The Stories They Tell: Halakhic Anecdotes in the Babylonian Talmud 9781463244576

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The Stories They Tell

Judaism in Context

32 Series Editors Rivka Ulmer Phillip Ackerman-Lieberman Elisheva Carlebach Jonathan Jacobs Naomi Koltun-Fromm David Nelson Lieve Teugels

Judaism in Context provides a platform for scholarly research focusing on the relations between Jews, Judaism, and Jewish culture and other peoples, religions, and cultures among whom Jews have lived and flourished, from ancient times through the 21st century. The series includes monographs as well as edited collections.

The Stories They Tell

Halakhic Anecdotes in the Babylonian Talmud

Judith Hauptman

gp 2022

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2022 by Gorgias Press LLC

All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of Gorgias Press LLC. ‫ܚ‬

1

2022

ISBN 978-1-4632-4456-9

ISSN 1935-6978

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A Cataloging-in-Publication Record is available from the Library of Congress. Printed in the United States of America

In memory of my husband, Milton B. Adesnik, a man of science and faith His favorite verse: ‫השמים מספרים כבוד אל ומעשה ידיו מגיד הרקיע‬ The heavens declare the glory of God, the sky proclaims His handiwork (Psalms 19:2) For my grandchildren, Clara, Caleb, Philip, Lilah, and Lavender, with love

TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents ......................................................................... v Acknowledgments ....................................................................... ix List of Abbreviations ................................................................... xi Introduction ................................................................................. 1 bYevamot 37b, Taking a wife on the road ...................... 1 Explanation .......................................................................... 2 Core theses of this study ...................................................... 4 Layered Structure of the Babylonian Talmud ...................... 5 The focus of this volume ...................................................... 7 Recent Research ................................................................... 8 Inner Dynamics of Halakhic Anecdotes ............................. 11 Research Methods .............................................................. 13 Amoraic Generations .......................................................... 14 Illustrative Sugyot .............................................................. 15 1 bSukkah 28b–29a, Leaving the sukkah because of rain ...................................................... 15 2 bBaba Qamma 118b–119a, Accepting charitable donations from married women .......... 20 3 bMoed Qatan 27b, Exchanging meals on the first day of mourning ............................................ 24 4 bPesahim 100a–b, Interrupting a meal when the Sabbath arrives................................................ 29 Talmud Yerushalmi parallels ............................................. 36 Use of manuscripts ............................................................. 36 Comments of Rishonim (Medieval Commentators) ........... 36 Selection of sugyot for this volume .................................... 36 Suggestions for how to benefit from this study ................. 37 v

vi

THE STORIES THEY TELL

Overview of the Book ......................................................... 38 Iqla anecdotes ..................................................................... 39 Hava Qa’imna/ Hava Yativna anecdotes ............................. 39 “He encountered him” (ashkeheih) anecdotes .................... 40 Multiple anecdotes commenting on the same halakhah .... 40 Ini veha anecdotes ............................................................... 41 Anecdotes that feature women........................................... 41 Concluding comment ......................................................... 42 Chapter 1. Halakhic anecdotes that include the term “iqla” ..... 45 1.1 bHullin 104b, Washing hands after eating cheese and before eating meat .............................. 48 1.2 bBerakhot 40a, Table etiquette ............................... 53 1.3 bBaba Qama 113a, Missing a court date ................ 55 1.4 bMoed Qatan 27b, Respect due a corpse ................ 58 1.5 bShab 157a–b, Measuring on the Sabbath ............. 60 1.6 bBerakhot 43b, Order of blessings at a meal .......... 64 1.7 bBerakhot 50a, Standardizing liturgy ..................... 68 Talmud Yerushalmi, Berakhot 7:3, 11c ........................ 70 1.8 bMoed Qatan 12a, Non-Jews working for Jews on the Sabbath and festivals ........................ 72 1.9 bEruvin 104a, Producing sounds on the Sabbath .................................................................. 78 Summary ............................................................................ 85 Chapter 2. Hava Qa’imna/Hava Yativna Sugyot ......................... 89 2.1 bBerakhot 24a–b, Spitting during prayer ............... 91 2.2 bBerakhot 41b, Reciting blessings on the Seven Species ........................................................ 96 2.3 bBerakhot 13b, Lengthening the Ehad of Shema .................................................................... 99 2.4 bYevamot 103b, Halizah shoes ............................. 102 2.5 bZevahim 94b, Dabbing shoes with water on the Sabbath.......................................................... 108 2.6 bShabbat 147a, Shaking out a tallit on the Sabbath ................................................................ 111 2.7 bPesahim 100b–101a, Reciting kiddush where one eats the Sabbath meal........................ 116 2.8 bBerakhot 11b, Reciting a blessing for the study of Mishnah and Midrash ............................ 124

TABLE OF CONTENTS

vii

Summary .......................................................................... 134 Chapter 3. “Encountered him” anecdotes ................................ 137 3.1 bShabbat 154b, Sliding a child down the back of an animal on the Sabbath ....................... 139 3.2 bSukkah 19b, Sleeping in a bridal bed in a sukkah ................................................................. 144 3.3 bMoed Qatan 20b, Mourning with a wife ............ 148 3.4 bMoed Qatan 24a, Mourning on the Sabbath....... 152 Talmud Yerushalmi Moed Qatan 3:5, 83a .................. 156 3.5 bGittin 88b, Forcing a get ..................................... 158 3.6 bYevamot 106b, How to recite verses at a halizah ceremony ................................................. 161 3.7 bShabbat 95a, Sprinkling a floor on the Sabbath ................................................................ 163 Talmud Yerushalmi Shabbat 2:7, 5c ........................... 165 3.8 bMenahot 42a, Tying zizit..................................... 168 3.9 bHullin 107a–b, Washing hands before eating ................................................................... 174 3.10 bMegillah 18b, Writing a Megillah from memory ............................................................... 177 3.11 bPesahim 39a, Maror or lettuce for the Paschal meal ........................................................ 180 Summary .......................................................................... 182 Chapter 4. Sugyot with multiple halakhic anecdotes .............. 185 4.1 bTa’anit 12b, Wearing shoes on a public fast day ....................................................................... 186 4.2 bYoma 73b; 78a, Wearing shoes on Yom Kippur .................................................................. 192 Talmud Yerushalmi Yoma 8:1, 44d ............................ 196 4.3 bKiddushin 80b–81b, Seclusion with animals ................................................................ 199 4.4 bShabbat 150a–b, Havdalah in the field .............. 203 4.5 bBesah 32b, Raking out an oven on a festival ................................................................. 208 Talmud Yerushalmi Besah 4:5, 62c ............................ 211 4.6 bYevamot 101a, Halizah requires the presence of five, not three ................................... 214 4.7 bBaba Mezia 60a–b, Prettifying Merchandise ...... 221

viii

THE STORIES THEY TELL

4.8 bShabbat 148b, Festival Loans ............................. 225 Summary .......................................................................... 228 Chapter 5. Ini Veha anecdotes .................................................. 229 5.1 bTa’anit 19a; 25b–26a, Reciting Hallel after a drought ends..................................................... 231 5.2 bYevamot 37b, Taking a wife on the road ........... 236 5.3 bGittin 59b, First Aliyah Privileges of a Kohen .................................................................. 240 5.4 bBerakhot 14a, Interrupting prayer to greet someone of greater stature .................................. 243 5.5 bBerakhot 27a, Passing in front of one who is praying ............................................................. 248 5.6 bBesah 25b, Sedan Chair Transport on a Festival ................................................................ 250 Summary .......................................................................... 256 Chapter 6. Halakhic anecdotes that feature women ................ 259 6.1 bNiddah 67b, Menstruants and Mikveh ............... 261 6.2 bBesah 13b, Hulling Barley on the Sabbath ......... 263 6.3 bKetubot 61a, Women and Wine .......................... 266 6.4 bBesah 29b, Sifting flour on a festival .................. 270 6.5 bShabbat 114b, Preparing Vegetables for the Yom Kippur Break-fast ........................................ 274 Summary .......................................................................... 278 Concluding Remarks ................................................................ 279 Appendix. Halakhic anecdotes in the Yerushalmi ................... 285 Talmud Yerushalmi Berakhot 4:1, 7a ......................... 285 Bibliography ............................................................................. 289 Index......................................................................................... 295

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This volume took a long time to write. I began discussing its central hypothesis in public in 2013, when I was the plenary speaker at the opening session of the World Congress of Jewish Studies in Jerusalem. I continued to develop it at the Association for Jewish Studies conference in 2015, and at several later conferences. Responses I often received were, “there is nothing new in your presentation, others have already said this,” or “there is no evidence of halakhic change in these anecdotes,” or even, “how dare you disagree with Rashi?” I am happy to report that none of these critiques derailed me. To my delight, there were also colleagues who told me to keep working on this project. Over the years, I published a number of articles on various aspects of this study. In this volume I believe I have presented extensive evidence for my main claim that virtually every halakhic anecdote in the Babylonian Talmud innovates: it either shows halakhic modification or decides an earlier halakhic dispute. Many people have been very helpful to me throughout the years. My good friend Dale Stern read and insightfully critiqued the entire manuscript. A former student and now an editor, Susan Fendrick, reviewed the entire manuscript for clarity of expression. My JTS colleague, Professor Richard Kalmin, read and critiqued several chapters. He consistently encouraged me to proceed to publish despite skeptical voices. Professor Robert Brody of Hebrew University discussed the study’s core ideas with me and read and commented on the Introductory chapter. My longtime friends Emily Silverman, Valerie Rhein, and Aviad Broshi each read and helpfully commented on several chapters. ix

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THE STORIES THEY TELL

My son Moshe Adesnik offered astute comments on the Introductory chapter. A JTS colleague and friend, Dr. Jay Rovner, also encouraged me to publish and connected me to Gorgias Press, the publisher of this volume. My heartfelt thanks to them all. Many thanks to Havva Zellner, Digital Librarian at the Library of The Jewish Theological Seminary, for finding an apt cover image for this volume. The cover image is taken from Tikune Shabat, produced in 1724, about Sabbath rituals. I am pleased that it shows an equal number of men and women sitting at a Sabbath table, each with a plate in front of him or her. And many thanks also to Dr. Sharon LibermanMintz, Curator of Jewish Art at The Library, who explained to me “that this genre of miniature luxury illustrated eighteenth century manuscripts were often presents from the groom to his bride and so inscribed on the title pages. This image appears in a book that does not have such an inscription, so we cannot say for certain that it was created for a woman but many of them were and this miniature book is emblematic of this genre of manuscript.” In addition to colleagues, friends, and my three sons, my late husband of 47 years, Professor Milton B. Adesnik, a man of science and faith, sustained me during the lengthy period I was working on this volume. Unfailingly upbeat and supportive, he showed keen interest in my work over the entire course of our marriage. It is my wish that all individuals working on longterm projects enjoy this kind of support. Although Milton did not live to see this study published, he knew it was on the way. I dedicate this volume to his memory and to our five grandchildren, his living legacy. In the years since I became the first woman to obtain a PhD in Talmud, many more women have gone on to get advanced degrees in Talmud studies and to publish groundbreaking volumes of Talmud research. It pleases me greatly that in this area, which used to be dominated by men, the academy and the Jewish world are now benefiting from the voices and significant contributions of women. New York, NY June 2022

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Bava Batra

BB

Niddah

Nid

Bava Qamma

BQ

Qiddushin

Qid

Bava Metzi’a Berakhot Betzah Eruvin Gittin

Hagigah Hullin

Kerithot

Ketubbot

Ma’aserot Megillah

Menahot Mishnah

Moed Qatan

Pesahim

BM

Rosh Hashanah

Ber

Sanhedrin

Bes

Shabbat

Eruv

Sotah

Git

Sukkah

Hag

Pes RH

Sanh Shab Sot

Suk

Hul

Ta’anit

Ket

Talmud Yeushalmi y

Meg

Yevamot

Talmud Bavli

Ker

Ma’as Men MQ

xi

b

Tosefta

T or t

Yoma

Yoma

Zevahim

Zev

Zavim

M or m

Ta’an

Yev

Zav

INTRODUCTION The Babylonian Talmud tells many stories about rabbis. The long ones have attracted a lot of attention; the short, anecdotal ones have not. What is the point of these anecdotes? Why were they included in the Babylonian Talmud? This study seeks to provide answers. Our inquiry opens with a well-known, short story. The question it addresses is, whether a man on the road may take a wife-for-a-day if he already has a wife at home? A marriage of short duration would enable him to have sex while traveling, without visiting a prostitute. Ruth Calderon, in her book A Bride for One Night: Talmud Tales, 1 comments on the story from a feminist perspective, showing nuances never before noticed. I will read this same story from a different perspective. My question is: What message does this story convey about rabbinic attitudes toward halakhah (Jewish law) when it reports that two prominent rabbis violated a standard set by a colleague centuries earlier? bYevamot 37b, Taking a wife on the road ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת יבמות דף לז עמוד ב‬

1

Jewish Publication Society 2014 (57–67).

1

2

THE STORIES THEY TELL ‫ לא ישא אדם אשה במדינה‬:‫ יתר על כן אמר ר' אליעזר בן יעקב‬... ‫ ונמצא אח‬,‫ שמא יזדווגו זה לזה‬,‫זו וילך וישא אשה במדינה אחרת‬ .‫נושא את אחותו‬ ?‫ מאן הויא ליומא‬,‫איני? והא רב כי איקלע לדרדשיר ]מכריז[ ואמר‬ ?‫ מאן הויא ליומא‬,‫ ]מכריז[ ואמר‬,‫ורב נחמן כי איקלע לשכנציב‬ .‫ דפקיע שמייהו‬,‫שאני רבנן‬ … Moreover, R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov said: A man should not take one wife in one province and then go and take [another] wife in another province, lest [the children of the two wives] marry each other and it turns out that a brother marries a sister. Is that so [i.e., is that in fact the law]?! For when Rav visited Dardashir he [announced and] 2 said, “who will [marry me] for one day?” and when R. Nahman visited Shekhnaziv, he [announced and] said, “who will [marry me] for one day?” Rabbis are an exception, for [people] know their names.

EXPLANATION

R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov, an early rabbi or tanna, 3 frowns upon a man who marries two women in two different provinces, but not because such a marital situation would hurt him or the two wives, or because having multiple wives is not permitted. The The word “announced” in both anecdotes is missing from MS Munich 95. The story ends in MS Munich 95 with the words "‫"דפקיעי בשמייהו‬, i.e., [people] know them by their names. Such a reading matches Rashi’s citation exactly. He says (s.v. ‫ )דפקיעי‬that “people know the amoraim by their names. And if a daughter is called by her father’s name, then should a man from somewhere else, son of the same father, want to marry her, he will learn that she is his (half-) sibling and will retreat.” 3 There are two rabbis by this name. The rabbi in this passage is either a very early tanna or a student of the tanna R. Akiba. 2

INTRODUCTION

3

fear is that years later their children, unaware they are siblings, might find themselves in an incestuous match. The tanna’s statement also bans a short-term marriage on the road if a man has a long-term marriage at home. The passage then challenges the tanna’s statement with the phrase ini veha, which can be understood as, “Really?! Have we not learned to the contrary, i.e., that a marriage of short duration is allowed, for did not two rabbis, who lived several generations later and must have known about the prohibition, do exactly what R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov said not to do? Didn’t each of them first take a wife in his own hometown and then take another wife on the road?” The conflict between the tanna’s rule and the two rabbis’ behavior is clear. It is then resolved by the statement that rabbis are “exceptional.” Since their children’s lineage is known to all, the children will not come to marry each other, so no incest will occur. It follows that only rabbis, but not other men, may take a wife-for-a-day when on the road. 4 We see here a standard Talmudic technique of conflict resolution. 5 To exonerate the two rabbis, the Talmud modifies the meaning of the tanna’s rule “no second wife on the road.” The ban on taking a wife-for-a-day is upheld for men in general; for rabbis alone, the taking of such a wife is declared permissible. (Quite ironic!) Such a strategy is called “case distinction.” However, there is no reason to think that when R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov originally issued his ban, he intended it for men in general but not for rabbis. That exclusion seems to have originated as a way of defending two later rabbis from a pointed challenge. 6 When they disagreed with the rule of an earlier rabbi and acted on their own view of what was allowed, the old rule is understood My purpose here is not to make a judgment about the propriety of a wife-for-a-day but rather to look at how conflicts in rabbinic opinions are resolved. 5 Many textual conflicts in the Talmud are resolved by suggesting that the two texts were addressing different sets of circumstances. 6 For further analysis of the sugya, see the Ini Veha chapter, 236, see also bYoma 18b. 4

4

THE STORIES THEY TELL

in a modified and updated manner. 7 That is, an anecdote is understood differently from the way its author intended it to be understood to avoid acknowledging that later rabbis modified an earlier stated halakhah.

CORE THESES OF THIS STUDY

I claim in this volume that each halakhic anecdote innovates, that it does not merely show that a later rabbi piously upheld the rule of an earlier rabbi, as Rashi and other traditional commentators imply, but teaches something new. I further argue that the new point is, in most cases, a lenient modification of an earlier stated rule. Finally, I suggest that the collective message of the hundreds of halakhic anecdotes in the Babylonian Talmud is that the Talmud itself endorses, even promotes, halakhic change. Others have written about selected anecdotes in the Babylonian Talmud and have noted that they report actions that are not consonant with earlier stated halakhot. No one, however, has conducted a horizontal study of tens of halakhic anecdotes nor articulated such a generalization. There are two principal kinds of halakhic anecdotes: 1) those that present criticism by one rabbi, or by the Talmudic editor, of the action of another, which is then followed by that rabbi’s, or the editor’s, defense of his action; 2) those that deIt is of interest that an anonymous comment, a few lines later in the sugya, suggests that it is possible that the two rabbis did not have sex with their wife-for-a-day, that they merely secluded themselves with her. This would satisfy their sexual needs, because “he who has bread in his basket is different from he who does not,” apparently meaning that just knowing she is sexually available to him will calm his sexual urge. I doubt that this fanciful interpretation is the plain sense meaning of the passage. It seems to be an attempt by an anonymous editor to portray the two rabbis as exemplars of proper sexual behavior. Note that the Talmud does not prohibit a man from having sexual relations with a woman who is not his wife, provided she is not married to a different man.

7

INTRODUCTION

5

scribe in only a few words how a rabbi carried out a halakhic rule. A close look at the first category reveals that, in response to critique, a rabbi, or an editor, modifies an earlier stated rule. An example is the anecdote about taking a wife-for-a-day. As we saw above, the Talmud reports that, despite an early teaching opposing such a practice, two later rabbis went ahead and took a wife-for-a-day. The Talmudic editor first critiques their behavior but then adjusts the older rule to accommodate them. As for the second category, brief reports of a rabbi’s performance of an earlier stated rule, I have discovered that they often address borderline, or murky, cases. Had the Talmudic editors not included the anecdote, these cases would likely have fallen under the purview of the older rule. The point of the anecdote is to say that the case in question may be decided differently. As we will see below, when two rabbis exchanged meals on Purim, they were showing that a single food exchange can serve two purposes at once. It can count both as a Purim meal and a Purim gift (bMeg 7b). Without the anecdote, one might have concluded that a Purim meal cannot also serve as a Purim gift. By understanding the anecdotes as introducing halakhic modifications, they become an element of the Talmud’s legal stratum. They are not merely reports of how various rabbis behaved in concert with the halakhah. Rather, they are a source of law unto themselves. In that sense, the earlier halakhah and the later anecdote are one continuous unit. In the coming chapters, detailed analysis of over 80 anecdotes will support these somewhat radical claims. But before I develop my argument, I must state my assumptions about the evolution of the text of the Talmud.

LAYERED STRUCTURE OF THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD

The Babylonian Talmud, often called the Bavli, is a repository of rules of Jewish practice. Written in a mixture of Hebrew and Aramaic, its spokesmen span at least five centuries, from 1–550 CE. No one knows with certainty how the Bavli came into being. Opinions differ as to how the teachings of many rabbis, living in different locations and time periods, coalesced into one text.

6

THE STORIES THEY TELL

The overall structure of the Bavli is easy to grasp: the Mishnah, published about 200 CE, lies at its base. Each individual piece of Mishnah, also called a mishnah, is followed by gemara, i.e., discussion and analysis by later rabbis. The Mishnah’s spokesmen are called tannaim, and their dicta “tannaitic.” The gemara’s spokesmen are called amoraim, and their dicta “amoraic.” A unit of discourse in the gemara, a sugya, consists of comments on a single statement in the Mishnah. A typical sugya is composed of several layers. The oldest type of sugya is a collection of tannaitic texts called baraitot. The term signifies that they are “outside” the Mishnah. The baraitot address the same issues as the mishnah under discussion and are articulated by mostly the same spokesmen in roughly the same time period. These passages formed the earliest commentary on the Mishnah. 8 As time passed, a second layer took shape. Amoraim explained difficult statements in the Mishnah and its associated baraitot, introduced new rules, pointed out contradictions between one text and another and resolved them, provided biblical prooftexts, and so on. At the end of the amoraic period, around 550 C.E, a typical sugya was composed of a series of tannaitic and amoraic passages. The relationship of these passages to each other was often not evident, however. Many sugyot were hard to understand. To solve this problem, a number of individuals in the post-amoraic period interpolated additional comments into the sugya. 9 This See my article, ,"‫ המימרה והברייתא‬,‫ הסתם‬,‫"שלשת המרכיבים היסודיים של הסוגיה‬ .39-53 (2011 ‫מלאכת מחשבת )הוצאת בר אילן‬ 9 David Halivni, Meqorot Umesorot, from Yoma to Hagigah (JTS 1975, 2–12); Shamma Friedman, Mehqarim Umeqorot (JTS 1977), in particular 301–308. Friedman argues that regarding some stam as post-amoraic began in the period of the Rishonim. Not all rabbinics researchers agree on the dating of the stam. Robert Brody, in “Stam Hatalmud v’Divrei Ha’amoraim,” [Hebrew], 222ff., ‫ ספרות חז"ל ומשפט‬,‫ המקרא ועולמו‬:‫איגוד א‬ '‫ עמ‬,‫ ירושלים תשס"ח‬,(‫ ב' שורץ וא' שמש‬,‫עברי ומחשבת ישראל )בעריכת א' מלמד‬ 8

INTRODUCTION

7

third layer is called stama d’gemara, or stam for short. Stam, in this context, means “anonymous,” because these later contributors did not disclose their names. Nor did they issue halakhic statements of their own. The stam commentators wove the earlier materials together into a unified whole, provided transitions from one tannaitic or amoraic text to the next, and drew the implications of the various texts. 10 The stam layer accounts for over 50% of all Talmudic material. 11

THE FOCUS OF THIS VOLUME

This study pays close attention to the sugya’s amoraic layer, which consists of halakhic statements by amoraim and short narratives about amoraim. Upon reviewing many sugyot, one begins to notice that occasionally, after a number of amoraim have completed a detailed analysis of the mishnah under discussion, a short anecdote appears that describes how the rule of an earlier amora (or tanna) was carried out by a later amora. Even though most elements of a sugya are hypothetical discussions of the law, these anecdotes describe an event that, purportedly, actually took place. Whether they did or did not is immaterial for this study; what they convey is what matters. While at first glance the anecdotes appear to be unremarkable reports of how one or another amora behaved, close examination reveals that they do 213–232, casts doubt on the theory of the late stam. He argues that, already in the amoraic period, there is much stam included in the Bavli. He also says that there is no way to determine, for most stam, when it was added to the sugya. 10 Please note that the stam’s understanding of the amoraic sugya does not always accord with that of its amoraic spokesmen. 11 The stam put the finishing touches on the Bavli, although anonymous material continued to be added even as late as the 13th century. Some rabbinics researchers today view the Talmud as having evolved over generations, with sugyot growing over time by accretion. Others think that individual rabbinic passages circulated freely for centuries and were arranged into sugyot only at the end of the rabbinic period, around 550 CE. I belong to the “slow accretion” school.

8

THE STORIES THEY TELL

more than tell a story. Because they show how earlier rules were tweaked by later rabbis, they present amoraic reflections on the topic of halakhic change. What is the provenance of these amoraic anecdotes? When students transmitted teachings of their mentor, they also sometimes reported actions they saw him take, utilizing expressions such as, “I was sitting before him when he…,” or “I saw him [do the following] …”. By the end of the amoraic period, these reports had become part of the sugya. Please note that halakhic anecdotes are not “aggadic” texts. The adjective “halakhic” indicates that they address a rule of Jewish practice, a halakhah. The noun “anecdote” indicates that they describe an event that already took place. They are thus different from prescriptive halakhot which tell a person how to behave in the future. But they are halakhic nonetheless.

RECENT RESEARCH

Much attention has been paid in recent years to narratives in the Talmud. 12 Two volumes have appeared that deal exclusively with rabbinic stories. Moshe Shoshan, in Stories of the Law (Oxford 2012), analyzes narratives in the Mishnah. Barry Wimpfheimer, in Narrating the Law (UPenn 2011), discusses legal narratives in the Bavli. Both authors conclude that a main point of the many tales is to establish the authority of rabbis to determine halakhah. Wimpfheimer notes that the Bavli’s legal narratives are often at odds with the juxtaposed legal precepts. “They inherently resist the systematizing force of the Talmud,” he says (12). A main conclusion of his is that narratives “serve as vehicles for storytellers to process their cultural worlds”

Shulamit Valler, in Nashim v’Nashyut Besippurei Hatalmud (Hakibbutz Hameuchad 1993) already notes that an anecdote that follows a halakhic discussion may describe a behavior differ from what is prescribed. See, for instance, 95. See also Daniel Boyarin, Socrates and the Fat Rabbis (University of Chicago 2009), 163ff.

12

INTRODUCTION

9

(149). 13 Instead of reading narratives as law, he analyzes them as cultural discourse. Unlike Wimpfheimer, Shoshan sees the Mishnah’s narratives as speaking about law. He claims that the stories teach that rabbis are embodiments of halakhah who transmit the law not just through their teachings but through their actions. Rabbis, he writes, have the authority to alter halakhic practice in extraordinary circumstances (86–87). 14 Both of these excellent works capture something important about how narratives function in rabbinic texts. However, neither one suggests that a key message of the many halakhic anecdotes is that a later amora may modify the rule of an earlier amora. 15 That is, both scholars hold the view that rabbis would Narrating the Law, A Poetics of Talmudic Legal Stories, B. Wimpfheimer (University of Pennsylvania 2011). “This examination … suggests that scholars look to rabbinic narratives not as vehicles for transmitting discrete morals but as literary attempts to process contemporaneous culture” (8). “By focusing on Talmudic legal narratives, a set of canonical texts that inherently resist the systematizing force of the Talmud, this work provides a new set of texts through which to describe law as cultural discourse or language rather than a systemic code” (12). “Recent work in narrative theory has suggested that the resistance to legal precepts … often observed in talmudic legal narratives is no accident, but is part and parcel of what narrative requires” (19). 14 I do not question Shoshan’s findings because this study focuses on anecdotes in the Bavli, not the Mishnah. It is entirely possible that the editor(s) of the Mishnah treat anecdotes differently from the editors of the Bavli. As for Wimpfheimer, he asks a different question from the one I am asking: he wants to understand what the Bavli is saying when it creates dissonance between narrative and law. His conclusion is that the “disruptions” of the narratives are intentional. “They allow,” he says, “the full complexity of lived life to shine through in order to make sense of the cultural world” (159). 15 See Shoshan, Stories of the Law. “Exempla are ma’asim which portray the acts of individual rabbis … who are considered to be righteous and knowledgeable in the law. Their actions can be taken as precedents for proper halakhic behavior” (46). Shoshan further says, “The collective 13

10

THE STORIES THEY TELL

not behave differently from what was prescribed. There is no suggestion in either of these works that the point of the many halakhic anecdotes is that later rabbis need not accept the rules of earlier rabbis. Upon studying hundreds of halakhic anecdotes, I have arrived at the conclusion that change is precisely what the anecdotes are broadcasting. In most texts that I have examined, the anecdote does not offer resistance to the overall legal system. Rather, the amoraic editor included the anecdote in the sugya to show that the protagonist, when implementing an already stated halakhah, chose to adjust it. When the Talmud is studied linearly, as today it often is, these short anecdotes attract little attention. Only one or two appear every several pages. No one has collected them or viewed them side by side. Their import, therefore, has been overlooked. But when they are assembled and read in tandem, it is impossible to miss their key message: when a halakhah impact of the Mishnah repeatedly citing exempla about different rabbis in the context of different situations is to assert that rabbis are, at least in principle, embodiments of the law whose actions can be used to determine appropriate action in other situations” (85). “The authority of the law is based not on received principles but on the wisdom and judgment of the rabbis in each generation. … They alone have the authority to alter halakhic practice in extraordinary circumstances. Finally, they are themselves embodiments of the law, so that their very actions in their day-to-day lives are sources of legal precedent” (86–87). “On the one hand, then, the Mishnah and its stories establish an authoritative framework in which the rabbis and their law function. On the other hand, they consistently question this framework by testing its boundaries and exposing its limitations” (96). To my mind (JH), the purpose of including halakhic anecdotes in the sugya is not to establish the rabbi as a charismatic leader whose actions should be mimicked, nor to establish the rabbi as authoritative arbiter of halakhah. That rabbis function in those ways is a given of the Bavli. Unlike Shoshan, I am suggesting that the halakhic anecdotes of the Bavli (not of the Mishnah) announce to their audience that a later rabbi may adjust or modify the halakhah of an earlier rabbi.

INTRODUCTION

11

emerges from the study hall and confronts real life circumstances, it may undergo modification.

INNER DYNAMICS OF HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

In his volume, Sages, Stories, Authors and Editors in Rabbinic Babylonia, Richard Kalmin analyzes conversations between amoraim. 16 He writes that the most common form of dialogue in the Bavli is between scholars of different rank, one “superior” and the other “inferior.” For instance, conversations between Abaye and his teacher R. Yosef, or Abaye and his teacher Rabbah, far outnumber conversations between Abaye and Rava, his colleague and contemporary. 17 This study will utilize Kalmin’s observations when analyzing halakhic anecdotes. These anecdotes often include an exchange between two amoraim. In most cases, it is a junior scholar who observes the halakhic performance of a senior scholar, realizes that the senior scholar has deviated from a stated halakhah, and questions him regarding his behavior. The senior scholar defends his action, usually claiming that his specific circumstances do not fall under the purview of the stated rule. He has thus not violated it. His action suggests that in circumstances like his own, the rule does not apply. It still does apply in all other circumstances, however. It is possible that the senior amora of the anecdote had already made up his mind to behave as he did precisely in order to be observed by his younger colleague, that he was waiting to be “discovered” in violation of the earlier stated halakhah so that he could then make his new view known. Alternatively, it is possible that he was simply caught by a junior scholar when engaging in “deviant” behavior and instituted a change on the Brown Judaic Studies 1994, 209ff. This is true despite the fact that one name for the Babylonian Talmud is Havayot DeAbaye veRava (problems or investigations of Abaye and Rava). This phrase implies that their conversations with each other are frequent. Kalmin concludes otherwise, as noted.

16 17

12

THE STORIES THEY TELL

spot to defend himself against the critique. Either way, when challenged by a junior scholar, the senior scholar justifies his action. He has thus brought about halakhic change. 18 Case distinction, as described above, is probably the most prevalent method of halakhic change in the Babylonian Talmud. 19 The amora who utilizes this technique is saying that the range of cases to which the earlier rule applies is not allinclusive. When the rule was first promulgated, no exceptions were listed; it is only when the rule is applied to a real-life situation that its shortcomings (that is, in being stated too generally) come to light. It therefore becomes necessary for a later amora to restrict the rule’s application and decide otherwise for a group of cases. Removing cases from the purview of the rule usually results in a leniency, as we saw, for example, in the opening anecdote, where allowing rabbis to take a wife-for-aday when on the road is a more liberal stance than disallowing. Analysis of several hundred halakhic anecdotes has led me to the conclusion that the editor(s) inserted them into the evolvI am taking Kalmin’s observation further and arguing that the Talmud, by favoring this form of interaction, is saying to its audience that this is how halakhah develops: via encounters between rabbis of different rank, in particular when a junior scholar challenges a senior scholar who then defends his “errant” behavior. 19 It is fairly common in the gemara for a junior scholar to challenge a statement of a senior scholar. The term eiteveih indicates such a step on the part of a junior scholar. He will often cite a source of higher authority, such as a baraita, and show that the dictum of the senior scholar conflicts with a tannaitic statement. The senior scholar typically defends himself against the challenge by suggesting that the baraita was addressing situations different from the ones he is addressing. He thus maintains the validity of his own halakhic statement and, at the same time, limits the scope of the tannaitic text. As already noted, a junior scholar will often challenge an action of a senior scholar, which the senior scholar then rebuts by claiming that his particular circumstances are not addressed by the tannaitic or earlier stated amoraic statement. Here, too, he has modified a halakhah. 18

INTRODUCTION

13

ing sugyot in order to communicate to the Bavli’s audience that a later amora may disagree with, and even modify, a halakhah of an earlier amora and even of a tanna. Not merely neutral reports of what amoraim did, these narratives illustrate the mechanics of halakhic innovation. The a priori assumption that an amora would not break a law has led centuries of commentators to claim that the anecdotes merely show an amora abiding by the law, carrying out the law as formulated, engaging in an act of piety. 20 An unbiased look at the anecdotes, however, forces one to realize that they are showing just the opposite, that the amoraic actor is depicted not as upholding but as modifying the law.

RESEARCH METHODS

This inquiry showcases the technique of reading Talmudic texts horizontally, jumping from one occurrence of a phenomenon to the next, instead of vertically, line by line. As I demonstrated in my volume on baraitot introduced by the phrase tanya nami hakhi, upon perusing seriatim the 350 sugyot that contain this phrase, I found a new, evidence-based solution to the longstanding problems associated with this phrase. 21 It was horizontal study of the Talmud that made it possible to solve the conundrum of an amora saying the same thing in the same words as a tanna but not acknowledging that he was quoting. Here too, by reading halakhic anecdotes from different folio pages, chapters, Shoshan says that rabbis are “considered to be righteous and knowledgeable in the law and that their actions may be taken as precedents for proper halakhic behavior” (46). For me, “righteous” means that rabbis modify the law when necessary, that they don’t just uphold the law as it was transmitted to them. The Babylonian Talmud, in my judgment, regards rabbis who make adjustments in the law in a very positive light. 21 See my volume, Development of the Talmudic Sugya, Relationship Between Tannaitic and Amoraic Sources (University Press of America, Studies in Judaism, 1988). 20

14

THE STORIES THEY TELL

and tractates in association with each other, it becomes possible to see an emerging pattern, namely that the amoraic protagonist introduces a modification to an earlier stated halakhah. In fact, recognizing that halakhic change is the message of the anecdotes often leads to interpreting the anecdote, and even the entire sugya, differently. 22 My strategy when studying a sugya is to read the words as they are written, without a preconceived notion of an unchanging halakhah. As a woman who studied Talmud outside the confines of a yeshivah, I was positioned to potentially ask—and have found myself asking—different questions of the text from those who studied Talmud in a traditional context, and to use different techniques to find answers. This is my third volume of commentary on the Talmud that is not on a chapter or tractate, but instead a reading of one instance after another of a particular genre of halakhic phenomenon. 23 In this kind of reading, almost inevitably, new interpretations and truths emerge.

AMORAIC GENERATIONS

To highlight the relative generations of the amoraim, I have included their land of origin and generation in parentheses following their name. BA stands for Babylonian amora and JA for Je-

One may wonder whether or not the codes of Jewish law, composed over the centuries, accepted the tweaks made by later amoraim to the rules of earlier amoraim. The answer is that the authors of these codes incorporated the modifications into their codes but did not note that the earlier version of the law differed from the later. In other words, a halakhah in the Shulhan Arukh (1565) appears only in its modified version. 23 My first volume, as noted above, was a study of the phrase tanya nami hakhi. A later volume, Rereading the Mishnah, A New Approach to Ancient Jewish Texts (Mohr Siebeck 2005), compared selected passages of the Mishnah and the Tosefta. 22

INTRODUCTION

15

rusalem (Talmud) amora. 24 The number that follows indicates the amora’s generation.

ILLUSTRATIVE SUGYOT

The following four sugyot will showcase two claims: that each anecdote teaches something new, and that each shows amoraic modification of an earlier stated halakhah. 1 bSukkah 28b–29a, Leaving the sukkah because of rain ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת סוכה דף כח עמוד ב‬ ‫ ירדו‬.‫ כל שבעת הימים אדם עושה סוכתו קבע וביתו עראי‬.‫משנה‬ ... ‫ משתסרח המקפה‬,‫ מאימתי מותר לפנות‬,‫גשמים‬ Mishnah: For all seven days [of the holiday], a person should make his sukkah [i.e., his shed or booth] into his permanent dwelling and his home his temporary dwelling. If it rains, from when is a person permitted to evacuate [the sukkah and move back home]? From when the gelled food spoils. …

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת סוכה דף כט עמוד א‬ "‫"ירדו גשמים‬ .‫ משתסרח המקפה של גריסין‬:‫תנא‬ ‫ נשב זיקא קא מייתי‬.‫אביי הוה קא יתיב קמיה דרב יוסף במטללתא‬ .‫ציבותא‬ .‫ פנו לי מאני מהכא‬:‫אמר להו רב יוסף‬ !‫ והא תנן משתסרח המקפה‬:‫אמר ליה אביי‬ 25 .‫לי‬

‫ כיון דאנינא דעתאי כמי שתסרח המקפה דמי‬,‫ לדידי‬:‫אמר ליה‬

The Talmud of the land of Israel is known as the Talmud Yerushalmi, even though the amoraim did not reside in Jerusalem. It is also called the Palestinian Talmud to differentiate it from the Babylonian Talmud. 25 MS Munich 95: ‫כיון דאנינא דעת כמי שתסרח המקפה דמי‬. In some of the mss. in the Friedberg project of Talmud Bavli variants: the wind 24

16

THE STORIES THEY TELL [Citation of mishnah:] “If it rains.” A tannaitic text [says]: from the time that a pounded grain dish spoils. Abaye (BA 4) was sitting in a sukkah in the presence of R. Yosef (BA 3). A wind blew and brought down chips of wood. R. Yosef said to them: remove for me the utensils from here. Abaye said to him: But the mishnah teaches, “From when the gelled food spoils [one may leave the sukkah, and not before]!” He said to him: For me, since I am fastidious, [it is] like the gelled food spoiling for me.

EXPLANATION

According to the mishnah, if it starts to rain, as soon as a miqpah, a gelled food, loses its texture, a person is permitted to leave the sukkah and move back home. This is a leniency, since a gelled food will lose its texture much faster than other kinds of food, such as a slab of meat. A short baraita, a text from the same time as the Mishnah, comments on the mishnah’s phrase “If it starts to rain.” The baraita states that the gelled food of the mishnah is made of pounded beans or grains (gerisin). Such a dish will decompose as soon as a little rain falls. brought down chips that filled it (the sukkah), ‫אתא זיקא הוה קא מלי ליה‬ ‫ציביאתא‬. And in MS Oxford 2677, R. Yosef does not say he is sensitive, only that, for him, chips in the sukkah are like a gelled food losing its texture. These mss. variants do not affect the analysis above. In one way, however, the Oxford ms. might. If the words “I am fastidious” are a later addition, taken from bPes 113b, then R. Yosef is altering the mishnah’s rule in a purely subjective manner, without regard to any general principle. See next note.

INTRODUCTION

17

An anecdote follows. Abaye, a junior scholar, was sitting in a sukkah in the presence of R. Yosef, his mentor. (Note that the expression “sitting before him” usually implies that the one who sits is junior, and the one before whom he sits is senior.) A wind blew and brought down chips from the roof thatch into the sukkah. R. Yosef said to “them,” either his servants or his students, “remove my utensils from here,” by which he meant that they should bring the platters of food inside. Abaye reproaches R. Yosef, saying that according to the mishnah one may leave the sukkah only after the rain begins and causes the gelled food to lose its texture! With this critique, Abaye suggests that R. Yosef left the sukkah prematurely. Gelled food will lose its texture only after the rain begins, and not as soon as a strong wind blows down chips. R. Yosef answers that he is fastidious, which means that, for him, chips falling into the sukkah, and probably into the food, is equivalent to a gelled food losing its texture because of rain. This anecdote clearly adapts the halakhah of the mishnah. It provides an earlier time to evacuate the sukkah in the case of rain. The mishnah stipulates that only after the rain has begun does one move into the house. And yet the anecdote indicates that for a delicate or fastidious person, who is not mentioned in the mishnah, there is an even earlier time of departure from the sukkah. R. Yosef thus claims that the mishnah’s rule about rain ruining a gelled food does not apply to everyone: People who are fastidious may leave the sukkah even before the rain starts to fall. 26 Was the exclusion of a fastidious person from the “gelled food” rule the intention of the author of the mishnah? I don’t think so. The anecdote makes it clear that Abaye was not aware of such an exclusion. The passage seems to be saying that R. Yosef made an ad hoc decision to move into the house because chips of thatch falling into the sukkah made him uncomfortable. Only when challenged by his student Abaye, who knows the 26

See bPes 113b where R. Yosef claims he is fastidious, ‫אנין דעת‬.

18

THE STORIES THEY TELL

mishnah and thinks it applies to everyone, did R. Yosef qualify the mishnah, claiming that it applies to most people but not to those who are fastidious. If he was merely interpreting the mishnah, all he had to do was comment, from the outset, that the mishnah refers to most people but not to a fastidious person who may leave the sukkah at an earlier time. It was only when a student caught him in the act of leaving the sukkah early that R. Yosef issued this leniency. It is true that there is precedent elsewhere in the Mishnah for someone who is fastidious not being required to observe certain rules. In mBerakhot 2:6, Rabban Gamliel, after being challenged by his students about his behavior, claimed he was delicate, and for that reason permitted himself to bathe the first night after his wife died, rather than refrain from doing so for the seven days of mourning, as he himself had taught his students. 27 In that text, however, the exception for a fastidious person is stated first, before the presentation of the general rule of no bathing for a mourner. In this case, the exception for a fastidious person is stated at a much later time than the general rule. R. Yosef did not invent the concept of “fastidious,” but he does apply it to a case where it is not evident that the tannaitic author of the rule meant it to be applied. To summarize: the position of the sugya’s editor is that the mishnah has to be read together with the associated anecdote in order to understand fully its rule about leaving the sukkah because of rain. The “enhanced” rule has two parts: 1) According to the mishnah, a person may leave the sukkah after rain causes Mishnah Berakhot 2:6, ‫ אמרו לו תלמידיו לא למדתנו רבינו שאבל‬.‫רחץ לילה הראשון שמתה אשתו‬ ‫אסור לרחוץ?! אמר להם איני כשאר כל אדם אסטניס אני‬ He bathed the first night after his wife died. His students said to him: did you not teach us, our Rabbi, that a mourner is forbidden to bathe? He said to them: I am not like most people. I am an istenis, meaning ‘delicate’ or ‘fastidious.’ M. Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic (Bar Ilan 1990), translates istenis as “weak.”

27

INTRODUCTION

19

a gelled food to lose its texture; 2) According to the amoraic anecdote, a fastidious person may leave the sukkah even before rain starts to fall. Therefore, the implicit message of the editor of the sugya, who inserted the anecdote, is that when law exits the “study hall” and meets up with life, adjustments may be made. It is also clear that the role of a student is to question a mentor when the mentor’s actions don’t jibe with the halakhah as the student knows it. Abaye’s query is not impertinent. 28 The way he questioned his mentor is perfect form for a Talmudic-era student: he does not say “you broke the law,” but instead cites an established rule to his mentor, in this case a mishnah, which conflicts with the mentor’s behavior. As a result of Abaye’s challenge, R. Yosef is given the opportunity either to produce a new rule or narrow the scope of an old one. 29 If anything characterizes legal debates in the Talmud, it is the criticism that one rabbi lobs at another. Not only do amoraim often shame each other for not grasping a point or knowing a source, but they call each other insulting names. These kinds of exchanges could be viewed by the reader as negative, as ways in which a debate should not proceed. Does such an atmosphere, which one might characterize as toxic, adversely affect the development of halakhah? The answer is a resounding “no.” Criticism by one amora of another should be seen as a positive phenomenon. Given the prevalence in the Talmud of students criticizing teachers, it seems that the teachers are not just allowing but even encouraging disciples to speak forthrightly to their mentors, reproaching the mentors, when warranted, for not behaving according to the law. This kind of critique almost always leads to modification of the law, a benefit in and of itself, but also a message to the audience from the editors of the Talmud that even after a law leaves the study hall, it may be altered. See J. Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud (The Johns Hopkins University Press 2003), in particular the chapters on Shame and Violence. Rubenstein writes: “The conception of learning depicted here is that of sages arguing with one another so as to improve their analytical skill ….” (52). 29 Others may claim that R. Yosef was simply showing Abaye yet another reason to leave the sukkah. If that were so, however, there is no reason for Abaye to quote the statement in the mishnah that one leaves the 28

20

THE STORIES THEY TELL

2 bBaba Qamma 118b–119a, Accepting charitable donations from married women

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת בבא קמא דף קיח עמוד ב‬ ‫ אבל לוקחין מן‬...‫ אין לוקחין מן הרועים צמר וחלב וגדיים‬.'‫מתני‬ ... .‫ ועגלים בשרון‬,‫ וכלי פשתן בגליל‬,‫הנשים כלי צמר ביהודה‬ Mishnah: One may not purchase wool or milk or kid goats from a shepherd … But one may purchase from women woolen garments in Judea and linen garments in the Galilee and calves in the Sharon [valley].…

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת בבא קמא דף קיט עמוד א‬ ".‫"אבל לוקחין מן הנשים‬ ‫ אבל לא‬,‫ לוקחין מן הנשים כלי צמר ביהודה וכלי פשתן בגליל‬:‫ת"ר‬ ‫ מוכרת אשה בארבעה‬:‫ אבא שאול אומר‬... ‫יינות ושמנים וסלתות‬ ‫ גבאי צדקה לוקחין מהן‬... ‫ כדי לעשות כפה לראשה‬,‫וחמשה דינר‬ ‫ לוקחין מנשים‬:‫ רשב"ג אומר‬... ‫ אבל לא דבר מרובה‬,‫דבר מועט‬ ,‫ שפעמים אדם בוש למכור על פתח ביתו‬,‫זיתים במועד בגליל העליון‬ .‫ונותן לאשתו ומוכרת‬ ‫רמו קמיה כבלי‬

30 ‫מחוזא‬

‫ אתו נשי דבי‬,‫רבינא איקלע לבי מחוזא‬ .‫ קביל מינייהו‬,‫ושירי‬

‫ גבאי צדקה מקבלין מהן דבר‬:‫ והתניא‬,‫א"ל רבה תוספאה לרבינא‬ !‫ אבל לא דבר מרובה‬,‫מועט‬ .‫ הני לבני מחוזא דבר מועט נינהו‬:‫א"ל‬ [Citation of mishnah]: “But one may purchase from women.” A baraita: One may purchase from women woolen garments in Judea and linen garments in the Galilee but not wine or sukkah after rain starts to fall, and the gelled food loses its texture. Abaye thus implies that the issue under consideration is leaving the sukkah early because of rain, not for some other reason. 30 MS Munich 95: ... ‫אתו נשי בני מחוזא‬. No significant variants in the mss. in the Friedberg project of Talmud Bavli variants.

INTRODUCTION

21

oil or fine flour [because the women would likely be selling off their husbands’ products] … Abba Shaul allows a woman to sell [her goods] for four or five dinarii, enough to make a hat (kippah) for herself … Charity collectors may accept small donations from them [i.e., women] but not large ones … Rabban Simon b. Gamliel says: One may purchase olives from a woman on a festival’s intermediate days in the Upper Galilee because sometimes a man is embarrassed to sell from the doorway of his home and gives [the olives] to his wife to sell [and in such a case, there is no issue of stealing from a husband]. Ravina (BA 7) visited the town of Bei Mehoza. The women of Bei Mehoza came and threw chains and bracelets before [i.e., at] him. He accepted these [expensive] items from them. Rabbah Tosfa’ah (BA 7/8) said to him: Have we not learned that charity collectors may accept small donations from women but not large ones?! He responded: For the people of Mehoza, these are small [donations].

EXPLANATION

The mishnah about buying farm products from women appears in the context of a broad discussion of robbery. Buying wool from a shepherd is not allowed, for it would almost certainly be a case of purchasing from him that which was not his to sell. But, the mishnah goes on to say, one may buy woolen garments from women in Judea because they make these garments themselves, apparently with a husband’s consent, and so the purchaser would not be robbing him (Rashi). 31 The sugya opens with a

Rashi comments that wives engage in these activities with the knowledge, and presumably consent, of a husband.

31

22

THE STORIES THEY TELL

baraita that continues the theme of the mishnah but adds details, such as that a charity collector may accept a small donation from a woman, because she is likely to have earned some money of her own, but not a large one, presumably because she would be giving away her husband’s money without his knowledge or consent. The anecdote that follows the baraita reports that two amoraim visited a town together—or else one amora visited, i.e., Ravina, and the other, Rabbah Tosfa’ah, was local. The junior colleague, Rabbah Tosfa’ah, sees that the senior colleague, Ravina, was accepting donations of jewelry from women. The junior scholar criticizes the senior scholar, claiming that he violates a rule of the baraita, that one may not accept large donations from women, and a gift of jewelry surely qualifies as a large donation. Ravina most likely knew, according to the baraita, that he could not accept women’s chains and bracelets as donations. But he already had accepted them and is apparently loath to return them. To justify keeping the donations, he says that the baraita’s statement about not accepting large donations from women was not to be understood as defining “large” and “small” in absolute but rather relative terms. What would be a large and, hence, a prohibited donation from a poor woman is actually a “small” donation from a rich woman. 32 Since the

‫ זו היא מלאכת הנשים והן עצמן עושות ומוכרות‬- ‫צמר ביהודה ופשתן בגליל‬ ‫ולדעת בעליהן הוא‬ Wool in Judea and flax in the Galilee – these are women’s labors. And they themselves produce and sell [the wool and flax]. It is with the knowledge of their husbands. 32 That the words “large” and “small” may be interpreted as relative terms is not obvious from the outset. Rabbah Tosfa’ah does not think the terms are relative and for that reason criticizes Ravina for accepting large donations. Had Rabbah Tosfa’ah thought the words could be interpreted as “relatively large” or “relatively small,” he would not have issued his critique. That the people of Mehoza are wealthy is a given in the Talmud. See next note.

INTRODUCTION

23

women of Mehoza are known to be rich, 33 their jewelry donations may be accepted. The outcome of Ravina’s comment is that a halakhah has been changed. It is now possible to accept not just small but even large donations from certain women. Note that, in this case, the women gave their own jewelry as a charitable donation. Is accepting large donations from rich women a new rule, or did the baraita approve of that to begin with? Rabbah Tosfa’ah did not think that the baraita was issuing such a rule about rich women and therefore challenged Ravina for accepting the jewelry tossed at him. But the editor, I suggest, included the anecdote in the sugya to endorse Ravina’s modification of the baraita, i.e., that “small” could be interpreted as a relative term. Again we see a junior scholar criticizing a senior scholar for breaking an earlier stated rule, and a senior scholar defending himself with an innovative and lenient interpretation of the rule. Only when one reads the anecdote together with the baraita does one learn the full rule about accepting donations from women. Did Ravina plan to change the rule of the baraita before he received a donation of jewelry from the wealthy women of Mehoza? Probably not. But after the junior scholar claimed that Ravina was violating the rule of the baraita, he modified it. Note that in both of these examples—rain in the sukkah and women giving charity—the change is in the direction of leniency: One is allowed to leave the sukkah even before the rain begins; one is allowed to accept even large charitable donations from rich women. Feminist sidebar: It is of note that the baraita states that women often sell small amounts of handmade products at the bShab 32b, women of Mehoza eat but don’t earn [their keep]; bShab 59b, women of Mehoza wear expensive jewelry; bShab 19a, people of Mehoza are pampered (mefanqei); bPes 50b, women of Mehoza are pampered. 33

24

THE STORIES THEY TELL

door of their homes, presumably rural. 34 The reason a woman does so, according to the baraita, is to earn money that she can spend on herself, to buy, for instance, a kippah for her head. The word “kippah,” which means “dome,” refers to a skull cap. We see elsewhere that women wore this kind of headgear as a base to which they added ornaments. 35 Rashi, however, explains that the word “kippah” refers to a veil or scarf, and says that her husband will not object—although theoretically he could—to her spending money in this manner. 36 I think Rashi was interpreting the word according to feminine fashion of his own day, and that the more historically correct reading is that female Jews were wearing skull caps, or kippot, a long time before male Jews(!). The next example will show how easy it is to read a brief anecdote and think that all it says is that two rabbis fulfilled an earlier stated rule. But if we assume the report likely does more than that, we will grasp its innovative point. Also note that in the coming two sugyot there is no verbal exchange between amoraim. There is only a description of an action they took. 3 bMoed Qatan 27b, Exchanging meals on the first day of mourning

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת מועד קטן דף כז עמוד ב‬

Women’s freedom to spend their earned money as they wish is the subject of the baraita. 35 See mShabbat 6:1. See also mKet 5:8, mZav 4:1, tSot 3:3, and tZav 4:4. 36 ‫רש"י מסכת בבא קמא דף קיט עמוד א‬, ‫ צעיף ואין הבעל מקפיד‬- ‫כפה‬. Kippah – a veil, and the husband is not particular [i.e., it does not concern him that she spends money on these items]. The word tz’aif in Biblical Hebrew means a shawl or veil. See Brown Driver Briggs, Lexicon (858). 34

INTRODUCTION

25

‫ אבל יום ראשון אסור לאכול לחם משלו‬:‫אמר רב יהודה אמר רב‬ ‫יז( "ולחם אנשים לא‬:‫מדאמר ליה רחמנא ליחזקאל )יחזקאל כד‬ ."‫תאכל‬ 37 .‫להדדי‬

‫רבה ורב יוסף מחלפי סעודתייהו‬

R. Judah (BA 2) said that Rav (BA 1) said: A mourner may not eat his own food on the first day [of the mourning period]. As God [literally, the merciful One] said to Ezekiel (24:17), “Do not eat the bread of men.” Rabbah (BA 3) and R. Yosef (BA 3) exchanged meals with each other [when in mourning].

EXPLANATION

R. Judah in the name of Rav says that a mourner should not eat his own food on the first day of mourning. Others must provide for him. The amora deduces this principle from a verse in the book of Ezekiel in which God tells the prophet to abandon standard mourning practices. The phrase “Do not eat the bread of men,” addressed by God to the prophet, implies that other people, when in mourning, should “eat the bread of men,” i.e., be fed by others. A very brief anecdote relates that Rabbah and R. Yosef, when they were in mourning, exchanged meals with each other. This means that one amora would send the other a meal when that amora was in mourning and the other would reciprocate when the first was in mourning (not that they were simultaneously in mourning and actually “exchanged” meals). On the surface, this appears to be a report of the pious behavior of these two colleagues, that they each implemented Rav’s rule of not eating their own food on the first day of mourning, and, furthermore, that they each took care of a colleague when he was in mourning. No significant variants in MS Munich 95 or in the mss. in the Friedberg project of Talmud Bavli variants. 37

26

THE STORIES THEY TELL

However, if we assume the anecdote is here to teach something new, we will look for and find it. Upon analysis, it turns out that this anecdote addresses the question of whether advance arrangement of two amoraim to exchange mourning meals is consistent with Rav’s rule. On the one hand, each mourner eats meals prepared by others, as stipulated by Rav. On the other, since each amora “pays” for his own mourning meals by sending meals to his associate when the associate is in mourning, each of them is, in a sense, eating his own food in violation of Rav’s rule. However, by including this anecdote in the sugya, the amoraic editor is communicating his approval of this arrangement. Had the anecdote not been included, such an arrangement is likely to have been regarded as in violation of Rav’s rule. Because of the anecdote, this borderline case qualifies as a valid performance of Rav’s rule. 38 How do the Medieval commentaries understand the mourning meal exchange? Neither Rashi nor Tosafot comment on the exchange of meals. The Ran (Rabbenu Nissim, 15 c.) comments and explains. ‫חידושי הר"ן מסכת מועד קטן דף כז עמוד ב‬ ‫ פירוש כשהיה אחד מהם אבל‬.‫רבה ורב יוסף מחלפי סעודתיהו להדדי‬ ‫מחליף סעודתו לחברו ונמצאו שאין אחד מהם חסר כלום והאבל לא היה‬ ‫אוכל משלו‬ Rabbah and R. Yosef exchanged [mourning] meals with each other. This means that when one of them was in mourning he would exchange a meal with his colleague [and the other would do the same when he was in mourning]. And it turns out that neither of them expended any resources at all [i.e., each paid for a meal for the other, and each received a meal from the other] and, thus, the mourner was not eating his own food. The RaN is aware of the possibility that a stipulated exchange of mourning meals may lead to the conclusion that each of the two mourners is actually eating his own meal and not being fed by someone else. Even so, this arrangement is still regarded as if the mourning meal each received from his colleague fulfilled the rule of not eating one’s own meal on the first day of mourning. Since neither expended any funds on the meal each received from his colleague on the first day of 38

INTRODUCTION

27

The exact same phrase—‫(—מחלפי סעודתייהו להדדי‬they exchanged meals with each other)—also describes a meal exchange on Purim (bMegillah 7b). 39 The context is a discussion of mishloah manot, Purim gifts of food. By exchanging Purim meals, both Abaye bar Abin (BA 4) and his brother R. Hanina bar Abin, 40 fulfilled two mitzvot simultaneously: mishloah manot and se’udat Purim, eating a Purim meal. The meal each sent the other doubled as a Purim meal and a Purim gift of food. 41 Unlike 38F

39 F

40F

mourning, although each was then obligated to send a meal back when the colleague was in mourning, even so this arrangement fulfills the requirement of not eating one’s own food for the first meal of mourning. They are both still in compliance with Rav’s rule. I therefore see support in the RaN for my point that the anecdote about exchanging meals was not included in the text to show amoraic piety but amoraic halakhic innovation, that even such an arrangement fulfills Rav’s rule. 39 ‫רש"י מסכת מגילה דף ז עמוד ב‬ ‫ ובשניה סועד חברו‬,‫ זה אוכל עם זה בפורים של שנה זו‬- ‫מחלפי סעודתייהו‬ .‫עמו‬ Rashi explains that the two brothers alternated years hosting the Purim meal, “one ate with the other this year on Purim, and the other did so [i.e., ate with the first] the following Purim.” The Talmud, overall, has little to say about the Purim meal. I am suggesting that this meal exchange, unlike the mourning meal exchange, took place with both meals being sent at the same time, not in alternate years as suggested by Rashi. This commentator, I suspect, either wants to make the two meal exchanges similar to each other or else does not want to acknowledge that the Purim meal exchange makes a new halakhic point. 40 ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת מגילה דף ז עמוד ב‬ .‫אביי בר אבין ורבי חנינא בר אבין מחלפי סעודתייהו להדדי‬ No significant ms. variants. 41 See a similar example at the top of bMeg 7b, involving R. Judah Nesia and R. Oshaiah. The latter claims that the mishloah manot he received from the former also served as “gifts to the poor,” yet another Purim mizvah.

28

THE STORIES THEY TELL

the mourning meals, which are not exchanged at the same time, the Purim meals are. We would not have known that these marginal cases are acceptable had the two anecdotes not been included in their respective sugyot. We would likely have concluded that such an exchange of mourning meals means that the two rabbis ate their own food, in violation of Rav’s rule, and that the two brothers ate a Purim meal but did not fulfill the mitzvah of mishloah manot. Thus, the two similar anecdotes teach otherwise. 42 It is of interest that R. Yosef Karo, in the Shulhan Arukh, takes a step back. He does not permit “meal exchange” arrangements to be made in advance, because that would mean that a mourner is eating his own food by agreeing to exchange a meal with someone else. See Shulhan Arukh Yoreh De’ah, Laws of Mourning, Section 378, Paragraph 1. ‫שולחן ערוך יורה דעה הלכות אבילות סימן שעח סעיף א‬ ‫ אפילו ביום‬,‫ אבל בשניה מותר‬,‫אבל אסור לאכול משלו בסעודה ראשונה‬ ‫ ויכול‬.‫ כדי שלא יאכל משלו‬,‫ ומצוה על שכניו א שיאכילוהו משלהם‬.‫ראשון‬ ,‫ והוא יחזור גם כן ויאכילנו בימי אבלו‬,‫אחד להאכיל את חברו בימי אבלו‬ .‫ובלבד שלא יתנו בתחילה‬ A mourner may not eat his own food at the first mourning meal. But at the second meal he may eat his own food, even on the first day of mourning. It is a mizvah for his neighbors to feed him with their food so that he does not eat his own. And one person can feed another in his days of mourning, and he can return and feed the first in the first one’s days of mourning, provided they don’t stipulate this exchange in advance. Karo, basing himself on the anecdote about Rabbah and R. Yosef, asserts that mourners who exchange meals are not eating their own meals, provided they did not make such an agreement in advance. As noted above, one could easily think that this meal exchange violates the rule of a mourner not eating his own meal on the first day of mourning because he is “buying” himself a meal by giving a mourning meal to someone else. However, Karo says, as long as there is no formal agreement about the meal exchange prior to the mourning period, the arrangement is permitted. It is not considered a violation of the rule of not eating one’s own meal on the first day of mourning. But such ex42

INTRODUCTION

29

It is important to note that this last anecdote about meal exchange, only six words long, lacks any term or vocabulary common to most halakhic anecdotes (such as iqla, see below). It also lacks amoraic dialogue. Because of its brevity, its significance has been overlooked. It is all too easy to pass over it, and many others like it, and say that their only message is that an amora carried out a halakhah. But even in their brevity, if examined closely, these short anecdotes, too, teach a new point. 4 bPesahim 100a–b, Interrupting a meal when the Sabbath arrives

This fourth sugya, like the third, is very brief, but it too teaches a new point. At first glance, the anecdote seems to do nothing more than say that Rabbah bar R. Huna (RBRH, BA 3) fulfilled the rule of his predecessor Shmuel (BA 1). Careful review of the sugya, however, shows a difference of opinion among Medieval commentators, i.e., Rashi, Rashbam, and Tosafot, about the meaning of RBRH’s action. According to Rashi (s.v. iqla l’vei Resh Galuta), RBRH merely carried out the rule as articulated by Shmuel. According to Rashbam and Tosafot, the amora applied Shmuel’s statement to a new case, not anticipated by Shmuel. I favor Rashbam’s and Tosafot’s understanding of the anecdote. Approaching this anecdote from the perspective that it may contain a new point makes it possible to notice that RBRH was addressing a slightly different case from that addressed by Shmuel’s rule. That is, a key hypothesis of this volume—that each halakhic anecdote innovates—can be utilized in this instance to help decide among commentators. ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת פסחים דף ק עמוד א‬

changes, he goes on to say, may not be made in advance (presumably because in the case of advance arrangements one is actually eating one’s own food, that he “paid” for). Karo’s comment thus supports the notion that the mourning meal exchange anecdote is innovative.

‫‪THE STORIES THEY TELL‬‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫‪...‬דתניא‪ :‬מפסיקין לשבתות‪ ,‬דברי רבי יהודה‪ .‬רבי יוסי אומר‪ :‬אין‬ ‫מפסיקין‪ .‬ומעשה ברבן שמעון בן גמליאל ]ורבי יהודה[ ורבי יוסי‬ ‫שהיו מסובין בעכו‪ ,‬וקדש עליהם היום‪ .‬אמר לו רבן שמעון בן‬ ‫גמליאל לרבי יוסי‪ :‬ברבי‪ ,‬רצונך נפסיק‪ ,‬וניחוש לדברי יהודה חבירנו?‬ ‫אמר לו‪ :‬בכל יום ויום אתה מחבב דבריי לפני רבי יהודה‪ ,‬ועכשיו‬ ‫אתה מחבב דברי רבי יהודה בפני‪) ,‬אסתר ז‪:‬ח( הגם לכבוש את‬ ‫המלכה עמי בבית? אמר לו‪ :‬אם כן לא נפסיק‪ ,‬שמא יראו‬ ‫התלמידים‪ ,‬ויקבעו הלכה לדורות‪ .‬אמרו‪ :‬לא זזו משם עד שקבעו‬ ‫הלכה כרבי יוסי‪.‬‬ ‫אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל‪ :‬אין הלכה לא כרבי יהודה ולא כרבי‬ ‫יוסי‪ ,‬אלא‪ :‬פורס מפה ומקדש‪.‬‬ ‫איני? והא אמר רב תחליפא בר אבדימי אמר שמואל‪ :‬כשם‬ ‫שמפסיקין לקידוש )ק‪ (:‬כך מפסיקין להבדלה‪ .‬מאי מפסיקין‪ ,‬לאו‬ ‫לעקירת שולחן?‬ ‫לא‪ ,‬למפה‪.‬‬ ‫רבה בר רב הונא איקלע לבי ריש גלותא‪ .‬אייתו תכא קמיה‪ ,‬פרס‬ ‫מפה וקידש‪.‬‬ ‫תניא נמי הכי‪) :‬ושוין( שאין מביאין את השולחן אלא אם כן קידש‪,‬‬ ‫ואם הביא פורס מפה ומקדש‪43 .‬‬ ‫‪…As a Baraita teaches: one interrupts a meal for the Sab‬‬‫‪bath, the opinion of R. Judah. R. Yosi says: one does not in‬‬‫‪terrupt. It once happened that Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel‬‬ ‫‪(RSBG), R. Judah and R. Yosi were reclining [at a meal] in‬‬ ‫‪Akko [on a Friday afternoon] and the Sabbath arrived. RSBG‬‬ ‫‪said to R. Yosi: B’rabbi, 44 do you want to interrupt [the‬‬ ‫?‪meal] and thereby heed the opinion of Judah, our colleague‬‬ ‫‪He [R. Yosi] responded: every day you favor my opinion‬‬ ‫‪over that of R. Judah, and now, in my presence, you want to‬‬ ‫‪favor R. Judah’s opinion [over mine]!? Do you wish to “rav‬‬‫‪In MS Munich 95 the tanya nami hakhi baraita precedes the iqla an‬‬‫‪ecdote.‬‬ ‫‪44‬‬ ‫‪Rashi (s.v. berabbi) says this word, berabbi, means gedol hador, a high‬‬‫‪ly regarded rabbi.‬‬ ‫‪43‬‬

INTRODUCTION

31

ish the queen in my own palace”? 45 He [RSBG] said to him: then we will not interrupt the meal lest the students notice what we have done and decide the halakhah [like R. Judah] for generations to come. It was stated: they did not move from there until they decided the halakhah like R. Yosi. R. Judah (BA 2) said in the name of Shmuel (BA 1): the halakhah is not like R. Judah, nor like R. Yosi, but rather one spreads a cloth [over the table on which the meal-in-progress is laid out] and recites kiddush. [Stam asks:] Is that so? Did not R. Tahlifa bar Avdimi (BA 2) state in the name of Shmuel that just as one interrupts a meal to recite kiddush, so too one interrupts a meal to recite Havdalah? Don’t [the words] “to interrupt a meal” mean to remove the table [and so Shmuel is contradicting himself by suggesting in this second statement that one should remove the table and then recite kiddush, and in the first statement he is saying that there is no need to remove the table in order to recite kiddush, i.e., that one should just cover it with a cloth]? [Stam answers:] No. [By “interrupting a meal” Shmuel means to cover the table] with a cloth. Rabbah bar R. Huna (RBRH, BA 3) visited the home of the exilarch. They set down [lit., brought] a table before him. He spread a cloth [over it] and recited kiddush. A baraita also teaches thus (tanya nami hakhi): one does not bring out the [Sabbath] table until after kiddush is recited; but if one already brought out [the Sabbath table before kiddush was recited], he spreads a cloth [over it] and recites kiddush.

A reference to Esther 7:8. Here the amora is saying that favoring the view of R. Judah over his view in his presence would shame him.

45

32

THE STORIES THEY TELL ‫רש"י מסכת פסחים דף ק עמוד ב‬ ‫ וקידש‬,‫ והיו מסובין על השולחן בערב שבת‬- ‫איקלע לבי ריש גלותא‬ ‫ ופרס מפה וקידש‬,‫עליהן היום‬ Rashi: He visited the home of the exilarch – and they were [already] sitting at the table dining on the Sabbath eve, and the Sabbath entered, and he spread a cloth and recited kiddush.

‫רשב"ם מסכת פסחים דף ק עמוד ב‬ ‫ רבה בר בר חנה איקלע לבי ריש גלותא ולא היו‬:‫והכי פירושה‬ ‫אוכלין קודם חשיכה ולאחר שיצאו מבית הכנסת החשיך אייתו תכא‬ ‫לקמיה הביאו את הפת על השולחן כמו שאנו עושין קודם קידוש‬ ... ‫פרס מפה על הלחם ואח"כ קידש‬ Rashbam: This is what it [the anecdote] means: RBRH visited the home of the exilarch and they were not dining prior to sundown. But after they left the synagogue it grew dark and they brought a table before him. They brought [out] bread on the table, as we do before kiddush. And he spread the cloth over the bread and recited kiddush…

‫תוספות מסכת פסחים דף ק עמוד ב‬ .‫ בהתחלת סעודה איירי כדפי' רשב"ם‬- ‫איקלע פירס מפה וקידש‬ Tosafot: He visited, spread a cloth and recited kiddush – this refers to the beginning of the meal, as interpreted by Rashbam.

