981), 62-75. 2 PRO CAB 24/28/GT2235: Blair to DMI, 15 Sept. 1917. 3 R. K. Debo, Revolution and Survival: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 19171918 (Liverpool, 1979), 16-18, 21-2; D. Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (Oxford, 1987), 183-6; PRO CAB 24/33/GT2742: Military attaché, Petrograd, to DMI, 20 Nov. 1917. 4 B. Pearce, How Haig Saved Lenin (London, 1987), 6. > Debo, Revolution and Survival, 27-8; PRO CAB 23/4/WC286: War Cabinet, 29 Nov. 1917; PRO CAB 24/34/GT2860: Dept. of Information, Intelligence Bureau, Weekly report on Russia, 3 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 24/35/GT2935: Dept. of Information, Intelligence Bureau, Weekly report on Russia, 10 Dec. 1917.

6 J. B. Scott (ed.), Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918 (Washington, DC, 1921), 202-3; PRO CAB 24/ 35'GT2959: Dept. of Information, Intelligence Bureau, Short memorandum on the manifesto of the Bolshevik government, “To all the labouring class Moslems of Russia and the Orient’, 12 Dec. 1917; A. L. Macfie, ‘The Straits Question in the First World War, 1914-1918’, Middle Eastern Studies, 19/1 (1983), 67; P. Hopkirk, Setting the East Ablaze: Lenin’s Dream of an Empire in Asia (Oxford, 1984), 15. 7 PRO CAB 24/36/GT3075: Brig. Gen. Shore to DMI, 19 Dec. 1917.

Victory in 1918 or 1919? 173 The German government believed that it would be possible to keep Russia in permanent political subjugation.’ The German high command had no love of Bolshevism. They made peace with Lenin both because the Bolsheviks were the only political group in Russia willing to accept their terms, and because they needed a compliant

regime in Russia to enable them to defeat France and Britain before the arrival of an overwhelmingly powerful American army. The Brest-Litovsk peace conference began on 22 December and,

by the time it ended on 3 March 1918, the Germans had gained nearly everything they sought.’ Lenin acquiesced because he recog-

nized that any attempt to wage a revolutionary war against the Germans would lead to the overthrow of his regime. He was willing to appease the Germans in every way necessary, on condition that

they did not topple the Bolsheviks in Petrograd or Moscow. Lithuania, Courland, part of White Russia, and Poland were taken away from Russia, and Germany was left to determine their future. Turkey received eastern Anatolia, Kars, and Batum. The Russians were compelled to evacuate Estonia and Livonia, Finland, and the Aland islands and to recognize the government of an independent Ukraine. Russia lost about a million square kilometres of territery, 50 million people, 90 per cent of its coal mines, half its industry, a third of its railways, a third of its agricultural land, and nearly all of

its oil and cotton. The Soviet government was also obliged to disarm its armed forces and to refrain from launching a propaganda offensive against its former enemies. Brest-Litovsk, and the almost equally rapacious peace treaty which the Germans forced on Rumania in May 1918, showed the impossibility of achieving the so-

cialists’ dream of a peace without annexations or indemnities in 1918. In the Reichstag the Social Democrats abstained from supporting the treaty, but voted in favour of war credits, and only the Independent Social Democrats denounced it.'? Germany remained ~ avery long way from being ‘democratized’ in any sense acceptable to the British government.

The Russian collapse transformed Britain’s strategic position in three respects. [t threatened the efficacy of the blockade because it 1 Hillgruber, Germany and the Two World Wars (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), ° M. Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916-1918 (London, 1976), 159-60; PRO FO 371/2864/238605: Townley to FO, 17 Dec. 1917. 10 Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship, 183.

174 Victory in 1918 or 1919? offered the Central Powers not only the opportunity to draw upon Russian resources, but it also promised to give them access to the

hundreds of thousands of tons of allied supplies at Archangel, Murmansk, and Vladivostok."' It threatened to upset the naval

balance of power both in the North Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. And it menaced the security of Britain’s Asiatic empire.

The Admiralty feared that even if the Germans did not acquire possession of any Russian vessels, the elimination of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets meant that the Germans would be able to concentrate their whole fleet in the North Sea, while the Entente’s maritime control in the eastern Mediterranean would be endangered because the Goeben and Breslau need no longer fear being attacked by the Russians. In November, when a rumour reached the Admiralty that the Germans were trying to buy the Russian Baltic Fleet, the War Cabinet considered ordering the British submarine

flotilla in the Baltic to torpedo the Russian fleet at anchor at Helsingfors. When this proved impossible, they authorised the DNI to encourage Russian officers loyal to the Entente to sabotage their own vessels.’ That plan also failed and led to a re-evaluation

of British naval strategy in early 1918. The strain on the Grand Fleet’s resources was growing. The need to detach destroyers to escort convoys, and the work entailed in maintaining minefields in the Heligoland Bight, imposed constant activity on its light forces.

Following German attacks on the Scandinavian convoys, heavy units had to be detached to cover them. In December 1917 the shift in the naval balance of power in the North Sea was partly offset by the arrival of four American oil-burning Dreadnoughts. But it took some time for them to work up to the same standard of efficiency

as the Grand Fleet. Beatty therefore preached caution. At a conference at the Admiralty on 2 January 1918, he argued that his proper role was to contain the High Seas Fleet in harbour until the 11 PRO CAB 24/20/GT1465: H. W. C. D[avis], Summary of blockade intelligence, 19 July 1917; PRO CAB 24/23/GT1753: H. W. C. D., Summary of blockade information, 17 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 24/36/GT3013: Cecil, Memorandum [n.d., but c.13 Dec. 1917]; PRO CAB 24/36/GT3015: Hankey, Stocks of munitions, railway material, and other stocks now lying at Russian ports, 17 Dec. 1917. 2 PRO ADM 116/1805: Paget to FO, 8 Nov. 1917; PRO CAB 24/33/GT2715: Admiralty, Naval situation in the Baltic, 22 Nov. 1917; PRO CAB 23/16/WC281A: War Cabinet, 23 Nov. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 23 Nov. 1917.

Victory in 1918 or 1919? 175 overall strategic situation became more favourable. In the meantime, he recommended offensive mining operations in the North

Sea and air attacks against the enemy’s bases on the Flanders coast. The Board of Admiralty endorsed his recommendations but insisted that this was only a temporary change of policy which

would be reassessed when more American destroyers became available. They also ordered the construction of the Northern Barrage, a minefield stretching from the Norwegian coast to the north of Scotland, and the laying of additional minefields in the Heligoland Bight and across the Straits of Dover. The War Cabinet approved their recommendations on 18 January and they became the basis of British naval policy in the North Sea for the remainder of the war."*

But the most significant result of the Russian collapse was that

it created a new strategic geography. Hitherto the British had protected their Asiatic empire by supporting an Anglo-Russian cordon sanitaire. The British held the line from Egypt through southern Palestine and Mesopotamia, and they co-operated with the Russians to prevent German and Turkish agents infiltrating through Persia to Afghanistan and India. The Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, who had been cautious about encouraging British military intervention in Persia for fear of alienating the regime in Teheran, now predicted that if even a small enemy force arrived on the Afghan frontier, it could ignite a jihad on the north-west frontier.!> Chelmsford was confident that the Muslim troops of the Indian army would fight the Germans, but ‘What he would do against the Mahommedan at a time when prayers are still offered for the Khalif, who is the Sultan of Turkey, in many a mosque in India, I do not know.’!®

The emphasis which policy-makers like Curzon and Amery placed on the Middle East in 1917-18 was not the result of a crude desire to add more territory to the British empire.’’ In May 1917 PRO ADM 116/1806: Memorandum: Discussions at Admiralty on occasion of visit of C.-in-C., Grand Fleet, on 2 and 3 Jan. 1918; A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, v. Victory and Aftermath (January 1918—June 1919) (Oxford, 1970), 132-5. 44 PRO CAB 23/5/WC325: War Cabinet, 18 Jan. 1918; CCC, Hankey MSS HNK Y 1/3: Hankey diary, 18 Jan. 1918. ' PRO CAB 24/49/GT4346: Viceroy to India Office, 23 Apr. 1918. ‘© PRO CAB 24/54/GT4877: Montagu to War Cabinet and enc., 15 June 1918. 17 B. Schwarz, ‘Divided Attention: Britain’s Perception of a German Threat to her Eastern Position in 1918’, Journal of Contemporary History, 28/1 (1993), 103-22.

176 Victory in 1918 or 1919? Curzon had presided over a committee which had concluded that if Russia collapsed there would have to be some profound shifts in British strategic policy.'® Germany, according to Amery, would be impregnable, for it would have achieved one of its major war aims,

the creation of a middle-European empire. The most that the Entente could do would be ‘to reduce this great bloc at its extremities, by the liberation of Belgium or the conquest of Palestine or Syria. But without Russia we are powerless to dispute the settlement of the Polish, Rumanian and Serbian problems according to the wishes of the Central Powers and within the orbit of the sphere

of their future economic and military control.’ Curzon did not recommend that the British should withdraw from western Europe to meet this new danger, but he insisted that Britain would have to place greater emphasis on the war in the Middle East and Africa.

As part of a strategy designed to contain, rather than to destroy, this menace, the British would have to retain Germany’s African colonies, for ‘As naval bases the German colonies will be twice as

formidable when the German Navy has at its back the resources not of 70, but 170 million people.’ After the Bolsheviks came to power British policy-makers grew concerned that, although the distances involved were enormous,

the geographical obstacles formidable, and the communications primitive, the Germans and Turks might now be able to threaten the security of India by advancing through Transcaucasia and Transcaspia to Bukhara and Afghanistan. On 17 December 1917 Sir J. E. Shuckburgh, head of the Political and Secret Department of the India Office, warned the War Cabinet that the Germans had abandoned ‘the “Berlin—Baghdad” line, as a means of striking at

the British Empire in India, in favour of the “Pan-Turanian” project—which the collapse of Russia has brought within the range of practical politics—of uniting all the Turkish-speaking peoples, of

course under German guidance and control, in one continuous chain from Constantinople to Samarakand and beyond.”! His fears '8 PRO CAB 24/13/GT703: Curzon, Policy in view of Russian developments, 12 May 1917. 19 PRO CAB 24/14/GT831: Amery, The Russian situation and its consequences, 20 May 1917. 20 Tbid.

21 PRO CAB 24/36/3041: Islington, Employment of Japanese troops in Mesopotamia and enc., 18 Dec. 1917; L. P. Morris, ‘British Secret Missions in Turkestan, 1918-1919’, Journal of Contemporary History, 12/3 (1977), 365—6.

Victory in 1918 or 1919? 177 were justified. OHL and the German Foreign Office did want to establish a Transcaucasian state which would provide them with a gateway into central Asia and Persia, and in June the Admiralty Staff in Berlin prepared another war aims programme to secure permanent German ‘influence in Asia via Caucasia in the direction of India’.””

Milner recognized the magnitude of this threat and applauded the War Office’s decision to dispatch a military mission under Major-General Dunsterville ((Dunsterforce’) to the Transcaucasus to help the government in Tiflis to organize its volunteer army. Unless the British held the Caucasus, he warned, the Turks might recover Armenia and establish communications with the Turkish population of northern Persia and with the Russian Muslims. ‘Such a combination would present a new and very real danger to our whole position in the East.’ That danger was even more obvious after the Bolshevik surrender at Brest-Litovsk. A power vacuum

now existed along the northern frontiers of Britain’s empire in southern Asia. Until the Central Powers accepted British peace terms, the security of the British empire would be threatened. As Curzon explained to the Imperial War Cabinet in June 1918: German ambitions, which had received an immense impetus since the collapse of Russia and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, lay along two main lines of advance: a northern line through the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Caspian and Turkestan, to the borders of Chinese Turkestan; and the southern through Palestine, Mesopotamia, and through Persia and Afghanistan against India. The whole of the area between these lines was a theatre of actual or probable warfare.”

Finally, Russia’s collapse emphasized something that British policy-makers had recognized since the start of the war, the interdependence of the eastern and western fronts. Less than a week

before the start of the German spring offensive in France, they concluded that ‘the situation in the east must be carefully considered, and that if there were a serious reverse in France a dangerous position in India might arise’.*»> Commanders who had been * U. Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918 (Princeton, NJ, 1968), 171-3, 177; H. H. Herwig, ‘Admirals versus Generals: The War Aims of the Imperial German Navy, 1914-1918’, Central European History, 5/3 (1972), 228-9. 73 PRO CAB 24/38/GT3275: Milner, The new embryo governments in south Russia, 9 Jan. 1918. 74 PRO CAB 23/43/IWC20: Imperial War Cabinet, 25 June 1918. 2> PRO CAB 23/14/WC374A: War Cabinet, 17 Mar. 1918.

178 Victory in 1918 or 1919? closely associated with operations in France and Flanders recognized the necessity of blocking the Germans in the east. Rawlinson, who had just left the command of the Fourth Army to become the

British military representative at Versailles, spent 13 March impressing on Henry Wilson ‘the importance of occupying Persia without delay [and] also of bringing in the Japs but he was not hopeful of the latter. I am sure it is of the utmost importance if we are to prevent the Bosh [sic] from occupying Turkestan and raising

the Afghans against us.’ And even that apparently most committed of ‘westerners’, Douglas Haig, tried to impress on Derby and the King ‘the necessity for immediate action in Persia to checkmate the Germans in their attempt to reach Afghanistan and India.’?’

At the end of July 1917 Lord Hardinge believed that some members of the War Cabinet, depressed by the Russian collapse and fearful that neither France nor Italy would stand another winter at war, were contemplating the best moment to begin peace negotiations.” But at the end of the month Hankey discovered that, although the possibility of delivering a knock-out blow against Germany was receding, neither Lloyd George, Milner, nor Carson

were prepared to accept peace, even if Germany evacuated Belgium in return for Britain handing back the German colonies.” The factor which above all others sustained their belief in an eventual British victory was the weight which the USA could throw into the scales.*° Consequently, the slow arrival of fully trained and equipped American troops in Europe in the second half of 1917 was a grave disappointment. *6 CCC, Rawlinson MSS RAWLN 1/9: Rawlinson diary, 13 Mar. 1918. 27 PRO WO 256/28: Haig diary, 13 Mar. 1918; R. Blake (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1918 (London, 1952), 293; CCC, Rawlinson MSS RAWLN 1/ 9: Rawlinson diary, 15 and 16 Mar. 1918; F. Stanwood, War, Revolution and British Imperialism in Central Asia (London, 1983), 105-6. 78 PRO FO 800/169/Fr/17/63: Hardinge to Bertie, 31 July 1917; PRO CAB 1/25/ 4: Cecil to Balfour, 10 July 1917. 2° CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 31 July 1917. 30 PRO CAB 24/13/GT703: Curzon, Policy in view of Russian developments, 12 May 1917; D. Woodward, ‘David Lloyd George, a Negotiated Peace with Germany and the Kiihlmann Peace Kite of September 1917’, Canadian Journal of History, 6/ 1 (1971), 80; K. Neilson, Strategy and Supply: The Anglo-Russian Alliance, 19141917 (London, 1984), 263; PRO CAB 23/13/WC200A: War Cabinet, 31 July 1917.

Victory in 1918 or 1919? 179 In August 1917 the War Cabinet was disconcerted to discover

that the US army was so short of boots and clothing that they wanted the British to provide them with equipment for 200,000 men.*! The War Office became justifiably sceptical about the Americans’ ability to deploy a sizeable army in France in 1917, and on 3 September Maurice told the War Cabinet that it was unlikely that the US army in France would number more than 500,000 men,

or twenty divisions, by June 1918, and most of them would be untrained.** Two months later General Bliss, the American chief of

staff, informed Robertson he could not meet even that target. Owing to shipping shortages, he could not send more than twelve US divisions to France by May 1918.°° American divisions were

larger than their French or British counterparts, but it seemed unlikely that American reinforcements would redress the military balance in the west, which was tilting against the Entente as the

Germans were reinforced with troops released by the Russian collapse." British policy-makers concerned with relations with the USA

concluded that the administration’s apparent dilatoriness was partly a reflection of the myopia of the wider American public, many of whom had failed to realize that America was now at war.» But it was also a reflection of an unwillingness on the part of the

American people and government to act as the milch cow of the Entente allies.*° From the beginning of their involvement in the war

until the armistice, the Americans were determined to raise their own army. Feeding American soldiers into the British and French armies might have hastened the speed with which American power made itself felt in France, but only at the cost of diluting American political influence over the final peace settlement.*’ The British 31 PRO CAB 23/3/WC222: War Cabinet, 22 Aug. 1917. 32 PRO CAB 23/4/WC227: War Cabinet, 3 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC243: War Cabinet, 2 Oct. 1917. 33 PRO CAB 23/4/WC275: War Cabinet, 16 Nov. 1917. 34 PRO CAB 24/32/GT2654: General Staff, American assistance to the allies, 17

S PRO CAB 24/24/GT1802: Buchan, The American attitude to the war, 8 Aug. 1917; PRO FO 800/209: Wiseman to Drummond, 21 Sept. 1917. 36 PRO FO 800/209/277: Reading to Drummond, 29 Sept. 1917. 37 —. F. Trask, The American Expeditionary Force and Coalition Warfare: Pershing, Foch, Ludendorff, and the Campaign of 1918 (Lawrence, Kan., 1993), passim.

180 Victory in 1918 or 1919? could do little to change their minds. There was, as Spring-Rice warned, a real danger if the British were seen to be trying to gain control of American resources, for ‘a number of Americans do not realise that George III is dead’.*®

The Russian collapse and the slow arrival of American military assistance had convinced Lloyd George that the Entente could not

defeat the Germans in 1918. He therefore concluded that the

proper course for the Entente in 1918 was to conserve its resources in preparation for a decisive campaign on the western front in 1919, to prepare the civilian population for a further prolongation of the

war, and, in the mean time to do everything possible to hamper German ambitions elsewhere. Between January and November 1917 the British army suffered nearly 790,000 casualties.” If the British were to be able to exert their maximum effort in 1919, the War Cabinet must husband their dwindling reserves of manpower in 1918. The recruiting apparatus was experiencing increasing difficulty in making good such horrendous losses in the face of competition for labour from munitions manufacturers, agriculture, the mines, the railways, the docks, the Civil Service, and other essential occupations.*° By November 1917 the problem of maintaining the army was so acute that Derby told the War Cabinet that he needed 250,000 category A men at once and 50,000 per month from December 1917 to June 1918. If the

dearth of drafts continued, Haig warned that by March 1918 his infantry divisions would be 40 per cent below establishment and he would have to break up fifteen of his forty-six British divisions to

bring the remainder up to strength." In August, following Neville Chamberlain’s resignation as Direc-

tor-General of National Service, control of recruiting had passed from the War Office into the hands of Sir Auckland Geddes, the Director of the new Ministry of National Service.” Unlike Cham33 PRO CAB 24/35/GT2797: Spring-Rice to Balfour, 16 Nov. 1917; PRO CAB 24/ 24/GT1802: Buchan, The American attitude to the war, 8 Aug. 1917. 3° PRO CAB 24/34/GT2866: Casualties in the expeditionary forces Jan. to Nov. 1917 [n.d., but c.3 Dec. 1917]. 4 PRO CAB 24/26/GT2100: Ormsby-Gore, Committee on Manpower and Recruiting, 22 Sept. 1917. 41 PRO CAB 24/33/GT2751: Derby, Recruiting for the army, 24 Nov. 1917; PRO CAB 24/33/GT2792: Derby, recruiting for the army, 28 Nov. 1917. K. Grieves, Politics of Manpower, 1914-1918 (Manchester, 1988), 138-9.

Victory in 1918 or 1919? 181 berlain, Geddes was given the power to review the whole field of manpower, and could inform the War Cabinet of the meaning, in terms of manpower, of any proposals put forward by other departments.** Consequently, his ministry combined the functions of recruiting for the army and the transfer of labour to vital war work. It became a de facto General Staff for manpower. On 13 October Geddes supplied the War Cabinet with a review of the manpower situation for 1919. Between 1 October 1917 and 30 September 1918

there would probably be 883,765 category A men fit for general service, a good many fewer than the 1,176,000 category A men the

army had requested. If the army’s demands were to be met, it would be necessary to recruit between 40,000 and 50,000 men per month between November 1917 and June 1918 to make good the

shortfall. And this would have to be done when industries like shipbuilding and agriculture needed more, not less, labour, when the temper of organized labour was hostile to further recruiting, and when “The original enthusiasm for active participation in the war has wholly departed.”

Hitherto the Asquith and Lloyd George governments had allowed military strategy to determine their manpower policy, and had adopted a manpower-intensive strategy which focused on large numbers of infantry supported by great masses of artillery. The result had been huge casualty lists and few visible gains. Now

Lloyd George reversed both priorities. On 10 October the War Priorities Committee, which had been established to determine priorities between production departments for labour and raw materials, had informed ministers that there was no spare productive capacity in the economy. Any new production programmes could be started only if existing ones were curtailed. It was therefore necessary for the War Cabinet to decide ‘whether a supreme

effort to bring the War to an end was to be made in 1918, or whether provision should be made for a prolongation of the War into 1919 and after’.*® 8 PRO CAB 24/24/GT27: Draft minutes of a meeting of the War Cabinet manpower committee, 23 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 24/4/G155: Milner, Committee on Manpower and Recruiting, 11 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC231: War Cabinet, 12

th PRO CAB 24/28/GT2295: Geddes, Recruiting position: The problem and prospects, 13 Oct. 1917. 4 PRO CAB 24/31/GT2510: Smuts, War Priorities Committee: Minutes of 3rd meeting, 10 Oct. 1917.

182 Victory in 1918 or 1919? Churchill was the leading exponent of a more technologically intensive strategy. Anxious to inflict maximum damage on the Germans and to minimize British casualties by reducing the numbers of infantrymen exposed to direct enemy fire, since early 1917 he had been preaching that ‘Machines save life, machine power is a substitute for man-power...’.“© At the end of October 1917 he

prepared a munitions budget for 1918 designed to achieve that objective. In 1918 the manpower balance would swing in favour of Germany as its armies were reinforced by troops released from the

eastern front just when the British and French would be handicapped by the slow arrival of the AEF. Shortages of shipping and steel made it unlikely that his ministry would be able to redress the balance by providing the BEF with significantly more artillery in 1918. The Entente should therefore exploit their other industrial resources and substitute technology—in the shape of greater quantities of tanks, aircraft, trench-mortars and gas—for manpower.*’ In the opinion of the director-general of tank production, one tank with a crew of nine was worth nearly 400 infantry.* Robertson and Haig did not take kindly to these suggestions. The CIGS reasoned that, although it might benefit the Entente to await the arrival of the Americans, it would also permit the Germans to defeat France and Britain in 1918 before the Americans disembarked. ‘[T]he Campaign of 1919 may never come, and in any case we shall next year inevitably have to bear the chief burden of the war.” Haig did not turn his back on tanks, mortars, and gas, but, believing them to be no more than useful adjutants to a sufficient force of infantry, he was unwilling to make them the centre-

piece of his operational doctrine.” Both generals thought that nothing would be more likely to dispirit Britain’s faltering allies

than if the BEF remained on the defensive in 1918. Thus they wanted to prepare for another major offensive in the west in 1918, although Robertson was willing to await the outcome of events in “6 Quoted in T. Ben-Moshe, ‘Churchill’s Strategic Conception during the First World War’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 12/1 (1989), 12. 47 PRO CAB 24/30/GT2436: Churchill, Munitions possibilities in 1918, 21 Oct. 1917; PRO CAB 24/31/2579: Churchill, Munitions budget, 1918; T. Travers, “The

Evolution of British Strategy and Tactics on the Western Front in 1918: GHQ, Manpower, and Technology’, Journal of Military History, 54/2 (1990), 179. 48 PRO CAB 24/35/GT2940: D’Eyncourt, Proposed tank armies, 10 Dec. 1917. * PRO CAB 27/8/WP68: Robertson, Future military policy, 19 Nov. 1917. ” PRO CAB 27/8/WP66: Haig to Robertson, 13 Nov. 1917; Travers, “The Evolution of British Strategy’, 179-80; PRO WO 256/24: Haig diary, 28 Nov. 1917.

Victory in 1918 or 1919? 183 Russia and Italy before launching it. On 14 November the CIGS told the War Cabinet that it was time to ‘closely and carefully go into Our remaining resources in manpower and find out definitely what can, by a supreme effort, be made available’.>! They received no support from Geddes, who sided with Churchill. Geddes argued that if Britain wished to continue fighting into 1919, the needs of merchant shipping, the navy, agriculture, and

munitions production would have to come before those of the army. Even then the law would have to be changed to facilitate the

enlistment of more category A men from non-essential occupations, conscription would have to be applied to Ireland, and compulsory service would have to be extended to youths of 18 and middle-aged men of 50.°2 When the Prime Minister tentatively placed this agenda and his timetable for victory before the War Cabinet on 26 November, he could not persuade his colleagues to swallow it whole. But there was a measure of agreement that the war would end ‘by the general collapse of some of the belligerents rather than by complete mili-

tary overthrow. It was, therefore, necessary to ensure, as far as possible, that the Allies should have the power of continuing the war into 1919.’ That made the provision of an adequate quantity of

merchant shipping a first priority for allied resources and meant that shipbuilding ought to have priority in the allocation of manpower over the armed services. But ministers baulked at the politi-

cal furore which Geddes’s proposals to enlarge the pool of available recruits would arouse. Raising the age of military service from 45 to 50 would only provide 50,000 men and lowering it would

probably be unacceptable to Parliament. A general comb-out of workers in vital industries would meet widespread opposition from

organized labour, and applying conscription to Ireland would wreck the Convention which was attempting to find a constitutional

solution to the Irish question.’ But ministerial patience finally snapped when Derby and the Adjutant-General, Sir Neville Macready, claimed that if Haig was not given the men he demanded the Germans would break through his line. That was so 1 PRO CAB 24/32/GT2613: Robertson, Italian situation, 14 Nov. 1917; PRO CAB 27/8/WP68: Robertson, Future military policy, 19 Nov. 1917. 2 PRO CAB 24/4/G174: A. Geddes, Problem of the maintenance of the armed forces, 15 Nov. 1917. 3 PRO CAB 23/13/WC282A: War Cabinet, 26 Nov. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/4: Hankey diary, 26 Nov. 1917.

184 Victory in 1918 or 1919? inconsistent with Haig’s earlier reports that German morale and manpower had been severely sapped by the Flanders offensive, and

sO inconsistent with the General Staff’s own estimate that 150 German divisions were facing 168 allied divisions in the west, that ministers insisted on a full investigation.°* On 6 December the War Cabinet established a committee on manpower consisting of Lloyd George, Curzon, Barnes, Smuts, and Carson, with Hankey as sec-

retary, to get to the bottom of the matter.» In 1914 the British had intended to fight to the last Frenchman and the last Russian. By late 1917 they had nearly done so. But the Germans were still resisting and it seemed as if the General Staff

were now willing to fight to the last Briton. Macdonagh and Macready estimated that to make good its existing manpower deficit and replace predicted casualties, the army would need 1,304,000 more men by September 1918.°° But in the Prime Minister’s opin-

ion it was the turn of the Americans to die for Britain and its empire. The committee provided plenty of ammunition to support the Prime Minister’s preference for remaining on the defensive in France and awaiting the arrival of the Americans. Figures supplied by the General Staff itself showed that, although Bliss expected to have a maximum of only twenty-four divisions in France by December 1918, the USA had enormous untapped reserves of military manpower which it could mobilize if it chose, but which it lacked the ability to transport to Europe.’ Far better, Lloyd George be-

lieved, to put British manpower into the shipyards than the trenches, for ‘by putting men into shipping we are adding [to] the Americans on the Western Front. Americans would do just as well as English for the purpose; in fact, the arrangement would be better for us, as we should reduce our man-power less.”® 4 PRO CAB 24/34/GT2870: General Staff, Strengths of allied and enemy forces on 5 Dec. 1917; S. Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, i. 1877-1918 (London, 1970),

a Grieves, Politics of Manpower, 165; PRO CAB 23/4/WC293: War Cabinet, 6 os ‘PRO CAB 24/34/GT2866: Casualties in the expeditionary forces Jan. to Nov. 1917 [n.d., but c.3 Dec. 1917]; PRO CAB 27/14/MPC/4: Adjutant-General, Summary of requirements of the army in men in order to maintain the fighting efficiency of the Expeditionary Forces, 10 Dec. 1917. 7 PRO CAB 24/14/MPC/6: General Staff, War Office, American army, 8 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 24/14/MPC/15: General Staff, War Office, American army—reserves, 15 Dec. 1917. 8 PRO CAB 27/14/MPC: Minutes 3rd meeting of manpower committee, 11 Dec. 1917.

Victory in 1918 or 1919? 185 Auckland Geddes had received demands for 400,000 men and 100,000 women for shipbuilding, aircraft manufacturing, and munitions.’ If the War Cabinet capitulated and met the army’s de-

mands in full, it would decimate essential war industries and threaten Britain’s ability to continue fighting into 1918. The Prime

Minister was determined to reduce the army’s demand for manpower by increasing the fire-power of each division, while reducing

the size of its infantry component from twelve battalions to nine, and by following Pétain’s policy of an ‘active defence’ in France in

1918.

The committee represented a wholesale defeat for the War Office and a victory for Lloyd George. It concluded that the western front would be stalemated in 1918. The Central Powers would have a numerical advantage which would make it impossible for the allies to win the war in the west in 1918, but they would be too weak

to effect a decisive breakthrough. Consequently, ‘it is evident that the staying power of the Allies must be safeguarded until such time

as the increase in the American forces restores the balance of superiority decisively in their favour’. It then proclaimed a new strategic doctrine, namely that ‘The safeguarding of staying power involves not only the maintenance of the armies, but of the nations, and in both respects our Allies are becoming increasingly depen-

dent upon ourselves.’*! As Britain had to bear the main burden of securing the allies’ maritime communications and providing financial support, it would be positively detrimental to the alliance’s chances of winning the war: ‘If so large a number of men were diverted from industry or production to military service as to impair our power of maintaining our Allies during the coming year

the war might be lost, and already our powers in this respect are severely taxed.’ The navy was to have first priority over all other services for manpower, followed by shipbuilding and the construction of aircraft and tanks. Fourth priority was accorded to agricul° PRO CAB 1/25/26: Churchill, Manpower and the situation, 8 Dec. 1917; Grieves, Politics of Manpower, 170-2.

6 PRO CAB 27/14/MPC: Minutes of the 1st meeting of the manpower committee, 10 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC301: War Cabinet, 18 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 27/14/MPC/24: French General Staff, Note on attacks with a limited objective, 16 Dec. 1917.

6 PRO CAB 24/4/G185: Report of the Cabinet committee on manpower, 9 Jan.

ve Ibid

186 Victory in 1918 or 1919? ture, followed by timber-felling and the construction of food storage accommodation. The army came last. It was promised only 150,000 new recruits.“ To hasten the arrival of the AEF, the cabinet Committee on the Restriction of Imports was asked if it would be possible to free more tonnage to expedite the transport of US troops, and the Manpower Committee decided to try to persuade Pershing to incorporate US battalions and companies into British brigades and battalions.“ Henceforth the War Cabinet was determined that British military policy would be driven by what was feasible within a shrinking manpower budget, rather than by what the soldiers told them was necessary. On 7 January the military members of the Army Council warned

the War Cabinet that the committee’s conclusions would leave Haig so weak that he might not be able to resist a German attack.© But their case was immediately undermined when Haig, who had not seen a copy of the draft report, indicated that he was confident

that the Germans would not attack him. Robertson immediately wrote privately to the Commander-in-Chief, telling him to amend his statement to show that he would only be able to repel a German

attack if his formations were kept up to strength.°° When Lloyd George saw the result ‘he contemptuously threw it on the table and

asked what could be thought of a man who now expressed an opinion totally different from what he had told them two days before’.”’ The BEF soon began to feel the impact of the War Cabinet’s policy. On 10 January the War Office ordered Haig to

reduce his British, although not his dominion, divisions from twelve to nine battalions and to disband two of his five cavalry divisions. One reason why the War Cabinet was willing to defy the soldiers

was that by January only the Morning Post and the Globe backed their case for more men.® What the War Cabinet were not yet 6 Report of the Cabinet committee on manpower. & PRO CAB 23/5/WC319: War Cabinet, 9 Jan. 1918. & PRO CAB 24/38/GT3265: Memorandum by the military members of the Army

tone on the draft report of the War Cabinet committee on manpower, 7 Jan. 66 LHCMA, Robertson MSS I/23/77: Robertson to Haig, 7 Jan. 1918. The minutes of the meeting in question, with Haig’s subsequent ‘corrections’, are in PRO CAB 23/13/WC316A and PRO CAB 23/44B/WC316A: War Cabinet, 7 Jan. 1918. &’ PRO CAB 45/193: Robertson to Edmonds, 1 Dec. 1932; PRO CAB 24/38/ GT3268: Robertson to Hankey and enc., 9 Jan. 1918. 6 C. a Court Repington, The First World War 1914-1918 (London, 1920), ii. 165.

Victory in 1918 or 1919? 187 prepared to do was to bear the political odium of attempting to introduce conscription into Ireland, or of extending the age of military service in Britain. The most they would do was to conduct yet another comb-out of industry. On 20 December Lloyd George told the Commons that schedules which had provided protection from military service would have to be revised. On 3 January 1918

Geddes explained the manpower situation to union leaders. But the ASE, which opposed the recruitment of skilled men before all dilutees had been taken, refused to co-operate. Even so, the War Cabinet hurried through legislation and another Military Service Bill became law on 6 February. It gave Geddes the power to cancel certificates of exemption granted on occupational grounds, to call up men by occupation, age, and marital status, and to make possible a ‘clean-cut’ policy, thus permitting the government to recruit from amongst the youngest men in industries which were not essential to the war effort. During the debate on the second reading of the bill, the Liberal MP J. M. Hogge moved for a secret session and the House was cleared. Lloyd George defended his government’s policy in a rousing speech, insisting that the allies had and would retain numerical preponderance on the western front and suggesting that both Turkey and Austria-Hungary were tottering. But at least one perceptive Unionist MP saw behind the Prime Minister’s rhetoric. He recognized the real meaning of the new legislation.

It ‘seemed to point to peace through exhaustion of the Central Powers, not to the “knock-out blow” ’.” At the same time as he was persuading his ministerial colleagues to defer the climax of the war until 1919, Lloyd George was also trying to persuade Britain’s partners to do so. On 28 November he went to Paris for a meeting of the Supreme War Council, armed with a six-point agenda. He wanted to avoid any further costly and fruit-

less assaults on the western front, to remain on the defensive in France 1n 1918, and to await the arrival of the Americans before delivering the knock-out blow against Germany in 1919. In the meantime he wanted to do everything possible to hasten the arrival ® Grieves, Politics of Manpower, 181-3; PRO CAB 23/5/WC324 and WC326: War Cabinet, 17 and 21 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 24/39/GT3304: Draft of a bill to repeal

subsection 3 of the Military Service Act 1916 and to provide for cancellation of certificates of exemption granted on occupational grounds, 8 Jan. 1918. ” J. Ramsden (ed.), Real Old Tory Politics: The Political Diaries of Sir Robert Sanders, Lord Bayford, 1910-35 (London, 1984), 98.

188 Victory in 1918 or 1919? of the Americans and to persuade the allies to co-ordinate their economic resources so that Churchill’s vision of machines saving lives could be made reality. Finally, he hoped they would allow him

to take steps to persuade Turkey and Austria-Hungary to break away from Germany and to make a separate peace. Lloyd George and the new French Premier, Georges Clemenceau, met before the full council convened to approve the main points of the agenda and the conclusions. To some extent Lloyd George was preaching to the converted. Clemenceau was already committed to Pétain’s policy of conserving allied manpower and

awaiting the arrival of the Americans, and he accepted Lloyd George’s timetable. On 19 December he told a committee of the French Chamber that ‘the German interest is to make peace in 1918, while ours is to make peace in 1919, when we will have an

indisputable victory’. The Council agreed that the Permanent Military Representatives should examine the entire field of military

operations for 1918. Each government promised to supply full information about. their own military, naval, and economic capacity, together with intelligence estimates of the capabilities and intentions of the Central Powers.” The Permanent Military Representatives became the channel through which the War Cabinet persuaded their partners to accept the British plan of campaign for 1918. They were assisted by the fact that the French general, Weygand, was little more than Foch’s mouthpiece, the Italian representative, Cadorna, was a defeated general who was asking his allies for help, and the American, Bliss, was the representative of a power which had not yet mobilized its resources. Consequently, the British representative, Sir Henry Wilson, could act as the dynamo behind their deliberations and in large measure succeeded in persuading his colleagues to support Lloyd George’s agenda for 1918.” 7 Quoted in D. R. Watson, Georges Clemenceau: A Political Biography (London, 1974), 295.

2 D. R. Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 1917-1919 (Lincoln, Nebr., 1966), 44-5; PRO CAB 23/4/WC291/IC36: Resolutions passed by the Supreme War Council, War Cabinet, 1 Dec. 1917; Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers 1914-1920 (Washington, DC, 1920), 68-9; C. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries (London, 1927), ii. 33-4; J. Barnes and D. Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 1896-1929 (London, 1980), 183-4. 3 L.S. Amery, My Political Life, i. War and Peace 1914-1929 (London, 1953), 128.

Victory in 1918 or 1919? 189 On 13 December the representatives began by making a series of sweeping recommendations about military and industrial policy for

1918. Although they did not yet rule out offensive operations in 1918 after the situation in Russia and Italy had been clarified, they

recommended that the Entente should adopt a co-ordinated defensive system from the North Sea to the Adriatic. They advocated the construction of a series of defensive positions, making the utmost use of mechanical devices to provide mobile reserves and to

afford rest and training for their troops, and developing road and railway communications between the fronts. They also wanted the allies to co-ordinate the manufacture of all war material, and, in

view of the likelihood that they would have a greatly increased number of aircraft available in 1918, they wanted to make a study of how to conduct a co-ordinated air offensive against the Central Powers.” Six days later, the War Cabinet accepted their recommendations without amendment.” In January the representatives accepted three further resolutions, all submitted by Wilson. The first recommended that the Council establish an inter-allied com-

mittee to co-ordinate transportation behind and between the French, Italian, Greek, and Palestine fronts.” The second asked the Council to establish an inter-allied committee on supplies. It was to

meet in conjunction with the transport committee to co-ordinate the supply of food, raw materials, and minerals.” And the third resolution accepted by the representatives was that the Council should establish an inter-allied committee to plan the allied tank programme and advise the Council on the production and employment of tanks.”

But the military representatives’ most important recommen™ PRO CAB 23/4/WC302/WP69: Joint note to the Supreme War Council submitted by its Permanent Military Representatives: Military policy, 13 Dec. 1917. > PRO CAB 23/4/WC302: War Cabinet, 19 Dec. 1917. 7 PRO CAB 25/120/SWC39: British Section, Supreme War Council, Draft resolution: Transportation, 5 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 25/120/SWC43: 10th Meeting of Permanent Military Representatives, 8 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 25/120/SWC8: Permanent Military Representatives to Supreme War Council, Joint note 8: Transportation, 9 Jan. 1918. ™ PRO CAB 25/120/SWCS9: British Section, Supreme War Council, Draft resolution: Supply, 22 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 25/120/SWC64: 14th meeting of the Permanent Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, 23 Jan. 1918. 7% PRO CAB 25/120/SWC38: British Section, Supreme War Council, Draft resolution: Tanks, 5 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 25/120/SWC43: 10th Meeting of Permanent Military Representatives, 8 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 25/120/SWC8: Permanent Military Representatives to Supreme War Council, Joint note 9: Tanks, 9 Jan. 1918.

190 Victory in 1918 or 1919? dations, incorporated in their Joint Note number 12 and again proposed by Wilson, concerned the Entente’s military policy for 1918. It incorporated most of Lloyd George’s most cherished ideas.

