The Story of the Scottish Parliament: The First Two Decades Explained 9781474454919

Citation preview

The Story of the Scottish Parliament The First Two Decades Explained

Edited by

GERRY HASSAN

Edinburgh University Press is one of the leading university presses in the UK. We publish academic books and journals in our selected subject areas across the humanities and social sciences, combining cutting-edge scholarship with high editorial and production values to produce academic works of lasting importance. For more information visit our website: edinburghuniversitypress.com © editorial matter and organisation Gerry Hassan, 2019 © the chapters their several authors, 2019 Edinburgh University Press Ltd The Tun – Holyrood Road 12 (2f) Jackson’s Entry Edinburgh EH8 8PJ Typeset in 10/13 Giovanni by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire and printed and bound in Great Britain A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 1 4744 5489 6 (hardback) ISBN 978 1 4744 5490 2 (paperback) ISBN 978 1 4744 5491 9 (webready PDF) ISBN 978 1 4744 5492 6 (epub) The right of contributors to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 and the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498). Published with the support of the University of Edinburgh Scholarly Publishing Initiatives Fund.

Contents

List of Tablesvi Notes on the Contributorsvii Introduction  Back to the Future: Exploring Twenty Years of Scotland’s Journey, Stories and Politics Gerry Hassan

1

PART ONE  The Political Institutions and Environment   1 The Electorate and Elections John Curtice

31

  2 Attitudes to Constitutional Change Ailsa Henderson

45

  3 The Scottish Government Margaret Arnott

52

  4 The Scottish Civil Service Zoe Ferguson

64

  5 The Scottish Parliament and ‘New Politics’ at Twenty Emily St Denny

73

iv | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

  6 The Emergence of a Scottish Political Class Klaus Stolz

84

  7 The Committee System of the Scottish Parliament Mark Shephard

97

  8 Scotland and Westminster and Continental Drift Torcuil Crichton

105

  9 British Political Tradition and Scottish Local Government116 Neil McGarvey 10 Public Spending and Taxation Richard Kerley

123

PART TWO  Scotland’s Political Parties 11 SNP: Devolution Winners Craig McAngus

135

12 The Fall of the House of Scottish Labour Gerry Hassan

145

13 The Scottish Conservative Party: Wilderness to Recovery 159 Alan Convery 14 The Liberal Democrats: From Coalition to the Margins David Torrance

169

15 Greens: Radical and Relevant? Lynn Bennie

179

16 Socialism in a Cold Climate: The Radical Left since 1999 189 Ewan Gibbs PART THREE  The Wider Environment 17 Scotland’s Brexit Blues Kirsty Hughes

201

18 Europe David Gow

211

contents | v

19 Independence and Union Revisited: Recent Interpretations in Scottish History, Literature and Politics 219 Colin Kidd PART FOUR  Inside Politics 20 The Parliament Sits in the Land Ambrose Gillick and Lee Ivett

231

21 Devolution: An Assessment Jim Gallagher

242

22 Inside the Changing Business of Governing Scotland Marco G. Biagi

252

23 The Journey of the Scottish Parliament to Maturity Johann Lamont

260

24 From Think Twice to Radical Devolution: A Scottish Conservative Movement Murdo Fraser

268

25 The Scottish Parliament: Past Dreams, Present Realities, Possible Futures Joyce McMillan

276

Appendix289 Index301

Tables

  1.1   1.2   1.3   1.4   2.1   6.1   6.2 10.1 10.2 12.1 12.2 13.1 15.1

Scottish Parliament election results, 1999–2016 33 UK general results in Scotland, 1997–2017 34 Different elections, different criteria? 35 SNP support by constitutional preference, 1999–2016 39 What impact has [devolved institution] had on the governance of the UK 48 MSPs entering before 2016 88 Career movements between Westminster and Holyrood90 Overall expenditure in Scotland for selected years 127 Combined revenue and capital DEL 128 Scottish Labour support at UK elections, 1945–2017 148 Scottish, Welsh and English Labour support, 1945–2017148 Scottish Conservative Party performance at Scottish Parliament elections 160 Scottish Green Party performance in Scottish parliamentary elections 181

Notes on the Contributors

Margaret Arnott is professor of public policy at the University of the West of Scotland. She has published widely on UK territorial politics and governance. In 2016 she was awarded a House of Commons Fellowship to research ‘The Future of the UK Parliament and Devolution’. Lynn Bennie is reader in politics at the University of Aberdeen. Her research interests span the areas of democratic participation, elections, political parties and green politics; she has published books and articles on all these themes. Her latest book, with Rob Johns and James Mitchell, explores the exceptional party membership surges which followed the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence. The Revival of Party Membership: The Scottish Referendum and Recruitment to Parties will be published later in 2019. Marco G. Biagi was MSP for Edinburgh from 2011 to 2016, latterly serving as Minister for Local Government and Community Empowerment. He stood down to return to academic research and is currently completing a PhD in comparative politics from Yale University. Alan Convery is lecturer in politics at the University of Edinburgh. He researches Scottish and British politics and his first book is The Territorial Conservative Party (2016).

viii | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Torcuil Crichton is the Daily Record’s Westminster editor and a journalistic veteran of six UK general election campaigns, five Scottish elections and several political mishaps along the way. He has worked for the West Highland Free Press, the Herald and was on the Sunday Herald launch team, reporting from across the globe. Formerly a BBC TV producer, he remains a regular television and radio commentator in Gaelic and English, and was the 2017 Scottish political journalist of the year. Sir John Curtice is professor of politics at Strathclyde University and senior research fellow, NatCen/ScotCen Social Research. He has written extensively about voting behaviour and electoral systems both across the UK as a whole and in Scotland in particular. He has been a co-editor of NatCen/ScotCen’s annual British/ Scottish Social Attitudes series for over 20 years, and is a regular contributor to British and international media coverage of politics in the UK. Curtice is chief commentator at whatscotlandthinks. org, which provides a comprehensive collection of materials on public attitudes towards how Scotland should be governed and on electoral politics in Scotland. Zoe Ferguson is an associate with the Carnegie UK Trust and has been developing their work on kindness. She has 20 years’ experience in public policy in Scotland in roles spanning research, analysis and policy, including as the chief social researcher at the Scottish Government. She has worked across a wide range of policy areas including education, lifelong learning, work, regeneration, economic development, culture and public service reform. She is a trustee of Cornerstone, a charity providing social care and support services across Scotland. Murdo Fraser is MSP for Mid Scotland and Fife and was deputy leader of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party from 2005 to 2011. Jim Gallagher’s 35-year civil service career included heading the Scottish Justice department, being private secretary to two Secretaries of State for Scotland, and twice serving in the No. 10

notes on the contributors | ix

Policy Unit under different Prime Ministers. He is now a part-time academic, and a company director in the private and voluntary sectors. He is a member of Nuffield College, Oxford and holds visiting and honorary professorships in the universities of Glasgow and St Andrews. His main academic interests are in the UK’s territorial constitution and its financing. Ewan Gibbs lectures in sociology and social policy at the University of the West of Scotland and sits on the committee of the Scottish Labour History Society. Ewan completed a PhD studying deindustrialisation in the Scottish coalfields in 2016. He has published on ‘left-wing’ Scottish nationalism, the poll tax non-payment campaign, industrial policy, labour-market restructuring and the memory and legacy of heavy industry. Ambrose Gillick is a designer and lecturer in architecture at Kent School of Architecture. He researched and taught at Glasgow School of Art between 2011 and 2018 and is a director of Baxendale. David Gow celebrated his ‘golden anniversary’ as a journalist in 2018, having joined The Scotsman as a graduate trainee in September 1968 after taking degrees in French and German at Oxford/London universities. He contributed to the first Red Paper on Scotland (1975) and was an editorial adviser for Scottish International. He was Scotland’s first full-time EU correspondent 1976–8 and, later, The Guardian’s German correspondent (1989–95) and European business editor (2004–9, 2011–12) based in Brussels. He is now editor of Social Europe and of sceptical.scot. He lives in Edinburgh and Aumelas, a village in the Hérault, France. Gerry Hassan is research fellow in contemporary history at Dundee University. He has previously been a research fellow at the University of the West of Scotland and IPPR Scotland and has written and edited over two dozen books on Scottish and British politics including The Strange Death of Labour Scotland (with Eric Shaw, 2012, Edinburgh University Press), Caledonian Dreaming: The Quest for a Different Scotland (2014), Independence of the Scottish Mind: Elite Narratives, Public Spaces and the Making of a Modern

x | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PA R L I AME N T

Nation (2014), Scotland the Bold: How Our Nation Changed and Why there is No Going Back (2016), SNP Leaders (edited with James Mitchell, 2016) and A Nation Changed? The SNP and Scotland Ten Years On (2017). Ailsa Henderson is professor of political science at the University of Edinburgh where she conducts research on comparative substate political behaviour and political culture. Kirsty Hughes is director of the Scottish Centre on European Relations. She is a researcher, writer and commentator on European politics and policy. She has worked at a number of leading European think tanks including as senior fellow at Friends of Europe, Brussels; senior fellow, Centre for European Policy Studies; director, European Programme, Chatham House; senior fellow, Policy Studies Institute; and research fellow, WZB Berlin Social Science Centre. She has published extensively, including books, reports, and policy papers, as well as contributing to a wide range of national and international media outlets. Her research focus has included the UK, Scotland and Brexit, EU democracy, the politics of the Eurozone crisis, the EU enlargement to central and eastern Europe, and Turkey’s EU accession process. Lee Ivett is an award-winning architect, designer and founding director of Baxendale Studio. His work uses creative interventions to engage people and places in useful and transformative ways. Lee is a design tutor at the Mackintosh School of Architecture and a contributor to The Architectural Review, Architects Journal, Metropolis Magazine and RIBA Journal. Richard Kerley is Emeritus Professor of Management at Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh, and co-chair of the Centre for Scottish Public Policy. He is currently researching elected roles in sub-state governments across a number of countries. Colin Kidd is Wardlaw Professor of Modern History at the University of St Andrews. He is a Fellow of both the British Academy and the Royal Society of Edinburgh. He is the author of five books,

notes on the contributors | xi

including Subverting Scotland’s Past (1993) and Union and Unionisms (2008). He has also co-edited, with Gerry Carruthers, Literature and Union: Scottish Texts, British Contexts (2018). In addition, he is a regular contributor to the London Review of Books and The Guardian. Johann Lamont is Labour MSP for Glasgow and was previously leader of the Scottish Labour Party. Craig McAngus is a lecturer in politics at the University of the West of Scotland. He was previously a lecturer at the University of Aberdeen and a research fellow at the University of Aberdeen. He has previously published on the organisational development and strategy of the SNP. His current research focuses on the impact of Brexit on UK fisheries policy. Neil McGarvey is a senior teaching fellow in the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. He is the co-author (with Paul Cairney) of Scottish Politics (2008, 2013, new edition in draft). He has published widely in the fields of Scottish politics, local government and public administration. Joyce McMillan is a freelance writer based in Edinburgh, and a critic and columnist for The Scotsman. She is currently president of Scottish Environment Link. In the 1990s, she co-convened the Scottish Constitutional Convention’s Commission on ‘wicked issues’, including gender balance, and the voting system for the Scottish Parliament; and in 1997–9 she served as a member of the Scottish Office Consultative Steering Group, set up to advise on the structure and procedures of the new Parliament. Emily St Denny is a lecturer in politics and public policy at the University of Stirling. Her research focuses on policymaking and public-sector reform in the devolved UK. She is a fellow of the Centre on Constitutional Change and has previously worked as a policy researcher at the Public Policy Institute for Wales, based at Cardiff University. Her areas of expertise include health and criminal justice policy, policy divergence in the UK, and the evolution of

xii | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

devolved institutions in Scotland and Wales. Her current research explores the emergence of the ‘prevention’ agenda in Scotland as a lens through which to assess claims of the advent of a putatively ‘Scottish approach’ to policymaking. Mark Shephard is a senior lecturer at the School of Government at Strathclyde University. He has broad interests in Scottish and British politics, legislatures, media, campaigns, youth politics, elite and public opinion and behaviours, particularly legislative impact on opinions and behaviours that are less than optimal both in parliaments and on social media. He has published in a myriad of books and academic journals and has delivered two TED Talks. Klaus Stolz is chair of British/American Cultural/Social Studies at Chemnitz University of Technology, Germany. David Torrance was for many years a freelance journalist, writer and broadcaster, as well as the author or editor of more than a dozen books on Scottish politics; since 2018 he has kept his opinions to himself as a researcher at the House of Commons Library.

INT R ODU C T IO N

Back to the Future: Exploring Twenty Years of Scotland’s Journey, Stories and Politics Gerry Hassan The Scottish Parliament marked its twentieth anniversary in 2019 – its first elections took place on 6 May 1999, its first session on 12 May 1999, and the formal transfer of powers from Westminster to Scotland on 1 July 1999. Several timeframes led up to this: a more-than-a-century-long campaign for Scottish home rule which dated back to Gladstonian home rule and Keir Hardie’s Independent Labour Party in the 1880s; the more recent post-war attempt to progress constitutional change and self-government which accelerated after the SNP began to become a serious electoral force from the late 1960s onwards; and finally, the shorter period which encapsulated Labour’s preparation for office pre-1997, followed by the relatively smooth last phase of 1997–99 legislating and preparing for a Scottish Parliament. These three phases are all interlinked and overlap, and are part of a bigger picture of negotiating Scotland’s place in relation to the Union, and its autonomy, distinctiveness and voice. Twenty years in historical terms is a relatively short period of time but in terms of politics and political development it is a sizeable period where many of the events now seem part of contemporary history and can often only be described in such a way. This introduction addresses the wider context of the past 20 years, the key ideas and drivers, what devolution was in the beginning of this period, what it aimed to do, and how it – and the Scottish Parliament – are portrayed two decades on. It addresses what became the stories of devolution, the contours of public life, who had voice and who did

2 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PA R L I AME N T

not, and concludes by surveying where we are now and where we might head in the future.

Twenty years ago Pre-Scottish Parliament, there was much expectation around the impact that the new institution and the politics around it would be able to achieve. There was hope of an oft-cited but vague ‘new politics’ that would produce better democracy and governance leading to better decisions, policy and outcomes (Brown, 2000; for a counter view see Mitchell, 2000). Underpinning this was a critique of Westminster and its adversarial practices, and its increasing disconnect to majority Scottish public opinion. Before the onset of the new institution, a home rule consensus emerged – based on the importance of democratic ­accountability – believing that a Scottish Parliament could do better than Westminster, and thus have a beneficial effect on our politics. Subsequently, the prevailing view has become that people overhyped their hopes and expectations, aided by that consensus and a ‘devolution industry’ – a view put forward by the BBC Scotland’s Andrew Kerr, ‘Maybe expectations were too high in 1997 and 1999, when the current Parliament first met’ (BBC Scotland, 8 September 2017). However, the actual evidence of those high expectations shows they were not as unconditional as often portrayed. Take Yes–Yes voters in the 1997 devolution referendum for example. They recorded huge majorities – believing a Parliament would improve social welfare (71 per cent), education (89 per cent), the NHS (82 per cent), and the economy (86 per cent). Yet, the numbers believing change in each of these would be ‘a lot’ was in each case a minority, namely social welfare (19 per cent), education (39 per cent), the NHS (36 per cent), and the economy (36 per cent) (Denver et al., 2000: 200). And in every one of these cases the percentage believing that positive change would be ‘a little’ was a larger group of voters than those saying ‘a lot’. Therefore, even within the home rule consensus there was a degree of qualification which was often written up as the ‘high expectations’ thesis. Politics, even at the point of 1997–9, was

introduction | 3

always more conditional than the impression that some of the commentary gave. It is also true that even in this period several more thoughtful voices talked of ‘an expectations gap’ and the limited powers of the Parliament over whole acres of public life and resources. But these were in a clear minority and were crowded out in the general sense of anticipation which arose at the prospect of a Scottish Parliament. Those heady days of 20 years ago were characterised by all sorts of omissions. First, even the detailed plans for the Parliament in the Scottish Constitutional Convention, and post-1999, in the work of bodies such as the Consultative Steering Group (CSG), did not look at the political party and governmental terrain of politics. Thus, party dynamics, the role of the executive in relation to the legislature, and issues such as government patronage and the role of the payroll vote, were left unexplored pre-devolution. There were complacencies about the prospect of a ‘new politics’ – one where a PR-elected Parliament with a powerful committee system would somehow see a more equitable sharing of power within the institution, as well as between Parliament and people. There was an investment in the belief that a politics of presence – a body which more accurately reflected Scotland not just by party, but gender, ethnicity and other identities – and one with more accessible processes would produce automatically a more modern politics and democracy. Scotland’s Parliament has turned out a more complex, nuanced story than these and other pre-devolution expectations. In one important respect, while Scotland gained from the setting up of the Scottish Parliament it also felt a loss – namely that of a ‘fantasyland Parliament’ of pre-1999. This was a mythical, idealised institution that would be a place of participation, boldness, and a rich array of voices that would do ‘good’ things. This was a projection as well as a mobilising story, and the arrival of a real Parliament made up of real politicians ended this fiction. Moreover, in the early years when elements of the media went after the new body some people undoubtedly felt in quiet reflection that loss – as much as the undoubted gain. This book is an attempt to chart the development, work and activities of the Scottish Parliament over its first 20 years. It does so

4 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PA R L I AME N T

by looking at the institution itself, the key agencies connected to it, other political institutions, and the wider political environment, including the main parties. It draws together a wide range of perspectives from academics, to specialists, practitioners and journalists, as well as elected and former politicians, ex-civil servants and participants active over the course of the two decades.

The expectations agenda Over 20 years’ span Scotland has changed dramatically in numerous ways – as an economy and society, culturally and politically. Not all of this change is due to the activities and existence of the Scottish Parliament: some of the change is in areas outwith the remit of the Parliament, some beyond politics, and some would have happened with or without a Parliament (see McCrone, 1992; 2017). Scotland has changed politically in public attitudes in relation to how people see devolution in comparison to Westminster. When asked who has the most influence over the way Scotland is run, a distinct pattern can be discerned. From a 2 per cent lead of the Scottish Executive over the UK Government in 1999 (41 per cent/39 per cent), this dramatically changed into a 53 per cent UK lead the following year (66 per cent/13 per cent). Subsequent years showed consistent UK majorities narrowing to a 21 per cent UK lead in 2007 – when the Executive was renamed the Scottish Government – with the two only reaching parity in 2011. In 2016 the Scottish Government established a lead of 42 per cent to 41 per cent compared to the UK Government, and in 2017 this expanded to 43 per cent to 41 per cent: the first time it had ever been ahead for two consecutive years and, since 1999, at all (Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2017; 2018). When asked who they trusted to best look after Scotland’s longterm interests – a different picture emerged. In 1999, 81 per cent said the Scottish Parliament; 73 per cent in 2015; falling back to 65 per cent in 2016 and 61 per cent in 2017; with 32 per cent saying Westminster in 1999 and 23 per cent in 2015, 25 per cent in 2016 and then 20 per cent in 2017 (Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2017; 2018). A broader set of trends occurred in Scotland with which the

introduction | 5

Parliament had a relationship, but which were more often than not independent of it, as Scotland became a more diverse, cosmopolitan, multicultural society and a place more at ease with itself on issues such as gender, sexuality, ethnicity and multiple identities than in the past. There has been a complex relationship between these two developments, but it has not been a determinist one. To put it simply, the story of Scotland over the last 20 years has not been just about the Parliament, or the Scottish Parliament and Westminster, or even politics. Yet this Scotland has, as a political community, become more autonomous and distinctive within the UK. This can be seen in how Scotland increasingly sees itself, talks and thinks – or to be accurate – how parts of Scotland do all of these things, a sentiment and mindset I have described as ‘independence of the Scottish mind’ (Hassan, 2014b). This semi-independence has a twin track: the increasingly homegrown nature of politics in Scotland and the more Londoncentric focus of a large section of the UK political classes and their hinterland.

‘Scotland’s velvet revolution’ Questions inevitably arise about who, and what, aided the origins of the modern Scotland we now live in. Is all or most of it the result of Thatcherism and deindustrialisation, or are there other trends around? Scotland has been through dramatic economic and social change over the last 40 years or so; historian Tom Devine summarised these as being the equivalent of ‘Scotland’s velvet revolution’ – a set of profound socio-economic changes which were far reaching and had lasting impact, throwing up widespread dislocation and the loss of familiar anchor points of meaning and identity for large parts of the population (Craig and Devine, 2005). This transformation is often presented in the shorthand of ‘Thatcherism’ and what her government and ideology did to Scotland (Torrance, 2009; Stewart, 2009). But the story is much more layered and involved an economy and society which has dramatically altered and become service-led, less male-dominated, and more feminised (Gibb et al., 2018). This has been in Devine’s account, a revolution without a defined and clear leadership, and

6 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PA R L I AME N T

if this is true it raises numerous questions about who have been our guides and interpreters for these changes in the past and, who can be for the future transformations that will come? The Scottish Parliament might be the answer for some and for its elected politicians, but we live in an age where many have doubts about the political class, and it would be naïve to imagine they could do all the heavy lifting themselves.

Devolution and the role of the Scottish Parliament Devolution is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘the transfer or delegation of power to a lower level, especially by central government to local or regional administration’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 2019); and constitutional expert Vernon Bogdanor describes it as: . . . the most radical constitutional change this country has seen since the Great Reform Act of 1832. This is because it seeks to reconcile two seemingly conflicting principles, the sovereignty or supremacy of Parliament and the grant of self-government in domestic affairs to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. (Bogdanor, 1999: 1)

Given the context and backstory of Scottish devolution it is no surprise that there are a variety of interpretations (Mitchell, 2009). In writing this introduction I asked more than fifty figures from different backgrounds and public life their thoughts on devolution and whether the Parliament had been a success or not. For example, academic Richard Rose of Strathclyde University describes it as ‘A Rorschach ink blot that people can interpret as they wish.’ The writer David Torrance observes that: Devolution was many things. For some (like Donald Dewar) it was a sincere attempt to reorganise the constitutional status quo; for others (such as Robin Cook) it was a necessary evil to mitigate upper case Nationalism; and for some more (i.e. Alex Salmond) it was a means to an end.

The commentator Iain Macwhirter states that devolution ‘was the civic project of restoring the Scottish Parliament, and was a great

introduction | 7

success. Since 1999, the Scottish Parliament has established itself as the key democratic institution at the centre of Scottish public life.’ The columnist Joyce McMillan believes that: Some Nationalists tend to view it as a trick, and it is true that ‘power devolved is power retained’, as we are currently being reminded. But within limits, the Scottish Government has been able to run Scottish domestic policy along different lines from the rest of the UK.

The former civil servant, now academic at Nuffield College, Oxford, Jim Gallagher takes the view that devolution has answered two principles: Representative: just by being there, they provide a political focus for Scotland, whether within the UK or under independence. And utilitarian: at the least to match Scottish public policies to Scottish preferences.

Arthur Aughey of Ulster University takes a more detached and longterm view: From a philosophically radical angle, devolution is a ‘new beginning’, meaning either a rebirth of Scotland’s tradition of self-government (interrupted in 1707), a confirmation of its distinctively assumed Radical, Communal (or whatever) traditions and culture; or, to use an Irish expression (a reluctant acceptance by SNP) the ‘freedom to achieve freedom’.

Kirstein Rummery of Stirling University thinks that devolution was ultimately about identity: Devolution is . . . a project designed to create a sense of political identity at the substate level – in this case, to support a Scottish political identity, separate to, but not replacing, a UK political identity.

Historian Richard Finlay of Strathclyde University takes a similar view: I think devolution has been primarily an anti-independence device which acts as a sort of surrogate for full-blown statehood. It has many of the trappings of independent statehood, but not the depth.

8 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PA R L I AME N T

Nigel Smith, who chaired the Yes–Yes pro-devolution campaign in the 1997 referendum, makes the point that Scottish devolution had British roots too: ‘Britain created devolution enclaves, allowing the centre to roll on largely as before’ but this British dimension was never fully addressed – ‘It is clear now that devolution was more a response to Scottish nationalism than to the centralism of Britain.’ There were more critical voices – even when talking about the idea of devolution. Alex Bell, formerly Head of Policy in Alex Salmond’s government assesses that it was: ‘Not what it was claimed. We didn’t come up with divergent policies to the UK or with “Scottish solutions to Scottish problems”, to quote Donald Dewar.’ The journalist Peter Geoghegan observes that ‘it’s hard to see how devolution can be said to have solved the issue it was in many ways designed to fix.’ More fundamentally, Gerry Mooney of the Open University states: Devolution for me is a neoliberal project: it was integral to the New Labour project of ‘modernising’ the UK constitution . . . Both New Labour and the SNP, constitutional issues aside, have a shared vision of what I would call a ‘tartan third way’ approach . . .

Alan Cochrane of the Daily Telegraph offers a pithy overview, questioning the intent of Labour advocates: Whatever its technical definition devolution is the system of government dreamed up principally by Labour bigwigs to see off the Nationalists . . . The former [Labour’s bigwigs] would stay in London to run the ‘empire’ whilst the party’s also-rans – councillors and trades union officials etc. – could run bits of Scottish policy.

With all of these different interpretations, and hence expectations, people have different gauges to judge whether devolution and the Parliament has been a success. In many comments and judgements made, there was a distinct strand of soft disappointment with the actions and record of the Parliament so far, often said with a whiff of sadness and regret, even wanting to be proved wrong. A starting point is that devolution delivered a working Scottish Parliament and in the words of Paul Cairney: ‘In those terms, devo-

introduction | 9

lution was a success as soon as it happened and everything else is just detail’ (2011: 258). Joyce McMillan has no doubts about having a positive assessment: I would say that compared with the predictions of doom and chaos that were common among large and small-c conservative types at the time, the Scottish Parliament has been an outstanding success, and has moved rapidly to fill an obvious gap in Scotland’s previous governing structures.

Kevin Pringle, former SNP staffer and now at Charlotte Street Partners, was positive in his assessment: ‘It has been a success in changing the governance of Scotland from the lobbying culture of the old Scottish Office to one that is genuinely about the business of governing.’ John McTernan who worked for Henry McLeish and Tony Blair in government has a more qualified judgement: It has been partially successful. It has delivered decisions made closer to communities. But it has failed to generate innovation through divergence and experimentation. Instead it has generally led to policies exemplified by spending more on ‘free stuff’ . . .

Similarly, Michael Keating of Aberdeen University gives a conditional thumbs-up: ‘It has been a success if we are comparing it with what went before. It has legitimised the state in Scotland . . .’ The writer James Robertson also assessed devolution in comparison with what came before: ‘I cannot imagine what moribund political condition Scotland would be in if still a part of the UK yet without its own Parliament, and all that has flowed from its existence.’ Robin McAlpine, director of Common Weal, the pro-­ independence group, thinks much of its success comes from what it has deliberately not done: the road not travelled: ‘Most of the biggest achievements have been about things not done – the privatisations that didn’t happen, the outsourcing that didn’t happen, the tuition fees not imposed, the care for the elderly not marketised.’ For some its very existence was a statement and gave people a connection. Sue Lyons, an Inverness-based mental health development worker put it:

10 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

I also think the sense that the Scottish Parliament is ‘ours’. The MSPs are not in some ivory tower but living amongst us, taking our trains, driving our roads, we can go and see them, we can hold them to account and we can see how they put people at the centre of developing policies . . .

This was a common thread expressed by many; Kerri Friel, an anti-poverty activist based in Glenrothes said of the Parliament: ‘Its very existence is a light in the dark.’ Kathleen Caskie, a third-sector manager, saw the Parliament’s creation as shifting power: ‘Scotland has changed for the better in the last 20 years because it no longer feels that we are far away from the centre of everything.’ But not all saw the Parliament’s expression of identity as an unbridled positive, with Jim Gallagher stating that: ‘Holyrood has proved better at being than doing.’ Angela Haggerty, journalist and political commentator, assessed its impact in relation to the independence question: . . . from a unionist perspective, I’d say devolution has failed. If anything it has sped up the rate of collapse . . . From a Scottish nationalist perspective, it couldn’t really have gone any better up until this point. Scotland remains on the brink of an entirely possible Yes for independence vote . . .

Anna Fowlie, chief executive of SCVO, took a nuanced approach: ‘What interests me is that it hasn’t “trickled down” . . . ­devolution to local councils and then to communities . . . Actual power still rests with the wealthy, with men and with big, global business.’ Cathy McCulloch, co-director of the Children’s Parliament observed, ‘Short-termism is a stifling factor in the push for p ­ rogress – ­education being an example of limited vision and action.’ Dave Watson, former head of policy and public affairs at UNISON Scotland, emphasised its failure at substantive reform: ‘The failure has been the emphasis on process rather than substantive action that challenges the power structures in our society.’ Not surprisingly Alan Cochrane was more critical – judging that the Parliament’s success had been to create its own bubble: In terms of breeding an ‘industry’ – a parliament, politicians, staff, researchers, etc., etc., perhaps it has. Not forgetting a media industry

introduction | 11

where we have an extremely critical press, some might say overly so, and an almost supine national broadcaster in BBC Scotland . . .

Others were also critical but from a very different political perspective. Author Carol Craig stated: ‘The Scottish Parliament has been disappointing . . . a middle-class parliament for a middle-class electorate’ and felt overall its actions had been ‘tame’ and had not brought about ‘much-needed change in inequality and poverty.’ Gerry Mooney was even more disappointed at the Parliament’s record: ‘The key to this answer is asking: a success for whom? It has been successful for the rich, the powerful and other vested interests in Scotland.’ Gehan Macleod, co-founder of the pioneering Galgael in Govan, Glasgow, articulated dissatisfaction at the state of the nation: ‘Heightened levels of uncertainty and a state of perpetual anxiety have become the norm for many Scots, raising the question of better or worse for whom?’ Others saw the Scottish Parliament’s refusal to go in the same direction as Westminster as cause for cheer. Alastair McIntosh, writer and theologian, put it: Living in Govan, I see all around the crippling effects of austerity, the shifting of the burden of the feckless avarice of the rich onto the poor. But it feels so good that this has not been caused by our own Parliament, and that Holyrood has taken what steps are within its power to mitigate some of austerity’s impacts.

Kerri Friel stated: Community activists seek to make changes where we see inequality, ­injustice – many of the people we talk with in our communities are affected by child poverty, disability, in-work poverty, food-bank usage, homelessness, the list goes on – BUT – these are all the result of Westminster.

Kathleen Caskie stated: ‘we now have a Government which talks about care-experienced young people unashamedly using the word “love”.’ Innocent Jakisa, a disability and poverty activist living in Scotstoun, Glasgow, mentioned: ‘The introduction of the smoking

12 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

ban on 26th March 2006, it means that our children will grow up healthy in a smoke-free public places environment.’ Sue Lyons reflected on her family’s experience, saying, ‘I think the biggest change in policy decisions, certainly for myself and my family has been removing university tuition fees. This has led to four of us achieving degrees in the last five years.’ Writer Alan Bissett noted a different climate being created north of the border: ‘While we’re hardly immune to racism, Scotland hasn’t quite been infected by the resurgent xenophobia and chauvinism that seems to be sweeping the Western world.’ Broadcaster Stuart Cosgrove saw the Parliament as tapping into, and facilitating, a wider shift in the nation: One thing I’m most impressed by is a clearer focus on futures. Prior to the existence of the parliament there was an understandable focus on post-industrial decline and its long-term impacts.

This brings us to the official stories of devolution. We have, first, already mentioned the ‘new politics’ thesis which had much currency pre-Parliament, but less after the Parliament came into existence. Second, related to this, was the Parliament as the creation and expression of civil society, and in many accounts, ‘civic Scotland’. Third, has been a thread evident in the above comments of the Parliament as giving voice and institutional form to a sense of being and identity, providing an expression of what could be seen as a political home with many feeling they were connected to the institution and could call it ‘ours’. Fourth, is the disappointment some feel with the track record of the Parliament, which comes in many gradations, from the lament that it hasn’t lived up to its prior billing, to a judgement by parts of the left that it hasn’t significantly shifted power (except to itself) or tried to transform Scotland. Finally, is the story of the Parliament as the champion of social justice and social democratic values. This has been centred on the belief that Scotland is becoming a fairer, more equal country, and that whatever the compromises and diversions Scotland is inexor­ ably moving in the right direction. This is the terrain Labour naturally thought was its own home turf, but which came increasingly

introduction | 13

under challenge from the SNP to the point that they have claimed it as their own (Maxwell, 2009). What unites Labour and SNP in their respective periods of dominance is that neither has thought it necessary to offer a detailed interpretation of what social justice is and how to achieve it. Both have tended to define it as an unproblematic concept (when there are actually numerous different interpretations), and have tended to take as a given that it is a good, that their actions contribute to its advancement, and that even more, that their respective party animates in its essence the cause of social justice (on different interpretations of social justice see Atkinson, 1982). The mantle of this perspective seems to have passed without disruption from Labour to the SNP as the dominant party of the centre-left.

The record of the Scottish Parliament The Scottish Parliament is a political space, debating chamber, legislature and place for holding government and power to account – as well as speaking for Scotland. Yet, as well as being a living political institution, its track record over the last 20 years has been active in terms of legislation, with 284 Acts passed between 1999 and January 2019: 62 in 1999–2003, 66 in 2003–7, 53 in 2007–11, 79 in 2011–16, 24 in 2016–January 2019 (SPICe, 2019). A key determinant has been the relationship between the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government. How the two have interacted has changed over the period, from the early days of both bodies, with different attitudes and behaviours marking Labour–Lib Dem and then SNP administrations, and the experience of coalition, followed by minority, then majority, and back to minority government. Parliamentary debates and votes have been defined, as elsewhere, by codes and cultures of party discipline, and occasions when the Parliament has effectively held ministers to account have been rare. The committee system, much vaunted in the early days, has succeeded in throwing the light of scrutiny on aspects of public life previously unexamined, but in more recent years has become less effective in holding government and public agencies to account, limited by the ties of party loyalty. As important has been the accumulation of power at the centre

14 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

by the Scottish Government, which has been in part an inevitable trend of devolution and the creation of a new institution and the inherent tendency of new bodies to seek to justify their position and importance to increase their status and reach. Related to this has been the mindsets of, first, Labour in office (with the Lib Dems) and then the SNP – and the length of time each has been in power, with the latter by the next Scottish Parliament elections in 2021 having been in power for fourteen consecutive years. Reinforcing this trend has been the attitude of central government and the political forces running them. Thus, one example of how the SNP see government is the Scottish Government White Paper on independence, ‘Scotland’s Future’. This expressed satisfaction with the way the Parliament was working, and promised more of the same under independence: Scotland already has a modern, accessible parliament, elected on a proportional representation system. It will remain the parliament of an independent Scotland. The Scottish Parliament has set an example within the UK on how a modern legislature should operate. In line with its founding principles of power sharing, accountability, access and participation, and equal opportunity, the Parliament has successfully put into practice the principles on which it was founded: the petitions system makes the Parliament accessible and improves accountability; the legislative process gives civil society and individuals significant opportunities to participate before and during the formal Parliamentary process . . . (Scottish Government, 2013: 355)

Connected to this was the vision of the state presented in the White Paper which was a continuation of the patronage state – reaching out and including various interest groups, experts and parts of civil society in a time-honoured and established way. Another dimension in play is the relationship between Scottish devolved institutions and Westminster and Whitehall. The UK institutions have had a key role in the evolution of devolution – from the Scotland Act 1998 setting up the Parliament to the subsequent Scotland Acts of 2012 and 2016. As critically, Westminster has responsibility over significant areas of Scottish public life from macroeconomic powers, taxation, welfare, defence and foreign

introduction | 15

affairs, and even after the 2012 and 2016 Acts resulted in the devolution of elements of taxation and welfare powers, the majority of these areas still remain with Westminster. When the Scottish Parliament was established in 1999 there was a continuity of the party in power on both sides of the border, with Labour and the Lib Dems establishing the first devolved administration while Labour was in office in the UK. This still involved significant intra-party Labour tensions, but these were often masked or kept private. This changed when the SNP won in 2007 and then again when the Conservative–Lib Dem coalition was established in the aftermath of the 2010 UK election. Now in retrospect we can see that the early period of Labour being in office in Scotland and the UK was a historic missed opportunity shaped by the party’s innate constitutional conservatism (Keating and Jones, 1985). For devolution to work in a UK context it had to be devised not just as a Scottish-and-Welsh-only project (leaving aside the special circumstances of Northern Ireland) but had to involve reforming the political centre of the UK and creating formal arrangements between the centre and the new devolved bodies which would entail sharing power. Instead, what the UK Government devised was a Joint Ministerial Council (JMC) which brings together the devolved administrations and the UK Government. This has plenary meetings of ministers and civil servants, and numerous technical and specialist sub-groups. While the latter have sometimes worked well, the former rely on the goodwill of the UK Government to listen to the devolved bodies; this slowly began to erode and then, with Brexit, to evaporate. The fallout from Brexit led to a whole series of clashes between the Scottish and UK governments which ultimately saw UK law officers take the former to the UK Supreme Court over the remit of the European Union (Legal Continuity) Scotland Bill. The verdict was one which gave something to both sides, in that the judges said the bill ‘as a whole’ was within Holyrood’s competence, but that MSPs had acted outwith their powers in relation to one section (BBC News, 13 December 2018). Moreover, the UK was widely perceived as acting in an insensitive way towards Scottish concerns over what happened to powers coming back to the UK from

16 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Brussels over Brexit – with widespread concerns of a Westminster ‘power grab’ which went way beyond the SNP. There was a discernable feeling that Westminster and Whitehall never fully grasped or understood devolution, and instead saw it as a one-off event and a box ticked, rather than something which had to evolve. Fundamentally, the UK centre saw Scottish devolution as not directly impacting on itself, but about something ‘other’ and ultimately, far away. Thus, the British state at its core did not reform or democratise, or embrace far-reaching constitutional change which codified the reforms Labour initiated; neither did it advance towards some kind of quasi-federalism, or address in any way the English dimension (left to wilt after the failed 2004 North of England regional referendum) (see, on England and Britain: Weight, 2002). In many respects the UK political centre went backward after devolution. Under New Labour it came to represent a compromise between the forces of turbo-capitalism and the City to fund increased public spending, in so doing becoming advocates for light-touch regulation, privatisation and outsourcing (Shaw, 2007). And once the 2014 referendum result was called, the very next day David Cameron declared: ‘We have heard the voice of Scotland – and now the millions of voices of England must also be heard. The question of English votes for English laws – the so-called West Lothian question – requires a decisive answer.’ (BBC News, 19 September 2014). This did not go down well in Scotland, with the leader of the No campaign Alistair Darling, along with Gordon Brown and others, feeling betrayed. The European dimension in relation to Scotland has now become inexorably framed around Brexit, the nature of UK withdrawal, and how Scotland’s voice is represented and respected in this process. The Scottish Government has published two White Papers on Brexit and sought to get the UK Government to develop a withdrawal which takes on board Scottish interests (Scottish Government, 2016; 2018). This could have encompassed a ‘soft’ and differentiated Brexit – with the latter adapting the terms of exit to Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish concerns. But any chance of this ended when Theresa May called the 2017 UK election and lost her Commons parliamentary majority, restricting her political room for manoeuvre.

introduction | 17

All of this was a far cry from early days of devolution and the hopes of a ‘Europe of the regions’ in which devolved and regional governments and politicians were viewed as having an important say in the European political project. The nature of Brexit threw up numerous difficult questions for Scotland and the prospects of self-government in the future. These include the nature of the British state and statecraft after Brexit, the inexorable rightward drift of UK politics and the influence of an intransigent, uncompromising version of Euroscepticism, and the problems which a ‘hard’ Brexit might raise for a new independence offer in the near future. These and other difficult issues related to Brexit look likely to dominate many Scottish political discussions for many years to come.

The human dimension of politics Politics is about people and the human dimension of the last 20 years is fundamental to understanding the scale of change, the impact of the Parliament, and the role of politicians and public. 129 MSPs were elected in 1999 – 15 of them with Westminster ‘dual mandates’ – and the vast majority of the rest elected for the first time to national elected office. This, at one stroke, more than doubled the national political class of the country (MPs, MSPs, MEPs) – and over the course of 20 years saw the sum total of 305 individuals elected as MSPs. The role of politicians in Scotland’s Parliament with the differentiation between the 73 First Past the Post (FPTP) and 56 regional list MSPs, affected a sea change in how politics was done. There was, as well as a new institution, a new way of electing a significant number of them that dramatically changed the overall composition of the Parliament – making all parties parliamentary minorities until 2011 – and presenting a very different public face from the one people had come to associate with Westminster. The newly elected politicians acted and spoke in ways which broke new ground. They were present in Scotland for their working week, unlike Westminster MSPs, accessible and available to answer questions, and to ask questions of others. This was a culture shock for Westminster politicians who, particularly in Labour, felt aggrieved at all the public and media attention the new

18 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

body and politicians got when it was set up (not all of which was positive). As well as the above, it is important to reflect on one’s own small role in this story. I have a track record over the arc of the past 20 years of contributing to and analysing the Scottish Parliament and wider politics. Pre-Scottish Parliament in 1999 I produced a bestselling guide to the Parliament and the new political environment; subsequently the same year, once the Parliament was up and running, I produced a policy and ideas prospectus of what it could do to advance a centre-left reform agenda (Hassan, 1999; Hassan and Warhurst, 1999). Following on from this came an analysis of the frenetic first year of the Parliament, then studies of the Scottish Labour Party and modern SNP, along with a comprehensive account of Scottish Labour’s decline and the demise of ‘Labour Scotland’ (Hassan and Warhurst, 2000; Hassan, 2004; Hassan, 2009; Hassan and Shaw, 2012). After this came an assessment of the SNP’s ten years in office and an overview of how Scottish society and wider politics had shifted over the course of 20 years of devolution (Hassan and Barrow, 2017; 2019). Over the course of the 20 years I was both an active participant in numerous discussions, projects and policies, and an analyst and observer, aware that the first was informing and influencing the second and vice versa. Giving just a few select examples of the former will aid me in making a number of points about the wider political environment. First, in the early years of the Parliament, under the Jack McConnell administration, I mapped the use of Sewel motions – which the Parliament was using to pass numerous issues including some controversial areas back to Westminster (Hassan, 2002). I charted the number and type of motions, analysed it and assessed the political consequences, namely the Scottish Parliament – after the Clause 28 episode – avoiding legislating on various ethical and sexual issues which could cause controversy. My intervention subsequently became a political news story and the practice declined. Second, under the first Salmond administration I developed the idea of a commission on public service reform driven by a number of factors including the increasing constraints on public spending. This became the Campbell Christie ‘Commission on the Future

introduction | 19

Delivery of Public Services which I presented to the First Minister, his advisers and civil servants, and then wrote its original remit and terms of reference which was agreed by the Cabinet (Christie, 2011). Third, in the independence referendum I identified and named ‘the missing Scotland’ and ‘missing million’ – the near to one million Scots (989,540) who had not voted for a generation but who would have done so 25 years previously. I defined it, and the Electoral Commission quantified it, ran focus groups in Glasgow and Dundee with Ipsos MORI in association with the Electoral Reform Society Scotland, and commissioned a study examining it (Hassan, 2014a; Sullivan, 2014). This became one of the defining concepts of the referendum to both the Yes and No camps and a political idea they both thought was one of the keys to the result. What wider lessons do I surmise from the above and numerous other activities? First, there is a positive aspect to the above. This is that it is possible to engage with government and related institutions at the highest level and affect change. It is possible to bring new ideas, thinking and innovation into the system and for this to facilitate change and have an impact on public policy, government and consequentially individual lives. Second, there is the oft-overlooked issue of ‘mind the gap’ in public life: something which is inherent in small-sized nations and polities the world over. This centres on the relative ease of access and influence it is possible to have, and how this can have the potential downside of co-opting and incorporating individuals and groups – thus as a consequence becoming a part of the insider class. Some people of course want to be co-opted, but by doing so as well as gaining they lose a degree of independence and therefore, potentially, of value. Hence, there is an insider/outsider status which has to be recognised and balanced as much as it can in public affairs and public policy. This raises challenges for how Scotland and other similar-sized nations can combine access and transparency with the nurturing of spaces and resources which can encourage new or challenging ideas and innovation. As critical in all of this is referencing back to the notion of the ‘missing Scotland’ – who is included and who is not included in such processes and conversations?

20 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Scotland fails badly at this in a number of respects, including one of the most basic: voting levels with turnout for Scottish Parliament elections never exceeding the 58.2 per cent achieved in 1999 and falling to a low of 49.4 per cent in 2003, subsequently rising post-referendum to 55.6 per cent in 2016. Most of Scotland is absent from detailed engagement with the system, and the biggest engager with Scottish Government consultations is the Scottish Government itself in what is a semi-circular process (see Cairney et al., 2009; Halpin et al., 2010). Even more, as well as noting the voices and interests of those who are engaged with government, it is as equally important to be aware of the silences and gaps in public life. In every aspect of politics, government and society, the silences say as much as who is speaking and who has voice. Scotland, in the not-so-distant past, was defined by numerous taboos and subjects that were not meant to be raised in public or polite society. This has dramatically changed across a range of areas – religion, sexuality, gender, ethnicity, sectarianism and more – but it does not mean new taboos have not emerged around which new silences and orthodoxies exist. The extent of Scotland’s progressive values and how we live up to these at a time when we are across a range of indicators (wealth, income, health) as divided as we have ever been, would be one such issue (see on the evidence Pryce and Le Zhang, 2018). We have to at least be aware of this manifestation of who is included and excluded, and be open to critique and ideas for how change can come about which addresses the power and privilege imbalances which mar too much of our society to this day.

Scotland’s future after devolution Making sense of the past 20 years is important for several reasons. An obvious one is to understand the journey we have been on and to assess how we have changed or not changed in our politics and as a society. But there are also lessons to be examined to aid us to be more effective in the present, and to make the right choices that will inform our collective future. One definite strand of the previous two decades in relation to devolution has been that of ‘continuity Scotland’. Despite the

introduction | 21

establishment of a Scottish Parliament and Executive-turnedGovernment, along with significant shifts in society and politics, there has been a degree of continuity. There have been within institutional Scotland attempts to minimise disruption and maintain the existing array of relationships and power balances. This has been aided by the policy and political conservatism of Labour, Lib Dems and the SNP in office, and can also be identified in the version of independence the Nationalists put before the electorate in 2014. The role of the Scottish Government has come centre stage in public life but this has the consequence of placing popular expectations directly on its shoulders. The Scottish Parliament has, as a political community and actual institution, created a place for itself in civic life and the public sphere, and this is a space and stage where exchange, discussion and decisions can occur, be engaged with and scrutinised. There is where political statecraft can be articulated and observed, but this has a vital added dimension of scenography – a term associated in theatre with the Czech artist Josef Svoboda and in the UK with German-born set designer Ralph Koltai – which means the creation of the stage space (McKinney and Butterworth, 2009). This has been dramatically enhanced by the establishment and evolution of the Parliament, with more attention needing to be paid to its ecology and the differing political and social actors present (and not present). Relevant to this are the politics of centralisation, standardising public boards and bodies, and the long-term atrophying of local government. These trends, and 20 years of devolution’s forward march gaining more powers, has raised questions of where the ideas, policies and innovation come from to inform public life. The semi-autonomy of the public sphere in Scotland is also marked by its fragility in places and by the absence of think tanks, research agencies and resources devoted to policy and practice. There are only two conventional think tanks, Reform Scotland and IPPR Scotland, whereas hybrid bodies such as the ‘do tank’ Common Weal are funded by donation, and the policy-practice interface – of examining actual delivery and outcomes – is still massively under-examined, despite the best intentions of bodies such as What Works Scotland at Glasgow University. Added to

22 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

this, a number of the agencies of civil society have either experienced retreat, such as the trade union movement and churches, or become increasingly reliant on government for funding: the STUC and SCVO being prime examples. However, a counter to the above has been that of an increasingly divergent Scotland from the rest of the UK. This often stresses the cumulative achievement of social democratic Scotland giving form to a set of policy achievements such as the abolition of student tuition fees, free care for the elderly and the abolition of prescription charges, which stress the universalist credentials of the social contract between government and citizen here, as opposed to the more selective approach by successive UK governments. A more pessimistic interpretation of this viewpoint emphasises that Scotland has embarked on policy divergence primarily because it has actively chosen to not embrace the ‘choice’ and marketisation of public services pursued in England – in the NHS, academies and free schools in education – and instead maintained a more ­producer-orientated vision of public services (see Sime, 2017). This is even, to many of its supporters, a defensive social democracy – holding the ground against the encroachment of what is often portrayed as a Blairite New Labour-inspired agenda which has had little traction in Scotland. A critical aspect mostly missing from an advocacy of this approach has been the distributional consequences, which has aided those further up the income scale. However, the above two accounts (continuity, divergence) do not fully reflect the scale of change which has occurred in recent decades in Scottish society and politics – which could be framed as a second great disruption where power, authority and voice have become much more conditional and contested. The scale of change that Tom Devine invoked, talking of a ‘velvet revolution’ from the early 1980s onward, has continued in scale and degree in the last decade. This dramatic change has seen many of the once-dominant institutions of the country experience crisis, challenge and even collapse. There was the implosion of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), the administration and then liquidation of Glasgow Rangers FC, and the sequential moral crises of the Catholic Church and Church of Scotland. Other once-powerful institutions such as the BBC and

introduction | 23

CBI Scotland equally, in less dramatic manner, have found their once-pivotal places of influence in society now openly challenged and up for question. This turbulence came against the long-term backdrop of a society where the traditional idea of Scottish society, of authority, order and hierarchy imposing a moral code of conduct, explicitly under the Kirk, and then more implicitly, with the heyday of the dominance of Scottish Labour, was falling away. This was a society slowly learning to loosen up, to embrace more individualism and diversity, and to do so while trying to retain its collectivist values. This brought into the open tensions between the role of the state as a guardian and freedom of speech and civil liberties seen in the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 and Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012; the ‘Named Person’ scheme in the former was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2016, while the later was repealed in 2018. Some critics presented this as the Scottish penchant for a ‘nanny state’: one over-the-top account claiming that ‘Scotland the Brave has become Scotland the Brave New World’ of Aldous Huxley vintage (O’Neill, 2015). A more reasonable critique would use such cases to look at how moral authority asserted itself in public life in an age of increasing secularism and individualisation and gauge how these competing forces could be best balanced. The conventional SNP argument has been to portray independence as the inevitable expression of a society and politics increasingly autonomous, confident and distinctive from the rest of the UK. This is an evolutionary argument for self-government: that Scotland is inexorably and in a myriad of ways, both big and small, becoming more and more independent. It is a powerful argument reducing the risk and rupture of change, but it also carries a downside of minimising change and not reflecting the age of disruption we are living in across the West. Hence, in the historic 2014 debate and vote the SNP offered a future vision of Scotland based upon a bright, shiny offer of an optimistic modernity. This said that if we have the levers, power and ambition we can achieve fundamental change in relation to economic growth and social divisions. All that is required is the collective human willpower, leadership and mobilisation of

24 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

resources which independence can bring about. But underneath these assumptions sat an irrevocable faith in the power of modernity, technocratic change and experts, which was at odds with the political and intellectual mood across the West. Not only is such a mindset rather similar to that of the uphill positive years of Scottish Labour at its peak in the 1960s and 1970s, it also evokes the overreach and self-belief of New Labour post-1997 that it represented the future. Both of these eventually exhausted themselves and imploded. More is at play than this. This SNP prospectus sat at ill-ease with another pro-independence interpretation of Scotland which was evident and energised in the 2014 campaign. This Scotland was that of the self-organising, self-starting, grass-roots organisations which emerged in the run-up to the vote: bodies such as Women for Independence, the cultural National Collective and Radical Independence Campaign – which I termed ‘the third Scotland’ to denote its separation from the old and new emergent establishments (Hassan, 2014a). The notion of independence implicit in such initiatives was very different: one which was diverse, with new forms of organisation and leadership, with a generational and gender dimension. In the period up to the 2014 vote, these two competing visions sat in collaboration and co-existence, burying their disagreements and tensions, but ultimately, they have little in common beyond the principle of independence. We should not be surprised by any of the above – as such tensions and fissures can be found in similar form across the developed world. Mainstream politics is increasingly in retreat – there is the widespread march of populists and xenophobes; everywhere insurgents are challenging insiders; and the allure and promise of modernity on the left and right has been hollowed out and increasingly questioned. This raises the question of what kind of future Scotland, politically and socially, will emerge over the next two decades? Much of the future cannot be identified or predicted but some of our future is already here and present. Scotland’s increasing political autonomy will continue and either embrace formal independence or a new set of arrangements in the Union in which our political voice and interests are respected. How this manifests itself in terms

introduction | 25

of these isles is not just about what happens north of the border but how the right-wing drift of British (and English) politics over the last four decades plays itself out. One inevitable future is that the Scots will outgrow the idea and practice of devolution: a political compromise and halfway house which was based upon the supremacy of the Westminster system and a state which does not treat its people as informed citizens who are equal partners with government. Scotland will embrace a future after devolution. It will also embrace a future which is not about a version of self-government or independence exclusively focused on politicians and the Scottish Parliament. That would be a minimal version of change which would replace Westminster with a mini-Westminster of the North which found it impossible to share power with other parts of the country. That future Scotland will not belong to one political party or tradition and will be emboldened by more than constitutional change and political processes – such as the date and timing of another independence referendum. All of these factors matter but they have to be informed by a wider social compact and tapestry which amounts to remaking the social contract between government and people. And that future will, as all futures do, draw from the best of our own past, our own idealism and radicalism and questioning of power, and invoke a culture of self-determination which informs a living politics of self-government.

References Atkinson, A. B. (1982), Social Justice and Public Policy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bogdanor, V. (1999), Devolution in the United Kingdom, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brown, A. (2000), ‘Designing the New Scottish Parliament’, Parliamentary Affairs, 53 (3). Cairney, P. (2011), The Scottish Political System since Devolution: From New Politics to the New Scottish Government, Exeter: Imprint Academic. Cairney, P., D. Halpin and G. Jordan (2009), ‘New Scottish Parliament: Same Old Interest Group Politics?’, in C. Jeffrey and J. Mitchell (eds), The Scottish Parliament 1999–2009: The First Decade, Edinburgh: Luath Press in association with the Hansard Society. Christie, C. (2011), ‘Christie Commission on the Future Delivery of Public Services’, Edinburgh: Scottish Government.

26 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T Craig, C. and T. Devine (2005), ‘Scotland’s “Velvet Underground”’, in G. Hassan, E. Gibb, and L. Howland (eds), Scotland 2020: Hopeful Stories for a Northern Nation, London/Edinburgh: Demos in association with Scottish Book Trust. Denver, D., J. Mitchell, C. Pattie and H. Bochel (2000), Scotland Decides: The Devolution Issue and the Scottish Referendum, London: Frank Cass. Gibb, K., D. Maclennan, D. McNulty and M. Comerford (eds) (2018), The Scottish Economy: A Living Book, London: Routledge. Halpin, D., I. MacLeod and P. McLaverty (2010), ‘Committee Hearings of the Scottish Parliament: Who Gives Evidence? And Does it Contribute to “Policy Learning?”’, paper presented to the Political Studies Conference. Hassan, G. (2002), ‘Scotland’s Copycat Parliament’, Herald, 4 September. Hassan, G. (2014a), Caledonian Dreaming: The Quest for a Different Scotland, Edinburgh: Luath Press. Hassan, G. (2014b), Independence of the Scottish Mind: Elite Narratives, Public Spaces and the Making of a Modern Nation, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hassan, G. and E. Shaw (2012), The Strange Death of Labour Scotland, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Hassan, G. (ed.) (1999), A Guide to the Scottish Parliament: The Shape of Things to Come, Edinburgh: HMSO. Hassan, G. (ed.) (2004), The Scottish Labour Party: History, Institutions and Ideas, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Hassan, G. (ed.) (2009), The Modern SNP: From Protest to Power, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Hassan, G. and S. Barrow (eds) (2017), A Nation Changed? The SNP and Scotland Ten Years On, Edinburgh: Luath Press. Hassan, G. and S. Barrow (eds) (2019), Scotland the Brave? Twenty Years of Change and the Future of the Nation, Edinburgh: Luath Press. Hassan, G. and C. Warhurst (eds) (1999), A Different Future: A Moderniser’s Guide to Scotland, Glasgow/Edinburgh: The Big Issue in Scotland/Centre for Scottish Public Policy. Hassan, G. and C. Warhurst (eds) (2000), The New Scottish Politics: The First Year of the Scottish Parliament and Beyond, Edinburgh: Stationery Office. Keating, M. and B. Jones (1985), Labour and the British State, Oxford: Clarendon Press. McCrone, D. (1992), Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Stateless Nation, London: Routledge. McCrone, D. (2017), The New Sociology of Scotland, London: Sage. McKinney, J. and P. Butterworth (2009), The Cambridge Introduction to Scenography, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Maxwell, S. (2009), ‘Social Justice and the SNP’, in G. Hassan (ed.), The Modern SNP: From Protest to Power, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Mitchell, J. (2000), ‘New Parliament, New Politics’, Parliamentary Affairs, 53 (3). Mitchell, J. (2009), Devolution in the UK, Manchester: Manchester University Press. O’Neill, B. (2015), ‘Scotland: The Most Nannying of Europe’s Nanny States’, reason, 6 April, .

introduction | 27 Oxford English Dictionary (2019), ‘Devolution’, . Pryce, G. and M. Le Zhang (2018), ‘Inequality in Scotland: despite Nordic aspirations, things are not improving’, The Conversation, 7 November, . Scottish Government (2013), ‘Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland’, Edinburgh: Scottish Government. Scottish Government (2016), ‘Scotland’s Place in Europe’, Edinburgh: Scottish Government. Scottish Government (2018), ‘Scotland’s Place in Europe: People, Jobs, Investment’, Edinburgh: Scottish Government. Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2017), ‘Scottish social attitudes: attitudes to government and political engagement, 2016’, . Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2018), ‘Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2017: attitudes data’, Edinburgh: Scottish Government, . Shaw. E. (2007), Losing Labour’s Soul? New Labour and the Blair Government 1997– 2007, London: Routledge. Sime, M. (2017), ‘A Decade in the Life of Scotland’s Public Services’, in G. Hassan and S. Barrow (eds) (2017), A Nation Changed? The SNP and Scotland Ten Years On, Edinburgh: Luath Press. SPICe (Scottish Parliament Information Centre) (2019), ‘Personal communication to author’, 4 February. Stewart, D. (2009), The Path to Devolution and Change: A Political History of Scotland under Margaret Thatcher, London: I. B. Tauris. Sullivan, W. (2014), The Missing Scotland: Why over a million Scots choose not to vote and what it means for our democracy, Edinburgh: Luath Press in association with Electoral Reform Society Scotland. Torrance, D. (2009), ‘We in Scotland’: Thatcherism in a Cold Climate, Edinburgh: Birlinn. Weight, R. (2002), Patriots: National Identity in Britain, 1940–2000, London: Macmillan.

introduction | 29

Part One

The Political Institutions and Environment

the electorate and elections | 31

O NE

The Electorate and Elections John Curtice

Introduction The devolution settlement introduced in 1999 was devised jointly by Labour and the Liberal Democrats. Between 1989 and 1995 the two parties, then both in opposition, participated alongside a range of civil society organisations in what was known as the Scottish Constitutional Convention, which body developed a detailed proposal for a devolved Scottish Parliament (Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995). It proposed a parliament of 129 members, 73 of whom would be elected by the familiar single-member plurality electoral system used in elections to the House of Commons, but with the other 56 elected by a closed party-list system in such a way that the relationship between votes cast and total seats won in each of eight regions was as proportional as possible. Shortly after winning a landslide victory in the 1997 UK general election, Labour secured popular support for the idea in a referendum and went on to pass the legislation that allowed the new body to start its life on 1 July 1999. The motivations behind the introduction of devolution were clear (Aughey, 2001; Bogdanor, 1999; Paterson, 1998). Labour feared that the SNP, which had first become a significant electoral force in the 1970s, could threaten its hegemony of Scotland’s representation in the House of Commons, a hegemony that had been crucial to Labour’s ability to win an overall majority in both 1964 and October 1974. By demonstrating that Scotland’s ­distinctive

32 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

needs, aspirations and identity could be reflected in how the country was governed within the framework of the UK, Labour hoped to demonstrate that independence was unnecessary and that consequently popular support for the idea – and thus the SNP – would fall away. True, in accepting, under pressure from the Liberal Democrats, that the new body would be elected by proportional representation, Labour was backing a system that meant they might not always be able to win an overall majority in the new devolved institution, but at the same time the proposal had the saving grace that it would seemingly make it near impossible for the SNP to win an overall majority and thus be able to use the devolution settlement as a springboard for independence. Meanwhile, the Liberal Democrats, who had not tasted governmental office since 1945, anticipated that they would become a near-indispensable coalition partner in future Scottish devolved governments. Initially, everything went almost to plan. As Table 1.1 shows, Labour did not secure an overall majority in the first devolved election in 1999, but, between them, Labour and the Liberal Democrats enjoyed an overall majority of 17 and duly formed a coalition, subsequently retaining office after the second devolved election in 2003. Yet 20 years on, the picture looks very different. It is their opponents who are in the ascendancy. The SNP has provided Scotland with devolved government for a dozen years. In 2011, the nationalists even won an overall majority, thereby paving the way for them to hold a referendum on independence. They may not have won that referendum, held in September 2014, but, nevertheless, a few months later in the 2015 UK election Labour’s domination of Scotland’s Westminster representation was brought to a dramatic end as the SNP captured every single seat bar just three (see Table 1.2). In 2019, Labour is now only the third largest party in the Scottish Parliament, having been overtaken by the Conservatives, while the Liberal Democrats find themselves with even fewer MSPs than the Greens. In this chapter, we attempt to explain why devolution did not work out as its proponents – and particularly Labour – had hoped and intended. We explain why, from the very beginning, the introduction of devolved Scottish elections proved to be a springboard for the SNP, why the nationalists proved to be adept at exploiting

the electorate and elections | 33

that opportunity, and how, with devastating effect, they have been able to turn the question of Scotland’s constitutional status into the central question of Scottish electoral politics. It is very much a tale of unintended consequences. Table 1.1  Scottish Parliament election results, 1999–2016 % Constituency Vote Labour Conservatives Liberal Democrats SNP Greens Scottish Socialists Others Turnout

1999

2003

2007

2011

2016

38.8 15.6 14.2 28.7    –  1.0  1.7 58.2

34.6 16.6 15.4 23.8    –  6.2  3.4 49.4

32.1 16.6 16.2 32.9  0.1  0.0  2.0 51.7

31.7 13.9  7.9 45.4    –    –  1.1 50.3

22.6 22.0  7.8 46.5  0.6    –  0.5 55.6

% Regional List Vote Labour Conservatives Liberal Democrats SNP Greens Scottish Socialists Others

1999

2003

2007

2011

2016

33.6 15.4 12.4 27.3  3.6  2.0  5.7

29.3 15.5 11.8 20.9  6.9  6.7  9.0

29.2 13.9 11.3 31.0  4.0  0.6 10.0

26.3 12.4  5.2 44.0  4.4  0.6  7.1

19.1 22.9  5.2 41.7  6.6    –  4.5

1999

2003

2007

2011

2016

56 18 17 35  1  1  1

50 18 17 27  7  6  2

46 17 16 47  2  0  1

37 15  5 69  2  0  1

24 31  5 63  6  –  0

Seats Labour Conservatives Liberal Democrats SNP Greens Scottish Socialists Others

Sources: Rallings and Thrasher (2012); Curtice (2016). Voters have two votes, one for their local constituency MSP and one for a regional list, which they may cast for different parties. Table shows all instances of a party winning 2 per cent or more of the vote except that the Socialist Labour Party won 2.4 per cent of the regional list vote in 1999 and UKIP 2.0 per cent on the same vote in 2016. Turnout is the percentage of valid constituency votes cast divided by the registered electorate.