EXPLANATION

The baraita that opens the sugya talks about “interrupting” an ongoing meal if the Sabbath arrives while still dining. It is not yet clear what “interrupting” means. R. Judah says “we do interrupt” and R. Yosi says “we do not.” In the baraita’s episode, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (RSBG) decides to follow R. Yosi’s opinion and not interrupt the meal. Apparently, “to interrupt” means to remove the small table with food on it from in front of the diners, recite kiddush, and then bring back the table with the food, this time as a Sabbath meal. RSBG decided not to permit

INTRODUCTION

33

such an interruption and instead allowed the meal to continue. Kiddush could be recited afterwards. Commenting on the baraita, Shmuel says that the halakhah is not according to either one of the two tannaim. In his opinion, one does not remove the table, as holds R. Judah, and neither does one leave the table as is, as holds R. Yosi. Rather, one covers it with a cloth and recites kiddush. By implication, when one then removes the cloth, the meal on the table is for the Sabbath. The stam issues a challenge. It notes that Shmuel is cited as saying that one does interrupt a meal (mafsiqin) at the onset of the Sabbath to recite kiddush, which means he holds like R. Judah, yet he just stated that he does not agree with either R. Yosi or R. Judah. The stam resolves the apparent self-contradiction by interpreting the word “interrupt” as “covering the table with a cloth.” That is, when Shmuel said one interrupts a meal for kiddush recital, he did not mean that one removes the table, as holds R. Judah, but rather that one covers the table with a cloth, recites kiddush, and then uncovers the table. An amoraic anecdote follows. Rabbah bar R. Huna (RBRH) arrived at the home of the exilarch for the Sabbath, “they” [the household staff or his students] brought out a table, presumably with food on it, and he covered it with a cloth and recited kiddush. A baraita follows, stating that a table should not be brought out until kiddush is recited, but if it is brought out before kiddush, one covers it with a cloth and recites kiddush. At first glance the anecdote does nothing more than uphold Shmuel’s rule of covering a table with a cloth and then reciting kiddush. But the question to ask is, what were the circumstances of the meal? Did RBRH interrupt a meal that had already begun or did he arrive before it began? If the meal had not yet begun, we cannot say that he upholds Shmuel’s rule, because Shmuel was addressing a situation in which a meal was in progress when the Sabbath commenced. Rashi, however, claims that when RBRH arrived at the home of the exilarch, the meal had already begun. When the Sabbath entered, he spread a cloth over the table and recited kiddush. If these are the circumstances, then the amora is merely carrying out Shmuel’s rule, that if a meal is in session before the Sabbath and the Sabbath arrives,

34

THE STORIES THEY TELL

one covers the table with a cloth and recites kiddush. The amora, according to Rashi, is not innovating. Rashbam understands the scenario differently. He says that the meal had not yet begun when RBRH arrived. The staff then brought out a table with food on it. RBRH covered the table with a cloth, recited kiddush, uncovered the table, and partook of a Sabbath meal. If Rashbam is right, then the anecdote is teaching something new: not only if a meal was in progress before the onset of the Sabbath may one keep the table there and cover it when the Sabbath begins, recite kiddush, uncover it and continue to eat, as suggested by Shmuel. According to RBRH, even if the meal had not yet begun, and a table with food was brought out before kiddush, the diners need not ask for the table to be removed. They can just cover it, recite kiddush, uncover it and eat a Sabbath meal. Ideally, a table should not be brought out before kiddush is recited. Shmuel did not address a case in which it was brought out before kiddush, however. He only said that if a meal is in progress and the Sabbath arrives, one covers the table and recites kiddush. RBRH was confronted with a new situation—a table with Sabbath food had been brought out before the recitation of kiddush, before the meal had begun. He had to decide, on the spot, whether to send the table back or keep it and cover it. He did the latter. Tosafot agree with Rashbam, that the meal had not yet begun. And so do I, for the following reason: an anecdote, as we have seen earlier in this chapter, comes in most cases to teach something new. In this case, RBRH was likely confronted with circumstances different from those addressed by Shmuel. Even if the meal had not yet begun, and the table could more easily be removed, he claims that there is no need to do so in order to recite kiddush. One covers the table, recites kiddush, and then uncovers the table and begins the meal. He thus issues a new

INTRODUCTION

35

point. 46 This rule is likely to be the origin of the widespread practice today of covering the hallah until after kiddush is recited. 47 In sum, these four sugyot show that later amoraim made changes to the rules of earlier amoraim, or presented cases to which the rules of earlier amoraim did not apply. These anecdotes are typical of many others in this volume. As already noted, the third anecdote about meal exchange, only six words long, lacks a term common to halakhic anecdotes (see below). It also lacks amoraic dialogue. The fourth also lacks amoraic dialogue. Apparently, because of the brevity of these anecdotes, their significance has been overlooked. It is all too easy to just pass over them, and many others like them, and say that their only message is that an amora carried out a halakhah as stipulated. But as short as these anecdotes are, if examined closely, we see that they show halakhic innovation. Also note that all four anecdotes show change in the direction of leniency: more opportunities to leave the sukkah; more opportunities to collect donations; more ways to fulfill the rule of not eating one’s own food on the first day of mourning; and, finally, more opportunities not to send back an already laid out Sabbath meal.

I can only guess that what divides Rashi from Rashbam and Tosafot is their opinion regarding the innovative aspect of the anecdote. Rashi seems to think here, as he does elsewhere, that anecdotes do not innovate. They merely show that an amora’s performance complied with the earlier stated rule. Rashbam and Tosafot seem to sense that the simple, yet innovative, meaning of the anecdote is that the meal had not yet begun and even so one need not send the table back but may cover it and recite kiddush. 47 See Rashbam s.v. hakhi garsinan Rabbah bar bar Hanna. He writes that the origin of covering the hallah on the Shabbat table, as is already done in his day, originated in the context of beginning a meal before the onset of the Sabbath and then the Sabbath arrived. 46

36

THE STORIES THEY TELL

TALMUD YERUSHALMI PARALLELS

For some sugyot in this volume, there exists a parallel anecdote in the Talmud Yerushalmi. When relevant to the argument being made, I cite it either in the text or the footnotes. Comparison of the two versions of the same (or similar) anecdote, in the Bavli and Yerushalmi, also assists in clarifying the message of the anecdote.

USE OF MANUSCRIPTS

The Vilna Shas text of each of the sugyot in this volume was checked against at least one ms. For the most part, MS Munich 95 served as the basis for comparison. On occasion, other mss. also were consulted. Significant variants are recorded in the footnotes. What became evident, however, is that although variant readings did show up in the mss., not even once did a variant alter the clear point of the anecdote regarding halakhic adjustment. For details, see footnotes.

COMMENTS OF RISHONIM (MEDIEVAL COMMENTATORS)

On occasion, Rishonim other than Rashi are cited in this volume. When a Medieval commentator made a comment that supported the main thesis of this volume, I cited it. Otherwise I did not. One example can be found in the fourth sugya above, on the subject of interrupting an ongoing meal for kiddush when the Sabbath arrives.

SELECTION OF SUGYOT FOR THIS VOLUME

I have not reviewed all halakhic anecdotes in the Babylonian Talmud. They number in the hundreds, if not thousands. Rather, I began to notice that certain words and terms were common to many anecdotes. It thus became possible, via a database search, to locate all anecdotes that contained a particular phrase. The word iqla, which means “he visited,” is one of those phrases, as is hava qa’imna, which means “I was standing [before my men-

INTRODUCTION

37

tor].” Utilizing this strategy, I amassed a collection of over 300 anecdotes. 48 To convince readers that a theory is correct, especially if that theory uproots a long-held assumption, it is understandably necessary to provide wide and overwhelming evidence. Analysis of just a few examples would prove one’s point only for those examples. However, after studying hundreds of anecdotes and finding that nearly all point in the direction of halakhic modification, I was able to identify a general phenomenon. In each of this volume’s chapters I have chosen to highlight those sugyot that most clearly, interestingly, and diversely demonstrate the central thesis.

SUGGESTIONS FOR HOW TO BENEFIT FROM THIS STUDY

After reading this introductory chapter, one can continue in several ways. It is possible to review chapter after chapter, example after example. Each sugya is presented in full, in the original and in translation, and each contributes to the emerging thesis. For specialists, I recommend working one’s way through the entire volume. Please note that the most complicated examples appear towards the end of each chapter. For the non-specialist, I recommend dipping into each chapter and reading just one or two sugya analyses. If you are persuaded of my general theory, when you next come across a halakhic anecdote in your study of the Talmud, you can check to see if I have commented on it. This volume presents analyses of over eighty halakhic anecdotes.

An advantage of locating anecdotes in this way is that my selection of passages to study was not subjective. That is, I could not, however unintentionally, choose to examine only those anecdotes that nicely illustrated an already formulated hypothesis.

48

38

THE STORIES THEY TELL

OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

This study consists of six chapters, each focusing on different groups of anecdotes, plus this introduction and a short summary chapter at the end. Although there are similarities among the groups of anecdotes chosen, their differences justified devoting a chapter to each. The first three chapters include anecdotes in which amoraim talk to each other. The last three include anecdotes that merely describe actions taken by one amora or several amoraim. There are other terms that also appear with some frequency in halakhic anecdotes, such as the verb “to see,” (H.Z.Y) but they are not included in this volume. 49 Like iqla and other terms, the appearance of the verb H.Z.Y often introduces a “seeing” that leads to a “criticizing” and, ultimately a halakhic modification. At bBer 34b, a baraita describes the various forms of bowing: either with one’s face towards the ground, or on one’s knees, or full prostration. The sugya then says that R. Hiyya breih d’R. Huna (BA 5) “saw” that Abaye (BA 4) and Rava (BA 4) would “lean” to the side. Their action is clearly a deviation from the prescribed form for prostration. Traditional commentators, such as Shittah Mequbetzet, suggest that prominent rabbis should not prostrate themselves in the standard ways. However, the text does not fully lend itself to that interpretation. I am suggesting that these two amoraim, on their own, devised this alternate way of prostrating themselves, not that there already was a rule about prominent rabbis not prostrating themselves. They are the ones who went ahead and created this exception. Their rationale is not clear. .‫ חזינא להו לאביי ורבא דמצלו אצלויי‬:‫אמר רב חייא בריה דרב הונא‬ R. Hiyya breih d’R. Huna (BA 5) said: I saw Abaye and Rava leaning to the side [instead of fully prostrating themselves]. ‫רש"י מסכת ברכות דף לד עמוד ב‬ ‫ אלא מטין‬,‫ כשנופלין על פניהם אין פושטין ידיהם ורגליהם‬- ‫דמצלו אצלויי‬ .‫על צדיהן‬ That they leaned to the side – when they fell on their faces [i.e., prostrated themselves], they do not spread out their arms and legs but rather lean to the side. See the parallel version at bMeg 23a.

49

INTRODUCTION

39

IQLA ANECDOTES

Many amoraic anecdotes open with the statement that one amora visited (iqla) another. Sometimes the visit is described as at the “home” of the host, bei R. X. In the ancient world, the home was all-encompassing. People ate, slept, conducted business, and also discussed Torah there. The visiting amora can be assumed to be an overnight guest. Since travel was common in the ancient world, in Babylonia in particular, with its many rivers and ferry boats, it is not surprising that scholars dropped in on one another for a few days stay, especially over the Sabbath. It is not clear if the term iqla implies a pre-arranged visit or an unannounced arrival. In most cases, the visitor is either younger than the host or of the same generation but less prominent. That is to say, senior or prominent amoraim did not, in general, drop in for a visit on younger or less well-known amoraim. Also note that the host and guest are not usually in an ongoing master-disciple relationship. At some point during the visit, one amora observes the other engaging in halakhic behavior that conflicts with an earlier stated halakhah and criticizes him. The chastised amora will usually defend his behavior by case distinction, arguing that his specific circumstances are not covered by the earlier stated rule. In this way, as noted above, he makes a change in the earlier halakhah. In general, it is a junior amora who criticizes a senior amora. This gives the senior amora the opportunity to teach the junior amora a modified rule. When the criticism is by a senior scholar of a junior scholar, there is no rejoinder on the part of the junior amora. He accepts the criticism. The senior scholar’s retort, on occasion, innovates.

HAVA QA’IMNA/ HAVA YATIVNA ANECDOTES

Many anecdotes open with the phrase, “R. X was standing (or sitting) before R. Y.” This terminology implies that the one who stands or sits before another is junior to him. In most cases, the junior scholar is in an ongoing relationship with the senior scholar. Hava qa’imna anecdotes are like iqla anecdotes in many

40

THE STORIES THEY TELL

ways. Two amoraim engage in an exchange. It is generally the disciple who criticizes his mentor, in response to which the mentor defends his “deviant” performance of an earlier stated halakhah. Also true is that a few hava qa’imna anecdotes resolve amoraic disputes. The unique feature of these anecdotes is that they offer details of what it is like to be the student of a master. A student may eat at the master’s home on Friday night. He may be tasked by the master to perform errands such as showing up to fill out a five-man rabbinic court, dabbing his mentor’s shoes with water on the Sabbath, or bringing the mentor his hat. Students are portrayed as doting on their masters and serving at their beck and call.

“HE ENCOUNTERED HIM” (ASHKEHEIH) ANECDOTES

Yet another group of anecdotes begins by saying that R. X “encountered” or “chanced upon” R. Y. There is no implied travel in these anecdotes, as there is in iqla anecdotes. And there is no formal or semi-formal setting of one amora sitting or standing in the presence of another, as there is in hava qa’imna anecdotes. Rather, in this third group, one amora simply happens upon another, usually a disciple encountering his mentor. The anecdotes relate the ensuing exchange between the two. As in iqla and hava qa’imna anecdotes, the junior amora challenges the observed behavior of the senior amora by citing a rule mentioned earlier in the sugya. The mentor, in most cases, defends his behavior by case distinction.

MULTIPLE ANECDOTES COMMENTING ON THE SAME HALAKHAH

In general, when the Talmud presents a halakhic anecdote, it limits itself to just one. Rarely do we encounter a string of anecdotes that all modify the same halakhic statement. But there are instances when the Talmud does bring a number of anecdotes— two or more—all relating to the same, earlier stated halakhic rule. Why more than one, if one is sufficient to modify the rule?

INTRODUCTION

41

A review of sugyot with multiple halakhic anecdotes leads to the observation that the Talmud is saying, by means of these anecdotes, not only that halakhic change possible, but that there are many different ways to institute a specific change. Also noteworthy is that these anecdotes do not contain a common term. One cannot locate them by searching a data base. I found them by turning the pages of the Talmud. Each anecdote of a series presents, in very few words, the name of an amora and an action he took. In these anecdotes there is no amoraic exchange, no criticism, and no defense of “errant” behavior. But my reading will demonstrate that even without dialogue, each anecdote either innovates or resolves a dispute.

INI VEHA ANECDOTES

Halakhic anecdotes sometimes appear in a sugya immediately following the anonymous question ini veha, which means, “Is that so? Did we not learn to the contrary?” Even before one knows what an amora did, this language suggests that he contravened a stated halakhah. Here, it is not an amora who issues a challenge to a colleague, as in earlier chapters, but the stam. The stam poses the ini veha question, and then answers it. In most instances, the stam justifies the amora’s behavior, claiming that his particular circumstances allowed him to behave differently from the earlier stated rule. We will also see that ini veha sugyot can be read with or without the stam. Upon removing the stam layer, thereby isolating the amoraic layer, one can pinpoint the differences in attitudes to halakhic change of amoraim and of the stam. Whereas amoraim appear to endorse the possibility of broad halakhic change, the stam is more conservative, allowing only limited exclusions from an earlier rule.

ANECDOTES THAT FEATURE WOMEN

A small subset of halakhic anecdotes in the Bavli feature women making changes in halakhic practice. For instance, rabbis’ wives are described, when menstruants, as serving wine to their husbands in opposition to a rule of R. Huna (bKet 61a), and as hull-

42

THE STORIES THEY TELL

ing cupfuls of barley for their husbands on the Sabbath in opposition to a ruling of R. Eleazar (bBes 13b). Women also appear in the anecdotes as secondary actors: they are described as baking bread, performing a halizah ritual, showing up as a litigant in a rabbinic court, or asking for a bill of divorce. However, in none of these anecdotes do women chide an amora for behaving contrary to the rules. I am not suggesting that these anecdotes, like those in previous chapters, shed light on an as yet unexplored aspect of halakhic anecdotes. The point of presenting these sugyot in a chapter of their own is to say that they confound expectations. Before embarking on this project, I would have assumed that a woman could not, through her behavior, tweak a halakhah as can a man. The anecdotes in this category, although few in number and describing the actions of women related to rabbis, show otherwise.

CONCLUDING COMMENT

The sugyot analyzed in detail in this study challenge the longheld assumption of many students of the Talmud, namely, that anecdotes merely show how an amora performed a halakhah as stipulated. And that the anecdotes showcase pious compliance with stated rules, not modification of those rules. I believe I convincingly demonstrate throughout this volume that each anecdote teaches a new halakhic point, in many cases altering an already existing halakhah. Another general conclusion is that whereas halakhic debates among amoraim can be assumed to take place in a study location and at study sessions, halakhic anecdotes make it abundantly clear that halakhic exchange was taking place outside of formal sessions, at any and all locations, such as at meals, at prayer, or at the marketplace, and at any and all times, including Sabbaths and festivals. 50 Students paid close attention to the Many scholars speak of an amoraic mentor having a disciple circle. I do not doubt the veracity of that statement. Anecdotes, however, do not

50

INTRODUCTION

43

halakhic behavior of their mentor and then reported on it to others. A mentor’s performance became as halakhically significant as his pronouncements.

reflect a “circle” but a “twosome” or occasionally a “threesome”—a mentor and one or two students, or an amora and one or two colleagues.

CHAPTER 1.

HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT INCLUDE THE TERM “IQLA” The term iqla, which means “he visited,” 1 appears frequently in the Babylonian Talmud introducing halakhic anecdotes, painting a picture of amoraim traveling often. Babylonia’s many rivers and ferry boats afforded people the means of traversing great distances with relative ease. 2 The word iqla can mean that an amora asked to visit a colleague, was invited to visit a colleague, or, most likely, just showed up unannounced at the home of a colleague, often for a Sabbath stay of several days. 3 During that The word iqla (Q.L.’) is in the itpe’el conjugation. Were it written in full, it would be itqela (‫)איתקלע‬. The letter taf has conflated with the qof that follows. Iqla means “happened to come” (Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic, 1021), which implies that the visit was not pre-arranged. Professor David Marcus, in an e-mail communication (10.9.20), notes that iqla literally means, “he was thrown by chance.” I will routinely translate it as “he visited.” 2 Catherine Hezser, Jewish Travel in Antiquity (Mohr Siebeck 2011). See, in particular, 165ff.; 197–8; 227ff. She comments that the term for visit in the Yerushalmi is not iqla but salaq mevaqra (‫)סלק מבקרא‬. 3 Avinoam Cohen, in an article entitled ‫"למשמעותה ההיסטורית הגלומה‬ "'‫( במונח 'איקלע רב פלוני‬Sidra 15, 1998, 51–64), surveys a number of iqla anecdotes. His main findings are that these anecdotes may be used to determine hierarchical relationships among amoraim, as well as geo1

45

46

THE STORIES THEY TELL

time, the visitor and the host each observed how the other implemented halakhic rules. In most iqla anecdotes, both the visiting amora and the host commented on, and often criticized, how the other implemented halakhic rules. The criticized amora usually defends his “errant” performance—“errant” in the sense that he transgresses an earlier stated rule. He claims that he is not bound by the rule because his circumstances differ from those the rule was addressing. He thus limits the earlier stated rule to circumstances other than his own. Such a modification is generally a leniency, in that he asserts that a particular rule need not be observed by him. We don’t know if he espoused the leniency prior to the visit or if his colleague’s criticism led him to articulate the leniency on the spot. Either way, an amora modified a rule. In most cases, since no commentary follows the anecdote, it gets the last word. It is not surprising that the authors of the post-Talmudic codes decided that the halakhah is fixed according to the anecdote. 4 In most anecdotes, the criticized amora defends his action. On occasion, however, the attacked amora does not defend his position and the criticizing amora wins the day. In such a case, graphical information about them. The use of the verb iqla implies that the visitor to a town is not a regular resident of that town and hence, in general, not a regular student of the rabbi he visits. The term iqla necessarily implies, he writes, only an occasional connection (‫)אירוע מזדמן‬. He also notes that when the phrase is iqla levei, it means that the amora visited the home, not the bet midrash, of the host rabbi. Cohen suggests that there is a possibility that the home and the bet midrash are in one and the same location. However, he writes, a “learning framework” is different from a “private” framework, even if both occur in the rabbi’s home. On this last point I differ. It seems to me that halakhic discussions took place at many different times at the master’s home and in different locations (dining area, courtyard, attic). If so, there was no distinction between “learning” and “private” frameworks. 4 The authors of the codes do not acknowledge that the halakhah underwent change in the anecdote. They merely record the changed rule.

1. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT INCLUDE THE TERM “IQLA”

47

the earlier stated halakhah either remains in place or is somewhat modified by the challenger. It is worth noting here an occasional role of iqla anecdotes. They decide the halakhah in the case of a tannaitic dispute in a mishnah or baraita. If tannaim disagree about a matter and an amora later behaves according to one of the disputants, the halakhah is fixed according to the view adopted by the amora. In other words, an ongoing tannaitic dispute is resolved by an amora carrying out the law according to one of the two sides. This phenomenon is denoted “ma’aseh rav,” which means that the action of an amora, the ma’aseh, is rav, dispositive. The anecdotes chosen for inclusion in this chapter illustrate a variety of features. The first anecdote, about eating meat after cheese without washing one’s hands in between, and the second about breaking bread before others are served the accompaniments, show that a later amora may choose to interpret an earlier stated halakhah in a way not likely envisioned by the author of that halakhah. By excluding certain cases from the rule, an amora achieves freedom of action. The third anecdote moves in the opposite direction, showing that a rule giving everyone the same options when missing a court date may be later limited to men, thereby denying women the same options. In the fourth anecdote, it is not the rabbi who modifies a rule but the townspeople. The rabbi, who at first criticized the townspeople’s behavior, later accepts their interpretation. In the fifth, a Babylonian amora, when criticized by a land of Israel amora, responds in an ambiguous way, perhaps accepting the criticism or perhaps insisting his behavior was correct. In the sixth, an amora defends his decision to act on the view of the House of Hillel, even though all previous tannaim and amoraim favored the House of Shammai. Even more surprising, the stam accuses the amora of having fabricated the passage he cites in support of his own stance. The seventh anecdote resolves a dispute in the Mishnah—whether or not to add the word hamevorakh to the barkhu response. The eighth simply shows that when an amora utilized, for his own benefit, an earlier stated leniency, his colleagues shunned him, thereby abrogating the leniency. In the ninth, somewhat like the fifth, a Babylonian amora defends his

48

THE STORIES THEY TELL

liberal stance regarding producing sounds on the Sabbath from the criticism of a land of Israel amora. Note that the common feature of all these anecdotes is that each one innovates. 1.1 bHullin 104b, Washing hands after eating cheese and before eating meat

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת חולין דף קד עמוד ב‬ ,‫ העוף עולה עם הגבינה על השולחן ואינו נאכל דברי ב"ש‬.'‫מתני‬ ‫ זו מקולי ב"ש ומחומרי‬:‫ א"ר יוסי‬.‫ לא עולה ולא נאכל‬:‫וב"ה אומרים‬ ... .‫ב"ה‬ Mishnah: Fowl may be placed on the same table as cheese but not eaten together: the view of the House of Shammai. But the House of Hillel says: cheese and fowl may not be placed on the same table nor eaten together. R. Yosi said: This is a leniency of the House of Shammai and a stringency of the House of Hillel. … 5 .‫באפיקורן‬

‫ עוף וגבינה נאכלין‬:‫ תנא אגרא חמוה דרבי אבא‬... .'‫גמ‬

.‫ בלא נטילת ידים ובלא קינוח הפה‬:‫הוא תני לה והוא אמר לה‬ ‫ אייתו ליה גבינה‬,‫רב יצחק בריה דרב משרשיא איקלע לבי רב אשי‬ .‫ ולא משא ידיה‬,‫ אייתו ליה בשרא אכל‬,‫אכל‬ ‫ והא תאני אגרא חמוה דרבי אבא עוף וגבינה נאכלין‬:‫אמרי ליה‬ 6 !‫ בשר וגבינה לא‬,‫ עוף וגבינה אין‬,‫באפיקורן‬ 7 .‫חזינא‬

‫ אבל ביממא הא‬,‫ הני מילי בליליא‬:‫אמר להו‬

Gemara: … A teaching of Agra (JA 2), the father-in-law of R. Abba (JA 3): fowl and cheese may be eaten “freely.” He transmitted it and also explained it: without washing hands Jastrow 104, Without restraint. Rashi (s.v. ba’afiqoren) comments, derekh hefqer, meaning freely, that he need not be careful about them, meaning he need not wash his hands in between cheese and fowl. 6 MS Munich 95, ‫עוף אין בשר לא‬ 7 MS Munich 95, ‫קא חזינא‬ 5

1. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT INCLUDE THE TERM “IQLA”

49

and without wiping out the mouth [in between the cheese and the fowl]. R. Yizhaq breih d’R. Mesharshaya (BA 5) visited the home of R. Ashi (BA 6). They brought him cheese and he ate it. They [then] brought him meat and he ate it. He did not wash his hands [in between]. They said to him: But did not Agra, the father-in-law of R. Abba, teach that cheese and fowl may be eaten without washing hands in between, [and doesn’t this imply] cheese and fowl—yes, but cheese and meat—no! He said to them: this [requirement of handwashing] refers to nighttime [meals]; but in the daytime we can see [if any cheese remains in one’s mouth or on one’s hands] … . 8

EXPLANATION

The mishnah states that, according to the House of Hillel, cheese and fowl may not be eaten together, nor even placed at the same time on the same table. Like the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai does not permit them to be eaten together, but it does allow them to be placed at the same time on the same table. Agra (JA 2, a little known amora himself but father-in-law of a well-known amora, R. Ba) states that fowl and cheese may be eaten freely, apparently meaning that there is no need to 8

‫רש"י מסכת חולין דף קד עמוד ב‬ .‫ שאם אכל זה ובקש לאכול זה אין צריך ליטול ידיו ולקנח‬- ‫בלא קינוח הפה‬ ‫ שלא יהא נדבק כלום מן הראשון‬,‫אבל בבשר בהמה בעי קינוח כדלקמן‬ .‫בחניכיו‬ Without wiping out the mouth – that if he ate this and then wanted to eat that, he need not wash hands and wipe out [the mouth]. But with animal flesh, he needs to wipe out [the mouth], as below, so that no particle of the first food [i.e., flesh] will stick to his gums.

50

THE STORIES THEY TELL

wash one’s hands after eating fowl and before eating cheese, and no need to wipe out one’s mouth between them. An anecdote follows. When one rabbi visited another, the staff of the host served the guest cheese. He ate it. They then served him meat. He went ahead and ate it without washing his hands after the cheese and before the meat. “They,” apparently the household staff, 9 said to him: “but Agra, the father-in-law of R. Abba, taught that one need not wash after eating cheese and before eating fowl.” This means, they go on to say, that his rule holds for fowl and cheese, but not for meat and cheese. They thus imply that the visitor is remiss for not washing his hands after cheese and before meat. 10 The visitor, R. Yizhaq breih d’R Mesharshaya (BA 5), who is senior to his host, R. Ashi (BA 6), defends his omission by saying that the rule to wash hands after cheese and before meat applies only at night. As for daytime, there is no need to wash hands after cheese and before meat. He apparently is saying that in the daytime a person will be able to see if any particle of cheese is left on his hands. This amora has thus modified Agra’s rule: he has eliminated the need to wash hands after cheese and before meat in the daytime. Agra would require one to wash hands in these circumstances, having only eliminated it for fowl after cheese. There is no further commentary on this anecdote. It follows that the visitor gets the last word: his lenient extension of Agra’s rule becomes halakhah. Note that R. Ashi, the named host, plays no role in the anecdote. It stands to reason, however, that the serving staff is folThe Soncino (S) translation of the Talmud uses the word “they,” without explaining who the “they” is. Soncino translates, “He was served with cheese … with meat … . They said to him … By using the passive voice, Soncino avoids figuring out if the people who served the food are the same people who then cite Agra and criticize the guest. Commentators do not comment on the amru leih, only on the halakhic issues of meat and dairy. 10 Munich 95 has the words ‫ אמרו ליה‬written out. His answer to them just has ‫א"ל‬. It is thus not clear if he is responding to “them” or to his host, R. Ashi. 9

1. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT INCLUDE THE TERM “IQLA”

51

lowing his instructions. He has apparently taught them Agra’s rule of no need to wash hands after eating cheese and before eating fowl. The unnamed interlocutors, who infer that washing hands is necessary after eating cheese and before eating meat, are perhaps other scholars and not only R. Ashi’s household staff. It is likely that R. Ashi expected his students to perform domestic tasks in lieu of tuition. 11 There is no basis for suggesting that Agra intended his leniency regarding fowl and cheese to be understood as also applying to the daytime consumption of meat after cheese. He seemed to be saying that only for fowl following cheese is the requirement of washing hands lifted, at all times. There is no reason to think he applied his leniency to eating meat after cheese in the daytime. 12 It appears that the visiting amora, possibly for his own ease, did not bother to wash his hands after cheese and before meat. When challenged, he acknowledged that he was familiar with Agra’s rule but suggested that it applied only at night. In this way he justifies his own behavior and at the same time issues a leniency: the requirement to wash hands after eating cheese and before eating meat is limited to the nighttime. No need to wash hands if cheese and then meat are consumed in the daytime. The meal he was served, it now follows, took place during the daytime. 13 He has thus extended Agra’s elimination of See my article, “Hadavar Masur LeNashim: Nashim VeTiqsei Dat Beitiyim,” Sidra 24/25, (Bar Ilan, 2010) for anecdotes in which students prepared food for their teachers (98–100). See C. Hezser, The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement in Roman Palestine (Mohr Siebeck 1997). She writes that students are portrayed as rendering various services to their teachers. They also served as the transmitters of the teacher’s traditions. In exchange, the students received food, lodging and Torah instruction, in the broad sense (332ff.). 12 Because some rabbis view poultry as in a different category from “red meat,” the rules of separation of poultry and dairy are not as strict as those of the separation of red meat and dairy. 13 There is no further discussion of Agra’s rule. A new topic is raised. A baraita is cited and then discussed. In later centuries, Maimonides, in 11

52

THE STORIES THEY TELL

the requirement to wash hands between courses to consuming meat after cheese, but only in the daytime. Note that there is no basis in the text for saying that the meal was served in the daytime. When one reads this anecdote in conjunction with the mishnah and Agra’s rule, it is clear that the anecdote suggests that when law is carried out in real life, it may undergo change. Since Agra said nothing about cheese followed by meat, later amoraim logically deduce that his leniency does not apply to such a case. It is therefore surprising that the visitor did not wash his hands after eating cheese and before eating meat. One can explain the amora’s omission of handwashing in two ways: either he generally disagreed with Agra’s rule in this way and behaved according to his own rule, i.e., he deemed handwashing unnecessary even when eating meat after cheese (at least in the daytime), or else he accepted the need to wash hands after cheese and before meat but was lax in his behavior in this one occurrence. Either way, the end result is that he has tweaked a halakhic rule. When eating meat after cheese in the daytime, he indicates, there is no longer a requirement to wash one’s hands in between the two courses. Had the editors not included the anecdote, the halakhah would have remained as it first appeared: one needs to wash hands between cheese and meat in all circumstances. With the inclusion of the anecdote, the rule has been modified: one only needs to wash hands after eating cheese and before eating meat if served at night. There is no need to wash hands after cheese and before meat in the daytime. Note also that it is the more senior visiting amora who introduces the change. Challenged by junior amoraim and household staff, he defends his behavior by modifying Agra’s rule.

the Mishneh Torah, and Karo, in the Shulhan Arukh, accepted R. Yizhaq breih d’R. Mesharshaya’s suggestion of limiting the requirement to wash hands after cheese and before meat only to nighttime.

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53

1.2 bBerakhot 40a, Table etiquette ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת ברכות דף מ עמוד א‬ ‫ אין הבוצע רשאי לבצוע עד‬:‫אמר רבא בר שמואל משום רבי חייא‬ .‫שיביאו מלח או לפתן לפני כל אחד ואחד‬ ‫ אפיקו ליה ריפתא ובצע‬,‫רבא בר שמואל אקלע לבי ריש גלותא‬ .‫להדיא‬ ?‫ הדר מר משמעתיה‬:‫אמרו ליה‬ 14 .‫בשש‬

‫ לית דין צריך‬:‫אמר להו‬

Rava bar Shmuel (BA 3 or BA 5) said in the name of R. Hiyya (JA 1): one who breaks bread is not permitted to do so until salt or spreads are placed before all [diners]. Rava bar Shmuel visited the home of the exilarch.15 They brought him bread and he immediately broke it. They said to him: has the master reneged on his [own] rule? He answered them: No need in this case to wait [because this bread requires no condiments].

EXPLANATION

The sugya opens with a rule transmitted by Rava bar Shmuel in the name of R. Hiyya, an early prominent amora. The rule states No significant variants at MS Firenze. Could it be the exilarch himself who criticizes the visiting rabbi? There are many instances of a visitor arriving at the bei resh galuta, the home of the exilarch. But in the conversation that follows, the exilarch is not present. According to Geoffrey Herman, it was not unusual for rabbis to gather at the home of the exilarch and converse about halakhic matters, even in his absence. Herman comments that being at the home of the exilarch connotes a sense of luxury (e/m communication, November 24, 2015). It follows that questions may arise about table etiquette.

14 15

54

THE STORIES THEY TELL

that one may not break bread until all are served with salt and/or spreads. When dining at the home of the exilarch, however, this same Rava bar Shmuel does not abide by the rule he himself taught. He breaks bread as soon as he is served, not waiting for all other guests to be given salt and/or spreads. Not surprisingly, the household staff challenges him. Again it is not clear who they are but they know the rule of not breaking bread until all are served salt and/or spreads, and they also know that it is this very amora who transmitted that rule. Rava bar Shmuel’s response is a typical iqla response: “the bread you served me does not fall under the rule that I transmitted from R. Hiyya of waiting until all are served. This kind of bread needs no condiments and thus may be eaten immediately.” Alternatively, “for this bread I do not need to wait until all are served.” 16 Again, in his original formulation of the rule, R. Hiyya did not limit its application to some cases but not others. However, when Rava bar Shmuel, having himself transmitted R. Hiyya’s rule, violates it, he is forced to justify his own behavior. He seems to create, possibly on the spot but maybe earlier, an exclusion to the rule. Some breads, he claims, may be eaten without waiting for others to be served. The editor of the sugya included the anecdote in the text to show how the rule evolved over time. The anecdote implies that the rule, as formulated by R. Hiyya, did apply to all kinds of bread and how they are typically eaten. However, when the rule was implemented at a meal in the exilarch’s luxurious setting, it 16

‫רש"י מסכת ברכות דף מ עמוד א‬ ,‫ פת נקיה היא זו‬:‫ כלומר‬,(‫כח‬:‫ "בושש רכבו" )שופטים ה‬:‫ כמו‬,‫ עכוב‬- ‫בשש‬ ‫ואין צריכה לפתן‬ Boshesh – a delay. As in “his chariot is delayed” (Judges 5:28). That is to say, this is fine bread and it needs no condiments. In my opinion, it is likely that the staff caught him in a hypocritical moment, and he said what he said to defend his inappropriate behavior.

1. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT INCLUDE THE TERM “IQLA”

55

underwent revision. When the staff criticizes the amora, asking, “have you abandoned your own rule,” they are perhaps mocking him. They have learned his rule of waiting until all are served salt and/or spreads before breaking bread and are surprised to see that he behaves otherwise. We might guess that the amora is so hungry that he violates the rule of etiquette that mandates a wait, but the outcome of the exchange is that the rule has been modified; it excludes a wait time for one kind of bread. Did Rava bar Shmuel adjust the law he transmitted from R. Hiyya only when criticized, or had he formulated the revised version before the incident happened? In my opinion, the formulation of the anecdote suggests that the rule was modified on the spot. To defend himself from apt criticism, Rava bar Shmuel emended it to exclude the kind of bread he was eating. If one were to suggest that the anecdote shows that R. Hiyya, from the outset, excluded a certain kind of bread from the requirement of “waiting,” and that the anecdote does not give evidence of halakhic change, I would respond that such a claim is not the plain sense meaning of the words. R. Hiyya’s statement is broad and inclusive. 1.3 bBaba Qama 113a, Missing a court date ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת בבא קמא דף קיג עמוד א‬ ‫ עד‬,‫ האי מאן דכתיב עליה פתיחא על דלא אתי לדינא‬:‫אמר רבא‬ ... ‫דאתי לדינא לא מקרעינן ליה‬ ‫ זמנא וזמנא בתר‬,‫ קובעים זמן שני וחמישי ושני‬:‫אמר רב חסדא‬ .‫ ולמחר כתבינן‬,‫זמנא‬ ‫ חזא ההיא איתתא‬,‫[ איקלע בי רב כהנא‬17 ‫רב אסי ]צ"ל רב אשי‬ .‫ ובצפרא כתיב עלה פתיחא‬,‫דאזמנה לדינא בפניא‬ ‫ קובעין זמן שני וחמישי‬:‫ לא סבר לה מר להא דאמר רב חסדא‬:‫א"ל‬ ?‫ושני‬

17

MS Munich 95, ‫רב אשי‬

56

THE STORIES THEY TELL ‫ ה"מ גברא דאניס וליתיה במתא אבל איתתא כיון דאיתה‬:‫א"ל‬ .‫ מורדת היא‬18 ‫במתא ולא אתיא‬ Rava said (BA 4): A person against whom a petiha has been written for not showing up in court, it is not torn up until that person shows up in court … R. Hisda said (BA 3): [When we summon a person to appear in court,] we set [the appearance for] a Monday, a Thursday, and a Monday, one after the other. [If the person still does not show up], the next day we write [a petiha]. R. Ashi (BA 6) visited the home of R. Kahana (BA 5). He saw [there the case of] a woman who was asked to appear in court in the evening [and did not show up], and in the morning a petiha was written against her. He said to him: doesn’t the master hold what R. Hisda said, that one sets three court dates in succession, a Monday, [and then a] Thursday, and [then the following] Monday? He answered: that applies to men only, for they are sometimes unable to appear on the appointed date because of circumstances that keep them out of town. But a woman, since she is [always] in town, if she does not appear, she is a moredet [a rebellious woman].

EXPLANATION

A petiha is the declaration of a ban, which means social isolation for a period of time for disobeying the judges. In a discussion of court procedures, Rava says that if a petiha was written for someone who does not show up in court on the appointed date, it is not torn up until he does show up. R. Hisda (BA 3) comments that a person is given three successive court dates—a Monday, a Thursday, and a Monday. If he does not show up on 18

MS Munich 95, ‫ולא אתיא מעיקרא מורדת היא‬

1. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT INCLUDE THE TERM “IQLA”

57

any of those days, the judges issue a petiha against him. An anecdote reports that R. Ashi (BA 6) visited the home of R. Kahana (BA 5), his mentor, and saw there a woman who had been summoned to appear before R. Kahana the previous evening but did not show up. The very next morning he wrote a petiha against her. R. Ashi asks his mentor why he wrote it so soon, since, according to R. Hisda, one gives a person three chances to show up and she was given just one. R. Ashi answers that R. Hisda gives men three chances to show up because they are often on the road; women, he goes on to say, are always in town and so they are assigned only one court date. If a woman misses her court date, it indicates rebellious behavior. 19 We see here an amora, R. Kahana, who justified his behavior towards a particular woman with a claim that the rule of an earlier amora does not apply to an entire category of people, i.e., women. As in the previous cases of table etiquette and of the requirement to wash hands after cheese and before meat, here, too, it seems that the amora may have issued this limitation on the spot in response to criticism. There is no indication whatsoever in the statement of R. Hisda that he intended it to apply to men only. Such a claim would be reading into, rather than out of the words. R. Kahana, when challenged regarding his decision to issue a petiha after just one missed court date, modified the law in a way that harmed women but exonerated him. The moral voice is that of R. Ashi who feels a woman was wronged in that she was treated more harshly than the law allowed. But he is silenced by his mentor who claims that the law has reason to treat men more leniently than women. This time a senior amora has tweaked a halakhah, this time in the direction of stringency. It is worthy of note that neither Maimonides nor Karo accept this gender distinction in their codes. They both say that if someone is in town, i.e., not traveling, that person is given only one court date. If on the road, three court dates. This rule applies, therefore, to men and woman alike. See Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Sanhedrin 25:8; Karo, Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 11:1.

19

58

THE STORIES THEY TELL 1.4 bMoed Qatan 27b, Respect due a corpse ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת מועד קטן דף כז עמוד ב‬ ‫ מת בעיר כל בני העיר אסורין בעשיית‬:‫ ואמר רב יהודה אמר רב‬... .‫מלאכה‬ ‫ חזא הנך‬.‫ שמע קול שיפורא דשכבא‬,‫רב המנונא איקלע לדרומתא‬ ‫ ליהוו הנך אנשי בשמתא! לא‬:‫ אמר להו‬,‫אינשי דקא עבדי עבידתא‬ !?‫שכבא איכא במתא‬ 20 .‫במתא‬

‫ חבורתא איכא‬:‫אמרו ליה‬

.‫ אי הכי שריא לכו‬:‫אמר להו‬ … And R. Judah (BA 2) in the name of Rav (BA 1) also said: if there is a corpse in town, all townspeople are forbidden to perform labor [until the corpse is buried]. R. Himnuna (BA 2) visited [the town of] Daromata. He heard a shofar blast [announcing the presence of a corpse]. He then saw some townspeople who were performing labor and said to them: You are under a ban! Isn’t there a corpse in town [and labor is therefore forbidden]?! They said to him: there are havurot (burial groups) in town. He said to them: if so, you are permitted [to perform labor prior to burial].

EXPLANATION

The sugya opens with a statement by R. Judah in the name of Rav that when there is a not-yet-buried corpse in town no one may perform other labor until the corpse is buried; all have to prepare the corpse for burial or, at least, out of respect for the MS Vatican Ebr. 108 is not clear on their response. MS London Harley 5508, ‫ חבורתא איכא אי הכי שרי לכו‬as Rav’s response.

20

1. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT INCLUDE THE TERM “IQLA”

59

deceased, not perform labor until after the burial. Caring for the dead supersedes all other activities. An anecdote follows: When R Himnuna visited the town of Daromata, he heard a shofar blast announcing a death. He then looked around and saw that people were performing labor prior to burial. In anger, he placed them under a ban, which means complete social isolation for a period of time. They then told him that there are havurot in town. There is no further explanation of the significance of havurot, but Rashi comments that each havurah tends to, and buries, its own dead. 21 R. Himnuna then relents, saying that, if so, the townspeople are permitted to perform labor before the burial. To ensure a rapid burial and show respect for the deceased, Rav’s position was that all townspeople had to stop work until the deceased was buried. A different approach was apparently employed in Daromata. Groups of people were assigned the task of preparing a corpse for burial. Perhaps the town was divided into regions and each havurah was asked to bury the dead of its own region. By designating a particular group of individuals to care for a deceased person, others are relieved of the task and of 70 F

21

‫רש"י מסכת מועד קטן דף כז עמוד ב‬ ‫ שאלו קוברין מתים שלהם לבדם ואלו קוברין‬,‫ חבורות הן‬- ‫חבורתא איכא‬ ‫מתים שלהם לבדם‬ There are havurot (i.e., burial groups). These bury their dead by themselves and these bury their dead by themselves. The Alfasi, a contemporary of Rashi, notes: ‫רי"ף מסכת מועד קטן דף יח עמוד א‬ ,‫אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל מת בעיר כל בני העיר אסורין בעשיית מלאכה‬ ‫ואי אית ליה מאן דקאים בצרכיה שרי‬ R. Judah said that Shmuel said: if there is corpse in town, all townspeople are forbidden to perform labor. But if there is someone who will meet the needs [of the deceased for burial], [labor is] permitted. Neither Rashi nor Alfasi calls this exclusion a modification of the original rule, but that is what it is.

60

THE STORIES THEY TELL

the need to refrain from other labors prior to burial. 22 Upon hearing of this arrangement (and thus this explanation) from the people of Daromata, R. Himnuna agrees that they may work even when there is a corpse in town. The tweak, in this case, is that Rav’s rule of not performing labor prior to burial has been considerably narrowed: only the members of a particular havurah must care for the deceased; the other townspeople may continue to go about their tasks as usual. This is a rare example in which a visiting rabbi criticizes townspeople, and it is they, not he, who first tweak Rav’s rule, with their behavior and explanation, providing the visiting rabbi a basis for modifying the standing rule. There is no reason to think that Rav, when issuing his rule, was excluding havurot and allowing people in a town with “burial societies” to continue to perform labor. But the Daromata tweak is reasonable and does not contradict the sense of Rav’s rule, which is that a corpse must be properly attended to. Nevertheless, it is very unusual for a rabbi to be portrayed as aggressively enforcing a previously stated ruling and then “backing off” in response to local practice. 23 1.5 bShab 157a–b, Measuring on the Sabbath ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת שבת דף קנז עמוד א‬ ‫ ומודדין את‬,‫ ומודדין את המטלית‬... ‫ מפירין נדרים בשבת‬.‫משנה‬ ‫ ומדבריהם למדנו שפוקקין ומודדין וקושרין‬... ‫ ומעשה‬.‫המקוה‬ .‫בשבת‬ This system may be the forerunner of the Hevra Kadisha of Medieval Jewish communities, whose job it was, and still is, to prepare the deceased for burial. 23 I know of no other anecdote in which townspeople modify a rule, or in which they inform an amora of a modification they have already instituted. See the sugya at bBer 50a about adding the word “hamevorakh” to the Barkhu prayer. In this instance, the people choose the view of R. Ishmael over the view of R. Akiba. 22

1. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT INCLUDE THE TERM “IQLA”

61

Mishnah: One may cancel vows on the Sabbath … . One may measure a cloth on the Sabbath [to see if it complies with the dimensions required in purity law], and one may measure a miqvah [also to see if it complies with the dimensions required in purity law]. It once happened that … We learn from the words of the rabbis that one may stop up [a skylight], measure, and tie on the Sabbath.

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת שבת דף קנז עמוד ב‬ ".‫"ומדבריהם למדנו שפוקקין ומודדין וקושרין בשבת‬ ‫ חזייה לרבה בר רב הונא דיתיב‬.‫עולא איקלע לבי ריש גלותא‬ .‫ וקא משח ליה‬,‫באוונא דמיא‬ ?‫ דלאו מצוה מי אמור‬,‫ אימר דאמרי רבנן מדידה דמצוה‬:‫אמר ליה‬ 24 .‫אנא‬

‫ מתעסק בעלמא‬:‫אמר ליה‬

‫הדרן עלך מי שהחשיך וסליקא לה מסכת שבת‬ [Citation of mishnah:] “We learn from the words of the rabbis that one may stop up, measure, and tie on the Sabbath.” Ulla (JA 3) visited the home of the exilarch. [When there,] he saw Rabbah bar R. Huna (BA 3) sitting inside a basin of water on the Sabbath and measuring it. He said to Rabbah bar R. Huna: when the rabbis [of the Mishnah] permitted measuring [on the Sabbath, it was for the purpose of] a mitzvah. Did they [also] allow [measuring] not for the purpose of a mitzvah?! [Of course not!] He [Rabbah bar R. Huna] responded to him [Ulla]: I am merely mit’aseq [i.e., I have no intention to measure; I was not paying attention to what I was doing.] 25

No significant variants, Vatican 108. See tShabbat 9:15 for another instance of mit’aseq meaning inadvertent behavior.

24 25

62

THE STORIES THEY TELL (… end of tractate Shabbat)

EXPLANATION

This short anecdote shows yet another type of an iqla sugya. The issue is measuring on the Sabbath, which the mishnah permits. One rabbi criticizes another because it seemed to him that the other was violating a rule of the mishnah. In this case, as in two others, 26 a visitor from the land of Israel criticizes a Babylonian rabbi. Ulla, from the land of Israel, sees Rabbah bar R. Huna (RBRH) sitting in a basin of water and measuring it on the Sabbath. Although the mishnah clearly states that measuring on the Sabbath is permitted, Ulla claims that the mishnah only permits measuring for a mitzvah, such as determining if a miqvah (ritual bath) holds the required amount of water. RBRH, however, appears to be measuring a basin of water for no particular reason. Upon being criticized by Ulla, RBRH does not challenge Ulla’s stringent understanding of the mishnah but rather exculpates himself by saying he did not mean to measure, that he was doing so inadvertently. 27 He seems to accept Ulla’s stringent rule, that measuring not for the sake of a mitzvah is forbidden on the Sabbath. The point of this anecdote, at first glance, is to interpret the mishnah stringently. Without the anecdote, we would have thought that measuring is permitted on the Sabbath, as the mishnah explicitly states. But Ulla, the visitor, introduces a restriction: one may only measure on the Sabbath for the sake of a mitzvah. Other kinds of measuring are forbidden. It was not obvious that the mishnah was teaching such a rule, but Ulla brings his understanding of the mishnah to the attention of the Babylonian rabbis.

See bShab 147a and bEruv 104a. Inadvertent violation of the Sabbath, and ensuing liability for punishment, is the subject of a dispute between Rava and Abaye at bShab 72bff. See also bKeritut 19b.

26 27

1. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT INCLUDE THE TERM “IQLA”

63

This is a rare case in which an amora, RBRH, defends his own action, but also appears to accept the criticism of his fellow amora and his stringent interpretation of one rule of the mishnah. Much more often, when an amora defends his own action, he introduces a leniency, i.e., an exception to a rule stated earlier in the sugya. In light of these observations, another possible interpretation of the anecdote presents itself. It is likely that RBRH allowed himself to measure on the Sabbath simply because the mishnah permitted such activity. Only in response to criticism by a visitor from the land of Israel does he appear to agree that non-mitzvah measuring is prohibited and that he, himself, was not intentionally measuring. 28 Rather than challenge the visitor’s interpretation of the mishnah when sitting in a bathtub, RBRH utters a somewhat opaque statement that placates the visitor but is probably not to be understood as conceding the stringency. RBRH’s statement that he was measuring without intending to measure, whatever that may mean, is an attempt to defuse the tension. He is not necessarily endorsing Ulla’s interpretation of the mishnah but rather saying that even in Ulla’s eyes, let alone his own, he is not violating the Sabbath. Note that the anecdote closes this very long tractate. There is no discussion of the incident here or anywhere else. The message of the editors who chose to include it is not obvious. Are they suggesting that Ulla’s narrow, more stringent understanding of this Sabbath law trumps the local, Babylonian approach? Or are they saying that the Bavli rabbi is in the moment justifying his behavior in the eyes of his visitor but not accepting his stringent mishnah interpretation? I lean towards the latter. The editors’ message in including this anecdote, it seems to me, is In the two other instances of Ulla visiting Babylonia and chiding the Babylonian rabbis for their lenient Sabbath behavior—they allow knocking on the door and shaking out a tallit (an outer garment)—the Babylonian rabbis do not succumb to Ulla’s stringencies. In the tallit anecdote, they even intentionally flout his rule to his face. See below.

28

64

THE STORIES THEY TELL

that, despite criticism, Babylonian rabbis should adhere to their own vision of the law. It is hard to imagine that the closing passage of a long, important tractate in the Babylonian Talmud would imply that land of Israel stringencies supersede Babylonian leniencies. 29 1.6 bBerakhot 43b, Order of blessings at a meal ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת ברכות דף מג עמוד ב‬ ‫ מברך על‬:‫ בית שמאי אומרים‬,‫ הביאו לפניו שמן והדס‬:‫תנו רבנן‬ ‫ מברך על‬:‫השמן ואחר כך מברך על ההדס; ובית הלל אומרים‬ .‫ אני אכריע‬:‫ אמר רבן גמליאל‬.‫ההדס ואחר כך מברך על השמן‬ .‫ לריחו זכינו לסיכתו לא זכינו‬,‫ הדס‬,‫ זכינו לריחו וזכינו לסיכתו‬,‫שמן‬ .‫ הלכה כדברי המכריע‬:‫אמר רבי יוחנן‬ ‫ אייתו לקמייהו שמן‬,‫רב פפא איקלע לבי רב הונא בריה דרב איקא‬ .‫ שקל רב פפא בריך אהדס ברישא והדר בריך אשמן‬,‫והדס‬ ?‫ לא סבר לה מר הלכה כדברי המכריע‬:‫אמר ליה‬ .‫ הלכה כבית הלל‬:‫ הכי אמר רבא‬,‫אמר ליה‬ 30

.‫ לאשתמוטי נפשיה הוא דעבד‬,‫ולא היא‬

A baraita: they set down before him oil and myrtle: the House of Shammai says that he first recites a blessing on the oil and then on the myrtle; but the House of Hillel says that he first recites a blessing on the myrtle and then on the oil. Rabban Gamliel said: I will decide. 31 As for oil, we benefit from its pleasing odor and its ability to anoint; as for myrtle, we benefit from its pleasing odor but not from its ability to anoint.

See Joshua Schwartz, “Tension Between Palestinian Scholars and Babylonian Olim in Amoraic Palestine,” Journal for the Study of Judaism 11, (1980, 78–84). 30 MS Paris 671 ‫לשמוטי נפשיה הוא דעבד‬ 31 Literally, ‫ להכריע‬means to tip the scale. 29

1. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT INCLUDE THE TERM “IQLA”

65

R. Yohanan (JA 3) said: the halakhah is according to the “decider.” R. Pappa (BA 5) visited the home of R. Huna breih d’R. Iqqa (BA 4). They set down before him oil and myrtle. He took the myrtle and recited a blessing on it and afterwards recited a blessing on the oil. R. Huna breih d’R. Iqqa said to him: doesn’t the master hold that the halakhah is like the “decider”? He [R. Pappa] responded: thus said Rava, the halakhah is like the House of Hillel. [Stam comments:] Not so. R. Pappa said this [i.e., that the halakhah is like the House of Hillel] to excuse himself.

EXPLANATION

The Houses of Hillel and Shammai disagree about the order of blessings at the end of a meal. According to the House of Shammai, if both oil and myrtle are brought out at the same time—oil for cleaning one’s hands and myrtle for its pleasing odor—one first recites a blessing on the oil and only afterwards on the myrtle. But according to the House of Hillel, one first recites a blessing on the myrtle and only afterwards on the oil. Rabban Gamliel decides the matter based on the differing uses of oil and myrtle. He says that one first recites a blessing on oil, for one benefits from both its pleasing odor 32 and its ability to anoint, and then recites a blessing on the myrtle, for one benefits only from its pleasing odor. The item that provides more benefits takes priority. R. Yohanan (JA 2) fixes the halakhah according to Rabban Gamliel, which means oil first and then myrtle. An anecdote Rashi, s.v. shemen vehadas. The reference to the pleasing odor of oil is not clear. Medieval commentators suggest that oil was sometimes infused with flowers. The expression they use is shemen areiv, which means “fragrant oil.”

32

66

THE STORIES THEY TELL

reports that R. Pappa (BA 5) visited the home of R. Huna breih d’R. Iqqa (BA 4) and recited a blessing first on myrtle and only then on oil. The host asked him if he doesn’t hold, like R. Yohanan (JA 2), that the halakhah is according to the “decider,” i.e., Rabban Gamliel, who ruled like the House of Shammai, which means one should first recite a blessing on oil and only then on myrtle. 33 R. Pappa responds that Rava (BA 4) decided the halakhah like the House of Hillel, which means first a blessing on myrtle and then on oil. R. Pappa’s comment is problematic. Nowhere in the Talmud is there a statement that Rava decided the halakhah in this circumstance like the House of Hillel. Such a statement, if it existed, would in fact likely appear right here in this sugya. It does not. Moreover, it is hard to imagine that Rava would fix the halakhah against the determination of both Rabban Gamliel, a tanna, and R. Yohanan, an earlier amora from the land of Israel. Instead of admitting that he made a mistake in his order of blessings, R. Pappa, it seems, attributed a statement to Rava that he never made. The stam goes on to say exactly that: “Rava did not issue such a statement, and further, R. Pappa [claimed that Rava said so] to excuse his own behavior.” 34 This appears to be one of sevIt is unusual for a more senior rabbi to criticize a more junior rabbi with the expression, lo savar lah mar (doesn’t the master hold?). In this case, the more junior rabbi is more prominent than the senior rabbi. See my article, “An Analysis of Sugyot Containing the Phrase Lo Savar Lah Mar in the Babylonian Talmud,” in Strength to Strength, Essays in Honor of Shaye J. D. Cohen (Brown Judaic Studies 2018) 455-471. 34 ‫רש"י מסכת ברכות דף מג עמוד ב‬ ‫ לא אמר רבא הלכתא כבית הלל אלא רב פפא אכסיף לפי שטעה‬- ‫ולא היא‬ 33

‫והשמיט עצמו בכך‬

Rashi, s.v. velo hee – Rava did not say that the halakhah is like the House of Hillel. Rather, R. Pappa felt ashamed because he erred and so he extricated himself in this manner [claiming that he was following Rava who said the halakhah was like the House of Hillel].

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eral cases in which an amora, when put on the spot by a colleague, either fabricates a statement or interprets an earlier halakhah in a way it was never intended to be understood, in order to defend his own lapse in halakhic behavior. 35 It is likely that R. Pappa was trying to fix this particular halakhah like the House of Hillel, according to whom one generally determines the halakhah. But the stam does not let him do so. Note that in the end there is no tweak here by an amora. The role of the anecdote is not to reshape any halakhic rule, but to give voice to an objection to deciding the halakhah like the House of Shammai. Since it is rare for Rabban Gamliel and also R. Yohanan to side with the House of Shammai, 36 the anecdote raises the possibility that, despite those rabbinic opinions, the halakhah should be decided like the House of Hillel. The anecdote does not prevail, however. It is the stam that resolves the matter in favor of the House of Shammai by discrediting the amora who behaved according to the House of Hillel and his claim to knowing a ruling by Rava that supports his behavior. If we ignore the stam and look only at the amoraic layer of the sugya (as we will do in the chapter entitled ini veha) the point of the anecdote, as noted, is to change the halakhah from oil first and then myrtle, as suggested by the House of Shammai, to myrtle first and then oil, as suggested by the House of Hillel. It is not out of the ordinary for a later amora to decide a halakhah differently from earlier amoraim. If so, in the amoraic period, the goal of the anecdote was to determine the halakhah like the House of Hillel, against Rabban Gamliel and R. Yohanan. With the addition of the stam, the role of the anecdote changes. It now de facto argues in favor of the House of Sham-

This is the only case I know of in which the stam says one should disregard the view of the defending amora. 35 See also bSuk 19b and bYev 106b. 36 See mBes 2:6. In three instances Rabban Gamliel II adopted the stringency of the House of Shammai.

68

THE STORIES THEY TELL

mai, as suggested by Rabban Gamliel, and against the House of Hillel. R. Pappa’s attempt to decide the halakhah like the House of Hillel is defeated. While it is unusual for the stam to criticize an amora, in this instance R. Pappa, that is what the stam seems to be doing here. 1.7 bBerakhot 50a, Standardizing liturgy ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת ברכות דף מט עמוד ב‬ ‫ מה מצינו בבית הכנסת אחד מרובים‬:‫אמר רבי עקיבא‬... :‫משנה‬ '‫ ברכו את ה‬:‫ רבי ישמעאל אומר‬.'‫ואחד מועטים אומר ברכו את ה‬ .‫המבורך‬ Mishnah: … R. Akiba said, whether there are many or few in a synagogue, he [i.e., the prayer leader] says “Barkhu et Hashem” (Bless the Name). R. Ishmael says, “Barkhu et Hashem hamevorakh” (Bless the blessed Name).

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת ברכות דף נ עמוד א‬ ".‫"רבי ישמעאל אומר‬ ‫ קם קרא בספרא‬,‫רפרם בר פפא איקלע לבי כנישתא דאבי גיבר‬ .‫ המבורך‬37 ‫ ברכו את ה' ואשתיק ולא אמר‬:‫ואמר‬ 38 (!‫המבורך‬

‫נהוג‬

40 ‫הא‬

‫ ועוד‬,‫למה לך‬

39 ‫פלוגתא‬

'‫ )ברכו את ה‬:‫אוושו כולי עלמא‬ ‫ בהדי‬,‫ פתיא אוכמא‬:‫אמר רבא‬ .‫עלמא כרבי ישמעאל‬

[Citation of mishnah:] “R. Ishmael says.” Rafram bar Pappa (BA 5, student of Rava) visited a synagogue in Abu Giber, arose and read [from the Torah MS Paris 671 '‫ולא אמ' עליה כולי עלמ‬, apparently the copyist omitted several words. 38 MS Firenze II.1.7, ‫חסר‬ 39 MS Paris 671 ‫דסבי‬ 40 MS Firenze II.1.7, ‫האידנא‬ 37

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69

scroll] and said “Barkhu et Hashem” and grew silent and did not say “hamevorakh.” Everyone called out noisily, “Barkhu et Hashem hamevorakh.” Rava (BA 4) said: [You] black jug, why [insert yourself] into this dispute?! Moreover, the people have already adopted the view of R. Ishmael. 41

EXPLANATION

The mishnah discusses the call to prayer. According to R. Akiba, whether a synagogue has few or many in attendance, the call to prayer does not vary. It is always “Barkhu et Hashem.” R. Ishmael, in disagreement, adds the word “hamevorakh.” The sugya on this rule of the mishnah is short, composed of an anecdote and nothing more. Rafram bar Pappa, a student of Rava, visited a synagogue in Abu Giber, arose to read from a Torah scroll, and said “Barkhu et Hashem” and nothing more. He did not continue with “hamevorakh.” The people who were present grumbled noisily and called out, “Barkhu et Hashem hamevorakh.” Rava, a prominent contemporary of Rafram bar Pappa, who appears to also have been at the synagogue at that time, insults Rafram bar Pappa, calling him a black jug, and criticizing him for inserting himself into a dispute by using R. Akiba’s formulation. But the people had already resolved the liturgical dispute in favor of R. Ishmael. The anecdote is composed of three parts: the action of the visitor who omitted a word, the congregation’s reaction, and the harsh criticism by a senior sage of a junior sage. The junior sage does not defend his action, which was to adopt the view of R. 41

‫רש"י מסכת ברכות דף נ עמוד א‬ ‫ שאף רבי עקיבא‬,‫ טוב לך לאחוז דברי רבי ישמעאל‬- ‫בהדי פלוגתא למה לך‬ ‫ אלא שאין צריך‬,‫מודה דכי אמר המבורך טפי עדיף‬ Rashi: Regarding this dispute, why [should] you [insert yourself] – better for you to take hold of the opinion of R. Ishmael, for even R. Akiva concedes that adding [the word] “hamevorakh” is preferable even though not necessary.

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THE STORIES THEY TELL

Akiba, as stated in the mishnah. This iqla anecdote functions in a way we have not seen so far: it decides the halakhah in the case of a dispute. According to Rava, it is the people, not he, who have made the decision to accept the view of R. Ishmael. And it is the people who rebelled upon hearing Rafram bar Pappa stop after Hashem, and who yelled out “hamevorakh.” There is no tweaking of halakhah here. The role of the anecdote is to fix the halakhah like R. Ishmael. When a senior sage criticizes a junior sage, in this case his own student, the action of the junior sage is no longer a viable option. A different version of the anecdote appears in the Yerushalmi in association with the same mishnah: Talmud Yerushalmi, Berakhot 7:3, 11c ‫ יא ג‬,‫ג‬:‫תלמוד ירושלמי ברכות ז‬ '‫א"ר עקיבה וכו‬ .‫ר' חייא בר אשי קם מיקרי באורייתא ואמר ברכו ולא אמר המבורך‬ .‫בעון מישתקוניה‬ .‫ דנהיג כר' עקיבה‬.‫אמר להון רב ארפוניה‬ ‫רבי זעירא קם מקרי כהן במקום לוי ובירך לפניה ולאחריה ובעון‬ .‫מישתקוניה‬ .‫אמר לון ר' חייא בר אשי ארפוניה דכן אינון נהיגון גבייהו‬ [Citation of mishnah:] “R. Akiba said…” R. Hiyya bar Ashi (BA 2, student of Rav [BA 1]) arose to read from the Torah and said Barkhu but did not say Hamevorakh. They wanted to silence him [i.e., stop him from reading the Torah]. But Rav said to them, let him be. He follows the view of R. Akiba. R. Zera (BA/JA 3) arose to read as a Kohen in place of a Levite [i.e., the second aliyah], and recited a blessing before and after [he read; it was the custom to recite a blessing be-

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71

fore the first aliyah and after the last but not before or after the Levite aliyah] and they wanted to silence him. R. Hiyya bar Ashi said to them: let him be. Thus is their practice [regarding these blessings]. 42

EXPLANATION

In both cases in the Yerushalmi, a senior rabbi tries to quash the people’s criticism of a junior rabbi; here, the senior rabbi tolerated divergent views of halakhic practice, whereas the people did not. In the first case, when the person called to read from the Torah did not say “hamevorakh” upon reciting the Barkhu, the people wanted to silence him and not let him read from the Torah. Rav, the senior rabbi, told those present to leave R. Hiyya bar Ashi alone because he was following the opinion of R. Akiba, who does not add the word “hamevorakh” to the Barkhu. Rav tolerated this view in the synagogue in which he prayed. The people, it is clear, had already decided to follow the view of R. Ishmael, but Rav here sees either view as acceptable. This Yerushalmi anecdote is a report of what took place in Babylonia, not in the land of Israel. It is an alternate version of 42

A commentator on the Yerushalmi, Pnei Moshe, says: ‫פני משה מסכת ברכות פרק ז הלכה ג‬ ‫ הניחו אותו דכר"ע הוא נהיג‬.‫ארפוניה‬ Arpuneih – Leave him alone, for he follows the practice of R. Akiva. ‫ עוד פעם אחרת כשקרא במקום לוי והיו רוצים‬.‫ובירך לפניה ולאחריה‬ ‫להשתיקו לפי שכבר בירך בתחלה כשקרא כהן ואמר להן ר' חייא בר אשי‬ .‫הניחו אותו שכך הן נוהגין בבבל‬ And he recited a blessing before [the aliyah] and after it – On another occasion, when he read [from the Torah as a Kohen] in the place of a Levite and they wanted to silence him because he already recited blessings when he read the Kohen’s [first] aliyah, R. Hiyya bar Ashi said to them, leave him alone for this is the Babylonian practice [to recite blessings before and after each aliyah].

72

THE STORIES THEY TELL

the anecdote presented in the Bavli. The rabbis in the first Yerushalmi anecdote are first and second generation Babylonian amoraim. Rav, the senior rabbi, does not criticize his student, R. Hiyya bar Ashi, for omitting “hamevorakh” as does Rava in the Bavli version, but rather protects his student from the disgruntled congregation by saying that R. Hiyya bar Ashi is within his rights to accept the other view in the mishnah, that of R. Akiba. The second Yerushalmi anecdote shows that the very same rabbi who was defended by his mentor does exactly that for his own student. When R. Zera, a Babylonian amora who moved to the land of Israel, recites a blessing before and after the second/middle aliyah of three (for which no blessings are called for), and the people are upset, R. Hiyya bar Ashi calms them down by saying that R. Zera is simply following the custom of his own hometown (“thus is their practice”), and they should leave him alone. It appears that the Bavli, when reporting on its own episode, provides a far harsher version of the Torah-reading incident. To follow a minority opinion seems to have been a greater infraction in Babylonia than in the land of Israel. In the Bavli, the senior rabbi goes so far as to publicly insult the student who adopted the view of R. Akiba. In the Yerushalmi, the senior rabbi asks those assembled to tolerate divergent practice. In an apparent attempt to standardize liturgy, the Bavli discourages deviation from what has become local practice. Like several other anecdotes in this and following chapters, the role of the anecdote is not to tweak but to decide halakhah. 1.8 bMoed Qatan 12a, Non-Jews working for Jews on the Sabbath and festivals

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת מועד קטן דף יב עמוד א‬ ‫ חוץ לתחום‬,‫ בתוך התחום אסור‬,‫ מקבלי קיבולת‬:‫ אמר שמואל‬... .‫מותר‬ ‫ ואפילו חוץ לתחום לא אמרן אלא דליכא מתא‬:‫אמר רב פפא‬ .‫ אבל איכא מתא דמקרבא להתם אסור‬,‫דמקרבא להתם‬

1. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT INCLUDE THE TERM “IQLA”

73

‫ לא אמרן‬,‫ וכי ליכא מתא דמקרבא להתם נמי‬:‫אמר רב משרשיא‬ ‫ אבל‬.‫ דלא שכיחי אינשי דאזלי להתם‬,‫אלא בשבתות ובימים טובים‬ .‫ דשכיחי אינשי דאזלי ואתו להתם אסור‬,‫בחולו של מועד‬ ‫מר זוטרא בריה דרב נחמן בנו ליה אפדנא מקבלי קיבולת חוץ‬ .‫ ורב הונא בר חיננא ולא עלו לגביה‬43 ‫ איקלע רב ספרא‬.‫לתחום‬ .‫ הוא נמי לא על בגוויה‬:‫ואיכא דאמרי‬ ‫ חוץ לתחום‬,‫ בתוך התחום אסור‬,‫ מקבלי קיבולת‬:‫והאמר שמואל‬ !‫מותר‬ .‫אדם חשוב שאני‬ .‫ סיועי סייע בתיבנא בהדייהו‬:‫ואיכא דאמרי‬ … Shmuel (BA 1) said: [Non-Jews] who accept contract work within the Sabbath boundary, may not [perform that work on festival days and Sabbaths]. [If they accept contract work] outside the Sabbath boundary, they may [perform such work on festival days and Sabbaths]. R. Pappa (BA 5) said: Even [if they accept it] outside the Sabbath boundary [they may engage in work on festival days and Sabbaths] only if there is no town nearby. But if there is a town nearby, it is forbidden. R. Mesharshaya (BA 5, a student of Abaye) said: When there is no town nearby, also. [That is,] we only [allow work by non-Jews for Jews] on Sabbaths and festivals because few people will pass by [since there is no town nearby]. But on intermediary days of a festival [even without a town nearby], many people will pass by, and it is [therefore] forbidden. [It happened that some non-Jewish] contractors built a mansion [on a Sabbath or festival] for Mar Zutra breih d’R. Nahman (BA 4) outside the Sabbath boundary. R. Safra and R. Huna bar Hinena (both BA 4) visited [him]

43

MS BSB Cod. Hebr. 95 ‫איקלעו רבה ורב יוסף ורב הונא בר חיננא ולא עייל לגויה‬

74

THE STORIES THEY TELL but did not enter into it. Some say that Mar Zutra himself did not enter. [Stam asks:] But did not Shmuel say that contract work by non-Jews is forbidden within the Sabbath boundary but permitted, on the Sabbath and festivals, outside the Sabbath boundary [and so why did the rabbis not enter his new home]?! [Stam answers:] A prominent man is different. Another version: he [the assistant to Mar Zutra] assisted them [the non-Jewish workers] with straw [and that was not allowed].