On 21 January the representatives agreed that, although Britain was Safe from invasion, France could be made safe in the face of the

expected German offensive only if the British and French armies on the western front were maintained at their present aggregate strength and if they received the expected reinforcement of no less than two US divisions per month. They also maintained that the allied armies had to receive more artillery, machine-guns, tanks, and aircraft, that everything possible be done to strengthen their defences, that the railway system supporting the defences must be improved and co-ordinated, and that ‘the whole Allied Front in France be treated as a single strategic field of action’. In Italy the army had to be retrained and re-equipped by 1 May, more defensive lines had to be dug, the railway system linking Italy and France had to be improved, the government had to continue its measures to extirpate pacifism, and the allies had to assist Italy with wheat, coal, and money.” Together these measures would prevent the Germans from defeating the Entente in 1918, but victory over Germany could not be gained until 1919 and the arrival of the Americans in force. No decisive action was possible in the Balkans, where the Central Powers enjoyed superior communications. Indeed, they did not eliminate the possibility that the allied army might itself be at-

tacked. But Turkey’s weakness did offer scope for operations which might bring about its final collapse and permit the Entente to

make contact with forces in Rumania and southern Russia still fighting the Germans. However, the Permanent Military Representatives did not recommend shipping troops from the western front to Palestine. To do so would not only be dangerous in the face of the expected German offensive, but also unnecessary. The British already had sufficient forces in Palestine and Mesopotamia to defeat the enemy troops facing them. All that was necessary was to provide Allenby and Sir William Marshall, Maude’s successor in Mesopotamia, with more railway equipment, and to co-ordinate ? PRO CAB 25/120/SWCS7: Permanent Military Representatives, Joint note no. 12: 1918 campaign, 21 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 25/120/SWC60: 13th meeting, Permanent Military Representatives, 21 Jan. 1918.

Victory in 1918 or 1919? 191 any military action with a vigorous political offensive amongst the non-Turkish peoples of the Ottoman empire and amongst Turkish dissidents near to the government.” Nothing in Joint Note number 12 persuaded Robertson to abandon his objections to a Palestine offensive, and he told Haig that if the War Cabinet accepted the note he would resign.*! But on 25 January, after only a perfunctory discussion, the War Cabinet gave

Lloyd George and Milner a free hand to settle the question at Versailles. Three days later they ordered Smuts to go to Egypt to confer with the commanders on the spot about how to prosecute the war against the Turks more vigorously.” More effective opposition came from the French. On 30 January the full Council, meeting in Paris, accepted the Permanent Military Representatives’ recommendations that the allies should remain on the defensive in the west in 1918. But Clemenceau, Foch, and Pétain joined Haig and Robertson in criticizing their recommendations that the allies should attempt to knock out Turkey in 1918. Like the generals, the French Premier did not agree with Lloyd George that the allies

were ‘over-insured’ in France. He feared that Lloyd George’s policy would cause him to shift troops from France to Palestine.™*

To prevent that, and to compensate France for its own dwindling manpower, he wanted the BEF to take over a greater share of the line in France. According to Robertson, “The proceedings at this

point were decidedly of a warm nature...’. It was only after a private meeting between the British, French, and Italian political

leaders, from which all military advisers were excluded, that Clemenceau agreed to permit the British to mount a major effort 8 PRO CAB 25/120/SWC60: 13th meeting, Permanent Military Representatives, 21 Jan. 1918.

81 D. R. Woodward (ed.), The Military Correspondence of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, December 1915—February 1918 (London, 1990), 274; PRO CAB 24/40/GT3440: Robertson to WO, 25 Jan. 1918.

8 PRO CAB 23/5/WC331 and WC332: War Cabinet, 25 and 28 Jan. 1918; N. Maurice (ed.), The Maurice Case: From the Papers of Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice (London, 1972), 66. 83 PRO CAB 25/120/SWC70: Draft summary of the opinions expressed at the Ist session of the 3rd meeting of the Supreme War Council, 30 Jan. 1918; Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 202-3; Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, ii. 55. PRO CAB 25/120/SWC71: Procés-verbal of the 2nd session of the 3rd meeting of the Supreme War Council, 31 Jan. 1918; Watson, Clemenceau, 296-8.

192 Victory in 1918 or 1919? against the Turks in return for a promise that they would not reduce their efforts on the western front.®

That agreement, reached on 1 February, represented a victory for

Lloyd George and marked the high point of British influence within the councils of the Entente alliance. The Prime Minister had not persuaded his ministerial colleagues to redirect Britain’s military effort in 1918 against Turkey because he believed that Britain could overthrow Germany by occupying Palestine and Mesopotamia and by defeating the Ottoman empire. He did so because the Russian collapse, and the slow arrival of the AEF in France, per-

suaded him that victory on the western front in 1918 would be unattainable. Like his colleagues, he never ceased to believe that it would eventually be necessary to defeat the German army. But he considered that, without significant American military assistance,

the cost of doing so would be so high as to rob Britain of all prospect of dominating the final peace settlement. He therefore preferred to delay the final decision in the west until 1919 and in the meantime to defeat Turkey. That would bring the Entente the propaganda victory it needed to sustain the morale of its people for another campaign in 1919. And, faced by the new strategic geography created by Russia’s collapse, it would bring Britain the not incidental benefit of a greater measure of security for its empire in Asia. But although ministers had agreed that victory over Germany could not be achieved until 1919, they now had to persuade the British people that it was worthwhile enduring another two years of fighting to achieve that victory. 8 PRO CAB 25/120/SWC72: Procés-verbal of the 3rd session of the 3rd meeting of the Supreme War Council, 1 Feb. 1918; Maurice (ed.), The Maurice Case, 68; LRO Derby MSS 920 DER (17) 27/7: Robertson to Derby, 2 Feb. 1918.

8

The British Peace Offensive, December 1917—March 1918 THE Russian collapse and the entry of the USA into the war did

not only compel the War Cabinet to reassess its timetable for victory. The disintegration of their eastern ally also made it more desirable than ever for the British to redress the strategic balance between the belligerent alliances by persuading one of Germany’s

allies to make a separate peace. Between December 1917 and March 1918 they redoubled their efforts to do so. In addition, the Bolsheviks’ appeal to the war-weary peoples of the Entente to revolt compelled the War Cabinet to recast their war aims. They had to make them acceptable to people who were increasingly

doubtful of the possibility of inflicting a knock-out blow on Germany and who suspected that their rulers were prolonging the war in their own selfish interests. Consequently, in January 1918 Lloyd George made a major speech outlining British war aims. It was designed to persuade the British people that it was worthwhile

to continue fighting, and to convince both the peoples and the rulers of the Central Powers that they had more to gain by negotiating than by continuing to fight. The War Cabinet had redrafted their manpower and strategic policies because they feared that the British people might not tolerate in 1918 a repetition of the heavy losses which Haig’s armies had

suffered in 1917. By the autumn the National War Aims Committee, which had been established to encourage the population to work for victory, had discovered that amongst the leaders of organized labour commitment to military victory as an end in itself, was waning.' Enthusiasm for the war had evaporated amongst soldiers and civilians. It had been replaced by scepticism about the causes for which the war was being fought, and disenchantment with the 1 J. Ramsden (ed.), Real Old Tory Politics: The Political Diaries of Sir Robert Sanders, Lord Bayford, 1910-35 (London, 1984), 89; V. H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1971), 145.

194 The British Peace Offensive way in which the government was organizing the nation to fight it. “The absence of any marked strategical success’, George Barnes

cautioned, ‘is beginning to be commented upon in unfavourable terms’.* Although the army was not calling for a compromise peace,

soldiers wanted improvements in their pay, pensions, and separation allowances. Veterans who had been wounded several times sometimes found themselves returned to the front, and were resentful of the good fortune which kept many civilian workers in vital industries safe in Britain.* Civilian morale was threatened by inflation and shortages. Between July 1914 and July 1917 retail food prices rose by 104 per cent.* Wages and earnings, despite the extra overtime that many employees were working, lagged behind prices, and the supply of articles whose prices had been fixed by the

government dried up in certain areas. Queues outside grocery stores became common and complaints that the rich were using their wealth to procure supplies for themselves while the poor had

to do without were rife. Discontent focused on war profiteers: shopkeepers were blamed for hoarding and manufacturers were accused of making large profits from the war. ‘Profiteering’ entered the language as a potent term of abuse. From June 1917 the government faced an increasing threat of industrial unrest in vital indus-

tries and the food situation approached crisis point in December 1917 and January 1918. Police had to be employed to control food

queues when shoppers looted food shops, and troops in France began to complain that the government was failing to feed their families. * HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/4/2/14: Barnes to Lloyd George, 29 Oct. 1917. 3 PRO CAB 23/4/WC231: War Cabinet, 12 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 27/14/MPC: Minutes of 2nd meeting of the manpower committee, 11 Dec. 1917; I. F. W. Beckett, ‘The Real Unknown Army: British Conscripts 1916-1919’, The Great War, 2/1 (1989), 5. I am most grateful to Dr Beckett for providing me with a copy of his article. 4 L.M. Barnett, British Food Policy during the First World War (London, 1985), 139; PRO CAB 24/23/GT1774: Ministry of Food, Report for week ending 15 Aug. 1917.

> PRO CAB 24/34/GT2876: Chamberlain, Food situation, 6 Dec. 1917; J. Harris, ‘Bureaucrats and Businessmen in British Food Control, 1916-1919’, in K. M. Burk (ed.), War and the State: The Transformation of British Government 1914-1918 (London, 1982), 143; C. J. Wrigley, Lloyd George and the Challenge of Labour: The

Post War Coalition 1918-1922 (Hemel Hempstead, 1990), 36; B. Waites, ‘The Government of the Home Front and the “Moral Economy” of the Working Class’, in P. H. Liddle (ed.), Home Fires and Foreign Fields: British Social and Military Experience in the First World War (London, 1985), 186-9.

The British Peace Offensive 195 The ambivalent attitude of many people towards the war and the way in which the government was waging it was demonstrated in two by-elections in the second half of 1917. In June 1917 hatred of the Military Services (Review of Exemptions) Act, which allowed for the call up of men previously discharged as unfit, crystallized

during a by-election campaign in Lord Derby’s own Liverpool stronghold. Although Derby’s son won the seat, the War Cabinet was so shaken by demands to repeal the Act that it promised an investigation into its operation. Five months later Ben Tillett, the dockers’ leader, won a by-election against a coalition candidate. Tillett stood on a platform supporting the vigorous prosecution of the war, but also demanded action against profiteers and the doubling of soldiers’ and sailors’ pay.® The British people as a whole were not about to embrace defeatism in the autumn and winter of 1917/18, but the government could not ignore the possibility that they might do so. As Barnes warned: ‘there is a great deal of warweariness which might easily be turned into disaffection by any great reverse or untoward circumstances here at home.” Fortunately for the War Cabinet, war weariness was not confined to Britain and its allies. In the winter and spring of 1917/18 they hoped to take advantage of that fact by persuading one or more of Germany’s allies to make a separate peace. Throughout the spring and summer of 1917, the British continued to receive intimations

that at least some of their counterparts in Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria might be willing to discuss a negotiated settlement.’ But three obstacles remained. Britain’s own allies had to be persuaded to abate those of their war aims which were directed against Ger-

many’s allies. To avoid imperial jealousies tearing the Entente alliance apart, Britain might also have to abate some of its own ambitions. And finally, following the Russian collapse, the British had to secure a military victory somewhere of sufficient magnitude 6 Wrigley, Lloyd George, 36-8. ’ HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/4/2/14: Barnes to Lloyd George, 29 Oct. 1917. 8 PRO CAB 371/3079/138769: Rumbold to FO, 11 July 1917; W. B. Fest, Peace or Partition: The Habsburg Monarchy and British Policy 1914-1918 (London, 1978), 132; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 25 July 1917; PRO CAB 24/21/ GT1574: Herbert, The possibility of a separate peace with Turkey, 29 July 1917; PRO WO 106/1514: Macdonogh to Robertson, 1 Aug. 1917. For Bulgaria, see PRO

FO 800/200/212: Wiener to Swaythling, 20 June 1917; PRO FO 800/200/223: Macdonogh to Drummond, 29 July 1917; PRO FO 800/200/227: Drummond to Balfour, 29 July 1917.

196 The British Peace Offensive to persuade Germany’s allies that they had more to gain by breaking with Germany than by remaining loyal to her.’ Their attempts to secure a separate peace failed because in no instance could all three of these conditions be met. In September and October bids to open negotiations with Bulgaria were abortive. Tsar Ferdinand was not receptive and by late October the dissidents of the ‘National Committee’ had split into two warring factions.'° The French Premier, Ribot, was right when he insisted that any attempt at negotiation would be pointless until the allied army at Salonika had inflicted a defeat on the Bulgar-

ians.'! The protests of the Serbs, Rumanians, and Greeks when they heard rumours of the negotiations supported Balfour’s weary insistence that “The Balkan peoples, with all their admirable qualities, are much more faithful to their hates than to their loves, and would much rather injure a rival than benefit themselves.’'” Until the end of 1917, Italian and French ambitions were major stumbling-blocks to negotiating a separate peace with either Austria-Hungary or Turkey. But in late 1917 two things happened to break this log-jam. The Italian collapse at Caporetto meant that the western allies now looked upon Italy’s war aims with even less deference than in the past, and the Italians themselves reluctantly abated their demands. On 1 December the Italian Finance Minis-

ter, Nitti, told Lloyd George that, although Italy remained con-

cerned about the fate of Trentino and Trieste, ‘considerable changes have, unfortunately taken place lately in the military situ-

ation. If we are now compelled to treat for peace it would be necessary that the interest of Italian subjects residing in these districts should be properly protected. This would satisfy the Italian

people now that we have been beaten back.’ ‘This’, as Lloyd * LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/32/65: Robertson to Monro, 1 Aug. 1917; LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/32/66: Robertson to Allenby, 1 Aug. 1917; J. Barnes and D. Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 1896-1929 (London, 1980), 164— 5; G. Riddell, Lord Riddell’s War Diary 1914-1918 (London, 1933), 258. '0 LHCMA, Spears MSS 1/13: Spiers to Macdonogh, 17 Aug. 1917 and 4 Sept. 1917; PRO FO 800/198: Macdonogh to Cecil, 11 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 1/25/15: Balfour, Peace negotiations, 20 Sept. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 6 Oct. 1917. 1 PRO FO 800/201: Bertie to Balfour, 25 Aug. 1917. 2 PRO FO 800/200/173: Balfour, Some notes on peace arrangements: The Bal-

kans, 9 Oct. 1917; G. Torrey, ‘Romania in the First World War: The Years of Engagement’, International History Review, 14/3 (1992), 465-7. 13, PRO FO 371/3086/231940: Memorandum of an interview at breakfast at the Hotel Crillon, Paris, on 1 Dec. 1917.

The British Peace Offensive 197 George told the War Cabinet, ‘was a remarkable abatement in

Italian minimum war aims as hitherto expounded by Baron Sonnino.’“ In France the establishment of the Clemenceau govern-

ment in November produced a similar willingness to negotiate peace with one of Germany’s allies. Clemenceau’s overriding ob-

ject was to expel the Germans from France and to guarantee French security against Germany. He had no desire to divert resources to the expansion of the French empire in the Middle East. On 28 November he told Lloyd George that, although he would welcome a French protectorate over Syria in order to placate his own colonial party, he was willing to give him a free hand to make peace with the Turks on any terms he chose." By December even the Foreign Office was willing at least to

consider negotiating with Britain’s enemies.’ When Count Czernin, the Austrian Foreign Minister, intimated at the end of October that he was willing to discuss peace terms, that he would keep the matter secret from the Germans, and that he would make an immediate declaration guaranteeing the integrity of Italy as it existed before the war in spite of Caporetto, the Foreign Office was

ready to listen.'? But to avoid charges that he was negotiating behind their backs, Balfour immediately informed Britain’s partners of the Austrian approach.’”? A month later, Balfour told the British legation in Athens to inform Turkish dissidents with whom they were in contact that Britain was willing to make peace with Turkey on the basis of independence for Armenia, Arabia, and Mesopotamia and real autonomy for Palestine and Syria. The con4 PRO CAB 23/13/WC290A: War Cabinet, 4 Dec. 1917. ' C. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, France Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion (London, 1981), 137-8. 16 PRO FO 371/3086/231940: Hankey to Balfour, 5 Dec. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/4: Hankey diary 28 Nov. 1917. 17 PRO CAB 24/32/GT2630: Robertson, The situation in Turkey, 15 Nov. 1917; Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 179; PRO CAB 23/13/ WC273A: War Cabinet, 14 Nov. 1917; LHCMA, Robertson MSS [/33/43: Hankey to Robertson, 14 Nov. 1917. 18 PRO FO 371/2864/208754: Rumbold to FO, 31 Oct. 1917; PRO FO 371/2864/ 209341: Townley to FO, 1 Nov. 1917; PRO FO 371/2864/208754: FO to Rumbold, 11 Nov. 1917. PRO FO 371/2864/215747: Balfour to Townley 15 Nov. 1917, and Balfour to British ambassadors Paris, Washington, Rome, and Tokyo, 16 Nov. 1917; PRO FO 371/2864/2200064: Balfour to Townley, 17 Nov. 1917; PRO FO 371/2864/224082: Rumbold to FO, 22 Nov. 1917; PRO FO 800/161/Au/17/6: Rumbold to Bertie, 23 Nov. 1917.

198 The British Peace Offensive tinuation of nominal Turkish rule in Palestine and Syria would at least ensure that neither France nor Italy had much influence in the region.”” Ministers and officials next turned their minds to deciding

how the map of eastern and south-eastern Europe and the Ottoman empire could be redrawn to minimize German gains and maximize the post-war security of Britain and its empire. Hitherto Britain had looked to Russia as the ‘great future barrier to German expansion towards the East and South East’. However, as Russia

would take decades to recover its Great Power status, they now

agreed that a federalized and rejuvenated Austria-Hungary which had broken with Germany should form the pivot of the British security system in the region. It would constitute ‘a strong

and efficient barrier against German predominance in Mittel Europa ...’. But they were willing to be much less generous to the Turks, insisting that, in order to provide buffers to safeguard India and Egypt, Mesopotamia and Arabia would have to become inde-

pendent Arab states under British suzerainty, Palestine should become a joint Arab-—Jewish state under British, French, and United States’ protection, and the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus would have to be neutralized and open to all nations.” These deliberations were of importance only in so far as they

illustrated the thinking of British policy-makers when they attempted to safeguard the post-war security of the British empire. There was never any possibility that the talks, which took place in

Switzerland between Smuts and the Austrian representative, Count Mensdorff, and between Lloyd George’s secretary, Philip Kerr, and Turkish representatives, would yield a separate peace with one of Germany’s allies. The Germans knew about them even before they occurred, for on 17 December Czernin told the German ambassador that they were about to take place. Mensdorff’s instructions were to listen to any British proposals and to empha-

size that Austria-Hungary would not make a separate peace. Smuts’s instructions were that he was to discuss only terms for a separate peace. He was to instil into Mensdorff’s mind the idea that, if his country freed itself from German domination, it would have Britain’s full support and would not be broken up.” When *0 Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 180-1. 21 PRO FO 800/200: Drummond, Memorandum, 10 Dec. 1917; PRO FO 800/214: Smuts, Peace conversations, 13 Dec. 1917. 22 Fest, Peace or Partition, 171-3.

The British Peace Offensive 199 they met in Geneva on 18 and 19 December, neither departed from his orders. Smuts refused Mensdorff’s offer to mediate for a general peace with Germany on the grounds that three years of war had left the British impressed ‘with the dangers to the future political system of Europe, if Germany survived as a sort of military

dictator ...’.° Kerr made no better progress with the Turks and both men returned to London empty-handed.” Kerr’s mission was

always likely to be abortive because Lloyd George, working through a private intermediary, the arms dealer Sir Basil Zaharoff, had already offered one of the Committee of Union and Progress leaders a bribe and much more generous terms than the Foreign Office was willing to contemplate.” The Smuts—Kerr mission was shrouded in secrecy, for if the War Cabinet’s refusal to negotiate with Germany had become Known it would have given still more ammunition to those who were criticizing the government for their determination not to end the war until they had delivered the knock-out blow. But the War Cabinet could not maintain its tactful silence any longer. On 29 November the Daily Telegraph published a letter by the Unionist elder statesman,

Lord Lansdowne. The letter made public the ideas he had first outlined in a secret memorandum for the Asquith cabinet a year earlier.” Lansdowne feared that if the war continued much longer it would result in at best a Pyrrhic victory, and at worst the sweeping away of the old social order. It was time, he believed, for the government to formulate a programme of war aims which would lead the way to a negotiated peace.?’

In Italy and France the Lansdowne letter shook those people who believed that Britain was determined to continue the war to 73 PRO CAB 1/25/27: Smuts, Report of General Smuts Mission, Part I, 18-19 Dec. 1917; PRO FO 800/200/91: Rumbold to Drummond, 19 Dec. 1917; PRO FO 800/200/93: Rumbold to Drummond, 19 Dec. 1917; PRO FO 800/200/95: Rumbold to Drummond, 20 Dec. 1917. ** PRO CAB 1/25/27: Kerr, Note of interview with Dr Parodi, head of the Mission Scolaire Egyptienne, 19 Dec. 1917; J. Turner, Lloyd George’s Secretariat (Cambridge, 1980), 78-9. *° HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/6/1/1: Caillard to Lloyd George, 1 Aug. 1917; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/6/1/5: Zaharoff to Caillard, 15 Dec. 1917. 276 PRO CAB 37/159/32: Lansdowne, Memorandum, 13 Nov. 1917. 27 W. B. Fest, ‘British War Aims and German Peace Feelers during the First World War (December 1916—November 1918)’, Historical Journal, 15/2 (1978), 303;

K. Robbins, The Abolition of War: The Peace Movement in Britain 1914-1919 (Cardiff, 1976), 149.

200 The British Peace Offensive the bitter end and, according to Bertie, gave ‘the Pacifists’ apparent

evidence that there was a strong peace party in Britain ‘and that France may be left in the lurch by Perfide Albion’.* In Britain it created a new fault-line in domestic politics by ensuring that for the

rest of the war the division between supporters and opponents of the coalition would be expressed either in terms of support for fighting the war to the bitter end or for a negotiated peace.” Lloyd George was right to believe that the letter ‘had made a profound impression on the country, and was being freely discussed’.*° Several ex-cabinet ministers urged Asquith to support Lansdowne, and some back-bench Liberal MPs believed that the question of a negotiated peace was an issue which would reunite the Liberal party. The Independent Labour party, the Union of Democratic Control, and other left-wing organizations which disapproved of continuing the war rallied to Lansdowne’s support, as did the metropolitan Liberal press and some provincial papers.°? But although some Unionist MPs privately expressed sympathy with Lansdowne’s sentiments, the strongest opposition to his letter

emanated from his natural political supporters in the Unionist party.” The letter was roundly denounced by the Tory press, led by the Daily Mail and the Morning Post. On 30 November Bonar Law expressed his complete disagreement with Lansdowne at a meeting of the National Union of Conservative Associations.°? In public Asquith tried to remain consistent with the line he had

pursued as Prime Minister and supported the government. In speeches they made on 11 and 14 December, Asquith and Lloyd George both claimed that they wanted a stable peace based on the restitution of the territory Germany had occupied. But thereafter they parted company. Asquith, like Lansdowne, did not insist that 8 PRO FO 800/169/Fr/17/132: Bertie to Lloyd George, 4 Dec. 1917; PRO FO 371/ 3086/233961: Rodd to FO, 6 Dec. 1917. 29 J. Turner, British Politics and the Great War: Coalition and Conflict 1915-1918 (London, 1992), 252. 30 PRO CAB 27/14/MPC: Minutes of 1st meeting of the manpower committee, 10 Dec. 1917. 31 Robbins, The Abolition of War, 150-2.

32 Ramsden (ed.), Real Old Tory Politics, 92; K. Wilson (ed.), The Rasp of War: The Letters of H. A. Gwynne to the Countess Bathurst 1914-1918 (London, 1988), 234.

33 Ramsden (ed.), Real Old Tory Politics, 93; R. Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister: The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law, 1858-1923 (London, 1955), 363-4.

The British Peace Offensive 201 there had to be a fundamental change in the German regime before

peace would be possible. Lloyd George, however, remained in public committed to the knock-out blow and the democratization of Germany, maintaining that victory must precede peace negotiations and that no stable peace was possible until a democratic regime had been established in Germany. Victory, he told C. P. Scott, echoing Woodrow Wilson, would be won when ‘the world should have been made a safe place for democracy’.* If Lloyd George hoped that his speech would end pressure for a

full and official statement of Britain’s war aims, he was disappointed. The letter received a generally favourable reception in the left-wing press, and Arthur Henderson demanded that the government issue a statement of their war aims ‘based on the principles of

mankind we are bound to insist upon and a repudiation—frank, explicit, and formal—of the knock-out blow’.» For several months a sub-committee of the parliamentary committee of the TUC and the National Executive of the Labour party had been preparing a memorandum on war aims and peace proposals. They demanded the democratization of the conduct and aims of foreign policy, an end to secret diplomacy, international limitations on armaments,

and the establishment of a League of Nations to prevent future wars. On specific territorial issues, the committee insisted that Bel-

gium must be granted full independence and indemnified by the Germans and that the peoples of Alsace-Lorraine and the Balkans should be allowed to settle their own future. Although they supported the right of Italians living in Austria-Hungary to be united with Italy, they condemned Italy’s other imperial ambitions and

wished to place the African and Asian colonies of all of the belligerents, including those of Britain, under international trusteeship. On 28 December a special Labour party conference endorsed the programme by 2,132,000 votes to 1,164,000.*° The day before, in 4 J. B. Scott (ed.), Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918 (Washington, DC, 1921), 206-10; T. Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott 1911-1918 (London, 1970), 319.

win CAB 24/35/GT2952: Ministry of Labour, The labour situation, 12 Dec. 36 PRO CAB 24/37/GT3167: The Labour party and the TUC, Memorandum on war aims, 28 Dec. 1917; Robbins, The Abolition of War, 152—3; W. R. Louis, Great Britain and Germany’s Lost Colonies 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1967), 91-2; P. S. Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-64 (London, 1975), 51; G. W. Egerton, Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics and International Organization, 1914-1919 (London, 1979), 56-7.

202 The British Peace Offensive a declaration designed to embarrass their enemies, the Germans had agreed to a ten-day adjournment of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and gave the Entente until 4 January to consider whether or not they wanted to join negotiations for a general peace.*’ The War Cabinet had no intention of becoming involved in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. But, in view of the pressure on them from Lansdowne, the Asquithian Liberals, and the Labour movement, they could not issue a brusque refusal. If they did not pro-

duce a reasoned reply they ran the risk that organized labour would see in their rejection of the call for a general peace conference evidence that they did indeed want to continue the war for selfish imperialist ends and withdraw their support from the war effort. The Prime Minister and his colleagues did not believe that the Germans, at the moment of their military triumph in Russia, wanted a compromise peace. On the contrary, they believed that the Germans wanted a truce which would divide their enemies and give them the opportunity ‘to organize her forces for a fresh attack, calculated to give her that world dominion which she has failed to obtain in the present war’.** On 31 December ministers agreed to issue a reply to the proposals for a peace conference ‘couched in

moderate and reasonable terms in order to show to the democracies, not only in allied, but also in enemy countries, that we were

not continuing the war for imperialistic or unreasonable war aims’.°?

The discussions, which took place inside the War Cabinet between 28 December and 3 January, showed that ministers and their

advisers were not defeatist. They remained sanguine about the Entente’s long-term military prospects. Military victory was possible, the CIGS asserted, for ‘with the vast potential supply of men

in America there should be no doubt of our winning’. But the magnitude of that victory would probably be limited. Like its Asquithian predecessor, the Lloyd George government was not fighting just to inflict a military defeat upon the Central Powers. 37 M. Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916-1918 (London, 1976), 163; R. K. Debo, Revolution and Survival: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1917-1918 (Liverpool, 1979), 55. 38 PRO CAB 24/37/GT3145: Robertson, The present military situation with regard to the peace proposals of the Central Powers, 29 Dec. 1917. 3? PRO CAB 23/13/WC308A: War Cabinet, 31 Dec. 1917. *® PRO CAB 24/37/GT3191: Robertson to Hankey, 3 Jan. 1918.

The British Peace Offensive 203 They also sought a post-war settlement which would make a future war less likely. Most policy-makers still agreed with Cecil that the best guarantee of post-war peace would be a democratic government in Germany.*' But they also agreed with Barnes that it was unlikely that the Entente would be able to inflict such a crushing defeat on Germany that it would be forced to accept democracy at the point of a bayonet and that to insist upon it would be a barrier to eventual peace negotiations.” They therefore adopted a middle course, suggested by Kerr and Smuts. They decided to announce that Britain was not fighting to democratize Germany, but to add that if Germany did establish a democratic constitution it would be easier to make peace. They coupled that with the bland assertion that, merely by accepting Britain’s territorial war aims, Germany would demonstrate that it was no longer governed by a militarist regime.” Policy-makers were thus willing to negotiate with Germany, but

only if the German government was willing to accept Britain’s terms. As the Commons was not sitting, Lloyd George presented the results of the War Cabinet’s deliberations to a trade union conference at the Caxton Hall on 5 January. He had three objects. He wanted to impress the British public with the reasonableness of Britain’s case and so encourage them to make greater sacrifices to

continue the war. He wanted to reassure the governments of Britain’s European partners that if they continued fighting Britain would continue to support them. And he wanted to appeal over the heads of their governments to the peoples of the Central Powers, to

demonstrate to them that it was only their governments which stood in the way of a quick peace which would safeguard the continuation of their national life.“ He denied that Britain sought to destroy the German or AustroHungarian empires or to deprive the Turks of Constantinople, Asia Minor, or Thrace. While the liberalization of the German constitution would facilitate a lasting peace, he insisted that was a matter 41 PRO FO 800/207: Cecil to Balfour, 28 Dec. 1917. 42 PRO CAB 1/25/28: Barnes, Notes on the war, 30 Dec. 1917.

43. Jaffe, The Decision to Disarm Germany: British Policy Towards Postwar German Disarmament, 1914-1919 (London, 1985), 79-81; PRO CAB 24/37/ GT3182: Kerr, Statement of war aims: Draft based on General Smuts’s draft, 3 Jan.

os FRO CAB 23/5/WC312: War Cabinet, 3 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 23/5/WC313: War Cabinet, 3 Jan. 1918.

204 The British Peace Offensive for the German people alone to decide. Britain was fighting a war of self-defence and to uphold the public law of Europe. He called upon the Central Powers to evacuate Belgium, Serbia, Rumania, Montenegro, and northern France. In private some ministers had doubted whether the military situation would admit of France re-

covering all of Alsace-Lorraine, but they agreed that to insist otherwise would be fatal to the continuation of the alliance and Lloyd George promised that Britain would stand by the French in whatever demands they made over Alsace-Lorraine. By contrast,

the War Cabinet was prepared to support Italian claims against Austria-Hungary only in so far as they were consonant with the principle of nationality. If Russia concluded a separate peace, it would be left to face the consequences. In order to keep open the

possibility of a separate peace with Austria-Hungary, Lloyd George dismissed the idea that Britain was fighting for the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire, but he did call for democratic

self-government for its subject nationalities and for Italy and Rumania to be allowed union with their nationals living under Austrian rule.* In the Middle East Lloyd George announced that Britain wanted to internationalize and neutralize the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. But the formula he announced for the outlying provinces of the Ottoman empire—that Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine all deserved ‘recognition of their separate national condition’—was sufficiently vague as to admit of the possibility that an

Ottoman empire of sorts might remain at the end of the war. The fate of Germany’s colonies should be left to the peace conference, where the primary consideration should be the welfare of their indigenous peoples through the establishment of administrations which were acceptable to them and which would prevent their exploitation by European capitalists. (The sincerity of that particular promise could be judged by a telegram which Long had sent the previous day to the Dominion governments cautioning them not to take the Prime Minister’s words at their face value. The security of the empire meant that Britain intended to retain Germany’s colonies, but ‘owing to divergence amongst Allies it has not been possible to secure acceptance of this view’.**) Finally, to limit the 45 Scott (ed.), Official Statements of War Aims, 225-33.

4 G. Smith, ‘The British Government and the Disposition of the German Colonies in Africa, 1914-1918’, in P. Gifford and W. R. Louis (eds.), Britain and

The British Peace Offensive 205 burden of arms and to reduce the possibility of future wars, he called for the establishment of an international organization to maintain the peace.’ These terms represented a major retreat from the maximum war aims programme the British had agreed with their allies between 1914 and 1916 or even from the more moderate but still ambitious programme they had transmitted to Wilson in January 1917. Lloyd George’s speech received a mixed reception. The French press was pleased because of his endorsement of French claims to Alsace-Lorraine.* By contrast, the Italian press and Italian officials

were disturbed that, although Lloyd George supported Italian claims against Austria-Hungary where they were consonant with the principle of nationality, he had not endorsed their claims to the

Adriatic.” ‘Of course the answer is obvious’, Rodd wrote to Balfour, ‘if we could make it, that France has held firm and made enormous sacrifices and that Italy has given way and by the disaster or treachery of Caporetto has gravely compromised the general situation. But it is not well to say such things to people who are only

too conscious of the truth of them, and very sore at their own humiliation.”°° Some of the lesser allies were equally upset. The Crown Prince of Serbia claimed that Lloyd George’s speech had depressed Serbian morale because it contained no specific references to their aspirations. And the Pole, Count Horodyski, complained that there was no hope of a nationalist rising within the Austro-Hungarian empire as long as the Entente leaders stated that they did not consider Austria to be their principal enemy.>! At home, Lloyd George’s announcement was greeted with little

enthusiasm. J. L. Garvin, the editor of the Tory Observer, and Churchill both considered that if the Germans accepted the terms Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule (New Haven, Conn., 1967), 294.

47 Scott (ed.), Official Statements of War Aims, 225-33. 48 PRO FO 371/3435/3486: Bertie to FO, 6 Jan. 1918; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/23/2/4: Spiers to Hankey, 7 Jan. 1918. ” PRO CAB 24/39/GT3323: Dept. of Information, Intelligence Bureau, Weekly

report on Italy, 11 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 24/39/GT3451: Dept. of Information, Intelligence Bureau, Weekly report on Italy, 25 Jan. 1918. °° PRO FO 800/202/291: Rodd to Balfour, 16 Jan. 1918; Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers 1914-1920 (Washington, DC, 1940), 89-90. 1 PRO CAB 24/39/GT3332: Gen. Corkan to Robertson, 10 Jan. 1918; PRO FO 800/385/Au/18/1: Horodyski to Keynes, 10 Jan. 1918.

206 The British Peace Offensive on offer it would leave Germany stronger than it had been in 1914 and might pave the way to future hostilities. W. L. Bridgeman, a Unionist junior minister, thought that the most that would come of the speech was that it might divide the German people from their

rulers and Germany from Austria.” But it was the impact on the labour movement which caused the War Cabinet most concern. On 2 January the Ministry of Labour had informed the War Cabinet that ‘by dint of harping on “profiteering”, “the inequality of sacrifice” and “the capitalist war”, a great deal has been done to destroy the spirit of unity which permeated the country in the early stages of the war, and unless this spirit is restored to a large measure the outlook for the critical months ahead is rather precarious.”** The speech went some way towards placating such critics.* When the

Labour party conference met at Nottingham between 23 and 25 January, it did not demand an immediate end to the war.> But Milner, Curzon, and Carson were no more trusted by the leaders of organized labour to pursue a ‘democratic’ peace after the speech than they were before it, and the Ministry of Labour warned that ‘the government has to a large extent lost its authority in the eyes of the workers, and there is a general impression that it 1s bound to

obey their demands’. Henderson approved of Lloyd George’s speech, but was critical of the way in which he had cold-shouldered

the Bolsheviks. Henceforth Henderson sought a peace based on the fourteen-point peace plan which President Wilson announced three days after Lloyd George’s speech.°’

Lloyd George’s speech therefore demonstrated that rhetoric could only go so far in sustaining popular support for the war. At least as important in ensuring that the majority of the population remained willing to follow the government’s lead and continue fighting were 2 Riddell, War Diary, 304; P. Williamson (ed.), The Modernization of Conservative Politics: The Diaries and Letters of William Bridgeman 1904-1935 (London, 1988), 124.

3 PRO CAB 24/37/GT3195: Shackleton, The labour situation, 2 Jan. 1918; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/23/2/1: Hankey to Lloyd George, 2 Jan. 1918 and enc. by Ormsby-Gore. 4 PRO CAB 24/40/GT3442: Shackleton, The labour situation, 23 Jan. 1918.

°° PRO CAB 24/42/GT3609: Roberts, Report on the annual conference of the Labour party, 13 Feb. 1918. °° PRO CAB 24/41/GT3502: Shackleton, The labour situation, 30 Jan. 1918; PRO FO 800/175/Misc/17/4: Hardinge to Bertie, 6 Feb. 1918; K. Middlemas (ed.), Thomas Jones: Whitehall Diary, i. 1916-1925 (Oxford, 1969), 43. °7 PRO FO 800/175/Misc/18/7: Bertie, Memorandum, 17 Feb. 1918; Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, 327.

The British Peace Offensive 207 the more tangible measures the War Cabinet took to meet the needs and demands of consumers, wage earners, and employers. One of the major reasons why war weariness did not develop into defeatism was that the government succeeded in feeding the population. From the summer of 1917, the main thrust of its food policy was to ensure that adequate supplies reached the consumer at reasonable prices. In September the Food Controller began to issue a list of maximum wholesale and retail prices for foodstuffs and the bread subsidy began to have an impact on the consumer.°®

The disturbances of late 1917 and early 1918 demonstrated not widespread hunger but widespread anger at the hardships imposed

by an inefficient system of food distribution.’ Rhondda and the War Cabinet feared that compulsory rationing might produce a

thriving black market as it had done in Germany. They were compelled to accept it by the Shipping Controller’s prediction that imports in 1918 would fall by eight million tons, by the Admiralty’s fears that U-boats would continue to destroy shipping faster than it could be replaced, by strikes in munitions factories in protest at the breakdown of food distribution, and by the appearance around the country of municipal rationing schemes devised by local food control committees.*' On 22 December the Ministry of Food issued an

order confirming that local authorities did have the powers to introduce rationing schemes, and on 30 January the War Cabinet introduced compulsory rationing for flour, meats, fats, and sugar.” The British people were not facing famine. Sufficient tonnage was allocated to food imports to ensure that basic foodstuffs, especially bread, were available. The Registrar General’s statistics for deaths in England and Wales for the quarter ending in September 1917 were the lowest yet recorded.® Rationing was generally popular. It was egalitarian, and, with the exception of the rich, most people 38 PRO CAB 24/24/GT1820: Rhondda, Introduction of the 9d. loaf: Wholesale price of flour to bakers, 23 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 23/3/WC225: War Cabinet, 28 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 24/27/GT2132: Ministry of Food, Food control and labour unrest, 27 Sept. 1917.

° T. Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1986), 514. 6° PRO CAB 23/4/WC285: War Cabinet, 28 Nov. 1917. 6§| PRO CAB 24/4/G171: Rhondda, Compulsory rationing, 9 Nov. 1917; PRO

CAB 24/33/GT2769: War Cabinet, 26 Nov. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC297: War Cabinet, 13 Dec. 1917. 6& PRO CAB 23/5/WC334: War Cabinet, 30 Jan. 1918.

6 PRO CAB 24/37/GT3194: Rhondda, Expenditure on food since 1914, 2 Jan. 1918; J. M. Winter, The Great War and the British People (London, 1985), 153, 21825.

208 The British Peace Offensive were not allocated smaller supplies than they had purchased in peacetime.™ Prices began to stabilize and between November 1917 and the summer of 1918 retail prices remained almost static.™

The government placated employers by protecting them from confiscatory levels of taxation. When G. H. Roberts, the Minister of Labour, suggested that complaints about profiteering could be reduced if the excess profits duty was raised, he met powerful opposition. Sir Alfred Mond, the First Commissioner of Works and a major chemical manufacturer, pleaded that if the duty was raised from 80 per cent to 100 per cent it would deprive British industry of the capital it needed to compete with foreign competitors after the war. It would also remove from employers any inducement to cooperate willingly with the government, for ‘to men accustomed to business all their lives, the idea of putting forth a great effort, with no financial result to show, is, on the whole, very difficult to accept’. Roberts’s scathing reply, that a majority of profits were paid to shareholders in joint stock companies who did nothing to earn their money, and that industrialists were not so lacking in patriotic spirit that they would only exert themselves if they were reaping a 20 per cent profit, had no effect. As Chancellor, Bonar Law sided

with Mond and used direct taxation simply to meet interest payments on the burgeoning national debt.” In the budget he introduced in April 1918, he raised income tax to 6s. in the £1 and increased supertax on incomes of over £2,500 per annum, but he took care to keep excess profits duty at 80 per cent.® 64 Barnett, British Food Policy, 146-52. 6 PRO CAB 24/23/GT1774: Ministry of Food, Report for week ending 15 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 24/28/GT2286: Ministry of Food, Report for week ending 10 Oct. 1917; PRO CAB 24/30/GT2413: Ministry of Food, Report for week ending 24 Oct. 1917; PRO CAB 24/31/GT2565: Ministry of Food, Report for week ending 7 Nov. 1917.

