The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948-1983: Uncertain Allegiance [Course Book ed.] 9781400856619

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Charts
Preface
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Chapter One. Party-Military Relations in Eastern Europe
Chapter Two. The Historical Foundations of the Relationship Between the Party and Military in Czechoslovakia
Chapter Three. The Formation of the Army of the Socialist Type, 1948-1956
Chapter Four. The Czechoslovak People's Army After De-Stalinization, 1956-1967
Chapter Five. The Military in the Period of Liberalization, January to August 1968
Chapter Six. Invasion and Normalization, August 1968-1975
Chapter Seven. The Czechoslovak People's Army Since 1975
Chapter Eight. Party-Military Relations in Eastern Europe: The Impact of Soviet Power
Notes
Selected Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK ARMY, 1948-1983

THE

SOVIET UNION AND THE

CZECHOSLOVAK ARMY, 1948-1983 UNCERTAIN ALLEGIANCE Condoleezza Rice

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

Copyright © 1984 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Guildford, Surrey All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data will be found on the last printed page of this book ISBN 0-691-06921-2 Publication of this book has been aided by the Whitney Darrow Fund of Princeton University Press This book has been composed in Linotron Caledonia Clothbound editions of Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-free paper, and binding materials are chosen for strength and durability Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

TO JOHN WESLEY AND ANGELENA R. RICE for their love and support TO JOSEF KORBEL in memory of his love for Czechoslovakia

CONTENTS

LIST OF CHARTS

ix

PREFACE

Xi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS INTRODUCTION

Xiii 3

ONE

Party-Military Relations in Eastern Europe

7

TWO

The Historical Foundations of the Relationship between the Party and Military in Czechoslovakia

31

THREE

The Formation of the Army of a Socialist Type, 1948-1956

58

FOUR

The Czechoslovak People's Army after De-Stalinization, 1956-1967

85

FIVE

The Military in the Period of Liberalization, January to August 1968 111 six Invasion and Normalization, August 1968-1975

157

SEVEN

The Czechoslovak People's Army since 1975

197

EIGHT

Party-Military Relations in Eastern Europe: The Impact of Soviet Power

218 Vll

CONTENTS NOTES

247

BIBLIOGRAPHY

279

INDEX

293

L I S T OF

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 3.1 5.1 7.1 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10 8.11

CHARTS

The First Dimension (Domestic Context) of East European Party-Military Relations The First and Second Dimensions (Soviet Factor) of East European Party-Military Relations Institutions and Designations of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces and Their Soviet Counterparts Instruments of Party Policy Instruments of Soviet Policy The East European Party-Military Relationship The Organization of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces in 1950 Links between Political and Military Organs in the Czechoslovak Armed Forces in 1968 Links between the Soviet Armed Forces and the Czechoslovak People's Army after 1975 Coercive Policy Instruments (Party) Utilitarian Instruments (Party) Normative Policy Instruments (Party) Issues in the Relationship of the Party to the Armed Forces Coercive Instruments of Policy (Soviet) Normative and Utilitarian Instruments of Policy (Soviet) Issues in the Soviet Relationship with the Czechoslovak Armed Forces The Relative Balance of Power in Party-Military Relationship (1948-1953) The Relative Balance of Power in Party-Military Relationship (1953-1967) The Relative Balance of Power in Party-Military Relationship (1968: with reforms) The Relative Balance of Power in Party-Military Relationship (1969-1983)

7 8 9 10 23 25 77 119 213 220 220 221 222 223 223 224 225 225 226 226

PREFACE

This is a study in civil-military relations. There are few more critical factors in the stability of civilian governments than the relationship between the professional military and the society it serves. Paradoxically, an efficient and cohesive military is at once a guarantor of regime security and a potential threat to civilian rule. Thus, civilian leaders, whether democratic or authoritarian, pursue policies to ensure that the professional military is loyal to the regime, adheres to constitutional processes, and subordinates its own policy preferences to civilian decisions. This study examines the relationship of civilian and military leaders in Czechoslovakia in the period 1948-1983. The study grew out of a dissertation completed at the Graduate School of International Studies at Denver University. My interest in this subject came about when in examining the literature on civil-military relations, I came to realize that little attention had been devoted to East European armed forces. This was an entire subset of communist civilmilitary affairs that was virtually untouched. My interest grew when I discovered how underdeveloped the theory of civilmilitary relations in communist systems really was. What accounted for (at that time) the fact that there had never been a coup d'etat in a communist country? How effective was the effort to politicize the armed forces and to create a force red and expert? Most importantly, what accounted for the differences and similarities between states? My interest peaked when I began to examine East European civil-military relations. There, in the shadow of the Soviet Union, the relationship between party leaders and military professionals just had to be different. What was the role of the Soviet Union in domestic civil-military relations and how could that role be addressed to allow comparison across East Europe? What could XI

PREFACE

be said about civil-military relations under the twin circumstances of communist development and Soviet clientage? The Czechoslovak case has sustained my intense interest in these questions. Caught between East and West, possessing thoroughly modern military forces, and tempered by the cataclysmic events of 1968, Czechoslovakia provided a window on the tensions inherent in military clientage. This study tries to tell that story. But it does so with the hope that the insights gained will help us to understand better military politics in states that are at once national entities and members of the socialist world order. Ultimately, it is hoped that this story will enhance our understanding of the factors that determine the relationship between civilian rulers and the militaries that serve them.

Xll

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to many individuals and institutions for their aid in the completion of this work. The book was completed with support from the Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms Control. Generous assistance was also given by Stanford University, in the form of faculty research grants, and by the Center for Research in International Studies. Thanks to the Ford Foundation's Program for Dual Expertise in Soviet and East European Studies and International Security and Arms Control, I acquired new areas of expertise that enhanced this work. For this, I am grateful to Felice D. Gaer and Enid C. B. Schoettle. So many individuals deserve credit for their freely and cheerfully given assistance. My special thanks and admiration go to Professor Alexander George, who provided intellectual stimulation and steady friendship, and to Professor John Wilson Lewis, who was, throughout, an important influence on my work. Professors Alexander Dallin, Heinz Eulau, and Jan Triska, who read parts of the manuscript at an earlier stage, must also be singled out for gratitude. Professor Robert Packenham read sections of the manuscript and I would like to thank him. I am very grateful to those who helped in the original research project. Foremost among them are the members of my dissertation committee, Professors Jonathan Adelman, David Bayley, Michael Fry, and Catherine Kelleher. I am particularly grateful to Professors Fry and Kelleher, who continue to be supportive of my work. I wish to thank Alexander Alexiev and A. Ross Johnson of the Rand Corporation, who were very helpful when I was an intern there in the summer of 1980 and who continue to take an interest in my research. Special mention must be made of my colleagues at the Stanford Arms Control Center. My good friend and colleague Xlll

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Coit Dennis Blacker was always there and continues to be a source of comfort and intellectual guidance. Gloria Duffy, Shai Feldman, Janne E. Nolan, and Cynthia Roberts, fellows at the Center, have all contributed in their own ways to the completion of this work. I have appreciated the friendship of Dr. Philip Farley and Professor Sidney Drell during this time and of my friend in political science Professor Judith Goldstein. My research assistants, Carol Rose, Victor Valdavia, and particularly Renee de Nevers, have been untiring and cheerful in their work and I wish to thank them for their hard work and good humor. Rose McDermott has also provided valuable service in the later stages of the project. The linguistic skills that made this work possible were taught to me by Professor Libor Brom, a professor of the Russian and Czech languages at Denver University. He has been not only a supportive teacher but also a good friend. Special mention should be made of the contributions of Arlee Ellis and Gerry Bowman. Wilma Fuller must be singled out for her tireless efforts in typing the manuscript and so must Barbara Johnson, who typed and edited endless earlier versions. Vera Henzl and Eliska Ryznaz provided invaluable help with Czech language editing. I extend my warmest thanks to my editor Sanford G. Thatcher for his help and to Susan Oleksiw, my copy editor. Christopher Jones and Timothy Colton, who read and critiqued the manuscript, provided an invaluable service. I also thank Professors Robin Remington and Jifi Valenta, who provided important information. I also wish to thank two personal friends, Cristann Lea Gibson and Denise DiGregorio, who not only read the manuscript but also helped to keep me cheerful throughout. Finally, but most importantly, I want to thank my mother and father, Dr. John Wesley Rice and Mrs. Angelena Ray Rice, for their love, support, and unwavering faith.

xiv

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK ARMY, 1948-1983

INTRODUCTION

On August 21, 1968, the joint forces of the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia, ending a crisis in the society. The intervention was swift and bloodless. The Communist party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) did not call upon the Czechoslovak People's Army (CLA) to defend its sovereignty and the Warsaw Pact command did not ask Czechoslovak soldiers to reverse the reform. Pledged to allegiance to both the KSC and the Soviet Union, the CLA watched the clash between them from the barracks. This dramatic conclusion to the crisis of 1968 exemplifies a fundamental problem for the East European armed forces. They are at once national entities and defenders of the socialist international order. The history of the armies has been one of coming to terms with both identities. When, as in 1968, there is a direct clash between the two, the strain upon the political-military order is immense. The crisis of 1968 revealed differences between the Czechoslovak Communist party and the Soviet Union over the course of communist development. As the Chinese characters for crisis (wei-ji) indicate, crises contain both danger (wei) and opportunity (ji). In the crisis of 1968, the Czechoslovak Communist party saw the opportunity for reform and legitimacy; the Soviet leadership saw a danger to the "socialist world order." During this national revival, the military was something of a stepchild. The army was besieged by criticism, branded by many as alien and a danger to the "new stage of socialism" emerging in Czechoslovakia. The Dubcek leadership, which saw opportunity for reform in every other area, saw danger in reform of the armed forces. The leadership moved cautiously, always determined to convince the Soviet Union that Czechoslovakia would remain a vital and loyal member of the Warsaw Pact. 3

INTRODUCTION

Nonetheless, a crisis did emerge in the armed forces too. Some within the military-political leadership took the opportunity to solve debilitating problems that faced the CLA. They began to walk the tightrope between reforming the domestic system and threatening Soviet faith in the institution. Gradually, the balance between the two poles eluded them as the reform took on a momentum of its own. Movement toward a reduction of party control began and those who wished to retain the old, Soviet-style apparatus were isolated. The danger of the course of reform was now apparent, and in the new, freer atmosphere questions arose not only about domestic party control but also about the nature and value of alliance with the Soviet Union. Now in spite of protestations to the contrary by the Dubcek government, Moscow watched and became convinced that even Czechoslovakia's commitment to the defense of world socialism would be altered by the party's devotion to "socialism with a human face." When the Pact forces intervened, the CLA took neither the side of world socialism nor that of the Czechoslovak nation. In retrospect, it is not surprising that the armed forces did not resist the invasion. One could point to the overwhelming odds against successful defense and the fear of even more severe political reprisals by the Soviet Union if resistance failed. Civilian leaders might have even questioned their ability to mobilize support within the armed forces for resistance on that scale. In the case of Czechoslovakia, there is always the cultural trait explanation lurking in the background. Czechoslovaks are supposedly passive and consider resistance to invading forces unnecessary and dangerous, preferring instead political solutions. The explanation would set Czechoslovakia apart and suggest that the same circumstances in another context would produce completely different results. After all, August 21, 1968, was not the first time that the Czechoslovak armed forces watched invaders from the barracks. During the German invasion in 1939 and during the communist takeover of 1948, the Czechoslovak president, Edvard BeneS, ordered his troops to the barracks. Dubdek and Svoboda were, then, 4

INTRODUCTION

just following precedent. Czechoslovak passivity meant that the decision of 1968 was preordained. Perhaps the Czechoslovak preference for political solutions did show through in 1968. But it is all too easy to learn incomplete or even incorrect lessons from history. The explanation of these events in terms of Czechoslovakia's passivity obscures other important factors that kept the party and army from acting in a concerted fashion on August 21. The events of 1968 provide a window on an ongoing problem for the East European armed forces. Never before or since has the outside world been able to watch the tensions of clientage unfold so dramatically. But the problems that 1968 exposed are inherent in the very nature of East European party-military relations. After all, Czechoslovakia is not the only state where doubt and suspicion surround the behavior of the armed forces. Thirty years after the communist "revolutions" in Eastern Europe, there are significant doubts that the armed forces of Eastern Europe will defend their civilian rulers from outside attack—be it from East or West. If the armed forces are ordered to the barracks, there are doubts that they will stay there and remain cohesive, and there is concern that splintering and desertion will become the rule rather than the exception. Even the behavior of high-ranking officers and commanders is difficult to predict. What, then, is the source of the uncomfortable relationship of party and army so characteristic of East European political-military systems? The East European systems take their organizational characteristics from the Soviet model. Certainly there are elements in the history of the party-military system in the Soviet Union that provide clues to the suspicion with which the loyalty of the armed forces in East Europe is regarded. The early relationship between the party and military in the Soviet Union was wrought with distrust, suspicion, and extensive networks to control and monitor the behavior of the professional officer corps. But the relationship between party and military in the Soviet Union has changed considerably. Several scholars have noted the more harmonious relationship between the Soviet 5

INTRODUCTION

army and the Communist party in the post-Stalin era. : As the military leaders have become communist (red) and professional (expert), military men have become participants in, rather than victims of, the political system. The goals of the political and military leadership have become quite consonant.2 The construction of armed forces that are both "red" and "expert" has not produced a similar pattern of rapprochement in East Europe, however. In a number of East European countries, the armed forces are virtually isolated from political processes, and there continue to be doubts about their behavior in crisis. In Poland, a soldier is now first party secretary and the army leadership has assumed responsibility for government at the expense of an ineffective party that lacked cohesion. The Polish situation is very fluid and the relationship between party and army is still unfolding, but it is clear that the careful separation of civilian and military functions characteristic of communist systems did not withstand the strain of the crisis of 1981. Contemporary military politics in Eastern Europe are therefore very different from those in the Soviet Union, though the systems are formally quite similar. The East European states are also quite different from each other. But they share an important characteristic: the influence and interference of the Soviet Union in the military affairs of the region. And it is this characteristic that has been underestimated in the examination of party-military relations in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union must be examined systematically as a third actor in the system—not as an external factor, but as a pervasive and central influence upon the interaction between communist civilian and military leaders. This study explores this particular type of civil-military system. In the first chapter the central features of the system are analyzed. The Czechoslovak case and the tensions inherent in that particular system are examined in subsequent chapters.

6

CHAPTER ONE

Party-Military Relations in Eastern Europe The East European party-military relationship has two central dimensions. There is a domestic context in which the indigenous party and military interact. (See Chart 1.1.) A second dimension emanates from the client status of the East European states. The Soviet Union plays a major role in the region's military policy and development and is, by virtue of that role, an important actor in the East European party-military system. (See Chart 1.2.) A viable framework must be able to monitor the interaction among four actors: the indigenous party and military and the party and military of the Soviet Union. The central hypothesis of this study is that Soviet policy is such a major factor in the relationship between the East European party and military that changes in the nature of Soviet policy will produce a discernible effect upon the party-military interaction. Not all the actors are unitary. (See Chart 1.3.) There are factions within the Soviet party and military, but it is asChart 1.1 The First Dimension (Domestic Context) of East European Party-Military Relations East European Party

I I I I\ East European Military 7

PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS

Chart 1.2 The First and Second Dimensions (Soviet Factor) of East European Party-Military Relations Soviet Party -«—

• I I Soviet Military -*— •

*- East European — Party T

I I •*- East European — Military

sumed that for the most part Soviet policies are unified. The various factions and subinstitutions of the indigenous party and military are important and unity of action among them is not assumed.

T H E FIRST DIMENSION

The analysis of the first dimension is less complicated than is that of the second. In the domestic context, the East European party-military system shares organizational and ideological features with other communist states, in particular with the Soviet Union. Therefore, the study of the domestic interaction can be structured around features identified throughout the party-military literature. Briefly, the party pursues policies to ensure that the military will be a source of domestic support and external protection, as well as a means of socialization and legitimization. Furthermore, the party is determined to control the political activity of the military.1 The party, in pursuit of these goals, relies upon coercive, normative, and utilitarian means. The task of research is to show how these means have been employed and how their implementation has changed over time. The following indicators have been used in analyzing the policies of the indigenous Communist party. (See Chart 1.4.) 8

PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS Chart 1.3 Institutions and Designations of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces and Their Soviet Counterparts CZECHOSLOVAKIA

SOVIET

Ministry of Defense General Staff Defense and Security Affairs Committee of the Central Committee (Eighth Department) Defense and Security Affairs Committee of the Federal Assembly (1968) Defense Council Main Political Administration Party Organizations in the Armed Forces Party Collective of Communists (Group of high-ranking communists apparently housed at the Ministry of Defense and drawn from the leadership of the party organizations in the armed forces and party officials of the Eighth Committee)

Same Same No Soviet counterpart

SVAZARM (Union for Cooperation with the Army)

DOSAAF (AU-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy) Same No known Soviet counterpart

Inspector general State secretary for defense (created in 1969) Deputy minister of defense for defense industries

No known Soviet counterpart

Same Same Same No known Soviet counterpart

Minister of defense industries

PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS Chart 1 4 Instruments of Party Policy COERCIVE"

NORMATIVE11

UTILITARIAN 6

Purge Demotion Fuctioning of the secret police network in the military The use of political officers to monitor professional officers' behavior The use of paramilitary groups as counterweights to the regular armed forces

Political education Homogenization of officer background The use of the military in the civilian sector The nationalization of the military image" The treatment of nationality problems'1

Higher wages for officers Special living standards Educational benefits

T H E RELATIONSHIP O F THE PARTY AND MILITARY

Changes in the organization and structure of the political-military apparatus The institutional relationship of the Main Political Administration to the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff The political role of the military Membership in the Central Committee or Politburo The involvement of the military in political conflicts The discussion of the role of the military in the defense of the nation The discussion of the role of the military in the society * Coercion is used in this study to denote policies that elicit obedience through violence or the threat of violence and policies that through threat and force nullify individual will b Normative instruments are those that seek to harmonize the interests and value systems of the military elites with those of the party and society c Because so much of interest for the military rests on Soviet decisions and not on those of the domestic party, the party may choose to court the military by appealing to nationalism d Several East European states are multinational In Czechoslovakia, the test case for this study, the problems between the Slovaks and Czechs are significant The treatment of nationality in the military is important in harmonizing the values of the elite " The use of incentives to elicit obedience is defined as utilitarian policy

PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS

Additionally, a central issue in the study of any party-military system is the professionahzation debate. The origins of the debate are often misunderstood and its importance is underestimated. The concern for a military both "red" and "expert" should be viewed not only as an effort to ensure control of the professional officer corps through a severance of links with the past but also as a desire to make certain that the armed forces are representative of the "socialist" or "workers' " society.2 The two goals have merged over time, but a full appreciation of the ideological tension between professionalism and politicization is necessary if one is to understand the depth of the Communist party's preoccupation with the question. The early tensions between the party and the military in the first socialist state, the Soviet Union, were a function of the historical circumstances of the development of the Red Army. Ideologically, the Soviets were more comfortable with a workers' militia and people's army than with standing professional armies. Professional armies were considered anachronistic in a socialist society and potentially dangerous, while a workers' militia was considered representative of the new social system. This explains, in part, the Soviets' haste to draw men of "working-class background" into the officer corps. But the civil war and a hostile international environment eventually dictated a change in Soviet thinking on "professional standing armies." Gradually, the professionahzation of the officer corps took priority over the infusion of workers' blood. In the short term, this meant the recruitment of officers of dubious political loyalties: Former czarist officers, needed for their expertise, were recruited into the officer corps. The presence of officers of suspect loyalty exacerbated the ideological discomfort with standing armies and produced the elaborate efforts, characteristic of the Soviet army, to monitor and politicize military professionals. When the East European armed forces were formed, the reliance on officers from prerevolutionary armed forces was 11

PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS

also necessary. The professionalization debate that followed was extremely important in the development of these militaries. The search for an officer corps both red and expert continues to be a critical issue for the party-military interaction in Eastern Europe. T H E SECOND DIMENSION

The study of the East European party-military interaction in isolation will not explain the way in which the system functions. Neither the party nor the military is an independent actor in East Europe. Soviet influence and interference in East European security affairs are established facts. But, curiously, the sparse literature on the East European militaries underestimates the impact of this factor on the internal civilmilitary interaction.3 In part, this is a reflection of the failure to examine systematically the impact of Soviet power on East European institutional development. Soviet influence within East European institutions has received little attention, while the relationship at the national level is incessantly examined.4 The intense interest in the larger relationship has unfortunately obscured and often confused the discussion of the interaction below the national level. The confusion stems from a failure to examine critically three important elements: (1) the nature of the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe; (2) the locus of Soviet influence; and (3) the instruments of that influence. The Nature of Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe The interaction between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is a power relationship. Power can be defined as possession of control, authority, and influence over another and a consequent ability to produce a discernible effect. Clearly, unequal status between the Soviets and East Europeans means that the relationship is asymmetrical. By all "measures" of power, the Soviets are the dominant actor in the relationship. 12

PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS

They are able to "force adaptation through control of the environment. " And in a classical definition of power they are able to impose costs on others in ways that weaker states do not and cannot.5 Power can be manifested and maintained through legal or official authority, through physical might, or through unspoken but effective political, economic, and cultural influence. All of these factors operate in the Soviet-East European relationship. Three explanations of the nature of the power relationship between the Soviet Union and East Europe are prevalent in the literature, and these are imperialism, patron-client, and alliance. The explanations address the issue of benefit—whether the relationship is exploitative or beneficial—and the problem of the maintenance of the asymmetry. The first, imperialism, is the oldest explanation and is still apparent in the literature. 6 The assumption that the region is held "captive" by the USSR is implicit in many analyses of East European development. Images of "imperial Russia" exploiting the region economically, politically, and culturally still abound. The relationship is viewed not only as wholly exploitative but also as wholly coercive. Solicitation of compliance and obedience are assumed to be through brute force and coercion. Another very important assumption of the imperialist explanation is that the East European leaders are extensions of Soviet power, imposing unpopular "foreign" policies upon an unwilling population. There is a kind of political division of labor: The Soviets produce policy and the East Europeans produce obedience. Both the East European leaders and the decisions they implement are viewed as illegitimate in the eyes of the domestic constituency, and it is assumed that leaders and their decisions are tolerated only because of possible coercion and terror and the lack of a political alternative. The elites themselves are—as extensions of Soviet power—interested only in their own maintenance, out of touch with their people, and held in power by the threat of Soviet force. Although this description of Soviet power holds some rel13

PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS

evance for Stalin's era, it does little to explain changes in the Soviet-East European relationship over time. It cannot explain, for example, why conflicts have occurred between the Soviets and East European leaders over issues of national reform. The communist leaders of the region do seek national answers to national problems—some more effectively than others—and it is this quest that often leads them into conflict with the Soviet Union. Consequently, the importance of intraparty struggles and of changes in leadership is often underestimated until major crises explode within the parties of the region. Moreover, the approach obscures differences that culture, history, and idiosyncratic factors play in determining political development. There are differences in culture and history within the Eastern bloc and these differences drive client rulers to seek various kinds of accommodation with their domestic constituencies and with the Soviet Union. National leadership and national interest have not disappeared in relations between the Soviet Union and East Europe. A final critical shortcoming of the approach lies in its concentration on just one element of the relationship—exploitation. This concentration actually serves to underestimate Soviet influence in the region. It is difficult to imagine a relationship that is wholly exploitative without being wholly coercive, and the relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that has evolved over thirty-seven years does not seem to rely exclusively on coercion. In any case, exploitation should not be assumed and the possibility of benefit for the East Europeans must be entertained. A second approach, the patron-client explanation, is implicit in some analyses of the relationship, but is seldom applied rigorously or explicitly.7 The explanation is attractive because it can accommodate the power asymmetry, the possibility of mutual benefit, and the use of bargaining and compromise in maintaining the relationship. Initially produced in the study of rural, traditional relationships, it seeks to explain the phenomenon in which the wealthy "patron" adopts and assumes responsibility for and protects a less fortunate client. 14

PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS

The patron assumes the burden for some aspect of well-being of the client. The relationship is reciprocal, involving an exchange of favors. Since the client has little of material value that the patron needs, the client more often than not exchanges such intangibles as loyalty, respect, and a promise to aid the patron against enemies in time of need. Often the client also supports the patron in societal and political institutions. There is often bargaining, with the expectation that the patron will try to maximize the return from the client while minimizing his own investment. Conversely, the client attempts to minimize his contribution and maximize the favors received. There are obvious parallels between the patron-client relationship and the relationship between the East Europeans and the Soviet Union. In the military sphere, the allies "exchange" loyalty, political support, and a promise to defend the western frontiers for political support, prestige, arms, and ultimately armed assistance from the USSR. This aspect of the relationship is being noted when analysts refer to Soviet client states and, particularly, Soviet client militaries.8 The notion of reciprocity is important and useful, but the concepts of patron and client taken alone mask central features of the interaction. First, the paradigm—developed in the study of relationships between individuals—reduces the interaction and assumes unity of action and interests of the institutions of Eastern Europe. Bargains made by the Communist party on behalf of the military—or vice versa—may not serve both interests equally. There are many clients within each client state of Eastern Europe and an explanation that portrays a single actor assessing interest and then bargaining for better terms of exchange is misleading. Second, while the relationship is not wholly exploitative, as imperialism suggests, neither is it entirely of mutual benefit. There is considerable exploitation, with the interests of the Soviet Union dominating by virtue of Soviet power. Neither are there alternative "patrons" for the East Europeans. The costs of disengagement are prohibitive and, consequently, the room for maneuver in bargaining 15

PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS

is limited. In short, the patron-client paradigm imputes a voluntary quality and a freedom of action to a unitary client that is not present. The broad basis of Soviet power is underestimated here too. A third explanation, alliance, is often used, since the relationship between the Soviet Union and East Europe is formalized in a series of multilateral organizations (COMECON in 1947 and the Warsaw Pact in 1955).9 The problem is that the alliance explanation, that is, treating the Soviets and East Europeans as sovereigns bound together by a formal structure, masks the scope of Soviet power and the constraints on the East Europeans. This system exhibits features that make it a peculiar alliance. The degree to which membership is voluntary is highly questionable. There are prohibitively high costs for unilateral withdrawal, and coercion plays an indeterminable role in the cohesion of the alliance. Furthermore, the bargaining power of the small states is arguably minimized rather than enhanced, as alliance explanations would suggest. Some students of the Warsaw Pact argue that multilateralism is really a means by which the Soviets use pliable allies to overwhelm the interests of dissident members of the Pact, thereby undermining small state bargaining power. Therefore, the most important factor in holding the alliance together may be the absence of alternatives and the prohibitive costs for withdrawal. Here a critical flaw of the alliance approach is its assumption that the East European states are completely integrated sovereignties whose leaders bargain within the alliance to secure their national interests. On the other hand, if one argues that the small states use the Warsaw Pact to enhance their limited bargaining power, it is hard to imagine that the Soviets would concentrate their efforts to exercise power within a difficult multilateral alliance. In either case, the full scope of Soviet power is underestimated. This asymmetrical relationship between the Soviets and the East Europeans has come to resemble one of "dependence," a concept employed most often in the study of the effect of external state relations upon internal political development. 16

PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS

Students of dependence describe a pattern of external reliance by weak, but integrated, states on a far more powerful state. Dependence is measured in terms of the size of one state's reliance upon another, the importance attached to the "goods" involved, and the possibilities for substitution. Dependence is not the absence of autonomy, but a relationship can be so asymmetrical that constraints of the environment completely condition the behavior of the less powerful actor. The costs of testing the more powerful actor may be so great that the small state does not test the limits of autonomy. The Soviet-East European case is an excellent example of this phenomenon. The dependence of the East Europeans on the Soviet Union is obviously extensive. The regimes rely upon the Soviets for a variety of "goods." The list is complete, running the gamut from political support and military guarantees to trade relations. In fact at times some East European leaders have been dependent on Moscow for their political lives. The power that accrues to the Soviet Union under these circumstances is obviously great. Moreover, because of Soviet dominance, some perception of mutual benefit, and the threat of coercion, the alternatives are few and the costs for substitution very high. The highly asymmetrical dependence is self-reinforcing. The importance of this concept for the present study is that while the East Europeans are, in theory, autonomous states, their dependence on the Soviet Union is great enough to dictate the policies of East European leaders at the domestic level. But this explanation also captures the potential conflict between dependence on the Soviet Union and the need to undertake policies to solve national problems. Open splits in the relationship occur when the East Europeans test the limits of their autonomy, in spite of the tremendous dependence on the Soviets. But these open breaks are fairly rare and some delicate balance operates most of the time. Understanding how a balance is maintained between national policy and the external relationship in any particular 17

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policy arena depends upon our ability to understand how and where the Soviets exercise their power. The Locus of Soviet Power The problem of locating Soviet power in the party-military relationship is significant, because Soviet influence operates on four distinct levels. There is the national level, on which the states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union operate as sovereigns in the international environment. Below the national level there are transgovernmental channels of communications (the institutional level). One level below the transgovernmental contacts are personal networks that function both formally and informally. Above the national level there are multilateral organizations like COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. Because the Soviets are such a dominant force in East Europe, the lines of communication at all levels are well developed. The researcher must decide where to focus, and the failure to make this choice correctly has retarded the study of the impact of Soviet power upon East European institutional development. The importance of the context of the exercise of Soviet power cannot be overstated. Since Soviet influence is based on power, great care must be taken to monitor that influence within the context in which it is wielded. Students of power relationships state that power is difficult to measure because rather than absence or presence, there are degrees of power.10 The wielder of power is limited by the context in which he intends to use the power, and certain kinds of power are suitable for some tasks, but limited in other areas. One must understand how the actor intends to use his power and what kind of behavior he intends to elicit. When transferring the notion of Soviet power in East Europe to a discussion of Soviet influence in East European institutions, the problem of the level of analysis becomes critical, given the importance of context in the exercise of power. Soviet power at the national level emanates from a combina18

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tion of several institutional and personal power bases, some stronger than others. The bases are not identical in either strength or nature. Power exercised in one institution—for example, the party—might not be sufficient to elicit certain types of behavior from the military. The failure to study Soviet power in its institutional context creates problems for the analysis. An obvious example of this problem is the frequently addressed concept of nationalism in Eastern Europe. The fact that the Poles, for example, are nationalistic is said to undermine Soviet "power" in the region. This is undeniably true, but in examining the military, the question must be addressed in the proper context. The nationalism of the Poles may be of greater (or lesser) consequence in the military, given characteristics of militaries that amplify or diminish Polish nationalism. These are, in fact, principles that are largely unheeded by those who study matters such as loyalty and cohesion in the East European militaries on the basis of assessments of Soviet power at the national level. Furthermore, institutional context is essential in addressing the key question, "Loyalty to whom and for what?" The concepts of persuasion and dissuasion would enhance discussions of the loyalty issue. Are the Soviets trying to persuade the East Europeans to do something or to dissuade them from some action? The argument that it is easier to deter than compel merits closer attention when speculating about the obedience of East European militaries.11 Finally, the difference between potential and actual power is important when analyzing the Soviet relationship with various militaries. Power does not always manifest itself, but rather can be held in reserve. The threat of the use of Soviet power in areas vital to the military is one key to understanding client behavior. Unfortunately, the transfer of the commonly held notions of the Soviet-East European relationship to an examination of the impact of Soviet power on East European institutional development further complicates the picture. In the case of alliance and patron-client explanations, the level of analysis problem is severe. Alliance explanations impute to the East 19