EXPLANATION

This sugya addresses the question, may a non-Jew perform work for a Jew on a Sabbath or festival that a Jew is not allowed to perform for himself? According to Shmuel, a non-Jew may perform such work for a Jew, so long as he does so outside the Sabbath boundary, where people are not likely to see what is happening. A Sabbath boundary is a ring around a town 2000 cubits wide. On the Sabbath, one may walk to the edge of the boundary but no further. Two late amoraim qualify Shmuel’s statement: R. Pappa says that even outside the Sabbath boundary work may not be performed by non-Jews for a Jew on a Sabbath or festival if there is a town nearby. Only if there is no town nearby, may work be performed on the Sabbath by non-Jews for a Jew. R. Mesharshaya says that even if there is no town nearby, work may not be performed by a non-Jew for a Jew on the intermediate days of a festival, because on those days many people pass by, even outside the Sabbath boundary and even without a town nearby. The underlying principle seems to be that it doesn’t look right to have non-Jews constructing a home for a Jew on the Sabbath and festivals. Following these two limitations, authored by fifth generation Bavli amoraim, an iqla anecdote appears featuring several fourth generation amoraim. Mar Zutra breih d’R. Nahman had a

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75

mansion built for him by non-Jewish contractors outside the Sabbath boundary. Presumably they engaged in building it on Sabbaths and festivals, days on which, according to Shmuel (BA 1), such work is permitted (otherwise the anecdote would not be relevant to include here). But two visitors, R. Safra and R. Huna bar Hinena, refuse to enter into the mansion, thereby implying criticism of Mar Zutra for allowing non-Jews to build it for him on Sabbaths and festivals. Mar Zutra does not defend himself. The anonymous voice, the stam, asks why the two amoraim did not enter, since Shmuel said that labor may be performed for a Jew by non-Jews on a Sabbath (or festival) outside the boundary. The stam answers its own question, saying that a prominent man is an exception to the rule that labor may be performed, meaning that he should avoid even the appearance of impropriety. That is, a rabbi should not have work done for him on Sabbaths and festivals, even if it is allowed. The expression, “a prominent man is an exception to the rule,” is usually employed in the opposite direction, to justify forbidden behavior by an amora by asserting that he is allowed to do what others may not. 44 In this case, it is used to argue that, although he behaved exactly according to the rule, as a rabbi he should not have taken advantage of a leniency. A second possible explanation for the refusal to enter is that Mar Zutra himself, or his staff, assisted the non-Jewish workers. If we compare this anecdote to a typical iqla anecdote, we will see similarities and differences. The sugya begins with a statement of halakhah. It then relates that two rabbis visited a third rabbi. Their criticism, or snubbing, of the local rabbi did not take the form of words but action. The local rabbi apparently wants to show his visitors his new mansion but they refuse to step foot in it. That is the entire anecdote. By their refusal, they

44

See bMeg 22b; bMQ 12b; bAvodah Zarah 28a.

76

THE STORIES THEY TELL

are broadcasting loud and clear that they disapprove of his halakhic behavior, even if it is technically allowed. 45 Shmuel (BA 1) issued a major leniency by permitting a Jew to have a non-Jew do for him on the Sabbath what he may not do for himself. But since the amoraim in the anecdote (BA 4) lived a generation earlier than the amoraim (BA 5) who limit Shmuel’s leniency to fewer and fewer cases, it is possible that these later amoraim articulated their stringency in response to the anecdote, and not vice versa. That is, the two amoraim who refused to enter the new home initiated the tendency towards stringency. The fifth generation amoraim, it seems, took their cue from the fourth generation amoraim and further narrowed the circumstances in which non-Jews may perform work for Jews on Sabbaths and festivals. In short, this is not a case in which an amora liberalized Jewish practice, as did amoraim in most previous sugyot. On the contrary, Mar Zutra seems to be following Shmuel’s dictum meticulously, but his colleagues suggest that that is not enough. They tweak the law in the direction of stringency. That is, if we disregard the stam, the two amoraic visitors are showing by their action that they are modifying Shmuel’s lenient rule. He allowed such work to be done on the Sabbath and festivals by non-Jews for Jews, provided it takes place outside the Sabbath boundary. In line with Shmuel’s dictum, Mar Zutra allowed his construction workers to build his mansion on Sabbaths and festivals outside the Sabbath limits. But the two visitors don’t approve of his behavior. They won’t

A baraita appears a little later in the sugya stating that one may enter into an agreement with a contractor on the intermediary days of the holiday for work to be done after the holiday but not for work to be done on the intermediary days themselves. According to Rashi, that is the underlying issue of both Shmuel’s halakhic statement and the iqla anecdote. It seems to me, however, that Rashi is reading into the text. Shmuel is not addressing the permissibility of entering into agreements on a festival but commenting on the location where work will be performed on the Sabbath or holidays.

45

1. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT INCLUDE THE TERM “IQLA”

77

enter the new home. They are thus changing Shmuel’s rule in a stringent direction. 46 That is, if we disregard the stam, the two amoraic visitors are showing by their action that they are modifying Shmuel’s lenient rule. He allowed such work to be done on the Sabbath and festivals by non-Jews for Jews, provided it takes place outside the Sabbath boundary. In line with Shmuel’s dictum, Mar Zutra allowed his construction workers to build his mansion on Sabbaths and festivals outside the Sabbath limits. For reasons that are not clear, the two visitors don’t approve of his behavior. They won’t enter the new home. They are changing Shmuel’s rule in a stringent direction. If we now look only at the amoraic passages in the sugya, we see that the visitors’ stringency applies not just to scholars but to all Jews. The stam, however, claims that the stringency is limited to scholars, that they alone must behave in a supererogatory manner. The stam issues such a statement, I speculate, because the behavior of the two visitors is at odds with Shmuel’s leniency. To defend Shmuel, the stam refers his leniency to ordinary people. For scholars, the leniency no longer applies. There are thus two ways to read this sugya. On the surface, the sugya is saying that non-Jews may perform work for Jews outside the Sabbath limits on Sabbaths and festivals. But the two visitors narrow the rule and deny that permission to scholars. A better way to read the sugya is that Shmuel issued a leniency for all Jews but the two visitors later changed his rule. According to them, no Jew, neither ordinary persons nor rabbis, may allow non-Jews to perform work for them on Sabbaths and festivals outside the Sabbath boundary. Why did these two fourth generation rabbis impose a stringency on all Jews? Perhaps allowing work to be performed by nonJews on the Sabbath, even outside the Sabbath boundary, work that a Jew may not perform for himself, seems hypocritical. The stam later limited the stringency as applying to rabbis alone. Other Jews, i.e., nonrabbis, may permit non-Jews to perform work for them on Sabbaths and holidays outside the Sabbath boundary, as stated by Shmuel. In this case, unlike the others in the ini veha chapter, the stam changes a lenient rule for all into a lenient for most people but a stringent rule for rabbis. The stam, it seems, took its cue from the two amoraim who refused to enter Mar Zutra’s new mansion.

46

78

THE STORIES THEY TELL 1.9 bEruvin 104a, Producing sounds on the Sabbath ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף קד עמוד א‬ ".‫"ממלאין מבור הגולה‬ .‫ אתא ההוא גברא טרף אבבא‬,‫עולא איקלע לבי רב מנשה‬ .‫ ליה לשבתא‬47 ‫ מאן האי? ליתחל גופיה דקא מחיל‬:‫אמר‬ .‫ לא אסרו אלא קול של שיר‬:48 ‫אמר ליה רבה‬ ... ‫איתיביה אביי‬ [Citation of mishnah:] “One draws [water on the Sabbath by means of a wheel] from the Cistern of the Exiles.” Ulla (JA 3) visited the home of R. Menashe (BA 3) [on a Sabbath]. A man came and knocked on the door. Ulla said: Who is this [who knocks on a door on the Sabbath]? Let his body be desecrated because he has desecrated the Sabbath! Rabbah (BA 3) said to him: the rabbis have only prohibited musical sounds [on the Sabbath and not the sounds made by knocking on a door]. Abaye (BA 4) challenged him [from a tannaitic source] …

EXPLANATION

The penultimate mishnah in Eruvin talks about drawing water on the Sabbath by means of a wheel, from a cistern called Bor Hagolah. It is presumed that, in the time of the Temple, when water was drawn from that cistern, the wheels made noise as they turned. Even so, according to the mishnah (mEruvin BSB Cod. Hebr. 95 ‫מתחיל‬ MS BSB Cod. Hebr. 95 ‫ רבא‬Rabbah seems more correct than Rava because Abaye almost never refutes Rava. Furthermore, the term ‫ איתיביה‬appears just twice in connection with Abaye refuting Rava but many, many times in connection with Abaye refuting Rabbah. 47 48

1. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT INCLUDE THE TERM “IQLA”

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10:14), drawing water from Bor Hagolah was permitted on the Sabbath. The sugya addresses the general topic of producing sounds, i.e., making noise, on the Sabbath, and in that way comments on the mishnah. An anecdote relates that when Ulla (BA/JA 3) was visiting the home of R. Menashe (BA 3/4) on the Sabbath, a man came and knocked on the door. Ulla asked who he was, but without waiting for an answer cursed him for desecrating the Sabbath. It is clear that, in Ulla’s opinion, knocking on a door on the Sabbath is forbidden. He is from the land of Israel and, according to the Yerushalmi, as we will see below, such an action was forbidden. Rabbah (BA 3), upon hearing Ulla’s curse, explained the Babylonian practice to him: the only noise one is forbidden to make on the Sabbath is playing a musical instrument. Making noise when knocking on a door is permitted. Note that here the visiting amora criticizes an act his host tolerates, even though it is not an act the host himself performed. Rabbah’s defense of the Babylonian permission to knock on a door on the Sabbath is accomplished by limiting the ban on making noise on the Sabbath to musical instruments alone. 49 All other sound production is permitted. This is a relaxing of the rule of not producing sounds on the Sabbath, as we will see from the Yerushalmi’s discussion. The sugya continues, after the part quoted above, with Abaye challenging Rabbah, probably at a later time, and citing several sources, each of which seems to show that a person is forbidden to make any noise, or produce any (non-vocal) sound, on the Sabbath. Each passage Abaye cites is neutralized, preRabbah does not explain why playing a musical instrument is forbidden. Elsewhere (mBes 5:3; bBes 36b), when the mishnah says that one may not clap hands, or slap thighs, or jump in dance on the Sabbath, the stam comments, “lest he come to fix a musical instrument” (‫שמא‬ ‫)יתקן כלי שיר‬. In other words, it is not the production of a musical sound that is problematic, but rather the possibility that if, for instance, a string breaks, one will attempt to fix it on the Sabbath, and fixing is forbidden. 49

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sumably by Rabbah. Note that this is a rare case in which amoraim comment on a halakhic anecdote. The penultimate source Abaye cites is a statement by Rav that women may not play with nuts on the Sabbath. And the reason, he asserts, is that playing with nuts makes noise and Rav’s ban suggests that it is forbidden to produce sounds on the Sabbath. Rabbah responds that it is forbidden for women to play with nuts for fear they will “level the floor,” which means “to even out the depressions,” an act forbidden on the Sabbath in that it is similar to threshing. 50 If so, Rav’s statement does not ban producing sounds on the Sabbath. Finally, Abaye cites the mishnah about drawing water on the Sabbath and deduces that outside the Temple precincts one may not draw water on the Sabbath because such an act produces sounds. Rabbah responds that the reason for not allowing one to draw water on the Sabbath is to stop a person doing so to water his garden. Thus, the various challenges by Abaye to Rabbah’s leniency all fail. Rabbah’s rule, that producing sounds on the Sabbath is permitted, just not musical sounds, is thus upheld. Unlike other anecdotes, the defending amora in this one is not justifying an action that he himself took but that someone else took. One can read this sugya and conclude that there is no halakhic change here, only a rejection of a land of Israel stringency. That, too, is a halakhic change, however. It is also possible that Rabbah is initiating a new leniency of permission to produce sounds on the Sabbath and for that reason Abaye mounts several challenges. Or it is possible that Rabbah is defending an already accepted Babylonian leniency. The parallel discussion in Talmud Yerushalmi Besah 5:2, 63a reveals a more stringent point of view. Rabbah goes on to say, “For if you don’t hold that that is the reason, then why did R. Judah forbid women to play with apples on the Sabbath, a game that does not produce any sound?!” Thus, the reason playing with nuts is forbidden is to prevent women from violating the Sabbath by levelling the floor. 50

1. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT INCLUDE THE TERM “IQLA” ‫א‬:‫ סג‬,‫ב‬:‫תלמוד ירושלמי )וילנא( מסכת ביצה פרק ה‬ "‫"ולא מטפחין‬ ‫טיפוח שהוא לרצונו‬ ‫ וחורנה אמר בין‬,‫ר' יונה וחברייא חד אמר הכין שרי והכין אסור‬ ‫ מן מה‬.‫ ולא ידעין מאן אמר דא ומאן אמר דא‬,‫הכין ובין הכין אסור‬ ‫דא"ר יונה אית הוה סבין ביומינן והוון מטפחין לאחורי ידיהון‬ .‫בשובתא הוי דו אמר הכין שרי והכין אסור‬ .‫רבי הוה מסב לר"ש בריה והוון מטפחין לאחורי ידיהון בשובתא‬ ‫עבר ר"מ ושמע קלהון אמר רבותינו הותרה השבת‬ ‫ ואית‬,‫שמע ר' קליה אמר מי הוא זה שבא לרדותינו בתוך ביתינו‬ ‫ שמע ר"מ‬.‫דאמרי הכין אמר מי הוא זה שבא לצנעינו בתוך ביתינו‬ ...‫קליה וערק‬ [Citation of mishnah:] “No slapping [on the Sabbath or on festivals].” [This refers to] voluntary slapping. R. Yonah (JA 4) and colleagues: one said “like this” is permitted and “like that” is prohibited, and the other said, whether “like this” or “like that,” both are forbidden. We don’t know who holds which view. From the fact that R. Yonah said, there were some old men in our day who were clapping with the back of their hands on the Sabbath, it follows that R. Yonah (and not the other rabbis) is the one who said “like this” is permitted, but “like that” is forbidden.” Rabbi [Judah the Prince] was dining with his son R. Shimon and the two of them were clapping with the back of their hands on the Sabbath. R. Meir passed by and heard the sounds and said, Rabbis, have you relaxed the Sabbath [rules]?! Rabbi heard his voice and said, Who is this who comes into our own homes to tyrannize us? Some say that Rabbi said thus, Who is this who comes to make us behave more modestly in our own homes? R. Meir heard Rabbi’s voice [of criticism] and fled [town] …

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EXPLANATION OF YERUSHALMI

The land of Israel rabbis discuss the topic of producing sounds on the Sabbath in conjunction with mBesah 5:2 which says “No clapping, no slapping, no jumping” on the Sabbath or festivals. These are considered shevut violations, which means they compromise the rule of complete cessation of work. It is clear from the anecdote in the Yerushalmi that there is already disagreement in the late tannaitic period regarding producing sounds on the Sabbath. Rabbi Judah the Prince (“Rabbi”) seems to permit such an act, but R. Meir considers such activity a desecration of the Sabbath. In the late amoraic period, there still is controversy: R. Yonah (JA 4) does not issue a ruling but seems to permit clapping on the Sabbath as long as it is done differently from during the week, i.e., with the back of the hand, whereas his colleagues say that all clapping, or presumably all producing of sound, is forbidden. In the land of Israel, as we see more explicitly in the continuation of the sugya, the issue of which sounds may or may not be produced on the Sabbath remained unresolved throughout the amoraic period. 51 The Yerushalmi sugya continues: :"‫"ולא מרקדין‬ ‫א"ר לעזר כל משמיעי קול אסורין בשבת‬ ‫רבי שמואל בר רב יצחק סבר מקושה דכנישתא חדתא‬ ‫ר' ליל בי ר' אלם מקש על כסא‬ ‫ר' אילא עני בסדרא סלק לביתא אשכחון דמיכין רבע ליה על סולמא‬ ‫בגין דלא מקשה על תרעא בשובתא‬ ‫ר' ירמיה הוה פשט עם בריה דרבי אימי אזל בעי מתערתא‬ ‫בקריצתא דשובתא שרי מיקש על תרעא‬ Rabbi (Judah the Prince) does not issue a statement about playing musical instruments on the Sabbath and neither does R. Yonah. Thus, the controversy on the topic continues throughout the amoraic period.

51

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... ?‫ אבא מאן שרא לך‬,‫א"ל‬ [Citation of mishnah:] “No jumping [on Sabbath or festivals].” R. Lezar (JA 3) said: all [things] that produce sound are forbidden on the Sabbath. R. Shmuel bar R. Yizhaq (JA 3) held that [using] the knocker of a new synagogue is permitted. R. Lil at the home of R. Elem banged on a chair. R. Ila (JA 3) left the study session and wanted to enter his home but found them sleeping. He lay down on a ladder so as not to bang on a gate on the Sabbath. R Yirmiyah (JA 4) was the teacher of the son of R. Imi. He needed to wake the boy up early on the Sabbath. He began to knock on the gate. He [the father of the boy] asked him: Abba, who permitted you [to knock on the gate on the Sabbath]? …

EXPLANATION

These rulings and anecdotes show that the issue of producing sounds on the Sabbath was controversial throughout the amoraic period in the land of Israel. Over the generations, some rabbis permit making noise on the Sabbath but others do not. Some sharply challenge their more lenient colleagues who permit making noise on the Sabbath. The ban on producing sounds seem to have originated with R. Eleazar (JA 3) who understands the mishnah’s rule of no slapping and clapping and jumping as banning making noise on the Sabbath. However, the multiplicity of anecdotes, nearly all of which assume a ban but most of which chip away at it, suggests that in the land of Israel there was ongoing pressure to reduce the ban’s severity. It is therefore not at all surprising that when Ulla visits Bavel and hears, or sees, a man knocking on the door on the

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Sabbath that he immediately curses him. Ulla has simply adopted the view of the stringent amoraim in the land of Israel. 52 As for Babylonian rabbis, Rabbah issues a statement that only making sounds with musical instruments is forbidden. Other kinds of sound-production are, therefore, permitted. This is a rather striking statement in light of and in contrast to the ongoing debate in the Yerushalmi. Rabbah’s leniency, although challenged, is ultimately upheld. This is, therefore, another example of a Babylonian amora ruling leniently relative to a land of Israel amora’s more stringent ruling. In the other two cases in this study in which Ulla criticizes a Babylonian colleague, the rule under consideration is a mishnah (measuring on the Sabbath, bShab 157a–b, discussed above) or an amoraic statement (permission to shake out a tallit on the Sabbath, bShab147a, discussed below). In this case, in the Bavli, there is only an implied ban on producing sounds on the Sabbath. It seems as if a Bavli editor looked for an appropriate place to locate this anecdote and decided this mishnah’s rule about drawing water on the Sabbath was a fitting context. Nowhere in the Bavli is such a ban spelled out. A superficial reading of the anecdote suggests that Ulla, a land of Israel amora, tried to impose his stringent view on his Babylonian colleagues. Rabbah stops him in his tracks. One might conclude that Rabbah was not changing any rule, that he was just citing a Babylonian leniency. I think it possible, however, that Ulla’s criticism led Rabbah to issue a new rule for Babylonia, i.e., that most sounds may be produced on the Sabbath, excluding sounds made by a musical instrument. Until his day it seems that a general ban was in place, as in the Yerushalmi. Rabbah, in response to Ulla’s harsh It is interesting that in bBes 22a, Ulla visits R. Judah on the Sabbath and is criticized by his host for violating the Sabbath. This is the opposite of what Ulla does in three anecdotes in this study. It is rather ironic that the very stringent Sabbath observer from the land of Israel is shamed, in this instance, by a Babylonian less stringent Sabbath observer.

52

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85

words and highhanded behavior—cursing before asking— converts a stringency into a leniency, turning the rule that producing most sounds is not allowed into a rule that producing most sounds is allowed. It is for this reason, I think, that this sugya does not appear in conjunction with mBes 5:2, as in the Yerushalmi, because that mishnah is about actions that are forbidden on the Sabbath and festivals. Since the Bavli sugya moves in the direction of leniency, it follows that mEruvin 10:14, about permitted Sabbath actions, is a better place in which to locate the anecdote than mBesah 5:2. This is another sugya in which amoraic discussion follows the anecdote. In the end, however, the Babylonian leniency is upheld. Whether it predated Rabbah or was issued by Rabbah makes little difference. From Rabbah’s time and onward, producing sounds on the Sabbath is allowed, just not via musical instruments.

SUMMARY

Having reviewed nine iqla anecdotes, it is fair to say that visitors stir up “trouble.” When the verb iqla appears in an anecdote describing a visit, a clash in halakhic practices between host and visitor, or between one community and another, usually manifests itself. The halakhic modifications in these nine sugyot: bHullin 104b, Washing hands after eating cheese and before eating meat

R. Yizhaq breih d’R. Mesharshaya innovates that one need not wash hands after eating cheese and before eating meat. Agra’s earlier stated rule only eliminated handwashing after eating cheese and before eating fowl. This is a leniency. bBerakhot 40a, Table etiquette

Rava bar Shmuel innovates that, for a particular kind of bread, one need not wait for other diners to be served salt and spreads. His own transmission of R. Hiyya’s rule, however, implied that

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for all kinds of bread one was required to wait for others to be served these items. This is a leniency. bBaba Qama 113a, Missing a court date

R. Kahana innovates that the three-court-date rule prior to issuing a ban does not apply to women. Only men are given this option. Women receive one court date. This is a stringency. bMoed Qatan 27b, Respect due a corpse

The townspeople of Daromata innovate that only members of the havurah that prepares the body for burial are prohibited from performing labor prior to the burial. Others may. This is a leniency. bShabbat 157b, Measuring on the Sabbath

Ulla, from the land of Israel, criticized Rabbah bar R. Huna (RBRH) for measuring a basin on the Sabbath. The Babylonian amora responds cryptically, claiming that he was not intending to measure and hence did not violate the Sabbath. Either RBRH accepted Ulla’s stringent interpretation of the mishnah, that no secular measuring is permitted on the Sabbath, or else he simply deflects the criticism with a vague response but still thinks that the mishnah allows secular measuring. bBerakhot 43b, Order of blessings at a meal

R. Pappa, when visiting the home of R. Huna breih d’R. Iqqa, recited blessings according to the view of the House of Hillel, not the House of Shammai, as stipulated by his predecessors. The role of the anecdote in this instance is to determine the halakhah. The stam later asserts, however, that the halakhah is according to the House of Shammai. bBerakhot 50a, Standardizing liturgy

Rafram bar Pappa recited the Barkhu call to prayer as it was formulated by R. Akiba, not R. Ishmael. The people in Abu Giber

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87

objected, and Rava criticized Rafram bar Pappa’s recitation. The role of the anecdote is to fix the halakhah like R. Ishmael. bMoed Qatan 12a, Non-Jews working for Jews on the Sabbath and festivals

Mar Zutra acted upon Shmuel’s leniency and allowed non-Jews to build a mansion for him on Sabbaths and festivals beyond the Sabbath boundary. When his colleagues visited, they did not step foot in it. They innovated that a rabbi should not utilize Shmuel’s leniency. This, obviously, is a stringency. bEruvin 104a, Producing sounds on the Sabbath

Ulla, from the land of Israel, criticizes a Babylonian man for knocking on the gate on the Sabbath. Rabbah defends the man’s action. He innovates that most sounds may be produced on the Sabbath, just not the sounds of musical instruments. This is a leniency. What do iqla anecdotes teach in general? The initial assumption of many, even most, rabbinics researchers is that halakhic anecdotes, of which iqla anecdotes are a subset, are reports of how an amora carried out a halakhah and nothing more. I argue in this chapter, however, that a plain sense reading of the anecdotes shows that they play a key role in the development of halakhah. Most iqla anecdotes, if read without preconceived conclusions, show one amora carrying out a rule differently from how it was originally formulated, a second amora challenging the first amora’s behavior, and a defense by the first amora of his action. The end result is modification of halakhah, usually in the direction of leniency. Another role of iqla anecdotes is to fix the halakhah according to one of two disputants. When an amora carries out a halakhah according to the view of one of the disputants, his action is dispositive. In these cases, no halakhah is tweaked. Although it may often appear that a defending amora “conjured up” his justification on the spot, in response to a challenge, such a conclusion remains tentative. All that can be said is that the amora who behaved contrary to an earlier stated rule

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was able to offer support for his deviation from the rule. In most cases, in the post-talmudic period, his modification was fixed as halakhah. If so, an effective way of modifying halakhah is to act according to one’s own view and then, by chance or by design, make one’s view public. It is also clear from a few examples that Babylonian amoraim developed their halakhot as they saw fit, not necessarily in the same way as land of Israel amoraim. In fact, they strongly rebuffed challenges to their own halakhic practice from land of Israel amoraim.

CHAPTER 2. HAVA QA’IMNA/HAVA YATIVNA SUGYOT Each anecdote in this chapter contains one of the following phrases: either hava qa’imna (HQ), which means “I was standing,” or havah qa’ei, “he was standing,” or hava yativna (HY), “I was sitting,” or hava yativ, “he was sitting.” All four expressions indicate that a junior scholar was standing or sitting in the presence of a senior scholar. 1 The junior scholar reports on the senior scholar’s halakhic behavior and then engages him in giveand-take, often criticizing him. It does not necessarily follow that the exchange took place in a study session. In what ways are the HQ/HY anecdotes different from the iqla anecdotes of the previous chapter? Some do follow a similar pattern; they relate that one amora criticized another, who then defended his behavior while innovating halakhically. But there are several ways in which the HQ/HY anecdotes often differ from the iqla anecdotes: first, the two protagonists are usually in an ongoing teacher-student relationship. It follows that the student would be familiar with his mentor’s personal qualities, such as whether or not his mentor is delicate, a quality that is on oc-

R. Kalmin, in Sages, Stories, notes that colleagues of similar rank rarely interact with each other (198ff.). 1

89

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casion halakhically relevant. A mentor cannot, therefore, claim a personal quality that his student knows he lacks. The HQ/HY anecdotes further suggest that a junior scholar was often expected to serve a senior scholar, probably as a form of tuition payment. 2 For instance, there are anecdotes in which a junior scholar dabs the shoe of a senior scholar on the Sabbath or brings him his hat. Some anecdotes report that the junior scholar was present at meals of the senior scholar, perhaps helping to serve the food, even on the Sabbath. These various tasks assume a student who is serving his master in the master’s home and is ready to perform his master’s bidding. In these cases, the student has considerable familiarity with the mentor’s nature as well as his customary practices. In a number of HQ/HY anecdotes, it is the teacher who criticizes a student, and not vice versa, as is the case in most HQ/HY and other anecdotes. When a senior scholar criticizes a junior scholar, the junior scholar does not defend his action. For instance, when R. Hiyya bar Abba criticized the seemingly ostentatious behavior of R. Yirmiyah (bBer 13b), the junior scholar remained silent. In such cases, it is the senior scholar who introduces a halakhic innovation via his criticism. Finally, on occasion, when a student criticizes his teacher, the criticized senior amora responds ironically, uttering what may sound like praise but is more likely to be a sarcastic rebuttal of the critique. There are two principal kinds of HQ/HY anecdotes: those that contain verbal exchange and those that present a student’s report of his mentor’s behavior. The reason the student made the report and the editor included it is that it establishes halakhah. That is, not only do senior rabbis articulate halakhah, as is expected of them, but even their behavior is understood by their students as making a halakhic pronouncement. On occasion, a report of amoraic behavior will resolve a dispute, as we saw in the iqla chapter. 2

C. Hezser, The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement, 332ff.

2. HAVA QA’IMNA/HAVA YATIVNA SUGYOT

91

Like other halakhic anecdotes, the ones in this chapter also give the impression that they actually took place. There does not seem to be a reason why someone would fabricate them. But whether or not an anecdote is “historically” true, the effect of its inclusion in the text is the same. These anecdotes do not demonstrate how meticulous an amora was, how he carried out the law as stipulated. Instead, most show halakhic adjustment rather than mere compliance, and most teach a new point, usually a more lenient one. 2.1 bBerakhot 24a–b, Spitting during prayer ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת ברכות דף כד עמוד א‬ ... ‫ ורק‬,‫ ונתעטש‬,‫ אני ראיתי את רבי שגיהק ופיהק‬:‫ואמר רבי חנינא‬ ... ‫הרק בתפלתו כאילו רק בפני המלך‬... :‫מיתיבי‬ !‫ אלא רק ארק קשיא‬... ‫ היה‬:‫ אפשר כדרב יהודה; דאמר רב יהודה‬:‫רק ארק נמי לא קשיא‬ ‫ ואם טלית נאה הוא‬,‫עומד בתפלה ונזדמן לו רוק מבליעו בטליתו‬ .‫מבליעו באפרקסותו‬ .‫ פתקיה לאחוריה‬,‫ נזדמן לו רוק‬,‫רבינא הוה קאי אחורי דרב אשי‬ 4 ?(‫באפרקסותו‬

‫ לא סבר לה מר להא דרב יהודה )מבליעו‬:‫ ליה‬3 ‫אמר‬ .‫ אנא אנינא דעתאי‬:‫אמר ליה‬

R. Hanina (JA 1) also said: I saw Rabbi belch and yawn and sneeze and spit [during prayer] … A challenge [from a tannaitic text]: … One who spits during prayer is like spitting before a king … the [two statements] about spittle contradict each other [since one says no spitting is allowed during prayer and the other says that Rabbi spat during prayer]!

3 4

MS Munich 95: ‫אמרי‬ MS Munich 95: ‫חסר‬

92

THE STORIES THEY TELL The two statements [concerning spittle] do not contradict each other. It is possible [to resolve the seeming contradiction] by citing the rule of R. Judah (BA 2), who said: if one is standing in prayer and saliva accumulates [in his mouth], he can spit it out 5 into his tallit [i.e., his over-garment]; and if the tallit is a fine [garment], he can spit out the saliva into his afraqsut [i.e., his undergarment]. Ravina (BA 7) was standing behind R. Ashi (BA 6). Saliva gathered [in his mouth]. He spat it out behind him. He said to him: doesn’t the master hold the opinion of R. Judah that if saliva gathers [in his mouth during prayer], he should spit it out into his undergarment? He said to him: I am delicate.

EXPLANATION

This passage discusses what to do if saliva accumulates in the mouth during prayer, specifically during the recitation of the Amidah, the standing prayer. Ravina criticizes the behavior of his mentor R. Ashi, who, during prayer, spat onto the ground behind him. R. Ashi defends his behavior by saying he is in a different category from most other people. Because he is “delicate”—that is, fastidious—it would distress him to spit into his overgarment or even undergarment. But it is still understood that the accumulation of excess saliva during prayer is unseemly, or at the very least sufficiently uncomfortable to warrant action. He, therefore, will spit onto the ground during prayer, albeit behind himself. Like others before him—Rabban Gamliel in the Mishnah who bathed when in mourning (mBer 2:6) and R. Yosef who left the sukkah even before rain spoiled the food (bSuk 29a)—R. Ashi, when caught in questionable halakhic beThe literal meaning of ‫ מבליע‬is to cover up, to hide. In this context, the phrase ‫ מבליעו בטליתו‬means “he spits it into his outer garment, thereby hiding it from sight.” 5

2. HAVA QA’IMNA/HAVA YATIVNA SUGYOT

93

havior by a junior scholar, defends his action by claiming special status for himself, that of a delicate person who (in this case) cannot tolerate spitting into his own garment. Note that Ravina was not aware that his mentor, R. Ashi, was delicate. Nor was Ravina aware that the rule of no spitting during prayer except into one’s own garment excluded someone delicate. It seems likely that R. Ashi claimed special status in the moment to deflect Ravina’s critique. The Yerushalmi discussion of spitting during prayer differs significantly from the Bavli’s. It seems more tolerant of such behavior, stating, first of all, that Rabbi Judah the Prince did not spit during prayer, and then suggesting that, if saliva accumulates, one should spit either behind himself or to the left. Even so, amoraim seem opposed to spitting during prayer and suggest distancing oneself from spittle. 6 6

The Yerushalmi presents a long discussion on spitting during prayer. (yBer 3:5, 6d) ‫ד‬:‫ ו‬,‫תלמוד ירושלמי )וילנא( מסכת ברכות פרק ג הלכה ה‬ ‫אתיא דמר ר' חנינא אני ראיתי את רבי מפהק ומעטש ונותן ידיו על פיו אבל‬ ‫לא רוקק‬ ‫ר' יוחנן אמר אפילו רוקק כדי שיהא כוסו נקי‬ ‫לפניו אסור לאחריו מותר לימינו אסור לשמאלו מותר‬ ‫הדא הוא דכתיב ]תהילים צא ז[ יפל מצדך אלף‬ ‫כל עמא מודיי בההין דרקק איצטלין דהוא אסור‬ ‫ר' יהושע בן לוי אמר הרוקק בבית הכנסת כרוקק בבבת עינו‬ ‫ר' יונה רקק ושייף‬ ‫ר' ירמיה ר' שמואל בר חלפתא בשם ר' אדא בר אחוה המתפלל אל ירוק‬ ‫עד שיהלך ארבע אמות‬ ‫א"ר יוסי בי רבי אבון וכן הרוקק אל יתפלל עד שיהלך ארבע אמות‬ It is like what R. Hanina (JA 1) said: I saw Rabbi yawn … but he did not spit. … [Spitting] in front of himself is forbidden, behind himself is permitted; to the right forbidden, to the left permitted. As the verse states … All concede that spitting into one’s cloak is forbidden. Rabbi Joshua b. Levi (RYBL, JA 1) says, one who spits in the synagogue is like one who spits into his eye. R. Yonah (JA 5) spat [onto the ground] and rubbed it in.

94

THE STORIES THEY TELL

There is no amoraic commentary on the Bavli’s anecdote. It alters the rule of R. Judah, stated here and nowhere else, that one should spit into his garment if saliva accumulates in the mouth. But R. Ashi claims that those who are delicate may spit onto the ground. This is a clear example of how criticism by a junior scholar of a senior scholar leads to adjustment of an earlier stated halakhah, in this case in the direction of leniency. An unusual feature of this passage is the lack of syntactic clarity as to who criticized whom. The text just says, “he said to R. Yirmiyah (JA 4), R. Shmuel bar Halafta (??) in the name of R. Ada bar Ahoha (??): one who is praying, should distance himself four amot and then spit. Said R. Yosi bei R. Abun (JA 3/4), and similarly, one who spits should distance himself four amot [from the spittle] and then pray. The Yerushalmi sugya opens by saying that R. Hanina saw Rabbi yawn and belch and put his hands on his mouth during prayer but not spit, whereas the Bavli reports that Rabbi did spit during payer. The Yerushalmi sugya then presents rules about where to spit – only behind oneself and to the left. The sugya goes on to say that all agree that spitting into one’s garment is forbidden. Commentators change that statement into “one is permitted to spit into a garment,” apparently to align the Yerushalmi with the Bavli. It is possible, however, that the two Talmuds disagree on this matter. R. Joshua b. Levi condemns spitting in the synagogue. An anecdote reports that R. Yonah, a late amora, spat during prayer but then rubbed the saliva into the ground with his foot. His is an intermediate position: it is neither spitting on the ground nor into one’s garment but a compromise: one may spit on the ground during prayer but then rub it in so that it is not visible. How does the Yerushalmi material square with the Bavli material? The Yerushalmi seems sympathetic to those who need to spit while praying, whether in a synagogue or not. That is, it provides a way of dealing with the need to spit during prayer. The Bavli is stricter in its rules about spittle: only into one’s garment, not on the ground unless one is fastidious. There seems to be movement in both Talmuds to find a way to spit during prayer. Even so, both Talmuds have very negative things to say about spitting during prayer.

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him.” In most cases, the speakers are clarified by the context. However, the criticizing scholar calls the criticized scholar, mar, i.e., master. In all other instances of the query “lo savar lah mar” (doesn’t the master hold), it is the student who asks the mentor a question, appropriately calling him “master.” 7 I therefore conclude that here, too, it is Ravina, who was both a student and a colleague of R. Ashi, who asks that question of R. Ashi. That is, it is Ravina who criticizes the spitting behavior of R. Ashi, and it is R. Ashi, who, in response to criticism, creates the new rule that a delicate person may spit onto the ground during prayer, and not into his own garment. For someone who has not studied the phrase lo savar lah mar, the tendency is to say that it was the student who spat on the ground during prayer and the teacher who criticized him. Indeed, both the Soncino and the Sefaria translations of the Talmud claim that it was R. Ashi who saw Ravina spit and not vice versa. These translations are wrong. 8 In most halakhic anecdotes, in fact, it is the junior scholar who issues a critique and a senior scholar who innovates in response. See my article, “An Analysis of Sugyot Containing the Phrase Lo Savar Lah Mar.” 8 Soncino translates: “Rabina was once standing behind R. Ashi and he wanted to spit, so he spat out behind him. Said R. Ashi to him: Does not the Master accept the dictum of R. Judah, that he covers it up in his scarf? He replied: I am rather squeamish.” The Hebrew Steinsaltz does not take a stand on who spat and who criticized. That is, it does not provide antecedents for the pronouns. Sefaria: “Ravina was standing behind Rav Ashi during prayer when saliva happened to accumulate in his mouth, so he discharged it behind him. Rav Ashi said to him: And does the Master not hold in accordance with that statement of Rav Yehuda, who said that one absorbs it in his head covering? He said to him: I am delicate, and the mere knowledge that there is spittle in my head covering disturbs my prayer.” This English translation also assumes that it was Ravina who spat, not R. Ashi, and it was R. Ashi who said to Ravina, Does the Master not hold … . That phrase, however, is utilized by a junior scholar when speaking to a senior scholar and not vice versa. 7

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THE STORIES THEY TELL

I claim that in this instance, also, as tempting as it is to say that the student spat on the ground and his teacher reprimanded him, thereby preserving the honor of the mentor, that is not the case here. It is R. Ashi, the senior scholar, who spits, is criticized, and teaches his student an adjusted rule, that delicate people may spit even onto the ground. 2.2 bBerakhot 41b, Reciting blessings on the Seven Species Deuteronomy 8:8

.‫וּת ֵא ָנ֖ה וְ ִר ֑מּוֹן ֶ ֽא ֶרץ ֵ־ז֥ית ֶ ֖שׁ ֶמן ְוּד ָ ֽבשׁ‬ ְ ‫וּשׂע ָ ֹ֔רה וְ ֶג ֶ֥פן‬ ְ ‫ֶ ֤א ֶרץ ִח ָטּ ֙ה‬ A land of wheat and barley, of vines, figs, and pomegranates, a land of olive trees and [date] honey.

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת ברכות דף מא עמוד ב‬ ‫ אייתו לקמייהו תמרי‬,‫רב חסדא ורב המנונא הוו יתבי בסעודתא‬ .‫ שקל רב המנונא בריך אתמרי ברישא‬,‫ורמוני‬ ‫ לא סבירא ליה מר להא דאמר רב יוסף‬:‫אמר ליה רב חסדא‬ ?‫ כל המוקדם בפסוק זה קודם לברכה‬:‫ואיתימא רבי יצחק‬ .‫ וזה חמישי לארץ‬,‫ זה שני לארץ‬:‫אמר ליה‬ 9 .‫ונשמעינך‬

‫ מאן יהיב לן נגרי דפרזלא‬:‫אמר ליה‬

R. Hisda (BA 2/3) and R. Himnuna (BA 2), when they were sitting at a meal, were served dates and pomegranates. R. Himnuna first picked up some dates and recited a blessing on them. R. Hisda said to him: doesn’t the master hold that which R. Yosef (BA 3), or perhaps R. Yizhaq (JA 3), taught: the earlier in the verse, the earlier for a blessing [and the pomegranate (#5) precedes the date (honey, #7)]!

MS Munich 95, no significant variants. Rashi comments, “we will serve you and follow you [around].” The use of the verb ‫ע‬.‫מ‬.‫ ש‬in this form is not clear. 9

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97

R. Himnuna answered: this one [i.e., the date] is the second species mentioned after [the second instance of] “a land” and this one [i.e., a pomegranate] is the fifth species mentioned after [the first instance of] “a land.” R. Hisda said to him: if only we had feet of iron to [follow you] and listen to you [teach Torah].

EXPLANATION

This sugya does not employ the term “R. X was sitting before R. Y,” which would mean that R. Y is senior to R. X. Instead, it says that both were sitting at a meal, apparently at the home of the exilarch, a frequent place for rabbis to gather and dine. According to Geoffrey Herman, this setting connotes luxury. 10 The sugya cites a rule regarding the seven species of the land of Israel: if a person is served two of them at the same time, he should recite a blessing (e.g., “…who creates the fruit of the tree”) over the species that appears earlier in the verse. In this case, since the two amoraim, R. Himnuna and R. Hisda, were served both dates and pomegranates at the same time, it follows that they should recite the blessing over a pomegranate (#5), not a date (#7). R. Himnuna, however, recited a blessing on the date. His younger colleague R. Hisda criticizes his behavior, saying that he should have recited the blessing on the pomegranate. R. Himnuna responds that there is more than one way of understanding the seven species rule: since the word eretz (land) appears twice in the list, once at the beginning and a second time after mention of the fifth species, it follows that dates (in the form of honey), which appear seventh, can also be understood as appearing second, because they are the second species mentioned after the second appearance of the word eretz. If so, they rank higher than pomegranates which appear fifth, following the first appearance of the word eretz. No commentary follows the anecdote. 10

See G. Herman’s comments on bBer 40a.

98

THE STORIES THEY TELL

R. Himnuna’s clever and self-serving defense appears to have been created on the spot. It seems that, when dining with R. Hisda, R. Himnuna forgot to apply the rule of reciting blessings on the seven species according to the order in which they appear in the verse. To justify reciting a blessing on a date and not a pomegranate, R. Himnuna cannily responds that dates have higher status since they can also be considered number two, and not just number seven, whereas pomegranates are always number five. Upon hearing this answer, R. Hisda says that he wishes his feet were made of iron, meaning that they would never wear out, so that he could follow R. Himnuna from place to place and learn everything he has teach. Since the “blessing rank” of a species depends on its precise location in the verse, it seems strange that the second appearance of the word eretz is regarded by R. Himnuna as equivalent to the first, allowing one to say that dates, number seven on the list, can now be considered as number two. Such a response, in a sense, subverts the point being made, that where an item appears on a list matters. It does not seem logical that a second appearance of eretz starts the list anew. Yet that is precisely the argument made by R. Himnuna. To me it seems that R. Himnuna modifies the halakhah on the spot in order to justify his delinquent behavior: rather than say he forgot to abide by the rule, he reinterprets the rule so that reciting a blessing on dates, when also served pomegranates, is justified. And his gambit appears successful, for R. Hisda is so impressed with this quick-witted response that he wishes he could become a student of R. Himnuna and follow him from place to place to learn all of his “Torah.” It is hard to know whether the editor views R. Hisda’s concluding comment to R. Himnuna as mocking or straightforward. Is R. Hisda praising the answer he just heard from R. Himnuna or is he doing the opposite, calling it absurd through his sarcas-

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tic and false praise? 11 In general, R. Hisda, even though younger than R. Himnuna, is viewed as a more prominent amora. It follows that for R. Hisda to offer such praise to someone less prominent is unlikely. However we understand R. Hisda, the editor included the anecdote because, like so many others, it assumes a rule and then relates an anecdote of an adjustment of the rule— that items #6 and #7 on the list can also be regarded as items #1 (olives) and #2 (dates)—through real-life circumstances. 12 2.3 bBerakhot 13b, Lengthening the Ehad of Shema ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת ברכות דף יג עמוד ב‬ ‫ עד כאן צריכה כוונת‬,‫ שמע ישראל ה' אלהינו ה' אחד‬:‫תנו רבנן‬ .‫ דברי רבי מאיר‬,‫הלב‬ .‫ הלכה כרבי מאיר‬:‫אמר רבא‬ .‫ כל המאריך באחד מאריכין לו ימיו ושנותיו‬:‫תניא סומכוס אומר‬ .‫ ובדלי"ת‬:‫אמר רב אחא בר יעקב‬ .‫ ובלבד שלא יחטוף בחי"ת‬:‫אמר רב אשי‬ ‫רבי ירמיה הוה יתיב קמיה דרבי ]חייא בר אבא[ חזייה דהוה מאריך‬ ‫ כיון דאמליכתיה למעלה ולמטה ולארבע רוחות‬:‫ אמר ליה‬.‫טובא‬ 13 .‫ תו לא צריכת‬,‫השמים‬ Jeffrey Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud, writes that verbal assault was common in the academy. See Introduction, n. 28. 12 Maimonides (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Berakhot 8:13) and Y. Karo (Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 211:4) accept R. Himnuna’s adjusted rule. 13 MS Munich 95: ‫כדי שתמליכהו עליך בשמים ובארץ ובארבע רוחות העולם תו לא צריכת‬ This version means something a little different: in order to accept His sovereignty upon yourself in the heavens and the earth and the four directions of the world, you need not do more. The word ‫ תו‬is not clear in the ms. 11

100

THE STORIES THEY TELL A baraita: “Shema Yisrael … ehad” (Deuteronomy 6:4)—until this point one needs to direct one’s heart. The opinion of R. Meir. Rava (BA 4) said: the halakhah is like R. Meir. A baraita: Symmachus says, anyone who lengthens “ehad,” his days and years will be lengthened. R. Aha bar Ya’akov (BA 3) said: this refers to the [letter] dalet [at the end of ehad]. R. Ashi said (BA 6): so long as he does not shorten the [letter] het [that precedes the dalet of ehad]. R. Yirmiyah (JA 4) was sitting before R. Hiyya bar Abba (JA 3). He saw that he was greatly lengthening [the word ehad]. He said to him: since you have [already] accepted [God’s] kingship above and below and in the four directions, you need not do more!

EXPLANATION

The opening baraita says that one should recite the first line of the Shema while “directing one’s heart,” i.e., with concentration or intention. Such is the opinion of R. Meir. Rava fixes the halakhah according to this tanna’s view. In a second baraita, Symmachus, a late tanna who was a student of R. Meir, says that anyone who lengthens the word ehad, thereby stressing the oneness of God, will live a long life. The amora R. Aha bar Ya’kov comments that the lengthening of the word ehad should focus on the dalet, its last letter. R. Ashi adds that one should be careful not to shorten the letter chet that precedes the dalet. An anecdote follows in which R. Yirmiyah (JA 4, moved from Bavel to land of Israel) was sitting in the presence of R. Hiyya bar Abba (JA 3, also moved from Bavel to land of Israel). R. Hiyya bar

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101

Abba saw that R. Yirmiyah 14 was greatly lengthening the word ehad and criticized his behavior, saying it was unnecessary. That is, the senior scholar criticized the ostentatiously pious behavior of the junior scholar. 15 No response from the junior scholar. The new point of the anecdote is that there is an upper limit to the lengthening of the word ehad. That was not obvious from Symmachus’ statement. Any amount of lengthening seemed acceptable. But the anecdote teaches that reasonable lengthening fulfills Symmachus’ rule. Excessive lengthening is inappropriate and may even appear arrogant. It is clear that the editor included the anecdote to add a detail not provided by Symmachus. In this case, also, there is some ambiguity as to who criticized whom. Since the criticized amora does not offer a defense, it follows that he is the junior scholar. As we have seen elsewhere, when a senior scholar criticizes a junior scholar, the latter does not respond. It follows that the senior scholar, via his The anecdote does not state clearly who criticized whom. Since the critique is an attack on the arrogance of another scholar, it appears that the criticizer is the senior scholar. Junior scholars may criticize or question the behavior of senior scholars but they may not accuse a senior scholar of arrogance. See comments above. 15 Critique of ostentatious behavior appears elsewhere too. The same amora, R. Hiyya bar Abba, appears in the Yerushalmi. Compare yBer 1:5, 3d. The context is bowing during prayer. ‫ מעשה באחד ששחה יותר‬:‫רבי שמואל בר נתן בשם ר' חמא בר חנינא‬ .‫מדאי והעבירו רבי‬ .‫ ר' יוחנן הוה מעביר‬,‫ר' אמי אמר‬ .[‫ לא היה מעבירו אלא גער ]ביה‬,‫א"ל ר' חייא בר בא‬ R. Shmuel b. Natan (JA 3) in the name of R. Hama bar Hanina (JA 3): it once happened that someone prostrated himself for too long a time and Rabbi [Judah the Prince] removed him. R. Ammi (JA 3) said: R. Yohanan (JA 2) would remove [people who bowed down too long]. R. Hiyya bar BA (JA 3) said to him: He did not remove him; he scolded him. 14

102

THE STORIES THEY TELL

criticism, has tweaked a halakhah. The same anecdote appears in the Yerushalmi (yBer 2:1, 4b). The text there states clearly that it was R. Yirmiyah (JA 4) who lengthened the word ehad more than was called for. R. Ze’ira (JA 3) criticized him in similar terms as R. Hiyya bar Abba. 16 2.4 bYevamot 103b, Halizah shoes ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת יבמות דף קא עמוד א‬ ‫מתני' מצות חליצה בשלשה דיינין ואפילו שלשתן הדיוטות חלצה‬ ‫במנעל חליצתה כשרה באנפילין חליצתה פסולה בסנדל שיש לו‬ ...‫עקב כשר‬ ‫ או בשל שמאל‬,‫ או בסנדל של עץ‬,‫ חלצה בסנדל שאין שלו‬...'‫מתני‬ ... .‫ חליצה כשרה‬,‫בימין‬ Mishnah Yevamot 12:1: The halizah ceremony should be performed in the presence of three [judges] even if they all are laymen. If she performed the halizah ceremony with a shoe, it is valid. With a felt slipper, it is not valid. With a sandal with a heel, valid. … Mishnah Yevamot 12:2: If she performed halizah with a sandal that did not belong to him, or if the sandal was made of wood, or if she put a left foot sandal on his right foot, the halizah is valid…

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת יבמות דף קג עמוד ב‬ .'‫חלצה במנעל שאינו שלו וכו‬

16

‫ אלא כדי שתמליכהו‬,‫ א"ל ר' זעירא לית את צריך כל הכין‬.‫ר' ירמיה הוה מאריך סגין‬ .‫בשמים ובארץ ובארבע רוחות העולם‬ R. Yirmiyah greatly lengthened [the word ehad]. R. Ze’ira said to him: You don’t need [to do] all this. Rather, [all that is necessary] is for you to acknowledge His kingship in the heavens, on earth, and in the four directions of the world.

2. HAVA QA’IMNA/HAVA YATIVNA SUGYOT

103

:‫ נעל של כל אדם מנין? ת"ל‬,‫ "נעלו" אין לי אלא נעלו‬:‫תנו רבנן‬ ‫ פרט‬,‫ א"כ מה ת"ל "נעלו"? נעלו הראוי לו‬.‫"נעל" נעל מכל מקום‬ ...‫ ופרט לקטן שאינו חופה רוב רגלו‬,‫לגדול שאין יכול להלוך בו‬ .‫ אתאי יבמה לחלוץ‬,‫אביי הוה קאי קמיה דרב יוסף‬ .‫ הב ליה סנדלך‬:‫אמר ליה‬ .‫יהיב ליה סנדלא דשמאלא‬ ?‫ לכתחלה מי אמר‬,‫ אימר דאמור רבנן דיעבד‬:‫א"ל‬ ,‫ אימר דאמור רבנן דיעבד‬,‫ סנדל שאין שלו נמי‬,‫ אי הכי‬:‫א"ל‬ ?‫לכתחלה מי אמור‬ 18 .‫ליה‬

‫ ליה ואקני‬17 ‫ הב‬:‫ הכי קאמינא לך‬,‫א"ל‬

[Citation of mishnah:] “If she performed halizah with a shoe 19 that did not belong to him and so on.” A baraita: From [the words] “his shoe” (v. 9) I can only deduce that his [own] shoe [must be used for the ceremony]. What about a shoe belonging to someone else? The [next] verse says “shoe,” which means any shoe [is suitable for the halizah ceremony]. If so, what does “his shoe” come to teach? That the shoe has to fit him, which excludes a shoe Munich MS 95: ‫זיל הב ליה ואקני ליה‬ ‫רש"י מסכת יבמות דף קג עמוד ב‬ ‫ במתכוין עבד דלא סבירא ליה לאביי דסנדל שאין שלו‬- ‫יהיב ליה דשמאלא‬ ‫מותר לכתחלה‬ He gave him the left [sandal] – he did so intentionally, for Abaye did not hold that a sandal that did not belong to him [i.e., the levir] was permissible from the outset [i.e., only after the fact would such a shoe be deemed fit]. 19 The citation of the mishnah in the sugya, the pisqa, calls the footgear a ‘shoe’ whereas the mishnah itself calls it a ‘sandal.’ For the purposes of halakhah, there is no difference between a shoe and a sandal. For more on shoes and sandals, see below and also bYoma 78a, about wearing footgear on a public fast day. And for more on halizah, see bYev 101a (number of judges needed for halizah) and 106b (recitation of halizah verses). 17 18

104

THE STORIES THEY TELL too big for him to walk in it or too small so that it does not cover the greater part of his foot … Abaye (BA 4) was standing before R. Yosef (BA 3), when a yevamah [i.e., a widow awaiting levirate release] showed up for a halizah ritual. R. Yosef said to him [to Abaye], give him [the levir] your sandal. Abaye gave him a left foot sandal. R. Yosef said to Abaye: the rabbis have ruled that a left foot sandal for halizah is [only valid] after the fact; did they [also] say before the fact?! [No!] Abaye responded: if so, then a sandal that does not belong to the levir should [also] not be valid [before the fact], as the rabbis have stated that such a sandal is valid only after the fact. Did they [also] say it was valid before the fact?! [No!] R. Yosef said to him: this is what I meant to say to you, hand him [your sandal] and also transfer possession of it to him.

EXPLANATION

Deuteronomy 25:5–10 introduces the topic of levirate marriage. It says that if a man dies childless, his wife is maritally bound to his family. She is required either to consummate a marriage with her levir, the brother of her deceased husband, or else perform halizah with him, a release ceremony which would free her to remarry as she pleases. According to mYevamot 12:2, the halizah ritual of removing a sandal from the levir’s foot should be performed with a sandal that belongs to him, the levir. However, the mishnah goes on to say, if she went ahead and performed the ritual with a sandal that was not his, the halizah is still valid. Similarly, if she went ahead and put a left foot sandal on his right foot, the halizah is still valid, even though ideally a right foot sandal should be placed on a right foot.

2. HAVA QA’IMNA/HAVA YATIVNA SUGYOT

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Since mYevamot 12:1 speaks in its opening line of performing halizah with a shoe, and later on about performing it with a sandal, it follows that for a halizah ceremony a shoe and a sandal are both acceptable. 20 Even so, a few words about the difference between these two kinds of footgear are in order. Sandals were made of leather, they attached to the foot with straps, and appear to have been the prevalent form of footgear in ancient Israel. A shoe differs from a sandal in that it covers most of the foot and is not attached by straps. It, too, is generally fashioned of leather. Since they are halakhically equivalent, I will use “sandal” and “shoe” interchangeably in presenting this sugya. The sugya opens with a baraita that cites verses from the Torah about the release ceremony. Deuteronomy 25:9 says “she should remove his shoe [na’alo],” which means that the shoe must belong to him, i.e., the levir. But since the word “shoe,” appears in the next verse without a suffix, it implies that using a shoe belonging to someone else is also valid. If so, the suffix “his” in v. 9 teaches a different rule, that even if it’s not his shoe, it should be a shoe that is theoretically right for him, which excludes a shoe so big that he cannot walk in it or so small that it does not cover the majority of his foot. 21 An anecdote follows the baraita. A widow and her brotherin-law show up for a release ceremony. The levir, it seems, has neither a shoe nor a sandal. When R. Yosef asks Abaye to hand over his own sandal to the levir, it is clear that R. Yosef sides with the baraita that allows any shoe for halizah, and not with Another example of the interchangeability of shoes and sandals: Mishnah Yevamot 12:2 says “if she performed the ritual with a sandal that did not belong to the levir, the halizah is still valid.” When this same rule appears as a pisqa, a brief citation of the Mishnah at the beginning of a sugya, it appears with the word “shoe.” See 4.1, bTa’anit 12b, for further discussion of sandals and shoes. 21 Similar notions appear in the Mishnah (mYevamot 12:2), which says that if the sandal is so big that he cannot walk in it, or so small that it does not cover the majority of his foot, it is not fit for the halizah ceremony. On these points the mishnah agrees with the baraita. 20

106

THE STORIES THEY TELL

the mishnah that stipulates that the shoe must belong to the levir from the outset. In what appears to be an act of defiance on Abaye’s part, he hands over his left foot sandal to the levir, even though he knows that, according to the mishnah, such a sandal is valid only after the fact. When R. Yosef then criticizes him for handing over a left foot sandal, Abaye responds with a parallel critique. He points out that not just he, but R. Yosef too, was violating the mishnah’s rules by suggesting that Abaye use, from the outset, a sandal that does not belong to the levir. R. Yosef ends the exchange by saying, in apparent agreement on the rule with Abaye, “hand over to him [your own sandal] and also transfer possession of it to him,” which means that, from the start of the halizah ritual, the sandal will belong to the levir, and not to Abaye. Thus, it appears that R. Yosef concedes the point to Abaye. Despite the baraita’s rule permitting any sandal or shoe from the outset—either one belonging to the levir or to anyone else—R. Yosef now requires that the sandal belong to the levir from the outset, as stipulated by the mishnah. Thus, there appears to be no halakhic change instituted by the anecdote. To be clear: when a junior scholar criticizes a senior scholar, the usual outcome is that the senior scholar defends his action by tweaking the halakhah. In this case, the junior scholar’s (Abaye’s) criticism of the senior scholar (R. Yosef) is upheld. From then on, in accordance with Abaye’s criticism, the levir will be given ownership of the halizah sandal from the outset. But there is more to say on this subject, as noted by early Medieval commentators. ‫חידושי הרשב"א מסכת יבמות דף קג עמוד ב‬ ‫ והא דקתני "בסנדל‬,‫ מנין? ת"ל נעל נעל ריבה‬,‫נעל של כל אדם‬ ‫ מדרבנן היא‬... ‫שאינה שלו חליצתה כשרה" דיעבד אין לכתחלה לא‬ ... That any shoe [may be used for halizah], from where is this rule derived? The text teaches “shoe” [in one verse (v. 9)] and “shoe” [in another verse (v. 10)] to include any shoe [for the halizah ceremony, not just one belonging to the levir]. As for the rule [in the mishnah] that if the sandal does

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not belong to the levir, it may not be used from the outset, even though halizah with such a sandal is valid after the fact … it is a rabbinic rule. … 22

The Rishonim (Medieval commentators), for instance Rashba (above), uphold the baraita which teaches that any sandal may be used for halizah, not just one belonging to the levir. Furthermore, as noted by this commentator, the rule that the sandal must belong to the levir from the outset was instituted by the rabbis, not the Torah. It is thus reasonable that R. Yosef attempts to follow the baraita’s rule, which allows any shoe from the outset, and not the mishnah, which stipulates that the shoe must belong to the levir. Abaye, however, prevents R. Yosef from acting according to this view, holding up the mishnah as the standard to follow. R. Yosef concedes the point to Abaye. But of particular interest is that R. Yosef, on the spot, creates a new way of performing halizah: an amora—or a rabbinical court—can provide the levir with a halizah sandal and transfer ownership of it to him for the duration of the ritual. Thus, there is an innovative point in the anecdote: R. Yosef accepts Abaye’s suggestion that the shoe, from the outset, must belong to the levir, but initiates a process in which the court provides the levir with “his” shoe for the ritual, which he then returns to the court. This, I think, is a compromise between the baraita’s rule that any shoe is acceptable and the mishnah’s rule that the shoe must belong to the levir. The court’s halizah sandal can thus be regarded as both “any [person’s] shoe” of the baraita and as “his shoe” of the mishnah. As the Ritva, another early commentator, notes, a passage at bSanhedrin 7b lists, among a court’s possessions, a halizah sandal! 23 ... ‫חידושי הריטב"א מסכת יבמות דף קג עמוד ב‬ ‫ותמיהא לי מאי טעמא אצרכוה רבנן נעל שלו לכתחלה‬ The Ritva comments: And I wonder why the rabbis felt it necessary that the halizah shoe, from the outset, must belong to the levir? … 23 ‫חידושי הריטב"א מסכת יבמות דף קג עמוד ב‬ 22

108

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What is the role of the anecdote in the sugya? First, it innovates that a shoe may be provided to the levir for the duration of the ritual. It need not be “his” shoe in the sense that he will take it home. Second, it shows how a clever student brought his teacher’s attention to a mishnah violation without directly confronting him. The sugya does not explain why Abaye, upon being asked to give one of his sandals to the levir, gives his left foot sandal, clearly before-the-fact. That is in direct conflict with the mishnah, which considers a left foot sandal valid only afterthe-fact. A reasonable explanation is that Abaye did it to draw R. Yosef’s attention to the mishnah’s distinction between beforeand after-the-fact. In a way, Abaye makes himself look bad, as if he did not pay attention to the mishnah’s rule, and this softens his criticism of R. Yosef. It seems possible that Abaye acted in this way to force R. Yosef to criticize him so that he could then, in a very similar way, criticize R. Yosef. The upshot is that the mishnah’s requirement before the fact of only using a levir’s sandal—even one given to him by the court—is upheld, 24 although a new practice of temporary ownership transfer of the sandal is established. 2.5 bZevahim 94b, Dabbing shoes with water on the Sabbath

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת זבחים דף צד עמוד ב‬

‫מפני שפעמים שאין סנדל מצוי ליבם אמרינן בסנהדרין )ז' ב'( כלי הדיינים‬... ,'‫שיפורא רצועא וסנדלא וכו‬ The Ritva comments: Since sometimes the levir does not have available a sandal for halizah, a court’s utensils [included] … a [halizah] sandal and so on (bSanh 7b). 24 It is not clear, however, if the sandal Abaye gave the levir, at the end of his exchange with R. Yosef, was a left foot or right foot sandal. None of the Rishonim comment on this matter. One version of the sugya, in Pisqei Rid, seems to say that Abaye was only going to give—not already did give—his left foot sandal, and then R. Yosef criticized him.

2. HAVA QA’IMNA/HAVA YATIVNA SUGYOT

109

.‫ מותר לכבס מנעל בשבת‬:‫דרש רבא‬ ‫ זימנין סגיאין הוה קאימנא‬,‫ והא"ר חייא בר אשי‬:‫א"ל רב פפא לרבא‬ ‫ אבל כיבוס‬,‫ במיא; שכשוך אין‬25 ‫קמיה דרב ושכשיכי ליה מסאני‬ !‫לא‬ ‫ דברים שאמרתי לפניכם טעות‬:‫הדר אוקי רבא אמורא עליה ודרש‬ .‫ כיבוס אסור‬,‫ שכשוך מותר‬:‫ ברם כך אמרו‬,‫הם בידי‬ Rava (BA 4) expounded [in public]: 26 One is permitted to launder a shoe [by rubbing it] on the Sabbath. R. Pappa (BA 5) said to Rava: but did not R. Hiyya bar Ashi (BA 2) say, Many times I was standing before Rav (BA 1) [to serve him] and I dabbed his shoes with water [on the Sabbath]. [This shows that] dabbing is fine but laundering [by rubbing] is not! Rava again placed an amora near him [to transmit his revised teaching to the public] and expounded: the things I said to you [earlier] were a mistake on my part. Rather, this is what they [i.e., the rabbis] said: dabbing [a shoe with water] is permitted [on the Sabbath]; laundering [by rubbing] is prohibited.

I was not able to read the words for “his shoe” in MS Munich 95. It is not ‫מסאניה‬. 26 A search for the root D.R.SH in rabbinic literature shows that quite a few of the reported public lectures on halakhic matters deal with women. It is possible that women came out to hear such lectures, and that they were aimed at men and women alike. See Ofra Meir, “The Meaning of ‘Darash Rabbi X’ in the Midrashim” (Hora’at “Darash Rabbi X” Bamidrashim), Dapim lemeḥkar besifrut, 3 (1986), 217. See Stuart S. Miller, Sages and Commoners in Late Antique ‘Erez Israel (Mohr Siebeck 2006) 342ff. Miller writes that the verbs derash and horei, and like terms, imply that the teaching was directed to rabbinic households, including women. 25

110

THE STORIES THEY TELL

EXPLANATION

In general, a hava qa’imna anecdote appears in the text on its own, not introduced by an amora. In this sugya, however, the hava qa’imna anecdote is cited by R. Pappa to challenge Rava. At first, Rava publicly asserts that one may launder shoes on the Sabbath. R. Pappa then reminds him that R. Hiyya bar Ashi reported that when serving Rav as a junior scholar, he would often dab Rav’s shoes with water on the Sabbath. This means that he did not rub or launder them. If so, continues R. Pappa, dabbing with water is permitted on the Sabbath but laundering or rubbing is not. Rava’s response to the criticism of R. Pappa is not to defend his own teaching, as one might have expected. On the contrary, Rava goes right out to the public to tell them that his previous teaching was wrong. Criticism by a junior scholar in this case led to the retraction of a halakhah by a senior scholar. Rescinding a halakhah is an unusual response to criticism. It is slightly reminiscent of R. Yosef conceding the point to Abaye that the halizah sandal must belong to the levir at the time of the ritual. The hava qa’imna anecdote in this sugya differs from others in that it is merely a report of a junior scholar, R. Hiyya bar Ashi, regarding his service to his mentor, Rav. There is no verbal exchange. Furthermore, unlike most anecdotes which appear in the text independently, this anecdote, as already noted, is cited by a later scholar, R. Pappa, to criticize the halakhic stance of his senior colleague, Rava. R. Pappa cites the hava qa’imna anecdote about earlier amoraim (Rav and R. Hiyya bar Ashi) to criticize the public teaching of Rava. That is, rather than criticize Rava with a tannaitic or amoraic teaching, as is generally done in a halakhic anecdote, R. Pappa tells him that his rule about permitted laundering on the Sabbath is not likely to be correct because an anecdote shows that only dabbing is allowed. In this sugya, the halakhic process unfolds before our very own eyes: A BA 4 amora (Rava) issues a halakhah. A BA 5 amora (R. Pappa) reminds him of a BA 1 anecdote. The BA 4 amora changes his halakhah in the direction of stringency, in accord with the BA 1 anecdote. The power of an anecdote is thus clear.

2. HAVA QA’IMNA/HAVA YATIVNA SUGYOT

111

In most other cases, a halakhah is promulgated by an earlier amora and a halakhic anecdote appears at the end of the sugya, featuring a later amora who behaves contrary to the earlier stated halakhah. When challenged, the criticized amora applies the early halakhah to other cases, not to his own circumstances. Here we see the reverse: an anecdote about an earlier amora brings about a change in the formulation of a halakhah of a later amora. He rescinds his liberal statement about washing shoes on the Sabbath and instead permits only dabbing. 2.6 bShabbat 147a, Shaking out a tallit on the Sabbath ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת שבת דף קמז עמוד א‬ .‫ המנער טליתו בשבת חייב חטאת‬:‫אמר רב הונא‬ .‫ אבל בעתיקי לית לן בה‬,‫ולא אמרן אלא בחדתי‬ .‫ אבל בחיורי וסומקי לית לן בה‬,‫ולא אמרן אלא באוכמי‬ :‫ אמר‬.‫ חזא רבנן דקא מנפצי גלימייהו‬,‫עולא איקלע לפומבדיתא‬ !‫ שבתא‬27 (‫קמחללי)ן רבנן‬ .‫ אנן לא קפדינן מידי‬,‫ נפוצי ליה באפיה‬:‫אמר להו רב יהודה‬ ,‫אביי הוה קאי קמיה דרב יוסף‬ .‫ הב לי כומתאי‬:‫אמר ליה‬ .‫ הוה קמחסם למיתבה ליה‬,‫ טלא עליה‬28 [‫]חזא דאיכא‬ .‫ אנן לא קפדינן מידי‬,‫ נפוץ שדי‬:‫אמר ליה‬ R. Huna said (BA 2): One who shakes out his outer garment [tallit, not to be confused with prayer shawl, now also called tallit] on the Sabbath is liable for a sin-offering. [Stam comments:] But this rule only applies to new [outer garments]. As for old ones, we do not hold that he is liable [if he shakes them out on the Sabbath]. 27 28

Munich MS 95 ‫חסר‬ Munich MS 95 ‫הוה איכא טלא עליה‬

112

THE STORIES THEY TELL [Stam comments:] But this rule refers only to [new] black [outer garments]. As for [new] white and red [ones], we do not hold that he is liable [if he shakes them out on the Sabbath]. Ulla (JA 3) visited Pumbedita. He saw rabbis shaking out their outer garments [on the Sabbath]. He said: the rabbis are desecrating the Sabbath! R. Judah (BA 2) said to them: shake it [the gelimah] out in his presence. We are not at all particular. Abaye (BA 4) was standing before R. Yosef. He said to him [i.e., to Abaye]: bring me my hat. He [i.e., Abaye] saw that there was dew on it and was hesitant to give it to him [i.e., to R. Yosef]. He [i.e., R. Yosef] said to him [i.e., Abaye]: shake [the hat] and cast [off the dew]. We are not at all particular. 29

EXPLANATION

This sugya examines the permissibility of shaking out one’s tallit on the Sabbath. The tallit in question is not a prayer shawl but 29

‫חידושי הריטב"א מסכת שבת דף קמז עמוד א‬ ‫ פרש"י ז"ל שמנערה מן‬.‫אמר רב הונא המנער טליתו בשבת חייב חטאת‬ ‫ ובתוספות הקשו שאין מלבן בלי מים או‬,‫העפר והויא ליה תולדה דמלבן‬ ‫ ולפיכך פירשו שמנער מן הטל וכעובדא דכומתא דרב יוסף דבסמוך‬,‫משקה‬ Ritva: R. Huna said that one who shakes out his tallit on the Sabbath is liable for a sin offering. Rashi explained that he shakes out the dust, and this would be a derivative of the labor of “whitening” [#13 of the 39 forbidden Sabbath labors]. Tosafot points out a difficulty, that one cannot whiten without water or [some other] liquid, and therefore they interpreted this instance as shaking out to remove dew, [not dust,] as in the anecdote with R. Yosef’s hat in the next [episode].