6 PRO CAB 24/32/GT2609: Mond, Wages and prices, 13 Nov. 1917. 67 PRO T 171/147: 1918 Budget, 25 June 1918; PRO T 171/150: Hamilton to NottBower, 19 Sept. 1917; PRO T 171/151: Board of Inland Revenue to Bonar Law, 27 Dec. 1917; PRO T 171/150: Board of Inland Revenue, Budget 1918-19, 12 Mar. 1918; PRO T 171/154: Ramsay, Memorandum on the financial outlook, 12 Jan. 1918; PRO T 171/154: Bradbury, Budget Committee, 16 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 23/16/

WC359A: Points from the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s statement to the War Cabinet, 20 Apr. 1918. 6 PRO CAB 24/34/GT2851: Roberts, Observations by the Minister on Sir Alfred Mond’s memorandum GT2609 of 13 Nov., 3 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC305: War Cabinet, 24 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 24/38/GT3253: Bonar Law, Excess profits duty, 7 Jan. 1918.

The British Peace Offensive 209 The government was equally willing to buy the support of certain wage earners. [ts wages policy was inchoate because wage bargaining was divided between a number of competing ministries, including the Admiralty, the War Office, the Ministry of Munitions, the

Shipping Controller, and the Board of Trade. This was a recipe for wage inflation. When one ministry conceded the demands of a particular group of workers, other groups demanded similar treatment, and the result was a wages spiral. Individual ministries and the War Cabinet ensured that wages in vital industries did not fall hopelessly behind rising prices by pursuing a simple policy. They granted concessions to groups of organized workers depending upon how vital they judged a particular industry to be to the war economy and did so without regard to the inflationary results of their policy. Thus in September 1917 the War Cabinet granted the miners a rise despite the opposition of the Coal Controller and the Ministry of Labour. For if the miners struck, munitions factories would close and that would ‘be equivalent to a military defeat’. Similarly, in November, when Belfast power workers threatened to strike and bring the city’s shipyards to a standstill, the War Cabinet ordered the Irish Secretary to reprimand their employers, the city corporation, for threatening war production.” Churchill summed up this policy when he minuted that it would ‘keep the machinery

oiled by satisfying them [the labour force], as regards pay, etc., even if it involved progressive depreciation of all their money values’.”’ Workers in the mines, in the engineering industry, and on

the railways made the largest gains, but those in non-essential industries like cotton spinning did much worse. It was hardly sur-

prising that the latter felt bitter about the good fortune of the former.” These concessions proved sufficient. Key groups of employers and employees were satisfied. By February 1918 the Ministry of Labour could already detect a diminution in public agitation about the food situation. The shipowner Lord Inchcape could find no one 6 R. Lowe, ‘The Ministry of Labour, 1916-1919: A Still, Small Voice?’, in K. M. Burk (ed.), War and the State: The Transformation of British Government 1914-1918 (London, 1982), 115-16. 7” PRO CAB 23/4/WC239: War Cabinet, 26 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC270: War Cabinet, 12 Nov. 1917.

1 M. Gilbert (ed.), Winston S. Churchill, iv. Companion, Part 1: Documents, January 1917 to June 1919 (London, 1977), 174. % PRO CAB 24/28/GT2203: Barnes, State regulation of wages, 5 Oct. 1917.

210 The British Peace Offensive in the City of London who had a word of complaint about the Chancellor’s policy.” Lloyd George’s speech had made some contribution towards main-

taining social peace at home and it had caused only minimal offence amongst Britain’s allies. But it failed to alter German policy.

Ludendorff, as the British knew, remained convinced that Germany could secure its complete war aims programme, including the annexation of territory to protect Upper Silesia, Lorraine, and the lower Rhine, the division of Belgium under a customs union

with Germany, and the occupation of the Baltic provinces as a deployment area in a future German—Russian war.” On 24 January Chancellor Hertling, who had replaced Michaelis on 1 November

1917 and who was noted for his opposition to the Socialist party and to democratic constitutional reforms, publicly refused to give

any assurances about Belgium, and insisted on the retention of Alsace-Lorraine.”? Nor did Lloyd George’s pronouncements persuade any of Germany’s lesser allies to take the road towards a

separate peace. The Prime Minister’s deliberately half-hearted support for Italy’s claims against Austria-Hungary had been intended ‘to give a clear indication to Austria that we did not wish to destroy her, and to make her people lukewarm in the war’.’” On 2 January the War Cabinet had agreed that Smuts should eventually return to Switzerland to continue his discussions with Mensdorff.”’ They had little faith that this might result in a separate peace, but they did hope that it might be possible ‘to drive a wedge between Kithlmann and Czernin on one side and the German militarists on the other .. .’.”’ They were disappointed, for on 14 March the Aus-

trian envoy informed Kerr, who had gone in Smuts’s place, that 3 PRO CAB 24/42/GT3677: Shackleton, The labour situation, 20 Feb. 1918; PRO T 171/151: Inchcape to Bonar Law, 24 Apr. 1918. ™ Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship, 165-6; PRO FO 371/3077/240917: Rumbold to FO, 20 Dec. 1917. % Scott (ed.), Official Statements of War Aims, 246-54; PRO CAB 24/30/GT2539:

Dept. of Information, Intelligence Bureau, Weekly report on Germany, 8 Nov. 1917; PRO CAB 24/30/GT2473: Dept. of Information, Intelligence Bureau, Weekly report on Germany, 30 Oct. 1917. 7 PRO CAB 23/5/WC315: Minutes of the War Cabinet, 5 Jan. 1918. ™7™ PRO CAB 23/44B/WC307A: Minutes of the War Cabinet, 28 Dec,1917; PRO CAB 23/16/WC311A: Minutes of the War Cabinet, 2 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 23/16/ WC318A:;: Minutes of the War Cabinet, 8 Jan. 1918.

78 Roskill, Hankey, i. 483; PRO CAB 23/16/WC325A: Minutes of the War Cabinet, 18 Jan. 1918.

The British Peace Offensive 211 Austria would not abandon Germany. The resulting stalemate was best captured by Kerr’s laconic report: ‘Skrzynski [the Austrian envoy] objected to separate peace as possible object of discussion. I equally refused to rule it out as excluded from discussion.’” The British had no more success in inducing the Committee of Union and Progress to respond positively to their overtures, and for the same reason.*® The same Russian collapse which made the British so eager to reduce the number of their enemies by negotiation offered those enemies rich rewards, and the Germans promised them that their forthcoming offensive in the west would allow them to collect them.®! According to Sir Horace Rumbold, the British minister in Switzerland, Brest-Litovsk ‘has filled the Turks with extravagant hopes for the future of their empire. Not only do they hope to recover Mesopotamia, Palestine etc., with the help of the Germans, but they also expect to get portions of the Caucasus and to enter into an alliance with such a state as Georgia.’®’

The possibility of Britain negotiating a separate peace with Germany’s allies was a chimera. The negotiations of December 1917 and March 1918 demonstrated that the Foreign Office’s scepticism was justified. Only the kind of overwhelming military pressure which the Entente was not in a position to inflict upon them would have made Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey willing to accept a negotiated settlement in the winter and spring of 1917/18. The failure of the Smuts—Kerr mission marked the end of serious British negotiations to secure a separate peace with Austria-Hungary ® PRO FO 371/3133/45538: Rumbold to FO, 14 Mar. 1918; PRO FO 800/200: Kerr, Report on mission to Switzerland, 19 Mar. 1918. 89 PRO CAB 25/120/SWCS8: British section, Supreme War Council, Note for the

Prime Minister [n.d., but c.7 Dec. 1917]; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/6/1/6: Caillard to Lloyd George, 1 Jan. 1918; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/44/3/38: Robertson to Lloyd George, 4 Jan. 1918; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/6/1/7: J. T. Davies, Memorandum given to Sir V. Caillard, 9 Jan. 1918; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/6/1/8: Caillard to Lloyd George, 12 Jan. 1918; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/ 6/1/1: Caillard to Zaharoff, 16 Jan. 1918; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/6/1/13: Zaharoff to Caillard, 29 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 23/16/WC338A: War Cabinet, 4 Feb. 1918; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/4: Hankey diary, 4 Feb. 1918; PRO FO 800/206/ 336: Balfour to Beaverbrook, 9 Aug. 1918; PRO CAB 23/16/WC362A: War Cabinet, 8 Mar. 1918. *! PRO FO 800/206/332: Kerr, Notes on the present position in Turkey, 19 Mar. 1918; PRO FO 371/3133/55733: Rumbold to FO and FO to Rumbold, 26 and 28 Mar. 1918; PRO FO 800/385/Aus/18/3: Rumbold to Kerr, 30 Mar. 1918. 82 PRO FO 800/206/327: Rumbold to Balfour, 7 Jan. 1918.

212 The British Peace Offensive or Turkey. The British peace offensive had failed to redress the strategic balance in the Entente’s favour. It was now left to the German generals to discover whether they could defeat the armies of the western allies in the field. It was the responsibility of the

generals of the western allies to frustrate their attempt and buy time until the arrival of the Americans redressed the strategic balance, and paved the way for an Entente victory in 1919.

9

The Defeat of the Spring Offensive, March—July 1918 By the spring of 1918 the War Cabinet was committed to a Fabian policy on the western front for the rest of that year, coupled with an

attempt to knock out Turkey. They had reached this decision on the assumption that in 1918 the Germans would follow the French and British example and remain on the defensive in the west.' But the Germans were not so obliging. The British were not the only belligerents who were conscious of their failing strength. By November 1917 the U-boat war had failed to defeat Britain and the USA represented an enormous accretion of potential military

power to the Entente alliance. Despite the Russian collapse, Ludendorff recognized that Germany’s ability to sustain its efforts was not inexhaustible. As early as April 1917 he had decided that Germany must eschew the strategic defensive in the west in favour of an offensive.? At Mons on 11 November he told a group of staff

officers that, as the alliance of the Central Powers was held together only by the hopes that their allies invested in a German victory, they had to secure it in 1918, before the Americans had mobilized and deployed a huge army in France.? Ludendorff considered three possible locations for the offensive: in Flanders, where a penetration of Haig’s line would threaten the Channel ports; on the Somme, where the British and French lines met; or further south against the French. He decided to mount his spring offensive against the BEF because he believed that its commanders were less tactically skilful than their allies, because he had too few divisions to destroy the French army, and because it might ' PRO CAB 27/14/MPC: Minutes of the 1st meeting of the manpower committee, 10 Dec. 1917. 2 +H. H. Herwig, “The Dynamics of Necessity: German Military Policy during the

First World War’, in A. R. Millett and W. Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness, i. The First World War (Boston, Mass., 1988), 100. 3 FE. Ludendorff, My War Memoirs, 1914-1918 (London, 1919), ii. 538-43; R. Aspery, The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct World War One (New York, 1991), 364-7.

214 Defeat of the Spring Offensive be possible to outflank part of the BEF and turn a tactical breakthrough into an operational victory. Unlike the French, Haig could

not trade space for time.* Ludendorff contemplated fighting a series of attritional battles which would be mounted consecutively throughout the spring and summer.’ The first would be on a fortyseven-mile front between Arras and La Fére where a successful offensive would divide the British and French armies. Ludendorff expected that Haig would react by withdrawing troops from Flan-

ders to reinforce the threat to his right, and when he did so the Germans would switch their efforts northwards and mount their own Flanders offensive aimed at reaching the Channel coast. In case the opportunity should arise of attacking the French, he also told his staff to prepare an offensive against Pétain’s forces on the Aisne.® Exactly what strategic consequences Ludendorff hoped for should he achieve a tactical victory were unclear. In early April 1918 he told one of his staff that ‘We shall simply tear open a hole,

and the rest will follow. That is the way we did it in Russia.” Perhaps he hoped that by dividing the British from the French he would place an insurmountable strain on the Anglo-French alliance, and that the defeat of their armies in the field might ignite the kind of revolution in France and Britain which had already brought down Russia. Chancellor Hertling certainly entertained such hopes, writing on 5 June that ‘A succession of blows destroying the military might of France and England would finally result in

a powerful popular movement directed against those Governments, a movement that, taken together with the existing and increasing pacifist tendencies in both countries, would lead to the opening of peace negotiations.” The best evidence of the Germans’ success in sowing confusion in the minds of the British and French was their inability to concert + B. I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914— 1918 (New York, 1989), 155-6. > G. Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptre: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, iv. The Reign of German Militarism and the Disaster of 1918 (London, 1968; 2nd edn. 1973), 230; R. Parkinson, Tormented Warrior: Ludendorff and the Supreme Command (London, 1978), 143, 149. 6 R. Paschall, The Defeat of Imperial Germany 1917-18 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1989), 131-3; Ludendorff, My War Memoirs, ii. 589-91. ’ Quoted in Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptre, iv. 230. § Quoted in B. Pearce, How Haig Saved Lenin (London, 1987), 27; see also D. E. Showalter, “Total War for Limited Objectives: An Interpretation of German Grand Strategy’, in P. M. Kennedy (ed.), Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, Conn., 1991), 116-17.

Defeat of the Spring Offensive 215 their defensive plans and to have their reserves in place behind the British line by mid-March. The only result of their attempts to do so was Robertson’s supersession. At their first meeting the Permanent Military Representatives at the Supreme War Council agreed

that their main priority was to consider the steps necessary to defend the allied line.? Wilson wanted to establish a co-ordinated

system of defence from the North Sea to the Adriatic, but he quickly discovered that the particularism of individual commanders-in-chief made this impossible.’° Since September 1917, Haig, Pétain, and their governments had been engaged in a running argument over how much of the French line the BEF should take over. The French were short of troops, and public and political opinion forced the French government to demobilize large numbers of elderly soldiers."' The French high command and government therefore wanted Haig to extend the front of the BEF. But between September and January Haig prevaricated, knowing that if he agreed he would have too few troops to resume his offensive in Flanders in the spring. Only overwhelming political pressure forced him to co-operate.” By the end of January he had extended the British line to the river Oise, a point short of the line the French

wanted him to take over. But as neither Haig nor Pétain could decide which one of them would be the main focus of the German offensive, they made no real progress towards solving the larger

question of how to deploy their reserves to afford each other * PRO CAB 25/120/SWC16: Minutes of the meeting of the Permanent Military Representatives, 4 Dec. 1917.

PRO CAB 25/120/SWC9: British Section, Supreme War Council, Consideration of general policy for winter of 1917-18, 8 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 25/120/ SWC18: Minutes of 3rd meeting of the Permanent Military Representatives, 12 Dec. 1917.

4 J. Horne, ‘“L’impét du sang”: Republican Rhetoric and Industrial Warfare in France, 1914-1918’, Social History, 14/2 (1989), 201-23; LHCMA, Clive MSS II/4: Clive diary, 25 Oct. 1917; LHCMA, Spears MSS 1/17: Spiers to Derby, 25 Oct. 1917; PRO WO 256/24: Haig to Milner, 1 Nov. 1917; PRO WO 256/25: Haig to Pétain, 1 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 24/34/GT2884: Robertson to Haig, 6 Dec. 1917.

2 R. Blake (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig (London, 1952), 278; LHCMA, Benson MSS B1/63: Haig to Pétain, 19 Oct. 1917; PRO WO 256/23: Haig diary, 18 Oct. 1917; PRO WO 106/407: Haig to Robertson, 19 Oct. 1917; LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/23/69: Robertson to Haig, 1 Dec. 1917; D. R. Woodward, Lloyd George and the Generals (Newark, NJ, 1983), 254; PRO CAB 23/4/WC295: War Cabinet, 10 Dec. 1917; LHCMA, Spears MSS 1/13: Spiers to Maurice, 12 Dec. 1917; J. Barnes and D. Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 1896-1929 (London,

1980), 187; C. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries (London, 1927), ii. 41; PRO CAB 63/23: Spiers to Hankey, 24 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC305: War Cabinet, 24 Dec. 1917.

216 Defeat of the Spring Offensive mutual support. Both generals refused to endanger their own army

by placing their reserves at the other’s disposal. The most that Pétain would agree to do was to exchange plans for mutual support, and Haig thought that this would suffice.’

In London ministers agreed that before they assented to a further extension of the British line the matter would have to be considered in the light of the larger question of the general military

policy the Entente should pursue in 1918. At Versailles Wilson recommended that, because the BEF could not retreat far without uncovering vital objectives like Amiens and the Channel ports, the

' meeting-place between the British and French armies should be no further south than a point between the rivers Oise and Ailette. When the French objected to this, the representatives agreed

to recommend a further extension just south of the Aiulette.“ Robertson and Haig were incensed at being asked to extend their front for another fourteen miles. Their objections were not purely military. Not only would this decision endanger the safety of the BEF, but it would also diminish Britain’s political influence within the alliance. For, as Robertson noted, it would ‘have the effect of making the bulk of the reserves on the West Front French [and] it follows that the main control of the operations will be in French hands, as we can only make our influence felt by having reserves at

our disposal.’ They found Wilson’s second proposal, that both armies should allot divisions to a General Reserve to come under the control of

the representatives, equally objectionable. This threatened to make the representatives the de facto arbiters of military policy by

giving them the power to accept or reject requests from the national army commanders for troops drawn from the reserve.'® Haig and Robertson also recognized that the suggestion raised in a most 1 LHCMA, Robertson MSS I/23/72: Haig to Robertson, 18 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 24/36/GT3056: Haig to Robertson, 18 Dec. 1917; Blake (ed.), Haig, 273-4. 4 PRO CAB 25/120/SWC41: Wilson, Extension of German front [n.d., but c.5 Jan. 1918]; PRO CAB 25/120/SWC42A: 9th and 11th meetings of the Permanent Military Representatives, Supreme War Council, 7 and 11 Jan. 1918; PRO WO 106/ 407: Supreme War Council, Joint note no. 10 to the Supreme War Council by its Permanent Military Representatives, Extension of the British front, 10 Jan. 1918. PRO CAB 24/39/GT3343: Robertson, Proposed extension of British front, 15 Jan. 1918; PRO WO 256/27: Wilson to Haig, 11 Jan. 1918; Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 11. 50-1. 16 PRO CAB 25/120/SWC49: British Section, Supreme War Council, The question of reserves in the campaign of 1918 in western Europe, 15 Jan. 1918.

Defeat of the Spring Offensive 217 acute form the question of who was responsible for advising the War Cabinet, Wilson at Versailles or Robertson in London." Pétain was equally unhappy with the proposal and co-operated with Haig in outflanking the representatives. They presented their governments with a fait accompli in the form of an agreement to co-ordinate their reserves in the event of a German offensive. On 19 January, according to Haig, they ‘discussed our arrangements on defence and were agreed on all points.’® At the next meeting of the Supreme War Council on 30 January they presented a united front. Pétain assured the politicians that their plans to create a General Reserve were unnecessary because ‘the plans both for the defensive and for the preparation of sectors for local attacks had been completed between Sir Douglas Haig and himself. He would have an army ready to support Sir Douglas Haig in an emergency and knew Sir Douglas Haig would be ready to assist him in the same manner.’’? On 2 February the Council

accepted a solution devised by Hankey and Milner, which was subsequently ratified by the War Cabinet.” The General Reserve was to be placed under the command of an Executive War Board of the Permanent Military Representatives led by General Foch. The

strength and composition of the reserve would be decided by the representatives and the national commanders-in-chief, and approved by the full Council. Until the troops were released by the representatives they would be under the administrative control of their own national commanders, although the latter would not be permitted to move them without the former’s agreement. The Executive War Board would have the power to decide what part of the reserve could be released to a particular national commander, but once they had taken that decision the commander would have

complete control over the troops allotted to him. In return the French agreed to leave it to Haig and Pétain to decide how much more line the BEF should take over.”! '7 Blake (ed.), Haig, 278-9. 8 PRO WO 256/27: Haig diary, 19 Jan. 1918; LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/23/81: Haig to Robertson, 20 Jan. 1918. '9 PRO CAB 25/120/SWC70: Draft summary of the opinions expressed at the 1st session of the 3rd meeting of the Supreme War Council, 30 Jan. 1918; Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 202-3; Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 11. 55. 20 PRO CAB 23/5/WC338: War Cabinet, 4 Feb. 1918.

21 PRO CAB 25/120/SWC76: Procés-verbal of the 5th session of the 3rd meeting of the Supreme War Council, 2 Feb. 1918; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/4: Hankey

218 Defeat of the Spring Offensive Wilson believed that the Council’s decision meant that Robertson had been defeated and that he was established as the War Cabinet’s premier military adviser.” But the CIGS had no intention of giving up without a struggle. Robertson had supported

Haig and Pétain, even going so far as to deliver a homily on the constitutional impossibility of placing British troops under a foreign general.”* Lloyd George was incensed. He had no intention of

being lectured to by the CIGS on the British constitution. Relations between the Prime Minister and the CIGS had been deteriorating since Lloyd George had established the Supreme War Council and attacked the generals’ conduct of the war in his Paris speech. By Christmas Lloyd George was considering dismissing Robertson, Haig, and Derby. In the new year he began to prepare

the ground in the press.“ He found Robertson an uncongenial colleague, and, as Milner remarked, “The whole object of the change is to make the chief military adviser of the Govt. a man with

whom we can get on.” Haig, Robertson, and Derby formed a nexus with powerful political supporters on both sides of the Commons. But, encouraged by Milner, who threatened to resign if he did not get rid of the CIGS, Lloyd George played upon the divergence between the three men to isolate Robertson. Derby, whom even Robertson recognized as being a weak personality, was won over when the Prime Minister threw a veneer of constitutional propriety over the Supreme War Council’s decision by offering to make the British Permanent Military Representative a member of the Army Council.2° Haig accepted Robertson’s supersession because of a growing

rift between the two soldiers over strategic policy. Throughout 1917 Haig had clung to his belief that the BEF could defeat the diary, 2 Feb. 1918; Blake (ed.), Haig, 282; Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, uu. 57.

22 Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, i. 57. 23 LHCMA, Robertson MSS I/24/3: Robertson to Lloyd George, 30 Jan. 1918; N. Maurice (ed.), The Maurice Case: From the Papers of Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice (London, 1972), 68; LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (17) 27/7: Robertson to Derby, 2 Feb. 1918. #4 'T, Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott 1911-1918 (London, 1970), 321; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 29 Dec. 1917; HLRO, Bonar Law MSS 82/8/5: Younger to Bonar Law, 25 Jan. 1918. 25 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/38/3/12: Milner to Lloyd George, 11 Feb. 1918. *6 Maurice (ed.), The Maurice Case, 69; PRO WO 256/27: Haig diary, 23 Jan. 1918.

Defeat of the Spring Offensive 219 Germans, but in private Robertson had become sceptical. Haig summed up their disagreement when he wrote to his wife on 5 February that Robertson ‘has not resolutely adhered to the policy of “concentration on the Western Front”—he has said that this is his policy, but has allowed all kinds of resources to be diverted to distant theatres at the bidding of his political masters.’”’

Lloyd George finally engineered the CIGS’s dismissal on 16 February, after the latter had refused either to go to Versailles as the British Permanent Military Representative or to remain as CIGS but with much reduced powers.” Robertson was right to recognize that ‘the whole thing is, in fact, a plot to get me out of here. I would have been a useless fool at Versailles, with Wilson here as CIGS, who could always have scotched me.” Robertson’s supersession did not place the government in politi-

cal danger. A general election on an out-of-date register which excluded millions of soldiers was impossible. Those Unionists and Liberals who were critical of the way in which Lloyd George had

dismissed Robertson could not find a Prime Minister-in-waiting behind whom they could unite to topple Lloyd George. Ministers like Long, Cecil, and Derby, whose resignations might have embar-

rassed the government, hesitated to act. Rumours abounded that Asquith and Lansdowne were trying to work together, but Asquith’s endorsement of Lloyd George’s speech to the TUC on

5 January formed an insuperable barrier to their co-operation. Henderson admitted that as long as the war continued, he preferred to see Lloyd George in Downing Street. As CIGS Wilson exercised only the reduced powers that his 27 Blake (ed.), Haig, 283; Bodleian Library, Milner MSS dep. 355: Lloyd George to Milner, 9 Feb. 1918. 8 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 12, 13, and 16 Feb. 1918; PRO WO 256/27: Derby to Haig, 7 Feb. 1918; PRO WO 256/27: Haig diary, 8 Feb. 1918; Blake (ed.), Haig, 284; D. R. Woodward (ed.), The Military Correspondence of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, December 1915—February 1918 (London, 1990), 287-91; J. M. McEwen (ed.), The Riddell Diaries: A Selection 1908-1923 (London, 1986), 218; G. de Groot, Douglas Haig, 1861-1928 (London, 1988), 364-5; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/38/3/11: Lloyd George to Milner, 9 Feb. 1918; PRO CAB 23/13/WC345A: War Cabinet, 14 Feb. 1918; Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, ii. 60-1; PRO CAB 23/13/WC347A: War Cabinet, 16 Feb. 1918. 29 ‘Woodward (ed.), The Military Correspondence of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 303. 30 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/23/2/14: Esher to Hankey, 13 Feb. 1918; PRO FO 800/175/Misc/18/6: Bertie, Memorandum, 17 Feb. 1918.

220 Defeat of the Spring Offensive predecessors had exercised before the Kitchener—Robertson compact of November 1915. He enjoyed much better personal relations with the Prime Minister than Robertson, for Wilson ‘had the happy knack, which suited L. G., of interspersing serious business with jokes and badinage’.*! Milner, under whom Wilson served at the War Office when the former became Secretary of State for War in April, thought highly of his ability, especially because his ‘power

of clear exposition was wonderful...’. However, on the debit side Milner conceded that Wilson’s judgement was not infallible ‘and he hasn’t always the courage to see things through where it meant unpleasantness to old fellow officers—plenty of courage

otherwise’.

But Wilson’s accession did not mark a completely new beginning

for relations between the Prime Minister and his senior military adviser. Like Robertson, Wilson believed there were some things the War Cabinet had better not know, and he maintained an extensive personal correspondence with his subordinates to ensure they did not.* In April 1918 the War Cabinet again complained about the paucity of information it received from GHQ.* In June Wilson quarrelled with Lloyd George over the appointment of senior com-

manders in France, because the CIGS believed that the government should choose a commander-in-chief and leave it to him to nominate his own subordinates and not force them on him.* Nor did his strategic preferences differ much from Robertson’s. Both men accorded primacy to the western front, but both recognized that it was necessary to maintain sufficient forces on other fronts to ensure the security of the empire.*° What was different were the circumstances in which they tried to apply their common preferences. Wilson was compelled to afford the defence of the eastern

empire a higher priority than Robertson, because, following the Russian collapse, Wilson could no longer rely upon the Russian 31 G. Riddell, Lord Riddell’s War Diary 1914-1918 (London, 1933), 312; C. Harington, Tim Harington Looks Back (London, 1940), 77. 2 Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 238; Bodleian Library, Milner MSS dep. 23/1: Thornton diary, 4 Mar. 1917. 33 LHCMA, Spears MSS 1/15: Wilson to Spiers, 6 Aug. 1918. 344 PRO CAB 23/5/WC384: War Cabinet, 6 Apr. 1918. > PRO CAB 23/44/A: Committee of Prime Ministers, 21 June 1918. 36 PRO CAB 27/8/WP61: Wilson, The present state of the war, the future prospects, and future action to be taken, 20 Oct. 1917.

Defeat of the Spring Offensive 221 army to prevent the German Drang nach dem Osten reaching India. In January 1918 he had opted for an offensive policy to knock out Turkey because he believed that in the long run it would

prove to be the most economical way of checking the Central Powers’ ambitions and preserving the security of the British empire. But by July Lloyd George was complaining that Wilson’s

continued commitment to the western front meant that he was ‘“Wully redivivus”’.*’

The new CIGS was also handicapped in that, unlike Robertson, he was widely distrusted by many of his senior colleagues, both because he was believed to be a Francophile and because he was prepared to dabble in politics.** Both complaints were exaggerated. Wilson’s reputation as a noted Francophile did not mean that his

appointment led to more harmonious co-operation with the French. By the summer of 1918 he fully shared Lloyd George’s suspicions that Clemenceau was exploiting his relationship with Foch to bend allied strategy to France’s advantage. In October 1918, Lord Derby discovered ‘with what profound contempt appar-

ently both Clemenceau and Foch regard him.’ While his repu-

tation as a political intriguer, which dated from the Curragh incident in March 1914, made Haig anxious to keep him at arm’s length throughout 1914-17, in practice the two men worked together in reasonable amity. Wilson’s accession was soon followed by other changes amongst senior officers. At the War Office, Maurice was replaced as DMO by Sir P. de B. Radcliffe, the chief of staff of the Canadian Corps.

In May Sir Robert Whigham was replaced as Deputy CIGS by Plumer’s chief of staff, Sir Charles Harington. At Haig’s suggestion, Rawlinson went to Versailles, where Wilson moved quickly to limit his authority. On 22 February Wilson wrote to him explaining

that all executive orders concerning the movement of divisions allotted to the General Reserve would come from the War Office and not from Rawlinson. That only underlined the fact that the crisis over the command of the General Reserve had been about 37 M. Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918 (London, 1961), ii. 830. The cause of their argument was Wilson’s memorandum PRO CAB 27/8/WP70: British military policy 1918-1919, 25 July 1918. 33 Hankey, The Supreme Command, ii. 776; LHCMA, Clive MSS IT/4: Clive diary, 13 Jan. 1918; Harington, 7im Harington Looks Back, 80. % LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (17) 28/1/1: Derby diary, 2 Oct. 1918.

222 Defeat of the Spring Offensive personalities and power, not constitutional niceties. Plumer was recalled from Italy to replace Rawlinson and Lord Cavan took command of the British forces in Italy.” The price Lloyd George paid for Robertson’s supersession was that Haig and Pétain, with the support of Clemenceau, were allowed to wreck the Executive War Board and to prevent the formation of the General Reserve.*! Wilson thought that a General Reserve composed of Italian, French, and British divisions withdrawn from Italy would not suffice but, as he knew, ‘I am not in a position to overcome the Tiger, Pétain and Haig’.” By the beginning of March, the attempt to form a General Reserve had collapsed. Haig and Pétain remained adamant that each national commander should remain responsible for the security of his own front.“ When the German offensive came, the allied response would therefore depend upon the effectiveness of the accord they had struck in December 1917. The Germans owed their initial success in March 1918 to a number of factors. The British failed to recognize the significance of the

storm-troops that they had first encountered at Cambrai, their defensive doctrine was faulty, some of their defences were poorly prepared and they failed to anticipate the fog which so assisted the storm-troops’ infiltration tactics at the start of the battle. But of even greater significance was the fact that Haig was the victim of a successful German deception campaign which was designed to mislead the allies as to the precise whereabouts of the main German thrust.“ Consequently, the British had their reserves in the wrong place. Although the initial German blow was directed against the 40 PRO CAB 23/5/WC349 and WC363: War Cabinet, 19 Feb. and 11 Mar. 1918. “| Blake (ed.), Haig, 283, 285, 289, 290; C. a Court Repington, The First World War 1914-1918 (London, 1993), ii. 222; LHCMA, Clive MSS II/4: Clive diary, 8 and 26 Feb. 1918; LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/36/95: Clive to Robertson, 12 Feb. 1918; CCC, Rawlinson MSS RWLN 1/9: Rawlinson diary, 22 and 25 Feb. 1918; de Groot, Haig, 368-9. ® Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, ii. 66. % PRO CAB 23/13/WC360A: War Cabinet, 6 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 25/120/

SWC105: 19th meeting of Permanent Military Representatives, Supreme War Council, 7 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 25/120/SWC107: Draft summary of decisions of 6th meeting of Executive War Board, 8 Mar. 1918; LHCMA, Spears MSS 1/18: Spiers to Wilson, 10 Mar. 1918.

“ D. French, ‘Failures of Intelligence: The Retreat to the Hindenburg Line and the March 1918 Offensive’, in M. L. Dockrill and D. French (eds.), War, Strategy and Intelligence: Essays on the First World War (London, 1995).

Defeat of the Spring Offensive 223 southern part of the BEF’s line held by Sir Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army, Haig allocated only two of the eight divisions he held in GHO reserve to support Gough. And yet Gough was in more need of reserves than any of Haig’s army commanders. Gough had only twelve infantry and three cavalry divisions to hold a front of fortytwo miles. In contrast the Third Army had fourteen divisions to hold a front of twenty-eight miles, the First Army had fourteen divisions to hold a front of thirty-three miles, and, significantly, the Second Army holding the Ypres salient and the road to the Channel ports had twelve divisions to hold a front of only twenty-three miles.*

The British awaited the German offensive with some complacency. On 7 January 1918 Haig gave the War Cabinet an optimistic report of the situation on his front. In reply to a query by Carson about whether the Germans could break through the British line, Haig replied that although nothing was certain in war, he had consulted his army commanders and ‘was satisfied that the condition and moral of the British Army was such as to give him every confidence that the British Army would hold its own, as it had always done in the past’.** Maurice characterized his prediction as ‘very rash’ and there is some doubt whether Haig himself believed that the morale of his army was quite so good as he told the ministers.*7 But on 2 March Haig told his army commanders that the defences along the fronts of the three armies he had recently inspected were so strong that his only fear was that the Germans would hesitate to attack.** His opinion about the strength of his defences was shared by Hankey and Smuts, who had visited the front in late January.® On 16 March Haig’s new chief intelligence officer, Brigadier General Cox, presented him with a confusing report about the timing of the German attack, suggesting that the Germans’ preparations were not yet complete but that they might, or might not, attack in the near future.°° When the offensive began 4° M. Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle, 21 March 1918: The First Day of the German Spring Offensive (London, 1978), 78. 46 PRO CAB 23/44B/WC316A: War Cabinet, 7 Jan. 1918. 47 Maurice (ed.), The Maurice Case, 63; PRO CAB 24/38/GT3211: Robertson to Hankey, 4 Jan. 1918; LHCMA, Kiggell MSS II/15: Haig to Kiggell, 4 Jan. 1918; Repington, The First World War, ii. 173. 4 Blake (ed.), Haig, 291. ” HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/23/2/11: Hankey to Lloyd George, 22 Jan. 1918. °° PRO WO 256/28: Haig diary, 17 Mar. 1918.

224 Defeat of the Spring Offensive on 21 March, the War Cabinet literally did not know what had hit them. The CIGS told ministers that, ‘there was the possibility that it might only develop into a big raid or demonstration’ and that the real German attack might come further north.*' The force of the German thrust against Gough’s army came as a most unpleasant

surprise to both GHQ and the War Office, both of whom more than half expected the initial offensive to be but a preliminary to a more dangerous German thrust towards the Channel ports. The critics of Ludendorff’s conduct of the March offensive have overlooked just how close he came to achieving one of his objectives, the splitting of the British and French armies, for the loose

arrangement for co-operation which Haig and Pétain had concocted quickly collapsed. Throughout the crisis of March and April Haig remained imperturbable.” His initial reaction to the news of the offensive, one shared by the Operations Branch at GHQ, was

to welcome it and to express satisfaction at the resistance maintained by his own troops.* It was not until the evening of 22 March,

by which time Gough had retreated some twenty kilometres, that Haig recognized the seriousness of the situation and tried to put into operation the plans for mutual support that he had prepared with Pétain.* After the war Haig claimed that when he met Pétain on 24 March it appeared as if allied co-operation had broken down. The French divisions around Montdidier, south of the vital railway junction at Amiens, seemed poised to retreat south-west to cover

Paris and thus cause a break between the BEF and the French army. As a result, Haig asked Wilson to come to France, and at the

Doullens conference on 26 March asked that Foch be made the allied generalissimo so that he could overrule Pétain and ensure that no break occurred.°> Contemporary evidence suggests a different sequence of events. On 20 March General Humbert, the commander of Pétain’s Sixth

Army, had assured Haig that if necessary he could hurry north1 PRO CAB 23/5/WC369: War Cabinet, 21 Mar. 1918; Maurice (ed.), The Maurice Case, ’76. >2 LHCMA, Liddell Hart MSS 11/1929/8a: Liddell Hart, Talk with J. E. Edmonds,

24 June 1929; LHCMA, Liddell Hart MSS 11/1929/16: Liddell Hart, Talk with J. F. C. Fuller, 1 Oct. 1929. 3 LHCMA, Liddell Hart MSS 1/259/102: Edmonds to Liddell Hart, 23 Nov. 1934; Blake (ed.), Haig, 295-6. * de Groot, Haig, 372-3; Blake (ed.), Haig, 296. > PRO CAB 45/183: Haig, Memorandum on events 21 Mar. to 15 Apr. 1918: Copy made on 26 Nov. 1920 from Earl Haig’s original MS by Edmonds.

Defeat of the Spring Offensive 225 wards to occupy the Péronne bridgehead. At 10.30 p.m. on the evening of 22 March, GHQ explained to Pétain that, as they expected a major German attack at Arras, and could not therefore denude their forces on that part of the front, they wanted Pétain to send a considerable force of French troops immediately to begin to take over their line as far north as Péronne.’’ The next day the two commanders-in-chief met at Dury. Pétain emphasized the import-

ance of the British and French armies Keeping in contact, and agreed to place eight divisions already earmarked to support Haig, plus a further four under General Fayolle, in the Somme Valley. But, perhaps misled by a German deception campaign which used fake wireless signals to create a phantom army on the French front, perhaps anxious to mount a French offensive to recover AlsaceLorraine, and certainly afraid of a German offensive in the Champagne, Pétain refused Haig’s request to place twenty divisions near Amiens. But on 24 March, when both commanders realized that the Germans had succeeded in dividing the British Third and Fifth Armies, each decided to place the protection of their own national objectives above the preservation of the Anglo-French alliance.

Pétain ordered the French divisions at Montdidier to fall back south-westwards towards Paris, while Haig, who remained determined not to uncover the Channel ports, had already told Sir Julian Byng, the commander of the Third Army, that if he was forced to retreat he should withdraw his right flank, thus endangering his communications with Gough and the French to the south.”

On 23 March Lloyd George asked Milner to go to France to consult with Clemenceau. As soon as the Prime Minister heard that the Haig—Pétain accord was collapsing and that the Anglo-French alliance itself was in danger, he agreed that Wilson should accom*° PRO WO 256/27: Haig diary, 20 Mar. 1918. 7 PRO WO 158/43: Telephone message from Gen. Davidson to Gen. Clive, 10.30 p.m., 22 Mar. 1918; LHCMA, Clive MSS II/4: Clive diary, 22 Mar. 1918; T. Travers,

How the War was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917-1918 (London, 1992), 50-3; PRO CAB 45/192: Dill to Edmonds, 5 Dec. 1932.

8 PRO WO 256/28: Haig diary, 23 Mar. 1918; PRO WO 256/28/OAD/786: Procés-verbal of conference held at Dury between Field Marshal, C.-in-C., and Gen. Pétain, 23 Mar. 1918; LHCMA, Clive MSS IT/4: Clive diary, 23 Mar. 1918; PRO WO 170/4268: Memorandum by General Staff, Intelligence, GHQ, 20 Jan. 1919, quoted in J. Ferris (ed.), The British Army and Signals Intelligence during the First World War (London, 1992), 81-2. »? Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 11.76; PRO WO 256/28: Haig diary, 24 Mar. 1918.