34 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Table 1.2  UK general results in Scotland, 1997–2017 % Vote Labour Conservatives Liberal Democrats SNP Greens Scottish Socialists Others Turnout

1997

2001

2005

2010

2015

2017

45.6 17.5 13.0 22.1  0.1  0.3  1.5 71.3

43.9 15.6 16.3 20.1  0.2  3.1  0.7 58.1

39.5 15.8 22.6 17.7  1.1  1.9  1.4 60.8

42.0 16.7 18.9 19.9  0.7  0.1  1.7 63.8

24.3 14.9  7.5 50.0  1.3    –  1.9 71.1

27.1 28.6  6.8 36.9  0.2    –  0.5 66.4

Seats Labour Conservatives Liberal Democrats SNP Greens Scottish Socialists Others

1997

2001

2005

2010

2015

2017

56  0 10  6  0  0  0

56  1 10  5  0  0  0

41  1 11  6  0  0  0

41  1 11  6  0  0  0

 1  1  1 56  0  –  0

 7 13  4 35  0  –  0

Sources: Rallings and Thrasher (2012); Cowley and Kavanagh (2016; 2018). Table shows all instances of a party winning at least 2 per cent of the vote. In 2001 and 2005, votes cast for the Speaker are included in the Labour tally. Note that the number of MPs in Scotland was reduced from 72 to 59 in 2005.

A different kind of contest From the very beginning devolution did not work out electorally quite as those who had advocated it had hoped. What had not been appreciated was that many voters would come to regard Scottish Parliament elections in a rather different light to UK Parliament elections. For a start, at just 58 per cent, the turnout was 13 points down on that for the previous UK election, suggesting that the new institution was not necessarily going to be regarded by the public as the principal fulcrum of the nation’s political life. Indeed, turnouts of around 50 per cent or so have subsequently proven the norm in Scottish Parliament elections. But more importantly, those who did vote were not necessarily making their choice on the basis of the same considerations as they had in a UK general election. Table 1.3 shows how respondents to the Scottish Social Attitudes survey

the electorate and elections | 35

Table 1.3  Different elections, different criteria? UK General Election Basis for vote choice

2001 %

2005 %

2010 %

2015 %

2017 %

What mostly going on in Scotland Britain as a whole

34 44

32 43

24 54

34 37

27 51

Scottish Parliament Election Basis for vote choice

1999 %

2003 %

2007 %

2011 %

2016 %

What mostly going on in Scotland Britain as a whole

52 34

54 27

56 29

49 28

53 26

Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 1999–2017. Table based only on those claiming to have voted.

answered when, after each Scottish Parliament and UK Parliament election, they were asked whether they had voted mostly on the basis of what was going on in Scotland in particular or on the basis of what was going on across Britain as a whole. From the top half of the table we can see that in a UK general election typically rather more voters state that they have decided how to vote on the basis of what is going on across Britain as a whole. But in a Scottish Parliament election the balance of attention is tilted in the opposite direction, with usually rather more than half saying that they were focused on what was happening in Scotland in particular. Such a difference of perspective was potentially helpful to the SNP. However successful the party might be in a UK general election, it would never be in a position to form an administration at Westminster. Voters who were concerned to express their view about who should form the next UK government could therefore be discouraged from backing the SNP. But in any election confined to Scotland, the SNP were as much a contender for power as any other party. Meanwhile, and perhaps even more importantly, if voters’ minds were focused more on what might be best for Scotland, then the SNP could be advantaged by another consideration – that it was more closely aligned in voters’ minds with the promotion of Scotland’s interests. On the occasion of the first devolved election in 1999, as many as 24 per cent said that the SNP looked after

36 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Scotland’s interests ‘very closely’ whereas only 7 per cent said the same of Labour (Paterson et al., 2001). According to later Scottish Election Studies this gap grew yet wider (Johns et al., 2010; Carman et al., 2014), not least, perhaps, because of Labour’s insistence in the early years of devolution on offering a ‘a partnership’ between a Labour-led administration in Scotland and a Labour-run government at Westminster, a stance that did little to encourage the perception that a Labour-led administration in Edinburgh was willing to fight Scotland’s corner in its dealings with the UK government (Curtice et al., 2009). In any event, the SNP certainly performed relatively well in the first Scottish Parliament election in 1999. In a ballot in which voters could cast two votes, one for their local constituency MSP and one for their regional list, the party won 29 per cent of the vote on the constituency ballot and 27 per cent on the regional list, more than it had done in any UK election since October 1974. Moreover, the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey revealed that support for the SNP was seven points higher than it would have been if a UK general election had been held on the same day, while, conversely, Labour’s vote was as much as nine points lower (Paterson et al., 2001), a pattern that fits the wider international evidence on how voters are more likely to support nationalist parties in sub-state elections (Jeffrey and Hough, 2003). As Table 1.4 below shows, not least of the reasons for this was that the SNP were notably more successful than they were in a UK general election at winning the votes of those who supported independence. Meanwhile, the use of proportional representation meant the party’s geographically evenly spread voting strength was reflected in its parliamentary representation in a way that it had never been under the single-member plurality system used in elections to the House of Commons. Consequently, far from killing nationalism ‘stone dead’, as the former Labour Shadow Scottish Secretary of State George Robertson had anticipated, the most immediate consequence of the first Scottish Parliament election was to turn the SNP into a substantial full-time parliamentary force for the first time in its history.

the electorate and elections | 37

Leadership and competence That parliamentary force was also a senior one. All six of the party’s existing MPs opted to stand for the Scottish Parliament, albeit that the party’s leader, Alex Salmond, resigned the leadership in 2000 and then opted to focus on his role at Westminster (though only for what proved only a short while). At the same time, many an already high profile SNP politician, such as Nicola Sturgeon and Michael Russell, were able to become full-time parliamentary politicians. In contrast, only five of Labour’s 56 MPs sought and secured election as a Labour MSP, one of whom (Donald Dewar, the inaugural First Minister) died just a year later, another resigned in 2001, while only one of the other three remained an MSP after the 2003 election. Nearly all of Scottish Labour’s senior personnel such as the future Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, and Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, opted to stay at Westminster. Thus, when it came to voters’ perceptions of the leadership and competence of the parties, the fact that the SNP had never previously been in government was counterbalanced by relative inexperience and lack of charisma on the Labour benches in the new parliament. Perceptions of leadership and competence proved crucial to the SNP’s initial success in displacing Labour as the largest party in the Scottish Parliament (by just one seat) in 2007, a success that enabled the party to form a minority government. Although perceptions of Labour’s record in office in 2007 were not markedly worse than they had been four years previously (Curtice et al., 2009), nevertheless there was a feeling that the SNP could do at least as good a job. For example, according to the Scottish Election Study, 36 per cent thought that the SNP would handle Health well, slightly more than the 33 per cent who thought that Labour had done so (Johns et al., 2010). But probably the crucial development was Alex Salmond’s decision to return once again to the political fray in Edinburgh, both as the party’s leader once more and its candidate for First Minister. Labour’s Scottish leader and the country’s First Minister since 2001, Jack McConnell, was not especially unpopular. For example, the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey found that at least as many people thought that he was a good leader (23 per cent) as reckoned he was a bad one (22 per

38 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

cent), figures that were little different from what they had been four years earlier (Curtice et al., 2009). However, the more charismatic Salmond was much more popular than McConnell, with 39 per cent reckoning he was a good leader and only 14 per cent a bad one (Curtice et al., 2009). With Labour also losing support among the minority of its voters who disliked the Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and/or the record of his government at Westminster, these considerations – together with the more favourable environment that Scottish elections afforded the SNP – were enough to tilt the overall outcome in the SNP’s favour – even though the level of support for independence was no higher than it had been eight years previously (see Chapter Two). Many of the same considerations lay behind the SNP’s success in winning an overall majority in 2011 – when again there was no evidence that independence had become any more popular – though by now the SNP’s advantage on competence and leadership was much more decisive. Two thirds (66 per cent) reckoned the SNP had performed well in office, whereas only around one third (31 per cent) believed that Labour would do so (Carman et al., 2014). With an average score of 5.5 out of 10, Salmond was even more popular than he had been in 2007, when his mark had been a more modest 4.8. His advantage over his hapless Labour opponent, Iain Gray, increased markedly during the course of an election campaign in which confidence in Labour’s ability to govern seemed to ebb away (Curtice, 2011). Many a voter who was still minded to vote for one of the unionist parties and was opposed to independence seemed to believe that the SNP might be better able to run Scotland’s devolved administration. There was, though, a crucial difference between how perceptions of competence and leadership helped the party in 2011 from how they had done so in 2007. In 2007, favourable perceptions of the party were largely found among those who supported independence. For example, the increase in Salmond’s popularity as compared with that of John Swinney, who had led the party at the 2003 Scottish Parliament election, had been most marked among those who supported independence (Curtice et al., 2009). In line with this, as Table 1.4 shows, the growth in the party’s support at that election occurred primarily among those who supported independ-

the electorate and elections | 39

ence. As many as 80 per cent of them backed the party, 22 points above the proportion that did so in 2003. In contrast, the increase in support for the SNP among those who wished to stay in the UK was just eight points. In short, in 2007, favourable perceptions of the party’s leadership and competence enabled the SNP to mobilise more effectively those who already backed independence. However, as we have already noted, in 2011 a significant number of voters who said they would vote for one of the unionist parties in a UK general election felt that the SNP had done a good job and/or indicated that they thought that Alex Salmond would make the best First Minister, and as a result were inclined to support the SNP in the forthcoming Scottish contest (Curtice, 2011). According to the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, support for the party was this time no less than 19 points higher than it would have been in a contemporaneous Westminster election, a much bigger gap than at the three previous Scottish Parliament elections. Meanwhile, as we can see from Table 1.4, whereas the party was no more successful than it had been in 2007 at winning the support of those who backed independence, it now enjoyed, at 38 per cent, an unparalleled level of support among those voters who wished to remain part of the UK. In short, the SNP’s spectacular 2011 election victory, a victory which paved the way for it to hold a referendum on independence, was obtained by winning over many a voter who still wished to remain part of the UK. Table 1.4  SNP support by constitutional preference, 1999–2016 Constitutional Preference % Voted SNP in:

Independence

Union

1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2010 2011 2015 2016 2017

62 35 58 33 80 55 79 85 80 70

17  9 14  8 22 12 38 25 24 14

Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 1999–2017.

40 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

The constitutional question becomes centre stage That independence referendum was, in turn, to disrupt the electoral scene yet further. Not only did it result in a marked increase in the level of support for independence (see Chapter Two), but, with a UK general election scheduled to take place just eight months later, it was also followed by a marked increase in support for the SNP in the polls. Even after its initial success in the Scottish election of 2007, the party had still managed no more than a fifth of the vote in the subsequent UK general election in 2010 (see Table 1.2). Instead of four fifths, only a little more than a half (55 per cent) of those who backed independence had voted for the party at that election, and its support, according to the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, was 10 points lower than it would have been in a contemporaneous general election. Labour might have lost power in Edinburgh in 2007, but it still had 41 of the country’s 59 MPs at Westminster. The fallout from the independence referendum changed all that. Instead of shying away once again from voting for the SNP in a UK general election, those who backed independence (now a much larger group) seemed determined to use the 2015 general election to reaffirm their belief in independence. As many as 85 per cent of them voted for the SNP, while, at 25 per cent, backing for the party amongst supporters of the Union was well down on what it had been in 2011. With voters also less focused on what was going on across Britain as a whole than at any previous UK general election (see Table 1.3), whether or not people voted for the SNP reflected their support for – or opposition to – independence to a greater extent than ever before. At the same time, the gap between people’s willingness to support the SNP in a Scottish election and their propensity to do so in a UK general election had almost disappeared – the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey reckoned the difference between the two was now just four points. As a result, the SNP won almost exactly half the vote and Labour’s dominance of Scotland’s Westminster representation was destroyed (see Table 1.2). This strong link between attitudes towards independence and whether or not people voted for the SNP was largely upheld in the Scottish Parliament election the following year. Consequently,

the electorate and elections | 41

although the party’s share of the vote was on a par with what it achieved in 2011, the composition of its support was now very different. No less than three quarters of those who voted for the party in 2016 supported independence, compared with only a half in 2011. This time, though, its support was not quite enough to secure a second overall majority, partly because it appears that some SNP supporters switched to the Greens on the regional list vote and partly because the party was less successful than it might have been in turning its slightly increased vote into seats won in the constituency contests (Curtice, 2016). Even so, thanks to the fact that the Greens won six seats, the new chamber still contained a majority of MSPs in favour of independence, the very opposite of what the original proponents of devolution had intended.

Brexit fallout That said, the SNP did suffer a real reverse in the snap general election held in June 2017. The party was not only unable to replicate the 50 per cent of the vote that it won in 2015, but even fell well short of its performance in the Scottish Parliament election the previous year (see Table 1.2). Supporting independence was no longer the near-automatic passport into voting for the party that it had been two years previously (see Table 1.4), though the SNP lost ground heavily among supporters of the Union too. The fall among the latter group could plausibly reflect a reaction against Nicola Sturgeon’s decision a few weeks earlier to seek authority from the UK Parliament to hold another independence referendum, a decision that was greeted with much disquiet among supporters of the Union; according to a poll conducted by Panelbase on the eve of the election, just 19 per cent of those who voted No in 2014 favoured holding a referendum at some point in the next couple of years. However, that explanation cannot plausibly account for the SNP’s loss of support among those who supported independence. One possibility, of course, is that perhaps voters had once again become markedly less willing to vote for the SNP in a Westminster election. After all, voters’ attention was back once more on developments across Britain as a whole (see Table 1.3). This, however, seems unlikely to be the case. A YouGov poll conducted in March

42 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

2017, shortly before the general election was called, put support for the SNP in such an election at just four points below what it was anticipated the party would secure in an immediate Scottish Parliament election. Equally, the first two polls to be conducted after the general election found differences of only one or two points in the level of SNP support in the two kinds of contest. The near elimination of the once-dramatic difference between the performance of the party in a Scottish election and that in a UK one remained in force. Rather, what appears to have happened is that fallout from yet another referendum, this time on Britain’s membership of the EU, cut across the argument about Scotland’s constitutional status and in so doing reduced SNP support among both supporters of independence and those who back the Union. One consequence of the EU referendum was to link the case that was being made for independence – and thus the SNP itself – more firmly to the question of EU membership. Although the UK as a whole voted to Leave the EU, Scotland voted by 62 per cent to 38 per cent to Remain. This outcome encouraged Nicola Sturgeon to pursue a second independence referendum on the grounds that by voting for independence Scotland could maintain its status as part of the EU. However, this was not a message designed to retain the support of those SNP voters who were more sceptical about the EU. SNP support fell by as much as 15 points among those who can be classified as Eurosceptics, whereas it hardly fell at all (by just two points) among those who believe that Britain’s relationship with the EU should remain as close as ever (Curtice and Montagu, 2018). In short, Brexit created a new dividing line in Scotland’s electoral politics – to the SNP’s disadvantage.

Conclusion Perhaps those who anticipated that devolution would keep the SNP at bay were fundamentally misguided in their expectations. There was always good reason to anticipate that the party might thrive in an exclusively Scottish political environment. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that the SNP’s success in becoming the dominant party of Scottish politics was inevitable. Much rested initially

the electorate and elections | 43

at least on its ability to persuade both supporters and, eventually, opponents of independence, that it had the ability to govern. It was Labour’s inability to compete effectively with the nationalists on that criterion that enabled the SNP to make the best of the opportunity that devolution potentially afforded it. However, as the 2017 UK general election showed, the nationalists’ dominance is not an invulnerable one, as the party struggles to navigate its way effectively through stormy seas created by UK-wide political winds over which they have little immediate control. Much may now depend on their success or otherwise in handling the new political environment created by Brexit.

References Aughey, A. (2001), Nationalism, Devolution and the Challenge to the United Kingdom, London: Pluto Press. Bogdanor, V. (1999), Devolution in the United Kingdom, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carman, C., R. Johns, and J. Mitchell, (2014), More Scottish than British, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Cowley, P. and D. Kavanagh, (2016), The British General Election of 2015, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Cowley, P. and D. Kavanagh (2018), The British General Election of 2017, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Curtice, J., D. McCrone, N. McEwen, M. Marsh, and R. Ormston (2009), Revolution or Evolution? The 2007 Scottish Elections, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Curtice, J. (2011), ‘The 2011 Scottish Election: Records Tumble, Barriers Breached’, Scottish Affairs, 76: 51–73. Curtice, J. (2016), The 2016 Scottish Election: Getting to Minority Government, Edinburgh: Electoral Reform Society Scotland, . Curtice, J. and I. Montagu (2018), ‘Scotland: How Brexit has created a new divide in the nationalist movement’, in D. Phillips, J. Curtice, M. Phillips and J. Perry (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 35th Report, London: NatCen Social Research, . Jeffrey, C. and D. Hough (2003), ‘Regional Elections in Multi-Level Systems’, European Urban and Regional Studies, 10: 199–212. Johns, R., D. Denver, J. Mitchell and C. Pattie (2010), Voting for a Scottish Government: The Scottish Parliament Election of 2007, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Paterson, L. (ed.) (1998), A Diverse Assembly: The Debate on the Scottish Parliament, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Paterson, L., A. Brown, J. Curtice, K. Hinds, D. McCrone, A. Park, K. Sproston and P. Surridge (2001), New Scotland, New Politics?, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

44 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T Rallings, C. and M. Thrasher (2012), British Electoral Facts 1832–2012, London: Biteback Publishing. Scottish Constitutional Convention (1995), ‘Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right’, Edinburgh: Convention of Scottish Local Authorities.

attitudes to constitutional change | 45

TWO

Attitudes to Constitutional Change Ailsa Henderson

The previous five years have seen considerable attention to constitutional debates in Scotland and there has been a lot of polling activity to help us understand how Scots feel about constitutional change. This fits within a larger body of evidence on constitutional preferences in Scotland. When we want to know about people’s constitutional preferences, we can ask them to pick a single item from a longer list of possible options (independence vs devolution vs no Parliament, for example) in a forced-choice scenario or we can put a range of options to people and ask them to evaluate each one separately. In the forced-choice option we have decades of opinion research on support for devolution and independence. The data reflect a general increase in support for independence, from no greater than one quarter of the electorate in the late 1970s to the low-to-mid forties today. Partly, though, we are comparing apples and oranges. Polling in the 1970s and 1980s typically offered three-way (status quo vs devolution vs independence) questions, a practice continued by the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey between 1999 and today. If we are to compare three-way polling then the proportion of respondents choosing independence ranges from 20 per cent (with a further 4 per cent undecided) in April 1978 to 45 per cent in the 2017 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey. Most polling houses have dropped this formulation, asking about support for independence in a binary choice against the status quo with a Don’t Know option as well. Since the 2014 referendum there have been (at time of

46 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

writing) fewer than 15 publicly released polls showing plurality support for independence when asked in this way and only one of these showed that the Yes side commands majority support. The proportion of Don’t Knows typically range from 3 to 12 points. Of course it is not just the choices that people make but the strength with which they are held. Before and after the 2014 referendum we asked voters on a scale of −10 (very against) to +10 (very supportive) how they felt about independence. We found that most voters were at the poles of that scale, with only 5 per cent at the midpoint and a further 12 per cent of respondents close to the midpoint (−5 to −1, +1 to +5). The vast majority were at the poles so it is clear that constitutional attitudes are deeply held. This was reflected in data from the last four weeks of the campaign, which showed minimal switching from Yes to No and No to Yes, but also accounts for the general stability in preferences since 2014. True, some voters change their minds, but this is a small part of the Scottish electorate (and largely, at the moment, the changes are cancelling each other out). While the aggregate stability masks a certain degree of individual churn the fact that support for independence has not much budged after the Leave vote in the Brexit referendum, a referendum in which a significant majority of Scots voted to Remain, suggests that further movement is likely to be of the incremental pre-2012 rate, rather than the swings of 2013–14. This could well all change in any eventual campaign, and it perhaps depends on the type of Brexit that develops, but there is no recent evidence to suggest that one should expect seismic changes in independence preferences. We also know a fair bit about the type of voter who backed independence in 2014 and those who voted No. With respect to demographics, women, those born in the rest of the UK, those who owned their homes, and Church of Scotland as well as Church of England adherents were more likely to vote No. Those in the lowest-income quartile were more likely to vote Yes. Identity mattered. Those who prioritised a Scottish (rather than a British) identity were more likely to vote Yes as were those who felt certain about the consequences of independence. We also know that the type of society people want to live in matters. Those who felt that Scotland remaining within the UK would mean living in a society where

attitudes to constitutional change | 47

the gap between rich and poor would be wider were more likely to vote Yes, as were those who believed an independent Scotland would lead to a smaller gap between rich and poor. These effects are interesting in part because of how they changed over the course of the last four weeks of the referendum campaign, growing in each case as referendum day approached. We can also identify things that don’t tend to drive referendum vote choice. Those who anticipated further devolution were more likely to vote No, but this effect was present before the Vow, which promised more powers to the Scottish Parliament in light of a No vote, and in the days following the Vow there is little sign that it had a decisive effect on switching. When the Scottish Referendum Study asked people why they voted No, the least popular option (at 3 per cent) was ‘because Scotland is going to get the extra powers I want anyway’. The main reasons were feeling British and believing in the Union (30 per cent), feeling there were too many unanswered questions (28 per cent) and because independence would make Scotland worse off economically (26 per cent). When it comes to reasons why people voted Yes, the main reasons were ensuring that Scotland always gets the government it votes for (25 per cent) because the whole Westminster system is rotten (24 per cent) because independence is the natural state of nations (22 per cent) and because Scotland would be better off economically (20 per cent). Further, recent polls indicate that Scots might not want independence, and they also don’t want a referendum in the foreseeable future, but they believe that a Scottish Parliament should be able to call one whenever it wants without permission from Westminster. In a recent poll, almost half felt that there should not be a referendum in the foreseeable future, 41 per cent felt one should be held ‘whenever the Scottish government decides it want to hold one’ and a further 4 per cent said ‘if the UK government agrees to let it’. There is therefore no consensus on outcome or timing, but among those who want a referendum, there appears to be consensus on which government should control the process (this correlates with referendum preferences, obviously). The 2016 wave of the Scottish Election Study asked a similar question and found that over one third felt there should never be another independence referendum,

48 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

one third felt it should be held some time after 2021, and just under a quarter wanted one before 2021. Asked about what should trigger such a referendum, the most preferred option was ‘if there is clear and sustained evidence that independence has become the preferred option of a majority of the Scottish electorate’ (38 per cent) or a Leave vote in the Brexit referendum (30 per cent). In a follow-up question we asked how we would identify ‘clear and sustained evidence’ of support for independence. Respondents suggest that majority support in polls would suffice, either showing over 60 per cent support in five polls (30 per cent) or two years of polling evidence showing over 50 per cent support.

The perceived impact of the Scottish Parliament There are some caveats to this discussion of constitutional preferences. First, while independence is often the headline option, support for devolution has tended to outstrip independence. Support for devolution is robust and, if we look comparatively around the UK, is stronger in Scotland than in Wales. Twenty years after devolution we see that voters in Northern Ireland are the most supportive about the impact of the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly and NI Assembly on how the UK is governed, with majorities saying in each instance that it has improved things. Support in Scotland is highest for the impact of its own Parliament but attitudes to other institutions have more in common with the lower levels of support in Wales for the Welsh Assembly. Voters in England are not convinced that devolution, in any of its forms, has improved the way the UK is governed. Second, notwithstanding a general pattern of static preferences, Table 2.1  What impact has [devolved institution] had on the governance of the UK, % perceived improvement

Scottish Parliament Welsh Assembly NI Assembly Total number of respondents

Scotland

Wales

NI

England

  48   29   28 1502

  24   35   21 2016

  60   56   52 1089

  16   16   19 2741

Source: Future of England Survey, 2018.

attitudes to constitutional change | 49

attitudes can be malleable. In part this stems from awareness of constitutional options. We know from our polling before the 2014 referendum that knowledge about different constitutional options and the constitutional status quo is patchy. When devising the poll we knew we could not ask knowledge questions about the constitutional future, given the high number of known unknowns, but we could question individuals on their knowledge of published government policy. To this end we devised a true/false series of questions that allowed individuals to indicate whether they thought something was or was not being promoted by the Scottish Government in the ‘Scotland’s Future’ White Paper. People typically got the tax and head-of-state questions correct, but majorities either got wrong or said they didn’t know about a range of other possible plans for independence. This level of knowledge is interesting in itself, but it is relevant here for its effects. Take for example, knowledge of legislative competence. When we asked individuals to tell us which level of government controls various policy areas, individuals were more likely to get the reserved areas correct but to misattribute Westminster control over Scottish Parliament policy areas. In our 2016 Scottish Election Study majorities in each case identified the correct level of government, with the exceptions of energy, and agriculture, forestry and fisheries. The levels of Don’t Knows are rather high, ranging from 16 per cent (for issues such as health, education and income tax) to 25 per cent (energy). We found similar patterns in polls immediately after the 2014 referendum. But when we provide individuals with information about who controls which areas of policy it has a tempering impact on calls for change. In other words, those who are told about legislative competence have less radical demands for constitutional change than those who are not informed about the status quo. In light of this, it is difficult to know whether people want more powers than the Scottish Parliament has, or more powers than they think it has. The same is true not just for information about legislative competence but about party proposals. When we provide voters with information about what parties want it has a tempering demand on calls for change. In England we know that voters were more likely to call for

50 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

‘English Votes for English Laws’ (EVEL) as a possible solution to what is perceived to be underdeveloped governance. After EVEL was introduced, the Future of England Survey asked voters whether they felt that had happened. Most did not, and for those who were aware that EVEL had been introduced, individuals felt it didn’t go far enough. Third, there is something of a devolution paradox in Scottish attitudes to constitutional change (although it is by no means limited to Scotland). Respondents want the Scottish Parliament to be the most influential institution in running Scotland but a majority also want policy uniformity across the UK. So Scots want a powerful Scottish Parliament, but they want that powerful Scottish Parliament to make decisions that are identical to those made elsewhere in the UK. We see these same patterns in Wales and in other substate units in Spain, Germany and Austria. All of this suggests that attitudes to change and the specifics of those changes should be treated with caution. Preferences are malleable, responsive to different facts, and also suggest that change, when introduced, does not necessarily satisfy those who demanded it in the first place. Last, the electoral success of the SNP in Scottish and Westminster elections should not be seen as a proxy for support for independence. It is clear that voters are casting ballots for a number of reasons. One of these is the perceived competence of the SNP. Such a view is consistent with valence explanations for voting – that the electorate broadly agrees on issues that matter and chooses the party best seen to manage these rather than policy positions as such. Much has been made of the SNP being perceived to best stand up for Scotland but in polling before the 2016 devolved elections they were perceived to be best able to manage every single policy area, including education. Before the 2017 UK general election they were also perceived to be most effective in every policy area (including looking after the economy, immigration, keeping people safe from terrorism, defending the country) but, in what might be considered remarkable given the focus on opposition parties, still ahead of both Labour and the Conservatives on the management of education. There is both good and bad news here for the SNP. Perceived competence appears to lead to greater support at the polls. But

attitudes to constitutional change | 51

while an effective SNP is perceived to be good for devolution, this is not necessarily perceived to be an argument for independence. In this vein it could be argued that devolution in practice appears to be enhancing support for devolution in principle.

52 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

THREE

The Scottish Government Margaret Arnott

Introduction This chapter considers how changes over the past 20 years in the devolved asymmetric framework together with wider constitutional questions about Scotland’s relationship with the UK have influenced the shaping of structures and governing approaches of devolved administrations in Scotland. While devolution offered devolved administrations more policy capacity, the nature of asymmetrical devolution was an ad hoc process. The UK-wide departments’ role in ‘reserved’ issues and the spillover between devolved and reserved powers posed ongoing constitutional and political questions about the nature of intergovernmental relations in the devolved UK. Constitutional, political and administrative drivers have been recurring themes of how Scotland has been governed since the Union of 1707. Arguably these themes have intensified since 1999. The SNP’s electoral performance in UK general elections and Scottish Holyrood elections over the last 20 years have changed the dynamics of party competition and had significant implications for debates about the future constitutional relations of Scotland both with the UK and with the EU. Fundamental political and constitutional debates/issues about the future of governance of the UK following the UK EU referendum result in June 2016 are being raised including reform to the devolved governing arrangements. In September 2014 the Scottish independence referendum result did not end debates about reform to devolution. The Calman Commission and the 2016

the scottish government | 53

Scotland Act led to enhanced devolution and additional devolved powers for the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government. The governance of post-devolution Scotland marked a turning point in the institutional arrangements within UK and for the territorial relations within its un-codified constitution. While legislative devolution brought new governing structures these new devolved institutions in Scotland developed alongside continuities from the governance of Scotland under administrative devolution before 1999. Territorial relationships within the UK have evolved and adapted to constitutional and political concerns throughout its history. Administrative efficiency has also shaped the institutional governance of Scotland in UK since 1707. The Scottish Office was established in the late nineteenth century. Its remit incrementally expanded until 1945. Post 1945, the development of the welfare state as well as regional aid in the UK led to significant changes to its administrative roles. The policy capacity of the Scottish Office was arguably limited. The creation of the devolved Scottish Parliament in 1999 brought enhanced scrutiny and accountability for the Scottish Executive/Government 1999–2018. A recurring question over the past 20 years has been the balance of power between the Scottish Executive/Government and the Scottish Parliament. This chapter is not a comprehensive review of devolved Scottish government since 2007 but rather seeks to explore some issues relevant to assessing the workings of devolution in Scotland over the past 20 years. While devolution offered devolved administrations more policy capacity, the nature of asymmetrical devolution was an ad hoc process and the UK-wide departments’ roles in ‘reserved’ issues and spillover effects of devolved/reserved matters have raised several on-going issues. These relate to intergovernmental relations, to policy autonomy/leadership of the devolved administrations and to the Scottish Parliament’s role in scrutiny and accountability. They include too the extent to which the Scottish Parliament plays a role in law-making rather than scrutiny alone. The ad hoc nature of asymmetrical devolution could be partly explained as a continuation of approaches before 1999 to the reforms to the governance of Scotland within the UK – themselves responses, in part at least, to pressures for home rule in Scotland

54 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

tied with both the politicisation of national identity and also administration concerns. The backdrop to devolution debates in the late 1980s and 1990s was concern about how Scotland was governed. The Claim of Right document issued by the Scottish Constitutional Convention in the late 1980s argued that there was a ‘democratic deficit’ in the governance of Scotland and reminded Westminster that sovereignty lay with the people rather than Westminster. In this same period national identity became increasingly politicised in Scotland (Paterson et al., 2001; Brown et al., 1998). Arguments in Scotland for reform centred upon putting in place structures of governance which would rectify perceived deficiencies in how policy was handled by Westminster and Whitehall. In these arguments the Scottish Parliament–Executive relationships should not be based solely on scrutiny and accountability but should include procedures and practices of the devolved legislature to facilitate more non-­executive legislation. However, in practice, since 1999 this legislative role for the Scottish Parliament has not been evident.

Devolved administrations and electoral politics Labour–Liberal Democrats devolved administrations, 1999–2007 Since the formation of the devolved legislatures in July 1999 there have been a number of changes to the governing structures of devolved government. Since 1999 electoral politics have changed and produced different approaches to forming the devolved government. The founding principles of the Scottish Parliament envisaged a less adversarial and more consensual approach to operation than that of the ‘Westminster model’. Over the first five devolved parliamentary sessions there have been two coalition administrations, a minority administration, one majority executive and a return to minority government. While parliamentary arithmetic has influenced arrangements in the forming of the devolved government, the devolved legislature has no input into decisions about drawing up departmental portfolios. To what extent has the relationship between the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive/Scottish Government

the scottish government | 55

changed in light of the different composition of devolved administrations? The potential of the devolved parliament to go beyond the scrutiny of the devolved administrations in Scotland was a recurring theme over the course of legislative devolution. Cairney has argued that the Scottish Parliament does not ‘have the resources to do much more than perform a traditional parliamentary role, monitoring government departments and scrutinizing legislation proposed by the Scottish Executive/Government’ (Cairney, 2011). The Scottish Parliament could offer parliamentary power to challenge executive dominance. For the first two parliamentary terms of devolution a coalition Scottish Executive was formed after both the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties agreed a ‘Partnership Agreement’ that would offer a substantial legislative programme. This set out their policy commitments and priorities. Tensions between coalition parties and pressures on maintaining Cabinet responsibility on high-profile policies such as free care for the elderly and tuition fees for students became evident. Under the coalition, the legislative output placed pressures on the Scottish Parliament to cover roles other than scrutiny of legislation and devolved departments. In the first parliamentary term, 1999–2003, 50 Scottish Executive bills were passed; 53 Scottish Executive bills were passed in 2003–07 (Cairney, 2011). For the proponents of home rule and devolution a devolved legislature and government would offer enhanced legislative powers that administration devolution before 1999 could not. The Scottish Executive 1999–2007 moving to a minority administration in 2007 offered the Parliament more influence over the minority SNP government. Cross-party working in the Parliament would be necessary to secure its legislative programme, but for the new SNP administration in 2007 other routes to achieve policy priories were significant.

SNP and Scottish Government, 2007– A single-party minority government was formed by the SNP in 2007. Given the parliamentary balance between different parties in the Scottish Parliament a period arguably followed where the scope

56 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

for the devolved government to meet its manifesto commitments was reduced. When it was first formed there were doubts about whether the minority government could survive for more than the short term. For the minority SNP administration, having devolved government that was seen as ‘competent’ and providing stability was part of its governing approach. Shaping its governing approach was a strategy that sought to achieve greater autonomy and also independence for Scotland. Enhancing the devolved powers of the Scottish Parliament was part of the constitutional journey to independence. The ability to pass legislation in the Scottish Parliament would prove difficult for a minority administration. By January 2008 the new minority administration had only been able to present five legislative bills to the Scottish Parliament. The new minority administration changed the name of the devolved administration from the Scottish Executive to the Scottish Government in September 2007. The new SNP First Minister Alex Salmond argued, ‘[T]he Scottish administration is the government. It is regarded as the government across a range of issues, and it should act like a government.’ (BBC, 2007) As a minority government 2007–11, the SNP used discourse to shape its policy programme. The SNP administration declared itself a ‘learning’ government that would seek to combine economic recovery with fairness and inclusion and this would be part of Scotland’s constitutional journey to independence. As a minority government, consensus and cooperation were necessary both to govern for a full four-year term and to shape its constitutional and political programme of enhanced powers for the Scottish Parliament up to and including independence. The structure of the Scottish Government was changed to work in a cross-cutting way: departments were replaced by directorates – focused on the five strategic priorities of the SNP government – for a ‘wealthier and fairer, healthier, stronger, smarter, greener Scotland’ (Scottish Government, 2008). In August 2007 the National Conversation was launched by the SNP administration and followed by a White Paper. The interdependencies between levels of devolved institutions in Scotland were used by the SNP government to build trust and credibil-

the scottish government | 57

ity beyond the Scottish Parliament. Arnott and Ozga argued in 2011: ‘The [SNP] Government presents governing discursively as ­co-dependent, based on partnership, and negotiated, thus turning their minority position into a source of strength.’ Devolved policymaking moreover become increasingly ‘Europeanised’. As the EU became more significant in social policy the SNP government located its policy debates as having to respond to developments within EU policy frameworks such as support for ‘social solidarity’. This brought tensions between the UK and Scottish governments about how to combine economic recovery with social priorities of ‘fairness’ and tackling ‘disadvantage’. The SNP government strategy for economic recovery, ‘fairness’ and ‘egalitarianism’ in following a social democratic Nordic model was influenced by a discursive approach that embedded references of ‘myths’ in Scottish society while also referencing global economic positioning. The Scottish Government used ‘compared’ Scottish performance in economic recovery and also in policy interventions to address poverty and ‘fairness’ with non-UK international comparisons. As part of this approach the Scottish Government wanted more Scottish-related policy data to inform policymaking. Shifting the emphasis from inputs to outcomes-based policymaking would be part of the SNP’s governing approach. Initially this produced tensions for the SNP minority government. Its 2007 manifesto was input-driven, setting out targets such as teacher numbers and class sizes with outcomes based within a National Performance Framework. Arguably for the SNP, this move to outcome-based policymaking, alongside its discursive strategy for referencing embedded myths and tradition and the principle of employing comparisons with social democratic Nordic states, was seeking a ‘cultural’ shift in devolved government and aspirations of the SNP for Scottish independence.

Devolved policymaking and approaches by Scottish Executives/Governments since 1999 In his speech at the opening of the Scottish Parliament on 1 July 1999, First Minister Donald Dewar set out his ambitions for and commitment to the new Executive of the devolved Scotland: ‘As

58 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

a team, this first Executive will lead the new Scotland into the new Century – and I am determined that we must make the new Scotland a showpiece for social justice and for economic success.’ (Dewar, 1999) As devolution has evolved over the past 20 years the administrations of the Scottish Parliament have acquired enhanced policy capacity. Social justice and economic growth have featured in the devolved government strategies since 1999. The Scottish Parliament would adopt a policymaking approach that would be arguably more consultative and participative, and that would be conducted in a more open and transparent culture. The policymaking context to support these twin strategic aims has been different in each devolved administration. Devolution has presented new opportunities and new challenges for each administration. Expanding the policy capacity of devolved administrations was one of the new opportunities but major gaps in policy evidence and data soon became evident. For the first ten years of devolution, filling these gaps would be one of areas of post-devolution policymaking and implementation that the Scottish Executive 1999–2007 would require to develop further. Under administrative devolution, Scottish Office policy approach was arguably conservative and lacked the resources and culture to adapt for policy innovation. As discussed above, the policy framework of the Scottish Labour and Liberal Democrat coalition was input-driven in part by the nature of the policy commitments in the Partnership Agreement between the coalition parties. Also in part, the Scottish Parliament still required more access to policy evidence and data to support the work of its committees and the Scottish Parliament Standing Orders. In 2007 the formation of the minority SNP administration marked a change in policy approaches. As a minority government, as argued above, parliamentary arithmetic would mean legislative changes would be more challenging than those for a majority-led administration. The strategic discourse of the SNP government was to move away from target-setting and move towards increasing collaboration and partnerships with the wider policy communities and civil society. In 2008 the SNP government started a wide-­ ranging review of policymaking; this would stress the importance

the scottish government | 59

of partnership working, ‘co-production’ of policy and ‘responsible’ autonomy. It also addressed the policy capacity of the policy process – setting out that a greater ‘system’ level of ‘learning’ was required by the Scottish Government. The Crerar Review of Regulation, Audit, Inspection and Complaints Handling of Public Services in Scotland was part of this review of policymaking (Crerar, 2007). Extending the resources available to the Scottish Government to support the critical analysis of policymaking was prioritised by the incoming administration. The changing policy environment where new forms of accountability and scrutiny were required to strengthen democratic engagement were being called for in regard to relations between the executive and legislature and also in regard to relations with the wider policy community such as non-departmental bodies and public-sector service providers. The National Performance Framework (NPF), which was introduced in 2007: ‘. . . to focus Government and public services on creating a more successful country, with opportunities for all of Scotland to flourish, through increasing sustainable economic growth.’ (Scottish Government, 2007) The NPF consisted of 7 purpose targets, 15 National Outcomes, and 45 National Indicators. This signalled that a new relationship with local government and economic growth was characterised as ‘a public good’: . . . but also offers a good example of the deployment of discursive resources to shift culture and behaviour in Scottish government. The framework is driven by a narrative that has an overarching theme: the pursuit of economic prosperity – now recovery – in order to achieve a wealthier and fairer, healthier, safer and stronger, smarter and greener, Scotland. (Arnott and Ozga, 2012)

As part of the move to outcome-focus, ‘performance management’ arrangements would have a greater levels of self-assessment and self-evaluation. The Europeanisation of policymaking in support of devolved policy process was another shift in the priorities set by the SNP government. As a comparator, the EU became increasingly employed as a reference for policymaking in Scotland by the SNP government.

60 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

The success of the SNP in the 2011 Scottish Parliament election and the 2015 UK general election changed the policy landscape of territorial politics in the UK. The pace of political developments concerning the constitutional future of the UK intensified. In 2012 a new Scotland Act saw enhanced devolved powers legislated in the UK Parliament and the Edinburgh Agreement between the UK and Scottish governments made it possible for the Scottish Parliament to legislate for a Scottish independence referendum. The result of the September 2014 Scottish independence referendum was a No victory. This vote did not signify the end of constitutional debates about enhanced devolved powers in Scotland. The relationship between domestic devolved policymaking and aspiration for an independent Scotland became more explicit in the run up to the 2014 referendum and following the result of the referendum. Alex Salmond stood down as party leader and First Minister and Nicola Surgeon was elected party leader and First Minister in November 2014. The Scottish Government under Sturgeon’s leadership has arguably made more explicit links in its government strategy between economic growth and social justice. Sturgeon, for example, made the ending of the attainment gap associated with the socio-economic background of pupils a key policy priority under her leadership. In the 2016 Scottish Parliament election, support for the SNP had declined from its performance in the previous election and the party formed a minority administration again. The policymaking approaches of the new minority administration in May 2016 utilised their previous experience of running a minority government in 2007–11. However, the changing policy landscape after the June 2016 EU referendum presented the devolved government with significant policy changes. One of the key challenges for the SNP was that its devolved government presented Scotland in a European context – where devolution offered the devolved administration some flexibility and autonomy under EU membership. From June 2016 one of the most pressing challenges for the Scottish Government was the increasingly politicised nature of intergovernmental relations.

the scottish government | 61

Scottish Government and intergovernmental relations: future reform of the devolved UK? Over the past two years the salience of constitutional and political questions has markedly heightened regarding the working – both informal and formal – of devolution in the UK. The possible implications of Brexit for asymmetric devolution in the UK and the devolved powers of the Scottish Government have led to an increasingly heated political environment for intergovernmental relations. The legal dispute between the UK and Scottish governments concerning the Scottish Parliament’s EU Continuity Bill was heard in July 2018 by the UK Supreme Court. This legislation retains EU law in devolved matters and allows Scottish Government ministers to amend law outside EU membership. The judgment is expected soon. The interface between devolved and reserved powers in the UK EU Withdrawal Act and also the Scottish Parliament’s EU Continuity Act have intensified tensions within IGRs. These increasingly heated political, legal and constitutional debates centre on questions about the future of the devolved settlements in the UK. These debates will have a direct bearing on the roles and powers of the Scottish Government. At the root of these heated debates are questions about the future governing arrangements in the UK (decentralised and devolved) and the extent to which cross-UK arrangements (‘frameworks’) could cut across (or potentially undermine) existing devolved arrangements if there is movement from the subsidiary principle underpinning EU treaties. Twenty years after the establishment of the devolved Scottish Parliament we are facing fundamental political and constitutional debates/issues about the future of governance of UK – with very different political visions of the future of devolution. The devolution clauses were among the most significant provisions in the Withdrawal Bill by raising key political and constitutional debates about the future governance of the UK. We should set these policy challenges in the broader constitutional and political contexts – both of which might be characterised as in a state of flux and uncertainty. Legal input is significant – with the Court of Session in Edinburgh, the UK Supreme Court and the

62 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

European Court of Justice having a direct bearing on debates about the future of governance of the devolved UK.

References Arnott, M. A. and J. Ozga (2010a), ‘Nationalism, Governance and Policy Making: The SNP in Power’, Public Money and Management, 30 (2), 91–7. Arnott, M. A. and J. Ozga (2012), ‘Education, Nationalism and Social Justice’, in G. Mooney and G. Scott (eds), Education and Social Justice in Scotland, Bristol: Policy Press. Arnott, M. A. (2016), ‘Governing Strategies of the SNP Government 2007–2016: Education Policy’, Scottish Affairs, 25 (1), 45–61. BBC (2007), Scottish Executive renames itself, 3 September, . Bodganor, V. (2009), The New British Constitution, London: Bloomsbury. Cairney, P. (2011), The Scottish Political System Since Devolution: From New Politics to New Scottish Government, Exeter: Imprint Press. Commission on Scottish Devolution (2009), ‘Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the UK in the 21st Century Final Report’, Edinburgh: Commission on Scottish Devolution. Crerar, L. (2007), ‘The Crerar Report: The Report of the Independent Review of Regulation, Audit, Inspection and Complaints Handling of Public Services in Scotland’, Edinburgh: The Scottish Government. Devine, T. M. (2017), Independence or Union: Scotland’s Past and Scotland’s Present, London: Penguin. Dewar, D. (1999), ‘Donald Dewar opening speech Scottish Parliament’, . Hassan, G. and E. Shaw (2012), The Strange Death of Labour Scotland, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Macdonald, C. M. M. (2009), Whaur Extremes Meet: Scotland’s Twentieth Century, Edinburgh: John Donald. Mitchell, J., L. Bennie and R. John (2011), The Scottish National Party: Transition to Power, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mitchell, J. (2014), The Scottish Question, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mitchell, J. (2015), ‘Sea Change’, Parliamentary Affairs, 68 (1), 88–100. Paterson, L. et al. (2001), New Scotland, New Politics?, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Russell, M. (2014), ‘Learning Curve’, Holyrood, 30 July. Sanderson, I. (2009), ‘Intelligent Policy Making for a Complex World: Pragmatism, Evidence and Learning’, Political Studies, 57 (4), 699–719. Scottish Government (2007a), ‘The Government Economic Strategy’, . Scottish Government (2007b), ‘Scotland Performs: National Outcomes’, .

the scottish government | 63 Scottish Government (2010), ‘Scotland’s Future: Draft Referendum (Scotland) Bill Consultation Paper’, Edinburgh: The Scottish Government. UK Government/Scottish Government (2012), ‘Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on independence for Scotland’, 15 October, .

64 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

F OU R

The Scottish Civil Service Zoe Ferguson

Talking to a friend and former colleague about this chapter, which aims to explore the identity and culture of the Scottish civil service, she remarked that hearing breaking news of the Windrush scandal highlighted, for her, the difference between the civil service in England and in Scotland. Her sense was that this shocking disregard for people and blind acceptance of bureaucratic error was something which could not happen in Scotland. We talked about a different sense of what the job is in Scotland, of shared underpinning values and of the closeness of ministers, civil servants, and the public. But is this true? Or were we guilty of just imbuing the whole institution with our own values and occupying the moral high ground? If it is true what has made it so? And what has it felt like to be part of the civil service in Scotland over the last 20 years? In December 1997, with the publication of the Scotland Bill, the decision was taken to retain the civil servants serving the devolved government in Scotland within a unified Home Civil Service. The Scottish Office, which was described to me by another former colleague as, at this time, ‘dusty, provincial and a long way from policy’, started to wake up in preparation for devolution whilst impending change went largely unnoticed in Whitehall. Where previously staff often spent the first part of their career learning the ropes in Whitehall only to return to Scotland to feel removed from the thick of it, many now felt hugely motivated by this new opportunity to make decisions rather than merely implement them.

the scottish civil service | 65

Colleagues who experienced working in the civil service in Scotland pre and post devolution uniformly describe it as a transformational change. For me, starting with a wave of recruitment in early 2000, walking through the doors at Victoria Quay for the first time was exciting. I felt proud and, obviously with a certain degree of youthful naïvety, at the centre of where I thought change for Scotland would happen. It did not take long for that excitement and optimism to be, if not crushed, at least, dented. In spite of the transformation spoken about by colleagues in 2000 there was still plenty of evidence of tradition, hierarchy, and bureaucracy. Ministerial correspondence arrived in ‘green folders’ at your desk and there was a formality to addressing colleagues which I had not experienced before in other working environments. There was an intimidating premium on knowledge and probably even more so, on articulacy; it did not do to admit you did not know the answer to a question, even worse to be straightforward or make a joke about it. It does not take much of a leap of imagination to put yourself in new ministers’ shoes; making big steps up in terms of public roles and personal careers and doing it with no link to the establishment. It is no surprise that the separation of the political class from the governing class made for suspicion and led in early days to some antipathy. As an early career researcher I was most aware of the continued practice of ministers to seek advice outside the civil service and being kept out of the loop on key evidence and debates. I was also generally, and a couple of times very specifically, aware of the lack of communication and trust between senior officials and ministers which led, I think on both sides, to a damaging blame culture.

The John Elvidge era This began to change with the appointment of Sir John Elvidge in 2003. The particular trust between the First Minister, Jack McConnell, and the Permanent Secretary was key to establishing a vision for change, a focus on outcomes, valuing evidence, and the adoption of theories of public value and adaptive leadership in how we addressed policy challenges. This gave us both the ambition and a structured framework to address big issues, described

66 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

by Elvidge as the intractable problems of: educational outcomes for the least successful 20 per cent, health inequalities, geographic concentrations of poverty, and low rate of GDP growth. The culture had also changed noticeably by then, being less formal, as a result, probably, both of large-scale recruitment of people who had not experienced and did not experience the Whitehall initiation and by the introduction of electronic communication. The dampener on enthusiasm at this stage related to working for a coalition where bargaining led to 460 separate commitments in their Partnership Agreement. It is hard to concentrate on the big issues when you are addressing, monitoring and communicating on such detailed plans. As Elvidge has noted, the coalition ‘made a straightjacket for themselves’, and for us (see Elvidge, 2011). The decision of the SNP to run with a minority administration in 2007 coincided with thinking and work Elvidge had been leading to focus on longer-term outcomes. As a minority government the SNP needed a small Cabinet and welcomed Elvidge’s suggestion of steps to eradicate departmentalism and as such loyalty to one minister rather than the government as a whole. In contrast to the previous Partnership Agreement which essentially proposed refinements to the delivery process rather than deeper policy reappraisal, the introduction of the National Performance Framework encouraged a more integrated approach. Partnership across the public sector was seen as vital in achieving outcomes and the 2007 Concordat with local government was indicative of a broader looking-out from the civil service, a focus on listening to and working with ‘external stakeholders’ rather than a focus on the coalition negotiations (Scottish Government, 2007). This moment has been described to me by a former colleague who worked closely with John Swinney and Elvidge in agreeing both the NPF and Concordat as feeling like more of a watershed than devolution. It was certainly a defining moment in shaping how we all worked thereafter. It unleashed a tsunami of logic modelling in which we tried to understand all of the factors which influence positive and negative outcomes in every area of policy. In many cases, most notably in the Justice Strategy, this led to rethinking the nature of policy problems and solutions from first principles and a recognition that the justice sector alone cannot fix rates of offending.

the scottish civil service | 67

My feeling about this period is that whilst much of this rethinking was valuable it was limited in impact by our ingrained leadership culture. Steps had been taken to reduce departmentalism and put in place collaborative, corporate projects but it remained a fact that the civil service was competitive. In my recollection, for example, the kudos for achieving reduction in offending went to justice colleagues and stakeholders for getting others on board with what they needed to do, not to others for making their contribution. There were two narratives going on, one recognising the need to work by the principles of integration recommended by Campbell Christie (Christie, 2011), and another in which you outlined your specific achievements (no doubt articulated as corporate and collaborative) in order to gain recognition, status and promotion. It takes more than changing organisational structures to dismantle long traditions of elitism and a hierarchy dependent to no small degree on exploiting competitive edge. Elvidge has written about relationships between civil servants in Scotland and Whitehall at this time as particularly important. This was the first time devolution had produced a different leading party and ‘the civilities between opposing political parties which are part of the behaviour which assist transitions of power in Westminster were less in evidence in the reaction of the UK Government to the political change in Scotland’. He credits a sense of shared professional values and trust between civil servants enabling key communication channels to remain open. This is one example of a continued narrative which stresses the professionalism and impartiality of the civil service.

The Peter Housden era In 2011, the SNP, confounding the electoral system, gained an outright majority. It might be argued that the maturity of the institutions, structures and relationships by this stage, combined with a parliamentary majority should have resulted in confidence. In part it did, in the shape of the campaign for independence but was held back, I think, in two respects: firstly, the fear of reducing public budgets, just beginning to bite in 2011, with much worse in prospect for future years, and secondly, the view that to achieve

68 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

support for independence the Scottish Government needed to win the trust of the people by proving ‘competence’. The 2011 spending review was the first to deal with cuts. Prior to that the budget settlement process had been one of bilateral agreement with portfolio ministers on how they would spend more money. In 2011, Swinney, aware of the challenges, was keen for the process to work in a more corporate, collegiate way, with Cabinet members discussing and agreeing priorities across the whole budget allocation. In practice, largely because of ministers’ inability to accept the gloomy prognosis, and the fact that budget lines did not match the outcomes in the National Performance Framework, this was difficult to achieve. The discussions with Swinney and special advisers leading up to this spending review, of which I was part, came by far the closest to my initial hope of what working in the Scottish Government would be and I think reflected most closely the ambition and capability that Elvidge had instilled. We perhaps needed the threat of money running out to focus minds on what was really important to people, the future and the collective responsibility of the Scottish Government. It felt daunting, but at the same time hugely motivating to be addressing big issues. Of course, in part, this feeling of engagement for me, was also due to this being a time when I worked more closely with ministers than at other points in my career. Serious consideration of radical options followed by decisions based on the cautious route, I think, marked this approach to ‘competent’ government. We considered, for example, combining budgets for community-planning partnerships rather than allocating to separate services to drive a step change in collaboration and deciding to wait until partnerships demonstrate necessary maturity to manage a collective budget. Personally, I found the lack of confidence to commit to more radical options in light of both the dire implications of the financial situation and the strength and popularity of the Scottish Government frustrating. At this time too, the leadership of Sir Peter Housden – who had become Permanent Secretary in June 2010 – was influential in how it felt to be part of the civil service. If Elvidge had put in place the rationale and structure for outcomes in government and

the scottish civil service | 69

had addressed the minds of minsters and civil servants, Housden addressed the hearts. He has spoken and written about the limitations of the ‘sword in hand’ leadership of new public management and articulated a ‘Scottish approach’ to policymaking which fundamentally should ‘enable citizens to be and remain in charge of their own lives’. This approach stressed an assets-based approach, ­focusing on the strengths of individuals and communities rather than addressing deficits, co-production, doing with and not to people and encouraged use of improvement science which had proved particularly successful in the Patient Safety Programme. Alongside these theories and methods, the importance of connection and relationships in leadership was stressed, how we do things being as important as what we do. We were encouraged to be authentic, bring ourselves to work, and to engage emotionally as well as rationally with our work. This approach makes intuitive sense and is powerful in connection with a long-term outcomes framework and broad political consensus in Scotland around the priority of tackling inequality. I joined the senior civil service, albeit with a temporary pass, in 2013. Speaking to former colleagues we have agreed that it feels like a separate club. Full entry to that club seemed to me to depend not so much on competence to do the job, though that was clearly a requirement, but on character and fundamentally an acceptance that whatever that character was it could be taken apart and put together again in a shape that fitted. In the end, for me, it didn’t. This perhaps says more about my fitness to be a civil servant than anything else as many former colleagues do not share my feelings. To a certain extent, feeling like we fit has come and gone at different times depending on how engaged we have been personally with issues and colleagues. It is also notable that the organisation definitely feels more diverse and inclusive than it did 20 years ago. Deliberate efforts to address inclusion, notably reflecting wider change in attitudes around LGBT, and more recently, and vitally, to address class issues are to be welcomed. However, it is still perhaps surprising that some people who look on the face of it very much part of the institution, might privately admit to not feeling part of the club. The independence referendum was perhaps the first really

70 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

­ ivisive issue we had to deal with as civil servants, as the devolved d powers do not tend to include highly controversial areas. As the campaign developed, the scale and nature of public engagement, I think, surprised us. We were in the middle of something very big, that family, friends, parents in the school playground and folk in the supermarket were talking about. We were all clearly engaged as individuals in our private lives, but at work we had to be careful to maintain impartiality. It was a difficult line to tread. There was heavy scrutiny, particularly of Housden’s role. I think there was no little bravery in his approach, making space for us, for the senior civil service at least, to talk openly about difficult issues. Though, in my experience, those discussions always seemed to jar with the idea that you could connect emotionally to your work and then be ready, as a professional, to turn on a sixpence. In my mind connecting emotionally requires at least some level of belief in what you are doing. Again, this is a very personal reflection as others have not experienced this tension between connecting emotionally to the work at hand whilst maintaining impartiality, most notably Housden, who conducted his role in relation to the referendum with absolute integrity as a civil servant. The day after the independence referendum was the strangest day I experienced at work. A combination of lack of sleep, anticipation, tension and what was carefully described as an inevitable sense of anti-climax when staff had given full commitment to the job and the government whether they had voted Yes or No. The atmosphere was extraordinarily flat.

Current and future challenges I am relying on testimony from former colleagues for the rest of the story. I left in 2015, feeling disappointment, not so much that the independence I had hoped for had not been achieved, but that we failed to sufficiently quickly capitalise on the public engagement in the future of Scotland. The energy and commitment of all those who had engaged in serious, informed and constructive debate seemed to me to be an enormous resource lost in the analytical complexity and academic abstraction of subsequent discussion of democratic renewal.

the scottish civil service | 71

Former colleagues have spoken to me about recent years, dominated by Brexit. The things which unite civil servants in Scotland and in Whitehall are again important in underpinning difficult negotiations. There is still a sense of strong alignment, policed by codes, but more fundamentally felt in ‘the kind of people we are’. However, in Scotland, it feels that both the political experience of the independence referendum and the particular approach in leadership of the civil service have led to a more open acknowledgement of Scotland’s distinct national interests and that doing so is both legitimate and proper for the civil service in a way that would not have felt possible 20 years ago. Where many in Scotland cite the approach of connecting emotionally to work as helpful in dealing with the difficult issues this is not evident in the culture currently in Whitehall. There are perhaps good reasons which make it less possible. Where the goal of independence, whilst publicly divisive, was at least clear in respect of the Scottish Government, there is no unity or clarity in the case of Brexit for the UK Government. This is a dangerous space for the civil service which provides no safe thing to say but instead the opportunity of chaos to grab power. One former colleague tried at a leadership forum to raise some open discussion of the emotional difficulties of dealing with such huge division in politics and society and experienced the proverbial tumbleweed moment. A few attendees afterwards commented that he was of course right but that it would be suicidal to admit in public. It is perhaps premature to judge what Leslie Evans’ legacy for the civil service will be, though it will no doubt be coloured by the outcome of, as I write, the ongoing legal proceedings involving Alex Salmond. Regardless of that specific outcome, it feels intuitive that a partnership of the first female First Minister and the first female Permanent Secretary, in the current climate of #MeToo will be significant in defining new norms in attitudes towards women, and that those attitudes will need to be demonstrated first and foremost in government. The importance placed on values of dignity, respect and kindness at the centre of the new National Performance Framework seem too to be important in setting a tone for wider interactions and relationships in public services and communities, as demonstrated recently in the openness of recognising the need

72 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

for love in corporate parenting. Acknowledging this tricky balance of recognising the humanity necessary in public service alongside intolerance of abuse of power seems defining. In answer to my initial questions, I think it is true that the civil service in Scotland has a separate identity and culture. Though we no doubt share characteristics born of a long tail of tradition and changes due to broad economic and social evolution – institutional change, structural change, leadership both political and official and the people in it, all distinctive to Scotland, make it a very different place. And despite some of the personal reservations and frustrations I have expressed, within the civil service in Scotland it has felt possible to care about people in a way that seems much harder in Whitehall.

References Christie, C. (2011), ‘Christie Commission on the Future Delivery of Public Services’, Edinburgh: Scottish Government. Elvidge, J. (2011), ‘Northern Exposure: Lessons from the first twelve years of devolved government in Scotland’, London: Institute for Government. Housden, P. (2016), ‘Rethinking Public Services’, n.p.: Centre for Public Impact. Scottish Government (2007), ‘Concordat between the Scottish Government and Local Government’, Edinburgh: Scottish Government.

‘new politics’ at twenty | 73

F IV E

The Scottish Parliament and ‘New Politics’ at Twenty Emily St Denny

Introduction In 1707, the enactment of the Treaty of the Union effectively incorporated the previously distinct Scottish and English parliaments into a single Parliament of Great Britain. A referendum, held nearly 300 years later, in September 1997, saw a 74 per cent vote in favour of legislative devolution and the re-establishment of a parliament in Scotland. The institution provided for in the subsequent Scotland Act of 1998 was not, legally speaking, intended to be a new Parliament. The Act simply asserted that ‘There shall be a Scottish Parliament’, and the political discourse that accompanied the commencement of its functions was primarily interwoven with the language of resumption and reinstatement rather than novelty. Thus, Winnie Ewing, the oldest Member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP) returned in the first devolved elections, opened the Parliament’s first session on 12 May 1999 by announcing that ‘the Scottish Parliament, which adjourned on 25 March 1707, is hereby reconvened’. Politically speaking, however, it is not the case that the reopening of the Scottish Parliament was experienced as the simple resurrection of its earlier and by now long-dormant variant. Instead, the intense civic and political conversation that preceded, and gave rise to, its re-establishment strongly featured the language of radical new beginnings. This chapter therefore explores the establishment, operation, and current track record of the Scottish Parliament in relation to

74 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

its architects’ original expectations of its transformative potential. It argues that few of these initial hopes, many of which remain stubbornly elusive, could ever have been realised solely through the institutional medium of a well-designed parliament. It concludes, however, that these aspirations are still well within reach, as long as what is expected of the Scottish Parliament, both as a legislature and a key element of contemporary Scottish democracy, is collectively reconsidered in light of what it is today, not of what it was in 1999. This means recognising it as a maturing institution faced with significant challenges and strong constraints, but which the people of Scotland have never been better equipped to understand and address.