2. HAVA QA’IMNA/HAVA YATIVNA SUGYOT

113

an outer garment, like a cloak or a Roman toga. It is made, most often, of wool or linen. The question that arises is, may one, upon removing a tallit, shake it out on the Sabbath, or is the act of shaking out forbidden, much as laundering is forbidden? The sugya opens with R. Huna in Bavel, saying that one who shakes out a tallit on the Sabbath incurs liability for a sin-offering. 30 That is the same punishment meted out for someone who performs any one of the 39 forbidden Sabbath labors (mShab 7:2). 31 In fact, the continuation of the sugya, instead of using the verb N.’.R (‫)נער‬, as did R. Huna, employs the verb N.P.Z (‫ )נפצ‬to describe the activity of shaking out. This verb is #14 on the list of 39. It describes one of the steps of producing a woolen fabric. The English translation is to shake, hackle, or split. 32 The fact that R. Huna prescribes a sin-offering as punishment for shaking out a tallit indicates that he views this act as a serious violation of the Sabbath. 33 Two statements by the stam follow R. Huna’s ruling. They limit the application of R. Huna’s ban to new black outer garments. As for old ones, or new colored ones, shaking out is per13 F

134F

There are other examples in which R. Huna is more stringent than his colleagues—he bans trimming vegetables in the late afternoon when Yom Kippur falls on the Sabbath (see below, bShab 11a) and he bans a wife from serving her husband wine when a menstruant (see below, bKetubot 61a). 31 The assumption behind the liability of a sin-offering is that the transgression was inadvertent. Were the transgression intentional, the punishment is execution at the hands of a court. See my article, “A New Interpretation of the Thirty-Nine Forbidden Sabbath Labors,” in The Faces of Torah, Studies in the Texts and Contexts of Ancient Judaism in Honor of Steven Fraade (V&R Academic 2017), 323-339. 32 Sokoloff, Babylonian Aramaic, 763. 33 There is no reason to think that Sabbath violations are limited to the 39 labors of mShabbat 7:2. Those 39 acts are major categories of Sabbath labor, avot melakhot, but many more actions or transgressions incur the same punishment. See my article, above. 30

114

THE STORIES THEY TELL

mitted. These statements may have actually been issued in response to the lenient direction of the rest of the sugya. Two anecdotes follow. The first contains the term iqla and the second the phrase hava qa’ei. As we have seen elsewhere, here too, in the first anecdote, a visiting rabbi from the land of Israel criticizes the Babylonian observance of the Sabbath. 34 When Ulla (JA 3) spends the Sabbath in Pumbedita, he sees Babylonian rabbis shaking out their gelimot (outer garments) on the Sabbath. He condemns their action, calling it, in very strong terms, a desecration of the Sabbath. The amora R. Judah (BA 2), apparently annoyed by Ulla’s criticism, says to the rabbis who are shaking out their garments, “go ahead and shake them out in his presence, for we—in Bavel—are not particular at all.” He is saying that although there is a ban on shaking out garments on the Sabbath, it does not apply to instances in which the owner of the garment is not particular about the cleanliness of his garment, i.e., the presence of dust or dirt does not bother him. R. Judah, in this way, tweaks R. Huna’s ban (and the ban that Ulla assumes): he tells his colleagues to openly shake out their gelimot on the Sabbath to show the visitor that if one is not particular about dirt or dust, shaking out a tallit or gelimah is not a forbidden Sabbath labor. 35 The anecdote that features Ulla reflects tension between rabbis of Bavel and those in the land of Israel. Elsewhere, Ulla criticizes Babylonian rabbis for allowing a person to knock on a door on the Sabbath and for measuring on the Sabbath. He is chastised by Rabbah (BA 3, one may knock on a door on the Sabbath, bEruv 104a) and Rabbah bar R. Huna (BA 3, son of R. See bEruv 104a on producing sounds on the Sabbath and bShab 157b on measuring on the Sabbath. In all three cases, it is Ulla, visiting from the land of Israel, who criticizes in strong terms a more lenient Babylonian Sabbath practice. 35 According to Rashi, and later the Ritva, the amora is saying that Babylonian rabbis who shake out their gelimot on the Sabbath are not doing so because dust or dirt on the gelimah troubles them but simply to make them look more attractive. 34

2. HAVA QA’IMNA/HAVA YATIVNA SUGYOT

115

Huna, one may measure on the Sabbath, bShab 157b). In this sugya, R. Judah is saying that we Babylonians need to show Ulla that here, in Bavel, we regard the activity of shaking out a gelimah on the Sabbath as perfectly acceptable. A second anecdote immediately follows the first. Were I not convinced that each successive anecdote makes a point of its own, I would have assumed that this second anecdote simply reiterates the point of the first, that if one is not particular, shaking out a garment is permitted on the Sabbath. But if we assume that there is a new point in the second anecdote, it can easily be found. The sugya reports that Abaye was standing before his mentor R. Yosef on the Sabbath (the same two scholars from the halizah sugya). R. Yosef asks Abaye to give him his hat. Note that this detail again shows that junior scholars waited on senior scholars, even on the Sabbath. Abaye notices that there is dew on the hat and hesitates to give it to R. Yosef, apparently thinking, along the lines of R. Huna who banned shaking out a tallit on the Sabbath, that it is forbidden to shake dew off a hat on the Sabbath. R. Yosef then says to Abaye, “shake the hat and cast off the dew, for we are not particular at all.” R. Yosef, in this second anecdote, is thus extending the halakhah further than did R. Judah in the first. R. Yosef is saying that one may even shake out a garment on the Sabbath to remove an unwanted substance, in this case dew. R. Judah only permitted shaking out a garment if one did not seek to remove dirt or dust, even if that happened to be the unintended outcome. He did not give permission to his colleagues to shake out a gelimah with the intention of removing a foreign substance. R. Yosef does exactly that: he extends permission to shake out a garment even to one who intends to remove unwanted dew. The editor undoubtedly included both anecdotes in the sugya because each makes a different, albeit related point. 36 In the end, some Sabbath regulations Munich 95 does not have any variants of significance. Rashi (s.v. hamena’er tallito) claims that the point of shaking out a cloak is to re-

36

116

THE STORIES THEY TELL

in Bavel are less stringent than the Sabbath regulations in the land of Israel: in Bavel one may produce sounds on the Sabbath, measure a basin, and shake out a gelimah or hat, even if covered with dew. 2.7 bPesahim 100b–101a, Reciting kiddush where one eats the Sabbath meal

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת פסחים דף ק עמוד ב‬ ‫ ידי‬,‫ ידי יין לא יצאו‬:‫ אמר רב‬.‫אותם בני אדם שקידשו בבית הכנסת‬ .‫( אף ידי קידוש לא יצאו‬.‫ ושמואל אמר )קא‬.‫קידוש יצאו‬ .‫ למה ליה לקדושי בביתיה? כדי להוציא בניו ובני ביתו‬,‫אלא לרב‬ ,‫ למה לי לקדושי בבי כנישתא? לאפוקי אורחים ידי חובתן‬,‫ושמואל‬ .‫דאכלו ושתו וגנו בבי כנישתא‬ ‫ אין קידוש אלא במקום‬:‫ דאמר שמואל‬,‫ואזדא שמואל לטעמיה‬ .‫סעודה‬ ‫ אבל ממקום למקום בחד ביתא‬,‫ הני מילי מבית לבית‬:‫סבור מינה‬ .‫לא‬ ‫ זימנין סגיאין הוה קאימנא קמיה‬:‫אמר להו רב ענן בר תחליפא‬ 37 .‫ והדר מקדש‬,‫ ונחית מאיגרא לארעא‬,‫דשמואל‬ [Stam comments:] For people who recited kiddush [on Friday night] in the synagogue: Rav (BA 1) said, they have not [yet] fulfilled their obligation of [drinking] wine but they have fulfilled their obligation to

move dust or dirt, and these activities are a form of bleaching, which is forbidden. Tosafot (s.v. hamena’er tallito) hold that removing dirt is fine, because it is not bleaching, but removing dew is not, because it is bleaching. Either way, the common point of both anecdotes is that shaking out a garment on the Sabbath is permitted provided one is not “particular” about whatever it is that one is removing. 37 MS Munich 95: ‫והוה‬

2. HAVA QA’IMNA/HAVA YATIVNA SUGYOT

117

recite kiddush. But Shmuel (BA 1) said, they have not even fulfilled their obligation to recite kiddush. [Stam asks and answers:] As for Rav, why recite kiddush [a second time] at home [if he has already discharged his own obligation in the synagogue]? [So that he can] discharge the obligations of his wife 38 and children to hear kiddush recited]. [Stam asks and answers:] As for Shmuel, why recite kiddush at the synagogue [since he has to repeat it at home]? [So that he can] discharge the obligations of those who eat and drink and sleep at the synagogue. And Shmuel is consistent with his own rule, for Shmuel said, one must recite kiddush at the place where one dines. [Stam comments:] They thought this meant from house to house [that if a person recites kiddush in one house and then moves to another house to dine, he is required to repeat kiddush where he dines.] But if he recites kiddush in one place in his own home and then decides to dine in a different place in his own home, he need not [recite kiddush a second time]. [Not so!] R. Anan bar Tahlifa said (BA 2): it happened often that I was standing before Shmuel [to serve him or dine with him] and he went down from the roof to the ground [floor] and recited kiddush a second time [after reciting it for the first time on the roof].

EXPLANATION

Even though the tenth chapter of Pesahim mainly focuses on the Passover seder (which does begin with kiddush), it also discusses the Friday night kiddush at length, which, as its name implies, is a prayer that declares the sanctity of the Sabbath or a festival. The phrase benei beito means “his wife.” See Saul Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshutah Moed (JTS 1962, 627). 38

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THE STORIES THEY TELL

The sugya opens with a question: need a person recite kiddush at home if he already recited it in the synagogue? Rav holds that recitation in the synagogue is sufficient but Shmuel says that kiddush also needs to be recited at home. 39 The stam comments that Shmuel is consistent with his own view, for he holds that kiddush must be recited where one eats the Sabbath meal. Three anecdotes follow. Immediately prior to each, the stam comments “and even R. X holds that kiddush must be recited where one eats the Sabbath meal.” That is, even though R. X never issued such a statement, his opinion on this matter can be deduced from an anecdote in which his behavior shows what he thinks. In its current form, the sugya strongly implies that the lesson of all three anecdotes is to show amoraic agreement with Shmuel’s rule that one must recite kiddush where one eats the Sabbath meal. But if we approach these anecdotes from the perspective that the editor included all three because each teaches something additional, three distinct and new points become apparent. The first of the three anecdotes, reported by his student, shows how Shmuel interpreted his own statement. The rule of reciting kiddush at the place where one dines means not just at the home where one will dine but at the very place in the home where one will dine. If a person recited kiddush in one room and then decided to dine in another room in the same house, he must repeat kiddush, as did Shmuel when he left the roof— where he apparently had planned to eat and where he had already recited kiddush—and dined inside. That is, this anecdote indicates that when Shmuel said that one must recite kiddush where one eats, he intended it to mean that kiddush needs to be recited at the very place where one will dine, not anywhere else The sugya raises a double question: need a person recite kiddush both at the synagogue and at home? Need a person recite kiddush over wine in both places? The answer is that kiddush over wine in both places is necessary. People at home need to hear kiddush recited. People sleeping at the synagogue also need to hear kiddush recited.

39

2. HAVA QA’IMNA/HAVA YATIVNA SUGYOT

119

in the same house. Note that Shmuel’s student, R. Tahlifa, is with him on Friday night on a regular basis, although it is not clear if he sits at the table with his mentor or serves him the meal. The sugya continues with a second anecdote: .‫ אין קידוש אלא במקום סעודה‬:‫ואף רב הונא סבר‬ ‫ ועיילי ליה למניה לבי גנניה‬,‫ ואיתעקרא ליה שרגא‬40 ‫דרב הונא קדיש‬ ‫ אין‬:‫ )אלמא קסבר‬.‫ וקדיש וטעים מידי‬,‫דרבה בריה דהוה שרגא‬ 41 (.‫קידוש אלא במקום סעודה‬ [Stam says:] And R. Huna (BA 2) also holds, one must recite kiddush at the place where one dines. For R. Huna recited kiddush, and then his lamp went out, and they brought his utensils to his son Rabbah’s (BA 3) chambers, where there was light, and he recited kiddush [a second time] and tasted a little bit of food. It follows that he holds that one must recite kiddush at the place where [one eats] the Sabbath meal.

EXPLANATION

The second anecdote relates that R. Huna recited kiddush at the place where he planned to eat, but before he could partake of the Sabbath meal his lamp went out. “They,” presumably his staff and maybe even his students, took everything to his son’s chambers, where there was light, and he recited kiddush a second time at those chambers and ate “something” there. That is, he did not eat a Sabbath meal in his son’s chambers, just a small amount of food. Immediately following the anecdote, the stam concludes—as it already stated above—that R. Huna subscribes to the principle that one must recite kiddush where one dines. 42 MS Munich 95: ‫ובעי מיטעם מידי‬ MS Munich 95: ‫חסר‬ 42 This apparently superfluous statement does not appear in MS Munich 95. 40 41

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THE STORIES THEY TELL

The new point R. Huna is making, which is why the amoraic editor included this anecdote, is that the meal that follows the recitation of kiddush—which will fulfill the requirement of reciting kiddush where one dines—may be minimal. It is not clear why R. Huna ate only a little in his son’s quarters, not a whole Sabbath meal. So as not to impose on his son? Perhaps. But this anecdote clearly shows that a small meal following kiddush is sufficient to discharge one’s obligation to recite kiddush where one eats his Sabbath meal. R. Huna has thus interpreted Shmuel’s rule in a lenient manner. The third anecdote: .‫ אין קידוש אלא במקום סעודה‬:‫ואף רבה סבר‬ ,‫ טעימו מידי‬:‫ כי הוה מקדש אמר לן‬43 ‫ כי הוינא בי מר‬:‫דאמר אביי‬ ‫ שרגא )ולא מקדש‬45 (‫ מתעקרא )לכו‬44 ‫דילמא אדאזליתו לאושפיזא‬ ‫ ובקידושא דהכא לא נפקיתו דאין קידוש אלא‬46 ,(‫לכו בבית אכילה‬ .‫במקום סעודה‬ [Stam says:] And Rabbah (BA 3), too, holds that kiddush must be recited at the place where one eats [the Sabbath] meal. For Abaye (BA 4) said: when we were at the master’s home, and he would recite kiddush, he would say to us, taste something [here], for perhaps when you go to your lodgings [to eat the Sabbath meal] the lamp will go out on you and you will not be able to recite kiddush at the place where you [planned to] eat the Sabbath meal. As for the kiddush [that you heard] here, you will The expression “when I was at/when we were at” is yet another way of saying that students were spending time in the home of their mentors. In this anecdote, Abaye speaks on behalf of several students. 44 MS Munich 95: ‫לבתייכו‬ 45 MS Munich 95: ‫חסר‬ 46 MS Munich 95: ‫חסר‬. The six noted differences between the Vilna Shas and MS Munich 95 do not change my claims about the innovative aspects of the anecdotes. 43

2. HAVA QA’IMNA/HAVA YATIVNA SUGYOT

121

not have discharged your obligation, because kiddush must be recited at the place where one eats [the Sabbath] meal.

EXPLANATION

The third anecdote is a report by Abaye that when he and others were at Rabbah’s home, their mentor would recite kiddush and tell his disciples to eat something right there lest, when they return to their lodgings, their lamp goes out and they would not have fulfilled the requirement of reciting kiddush where they dine. Presumably one cannot eat without light. But if they eat something at their mentor’s home after hearing him recite kiddush, they will have fulfilled their obligation to recite kiddush where they dine, even if they plan, from the outset, to eat their Sabbath meal elsewhere. That is, although this anecdote sounds much like the previous one, there is a new point here. Not only after the fact may one recite kiddush and eat just a little to fulfill Shmuel’s rule of reciting kiddush where one dines, but even from the outset—even if one plans in advance to eat a Sabbath meal elsewhere—so long as a student recites kiddush at his mentor’s home and eats just a little there, he has fulfilled his obligation to recite kiddush where he eats his Sabbath meal. When he then eats his full Sabbath meal elsewhere, he need not recite kiddush again. This is a different lenient interpretation of Shmuel’s rule. To summarize: The first anecdote teaches that reciting kiddush in one place in the home, i.e., on the roof, and then eating the Sabbath meal in a different place in the same home, is not to be considered fulfilling the rule of reciting kiddush where one eats. Kiddush must be recited in the very place in the home where one eats the Sabbath meal. The second anecdote suggests that even a small amount of food—not a complete Sabbath meal—fulfills the rule of reciting kiddush where one dines. 47 And Karo, in the Shulhan Arukh, says that even a small meal qualifies as a Shabbat meal for reciting kiddush where one dines Shulhan Arukh Hilkhot Shabbat 273:5. 47

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the third anecdote teaches that even if one plans in advance to eat a full Sabbath meal elsewhere, reciting kiddush in one place and eating a small amount of food there, fulfills the obligation to recite kiddush where one dines. 48 Note that each of these anecdotes develops further the stated requirement to recite kiddush where one dines, the first anecdote stringently and the next two leniently. My point is that each of the three anecdotes was included in the text to teach something additional about the basic rule that one must recite kiddush where one eats the Sabbath meal. The amoraic editor did not include the anecdotes to show how meticulous these rabbis were, how they fulfilled Shmuel’s rule of reciting kiddush at the Sabbath meal, but to show how amoraim interpreted and developed the rule over time. 49 By framing the ‫שולחן ערוך אורח חיים הלכות שבת סימן רעג סעיף ה‬ ‫ או‬,‫ אפי' אכל דבר מועט‬,‫כתבו הגאונים הא דאין קידוש אלא במקום סעודה‬ ‫ יצא ידי קידוש במקום סעודה וגומר סעודתו‬,‫שתה כוס יין שחייב עליו ברכה‬ ...‫במקום אחר‬ ‫ ושם א"צ לברך עוד על הכוס‬- ‫משנה ברורה סימן רעג ס"ק כד במקום אחר‬ .‫קודם שיסעוד דהא כבר יצא ידי קידוש‬ Karo, citing Geonim, and later the Mishnah Berurah, makes the implication of the anecdote explicit: a person need not repeat kiddush if he began the Sabbath meal in one place with kiddush, ate only a little, and then had a full meal elsewhere, as he had already planned to do. By eating a little, he has already fulfilled his obligation to eat where he recites kiddush. As the Mishnah Berurah notes, he need not repeat kiddush in the place where he eats his full Sabbath meal. 48 R. Kalmin, in Sages, Stories, notes that colleagues of similar rank rarely interact with each other (198ff.). 49 To the best of my knowledge, neither Rashi nor other Rishonim noted these developments. By that I mean that neither Rashi nor other Rishonim noted that these anecdotes accomplish more than the stam’s stated point that each of these three rabbis subscribed to the principle of reciting kiddush where one eats. Were these additional points obvious? I think not. It was not clear from the formulation of his principle that Shmuel meant that kiddush in one place in the house was not sufficient if one then ate the Sabbath meal in a different place in the same

2. HAVA QA’IMNA/HAVA YATIVNA SUGYOT

123

three anecdotes with the statement “and also R. X holds that one recites kiddush where one dines” the stam downplayed and even obfuscated the unique halakhic addition of each anecdote. 50 If we remember that the stam’s framing is post-amoraic, and at an earlier stage the sugya contained the three anecdotes without the frame, we can much more easily notice the new halakhic point of each. It is somewhat ironic that, by the end of the sugya, the overarching statement by Shmuel, that one may not recite kiddush in one location and eat the Sabbath meal in another location has been, in effect, reversed. Rabbah instructs his disciples to recite kiddush at his home, taste “a little something” to fulfill their kiddush-at-the-meal obligation, and then go and eat their Sabbath meal in a different location altogether. This amora has de facto decoupled kiddush from the Sabbath meal, the opposite of what Shmuel was trying to accomplish. We again note that students are with their mentor on a Friday night. R. Tahlifa bar Anan goes up to the roof with Shmuel and then down to the ground floor. It appears that he is going to dine with, or possibly serve, his mentor. Abaye and others are with Rabbah at his home on a Friday night, although following kiddush and a “snack” they eat their Sabbath meal elsewhere, presumably at their own lodgings. These details are consistent with, or perhaps give rise to, the theory of C. Hezser, 51 that in exchange for tuition, students were required to serve their master. The last sugya of the chapter is complicated. A nonspecialist might wish to skip it and move to the next chapter.

home. Nor was it obvious that the rule of kiddush where one dines meant that a minimal amount of food constituted a Sabbath meal afterthe-fact and even before-the-fact. Later amoraim had to come along and issue those modifications. 50 My thanks to Pratima Gopalakrishnan for this observation. 51 The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement, 332ff.

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THE STORIES THEY TELL

2.8 bBerakhot 11b, Reciting a blessing for the study of Mishnah and Midrash

Given this sugya’s complexity, an introduction: The question of whether or not one is required to recite a blessing before the study of Jewish texts is the subject of this sugya. The Ahavah Rabbah blessing that is part of the morning prayers covers all subjects that one may choose to study afterwards. But if one wishes to study before the morning prayers, the question of whether or not to recite a blessing for study arises. In the sugya below, knowledge of many other hava qa’amina sugyot makes it reasonable to identify and correct a textual error in this one. ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת ברכות דף יא עמוד ב‬ ‫ עד שלא קרא קריאת‬,‫ השכים לשנות‬:‫אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל‬ ,‫שמע צריך לברך‬ .‫ שכבר נפטר באהבה רבה‬,‫משקרא קריאת שמע אינו צריך לברך‬ ;‫ ולמדרש אינו צריך לברך‬,‫ למקרא צריך לברך‬:‫אמר רב הונא‬ ‫ למשנה אינו צריך‬,‫ למקרא ולמדרש צריך לברך‬:‫ורבי אלעזר אמר‬ ;‫לברך‬ ‫ ]אבל לתלמוד אינו‬,‫ אף למשנה נמי צריך לברך‬:‫ורבי יוחנן אמר‬ .[‫צריך לברך‬ ;[‫ אף לתלמוד צריך )לחזור ולברך( ]לברך‬:‫ורבא אמר‬ ‫ זימנין סגיאין הוה קאימנא קמיה דרב לתנויי‬:‫דאמר רב חייא בר אשי‬ ‫ הוה מקדים וקא משי ידיה ובריך ומתני לן‬,‫פרקין בספרא דבי רב‬ .‫פרקין‬ R. Judah (BA 2) said that Shmuel (BA 1) said: If one arose early to study, before he had recited the Shema, he must recite a blessing [for engaging in study]. If after he recited the Shema, he need not recite a blessing, because he is exempted by the Ahavah Rabbah [which immediately precedes the Shema and speaks of text study]. Said R. Huna (BA 2): for [the study of] Scripture he needs to say a blessing but for the [study of] Midrash he need not recite a blessing.

2. HAVA QA’IMNA/HAVA YATIVNA SUGYOT

125

But R. Eleazar (JA 3) said: for [both] Scripture and Midrash he needs to recite a blessing; for Mishnah he need not recite a blessing. But R. Yohanan (JA 2) said: even for Mishnah he needs to recite a blessing, but for Talmud he need not recite a blessing. But Rava (BA 4) said: even for Talmud he needs to recite a blessing. For R. Hiyya bar Ashi (BA 2) said: many times I was standing before Rav [BA 1, waiting for him] to teach our chapter in Sifra devei Rav and he would first wash his hands and recite a blessing [for study] and [then] teach us our chapter.

EXPLANATION

The question under discussion is which subjects require a blessing before one engages in their study, provided the study takes place before reciting the Ahavah Rabbah blessing in the morning Amidah. Four views are presented. R. Huna requires a blessing for the study of Scripture, but not for the study of Midrash. The word Midrash in this context means the derivation of new rules from the words of Scripture. R. Eleazar adds Midrash as requiring a blessing but excludes Mishnah. Mishnah, in this context, refers to rules introduced by rabbis that are not derived from, or closely associated with, the words of Scripture. R. Yohanan, his mentor, adds Mishnah but excludes Talmud, and Rava, much later, adds Talmud, which in his day most likely referred to the explication of Mishnah. An eyewitness report by R. Hiyya bar Ashi, an early amora, comes after these four views. He states that frequently, when in the presence of Rav, before his mentor would teach the disciples a chapter of Sifra devei Rav, which is a Midrash collection, he would wash his hands, recite a blessing [for study], and then teach. As we saw in the anecdotes preceding this one, the phrase hava qa’imna (I was standing) usually introduces an anecdote that connects to, or relates to, the immediately preceding state-

126

THE STORIES THEY TELL

ment. In this sugya, that is not the case. The eye-witness report does not speak of Talmud or even Mishnah, the subject of the two preceding statements. Rather, the anecdote sides with R. Eleazar (the second speaker of the four), who requires a blessing for Midrash, and rules against R. Huna (the first speaker of the four), who does not. More precisely, the anecdote supports the first part of R. Eleazar’s statement, about Midrash requiring a blessing, but is silent regarding the second part of his statement, that Mishnah does not. It is true that one could make the case that not only R. Eleazar but also R. Yohanan and Rava require a blessing for Midrash. Each of them added a subject before which to recite a blessing, but also accepted the views of their predecessors. If so, the anecdote supports all three of them. However, a hava qa’imna anecdote, in most cases, supports an explicitly stated halakhic opinion. A problem arises when the same anecdote appears a few folio pages later in the same tractate, at bBer 14b. .‫ וצלי‬,‫ ואנח תפילין‬,‫רב משי ידיה וקרא קריאת שמע‬ ‫ החופר כוך למת בקבר פטור מקריאת‬:‫והיכי עביד הכי? והתניא‬ ‫שמע ומן התפלה ומן ה‬ ‫ הגיע זמן קריאת שמע עולה‬,‫תפילין ומכל מצות האמורות בתורה‬ ... !‫ונוטל ידיו ומניח תפילין וקורא קריאת שמע ומתפלל‬ ‫ עול מלכות שמים‬:‫ דאמר‬,‫רב כרבי יהושע בן קרחה סבירא ליה‬ .‫תחלה ואחר כך עול מצות‬ ‫ קריאה‬,‫אימר דאמר רבי יהושע בן קרחה להקדים קריאה לקריאה‬ ?‫ מי סבר ליה כרבי יהושע בן קרחה‬,‫לעשיה מי שמעת ליה?! ותו‬ ,‫ זמנין סגיאין הוה קאימנא קמיה דרב‬:‫והאמר רב חייא בר אשי‬ ‫ ומנח תפילין והדר קרי‬,‫ומקדים ומשי ידיה ומברך ומתני לן פרקין‬ !‫קריאת שמע‬ ‫ מאי אסהדתיה דרב‬,‫וכי תימא בדלא מטא זמן קריאת שמע אם כן‬ !‫חייא בר אשי‬ ‫לאפוקי ממאן דאמר למשנה אין צריך לברך קמשמע לן דאף למשנה‬ ... .‫נמי צריך לברך‬ Rav (BA 1) washed his hands, recited Shema, donned tefillin, and prayed.

2. HAVA QA’IMNA/HAVA YATIVNA SUGYOT [Stam asks:] How could he do thus [don tefillin after reciting the Shema instead of before]? Did we not learn in a baraita, One who digs a grave for the deceased is exempt from [reciting] the Shema and the Amidah, from donning tefillin, and from all mizvot mentioned in the Torah; when the time for reciting the Shema arrives, he should come up [from the grave] and wash his hands and don tefillin and recite the Shema and [then] pray [the Amidah]! … [Stam answers:] Rav agrees with R. Joshua b. Qorhah who said (mBer 2:2), first accept the yoke of Heaven and only afterwards the yoke of mizvot [which means, in this context, first recite the Shema (or first study Torah) and afterwards don tefillin]. [Stam challenges that answer:] R. Joshua b Qorhah was not speaking of actions but recitations [i.e., he was saying that the Shema paragraph precedes the v’hayah im shamo’a paragraph, which is about mizvot, and so his view is not relevant in this context of study]. Moreover, can you say that Rav holds the same opinion as R. Joshua b Qorhah? Did not R. Hiyya bar Ashi say, many times I was standing before Rav and he would first wash his hands and then recite a blessing and teach us our chapter and then don tefillin and recite the Shema [which is the reverse order from that prescribed by R. Joshua b Qorhah—first the Shema and then tefillin]?! [So we cannot say that Rav agrees with R. Joshua b. Qorhah!] [Stam rejects a possible rejoinder:] And should you say that the anecdote [about Rav] speaks of a time in the morning when it was too early to recite the Shema [and that is why Rav first donned tefillin and then recited the Shema, and it therefore does not show that Rav disagreed with R. Joshua b. Qorhah], you would be wrong because then there would be no significance to the eyewitness testimony of R. Hiyya bar Ashi, for of course one has to don tefillin before reciting the Shema if it is too early to recite the Shema].

127

128

THE STORIES THEY TELL [Stam offers possible rejoinder:] The anecdote comes to reject the view that one need not recite a blessing for the study of Mishnah (i.e., the view of R. Eleazar); [it instead comes to teach] that even for Mishnah one is required to recite a blessing (i.e., the view of R. Yohanan) [as Rav did, before he taught a chapter, presumably of Mishnah. Thus the point of the anecdote is not to teach that one has to don tefillin before reciting the Shema. …]

There are two surprising phenomena in this passage on 14b. The first is that the words Sifra devei Rav are missing from the eyewitness report, words that do appear when the same anecdote is cited on 11b. 52 Without these words, the subject Rav taught at that early hour was not Midrash but Mishnah, because the word pirqin, as it appears elsewhere in the Bavli, refers to the study of Mishnah, not Midrash. The anecdote at 14b is therefore saying that Rav washed his hands, recited a blessing, taught a chapter of Mishnah early in the morning, and after that recited the Shema, donned tefillin and prayed. The second surprising phenomenon is that the stam at 14b says that the anecdote about Rav comes to refute the amora who holds that no blessing is required for the study of Mishnah, i.e., R. Eleazar, and in fact establishes that a blessing is required for the study of Mishnah, as suggested by R. Yohanan. But at 11b the very same anecdote comes to establish a different rule, that a blessing is required for the study of Midrash, because Midrash is what Rav taught his students, not Mishnah. We are therefore faced with a choice: If Rav taught his students Midrash, then he established, by his action, the requirement of a blessing before teaching Midrash (11b); however, if Rav taught his students

The report at bBer14b does include the words, “he donned tefillin and then recited the Shema,” which do not appear at 11b, but these words are not relevant to our discussion.

52

2. HAVA QA’IMNA/HAVA YATIVNA SUGYOT

129

Mishnah (14b), then he established, by his action, the requirement of a blessing before teaching Mishnah. 53 Which is it? To answer this question, we turn to the parallel sugya in the Yerushalmi, Berakhot 1:4, 3c. ‫ג‬:‫ ג‬,‫תלמוד ירושלמי )וילנא( מסכת ברכות פרק א הלכה ד‬ ‫ לאחר ק"ש א"צ‬,‫שמואל אמר השכים לשנות קודם ק"ש צריך לברך‬ .‫לברך‬ .‫א"ר בא והוא ששנה על אתר‬ .‫ר' חונה אמר נראים הדברים מדרש צריך לברך הלכות א"צ לברך‬ .‫רבי סימון בשם רבי יהושע בן לוי בין מדרש בין הלכות צריך לברך‬ ‫א"ר חייא בר אשי נהגין הוינן יתבין קומי רב ובין מדרש בין הלכות‬ .‫זקיקינן למיברכה‬ Shmuel (BA 1) said: if one arose early to study before [reciting] the Shema, he needs to recite a blessing. If [he arose to

A late Medieval commentator already notes the conflict between the two versions of the same anecdote. ‫שיטה מקובצת מסכת ברכות דף יד עמוד ב‬ ‫ואף על גב דלעיל מייתינן ראיה מהכא למאן דאמר למדרש צריך לברך‬ ‫דספרי דבי רב הוה מתני להו כדאיתא לעיל והכא אמרינן דראיה הוא למאן‬ ‫ איכא למימר דכיון שאין זה מקומו תלמודא לא דייק ודכותה‬.‫דאמר משנה‬ ‫איכא טובא‬ Shittah Mequbetzet: And even though earlier we bring a proof from here for the one who said that for the study of Midrash one needs to recite a blessing, for he was teaching them Sifra devei Rav, as we read above (11b), but here we say that it is proof for the one who said that for the study of Mishnah one needs to recite a blessing. This conflict can be resolved as follows: since this is not its “place” [ i.e., the prime location of the anecdote], the Talmud did not express itself with precision. There are many instances [in the Talmud] of this [phenomenon].

53

130

THE STORIES THEY TELL study] after [reciting] the Shema, there is no need to recite a blessing. R. Ba (JA 3) said: provided he studies at the same place [where he prays]. R. Huna (BA 2) said: it seems likely [nir’im hadevarim] that for Midrash he is required to recite a blessing, [but] for Halakhot [rabbinic teachings] he is not required to recite a blessing. R. Simon (JA 3) in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi (JA 1, RYBL): whether for Midrash or for Halakhot, he is required to recite a blessing. R. Hiyya bar Ashi (BA 2) said: it was our practice, when sitting before Rav (BA 1), that whether [the subject] was Midrash or Halakhot, we were required to recite a blessing.

Shmuel’s statement in the Yerushalmi about early morning study requiring a blessing is nearly identical to his statement in the Bavli. No Bavli parallel exists for R. Ba’s comment that limits the exemption from reciting a blessing to studying in the same place where one recited the Shema. The dispute that follows, between R. Huna and R. Simon/RYBL, in some ways resembles the dispute in the Bavli between R. Huna and R. Eleazar but is also different in crucial ways. In the Yerushalmi, R. Huna requires a blessing for Midrash but not for Halakhot, i.e., Mishnah and Talmud. His disputant, R. Simon/RYBL, requires a blessing for both Midrash and Halakhot. The immediately following eyewitness report by the same amora as in the Bavli, R. Hiyya bar Ashi, says that it was customary for Rav to require a blessing whether the subject was either Midrash or Halakhot. If we compare the Bavli and Yerushalmi versions of the dispute, we see that in the Yerushalmi all agree that one recites a blessing for Midrash. The question they are addressing is whether one also recites a blessing for Halakhot, meaning rabbinic teachings not directly connected to Scripture. R. Huna says no but R. Simon/RYBL says yes. The eyewitness report, which requires a blessing for Halakhot, thus supports R. Simon/RYBL

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131

and refutes R. Huna. Note that whereas in the parallel Bavli sugya the anecdote does not immediately follow the dispute, in the Yerushalmi it does. How does this Yerushalmi sugya affect our understanding of the Bavli sugya? If we compare the Yerushalmi version of the anecdote to the bBer 14b version, we see that neither contains the words Sifra devei Rav. It follows that the stam’s comment on 14b—that the anecdote teaches that one needs to recite a blessing for studying Mishnah—shows that the stam did not have the words Sifra devei Rav in the anecdote, i.e., that the word pirqin necessarily refers to Mishnah, not Midrash. Had the words Sifra devei Rav, which refer to a Midrash collection, appeared, they would have forced the stam to say that the anecdote on 14b teaches that one needs to recite a blessing before studying Midrash, not Mishnah. That is, the word pirqin would have to be understood as referring to a chapter of Midrash, not Mishnah. But since the stam spoke of a blessing before the study of Mishnah, it follows that the words, Sifra devei Rav, did not appear in his version of the anecdote, just as they do not appear in the Yerushalmi version of the anecdote. Rav was teaching Mishnah, not Midrash, to his students, and by reciting a blessing before study, he indicated that one should recite a blessing before the study of Mishnah. If we now delete the words “Sifra devei Rav” from the version of the anecdote at 11b, as the version at 14b and in the Yerushalmi imply we should, a number of problems will be solved. Once those words are removed, the subject Rav taught his students becomes Mishnah, and not Midrash. The anecdote, in its altered form, thus supports the view that one should recite a blessing before the study of Mishnah, but it does not address the issue of reciting a blessing before the study of Midrash. It therefore agrees with R. Yohanan, who added Mishnah to the list of subjects requiring a blessing, and it refutes the view of R. Eleazar who ruled out Mishnah as requiring a blessing. Moreover, without the words “Sifra devei Rav,” the anecdote immediately follows the view it comes to support: that of R. Yohanan who adds Mishnah as requiring a blessing and that of Rava who

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THE STORIES THEY TELL

adds Talmud, both of which can be called Halakhot, i.e., rabbinic teachings not based on Scripture. Rav is demonstrating in the HQ anecdote that the teachings of the tannaim who preceded him—which are not attached to Torah verses—that such teachings require a blessing, just as Scripture and Midrash do. And this behavior of Rav supports the view of R. Yohanan who requires a blessing for the study of Mishnah. If so, then Rav and R. Yohanan, and later on Rava, are all making a critically important statement: not just Torah and interpretation of Torah, i.e., Midrash, require a blessing before one engages in their study, but so do the independent pronouncements of rabbis. The amoraim are in this way ascribing authority to their own teachings. And this is why this sugya is so important. That Midrash requires a blessing is not debated in the Yerushalmi. Both R. Huna and R. Joshua b. Levi agree that it does, most likely because of the close connection of Midrash to Torah verses. But Mishnah and Talmud are composed of rabbinic teachings not generally connected to biblical verses. This is the question the Yerushalmi amoraim are debating: does one recite a blessing when studying this kind of rabbinic teaching? It follows that the Bavli amoraim are engaged in the same dispute: R. Eleazar says there is no need for a blessing on such texts whereas R. Yohanan says that a blessing is required for the study of Mishnah. And Rava adds also for the study of Talmud. In short, once we remove the words Sifra devei Rav from the anecdote on 11b, both problems noted above are solved. The anecdote on 11b is now adjacent to the dispute it comes to resolve. The stam’s comment on the anecdote on 14b—that Mishnah study requires a blessing—makes sense because he was familiar with a version in which Rav recited a blessing before teaching Mishnah, not Midrash. Examination of the mss. of the Talmud shows that the sugya on bBer 11b does not have a fixed wording. 54 The amoraic How does all of this play out in the mss.? There is agreement among the many mss. that R. Huna requires a blessing for Scripture but for 54

2. HAVA QA’IMNA/HAVA YATIVNA SUGYOT

133

spokesmen change from one ms. to the next, as do many of their opinions. The anecdote, however, appears in nearly identical wording in all ms. versions. It therefore seems to me that when the various ms. copyists read the anecdote, which by then contained the words Sifra devei Rav, they recognized that the HQ anecdote and the preceding set of halakhic opinions did not match as expected, and so they made changes in the authors of the halakhic opinions. The words Sifra devei Rav are a later addition to the anecdote on 11b. These words were added after the stam commented on the anecdote on 14b but before the era of the mss. Whoever added them likely thought that since the anecdote is about Rav and the name of a Midrash collection on Leviticus is Sifra devei nothing else. It also clear that R. Eleazar adds a blessing for another subject, either Midrash (Vatican [V], Munich [M], Firenze [F]) or Mishnah (Paris [P]) or Talmud (Rif, F) and that R. Yohanan implicitly requires a blessing for Midrash (Rif, M) and explicitly requires a blessing for Mishnah (V) or Talmud (Rif, M, P). Rava, who only appears in Vilna Shas and Firenze ms., implicitly requires a blessing for Miqra and Midrash (V, F), and explicitly requires a blessing for Mishnah (F) or Talmud (V). In sum, the mss. versions of the sugya at 11b differ from each other in significant ways. Moreover, each of the mss. has problems: In the Firenze ms., a number of points don’t make sense. How could R. Eleazar suggest a blessing for Talmud but not Mishnah? Also, the anecdote supports reciting a blessing for Midrash but that is not what the amoraim disagree about, yet an eyewitness anecdote usually supports one side of a dispute. In the Paris ms. the anecdote supports reciting a blessing for Midrash, but no amora even mentioned Midrash. In the Munich 95 ms., R. Yohanan holds one should recite a blessing for the study of Talmud. But no one has suggested reciting a blessing for the study of Mishnah. As for Alfasi (Rif), his version of the sugya reads well. But he is the only one to include Rav, who holds that one is required to recite a blessing for Midrash. That is the view of R. Eleazar in all other versions. Also, according to Alfasi, R. Eleazar holds no blessing is required for Midrash, but in all other mss. R. Eleazar requires a blessing for Midrash.

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THE STORIES THEY TELL

Rav, it is likely that that is what he was teaching. At an early stage, the amora in the original anecdote, in its appearance on both 11b and 14b, was making the point that a blessing is required not just for Midrash but also before the study of rabbinic teachings not directly related to Scripture, i.e., Mishnah and Talmud. If so, the anecdote nicely supported the amoraic view that preceded it. I cannot determine which amora it was because of the fluidity of the mss., but I can say with near certainty that the author of the view was adding the requirement of a blessing before studying either Mishnah or Talmud or both. If so, amoraim in both Talmuds are viewing their own teachings—which are not directly linked to Scripture—with the same level of worthiness for a blessing as Midrash, which links rabbinic teachings directly to Scripture. This sugya, therefore, presents a very strong statement by the rabbis themselves of the value of their own project. It is important to note that this is an instance of an HQ anecdote that resolves a dispute. As is characteristic of this kind of HQ anecdote, the amora in question does not tweak any halakhah. He merely carries out one or another opinion of the disputants. Such an anecdote may be categorized as ma’aseh rav, which means that an actual occurrence is greater, or carries more weight, than a hypothetical statement. It is dispositive.

SUMMARY

The phrases “I was standing before” and “I was sitting before” in the sugyot in this chapter also describe scholars of different statuses in a wide variety of settings. A junior scholar was standing or sitting before a senior scholar at a study session, a Friday night meal, at prayer, at a halizah release ritual, or ready to dab his mentor’s shoe for him on the Sabbath. These expressions suggest that the one who stands or sits before the other is subordinate to him, in the sense that he is expected to serve him. Yet the various sugyot that are analyzed in this chapter all show that when an amora is standing or sitting before his mentor, it is perfectly acceptable for him to question, even criticize, his mentor’s halakhic behavior. I will further assert that such activity is actually the role of a junior scholar. He is expected to

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sharpen the mentor’s halakhic thinking and challenge his pronouncements in order to prod the mentor to think his positions through more carefully. Critique by junior scholars of senior scholars is thus desirable and necessary. The outcome of such questioning is clarification of the mentor’s halakhic stance. As we saw again and again in the HQ/HY anecdotes, in response to a student’s critique of his halakhic behavior, a mentor would either narrow a ban or expand a leniency. The goal always was to reconcile his behavior with an earlier stated halakhah. To do so, however, the mentor needed to exclude his own set of circumstances from falling under the purview of the earlier stated rule that he was violating, as noted by the student. An example can be found at bBer 24a-b. Ravina criticizes R. Ashi for spitting on the ground during prayer instead of into his undergarment. R. Ashi defends his action by claiming he is fastidious. Hence, the rule of spitting into an undergarment does not apply to him. The practice of spitting on the ground during prayer thus becomes acceptable for others who are fastidious. We also saw a case in which a mentor conceded a point to his student, as R. Yosef did to Abaye regarding a levir’s shoe (bYev 103b). Once more we saw Ulla, from the land of Israel, harshly criticize a Babylonian lenient practice. His critique was rebuffed by his Babylonian colleagues who had instituted the leniency. And we saw that when a sugya presents a second anecdote in conjunction with the same halakhah as the first, it introduces a new, not immediately evident point. But if we look for the amora’s tweak, we will find it. Finally, in the last sugya, we saw a different role for a hava qa’imna anecdote: it resolves an amoraic dispute regarding reciting a blessing before studying Midrash (bBer 11b).

CHAPTER 3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES In addition to iqla anecdotes, which report that one amora visited another (Chapter 1), and HQ/HY anecdotes, which report that one amora was standing or sitting before another (Chapter 2), there is yet a third group of anecdotes which report that one amora “found” or “encountered” another. There is no implied travel in these anecdotes, as there is in iqla anecdotes. And there is no formal setting of one amora sitting or standing in the presence of another, as there is in many HQ/HY anecdotes. Rather, in this third group, one amora simply happens upon another, usually a junior amora encountering his mentor, a senior amora. The anecdotes relate the ensuing exchange between the two. As in iqla and HQ/HY anecdotes, the junior amora challenges the observed behavior of the senior scholar by citing a rule mentioned earlier in the sugya. For instance, he might say to his mentor, “since there is no mourning on the Sabbath, why are you donning a mourning headdress?” The mentor, most often, defends his behavior by case distinction. He thereby adjusts the halakhah, removing his own set of circumstances from being governed by the rule. 1 These “encountered him” anecdotes, like In HQ anecdotes, as already noted, it is the junior scholar who stands or sits before the senior scholar. In “he found him” anecdotes, it is generally the case that the one who encounters the other is junior to him. 1

137

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THE STORIES THEY TELL

others in previous chapters, show halakhic development over time; by including them in the sugya, the amoraic editor advises and informs the audience of this phenomenon. As noted earlier, the amoraic layer of the Talmud is composed of statements by amoraim and anecdotes about amoraim. Each of the “encountered him” anecdotes in this chapter, when read carefully, describes a modification of halakhah by an amora. A question to ask again here is: Did the senior amora, who acted differently from what the earlier halakhah stipulated, intend to change the law, or was he just, by chance, caught in “deviant” behavior by a student or colleague? If the latter, then the defense that the attacked amora offers is an attempt to exculpate himself. By that I mean that it was not his intention from the outset to change the law. He just wanted, for instance, to amuse a child on the Sabbath and for that reason glided him down the back of an animal (bShab 154b). But when questioned by his student, he justified his action, thereby changing the earlier halakhah so that it now allows for this exception. This would be incidental, not premeditated change. Another possibility is that the attacked amora fully intended to modify an earlier rule and acted accordingly. One might imagine that he was even hoping to be observed by a student, and when that did happen, he justified his action. If so, one way to change halakhah is to go ahead and perform the change and then explain it to students— that is, not to discuss the change with students or colleagues in advance, but to just go ahead and act on it. Also possible is that the senior amora intended, at the outset, for the change to be more encompassing but, when questioned by a colleague, limited the change to a narrower set of circumstances. It is impossible to determine with certainty which of these possibilities is true for a given anecdote. There are also instances in which the amora who criticizes or comments is himself the senior or more prominent amora, and the criticized amora is junior to him. In these cases, the criticized amora does not defend his behavior to his more prominent or more senior colleague. The general rule for halakhic anecdotes seems to be that senior and prominent amoraim are innovators: when their behavior is criticized, they put forward a

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139

modification of an existing rule. When they themselves criticize the behavior of others, their criticism stands. No rejoinder is offered by the person they criticize, and the criticism itself often contains a halakhic adjustment. In “he encountered him” anecdotes, the meeting does not take place in a “study” location; a junior scholar may come upon his senior scholar sleeping in a kilat hatanim (bridal chamber, bSuk 19b) or suffering from the heat when staying indoors on a Sabbath day (bShab 95a). Such scenarios imply a disciplemaster relationship in which the disciple attends to his master at all times and in all locations. Eleven sugyot will illustrate these notions. 3.1 bShabbat 154b, Sliding a child down the back of an animal on the Sabbath

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת שבת דף קנג עמוד א‬ ‫ הגיע לחצר החיצונה נוטל את הכלים‬... ‫ מי שהחשיך בדרך‬.‫משנה‬ ‫ והשקין נופלין‬,‫ ושאינן ניטלין בשבת מתיר החבלים‬,‫הניטלין בשבת‬ .‫מאיליהם‬ Mishnah: If the Sabbath begins [when a person is still traveling] on the road … upon entering the outer courtyard [of town] he should remove [from the pack-animal] items that are permitted to be used on the Sabbath. As for items that are forbidden to be used on the Sabbath, he loosens the ropes [on the animal’s back] and the sacks fall to the ground on their own.

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת שבת דף קנד עמוד ב‬ ‫ היתה בהמתו טעונה שליף של‬:‫תניא רבי שמעון בן יוחי אומר‬ .‫ והוא נופל מאליו‬,‫תבואה מניח ראשו תחתיה ומסלקו לצד אחר‬ ‫חמורו של רבן גמליאל היתה טעונה דבש ולא רצה לפורקה עד‬ .‫מוצאי שבת למוצאי שבת מתה‬ ... .‫אביי אשכחיה ליה לרבה דקא משפשף ליה לבריה אגבא דחמרא‬ !‫ קא משתמש מר בבעלי חיים‬:‫אמר ליה‬

140

THE STORIES THEY TELL 2 .‫רבנן‬

‫ וצדדין לא גזרו בהו‬,‫ צדדין הן‬:‫אמר ליה‬

A tannaitic teaching: R. Simon bar Yohai says, [If the Sabbath begins when a person is still traveling on the road, and] his animal is loaded with a bag of grain [that was not yet tithed, then when he arrives at the outer courtyard] he should place his head under the bag and push it to the other side [of the animal] so that it falls down on its own. Rabban Gamliel’s donkey was loaded with honey. He did not want to unload it until the end of the Sabbath. At the end of the Sabbath, the animal dropped dead. … Abaye (BA 4) encountered Rabbah (BA 3) [on the Sabbath] gliding his son down the back of a donkey. Abaye said to him: you are making use of an animal [on the Sabbath which is not allowed]! He [Rabbah] answered him: [I am only using] the sides of the animal and the rabbis did not decree against [using] the sides.

EXPLANATION

The mishnah discusses what to do if one arrives home with a pack animal after the Sabbath has begun. Unloading the animal may take place according to certain guidelines: Utensils with a permitted Sabbath use may be removed from the animal; utensils without a permitted Sabbath use may only be dropped from the back of the animal to the ground. The latter utensils are muqzeh, which means that they may not be handled on the Sabbath. However, they should not remain on the pack animal for the duration of the Sabbath because the animal would suffer. Without the muqzeh items themselves being handled, ropes can be loosened and the muqzeh items will fall to the ground of their own accord. The underlying principle of this rule is concern for 2

MS Munich 95 ‫צדדין הן וצדדין מותרין ולא גזרו בהו לרבנן‬

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

141

the welfare of animals and, it follows, the financial welfare of their owner. The sugya opens with a tannaitic text. The first clause relates how to unload a pack animal carrying untithed grain if the driver reached town after the onset of the Sabbath. The second clause presents an anecdote illustrating the potential cost of not taking advantage of this or another permitted method. Rabban Gamliel’s donkey arrived home after dark on a Friday afternoon. Instead of removing the load of honey from the animal’s back on the Sabbath, he left it on the animal. When the Sabbath ended, the donkey dropped dead. The anecdote clearly disapproves of leaving a load on an animal for the entire Sabbath to avoid unloading it on the Sabbath. 3 Although the stam, via a complicated set of superimposed circumstances (not quoted above), defends Rabban Gamliel’s refusal to remove the heavy load of honey from the back of his pack animal, the overall sense of the sugya is that one should not do what he did. The immediate context of the “he found him” anecdote that follows is, thus, concern for the welfare of animals as expressed by not “using” them on the Sabbath. An anecdote reports that Abaye encounters his mentor Rabbah gliding his child down the sides of an animal on the Sabbath, apparently to entertain him (Rashi s.v. dimeshafshef). He says to Rabbah: “But you are not allowed to use an animal on the Sabbath!,” basing himself, it seems, on the local mishnah and associated baraita, and presumably referring to a commonly understood, more general principle that any use of an animal is forbidden on the Sabbath. Rabbah responds that the ban does not extend to the sides of the animal. That is, both Abaye and Rabbah understand the local mishnah as saying that one may not make use of an animal on the Sabbath, but they differ on the extent of the ban—i.e., what “using” means. Abaye prohibits It is not clear why the jugs of honey are muqzeh, since food is, by definition, not muqzeh. The stam suggests that the honey was spoiled and hence no longer edible. 3

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THE STORIES THEY TELL

gliding a child down the sides of an animal on the Sabbath; Rabbah claims that the ban is limited to the animal’s back, and so gliding a child down the sides is permitted. Rabbah thus defends his action by distinguishing between the back and sides of an animal. 4 This is a typical “he encountered him” anecdote. One rabbi chances upon another performing an action on the Sabbath that the first thinks is forbidden. The other, caught in the act, limits the implied ban to circumstances other than his own. The ban in this instance, Rabbah claims, refers only to using the back of the

4

‫רש"י מסכת שבת דף קנד עמוד ב‬ ,‫ לא רוכבין על גבי בהמה‬:(‫ ב‬,‫ ותנן )ביצה לו‬- ‫קא משתמש מר בבעלי חיים‬ ‫והוא הדין לכל תשמיש‬ The master is making use of animals – and we learned in a mishnah (bBesah 36b), no riding on the back of an animal [on a Sabbath or festival], and the same applies to any use [of an animal]. ‫ ואין זה דרך‬,‫ אלא משפשפו על צדי גבו‬,‫ שאינו מרכיבו עליו‬- ‫צדדין‬ ‫ ורבנן לא גזרו בה‬,‫תשמישו‬ Sides – that he does not have him ride on the animal, rather he glides him down the sides of its back, and this is not the manner [in which an animal is generally] used and so the rabbis did not issue a ban on it. Rashi (s.v. zedadin) explains Rabbah’s stance, that making use of the sides is permitted, by suggesting that one does not generally use the sides of an animal, only the back, and hence the sides were not included in the ban on making use of an animal on the Sabbath. Rashi (s.v. qa mishtamesh mar beva’alei hayyim) cites mBes 5:2 as the source for the ban on using an animal on the Sabbath. In that mishnah only riding is banned, as a shevut (total cessation of work) violation, but Rashi claims that the ban extends to all manners in which one might use an animal on the Sabbath. Note that the reason mBesah 5:2 forbids riding on an animal on the Sabbath is not out of concern for the welfare of the animal. Rashi, in my opinion, could have used the local mishnah as the source for a ban on mistreating an animal on the Sabbath. It is not clear why he did not do so.

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143

animal, not the sides. He has thus narrowed the ban, thereby defending his own action. It is worth noting that, since a ban on using an animal on the Sabbath or festivals is not stated clearly anywhere in tannaitic or earlier amoraic literature, it is hard to fully grasp Abaye’s critique, phrased in the language of “using”. However, locating the anecdote about gliding a child down an animal’s back right after a tannaitic anecdote in which Rabban Gamliel let a pack animal die rather than remove muqzeh items from its back on the Sabbath, implies a ban on Sabbath exploitation, or even use, of animals. The anecdote featuring Rabbah and Abaye has thus created an exclusion from the ban. 5 There is a discussion in the Yerushalmi (yShab 5:2, 7b) on precisely the same question of making use of an animal on the Sabbath. When amoraim deliberate about what an animal may wear out into the public domain on the Sabbath, the question arises whether or not one may make use of the sides of an animal on the Sabbath. Some amoraim say one may not and others say one may. R. Shemi resolves the dispute with a statement of the tanna R. Shimon b. Eleazar: one is permitted to make use of the sides of an animal on the Sabbath. 6 The Bavli discusses both here and at bHagigah 16b the issue of using the sides of an animal on a festival or Sabbath, arriving in both sugyot at the conclusion, as suggested by Abaye, that one may not make use of the sides of an animal on those days. Rabbah, who rules leniently, may have been familiar with the tanna R. Shimon b. Eleazar’s permission to make use of the 16 F

The issue of “sides” occupies the sugya’s ongoing attention. Abaye, when challenged, defends his position several times over. Following a comment by R. Pappa, the gemara decides that the halakhah is that “sides are forbidden,” which was Abaye’s position. Rabbah’s modification is rejected. 6 ‫ב‬:‫ ז‬,‫תלמוד ירושלמי )וילנא( מסכת שבת פרק ה הלכה ב‬ .‫ דתני רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר מותר להשתמש על צדדי בהמה בשבת‬... … As (the tanna) R. Shimon b. Eleazar taught: one may make use of the sides of an animal on the Sabbath. 5

144

THE STORIES THEY TELL

sides of an animal, and, basing himself on that view, permitted himself to glide his child down the sides of an animal on the Sabbath. In any event, in Rabbah’s day no conclusion had yet been reached, either in Bavel or the land of Israel, regarding the permissibility (or impermissibility) of making use of the sides of an animal on the Sabbath. Rabbah’s gliding his child down the back of an animal on the Sabbath appears to trigger the discussion of this topic. Unlike most other halakhic anecdotes, in this instance the anecdote does not get the last word. Amoraim comment on the issue and decide, ultimately, against Rabbah’s leniency. That is, this anecdote shows a senior amora tweaking the law in response to criticism by a junior amora, but the tweak is later rejected. 3.2 bSukkah 19b, Sleeping in a bridal bed in a sukkah ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת סוכה דף יט עמוד ב‬ ‫ רבי אליעזר‬,‫ או שסמכה לכותל‬,‫ העושה סוכתו כמין צריף‬.‫משנה‬ .‫ וחכמים מכשירין‬,‫פוסל מפני שאין לה גג‬ Mishnah: One who makes his sukkah like a hut [i.e., with sloping sides and no roof] or constructs it leaning on a wall [again, with sloping sides and no roof], R. Eliezer declares it unfit because it does not have a roof, but the Sages declare it fit.

‫ מודה רבי אליעזר שאם הגביהה מן הקרקע טפח או‬:‫ תנא‬.‫גמרא‬ .‫ מן הכותל טפח שהיא כשרה‬7 ‫שהפליגה‬ .‫מאי טעמייהו דרבנן? שיפועי אהלים כאהלים דמו‬ .‫אביי אשכחיה לרב יוסף דקא גני בכילת חתנים בסוכה‬ ?‫ שבקת רבנן ועבדת כרבי אליעזר‬,‫ כמאן כרבי אליעזר‬:‫אמר ליה‬ .‫ רבי אליעזר מכשיר וחכמים פוסלין‬,‫ ברייתא איפכא תני‬:‫אמר ליה‬ ?‫שבקת מתניתין ועבדת כברייתא‬ 7

MS Munich 95 ‫הרחיקה‬

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

145

‫ העושה סוכתו כמין צריף או‬:‫ דתניא‬.‫ מתניתין יחידאה היא‬:‫אמר ליה‬ ,‫ רבי אליעזר פוסל מפני שאין לה גג‬:‫ רבי נתן אומר‬,‫שסמכה לכותל‬ ‫וחכמים מכשירין‬ Gemara: A tannaitic text, R. Eliezer concedes that if a person raised [the sloping sides of a hut] one tefah (handbreadth) off the ground, or moved the hut one tefah away from the wall [on which it was leaning], then it is a fit [sukkah because he has created a roof]. 8 [Stam asks:] What is the reasoning of the Sages [who declare a sukkah without a roof to be fit]? [Stam answers:] The sloping [sides of] tents [e.g., the structures in the mishnah] are to be considered [tents, even without a roof, and therefore are valid sukkot]. Abaye (BA 4) encountered R. Yosef (BA 3) sleeping in a sukkah in a bridal bed [above which was suspended a sloping curtain]. He said to him: Like whom [do you hold]? Like R. Eliezer [who holds that the sloping curtain over a bridal bed is not to be considered a tent, and hence sleeping under such a curtain is still to be viewed as sleeping under the thatch of the sukkah]? Have you abandoned the rabbis and acted according to [the view of] R. Eliezer?! He [R. Yosef] answered him: a baraita teaches the reverse, R. Eliezer deems a sukkah [with sloping sides] valid but the rabbis deem it invalid. [Abaye said to R. Yosef]: have you abandoned the mishnah and acted in accordance with a baraita? He [R. Yosef] answered him: our mishnah is the view of one [tanna] only, as [another] baraita teaches: if one makes his sukkah like a hut, R. Natan says that R. In the first instance, the sloping side is now the roof. In the second instance, the “tefah” is the roof.

8

146

THE STORIES THEY TELL Eliezer declares it unfit, because it does not have a roof, but the Sages declare it fit. [Attributing the mishnah’s version of the dispute to only one tanna implies that the rest of the tannaim of that generation hold the opposite view, i.e., that R. Eliezer declares such a sukkah fit but the Sages declare it unfit. It follows that when R. Yosef was seen sleeping in a bridal bed in a sukkah, he was acting according to the Sages who do not regard sleeping in a bridal bed as sleeping in a tent, which means that they would regard R. Yosef as sleeping under the thatch.]

EXPLANATION

The Sages in the mishnah hold that a sukkah with sloping sides but no roof is a fit sukkah. R. Eliezer disagrees and declares it unfit. The issue seems to be whether or not a tent, which does not have a roof, only sloping sides, is a valid sukkah. The Sages say it is but R. Eliezer says it is not. The sugya continues with an amoraic exchange. Abaye, a junior scholar, encounters R. Yosef, his mentor, sleeping in a sukkah in a bridal bed over which was suspended a sloping curtain. R. Yosef thus appears to have accepted the view of R. Eliezer in the mishnah, who holds that a structure with sloping sides and no roof—whether a hut or a tent or a bridal bed—is not a valid sukkah. Therefore, sleeping in a bridal bed in a sukkah is still to be considered as sleeping under the thatch of the sukkah. The bed’s sloping curtain does not intervene. It is as if the curtain is not there. Abaye criticizes his mentor, saying that R. Yosef has abandoned the view of the Sages, as stated in the mishnah, and instead adopted the view of the dissenting R. Eliezer. This is a strong accusation since R. Eliezer is known to be a follower of the House of Shammai and their opinions do not generally become standard practice. R. Yosef, in defense of his own behavior, cites a baraita which reverses the views of the mishnah. According to this baraita, it is R. Eliezer, and not the Sages, who declares a sloping-side structure to be fit. The Sages, in this baraita, declare it unfit. It follows that in their view a bridal bed with a sloping curtain is not to be regarded as a fit sukkah. One may therefore sleep in a bridal bed in a sukkah.

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

147

According to this baraita, R. Yosef is following the view of the Sages, not of R. Eliezer. Abaye does not accept R. Yosef’s defense of his behavior. He goes on to express surprise that his mentor would regard the baraita’s reversed version of the dispute as more authoritative than the mishnah’s. R. Yosef then offers a different defense. He claims that the version of the mishnah in which the Sages regard a sloping-side sukkah as fit is the view of one tanna only, R. Natan. This implies that the rest of the tannaim of R. Natan’s generation hold that the Sages regard a sloping-side sukkah as unfit. If so, one who sleeps under a bridal canopy in a sukkah is still sleeping under the thatch. There is no further response by Abaye and no further discussion of the matter. R. Yosef has the final word, but his arguments are problematic. First, there are no extant parallels anywhere in rabbinic literature of a baraita that reverses the views of the Sages and R. Eliezer on this matter. Second, there are no extant texts of a baraita that say that the mishnah’s presentation of the dispute is the view of one tanna only. Third, there is no extant text in which the Sages hold that a sloping-side sukkah is unfit. Fourth, the baraita that opens the sugya, which also appears in the Tosefta and Yerushalmi, 9 indicates clearly that R. Eliezer holds the view that a sloping-side sukkah is not fit, for he says that the only way to make a sloping-side sukkah fit is to provide it with a roof. It is thus hard to accept R. Yosef’s contention that the views of the mishnah should be reversed, with Sages holding that a sloping-side sukkah is unfit and R. Eliezer that it is fit. It is then reasonable to conclude that R. Yosef fabricated the two tannaitic texts he cited in order to defend his behavior to his student who correctly noted that, by sleeping under a bridal tent in a sukkah, R. Yosef was abandoning the rabbis’ view (that in doing so he was not sleeping under the thatch) and siding with R. Eliezer (that in doing so he was sleeping under the thatch). That kind of criticism demands a response. It led R. 9

tSuk 1:10; ySuk 1:11, 52c.

148

THE STORIES THEY TELL

Yosef to produce two texts, one after the other, to justify his behavior. 10 It is also possible that the stam produced them and attributed them to R. Yosef. But one can also read the amoraic exchange somewhat differently: It is possible that R. Yosef wanted to introduce a leniency, i.e., that sleeping in a bridal bed in a sukkah is in accord with the requirement of dwelling under the thatch. He could have issued a halakhic statement that made that point. Instead, he went ahead and slept in a bridal bed in a sukkah. When questioned by his student Abaye, he defended himself in the most convincing way he could think of: by citing texts that supported his position, even though he himself created those texts. Also possible is that he did not respond at all because he believed that his action indicated his opinion. And he did not think it problematic to decide the halakhah, in this case, like R. Eliezer. 3.3 bMoed Qatan 20b, Mourning with a wife ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת מועד קטן דף כ עמוד ב‬ ‫ שכהן מיטמא להן אבל מתאבל‬,‫ כל האמור בפרשת כהנים‬:‫תנו רבנן‬ ‫ דברי‬,‫וכשם שמתאבל עליהם כך מתאבל על שניים שלהם‬... .‫עליהן‬ .‫ כל שמתאבל עליו מתאבל עמו‬:‫ וחכמים אומרים‬... .‫רבי עקיבא‬ Traditional commentators on the Talmud won’t admit such a possibility and will simply accept that R. Yosef had access to the texts he cited, that he did not fabricate them. But the lack of any parallels, and the fact that a baraita appearing in the Tosefta and in both Talmuds suggests that R. Eliezer is of the opinion, as stated in the Mishnah, that a sloping-side sukkah is not valid, supports my contention that R. Yosef fabricated the texts he cites to defend his innovative behavior to his student. Other examples of “fabrication” can be found at bBer 43b and bYev 106b. As noted above, the stam, at bBer 43b, claims that R. Pappa fabricated a text to defend his own behavior. It is possible, however, that R. Pappa was trying to shift the halakhah away from the House of Shammai and replace it with the halakhah of the House of Hillel, according to whom one generally fixes the halakhah. See my comments on bBer 43b, above.

10

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES !‫חכמים היינו תנא קמא‬ .‫איכא בינייהו עמו בבית‬ ‫(אמר ליה רב לחייא בריה )וכן אמר ליה רב הונא לרבה‬11 ‫)כי הא ד‬ .‫ בלא אפה לא תינהוג אבילותא‬,‫ באפה נהוג אבילותא‬:12 (‫בריה‬ .‫ סבר למיתב עליה שבעה ושלשים‬,‫מר עוקבא שכיב ליה בר חמוה‬ ‫ צודנייתא בעית למיכל? לא‬:‫ אמר ליה‬.‫ אשכחיה‬,‫על רב הונא לגביה‬ ‫ מי שמת חמיו או‬:‫ דתניא‬.‫אמרו לכבוד אשתו אלא חמיו וחמותו‬ .‫חמותו אינו רשאי לכוף את אשתו להיות כוחלת ולהיות פוקסת‬ ‫ וכן היא שמת חמיה או‬.‫ ונוהג עמה אבילות‬,‫אלא כופה מטתו‬ ‫ אלא כופה מטתה‬,‫חמותה אינה רשאה להיות כוחלת ולהיות פוקסת‬ .‫ונוהגת עמו אבילות‬ A baraita: for close relatives mentioned in Parashat Kohanim (Leviticus 21:1–3), i.e., those for whom a kohen defiles himself [should they die], a mourner is required to observe mourning rites for them. They are: his wife, father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter. … And just as he mourns for these individuals, he mourns for their relatives in the second degree. That is the opinion of R. Akiva. … But the Sages say: whomever he mourns for, he should also mourn with. [Stam asks:] [But] the Sages’ [view] is the same as that of the first tanna [i.e., R. Akiva]! [Stam replies:] They differ on at least one case: when someone is with the mourner in the same house. As Rav (BA 1) said to his son Hiyya (BA 2), and R. Huna (BA 2) said to his son Rabbah (BA 3): When in her presence, engage in mourning practices; when not in her presence, do not. A son of Mar Uqba’s father-in-law died [i.e., a brother of Mar Uqba’s wife]. Mar Uqba (BA 1/2, exilarch) was thinking of sitting shivah and sheloshim for him [together with his wife]. R. Huna entered Mar Uqba’s home, 11 12

MS Munich 95 ‫חסר‬ MS Munich 95 ‫חסר‬

149

150

THE STORIES THEY TELL found him [sitting shivah with his wife], and said to him: you wish to eat mourners’ fare?! They [the Sages] only said out of deference to one’s wife [that he should mourn with her] when her mother or father dies. As a baraita states: if his mother-in-law or father-in-law dies, he is not permitted to compel his wife to plait her hair or apply cosmetics. Rather, he should overturn his couch and join her in mourning. And similarly, if her mother-in-law or father-in-law dies, she may not plait her hair or apply cosmetics but should overturn her couch and join him in mourning.