226 Defeat of the Spring Offensive pany Milner.® On 25 March, Clemenceau, Milner, Pétain, and Foch

met at Compiégne and Haig, Wilson, and Weygand met at Abbeville. Both parties discussed the same question: who should

control the reserves and co-ordinate the operations of the two commanders-in-chief to ensure that the two armies remained in contact and that the BEF was not defeated in detail? After considering Clemenceau’s suitability as a generalissimo, Foch, Wilson, and Milner agreed to support Foch’s claims to the job.*! When the generals and politicians assembled at Doullens on 26 March, they

gave Foch the power to co-ordinate the movements of all allied armies on the western front.” A subsequent agreement reached at Beauvais on 3 April refused Foch the right to issue orders to the national army commanders, but did give him authority over the ‘strategic direction’ of operations on the western front. National commanders were left with the right to exercise tactical control over their own troops, and could appeal to their government if they believed that a directive from Foch compromised the safety of their

armies. The Americans, who had not been part of the Doullens agreement, agreed to abide by the Beauvais agreement. At the fifth session of the Supreme War Council, which was held in May, Foch was granted powers to co-ordinate but not to command the oper-

ations of the Italian army. Foch’s appointment did not pave the way towards effective unity of command. That could have been achieved only had there been a

consensus amongst both the soldiers and civilians of all of the Entente partners about the objectives for which they were fighting and the means they needed to deploy to achieve them. There was no such consensus, and the most that Foch was able to do was to

improve the tactical co-ordination of operations on the western 6 Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 11.76; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/ 4: Hankey diary, 24 Mar. 1918. 6 LHCMA, Maurice MSS 4/5/10: Milner, Memorandum by Lord Milner on his visit to France including the conference at Doullens 26 Mar. 1918, 27 Mar. 1918; Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 210-11; CCC, Rawlinson MSS RWLN 1/9: Rawlinson diary, 25 Mar. 1918; Blake (ed.), Haig, 297-8; Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, i. 78. 6& LHCMA, Maurice MSS 4/5/10: Milner, Memorandum by Lord Milner on his visit to France including the conference at Doullens 26 Mar. 1918, 27 Mar. 1918; G. Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory (London, 1930), 35; Callwell, FieldMarshal Sir Henry Wilson, ii. 78. 6 PRO CAB 23/6/WC380: War Cabinet, 2 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 23/6/WC382/ IC55: Co-ordination of allied operations on the western front: Agreement reached at Beauvais, 3 Apr. 1918; Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, u. 86-7.

Defeat of the Spring Offensive 22/ front. Foch was slow to recognize that he had little real authority over his nominal subordinates, but eventually he realized that he would have to rely upon persuasion, not coercion, to co-ordinate the movements of the Entente’s armies.“ But his appointment did diminish the authority of the Supreme War Council, and sounded the death-knell of the Executive War Board. Henceforth the Council’s major role was to enable the European allies to present their policies to President Wilson, and it remained one of the few means by which the President could sometimes be persuaded to overrule the objections of General Pershing to some of them.® The Doullens agreement preserved the link between the British and French armies and therefore safeguarded the Anglo-French alliance. But its success was only apparent in retrospect. For three months after its signature, the British repeatedly contemplated its

disintegration. By 5 April the initial German assault had been blunted, but a few days later they mounted a second major offensive in Flanders which threatened the Channel ports. Once again

the War Cabinet had to consider whether they should place the solidarity of the alliance before Britain’s more parochial concerns for the safety of the Channel ports. Naval opinion was unanimous. Wemyss doubted whether retreating to the south really was a viable option. There was no guarantee that French ports further to the south had the capacity to supply the BEF, and if the Germans succeeded in basing destroyers at Dunkirk they would represent a serious threat to the BEF’s cross-Channel communications.© However, Churchill pointed out an even more obvious fact: if the British withdrew to the south in conformity with the French, the war could still continue. But if they tried to protect the Channel ports and lost contact with the French, the Germans could defeat the allied armies singly and the Germans would win. It was not until 2 May that the allies decided that if the worst happened and the Germans R. Recouly, Foch: My Conversations with the Marshal (New York, 1929), 1819.

® PRO FO 800/224/We/54: Wiseman to Drummond, 30 May 1918. 6 CCC, Wemyss MSS WMYSS 11: Beatty to Wemyss, 5 May 1918; PRO CAB 24/ 48/GT4300: Wilson to Hankey, 21 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 23/14/WC400A: War Cabinet, 26 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 23/14/WC401A: War Cabinet, 30 Apr. 1918; A. J.

Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, v. Victory and Aftermath (January 1918—June 1919) (Oxford, 1970), 157-8.

5 PRO FO 800/201: Churchill, A note on certain hypothetical contingencies, 18 Apr. 1918.

228 Defeat of the Spring Offensive broke Haig’s line, he was to retire in conformity with the French.

The solidarity of the Entente alliance had to come before the security of the Channel ports.® Both German offensives had failed for the same reasons: lack of supplies, lack of transport, lack of sufficient artillery support after

the initial attack, and exhausted troops. Twice the Germans had broken through the British defences, but twice they had failed to discover how to exploit their breakthrough. In early June a third German offensive on the Chemin des Dames threatened Paris. So serious did the situation appear to be that on 28 June Lloyd George

asked Milner to consider how Britain could continue the war if France and Italy collapsed. The War Cabinet, convinced that if Paris fell France would make peace, considered the ‘rate at which

troops could be transported from France in the eventuality of a sudden disaster’, and the Admiralty and War Office prepared plans to evacuate the BEF from either le Havre, Cherbourg, or Dunkirk.

It was not until 16 July, following the French defeat of the final

German offensive at Reims, that they abandoned their preparations.” Ludendorff had failed to divide the British and French armies.

The Germans also failed to achieve their second objective, to induce a mood of defeatism in Britain which would cause the government to emulate the Russians and make peace. Far from igniting a revolution in Britain, the initial success of the German

offensive produced a heightened sense of national unity and permitted the government to intensify the mobilization of British manpower.

The offensive did not heighten war weariness in the BEF. GHQ’s censors reported that morale in general was good, except in the Fourth Army—Gough’s former Fifth Army—and except during periods of inactivity when there were growing complaints of 6 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 2 May 1918; Blake (ed.), Haig, 307-8; CCC, Wemyss MSS WMYSS 11: Wemyss to Beatty, 4 May 1918; PRO CAB 23/14/WC401A: War Cabinet, 30 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 23/14/WC405A: War Cabinet, 6 May 1918. & PRO ADM 116/1603: Rear-Admuiral H. H. D. Tothill, Naval aspects of evacuating the BEF from France, 20 June 1918; PRO ADM 116/1603: Geddes to Lloyd George, 16 July 1918; PRO CAB 23/17/X7, X8, X18: X-Committee, 5 and 28 June 1918; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 5 June 1918; Callwell, FieldMarshal Sir Henry Wilson, 11. 103.

Defeat of the Spring Offensive 229 boredom, over-strict discipline, and lack of leave. But at no time during the German offensive did more than a small minority of troops doubt that Britain would be victorious, and the March retreat was not accompanied by the kind of rout which had followed the Central Powers’ breakthrough at Caporetto.”” The confidence of the majority of soldiers was bolstered by small events, like the Zeebrugge raid, as well as by much more portentous ones. The censors especially noted that ‘the arrival of the Americans have had a wonderful effect in inspiring enthusiasm’.” Although the BEF lost much territory, the Germans had failed both to cause it to disintegrate and to strike directly at Britain itself. As a result the

British were afforded the priceless advantage of being able to reinforce their forces on the continent, and domestic morale was not shaken by the appearance of German soldiers landing on the east coast. The opening of the offensive also consolidated the support of organized labour for the government. In February the Ministry of Labour detected a perceptible reduction in labour unrest. They believed it was due to five factors: the firm manner in which the government had gone ahead with its new Military Service Bill, the success of the National War Aims Committee, the Ministry of Food’s compulsory rationing schemes, wage increases, and news of

the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations.” The beginning of the German offensive enabled the government to capitalize on this trend. Before the offensive, both the ASE and the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain had threatened to strike in opposition to the clauses

in the new Military Service Act empowering the Ministry of National Service to revise the schedule of protected occupations.” But by 4 April both unions had shelved their objections, and the Labour party announced that it would cease campaigning for its ” J. G. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1990), 2. 71 PRO WO 256/33GHQ, CP(A): BEF, The British armies in France as gathered from censorship, July 1918. 2 PRO CAB 25/42/GT3677: Shackleton, The labour situation, 20 Feb. 1918; PRO CAB 24/45/GT3943: Churchill, Labour position in munitions industries, 13 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 24/46/GT4007: Churchill, Labour position in munitions industries, 20 Mar. 1918. 3 PRO CAB 23/5/WC364 and WC365: War Cabinet, 12 and 13 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 24/44/GT3814: Cave, Committee on civil disturbances, 5 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 24/44/GT3838: Munro, Revolutionary agitation in Glasgow and Clydeside, 7 Mar. 1918.

230 Defeat of the Spring Offensive war aims and social reconstruction programme so as not to embarrass the government at a moment of crisis.” The events of March to June demonstrated that the War Cabinet had been right to try to conserve British manpower. Only by pouring SO many men into the BEF that the domestic economy would

have been crippled could they have forestalled a major German success in the spring. And, had they done so, they would have played into Ludendorff’s hands, undermining Britain’s staying power and bringing about the very collapse of British morale which Ludendorff sought. As it was, by being seen to attempt to conserve manpower until the crisis broke, they were able to mobilize the last dregs of patriotic self-sacrifice. They could scrape the bottom of the manpower barrel without destabilizing the industrial economy by igniting a series of protest strikes.” The drastic steps which the War Cabinet took in late March and

April included the passage of another Military Service Act. The government raised the age of military service, withdrew men from munitions, mining, and the docks, lowered medical standards so that more men could be placed in category A, and dispatched boys of 185to France. These measures demonstrated that Britain did not

have a pool of available labour which could easily have been tapped before March.” On the contrary, the War Cabinet was now

so close to exhausting its supplies of manpower that they considered conscripting Irishmen and boys of 17.” The new act met less opposition from organized labour than the Ministry of Labour ™ PRO CAB 24/47/GT4147: Shackleton, The labour situation, 3 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 24/50/GT4463: Cave, Pacifism and revolutionary organizations in the UK, 6 May 1918.

® PRO CAB 23/5/WC371: War Cabinet, 23 Mar. 1918. 7% PRO CAB 23/5/WC371 and WC372: War Cabinet, 23 and 25 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 24/46/GT4021: Geddes, Maintenance of the armed forces, 24 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 24/46/GT4036: Geddes, Amendment of Military Service Acts, 26 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 23/5/WC377: War Cabinet, 29 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 24/46/GT4070: Amendment of the Military Service Acts, 29 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 24/46/GT4075: Committee on amendment of Military Service Acts, 30 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 24/47/ GT4125: Committee on amendment of Military Service Acts, 3 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 23/6/WC383: War Cabinet, 5 Apr. 1918. 7 PRO CAB 23/5/WC373: War Cabinet, 26 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 24/46/GT4049: Mahon, Application of Military Service Acts to Ireland, 26 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 24/46/GT4052: Duke, Manpower of Ireland, 27 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 2447/GT4133: Duke, Compulsory service in Ireland, 4 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 23/6/WC388: War Cabinet, 10 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 24/48/GT4218: Duke, Grave crisis in Ireland, 13 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 24/49/GT4302: Duke, Anti-conscription campaign in Ireland, 21 Apr. 1918.

Defeat of the Spring Offensive 231 had predicted. The left-wing press was more hostile to the bill than were many unions, but the Ministry believed that the unions would

not disrupt vital war industries.” They were right, for it was not until June that the patriotic commitment which had been aroused by the offensive faded. By then the older men who were now subject to the call-up for the first time were resentful, and tribunals

all over the country refused to release them as long as younger men remained in protected occupations.” Industrial unrest increased in July, and the Ministry of Labour believed it had detected indications that workers in munitions industries were refusing to

work overtime and increase output for fear that doing so would open the way for another comb-out campaign by the Ministry of National Service.®® The decline in the influence of national union leaders was demonstrated by a major strike in the aircraft industry at the end of June.*! Two by-elections, at Keighley in late April and

at Wansbeck in early June, told a similar story. During the first there was little support for a negotiated peace amongst the electorate, but by June such support was growing. However, by then the German offensive had almost run its course and the act had served its purpose.”

One man who was not a casualty of the German offensive was Haig, even though Lloyd George had twice considered dismissing him before it began. In January the Prime Minister sent Smuts and Hankey to France to inspect the BEF’s defences and ‘to find out who are the rising men’. Between 21 and 26 January, they visited GHQ, saw each of Haig’s army commanders, and met a good many corps and divisional commanders, but they could find no one who might replace Haig.** On the second occasion, following Haig and Pétain’s success in thwarting Lloyd George’s plans for a General 7 PRO CAB 24/48/GT4239: Shackleton, The labour situation, 17 Apr. 1918. 77 PRO CAB 24/55/GT4984: Roberts, The labour situation, 28 June 1918; PRO CAB 24/55/GT4974: Chamberlain, Calling-up of men for the army, 28 June 1918; PRO CAB 23/6/WC431: War Cabinet, 17 June 1918. 8° PRO CAB 24/57/GT5013: Roberts, The labour situation, 3 July 1918. 81 PRO CAB 24/57/GTS5055: Strike of woodworkers in the aircraft industry in

here July 1918; PRO CAB 24/57/GT5093: Roberts, The labour situation, 10 ar PRO CAB 24/50/GT4880: Shackleton, The labour situation, 8 May 1918. 88 PRO CAB 23/5/WC324: War Cabinet, 17 Jan. 1918; Hankey, The Supreme Command, i. 756. 8 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/23/2/11: Hankey to Lloyd George, 22 Jan. 1918.

232 Defeat of the Spring Offensive Reserve, the Prime Minister wanted to replace Haig with Plumer. This time Haig was saved by Wilson, who intimated that the eve of the German offensive was no time to change generals.® After the offensive began, Lloyd George’s willingness to spare

Haig was the result of the balance of political power within his coalition. With the benefit of hindsight, Lloyd George was indeed the indispensable man necessary to win the war. But in the spring of 1918 he was reluctant to play fast and loose with the party political susceptibilities of his nominal supporters in the Commons.® In April he was already embroiled in a series of political difficulties, one of which concerned the resignation of a senior military figure, Sir Hugh Trenchard, the first Chief of the Air Staff. Lloyd George could not afford to dissipate his limited stock of political goodwill

on too many fronts.’ Rather than act against Haig, he chose to move against Derby and Gough. Since January the Prime Minister had been considering sending Derby to Paris as ambassador and replacing him at the War Office by Milner.®® He had not acted

sooner for fear of the political repercussions which Derby’s dismissal, coming hard on the heels of Robertson’s departure from

the War Office, might have.” In April Bertie was retired, Derby went to the Paris embassy, and Milner replaced him at the War Office. Milner’s translation to the War Office meant that he nomi-

nally ceased to be a member of the War Cabinet. Lloyd George

gave his seat to Austen Chamberlain in a clever move to silence one of his critics.” But to ensure that Milner remained in the innermost circle of government, Lloyd George devised yet another War Cabinet subcommittee, the X-committee. Its members, Lloyd George, Milner, Wilson, and Hankey, with Amery present to keep the minutes, held their first meeting on 15 May. Henceforth they conducted much of the purely military and naval 8 L. Amery, My Political Life, ti. War and Peace 1914-1929 (London, 1953), 145; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 13 Mar. 1918. 86 McEwen (ed.), The Riddell Diaries, 220. 87 J. Turner, British Politics and the Great War: Coalition and Conflict 1915-1918 (London, 1992), 294-5. 88 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/4: Hankey diary, 3 Feb. 1918; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/14/5/2: Derby to Lloyd George, 18 Jan. 1918. 8° CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 16, 17, and 24 Feb. 1918; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/14/5/16: Derby to Lloyd George, 16 Apr. 1918. % CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 18 Apr. 1918; D. Dutton, Austen Chamberlain: Gentleman in Politics (Bolton, 1985), 139-42.

Defeat of the Spring Offensive 233 business which had hitherto fallen to the War Cabinet or its ad hoc subcommittees.”!

Gough became the army’s sacrifice to appease the government’s critics. He was a more vulnerable target than Haig. Confidence in Gough had been diminishing since the Flanders offensive, and on 5 March Derby had written to Haig suggesting it was time to transfer him from the command of the Fifth Army to the governorship of Gibraltar.” Haig did not take the hint until, just after the signing of the Doullens agreement, Wilson insisted that Gough would have to go and that he would be replaced by Rawlinson.” Haig then wrote privately to Derby offering his own resignation.” Derby read his letter to the War Cabinet on 8 April. Although no mention of it was made in the minutes, after the meeting Lloyd George held a con-

clave with Curzon, Bonar Law, and Hankey to consider taking Haig at his word. One obstacle to Haig’s dismissal, the political support he had once enjoyed in London, had all but disappeared following the disintegration of the Fifth Army. But another remained: according to Hankey, there was ‘no very obvious successor. Plumer, in whom the troops are said to have confidence, being as stupid as Haig himself.’ Wilson also advised a stay of execution because ‘failing some really outstanding personality, and we have none, I thought we ought to wait for Haig’s report’.* Haig’s position remained insecure until the late summer. In July,

when Milner told the Prime Minister that he remained unconvinced that a better officer could be found to replace Haig, Lloyd George treated him to a petulant harangue, an indication perhaps of his frustration.’ One possible successor whom Lloyd George had in mind was the Earl of Cavan, the commander of the British . PRO CAB 23/6/WC411: War Cabinet, 14 May 1918; PRO CAB 23/17/X1: Xcommittee, 15 May 1918; Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 220; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 16 May 1918. % PRO WO 256/28: Derby to Gough, 5 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 27/14/MPC: Minutes of 2nd meeting of manpower committee, 11 Dec. 1917; LRO Derby MSS 920 DER (17) 27/2: Derby to Haig, 12 Dec. 1917. 73 CCC, Rawlinson MSS RWLN 1/9: Rawlinson diary, 26 Mar. 1918; Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, ii. 78. % LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (17) 27/2: Derby to Haig, 4 Apr. 1918; LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (17) 27/2: Haig to Derby, 6 Apr. 1918. ® CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 8 Apr. 1918. © Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, i. 88. °7 PRO CAB 23/17/X21: X-committee, 16 July 1918; Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, 1. 227.

234 Defeat of the Spring Offensive force in Italy.”* In July Cavan was summoned to London, ostensibly to report on the strategic situation on the Italian front, but in reality

to enable Lloyd George ‘to “vet” him with a view to his replacing Haig’. Again, Haig was saved by Hankey, who privately poured

scorn on Cavan because he had little idea of how to deal the Austrians a fatal blow. This bought Haig some more time, but what

finally saved him was that three weeks later he began to redeem himself at Amiens.! By then Lloyd George had also redeemed himself. On 9 April, in reply to accusations that the BEF had been defeated because the government had deprived Haig of the troops he needed and sent reinforcements elsewhere, Lloyd George had told the Commons that the BEF had been stronger in January 1918 than it had been a

year earlier. A fortnight later, Bonar Law denied that the War Cabinet had been responsible for forcing Haig to lengthen the BEF’s line in France. However, on 30 April Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice drew Wilson’s attention to what he regarded as the politicians’ misstatements, and when by 7 May he had received no satisfaction, he published a letter in the press contradicting their

claims.'*' His charges were taken up by the Opposition, but the resulting debate, held on 9 May, was a triumph for the coalition. It

won the division by 293 votes to 106. Even before the vote was held, the Opposition’s chances of bringing down the government were small. On 8 May Carson tried and failed to persuade the Unionist Business Committee to take an independent line and support neither Lloyd George nor Asquith. But the committee opted for Lloyd George. It was impossible to hold a general election on a register which was five years out of date and, come what may, it was all-important to keep Asquith out of Downing Street.'” And Asquith destroyed his credibility as an alternative Prime Min8 PRO CAB 23/43/ITWC19: Imperial War Cabinet, 20 June 1918. ” Hankey, Supreme Command, ii. 828. 100 Ibid. 11. 829; PRO CAB 23/44A/IWC26A: Committee of Prime Ministers, 23

a 1. Gooch, ‘The Maurice Debate 1918’, Journal of Contemporary History, 3/4 (1968), 217-20; de Groot, Haig, 379-80; Maurice (ed.), The Maurice Case, 97-8. 102 Turner, British Politics and the Great War, 297-301; LHCMA, Maurice MSS 4/ 4/2/20: Sassoon to Maurice, 21 May 1918; LHCMA, Maurice MSS 4/5/44: Burn to Maurice, 31 May 1918; Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 21920; R. Rhodes James (ed.), Memoirs of a Conservative: J. C. C. Davidson’s Memoirs and Papers, 1910-1937 (London, 1969), 73-4.

Defeat of the Spring Offensive 235 ister when he insisted that his motion was not a vote of censure and that he did not wish to succeed Lloyd George.

Paradoxically, a battle which had been intended to undermine support for a government committed to the vigorous prosecution of the war served only to consolidate that support. However, it also left the War Cabinet more convinced than ever that they would not be able to win the war until 1919, for, as Milner impressed on the Prime Minister, ‘It must be a year at least before the Americans can make their weight felt. We & the French can at the best hold the

Germans. We are not strong enough to do more...’.!° 03 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/38/3/22: Milner to Lloyd George, 27 Mar. 1918.

10

The Campaign of 1919 By December 1917 the War Cabinet had agreed that they could not

defeat the Germans in 1918 and that it would be wiser not to attempt to do so until 1919. Between March and August 1918 the

offensives which the Germans launched in the west confirmed the wisdom of their conclusion and persuaded some ministers that the war might not even be won until 1920. The imminent possibility of defeat in the west encouraged them to take steps to hasten the arrival of the AEF in France and to persuade the Americans and Japanese to intervene in Russia to recreate the eastern front. The receding possibility of an early Entente victory also induced them to lay greater emphasis on non-military means to weaken the Central Powers. And their fear that Britain might be about to pass the peak of its power within the alliance encouraged them to prepare a plan of campaign for 1919 which would minimize Britain’s manpower losses and maximize its territorial and political gains from the war.

In January 1918 there were only 58,000 American infantry and machine-gunners in France.'! The Americans were not deliberately withholding their troops from the front line. They were intent on deploying a large army in France, but they were determined that it must be an American army capable of operating independently of

British or French control. Neither the President nor his senior advisers, who included House, Pershing, and General Bliss, the American military representative at the Supreme War Council, were prepared to discard America’s political influence over the European allies by surrendering control of the US army to their partners.” Consequently, many of the first waves of American

troops who landed in France were non-combatants who had been 1 PRO CAB 23/5/WC319: War Cabinet, 9 Jan. 1918.

2 D. R. Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 1917-1919 (Lincoln, Nebr., 1966), 118-20.

The Campaign of 1919 237 sent to France to prepare the logistical infrastructure Pershing’s army required. Following the collapse of Russia’s final offensive in July 1917, the War Cabinet concluded that the one glimmer of hope was the entry of the USA into the war. By the end of the year they were therefore

disconcerted at the slow arrival of the AEF. Their anxieties were shared by the French, and both governments tried to persuade the Americans to hasten the moment when the US army could make

an effective military contribution in France by incorporating American infantry into their own depleted divisions.* By January

1918 the BEF’s infantry battalions were 114,000 men below strength, and Haig, anxious “to make good our deficit with American recruits’, suggested to the War Cabinet that ‘a certain number of British divisions should gradually be Americanized’.* Pétain also requested that American battalions be amalgamated with French

divisions for training before being reformed into independent American divisions. Amalgamation would also have reduced the strain on British tonnage of transporting American troops to Europe. [t required five times as much merchant shipping to transport a complete division, with all its artillery and transport, as it did to ship a division’s infantry battalions. In March the Allied Maritime Transport Council warned that, unless the Americans contributed more tonnage to the Entente’s needs, the shipping shortage confronting the European allies would become critical. The British suspected that the Americans intended to rely on British tonnage

to transport their troops to Europe so that they could preserve their own tonnage and emerge after the war as a major competitor for the world’s carrying trade. President Wilson had given Pershing wide powers to determine the employment of his troops. Between January and March 1918 he resisted any attempt to bring about the permanent amalgamation of his forces with the British or French armies. Pershing knew that, > PRO CAB 23/4/WC249 and WC292: War Cabinet, 15 Oct. and 5 Dec. 1917. 4 C. a Court Repington, The First World War 1914-1918 (London, 1920), ii. 175; PRO CAB 23/13/WC316A: War Cabinet, 7 Jan. 1918. > PRO CAB 24/44/GT3826: Maclay, America and shipping, 6 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 24/45/GT3906: Ministry of Shipping, Allied Maritime Transport Council, Effect of the American military programme on the supplies of the allies, 13 Mar. 1918; E. B. Parsons, ‘Why the British Reduced the Flow of American Troops to Europe in August—October 1918’, Canadian Journal of History, 12/2 (1977-8), 177; PRO CAB 23/5/WC355: War Cabinet, 27 Feb. 1918.

238 The Campaign of 1919 ‘when the war ends, our position will be stronger if our army acting as such shall have played a distinct and definite part’. The most he was prepared to allow was the temporary attachment of some of his combat units to British or French divisions for training.’

Pershing maintained this position throughout the German offensive, even when he came under growing pressure to assist America’s hard-pressed partners. On 29 March Lloyd George asked the Americans to send to France 120,000 infantry and machine-gunners per month between April and July, to be brigaded with French and British divisions for training. It was a measure of the real urgency of the situation that the War Cabinet was willing to

reduce food imports to find the tonnage to transport them.’ AIthough the proposal was endorsed by the Permanent Military Representatives, by Bliss, by the American Secretary for War, Newton

D. Baker, and eventually by the President, lengthy discussions ensued before Pershing would agree to even a temporary amalgamation.’ By the end of May the infantry and machine-gunners of ten American divisions were training with the British. Although they played only a small part in repelling the German offensive, they did enable the British to concentrate their own more experi6 Quoted in Beaver, Newton D. Baker, 124. ’ FE. Coffman, ‘The American Military and Strategic Policy in World War One’, in B. Hunt and A. Preston (eds.), War Aims and Strategic Policy in the Great War 1914-1918 (London, 1977), 75; D. F. Trask, The United States in the Supreme War Council: American War Aims and Inter-Allied Strategy, 1917-1918 (Middletown, Conn., 1961), 70-3; D. Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies (Bloomington, Ind., 1986), 75-8; PRO CAB 23/4/WC304: War Cabinet, 21 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 24/39/ GT3327: Robertson, American battalions for British divisions, 12 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 24/39/GT3349: Robertson to Hankey and enc., 15 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 23/5/

WC323: War Cabinet, 16 Jan. 1918; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS _ F/44/3/46: Robertson to Lloyd George, 22 Jan. 1918. § PRO FO 800/224/We7: Reading to Lloyd George, 28 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 23/ 5/WC377: War Cabinet, 29 Mar. 1918; PRO FO 800/209/507: Reading to Lloyd George, 29 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 24/46/GT4083: Lloyd George to Reading, 29 Mar. 1918.

? PRO FO 800/224/We8: Reading to Lloyd George, 30 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 24/ 46/GT4097: Minutes of a conference held at 10 Downing St., 1 Apr. 1918; PRO FO 800/224/We10: Lloyd George to Reading, 2 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 23/6/WC386 and WC387: War Cabinet, 8 and 9 Apr. 1918; PRO FO 800/224/We17: Reading to Lloyd George, 10 Apr. 1918; PRO FO 800/224/We17 and Weg19: Reading to Prime Minister, 18 and 19 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 24/49/GT4388: Milner, Dispatch of American

troops, 29 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 23/6/WC398: War Cabinet, 24 Apr. 1918; G. Riddell, Lord Riddell’s War Diary 1914-1918 (London, 1933), 322-3; Beaver, Newton D. Baker, 134-5; PRO CAB 23/14/WC397A: War Cabinet, 1 Apr. 1918; Smythe, Pershing, 103—4, 108-11.

The Campaign of 1919 239 enced troops where they were most needed. This was far from ideal, for, as Balfour remarked, it ‘left us dependent upon General Pershing’s good will’.!° But Pershing was becoming impatient at delays in the formation

of an independent American army. At the beginning of May he insisted that the Supreme War Council must decide when an independent American army would come into being, and in June he demanded that over a quarter of a million rear-echelon troops should be shipped in the next two months."! Had these troops not been shipped, Pershing would not have been able to activate an independent American army in August in time for the final allied offensives, and Wilson’s influence on the armistice and peace terms might have been correspondingly diluted.

Reconstructing the eastern front proved to be equally difficult. Following the Bolshevik coup, neither the men on the spot nor policy-makers in London had a clear idea of what was happening in Russia.” In an ideal world the wisest thing to do would have been

to wait until the situation had clarified before deciding who, if anyone, to support. But the Entente powers did not have the luxury of pursuing a policy of masterly inactivity. Longer-term consider-

ations had to take second place to winning the war against Germany. The War Cabinet had no love for the Bolsheviks. They had signed an armistice and called upon the Muslim population of India to revolt in the hope that a pan-Islamic rising ‘may incline them [the British] towards an immediate peace’, stating their appeal was ‘to every revolutionary force, economic, social, racial or religious, which can be used to upset the existing political organizations, of 10 PRO CAB 23/6/WC397: War Cabinet, 23 Apr. 1918; PRO FO 800/224/We¢33: Balfour to Reading, 3 May 1918; Riddell, War Diary, 325. 1 PRO CAB 25/121/SWC186: Procés-verbal of the 1st meeting of the 5th session of the Supreme War Council, 1 May 1918; PRO CAB 25/121/SWC190: Procésverbal of the 3rd meeting of the 5th session of the Supreme War Council, 2 May 1918; PRO CAB 23/17/X3 and X5: X-committee, 17 and 29 May 1918; PRO CAB 24/52/GT4699: Wilson, Memorandum for the War Cabinet, 29 May 1918; PRO CAB 24/52/GT4700: Wilson, Memorandum II, 29 May 1918; PRO CAB 25/121/SWC237: An agreement concluded between Gen. Foch, Gen. Pershing, and Lord Milner with reference to the transportation of American troops in the months of June and July [n.d., but c.3 June]; D. F. Trask, The American Expeditionary Force and Coalition Warfare: Pershing, Foch, Ludendorff, and the Campaign of 1918 (Lawrence, Kan., 1993), passim. 122 PRO FO 800/209: Cecil to Balfour, 8 Jan. 1918; PRO FO 800/329/Rus/18/5: Lindlay to Drummond, 19 Jan. 1918.

240 The Campaign of 1919 mankind’. Ministers therefore refused to recognize them as the legitimate government of Russia. But they were also anxious to avoid driving them into the arms of the Germans and wished to ensure that the Germans had to retain large numbers of troops in Russia. The upshot, as Robertson wrote on 10 December, was, ‘What we are really trying to do is to keep up a state of chaos of some sort and not to drive the Bolshevists [sic] into the arms of the

Germans’. British intervention in Russia began as part of an attempt to recreate an eastern front against the Central Powers, not as a crusade against Bolshevism. At the end of 1917 the British began to offer assistance to those groups in Russia whom they believed to be intent on continuing to fight the Central Powers.’> On 23 December the French and British divided Russia into spheres of interest. France was to be responsible for the Ukraine and Britain for Armenia, Georgia, the Caucasus, and Siberia. Their objectives were to save Rumania, to prevent the Central Powers’ acquiring Ukrainian wheat and raw materials,

and to protect Armenia and Georgia. If they failed, the Central Powers would be able to attack Britain’s Asiatic empire, for there would be no ‘barrier against the development of a Turanian movement that will extend from Constantinople to China, and will provide Germany with a weapon of even greater danger to the peace of the world than the control of the Baghdad railway’.'® The British and French could dispatch money and small military missions to the former Tsarist empire, but only the USA and Japan

had significant numbers of troops to send.'’ However, neither PRO CAB 24/35/GT2959: Dep. of Information, Intelligence Bureau, Short memorandum on manifesto of the Bolshevik government at Petrograd ‘To all the labouring class Moslems of Russia and the Orient’, 12 Dec. 1917; PRO FO 800/214: Balfour, Note on the present Russian situation, 9 Dec. 1917. 144 LHCMA, Robertson MSS I/34/41: Robertson to Plumer, 10 Dec. 1917. IS PRO CAB 23/4/WC289: War Cabinet, 3 Dec. 1917; PRO FO 800/214: Balfour, Note on the present Russian situation, 9 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 24/36/GT3014: Cecil, Memorandum [n.d., but c.13 Dec. 1917]; PRO CAB 23/4/WC295: War Cabinet, 10 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC279: War Cabinet, 21 Nov. 1917; R. K. Debo, Revolution and Survival: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1917-1918 (Liverpool, 1979), 37-8; M. Kettle, The Allies and the Russian Collapse March 1917 to March 1918 (London, 1981), 148-75. ‘6 PRO CAB 23/4/WC306: Milner, Suggested policy in Russia, 23 Dec. 1917; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/38/2/27: Milner to Lloyd George, 23 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 23/5/WC309: War Cabinet, 1 Jan. 1918; D. R. Watson, Georges Clemenceau: A Political Biography (London, 1974), 319-20. 17 PRO CAB 23/4/WC299: War Cabinet, 17 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 24/36/GT3068: Macdonogh, Organization of military forces in south Russia on the Persian frontier, 21 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC290: War Cabinet, 10 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 24/

The Campaign of 1919 241 President Wilson nor the Japanese welcomed British and French requests to dispatch troops to Vladivostok in order to protect the huge quantities of stores there, take control of the trans-Siberian railway, and open a line of communications to southern Russia.!® The Japanese probably shared Balfour’s doubts about the practicality of the whole enterprise. ‘How can the Japanese or anyone else’, Balfour asked, ‘protect 3,000 miles of railway in a foreign and perhaps hostile country?’? They also knew that their army was not

prepared to fight a European enemy. They refused to act without American support, and for several months President Wilson re-

fused to give it.° He had learnt from his own intervention in Mexico between 1914 and 1916 the difficulties which could arise if

the USA interfered in someone else’s revolution. He did not see Bolshevism as a serious threat until the peace conference in 1919, and his inclination in 1917-18 was to allow the Russians a free hand

to shape their own destiny.”! He was also afraid that military intervention, especially if it was spearheaded by the Japanese, would

make a dangerous situation even more dangerous, for it might create a strong body of anti-allied and pro-German sentiment in Russia.”

By the beginning of March, negotiations between London, Washington, and Tokyo were blocked by Wilson’s reluctance to give a clear lead.”* On 19 March, asked by the British ambassador 29/GT2310: Balfour, Japanese co-operation in the war, 11 Oct. 1917; PRO CAB 23/ 4/WC250: War Cabinet, 16 Oct. 1917; D. R. Woodward, “The British Government and Japanese Intervention in Russia during World War One’, Journal of Modern History, 46/4 (1974), 665. 18 PRO CAB 23/4/WC294: War Cabinet, 7 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 24/40/GT3422: Milner to Balfour, 19 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 23/13/WC330A: War Cabinet, 24 Jan. 1918; Woodward, “The British Government and Japanese Intervention in Russia’, 667-8.

9 PRO FO 800/203/292: Balfour to Milner, 19 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 24/40/ GT3421: Balfour to War Cabinet, 19 Jan. 1918.

2 PRO CAB 23/4/WC262: War Cabinet, 1 Nov. 1917; V. H. Rothwell, ‘The British Government and Japanese Military Assistance’, History, 56/186 (1971), 44; I. Nish, Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1908-1923 (London, 1972), 233-4, 239-40, 254-5. 41 BR, P. Trani, ‘Woodrow Wilson and the Decision to Intervene in Russia: A

Reconsideration’, Journal of Modern History, 48 (1976), 441-6; Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers 1914-1920 (Washington, DC, 1940), 55. 22 PRO CAB 24/42/GT3624: Balfour to Wiseman, 30 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 24/42/ GT3624: Wiseman to Drummond, 4 Feb. 1918. 23 PRO CAB 23/5/WC363: War Cabinet, 11 Mar. 1918; Trask, The United States in the Supreme War Council, 109-10; PRO FO 800/205/247: Wiseman to Balfour, 6 Mar. 1918.

242 The Campaign of 1919 Lord Reading whether he had any alternative to allied intervention in Russia, Wilson ‘replied that the decision must be on the Western Front’.“* Three days later the Germans showed that they agreed.

Ludendorff’s initial success forced the British and French to redouble their efforts to foster Japanese intervention in a desperate effort to prevent the Germans from transferring still more divisions from Russia to France.” But it was not until July, after an unceas-

ing diplomatic barrage, that the President relented.” Two events forced him to change his mind. The outbreak of fighting between the Czech Legion and the Bolsheviks at the end of May dashed any hopes that the embryonic military co-operation which had evolved between the British and the Soviets at Murmansk and Archangel in north Russia might develop into something bigger.?’ And, at the

moment when the outcome of the German offensive in the west hung in the balance, the War Cabinet succeeded in impressing on Wilson that by June 1919 British and French manpower reserves would be exhausted. Even the arrival of the AEF would not redress the manpower balance in the Entente’s favour unless a large part of the German army remained fighting in Russia.”

Wilson had refused so many allied requests for help on the western front in recent months that he was afraid that Britain and France ‘were beginning to feel that he was not a good associate, much less a good ally’.*? On 6 July, in an attempt to placate his 24 PRO CAB 24/51/GT4501: Foreign Office, President Wilson’s views on allied intervention in Russia, 10 May 1918. 25 PRO CAB 23/5/WC369: War Cabinet, 21 Mar. 1918; C. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries (London, 1927), ti. 73; M. J. Carley, “The Origins of French Intervention in the Russian Civil War, January—May 1918: A

Reappraisal’, Journal of Modern History, 48 (1976), 420; T. Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott 1911-1918 (London, 1970), 337-9; J. Barnes and D. Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 1896-1929 (London, 1980), 209-10. 26 C. J. Lowe and M. L. Dockrill, The Mirage of Power: British Foreign Policy 1902-22 (London, 1972), iii. 673-4; PRO CAB 25/121/SWC151/1: Joint note no. 20 by the Permanent Military Representatives to the Supreme War Council, 8 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 25/121/SWC163: 25th meeting of the Permanent Military Representatives to the Supreme War Council, 8 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 23/6/WC391: War Cabinet, 15 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 24/48/GT4236: Balfour to War Cabinet, [n.d., but c.15 Apr. 1918]; PRO CAB 23/6/WC395: War Cabinet, 19 Apr. 1918; PRO FO 800/ 222/Gr/2: Balfour to Reading, 19 Apr. 1918; PRO FO 800/223/Rus/19: Balfour to Reading, 23 Apr. 1918. 27 EF, Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War (London, 1987), 47-9. 78 PRO FO 800/223/Rus/31: Balfour to Reading, 20 June 1918. 29 Quoted in G. F. Kennan, The Decision to Intervene: Soviet-American Relations 1917-1920 (Princeton, NJ, 1958), 378.

The Campaign of 1919 243 European partners and restrict allied intervention to eastern Siberia, he agreed that 7,000 US troops and an equal number of Japanese soldiers should land at Vladivostok to protect the stores in the city and help the Czechs assembled there to embark for France.” Some policy-makers entertained the unrealistic hope that, by intervening, the allies “would once more get a solid Russia antiGerman.”*! But tokenism of the kind the Americans and Japanese were practising in Siberia was unlikely to inspire the peoples of the

former Tsarist empire to continue the war against the Central Powers. In Transcaucasia, the Don region, the Ukraine, Finland, and Siberia the constituent parts of the old empire were dissolving into independent political entities. Their soldiers were demoralized, and like the great mass of the Russian people they wanted peace. Looking at the situation in southern Russia, LieutenantGeneral Sir William Marshall, the commander of the British forces in Mesopotamia, could only lament that: ‘All the swine up there are fighting and murdering one another and there isn’t an hour of fight

in the Russians who are now just like frightened children and simply want to run home for fear of the unknown.” In practice, however, the Entente did not need Russia to be united against Germany. ‘Civil war, or even the mere continuation of chaos and disorder, would be an advantage to us...’, Milner informed the Prime Minister.» It was not the presence of allied forces in Russia

which prevented the Central Powers from exploiting the weaknesses of the Bolshevik government, it was the chaos into which the

Tsarist empire had fallen. However, anxious as they were to do everything to stave off defeat on the western front between March and July, that was something which most British policy-makers did not recognize until after the last German offensive in the west had been stopped.» But although the Germans might not be able to exploit Russia’s human and economic resources with the efficiency that the British 3° PRO FO 800/223/Rus/46: Reading to Balfour, 9 July 1918. 31 PRO CAB 24/39/GT3334: Knox to Robertson, 16 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 24/36/ GT3076: Knox to DMI, 19 Dec. 1917. 3% PRO CAB 24/35/GT2915: Brig. Gen. Shore to DMI, 4 Dec. 1917. 33 LHCMA, Maurice MSS 3/5/71: Marshall to Maurice, 2 Mar. 1918. 34 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/38/2/27: Milner to Lloyd George, 23 Dec. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 23 Dec. 1917. 3° PRO CAB 23/44A/IWC27A: Committee of Prime Ministers, 31 July 1918.