(Re)imagining Scottish politics The Scottish Parliament exists as a simultaneously ‘new’ and ‘renewed’ institution. This is a testament to the process of national re-imagination that can take place as, in the fullness of time, social history is collectively and partially forgotten, remembered, and reconstructed (Anderson, 1991: 203–5). While support for the reinstatement of a parliament in Scotland had existed, and periodically resurfaced, since 1707, the process of deliberating and (re) imagining what home rule might look like intensified throughout the twentieth century (Finlay, 1994: 131; Mitchell, 1996: 140–2; Keating, 1998). The political dimension of this movement was gradually structured into parties that, in one way or another, supported devolution and, more often than not, full independence for Scotland. This is the case, for example, with the establishment of the ‘National Party for Scotland’ in 1928, followed by that of the ‘Scottish (SelfGovernment) Party’ in 1932, both of which merged into the ‘Scottish National Party’ (SNP) in 1934, for whom devolution is a tolerable interim measure on the path to independence (cf. Mitchell, 1996). Civic support for devolution also grew during the period, often driven by broad and eclectic coalitions bringing together community groups, churches, trade unions, political activists, and prominent civic leaders (Bonney, 2003: 459). The most influential of these was the Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC) set up in

‘new politics’ at twenty | 75

1989. With roots in the earlier ‘Campaign for a Scottish Assembly’, the SCC’s principle purposes were to reinvigorate the campaign and develop a blueprint for Scottish home rule (Keating, 1998: 224). The SCC’s conclusions about what devolution could and should look like in Scotland were set out in its 1995 report, ‘Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right’ (SCC, 1995). In it, the SCC wove a narrative of ‘new politics’, in which devolution, and particularly the re-establishment of a parliament in Scotland, was strongly associated with notions of democratic renewal and the ability to develop more appropriate, ‘Scotland-specific’, policies (Mitchell, 2000: 607). However, in many ways, ‘new politics’ was essentially concerned with ‘difference’ rather than with ‘newness’. This vision of post-devolution Scotland was intended to stand in stark contrast to the putatively outdated and regressive orthodoxy represented by ‘old’ Westminster (Arter, 2004a: 73; Brown, 2000; Hassan and Warhurst, 2000; Mitchell, 2000; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 11; Cairney, 2011: 11). Eschewing the majoritarian, centralising, impositional and elite ‘Westminster-style’ of democracy and policymaking, devolution and ‘new politics’ would resolve the perceived democratic deficit in Scotland across three dimensions: politics, institutions, and policies. Politically, devolution would enable better consideration of the Scottish people and their distinctive interests by introducing a subnational level of democratic representation. Institutionally, a devolved legislature would introduce a new venue in which Scottish interests might exclusively be deliberated and acted upon. Finally, in terms of policies, having the capacity and authority to carefully consider Scottish issues in a dedicated democratic forum would presumably lead to the development of more suitable laws and programmes with which to address the needs of Scotland’s people (Arter, 2004a: 73; Bradbury and Mitchell, 2001; Cairney, 2011: 9–10). In the wake of the 1997 referendum vote for Scottish devolution, a Consultative Steering Group (CSG) was appointed to draw up firm plans for how a Scottish Parliament might function. The resulting blueprint strongly echoed the values and expectations underpinning the SCC’s narrative of ‘new politics’. Thus, the CSG proposed a Parliament that functioned according to the principles of: power-sharing between the people, legislature, and executive;

76 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

civic access to, and democratic participation in, the deliberative and decision-making process; legislative and political transparency and accountability; and the support and championing of equal opportunities for all, both within and outwith formal politics (CSG, 1998). These principles were operationalised with the introduction of, among other procedures: a proportional voting system to elect representatives who more closely mirrored the country’s demographic and partisan diversity; a strong committee system through which to channel more intensive and focused scrutiny and deliberation of legislative proposals; and a formal requirement for Government and Parliament to systematically and meaningfully consult society and stakeholders in the process of developing policy.

(Re)designing Scottish democracy Since 1999, one of the dominant themes in commentary and research on post-devolution Scottish politics has been a concern with exploring whether and how the Scottish Parliament has lived up to the aspirations of ‘new politics’. If the ‘first’ wave of scholarship on Scottish devolution focused on the development of the political and institutional plans for home rule, then the ‘second’ wave was interested in assessing the extent to which these plans were respected, and their intended outcomes realised (e.g. Arter, 2004a; Cairney, 2006; Fawcett, 2003; Mitchell, 2010; Jeffrey and Mitchell, 2009). Overall, conclusions have been measured and modest. In brief: the extent to which devolution and the ­re-establishment of a Scottish Parliament are considered to have delivered radical democratic renewal depends largely on what aspect of contemporary Scottish politics you focus on, and is usually a question of degree. Devolution has unquestionably transformed the way policy is deliberated, decided, and delivered in Scotland, especially in those areas where the Parliament has full legislative competence. The Scottish Parliament’s operating procedures were designed with the intention of setting it apart from Westminster across three primary dimensions: openness, a rejection of executive dominance, and capacity and willingness to meaningfully scrutinise proposals with input from both stakeholders and outside expertise. This has driven claims that the Scottish Parliament resembles a ‘Nordic-style’

‘new politics’ at twenty | 77

assembly based on the principles of consensus and civic participation rather than a majoritarian ‘Westminster-style’ legislature. Three elements, in particular, underpin this perspective. Firstly, the Scottish Parliament’s committee system is endowed with the ability to initiate legislation and recommend amendments. In this way, committees were envisioned as legislative actors in their own right, with the ability to counterbalance the executive in setting and driving the policy agenda (Arter, 2004a: 74; Keating and Cairney, 2009). Secondly, the executive would be drawn from the Parliament and would be responsible to the people via Parliament. Finally, proportional elections would decrease the likelihood of any single party winning a majority, and require the formation of coalitions or minority governments. Together, these features were anticipated to incentivise and gradually structure a careful, considered, and collegial politics putatively comparable to that of Sweden, Denmark, or Iceland (Arter, 2004b: 6; Newby, 2009: 312–13). This was desirable because productive deliberation leading to compromise and consensus were believed to be necessary to the development of policies that better reflected the diverse interests contained in Scottish society. Nevertheless, since devolution, the extent to which contemporary Scottish politics and policymaking is different from that of the UK or is truly representative of a ‘Nordic-style’ has tended to be overstated. This is partly a result of a propensity to caricature Westminster as more centralising and impositional (Jordan and Cairney, 2013) and Scotland as more ‘Nordic’ – that is, deliberative and consensual – than they both really are. In reality, the Scottish Parliament retains many elements associated with the ‘Westminster model’, including the tendency for most policy and spending decisions to be controlled by the executive, whose recognised role is to govern while the Parliament asks for accounts (Johnson, 2009: 31; Cairney and Widfelt, 2015: 8; Cairney, 2017: 46). At the same time, many of the institution’s ‘Nordic’ aspects have been gradually muffled as a consequence of the Parliament’s increasing workload across an ever-expanding portfolio of legislative competences. In this sense, there exists a tendency towards a ‘narcissism of small differences’ (Mitchell, 2010), in which minor divergence between the Scottish and UK systems is disproportionately magnified to project

78 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

a sense of strong Scottish distinctiveness. In both cases, the ‘Nordic’ and ‘Westminster’ models of government are both simplified ‘ideal types’ to which no nation, Scotland included, can ever fully correspond (Cairney and Widfelt, 2015: 2; Newby, 2009: 322).

(Re)assessing ‘new politics’ Devolution, by way of ‘new politics’, was intended to deliver new (or at least very different) institutions, political culture and policies to Scotland. The exact extent to which this has been realised remains strongly contested. Heavy constraints have inhibited the Scottish Parliament’s ability to deliver transformative politics and policy. Some of these constraints have been context-specific. For example, a quickly growing legislative workload has impeded committees’ ability to make full use of their otherwise quite considerable powers. The gradual expansion of the Scottish Parliament’s legislative competence, resulting from successive Acts devolving control over new policy areas as well as granting new administrative powers to raise money, combined with high turnover of committee membership, have made it difficult for these instances to do much more than scrutinise Executive bills (Cairney, 2006: 183; Mitchell, 2000: 611; Carman and Shephard, 2009: 22–3; Johnson, 2009: 29). As such, the policy agenda remains primarily dominated by the Scottish Government, which proposes and passes the most bills. At the same time, the expectation that a proportional electoral system and putatively more ‘social democratic’ attitude in Scotland would foster a new, more consensual and collegial (Henderson, 2005: 278; Cairney, 2011: 209), political culture has also not been fully met. Instead, political antagonisms echoing the adversarialism of ‘old’ Westminster have emerged on a new, subnational, Scottish scale (Brown, 2000; Mitchell, 2000; Henderson, 2005; McMillan, 2009: 66). Where cross-party collaboration has taken place, it has tended to be driven by the perception of mutual advantage and, more rarely, from the pursuit of a common policy goal, rather than from the emergence of a genuinely ‘Nordic’ tradition of institutionalised bargaining (Mitchell, 2000: 617; Cairney and Widfelt, 2015: 7–8). Finally, devolved elections have always fallen short of delivering parliamentary cohorts that perfectly reflect the demographic

‘new politics’ at twenty | 79

make-up of the Scottish population. While the Scottish Parliament has outpaced the UK one in terms of improving representation of women and minority groups, it has never achieved representativeness in terms of gender, age, or ethnicity (Henderson, 2005; Cairney, et al., 2016a). Other pressures that have hindered the Scottish Parliament’s ability to deliver on the hopes of ‘new politics’ can be categorised as ‘universal’ to all democratic policymaking systems. These include the limited nature of policymakers’ time, resources, and capacity for attention, which generally requires the routinisation of politics to focus effort on a standard and manageable set of issues usually characterised by either high public salience (e.g. health, education, national security) or extreme urgency (i.e. unexpected crises) (Carman and Shephard, 2009; Cairney, et al., 2016b). Moreover, interdependencies linked to Scotland’s existence within a complex and multi-level system have limited its ability to forge a truly divergent policy path in many sectors (Cairney, 2006: 183; Cairney, et al., 2016b). This is the case, for example, with the need to develop policy compatible with the frictionless functioning of the UK and European Union single markets. A number of high-­ profile instances of Scottish policy divergence continue to capture the media and public’s imagination – from the abolition of university tuition fees, to the introduction of a free universal ‘baby box’ and the implementation of a minimum unit price per unit of alcohol – but these remain exceptions, however striking, in a policy trajectory that otherwise has tended to closely parallel the UK’s (Cairney, 2006: 182). Overall, however, this does not mean that the Scottish Parliament has entirely failed to live up to its architects’ lofty aspirations. There have been notable instances of ‘new politics’ in action, though many have unfolded quietly, out of the media limelight or the public’s attention (Cairney, 2007: 76; Jordan and Cairney, 2013). The Parliament stands out for its myriad efforts to operationalise the principles of democratic consultation. For instance, while the initial intention to routinely host ‘roaming’ parliamentary meetings outside of Edinburgh was never systematised, committees have remained quite stalwart in efforts to institutionalise public deliberation (Arter, 2004a; Davidson and Stark, 2011; Johnson, 2009;

80 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

McLaverty and MacLeod, 2012). Similarly, while non-­ Executive bills might be few, some that have been successful have exemplified the ‘new politics’ principles of openness and deliberation. Moreover, the Executive’s apparent dominance over the legislative agenda often belies committees’ and MSPs’ capacity to set priorities (Arter, 2004a: 81; Cairney, 2006: 184; Shephard and Cairney, 2005). Indeed, proposals originating from outside of the Executive have regularly been taken on, amended, and introduced as government proposals, usually because of the issue’s salience or the need to demonstrate cross-party support during period of coalition or minority government.

Conclusion: a maturing institution The Scottish Parliament is now 20, and the question of whether it has managed to live up to original expectations remains contested. Ultimately, the debate concerns whether it was ever truly possible to achieve primarily social and political aims, such as enhanced civic participation in politics, a reduction in socio-economic inequality, or the emergence of a collegial political culture, solely through institutional means. In many ways, the original hopes of ‘new politics’ could never be fully realised simply by designing a parliament ‘just so’. A parliament that enshrined and operationalised principles of power-sharing and deliberative democracy may be necessary but is in itself insufficient to deliver radically new politics and policy to Scotland. This invites reflection on the Scottish Parliament’s role and potential to deliver a truly ‘new’, rather than merely ‘different’, form of politics, going forward. The Parliament’s first two decades have been primarily measured against objectives set by those who designed it. Some have been more readily achieved than others. As such, a ‘capacity-expectation’ gap between the promise of ‘new politics’ and the institutional capability and political willingness to deliver it emerged early (Arter, 2004a: 83–4; Fawcett, 2003). Yet, both the social and political expectations of what devolution could offer, and the institutional and political capacity to deliver these have evolved considerably since the early 2000s. Over the last 20 years, the Parliament and the people of Scotland have changed. Devolution, and the Scottish

‘new politics’ at twenty | 81

Parliament’s authority to make and shape policy across a range of sectors, is now a permanent, if not immutable, fact of life. At the same time, the Scottish Parliament is no longer the same institution it was when it reconvened in 1999. The range of powers at its disposal, as well as the policy areas over which it has control, have grown considerably over the period. Additionally, the people who make up the Parliament have changed. Today’s MSPs operate in the context of rules, norms, and legacies gradually designed and institutionalised over 20 years. We are no longer in the presence of a juvenile institution whose every procedure needs to be invented, trialled and learned. Rather, a series of incremental and cumulative changes linked to constitutional reform, socio-economic and political transformation, and historical institutionalisation have created new opportunities and constraints for, and new expectations of, the Scottish Parliament. In effect, the current socio-political context, which is characterised by fraught yet eminently important debate over, among other issues, the place and role of Scotland in the UK, the EU, and the world, represents a critical juncture. Institutionally and democratically, it invites a practical debate about what the role of the Scottish Parliament should be. The institution’s track record is equivocal. It has managed to achieve elements of ‘new politics’, including the normalisation of a culture of consultation in the legislative process and the fostering of some highly visible policy divergence, but it has not been able, for reasons of resource limitations and political antagonism, to deliver on all those early hopes for devolution. Over the last 20 years, however, Scottish policymakers and civil society alike have developed a much keener understanding of these contextual, institutional, and political challenges. This juncture therefore offers an opportunity to reassess what a ‘new Scottish politics’ could and ought to look like if we go beyond the original desire to primarily be ‘different’ to ‘old Westminster’. Success, however, will depend on making sure we provide the Scottish Parliament with the capacities and resources commensurate with our expectations of it.

82 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

References Anderson, B. (1991), Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: New York: Verso. Arter, D. (2004a), The Scottish Parliament, a Scandinavian-style Assembly?, London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass. Arter, D. (2004b), ‘The Scottish Committees and the Goal of a ‘New Politics’: A Verdict on the First Four Years of the Devolved Scottish Parliament’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 12 (1), 71–91. Bonney, N. (2003), ‘The Scottish Parliament and Participatory Democracy: Vision and Reality’, The Political Quarterly, 74 (4), 459–67. Bradbury, J. and J. Mitchell (2001), ‘Devolution: New Politics for Old?’, Parliamentary Affairs, 54 (2), 257–75. Brown, A. (2000), ‘Designing the Scottish Parliament’, Parliamentary Affairs, 53 (3), 542–56. Cairney, P. (2006), ‘The analysis of Scottish Parliament committee influence: Beyond capacity and structure in comparing West European legislatures’, European Journal of Political Research, 45 (2), 181–208. Cairney, P. (2007), ‘Using devolution to set the agenda? Venue shift and the smoking ban in Scotland’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 9 (1), 73–89. Cairney, P. (2011), ‘The new British policy style: From a British to a Scottish political tradition?’, Political Studies Review, 9 (2), 208–20. Cairney, P. (2017), ‘Why is the SNP so pleased with the Scottish Parliament?’, in G. Hassan, and S. Barrow (eds), A Nation Changed? The SNP and Scotland Ten Years On, Edinburgh: Luath Press, 46–51. Cairney, P. and A. Widfelt (2015), ‘Is Scotland a Westminster-style majoritarian democracy or a Scandinavian-style consensus democracy? A comparison of Scotland, the UK and Sweden’, Regional and Federal Studies, 25 (1), 1–18. Cairney, P., M. Keating and A. Wilson (2016a), ‘Solving the problem of social background in the UK ‘political class’: Do parties do things differently in Westminster, devolved and European elections?’, British Politics, 11 (2), 142–63. Cairney, P., S. Russell and E. St Denny, (2016b), ‘The ‘Scottish approach’ to policy and policymaking: What issues are territorial and what are universal?’, Policy and Politics, 44 (3), 333–50. Carman, C. and M. Shephard (2009), ‘Committees in the Scottish Parliament’, in C. Jeffrey, and J. Mitchell (eds), The Scottish Parliament 1999–2009: The First Decade, Edinburgh: Luath Press, 21–8. Cohen, B. (2003), ‘Scotland’s Children and the New Parliament’, Children and Society, 17 (3), 236–46. Consultative Steering Group on the Scottish Parliament (CSG) (1998), ‘Shaping Scotland’s Parliament’: Report of the Consultative Steering Group on the Scottish Parliament, Edinburgh: The Scottish Office. Davidson, S. and A. Stark (2011), ‘Institutionalising public deliberation: Insights from the Scottish Parliament’, British Politics, 6 (2), 155–86. Fawcett, H. (2003), ‘Social inclusion policy-making in Scotland: Assessing the ‘capability-expectation’ gap’, Political Quarterly, 74 (4), 439–49.

‘new politics’ at twenty | 83 Finlay, R. (1994), ‘Controlling the past: Scottish historiography and the Scottish identity in the 19th and 20th centuries’, Scottish Affairs, 9, 127–42. Hassan, G. and S. Barrow (eds) (2017), A Nation Changed? The SNP and Scotland Ten Years On, Edinburgh: Luath Press. Hassan, G. and C. Warhurst (eds) (2000), The New Scottish Politics: The First Year of the Scottish Parliament and Beyond, Edinburgh: Stationery Office. Henderson, A. (2005), ‘Forging a new political culture: Plenary behaviour in the Scottish Parliament’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 11 (2), 275–301. Jeffrey, C. and J. Mitchell (eds) (2009), The Scottish Parliament 1999–2009: The First Decade, Edinburgh: Luath Press. Johnson, J. (2009), ‘The legislative process: The Parliament in practice’, in C. Jeffrey and J. Mitchell (eds), The Scottish Parliament 1999–2009: The First Decade, Edinburgh: Luath Press, 29–36. Jordan, G. and P. Cairney (2013), ‘What is the ‘Dominant Model’ of British Policy Making? Comparing Majoritarian and Policy Community Ideas’, British Politics, 8 (3), 233–59. Keating, M. (1998), ‘Reforging the Union: Devolution and constitutional change in the United Kingdom’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 28 (1), 217–34. Keating, M. and P. Cairney (2009), ‘The new Scottish statute book: The Scottish Parliament’s legislative record since 1999’, in C. Jeffrey and J. Mitchell (eds), The Scottish Parliament 1999–2009: The First Decade, Edinburgh: Luath Press, 37–41. McGarvey, N., and P. Cairney (2008), Scottish Politics: An Introduction, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. McLaverty, P. and I. MacLeod (2012), ‘Civic Participation in the Scottish Parliament Committees’, International Journal of Public Administration, 35 (7), 458–70. McMillan, J. (2009), ‘The Principle of Power-Sharing, 10 years on’, in C. Jeffrey and J. Mitchell (eds), The Scottish Parliament 1999–2009: The First Decade, Edinburgh: Luath Press, 63–8. Mitchell, J. (1996), Strategies for Self-government: The Campaigns for a Scottish Parliament, Polygon: Edinburgh. Mitchell, J. (2000), ‘New Parliament, New Politics in Scotland’, Parliamentary Affairs, 53, 605–21. Mitchell, J. (2010), ‘The Narcissism of Small Differences: Scotland and Westminster’, Parliamentary Affairs, 63 (1), 98–116. Newby, A.G. (2009), ‘In Building a Nation Few Better Examples can be Found’: Norden and the Scottish Parliament’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 34 (3), 307–29. Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC) (1995), ‘Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right’, Edinburgh: Scottish Constitutional Convention. Shephard, M. and P. Cairney (2005), ‘Does the Scottish Parliament matter? The use of legislative impact to explore the “new politics”’, Political Studies, 53 (2), 303–19.

84 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

S IX

The Emergence of a Scottish Political Class Klaus Stolz

Introduction Devolution, the transfer of legislative competences to parliaments and assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, has regionalised the territorial order of the unitary British state and democratised the government of the devolved nations. These processes of regionalisation and democratisation have gone hand in hand with processes of political professionalisation. In Scotland, the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 as a fully professionalised political institution has provided a new focus for all those who, in the (slightly adapted) words of Max Weber, do not merely want to live for Scottish politics, but also off Scottish politics, that is, for those who ‘strive to make [Scottish] politics a permanent source of income’ (Weber, 1958: 84). According to Weber, political professionalisation changes democracy for good. Professional politics can be seen as highly functional for modern democracies, helping to overcome social divisions and ideological conflict and to facilitate informed, deliberative decision-making. On the other hand, it also risks producing a self-referential group of politicians, detached from the problems and preferences of ordinary citizens, whose long-term interest in their careers is at odds with their temporary mandate to represent the electorate. Acknowledging this Janus-faced characteristic, political professionalisation has thus been aptly termed a ‘necessary nuisance’ (Borchert, 2003a).

emergence of a scottish political class | 85

The establishment of a Scottish Parliament was strongly linked to hopes and expectations of a new Scottish politics (Mitchell, 2000). An essential element of this new politics was to be its personnel, as it was hoped that the new Scottish arena would attract ‘a “new breed” of politician’ (Shephard et al., 2001: 79). While opinions about the desirable qualities of this new breed have varied considerably, the effects of political professionalisation on recruitment and retention in the Scottish Parliament have rarely been factored in. In this contribution I will thus take a glance at Scotland’s professional politicians through the lens of political class, a concept that has the process of political professionalisation at its core.

The concept of political class (and its application to Scotland) Originally introduced by Gaetano Mosca at the end of the nineteenth century, the concept of political class has been used and adapted ever since. While some political scientists have recently warned of the ubiquity and the ‘toxic’ connotation of the notion (Allen and Cairney, 2017: 24), a clear definition may turn it into an analytically fruitful concept. According to Borchert (2003b: 3), the political class is constituted by ‘the collective interest in a reliable income from politics and in a reasonable chance for career maintenance and advancement’ and is to be distinguished from the political elite, which is defined by its steering capacity, irrespective of career interests (Beyme, 1996). From a neo-institutional perspective, the career opportunities of such a political class are contingent on an institutional structure (e.g. the electoral system, recruitment procedures, the number of available positions) ‘providing both selective incentives and imposing restrictions’ (Borchert, 2003b: 15) for the pursuit of political careers. Socialised in this institutional structure and following structurally favoured career patterns, politicians may become conscious of their common profession and may, in turn, start to act upon this opportunity structure by reshaping it according to their collective self-interest. This is the point where what Marx had termed the ‘class in itself’ (defined by objective criteria) turns into a ‘class for itself’ (defined by collective consciousness and collective action).

86 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

The concept of political class, like many other social-science concepts, was developed in the context of the nation state. In the Scottish case, though, we might not only ask about the functional differentiation of professional politicians vis-à-vis citizens, but also about a possible territorial differentiation as a distinct Scottish political class vis-à-vis politicians based at Westminster (Stolz, 2009). In the following cursory discussion of the emergence of a Scottish political class in and for itself, I will highlight some of the most pronounced developments with regard to these two questions.

MSPs as a political class in itself Functional differentiation A brief look at the personal and social background of MSPs over the last 20 years already suggests their functional distinction from the population at large. While the share of women (40 per cent in 2003) and ethnic minorities (at least since 2011) has so far been much closer to the share in the Scottish population than to the respective ratio in most other western democracies (especially compared to Westminster), early studies of the educational and occupational background of MSPs show Scotland to follow the general trend of decreasing levels of descriptive representation (Shephard et al., 2001; Keating and Cairney, 2006). The most striking deviations can be found in the immense over-representation of the professions (especially professionals from the education, health and social welfare sector) and the almost complete absence of working-class representatives. Both tendencies are even more pronounced than at Westminster. In line with general developments, higher education (i.e. university degree) seems to have become a necessary precondition for a parliamentary mandate. In a similar vein, expectations that the Scottish Parliament would turn into something other than a home for professional career politicians selected by their political parties have proven to be ill-founded. Despite hopes to the contrary, the first MSP cohort did not include non-partisan representatives of Scotland’s civic society or the self-government movement in significant numbers,

emergence of a scottish political class | 87

as they either failed to stand for election (e.g. STUC general secretary Campbell Christie), failed to survive rigid intra-party loyalty assessments (e.g. Stephen Maxwell/SNP, Isobel Lindsay/Lab) or were rejected at the ballot box standing as independents (e.g. Canon Kenyon Wright, former chair of the Scottish Constitutional Convention). The few independent candidates (e.g. Jean Turner, former Labour MP Dennis Canavan and former SNP MP/MSP Margo MacDonald) and independent-minded party candidates (e.g. Labour’s John McAllion or the historian Christopher Harvie and the journalist Dorothy-Grace Elder for the SNP) who had been able to beat the system have mostly gone now. Only a small number of non-party candidates who had been active in the Scottish independence referendum campaign entered Parliament in 2016 on an SNP or any other ticket. From the very first day on, MSPs have been characterised by their extensive prior experience in parliamentary and party politics, local government and, increasingly, political staff positions. An astonishing 80 per cent of the first MSP cohort (elected in 1999) had held an elected party office prior to their parliamentary election, 40 per cent had previously held elected office at local government, 19 per cent had come from Westminster (15 MSPs directly, 9 MSPs after a break), while as many as 40 per cent had already stood for election to Westminster (Stolz, 2009: 60–1). Over the last two decades, this original Westminster intake has continuously grown out of the Scottish Parliament (with only two of them remaining after 2016). Elected party office and local government mandates have remained the most important stepping stones to a Scottish mandate. While it is difficult to determine the exact number of party political positions held by MSPs, the share of former local councillors is currently at one third (August 2018). In line with developments in other advanced democracies, however, an additional career path into the Scottish Parliament has developed: paid political staff positions as researchers and advisers, and so on, at party headquarters, constituency offices or the UK and Scottish parliaments and governments. By 2011 already 14 per cent of MSPs had come via this pathway, with almost 10 per cent progressing from a staff position at the very institutions they later got elected to (i.e. the Scottish Parliament). By 2017, the share of

88 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

MSPs with a prior staff position had doubled to 28 per cent, with 17 per cent following the in-house recruitment pattern (among SNP MSPs this ratio is 23 per cent). Local government and staff positions are mostly alternative springboards. Thus, more than half of all current MSPs (53 per cent) have either come via the one or the other route, with Labour (61 per cent) and SNP (57 per cent) MSPs much more likely to have come this way than Conservatives (39 per cent), whose major qualification seems to be previous candidacies either for Westminster or the Scottish Parliament (figures not attributed to other sources are calculated from the author’s own database). However, the strong career orientation of MSPs cannot only be deduced from their pre-parliamentary positions, it is also clearly visible in the length of their service. Of the 129 MSPs who got elected in 1999, a full 19 have served continuously since (13 SNP, 5 Labour, 1 Lib Dem), while seven have come back after a short break of their parliamentary career. With 26 of them still in office, the average tenure of the 1999 cohort at the Scottish Parliament is currently at 11.4 years. If we add the time they have served at Westminster and the European Parliament before and after their Scottish mandate we even reach 13.6 years. But let’s extend our analysis to the full time frame. Since its opening, 305 MSPs have entered the Scottish Parliament. Disregarding the new intake of 2016 (those just beginning their parliamentary careers), the number of legislative periods in which they have served (with 80 still serving) are shown in Table 6.1. The average tenure of this group is currently at 9.3 years. However, if those still serving only completed the current legislative period (until 2021), this figure would increase to 10.2 years. If

Table 6.1  MSPs entering before 2016 only in 1 period 2 and more 3 and more 4 and more in all 5 periods

 73 180 104  52  22

Source: author’s own calculations. n=253/number of legislative periods served in Scottish Parliament.

28.9% 71.1% 41.1% 20.6%  8.7%

emergence of a scottish political class | 89

we further exclude those who only sat in one period, the remaining group averages between 11.4 and 12.8 years (extrapolated to 2021) respectively. This brief glance at the career backgrounds and tenure-length of MSPs should be enough to reveal quite high levels of individual political professionalisation. A majority of MSPs enter Parliament from a fully or semi-professional political position (in 2006, over a third of Scottish councillors claimed to be full-time; the new remuneration scheme of 2007 may have even increased this figure). The great bulk of them, then, have spent two or more legislative periods inside the Scottish Parliament with a full salary and generous allowances, with even higher earnings for those serving the Executive/ Government. While some MSPs do have a second income (especially among the Tory group), the Scottish Parliament mandate is generally understood to be a full-time occupation with strong informal pressure on those deviating from this norm to comply (as was to be seen in the case of Labour MSP and Queen’s Counsel Gordon Jackson). Those losing their seat frequently ran again (12 MSPs have actually regained their mandate), others stand for Westminster, while some even move to political staff positions as a fall-back or interim post (e.g. former Labour minister Iain Gray, who worked as advisor in the Scotland Office of the UK Government in between his stints in the Scottish Parliament). Taken together, this evidence suggests that a large share of MSPs has embarked on a long-term professional political career. As we can expect them to develop a common material interest in the maintenance and advancement of this career, they can be seen to form a political class in itself.

Territorial differentiation The question remains whether MSPs are an integral or distinct part of the British political class. Again, a look at the prevailing career patterns may help to answer this question. As Table 6.2 shows, the frequency of career movements between the Scottish and the UK political arena is fairly low. While the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 saw a significant number of Westminster MPs change their career tack in favour of the new Scottish arena (ardent devolutionists from Labour

90 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Table 6.2  Career movements between Westminster and Holyrood Election

UK Parliament

SP 1999 UK 2001 SP 2003 UK 2005

→ Direct 1 Indirect 0 Total 1

SP 2011 UK 2015 SP 2016 UK 2017 2001–17

Direct 1 Indirect 2 Total 3

Direct 0 Indirect 2 Total 2

← →

Direct 3 Indirect 1 Total 4 Direct 8 Indirect 3 Total 11

Total 0

← →

Direct 1 Indirect 1 Total 2

Direct 15 Indirect 9 Total 24

← →

Direct 2 Indirect 0 Total 2

Scottish Parliament

← →

Direct 1 Indirect 1 Total 2

SP 2007 UK 2010

Direction

Direct 0 Indirect 1 Total 1

← Direct 1 Indirect 5 Total 6

Source: author’s own calculations.

and the Lib Dems plus leading SNP MPs) subsequent e­lections have brought only little institutional exchange. On average, each Westminster or Holyrood election brings about two current or former parliamentarians from London to Edinburgh or vice versa. Consequently, the centripetal ratio of former MSPs at Westminster (currently at 8.5 per cent) and the centrifugal ratio of former MPs at Holyrood (currently at 4.6 per cent) are relatively low in international terms (see Stolz, 2015). The difference between centripetal and centrifugal career path-

emergence of a scottish political class | 91

ways, however, is that the former are predominantly voluntary (i.e. seats won by current mandate holders), while in the latter case, the change of territorial arena has mostly followed electoral defeat. Apart from former SNP leader Alex Salmond – who moved twice in both directions and whose career can certainly not be seen as ­representative – no sitting MPs have moved directly from the UK into the Scottish Parliament after their inaugural election. Neither Labour nor the Conservatives have since imported their Holyrood leaders from Westminster – a pattern often found in federal countries. By contrast, the (rather small) road from Holyrood to Westminster seems to offer some form of upward mobility, at least for MSPs from the Conservative Party. The first two Conservatives who made this move – David Mundell and Ben Wallace (both in 2005) – were later promoted to the UK government, a promotion they would have hardly achieved in Scotland. The last UK general election of 2017 saw three sitting Conservative MSPs win Westminster seats, two of them who had been elected to the Scottish Parliament only a year before. These career movements seem to reflect an emerging (though still quite frail) springboard pattern for Conservative MSPs with Westminster ambitions. This pattern would be considerably strengthened should rumours be proven that MSP and Scottish Tory leader Ruth Davidson could in future move to Westminster in order to become leader of the British Conservative Party and perhaps even UK Prime Minister. The only non-Conservatives who have deliberately given up Holyrood in favour of Westminster (again, apart from Alex Salmond) were two leading members of the Labour group in the Scottish Parliament, Margaret Curran and Cathy Jamieson. Following Labour’s electoral defeat at the Scottish elections in 2007 and their subsequent loss of government office (Curran) and government prospects (Jamieson), they decided to stand for the UK Parliament in 2010. Unfortunately for them, their election to Westminster coincided with another Labour defeat, resulting in another legislative term in opposition. Five years later at the general election of 2015, they were swept out of the UK Parliament by the so-called ‘SNP tsunami’ (Macwhirter, 2015). Unlike the careers of Mundell and Wallace, their fate serves as a warning for MSPs tempted by UK office.

92 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

These observations suggest that the overwhelming majority of MSPs have set their mind on a Holyrood career. These MSPs can be seen as the core of a distinct Scottish political class whose opportunity structures are almost exclusively determined by Scottish institutions and Scottish actors, mainly the Scottish Parliament and their parties in Scotland. Diverging career orientations together with opportunity structures that reward institutional loyalty and hamper career movements across institutional boundaries separate MSPs from their Westminster counterparts. This clear-cut territorial division remains meaningful even though it is somehow blurred by a handful of Conservative MSPs with UK ambitions on the one hand and by SNP MPs focused on Scottish politics and dependent on their Scottish party on the other.

MSPs as a political class for itself The question of whether these common career interests are consciously perceived as such and acted upon by members of this class is notoriously difficult to investigate. And indeed, in Scotland, like elsewhere, party political competition (rather than uniform collective class action) remains the standard mode of interaction between professional politicians. However, a look at the 20-year history of the Scottish Parliament shows that MSPs’ common interests in career maintenance and career advancement nevertheless seem to have found their way into the parliamentary rulebook and beyond. MSPs have successfully institutionalised their parliamentary mandate into an attractive, generously endowed, long-term professional career with manifold opportunities for career specialisation and advancement. They have done so by voting in Parliament for relatively high levels of staff, allowances and infrastructural resources, which apart from assisting their parliamentary work also allows them to build up a high public profile that is of invaluable advantage in any reselection process. Although they are legally prohibited from legislating for a Scottish system of public party funding, MSPs furthermore have managed to establish a system of formal and informal transfers from the Parliament’s budget to its parliamentary parties, helping to professionalise party machines inside and outside Parliament. Within their party organisations, MSPs have

emergence of a scottish political class | 93

gained considerable status and influence which has been used to push intra-party candidate selection procedures towards one-­ member-one-vote postal ballots. Again, this selection mechanism might be seen first and foremost as a democratic procedure, but it is also – and perhaps not entirely by chance – more favourable for well-known incumbents than for challengers from the outside (for a detailed account of these processes see Stolz, 2009). Although not all of these decisions were taken unanimously and by all MSPs together as the notion of political class suggests, they can be seen as an institutionalisation of their collective interest, and MSPs generally managed to see them through with little internal division and little publicity (the exception being the highly controversial allowance debate in the early days of the Parliament). Together these interventions largely immunised them from the risks of a premature and involuntary end to their careers, even though several high-profile casualties (e.g. Michael Russell and Andrew Wilson in 2003) and the current opening of the SNP party list to non-party indyref campaigners suggest that this immunisation is still not all-encompassing. From the perspective of democratic theory, this institutionalisation of the collective class interests of MSPs can be seen as highly ambivalent. On the one hand, the resources MSPs have awarded themselves support them in their task to communicate in a responsive, transparent and effective way with the Scottish public, i.e. their electorate. Being fully endowed also helps to diminish possible conflicts of interest. Furthermore, it is only because of staff and other allowances that Scotland’s elective representatives can stand up to a fully manned public administration and thus fulfil their function of government control. On the other hand, though, the privileges of this in-group and the favourable election (closed list) and selection mechanisms (postal ballots) have put them way above challengers from the outside. This form of systematic social closure is perhaps more detrimental to Scottish democracy than the individual misdoings of some MSPs that were eagerly scandalised by the Scottish press (e.g. the McLeish, McLetchie and Alexander cases). The distinct Scottish career orientation of this political class has found its expression in the territorial politics that have ­accompanied

94 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

the dynamic institutionalisation process of devolution. The first and so far most striking confirmation of this interest was given when the implementation of the Scotland Act 1998 demanded a reduction of the number of seats in the Scottish Parliament, in accordance with a reduction of Scottish Westminster constituencies. Threatened with job insecurity (and a significant aggravation of their working conditions), MSPs campaigned heavily against such a reduction, setting themselves clearly apart from their Scottish colleagues in London. In the end, they successfully decoupled Holyrood from Westminster constituencies and thus traded an almost perfect direct-access route to Westminster for enhanced career security at Holyrood. MSPs across the ideological divide have also continuously lobbied for an expansion of the rather restricted self-regulatory a­ utonomy of the Scottish Parliament. Furthermore, even with regard to the much more politicised issue of Scotland’s legislative competences, MSPs from unionist parties usually take a different, more pro-­Scottish position than their fellow party politicians. The latest example of such a staunch defence of their own institutional base was the Scottish Parliament’s clear rejection of the UK Government’s EU Withdrawal Bill (only the Tories voted in favour), withholding its legislative consent to a proposal that will infringe on powers already devolved to Scotland.

Conclusion The establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 has created a new opportunity to pursue professional political careers in Scotland. While this new institutional opportunity structure has formed a distinct Scottish political class, this class has, in turn, adapted and reshaped this structure according to the collective self-interest of its members. As the interest of a particular group of professionals, this interest is, by definition, a particularistic interest. In the early days of Scottish devolution, the Scottish media and public opinion – still largely unexposed to the mechanisms of professional politics – reacted vehemently against some politicians that apparently put their individual self-interest above the interests and concerns of the Scottish public. However, these were not the doings of a political class, but should rather be seen as individual

emergence of a scottish political class | 95

transgressions from a collectively set professional code of conduct. If anything, these cases have shown that internal and external control mechanisms work, and thus reflect, positively upon the newly established institutional structures. The collective interest of the Scottish political class is not necessarily always opposed to the interests of the population at large. Adding weight to the Scottish Parliament vis-à-vis the Scottish Government and to the Scottish devolved institutions vis-à-vis the British state, the Scottish political class can indeed be seen as a stabilising factor for the devolution settlement and for Scottish democratic self-government. However, such a political class inevitably strives to immunise the political careers of its members against outside challenges and challengers. It thus comes with an inherent tendency to erect institutional boundaries to the democratic process, excluding a wide range of critical and nonconformist voices from the outside. Modern democracy – in Scotland and elsewhere – cannot do without professional politics, yet it remains a constant task of the general public, the media, civic society, and political campaign groups to perforate these institutional boundaries and to keep the collective self-interest of its professional politicians in check.

References Allen, P. and P. Cairney (2017), ‘What Do We Mean When We Talk about the ‘Political Class’?’, Political Studies Review, 15 (1), 18–27. Beyme, K. (1996), ‘The concept of political class: a new dimension of research on elites?’, West European Politics, 19, 68–87. Borchert, J. (2003a), Die Professionalisierung der Politik. Zur Notwendigkeit eines Ärgernisses, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. Borchert, J. (2003b), ‘Professional politicians: towards a comparative perspective’, in J. Borchert and J. Zeiss (eds), The Political Class in Advanced Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–25. Keating, M. and P. Cairney (2006), ‘A new elite? Politicians and civil servants in Scotland after devolution’, Parliamentary Affairs, 59, 43–59. Macwhirter, I. (2015), Tsunami: Scotland’s Democratic Revolution, Glasgow: Freight Books. Mitchell, J. (2000), ‘New parliament: new politics in Scotland’, Parliamentary Affairs, 53, 249–73. Shephard, M., N. McGarvey and M. Cavanagh (2001), ‘New Scottish Parliament, New Scottish Parliamentarians?’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 7, 79–104.

96 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T Stolz, K. (2009), Towards a Regional Political Class? Professional politicians and regional institutions in Catalonia and Scotland, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Stolz, K. (2015), ‘Legislative Career Paths in a Multi-Level Europe’, in M. Edinger and S. Jahr (eds), Political Careers in Europe. Career Patterns in Multi-Level Systems, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 149–70. Weber, M. [1919] (1958), ‘Politics as a vocation’, in H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (eds), From Max Weber, New York: Oxford University Press, 77–128.

committee system | 97

SEVEN

The Committee System of the Scottish Parliament Mark Shephard

Prior to the creation of the committee system and the Scottish Parliament, a Consultative Steering Group was tasked with drawing up detailed proposals of how the Scottish Parliament was going to operate, and from the outset, committees were expected to be the ‘engine rooms’ not only for the effective scrutiny and influence of government, but for policy initiation as well. The idea was for a ‘new politics’ in which the ‘old politics’ of Westminster (majoritarian and top-down) would be replaced by more consensus-based and bottom-up democracy. To that end, committees were given extensive powers to scrutinise policy, administration and finance, to conduct inquiries, and to introduce legislation. There are two main types of committee in the Scottish Parliament: mandatory committee and subject committee. Mandatory committees are set up at the start of each session and are subject to parliamentary rules. They include: Standards, Procedures and Public Appointments Committee; Finance Committee; Audit Committee, European and External Relations Committee; Equal Opportunities Committee; Public Petitions Committee; and Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee. Subject committees are established at the beginning of each session and reflect main devolved policy domains and ministerial portfolios (for example, Education and Skills, Health and Sport, Justice, and Local Government and Communities). While matching changing ministerial portfolios and priorities has an obvious benefit of committees fitting latest ministerial briefs, concerns have been raised that this can create

98 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

confusion outside the parliament as groups have to adjust to committee name and brief changes. Other committees include private bill committees that are established to work with persons and/or companies at delivering outcomes that cannot be achieved through regular channels, for example, major infrastructure projects like trams and railways.

Theory versus practice and potential improvements Committees can be given extensive theoretical powers, but what matters is what happens in practice. By the end of the first session it became clear that committees were not realising the potential their extensive powers suggested. The Procedures Committee (2003) noted how committees had become a ‘conveyor belt’ for dealing with government legislation. The laments of 20 years ago are much the same issues of today. In the first session of the Scottish Parliament (1999–2003), 50 government (then Executive) bills passed compared with eight members’ bills, three committee bills and one private bill. In the second session (2003–7), 53 government (then Executive) bills passed compared with three members’ bills, one committee bill and nine private bills. In the third session (2007–11), 42 government bills passed compared with seven members’ bills, two committee bills and two private bills. In the fourth session (2011–16), 66 government bills passed compared with seven members’ bills, one committee bill and five private bills. If we count current bills in the fifth session of the Scottish Parliament (as of 1 November 2018) we find 16 are government bills, two are members’ bills and two are private bills. What is noticeable about this comparison across the years is that even when the government has been in minority (2007–11; and 2016– ), the preponderance of bills being considered in committee and passing into legislation are from the government. While we can quibble about the actual origin of legislation and of amendments (for example, legislation can be inspired by backbenchers and a minority of amendments originate from backbenchers and are withdrawn on the proviso that government ministers will address the point(s) raised – see Shephard and Cairney, 2005), what is clear is that government dominates even when it is a minority government. Research on inquiries

committee system | 99

also points to limited committee performance given the primary emphasis given to the consideration of government legislation (Cole, 2016). In turn, evidence for a ‘new politics’ has been sorely lacking. Why does the government dominate? First, the government has a strong level of control over the parliamentary agenda and business conducted. Second, parties maintain too much discipline over their MSPs meaning that votes are less about building an informed committee consensus and more about adherence to party whips and the party line. Third, while committees may theoretically be able to exercise lots of powers (e.g. right to initiate legislation), in practice reaction to government legislation dominates the agenda and calls for more proactive inquiry work as well as more pre- and post-­ legislative scrutiny still resonate, including calls for the three-stage legislative process to be replaced by a five-stage process that incorporates pre- and post-legislative scrutiny as the norm rather than the exception. Fourth, the Scottish Parliament is relatively small in size and so any rotation (e.g. of ministers, of committee members, of leaders) can have more noticeable knock-on effects for all committee memberships. In the case of the nine-member Health and Sport Committee, for example, 21 MSPs have been members of this committee in just over two years since the start of the 2016 session. While this committee has experienced most turnover, there have been 97 movements across committees since the 2016 session, and only two committees out of 16 (mandate and subject committees) have experienced no turnover. This then affects the capacity of committees to develop subject expertise and institutional memory, both of which are critical in building power and influence vis-àvis the scrutiny of the government. One theoretical solution is to increase the number of MSPs as this would dilute the knock-on effects of any movement. While politically sensitive to increase MSPs in practice, this should become less of an issue the more powers the Scottish Parliament accrues from both Westminster and, ultimately, most likely, from Europe post-Brexit. Alternatively, you could reduce the number of MSPs per committee and rely more on substitute members to deal with absences. However, one of the side-effects of reducing the number of MSPs per committee is the risk of losing the representation of party dynamics in the

100 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Parliament. A more radical solution to the increasing pressures and lack of time for scrutiny within the Scottish Parliament is to introduce a second chamber. Developments at Westminster (and in other parliaments such as the Welsh Assembly) have not gone unnoticed and one of the ways party control in committees has been reduced in the House of Commons has been to remove committee chair selection from the power of the party leaders and whips and to hand this power to Parliament. Indeed, the Commission on Parliamentary Reform (2017) has recommended that conveners (committee chairs) be elected by the Parliament rather than allocated according to party seat-share balance in the Parliament and then by party (leadership) choice. The rationale for this change is threefold: to increase transparency and fairness of selection; to facilitate more independence and strength of convener behaviour (especially when scrutinising government policy, administration and actions); and also to provide alternative career paths for politicians other than ministerial posts. To attract the best talent to convener (chair) posts, additional pay incentives were made available in Westminster and this and/or money for support fulfilling wider roles that a convener may forgo to fulfil committee duties is also something that has been proposed for the Scottish Parliament and that is being considered by the Standards, Procedures and Public Appointments Committee. A more radical proposal would be to ensure that all conveners were from opposition parties (current Standing Orders of the Parliament state that the convener of the Public Audit and Post-Legislative Scrutiny Committee cannot be from the governing side). Committee size has continued to be a point of contention over the last 20 years. Initially, committees were quite large (up to 15 members). Currently, mandate and subject committees are much smaller and range from five (Delegated Powers and Law Reform) to 11 members (Education and Skills, Finance and Constitution, and Rural Economy and Connectivity) with seven to nine MSPs the norm. The Commission on Parliamentary Reform (2017) has recommended a norm of seven MSPs per committee with exceptions granted for larger committees where sizeable issues such as constitutional reform should permit a more balanced representation of party dynamics in the Parliament.

committee system | 101

While limited resources do mean that most committee meetings are based in Edinburgh, committees have worked hard at connecting with the wider community through visits and meetings and evidence collection around Scotland. Concerns that committees are still too removed from public service users and ‘remote’ voices (for example, by geography, culture, language, accessibility or finance) are currently being addressed through the creation of a Committee Engagement Unit designed to assist committees and witnesses in undertaking more innovative and meaningful engagement. Lessons have been learned from Wales, particularly on how to engage early, think across committees (rather than in silos), and on how to broaden communication with groups beyond the usual suspects while at the same time taking some of the weight off conveners and clerks in delivering on these fronts. The benefits of addressing CSG principles of power sharing and participation, as well as improving public trust and evaluating all of this, are deemed worthy of the additional costs. As well as assistance from a Committee Engagement Unit, another way in which committees could improve their scrutiny could be to rely more on existing external expertise and advice, and not just through formal appointment of advisers, but through ad hoc informal channels as well. The Committee Engagement Unit could also help deliver these connections. Thinking more radically, external expertise and advice could provide the basis for a second chamber that connects experts and sectors and regions to the Parliament without the need for an added tier of elected politicians and all the costs associated with this. Internally too, more could be done to realise the potential expertise, knowledge, resources and external links of cross-party groups. Committees are also starting to find more ways to use the chamber as a forum for announcing and publicising the launch of inquiries and for summarising the findings from published reports. This will help with increasing visibility outside the chamber, which should help widen community engagement and trust and support. Committee timetabling could also be improved so that it is not curtailed unnecessarily by chamber business. One way of doing this might be to have set days and/or weeks for chamber business and set days and/or weeks for committee business so as to reduce the stop–start nature of trying

102 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

to do multiple things on one day. Timetabling could also be used to enhance the profile of issues by making chamber debates connect more closely with committee topics and discussions. Finally, experience to date has shown that legislation comes thick and fast at the end of a session and so timing of parliamentary activities like inquiries might need better and earlier planning. To address better the need for government scrutiny, the Commission on Parliamentary Reform (2017) recommended that the Conveners’ Group (chairs of all the committees) start thinking more strategically across committees about the issues that they focus on for scrutiny given the time and resource limitations of the committees. From the government, giving committees both additional supporting documents and evidence for new government bills and also post-legislative feedback on the extent to which bills have been enacted, at what cost, and with what effect compared to that proposed would greatly assist committee scrutiny. Also, granting committees more control over the timescale for completing oversight of bills would greatly improve committee capacity to scrutinise the government. Other developments at Westminster have not gone unnoticed. The creation of a Backbench Committee has enabled MPs to have a say in parliamentary business, often to raise issues and agenda-set through their own debates; for example, calls for a referendum on EU membership can arguably be traced back to discussions and pressures stemming from the backbench business committee. The Commission on Parliamentary Reform (2017) has recommended that the Scottish Parliament think about introducing something similar to raise the capacity and profile and impact of backbenchers.

Conclusion Committees in the Scottish Parliament are expected to do a lot (theoretical powers) with little (relatively small number of politicians and support resources combined with an increasing amount of devolved powers and expectations). Consequently, the concern from the outset of devolution that committees were ‘conveyor belts’ for government legislation is arguably even more prescient now. Ever mindful of the need for efficiencies and creative thinking to

committee system | 103

solve problems, the Commission on Parliamentary Reform (2017) has provided a range of creative and low-cost solutions to many of the problems faced by committees (for example, better use of external experts). While many of these will see improvements in how committees operate, we might still need to think more radically (for example, increased numbers of politicians, a possible second chamber . . .) if we don’t want to keep reiterating many of the concerns about theory not matching practice raised by the Procedures Committee in the very first session of the Parliament. This becomes even more acute an issue given the additional pressures likely to be created by increasing levels of devolution from both London and Brussels. Relating reforms proposed versus reforms realised to the founding principles of the Scottish Parliament (power sharing, accountability, participation and access, equal opportunities) it is arguably easier for the Parliament to implement reforms that address participation and access and equal opportunities (for example, the creation of a Committee Engagement Unit) and harder to implement reforms that deal with the more politically sensitive areas of power sharing and accountability, particularly when these pertain to the working relationships between committees and the government (for example, elected conveners and greater roles and powers for the opposition and backbenchers). While elected and remunerated conveners and greater roles for backbenchers are likely to see the light of day (after all, if Westminster can do it . . .), some of the more challenging proposals such as weakening government control over timetabling and conveners (opposition conveners only) are less likely to come to fruition.

References Cole, M. (2016), ‘Committee Scrutiny in Scotland: A Comparative and Bi-Constitutional Perspective’, Policy and Politics, 44, 465–83. The Commission on Parliamentary Reform (2017), ‘Your Parliament Your Voice’, . Shephard, M. and P. Cairney (2005), ‘The Impact of the Scottish Parliament in Amending Executive Legislation’, Political Studies, 53 (2), 303–19. Procedures Committee (2003), ‘Report on the Founding Principles of the Scottish

104 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T Parliament: The Application of Access and Participation, Equal Opportunities, Accountability and Power Sharing in the Work of the Parliament Volume 1’ (3rd report 2003), .

continental drift | 105

E IGH T

Scotland and Westminster and Continental Drift Torcuil Crichton

So, is this how it ends? Though just over a decade old, the UK Supreme Court is ­furnished in that quintessential British state style which drapes institutions, no matter how modern, with kitsch references to the past. Even the bright pop-art carpet designed by Sir Peter Blake, he of ‘Sgt. Pepper’ fame, combining the court motif of flowers from the four nations of the UK, somehow contrives to look ever so slightly dated. It seems to say that Britain is rooted in history and only inches reluctantly into the future. But there, in the summer of 2018, in Court One of the former Middlesex County Council building, beneath restored wooden beams, pristine stonework and an incongruous portrait of the Duke of Wellington, it was possible to glimpse the future of the United Kingdom, or a version of it at least. The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal in the UK for civil cases, and for criminal cases from England, Wales and Northern Ireland. It also hears cases of the greatest constitutional importance affecting the whole population of the UK. Two years after the rupture of the Brexit referendum, as Britain’s body politic rocked on its heels, still stunned and unsure of how to handle the result, it was in the highest law court in the land that the rocky relationship between the Scottish and Westminster governments ended up. These were not divorce proceedings, though anyone wondering where the Scottish Nationalist search for Scotland’s destiny goes next may have had cause to daydream.

106 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

The two governments, and the two nations, continue to live under the one roof, of course. But anyone looking at the signal discord between Edinburgh and Whitehall would have done well to observe legal arguments across the crescent-shaped benches which, like those of the Scottish Parliament, were ironically designed to remove an adversarial atmosphere from debate. The exchanges, dry and complicated, centred on whether the Scottish Parliament had exceeded its powers by passing an EU Continuity Bill in defiance of the Westminster’s own EU Withdrawal Bill. In December 2018, as Theresa May faced a leadership challenge from her Brexiteer MPs, the Court ruled that key parts of a continuity bill to repatriate EU powers in areas such as farming and fisheries to Holyrood breached UK law. Westminster, it ruled, had the ultimate say over EU legislation. Legally it was a significant setback for First Minister Nicola Sturgeon but any immediate political fall-out was lost in the wake of the Tory psycho-drama being played out on College Green and in the committee rooms of the House of Commons. Redrafting the legislation was an option considered by the Scottish Government and Mike Russell, her Constitutional Affairs Secretary, said he would start urgent talks with opposition parties. On the scale of Brexit disasters, it would matter little if there are two Brexit laws or one. The Court’s judgement, like so many points of constructional argument, was interpreted by either side as a win. Nonetheless this legal clash was important as it was the first time in the short history of devolution that the UK Government had sought to strike down legislation passed by Holyrood. It probably will not be the last. Though it is written into legislation that any legal dispute between the devolved Scottish Government and the UK Government should ultimately be resolved in the Supreme Court, (and beforehand the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) the founders of devolution could not have foreseen that the day would come so soon. But barely two decades on, following two referendums on the future direction of the country, relations between the two governments are a legal low. The Court’s ruling was not and could not be a fix for that bigger problem.

continental drift | 107

How did we get here? Part one: the Labour years Although not set up for failure it seems that the limits of the relationship between Westminster and Holyrood, two parliaments in one country, are being severely strained. Brexit has simply multiplied the polarisation between the Theresa May’s defence of what she describes as ‘our precious Union’ and Nicola Sturgeon’s personal date with destiny, a second independence referendum. In 1997, as the first Scotland Act was being drafted, few could imagine an SNP majority at Holyrood within a decade and an independence referendum within 15 years, far less the constitutional crisis caused by UK voting to leave the European Union. The early days of devolution can now be looked back on as a tranquil political nursery school. A spat between the then Scottish Secretary John Reid and First Minister Donald Dewar, the focal point of which became Reid’s son who worked for a PR agency offering access to Scottish ministers – seems like a scrappy turf war compared to what followed. The clash reflected confusion about the role of the Secretary of State for Scotland now that many powers had been devolved from Westminster to the new Scottish Parliament. With Labour in power in Westminster, and in Scotland in coalition with the Lib Dems, conflict was minor and differences of opinion rare. A difference of approach, which had been the promised potential of the Scottish Parliament, was hard to distinguish in the early days. Dewar’s successors, both Labour First Ministers, stretched the envelope of Westminster’s superiority slightly. Henry McLeish, who followed Dewar, clashed with the Treasury over free care for the elderly but disputes were rare and minor. During this time the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), the mechanism bringing together Whitehall ministers and the Welsh, Northern Irish and Scottish counterparts to resolve disputes, was rarely cranked into life. It first met outside London in December 1999, chaired by then Chancellor and Labour’s Scottish powerhouse both north and south of the border, Gordon Brown, but quickly fell into abeyance. Jack McConnell succeeded McLeish as First Minister. McConnell insisted the infrequency of JMC gatherings was not deliberate neglect but a desire for departments in Whitehall and Holyrood

108 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

to work on a bilateral basis without having to trigger ministerial meetings. And with strong Scottish Labour figures in power in Westminster, the writ of government ran across the UK with barely a wrinkle as it crossed into Scotland. McConnell ran a separate foreign policy, making Malawi a priority and for a while he ran a separate immigration policy, allowing postgraduate students extended visas to stay and find work. The scheme was closed when Theresa May, as UK Home Secretary began tightening immigration and chasing a targets-based policy. The calls for separate immigration powers, post-Brexit, have grown stronger though their realisation no less likely. Dissatisfaction with New Labour and the party’s complacent, managerial approach to Holyrood gave the impression the party had no radical ideas about what to do about devolution. At Holyrood the door was left open to the SNP rising on the discontent that crystallised around opposition to the Iraq War.

How did we get here? Part two: the SNP years The actors changed and so did the dynamic between Holyrood and Westminster. The first SNP Government (2007–11) gave the appearance of being dynamic and effective. The Executive became a Government, which seemed a small change at the time as well as a source of some controversy; it was simultaneously indicative of the aspiration of senior SNP figures and also their Achilles’ heel: an obsession with status. However, competence creates an impression and the trinity at the top of the Scottish Government, Alex Salmond as First Minister, John Swinney as Finance Secretary and Nicola Sturgeon as Health Secretary, the heir apparent, were impressive politicians. Many predicted that the outcome of the 2007 election would be a complete breakdown in relations between Edinburgh and London. A Cold War was foreseen in newspaper headlines. The structures established at the outset of devolution proved themselves to be functional, but perhaps only because Alex Salmond as First Minister insisted on kick-starting them into life. Central now to the relationship between the two governments is the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC).

continental drift | 109

The JMC, as is usually referred to with another acronym attached to indicate which policy is being discussed, became the main vehicle for intergovernmental relations at a political level, although officials and ministers exchanged information and meetings on a regular basis. Some departments like the Home Civil Service, for example, remain unified despite devolution to Scotland and Wales. Others, like the Department of Work and Pensions, are undergoing a slow and sometimes painful process of reproduction as a parallel, devolved welfare system is set up in Scotland. The JMC formally convenes the UK Government and the devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales on a regular basis. In officialese, it serves its purpose ‘to provide central coordination of the overall relationship between the administrations’ (UK Cabinet Office, 2012). It is meant to be the mechanism by which disputes are resolved. In reality it often serves as a backdrop for theatrical grandstanding outside the door of Ten Downing Street for visiting First Ministers, or the Cabinet Office for their respective ministers. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the UK Government and the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland was first agreed in 2001 and most recently updated in October 2013. It sets out the principles which support relations between these administrations. The MoU puts emphasis on the principles of good communication, consultation and cooperation. These were tested to the limit during the referendum years, the change from Labour to a Conservative–Lib Dem coalition at Westminster and the stunning success of the SNP in the 2011 Holyrood election which produced a working majority – an incredible feat given the voting system had been designed to prevent majority government. From that moment, independence was in the only item on the JMC agenda regardless of what the minutes might show. In a sense the menu has not changed since. By that time, of course, Labour and Scottish Labour in particular, had lost control of Downing Street and also the top echelons

110 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

of the UK Labour Party. The Tories clung on in Scotland for a long ­devolutionary phase with one MP, David Mundell. (Such was the attrition rate in Theresa May’s Brexit Cabinet that as Scottish Secretary since 2015 Mundell is one of the few serving Cabinet members still in the same role.) David Cameron, saddled with a coalition government, sought to reset relations with the SNP administration. The UK Prime Minister talked about an agenda for both parliaments to work together, ‘governing with respect, both because I believe Scotland deserves that respect and because I want to try and win Scotland’s respect as the prime minister of the United Kingdom’ (BBC News, 14 May 2010). A further Scotland Act in 2012 and the Edinburgh Agreement between Cameron and Salmond set the terms for the Scottish referendum. The post-referendum Smith Commission and the 2016 Scotland Act transformed the famous front-page Daily Record ‘Vow’ into tax-setting and welfare powers, extended the Parliament’s scope well beyond those originally envisaged. In the day-to-day running of government there were bumps along the way, some major some minor. The release of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi the man found guilty of the Lockerbie bombing from a Scottish jail was one. David Cameron declared publicly that the decision to allow Megrahi return to Libya ‘undermined’ the UK’s global standing. Similarly the UK Government’s decision in the Fixed Term Parliaments Act, to set the date for the Westminster election on 7 May 2015 clashed with the Holyrood elections already scheduled for the same day, ruffled feathers. The Scottish Government moved the Holyrood election date to 2016 with a spokesperson for the FM claiming that the lack of consultation on the part of the coalition government showed that they were ‘pursuing an agenda of disrespect’. However, the gift of an extra year in power was privately welcomed by Scottish Government ministers. With the division of the Scottish referendum overshadowing all politics from 2011, and with two governments of such fundamentally contrasting views coexisting if not cooperating, there were inevitable clashes. Arguments over the 2012 Scotland Act, giving tax-varying powers to Holyrood, set a pattern for the tug-of-war

continental drift | 111

style negotiations between the two governments, the SNP refusing to budge, in public at least, until at the last minute when a solution would be found. The UK Government stated that it would not pass the bill unless it had obtained a legislative consent motion, a Sewel Motion, from the Scottish Parliament although Westminster could have passed the bill in any case. The SNP said it would block the bill in Holyrood. However after much toing and froing, a deal was reached between the two governments and the Scottish Parliament unanimously passed a legislative consent motion in respect of the bill on 18 April 2012. Mistakenly, ministers in Whitehall took this to be the pattern of all future negotiations with the SNP government. When it came to the financial arrangements for the subsequent 2016 Scotland Act, and later Brexit negotiations, they were to find out to their cost that their opponents did not always blink first. John Swinney, then Finance Secretary, is credited with winning substantial financial concessions from the UK Treasury to ease the transition to Scotland’s own income-tax raising powers. Whitehall ministers, whether they are pressing the case for the defence of the nation or for frontline health services, rarely succeed in a straight fight against the Treasury. After 20 years of devolution, Scotland is not markedly more equal, educated, healthy or prosperous. In some cases, the opposite is true. The promise of devolution has gone mostly unrealised. A heavily contested referendum, catching the swell but not the crest of rising populism across western democracies, and the terrible misreading of the result by David Cameron who immediately announced plans for ‘English Votes for English Laws’ in the Commons, have all opened up the political distance between Scotland and Westminster, and aided its continued growth.

The SNP’s emergence as Britain’s third force The referendum backlash, the election of 56 SNP MPs in the 2015 UK election, changed perceptions of Scotland at Westminster, though not actually the balance of power.