EXPLANATION

The topic of the sugya is determining for which close relatives one sits shivah [the seven day mourning period] and observes sheloshim [the thirty day mourning period]. The first tanna of the baraita, R. Akiva, says that one mourns for close relatives— spouse, parents, siblings, and children—those listed in the Torah (Leviticus 21:1–3) for whom a kohen must defile himself. One also mourns, he says, for relatives of the second degree, such as a father’s father. The Sages then say that any person one sits shivah for, one also sits shivah with. That is, if a person is required to sit shivah for a parent, then if that parent sits shivah for a close relative, such as his or her brother, the child joins that parent in shivah. The stam issues a challenge, noting that the Sages and R. Akiva are saying the same thing, and, if so, there was no need for both views to appear in the baraita. However, the stam continues, there is at least one case that differentiates them from each other. The first tanna, R. Akiva, requires mourning with one’s relatives when in their presence and even when not in their presence. The Sages require mourning with one’s relatives only when in their presence—literally, with. The stam’s distinction appears to have been drawn from the amoraic statements that follow. Rav and R. Huna both tell their sons that when a husband joins a wife in mourning, he need only do so

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

151

when in her presence. When not in her presence, he need not observe mourning rites. 13 An anecdote follows. Mar Uqba’s (BA 1/2, exilarch) brother-in-law died. He was thinking of sitting shivah and observing sheloshim with his wife. Since Mar Uqba would mourn for her, he felt he should mourn with her, as stated by the Sages in the baraita. R. Huna (BA 2) visited Mar Uqba, the political head of the Jewish community in Bavel, and found him observing mourning rites along with his wife. He criticized him for doing so, citing a different baraita which says that one only observes mourning rites together with a wife when she mourns her parents, not when she mourns a sibling. The role of the anecdote is clear: it modifies a rule of the first baraita—whoever one mourns for, one should also mourn with—limiting the instances in which one joins a wife in mourning to the death of a spouse’s parents. We see here a younger colleague (R. Huna) criticizing a somewhat older one (Mar Uqba), who is also the exilarch. Mar Uqba does not respond. The halakhah has now been adjusted according to the opinion of R. Huna: One does not observe mourning rites with a wife for relatives other than her parents. This is not a typical “he found him” case. In general, in the kinds of sugyot we have been discussing, when one amora criticizes the behavior of another, the one who criticizes supports his claim with a halakhah or a baraita cited earlier in the sugya. In this instance, it is Mar Uqba, the target of the criticism, who upheld the dictates of the baraita that appears at the beginning of the sugya. It is the criticizing rabbi, R. Huna, who supports his own position—which is at variance with the first baraita— with a second baraita he now introduces into the sugya. 14 Thus, The Yerushalmi makes a similar point, yMQ 3:5, 83a. The parallel baraita in the Yerushalmi, however, includes mourning with a spouse not just for the parents of the spouse, but also for other relatives of the spouse. Shmuel comments on the baraita that the rule of mourning with a spouse applies only to the parents of the spouse. It is thus not surprising that in the Bavli, Mar Uqba was planning on joining

13 14

152

THE STORIES THEY TELL

it is R. Huna, a prominent amora, who, with the aid of a baraita, modifies the halakhah regarding the relatives for whom one joins a spouse in mourning, introducing a halakhic position we have not seen before. That Mar Uqba, an exilarch, who does not have the title “rabbi,” does not respond to the criticism is not surprising, as noted above. If a senior scholar criticizes a junior scholar, the latter does not defend his behavior. The same principle appears to hold when a prominent amora criticizes an exilarch. 3.4 bMoed Qatan 24a, Mourning on the Sabbath ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת מועד קטן דף כד עמוד א‬ ‫ יש אבילות בשבת או אין אבילות‬:‫בעא מיניה רבי יוחנן משמואל‬ ?‫בשבת‬ .‫ אין אבילות בשבת‬:‫אמר ליה‬ ... ,‫ זקיפת המטה‬,‫ חזרת קרע לאחוריו‬,‫ פריעת הראש‬... :‫אמר שמואל‬ ‫ רחיצת ידים ורגלים בחמין‬,‫ תשמיש המטה‬,‫ נעילת הסנדל‬.‫חובה‬ .‫ רשות‬,‫ערבית‬ .‫ מטייל באונקלי בתוך ביתו‬15 ‫ אבל‬:‫אמר רבא‬ 16 (‫)ואתי‬

‫ ואזיל‬,‫אביי אשכחיה לרב יוסף דפריס ליה סודרא ארישיה‬ .‫בביתיה‬ ?‫ לא סבר לה מר אין אבילות בשבת‬:‫אמר ליה‬ .‫ דברים שבצינעא נוהג‬:‫ הכי אמר רבי יוחנן‬:‫אמר ליה‬

his wife when mourning her brother. But R. Huna, like Shmuel in the Yerushalmi, discourages Mar Uqba from doing so. 15 MS Munich 95 ‫אמ' רבא מטייל אבל‬. This formulation avoids the confusion of how to vocalize ‫אבל‬. 16 MS Munich 95 ‫וקאזיל‬. No ‫ואתי‬.

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

153

R. Yohanan (JA 2) asked Shmuel (BA 1): 17 Does one observe mourning rites on the Sabbath or not? He answered: mourning rites are not to be observed on the Sabbath. … Shmuel said: … uncovering one’s head [i.e., removing a mourner’s headcovering] on the Sabbath during shivah], turning back the torn fabric, and righting the overturned couches are obligatory [on the mourner in preparation for the Sabbath during shivah so that he honors the Sabbath]; bathing in hot water [before the Sabbath], engaging in sexual relations, donning of sandals [on the Sabbath during shivah] are optional … Rava (BA 4) said: A mourner is to walk around in [his torn] garment in his home [on the Sabbath during shivah]. Abaye (BA 4) encountered R. Yosef (BA 3) donning a [mourning] scarf on his head [on the Sabbath during shivah] and walking back and forth in his home. He [Abaye] said to him: don’t you hold that mourning rites are not to be observed on the Sabbath [during shivah]? R. Yosef answered: Thus said R. Yohanan, mourning rites performed in private are to be observed [on the Sabbath during shivah]. 18 R. Yohanan never interacts with Shmuel. However, the various mss. support this reading. MS London British Library Harley 5508 reads: ‫בעא‬ '‫ ;מיניה ר' יוחנן משמו‬Vatican 134, ‫משמואל‬. MS Munich 95 reads, Mar Yohani. See also Tosafot s.v. ‫בעא מיניה ר' יוחנן משמואל‬. 18 Soncino translates: intimate forms of mourning may [italics mine] be maintained on the Sabbath. I think this translation is incorrect. Intimate forms of mourning are required to be maintained on the Sabbath (Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Eivel 10:1): ‫ כגון‬,‫ ואין אבילות בשבת אלא בדברים שבצנעה‬,‫השבת עולה למנין אבילות‬ ... . ‫עטיפת הראש ותשמיש המטה ורחיצה בחמין‬ 17

154

THE STORIES THEY TELL

EXPLANATION

The sugya opens with R. Yohanan asking Shmuel, does one observe private mourning rites on the Sabbath of shivah or not? For instance, is one required to overturn couches or wear a torn garment on the Sabbath that falls during the week of mourning? Shmuel answers that private mourning rites are not to be observed on the Sabbath, apparently because they would compromise the honor due the Sabbath. A little later in the sugya, Shmuel states that uncovering one’s head on the Sabbath of shivah is obligatory, because to cover one’s head is a mourning rite and should not be observed on the Sabbath. The underlying issue, discussed earlier in the sugya, is whether sexual relations are permitted on the Sabbath of shivah. Logic dictates that if mourning restrictions are lifted on the Sabbath, then sexual relations, which are forbidden during the week of mourning, are permitted on the Sabbath. However, this conclusion is questioned by an anecdote in which a man who engaged in sexual activity on the Sabbath of shivah was punished with death. The sugya continues with a statement by Rava that a mourner’s rent garment is expected to be worn in his home on the Sabbath. The amora is thus making a distinction between public mourning, which is forbidden on the Sabbath, and private mourning, which he requires of the mourner on the Sabbath in full. An anecdote follows. Abaye, a junior scholar, encounters his mentor, R. Yosef, going about in his home on the Sabbath of shivah wearing a mourning scarf on his head. Abaye asks R. Yosef, doesn’t the master hold that mourning rites are not to be observed on the Sabbath? Abaye is most likely referring to what Maimonides writes: the Sabbath counts towards mourning [as a day of shivah]. [Public] mourning rites should not be observed on the Sabbath but private ones should: wear head wrapping, refrain from sexual relations and from bathing in warm water. That is, according to Maimonides, these private mourning practices, not visible to the public eye, are supposed to be observed on the Sabbath.

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

155

Shmuel said earlier in the sugya, that mourning rites are not to be observed on the Sabbath, and specifically mentioned removing a mourning head covering. R. Yosef answers that R. Yohanan ruled otherwise, i.e., that mourning rites performed in private are to be observed [on the Sabbath]. 19 It follows that it is R. Yosef is likely referring to R. Yohanan’s statement at bKet 4a, that even though there is no outward mourning on a festival, rites of private mourning still apply. As Tosafot comment (s.v. aval devarim shel tzin’ah noheg), these [private mourning rites] are obligatory, not optional. Tosafot understand the verb noheg as “do apply.” ... ‫ד"ה אבל דברים של צינעה נוהג – פי' חובה לעשות כן ולא רשות‬ bKetubot 4a ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת כתובות דף ד עמוד א‬ .‫ הוא ישן בין האנשים והיא ישנה בין הנשים‬:‫אמר מר‬ ‫ אף על פי שאמרו אין אבילות‬:‫ דאמר רבי יוחנן‬,‫מסייע ליה לרבי יוחנן‬ .‫ אבל דברים של צינעא נוהג‬,‫במועד‬ The master said [above, in a baraita]: he sleeps among the men and she among the women [if the groom suffered a loss when about to marry]. This [statement] supports R. Yohanan (JA 2) who said: even though the [Sages] said no mourning rites are to be observed on a festival (mo’ed), private [mourning] rules still apply [noheg, and so a groom must sleep among men and the bride among women, which means that sexual relations are not permitted]. A question arose regarding a bridegroom whose father died right before the wedding. A baraita states that immediately following the first sexual act (be’ilat mizvah), for the seven days of the wedding celebration, he, the groom, must sleep among the men, and she, the bride, among the women. Right after those seven wedding days, he is required to sit shivah for an additional seven days, during which time sex is again not allowed (bMQ 15b). This ruling supports a statement made by R. Yohanan, that even though there is no public mourning on a festival [or, by implication, on a joyous occasion like a wedding], private mourning practices do apply, that is, are obligatory. Rashi (s.v. mesayya leih) and Tosafot (s.v. mesayya leih l’R. Yohanan) both claim that R. Yohanan 19

156

THE STORIES THEY TELL

not just permissible, but obligatory, to wear a mourning scarf in one’s home on the Sabbath. Note that R. Yohanan nowhere said explicitly that private mourning rites are to be observed on the Sabbath. All R. Yohanan said, at bKet 4a, is that they should be observed on a festival. It is R. Yosef who reasonably understands R. Yohanan’s statement as addressing not just festivals but the Sabbath, too. Talmud Yerushalmi Moed Qatan 3:5, 83a ‫ פג א‬,‫ה‬:‫תלמוד ירושלמי מסכת מועד קטן ג‬ ‫ דאמר ר' סימון בשם ריב"ל והלא אמרו אין אבל ברגל אלא שהרבים‬... ‫נוהגין בו בצינעה‬ R. Simon (JA 3) said in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi (JA 1): didn’t they [i.e., the rabbis] institute [a rule] not [to observe private] mourning [practices] on festivals, but, the people [on their own] have adopted the custom [nohagin bo] of observing private mourning practices [on festivals]?!

The Yerushalmi sugya, like the Bavli, raises the issue of sex on the Sabbath of shivah. Following the conflicting reports of R. Yohanan’s opinion—some say he permitted sex on the Sabbath of shivah and some say he forbade—R. Joshua b. Levi, who lived a generation before R. Yohanan, says that even though there is no public mourning on a festival, people in the land of Israel have freely chosen to observe private mourning rites on a festival, meaning they are an option, not an obligation. When R. Joshua b. Levi’s statement in the Yerushalmi was transmitted to the Bavli, it underwent two changes, either inadvertently or advertently. First, R. Yosef attributes the statement about private mourning practices to R. Yohanan and not R. Joshua b. Levi, as in the Yerushalmi. Second, the meaning of the verb N.H.G has been substantively changed. Whereas in the applied his rule of obligatory private rites of mourning to festivals and also to weddings.

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

157

Yerushalmi it meant that people have voluntarily chosen to observe private mourning rites on a festival [‫]רבים נוהגין בו בצינעה‬, in the Bavli, exactly the same verb is understood as meaning that mourning rites apply, i.e., are obligatory on the Sabbath of shivah [‫]דברים שבצנעה נוהג‬. This connotation of obligation is common for the verb N.H.G, as we see in other texts, such as mKiddushin 1:8, 20 and as affirmed by Tosafot. 21 It follows that R. Yosef’s response to Abaye’s challenge, that mourning rites performed in private are, in fact, obligatory on the Sabbath, is a new, more stringent understanding of how to mourn. Did R. Yosef deliberately alter the meaning of R. Yohanan’s statement about private mourning on festivals, changing N.H.G from “are optional” to “are obligatory”? We do not know. R. Yosef may have reasoned that if sex is not allowed on the Sabbath of shivah, which means that private mourning does apply in that instance to the Sabbath, then other private mourning rites also apply. Abaye, however, appears to support the status quo, which means he holds that private mourning rites are pro175F

176F

Mishnah Qiddushin 1:8 ‫ נוהגין באנשים ולא בנשים חוץ ממנחת סוטה ונזירה‬... ‫הסמיכות והתנופות‬ :‫שהן מניפות‬ Placing hands on the head of a sacrificial animal, wavings, …, apply to men but not to women, except for the meal-offerings of the sotah and the female nazirite, which they themselves have to wave. Tosefta Megillah 1:6 ‫קראו את המגלה באדר הראשון ונתעברה שנה צריכין לקרותה באדר השני‬ ‫שכל מצות שנוהגות באדר השני אין נוהגות באדר הראשון‬ If they read the Megillah on the first Adar and an extra Adar was added, they need to read it again in the second Adar, for all mizvot that apply to the second Adar do not apply to the first Adar [i.e., their implementation in the first Adar does not count]. Sokoloff, Babylonian Aramaic (732), ‫נהג‬, 4. “to apply.” Sokoloff speaks of the Aramaic connotations of the verb, which are also found in Hebrew. 21 See n. 19 above. 20

158

THE STORIES THEY TELL

hibited on the Sabbath. R. Yosef thus breaks new halakhic ground, obligating private mourning practices on the Sabbath. Note that Rava, who lived a little later, followed in his footsteps, requiring a mourner to wear a rent garment at home, even on the Sabbath. 3.5 bGittin 88b, Forcing a get ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת גיטין דף פח עמוד ב‬ ... ‫ כשר ובעובדי כוכבים פסול‬22‫ גט מעושה בישראל‬.'‫מתני‬ Mishnah: A get given under compulsion by a Jewish [court of law] is valid; if by a non-Jewish court of law, it is not valid. …

‫ והא אנן‬:‫ א"ל‬,‫ אגיטי‬23 ‫אביי אשכחיה לרב יוסף דיתיב וקא מעשה‬ !‫ ולא לפני הדיוטות‬- ‫הדיוטות אנן ותניא לפניהם‬ .‫ מידי דהוה אהודאות והלואות‬,‫ אנן שליחותייהו קא עבדינן‬:‫א"ל‬ Abaye (BA 4) encountered R. Yosef (BA 3) sitting and compelling [men to give] bills of divorce [to their wives]. He said to him [to R. Yosef]: but we are laypeople [i.e., not expert judges] and it has been taught … “Before them” 24 – but not before laypeople!! He [R. Yosef] responded [to Abaye]: We carry out their commission, as we do in cases of admissions and loans.

EXPLANATION

The mishnah states that a get [a bill of divorce] forced by a Jewish court is valid, but by a non-Jewish court is not. The word The mishnah’s word “beyisrael” does not mean “in the land of Israel” but “by a Jewish judge,” in contradistinction to a non-Jewish judge, i.e., an idolater (oved kokhavim). 23 MS Munich 95 ‫מעשי‬ 24 Exodus 21:1, “And these are the laws that you shall place before them … .” 22

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

159

“forced” (me’useh) implies that the husband did not want a divorce but was pressured into ending the marriage. Following a discussion of various halakhic implications of the mishnah, the sugya continues with an anecdote. Abaye encountered his mentor R. Yosef sitting and forcing gittin (divorce bills), i.e., pressuring men to divorce their wives and preparing divorce documents, presumably at the wives’ request. It is likely that R. Yosef was drawing up these documents in a public place, which is where Abaye chances upon him. The junior scholar, Abaye, challenges his mentor, R. Yosef, with a baraita that states that the word “lifneihem” (before them) in the verse, “And these are the laws you shall place before them” (Exodus 21:1), implies that cases must be tried before expert, not lay judges. By criticizing R. Yosef with this verse, Abaye is saying that the rabbis in Bavel are not considered expert judges and hence may not force a man to divorce his wife. Only judges in the land of Israel may do so. This criticism does not deter R. Yosef. He answers Abaye that judges in Bavel act as the agents of, or on behalf of, expert judges in the land of Israel and hence are empowered to force husbands to write a get for their wives. He goes on to say that Babylonian judges may also act as agents of the land of Israel judges for cases involving loans and admissions of debt. These cases require expert judges and yet they may be adjudicated in Bavel, for the same reason. Since the principle of Babylonian judicial jurisdiction had not been established in the Babylonian Talmud prior to this exchange between Abaye and R. Yosef, this sugya is of great significance. 25 R. Yosef claims for himself, and for Babylonian rabbis in general, the mantle of an expert judge. In short, because of Abaye’s criticism, R. Yosef informs him of a new principle, one The issue of which kinds of cases may be adjudicated in Bavel, and which may not, is dealt with extensively at bBaba Qamma 84b. Rava issues a number of statements on the subject. Many factors are taken into consideration, such as how common is the matter that needs to be adjudicated, or whether the issue at hand is a matter of imposing a fixed penalty or a compensation for injury, which varies case by case.

25

160

THE STORIES THEY TELL

that applies broadly and not just to the case at hand. The expansion of judicial jurisdiction to Bavel is the main message of the sugya. The editor’s point in including the anecdote is to make the case that the mishnah’s rule—which empowers a woman to divorce her husband if she gains the support of the court—is intended to be applied not just by expert judges in the land of Israel, but also by lay judges in Bavel. Otherwise, as noted earlier in the sugya by R. Mesharshya (BA 5), if the rabbinic courts in Bavel do not help women obtain a divorce from a husband they no longer want to live with, disgruntled women would go to secular courts to obtain a divorce. With this kind of divorce in hand but without a get, a woman who remarries and gives birth to children will discover that, according to the rabbis of her day, her children with her second husband are mamzerim, i.e., born of adultery. The rabbis will regard her as still married to her first husband even after divorcing him and living with a second one. Thus, what may have led R. Yosef to force men to write gittin for their wives is a political consideration—to keep women away from the secular courts, with their problematic implications for personal status issues within the Jewish community. Unlike most other halakhic anecdotes that show an adjustment in a previously stated halakhah, this anecdote accomplishes much more than that. It establishes a new, important jurisprudential principle. R. Yosef did not introduce a change to the rule of the mishnah that a get forced by a Jewish court in the land of Israel is valid. Such a get remains valid. He did something much more far-reaching: he claimed judicial jurisdiction for the Bavel rabbis, who, by definition, are lay judges relative to those in the land of Israel, and gave them the authority to act as agents of judges in the land of Israel. Rather than refer cases to expert judges in the land of Israel, the Babylonian amoraim have arrogated to themselves the authority to adjudicate certain kinds of cases. Women in Bavel, from the time of R. Yosef and onwards, are able, with the assistance of a court, to compel a get from a husband. This is a new benefit.

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

161

3.6 bYevamot 106b, How to recite verses at a halizah ceremony

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת יבמות דף קו עמוד ב‬ "‫ לא ליקרי לדידה "לא‬,‫ האי מאן דמקרי גט חליצה‬:‫אמר אביי‬ ‫ אלא "לא אבה‬,‫ דמשמע אבה יבמי‬,‫לחודיה ו"אבה יבמי" לחודיה‬ ‫ דמשמע‬,‫יבמי"; ולא ליקרי לדידיה "לא" לחודיה "חפצתי" לחודיה‬ ."‫ אלא "לא חפצתי לקחתה‬,‫חפצתי לקחתה‬ .‫ ואפסוקי מילתא לית לן בה‬,‫ אפסוקי מילתא היא‬:‫רבא אמר‬ 26

,‫רב אשי אשכחיה לרב כהנא דקמצטער ומקרי לה לא אבה יבמי‬ 27 ?‫ לא סבר ליה מר להא דרבא‬:‫אמר ליה‬ .‫ מודה רבא בלא אבה יבמי‬:‫אמר ליה‬

Abaye (BA 4) said: One who is dictating [the words of] a halizah document shall not read for her separately [the word] “lo” and separately [the words] “avah yabmi” because that would mean that he [the levir] agrees to enter into levirate marriage [with her], but rather he should recite [without a pause] the words “does not” and “agrees to enter into levirate marriage with me.” [And one who is dictating the words of a halizah document shall not read for the levir separately the word “lo” and separately the word “hafazti” (wish), because that would mean that he, the levir, does wish to enter into levirate marriage with her. Rather he should recite [without a pause], “I do not wish to marry her.” Rava (BA 4) said: It is just a brief pause and does not matter. R. Ashi (BA 6) encountered R. Kahana (BA 5) making a painful effort to recite the phrase “he does not agree to enter into levirate marriage with me” [without a MS Munich 95 ‫לא אבה יבמי בבת אחת‬ MS Munich 95 ‫לא סבר לה מר אקרינהו לדידיה מן יבמי עד יבמי להא דרבא‬. It seems that some words from the next line of the sugya found their way into this line. 26 27

162

THE STORIES THEY TELL pause]. R. Ashi said to him, doesn’t the master hold, according to Rava, that a brief pause does not matter? R. Kahana answered him: Rava concedes [to Abaye] that the words “he does not agree to enter into levirate marriage with me” [must be read without any pause at all].

EXPLANATION

This sugya deals with halizah—a ritual that dissolves a childless widow’s bond to her deceased husband’s family—and its accompanying document. 28 Abaye warns rabbinical judges not to pause between reciting the phrases “does not” and “agrees to enter into levirate marriage with me” so that the widow not think that the levir does, in fact, agree to enter into levirate marriage with her. Similarly, the amora says that a judge should not pause between “I do not” and “wish” so that the levir not think the judge is saying that he, the levir, does wish to marry the widow. Rava disagrees and says that a pause is too brief to be misleading, from either her perspective or his. An anecdote relates that R. Ashi encountered R. Kahana, his mentor, as he was having trouble reciting the phrase “he does not agree” without a break. He asked his mentor, don’t you accept Rava’s rule that one need not concern himself about a brief pause? R. Kahana replied that Rava, in general, overlooks a brief pause. However, he continued, regarding the words “he does not agree to enter into levirate marriage with me,” Rava concedes to Abaye that there should be no pause at all. That is, in response to the criticism of his student R. Ashi, R. Kahana cites a teaching of Rava that specifically affirms his effort to recite the words “he does not agree A discussion in bYevamot 106a refers to a halizah document (‫גט‬ ‫)חליצה‬. Rashi comments (s.v. ein kotevin get halizah) that she can present such a document prior to remarriage to prove her marital availability. It functions like a divorce document, which also is designed to serve as proof of marital availability. 28

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

163

to enter into levirate marriage with me” without the slightest pause. The anecdote ends the sugya. It is problematic, as we have seen before, that Rava’s concession to Abaye, as cited by R. Kahana, does not appear anywhere else in the Talmud. In this instance, as in others, 29 it seems that R. Kahana, when criticized, fabricated Rava’s concession on the spot. Had Rava agreed with Abaye concerning the words “he does not agree to enter into levirate marriage with me,” but disagreed regarding “I do not wish to marry her,” it stands to reason that he would have said so in the statement quoted just before, for it is right there that Rava notes that a slight pause can be overlooked. But he did not make any distinction there. It is possible that R. Kahana is embarrassed that he did not remember Rava’s teaching that one may overlook a small pause, that he thought that on this point Rava was wrong, or even that he actually agrees with Abaye and not Rava on this matter, but instead of saying so, he attributes to Rava a statement that he, apparently, never made. R. Kahana has thus modified the halakhah of halizah recitation, making it stricter, requiring the judge who reads the verse “lo avah yabmi” to be careful not to pause. Did R. Kahana arrive at his halakhic stance prior to his student seeing him struggle to recite words without a pause, or did R. Kahana fabricate Rava’s statement on the spot to defend himself against criticism? Again, one cannot know. We saw in the iqla chapter a sugya in which R. Pappa (bBer 43b) attributed to Rava a statement that he did not make, and it seems that the same is happening here. 3.7 bShabbat 95a, Sprinkling a floor on the Sabbath ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת שבת דף צה עמוד א‬ See also bBer 43b and bSuk 19b. In all these cases, the amora who cites a statement that appears fabricated is trying to fix the law according to his own opinion, against the opinion of others.

29

164

THE STORIES THEY TELL ‫ דילמא‬,‫ טעמא מאי אמור רבנן‬:‫ אמר‬,‫אמימר שרא זילחא במחוזא‬ .‫ הכא ליכא גומות‬,‫אתי לאשויי גומות‬ ,‫רבא תוספאה אשכחיה )לרבינא דקא מצטער מהבלא‬ ‫לרב אשי דקא‬

30

(‫ואמרי לה מר קשישא בריה דרבא אשכחיה‬ ,‫מצטער מהבלא‬

‫ הרוצה לרבץ את ביתו‬:‫ לא סבר לה מר להא דתניא‬:‫אמר ליה‬ ,‫ ידיו בזוית זו‬,‫בשבת מביא עריבה מלאה מים ורוחץ פניו בזוית זו‬ ?‫ ונמצא הבית מתרבץ מאליו‬,‫רגליו בזוית זו‬ .‫ לאו אדעתאי‬:‫אמר ליה‬ .‫ אשה חכמה מרבצת ביתה בשבת‬:‫תנא‬ Amemar (BA 5/6) permitted sprinkling [a floor with water on the Sabbath] in Mehoza. He said: Why did the rabbis rule [that sprinkling a floor on the Sabbath is forbidden], lest one come to even out depressions [in the floor]? Here there are no depressions [in the floor]. Rabbah Tosfa’ah (BA 7) encountered Ravina (BA 7) [on a Sabbath] suffering from the heat. And some say it was Mar Qashisha son of Rava (BA 6) who encountered R. Ashi (BA 6) suffering from the heat. 31 He said to him: Doesn’t the master hold that which was taught in a tannaitic text: “One who wishes to sprinkle his home on the Sabbath brings a basin full of water and washes his face in this corner, his hands in that corner, his feet in yet another corner, and in this way the [entire] house is sprinkled on its own”!? MS Munich 95: ‫רבא תוספאה אשכחיה לרב אשי‬. It is unlikely that Rabbah Tosfa’ah spoke with R. Ashi. 31 This alternate attribution is omitted in Munich 95. And in the following question, beginning lo savar lah mar, the words ha detanya appear twice in succession. 30

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

165

He responded: it did not occur to me. A tannaitic text: a wise woman sprinkles her home on the Sabbath.

Talmud Yerushalmi Shabbat 2:7, 5c ‫ ה ג‬,‫ז‬:‫תלמוד ירושלמי מסכת שבת ב‬ ‫ אשה פיקחה מדיחה כוס‬:‫ר' ירמיה ור' זעירא בשם ר' חייא בר אשי‬ .‫כאן קערה כאן תמחוי כאן ונמצאת מרבצת את ביתה בשבת‬ R. Yirmiyah (JA 4), R. Zeira (JA 3) in the name of R. Hiyya bar Ashi (BA 2): A clever woman washes a cup here, a bowl there, a basin somewhere else, and it turns out that she sprinkles her [entire] home on the Sabbath.

EXPLANATION

This sugya discusses what one may do on the Sabbath to relieve the oppressiveness of extreme heat. Amemar (BA 5/6) permitted the people of Mehoza to sprinkle their floors with water on the Sabbath in order to cool the room off. He goes on to explain that sprinkling water on the floor on the Sabbath is generally forbidden because of the possibility of evening out depressions (‫)לאשוויי גומות‬, i.e., flattening out a dirt floor. 32 However, there is no such concern in Mehoza where floors are made of stone. An anecdote follows in which Rabbah Tosfa’ah (BA 7) encountered Ravina (BA 7) suffering from the heat on the Sabbath, probably in Mata Mehasia, where he lived and where the floors were not made of stone. 33 Rabbah Tosfa’ah asks his mentor/colleague if he is willing to adopt a strategy outlined in a baraita, which is to wash one’s face in one corner, one’s hands in another, and so on. The incidental outcome of such activity is 187F

See bShabbat 141a. If the amora suffering from the heat is R. Ashi, he lived in Sura. One has to assume that there, too, the floors are not made of stone.

32 33

166

THE STORIES THEY TELL

cooling the house off. Ravina responds that utilizing such a strategy never occurred to him. The meaning of Ravina’s answer is not clear. He is probably saying that he does not oppose sprinkling the home in that manner on the Sabbath but did not think of it himself. In this instance, the mentor accepts the advice of the student and does not defend his (lack of) action. As for halakhic change, it is the student who raises the “inadvertent” floor sprinkling technique to cooling a home on the Sabbath. The mentor seems willing to go along with this strategy. The sugya continues with a short baraita stating that a wise or clever woman sprinkles her floor on the Sabbath. There is no explanation of what that means or how she does that. The Yerushalmi contains a related statement, not as a baraita but as an amoraic statement, transmitted by three amoraim of successive generations (JA 4, JA 3, JA2). It explains in detail how a woman can accomplish the task: she can wash a cup here, a bowl there, and so on, and in this way her [entire] floor gets sprinkled on its own. The context in the Yerushalmi, different from the Bavli, implies that she is engaging in ha’aramah, an attempt to circumvent the law. That is, she knows she may not sprinkle her floor on the Sabbath, but does so “incidentally” by means of washing dishes in a variety of locales. 34 One wonders why Ravina did not take advantage of the baraita’s strategy on his own, independent of his student’s comment. Wasn’t he familiar with the baraita? Did it not explicitly permit such heat-reducing activity? I think it possible that Ravina’s version of the baraita was similar to the one in the Yerushalmi, which speaks not of a man but a woman. Her goal is to keep the dust down. Washing dishes in various places in the home would help to do that. It did not occur to Ravina that The context in the Yerushalmi suggests that the point of her actions is to wash the floor without “intending” to, probably to keep down the dust on the Sabbath. It does not seem likely that her goal is to cool the room off.

34

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

167

the rule could apply to a man washing his face, hands and feet in different corners of the room to cool the house down. Moreover, it involves ha’aramah, circumvention of the law, which likely deterred the amora from adopting that strategy. His junior colleague, however, upon seeing him suffer from the heat, suggests to him that the same technique could be utilized by a man to bring relief from heat. It is likely that, following the student’s suggestion to apply the baraita’s sprinkling technique to a man who wants to cool a home on the Sabbath, the text of the baraita was emended over time: Instead of speaking of a woman washing dishes, it was changed to speak of a man washing parts of his body. 35 Evidence that the baraita was originally about a woman sprinkling her floor on the Sabbath appears in the truncated version of the baraita at the end of the sugya. As it now appears in the Bavli, this short baraita is hard to understand. If one does not know the Yerushalmi parallel, it is not evident that a wise woman can adopt a strategy to keep the dust down similar to the one proposed by the student to cool the house. It seems that once Rabbah Tosfa’ah argued that men, too, could utilize a sprinkling strategy, the Bavli’s “baraita” was reformulated. It replaced a woman washing dishes with a man washing parts of his body. And when that happened, it was no longer evident why Ravina did not adopt the technique for cooling down his home on the Sabbath that the “baraita” recommended. Furthermore, once the “baraita” was emended to speak about a man washing his body, it was no longer necessary to include in the text the baraita about a woman. So only a truncated version remained in the Bavli sugya, stating that a wise woman knows how to sprinkle her floor on the Sabbath. As the sugya now

Also possible is that the student consciously and tendentiously rewrote the Yerushalmi “baraita.” He may have done so to offer Ravina a passage that speaks of a man, not a woman, and could thereby more easily persuade him to adopt a heat-reducing strategy.

35

168

THE STORIES THEY TELL

reads, it implies that a woman may copy the strategy of a man, even though the opposite is true. It appears that when the Bavli reformulated the Yerushalmi text, replacing a woman with a man, it also turned an amoraic statement into a baraita. I point this out because, in general, when a student says to his teacher, “doesn’t the master hold the opinion of R. X,” he cites an amoraic statement, not a baraita. It is also possible that the term “detanya” which follows the words “lo savar lah mar” is an addition to the text by a later editor who (mistakenly) considered any Hebrew teaching to be tannaitic. 3.8 bMenahot 42a, Tying zizit ‫תוספתא מסכת ברכות )ליברמן( פרק ו הלכה י‬ ‫ כשהוא מתעטף או' ברוך‬.‫העושה ציצית לעצמו או' ברוך שהחיינו‬ .‫אשר קדש' במצ' וצו' להתעטף בציצית וצריך לברך עליהן בכל יום‬ Tosefta Berakhot 6:10 One who makes zizit for himself, recites Baruch … She-he-heyanu. When he wraps himself [in the zizit,] he says, Baruch … to wrap [oneself] with zizit. And he should recite a blessing on them [i.e., the zizit] every day.

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת מנחות דף מב עמוד א‬ ... ‫ וצריך שירחיק מלא קשר גודל‬:‫אמר ר' יעקב אמר רבי יוחנן‬ ‫ חזייה רב סמא לקרניה‬,‫רבינא ורב סמא הוו יתבי קמיה דרב אשי‬ .‫דגלימיה דרבינא דסתר ובצר ממלא קשר גודל‬ ?‫ לא סבר לה מר להא דר' יעקב‬:‫אמר ליה‬ .‫ בשעת עשייה איתמר‬:‫אמר ליה‬ .‫איכסיף‬ .‫ חד מינייהו כתרי מינן‬,‫ לא תתקיף לך‬:‫אמר ליה רב אשי‬ ...

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES ‫רב נחמן אשכחיה לרב אדא בר אהבה רמי חוטי וקא מברך "לעשות‬ ‫ הכי אמר רב ציצית‬36 ?‫ מאי "ציצי" שמענא‬:‫ א"ל‬,"‫ציצית‬ .‫צריכה ברכה‬

37 ‫אין‬

R. Ya’akov (BA/JA 3) said in the name of R. Yohanan (JA 2), It [the zizit] must be indented from the corner [of the garment] a distance [equal to] the first joint of the thumb. … Ravina (BA 7) and R. Sama (BA 7) were [once] sitting before R. Ashi (BA 6), when R. Sama noticed that the [edges around the zizit opening in the] corner of Ravina's garment had frayed and [the zizit] were now less than the distance of the first joint of the thumb [from the corner of the garment]. He said to him, ‘Doesn’t the Master abide by R. Ya’akov’s teaching?’ He replied, That rule [of required distance of zizit to the edge of the garment] was intended to apply only when the zizit were [first] made. [R. Sama] became embarrassed. R. Ashi said to him, Don’t be upset, for one of them is like two of us. … R. Nahman (BA 3) encountered R. Adda b. Ahavah (BA 2, student of Rav) inserting zizit threads [into a garment] and reciting the blessing “[Blessed are You … and has commanded us] to make zizit [i.e., to tie zizit onto a four-cornered garment]”, whereupon he said, “What is this zizi that I hear? Thus said Rav: ‘[When tying] zizit no blessing is required.’”

36 37

MS Munich 95 ‫דקשמענא‬ MS Munich 95, ‫אינה‬

169

170

THE STORIES THEY TELL

EXPLANATION

R. Ya’akov in the name of R. Yohanan issues a rule regarding the required distance of zizit from the corner of the garment—a distance equal to the first joint of the thumb. An anecdote reports that a junior amora saw that his colleague’s zizit were too close to the corner. Upon pointing this out, the colleague responds that the rule of the required distance applied only to producing the zizit [and tying them into the garment]. Once that is done, even if the zizit later approach the corner, it is of no consequence. Ravina thus limits R. Ya’akov’s rule of required distance of zizit to the corner of the garment. Without this anecdote, we might well have thought, as did R. Sama (BA 7), that R. Ya’akov’s rule of required distance applies not just during insertion of zizit into the garment but later on, when donning the garment, as well. It is only when R. Sama questions Ravina in the presence of R. Ashi that we hear from Ravina that R. Ya’akov’s rule of required distance of zizit to the corner of the garment applies only when one ties the zizit onto the garment and not later on. Note that this exclusion was not stated by R. Ya’kov when he formulated his rule. Most anecdotes would end right there. Ravina has significantly limited the application of R. Ya’akov’s rule—distance of zizit to the edge of the garment is only required when first making the garment, not when wearing it—thereby deflecting R. Sama’s criticism of Ravina’s garment. However, R. Ashi, before whom this anecdote unfolded, sees that R. Sama is ashamed, apparently because he was just told by Ravina that he did not correctly grasp R. Ya’akov’s rule, which led him to critique Ravina inappropriately. In an apparent attempt to alleviate R. Sama’s discomfort, R. Ashi says to him that “one from (of) them is like two from (of) us.” This is a cryptic comment. It is hard to accept Rashi’s suggestion (s.v. had minaihu) that it means that scholars from the land of Israel are twice as good as those in Bavel and that

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

171

Ravina is a land of Israel scholar. Ravina, as is well attested, is a Babylonian scholar, not a land of Israel scholar. 38 In fact, none of the three amoraim in the anecdote (R. Ashi, Ravina, R. Sama) is known to have spent time in the land of Israel. Perhaps R. Ashi is saying that “one of Ravina’s statements is like two of ours,” meaning Ravina’s statements are excellent, that the amora is of superior intellect, and that R. Sama should not, therefore, feel ashamed that he challenged Ravina’s implementation of R. Ya’akov’s rule. (See more on this phrase below.) The sugya continues with a number of reports of how various amoraim tied their zizit. It ends with a “he encountered him” anecdote. R. Nahman (BA2/3) found R. Ada bar Ahavah (BA 1/2, student of Rav) tying zizit onto a garment and reciting the appropriate blessing, “… to make zizit.” In a mocking manner, R. Nahman asks R. Ada b. Ahavah, “what is this ‘zizi’ that I hear?” 39 He continues and says that, according to Rav, one should not recite a blessing when tying zizit onto a garment, only when donning them. R. Ada b. Ahavah does not defend his action. It is hard to understand how Rashi could make such an assertion. There is no basis for saying that. Elsewhere (bKet 75a) Rashi notes that the land of Israel scholars were “sharp.” ‫ מבני ארץ ישראל ורבינא‬- ‫רש"י מסכת מנחות דף מב עמוד אחד מינייהו‬ ‫מא"י הוה‬ One of them – of the land of Israel people and Ravina was from the land of Israel. - ‫ מבני ארץ ישראל; עדיף‬- ‫רש"י מסכת כתובות דף עה עמוד א וחד מינייהו‬ ‫פקחים וחריפים‬ And one of them – of the land of Israel people. Adif – clever and sharp. See critique of Rashi by Pisqei Rid. 39 See bBer 42a for another example of a rabbi mocking some guests reciting the wrong blessing, also repeating their sound. Strangely enough, it is the same sound as here, zizi. In bBer it refers to the blessing over bread, ha-mo-zee, ‫המוציא‬. Here, the same zizi sound refers to zizit. It is possible that both anecdotes use a readymade mocking sound. 38

172

THE STORIES THEY TELL

Whether Rav did or did not issue a statement that zizit do not require a blessing when first tying them is later discussed by the Talmud. The outcome of that discussion does not matter for our purposes. By citing Rav, R. Nahman was telling R. Ada bar Ahavah that the blessing he was reciting was unnecessary, perhaps even taking God’s name in vain. The innovative point is that R. Nahman changes the rule of when to recite a blessing over zizit. It may possibly have been common practice to recite the zizit blessing when tying them onto a garment. R. Nahman, however, asserts that the blessing should only be recited when donning zizit. This is consistent with the Tosefta’s halakhah that the zizit blessing is recited when donning them each day, but only a she-he-heyanu blessing when first fashioning them. 40 This second anecdote is a typical “he found him” anecdote in that one amora, upon encountering another, criticizes the way that the other carries out a halakhah. However, in this case, the other does not defend his behavior. That is, it is not the criticized amora, R. Ada bar Ahavah, who tweaks the halakhah, but rather the criticizing amora, R. Nahman, who is far more prominent, although younger than R. Ada bar Ahavah. As already noted, when the more prominent amora is the criticizer, the criticized, less prominent amora does not defend his position. 41 As for the difficult phrase, “one of them is like two of us,” we need to look at a similar statement at bKetubot 75a: ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת כתובות דף עה עמוד א‬ .‫ וחד מינייהו עדיף כתרי מינן‬:‫אמר אביי‬ The Tosefta requires a she-he-heyanu blessing upon “making zizit” (tBer 6:10, ‫)העושה ציצית לעצמו‬. It probably is speaking of tying zizit onto a garment. 41 This second anecdote is, in some ways, the opposite of the first. The first states that a rule that applies when tying zizit, i.e., required distance of the zizit to the corner of the garment, does not apply later on, when wearing zizit. In the second anecdote, a rule that applies to donning zizit, i.e., reciting a blessing, does not apply to tying zizit. 40

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

173

‫ דהא רבי‬,‫ וחד מינן כי סליק להתם עדיף כתרי מינייהו‬:‫אמר רבא‬ ,‫ כי סליק להתם‬,‫ לא הוה ידע מאי קאמרי רבנן‬,‫ירמיה דכי הוה הכא‬ .‫קרי לן בבלאי טפשאי‬ Abaye (BA 4) said: And one of them [land of Israel scholars] is worth two of us. Rava said (BA 4): [It is just the opposite.] When one of us goes up there he is as good as two of them. For [you have the case of] R. Jeremiah (JA 4) who, while here, did not understand what the rabbis were saying, but when he went up there he was able to refer to us as “the foolish Babylonians.”

EXPLANATION

In this passage, Abaye praises the scholars of the land of Israel and criticizes local Babylonians by saying that they, the amoraim in the land of Israel, surpass the Babylonian scholars, in that one of them is equal to two of “us.” Rava, on the other hand, praises the Babylonian scholars by saying that when they move there, i.e., to Zion, they have the insight of two of them, i.e., the land of Israel scholars. He points out that only when R. Jeremiah arrived in the land of Israel did he achieve full understanding of the Babylonian teachings, even to the extent that he then denigrates his former Babylonian colleagues. It is now possible to understand differently what R. Ashi said to R. Sama about Ravina in the sugya about the required distance of zizit to the corner of the garment, i.e., “one of them is like two of us.” He is apparently saying that Ravina had a moment of great clarity. To summarize what was stated earlier: Ravina responded to R. Sama, who criticized him for not following R. Ya’akov’s teaching, that the rule of distancing zizit from the edge of the garment does not apply to the case at hand, which is wearing zizit. It only applies when tying zizit onto a garment. R. Ashi, who then said “one of them is like two of us,” is apparently praising Ravina to R. Sama and saying that Ravina’s answer—‫—בשעת עשייה איתמר‬was very clever, that just one of Ravina’s statements [“one of them”] is as good as two of ours.

174

THE STORIES THEY TELL

But there is another, likely better, way to understand what R. Ashi meant. It is possible that he is mocking his student Ravina, saying that “he thinks he is so smart (!),” i.e., that one of his answers (‫ )חד מינייהו‬is better than two of ours (‫)כתרי מינן‬. This would be similar to Rava mocking R. Yirmiyah (above) who did not fare well in Bavel but improved in the land of Israel to the extent that he then called his Babylonian teachers foolish. It is possible that R. Ashi is criticizing Ravina’s quick rejoinder to R. Sama that R. Ya’akov’s rule no longer applies to wearing his garment. There is no reason, suggests R. Ashi, that the distance requirement ends as soon as the garment begins to be worn. R. Ashi may be suggesting that Ravina was just making up a rule to deflect R. Sama’s apt criticism of his garment. Understanding R. Ashi as mocking Ravina, while defending R. Sama, is supported by the fact that in the very next anecdote R. Nahman mocks R. Ada bar Ahavah for reciting a blessing when tying zizit onto a garment. Note that in both instances the more prominent (R. Nahman) or senior rabbi (R. Ashi) is the one who mocks the less prominent or junior rabbi. 42 197F

3.9 bHullin 107a–b, Washing hands before eating ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת חולין דף קז עמוד א‬ ?‫ מהו לאכול במפה? מי חיישינן דלמא נגע או לא‬:‫איבעיא להו‬ ‫אמר ליה‬

43 ,‫במפה‬

‫ דשמואל אשכחיה לרב דקאכיל‬,‫ תא שמע‬... ?‫ עבדין כדין‬:(:‫)קז‬ 44 .‫עלי‬

‫ דעתי קצרה‬:‫אמר ליה‬

They pondered: May a person cover his hands with a cloth [Rashi (s.v. bemappah), instead of washing them] to eat [food]? Should we be concerned that perhaps he [or she] Another instance of a mocking rejoinder can be found at bBer 41b. See Chapter 2. 43 MS Munich 95 ‫דקאכיל מפה‬ 44 MS Munich 95 ‫דעתין קצרה‬ 42

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

175

touched the food [possibly rendering it ritually impure], or not? … Come and hear [a text that will answer the question of whether one may cover one’s hands before eating instead of washing them]: for Shmuel (BA 1) encountered Rav (BA 1) eating with covered [hands]. He said to him (107b): is that an acceptable option? 45 He [Rav] answered: I was impatient 46 [and needed to eat right away and so did not wash my hands but instead covered them with a cloth].

EXPLANATION

This sugya raises the question, may a person cover his or her hands before eating food instead of washing them? The answer appears in an anecdote. Shmuel chanced upon Rav eating with covered hands. Surprised, he asks Rav if that is acceptable. Shmuel clearly assumes the requirement of washing one’s hands before eating. An entire tractate of Mishnah, Yadaim, explicates this basic rule. His question to Rav, “Is that an acceptable option,” implies that, in his opinion, covering one’s hands may not replace washing them. Rav does not answer the challenge by case distinction or any other technique that amoraim often use in these kinds of circumstances. Rather, he simply says, “I needed to eat right away.” He may be saying that he felt faint with hunger and would have experienced untoward consequences had he postponed eating to find water to wash his hands. Rav thereby indicates that covering one’s hands is a legitimate alternative to washing them if one has a “good” reason to go that route. His statement, “I needed to eat right away,” although subjective, is sufficient. This is somewhat similar to those rabbis Soncino translates, “Is it right to do so?” S. Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshutah, Berakhot, 34, explains the phrase da’ati qazrah as ‫טרודים ומרוגזים‬, distracted and angry, or preoccupied and irritated. 45 46

176

THE STORIES THEY TELL

who claim to be delicate. The outcome of such a claim is that a certain rule does not apply to them. 47 Rav thus agrees with Shmuel that washing one’s hands is generally required before eating, but he also holds that there are times when covering one’s hands can serve as a valid alternative to washing them. Note that Rav, the challenged rabbi, has produced a leniency. Shmuel seems to be the stricter of the two, applying the tannaitic rule of washing hands without exception. Also note that Rav and Shmuel are colleagues, not student and mentor. We thus see that colleagues may challenge each other, 48 although this is far less common than a student challenging his mentor. Rashi interprets the episode differently, however. He suggests (s.v. v’ha da’ati qatzrah) that Rav did, in fact, wash his hands but then covered them when eating because he was an istenis, i.e., did not want to touch food with his hands. Shmuel suspected him of having not washed his hands. Rav thus responds, according to Rashi, “I washed my hands before I covered them.” I find this explanation without merit. There is no indication in the words that Rav washed his hands. Rashi may have superimposed this interpretation onto the text to eliminate covering hands as an alternative to washing them. 49 But Rav See the anecdote at bSukkot 29a, in the Introduction. And yYoma 8:1, 44d. See similar anecdote about washing hands at yBer 8:2, 12a. 48 R. Kalmin, in Sages, Stories, notes that colleagues of similar rank rarely interact with each other (198ff.). 49 I don’t know on what basis Rashi makes the claim that Rav washed his hands. Does he think that ‫ דעתי קצרה עלי‬means that Rav is fastidious, and that he is saying to Shmuel, of course I washed my hands but since I am fastidious I covered them anyway? I don’t find that persuasive. The phrase ‫דעתי קצרה‬, to my mind, means that he was impatient to eat, that he was very hungry, even faint, and could not take the time to go and find the required amount of water (a re’vi’it) to pour on his hands. The expression da’ati qezarah is a hapaxlegomenon in the Babylonian Talmud. In later halakhic writings, it means that “I am impatient,” or “I am limited in my understanding.” I doubt Rav is saying, by means of 47

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

177

tweaks the requirement of washing hands before eating, suggesting that there are occasions on which one may cover hands instead. 3.10 bMegillah 18b, Writing a Megillah from memory ‫תוספתא מסכת מגילה )ליברמן( פרק ב הלכה ה‬ '‫קראה על פה לא יצא ידי חובתו אמ' ר' שמעון בן לעזר מעשה בר‬ ‫מאיר שהלך לאסיא לעבר את השנה ולא מצא שם מגלה כתובה‬ ‫עברית כתבה מפיו וחזר וקראה מתוכה‬ Tosefta Megillah 2:5 If one recites [the Megillah] from memory, he has not fulfilled his obligation. R. Shimon b. Lezer said: it once happened that R. Meir went to Asya to intercalate the year and did not find there a Megillah written in Hebrew [to read from on Purim], and so he wrote one out from memory and then went and read from it [on Purim].

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת מגילה דף יח עמוד ב‬ ‫ אסור לכתוב אות אחת‬:‫ אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן‬:‫גופא‬ .‫שלא מן הכתב‬ ‫ אמר רבי שמעון בן אלעזר מעשה ברבי מאיר שהלך לעבר‬:‫מיתיבי‬ .‫ וכתבה מלבו וקראה‬,‫ ולא היה שם מגילה‬,‫שנה בעסיא‬ this phrase, that he is an istenis, as Rashi claims. This is not how an amora would say he is fastidious. The sugya later states that only kohanim may cover their hands instead of washing them. ‫רש"י מסכת חולין דף קז עמוד ב‬ ?‫ וכי עושין כן לאכול בלא נטילה‬- ‫עבדין כדין‬ Does one behave like this – does one act thus, eating without washing hands? ‫ אסטניס אני דאע"פ שנטלתי ידי אי אפשי לאכול בידי‬- ‫דעתי קצרה‬ My mind is short – I am an istenis, that even though I washed my hands, I cannot eat with my [bare] hands [and so I cover them].

178

THE STORIES THEY TELL ... ‫ שאני רבי מאיר‬:‫אמר רבי אבהו‬ ,‫רב חסדא אשכחיה לרב חננאל דהוה כתב ספרים שלא מן הכתב‬ ‫ אלא כך אמרו‬,‫ ראויה כל התורה כולה ליכתב על פיך‬:‫אמר ליה‬ 50 .‫ אסור לכתוב אות אחת שלא מן הכתב‬:‫חכמים‬ ‫מדקאמר כל התורה כולה ראויה שתיכתב על פיך מכלל דמיושרין‬ !‫ והא רבי מאיר כתב‬,‫הן אצלו‬ .‫שעת הדחק שאני‬ Gufa [revert to a text previously mentioned]: Rabbah bar bar Hannah (BA 3) said that R. Yohanan (JA 2) said: it is forbidden to write even one letter [of a scroll] if it is not [copied] from another scroll. [Stam] refutes [this view] from a baraita: … it once happened that R. Meir went to Asya to intercalate the year, and there was no Megillah there [written in Hebrew] and he wrote one out from memory, and then read from it [on Purim]! R. Abahu (JA 3) said: R. Meir is a special case. … R. Hisda (BA 3) encountered R. Hananel (BA 2) writing scrolls [from memory,] not [copying a new scroll] from another scroll. He said to him, the entire Torah could be written by you from memory, but the Sages have said, it is forbidden to write even one letter of a scroll unless [copied] from another scroll! [Stam asks:] Since he said “the entire Torah could be penned by you [i.e., R. Hananel] from memory,” which means he remembers the verses accurately, [then why couldn’t R. Hananel be permitted to write scrolls from memory], as did R. Meir?! [Stam answers:] Pressing circumstances are different [and these are not pressing circumstances].

50

No significant variants in MS Munich 95.

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

179

EXPLANATION

The rule, as stated by R. Yohanan, is that new scrolls, such as tefillin and mezuzot, must be copied from existing scrolls and not written out from memory. Although the Tosefta relates that R. Meir wrote out a Megillah from memory, because he found no Megillah in Asya to read from on Purim that was written in Hebrew, R. Abahu comments that R. Meir is an exception to the rule because of his vast store of memorized texts. When R. Hisda encounters R. Hananel writing scrolls from memory, he tells him to stop, that what he is doing violates the rabbinic requirement to prepare new scrolls by copying old scrolls. The stam then points out, in defense of R. Hananel, that although R. Meir wrote out a Megillah from memory, in violation of the rule of copying, only in pressing circumstances like R. Meir’s may the rule be suspended. This is a typical “he encountered him” anecdote in that one rabbi criticizes the action of another by citing an earlier rabbinic teaching that the other is violating. But this is not a typical anecdote in that the criticized rabbi, R. Hananel, does not defend his own practice; instead, the view of the criticizing rabbi, R. Hisda, is upheld. Since R. Hisda is far more prominent than R. Hananel, even though his junior, it is not surprising that R. Hisda has the final word. There is even a new point in this anecdote. Until now it seemed that someone who knew the text accurately by heart, such as R. Meir, could prepare a new scroll from memory, not from another scroll. But R. Hisda rescinds that permission. Even someone with a perfect textual memory is banned from writing out a scroll from memory. The continuation of the sugya, however, undermines R. Hisda’s view and upholds R. Hananel’s. In a later generation, Abaye permits writing tefillin and mezuzot from memory. 51 A

51

‫ מאי טעמא מיגרס‬... ‫אביי שרא לדבי בר חבו למיכתב תפלין ומזוזות שלא מן הכתב‬ .‫גריסין‬

180

THE STORIES THEY TELL

baraita is cited to support his rule. This is thus a clear example of the evolution of halakhah, from not writing any scrolls from memory except in pressing circumstances, to the standard writing of certain kinds of scrolls from memory, with the argument that the text is so well-known that no errors will creep in. 3.11 bPesahim 39a, Maror or lettuce for the Paschal meal ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת פסחים דף לט עמוד א‬ ... ‫ בחזרת‬:‫מתני' ואלו ירקות שאדם יוצא בהן ידי חובתו בפסח‬ .‫ובמרור‬ Mishnah: With these greens a person may discharge his obligation on Pesach: with lettuce… and with maror.

.‫ דהוה מהדר אמרירתא‬52 ‫ רבינא אשכחיה לרב אחא בריה דרבא‬... ‫ ותנא דבי‬,‫ והא חזרת תנן‬,‫ מאי דעתיך דמרירין טפי‬:‫אמר ליה‬ ‫ מאי‬:‫ ואמר רבא‬,‫ מצוה בחזרת‬:‫ ואמר רבי אושעיא‬,‫שמואל חזרת‬ ... .‫ דחס רחמנא עילוון‬,‫ מאי חסא‬.‫חזרת חסא‬ .‫ הדרי בי‬:‫אמר ליה‬ … Ravina (BA 7) 53 encountered R. Aha breih d’Rava (BA 6/7, student-colleague of R. Ashi) looking for merirta (i.e., a specific bitter herb) [for Passover]. He [Ravina] said to him: What do you think, that [marirta] is more bitter?, But have we not learned in the mishnah that hazeret (lettuce) can fulfill the Passover vegetable obligation, and the school of Shmuel (BA 1) [approved of] hazeret, and R. Oshaia (JA 1) said that the best way to fulfill the mizvah is with hazeret, and Rava Abaye permitted the family of Bar Habu to write tefillin and mezuzot without copying them from a written [version] … The reason is that the words [of tefillin and mezuzot] are well-known. 52 MS Munich 95 ‫רב הונא ורבינא אשכחיה לרב אחא‬ 53 Cannot be sure which Ravina this is. Perhaps BA 5. Or perhaps BA 7, the most prominent of the Ravina’s.

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

181

said that hazeret is hasa (lettuce)?! And what is [the meaning of] hasa (lettuce)? That God has mercy (has, ‫ )חס‬on us… R. Aha breih d’Rava responded: I retract.

EXPLANATION

The mishnah says that there are five vegetables that can fulfill the “greens” (‫ )ירקות‬obligation at the paschal meal. It lists maror last, perhaps indicating that hazeret, which it lists first, is preferable. It is likely that the Torah’s use of the plural, merorim, 54 raises the possibility that the word merorim is not indicating a particular vegetable but is saying that any bitter vegetable can serve as a condiment. On a similar note, the anecdote itself seems to reflect a difference of opinion regarding how to interpret merorim. Ravina encountered a colleague looking for a particular vegetable, called maror (in Aramaic, marirta), for his seder. Ravina tells him that although maror may be very bitter, lettuce is the preferred vegetable, according to both the mishnah and the several amoraim whom he cites. That is, according to Ravina the Torah is not naming a particular vegetable but just asking for a bitter vegetable. R. Aha breih d’Rava, with whom Ravina often disagrees, 55 concedes the point to him. This is an unusual anecdote in that the criticized rabbi accepts the criticism and withdraws his opinion. What did the editor of the sugya, who decided to include this short anecdote, seek to accomplish? It seems that the possibility of interpreting merorim as one particular vegetable continued into the late amoraic period. The point of the anecdote is to argue that the option of hazeret (lettuce), which appears first on the mishnah’s list of 209F

210F

54

‫ואכלו את הבשר בלילה הזה צלי אש ומצות על מררים יאכלהו‬. Exodus 12:8, “And they shall eat the flesh that same night, roasted over the fire, with matzot and merorim (plural) they shall eat it.” 55 For example, bEruv 24b; bSuk 18a; bYev 11a.

182

THE STORIES THEY TELL

acceptable vegetables, should be embraced, and a search for maror, last on the mishnah’s list, abandoned. In this case, the prominent but younger rabbi is the one who criticizes a somewhat older rabbi. The view of the younger, prominent rabbi prevails. 56

SUMMARY

In “he encountered him” anecdotes, one amora, usually a junior scholar, interacts with another, usually his mentor, outside a formal study framework—for instance, a junior scholar encounters his mentor sleeping in a bridal bed in a sukkah or wearing a mourning scarf at home on the Sabbath. The senior scholar performs a halakhah somewhat differently from the way it was earlier stated, and his disciple notices the change and criticizes or challenges his mentor. The mentor finds a way to deflect the critique, often by case distinction. That is, he claims that his circumstances are not addressed by the rule in question. Such an exception had not been made known previously to the student. The senior scholar thereby upholds his innovation, which usually is a leniency. It is likely that sometimes the mentor who behaved in a manner contrary to an earlier stated halakhah did so intentionally. His goal was to modify it. When a student questions him regarding his “deviant” behavior, he seizes the opportunity to distinguish his circumstances from the more general case. That is, he does not make up a new rule on the spot, even though it may appear that he does, but is deliberately carrying out the halakhah as he saw fit. Even in situations where the senior colleague already had the innovation in mind, we cannot know whether he was observed by his student fortuitously or by deSince there are several late amoraim by the name Ravina, it is not possible to determine with certainty which Ravina this is. If it is the later Ravina, then the younger but more prominent rabbi’s view becomes the rule. If it is the earlier Ravina, then the general pattern holds: the senior rabbi’s rule is accepted.

56

3. “ENCOUNTERED HIM” ANECDOTES

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sign. Though a learned and skilled reader may have instincts here and there, we have no definitive way to distinguish between planned and fortuitous observation by a student, or between thought-out and spontaneous innovation. The outcome of most of these scenarios is the same, however: a senior scholar has modified a halakhah. As I noted in previous chapters, the message of the editor(s) who chose to include these anecdotes in the sugya is that carrying out a halakhah may, on occasion, necessitate adapting it.

CHAPTER 4.

SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

As we have seen in previous chapters, when the Talmud presents a halakhic anecdote at the end of a sugya, it generally limits itself to just one. We don’t usually encounter a string of anecdotes all referring to the same halakhah. But there are times when the Talmud does present a number of anecdotes—two or more—all of which relate to the same halakhah. Why does the Talmud do that? Why isn’t one anecdote sufficient for the point the editor wants to make? A review of sugyot with multiple halakhic anecdotes leads to the conclusion that the Talmud is demonstrating by means of these anecdotes not only that halakhic change is possible but also that there are many different ways to institute a given change. Had the Talmud recorded only one anecdote, it would likely be understood as the only acceptable way of modifying the law in question. But by presenting multiple anecdotes, each of which describes how yet another amora modified the same law, the Talmud’s message is that not only may an earlier rule be adjusted, but it may be adjusted in a variety of ways. For example, a sugya in bKetubot 61a shows that there are at least four ways in which a wife may serve wine to her husband wine when a menstruant—even though R. Huna stated that such an action was prohibited. If multiple options exist, there can be no single “right” way to make a change. 185

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THE STORIES THEY TELL

The eight anecdotes presented in this chapter differ from others in earlier chapters in at least two significant ways. First, they are extremely short. Only rarely do they contain an amoraic verbal exchange. For the most part, they describe, in just a few words, an action an amora (or an amora’s relative) took. Second, they do not contain any term common to halakhic anecdotes. They could not, therefore, be located by a data base search. I found them by turning the pages of the Talmud. As in prior chapters, the innovative point in each of these anecdotes is often overlooked. Previously, because there was critique and defense in most of the anecdotes, the new point was easier to grasp. It was often stated explicitly. But in these sugyot, the modification is far from obvious. At first glance, they simply show how an amora carried out an earlier stated halakhah; upon careful examination, however, they show how each amora made a slight change to the halakhah upon implementing it. 4.1 bTa’anit 12b, Wearing shoes on a public fast day ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת תענית דף יב עמוד ב‬ ‫ עברו אלו ולא נענו בית דין גוזרין שלש תעניות אחרות על‬.‫משנה‬ ‫ ואסורין במלאכה וברחיצה‬,‫ אוכלין ושותין מבעוד יום‬,‫הצבור‬ ... .‫ובסיכה ובנעילת הסנדל ובתשמיש המטה‬ Mishnah: … If these [public fasts] pass and they were not answered [with rain], the court decrees yet another three fasts on the community. One may eat and drink while it is still daytime [but not later]. [On these fast days] it is forbidden to perform labor, bathe, anoint [oneself with oil], wear sandals, engage in sexual relations …1 21F

... '‫גמ‬

Note that the mishnah that lists the five bans follows, rather than precedes, the discussion of the ban on wearing shoes. 1

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‫ הא קא חזינן רבנן דמסיימי מסנייהו ואתו‬:‫אמרו ליה רבנן לרב ששת‬ 2 !‫לבי תעניתא‬ .‫ דלמא מיכל נמי אכול‬:‫איקפד ואמר להו‬ .‫אביי ורבא מעיילי כי מסיימי אפנתא‬ .‫ ודשמאלא לימינא‬,‫מרימר ומר זוטרא מחלפי דימינא לשמאלא‬ ‫ אין‬:‫ סברי כי הא דאמר שמואל‬.‫רבנן דבי רב אשי נפקי כי אורחייהו‬ .‫תענית צבור בבבל אלא תשעה באב בלבד‬ Gemara: [Some] rabbis said to R. Sheshet (BA 3): behold, we have seen rabbis put on shoes [on a public fast day] and come to the bei ta’anita. 3 R. Sheshet grew angry and said to them, maybe they also eat [on a fast day]! Abaye and Rava (both BA 4) entered wearing only the upper part of their shoes. 4 Mereimar and Mar Zutra (both BA 6) switched right [shoe] to left and v.v. Rabbis of the school of R. Ashi (BA 6/7) went out [on a public fast] as was their usual practice [i.e., wearing shoes]. They held, in accordance with Shmuel, that there are no public fast days in Bavel [with a ban on wearing shoes], except for Tish’ah BeAv.

EXPLANATION

The topic of this sugya is the mishnah’s ban on going out wearing sandals on a public fast, such as a fast for rain. The mishnah MS Munich 95 ‫קאתו רבנן לבי כנישתא כי סיימי מסאני‬ Soncino translation: Assembly; ArtScroll translation: the house of the fast. 4 So translates Sokoloff, Babylonian Aramaic, 157. 2 3

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prohibits a number of acts on those days: eating and drinking after nightfall, performing labor, bathing, anointing [one’s body with oil], wearing sandals, and sexual relations. The phrase “ne’ilat hasandal (donning sandals) [is forbidden]” means not just that one may not wear sandals but even any other footgear. A person is required to go out barefoot. The reason the mishnah formulates the barefoot rule in a negative way—“do not wear sandals” instead of “do go out barefoot” is that all the other bans are formulated as prohibitions. However, the phrase “do not wear sandals,” does not mean that shoes, or other kinds of foot coverings, are permitted. Rather, the mishnah’s point is that one should act on a public fast day as if one is in mourning, which includes going out barefoot. The prototype of a mourner going barefoot is King David, who ascended the Mount of Olives barefoot when grieving for his son Absalom (2 Samuel 15:30). 5 The mishnah chose to express the ban on all footgear with the phrase “no sandals,” because sandals are the most common type of footwear worn by Jews in ancient Israel. 6 But the word “sandals” stands for all kinds of footgear, 7 including shoes, as already noted in the HQ/HY chapter in reference to halizah shoes. bYoma 77a ‫ונעילת הסנדל מנא לן? דכתיב ודוד עלה במעלה הזיתים עלה ובוכה וראש‬ ‫ לאו‬- ‫ יחף ממאי‬.‫ יחף‬+[‫ ]והוא הולך‬:‫מסורת הש"ס‬+ (‫לו חפוי )והלך‬ ?‫מנעילת הסנדל‬ From where [in Scripture do we derive the] prohibition of wearing shoes [on a fast day]? As Scripture says about King David … . He walked yahef. Doesn’t yahef mean “not wearing sandals”? … Although the Talmud rejects this answer regarding King David, it is clear that the main meaning of yahef is barefoot. See also Ezekiel 24:17. 6 Regular shoes were closed. Sandals, which were open, were tied on with straps. The soles of sandals were usually made of several layers of leather (The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Daily Life in Roman Palestine, ed. Catherine Hezser [Oxford 2010], 374). See next sugya. 7 See yYoma (8:1, 44d): ‫כל אלו שאמרו אסורין בנעילת הסנדל יצא לדרך נועל הגיע לכרך חולץ‬ 5

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

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In a number of places the Mishnah uses the words “sandals” and “shoes” interchangeably. 8 Is there a difference, halakhically speaking, between sandals and shoes? No, both are fashioned from leather and are equally forbidden to be worn on fast days (or equally permitted for use in the halizah ceremony). Therefore, when the local mishnah lists forbidden activities on a fast day, although it employs the word “sandal,” it also bans shoes and any other kind of footgear. Note that the Tosefta even bans footgear made of fabric. It, too, requires a person to go barefoot. 9 The sugya is composed of four anecdotes. The first reports that R. Sheshet grew angry when informed that there are rabbis who go out wearing shoes on public fasts. He says, sarcastically, that anyone who would wear shoes on a public fast would also eat on a public fast—in other words, he mocks their commitment to halakhah. The second relates that Abaye and Rava did wear “shoes” on a public fast, but only the upper parts, no soles. The third notes that Mereimar and Mar Zutra wore shoes on a public fast, but they put the right shoe on the left foot and vice versa. The fourth says that rabbis of the school of R. Ashi wore shoes on a public fast day as they did on an ordinary day. They

“All those who are forbidden to wear sandals [on a fast day], if he sets out on the road [on a public fast], he puts on [his] sandals; when he enters a city, he takes them off.” This statement implies that, for safety, one does not go barefoot when traveling. But when reaching a populated place, one removes his sandals and, it follows, goes barefoot. It is not saying that when arriving in town one removes his sandals and puts on other footgear. 8 See, for example, mYevamot 12:1 and 12:2. Also, mYevamot 12:2, as cited in the gemara at the beginning of the chapter, says “sandals,” but in the citation of the mishnah in the gemara, it says shoes. 9 Had the editor of the Mishnah also said, like the Tosefta, that felt shoes were prohibited, it is unlikely that the practice of wearing footgear that was technically not “shoes,” or not made of leather, could have developed.

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THE STORIES THEY TELL

followed the opinion of Shmuel that the ban on wearing shoes on a fast day in Bavel applies only to the Tish’ah BeAv fast. In sum, most amoraim held that one could still be regarded as going barefoot so long as one’s shoes were worn differently than usual. None of them, it seems, went out with bare feet. Such an expansive understanding of the mishnah’s barefoot requirement shows considerable rabbinic reluctance to going out in public with feet uncovered. The hesitation may stem from considerations of comfort, safety, or concern for social status. In the Greco-Roman world, slaves and poor people often went barefoot. 10 Although the named rabbis live not in the land of Israel but in Babylonia, Greco-Roman practices had arrived there too. 11 Had the mishnah’s rule of “no wearing sandals” been easily understood as meaning that other footgear is permitted, no anecdotes would have been necessary. The multiplicity of anecdotes, however, suggests that the amoraim are reinterpreting the mishnah, claiming that its phrase “do not wear shoes” does not mean “you should go barefoot” but rather “you may not wear shoes properly but may wear shoes differently.” Furthermore, since these anecdotes exhibit a number of different strategies, the implicit message of the sugya is that not only are these strategies acceptable, but people are free to improvise others as well. The reported ones are merely examples. They do not exhaust all possibilities. Had there been only one anecdote, we might have concluded that that strategy alone had to be adopted. Multiple anecdotes suggest multiple possibilities. Hezser, The Oxford Handbook, 375. ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת שבת דף קנב עמוד א‬ ‫ בן‬- ‫ דעל חמור‬,‫ מלך‬- ‫ דעל סוס‬:‫ אמר ליה‬,‫ חזייה דלא סיים מסאניה‬... ‫ בר איניש‬- ‫ ודמנעלי בריגלוהי‬,‫חורין‬ … He saw that he was not wearing shoes. He said to him: one who rides on a horse is a king; on a donkey, a free man, and one who wears shoes on his feet is a human being. This last phrase (above, at bShab 152a) suggests that one who goes barefoot is socially degraded. 11 See R. Kalmin, Jewish Babylonia Between Persia and Roman Palestine (Oxford 2006) 4ff. 10

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

191

There is a difficulty in this sugya, however. Shmuel’s statement permitting regular shoes on a public fast day, transmitted by seventh generation amoraim, appears at the end of the sugya and not at the beginning, cited by late amoraim, even though Shmuel is a first generation Babylonian amora. If he had issued such a statement in his own day, it is likely (but not necessarily so) that R. Sheshet, Abaye, Rava, Mereimar, and Mar Zutra, would have condoned wearing ordinary shoes on a fast day. Instead, these five rabbis invented ways to permit wearing “shoes” on a public fast, albeit in ways that are different than usual. In its current location, the role of Shmuel’s liberal ruling is to provide a strong basis for wearing shoes on a public fast in the late amoraic period, but not before. Note that it is not R. Ashi himself who cites Shmuel, but his lesser-known associates or students. And it is they, not he, who go out in regular shoes on a public fast. The report of their practice does not have the same weight as it would have had, had it come from R. Ashi himself. 12 The bottom line is that although the Mishnah requires going out barefoot on a public fast, the amoraim over the generations redefined “not wearing shoes” as “not wearing shoes properly.” If so, wearing shoes in an unusual way is permitted.