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Europeans a degree of autonomy that is too great and that assumes that the Soviets carry out their policies through ruling Communist parties as representatives of sovereign states. The focus on the national level obscures potentially important relationships below this level. Patron-client notions create similar problems, obscuring the scope of Soviet power and imputing a kind of unitary action to East European leaders on behalf of the entire nation that is not present. Imperialism, as holistic and without regard for levels of analysis, would render institutional development a superfluous notion. While the others allow too much integration in East Europe, imperialism allows none, assuming that the East European leaders are just appendages of the Soviet state. Each institution would be expected to serve Soviet interests, virtually without regard for the national interest. None of the three, therefore, captures the tension between East European sovereignty (autonomous, integrated states) and a power asymmetry so great that the Soviets enjoy influence at many levels below the national one. Soviet power is strong in the region because the asymmetry is preserved by benefit, coercion, and the absence of alternatives. It is also preserved by its presence at several different levels simultaneously, which gives the Soviets inordinate influence in each of the institutions. The "costs" of losing control of the East European militaries are very high and the Soviets, therefore, employ extensive bases of influence directly within the armed forces.12 Clearly there are two institutions involved—the party and the military. The Soviets can influence East European military development through prohibitive control of the domestic Communist party as well. But given Soviet dominance at every level, it is likely that the Soviet Union for the most part tries to maintain direct ties to the officer corps. The Soviets usurp primary responsibility for training, equipment, and military doctrine in the region. This responsibility is accompanied by an elaborate network of control instruments based on formal and informal, personal and institutional contacts. The potential for direct Soviet influence with the military professionals 20

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is a kind of wedge between the East European parties and their own armed forces. Only by holding direct instruments of influence can the Soviets hope to be certain that the militaries will remain loyal to and defend the Soviet Union. Furthermore, because the Soviet Union enjoys this luxury of direct influence with the militaries, it does not need to employ the Warsaw Pact as a primary means of control, though the Pact can justify and reinforce that control. The Warsaw Pact may well have dual functions as a security instrument and as a vehicle of control in Eastern Europe. But for the latter concern, control of the East Europeans, the Soviets can better rely on their carefully sculpted and maintained bilateral ties. Because there are numerous opportunities for direct contact with the officer corps, exclusive focus on the unwieldy, multilateral forum of the Warsaw Pact as the locus of Soviet influence is misleading. The proper context in which to examine Soviet influence on East European party-military systems is within the military institutions themselves. Because the locus of Soviet power is the East European military, the conduit of Soviet power is logically the Soviet military. Contacts between Soviet officers and their East European counterparts exist within every military subinstitution (the MPA, General Staff, and Ministry of Defense). Moreover, Soviet officers act as instructors and advisers in Eastern Europe and in some cases there are troops stationed on East European soil. It is in this fashion that the Warsaw Pact plays an important role. The multilateral meetings and trappings are just one function of the Warsaw Pact. The Pact is also another justification for bilateral contact through Soviet representatives, officers, and advisers in each East European state. The training exercises, which are sometimes bilateral, also allow Soviet officers an opportunity to monitor the behavior of the East European elite. Obviously, other Soviet conduits of influence cannot be ignored in the study of the impact of Soviet policies upon the party-military relationship. The Soviet-East European party link is less important but does function in the exercise of in21

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fluence and is addressed selectively. Fortunately, because so much is written on the relationship between the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the East European Communists, there is sufficient data on which to draw without a systematic examination of that link. Instruments of Soviet Power The next task of research is to identify the bases of Soviet power within the East European militaries so that the use of the instruments can be monitored over time. Soviet bases of power are numerous and exist in several different forms simultaneously. (See Chart 1.5.) It is the hypothesis of this study that the forms are important and that changes in the instruments will produce a discernible impact upon the partymilitary relationship. The intensity of Soviet influence varies both across national contexts and over time. This study is concerned with how the influence has varied over time. In the earliest developmental period, the Soviet Union was so dominant in East European affairs that there was no discernible indigenous institutional relationship. The parties of the region—with the exception of Czechoslovakia—were brought to power largely by force of the Red Army. The domestic popularity of the Czechoslovak Communist party makes the initial postwar years unique in that case, but after the coup of February 1948, Sovietization of national institutions was rapid. In the Stalinist period, the political relationship between the East Europeans and the Soviet Union was characterized by coercive and overt Soviet interference. Moreover, the institutions of the region were virtually exact copies of the Soviet forms. The satellite institutions were thoroughly dominated by Soviet advisers, and training and education were identical to that of the Red Army. In this period Soviet policies were so prohibitive that the domestic party-military interaction was completely dictated by the external power. In other words, there was little vertical integration of East European institutions. The party (the leading institution) was at 22

PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS Chart 1.5 Instruments of Soviet Policy COERCIVE

NORMATIVE

UTILITARIAN 8

Presence of Soviet troops Presence of Soviet advisers Presence and activity of Soviet secret police

Political education (identification with USSR) Study of the Russian language Education of East European officers in the Soviet Union

Control of weapons production Control of military modernization Special recognition of East European officers in Soviet publications Special activities for East European officers

T H E RELATIONSHIP O F THE MILITARIES TO THE SOVIET UNION

Military integrationb The discussion of the role of the Soviet Union in the defense of the East European state The development of military doctrine a Utilitarian instruments in this section represent Soviet means of enticing East European military elites to see their interests as tied to the Soviet Union. Because of Soviet dominance in weapons production and modernization of East European armies, the incentives are numerous. b This study concentrates on those aspects of military integration that tie the interests of the East European armies to the Soviet Union and, through bilateral contacts, increase Soviet opportunities to monitor the behavior of the elites.

best an agent of Soviet policy in dealing with other institutions. The institutions w e r e created with few links between them, but with each institution linked directly to the USSR. The imperial model, which sees the domestic Communist party as an extension of the the Soviet Union is useful in describing the Stalinist era. The death of Stalin and the policies of his successors fundamentally altered the Soviet-East European relationship at the national level. Since the Khrushchev era, the Soviets have 23

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acknowledged national diversity and the need for limited divergence in the solution of domestic problems. Movement toward national authority with the parties assuming a larger role for decisions concerning institutional development began. In addition, the Soviet Union accepted the premise that the East European states should be semisovereign within a socialist alliance. The Stalinist, imperial relationship was partially dismantled and replaced by an interstate system with multilateral trappings. Soviet influence still dominated the interaction, but the pace of nationalization of communist rule varied across Eastern Europe and significant differences emerged. The adoption of these new principles plunged the Soviet alliance into a chaotic period of readjustment, first in Poland and culminating in the Hungarian invasion. The Soviets forcefully reasserted their right to leadership in 1956, but most of the "bloc liberalization" survived, and the relationship between the various countries remained fundamentally different from that under the Stalinist system. Periodic upheavals continue, as does Soviet reassertion of its power, and certain relationships, in particular that with Romania, appear to be permanently altered. The process of national integration and responsibility for decisions was tolerated in domestic policy, but homogeneity and adherence to the Soviet line were insisted upon in foreign and military affairs.13 The development of national military concerns was thus much slower. The parties, fighting for popular legitimacy, began to adopt national solutions for uniquely national problems, but left the military sphere relatively untouched. Nonetheless, the military was not easily separated from other national problems. Issues like an appropriate economic and industrial profile, the role of the military in society, the extent of military socialization, and the nature of military professionalism are inextricably linked. Neither was the military always willing to be isolated as it fought its own national problems and its own battle for legitimacy. Romania is, of course, the obvious case, but there have been others 24

PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS Chart 1.6 The East European Party-Military Relationship #2 Soviet — Party -*-

•*- East European Party

•

t #1

I I

j #4 #3

Soviet Military -*

\I *- East European Military

and the variation is more prevalent than publicly acknowledged. The tensions produced by changes in the Soviet-East European relationship are readily apparent when viewed through the two-dimensional framework. The changes that set in motion forces toward national integration, with the party assuming a decision-making role while leaving the military in an ambiguous position, produced definite strains upon the relationship. (See Chart 1.6.) There are four major links. For the purposes of this study, the most important are links two, three, and four. They vary together, and changes in two and t h r e e — in particular in three—lead to changes in four. The following theses can now be suggested. 1. Soviet influence is increasingly based on utilitarian and normative instruments. There is a concomitant decline in coercive means. 2. The domestic Communist party relies increasingly on utilitarian and normative means. There is a concomitant decline in coercive means. 3. Changes in links two and three produce a strengthening of link four at the expense of link three. In short, the link between the Soviets and the parties was weakened by choice in the Khrushchev era, when the Soviets allowed increased responsibility, limited divergence, and flexibility for the parties in dealing with national issues. Si25

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multaneously, there was a change in Soviet bases of power within the East European militaries, relying increasingly upon persuasion. There was, however, an attempt to hold the partymilitary link constant by not allowing the party to assume responsibility for military affairs. The military was to be held apart. Military policy was still the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union. As events have unfolded, though, the artificial separation has been difficult to maintain. The link between party and military becomes an issue. As the military becomes an issue, the problem of dual control and loyalty arises. It is this duality that explains the lack of cohesion of the military elite and the suspect loyalty characteristic of East Europe. It also explains the isolation of the military from political processes and the fear that the military might become politically involved during crises. In sum, because of the dominance of the Soviet Union in the asymmetrical power relationship with Eastern Europe, the party-military relationship can only be understood in terms of direct Soviet influence and the impact of Soviet policy upon the domestic interaction. The two dimensions must be taken in concert, since within any time frame and national context Soviet influence is exercised within a particular domestic environment. Consequently, while the East European partymilitary relationship is a function of a variety of societal, ideological, political, and economic policy choices, the choices are fundamentally conditioned by the nature of Soviet policy and influence at any given time. The influence is so complete in political-military affairs that the Soviets must be treated as another actor in the party-military systems of Eastern Europe. Timothy Colton's admonition to examine party-military relations in terms of both military development and environmental constraints was never more pertinent than in the case of the six junior members of the Warsaw Pact.14 T H E VALIDITY OF THE CASE STUDY

Because the East European party-military systems have been little studied, there are few comprehensive country studies 26

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that yield general data about the relationship of the East European party to the military and of the military to the Soviet Union. It is important to develop a replicable framework that can be used to compare the countries on salient aspects of their development. The focused case study approach allows comprehensive examination of the framework in one national context and commentary upon the viability of the framework in this one case. The key variable is Soviet policy over time and thus an examination of the framework over time is initially more important than variations caused by national context. Nevertheless, the final goal is the development of a framework that is valid for all six cases. Ultimately, this will allow comparison of the East European cases with other civilmilitary systems. The use of the case study presents some problems for analysis. The most critical problem is how best to present the evidence. There are two possible approaches. First, the data can be presented thematically, by analyzing the development of the policy instruments separately over time, or second, the evidence can be presented chronologically, thereby preserving the integrity of the events and treating changes in policy and behavior within the larger picture. The second approach has been chosen in this study. The element of time is critical to the argument and the chronological presentation allows the examination of events in sequence. It is a historical axiom that what happened today can affect tomorrow's events, but not yesterday's. Thus, chronology is important in understanding the question of impact—whether changes in one actor's behavior have produced changes in the behavior of others. Finally, it is the functioning of the party-military system as a whole that is of interest here. The best approach is to take all aspects of the behavior of all actors in distinct time periods. In examining the two-dimensional framework, Czechoslovakia is an important and interesting case. The affinity of Czechoslovakia for democratic political institutions makes the precommunist history of the state unique in Eastern Europe. But Czechoslovakia shares the uncomfortable geographical position of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies and has, like 27

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all states of the region, operated under this environmental constraint. The rulers of Czechoslovakia have had to abandon the balance between East and West and accept Soviet dominance since communization. Nevertheless, the tension between democratic ideals and geographical realities has surfaced even under communist rule. Czechoslovakia is also a critical case because of its importance in the Soviet security system. An important state in the Warsaw Pact, the country forms the wedge between the northern and southern tiers of the alliance. Furthermore, Czechoslovakia's location means that early contact would occur on Czechoslovak soil in the event of a ground conflict in Europe. One of the most industrialized states in the Eastern bloc, Czechoslovakia possesses one of the most advanced militaries of the alliance and is part of the strategically central northern tier of the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, it is a client state with a mature and historically active domestic arms industry and is an important arms supplier to the Soviet alliance and to the Third World. Perhaps of greater interest for our purposes is that this advanced and strategically important military endured an extended period of tension during the crisis of 1968 and survived the invasion of "fraternal allies." No other military in Eastern Europe has been subjected to the intense and prolonged reevaluation of communist rule. The behavior of the Czechoslovak military and party and of the Soviet Union under the circumstances of the 1968 crisis is an important case for study in the analysis of military politics in communist East Europe. OVERVIEW

The remainder of the study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 examines the development of the military in the immediate postwar period, 1945-1948. Because the Communist party did not rule until 1948, this period is not, in the strictest sense, a consideration of party-military relations. 28

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Nevertheless, the period before the February "Revolution" was important in the development of the military in Czechoslovakia. Interestingly, much of the groundwork for the communization of the military was laid during the rule of the coalition government. Chapter 2 highlights the steps taken in rebuilding the military and particular attention is accorded the activities of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The case study begins in chapter 3 and subsequent chapters examine the behavior of the party, the Soviet Union, and the military elite. Chapter 3 explores the relationship from the "revolution of 1948" until the Khrushchev period and the reorientation of the alliance in 1956. The period was characterized by heavy coercion and thorough Sovietization. Nevertheless, the last years of the period saw the rise of traditional concerns over the red-versus-expert dichotomy. In particular, the decision to modernize the armed forces in the 1950s began to alter the relationship between party and military. The process was accelerated by new Soviet policies of the Khrushchev era. Chapter 4 examines military development and the relationship between the actors from 1956 through 1967. The professionalization of the elite, rapid modernization of the northern tier militaries, and the development of the Warsaw Pact dominate this stage of party-military history. Chapter 5 is devoted to the Prague Spring, the 1968 liberalization in Czechoslovakia. This short, but very intense period exposed the tensions in the relationship between party and military in the communist system, as well as those resulting from the influence of the external power. The liberalization triggered debates within the military community that were unparalleled in communist military history. The interaction between party and military in which the political control apparatus was fundamentally altered was truly historic. The debate took place primarily within the military, but dialogue between party and military did evolve. The period is critical, because for the first time it was the Soviet Union and its unquestioning supporters within the military who were 29

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isolated from the interaction. It is in 1968 that the Czechoslovak case bears no resemblance to its East European counterparts. But it is from this remarkable period, when the external actor's influence was temporarily silenced, that we learn so much about the tensions inherent in military clientage. The period also affords an opportunity to observe Soviet behavior in attempting to manage a client military in a state of crisis. Chapter 6 examines the period from the invasion on August 21, 1968, until 1975. In the period of "normalization" and "consolidation," the Soviet Union and the conservative elements in the domestic Communist party reasserted control over the military. The period was one in which elements of the liberalization existed side by side with elements of the conservative revival. For the most part, however, the period was characterized by a return to hegemonic party control and the cessation of the party-military dialogue. The normalization and consolidation of the military continued until about 1975, when the Czechoslovak military leadership finally declared publicly that the effort had succeeded. The years from 1975 to the present have been characterized by massive efforts in the domestic arena to rebuild the armed forces and to reestablish the direct networks of Soviet influence that were weakened in 1968. This period of reconsolidation is explored in chapter 7. Chapter 8 examines the two-dimensional approach in light of the evidence and suggests how this approach might be applied in other cases.

30

CHAPTER TWO

The Historical Foundations of the Relationship between the Party and Military in Czechoslovakia The reconstitution of the East European armed forces after World War II was a difficult task. In Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria the communist parties came to rule primarily by force of the Red Army. The liquidation of all resistance and of all nonfascist parties compromised the legitimacy of the regimes, and for the most part the communists were unpopular and weak. Under these circumstances, the most important task was reconstructing the decimated political institutions of the states in order to lend legitimacy and normalcy to the regimes. One critical concern was the reconstitution of the power instruments, the military and the police. Eventually, these instruments would help to guarantee the stability and well-being of the communist regimes. Universal conscription would solve the problem of filling the rank and file, but finding officers to serve in the militaries was quite another matter. The Polish prewar officer corps was practically decimated by the war with Germany and by the liquidation of eight thousand officers in the Katyn Forest late in 1945.1 Moreover, it was difficult in strongly anti-Russian, anticommunist, and devoutly Catholic Poland to find officers among the survivors who would support the regime. The pool of eligible officers was diminished further by the flight of several highranking professionals to the West when the London Poles lost the battle for dominance in the postwar government. The supply of officers for the new armed forces of Poland thus dwindled to the few communists who had returned with the 31

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Red Army in the liberation of Warsaw, surviving members of the resistance, and young soldiers trained on the territory of the Soviet Union as a part of the Polish armed forces in exile. The situation in the occupied former Axis states of Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary was even more desperate. 2 Allied with Germany, these states engaged Soviet forces in some of the bloodiest battles of World War II. Again, the solution was to use the few resistance fighters and communists who remained in the states. Interestingly, former fascist officers, some of whom were prisoners of war and others who were "repentant" collaborators, were also co-opted. Obviously, the loyalty of these officers was suspect, and the militaries were kept small and given only primitive, often heavily damaged equipment. Circumstances in Czechoslovakia were considerably different from those in Poland and the former Axis states. The problem of reconstituting the military was exacerbated by coalition rule, and the communists did not enjoy complete control over the process. Moreover, there were no Soviet troops on Czechoslovak soil—all Soviet and American troops had departed by December 1945—and the Soviet presence was minimal. On the other hand, the problems of reconstitution were ameliorated by the absence of the Russophobia so prevalent throughout East and Central Europe. Moreover, unlike other Communist parties of the region, the KSC enjoyed popular support and legitimacy. A final factor was the proSoviet foreign policy stance of Edvard Benes, the National Socialist president of the Republic from 1946 to 1948. In hopes that the domestic integrity of the state could be secured, BeneS was determined to make all vestiges of Czechoslovak foreign policy acceptable to the Soviet Union. In November 1940, while the Soviet Union was still allied with Germany, BeneS was already speaking of the necessity of an eventual alliance with the USSR. After Barbarossa, the Czechoslovak government in exile issued declarations that in alliance with the Soviet Union it would seek to once and for all render Germany harmless. 3 Recalling the declaration in a speech before the 32

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Czechoslovak State Council in November 1942, Benes stated, "I regard the present war as the decisive opportunity to bring to an end once and for all time the pan-German Drang nach Osten' [Drive to the East]. This same war has proved that in order to do so, real friendly cooperation between Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union is essential."4 Benes tried, for some time, to coordinate his efforts with the Poles. But the Soviets objected, and when it became increasingly apparent that Polish-Soviet relations would remain strained, he abandoned this strategy and turned to bilateral negotiations with Stalin. Consequently, by the time of the Battle of Stalingrad, Benes's plans for close postwar cooperation with the USSR were mature. One aspect of this policy was to allow the Soviets broad influence within the new military institution. But almost in contradiction, Benes fought to maintain the integrity of the armed forces and to secure a place for the traditions and officers of the Czechoslovak interwar forces. Military development in the period reflected the difficulties of keeping Czechoslovakia on middle course between East and West. SOURCES OF SOVIET AND COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT O F THE CZECHOSLOVAK ARMED FORCES

The governmental blueprint for the new Czechoslovak state, the Kosice Accord of April 1945, granted the communists and the USSR broad influence in the reconstruction of the armed forces. At Kosice, the Czech leadership agreed that the new army should strive for complete cooperation and coordination with the Red Army. The program stated, "We want still more to recognize the combat allegiance of the Czechoslovak army with the Red Army and to use it as our model in building a new, really democratic, antifascist, Czechoslovak army."5 In addition to accepting the Soviet army as its model of development, KoSice completely rejected the concept of the apolitical army: "Our army was educated in the spirit of the state, with democracy and antifascism. We want the gov33

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ernment to state that a nonpolitical army is not really nonpolitical, and that in it is a hidden underestimation of the moral factor in the struggle and that under it are masked rampant antidemocratic and capitalistic tendencies. On the contrary, it is necessary that each Czechoslovak soldier have this [spirit] for his fighting consciousness (emphasis added)." 6 After promising unreserved copying of the Soviet model, the last paragraph, almost as an afterthought, declared, "The government will establish the new Czechoslovak forces with distinction, answering to the spirit and military traditions of our people." 7 The KSC embraced the program in 1945 and continued to do so in subsequent histories of the development of the Czechoslovak People's Army (Ceskoslovenska Lidova Armada—CLA). Profuse praise is heaped upon the military plank of the program and it is said to have laid the foundation for the "correct development of the CLA."8 These histories never fail to mention the KSC's major role in drafting the military plank of the KoSice program. But at the time, the military plank of the KoSice program was also embraced by noncommunist statesmen. The president of the National Assembly reiterated the government's support for the ideals of KoSice in a speech delivered before the Assembly: "The Red Army has been taken as our example for the organization of our new army . . . aiding us materially. . . . We also appreciate the help of the British army. "9 The KoSice program thereby provided the legal framework through which the Soviet Union and the KSC wielded influence in the reconstruction of the military. The influence of the East was not, however, limited to this document. Several factors strengthened communist influence during the period of coalition rule. One extremely important factor was the role of the Red Army and the Soviet-sponsored Czechoslovak forces in the liberation of the homeland. On April 8, 1944, the Soviet army reached the border and six months later, on October 18, crossed Dukla Pass en route to liberating Czechoslovak territory. The bloody battle 34

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for Dukla Pass is much heralded in Czechoslovak military history and October 18, a national holiday, has become a symbol of Czechoslovak-Soviet military friendship. The place in history that the Dukla Pass battle afforded the Soviets was reinforced by the failure of the Slovak national uprising. Though the story is unclear, it appears that the Soviets sacrificed the most important uprising on Czechoslovak territory in order to gain full benefit as primary liberator of Czechoslovakia. On August 29, 1944, the Slovak National Council proclaimed an uprising against the puppet government of Josef Tiso. The Czechoslovak government in exile asked the Allies to aid the partisans, especially the Red Army, which was about one hundred miles from the area. Soviet aid was slow in coming and sparse when it arrived. The consensus among Western scholars is that, as in the case of the Warsaw uprising, Stalin, distrustful of resistance fighters, preferred to liberate East Europe by force of the Red Army.10 The Soviets claimed at the time that bad weather prevented them from substantively aiding the rebellion.11 The story was later changed, with communists claiming that substantial aid was granted to the uprising. One source claims, for example, that the Communist party of Slovakia was the inspiration for the rebellion and Western states, afraid of communist influence, allowed the uprising to fail.12 The Soviet command, on the other hand, "actually changed their original intentions . . . in order to aid the uprising."13 Whatever the case, the rebellion was crushed by the German army and most of the resistance fighters, including militarily experienced deserters of Tiso's army, were slaughtered. A few months later the Red Army and the Czechoslovak First Army Corps liberated Slovakia. Perhaps of greater symbolic value was the liberation of Prague. This task was left to the East by prior agreement among the Allies A third source of influence for the Soviet Union was its role in the formation of the Czechoslovak First Army Corps. According to the KoSice Accord, the "New Czechoslovak Army" was to be constructed with the First Army Corps at its cen35

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ter.14 The corps was formed under the terms of a SovietCzechoslovak military agreement of September 27, 1941. The forces were to number 1,100, with 300 temporary and reserve men, but only 25 officers, 54 NCOs, and 8 soldiers volunteered. 15 The recruitment of Czechoslovak and Soviet citizens increased the group's size rapidly and by September 1942 there were 26 officers, 237 NCOs, and 663 privates.16 Ludvik Svoboda was promoted to full colonel at this time. The detachment was trained and financed by the Soviets and equipped with surplus Red Army material, and Svoboda declared in 1942 that the brigade was ready to fight "shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet army on the German front."17 But it was almost four months before the brigade engaged in combat. In the interim, the detachment was involved in building bridges, operating factories, and aiding kolkhozes. The delay was caused by disagreements between the BeneS government in London and the KSC representatives in Moscow over the mission and organization of the brigade. Eventually, in January 1943, the brigade was dispatched to the front, apparently without the knowledge or permission of the Czechoslovak government in exile in London. Later, in 1944, additional Czechoslovak units were formed and commanded for a short time by General Kratochvil, who had commanded a Czechoslovak regiment in France. Command was soon returned to Svoboda, who was promoted to general. Benes, perhaps in a belated effort to establish influence within the forces, dispatched officers of the London group to help command the brigade, which was badly in need of experienced officers.18 The Soviet government objected initially, but the London group was finally accepted. By the summer of 1944, the group, numbering eighteen thousand, fought actively with Soviet forces.19 While these issues were being settled, the Soviet command had begun to develop programs of military study for the detachment. The first class included thirty-seven officers and sixty-three rank and file. The course of study included infantry, flight, and tank training and carried with it a promise of promotion for officers and commissions for the rank and 36

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file. Another course for officers was carried on concurrently and offered training for 350 students. Party organs soon developed within the detachment as well. There were formal party organizations only in the middle of 1944, but party agitators had been operating from the time of the brigade's formal constitution.20 According to communist sources, "Though the KSC organizations did not exist and were small even after they were built, their influence was great. Soviet and Czech political workers and communists strengthened the moral spirit of the detachment." 21 On at least one occasion party chief Klement Gottwald addressed the group. Additionally, an enlightenment corps was attached to the brigade under the leadership of Jaroslav Prochazka, soon to become the first head of the Main Political Administration of the CLA. The number of party members remained small, however, with only 8 of the 92 officers and 194 members of the entire brigade holding membership in the KSC.22 By all accounts, the Czechoslovak detachments fought well, participating in the Battle of Sokolov and in the assault on Kiev. The heaviest battle was the assault on Dukla Pass, which cost over sixty-five hundred Czechoslovak lives.23 Twenty-five of those who died in battle received the distinction Hero of the Soviet Union.24 Finally, the activity of the detachment in the liberation of the homeland lent legitimacy to First Army Corps' claims to postwar dominance. In April 1945, as a result of intensive recruitment and the addition of defectors from the Slovak army, the army numbered seventy thousand.25 One final Soviet influence was the contribution of Soviet forces to the reconstruction of the Czechoslovak economy. This was done not only by delivery of supplies but also by sending brigades of Soviet troops to aid in the reconstruction effort.26 This was very prevalent in Slovakia, which had been decimated during the Soviet-Czechoslovak advance. Considerable political value was gained from these efforts and no publicity was spared in advertising the Soviet role. Not only did political capital accrue to the Soviets, but their troops were able to mingle with Czechoslovak units. 37

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A major source of influence prevalent throughout Eastern Europe but not operating in Czechoslovakia was the presence of Soviet troops. Both Soviet and American forces withdrew from Czechoslovak territory by December 1945. Soviet influence thereafter was maintained primarily through the activities of the few Red Army officers who stayed behind and acted as instructors in military academies and officer-training programs. According to communist sources, there were 531 advisers in Czechoslovakia immediately after the war and this number was reduced over time.27 This was considerably fewer advisers than in most of Eastern Europe. By way of comparison, the same source claims that there were 16,396 Soviet advisers in Poland.28 In spite of the several bases of Soviet influence, the reconstitution process under the coalition was difficult for the Communist party. Official histories of the development of the CLA call the period from 1945 to 1948 the era of "the struggle for the democratization of the armed forces."29 This was a difficult struggle, they claim, but the democratic army was achieved and the process begun for the creation of "an army of a socialist type." 30 In this effort the greatest source of consternation and concern for the Communist party and the Soviet Union was the development of a reliable officer corps. PROBLEMS OF OFFICER CORPS FORMATION

The problems of officer corps formation Czechoslovakia faced in 1945 were markedly different from those facing most other East European states. Like Poland, Czechoslovakia had been associated with the Western alliance and did not face the stigma of fascism that saddled the former Axis satellites Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. Many Slovak officers were compromised by association with the armed forces of the "Slovak Republic" and a few Czechoslovak officers served the protectorate, but most officers either fled and fought for the Allies or remained in Czechoslovakia and retired from military duty. Unlike Poland, Czechoslovakia did not face a huge lack of 38

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experienced officers after the war. Unlike their Polish counterparts, Czechoslovak forces did not engage in an all-out war with Germany in 1939 and avoided the heavy casualties that decimated Polish forces. There had also been no experience comparable to the Katyn massacre. Thus, many Czechoslovak officers returned uncompromised and willing to serve. The existence and return of these officers was both a source of consternation and a comfort for the KSC. It was a blessing to have so many capable and experienced officers on whom to draw. On the other hand, it was more difficult to ensure the dominance of communist-influenced officers returning from Moscow. Ironically, the KSC found its hands tied in the one national context in which there were communist-trained, battle-experienced military men. Although the Kosice program promised special consideration for officers of the First Army Corps and although this was legitimized by their role in the liberation, pro-Western officers had counterclaims to dominance in the postwar army. Much to the chagrin of the communists, the interwar military elite had fled, not to Moscow, but to London with Bene§.31 The officers who had held the elite positions prior to the war expected comparable positions in the postwar army. It was thus not without significance that the Kolice Accord promised to establish a new army (nova armada).32 The wording is not just an exercise in semantics, but rather implies a complete break with the past. In order to allow the First Army Corps officers to penetrate the upper echelons, it was necessary to disavow the claims of officers in the experienced London corps. The concept of a "new" army placed all officers on an equal footing and allowed the liberation effort to dominate the consideration of postwar positions. Czechoslovak leaders were able to draw upon five major sources in rebuilding the officer corps. These sources are enumerated as follows in the KoSice Accord. First, the First Army on the Territory of the USSR was to form the core of the officer group. Second, the air force, primarily housed in London, was to be next in importance. Third, the Czechoslo39

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vak Defense Brigade (located in France and the Middle East), fourth, the Slovak and Czech partisans, and, fifth, the resistance fighters were to receive the remaining posts. Special consideration was supposed to be given, however, to partisans in the formation of the officer corps.33 The Accord also promised to "purge all treasonous, collaborationist, antidemocratic, and antipeople elements. We will take care that these elements will not be able to rise to high commands ever again."34 The formation of the First Army Corps has been examined in depth. Before turning to the issue of the actual reconstitution, the nature of the other groups will be briefly discussed. The air force was headquartered in London during the war and served under the command of the Royal Air Force (RAF). Considered the most efficient force of the prewar Czechoslovak military, the air force lived up to this reputation and served with distinction in World War II under Gen. Karel Janousek. The air force was so efficient that it is believed that on the basis of its strength, the Czechoslovaks could have repelled the German attack in 1939. Composed of pro-Western officers trained by the RAF, the air force was treated with great suspicion and caution by the Communist party throughout the period of coalition. The Czechoslovak Defense Brigade was primarily proWestern, but the group fighting in the Middle East and France had served briefly in Moscow in 1941. The soldiers in France fought either with the free French or with the Western Allies during the assault through French territory on Germany's western front. Perhaps in anticipation of the political significance of the liberation of the homeland, Benes attempted to have several of these western Czechoslovak units transferred to the East to participate in the assault on Prague. 35 The Slovak and Czech partisans were few in number, but heavily infiltrated by Communist party members. Resistance was never as pervasive as in other East European countries and the movements that did operate were dispersed and poorly organized. Only the Communist party maintained its organi40

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zation and structure and spent considerable energy proselytizing among partisan fighters and the population.36 The number of partisans was larger in Slovakia than in Bohemia and Moravia. The puppet government of Josef Tiso was constantly subjected to assassination attempts and acts of sabotage by Slovak partisans. The movement was augmented by the steady stream of defectors from Tiso's "independent Slovak army." Communist sources claim that within a few months of the opening of the Soviet-German front, Tiso's forces decreased by 15,066 men, from 50,689 to 35,623.37 Two Slovak divisions were formed from these deserters and fought with the citizens of the underground movement. The source claims that communist agitation was a great influence in the rapid desertions from Tiso's forces. Many Slovak communists who rose to high party posts after the war were wartime agitators. The fifth source for the construction of the officer corps were the insurrectionists in Slovakia. The Kosice statement makes a clear distinction between this group and the partisans, though in actuality a number of partisans fought in the uprising. The distinction is important, though, given Stalin's apparent ambivalence toward the Slovak national uprising. If, as Western sources claim, Stalin allowed the uprising to fail, fearing competition for Svoboda's corps and the Red Army, the distinction is logical and allowed the survivors of the uprising to be singled out and eliminated from consideration for positions of power. Prisoners of war, a staple in the construction of most new communist armies, were not mentioned in the Kosice Accord. There were few Czech prisoners of war, and the Slovaks who were captured were repatriated and incorporated into Slovak partisan divisions or the Czechoslovak First Army Corps in the USSR. The officer corps that was formed as a result of these complicated criteria was extremely heterogeneous. Communist sources lamented the bourgeois nature of the new officer cadre. In 1945, only 605 members of the entire corps were communist, but even this was considerably higher than the 35 41