112 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Some commentators behaved as if Scots MPs had not previously attended the UK Parliament, with tales of the extra stocks of Irn Bru being ordered for cafés and restaurants. The extra demand probably stemmed not from the drinking habits of the MPs but their bag carriers and backroom staff who tended to copy the Monday-to-Thursday migratory pattern of their employers as there was a smaller pool of London-based SNP researchers to draw from. As the third party the SNP gained more seats on Select Committees covering UK-wide policy areas and continued to make a solid contribution to reports and investigations covering the whole British nation. Obtaining third-party status and a slot at Prime Minister’s Questions was skilfully exploited by SNP Westminster leader Angus Robertson to emphasise not just the party’s nationalist credentials, but international ones too. Robertson’s first question to the Prime Minister in the 2015 Parliament was on the Mediterranean refugee crisis. His job was to make the party look good, which he did with ease, and united, which he did by attentive management of the disparate group of 56 who had found themselves in Westminster. During the period, the SNP’s claims to be the real Westminster opposition seemed justified in that, despite his inexperience as a frontbencher, Robertson never had to use his reserve question in any PMQs. Labour leader Corbyn fought with his own MPs and never scored highly in any confrontation across the despatch box. Something new and novel always becomes normal. Slightly humbled by their glimpse of political mortality in the 2017 snap election, the 35 surviving SNP MPs returned to Westminster with a new leader. It was not until Ian Blackford led a walk-out of MPs over the so-called ‘Brexit power grab’ in June 2018 that the now-­ reduced cohort of SNP MPs caught the attention of the British nation again (Crichton and Bussey, 2018). That was the culmination of the row over devolved powers on a range of EU powers on areas from fishing to plant regulations being reserved at Westminster instead of flowing directly from Brussels to the devolved parliaments which had previously had responsibility for implementing them. The so-called power grab was the subject of numerous meetings

continental drift | 113

of the Joint Ministerial Committee and subsequent theatrical flourishes for the TV cameras outside the Cabinet office when they failed to produce any progress. With the rancour of Brexit not deflected by any personal warmth in the relationship between the leading players, meetings between the Prime Minister and First Minister are said to be cheerless affairs. There has been an acceptance in Whitehall and in Edinburgh that the formal relationship between governments has to change. It is not just in the set-piece political arguments that the system produces stalemate. Ministers like Scottish Rural Economy Secretary Fergus Ewing can get on with his opposite number but complain, as he did on Radio Scotland, that Whitehall civil servants simply do not believe in devolution. The system needs a Brexit reboot if it is to work at all. Little noted, because of the heat of the Brexit arguments, is that the UK Government and the First Ministers of Scotland and Wales have again committed to review the existing intergovernmental structures with a view ‘to ensure they are fit for purpose in light of the UK’s exit from the EU’ (quoted in Torrance, 2018). One of the tests the Prime Minister set out in her Mansion House speech in March 2018 was that the UK Government’s Brexit deal ‘must strengthen our union of nations and our union of people’. The tentative beginnings are seen in ministerial proposals to have devolved governments join UK ministers in trade missions and in the desperate last-minute plea from Theresa May, as she faced the defeat of her Brexit plan, to give devolved parliaments a bigger say in the extension of the transitional period for leaving the EU. It is nothing less than the devolved governments have been asking for. Post-Brexit, or even post-aftermath of the Brexit process, both Scotland and Wales, with their First Ministers working hand-in-glove, have demanded a bigger, and more equal role, in determining UK policy. At the British–Irish Council meeting on the Isle of Man in November 2018, Sturgeon hinted again at the need for a beefed-up JMC process. Both Scottish and Welsh leaders wrote to the Prime Minister at the time: ‘Given the future relationship will cover a

114 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

number of matters within our devolved competence and crucial matters that will impact on the citizens of Wales and Scotland, it is essential we are involved.’ (ITN News, 15 November 2018) And given the ongoing constitutional arguments over ‘power grab’, funding for agriculture, share of fisheries quotas and every other row between Westminster and Holyrood flowing from the fall-out of Brexit, the case for a more robust and more transparently equal relationship between Whitehall and the devolved centres of power seems obvious. Barring another independence referendum the alternative is an increasingly loud echo of the bitter public stand-off between the Conservative government and devolved administrations in Edinburgh and Cardiff over the EU Withdrawal Bill, which led to Scotland and Wales bringing in their own continuity legislation. That ended in the Supreme Court which is where we began, under a portrait of Wellington. At stake in Court One of the Supreme Court was the sovereignty of Westminster, not just the minutiae and order of Brexit bills, and the political lesson, if not the legal one, was that some kind of reset is necessary. The next time we are back in the Supreme Court (on wild political seas, why not go into the prediction business?) it might be to debate the legality of something more fundamental – something like Holyrood’s right to legislate for an independence referendum. Now, that would test the relationship between Westminster and Holyrood. It may be a case of reform the relationship, or see you in court.

References BBC News (2010), ‘Cameron calls for Scots “respect”’, 14 May, . Crichton, T. and C. Bussey (2018), ‘SNP Westminster leader Ian Blackford kicked out Commons in PMQs chaos amid Brexit “Power Grab” row’, Daily Record, 13 June, . ITN News (2018), ‘Welsh and Scottish First Ministers call on meeting with the PM over Brexit deal’, 15 November, . Torrance, D. (2018), ‘Intergovernmental Relations in the UK’, London: House of Commons Library Briefing Paper.

continental drift | 115 UK Cabinet Office (2012), ‘Devolution: Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements between the UK Government, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, and the Northern Ireland Executive Office’, London: UK Government.

116 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

NINE

British Political Tradition and Scottish Local Government Neil McGarvey

Introduction Scottish local government’s umbrella group, the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) was a significant part of the broad coalition of Scottish political parties and civic groups that campaigned for the establishment of a Scottish Parliament. Indeed it provided administrative and logistical support to the Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC), the body widely accredited with drafting the basic parameters of the blueprint for the Parliament. Given this, the expectation would be that the Parliament and the process of devolution would have a positive impact on Scottish local government (see Gordon, 2002; Mitchell, 2017). Whether it has is debatable and one suspects most insider judgements may be negative, though one should emphasise we simply do not know – the lack of empirical research on local government attitudes to devolution is perhaps one side-effect of its diminishing status in recent years. Research in Scottish politics is overwhelmingly focused on the ‘sexier’ subjects of elections, referenda, public attitudes, campaigning, voting, parliament, national government, the economy and Europe. When topics related and relevant to local government such as education, health and wider public services are examined they are inevitably framed in a national rather than local manner. The 2014 and 2016 referendum campaigns were conducted with almost no consideration of the impact of independence or Brexit on local

scottish local government | 117

government. If local government is considered when reform is discussed it tends to be a mere footnote in the broader analysis. There are a host of reasons why judgements of devolution’s impact may be negative – declining budgets, restrictive local taxation regime, regulatory oversight, institutional conservatism, nationalisation and centralisation. The place of Scottish local government relative to others in the Scottish polity has undoubtedly been diminished since 1999. The SNP’s focus and priority since 2007 has been on issues related to Scottish independence, economic performance, energy (non-nuclear and sustainable) and the promotion of social justice, in that order. Ross Perot, a US presidential candidate in the 1990s, used to refer to ‘the giant sucking up sound’ of the US Federal Government in Washington. Whilst the establishment of a Scottish Government in Edinburgh has not resulted in such a scenario, there has been an incremental and steady accumulation of more powers at the centre and a consequent weakening of local authorities. This chapter will argue that many of local government’s weaknesses today are not necessarily a consequence of the creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999. Indeed many are more long-­ standing than that. However, the Parliament could have been a critical juncture that could have reversed the previous trajectory and led Scottish local government down a new path. It has not. Instead, it has carried on the same path shaped by its inheritance and British political tradition (see Hall, 2011; Marsh and Hall, 2007).

Inheritance and tradition in Scottish local government The national world of Scottish local government remains the same small and cohesive community in 2019 as it was in 1999. The Scottish Government and COSLA are at its core and other groups such as Society of Local Authority Chief Executives (SOLACE), Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA), Educational Institute of Scotland (EIS), Local Government Boundary Commission for Scotland (LGBCS) playing key roles in their spheres of influence. Relative to England, professional, public sector and trade union interests have retained more policymaking influence. It is a world that serves various functions including

118 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

dissemination of innovation, the maintenance of policy practice as well as networking and lobbying. It is an arena that has tended to emphasise evolution and incremental adjustment in local government’s role in politics. It is rooted in an idea of the purpose of Scottish local councils being the delivery of a specified range of public services within a framework of public accountability. This philosophy has been shared across the professional, regulatory, central and local party-political spectrum (see McGarvey, 2011: 17–18). Today’s framework is essentially the same one as 1999. It is based on the British political tradition. This emphasises responsibility over responsiveness in government, effective service delivery over local democracy and party democracy over accountability and transparency. Scottish local government remains rooted in the philosophical and administrative traditions rooted in the nineteenth century and the post-war settlement based around the welfare state. In terms of responsibility over responsiveness, Scottish local government is rooted in conservatism. It has become a settled, and rather neglected, institution of Scottish politics. The 32-council structure, despite causing much political controversy during the 1990s reorganisation which preceded devolution remains in place. Council tax, despite some minor tweaks, remains based on banded property values almost three decades out of date. The centrally directed funding model is broadly the same. Waves of marketisation, New Labour modernising reforms, democratic innovation, and localist agendas associated with local government in England have had a negligible effect on Scottish local government. The only reform that significantly impacted on Scottish parties was that of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) and they have largely adjusted to that without too much change in their modes of operation. Moreover, despite two decades of devolution, and with two Scotland Acts changing responsibilities at national level, local government has remained largely untouched. Any reform that has taken place has tended to be in the centralist rather than localist direction. None has fundamentally reframed the key arenas of power dynamics within councils: the interaction of councillors, party groups and officers (see Kerley and McGarvey, 2017; McGarvey and Stewart, 2018).

scottish local government | 119

Emphasis on the purpose of local government to be the effective delivery of local public services is a long-standing one in Britain (see Sharpe, 1970). Local democracy, responsiveness, deliberation and participation has long been somewhat peripheral to the concerns of government in Britain. The post-war expansion of the welfare state was rooted in ideas of citizenship, universalism and social solidarity, all of which tend to give emphasis to national standardisation rather than local autonomy and adaptation. Emphasis is placed on the efficiency and effectiveness of intervention and the exploitation of economies of scale in service delivery. Post-devolution, Scotland has retained this long-standing tradition. This philosophy as regards the role and purpose of local government was reflected in the 1990s debates regarding reorganisation into the existing 32 unitary local authorities. The local government map of Scotland was redrawn in a top-down manner with only minimal concern for notions of participation and local democracy. The emphasis was on creating effective units for local service delivery. Technocratic and administrative concerns tend to dominate those of locality and democracy (see Rae and Hamilton, 2018, for an extreme, albeit theoretical, approach in this vein). Scotland’s two major governing parties – Labour and the SNP – have been complicit in how local government has been neglected in favour of ‘the national’. From 1999 to 2007, Labour’s approach followed the Gordon Brown UK Treasury-driven model of using legislation, funding, regulation, ring-fencing and targets to drive policy from the centre. The initial SNP approach was to give more freedom to councils and, particularly during the minority government period, work closely in partnership. However, institutional nationalisation or centralisation has been evolving over the past decade, creating for example Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, with more recently the suggestion that Scottish Enterprise, Highlands and Islands Enterprise and the Scottish Funding Council should merge under one board. Salmond in 2007 initially suggested, ‘The days of top-down diktats are over’ but the SNP have adopted a national-orientated approach in many areas of governance. Both parties, in their own ways, have remained attached to political philosophies that emphasise national p ­ ublic-service

120 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

standards and universalism underpinned by a degree of distrust of local government. The introduction of STV in 2007, bringing with it much more pluralism and diversity in the make-up of council administrations has, one could argue, further divided the voice of localities. There remains what Peter John (2009) referred to as a tradition of ‘invisible leadership’ with few outwith political anoraks knowing much about the political leadership of Scotland’s local authorities. There is little tradition of autonomous local parties and leadership with party career paths focused on the ‘prizes’ of parliamentary seats and party regional listings. This all adds to a picture of dependent local administration rather than government. The Scottish Government’s ‘Agenda for Cities’ was launched in Scotland in March 2016. What is notable is how late Scotland came to the game. When Scotland’s first city deal was complete, 26 had already been agreed in England. The cities agenda has been transplanted to Scotland by the Scotland Office, funded by the UK Treasury and is perhaps one of the few meaningful areas where the Scotland Office has some policy reach. It is notable Scottish deals is that they involve no change in the governance of the areas, whereas they typically do in England. Indeed Fellows et al. (2016) note, that despite its all-encompassing nature, Scottish local government retains a degree of invisibility in public perception. When it is discussed in the Scottish political arena it is often within what could be termed a negative problematic prism. Where it ‘fits’ in Scottish governance the tendency is to place Scottish Government at the ‘command and control’ centre with local councils the local administrations existing to deliver nationally determined policies and priorities. Local government’s status as units of local democracy is rather glossed over.

Conclusion Scottish politics has not shaken off the inheritance and legacy of British political traditions associated with the Westminster model and traditional ideas of local government. The emphasis is now on strong, responsible government in Edinburgh rather than London. Political parties have competed on the basis of which one will be

scottish local government | 121

most effective at standing up for Scotland’s national interest. Scottish local government has been standing on the sidelines of these processes and broader debates about independence, enhanced Scottish governing autonomy and fall-out of Brexit. Local government has become a rather peripheral, detached and neglected institution in Scottish politics over the devolved period. Pre-devolution British inherited beliefs continue to shape how Scottish local councils operate. These beliefs include the delivery of public services through a line management of accountable bureaucracy, a political framework emphasising elections, councillors’ policy mandates and political oversight via meeting and committee and administration via mutuality and professionalism. Part of this, of course, reflects the fact that the external environment of Scottish local government has not changed. Constitutional underpinning, centralised Treasury-driven public finance and council tax as an almost singular source of finance is the same in 2019 as it was in 1999. There is just a new transmission mechanism – the Scottish Government instead of Scottish Office. The British constitutional paradigm of local government subordination remains in Scotland. The post-1999 story of local government in Scotland does not feature much by way of transformation and innovation. To the extent that it has occurred, it has been within the well-established and broad parameters of the long-standing traditions of British politics. Devolution has merely changed the institutional context. The changes that have come with it have been absorbed and the world of local government has largely carried on as before. Post devolution Scotland has carried on the ‘longer term trend of rationalisation and (de) localisation of local government’ (Mair, 2016: 109). The central–local financial relationship of dependence means that notions of ‘partnership’ between central and local government, despite all the rhetoric, when it does occur (and there have been instances of genuine partnership) it remains one based around a rather unequal relationship of power, command and dependency. Overall, the independent impact of the Scottish Parliament and Government over the past 20 years has been less than one may have expected given pre-devolution rhetoric and expectation. Indeed, if anything, devolution’s impact has been corrosive. Rather ironically, despite 12 years of SNP governance, the local governance model

122 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

remains rooted in the British political tradition, fixated on a centrist command model of governance.

References Gordon, C. (2002), ‘From War of Attrition to Roller Coaster Ride: Local and Central Government in Scotland’, Public Money and Management, 22, 6–8. Fellows, K., J. Mitchell and H. Muirhead (2016), ‘What is the Future of the Scottish Public Sector?’ . Hall, M. (2011), Political Traditional and UK Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave. John, P. (2009), ‘Why Study Urban Politics?’, in J. S. Davies and D. L. Imbroscio (eds), Theories of Urban Politics, London: Sage 2nd edn. Kerley, R. and N. McGarvey (2017), ‘Research Report: Councillors Roles and Workload’, . McGarvey, N. (2011), ‘Expectations, Assumptions and Realities: Scottish Local Government Post-Devolution’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 14 (1), 153–74. McGarvey, N. (2017) ‘The SNP and Local Government’ in G. Hassan and S. Barrow (eds), A Nation Changed? The SNP and Scotland Ten Years on, Edinburgh: Luath. McGarvey, N. and F. Stewart (2018), ‘The role of the local councillor’, in R. Kerley, J. Liddle and P. T. Dunning (eds), The Routledge Handbook of International Local Government, London: Routledge. Mair, C. (2016), ‘Scottish local government: past, present and futures’, in D. McTavish (ed.) Politics in Scotland, London: Routledge. Marsh, D. and M. Hall (2007), ‘The British political tradition: Explaining the fate of New Labour’s constitutional reform agenda’, British Politics, 2 (2), 215–38. Mitchell, J. (2017), ‘Audit 2017: How democratic is local government in Scotland?’, . Rae, A. and R. Hamilton (2018), ‘New Map of Scotland – as reimagined by an algorithm’, The Conversation, 11 October, . Sharpe, L. J. (1970), ‘Theories and Values of Local Government’, Political Studies, 18 (2), 153–74.

public spending and taxation | 123

TEN

Public Spending and Taxation Richard Kerley

Introduction This chapter was written after the announcement of the UK budget, and after the Cabinet Secretary for Finance announced plans for the 2019–20 Scottish budget. The relationship between the two governments is complex in normal times, more so when neither government has guaranteed majority votes for any budget proposals. It is even more complicated currently as the UK Chancellor has clearly implied the budget could even be torn up if there is no agreement on leaving the EU, or the manner in which we do leave the EU. The Scottish budget is in many respects dependent on the UK budget, so there are uncertainties for Finance Secretary Derek Mackay too (SPICe, 2018; Young, 2018) and these would be compounded by any changes to the UK budget. Interestingly, the day after the Scottish budget one report had seven vox pop Scottish interviews about budget impacts; four of the people appeared confused about respective UK and Scottish tax and spend decisions (Times, 2018). This is an interesting time to reflect on the how the financial relationship between the two parliaments has exemplified in real time the 1997 statement – attributed to both Donald Dewar and Ron Davies – that ‘devolution is a process not an event.’ By examining some aspects of the ‘getting and spending’ that all governments must do, we can see the extent to which the Scottish Parliament has matured over these 20 years; 20 years in which the

124 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Parliament has gained further powers from Westminster or developed powers exercised in conjunction with Westminster – as many of the fiscal powers are.

Taxation and spending ‘Taxes are what we pay for a civilized society’ said US Justice Holmes. That is, the totality of government revenues are used to pay for public services that we all benefit from. This is not the only purpose of taxes. Governments use them to effect changes in behaviour – whether by companies or by individuals. We pay some consumption taxes at a level intended to discourage behaviour (smoking tobacco); we can receive some tax rebates on personal taxes to incentivise us (pension contribution). Equally some taxes on business or other organisations are intended to discourage activities (landfill) or encourage activities (the proposed reduction by the Scottish Government of air passenger duty). So the classic reasons for taxation are several: raising revenue for government; managing aggregate economic demand; altering behaviours; and contributing to changes in the distribution of pretax income. This last clearly links to many aspects of social security programmes, a field where Holyrood has recently gained some further powers. The complexity of the interrelationship between the tax system and various forms of social protection is immensely tangled and complex. This has been most starkly illustrated by the current controversy surrounding the implementation of Universal Credit; a proposal which in principle initially had the general support of most major political parties. Because of such complexity, while this chapter refers to some aspects of social protection it does not even attempt to discuss the overall relationship between that and taxes.

Taxation and spending in all devolved legislatures The reality of various forms of devolved legislature, regardless of the formal constitutional status of the body is that various powers and competences are reserved, devolved, or held and exercised concurrently. Within the UK, the three devolved legislatures have

public spending and taxation | 125

asymmetrical powers and resources within the context of a ‘quasi federal system’. Indeed, a report of the European Commission categorises both the UK and Spain as ‘federal in practice’ (2018). In most respects devolved legislatures – even in formal federal systems – are subordinate to a nation-state-wide legislature (e.g. on defence and border entry). In other respects there are shared competences (tax/social protection) or unique devolved competences that the central state cannot intervene in (Scottish criminal law, as we saw in the release of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi in 2009). In practice, in multi-tier systems, the nation-state government usually takes the leading and dominant role in taxation. Even where the exercise of such superordinate power is subtle and understated this still arises. So, in ‘effectively federal’ Spain, although the Basque Country is described as having ‘full fiscal autonomy’ the reality is somewhat different. VAT, social security taxes and excise duties are reserved to Madrid. In Germany the majority of tax is collected by the federal government (although clear proportions of that tax take are assigned to the Länder). This balance or tension between the taxation powers of the centre and of devolved legislatures was reflected in the initial establishment of the Scottish Parliament. The 1998 Scotland Act provided for a tax varying power of 3p – increase or decrease – on the basic rate of earned income. The rationale for this tax-varying power was described as a suitable mechanism for the new Parliament: . . . to face real financial choices and makes it, in a sense more directly accountable to the people it represents . . . after all, Scots elected to the UK Parliament and to local government are trusted in this way and the new Parliament should be as well. (Hansard, 1997)

Holyrood phase one: spending and limited taxation Not everybody agreed that such powers to enhance the new parliament were desirable. The former Scottish Secretary of State, Michael Forsyth, had previously dubbed this tax-varying power as ‘a tartan tax’. Of course, Forsyth and much of the Conservative Party were opposed to both a Parliament and taxation powers and used this tax slogan as a weapon in the campaign. However, it seems likely

126 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

that other parties did take some account of the vote differential between the 74.3 per cent who voted for a Scottish Parliament and the drop-off to 63.5 per cent of those favouring tax-varying powers for the Parliament: an 11 per cent difference. Jackson (1999) has argued that there was actually very little likelihood that such powers would be employed. His chapter ‘Tax varying powers: the watchdog that will not bark’ explained that there were technical reasons that such powers were unlikely to be of great substance financially – with the complex administration and cost of collection – and that actually some potential penalties might have flowed from using the powers. Additionally, the actual amount that could be raised from individuals on Non-Savings, Non-Dividend (NSND) income would at that point have netted less than one third the tax take available through existing levels of council tax, and amounted to a fraction under 1.5 per cent of overall Scottish public expenditure. As Alan Trench elegantly described the possible use of the Scottish Variable Rate (SVR): ‘any use would have occasioned a great deal of political pain for little financial gain’ (Trench, 2013: 9). In any event, apart from the single instance of the SNP arguing in the 1999 Scottish election for a penny tax increase, the first ten or so years of Holyrood were played out as the UK Government significantly increased public spending across the board. Because of the broadly mechanistic workings of the Barnett formula, spending increases introduced at Westminster transmitted through to Scottish revenues. One senior minister in the 1999 then Scottish Executive, recalled in private how Donald Dewar, as First Minister, urged them to ‘get on and spend the money that’s coming’. There were debates within the Executive about how much to spend and on what – such as free personal care – but the financial climate in the first decade or so was generous to overall government spending as Table 10.1 illustrates. Because the new Parliament was therefore focused almost entirely on domestic matters including a wide range of public services, and because this increased flow of money was available, spending was broadly treated as an endowment from Westminster. Little attention was directed to raising money through alternative forms of taxation that could have been available to successive governments.

public spending and taxation | 127

Table 10.1  Overall expenditure in Scotland for selected years 1999

2003

2007

2010

33,986

44,427

55,969

63,807

Sources: various annual editions of ‘Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland’. Figures show £million approximate.

Council tax was left to councils; non-domestic rates were varied with a close eye on decisions in England. Indeed, limited attention was paid even to the logistics and procedures of financial systems with limited formal civil service expertise or specialisation in fiscal matters. As illustration of the lack of interest, the administrative agreement with HMRC by which the Scottish Government could vary the basic rate of income tax was quietly allowed to lapse in 2007 (BBC, 2010). The one exception to this inaction on the major forms of taxation was the manifesto proposal from the incoming minority Scottish Government of 2007 to introduce a ‘local income tax’ (LIT) to replace the council tax which was ‘frozen’ until such changes took effect. Such a change did not occur, partly because of insufficient votes to support it in the Parliament. Another factor that swayed the Scottish Government was private official work that suggested the strong possibility of a far more substantial and therefore controversial impact on many voters of any shift from council tax to LIT than at first thought. However, one key aspect of this proposed change that was significant for any future proposals was the definition of ‘Scottish’ taxpayers as essentially people who spent more than half the year here. Eventually, and despite suggestions that government take some more radical action on council tax (Biagi and O’Neill, 2015), minor banding changes were introduced that effectively gave modest financial concessions to lower-banded households and increased council tax for higher-banded households.

Holyrood phase two: financial flows squeezed The 2008 financial crash had a dramatic impact on the trajectory of government actions and the options available for spending. In the second decade of the Parliament the expenditure directly allocated

128 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Table 10.2  Combined revenue and capital DEL 2010–11

2015–16

2016–17

2017–18

2018–19

2019–20

31,492

29,123

28,979

29,167

28,820

28,603

Source: Scottish Government (2017). Figures reflect 2016–17 prices, £million approximate.

to the Scottish Government turned down significantly, as the UK coalition austerity programme took effect in the manner that Table 10.2 shows. The powers and possible further competences of the Parliament were again discussed in the Calman Commission which was charged with both a general review and specifically any means to ‘improve the financial accountability of the Scottish Parliament . . .’ (2009). The outcome of this review was legislated for in the Scotland Act 2012 and created the Scottish rate of income tax and transferred powers over stamp duty land tax and landfill tax to the Parliament. These changes were being discussed and introduced at the same time as the debate on possible independence in the 2014 referendum was under way. In the wake of the referendum, the UK Government legislated broadly in terms of the Smith Commission as the Scotland Act 2016 transferred some aspects of earned income taxation in a different manner than that proposed by Calman. Also covered was air passenger duty; a range of social security powers and some other matters to the Holyrood Parliament. The tax powers available to Holyrood were used in the 2018 budget for the first time. They were used rather cautiously by Derek Mackay to make minor although distinctive adjustments that reduced tax payments for those on lower incomes and increased them for those on higher incomes. Immediately after the UK 2018 budget, Mackay stated similar intentions for his budget for 2019–20, and this has excited a lot of comment about what signals this gives to higher earners who live in Scotland and – perhaps more importantly – those who might consider moving to Scotland (Young, 2018).

public spending and taxation | 129

Tax and spend in the Scottish Parliament: a cross-party consensus? In a telling – possibly quite wounding – phrase commenting on the early progress of the first SNP minority government, Jim Cuthbert and Margaret Cuthbert described the economic policy of that party as: ‘neo-liberalism with a heart’ (2009). They observed that SNP policies from 2007 were broadly in favour of a low tax and ­lighter-touch regulatory environment that would be business friendly but aspired to have a strengthened focused on inclusion through the manner in which any benefits of economic growth would be applied. In a more recent intervention, entitled rather more soberly: ‘The SNP’s Economic Strategy: Economic Performance in a Changing Fiscal Context’, the two authors continue to argue that this kind of approach is not well adjusted to the post-referendum fiscal arrangements governing taxation and transfers between the rest of the UK and Scotland (Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 2017). I would go further and suggest that what we have seen throughout the life of the Parliament has been some rhetorical claims and policy decisions that are more radical than the norm of recent UK-wide political choices. Despite this, all governing parties have been, in office, very cautious about substantial departure from established patterns of behaviour. So, for example, when in office, both SNP and Labour have been, up to now, immovable on the modest idea of a discretionary tourist tax for local councils. At the heart of this caution is that set of neo-liberal orthodoxies and the continuing tension between a general wish to spend more on some public services allied to a general reluctance to raise income and consumption taxes, particularly on the mid-section of the salaried and wage-earning population. In effect, this reflects a governing assumption that neo-liberal approaches are more likely to generate economic growth, and that any fruits of that growth can be directed to improving life circumstances for lower income households. This hard-to-balance tension grew from the pre-1997 New Labour reaction to the tax cutting and de-regulating themes of the Thatcher governments, and has coloured UK politics since. Politicians of all parties follow this approach because they assume that it reflects

130 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

what a good proportion of citizens wish for. I have previously characterised this as a general wish amongst a good proportion of our fellow citizens to live in Amerinavia; that is, to have Swedish levels of public services and support, with American levels of taxation (Groom, 2011). As one academic observed during the 2014 debates on policies that any potential independent Scottish Government might follow: ‘Professor Keating . . . suggested that the debate so far has been guilty of dishonesty. He added that in the Western world it is impossible to talk about taxation, as this is seen as a taboo by politicians.’ (Royal Society of Edinburgh–British Academy, 2014: 218) We can observe the consequence of such uncertainties in various behaviours of the different parties. So, for example, the SNP government has introduced schemes to abate non-domestic rates in various ways, mainly targeted on smaller premises and businesses and thus feeding the perception of such rates as a ‘burden ‘ on businesses. The Labour Party has clearly been in a recent tangle on how it responds to tax reductions for all higher earners that flow from the proposed increase of the criteria to enter the 40 per cent (41 per cent in Scotland) banding. Whether the Holyrood administration has been Lab–Lib Dem or SNP, there have been few really radical and substantial programmatic departures from the overall direction of UK policies. The first two governments introduced free personal care, whereas there was a government refusal to this in England and Wales. The 2007 Scottish Government removed higher education tuition fees. In both cases, the costs were substantial and in both cases, the outcomes have been mixed, and there have been consequential disadvantages. All of these instances might be characterised as representing the ‘neo-liberalism with a heart’ policies that the Cuthberts refer to above. The challenge that all parties face is that such ‘with a heart’ policies, as they become embedded and increasingly taken for granted, may well require taxation to be levied on a wider range of citizens than any of the major parties assert is the case. Confusion over taxation arrangements is widespread. At a discussion in Holyrood, when I observed that MSPs fell into the top 5 per cent of the income distribution, some there shook their heads at

public spending and taxation | 131

this absurd claim; actually they are in the top 3 per cent of income distribution. Unpromoted teachers and unpromoted police officers are in the top 10 per cent of income distribution. Over its third decade, the Scottish Parliament will have to consider whether, if we really want Scandinavian public services, whether we actually have to pay at Scandinavian rates of personal taxation.

Conclusion Polling data appears to show that over the past 20 years a growing proportion of citizens have become more attached to, and confident about the role of the Scottish Parliament. Paradoxically, and curiously, election turnouts appear to suggest more importance is attached to the UK Parliament. Correspondingly, observation suggests that MSPs have been willing to think more boldly about the options available to them. Some policy changes introduced over time are highly valued – free personal care and free prescriptions perhaps most of all. It is also the case that various public service changes have not actually been very progressively redistributive in effect, despite the forceful rhetoric. It is too early to tell whether people are willing to see various taxes increased to support enhanced public services. Scottish Government decisions this year may give us some idea of whether there may still remain a differential between support for the Parliament and support for tax changes.

References Biagi, M. and D. O’Neill (2015), ‘Commission on Local Tax Reform’, Edinburgh: Confederation of Scottish Local Authorities. BBC Scotland (2010), ‘Holyrood “loses tax varying power” for next three years’, 18 November, . Calman Commission (2009), ‘Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 21st Century: Final Report’, Edinburgh: Commission on Scottish Devolution. Cuthbert, J. and M. Cuthbert (2009), ‘SNP Economic Policy: Neo-liberalism with a Heart’, in G. Hassan (ed.), The Modern SNP: From Protest to Power, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Cuthbert, J. and M. Cuthbert (2017), ‘SNP Economic Policy: Economic Performance in a Changing Fiscal Context’, in G. Hassan and S. Barrow (eds), A Nation Changed? The SNP and Scotland Ten Years On, Edinburgh: Luath Press.

132 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T The Economist (2018), ‘Credit comes later: Britain’s universal credit could yet be a success’, 27 October, . European Commission (2018), ‘A comparative overview of public administration characteristics and performance in the EU28’, Brussels: European Commission. Groom, B. (2011), ‘Creeping Conflict Edges Forward’, Financial Times, 17 May, . Hansard (1997), House of Commons, 31 July, col. 465. Jackson, T. (1999), ‘Tax varying powers: the watchdog that will not bark’, in J. McCarthy and D. Newlands (eds), Governing Scotland: Problems and Prospects, Ashgate: Aldershot, 69–83. Royal Society of Edinburgh–British Academy (2014), Enlightening the Constitutional Debate, Edinburgh: Royal Society of Edinburgh. Scottish Government (2017), Scottish Budget, Edinburgh: Scottish Government. SPICe (Scottish Parliament Information Centre) (2018), ‘UK Budget 2018: Spending increases with tax choices to come’, Edinburgh: Scottish Parliament. Trench, A. (2013), ‘Funding Devo More: Fiscal options for strengthening the union’, London: Institute for Public Policy Research. Young, A. (2018), ‘Hammond’s gamble puts SNP in quandary for its pre-Christmas budget’, 31 October, The Times.

public spending and taxation | 133

Part Two

Scotland’s Political Parties

snp : devolution winners | 135

ELEVEN

SNP: Devolution Winners Craig McAngus

Introduction The SNP’s main objective is to achieve Scottish independence. How to achieve this end has, however, existed as a long-running debate within the party, and the interaction between this debate and the prospect of a Scottish Parliament has had a major influence on this. The SNP is now a party of government and having a consistent and influential parliamentary presence has shaped both it and the Parliament within which it operates. This chapter explores the relationship between the SNP and the Scottish Parliament. It begins by providing a brief overview of the SNP before the Scottish Parliament, followed by an assessment of how the party adapted to devolution. It then assesses the relationship between the SNP and the Scottish Parliament during the party’s time in government, and concludes by assessing the legacy of the 2014 independence referendum.

The SNP before the Scottish Parliament The very fact the SNP survived at all in its infancy is the most remarkable feature of its early development after its formation in 1934 (Finlay, 1994). The party struggled with internal divisions over strategy and policy, an unforgiving electoral system and a political context in post-war Scotland with very few political openings for a party that largely eschewed class as the major dividing line between voters at this time (Lynch, 2009).

136 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

However, the SNP did survive and went on to significant electoral success in the late 1960s and 1970s. Winnie Ewing’s infamous by-election victory in Hamilton in 1967 (see Mitchell, 2017) is seen as a watershed moment, with Mitchell (2009: 31) suggesting it marks the beginning of modern Scottish politics and Kidd (2008) arguing that it represents the end of ‘banal unionism’ in Scotland. Alongside Gwynfor Evans’ by-election victory for Plaid Cymru in Carmarthen the previous year, the UK Government was forced to respond through the Kilbrandon Commission which examined the prospect of devolution in the UK. Electoral pressure from previously unsuccessful political parties had opened up a debate about how Scotland (and Wales) should be governed. At the October 1974 general election, the SNP achieved its highest share of the vote (30.4 per cent in Scotland) and seats (11) in the twentieth century. The workings of the First Past the Post system had effectively rescued a swathe of Labour seats in Scotland from the SNP surge and Harold Wilson’s government had to react. The Scotland and Wales Bill was introduced to the House of Commons in 1976 and proposed the creation of a Scottish (along with a Welsh) Assembly. Separate bills for each nation were produced in 1977, with the Scotland Act 1978 passed and a post-legislative referendum held in March 1979. Although a slim majority of those who turned out voted in favour of a Scottish Assembly, that majority had to represent at least 40 per cent of the Scottish electorate in order to set up an Assembly. The result did not overcome this hurdle and a Scottish Assembly was never created. Despite being the catalyst for the devolution debates in the 1960s and 1970s, the SNP was not completely sold on the idea of a devolved Scottish Assembly. The prospect of a devolved legislature was a key strategic division within the party between those who saw devolution as a trap that would make independence more difficult (fundamentalists) and those who saw devolution as an incremental set of stepping stones towards independence (gradualists) (Mitchell, 1996). Despite major divisions, the party backed devolution at its 1976 conference (Mitchell, 2009: 36). The SNP lost all but two of its seats at the 1979 general election, with the 1980s representing a period of electoral stagnation for the party. Internally however, the 1980s was a period of generational

snp : devolution winners | 137

shift in the party that culminated in the election of Alex Salmond as party convener in 1990. Salmond was very much a gradualist and saw a Scottish Parliament as an opportunity for such an institution to accrue power in the journey towards independent statehood (Lynch, 2013). The SNP had decided not to take part in the 1989 Scottish Constitutional Convention given that it would not consider Scottish independence as a constitutional option. Although in hindsight this probably aided the convention, Salmond was far more willing to accept that devolution represented the constitutional zeitgeist and campaigned enthusiastically for a Yes–Yes vote in 1997.

Adapting to devolution The creation of the Scottish Parliament was hugely significant for the SNP in both strategic and organisational terms. General elections had given the party the opportunity to hold seats in the House of Commons and accentuated the party’s ‘blackmail potential’ (Sartori, 1976). The Scottish Parliament represented a new opportunity for the SNP to become a party of government and the party campaigned as such in the first Scottish Parliament elections in 1999. While Labour focused on the dangers of independence, the SNP focused on policies it would pursue if it won the election such as a 1 per cent increase in income tax rates to fund improved public services (Jones, 1999). The SNP won 35 seats, enough to comfortably secure its position as the largest opposition party. However, the first parliamentary term was a difficult one. Alex Salmond stood down as the party’s convener in 2000 and his successor, John Swinney, saw his tenure dominated by internal strife over candidate selection for the regional list ahead of the 2003 election. Swinney and his inner circle identified the SNP’s organisational structures as a key source of the party’s difficulties and began a process of internal reform. Despite becoming a party with a significant parliamentary presence, the SNP was still an ‘amateur activist’ organisation (Mitchell et al., 2012) which relied on the efforts of volunteer activists in local branches. A number of key organisational problems had come to the fore. First, the party did not have a formal leader: every ‘leader’ until

138 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

that point was a ‘convener’ that had a number of administrative responsibilities within the party which took up a significant portion of their time. Second, there was no reliable record of how many members the party had or how much they were paying in membership fees given that both of these functions were carried out by local branches. Third, local branches were responsible for placing candidates on the regional list ahead of elections. This proved to be a major source of strife ahead of the 2003 election, with senior figures in the party, such as Andrew Wilson and Margo MacDonald, placed so far down the list that they were effectively deselected. A number of key changes were made to the party’s structures which were ratified at a special conference in 2004. The position of leader was created and many of the administrative roles once previously overseen by the convener would carried out by party HQ. This freed up the leader to focus on electoral campaigning and parliamentary business. A centralised membership list was drawn up and fees were paid directly to party HQ. The result was a reliable record of membership and a more reliable funding stream. One Member One Vote was introduced which shifted power and influence over selections away from active branch members and towards the wider membership and thus into the hands of a group who more closely reflected the wider Scottish electorate (McAngus, 2017). The 2003 election proved a disappointing one for the SNP with it winning only 27 seats. Swinney stood down as leader soon after, making room for Alex Salmond to return as party leader in 2004. Although Swinney’s leadership had not been successful in electoral terms, the organisational reform process is identified as a key contributing factor to the SNP’s subsequent electoral success. Under Salmond’s stewardship, the SNP would go on to win the 2007 election by a single seat and the party entered government, albeit as a minority government, for the first time in its history.

Minority government Winning the 2007 Scottish Parliament election illustrated the strategic maturity of the SNP. Although the party never compromised on its primary goal of advocating independent statehood

snp : devolution winners | 139

for Scotland, the electorate backed the SNP because of its perceived competence in delivering and managing public services, the strength of its leadership team in comparison to Labour’s, and the belief that the party would be an effective advocate of Scotland’s interests within the UK (Johns et al., 2009). Early hopes of a coalition with the Liberal Democrats faded quickly because of the SNP’s unwillingness to rule out tabling a bill on holding an independence referendum. Minority government is a fairly normal model of government internationally (Strøm, 2010). In the UK, however, it is a novel one. Parliamentary arithmetic meant flagship policies such as the creation of a local income tax were dropped, as well as the commitment to introduce a bill on holding a referendum on Scottish independence. However, high-profile legislative successes such as the scrapping of the graduate endowment was supported by Parliament, though much of the party’s legislative programme was fairly managerial and low-key (Cairney, 2011). One of the most pressing sources of potential instability that a Scottish Government can face is during the annual budget. In 2009, the SNP’s budget was defeated at the final stage, forcing the government to seek fresh talks with other parties. First Minister Alex Salmond threatened to force a snap election if a budget could not be agreed, and in the end only the Greens voted against. All other budgets in this term were passed successfully which is testament to the ability of the SNP to gather support across the Parliament. The SNP’s business convener, Bruce Crawford, played a crucial role in acting as the interface between the Scottish Government and other parties. Although the SNP was able to garner support from different parties, they regularly relied on Conservative support, particularly for budgets, by offering concessions on policies like extra police numbers and a town-centre regeneration scheme. Indeed, the Conservatives voted with the SNP on 72 per cent of bills including budgets (Cairney and McGarvey, 2013: 100). Despite governmental office being an opportunity for the SNP to highlight its ‘mainstream’ credentials and its capacity to be a competent party of government (McAngus, 2016), the primary goal of the SNP is Scottish independence. The parliamentary arithmetic between 2007 and 2011 made the passing of a referendum bill

140 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

practically impossible. To counter the SNP’s discourse on constitutional change, the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats used their combined majority in the Scottish Parliament to set up the Calman Commission in late 2007. The commission would look at the possibility of extending the policy and fiscal powers of the Scottish Parliament and its findings provided the basis for the Scotland Act 2012. Ironically, it was the SNP’s opponents that used Parliament itself to advance their constitutional preferences. The SNP had to rely on the capacity of the executive rather than the legislature to discuss the constitutional issue on their own terms. Whilst the Calman Commission ruled out the possibility of independence, the Scottish Government’s National Conversation was a series of government publications, online consultations and events designed to engage the public in some of the issues around Scottish independence and other forms of devolution, namely ‘devo max’. The process had limited success in that it became more of a forum for the public to engage on everyday policy matters rather than independence (Harvey and Lynch, 2012). Despite this, constitutional change was a consistent aspect of public discourse.

Majority government and indyref The electoral system that the Scottish Parliament uses means it is extremely difficult to win an overall majority and thus encourages coalition or minority government. Despite this, the SNP won 69 seats at the 2011 Scottish election, giving it a slim majority. Once again, the electorate had backed the SNP despite its support for independence, not because of it (Carman et al., 2014). Women had also backed the SNP in greater numbers as well at this election and closed the gender gap that had existed in 2007 (Johns et al., 2011). It is important not to exaggerate the effect that minority government had on Parliament, despite the fact that the SNP did lose a number of votes in plenary. The vast majority of these were, however, non-binding votes. Committees were also unable to influence parliamentary votes all that effectively because of partisan differences (Cairney and McGarvey, 2013: 102). By winning a majority in 2011, the SNP would no longer need to rely on support

snp : devolution winners | 141

from other parties to pass legislation and could thus dominate the Parliament’s committees. The executive thus tabled a larger number of bills, highlighting the confidence that the government had now it could rely on a parliamentary majority. The most symbolic piece of legislation placed before Parliament in this term of course was the Scottish Independence Referendum Bill. After constructive negotiations between the UK and Scottish governments, Prime Minister David Cameron and First Minister Alex Salmond signed the Edinburgh Agreement which, importantly, granted the Scottish Parliament the capacity to set the date of the referendum (Cetra and Harvey, 2018). On the whole, the Scottish Parliament supported the principle of holding a referendum given the SNP’s clear electoral victory in 2011.

The legacy of the independence referendum Despite a majority of the Scottish electorate opting to remain within the UK, the result of the independence referendum did nothing to quell the debate about Scotland’s constitutional status. The UK Government moved quickly after the September 2014 result to create the Smith Commission which looked at the possibility of further tax and welfare devolution. The outcome of this speedy process resulted in the Scotland Act 2016 which devolved income tax receipts in their entirety, as well as the capacity to alter existing bands and create new ones. A number of social security powers were devolved, including those benefits that directly affect disabled people and carers (Rummery and McAngus, 2015), although Universal Credit would remain largely reserved to the UK. The 2016 election led to further SNP success, although they did lose six seats, leaving them two seats short of a majority. A matter of weeks after this election, the UK voted to leave the EU in a referendum. This vote would, and still does, dominate both Scottish and UK politics, particularly because 62 per cent of voters in Scotland elected to remain with the EU. The SNP had campaigned on a manifesto which stated that if such a result arose then it would provide a mandate to hold another independence referendum. The Scottish Government produced a draft referendum bill in October 2016 in order to prepare for the possibility of second vote.

142 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

The 2016 election threw up a Scottish Parliament that housed a pro-independence majority due to the increased presence of the Greens. Ironically however, the prospect of a second independence referendum has triggered greater opposition from the pro-UK parties. Furthermore, public opinion has not dramatically shifted in favour of independence and the public is divided on whether there should be a second referendum at all. Where the SNP has been able to garner parliamentary support is in regards to Brexit, arguing that the EU Withdrawal Bill represents a threat to the devolution settlement itself and gaining Labour and Liberal Democrat support in the process. From being a party sceptical of devolution to one that came reasonably close to achieving independent statehood for Scotland, the SNP has now fashioned itself as the guardian of devolution and the protector of the autonomy of the Scottish Parliament.

Conclusion The Scottish Parliament represented, and still represents, an opportunity structure for the SNP. Despite periods of electoral success at UK general elections, the number of seats the party has been able to win, historically speaking, has been inconsistent and its ability to influence UK governments has ebbed and flowed. Devolution gave the SNP the potential to be in government and develop a more permanent, consistent and larger parliamentary presence. Overall, devolution has been a positive development for the SNP in that it has been able to further the cause of Scottish independence in a way that would have otherwise been extremely difficult, if not impossible. Striking a balance between being a party that supports independence and being a party of government has not been easy. In order to win elections, the SNP has had to generate the perception that it is more competent in its ability to govern than its rivals. On the other hand, the party has to be seen to be pushing towards the goal of an independent Scotland in order to maintain the support of voters who place independence high on their list of political priorities. Supporters of independence are firmly behind the SNP with regards to electoral support, but behind that is a desire to see

snp : devolution winners | 143

a more equal society and a Scottish state that can more effectively support a government that leans to the centre-left. Despite being a party that is on the centre-left of the ideological spectrum, the SNP has been wary of moving too far to the left because of its desire to present itself as a moderate government that can appeal to the wider electorate and interests within society, such as the business community. Brexit has resulted in a strategic headache for the SNP. Although the party can rely on support for the general principle of, at the very least, a ‘soft’ Brexit from the Scottish Parliament, it is not yet clear how Brexit has affected public support for independence. Indeed, a substantial minority of independence supporters voted to leave the EU. Come the next Scottish election, there is no guarantee that a pro-independence majority will be elected to the next Scottish Parliament. Whether the SNP sees Brexit as an opportunity to push for a second referendum on independence or a risk not worth taking given uncertainty on public opinion will continue to be the defining questions in Scottish political discourse.

References Cairney, P. (2011), The Scottish Political System since Devolution: From New Politics to the New Scottish Government, Exeter: Imprint Academic. Cairney, P. and N. McGarvey (2013), Scottish Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edn. Carman, C., R. Johns and J. Mitchell (2014), More Scottish than British?: The 2011 Scottish Parliament Election, London: Palgrave. Cetra, D. and M. Harvey (2018), ‘Explaining accommodation and resistance to demands for independence referendums in the UK and Spain’, Nations and Nationalism, 1–23, . Finlay, R. J. (1994), Independent and Free: Scottish Politics and the Origins of the Scottish National Party, 1918–1945, Edinburgh: John Donald. Harvey, M. and P. Lynch (2012), ‘Inside the National Conversation: The SNP Government and the Politics of Independence 2007–2010’, Scottish Affairs, 80 (1), 91–116. Johns, R., L. Bennie and J. Mitchell (2011), ‘Gendered nationalism’, Party Politics, 18 (4), 581–601. Johns, R., J. Mitchell, D. Denver and C. Pattie (2009), ‘Valence Politics in Scotland: Towards an Explanation of the 2007 Election’, Political Studies, 57 (1), 207–33.

144 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T Jones, P. (1999), ‘The 1999 Scottish Parliament Elections: From anti-Tory to anti-Nationalist politics’, Scottish Affairs, 28 (1), 1–9. Kidd, C. (2008), Union and Unionisms Political Thought in Scotland, 1500–2000, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lynch, P. (2009), ‘From Social Democracy back to No Ideology?: The Scottish National Party and Ideological Change in a Multi-level Electoral Setting’, Regional and Federal Studies, 19 (4–5), 619–37. Lynch, P. (2013), SNP: The History of the Scottish National Party, Cardiff: Welsh Academic Press. McAngus, C. (2016), ‘Party elites and the search for credibility: Plaid Cymru and the SNP as new parties of government’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 18 (3), 634–49. McAngus, C. (2017), ‘Do stateless-nationalist-regionalist parties differ from other party types? Comparing organisational reform processes in Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party’, British Politics, 12 (1), 20–41. Mitchell, J. (1996), Strategies for Self-Government: The Campaigns for a Scottish Parliament, Edinburgh: Polygon. Mitchell, J. (2009), ‘From Breakthrough to Mainstream: The Politics of Potential and Blackmail’ in G. Hassan (ed.), The Modern SNP: From Protest to Power, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 31–41. Mitchell, J. (2017), Hamilton 1967: The By-election that Transformed Scotland, Edinburgh: Luath Press. Mitchell, J., R. Johns and L. Bennie (2012), The Scottish National Party: Transition to Power, Oxford: Oxford University Press Rummery, K. and C. McAngus (2015), ‘The Future of Social Policy in Scotland: Will Further Devolved Powers Lead to Better Social Policies for Disabled People?’, Political Quarterly, 86 (2), 234–9. Sartori, G. (1976), Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Strøm, K. (2010), Minority Government and Majority Rule, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

fall of the house of scottish labour | 145

TWELVE

The Fall of the House of Scottish Labour Gerry Hassan

Introduction The Scottish Labour Party has been one of the defining forces of modern Scottish politics. It was the dominant party electorally for much of the post-war period, has ideologically shaped much of twentieth-century Scotland, and played the key role in legislating for the establishment of the Scottish Parliament. This long lineage and dominance has clearly come to an end, begging the questions – how did this happen and what, if anything, can the party do to revive its fortunes?

What is the Scottish Labour Party? There has for a long time been a distinct Scottish Labour Party with its own history, tradition and identity. It has gone through several incarnations, its origins going back to the foundation of the Scottish Labour Party in 1888 that became part of the Independent Labour Party in 1893 and then the national Labour Party. Initially called the Scottish Council of the Labour Party, in 1994 it adopted its current name – the Scottish Labour Party – in expectation of a Scottish Parliament. Until 1994 its constitutional status was no more than that of a party regional council and this was reflected in how it conducted its politics for much of the post-war period. Annual conferences in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, were often dull, even apolitical,

146 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

affairs without proper debates and avoiding issues of contention. However, Labour was not immune to wider changes going in the party and society like the decline in deference to authority, expansion in higher education, and the rise of a ‘new left’, and in 1968 the party passed a motion abolishing the veto on debating non-Scottish subjects at conference, with in 1972 the constitutional rule passed putting this into effect (Wood, 1989: 109–10). This contributed to a transformation in Conference which by the 1980s became a place of vibrant debate on subjects ranging from poll tax non-payment to party autonomy, Tory housing policy and the Palestinian cause. Devolution inevitably had major repercussions for the structure of Scottish Labour. The party was officially entrusted with full responsibility for determining policy over matters devolved to Holyrood whilst jurisdiction over reserved matters (including foreign policy and most aspects of economic and social policy) was left to the British party. As a result, across a range of high-­ profile issues (such as the retention of the Scottish-based Trident) the Scottish party formally did not have an official position which was instead left to the British party. After the party’s defeat in 2011, an internal review was set up – the Sarah Boyack–Jim Murphy review which finally pushed through more autonomy for the party including the right to debate and decide on non-devolved issues; this review also changed the post of Scottish party leader (more on which below). This greater autonomy and decision-making occurred not at a time of party strength, but in response to defeat and reverse, and raises questions about the degree of resources and finances that the party has to draw upon to compete with the SNP and the Tories. Another critical dimension is party membership. The Scottish party has never in its history had a mass membership, instead showing the characteristics of a selectorate. However, at some points it has been more popular than others: under the first phase of New Labour, membership rose from 19,321 in 1993 to 30,371 in 1997 – a rise of 57 per cent (Scottish Labour Party, 1993; 1997); it subsequently fell dramatically, to the extent the party stopped publishing annual membership figures. In recent years, the British party has seen the influx of many

fall of the house of scottish labour | 147

new members inspired by the Corbyn leadership, but this has not had a major impact in Scotland. The party had 18,824 individual members in September 2015 with no evidence of the rise in numbers and energy which had transformed the party south of the border (The Scotsman, 27 September 2015). The November 2017 leadership contest in which Richard Leonard was elected party leader saw party membership peak at 25,836 in January 2018, before falling back to 21,162 in January 2019 – a fall of 18.1 per cent in one year (Herald on Sunday, 3 February 2019). The wider context of this is of Corbyn’s Labour Party having over 500,000 members, and an SNP which is the second largest membership party in the UK, with over 120,000 members, putting Scottish Labour at a significant disadvantage in people and resources.

The electoral dimensions of Scottish Labour Scottish Labour’s electoral performance post-1945 has varied and can be divided into three distinctive periods – 1945 to 1970, 1974 to 1997, and 2001 to the present day. These constitute the immediate post-war period of two-party dominance in the UK and Scotland, multi-party politics seen in the first rise of the SNP and the emergence of the Liberal–SDP Alliance, and finally, post-­ devolution politics. If we look at Scottish Labour’s electoral performance at different levels and assess Westminster first, we are able to gauge the Scottish party’s support in comparison to English Labour – as well as Welsh Labour (see tables 12.1 and 12.2). In the period 1945–70 Scottish Labour won 47.3 per cent of the vote on average and had a relatively stable vote – with a high of 49.9 per cent (1966) and low of 44.5 per cent (1970) – a difference of 5.4 per cent. The Scottish party finished in first place in votes ahead of the Conservatives on five occasions and in second place behind them on three; across the UK exactly the same pattern emerged as Labour finished ahead on five occasions and second on three. Across the period 1974–97 Scottish Labour won an average 39.5 per cent of the vote – ranging from a high of 45.6 per cent (1997) to low of 35.1 per cent (1983) – a difference of 10.5 per cent,

148 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

nearly twice the previous period. The Scottish party finished in first place in votes in every one of the seven UK elections, with the Conservatives second in five and the SNP in two; across the UK Labour won the popular vote on two occasions. These two periods had very different party competitions: the first dominated by Labour and Conservative with the SNP and Liberals struggling to make an impact beyond the occasional by-election. During 1945–70 Labour averaged 47.3 per cent to the Conservatives 43.5 per cent, Liberals 5.0 per cent and SNP’s 2.8 per cent: a Labour lead of 3.8 per cent. Whereas the 1974–97 era saw increased fragmentation and volatility which affected Labour support, it disproportionately hit the Conservatives with average support showing Labour 39.5 per cent, Conservatives 26.3 per cent, SNP 19.8 per cent and Liberals (including Liberal–SDP Alliance and Lib Dems) 13.6 per cent: a Labour lead of 13.2 per cent. Scottish politics changed with the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 and across the five post-devolution Westminster elections Labour support averaged 35.1 per cent, with a huge varTable 12.1  Scottish Labour support at UK elections, 1945–2017 (average vote percentage)    Period Party

1945–70

1974–97

2001–17

Labour Conservative SNP Lib/Lib Dem

47.3 43.5 2.8 5.0

39.5 26.3 19.8 13.6

35.1 18.3 28.9 14.4

Sources: Rallings and Thrasher, 2012; Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015; 2018.

Table 12.2  Scottish, Welsh and English Labour support, 1945–2017 (average vote percentage)    Period Party

1945–70

1974–97

2001–17

Scottish Labour Welsh Labour English Labour Diff: Welsh/Scot. Lab Diff: Eng./Scot. Lab

47.3 57.6 46.1 +10.3 −1.2

39.5 47.4 35.5 +7.9 −4.0

35.1 42.7 35.7 +7.6 +0.6

Sources: Rallings and Thrasher, 2012; Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015; 2018.

fall of the house of scottish labour | 149

iation from a high of 43.2 per cent (2001) to low of 24.3 per cent (2015): a difference of 18.9 per cent. Despite the perception of Scottish Labour dominance in post-war politics as being impregnable, this was always a myth. Talk in the post-war period of ‘Labour Scotland’ or ‘a socialist country’, always overstated and misread the scale and nature of the party’s support (Hassan and Shaw, 2012). Scottish Labour never won a majority of the popular vote, coming closest with 49.9 per cent in 1966, while the party’s vote was not always higher than English Labour’s. A major factor in the party’s long dominance of politics north of the border has been the First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system. This massively worked in the party’s favour, magnifying its strength, winning 42.4 per cent of the vote in 1987 and 69.4 per cent of seats, and in 1997 with 45.6 per cent of the vote, 77.8 per cent of seats. The reason for this discrepancy was that the party’s vote was unevenly spread across the country and clustered in West of Scotland seats which gave it an enormous advantage versus competitors. The Scottish Parliament was from the outset elected by a hybrid system of FPTP and a regional list within a broadly proportional system. This facilitated a major change for Labour in how it saw itself and did politics. The party had grown comfortable talking about and seeing itself as a majority party, and articulated the same politics of mandate as the Thatcher government at its peak in the 1980s, when both were popular minorities. Labour ‘mandaters’ north of the border tried to emphasise that the party’s 42 per cent in 1987 was part of a pan-home-rule consensus, but this could not disguise similarities between the two. Suddenly in 1999, in the context of the Scottish Parliament, Labour was confronted with the reality of its popular support: that it was a minority like all parties. This was a cathartic moment for the party and wider politics, and one some in the party relished, seeing it as a potential liberation from traditional Labour politics, while others, including numerous Westminster Labour MPs, were resentful that the party had voluntarily given away its majority of seats by abandoning FPTP. After Labour saw its vote share and seats fall in 2003 but retained office in coalition with the Lib Dems, an electoral shock occurred to the Scottish political landscape which changed everything: in 2007

150 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Labour lost by a narrow margin to the SNP, followed in 2011 by the SNP landslide when the party won a parliamentary majority, setting in motion the independence referendum and henceforth crystalising Scottish politics around pro- and anti-independence opinion. The 2015 Scottish election saw the party’s vote fall from 42.0 per cent to 24.3 per cent while the SNP’s rose from 19.9 per cent to 49.97 per cent, but even more emphatically it went from 41 seats in 2010 to one. The following year’s Scottish Parliament elections saw the party fall further, winning 22.6 per cent of the constituency vote and 19.1 per cent of the regional vote. And while there was a small recovery when Theresa May called the 2017 election with 27.1 per cent of the vote and seven seats (gaining six), the party’s newfound diminished status and third place seemed to have become permanent. Often overlooked in an analysis of these events is the psychological element and human factor. Scottish Labour has lost a host of experienced politicians from Westminster and Holyrood in recent years. A whole generation such as Gordon Brown, Alistair Darling, John Reid and Helen Liddell retired from elected Labour politics. Similarly at Holyrood, former Labour ministers such as Wendy Alexander and Susan Deacon decided that the party political arena was not for them. And then on top of this, the party has experienced significant losses at Holyrood and a near wipeout at Westminster. In 1999 Scottish Labour had 115 national elected representatives (MPs, MSPs, MEPs), whereas in 2017 it had 33 – a fall of 82. The party has gone from gaining attention, influence and making an impact in public life, to struggling to do these things and to adjust to a diminished role. The party was for several decades the insider party and political establishment. Such a shift, over a relatively short time, is bound to be disorientating for many. What has until now been missing is a distinctive, genuine and new Scottish-based approach.

The inner world of Scottish Labour Beyond rules and structures the inner world of the party has contributed to its unique character and identity. This is about the infor-

fall of the house of scottish labour | 151

mal culture and codes which shape how members behave, talk and do politics inside the party, and which have an effect on their external behaviours. Drucker’s fundamental distinction between doctrine and ethos is helpful here, where doctrine is about policy and formal politics, and ethos about cultural norms and being more indefinable (Drucker, 1979). Drucker argued that too many studies of Labour concentrated on policy and structure because they could be easily identified, whereas what mattered more was what could not be so easily identified. Drucker defined ethos in the following terms: By the ethos of the party I have in mind what an earlier age might have called the spirit of the party; its traditions and habits, its feel. The ethos is not explicit, it is not laid down in the rules . . . (Drucker, 1991: 244)

Scottish Labour’s ethos has, throughout its history, contributed to a sense of its distinctiveness from the rest of British Labour while seeing itself as part of this wider movement. This has allowed it to think of itself as radical, drawing from the heritage of the once great Liberal Party, but also numerous socialist pioneers and campaigners. And yet it has also seen itself as a practical party, concerned with administration and with even a conservative-minded approach to politics compared to comrades elsewhere. An important factor in Scottish Labour’s ethos has been its emotional symbols and folklore – which stress links to past radicals of previous times, pre-Labour, such as home rule, crofters’ rights, and land reform, and that sees their modern-day equivalent carried forth through the generations, irrespective of the party’s day-today position. Hence, Scottish Labour home rule campaigners have regarded this issue in the long campaign for a Parliament as one woven into the fabric of Labour, irrespective of times when the party opposed a Parliament. The party’s ethos has been critical in the sustenance and sustaining of the inner world of Scottish Labour: a story of distinctiveness even at the apex of the centralising story of post-war Labour. It left the party with a set of skills and insights to return to when British politics fragmented, and politics north of the border became more shaped by the Scottish dimension.

152 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Labour’s leadership issue Scottish Labour has had nine leaders over the devolution era; the British party over the same period has had four. Aside from Donald Dewar, who died in office, all of the predecessors of incumbent Richard Leonard have in effect been ejected or felt that they had no option but to resign. This multiplicity of leaders is particularly striking because loyalty to leaders has (in contrast to the Tories) long been an aspect of Labour’s political culture. Scottish Labour leaders, 1998 to the present day Donald Dewar (19 September 1998 – 11 October 2000) Henry McLeish (27 October 2000 – 8 November 2001) Jack McConnell (22 November 2001 – 15 August 2007) Wendy Alexander (14 September 2007 – 28 June 2008) Iain Gray (13 September 2008 – 17 December 2011) Johann Lamont (17 December 2011 – 24 October 2014) Jim Murphy (13 December 2014 – 13 June 2015) Kezia Dugdale (15 August 2015 – 29 August 2017) Richard Leonard (18 November 2017 – )

The nature and title of the post and its role has changed over 20 years. First, there was no formal leader of the Scottish Labour pre-1998. The official leader of the party until then was the British party leader with a key role held by the Secretary of State for Scotland who could exercise significant power and influence, but ultimately was accountable to the party leader. Second, when the post was created in September 1998 it was not as Scottish Labour leader, but the convoluted ‘leader of the Labour Group at the Scottish Parliament’, reflecting tensions in the party and the jealousy of some Westminster Scottish party colleagues towards the new Parliament. In reality the new post was seen by most (apart from some Labour MPs) as leader of the Scottish Labour party. Thus, the initial leaders had a pre-determined limited set of responsibilities, degree of autonomy, and control over party resources. This was to change over the course of devolution and party electoral reverses, but it was to take five party leaders before

fall of the house of scottish labour | 153

leader number six, Johann Lamont became the first ever official leader of the Scottish Labour Party. How can this state be accounted for? First, as mentioned, was the nature of the post: how it was created with a constrained remit without responsibility for MPs, MEPs or councillors. Some Westminster Scottish Labour MPs were disturbed by the media attention the new body received in its early years, at their expense. Hence, when Henry McLeish as First Minister floated the idea of renaming the then Scottish Executive as ‘the Scottish Government’ a senior Labour colleague, believed to be Brian Wilson responded: ‘They can call themselves the White Heather Club if they like, but not government.’ (Herald, 12 January 2001) Second, has been the question of the mandate conferred by a victory in a competitive election. None of Labour’s first four leaders – Dewar, McLeish, McConnell or Wendy Alexander – were elected in fully democratic contests. Dewar became leader when a special conference elected him as the sole candidate with a 99.8 per cent vote. McLeish emerged in the stunned aftermath of Dewar’s death and won a vote of Labour delegates narrowly against McConnell that was meant to go to the wider party but never did. McConnell then succeeded McLeish with no contest of any kind. Alexander went out of her way to, in a manner similar to Gordon Brown and his 1997 ‘coronation’, avoid any contest. Alexander proved to be a short-lived leader, being forced to resign in a mini scandal about campaign funding. The ensuing contest in September 2008 saw Iain Gray, Cathy Jamieson and Andy Kerr stand for the leadership and Gray emerged victorious: the first occasion Labour members gained the right to choose their leader. Subsequent leaders – Johann Lamont, Jim Murphy, Kezia Dugdale and Richard Leonard – were all elected in contests with opponents, debate and winning a mandate from party members. Lastly, the setting up of the Scottish Parliament meant that party leadership had, for the first time, to be Scottish-focused, and prepared to face unprecedented levels of scrutiny. Thus, pre-­devolution, there was little lived practice or culture to draw from to nurture the kind of public, front-facing leadership which devolution necessitated and this contributed to the appearance of a hesitant Labour Party unsure what to do.