According to Rashi (s.v. qa’atu rabbanan leta’anita), Shmuel issued his liberal statement—that shoes are permitted on a public fast day—at an early time, but later rabbis did not accept it. They, therefore, only donned footgear that were like shoes but not actually shoes. Rashi goes on to say that they claimed that the mishnah was saying that only proper shoes are forbidden but other footgear is permitted. They thus did not modify the mishnah’s rule. I think Rashi interpreted the mishnah’s barefoot rule in this way to avoid saying that the amoraim changed a rule of Mishnah. I am claiming, to the contrary, that the mishnah requires a person to go barefoot on a public fast day and that the amoraim, in fact, did modify the mishnah’s rule by permitting footgear of one sort or another. 12

192

THE STORIES THEY TELL 4.2 bYoma 73b; 78a, Wearing shoes on Yom Kippur ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת יומא דף עג עמוד ב‬ ‫יום הכפורים אסור באכילה ובשתיה וברחיצה ובסיכה ובנעילת‬ .‫הסנדל ובתשמיש המטה‬ Mishnah: On Yom Kippur one is forbidden to eat and drink, to bathe, to anoint [one’s body], to wear sandals, and to engage in sexual relations.

‫תוספתא מסכת יומא )כפורים( )ליברמן( פרק ד הלכה א‬ ‫יום הכפורים אסור באכילה ובשתיה ברחיצה ובסיכה בנעילת הסנדל‬ ...‫ אפי' באנפיליא של בגד‬,‫בתשמיש המטה‬ Tosefta Yoma 4:1 On Yom Kippur one is forbidden to eat and drink, to bathe, to anoint [one’s body], to wear sandals, and to engage in sexual relations. Even [wearing] a felt shoe [is forbidden.] 13

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת יומא דף עח עמוד א‬ ‫( שעם ביום‬:‫ מהו לצאת בסנדל של )עח‬:‫ ותו קא מבעיא להו‬... ?‫הכפורים‬ ‫ אני ראיתי את רבי יהושע‬:‫)עמד רבי יצחק בר נחמני על רגליו ואמר‬ ‫ בתענית‬:‫ ואמינא ליה‬,‫בן לוי שיצא בסנדל של שעם ביום הכפורים‬ .‫ לא שנא‬:‫צבור מאי? אמר לי‬

S. Lieberman writes in Tosefta Ki-fshutah Yoma (808), that according to one Medieval commentator, “anything that a person is not accustomed to wear [in order] to walk in it is permitted, because it is still considered barefoot” (‫ שאינו יוצא מכלל יחף‬,‫)וכל מידי שאין דרך להלך בו מותר‬. In other words, this commentator, Ba’al Sefer Yerei’im Hashalem, understands the mishnah’s ban on shoes as requiring a person to go barefoot but interprets “going barefoot” broadly to include footgear to which one is not accustomed. This is very similar to what I am saying. My point is that interpreting “going barefoot” broadly is a modification of the mishnah’s rule. See next several notes.

13

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

193

‫ אני ראיתי את רבי אלעזר דמן ננוה שיצא‬:‫אמר רבה בר בר חנה‬ ?‫ ביום הכפורים מאי‬:‫ ואמינא ליה‬,‫בסנדל של שעם בתענית צבור‬ 14 (.‫ לא שנא‬:‫אמר לי‬ .‫רב יהודה נפיק בדהיטני‬ .[‫ רבא נפיק )בדיבלי( ]בדיקולי‬,‫אביי נפיק בדהוצי‬ .‫רבה בר רב הונא כריך סודרא אכרעיה ונפיק‬ …They further pondered: May one go forth on Yom Kippur in sandals [made] of bamboo? [Thereupon] R. Isaac b. Nahmani (JA 3) stood up and said: I myself saw R. Joshua b. Levi (JA 1) go forth in sandals of bamboo on Yom Kippur. I asked him: How about on a public [e.g., rain] fast? He answered: There is no difference. Rabbah b. Bar Hanah (BA 3) said: I saw R. Eleazar of Nineveh go forth in sandals of bamboo on a public fast, and I asked him: How about Yom Kippur? He answered: There is no difference. R. Judah (BA 2) went forth in [footgear made of] reeds [on Yom Kippur]. Abaye (BA 4) in [footgear made] of palm-branches [on Yom Kippur]. Rava (BA 4) in [footgear made of] twisted reeds [on Yom Kippur]. Rabbah b. R. Huna (BA 3) tied a piece of cloth around his legs and went out [on Yom Kippur].

EXPLANATION

Like the previous sugya, this one also deals with the requirement to go out barefoot on a fast day, in this instance Yom Kip14

MS Munich 95 ‫חסר‬

194

THE STORIES THEY TELL

pur. The sugya opens with a question by the stam: may one go out on Yom Kippur in shoes made of sha’am [bamboo]? The stam appears to be asking if wearing shoes made of a material other than leather, the standard material of shoes and sandals, could still qualify as going barefoot. The previous sugya from bTa’anit makes it clear that, according to the cited amoraim, only wearing shoes “properly” is banned by the Mishnah on a fast day. Other ways of wearing shoes still allow a person to consider oneself as going barefoot. According to the amoraim in this sugya from bYoma, a person who wears shoes made of materials other than leather is still regarded as going barefoot. Hence the question about bamboo sandals. 15

Furthermore, mYoma 8:1, after listing the five afflictions, says that a parturient should wear shoes on Yom Kippur. ‫ והחיה תנעול את הסנדל‬It is hard to imagine that the mishnah is merely saying that shoes made of other materials are not good for her, although others may wear them, and that she should wear leather shoes only. If the point is to protect her from a chill, then the mishnah is saying that while others must go barefoot, she should wear shoes. That would make sense as the intended meaning of the mishnah. See bYoma 78b, ‫ החיה תנעול את‬... ‫כדתניא‬ ‫הסנדל משום צינה‬. The simple translation is, a woman who is post-partum should wear sandals [to avoid] a chill. It does not say that she should wear shoes made of leather instead of shoes made of other materials. Some students of the Talmud would claim that the amoraic interpretation of the mishnah—permitting footgear if it is not proper shoes (mTa’anit) or permitting shoes made of material other than leather (mYoma)—is precisely the meaning intended by the authors of these two mishnahs, but I believe that such students of the Talmud are reading their own ideas into the mishnah. There is no qualification of the ban on shoes, no suggestions that only leather shoes are prohibited. Unlike traditional commentators, I view the amoraic interpretation as a reversal of the mishnah’s rule: the mishnah requires one to go out barefoot on public fast days; the amoraim read the mishnah innovatively, as permitting shoes that are not made of leather or that are not proper shoes so that they can consider themselves still going barefoot, technically not wearing shoes. They resisted going out barefoot in public. 15

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

195

The sugya continues with two eyewitness reports: R. Yizhaq bar Nahman (JA 3) says that he saw R Joshua b. Levi (JA 1) go out in bamboo sandals on Yom Kippur (YK); Rabbah b. bar Hannah (BA 3) says that he saw R. Eleazar of Nineveh go out in bamboo sandals on a public fast day. Thus, the question about bamboo footgear has been answered in the affirmative; bamboo sandals still allow a person to fulfill the “going out barefoot on Yom Kippur” requirement. Note that the phrase “I saw him …” often describes a rabbi who deviated in his behavior from the halakhah as stated earlier or who decided an open halakhic question. 16 Four anecdotes follow: R. Judah wore dahitni [on Yom Kippur]; Abaye wore dehuzei; Rava wore diqulei; and Rabbah bar R. Huna wrapped a scarf or cloth around his feet and went out [on YK]. These four amoraim wore footgear made of materials other than leather because they chose to understand the mishnah as saying that donning footgear made of anything other than leather is still regarded as going barefoot. These four have, therefore, replaced the mishnah’s rule of no shoes at all on Yom Kippur 17 See Introduction, n. 49 and the example therein, “I saw Rava and Abaye …” (bBer 34b). 17 Further proof of the mishnah’s ban referring to all shoes, not just leather shoes, is the following statement in Tosefta Yoma 4:1: ‫תוספתא‬ ‫מסכת יומא )כפורים( )ליברמן( פרק ד הלכה א‬ ‫יום הכפורים אסור באכילה ובשתיה ברחיצה ובסיכה בנעילת הסנדל‬ .‫בתשמיש המטה אפי' באנפיליא של בגד‬ On Yom Kippur one is forbidden to eat and drink, to bathe, to anoint, to wear shoes, to engage in sexual relations. Even a felt shoe (inpilia) [is included in the words “no shoes”]. This statement in the Tosefta is saying that the ban on shoes, on ne’ilat hasandal, includes not just leather shoes but also those made of fabric. This means that no shoes at all may be worn in public on Yom Kippur. S. Lieberman, in Tosefta Ki-fshutah, Kippurim (819), says that R. Simon b. Gamliel’s (RSBG) dispute with the first tanna—RSBG permits a person to wear shoes at home on Yom Kippur and the first tanna bans such a practice—that the basis of RSBG’s leniency is that he holds that casual 16

196

THE STORIES THEY TELL

with permission to wear shoes, so long as they are not made of leather. In this way they reconcile the mishnah’s requirement to go out barefoot with their own apparent need or desire to cover their feet when in public. The parallel sugya in the Yerushalmi also presents a number of anecdotes. Talmud Yerushalmi Yoma 8:1, 44d ‫ד‬:‫ מד‬,‫תלמוד ירושלמי )וילנא( מסכת יומא פרק ח משנה א‬ "‫"ובנעילת הסנדל‬ ‫ ואית תניי תני אין‬,‫אית תניי תני יוצאין באמפליא ביום הכפורים‬... .‫יוצאין‬ ‫אמר רב חסדא מאן דאמר יוצאין באמפליא של בגד ומאן דאמר אין‬ .‫יוצאין באמפליא של עור‬ ‫ר' יצחק בר נחמן סלק לגבי רבי יהושע בן לוי בלילי צומא רבא נפק‬ ‫לגביה לבוש סוליסה‬ ‫אמר ליה מה הוא דין‬ ‫א"ל איסתניס אנא‬ ‫רבי שמואל בר נחמן סלק לגביה ריב"ל בלילי תעניתא נפק לגביה‬ ‫לבוש סוליסה‬ ‫א"ל מה הוא דין‬ ‫א"ל איסתניס אני‬ ‫ר' סמיי חמונה נפיק בלילי תעניתא לבוש סוליסה‬ ‫חד תלמיד מן דרבי מנא הורי לחד מן קריבויי דנשיא מלבש סוליסה‬ ‫א"ל אן מן הדה‬ wearing of a shoe in one’s home does not mean that the person stopped going barefoot. This supports my claim that the mishnah’s ban on wearing shoes outside the home means that no shoes at all are allowed, that one is required to go barefoot in public.

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

197

‫א"ל מן דריב"ל הוא‬ .‫א"ל ריב"ל איסתניס הוה‬ [Citation of mishnah:] “And [no] wearing sandals [on Yom Kippur]” … Some tannaitic texts say: “One may go out in felt shoes on Yom Kippur” and some say “one may not.” R. Hisda (BA 3) said: the one who says one may go out [refers to] a felt shoe [not covered in leather]; the one who said one may not go out [refers to] a felt shoe [covered with] leather. R. Yizhaq b. Nahman (JA 3) went to see R. Joshua b. Levi (JA 1) on the night of Yom Kippur. He came out wearing slippers. He [R. Yizhaq b. Nahman] said to him [R. Joshua b. Levi]: What is this? He said: I am an istenis 18 [fastidious, i.e., I cannot tolerate going out barefoot]. R. Shmuel b. Nahman (JA 3) went to see R. Joshua b. Levi on the night of a [public] fast. He came out wearing slippers. He [R. Shmuel b. Nahman] said to him [R. Joshua b. Levi]: What is this? He said: I am an istenis. R. Simai (JA 1) was seen going out on the night of a [public] fast wearing slippers. A student of R. Mana (JA 5) instructed a relative of the Nasi to wear slippers [on a public fast]. He [the relative] said to the student: From whom is this [permission]? He answered: from R. Joshua b. Levi. He said: R. Joshua b. Levi was an istenis.

EXPLANATION

Further support for interpreting the mishnah as requiring a person to go out barefoot on Yom Kippur can be found in the 18

Sokoloff, Palestinian Aramaic (53) interprets istenis as “weak.”

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THE STORIES THEY TELL

Yerushalmi. The sugya opens with a dispute among tannaim about whether or not one may go out on Yom Kippur wearing an ampilia, a shoe made of felt. R. Hisda, a Babylonian amora, resolves the dispute by saying that those who permit wearing an ampilia are speaking of a fabric shoe, and those who prohibit are speaking of a fabric shoe covered with leather. 19 Four anecdotes follow. In each case in which an amora (either R. Joshua b. Levi or R. Simai) wore sulisa (slippers not made of leather) 20 on Yom Kippur, 21 he was criticized for doing so. The defense offered in all instances is that the person wearing sulisa is an istenis, a fastidious or delicate person, which means that he is unable to tolerate going out barefoot on Yom Kippur and so wears slippers. If the mishnah were saying that only leather shoes are banned on Yom Kippur but that shoes made of other materials are permitted, why were amoraim who wore non-leather shoes, i.e., slippers, challenged? We can therefore conclude that the mishnah is banning all foot coverings on Yom Kippur, regardless of the material from which they are made. That is why the amoraim who wore sulisa are challenged: they should be going out barefoot but instead are appearing in public in slippers. The amoraim in the Yerushalmi are thus more stringent than those in the Bavli. The Yerushalmi amoraim allow non-leather foot coverings only for an istenis but not an ordinary person. The Bavli amoraim apply the mishnah more liberally. Instead of requiring one to go out barefoot, they interpret the mishnah’s phrase “no shoes” as either a ban on leather shoes but not shoes of other materials (bYoma) or as a ban on wearing shoes S. Lieberman, Tosefta Yoma 4:1 (249), writes that an ampilia is a shoe made of felt (leved). The reference to an ampilia of leather refers to a fabric shoe covered with leather. 20 Sokoloff, Palestinian Aramaic, 370. 21 Whether or not sulisa means bamboo, it cannot mean leather footwear, because the Yerushalmi makes it clear, in its opening statement, that leather on the feet is forbidden on Yom Kippur. It says that a shoe made of leather is forbidden on Yom Kippur but a shoe made of fabric is permitted. As noted above, ampilia means a shoe made of felt. 19

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

199

“properly” but not on wearing shoes in other ways (bTa’anit). Such interpretations make it possible for an amora to cover his feet with non-leather footgear on Yom Kippur, or not “proper” shoes on a public fast, and still regard himself as fulfilling the mishnah’s requirement to go out barefoot. These collections of anecdotes, in both the Bavli and the Yerushalmi, provide a clear example of how halakhah changes over time. The accumulation of so many anecdotes, over a number of generations and across geographical locations, suggests that there was widespread amoraic resistance to going out barefoot on Yom Kippur and other public fast days. As time passed, the rabbis turned the mishnah’s barefoot requirement into a ban on leather shoes on Yom Kippur and proper shoes on a public fast day. Such a narrowing of the ban made it possible for amoraim to design footwear that would cover a person’s feet but would not technically violate the barefoot rule. The multiplicity of anecdotes, in both Talmuds, suggests that there are many ways to accomplish this goal. To summarize: amoraim in both Talmuds, and in both bYoma and bTa’anit, interpret the mishnah’s ban on donning shoes or sandals on a public fast not as a requirement to go barefoot but, more literally, as a ban on properly worn, leather shoes only. This opens the door to other kinds of footgear which, as the anecdotes indicate, they (gladly) wore. The rather radical rereading of a mishnah in both bYoma and bTa’anit was probably triggered by considerations of social standards, safety, and even personal comfort. 4.3 bKiddushin 80b–81b, Seclusion with animals ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת קידושין דף פ עמוד ב‬ ‫ אבל אשה אחת מתייחדת עם‬,‫ לא יתייחד אדם עם שתי נשים‬.'‫מתני‬ ‫ מתייחד אדם עם אמו ועם בתו וישן עמהם בקירוב‬...‫שני אנשים‬ .‫ זו ישנה בכסותה וזה ישן בכסותו‬,‫ ואם הגדילו‬.‫בשר‬ Mishnah: A man may not seclude himself with two women but a woman may seclude herself with two men. … A man may seclude himself with his mother [when he is young] and his daughter [when she is young], and even sleep with them

200

THE STORIES THEY TELL in bodily contact. But when they mature [physically], each must sleep in his or her own garment.

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת קידושין דף פא עמוד ב‬ ".‫"מתייחד אדם עם אמו‬ ‫ ודר עם אמו‬,‫ מתייחד אדם עם אחותו‬:‫אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אסי‬ .‫ועם בתו‬ ‫ אסור להתייחד עם כל עריות‬:‫ אמר‬,‫כי אמרה קמיה דשמואל‬ .‫ ואפילו עם בהמה‬,‫שבתורה‬ ... ".‫”אפילו עם בהמה‬ .‫אביי מכלליה מכולה דברא‬ 22 .‫מצרא‬

‫רב ששת מעבר ליה‬

‫ חזייה דיתיב וקא‬,‫רב חנן מנהרדעא איקלע לרב כהנא לפום נהרא‬ ‫ לא סבר לה מר אפילו עם‬:‫ אמר ליה‬,‫גרס וקיימא בהמה קמיה‬ ?‫בהמה‬ .‫ לאו אדעתאי‬:‫אמר ליה‬ [Citation of mishnah:] “A man may seclude himself with his mother.” Said R. Judah (BA 2) in the name of R. Asi (BA 1): A man may seclude himself with his sister and may live with his mother and his daughter [in the same dwelling]. When he recited this [rule] in the presence of Shmuel (BA 1), the latter replied: a man may not seclude himself with any of the persons forbidden to him by the Torah [as a sexual partner, and may not seclude himself] even with an animal. …

22

MS Munich 95 '‫רב ששת מעבר לה נהר‬

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

201

“Even with an animal.” Abaye (BA 4) would remove animals from the entire meadow. R. Sheshet (BA 3) had them put on the other side of the bridge [or of the boundary]. R. Hanan of Nehardea (BA 4) visited R. Kahana (BA 3) at Pum Nahara. He saw R. Kahana sitting and studying with an animal standing nearby. He said to him [to R. Kahana]: Doesn’t the master hold “[one may not seclude himself with any of the persons forbidden to him by the Torah, not] even with an animal”?! He answered him: It did not occur to me.

EXPLANATION

The mishnah permits a man to seclude himself with his mother or daughter, and share a bed with them, even if they will be in bodily contact, so long as one of them is sexually immature, i.e., a child. The Mishnah does not fear that a young son will have sex with his mother, or a father with his young daughter. The sugya discussing this Mishnah opens with an amora saying more liberally that a man may even seclude himself with his sister, and share living quarters with his mother and his daughter, but not, by implication, with other women. When this rule was recited before Shmuel, he commented that not only may a man not seclude himself with any person forbidden to him by the Torah as a sexual partner, he may not even seclude himself with an animal. Shmuel is apparently implying that were a man to find himself alone with an animal, the temptation to engage in bestiality could overtake him. The sugya on Shmuel’s statement, “not even with an animal” is composed of three anecdotes and nothing more. The first two, featuring R. Sheshet and Abaye, show that amoraim took seriously the ban on being secluded with an animal. These two rabbis would remove animals from their vicinity. The third anecdote, unlike the first two, seems to move in the direction of leniency. When R. Hanan of Nehardea visits R. Kahana and sees

202

THE STORIES THEY TELL

him studying Torah with an animal standing nearby, he cites Shmuel’s ban on secluding oneself with an animal. That is, he criticizes R. Kahana’s “lax” behavior. The amora responds that it did not occur to him that this was a problem. He seems to be saying that he knows Shmuel’s rule of not secluding oneself with an animal but does not think being near an animal is problematic. He therefore does not abide by Shmuel’s rule. 23 Alternatively, he may be saying that R. Hanan is right, that he should not be studying with an animal standing nearby. In most other sugyot with multiple anecdotes, each one accepts but modifies an earlier ruling. This sugya is unusual in that the first two show compliance with Shmuel’s strict dictum. Each of the first two amoraim made sure no animals were nearby, presumably when they were studying or teaching Torah. But the third possibly shows non-compliance. R. Kahana studied Torah with an animal standing nearby but was criticized by a colleague. The halakhic outcome is therefore murky. Need one avoid animals during Torah study or not? Later commentators accepted both stances: one need not avoid being alone with an animal. Even so, it is praiseworthy if one does so. 24 Rashi does not comment. Soncino translates, “I was thoughtless.” More likely, I think, it means that R. Kahana is defending himself against R. Hanan’s criticism. He seems to be saying that such a precaution is not necessary. That kind of defense fits the general pattern of halakhic anecdotes. Not that R. Kahana concedes the point and realizes he behaved without regard to Shmuel’s rule, but that R. Kahana is saying that Shmuel’s rule need not be followed. Tosafot (s.v. Abaye mekhalei leho) say that Jews are not suspected of bestiality. They seem to be saying that Abaye need not have removed the animals. See next note. 24 ‫רמב"ם הלכות איסורי ביאה פרק כב הלכה ב‬ ‫ לפיכך אין אסור להתייחד‬,‫לא נחשדו ישראל על משכב זכור ועל הבהמה‬ ‫ וגדולי‬,‫ ואם נתרחק אפילו מייחוד זכור ובהמה הרי זה משובח‬,‫עמהן‬ .‫החכמים היו מרחיקין הבהמה כדי שלא יתייחדו עמה‬ Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Issurei Bi’ah 22:2, “Jews were not suspected of homosexuality or bestiality. Therefore, it is not forbidden to seclude oneself with them [i.e., with ani23

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

203

4.4 bShabbat 150a–b, Havdalah in the field ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת שבת דף קנ עמוד א‬ ‫ ולא יאמר אדם לחבירו‬,‫ לא ישכור אדם פועלים בשבת‬.‫משנה‬ ‫ אין מחשיכין על התחום לשכור לו פועלים ולהביא‬.‫לשכור לו פועלים‬ ... .‫ ומביא פירות בידו‬,‫ אבל מחשיך הוא לשמור‬,‫פירות‬ Mishnah: A person may not hire laborers on the Sabbath, nor ask someone else to do so for him. One may not wait for nightfall at the edge of the Sabbath boundary to hire workers or bring in produce. But one may wait for nightfall at the edge of the Sabbath boundary to guard [his crops, after the Sabbath] and bring home [some] produce in his hand …

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת שבת קנ עמוד ב‬ ."‫"אבל מחשיכין‬ ‫ואף על גב דלא אבדיל? והאמר רבי אלעזר בן אנטיגנוס משום רבי‬ !‫ אסור לו לאדם שיעשה חפציו קודם שיבדיל‬:‫אליעזר בן יעקב‬ ‫ המבדיל‬:‫ והאמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל‬,‫וכי תימא דאבדיל בתפלה‬ .‫בתפלה צריך שיבדיל על הכוס‬ !?‫ כוס בשדה מי איכא‬,‫וכי תימא דאבדיל על הכוס‬ .‫ בין הגיתות שנו‬:‫ דרבא‬25 ‫תרגמא רבי נתן בר אמי קמיה‬ ‫במערבא אמרינן הכי המבדיל בין‬

26 : ‫אשי‬

‫אמר ליה רבי אבא לרב‬ .‫קודש לחול ועבדינן צורכין‬

mals]. And if one distances himself, even from seclusion with a homosexual male or an animal, it is praiseworthy. And the great sages would keep cattle at a distance so as not to seclude oneself with them.” Maimonides seems to be interpreting the third anecdote as agreeing with Shmuel, that one should not seclude oneself with animals. 25 MS Munich 95 ‫משמיה‬ 26 MS Munich 95 ‫א"ל ר' אבא בר אשי‬

204

THE STORIES THEY TELL ‫ בין קודש‬27 (‫ כי הוינא בי רב כהנא )הוה אמר המבדיל‬:‫אמר רב אשי‬ .‫לחול ומסלתינן סילתי‬ [Citation of mishnah:] “But one may wait for nightfall [at the edge of the Sabbath boundary].” [Stam asks:] [May he perform labor when the Sabbath ends] if he has not [yet] recited Havdalah? Did not R. Eleazar b. Antigonos (JA 2) say in the name of R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov (T 5): A person is prohibited from attending to his needs [i.e., performing labor after the Sabbath ends] until he recites Havdalah?! 28 [Stam asks further:] And if you say he recited Havdalah in the Amidah [in Ma’ariv], did not R. Judah (BA 2) say that

MS Munich 95 '‫אמרי‬ There is no Talmud Yerushalmi for Shabbat 23. However, in a very different context, the Yerushalmi does include the statement by R. Eleazar b. Antigonos (JA 2) in the name of R. Eleazar bei R. Yannai (JA 1), that one may not perform labor after the Sabbath ends until he recites Havdalah. It is hard to know the composition of Havdalah in the day of this early amora. He similarly says that one may not petition God for his personal needs until he recites Havdalah, since that activity, too, was forbidden on the Sabbath. yBerakhot 5:2, 9c ‫ר"א בן אנטיגנוס בשם ר"א בי ר' ינאי זאת אומרת שאסור לעשות מלאכה‬ ‫עד שיבדיל‬ ‫כמה דאמר אסור לעשות מלאכה עד שיבדיל ודכותה אסור לו לאדם לתבוע‬ ‫צרכיו עד שיבדיל‬ R. Eliezer b. Antigonos said in the name of R. Eliezer bei R. Yannai: That is to say, one may not perform labor until he recites Havdalah. Just as he said no performing labor until after one recites Havdalah, [the amora said], one may not petition [God] for one’s [personal] needs until he recites Havdalah. Note that the Bavli statement by R. Eleazar b. Antigonos, to perform his needs, combines two phrases of the Yerushalmi version: to perform labor and to petition [God] for his needs. 27

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

205

Shmuel (BA 1) said, one who recites Havdalah in the Amidah must also recite it over a cup [of wine]? [Stam asks further:] And if you say he [already] recited Havdalah over a cup [of wine], can one [find] a cup in the field? [No!] R. Natan bar Ammi (BA 5) explained in the presence of Rava (BA 4): It was the time of wine pressing [that the mishnah was referring to]. R. Abba (BA 6) said to R. Ashi (BA 6): In the West, [it is our practice] to say thus, “hamavdil bein qodesh lehol” (He who distinguishes between holiness and the profane) and we [then] attend to our needs [i.e., perform labor]. R. Ashi said: when we were at the home 29 of R. Kahana (BA 5), [at the end of the Sabbath] he would say hamavdil bein qodesh lehol and we would [then] chop up wood. 30

EXPLANATION

The mishnah (mShab 23:3) states that if, when the Sabbath ends, a person finds himself at the edge of his Sabbath boundary, he may carry produce home in his hands. That is, as soon as the Sabbath ends, he may walk past the Sabbath boundary, perhaps to check on the growth of a crop, and then harvest some produce. 31 In such a case, he may bring home the produce in his hands, meaning, it seems, the small amount he just harvested. 32 Soncino translates “bei R. Kahana” as “at R. Kahana’s academy.” Saying that the students were at his home is a better translation. 30 The phrase mesaltinan siltei means to chop up a tree trunk into smaller pieces (Sokoloff, Babylonian Aramaic, 817). 31 So explains Rashi (s.v. ve’af al gav delo avdil). 32 That is, the mishnah permits him, on the Sabbath, to walk to the end of the Sabbath boundary, but not in order to prepare on the Sabbath to 29

206

THE STORIES THEY TELL

In the preceding clause the mishnah stated that he may not approach the boundary late in the day on the Sabbath in order, immediately after the Sabbath ends, “to bring home produce.” That is, he may not walk to the Sabbath boundary to get a head start on harvesting a large amount of produce after the Sabbath ends. However, if he drew near the boundary for the purpose of guarding his produce after the Sabbath ended, should he then happen to harvest a small amount, he may bring it home. The sugya on this mishnah opens with the stam’s rhetorical question: How can the mishnah suggest that a person is allowed to perform labor, right after the Sabbath ends, before he recites Havdalah [i.e., the set of blessings that marks the end of the Sabbath]? Hasn’t an amora already stated that one may not perform labor when the Sabbath ends until he recites Havdalah? Furthermore, says the stam, even if he said Havdalah in the Amidah, the statutory prayers, it is not sufficient, for according to a different amora, one also needs to recite Havdalah over a cup of wine. A person at the Sabbath boundary could not have done so. Note that the stam is reading the mishnah through the eyes of later amoraic statements and discovering that it is not consistent with them. In response to the last point, about reciting Havdalah over a cup of wine at the Sabbath boundary, R. Natan bar Ami comments to Rava that at the time of the grape harvest one is actually able to find a cup of wine in the field. If so, the mishnah can be considered consistent with both the rule of no

perform work right after the Sabbath. He may not get a head start on the Sabbath for work he will perform when the Sabbath ends. Thus, he may not proceed into his fields Saturday night to harvest produce if he walked to the edge of the Sabbath boundary during the day, because that would be preparing on the Sabbath for work to be done after the Sabbath. But he may bring home a small amount of produce that he harvests right after the Sabbath ends because it clearly was not his intention to walk on the Sabbath to the edge of the Sabbath boundary to harvest just a small amount of produce.

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

207

work until one recites Havdalah in the Amidah and the rule of reciting it over a cup of wine. The sugya continues with two eyewitness reports. R. Abba relates to R. Ashi that in the West, if a need arose to perform labor after the Sabbath ended but before reciting Havdalah, one would recite a short Havdalah wherever he was. That would permit the immediate performance of labor. R. Ashi himself goes on to say that when he was at the home of R. Kahana, his mentor would recite a short Havdalah at the end of the Sabbath— just the words hamavdil bein qodesh lehol—and they would proceed to chop wood. This means that they did not recite a full Havdalah over a cup of wine before performing labor. The sugya apparently assumes that the person in question had not yet recited Ma’ariv, which can be done as late as one wishes. As commentators note, if one already recited Havdalah in Ma’ariv, he need not recite the abbreviated Havdalah before performing labor. These two amoraim have thus introduced a new option, that one need not go home right away at the end of the Sabbath and recite Havdalah in order to perform labor. In both the land of Israel and in Bavel, an amora ruled that a person who is away from home at the end of the Sabbath, e.g., at the edge of his Sabbath boundary, may recite an abbreviated Havdalah and then perform labor. The sugya implies, but does not say explicitly, that when he arrives home he should recite a full Havdalah again, this time over a cup of wine. 33 As stated elsewhere in the Talmud, this second Havdalah is for the benefit of his family and also for himself, to fulfill his obligation. 34 Rashi comments (s.v. v’avdin tzorkhin), ‫וכ"ש דאי אבדיל בתפלה מותר לעשות צרכיו וחוזר ומבדיל על הכוס‬ All the more so if he recited Havdalah in the Amidah, he is permitted to perform his needs and then return [home] and recite Havdalah on a cup of wine. 34 Discussions of whether to recite Havdalah either in Ma’ariv or on a cup of wine continue over the generations in both Talmuds. The bottom 33

208

THE STORIES THEY TELL

The editor of the Bavli did not include two eyewitness reports in this short sugya in order to show his audience how pious R. Kahana in Bavel and the rabbis in the West were, that before performing labor when the Sabbath ended they made sure to recite Havdalah, albeit in a shortened form. On the contrary, he included these eyewitness reports to show a halakhic breakthrough. Faced with the need to perform labor prior to reciting Havdalah on a cup, R. Abba from the land of Israel and R. Kahana in Bavel endorsed a new practice: reciting a short Havdalah, 35 not on a cup, but still sufficient to permit one to perform labor as soon as the Sabbath ends. The difference between the two anecdotes is that the one from the land of Israel describes an apparently widespread practice, “in the West we say.” The Babylonian anecdote attributes the practice to a prominent named amora, R. Kahana, as reported by his student R. Ashi. It is not clear if the short Havdalah had already “caught on” in Bavel. Note that there is no amoraic exchange in this sugya, no criticism and no defense of “deviant” behavior. Instead, we see two amoraim, each confronting the question of how one can perform labor when the Sabbath ends without having recited a full Havdalah over a cup of wine? They answer, through their behavior, the same innovative way: a short Havdalah, without a cup of wine, is sufficient to permit one to perform labor. 4.5 bBesah 32b, Raking out an oven on a festival ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת ביצה דף לב עמוד ב‬ ‫ אבל‬,‫ ואין גורפין תנור וכירים‬... ‫ אין שוברין את החרס‬.‫משנה‬ ...‫מכבשין‬

line is that one needs to do both. See lengthy sugya at bBer 33a and yBer 5:2, 9b. 35 At an earlier time, this short Havdalah was considered a full Havdalah. See bPes 103a.

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

209

Mishnah: One may not break up clay pots [on a festival] … nor rake out an oven or a stove. But one may press down [the ashes] …

".‫ "ואין גורפין תנור וכירים‬.‫גמרא‬ ‫ ואם אי אפשר לאפות אלא‬:‫תני רב חייא בר יוסף קמיה דרב נחמן‬ .‫אם כן גורפו מותר‬ ‫ אמר לה‬.‫דביתהו דרבי חייא נפל לה אריחא בתנורא ביומא טבא‬ .‫ חזי דאנא רפתא מעלייתא בעינא‬:‫רבי חייא‬ .‫ ואזדהר מחרוכא‬,‫ טוי לי בר אווזא‬:‫אמר ליה רבא לשמעיה‬ Gemara. [Citation of mishnah:] “Nor rake out an oven or a stove.” R. Hiyya bar Yosef (BA 2) taught in the presence of R. Nahman (BA 2): But if one cannot bake unless he [first] rakes it out, it is permitted [to do so on a festival]. The wife of R. Hiyya (JA 1)—a brick fell down into her oven on a festival. R. Hiyya said to her: Look, I want excellent bread [i.e., rake out the oven (Rashi s.v. rifta ma’alyata ba’inan)]. Rava (BA 4) said to his servant [on a festival]: Roast me a duck but take care not to burn it [i.e., rake out the oven and remove any foreign substances that might interfere with the roasting of the duck] (Rashi s.v. veizdahar meiharokha).

EXPLANATION

The Mishnah prohibits raking out an oven on a festival. R. Hiyya bar Yosef (BA 2) modifies this rule, saying that if raking out is necessary in order to bake, one may rake out an oven on a festival. This statement, as arranged in the sugya, appears to foreshadow the two anecdotes in which, it seems, something in the oven will interfere with proper baking or roasting. Note, however, that R. Hiyya bar Yosef lived later than R. Hiyya (JA 1), who appears in the first anecdote. It reports that R. Hiyya’s wife found a brick in her oven on a festival. This impediment will not

210

THE STORIES THEY TELL

allow her to bake bread without burning or harming it in some way. Although not stated explicitly in this Bavli version of the anecdote, it is rather clear that she knows that one may not rake out (that is, clearing in some way) an oven on a festival. It seems, therefore, that she approaches her husband with the question of what to do in this instance of unforeseen circumstances, since baking is permitted and necessary on festivals. She is asking, is the ban lifted in these circumstances? He responds, in veiled language, do what you have to do to produce the excellent bread that I want, even expect. In other words, as understood by Rashi (s.v. rifta ma’alyata ba’ina), this is his indirect way of telling her to rake out the oven. Why indirect? Because in R. Hiyya’s day the rule of the mishnah had not yet been modified (to allow raking if necessary in order to bake) and so he cannot openly tell her to rake out the oven. But he adapts the rule of the mishnah in a case of unforeseen circumstances [i.e., a brick having fallen into the oven], giving her permission to rake out the oven on the festival so that the bread will not burn or otherwise lose flavor. It is only a generation or two later that R. Hiyya bar Yosef modifies the mishnah’s no raking rule. He says that if baking on a festival necessitates raking, one may do so. It seems rather clear that R. Hiyya bar Yosef based himself on the anecdote about R. Hiyya’s wife. Note that this amora’s halakhic rule is circumscribed: one may only rake out the oven if it is necessary for baking, not for any other purpose. The rule of the mishnah is, thus, upheld for most cases. Also note that R. Hiyya bar Yosef’s statement was placed in the sugya before the anecdote. If one reads the sugya in a linear fashion, it appears that the rule of “raking for baking” existed even before R. Hiyya gave his wife permission to do so on a festival, even though that is not so. The outcome of this placement is that R. Hiyya’s statement appears less innovative than it actually is. Similarly, in the second anecdote, Rava tells his servant, on a festival, to roast him a duck and be sure not to char it. This is his way of saying, rake out the oven before roasting so that the bird does not burn. This anecdote teaches a new point, as is standard for a second anecdote in a series. Even without a brick

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

211

in the oven, which is a circumstance that could compromise the quality of the food one is about to cook, one may rake out the oven to begin with, not just after discovering a problem. And raking may be performed for roasting, not just for baking. Why did Rava merely hint at raking out the oven instead of saying so explicitly? I can only guess that one does not openly contradict a mishnah even if that is the goal. Note that R. Hiyya bar Yosef’s rule of “rake in order to bake” does not apply to Rava whose servant will roast, not bake, him a duck. The leniency of raking out an oven on a festival has now been expanded. It is not only baking that permits raking, but any other kind of food preparation which could be harmed by accumulated ashes or foreign bodies in the oven. Also, here, the servant is told before the fact to rake out the oven, even if nothing had yet fallen into it, whereas R. Hiyya’s wife was given permission to rake out the oven only after the discovery of the brick. A parallel anecdote appears in the Yerushalmi. Talmud Yerushalmi Besah 4:5, 62c ‫ סב ג‬,‫ה‬:‫תלמוד ירושלמי מסכת ביצה ד‬ ‫ אתת‬.‫ברתי' דר' חייה רבה אתת מיפה גו תנור' אשכח' כיפה בגויה‬ .‫שאלת לאבוה‬ .‫ איזלין גרפין‬36 ‫א"ל‬ .‫אמרה לינה יכלה‬ .‫א"ל איזלין כבשין‬ .‫ידעה הוות אלא דהוות בעיא מישמע מן אבוה‬ The daughter of R. Hiyya Rabbah (JA 1, called R. Hiyya in the Bavli) came to bake in an oven [on a festival] and found a rock in it. She came and asked her father [what to do]. The Leiden ms. consistently writes ‫( אמ' לה‬instead of ‫ )א"ל‬when a man addresses a woman. 36

212

THE STORIES THEY TELL He said: Go and rake it out. She said to him: I am not able to do so. He said to her: Go and press down [the ashes]. She knew [this rule] but wanted to hear it from her father.

EXPLANATION

The daughter of R. Hiyya Rabbah found a rock in the oven on a festival and was concerned lest it ruin the bread she was about to bake, or even make baking impossible. Raking out the oven would solve the problem but she apparently had already learned the rule that one may not rake out an oven on a festival. She comes and asks her father what to do in these challenging, unforeseen circumstances. He tells her, openly and in opposition to the mishnah, to rake out the oven. She refuses to do so. 37 Her father then tells her to press down the ashes, which the mishnah permits. The anonymous voice comments that she knew that pressing down the ashes was the solution but wanted to hear it from her father. The reason the stam must speak up at this point is that the story does not make sense: if she knows the mishnah that says raking out is forbidden, she also knows that pressing down ashes is permitted. Why would her father need to inform her of that? Why would she ask? The answer, according to the stam, is that although she knew the rule, she wanted to hear from her father that such activity was permitted before proceeding to do so on a festival. There are differences between the Yerushalmi and Bavli versions of the anecdote, but in common is a woman’s sensing the need to rake out an oven on a festival yet knowing that such an act is generally prohibited. In the Yerushalmi, as in the Bavli, the father rules leniently, permitting raking out an oven on a Raking out an oven was a woman’s job. See T. Or, Massekhet Betsah (Mohr Siebeck 2010), 155. See also bHag 4b–5a, for another reference to a woman cleaning out an oven. 37

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

213

festival. But the similarity ends there because the daughter in the Yerushalmi refuses to violate the rule of the mishnah. She settles, instead, on pressing down the ashes, clearly permitted by the mishnah. 38 We now see that the Bavli story is even more liberal than we first thought. When this anecdote traveled from the land of Israel to Bavel, the female character changed from daughter to wife, and the impediment from rock to brick. But the significant change is that whereas in the Yerushalmi the raking out ban is not reversed, in the Bavli it is, but only in a case of unforeseen circumstances (e.g., finding a brick in the oven on a festival). It is the daughter in the Yerushalmi who resists a father who wants to turn a prohibition into permission, and he does not persist in this reversal. In the Bavli, it is a husband who goes ahead and turns a prohibition into permission, in a limited set of cases. It is possible that the Bavli editors intentionally emended the Yerushalmi anecdote to accord with their more lenient principles, depicting R. Hiyya as giving permission to rake out an oven if a brick fell in. The Bavli editor(s) also inserted the later comment of R. Hiyya bar Yosef, locating it right before the first anecdotes. This insertion made the earlier R. Hiyya look as if he was not modifying the mishnah, although in reality he was. And, as noted, the second anecdote liberalized the rule further.

It is possible that permission to press down the ashes was not yet included in the Mishnah in the time of R. Hiyya but was added in response to this anecdote. An even more radical possibility is that he is instructing her to rake out the oven even though the Mishnah forbids such action. His rationale would be that having tasty bread on a festival trumps the rule of no raking. See my article, “A New View of Women and Torah Study,” in JSIJ, https://jewish-faculty.biu.ac.il/files/jewishfaculty/shared/hauptman.pdf, 261.

38

214

THE STORIES THEY TELL

4.6 bYevamot 101a, Halizah requires the presence of five, not three

According to the Torah (Deuteronomy 25:5–10), if a man dies childless, his widow is automatically betrothed 39 to her levir, i.e., her dead husband’s brother, or is at least bound to his family. If the levir does not wish to marry her, he can release her from the already existing marital bond by undergoing a halizah ritual: in the presence of the elders of the town, the levir declares he does not wish to marry her, she removes his shoe, spits in his face, and announces that he does not wish to maintain his dead brother’s line. The ceremony frees her to marry anyone else she chooses. 40 Halizah is, in this sense, the equivalent of divorce. 41 Betrothal is like marriage in that it can only be dissolved by a bill of divorce. In standard cases, following betrothal, a couple has a wedding and is then permitted to live together. 40 See several previous sugyot that mentioned halizah: bYev 103b, a discussion of the halizah shoe; bYev 106b, a discussion of reciting biblical verses at the halizah ceremony. 41 ‫דברים פרק כה‬ ‫ל־הזְּ ֵק ִ֗נים‬ ַ ‫ם־ל ֹא יַ ְחפּ ֹ֙ץ ָה ִ֔אישׁ לָ ַ ֖ ק ַחת ֶאת־יְ ִב ְמ ֑תּוֹ וְ ָﬠ ְל ָת ֩ה יְ ִב ְמ ֨תּוֹ ַה ַ֜שּׁ ְﬠ ָרה ֶא‬ ֤ ‫ז( וְ ִא‬ ‫יִשׂ ָר ֵ֔אל ֥ל ֹא ָא ָ ֖בה יַ ְבּ ִ ֽמי‬ ְ ‫וְ ָ ֽא ְמ ָר ֙ה ֵמ ֵ֨אן יְ ָב ִ֜מי ְל ָה ִ֨קים ְל ָא ִ ֥חיו ֵשׁ ֙ם ְבּ‬ ‫י־ﬠ ֖ירוֹ וְ ִד ְבּ ֣רוּ ֵא ָל֑יו וְ ָﬠ ַ ֣מד וְ ָא ַ֔מר ֥ל ֹא ָח ַ ֖פ ְצ ִתּי ְל ַק ְח ָ ֽתּהּ‬ ִ ֵ‫ח( וְ ָ ֽ ק ְראוּ־ל֥ וֹ זִ ְקנ‬ ‫ם וְ ָחלְ ָצ֤ה נַ ֲﬠ ֙לוֹ ֵמ ַﬠ֣ל ַרגְ ֔לוֹ וְ יָ ְר ָ ֖ קה ְבּ ָפ ָנ֑יו‬ ֒ ‫ט( וְ נִ גְּ ָ֨שׁה יְ ִב ְמ ֣תּוֹ ֵא ָליו֘ ְל ֵﬠ ֵינ֣י ַהזְּ ֵקנִ י‬ ‫ת־בּית ָא ִ ֽחיו‬ ֥ ֵ ‫שׂה ָל ִ֔אישׁ ֲא ֶ ֥שׁר לֹא־יִ ְב ֶנ֖ה ֶא‬ ֣ ֶ ‫וְ ָ ֽﬠנְ ָת ֙ה וְ ָ ֣א ְמ ָ ֔רה ָ ֚כּ ָכה יֵ ָﬠ‬ :‫י( וְ נִ ְק ָ ֥רא ְשׁ ֖מוֹ ְבּיִ ְשׂ ָר ֵ ֑אל ֵ ֖בּית ֲח ֥לוּץ ַה ָנּ ַֽﬠל‬ 7 But if the man does not want to marry his brother’s widow, his brother’s widow shall appear before the elders in the gate and declare, “My husband’s brother refuses to establish a name in Israel for his brother; he will not perform the duty of a levir.” 8 The elders of the town shall then summon him and talk to him. If he insists, saying, “I do not want to marry her,” 9 his brother’s widow shall go up to him in the presence of the elders, pull the sandal off his foot, spit in his face, and make this declaration: Thus shall be done to the man who will not build up his brother’s house. 10 And he 39

‫‪4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES‬‬

‫‪215‬‬

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת יבמות דף קא עמוד א‬ ‫מצות חליצה בשלשה דיינין ואפילו שלשתן הדיוטות‪ .‬חלצה במנעל‬ ‫חליצתה כשרה‪ ,‬באנפילין חליצתה פסולה‪ .‬בסנדל שיש לו עקב כשר‬ ‫‪...‬‬ ‫‪Mishnah: For halizah, three judges [are required], even if all‬‬ ‫‪three are lay [judges]. If she performed halizah with a shoe,‬‬ ‫‪her halizah is valid; with a slipper, it is not valid. With a‬‬ ‫… ‪sandal that has a heel, valid.‬‬

‫תוספתא מסכת יבמות )ליברמן( פרק יב הלכה ט‬ ‫מצות חליצה בשלשה ובלבד שיהו יודעין לקרות ר' יהודה אומ'‬ ‫בחמשה‪ .‬אמ' ר' לעזר בי ר' שמעון מעשה וחלצה לפני ר' ישמעאל‬ ‫ביחידי בלילה‪.‬‬ ‫‪Tosefta: The requirement for halizah is three [laymen], pro‬‬‫‪vided they know how to recite [the relevant Torah verses].‬‬ ‫‪R. Judah says: five. R. Lezar son of R. Shimon said: it once‬‬ ‫‪happened that she performed halizah in the presence of R.‬‬ ‫‪Ishmael alone at night [and it was deemed valid].‬‬

‫גמ'‪...‬‬ ‫תנינא להא דתנו רבנן‪ :‬מצות חליצה בשלשה שיודעין להקרות כעין‬ ‫דיינים‪ ,‬רבי יהודה אומר‪ :‬בחמשה‪.‬‬ ‫)קא‪ ... (:‬אלא אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק‪ :‬הואיל וסתם במקום מחלוקת‬ ‫דתנן‪ :‬סמיכת זקנים ועגלה ערופה בשלשה‪ ,‬דברי ר' יוסי‪ ,‬ר' יהודה‬ ‫אומר‪ :‬בחמשה; החליצה והמיאונין בשלשה‪ ,‬ולא קפליג ר' יהודה‪,‬‬ ‫ש"מ הדר ביה ר' יהודה ש"מ‪.‬‬ ‫אמר רבא אר"נ הלכה חליצה בשלשה‪ ,‬הואיל וסתם לן תנא כוותיה‬ ‫‪...‬‬ ‫אמר רבא‪ :‬צריכי דייני למיקבע דוכתא‪ ,‬דכתיב ‪...‬‬ ‫רב פפא ורב הונא בריה דרב יהושע עבדי עובדא בחמשה‪.‬‬ ‫‪shall go in Israel by the name of “the family of the unsan‬‬‫”‪daled one.‬‬

216

THE STORIES THEY TELL !‫ והא הדר ביה‬,‫כמאן? כר' יהודה‬ 42 .‫מילתא‬

‫לפרסומי‬

‫ סליק מר לגבן למלויי בי‬:‫ אמר ליה‬,‫רב אשי איקלע לבי רב כהנא‬ .‫חמשה‬ ‫ תא סק‬:‫ ואמר לי‬,‫ הוה קאימנא קמיה דרב יהודה‬:‫אמר רב כהנא‬ ,‫ בי חמשה‬43 ‫לזירזא דקני לאיצטרופי‬ .‫ כי היכי דליפרסם מילתא‬:‫ למה לי חמשה? אמר להו‬:‫אמרו לו‬ ‫ )סק תא‬:‫ אמר ליה‬,‫רב שמואל בר יהודה הוה קאי קמיה דרב יהודה‬ .‫ לפרסומי מילתא‬,‫ לאצטרופי בי חמשה‬44 (‫לזירזא דקני‬ ,‫ בב"ד ישראל ולא בב"ד של גרים‬-- "‫ "בישראל‬:‫ תנינא‬,‫אמר ליה‬ ... .‫ואנא גר אנא‬ Gemara: … We learned in a tannaitic text: For halizah, three [laymen] who know how to recite [Torah verses] like judges are required. R. Judah says: five … [101b] … But R. Nahman bar Yizhaq (BA 4) said: since there is an anonymous opinion in a mishnah [that halizah requires three judges] … and it appears right after a dispute [about several other topics, regarding which R. Judah (the tanna) expressed a dissenting opinion 45 but he remained silent regarding the number needed for halizah] … this [silence that follows the statement that three are needed for halizah] implies that he agrees that three are needed for halizah and has reneged on his opinion [that five are needed for halizah]. MS Munich 95 ‫לפרסומי מילתא בעלמא‬ MS Munich 95 ‫למלויי לאיצטרופי בי חמשה‬ 44 MS Munich 95 ‫ סליק מר לגבן‬,‫חסר‬ 45 The laying on of hands of the elders and breaking of the heifer’s neck: R. Simon holds three judges are need. R. Judah dissents and says five are needed. The mishnah then says “for halizah, three judges.” R. Judah does not dissent. 42 43

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

217

Rava (BA 4) said that R. Nahman (BA 3) said: The halakhah is that halizah requires three [judges or laymen] since the tanna [of Mishnah Sanhedrin] presented the rule of three [for halizah] without attribution. Rava said: the judges must determine the place [for the halizah ritual], as it says … R. Pappa (BA 5) and R. Huna breih d’R. Joshua (BA 5) performed a case [of halizah] with five. [Stam asks:] Like whom? Like R. Judah? But he reneged! [Stam answers:] [The purpose of five is] to publicize the matter [i.e., so that more people will be able to offer firstperson testimony of her status if needed]. R. Ashi (BA 6) visited the home of R. Kahana (BA 5), who said to him: Come up and join us to fill out a panel of five [for halizah]. R. Kahana said: I was standing before R. Judah [BA 2, the amora] and he said to me: Come to such-and-such location to join a panel of five. They [i.e., students or colleagues] said to him: Why do we need five? He said to them: to publicize the matter. R. Shmuel bar Judah (BA 3) was standing before R. Judah [(BA 2), the amora]. He said to him: Come to suchand-such location to join a panel of five to publicize the matter. R. Shmuel bar Judah replied to R. Judah: [But] we learned in a tannaitic text, “… in Israel” (Deut 25: 10), [which means a court of Jews by birth] and not a court of converts, and I am a convert …

EXPLANATION

The Mishnah states that the halizah (release) ritual is to be performed in the presence of three men—either judges or lay people. The parallel statement in the Tosefta says that the three must be able to recite the relevant Torah verses aloud. The

218

THE STORIES THEY TELL

Tosefta goes on to say that a dissenting tanna, R. Judah, holds that five need to be present at the halizah ritual. Yet another tanna, R. Eleazar bei R. Shimon, relates that it once happened that a woman performed the halizah ritual in the presence of only one judge, R. Ishmael, and also that it took place at night, even though judicial proceedings are expected to take place during the day when judges can see well. The Tosefta implies that it was deemed a valid halizah despite the double deficiency. What underlies the dispute between the first tanna of the mishnah, who requires three for halizah, and R. Judah, who requires five? A panel of fewer judges (or qualified lay people) means that halizah will happen more easily, with the result that childless widows will be able to remarry someone other than the levir sooner. But, if challenged regarding her marital availability, there will be fewer judges able to testify to her newly single status. A panel of a greater number of judges, which will take longer to convene, means that more judges will be able to testify regarding her marital status. Both sides, then, agree on the goal of freeing the widow for remarriage but disagree on the manner of achieving it. The Bavli sugya opens with a baraita from the Tosefta that presents the dispute between R. Judah and his colleagues regarding the number of judges, or qualified laymen, needed to oversee a halizah ritual, R. Judah holding five and the others three. R. Nahman bar Yizhaq claims that since a mishnah in Sanhedrin states, without dispute, that halizah requires only three, it resolves the tannaitic dispute in favor of three. That is, R. Judah’s lack of dissent in Mishnah Sanhedrin 1:3 regarding the number of judges needed for halizah implies that he ultimately conceded the point to his colleagues, i.e., that only three judges are needed for the halizah ritual, not five. The sugya goes on to say that Rava in the name of R. Nahman also decided the halakhah in favor of three judges for halizah. Rava further notes that the judges must determine where the ritual will take place. Four anecdotes follow. In all of them the number of judges present for halizah, quite surprisingly, is five, not three.

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

219

In the first anecdote, R. Pappa and R. Huna brei d’R. Joshua, both fifth generation amoraim, oversee a halizah ritual with five rabbis present. There are no further details. According to the stam, the amoraim increased the number of judges to five to “publicize the matter” more quickly, which apparently means to make it easier for the widow to remarry without a challenge to her marital status. In the second anecdote, R. Ashi visits his mentor, R. Kahana (BA 5), who asks him to “fill out” a panel of five for halizah. In the third, R. Kahana, who is likely to be a different, earlier rabbi by the same name, 46 comments that he was standing before the amora R. Judah (BA 2) who said to him, “come to such-and-such a location to join a panel of five for halizah.” When questioned regarding the need for five, R. Judah responded, “So that the matter becomes public knowledge.” This is a typical hava qa’imna anecdote in that the senior scholar asks the junior scholar to perform a task—in this case, to show up for a halizah ceremony. The halakhic change instituted by the senior scholar is requiring five, not three, for halizah. Similarly, in the immediately previous anecdote, which says that one rabbi visited another, the senior scholar, R. Kahana, asks the junior scholar, R. Ashi, to show up for a halizah ceremony as one of five judges. The fourth anecdote relates that R. Shmuel bar Judah was standing before the amora R. Judah who asked him to show up at the same place as mentioned in the previous anecdote to join a panel of five for halizah. R. Shmuel demurred, saying that the panel had to be composed of Jews by birth whereas he was a convert. In this case, the junior scholar rejects the request of the senior scholar by citing a tannaitic text that disallows converts from participating in a halizah ceremony.

This R. Kahana lived in an earlier generation than the R. Kahana of the previous anecdote. The later R. Kahana could not have interacted with R. Judah.

46

220

THE STORIES THEY TELL

It is clear from all four anecdotes that in Bavel, despite Rava’s fixing the halakhah at three for halizah, there is a move afoot to require five, which is the position of the dissenting tanna R. Judah. The shift to five begins with the amora R. Judah and continues in succeeding generations with R. Kahana, R. Pappa, R. Huna breih d’R Joshua, and R. Ashi. The repeated, stated rationale for five judges is the need to publicize the ritual, which minimizes the possibility that anyone would later question the widow’s marital availability. Unlike a divorce in which a woman can prove her marital status with a document, i.e., a get, a halizah widow may find it hard to convince others of her availability for re-marriage without proof of being single. 47 But if five judges or laypeople witness the halizah ritual, it will be easier for her to support her claim. This sugya makes no reference to a “get halizah,” a document that testifies that a halizah ceremony took place, which the Talmud mentions a few pages later. 48 If rabbis, in general, did not produce such a document for the widow, she was at a disadvantage, in which case the more judges the better for publicizing the ritual. Note that in three out of the four anecdotes, it is a senior rabbi who asks a junior rabbi to join a panel of five for halizah. This seems to indicate, yet again, that a student is expected to do his mentor’s bidding in these kinds of matters, in addition to performing other tasks for him. Also note the language iqla and hava qa’aei in the anecdotes, which imply innovation. Why are four anecdotes included in the sugya if they all teach the same halakhah, i.e., the need for five for halizah? It seems that to change the rule of three for halizah, as stipulated in both Mishnah Yevamot and Mishnah Sanhedrin, and as decided by Rava, one anecdote will not suffice. In general, when several anecdotes appear in succession each teaches a new That is, a woman who underwent a halizah ceremony may not be able to show proof that she is no longer bound to the family of her deceased husband. 48 See discussion at bYev 106b, above. 47

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

221

point, but that is not the case here. 49 In instances in which the earlier stated halakhah is undergoing significant change—in this case, the essence of the ruling, which is the number of judges needed, is changed, not just tweaked under certain circumstances—several anecdotes are preferable to just one, even if they all make the same point. 50 By including so many anecdotes, which all stipulate five for halizah, the Bavli stresses that the Mishnah’s rule of three judges for halizah is being changed, and that a tannaitic dispute is being revived and resolved by amoraim in favor of the dissenting, rejected opinion. Later law codes require only three, but recommend five. 51 There is no discussion in the Yerushalmi of five for halizah, and no anecdotes about the required number of judges for a halizah panel. 52 It therefore seems that in the later generations in Bavel, but not in the land of Israel, increasing a halizah panel from three to five became standard practice. Did that make halizah harder to accomplish? The answer is not clear. 4.7 bBaba Mezia 60a–b, Prettifying Merchandise ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת בבא מציעא דף ס עמוד א‬ See bPes 100b, infra. Note that in Chapter Two, the convener of the panel, the amora R. Judah, seems so eager to gather five that he overlooks the rule of empaneling only judges who are Jewish by birth. 51 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yibbum and Halizah 4:5 ‫ומצותה בחמשה‬... ,‫ בפני שלשה שיודעין להקרות‬,‫והחליצה ביום ולא בלילה‬ . ‫ ואותן השנים אפילו היו עמי הארץ‬,‫כדי לפרסם הדבר‬ Halizah must take place in the daytime and not at night. In the presence of three who know how to recite [Torah verses]. But the preferred behavior is [to perform halizah] in the presence of five to publicize the matter. The additional two judges need not be learned. 52 The Yerushalmi sugya (yYevamot 12:1, 12b) makes no mention of five judges for halizah, nor does it cite any anecdotes, but it does mention the rule of limiting the halizah panel to judges who are born Jewish, i.e., who did not convert to Judaism. 49 50

222

THE STORIES THEY TELL ‫ אין מפרכסין לא את האדם ולא את הבהמה ולא את‬...'‫מתני‬ .‫הכלים‬ Mishnah: … Persons, cattle and utensils may not be prettified [when they are offered for sale].…

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת בבא מציעא דף ס עמוד ב‬ ... .‫ תומי לסרבלא‬53 ‫שמואל שרא למרמא‬ .‫רב יהודה שרא לכסכוסי קרמי‬ .‫ שרא למידק צרדי‬54 ‫רבה‬ .‫רבא שרא לצלומי גירי‬ .‫ שרא לצלומי דיקולי‬55 (‫רב פפא )בר שמואל‬ ‫ אין מפרכסין לא את האדם ולא את הבהמה ולא את‬:‫והא אנן תנן‬ !‫הכלים‬ .‫ הא בעתיקי‬,‫ הא בחדתי‬:‫לא קשיא‬ ... Shmuel (BA 1) permitted fringes to be put on a garment. Rab Judah (BA 2) permitted rubbing material. Rabbah (BA 3) permitted beating coarse garments. Rava (BA 4) permitted arrows to be painted. R. Pappa b. Shmuel (BA 4) allowed baskets to be painted. [Stam asks:] But did we not learn in the mishnah that persons, cattle, and utensils may not be prettified? MS Munich 95 ‫למעבד‬ MS Munich 95 ‫ר' אבא‬ 55 MS Munich ‫ חסר‬Because of the sequence of generations, it is more likely to be R. Pappa (BA 5) who painted baskets, not R. Pappa bar Shmuel (BA 4). 53 54

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

223

[Stam answers:] There is no difficulty; one refers to new, the other to old.

EXPLANATION

The last line of the last mishnah of the fourth chapter of Mishnah Baba Mezia (4:12), on the topic of fraud, clearly states that a seller may not alter merchandise to misrepresent its age or conceal its flaws. Even so, the sugya brings no fewer than five anecdotes to say that five rabbis did indeed engage in prettifying what they were selling. 56 The details of what they did are not clear but the message is: it is acceptable to prettify old or flawed merchandise in these ways. The logic seems to be that no prettifying at all would put the rabbinic seller at a disadvantage since other sellers who don’t follow rabbinic rulings would surely engage in such practices. These five rabbis, therefore, went ahead and found ways to improve the looks, i.e., hide the imperfections, of their merchandise. Did they violate the mishnah’s rule of no prettifying? Apparently, they felt that what they did was allowed—or, to say it differently, they interpreted the mishnah so that it made room for their particular practices. The stam notes the discrepancy between these five behaviors and the Mishnah’s ban on such activities and asks the obvious question, Weren’t they transgressing the “no prettifying” rule of the Mishnah? The stam’s answer is “no, they were acting within the boundaries of the law.” The five rabbis were prettifying brand-new merchandise, to which the Mishnah’s ban, it is reasonable to assume, did not apply. That is, they did not conceal age or flaws. They simply “decorated” their new wares. The stam’s distinction between old and new can hardly be what the sugya was saying in its amoraic layer, i.e., before the stam superimposed its views onto the text. That is, since the mishnah is speaking of prettifying old merchandise to make it The prohibition is presumably not regarding prettifying that enhances the object artistically but rather with changes that hide deficiencies and enable the seller to mislead the buyer as to the quality of the item.

56

224

THE STORIES THEY TELL

appear newer (or prettifying flawed merchandise to make it appear less flawed), it makes little sense to say that the amoraim in the five anecdotes were prettifying new merchandise. New merchandise does not have flaws that need to be hidden. There is no reason to misrepresent its age. It is more likely that, as businessmen, these amoraim engaged in practices that they asserted did not fall under the rubric of forbidden prettifying. Or they simply set aside the Mishnah’s ban and went ahead and prettified in these ways and that is the (more radical) message of the anecdotes. The Yerushalmi goes even further than the Bavli. 57 Its sugya is composed of four anecdotes, in each of which an amora prettifies his merchandise. The amora is either criticized by a colleague (first anecdote) or asks a colleague whether he may do what he is doing, and the colleague grants permission (second and third anecdotes). The fourth anecdote is a two-word report of what an amora did to prettify. 58 The Yerushalmi sugya, then, supports the five Bavli rabbis who went ahead and prettified even without consulting a colleague. 59 It is only the stam, as noted, who sees a need to deny that the amoraim prettified flawed merchandise. The amoraic layer of the Bavli thus permits various forms of prettifying. It is only the stam that senses the discrepancy between the five rabbis’ behavior and the mishnah. The stam’s solution is weak, as already noted. We thus see that in both Talmuds the mishnah’s demanding standard is compromised. The reason the amoraic editor(s) of the Bavli included as many as five anecdotes, since all make the same point, is to show that there is a multiplicity of ways to prettify without violating the See yBaba Mezia 4:12, 9d. Note that most of the anecdotes, in both Talmuds, are hard to translate since they name various utensils. 59 Note that several amoraim in the Yerushalmi wondered if they were allowed to engage in certain prettifying behavior and sought out a colleague to advise them if they could do so. The Bavli does not record any consults with colleagues regarding prettifying. 57 58

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

225

rule of the mishnah. In sum, although the stam in the Bavli does not acknowledge that amoraim may modify a rule of the mishnah, it seems clear that that is exactly what they did. These five amoraim changed a rule of the mishnah because it seemed too restrictive to them. Therefore, the editor’s inclusion of a multiplicity of anecdotes was likely intended to show rabbinic resistance to the mishnah’s rule and some of the ways in which it could be set aside. 4.8 bShabbat 148b, Festival Loans ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת שבת דף קמח עמוד ב‬ ‫ ורבה‬,‫ לא ניתנה ליתבע‬:‫ רב יוסף אמר‬,‫ הלוואת יום טוב‬:‫איתמר‬ .‫ ניתנה ליתבע‬:‫אמר‬ ‫ דאי אמרת ניתנה ליתבע אתי‬,‫ לא ניתנה ליתבע‬:‫רב יוסף אמר‬ .‫למיכתב‬ ‫ ואתי‬,‫ דאי אמרת לא ניתנה לא יהיב ליה‬,‫ ניתנה ליתבע‬:‫רבה אמר‬ .‫לאימנועי משמחת יום טוב‬ ... ,‫רב אויא שקיל משכונא‬ 60 .‫איערומי‬

‫רבה בר עולא מערים‬

It was stated: If a loan was made on a festival, [may the lender sue the borrower in court if he defaults on the loan]? R. Yosef (BA 3) says that such a loan may not be claimed [in court]; Rabbah (BA 3) says it may. R. Yosef said it may not be claimed, because if you hold it may be claimed, it will lead them to write [an IOU document on a festival]. Rabbah said it may be claimed, because if you say it may not be claimed, then he [the lender] won’t give it [the loan] to 60

No significant variants in MS Munich 95.

226

THE STORIES THEY TELL him [the borrower] and he will refrain from joyous celebration of the festival. … R. Avya (BA 4) took collateral [when he made a loan on a festival]. Rabbah bar Ulla (BA 4) used a legal fiction [when he made a loan on a festival to guarantee he would recover his property in court if the borrower defaulted.].

EXPLANATION

The topic of this sugya is a loan made on a festival. Such a loan is not likely to be of funds but foodstuffs, like eggs or meat or wine. If the borrower does not pay back—in kind or in value— what he owes after a reasonable (or stipulated) amount of time, may the lender sue the borrower in court to recover his loan? This question arises because it is clear from mBes 3:8 that one may not buy and sell on a festival in the ordinary manner. The mishnah states: “A person may not say to a butcher, “Weigh out for me 61 a dinar’s worth of flesh,” but the butcher may slaughter [an animal] and they may [then] divide it among themselves [without discussing price and without paying]. 62 Mss. read: ‫מכור לי‬, which means “sell me.” If so, the mss. would allow someone to say “weigh out for me,” because that is not the same as saying “sell me.” 62 bBes 27b. This is a clear statement by an early amora that business transactions are not permitted on a festival, and, by a fortiori argument, also not on the Sabbath. However, if a change is introduced into the transaction on a festival, or even on a Sabbath, exchange of goods may take place. The Tosefta (tYomTov 3:5-7) makes it very clear that purchasing meat, bread, eggs, pomegranates, et al, on a festival is permitted provided the transaction does not involve a stated price. For instance, one may say to the butcher [before he slaughters the animal], I will take a half or a third or a quarter. 61

4. SUGYOT WITH MULTIPLE HALAKHIC ANECDOTES

227

That is, goods may change hands from seller to buyer on a festival but money may not. It is thus different from a weekday purchase. Therefore, if one lends casks of wine, for instance, on a festival, is this like a regular loan, on an ordinary day, regarding which the lender may sue the borrower in court if he defaults on repayment, or is this different from a weekday loan and therefore not recoverable in court? R. Yosef says a festival loan is not recoverable in court, presumably because he holds that business transactions on a festival should be significantly different from weekday business transactions. Rabbah disagrees and says that such a loan is recoverable in court, because lenders will not lend if they stand to lose. After a considerable amount of give-and-take, the sugya ends with two very short halakhic anecdotes. R. Avya took collateral when he made a loan on a festival. In that way, the issue of suing to recover in court would not arise because the collateral could be sold to pay off the loan. The amora thereby tweaks the law under discussion which assumes a festival loan without collateral. The amora, it seems, was not satisfied with nonrecoverability of a festival loan. Nor was he happy with making a festival loan recoverable if this would mean that festival loans and weekday loans were indistinguishable. He therefore requires collateral, which renders the issue of recoverability in court moot. Rabbah bar Ulla also made the matter of recoverability in court moot but the details of his action are not recorded. We are only told that he would use a legal fiction to circumvent the issue. 63 The verb ‘.R.M (ma’arim) suggests that he did so in a shrewd, or even wily, manner. In other words, the two amoraim rejected both views: R. Yosef’s stance that a festival loan is non-recoverable and Rabbah’s view that a festival loan is recoverable, just like a weekday According to Rashi, Rabbah bar Ulla asked for collateral right after the festival. That means that a festival loan remained without collateral until the lender goes back to the borrower after the festival and asks for it. This makes little sense for the lender, however. 63

228

THE STORIES THEY TELL

loan. Since the sugya presents two approaches to circumventing the issue of recoverability in court, even though one of them is not spelled out, the implication is that there may be additional strategies to make a festival loan attractive to lenders and hence funds [or products] will be made available to borrowers on a festival. 64

SUMMARY

These examples demonstrate some of the reasons that, on occasion, a sugya presents not just one but a series of anecdotes, all referring to the same halakhah. To begin with, as already noted, amoraim felt free to modify an earlier stated halakhah, whether issued by an amora or even a tanna. In addition, multiple anecdotes relating to the same halakhah show that change can be accomplished in a variety of ways, which are not necessarily limited to the methods illustrated. Each protagonist, whether a rabbi or a rabbi’s wife (or daughter), realized the same goal slightly differently. The array of methods seems to imply that no one way is sanctioned. A clear example is the discussion of donning footgear on a public fast day (bTa’anit 12b). The Mishnah states that one should go out barefoot on a public fast. But amoraim in both the land of Israel and Bavel devised a variety of ways to cover their feet when going out on a public fast. The clear message, beyond that one may cover one’s feet, is that there isn’t one sanctioned way to do so but a variety of ways. A likely implication is that one is at liberty to devise yet other ways to accomplish necessary or desired halakhic change.