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members in 1943.38 This meager communist representation was a source of consternation for the party. One communist commentator noted, "Benes used his office to secure in the army the most reactionary bourgeois officers who worked in the time of occupation as functionaries in the control organs, served in the 'Slovak army' . . . and themselves were accomplices of fascism."39 At the insistence of the party's military Soviets (formed in 1945), the officer corps was reviewed in 1946. Applications were taken from all officers who "had not compromised themselves."40 Of the eleven thousand applications received, only a handful were rejected.41 Even in Slovakia, where the army collaborated, only 87 of 1,530 applications were turned down.42 Dissatisfied with the work of the commission, the communists took steps to gradually change the composition of the officer corps. Gottwald, then prime minister, personally appealed to sons of working-class or peasant families to enroll in reserve officer training.43 New military and premilitary training schools were then opened; of these, eight were officer-training academies.44 Soviet instructors staffed many of the institutions. The results were impressive. By 1947, there were 5,350 students, primarily of working-class background, in these military-training academies.45 Another step the communists took to change the complexion of the officer corps was the initiation of an exchange program between Soviet and Czechoslovak officers. The number of Soviet officers involved is unknown, but twenty young, middle-level officers of Svoboda's corps were sent to the Soviet Union for advanced study.46 Finally, officers of air and air support units of the First Army Corps were brought en masse into the heavily Western air force. Though the First Army Corps air units were underdeveloped, officers of this background progressed rapidly, thanks to the expenditure of immense resources on air operations training.47 The results of the strategy were apparently mixed. Party accounts proudly state that there were three thousand new Communist party members in the armed forces.48 But in spite of these efforts only 15 percent of the 42

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"most important officers" in the army were members of the KSC on February 1, 1948.49 This failure to communize the elite ranks troubled Communist party officials and indeed the higher posts were filled largely by "compromise candidates." The minister of defense, deputy minister of defense, and chief of the General Staff of the military in exile were all dismissed. Benes's request to name the wartime minister of defense Sergei Ingr to that postwar position was vetoed and Ludvik Svoboda, the commander of the First Army Corps, was installed. Svoboda, the son of a farming family, was born in 1895. During his service in the Austro-Hungarian army in World War I, he deserted to the Russian side and later joined the Czechoslovak Legion. Svoboda returned to Czechoslovakia late in 1920. He held several commands, including a battalion command in 1938. In May 1938, he went to Poland to organize Czech units and, after the defeat of Poland, escaped to the USSR, where he was promoted rapidly through the ranks, from lieutenant colonel in 1939 to army general in 1945. He was not, at the time of his appointment, a member of the KSC. There was speculation, since supported by Svoboda's own story, that he remained outside the party because Gottwald thought him more useful as an outsider.50 This claim would explain Svoboda's survival in this key position in the postrevolutionary era. The position of chief of the General Staff was given to Bohumir Bocek, who had been one of the officers dispatched to help command the Czechoslovak detachment in 1944. Again Benes's candidate, Alois LiSka, the commander of the Czechoslovak armored brigade in Great Britain, was vetoed by the KSC. Nevertheless, two of the highest elite positions remained in the hands of Londoners. Gen. Karel Janousek was, for a very brief period, retained as chief of the air force. He was replaced by another Westerner, A. Vicherek, and Janousek was appointed representative of the chief of the General Staff for international affairs. Karel Klapek, commander of the ground forces of the Czechoslovak army in exile, retained that 43

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position. But two high-ranking officers were not allowed to return to the officer corps at all: Bedfich Neumann, former chief of staff for rebuilding the Czechoslovak army, and Gen. Sergei Ingr, who was appointed minister to the Netherlands. On the whole, there was greater continuity in the New Czechoslovak Army than in Poland or the Axis states. The lack of anti-Sovietism in Czechoslovakia must have been a comfort for communist leaders. But the argument must not be overdrawn in describing the attitudes of the entire professional elite. The military legacy of the professional corps was one that the Soviets could hardly have viewed favorably. The importance of the heritage of the Czechoslovak Legion of World War I must not be underestimated in discussing the attitude of Czechoslovak military officers toward the Soviet Union. Unlike the general Czechoslovak population, many members of the military had been involved in a bitter experience that involved Soviet military and political officers. The Czechoslovak Legion was born during the chaotic period preceding the fall of the Russian empire. 51 Convinced that Russia was no longer a trustworthy and effective ally, the Allied powers began to solicit aid against the German and Austro-Hungarian forces. Edvard Benes, then foreign minister for the Czechoslovak Council, approached the French and Italian governments with a plan to aid the effort. There had been mass defections of Czechs and Slovaks from the AustroHungarian forces and many prisoners of war were being held as well. BeneS suggested that an army be formed with these men and sent to relieve the pressure on Allied forces on the eastern front. Before the detachments could be formed, however, the eastern front collapsed with the Soviet Decree of Peace in 1917. BeneS suggested that Czechoslovak units be formed anyway and transported to France to bolster the western effort. Similar arrangements were being negotiated by the Poles. After tedious negotiations, France in December 1917 and Italy in April 1918 approved the formation of Czechoslovak military units. More importantly, the Legion was recognized as 44

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an autonomous national unit. The units were trained by the French, but the insignia and oath were of the Czechoslovak nation. On February 7, Masaryk declared all Czechoslovak troops then on the territory of the former Russian state part of the Czechoslovak army in France. The Czechoslovaks were gaining political recognition. The next day Kiev was occupied by the Soviet army and negotiations were begun between Czechoslovak commanders and Soviet commander Muravyev. The Czechoslovaks were recognized as neutrals and an agreement signed that guaranteed their safe passage to France. Initially, in clashes with the Germans in the Ukraine, Bolshevik and Czechoslovak troops fought together, and as they began their march westward, the Czechoslovaks handed over scores of arms to the Red Army command. The ensuing events, which resulted in the transfer of Czechoslovak allegiance to the anti-Bolshevik forces, are clouded in both Western and Soviet accounts. Eventually, the Bolsheviks began hindering the advance of the Czechoslovaks and there were frequent conflicts between them. Soviet and Western sources, of course, disagree about the cause of these tensions. According to communist sources, Red Army commissars agitated so successfully among the Legionnaires that reactionary officers and soldiers broke off and started fighting the Bolsheviks. The Legion was beset with defections and many young soldiers were won to the Soviet side. This is also the account that appears in the biographies of communist officers whose first military experience was with the Legion.52 Western accounts also cite communist agitation as the cause of the disturbances and claim that Czechoslovak professional soldiers, disgruntled by communist proselytizing, gradually turned against the Soviets. Whatever the case, relations between the Bolsheviks and the Legion rapidly deteriorated. Meanwhile, the French and British pressured Benes and Masaryk to open an anti-Bolshevik front. Masaryk was very much against this, thoroughly convinced that anti-Bolshevik 45

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forces could not win and that Lenin should be appeased. Nonetheless, growing anti-Bolshevism among Czechoslovak officers triumphed before the decision could be made. The Czechoslovak Legion, under Captains Kadler and Gajda, began a march eastward, over a stretch of five thousand miles. The Czechoslovak Legion in Siberia was heralded worldwide for its fight against the Bolsheviks. At one time this small detachment actually set up an occupation government along the Trans-Siberian railway and managed to keep lines of communication open. The Legion and the Bolsheviks warred openly. The seriousness of the conflict can be seen in Lenin's despair about Czechoslovak successes: "The fatal plans of Anglo-French imperialism can only be frustrated if we succeed in crushing the Czechoslovaks and their counterrevolutionary partisans on the Volga, the Urals and in Siberia."33 It was not long before Czechoslovak soldiers became disenchanted with the anti-Bolshevik cause, however. The repressiveness and corruption of General Kolchak and certain Cossack units disillusioned the young Czechoslovaks. But as disillusioned as the Legion members were with Kolchak, it was the clashes with the Bolsheviks that were bloody. Indeed, the inroads that communist agitation and disillusionment with Kolchak made were undermined by the activities of the international communist movement. The 1919 incursion of the forces of Bela Kun's short-lived Hungarian Socialist Republic into Slovak territory repulsed the young Czechoslovaks. Many young Legionnaires tried to return to the homeland to fight the invaders. Before much of consequence could come of their efforts, however, Kun's socialist experiment was overthrown. These deep and bitter memories of clashes with the Bolsheviks must have left an impression upon the young Legionnaires. In fact, one of the most famous Czechoslovak collaborators during the German occupation was Gajda, the Legion's leader. It is difficult to estimate the depth of the ambivalence toward the Soviets that these experiences must have engendered. The numerous atrocities that Bolshevik and Czechoslovak troops committed against one another 46

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must have been difficult to forget. This was the military legacy of the soldiers who constituted the professional officer corps in interwar Czechoslovakia. It is a heritage that casts some doubt on the consistently argued point that there was no cause for anti-Sovietism among the army personnel of the interwar Republic. In sum, the Czechoslovak officer corps was an extremely heterogeneous group and in the period from 1945 to 1948 there was little disenfranchisement of elite officers. But as the communization of Czechoslovakia progressed, the noncommunists were increasingly circumvented in decision making. This strategy was pursued together with attempts to create a junior officer corps more to the liking of the KSC. In conjunction with this strategy of building for the future the party began an effort to politicize and communize the New Czechoslovak Army. An army "enlightenment program" under Jaroslav Prochazka had been instituted in the brigade soon after its inception. The program was retained under the Kosice Accord and a Main Department of Enlightenment and Education was created. The Accord provided that only men of the highest moral and political purity could become enlightenment officers. Not surprisingly, the department, which was the predecessor of the Main Political Administration, was made up of officers who were overwhelmingly communist. More importantly, the program stated that enlightenment officers should exist at the unit level and they should be directly subordinate to the Department of Enlightenment, not to the commander of the unit.54 Several laws were enacted in an attempt to actually diminish party politics in the army. Most notably, laws against party proselytizing were instituted in 1946 by joint decree of the president and the minister of defense.55 Under these laws, no party was permitted to campaign within the military during preelection activities. Furthermore, party documents were prohibited in the military. Other laws favored the communist, or more directly the Soviet, cause, however. It was, for instance, forbidden to distribute any publications except those 47

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of "friendly foreign presses" on the grounds of Czechoslovak military installations.56 The "friendly" status was to be determined by the commander in consultation with the political education department. Thus, nothing could be distributed unless Prochazka's strongly communist office approved. The situation was apparently less than ideal for either side. Most accounts state that the political network was incomplete. In addition to the dearth of reliable officers, the reticence of other parties bridled Prochazka's activities. Typical of the distrust of Prochazka was a statement by BeneS categorically warning political officers about party politics in the army. On the occasion of the opening of the Czechoslovak military school for education officers he stated, "The school is an outgrowth of the cultural work of the Czechoslovak Legion and the army of the First Republic. As for politics, education officers should point out the political events and their relationship to Kosice, but should remember that soldiers may be of different political views and should avoid taking the side of any party." 57 Stressing the importance of traditional military and cultural values, BeneS was attempting to cast political education in a mold quite different from the communist political education initiative. Prochazka's work was checked by the coalition, but pervasive enough to engender complaints from regular officers that political education was taking too much time. Ministry officials issued numerous statements asking that enlightenment programs not interfere with regular army training, but it is clear that Prochazka's efforts grew stronger as the period of coalition drew to a close.58 Over time, the recruitment of officers into the communist ranks weakened the opposition to the program. The modest communist successes in the reconstitution of junior and middle officer grades and the institution of a political education program did not mean that the goals of KoSice had been achieved, however. The constraints of coalition politics seriously retarded other aspects of military development. The problems were most evident in the fluctuation in the size of the military in the three-year period and in the severe 48

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problems that beset the training and equipping of the New Czechoslovak Army. Communist historians readily admit that the close coordination with the Red Army, so triumphantly proclaimed in KoSice, did not materialize in this period. There were numerous delays in building the military to full strength, since coalition members disagreed about the proper size of the forces. Originally, it was hoped that the military would be returned to about 190,000 men. This number would grow to about 240,000 by 1954.59 The actual size of the 1945 CLA was about 177,000 and the consensus is that this number decreased over the three-year period. In 1948, the military numbered only about 130,000 in eleven incomplete divisions.60 The most serious hindrance to building the military were problems associated with training and equipment. The communists complained bitterly during the entire period that "Westerners" were trying to torpedo the Kosice promises on training and coordination with the USSR. At a meeting of the National Defense Committee of the National Assembly, communist deputies accused the coalition government of bad laith and tacitly threatened "sanctions" if the situation were not corrected. 61 In reality, the training difficulties were due as much to Soviet inability to provide enough instructors, training manuals, small arms, and ammunition as to recalcitrance on the part of the coalition. Furthermore, the communistinitiated decision to employ military personnel in civilian brigade activity—particularly bridge building and aid to farmers—seriously reduced the time available for training. These difficulties were exacerbated by the rather slow recovery of Czechoslovakia's armament industries. The domestic armament potential of the industries was impressive, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. During the interwar years Czechoslovakia was Central Europe's largest producer of small arms and artillery pieces, and with the interwar restrictions on German rearmament, Czechoslovakia became a center of production for all Europe. The quality of Czechoslovak arms was widely acclaimed, as were the domestically produced in49

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novations and design modifications of foreign weapons. Nonetheless, Czechoslovakia was resource poor and dependent on imported raw materials. Because of Soviet inability to deliver sufficient raw materials, the armament sector could not operate at full capacity. Severe dislocations were also caused by the refusal of members of the coalition to acquiesce in several communist proposals for the reorganization of the industries and for weapons mix and diversification.62 Thus, as communist sources have claimed, one major problem was indeed political disagreement. A speedup in the reestablishment and reconstruction of armament industries was ordered in 1946. In order to facilitate the reconstruction of all industries, including arms production, heavy industry had been nationalized earlier. The struggle between noncommunist and communist members of the coalition was fierce. In a January 15 meeting of the National Defense Committee, the communists categorically expressed dissatisfaction over the course of rearmament. "The Communist Party hopes that the CLA will solve problems of organization and specifications of new armament, battle command and other problems leading toward unchangeable alliance with the U.S.S.R. The Kosice program stated that an effort would be made for the closest cooperation in armament coordination with the Red Army. This has not been achieved." Particularly objectionable to noncommunist leaders was the suggestion that Czechoslovak armament industries at Brno and Plzeii be abandoned in favor of the easternmost locations. The proposals even suggested that Czechoslovakia was too far west and thus too exposed to be a reliable center of armament for the USSR. Therefore, they concluded, Czechoslovak domestic armament should be "completely incorporated into Soviet production or abandoned entirely in favor of dependence on the U.S.S.R."63 In addition to the inability of the Soviet Union to supply raw materials to the Czechoslovak armament industries, only a portion of the expected donation and sale of Soviet military supplies and equipment was received. The Soviets, engaged 50

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in a mammoth reconstruction effort, were overextended in trying to supply all of Eastern Europe. In 1945 the Soviet military liaison in Prague admitted to U.S. officials that the termination of Lend-Lease and the devastation of Soviet industry would make it difficult to equip the Czechoslovaks.64 Consequently, Czechoslovakia turned to Great Britain and the United States to obtain the equipment. Although the United States was reluctant, the British considered the chance to aid the Czechoslovaks a final opportunity to promote British influence within the new armed forces. In November 1945, for example, the United States Department of State received requests from Svoboda for clothing and supplies for the reequipment of the Czechoslovak army.65 The initial request was primarily for the supply of blankets, boots, and so on, and included no request for arms.66 Requests were subsequently received for damaged British and U.S. munitions and captured German material for training purposes. These requests were denied on the grounds that by law surplus Lend-Lease had to be returned and all captured German material had been destroyed or had deteriorated so badly that it was unusable.67 In fact, secret correspondence shows that the United States was actually concerned, not with the state of the surplus goods, but with the possibility that the transfer of munitions to Czechoslovakia might trigger similar requests from Poland and Yugoslavia.68 A memorandum cautions the War Department "to consider whether increasing the military potential of these countries is in the best U.S. interest." 69 Obviously, at least some in the Department of State already considered Czechoslovakia within the Soviet orbit. For over a year, the United States and the Czechoslovaks bickered about various terms of loans and payment for equipment. 70 The British continued to press for U.S. permission to sell equipment, including a fighter-bomber squadron of mosquito aircraft, to the Czechs.71 In subsequent documents, U.S. Department of State officials considered the British request: "The United Kingdom requested permission of the U.S. to send 51

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obsolete (Lend-Lease) British war planes to Czechoslovakia. The British want to maintain a connection with the Czech air force which was U.K. trained and feel that a denial would turn the Czechs completely to the Soviets for supplies and work to replace pro-British aviators."72 The United States did not find these arguments compelling but eventually agreed, although the Americans considered tying the hands of the British in pursuing this policy.73 There were several angry exchanges between Czechoslovakia and the United States. The Czechoslovaks were furious about the incidents, claiming unfair treatment and discrimination in U.S. policy. National Socialist Hubert Ripka wrote a scathing telegram that stated, "If we cannot get credits in sufficient measure from one country, we shall try another." 74 It is doubtful that a different U.S. policy would have made a major difference in Czechoslovakia's course toward military alignment with the USSR. Nevertheless, the policies on arming and equipping Czechoslovakia were part of a larger U.S. policy that often publicly embarrassed the pro-Western forces within the coalition. The coalition's fight to maintain Western influence in the military was certainly not helped by U.S. refusals and by policies that publicly proclaimed Czechoslovakia neutral while privately considering it a part of the Soviet camp. U.S. armament-export policies further weakened the already slim chances for Czechoslovak-Western military cooperation, and at a time when Czechoslovak good will toward the USSR was running low within the military establishment because of chronically late and insufficient deliveries of materials. T H E MILITARY AND THE POLICE

In addition to trying, with great difficulty, to establish a reliable military, the communists worked feverishly to provide counterweights to the armed forces by upgrading the other power instruments. The activity of these organizations lies outside the scope of this work, but a brief digression to 52

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discuss their relationship to the regular armed forces is useful. In 1946 a group of party members who worked in the factories was commissioned, armed, and given the task of protecting plants against saboteurs.75 This group was the predecessor of the People's Militia, and operated in strict secrecy. Constituted in earnest just prior to the revolution in 1948, the militia was quite effective in putting down numerous anticommunist demonstrations in the immediate postrevolutionary period. In fact, the militia was used instead of the military to garrison Prague during the February crisis. Additionally, the Czechoslovak police forces were reconstituted and became a strong counterforce to the regular armed forces. Briefly, the Ministry of the Interior housed the regular police and the secret police (StB). The highly secretive StB was authorized to conduct investigations and arrest those suspected of crimes against the state. A second group involved in many police activities was the military intelligence unit known as OBZ (Obranne Bezpecnostni Zpravodajsvi), under the leadership of Col. Bedfich Reicin. The military intelligence unit was housed in the Ministry of Defense. Reicin allegedly used the OBZ for political spying on army personnel. 76 He was given jurisdiction over military personnel and civilians who were deemed security threats. Obviously, this often set the StB and OBZ on a collision course and the tension and rivalry between them were great. Moreover, it is clear that the StB often investigated military personnel, ostensibly Reicin's jurisdiction. Reicin was a political appointee with no military experience, having joined the armed forces only in Moscow in 1942. He is said, nonetheless, to have had decisive influence in settling matters of commission, assignment, and promotion affecting regular army officers.77 Suspected of having a Soviet background, Reicin organized the OBZ so that, according to military officers, the OBZ was active down to the unit level. These officers claimed that the OBZ officer was usually not known to the chief of the General Staff or to the commanding officer.78 In alliance with Pro53

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chazka's political enlightenment group, Reicin is said to have controlled military decision making. By late 1946, other parties in the coalition, in particular the National Socialists, were calling for the abolition of the OBZ, citing Reicin's pervasive control and meddling. These groups also launched a drive to remove the OBZ from the Ministry of Defense and place it under the General Staff, claiming that Svoboda had done nothing to check Reicin's power.79 The move was never made, and the OBZ remained under the minister. The police forces and the military were almost completely parallel organizations. The uniforms and insignia differed only slightly and police ranks and grades were identical with those of the Czechoslovak army. Moreover, the police were identically equipped with weapons and often received material when the army did not. Collectively, the police apparatus was a powerful counterweight to the military, having increased by forty thousand from the size of the prewar forces. Thus, by distributing power among the regular armed forces, the various police, and the militia, the power instruments were effectively dispersed and each rendered incapable of independent action. It was thus possible to ensure that none of the instruments could seize political power and that later each could be manipulated when the Communist party took control. At the time of the February "Revolution" the armed forces were at least twenty thousand men short of their intended peacetime strength. The postwar effort to effectively train and equip the New Czechoslovak Army had stalled as a result of both the tug of war of coalition politics and drastically underestimated difficulties in the production and supply of arms. The military elite was still divided between pro-Soviet and pro-Western officers and the loyalty of the officer cadre was equally suspect in the eyes of the communists and of Benes. Consequently, the skeletal armed forces played no role in the February takeover and remained confined to barracks by presidential order. Communist sources have since attempted to establish that there was army support for the "revolution of 1948." Several 54

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sources cite organized procommunist demonstrations by officers and soldiers in January 1948. ^ Furthermore, they claim that Rude Prdvo, distributed by the enlightenment department within army organizations, was read widely. At least one source even claims that Gottwald received a letter from an organization of military officers in January 1948 asking him to "save the democratic people's government."81 Whatever the verity of these "incidents" of army support, it is clear that the armed forces remained neutral in the political crisis. The military role was usurped by the militia and the police. On February 22, the state security organ, the SNB, informed Gottwald that "preparations were being undertaken by several National Socialist groups for illegal military organizations."82 Allegedly in reaction to this disclosure, Gottwald ordered the official formation of the People's Militia and the establishment of a General Staff of the People's Militia.83 A rudimentary militia had been formed in 1946 for the purpose of safeguarding factories. This more formal organization brought all of the smaller groups under one central command. And the militia was formally recognized as a "column" of the SNB and placed under the management of the Ministry of the Interior. During the crisis, the militia was armed with weapons and equipment from the regular army's arsenal. In fact, communist members of the military were even summoned to duty with the militia. In conjunction with the police forces, the militia and these individuals from the regular armed forces formed an effective counterweight to the New Czechoslovak Army. At the end of the crisis, Gottwald acknowledged the role of these groups in securing the dictatorship of the proletariat.84 The army's neutrality cannot be dismissed as an unimportant factor in the communist rise to power, however. Many have questioned the wisdom of Benes in failing to order the army to resist the communist takeover in February 1948. It must be reiterated that the strong communist infiltration of the military achieved during the coalition period casts doubt on the efficacy of such an attempt. In fact, communist sources claim that neutrality was all that was asked of the army and 55

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that communist organizations in the armed forces worked feverishly during the crisis to make certain that "certain reactionary attempts to use the army would not succeed. This goal of the KSC in the army was fully realized. "85 Though the senior officer corps was quite heterogeneous, many junior officers were brought into the army from the First Army Corps or from the efforts, beginning in 1946, to bring working-class youth into the military. In this regard, the "failure" to call on the army to "defend the nation" takes on a very different light. Furthermore, there is some evidence that very highranking officers, in particular Ludvik Svoboda, exhibited attitudes about the crisis that may have forewarned Benes of difficulties in employing the military. It has been said that Svoboda told Benes, "The army goes with the nation."86 This rather amorphous statement cannot be interpreted as support for Benes, however, and there are contradictory reports that Svoboda and other communist officers donned uniforms and pressured the president into accepting the "revolutionary" solution.87 Thus, one must doubt the ability of Benes to mobilize the army in support of the democratic coalition. Moreover, after the strong forces of the police and the militia were mobilized to support the KSC, the ill-equipped army might have been incapable of effective resistance in any case. In retrospect, communist historians who emphasize the importance of the neutrality of the armed forces in the KSC's successful rise to power make a very persuasive argument. The army did not take an active part in the events of February. However, this fact, that the army and its leaders stood on the side of the people, buried the final hopes of the reaction. . . . And this, that in the days of February the army did not take part, corresponded with the tactical plan of the leadership of the KSC . . . to decide the governmental crisis peacefully, by constitutional means. The Communist party depended upon the resolve of the masses of the people, and entrusted the hopes for resolution to the preparation of the working class.88 56

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This contention that neutrality was all that was asked of the army is quite logical. The fact is that in denying the support of the armed forces to Benes, the KSC could confidently demand the resolution of the crisis in its own favor and then establish communist rule. In Czechoslovakia, where resistance was minimal, it is clear that this was a more compelling strategy than trying to mobilize the army. Clearly, the strategy was successful. But the stage was also set for isolating the army from the Communist party when the KSC excluded the military from the "political solution" in 1948.

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CHAPTER T H R E E

The Formation of the Army of the Socialist Type, 1948-1956 The immediate casualties in the armed forces of the February takeover were the remaining senior officers who were considered Westerners Often, officers who were outside Czechoslovakia did not answer the recall of the KSC in 1948 Numerous members of military missions abroad resigned and sought asylum in the West, several high-ranking officers defected to the West Among these were Gen Frantisek Dastich, Gen Alois Liska, Gen Mirko Vesel, and Gen V Hasal, all members of the "London elite " These officers criticized the "foreign will being imposed upon Czechoslovakia" and the "backward, foreign methods being employed within the military "l "Londoners" who did not leave were removed from positions of authority, tried, and imprisoned At least eighteen top officers were purged immediately in 1948 2 All were men who had been installed in positions of authority at Benes's insistence The General Staff was thoroughly decimated The entire command of the General Staff was removed, and between February and December 1948, 10 percent of all personnel assigned to staff duty was purged 3 Gen Hehdor Pika, deputy chief of the General Staff, was dismissed Pika was an outspoken anticommunist whom the KSC had tried, unsuccessfully, to remove from positions of authority throughout the coalition period Following his dismissal, Pika was accused of high treason The charges included "working against the Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance and giving military, state, and industrial secrets to foreign powers in 1946 and 1947 "4 Pika was executed shortly thereafter, on June 22, 1949 A few months later, Pika's superior, Bohumir Bocek, was removed 58

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1948-1956 Bocek had apparently been a compromise candidate for the post of chief of the General Staff in 1945. He was an officer with "Moscow experience," but had actually been in the USSR as one of the representatives of the Benes group, sent to Moscow to coordinate the activities and aid in the command of the First Army Corps. A second group of officers who drew immediate attention in 1948 were members of the air force. The air force command, under General Janousek, lost 124 members in a purge. 5 Janousek was sentenced to eighteen years in prison. In the case of the air force, the suspicion extended well beyond the officer corps. As previously mentioned, the regular air forces were long suspect, having been heavily influenced by the British Royal Air Force. Unlike the ground forces, the airmen maintained contacts with the British throughout the coalition period, even receiving considerable surplus RAF equipment. The attempts to dilute the air force with members of the air support units of the Czechoslovak First Army moved slowly, and in 1948 the air force was still considered a Western stronghold. Soon after the takeover, numerous airmen defected. In fact, individual airmen as well as whole air formations escaped across western borders in their aircraft. Attempts were made to halt the fleeing air force personnel, and airmen were locked in the barracks and the fuel drained from their planes. As party sources admitted in 1968, "The crossings of the border . . . created mistrust toward the majority of air force personnel, but particularly the Westerners." 6 The source goes on to say that many of the concerns about the air force were warranted: "There existed groups of officers who after February prepared antistate attacks."7 The attacks were extended to other officers, against whom charges were fabricated, however: "Apart from these real groups, further groups appeared . . . artificially constructed by the military information service. . . . Therefore, not long after February, cases were 'created' which later developed into unauthorized arrests of officers. . . . It 59

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is in this category that we can also place investigations of Slovak generals and some Western officers."8 The fabricated cases were prepared primarily by Bedfich Reicin's military intelligence group. Early in 1949, a military counterintelligence department was formed within the Ministry of Defense to monitor and act on "matters involved with personnel." 9 Reicin was given wide latitude in seeking antiparty elements within the military. He was instrumental in preparing the trial against Pika and other pro-Western officers. When the purges turned to communist officers as well, he played an equally active role in constructing "testimony" and obtaining "evidence" in those cases. The purge of the officer corps was bolstered by the alleged involvement of the military in the resistance movements that followed the takeover of 1948. For some time after the takeover, the communist regime was troubled by popular resistance, sabotage, and unrest. The problems were not limited to, but were particularly acute in Slovak lands. In connection with the resistance, an alleged coup was discovered. According to certain members of Reicin's military intelligence group, "reactionary" military elements, in concert with enemy agents, were intending to overthrow the regime. 10 The plot was supposedly headed by a Lt. Col. Josef Hruska, who had enlisted the support of "several" high-ranking officers. Among these was Gen. Karel KultvaSr, a former wartime resistance fighter. Initially, fourteen junior officers were arrested in addition to KultvaSr and accused of espionage and terrorism. Eventually over two thousand Czechoslovak citizens, at least seven hundred of whom were military personnel, were accused of involvement in the intended coup. Of the seven hundred who were arrested, approximately two hundred were middle- and high-ranking officers, but Kultvasr was the only officer of general rank who was accused in the plot.11 In addition to those purged, hundreds of officers were demoted to reserve duty. 12 In this way, officers of marginal political loyalty were retained in the reserves. It was thus possible to bring them back into the institution after the critical period had passed. 60

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1948-1956 The history of the coup remains shrouded in mystery. U.S. intelligence maintained the coup's authenticity at the time and several defectors claimed that army officers were intending to "gain control of military and economic objectives in western Czechoslovakia, hoping for spontaneous general uprisings of the whole population. "13 In fact, the uprisings that had begun in February 1948 continued and even intensified in January 1949, when the coup was allegedly scheduled. The government did find it necessary to cancel all officer leaves, secure side arms, and restrict all garrison areas to "approved personnel" during the first month of 1949.14 If indeed there was a planned coup, it apparently failed when a "coconspirator" betrayed the plot to the minister of defense. At a cabinet meeting on May 17, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior commended Genek Hruska for the successful liquidation of the the coup. Hruska was given the Order of the White Lion and promoted. 15 He eventually rose to deputy minister of defense for political affairs. In spite of this "evidence" of the coup's authenticity, subsequent events undermine the validity of the charges. First, though he was accused of high treason, Kultvasr was not executed but given a life sentence. It was said that this was because of his nominal role in planning the coup.16 Lt. Col. Josef Hruska was executed. But in 1966, a commission of inquiry into the political trials of the post-takeover period conditionally acquitted Hruska. This was done even though the commission maintained that "certain army officers" had been involved in crimes against the state in the 1948-49 period." 17 The commission admitted that in the search for those elements, some mistakes were made. It is probable, therefore, that certain military officers were involved, but that Kultvasr and Hruska were scapegoats. Given the "evidence" at the time that the military was going to be used against the government by pro-Western elements, the pressure to find culprits must have been great. This is especially true, since the party was facing very real resistance and sabotage. In this atmosphere, the military elite, suspected of pro-Western 61

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1948-1956 sympathies, was an easy mark. The degree of discomfort is apparent in the fact that at the ninth Congress, in August 1949, only one percent of the Central Committee members elected were from the army or the police organization.18 The degree of distrust between party and military is also apparent in the fact that the size of the CLA was allowed to fall below its 1948 level. The new class of twenty-year-olds was not called up for service in May 1949.19 In fact, it became common practice, once the draft was reactivated, to send sons of "capitalist" and "middle-class" families into forced labor instead of into military service.20 T H E PURGE OF COMMUNIST PROFESSIONALS IN THE OFFICER CORPS