154 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

The evolution of devolution Scottish Labour has a long history of championing the cause of a Scottish Parliament. This was called home rule in the party’s early days with Labour drawing from the rich Gladstonian tradition of radical liberalism; as the party’s electoral fortunes rose so its commitment to home rule weakened, and by 1945 both the Scottish and British party was signed up to the British state and the politics of centralisation. Labour came back to devolution in 1974 due to the electoral threat of the SNP, but the party in Scotland and the UK was not completely convinced, as the divisions of 1974–9 showed. The post-1979 environment changed Scottish Labour’s attitude, and the party deepened its commitment to devolution aided by its membership of the cross-party Scottish Constitutional Convention with the Lib Dems and Greens, along with the STUC, churches and other bodies. After 1997 Labour quickly legislated for a devolution referendum on the basis of a White Paper on devolution which was endorsed 74 per cent to 26 per cent and led to the passing of the subsequent Scotland Act 1998. The key Labour figure in this Labour journey to a more coherent form of devolution was Donald Dewar, Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland from 1983–92 and Secretary of State from 1997–9. Other key personnel in government were Henry McLeish, junior minister at the Scotland Office, and Murray Elder and Wendy Alexander, Dewar’s senior advisers. Dewar’s political style was patient and bridge-building, well-suited to nurturing through Parliament devolution legislation, and when the Scotland Bill was first published in December 1997 Dewar read its first line, ‘There shall be a Scottish Parliament’, paused, smiled, and then added, ‘I like that’ (Herald, 19 December 1997). With emphatic popular backing from a referendum and a Labour Commons majority of 179, the Scotland Act 1998 passed smoothly through the Commons and did not face any major obstacles in the Lords. There then followed preparations for the first Scottish Parliament elections which saw Labour, like all parties, having to devise new systems of candidate selection, bringing together policy and campaigning. The party faced accusations of centralist

fall of the house of scottish labour | 155

control by running a national panel of approved candidates which excluded some prominent left-wingers such as Denis Canavan, who resigned from the party and subsequently won as an independent, and Susan Deacon, who appealed, won, was elected and served as Dewar’s first Health Secretary. By 1999 Labour had been championing devolution for a quarter of a century: the party knew why it wanted a Scottish Parliament and it knew what kind of Parliament it wanted to bring about. What it had unfortunately spent little time on was what the Parliament should bring about policy- and change-wise, and even more, what kind of Scotland devolution it was meant to bring into being. This latter area proved to be an Achilles heel for the party: with a Parliament with legislative capacity and time, it needed to be directed. Many of the ideas came from coalition bargaining between Labour and Lib Dems, but free care for the elderly came about because Henry McLeish wanted to differentiate from Westminster and wanted to make an impact, and in the case of local government electoral reform, Labour was under pressure from its Lib Dem coalition partners. Further, Jack McConnell wanted to send a signal to party and public that the old Labour local fiefdoms were over. These and other cases showed that party processes and internal democratic debate did not supply enough policy proposals. But the bigger problem was answering what kind of Scotland devolution was meant to create. Whilst McLeish thought ‘the vision thing’ important McConnell preferred a ‘do less, better’ approach. By the end of Labour’s period in office, the quest for a distinct Scottish Labour vision remained unfulfilled.

After the age of Labour insider politics The decline of the Scottish Labour Party has been dramatic, but it has been a manifestation of a wider pattern of social democratic crisis and disarray, whose other casualties include the French and Spanish Socialists, the Dutch Labour Party and, most recently, the German and Swedish Social Democrats. Yet, even in this climate of widespread retreat Scottish Labour has fallen by a spectacular amount comparable with the worst performances of the social democratic family; the only party which has experienced a much

156 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

more severe decline being the Greek PASOK in the exceptional circumstances of Greece after the Euro crisis. Social democracy has, in the past, derived strength, sustenance and resilience from a vibrant world of collectivist institutions, ideas and identities. Everywhere in the developed world these are corroding as trade union memberships continue to shrink and retreat, traditional class and collective allegiances and solidarities ebb, and the politics and cultures of individualism strengthen – from economic to social – not all reactionary. Whilst the waning of Scottish Labour is part of a broader trend afflicting social democratic parties it has been compounded by forces specific to Scotland. The first is the SNP’s success in projecting itself convincingly as a reliable and authentic advocate of Scottish interests evicting Labour from a role it had long occupied. Constrained by both its status as the Scottish wing of a British party as well as by its commitment to the Union, Labour has found it hard to match the SNP’s unabashed claim to be ‘the party of Scotland’. Scottish Labour’s association with New Labour, with its ambivalent attitude to the welfare state, its enthusiasm for so-called ‘Middle England’ and its responsibility for the deeply unpopular involvement in Iraq, added to Scottish Labour’s problems. Second, Scottish Labour was slow to grasp the steady attrition in its electoral base as the delusion of hegemony fostered by the FPTP electoral system distracted it from the reality of electoral decline. The ease with which FPTP enabled it to easily win masses of seats at both Westminster and local level encouraged a neglect of constituency campaigning, as membership and activism languished (Saren and McCormick, 2004). In reality, particularly in its West of Scotland heartlands, Labour had for years been in an advanced state of atrophy with moribund local constituencies of small, inactive memberships who did little canvassing. Labour’s ‘heartlands’ had been weakening for decades, party allegiances loosening, and traditional class voting less predictable. Scottish Labour was slow to grasp that, after devolution and the introduction of a PR electoral system, it had to adapt to more competitive, pluralist politics. Far from burying nationalism, devolution contributed to its reinvigoration and a dynamic and increasingly plausible SNP under first Alex Salmond, and then Nicola

fall of the house of scottish labour | 157

Sturgeon offered a more attractive and positive vision for Scotland than Labour could muster. The SNP wooed and won over a section of what had been Labour’s traditional constituency and it is not at all clear how it can be got back. There are opportunities, notably the widening chasm between the SNP’s social democratic discourse of a fairer, more equal Scotland and the realities: which are of a country with structural inequalities, poverty and strained public services. The Leonard leadership, it is true, has abandoned the cautious, pragmatic approach which has long typified Labour but there is little evidence that its alternative – attempting to recharge and revive class politics – is making any real inroads into the party’s lost electorate. It is showing little intellectual vitality and little disposition to query old shibboleths. Equally, it still retains something of Scottish Labour’s ‘entitlement’ philosophy – an ingrained belief that Scottish Labour has a special insight into what voters really want and desire. Scottish Labour has in electoral fortunes, influence and place fallen dramatically in a very short time, but its supposed strength hid many weaknesses: the hollowness of the party, the demise of ‘Labour Scotland’, different from the party, and its inability to come up with a plausible project for devolution. It has shown basic failures over the last 20 years in terms of organisation, positioning, an inability to adapt to the rise of the SNP, and an inability come to terms with a changing political system where the party had to shift from internal to external dynamics. In this, the problem of the leadership issue with nine different leaders is merely a symptom of a much deeper malaise. Scottish Labour took a long time getting to where it did. Then in recent times it suffered successive body blows: the 2007 shock election, losing to the SNP; followed by adjusting to the 2010 UK defeat with the false hope that Labour had performed well in Scotland; the 2011 SNP landslide; and post-referendum, the wipeout of 2015, after which the party fell to third place in votes and seats, despite the small recovery of 2017. It is impossible to understand the above just by reference to these recent events. Scottish Labour in its years of dominance built an elaborate culture and ethos of why it should be the dominant party

158 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

of the country. In so doing, it ignored negative aspects of its rule and grew complacent. One-party dominant systems in democracies nearly always come to an end. Scotland has proven no exception with the era of Labour hegemony. The same will surely prove true of the SNP. But Scottish Labour has to find a new mission, raison d’être and set of stories for itself and Scotland if it is to adapt and challenge the current third-party status it languishes in.

References Cowley, P. and D. Kavanagh (2015), The British General Election of 2015, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Cowley, P. and D. Kavanagh (2018), The British General Election of 2017, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Drucker, H. (1979), Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party, London: Allen and Unwin. Drucker, H. (1991), ‘The Influence of the Trade Unions in the Ethos of the Labour Party’, in B. Pimlott and C. Cook (eds), Trade Unions in British Politics: The First 250 Years, London: Longman 2nd edn. Hassan, G. (ed.) (2004), The Scottish Labour Party: History, Institutions, Ideas, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Hassan, G. and E. Shaw (2012), The Strange Death of Labour Scotland, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Rallings, C. and M. Thrasher (2012), British Electoral Facts 1832–2012, London: Biteback Publishing. Saren, J. and J. McCormick (2004), ‘The Politics of Labour’s Heartlands’, in G. Hassan (ed.) (2004), The Scottish Labour Party: History, Institutions, Ideas, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Scottish Labour Party (1993), Annual Report, Glasgow: Scottish Labour Party. Scottish Labour Party (1997), Annual Report, Glasgow: Scottish Labour Party. Wood, F. (1989), ‘Scottish Labour in Government and Opposition, 1964–1979’, in I. Donnachie, C. Harvie and I. S. Wood (eds), Forward! Labour Politics in Scotland 1888–1988, Edinburgh: Polygon, 99–129.

scottish conservative party | 159

T H IR T E E N

The Scottish Conservative Party: Wilderness to Recovery Alan Convery

The Scottish Conservatives arrived in the Scottish Parliament in 1999 as the only party to have opposed its existence. They therefore had the most difficult transition to make to life after devolution. However, despite having long opposed proportional representation, the Scottish Conservative parliamentary party numbered 18, thanks to the Scottish Parliament’s mixed-member electoral system. Thus, although they faced many difficulties in 1999, this group (and the attendant reach and resources) was not the worst platform upon which to begin to rebuild support and find a new purpose. This chapter considers the development of the Scottish Conservative Party since 1999. The party’s first post-devolution leader, David McLetchie, managed to steady the ship and ensure the party’s survival. Under Annabel Goldie, the party treaded water, but she paved the way for a new generation of Scottish Conservatives, particularly the party’s current leader, Ruth Davidson. Having been on a downward trend since 2011, the party finally made its electoral breakthrough in 2016 and 2017. Under Ruth Davidson, the party has mastered the art of opposition and fought two very disciplined and successful campaigns in 2016 and 2017. The question that now confronts the party is whether it can use its increased popularity to make a serious pitch to be in government in Scotland. Having become a credible opposition, it now faces the task of being an alternative government. However, debates about policy have been largely absent from Scottish Conservatism since the 1990s. The Scottish Conservatives’

160 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

critique of the SNP government has become ever sharper, but they have thus far only dimly answered the question: what would you do differently?

‘The Wilderness Years’ Between 1999 and 2016, the Scottish Conservatives’ breakthrough was elusive. In 2010, for example, some in the party predicted that it would return with 10 seats in Scotland. Similarly, 2015 was supposed to be the year their fortunes would turn around. In the 2011 Scottish Parliament elections, the party actually went backwards, both in terms of vote share and seats. However, it can be easy with hindsight to downplay the scale of the task facing the party’s first post-devolution leaders. The UK Conservative Party was politically and intellectually exhausted after 18 years in power and was about to embark under Hague on a journey further into irrelevance and defeat in 2001 (Garnett and Lynch, 2003). The UK party would not regain its appetite for power until David Cameron’s leadership in 2005. Similarly, the Scottish Conservatives had just endured a searing 1990s, during which they had allowed elements of Scottish identity to become infused with Table 13.1  Scottish Conservative Party performance at Scottish Parliament elections Year

Votes

Percentage Share

Number of MSPs

Constituency 1999 2003 2007 2011 2016

364,425 318,279 334,743 276,652 501,844

15.6 16.6 16.6 13.9 22.0

0 3 4 3 7

Year

Votes

Percentage Share

Number of MSPs

Region 1999 2003 2007 2011 2016

359,109 296,929 284,005 245,967 524,222

15.4 15.5 13.9 12.4 22.9

18 15 13 12 24

Sources: Rawlings and Thrasher, 2012; Curtice, 2016.

scottish conservative party | 161

anti-Toryism. The nation it wanted to represent had in part defined itself against the Conservative Party. Their share of the vote in Scotland dropped to 17.5 per cent in 1997 and 15.6 per cent in 2001. Moreover, the cupboard of fresh ideas was bare. It was not easy to formulate a Conservative response to the dominance of Tony Blair’s New Labour. In short, there was not much to be done initially except try simply to keep the show on the road. We might break down the task facing the Scottish Conservatives’ leaders into four elements: coming to terms with devolution; becoming an effective opposition; rehabilitating the party’s brand; and trying to come up with a policy vision in a new (political and constitutional) context. There is a strong case for saying that the party has mastered the first three after 20 years. The final challenge remains.

Keeping the show on the road: McLetchie David McLetchie was concerned at first with how best to keep the party alive. In the interregnum between the 1997 general election and the 1999 first Scottish Parliament election, there were no elected Scottish Conservative politicians above the level of local councillors. Asked about initial priorities for the party during this period, one official told Convery (2016: 51), ‘I think in the first decade, I mean between 1999 and 2005, it was continuing to exist.’ The party was not at this point sure how well it would do in the first Scottish Parliament elections. Nevertheless it put together the machinery necessary for selecting candidates for the Scottish Parliament. The party also commissioned a review of its structures by Lord Strathclyde and a review of policies by Malcolm Rifkind. The Strathclyde Commission recommended an unwieldy structure that split the leadership of the Scottish party between the leader in the Scottish Parliament (elected by the MSP group), the Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland and a party chairman (elected by the membership). This confusion was only later corrected by the Sanderson Commission in 2010. The Rifkind Policy Commission was an interesting attempt to reset the party’s policy outlook, but ended up coming up with much the same policies that the party had pursued in government in the 1980s and 1990s.

162 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Entering the Parliament with 18 Scottish Conservative MSPs, David McLetchie thus saw the party through the immediate danger and created a solid platform on which to rebuild. On the question of coming to terms with devolution, McLetchie’s record is more mixed. The first manifesto committed the party to reducing the number of MSPs. The second manifesto in 2003 might be interpreted as actively hostile. It concentrated on the cost of the Parliament building and contained a mock-Holyrood sign that said ‘Follyrood’. By 2005, however, the cost of the building was no longer a central political issue and the Parliament had become entrenched as a part of Scotland’s political landscape. On the question of devolution, all of the party’s leaders had a difficult path to tread. Having 18 MSPs in the new Scottish Parliament did not ensure the party’s complete conversion at all levels to the idea of devolution. However, instead of confronting the sections of the party that were still not reconciled to the reality of the Scottish Parliament, McLetchie largely ignored the issue and did not engage with discussions about how the Parliament might be improved along Conservative lines with, for instance, greater fiscal responsibility. Nor did he try to take the party in radical new policy directions. However, as one MSP pointed out to Convery (2016: 44), this strategy seemed like a rational approach at the time: We knew a lot of the Conservatives voters in the early years of this Parliament had never voted for the Scottish Parliament in the first place and therefore it was a hard enough sell for us to get them to come out and vote at all in a Scottish Parliament election . . . so sticking to very core Conservative messages, we thought, was the best way to try and motivate our voters.

On policy and devolution, therefore, McLetchie failed to move the party on from the 1990s. His main achievement (which should not be underestimated) was ensuring the survival of the Scottish Conservatives and carving out a place for them in the new Scottish Parliament. His robust parliamentary presence and lawyerly approach also ensured the Scottish Conservatives were a serious opposition party.

scottish conservative party | 163

Steady state: Goldie David McLetchie resigned in 2005 and Annabel Goldie was elected unopposed as leader of the Scottish Conservatives. Goldie mainly pursued the same strategy as McLetchie when it came to repositioning the Conservatives. She concentrated on core Conservative messages and stood on a manifesto in 2007 that emphasised money following patients through the NHS and parental choice over schools. Goldie’s leadership certainly did not foreshadow the type of thinking that informed Cameron’s later modernisation strategy and she did not set much store by the idea of ‘detoxifying’ the Conservative brand. However, she did manage to take advantage of the circumstances of the SNP minority government to push for Conservative priorities. The Conservatives voted for three out of four SNP budgets during the 2007–11 Parliament. In exchange, the party won concessions on tax cuts for small businesses and police numbers. Under Goldie, therefore, the Scottish Conservatives achieved some policy relevance for the first time after devolution and were able to point to some tangible achievements. The party also showed that it could work well in a multi-party system and its then finance spokesman Derek Brownlee developed very good working relationships with the SNP government. On devolution, Goldie did start the process of moving the party forward. She supported the creation of the Calman Commission on further devolution in December 2007 following the election of the SNP government. Conservative MSPs voted for a Labour motion to establish the Commission. The Scottish Conservatives were therefore involved in thinking about the future of Scottish devolution (unlike the Constitutional Convention in the 1990s). Despite some disquiet in the party, Goldie also supported the findings of the Commission for further powers over fiscal policy and other areas for the Scottish Parliament. A final aspect of reform under Goldie corrected the confused organisational structure put in place in the immediate post-­ devolution period. A review by Lord Sanderson published in 2010 finally gave the party a coherent structure in which the party leader was elected by party members and fully in charge of the

164 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

­ rganisation. Such a change became significant in the 2011 leado ership election when a plurality of MSPs in fact supported Murdo Fraser, rather than Ruth Davidson. Overall, Goldie was another steadying rather than transformational leader of the Scottish Conservatives. Despite her personal popularity, she did not achieve an electoral breakthrough for the party. Indeed, the 2011 election was the party’s worst Scottish Parliament result. The party’s constituency vote share declined from 16.6 per cent to 13.9 per cent; its list vote share declined from 13.9 per cent to 12.4 per cent. The party’s overall number of MSPs declined from 17 to 15. It was becoming increasingly clear that the Scottish Conservatives were reaching the end of the road with the strategy of focusing on core supporters and treading softly on  the devolution issue. This situation created the circumstances both for Murdo Fraser’s radical proposal to form a new party and Ruth Davidson’s campaign to be the new face of Scottish Conservatism.

Slow-burning star: Ruth Davidson It is instructive to remember that Ruth Davidson was elected leader of the Scottish Conservative Party in 2011. The path to her eventual popularity and success was uneven and it was not certain that the circumstances would align to allow her to pursue a strategy of repositioning the Conservatives. In the 2011 Scottish Conservative Party leadership election, she became the main alternative to Murdo Fraser’s radical proposal to form an entirely new party of the centre-right in Scotland. In that contest, therefore, she represented continuity rather than a complete rupture with the past. As she saw it, instead of throwing away the Conservative brand, what was required was a change in how people perceived it. This change was to be achieved through her leadership, not a new party organisation. Nevertheless, she clearly represented a new generation of Conservatism and was, in the tagline of some journalists, the ‘kick-boxing lesbian’ (Holyrood Magazine, 2011). Ruth Davidson’s main policy achievement has been to decisively settle debates in the party about the commitment to devolution. However, again, this shift was the result of a slow-burning process.

scottish conservative party | 165

Davidson’s original position in the 2011 leadership election was that the proposals of the Calman Commission represented a ‘line in the sand’ for further powers for the Scottish Parliament. It was only after the 2014 independence referendum was scheduled that she commissioned Lord Strathclyde to write the Conservatives’ alternative proposals for devolution in the event that Scotland voted to remain in the UK. In fact, the prospect of independence (universally regarded with horror in the party, regardless of anyone’s views about devolution) broke the logjam that prevented the Scottish Conservatives from thinking more radically about how the Scottish Parliament might be reformed. Davidson was therefore able to embrace Strathclyde’s proposals and his formulation of a new philosophy for Scottish Conservatism and devolution: When these actions are taken within the context of Conservative policies on empowering individuals and decentralising power throughout the rest of the UK, it is clear that empowering the Scottish people to shape their own nation within the security of a United Kingdom is not just something we are willing only grudgingly to accept, it is something that sits at the very heart of what it means to be a modern Scottish Conservative. (Scottish Conservative Party, 2014: 3–4)

No other post-devolution leader could take the party to this inevitable conclusion. Ruth Davidson’s slow approach (whether deliberate or opportunistic) finally enabled the party to move on and become explicitly pro Scottish devolution. The Scottish Conservatives’ electoral success under Ruth Davidson is also striking. Her own personal popularity has played a part in this success. According to a pollster quoted by Shipman (2017: loc. 7012): She is a very strong advocate of LGBT rights, but she’s also a Church of Scotland Christian and an army reservist. She’s a strong Remainer and quite economically driven. She’s political alchemy, in the sense that’s she’s able to demographically hold different groups together.

In 2016, the party’s number of MSPs rose from 15 to 31. In 2017, the party’s number of MPs rose from 1 to 13, the party’s best result

166 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

since 1983. However, it must also be remembered that Davidson presided over the 2015 general election result in which the party’s vote share declined and it still only returned one MP. The right set of circumstances did not fully align until the idea of the Union became a more central political issue in 2016 when Nicola Sturgeon refused to rule out having a second independence referendum. Davidson was then able to exploit her increasing popularity to encourage voters to have a second look at the Scottish Conservatives. Unlike other post-devolution leaders, she was also able to benefit from the SNP’s troubles over some policy areas (notably education) and the general wear and tear that comes with being in government for nine years. However, on policy, Davidson’s record is mixed. Beyond devolution, the strategy in 2016 appears to have been to try to focus more on unionism and opposition to a second independence referendum, rather than offer an alterative plan for government. The 2016 manifesto promotes eye-catching initiatives on mental health and town centres, but ditches the previous commitments to organisational reform of health and education. Travelling lightly on policy probably allowed the Conservatives to maximise their appeal and avoided any hostages to fortune, but it leaves a gap in thinking about how the party might approach alternatives to the SNP’s policy choices. The only controversial policy that remained was the commitment to introduce a form of fees for university students. Ruth Davidson has been by far the most successful post-devolution leader of the Scottish Conservatives. She has decisively dealt with the devolution issue and she has shown how the Conservative brand can be revived in Scotland. Her electoral successes and personal popularity are unarguable. However, she has also exposed the limits of reform and has left largely untouched the bigger questions her predecessors also avoided about what kind of government the Scottish Conservatives might eventually be. Is it to be a return to the  quasi-market public service reforms of the 1990s or do the Scottish Conservatives have an alternative that does not involve simply a continuation of the status quo under a different party? As the largest opposition party in the Scottish Parliament, that is a question that will increasingly be asked of the Scottish Conservatives.

scottish conservative party | 167

Conclusion The Scottish Conservatives’ long road to recovery was not inevit­ able and each of its post-devolution leaders have played a part in trying to move the party on from the low point of the late 1990s. In keeping the party together and ensuring it carved out a place as a scrutinising opposition, McLetchie performed the first essential task. Goldie’s consolidation of that legacy failed to strike out in a new direction, but did take advantage of the circumstances of the SNP minority government. What neither of those two leaders could do, however, was quite move on fully from the ghosts of the 1990s that continued to haunt the party in terms of its reputation and its attitude towards the Scottish Parliament itself. Ruth Davidson, despite her initial misgivings about further powers and her seeming opposition to radical change, moved the party decisively forward on these two issues. She therefore ensured that the party’s sails were in the optimum place to take advantage of any change in direction of the political wind. If 1997 represented a perfect storm of negative factors for the Scottish Conservatives, the positive set of circumstances that came together under Ruth Davidson’s leadership might be viewed as the opposite. The Scottish Conservatives were extremely lucky to have a popular leader, a government that was beginning to show its age, and an electorate that were receptive to an uncompromising attitude towards a second independence referendum. Unionism, the issue which unites the party like no other and which the party decisively ‘owns’, became one of the central issues of the election campaigns it fought. It is difficult to find unionist space to the right or left of the Scottish Conservative Party. On this issue, their troops are united, their passions are raised, and their arguments honed. Being able to run a campaign on this theme is an ideal scenario for the Scottish Conservatives. However, there is also a danger for the Scottish Conservatives in relying on this intoxicating mix of factors. It is tempting to imagine that it represents a permanent shift in the electorate towards their way of thinking. However, it is not clear how far the Scottish Conservatives have reformed the party beyond the issues of leadership, organisation and devolution. Having mastered the

168 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

art of opposition, the Scottish Conservatives now need a governing statecraft for Scotland.

References Convery, A. (2016), The Territorial Conservative Party: Devolution and Party Change in Scotland and Wales, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Curtice, J. (2016), The 2016 Scottish Election: Getting to Minority Government, Edinburgh: Electoral Reform Society Scotland, . Garnett, M. and P. Lynch (eds) (2003), The Conservatives in Crisis, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Holyrood Magazine (2011), ‘Tartan Tory: The Ruth Davidson Interview’, . Rallings, C. and M. Thrasher (2012), British Electoral Facts, 1832–2012, London: Biteback Publishing. Scottish Conservative Party (2014), ‘Commission on the Future Governance of Scotland’, Edinburgh: Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party. Shipman, T. (2017), Fall Out, London: William Collins.

liberal democrats | 169

FOURTEEN

The Liberal Democrats: From Coalition to the Margins David Torrance

The long coalition Scottish Liberal Democrats joined the new Scottish Parliament in May 1999 as a minor party punching above its weight. It remained Scotland’s ‘third’ party, gaining fewer votes and MSPs than the apparently ‘toxic’ Scottish Conservatives, but entered devolved government via a coalition, as widely expected, with the Scottish Labour Party. The working relationship between the two parties went back to the late 1980s, when they had backed the 1988 ‘Claim of Right’ and Scottish Constitutional Convention convened the following year. Indeed, Scotland’s devolution settlement – especially its 129 members and additional member system of elections – was the product of sustained negotiations between Scottish Labour and Liberal Democrat politicians. Thus, the eight years in which Lib Dems governed in coalition with Labour could be seen as the natural conclusion of a less formal partnership that lasted for almost two decades. That said, the Scottish Liberal Democrat leader, Jim Wallace – party leader since 1992 – approached the brief coalition negotiations better prepared than his Labour counterpart, Donald Dewar. Wallace consulted his party and elected colleagues throughout. His reward was four ministers (two in the Cabinet, including Wallace as Deputy First Minister, with the Justice brief), while an impasse over tuition fees was solved by asking corporate lawyer

170 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Andrew Cubie to chair an inquiry (Richard Kerley, an academic, was also asked to look at PR for local government). The Partnership Agreement was signed on 14 May amid the modernist curves of the new Museum of Scotland. The challenges faced by junior parties in coalitions were well known, so Wallace’s challenge was to maintain a distinct party identity while fending off accusations that he was little more than Scottish Labour’s poodle. Matters tended to come to a head shortly before elections. In January 2001, for example, Scottish Liberal Democrat MSPs threatened to rebel over proposals for free personal care for the elderly, forcing new First Minister Henry McLeish to commit. Jim Wallace performed solidly as Deputy First Minister (and Acting First Minster on two occasions), as did Ross Finnie as Minister for Agriculture, where the latter was widely judged to have handled well an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. But there were no immediate dividends, judging by opinion polls, and the party struggled to reach double figures. It also came behind the fledgling Scottish Socialist Party at by-elections in Ayr (for the Scottish Parliament) and Hamilton (for the House of Commons). At the 2001 UK general election, the party talked up its impact in devolved government, while it benefitted more generally from the popular Charles Kennedy, who had been federal party leader since August 1999. On polling day, the Scottish Liberal Democrats gained 16.4 per cent of the vote (an increase of 3.4 per cent) and, more to the point, overtook the Conservatives to become the third party in Scottish politics. Jim Wallace appeared to have convinced voters that he and his party were worth voting for. Measured against pre-election polling of less than 10 per cent, it was a good result. Thereafter, pressure from Lib Dem activists to introduce PR for local government elections increased. The messy resignation of Henry McLeish in November 2001 provided Wallace with another opportunity to push for the Single Transferable Vote (STV). Jack McConnell, the new First Minister, appeared amenable, promising ‘greater urgency’ and privately pledging to deliver by 2007. Jim Wallace clearly envisaged the coalition lasting for some time. In an interview in November 2001, he said he could not see the

liberal democrats | 171

SNP being strong enough to lead a coalition in 2003. He turned out to be correct, although Scottish Labour were no pushovers. Opponents of PR pointed out that the 1999 Partnership Agreement referred only to ‘progress towards electoral reform’ rather than any specific scheme, while the April 2002 Scottish Lib Dem conference demanded a bill by the next Holyrood elections. Indeed, the party often faced as much criticism from within its own ranks as from its coalition partners. Polling suggested the party would pick up a few seats at the 2003 election, but in the event, it held steady. Wallace had campaigned on ‘a social democratic manifesto with liberal trimmings’, proposing a review of the devolution settlement in 2009, a needsbased replacement for the Barnett formula and possible use of the Scottish Variable Rate to finance its spending plans (Mitchell, 2003: 60). A backdrop to the campaign had been the Iraq conflict, which provided a useful point of differentiation between the anti-war Liberal Democrats and generally supportive Scottish Labour Party.

Peak Scottish Liberal Democrat Scottish Labour’s loss of six seats at the 2003 election gave the Lib Dems an additional Cabinet minister in future leader Nicol Stephen. It also secured agreement on free eye and dental checks, while a bill proposing STV for three- and four-member local council wards appeared later that year, further evidence of the junior coalition party’s influence. The outspoken Labour minister Sam Galbraith attacked electoral reform as a right-wing Liberal policy forced upon Labour. There were other tensions. Labour’s determination to crack down on youth crime unnerved the Liberals, while junior minister Tavish Scott repeatedly challenged the Scottish Executive’s support for the European Common Fisheries Policy. In a 2004 interview, Jim Wallace claimed his party was responsible for most of the coalition’s successful policies, then 15 of his MSPs abstained in a crucial Holyrood vote opposing Westminster plans to introduce ID cards, meaning the Executive was defeated. In addition to natural strains after five years sharing power, there was a need to distance themselves from Labour ahead of the 2005 UK general election.

172 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

In that contest, the Scottish Liberal Democrats peaked, gaining two MPs (despite an overall reduction to 59 constituencies) and 22.6 per cent of the vote, well ahead of the SNP (which was once again led by Alex Salmond) and the Conservatives. Jim Wallace chose to go out on a high, announcing his resignation as leader soon after. He was succeeded by Nicol Stephen, who became Minister for Enterprise and Lifelong Learning as well as Deputy First Minister. The Scottish media viewed him as solid but uncharismatic. This electoral buoyancy continued in February 2006 when Willie Rennie took the Westminster constituency of Dunfermline and West Fife from Labour on a 16 per cent swing. The surprise win came amid Executive infighting over the Forth Road Bridge and UK Lib Dem turmoil following the ousting of Charles Kennedy and further media headlines involving those jostling to succeed him. Sir Menzies Campbell, also a Scottish MP, eventually took over. The following month, David Steel (another former UK party leader) published ‘Moving to Federalism – A New Settlement for Scotland’, which advocated greater fiscal autonomy for the Scottish Parliament, an indication the party was thinking ahead to the next Holyrood election, when it anticipated the need to provide a constitutional ‘offer’ for voters. Lord Steel argued that ‘despite the mutual benefits that can be clearly seen from the current union, there remains a clear argument for further reform to move towards a new modern settlement’ (Steel, 2006: 54). Presciently, the commission also suggested that any change to the Scotland Act should follow cross-party discussion. Nicol Stephen entered the 2007 Holyrood election campaign with his party having delivered on PR for local government but with little new to say: the headline manifesto commitment was more hours of physical education in schools. Discourse was dominated by coalition speculation should the SNP emerge, as some polls suggested, the largest single party. While Liberal Democrat voters generally wanted their party to renew its vows with Labour, the electorate more generally liked the idea of a new relationship between the Lib Dems and SNP. There was, on paper, a degree of policy overlap: both parties emphasised environmental issues, both were committed to replacing the council tax with a local income tax while, most importantly,

liberal democrats | 173

both favoured some sort of constitutional change. In his pre-election conference speech, Nicol Stephen had sounded an ecumenical note, although one of his MSPs, Jamie Stone, undermined this by attacking Nationalists as ‘xenophobic’. Another major sticking point was the Lib Dems’ refusal to countenance an independence referendum, and indeed this led to Alex Salmond (who had ousted a Lib Dem MSP in Gordon) taking a gamble and forming a minority administration. Out of office, the Scottish Liberal Democrats lost their main selling point since the late 1980s, and particularly since entering government in 1999 – political relevance. In any case, the numbers were not there; even a Lib Dem–SNP deal would have fallen short of an overall majority.

Clinging on to political relevance The ‘hung’ Scottish Parliament, however, presented theoretical opportunities. In June 2007, the Liberal Democrats joined forces with other parties to force the Scottish Executive (soon to be renamed the Scottish Government) to see through the Edinburgh trams project, although in other policy areas it chose to support the SNP, including a bill to abolish the graduate endowment scheme. As a sort of quid pro quo, the Scottish Government planned to promote the Liberal Democrats’ policy on two hours’ physical education in schools. Ultimately, they could not agree on a local income tax: the SNP wanted, paradoxically, a national rate, the Lib Dems local variation. Complacently, there was a widespread belief at Holyrood that the SNP would not last until Christmas. The Lib Dems joined Labour and the Conservatives, meanwhile, in forming the crossparty Calman Commission on further powers for the Scottish Parliament, as suggested by the Steel Commission. Of all the parties, they had the most to contribute, although it was some way removed from the sort of pressure they had once been able to exert on Labour in office. Jim Wallace, now Lord Wallace, joined the Calman Commission as one of two Lib Dem representatives. There were minor achievements. Nicol Stephen garnered headlines when he said the Scottish Government’s unprecedented decision to ‘call in’ a planning application from Donald Trump for a

174 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

£1 billion golf resort plan in the north-east of Scotland had the ‘smell of sleaze’. The First Minister hit back that the Lib Dem leader was ‘unelectable’. Some said the same of Scottish MP Sir Menzies Campbell, who resigned as UK Liberal Democrat leader following relentless media and party criticism. Less than a year later, in July 2008, Nicol Stephen also resigned to spend more time with his wife and four young children, responsibilities that had been easier to manage as a minister. Tavish Scott, former Cabinet minister Ross Finnie and perennial rebel Mike Rumbles all vied for the Scottish Lib Dem crown. Finnie argued that the party’s message had ‘become blurred and lacking a distinctive Liberal Democrat edge’, squeezed between the SNP–Labour duopoly and merely responding to a debate, ‘the terms of which have been set by another party’ (Finnie, 2008). This was a shrewd diagnosis of where the party found itself a year after leaving office, but not enough to win a leadership election. Tavish Scott beat Finnie and Rumbles but found it difficult to establish his authority for precisely the reasons outlined above. In a radio interview, Scott suggested, not incorrectly, that politicians and the media were ‘too obsessed by endless talk about referendums and the constitution’, but it was a curious thing to say ahead of the Calman Commission’s report, in which the Liberal Democrats had been so heavily involved. By 2010, at which point Scott had been leader for two years, it was difficult to associate any memorable speech, policy or campaign with his stewardship, his call for a 2p tax cut having made little impact.

Coalition redux The 2010 UK general election appeared to offer the Scottish Liberal Democrats another shot at political relevancy. Not only did the party retain its eleven Scottish MPs (a tally roughly in proportion to its 18.9 per cent of the vote), but a ‘hung’ Parliament propelled the UK party into government for the first time since 1945. The Conservatives’ relative weakness in Scotland, meanwhile, meant the Cabinet post of Secretary of State for Scotland went to a Lib Dem, Danny Alexander, although he was replaced a few weeks later by Michael Moore following the resignation of David Laws.

liberal democrats | 175

Alex Salmond, however, predicted the coalition would spell disaster for the Liberal Democrats at the next Scottish Parliament election. It proved a brutally accurate prediction: the party lost all its mainland constituencies amid an SNP tsunami, retaining only Orkney, Shetland and three list MSPs. Its vote share sank to just 7.9 per cent in constituencies and 5.3 per cent on the regional list. As Malcolm Harvey summarised, in just five years ‘the collective representation of the party in Scotland had dropped from 193 MPs, MSPs and councillors in 2007 to 87 in 2012’. This, he added: . . . had a direct impact on the ability of the party to campaign: fewer representatives means fewer seats to defend, fewer seats to defend means less motivation for activists to knock on doors, less motivation means a less active membership, and a less active membership means an inability to seriously challenge incumbents, meaning fewer opportunities to return representatives.

Only 3,000 Scottish members remained (Harvey, 2013). The 2011–16 Scottish parliamentary term, meanwhile, was dominated by the build-up to the independence referendum. Willie Rennie, who succeeded Tavish Scott as leader following the 2011 election, did his best to push the party’s vision of a ‘strong Scotland’ within a ‘federal UK’, while it fell to Michael Moore to do the heavy lifting on the terms of an independence ballot, which became the 2012 Edinburgh Agreement. Both were effective operators, albeit in a challenging arena. It was Jim Wallace, now Advocate General for Scotland, who first suggested using a Section 30 Order to facilitate a legal referendum. Rennie also asked Sir Menzies Campbell to lead another commission ahead of the referendum due in September 2014. The (first) Campbell Commission reported in 2012, arguing for a ‘radical’ allocation of tax and borrowing powers to Holyrood, allowing the Scottish Parliament to raise around two thirds of its own revenue. ‘A rejection of independence’, argued Sir Menzies, ‘will enable Scotland to continue down the track towards a modern, pluralist and federal relationship with the other parts of the United Kingdom.’ (Campbell, 2012: 19) Otherwise, the party’s strategy was to campaign for a No vote

176 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

alongside Labour and the Conservatives under the ‘Better Together’ umbrella. Rennie said the party would act as ‘the guarantors of change’ (a similar argument to that used before the 1997 devolution referendum). ‘Liberal Democrats have wanted home rule for a hundred years’, he said at the 2012 Scottish conference. ‘A Scotland with the powers to run our home affairs but proud to share the wins and share the risks with the United Kingdom family of nations.’ (Rennie, 2012)

A pyrrhic victory A majority No vote on 18 September 2014 proved a pyrrhic victory for all the Unionist parties. Adding to the Liberal Democrats’ woes was its inability to take any credit for policy wins within the UK Government coalition (increasing, for example, the personal allowance). Worse, the Scottish Liberal Democrats became scapegoats for some of its more unpopular policies, such as tuition fees. Polling suggested the party was set to lose most of its 11 Scottish MPs, with even former Lib Dem leader Charles Kennedy at risk in the Ross, Skye and Lochaber constituency he had held for more than 30 years. The Liberal Democrats also dominated the campaign in an unhelpful way. Just after Nicola Sturgeon’s triumph in the first televised leaders’ debate, a Lib Dem special adviser at the Scotland Office leaked a memo based on a conversation with the French consul general in Edinburgh, who had apparently passed on details of a meeting between the First Minister and the French ambassador to the UK, during which Sturgeon had indicated that her preferred election outcome was another Conservative government. ‘Nikileaks’, as it was dubbed on Twitter, rumbled on for the next year, reflecting badly on a party that had once punched above its weight in Scottish politics. Its 2015 Scottish manifesto, meanwhile, was launched at a café in South Queensferry, which again spoke to the party’s diminished status. Willie Rennie warned of another independence referendum and urged Scots to ‘vote intelligently’ to keep out the SNP, a plea for tactical voting echoed by Nick Clegg on a campaign visit to Scotland. Clegg also ‘totally’ ruled out any arrangement with the

liberal democrats | 177

SNP, saying his party could never ‘help establish a government which is basically on a life-support system, where Alex Salmond could pull the plug any time he wants’ (Clegg, 2015). On polling day, it was the Liberal Democrats – in Scotland and across the UK – who were left on life support, losing 10 of 11 Scottish MPs, with only former Scottish Secretary Alistair Carmichael (the focus of the Nikileaks row) narrowly retaining Orkney and Shetland. At Holyrood elections a year later, the party held its five MSPs but was pushed into fifth place by the Scottish Greens. The political relevancy retained in 2010 was now gone. At the 2017 UK general election, all the Scottish Liberal Democrats could do was focus on a small number of constituencies, the priority being Orkney and Shetland, where Carmichael had survived a legal attempt to unseat him in the wake of the Nikileaks incident. During the unexpected campaign, the party appeared spirited yet irrelevant, but it managed to gain three seats despite its vote share dropping to just 6.8 per cent. With five MSPs and four MPs the party was at least back in the game, if still a shadow of where it had been 20 years earlier.

Conclusion Although expectations of what devolution would mean in terms of Scottish party politics and policy outcomes were arguably quixotic, it is worth remembering that in the first eight years of the Scottish Parliament the Liberal Democrats (in coalition with Labour) delivered on at least some of the anticipated ‘new politics’, making good on Liberal policies via negotiation and compromise with a larger party which had agreed (via the earlier Scottish Constitutional Convention) to share power in the new legislature. At points, that coalition was rocky, but more due to the loss of the first two First Ministers than any major tension between its two parties. Looking back, what is striking is its stability, especially when contrasted with the UK Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition that followed in 2010. Euan Roddin (2004) suggested two thirds of Scottish Executive policies delivered by 2003 had started life as Liberal Democrat initiatives, while by 2007 it was able to add PR for local government to that record. It is difficult not to

178 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

conclude, therefore, that the Scottish party was better at deriving policy and electoral benefits from coalition politics than Nick Clegg et al. between 2010 and 2015. After the 2007 Scottish Parliament election, however, the Lib Dems were out of government and therefore lacked the political relevancy they had possessed since the beginning of its alliance with Scottish Labour in the late 1980s. In a political arena increasingly dominated by the constitutionally radical and centrist SNP, the Scottish Liberal Democrats found it difficult to make an impact, with consequential electoral decline, from which it seems likely recovery will be slow.

References Campbell, M. (2012), The Home Rule and Community Commission of the Scottish Liberal Democrats, Edinburgh: Scottish Liberal Democrats. Clegg, N. (2015), ‘Clegg rules out coalition with SNP “life support”’, The Times, 25 April. Finnie, R. (2008), ‘Finnie says Lib Dems lack clarity’, BBC News online, 25 July, . Harvey, M. (2013), ‘The Scottish Liberal Democrats and the independence referendum’, in Adamson, K. and P. Lynch (eds), Scottish Political Parties and the 2014 Independence Referendum, Cardiff: Welsh Academic Press. Mitchell, J. (2003), ‘Quarterly Monitoring Programme: Scotland’, May. Rennie, W. (2012), ‘Scottish referendum: Liberal Democrats plan more Holyrood powers if Scotland votes no’, The Telegraph, 4 March. Roddin, E. (2004), ‘Has the Labour Party or the Liberal Democrats Proved More Successful in the Partnership for Scotland Coalition? An Initial Assessment’, Scottish Affairs, 48, 24–49. Steel, D. (2006), Moving to Federalism – A New Settlement for Scotland, Scottish Liberal Democrats, March.

greens : radical and relevant ? | 179

F IF T E E N

Greens: Radical and Relevant? Lynn Bennie

Green parties are established political actors, no longer new kids on the block. The first of these parties were formed nearly half a century ago, many have entered national parliaments and some have supported minority governments or enjoyed positions in formal governing coalitions. The Scottish Green Party (SGP) has become something close to a permanent fixture in electoral politics, a position that stems from the creation of a new set of political institutions in 1999, but it has enjoyed relatively little direct impact in policy terms. However, the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence enhanced the status of the Scottish Greens. The party’s role in that debate transmitted a clear message that Greens support independence because of the transformational potential to create a more equal and sustainable society. The party has been strongly pro-­European, arguing that events in UK politics made the case for Scottish independence even more compelling. Electoral and parliamentary politics, though, remain challenging for Greens, raising the question of what can be achieved by a small Green party in Scotland. The forthcoming discussion addresses a number of questions about the Scottish Green Party’s role in Scottish politics. It explores the party’s identity and impact, its position in the Scottish independence movement, and how 20 years of devolution have changed the party. What kind of Greens are the Scottish Greens? What has the party achieved? And what are the party’s challenges at a time when Britain is preparing to leave the EU and the campaign for Scottish independence continues?

180 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

In an exploration of party ‘relevance’, Pederson (1982) outlined ‘thresholds of relevance’ that small parties attempt to overcome, namely declaration, authorisation, representation (gaining parliamentary seats) and then ‘relevance’ when parties impact on government formation and policy output. Various factors affect party trajectories including system-level features like electoral systems, public opinion and the behaviour of other parties. Pederson (1982: 8) argued that ‘the goal of any minor party is to pass the threshold of relevance, and, next, to become an influential, at best ruling, party.’ In these terms, Green parties across the world have become increasingly relevant (van Haute, 2016). The Scottish Greens, too, have gradually made more impact, but they still face notable challenges in their attempts to implement radical policy ideas.

Party roots and electoral representation Early studies of Scotland’s environmental movement document a ‘cold political climate’ for green campaigners that discouraged party activity (Bennie, 2004; McCormick and McDowell, 1999). A British political system that was highly centralised and a Scottish party system dominated by Labour limited opportunities available to Greens. Scottish Ecologists stood for the first time in a general election in 1979, five years later than their counterparts in England, and through the next two decades the Scottish Greens maintained a low profile. Devolution changed the political parameters for Greens, almost entirely positively. The adoption of the Additional Member System (AMS) to elect members of the Parliament opened the door to multi-party politics. The Scottish Greens, who had asserted their organisational independence as a party by 1990, now gained considerable advantage over other UK Greens, with a realistic hope of taking parliamentary seats. In 1999, Robin Harper became the first Green parliamentarian in the UK. It is hard to exaggerate the importance of devolution in the development of the Scottish Greens; it created a forum in which they became a relevant voice with the potential to affect change. However, the electoral system used in Scottish parliamentary elections can be both beneficial and punishing for small parties, due to

greens : radical and relevant ? | 181

Table 15.1  Scottish Green Party performance in Scottish parliamentary elections Constituency

1999 2003 2007 2011 2016

Region

Total

Votes (%)

Seats (N)

Votes (%)

Seats (N)

Seats (%)

Seats (N)

— — 0.2 — 0.6

0 0 0 0 0

3.6 6.9 4.0 4.4 6.6

1 7 2 2 6

0.8 5.4 1.6 1.6 4.7

1 7 2 2 6

Source: SPICe (2019).

a high de facto threshold in the allocation of seats (approximately 5 per cent of votes in a region are required to be successful). In 2003–7, the so-called ‘rainbow parliament’ included a group of seven Greens, but this fell back to only two in 2007 (see Table 15.1). In 2016, the Scottish Greens became the fourth largest party in Parliament (ahead of the Liberal Democrats), and the new intake included Ross Greer, the youngest ever MSP. Green MSPs have all been elected through the regional lists, performing best in the Lothians, Glasgow, Mid Scotland and Fife, and the Highlands and Islands. In some areas like North East Scotland the party does less well. Locally, Greens have gradually increased their presence, helped by the use of STV in local government elections. In 2017, 19 SGP councillors were elected, in six of the 32 council areas, the party’s best ever tally. The party now has a critical mass of councillors in Edinburgh (eight) and Glasgow (seven). Overall, the electoral performance of the Scottish Greens suggests a small but relatively successful Green party by international standards, certainly in terms of long-term presence within a legislature. In national parliamentary elections globally, Greens average less than 4 per cent of the vote (Grant and Tilley, 2018: 8). It is clear that devolution creates institutional structures that encourage supporters to actually vote Green.

The Scottish Green agenda and parliamentary politics The Scottish Greens promote a radical agenda. Their policy programme has become more comprehensive over the years and has

182 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

settled on a clear left-of-centre green position. The party combines ecological principles – critiquing the mainstream commitment to a carbon economy and economic growth – with radical participative democracy, social justice, libertarianism, peace and non-violence. The party itself describes its core ideological principles as ‘environmental, social and economic justice’ (Scottish Green Party, n.d.). This involves a belief in redistribution of wealth and power. Scottish Greens have consistently argued for a more progressive taxation system and increased support for low earners, and they have been harsh critics of the austerity agenda in the UK. Many European Greens have followed a similar trajectory, initially resisting the language of left and right, but eventually accepting their ‘left anchorage’ (van Haute, 2016: 320). Few now suggest they are ‘neither left nor right’. Also like other Greens, the party in Scotland is thoroughly liberal on social issues – emphasising the rights of all minority groups, including same-sex couples and migrant communities. Support for Scottish independence can be understood in terms of the party’s belief in radical democracy and decisions being taken at the most locally appropriate level, sensitive to local needs. The Greens support community reinvigoration and decentralisation within Scotland, arguing for more fundamental land reform than that encouraged by the SNP’s Land Reform Act 2016. On Europe, the party advocates reform of EU institutions and challenges the power of corporations, but it supports European collaboration on freedom of movement, protecting the environment and workers’ rights. In the Brexit era, the Scottish Greens have more wholeheartedly supported the EU (a people’s Europe). Following the publication of the UK’s EU Withdrawal Agreement in November 2018, the Scottish Greens were quick to make the case that another Scottish independence referendum was urgently required. The party’s green, left values are now more widely understood by voters. No longer can it be considered a ‘single-issue’ party. However, following two decades of devolution, one might question the ability of the Scottish Greens to affect change. They have been permanent residents in the Parliament but what have they actually achieved? As a small party, they have limited opportunities to introduce or amend legislation but over the years they have

greens : radical and relevant ? | 183

made a difference to Scottish political debate, they have influenced policy and have at times demonstrated the power to ‘intimidate’ or shape governing party behaviour, what Sartori famously described as having ‘blackmail’ and ‘coalition’ potential (Sartori, 1976). Most often, this has involved informal influence rather than tangible policy output. The party has benefited from highly competent MSPs who punch above their weight in parliamentary debates and committee work. They have injected colour and innovative policy ideas into Scottish parliamentary politics. Following the first Scottish elections, as the party’s sole MSP, Robin Harper worked with others in the Parliament and gained a lot of attention for green issues like organic farming. The current group of six are hard-working and have a strong record of campaigning on issues like land reform, child protection, traffic speed reduction and social security reform. It might seem obvious, but the larger the group in Parliament, the more resources and influence the party enjoys, with a bigger team of support staff and increased opportunities to initiate debate and attract media attention. They have an increased presence on parliamentary committees and are more able to question the government in debates. However, the size of the parliamentary group is not the only factor that determines influence. When the SNP has been a minority government, opportunities have been created for the Greens. In 2007, despite losing five MSPs, the Greens suddenly held the balance of power and entered an ‘agreement’ with the minority SNP government which involved support for the First Minister and SNP budget in return for progress on climate-change legislation, although this agreement later fell apart. As is often said, the Scottish Parliament is a parliament of minorities and the Greens have been important in annual rounds of budget negotiations with the SNP, securing some notable concessions. As well as policies to promote low-carbon infrastructure, there has been additional funding for local councils and a government commitment to progress local government tax reform. From 2016, with a sizeable Green group and a minority SNP government at Holyrood, cooperation between the pro-­independence parties was expected. However, the Greens are sensitive to the

184 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

suggestion that they are ‘mini-me’ to the SNP; and Green–SNP relations can be difficult. The Greens claim the governing party is much too centralising and contradictory on matters of ­ sustainability – anti-nuclear and anti-fracking, but supportive of air travel and other environmentally unfriendly behaviours. And the Greens do vote against the Scottish Government, forming alliances with other parties. In early 2018, such cooperation brought an end to the Offensive Behaviour at Football Act. In the same year, party co-convener Patrick Harvie told the SGP autumn conference that they ‘pushed the SNP beyond its comfort zone’. Like the UK government, he argued, the SNP was still attached to traditional principles of GDP and economic growth through exploitation of fossil fuels, and in these circumstances the Greens ‘keep the pressure on’. These claims are legitimate. The Green vision is more radical and demands more societal, political and economic change than that of the SNP while the leverage exerted on the SNP is indirect and informal rather than tangible.

The 2014 referendum and unintended consequences When it became clear that a referendum on Scottish independence was to take place following the SNP’s success in the 2011 Scottish parliamentary elections, the Greens had to take a position. That involved the party publicly supporting Scottish independence while recognising that many members and activists were against it (including Robin Harper). The referendum campaign was long and demanding for party activists, but it was also energising and rewarding. The Scottish Greens worked closely with other parties, groups and individual campaigners and took part in a vast array of campaign activities. Across the country, Greens shared platforms with the SNP, SSP, Common Weal, Women for Independence, National Collective, the Radical Independence Campaign and more. Some Greens represented more than one organisation; some people from these campaigning groups later joined the Greens. And online campaigning and networks came to the fore. In all, the grassroots campaign was colourful, dynamic and at times spontaneous, taking on the organisational form of a social movement. Scottish Green ideas and policies were given the kind of expo-

greens : radical and relevant ? | 185

sure that is difficult to achieve in normal election campaigns. Television debates provided a platform for SGP ideas, helping the party explain its vision of a sustainable, more equal, independent Scotland. Unlike the SNP, the Greens supported a new currency for an independent Scotland and were against retaining the UK monarchy. The SNP was portrayed by the Greens as a party lacking radicalism, without a clear idea of what kind of society Scotland could be. The Greens attacked the SNP’s emphasis on carbon-based solutions, specifically the continued emphasis on North Sea oil. Harvie proved to be a significant asset during the campaign, effectively communicating a message of social justice as well as ecological sustainability – linking these positions. Following the referendum, there was increased awareness of the party’s policies and values, and perceptions of the Scottish Greens as a party of independence were cemented. Quite unexpectedly, the referendum result had other consequences. In the days and weeks following the referendum, new recruits flooded into the party. Membership multiplied by a factor of six, increasing to 9,000 by May 2015. This membership rush paralleled a similar dynamic in the significantly larger SNP, but the growth in Scottish Green membership was proportionately greater (Mitchell et al., 2017). This created some organisational strain for the Scottish Greens, but it was unquestionably a positive experience, bringing in valuable resources and boosting the party’s organisational and campaigning capacity.

Taking stock: the Scottish Greens and twenty years of devolution What kind of party has emerged from this exceptional series of events? The membership profile, in essence, has changed only a little. The members remain largely middle class, middle-aged and remarkably well networked, in other words, the same kind of people previously drawn to the Greens were recruited by the referendum. However, more women have joined and now make up half the membership, a ratio few parties achieve (38 per cent of SNP members are women) (Mitchell et al., 2017). Ideologically, the membership’s left-ecology principles have been strengthened.

186 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

The party is more visibly pro-independence than in the past, and it is more pro-European. Scottish Green members are even more positive about the EU than SNP members (Mitchell et al., 2017). Organisationally, the party has been strengthened and become more professional. More branches exist than before, party conferences are well attended and there are more financial resources available for election campaigns and other activities like management of social media communication. The party has embarked on a process of organisational review which has revealed different opinions on leadership and organisation. Patrick Harvie has a prominent media profile and some in the party would like more of a ‘team effort’, perhaps involving time limits and rotation of leadership roles. No one can deny, though, that Harvie is an effective communicator and the party gains from his profile. A more immediate organisational challenge for the party is maintaining its new members – there has been some decline since 2015 – but benefits still accrue from a 7,000-strong membership. Electorally, the Scottish Greens remain a small party and strategic challenges exist. For many voters with environmental concerns, the SNP position on climate change, nuclear power and fracking is sufficient. Mainstream party adoption of green policies can actually serve to ‘raise the salience of environmental issues’ (Grant and Tilley, 2018: 13). Nevertheless, support for the Scottish Greens remains subdued, and there is debate amongst Greens on how to progress. Questions exist on where and when Greens should stand candidates in elections, and the extent to which they should work with others. In 2017, the party presented only three candidates in the UK general election. In Scottish elections, the party has focused on the regions. While concentrating resources in this way makes sense, it means that sympathetic voters do not always have the opportunity to support the party. The extent to which the party engages in electoral politics will be an enduring question. Prominent members like party co-convener Maggie Chapman are committed to working with social movements and other campaigners to promote radical democratic change. Alliances formed during the 2014 referendum have been built on and new groups and relationships established. This has generated connections between movement actors on topics like land reform, local government

greens : radical and relevant ? | 187

and electoral reform. Scottish Greens participate in the Scottish Independence Convention (SIC), a high-profile group of pro-­ independence campaigners (Chapman is a member of SIC’s executive). The evidence of recent years is that when the Scottish Greens cooperate with others, their relevance is enhanced. Participation in extra-parliamentary politics and a national movement for change has been advantageous for the party. Indeed, Greens are naturally connected to movements – they have always existed within wider social-movement politics.

Conclusion Two decades of devolution have been good to the Scottish Greens, creating a democratic springboard for the party. The party has gained relevance in a way that would have been impossible if the Scottish Parliament had not existed. The electoral system used to elect MSPs gives Greens a fighting chance of representation. These political-system factors matter and have aided the Greens. In Pederson’s terms, the party has passed the threshold of relevance, but its central challenge is to become more relevant. This is testing for the party because its proposals for change are fundamentally challenging to the economic and political orthodoxy. But in uncertain political times – some would say crisis – Green ideas are being taken more seriously. There is discussion in British politics of the Universal Basic Income Scheme, a Green proposal that was once regarded as unrealistic and ‘wacky’. In the 20 years since the creation of the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Greens have changed as a party. Evolving from a narrow ecological agenda to a more inclusive left-green position has been successful, and the party is now better at articulating and communicating its ideas. The Scottish Greens have also transitioned to become an unmistakably pro-independence party, creating opportunities to form alliances with others in a national movement for change. These relationships will be beneficial to the party as it deals with the turbulence of UK politics and prepares for the next stage of the pro-independence campaign in Scotland.

188 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

References Bennie, L. (2004), Understanding Political Participation: Green Party Membership in Scotland, Aldershot: Ashgate. Grant, Z. P. and J. Tilly (2018) ‘Fertile soil: explaining variation in the success of Green parties’, West European Politics, . McCormick, J. and E. McDowell (1999), ‘Environmental Beliefs and Behaviour in Scotland’, in E. McDowell and J. McCormick (eds), Environment Scotland: Prospects for Sustainability, Aldershot: Ashgate, 42–64. Mitchell, J., L. Bennie and R. Johns (2017), ‘Referendum as platform: the SNP and Scottish Green membership surge’, Political Insight, 8 (3), 16–19. Pederson, M. (1982), ‘Towards a New Typology of Party Lifespan and Minority Parties’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 5 (1), 1–16. Sartori, G. (1976), Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scottish Green Party (n.d.), ‘Policy’, . SPICe (Scottish Parliament Information Centre) (2019), ‘SPICe Briefing: Election 2016’, Edinburgh: SPICe, . van Haute, E. (2016), Green Parties in Europe, Abingdon: Routledge.

radical left since 1999 | 189

S IX T E E N

Socialism in a Cold Climate: The Radical Left since 1999 Ewan Gibbs

The twenty-first century began with cautiously optimistic forecasts from the Scottish left. A devolved parliament was set to deliver a promising climate in which to develop a prospectus for a more generous welfare settlement, to reverse the ‘private good public bad’ logic of New Labour, and a platform to critique market-driven globalisation. There were few illusions about the leadership of Scottish Labour who formed the first Scottish Executive in coalition with the Liberal Democrats. Unlike the Welsh Assembly, Scotland’s Parliament would not be an island of confident social democracy that put ‘clear red water’ between itself and London (Jones, 2014). It was this discrepancy between the experiences that had popularised devolution and the agenda of the Scottish Executive which set the genesis of opportunity felt by the forces of the radical left outside the Labour Party.

The left claim to devolution These forces were most significantly found in the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP). Devolution had shifted from being a contentious issue to becoming the ‘settled will’ of the Scottish people during the 1980s and 1990s under the auspices of intensified deindustrialisation, Thatcherite social policy and the ‘democratic deficit’. Predominant narratives in the emergent history of late-twentieth-century Scotland credit a broad ‘civic Scotland’ coalition of churches, trade unions,

190 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

local government and public- and third-sector actors with the heavy lifting which produced the Blair government’s commitment to devolution (Stewart, 2009). Yet, the radical left has justified claims of its own to moulding arguments for increased national autonomy. The longer roots of devolution were also shaped by workplace activism during the 1960s and 1970s (Phillips, 2008) and intellectuals responding to the demise of Marxist orthodoxies (Scothorne and Gibbs, 2017). Memories of the poll tax non-payment campaign were more immediate to perspectives in the late 1990s. A decade earlier the Thatcher government had inadvertently provided perfect storm making material for socialists and community activists. The AntiPoll Tax Federation (APTF), which operated largely through neighbourhood action committees, merged discontent over social policy and mass unemployment with objections to the imposition of an unpopular policy by a London government which was seen to lack political legitimacy. Poll tax non-payment confirmed disenchantment with the Labour Party as local authorities were financially and legally obliged to enforce a measure which harmed their traditional constituents. Labour also expelled the leadership of the APTF, who were members of the Trotskyist ‘Militant’ tendency (Gibbs, 2014). Following their expulsion and subsequent participation in local elections, a Scottish Militant Labour group was formed within Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District (Sheridan and McAlpine, 1994). These developments were formative to the leading cadre of what later became the SSP and demonstrated the electoral viability of a nationalist-leaning socialist alternative. The SSP achieved its initial aim of a presence at Holyrood when its principal public face, Tommy Sheridan, was returned as a Glasgow list member at the first Scottish parliamentary election in 1999. Following this Sheridan (2000) co-authored Imagine with his collaborator-in-chief Alan McCombes. The volume is demonstrative of the sunny expectations associated with Holyrood as well as the rough-and-ready sensibilities of the SSP. Sheridan was adamant that his party was not just for political meteorologists, insisting it would make the weather: his work was not ‘some academic treatise written for the benefit of economists or sociologists’ (2000: xv). The SSP MSP justified his credentials as a community activist

radical left since 1999 | 191

who had stood up for his principles through facing arrest for disrupting poll tax warrant sales. Sheridan committed to action ‘on all fronts’, not just the parliamentary. Imagine illuminates some of the major assumptions which have shaped the Scottish radical left under devolution. These relate not just to the doubting of electoral office’s efficacy but also core questions of strategy and presentation. Actor and SSP supporter Peter Mullan provided a foreword that stressed his manual working-class credentials by introducing himself as the ‘son of a nurse and a toolmaker’ and profiled himself a having been ‘a labourer in a bed-making factory’ (Sheridan and McCombes, 2000: vii–viii). Sheridan himself similarly lent on his family’s Govan heritage. Yet, the reader is reassured that ‘more or less everyone who works for a living’ is part of the working-class majority, before being informed, ‘The battle for socialism won’t be spearheaded by prosperous politicians or middle-class intellectuals but by those who have nothing to lose and everything to gain from the defeat of capitalism’ (Sheridan and McCombes, 2000: xvi; 154). Scottish tensions between structural analyses of class and cultural identity are a particularly acute variant of ‘authenticity’ politics which have grown in strength over the UK in recent years (Kennedy, 2018). The politics of class identity have represented a potentially powerful means of generating legitimacy for otherwise marginal left-wing voices. However, these gambits come with the significant potential bear traps of giving succour to (usually small-c) conservative values and conflict with emergent social structures. In effect they legitimate the prevailing perspective within Scottish academia and politics that the nation is increasingly affluent and middle class (McCrone, 2017). Social policy should then principally be concerned with the minority who can’t or won’t make the jump. It is within this environment that Darren ‘Loki’ McGarvey’s (2017) perspective on class flourished. His reading emphasises the divide between an ‘underclass’ minority and a culturally proficient and economically comfortable ‘middle class’. Though, as Dani Garavelli’s (2017) pointed review of Loki’s Orwell-prize-winning book, Poverty Safari, reflected, ‘social mobility in the 1960s and 1970s means many of the people who now live in affluent suburbs of the South Side, if not the West End, were raised in Govan or the Gorbals.’ Loki is,

192 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

however, in terms of presentations of class identity and cultural divides, following a well-trodden path on the Scottish left. It was also in evidence during the 2014 independence referendum. The Radical Independence Campaign (RIC) was keen to profile itself as a voice of tower blocks and peripheral housing schemes through its ‘mass canvasses’. Yet these areas house far lower proportions of Scotland’s population, and its working class, than they did in the age of mass public housing (Brooks, 2014). Within the varied mediums through which the Scottish left have presented class, facets of the ‘Labour Scotland’ which predominated across much of the Central Belt between the 1940s and 1980s are apparent (Hassan and Shaw, 2012). These dynamics are evident with regards to public tenancies in urban housing schemes, but also through the premium placed on affinities with manual occupations. Labour Scotland’s demise and the associated process of intensifying deindustrialisation during the 1980s and 1990s most prominently affected the Labour Party left, which was until recently reduced to internal marginality. It also proved nearly fatal to the Communist left which survives through a small rump successor party to the Communist Party of Great Britain, and the Morning Star newspaper (Foster, 2003). Labour Scotland’s decline also dislocated the certainties that grounded both the strategic and cultural perspective of socialist strategies predicated on a self-aware industrial working-class majority or at least plurality. This outlook was formative to much of the rest of the Scottish left, including those who built the SSP. Although he identifies as a socialist, unlike Sheridan, McGarvey does not align with specific left currents or activism, which perhaps itself is indicative of the direction that the Scottish left has taken in the last 20 years. Sheridan lost his credibility following his personally and politically disastrous decision to stake the future of his career and the SSP on suing the Murdoch press over allegations of sexual infidelity. These actions subsequently led to him being jailed for perjury. Sheridan’s ‘downfall’ was presented by his long-time ally Alan McCombes (2011) as principally the product of hubris and personal (mis)calculations. However, these arguments cannot counter Gall’s (2012) insights on the centrality of respectability to Sheridan’s profile, which was significantly bigger than the SSP’s.

radical left since 1999 | 193

The fatal path that he followed, including putting his comrades through an emotionally damaging court case and ruinous party split was therefore the product of a strategy that rested on an individual’s affability and character. The split in the SSP was a fatal episode for Scotland’s largest left-wing organisation. It had gained six MSPs at the 2003 election following its pivotal role in the anti-Iraq War protest movement in Scotland. Briefly it seemed that a leftwing, pro-independence formation was electorally viable. Later, long-term observers understood that the ‘rainbow parliament’ of 2003–7 was a rare convergence of multiple factors: Labour and SNP unpopularity, the anti-Iraq war protest movement and the aftermath of the high profile and impact of Sheridan and Robin Harper, the sole Scottish Green, in the first Scottish Parliament. All of which was unlikely to be repeated.