244 The Campaign of 1919 had feared, their continued presence on Russian territory still constituted a serious threat to British interests. Russia might become the German high road to British India. It was only in the last two months of the war, when the German—Turkish threat was fading,

that what had started as an attempt to recreate an eastern front against the Central Powers began to assume some of the colouring of an anti-Bolshevik crusade. The British had been waging economic warfare against the Central Powers since the outbreak of the war, but until 1917 planning for the post-war economy had largely been directed towards assisting the reconstruction of the British and allied economies and retarding that of the Germans.* But, by the spring and summer of 1917,

the British government’s fears that they would not be able to impose a decisive military defeat on the Central Powers in the foreseeable future persuaded them to take heed of French suggestions that they should look for other means to make the Germans more pliable. In April 1917 the Reconstruction Committee had suggested that the Entente could use its control of a large part of the world’s stocks of foodstuffs and raw materials to

make the Central Powers more amenable to the Entente’s war aims.*’ In July Cecil asked the War Cabinet to encourage President Wilson to join the British in threatening the Germans with a trade war after the war if they did not end hostilities.5> And a month later

Etienne Clémentel, the French Minister of Commerce, suggested

that, if the allies cornered the world market in sixteen key commodities, the mere threat of withholding access to these com-

modities from the Germans after the war would force them to come to terms.” The War Cabinet were cautious. Clémentel’s proposal might give Britain a lever with which to influence Germany, but only at 36 P. Cline, ‘Winding Down the War Economy: British Plans for Peacetime Recovery, 1916-1919’, in K. Burk (ed.), War and the State: The Transformation of British Government, 1914-1919 (London, 1982), 163-7. 37 PRO CAB 24/10/GT411: Post-war commercial policy: Memorandum from the reconstruction committee, 11 Apr. 1917; Cline, ‘Winding Down the War Economy’,

on PRO CAB 24/20/GT1447: Cecil to War Cabinet, 19 July 1917; PRO CAB 23/3/ WC191: War Cabinet, 20 July 1917. 39 D. Stevenson, French War Aims against Germany, 1914-1919 (Oxford, 1982), 84; M. Trachtenberg, Reparations in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916-23 (New York, 1980), 6-7.

The Campaign of 1919 245 the cost of surrendering one which it might be able to use to influence France. Clémentel’s scheme entailed the establishment of

a number of inter-allied purchasing bodies which would reduce Britain’s control over French purchasing because France would secure control of a percentage of the raw materials in question for itself. But Clémentel did have one strong supporter. Carson assumed that at the peace conference Germany would be in occupation of large tracts of allied territory and the threat of a post-war trade boycott might be all the allies had to bargain with to regain their possessions. British intelligence believed that German commercial opinion was afraid of such a threat, and it might persuade German businessmen to put pressure on their government to end the war.*! It was a measure of how poor Britain’s military prospects appeared to be in September 1917 that Carson was supported by Liberal ministers, even though his policy would compel Britain to depart from free trade orthodoxy. Montagu, still a self-confessed free trader, was ‘prepared to sacrifice sound economic doctrine for considerations of defence to maintain the key supplies in time of

danger to control national assets’.* Addison, now the Minister of Reconstruction, had already established an investigation to collect information about Britain’s post-war raw material requirements.” The only minister who had reservations was a Unionist, Cecil. He pointed out that the Russians, Belgians, Italians, and Americans had, by their adverse reactions to the Paris economic resolutions of August 1916, shown their opposition to attempts by their partners to control their post-war trade policy.“ But his objections were brushed aside, and on 9 October the War Cabinet told Carson to establish the Economic Offensive Committee to plan the offensive.* The Board of Trade had already proposed a programme involv-

ing legislation restricting the control of certain strategic imports and exports and the ownership of non-ferrous metals in the imme“ PRO CAB 23/3/WC220: War Cabinet, 20 Aug. 1917; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 20 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 24/27/GT2101: Control of raw materials: Translation of a note given by M. Clémentel to Sir Albert Stanley, 23 Aug. 1917. 44 PRO CAB 24/4/G156: Carson, Memorandum on the economic offensive, 20 Sept. 1917; Cline, “Winding Down the War Economy’, 169. PRO CAB 24/28/GT2239: Montagu, A rough preliminary note, 8 Oct. 1917. * PRO CAB 24/27/GT2170: Addison, The economic offensive, 28 Sept. 1917. “ PRO CAB 24/4/G159: Cecil, Proposed economic offensive, 28 Sept. 1917. *® PRO CAB 23/4/WC247: War Cabinet, 9 Oct. 1917.

246 The Campaign of 1919 diate post-war period. In November the War Cabinet agreed to proceed with it, but they met opposition from three sources.*° Some

exporters objected to government controls on exports after the war.*’ The Labour party and many Liberals objected that the ‘trade

war’ was no more than a stalking-horse for protectionism, and Woodrow Wilson announced his objection to exclusive trading blocs in the third of the fourteen points which he had announced on 8 January 1918. These objections did not put an end to Britain’s

economic offensive propaganda, but they may have reduced its effectiveness in German eyes.* The opponents of the economic offensive scored their major success when they held up the passage

of the Imports and Exports Bill, intended to be the legislative cornerstone of the offensive.*? But in February 1918 the Non-ferrous Metals Bill was passed. It excluded Germans from this trade, and it was followed by the Trading with the Enemy (Amendment) Act which prevented enemy subjects from gaining control of British banks.°° The War Cabinet also negotiated with the Australian government to purchase their entire export stock of wheat to pre-

vent it falling into German hands at the end of the war, and in August they agreed to follow the French example and remove the most-favoured-nation status from Germany.*! According to Smuts, each measure was ‘a sword to hang over Germany, and a safeguard in the event of incomplete victory’.

In the summer of 1917 there were encouraging indications that the German people were not united behind their government. Bethmann-Hollweg’s dismissal, the Reichstag peace resolutions, and the establishment of extremist political parties like the Father46 PRO CAB 24/4/G158: Stanley, Notes on Sir Edward Carson’s memorandum entitled ‘Economic Offensive’, with some immediate practical suggestions for action by the President of the Board of Trade, 4 Oct. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC265 and WC283: War Cabinet, 5 and 27 Nov. 1917.

47 PRO CAB 24/34/GT2811: Rhondda and Mond, The Imports and Exports (Temporary Control) Bill, 28 Nov. 1917. 48 Cline, ‘Winding Down the War Economy’, 170. ® PRO CAB 23/4/WC312: War Cabinet, 3 Jan. 1918. °° PRO CAB 24/14/GT813: Non-ferrous Metals Bill [n.d., but c.25 Mar. 1917]; Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 226. >t PRO CAB 24/46/GT4015 and GT4015A: Committee on trade relations of the UK within the Empire: 1st and 2nd reports [n.d., but c.23 Mar. 1918]; PRO CAB 23/ 6/WC387: War Cabinet, 9 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 23/6/WC448: War Cabinet, 18 July 1918; PRO CAB 23/5/WC355: War Cabinet, 27 Feb. 1918. °2 PRO CAB 23/7/WC458: War Cabinet, 14 Aug. 1918.

The Campaign of 1919 247 land party, the Independent Socialists, and the revolutionary Spartacists suggested that major divisions were appearing in the German body politic which, if they could be widened, might bring about its downfall.’ It was Sir George Macdonogh, the DMI, who argued the case for fostering revolution in Germany most forcefully. On 13 October, encouraged by news of a mutiny amongst

some units of the German navy, he argued that Germany was confronting a political crisis. Soon the German government would either have to mount a coup d’état and dissolve the Reichstag or it would have to abandon the pan-Germans and establish a majority

government.’ This was part of a plea to continue the Flanders offensive in 1918, something the War Cabinet soon rejected. But by December Carson, Hankey, and Addison were adding their voices

to that of the General Staff. They wanted the War Cabinet to follow the example the Germans had set in Russia, and to launch a propaganda offensive on the enemy’s home front designed to cause defections amongst enemy troops and subject nationalities.» A section of the War Office’s Directorate of Special Intelligence,

MI7(b), was responsible for psychological warfare operations against the German army at the front, but the dissemination of propaganda in enemy countries had been conducted by Wellington House and the Department of Information. However, in February

1918, following a report critical of their efforts, Lloyd George asked Lord Northcliffe to take charge of the psychological offensive against the Central Powers.°° Northcliffe organized the Enemy Propaganda Department at Crewe House in London, and it concentrated its efforts against Germany, Austria—~Hungary, and Bul-

garia. The Ministry of Information,. under Lord Beaverbrook, although mainly responsible for propaganda in allied and neutral 3M. E. Occleshaw, ‘The “Stab in the Back”: Myth or Reality?’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 130/3 (1985), 50-2; PRO FO 800/ 197: Headlam-Morley to Drummond, 16 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 24/24/GT1813: J. W. Headlam-Morley, Special memorandum on the German minority socialists, 22 Aug.

& PRO CAB 23/4/WC248: War Cabinet, 12 Oct. 1917; PRO CAB 24/28/GT2291: Macdonogh, Effect of military operations on the political situation, 13 Oct. 1917. °> PRO CAB 24/35/GT2941: Carson, A psychological offensive, 11 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 24/36/GT3031: Addison, Propaganda in allied and enemy countries, 17 Dec. 1917; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/1/4/4: Addison to Lloyd George, 13 Dec. 1917; PRO CAB 23/5/WC309: War Cabinet, 2 Jan. 1918. °6 M. Sanders and P. M. Taylor, British Propaganda during the First World War (London, 1982), 72-4, 89, 213.

248 The Campaign of 1919 countries, was also given authority to propagandize in Turkey. In May 1918 Beaverbrook asked Northcliffe to take charge of propa-

ganda in Italy, the starting-point for the propaganda offensive against Austria-Hungary. Crewe House’s major innovation was the campaign against Austria—Hungary. This was largely the work of Henry Wickham Steed and R. W. Seton-Watson. As long ago as March 1916, Steed had produced a peace plan calling for the establishment of a Yugoslav state, a self-governing Poland, and an autonomous Bohemia. Together they would form a far more powerful obstacle to a German-

dominated middle-European empire stretching from Berlin to Baghdad than Austria-Hungary was ever likely to constitute. In October 1916 he had helped to found a journal, The New Europe, to promote these ideas.°’ But it was not until Lloyd George and Wilson had made their war aims declarations in January 1918 that the Entente’s policy gave real scope for a propaganda offensive designed to promote the cause of the subject nationalities of the

Dual Monarchy. At Crewe House, Steed seized the chance to weaken Germany’s capacity to continue fighting by causing the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy through the promotion of internal disaffection.*®

He had a fertile field in which to operate. The growing domination of Germany over the Austro-Hungarian empire was creating a reaction amongst the subject nationalities. It was becoming clear to them that if the Germans won the war, the power of the Germans and Magyars within the Dual Monarchy would be increased, perhaps spelling the end of the toleration many of them had enjoyed

before 1914 in the Austrian half of the empire.” The imperial government also made the twin mistakes of failing to control the flow of information throughout the empire and of failing to mount an empire-wide propaganda campaign to retain the loyalty of its subjects.© In June and July 1917, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes 7 W. R. Callcott, “The Last War Aim: British Opinion and the Decision for Czechoslovak Independence, 1914-1918’, Historical Journal, 27/4 (1984), 982-3; H. Seton-Watson and C. Seton-Watson, The Making of a New Europe: R. W. SetonWatson and the Last Years of Austria~Hungary (London, 1981), 110-11, 175-6, 179. *8 Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, 223-4.

7 N. Stone, ‘The Austro-German Alliance, 1914-1918’, in K. Neilson and R. Prete (eds.), Coalition Warfare: An Uneasy Accord (Waterloo, Ont., 1983), 24-5.

6 M. Cornwall, ‘News, Rumour and the Control of Information in Austria— Hungary, 1914-1918’, History, 77/249 (1992), 50-64.

The Campaign of 1919 249 subscribed to the Unitary Declaration and the Declaration of Corfu, expressions of their shared desire to resist foreign domination. The declarations caused considerable unrest amongst the Slav

regiments of the Habsburg armies. In January 1918 a series of major strikes not only revealed that there was serious economic distress in Austria-Hungary, but also that there was considerable discontent with the way in which Germany’s annexationist demands at Brest-Litovsk threatened to prolong the war.*! The failure of the Smuts—Mensdorff meetings encouraged Steed

to force the War Cabinet’s hand by announcing that the British government supported the liberation of the subject nationalities from Habsburg rule. Northcliffe supported Steed, telling Balfour that Britain’s aim should be to establish a non-German confederation of Central European and Danubian states. To that end statements ‘that the Alhes do not wish to “dismember Austria” should be avoided. The war cannot be won without so radical a transformation of Austria-Hungary as to remove its peoples from German control.’ He wanted to ‘break the power of Austria-Hungary, as the weakest link in the chain of enemy states, by supporting and

encouraging all anti-German and pro-ally peoples and tendencies’. Northcliffe’s suggestions threatened to overturn previous British policy towards the post-war status of Austria—~Hungary.

Hitherto the Foreign Office had been willing to see parts of the empire given to Italy and Rumania. But they had always envisaged

that at the end of the war some form of united but federal state would be maintained as a counterweight to both Germany and Russia. Balfour had no sympathy with Steed’s anti-Habsburg prejudices and informed Northcliffe that, although Steed might propagandize in favour of national self-determination, he must not assert that the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian empire was encouraged by the British.® But, following the failure of efforts to achieve a separate peace and confronted by an imminent offensive in France, the War Cabinet’s first priority was now to weaken the Central Powers by any means. On 5 March they gave their cautious assent to Northcliffe’s 61 PRO CAB 24/41/GT3576: Dep. of Information, Intelligence Bureau, Weekly report on Germany, 8 Feb. 1918. 6 Quoted in Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, 92. 6 PRO CAB 24/43/GT3762: Northcliffe to Balfour, 24 Feb. 1918, and Balfour to Northcliffe, 26 Feb. 1918.

250 The Campaign of 1919 scheme, insisting only that he must not make any promises to the

subject nationalities which the British might not be able to redeem.™ Hitherto, Italy had been an obstacle to such a policy, but the Bolshevik revolution and Caporetto had transformed Italy’s international position. The former made it unnecessary to create an Adriatic barrier against the Tsarist regime, and the latter made

it unlikely that Italy would be able to conquer the territory it coveted. Consequently, Orlando permitted a rapprochement between the Italians and the Slavs.° On 7 March Steed encouraged Dr Trumbic, president of the South Slav Committee, and Andrea

Torre, leader of a powerful group of Italian liberals, to sign a pact in London promising reciprocal support for Italian and Yugoslav unity. And on 8 April at the Congress of Oppressed Nation-

alities held in Rome, Steed participated in the creation of an Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission to co-ordinate an allied political offensive against Austria-Hungary. The allies agreed that the Czechs, Poles, and Yugoslavs should issue proclamations of independence which would be recognized by the allied govern-

ments. As one of the British representatives told Balfour, ‘it 1s hoped that general results of Rome resolutions and propaganda arising out of it will be to encouragement of subject races and eventually effect troops [sic].’° Neither the British nor the Italian foreign ministries welcomed these departures.® It was only in May 1918 that the British Foreign Office accepted that a separate peace with the existing regime in Vienna was impossible. In April, following the revelation of Emperor Karl’s attempts to secure a negotiated peace in 1917, Czernin

resigned and was replaced by Count Burian, a man Balfour believed to be a strong supporter of the German alliance.” On 12 May, Karl visited the German emperor to rebuild his fences with his major ally. Karl agreed not to contact any foreign powers with6 PRO CAB 23/5/WC359: War Cabinet, 5 Mar. 1918; K. J. Calder, Britain and the Origins of the New Europe, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 1976), 179; V. H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1971), 167. 6 J. Whittam, ‘War Aims and Strategy: The Italian Government and High Command’, in B. Hunt and A. Preston (eds.), War Aims and Strategic Policy in the Great War 1914-1918 (London, 1977), 96. 6% PRO CAB 24/45/GT3976: Balfour, Yugoslav political and economic unity, 13 Mar. 1918; Calder, Britain and the Origins of the New Europe, 179-80. 6? PRO FO 800/222/Aus/7: Murray to Balfour, 16 Apr. 1918. 8 Calder, Britain and the Origins of the New Europe, 181-2. ° PRO FO 800/222/Aus/11: Balfour to Reading, 26 Apr. 1918.

The Campaign of 1919 251 out German permission, to negotiate a new political and military alliance, and to move towards a customs union with Germany.” To

the British it appeared as if Austria-Hungary was about to be absorbed by Germany and so, on 21 May, Balfour informed the British ambassador in Washington that henceforth Britain would no longer attempt to maintain the Dual Monarchy but would give every support to the subject nationalities.” The War Cabinet soon underlined their new determination. On 3 June the Supreme War Council issued the Versailles Declaration. They agreed that the establishment of an independent Poland with access to the sea would constitute one of the elements of a just peace, but they expressed only sympathy towards Czech and Yugo-

slav aspirations.” Northcliffe protested that this was too little to form the basis for an effective propaganda campaign amongst the Yugoslavs and Czechoslovaks.” Despite Balfour’s resentment at

his intrusion into the realms of foreign policy-making, the War | Cabinet supported Northcliffe.” In June and July, in the wake of

Austria’s last offensive in Italy, it seemed even more vital to weaken the Austrian army by taking more determined action to win over the subject races. On 3 July the Permanent Military Representatives recommended recruiting troops from amongst Yugoslav prisoners to replenish the depleted regiments of the Serbian army at Salonika. They hoped that ‘such a demonstration by its former subjects would have a considerable effect in the AustroHungarian Empire, which is at present shaken by a serious internal

political crisis with separatist tendencies’. On 25 July Balfour therefore told a meeting of Yugoslavs in London that he supported ® PRO FO 371/3136/87568: Townley to FO, 16 May 1918; G. Brook-Shepherd, The Last Hapsburg (London, 1968), 156-8; G. W. Shanafelt, The Secret Enemy: Austria-Hungary and the German Alliance, 1914-1918 (New York, 1985), 195-6. 7 PRO FO 800/222/Aus/15: Balfour to Reading, 21 May 1918; PRO FO 800/222/ Aus/11: Balfour to Reading, 26 Apr. 1918; PRO FO 371/3136/87568: Townley to FO, 16 May 1918; PRO FO 800/385/Aus/18/4: Reading to Drummond and minutes, 17

May 1918; PRO CAB 24/53/GT4727: PID, FO, Memorandum on certain points in the basis for the prospective Austro-German alliance, 30 May 1918. 2 PRO CAB 25/122/SWC307: Procés-verbal 3rd meeting of the 6th session of the Supreme War Council, 3 June 1918; Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (Oxford, 1987), 218; Calder, Britain and the Origins of the New Europe, 193-4. 3 PRO FO 800/212: Northcliffe to Balfour, 6 June 1918. ™ PRO FO 800/329/Yu/18/1: Balfour to Northcliffe, 8 June 1918. ® PRO CAB 25/122/SWC272: Permanent Military Representatives, Supreme War Council, Joint note no. 32, 3 July 1918.

252 The Campaign of 1919 the independence and unity of all Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in a single state. But the Foreign Office still remained chary of offering such outright support to the Czech National Council, and it was not until 9 August that they recognized the council as a provisional government.’ In May the War Cabinet had abandoned their search for a sepa-

rate peace with Austria-Hungary. Henceforth they sought to destabilize the political and military cohesion of the Central Powers, and to undermine a German-dominated middle-European empire, by throwing their support behind the subject nationalities of the Dual Monarchy. But they did so reluctantly, conscious that

they might be placing short-term military expediency before Britain’s post-war strategic interest in creating a stable balance of power in eastern Europe. As Sir Eric Geddes remarked in September, ‘For post-war purposes I suggest that we want a strong united Austria and not a disintegrated collection of German vassal states; our obligations to Allies make it difficult for us to pursue this aim, but I think that in a main feature [sic] we and Austria have common interests opposed to Germany.’”’

The Foreign Office had less difficulty in accepting Crewe House’s propaganda offensive against Germany. The German sec-

tion of Crewe House was led by H. G. Wells, and on 27 May he suggested that British policy towards Germany should not just be aimed at Germany’s defeat. It should also be designed to establish a practical League of Nations which would preclude future wars. The German people should be told that nothing stood between them and peace except their government, the ruling dynasty, and the military caste. Consequently, if they wanted peace they must overthrow their government.” Balfour approved of Wells’s sugges-

tions. They were consonant with the public pronouncements of Asquith and Lloyd George that Britain was fighting the war to destroy Prussian militarism, not the German nation. Wells’s programme formed the basis of the orchestrated propaganda cam7% PRO FO 371/3136/142334: Conference held under Lord Cecil’s chairmanship to consider draft convention presented to HMG by Czech National Council, 16 Aug. 1918.

eet FO 800/200/154: Geddes to Drummond and Balfour, 17 Sept. 1918; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/5: Hankey diary, 24 Sept. 1918. 78 C. Stuart, Secrets of Crewe House: The Story of a Famous Campaign (London, 1920), 50, 61-89; Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, 235-6; G. S. Messinger, British Propaganda and the State in the First World War (Manchester, 1992), 194—5.

The Campaign of 1919 253 paign which the British mounted against the German army for the remainder of the war. British propagandists emphasized the superiority of the Entente in manpower, munitions, and foodstuffs, and tried to drive a wedge between ordinary Germans and their

government by pointing to the evils of Prussian militarism and German imperialism. They blamed the German government for refusing genuine peace efforts by neutrals and tried to increase separatist tendencies by targeting propaganda at particular regional groups such as Bavarians and Saxons.”

Between June and November 1918 the British disseminated approximately 18,500,000 leaflets over the German lines. Their propaganda did not cause the German defeat in the autumn of 1918, but it did hasten it. Victorious troops were likely to be resistant to defeatist propaganda just because they were successful. But

when the German spring offensive had been contained British propagandists were provided with fertile ground for their work. By

May the British knew that the German public were starting to doubt Hindenburg’s promises that the March offensive would lead to the fall of Paris.*° However, as the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office explained in July 1918: “The Army itself will never revolt until it has been thoroughly beaten.’*!

Thus, although economic warfare and propaganda might weaken the Central Powers’ will to resist, the War Cabinet knew that the Germans would not be brought to the peace table without further fighting. In the spring and summer of 1918 they had to determine how to defeat Germany in 1919 or even in 1920, for they saw no

prospect of doing it in 1918. On 27 May the CIGS told the Xcommittee that, in the wake of the German breakthrough on the Chemin des Dames, ‘we are in for two months of great anxiety; these will be followed by two months of diminishing anxiety; after this, if we survive, we shall have a long interval before we are in a position to strike the tremendous blow which alone can overcome the enemy’.® In devising their plan of campaign for the remainder ” Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, 219. 89 PRO FO 371/3435/81045: Paget to FO, 7 May 1918; Sanders and Taylor, British

Propaganda, 237, seven million were distributed between July and Sept. HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/4/5/36: Beaverbrook to Lloyd George, 10 Sept. 1918. 81 PRO CAB 24/59/GT5205: PID, Memorandum on the reasons for Kiihlmann’s resignation, 22 July 1918. 8 M. Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918 (London, 1961), ii. 808.

254 The Campaign of 1919 of the war, British policy-makers tried to strike a balance between two conflicting priorities. They were anxious to ensure that Britain had the loudest possible voice in the final peace settlement. That necessitated the BEF making a major contribution to the defeat of the German army in the west. But they also sought to ensure that Britain gained the greatest possible degree of security for its empire in Asia. That necessitated diverting forces from the western front to the Middle East. Lloyd George explained these competing priorities to the first meeting of the second session of the Imperial War Cabinet in June.

If the western allies collapsed before the Americans arrived in sufficient strength, the British empire and the Americans would have to fight alone against a German-dominated land mass stretch-

ing from Holland to the Persian Gulf and Siberia. Mesopotamia and Palestine were vital to the defence of Britain’s eastern empire and to the maintenance of British sea power. If the Germans occupied either region they could render the power of the Royal Navy

to safeguard the empire nugatory, for they could attack British India and British Africa overland. But, as he candidly admitted, although operations in the Middle East would ensure that Germany did not destroy the British empire and might place Britain in

a better position to garner the spoils of victory, the only way to defeat the Germans was to conquer their army in the west in 1919.

That would be the task of the growing American army and a powerful British army, to which the empire would have to make a major contribution. Britain and its Dominions would have to mobilize still more of their manpower resources.®

The Dominion leaders accepted, according to the Australian Premier W. M. Hughes, that ‘It was essential that, at the Peace Conference and afterwards, we should not be exhausted and in a position that our policy should be dictated to us by the United States or anyone else.’ But they were critical of the military high command’s conduct of the war on the western front, fearing that if 83 PRO CAB 23/43/IWC15: Imperial War Cabinet, 11 June 1918; G. L. Cook, ‘Sir Robert Borden, Lloyd George and British Military Policy, 1917-1918’, Historical Journal, 14/2 (1971), 384; PRO CAB 23/43/IWC18: Imperial War Cabinet, 18 June 1918; PRO CAB 23/17/X4: X-committee, 27 May 1918. 34 PRO CAB 23/43/[WC22: Imperial War Cabinet, 28 June 1918; PRO CAB 23/ 43/IWC19: Imperial War Cabinet, 20 June 1918; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 20 June 1918; Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, 1, 224.

The Campaign of 1919 255 the BEF continued the policy it had pursued since 1916 it ‘would leave the Empire crippled, whether the war were won or lost’.» On 20 June Lloyd George therefore agreed to establish a Committee of Prime Ministers to prepare a strategic plan that would ensure that past mistakes were not repeated. The operations section of the General Staff in London had already formulated a plan for 1919. They recommended that seventy allied divisions, including twenty drawn from the BEF, supported by the largest possible number of tanks, should mount a major offensive in France to end the war. Lloyd George did not welcome their suggestions. He was afraid that if the allies concentrated their resources in France the Germans would assume the defensive and detach troops to Russia or other fronts. He wanted to return to the

strategy the War Cabinet and the Supreme War Council had agreed upon before the March offensive and insisted that the General Staff prepare alternative plans for operations to knock out

either Austria or Turkey. Henry Wilson was willing to go some way towards meeting the Prime Minister’s wishes. He recognized the German threat to Egypt and India, and admitted that ‘it is

difficult to see how we can force such terms on the Central

Powers as would loosen their hold in the East or close the road to

Egypt and India’.®’ To prevent the Germans outflanking the British position in Mesopotamia and Persia and so threatening India through Afghanistan, Wilson wanted Marshall to establish himself in northern Persia by opening a line of communication from Baghdad via Hamadan, and Kazvin to the Caspian Sea and Baku. But the only permanent defence against the German Drang

nach dem Osten was, as it had been before 1914, a strong and independent Russia.® But he would go no further, emphasizing that the war would be won or lost in France. If the allies were to win the war in 1919, their first priority should be to mount a series of limited operations to push the Germans back from a number of vital strategic points: the 8 PRO CAB 23/43/IWC16, IWC19, and IWC22: Imperial War Cabinet, 13, 20, and 28 June 1918; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 20 June 1918; Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 224. 86 PRO CAB 23/17/X19: X-committee, 1 July 1918. 87 PRO CAB 27/8/WP70: Wilson, British military policy, 1918-19, 25 July 1918; L. S. Jaffe, The Decision to Disarm Germany: British Policy Towards Postwar German Disarmament, 1914-1919 (London, 1985), 58-9. 88 PRO CAB 27/8/WP70: Wilson, British military policy, 1918-19, 25 July 1918.

256 The Campaign of 1919 Channel ports, the Bruay coal mines, the Amiens rail centre, and

Paris. This had to be done before the winter and no divisions should be dispatched to other theatres until they had been made safe. The final effort to knock out the Germans in the west should

be postponed until July 1919. By then the allies would have a total of 181 divisions in France, including sixty-five American, forty-four British, and sixty-five French, compared to 170 German divisions. This was not an overwhelming superiority, but it would

suffice, especially if the allied armies had a preponderance of tanks, aircraft, and artillery, and if their intervention in Siberia had been successful in forcing the Germans to dispatch troops to

Russia.

The Prime Minister condemned Wilson’s plan for its ‘purely “Western front attitude”’.” But in fact there was little which divided them. Like Wilson, Lloyd George was also committed to delivering a knock-out blow against the German army as the only road to a stable peace, for If we did not achieve a military decision, military opinion in Germany would always be saying: ‘We held them up all through the War: if only we had provided a proper stock of copper or cotton, or some other material, we should have won.’ Consequently, he believed that a military victory was even more important than the securing of the terms of peace we desired. In the event of military victory we could afford to be more generous in our peace conditions.”!

But, like Milner, Lloyd George wanted Britain’s partners to pay the largest share of the bill to do this. Both Milner and the Prime Minister wanted to revert to Kitchener’s strategy and to leave the allies, in this case the French and Americans, to provide the major-

ity of the troops needed to defeat the German army in France in 1919. The BEF could be reduced to thirty divisions, thus leaving ten or fifteen divisions ‘with which we could operate in other parts of the world’.” The result would be that the Americans and French might claim the prestige of having defeated the German army, but

the British would have garnered the largest share of the spoils outside Europe.” 8? PRO CAB 27/8/WP70. % Hankey, The Supreme Command, i. 830. 21 PRO CAB 23/44A/IWC27A: Committee of Prime Ministers, 31 July 1918.

92 .

33 oon Hankey MSS HNKY 1/5: Hankey diary, 1 Aug. 1918; PRO CAB 23/44A/ IWC27A: Committee of Prime Ministers, 1 Aug. 1918.

The Campaign of 1919 257 This plan might solve the problem of how to inflict such a defeat

on the German army without leaving ‘the Army of the British Empire, so beaten and shattered, that, in fact, at the end of the War the American army would be the only one left’.“* But Lloyd George

could not convince his colleagues to accept it.” It was left to Hughes to point to its major weakness. By withdrawing a large part

of the BEF from France, the British would not just forfeit their share of the prestige of defeating the Germans. They would also forfeit a say in the post-war European settlement: ‘the Powers that had the largest forces on the Western front at the end of the War

would probably exercise the greatest influence on the terms of peace. From this point of view it was very undesirable to leave France and the United States to finish the War on the Western front.’ On 16 August the committee compromised between the Wilson and Lloyd George plans. There were to be no more operations like the Flanders offensive of 1917 in 1918. In 1918-19 they would prepare the BEF to co-operate with the French and Ameri-

cans for a decisive offensive against the Germans in the west, although its exact timing would depend upon the situation in Russia. And, in the meantime, they would combine military and diplomatic pressure to knock Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria out of the war.” The War Cabinet had already taken steps to ensure that the BEF

was equipped with the largest possible number of tanks, guns, aircraft, and machine-guns in 1919 as compensation for its dwind-

ling manpower. As soon as the immediate crisis on the western front had passed, they abandoned the manpower policy of March and April. So many pivotal skilled men had been enlisted in the spring that by July aero-engine and tank production were only about half of what they had intended.” In order to provide enough men to fill a couple of infantry companies, the army was being deprived of hundreds of tanks. On 19 July the War Cabinet therefore re-established the priorities of January. Henceforth no more men were to be withdrawn from industry by quota release procedures from vital war industries.” 4 PRO CAB 23/44A/IWC27A: Committee of Prime Ministers, 31 July 1918.

> Tbid. 6 bid.

77 PRO CAB 23/44A/IWC32B: Committee of Prime Ministers, 16 Aug. 1918; Hankey, The Supreme Command, ii. 831. 8 PRO CAB 23/6/WC450: War Cabinet, 19 July 1918. ” PRO CAB 23/7/WC450: War Cabinet, 19 July 1918; PRO CAB 24/58/GT5114: Churchill, Munitions and the limits of enlistment, 12 July 1918.

258 The Campaign of 1919 But the War Cabinet’s decision to give priority to the production of high-technology weapons did not prove to be the panacea they had hoped for, as Churchill remarked ruefully: ‘[By] a sort of irony the very production of aeroplanes, guns and weapons of precision,

makes for reduced numbers in those engaged on their manufacture, since their multiplication enlarges the need of the army itself for skilled men. The demand for skilled labour on important muni-

tions work is not much less than twice what it was eight or nine

months ago.’ In December 1917, such was the scope of the German victory in Russia, that the War Cabinet had agreed that Britain and its partners would not be able to defeat Germany until 1919. In the ensu-

ing months they did what they could to hasten the arrival of effective American military assistance in France, they attempted to

recreate an eastern front, and they tried by propaganda and economic warfare to disrupt the cohesion of the Central Powers. The magnitude of the German advance in France between March and July 1918 did not induce ministers to make peace. But it did persuade them that victory would be further postponed. Their mood was captured by Lloyd George, who told his colleagues on 15

August that ‘he was confident that we should achieve such progress, both actually and from the point of view of the progressive deterioration of internal conditions among the enemy, that we could hope in 1920 to inflict upon Germany a defeat which she herself would recognize to be a defeat’.!? It also encouraged them to place short-term strategic expediency before Britain’s longer-term interests in re-establishing a balance of power in central Europe by promoting the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy. But what the apparently imminent German victory in France did not persuade policy-makers to do was to retire

into imperial isolation. If the western front collapsed, Britain’s remaining allies in western Europe would make a separate peace and the Germans would be free to devote all of their resources to occupying the remainder of Russia and expelling the British from the Middle East.'” The plan they devised to win the war was in part 100 PRO CAB 24/58/GT5110: Churchill, Labour position in munitions, 10 July vot PRO CAB 23/7/WC459: War Cabinet, 15 Aug. 1918. 1022 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/2/1/25: Amery to Lloyd George and enc., 19

The Campaign of 1919 259 a reversion to the Kitchener strategy of 1914-15. In 1919 they would afford their allies in the west just enough military assistance

to enable them to defeat the German army, whilst ensuring that they retained sufficient troops under their own control to amass the largest possible share of the rmperial spoils. Thus, they would safe-

guard Britain’s post-war security against both their current enemies and their current friends. June 1918; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/38/3/35: Milner to Lloyd George, 9 June 1918.

11

‘Victory is Essential to Sound Peace’: The Armistice Negotiations, September—November 1918 In 1914 British policy-makers had entered the war determined to strengthen their post-war security against both their enemies and their allies. They remained committed to those goals throughout

the war. At the end of 1917 the War Cabinet had decided to

postpone Britain’s supreme effort against Germany until 1919 to ensure that, when the fighting stopped, Britain would still retain sufficient military and economic strength to be the dominant power at the peace conference. It would then be able to impose its terms on all the other belligerents. The sudden collapse of the Central Powers in the autumn of 1918 therefore caught British policymakers off balance. It happened a year before they had expected it.

On 13 August Hankey had noted that, despite recent Entente successes in France, Lloyd George ‘does not take a very sanguine view of our military prospects’.! But the private deliberations of British policy-makers between late September and November 1918 demonstrated the underlying consistency of their policy. They were not so surprised by the unexpected turn of events that they forgot

that their fundamental goal was to secure the benefits due to Britain and its empire following the collapse of the Central Powers by maximizing their post-war security against both their friends and their enemies. The alliance of the Central Powers began to unravel on 15 Septem-

ber when the allied commander at Salonika, General d’Esperey, mounted an offensive designed to draw German forces away from the western front and to produce ‘a revolution in Bulgaria...’.’ The quotation in the chapter title is taken from The Times, 13 Sept. 1918. ! CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/5: Hankey diary, 13 Aug. 1918. 2 PRO CAB 25/26: Bellin to Sackville-West, 30 June 1918; PRO FO 800/385/Gre/ 18/2: Drummond to Balfour and Lloyd George, 3 July 1918.

Armistice Negotiations 261 Within less than ten days, bereft of manpower, supplies, and German assistance, the Bulgarians had sought an armistice.’ Bulgaria’s sudden collapse surprised the British. Lloyd George, once the leading British exponent of the Salonika campaign, had only reluctantly agreed to participate in the offensive, and the local British commander, Sir George Milne, had been pessimistic about the allies’ chances of success.’ The British had long suspected that the French were intent on exploiting the allied army at Salonika to create their own post-war

empire in the Balkans and their suspicions had not abated even after Clemenceau dismissed Sarrail.° Milne surmised that: ‘the French are playing their cards in this theatre solely for their own purposes, and that the British army, like the Italian, Serbian and Greek, is merely one of the cards, and that while the British nation

is paying half the bill and providing practically the whole of the supplies for all the armies here, it is being used solely as one of the pawns whereby all the “kudos” of success will fall on the French.” The high-handed way in which Clemenceau had forced the British into agreeing to the offensive seemed to confirm their suspicions, and Clemenceau’s handling of the Bulgarian armistice negotiations lived down to Milne’s expectations. In August Cecil had suggested to the French that ‘the Great Powers ought to make up their minds what was really in the interests of their Greek and Serbian Allies 3G. Nicol, Uncle George: Field-Marshal Lord Milne of Salonika and Rubislaw (London, 1976), 176-8; PRO CAB 23/43/IWC23: Imperial War Cabinet, 9 July 1918; S. Noykov, “The Bulgarian Army in World War One, 1915-1918’, in B. K. Kiraly, N. F. Dreisziger, and A. A. Nofi (eds.), East Central European Society in World War One (New York, 1985), 412-13. + Nicol, Uncle George, 167, 171; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/47/7/35: Milne to Wilson, 27 July 1918; M. Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918 (London, 1961), 11. 821, 837; LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (17) 28/1/1: Derby diary, 3 July 1918; C. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries (London, 1927), i. 113-14, 124; PRO CAB 23/43/ITWC23: Imperial War Cabinet, 9 July 1918; J. Barnes and D. Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 1896-1929 (London, 1980), 225; LHCMA, Spears MSS 1/13/3: Spiers to Macdonogh, 12 July 1918; PRO CAB 25/122/SWC298: Permanent Military Representatives, Report on the situation in the Balkans, 3 Aug. 1918; PRO CAB 25/122/SWC299: 42nd meeting of Permanent Military Representatives, 3 Aug. 1918; LHCMA, Spears MSS 1/11: Spiers to CIGS, 27 Aug. 1918; PRO CAB 24/62/GT5549: Derby to Balfour, Interview between Lord Derby and M. Clemenceau, 27 Aug. 1918; PRO CAB 23/1/WC466A: War Cabinet, 30 Aug. 1918.

> PRO CAB 24/35/GT2904: Clemenceau, Command in Macedonia, 8 Dec. 1917.

° HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/47/7/35: Milne to Wilson, 27 July 1918.

262 Armistice Negotiations and ultimately impose that settlement on them’.’ Lloyd George contemplated going to Paris to meet Bulgarian emissaries himself, but he never had the opportunity.’ Clemenceau had no enthusiasm

for horse-trading in the Balkans with either the British or the Americans. He ordered d’Esperey to exclude the British from the armistice negotiations, and told him to impose terms on the Bulgarians before either President Wilson or Lloyd George could inter-

vene. Hostilities on the Bulgarian front ceased at noon on 30 September and Lloyd George knew nothing of the terms of the armistice until after they had been signed.? Clemenceau’s high-handed action in excluding his partners from the Bulgarian armistice negotiations persuaded the British that, if they were to enhance their own security in the Middle East, they would have to act in a similar manner. On 19 September Allenby launched the final British offensive in Palestine.!° The forces facing him were formidable on paper but thin on the ground.'! Even so, Allenby was surprised at the speed and extent of his victory. By 24 September the EEF had taken 300 guns and 40,000 prisoners; it already occupied Haifa and Acre, and there was little the remaining Turkish troops could do to prevent Allenby occupying Damascus, Aleppo, and the rest of Syria.” Anglo-French relations in the Middle East were in theory governed by the terms of the Sykes—Picot agreement of 1916. But, if the French were to be predominant in the Balkans after the war,

the British decided that they would enjoy predominance in the former Ottoman empire. On 3 October Lloyd George told the War Cabinet that ‘Britain had won the war in the Middle East and there was no reason why France should profit from it’. As long ago as March 1918, Sir Mark Sykes had warned Picot 7 PRO FO 371/3437/144936: Cecil, Memorandum, 16 Aug. 1918. § PRO CAB 23/14/WC479A: War Cabinet, 27 Sept. 1918; J. M. McEwen (ed.), The Riddell Diaries: A Selection 1908-1923 (London, 1986), 239. ° LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (17) 28/1/1: Derby diary, 30 Sept. 1918; PRO CAB 24/65/5836: General Staff, War Office, Battle situation, 30 Sept. 1918. 10 J.Q. C. Newell, ‘Learning the Hard Way: Allenby in Egypt and Palestine 1917— 1919’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 14/3 (1991), 376-9. 1G. Dyer, “The Turkish Armistice of 1918, 1: The Turkish Decision for a Separate Peace, Autumn 1918’, Middle Eastern Studies, 8/2 (1972), 143-5; U. Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918 (Princeton, NJ, 1968), 103-4, 191, 195. 2, A. P. Wavell, The Palestine Campaign (London, 1928), 230; PRO CAB 24/64/ GT5741: General Staff, War Office, Battle situation, evening, 20 Sept. 1918; PRO CAB 23/7/WC476: War Cabinet, 24 Sept. 1918. 8 PRO CAB 23/14/WC482A: War Cabinet, 3 Oct. 1918.