The dismantling of the officer corps did not cease when the purge of the Westerners was completed. The liquidation of the Kultvasr group did not clear the air and the entire professional military came under suspicion. Even Moscow-trained communists were dismissed. The new wave of purges destroyed the nucleus of a national, communist, and professional military elite. In the middle of 1949, the general secretary of the ruling Communist party Rudolf Slansky, announced, "Because of the prevalence of enemy agents among the officers, but for a few exceptions, the entire old officer corps must be replaced by new people." 21 The new purges thus engulfed officers who were members of the Communist party. In 1950, laws were passed that ordered the immediate release from the armed forces of veterans who fought in the West or with the International Brigade (an overwhelmingly communist group) in the Spanish Civil War.22 But the purge did not stop even here and members of the First Army Corps were quickly engulfed in the reign of terror. Apparently, the new political trials that followed in the military were engendered primarily by changes in the international environment. In 1949, the KSC came under attack by the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary for failure to actively conduct a struggle 62

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1948-1956 against residual antisocialist elements in Czechoslovakia. The proponents of this claim cited the continued resistance throughout the state. But the real target of this "antisocialist" purge were members of the party who were considered disloyal. The environment was charged with the break of the Yugoslav Communist party and Tito's deviation. The intensifying cold war added fuel to the already volatile Soviet sentiment. All East European satellites were vigorously encouraged to unmask anti-Soviet, bourgeois nationalists in their own parties. The most substantial effort against "nationalists" was launched in Hungary, where a leading communist, Laszlo Rajk, was implicated in crimes against the state and arrested. Gradually throughout the bloc, "conspiratorial centers" were discovered, in which Titoists were said to be operating. In preparation for the Rajk trial, the Hungarian party secretary, Matyas Rakosi, asked Gottwald for the arrest of several Czechoslovaks whom the Hungarians did not trust. Gottwald resisted, but increasingly the Soviets and Poles joined the Hungarian attack, claiming that Czechoslovakia was not vigilant in dealing with "Titoists" in the KSC. Starting in 1949 and continuing through 1951, Czechoslovakia reportedly was repeatedly rebuked, called the weak link in the socialist alliance, and told to pursue anti-Soviets more diligently.23 The Hungarians were especially virulent. Czechoslovakia, they said, had come only recently to socialist rule. But the most important reason that Czechoslovakia was the weak link was the country's unprotected and unsecured frontier.24 This rather blatant reference to the absence of Soviet troops was apparently rebuffed by Gottwald. Nevertheless, Cominform members pressured Gottwald to allow the USSR to station troops on Czechoslovak soil. Though the KSC leadership resisted this initiative and troops were not stationed, the Czechs agreed that vigilance in locating antiparty elements should be intensified. Regarding the armed forces, Slansky even admitted, "We are still unmasking many enemy agents among our officers. •" 63

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Unable to convince the Czechoslovaks of the need for Soviet troops, the Hungarians began to insist that the Czechs invite Soviet security advisers to aid in unmasking reactionaries. The KSC acceded to the request, and in the fall of 1949 twenty-six Soviet security advisers led by Generals Likhachev and Markov arrived in Czechoslovakia.26 They were soon replaced by a second group headed by Boyarsky. Rapid reorganization of the Czechoslovak security services—which the Soviet advisers denounced as "soft" on class enemies—was undertaken and a department was created within the Ministry of the Interior to deal with the cases of party members. A subdivision was created solely for the purpose of investigating military officers. In order to deny the National Assembly responsibility for overseeing the military in these troubled times, the party secretary and his inner circle assumed authority over the armed forces and the security apparatus. This control was institutionalized with the creation of a Department of Defense and Security Affairs within the Central Committee. With the changes accomplished, the search for a Czechoslovak Rajk began in earnest. The Czechoslovak effort eventually blossomed into the most comprehensive postwar political trials in East Central Europe. There were other incidents of "renegade" Czechoslovak behavior that fueled anti-KSC sentiment within the Cominform. Just as Titoism and bourgeois nationalism were rallying cries on the heels of the Yugoslav split, subsequent difficulties between the Soviet Union and Israel added Zionism to the list of sins. In the Soviet Union, the dismissal of members accused of Zionist behavior was epidemic. There was an element of anti-Semitism in Poland, Hungary, and Romania as well. But in Czechoslovakia, the anti-Semitism would become extremely pronounced. The reasons for this are inextricably linked to international circumstances. When the Soviet Union broke diplomatic relations with Israel in 1949, all other bloc states, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, immediately did the same. Czechoslovakia's attachment to Israel was deeper than that of the other Soviet allies, rooted in 64

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1948-1956 pro-Semitic feelings within the party and in recently formed ties with the new Israeli state. It will be remembered that Czechoslovakia was the initial, and at one time sole, supplier of arms for the Israeli war for independence against the Palestinians. On the basis of this record, it was decided that the Czechoslovak leadership was probably harboring Zionists and that the search for pro-Israel elements should be intensified.27 Thus many of the first key victims of the hunt for antistate elements were Slovak and Jewish. The armed forces were linked to activity within these regional espionage groups, but this pretext was soon dropped as the purge of the armed forces spread. This time, the effort to eliminate questionable elements was comprehensive, and the greater portion of the professional military elite, men who had come to their positions through military careers, was dismissed. Before April 1950, all top elite positions were held by career officers, with the exception of Prochazka in political education. After July 1950, only one member of the top five officers in the CLA was a career military man. Under the new order, Alexej Cepicka, formerly minister of justice and a highranking communist, became minister of defense; Prochazka became chief of the General Staff; Reicin was promoted to deputy minister status, and Gen. K. Drnec, a professional officer, was retained for a short time as second deputy minister. In the position of MPA chief, Bohuslav Lastovicka replaced Prochazka. This purge of the High Command was engendered by Soviet distrust of the military elite, which it had only recently helped to install. The first sign that the Soviets considered these professional officers untrustworthy was the refusal, in April 1950, to send military advisers to Czechoslovakia upon Svoboda's request. The Soviets replied directly to Gottwald, stating, "Our military staff consider that General Svoboda is not deserving of confidence and that it will be impossible to talk openly with him about military secrets of the U.S.S.R."28 Remarkably, this statement was made about a man decorated with high Soviet military honors, but Slansky clarified the 65

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Soviet objections to Svoboda. Apparently, Svoboda's appointment to the Ministry in 1945 had been a temporary measure. Svoboda was, according to Slansky, "essentially a man who although he joined the party, was alien to it and surrounded himself with Drgac, Drnec, Klapalek and Novak—all exLegionnaires—who had been trained in western military doctrine and were not favorably disposed to Soviet military doctrine" (emphasis added).29 Clearly, the Legionnaire background, discussed previously, was a source of consternation for the Soviets. The Legionnaires were essentially Western trained and were involved in anti-Bolshevik fighting at the end of World War I. A few of these officers claim to have been converted to communism during the experience. The former fact outweighed the latter, however, and more senior Czechoslovak officers—most of whom shared the Legionnaire's heritage—were considered untrustworthy. Svoboda was "promoted" to vice-premier for physical education and sport. Slansky explained that the army's failings were all attributable to Svoboda and his "group" and that only the "urgent advice of Comrade Stalin pointed this out. "30 The replacement of Svoboda with Cepicka, a man with no professional military experience, was an apparent victory for those who doubted the loyalty of the professional elite. Cepicka was also a hard-liner, having participated in the first round of purges. It was, in fact, Cepicka who held the distinction of creating the closed interrogation sessions that would become infamous for their brutality. Nevertheless, Cepicka may have been a compromise candidate. Other allied ministers of defense were Soviet nationals of East European origin, most having lived their entire adult lives in the Soviet Union. After Svoboda's dismissal, there were rumors that a Soviet citizen would be appointed. 31 Given Cominform's concern about the absence of Soviet troops, the idea might have been entertained. Whatever the case, a Soviet national was not appointed and this modicum of military autonomy was preserved in Czechoslovakia at a time when other armies were directly overseen by Soviet nationals. This 66

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1948-1956 explains, in part, why the "renationalization" of the next period was less comprehensive in the CLA than in the Polish and Hungarian militaries. The appointment of a Czechoslovak national did not halt the purges; rather the terror increased. Immediately after Cepicka's appointment, criticism of the CLA intensified. In his first pronouncement as chief of the General Staff, Prochazka stated that the army was purging many officers because they showed "resistance—based on hatred of the Soviet Union—to efforts to build the army in the Soviet pattern. We are finding out that a lack of knowledge and ability is displayed in the Czechoslovak army toward Soviet military science and the Soviet war experience, and that we encounter even direct distaste and resistance based on hatred toward everything Soviet."32 Cepicka, echoing Prochazka's sentiment, stated that there were shortcomings in the armed forces and that it was necessary to "root them out with all speed." 33 He assailed the failure of the CLA to follow the example of the Soviet army and said that all of the talk of using the experience of the Soviet army had remained mostly talk. On the basis of this discovery of anti-Sovietism, the next round of military purges began. This time—as in the purge of the elite—the professional officer corps was purged of communists who had the misfortune to become entangled in the trials of several "conspiratorial centers." Moreover, the members of the senior elite who had been charged with negligence were now charged with more serious crimes against the state. The military purges officially began in June 1950 with the dismissal of Gen. Bruno Zapletal and the arrest of Svoboda and other recently demoted officers. Afterward, Cepicka warned that this was "just the beginning of improvements. We shall in the future do everything possible to improve the conditions of the soldier and to punish all culprits guilty of negligence of state duties in this respect. " M The charges soon became less benign, however. In connection with the discovery of yet another antiparty conspiratorial center around Otto Sling, the chief of the par67

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1948-1956 ty's regional committee in Brno, charges were brought against the so-called generals group. Sling, who was accused of foreign espionage, was said to have had the backing of several Czechoslovak generals in the Third Military Area in Slovakia. Early in 1951, Generals Bulandr and Novak—commanders in that district—and a political officer, Gen. Bedfich Kopold, were arrested. As a result of the "generals' plot," eight Czechoslovak generals were sentenced, over a period of three years, to a total of 128 years in prison.35 All were exonerated in 1968 by governmental rehabilitation commissions. All but one of the generals were Communist party members. Additionally, lighter sentences were passed against numerous Slovak officers and junior officers. It was later revealed that the Ministry of Defense was actually maintaining large forced labor camps for military personnel convicted of "political crimes."36 The Ministry was also supporting the notorious "cottage" where military personnel were tortured and often confessed to crimes against the state. Many other officers were sentenced to labor in special prisons. Cepicka oversaw this set of purges, but the governmental commissions reviewing the cases fifteen years later claimed that primary responsibility rested with Bedfich Reicin, the security services, and the international communist movement. 37 But, apparently, new security services—now under Soviet direction—eventually eclipsed Reicin. The investigations were, after 1952, carried out by HIS (the Main Information Administration), which was headed by General Musil. Musil was promoted within three years from staff captain of the SNB to general.38 In 1949 and 1950, the budget of the Ministry of the Interior exceeded that of the Ministry of Defense by one billion dollars.39 This shows the depth of police influence in the Czechoslovak state in the period. Finally, the militia seems to have been involved as well, often employed as "investigators" by the security services.40 The discovery of conspiratorial centers around the Slovaks in regional organizations was followed by the arrest and trial of the ruling general party secretary, Rudolf Slansky. The 68

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1948-1956 purges were allegedly planned by Minister Cepicka in concert with the Soviet Union. On July 23, 1951, Cepicka attended a Soviet Politburo meeting as Gottwald's personal representative. 41 Sent to Moscow to report on the creeping suspicion of Slansky, Cepicka was confronted with Soviet criticism of the state of affairs within the Czechoslovak military. This was so in spite of the breadth of the trials that had just been prepared. Upon Cepicka's return, preparations began for the third wave of purges. Again, numerous Czechoslovak officers were found to be members of the "Slansky anticonspiratorial center." This time, a circle of fourteen was arrested—including the Jewish Bedfich Reicin, the military counterintelligence chief. In this wave of purges, there were elements of intraparty politics between Gottwald and Slansky. Gottwald was always senior, having founded the party, but apparently Slansky constituted a challenge to his authority.42 Cepicka gained considerably from his role in this wave of terror, and on the heels of the purges he became one of the four or five top-ranking communists in the country. He also gained Gottwald's favor—cemented by his marriage to Gottwald's daughter—and rose to Politburo membership in 1953. But in his efforts to rise to this position, he sacrificed many military officers in the new purges of 1952-1953. This element of domestic party struggle added to the already intense pressure for purges by the communist alliance. Still another wave of purges was apparently being prepared in 1953. Indeed, charges against Generals Drnec and Drgad were discussed in January 1954. Both had been demoted in 1950. On January 8, 1954, Generals B. Kopold and O. Hromadko were indicted along with twenty-two Slovak commanders of various ranks. Six other military trials were held during the early months of 1954. These were primarily trials that were "investigated" in early 1953. By the beginning of 1954 rumors were rampant of yet another wave of terror against the military.43 The new wave never began, however. International cir69

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cumstances were again changing. Stalin's and Gottwald's deaths in 1953 brought an end to their personal dictatorships and the former's demise brought an immediate lessening of terror as well. Most importantly, Soviet security chief Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria's execution set off a chain reaction in security forces throughout the bloc. The new Soviet leadership initiated a purge of Beria's police apparatus in order to neutralize the KGB in the collective leadership struggle. The activities of Soviet advisers throughout the bloc were curtailed and the respective chiefs within the bloc were recalled to Moscow. Likhachev and Markov were subsequently executed. The decrease of Soviet participation in the terror was bolstered by other domestic pressures within Czechoslovakia. After 1951 public knowledge of the terror was growing, as family members asked questions about imprisoned victims. The horrors of the military "concentration camps" became public knowledge and Cepicka eventually closed the "cottage" and other labor camps.44 Inertia, the cold war, and continuing Stalinist rule perpetuated the reign of terror for three more years, but when the change in the international atmosphere came, Czechoslovakia and the KSC seemingly welcomed the chance to put the blood purges in the past. When the new Soviet premier, Malenkov, initiated the "new course" in East Europe along with a further lessening of terror, events moved quickly toward a reversal of the damage of the purges. A commission of inquiry was appointed by the new first party secretary, A. E. Zapotocky, in January 1955. The commission worked slowly, and in trying to cover the involvement of Zapotocky, Antonin Novotny, and others still ruling in Czechoslovakia, it did little for the rehabilitation of many innocent citizens. The military was not immune to the halfhearted nature of the rehabilitation effort and few officers were exonerated by this first commission. Nonetheless, the blood purges were over and the long process of recovery had begun. Changes in Soviet policy were directly responsible for the end of the military blood purges in Czechoslovakia. The rapid 70

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1948-1956 buildup of the Czechoslovak military had begun in 1949. The stabilization of the military elite and professional officer corps was, by 1954, a necessity. The cessation of terror came just in time. Clearly, it was Cepicka's job to accomplish two tasks: the development of a loyal elite, initially at the expense of professional efficiency, and the buildup of an efficient, wellequipped military force. Thus, concurrent with the dismantling of the officer corps of the postwar armed forces—including many communist professionals—Cepicka began the development of a new officer corps and an efficient military instrument. The progress in building a reliable and efficient force was checkered and often undermined by the reign of terror, but from 1949 and increasingly after Cepicka's appointment, the buildup of the CLA became the first priority of the Czechoslovak state. Already in 1949, the KSC leadership declared its readiness to carry out the task of building a socialist and efficient army. In August 1949, Svoboda announced Czechoslovak intentions to "model the army training after that of the Soviet army, by whose side we had the honor to fight in the Second World War and by whose side in case of need we would fight again."45 In effect, this committed Czechoslovak troops to fight on the side of the Soviet Union in the event of war. Moreover, claiming that recent maneuvers showed that the CLA had made considerable progress since the February "Revolution," Svoboda added that there was still a long way to go. The most important step was initiating the "second" reconstitution of the officer corps and the replacement of the many officers who were purged during the political crisis. The need to infuse the armed forces with "workers' blood" was constantly proclaimed.46 As previously noted, a nascent worker recruitment program was operating under the coalition. The new programs that were initiated in 1947-1948 provided special opportunities for working-class youth to develop military leadership skills, but the volunteers were few in numbers and dispersed. After the takeover, the effort was accelerated and the first 71

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academy exclusively for workers was opened in the spring of 1948. The party was concerned that "a state with a leading class that is the factory class must include workers in the leadership of the army."47 The workers' school, or the Officers School of the New Generation, graduated its first class in June 1949. The timetable was apparently accelerated. The purges left many vacancies in the junior officer grades and it was necessary to quickly replace the departed officers. Congratulating the new officers, Slansky admitted that the recent difficult period had made the acceleration of training necessary. He congratulated the young men on "finishing four years' work in the space of one year. "48 But in the haste to bring workers into the military, educational requirements and technical skill were often sacrificed. Party commentators noted that "one more bourgeois notion, that leadership by workers entails lessening of efficiency, has been broken down."49 Nevertheless, the same source added, apologetically, "Teachers and officer candidates successfully completed four years of work in one year, in spite of difficulties presented by the fact that many students who had been workers for years had forgotten how to study and found that the course matter was completely foreign."30 Furthermore, admitting that the task was not easy, the commentator stated, "It was found necessary to teach courses, as much as possible, from the practical side and it had to be remembered that students came directly from manual to mental work and it was necessary to make them understand by practical methods. . . . Extensive use was made, for example, of films."51 Apparently many of these young men were actually illiterate. Platoon sergeants served as "readers," reading newspapers and political matter aloud.52 The problem of the educational level of the developing officer corps persisted for some time. In 1953, the military schools were told to bring their students to the level of secondary school graduates.53 But though the educational level of the officer corps suffered, the communization was definitely furthered by the infusion of workers. The officer corps, which had been only 37.9 percent communist in 1948, was 64.9 per72

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1948-1956 cent communist by 1952.M The composition of the corps was as follows: 53.8 percent from workers' backgrounds, 13.9 percent from poor peasant background, and 8.3 percent from families of government service. The remainder were listed as "members of other classes."55 The party leadership clearly was concerned about the dismal educational level of the officer corps. After 1950, incentive programs were begun to attract secondary-level graduates to the officer corps after their military service was completed. This was the first manifestation of the policy decision to use incentives to attract qualified candidates to military service. Initially, all civil servants who were party members were paid skilled workers' wages. This policy reflected the ideological tenet, long since dropped in the Soviet Union, that party members should be paid on a par with workers to ensure eventual equalization of wages throughout the society. In fact, the wage debate had been a key one in the Soviet Union, as leaders attempted to balance the concern for eventual wage equalization with the need to attract highly educated members of the population into the party. The Soviets eventually emerged on the side of professionalization of the party, and slowly the wage equalization question receded into the background. Czechoslovakia's flirtation with wage equalization was much briefer, and when incentives were offered to potential officer candidates, party members were apparently not excluded.56 The concern with professionalism was demonstrated in the reconstitution of the senior elite as well. As previously noted, the High Command was overwhelmingly balanced toward political officers in 1950. In 1952, this process was reversed. Prochazka, Lastovicka, and Reicin were all implicated in the Slanslcy purge and removed from office. Prochazka and Reicin were executed. But they were not replaced with fellow political officers. Rather, professional officer Vaclav Kratochvil replaced Prochazka as chief of the General Staff, and Thor, another professional officer, joined the High Command. The Main Political Administration remained in the hands of a po73

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litical officer, Hruska, and Cepicka continued as minister. Nevertheless, the two military operational posts were held by professional officers. Kratochvil was undoubtedly considered politically loyal, however. He was one of the assessors who helped to prepare the trial of Slansky. This professionalization of the officer corps was accelerated by the cessation of the blood purges and the process of rehabilitation. Numerous officers who had been deprived of party membership and removed from military service slowly reemerged after 1954 and assumed positions of responsibility. This was particularly true in the junior and middle grades, where the depth of political involvement was a less formidable obstacle. These still young, experienced military men assumed junior commands and staff positions. Notably, Martin Dzur, who would later become minister of defense, and other young Slovak officers were rehabilitated in 1955 and gradually moved to staff positions. The review and rehabilitation process was less than perfect. There were charges of unfair and uneven treatment of different cases and efforts to complete the rehabilitation continued until 1968. In the freer atmosphere of 1968, this would become one of the military's primary areas of concern. Throughout the early 1950s, the party made a number of attempts to reconcile the ideological tension between these efforts to raise the level of competence and the desire to forestall elitism and the development of a new military caste. In July 1950, all prewar army regulations were abolished. Soldiers were told that their commander's word should not be taken as law and that it was honorable to question a commander's orders. 57 Moreover, new regulations, which encouraged soldiers to actively monitor the political attitudes of their commanders, were said to "eliminate the idea that officers are a 'special caste.' It is important to replace this idea with a system of praise and rewards for exemplary as well as capable leaders." 58 More importantly, substantial efforts were devoted to the development of a pervasive political education program. The 74

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1948-1956 incipient enlightenment program that was developed under the coalition was rapidly accelerated after the takeover. Already in July 1949, General Prochazka, a Marxist intellectual whose military experience was as political commissar for the First Army Corps, stated, "Henceforth the army will have political education. He who does not have a positive attitude cannot serve as a commander."59 New party organizations, subordinate only to the president of the Central Committee, were immediately constituted. The organizations were to work "alongside the Central Committee in carrying out the course of the party within the armed forces."60 Reflecting the party's distrust of even its own members, however, party organizations consisted of "members and candidate members of the party in the armed forces and members of the party in the SNB" (emphasis added).61 Thus, the police influence in the military was direct. The formal constitution of the Main Political Administration in 1950 crystallized these political efforts under Prochazka's command. In August 1950 Rude Prdvo declared, "Political education will be rapidly intensified in the Czechoslovak army. Both men and officers must be more thoroughly indoctrinated in communism."62 The power of political commissars was increased and the "loyalty" contracts to commanders were abolished in favor of more traditional oaths to socialism and to the Soviet Union. When Prochazka was promoted to chief of the General Staff, he was replaced by communist Lastovicka, who further accelerated the program. The commitment to political education was to be total, as the minister Cepicka declared, for "only an army made up of conscious and mature soldiers and commanders is in truly fighting condition."63 A post was created for the deputy commander of political affairs within each unit. Political education classes were taught daily and reading of "political materials" during off-duty hours was required. This requirement was established because political leaders felt that "the new consciousness could hardly be cultivated in various saloons."64 75

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1 9 4 8 - 1 9 5 6 SOVIETIZATION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK ARMED FORCES

The politicization effort centered heavily upon forging cultural and ideological identification with the Soviet Union and the Soviet army. Students were encouraged to understand not only Marx-Leninism but also Soviet military science and to pursue the Soviet spirit. Russian had been taught in military academies since the war, but language instruction was made compulsory in 1950. m Courses on Soviet culture, the work of Soviet youth, and the Red Army were also instituted in all military-related schools. Soviet symbols, practices, and organizations were copied as well. Exact replicas of Soviet uniforms and insignia were adopted in the CLA, though officers were allowed to wear insignia that differed somewhat from that of the Soviet officer corps. Enlisted men were ordered to adopt Soviet traditions such as shaved heads. This proposal met with considerable resistance and the Communist party regional newspapers criticized soldiers who were spreading rumors about "concentration camps in the barracks and the institution of foreign customs."66 This symbolic Sovietization was accompanied by the adoption of an organizational structure similar to that of the Soviet army. The following is a schematic of the CLA reorganization in 1950. It retained this rough organization structure until 1968. (See Chart 3.1.) The Ministry of Defense was subordinated to the party through the Defense and Security Committee and to the government through the president of the Republic, who remained commander in chief of the forces. Mirroring the Soviet model, the Main Political Administration was afforded dual standing as a division of the Ministry of Defense—the chief of the MPA holding deputy minister status—and as an arm of the Central Committee. Party secretaries of the armed forces' party organizations were subordinated directly to the MPA, rather than to the commanders of their respective detachments. The General Staff was subordinated to the Ministry. There was not, as of yet, a separate 76

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1 9 4 8 - 1 9 5 6 Chart 3.1 The Organization of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces in 1950 President of the Republic/ Commander in Chief Party Central Committee Defense and Security Affairs Committee Ministry of Defense (Minister of Defense) Deputy/Chief of the MPA

Deputy/Chief of the General Staff Czechoslovak People's Army*

Deputy

Deputy/Military Intelligence (until 1952)

District Commands Secretaries of the Party Organizations in the Armed Forces Political Officer (Deputy Commander for Political Affairs) * The Czech word armada can be translated "armed forces" and usually Ceskoslovenska Lidova ArmSda refers to all branches of the regular armed forces. 77

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1948-1956 command of the air forces, but rather all were under the CLA command. There was, in this early organization plan, no inspector general and the National Assembly had no direct responsibility for the armed forces. Finally, as an indication of the difficult times through which the armed forces were passing in 1950, the military intelligence chief was afforded deputy minister status. This was revoked in 1952, when Reicin was purged and the CLA conformed to the characteristic three deputies. Reflecting the Soviet emphasis on capable land armies and continuing difficulties in the air force, the CLA was dominated by the ground forces branch. Reportedly, the CLA was charged with preparing an operational group of armies, subordinate in wartime to the Soviet command and prepared for a major conventional ground war.67 In order to facilitate this coordination, one thousand Soviet advisers arrived in August 1950.M Though Soviet advising was reestablished, the command staff remained in Czechoslovak hands. This contrasts with the situation in Poland, where Soviet officers of nominal Polish heritage assumed many command functions as well as the Ministry itself.69 In order to ensure a steady pool of manpower for the rapidly Sovietizing CLA, Czechoslovak laws on conscription were made to conform to those of the Soviet Union. Military service was made compulsory for young men of nineteen, but all men between the ages of seventeen and sixty were eligible for military conscription.70 Reflecting the heavy demands of the militarization effort on the small Czechoslovak population, women were made eligible for voluntary duty in peacetime and for draft in the event of war. Citizens outside of the country could be ordered to report for duty "with an allied state" in which they were living or which they could reach.71 All of these efforts were initiated to organize properly what was fast becoming a very large military establishment. The armed forces numbered about 140,000 in 1950. This was standard for peacetime in Czechoslovakia, and represented a little more than 1 percent of the population. In 1950, it was 78

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1948-1956 decided that this number was inadequate and one year later, in 1951, the CLA numbered 250,000. Another one hundred thousand men were under arms in the border guard and at least two hundred thousand were in the militia. This does not include the reported one million men in the reserves of the regular armed forces and police detachments, the armed columns of the secret police (whose size was a well-guarded secret), and the huge paramilitary youth organizations.72 In the early 1950s, Czechoslovakia may have had as many as 1.5 million people under arms, more than 10 percent of the population. T H E GROWTH OF STRATEGIC DEPENDENCE

The remarkable size of the armed forces represented a belief in the Soviet Union and throughout the communist bloc that war was imminent. Stalin reportedly spoke often of the coming conflict and the need to prepare. 73 The militarization of Czechoslovak society was perhaps best reflected in the remarkably high budgets of the time for military growth. In 1951, the budget was well over 1.5 billion korunas, but it doubled in 1952 and doubled yet again in 1953.74 By 1954, defense expenditures represented 11 percent of all items in the governmental budget. In fact, this figure probably represented only a portion of the cost, since all military education (with the exception of officer training) was ostensibly under the Ministry of Education and was reported under items designated as expenses for public education. Alexej Cepicka's influential political position and the Soviet desire to see the CLA enlarged and modernized were the only justifications needed for these immense expenditures. But even with the scope of the militarization, Cepicka continued to push. In 1952, he again called for the buildup of the armed forces and stated that it was still the country's number one priority.75 In support of this policy, the constant rise in defense spending was not the only sacrifice that Czechoslovakia made. The entire economic profile of the country was altered in this era to 79

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1948-1956 advance the militarization of the society and to support the modernizing CLA. The most important economic change was the complete shift to heavy industry. Except for its disproportionate shares of uranium, Czechoslovakia is poor in resources. Historically, in exchange for raw materials, Czechoslovakia exported consumer and light industry goods, fine china, crystal, leather products, and gourmet foods. Under the German protectorate, Czechoslovakia's industrial base was rapidly shifted to heavy industry, including the production of machine goods. After the war, Czechoslovak industries were nationalized and heavy industrial production continued, but at a slower pace. The economic profile had slowly begun to revert to its pre1939 appearance when the communist takeover and the rapid buildup of the armed forces in 1950-1951 permanently altered the economic profile, changing it to reflect the Soviet preference for heavy industry. Under the new arrangements, Czechoslovakia continued to import raw materials, but increasingly exported finished machines and metallurgical material. In fact, Czechoslovak deliveries of finished machine products trebled over five years.76 Of the total volume of machinery exported to the USSR, about one-third was manufactured according to Soviet blueprints. 77 Additionally, as Czechoslovakia's economy was increasingly devoted to machine building, the import profile showed increasing reliance upon foreign copper, aluminum, iron ore, and crude oil. The country's resource poverty and the shift to heavy industry thus created extreme dependence upon raw materials. The alternative suppliers for raw materials and chemicals were few. Initially, Czechoslovakia bought materials from France as well as from the Soviet Union.78 But under the strategic embargo of 1950, the West increasingly refused to sell many of the materials necessary for the new production profile. Limits were set on copper, aluminum, tin, and other strategic items. Thus as a heavy industry-bound, resource-poor member of the Soviet bloc, Czechoslovakia had no choice but to depend upon raw material deliveries from the Soviet Union. In the 80

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years 1951-1955, Czechoslovakia received 82 percent of its copper, 99.5 percent of aluminum, 77.4 percent of iron ore, 82.9 percent of crude oil, and sizable percentages of other materials from the Soviet Union.79 The Czechoslovak economy was developing a critical dependence on the Soviet Union. Indicative of this rapidly increasing dependence is the fact that in 1947 the Soviet Union was Czechoslovakia's sixth leading partner in trade. 80 Just two years later, the USSR was Czechoslovakia's most important partner. The shift to heavy industry also reflected the needs of a rejuvenated arms industry. During the interwar years, Czechoslovakia had been East Central Europe's largest arms producer, and during the war this active arms industry had been a critical producer for the German war machine. Krupp and other arms manufacturers used the tremendous capacity of the Skoda works for the production of armored vehicles, tanks, and small arms. After the war, the communists initially entertained the idea of closing down the Skoda works, but once in sole possession of power the KSC reconsidered and put the arms capacity to work in arming the modernizing armed forces of the bloc. Reportedly, Soviet experts usurped control of Skoda and other armament industries. 81 Large numbers of housing units were suddenly reserved for Russians in Plzeft, the center of the Skoda works.82 Skoda was given important responsibility in the design, modification, testing, and production of tanks. In support of this mission, Nikolai Khvorninov, a senior Soviet engineer, replaced Vojetech Volenik, a Czech, as head of Skoda's research department in 1949.83 During these years, Skoda produced and repaired arms for the entire bloc. In recognition of its contribution to the military development of communist power, a part of Skoda was renamed the Lenin works in 1950. In addition to domestic design and production, the Czechoslovaks were also granted the first Soviet licenses for the production of parts of aircraft. Under a coproduction license, Skoda experimented with engine parts for the MiG 15.84 This relationship, begun in 1951, was apparently fruitful and has 81

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1948-1956 expanded over the years. The Lenin works continued, of course, to produce small arms, for which the Czechoslovaks had long been famous. This period marked the first generations of Skorpion, Samoval, and the Czechoslovak variety of Kalashnikov. Czechoslovak arms production grew quantitatively, as well as qualitatively. In 1950, the arms production index was 100. Three years later, in 1953, the index was 95S.85 Czechoslovak sources claim that by 1955 the CLA was domestically supplied in small arms and small artillery pieces.86 In sum, the Czechoslovak People's Army was slowly being molded into an instrument that was both red and expert. Western analysts often overestimated the efficiency of the CLA in the period when the threat of war between East and West was so pervasive. The CLA was a large infantry detachment with an officer corps that still lacked sufficient educational and technical merit. Nevertheless, the forces were large and the process of politicization and professionalization was underway. That a greater atmosphere of trust of the professional military was emerging is reflected in a change in the composition of party organizations in the armed forces. In 1954, members of the security forces were removed from the armed forces party groups and allowed to form separate detachments. 87

SOVIET POLICY AFTER THE DEATH OF STALIN

The birth of the "army of a socialist type" coincided almost exactly with the far-reaching changes that were occurring in Soviet policy. As the tumultuous period of de-Stalinization approached, the development of the CLA began to reflect the shifting emphasis of Soviet policy. First, as a part of the peace initiative toward the West, the reduction of East European forces was offered as a symbol of the verity of the new Soviet foreign policy.88 Moreover, with the West threatening to rearm West Germany, this was a carrot to forestall such actions. CLA forces would be cut by thirty thousand men. When it was clear that the West intended to proceed with West Ger82

FORMATION OF THE ARMY, 1948-1956 man rearmament, however, the KSC threatened to increase its forces.89 Though the FRG was included in NATO, Czechoslovak troop strength did decline slightly, and a trend toward lower defense budgets began. This was in response to a second Soviet change of policy. During Malenkov's rule and continuing to a lesser degree under Khrushchev in the Soviet Union, modification of the heavy industry and defense-spending burden was begun. In 1955-1956, Czechoslovakia's spending profile, so rapidly built up in 1950-1954, began to shift. This was also a reflection of the success of the rapid buildup that had just taken place. It would have been crippling, in any case, for Czechoslovakia to continue the militarization at that feverish pace. A final shift in Soviet foreign policy that was reflected in the development of the CLA was the new Soviet emphasis on the extension of socialist power into the Third World. Prior to 1955, the Soviets, engaged in a massive reconstruction effort, were content to operate as a regional power. There were, after all, few independent governments in the Third World and Stalin's insistence on economic self-sufficiency made trade and raw material relationships a less critical motivating factor. Moreover, Stalinist ideology constrained Soviet initiatives in the rest of the world by insisting on support for communist insurgents and assailing bourgeois nationalists and colonialism with equal furor. But in 1955, when Egypt's Nasser broke with the West, the Soviet Union, emerging from the reconstruction, enjoying unprecedented growth, and no longer constrained by an ideological straitjacket, seized the opportunity to extend Soviet power beyond the Eurasian continent. Still, with new peace initiatives just begun and international acceptance newly won, the Soviets pursued the business of influencing formerly pro-Western governments hesitantly. Rather than openly approach and deal with Nasser, the Soviets used a surrogate, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. As an important arms producer and an industrialized power in Central Europe, the CSSR was a credible stand83

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in. Neither did the Czechs simply front the Egyptian arms deal; they provided substantial numbers of arms. Consequently, 1955 marked the beginning of Czechoslovak military assistance to the Third World. This partnership in the Third World between the Soviet Union and the junior ally, Czechoslovakia, unfortunately lies outside the focus of this study. It can only be noted here that from 1955 until the early 1970s, Czechoslovakia was pervasively involved in support of Soviet efforts in Third World countries. And this did not just involve arms. Members of the CLA became East Europe's most active military tutors, training Third World officers in Czechoslovak military academies and sending military technicians to training facilities in Egypt, Indonesia, and numerous other developing countries. Czechoslovakia's pervasive involvement in foreign activity suggests that by 1955 the CLA was being transformed into an instrument that was red and expert and loyal to the Soviet Union. The CLA and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic found prestige and an important new foreign policy role as a valuable ally in the extension of socialist power into the emerging Third World. The two-dimensional system was functioning smoothly because Soviet power was so dominant that dual loyalty was not an issue. At least for the time being, loyalty to socialism and loyalty to the Soviet Union were completely synonymous.