Rabbenu Hananel, an early commentator on the Talmud, says that the borrower orally commits himself to repayment. 64

CHAPTER 5. INI VEHA ANECDOTES This chapter will examine yet another group of halakhic anecdotes, those that appear immediately following the question ini veha, which means, “Really?! Have we not learned to the contrary?!” What immediately follows is a report of an amora transgressing an earlier stated rule. The underlying assumption, of course, is that rules should be upheld as stated. In these sugyot, the anonymous editor, the stam, reconciles the apparent discrepancy between prescription and performance by claiming that the older rule addresses one set of circumstances whereas the amora in the anecdote was addressing a different set. We have already seen an example of this kind of reinterpretation in the anecdote that opens this volume. At first the tanna seemed to say that no men at all were allowed to take a second wife on the road. But the stam later emended the tannaitic rule to mean that rabbis were not included in the ban; they may take a wifefor-a-day when away from home. Other men may not. The ini veha sugyot thus differ from those discussed in earlier chapters in that the stam plays a key role in interpreting the relationship between the earlier stated rule and the halakhic anecdote. Unlike most iqla, HQ/HY and “he encountered him” sugyot, in which one amora questions the behavior of another and the other defends his performance, the ini veha anecdotes report on the behavior of just one amora. It is the stam, and not a colleague, who challenges an amora’s behavior and then rationalizes it. 229

230

THE STORIES THEY TELL

The ini veha sugyot also differ from all the others included in this study in that they are an amalgam of amoraic and stam statements. If we accept the view that the stam layer was interpolated into the sugya in the post-amoraic period, 1 it is possible to look at the sugya in two distinct ways: first, as the sugya now reads, with the stam’s comments interpolated into the amoraic sugya, and second, looking only at the amoraic materials, without the stam’s comments. By comparing these two “sugyot,” we can determine how the stam understood—and perhaps rewrote—the amoraic sugya. Before doing so, however, we need to determine at what point the amoraic anecdote was added to the sugya. The way the sugya now reads, it seems that the stam introduced the anecdote into the sugya in order to point out a difficulty. However, it is far more likely that the amoraic anecdote was already present in the sugya by the time the stam began to function. It was when the stam examined the relationship between the amoraic anecdote and the earlier stated halakhah and found a discrepancy, that it interpolated the phrase ini veha right before the anecdote. In this way the stam drew attention to the apparent conflict. That is, the stam did not add the anecdote to the sugya. It did add the phrase “ini veha,” however, to indicate a problem. If we read an ini veha sugya without the stam, we notice that the amoraic core is generally composed of only two elements: an amoraic (or tannaitic) statement and an amoraic anecdote. By juxtaposing these two texts—prescriptive statement and descriptive anecdote—the amoraic editor is suggesting that the first amora’s statement, i.e., the earlier stated halakhah, was regarded as acceptable until a later amora came along and modified it. The amoraic editor is thus of the opinion that if a later amora senses that an adjustment needs to be made to the halakhah of an earlier amora, he may go ahead and make it. But rather than restate the halakhah in his own terms, the later Not all rabbinics scholars accept this view of the late entry of the stam. See R. Brody, Stam Hatalmud. 1

5. INI VEHA ANECDOTES

231

amora simply needed to behave according to his own view of the matter. Upon insertion of the stam, the amoraic editor’s policy of allowing a later amora’s halakhic behavior to modify the rule of an earlier amora was superseded. The stam chose instead to view the amoraic anecdote as upholding the earlier halakhah. To resolve the apparent conflict, the stam regards the behavior of the later amora not as a modification of an earlier stated halakhah but as an attempt merely to exclude a number of cases from the purview of the earlier stated halakhah. The earlier halakhah, according to the stam, remains in effect, minus a few exceptions. In short, I am claiming that the stam subverted the subversive meaning of the amoraic sugya. This reinterpretation needs to be acknowledged, because it can allow us to identify and uncover the thinking of the amoraic editor, prior to the interpolation of the stam’s comments—thinking that was more radical than many have assumed over the ages, including contemporary interpretation and scholarship. We will read six sugyot in this chapter first with the stam and then without it. The significant differences in interpretation will be noted. For each sugya, I will argue that the amora intended a broader modification of a halakhah than the stam later allowed. In a more general way, I am suggesting that the stam transformed the amoraic sugya in even more ways than noted until now. The stam introduced into the Talmud the concept of a static halakhah, contrary to the amoraic outlook of an evolving halakhah. Even so, the stam succeeded in making this the bedrock assumption of halakhic thinking for generations to come. 5.1 bTa’anit 19a; 25b–26a, Reciting Hallel after a drought ends

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת תענית דף יט עמוד א‬ ‫ מעשה שגזרו תענית בלוד וירדו‬... ‫היו מתענין וירדו להם גשמים‬ ‫להם גשמים קודם חצות אמר להם רבי טרפון צאו ואכלו ושתו ועשו‬ ‫ ובאו בין הערבים וקראו‬,‫ ויצאו ואכלו ושתו ועשו יום טוב‬,‫יום טוב‬ .‫הלל הגדול‬

232

THE STORIES THEY TELL Mishnah: They were fasting [because of a drought] and then the rains came … It once happened that a fast was decreed in Lydda and the rains came before noon. R. Tarfon said to them, go out and eat and drink and celebrate, and the people went out and ate and drank and celebrated and came back towards evening and recited the Great Hallel. 2

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת תענית דף כה עמוד ב‬ .'‫מעשה וגזרו תענית בלוד כו‬ ?‫ונימא הלל מעיקרא‬-‫( אלא על‬.‫ לפי שאין אומרים הלל )דף כו‬:‫אביי ורבא דאמרי תרווייהו‬ .‫נפש שבעה וכרס מלאה‬ ‫ וגזר תענית‬,‫איני והא רב פפא איקלע לבי כנישתא דאבי גובר‬-3 !‫וירדו להם גשמים עד חצות ואמר הלל ואחר כך אכלו ושתו‬ .‫שאני בני מחוזא דשכיחי בהו שכרות‬-‫הדרן עלך סדר תעניות אלו‬ [Citation of mishnah:] “It once happened that a fast was decreed in Lydda and so on.” [Stam asks:] But let them first say Hallel [before eating]! Abaye (BA 4) and Rava (BA 4) both said: one only says Hallel (folio 26a) on a sated soul and a full stomach [as in the mishnah]. [Stam asks:] Really? Didn’t R. Pappa (BA 5) come to a synagogue in Abu Giber and decree a fast and the rains came before noon and he [first] said Hallel and only afterwards did they eat and drink!

2 3

Psalm 136. See Rashi, s.v. Hallel Hagadol. MS Munich 95 ‫ואמ' להם אמרו הלל הגדול ואכלו ושתו‬

5. INI VEHA ANECDOTES

233

[Stam answers:] The people of Mehoza are different for they often get drunk. 4 [End of chapter of Talmud]

EXPLANATION

According to Mishnah Ta’anit, should a drought continue, rabbis are instructed to proclaim a series of rain fasts. When the rains finally do come, the people are expected to celebrate with a feast. They no longer need to fear famine. The Mishnah records one instance of such a celebration. It relates that when the rains came, the people first ate and drank and only later in the day did they recite the Great Hallel, Psalm 136, which offers thanksgiving and praise to God. Both Abaye and Rava, when commenting on this mishnah, prescribe that celebrants should recite Hallel after they feast, not before. On a full stomach, they say, a person is more likely to feel grateful, as seems evident in the anecdote in the mishnah. The stam asks, how can that be the rule since an anecdote relates that R. Pappa instructed the people at the synagogue of Abu Giber to say Hallel on an empty stomach? R. Pappa thus contradicted the opinion of Abaye and Rava and also differed with the sequence of the mishnah’s anecdote. The stam resolves the conflict by saying that R. Pappa was addressing only the people of Mehoza, to make sure that they would say Hallel. Since they often became intoxicated, they might not say Hallel if they waited until after eating and drinking. As for everyone else, Hallel should be recited after they fill their stomachs, as suggested by the mishnah and the amoraim. The halakhic anecdote ends the sugya and the chapter. Rashi comments that their getting drunk is a common occurrence. As a result, they will forget to say Hallel. ‫ ופשעי ולא יאמרו הלל‬,‫ יין ושכרות‬- ‫דשכיח בהו‬ It is common among them – wine and liquor, and they will grow negligent and not say Hallel. 4

234

THE STORIES THEY TELL

Note that the sugya conflates Mehoza and Abu Giber: R. Pappa is at a synagogue in Abu Giber but the stam suggests that his ruling applies to the people of Mehoza. 5 Although there is one more reference in the Talmud to the synagogue of Abu Giber, it is not clear where Abu Giber is, whether in Mehoza or elsewhere, or even if it is the name of a place or a person. This missing fact will not affect our analysis of the sugya. If we now ignore the stam and look only at the amoraic layer of the sugya, we see that it is composed of the joint statement of Abaye and Rava, that one recites Hallel after eating and drinking, and an anecdote in which R. Pappa told the people at the synagogue of Abu Giber to recite Hallel before eating and drinking. R. Pappa, who lived one generation later than Abaye and Rava, did not feel obligated to accept their ruling. He apparently thought it made more sense to express gratitude to God right away, and not following a festive meal, after which one may, or may not, fulfill the obligation to say Hallel. Thus, a clear message of the amoraic sugya is that a later amora may ignore or even reverse the ruling of an earlier amora. Once the stam is added to the sugya, the message changes. The stam does not allow R. Pappa to disagree with his predecessors. Rava and Abaye’s rule remains in effect. According to the stam, R. Pappa was legislating only for Mehoza, which is Rava’s home town, although R. Pappa certainly did not say his ruling was directed to one community only. In this anecdote, R. Pappa appears to be on Rava’s turf but legislates differently from Rava, for what R. Pappa decided was a good reason. In other words, although R. Pappa is likely to have been changing the rule for all geographical locations, to make sure people did not omit Hallel after a full meal, the stam does not tolerate the notion that R. Pappa would change a rule instituted anecdotally by the mishnah and endorsed for all cases by Abaye and Rava. The stam therefore claims that R. Pappa ruled that Hallel should Rashi writes (s.v. Abu Giber) that Abu Giber is either a place or the person for whom the synagogue is named.

5

5. INI VEHA ANECDOTES

235

come before a meal only for the people he was dealing with at that time. The general rule remains in effect, however, that one should recite Hallel after the meal, not before. It is of interest that post-talmudic commentators, apparently finding merit in R. Pappa’s ruling, broaden it beyond what the stam allowed. Like the stam, however, they assume that a later amora may not disagree with the ruling of an earlier amora. Here are two examples: ‫רבינו חננאל מסכת תענית דף כה עמוד ב‬ ‫ ולכ"ע אין אומרים הלל הגדול‬... .'‫מתני' היו מתענין וירדו גשמים כו‬ ‫אלא על נפש שבעה ואי איכא אתרא דחיישי משום שכרות גומרין‬ ‫הלל הגדול ואח"כ אוכלין‬ Rabbenu Hananel (North African commentator, 11c.) writes that, “according to all opinions, when a drought ends, one recites Hallel Hagadol after one feasts and is satisfied. But in any place where there is fear of drunkenness, one should say the Great Hallel first and only then eat.”

This commentator seems troubled by the fact that R. Pappa’s suggestion to say Hallel before the meal makes good sense but, even so, did not become standard practice. It seems, however, that Rabbenu Hananel could not allow himself to disagree with the stam, who applied R. Pappa’s rule of Hallel before the meal only to the people of Mehoza. All Rabbenu Hananel suggested, therefore, was a slight expansion of R. Pappa’s rule to other towns where drunkenness was likely to occur. Ritva (Spanish commentator, 13c.) issues a similar statement. ‫חידושי הריטב"א מסכת תענית דף כו עמוד א‬ ‫ואמרינן בגמרא דהיכא דשכיחא שכרות כגון מחוזא אומרים הלל‬ ‫קודם אכילה‬ And the gemara says that where there is [likely to be] drunkenness, such as Mehoza, one says Hallel before eating.

Like Rabbenu Hananel, Ritva extends the rule of “Hallel before the feast” to any place where there might be a fear of drunkenness. This commentator even goes so far as to claim that the

236

THE STORIES THEY TELL

gemara itself does not limit R. Pappa’s ruling to Mehoza, that it just cites Mehoza as one example of a place where Hallel should be recited before the meal. This is not the plain sense meaning of the gemara’s words, however. Both commentators sensed that R. Pappa intended his rule to be applied more broadly than to just one location and so they went ahead and expanded its reach, but without saying that they disagreed with the stam who limited it to Mehoza. These commentators thus support the position that a halakhic anecdote, in the amoraic period, should be understood as modifying the earlier stated halakhah, not as upholding it. 5.2 bYevamot 37b, Taking a wife on the road

This sugya appears here for the second time. In the Introduction, I utilized it to present this study’s general thesis regarding halakhic modification. In this chapter, I will read the sugya through an ini veha lens. ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת יבמות דף לז עמוד ב‬ ‫ לא ישא אדם אשה במדינה‬:‫ יתר על כן אמר ר' אליעזר בן יעקב‬... ‫ ונמצא אח‬,‫ שמא יזדווגו זה לזה‬,‫זו וילך וישא אשה במדינה אחרת‬ .‫נושא את אחותו‬ ?‫ מאן הויא ליומא‬,‫איני? והא רב כי איקלע לדרדשיר ]מכריז[ ואמר‬ ?‫ מאן הויא ליומא‬,‫ ]מכריז[ ואמר‬,‫ורב נחמן כי איקלע לשכנציב‬ .‫ דפקיע שמייהו‬,‫שאני רבנן‬ … Moreover, R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov said: a man should not take one wife in one province and then go and take [another] wife in another province, lest [the children of the two wives] marry each other and it turns out that a brother marries a sister.

5. INI VEHA ANECDOTES

237

Is that so?! For when Rav (BA 1)visited Dardashir he [announced and] 6 said, “who will [marry me] for one day?” and when R. Nahman (BA 3) visited Shekhnaziv, he [announced and] said, “who will [marry me] for one day?” Rabbis are an exception for [people] know their names.

EXPLANATION

The next three paragraphs repeat material from the Introduction: R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov, a tanna, 7 frowns upon a man who marries two women in two different provinces, but not because such a marital situation would hurt him or the two wives. The fear is that years later their children, unaware they were siblings, might find themselves in an incestuous match. His statement is also understood as banning a short-term marriage on the road if a man has a long-term marriage at home. The passage challenges the tanna’s statement with the phrase ini veha, which means, “Is that so?! Didn’t [someone do exactly that]?” As the sugya goes on to say: How can it be that a marriage of short duration is not allowed, for did not two rabbis, who lived several generations later, do what R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov said not to do? Didn’t each of them first take a wife in his own hometown and then take another wife on the road? The conflict between the tanna’s rule and the two rabbis’ behavior is clear. It is then resolved by the statement that rabbis are excepThe word “announced” in both anecdotes is missing from MS Munich 95. The story ends in that ms. with the words "‫"דפקיעי בשמייהו‬, i.e., [people] know them by their names. This reading matches Rashi’s citation exactly. The commentator says (s.v. ‫ )דפקיעי‬that people know the amoraim by their names. A daughter will be called by her father’s name; should a man from somewhere else, son of the same father, want to marry her, he will learn that she is his (half-) sibling and will back off. 7 Either a very early tanna or a student of R. Akiba. 6

238

THE STORIES THEY TELL

tional. Since their children’s lineage is known to all, they will not come to marry each other. No incest will, therefore, occur. It follows that only rabbis, but not other men, may take a wife-fora-day when on the road. 8 We see here a typical Talmudic technique of conflict resolution. To exonerate the two rabbis, the tanna’s rule of no second wife on the road underwent modification. The ban is upheld for men in general. For rabbis alone, taking a wife-for-a-day is declared permissible. As noted earlier, such a strategy is called “case distinction.” However, there is no reason to think that when R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov issued his ban he intended it only for men in general, but not for rabbis. That exclusion seems to have originated as a way of defending two rabbis from a pointed challenge. But there is another way to approach this text. If we remove the two underlined stam comments—the phrase “ini veha” and the response that “Rabbis are an exception for [people] know their names”—the passage reads differently. The earlier version probably contained just two statements, which can be summarized as: —R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov said, Don’t take a second wife in a different province from the first wife because it may lead someday to an incestuous marriage. —Rav and R. Nahman each took a wife-for-a-day when on the road. It is immediately obvious that these two statements clash with each other: the first implies that a man should not take a second wife on the road, and the second reports that two later rabbis did each take a second wife on the road. I am suggesting that this shorter, presumed amoraic version of the passage clearly shows that a later rabbi may disagree with an earlier rabbi and even act in violation of his rule. Rav and R. Nahman were My purpose here is not to make a judgment about the propriety of a wife-for-a-day but rather to look at how conflicts in rabbinic opinions are resolved. 8

5. INI VEHA ANECDOTES

239

indicating, not by words but by actions, that the older rule need not be followed. They likely thought that the probability of an incestuous marriage among siblings was negligible in such a case. In contradistinction to R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov, they held that taking a wife on the road is allowed, even if one already has a wife at home. If so, this presumed earlier version of the passage is saying something even more extreme than the later one: not just rabbis may take a second wife on the road, but all men may. That is, there is no sense in the earlier version that Rav and R. Nahman are limiting the taking of a wife-for-a-day to rabbis. That restriction appears only in the later version. Note that these two rabbis made their marital behavior on the road very public, saying (or announcing), when they arrived in town, “Who will marry me for a day?” They are thus implicitly broadcasting to all men that, when on the road, they should not visit a prostitute but instead enter into a short-term marriage. That is likely a better option for the women with whom they have sex. 9 And it is better for men than abiding by what the earlier rabbi preached, which—in the absence of a marriagefor-a-day—is no sex on the road. This amoraic passage, therefore, conveys a very powerful message: Halakhah is open not only to modification but even reversal. With the stam’s interpolation, the passage still conveys a message of permitted modification, but in a more restrained way: only rabbis may take a second wife on the road. Other men may not.

This passage about marriage-for-a-day views such an arrangement as an acceptable means for satisfying men’s sexual needs when away from home. A woman who enters a short-term marriage gains little, however. After one night with a husband, and perhaps a ketubah payment from him when he leaves, i.e., divorces her, she is without any of the benefits of marriage: no husband, no companionship, no father for a child of his she may be carrying, no possibility of additional children from this man, no standing as a married woman. Is it possible that her one-night-stand with either Rav or R. Nahman confers social status on her? I tend to doubt it.

9

240

THE STORIES THEY TELL 5.3 bGittin 59b, First Aliyah Privileges of a Kohen ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת גיטין דף נט עמוד ב‬ ‫ ואם בא לחלוק כבוד לרבו‬,‫הבוצע הוא פושט ידו תחלה‬... :‫דתניא‬... ;‫או למי שגדול ממנו הרשות בידו‬ ‫ דאתו‬,‫ אבל בבהכ"נ לא‬,‫ לא שנו אלא בסעודה‬:‫ואמר מר עלה‬ .‫לאינצויי‬ ‫ לא אמרן אלא בשבתות‬,‫ הא דאמרת בבהכ"נ לא‬:‫אמר רב מתנה‬ .‫ אבל בשני ובחמישי לא‬,‫וימים טובים דשכיחי רבים‬ !‫איני? והא רב הונא קרי בכהני בשבתות ויו"ט‬-‫ דאפילו רבי אמי ורבי אסי כהני חשיבי דא"י מיכף‬,‫שאני רב הונא‬-10 .‫הוו כייפי ליה‬ … As a baraita teaches: … The one who breaks bread takes the first portion. But if he wishes to honor his teacher or someone of higher status, he is permitted [to waive his right to the first portion and offer it to the person he wishes to honor]. But a master stated with regard to this teaching: this rule [that one may waive his right to the first portion] was taught only in reference to a meal; one may not [waive his right to honor] in the synagogue lest a fight break out. R. Mattanah (BA 2) said: What you said about not waiving one’s right in a synagogue refers to Sabbaths and festivals, when synagogues are very full, but on Mondays and Thursdays, no [i.e., a person may waive his right to the honor due him on those days]. [Stam asks:] Is that so? Did not R. Huna [BA 2, who was not a kohen] read the first aliyah on Sabbaths and festivals? [And isn’t that in violation of what was just said, that

10

No significant variants in MS Munich 95.

5. INI VEHA ANECDOTES

241

a kohen may not waive honor due him on a Sabbath or a festival?!] [Stam answers:] R. Huna was a special case, because even R. Ami and R. Asi (both JA 3), who were highly regarded kohanim in the land of Israel, paid him homage.

EXPLANATION

A baraita states that the one who breaks bread is entitled to take the first portion. If he wishes, however, he may offer it to his teacher or someone else of stature. Mar, i.e., Rabbah, goes on to say that the rule is limited to meals. As for synagogues, if one waives his right to an honor, such as being called first to the Torah, it may lead to fights. Presumably, some people will feel they too should have been offered this honor but were not. 11 R. Mattanah (BA 2) creates an exception to the synagogue rule: it does not apply on weekdays, he says, only on Sabbaths and festivals. According to this amora, although on Sabbaths and festivals a kohen may not offer the first aliyah to the Torah to a nonkohen, on weekdays he may. The sugya continues with an exclamation by the stam: Is that so?! Did not R. Huna (BA 2), who was not a kohen, read the kohen’s first aliyah on Sabbaths and festivals, which is in clear violation of the rule stated by Rabbah, as interpreted by R. Mattanah?! The stam responds that R. Huna was in a different category. It is true that he was not a kohen but he was like a kohen in stature since R. Ami and R. Asi, prominent kohanim of the land of Israel, deferred to him and paid him homage. 12 Thus, the Rashi (s.v. aval) says that when people see a non-kohen reading the first aliyah, they will say “I too deserve to read the first aliyah.” 12 See bMeg 22a where the stam makes the same assertion, i.e., that R. Ami and R. Asi deferred to R. Huna. It seems likely that the detail about R. Ami and R. Asi is an amoraic anecdote that the stam co-opted. If so, the amoraic sugya is saying that generally a kohen may not waive rights to the first aliyah, but an unnamed kohen (or several kohanim did) did and gave the first aliyah to R. Huna on a regular basis, proba11

242

THE STORIES THEY TELL

rule that a kohen may not waive his right to the first aliyah is upheld. R. Huna is the only exception; other non-kohanim may not read the first aliyah on a Sabbath or festival. This is what the sugya is saying when read with the stam’s comments. If we now look at the amoraic layer alone, a different interpretation presents itself. This earlier layer is composed of the baraita about honors at a meal, Rabbah’s comment on the baraita, R. Mattanah’s elaboration, and an anecdote about R. Huna. 13 According to the amoraic version of the sugya, those persons who are due honor may not waive it for those to whom honor is not due. The rule is limited, however, to Sabbaths and festivals. On ordinary days, honors may be waived. An anecdote relates that R. Huna, who was not a kohen, read the kohen’s first aliyah on Sabbaths and festivals on a regular basis. In doing so, he shows that a kohen may defer to a non-kohen, even on Sabbaths and festivals, in contradistinction to what R. Mattanah had just stated. That R. Ami and R. Asi deferred to him explains why they, as kohanim, waived their right to the first aliyah in favor of R. Huna. It does not say that only R. Huna could be treated like that. The message of the amoraic sugya, therefore, is that nonkohanim of stature, not just R. Huna, may receive the honor of the first aliyah on Sabbaths and festivals. This makes sense because there is no obvious reason why R. Huna alone, but no other (prominent) non-kohen amoraim, may be given the honor of bly because of his prominence. It follows that a kohen may, in certain circumstances, give away his honor. The stam reads the sugya as saying that a kohen may not give away the first aliyah. The stam holds that only in one case, that of R. Huna, did this ever happen. 13 As noted, it is even possible that the report of R. Ami and R. Asi deferring to R. Huna is part of the amoraic sugya, but also possible that it was the stam that transferred the report from bMeg 22a. If so, the stam likely added the words, “R. Huna was an exception” to integrate the halakhic anecdote into the sugya, thereby saying that only R. Huna could be honored in this way.

5. INI VEHA ANECDOTES

243

the first aliyah. The stam, however, does not allow R. Huna’s action to contradict R. Mattanah’s rule and therefore rationalizes the deference shown R. Huna by claiming that this amora was in a category by himself. He was like a kohen in stature and therefore a kohen would be permitted to offer him a synagogue honor. The difference, therefore, between the sugya with the interpolated stam and without it is whether R. Huna changed R. Mattanah’s rule for many or even all non-kohanim of stature (amoraic layer alone), or whether R. Huna may be offered a kohen’s honor but no one else may be offered that honor (sugya with stam’s interpolations). In my opinion, the stam chose to regard R. Huna as the only exception to the rule in order to resolve the conflict between R. Huna’s accepting a synagogue honor on Sabbaths and holidays and Rabbah/R. Mattanah’s rule that synagogue honors may not be given away on those days to a non-kohen. By limiting the waiving of honors to R. Huna alone, the stam upholds Rabbah/R. Mattanah’s rule. More generally, this is yet another instance in which the amoraic sugya communicates a message of permitted disagreement among amoraim and the possibility of broad halakhic change, whereas the post-amoraic sugya suppresses disagreement and denies the possibility of anything but very limited halakhic change. 5.4 bBerakhot 14a, Interrupting prayer to greet someone of greater stature

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת ברכות דף יד עמוד א‬ ‫ בהלל ובמגילה מהו‬:‫בעא מיניה אחי תנא דבי רבי חייא מרבי חייא‬ ‫ הלל‬,‫ קריאת שמע דאורייתא פוסק‬:‫שיפסיק? אמרינן קל וחומר‬ ?‫דרבנן מבעיא?! או דלמא פרסומי ניסא עדיף‬ .‫ פוסק ואין בכך כלום‬:‫אמר ליה‬

244

THE STORIES THEY TELL ,‫ ימים שהיחיד גומר בהן את ההלל בין פרק לפרק פוסק‬:‫אמר רבה‬ ‫באמצע הפרק אינו פוסק; וימים שאין היחיד גומר בהן את ההלל‬ .‫אפילו באמצע הפרק פוסק‬ ‫ וימים שאין‬,‫דרבינא‬

15 ‫לגביה‬

16 !‫ליה‬

‫ איקלע‬14 ‫איני?! והא רב בר שבא‬-‫ ולא פסיק‬,‫היחיד גומר את ההלל הוה‬

.‫שאני רב בר שבא דלא חשיב עליה דרבינא‬-R. Hiyya (JA 1) was asked a question by the brother of a tanna of the school of R. Hiyya: does one interrupt a recitation of Hallel, or a reading of the Megillah [for someone of higher status or someone whom one fears, as one does when reciting the Shema]? May we derive an answer a fortiori: if one interrupts the Shema recitation, which is a Torah mandated rule, for a person one honors or fears, surely one interrupts the recitation of Hallel, a rabbinically mandated rule, for a person one honors or fears!? Or perhaps, publicizing a miracle [by reciting Hallel or reading the Megillah 17 [takes precedence over honor or fear and one does not interrupt the recitation]? 29F

R. Hiyya answered: One interrupts [reciting Hallel or reading the Megillah for honor or fear] and it is not a problem to do so. Rabbah (BA 3) said: Regarding days on which an individual completes the entire Hallel [i.e., major holidays], in between MS Munich 95 ‫רבא בר שבא‬ MS Munich 95 ‫לבי‬ 16 MS Munich 95 ‫לה‬ 17 According to bArakhin 10b, Hallel is recited in some cases to acknowledge a miracle, such as the one associated with Hanukkah. Purim also has a miracle associated with it but reading the Megillah on Purim takes the place of Hallel. Hence the question in the sugya about interrupting a reading of the Megillah. It is not clear if the first part of the sugya speaks only of Hallel, that one interrupts its recitation for honor or fear, or also speaks of the Megillah, that one may also interrupt its recitation for honor or fear. 14 15

5. INI VEHA ANECDOTES

245

chapters he interrupts [his recitation for someone to whom he owes honor or whom he fears] but not [if he is] in the middle of a chapter. For days on which an individual does not complete the entire Hallel [i.e., lesser holidays], he interrupts [his recitation of Hallel] even within a chapter [for honor or fear]. [Stam asks:] Is that so? Did not Rav bar Sheba (BA 5) visit Ravina (BA 7) on a day on which an individual does not complete the entire Hallel, and even so Ravina did not interrupt [his recitation] of Hallel to greet him]! [Stam answers:] The case of Rav bar Sheba is different because Ravina did not hold him in high regard.

EXPLANATION

According to mBerakhot 2:1, a person interrupts the recitation of the Shema if he needs to greet someone he fears or whom he is expected to honor. Rules vary if the person is in the middle of a Shema paragraph or in between paragraphs. 18 A question is asked of R. Hiyya: Do the same rules of interrupting a recitation hold for chanting Hallel and reading the Megillah? Or does the need to publicize a miracle, e.g. of Hanukkah, override the need to interrupt the recitation for honor or fear? R. Hiyya answers mBer 2:1, ‫ ובאמצע שואל מפני היראה ומשיב‬,‫בפרקים שואל מפני הכבוד ומשיב‬... ‫ בפרקים‬,‫דברי ר' מאיר; ר' יהודה אומר באמצע שואל מפני היראה ומשיב מפני הכבוד‬ .‫ שואל מפני הכבוד ומשיב שלום לכל אדם‬When in between paragraphs [of the Shema], one may ask after the wellbeing of anyone to whom he owes honor, and may respond to an inquiry [about his own wellbeing]. When in the middle of a paragraph [of the Shema], one may ask after the wellbeing of someone he fears and may also respond if that person asks after his own wellbeing. This is the opinion of R. Meir. R. Judah says, when in the middle of a paragraph, one may ask after the wellbeing of someone he fears and may respond [to someone he fears and] even to someone he owes honor. In between paragraphs, he may ask after the health of someone he honors and respond “shalom” to anyone at all. 18

246

THE STORIES THEY TELL

that one interrupts Hallel for honor or fear. Rabbah later adds that on a day when one completes the Hallel, one does not stop in the middle of a chapter, only between chapters. But on a day when one recites only an incomplete Hallel, 19 such as on a Rosh Hodesh (new month), one interrupts the recitation, even in the middle of a chapter, for honor or fear. The stam then says, but is it not so (ini veha) that Ravina did not interrupt his recitation of Hallel when approached by a colleague on a day on which one recites an incomplete Hallel (i.e., a lesser holiday)? The stam is saying that Ravina was, thus, in clear violation of Rabbah’s rule. The stam then resolves the conflict by saying that because Ravina did not hold Rav bar Sheba in high regard, that amora did not actually fall into the category of someone Ravina felt he was obliged to honor, and so he did not stop his recitation of Hallel when Rav bar Sheba approached. Therefore, no violation of (or change in) the general rule took place. Note that the stam is simply asserting that Ravina did not hold Rav bar Sheba in high regard. There is no supporting evidence. The stam simply concludes that if Ravina did not stop his recitation of Hallel for Rav bar Sheba, it follows that Ravina did not feel he needed to honor him. If we read the sugya without the stam, looking only at the amoraic layer, we see a question addressed to R. Hiyya, his answer, Rabbah’s rule, and then a report on Ravina’s behavior, which was in clear conflict with Rabbah’s rule. It seems likely that Ravina, who lived several generations after Rabbah, disagreed with Rabbah’s rule and showed his dissatisfaction with the rule by violating it, by not stopping his recitation of Hallel for Rav bar Sheba. There is no evidence in the Babylonian Talmud that Ravina did not respect Rav bar Sheba, as claimed by the stam. Rav bar Sheba is not a well-known amora but there is no basis on which to suggest that Ravina held him in lower regard Incomplete Hallel, also called “Half Hallel,” refers to the recitation of Psalms 113–118 in full, but only the latter half of Psalms 115 and 116. Such a Hallel is recited on New Moons and the last six days of Pesach.

19

5. INI VEHA ANECDOTES

247

than other colleagues. Rather, the amoraic sugya is likely to be saying that Ravina disagreed with Rabbah. It is not that Rav bar Sheba was being singled out for disrespectful treatment, but simply that Ravina is showing by his behavior that he does not hold that one interrupts a chapter of Hallel to greet a colleague even on a day when one recites an incomplete Hallel. In other words, according to Ravina, even on a lesser holiday, like Hanukkah, one does not interrupt a recitation of Hallel for honor or fear. That would disrespect the holiday. When the stam’s comments were interpolated into the sugya, Rabbah’s rule of stopping the recitation of Hallel became the standard to follow, with Ravina’s departure from it explained away by the stam’s claim of Ravina’s lack of high regard for Rav bar Sheba. Again, the earlier rule is upheld and the later amora’s “deviant” behavior is rationalized. The pre-stam sugya, with its amoraic anecdote, suggests that a later amora may modify a ruling of an earlier amora. But according to the stam’s sugya, while a later amora may make exceptions to the rule of an earlier amora, he may not modify or reverse it. As we see in this sugya, the stam deduces from Ravina’s behavior, without any evidence whatsoever, that he did not hold Rav bar Sheba in high regard. That is, the stam needs to explain why Ravina did not interrupt his recitation for a colleague and begs the question by saying he did not stop for Rav bar Sheba because he did not hold him in high regard. This answer, however, serves the stam’s outlook that a later amora may not disagree with, or modify, the rule of an earlier amora. The stam’s comment that Ravina did not stop for Rav bar Sheba because he did not hold him in high regard, one might still say, is a slight modification of Rabbah’s rule. But it does not come close to the level of disagreement of amoraim in the prestam sugya in which Ravina, by his behavior, repudiates Rabbah’s rule of stopping the recitation of Hallel or the Megillah for honor or fear. In other words, Ravina seems to hold minor holidays in higher regard than does his predecessor Rabbah. The stam later downplays the extent of the disagreement by singling out Rav bar Sheba for disrespectful treatment.

248

THE STORIES THEY TELL

5.5 bBerakhot 27a, Passing in front of one who is praying ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת ברכות דף כז עמוד א‬ ‫ והוה מצלי רבי‬,‫רב איקלע לבי גניבא וצלי של שבת בערב שבת‬ ‫ וסיים רב ולא פסקיה לצלותיה דרבי‬,‫ירמיה בר אבא לאחוריה דרב‬ .‫ירמיה‬ .‫ ושמע מינה אסור לעבור כנגד המתפללין‬... ‫ אסור‬:‫ דאמר רבי יהושע בן לוי‬,‫)מסייע ליה לרבי יהושע בן לוי‬ 20 (.‫לעבור כנגד המתפללין‬ !‫איני והא רבי אמי ורבי אסי חלפי‬-21 .‫דחלפי‬

‫רבי אמי ורבי אסי חוץ לארבע אמות הוא‬--

Rav (BA 1) visited the home of Geneiva (BA 3) and prayed the Sabbath prayer on the eve of the Sabbath. R. Yirmiyah bar Abba (BA 2) was praying behind Rav, and when Rav finished [praying], he did not interrupt the prayer of R. Yirmiyah [by passing in front of him]. … from here one can deduce that one may not pass in front of those who are praying. … This supports R. Joshua b. Levi (JA 1), for he said: one may not pass in front of those who are praying. [Stam asks:] Is that so? But R. Ammi (JA 3) and R. Asi (JA 3) would pass! [Stam answers:] R. Ami and R. Asi passed outside of four amot [of those who were praying].

MS Munich 95 ‫חסר‬ MS Munich 95 ‫חוץ לארבע אמות שלו הוא דחלפי‬. See similar anecdote at yRH 2:5, 58b.

20 21

5. INI VEHA ANECDOTES

EXPLANATION

249

This sugya deals with the etiquette of prayer. It begins with an iqla anecdote: Rav visited Geneiva and prayed the Sabbath prayer early. A student was standing behind him and praying. Rav finished reciting his own prayers but waited for the student to finish his prayer before passing in front of him. One may deduce from the anecdote that it is forbidden to pass in front of someone who is praying. The stam notes that such a deduction supports R. Joshua b. Levi who holds that same rule. The stam then asks: But didn’t R. Ami and R. Asi pass in front of those who were still praying? It answers that they did so at a distance of four cubits (amot). That is, the two rabbis passed in front of those who were praying but not very close to them. When the two rabbis were that far away from someone who was praying, they were not likely to interrupt his prayer. They thus de facto behaved according to the “no passing” rule of R. Joshua b. Levi. On the surface, this explanation is very convincing. If it is distracting, or demeaning, to someone praying to pass in front of him, then the two rabbis who did so were probably not passing that close to him. That is how the stam interprets the sugya. However, if we remove the stam, the amoraic layer is made up of a statement of R. Joshua b. Levi that one may not pass in front of those who are praying and a report that R. Ami and R. Asi did pass in front of those who were praying. It appears that they disagree with R. Joshua b. Levi and permit passing in front of someone praying. But since there is no definition of what it means to “pass in front,” it is not unreasonable to assume that these two amoraim did not pass very close to the person who was in the midst of prayer. In this case, it seems that the stam may in fact be providing the simple meaning of the sugya: When someone is in the midst of prayer, there is no passing within his personal space. Outside of his four amot, one may pass. Of course, it is still possible that R. Ami and R. Asi did not hold that passing in front of someone praying would adversely affect him and did pass within four cubits. Alternatively, R. Ami and R. Asi were assigning a size to personal prayer space since R. Joshua b. Levi did not. If so, these two rabbis showed that it has an upper limit of four cubits.

‫‪THE STORIES THEY TELL‬‬

‫‪250‬‬

‫‪5.6 bBesah 25b, Sedan Chair Transport on a Festival‬‬ ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת ביצה דף כה עמוד ב‬ ‫"שחטה בשדה לא יביאנה במוט‪".‬‬ ‫תנו רבנן‪ :‬אין הסומא יוצא במקלו‪ ,‬ולא הרועה בתרמילו‪ ,‬ואין יוצאין‬ ‫בכסא‪ ,‬אחד האיש ואחד האשה‪.‬‬ ‫‪-‬איני? והא שלח רבי יעקב בר אידי‪ :‬זקן אחד היה בשכונתינו והיה‬‫יוצא בגלודקי שלו‪ ,‬ובאו ושאלו את רבי יהושע בן לוי ואמר‪ :‬אם‬ ‫רבים צריכין לו מותר‪ .‬וסמכו רבותינו על דברי אחי שקיא דאמר‪:‬‬ ‫אנא אפיקתיה לרב הונא מהיני לשילי ומשילי להיני‪ .‬ואמר רב נחמן‬ ‫בר יצחק‪ :‬אנא אפיקתיה למר שמואל משמשא לטולא ומטולא‬ ‫לשמשא‪.‬‬ ‫‪-‬התם כדאמר טעמא אם היו רבים צריכין לו מותר‪.‬‬‫אמר לו רב נחמן לחמא בר אדא שליח ציון‪ :‬כי סלקת להתם‪ ,‬אקיף‬ ‫וזיל אסולמא דצור‪ ,‬וזיל לגבי דרבי יעקב בר אידי‪ ,‬ובעי מיניה‪ :‬כסא‬ ‫מה אתון ביה?‬ ‫אדאזל להתם נח נפשיה דרבי יעקב בר אידי‪ .‬כי סליק‪ ,‬אשכחיה‬ ‫לרבי זריקא‪ ,‬אמר ליה‪ :‬כסא מה אתון ביה?‬ ‫אמר ליה‪ :‬הכי אמר רבי אמי‪ :‬ובלבד שלא יכתף‪.‬‬ ‫‪-‬מאי ובלבד שלא יכתף?‬‫אמר רב יוסף בריה דרבא‪ :‬באלונקי‪.‬‬ ‫‪-‬איני? והא רב נחמן שרא לה לילתא למיפק אאלונקי!‬‫‪-‬שאני ילתא ‪ 22‬דבעיתא‪.‬‬‫אמימר ומר זוטרא מכתפי להו בשבתא דרגלא משום ביעתותא‪,‬‬ ‫ואמרי לה משום דוחקא דצבורא‪.‬‬ ‫‪[Citation of mishnah:] “If [on a festival] he slaughtered [an‬‬ ‫‪animal] in a field, he may not bring it [the carcass] in [to‬‬ ‫‪town] on a pole.” 23‬‬ ‫שאני איתתא דבעיתא ‪MS Munich 95‬‬

‫‪22‬‬

5. INI VEHA ANECDOTES

251

A tannaitic teaching: [On a festival,] a blind man may not go out with his staff, nor a shepherd with his pack, nor may a person go out in a sedan chair, neither a man nor a woman. 24 [Stam asks:] Really?! But [did not] R. Ya’akov bar Idi (JA 2/3) send [to us in Bavel saying], “There was an old man in our neighborhood who used to go out in his sedan chair [on a festival] and they came and asked R. Joshua b. Levi (BA 1), and he said, 'If he serves a public need, it is permitted'”?! And [is it not so that] our rabbis relied on the words of Ahi Shaqia who said, “’I transported R. Huna (BA 2) from Hini to Shili and from Shili to Hini’”?! And [is it not so that] R. Nahman bar Yizhaq (BA 4) said: “’I transported Mar Shmuel (BA 1) from sun to shade and from shade to sun’”?! [Stam answers:] The reason [for allowing transport in these three cases] is as it was stated [by R. Joshua b. Levi], “If he serves a public need, it is permitted.” R. Nahman (BA 3) said to Hama bar Ada, a messenger of Zion: when you go up there [to the land of Israel], go around to Sulama of Tyre, and to R. Ya’akov bar Idi (JA 2/3), and ask him, What do you [hold] regarding [going out in] a chair [on a festival]? By the time he left [for the land of Israel], R. Ya’akov bar Idi had passed away.

The reason for this rule is not clear. The explanation offered by Rashi (s.v. alunqi) is that a person should not act on a festival in the same way he acts on an ordinary day. See tShab 14:4, 11; tBes 1:20. 24 Since carriage is permitted on a festival, these bans do not have a clear basis. Again one might say that behavior on a festival should differ from behavior on an ordinary day. See previous note. 23

252

THE STORIES THEY TELL When Hama bar Ada arrived [there], he encountered R. Zeriqa (JA 3) and said to him: What do you [hold] regarding a sedan chair? He said to him: “Thus said R. Ammi (JA 3): so long as he does not carry it on his shoulders.” [Stam asks:] what does “so long as he does not carry it on his shoulders” mean? R. Yosef the son of Rava (BA 5) said: “[not] on a palanquin [which is carried on the shoulders].” [Stam asks:] Is that so!? Did not R. Nahman permit Yalta to go out on a palanquin [on a festival]? [Stam answers:] The case of Yalta is an exception because she was afraid. Amemar (BA 5/6) and Mar Zutra (BA 6) were carried on the shoulders on the Sabbath of the festival because of fear, or some say because of pressing crowds.

EXPLANATION

The topic of this sugya is sedan chair transport on a festival. Such transport was common on ordinary days, in particular for upper class women, both gentile and Jewish. The question is, may this kind of transport occur on a festival too? On the Sabbath, there is a ban on public carrying, including “carriage” of a person. No such ban applies to festivals, however. 25 There are two ini veha questions in this passage. The sugya opens with a baraita that states that neither men nor women may be transported on a chair on a festival. 26 That Carrying from domain to domain is prohibited on the Sabbath. It is the last forbidden labor on the list of 39 (mShab 7:2). That ban is lifted on festivals, although most other Sabbath prohibitions remain in place. 26 The same Baraita appears in tBesah 3:17: ‫אין יוצאין בכסא אחד האנשים ואחד הנשים‬ 25

5. INI VEHA ANECDOTES

253

the baraita feels the need to mention women explicitly suggests that sedan chair transport was a common mode of transport of women too, not just of men. The stam asks ini veha, meaning isn’t this rule violated in the following cases, and proceeds to cite three anecdotes, one right after the other, all of which report that someone, either an elderly person or an amora, was transported on a “chair” on a festival. 27 The three anecdotes, which clearly conflict with the baraita’s ban on chair transport on a festival, create the impression that the amoraim in Bavel were sympathetic to chair transport on a festival. 28 The stam resolves the conflict by repeating what R. Joshua b. Levi stated in the first anecdote, i.e., that public servants are an exception to the rule and may be transported on a festival. This ini veha passage is unusual in that the conflict between the amoraic anecdotes and the baraita seems forced. R. Joshua b. Levi, in the first anecdote, already made an exception for public servants. The stam does not add anything to one’s understanding of the sugya by superimposing an ini veha structure onto the three amoraic anecdotes. The second ini veha section is more complicated, however. R. Nahman sends a messenger to the land of Israel to get a ruling on festival chair transport from R. Ya’akov bar Idi. It turns out the amora is no longer alive and so the messenger turns instead to R. Zeriqa. The answer he receives, in the name of R. Ami, is that transport on the shoulders is not permitted. Palanquin (alunqi) transport, which necessarily means on the carriers’ shoulders, is thus prohibited. The stam again asks, “ini Neither men nor women may go out in a sedan chair [on a festival]. 27 The word “chair” only appears in the first anecdote. It is assumed in the second and third. Or perhaps the rabbi was carried on the back of the person transporting him. 28 The anecdotes in the parallel sugya in the Yerushalmi (yBes 1:7, 60c) similarly show that transporting teachers and physicians, who are public servants, is permitted on a festival. Earlier in Yerushalmi discussion see similar anecdote about Shmuel.

254

THE STORIES THEY TELL

veha,” i.e., is it so that transport on a palanquin is prohibited? Did not R. Nahman permit Yalta to be transported on a festival on a palanquin?” In other words, how could R. Nahman, who had asked a question and received the answer that shoulder transport is forbidden, permit Yalta, on a festival, to be transported on a palanquin, which is by definition on the shoulders? The stam resolves this conflict by saying that Yalta’s case was an exception because she was afraid. There is no explanation of what she feared. Rashi (s.v. deba’ita) says she was afraid of falling, but he does not explain what that means or how that would resolve our conflict. In fact, it seems rather clear that transport on a sedan chair, with carriers’ arms extended downward, is less precarious than transport up high, on a palanquin, on the carriers’ shoulders. But if we ignore the difficulty in understanding the stam’s opaque explanation of the reason R. Nahman allowed Yalta to be transported on a festival on a palanquin, the result of the stam’s comment is that R. Nahman no longer disagrees with R. Ami’s overall ban on palanquin transport on a festival. According to the stam, then, R. Nahman made an exception only for his own wife, for a reason that the stam, not R. Nahman, supplies. Others may not be transported in this manner. (It is not clear, however, why R. Nahman allowed his wife, who was not a public servant, to be transported at all on a festival, whether on a palanquin or even a sedan char.) 29 The sugya ends with another anecdote. Two late amoraim, Amemar and Mar Zutra, were carried on a palanquin on a festival (shabta derigla) 30 because of fear or because of pressure of the crowds. The stam does not comment on this anecdote. It goes without saying that since Yalta was not a public servant, she should not have been transported on a festival. See Tosafot (s.v. shani Yalta deba’ita) who claim that she served the public since she was the daughter of an exilarch. But even if we overlook that incongruence, we do not understand why R. Nahman permitted shoulder transport for Yalta since his own messenger had told him that R. Ami forbade it. 30 It is not clear what the expression shabta d’rigla means. Rashi (s.v. beshabta derigla) says that it refers to the Sabbath that falls thirty days 29

5. INI VEHA ANECDOTES

255

If we now eliminate the stam from this part of the sugya, what is left in the amoraic layer is R. Ami’s ban on shoulder transport on a festival, the definition of shoulder transport as being carried on a palanquin, an anecdote relating that R. Nahman permitted Yalta to be transported on a palanquin on a festival, and another anecdote about two late amoraim who were also transported on a palanquin on a festival. A likely interpretation of the amoraic core is as follows. It stands to reason that Yalta, as an upper-class woman, was regularly transported on a palanquin on weekdays. She probably wanted to be transported on a palanquin on a festival also, and she may even have asked her husband permission to do so. Crowds were larger than usual on a festival, leading her to want to avoid them even more than on a weekday. And a palanquin provided more separation from crowds than a sedan chair. It was for this reason, I claim, that R. Nahman sent a messenger to the land of Israel to learn an amora’s opinion on festival transport. That a public servant could be transported on a sedan chair on a festival was well-established. What R. Nahman was hoping to hear, it seems, was that a woman could be transported before the holiday, when the rules of the holiday were presented to the public. He further says (s.v. mekhatfei leho) that the rabbis were transported on shoulders, within the study hall, to their place. Rashi needs to suggest this very unlikely scenario because transport is not permitted on the Sabbath. I have written elsewhere that this phrase refers to the festival days themselves, not the intermediary days when transport is permitted. See my article in Zeramim, An Online Journal of Applied Jewish Thought (Vol. II, Issue 1, Fall 2017/5778), “Why did R. Naḥman Permit Yalta to Be Transported On a Palanquin On a Festival? A New Reading of Bavli Beṣah 25b,” Vol. II, Issue 1, Fall 2017/5778. The same expression appears in bSanh 7b: ... ‫מר זוטרא חסידא כי הוו מכתפי ליה בשבתא דריגלא אמר הכי‬ When Mar Zutra Hasida was carried on the shoulders on the Sabbath of a festival, he said thus … Here, too, the expression “Sabbath of a festival” means the festival days themselves.

256

THE STORIES THEY TELL

not just on a chair but also on a palanquin, the mode of transport to which Yalta was accustomed and which would provide her with better protection from crowds. The answer came back negative—no shoulder transport—but R. Nahman proceeded to permit Yalta to be transported on a palanquin anyway. This amoraic layer of the sugya shows clearly that a rabbi in Babylonia may rule differently from a colleague in the land of Israel, and differently, as well, from a baraita which bans transport on a festival for both men and women. How does this interpretation of the amoraic core, which suggests that the topic under consideration is palanquin transport for women on a festival, compare to that of the stam? It is likely that R. Nahman was attempting to address a broad set of circumstances, palanquin transport on a festival for women in general. But the stam, to avoid having an amora disagree with both a baraita and another amora, limited R. Nahman’s leniency to a narrow set of circumstances, i.e., only his own wife may be transported on a palanquin on a festival for a particular reason. In so doing, the stam left in place the ban on sedan chair and palanquin transport on a festival for all other women. It is strange that the justification for transporting Mereimar and Mar Zutra on a palanquin is presented in terms of fear or pressure from the crowds. Since these amoraim served the public, that should have been reason enough to offer them chair transport. But because of fear of crowds or pressure from crowds, these amoraim instituted an additional leniency, that even palanquin transport is permitted, although outlawed by R. Ami, as interpreted by R. Yosef breih d’Rava. It is also likely that the two rabbis were expanding the limits of chair and palanquin transport on a festival to include not just public servants but anyone who fears crowds.

SUMMARY

These sugyot show that when a halakhic anecdote is introduced by the phrase ini veha, it means that the amoraic anecdote conflicts with an earlier stated halakhah. The stam notes the conflict, but then resolves it by claiming that the amora was merely creating one or a few exceptions to the earlier stated rule, not

5. INI VEHA ANECDOTES

257

disagreeing with, or changing it significantly. I argue, to the contrary, that if we examine the amoraic core of the sugya, prior to the insertion of the stam, we see that a later amora was modifying an earlier stated halakhah as he was carrying it out, not just creating an exception or two. The message of the amoraic layer of the sugya is that a halakhah issued by an earlier amora may in fact be changed by a later amora. His performance reveals his position. This key message of the amoraic layer gets lost when reading the sugya with the interpolated stam who suppresses the message of halakhic change by reconciling the conflict between the earlier memra and the later anecdote. In this way, the stam denies that a later amora may alter the rule of an earlier amora. All the later amora may do, according to the stam in these sugyot, is exclude a case or two from the rule. All other cases still must abide by the rule. The central thesis of this study, however, is that a later amora may modify or even reverse the rule of an earlier amora. In most ini veha sugyot, the upshot of the stam’s reinterpreting the sugya is the narrowing of a proposed leniency. Therefore, when reading a sugya that contains the phrase ini veha, one should not accept at face value the stam’s resolution of the conflict between an earlier stated halakhah and a later anecdote. Rather, one should compare the stam’s message to the message of the amoraic core. Only upon doing so will it be possible to grasp fully the change that a later amora made to the halakhah of an earlier amora.

CHAPTER 6.

HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT FEATURE WOMEN

Throughout this volume I have argued that when an anecdote reports that an amora implemented an earlier stated halakhah, in the process he modified it. That is the core message of the halakhic anecdotes. Is there any evidence that female relatives of amoraim who carried out a halakhah could modify it too? And if they could, were their changes in halakhic practice accepted by the men in their lives? The answer is yes to both questions. On occasion, an anecdote portrays a woman, together with the household staff she supervises, implementing a halakhah differently from the way it was stated earlier in the sugya. Sometimes men explicitly endorse the change a woman made. But even without explicit male approval, the inclusion of the anecdote in the sugya suggests that women’s changes are endorsed by the editor. Of interest is that post-Talmudic commentators follow suit. That is, the codes of Jewish law consistently accept a change even if enacted by a woman. 1

For instance, see Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah, Hilkhot Niddah, 195:10. Karo permits women to serve wine to their husband when a niddah if they follow the examples in the sugya. See below bKet 61a. Another example can be found at Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim, Hilkhot Yom 1

259

260

THE STORIES THEY TELL

Women did not function as halakhic decisors. Only men did. But given that the study hall and the home were often located in the same space, women overheard halakhic discussions and, on occasion, even participated in them. Various anecdotes show that women could, and did, converse with a husband, father, brother or son about a halakhic matter. As I argue elsewhere, if men were continuously developing new rules about subjects like Shabbat or kashrut, and if they did not communicate these new rules to the women in their lives, the men would end up eating food they themselves considered not kosher or violate Shabbat according to rules they themselves developed. 2 It is therefore not surprising that women knew halakhot and sometimes enacted changes when performing them. A survey of halakhic anecdotes featuring women reveals three phenomena: rabbis made changes that benefited women, 3 they endorsed women’s practices that other rabbis wanted to outlaw, 4 and they even approved of halakhic changes that women themselves instituted. 5 The following five sugyot will illustrate these points. Many other sugyot in this volume feature

Tov 506:2, where Karo accepts women’s change regarding second sifting. See below bBes 29b. 2 See my article, “A New View of Women and Torah Study,” in JSIJ, https://jewish-faculty.biu.ac.il/files/jewish-faculty/shared/ hauptman.pdf, in which I argue that women knew halakhah. 3 bNiddah 67b. I did not include bGit 88b in this chapter, in which rabbis force a man to divorce a wife, presumably at her request, because the change was also made to maintain rabbis’ control of the divorce process. Had they not made it possible for women to get rabbinic assistance in divorcing a husband, the women may have turned to the secular courts. I discuss this sugya above in Chapter 3. 4 Second sugya, bBesah 13b. 5 Third, fourth and fifth sugyot: bKetubot 61a; bBesah 29b; bShabbat 114b.

6. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT FEATURE WOMEN

261

women, for instance as coming to a rabbi for a halizah 6 ceremony. But the women who appear in most anecdotes are not agents of change. In three of the five sugyot in this chapter, they are. 6.1 bNiddah 67b, Menstruants and Mikveh ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת נדה דף סז עמוד ב‬ ‫ ושלא בזמנה טובלת‬,‫ נדה בזמנה אינה טובלת אלא בלילה‬:‫אמר רב‬ .‫בין ביום בין בלילה‬ ,‫ בין בזמנה בין שלא בזמנה אינה טובלת אלא בלילה‬:‫רבי יוחנן אמר‬ .‫משום סרך בתה‬ ‫ בין בזמנה‬,‫ נדה‬:‫ דאמר רבי חייא בר אשי אמר רב‬,‫ואף רב הדר ביה‬ .‫ משום סרך בתה‬,‫ אינה טובלת אלא בלילה‬,‫בין שלא בזמנה‬ .‫אתקין רב אידי בנרש למטבל ביומא דתמניא משום אריותא‬ .‫רב אחא בר יעקב בפפוניא משום גנבי‬ .‫רב יהודה בפומבדיתא משום צנה‬ .‫רבא במחוזא משום אבולאי‬ Rav (BA 1) said: a menstruant who goes to immerse [in a mikveh] at the appointed time [i.e., at the end of seven days of blood flow] 7 may do so only at night [on the eve of the eighth day]. [If she goes to immerse] not at the appointed time [i.e., later than the eve of the eighth day], she may immerse either at night or in the daytime. R. Yohanan (JA 2) said: whether at the appointed time or not, she may only immerse at night, lest she lead her daughter astray [who might conclude that immersing at the apA halizah ceremony releases a widow to marry someone other than her levir, a brother of her deceased childless husband. See sugyot on the topic of halizah: bYev 101a; 103b; 106b. 7 This rule was later changed. An additional seven “white” days were added. See my Rereading the Rabbis, A Woman’s Voice (Perseus 1998), 156ff. 6

262

THE STORIES THEY TELL pointed time may be done in the daytime of the seventh day]. And Rav rescinded [his ruling], for R. Hiyya bar Ashi (BA 2) said in the name of Rav: a menstruant, whether at the appointed time or not, may only immerse at night, lest she lead her daughter astray. R. Idi (bar Abin, BA 3/4) enacted in Narsh [that menstruants] immerse in the daytime [of the eighth day] because of [the danger of] lions. R. Aha bar Ya’akov (BA 3) [enacted this rule] in Papunia, because of thieves. R. Judah (BA 2) [enacted it] in Pumbedita because of the cold. Rava (BA 4) [enacted it] in Mehoza because of [lewd] gatekeepers. 8

EXPLANATION

The “appointed” time for a menstruant to immerse in a mikveh is at the end of the seven days of blood flow, meaning after dark at the end of the seventh day. Rav states that when a niddah (menstruant) immerses at her appointed time, she may only immerse at night. But if she chooses to immerse later than the first allowable time, she may immerse even in the daytime. R. Yohanan comments that immersion should take place at night only, even if later than the first allowable time. Rav then concedes the point to R. Yohanan. However, the sugya goes on to say, four rabbis instituted immersion during the daytime of the eighth day, instead of the eve of the eighth day, for a variety of reasons: to protect women from lions, thieves, a chill, and lewd gatekeepers. That is, after Rav and R. Yohanan both said that immersion should take place only at night, these other amoraim 8

No significant mss. variants.

6. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT FEATURE WOMEN

263

went ahead and changed the rule to allow for daytime immersion. The point of including numerous anecdotes is clear. For a good reason, i.e. to keep women safe, a later rabbi may reverse an earlier ruling, even if originally instituted by a prominent colleague, such as Rav or R. Yohanan. Four anecdotes, and not just one, show that a variety of concerns can justify reversing a law to protect people from danger and possible death. This case is a trivial one for the general argument I am making in this volume: clearly an amora may modify an earlier stated law for the sake of safety. If ritual immersion at the end of a menstrual period, which is supposed to occur at night, would put a woman at risk, it goes without saying that she may postpone immersion until the daytime of the next day. Immersion at the end of the seventh day thus remains the rule. It is suspended only to protect women from danger. The possibility of leading a daughter astray is not a strong enough argument to outweigh the concern for safety. 6.2 bBesah 13b, Hulling Barley on the Sabbath ‫משנה מסכת מעשרות פרק ד משנה ה‬ ‫ ואם קלף ונתן לתוך ידו‬.‫המקלף שעורים מקלף אחת אחת ואוכל‬ ‫ המולל מלילות של חטים מנפה מיד ליד ואוכל ואם נפה ונתן‬.‫חייב‬ .‫לתוך חיקו חייב‬ Mishnah Ma’aserot 4:5: if one hulls barley, he may peel one [kernel] at a time and eat [and in this way be exempt from tithing because it is not a meal]. But if one hulls and [fills] his hand, he is obligated [to tithe]. If one rubs ears of wheat he may winnow a little at a time and eat [without tithing]. But if he winnows into his lap, he is obligated [to tithe].

‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת ביצה דף יג עמוד ב‬ ‫ ואם קלף ונתן‬,‫ המקלף שעורין מקלף אחת אחת ואוכל‬:‫תנן התם‬ .‫לתוך ידו חייב‬ .‫ וכן לשבת‬:‫אמר רבי אלעזר‬

264

THE STORIES THEY TELL ‫איני והא רב מקלפא ליה דביתהו כסי כסי )ורבי חייא מקלפא ליה‬-9 !(‫דביתהו כסי כסי‬ ‫ המולל מלילות של חטים מנפח על‬:‫אלא אי אתמר אסיפא אתמר‬-.‫ ואם נפח ונתן לתוך חיקו חייב‬,‫ ואוכל‬,‫ על יד‬,‫יד‬ .‫ וכן לשבת‬:‫אמר רבי אלעזר‬ A mishnah elsewhere (mMa’aserot 4:5) teaches: if one hulls barley, he may peel one [kernel] at a time and eat [and in this way be exempt from tithing because this is not a meal]. But if one hulls and [fills] his hand, he is obligated [to tithe]. R. Eleazar (JA 3) said: the same [rule] applies to the Sabbath. [One may hull one kernel at a time. But hulling enough to fill one’s hand is a forbidden Sabbath labor]. [Stam asks:] Is that so? But did not Rav’s (BA 1) wife hull for him cupfuls [of barley on the Sabbath], and didn’t R Hiyya’s (JA 1) wife hull for him cupfuls [of barley on the Sabbath and in this way violate the Sabbath according to R. Eleazar]? [Stam answers:] R. Eleazar’s statement was not made in conjunction with the first clause [of the mishnah], but the second, which states: if one rubs ears of wheat he may winnow a little at a time and eat [without tithing]. But if he winnows into his lap, he is obligated [to tithe]. R. Eleazar said [in reference to this second clause]: the same applies to the Sabbath [meaning that if one rubs ears of wheat and winnows the kernels into his hand on the Sabbath, this is allowed. But if he winnows into his lap, it is forbidden].

9

MS Munich 95 ‫כסי כסי בשבת ;חסר‬

6. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT FEATURE WOMEN

265

EXPLANATION

The mishnah from Ma’aserot states that if a person hulls only a little barley, he or she may eat it without tithing. If more than a little, e.g., a handful, one must tithe. R. Eleazar, an amora, asserts that the same rule applies to the Sabbath, namely that if one hulls just a little barley on the Sabbath, there is no Sabbath labor violation, but if one hulls a handful, there is a Sabbath violation. Apparently, the amora regards such action as threshing, a forbidden Sabbath activity. At this point the stam says, but is it not so that the wives of two rabbis hulled cupfuls of barley for their husbands on the Sabbath, which would mean that, according to R. Eleazar, the two women violated the Sabbath? The stam resolves the apparent conflict by saying that R. Eleazar’s comment “the same rule applies to the Sabbath” was made in reference to the second clause of the mishnah, about wheat, and not the first clause, about barley. If so, women may continue to hull cupfuls of barley on the Sabbath. Such is the outcome of “reassigning” R. Eleazar’s comment to wheat from barley. Note that both R. Hiyya and his nephew Rav are first generation amoraim whereas R. Eleazar is a second generation amora. He may, therefore, have known about the practice of the two rabbinic wives and was attempting to outlaw it. He did not succeed. Also note that the two women, in their own day, were not transgressing any amoraic rule. It appears that R. Eleazar tried to establish a Sabbath stringency, that one (i.e., a woman) may not hull more than one kernel of barley at a time. However, since it is reported that two rabbinic wives were in the habit, on the Sabbath, of hulling cupfuls of barley for their husbands, the stam does not allow R. Eleazar’s Sabbath rule to apply to barley. The stam instead reassigns R. Eleazar’s comment to wheat. What the women were doing with barley, therefore, remains acceptable. 10 We cannot The Yerushalmi does not present R. Eleazar’s rule regarding the Sabbath. However, in discussing the mishnah’s “one kernel rule” for tith-

10

266

THE STORIES THEY TELL

say for sure that the stam was intentionally trying to uphold the women’s practice, however. 11 As we have seen, it is the stam’s standard mode of operation to defuse conflicts between amoraic rules and halakhic anecdotes. And that is what the stam may be doing here. If we now suppress the stam’s question and answer, we can examine the amoraic core of the sugya on its own terms. It probably contained the mishnah about tithing, the comment of R. Eleazar applying the “one kernel at a time” rule to the Sabbath, and the report about two wives who hulled cupfuls of barley on the Sabbath. This earlier layer was therefore suggesting that although R. Eleazar only allows a person on the Sabbath to hull barley and eat one kernel at a time, these two women acted more liberally, hulling a cupful at a time for their husbands. In their day, no one considered such an act a violation of the Sabbath. But, at a later time, along came R. Eleazar and tried to stop them, or others like them, from doing so. Since the report of the women’s practice ends the barley discussion, the message is clear: R. Eleazar’s barley stringency did not become halakhah. 6.3 bKetubot 61a, Women and Wine ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת כתובות דף סא עמוד א‬ ing, the Tosefta (tMa’as 3:6) and amoraim expand it to three or four kernels. An anecdote in the Yerushalmi (yMa’as 4:5, 51a) suggests that rabbis hulled much more than that without tithing. This might explain why R. Hiyya, a land of Israel rabbi, and his nephew Rav did not stop their wives from hulling cupfuls on the Sabbath. 11 See Tamara Or, Massekhet Betsah, A Feminist Commentary on the Babylonian Talmud (Mohr Siebeck 2010, 82). She writes in her commentary on this sugya that the women “were experts in preparing food and also adhered to halakhah.” I would say that the women were simply doing what they were accustomed to doing on the Sabbath. Their husbands, prominent rabbis, did not disapprove. Since in their day there existed no ban on hulling cupfuls of barley on the Sabbath, the women were not violating the Sabbath.

6. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT FEATURE WOMEN ".‫"ארבע יושבת בקתדרא‬ ‫ אע"פ שאמרו יושבת‬:12 ‫אמר רב יצחק בר חנניא אמר רב הונא‬ ‫ ומרחצת לו פניו‬,‫ ומצעת לו את המטה‬,‫ אבל מוזגת לו כוס‬,‫בקתדרא‬ .‫ידיו ורגליו‬ ‫ כל מלאכות שהאשה עושה‬:‫אמר רב יצחק בר חנניא אמר רב הונא‬ ,‫ והצעת המטה‬,‫ חוץ ממזיגת הכוס‬,‫לבעלה נדה עושה לבעלה‬ ... .‫והרחצת פניו ידיו ורגליו‬ ".‫"ומזיגת הכוס‬ .‫ ליה דביתהו בידא דשמאלא‬13 ‫ מחלפא‬,‫שמואל‬ .‫ מנחא ליה אפומא דכובא‬,‫אביי‬ .‫ אבי סדיא‬,‫רבא‬ .‫ אשרשיפא‬,‫רב פפא‬ [Citation of mishnah:] “[If she brought] four [maidservants into the marriage], she may sit in an easy chair.” R. Yizhaq bar Hananiah (BA 3) said that R. Huna (BA 2) said: Even though they said [that a woman with four maidservants] may sit in an easy chair, she must still pour him his cup [of wine], make his bed for him, and wash his face, hands and feet for him. R. Yizhaq bar Hananiah said that R. Huna said: All the tasks that a woman performs for her husband, a menstruant performs for her husband, except for pouring [his] cup, making [his] bed, and washing his face, hands, and feet. … “And pouring [his] cup.” Samuel’s wife (BA 1) switched it to her left hand; Abaye[’s wife] (BA 4) set it on the mouth of the cask; Rava[’s wife (BA 4) put it] on the pillow; 12 13

MS Munich 95, ‫אמר רב אע"פ‬ MS Munich 95, ‫מיחלפא‬

267

268

THE STORIES THEY TELL R. Pappa[’s wife (BA 5) put it] on the stool.