Armistice Negotiations 263 that, in the light of the Bolshevik revolution and Wilson’s known opposition to imperialism, the terms of the Sykes—Picot agreement

would have to be set aside.'* The British had already begun to exploit their close relationship with the indigenous Arab élites so

that they could retain control of the region after the war.’ In January 1918 they gave the Sharif of Mecca a guarantee of his independence. Six months later they issued the ‘Declaration of the Seven’, promising complete sovereign independence to those Arab territories—the Hejaz—which had been independent before 1914 and those liberated from the Turks by the Arabs themselves. Those regions which were under allied occupation—Palestine and Mesopotamia, but excepting Basra, which Curzon insisted must be annexed—were promised that their future government would be in

accordance with the wishes of their inhabitants.’° To bolster the prestige of his Arab clients, Allenby ensured that Sharifian forces were the first allied troops to enter Damascus.” Under orders from London, he hoisted the Arab flag over the city and installed the Amir Feisal as the military administrator of the city.'® On 8 October Cecil informed Stephen Pichon, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, that following the changed military situation in Palestine,

Mesopotamia, and Syria, Russia’s collapse, and the entry of the USA into the war, the terms of the Sykes—Picot agreement ‘do not

appear suitable to present conditions’.” In Syria the French now confronted both British imperialism and Arab nationalism. In order to prevent any of the advantages they hoped to gain

from slipping through their fingers, the War Cabinet repaid Clemenceau in his own coin and kept the control of armistice ‘4 PRO FO 800/221/330: Sykes to Georges Picot, 3 Mar. 1918. 1S J. Darwin, Britain, Egypt and the Middle East: Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of War 1978-1922 (London, 1981), 150; PRO CAB 27/24/EC19: Minutes of the Eastern Committee, 11 July 1918; PRO CAB 27/24/EC20: Minutes of the Eastern Committee, 15 July 1918; PRO CAB 27/24/EC21: Minutes of the Eastern committee, 18 July 1918.

‘6 R. Adelson, Mark Sykes: Portrait of an Amateur (London, 1975), 267; J. Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East 1914-1920 (London, 1969), 61— 2; PRO CAB 23/5/WC330: War Cabinet, 24 Jan. 1918.

'7 E. Kedourie, “The Capture of Damascus, 1 October 1918’, Middle Eastern Studies, 1/1 (1964), 66-83; J. Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorised Biography of T. E. Lawrence (London, 1989), 560-1. 8 ‘Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia, 567-8; PRO CAB 23/8/WC481: War Cabinet, 2 Oct. 1918; K. Jeffery (ed.), The Military Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson 1918-1920 (London, 1985), 55-6. % PRO CAB 27/24/EC-1915: Cecil to Pichon, 8 Oct. 1918.

264 Armistice Negotiations negotiations with Turkey firmly in British hands. On 4 October, at Clemenceau’s insistence, d’Esperey had ordered Milne to advance with three of his four divisions towards the Danube and to use the

fourth as part of a mixed force under either French or Greek command to attack the Turks. The British were incensed. Rather than use Milne’s troops to strike north towards Austria-Hungary, the War Cabinet wanted him to turn east to isolate Constantinople and bring down the Ottoman empire.” Lloyd George removed Milne from d’Esperey’s command and placed him under Allenby. The two British forces could then make a combined assault on Constantinople. On 7 October, at a meeting of the Supreme War Council, Lloyd George and Clemenceau ‘spat at one another like angry cats’.”! It was, as Lloyd George admitted, ‘a political and not a military plan’.”

Having ensured that British forces under British control would be deployed against the Turks to secure British war aims, the War Cabinet next made certain that Britain’s allies would be excluded from any share of the armistice negotiations. The simultaneous collapse of the Palestinian and Bulgarian fronts had rocked the Turkish government and on 14 October they addressed a request for an armistice to Woodrow Wilson.” If the French or Italians were involved in the negotiations, Milner insisted without any visible trace of irony, ‘they are sure to be suspicious and troublesome, & may spoil the whole game. For, by no possibility can you get any Frenchman or Italian to believe that if we took this job on alone &

at once, we were doing it for the general good. They would be convinced we were doing it to steal a march upon them, & to collar Constantinople for ourselves, or some such nonsense’. On 1 October the War Cabinet had decided to send two Dreadnoughts to the Aegean to ensure that Britain would be the prepon-

derant naval power in the region. A British, and not a French, 20 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/5: Hankey diary, 28 Sept. 1918; PRO CAB 23/43/ IWC480: Imperial War Cabinet, 1 Oct. 1918. 21 PRO FO 800/201: Cecil to Balfour, 7 Oct. 1918; Nicol, Uncle George, 180; PRO CAB 23/43/IWC484: Imperial War Cabinet, 12 Oct. 1918, Summary of conclusions reached at the series of conferences held between the British, French, and Italian governments in Paris between 5—9 October 1918; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/6: Hankey diary, 5, 6, and 7 Oct. 1918. 22 Hankey, The Supreme Command, ii. 843. 23 PRO CAB 24/66/GT5976: The Turkish note to President Wilson delivered at Washington on 14 Oct. 1918. 24 PRO FO 800/206/355: Milner to Balfour, 21 Oct. 1918.

Armistice Negotiations 265 admiral would lead the allied fleet through the Dardanelles to Constantinople and into the Black Sea. British attempts to persuade Clemenceau to agree to this were not models of tactful diplomacy, but it hardly mattered. On 20 October the Turkish government informed London that they wanted an immediate peace treaty with Britain. It was to be based on autonomy under the Sultan’s sovereignty for those areas of the Ottoman empire occupied by the British and financial assistance from Britain for the Turkish government. They ended by hinting that if the British did

not agree immediately the Greek population of Constantinople might be massacred.” But the War Cabinet had seen a decrypted telegram which the Turks had sent to Berlin threatening to surrender unconditionally unless the Germans assisted them, and dismissed these terms as a bluff. They believed that the Turks would sign an armistice if they were told that they could keep Constantinople and remain an independent state.”° On 22 October the War Cabinet decided to inform the French and Italians of the Turkish approach and of the terms that the British would offer them, but

to exclude them from further consultations. At least the Prime Minister’s rationale for proceeding alone—that the French had not consulted the British about the terms of the Bulgarian armistice—

lacked the whiff of hypocrisy that emanated from Milner’s effusion.”” The French were annoyed, but the British did little to mollify them except to agree that French troops might take part in occupying the fortifications of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.”

The armistice came into operation on 31 October. The British negotiator, Vice-Admiral Calthorpe, had driven a hard bargain, securing far more than the minimum terms the War Cabinet had 45 HLRO, Bonar Law MSS 70/10/67: Townshend to British Admiral North Aegean, 20 Oct. 1918; C. Townshend, My Campaign in Mesopotamia (London, 1920), 374-82.

> PRO CAB 24/67/GT6069: Wilson, Some notes hastily put together on the possibilities opened up by an armistice or peace with Turkey, 21 Oct. 1918; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/11/9/19: Curzon to Lloyd George, 23 Oct. 1918; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/11/10/19: Curzon to Lloyd George, 25 Oct. 1918; PRO CAB 24/68/

GT6127: Montagu, Conditions of armistice with Turkey, 24 Oct. 1918; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/5: Hankey diary, 22 Oct. 1918; PRO CAB 23/14/WC492A: War Cabinet, 29 Oct. 1918; PRO CAB 23/14/489A/WC489B and WC491B: War Cabinet, 21, 22, and 26 Oct. 1918. 27 PRO CAB 23/14/WC489B: War Cabinet, 22 Oct. 1918. 78 PRO CAB 23/17/X31: X-committee, 23 Oct. 1918; PRO CAB 23/14/WC490A and WC491A: War Cabinet, 24 and 25 Oct. 1918; LHCMA, Spears MSS 1/11: Milner to Lloyd George, 25 Oct. 1918.

266 Armistice Negotiations agreed.”” A week later, they repulsed another French attempt to gain equality of status at Constantinople. When d’Esperey tried to confine Milne’s troops to the occupation of the Dardanelles fortifications so that the French would have the exclusive right to occupy the Bosphorus fortifications, the War Cabinet quickly insisted that British troops would take part in both operations.*° Ministers were not about to allow the French to reap the spoils for which Britain had made so many sacrifices. Nor were they willing to allow the French to control the Mosul oil fields. In 1915 the British had wanted a French sphere of interest

to stretch across the Euphrates and Tigris to Mosul to ensure that after the war the French could act as a buffer between the Russians in Armenia and the British in Mesopotamia.*! But in the different strategic conditions of 1918 other factors assumed a new importance and the British once again reversed their policy at France’s expense. The Admiralty was anxious about their post-war oil supplies. If the USA consumed its own and most of Mexico’s output, the British might find themselves dependent upon the French for oil, as Mosul was at the centre of the world’s largest known oil deposits. They wanted to encourage British companies to obtain control of the largest possible share of the world’s oil reserves, sufficient to supply Britain’s own peacetime needs, so that they could conserve the stocks situated in British-owned territory as a wartime reserve.” Supported by Hankey and Sir Frederick Sykes,

the Chief of the Air Staff, Wemyss and Geddes urged Lloyd George to order Sir William Marshall to occupy Mosul.* On 2 October the War Cabinet overruled Balfour’s objection that this was no more than naked imperialism and ordered Marshall to resume his advance up the Tigris to occupy the oil-bearing region 22 PRO CAB 23/14/WC494A: War Cabinet, 31 Oct. 1918; J. B. Scott (ed.), Official

Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals December 1916 to November 1918 (Washington, DC, 1921), 444-6; G. Dyer, ‘The Turkish Armistice of 1918, 2: A Lost Opportunity: The Armistice Negotiations of Mudros’, Middle Eastern Studies, 8/3 (1972), 161-6. 39 PRO CAB 23/8/WCS500: War Cabinet, 8 Nov. 1918. 31 PRO CAB 27/24/EC34: Minutes of the Eastern Committee, 3 Oct. 1918. 22 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/5: Hankey diary, 29 July 1918; PRO CAB 24/59/

GT5267: Geddes and Wemyss and enc. by Slade, The petroleum situation in the British empire, 30 July 1918. 33 PRO FO 800/204/159: Hankey to Balfour, 1 Aug. 1918; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/5: Hankey diary, 1 Aug. 1918; PRO CAB 24/60/GT5376: Sykes, Petroleum situation in the British empire, 9 Aug. 1918.

Armistice Negotiations 267 around Mosul. Even the conclusion of the armistice did not stop them from squeezing the last drop of advantage from their efforts. On 31 October they instructed Marshall to continue his advance a further fifty miles to occupy Mosul itself.** The War Cabinet had no

intention of allowing British naval power to depend on French goodwill in the post-war world.

Since 1914 British policy-makers had accepted, often reluctantly, that although they might win the spoils of the peace in the Middle East or Africa, they could win the war only by defeating the Germans. The operations which finally defeated the German army in

the west were hatched in private by Foch, Haig, Pétain, and Pershing. The Entente’s counter-offensive began on 18 July when French and American forces attacked between Chateau-Thierry

and the Aisne and penetrated the line of the German Seventh Army to a distance of four miles. The growing success of the Entente’s counter-offensive and the crumbling morale of their own

troops were the final straws which persuaded Hindenburg and Ludendorff to seek an armistice. The fact that the Entente’s advance and their successful breaching of the Hindenburg line coincided with news of the Bulgarian armistice provided them with a convenient excuse to shift the blame for their own failures on to the

shoulders of their allies. On 4 October the German government asked the US President to help them to negotiate an immediate armistice to be followed by a peace based on the fourteen points.°> But in reality OHL did not want peace. They sought a breathingspace to regroup their forces prior to resuming the war. Although they were willing to abandon occupied territory in the west, they

thought that they could persuade the Entente to allow them to retain their gains in the east by exploiting their fears of Bolshevism.”° 4H. Mejcher, ‘Oil and British Policy towards Mesopotamia, 1914-1918’, Middle Eastern Studies, 8/3 (1972), 378-88; LHCMA, Maurice MSS 4/4/2/53: Marshall to Maurice, 30 Aug. 1918; PRO CAB 23/8/481: War Cabinet, 2 Oct. 1918; W. Marshall, Memories of Four Fronts (London, 1929), 318-24; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/5: Hankey diary, 3 Aug. 1918; PRO CAB 23/14/WC494A: War Cabinet, 31 Oct. 1918. °° D. Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (Oxford, 1987), 223-4; PRO CAB 24/66/GT5976: German government to President Wilson, 4 Oct. 1918.

36 W. Gorlitz (ed.), The Kaiser and his Court: The First World War Diaries of Admiral Georg von Muller, Chief of the Naval Cabinet, 1914-1918 (London, 1959; 2nd edn. 1961), 397; G. E. Weir, ‘Naval Strategy and Industrial Mobilization at the

268 Armistice Negotiations It was not inevitable that the War Cabinet would agree to the German request for an armistice. Speaking to an audience in Manchester on 12 September 1918, Lloyd George insisted that Victory is essential to sound peace. Unless you have the image of victory stamped on the surface the peace will depreciate in value. As time goes on the Prussian military power must not only be beaten, but Germany itself must know it. The German people must know that if their rulers outrage the law of nations the Prussian military strength cannot protect them from punishment.*’

Shortly before the dispatch of the German note to Wilson, Chancellor Hertling had resigned and been replaced by Prince Max of Baden. Baden was thought by the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office to be ‘animated by a spirit very different from that of Prussianism’.*® However, his ‘revolution from above’ did not persuade either the Foreign Office or Lloyd George that a stable democratic regime had now been established in Germany.*?

On 13 October Lloyd George feared that Germany’s embryonic democratic government would soon be toppled: ‘the Germans would say that these miserable democrats had taken charge and had become panic stricken, and the military party would get in power again.’ The upshot would be that ‘if peace were made now, in twenty years’ time the Germans would say what Carthage had said about the First Punic War, namely that they had made this mistake and that mistake, and that by better preparation and organization they would be able to bring about victory next time’.” ‘Was it’, he asked, ‘really worth stopping the fighting unless Germany was really badly beaten?! At least one of the allied commanders did not think so. Pershing

was sufficiently confident of his army to recommend that the Twelfth Hour: The Scheer Programme of 1918’, Mariner’s Mirror, 77/3 (1991), 27387.

37 The Times, 13 Sept. 1918. 33 PRO CAB 24/66/GT5915: PID, Memorandum on Prince Max of Baden, 3 Oct.

"% PRO FO 371/3434/160478: Rumbold to FO, 13 Sept. 1918, and minute by Oliphant, 22 Sept. 1918; PRO CAB 24/59/GT5224: PID, Memorandum on the Prussian Franchise Bill, 24 July 1918; PRO CAB 24/62/GT5539: PID, Memorandum on the coming German peace offensive, 28 Aug. 1918; PRO CAB 24/63/GT5615: PID, Memorandum on German war aims, 5 Sept. 1918. # PRO CAB 24/66/GT5967: Minutes of a conference held at Danny, Sussex, on Sunday, 13 Oct. 1918.

Tbid.

Armistice Negotiations 269 ‘Entente should continue the offensive until we compel her [Ger-

many’s| unconditional surrender’.” But, after lengthy deliberations, the War Cabinet disagreed. Harsh as the armistice terms imposed on Germany were, they fell short of a Carthaginian peace. One reason for this was that almost until the moment they signed the armistice, the British exaggerated Germany’s continuing power

of resistance, and were convinced that the Germans had the capacity to continue fighting into 1919. British intelligence detected many signs of the serious straits into which Germany had been plunged by early October.* But after so many bitter disappointments, many policy-makers hardly dared to hope that the German army might be on the point of disintegration. Lloyd George insisted that he ‘preferred basing his calculations on the actual facts. The danger was in rushing to extremes. Last year we had always assumed that the Germans were collapsing’. Haig’s successes at Amiens on 8 August—a date which Ludendorff described as ‘the black day of the German army in the history of this war’—did not persuade the War Cabinet to jettison their timetable for victory in 1919.4 On 21 August Wilson tried to persuade his colleagues that,

although the German army was not actually on the point of collapse, large numbers of German soldiers were demoralized, and ‘he wished the Cabinet to realize that we were now confronted

with a different situation from that which had obtained at #2 A.S. Link (ed.), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton NJ, 1985), li. 524—5.

43 Information reaching the British indicating Germany’s dire predicament can be found in PRO CAB 25/123/SWC329: Lt.-Col. G. N. Macready, Maintenance of the German army, 4 Oct. 1918; PRO FO 371/3444/168249: Robertson to FO [marked ‘Special Distribution’], 8 Oct. 1918; PRO FO 371/3444/168247: Kilmarnock to FO, 7 Oct. 1918; PRO FO 371/3444/168246: Kilmarnock to FO, 7 Oct. 1918; PRO FO 371/ 3435/161859: Robertson to FO, 30 Sept. 1918; PRO FO 371/3435/169718: Rumbold to FO, 9 Oct. 1918; PRO WO 157/35: GHQ Intelligence, Summary of information, Sept. 1918. 44 PRO CAB 23/17/X14: X-committee, 17 June 1918. 4S EB. Ludendorff, My War Memoirs, 1914-1918 (London, 1919), ii. 679; PRO CAB 24/60/GT5370: General Staff, War Office, Battle situation, noon, 10 Aug. 1918; PRO WO 256/34: Haig diary, 14 and 15 Aug. 1918; T. Travers, How the War was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front,

1917-1918 (London, 1992), 131-40; G. de Groot, Douglas Haig, 1861-1928 (London, 1988), 386—7; F. Maurice, The Life of Lord Rawlinson of Trent from his Journals and Letters (London, 1928), 229-30; T. Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1986), 594-5; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/5: Hankey diary, 13 Aug. 1918; M. Gilbert (ed.), Winston S. Churchill, iv. Companion, Part 1: Documents, January 1917 to June 1979 (London, 1977), 370-1.

2/0 Armistice Negotiations Passchendaele’. But many ministers and officials, who recognized that the German successes in the spring had not caused the British

to sue for peace, assumed that the Germans would be similarly stoical in the face of the allied counter-offensive.*’

Foch shared their reluctance to believe that the war might be finished sooner than they expected. In mid-September he was optimistic about the immediate military situation, although, according to Milner, ‘not at all unreasonably elated by the turn of the tide’.* But he probably did not yet believe that the Entente could win the war by the end of 1918. Lord Reading, who had spent some days

in France meeting senior allied commanders, concluded on 12

| September that most still believed that the war could not be won until 1919.” Haig’s pessimism was fed by three factors. First, the work of his intelligence staff had been disrupted by the sudden death of his chief intelligence officer in August.°? That was perhaps why he took too seriously reports suggesting that the Germans had

the capability of retiring slowly to the Rhine and fighting there throughout the winter.-! Secondly, he was conscious of the weaknesses of his own and his partners’ forces. On 10 October Haig told ministers that the French army was exhausted, that the Americans were insufficiently trained, and that the efficiency of the BEF was bound to suffer due to a lack of drafts.’ And thirdly, Haig knew that his troops’ mobility was hampered by logistical problems as they advanced across a wasteland in which the Germans had de-

stroyed all means of communication.*? On 16 October Henry Wilson told the War Cabinet that, although the German army was

more tired than the armies of France and Britain, within three weeks rain and mud would make further movement on the western front impossible. Thus, ‘there was nothing to warrant the assump46 PRO CAB 23/7/WC462: War Cabinet, 21 Aug. 1918. 47 LHCMA, Clive MSS II/4: Clive diary, 3 Sept. 1918. *® HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/38/4/17: Milner to Lloyd George, 17 Sept. 1918. ® PRO FO 800/225/20: Reading to Wiseman, 12 Sept. 1918. °° J. Marshall-Cornwall, Wars and Rumours of Wars (London, 1984), 38-9. 1 PRO WO 157/36: Summary of intelligence, GHQ: Entries for 11, 12, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27, and 31 Oct. 1918; PRO FO 800/225/114: Maxse to Campbell, 17 Oct.

2 PRO CAB 23/17/X29: X-committee, 19 Oct. 1918; R. Blake (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1918 (London, 1952), 333-4. 3 C, Harrington, Plumer of Messines (London, 1935), 169; C. a Court Repington, The First World War 1914-1918 (London, 1920), ii. 461; Maurice, The Life of Lord Rawlinson, 241.

Armistice Negotiations 271 tion that the present military situation justified the Germans in giving-in’.4 Taking these factors into account, Bonar Law believed

that ‘there was nothing in the military situation to compel them [the Germans] to accept such terms’ as the British contemplated.» The choice facing British policy-makers, therefore, seemed stark. If they wished to impose unconditional surrender on the Germans they would probably have to continue fighting into 1919. After considerable deliberation they decided that the likely costs of continuing the war would outweigh the benefits they might gain by doing so. What they found particularly persuasive was the fact that their partners seemed to be determined to ensure that the British would bear a disproportionately heavy share of the burden of that cost while they reaped the benefits. In the summer and autumn of 1918 British policy-makers came

to believe that the French were intent on doing what the British themselves had hoped to achieve since the start of the war: to exploit their allies’ resources to secure their own national ends. Following Foch’s appointment as generalissimo in the spring, the British came to suspect that Clemenceau was bent on exploiting his

position vis-a-vis Foch to bleed the BEF dry and to ensure that France controlled operations on the western front. During the battles of March and April, the slow arrival of French reinforcements convinced Haig that Foch was willing to sacrifice British manpower to conserve Pétain’s divisions.°° In April, when Foch suggested rotating tired British divisions to quiet sectors of the French front, Wilson suspected that he wanted to break up Haig’s army and so reduce Britain’s influence over the final peace settlement.’ Wilson thought that he detected ‘Numberless signs of increasing [French] interference’, and said that ‘the French mean to take us over body and soul’.°* On 27 July, when he heard that the French were determined to concentrate the whole of the American army on their sector of the line, Lloyd George ‘was convinced that 4 PRO CAB 23/8/WC487: War Cabinet, 16 Oct. 1918. °> PRO CAB 23/17/X29: X-committee, 19 Oct. 1918; LRO, Derby MSS 920 DER (17) 28/1/1: Derby diary, 30 Sept. 1918; J. Ramsden (ed.), Real Old Tory Politics: The Political Diaries of Sir Robert Sanders, Lord Bayford, 1910-35 (London, 1984), 109.

"8 PRO CAB 23/6/WC411: War Cabinet, 14 May 1918. 7? Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 11. 94, 99; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/3: Hankey diary, 13 May 1918. 8 Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 11. 99; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/ 38/3/38: Army Council to Milner, 15 May 1918.

272 Armistice Negotiations this was part of the political game which General Foch was playing

at M. Clemenceau’s instigation. The whole object of it was, by depriving us of the support of the American troops, to force us to keep up our present total of 59 divisions regardless of the effect upon our industries and national life generally’? Lloyd George’s suspicions deepened in August and September when Foch failed to give advance warning of his offensives. Indeed, the War Cabinet only learnt of the Amiens offensive some hours after it had begun. On 12 August they congratulated Haig while simultaneously attempting to retain the power to control Foch’s initiatives. They were willing to sanction operations like ‘the third

battle of the Somme, short of duration and productive of farreaching results at comparatively low cost, while inflicting heavy losses on the enemy in men, material, and moral’.*! But they insisted that major operations likely to involve heavy losses must first be submitted to them for approval.” As their overriding object was to defeat the German army in the west, the War Cabinet did not interfere in Foch’s conduct of operations. But Lloyd George recognized that Foch was intent on preserving the French army at the expense of the BEF, and hoped ‘that the French would take a big share in the battle, as he did not want the British Army to be so reduced that next year we should find ourselves the third Military

Power on the Western front’. That was a disturbing prospect, for since 1914 British policymakers had believed that their influence over the peace settlement would be in direct proportion to the size of the army they could maintain. They were therefore anxious, if at all possible, to avoid the need to continue fighting into 1919, for they knew that the BEF was certain to shrink in size. In late July Wilson had warned Haig that in 1919 the BEF would be reduced from fifty-nine divisions to between thirty-nine and forty-four divisions.“ The War Cabinet PRO CAB 24/17/X25: X-committee, 26 July 1918. 6° PRO WO 106/1456: Grant, Some notes made at General Foch’s headquarters, 7 Aug. 1918; Jeffery (ed.), The Military Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 48; PRO CAB 23/44A/IWC29A: Committee of Prime Ministers, 8 Aug.

8 PRO CAB 27/8/WP72: Hankey, Report of the Committee of Prime Ministers, 20 Aug. 1918; PRO CAB 23/44A/IWC29B: Committee of Prime Ministers, 12 Aug.

e PRO CAB 27/8/WP72: Hankey, Report of the Committee of Prime Ministers, 20 Aug. 1918; PRO CAB 23/17/X27: X-committee, 31 Aug. 1918. ® PRO CAB 23/17/X2: X-committee, 16 May 1918. 6 PRO WO 256/33: Wilson to Haig, 26 July 1918.

Armistice Negotiations 273 took this decision in the knowledge that it would have important implications for Britain’s influence within the alliance. Lengthy lists of the economic assistance which Britain was affording the French

cut little ice in Paris. The French wanted men and supplies, and believed the British could provide both. Foch was convinced that the war could be won only by attacking and defeating the German army in the west, and both he and Clemenceau intended to do so by making the maximum use of British and American manpower, thus

saving what was left of France’s own forces.© The French were unmoved when Lloyd George insisted that it made little sense for the British to recruit a few thousand more shipyard workers or engineers into the army if the cost of doing so would be to delay the production of the ships needed to transport the US army to France

and the artillery it needed to fight when it arrived.” Foch left the British in no doubt about what would be the implications in 1919 if they allowed the BEF to shrink as planned: ‘if when the time for

discussion of peace arrives we [i.e. Britain] have reduced the number of our divisions while they have not, we shall not have the same weight in council’. That was a doubly unappealing prospect, for there was little enthusiasm amongst British policy-makers to continue fighting just so that the French could invade Germany ‘to

pay off old scores’. Following the collapse of the German and Tsarist empires, the British saw the French as their major colonial rival, but not as a threat to their post-war status as a world power. The USA, by contrast, might be both. Any lingering hopes that Woodrow Wilson

would stand aside and allow the European allies to impose their terms on the Central Powers had been banished on 8 January 1918

when he had announced the fourteen points of his peace programme. One reason he did so was that he hoped he could compel the Entente to renegotiate the secret treaties the Bolsheviks had recently published.” In public Balfour and Lloyd George endorsed the President’s programme, claiming that his ideas were substan® HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/23/3/43: Hankey to Lloyd George, 22 June 1918. 6 Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War, 568. 67 PRO CAB 24/62/GT5572: Lloyd George to Clemenceau, 30 Aug. 1918. 6’ HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/23/3/10: Sackville-West to Hankey, 27 Aug. 1918; PRO FO 800/222/Fr/7: Reading to Lloyd George, 3 Sept. 1918. ® Blake (ed.), Haig, 334. ® Scott (ed.), Official Statements of War Aims, 237-8; PRO FO 371/3435/6381: Spring-Rice to FO, 10 Jan. 1918; Stevenson, The First World War, 193.

274 Armistice Negotiations tially the same as the British programme the Prime Minister had announced on 5 January. In reality there were serious differences: some of Wilson’s points, particularly those concerned with the freedom of the seas, the future of enemy colonies, and post-war trade policy, ran completely counter to British interests.”! Until October, the War Cabinet felt that the best way to preserve Anglo-American harmony was to avoid drawing attention to these differences.” However, the German request for an armistice and peace based upon Wilson’s programme meant that they could no

longer maintain their silence. Lloyd George was angry with Wilson’s initial reply, because the President sent it without first consulting his partners, because he had made no mention of Alsace-Lorraine, and because Wilson assumed that his partners accepted his programme in its entirety. They did not. Both the Prime

Minister and the Admiralty abhorred Wilson’s insistence on the freedom of the seas.” It was, as Wemyss remarked, a ‘step [that] was directed absolutely against the British Navy. If it were adopted we should lose enormously in prestige, and enormously in power’.”4

Britain could not surrender on this point and remain a great im-

perial power, for ‘On this basis the British Empire has been founded, and on no other can it be upheld.’ Similarly, those ministers responsible for imperial questions, Curzon, Montagu, and Long, were insistent that, despite Wilson’s wishes for an impartial settlement of colonial differences, Britain had to retain the German colonies and Turkish possessions it had occupied.” 7 PRO FO 800/209/478: Balfour to Spring-Rice, 12 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 23/5/ WC321: War Cabinet, 14 Jan. 1918. 2 PRO FO 371/3435/6103: Bertie to FO, 10 Jan. 1918; PRO CAB 24/39/GT3386: Dep. of Intelligence, Information Bureau, Weekly report on France, 17 Jan. 1918; D. Stevenson, French War Aims against Germany, 1914-1919 (Oxford, 1982), 101-

3; id., ‘French War Aims and the American Challenge, 1914-1918’, Historical Journal, 22/4 (1979), 887-8. 3 G. Riddell, Lord Riddell’s War Diary 1914-1918 (London, 1933), 366—7. ™ PRO CAB 24/66/GT5967: Minutes of a conference held at Danny, Sussex, on Sunday, 13 Oct. 1918. ® PRO CAB 24/76/GT6018: Wemyss, An inquiry into the meaning and effect of the demand for freedom of the seas, 17 Oct. 1918; M. G. Fry, “The Imperial War

Cabinet, the United States, and the Freedom of the Seas’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 110 (Nov. 1965), 353-5. 7” PRO CAB 24/66/GT5980: Curzon, Conditions of Armistice, 15 Oct. 1918; PRO CAB 23/67/GT6015: Curzon, Basis of policy concerning German colonies and Turkish possessions, 16 Oct. 1918; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/5: Hankey diary, 18 Oct.

1918; PRO CAB 24/67/GT6028: Montagu, The future of the German colonies, 18 Oct. 1918; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/23/3/17: Hankey to Lloyd George,

Armistice Negotiations 275 However, the War Cabinet knew that the longer the war lasted, the greater would be Woodrow Wilson’s influence over British policy. The American government had already shown little compunction about using their economic strength to bend the British to their will. In September 1917, by threatening to stop further loans,

they compelled the British to agree to the establishment of the Inter-allied Council for War Purchases and Finance to supervise all allied spending in the USA.” By threatening export embargoes the

Americans also compelled the European allies to agree to join similar councils organizing the flow of American food to the Entente countries.”* Henceforth, Britain could no longer exercise power over its allies through its control of allied finance. The creation of these bodies marked the end of Britain’s pretensions to be the economic powerhouse of the Entente.”

The British also recognized that the longer the war lasted, the greater would be the American economic challenge in the post-war world. In August 1917, determined that the British would not be in possession of a large merchant fleet able to compete with them, the

US government requisitioned all merchant ships being built in American shipyards for the allies.2° Maclay concluded that ‘the United States were out for post bellum development, of which they always suspect us’.*' In the spring of 1918 his suspicions were fed by Wilson’s refusal to switch American tonnage from civilian trade to transport troops to Europe to accelerate the arrival of the AEF. He also surmised that the Americans were using their political influ18 Oct. 1918; PRO CAB 23/14/WC495A: War Cabinet, 1 Nov. 1918; PRO CAB 23/43/IWC36 and [WC37: Imperial War Cabinet, 5 and 6 Nov. 1918. ” TD. Lloyd George, War Memoirs (London, 1938), ii. 1006-8; PRO CAB 1/25/12: Wiseman, Memorandum on Anglo-American relations, Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 24/ 15/GT966: Phillips, Purchases by European allies in the USA, 7 June 1917; PRO CAB 24/23/GT1780: Northcliffe to Lloyd George, 16 Aug. 1917; Gilbert (ed.), Winston S. Churchill, 1/1: 121-2; PRO CAB 23/3/WC210: War Cabinet, 10 Aug. 1917; PRO CAB 24/26/GT2007: Phillips to Cecil, 8 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 24/26/

GT2065: Curzon, Inter-ally council, 18 Sept. 1917; PRO CAB 24/29/GT2309: Hankey, Inter-ally council, 16 Oct. 1917; PRO CAB 23/4/WC239: War Cabinet, 26 Sept. 1917. 7% L.M. Barnett, British Food Policy during the First World War (London, 1985), 173-4. 7 K.M. Burk, Britain, America and the Sinews of War 1914-1918 (London, 1985),

147-8; PRO CAB 23/3/WC159: War Cabinet, 8 June 1917; PRO CAB 24/18/ G7T1228: Curzon, Purchases by the European allies in the USA, 30 June 1917; PRO CAB 23/3/WC176: War Cabinet, 5 July 1917. 8° PRO CAB 24/23/GT1790: Cecil to War Cabinet and enc., 20 Aug. 1917. 51 PRO CAB 23/4/WC253: War Cabinet, 10 Oct. 1917.

276 Armistice Negotiations ence in Latin America to further their own trade at Britain’s expense.” Latin America was a major centre for British foreign investment, and trade there would be essential for Britain’s post-war economic recovery.* During the crisis in France, concern for the long-term stability of the British economy took second place to the

need to accelerate the arrival of the AEF in France. But by July, when the crisis was over, the War Cabinet agreed that it was a mistake for the British to continue to sacrifice their export trade for the sake of the American army, and on 2 August they decided to reduce the tonnage allocated to the AEF.™ The longer the war continued the greater would be the economic

and military strength the Americans would exert and the better placed they would be to rob Britain of its post-war markets, its maritime supremacy, and its colonial spoils. In January 1918 Haig

hoped for an early peace for fear that, if the war continued, ‘America would get a great pull over us’.® But by the autumn it was Smuts who was the most eloquent exponent of the need for an early

armistice to forestall the emergence of US domination. ‘If peace comes now’, Smuts argued on 24 October, ‘it will be a British peace, it will be a peace given to the world by the same Empire that

settled the Napoleonic wars a century ago.’ However, if the War Cabinet insisted on continuing the war into 1919, Germany might 8 FE. B. Parsons, ‘Why the British Reduced the Flow of American Troops to Europe in August—October 1918’, Canadian Journal of History, 12/2 (1977-8), 177; PRO CAB 24/47/GT4155: Naval Staff, Naval weekly appreciation, 4 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 24/48/GT4219: Naval Staff, Naval weekly appreciation, 11 Apr. 1918; PRO CAB 24/50/GT4478: Geddes, World’s losses and output of merchant tonnage, 8 May 1918; PRO CAB 24/60/GT5318: PID, Memorandum on war trade organization in the USA [n.d., but c.2 Aug. 1918]; PRO CAB 24/60/GT5341: Stanley, Naval effort: Great Britain and the US, note, 6 Aug. 1918; PRO CAB 23/44A/IWC28A: Committee of Prime Ministers, 6 Aug. 1918. 83 PRO FO 800/222/LA/1: Drummond to Wiseman, 6 Mar. 1918; PRO CAB 23/ 4/WC243 and WC253: War Cabinet, 2 and 19 Oct. 1917.

34 PRO CAB 23/7/WC452: War Cabinet, 26 July 1918; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/5: Hankey diary, 25 July 1918; PRO CAB 23/43/IWC29: Imperial War Cabinet, 2 Aug. 1918; D. R. Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 1917-1919 (Lincoln, Nebr., 1966), 171; Parsons, ‘Why the British Reduced the Flow’, 173.

8 LS. Jaffe, The Decision to Disarm Germany: British Policy Towards Postwar German Disarmament, 1914-1919 (London, 1985), 58; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/23/2/11: Hankey to Lloyd George, 22 Jan. 1918; Blake (ed.), Haig, 294. 8 PRO CAB 24/67/GT6091: Smuts, A note on the early conclusion of peace, 24 Oct. 1918.

Armistice Negotiations 217 be ‘utterly broken and finished’, but Britain ‘would have lost the

first position; and the peace which will then be imposed on an utterly exhausted Europe will be an American peace’.®’ By 1919 the USA ‘will have taken our place as the first military, diplomatic and financial power of the world’. The British empire had to look to its

future and it behoved ministers to remember ‘that our opponents at the peace table will not only be our enemies; and the weaker we become through the exhaustion of war, the more insistent may be the demands presented to us to forgo what we consider necessary for our future security’.® Smuts also warned that ‘the grim spectre of Bolshevist anarchy is stalking to the front’. But in October, before the armistice terms were actually agreed, few policy-makers thought that the need to forestall its spread from Russia to central Europe was sufficient

reason for stopping the war before a final crushing defeat was inflicted on the German army. Two of them who did were Haig and J. W. Headlam-Morley of the PID. Headlam-Morley believed that ‘the danger of a collapse of society seems to me greater than that of a reassertion of the military supremacy’.® Haig opposed the idea of fighting the war to depose the Kaiser, because to do so ‘would leave

Germany at the mercy of Revolutionaries, and that if disorder started in Germany it would spread to France and England’.”? But

at the Foreign Office Sir Eyre Crowe asserted the opposite. He insisted that ‘we do want to weaken, if not shatter the system of government identified with the Junker regime in Prussia’. Cecil was

even more blunt in wishing to let events in Germany take their course: *] cannot imagine any conditions in which our intervention in the internal affairs of Germany would be wise.”! Wemyss dismissed talk of the Bolshevik threat by the German armistice delegation as a cynical ploy to win better terms from the Entente.” It was not until 10 November, when ministers had already agreed on 87 A note on the early conclusion of peace. 88 Tbid.; see also PRO CAB 24/65/GT5827: Churchill, Manpower, 1918 and 1919, 25 Sept. 1918. 8 PRO FO 371/3444/172800: Headlam-Morley to Tyrrell, 12 Oct. 1918. ” Blake (ed.), Haig, 252. 7! PRO FO 371/3444/172800: Minutes by Tyrrell, Crowe, and Cecil on HeadlamMorley to Tyrrell, 12 Oct. 1918. 72 PRO CAB 23/14/WCSO0OB: Wemyss to Balfour, 11 Nov. 1918.

218 Armistice Negotiations their armistice terms, that they accepted that: ‘Our real danger now is not the Bosches but Bolshevism.’?? And they preferred to deal

with it not by offering lenient terms to the German government, but by limiting its influence to Russia and the Ukraine by lending support to anti-Bolshevik separatist governments in Siberia, the Caucasus, and the Baltic states.” On 26 October, after weighing the advantages and disadvantages of ending the war in 1918 or continuing to fight into 1919, the War Cabinet plumped for the former. A prolongation of the war would benefit Britain’s partners more than it would benefit Britain. But there still remained the problem of devising armistice terms for Germany which would secure Britain’s interests and be acceptable not only to Britain’s partners, but also to the Germans. In 1914

Britain had gone to war because Germany threatened the European balance of power on land and Britain’s maritime security

at sea. Consequently, the War Cabinet agreed that: “The naval conditions of the armistice should represent the admission of German defeat by sea in the same degree as the military conditions

recognize the corresponding admission of German defeat by land.’® Convinced that if the belligerents signed an armistice it would be impossible to persuade their own forces to resume fighting, they also concluded that the armistice must cripple Germany’s ability to continue the war.” They had to preserve the domination of the Royal Navy and prevent the Germans from doing what Hindenburg and Ludendorff hoped to do, gain a breathing-space so that Germany could resume fighting after a few months. And they were equally determined not to surrender to Woodrow Wilson’s demands about the ‘freedom of the seas’.

Agreement on the final armistice terms to be imposed on Austria~-Hungary and Germany was reached in a series of meetings in Paris between Lloyd George, Balfour, House, Clemenceau, and Sonnino which began on 29 October. President Wilson had told ° Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 11. 148; PRO CAB 1/27/18: Lockhart

to Balfour, 7 Nov. 1918; PRO CAB 24/68/GT6106: PID, The growing danger of Bolshevism in Russia, 25 Oct. 1918. % PRO FO 800/329/Rus/18/7: Drummond, Memorandum, 20 Oct. 1918; PRO CAB 23/43/[WC37: Imperial War Cabinet, 6 Nov. 1918. 5 PRO CAB 23/14/WC491B: War Cabinet, 26 Oct. 1918. °° PRO CAB 23/43/[WC484: Imperial War Cabinet, 11 Oct. 1918.