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CHAPTER FOUR

The Czechoslovak People's Army after De-Stalinization, 1956-1967 The emergence of the Soviet Union from thirty years of Stalinist rule brought radical changes in Soviet policy behavior. The birth of the new Soviet Union was not accomplished easily, however. The task of striking a balance between old and new was complicated by the uncertainties of collective rule and the struggle at the apex of Soviet politics for the right to be "first among equals." For East European leaders dependent upon Moscow for their cues, the period was one of uncertainty and domestic tension. The rise of G. M. Malenkov in the Soviet Union brought a reevaluation of the past on several fronts. Malenkov proposed a rejuvenation of light industry in the domestic sphere and peaceful cooperation in international politics. Moreover, the demise of Beria was critical, for his enemies in Moscow— threatened by the potential power of the KGB—comprehensively curtailed the activities of his network. The neutralization of the Soviet security apparatus produced an immediate lessening of terror and signaled an end to the Stalinist rulers in East Europe. Archreactionaries, like Rakosi in Hungary and Bierut in Poland, were suddenly challenged by exiled political enemies. Some, like Laszlo Rajk, executed in the great terror, "emerged from the dead" to throw the East European rulers into internal party struggles and, ultimately, the alliance into chaos. Just two years after Malenkov emerged as Stalin's heir, however, he lost the succession struggle to a more conservative group. The "new course" was condemned for the neglect of heavy industry and a coalition—formed around Nikita Khrushchev—ascended. Immediately, the East European 85

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"rightists" who had come to power through association with Malenkov's course were in a weakened position. Hard-liners were rejuvenated by Malenkov's fall, and mirroring the struggle in Moscow, the next two years were marked by domestic contests for the reins of power. The rise of the more conservative Khrushchev did not portend the reinstitution of Stalinism. Rather, having temporarily isolated Malenkov, the Khrushchev collective embarked on its own radical course. The Khrushchev course was also aimed at eliminating Stalinist excesses, and in a collective gamble the new leadership condemned Josef Stalin, the dictator whose iron rule had cemented the fledgling Soviet alliance. Generally, the "secret speech" to the Twentieth Party Congress condemned Stalin's "cult of personality" and the sins against the workers' movement that resulted from authoritarian and coercive rule. There was also criticism of Stalin's East European policies. Stalin had forged an unequal, exploitative relationship with Eastern Europe, which Khrushchev considered improper among fraternal states. Indeed, before the "secret speech," Khrushchev and his colleagues had begun dismantling the Stalinist imperial system. It was to be replaced with an interstate system built on mutual interest and ideology and less dependent on coercion and terror. The promised rejuvenation of COMECON, the formation of the Warsaw Pact, and the attempted rapprochement with Yugoslavia were all elements of the new policy. Unfortunately for Khrushchev, the radical changes in intrabloc relations took on a momentum of their own and, coupled with the power struggles in East European parties, almost unraveled the socialist alliance. Crises in Hungary and Poland threatened to destroy Soviet hegemony in the region and to transform those states into national regimes over which Moscow had no control. The Soviet leadership found events in Poland unnerving as economic reform toppled the Sovietmodeled economic system and national solutions to problems of religious and cultural freedom began to emerge. But Go86

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mulka's Communist party was in control and the Soviets were forced to reach accommodation with the new, more liberal Polish leadership. In Hungary, the reforms were more threatening and Communist party rule was endangered. Nagy had lost control of the reformation and his long and openly professed neutralism, which threatened to take Hungary out of the Warsaw Pact, pressured the Soviets to reverse the process. The decision to invade Hungary set a precedent, for not even Stalin had taken up arms against a fraternal Communist party. In retrospect, the risks were vindicated, and the Soviets succeeded in establishing a form of communist rule more acceptable to Moscow. Nonetheless, the reassertion of Soviet dominance did not bury the new socialist order. Relations within the bloc were altered and the Soviets remained sensitive to charges of imperialism within the alliance. The statement of Soviet intentions toward the bloc entitled, "On Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States," survived the reassertion of Soviet control and provided a new basis for intrabloc relations. The declaration proclaimed that "the countries of the great commonwealth of socialist nations can build their relations only on the principle of full equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in the domestic affairs of one another. "l Moreover, after the events of 1956 and attending the rapprochement with Tito, the Soviets accepted the concept of national solutions to national problems. The new leadership seemed to understand that the regimes in Eastern Europe would have to seek domestic legitimacy on their own terms. The Soviets reserved the right to define the limits of nationalization. But an alliance of semisovereign states, accepted by their constituencies and capable of holding themselves in power, was quite advantageous and in any case preferable to the continued commitment of Soviet resources to the virtual occupation of the region. Throughout the period, Czechoslovakia was curiously isolated from the reform. The blood purges were halted in ac87

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cordance with the lessening of terror in 1954-1955. But unlike Gomulka and Nagy, purged "rightists" did not emerge in Czechoslovakia. The timely death of Gottwald shortly after Stalin's demise removed the most visible target of reform. The new rulers, Zapotocky and Novotny, though they had been in power during the last years of Stalin's reign, were able to distance themselves from the policies of the past. Thus the reform did not have the impact upon the party leadership it had in Hungary and Poland. Important changes were beginning beneath the surface and in lower echelons of the party, but the visible effects of the reformation of 1956 were minimal in Czechoslovakia. The demands for rehabilitation of victims of the purges, nascent discussion of cultural reform, and reassessment of party rule intensified, but the leadership appointed commissions that reached partial solutions and carefully protected those in power. Neither was Czechoslovakia subjected to the economic reformation that propelled the Hungarian and Polish crises. The Czechoslovak economy was, on the surface, prospering, and the economic issues seemed less important. Consequently, the Novotny-Zapotocky collective managed to keep the situation under control and Czechoslovakia weathered the crisis splendidly. In fact, Czechoslovakia took a vocal and conservative posture in 1956 and pressured the Soviets to reverse the reform in Poland and Hungary. Novotny was especially critical of both forms of deviation and quickly adopted the Soviet line of "counterrevolution brewing in Hungary. " 2 Reportedly, the Czechoslovaks even offered to send military detachments as part of the "fraternal assistance" to Hungary. 3 There were those in the military who objected to this kind of involvement. 4 And the Soviets apparently decided that the involvement of other socialist allies in the military action was unwise. Though the reform did not cause radical upheavals in Czechoslovakia, a relatively benign power struggle did take place. This was not a power struggle brought on by the reforms. Rather, Novotny and Zapotocky seized the opportunity created by the condemnation of the "cult of personality" 88

AFTER DE-STALINIZATION, 1956-1967 to consolidate their rule. The relatively inconsequential internal party struggle of 1956 is of interest here because it involved the minister of defense, Alexej Cepicka. Cepicka was one of the top communists in Czechoslovakia. He was Klement Gottwald's son-in-law, minister of defense, and a member of the Politburo. Moreover, he enjoyed a close association with Stalin and visible ties with the Soviet Union. After the "secret speech," this association and the personal ties to Gottwald became liabilities. Moreover, Cepicka's deep involvement in the political terror surfaced. He was partially insulated in 1955, since Novotny and Zapotocky could not—given their own involvement—allow the full story to be told. Nevertheless, the revelation of the horrors of the "cottage" and the reemergence of military men whom Cepicka had sacrificed placed him in a precarious position. Novotny and Zapotocky were able to exploit these liabilities and to sacrifice Cepicka in the name of reform. They thus insulated themselves from criticism and removed a rival power center. Cepicka, was, after all, minister of defense, in control of one of the power instruments. With the temporary dislocation of the police forces, the power of the armed forces was enhanced and Cepicka may have represented a threat to the collective in power. In April 1956, Cepicka lost the power struggle. He was accused of "cult of personality in the military and insufficient and ineffective leadership." 5 Cepicka was replaced by career military officer Bohumir Lomsky. Unlike the fall of the hated minister of defense Farkas in Hungary and the recall of Rokossovsky from Poland, Cepicka's dismissal was not a direct consequence of the emergence of national sentiment. Rather, it reflected an internal and highly personal party struggle.

CHANGES IN THE BASES OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE

CLA In spite of the relative insulation of Czechoslovakia from the crisis in the bloc, the changes in Soviet policy were not 89

AFTER DE-STALINIZATION, 1956-1967 inconsequential. The impact of the changes was less visible in the short term, but equally important in the final analysis. The Khrushchev era produced two policy changes that radically altered East European military affairs. The first was a direct outgrowth of the bloc reorientation of 1956 and altered the relationship between the Soviet Union and the militaries of the region. The second, the reassessment of Soviet military doctrine, transformed the armed forces themselves. And in Czechoslovakia, the transformation meant a radically altered level of competence, a change in the interaction between the domestic Communist party and the military, and ultimately a new self-image for the CLA within the socialist alliance. The new socialist order in military affairs was characterized by the simultaneous "renationalization" of the East European armed forces and their incorporation into the multilateral Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). The renationalization was both actual and symbolic. The substantive aspects were more noticeable in Poland and other countries than in Czechoslovakia. Unlike Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia had no outstanding problems on the wartime status of forces to negotiate. Neither was there—as in Poland—a massive dismantling of a separate Soviet command within the armed forces. Though Soviet advising was prevalent in Czechoslovakia, the defense minister had always been a true Czechoslovak national. The dismissal of numerous Soviet security advisers diminished direct Soviet influence in a manner of greater consequence for the CLA than the subsequent recall of Soviet military advisers. Nevertheless, the deSovietization of the East European militaries created an atmosphere in which the ties of the CLA to the Czechoslovak state were proclaimed and the military subordination to the Soviet Union masked. The new policies were attended by elaborate attempts to afford the armed forces a semblance of autonomy and to enhance their prestige. Soviet insignia, uniforms, and banners were replaced by national symbols, and gradually the exploits of national military heroes reappeared in state histories. 6 90

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Moreover, the Soviets went to great lengths to share the prestige of socialist military power and to "equalize" relations with the East Europeans. Commentary and scholarly articles by Czechoslovak and other Warsaw Pact officers appeared regularly in the Soviet military press—including the highly esteemed theoretical journal Voennaia mysl' (Military Thought). 7 Soviet publications frequently reported on Warsaw Pact affairs and special editions on the fraternal armies were common. It also became common practice for highranking Soviet theorists and military leaders to write articles and books on Warsaw Pact armies. 8 Other symbolic measures included regular invitations to high-ranking allied military officers to speak at Soviet all-army conferences. One particularly valued opportunity, which was always highly publicized, was the invitation to speak at the graduation of military officers from various academies. Usually the participant was a former graduate of the academy who had returned to service in the national army, although the honor was sometimes given to an allied officer during his own graduation ceremonies. The honor rotated among the Warsaw Pact states on an annual basis. The comments of the fraternal officers are typified by those made by a Czechoslovak graduate in 1964. Permit me in the name of the generals and officers of the armies of fraternal socialist countries who are graduating this year from the Soviet Union's academies to express heartfelt thanks to the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government for the opportunity to study in higher military education in the Soviet Army. . . . During our stay in the Soviet Union we have become closely acquainted with the wonderful Soviet people, who have treated us, the representatives of socialist countries, as brothers. It is very pleasant to note that with the passage of each day the inviolable fraternal friendship among the peoples and the military cooperation among the armed forces of the socialist countries are expanding. 9 91

AFTER DE-STALINIZATION, 1956-1967 All of the symbolic measures were aimed at forging fraternal spirit and at creating prestige and legitimacy for the members of the allied forces. Visits and constant contact between Soviet military officers and those of the Warsaw Pact countries also provided a different source of Soviet influence with military leaders of the region and a constant opportunity to monitor their behavior. In this regard, the custom of inviting members of Soviet military subinstitutions to all conferences and events of their counterparts in Eastern Europe forged multileveled links. For example, the Main Political Administration of the CLA did not initially have an official representative of the Soviet MPA attached to it. Nonetheless, the contact and frequent visits were so common that the result was practically the same. These links were repeated throughout the military subinstitutions. Moreover, the renationalization did not remove all Soviet customs. Though presented as "internationalist," Soviet customs were often retained, the Russian language remained compulsory in military academies, and Soviet history and familiarity with the Soviet Union as the "first and most influential" socialist state was continued. And growing acceptance of the Soviet Union in the international community and successes in Third World countries were taken as accomplishments of which the entire socialist community should be proud and count among their own.10 The second element of the new socialist military order was the development of the Warsaw Pact. Initially, the Warsaw Pact represented a hastily conceived effort to thwart NATO's retooling of military capabilities in Europe. The Pact was created to put pressure on the Western alliance against the rearming of the FRG and was a direct counter to the decision (in 1954) to include West Germany in the military alliance. The early anti-NATO nature of the Warsaw Treaty of May 1955 is evident both in the charter and in the underdeveloped character of the original organization. The charter, emphasizing the peaceful nature of the Pact, stated, "The Warsaw Treaty is open to all states of any social system. It is not 92

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a closed grouping, but an organization of peace-loving countries. . . . Participants have agreed to end the operation of the treaty as soon as a system of collective security is formed in Europe and a corresponding all-European treaty is concluded" (emphasis added). u This essentially negative purpose for the Pact persisted, and for some time during the Soviet peace initiatives in the West every unsettling NATO decision was countered with a threat to change the nature of the WTO. For example, discussion of theater nuclear weapons in Europe in 1958 led to a threat from the Soviet Union that "the Warsaw Pact states would be obliged to consider the question of deploying missiles in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the GDR in the interest of defending peace and of their own security."12 The organization was so hastily constructed that the charter created only two organizations in 1955: the Political Consultative Committee and the Joint Command. The latter was supposed to house forces earmarked for extranational duty, but little was accomplished during the first five years of the Pact's existence. One year later, in 1956, the Joint Secretariat and a Permanent Committee for Recommendations of Foreign Political Questions were established.13 But all of the organs met irregularly and East European military affairs were changed very little by the treaty.14 Though few operational changes occurred because of the treaty, it did further the "equalization" of Soviet and East European military relations. And gradually the Soviet leadership came to realize that this "counter to NATO" could be a valuable tool. First, the Pact was the logical means by which to further legalize and rationalize the military relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Bolstering bilateral arrangements and replacing status-of-forces agreements of the postwar period, the Warsaw Pact provided a justification for stationing Soviet troops and for Soviet military hegemony in the region. Second, the Warsaw Pact eventually emerged as a convenient tool for "internationalizing" the assets of member states. Stalin's almost imperial use of 93

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East European wealth was replaced by a multilateral "sharing" arrangement. Khrushchev gambled that because of Soviet wealth and power, Soviet hegemony would actually be enhanced. In this regard, the Warsaw Pact, like the rejuvenated COMECON, allowed the exploitation of the diversity of the alliance. Through military integration—like economic integration and division of labor—the assets of the member states were to be increasingly merged and used in support of "socialist power." Since there was, in the Soviet mind, no difference between the goals of socialism and those of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and other multilateral trappings of the new interstate system combined the assets of the members in support of Soviet policy.15 Several years passed before the Soviet Union could fully utilize the newly formed military alliance. The consolidation of Khrushchev's rule and vacillating policies in the international arena kept the East European militaries in limbo throughout the remainder of the 1950s. The incremental modernization of the CLA and meetings of the hibernating Warsaw Pact continued until the end of the decade. But it was not until substantive changes in Soviet military thought finally carried the day in Moscow and trickled down through the alliance that the Warsaw Pact and the CLA were at last transformed. T H E ROLE OF THE CLA IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

The transformation of Soviet military doctrine from the bounds of World War II to principles more in tune with the nuclear age was accomplished around the turn of the decade. Khrushchev was convinced that Soviet nuclear inferiority was a grave liability, and one of the distinguishing features of his tenure was the effort to change this. During the Stalin era, the Soviet Union had been—in spite of the birth of the atomic age—wedded to an emphasis on large conventional ground forces. Soviet military strategists insisted that the "new weapons" would be of little consequence and that the next war 94

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would be conventional, depending on large, well-prepared, effectively commanded ground forces.16 Stalin and the Soviet High Command pursued development of Soviet strategic forces and the atomic bomb was added to the Soviet arsenal during the period. But the old military guard was suspicious and fearful of the "new warfare" and successfully stifled the voices of those who insisted upon Soviet nuclear preparedness. After 1960 Khrushchev, now firmly in control, began to reverse the trend. Emphasizing strategic rocket forces at the expense of conventional might, he would eventually abolish the Ground Forces Command and reduce the number of Soviet ground forces.17 Though he met with considerable resistance, he succeeded in propelling Soviet doctrine forward and enhanced the nascent strategic program. The victory of the new doctrine was apparent when in 1963 the "decisive" influence of strategic nuclear strikes was elevated to a "general law of warfare," the highest designation for a principle of military doctrine. 18 The East European military forces figured greatly in Khrushchev's new plan. Coincident to rising tensions in Europe over Berlin and the widening rift between the Soviet Union and China and in conjunction with the need to reallocate Soviet resources to nuclear development, Khrushchev seized the opportunity for a more comprehensive collective effort. The East Europeans were for the first time given concrete military missions. They were to emphasize air defense and were given a more active role in joint defensive and offensive theater operations.19 In conjunction with these new missions, the military capability of the Pact forces was upgraded and joint preparation was given considerable attention for the first time. At the March 1961 meetings of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, provisions for regular consultation of foreign ministers on matters of doctrine and strategy were codified.20 Agreement was also reached on regular meetings for the defense ministers, though they continued to meet rather sporadically until 1969. Most importantly, provisions were adopted for joint military maneuvers and the 95

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first multilateral exercises were held in the fall of 1961. The joint exercises, which involved the Soviets and the front-line northern tier states, were well publicized and declared a major success.21 Subsequently, multilateral exercises under the general rubric of Warsaw Pact training became regular fixtures of the Soviet-East European military relationship. The East European militaries also received new equipment and T-54 and T-55 tanks replaced the old T-34 tanks. New antitank missiles, self-propelled guns, and fighter-bomber models of the MiG 21 and SU 7 soon followed.22 The first nuclear-capable delivery vehicles (SSMs) were placed along the northern tier at this time, though the warheads remained on Soviet territory. 23 As a part of the overall modernization of the armed forces, new measures were adopted for the standardization of armaments and a modicum of indigenous arms production was abandoned. Some productive capability—primarily in Czechoslovakia—was shifted to production for export.24 But just as the East Europeans began to prepare for Soviet military operations, the doctrinal debate took another turn. The embarrassment of the Cuban missile crisis, in which Khrushchev's inflated claims and reliance on nuclear blackmail were exposed, strengthened the argument of those who insisted that the future of Soviet power lay in conventional capability. Moreover, it appears that the Soviet military strategists finally reacted to the emerging NATO defense developments, in which the West emphasized conventional capability, and declared a general buildup of forces.25 After 1962, Soviet doctrine—which had for two years virtually ignored conventional capability—found the balanced position. Official Soviet policy became that of combined-arms operations, emphasizng both nuclear and conventional preparedness. 26 The debate continued though, and the new middle ground proved hard to define. As General Sokolovsky, the leading military strategist of the time, said, "In essence, the argument is over the basic ways in which a future war will be conducted. Will it be a land war with employment of nuclear weapons as a 96

AFTER DE-STALINIZATION, 1956-1967 means of supporting operations . . . or will it be a fundamentally new kind of war in which the main means of solving strategic tasks will be missiles and nuclear weapons?"27 Generally the view emerged that both kinds of forces were necessary and that they should be used in concert. The Soviets, speaking only of retaliation, never of first strike, envisioned a retaliatory nuclear strike followed by airborne landings with ground forces.28 The rapid advance of the ground forces and occupation of the territory of the enemy—depending on radiological conditions—would be supported by massive air force operations.29 This new shift in Soviet doctrine enhanced even further the relative importance of the East European forces. By contributing operational armies that could participate in the conventional phase of the war, the East Europeans augmented the combined-forces capability. Now, instead of representing forces of an age past, as had been the case in the initial neglect of conventional warfare, the East Europeans were an integral part of the modern war effort. The new emphasis on small, mechanized conventional forces did bring about a reduction in the size of the East European armies. 30 But, the new, smaller armies were better equipped and thoroughly modern forces. The Czechoslovaks found subsequent refinements of the new Soviet combined-forces doctrine unsettling. The most disturbing tenets were apparent readings that the Soviets were considering the possibility of "limited warfare." The Czechoslovaks had assumed that Khrushchev's promise to "defend the territory of Czechoslovakia . . . as if it were our own" was immutable. 31 It has been argued that the appearance in 1962 and 1963 of authoritative statements of Soviet doctrine by Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky was the catalyst for the Czechoslovak fears.32 Indeed though the volumes state repeatedly that war in Europe could not be limited, there are ambiguous references that might have troubled the Czechoslovaks, dependent on the Soviet nuclear umbrella. For example, the volume cautions 97

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that Warsaw Pact strategists should prepare for the possibility of a protracted war.33 These references are very rare, however, and the overwhelming conclusion is that limited war would escalate to world war. It is therefore difficult to see why the Sokolovsky volume taken alone would have caused such an uproar. One intriguing explanation is that "limited war" discussions and perhaps preparations were more widespread within the socialist community, especially after Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, than the public record would indicate. 34 The Czechoslovaks could have been reacting to what they viewed as disturbing trends in Soviet thought. After all, the Soviets, trying to undermine Western confidence in "flexible response," had every reason to curtail discussion of "limited war" options for the Soviet armed forces. Whatever the case, the ambiguity surrounding Soviet doctrine in the period fueled Czechoslovak fears that their territory could become a theater for war. This led, in turn, to questions about the indivisibility of Czech and Soviet interests. Estimates of casualties of 60 to 70 percent on the southwest front in a European war seemed to the Czechoslovaks to justify their concern. 35 These disintegrative tendencies were exacerbated by other factors as well. First, many Czechoslovak military strategists were beginning to express negative attitudes toward the unquestioning acceptance of Soviet military doctrine. The new, more highly educated Czechoslovak strategists began to question, especially in light of "limited warfare" discussions, whether small states could depend solely upon the military might of the dominant ally. New opinions on the disadvantages of the weapons race between the Soviet Union and the United States began to surface, and it was apparently suggested that the international superpowers shared certain objectives that excluded their smaller allies. This categorical rejection of the absolute and immutable common interests of socialist states was a radical departure that would fuel doctrinal deviations during the 1968 crisis. Second, attitudes seemed to have changed about the ability of the Soviet Union to fully protect 98

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its allies from Western aggression. Josef Hodic, a former military scientist, has stated that the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the U.S. effort in Indochina caused serious doubts within Czechoslovakia that the Soviet Union could meet the enemy's advance.36 This attitude was apparently solidified by the ArabIsraeli conflict of 1967, in which Soviet clients were defeated. Alarmed at these failures of Soviet and "socialist power," the Czechoslovaks decided to seek alternatives.37 This was apparently the period in which factions emerged within all military subinstitutions. The split was apparently most marked in the military intelligentsia, but rival factions grew up throughout the armed forces.38 One obvious strategy for Czechoslovakia was to pursue European detente. Clearly, the Czechoslovaks were entertaining questions that were emerging within the Western alliance. The realization that the small states of both camps shared certain concerns and certain dangers led to a nascent reassessment of Czechoslovak policies toward Western Europe. In particular, Czechoslovakia flirted with the formation of military doctrine on the basis of geostrategic principles rather than class analysis.39 This trend would soon accelerate, but the hesitant first steps were taken in this period. The reevaluation of the West German threat was even foreshadowed. Apparently the visit of Helmut Schmidt to Czechoslovakia in 1966 caused the Czechs to doubt imminent West German revanchism.40 In fact, fascination with and even admiration for the economic prowess of the FRG spilled over into foreign policy and the Czechoslovaks showed an intense interest in developing economic ties with and in understanding domestic circumstances within the West German state. This preoccupation with West Germany led to the establishment, in 1966, of a special institute within the Gottwald Military-Political Academy to study the FRG and "explore foreign policy options."41 Presumably, this particular kind of "deviation" was threatening to Walter Ulbricht, chairman of the State Council, and East Germany as a whole. The flirtation with West Germany might explain, in part, the ferocity 99

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with which Ulbricht and the defense minister of East Germany, Heinz Hoffman, assailed the Czechoslovak reform movement. The impending split between the CLA and the Soviet Union worsened over the question of stationing troops on Czechoslovak soil. The Soviets made several overtures about the stationing of troops. One of them also involved nuclear weapons and a so-called upgrading of Czechoslovakia's defenses. Reputedly, sometime around 1960, the Soviets approached the Czechoslovak leadership about "upgrading" the nuclear forces already on Czechoslovak territory. 42 The nature of the "upgrade" is not known, but the Czechs were sensitive to the stationing of Soviet troops who would receive warheads. Initially, the Czechoslovaks were unwilling to allow Soviet forces on Czechoslovak territory. 43 As a result, tactical nuclear delivery vehicles stationed there were unarmed. 44 This was in contrast to the situation in Poland and East Germany, where arrangements had been made for the stationing of warheads. 45 According to Hodic, the discussion went on for several years. The Poles and East Germans joined in the chorus of objections to Czechoslovakia's attitude, stating that "Czechoslovakia's refusal to agree to the deployment of appropriate Soviet troops, especially on missile formations, was endangering not just Czechoslovakia but the entire Southern flank of the central front and compromising the territories of the GDR and Poland."46 Hodic states, According to certain documents of the Defense Commission of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, that group arrived at a certain compromise solution as far back as 1965. . . . It was to eliminate the most problematic of the concerns. Installations were to be built on Czechoslovak territory by the autumn of 1968. They were to belong not to the Czechoslovak People's Army, but directly to the Soviet Army and were to be operated by small Soviet units. This was de100

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signed to solve the otherwise insoluble problem of putting the Czechoslovak army in full readiness, in other words, the transportation of tactical nuclear warheads to their carriers in the equipment of the Czechoslovak army.47 The compromise solution, by which units were assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces Command, not to the Warsaw Pact or Czechoslovak command, was thus concluded. Nevertheless, the Warsaw Pact command and the reborn Ground Forces Command continued to prefer the stationing of ground forces. The Warsaw Pact command gave the CLA low marks for performance in the joint exercises, and may have used the assessment to pressure the Czechs further.48 Novotny and Lomsky apparently successfully resisted, since Soviet troops were not stationed in Czechoslovakia until the invasion in 1968.49 The deleterious effects of these tensions were increasingly apparent in Warsaw Pact affairs: a "minicoalition" formed between the Czechoslovaks, the renegade Romanians, and, on some issues, the Hungarians. On the other side of issues stood the Soviet Union, the GDR, the Poles, and the Bulgarians. The dissatisfaction was apparent when in July 1966, the "three" began to push for greater rights of codetermination in planning and implementation of common coalition policy.50 The tensions were so marked that even the conservative minister of defense, Lomsky, cited "new factors emerging in the defense of the alliance of the Warsaw Treaty Organization that mean that individual members must accept greater responsibilities."51 This veiled criticism of intrapact relations by reference to "a more active role" and "greater responsibility" would become common during the 1968 crisis. But the depth of the schism between elements in the CLA and the Warsaw Pact was evident. Earlier, military theorist Ladislav Kopecky, summarizing the attitudes of certain members of the CLA, stated, Instead of the former general and almost axiomatically proclaimed "indestructible unity" of the socialist states, our 101

AFTER DE-STALINIZATION, 1956-1967 present view of the complex problems of the relations within the coalition is more realistic, more specific, and more penetrating. Military unity and alliance can be strengthened only through long-term intensive effort to solve key problems of the coalition and problems of national defense and security. The Warsaw Pact represents a type of integration that preserves the traditional sovereignty and absolute independence of individual national units . . . it is voluntary integration.52 The radicalizing military intelligentsia took the question of limited war as a point of departure and explained that Czechoslovakia's very existence depended upon rational evaluation of the alliance. As a commentator noted just prior to the involvement of the military in the crisis of 1968, "If the creators of Soviet strategic concepts today no longer consider it necessary to reply to an attack on one of the socialist countries with a nuclear strike . . . causing wholesale destruction of the attacker . . . the Warsaw Pact member countries might ask some questions similar to those that some time ago caused DeGaulle to quit NATO."53 Dissatisfaction with the alliance was brewing within Czechoslovakia, and given the recalcitrance of the leadership on some issues, dissatisfaction was not confined to the intelligentsia. The signs of divergence on issues of doctrine and strategy were thus quite clear before the crisis began. All evidence suggests that the Czechoslovaks intended to solve these problems within the confines of the Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, the warning of Kopecky could not have gone unnoticed in Moscow. When there exist basic differences and disagreements between individual states with regard to understanding the cardinal problems of revolutionary political strategy and tactics . . . when there is no unity of views with regard to the political part of socialist military doctrine, then cooperation of the socialist states is necessarily endangered in the area of military science and the military alliance may become seriously affected. . . . If certain key problems of 102

AFTER DE-STALINIZATION, 1956-1967 national defense are not solved . . . an objective base for the appearance of certain phenomena and trends toward disintegration would be apparent.54 The inherent contradictions of military clientage were apparent not only in relations between the CLA and the Soviet Union but also in the inability of the Czechoslovak leadership to halt the slow disintegration of the position of the armed forces within the society. The political-military system, fundamentally modeled after that of the Soviet Union, was increasingly incapable of accommodating the needs of the modernizing CLA. Unique Czechoslovak conditions that undermined the professionalization and modernization of the national armed forces were surfacing. In particular, the image of the CLA and its relationship to the population were souring. And there were nascent signs that some in positions of authority doubted the ability of the state to support the modern Czechoslovak armed forces.