EXPLANATION

According to mKetubot 5:5, if a woman brings four maidservants into her marriage, she is released from all seven domestic tasks, e.g., grinding grain and baking bread, that a wife is expected to perform for her husband. R. Huna comments that even if a woman is exempted from all these tasks, she must still make her husband’s bed, 14 pour his wine, and wash his face, hands, and feet. Rashi suggests that these tasks encourage a husband to feel affection for his wife. 15 Note that these three tasks are all steps in preparation for going to sleep at night. The same rabbi, R. Huna, goes on to say that when a woman is a menstruant, a niddah, she may not perform these three tasks for her husband. The point he is making is that these acts, which are erotic in nature, should be avoided when a woman is sexually forbidden to her husband. The text then presents four very short anecdotes. Four wives of rabbis did, in fact, serve their husbands wine when a menstruant. Shmuel’s wife would hand him a cup of wine with her left hand, Abaye’s wife would put the cup on a cask, Rava’s wife on a pillow, and R. Pappa’s wife on a stool. A close look at these brief anecdotes shows that rather than deny her husband his bedtime drink when a niddah, as stipulated by R. Huna, each of these women, when a niddah, brought 319F

320F

The task denoted in mKet 5:5 as “making his bed” (sixth on the list of seven) apparently refers to the hard work of unfolding bed frames, arranging cushions, and so on. When R. Huna comments that even if a woman is exempted from all seven tasks, she must still make her husband’s bed, he apparently refers to the lighter task of spreading bed linens or something similar. Today we might call this task, “plumping up the pillows” or “turning down the blankets.” 15 Rashi (s.v. aval mozeget lo kos) . ‫ דמילי דחיבה נינהו‬... ‫ד"ה אבל מוזגת לו כוס‬ ‫כדי שתתחבב עליו‬, She pours him his cup …, activities that generate affection, so that he will feel affectionate towards her. 14

6. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT FEATURE WOMEN

269

her husband his wine, but did not “serve” it to him. One of them extended the cup to him with her left hand instead of her right, the hand with which one is supposed to serve. 16 The three others put the cup down near him instead of handing it to him. In this way, they all abided by R. Huna’s rule of not technically “serving” a husband wine when a niddah, even though in all cases they did bring him his drink. The Talmud records the actions of these four women not merely to say that they complied with the law but to indicate that they implemented R. Huna’s rule, which they apparently knew, in ways he did not anticipate. They tweaked the law for their own purposes which were, as it turns out, to benefit men. Rather than deny a husband his nighttime drink one week (or more) a month, each of these women chose to continue beverage service when a menstruant with a slight change. The goal of the change, it should be noted, was not to announce to the husband that she was a menstruant, but to avoid violating R. Huna’s dictum. There would be little reason for the Talmud to say that women carried out the law exactly as the amora stipulated. That would be redundant. But there is good reason for the Talmud to include these anecdotes if they represent small, deliberate departures from the rule. The amora said no serving wine to a husband when a menstruant. The women were determined to get him his wine but by means that could not be called “serving” it to him. They thus, in essence, reversed R. Huna’s rule of no serving wine to a husband when a menstruant, even if they technically did not violate it. These four, short anecdotes suggest that women could take the law into their own hands, double entendre. Women could keep the law as it was known by them, but they could also modify it according to their own understanding of the circumstances. See bBer 62a where it is stated that one does not wipe oneself at the toilet with the right hand but the left. If so, bringing wine to her husband with the left hand was not technically “serving” him his wine.

16

270

THE STORIES THEY TELL

Rabbis produced law in the rarefied atmosphere of the bet midrash but the individuals who had to implement it, such as women and household staff, often discovered that the legal prescriptions didn’t work sufficiently well in real life settings. Therefore, they introduced changes while taking care not to violate the letter of the law. By reporting the actions of the four women, the amoraic editor of this unit endorses their changes. Did the women themselves create these changes or did their husbands instruct them to “serve” wine in these modified ways? Since the Talmud attributes the changes to the women themselves, it is likely to have been they, and not their husbands, who produced the innovations. 6.4 bBesah 29b, Sifting flour on a festival ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת ביצה דף כט עמוד ב‬ ‫ משום רבי פפייס ורבי יהודה בן‬.‫ אין שונין קמח ביום טוב‬:‫תנו רבנן‬ ... .‫ שונין‬:‫בתירא אמרו‬ ... .‫ שונין קמח ביום טוב‬:‫דרש רבא בר רב הונא זוטי אפתחא דנהרדעא‬ ‫ שקילא‬:‫ פוקו ואמרו ליה לאבא‬:[‫אמר להו רב נחמן ]ר' חמא‬ .‫ פוק חזי כמה מהולתא הדרן בנהרדעא‬,‫טיבותך ושדי אחזרי‬ ,‫ חזי‬:‫ אמר לה‬,‫דביתהו דרב יוסף נהלא קמחא אגבא דמהולתא‬ .‫דאנא רפתא מעליתא בעינא‬ ,‫דביתהו דרב אשי נהלא קמחא אגבא דפתורא‬ ‫ ורמי בר חמא מרא‬,‫ הא דידן ברתיה דרמי בר חמא‬:‫אמר רב אשי‬ .‫ ואי לאו דחזיא מבי נשא לא הוה עבדא‬,‫דעובדא הוה‬ A baraita: One may not sift flour a second time on a festival [to improve the taste of the bread and remove any foreign particles]. It was stated in the names of R. Pappias and R. Judah b. Bethyra: one may sift a second time. … … Rava bar R. Huna Zuti (BA 5) expounded at the entrance to Nehardea: one may sift flour a second time on a festival.

6. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT FEATURE WOMEN

271

R. Nahman (BA 3) [or R. Hama (BA 5)] said to them [apparently to the public]: go and tell Abba [Rava bar R. Huna Zuti], keep your favors [i.e., your leniency] to yourself. Go and see the many sieves that have returned [alternatively: that are now circulating] in Nehardea. R. Yosef’s wife (BA 3) sifted flour on the back of a sieve [on a festival]. He said to her: Look, I want tasty bread. The wife of R Ashi (BA 6) sifted flour on the back of a table [not on the top where one usually sifts]. R. Ashi said: this [wife] of ours is the daughter of Rami bar Hama (BA 4), and he is a man of pious deeds, 17 and if she didn’t see this done where she grew up, she would not do it [i.e., sift a second time on a festival.]

EXPLANATION

Baking bread, which is forbidden on the Sabbath, is permitted on a festival. This is a principal way in which a festival differs from the Sabbath. The question driving this sugya is, does the permission to bake on a festival include performing even those acts of dough preparation that can be carried out in advance? The sugya opens with a baraita that states that the action of “shonin” is not allowed on a festival. The apparent meaning of shonin (to repeat) in this context is to sift a second time. Bread will taste better if flour is sifted not just on the day before baking, but again on the day of baking. Even so, the first tanna prohibits second sifting on a festival. Two dissenting tannaim allow it. Since baking is permitted on a festival, they apparently think that steps in the preparation of dough are also permitted.

The expression mara de’uvda is not clear. Literally, it means “the master of the incident.” Rashi (s.v. mara de’uvda) comments that he was meticulous in his behavior (medaqdeq bema’asav).

17

272

THE STORIES THEY TELL

Rava bar R. Huna Zuti, a fifth generation amora, expounded to an audience of both men and women, 18 at the entrance to Nehardea, that second sifting is permitted on a festival. He thus disagrees with the anonymous first tanna of the baraita. Another amora remarks that Rava bar R. Huna Zuti’s ruling led to many sieves appearing on the streets of Nehardea, which means that many women were now performing a second sifting on a festival. Admittedly his comment is not clear, but this amora seems to oppose second sifting on a festival. Two anecdotes end the sugya. The first reports that the wife of R. Yosef performed a second sifting on a festival on the back of a sieve. Her husband then said to her, “look, I want excellent bread.” He thereby endorses her second sifting, saying that by her doing so the bread turns out tasty. Note that she uses the back of the sieve, which is not the way one generally sifts. It is as if she is saying that to allow a second sifting on a festival, one needs to make an adjustment. Her attitude is consistent with the Talmud’s oft-cited principle that on a Sabbath and a festival one has to accomplish tasks differently from weekday acts. 19 Also note that this husband, like the husband in the anecdote about raking out an oven on a festival, 20 calls for tasty bread, even if an earlier stated halakhah—no second sifting on a festival— needs to be set aside. Also, like the previous anecdote, the husband does not explicitly tell his wife to violate the earlier stated rule, but strongly implies that that is what he expects her to do. The second anecdote reports that R. Ashi’s wife performed a second sifting on a festival, on the back, or underside, of a table, not on the tabletop as is customary. It is clear that she, too, A search for the root D.R.SH in rabbinic literature shows that quite a few of the reported public lectures on halakhic matters deal with women. It is possible that women came out to hear such lectures, and that they were aimed at men and women alike. See Ofra Meir, “The Meaning of ‘Darash Rabbi X’ in the Midrashim.” See Chapter 2, n. 26. 19 ‫כדרך שעושה בחול‬. For example, tShab 17:6; tBes 1:20; tMQ 2:5. See also the sugya on festival transport, bBes 25b. 20 Cf. bBes 32b. See above Chapter 4. 18

6. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT FEATURE WOMEN

273

modified her festival sifting. 21 And, as did R. Yosef, the husband in the first anecdote, R. Ashi gives his wife’s action a ringing endorsement. He goes so far as to say that her father, a wellknown fourth generation amora, must have approved of this action or his daughter, i.e., R. Ashi’s wife, would not be performing second sifting on a festival. By calling his father-in-law “pious,” or “meticulous,” R. Ashi strengthens his claim that second sifting is allowed. If an earlier, established rabbi approved of it, R. Ashi need not say anything more. These two anecdotes, which document a halakhic change instituted by women, bring the debate over second sifting to a close. It is allowed, provided it is done somewhat differently from a weekday. What does this sugya say about how rabbis viewed women? First, it sees women as abiding by rabbinic teachings. The sugya implies that before permission was given to second-sift on a festival, women did not do so. But as soon as permission was given, they did so in large numbers. Second, it portrays women as halakhic innovators, in this case introducing a stringency. Even though rabbis permitted second sifting, two rabbinic wives did so slightly differently from usual. They have thus made a halakhic decision—to accept the leniency but restrict it a bit. Their changes, as noted, are approved by male halakhists. 22

See yBes 1:7, 60d, which reports that Shmuel ground spices on the back of the mortar. Maimonides (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yom Tov 3:14 and Karo (Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim, Hilkhot Yom Tov, 506:2) accept women’s innovation for second sifting on a festival. See next note. 22 ‫רמב"ם הלכות יום טוב פרק ג הלכה יד‬ ‫ אין מרקדין‬,‫ אף על פי שרקדו מערב יום טוב והסיר ממנו הסובין‬,‫הקמח‬ ‫אותו פעם שנייה ביום טוב אלא אם כן נפל בתוכו צרור או קיסם וכיוצא‬ ‫ כיצד? כגון שירקד מאחורי הנפה או שירקד על גבי‬.‫ ואם שינה מותר‬.‫בהם‬ .‫השלחן וכיוצא בשינוי זה‬ Maimonides says that “even if he(!) sifted the flour on the eve of the festival and removed the bran, one may not sift a second time on a festival unless a pebble or a chip or something similar fell into the dough. But if he made a change [in 21

274

THE STORIES THEY TELL

6.5 bShabbat 114b, Preparing Vegetables for the Yom Kippur Break-fast

Another example of women tweaking halakhah appears in conjunction with their preparation of food for the Yom Kippur break-fast. ‫תלמוד בבלי מסכת שבת דף קיד עמוד ב‬ ‫ ואמרי לה אמר רבי אבא אמר רב‬,‫אמר רבי זירא אמר רב הונא‬ .‫ יוה"כ שחל להיות בשבת אסור בקניבת ירק‬:‫הונא‬ ‫ יוה"כ שחל להיות בשבת‬:‫ אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן‬... .‫מותר בקניבת ירק‬ ‫ שבת‬23 [‫ יום הכפורים שחל להיות ב]ערב‬:‫תניא כותיה דר' יוחנן‬ ‫ וכן שחל להיות בחול מפציעים באגוזים ומפרכים‬,‫מותר בקניבת ירק‬ .‫ברמונים מן המנחה ולמעלה מפני עגמת נפש‬ .‫דבי רב יהודה מקנבי כרבא‬ .‫דבי רבה גרדי קארי‬ ‫ אתא איגרתא ממערבא‬:‫כיון דחזא דהוו קא מחרפי אמר להו‬ .‫משמיה דרבי יוחנן דאסיר‬

how the sifting was done], it is permitted. For instance, if he sifted on the back of the sieve or on the back of the table.” It is not clear if Maimonides is saying “on” a table or “on the back of a table.” Either way, he accepts second sifting in the manner in which the two wives carried it out. Karo (Shulhan Arukh, Hilkhot Yom Tov 506:2) similarly accepts the wives’ halakhic change. He says that one who wishes to sift a second time to make the bread taste better, must do so a little differently, for instance on a table. 23 The majority of the mss. read beshabbat, omitting the word erev. The reading be‘erev shabbat, “on the eve of the Sabbath,” makes no sense: A baraita cited in support of R. Yoḥanan’s rule that one may trim vegetables on Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath cannot be speaking of a Yom Kippur that falls on a Friday, because it would be like any other day of the week except the Sabbath.

6. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT FEATURE WOMEN

275

R. Zera (BA/JA 3) said that R. Huna (BA 2) said, and some say that R. Abba (JA 3) said that R. Huna (BA 2) said: if Yom Kippur falls on the Sabbath, one is forbidden to trim vegetables [before sundown]. … R Ḥiyya bar Abba (JA 3) said that R. Yoḥanan (JA 2) said: if Yom Kippur falls on the Sabbath, one is permitted to trim vegetables [before sundown]. A baraita accords with R. Yoḥanan: If Yom Kippur falls on the Sabbath, one may trim vegetables [before sundown]. And similarly, if it falls on a weekday, one may crack nuts and separate pomegranate [seeds] from the time of the afternoon service and on, because of ogmat nefesh [vexation]. 24 329F

The household of R. Judah (BA 2) trimmed cabbage. The household of Rabbah (BA 3) scraped pumpkins. Since he saw that they were doing so too early, he 25 said to them: A letter has arrived from the West in the name of R. Yoḥanan that it is forbidden. Because the Vilna edition is somewhat garbled at this point, I have copied the baraita from MS Munich 95. Unfortunately, MS Munich 95 is garbled following the baraita. The best overall text for this sugya seems to be Oxford Opp. Add. fol. 23: ‫תניא כותיה דר' יוחנן יום הכפורים שחל להיות‬ ‫בחול מותר בקניבת ירק וכך היו מפציעי' באגוזים ומפריכין ברמונים מן המנחה ולמעלה‬ ‫מפני אגמת נפש דבי רב יהודה מקנבי כרבא דבי רבא גרדי קארא כיון דחזי דהוו קא‬ ‫מחרפי אמרי להו אתאי אגרתא ממערבא משמיה דר' יוחנן דאסיר‬. However, even in this rather clear version, the baraita does not make sense because it speaks of Yom Kippur falling on a weekday and hence does not support R. Yoḥanan. I strongly suspect that the alternate version of the baraita, i.e., that Yom Kippur fell on a weekday, arose because the baraita makes the lenient statement that one may trim vegetables on Sabbath afternoon which is also Yom Kippur, and later copyists or editors were not comfortable with such a leniency since the sugya moves in the direction of stringency. Most ms. versions of the baraita speak of Yom Kippur falling on the Sabbath, not on a weekday. See previous note. 25 Mss.: Rava. 24

276

THE STORIES THEY TELL

EXPLANATION

The sugya opens with a statement of R. Huna that trimming vegetables in the late afternoon of Yom Kippur is forbidden when the fast day falls on a Sabbath. The reason is that one may not prepare food on the Sabbath to be eaten after the Sabbath. 26 The sugya continues with the dissenting opinion of R. Yoḥanan, who says that trimming vegetables on the afternoon of Yom Kippur is permitted even when it falls on a Sabbath. A baraita is cited in support of R. Yoḥanan. It states that various types of food preparation may be done even on a Sabbath in order to avoid ogmat nefesh, anxiety, on the part of those who are fasting. They need to know that food will be ready for them at sundown. 27 The sugya and the chapter end with two anecdotes. The first says that the kitchen staff of the amora R. Judah, i.e. his wife and her assistants, 28 trimmed cabbage—apparently on a Yom Kippur that fell on the Sabbath. The second says that the kitchen staff of Rabbah scraped pumpkins. However, when Rabbah saw that they were doing so too early, he told them that a letter in the name of R. Yoḥanan had arrived from the West (i.e., the Land of Israel), stating that such activity was forbidden. The second anecdote shows that the kitchen staff of Rabbah followed the leniency of R. Yoḥanan, an amora from the land of Israel, and not the stringency of the Babylonian R. Huna. It is likely that these individuals were accustomed, year after year, to … shehu kimetaken mikodesh leḥol (tShabbat 12:17). This is like preparing from holiness to ordinariness. 27 Like the baraita, R. Yoḥanan apparently holds that ogmat nefesh trumps a shevut, a minor violation of the Sabbath, such as trimming vegetables on the Sabbath to be eaten after the Sabbath ends. 28 I have argued that the expression “bei R. X,” when not employed in a Torah study context, where it would refer to the school or disciple circle of R. X, refers instead to his household, to his wife and her kitchen staff. See my article in Nashim (28) 5775/2015, “The Talmud’s Women in Law and Narrative” (30–51). 26

6. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES THAT FEATURE WOMEN

277

trim vegetables for the break-fast on the afternoon of Yom Kippur, but Rabbah, upon hearing R. Huna’s rule, wanted to end this practice and introduce a stringency. Upon seeing, or believing he sees, that the staff are beginning their trimming activities too early, he tells them that R. Yoḥanan has changed his mind and now forbids such activity before the end of the fast. It is not clear whether a letter actually arrived “from the West” or whether Rabbah merely claimed it had in order to convince his staff to adopt the more stringent position. Rashi thinks the latter. 29 Note that R. Judah did not stop his household staff from engaging in the food preparation activity on the Sabbath, but Rabbah did, and he did so in a strange way, first telling them that they began their vegetable trimming too early but then saying that a letter arrived from the land of Israel in which R. Yoḥanan says that such activity, formerly permitted by him, is now prohibited. No rationale for the change in R. Yoḥanan’s position is put forward. The issue is not when one may begin to trim vegetables, but rather that trimming them at any time before the fast ends is now off limits altogether, according to this amora. Rabbah implies that the staff are basing their activity on R. Yoḥanan’s leniency, and the only way to get them to change their practice is to tell them that the rabbi they follow has changed his mind. Rabbah apparently thinks that just asking them will not suffice to make them stop, that he needs to cite an authority. This is an example of a man trying to change how women work in the kitchen. It shows, yet again, that women engage in certain practices that men try to outlaw. R. Eleazar sought to stop women from hulling cupfuls of barley on the Sabbath, and Rava b. R. Huna Zuti opposed women performing a second sift29

‫ אתא איגרתא ממערבא כו' – כי היכי דלקבלו מיניה‬.‫אמר להו – לאינשי ביתיה‬. He told them – the members of his household (alternatively, his wife). A missive has arrived from the West and so on – so that they would accept it [i.e., the stringency] from him.

278

THE STORIES THEY TELL

ing on a festival. But many of the women’s changes became standard practice, as evidenced by later codes of Jewish practice. 30 35F

SUMMARY

These five sugyot show clearly that women, on occasion, were halakhic “players.” Since there is no stam comment on these five anecdotes, we can conclude that, in the amoraic period, female relatives of rabbis and their household staff, even though they did not discuss halakhah with men on a regular basis and never achieved the title Rabbi, were still able to participate in the halakhic process. The areas in which they were active were food preparation, Sabbath and festival observances, and menstrual purity. They made changes in halakhah that the men in their lives endorsed.

30

See above, n. 1.

CONCLUDING REMARKS This is a volume of commentary on the Talmud. A classical commentary, such as those written by Rashi and many others, interprets a chapter or a tractate line-by-line. The advantage of such a linear approach is that it clarifies one passage after another, enabling the reader to follow the arguments step by step. The disadvantage is that it fails to connect disparate occurrences of the same phenomenon. As a result, the meaning and significance of the phenomenon is often overlooked. Since halakhic anecdotes, the subject of this volume, appear only sporadically in the Talmud, perhaps one every few pages, a traditional commentary fails to note their cumulative message. Several recently published books point out that many anecdotes do not “match” the halakhah to which they are juxtaposed. But none of these volumes draw the halakhic implications of that dissonance. To address this deficiency, I set out to compose a horizontal, non-linear commentary on the Talmud. Instead of selecting a chapter or a tractate, I decided to investigate the phenomenon of the halakhic anecdote, defined as a passage that shows how an amora implemented an earlier stated halakhah. By locating and reviewing several hundred of these short reports, I discovered that they are not merely charming episodes that inform the reader how a certain amora piously carried out a specific halakhah. Close attention to these anecdotes, and to the context in which they appear, shows that the amora in question performed the halakhah differently from the way it was stated earlier. The amoraic editors, who incorporated the anecdotes into the text of the Talmud, were informing their audience that a halakhah 279

280

THE STORIES THEY TELL

emerging from the study hall could undergo modification when carried out in real life. A benefit of reading an anecdote from the perspective of possible halakhic innovation is that not only does the adjusted halakhah become visible but the plain sense meaning, the peshat, of the associated sugya is often understood differently. Another outcome of focusing on halakhic anecdotes is that they offer a glimpse into the lives of the amoraim. Since there are so few material remains from the rabbinic period, these descriptive passages—whether the incidents they report actually took place or were just imagined—offer us details on how life was lived back then. For this reason too, these anecdotes deserve more attention than they have received in the past. The six chapters of this volume can be divided into two large groups. The first three present anecdotes in which two amoraim engage in verbal exchange. In most of these cases one amora tells another that his halakhic behavior is in violation of an earlier stated rule. The critique is followed by the attacked amora’s defense of his “deviant” behavior. A close look at his defense reveals that it innovates: the amora excludes circumstances like his own from the scope of the earlier stated halakhah. He is, therefore, free to act otherwise. An anecdote about behavior on the Sabbath illustrates this claim (bEruv 104a). When Ulla, an amora from the land of Israel, visits Babylonia, he sharply criticizes R. Judah for permitting someone to knock on a gate, i.e., to make noise, on the Sabbath. R. Judah defends his position, claiming that the ban on producing sounds on the Sabbath applies only to sounds of music. He has, thus, significantly narrowed the ban. Although a pattern of critique and defense characterizes most of the anecdotes in the first three chapters, the differences among the various anecdote types justify considering them separately. Chapter 1 presents instances in which one amora drops in on another for an overnight stay, often including the Sabbath. Host and guest are not necessarily in an ongoing relationship. Chapter 2 presents instances in which one amora is sitting or standing before another, clearly his mentor, in a semi-formal setting, such as a communal prayer session or a meal. Chapter 3

CONCLUDING REMARKS

281

presents passages in which one amora chances upon another, often his mentor, in an informal setting, such as the mentor’s home. Despite these differences, the common theme of most anecdotes is halakhic modification and innovation. The portrait of the student-mentor relationship in these chapters matches that sketched by C. Hezser. Students attend to their mentors at all times and in all places. They dab the mentor’s shoes on the Sabbath, bring him his hat, serve him his meal, and so on. Students transmit their mentor’s teaching to his colleagues and to future generations. 1 I am further suggesting that their more formal task is to question their mentor regarding his halakhic views and behavior. Abaye is particularly active in this regard. For instance, he asks R. Yosef, his teacher, how he can justify sleeping under a canopied bridal bed in a sukkah since one who does so is not sleeping under the thatch (bSuk19b). I am claiming that it was incumbent upon a student to challenge his mentor’s halakhic actions in order to give him an opportunity to develop, finetune, and publicize his evolving halakhic stances. (Today this is called “constructive feedback.”) I think it possible that the Bavli writ large is essentially a product of students talking about their teachers: the disciples report halakhic discussions between themselves and their mentor, transmit debates between their mentor and his colleagues, and provide eye-witness accounts of their mentor’s halakhic behavior, in particular how he modified earlier stated rules. The fact that many halakhot in the Bavli are presented via a chain of transmission of two or three amoraim probably indicates that the senior amora is the one who formulated the halakhic statement but it was his students who recorded it for posterity, i.e., inserted it into the developing sugya. Sugyot usually exhibit a standard pattern. They begin with the local mishnah and its associated baraitot. Amoraim then engage in extensive give-and-take on these tannaitic materials and also present statements of their own. If there is a relevant hala1

The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement, 332 ff.

282

THE STORIES THEY TELL

khic anecdote, it is appended to the end of a sugya, a chapter or even a tractate. It is noteworthy that amoraim rarely comment on halakhic anecdotes. Admittedly, there is little one can deduce from the placement of the anecdote at the end of the sugya. However, the silence of the amoraim implies that they endorse what the anecdote teaches. In other words, since they don’t question the halakhic modification described by the anecdote, it appears that they accept it. If so, not only does an amoraic pronouncement determine halakhah, so does an amoraic performance. Note that tractates like Berakhot, Shabbat, Yoma, Ta’anit, Ketubot, and Gittin (as opposed to Sotah or Menahot) contain more anecdotes than other tractates. These are halakhic topics which rabbis did not only discuss but according to which they lived their Jewish lives. The last three chapters of this volume showcase very brief, third person reports of amoraic behavior. They contain no attack and defense. Close examination shows that they, too, endorse halakhic modification. Chapter 4 provides examples of multiple anecdotes all associated with the same halakhah. More than one anecdote is provided to convince an audience of the merit of a newly modified rule. For instance, Mishnah Yoma 8:1 requires a person to go out barefoot on Yom Kippur (bYoma 78a). Amoraim in both the land of Israel and Bavel, over the generations, restrict the “no shoes at all” rule to no “proper” or “leather” shoes. It follows that footgear that is neither “proper” nor made of leather may be worn out on Yom Kippur. Multiple anecdotes in both Talmuds show how amora after amora, generation after generation, found a way to cover their feet when leaving home yet still view themselves as in compliance with the barefoot rule of the Mishnah. Investigation of sugyot with multiple halakhic anecdotes also leads to the observation that each anecdote in a series teaches a new point. A good example is the sugya about reciting kiddush where one eats the Sabbath meal (bPes 101a). The first of three anecdotes teaches that kiddush must be recited in the very room where one will eat the Sabbath meal, the second that a snack can count as a Sabbath meal, and the third that even if, from the

CONCLUDING REMARKS

283

outset, one planned to eat the Sabbath meal elsewhere, a snack following kiddush is sufficient to fulfil the requirement of reciting kiddush at the Sabbath meal. These new points become evident if one actively looks for them. Chapter 5 presents anecdotes that contain the phrase ini veha, meaning, “Really? Is that the halakhah? Did not an amora behave to the contrary?” Although the stam that asks this question proceeds to cite a halakhic anecdote that conflicts with the earlier stated halakhah, the stam then reconciles the two statements. For example, the Mishnah says to shopkeepers, do not prettify persons, animals, or objects (mBM 4:12). Yet both Talmuds report that a number of amoraim went ahead and prettified. Such action may mislead a buyer regarding the value of the item for sale. The stam in the Bavli resolves the conflict by saying that the amoraim only prettified new merchandise, not old. That is, when it seems to the stam that an amora is modifying an earlier stated rule, the stam narrows the scope of the amoraic innovation, suggesting that all the amora did was exclude a limited number of cases from the purview of the earlier rule, not that he modified it. A close reading of many ini veha sugyot reveals that the stam seeks to constrict the innovative aspect of an amora’s behavior. It is likely that the stam’s halakhic philosophy is more conservative than that of the amoraim. Chapter 6 showcases women as halakhic actors. Since one might have thought that women, who show up as protagonists in many anecdotes, could not play a role in halakhic modification, these five anecdotes, although few in number, confound that expectation. Sometimes an amora upheld a particular practice of women that another amora sought to eliminate (bBes 13b). Sometimes women innovated halakhically, as in the case of a wife who is a menstruant finding ways to serve her husband a drink at night without openly violating the rule forbidding her to do so (bKet 61a). This study also brings to light that, on occasion, an anecdote will decide a halakhah that tannaim or amoraim disputed. That alone is the anecdote’s innovative point. In such a case, the anecdote does not modify an earlier stated halakhah but rather shows that an amora chose sides in a dispute.

284

THE STORIES THEY TELL

The overwhelming majority of halakhic anecdotes in this volume show adjustment in the direction of leniency. That seems to be the jurisprudential tendency of most, although not all amoraim. Also apparent, but based on a small number of texts, is that Babylonian amoraim seem more inclined towards leniency than their colleagues in the land of Israel. In conclusion, this study of halakhic anecdotes has shown that the Babylonian Talmud itself, in particular its amoraic layer, endorses halakhic change. The anecdotes show that amoraim over the generations modified earlier stated halakhot. This is not a surprising finding given that most legal systems make provisions for change over time. But it is somewhat unanticipated since the stam, the latest layer of the Talmudic text, seems to oppose such change, as do many later commentators on the Talmud and authors of codes of Jewish law, even today. Close examination of more than eighty amoraic anecdotes, however, shows that innovation is there, in marquee letters.

APPENDIX.

HALAKHIC ANECDOTES IN THE YERUSHALMI The question arises: if halakhic anecdotes in the Bavli show that a later amora may modify the halakhah of an earlier amora, is the same true of halakhic anecdotes in the Yerushalmi? Here is just one example to suggest that the Yerushalmi editors, like the Bavli editors, included reports of amoraic tweaking of an earlier stated halakhah. It follows that they too endorse halakhic modification. Talmud Yerushalmi Berakhot 4:1, 7a ‫א‬:‫ ז‬,‫א‬:‫תלמוד ירושלמי )וילנא( מסכת ברכות פרק ד‬ [‫ יכול יהא מגביה קולו ומתפלל? פירש בחנה ]שמואל א א יג‬... . ".‫"וחנה היא מדברת על לבה‬ ... ‫"וקולה‬... :‫אמר רבי יוסי בר חנינא מן הפסוק הזה את למד ד' דברים‬ .‫ מכאן שלא יגביה אדם את קולו ויתפלל‬,"‫לא ישמע‬ ... . ‫ר' אבא בר זבדא מצלי בקלא‬

285

286

THE STORIES THEY TELL ‫ וכד הוה מצלי‬,‫רבי יונה כד הוה מצלי בכנישתא הוה מצלי בלחישה‬ .‫גו בייתיה הוה מצלי בקלא עד דילפון בני בייתיה צלותיה מיניה‬ 1 [.‫מיניה‬

‫]אמר ר' מנא ובני בייתיה דאבא ילפי צלותא‬

… May a person raise his voice and pray [the Amidah]? It was stated in connection with Hannah (1 Samuel 1:13), "Now Hannah was praying in her heart; [only her lips moved but her voice could not be heard]." … R. Yosi bar Hanina said: one can deduce four things from this verse: … “But her voice could not be heard,” from here [one learns] that a person should not raise his voice and pray. … R. Abba bar Zavda (JA & BA 2/3) prayed [the Amidah] aloud. R. Yonah (JA 4, student of R Yohanan), when he would pray at the synagogue, he would pray in a whisper, but when he would pray in his own home, he would pray aloud, until the members of the household learned the prayers from him. [Said R. Mana (JA 5, son of R Yonah): the members of my father’s household learned the prayers from him.] 2

These words appear in small letters in the Leiden ms. of the Yerushalmi (published by Ya’akov Zussman, 2001), either to indicate that the text was altered by the editor or that these words appeared in a marginal note in the Leiden ms. See above, bPes 101b, where the text assumes that women are obligated to hear kiddush recited on Friday night. It is also clear that women are obligated to pray the Amidah daily (mBer 3:3). See my article, “Women and Prayer: An Attempt to Dispel Some Fallacies,” JUDAISM, Winter 1993, 94–103. 2 See previous note. 1

APPENDIX. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES IN THE YERUSHALMI

287

EXPLANATION

Both the Yerushalmi and the Bavli deduce from a description of Hannah’s prayer (1 Samuel 1:13) that one may not pray the Amidah aloud, just as she did not. The Bavli does not cite any anecdotes in connection with this halakhah. The Yerushalmi cites three. The first merely states that an amora, R. Abba bar Zavda (JA & BA 2/3), prayed aloud. The second says that when R. Yonah (JA 4) prayed in a synagogue, he prayed silently. But when praying at home, he prayed aloud, with the outcome that the members of his household learned the words of the prayer from him. It is likely that he prayed aloud so that they would learn the words. Women and slaves, after all, are obligated by the Mishnah to pray (mBer 3:3). That is, by hearing the words time and again, they became fluent in the prayer. The phrase benei beiteih, which is often translated literally as the “members of his household,” usually refers to a wife alone, 3 but in this context one can say that it refers to all members of the household—women, children, servants, tenants. This rabbi, although violating the norm of praying silently, seems to be saying that when there is a good reason to pray aloud, one may do so. It is rather remarkable that he places such value on the prayers of women and others. The last anecdote, which features R. Mana, the son of R. Yonah, repeats the message of the second, i.e., that the members of his household, perhaps including R. Mana himself when he was young, learned the words of the prayers from hearing his father, R. Yonah, pray aloud. The upshot of these anecdotes is that with a good rationale, praying aloud is permitted, possibly encouraged. When in public, praying aloud might appear ostentatious, as we saw in bBer 13b, or it might distract or annoy others. Praying silently is therefore the standard in public prayer. But there is good reason The phrase benei beiteih means “his wife.” See Saul Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshutah (JTS 1962), Moed, 627. See Chapter 2, n. 38. 3

288

THE STORIES THEY TELL

to limit the ban on praying aloud to public prayer. In a private setting, there is good reason to pray aloud. Note that Hannah’s silent prayer at Shiloh, a public venue, was actually private, since only Eli saw her moving her lips. One can, therefore, deduce a rule of private prayer from her action. I am suggesting that these three anecdotes, and many others in the Yerushalmi, lead to the same conclusion as I stated above with regard to the Bavli: the editors included halakhic anecdotes to show that a later amora did alter, and may alter, the rule of an earlier amora. If so, the Yerushalmi, like the Bavli, endorses halakhic change over the generations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES

Babylonian Talmud. Manuscript. From Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat.ebr.108. Babylonian Talmud. Manuscript. From Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Héb.671.4. Babylonian Talmud. Manuscript. Heb.e.51 (2677).

From

Bodleian

Library,

Babylonian Talmud Firenze. Manuscript. From Biblioteca Nationale Centrale di Firenze, II.1.7. Babylonian Talmud Munich Codex Hebraicus Manuscript 95. Manuscript. From Bavarian State Library, Codex Hebraicus 95. Babylonian Talmud (Seder Mo’ed), 1100–1299, Spain. Manuscript. From British Library, Harley MS 5508. Babylonian Talmud, Vilna Shas. Vilna: Widow Romm and Brothers. Accessed through the Bar Ilan Responsa 25 Plus Digital Library. Karo, R. Yosef. Shulhan Arukh. 1565. Accessed through the Bar Ilan Responsa 25 Plus Digital Library. Maimonides, Moses. Mishneh Torah. 1170–1180/4930–4940. Accessed through the Bar Ilan Responsa 25 Plus Digital Library.

289

290

THE STORIES THEY TELL

The Mishna. Commentary by Hanoch Albeck. Jerusalem: The Bialik Institute; Tel Aviv: Dvir Publishing House, 1988. Tosefta, ed. Saul Lieberman. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1955–1988. Zussman, Ya’akov. Talmud Yerushalmi: According to Ms. Or. 4720 (Scal. 3) of the Leiden University Library, with Restorations and Corrections. Jerusalem: Academy of the Hebrew Language, 2001.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Brody, Robert. “Stam Hatalmud v’Divrei Ha’amoraim” in Iggud: Mivhar Ma’amarim b’Mada’ey Ha’yahadut – Krakh Aleph; Ha’miqra v’Olamo, Sifrut Hazal u’Mishpat Ivri u’Mahshevt Yisrael, edited by Baruch Schwartz, Abraham Melamed, and Aharon Shemesh, 213–232. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2008. Boyarin, Daniel. Socrates and the Fat Rabbis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009. Calderon, Ruth. A Bride for One Night: Talmud Tales. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2014. Cohen, Avinoam. "‫"'למשמעותה ההיסטורית הגלומה במונח 'איקלע רב פלונ‬ Sidra 15, (1998): 51–64. Friedman, Shamma. Mehqarim Umeqorot. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1977. Halivni, David. Meqorot Umesorot [Sources and Traditions]: A Source Critical Commentary on the Talmund Seder Mo’ed from Yoma to Hagigah. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1975. Hauptman, Judith. " ‫ הסתם‬,‫שלשת המרכיבים היסודיים של הסוגיה‬, ‫המימרה והברייתא‬." in 2011 , ‫מלאכת מחשבת‬, edited by Aharon Amit and Aharon Shemesh, 27-38. Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2011. ——. “An Analysis of Sugyot Containing the Phrase Lo Savar Lah Mar.” In Strength to Strength: Essays in Honor of Shaye J.D.

APPENDIX. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES IN THE YERUSHALMI

291

Cohen, edited by Michael L. Satlow, 455–470. Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2018. ——. “A New Interpretation of the Thirty-Nine Forbidden Sabbath Labors.” In The Faces of the Torah, Studies in the Texts and Contexts of Ancient Judaism in Honor of Steven Fraade, editors Michal Bar-Asher Siegal, Tzvi Novick, Christine Hayes, 323–338. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Academic, 2017. ——. “A New View of Women and Torah Study.” Jewish Studies, an Internet Journal 9, (2010): 249–292. ——. Development of the Talmudic Sugya, Relationship Between Tannaitic and Amoraic Sources. Studies in Judaism. Lanham: University Press of America, 1988. ——. “Hadavar Masur LeNashim: Nashim Beitiyim.” Sidra 24–25 (2010): 83–111.

VeTiqsei

Dat

——. Rereading the Mishnah, A New Approach to Ancient Jewish Texts. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005. ——. Rereading the Rabbis, A Woman’s Voice. New York: Perseus Press, 1998. ——. “The Talmud’s Women in Law and Narrative.” Nashim: A Journal of Jewish Women’s Studies & Gender Issues 28 (Spring 2015/5775): 30–50. ——. “Why Did R. Nahman Permit Yalta to Be Transported On a Palanquin On a Festival? A New Reading of Bavli Besah 25b.” Zeramim, An Online Journal of Applied Jewish Thought 2, no. 1 (Fall 2017/5778): 17–32. ——. “Women and Prayer: An Attempt to Dispel Some Fallacies.” JUDAISM 42, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 94–103. Hezser, Catherine. Jewish Travel in Antiquity. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011. ——. The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Daily Life in Roman Palestine. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

292

THE STORIES THEY TELL

——. The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement in Roman Palestine. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997. Kalmin, Richard. Jewish Babylonia Between Persia and Roman Palestine. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. ——. Sages, Stories, Authors and Editors in Rabbinic Babylonia. Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 1994. Lieberman, Saul. Tosefta Ki-fshutah. New York: Jewish Theological Society, 1955–1988. Meir, Ofra. “The Meaning of ‘Darash Rabbi X’ in the Midrashim.” Dapim lemehkar besifrut 3 (1986): 209–218. Miller, Stuart S. Sages and Commoners in Late Antique Erez Israel. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006. Or, Tamara. Massekhet Betsah: A Feminist Commentary on the Babylonian Talmud. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010. Rubenstein, Jeffrey. The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003. Schwartz, Joshua. “Tension Between Palestinian Scholars and Babylonian Olim in Amoraic Palestine.” Journal for the Study of Judaism 11, no. 1 (1980): 78–94. Shoshan, Moshe. Stories of the Law: Narrative Discourse and the Construction of Authority in the Mishnah. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Valler, Shulamit. Nashim v’Nashyut Besippursei Hatalmud. Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1993. Wimpfheimer, Barry. Narrating the Law: A Poetics of Talmudic Legal Stories. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011.

DICTIONARIES

Brown, Francis, S.R. Driver, Charles A. Briggs. A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament. Lafayette: Associated Publishers and Authors Inc., 1978.

APPENDIX. HALAKHIC ANECDOTES IN THE YERUSHALMI

293

Jastrow, Marcus. Dictionary of the Targumim, Talmud Bavli, Talmud Yerushalmi, and Midrashic Literature. New York: Judaica Press Inc., 1985. Sokoloff, Michael. A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic. Bar Ilan University Press. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. ——. A Dictionary of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic. Raman Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1990.

INDEX SOURCES

Deuteronomy 6:4 8:8 25:5–10 25:9 25:10

Bible 100 96 104, 214 105 217

Esther 7:8

31n45

Exodus 12:8 21:1

181n54 158n24, 159

Ezekiel 24:17

25, 188

Judges 5:28

54n16

Leviticus 21:1–3

149

1 Samuel 1:13

286, 287

2 Samuel 15:30

188

Mishnah

Baba Mezia 4:12

223, 283

Berakhot 2:1 2:2 2:6

245n18 127 92

3:3

Besah 2:6 3:8 5:2 5:3 295

286n1, 287 67n36 226 82, 85, 142n4 79n49

296

THE STORIES THEY TELL Shabbat 6:1 7:2

Eruvin 10:14

78–79, 85

Ketubot 5:5 5:8

268, 268n14 24n35

Kiddushin 1:8

157

Ma’aserot 4:5

263, 264

Sanhedrin 1:3

Yoma 8:1

194n15, 282

218

Zavim 4:1

24n35

Berakhot 6:10 Besah 1:20

Yevamot 12:1 12:2

102–8, 189n8 102–8, 105n20, 105n21, 189n8

Tosefta 168, 172n40 251n23, 272n19

Kippurim 4:1

195n17

Ma’aserot 3:6

266n10

Megillah 1:6 2:5

23:3

24n35 113, 113n33, 252n25 205

157n20 177

Moed Qatan 2:5

272n19

Shabbat 12:17 14:4 14:11 17:6

276n26 251n23 251n23 272n19

Sotah 3:3

24n35

Yoma 4:1

192, 195n17, 198n19

INDEX Zavim

4:4 Babylonian Talmud

Avodah Zara 28b

75n44

Baba Mezia 60a–b

221–25

Baba Qama 84b 159n25 113a 55–57, 86 118b–119a 20–24 Berakhot 2:1 2:6 11b 13b 14a 14b 24a–b 27a 33a 34b 40a 41b 42a 43b

297

245 18, 18n27 124–129, 128n52, 131–35 90, 99–102, 287 243–47 126–29, 128n52, 131–34 91–96, 135 248–49 208n34 38n49, 195n16 53–55, 85– 86, 97n10 96–99, 174n42 171n39 64–68, 86, 148n10, 163,

50a 62a Besah 13b 22a 25b 27b 29b 32b 36b Eruvin 24b 104a

24n35 163n29 60n23, 68–70, 86–87 269n16 42, 260n4, 263–66, 283 84n52 250–57, 272n19 226n62 260n1, 260n5, 270–73 208–11, 272n20 79n49, 142n4 181n55 62n26, 78– 80, 87–88, 114, 114n34, 280

Gittin 59b 88b

240–43 158–60, 260n3

Hagigah 4b–5a 16b

212n37 143

Hullin 104b

48–52, 85

298 107a–b Keritut 19b Ketubot 4a 61a

75a Kiddushin 80b–81b Megillah 7b 18b 22a 22b 23a Menahot 42a Moed Qatan 12a 12b 15b 20b 24a 27b

THE STORIES THEY TELL 174–77

Niddah 67b

260n3, 261–63

62n27 155n19, 156 41, 113n30, 185, 259n1, 260n5, 266– 70, 283 171n38, 172– 74

Pesahim 39a 50b 100b 100a–b 100b–101a 101a 101b 103na 113b

180–83 23n33 221n49 29–35 116–23 282 286n1 208n35 16n25, 17n26

199–202

Sanhedrin 7b

5, 27, 27n41 177–80 241n12, 242n13 75n44 38n49 168–74 72–77, 87 75n44 155n19 148–52 152–56 24–29, 58– 60, 86

Shabbat 11a 19a 32b 72b 95a 141a 114b 147a 148b 150a–b 152a 154b 157a–b 157b Sukkah 18a 19b

107, 108n23, 255n29 113n30 23n33 23n33 62n27 139, 163–65 165n32 260n5, 274–78 62n26, 84, 111–16 225–28 203–208 190n10 138, 139–44 60–64, 84, 86 86, 114n34, 115 181n55 67n35, 139,

INDEX

28b–29a 29a Ta’anit 12b 19a 25b–26a Yevamot 11a 37b 101a 103b

Baba Mezia 4:12, 9d Berakhot 1:4, 3 1:5, 3 2:1, 4b 3:5, 6d 4:1, 7a 5:2, 9b 5:2, 9c 7:3, 11c 8:2, 12a

144–48, 163n29, 281 15–19 92 105n20, 186– 91, 228 231–36 229–36 181n55 1–4, 236–39 103n19, 214– 21, 261 102–108, 135, 214n40,

299

106a 106b

Yoma 18b 73b 77a 78a 78b

261 162n28 67n35, 103n19, 148n10, 161– 63, 214n40, 220n48, 261 3n6 192–96 188n5 103n19, 192– 96, 282 194n15

Zevahim 94b 108–11

Jerusalem Talmud 224n57 129–35 101n15 102 93n6 285–88 207n34 204n27, 208n34 70–72 176n47

Besah 1:6, 60c 1:7, 60d 4:5, 62c 5:2, 63a

253n28 53n28, 273n21 211–13 80–85

Ma’aserot 4:5, 51a

266n10

Moed Qatan 3:5, 83a Shabbat 2:7, 5c 5:2, 7b

151n13, 156–58 165–68 143

300 Sukkah 1:1, 52c Yoma

THE STORIES THEY TELL 8:1, 44d

147n9

176n47, 188n7, 196–99

SUBJECTS

Abahu, R., 177–80 Abaye, 11, 15–19, 20n29, 38n49, 62n27, 78–85, 78n48, 102–8, 103n18, 108n24, 110, 111–16, 120–21, 120n43, 123, 135, 139–43, 143n5, 144– 48, 152–56, 157, 158–60, 161–63, 172–74, 179, 180n51, 186–92, 192–99, 195n16, 199–202, 202n23, 231–34, 266–70, 281 Abaye bar Abin, 24–29 Abba, R., 48–50, 203–8, 274– 78 Absalom, 188 Abu Giber, 68–70, 86–87, 232–34 accepting charitable donations from married women, 20–24 Ada bar Ahavah, R., 94n6, 169–74 Agra, 48–52, 85 Aha bar Ya’akov, R., 99–102, 261–63 Aha breih d’Rava, R., 180–83 Ahavah Rabbah blessing, 124– 34 Ahi Shaqia, 250–56 Akiba, R., 2n3, 60n23, 68–72, 86, 237n7

Akiva, R., 69n41, 71n42, 148–52 Alfasi, 59n21, 133n54 Amemar, 163–68, 250–54 Ami, R., 240–42, 248–49 Amidah (standing prayer), 92, 125, 127, 204–8, 286–87 Ammi, R., 101n14, 248–49, 252–56 amoraic generations explanation, 14–15 Anan bar Tahlifa, R., 116–24 animals, 139–44, 142n4, 199–202, 202n23, 203n24 Ashi, R., 48–51, 55–57, 91– 96, 95n8, 99–102, 161– 63, 163–65, 168–74, 186– 92, 203–8, 214–21, 270– 73 Asi, R., 199–202, 240–42, 242n13, 248–49 Asya, 177–80 Avya, R., 225–28 Ba, R., 49, 129–34 Babylonian Talmud, structure of, 5–7 baking bread, 270–73 bamboo sandals, 192–99, 198n21 bar bar Hannah, Rabbah, 177–80

INDEX bar R. Huna, Rabbah, 29–35, 60–63, 86, 114–15, 195 bar R. Huna Zuti, Rava, 270– 73 bar Sheba, Rav, 243–47 bar Shmuel, Rava, 53–55, 85 bar Ulla, Rabbah, 225–28, 227n63 b. Bar Hanah, Rabbah, 192– 99 benei beiteih, 287, 287n3 benei beito, 117n38 bet midrash, 46n3, 270 betrothal, 214–21, 214n39 Bor Hagolah, 78–80 bowing, 38n49, 101n15 breaking bread, 47, 53–55, 85–86, 240–43 A Bride for One Night (Calderon), 1 Brody, Robert, 6–7n9 burials, 58–60, 60n22, 86 Calderon, Ruth, 1 case distinction, 3–4, 12, 39, 40, 137, 175, 182, 238 charitable donations from married women, 20–24 cheese, 48–52, 85 Cohen, Avinoam, 45–46n3 conflict resolution, 3–4, 231, 233, 237–38, 243, 246, 253–54, 257, 265, 293 corpse burial, 58–60, 60n22, 86

301 courts festival loans, 225–28 forcing a get, 158–60 halizah requires the presence of five, not three, 214–21 halizah sandal, 102–8 missing a court date, 47, 55–57, 86 dabbing shoes with water on the Sabbath, 108–11 Dardashir, 1–4, 236–39 Daromata, 58–60, 86 daytime, 48–52, 186, 221n51, 261–63 divorce, 158–60, 162n28, 214n39, 260n3 drawing water on the Sabbath, 78–85 drought, 231–36 ehad, 99–102 eiteveih, 12n19 Eleazar, R., 42, 80–85, 124– 34, 133n54, 144n54, 193– 99, 263–66, 267, 277–78 Eleazar b. Antigonos, R., 203–8, 204n27 Eleazar bei R. Shimon, R., 214–21 Eleazar bei R. Yannai, R., 204n27 Eleazar of Nineveh, R., 192– 96 Elem, R., 80–85 Eliezer, R., 144–48, 148n10

302

THE STORIES THEY TELL

Eliezer b. Ya’akov, R., 1–4, 202–8, 236–39 “encountered him” anecdotes, 40, 137–83 forcing a get, 158–60 how to recite verses at a halizah ceremony, 161– 63 maror or lettuce for the Paschal meal, 180–83 mourning on the Sabbath, 152–58 mourning with a wife, 148–52 sleeping in a bridal bed in a sukkah, 144–48 sliding a child down the back of an animal on the Sabbath, 139–44 sprinkling a floor on the Sabbath, 163–68 tying zizit, 168–74 washing hands before eating, 174–77 writing a Megillah from memory, 177–80 etiquette, table, 53–55, 85–86 etiquette of prayer, 248–49 exchanging meals on the first day of mourning, 5, 24– 29, 26–27n38, 28–29n42, 35

festival loans, 225–28 first aliyah privileges of kohen, 240–43 mourning practices, 156– 58 non-Jews working for Jews on the Sabbath and festivals, 72–77, 77n46, 87 raking out an oven on a festival, 208–13 sifting flour on a festival, 270–73 sound production, 81–85 first aliyah privileges of a kohen, 240–43, 241– 42nn11–12 fowl, 48–52, 85 fraud, 221–25 Friedman, Shamma, 6n9

fast days, 186–99, 194n15, 199. See also Yom Kippur festivals carrying from domain to domain, 252n26

ha’aramah, 165–68 halakhic anecdotes “encountered him” anecdotes, 40, 137–83

Gamliel, Rabban, 18, 64–68, 67n36, 92, 139–43 garments, 20–24, 91–96, 93– 94n6, 111–16, 116n36, 152–58, 168–74. See also prettifying merchandise gender distinctions, 57, 57n19. See also women Geneiva, 248–49 Greco-Roman practices, 190 greens obligation, 180–83

INDEX HQ/HY anecdotes, 39–40, 89–135 ini veha anecdotes, 41, 229–57 iqla anecdotes, 39, 45–88, 114 sugyot with multiple halakhic anecdotes, 40–41, 185–228 in Talmud Yerushalmi, 285–88 theses of the study, 4–5 women featured in, 20– 24, 41–42, 259–78 halakhic change, 4, 8, 12, 14, 41, 80, 106, 166, 185, 219, 243, 257, 273, 274n22, 284, 288 Halakhot, 129–32 halizah ceremony releasing a widow, 261n6 halizah document, 161–63 halizah requires the presence of five, not three, 214–21 halizah shoes, 102–8, 188 Hallel, 231–36, 233n4, 243– 47, 244–47, 246n19 Hama, R., 270–73 Hama bar Ada, 250–56 Hama bar Hanina, R., 101n15 Hananel, R., 177–80 Hananel, Rabbenu, 228n64, 231–36 Hanan of Nehardea, R., 199– 202 handwashing, 47, 48–52, 85, 174–77 Hanina, R., 91–96, 93–94n6

303 Hanina bar Abin, R., 27 hava qa’imna anecdotes. See HQ/HY anecdotes hava yativna anecdotes. See HQ/HY anecdotes Havdalah in the field, 203–8; Yerushalmi parallel, 204n27 havurot (burial groups), 58– 60, 59n21, 86 hazeret (lettuce), 180–83 heat, 163–68, 165n33, 167n35 Herman, Geoffrey, 53n15, 97 Hezser, Catherine, 45n2, 51n11, 123, 281 Himnuna, R., 58–60, 96–99, 99n12 Hisda, R., 55–57, 96–99, 177–79, 196–98 Hiyya, R., 53–55, 85–86, 149, 209–13, 244–47, 264–66 Hiyya bar Abba, R., 90, 99– 102, 101n15, 275–78 Hiyya bar Ashi, R., 70–72, 71n42, 108–11, 124–27, 129–34, 165–68, 261–63 Hiyya bar Yosef, R., 208–13 Hiyya Rabbah, R., 211–13 House of Hillel, 47, 48–49, 64–68, 66n34, 86, 148n10 House of Shammai, 47, 48– 49, 64–68, 67n36, 86, 146, 148n10 how to recite verses at a halizah ceremony, 161–63 HQ/HY anecdotes, 39–40, 89–135

304

THE STORIES THEY TELL

dabbing shoes with water on the Sabbath, 108– 11 halizah shoes, 102–8 lengthening the ehad of Shema, 99–102 reciting a blessing for the study of Mishnah and Midrash, 124–34 reciting blessings on the seven species, 96–99 reciting kiddush where one eats the Sabbath meal, 116–24 shaking out a tallit on the Sabbath, 111–16 spitting during prayer, 91– 96 hulling barley on the Sabbath, 263–66; Yerushalmi parallel, 265–66n10 Huna, R., 41–42, 86, 111–16, 113n30, 116–20, 124–34, 132n54, 148–52, 152n14, 185, 240–43, 241n12, 242nn12–13, 250–56, 267–70, 268n14, 274–78 Huna bar Hinena, R., 72–77 Huna breih d’R. Iqqa, R., 64– 66, 86 Huna breih d’R. Joshua, R., 214–21 Idi, R., 261–63 Ila, R., 80–85 Imi, R., 80–85 incomplete Hallel, 246–47, 246n19

ini veha anecdotes, 41, 229– 57 first aliyah privileges of a kohen, 240–43 interrupting prayer to greet someone of greater stature, 243–47 passing in front of one who is praying, 248–49 reciting Hallel after a drought ends, 231–36 sedan chair transport on a festival, 250–56 taking a wife on the road, 1–4, 4n7, 5, 236–39 interrupting a meal when the Sabbath arrives, 29–35, 36 interrupting prayer to greet someone of greater stature, 243–47, 244n17. See also passing in front of one who is praying iqla halakhah anecdotes, 39, 45–88, 114 measuring on the Sabbath, 60–64 missing a court date, 47, 55–57, 86 non-Jews working for Jews on the Sabbath and festivals, 72–77 respect due a corpse, 58– 60 sound production, 78–85 standardizing liturgy, 68– 72 table etiquette or breaking bread, 53–55, 85–86

INDEX

305

washing hands after eating cheese and before eating meat, 47, 48–52, 85 Isaac b. Nahmani, R., 192–99 Ishmael, R., 60n23, 68–72, 86–87, 214–21

kiddush, 29–35, 35n46, 35n46, 36, 116–24, 118n39, 122n47, 122n49, 282–83, 286n1 King David, 188, 188n5 kohen, 70–72, 148–52, 240– 43

Jeremiah, R., 172–74 Joshua b. Levi, R., 93–94n6, 129–34, 132, 156–58, 192–99, 248–49, 250–56 Joshua b. Qorhah, R., 126–29 Judah, R., 24–29, 29–35, 58– 60, 59n21, 80n50, 84n52, 91–96, 95n8, 111–16, 124–34, 192–99, 200–202, 203–8, 215–21, 219n46, 221n50, 245n18, 261–63, 274–78, 280 Judah, Rab, 221–25 Judah b. Bethyra, R., 270–73 Judah the Prince, Rabbi, 80– 85, 82n51, 93, 101n15 judges, 55–57, 158–60, 161– 63, 215–21, 221n50–52 judicial jurisdiction, Babylonian, 159–60

labor, 58–60, 59n21, 72–77, 86, 113, 113n33, 203–8, 204n27, 252n25, 263–66 laundering on the Sabbath, 108–11 leaving the sukkah because of rain, 15–19, 20n29 lengthening the ehad of Shema, 99–102; Yerushalmi parallel, 101n15, 102 leniencies, 12, 16, 18, 23, 35, 46–47, 48, 50–52, 63–64, 75–76, 77n46, 80, 84–85, 86–87, 94, 122, 135, 143– 44, 148, 176, 182, 195n17, 201, 211, 256, 271, 273, 273, 275n24, 276–77, 284 levir, 102–8, 103n18, 105n20, 107–8nn22–23, 161–63, 214–21, 261n6 levirate marriage, 102–8, 161–63 Lezar, R., 82–85, 215–21 Lieberman, Saul, 117n38, 175n46, 192n13, 195n17, 198n19, 287n3 Lil, R., 82–85 liturgy, 68–70, 86–87 loans, 158–60, 225–28

Kahana, R., 55–57, 86, 161– 63, 199–202, 202n23, 203–8, 214–21, 219n46 Kalmin, Richard, 11, 11n17, 12n18, 89n1, 122n48, 176n48 Karo, R. Yosef, 28–29n42, 52n13, 57n19, 121– 22n47, 259–60n1, 274n22

306

THE STORIES THEY TELL

lo savar lah mar, 66n33, 95, 164n31, 168 Lydda, 231–36 ma’aseh rav, 47, 133 Maimonides, 51–52n13, 57n19, 99n12, 153– 54n18, 203–4n24, 273– 74nn21–22 Mana, R., 196–99, 285–88 Marcus, David, 45n1 maror or lettuce for the Paschal meal, 180–83 Mar Qashisha, 163–68 marriage, 104, 161–63, 214n39, 236–39, 239n9, 266–70. See also divorce; taking a wife on the road Mar Shmuel, 250–56 Mar Uqba, 148–52 Mar Zutra, 72–77, 77n46, 87, 186–92, 250–56 Mata Mehasia, 165 Mattanah, R., 240–43 measuring on the Sabbath, 60–64, 86, 114n34 meat, 48–52, 50n9, 51n12, 85 Megillah, 177–80, 243–47 Mehoza, 20–24, 22n32, 163– 68, 231–36, 261–63 Meir, R., 80–85, 99–102, 177–80, 245n18 Menashe, R., 78–85 menstruants and mikveh, 41– 42, 261–63 Mereimar, 186–92, 256 merorim, 180–83

Mesharshaya, R., 72–77, 160 mezuzot, 177–80 Midrash, 124–35, 133n54 mikveh, 261–63 Miller, Stuart S., 109n26 Mishnah, 6, 8–9, 9–10n14, 124–34, 129n53, 133n54 missing a court date, 47, 55– 57, 86 morning prayers, 124–34 Moshe, Pnei, 71n42 mourning on the Sabbath, 152–58l Yerushalmi parallel, 156–58 mourning with a wife, 148– 52; Yerushalmi parallel, 151–52nn13–14 muqzeh items, 139–44, 141n3 Nahman, R., 1–4, 168–74, 208–13, 217–21, 236–39, 239n9, 250–56, 254n29, 270–73 Nahman bar Yizhaq, R., 214– 21, 250–56 Narrating the Law (Wimpfheimer), 8–11, 9n13 Natan, R., 144–48 Natan bar Ammi, R., 203–8 Nissim, Rabbenu, 26n38 non-Jews working for Jews on the Sabbath and festivals, 72–77, 77n46, 87 oil and myrtle, 64–68 Or, Tamara, 212n37, 266n11

INDEX order of blessings at a meal, 64–68, 86 Oshaia, R., 27n41, 180–83 Pappa, R., 64–68, 66n33, 72– 77, 86, 108–11, 143n5, 148n10, 163, 214–21, 231–36, 266–70 Pappa b. Shmuel, R., 221–25 Pappias, R., 270–73 Parashat Kohanim, 148–52 passing in front of one who is praying, 248–49 Passover vegetable obligation, 180–83 Pesach, 180–83, 246n19 petiha (declaration of a ban), 55–57 prayer bowing during, 101n15 interrupting prayer to greet someone of greater stature, 243–47 spitting during, 91–96 preparing vegetables for the Yom Kippur breakfast, 274–78 prettifying merchandise, 221– 25; Yerushalmi parallel, 224 private mourning practices, 152–58 punishment, 113 Purim, 5, 24–29, 27n39, 27n41, 177–80, 244n17 Rabbah, 78–85, 79n49, 80n50, 84–85, 87, 119–

307 21, 123, 140–44, 149, 222–25, 225–28, 242–43, 244–47, 275–78 Rafram bar Pappa, 68–70, 86–87 raking out an oven on a festival, 208–13; Yerushalmi parallel, 211–13 Rami bar Hama, 270–73 Rashbam, 29–35, 35nn46–47, 107 Rashi, 2n2, 20–24, 21n31, 27n39, 29–35, 30n44, 35n46, 36, 48n5, 58–60, 59n21, 96n9, 142n4, 174– 77, 191n12, 202n23, 209– 13, 254 Rav, 1–4, 24–29, 58–60, 70– 72, 80, 108–11, 116–24, 124–34, 148–51, 168–72, 174–77, 176n49, 236–39, 248–49, 261–63, 264–66, 266n10 Rava, 11, 38n49, 55–57, 62n27, 64–68, 66n33, 68– 70, 72, 78n48, 87, 99– 102, 108–11, 124–26, 131–32, 133n54, 152–56, 158, 159n25, 161–63, 163–65, 172–74, 180–83, 186–92, 192–99, 195n16, 203–8, 208–11, 214–21, 221–25, 233–35, 250–56, 261–63, 266–70 Ravina, 20–24, 22n32, 91– 95, 95n8, 135, 163–68, 167n35, 168–74, 171n38, 180–83, 182n56, 243–47

308

THE STORIES THEY TELL

reciting a blessing for the study of Mishnah and Midrash, 124–34; Yerushalmi parallel, 129– 34 reciting blessings on the seven species, 96–99 reciting Hallel after a drought ends, 231–36 reciting Hallel and interruption, 243–47, 244n17 reciting kiddush where one eats the Sabbath meal, 33, 116–24, 282–83 respect due a corpse, 58–60, 86 Rishonim, 6n9, 36, 106–7, 108n24, 122n49 Ritva, 107, 107–8nn22–23, 112n29, 114n35, 235–36 Rubenstein, Jeffrey, 99n11 Sabbath boundary, 72–77, 77n46, 87, 203–7 dabbing shoes with water, 108–11 drawing water on, 78–85 first aliyah, 242 food preparation, 274–78 Havdalah in the field, 203–8 hulling barley on the Sabbath, 263–66 interrupting a meal when the Sabbath arrives, 29–35 measuring on, 60–64

mourning on the Sabbath, 152–58 non-Jews working for Jews on the Sabbath and festivals, 72–77 passing in front of one who is praying, 248–49 reciting kiddush where one eats the Sabbath meal, 116–24 shaking out a tallit on the Sabbath, 111–16 sliding a child down the back of an animal on the Sabbath, 139–44 sound production, 78–85 sprinkling a floor on the Sabbath, 163–68 Safra, R., 72–77 Sages, 144–48, 148–51, 177– 80 Sages, Stories, Authors and Editors in Rabbinic Babylonia (Kalmin), 11 saliva, 91–96, 94n6, 95n8 Sama, R., 168–74 Samuel, 267 sandals, 102–8, 104n20, 110, 186–92, 192–99 seclusion with animals, 199– 202 second sifting of flour, 270– 73, 274n22 sedan chair transport on a festival, 250–56; Yerushalmi parallel, 253n28

INDEX Sefaria translation of the Talmud, 95 seven species of the land of Israel, 96–99 sexual relations, 4n7, 152–58, 186–91, 192–96, 199–202, 239, 239n9 shaking out a tallit on the Sabbath, 63n28, 111–16, 116n36 Shekhnaziv, 1–4, 237–39 sheloshim, 148–52 Shema, 99–102, 124–34, 243–47 Shemi, R., 143 Sheshet, R., 186–92, 199–202 Shimon, R., 81–82, 214–21 Shimon b. Eleazar, R., 139– 44 Shimon b. Gamliel, R., 29–35 Shimon b. Lezer, R., 177–80 shivah, 148–58 Shmuel, 29–35, 59n21, 72– 77, 76n45, 77n46, 87, 116–24, 122n49, 124–34, 151n14, 152–56, 153n17, 174–77, 176n49, 180–83, 186–92, 191n12, 199– 202, 202n23, 203–8, 203n24, 221–25, 273n21 Shmuel bar Halafta, R., 94n6 Shmuel bar Judah, R., 214– 21 Shmuel bar R. Yizhaq, R., 80– 85 Shmuel b. Nahman, R., 196– 99 Shmuel b. Natan, R., 101n14

309 shoes, 102–8, 103n19, 104n20, 108–11, 186–91, 186n1, 188n5, 189nn8–9, 190n10, 191n12, 192–99, 192n13, 194n15, 195– 96n17, 281, 282 shofar, 58–60 Shoshan, Moshe, 8–11, 9– 10nn14–15, 13n20, 13n20 Sifra devei Rav, 124–34, 129n53 sifting flour on a festival, 270–73, 273–74nn21–22 Simai, R., 196–99 Simon, R., 129–34, 156–58, 216n45 Simon bar Yohai, R., 139–44 Simon b. Gamliel, Rabban, 20–24, 195–96n17 sleeping in a bridal bed in a sukkah, 144–48, 281; Yerushalmi parallel, 147 sliding a child down the back of an animal on the Sabbath, 139–44; Yerushalmi parallel, 143 Soncino translation of the Talmud, 50n9, 95, 95n8, 153n18, 175n45, 187n3, 202n23, 205n29 sound production on the Sabbath, 78–85; Yerushalmi parallel, 80–85 spitting during prayer, 91–96; Yerushalmi parallel, 93– 94n6, 93–96

310

THE STORIES THEY TELL

sprinkling a floor on the Sabbath, 163–68; Yerushalmi parallel, 165–68 standardizing liturgy, 68–72; Yerushalmi parallel, 70– 72, 71n42 Stories of the Law (Shoshan), 8–11 sugyot with multiple halakhic anecdotes, 40–41, 185– 228 festival loans, 225–28 halizah requires the presence of five, not three, 214–21 Havdalah in the field, 203–8 prettifying merchandise, 221–25 raking out an oven on a festival, 208–13 seclusion with animals, 199–202 wearing shoes on a public fast day, 186–92 wearing shoes on Yom Kippur, 192–99 sukkah, 144–48, 148n10, 281 Symmachus, 99–102 table etiquette, 47, 53–55, 85–86 Tahlifa, R., 119 Tahlifa bar Anan, R., 123 Tahlifa bar Avdimi, R., 29–35 taking a wife on the road, 1– 4, 4n7, 5, 236–39

tallit, 63n28, 91–96, 111–16, 112n29 Talmud Yerushalmi, 15n24, 36 bowing during prayer, 101n15 halakhic anecdotes in, 285–88 Havdalah in the field, 204n27 hulling barley on the Sabbath, 265–66n10 lengthening the ehad of Shema, 101n15, 102 mourning on the Sabbath, 156–58 mourning with a wife, 151–52nn13–14 prettifying merchandise, 224 raking out an oven on a festival, 211–13 reciting a blessing for the study of Mishnah and Midrash, 129–34 sedan chair transport on a festival, 253n28 sleeping in a bridal bed in a sukkah, 147 sliding a child down the back of an animal on the Sabbath, 143 sound production on the Sabbath, 80–85 spitting during prayer, 93– 94n6, 93–96 sprinkling a floor on the Sabbath, 165–68

INDEX standardizing liturgy, 70– 72, 71n42 wearing shoes on Yom Kippur, 196–99 Tarfon, R., 231–36 tefillin, 126–28, 128n52, 177– 80, 180n51 Tish’ah BeAv fast, 186–91 Tosfa’ah, Rabbah, 20–24, 22n32, 163–68 tying zizit, 168–74 Ulla, 60–63, 63n28, 78–85, 83–85, 84n52, 86, 87, 111–16, 114n34, 135, 280 Valler, Shulamit, 8n12 washing hands, 47, 48–52, 85, 174–77 wearing shoes on a public fast day, 186–92 wearing shoes on Yom Kippur, 192–99; Yerushalmi parallel, 196–99 wife-for-a-day. See taking a wife on the road Wimpfheimer, Barry, 8–11, 9nn13–14 wine, 41–42, 116–17, 118n39, 185, 203–8, 259n1, 266–70 women accepting charitable donations from married women, 20–24 divorce, 160

311 halakhah anecdotes, featured in, 20–24, 41–42, 259–78 hulling barley on the Sabbath, 263–66 menstruants and mikveh, 261–63 missing a court date, 55– 57, 86 mourning practices, 157n20 preparing vegetables for the Yom Kippur breakfast, 274–78 public lectures on halakhic matters, 109n26 seclusion with animals, 199–201 sedan chair transport on a festival, 250–56 sifting flour on a festival, 270–73 sound production on the Sabbath, 80, 80n50 and wine, 41–42, 185, 259n1, 266–70 writing a Megillah from memory, 177–80 Ya’akov, R., 168–74 Ya’akov bar Idi, R., 250–56 Yadaim, 175 Yalta, 252–56, 254–55n29 Yirmiyah, R., 82–85, 90, 94n6, 99–102, 102n16, 165–68, 174 Yirmiyah bar Abba, R., 248– 49

312

THE STORIES THEY TELL

Yizhaq, R., 96–99 Yizhaq bar Hananiah, R., 266–70 Yizhaq bar Nahman, R., 192– 99 Yizhaq breih d’R Mesharshaya, R., 48–52, 52n13, 85 Yohanan, R., 64–68, 101n15, 124–28, 131–32, 133n54, 152–56, 153n17, 155n19, 168–74, 177–80, 261–63, 274–78 Yom Kippur, 113n30, 192– 99, 194n15, 195n17, 198n21, 274–78, 274n23, 275n24 Yonah, R., 78–82, 82n51, 93– 94n6, 285–88

Yosef, R., 11, 15–19, 16n25, 17n26, 19n29, 24–29, 26n38, 28n42, 92, 96–99, 102–8, 108n24, 110, 111– 16, 112n29, 135, 144–48, 148n10, 153–56, 155n19, 157–58, 158–60, 225–28, 250–56, 270–73, 281 Yosi, R., 29–35, 48–52 Yosi bei R. Abun, R., 93–94n6 Ze’ira, R., 102, 102n16, 165– 68 Zera, R., 70–72, 274–78 Zeriqa, R., 250–56 zizit, tying of, 168–74; Tosefta’s halakhah, 172, 172n40