Armistice Negotiations 219 House that his task was to prevent the European allies from invading Germany, and that ‘too much success or security on the part of the allies will make a genuine peace settlement exceedingly difficult, if not impossible’.”” On 13 October the British had warned

Wilson that, although they were in general agreement with his fourteen points and subsequent pronouncements, the European powers had never discussed them, and that some of Wilson’s proposals could be construed in ways which ran counter to Britain’s interests. They maintained that they would not agree to armistice terms which deprived the allies of their freedom of action at the peace conference.”® But House achieved the first of his objectives—

persuading America’s partners to subscribe to Wilson’s programme—by threatening that the USA would make a separate peace. The British and French tried to counter his blackmail by insisting that they would none the less continue fighting, but their

united front quickly crumbled when Lloyd George accepted Wilson’s proposals, albeit with two reservations. Clemenceau had no option other than to fall into line. On 1 November the delegates agreed that the ‘freedom of the seas’ was to be set aside for further

discussion at the peace conference, and the European allies reserved the right to extract compensation from Germany for the material damage it had done them.” There was little dispute between the major powers about the terms to be imposed on Austria-Hungary. As soon as they knew of the Bulgarian collapse, Emperor Karl and his ministers had sought

an armistice based on the fourteen points. On 16 October Karl conceded the right of the subject nationalities of his empire to form their own states. Thus, the Dual Monarchy was already disintegrat-

ing three days before the beginning of the Italian offensive at Vittorio Veneto that shattered the remnants of the Habsburg army

on the Italian front.!° On 26 October Karl telegraphed to the 7 Link (ed.), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, li. 340-1, 473. *8 PRO CAB 24/66/GT5967: Minutes of a conference held at Danny, Sussex, on Sunday, 13 Oct. 1918; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/5: Hankey diary, 13 Oct. 1918; Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, i. 136. ” CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/6: Hankey diary, 29 Oct. 1918; Stevenson, French War Aims against Germany, 125-6; Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, 1. 239; PRO CAB 25/123/SWC350: Procés-verbal of the 2nd meeting of 8th session of the Supreme War Council, 1 Nov. 1918; House to Wilson, 30 Oct. 1918, in Link (ed.), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, li. 511-12, 515-16, 581. 100 I. Deak, ‘The Habsburg Army in the First and Last Days of World War One: A Comparative Analysis’, in B. K. Kiraly, N. F. Dreisziger, and A. A. Nofi (eds.),

280 Armistice Negotiations Kaiser that he intended to seek a separate peace within twenty-four

hours, and the next day his government announced that it was prepared to concede independence to the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs in return for an immediate armistice and the start of peace negotiations.'*! The allies required the Austro-Hungarians to demobilize all of their army except some units needed to maintain internal order, withdraw all of their troops operating on the western front, and surrender half of their artillery. They were also to

evacuate allied territory and the Serbs were to be permitted to occupy all of the territory claimed by the Yugoslavs.'” At sea they were obliged to surrender fifteen of their most modern U-boats, three battleships, three cruisers, and nine destroyers, and to disarm

all of their remaining warships.’ The Austrians accepted these terms on 3 November. They represented the complete military collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire. In the east, there was never any question of allowing the Germans to retain their gains. To have done so would have been to

perpetuate the German threat to Britain’s eastern empire. The politicians agreed that the Germans must withdraw from occupied territory and retreat behind their 1914 frontiers, and that the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest would be abrogated. But what they could not do was to make any immediate provision for who would fill the resulting vacuum. Balfour was left worrying that ‘as soon as the Germans left, the people in the evacuated areas would become prey to Bolshevism, as they were devoid of both Army and Police. We, therefore, ran the risk of delivering them to an even worse regime than the German, and much as they hated the Germans they might prefer their rule to that of Bolshevism.” East Central European Society in World War One (New York, 1985), 309-10; G. E. Rothenberg, “The Habsburg Army in the First World War’, ibid. 297. 101 PRO CAB 24/66/GT5976: The Austro-Hungarian reply to President Wilson’s note of 18 Oct. 1918, 27 Oct. 1918; PRO FO 371/3445/180456: Barclay to FO, 29 Oct. 1918; G. Schulz, Revolutions and Peace Treaties, 1917-1920 (London, 1967; 2nd edn. lo PRO CAB 25/123/SWC349: Procés-verbal of the 1st meeting of the 8th session of the Supreme War Council, 31 Oct. 1918. 03 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/6: Hankey diary, 31 Oct. 1918; CCC, Wemyss MSS WMYSS 5/7: Wemyss diary, 31 Oct. 1918; P. G. Halpern, The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1914-1918 (London, 1987), 566; Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 11. 146.

104 PRO CAB 25/123/SWC351: Procés-verbal of the 3rd meeting of the 8th session of the Supreme War Council, 2 Nov. 1918.

Armistice Negotiations 281 The armistice terms to be imposed on Germany at sea and along

her western frontier were the subject of considerably more discussion, largely because some British policy-makers, notably Lloyd George, had qualms about asking for too much. On land Foch was

determined that the armistice must deprive the Germans of the ability to resume fighting if it broke down, and insisted that they must surrender 30,000 machine-guns, 3,000 mortars, 2,000 aircraft,

5,000 artillery pieces, 5,000 locomotives, 150,000 wagons, and 10,000 lorries. He was equally determined that, under the guise of the armistice, France should secure the military frontier on the Rhine it had long coveted. The Germans were to be required to evacuate not only all of the allied territory they had occupied in France and Belgium, including Alsace-Lorraine, but also all territory on the left bank of the Rhine. Allied troops were to occupy the

principal crossings over the Rhine together with bridgeheads of thirty kilometres’ radius on the right bank. If the armistice collapsed, the Entente armies would be fighting on German and not

allied soil.

At sea, the British intended to use the armistice to gain what they had failed to secure by fighting. The inability of the Grand Fleet to destroy its adversary in a naval battle in the North Sea convinced Beatty that ‘we have got to take the H. S. F. either by surrender or

as a result of Fleet action’.! This was essential to Britain’s postwar security, for ‘the existence of the Empire depends on our Sea Power [so] we must ensure that no Fleet in being is left which can threaten our supremacy’.’*’ The Board of Admiralty agreed. Their objective was to destroy ‘both the military and the naval power of

Germany’. On 19 October they decided that the Germans must surrender all of their U-boats, together with ten battleships, six 105 PRO CAB 23/43/IWC484: Foch, Conditions of an armistice with Germany, 8

Oct. 1918; Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers 1914-1920 (Washington, DC, 1940), 170-1; Stevenson, French War Aims against Germany, 118-19, 127; PRO CAB 25/123/ SWC350: Procés-verbal of the 2nd meeting of the 8th session of the Supreme War Council, 1 Nov. 1918; CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 1/6: Hankey diary, 1 Nov. 1918. 106 CCC, Wemyss MSS WMYSS 11: Beatty to Wemyss, 2 Oct. 1918; B. McL. Ranft (ed.), The Beatty Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty (London, 1989), 1. 554. 107 CCC, Hankey MSS HNKY 4/10: Beatty to Hankey, 23 Oct. 1918 and enc. 108 PRO CAB 24/67/GT6042: Wemyss, Naval conditions of armistice, 19 Oct.

1918; CCC, Wemyss MSS WMYSS 11: Wemyss, Memoirs, PRO CAB 23/14/ WC489A: War Cabinet, 21 Oct. 1918.

282 Armistice Negotiations battle cruisers, eight light cruisers, and fifty of their most modern

destroyers.’ But as late as 30 October, four days after Ludendorff’s resignation, the General Staff in London was still receiving intelligence

suggesting that the German high command was determined to continue to resist rather than accept humiliating armistice terms, and that the German army in the west might be able to delay the

knock-out blow until the spring of 1919." As a result, when Geddes presented the Admiralty’s terms on 1 November, he encountered a barrage of criticism from Foch and Lloyd George. They feared that the terms were so harsh that, coming on top of the

military terms, the Germans would rather continue fighting than accept such humiliation. Foch agreed that the Germans should be asked to surrender their U-boats, but believed that it would be sufficient if the High Seas Fleet were confined to the Baltic and the allies allowed to occupy Cuxhaven and Heligoland.""! Wemyss and

Geddes had to enlist Balfour to harden the Prime Minister’s resolve. The Foreign Secretary reminded him that, just as French interests demanded a victory on land, so Britain’s interests demanded a victory at sea. The internment of German ships might give Britain security during the armistice, but if they were then returned to Germany, Britain would once again find itself engaged in a naval arms race.'!” Lloyd George briefly procrastinated. On 2 November he decided

that if Austria-Hungary surrendered, the allies could stiffen the

terms they imposed on Germany. But if Austria rejected the armistice: ‘We should have to decide whether we wished to con-

clude peace immediately, or whether we wished to continue fighting for another year.’ He did not have to wait long. The Austrians signed an armistice the next day. The Council therefore 109 PRO CAB 24/67/GT6042: Wemyss, Naval conditions of armistice, 19 Oct. 1918; CCC, Wemyss MSS WMYSS 11: Wemyss, Memoirs. 110 PRO CAB 24/68/GT6153: Harrington, Appreciation of the situation, 30 Oct. 1918; PRO FO 371/3435/180960: Kilmarnock to FO, 30 Oct. 1918; PRO FO 371/ 3435/181808: Acton to FO, 1 Nov. 1918; PRO FO 371/3435/181212: Kilmarnock to FO, 1 Nov. 1918. 111 CCC, Wemyss MSS WMYSS 5/7: Wemyss diary, 1 Nov. 1918.

U2 PRO FO 800/201: Balfour to Bonar Law, 1 Nov. 1918; PRO FO 800/199: Balfour to Lloyd George, 1 Nov. 1918. 13 PRO CAB 25/123/SWC3S51: Procés-verbal of the 3rd meeting of the 8th session of the Supreme War Council, 2 Nov. 1918.

Armistice Negotiations 283 decided to insist that the Germans surrender 160 U-boats and agree to the internment in a neutral, or failing that an allied, port of

ten battleships and six battle cruisers. Wemyss still wanted the outright surrender of the German vessels, but the Prime Minister assured him that none of the interned ships would ever be returned to Germany.'"* The German armistice delegation arrived on 8 November.'® On the evening of 10 November, Room 40 intercepted a telegram from

the new German socialist government to their plenipotentiaries, permitting them to sign the terms."'° They did so at 5.10 a.m. on 11

November, and hostilities ended on the western front at 11 a.m. Five minutes before the agreement came into effect, Lloyd George

announced the fact to a crowd outside 10 Downing Street, who ‘started singing “God save the King”, a performance politically though not musically quite satisfactory’ .'"”

It is debatable, however, whether the terms of the German armistice were politically satisfactory. They did not amount to unconditional surrender. The German army did not march into captivity. The British, therefore, left one of the tasks they had set themselves

in 1914 only half complete. The abdication of the Kaiser and the proclamation of a republic on 9 November may have symbolized the destruction of the Junkers’ power. But the fact that the German army could march back into Germany meant that the supreme embodiment of ‘Prussian militarism’ remained intact. In the 1920s right-wing propagandists could claim that the German army had not been defeated in battle but had been stabbed 1n the back by the forces of democracy. Had the Entente invaded Germany and imposed harsher armistice terms, the Weimar regime might have been able to democratize the post-war officer corps, and so rob the 14 PRO FO 371/3445/182550: Balfour to FO, 3 Nov. 1918; Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 241; PRO CAB 25/123/SWC353: Procés-verbal of the 4th meeting of the 8th session of the Supreme War Council, 4 Nov. 1918; CCC, Wemyss MSS WMYSS 11: Wemyss, Memoirs. 15 PRO FO 371/3446/185406: Derby to FO, 8 Nov. 1918. 116 PRO ADM 137/3891: German Imperial Chancellor to German supreme command and plenipotentiaries with the allied army command, 10 Nov. 1918; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/47/4/6: Wemyss to Lloyd George, 10 Nov. 1918. 117 Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, i. 243; HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/47/4/7: Wemyss to Admiralty, 11 Nov. 1918; CCC, Wemyss MSS WMYSS 5/7: Wemyss diary, 8 Nov. 1918; Scott (ed.), Official Statements of War Aims, 477-83.

284 Armistice Negotiations Reichswehr of its ability to organize a militarized Germany which would once again be capable of waging industrialized warfare."'® This is not to suggest that the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Hitler were inevitable because the Entente failed to press home their military advantage. It is to suggest that it was not inevitable that the war had to end in November 1918 in the way in which it did. If the War Cabinet had been better informed about events inside Germany in the last week of October and the first few days of November, it might have reconsidered its decision to opt

for an immediate armistice. Confident that in a short time the Entente could complete the destruction of the German army, ministers might have been willing to ignore President Wilson’s strictures and instead to advance into Germany. This might have had incalculable results for the subsequent history of Europe. However, by the time the British recognized just how close to complete collapse Germany had come, it was too late to reverse

their decision. It was only on 5 November, a day after the last wartime session of the Supreme War Council had ended, that they began to understand that not only the German empire in central and eastern Europe, but the German state itself was disintegrating. On 4 November seamen’s leaders combined with factory workers to establish a local soviet in Kiel. Two days later, similar revol-

utionary organizations appeared mm Hamburg, Bremen, and Liibeck, and by 7 November they had spread to many other cities in the Reich.'!? But the earliest intimation the British received that a revolution might soon erupt in Germany did not reach them until

2 November, when an agent working for the British military attaché in Berne reported that soviets were preparing for a revolution in Berlin and other cities.’”° It was not until the evening of 5 November that Room 40 decoded signals suggesting that discipline

had collapsed in the High Seas Fleet. It was a measure of the confused British appreciation of the situation in Germany that Henry Wilson could tell the War Cabinet on 7 November that ‘from a purely soldier point of view [sic], there did not appear to be 118M. Messerschmidt, ‘German Military Effectiveness between 1919 and 1939’, in A. R. Millett and W. Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness, ii. The Interwar Period (Boston, Mass., 1988), 220-1; M. Kitchen, ‘Militarism and the Development of Fascist Ideology: The Political Ideas of Colonel Max Bauer’, Central European History, 8/3 (1975), 199-220. 19 Schulz, Revolutions and Peace Treaties, 111-12. 20 PRO FO 371/3445/182491: Acton to FO, 2 Nov. 1918.

Armistice Negotiations 285 any actual need yet for the Germans to accept the terms’.'*' It was not until 8 November that the British knew that soviets had been

established as far apart as Bremen, Hanover, Oldenburg, and Rostock.’ It was only when he received this news that Lloyd George was finally convinced that ‘the Germans must accept them [the allies’ armistice terms] in view of our menace through Austria,

the internal conditions of Germany & the revolt of the German

fleet’.'

The armistice terms which Britain helped to negotiate in the autumn of 1918 represented a qualified success. At sea they safeguarded Britain’s maritime supremacy, and on land they confirmed

that if the German army did resume fighting, it would do so at a distinct disadvantage, and on its own soil. They ensured that decisions on the issues of reparations, freedom of the seas, and the future of enemy colonies could be postponed for what the British hoped would be a more auspicious occasion. In Africa and Asia they robbed Turkey or Germany of any hope of menacing Britain’s imperial security. But what they had failed to do was to establish a

new balance of power in Europe that would promote Britain’s post-war interests by ensuring stability on the continent. That was something which would have to be left to the peace conference. 21 PRO CAB 23/8/WC499: War Cabinet, 7 Nov. 1918. 22 PRO ADM 137/3891: Memorandum, 8 Nov. 1918. 23 P. Williamson (ed.), The Modernization of Conservative Politics: The Diaries and Letters of William Bridgeman 1904-1935 (London, 1988), 135.

Conclusion In August 1914 British strategic policy rested on four pillars. Britain would act as paymaster to the Entente. At sea the Royal Navy was expected to keep open the maritime lines of communica-

tion upon which Britain and its allies depended. On land the French and Russian armies would fight to contain the armies of the Central Powers with only minimal direct British assistance. Kitchener predicted that a moment would be reached in early 1917 when the land forces of all of the continental belligerents would be exhausted. Britain’s New Armies could then intervene decisively in the land war, inflict a final defeat on the Central Powers, and enable the British government to dictate the peace settlement.

In September 1916 Lloyd George had promised to deliver the knock-out blow against Germany, and his only mandate to govern rested on the fact that a majority of MPs believed he was more likely than Asquith to do so. In December 1916 Lloyd George did not plan to deviate from Kitchener’s strategy. But between Decem-

ber 1916 and May 1917, at the very moment when the British thought they should have been on the point of victory, the pillars

of Kitchener’s strategy crumbled. The exhaustion of Britain’s financial resources in New York threatened the government’s abil-

ity to act as paymaster to the Entente. The declaration of unrestricted U-boat warfare threatened the Royal Navy’s ability to control the world’s oceans. The Russian Revolution, coupled with the failure of the Nivelle offensive and the mutinies in the French army, cast doubt on how much longer Britain’s major continental allies would be able to contain the armies of the Central Powers.

The War Cabinet was not compelled to adopt the expensive attritional policy it did pursue in the summer and autumn of 1917. They could, like Pétain, have opted to wait for the arrival of the Americans in 1918 before attempting to knock out Germany. They did not do so for a variety of reasons. To some extent the government was the prisoner of its own generals. Lloyd George inherited a group of senior military advisers who were intent on waging a war

Conclusion 287 of attrition on the western front almost regardless of the cost. After

talking to a group of officers who had taken part in the Somme offensive in late 1916, a British diplomat remarked: ‘I don’t think any of them give a moment’s thought to other financial, economic or non-military considerations which might make the prospects of absolute victory less complete.”! In September 1917 one of his own subordinates believed that Sir Lancelot Kiggell, Haig’s chief of staff, was unable ‘to see any aspect of the war beyond the limits of the battle of Ypres’.2 Amery thought that Robertson knew little of politics, history, or economics.’ In the eyes of too many senior officers, victory could only be won by the army and navy, and it was the duty of their civilian masters to provide them uncomplainingly

with the men, money, and munitions they required to achieve it. Many of those same officers had a low opinion of the ignorance of their ministerial superiors. Jellicoe lamented the amount of time he

had to spend ‘in endeavouring to show amateur strategists the impossibility of their ideas’, and Wemyss wrote of ‘the politicians and their ignorance of affairs naval’. In October 1916 Robertson explained the terms upon which he believed soldiers and statesmen could best co-operate, insisting that ‘politicians and soldiers must each keep within their respective sphere,’ and that: Where the politician goes wrong is in wanting to know the why and the wherefore of the soldier’s proposals, and of making the latter the subject of

debate and argument across a table. You then have the man who knows but who cannot talk discussing important questions with the man who can talk but does not know, with the result that the man who knows usually gets defeated in argument and things are done which his instinct tells him

are bad. It was the professionals’ claim to possess expertise which the politicians had no right to question, coupled with Lloyd George’s determination to do just that, which was the cause of so much of the 1 PRO 800/86: Mouncy to Drummond, 25 Nov. 1916. * LHCMA, Clive MSS II/4: Clive diary, 30 Sept. 1917.

3 J. Barnes and D. Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, 1. 1896-1929 (London, 1980), 172. 4 B. McL. Ranft (ed.), The Beatty Papers: Selections from the Private and Official

Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty QLondon, 1989), 1. 524; A. Temple Patterson (ed.), The Jellicoe Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe (London, 1968), ii. 181. > LHCMA, Robertson MSS 1/33/73: Robertson to Repington, 31 Oct. 1916; see also PRO CAB 17/150: Hankey to Lloyd George, 22 May 1916.

288 Conclusion tension in civil—military relations. It was the absence of sufficient

mutual respect between so many politicians and senior officers, especially during the Lloyd George regime, which made those tensions so difficult to resolve. In addition, Lloyd George was not master in his own house, for he was a Prime Minister without a majority party to call his own.

He was never able to rid himself completely of his advisers, for some of them were protected by the powerful patronage of the Unionist party. However, his domestic political difficulties were not the only reason why Britain persisted with an attritional strategy. Britain had entered the war believing that it could win it in association with its allies. But the Asquith government quickly

recognized that in reality these allies heavily circumscribed Britain’s freedom of action. As early as December 1914, it was becoming apparent that France and Russia were not willing to act as Britain’s continental cat’s-paws and suffer the growing human losses of the European land war without significant British assistance. At no point in the war did Britain possess the power so to dominate its allies that it could ignore their wishes. A strategy based on association had to give way to one based on co-operation. That was a difficult path for the British to follow, for they recognized that Britain and its allies were not pursuing the same political objectives. By 1918 the ad hoc machinery of liaison officers, diplomatic representatives, and occasional prime ministerial summits

had been supplemented by the elaborate bureaucracy of the Supreme War Council. But even that did not overcome the legion of practical obstacles standing in the way of closer allied co-oper-

ation. The growth of the bureaucracy of inter-allied relations, superficially so impressive, often failed to resolve fundamental divergences of national interests. Conferences sometimes only demonstrated, as Wemyss discovered in May 1918, that: ‘Our dear allies the French and the Italians are really almost more difficult to deal with than is the enemy.”

Wemyss’s attitude was symptomatic of the frustration which many British policy-makers felt at their partners’ unwillingness to

sacrifice their national interests for the sake of Britain. Balfour 6 CCC, Wemyss MSS WMYSS 5/7: Wemyss diary, 30 Oct. 1918; IWM, Wilson MSS microfilm reel VI: Wilson diary, 5 Apr. 1917; Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, 1. 186. 7 CCC, Wemyss MSS WMYS 11: Wemyss to Beatty, 29 May 1918.

Conclusion 289 warned with respect to France and Italy that ‘You never know how long a particular mood will exist in any country, least of all in the Latin countries.’® Milner believed that ‘It does make a difference to all foreigners—& especially Latins—to have a pat on the back & the sense of not being left in the lurch, when they are in the depths

of depression.’ By contrast, “The practical British doesn’t care about these things .. .’.” Henry Wilson dismissed the French as ‘half

men, half children and half women and that it is this last half that always beats us’.’° The result was that Britain’s relations with its allies were distinguished by the same ‘competitive co-operation’ that marred its relations with its allies in the Second World War. By 1916-17 British policy-makers had learnt the lesson that the solidarity of the Entente alliance demanded ‘an effort du sang’. In

the summer of 1917 the War Policy Committee weighed up Britain’s strategic options in the light of the crises in France and Russia, Britain’s own growing economic and manpower problems, the impact of German air raids on British domestic morale, and the military and diplomatic options in the Middle East, the Balkans, and on the Italian and western fronts. Inaction did not seem to be a viable option. Every time the Entente had allowed the Germans to seize the initiative in the past—in August 1914 when they had launched the Schlieffen Plan, in May 1915 when they had broken through on the eastern front at Gorlice-Tarnow, in September 1915 when they had invaded Serbia, and in February 1916 when they had begun to bleed the French army dry at Verdun—they had inflicted

grievous losses on the Entente. Reliance on the blockade might work, but, as Milner wrote in June 1917: ‘My only doubt is whether the Allied nations—suffering as they do, very acutely themselves—

would stick it out long enough to make this pressure decisive." Haig wanted to attack in Flanders because he believed that he could defeat the German army and win the war in 1917. Robertson supported him because he hoped that the offensive would make a major contribution towards his policy of wearing down Germany’s ability and willingness to continue fighting. Jellicoe backed Haig’s offensive because he wanted to eliminate the German naval threat to cross-Channel communications and because he wished to end § PRO CAB 23/41/IWC19: Minutes of the Imperial War Cabinet, 20 June 1918. ? PRO FO 800/204/229: Milner to Balfour, 15 Mar. 1918. 10 ITWM, Wilson MSS microfilm reel VI: Wilson diary, 18 Mar. 1917. 4 Bodleian Library, Milner MSS dep. 354: Milner to Poulton, 8 June 1917.

290 Conclusion the possibility that after the war the Germans might remain in

possession of the Channel coast and permanently threaten Britain’s maritime security.

Lloyd George gave his assent in the full knowledge that Haig would receive only minimal French assistance, but the politicians did not believe they were giving him permission to mount a sustained and costly battle of attrition on the model of the Somme. They had insisted, and Haig had apparently agreed, that his operation would proceed cautiously. They knew nothing of the confusion

and ambiguities which riddled the tactical planning of the battle. The crucial information which determined the politicians’ attitude towards the situation in France was not their understanding of what had happened to the French army; it was their understanding of the wider crisis in French society. They feared that if they did not act

vigorously to sustain French national morale, Caillaux might emerge as Prime Minister of a defeatist government bent on making peace. There seemed to be no other means available to them to

give French morale the boost they deemed necessary. A major diplomatic victory—a negotiated peace with one of Germany’s allies—appeared unlikely in the light of German military success against Russia. A great military victory in Palestine was geographically too remote to have much impact on the war in Europe, and in any case could not be mounted until the autumn. They were reluc-

tant to follow Pétain’s strategy, because of the slowness of the American military build-up and because, although they explicitly rejected Jellicoe’s assertion that Britain would have too little merchant shipping to continue fighting into 1918, the convoy system was still in an experimental stage. The Italian option was ruled out, not just by Haig and Robertson but by the French. Flanders was the only option remaining. Lloyd George did not think that Haig could deliver the knock-out blow in Flanders in 1917, but he hoped that

he just might present him with the morale-boosting victory the Entente needed. It was only in the autumn of 1917, after Haig had so patently failed to fulfil his aim, that Lloyd George was able to persuade his colleagues to adopt the Fabian policy of waiting for the arrival of the AEF and inflicting a final defeat on the Germans in 1919. In the

meantime, they turned eastward and determined to knock out Turkey, both to secure the British empire in Asia following the

| Conclusion 291 Russian collapse and to provide the Entente with a victory to persuade its people to continue fighting into 1919. It was only the failure of the German offensive in the spring and summer of 1918 that enabled the Entente to force an armistice on Germany a year earlier than they had planned.

From the beginning of the war British policy-makers had a clear appreciation that they were fighting to ensure a greater measure of security for Britain and its empire in the post-war world. They were determined not only to win the war but also to win the peace, and to achieve both objectives at minimum cost to Britain. Some vestiges of a cost-benefit approach to strategy remained even after the Kitchener armies had been committed to the western front in 1916.

At home the Lloyd George government tried to balance the need to maintain Britain’s military and naval effort and give economic

assistance to the allies with the need to contain domestic war

weariness and to preserve the industries upon which Britain’s post-

war prosperity would depend. In August 1918 Milner replied to French critics who claimed that Britain had retained too many men in industry who ought to have been sent to fight in France that: The question is... one of doing that which would contribute most to the victory of the Allies, thereby reducing the sacrifice of each and all, and ensuring that each and all should reap the fruits of their sacrifices. To have concentrated our whole effort upon achieving an equality of sacrifice with France in respect of the number of men put into the field, regardless of the needs of our Allies, would under the actual conditions of the present war, have been no service to the Allies’ cause or France herself.”

Allied criticisms were not justified. By 1916 the British were steadily sacrificing their long-term economic well-being to the immediate need to defeat the Central Powers. Lloyd George’s crony, Lord Riddell, was right when he wrote of the Prime Minister that: “The

expense of the war never seems to enter into his calculations. He rejoices in the sacrifices and efforts which he induces his country-

men to make. The question of the price never enters into his contemplation; the object to be achieved is the only thing that matters.’ 2 PRO CAB 24/62/GT5532: Milner, British manpower, 28 Aug. 1918. 13. G. Riddell, Lord Riddell’s War Diary 1914-1918 (London, 1933), 343.

292 Conclusion The effort and the price were indeed prodigious. On land Britain and its empire deployed 8,985,735 men on all fronts during the war, including 5,399,563 men who served on the western front. By the

armistice, the BEF represented about a third of the total allied force in France and Belgium.'* At sea the Grand Fleet was the cornerstone of the Entente. Had it failed to prevent the High Seas Fleet from operating effectively outside the Baltic, the Entente’s maritime communications would have been severed. The number of vessels of all types in service with the Royal Navy increased from 658 warships and auxiliaries in August 1914 to 5,018 in September

1918. The number of personnel carried on the fleet’s books rose from 145,318 officers and men to 408,997 over the same period. Thanks to the navy’s efforts, the British merchant marine was able to transport nearly 23,000,000 personnel, over 2,000,000 animals, and 52,000,000 tons of military stores.

The financial, economic, and human cost of this effort was equally immense. By 1920 the National Debt stood at £7,685 million, a twelvefold increase since 1914. During the war Britain lent £1,768 million to its allies and Dominions.” By 1918 British industry had been so concentrated on the war effort that the Minister of Shipping feared that ‘we shall be left with no export trades when the war is over if the present position continues’.'’ Far from reaping a profit from the war, in June 1918 the Board of Trade surveyed Britain’s imports and exports, and concluded that ‘when account is taken of the great rise in prices, both these figures imply large contractions in the quantity of exports’. In 1914 Britain had been the world’s largest creditor nation. By 1919 it owed £840 million to the USA and £90 million to Canada.’° One in four British servicemen were wounded and one in eight killed during the war. Those highest up the social scale, who were most likely to serve as ‘4 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/116: General Staff, British military effort during the war, 20 Dec. 1918. 'S HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/116: Admiralty, The British naval effort, 4 Aug. 1914 to 11 Nov. 1918, 24 Dec. 1918.

‘6 PRO CAB 24/5/G257: Treasury, Memorandum by the Treasury on the financial position and future prospects of this country, 18 July 1919. 17 PRO CAB 24/57/GT5153: Maclay, Proposal to improve the quality of bread, 15

ar PRO CAB 24/55/GT4980: Stanley, 17th report by the Board of Trade on imports and industry in relation to shipping, 27 June 1918.

19 PRO CAB 24/5/G257: Treasury, Memorandum by the Treasury on the financial position and future prospects of this country, 18 July 1919.

Conclusion 293 junior officers in the army, suffered a disproportionate share of the

casualties. The concept of the ‘lost generation’ was not a myth. International comparisons suggest that, compared to the number of men mobilized, the British army suffered more fatal casualties than either the German or Austrian armies.”°

These figures raise two questions: why did the Lloyd George government persist with the war despite its growing human, economic, and financial cost, and were Britain’s sacrifices worthwhile? Ministers had few doubts that they were and rejected the possibility

of a negotiated peace for a number of reasons. They saw the magnitude of what was at stake. Smuts described the war as ‘the greatest struggle in the world’s history’.“1 Lloyd George believed that ‘the destiny of the human race hangs on the issue of this war’.” The very enormity of the human losses which Britain suffered made it difficult for policy-makers to contemplate an unsatisfactory end to the fighting for fear that the nation’s sacrifices had been in vain. When Bonar Law’s son was killed in 1917, the Prime Minister

reminded him that ‘the knowledge that your gallant boy gave his life for a great cause must sustain you in your trial’.”

Britain’s strategic situation never seemed so precarious that policy-makers were led to believe that there was no way Britain could win the war. Even in the middle of 1917, in the midst of the U-boat crisis, the Russian Revolution, and the French mutinies, the strategic picture they confronted was not entirely bleak. Although they realized that American assistance would not arrive rapidly,

they believed that the entry of the USA into the war would eventually compensate them for the Russian collapse and France’s visible weakening. For the remainder of the war, the British government tried to extract the maximum amount of resources from the Wilson administration while offering them the fewest possible political concessions in return. By August 1917 it was evident that, although the U-boats had not been defeated, the threat they posed 20 J. M. Winter, The Great War and the British People (London, 1985), 71-2, 74;

see also id., ‘Britain’s “Lost Generation” of the First World War’, Population Studies, 31/3 (1977), 449-65.

1 Speech delivered by General Smuts at the House of Lords, 15 May 1917, in J. C. Smuts, Wartime Speeches: A Compilation of the Public Utterances in Great Britain by Lt. Gen. J. C. Smuts (London, 1917), 25. 22 The Times, 13 Sept. 1918.

23 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/30/2/18: Lloyd George to Bonar Law, 6 June 1917.

294 Conclusion to Britain’s maritime communications was being contained. The War Cabinet therefore had no immediate cause to seek a negotiated peace on German terms. Policy-makers were also sustained by a particular view of British

history. Just as some of them had gone to war convinced that the German government was intent on emulating Napoleonic France in attempting to establish its hegemony over Europe, so the knowIl-

edge that Britain had eventually defeated Napoleon encouraged them to believe that they could defeat Germany. ‘Yes’, asserted

Lloyd George in October 1917, ‘they would wear him |i.e. Germany] down. That is what the Allies did to Napoleon, and that is what we must do to the Germans.” It was just as well that they were sustained by this view of their national history, for until the autumn of 1918 any terms which the Germans might have accepted would have fallen far short of what the British sought. In September 1918 Lloyd George asserted to the newspaper editor C. P. Scott that he, like ‘the mass of the nation

was for a moderate policy which would secure our ends without unnecessary sacrifice’.* But the terms which the British and French had set out in their reply to President Wilson in January 1917 were

anything but moderate. Their quest for ‘restitution, reparation, guarantee against repetition’ did not only imply the disappearance

of the Austrian and Turkish empires.” It also implied a constitutional revolution in Germany culminating in a democratic gov-

ernment and the end of Germany’s hopes of establishing a middle-European empire which would ensure its hegemony over most of Europe. In March 1917 Lloyd George told Scott that “The destruction of militarism—i.e. of reactionary military government’ in Germany, and ‘the establishment of popular government as a basis of international peace’ were essential for the future peace of the world.”’ His generals agreed, for, as Macdonogh minuted in November 1917, ‘if the German people is not convinced at the end of this war that Prussianism does not pay, it will not be long before we have another ...’.”8 4 Riddell, War Diary, 287. 25 T. Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott 1911-1918 (London, 1970), ar Hansard, HC Debs., 5th ser., vol. 88, col. 1335, 19 Dec. 1917. 27 Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, 267-8. 28 HLRO, Lloyd George MSS F/44/3/32: Macdonogh, Memorandum, 24 Nov. 1917.

Conclusion 295 Even when, following the Russian collapse and the failure of the

Flanders offensive, the War Cabinet reduced the scope of their

ambitions and abandoned their public commitment to force democracy on Germany at the point of the bayonet, ministers and generals remained committed to defeating Germany’s current

bid for hegemony. Anything less would leave Germany able to threaten the security of Britain and its empire. That was unthinkable. Smuts believed that it was axiomatic that the British empire,

an organization ‘far greater than any Empire which has ever existed’, was a major force for moral good in the world.” The empire was, Lloyd George asserted, “the truest representative of freedom—in the spirit even more than in the letter of its institutions’? What was at stake for the British people were ‘their very lives and Imperial existence’.' A German-dominated middle-European empire was intolerable, for it would present a mortal threat

to the security of Britain and its empire. As Henry Wilson explained to the War Cabinet on 7 March 1918: Germany’s original programme was almost certainly to first make herself paramount in the Balkans, and then cut us off from our shortest line to India by establishing herself at the head of the Persian Gulf and in Egypt. She now finds herself debarred from the Persian Gulf and from Egypt, but the collapse of Russia has opened to her a new and more northerly road to the East by the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Caspian. If she succeeds in dominating Russia effectively she will have secured the northern flank of this line of advance and may even hope ultimately to develop a new drang nach osten, which will place her eventually on the shores of the Pacific.”

The War Cabinet feared that if they failed even in their more modest objective of defeating Germany’s current bid for hegemony, any peace they made would be no more than a temporary truce, and the post-war defence budget would be correspondingly

crippling. According to Robertson, ‘any peace which leaves the military domination of Prussia successful and intact will entail upon us in the future such a strain as would almost certainly render our 2? Smuts, Wartime Speeches, 31.

0 PRO CAB 24/43/IWC1: Minutes of the Imperial War Cabinet, 20 Mar. 1917. 31 PRO CAB 24/37/GT3145: Robertson, The present military situation with regard to the peace proposals of the Central Powers, 29 Dec. 1917. 32 PRO CAB 24/44/GT3891: Wilson, Note by the CIGS on memorandum T.21169 of 7 Mar. 1918, circulated by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (GT3840), 11 Mar. 1918.

296 Conclusion position intolerable, and to conclude peace before we have made

our greatest possible effort would be to estrange our overseas Dominions, to betray our own interests, and to dishonour the memory of those who have laid down their lives for the Empire’.

But at a deeper level, as the War Cabinet’s dismissal of the Lansdowne letter indicated, by late 1917 the war aims of both alliances no longer bore much relationship to what was militarily practical. The comments of an anonymous Foreign Office official on von KtihImann, ‘For his weakness seems to lie in this—that he does not recognise that he is face to face with national passions and convictions which cannot be dealt with merely by cleverness in

negotiation’, could have been applied to most of his British counterparts. The British gained a number of obvious benefits from the war. Britain had established itself as the paramount power in that huge arch of territory washed by the Indian Ocean. By 1922 a relatively stable post-war order had emerged in the Near and Middle East which lasted until the late 1930s. The threats which the Turkish empire had once posed to British security had collapsed, never to return. The threat to British security from the Tsarist empire had

also disappeared, although it was to be replaced in time by the menace of Bolshevism. The German threat, however, was only temporarily in abeyance. But Britain also gained one intangible benefit from the war which might have been of incalculable value. The willingness of British policy-makers to sacrifice almost three-

quarters of a million men to defeat the Central Powers made a profound impression on the minds of its former enemies. Britain may have lost some of its economic supremacy to the USA in the course of the war, but British power rested on more than pounds, shillings, and pence. It also rested on prestige—the visible expression of the willingness of Britain’s rulers and people to sacrifice themselves to retain their possessions. One German veteran noted after the war that the experience of fighting the British army in Flanders had quickly disabused him of 33 PRO CAB 24/37/GT3145: Robertson, The present military situation with regard to the peace proposals of the Central Powers, 29 Dec. 1917. 34 PRO CAB 24/31/GT2588: Dept. of Information, Intelligence Bureau, Memorandum on the views of Kiithlmann and Czernin on the situation, 25 Oct. 1917.

Conclusion 297 the notion that the British people were decadent.* ‘Prestige’ remained a powerful weapon in Britain’s armoury because other powers recognized it as such. But, perhaps because they were so overwhelmed by the human and economic cost of the war, too many British policy-makers in the 1920s and 1930s failed to realize

its worth. They behaved as if national power rested on nothing except tangible assets. Foreign observers were not so blind. In May

1938 a senior Czech officer told the British military attaché in Prague: ‘You English possess a powerful weapon to a degree which no other country enjoys and that is, your national prestige.”*° But

within a few months Neville Chamberlain flew to Munich and squandered this priceless resource. He met the same German veteran who had been so impressed by the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of British soldiers in Flanders. Shortly after the Munich conference Hitler confided to his generals that Chamberlain and company were, ‘little worms’. Nothing that happened subsequently

caused him to forget that: ‘they yielded to us everywhere. Like cowards they gave in to all our demands.”’ 35 J. R. Ferris, ‘ “The Greatest Power on Earth”: Great Britain in the 1920s’, International History Review, 13/4 (1991), 742-3. 36 P. Meehan, The Unnecessary War: Whitehall and the German Resistance to Hitler (London, 1992), 131. 37 Quoted in J. C. Fest, Hitler (London, 1973), 566.