A DEFENSE-SPENDING DEBATE?

Generally, the first signs of concern with the heavy defense burden came in 1966. Many felt that the armed forces would have to be reduced. 55 Both the political and military leaderships attempted to forestall this discussion and elaborately defended the level of CLA preparedness. In 1966, General Prchlik, the head of the Main Political Administration, spoke of the "dangers of imperialism evident in Vietnam and the existence of 'aggressive' NATO buildups and West German force increases."56 Novotny also defended the maintenance of large forces and chastised the party for insufficient attention to military matters. Saying that "to date, there has been no long-term military force planning," Novotny proposed a new five-year plan for the buildup of the armed forces and a subsequent survey on their development after 1970.57 Novotny may also have been responding to Warsaw Pact criticism of the level and preparedness of the CLA. 103

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Nevertheless, the proposal to increase defense preparedness met with resistance from those in the party who felt that defense spending was already too high. Though the details of the debate in 1967 are unavailable, the frequency of military elite attempts to defend expenditures on the armed forces suggests that the acceptance of Novotny's plan was not a foregone conclusion. It is important to note that the defense expenditure debate was taking place within the larger context of a reassessment of Czechoslovak economic planning and development. That debate, which surrounded Ota Sik's economic commission report in 1966, centered upon the need for a market mechanism but also upon the top-heavy nature of the Czechoslovak economy and the dangers of unbalanced growth.58 Because the relationship of defense to heavy industry was so obvious and because there was a disproportionate share of defense-related spending in the budget (still about 8 percent in 1966), military expenditure came under attack in the reassessment. Elaborate justifications of the arms production industry were put forth during this debate. Claiming that the arms industry was one of Czechoslovakia's most lucrative industries, the head of defense industries stated, "This is a really profitable industry. For every kilogram of a submachine gun, foreign trade receives 7000 korunas. . . . Moreover, it is one of the few areas where tough competition is not a problem. . . . Numerous countries are interested in Czechoslovak submachine guns, self-loading rifles, and light machine guns, as well as our antitank weapons and trophy weapons." 59 This dissatisfaction with the defense burden seems to have been translated into negative attitudes toward the military within incipient party factions. In an apparent attempt to demilitarize the "image" of Czechoslovakia, the party presidium decided to hold military parades only quinquennially rather than annually.60 More importantly, reflecting a change in the military's political position, representation in political bodies declined drastically in 1966. At both the Eleventh and Twelfth Party Congresses, in 1958 and 1962, respectively, military 104

AFTER DE-STALINIZATION, 1956-1967 representation was 4.8 percent. 61 The identical representation suggests that these matters were ritual, that a given number of seats were reserved for military men. But in 1966 at the Thirteenth Congress, representation dropped to 2.4 percent. 62 Apparently the input of the military had decreased in value. PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE CLA AND THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY

The problems the military was encountering in the splintering KSC were minor in comparison with those that were surfacing within the institution. In spite of the rapid modernization of the CLA, its general reputation for excellence, and the prestige of an active Third World policy, the domestic respect for the CLA was appallingly low. The CLA had a serious image problem that threatened to undermine the continued professionalization of the armed forces. It was increasingly difficult for the CLA to recruit young men to professional military service and even harder to keep the best officers in service after initial tours. The problem was exacerbated by the rapid modernization of the CLA, which required an increasingly sophisticated officer corps. The resultant shift from the recruitment of "working-class young men" low on technical merit to the enlistment of technically qualified and university-educated men exposed an archaic and unresponsive political-military system. The problems resulted from several factors. First, the military sector was unable to compete with the civilian sector for highly educated personnel. This was largely a result of an archaic incentive structure that emphasized upward mobility for men of low social origin rather than material incentive and future security. Second, the general anti-militarism of Czechoslovak society was growing in light of a relaxed international atmosphere. In Czechoslovakia, where pacifist strains were deep, this problem was particularly acute and presented a cultural barrier to the enhancement of the prestige of the 105

AFTER DE-STALINIZATION, 1956-1967 military profession. Third, those men who were already in the officer corps were disenchanted with the overbearing political education requirements and, as professionals, objected to the political nature of promotion and reward in the CLA. This perception that merit had little to do with promotion drove many good, apolitical officers out of the military before retirement. Fourth, the military was viewed as alien and largely useless in the society. Again, the Novotny-Lomsky leadership reverted to old practices to solve the problem. Noting that the military was a valuable tool in civilian work, the party leadership exhorted the propagandists to educate the people on the "work of professional soldiers in the political and cultural life of the society." Moreover, Novotny decided that the brigade activity of the CLA should be increased to allow more contact with the public. In this regard, an elaborate civil defense preparedness week was held in which the CLA participated in cities in which they were stationed.63 But in effect the CLA's image problems ran much deeper than resurgent pacifism or problems of incentive. These were the problems that Novotny seemed reluctant to address. The armed forces were viewed as foreign, undemocratic, authoritarian, and above all dangerous to the population. As one political theorist explained, "Incorrect practices from the period of the personality cult weakened the fundamental source of strength in our army, its connection with the population, and resulted in the fact that positive action was hampered, if not sometimes paralyzed altogether. . . . Gradually the army increasingly isolated itself from the public . . . frequently under the guise of false security. " M The debate that would soon explode on party excesses in the armed forces was thus foreshadowed in 1967. Novotny was paralyzed in addressing the deep, festering problem of the authoritarian nature of party control in the military. Many of the issues that were entangled in this general undemocratic image were problems for which Novotny was responsible—most notably the political trials and the repression of Slovaks in the military. The rehabilitation issue 106

AFTER DE-STALINIZATION, 1956-J967 sparked debate about political control in general, and negative attitudes about party control began to surface. In this, as in many other matters, Novotny tried to stifle the discussion and confine it according to his terms. Again he appointed rehabilitation commissions that halfheartedly approached the question, but eventually he was unable to avoid the inquiry about distortions in the role of the party. In fact, it was on this question that the CLA military leadership diverged. It would not be long before that split became an open rift. The split in the military leadership initially grew out of differences on the rehabilitation issue. Vaclav Prchlik, the MPA chief, had filed a minority report claiming that the rehabilitation was incomplete in 1955. He continued to fight for complete rehabilitation until 1968, when it was finally undertaken. It is likely that Novotny found this threatening, given his own deep involvement in the purges. Though the leadership admitted in 1962 that the "majority of sentences handed down in 1949-54 did not correspond to the measure and nature of the offenses," the commission of review that was subsequently appointed once again failed to satisfactorily complete the rehabilitation task.65 In 1963, Novotny tried to place the blame for the purges elsewhere, claiming first that they were the result of a personal struggle between Gottwald and Slansky and then admitting that Stalin had played an important role. Nevertheless, little progress was made, and particularly in the consideration of Slovak generals, rehabilitation was very slow. In spite of Novotny's efforts, the liberals did succeed in gaining the punishment of some of the security officials who were responsible. In August 1963, the Supreme Military Court convicted Antonin Prchal, former colonel of the Ministry of the Interior, and Karel Kostal, deputy minister of internal affairs in 1956, of legal violations in investigating false accusations. They were deprived of freedoms for six years and seven years, respectively.66 Moreover, this small victory heightened the military's already keen interest in righting the wrongs of the past. The Slovaks in the military elite, in par107

AFTER DE-STALINIZATION, 1956-1967 ticular Egyd Pepich, soon to become MPA chief, were deeply concerned and took it upon themselves to push for further reform. Even the reasonably conservative Martin Dzur and the dour Ministry of Defense would soon become embroiled in this most emotional of issues in the crisis of 1968. The concern over party abuses in the armed forces in 19491954 led to debate about the current role of the party. This discussion was, of course, quite muted before the crisis, but a nascent split within the elite was apparent on this issue, too. Prchlik was apparently convinced that the CLA's problems could only be addressed through a thorough reassessment of the party's role in political education and political control. Prchlik realized that the professionalization of the officer corps necessitated a reduction in political control. The Czechoslovak officer corps was over 90 percent communist and highly educated. 67 In 1964, the number of universityeducated officers was ten times that of the corps in 1954, and 32 percent declared themselves engineers and technicians. Moreover, every fifth officer was a graduate of a program of graduate study.68 Reflecting concern that the command structure was still subordinate to the political concerns, the Czechoslovaks apparently experimented with an entirely different structure of command and organization in 1965. The Soviet Union was not even consulted.69 The new MPA chief definitely favored a system by which the command superseded the party structure altogether. Though he cited the "need for moral and political preparedness of the troops," Prchlik explained, "Party organizations are an indivisible part of the entire army and should conduct party work. . . . The statutes of the KSC basic law for their work are important, but the indivisible military authority makes it necessary to adapt these regulations to the new age. "70 Already in 1963, then, Prchlik apparently realized the need for a new relationship between the party and army in an age when the professional officer corps was both red and expert. In this regard, Prchlik dismissed the longheld belief in the need for enlisted men to criticize their of108

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fleers. He stated, "The armed forces cannot permit criticism of orders and regulations of commanders and chiefs."71 It is not entirely clear how pervasive Prchlik's changes were in this period. It is instructive that in the postinvasion period the MPA was chastised for years of neglect of party work in the armed forces and for long entertaining "rightist" ideas about political control and political education.72 Reportedly in 1967 there was a reduction in political classes for officers, but the details of this arrangement are unknown.73 Clearly, a serious rift was developing between liberals and conservatives in the armed forces on almost every issue, but the proper role of the party in military work was the most volatile at the time. The principal actors were centered within the liberal MPA and the conservative party organization in the armed forces under political general Jan Sejna. As Prchlik's MPA became more liberal, the party organization became a refuge for conservative political officers. And given Novotnys apparent fear of Prchlik's demands for bringing those of the past to account for their sins, it appears that the Sejna group enjoyed Novotnys support. The details of this rivalry became clear during the crisis of 1968 and will be addressed shortly. But clearly the schism in the military, which became public knowledge in the clash between the Novotny wing and the liberals in the KSC, was already quite mature before the crisis. Interestingly, the schism took place within the militarypolitical leadership, the party organization against the MPA. But they did have allies within the regular military elite, and in the crisis of 1968 the unwitting professionals would become completely embroiled. Pervading the whole debate on the problems of the CLA was the client state nature of Czechoslovak military affairs. Not only was the Soviet-inspired political-military system constraining, the CLA's image was further suffering from the perception that it did not really belong to the national state. The problems that were surfacing in the doctrinal debate and in the assessment of the Warsaw Pact were undermining the image of the CLA. In particular, the pervasive lessening of 109

AFTER DE-STALINIZATION, 1956-1967 tension and the desire to approach the West made the CLA seem at once less necessary and more expensive. Moreover, long years of party-proclaimed reliance upon the Soviet Union for defense caused some to question the value of the CLA. The party initiated feeble attempts to upgrade the "national" image of the CLA in 1966. During the May Day parade in 1966, banners of the Czechoslovak Fighter Squadron of the RAF and the Czechoslovak tank brigade that had operated in France were displayed for the first time since the revolution.74 These links to the past inspired even greater sentiment for nationalization of Czechoslovak history. There was even some sentiment for reinstituting medals named for Czechoslovak military heroes, and October 28 (the day of the founding of the Republic) was explicitly recognized for the first time in the military press. 75 Finally, even conservative Czechoslovak leaders began to appeal to Czechoslovak national traditions. In a speech on the closing of the VLTAVA maneuvers—at which Marshal Grechko of the USSR was present—Novotny appealed to the audience to "draw a lesson in patriotism and national enthusiasm from the Hussites and their glorious leader, Jan Zizka. . . . It is not in a state borne of these people possible to indulge pacifist illusions and regard the army as a superfluous survival of the past," he said.76 Thus as 1968 drew near, even conservative political leaders were beginning to understand that something had to be done to reestablish the links of the armed forces with the Czechoslovak nation. More liberal leaders were willing to take greater risks—including, if necessary, a reformation of the politicalmilitary system. All failed to understand, however, that the reestablishment of national links could not be accomplished selectively. Within months, the latent disputes within the army, the party, and the Warsaw Pact—still dormant in 1967—rose to the surface and plunged the CLA deep into crisis.

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CHAPTER FIVE

The Military in the Period of Liberalization, January to August 1968 The political crisis of 1968 led to an extraordinary transformation of the Czechoslovak communist system. The relationship of the Communist party to the society was thoroughly and unreservedly examined and every aspect of Czechoslovak life was affected. During the period there was tremendous emphasis on freedom of expression and upon the proper form of communist rule. Remarkably, the military was not immune. Rather, the military's interest in reform and in politics, which had emerged in the previous period, was heightened and the institution changed drastically in eight months. As startling as these changes were, more critical was that the military community was not only the target of political policy but also an actor in shaping the new relationship to the party and to the society at large. Nevertheless, the constraints upon party-military interaction emanating from client military status were obvious in the period of liberalization. The military's participation in the liberalization was demanded by its domestic constituency, but the military stood isolated from the national revival by the character and nature of its ties to the Soviet Union. In an era of rapid and fundamental change, the military elite addressed the issues of the reform with one eye firmly riveted upon Soviet reaction.

T H E SEJNA AFFAIR AND THE DEMAND FOR REEVALUATION OF THE PARTY-MILITARY SYSTEM

The catalyst for the military's involvement in the reform was a negative one: a rumored attempt to interject the military into the January deliberations of the KSC's Central Com111

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mittee. Allegedly, a conservative group of military officers attempted to lend support to Novotny s wing of the party. A powerful politician, Maj. Gen. Jan Sejna, party-military security chief and chairman of the party collective in the Ministry of Defense, intended to use the military in support of the conservative cause. Sejna had been promoted quietly to general rank in November 1967 by Novotny. The plan may also have been supported by Gen. Vladimir Janko, deputy secretary of defense, and Miroslav Mamula, chief of the Central Committee's Eighth Department for Defense and Security Affairs. During the Central Committee plenum, a letter in support of Novotny arrived from the party collective. The letter urged that the positions of first secretary and president of the Republic remain joined. In conjunction with the arrival of the letter, "maneuvers" took place in which units assumed positions threatening an assault on Prague. The action was taken too late, however. Novotny had already been removed. In February, it was reported that Sejna had been accused of embezzling funds and had fled the country. He applied for and received asylum in the United States. The next day, General Janko committed suicide.1 The plan was apparently foiled by Maj. Gen. Vaclav Prchlik, then chief of the Main Political Administration and a Dubcek supporter, who notified the liberal wing of the party. Sejna himself denies that a coup was planned and such a plan has never been conclusively proven. 2 Nor is it clear whether the army was being mobilized to take action or just to bring psychological pressure on the anti-Novotny wing. Though the evidence is patchy, the sequence of events suggests that something unusual was in the offing. And confirmation of plans to use the military in some fashion was offered by both the liberal and conservative wing of the party. On February 23, the then chief of the Army Political Headquarters and later MPA chief, Egyd Pepich, revealed that the army had tried to interfere in party affairs. According to Pepich, "certain functionaries of the main party organizations at the Ministry of Defense had given one-sided information about the Central Committee plenum proceedings to the presidium 112

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of the Main Defense Committee."3 These men, Pepich claimed, intended to influence the deliberations of the party's Central Committee. Later, the new minister of defense, Martin Dzur, cited an "underestimation of the human error factor in failing to monitor the activities of conservative functionaries in the armed forces." There were, he said "serious signals indicating that the armed forces might be misused. This paralyzed the armed forces command in the critical period [January]."4 Later, in the postinvasion press, conservative spokesmen tacitly acknowledged that throughout the crisis, members of the armed forces were prepared to take political action and that some advocated action in the period. Col. Jifi Reindl stated, "To use the army within the country to defend socialism is quite permissible and right. I do not know why it is a secret that much of our army was in a state of combat preparedness . . . in order to ensure that it was sufficiently prepared to act against the counterrevolutionary forces."5 In light of this evidence, Sejna's denial of the coup episode must be called into question. This is especially true, since his story is based upon claims that he was a member of the Dubcek forces. The episode caused quite a furor and the Sejna affair became a cause celebre for liberal forces. Anyone suspected of association with Sejna was severely criticized. When it was learned, for instance, that Sejna was traveling on a diplomatic passport, Lidovd Demokracie, the press organ of the Czechoslovak People's Party, reprinted a New York Times article that implicated the Soviet Union.6 The Soviets were furious and vehemently denied that they had obtained safe passage for Sejna.7 There is no evidence that the Soviet Union was in fact involved. The United States also drew fire from the Czechoslovak press for granting Sejna asylum. An A-Revue commentator noted, "It is disappointing that the United States, the self-proclaimed bastion of freedom, would shelter this criminal who did all within his power to undermine the liberalization."8 The episode brought serious repercussions in the military. The affair, a rallying point for liberals, was a source of embarrassment for conservative officers who held responsible 113

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positions at the time of the "coup." The situation was especially uncomfortable for Bohumir Lomsky, the minister of defense, who was implicated by association even though there was no evidence that he was involved. Lomsky resisted even the suggestion, saying "I defend the principle that the army may not be used. We are not somewhere in Africa."9 Later, appearing on television, he denied that the army would have attempted such, and stated, "If somebody else tried to give an order for the abuse of the armed forces behind my back and if it were proved, he must take full responsibility. "10 He then stated that the whole affair was beyond his control because Sejna was under Mamula's command. Lomsky survived the episode for a few months, but Miroslav Mamula did not. In February, he was replaced because of abuses of power, by Vaclav Prchlik, the man who allegedly uncovered the coup attempt. The importance of the Sejna affair lies not in the event itself but in its role in the military's awakening. The ramifications of the affair went beyond the discrediting of conservative elements and placed the institution at odds with liberals in the Communist party and the society as a whole. The episode was a clear example of the potential misuse of a power instrument, and some within the party suddenly confronted the specter of military pressures or, at worst, military solutions to political problems. The use of the military by one party faction against another was well outside the rules of communist politics. The communist armed forces were expected to stand aside from political struggle and support the leadership after unity was reestablished. Here, the mechanism of political infiltration, designed to guard against Bonapartism, backfired. The professional officers had not betrayed the military's isolation from politics, but rather a politician within the military establishment had. The tenet of military noninvolvement had most recently been reaffirmed in the dismissal of Alexej Cepicka, accused of "cult of personality" in the military and of seeking a power base outside the party. There is no evidence that Cepidka ever attempted anything 114

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as radical as the §ejna episode suggested. The use of the military personalities within the party against the party was a very dangerous precedent indeed. The "coup" was an even greater source of embarrassment for the military in the society at large. Colloquially, the population referred to men in military dress as Sejnovites and branded them traitors.11 The military's delicate image suffered, and its longstanding efforts to present itself as the defender, not the enemy, of the society were seriously undermined. The so-called internal function of the armed forces, by which they were used to quell "counterrevolutionary tendencies" in domestic politics, had supposedly passed with the maturation of the socialist state.12 Now a potentially popular party initiative for reform had been jeopardized by the military. The key is that no matter how often the "coup" was denied or how frequently military leaders disassociated themselves from Sejna, there was no way to undo the damage to the image of the CLA once the rumors began. The Sejna affair was no less important as a source of selfdoubt for the military itself. Professional and political officers alike were embarrassed and distressed, but for the professional officer, the Sejna affair must have been a bitter pill. The "coup" was headed by the consummate politician who had never held a military command and who had been promoted to the rank of general because of political connections. Though opportunistic officers, like Janko, might have been involved, this attempt had little, if anything, to do with political advantage for the armed forces or political power for the military elite. The episode, had it succeeded, would have been a "military coup" in name only and all of the concern for Bonapartism must have rung hollow for the professional elite. The combined public and party disgust and the outrage of those in the military created an environment in which there were new demands for the reconsideration of the proper relationship of the party to the military and of the military's role in the society. Under the pressure of the Sejna affair, 115

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political-military and military leaders were forced to openly examine the question of the relationship between them. The immediate casualties of the episode were those who were disgraced—Mamula, Sejna, and Janko. But slowly, those who would not participate in this open dialogue about the role of the military in society were forced out of office. In March, Martin Dzur, an officer of more moderate leanings and a Slovak, replaced Bohumir Lomsky as minister of defense. In the pressure-filled environment, Lomsky was never able to completely absolve himself of guilt in the Sejna affair and became too closely linked to the Novotny wing of the party. Otakar Rytif, a conservative general, was replaced as chief of the General Staff by Karel Rusoy. Prchlik replaced Mamula, and his deputy, a Slovak, Egyd Pepich, became head of the MPA. Janko's deputy, FrantiSek Trcka, was replaced by professional officer Ferdinand Hanzal, and Miroslav Smoldas replaced Janko as deputy minister of defense and inspector general of the army. Numerous officers below these elite positions were dismissed. Hardest hit was the ultraconservative inner circle of the General Staff. Clearly, many conservatives remained in the army, as in the party, but most conservative officers were isolated from the military-political mainstream after April, and events began to overtake them as they became targets of ridicule by moderates and liberals alike. That this was the case is substantiated by Otakar Rytir's admission that he and his colleagues were unwelcome in military discussions after April.13 The isolation of the conservatives in the armed forces was connected to the rise of the Dubcek wing of the party. Dubcek's refusal to deal a fatal blow and remove all conservatives in the party was mirrored in the armed forces. But appointees to key positions were moderate and apparently serious about reform of the armed forces. In any case, the Sejna affair created an environment in which the leaders had no choice. The reform was led by the party's own instrument of political control, the liberal MPA still under Prchlik's influence but now led by the Slovak Pepich. A key role in the process of reform was also played by the radicalized military intelli116

LIBERALIZATION, JANUARY TO AUGUST 1968 gentsia. The most important consequence of the military intelligentsia's militant stand was the radicalization of the military press. Conservatives were simply denied access to the press as a forum. The positions of conservative officers were mercilessly attacked and ridiculed. When Samuel Kodaj, a conservative general, dared to criticize the authors of the "TwoThousand Words Manifesto," for instance, he was mocked throughout the military community. A-Revue fired back at Kodaj with an article questioning his "military qualifications."14 The satire on the general cited his impeccable credentials as those of party work, teaching in a high school, and more party work. The leadership was constantly under press scrutiny and this increased the pressure to support the liberalization, at least publicly. Not only were all of the top military leaders interviewed in the press, their backgrounds and political behavior were unreservedly examined. A-Revue stated, "Finally, Obrana Lidu has enabled readers to differentiate between members of the army to distinguish the small groups of conservatives and sectarians and wrong thinkers' from the mass of honorable and honest officers."15 Liberals such as Prchlik were publicly praised for their stands at the "closed" meetings of the Central Committee. Obrana Lidu even publicly revealed the stands of every single military leader who was present at the Ministry of Defense deliberations on the January plenum. For the first time, the political behavior of individual members of the military elite was publicized. Both the lower echelons of the military and the public at large were exposed to the positions of their military leaders, and in the 1968 environment military officers were obliged to defend their stands. Apparently, interest in such reporting was high. The active readership oiObrana Lidu increased by over 50 percent during the 1968 crisis.16

INTRAMILITARY POLITICS: T H E STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

In retrospect, it seems that neither the leadership of the MPA nor the professional military elite was always in control 117

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of the dialogue. Often the debate turned more radical, especially in the press, than either side might have wished. But a remarkable dialogue did begin in which the leadership was centrally involved. One fact is clear: The liberal military-political leadership, newly installed, and the professional military leadership, represented by the Ministry personnel and the new General Staff, showed tremendous coincidence of interest. The lines between the opinions of the MPA leadership and the professional military elite began to blur, and theses that would find relations between the two inherently conflictual obscure the common interests that surfaced. After all, with the military under public siege, the need for reform was crystal clear. But because the process of reform always came perilously close to skirting out of communist control, the two found a common interest in trying to constrain the terms of the debate. The professional military elite, the MPA, and the KSC leadership all wished to frame the issues of military democratization in terms of reforming party control. n The distortions and dangers in the CLA were thought to be a result of improper channels of party control and an outmoded political-military system. A role for the party in military affairs was not questioned, but that role would have to be seriously modified to keep pace with the "new stage of socialism" in Czechoslovakia. The first order of business was to reestablish the primacy of the MPA as the party's channel of influence in the armed forces. One party organization within the armed forces, a highlevel group known as the Party Collective of Communists, had taken on a life of its own. This group, which Sejna headed, was an offspring of Mamula's Eighth Department on military, police, and security. The collective had connections to some of the most powerful political leaders in the country. Housed in the Ministry of Defense but subordinate to the Eighth Department, not to the Ministry of Defense, Sejna's group complicated the role of the MPA by providing a second, more powerful party network within the armed forces. According to Gen. Egyd Pepich, the MPA chief after Prchlik's promotion, "The relationship between the MPA and 118

LIBERALIZATION, JANUARY TO AUGUST 1968 Chart 5.1 Links between Political and Military Organs in the Czechoslovak Armed Forces in 1968 CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Eighth Department Military Affairs

Police and Intelligence

Ministry of Defense

Ministry of the Interior (Sejna, Mamula)

Main Political Administration Collective of Communists Party Organization in the Armed Forces Trade Unions the collective has been and still is ill defined. Very often it has been said in various meetings and conferences that the communists at the Ministry are a great asset. . . . They talk, acknowledge, agree, but if we take a closer look . . . we must admit that everything is not exactly perfect in this respect." 1 8 Pepich claimed that the MPA appreciated the collective, but that the power relationship had to b e redefined in favor of the MPA. "It is no secret," h e said, "that the attitude of the chief of the Eighth Department [Mamula] and the chairman of the collective [Sejna] isolated the Ministry of Defense from party work. . . . The MPA wants to demonstrate its sincere confidence in the communists at the Ministry and it wants the latter's active participation in the MPA's role of forming the military policies of the party. " 19 Pepich was describing a dual structure that made unity of action within the Ministry impossible for the party. The party claimed responsibility for political control through the MPA, b u t the MPA's power was usurped by the collective. (See Chart 5.1.) It is important to reiterate that the collective was 119

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not subordinate to the Ministry. The MPA was subordinate to the Ministry, and apparently as in the Soviet case, the MPA was also a department of the Central Committee. Pepich complained that the coup episode was unknown to the Ministry leadership primarily because of these confused links and the unchecked power of the collective. The MPA, the party's proper policy arm, was isolated from political-military decision making. Pepich stated, "The army as an instrument of power designed to serve the defense of the country must not be used to interfere with discussions within the party. The matters discussed at the Central Committee meetings were primarily their affair. The MPA strictly observed this principle, but those who did not and who interpret the internal function of the army in a distorted manner arose outside the army and they were brought into the army from without [emphasis added]." 20 Consequently, Pepich goes on to insist that the intention to influence the deliberations was only connected with the names of a few officials, not with the entire collective. He claimed that except for these, the military elite wholeheartedly supported the November plenum. Pepich s argument that there was confusion as a result of the collective's role is revealing and suggests considerable rivalry between the MPA and the collective. The claim that the military elite supported the liberalization at the time of the November plenum is somewhat less convincing, however. Careful examination of the situation within the elite suggests that Pepich had seriously erred in his assessment that the only conservatism was in the party collective. The MPA leadership was clearly sympathetic to the November plenum, and had been liberalizing since the selection of Vaclav Prchlik as its chief in 1956. Prchlik was an influential man, having been elected to the Central Committee of the KSC in 1958, and is known to have long held liberal positions. Several facts support the contention that the MPA was liberal. First, on Prchlik's initiative, reform had begun in the early 1960s on matters of political education (see chapter 4). Second, it is known that Prchlik was the only officer within 120

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the Ministry of Defense's Main Committee who voted unreservedly in favor of the November-January party initiative.21 Additionally, it was reportedly Prchlik who foiled the Sejna attempt to undermine those initiatives. In this regard, it can be argued that the friction between the MPA and the collective that Pepich was describing actually culminated in the Prchlik-Sejna confrontation. Presumably, as the MPA liberalized after Prchlik's appointment, Sejna's party collective grew stronger and became the conservative wing's counterweight to the MPA. In alliance with certain opportunistic and reactionary generals within the Ministry, such as Janko and Rytif, the collective had become the Novotny wing's central arm of leverage within the Ministry. This would explain the isolation from the party—which Novotny now controlled—that Pepich was describing. Undoubtedly, there were still conservative generals within the MPA, but the leadership—including Prchlik and Pepich—was liberal. In assessing how deeply liberalism pervaded the MPA, the blame heaped upon the institution for revisionism and inattention to political control in the postinvasion period is instructive. The leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff was quite another matter. The General Staff was ultraconservative. Martin Dzur accused the leadership of the General Staff of nearsightedness and declared that it had been a major source of factionalism within the CLA. Citing tensions between the MPA and the General Staff, Dzur blamed the Ministry leadership—of which he was a part—for ineffective management. 22 Because of the inner circle of the General Staff and Rytif's highly personal and centralized decisionmaking apparatus, Dziir claimed that "the General Staff is completely ineffective in deciding or carrying out military policy. " M After April, Rytif's group was thoroughly purged and Karel Rusov, a professional officer, became chief of the General Staff. Rusov's apoliticism during the crisis apparently helped him to maintain his position after the normalization. Dzur was able to declare, however, "Those who had been the cause of these conflicts have been removed." 24 121

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The Ministry leadership apparently stood somewhere between the General Staff and the MPA. Dzur admitted that most of the CLA felt that the Ministry staff was both conservative and inept. The Ministry was heavily criticized for its inability to mitigate the friction between the Sejna collective and the MPA and for its characteristic failure to control the political potential of Sejna. When Lomsky was dismissed in March 1968, he was replaced by a deputy, suggesting that unlike the leadership of the General Staff, which was more thoroughly purged, the inner circle of the Ministry was not considered a threat to the liberalization. Dzur could be suspected of duplicity in the 1968 crisis, but though his private thoughts will never be known, he was certainly supportive of the moderate reforms introduced into the armed forces. There was also a personal element in Dzur's appointment, since he was a Slovak and an acquaintance of Dubcek. Opportunism should also, of course, not be ruled out. But whatever their feelings prior to November, the leadership—spurred on by the MPA and the intelligentsia—marched and at times stumbled toward a new political-military system.

CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL-MILITARY APPARATUS IN THE N E W STAGE OF SOCIALISM

The organizational changes that the MPA and Prchlik of the Central Committee proposed would have seriously diminished party control within the CLA. Most important was the planned abolition of the Eighth Department. In its place was created a Committee on Defense and Security Affairs, subordinate to the National Assembly. The National Assembly, while overwhelmingly communist, was constitutionally a coalition body; there was nominal noncommunist representation and if the liberalization had continued to foster interest in other parties, this representation might have grown. In any case, the idea of governmental jurisdiction, at the expense of the Communist party, was a fairly radical idea. Additionally, the Assembly was headed by the president of the Republic, 122

LIBERALIZATION, JANUARY TO AUGUST 1968 not the first party secretary. Since the understanding was that the two positions would never again be merged, the party's number one man was institutionally isolated from military affairs by the plan. The new committee would have been extremely important, holding wide competence in matters of military training, education, and expenditure, as well as monitoring the political activity of the military. A second major change, which was apparently never adopted but agreed to in principle, was the decision to create party organizations subordinate to the military commander, not to the MPA. These new party organs would serve "in the solution of conceptual problems of party defense policy, but would not directly manage military affairs."25 Some invoked the Yugoslav precedent, by which the command structure had finally superseded the party structure.26 Additionally, the press suggested that the post of deputy commander for political work be abolished. This too was "considered" by the MPA leadership. Though it was not suggested that the MPA itself be abolished, it was explicitly suggested that the MPA chief relinquish his separate deputy minister status and operate under the command structure. A major ramification of the new military-political apparatus would have been the removal of the military personnel function from the institutional jurisdiction of the party. Martin Dzur, remarking that the party had often interfered—at a high cost—in personnel matters, suggested that the new elected party bodies have only advisory functions in promotion decisions. Dzur stated, "We are removing from political action the personnel policy that is being converted into personalities. . . . The personnel administration must be independent." 27 Personnel authority was to be transferred to the Ministry of Defense and out of the jurisdiction of the MPA chief. Apparently, the military-political leadership was ready to rely upon prior socialization and the large number of communists within the elite to maintain party control of this function. But the importance of the reform of the political-military 123

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system lies not only in the actual changes in the function of the Communist party. The really remarkable aspect of the reform is what it reveals about the attitude of the politicalmilitary leadership toward the Czechoslovak armed forces. These ideas did not, in the minds of Prchlik and Pepich, constitute a "rejection" of communism in the armed forces. On the contrary, the MPA and many within the KSC were supremely confident that the army was a reliable instrument of the Communist party. The transformation of the CLA into a force both red and expert was complete and meant that it was now possible for the party to relinquish direct control and direction. The MPA saw its new role as one of administration of political affairs, primarily education of young soldiers and moral leadership, not daily management and interference. Gone were the days of distrusting the military professional as a remnant of a hostile class. Party work was still important, but control of personnel and promotions belonged to the minister of defense. The new political-military system was the culmination, not the rejection of twenty years of communist rule. Egyd Pepich, describing the new age, practically declared the "dictatorship of the proletariat," or the stage between capitalism and the classless society, complete. The repressive function of the instruments of violence has lost all justification with the development of socialism. . . . The specific internal conflicts do not stem from the class structure of society, but from the conflict between centralist party direction in the military and the objective refinements of the advanced socialist society.28 Martin Dzur, for his part, explained that the abuse of party power came about because the new stage had not been recognized. "It is time to implement the traditional Leninist principles of the creation of socialism in a new way. The situation in the military is objectively new and politically more complex and demanding in every respect than it was in the past."29 124

LIBERALIZATION, JANUARY TO AUGUST 1968 It is not without significance that the Yugoslav precedent was invoked, for the Yugoslav military and party had achieved a successful symbiosis in the search for national solutions to national problems. Now with governmental direction and the moral-political guidance of the party, the CLA could assume its role as a trustworthy partner. Perhaps the Czechoslovaks would have been better advised to invoke another precedent—that of the Soviet Union itself. The rapprochement and trust the MPA encouraged was not radically different from the rapprochement of party and army in the Soviet Union. But in their haste to rejuvenate the governmental structure and reform the party's role in the armed forces, there was a distinct neglect of the long-held principle of the "leading role of the party in the armed forces." The party's statements on this had been vague, automatic expressions of loyalty to the concept; but with little centralized direction from a party leadership preoccupied with other things, the debate gravitated downward to the intelligentsia. Many commentators took the relative silence about the leading role of the party as a hunting license on any role of the party. Regardless of whether Prchlik and Pepich believed the discussion of such ideas was healthy or were simply unable to control the debate, the moderate steps they had taken led to more radical ideas. Increasingly, the debate within the military press moved toward questioning the right of the party to direct the military and suggested that perhaps the party had no proper role within the military. The danger of the course that the leadership had taken was now evident. The leadership had been suggesting reform and even a diminution of party rule. Elimination of the party's presence was quite another matter. Generally, some commentators took issue with the position that party rule could be reformed. They held, rather, that party control isolated the military from all but party members and set the CLA apart from the society. These commentators rejected the notion that party control was necessary and argued that only a nonpartisan military could be a respected, democratic, and useful instrument of power. One commen125

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tator even said, "The CLA does not serve a class; it serves a nation, a nation of two peoples."30 Until party control could be completely eliminated, they argued, it was important to safeguard the rights of nonparty members within the military. Thus, nonparty members should be allowed to organize within the military. The kind of organization that was being described was, in effect, a kind of military trade union, independent of party control. Obviously, these ideas were even too radical for the liberalized MPA leadership. An apolitical army was completely contrary to all communist military thought; an army in which other, noncommunist parties operated was a blasphemous idea. Nevertheless, the suggestions passed without comment. Interestingly, the Club of Committed Nonparty Persons seems to have operated within the military. But the Military Council voiced its disapproval of their activities and promised to silence non-Communist party organizations.31 Nothing was ever done in this regard, however, and the Club members were neither silenced nor persecuted. Perhaps, until the August invasion, the emotionally charged environment and public pressure forced the military elite to ignore the organization rather than inflame public opinion. Perhaps some were sympathetic to an apolitical military. Whatever the case, this decision could have backfired had the liberalization lasted. The accommodation between the party and military had many positive effects. But the criticism of the principle of party control was just one of the more radical elements of the debate that placed a tremendous strain upon liberalization in the military. The Czechoslovak leadership was trying to walk a tightrope. The issue of party control pushed Czechoslovak communism to the limit. The commentator cited above came dangerously close to crossing that line in explaining the need for the new stage: "Czechoslovakia is no backward, Byzantine, agrarian state, but an advanced industrial society that should come easily to communism. . . . This must be reflected in the army." For better or for worse, the creation of a political126

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military system that could serve the Czechoslovak nation was now underway. T H E SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO O T H E R PROBLEMS IN THE

CLA The military elite accepted this accommodation and, with the growing isolation of the conservatives within the General Staff and the dismissal of the dour Lomsky, created a leadership that, if not as radical as the intelligentsia, was at least receptive to the reforms the MPA offered. While far-reaching institutional changes were discussed by the intelligentsia and the MPA, the Ministry of Defense concentrated on less dramatic but more concrete problems that had long festered within the CLA. The new party leadership was, in turn, receptive to these concerns. The most important of these was the concern for the nationality problems that were rife within the CLA and the adoption of measures to alleviate discriminatory practices. The military press played a major role in exposing the long-covered discrimination to which Slovaks had been subjected. The Slovak minister, Dzur, undertook immediate reform in this sphere. It was finally admitted that the post-1948 terror had decimated the Slovak officer cadre. The few Slovaks who did remain in the military and were promoted were said to have served in Bohemia first, for the purpose of "renationalization."32 Furthermore, it was charged and admitted that Slovaks were forbidden to use their native language as a command language, in spite of historical party denials. These revelations were embarrassing for the CLA, since Slovak sources produced very interesting numbers. In 1968, only 20 percent of the CLA colonels, 14.2 percent of all chiefs of Ministry Services, a paltry 9.2 percent of all administration chiefs, and 8.3 percent of department heads were Slovak.33 These sources went on to say that the dearth of capable Slovak officers was being perpetuated by the fact that Slovak soldiers did not remain in the military because they perceived ad127

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vancement opportunities as slim. The minister of defense was Slovak, so upward mobility was theoretically possible. Nevertheless, the record of the CLA on nationality discrimination was dismal and reforms were immediately undertaken in response to the charges. A kind of affirmative action program for Slovak officers, including admission quotas for military academies, was instituted.34 Additionally, dual staffing, whereby the deputy and chief of every department were to be different nationalities, was started. A more controversial proposal raised in the Slovak press but never adopted was a plan to have national units. 35 This would have eventually led to two separate armies and was thus never seriously considered. A related issue of utmost interest to the military was the reemergence of the rehabilitation question. The Defense Ministry was given permission to institute its own rehabilitation process in order to facilitate review. On May 17, 1968, Col. Frantisek Kundra of the Ministry announced authorization for a commission on the rehabilitation of officers "who were unjustly sentenced. ,36 This major effort accelerated the process begun by the general rehabilitation councils. Even before it began meeting, the commission had received twentyfive hundred applications for review.37 According to Kundra, "The Ministry is no longer content to wait until all those who have suffered report to the Ministry, but is taking steps to examine the fate of some soldiers."38 The commission was divided into subcommittees to explore the rehabilitation of officers of the World War II struggle on the western fronts, the Slovak national uprising, the partisan movements, and the internal struggle for independence. The subcommittee concerned with the last-named group was apparently expected to review the cases of officers executed for their alleged role against the party in the crisis of February 1948. The most notable rehabilitation of the commission was apparently carried out by this last group. Gen. Karel Kultvasr, a pro-Western general accused of plotting to overthrow the regime in 1949, was acquitted and rehabilitated.39 The general commission was subordinated and subjected to the review of an independent judiciary subcommission. 128

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Another concern that was discussed in detail was the problem of pensions for retiring officers. The CLA was without a pension plan for officers who left the military before the age of forty-five. Officers were not always able to compete for civilian jobs, and without a pension they had no incentive to leave the military. There was thus a glut of officers, a socalled age hump of men in their forties. Furthermore, there was no room for the promotion of officers in the lower and middle grades. Consequently, career advancement in the CLA was viewed as impossible and professional service was unattractive to many young men as an alternative to civilian training and employment. The Ministry was planning to introduce both a pension plan and a program to aid retiring officers.40 Another area of concern to both party and military leaders was military spending. It was clear that the defense-spending burden and the consequent concentration on heavy industry were key problems for the leadership. This was a very sensitive area, for military spending was still very much within Soviet jurisdiction. In an effort to safeguard the liberalization, the party had constantly reaffirmed its unquestioning alliance with the Warsaw Pact and its intention to maintain defense preparedness at a high level. But in consideration of the failing economy, the defense profile of Czechoslovakia entered the discussion. Though the party denied that there was any connection, the new Defense and Security Committee and the Defense Council would have addressed the issue of the "devotion of resources to defense."41 The Committee was to consider other means of financing the defense burden. These other means were never specified, but clearly the Committee was now entering a debate that could have led to changes in the military-spending profile of Czechoslovakia. Indeed, Czechoslovakia devoted sizable resources to defense, and the concentration on defense-related industries, including the armament industry, made the economy unbalanced and dependent on external, primarily Soviet, raw materials. Czechoslovakia's potentially most lucrative industry, the uranium industry, was subject to strict and overt Soviet control. The deputy minister of foreign trade admitted that he did not even 129

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know the details of Czechoslovakia's uranium production or the capacity of that industry.42 The uranium industry was particularly crippled by the decision to refine all uranium in the Soviet Union, and all export of uranium was a completely bilateral exchange. These concerns led the military community to take up the question of defense spending. Surprisingly, the leadership was willing to make concessions on military expenditures. Though it was not admitted that spending should be cut, the leadership agreed to reevaluate the profile. One commentator stated, "Our defense-spending profile has been, since the early 1950s, more appropriate for states like the USSR and the United States."43 He defended the high spending, claiming that Czechoslovakia's higher standard of living required higher wages for military professionals and better living conditions for the rank and file. Furthermore, Czechoslovakia's payments to families of men on duty were said to be higher. Another commentator was more critical, stating that "low effectiveness of our economy . . . influenced by the inadequate structures of industry . . . the raw materials branch and heavy industry, have in general received exaggerated representation. The requirements of economic support of defense policy are outstripping other concerns."** The defense-spending issue was a troublesome one, and the military leadership attempted to lend support to the public concerns about the economic effects of exaggerated spending, without admitting that reductions were necessary. One leader admitted that the expenditures were taking funds that could be used for "the improvement of the standard of living of the working people." Nonetheless, he contended, "The expenditure for defense is a historical necessity, brought on by the antagonistic relationship with the imperialist camp. It is necessary only to reexamine where the means for fulfilling defense needs can be obtained." 45 Clearly, the military leadership was in a difficult position as it tried to balance the desire of the population, the demands of military preparedness, and the concerns of the So130

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viet Union. In the short term, the military leadership was apparently sensitive to the domestic environment and was quite willing to make concessions. Direct reductions in spending were not entertained, but the Ministry of Defense did unilaterally propose a freeze on the size and budget of the army for a two-year period.46 The budgetary freeze, from 1968 until 1970, might have amounted to a decrease in spending since there was no adjustment for fluctuation in growth. These efforts to make the military a less objectionable economic burden were often taken as a sign that Czechoslovakia was being demilitarized. The public and the military press seemed to believe that Czechoslovakia's military "neutralization" would mean an end to universal conscription and premilitary service, as well as a decrease in military spending. The leadership constantly denied rumors that military service would be reduced or even abolished.47 But the military presence was indeed being scaled down. For example, in March, Maj. Gen. Josef Cepicky, deputy chief of staff, explained that planned large-scale CLA maneuvers would be considerably reduced in scope and that smaller units would participate. This step was being taken, he explained, because of the current difficult national situation.48 The military's presence was symbolically diminished as well. In the 1968 May Day parade, units of veterans from both world wars and survivors of the Czechoslovak Legion were allowed to march under their own banners in accordance with the precedent set in 1966. But the modern military was conspicuously absent. There was only one military parade and that was on the outskirts of the city. In light of the military's recent and infamous role in the attempt to crush the liberalization, both party and military seemed to deem it best to play down the military presence.

T H E CLA AND THE ALLIANCE

As the military tried to work out the nature of the reform, it became increasingly apparent that the artificial wall sepa131

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rating the criticism of the CLA's role in the nation from the criticism of its role in the Warsaw Pact was beginning to crumble. The KSC leadership was preoccupied and seemingly out of touch with the course of reform in the CLA. Dubcek and others consistently promised that alliance relations would not become an issue.49 This turned out to be a promise that the party could not keep, for the idea that a change in relations in the Warsaw Pact was not in the offing proved to be shortsighted. Many of the organizational changes that were being proposed would have, taken alone, changed the nature of the CLA's relationship with the Soviet Union. The involvement of the government at the expense of the party, for example, threatened to change the basis of direct Soviet-Czechoslovak military links. The links between the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the KSC, after all, transcend national boundaries and are links of a socialist world order. Links between the Soviet state and the Czechoslovak nation were potentially more restrictive. The diminution of party control in the armed forces arguably could have weakened one means of Soviet influence. Obviously, any further movement toward apoliticization of the armed forces would have even more serious consequences. Nor could the Soviets have looked with pleasure upon the awakening of long-dormant channels of communications between the Czechoslovak political and military leaders. Rapprochement of this type, at the expense of the Soviet Union, was threatening. Soviet fears about the impact of events in the CLA on the alliance were slowly confirmed as negative attitudes toward the Warsaw Pact, already evident in the mid1960s, exploded onto the surface. Gradually, the discussion of the role of the armed forces in the society opened the Pandora's box of the proper role of the CLA in the nation's defense. As noted previously, there were disintegrative tendencies in the Warsaw Pact after the publication of Sokolovsky's Military Strategy, which the Czechoslovaks felt clouded the is132

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sue of Eastern Europe's defense under the Soviet Union's nuclear umbrella. Until the liberalized environment of 1968, these concerns could not be openly discussed, but when the question did come to the fore, the debate was quite startling. This discussion of Czechoslovak military doctrine was codified in two basic documents: the Action Program of the Ministry of Defense, which was prepared for the aborted Fourteenth Party Congress, and the memorandum of the Klement Gottwald Academy staff. The Ministry's Action Program was a working paper for the upcoming congress. It did not, as such, represent official policy, but it enjoyed great support and would have surely been adopted had the congress taken place. The full document was never made public, but it apparently called for the creation of a national military doctrine and for the reorganization of the entire system and rationale of Czechoslovak defense.50 One of the most startling elements of the program was the contention that Czechoslovakia should be prepared to participate not only in conflicts between East and West but also in smaller conflicts in which the country might have to rely on its own resources. The report suggested that bilateral military assistance between Pact members—excluding the Soviet Union—might be valuable and should not be dismissed. In fact, it was stated that total reliance on the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact was inadequate. Consequently, the document concluded that the preparation of a national military doctrine and strategy would be the Ministry's top priority. This statement of purpose was also reflected in the memorandum of the Klement Gottwald Academy's military strategy staff.51 Addressing the question of an immediate consideration of the national doctrine, the staff of the military-political academy enumerated the salient features of the Czechoslovak national defense doctrine. Prepared and signed by the staff of the most prestigious military-political academy in Czechoslovakia, the memorandum was immediately influential with members of the intelligentsia and received wide acclaim and discussion. The document was endorsed by the rector, pro133

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rector, department heads of the Gottwald Academy, and members of the Zapotocky Military-Political Academy, and claimed to be a think piece for the formation of a viable national doctrine. In the introduction the authors stated that there should be an elaboration of official Czechoslovak military doctrine. "In our opinion," they said, "this doctrine must be based on Czechoslovak national interest in the military sphere, which has so far not been formulated or established."52 The document goes on to state that socialist internationalism is linked with the national responsibility of the sovereign state. Through this statement, the authors were attempting to establish the importance of national concerns. The Czechoslovak military became a real instrument, they noted, just at the time when a new political system was evolving in Europe (this is an apparent reference to peaceful coexistence after 1956). Czechoslovakia, however, failed to formulate its own doctrine and to reform the army. The allusion to peaceful coexistence is important here, but it was not the only message that the authors wished to convey. The revision of the Stalinist system ("the original notion of a uniform economic and political model") brought about, the authors apparently believed, a weakened alliance. The German factor, an external stimulant to reinforce socialist cohesion, therefore became the glue that held the alliance together. "The military factor was meant to compensate for inadequate economic cooperation and the lack of development of other ties between the socialist countries." 53 This blunt reference to the attempt to hold the military sphere separate and to force unity through it goes right to the heart of the problem. It was this divorce of the military from changing national circumstances that retarded its development and forestalled the creation of a national military doctrine. Decrying "twenty years of deformed development" and "primitive logic," the authors pleaded for attention to national circumstances and for the use of modern, scientific approaches in the formulation of doctrine. The document attempted to analyze the political-military 134

LIBERALIZATION, JANUARY TO AUGUST 1968 situation in a new way. The class analysis approach was deemed inappropriate. Rather, Czechoslovak military doctrine should be formulated on the basis of certain objective factors and the geopolitical circumstances of Czechoslovakia's existence. The most important factors in developing national military doctrine were the following: The worldwide military-political situation The behavior of NATO The character of future war The strategic position of Czechoslovakia Foreign military-political relations of Czechoslovakia The character of the Czechoslovak political system Czechoslovakia's human, economic, scientific, and technical resources Though these suggestions seem benign enough, they were revolutionary, not because of what was included, but because of what was omitted. There is no mention of the Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance as a critical factor. Second, there is no consideration of the correlation of forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Finally, and most critically, there is no mention of the class element in the struggle between two camps. This final omission—that the relationship between hostile classes should be the foundation of military doctrine—was very critical. The raison d'etre of the Warsaw Pact is the existence of hostile forces of the class character surrounding the socialist states. The Pact must constantly work to swing the "correlation of forces" (the quantitative and qualitative comparison between East and West) in favor of socialist states. The Warsaw Pact then will exist only as long as there are hostile classes and until socialism triumphs over capitalism. Geopolitical analysis is considered antithetical to Warsaw Pact doctrine, because only class analysis correctly identifies the nature of the Western threat. The suggestion that military doctrine be formulated on objective factors, other than class factors, was a radical departure from Warsaw Pact doctrine. And the consideration of Czechoslovakia's uniqueness was 135

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certainly contrary to the tenets of class analysis, implying that variation in Warsaw Pact foreign and military policy was necessary as a result of national differences. The memorandum analyzed the distortions that pervaded Warsaw Pact doctrine as a result of "foreign analysis" and exclusive reliance upon class concerns. One such distortion was an exaggeration of the NATO-West German threat. Warsaw Pact strategists have always contended that West Germany was at the center of the threat to East Central Europe's socialist alliance. Playing upon the historical animosities of the Czechs and Poles, strategists used the threat of West German revanchism to justify Soviet troop stationing, standardization of Warsaw Pact military establishments, and the oppressive military expenditures that these small states had to bear. Brezhnev's so-called iron triangle (Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany) bore the brunt of the responsibility, since they were front-line states against NATO. This specter of an imminent threat from the West was bolstered by the claim that NATO would not be satisfied until Germany was reunited under an imperialist West German leadership. Questioning the virulence of the West German threat was thus blasphemy. In fact, the memorandum went beyond this and suggested that there were "progressive" forces in West Europe. The conclusion drawn from this analysis was that Czechoslovakia, because of its unique geopolitical and cultural position, should be allowed considerable freedom in designing a military doctrine and in pursuing foreign policy initiatives. Continued alliance with the Soviet Union and the socialist camp was urged. "Czechoslovakia will continue to be guided by the claims of the alliance with other partners . . . above all the USSR."54 But the emphasis in the memorandum was on the development of policies independent of, perhaps in contradiction with, Warsaw Pact policy. The key was that Czechoslovakia should help in finding peaceful, all-European solutions to the problem. There was a strong sense that European relations need not, indeed could not, be conflictual. 136

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Though the party leadership continued to insist that alliance was not an issue, there was support for this position in the foreign policy establishments. One official noted: While in the past [there was] . . . acceptance of the concept of "the leading country," the accent now is on specific factors of their individual development. Now there is the creation of conditions permitting the common interests of the socialist countries to be asserted not only in proclamation as before, but chiefly in a joint course. . . . [We must allow] enough room for an independent Czechoslovak foreign policy. . . . What can a small country like Czechoslovakia actually afford in the field of international politics[?] . . . We must take a positive approach to this question of elbowroom in foreign policy . . . this cannot be done passively, but by our own initiative.55 Those who promoted independent foreign and military policy were fearful that Czechoslovakia would become embroiled in and liquidated by a European war. As the memorandum stated, "To regard the variant of a general war in Europe with the large-scale use of nuclear weapons as the only possibility is absurd from the point of view of Czechoslovakia's national existence."56 There was also a strong sense that policy initiatives should be discussed publicly. The public "information gap" was noted. One commentator stated, "Foreign policy is made by too select a group and there is therefore no information. A socialist general flees to imperialist America and we know nothing. We also don't know a thing about, let us say, the actual share of various countries of the Warsaw Pact in our common defense."57 Not surprisingly, these ideas were disturbing for the Soviet Union and the leadership of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets were furious about the memorandum, and in deference Czechoslovak officials disavowed it. Responsible officials in the Ministry of Defense stated that the intentions of the memorandum were good, but some of the conclusions were erroneous. The Ministry of Defense also claimed that the 137

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memorandum did not state the official policy line. 58 It is undeniable, however, that the memorandum stated explicitly what the Ministry's working papers would later imply, namely, that independent Czechoslovak national doctrine meant a reevaluation of the alliance with the Warsaw Pact and a more neutral stance based upon unique features of Czechoslovak national development. Though the document was disavowed, no punitive action was taken against the authors. Clearly, the military leadership was hesitant about the discussion of a national military doctrine, though sympathetic to the need for its examination. They were, however, paralyzed when the debate turned to the question of Soviet hegemony and dominance in the Warsaw Pact. Initially, Dziir, Prchlik, and others confined their comments to thinly veiled criticism of Pact inequality through promises to seek a more active role or "organizational rejuvenation" of the Warsaw Pact. At almost every available opportunity, the party, military-political, and military elites praised the role of the Warsaw Pact in the defense of socialism. The statement of MPA chief Pepich is typical of elite pronouncements: "It is necessary to constantly guard the willingness of the country and to boost preparedness and readiness, because the imperialists have changed tactics. The conditions that made it essential to coordinate the Warsaw Pact continue to exist. "59 Interestingly though, in every statement that officers made about the importance of the Warsaw Pact, there was one caveat. Like Lomsky in 1966, military leaders, albeit implicitly, asserted that the Pact was not as equal as it should be and that the importance of non-Soviet states should not be underestimated. Pepich stated: The role of the USSR as the only socialist state . . . able to meet all military contingencies of the present time does not detract from the importance and role of the military potential of other socialist states . . . particularly when nuclear war is not the only alternative. . . . We shall endeavor to intensify cooperation in the military-political sphere with all socialist states . . . especially with the USSR. But we 138

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regard it as our international duty to contribute in a more active manner to the common defense of socialism through contributions in military theory and practice [emphasis added]. 60 Martin Dzur also stated that active participation should be sought: "We are ever mindful of the existing aggressive aims of the imperialist world. . . . We shall make a more active contribution to the joint activities and defense of the Warsaw Pact member states." 61 Dzur went on to state that Czechoslovakia had been too passive in pursuing her duties in the socialist military alliance and that organizational changes were needed. The Soviets, though, printed Dziir's remarks about firm alliance with the Warsaw Pact.62 There was, as of July, no evidence in the Soviet press that the Czechoslovak's subtle message was getting through. Then, in July, the debate on alliance relations and the role of the Soviet Union changed qualitatively. Under mounting pressure from the Warsaw Pact leadership, Czechoslovakia's military elite began to push back. In mid-July, Vaclav Prchlik, former head of the MPA and now the Central Committee's chief of military affairs, held a press conference. The now famous attack on Soviet dominance in the Warsaw Pact also contained blunt references to Czechoslovak sovereignty. The pressure had been building and Prchlik finally lashed out. For weeks the leadership had been in the uncomfortable position of trying to explain the failure of Soviet troops to depart as scheduled, following joint Warsaw Pact maneuvers. On July 1, Rude Prdvo announced that the maneuvers were over, but certain very visible Soviet units did not leave Czechoslovak territory. 63 For almost two weeks, the Czechoslovak military leadership made a series of contradictory statements about the departure of the troops. But even when Pravda announced an official end to the maneuvers on July 12, several units remained in place.64 The CLA leadership was questioned constantly about the residual units and was unable, or unwilling, to explain the delay. On July 17, Vaclav Prchlik 139

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admitted that he was unable to say when the troops would withdraw. "Tomorrow, one will be wiser than today," he said.65 Prchlik was the highest member of Czechoslovakia's politicalmilitary elite, heading the Central Committee's Military Affairs Department, and the fact that he was uninformed about the status of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak soil must have been a source of consternation for the population and an embarrassment for the military elite. Indeed pressures were mounting for the military leadership to somehow reestablish public confidence in the ability of the CLA to defend Czechoslovak sovereignty. The troop debacle was, after all, taking place in an atmosphere charged with rumors of impending invasion. The July meeting of the five Warsaw Pact nations (the USSR, Poland, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Hungary), which publicly chastised the Czechoslovak leadership and threatened concerted action against the liberalization, would draw criticism from the press. The leadership and the public must have recognized the connection between the so-called Warsaw letter, the ultimatum delivered to Czechoslovakia by the five powers, and the foreign troops who showed no intention of leaving Czechoslovak soil. The military press sharply criticized the Warsaw letter and publicly called upon all elements of the society to defend the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak state. Obrana Lidu prominently quoted Hero of the Soviet Union and then president of Czechoslovakia, Ludvik Svoboda: It cannot be believed that the attitude of the Warsaw Pact nations is due to ignorance. The letter is the most infamous activity of the international workers' movement since the Cominform letter to Yugoslavia. Our one sin . . . is our desire to rid socialism of all its former distortions, to return to it its humane content . . . to respect our own national tradition and to implement the words of the constitution, which says that the only source of power in the state is the people . . . our people, our two nations, our independent and sovereign state. 66 140

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Thus, the troop withdrawal delays and the attitude of the Warsaw "five" raised the specter of allied intervention. The atmosphere was so charged that rumors of impending permanent troop stationing were rampant. In fact, Deputy Minister Plescott had found it necessary earlier to remind the Warsaw Pact that Benes, Gottwald, and Novotny had all denied Soviet stationing of troops and to do so anyway would be considered a serious abridgement of Czechoslovak sovereignty.67 Thus, at a time when Czechoslovak sovereignty and the ability and willingness of the CLA to defend it was in question, the highest military official finally challenged the Soviet Union and the Warsaw "five." In a nationwide press conference, Prchlik suggested that the Warsaw Pact was not operating properly and that changes in organization had to be made. He stated, "We hold the view that necessary qualitative changes should be made in the Warsaw Pact with respect to the concept of its functions and to relationships within the Pact. "^ Prchlik suggested that the role of the political advisory committee be upgraded so that the committee would meet regularly, purposefully, and systematically. More startling, however, were Prchlik's explicit comments about relations in the Pact: "Relations within this coalition . . . should be improved . . . in such a way as to emphasize the real equality of individual members of the coalition." Then finally confronting the Soviets directly, he stated: The problem is that the "joint command" is a command formed by marshals, generals, and officers of the Soviet army, and other member armies have only a few representatives who have so far held no responsibilities, nor had any hand in making decisions. They play, rather, a role of liaisons. The allied command should be reconstituted so that it is composed of appropriate specialists of the individual armies, and their incorporation into this command [should be] of such a nature as to enable them to cocreate and to participate in the whole process of learning and de141

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ciding. . . . I think that the present relation does not fully express representation of the basis of equal rights. 69 Prchlik went on to offer a few comments about Warsaw Pact threats against Czechoslovak sovereignty: "The convening of that Warsaw conference is in my opinion a lamentable act, all the more because our allies knew the positions of our presidium and government about the convocation of the meeting." 70 (The KSC leadership had opposed, in principle, the meeting of the alliance and had refused to attend.) Saying that sovereignty was a fundamental tenet of the Warsaw Pact, Prchlik contended that no provision entitled the partners to arbitrarily place their units on the territory of other member states: "The 1956 'Protocol on the Establishment of a Joint Command' expressly stated that 'basic measures, particularly those measures that concern the stationing of forces, will always be carried out . . . after an agreement with the participating states in the treaty.' " He then stressed the words "after an agreement." Prchlik concluded his comments by suggesting that Czechoslovakia would continue to "insist on the characteristic traits and tendency of our internal policy development, to insist that we shall not permit a violation of our state sovereignty or interference in our internal affairs, and to insist on the view that we are capable of solving our own problems with our own forces."71 The qualitative difference between Prchlik's statements and statements by Dziir and Pepich warrants attention. The ideas about inequality in the Warsaw Pact were not new. Dzur had stated that Czechoslovakia lacked initiative in Pact affairs. Up to now, we were a disciplined, responsible, but at the same time, little-active executor of the requirements of joint command. . . . We want to be in the future a disciplined and responsible, but active participant of the coalition of armies of the Warsaw Pact, participants who would take the initiative in that coalition. Therefore, we recommend an international composition of the joint command, the creation of collective advisory organs in the Warsaw Pact's 142

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Central Committee . . . in which all responsible representatives of all armies would participate . . . together with a coalition military doctrine that is to the present nonexistent. . . . A joint technical committee should also exist to decide matters of technical improvement. 72 Suggesting that Czechoslovakia take a more active role and that joint command be truly implemented was one thing; explicitly criticizing Soviet hegemony and insisting upon the inviolability of sovereignty was quite another. The Prchlik statements challenged the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact on quite a different plane. Though Prchlik later claimed that he could not understand the uproar his statements caused, it is easy to see that the explicit rejection of "limited sovereignty" and the implicit threat to defend the state's independence could not be tolerated. Prchlik was not simply a military officer with command responsibility. He was the chief of the Central Committee's Military Affairs Department and by virtue of that position the highest-ranking member of the military elite. He presumably held considerable responsibility for any decision to mobilize the military against allied invasion. Some have even stated that Prchlik approached Dubcek with a proposal to confront the Soviets with the possibility of military resistance.73 Whatever the case, Prchlik's comments, not without reason, provoked Soviet ire against the military-political leadership as no other event had. But curiously, there were eight days between the press conference on July 15 and the Soviet press attack on July 23. When the attack was finally printed, it not only denounced Prchlik but also implicitly chastised the CLA leadership in general. The delay is central to an understanding of how sponsor-client military relations may have been unfolding in the critical months before the invasion. Were the Soviets simply deciding how to respond to Prchlik's remarks, or were they engaged in information gathering and perhaps negotiation with the CLA leadership on the prevalence of these views and on an appropriate response? Cer143