The political terrain after 2007 After 2007 and the election of the SNP the radical left broadly took shelter in familiar and safer ground. The ongoing work of peace campaigning, solidarity with migrants, anti-fascism, environmentalism and trade union representation continued and maintained crucial networks. Despite the global financial crash realignment took several years. Labour Party members continued to argue for a different path through the left grouping ‘Campaign for Socialism’ (CfS), but were sidelined with a very limited public voice. Electoral defeat in 2007 did little to change this despite ushering in an SNP government and the unthinkable sight of Scottish Labour in opposition. During 2010 protests developed in tandem with a UK-wide movement opposed to the implementation of student fees by the newly elected Conservative-led coalition government. Although the fees had no direct impact on them, Scottish students attended the  major demonstration in London on 10 November 2010 and were involved in direction action against the Conservative headquarters at Millbank as well as later organising their own protests. Significantly these events brought forward a generation of activists who had little, if any, direct political memory of pre-devolution Scotland. The election of a majority SNP government committed to

194 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

an independence referendum in May 2011 further altered the strategic landscape. Two years later, Cat Boyd and James Foley (2013: 17), key activists in RIC, would write optimistically about developing social movements, including the growth of student activism and campus feminism, which had coalesced around opposing austerity and then united under the banner of independence. There are evident elements of long continuities with the SSP whose split was presented as disastrous for the left. Strategic logic therefore lay in building unity on an anti-austerity version of independence. The RIC position assumed that the radical left would be able to seize the initiative from the centre-left SNP Scottish Government whose ‘contradictions must start to unravel’. A broader assumption, that within Scottish nationalism there is an irreconcilable leftward pressure that cannot be maintained in concert with the priorities of business, has proven enduring since at least the mid-twentieth century. In the early 1960s, the Scottish miners’ leader Lawrence Daly (1962) implored the labour movement to campaign for a Scottish Assembly which he anticipated would have a leftward-leaning Labour majority. In Imagine, Sheridan and McCombes (2000: 127) stridently stated that: The balance of forces in Scotland is more heavily weighted in favour of the working class than in Britain as a whole. The influence of socialism is deeper. The forces of right-wing conservatism are weaker. Social attitudes tend to be more progressive. The political centre of gravity is significantly further to the left.

The RIC more simply sloganised: ‘Britain is for the rich: Scotland can be ours’. Arguments centred on Scotland’s more fertile environment for sewing red seeds appear simplistically logical but are also counterintuitive. When both Sheridan and McCombes and Boyd and Foley were writing, a key part of their case was a ‘democratic deficit’ based on the fact Scotland voted Labour at general elections but received Conservative governments, despite the Labour Party being the villain of their pieces. More pressing perhaps is the assumption that Scottish nationalism would readily blow the wind leftwards. Nairn (1968: 11) warned socialists against relying on Scotland’s ‘gritty sense of equality’ which he identified as stemming

radical left since 1999 | 195

from hierarchical structures of authority: ‘Scotland is certainly a more egalitarian country than England, and in some ways a more violent one. It does not follow that she is a more revolutionary one.’ Under devolution Scotland may have experienced heightened elements of diversity and cultural acceptance but Hassan’s (2017) belated sunlit ‘swinging sixties’ have been accompanied by the dark clouds of entrenched government legitimacy. The ‘Roch Winds’ collective (Gallagher, Westwell and Scothorne, 2016) have most clinically analysed the ‘Scottish ideology’ through which the consent of the governed is most effectively garnered. Cross-society partnerships are founded on a shared assumption of the national interest which interlinks economic competitiveness and social justice. This perspective has reach far beyond elected chambers and effectively organises and legitimates the form of ‘roll out’ neo-­ liberalism which predominates within Scotland. This has been ably critiqued by Marxist opponents (Collins, 2013) and supporters of independence (Miller, 2010) but it remains the chief obstacle to constructing a counter-hegemonic radical left project. Despite this cold climate, activists braving the blizzard have been able to achieve significant incremental advances. Sustained campaigns over precarious work and conditions in the private rented sector are among the key achievements. Both ‘Better than Zero’ (Gallagher and Collins, 2018) and ‘Living Rent’ (2018) have engaged in forms of direct action that have organised low-paid workers and tenants. These key, overlapping, sections of Scotland’s young and precarious working class are developing a collective consciousness and gaining an increasingly loud voice through this mobilisation which has crossed both constitutional and party affiliations. At the level of presenting a more generalised political programme, in an unlikely turn of events, the much-maligned Labour Party now presents the best chance for a radical offer from a mainstream party in the devolution era. This opportunity was no doubt partially the product of external forces, such as the election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader and the stimulation it provided for the growth of the party across the rest of the UK. However, as Scothorne (2017) notes, Richard Leonard’s election as Scottish Labour leader in 2017 was

196 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

produced by the staying power of left activists around CfS and their enduring connections with the trade union movement. Leonard’s (Foster and Leonard, 2013) analysis of political economy stresses Scotland’s dangerous dependency on multinational enterprises and he has advanced an agenda based around redistributing wealth and workplace power. At this stage, though, Labour lacks a clear agenda for constitutional reform with which to synthesise these significant proposals for economic reform. Until one is developed it is difficult to see the party overcoming its position in third place and managing some form of synthesis with left-wing pro-independence voices. Making these not-inconsiderable tasks more challenging, Scottish Labour remains stubbornly less Corbynite than the party across the UK from constituency level upwards. In November 2017 ranks of workers wearing orange boiler suits descended on Holyrood from the BiFab yards in Burntisland, Fife, which they were presently occupying against closure. They rallied outside and set the press agenda for the day before First Minister’s Questions began. Their union leaders used language that confidently merged the interests of Scotland and the workforce. Months later, a much-vaunted Scottish Government deal was signed and the yards were handed over to a Canadian firm, after which they sat idle and workers were laid off. Devolution was heralded as an opportunity partially of the radical left’s making that would allow it to use the fusion of class and nation it had potently developed in the twentieth century. In practice most of its hopes have been frozen in a cold climate of liberal market economics and nationalist consensual politics. At the twentieth anniversary of the Scottish Parliament’s inauguration, there are some reasons to hope for warmth on the horizons. Emergent organisations dedicated to coordinating the precarious and mounting collective action, as well as the puncturing of the main parties’ unified commitment to capital, present significant opportunities. A popular language that can broach nationhood and offer a coherent vision of past, present and future awaits.

radical left since 1999 | 197

References Boyd, C. and J. Foley (2013), ‘Out of the Ghetto: Why Detoxifying the Left is the First Step to Revival’, in G. Gall (ed.), Scotland’s Road to Socialism: Time to Choose, Biggar: Scottish Left Review Press, 11–19. Brooks, L. (2014), ‘Scottish independence campaign: mass canvassing in Glasgow’s Gorbals’, The Guardian, 22 June, . Collins, C. (2013), ‘The State and the Demobilisation of Working-Class Communities’, in Bryan, P. and T. Kane (eds), Class, Nation and Socialism: The Red Paper on Scotland 2014, Glasgow: Glasgow Caledonian University Archives, 33–40. Daly, L. (1962), ‘Scotland on the Dole’, New Left Review, 17, 17–23. Foster, J. (2003), ‘Communist Renewal in Scotland, 1986–1990’, Scottish Labour History, 38, 75–93. Foster, J. and R. Leonard (2013), ‘The Economy’ in P. Bryan and T. Kane (eds), Class, Nation and Socialism: The Red Paper on Scotland 2014, Glasgow: Glasgow Caledonian University Archives, 10–35. Gallagher, C. and S. Collins (2018), ‘Brand Damage: Better than Zero and the Conditions of Company Fear’, Notes from Below, . Gall, G. (2012), Tommy Sheridan: From Hero to Zero? A Political Biography, Cardiff: Welsh Academic Press. Gallagher, C. A. Westwell and R. Scothorne (2016), Roch Winds: A Treacherous Guide to the State of Scotland, Edinburgh: Luath Press. Garavelli, D. (2017), ‘Working Class Hero or Zero? Review: Poverty Safari’, Herald, 28 October, . Gibbs, E. (2014), ‘“Civic Scotland” versus Communities on Clydeside: Poll Tax Non-Payment c.1987–1990’, Scottish Labour History, 49, 86–106. Hassan, G. (2017), ‘When were the Swinging Scottish Sixties?’, Scottish Review, 22 March, . Hassan, G. and E. Shaw (2012), The Strange Death of Labour Scotland, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Jones, J. G. (2014), The History of Wales, Cardiff: Cardiff University Press. Kennedy, J. (2018), Authentocrats: Culture, Politics and the New Seriousness, London: Penguin Random House. Living Rent (2018), ‘About’, Living Rent, . McCombes, A. (2011), Downfall: The Tommy Sheridan Story, Edinburgh: Birlinn. McCrone, D. (2017), The New Sociology of Scotland, London: Sage. McGarvey, D. (2017), Poverty Safari: Understanding the Anger of Britain’s Underclass, Edinburgh: Luath Press. Miller, D. (2010), ‘Who Rules Scotland? Neoliberalism, the Scottish Ruling Class and its Intellectuals’, in P. McCafferty, D. Miller and N. Davidson (eds), Neoliberal

198 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T Scotland: Class and Society in a Stateless Nation, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 92–136. Nairn, T. (1968), ‘Three Dreams of Scottish Nationalism’, New Left Review, 49, 3–18. Phillips, J. (2008), The Industrial Politics of Devolution: Scotland in the 1960s and 1970s, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Scothorne, R. (2017) ‘Short Cuts’, London Review of Books, 39, 24, 19. Scothorne, R. and E. Gibbs (2017), ‘Origins of the Present Crisis? The Emergency of “Left-Wing” Scottish Nationalism, 1956–1981’, in E. Smith and M. Worley (eds), Waiting for the Revolution: The British Far Left from 1956, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 163–81. Sheridan, T. and J. McAlpine (1994), A Time to Rage, Edinburgh: Polygon. Sheridan, T. and A. McCombes (2000), Imagine: A Socialist Vision for the 21st Century Edinburgh: Rebel Inc. Stewart, D. (2009), The Path to Devolution and Change: A Political History of Scotland Under Margaret Thatcher London: I. B. Tauris.

radical left since 1999 | 199

Part Three

The Wider Environment

scotland’s brexit blues | 201

S E V E NT E E N

Scotland’s Brexit Blues Kirsty Hughes

Introduction At the time of writing, early February 2019, the UK has entered a deep and acute political crisis as the Brexit deadline beckons. But even in advance of March 2019, Brexit has impacted on Scotland in multiple ways. Scotland – and Northern Ireland – voted Remain to the UK’s overall Leave vote. So the Brexit result and subsequent chaotic and shambolic political processes in the UK over the ensuing two and a half years have been highly alienating for the pro-Remain majority in Scotland. The Brexit process has also arguably undermined the devolution settlement or at least shown it to be weaker politically and in legal terms than many had thought (Hughes and Hayward, 2018). While Scottish voters have continued, according to a range of polls, to oppose Brexit across the independence–unionist divide, political parties have split decisively along this divide. So while the pro-­ independence SNP and Scottish Greens have backed Remain, the pro-Union Scottish Conservatives and Labour have backed Brexit after the vote, leaving just the Lib Dems as pro-Remain and pro the Union. Scotland has been hit, too, by the general slowdown in growth and investment that the uncertainty around, and fear of, Brexit has created. With the Scottish economy very reliant on EU citizens coming to work in Scotland, the potential future impact of Brexit on the economy and on population size has been of particular ­concern

202 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

to the Scottish Government. The Scottish Government (2018) has estimated that staying in the EU single market would reduce future growth, in 2030, by 2.7 per cent; a Canada-style free-trade deal would lower growth by 6.1 per cent; and, in a WTO ‘no deal’ outcome, growth would be 8.5 per cent lower. UK Government estimates were similar. The Scottish Government’s initial response to the Brexit vote was, to begin with, fairly strong and strategic. But that has rapidly given way to a more cautious approach – only eventually to be superseded again in the autumn of 2018 by a stronger, more pro-Remain, and pro a People’s Vote strategy. So in some sense the Scottish Government has come full circle in the first two and a half years since Brexit. But the actual Brexit process has, of course, moved on. The deepening and multiple splits in the Conservative party led by the end of 2018 to a situation where Theresa May pulled a vote on the Brexit deal on 11th December that she had finally signed off with the EU27 only two weeks before. When she reintroduced it in mid January, it was defeated by a massive 230 votes. But May didn’t resign and Corbyn’s no-confidence motion the next day failed. May’s painfully put together deal with the EU has a legally binding Withdrawal Agreement (European Commission, 2018), including an indefinite backstop to ensure the Irish border stayed open, and a Political Declaration (European Council, 2018) that is the opposite of definitive in terms of where the UK’s future relationship with the EU might go. EU leaders were appalled at May’s failure to hold a vote on her deal in December 2018 and, after May’s historically large defeat in January 2019, to secure a Commons majority for any route ahead. By late January, it was looking possible that the UK could still crash out with ‘no deal’ at all (and with there being no such thing as a ‘managed no deal’). Others were hoping Westminster might coalesce around a ‘Norway plus’ model or another referendum or an election – or even that, with some tweaks from Brussels, May’s deal could yet go through. By the end of January, May found support from her backbenchers for an amendment that aimed to remove the backstop she herself had negotiated and agreed in the EU–UK deal and replace it with

scotland’s brexit blues | 203

unspecified ‘alternative arrangements’. Whether the EU would blink and offer up substantive changes to the backstop, or the Tory Brexiteers would blink and accept some minor tweaks, or in fact the UK would crash out with no deal were all uncertain less than two months before Brexit day (a date that looked like it would have to be extended under any scenario other than a ‘no deal’ crashing out). In this deep political crisis, SNP MPs at Westminster were coordinating cross-party with the Lib Dems, Plaid Cymru and Greens – who also supported a People’s Vote and Remain – and to some considerable extent with Remain Tories and Remain Labour MPs too. Meanwhile, support for independence in Scotland over the first two and a half years, and more, of the Brexit process has held steady rather than providing any sharp Brexit bounce. Whether that might change if and when Brexit goes ahead remains an open and key question for Scotland – together with the question of the political impact in Scotland if Brexit is halted through a second referendum. A cross-party group of Scottish politicians also took a case successfully to the European Court of Justice on whether Article 50 is unilaterally revocable. The ECJ said, on 10 December 2018, that Article 50 could be unilaterally revoked as long as the decision was unequivocal and unconditional. This opened up another, if tricky, route to halting Brexit: the ‘unequivocal and unconditional’ condition means it couldn’t be used to pause the clock, then hold a referendum or debate more at Westminster. And staying in the EU without asking voters again looks to many like a highly undesirable approach. But if the UK faces crashing out of the EU with no deal in March, it provides an emergency route to safety. And it also means, if the UK asks and the EU agrees (at unanimity) to extend Article 50 – whether for an election, a referendum or to amend the political declaration – then after a vote for remain in a second referendum, the UK could stay in on its current terms.

Public opinion in Scotland on Brexit Scotland voted 62 per cent Remain to 38 per cent Leave in the 2016 referendum across all its 32 voting areas. Across the UK’s 12

204 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

regions and countries, Scotland was the most pro-Remain and one of only 3 of the 12 that voted Remain – the others being London and Northern Ireland. But by 2018, opinion polls were starting to show small but mostly sustained majorities for Remain across the UK. The YouGov tracker poll in December 2018 had a UK majority of 56 per cent saying the Leave decision in 2016 was wrong to 44 per cent right (YouGov, 2018b). Scottish support for Remain varied according to different polls but mostly seemed to move higher after 2016. A YouGov poll for the People’s Vote campaign in August 2018 had Scottish support for remain at 66 per cent and one by Survation in November put it at 67 per cent (YouGov 2018a; Survation, 2018b). The Scottish public has also shown much stronger support for a People’s Vote than across the UK – even as some UK-wide polls started to show support for another referendum as well (depending on how the question was phrased). The August 2018 YouGov poll had support in Scotland for a People’s Vote at 61 per cent, while a later Survation poll in November had it at 59 per cent (YouGov, 2018a; Survation, 2018a). Most striking across these different polls is how there is no obvious unionist–independence divide amongst Scottish voters on Brexit. Across SNP, Labour, Green and Lib Dem voters, there are clear majorities both for Remain and for a People’s Vote with only a majority of Conservative voters supporting Brexit and against another referendum. According to one YouGov poll support for Remain in August 2018 was, by Holyrood voting intention (and excluding Don’t Knows): SNP 79 per cent, Labour 74 per cent, Conservative 32 per cent, Lib Dem 79 per cent and Green 91 per cent (YouGov, 2018a). This pattern is repeated in support for a People’s Vote: SNP 75 per cent, Labour 70 per cent, Conservative 26 per cent, Lib Dem 75 per cent and Green 89 per cent. Yet, while SNP and Green voters figure strongly as in favour of Remain and another EU referendum, there is a significant minority of SNP and 2014 Yes voters who supported Leave. In the same poll, 69 per cent of Yes voters in 2014 supported Remain in August 2018, with 31 per cent supporting Leave. No voters in 2014 overall were 61 per cent Remain in this 2018 poll.

scotland’s brexit blues | 205

So there is a small difference in the tendency of Yes voters to be more pro-Remain than No voters. This is a tension that the Scottish Government has tried to handle in different ways (as discussed further below). Meanwhile, it is clear that Labour – as elsewhere in the UK – is not in line with its voters given Labour’s acceptance of Brexit and, as of autumn 2018, fudged refusal to clearly back a People’s Vote.

Scottish politics of Brexit Opposition at Holyrood At the start of December 2018, the Scottish Parliament voted 92 to 29 to oppose Theresa May’s Brexit deal and to oppose a ‘no deal’ Brexit. This was a cross-party position agreed by the SNP, Labour, Lib Dems and Greens – with just the Conservatives defending May’s deal. Despite the differences of view across the four parties opposing May’s deal as to what should then happen – a different Brexit or a People’s Vote – this was nonetheless an important and symbolic vote (and the Welsh Assembly also took a similar stance against the deal). It was not just at Westminster that May’s deal was unpopular and opposed. This vote recalls an earlier vote of the Scottish Parliament a week after the Leave vote in June 2016. Then the Parliament voted 92 to 0 to look for ways to keep Scotland in the EU or in its single market – again crossing party lines and unionist–independence lines with just the Conservatives abstaining. Meanwhile, at the start of November 2018, Holyrood voted 66 to 28 for a People’s Vote – backed by most of the SNP, the Lib Dems, Greens and with the Conservatives opposed and Labour mostly abstaining but, significantly, with former leader Kezia Dugdale voting in favour.

Scottish Government policy evolves This vote for another EU referendum reflected a major shift in both the SNP and Greens’ positions in October 2018 (at their respective party conferences). In the SNP, there was concern in some quarters

206 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

at Nicola Sturgeon’s announcement that she now favoured another vote – some were worried at such a vote setting a precedent not for a second independence referendum but for a vote on any divorce deal after a successful independence vote. Yet if there is another EU vote – depending on the question on the ballot paper – it could well look more like a repeat referendum (not least since May’s deal leaves vague and open the nature of the future UK–EU relationship). And indeed May, in January 2019, expressed her concern in the Commons that a second EU vote would encourage those wanting to see the ‘break up’ of the UK. After the Leave vote in 2016, the Scottish Government took a number of rapid steps that looked strategic compared to the confusion in London as Cameron resigned and the Conservatives had yet to agree a new leader. Nicola Sturgeon made a rapid visit to Brussels to see Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker. She set up a ‘Standing Council’ on Europe, and made a speech that July setting out her five key red lines covering democracy, economic prosperity, social protection, solidarity and influence (Sturgeon, 2016). But that strategic approach rather gave way to a more technocratic one focused in particular on how to keep Scotland in the EU’s single market even if the UK were to leave it (Scottish Government, 2016). This was rejected by the UK Government in March 2017, at the same time as it triggered Article 50. Days earlier, Nicola Sturgeon had made the decision to call another independence referendum given the damage and upheaval Brexit would cause to Scotland. But May knocked that back with her ‘now is not the time’ rebuke and went on to call the 2017 UK election where she lost her majority and the SNP lost 21 seats. While the Scottish Government continued to argue that its preferred option was for the whole UK to stay in the EU, its focus – and the detail of its several policy papers on Brexit – was rather on Scotland and/or the UK staying in the EU’s single market and customs union (customs union being one of the preferences as long as both the rest of the UK and Scotland were in it – to avoid border problems). This seemed, at least in part, to reflect the view that a ‘soft’ Brexit could appeal to pro-independence supporters and SNP voters whether they are Leave or Remain. It also reflected

scotland’s brexit blues | 207

the underlying view, of at least some, that Brexit is definitely going to happen. May’s talks – and the Withdrawal Agreement – also show clearly that neither a ‘soft’ nor ‘hard’ Brexit, apart from the major democratic deficit it would entail, would leave the UK or Scotland in a strong position in terms of fisheries, with the EU insisting that fisheries are outside the UK-wide basic customs union in the backstop and so fisheries products would face tariffs unless and until a deal on access to waters was agreed. With the EU playing hardball, a Norway outcome starts to look less attractive, not least if it also could mean SNP MPs voting with Tory MPs to get Brexit over the line. And at the same time, the prospects of halting Brexit altogether starts to look much stronger. The political outcry at UK level over the backstop for Northern Ireland also casts a strong light on how difficult border issues can be with the UK outside the EU’s single market and customs union – including between Britain and Northern Ireland given the regulatory differentiation the backstop allows for Northern Ireland. For the SNP, there are lessons in all this as to how tricky border issues could become for an independent Scotland if the UK did leave the EU.

Devolution weakened At Holyrood, the argument over the return of EU powers in devolved areas became an intense focus of the Scottish Government in 2017–18. This resulted in the Scottish Parliament refusing consent to the EU Withdrawal Bill (then Act) and passing its own Continuity Bill. This was challenged by the UK Government. By December, the Supreme Court finally ruled that the Continuity Bill was largely within the competence of Holyrood but by then the UK Government had amended the EU Withdrawal Bill so that a number of clauses of the Continuity Bill were no longer valid. The Scottish Government claimed victory but also underlined how little consideration Westminster and the UK Government were giving to Holyrood. The lack of in-depth consultation and communication on much of the Brexit process and the ignoring of Holyrood’s refusal of

208 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

legislative consent on the EU Withdrawal Bill all added to a growing sense of devolved structures being weakened and shown to be weak in the face of Brexit while the UK Government emphasised centralisation. In a paper comparing Scotland and Northern Ireland’s experiences of the Brexit process, Hughes and Hayward (2018) concluded as follows on the weakening of devolution in both: Overall, the UK Government’s approach to Brexit has emphasised the unitary and centralised nature of UK politics, working against rather than with the grain of devolved politics. The fact that Westminster (after the Supreme Court case at the end of 2016) had a vote on Article 50, but the devolved administrations did not, reinforces the clear image that devolution remains in the gift of Westminster rather than being a firmly entrenched part of a constitutionally devolved UK. The push for a unitary Brexit reinforces this, as does the stand-off over the EU Withdrawal Bill – the essentially centralised nature of the UK political system has been firmly underlined.

Overall, the Scottish Government has had then a range of policy positions on Brexit – from independence in the EU, to Scotland remaining in the EU’s single market in a differentiated Brexit (not forthcoming despite a differentiated backstop for Northern Ireland in the Withdrawal Agreement), and has campaigned for the whole UK to stay in the EU’s single market and customs union, and for the UK to stay in the EU through a People’s Vote with a Remain option. Almost at the end of 2018, the Scottish Government and SNP MPs at Westminster finally made a notable pivot away from emphasising the two options of a People’s Vote or a ‘soft’ Brexit of staying in the single market and customs union. As the UK’s political crisis intensified, the SNP chose to speak out strongly (if belatedly) for an end to the increasingly damaging Brexit shambles and to move to another vote with the aim of staying in the EU (with ‘soft’ Brexit less or not visible at all). The earlier approach – stressing the protection of devolved powers and a ‘soft’ Brexit compromise – which some insiders had termed ‘strategic passivity’, at least with respect to not opposing Brexit full on – had turned into a stronger, more active stance as the Brexit endgame began to unfold.

scotland’s brexit blues | 209

Scottish Conservatives and Labour No such move has been visible from Scottish Labour or Conservatives. While the Lib Dems and Green parties have broadly reflected the views of their voters on Brexit, the Scottish Conservatives and Labour politicians have chosen to follow the lead of their respective UK party leaders and to argue that the Brexit result must be respected. In the case of the Scottish Conservatives, this is at least in line with the majority of their voters (according to the polls). Nonetheless, as the Brexit shambles have unfolded, and with ever-deeper divisions within the Tory party, Ruth Davidson, as party leader, and David Mundell, as Scottish Secretary, have at no point stood up to argue for reconsidering Brexit. Even when some UK Cabinet members were said to be arguing for resolving the Brexit stand-off at Westminster with another referendum, the Scottish Tories have instead been split over softer or harder versions of Brexit. Similarly, Scottish Labour, under first Kezia Dugdale and then Richard Leonard as leader, has broadly followed Corbyn’s party line. However, and in contrast to the Scottish Lib Dems, Scottish Labour did back Sturgeon’s proposal for a differentiated single-­ market deal for Scotland in 2016 and 2017 (something that the Lib Dems claimed was really a manoeuvre aimed at increasing support for independence). Nonetheless, overall, Labour has been substantially out of line with the preferences of its voters in Scotland. And while some individual Scottish politicians have spoken out against the ‘jobs first’ Brexit line and come out in support of Remain and a People’s Vote, most have not. So little pressure has come from Scottish Labour to push Jeremy Corbyn and the Shadow Cabinet to back another vote with Remain on the ballot – even while such pressures come from elsewhere in the UK Labour Party and from its supporters.

Looking ahead Scotland has not been bitterly divided over Brexit in the same way England and Wales have been due to its strong pro-Remain majority. But if Brexit goes ahead, Scottish voters are likely to feel even

210 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

more alienated. The impact on support for independence is uncertain but likely to be felt both in political debates and to some extent in the polls – more so, the more chaotic Brexit is. Even if Brexit is halted, deep political divisions are likely to remain in England, and the separateness of Scottish politics may be accentuated. Where the UK goes next is unclear as of early 2019. Might May’s or another deal stagger over the line? Will there be a caretaker UK Government to manage a second EU referendum, an election where Labour becomes a minority government and needs SNP support? Or, if the UK careers towards a ‘no deal’ Brexit, could Westminster revoke Article 50 without a referendum? Wherever Brexit takes the UK next, Scottish politics has been strongly impacted by Brexit and that will continue to play out in the coming year.

References European Commission (2018), ‘Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, as agreed at negotiators’ level’, 14 November, Brussels. European Council (2018), ‘Political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom’, 22 November, Brussels. Hughes, Kirsty and Hayward, Katy (2018), ‘Brexit, Northern Ireland and Scotland: Comparing Political Dynamics and Prospects in the Two “Remain” Areas’, Edinburgh: Scottish Centre on European Relations Policy Paper. Sturgeon, Nicola (2016), ‘Speech on Scotland and Europe’, IPPR Scotland, 25 July 2016, . Scottish Government (2016), ‘Scotland’s Place in Europe’, December, Edinburgh: Scottish Government. Scottish Government (2018), ‘Scotland’s Place in Europe: People, Jobs, Investment’, Edinburgh: Scottish Government. Survation (2018a), ‘Survation on Behalf of Scotland for a People’s Vote Poll’, 1 November, . Survation (2018b), ‘Survation on Behalf of Scotland in Union Poll’, 15 November, . YouGov (2018a), ‘YouGov/People’s Vote Campaign Results’, Fieldwork 8–14 August, . YouGov (2018b), ‘EU Tracker Questions (GB)’, 5 December, .

europe | 211

E IGH T E E N

Europe David Gow

Introduction Scotland is a self-styled ‘normal’, outward-looking European nation with a long history of commercial, cultural links to mainland Europe going back 1,000 years. The historian Tom Devine calls this ‘a total meshed experience’ (Devine, 2017). Scotland, he adds, is ‘less insular’ than England and its relations with the Continent are ‘wider and deeper’ – even than those with England. Certainly, in the two decades since the devolution settlement and the return of a Scottish Parliament, a long-standing diaspora from these shores to Europe has begun to be matched by a European in-migration that has boosted the population to a record 5.4 million from 5.1 million in 1998. Twenty years ago, some 40,000 EU nationals (plus 22,000 Irish) lived and worked here; ten years ago, it was 79,000; now the figure is 235,000 (Sturge, 2018). All of Scotland’s population growth over the next ten years was (pre that Brexit vote) expected to come from migration, much of it from the EU27. Restaurants and hotels are largely staffed by EU nationals who are also active in public administration, health and education – and (Scottish Government, 2017) provide 3 per cent of third sector employees. EU staff account for 11 per cent of all staff in Scotland’s 19 higher education institutions; this cohort of over 5,000 staff make up 17 per cent of academic staff and 24.8 per cent of researchonly staff, Universities Scotland (2017) says. Scottish streets

212 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

resound to conversations in Greek, German, Polish, Portuguese, Slovak. Without these voices, it is widely acknowledged, Scotland’s economy would be damaged, its public services severely curtailed, its intellectual output diminished. Yet this Europeanisation of everyday Scottish life has, this chapter will argue, not brought a congruent immersion of Scottish economic and political debate in mainstream continental discussions. Free movement of labour, goods, capital and services has not come with free movement of ideas. Au contraire. British – and Scottish – public discourse is overwhelmingly inward-looking. Even among ‘pro-Europeans’ that discourse is steeped in exceptionalism or worse: the expectation that the rest of Europe will ‘follow our lead’. The Scottish Government, led by the Scottish National Party since 2007 or for more than half of Holyrood’s lifetime, has not helped in this regard (though undoubtedly more than its rivals, especially Conservatives and Labour). The guiding principle of ‘independence in Europe’, fathered by Alex Salmond, remains vague or even vacuous; it has no deep roots in Scottish politics and culture. Rather, this chapter will argue, while the past 20 years may have witnessed a renewal of self-confidence, the arguments, notably in the four to five years since the independence referendum that was hailed as a ‘festival of politics’, have retreated into parochialism, nay provincialism.

Children of the Enlightenment It is hard not to remain beguiled by the extraordinary scale of the Scottish contribution to the European ‘century of lights’ as the French put it, but, equally, self-deluding to imagine that scale is still intact. ‘We look to Scotland for all our ideas of civilisation’, wrote Voltaire. Thomas Jefferson: ‘So far as science is concerned, no place in the world can pretend to a competition with Edinburgh’. Arthur Herman, ‘not a Scot or even of Scottish descent’, prefaced his book on the Scottish Enlightenment with paeans of praise: ‘When we gaze out on a contemporary world shaped by technology, capitalism and modern democracy, and struggle to find our place as individuals in it, we are in effect viewing the world as the Scots did.’ (Herman, 2001)

europe | 213

The first century of the Union, drawing on the long history of Scottish intellectual exposure to Europe – Devine often says at least 30 continental universities were attended by Scots between 1500 and 1707 (Devine, 2016b) – witnessed that internationalist efflorescence in Scottish thinking, culture and science that is unparalleled to this day. Yet, two centuries later, after a disproportionate contribution to the rise and fall of the British empire, Scots had become consumed by self-doubt to the point of self-loathing. Tom Nairn, in The Break-Up of Britain (1977), would write of his fellows as ‘cramped, stagnant, backward-looking, parochial’ (Craig, 2016). Thirty years later, in Brussels, the then new First Minister Alex Salmond, told an audience in Scotland House on the 90th anniversary of Passchendaele: Scotland has a rich European heritage – it was always true that Scots travelled and studied and taught on the continent of Europe. It is also true that so much of Scottish intellectual life has benefitted from and indeed has influenced countries across the continent. That legacy of engagement is what I want to recapture. (Salmond, 2007)

‘Rediscovering the sense of internationalism’, as he put it, has proved a bridge too far in a country obsessed with the national question and domestic constitutional arrangements to the detriment of virtually everything else. Of course, there are plenty of outward-looking thinkers but they tend to be non-Scots or, in the case of two of our leading economists, Mark Blyth and Angus Deaton, based in the US. It is hard to think of a political scientist or p ­ hilosopher who is setting the intellectual pace for a ­post-­neo-liberal democratic order that goes beyond the binary ‘nativist’ versus ‘globalist’ prism. Primary self-standing Scottish think tanks, pace the nationalist Common Weal and the Scottish Centre on European Relations (of which I am a director), are absent or limited in scope and reach through lack of funding. With a few rare exceptions, Scottish journalists and the media they work in are mired in provincialism. The creative sector, especially rock and pop, emerges alone as truly internationalist – and influential. Political scientists Michael Keating and Malcolm Harvey summed up this sorry state of affairs:

214 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

In recent decades, Scotland has been reconstituted as a political community and an arena for public policymaking but the fear of falling back into the old stereotypes has inhibited the development of new visions for the nation and its place in the world. (Keating and Harvey, 2014)

The work (and output) of the Scottish Government’s Standing Council on Europe, set up three years ago (2016), like that of the older (2007) Council of Economic Advisers, is pretty well hidden from view, with no wider resonance beyond the virtual space in which both meet. The Scottish Parliament’s Culture, Tourism, Europe and External Affairs Committee seems largely to talk to itself and government.

Independence in Europe The SNP adopted this policy – and moved left – at its 1988 conference to offset charges of favouring separatism (Devine, 2016b). This was the same year that the ‘Claim of Right’ with its call for the ‘concentration of power that masquerades as “the Crown-inParliament”’ to be ‘broken up’ was issued. Three decades later, and 20 years since the restored Scottish Parliament was reopened, the notion of ‘independence in Europe’ remains sketchy – and not without its critics inside the SNP itself. Similarly, the masquerade continues largely uninterrupted. At one level, it’s obvious what it means: an independent Scotland as the 29th (or 28th) EU member state. Salmond said as much in that 2007 speech in Brussels: ‘We recognise the success of so many small countries in Europe, and we aspire to the independent membership of the EU that they enjoy’. Certainly, the rise of Scottish nationalist aspirations within a European/EU context was aided by the collapse of the Soviet Union (1989–92) and independence movements and achievements in smaller ex-communist states such as the Baltics, Slovakia and Slovenia. These were among the A8 central and eastern European countries that acceded to the EU in 2004, prompting an economic convergence (continuing but uneven) towards the EU15. The non-EU economic and financial successes of Norway and (pre2008 crisis) Iceland undoubtedly spurred pro ‘independence in Europe’ (EU or EEA) sentiments (Happold, 1999).

europe | 215

Equally, the social democratic accomplishments in the three EU Nordic states, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, in terms of equality and income distribution combined with high degrees of competitiveness provided a benchmark to aim for. Ireland, lacking a comprehensive welfare state and driven by low corporate/ high personal taxes and flexible/deregulated labour and financial markets to attract foreign investors, provided a (for some) attractive ­alternative – neo-liberal – pole. (The overall ‘arc of prosperity’ favoured by Salmond). But the years since 1999, especially since the banking/sovereign crisis of 2009 onwards, have seriously undermined the very notion of independence in Europe while its proponents, notably the SNP/ Scottish Government, have failed to reinvent it for the chaotic contemporary world we live in. What’s more, as we discuss below, the social democratic model that lies behind it is in ruins all over Europe and many of the parties that saw it come to fruition in post-war Europe, notably in the trentes glorieuses (1945–75), face extinction. This appears to have passed the SNP and other pro-­ independence movements by: they are by and large wedded to an outmoded model. As Keating and Harvey (2014) argue, the more small states bolster their independence by joining multi-lateral organisations (such as NATO or the EU) the more they ‘compromise’ their sovereignty. Scotland may have emerged as a semi-autonomous substate within the EU, no doubt en route to greater self-determination and perhaps, ultimately, post-Brexit independence, but none of the inevitable trade-offs has been defined, let alone decided. Why, indeed, push for sovereignty then pool it at once with, say, NATO or subject it to the European Semester and imposed structural reforms (aka internal devaluation or wage cuts), let alone the one-size-fitsall Germany monetary policy of the European Central Bank. Why, indeed, opt, as Salmond proposed in 2014, for the monarchy? ‘Independence in Europe’ comes at a price, self-imposed or not. Latvia, which embraced the neo-liberal policy model entirely, has already lost a quarter of its population since 1991. ‘The UN predicts that by 2050, it will have lost an additional 22 per cent of its current population—second only to Bulgaria—and by 2100, 41 per cent.’ (Ragozin, 2018) Estonia and Lithuania are expected to lose a

216 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

third of their people by the century’s end. Post-2008 Latvia’s GDP contracted by a fifth in two years; average monthly wages are even now just €700 (Sommers, 2018). After wasting the first 40 years of independence (Fitzgerald, 2018), Ireland is now enjoying growth rates of 9 per cent a year – the rate of unemployment is 5.7 per cent but of relative poverty as high as 16.5 per cent (Keilthy, 2018).

The question of Scottish social democracy Apart from the lazy assumption that Scots are more egalitarian, socially liberal and friendly towards foreigners than the English, a common element of our political discourse is that we are, well, naturally European social democrats. Sturgeon and social democrat are often elided. And, indeed, 20 years of Holyrood have seen considerable policy attention paid to education, health and welfare differentials – with unsatisfactory results. Inequality has risen in recent years (Ferret journalists, 2018). Part of the enduring problem is that the policy debate is framed in terms more relevant to the 1990s or even 1970s than now. Scottish political discourse is not solely divided between pro- and anti-Union but between liberalism and, effectively, corporatism. But the predominant tone is one that stresses old-fashioned government intervention and state spending to redress social ills and injustices such as unequal educational and health outcomes and inequality more generally. Where are the radical thinkers ­re-imagining the welfare state? Across mainland Europe, at the same time, social democracy is in crisis, with parties that once ruled countries such as France, Germany and the Netherlands now polling in the lower teens or even below 10 per cent. Social democratic parties are losing votes both to far right (and left) populists such as Alternative für Deutschland and La France Insoumise as well as to the Greens. But little or none of this affects the Scottish debate whose main protagonists appear to have zero contact with, let alone influence upon, the arguments taking place on, say, eurozone reform or social Europe, on Big Tech taxation or the platform economy. The arguments on Europe have by and large been reduced to a very defensive and cautious anti-Brexit stance.

europe | 217

A nation and people that once set the intellectual and cultural pace in Europe, guiding its political and economic development, is said by pro-independence protagonists to have regained interest and sympathy in mainland Europe. This writer finds scant evidence of this. Rather, the EU27 pays far more attention to, say, Ireland or Latvia. These small member countries are, of course, independent sovereign states – unlike Scotland whose voice and interests have been ignored or brushed aside, notably since June 2016.

Conclusion Ten years ago, a book (Jeffery and Mitchell, 2009) analysing the first decade of the Scottish Parliament made virtually no mention of the European dimension in Scottish politics. A further ten years down the line there is no doubt that Scotland has become more Europeanised, largely through the arrival of tens of thousands of EU nationals as students, workers/professionals and, of course, tourists. The Scottish Government has opened more channels to the EU27 and some national capitals. The electorate showed in the Brexit referendum it sees EU membership as welcome. But the Parliament and MSPs cannot claim to have significantly influenced public opinion or to have rethought public policy options despite 45 years of EU membership and two decades of devolution. The binary argument over the constitution – what one author calls the ‘unsettled will’ of the Scottish people (Craig, 2016) – has crowded and drowned out all others.

References Craig, C. (2016), ‘Unsettled will: cultural engagement and Scottish independence’, Observatoire de la société britannique, 18, 15–36. Devine, T. (2016a), Independence or Union: Scotland’s Past and Scotland’s Present, London: Allen Lane. Devine, T. (2016b), ‘Scotland and Europe: the past shaping the present?’, University of Edinburgh lecture, 30 September. Devine, T. (2017), ‘The end of Scotland’s long love affair with Europe,’ The National, 5 March. Ferret journalists (2018), ‘Claim wealth inequality in Scotland has risen is true,’ The Ferret, 29 January.

218 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T Fitzgerald, J. (2018), ‘The Phoenix and the Ashes: 60 years of Irish economic policy,’ Longfield Lecture, University of Cork, 18 October. Happold, M. (1999), Scotland Europa: Independence in Europe, London: Centre for European Reform. Herman, A. (2001), The Scottish Enlightenment. The Scots’ Invention of the Modern World, London: Harper Perennial. Jeffrey, C. and J. Mitchell (2009), The Scottish Parliament 1999–2009: The First Decade, Edinburgh: Luath Press/Hansard Society. Keating, M. and M. Harvey (2014), Small Nations in a Big World, Edinburgh: Luath Press. Keilthy, T. (2018), ‘Ireland must finally address the real causes of poverty,’ Irish Times, 29 June. Nairn, T. (1977), The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism, London: New Left Books. Ragozin, L. (2018), ‘Europe’s Depopulation Time Bomb is Ticking in the Baltics’, Bloomberg News, 20 April. Salmond, A. (2007), ‘90th Anniversary of the Battle of Passchendaele,’ Brussels, 11 July. Scottish Government (2017), ‘The contribution of EEA citizens to Scotland: response to the Migration Advisory Committee call for evidence’, . Sommers, J. (2018), ‘No People, Big Problem: Democracy and its Discontents in Latvia’s National Elections,’ Social Europe, 17 October. Sturge, G. (2018), ‘House of Commons Briefing Paper No SN06077’, London, 24 August. Universities Scotland (2017), ‘Brexit and beyond: prospects for EU nationals working at Scottish universities’, 27 October, .

independence and union revisited | 219

NINE T E E N

Independence and Union Revisited: Recent Interpretations in Scottish History, Literature and Politics Colin Kidd In the two decades since the establishment of the Scottish Parliament, academics have reconfigured central aspects of Scotland’s culture and history. They have redescribed the characteristics of nationalism and unionism, as well as redrawing the contours and limits of autonomy, sovereignty and the nation state. All have been reformatted in some degree, whether subtly or in obviously important ways. These new interpretations called into question received ideas about both nationhood and the Union. In particular, historians of Scotland – or certainly a vanguard among them – began to see both Scottish nationhood and Britishness as fluid, contingent, and mutable. Identities, it seemed, were as much the product of circumstance, including external relationships, as they were direct expressions of long-standing underlying national characteristics. The principal change that we have seen in academic discussion of nationhood is a shift away from what we might term essentialism: the assumption that there is some irreducible, unchanging essence of Scottishness which finds expression – a unitary expression, indeed – throughout Scotland’s history, whether in its culture or its politics. Why, we might ask, did the SNP think it propitious to hold a referendum in 2014, the seven hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn? Is there a suggestion that the values and interests of fourteenth- and twenty-first-century Scots possess enduring features in common? The political classes as a whole, and a shrinking – though far from negligible – cohort of our academics, still think in terms of essences, of deep, underlying continuities in

220 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Scotland’s being and self-image as a nation from the medieval to the modern eras. However, this kind of thinking no longer passes muster in the most rigorous quarters of academic life.

Imagining Scotlands Of course, this transformation owed very little to the fact of the Parliament’s existence or to the doings of Scotland’s politicians. Indeed, although academics in Scotland applied many of these new concepts directly to the Scottish situation, several of these reformulations which appeared in Scottish historiography, literary criticism and political science had their origins outside the country, and were part of the international currency of academic enquiry. Highly influential here were Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983) – and its insight that all nations involved imagining entities that were larger than those perceived in immediate face-to-face contact – and Linda Colley’s argument in Britons (1992) that the British nation was a modern creation of eighteenth-century warfare with Catholic France. We must also allow make due allowance for the pace of change in academic life. Some of the works mentioned below were published in the early 1990s, a few years before the establishment of the devolved Parliament. Nevertheless, academic work is not read or digested overnight on publication. Few works of history or literary criticism are instant sensations. Their ideas take time to percolate into reviews, then into academic thinking, into further essays and books and into lectures delivered to students. Many of the works published in the early and mid 1990s were only having their full impact in academic life by the time the Parliament was up and running. The foundations of this major transformation were laid earlier in the 1970s by the expatriate US-based New Zealander, J. G. A. Pocock, who began to reimagine the historical relationships of the four nations of the British ‘archipelago’ (Pocock, 1975). However, Pocock’s project was daunting. Historians up to that point had convenient well-demarcated rigs, and were disinclined to venture too far from these comfort zones. English historians of that time now seem in retrospect complacently, indeed arrogantly, Anglocentric. Scottish, Welsh and Irish historians were blinkered in their own

independence and union revisited | 221

parochial fashion, tending to focus narrowly on internal developments within each nation. Thus, it took some time for Pocock’s call to arms to produce volunteers willing to tackle the demands of mastering and bridging multiple historiographies. In general, it was younger generations of historians who broke the logjam. Pocock’s centre of gravity was in seventeenth- and eighteenth-­century history, and it was here that the new British history achieved some of its earliest successes. A visible point of contact between English, Scottish and Irish historiographies was the English Civil Wars of the 1640s, which were reimagined in the 1980s and 1990s as the Wars of the Three Kingdoms or the British Wars of Religion (Russell, 1991). The Unions of 1603 and 1707 also began to attract more attention, in part – but not only – because of the quartercentenary of the Union of the Crowns in 2003 and the tercentenary of the Union of Parliaments in 2007 (Smout, 2005; Miller, 2005). Here there were striking new developments which mapped for the first time the ideological contexts of the Unions (Mason, 1994; Robertson, 1995), and complicated naïve assumptions about the extent to which Scottish public opinion at the time of the Union of 1707 can be straightforwardly gauged from petitions and addresses (Bowie, 2007). Chris Whatley’s major reinterpretation of the Union of 1707 broke away from assumptions about high political self-interest and office-grubbing, and pointed towards a principled Whig– Presbyterian case for Union on the basis of shared Revolution principles (Whatley, 2007). The reconceptualising of union also owed much to the insights of John Elliott, who showed that, far from the nation state being the standard unit of government in the early modern era, much more common was the composite state or multiple monarchy in which a single dynasty, sometimes imperial, ruled a multi-ethnic patchwork of distinct nationalities acquired, variously, by marriage, conquest and treaty (Elliott, 1992). England’s troubled relations with its satellites was far from unusual, indeed close to early modern norms, something brought more decisively into focus with Elliott’s more recent work on the vexed histories of Scotland and Catalonia with their larger, more assertive neighbours (Elliott, 2018). There was also growing recognition – in certain quarters at least

222 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

– that the standard literary identification of Scottish self-expression with Jacobitism was overly simplistic. Liam McIlvanney’s Burns the Radical (2002) reinserted the Ayrshire bard into a more convincing ideological context, that of the later Covenanting tradition of the south-western heartland and its reworkings in the commonwealth idiom of radical Whiggism. The rediscovery of an enduring Covenanting version of Scottish nationhood spilled over into other aspects of Scottish studies, in James Coleman’s intriguing discussion of the politics of memory and commemoration in nineteenth-century Scotland (Coleman, 2014), and in the ingenious work of the social scientist Jonathan Hearn, on the Covenanting inflections of modern Scottish political discourse. (Hearn, 2000) The early medieval era which preceded the formal consolidation and full territorial reach of the kingdom of Scotland also proved highly propitious for the new British history. Here the most important early initiatives in reimagining medieval four-nations history were taken by the Welsh historian Rees Davies (Davies, 2000), but the revolution he inaugurated was given a further dramatic overhaul at the hands of the most imaginative and ingenious historical scholar Scotland has produced in our times. Dauvit Broun’s work deconstructs the basic building blocks of four-nations history to rediscover an early-medieval Alba whose geographical meanings were confined to north-east Scotland between the Forth and the Moray Firth; a high-medieval bishopric of Glasgow which was self-consciously the descendant of the Welsh kingdom of Strathclyde (Broun, 2007); and a Scottish kingdom which traced its ethnic descent from Ireland (Broun, 1999). Broun’s work subtly but significantly reframes medieval Scottish identities from the era preceding the War of Independence. These identities were far from homogeneous, and bore marked Irish and Welsh inflections. Broun himself was nationalist in his politics, but his rigorous scholarship served to qualify nationalist assumptions about the origins, character and seamless continuity of Scottish nationhood.

History and politics However, it was developments in modern history and politics which had the greatest potential to shape wider political thinking

independence and union revisited | 223

about independence and union. No formulation has done more to break down the rigid categories of Scottish historiography than Graeme Morton’s influential term of art, unionist-nationalism. The National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights of the 1850s was, as Morton showed, a movement for the rectification of Scottish grievances within the Union (Morton, 1999). Then, how should it be described, as nationalist or unionist, or more accurately as unionist-nationalist? Of course, nobody has ever presented himor herself at the hustings as a unionist-nationalist, but the term accurately conveys the hybridity of so many political positions in the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, and has become indispensable in Scottish history. Unionist-nationalism seemed to capture a compelling truth about modern Scottish politics: that so much political debate, certainly on constitutional and territorial questions, involved politicians who were neither outright Anglicisers, nor outright separatists, but unionists who variously supported, say, a devolved assembly or administrative devolution or the repatriation of the Stone of Destiny, and nationalists who wished to gain greater traction, salience or autonomy for Scotland within larger supra-­ national political or economic entities such as the British empire, a looser Union of the Crowns, a social union, or the European Union (Kidd, 2008). The concept of unionist-nationalism seemed to catch the multiple, subtle scents and tastes which existed beneath the powerful flavours which predominated in Scottish politics. After all, autonomy was not a straightforward function of nominal independence. Lindsay Paterson argued that nineteenth-century Scotland enjoyed as much real autonomy within the Union as some of Europe’s smaller independent states (Paterson, 1994). Within the field of jurisprudence, Neil MacCormick’s explorations of post-sovereignty and interdependence served as a vital reminder from a leading nationalist that nationhood and independence were far from unproblematic categories. Autonomy was determined not by the will of the nation, but by the prevailing norms of the international states system (MacCormick, 1999). By the same token, James Mitchell’s Strategies for Self-Government (1996) corrected the assumption that the campaign for home rule had been the exclusive preserve of the Scottish National Party.

224 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Home rule – itself an ambiguous formulation, capable of encompassing devolution, devo-max, federalism and independence – was far from being a narrowly nationalist shibboleth. Mitchell’s work fruitfully explored the multiple types of devolution, including the administrative devolution favoured by Scottish Conservatives (Mitchell, 2003). Inspired by the distinction made in political science by Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin between unitary and union states (Rokkan and Urwin, 1982), Mitchell eventually redescribed the British polity as a ‘state of unions’, a formulation which recognised the various unions with Wales, Ireland (then Northern Ireland) and Scotland, as well as the asymmetries of the devolution process (Mitchell, 2009). Unionism too was reconfigured, Ian McLean and Alistair McMillan distinguishing between its primordial-fundamentalist forms, and a more instrumental and contingent strain of unionism dependent on a utilitarian calculus of benefits and disadvantages (McLean and McMillan, 2005). No longer was unionism – at least among specialists – reducible to a single caricature (Macdonald, 1998). Central to the new recoinings of independence and union in Scottish academia was an appreciation that it was Scotland’s relationships with the outside world which primarily determined its character and being. But no longer in academic history and politics – Scottish literature being less sophisticated in this regard – was the question of Scotland’s place in Britain reducible to crude Anglo-Scottish binaries. Murray Watson’s Being English in Scotland (2003) raised the profile of Scotland’s largest immigrant cohort, yet a group previously invisible in the academic literature. However, the principal way in which Scottish relations with other groups was reimagined was by way of recognition that Ireland has in Scotland’s modern history been just as significant an ‘other’ as England. The Irish influence on modern Scottish political culture has been immense. Britishness was at the very least a triangular arrangement, in which the frictions were just as much Scottish–Irish and Protestant–Catholic (Walker, 1995; Devine, 2000).

independence and union revisited | 225

Empire Scotland A rapprochement was also effected between domestic and imperial historiographies. Traditionally, England and its empire belonged to distinct historiographical realms. The transition from English to British history was connected with, and in turn stimulated, the reintegration of imperial history and the history of the home nations (Armitage, 2000). Scottish historians also became more alert to the imperial dimensions of Scotland’s past. Pre-1707 Scotland came into focus as an aspirant colonial power (Macinnes, 2007; Watt, 2007), and post-1707 as a more-than-willing accomplice in British imperial exploits (Devine, 2003; Devine, 2011; Mackenzie and Devine, 2011). Valerie Wallace’s stunning global history of the reception in multiple different imperial contexts of Scots Presbyterian radicalism, Covenanting and New Licht voluntaryism showed the potential to rewrite imperial historiography as a branch of four-nations history, not least by way of the frictions among Presbyterians, Catholics and Anglicans, as well as divisions within the Scots Presbyterian diaspora (Wallace, 2018). The empire had also played a significant role in the rise of Scottish nationalism at home. Richard Finlay has shown not only that pre-1945 Scottish nationalism was strongly torn between pro- and anti-imperialist positions, but also that the Scottish Party which merged with the National Party of Scotland in 1934 to become the SNP was a party of frustrated, reforming imperialists who wanted a properly British, or Anglo-Scottish, empire. A genuine imperial partnership, an Anglo-Scottish empire – by analogy with the post-1867 Austro-Hungarian empire in central and eastern Europe – was, it transpired, a major strand in the Scottish nationalist tradition. Nationalists as much as stereotypical blimpish unionists had imperialist skeletons in the closet (Finlay, 1992; Finlay, 1994). Essentialism took longer to dissolve in Scottish literature than in Scottish history. Although Gerry Carruthers led a bold assault on the central premises of literary essentialism in his synoptic survey Scottish Literature (2009), the stain was stubbornly ingrained and hard to erase. More recently, Carruthers’s co-edited collection Literature and Union (2018) was a further attempt to bring together in a cross-disciplinary manner the insights of the new British h ­ istory and an anti-essentialist criticism (Carruthers and Kidd, 2018).

226 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Nevertheless, some literary scholars did manage to escape the pernicious influence of chippy, anti-English inferiorism. Andrew Hook and Susan Manning perceived that the ‘puritan-provincial’ idioms of the Scottish literary tradition bore strong affinities with the timbre and matter of American literature (Hook, 1999; Manning, 1990). In this way they redirected critics towards periphery-periphery relationships in literature and culture in lieu of the standard playbook of core-periphery comparison, or indeed periphery-core whinge. Nor should we overlook the chequered case of Robert Crawford. His pioneering and wide-ranging revisionist survey, Devolving English Literature (1992) seemed like an auspicious augury of an emergent Scottish criticism which was decentred, pluralistic, and alert to hybridity. Indeed, Crawford’s edited collection The Scottish Invention of English Literature (1998) drew attention to the indirect but decisive role of the Scottish Enlightenment, and its interest in rhetoric and belles-lettres, in the long-term development of literary study as a distinct academic discipline. As an institutionalised field of knowledge, English literature, it transpired, had an ironic and unrecognised Anglo-Scottish lineage. Yet, sad to relate – and an unwelcome pricking of the vain delusions and self-importance from which academics even in Scotland are not altogether immune – the insights of our leading scholars appear to have had little purchase on the political classes, on the media, or on popular (and seemingly indestructible) myths about Scotland’s history, culture and political allegiances. Nevertheless, the opportunity is there for an informed citizenry to engage in future with Scotland’s heritage, identity and prospects in a more nuanced fashion than was evident in public debate during the independence referendum of 2014.

References Anderson, B. (1983), Imagined Communities, London: Verso. Armitage, D. (2000), The Ideological Origins of the British Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bowie, K. (2007), Scottish Public Opinion and the Anglo-Scottish Union 1699–1707, Woodbridge: Royal Historical Society/Boydell Press. Broun, D. (1999), The Irish Identity of the Kingdom of the Scots in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, Woodbridge: Boydell Press.

independence and union revisited | 227 Broun, D. (2007), Scottish Independence and the Idea of Britain, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Carruthers, G. (2009), Scottish Literature, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Carruthers, G. and C. Kidd (eds) (2018), Literature and Union: Scottish Texts, British Contexts, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Coleman, J. (2014), Remembering the Past in Nineteenth-century Scotland, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Colley, L. (1992), Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Crawford, R. (1992), Devolving English Literature, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Crawford, R. (ed.) (1998), The Scottish Invention of English Literature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davies, R. (2000), The First English Empire: Power and Identities in the British Isles 1093–1343, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Devine, T. M. (ed.) (2000), Scotland’s Shame? Bigotry and Sectarianism in Modern Scotland, Edinburgh: Mainstream. Devine, T. M. (2003), Scotland’s Empire 1600–1815, London: Allen Lane. Devine, T. M. (2011), To the Ends of the Earth: Scotland’s Global Diaspora 1750–2010, London: Allen Lane. Elliott, J. H. (1992), ‘A Europe of Composite Monarchies’, Past and Present, 137, 48–71. Elliott, J. H. (2018), Scots and Catalans: Union and Disunion, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Finlay, R. (1992), ‘For or against? Scottish Nationalists and the British Empire, 1919–39’, Scottish Historical Review, 71, 184–206. Finlay, R. (1994), Independent and Free: Scottish Politics and the Origins of the Scottish National Party 1918–1945, Edinburgh: John Donald. Hearn, J. (2000), Claiming Scotland: National Identity and Liberal Culture, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Hook, A. (1999), From Goosecreek to Gandercleugh: Studies in Scottish–American Literary and Cultural History, East Linton: Tuckwell Press. Kidd, C. (2008), Union and Unionisms: Political Thought in Scotland, 1500–2000, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. MacCormick, N. (1999), Questioning Sovereignty, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Macdonald, C. (ed.) (1998), Unionist Scotland 1800–1997, Edinburgh: John Donald. McIlvanney, L. (2002), Burns the Radical, East Linton: Tuckwell Press. Macinnes, A. (2007), Union and Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mackenzie, J. and T. M. Devine (eds) (2011), Scotland and the British Empire, Oxford: Oxford University Press. McLean, I. and A. McMillan (2005), State of the Union: Unionism and the Alternatives in the United Kingdom since 1707, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Manning, S. (1990), The Puritan–Provincial Vision, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mason, R. A. (1994), Scots and Britons, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Miller, W. (ed.) (2005), Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1900 to Devolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press for the British Academy.

228 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T Mitchell, J. (1996), Strategies for Self-Government: The Campaigns for a Scottish Parliament, Edinburgh: Polygon. Mitchell, J. (2003), Governing Scotland: the Invention of Administrative Devolution, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Mitchell, J. (2009), Devolution in the UK, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Morton, G. (1999), Unionist-Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland 1830–1860, East Linton: Tuckwell Press. Paterson, L. (1994), The Autonomy of Modern Scotland, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Pocock, J. G. A. (1975), ‘British History: a Plea for a New Subject’, Journal of Modern History, 47, 601–21. Robertson, J. (ed.) (1995), A Union for Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Russell, C. (1991), The Fall of the British Monarchies 1637–1642, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smout, T. C. (ed.) (2005), Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603 to 1900, Oxford: Oxford University Press for the British Academy. Rokkan, S. and D. Urwin (eds) (1982), The Politics of Territorial Identity, London: Sage. Walker, G. (1995), Intimate Strangers: Political and Cultural Interaction between Scotland and Ulster in Modern Times, Edinburgh: John Donald. Wallace, V. (2018), Scottish Presbyteriansm and Settler Colonial Politics: Empire of Dissent, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Watson, M. (2003), Being English in Scotland, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Watt, D. (2007), The Price of Scotland: Darien, Union and the Wealth of Nations, Edinburgh: Luath Press. Whatley, C. (2006), The Scots and the Union, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

independence and union revisited | 229

Part Four

Inside Politics

T W E NT Y

The Parliament Sits in the Land Ambrose Gillick and Lee Ivett

Introduction When, in 2005, the architects Enric Miralles and Benedetta Tagliabue’s (EMBT) Scottish Parliament Building was awarded the Royal Institute of British Architect’s Sterling Prize, it was not a decision which chimed with much popular sentiment. Although an undeniably significant piece of work, designed and constructed to a degree of precision and care seldom seen in contemporary architecture, the building’s massive budgetary and time overruns had to a great degree become the main story. The architecture’s meaning and possible value as a democratic space were lost in a sea of public hostility towards a government flashing the cash on a project it neither needed nor could afford and an architecture industry out of touch with the public mood.1 The intricate formal and aesthetic language of the building and its quality of construction were transfigured, changed from virtues to vices, becoming further evidence of the inappropriateness of the idea, let alone the reality of the building itself. Consequently, appreciation of the building as architecture has in some respects remained the preserve of an ‘enlightened’ minority and its valuable addition to the discourse on public, civic space in twenty-first-century urban and architectural design has too readily been missed. This is not to disregard issues relating to the discontent of the tax-paying public as insignificant – it is certainly legitimate to suggest that a building costing over 1,000 per cent of its original budget was poorly managed in its conception

232 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

and execution – but that painting EMBT’s work in Edinburgh as entirely bad because of its price is needlessly blinkered after the event. Instead, in this essay, we’ll explore the idea that the nature of the architecture realised for the nascent Scottish Government is (or was) seen to be so intrinsically valuable to the project of forging a new Scottish identity and the manufacturing of a renewed nation that issues as mundane as astronomical costs were not important enough to hold the client, the architect or the building back. The Scottish Parliament Building is without question one of the great architectural pieces of the twenty-first century, a totalising vision that celebrates the fragmentary qualities of postmodern culture within the context of a globalising, enlightened story of renewed democracy, of symbiosis between public and state values, and reciprocity between nations. Its form and aesthetic can be read as an embodiment of the new Scottish Government’s idea of what might be understood as a sort-of progressive memorialisation, whereby the past is reconstructed, the better to support a renewed, emerging national identity.