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Index Abbeville 226 Anglo-French Entente (1904) 4 Acre 262 Anglo-Russian Entente (1907) 4 Adams, W. S. S. 23 Arab revolt 11 Addison, C. 13, 77, 85, 86, 88, 90, 245, Arabia 38, 133, 197, 198, 204

247 Archangel 174, 242

Admirality 28, 41, 72-3, 79, 168, 175, Armenia 38, 91, 197, 204, 240, 266

209 Army Council 84, 165-6, 186, 218

Anti-submarine division 44, 72 Arras 110, 214, 225 armistice with Germany 281-2 Asia Minor 105, 203 conduct Flanders offensive 132 Asquith, H. H. 1, 16, 30, 90, 165

Room 40-1, 168, 283, 284 Lansdowne letter 200-1 strategy in North Sea and manpower policy 181 Baltic 150-3, 174—5, 292 Maurice debate 234—5

Trade division 71 strategy of government (1914unrestricted U-boat warfare 43-4, 16) 4—6, 67-8

71-5, 207 war alms 146, 219

War Staff 23, 71, 152, 168, 169 Astor, W. 24

Adriatic 106, 162, 189 Athens 98

Aegean 34, 264 attrition, strategy of 16, 21-2, 31, 62, Afghanistan 175, 176, 178, 255 97, 100, 122, 128, 286-7, 293-4

aircraft production 84, 185 Australia 62, 63, 77

air raids 83-4 Austria—Hungary 6, 8, 187

Aland islands 173 armistice negotiations 279-80, 282 Albania 105 army 31 Aleppo 262 separate peace 104-9, 195, 196-7, Alexiev, General 49, 60, 101 198-9, 210-11

Allenby, Sir E. 133, 135, 153, 155, 167, war weariness 248—9

190, 262, 263 Austro-German conference (Oct. Allied Maritime Transport 1916) 34 Council 237 Auxiliary Service Law 5, 31 Alsace-Lorraine 61, 64, 106, 142, 144, Azores 33 146, 147, 201, 203, 210, 225, 281

Amalgamated Society of Baghdad 9, 11, 132, 135, 153, 167, 255 Engineers 86, 87-8, 187, 229 Baden, Prince Max of 268 American Expeditionary Force: Baker, Newton D. 238

amalgamation with British and Balfour, A. 19, 37-8, 59, 93, 143, 144, French armies 179-80, 186, 236-9 146, 158, 168, 239, 250, 251 slow arrival in France 9, 102, 156, alliance relations 288—9

161, 178-80, 182, 236-9 armistice with Germany 282

Amery, L. 15, 63, 130, 287 Bolshevism 280 impact of Russian collapse 175-6 fourteen points 273-4 Amiens 215, 224, 225, 256 intervention in Russia 241 Anglo-French conference: mission to USA 26, 65-6

(Dec. 1916) 37-8 separate peace with Austria— (Feb. 1917) 55-7, 94 Hungary and Turkey 197-8 (May 1917) 97, 100, 110, 114 Balfour declaration 135

(Aug. 1917) 134-5 Baltic 34, 292 (Sept. 1917) 136-7 Baltic states 278

320 Index Bapaume 50 Blair, Lt.-Col. 45, 172

Barnes, G. 17, 18, 143, 184, 203 Bliss, General 179, 184, 188, 236, 238

war weariness 194, 195 blockade of Central Powers 41, 154, Basra 263 173-4, 244, 289 battle of: Board of Agriculture 68

Amiens 234, 269, 272 Board of Trade 78, 82, 209

Arras 60, 124 blockade of Central Powers 245—6

Broodseinde 125 Bohemia 105

Brusilov offensive 31 Bonar Law, A. 14, 17-18, 19, 59, 69Cambrai 9, 166~7, 169, 222 70, 83, 142, 145, 149, 156, 208

Caporetto 9, 159-61, 162, 165, 169, armistice with Germany 271

196, 197, 229 Bolsheviks 9, 141, 172—3, 176, 193,

Chateau-Thierry 206, 239—44, 267, 273 Flanders offensive 9, 50, 54, 94-123, German armistice 277—8, 280 124-32, 148 Bosphorus 198, 204, 265

Gallipoli 3 Bradbury, Sir J. 69-70

Gaza, second battle 134 ‘brass hats’ 1 Gaza, third battle 167 Bremen 284, 285

Jutland 31, 41, 151 Breslau 174 Kerensky offensive 124, 142 Brest-Litovsk, treaty of 172-3, 177, Langemarck 125 201, 211, 229, 249, 280

Loos 3 Briand, A. 53, 56, 60, 118, 133-4 Passchendaele 125, 126, 127, 270 Bridgeman, W. L. 206

Poelcapelle 125 Bridges, Maj. Gen. 102

Polygon Wood 125 Britain:

Menin Road 125 American entry into war 65-6, 94,

Nivelle offensive 27, 40, 53-61, 286 193, 237

Somme (1916) 3, 16, 22, 31, 33, 34, armistice with Bulgaria 12, 260-2

287 armistice with Germany 12, 268-85

Third battle of Ypres, see Flanders armistice with Turkey 12, 264—7

offensive army’s manpower requirements 84-—

Trafalgar 41 5, 157, 180—6, 237, 270

Verdun 31, 50, 57, 96 army’s morale 128-9, 194, 223, 228-

Vittorio Veneto 279 9

: Batum 173 assistance from Dominions 41

Beatty, Sir D. 20-1 balance of payments 67 armistice with Germany 281 blockade of Central Powers 244-6, blockade of Germany 41 289 convoys 71 campaign of 1919: 9-12, 171, 181-

strategy in North Sea and 92, 193, 212, 213, 235, 253-9, 260,

Baltic 150-3, 174-5 271

Beauvais agreement 226 civil-military relations 18, 21, 22-3, Beaverbrook, Lord 247-8 51, 55—7, 130-1, 149, 164-6, 186—

Beersheba 133, 135 7, 287-9 Belfast 209 coal shortages 83, 85

Belgium 34, 35, 64, 91, 106, 141, 144, competition from US shipping 76,

176, 178, 201, 203, 210, 281 237, 275-6, 292 economic assistance to 42 co-operation with France and Russia

Bertie, Lord 25—6, 27, 118-19, 200, (1914-16) 3-5, 184, 286, 288

232 co-operation with France and Russia

140, 246 123

Bethmann-Hollweg, T. von 32, 81, (1917-18) 7-12, 44-7, 52-60, 96-

Black Sea 34, 265, 295 cost of living 82

Index 321 cost of war 291-3 strategy (1917/18) 6-12, 50-9, 63, Drang nach dem Osten 11, 34, 52, 93—123

63—4, 105, 175-7, 198, 221, 240, strategy and manpower 272-3

243, 255, 295 suspicions of French post-war 273, 275, 291, 292 strategy in 1940: 1

economic assistance to allies 4, 42, ambitions 261-2, 271-2, 273 economic dependence on USA 33, strikes of May 1917 25, 67, 82-91

35, 40, 42, 67-8, 90, 286, 292 unrestricted U-boat warfare 70-82, European balance of power 34, 252, 286

278 war aims and peace terms (1914-

fear of national bankruptcy 5-6, 33 16) 3-5

fear that allies might make separate war aims and peace terms (1917-

peace 35, 46, 142-3, 159 18) 7-12, 34-9, 52, 63-6, 105,

fear of invasion (1917) 41, 229 139-47, 260, 291, 293-6 food production 69, 183 war weariness 7, 15—16, 17, 25, 67-

food stocks 44, 80-1 70, 82-91, 166, 193-5, 207-10, historiography of grand strategy in 229-31, 291

First World War 1-3 British Expeditionary Force 4, 8, 9, 14,

impact of Russian collapse on 22, 54, 55, 97, 112, 117, 129, 146,

Strategy 11, 48-50, 171-8 153, 162, 182, 213-14, 216, 217,

imperial objectives in Middle 218, 226, 254 East 38, 91, 153, 175-6, 198, Armies:

264-7 First 223

imports 70-1, 75, 80, 156 Second 129, 223 inflation 67, 82, 194, 208, 209 Third 166, 223, 225 intelligence and collapse of Fourth 228

Germany 269-70, 284-5 Fifth 114, 125, 223, 228, 233

intelligence community 25-30, 100 possible evacuation from

intervention in Russia 239-44 France 227-8

labour movement and Stockholm reduction in size 186, 270

peace conference 141-3 see also GHQ

manpower shortages 8, 67, 69, 76, British Workers’ League 90 84—5, 171, 180-6, 230, 237, 272-3 Bruay 256 merchant shipping losses 8, 32, 43, Bruges 132

67, 71, 73, 74 Brusilov, General 101 Germany 280-1 Buchanan, Sir G 25-6

military armistice terms with Buchan, J 90-1

naval armistice terms with Bucharest 5, 31

Germany 278, 281-2 Bucharest, treaty of 280

oil and British war aims 266-7 budget (1917) 83

overseas debt 42 Bukhara 176

post-war settlement 296-7 Bulgaria 99

post-war trade 79-80, 292 armistice negotiations 260-2, 267 power within the Entente Separate peace with 104, 108, 157, alliance 1917/18 10, 94, 97, 192 195, 196

prestige 296-7 Burian, Count 250 psychological warfare against Burnham, Lord 148

Central Powers 247-55 by-elections 195 1916—Jan. 1917) 33-9 Wansbeck 231

rejection of negotiated peace (Dec. Keighley 231

Salonika campaign 98-100, 260-2 Byng, Sir J 166, 225 shipbuilding 74—7, 185

strategy (1914-16) 3-6, 260, 286 Cadorna, General 52, 108, 109, 121,

322 Index Cadorna, General (cont): 22, 96, 133, 158, 202, 218-21 136, 137, 139, 153, 159-61, 163, China 240

188 Churchill, W. 1, 14, 30, 111, 149—SO, Caillaux, J. 117-20, 290 205-6, 209

Calais agreement 56-8, 94 Anglo-French alliance 227

Calthorpe, Vice-Admiral 265 munitions budget (1918) 182

Cambon, P. 38 naval strategy 151-2

Canada 62, 63, 292 technologically intensive Canadian Corps 60, 221 strategy 182-3, 258 Carson, Sir E. 17, 19, 44, 59, 74, 91, Clausewitz, C. von 3 138, 145, 150, 158, 166, 168, 184, ‘clean-cut’ policy 187

206, 223, 247 Clemenceau, G. 118—20, 222

blockade of Central Powers 245-6 Bulgarian and Turkish

Maurice debate 234 armistices 261-5 war aims 178 Doullens agreement 225-6

Caspian Sea 255, 295 German armistice 279

casualties: strategy for campaign of 1918American 9 19 188-92, 221, 271, 273 British 2, 23, 114, 130, 149, 180, war aims 197

292-3 Clémentel, E. 244-6 209 German 31 Coal Controller

Italian 52 Commission of Inquiry into Industrial Catholic Centre Party 81 Unrest 88-9 Caucasus 135, 177, 240, 278, 295 Committee of Union and Progress 199 Cavan, Earl of 233-4 see also Turkey

Caxton Hall 203 Compiégne 226

Cecil, Lord R. 14, 19, 37-8, 39, 59, 86, Congress of Oppressed

138, 143, 203, 219, 244, 245, 261, Nationalities 250

263 Constantine of Greece, King 98-100 civil—military relations 130 Constantinople 176, 203, 240, 264, 265, German armistice 277 266 Central Powers 3, 4, 5, 7, 17, 35, 38, convoy system, 70-5, 152 155, 203 Corn Production Act 69 collapse of 260 Courland 33, 172 strategy 10, 31, 52, 96, 163, 176, Coventry 86

213-14 Cox, Brig.-Gen. 223

see also Austria—Hungary; Bulgaria; Crewe House:

German; Turkey psychological warfare against

Chamberlain, A. 14, 17, 20, 59, 232 Austria-Hungary 247-52 Chamberlain, N. 20, 69, 180 psychological warfare against

Munich conference 297 Germany 252-3

see also Director of National Service Crowe, Sir E. 277 Chancellor of the Exchequer 208, 210 Cummings, Sir M. 27-8 Channel ports 58, 64, 113, 124, 126, Curzon, Lord 17, 18, 59, 63, 101, 156,

162, 213, 214, 216, 223, 224, 227, 158, 184, 206, 263

228, 256 committee on restriction of

Chantilly Conference (Nov. 1916) 16, imports 70-1, 77-80

44, 50 German armistice 274

Charteris, Brig.-Gen. 112, 128, 167 impact of Russian collapse 175-6

Chelmsford, Lord 175 slow arrival of AEF 102 Chemin des Dames 228, 253 Cuxhaven 282

Chief of the Air Staff 232, 266 Czech Legion 242, 243 Chief of the Imperial General Staff 21, Czech National Committee 252

Index 323 Czecho-Slovaks 38, 280 Egypt 10-11, 98, 175, 198, 295

Czernin, Count 104, 197, 198, 210 Egyptian Expeditionary Force 133, 153, 262

Daily Chronicle 165 Enemy Personnel Committee 132

Daily Mail 200 Entente alliance 8, 9, 31, 35, 94, 140,

Daily Telegraph 148, 166 195 and Lansdowne letter 199-200, 296 Beauvais and Doullens Damascus 9, 262, 263 agreements 226-7

Dardanelles 131, 198, 204, 265, 266 intervention in Russia 239-44

Davidson, Sir J. 115 need for better co-ordination of

Davies, D. 23 strategy 148, 158, 161-3

Davies, J. 24 strategy (1916-18) 44-5, 50, 51, 57, Débeny, General 100 61, 157, 174, 180, 185, 212, 267 ‘Declaration of the Seven’ 263 see also Supreme War Council Defence of the Realm Act 87, 88 Erzberger, M. 81 Delmé-Radcliffe, Brig.-Gen. Sir C. 27, Esher, Lord 25, 118, 120

52, 159, 160 Estonia 173

Denmark 28, 32 Etalpes 128-9

Department of Information, 90-1, 247 — excess profits duty 208 Intelligence Bureau 29-30, 100, 139,

140 Faeroes islands 33

Derby, Lord 18, 19, 44, 56, 57, 59, 92, Fatherland party 140-1, 246-7 138, 165-6, 167, 178, 180, 183, 195, Fayolle, General 225

218 Federal Reserve Board 42

dismissal 232 Feisal, Amir 263

d’Esperey, General 260-2, 264, 266 Ferdinand, Tsar 196

Devonport, Lord 19-20, 69, 89 Finland 173, 243 voluntary rationing 82-3 First Commissioner of Works 208

see also Food Controller First Punic War 268

Diaz, General 163 First Sea Lord 20, 72

57, 128 Wemyss

Director of Military Intelligence 29, see also Sir J. Jellicoe and Sir R.

see also Sir G. Macdonogh Fisher, V. 90

Director of Military Operations 15,27, Foch, General Ferdinand 12, 27, 108,

28, 101, 221 137, 153, 161, 163, 188, 217, 221

see also Sir F. Maurice armistice with Germany 270, 273,

Director of National Service 20, 68, 281, 282

69, 180-1, 229 Generalissimo 226-7, 271

Director of Special Intelligence 129, Italian offensive 138

247 opposition to Flanders

Doullens conference 224-6 offensive 110, 126

Drummond, Sir E. 146 Folkestone 83

Duff, Vice-Admiral Sir A. 72-3 Food Controller 19-20, 69, 207

Duma 49 Foreign Office 25-6, 27, 28, 100, 296

Dunkirk 227, 228 consuls 28

‘Dunsterforce’ 177 fear that allies might make a

Dunsterville, Maj.-Gen. 177 separate peace 35, 118

Dury 225 Papal mediation 143-4 Political Intelligence

eastern Anatolia Department 253, 268, 277

‘easterners’ 1-3, 6, 177-8, 220-1 separate peace with Germany’s

Economic Offensive Committee 245—6 allies 103-9, 195, 196-7, 198-9,

Edmonds, Sir James 1 210—11, 249-43, 290

324 Index Foreign Office (cont.) German East Africa 64, 91 War Department 29, 119 Germany 5, 6, 8 Zionism 135 African colonies 204 France 3, 9, 10, 32, 34, 64 Drang nach dem Osten 11

Alsace-Lorraine 34, 35, 61, 64, 205 Far Eastern colonies 33, 204 Chamber of Deputies 35, 117-19, impact of attrition upon 31, 128,

142 132, 148, 154, 246-7

dissatisfied with British impact of blockade upon 43, 97, 154 assistance 53-4, 199-—200, 288 Kiihlmann peace proposals 144-9 economic assistance from Britain 42 Papal mediation 144

French Congo 35 peace feelers (December 1916)

manpower shortages 53-4 31-4

mutinies in army in 1917: 8, 40, 50, revolution 283—4

60—2, 92, 100-1, 113-14, 121 seeks armistice 267

Nivelle offensive, 53-60, 94 spring 1918 offensive, 11-12

Palestine and Syria 133-5 strategy 10-11, 31-2, 57-8, 95-6,

Salonika 98-100 159-60, 213-14

separate peace with Austria— see also OHL Hungary and Turkey 196-7 treaty of Brest-Litovsk 173

strikes and domestic morale in war aims 8-9, 33, 92, 139-40, 144—

1917: 8, 100, 117-20 5, 172-3, 177, 210, 295 Hungary 104 GHOQ 27, 58, 95, 115, 124, 131-2, 148, French, Lord 156, 158 149, 167-8, 223, 224, 231 Franz-Joseph, Emperor of Austria— Gheluvelt plateau 114, 125

Friesian islands 152 Secret Service 2828

‘frock coats’ 1 Gibraltar 72, 233

Giolliti, G 159, 160

‘Garden Suburb’ 23-4 Glasgow 91 Garvin, J. L. 205 Globe 186 Gasparri, Cardinal 143 Goeben 174 Gaza 133, 135 Gorlice-Tarnow 96 Geddes, Sir A. 180 Gotha bombers 9, 83-4 manpower policy (1918-19) 181-7 Gough, Sir H. 114-15, 125, 126, 127, Geddes, Sir E. 55, 132 128, 223, 225, 228 armistice with Germany 282 dismissal 232-3

First Lord of Admiralty 150, 168,266 GQG 27, 54, 128

post-war European balance of Grand Fleet 20, 41, 113, 132, 151-3,

power 252 174, 281, 292

shipbuilding programme 75-7 Greece:

George III 180 economic assistance to 42 George V 86, 91 Salonika campaign 98-100 Georgia 240 separate peace with Bulgaria 196, General Reserve 215-18, 221-2, 232 261

General Staff 18, 23, 58, 92, 148, 149, Grey, Sir E. 26 162, 167

campaign of 1919 255-6 Haifa 262

conduct Flanders offensive 131-2 Haig, Sir D. 14, 16, 18, 19, 44, 60, 160, invasion of Britain 41 218

psychological warfare against armistice with Germany 12, 270

Central Powers 247 Calais agreement 56-7, 94

reorganized in 1918 221 campaign of 1918 and 1919: 182,

war weariness 109 218-19

Geneva 199 conduct of Flanders offensive 124-

Index 325 32 Henderson, Commander 72

conduct of March 1918 retreat 224-— Hertling, Chancellor 210, 214, 268

6 High Seas Fleet 20, 28, 31, 150-3,

defence of Persia 178 174-5, 281, 282, 284, 292

failure to co-ordinate reserves with Hill, Sir N. 73

Pétain 214-17, 222-5 Hindenburg, Field Marshal 31, 32, 144 fear of socialism 92, 127, 277 seeks armistice 267, 278 fear that USA will dominate peace Hindenburg line 58, 166

settlement 276 Hindenbury Programme 5, 31, 53

French mutinies 100, 109-10, 113- Hitler, A. 296-7

14, 121 Hogge, J. M. 187

Nivelle offensive 53-9 Holland 28, 32, 254 opposition to policy of waiting for Holtzendorff, Admiral von 33

the AEF 112 Hopwood, Sir F. 105-6

opposition to Kithlmann peace Horodyski, Count 205

proposals 145-6 House, Colonel E. M. 26, 28, 64, 236 opposition to Palestine armistice negotiations 279

offensive 153 House of Commons 13, 16, 25-6, 68,

origins Flanders offensive 50-1, 54, 91, 166, 203

109-23, 289 Hughes, W. H. 254-5

origins Supreme War Council 162-3 Humbert, General 224 manpower for BEF 180, 230 strategic policy in 1917 9, 22—3,148, Imperial War Cabinet:

157 (1917) 62-4, 177

strategic policy in 1918: 153, 155 (1918) 254; Committee of Prime

support for, i War Cabinet and Ministers and 1919 campaign 12,

press 58-9, 164-5 255-7

tactical planning Flanders Imports and Exports Bill 246 offensive 114-15, 122, 124-5, 290 Inchcape, Lord 209-10

Haldane, Lord 22 income tax 208

Hall, Admiral 103—4 Independent Labour Party 87, 200

Hamburg 8, 284 Independent Social Democrats 173, Hanbury Williams, Sir J. 22, 48 247

Hankey, Sir M. 14, 130, 138, 157, 178, India 10, 11, 62, 63, 77, 141, 175, 177

184, 217, 223, 231, 247 Indian Ocean 34, 296

attrition 62, 100 India Office 176

Calais agreement 56-7 Inter-allied Council for War Purchases convoys 72 and Finance 275 historiography of war 1-2 Ireland 183 Italian offensive in 1917: 52 conscription 187, 210

origins Flanders offensive 96, 101 Isonzo 52, 139

War Cabinet Secretary 23, 24 Istrian peninsula 52

Hanover 285 Italy 7, 8, 10, 32, 51-2, 121, 122, 135

Hardinge, Lord 19, 107, 178 army and morale 160-1

Harrington, Sir C. 221 Caporetto 159-61, 250

Headlam-Morley, J. W. 140 casualties 52 fear of Bolshevism 277 dissatisfied with British

Hejaz 263 assistance 199-200

Heligoland bight 174, 175, 282 separate peace with Austria-

Helsingfors 174 Hungary and Turkey 196-7

Henderson, A. 14, 17, 18, 86 war aims 105, 107-8, 135, 142, 196, Stockholm peace conference 141-3 204, 250

war aims 201-2, 206 Jaffa 154

326 Index Japan 240 Liddell Hart, Sir B. 1 intervention in Russia 241—4 Lille 124

Jellicoe, Sir J. 20 Lithuania 173

blockade of Germany 42 Littlewood, Joan 3 civil-miliary relations 287 Liverpool 195

conduct Flanders offensive 132 Liverpool Shipowners Association 73

dismissal 168—9 Livonia 173

origins Flanders offensive 113,289- — Lloyd George, D. 5, 8

90 armistice with Bulgaria 262

Salonika 98 armistice with Germany 12, 268-85

strategy in North Sea and Baltic armistice with Turkey 262-7

150-3 Austria—~Hungary 52

unrestricted U-boat warfare 43-4, Calais agreement 55-7

71-5 campaign of 1919 157-8, 183, 184, war aims 113 254-5, 256-7, 290

Jerusalem 9, 153, 154, 155, 167 Carthaginian peace 268

Joffre, General 50, 51 civil-miliary relations 287-8 Joint Note number 12, 190-1 concern to minimize British

casualties 23, 52, 55, 92, 108, 111,

Kaiser Wilhelm II 106, 144, 250-1, 115, 181-6

277, 280, 283 contemplates dismissing Haig 59,

Kars 173 149, 164-5, 167-8, 218, 231-4 Karl, Emperor 104-9, 136, 250-1, 279 convoy system 72-3

Kattegat 153 cost of war 291 Kerensky, A. 152 dismissal of Robertson 149, 164-5, Kerr, P. 24, 203 167-8, 216, 218-220

missions to Switzerland 198~9, 210-— fears British revolution 87

12 fourteen points 273-4

Keynes, J. M. 42 historiography of war 1-2

Kiel 284 Imperial War Cabinet (1917) 63-4 Kiggell, Sir L. 56, 112, 127-8, 167, 287 industrial conscription 69

Kitchener, Lord: Italian offensive in 1917: 52~—3, 108—Kitchener—Robertson compace 220 9, 135-9 strategic policy (1914-16) 4-6, 17, Italian war aims 196

40, 64, 256, 259, 286 knock-out blow 13, 35, 123, 143,

Knox, Lt.-Col. A. W. 27, 45, 47, 48-9 146, 158, 169, 171, 178, 187, 193,

Ktihlmann, R. von 144-9, 210, 296 201, 256

‘knocking the props from under Labour party: Germany’ 156-7 Lloyd George 13 Kiihlmann peace proposals 145-6

war aims 201-2, 229-30 lacks faith in strategic judgement 130

‘trade war’ 246 Lansdowne letter 200—1 La Fére 214 March Revolution in Russia 49, 286 Lansdowne, Lord 199—200, 296 Maurice debate 234-5

League of Nations 36, 38, 201, 252 mobilizing home front 68, 116

Leeds 146 Nivelle offensive 54-5, 61, 94, 116

le Havre 228 opposition to Flanders offensive 95-—

Lenin 173 123, 130-9, 290

Le Roy Lewis, Lt.-Col. 25 origins Supreme War Council 162-

Leslie, N. 72 3, 165-6 Liberal party 200 Palestine campaign 153-8 Lloyd George 13, 219 political skills 14—15

‘trade war’ 246 Pyrrhic victory 116, 157-8

Index 327 rejects negotiated peace with Marshall, Sir W. 190, 243, 255, 266-7

Germany 106 Maude, Sir F. 133, 153, 190

reply to Reichstag resolutions 141 Maurice, Sir F. 15, 101, 162, 167, 179,

role of Russia in Entente strategy in 223

1917: 45, 101-2 Maurice debate 234—5 Rome conference 52-3 Maxse, E. 34

Salonika 98-99 Mecca, Sharif of 263

search for quick victory 40, 137 Mediterranean 174 separate peace with Austria— Mensdorff, Count 198-9, 210, 249

Hungary 103-9, 136-9 merchant shipping 20, 32, 43, 67, 71,

separate peace with Turkey 154, 199 74, 179, 183

shipbuilding 75 concentration in North Atlantic 81 slow arrival of AEF 102, 116, 178- French and Italian trade 78-9

80, 238 requisitioning 68

strategic policy (1915-16) 15-16 Mesopotamia 7, 11, 64, 91, 118, 133, strategic policy (1916-18) 6-12, 16- 153, 154, 190, 197, 198, 204, 243, 17, 35-6, 63~—6, 115-16, 123, 132, 254, 255, 263, 266 135-6, 148, 153, 156-8, 169-70, Messines ridge 94, 115

180-92, 286, 290 Mesines—Wytschaete ridge 110 149-50, 219, 232, 288 Michaelis, G. 140, 210

support in Parliament 13-14, 59, Mexico 266

Supreme War Council and strategy Middle East 10-11, 38, 175-7, 204,

for 1918-19 campaigns 188-92 254, 264-7

suspicions of French ambitions 271- Military Service Acts 88, 187, 229, 230

2 Military Service (Review of

war aims 35—6, 63-6, 91-2, 115-16, Exemptions) Act 195

141, 154, 169, 193, 200-2, 203-5, Milne, Sir G. 98-9, 261-2, 264

262-7, 294 Milner, Lord 17, 18, 49, 59, 63, 101, London 9, 83, 86 125, 145, 156, 206, 217, 218, 220,

Long, W. 14, 59, 219, 274 228

Lubeck 284 alliance relations 289

Lubljana plain 52 blockade of Central Powers 289 Ludendorff, General E. 31, 32, 126-7, campaign of 1919 235, 256—7

144, 159, 210, 242 civil—military relations 130-1, 149

‘black day of the German army’ 269 Doullens agreement 225-6 plans for spring 1918 offensive 213- fears British revolution 87, 90

14, 224 impact of Russian collapse 177

resignation 282 intervention in Russia 243 seeks armistice 267, 278 origins of Flanders offensive 116-17 Lvov, Prince 49 Petrograd conference 45-8 Lynden-Bell, Maj.-Gen. 155 possible revolution in Russia 47~—8 Secretary of State for War 232-3

MacDonald, R. 141-2 Turkish armistice 264, 265 Macdonogh, Sir G. 128, 154, 184, 247 US entry into war 94

275-6 229

McKenna, R. 5, 83 war aims 96, 178

Maclay, Sir J. 19-20, 68, 71, 74-6, 78, Miners Federation of Great Britain

see also Shipping Controller Ministry of Food 80, 207, 229

Macready, Sir N. 183, 184 Ministry of Information 25, 247

Manchester 86, 268 psychological warfare against Manchester Guardian 165 Turkey 247-8 Madagascar 33 Ministry of Labour 68, 206, 209, 229,

Malmaison 127 230-1

328 Index Ministry of Munitions 15, 23, 77-8, North Sea 34, 42, 175

209 Northern Barrage 175

231 Nottingham 206

Ministry of National Service 180-1, Norway 28, 175

Ministry of Reconstruction 90 Ministry of Shipping 43, 68, 72, 73, 75, Observer 165, 205

77, 78, 292 Oh! What a Lovely War 3 Mittelafrika 141 OHL 58, 177, 267 Mond, Sir A. 208 Oldenburg 285

Mons 213 Oliphant, L. 119 Montagu, E. 149, 245, 274 Oliver, Sir H. 71, 72-3

Montdidier 224, 225 Orlando, V. 163, 250

Montenegro 204 Ostend 51, 127, 132 Morgenthau, H. 104

Morning Post 164, 186, 200 Pacific 64

Moscow 172 Pact of London 65

Mosul 266-7 Painlévé, P. 60, 153, 162

Munich conference 297 Palestine 7, 8, 10, 11, 64, 91, 97, 118, Munitions of War Act 85, 88 123, 134, 154-8, 176, 197, 198, 204,

dilution 85-6, 183, 187, 231 254, 262, 263

Murmansk 174, 242 pan-Germans 32, 247

Murray, Sir A. 11, 133, 134 pan-Islamicism 11, 239

Mustafa Kemal 133 pan-Turanisism 11, 176, 240 Paris 4, 164, 187, 191, 228, 262 Napoleon 118, 294 Permanent Military Representatives

Nation 165 164, 165-6, 188-92, 218, 219, 238, National Association of Discharged 251

Soldiers and Sailors 82 General Reserve 215-18, 221-2

National Debt 292 Péronne 225

National Federation of Discharged and _ Pershing, General J. J. 102, 161, 186,

Demobilized Soldiers and 227 Sailors 82 amalgamation of AEF with British National Liberals 32 and French armies 236, 237-9 National Review 164 German armistice 268—9 national self-determination 38, 64 Persia 175, 177, 178, 255 National War Aims Committee 91, Persian Gulf 34, 254, 295

146, 193, 229 Pétain, General Philippe 8, 138, 161

Nauen 28 failure to co-ordinate reserves with Naval Intelligence Department 29, Haig 214-17, 222-26

103—4, 174 French mutinies 100, 110, 121, 126

‘navalism’ 65 opposition to Flanders offensive

New Armies 4, 5, 15-16, 40, 286 110-11, 126

New Zealand 62, 63 origins Supreme War Council 162-3 Nicholas II, Tsar 46—7 strategy 60-2, 94, 96, 97, 108, 109,

refused asylum in Britain 86 112, 117, 120, 126—7, 156, 185, 286, Nitti, Snr. 196 290 110 conference 45~7 Non-ferrous Metals Bill 246 Pichon, S. 263 Nivelle, General R. 51, 53-61, 94, 97, Petrograd 4, 7,57, 152, 173

Northcliffe, Lord 14, 131, 165 Plumer, Sir H. 114-15, 125, 127, 221,

mission to USA 26 232

psychological warfare against Poincaré, President 60

Central Powers 247-55 Pola 52

Index 329 Poland 38, 173, 176, 251 origins Flanders offensive 95-122

Portugal 42 policy of attrition (1916-18) 21-2, Postal Censor 28 97 Prague 297 possible revolution in Russia 46 profiteering 68-9, 88, 194, 205 separate peace with Germany’s Provisional Government 26, 86, 101, allies 105-9, 154—5

142, 145, 161 strategy and war aims (1916-17)

strategy of 48-50, 101 34-5, 148, 156, 202-3

war aims 89, 91, 139 Supreme War Council 162, 164-5,

Prussian militarism 36, 65, 142, 252, 167, 191

283-4, 294, 295-6 war aims 96, 295

war aims in Middle East 134—5

Radcliffe, Sir P. de B. 221 western front strategy 51 rationing 69, 83, 207-8, 229 see also Chief of the Imperial Rawlinson, Sir H. 114, 178, 221 General Staff

Reading, Lord 270 Rodd, Sir J. R. 27 mission to USA 26 Roosevelt, T. 26

Reconstruction Committee 90, 244 Rostock 285

Reichstag 81, 173 Rotherham 86 Reichstag resolutions 140, 246 Roulers 110

Reichswehr 284 Royal Commission on Wheat Supplies

Registrar General 207 80-1 Reval 152 Royal Flying Corps 84 ‘Revolutionary defencism’ 89, 139 Royal Navy:

Rhondda, Lord 85, 89 strength 292

bread subsidy 89-90 strategic role of 4, 20, 40, 41-2, 113,

Ribot, A. 54, 60, 106, 107, 118, 134, 150-3, 173-4, 278, 286, 292

142, 196 Roye 53

Riddell, Lord 168, 291 Runciman, W. 5

Riga 139 Rumania 5, 31, 34, 118, 176, 204, 240 rivers: army 45, 99 Ailette 216 economic assistance to 42, 45 Aisne 53, 214 separate peace with Bulgaria 196 Danube 264 war aims 105

Euphrates 266 Rumbold, Sir H. 221 Oise 50, 53, 162, 216 Ruquoy, General 117

Rhine 270, 281 Russia 3, 6, 32, 34, 118, 198

Somme 50 allied intervention 236, 239-44

Tigris 266 Baltic Fleet 152-3, 174

Roberts, G. H. 208 disintegration of army 8, 40, 44, 45-

Robertson, Sir W. 5, 15, 20, 22, 24, 27, 6, 102 30, 58, 127, 131, 161, 287 dissatisfaction with British assistance

Calais agreement 56-7 46, 288

campaign of 1918 and 1919: 182-3 economic assistance to 42

civil-miliary relations 287 failure of 1917 offensive 101-2

conduct Flanders offensive 129, 137 revolution of March 1917: 7-8, 26,

dismissal 13, 23, 149, 216, 218-20 40, 44~50, 92, 99 French army mutinies 113-14, 121 revolution of November 1917: 9,

historiography of war 1-2 172-3 intervention in Russia 240 treaty of Brest-Litovsk 172-3 Italian army 108 see also Provisional Government

Mesopotamian campaign 133 Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne conference opposition to Italian offensive 138 (April 1917) 107-8

330 Index St. Quentin 126 agreements 226-7 Salonika campaign 10, 52, 98-100, constitution 164

133, 135, 260-2 General Reserve 215-18, 221-2

Samarakand 176 origins of 161-3

Sarrail, General 98-9 strategic policy 1917-18: 187-92

dismissed 261 Versailles Declaration 251 Scapa Flow 20-1 see also Permanent Military Scheer, Admiral 31 Representatives Schlieffen plan 96 Sutherland, W. 165 Scott, C. P. 201, 296 Switzerland 28, 198-9, 210, 211 Secret Service 27-8 Sykes, Sir F. 266

Serbia 204, 205, 280 Sykes, Sir M. 134, 262-3 economic assistance from Britain 42 Sykes-Picot agreement 134-5, 262-3 invasion of 96 Syria 134, 154, 176, 197, 204, 262 Salonika 98-9

separate peace with Bulgaria 103, Talaat 154

196, 261 taxation 69-70, 83, 208

Seton-Watson, R.W. 248 Teheran 175

Sheffield 86 Tenth Cruiser Squadron 41-2 shell production 78 The New Europe 248

Shipping Controller 19-20, 156, 207, Thomas, A. 38, 61, 136

209 Thourout 110, 114

Shuckburgh, Sir J. E. 176 Thrace 203 Siberia 240, 243, 254, 278 Tiflis 177

signals intelligence 28-9, 37 Tillett, B. 195

Sixte de Bourbon, Prince 106—7 Times, The, 167

Skrzynski 211 Torre, A. 250 Smuts, General J. C. 17, 18-19, 138, trade card scheme 84 145, 156, 165, 184, 203, 223, 231 Trades Union Congress 201, 219

fear of Bolshevism 277 Trading with the Enemy

fear that USA will dominate peace (Amendment) Act 246

settlement 276—7 Transcaspia 176

mission to Switzerland 198-9, 210, Transcaucasia 11, 176—7, 243

249 Treasury 15, 42, 69, 88

origins Flanders offensive 96, 101 Trenchard, Sir H. 232

Social Democrats 173, 210 Trentino 105, 108, 196

Sofia 99 Trieste 8, 52, 108, 196

197 Trumbic, Dr 250

Sonninio, S. 107, 108, 135, 136, 163, Trotsky 172

South Africa 63 Tryansylvania 105 South Slav Committee 250 Turkey 10, 187, 221

Spartacists 247 armistice 264—7 Spiers, Lt.-Col. 126 army 31

Spring-Rice, Sir C. 26, 180 British war aims 38

Staff College, Camberley 22 separate peace 104, 108, 153, 195, Stockholm peace conference 89, 139- 196~—7, 198-9, 210-11

43 strategy in 1917: 132-3

storm-troops 222

Straits of Dover 132, 175 Ukraine 11, 173, 240, 243, 278 Supreme War Council 10, 12, 236, 239, Unionist Business Committee 234

288 Unionist party 200

armistice with Turkey 264 Lloyd George 13-14, 219 Beauvais and Doullens Union of Democratic Control 87,

Index 331 141,Sacré 200 note 36-9, 205, Union 119 Salonika 99 296

United States of America 9, 32, 35 separate peace with Austria-

army 8, 66, 102 Hungary 104-5, 136-9, 195, 196-

declaration of war 8, 64, 94 7, 198-9, 210-11, 249~—50 intervention in Russia 240—4 and separate peace with Turkey

status as Associated Power 64-5 153, 195, 196—7, 198-9, 210-11 unrestricted U-boat warfare 5-6, 8, 32, shipbuilding 75—7

40, 43-4, 97, 286 shortcomings 30

failure of 70-—82 slow arrival of AEF 161, 178—80

Upper Silesia 210 spring 1918 offensive 224—6

technologically intensive strategy

Venizelos, E. 98-100 257-8 Versailles 164 Stockholm conference 141-3

Vienna 52, 106 unrestricted U-boat warfare 44, 70—

Vimy ridge 50, 60, 94 82,

Vladivostock 174, 241, 243 war aims in Middle East 134-5,

262-7 War Cabinet 14, 17~-19, 21, 24—30, 129 see also War Policy Committee; X-

armistice with Germany 268-85 committee

armistice with Turkey 262-7 war aims and compromise peace

attrition 286-7, 293-4 (1918) 193, 202-5

blockade of Central Powers 244-6 War Cabinet Secretariat 23-4 campaign of 1919: 9-12, 171, 181- War Cabinet Committee on manpower

92, 193, 212, 213, 235, 236, 258-9 184-5

conduct of Flanders offensive 130-2 War Committee (1915-16) 30, 50-1,

expansion of RFC 84 71

food stocks 80-2 War Office 15, 18, 177, 186, 221, 224 French and Italian trade 78-9 military missions 26—7

French mutinies, strikes and morale signals intelligence 28—9

100-1, 113-14, 117-18, 121, slow arrival AEF 179

122-3 Supreme War Council 164

General Reserve 217, 221-2 War Policy Committee 9, 94, 101-123,

import restrictions 77-9 137-8, 148, 149, 153—6, 289 intervention in Russia 239-44 War Priorities Committee 181

Italian collapse 160-1 Webb, Captain R. 71

Kiihlmann peace proposals 144-7, Weimar Republic 283-4

171 Wellington House 247

lack of intelligence analysis Wells, H. G. 252

apparatus 29-30 Wemyss, Sir R. 20, 169, 266, 288 May 1917 strikes 87-92 fear of Bolshevism 277

March revolution in Russia 47-50 armistice with Germany 282, 283

naval war in North Sea 175 ‘freedom of the seas’ 274 Nivelle offensive 54—5 ‘westerners’ 1-3, 6, 177-8, 220-1, 256

oil and war aims 266—7 Weygand, General 188 origins Flanders offensive 95-123 Whigham, Sir R. 221

Palestine campaign 135 White Russia 173

Papal mediation 143-4, 147 Wickham-Steed, H. 248-50 pay policy 209-10, 229 Wilson, Sir H. 24, 49, 110, 156, 158,

rationing 83, 207-8 178, 232

rejection German peace note (Dec. alliance relations 289

1916) 35-6 armistice with Germany 270-1,

reply to President Wilson’s peace 284-5

332 Index Wilson, Sir H. (cont.): and French armies 236, 237-9

campaign of 1919 255-6 armistice with Central Powers 278-9 Chief of the Imperial General Staff European balance of power 65

219-21 fourteen points 206, 246, 273-4

collapse of German army 269-70 ‘freedom of seas’ 36, 66

Doullens agreement 225-6 intervention in Russia 241-4

French mutinies and morale 101, League of Nations 36

112 peace note (December 1916) 36-9

General Reserve 215-18 strategy and war aims 64-6

military missions to French army 27 Wiseman, Captain Sir W. 26, 65 Permanent Military Representatives

to Supreme War Council 164, X-committee 232-3

188-91 campaign of 1919 253

Petrograd Conference 45

strategic policy in 1918 220-1 Ypres 58, 94, 95, 124, 125, 137, 223 suspicions of French ambitions Yugoslavia 105, 280 271-2

war aims 295 Zaharoff, Sir B. 199

Wilson, President Woodrow §8, 26, 28, Zeebrugge 51, 132

102, 143, 161, 169, 227, 264 raid on 229

amalgamation of AEF with British

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