History EMBT’s design for the Scottish Parliament Building grew out of a competition held by the Scottish Parliament in May 1998, launched by the then Secretary of State for Scotland, Donald Dewar. Dewar had been instrumental in bringing about the establishment of the devolved parliament, having campaigned for Scottish devolution for decades prior to the successful 1997 referendum. He would go on to become Scotland’s inaugural First Minister in 1999. The competition shortlist was put to a public vote, with a design by Rafael Viñoly Architects chosen by the public, but Dewar overrode this, selecting instead EMBT’s proposal. As with the site, the designers’ work can be read as a significant embodiment of Dewar’s desire for a Scottish icon. Whereas Viñoly’s proposal embodies a sort-of classical language of spatial dominance, a circular glazed debating chamber suspended above a public precinct overlooking the Queen’s Gallery and the Palace of Holyroodhouse, wrapped in a big imposing wall, EMBT’s proposal, as well as being significantly more speculative and vague in its presentation, is consciously sub-

the parliament sits in the land | 233

servient to the natural and historical hierarchy of the site. And whilst the logic of Viñoly’s proposal is legible within a continuum of big civic architecture, EMBT’s represents a definitive break, a new way of doing democratic space. The implication of this is that Dewar saw the building as a mechanism to promote the meaning of the new Scottish state to a public but also to signal a vision of progressive governance to the world.

Site The full history of the development of the construction of a suitable environment for a new Scottish Parliament has been the subject of much debate and conflict. Central to it, however, was a decision taken by Donald Dewar as leader of the first Scottish government, to reject the presumed and accepted repurposing of the Royal High School on Calton Hill on the grounds that it was too small (it has about 2,500 m2 of floorspace compared to 18,000 m2 in the Scottish Parliament Building today) and had become a ‘nationalist shibboleth’ having been the site of a proposed Scottish Assembly following the 1979 devolution referendum. Dewar opposed nationalism and chose instead a site at Holyrood, thereby subverting a political heritage he didn’t like. The classical language of the High School, with its implications of imperial power and hierarchy, had little relevance to Dewar’s visions for Scotland as a nation and the Holyrood site was cheap, the brewery company who occupied it offering it at a discount. It was also a more sophisticated site, permitting a measure of complexity and nuance in the design in both urbanistic and architectural ways. Simply, the new Scottish Parliament could use the clearer site at Holyrood to rewrite an old story. As such, the essential character of the Scottish Parliament Building was established by the selection of a site which faced the Palace, the historic seat of the Stuarts, to the easternmost end of Edinburgh’s Royal Mile. The effect of this was to imply a narrative of continuity between the past and the present, itself embodying ideas of resistance and resilience, ennobling once more the old Palace by placing beside it a building of significance (rather than a brewery). EMBT’s proposed leaf-like plan can be read within this idea too,

234 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

green shoots sprouting after a long winter. The Palace’s associations with English imperialism support this idea, both articulating the triumph of Scottish resistance and, as per Dewar’s anti-nationalist tendency, articulating a relationship between Scotland and the wider UK. However, alongside ideas of native rejuvenation, the impact of occupying this site has latterly affected the development of a governmental district, with the new Edinburgh City Council offices opening nearby along the Royal Mile in 2006. As such, the meandering plan and diffuse, anti-­classical façades of the Scottish Parliament Building belie the reality that power is being coalesced in the city at this point. This is more likely due to the fact of the building, rather than its design but, even so, the design, as EMBT stressed in their competition submission, is tied to its geographical location as interpreted through socio-­historical ideas demarcated by institutional actors. By adopting this aesthetic of Scottish heritage and culture, the building is inherently a manifestation of power: the newness of the building, in contrast to the option of repurposing an old one, is the only way such a story could be effectively described, free from counter-narratives which might obscure an agenda developed around ideas of openness and accessibility, enabling the building to both connect people with power and even, perhaps, articulate the mutuality and symbiosis of the two. This being said, the site also situates the new parliament within a geography of tourism, thereby explicitly and intentionally broadening the definition of ownership beyond a narrow, regional democratic vision. As visitor attraction, the building resists the possibility that it becomes a space only for those who are local or who have a stake in its function. The Scottish Parliament Building’s ornamental design can thus be read as submissive acceptance of the all-powerful leisure culture from which the city gains so much of its reputation and wealth. At the time of the building’s commission, the Bilbao Effect, whereby a large, extravagant building was commissioned for a derelict part of a city as a mechanism for attracting people and investment to post-industrial wastelands, was pursued relentlessly by municipal authorities the world over (Kengo Kuma’s V&A Dundee is the latest iteration of this old idea). The area of Edinburgh to the west of the Palace had been identified in the late

the parliament sits in the land | 235

1980s as an area in need of renewal. Dynamic Earth by Michael Hopkins & Partners, built to the south of the Palace in 2000, was part of this renewal push and, in its design (a suspended white tent sitting behind an amphitheatre, explicitly contrasting with the heavy, dark, native buildings) foregrounded the formalism that was to overtake civic architecture in the following years. The natural assets of Salisbury Crags and Arthur’s Seat lie to the south and the Royal Mile escalates westwards into a hyper-abundance of touristic thrills. Nevertheless, the relationship between tourism and power embodied in the building is not entirely uncomfortable or unwelcome for the government as an institution: the quick, snap-happy touristic gaze performs a substitution for actual scrutiny. For the cultural and social critic examining meaning in the built environment, the effect of inviting so much attention onto the metaphorical and abstract connotations of the aesthetics of the architectural object, as we see at the Scottish Parliament Building, is to distract analysis from where the critique should actually be applied. This is key here: the Scottish Parliament Building doesn’t really change the manner in which democracy is conducted, it just changes its appearance and performative nature; the architecture serves to theatrically frame the same old story. The stated ambition to facilitate a less adversarial form of politics (has there ever really been a government building designed with the intention of enhancing conflict?), manifest through the application of a voting system designed to make coalition government more likely, enhanced by a building plan which promotes thoughtful walking and talking, is now reduced to tour guides corralling tourists about, telling them about the boat-roof and how Rennie Mackintosh’s flowers were important design principles. In response, we’re minded to ask: Is this really enough?

Building To a significant degree, the Scottish Parliament Building defies a cohesive description. At once a sinuous whole, the building also appears to be composed of three separate sections – foyer, debating hall and offices – wrapping around Queensbury House on

236 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Canongate, a seventeenth-century townhouse, later repurposed as a barracks, to the north side. An external space, something like a public square running along the east side, fanning out into a landscaped park, models an amphitheatre without ever actually being one. Approached from along the Royal Mile, Queensbury House obscures any sense of the drama or significance to come until, as the street turns, a highly articulated façade of lateral curved concrete vaults supported by embedded buttressing grimaces onto the street, topped off by misshapen panelling in dark grey. Overhangs and cutbacks abound, the entrance at the northern corner framed between two sections of the composition, a nominally open square now baffled by bollards and intricate fencing. Turning the corner to face the south, one is confronted by the spectacular Salisbury Crags and the idea of the low, fissured building nestled in or emerging from the landscape becomes apparent. The building’s façade here is broken up, forming a sort-of colonnade to the public space, initiating public engagement. The office section of the building, a slab block five storeys high that forms the boundary to the west of the site, is a fruit salad of stuff, leaf-cum-tessellated shapes forming sort-of oriel windows that protrude to various degree across the elevation, here and there obscured by bent wood poles, shiny silver panelling giving way to lustreless grey. In short, something new is happening, a hodgepodge of ideas and moments that, strangely, holds together. Everything is designed, clearly – the interior is a symphony of superb instances, refined and finished to near ­perfection – and there are no moments in the original building where the architects have dropped their guard. As such, everything has intention and meaning, a superabundance of gestures and ideas – the plan is leaves, twigs, river flows, strata; the roof is boat hulls, cathedrals, water, wings; the materials are nature, Scotland, time, runes. The whole thing is as many things as you care to put to it – it is democracy, an invitation, a question and hope, yesterday, tomorrow, here and there – and as such, it serves to visualise and spatialise belonging and ownership. The Scottish Parliament Building’s guiding logic was, according to the architects, initially based around the idea of the monastic cloister, a walkway connecting a series of functions that are given coherence and meaning by the walkway itself. In this way, the frag-

the parliament sits in the land | 237

mentation of the plan is a device to promote that image of slowstepped, murmuring thoughtfulness common to the caricatured monk. Perhaps here, at the Scottish Parliament Building, EMBT hoped to engender a sense of communality and common purpose, the sinuous routes permitting a gentler discourse between political adversaries. Likewise, the debating chamber eschews the oppositional dynamic of the face-to-face debating chamber at Westminster, in favour of a more modern semi-circle style, thereby promoting not confrontation but mutuality. Of course, the possibility that sitting beside your foe might actually incapacitate vigorous debate (who argues side-by-side? Is it even possible?) isn’t considered. Committee rooms and offices are as they might be expected to be, but with fewer parallel walls, and the MSP’s personal rooms are each provided with an inglenook in which to sit and ponder the weighty responsibility of making laws and guiding a nation. In many ways the idealism and ambition of the design has ended up getting into a fight with pragmatism and none ends up the victor. As stated earlier, whilst EMBT’s work performs a kind of radicalism in its architectonics and visual language, it does not, in the end, actively seek to destabilise or reform the way democracy is done. The building’s fragmented plan, spatial complexity and artistic flourishes disguise democratic business-as-usual: a debating chamber (with public gallery) is surrounded by a corridor off which radiate committee rooms, leisure spaces (for members) and a large concourse. The Four Towers are occupied by parliamentary business and a long block to the south west of the site, is filled with MSP’s offices. The new democracy is, fundamentally, organised around the principles of older ones and the opportunities that there were, to begin to explore how the public might come and participate, are not really proposed. Of course, three years after the commission for the Scottish Parliament Building was set, the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq radically changed everything for architecture. How the public were allowed to behave and move through the urban realm shifted as the relationship between the governed and the governors was rapidly reinterpreted through a prism of mutual distrust and potential epic violence. In light of this, the design of the Scottish Parliament Building gained heft, walls thickened, security measures interrupted organic spatial

238 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

flows and the movement of people was mediated by an architectural infrastructure designed to ensure security. The Lee Boyd-designed check-in-style External Security Facility, added to the original building in 2013, is just the latest example of this. Nevertheless, even without this build-up of carceral objects, the building replaces a physical spatialisation of public engagement with a visual language of public interpretation – the building recedes from the world of action, the Arendtian ‘space of appearance’, into the world of the mind. And, as if to emphasise this cerebral engagement, interpretation is mediated, either by informed tour guides in the building or, like this piece, by suitably qualified people proposing suitable assessments using an accepted language. And perhaps this is right – even the public space to the east of the building is, in truth, no assembly space at all – but is instead a linear, interrupted and overseen strip that diffuses into splintered landscape by design.

Conclusion Our discussion here does not seek to question the significance or quality of the Scottish Parliament Building as architecture, but rather to question its value as an expression of a progressive vision of Scottish governance. This was clearly its intention: despite its florid appearance, the building is a characteristic example of late-twentieth-century public architecture, foregrounding ideas of civility, unity and transparency through the use of spatial and formal devices which either explicitly or through metaphor propose an enlightened and progressive political vision which attempts to link Scottish national identities to mainland Europe, in so doing, consolidating Edinburgh’s professed identity as the capital of a fundamentally European (and not just British) country. As such, the playful and complex postmodern tone and aesthetic of the Scottish Parliament Building cloaks an inherently modernist idea – that buildings themselves can and should be actors in the contemporary political and urban discourse, and that their commission, production and use indicate desirable praxis. The building is a pedagogue, capable of leading the narrative. As such, the explicit and somewhat clumsy superficial aesthetics and formal devices used to evidence the rhetoric of political transparency disguise a more

the parliament sits in the land | 239

subtle agenda which insinuates the Scottish Parliament into a story of pan-European identity and values, one which is based around a sort-of nationalised globalism, whereby national identity is treated as something that can be gathered together and pitched into the international cultural market place by institutional actors. In this way, the architecture’s use of nature and the corralling of a sort-of Scottish-Celtic mythos can be read as a mechanism for delineating and therefore ‘owning’ Scotland, as a place and as an identity. In this way, the building itself can be read as a tool which grants the right to a political institution to define Scotland: Parliament takes control of the identity of Scotland as it might the rail network or public utilities, the better both to control it and to sell it to a global audience too. This idea of a nationalised globalism extends from Kenneth Frampton’s fairly well-established ideas of critical regionalism, by which the austere and universalising International Style of the high priests of modernist architecture, such as Mies van der Rohe and Le Corbusier was nuanced by reference to local beliefs and practices, with an emphasis on ‘meaningful’ materials and arbitrarily selected, eclectic references to indigenous forms. The site, superficially a key aspect of this late modern style, is considered principally in relation to its climatic aspect, particularly the passage of the sun through the sky, but this remains fundamentally subservient to the formal aesthetic. The architecture of nationalised globalism extends this, using postmodern and critical regionalist principles to promote the internationalist credentials of the nation. Local knowledge, values and stories are instrumentalised towards situating Scotland (in this case) within a global marketplace of ideas. In a strange way, the architects thus insulates themselves from criticism, a position perhaps relating to the delicate position EMBT found themselves in – Catalonian architects designing for a born-again Scotland finding its way in the world, with all the layering of internationalist and separatist discourses this implied. There is a subtlety here, perhaps. Unsurprisingly, and in common with many people of our profession, we suggest that a focus on cost during and after the buildings completion caused other important ideas to be missed which might help articulate a new language for secular civic space in the decades to come. A great deal of time is spent by architects debating

240 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

the way good civic space can be made; with the Scottish Parliament Building we are presented with an example of how it might be done, not perhaps in the nature of its formal and spatial organisation, but as an embodiment of a relationship between the governed and the governing that derives its logic from a tacit acceptance by the electorate that only institutional power of the scale of a regional parliament could have the leverage and agency to gather national characteristics into a cohesive, defined character and national identity. EMBT’s building, then, specifically selected above the heads of the public by the Scottish government, is an embodiment of this idea: that Scotland’s identity was plural and hybrid, perhaps even fragmented, but the institution of a parliament operated as an opportunity to begin to coalesce these identities into a coherent whole. The hybrid architecture, a mess of ideas and themes, volumes and details, is thus not only an example of late-postmodern design characteristic of EMBT’s output but is the subtle articulation through architecture of another way of governing in the twenty-first century, one based around coordinating plural identities and narratives towards common civic goals in a globalised public square. And it is this vision of a globally situating architecture, we suggest, that constitutes the most significant critique of EMBT’s work for the Scottish Parliament. The fact that the client and architects’ bold vision of cooperation and participation for the Scottish Parliament Building has not been realised in the democratic processes would barely surprise even without the impact of subsequent terrorism. Nor do the attempts by institutional power to administer memory and meaning and instrumentalise them for political goals come as a surprise. Instead, and unfortunately, the building’s greatest legacy, we suggest, has been in the reaffirmation of perceptions of architecture in Scotland as either lifestyle or spectacle, its services and outputs accessible only to the ordinary citizen through invitation or when actively pursuing leisure. In addition, the effect of the Scottish Parliament’s choice of an international ‘starchitect’ to produce Scotland’s figurehead building (supported by a local practice), a decision closely linked to the idea of a nationalised globalism, has clearly significantly affected wider perceptions of architectural culture and its role within common life in Scotland. That model – foreign architect with local partner – has become

the parliament sits in the land | 241

a common occurrence when architects have subsequently been sought to deliver nationally significant buildings in Scotland, institutional bodies apparently unable to resist the idea that an international genius is required to gather, interpret and represent local culture, function, histories and amenity: Zaha Hadid’s Riverside Museum, Steven Holl’s Reid Building, Schmidt Hammer Lassens’ University of Aberdeen Library and, most recently, Kengo Kuma’s V&A Dundee, have all followed this model. This is to the detriment of Scottish design culture and, ironically, global visibility.

Note 1. The original estimated cost of £40–£50 million for a 23,000 m2 building had a proposed per-square-metre price of £1,740–£2,175. At completion, the building had a per-square-metre cost of £14,350 (30,000 m2 at a total cost of £430.6 million). Source: The Holyrood Inquiry: A Report by The Rt Hon. Lord Fraser of Carmyllie QC (2004).

242 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

T W E NT Y - ONE

Devolution: An Assessment Jim Gallagher

‘Scottish solutions for Scottish problems’ was one of Donald Dewar’s characteristically downbeat arguments for devolution before 1999. Twenty years later, it is fair to ask what sort of Scottish solutions have appeared, and which of Scotland’s problems they have solved. This chapter will argue radical, distinctive Scottish solutions have been few: with some exceptions, change in Scotland has largely mirrored change elsewhere in the UK.

Three models, and two periods, of policymaking Public policymaking is an art, not a science, but there are, broadly, three possible descriptions of how it is done. The first might be called politics and administration: public policy is the implementation of political promises made to the electorate. The 1997 Blair government’s ‘pledge card’ with its very specific promises followed through in government is an example. The second might be described as technocratic, rational policymaking: evidence is assembled of problems, solutions are devised and adopted, and implementation carried through. A third way of looking at public policy is one of negotiated adjustment and compromise between different interests, mediated through the political and administrative process, to reach outcomes acceptable to those affected. In the real world, of course, governments mix all three at different times. In post-devolution Scotland, however, consultation and negotiation have been a constant.

devolution : an assessment | 243

The two Labour–Liberal Democrat administrations from 1999 followed the classic model of coalition formation (seen at Westminster in 2010). With an electoral system designed to avoid majority government, parties needed to agree a programme to sustain a majority. Hence in 1999, and again in 2003, a ‘Programme for Government’ was presented: a list of quite specific commitments drawn from the manifestos of each party. The major issue for negotiation in 1999 was the Liberal Democrat opposition to tuition fees for university education, which led to the graduate endowment (later abolished by the SNP). The much more detailed 2003 document (Scottish Executive, 2003) contained no less than 450 commitments. These were intensively tracked inside government, and it is hardly a caricature to describe this as government-by-list. By the end of the second Parliament, ministers were able to claim the vast majority had been delivered, through, for example, the 66 Acts of the Scottish Parliament. At an official level, the Scottish Executive (as it then was) had developed its own internal, favoured policymaking process. An iterative cycle combined rational analysis (problem identification, evidence gathering) with very widespread consultation. Given the high expectations of public participation in policy development raised by devolution this was hardly surprising. But it is not the way to produce radical change. The first years of devolution coincided with rapid growth in public spending. Over that period total spending in Scotland grew by nearly 40 per cent (HM Treasury, annually). Health spending was a notable beneficiary. It increased from £5 billion in 1999 to £9 billion in 2006, contributing to improvements in treatment ­outcomes – for example, big reductions (40 per cent) in heart-disease deaths. These outcomes did not, however, differ much from those recorded in England over the same period. Scotland was, furthermore, the first part of the UK to ban smoking in public places, emulating the Republic of Ireland, but before England and Wales. The overall effect was reformist but largely consensual administrations. Many reforms were useful, such as catching up with the backlog of Scottish legislative change. Labour policies were typically similar to the approach of the Blair government in which Dewar and some others had served before devolution, with the

244 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

more market-oriented aspects diluted. Not just tuition fees being replaced by the graduate endowment but, e.g., policies of intervening in failing local councils in England became a less aggressive Best Value regime. The absence of intense spending pressure, a deeply embedded consultative process and the need to secure a parliamentary majority all militated against changes which would disturb established interests. The next decade of SNP administrations, minority then majority, was subject to different constraints. The minority Scottish Government had no negotiated programme, but secured support for its budget and legislation as best it could. Conservative support for the SNP’s spending plans, for example, was secured by promising additional police officers. The volume of legislation dropped somewhat. The new administration adopted a different, and ostensibly more strategic, approach to policy. Officials had developed (under the previous administration) a set of indicators of how Scotland was doing across the full range of economic and social policies, under the banner ‘Scotland Performs’. These were set in a hierarchy of more-general to more-detailed measures spanning devolved responsibilities. (Scottish Government, 2018) Incoming SNP ministers adopted this approach, and set improvement targets. Indicators, however, tell you how you’re doing, but not how to improve. Nor did the SNP bring a political philosophy to public policy or public services. An overall party aim was to promote Scotland’s interests, and the first administration set economic growth as its top priority, second only to the constitution. But policies such as abolishing the graduate endowment and freezing council tax were consciously populist (i.e. deliberately simplistic and crowd-­pleasing, albiet not demagogic). They were subject to other constraints. Their raison d’être was constitutional change: to build a consensus in support of independence, they wanted to demonstrate competent government, but were also reluctant to alienate interest groups whose support was needed. So the pressure for consensus remained. If the first decade was reformist, but consensual, the second was populist but consensual too. Radical policy shifts which would lose the support of influential groups were again off the agenda.

devolution : an assessment | 245

(Not) reforming the public sector Scotland’s public institutions – authorities, health boards, non-­ departmental public bodies (quangos) and the like – predated devolution, and a legislature and executive might have been expected to produce structural change. The new Welsh Government, for example, consciously strengthened its central capacity by absorbing staff from some quangos. Scottish local government was fearful of centralisation and structural change, as seen in the report of the McIntosh Commission. After two decades, however, what is striking is the effective centralisation of accountability and authority, but the paucity of structural change. Reorganising Scottish local government in 1995 into a single tier was not meant to facilitate devolution – quite the opposite – but removing one level of government and abolishing powerful regions like Strathclyde did make it easier. The first two Scottish administrations agonised over public-sector reform and ‘joined up government’ but they made no radical changes. They encouraged councils to share services (creating for example joint transport authorities) and nudged local social-work departments into closer cooperation with the NHS in dealing with social care for the elderly. In a populist move under Henry McLeish, personal care for the elderly was made free. But the organisational spaghetti of 32 councils, 15 or so health boards, 8 police authorities and so on was left largely untouched. Things changed under the SNP. Under the policy of freezing council tax for most of the second decade of devolution, Scottish councils lost all fiscal autonomy. Council tax became effectively a national tax, determined by ministers, via draconian grant penalties. Ministers also chose to pass on much more of the austerity emanating from UK budget changes to councils rather than their own directly managed programmes, so local government’s main task became implementing spending reductions on behalf of the centre. These cuts in spending and constraints on local autonomy did not become a major political battleground as the less stringent cuts and constraints of the Conservative government of the 1980s had been. This may reflect SNP strength in local councils. Perhaps this is also a sign of the political ­legitimacy

246 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

of the Scottish Parliament’s decisions; perhaps it is down to ­political skill in spotting the salience of rising council tax bills to voters. Centralisation has also been the watchword in the quango world. Bodies which pre-devolution enjoyed substantial autonomy are regarded as ‘delivery agents’ of the Scottish Government. Some of this is seen in day-to-day relationships of control and accountability, and some in structural change. Scottish Homes, for example, the successor to the largely autonomous Scottish Special Housing Association and Housing Corporation in Scotland became an executive agency of government during the first Parliament. More recently, Scottish Enterprise, the main economic development agency, was merged with Highlands and Islands Enterprise and the Higher Education Funding Council into a new and ill-defined super-quango closer to ministers. The last decade, however, has seen one major structural reform. Police and fire authorities were the last vestige of the pre-1995 regions. Their geographic pattern made little operational sense for those services alone, and they struggled to make efficiencies from joint working. Surprisingly, there was cross-party consensus (Liberal Democrats excepted) for single national police and fire authorities. Police Scotland has struggled since its inception. (In the view of this author, largely due to a failure to understand the specific governance requirements of policing, which have historically been designed to make political control of policing decisions difficult.) The organisation is now on its third chief constable, and its travails will undoubtedly make politicians wary of further ­structural reform.

Getting and spending Pre-devolution, the Scottish Office was a spending department. Taxing was for Westminster or local government. And for the last 20 years the spending choices of devolved government still give the best indication of their priorities. All Scottish administrations inherited the spending lead built up over years by the Barnett formula; throughout two decades of devolution, Holyrood spending has been approximately 25 per cent higher per head than in England

devolution : an assessment | 247

(Gallagher, 2017). No evidence suggests outcomes are 25 per cent better. Both of the Labour–Lib Dem administrations faced the challenge of managing spending growth wisely. In general, the overall pattern of spending in Scotland followed England. Health spending grew markedly as a proportion of the total. Participation in further and higher education reached around 50 per cent of the cohort of young people. Substantial investment was put into Scottish social housing, much linked to stock transfers from local authorities to other social landlords. Over the next 10 years, SNP ministers inherited that level of spending, but not the same rate of growth: the Scottish budget reached a real-terms peak in 2010–11, and then declined somewhat, so that by 2017–18 discretionary spending was back at 2007–8 levels (Fraser of Allander Institute, 2017). Their spending priorities reflected some populist choices: commitments to free prescriptions, free university education (abolishing the graduate endowment), continuing free personal care (the cost of which had grown substantially) and abolishing bridge tolls. But the continuing commitment to extra police officers and the costs of police reorganisation, together with an eight-year council tax freeze, squeezed other programmes, notably council services, very hard. Health spending grew, though nothing like as much as in England: a Scottish lead of 16 per cent in 2007 was reduced to 7 per cent a decade later (Gallagher, 2017). School spending was squeezed, and college places and grants to students reduced markedly. Government which spends but does not tax is virtually unknown worldwide. Following the Calman and Smith commissions, income tax and some minor taxes are now devolved, and 50 per cent of VAT is to be assigned to Holyrood. It is too early to say what effect this will have on its policies. Over the last 20 years only local taxation has been devolved. The first two administrations allowed a gradual rise in council tax, but the SNP’s eight-year freeze on council tax arguably now deprives Holyrood of around £400 million a year in spending power. Like universal free provision, this redistributes resources disproportionately to the better off, although recent adjustments to the council tax banding system may offset that in future. (It remains remarkable that no administration has done

248 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

anything other than tinker at the edges of council tax, introduced by the Conservatives in the 1990s to replace the poll tax. All have conspired not to revalue property during this period, so houses in 2018 are taxed on their value in 1991. This can only be described as a policy failure.) In 2018, Nicola Sturgeon took a slightly different approach in exercising the new income tax powers, tilting the balance against higher taxpayers (to an understandably cautious degree) and raising revenue by an estimated £300 million a year.

Policies and outcomes Twenty years of devolution has undoubtedly involved a great deal of activity, progress and achievement: over 200 substantive Acts of the Scottish Parliament, hugely more than could conceivably have been passed at Westminster. Reforms such as land tenure reform, or self-directed support for social care, stand as examples of many useful measures which have a very direct effect on citizens’ lives. Much good has been done. This might however fairly be described as the ‘business as usual’ activity of government, though there has been more of it since devolution and it is easy to forget how controversial some social changes (e.g. the repeal of ‘Section 28’) were at the time. A plethora of data is available to assess how successful Scottish policies have been, and it is sometimes possible to compare this data with rest of the UK. Scotland is richer, greener, better qualified and lives longer than it did 20 years ago. But so is the rest of the UK. The first two administrations attached high priority to economic growth, and over that period Scottish GDP per head growth continued (as it had since 1963) to match or marginally to exceed the UK average. The top priority of the SNP administration 2007 was the same, but relative economic growth has tailed off (although population growth ticked up). Overall, Scotland remains below the UK average of prosperity, and its position is slipping (see, e.g., HM Government, 2013; Scottish Government, 2017). Inequality in Scotland remains high, though not as high as in parts of England; child poverty is forecast to increase, largely due to UK Government benefit changes (Poverty and Inequality Commission, 2018). Holyrood’s attempts to offset that have so far had little effect. If the purpose of devolution

devolution : an assessment | 249

was to radically transform Scotland’s economy, or to make us more socially just, then after 20 years it has failed. There have been marked improvements in life expectancy in Scotland, like the rest of the UK, but these too have recently tailed off. Indeed in 2018, for the first time, life expectancy in Scotland decreased marginally (National Records of Scotland, 2018). The gap in life expectancy between the richest and poorest Scots has not narrowed. It would be simplistic to connect this directly with health services expenditure, but new health improvement strategies have been absent since the smoking ban. (The policy on minimum alcohol pricing got mired in legal challenges, and is only now coming into effect. It remains to be seen whether or not it will work.) The policies pursued in education since devolution have had mixed success. The second Scottish administration gave high priority to new school buildings (many built under private finance contracts, which have been criticised) but the evidence linking new buildings to education attainment or equality of outcomes is thin. The Curriculum for Excellence which was developed in Scottish school education (in very much the same consultative manner as pre-devolution) has also been criticised, and there is evidence that Scotland’s international standing on measures of educational attainment is slipping (Scottish Government, 2016). Levels of participation in tertiary education have grown markedly over the period, more than in England and, more recently, the present administration has set education as its key priority. Nevertheless it would be hard indeed to argue that, overall, devolution has transformed Scotland’s key public services of health and education over 20 years. Justice policies have been largely consistent over all administrations, and here some outcomes contrast favourably with England. Recorded crime has been going down; notably homicides have reduced to levels not seen since the 1970s, and at around 60 per annum are now comparable to the rate in England and Wales (much due to violence-reduction work in the now-abolished Strathclyde Police from 2005). Tragically, falling homicides are dwarfed by drug-related deaths: over 900 a year, tripled since devolution (reflecting drug use of the 1980s and 1990s) and still growing.

250 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

What would success look like? Is this a tale of missed opportunities or inflated expectations? Is what matters that there are solutions to Scotland’s problems, or that the policies offered are Scottish ones? Devolution serves multiple purposes over and above the expression of national identity: having a Parliament is the preference of a large majority of Scots, who trust it to look to Scotland’s interests more than the UK Parliament, which has other interests to look after too. One of the paradoxes of Scottish public opinion is that it wants Scottish policies, but doesn’t really want them to be markedly different from those in England. The needs and aspirations of most Scots are much the same as their fellow citizens south of the border. Hence, perhaps, disempowering Scottish local government is legitimate when done from Edinburgh, but not from London. For many on the left, devolution was a way of ensuring that Scotland could pursue a different social model from the rest of the UK if need be. Despite the rhetoric, this has hardly been tested on devolved policies yet. The first two Scottish administrations were quite close to a UK Labour government, and pursued many of the same priorities. Alex Salmond’s SNP administration was in practice slightly right-of-centre, tax-cutting and redistributive towards the middle classes; his beef with London was constitutional, not about social justice. Nicola Sturgeon’s approach may differ, and she now has greater scope through tax and welfare powers to pursue a more socially just model than in England. The rhetoric of the 1997 to 1999 period encouraged the belief that devolution offered the opportunity for different, imaginative Scottish policies, unconstrained by the need to persuade UK parties or departments that Scotland could be radically different. Perhaps that was overblown, but the record of policy innovation since devolution does suggest an opportunity missed. Before devolution, Scotland had a strong record of innovation – the Kilbrandon Commission and Children’s Hearings, the Scottish Development Agency – often copied elsewhere. That has been absent since. Three speculations might be hazarded as to why policy innovation has decreased. First, the culture of consensus and avoiding hard choices; this has been a characteristic of all administrations for

devolution : an assessment | 251

different reasons. Second, weakness in the Scottish policy and political communities. Devolution created state institutions – legislative and executive – but could not call into being effective and creative policy communities, nor powerful political leaders. If anything, the most able are disincentivised from entering politics. Finally, devolution was constitutional plan, not a policy one. Scotland is still, interminably, having a constitutional debate. Most of the intellectual energy, creativity and political attention of the nation for the last decade have been devoted to parsing constitutional options rather than taking economic opportunities or solving social problems. It is hard to decide what sort of country to be when arguing what country to belong to.

References Fraser of Allander Institute (2017), ‘Has the Scottish budget increased or decreased since 2010/11?’, . Gallagher, J. (2017), ‘Public Spending in Scotland: Relativities and Priorities’, . HM Government (2013), ‘Scotland Analysis: Macroeconomic and Fiscal Performance’, . HM Treasury (annually), ‘Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis’, . National Records of Scotland (2018), . Poverty and Inequality Commission (2018), ‘Key Facts’, . Scottish Executive (2003), ‘Partnership Agreement’, . Scottish Government (2016) ‘Scotland Performs’, . Scottish Government (2017), ‘Purpose Target, Economic Growth’, . Scottish Government (2018), ‘Scotland Performs’, .

252 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

T W E NT Y - T W O

Inside the Changing Business of Governing Scotland Marco G. Biagi

To really understand the actions that collectively constitute what we call ‘Scottish politics’, one must consider the actors who carry them out. They must be truly understood, not as disembodied variables in an equation or as abstract concepts, but as individual human beings. Every action by a minister or a parliamentarian or an official is the product not of an ideal type but an actual person with the full human gamut of psychological characteristics. Following this through allows defining features of the experience of government to be understood, and insight to be gained into how the Scottish Parliament has changed that experience. Government through the eyes of a minister is not a great strategic game of chess, it is an hour-by-hour, day-by-day set of decisions taken from the inevitably limited view that any one person can have. The making of public policy by governments, parties, legislatures, committees, and many other collective entities as agents is extensively studied and theorised, but at the heart of it all are the individuals who constitute those organisations. They are the indivisible, ultimate agents of the policy process. Government is the sum of its actions. Most of all is this important for understanding ministers in our Holyrood system and comparing them to their pre-devolution antecedents.

changing business of governing scotland | 253

The human face of government All ministerial careers begin with a call. It might be expected, as with MSPs who had been spokespersons in an opposition now become a government, or it might not. It might be to a portfolio of which they have some prior knowledge, or it might not. From that moment they are engulfed by a change that, while not as great as the shift from outside Parliament to inside, only comes second to original election in magnitude. A new private secretary – the nowto-be omnipresent manifestation of the civil service in their every professional moment – meets them and does so often before they leave Bute House. There is no handbook. Of all of the contributions to understanding the ministerial life that academic political science offers and that I have encountered since departing from one into the other, two leap out as useful for explaining what I observed across years in the Scottish Parliament in other roles. American books on how government works almost invariably draw on the rational-choice framework: politicians are players in a political contest similar to consumers in a market. Almost nothing feels further from the lived experience of the Scottish Government. The falsity of each of the assumptions provides a catalogue of what seemed actually to be going on. In the jargon of economics, ministers operate under conditions of imperfect information. They simply do not and cannot know the consequences of all courses of action or inaction. Whether the additional powers UK ministers chose to bestow through the Scotland Acts of 2012 and 2016 would mollify nationalist sentiment in the public or exacerbate it was not known at the time – nor is it even known now. Nor do those choosing between courses of action even necessarily know all the courses of action available. The long passage of the SNP’s land reform legislation under successive ministers was interspersed with the airing of new proposals from the Greens – some added by amendment, others resisted – that had not even been thought of when the bill was conceived. Information itself is a resource, tradable for time. A minister can wait, holding a further round of consultations with campaigning

254 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

groups and outside experts, but this, too, is a trade-off. In 2011, faced with what the First Minister considered to be an acute crisis of sectarianism in football, the Scottish Government chose to legislate by emergency measures, creating an Act that was criticised from day one and eventually repealed by the opposition parties. Would taking longer about the bill have meant a more durable Act? That is also uncertain. The said Act also illustrates that no one is entirely sure how others will react. Nicola Sturgeon’s initiation of a second independence referendum in March 2017 was based on an anticipation of Theresa May either relenting or facing a huge public outcry for attempting to block a vote. Neither happened. Within Holyrood, for the SNP, Labour is often the most inscrutable – when the nationalists introduce an ostensibly social democratic proposal they are always uncertain whether Labour will support it or find some reason to oppose. These positions need not be constant either, whether of the opposition or even of the ministers themselves. Early in my ministerial term I backed down in the face of civil service concern over my wish to introduce randomised ballot order in local elections as a solution to the problem of candidates with alphabetically early names having an unfair advantage. Later on, and more confident in my post, I would have dug in. A small issue perhaps, but the only decision I look back on and wish I had taken differently. Scholars will often simplify ministerial actions in order to attempt to trace incentives and consequences. The work is well-meaning, but in simplifying reality to make it tractable for analysis they must leave out too much. A minister is not homo economicus. The people I worked with were emotional, rounded human beings with finite resources of professional energy and attention working in often high-intensity, high-stakes environments where delay came with risk. Their decision-making called on the head, the heart and the gut in equal measure.

Two tribes One classic way of understanding government sits at the forefront of every minister’s mind. The longer two ministers talk in the

changing business of governing scotland | 255

Queensberry House bar, the more the chance of them comparing notes on civil servants rises to certainty. Most do not know they are talking about the principal–agent problem, such a classic concept that there is no agreed solution. It sums up the great dilemma at the heart of all activity by ministers as individual decision-makers, and is evidenced day after day in Holyrood and St Andrew’s House. As principal, a minister has objectives they wish to achieve, but from First Minister to lowliest junior deputy minister they can only achieve them through their agents: civil servants. An Education Secretary depends on civil servants to provide evidence of what works in raising attainment. There may be limited independent research knowledge from their party, professional contacts and own background, but they will always be dwarfed in scale many times over by the officials in the Learning Directorate. Moreover, the minister also requires the civil service apparatus to enact the decisions based on that evidence faithfully and competently. For some portfolios the task goes even beyond the civil service and into the wider public sector. Directions and circulars can be signed off by a Health Secretary, but their implementation will depend on both the Scottish Government and the wider administrative backbone of NHS Scotland’s health boards. As certain ministers have found most painfully, they also depend on the bureaucracy to signal to them where there are problems or where an issue may be sensitive. In 2013 the Environment Minister reversed a decision to sell sporting rights on the island of Raasay that had been taken by civil servants acting entirely within their authority, but which had caused a storm of controversy in Parliament and the media. Some ministers live in dread of such situations; others are more sanguine, but the phenomenon is omnipresent. To further complicate affairs, ministers and civil servants come from two different cultures. Expectations and values differ. The civil service cherishes the ability to analyse policy; politicians, in my experience, cherish the ability to communicate it. Career paths and the determinants of promotion are different. The directions and manner of accountability of senior civil servants to their superiors looks nothing like the complicated network of relationships that ministers are torn between. And yet one relies on the other to achieve their objectives. Trying to combine the party-political caste

256 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

with a Weberian bureaucracy is almost like trying to sow fabric to a cloud: they are both simply made of different stuff. Nonetheless, through this interface ministers must work. There is no alternative. Where it works there is complementarity and creative tension. Where it fails to – for whatever reason – there is disaster. In classic principal-agent style Scottish ministers depend on the civil service and must simply trust them. Yet though they are responsible for the actions of civil servants in a political sense the minister is not responsible in an organisational sense, not in the same way as a manager is for a supervisee. There is no power of dismissal. Ministers therefore read pages and pages of submissions sent to them, scanning for trouble, hoping not to miss what could destroy their career as much as hoping to spot opportunities for genuine action.

The business of government By and large, the system works. Somehow. The civil service has strong internal procedures and a professional culture, even if it is a different one to that of the party-political class. Furthermore, while it is a common observation around government that ministers spend more time with their civil service private secretaries than their spouses or partners, the experience is also marked by other relationships. Rarely do Scottish Government ministers (or MSPs for that matter) have genuinely friendly relations across party boundaries, but there is often respect for their shadow, albeit of a very particular form. Warmth is more likely with party colleagues on the backbenches, though contact is usually far more limited than those backbenchers would like. The most vital relationships, however, are between ministers and the First Minister. Alex Salmond and Nicola Sturgeon have brought different styles to government decision-making. Generally the former had to be kept appraised of decisions, while the latter has preferred to sign off. One tale from Cabinet involves Alex Salmond going round the room and in characteristically jocular style naming each Cabinet Secretary and mock-seriously berating each for the interest group they were currently alienating: lawyers, university principals, the churches. The present First Minister determines the Scottish

changing business of governing scotland | 257

Government’s battlefronts herself; it is not left to the Cabinet Secretaries. If Alex Salmond was an executive chairman with some personal priorities, Nicola Sturgeon is a chief executive officer who exerts a firm hand over the entire programme. Neither system is necessarily a better system; they are different. Again, however, they show the importance of changing the person in the office to the execution of that office. This is a reassuring thought for the individual who takes up the office: that they matter. A junior minister after all takes on collective responsibility and foregoes the ability to air even the gentlest free-thinking in front of the electorate. Indeed, they lose a great deal of the time they had to attend to the many expectations that the public has today of their constituency representative: surgeries, local campaigns, weighing in on unfathomable local authority decisions; to their minds harming their re-election chances in the process unless they win further promotion to join the select few senior ministers who gain a genuine public profile of their own. On the way to Bute House I phoned someone already in ministerial office to ask whether it was worth it. They answered that this was the chance to actually take decisions and set policy, the opportunity to directly affect how things are rather than just campaigning or arguing with a view to persuading others. I was sold. While many former ministers come to enjoy the backbenches with a renewed sense of freedom, those I have spoken to talk of that influence as the highlight of their time in government. All of this has been changed by the creation of the Scottish Parliament, as executive power has moved from a Scottish Office to the Scottish Government. Most significantly, the people involved are now just different people with different politics who have consequently taken different decisions. The pre-1999 constitutional setup, had it persisted, would have resulted in a radically different dramatis personae over the past two decades. There would have been no SNP government in 2007; instead decisions would have continued to be taken by Labour politicians in the Scotland Office, replaced by Lib Dem and Conservative MPs in 2010. These politicians would have brought with them the policies and styles of their parties. Scotland would have large-scale private provision in the NHS, as in England. With income tax lower and council tax higher,

258 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

public finances would be significantly less progressive. Universities would, like England’s, charge the highest tuition fees in western Europe. There would not be the 10,000 council homes built under the SNP and council tenants would still have the Right-to-Buy. Private renters would have fewer rights and prisons would continue to be crammed with offenders on short sentences. The vast majority of the public will probably be unaware of, or will at least underestimate the level of policy divergence from one country to the next within the UK. Leaving aside an observer’s sense on how well-chosen Scottish Government policy has been, it is very hard to argue that the same choices have been made. Some has been incremental, a difference of degrees, but it is difference nonetheless, and it is growing. What is less certain is whether the changes have also affected the machinations of how decisions are taken. Virtually all of my observations about the human experience of ministerial office could have been made by a minister of the UK Government. Scottish Government ministers can watch Yes, Prime Minister and The Thick Of It and see their own experiences reflected back in much the same way as their London-based counterparts. Differences there are nonetheless from what came before. For a start, there are more of them now. The five-strong ministerial team of the Scottish Office in 1997 has been replaced by a devolved government of 26. More projects can be managed and priorities pursued, though at the same time, political decisions need more sign-offs as portfolios proliferate. Indeed, the civil service has shrunk while the ministerial ranks have grown; one consequence of devolution is a change in the relative balance between the political class and the bureaucracy. Ministers also work on a different scale. As a local government minister it was possible to know who all the leaders of our local authorities were, the political composition of their administrations and indeed had met most of them. This was possible in a polity with 32 councils – my English counterpart, had they tried, would have had to stay abreast of over 300. Similar yawning gulfs in scale open up in every portfolio. Similarly, it was my impression in government, and dealing with representative groups from civil society, that the devolved adminis-

changing business of governing scotland | 259

tration was more open than Westminster. External chief executives knew officials, and, as one Scottish Government rather than a group of insular, territorial departments, the officials generally knew each other too. Officials prided themselves on this: having a permeable bureaucracy. A UK Chancellor can stand up and announce a budget with measures taking effect from midnight; the Scottish equivalent takes months, with extensive input from all affected interests. In these ways, therefore, government in Scotland feels much more like a stakeholder democracy than it formerly did, while still retaining elements of the old ways of the Mother of Parliaments. Change is usually gradual and rarely preordained – one need only look at the Westminster-levels of executive control of parliamentary and political business still the norm in Ireland a hundred years after its much sharper break from British institutions to see that. Indeed, ministers and former ministers of the Oireachtas could probably identify with much of the earlier account of Scottish ministerial office as much as their Whitehall counterparts. A difference does not need to be a revolutionary constitutional moment like the collapse of communism, and, looking back, 1999 feels more like a point of departure than a wholesale repudiation of all that had gone before.

Conclusion The experience of ministerial office is a peculiar product of hundreds of years of evolutionary change at Westminster, leavened with 20 years of the same at Holyrood. The people who occupy ministerial office are human beings like everyone else, and, indeed, remarkably more like those they govern than in many countries: the Scottish Parliament is no American-style Congress of millionaires. Arriving in ministerial office these people come with unique endowments of abilities and their own personal agenda they seek to implement and must adapt to the environment in which they arrive, most significantly that unique relationship between minister and official. The environment influences and changes them, that much is certain, but they also influence and change that environment too. Processes, values and habits change until, without anyone noticing a clean break, something new has come to be.

260 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

T W E NT Y - T H R E E

The Journey of the Scottish Parliament to Maturity Johann Lamont

Twenty years have passed and it is time to reflect on how the Scottish Parliament has developed, whether it has lived up to our ambitions for it and to consider to what extent it improves the lives of people across Scotland. It is hard to believe that the Scottish Parliament is on the point of celebrating its twentieth birthday. I have now been an MSP for as long as I was a schoolteacher and, for me, it is difficult in the flurry, fuss, energy, controversy, the times of high emotion, of personal loss and of achievement of the last 20 years to take a calm and objective settled view of its mission.

The early days My children were barely two and four – toddlers with their own developing and distinctive personalities – when the Parliament opened with such pomp on that gloriously sunny July day in 1999. They are now young adults with their own ambitions, achievements and a developed sense of themselves and their values. Their journey to adulthood has seen their growing capacity to speak up, to speak out, to mature, to compromise and to cooperate. Has the Scottish Parliament made the same journey to maturity? The jury, I would hazard, is still out. Twenty years is not enough for detached, objective analysis – or at least not by me. If it is not too grand a notion, I tend to think of myself as a primary source and my reflections here are simply

journey to maturity | 261

that. They do not seek to represent the views of my party and I do not pretend they are objective. They are my observations on the development of the politics of Scotland as seen through the prism of the work of the Scottish Parliament and of my frontline experience of it. In modern parlance, I have been on a ‘journey’ – one that has taken me from government backbencher, to committee convener, to government minister as part of a coalition, to leader of the opposition, and now on the backbenches in the party of third place. It has been an utterly privileged journey that has allowed me to see the very best of human nature, individuals, families and communities striving very often against the toughest of odds to overcome injustice and inequality. That direct experience of the cruelty and unfairnesses in life, the sheer sense of exhilaration – and humility – in being part of helping those who suffer, the deep satisfaction of grasping the causes of these injustices and taking the means of tackling them into the political debate are beyond measure and remain for me the burning heart of politics done well. It has been a journey that has not always been a happy one, of course. It could not help but be shaped by and reflective of the change in Labour’s electoral fortunes but it is also one that has seen significant – and I would argue detrimental – changes to how we as MSPs see our role. While it is never wise to look back with the warm glow of nostalgia on better times, there is no doubt that in the early days of the Parliament everything seemed more heightened and unpredictable. The Parliament was born into siege with the cost of the building and early scare stories about the work of MSPs proving a challenge to those of us lured into a false sense of security by the public endorsement of the Parliament in the referendum that brought it about. Under siege, there were friendships and respect forged that no political difference could diminish. That camaraderie of purpose in creating this brand new institution is no longer so evident. Looking back, there was an energy and an excitement. Government backbenchers proved early on that we were willing to rebel, that ‘lines to take’ from risk-averse government advisers were no match for or response to views on equality that had been long in their development and were not to be whipped away by business

262 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

­ anagers. External voices weighed heavily with us and were not m disregarded. The pressure from ‘civic Scotland’ was lucid, coherent and challenging. The early years of a broadly proportionately representative Parliament saw interesting alliances across all the backbenches – and that creative dialogue from the backbenches to their own frontbenches drove a dynamic that pushed policy beyond expectation. The early days of the Parliament saw a fascinating tackling of a backlog in legislation created by a House of Commons with not enough time and not sufficiently fleet of foot to meet Scottish legislative demands. We saw an opportunity to be radical on mental health and support for vulnerable adults, to develop real support for people with learning disabilities. We gave huge priority to housing and homelessness; we supported radical calls for a more inclusive education system; we challenged the justice system to meet the needs of victims and to understand the pervasive and corrosive nature of violence against women. There was a catalogue of ideas of importance and a determination to will the means to make real change happen. Most critically, government made itself open and responsive to groups and organisations in the voluntary sector and elsewhere which had already done the heavy lifting of developing policy, had done the hard thinking and had been awaiting the time when legislation was to be brought forward. This expertise was brought to ministers and, critically, to committees which saw that expertise not as a threat but as a massive resource. The committees then were the key to opening the Parliament up and were often where muscle was exercised against ministers with government backbenchers entirely uninhibited in taking on their own party colleagues. There is a whole study to be done on the nature of committees now where defensiveness of the party position is much more the norm. The loss of that committee member energy is one of the most to be regretted. It would also be true to say the Parliament in those early days resisted structures that were overly formal and imbued with deference. The sense of common endeavour was strong and I believe that sense of our common purpose, of being a team – politicians, clerks, security, catering and other support staff – remains a distinctive and cooperative core at the heart of the Parliament’s ethos.

journey to maturity | 263

The unique role of the Public Petitions Committee, the outreach work of our education service, our consultation approaches, the continuing monitoring of how we encourage the active participation of people in our work, these all give us heart that politics can be different and engaging. While I shall argue that much more needs to be done, there is an enduring belief in those ideals expressed in those first hesitant steps. But. There has to be a but.

Where has that early energy gone? Much of that energy has dissipated. The unpredictability has vanished. The sense that the policy should hold sway, that the choices were substantial and demanded rationality and evidence no longer are key. That the frontbench did not only have to deal with the opposition but with their own backbenches is no longer even considered. Perhaps unfairly, the unquestioning support of government backbenches is now a given. While all the discussion at Westminster can be about how rebellious backbenchers can create mayhem, the perceived passivity of government backbenchers in the Scottish Parliament has created a whole set of attitudes amongst those who lobby for change. I observe third-sector organisations trimming their demands or couching their concerns in more diplomatic language since the usual pressure through individual MSPs on their own government is accepted as a non-starter. That is not to gainsay the commitment and passion of individual MSPs. It is the expectation of their role and its limits which are a particular feature of the last period resulting, in my view, in expectations of external campaigning being more constrained. We cannot remain untouched by the constitutional debate which has so dominated Scottish politics, through the referendum and beyond and now, even in the chaos of Brexit, it remains a central factor. It was always there, of course – with independence as a core purpose of the SNP it could not be other. But it has come to dominate discourse with many arguments being a proxy debate on the constitution or where policy choices are shaped not by their evidential

264 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

merits but on how they will play on either side of the constitutional divide. And this goes back to the purpose of the Scottish Parliament in the minds of those who became advocates for it. There were those who saw it as a means to build the argument for independence, a step on the road to sovereignty. For others it was a means of addressing the demands for constitutional change by supporting a devolution of some power in order that we might secure the current constitutional arrangements of the UK. And for some (and I would count myself in this group), it was about decentralising power, of bringing control closer to communities and individuals, of offering solutions that chimed as closely as possible with people’s needs and values, working out the options and making rational choices focused on equality. It is this last purpose that has been squeezed. A thought-through sharing of power to maximise the benefits of cooperation with the liberating possibility of difference has lost out to a sterile debate – where more powers signify support for independence and retained powers enforce support for the UK. Along with that new, harsher and self-serving argument, too often everything else becomes grist to the mill. In policy terms we ask not, ‘Does it work and how?’ but rather, ‘Does it enhance or dilute my constitutional position?’ And from that another stultifying mindset emerges. Attitude to a policy is determined not by the merits of an idea but who is its advocate (and what is its underlying motive)? Take one example as illustration. On education policy in recent times, we have seen a dearth of thinking – one might argue in inverse proportion to the noise of declaiming commitment to its purpose. Proposals have been developed without an evidential base but are proclaimed as the shiny, new, must-do thing. When there is resistance, concerns are dismissed as playing politics or opposing for opposing’s sake. As someone who is steeped in education, I know we need radicalism and rigour in education; denying challenges by impugning the motives of those challenging may get a minister past the moment, but it leads to a digging in on an approach that may have flaws for which we may reap a heavy cost and opportunity

journey to maturity | 265

loss for the future. This is bad for education; as a way of political thinking it does immeasurable damage. A view that something is self- evidently right is as far away as we can get from the discipline of evidence and consequence of policy. This is not an academic argument for me. If we just do good things because they are self-evidently good, we ignore the consequences, unintended or otherwise, and we release ourselves from the burden of testing one set of choices against another. And our communities pay the price.

The limitations of binary Scotland and ‘Them’-and-‘Us’ politics We are not immune from the global political trends for easy fixes and easy targets – of a politics bold in the proclamations of politicians, populists and sloganeering, untainted by the lived reality of all too many. Too often policy is painted in black and white, take it or leave it, care or be hard-hearted, stand up for Scotland or let Scotland down. You have doubts about the benefits of baby boxes? Why don’t you want to welcome new babies into the world? You are anxious about the capping of funded places at universities on those with least opportunity to access them? Why do you oppose free education? On all sides, we see a shift to policy offers where the driver is whether it can fit on a leaflet, create a headline and be underpinned by a catchy soundbite, rather than an approach focused on understanding the challenge and its causes and is underpinned by rational, evidence based decision making. My fear is that we now are adept at signalling our commitment without the concomitant responsibility to test its value in the real world and its benefits against other policy choices and priorities. Our budget choices and commitment to equality and social justice should be indivisible. Sadly, they are not. In truth, tackling inequality, creating economic and social justice, understanding and eradicating the barriers to people achieving their potential involve complex action across government and beyond. It involves spending resources for which there will be no fanfare.

266 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Our challenge is to act and not chase the fanfare. And persuade our fellow Scots why. A Parliament created out of an aspiration to do politics better, to understand the diversity – economically and socially – across the UK and the much-needed redistribution of power, has become something different. An exchange of slogans. A shouting of our certainties across the constitutional divide. A Parliament born of a desire to decentralise authority has sucked up power, top-slicing funding from local government to fund eye-catching offers. It has, in part, failed in refreshing our politics. Where we might have had a more mature, thoughtful and engaged dialogue, we all too often settle for policy choices where the test is not their value but whether they allow us to claim that they make us first in the UK, different from Wales and Northern Ireland, smarter than England, explaining away problems, delegating blame and centralising credit. In short, we still do our politics as others do. Of course I see the role of the SNP in this – they have been in power for some time after all, but I recognise that this is a trend few political parties now resist. We must find a way of continuing the legitimate debate of the constitution, but it cannot bind our eyes and paralyse our thinking. Of course the choice between leaving or remaining in the UK may be a binary choice. But we should not force all debate and choice into that divide. So there are great challenges ahead. We first-termers are diminishing in number. The new generations who barely remember a time when the Parliament did not exist must now step up, not double down on poor habits. In the early days, much controversy emerged from the cost of the building – and understandably so. But the Scottish Parliament was for me never just a physical construct. I wanted it to be a living, breathing embodiment of a real sense of the purpose and focus of politics, where we test not just our capacity to want a fairer Scotland but are willing to make the rhetoric real in people’s life chances, where potential is unleashed, not denied. It is not all gloom and doom and I am conscious like many a Scot I may lean too close to that glass half-empty. For it is also true that I have been privileged to be part of a very exciting journey – being part of creating a new structure in the democratic landscape.

journey to maturity | 267

A whole political community, most of it invisible to the public eye, has played its part in creating this unique place that draws in people from across Scotland and beyond. The Garden Lobby, as an example, is a space at its best when it is bustling with young people, or campaigning groups, or celebrating aspects of our communities, or welcoming visitors, or hosting whatever amazingly diverse events people organise. It symbolises the Parliament’s sense of itself and its purpose. The Scottish Parliament, like my children, is reaching maturity. The centrality of the Scottish Parliament to the life of Scotland and its place at the heart of Scottish debate and dialogue is the greatest achievement of its first 20 years. The optimism and vision of its creation have still to be realised. But its existence and authority make that optimism and vision still relevant and possible. It is young and its best work is ahead of it. Just like my children, its untapped potential awaits.

268 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

T W E NT Y - F O U R

From Think Twice to Radical Devolution: A Scottish Conservative Movement Murdo Fraser

There was never anything automatic about Scottish Conservatives even sitting in the new Scottish Parliament. After all, most Tory activists had been enthusiastic members of Donald Findlay and Brian Monteith’s ‘Think Twice’ campaign, arguing for a No–No vote in the 1997 referendum on devolution. Even those at the heart of that campaign recognised that it was something of a suicide mission, but, nevertheless, given the party’s consistent opposition to a Scottish Parliament for more than two decades, felt that the battleground could not now be deserted and we might as well go down fighting. Someone, after all, had to speak up for the quarter of Scots who rejected home rule. When the referendum was lost in convincing fashion, there were those within the party who argued that the Conservatives should have nothing to do with devolution, and effectively boycot the first Scottish Parliament election. Fortunately, wiser voices prevailed, mainly in the form of the party chairman, former Aberdeen MP Raymond Robertson, and the Edinburgh lawyer David McLetchie, then president of the party’s voluntary wing. The purpose of a political party, they argued, was to use all opportunities presented to try to advance its arguments, and while the Tories might well have opposed the formation of the Scottish Parliament, it would be irresponsible not to try to provide a Conservative voice in this new institution with its significant range of powers.

from think twice to radical devolution | 269

1999 and all that In due course, McLetchie was elected leader of the Scottish Conservatives in the Parliament, narrowly defeating the popular former Ayr MP Phil Gallie. McLetchie understood that there was no future in the party fighting old battles against devolution, but it still took a long time for the Tories to be positive about the new Parliament. With 18 MSPs (all of them on regional lists) elected in the first Scottish Parliament election in 1999, the Scottish Conservatives, at that point without a single Westminster MP, at least re-established a foothold on the Scottish political scene. But there is no doubt that having been on the wrong side of the overwhelming vote in support of the Scottish Parliament in the 1997 referendum left a legacy of toxicity for the party which it took a long time to recover from. In his comparative study of the Scottish and Welsh Conservative parties in the devolution period, the academic Alan Convery quotes a conversation he had in 2012 with a Conservative MSP whom he asked: ‘Would it be fair to say that the party has never really got over the 1997 referendum result?’ The response (and this was fifteen years on) was: ‘I think it is gradually getting over the referendum result.’ (Convery, 2016: 35) Indeed, in the early years of devolution, Scottish Tories struggled to find a coherent political approach to the devolution question. Most Conservatives in the country had, after all, voted against the Scottish Parliament as an institution, and there were real concerns that these individuals would simply sit on their hands in Scottish Parliament elections and not vote for anyone. The party’s early electoral strategy was therefore focused on motivating ‘missing Conservatives’, being those Tories who would happily vote in a UK general election, but not turn out at Holyrood. Maintaining a healthy scepticism towards the whole Holyrood project, for example by talking up opposition to waste in the institution, not least the Holyrood building project, was seen as a way of driving these voters to the ballot box. This approach was not without its successes, at least in attracting media attention. Exposing the cost overruns and failures in the new Parliament building helped build a public profile for the p ­ reviously

270 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

unknown McLetchie. And his reputation as a parliamentary performer was enhanced by his harrying of Labour First Minister Henry McLeish – a harrying which led to a significant scalp. But on the bigger issue of the constitution, there was, unsurprisingly, substantial resistance to any notion of extending devolution in the direction of greater fiscal responsibility, despite some influential voices in the party making this case (among them Struan Stevenson MEP and, ironically, Brian Monteith). As far back as 1998, Michael Fry, Peter Smaill and I co-authored a pamphlet for the Tuesday Club entitled ‘Full Fiscal Freedom’, essentially arguing that giving Holyrood additional financial responsibility would not only provide greater opportunities for a party of the centre-right favouring lower taxes, but would also help address the party’s identity problem. However, the majority of party members remained hostile, despite a growing interest in such ideas from McLetchie himself and a number of other MSPs. There were often contrasts drawn between the relative success of the Welsh Conservatives with the lack of progress made in Scotland. As Convery points out, the election of Nick Bourne as leader of the Welsh Tories in 1999, to replace Rod Richards, was a catalyst for a change of direction there, and the adoption of a strategy of actively detoxifying the party’s brand, with an emphasis on promoting pride in Welsh culture and heritage (Convery, 2016: 84). The consequence was a steady growth in the numbers of Welsh Conservatives elected, both in Cardiff and at Westminster, whilst in Scotland numbers remained stubbornly low, with only one single Westminster constituency held until 2017.

The 2007 SNP victory The election of a minority SNP government in 2007 was a significant catalyst for a change in tack amongst the Scottish Conservatives. Under Annabel Goldie’s leadership, the party adopted an approach of constructive opposition to the SNP, lending its support in budget votes in return for policy concessions (e.g. on increasing police numbers, and on small-business rates relief). The belief was that this approach would not only demonstrate the relevance of the party in being able to deliver on Conservative manifesto pledges,

from think twice to radical devolution | 271

but it would also help in detoxification of the brand by working with a popular SNP government. In scenes which would be considered extraordinary a few years later, Tory MSPs happily voted with the SNP on a wide range of issues, with the respective party leaders, Goldie and Alex Salmond, enjoying a positive working relationship. In parallel with this approach, Annabel agreed that the party should participate in a new Commission on Scottish Devolution, set up jointly with Labour and the Liberal Democrats, and chaired by Sir Kenneth Calman. Motivated by unionist concern about the success of the SNP, the Calman Commission’s final report, published in June 2009, recommended enhancements to the taxation powers of the Parliament, in particular the right to vary income taxes by 10p, the devolution of some smaller taxes, including air passenger duty, landfill tax and stamp duty land tax, and devolution of legislative powers in a number of areas such as drink-drive limits and the regulation of air guns. The hope amongst the pro-Union parties was that the Calman Commission proposals would demonstrate that devolution was a dynamic process, that it could be enhanced should there be sufficient public demand, and that therefore there was no need to go down the SNP route of full independence. But if that was the objective, the Calman Commission failed with the election of a majority SNP government in 2011. In hindsight, the weakness of Calman was that it was neither fish nor fowl, going too far in terms of devolution to upset many hard-line unionists, whilst at the same time not going far enough, particularly in the area of taxation, to satisfy those who wanted to see proper fiscal accountability at Holyrood. The United Kingdom Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government elected in 2010 pledged to implement the findings of the Calman Commission, and subsequently used them as the foundation of the Scotland Act 2012. But while unionists were able to point out the benefits from these newly devolved powers, it was not enough to stop the SNP pursuing their independence campaign in the build-up to the 2014 referendum.

272 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Changing Tory fortunes In the meantime, Annabel Goldie stood down following the Scottish Parliament election of 2011, when Scottish Conservative representation at Holyrood fell from 17 to 15 seats. By now the Scottish Conservative constitution had been changed following recommendations from Lord Sanderson of Bowden’s Commission, to ensure that that there would be a distinct Scottish leader with overall authority for the first time (both McLetchie and Goldie being only technically leaders of the MSP group at Holyrood). This new leader would be directly elected by the entire party membership across the country. It was belated recognition that devolution was here to stay, and that organisational structures had to be adapted to reflect the growing importance of Holyrood as the focus of Scottish political life. A major issue in the subsequent leadership election was the question of further devolution: as a leadership candidate I was an enthusiast for a further enhancement of the Parliament’s financial powers, whilst the others (Jackson Carlaw, Ruth Davidson and Margaret Mitchell) stood opposed. Indeed, Ruth Davidson was robust in her stance – opposition to any further devolution of financial powers was ‘a line in the sand’. This was a policy position which might by now be out of tune with the majority of Tory MSPs, but still found strong resonance with the party membership whose votes in due course elected Ruth leader. Lines in the sand tend to get washed away by incoming tides, and in 2013 Ruth announced the formation of the Strathclyde Commission to look at how devolution could be enhanced. This produced a set of radical proposals, among them recommending that the setting of all rates and bands of income tax in Scotland should be decided by MSPs, and making a case for a share of Scottish VAT receipts being assigned to the Scottish Parliament. It was more radical than even the proposals from the Scottish Labour Party at the time, and represented a significant shift in opinion amongst Scottish Conservatives. At last the party was in the mainstream of Scottish public opinions, being overtly enthusiastic about devolution rather than being reluctant and grudging participants. Unsurprisingly, the staunchly unionist Michael Forsyth, former

from think twice to radical devolution | 273

Secretary of State for Scotland and now active in the House of Lords, was unimpressed. But there was surprisingly little opposition from elsewhere in the party – the threat of independence helping to convince doubters that it was no longer prudent to resist a public demand for change. The Strathclyde Commission came at a turning point in Scottish Conservative fortunes. The independence referendum gave Tories a cause to fight for, one that really mattered, and one to which the entire party was passionately committed – the defence of the Union. Across the country new activists were signed up, motivated by the challenge presented. Ruth Davidson’s energetic campaign thrust her into the forefront of Scottish public life for the first time, and people liked what they saw. Here was no typical old-school Tory, but a fresh face representing a new generation. And, with the party now committed to further devolution, there was a new political direction with much broader electoral appeal. It would still be two years before the real fruits of labour would show in terms of Scottish Conservative electoral success. The Strathclyde Commission proposals ended up as the foundation for the 2016 Scotland Act, demonstrating that the Conservative government in Westminster was not just paying lip service to the idea of enhanced devolution. Robust opposition to the notion of a second independence referendum led to a surge in Scottish Conservative fortunes in the 2016 Scottish Parliament elections, more than doubling representation from 15 to 31 seats, and supplanting Labour as the second party of Scottish politics – a quite remarkable turnaround. These successes were not just consolidated, but exceeded by Scottish Conservative progress in the local government elections a year later, and to an even greater extent in the 2017 general election, when the party went from just one Westminster seat to 13, the best result in some 30 years. Amongst the scalps taken by new Conservative MPs that night were those of the former First Minister Alex Salmond and the SNP’s Westminster leader Angus Robertson. As the Scottish Parliament has grown in power and influence, so the Scottish Conservatives have grown with it. Any notion today of the party opposing devolution would simply be laughed at. With substantial financial devolution now delivered, the focus is on how

274 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

these powers might be used in practice. Increasingly, the debate is around the performance of the Scottish economy, the size of the tax base, and what will be the impact of differential tax rates between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom. This is all rich territory for a party of the centre-right to operate in, and Scottish Conservatives can expect future electoral dividends from being the party of competitive taxation, and rigour in the management of public finances. Brexit means that constitutional issues are still centre stage in Scottish politics, but the question of more powers for the Parliament is one which has effectively gone off the agenda for now, not least due to the lack of bandwidth to discuss these issues when so much else is going on. The United Kingdom has effectively moved towards being a quasi-federal state, although the institutional mechanisms to make this work effectively, for example in terms of intergovernmental machinery, need to be strengthened. If there is unfinished business with devolution within Scotland, it must be around the relationships between Holyrood and local government. The SNP in power have been vociferous about devolution from Westminster to Edinburgh, but whilst complaining about London power-grabs, they themselves have been all too happy to grab power away from local councils. There is a great opportunity here for Scottish Conservatives to be the champions of enhanced local democracy, strengthening the regions against the centre, and pursuing the notion of directly elected mayors or provosts for our cities. The history of two decades of Conservatives in the Scottish Parliament is a story of transformation and progress, how a party once hostile to devolution became enthusiastic for it, and how it reaped the electoral rewards. With the Scottish Conservatives firmly in the political mainstream, no one now laughs at the possibility of a Tory First Minister in 2021. That such a thing is even imaginable speaks to the remarkable journey that Scottish Tories have made in this period.

from think twice to radical devolution | 275

Reference Convery, A. (2016), The Territorial Conservative Party: Devolution and Party Change in Scotland and Wales, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

276 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

T W E NT Y - F IV E

The Scottish Parliament: Past Dreams, Present Realities, Possible Futures Joyce McMillan

If there was one thing that seemed certain back in the 1990s, during the decade-long final campaign that led to the setting up of the Scottish Parliament, it was that in creating a new Parliament for the twenty-first century, we could and would do better than Westminster. As it approached the end of 18 years of Conservative rule during which it had seen little reform, the Westminster Parliament of the mid 1990s seemed almost laughably unfit for purpose, burdened not only with an archaic electoral system that delivered large overall majorities to parties which did not enjoy majority support in the country, but also by a tradition of overweening executive power that often reduced backbench MPs to lobby-fodder, overrode the deliberations of parliamentary committees, and made a mockery of supposed pre-legislative consultations with the wider public and civil society. The consequent poor quality of legislation emerging from Westminster was widely blamed for the chaotic or flawed outcomes of Tory policies such as the poll tax and rail privatisation, famously described by one Tory MP as a ‘disaster on wheels’. And in terms of fair representation of the nation, the House of Commons – to say nothing of the Lords – lacked any pretence of properly representing women, ethnic minorities, gay people, or people with disabilities. Although the MP and future Labour arts minister Chris Smith had come out as gay in 1984, there were still, in 1995, no MPs who had been ‘out’ at the time of their first election. There were only six ethnic minority MPs, compared with 52 today, and astonishingly,

past dreams, present realities , possible futures | 277

only 9 per cent of Westminster MPs were women – today, the figure is 32 per cent.

Pre-devolution Scotland It’s therefore hardly surprising that the Scottish Constitutional Convention – which included many powerful women’s organisations, and strong female representation from the STUC and Labour Party – was convinced that it could do much better, and began to develop plans for a Parliament that would not only be elected by proportional representation, but would be part of a system that aimed to share power between the Scottish Parliament, executive and people, and that dared to dream of requiring 50:50 representation of men and women by law (Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995). In 1995, Bernard Crick and David Millar, a former senior official of both the Westminster and European parliaments, produced a hugely influential short booklet called ‘To Make The Scottish Parliament A Model For Democracy’, which explored these ideas, along with many others (Crick and Miller, 1995). And although the idea of a legally enforced 50:50 rule was eventually ruled out, following discussions in the Scottish Constitutional Convention, many of the principles and practical proposals embodied in the Crick–Millar booklet exerted a powerful influence on the thinking of the devolution parties, and made their way through the Scottish Constitutional Convention’s final proposal for a Scottish Parliament into the historic Scotland Act of 1998, and also into the workings of the Consultative Steering Group on the new Parliament set up by Secretary of State Donald Dewar soon after the Blair government was elected in 1997. To read the final report of the Consultative Steering Group today is therefore to catch, in its outwardly prosaic pages, a glimpse of Scotland at a remarkable moment of change, when a range of non-government political parties and civil-society actors were able – after a decade of sustained work on the Constitutional Convention plan – to exert a decisive influence both on the Scotland Act, and on the government’s proposals for the operation and style of the new Parliament (Consultative Steering Group, 1998). The Consultative Steering Group document framed the­

278 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

aspirations for the Parliament under four headings, or ‘key principles’. The first was a commitment to ‘power-sharing’ among Parliament, executive and people, rather than a strict concept of sovereignty exercised by the executive through a whipped parliamentary majority. The second was a principle of accountability, in which the Scottish Executive was to be accountable to Parliament, and both were to be accountable to the people. The third was accessibility. In contrast to the arcane procedures and language of Westminster, great emphasis was laid on the idea of a Parliament that would not only make itself physically accessible through the design of its new building and of its information services, but would speak in clear, understandable language, adopt lucid and streamlined modern procedures, open its doors to as many people as possible, operate an effective petitions system, and develop legislation through an open and participatory consultation process. It was also hoped that the Parliament would develop a less adversarial culture than Westminster, since the ‘ya-boo’ atmosphere there was unpopular, and was widely believed to deter many people, including women, from participation in the political process. The final Consultative Steering Group principle was equality; an aim which embraced gender and all other forms of equality, and placed the idea of fair and equal representation of women and minorities at the heart of the Parliament’s operation. There was also much talk of the use of new technologies to link Parliament to people, and improve both access and accountability; and a general feeling that Scotland should be building a democratic institution fit for the twenty-first century, rather than one rooted in a ­nineteenth-century building and in traditions which date back to a time when Parliament was barely elected at all. The aspirations were high, in other words; and it is tempting, in assessing the performance of the Parliament over the last 20 years, to focus mainly on those hopes which proved unrealistic, and on the tendency of the Parliament to drift back towards the Westminster-dominated norms of British political culture.

past dreams, present realities , possible futures | 279

From aspiration to reality: the record of Scotland’s Parliament Yet with hindsight, it’s also possible to see that the achievements of the Parliament, in its first half-decade, were remarkable. Thanks to the hard work of the Scottish Constitutional Convention over more than a decade, followed by swift and skilful implementation by Donald Dewar’s Scottish Office, it emerged within 18 months of the passing of the Scotland Act as a fully fledged, functioning national legislature, already with its own distinctive atmosphere and language. It had been elected without a hitch by an additional member system similar to the one used by the German Bundestag; a system never used in the UK before, which succeeded – as the Convention had hoped – in delivering local MSP representation for every Scottish constituency (with an extra MSP to give Orkney and Shetland one each) while producing a broadly proportional Parliament, genuinely reflective of the balance of Scottish opinion. And more than 37 per cent of the MSPs elected to the first Scottish Parliament of 1999 were women; so that even though female representation at Westminster had doubled with the Blair victory of 1997, the new Scottish Parliament, along with the Welsh Assembly elected in the same year, was breaking new ground in terms of female representation, at least within the UK. Nor did the Parliament fail to build on that positive start. Although some of its plans for physical and symbolic accessibility were adversely affected by a tightening security culture after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the Parliament very rapidly became the unquestioned focus of Scottish political life. According to opinion polls, a large majority of Scots – a three-to-one majority, excluding Don’t Knows, in a 2014 YouGov poll – are inclined to trust Holyrood rather than Westminster with decisions about Scotland’s future. The building itself receives a constant stream of tourists, as well as visitors on business. By 2009, the new Parliament building at Holyrood, opened in September 2004, had clocked up 2 million visitors; people continue to check in to the Parliament at a rate of more than 400,000 a year – a high rate, in a country with a population of only 5 million.

280 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

In terms of culture – partly because of its large percentage of women members – the Parliament immediately achieved a more open, accessible and ‘normal’ atmosphere than Westminster, adopting more family-friendly working hours, tailoring its breaks to the Scottish school holidays, and avoiding arcane language and jargon in its procedures. And the Parliament’s rigorous expenses system has guaranteed that it has largely avoided the kind of financial scandal, and consequent unpopularity, that swept Westminster in 2009–10; although in the age of #MeToo, there have been some cases which have suggested that this relatively young Parliament is not immune to the political culture of sexual bullying, harassment and innuendo that is often criticised at Westminster. The Parliament has also registered some very substantial achievements in terms of legislation and representation. Its Public Petitions Committee is widely regarded as a successful institution, allowing members of the public with substantial grievances an immediate point of contact with the Parliament; in its first 15 years of operation, to 2014, the committee dealt with 1,500 petitions, leading to legislation or policy changes on subjects ranging from the safety of mobile phone masts to the availability of cancer medicines. Perhaps even more significantly, the Parliament has developed a close consultative relationship with most of Scotland’s major campaigning organisations across civil society – sometimes known as the ‘usual suspects’ of Scottish public life – and, alongside the Scottish Government, has made use of their expertise in developing and monitoring some ground-breaking legislation in major areas. It can be argued that this network of civic influence represents a far sounder basis for legislation than the more think-tank-driven model that thrives around Westminster, with the Scottish Government and Parliament – while not incapable of producing poor and badly drafted legislation – receiving plaudits for measures such as the Marine (Scotland) Act 2010, which set up a new system of marine protected areas to preserve the integrity of Scotland’s vast coastline, and for its legislation in the area of mental health.

past dreams, present realities , possible futures | 281

Time for fresh thinking Despite its achievements over its first 20 years, though, the Scottish Parliament is now undoubtedly in need of some fresh thinking about its operations and procedures, both in order to address various weaknesses that have emerged in these first two decades, and to ensure that the Parliament remains on the cutting edge of new developments in parliamentary democracy. There was therefore a widespread welcome for the current Presiding Officer Ken Macintosh’s decision, in 2016, to set up an independent Commission on Parliamentary Reform, chaired by former Scottish Electoral Commissioner John McCormick, to make recommendations on the Parliament’s future, ahead of its twentieth anniversary; the report of the Commission was published in the summer of 2017, and while some of its minor recommendations have already been implemented, most are still making their way through the Parliament’s committee system (McCormick, 2017). This moment of reflection on the Parliament’s history also comes after an exceptionally long period of dominance – a full 12 years by the time the Parliament celebrates its anniversary in July 2019 – by one party, the SNP, which has now formed the Scottish Government for more than half of the Parliament’s life; this political situation, unexpected at the time of the Parliament’s inception, has tested to the limit its ability to hold to account a powerful executive now deeply entrenched in office. At the same time, the Westminster Parliament – under the controversial and often radical Commons Speakership of John Bercow – has undergone a period of rapid reform, including a radical move, in 2010, to ensure that the members and chairs of most Commons committees are elected via a secret ballot of MPs, thereby removing these posts from the once all-powerful patronage of the respective party leaderships. Meanwhile, the representation of women in the Commons has almost quadrupled over 25 years, and now stands at 32 per cent of members. In the same period, representation of ethnic minorities has increased eightfold; and other measures have been introduced to enhance the role of backbench MPs both in committee, and in the chamber of the House.

282 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

A future agenda for a reformed Scottish Parliament There is therefore a growing sense that parliamentary democracy in these islands has been evolving rapidly over the years since 1999, and that it is more than time for the Scottish Parliament to take stock, and undertake a thorough update of its methods and procedures. Broadly speaking, the main persistent concerns about the Parliament’s operation – all reflected in the report of the Independent Commission on Parliamentary Reform – seem to fall into four areas. The first involves the Parliament’s committees, which were envisaged by the Scottish Constitutional Convention, and the Consultative Steering Group, as an immensely powerful and autonomous part of the Parliament’s operation, carrying out many of the functions of a second chamber in terms of considering and amending legislation, and holding the executive to account. It was also hoped that they would play a vital role as an interface between the Parliament and wider society, consulting not only with ‘usual suspects’, but in communities across Scotland. While committees have to some extent carried out all of these functions, though, it seems that they have, by and large, had neither the time nor the resources, nor the continuity of membership, to meet the hopes of the Parliament’s founders in full, or to become the autonomous source of research, scrutiny, amendment and new legislation envisaged in the Consultative Steering Group document. There are widespread concerns that the committees too often vote along party lines without taking an independent view, that their membership changes too often as MSPs step up to front bench positions or change the emphasis of their work, and that their conveners do not stay in post long enough, or with enough resources at their disposal, to acquire real expertise and authority, and to bring real pressure to bear on government ministers and other major figures in Scottish life. It is not only, in other words, that we rarely have a chance to see public figures being grilled by the Holyrood equivalent of a Margaret Hodge or an Yvette Cooper, but that when committees do take a proactive role in holding public officials to account – as in the recent sessions of Holyrood’s Culture, Tourism, Europe and

past dreams, present realities , possible futures | 283

External Affairs Committee, chaired by Joan McAlpine, following the chaotic Creative Scotland arts funding round of January 2018 – the spectacle seems to engender some shock in the small world of Scottish public life, as if the committee were overstepping some unwritten mark, and beginning to develop ideas above the somewhat humble station Holyrood committees have so far occupied. The second concern focuses on the reality that, contrary to the hopes of many advocates of proportional representation, the mere fact that Scottish Parliament elections produce a broadly proportional result does not, of itself, reduce the level of party tribalism in Scottish politics or weaken the iron grip of party leaderships on the consciences and voting patterns of individual MSPs. The intensely adversarial nature of Westminster politics has historically been so strongly associated with the First Past the Post electoral system that it was perhaps natural to assume that a system which normally produces coalition or minority governments would promote a more consensual culture, but while the smoothness with which Scottish government has continued over these 20 years suggests that party leaders can indeed cooperate effectively when necessary, we have learned that there is no guarantee that those top-level understandings will improve the atmosphere or quality of debate in the chamber, or weaken the control of party whips over individual backbench MSPs. Thirdly, there is some concern – related to a general sense of parliamentary weakness vis-à-vis the executive – that the Parliament is playing an insufficient role in supporting and representing some of the basic values and principles on which the devolution settlement was founded, including a fundamental commitment to uphold human rights, along with specific principles to do with children’s rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of information, among others. In several of these areas, the Parliament – not the Scottish Government – appoints special independent commissioners to ensure these values are respected in the work of the Scottish Parliament and Government. Yet even so, there is mounting concern that some well-­intentioned Scottish Parliament legislation in areas such as hate speech or family policy may be taking a cavalier attitude to fundamental rights of free speech and privacy; and in the area of Freedom of Information

284 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

– where the Scottish Parliament enacted some exceptionally strong legislation back in 2002 – there is now evidence that a culture has developed inside the Scottish Government which regards Freedom of Information legislation as a nuisance to be evaded as far as possible, particularly when requests come from journalists, and of a Parliament that has so far been powerless – or unwilling – to tackle that decline in commitment to what was supposed to be one the founding values of Scotland’s devolved government. And then, finally, there is concern that the Scottish Parliament’s performance on equality issues, measured against other parliaments worldwide, is simply no longer strong enough to put the Parliament in the forefront of fair representation for women and minorities. Scotland remains a world leader in the area of gay rights, and has been listed in some surveys as one of the two or three best countries in the world in which to be gay; two of the five main party leaders at Holyrood are ‘out’ gay politicians. Its representation of ethnic minorities is poor, however, with only two current MSPs out of 129 coming from Scotland’s black and Asian ethnic minorities, who should, statistically, provide a minimum of four MSPs. And on the matter of gender, the Parliament’s current composition is frankly disappointing, given its excellent start 20 years ago. Today, the proportion of women at Holyrood is 34.8 per cent, just a couple of points ahead of Westminster, three percentage points behind its own performance in 1999, and a depressing five points behind the high-water mark of female representation at Holyrood, achieved at the Scottish general election of 2003. The fact remains that Labour is the only Scottish party which has ever taken structural steps to ensure equal representation of men and women, with its famous ‘twinning’ of constituencies and ‘zipping’ of lists in early Scottish elections; Labour’s decline and the rise of the SNP has been accompanied by a slow drift back towards a predominantly male Parliament, despite the strong female leadership figures that have emerged in all three major parties at Holyrood.

Is there a political will for change? The question of what should be done to address these various weaknesses of the Scottish Parliament is of course a complex one;

past dreams, present realities , possible futures | 285

some of these issues lie directly within the power of the Parliament itself, while others – such as the achievement of gender balance – are also matters for the political parties, and for our wider political culture. What is concerning, though, is that in every one of the areas outlined above, a certain complacency seems to have settled over Holyrood – an assumption that as the new Parliament founded with such high aspirations, it is well ahead of the game in the matter of twenty-first-century democracy, and need not worry too much about major reforms. The 2017 ‘Report of the Independent Commission on Parliamentary Reform’ was hardly a radical document; it barely paused to outline the problems it was seeking to address, and plunged straight into a series of formidably detailed micro-recommendations about the working of the Parliament, many of which may well bring about marginal improvements in the scrutiny of the executive, in the relationship between committees and the wider business of Parliament, and in the empowering of individual MSPs. Yet even this cautious and detailed document seems to have been a shade too radical, in some respects, for the Scottish Parliament in its current mood. The weakness of the Parliament’s committees, for example, relative to the hopes of 1999, requires some profound thought on matters ranging from the actual size of the Parliament – are 129 members in a single chamber enough to cover the range of responsibilities the Parliament now has, and to ensure a strong committee system? Then there are questions around the size and resourcing of the committees, and the method of selection of members and conveners. The Independent Commission made a clear recommendation that the Scottish Parliament should follow Westminster in moving rapidly to system of direct election of conveners by secret ballot of MSPs, and that it should also consider paying the conveners of major committees in order to enhance their role, and to encourage them to remain in office for longer periods. Yet instead of the direct election of conveners being embraced by Scotland’s parliamentarians as an obvious next step, the whole matter has been kicked into the long grass of the Parliament’s Procedures Committee, where it has yet to be fully considered. The Commission also recommended that two new stages of pre- and post-legislative scrutiny should be added to the current three-stage

286 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

handling of bills in committee, in order to encourage a greater committee input into the initial drafting of bills, and a greater role in monitoring their implementation; but that suggestion has already been rejected, in favour of much vaguer language about committees increasing those activities. The flame of reform hardly seems to be burning brightly at Holyrood 20 years on, in other words, and if obvious moves to strengthen committees and their conveners are being put on the back burner, the same lethargy often seems to affect the Parliament’s other problematic areas. The current tone of its work is set by the SNP, which for the last 15 years has been one of the most formidably disciplined parties not only in Scotland but in the UK as a whole, with little dissent on any subject in its formally elected ranks. Disputes over basic rights and freedoms which may be infringed by the Scottish Government tend to take place on strict party lines, with Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, and Greens happy to score points against the executive, but few politicians seeming to take the wider principled view. And on the matter of equalities – where the Independent Commission Report recommends much more rigorous forms of regular self-scrutiny by the Scottish Parliament – some of the grand civic alliances that made possible the Scottish Parliament’s flying start, particularly in the matter of gender equality, seem somehow to have disbanded, assuming that the job was done, whereas in fact, in matters of equality, the job is never done, since the structural factors that bar traditionally excluded groups from standing for office or taking part in politics remain entrenched, and have in some ways been worsened by recent UK economic policies, the impact of which has fallen particularly heavily on women and people with disabilities. If the aim is to make the Scottish Parliament a model for democracy, in other words, it is time for the Parliament to stop taking its status as a new and forward-looking institution for granted, and to begin to reform and renew itself for changing times. In order to achieve that, it may need to elect a Presiding Officer, next time round, who is likely to offer imaginative and decisive leadership in that direction, in place of the current mild reform and genial caution.

past dreams, present realities , possible futures | 287

And, of course, it is also time for Scotland’s civil society organisations to make their collective voice heard once more, when it comes to shaping the Parliament’s future. For 20 years, the professional politicians and their officials have been in charge of the Scottish Parliament project, and their achievements have in many ways been remarkable. Now, though – in a time of new threats to Scotland’s fledgling democracy, both known and unknown – it seems they may need some support in moving on, and in rediscovering the excitement of reinventing parliamentary democracy for yet another new age. And although the task is not easy, it’s clear that it will be done best by Parliament and wider Scottish society acting together, ensuring – as we tried to do 25 years ago – that the very shape and structures of the Parliament reflect the needs of the people, as we move forward into new and troubling times.

References Consultative Steering Group (1998), ‘Shaping Scotland’s Parliament: Report of the Consultative Steering Group on Scotland’s Parliament’, Edinburgh: Scottish Office. Crick, B. and Miller, D. (1995), ‘To Make The Scottish Parliament A Model For Democracy’, Edinburgh: John Wheatley Centre. McCormick, J. (2017), ‘Commission on Parliamentary Reform’, Edinburgh: Scottish Parliament. Scottish Constitutional Convention (1995), ‘Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right’, Edinburgh: Convention of Scottish Local Authorities.

appendix | 289

Appendix: A Chronology of Scottish Politics and Devolution, 1997–2019 Gerry Hassan

1997 1 May 1997: Labour, under Tony Blair, wins an overall Commons majority of 179 committed to establishing a Scottish Parliament. 3 May 1997: Donald Dewar appointed Secretary of State for Scotland. 24 July 1997: UK Government White Paper on Scottish devolution, ‘Scotland’s Parliament’ published. 11 September 1997: Scotland votes 74.3 per cent to 25.7 per cent for a Scottish Parliament and by 63.5 per cent to 36.5 per cent for it to have tax-raising powers on a 60.4 per cent turnout. 14 November 1997: Consultative Steering Group (CSG) on procedures of the Scottish Parliament set up by the Secretary of State for Scotland. 18 December 1997: Scotland Bill published. 1998 9 January 1998: Donald Dewar announces Holyrood as the site of the future Scottish Parliament. 6 July 1998: The Spanish architectural practice EMBT, led by Enric Miralles, is awarded the contract to design the Scottish Parliament. 19 September 1998: Donald Dewar elected as Scottish Labour’s candidate for First Minister and becomes leader of the Scottish Labour Group at the Scottish Parliament with 99.8 per cent of the votes at a special conference. Formally, the party will not redesignate the post as Scottish Labour leader until Johann Lamont.

290 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

19 November 1998: Scotland Act 1998 receives royal assent. 14 December 1998: Consultative Steering Group (CSG) report, ‘Shaping Scotland’s Parliament’ presented to the Secretary of State. 1999 15 January 1999: Consultative Steering Group (CSG) report formally published. 6 May 1999: The first elections are held for the Scottish Parliament. Labour and the Liberal Democrats form a coalition Scottish Executive; in local government elections Labour wins 550 seats to 204 for the SNP. 12 May 1999: Sir David Steel elected Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament. 13 May 1999: Donald Dewar elected First Minister with 71 votes to 35 for the SNP’s Alex Salmond, 17 for Conservative David McLetchie and three for independent Dennis Canavan. 17 May 1999: Donald Dewar sworn in as First Minister by Her Majesty, the Queen; Jim Wallace becomes Deputy First Minister; John Reid becomes Secretary of State for Scotland. 10 June 1999: European elections in Scotland see Labour win 28.7 per cent to 27.2 per cent for the SNP with the Conservatives on 19.8 per cent. 1 July 1999: Formal transfer of powers from the UK Parliament to the Scottish Parliament which is formally opened by Her Majesty, the Queen. 13 September 1999: Mental Health (Scotland) Act receives royal assent: the first bill to be passed by the Scottish Parliament. 21 December 1999: Andrew Cubie Committee report on abolishing tuition fees published. 2000 16 March 2000: John Scott for the Conservatives wins the Scottish Parliament Ayr by-election from Labour, turning a Labour majority of 25 over the Conservatives into a Tory one of 3,344 over the SNP with Labour in third place. 27 April 2000: Scottish Socialist MSP Tommy Sheridan’s Abolition of Poindings and Warrant Sales Bill is passed by 79 votes to 15 with 30 abstentions: the Scottish Executive withdraws its opposition and

appendix | 291

it becomes the first non-Executive piece of legislation to go on the statute book. 30 May 2000: Unofficial referendum on the abolition of Section 28/ Clause 2A sees 86.8 per cent opposition on a 34.5 per cent turnout. 21 June 2000: Scottish Parliament votes 99 to 17 to abolish Section 28/Clause 2A. 17 July 2000: Alex Salmond announces his resignation as SNP leader. 23 September 2000: John Swinney elected SNP leader defeating Alex Neil; Roseanna Cunningham becomes depute leader. 11 October 2000: First Minister Donald Dewar dies at the age of 63. 21 October 2000: Henry McLeish defeats Jack McConnell by 44 votes to 36 in a mini-electoral college to become interim leader of the Scottish Labour Group at the Scottish Parliament. 26 October 2000: Henry McLeish is elected First Minister with 68 votes to 33 for the SNP’s John Swinney, 19 for Conservative David McLetchie and three for Independent Dennis Canavan. 27 October 2000: Henry McLeish formally becomes leader of the Scottish Labour Group at the Scottish Parliament. 2001 25 January 2001: Helen Liddell becomes Secretary of State for Scotland: the first woman to ever hold the post. 7 June 2001: Labour elected for a second UK term under Tony Blair. 8 November 2001: Henry McLeish resigns as First Minister. 22 November 2001: Jack McConnell is elected leader of the Scottish Labour Group at the Scottish Parliament and First Minister, winning in the latter 70 votes to 34 for the SNP’s John Swinney, 19 for Conservative David McLetchie and three for Independent Dennis Canavan. 27 November 2001: Jack McConnell carries out a reshuffle of his Cabinet, axeing four ministers, Angus MacKay, Sarah Boyack, Tom McCabe and Jackie Baillie, and demoting a fifth, Susan Deacon, who resigns rather than accepting the new post.

292 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

2002 27 March 2002: The Kerley Report, ‘Renewing Local Democracy: The Next Steps’, proposing the introduction of the Single Transferrable Vote (STV) in local government elections, published. 3 May 2002: Wendy Alexander resigns as Scottish Executive Minister for Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong Learning. 19 September 2002: Jack McConnell and Jim Wallace agree a plan to introduce STV in local government elections. 2003 16 January 2003: Scottish Parliament votes 67 to 51 with three abstentions against an SNP motion opposing UK military intervention in Iraq. 1 May 2003: Second Scottish Parliament elections see Labour and the Liberal Democrats continue their coalition Executive; in local government elections Labour wins 509 seats to 181 for the SNP. 7 May 2003: Sir George Reid elected Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament. 15 May 2003: Jack McConnell is elected First Minister with 67 votes to 26 for the SNP’s John Swinney, 18 for Conservative David McLetchie, six for Scottish Green Robin Harper, six for Scottish Socialist Tommy Sheridan, two for Independent Dennis Canavan and two for Independent Margo MacDonald. 13 June 2003: Alistair Darling becomes Secretary of State for Scotland. 27 September 2003: John Swinney defeats challenger Bill Wilson for the leadership of the SNP by 577 votes to 111. 2004 10 June 2004: European elections in Scotland sees Labour win 26.4 per cent to 19.7 per cent for the SNP and 17.8 per cent for the Conservatives. 29 July 2004: Local Governance (Scotland) Act 2004 receives royal assent paving the way for the introduction of STV in local elections. 3 September 2004: Alex Salmond elected leader of the SNP and Nicola Sturgeon depute leader. 7 September 2004: First meeting of the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood.

appendix | 293

15 September 2004: Holyrood Inquiry chaired by Lord Fraser of Carmyllie published. 9 October 2004: The Queen opens the Scottish Parliament’s new building at Holyrood. 11 November 2004: Tommy Sheridan resigns as convener of the Scottish Socialist Party. 2005 5 May 2005: Labour elected for a third UK term under Tony Blair. 9 May 2005: Jim Wallace announces his resignation as Scottish Liberal Democrat leader and Deputy First Minister. 27 June 2005: Nicol Stephen is elected Scottish Liberal Democrat leader and becomes Deputy First Minister. 6–8 July 2005: G8 summit held at Gleneagles. 6 August 2005: Robin Cook, former UK Foreign Secretary and Leader of the House of Commons, dies at the age of 59. 31 October 2005: David McLetchie resigns as Scottish Conservative leader. 5 November 2005: Annabel Goldie becomes the new leader of the Scottish Conservatives, elected unopposed. 2006 9 February 2006: Willie Rennie wins Dunfermline and West Fife in a Westminster by-election from Labour, overturning a previous Labour majority of 11,562 with a 1,800 Lib Dem majority. 26 March 2006: Smoking ban in Scotland introduced. 5 May 2006: Douglas Alexander becomes Secretary of State for Scotland. 2007 3 May 2007: Third Scottish Parliament elections see the SNP emerge as the largest single party with 47 seats, ahead of Labour on 46; first local government elections held under STV see the SNP win 363 seats to 348 for Labour. 14 May 2007: Sir Alex Fergusson is elected Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament. 16 May 2007: Alex Salmond is elected First Minister with 49 votes to 46 for Labour’s Jack McConnell.

294 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

17 May 2007: Nicola Sturgeon becomes Deputy First Minister. 27 June 2007: Tony Blair resigns as UK Prime Minister and is succeeded by Gordon Brown. 28 June 2007: Des Browne becomes Secretary of State for Scotland. 3 September 2007: The Scottish Executive is renamed the ‘Scottish Government’ – although this is not recognised in statute until 2012. 14 September 2007: Wendy Alexander elected leader of the Scottish Labour Group at the Scottish Parliament unopposed. 2008 8 February 2008: Tavish Scott becomes leader of the Scottish Liberal Democrats. 25 March 2008: Launch of the cross-party Calman Commission on more powers for the Scottish Parliament. 4 May 2008: Wendy Alexander declares in a relation to an independence referendum: ‘bring it on’, aiming to ‘call Alex Salmond’s bluff’. 28 June 2008: Wendy Alexander resigns as leader of the Scottish Labour Group at the Scottish Parliament. 24 July 2008: John Mason wins Glasgow East in a Westminster by-election for the SNP, defeating Labour’s Margaret Curran. He wins with a 365-vote majority, overturning a previous 13,507 Labour majority. 13 September 2008: Iain Gray elected leader of the Scottish Labour Group at the Scottish Parliament. 3 October 2008: Jim Murphy becomes Secretary of State for Scotland. 24 November 2008: Patrick Harvie elected co-convener of the Scottish Greens unopposed. 2009 28 January 2009: Scottish Government budget defeated after tied 64 to 44 on the casting vote of the Presiding Officer. 4 February 2009: Scottish Government revised budget passed by 123 to 2. 4 June 2009: European elections in Scotland sees the SNP win 29.1 per cent to 20.8 per cent for Labour and 16.8 per cent for the Conservatives.

appendix | 295

15 June 2009: The Calman Commission reports. 25 June 2009: Calman Commission endorsed by the Scottish Parliament by 69 votes to 49. 4 August 2009: Climate Change (Scotland) Act receives Royal Assent. 30 November 2009: The Scottish Government launches a National Conversation on Scotland’s constitutional future. 2010 6 May 2010: UK general election sees the Conservatives emerge as the largest party but short of an overall majority. 11 May 2010: David Cameron becomes UK Prime Minister at the head of a Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government. Danny Alexander becomes Secretary of State for Scotland. 29 May 2010: Michael Moore becomes Secretary of State for Scotland. 2011 5 May 2011: Fourth Scottish Parliament elections see the SNP win an overall majority with 69 seats. 11 May 2011: Tricia Marwick is elected Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament. 17 May 2011: Willie Rennie is elected leader of the Scottish Liberal Democrats. 18 May 2011: Alex Salmond is elected First Minister with 68 votes and no votes against. 10 September 2011: Publication of the Jim Murphy–Sarah Boyack review of the Scottish Labour Party recommending greater ­autonomy and the formal creation of the post of leader of the Scottish Labour Party. 4 November 2011: Ruth Davidson elected leader of the Scottish Conservatives. 17 December 2011: Johann Lamont elected leader of the Scottish Labour Party: she is the first person ever to hold this as their formal title. Anas Sarwar elected deputy leader.

296 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

2012 19 January 2012: Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012 receives royal assent. 26 January 2012: Scottish Parliament votes to affirm ‘A Claim of Right for Scotland’ by 102 to 14 votes. 1 May 2012: Scotland Act 2012 receives royal assent. 3 May 2012: Local government elections sees the SNP win 425 seats to 394 for Labour. 15 October 2012: The Scottish and UK Governments sign the ‘Edinburgh Agreement’ on the terms and details of the Scottish independence referendum. 19 October 2012: SNP conference votes 394 to 365 to reject an amendment that would have maintained the party’s anti-NATO stand and by 426 to 332 to support NATO membership of an independent Scotland. 5 December 2012: Scottish Parliament approves a Section 30 Order of the Scotland Act 1998 gaining temporary authority to hold an independence referendum. 2013 15 January 2013: House of Commons agrees Section 30 Order of the Scotland Act 1998 giving the Scottish Parliament temporary authority to hold an independence referendum. 30 January 2013: Scottish Government announces that the referendum question will be: ‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’ 21 March 2013: Date of independence referendum announced as 18 September 2014. 7 October 2013: Alistair Carmichael becomes Secretary of State for Scotland. 24 October 2013: Labour’s Cara Hilton wins Dunfermline from the SNP in a Scottish Parliament by-election, turning a SNP majority of 3,000 into a Labour one of 590. The by-election was called after the previous SNP MSP Bill Walker had resigned from the party and Parliament having been convicted of multiple acts of domestic violence. 14 November 2013: Scottish Referendum (Franchise) Bill giving

appendix | 297

16- and 17-year-olds the right to vote in the Scottish referendum passed unanimously. 26 November 2013: The Scottish Government publishes its White Paper on independence, ‘Scotland’s Future’. 2014 27 March 2014: Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 receives royal assent. 22 May 2014: European elections in Scotland see the SNP win 29.0 per cent to 25.9 per cent for Labour and 17.2 per cent for the Conservatives. 8 September 2014: Gordon Brown presents a timetable for action for more powers to the Scottish Parliament in the event of a No vote. 16 September 2014: David Cameron, Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg sign ‘the Vow’ published on the front page of the Daily Record promising more powers to the Scottish Parliament in the immediate aftermath of a No vote. 18 September 2014: Scotland votes 55.3 per cent to 44.7 per cent against independence on a turnout of 84.6 per cent. 19 September 2014: Alex Salmond announces his resignation as First Minister and SNP leader. David Cameron announces that Lord Smith of Kelvin has agreed to chair a commission on further powers for the Scottish Parliament. 24 October 2014: Johann Lamont resigns as Scottish Labour leader. 14 November 2014: Nicola Sturgeon elected SNP leader unopposed; Stewart Hosie elected depute leader. 19 November 2014: Nicola Sturgeon elected First Minister with 66 votes to 15 for the Conservative Ruth Davidson. 21 November 2014: John Swinney becomes Deputy First Minister. 27 November 2014: The Smith Commission publishes its report on further devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament. 13 December 2014: Jim Murphy elected Scottish Labour Party leader. Kezia Dugdale elected deputy leader. 2015 1 January 2015: Revenue Scotland created.

298 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

7 May 2015: Conservatives returned to UK government with an overall majority of 12 seats; the SNP win 56 out of Scotland’s 59 constituencies becoming the third-largest party in the House of Commons. 11 May 2015: David Mundell becomes Secretary of State for Scotland. 16 May 2015: Jim Murphy announces he will stand down as Scottish Labour leader. 1 June 2015: Charles Kennedy, former leader of the Lib Dems, dies at the age of 55. 13 June 2015: Jim Murphy stands down as Scottish Labour leader. 15 August 2015: Kezia Dugdale is elected Scottish Labour Party leader. Alex Rowley elected deputy leader. 2016 23 March 2016: Scotland Act 2016 receives royal assent. 5 May 2016: Fifth Scottish Parliament elections see the SNP remain the largest party but move from a majority to minority administration. 12 May 2016: Ken Macintosh elected Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament. 17 May 2016: Nicola Sturgeon is elected First Minister with 63 votes to five for Lib Dem Willie Rennie. 24 June 2016: UK votes 51.9 per cent to 48.1 per cent to withdraw from the European Union on a turnout of 72.2 per cent; Scotland votes 62.0 per cent to 38.0 per cent Remain. 28 July 2016: UK Supreme Court unanimously strikes down the Scottish Government’s ‘Named Person’ scheme in the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014. 13 October 2016: Angus Robertson elected depute leader of the SNP. 2017 21 February 2017: Using new fiscal powers devolved under the Scotland Act 2016, the Scottish Government sets income tax rates and bands for the first time. 13 March 2017: First Minister Nicola Sturgeon calls for a second independence referendum.

appendix | 299

16 March 2017: UK Prime Minister Theresa May says on an independence referendum: ‘now is not the time’. 28 March 2017: Scottish Parliament votes 69 to 59 to seek ­permission for a Scottish independence referendum. 29 March 2017: UK triggers Article 50 to begin the process of negotiating to leave the EU. 4 May 2017: Local government elections see the SNP win 431 seats to 276 for the Conservatives and 262 for Labour. 8 June 2017: Theresa May calls an election which sees the Conservatives returned as the largest party but nine seats short of an overall majority; the SNP wins 35 out of 59 of Scotland’s seats, a loss of 21 seats, while retaining their position as the third parliamentary party in the UK. 4 July 2018: House of Commons passes a motion supporting ‘A Claim of Right for Scotland’ without a division. 29 August 2017: Kezia Dugdale resigns as Scottish Labour leader. 18 November 2017: Richard Leonard elected leader of the Scottish Labour Party. 16 December 2017: Lesley Laird becomes Scottish Labour deputy leader. 2018 20 February 2018: Scottish Parliament agrees by 67 votes to 50 to set up new income tax rates and bands with a 19p ‘starter rate’, 21p ‘intermediate rate’ and a penny on the top rate of tax. 15 March 2018: Scottish Parliament votes by 62 to 60 to repeal the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012. 21 March 2018: UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill passed by the Scottish Parliament by 95 votes to 32. 1 May 2018: Minimum unit pricing of alcohol introduced in Scotland. 25 May 2018: SNP publishes its ‘Growth Commission’ report on the economics of independence chaired by former MSP Andrew Wilson. 8 June 2018: Keith Brown elected depute leader of the SNP. 13 December 2018: UK Supreme Court decides that the UK

300 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T

Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill ‘as a whole’ is within the competence of the Scottish Parliament with the exception of one section. 2019 8 January 2019: Alex Salmond wins his Court of Session case against the Scottish Government investigation into complaints of sexual misconduct made against him, finding the process ‘unlawful’ and ‘tainted with apparent bias’. 24 January 2019: Alex Salmond is charged with fourteen counts of alleged inappropriate behavior including two attempted rapes, nine sexual assaults, two indecent assaults and one breach of the peace. 31 January 2019: Scottish Government budget passes stage one with the support of the Scottish Greens by 67 votes to 58. 29 March 2019: First legal end date for the UK leaving the EU after the UK Parliament passed Article 50; extended to first 12 April and then 31 October. 27 April 2019: SNP spring conference votes against the party leadership on its Growth Commission by 781 to 729 votes on the timetable to an independent currency. 23 May 2019: European elections held.

index | 301

Index

Note: page numbers in italics indicate tables #MeToo, 71, 280 access/accessibility, 19, 278 accountability, 2, 53, 59, 76–7, 118, 245, 278 additional member system (AMS), 180, 279 agriculture, 114, 170, 183 Alexander, Wendy, 150, 153 American literature, 226 Anderson, Benedict, 220–1 Anti-Poll Tax Federation (APTF), 190 architectural design see EMBT Arnott, M. A., 57, 59 Article 50, 203, 206, 208 austerity, 11, 128, 182, 194, 245 backbenchers, 102, 261–2, 263, 281 BBC, 2, 22–3 Bercow, John, 281 Bilbao Effect, 234 Blackford, Ian, 112 Blair, Tony, 38, 161, 242, 243–4, 279; see also New Labour Bogdanor, Vernon, 6 Borchert, J., 85 border issues see under Brexit Bourne, Nick, 270 Bowden’s Commission, 272 Boyd, Cat, 194 Brexit, 15–17, 52, 61, 71, 102, 105–6, 141–3, 182 border issues/backstop, 202–3, 207 and devolution, 207–8

and the economy, 201–2 and local government, 116–17 ‘power grab’, 112–14 Scottish public opinion on, 203–5 and SNP, support for, 41–2 see also Europe/EU Broun, D., 222 Brown, Gordon, 16, 37, 107, 119, 150 Brownlee, Derek, 163 budgets, Scotland, 128, 139, 163, 259 businesses, tax rates, 130, 163 Cabinet, 55, 68, 256–7 Cairney, Paul, 8–9, 55 Calman Commission, 52–3, 128, 140, 163, 173, 271 Cameron, David, 16, 110, 141, 160, 206 Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, 75 ‘Campaign for Socialism’ (CfS), 193, 196 Campbell, Menzies, 172, 174 Campbell Christie Commission, 18–19 Canavan, Denis, 155 care for the elderly, 55, 126, 155, 170, 245 Carmichael, Alistair, 177 Carruthers, Gerry, 225 centralisation, 21, 119–20, 245, 246; see also decentralisation Chapman, Maggie, 186–7 Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA), 117

302 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014, 23 churches, moral crisis, 22 cities, Scottish, ‘Agenda for Cities’, 120 civic society, support for devolution, 74 civil liberties, 23 civil service, Scottish, 64–72, 255–6 civil society, 12, 31, 81, 287 and devolution, 58–9, 277 representation of, 258–9, 280 class identity, politics of, 191–2 Clegg, Nick, 176–7 Coleman, James, 222 collaboration, 58–9, 67, 68 collective action, 195–6 Colley, Linda, 220 Commission on Parliamentary Reform (2017), 100, 102, 281, 282, 285–6 Commission on Scottish Devolution see Calman Commission Committee Engagement Unit, 101 committee system, 13, 77–8, 97–104, 262, 282–3, 285–6 costs, 101 mandatory and subject, 97–8, 100 and the SNP, 141 Common Weal, 9, 21, 213 Concordat 2007, 66 consensus, 77, 196, 244, 250–1 Conservatives (UK), 125, 148, 160 –Lib Dem coalition, 15, 271 see also May, Theresa; Scottish Conservatives; Thatcherism constitutional debate/change, 45–51, 263–4, 266; see also Brexit; independence Consultative Steering Group (CSG), 3, 75–6, 101, 277–8 ‘continuity Scotland’, 20–1 conveners (committee chairs), 100, 102, 285 Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA), 116, 117 Convery, A., 162, 269 Cook, Robin, 37 Corbyn, Jeremy, 112, 147, 195, 209 corporatism, 216 council tax, 118, 121, 126, 127, 245–6, 247–8 Court of Session, Edinburgh, 61–2 Covenanting, 222, 225 Crawford, Bruce, 139 Crawford, Robert, 226 Creative Scotland, 283

creative sector, 213 Crerar Review, 59 Crick, Bernard, 277 crime, 171, 249 Culture, Tourism, Europe and External Affairs Committee, 214, 282–3 Daily Record, 110 Darling, Alistair, 16, 150 Davidson, Ruth, 159, 164–6, 272–3 Davies, Ron, 123 Deacon, Susan, 150, 155 decentralisation, 264 democracy, 84 deliberative, 80 MSPs, as a political class, 93–4 radical, 186 demographics, on independence vote, 46–7 Department of Work and Pensions, 109 departmentalism, 66 Devine, Tom, 5–6, 213 devolution additional powers for Scottish Parliament, 53 and Brexit, 201, 207–8 Conservative opposition, 269 defined/interpreted as, 6–13 and diversity, 195 and governance of UK, 48 history, 136 multiple types of, 224 public attitudes, 4 referendum, 1997, 2, 73, 268, 269 rhetoric on, 250 and the Scottish Greens, 180–1 values and principles, 283–4 see also ministers; Scottish Government Dewar, Donald, 37, 57–8, 107, 123, 126, 152–3, 154, 232–4, 242; see also Scottish Office direct action, 195–6 diversity, 23, 120 Drucker, H., 151 Dugdale, Kezia, 153 Dunfermline and West Fife, 172 Dynamic Earth, 235 economic growth, 58, 60, 184, 244, 248 and Brexit, 201–2 Edinburgh, Parliament building, 231–42

index | 303 Edinburgh Agreement, 110, 141, 175 education Curriculum for Excellence, 249 and devolution, 2 graduate endowment, 243, 244 outcomes, 66 PE in schools, 173 policy, critique of, 264–5 and the SNP, 50 spending, 247 student tuition fees, 55, 130, 166, 169–70, 176, 193, 243 Education Secretary, 255 Educational Institute of Scotland (EIS), 117 elections, general, UK October 1974, 136 2001, 170 2005, 171–2 2015, 32, 40, 110, 111 2017, 16, 41, 150, 177, 206, 273 Labour, support for, 148 results in Scotland, 1997–2017, 34 elections, Scottish Parliament, 1, 20, 33, 110, 137, 138, 140, 150, 177 Conservatives’ performance, 160, 164, 269, 272, 273 Greens focus on regions, 186 Electoral Commission, on the ‘missing Scotland’, 19 Electoral Reform Society Scotland, 19 Elliott, John, 221 Elvidge, John, 65–7 EMBT, Parliament building design, 231–42 English literature, 226 ‘English Votes for English Laws’ (EVEL), 50 environmental issues, 172; see also Scottish Green Party (SGP) equality, 284, 286; see also inequality essentialism, 225–6 ethnic minorities see minority groups EU Continuity Act, 106 European Central Bank, 215 European Commission, 125 European Court of Justice, 62 Article 50, 203 European Union see Europe/EU Europe/EU, 211–18 (Legal Continuity) Scotland Bill, 15 and devolved social policy, 57 migrants to Scotland, 211 reform, need for, 182

Scottish independence in, 214–16 Scottish majority to remain, 141 Scottish Parliament’s EU Continuity Act, 61 single market and customs union, 79, 206–8 UK EU Withdrawal Act, 61, 94, 102, 207 workforce in Scotland, 211–12 see also Brexit Evans, Leslie, 71 Ewing, Fergus, 113 Ewing, Winnie, 73, 136 expertise and advice, 101, 262, 280 federalism, 125, 175, 274 feminisation, 5 financial crash, 2008, 127–8 financial responsibility, 270, 272; see also public spending; taxation Findlay, Donald, 268 Finlay, Richard, 7, 225 Finnie, Ross, 170 First Ministers, 57–8, 113, 141 and ministers, 256–7 see also Salmond, Alex; Sturgeon, Nicola First Past the Post (FPTP), 136, 149, 156 fisheries, 114, 171, 207 Fixed Term Parliaments Act, 110 Foley, James, 194 football, 23, 184, 254 foreign policy, 108 Forsyth, Michael, 272–3 Fraser, Murdo, 164 Freedom of Information, 283–4 Friel, Kerri, 10, 11 Future of England Survey, 50 Galbraith, Sam, 171 Gallagher, Jim, 7, 10 Gallie, Phil, 269 Garden Lobby, 267 gay rights, 276, 284 gender see women Germany, 125, 215 Goldie, Annabel, 159, 163–4, 270–1 grass-roots organisations, 24 Gray, Iain, 38, 153 Greece, 156 Greens see Scottish Green Party (SGP) Hardie, Keir, 1

304 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T Harper, Robin, 180, 183 Harvie, Patrick, 184, 186 Hayward, Katy, 208 health, 171, 243, 247, 280; see also NHS Health and Sport Committee, 99 Higher Education Funding Council, 246 Highlands and Islands Enterprise, 246 historians, Scottish, and imperialism, 225 historiographies, 221, 225 Holyrood see Scottish Parliament Home Civil Service, 109 home rule see devolution; independence referendum (2014) Hook, Andrew, 226 Housden, Peter, 67–70 House of Commons, 137, 262, 281 representation in, 276–7 housing, 192, 246, 247 rented sector, 195 Hughes, Kirsty, 208 human rights see rights Iceland, 214 immigration, 108, 193, 211, 224; see also minority groups imperialism, 221, 225 inclusion, 68 income tax, 247–8, 272 independence support for, 45–8, 203, 263–4 see also constitutional debate/change; SNP independence referendum (2014), 16, 19, 24, 32, 40, 41, 46–7, 69–70, 175 ‘Better Together’ campaign, 176 and the Greens, 184–5 legacy of, 141–3 and local government, 116–17 and Scottish history, 219 Independent Labour Party, 1 individualism, 23 inequality, 11, 66, 157, 216, 248–9, 261, 286 information, 253–4 inquiries, committee, 99, 101 interest groups, 14, 244, 256 IPPR Scotland, 21 Iraq conflict, 171 anti-war protest, 193 Ireland, Irish, 216, 217, 224, 259

Jackson, T., 126 Jacobitism, 222 Joint Ministerial Council (JMC), 15, 107, 108–9, 113 Juncker, Jean-Claude, 206 justice sector, 66–7, 223, 249 Kennedy, Charles, 170, 172, 176 Kilbrandon Commission, 136 Labour (UK), 110, 146–7 see also Blair, Tony; Corbyn, Jeremy; New Labour; Scottish Labour Lamont, Johann, 153 land tenure reform, 182, 248, 253 Latvia, 215–16 leadership issues, 161, 163–4, 272 legislation, 55, 79, 244–5 284 Acts, 13 civic participation, 280 committee emphasis on, 98–9 CSG aspirations for, 277–8 freedom of information, 283–4 outcomes-based, 57, 59, 65–6 policy areas, and attitudes to constitutional change, 49–50 see also committee system Leonard, Richard, 147, 157, 195–6, 209 Liberal Democrats –Tory coalition, 15, 271 see also Scottish Liberal Democrats liberalism, 216 Liberals, 148, 151 Liddell, Helen, 150 life expectancy, 249 literature, Scottish, 225–6 local government, 116–22 and austerity, 245 and the civil service, 66 conservatism of, 118 elections, 120, 155, 170, 171, 172, 254 Greens in, 181 neglect of, 21, 118, 121, 274 Local Government Boundary Commission for Scotland (LGBCS), 117 local income tax (LIT), 127, 172, 173 McAlpine, Joan, 283 McCombes, Alan, 190, 192 Imagine, 194 McConnell, Jack, 37–8, 65, 107–8, 153, 155, 170

index | 305 McCormick, John, 281 MacCormick, Neil, 223 MacDonald, Margo, 138 McGarvey, Darren (Loki), 191–2 McIlvanney, Liam, 222 McIntosh Commission, 245 Mackay, Derek, 123, 128 McLeish, Henry, 107, 153, 155, 170, 245, 270 McLetchie, David, 159, 161–3, 268 McMillan, Joyce, 7, 9 Manning, Susan, 226 Marine (Scotland) Act 2010, 280 Marx, Karl, 85 May, Theresa, 16, 106, 108, 113, 150, 202, 254 mayors, 274–9, 270 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), 109 Menzies Campbell Commission, 175 Michael Hopkins & Partners, 235 migration see immigration Millar, David, 277 ministers, 252–9 and First Ministers, 256–7 minority groups, 79, 182, 278, 284 Miralles, Enric, 231 Mitchell, James, 136, 223–4 Monteith, Brian, 268 Moore, Michael, 175 Morton, Graeme, 223 MSPs, 81, 86–96, 130 allowances and staff, 92–3 equality issues, 284 First Past the Post (FPTP), 17 functional differentiation, 86–9 intra-party candidate selection, 93 and party control over, 99, 283 regional, 17 territorial differentiation, 89–92 see also backbenchers; ministers Mullan, Peter, 191 Mundell, David, 110 Murphy, Jim, 153 National Collective, 24, 184 National Party for Scotland, 74, 225 National Performance Framework (NPF), 57, 59, 66, 71 nationalised globalism, 239–40 nationhood, Scottish, 219–22; see also unionist-nationalism neo-liberalism, 129–30, 195, 215

New Labour, 16, 156, 161; see also Blair, Tony NHS, 2, 163, 245, 255; see also health Northern Ireland, 48, 109, 201, 202–3, 207 Norway, 214 Offensive Behaviour at Football (Scotland) Act 2012, 23, 184, 254 Orkney and Shetland, 177 outcomes, 57, 59, 65–6 Ozga, J., 57, 59 party tribalism, 283 patronage, 14 Pederson, M., 180, 187 People’s Vote, 203, 204–6 Permanent Secretaries, 65–70, 71 personal care see care for the elderly petitions system, 278, 280 Plaid Cymru, 136 Pocock, J. G. A., 220–1 policing, 139, 163, 246 policymaking see committee system; legislation political class, MSPs as, 86–96 poll tax, 190 populism, 111, 216, 244, 245, 247, 265 postmodernism, 232, 238, 239–40 poverty, 66, 216, 248; see also inequality Presbyterian radicalism, 225 principal–agent problem, 255 proportional representation (PR), 3, 32, 76, 77, 149, 170–1, 283 provincialism, 212, 213 public opinion on Brexit, 203–5 on devolution, 4–5, 48–51, 250, 279 on independence, 45–8, 142 survey, 35–9 Public Petitions Committee, 280 public sector/services, 59, 245–6 commission on reform, 18–19 and local government, 118, 121 and ministers, 255 partnership across, 66 and policy divergence, 22 Scandinavian levels, 130 standardisation, 119–20 public spending, 68, 126–7, 243, 246–8; see also austerity quangos, 245–6

306 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T Radical Independence Campaign (RIC), 24, 184, 192, 194 radical left, Scottish, 189–98 referenda see Brexit; devolution, referendum; Europe/EU; independence referendum (2014) Reform Scotland, 21 Reid, John, 107, 150 Rennie, Willie, 172, 175–6 Rifkind Policy Commission, 161 rights, 182, 223, 283–4, 286 Robertson, Angus, 112, 273 Robertson, Raymond, 268 Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), 22 Russell, Michael, 37, 106 Salmond, Alex, 56, 108, 110, 119, 137, 138, 139, 141, 173, 212, 213, 214, 256–7, 273 First Minister candidate, 37–9 Sanderson, Lord, 161, 163–4, 272 Sarah Boyack–Jim Murphy review, 146 Scotland Acts 1978, 136 1998, 14, 73, 94, 154, 277 2012, 14–15, 110–11, 128, 140, 253, 271 2016, 14–15, 53, 110, 128, 141, 253, 273 Scotland and Wales Bill, 1976, 136 ‘Scotland’s Future’ (White Paper), 14, 49 Scott, Tavish, 171, 174 Scottish (Self-Government) Party, 74 Scottish Centre on European Relations, 213 Scottish Conservatives, 32, 110, 159–68, 268–75 on Brexit, 207–8 constructive opposition to the SNP, 270–1 on devolution, 162, 163, 165, 224 electoral performance, 160 on independence, 166 leadership elections, reform, 272 party review, 161 policies, 2016, 166 and the SNP, 139 on unionism, 167 see also Conservatives Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC), 3, 31, 74–5, 116, 137, 154, 169, 277 Scottish Ecologists, 180

Scottish Election Study, 47–9 Scottish Enlightenment, and literary study, 226 Scottish Enterprise, 119, 246 Scottish Executive see Scottish Government Scottish Executive Bills 1999–2003, 55 2003–7, 55 Scottish Funding Council, 119 Scottish Government, 56, 153, 257–9 ‘Agenda for Cities’, 120 Continuity Bill, 207 and intergovernmental relations, 61–2 legislative dominance, 78, 80 National Conversation, 140 response to Brexit, 202 and Scottish Parliament, 13–14 Standing Council on Europe, 214 see also accountability; centralisation; legislation Scottish Green Party (SGP), 179–88 on Brexit, 204 and devolution, 180–1 electoral performance, 181, 186 on independence, 41, 182 membership, 185–6 –SNP relations, 183–5 Scottish identity, 54, 160, 222 Scottish Independence Convention (SIC), 187 Scottish Independence Referendum Bill see independence referendum (2014) Scottish Labour, 145–58 on Brexit, 204–5 and constitutional reform, 196 on devolution, 154 displaced as largest party, 32, 37–8, 40, 109, 149–50, 192 electoral performance, 147–50 on gender balance, 284 history, 145–6 informal culture and ethos, 151 leadership issue, 152–3 –Lib Dem coalition, 14, 15, 32, 54–5, 107, 243, 247 –Lib Dem coalition, ‘Partnership Agreement’, 58–9, 66 and local government, 119–20 party membership, 146–7 and social justice, 13

index | 307 see also Blair, Tony; Leonard, Richard; New Labour Scottish Liberal Democrats, 32, 139, 169–78 on Brexit, 204 on devolution, 169 on independence, 173 –Labour coalition, 169–73, 243, 247 Partnership Agreement, 170 Scottish Militant Labour, 190 Scottish National Party (SNP) see SNP Scottish nationalism, 194, 214–16, 225 Scottish Office, 53, 58, 64, 246, 258, 279 Scottish Parliament EU Continuity Act, 61 on the EU WIthdrawal Bill, 207–8 ‘hung’ in 2007, 173 on independence vote, 141 leadership elections, 163–4 new building, Holyrood, 231–42, 269–70, 279 ‘new politics’, 76–80, 85 petitions system, 280 ‘power-sharing’, 278 record of, 13–17 reform, recommendations, 281 vote on EU membership, 205 see also committee system; devolution; elections, Scottish Parliament; Scotland Acts Scottish Party, 225 Scottish Referendum Study, 47 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 1999–2017, 35–9, 39, 45 Scottish Socialist Party, 170, 189–94 scrutiny, policy, 99–100, 101, 102 SCVO, 22 Secretary of State for Scotland, 107, 152 sectarianism, 254 secularism, 23 security, and the Parliament building, 237–8 service-led economy, 5; see also public sector/services Sheridan, Tommy, 190–3 Imagine, 190–1, 194 Single Transferable Vote (STV), 118, 120, 170, 181 sloganeering, 265–6 Smith, Chris, 276 Smith Commission, 110, 141 SNP, 214–16, 281 on Brexit, 204, 205–6, 208

and devolution, 137–8 in government, 2007–11, 14, 15, 55–7, 66, 67–8, 108–9, 109, 138–41, 193–4, 270–1 and the Greens, 183–5 and imperialism, 225 on independence, 117, 223, 254 and local government, 119–20, 274 National Conversation, 56–7 organisational reform, 138 perceived competence of, 50–1, 138–9 policy overlap with Lib Dems, 172–3 policymaking, 243 before the Scottish Parliament, 135–7 Scottish Parliament election, 1999, 36, 137 Scottish Parliament election, 2011, 38, 39 Scottish Parliament election, 2016, 41 and social justice, 13 on taxation/spending, 127–30, 245, 247–8 third-party (UK) status, 112 UK general election, 2015, 32, 40 UK general election, 2017, 41, 206 social democracy, 12, 57, 215–17 crisis of, 155–6 social justice, 12–13, 58, 60, 182 social security, 2, 15, 22, 109, 124, 141, 183, 216 Society of Local Authority Chief Executives (SOLACE), 117 Spain, 125 special independent commissioners, 283 standardisation, 21, 119–20 Standards, Procedures and Public Appointments Committee, 100 Steel, David, 172 Stephen, Nicol, 171–2, 173–4 Stone, Jamie, 173 Strathclyde, 245 Strathclyde Commission, 161, 165, 272–3 structural change, 245, 246 STUC, 22, 277 student activism, 194 Sturgeon, Nicola, 37, 71, 106, 113–14 and Brexit, 41–2, 206 and independence, 166, 254 leadership style, 256–7

308 | TH E S T ORY OF T H E S C OT T I S H PAR L I AME N T Supreme Court, 15, 61–2, 105–6, 207 Swinney, John, 38, 66, 68, 111, 137 Tagliabue, Benedetta, 231 taxation, 14–15, 110–11, 123–32, 141, 175, 271, 272 business, 130, 163 Greens on, 182 income tax, Scottish rate, 128 varying power, 125–6 see also council tax; local income tax (LIT) terrorism, 110, 237 Thatcherism, 5, 149, 189, 190 think tanks, 21, 213 ‘Think Twice’ campaign, 268 Tories see Conservatives; Scottish Conservatives; Thatcherism tourism, 282–3 and the Parliament building, 234–5, 240 town-centre regeneration schemes, 139 trade unions, 22, 117, 156, 193, 196 trams project, Edinburgh, 173 transparency, 19, 58, 76, 100, 238 Treaty of Union, 1707, 53, 73 Trump, Donald, 173–4 UK EU referendum, 2016 see under Europe/EU

UK Parliament see Westminster (UK Parliament) Union, 1603, 221 Union, 1707, 53, 73, 221 unionism, 167, 224 unionist-nationalism, 223 Universal Credit, 124 universalism, 120 Viñoly, Rafael, 232–3 voluntary sector, 262 Wallace, Jim, 169–72, 175 Wallace, Valerie, 225 Watson, Murray, 224 Weber, Max, 84 welfare see social security Welsh Assembly, 48, 109, 113–14, 136 Welsh Conservatives, 270 Westminster (UK Parliament), 2, 14–15, 16, 102; see also House of Commons What Works Scotland, Glasgow University, 21 Whatley, Chris, 221 Wilson, Andrew, 138 women attitudes to, 71 grass-roots organisations, 24 representation of, 79, 140, 277, 278–9, 280, 281, 284