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tainly, the Soviets were not simply drafting a response to Prchlik's comments. This could have been done immediately, since he obviously had to be denounced. Rather, the tone and substance of the response, when it came, suggest that the Soviets finally decided that liberalization in the military had gone too far. The military-political aspects of the SovietCzechoslovak confrontation have been given little attention by students of the decision to invade, but it is probable that the relationship between the CLA leadership and the Soviet command was an important element in the final outcome of the crisis. A close look at the state of the CLA and military-political relations between the Soviets and Czechoslovakia finds that the Soviets harbored deep-seated fears about the state and loyalty of the CLA. They undoubtedly weighed this factor very carefully and thoroughly and may have attempted to manipulate the internal military situation to their advantage. The Soviets were extremely cautious in reacting to the liberalization within the Czechoslovak military establishment. The Soviet press, and particularly the military press, had been virtually silent on the democratization of the armed forces and even on the diminution of party control within the military. Only the Sejna affair drew comment, and this to deny that the Soviet Union was involved. After the rout of the conservatives in April, the Soviet press was still silent. It was not until the publication of the Gottwald Memorandum that the press questioned military-political events in Czechoslovakia and then only to denounce the memorandum and to implicitly question the motives of the military intelligentsia. Soviet gradualism can be explained in several ways, but throughout the spring and summer the Soviets must have been assessing the threat of the CLA's liberalization to the effectiveness of the alliance. Moreover, they may have harbored hopes of using or manipulating the CLA to manage the larger societal crisis. Though it is highly speculative, the possibility that the Soviets hoped until the last moment to use the CLA in the crisis should not be dismissed. The CLA lead144

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ership could have functioned as an informant on developments within Czechoslovakia, as an internal source of pressure on the liberals within the leadership to moderate the liberalization, and finally, if extreme measures had to be taken, as an internal source of intervention. It would be important, then, not to overreact and cut off this option. Moreover, in the early stages of the crisis, the Soviet leadership probably saw no cause for alarm, either in the question of military loyalty or in the question of CLA effectiveness. The Soviets may have believed that the more objectionable aspects of the CLA liberalization would be undermined when a solution was found to the larger political crisis. Indeed, the checks on party power would have been removed after party control was reestablished in general. Other reforms, such as the nationality, rehabilitation, and pension solutions, were not really threatening. Soviet gradualism may also have reflected some confusion and, in fact, disagreement about the nature and scope of the military-political liberalization. Presumably, direct Soviet lines of communication were undermined by the rout of Soviet hardliners like Rytif and Bedfich and it must have been increasingly difficult for other officers to maintain contacts under public scrutiny. Increasing Soviet nervousness and pressure were therefore perhaps the result of not only qualitative changes in the military liberalization but also growing isolation and severed lines of communication. The latter probably led to considerable misinformation and speculation about events in the CLA. The circumstance might have led to a division in the military-political leadership within the USSR on the nature of the threat and the proper solution. Soviet behavior progressed steadily during these months from information gathering to persuasion and finally to open attack and overtly coercive means. But this behavior, so measured and cautious between April and July, suddenly turned violent after the Prchlik press conference. Returning to the months before July, we see increasing pressure on the CLA leadership. As we have noted, the first stages of the Czechoslovak military lib145

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eralization were in direct response to the Sejna affair. The initial flurry of activity in February and March drew no comment from the Soviet leadership. The only public response was a delayed denial that the Soviet Union had aided Sejna's escape. Three days after Sejna's defection, however, Gen. I. I. Iakubovskii, commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact, arrived in Prague for discussions with Dubcek, Novotny, Lenart, and Lomsky.74 Iakubovskii remained the Soviet's liaison with the Czechoslovak military throughout the crisis. The Soviet leadership was apparently satisfied with CLA behavior during this time. Little had actually occurred. There was public outcry over Sejna and criticism of the party organization, but this was still confined to the pages of A-Revue and Lidovd Armada. The Warsaw Pact had been discussed in only the most general and positive terms. Moreover, the events of February and March and the fall of Mamula and Sejna were not necessarily unsettling for Moscow. These ambitious political apparatchiks were probably considered liabilities after their exposure. Just as in the dismissal of Novotny and the rise of Dubcek, the Soviets took a laissez-faire stance. The events of April until June were not taken so lightly. Four qualitatively different circumstances surfaced. First, the question of Czechoslovak national military doctrine appeared and was included in the military's draft Action Program. Second, the party-military apparatus endorsed the idea that party control should be reexamined and the MPA increasingly demonstrated its liberalism. Third, the issue of military expenditure and the size of the CLA surfaced. Fourth and most important, there were changes in the military leadership that isolated the most unreservedly pro-Soviet officers. In this regard, the rise of Slovak officers Dzur and Pepich, perhaps less trusted by the Soviets, must be mentioned. At every turn, pro-Moscow generals were being dismissed from the ranks of the leadership and isolated from the military-political debate. It could not have escaped the Soviets' attention that the Czechoslovak military press was no longer a vehicle for the expression of conservative views. This dismissal of the 146

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Moscow hard-liners created two new conditions: an antiliberalization lobby that, cut off from the domestic process, probably resorted to full-time "reporting" and "lobbying" with the Soviet leadership, and the aforementioned information gap, in which Soviet sources were effectively silenced. The latter circumstance probably made the reports of doom uttered by hard-liners like Otakar Rytif more credible than they might otherwise have been. Initially, the Soviets did not appear too alarmed at these leadership changes. After all, the backgrounds of the Czechoslovak army officers are so similar that Moscow must have felt that "Soviet men" were still in control. This tendency to depersonalize relations with the client officers is interesting and, though not empirically provable, might explain the fact that the Soviets seldom seem disturbed by changes in the client leadership. In fact, the selection process of officers and even party officials is such that their backgrounds and training are homogenized to ensure the interchangeability of personnel. Dzur's fine credentials and Soviet confidence in him were reported in the press and only routine announcements of the dismissal of conservative officers appeared.75 Throughout May and June, the Soviet leadership expressed confidence in Dzur and his colleagues. In May, for example, on the occasion of his promotion to colonel general, Dzur received well-publicized telegrams from an impressive array of Soviet military leaders. 76 On the anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia, a telegram was sent to Dzur, recalling "the jointly shed blood of the Czechoslovak and Soviet soldiers" and proclaiming that "the firm friendship and combat unity between our fraternal peoples and armies will strengthen the economic and military power of the countries of the socialist community. "77 For his part, Dziir dutifully proclaimed the value of the Warsaw Pact and was widely quoted throughout the Soviet press. Under the surface, however, the Soviet leadership was increasing its pressure on the CLA. After the events of April, Iakubovskii returned to Prague. The purpose of Iakubovskii's visit was not publicized and it might have been a fact-finding 147

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mission. On the other hand, the Soviet military leadership had for some time pressured the CLA leaders to allow Soviet troops on Czechoslovak soil. The pressure had come primarily from the Warsaw Pact command, under Iakubovskii, the Ground Forces Command, and perhaps MPA chief Yepishev. Always nervous about the absence of Soviet troops with this advanced military, they had become more concerned by the reportedly poor performance of the CLA in the Warsaw Pact's 1966 VLTAVA exercises. The events of April through June 1968 gave the Soviets a pretense for raising the issue anew and they might have done so. During May, the visits of Soviet military leaders increased. Marshals Grechko and Yepishev visited on May 17. Dzur tried to play down the importance of this visit, stating that Grechko had not been to Czechoslovakia since becoming defense minister and the visit was in answer to an invitation extended some time ago. Furthermore, Dzur denied that discussions of concrete matters or maneuvers had taken place. Maneuvers had indeed been scaled down, but "this was according to a prior plan. "78 He admitted that the scaling down had been because of the "tumultuous period," but said that inappropriate weather was also a reason. A few weeks earlier Generals Konev and Moskalenko had begun an "extended tour" of CLA units in fifteen cities. During one such visit Konev stated, "The preservation of militant revolutionary traditions of the proletariat and the defense of Soviet-Czechoslovak ties must be assured."79 This statement is typical of those uttered by visiting Soviet military leaders during the period. The Soviets were still reasonably satisfied with what they saw, and Pravda concluded that the visit had been most successful, fraternal, and friendly.80 Whatever Grechko and others discussed, the pressure continued to increase as the summer approached. Throughout the spring and summer, the minister of defense and others had to deny constantly that permanent allied troop stationing was in the offing. Then, on May 30, there were unannounced and apparently 148

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unexpected "maneuvers." Some have said that Soviet airborne troops and ground forces landed on Czechoslovak territory days ahead of schedule. 81 Certainly, the Ministry of Defense reacted as if surprised and issued a feeble claim that the May 30 exercises had not been announced, even to the participants, until the last minute so that they would be "as close as possible to reality."82 Dzur steadfastly refused to comment beyond the official statement. When Soviet troops were again the issue throughout June and July, Dzur simply issued statements that were then contradicted by other statements. The difficulty that Dzur and others had explaining the long delays in July has already been discussed. This overt pressure was bolstered by psychological pressure, suggesting that the Soviets were planning to use a counterweight to the CLA if the situation were not remedied. In Pravda on June 21, 25, and 26, prominently placed letters on militia activities appeared. 83 The militia was reportedly denouncing Czechoslovak antiparty tendencies at the highest levels and reiterating support for Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship. The first of these statements was carried on the day after the SUMAVA exercise began. As previously stated, Soviet troops remained on Czechoslovak soil until at least August 9, in spite of Rude Prdvo's July 1 announcement that maneuvers had ended. As July approached, events moved in a direction that the Soviets must have viewed with considerable alarm. The reforms were taking shape: the order for the establishment of a National Defense Council, discussion of Czechoslovak military spending, and a decline in party power over personnel decisions. Still, the Soviets were cautious and the events drew virtually no response. By the time of the Prchlik press conference, when the leadership of the CLA had reached the end of its rope, the Soviets were still holding out, assessing the CLA leadership and apparently deciding whether the elite was still in control of the military. Just prior to the denunciation of Prchlik, MPA chief Pepich was released from his duties and "promoted" out 149

LIBERALIZATION, JANUARY TO AUGUST 1968 of the armed forces command. There was also a slap at the "discussions" of the presence of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia and a response to charges that they were "violating Czechoslovak sovereignty."84 Then abruptly the Soviets also reached the threshold. In denouncing Prchlik's "irresponsible" comments, Krasnaia zvezda's editorial "Whose Favor Is General V. Prchlik Currying?" also denounced the CLA leadership, proclaiming surprise at the lack of disavowals of Prchlik from the CLA and KSC leaders. The editorial stated, "One would think that any attempt to cast aspersions on the socialist countries' comradeship in arms and on the Soviet army, which at the price of such colossal sacrifices delivered the peoples of Europe from the nightmare of fascist bondage . . . would be resolutely rebuffed by the Czechoslovak party and military leadership" (emphasis added).85 The editorial pointed out that Prchlik's charges of inequality had been denounced by ministers of defense of Poland, East Germany, and Bulgaria, and by veterans of Czechoslovak military service. "Soviet marshals, generals, and officers share with their comrades in arms as equals among equals," the editorial stated. Furthermore, these utterances had been taken up by the imperialist press, according to Krasnaia zvezda. The editorial quoted Reuters: "A prominent Czechoslovak general made an extremely strong public attack on the Warsaw Pact." The commentator added, "Here we see how quickly one can become a prominent general." After demanding Prchlik's censure, the editorial expressed faith in the "Czechoslovak working people and army personnel," but did not mention the CLA leadership. 86 In fact, the CLA leadership had said nothing and it was this silence that may finally have changed Soviet attitudes about military-political events in Czechoslovakia. Whether the leadership was too liberal to be tolerated or the domestic environment had tied the hands of well-meaning military leaders, the CLA elite had shown its impotence in moderating the liberalization. Not only did the leadership fail to immediately disavow Prchlik, its long-awaited reaction was vacil150

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lating and vague. In apparent concession to Soviet fury, Prchlik's Eighth Department was abolished. This had already been planned by liberal forces, however, and could hardly have mollified the Soviet Union. Moreover, Prchlik was granted immunity from prosecution and had still not been disavowed by the CLA leadership. Finally, seven days after the Soviet press attack, a mysterious Czechoslovak press agency release surfaced that stated that the military disagreed with Prchlik.87 Dzur said that he knew nothing of the statement. Asked for a position, Dziir said vaguely that the press conference was good in substance, but that all of what the general had said in response to journalists was not correct.88 Then, two weeks after the July 28 statement, the origins of which the Ministry denied knowing, the Military Council of the Ministry of Defense published a statement that in effect supported the disavowal. It was not, therefore, until August 15 that the Defense Ministry finally ofifered its own statement and officially disavowed Prchlik.89 This confused and, for the Soviets, unacceptable behavior of the minister of defense and the CLA leadership must have convinced the Soviets that military-political affairs were now out of control. The top military-political official had publicly criticized Soviet hegemony and implicitly threatened resistance, and the military leadership was unable to respond. It cannot be conclusively stated whether the demise of the CLA played a role in the Soviet decision to invade, but if it did, the events of July must have finally convinced the Soviets that the situation was critical. Some have argued that hardline Soviets, like General Shtemenko, favored invasion in April.90 Early in the crisis, Major General Zolotov of the Ground Forces Command is said to have proclaimed to Slovak officials, "Czechoslovakia is threatened by a return to capitalism and Soviet soldiers are ready to prevent it."91 Yepishev, Grechko and Iakubovskii are also believed to have favored invasion early in the crisis, claiming that their worst fears about the absence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia were being realized. Yepishev, as chief of the MPA, must 151

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have been particularly concerned, because it was the Czechoslovak MPA that was leading the military liberalization. Moreover, the divergence between the Warsaw Pact and the CLA, evident in 1966, had undoubtedly soured the attitudes of these conservative Soviet generals and increased their haste to reverse the trend in Czechoslovakia. The challenges to Soviet initiatives that CLA leaders had been presenting since 1966 in the Pact probably angered those Soviet generals who were in close contact daily with military-political conditions in Czechoslovakia. But according to one student of the decision to invade, not all among the Soviet military elite were convinced of the need for intervention. 92 The "modernists" of the Strategic Rocket Forces Command, who had worked out a compromise with the Czechoslovaks in 1965 on the stationing of Soviet forces, are numbered among the soft-liners.93 This command, which the Czechoslovaks themselves apparently considered less meddlesome, feared that the intervention would cause more problems in the military sphere than it would solve. They feared that invasion would undermine the efficiency of the CLA. Whether there were indeed soft-liners unconvinced about the need for intervention is difficult to say. But by July, most in the Soviet Union had good reason to worry. Pressure to do something may have been exerted by the defense establishments of Poland and East Germany. During the Cierna conference, a Soviet delegation met with the East German defense minister, Heinz Hoffman.94 The delegation was headed by Shtemenko. Furthermore, events drew fire from the Poles, who claimed Czechoslovakia was under counterrevolutionary siege: "Today's complicated and dangerous international situation demands special vigilance. . . . The targets are countries of the socialist commonwealth. . . . They seek to undermine their unity."95 These mounting pressures and an apparent decision that the CLA leadership could not be effectively manipulated, for whatever reason, probably contributed to the Soviet decision to invade. It was, after all, very clear that the 152

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CLA could not be handled apart from the larger societal crisis. This final failure of the direct Soviet link with the military must have been very disturbing for both the Soviet military and political elites. The inability of the Czechoslovak military leadership to react satisfactorily in light of the Prchlik conference is very instructive for an examination of client military behavior. The CLA leadership was caught between two masters: the domestic liberalization that it did not dare denounce and the Soviet Union's fury. The CLA leadership was in the uncomfortable position of balancing domestic legitimacy and Soviet loyalty. Prchlik received tremendous public acclaim and support from several military party organizations and the military press. When the Ministry reacted so hesitantly, it provoked recriminations not only from the Soviet Union but also from the Czechoslovak public and lower-ranking members of the military. The staff of the Gottwald Military Academy demanded an explanation of the origins of the CETEKA release disavowing Prchlik and stated, "The claims that General Prchlik took a negative stand toward the Warsaw Pact run counter to all his activity in army command posts and in the party. Although we have no pleasure in saying so, we express our apprehension lest the case of General Prchlik be a beginning of similar denunciations, which will gradually compromise our national effort."96 One military press organ added, "[He] is one of the few militarypolitical leaders who demand that the army should be exclusively for the true purpose for which it had been built, to safeguard the defense of the country and inviolability of its territory." 97 Statement after statement called upon the CLA leadership, and in particular the Ministry, to stand up for Prchlik. The CLA leadership was unable to respond. This military elite, which had been willing to join in the debate on internal democratization, was completely paralyzed in dealing with the nationalization of the military and the rejection of the Soviet line. This is so even though Prchlik had not called for neutralization of Czechoslovakia or for realignment. Rather, he had suggested that the CLA should be equal in 153

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Warsaw Pact relations and that Czechoslovak sovereignty was inviolable. This situation clearly illustrates two facts about the military-political relationship between the Soviet Union and its clients. First, even the slightest deviation in the military sphere and criticism of Soviet hegemony are simply forbidden. Second, the military elite, while willing to join the domestic dialogue and welcoming changes in the relationship with the domestic party, was in this case unwilling to challenge the Soviet sponsor. In this regard, Dzur's suspected duplicity takes on a slightly different color. Dziir may really have favored certain elements of the liberalization, especially those that addressed the festering problems of pensions, nationality, and rehabilitation. But when the military-political leadership, in the person of Prchlik, turned to open confrontation with the Soviet sponsor, as innocuous as it was, Dzur and others could not go along. Clearly, after the events of July 21 to 28, the Soviet Union turned to directly alter the situation in the CLA. A conscious decision was apparently made that the leadership was powerless to remedy the situation, and demands were finally presented for the dismissal of radical elements in the CLA. The concentration was upon the MPA, which had led the reform. While all other elements of Czechoslovakia's liberalization gained momentum, the military's transformation into a "reliable" instrument was begun. The radical MPA was silenced after Pepich's promotion to the Slovak National Council, where he assumed important nonmilitary functions. He was replaced by archconservative FrantiSek Bedfich, who was a colleague of Rytif and the conservative General Staff. Samuel Kodaj, commander of the forces in Slovakia, was placed in command of the entire Eastern Military District, a primary corridor of invasion. The period of liberalization at this point had come to an end. 98 A variety of issues had been addressed and the military had seized the opportunity to resolve longstanding problems related to nationality and rehabilitation and other party abuses 154

LIBERALIZATION, JANUARY TO AUGUST 1968 in the armed forces that had undermined CLA morale. Some solutions would have produced fundamental changes in the political-military apparatus. Organizational reform diminished direct party control and returned to the military leadership responsibility for the proper politicization and political control of the professional armed forces. More importantly, the military and political leaders came to the conclusion that they were partners—not adversaries—in the new stage of socialism. The military was now red and expert and its elite shared the party's concern for the well-being of the society. There were still numerous problems to work out, including the exact role of nonparty men in the socialist military. But in the new age, the military was given a voice in solving even this sensitive issue. And when the debate became too radical, threatening to isolate the party from military affairs, the military and political leadership tried to act, without coercion, to keep the liberalization within bounds. The contradictions of clientage were obvious in this new era of party-military interaction. When it was clear that military reform would be an issue, the Dubcek leadership tried to circumscribe the breadth of the reform, declaring alliance relations, doctrinal questions, and the commitment to defend the Soviet Union inviolable. But just as the military could not be separated from the societal rejuvenation, so the military's role in the alliance and the defense of the state could not be insulated from the debate. All military-political questions were soon issues for reform in the crisis environment of the summer of 1968. This rapid Czechoslovak divergence from the Soviet model of political-military relations alarmed the USSR. Clearly, the party and military were moving together toward reform, and when the Soviets were unable to pressure the CLA elite directly, it was obvious that the rapprochement was at the expense of Soviet influence. Eventually, the Soviets decided that the rapprochement would produce an unacceptable alteration of the political-military system. After several futile attempts to deal separately with the CLA leadership, the So155

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viets decided that either the military elite had lost control or had truly joined the liberalization. Either circumstance was unacceptable and the Soviets denounced the elite and moved to reestablish control. A remarkable dialogue was evolving on questions of internal democratization and on the role of the military in the defense of the state. The military leadership eventually joined the debate and soon enjoyed the fruits of the new era. But when Prchlik's outspoken comments about the Soviet Union threatened confrontation with the sponsor, the contradictions of clientage were obvious. The military elite could not react satisfactorily, either for domestic or for Soviet consumption. While the intelligentsia and several party organizations in the military backed Prchlik, declaring their allegiance to the Czechoslovak nation, the military elite vacillated and avoided the subject. The most thoroughly pro-Soviet officers were absent from the leadership, but the "moderates" in their places, either out of concern for personal safety or out of conviction, could not fully back Prchlik. Caught between domestic and Soviet audiences, the military elite showed that in a confrontation between the two constituencies it was powerless to support either.

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C H A P T E R SIX

Invasion and Normalization, August 1968-1975 As has been reported, the Soviet Union and other allied countries have satisfied the request by party and state leaders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for immediate assistance, including assistance with armed forces, to the fraternal Czechoslovak people. To execute this decision, on August 21, military units of allied socialist countries entered Czechoslovakia—all provinces and cities, including Prague and Bratislava. The troops of the fraternal countries have advanced without hindrance. Military units of the Czechoslovak People's Army are remaining where they are deployed.1 By presidential order, the Czechoslovak army remained neutral as fraternal troops advanced through Czechoslovak territory. The role of the CLA in the invasion of 1968 was thus much like the role of the Czechoslovak armed forces in 1938 and 1948. There is little evidence that the CLA or its leadership actually aided the invading forces, but the "cooperation" of the pro-Soviet general Samuel Kodaj, the commander of the Czechoslovak forces in eastern Slovakia, might have been obtained. Kodaj was, at some time prior to the invasion, given command of the entire Eastern District. In the initial phase of the invasion, Czechoslovak units were locked in the barracks and these actions, taken after the invasion, were probably carried out with the knowledge of the CLA leadership. It has been stated that Czechoslovak forces were disarmed, but these reports remain unsubstantiated and at least one other contradicts these. 2 Martin Dzur maintains that he was uninformed of the invasion. Karel Kaplan, an emigrant after 1968, supports this 157

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view and claims that the military leadership was indeed uninformed and acted responsibly in the wake of the invasion, informing the political leadership of the progress and behavior of the allied troops. 3 General Dzur is said to have stated, "We, too, were taken by surprise by the entry of the allied forces. It was around 2200 on 20 August when Comrade Cernik phoned me from the Central Committee presidium and asked whether I knew what was happening along the border. I knew the situation along the western border because I was responsible for that. But I did not know what the situation was elsewhere." 4 It is curious that Dzur was only responsible for the western border. Presumably, the minister of defense would have general responsibility and information about the entire military situation. Perhaps this "admission" calls into question the role of Kodaj, who had command of the Eastern District. Another report contends that Dzur was taken prisoner during the night by his Soviet adviser and allowed one call, which he used to notify the Dubcek leadership. 5 After he was released, he tried to contact the Interior Ministry but could not. He then contacted the Soviet representative directly and carried out the presidential orders that the CLA should not resist. "Although there was much emotion and much nationalistic passion at that time, not a single shot was fired from Czechoslovak weapons, at least that is what we were told," he said.6 Kaplan's account also suggests that Karel Rusov, the chief of the General Staff, was uninformed of the invasion. When questioned about troops massing on the border, Rusov stated that they were informed of this, but did not conclude that an invasion was being prepared. This dismissal of the threat of invasion coincides with the official position of the government. Rusov claims to have been concerned about the size of the invading forces, however, fearing that the invasion was a prelude to a move against Western Europe. Additionally, FrantiSek Bedfich, the new MPA chief, shared Rusov's concern and was intent on keeping the CLA together and under control.7 Given Bedfich's long association with the radical right, 158

INVASION AND NORMALIZATION, AUGUST 1968-1975 these statements might be considered duplicitous, but the cases of Rusov and Dzur are more difficult to dismiss. Czechoslovak military intelligence is completely geared to monitoring the western border, and it is not surprising that the intelligence was insensitive to an attack from the east. The possibility exists that selected members of the CLA elite were informed so that the neutrality of the forces could be ensured. But this is not to suggest that the leadership sanctioned or participated in the invasion. Pravda reported, "The command of the joint forces is in contact with the command of the Czechoslovak People's Army and it is assisting in safeguarding the internal and external security of Czechoslovakia. "8 As Martin Dzur explained, "The army will continue to follow the orders of the president of the Republic, Ludvik Svoboda, as its commander in chief."9 Those orders were simply not to resist. It is also instructive that the Soviet reports on their reception upon entering Prague spoke only of friendly conversations with one captain and some unnamed officers and soldiers. Either the Soviets were trying not to embarrass the leadership of the CLA or really failed to obtain their support. 10 Indeed, the military leadership was able to distance itself from the invasion so effectively that Martin Dzur was unreservedly supported as a representative to the postinvasion conference in Moscow. u His presence was demanded by his position, but the support he received was in marked contrast to the criticism of the participation of party hard-liners Bilak and Indra. Whatever "internal" assistance the Soviets received was probably offered by the security forces under Salgovi6. Numerous officials—who have since emigrated—have implicated Salgovic and the StB in collaboration with the KGB in plotting the invasion.12 The military elite has never been so cited. And even hard-liners like Kodaj found it necessary to denounce the invasion.13 Like the political leadership, the Czechoslovak military elite waited a full year to publicly embrace the invasion. And not until November 1968 was there even an official expression of friendship for the allied forces 159

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and this only implicitly, in reference to Warsaw Pact brotherhood in arms.14 During the first months after the invasion, the CLA leadership refused even to "welcome" the occupiers. Rather, the months after the invasion were marked by frantic attempts to adjust and to avoid confrontation. The CLA leadership played an integral role in this effort. The postinvasion period was difficult for all communist leaders, and the political consolidation of Czechoslovakia lagged far behind the successful military invasion. Passive—and sometimes active—resistance on the part of the population, the continued tenure of liberal Communist party and societal leaders, and genuine confusion on the part of the Soviet leadership on the proper course of the political consolidation, created a situation in which the normalization progressed very slowly for over a year. Unlike the "satisfactory" political solution that followed the invasion of Hungary, the political solution proved very difficult to effect in Czechoslovakia. The postinvasion period is thus marked by two distinct phases: the "resistance" to normalization, which lasted about one year, and the postinvasion normalization, which was begun after the spring of 1969. In the aftermath of invasion, the Czechoslovak leadership and population fought to save some of the achievements of the liberalization as well as a modicum of Czechoslovak national pride. While accommodation between the occupiers and the leadership was worked out, the country was administered as an occupation regime. The failure to subdue Czechoslovakia politically for this extended period created a situation in which elements of the liberalization existed side by side with the conservative backlash that the invasion engendered. The era was marked by great heterogeneity in the leadership and in the society. T H E CLA AND THE AFTERMATH OF INVASION

Generally, the normalization's slow pace was reflected in the military. A few steps had already been taken to reverse 160

INVASION AND NORMALIZATION, AUGUST 1968-1975 the course of the military liberalization. The transformation of the leadership had begun with the appointment of Bedfich to head the MPA, and Kodaj to control of the entire Eastern Military District. The military normalization can be roughly divided into three periods: the initial postinvasion stage, in which the military elite aided in the adjustment to the occupation and in which elements of the liberalization survived; the period of the rise of the radical right, which seems to have reached its zenith after the "ice hockey" riots of April 1969; and the final stage in which the radical right was subdued and the consolidation of the CLA began in earnest. The interesting fact is that the consolidation was no easier in the military than in any other sphere, and it is clear that the Warsaw Pact alliance paid heavy long-term costs. In the initial stage, the military leadership tried to aid in the normalization of relations with the occupying troops, while trying to salvage elements of the liberalization. Ignoring the inherent contradiction, the leadership undertook to adjust to the invasion while "fulfilling the tasks falling within the scope of the Action Program."15 The normalization of relations between the population, the CLA, and the allied occupying forces was a difficult task. This involved maintenance of the neutrality of CLA units and working out acceptable relations with the occupying troops. The first task proved to be a relatively simple one and there was no serious resistance from CLA units. There are unconfirmed reports, however, that a few commanders initially disobeyed the central command's order for nonresistance. The incidents took place in the Slovak lands and "thanks to the efforts of 'loyal' members of the units," the resistance was never consequential.16 Perhaps, Minister Dzur was mistaken in his categorical statement that no shots were fired by Czechoslovak soldiers. Whatever the case, the incidents were quickly curtailed, and for the most part the neutrality of the CLA was maintained. The development of acceptable relations with the Soviet and allied troops was more difficult. Following the invasion, 161

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there were numerous meetings between Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders on the course of normalization. As noted, Martin Dzur was party to these negotiations. The Czechoslovak leadership was generally defiant at the meetings in August and September, but eventually gave way to Soviet demands in October and agreed to reverse the liberalization completely. The October agreement allowed the "temporary" stationing of Soviet forces on Czechoslovak territory. The Treaty on the Temporary Stationing of Soviet Troops was signed October 16, 1968. At least one member of the military leadership, Vaclav Prchlik, voted against the treaty. 17 Even so, it is apparent that the treaty was toughly bargained and that the Czechs had a few demands of their own in spite of the enormous pressure of the occupation. Because of the importance of this document in understanding the initial postinvasion phase, it will be examined in some detail. The statement of purpose is rather standard, promising to "make every effort to strengthen friendship and cooperation between the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and Czechoslovakia, as well as among all of the states of the socialist commonwealth and to defend the gains of socialism."18 The treaty then calls upon parties to act in accord with numerous treaties signed between the two nations, but particularly the treaty negotiated by Benes in 1943. These reaffirmations of Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship are not uncommon, but do establish that this is a conflict between states, not one in which the Czechoslovak government needed help in managing its domestic situation. This line of reasoning is supported by Article 1 of the treaty. The article states that the reason for the deployment of Soviet troops was "the safeguarding of the security of countries of the socialist commonwealth against the mounting revanchist ambitions of West German militarist forces."19 This statement differs markedly from the original rationale for the invasion. On August 22, Pravda and Izvestiia reported, "Tass is authorized to state that party and state leaders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have requested . . . immediate assistance. . . . The 162

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reason for this appeal is the threat posed to the socialist system existing in Czechoslovakia and to the constitutionally established state system by counterrevolutionary forces that have entered into collusion with external forces hostile to socialism (emphasis added). 20 Neither had the Soviets stated since the invasion that the internal threat to Czechoslovakia had passed. On the contrary, the Soviet press continued throughout the autumn months to rail against these elements, reporting numerous "counterrevolutionary incidents and coalitions."21 The Czechoslovak government may simply have refused to allow any statement in the treaty that cited "internal" counterrevolution. The moderate leadership, including the moderate military elite, clung to the position that the events of 1968 were extreme, but denied, until the fall of 1969, that there was a danger of counterrevolution. The treaty is in some ways favorable to Czechoslovakia, since it leaves the Soviet Union to assume many of the expenses related to the stationing. The Czechs were to provide housing facilities for the forces, and the CLA and Soviet forces were to share training facilities. Interestingly, the Czechoslovak government won civil jurisdiction over all Soviet troops and their dependents. Hedging this provision, however, the treaty states that "this does not apply to crimes or misdemeanors committed by persons serving with Soviet troops in the performance of direct duties in areas where the military units are deployed."22 This apparent contradiction is indicative of the concern of Soviet authorities with the jurisdictional question. The provision established a kind of Soviet veto over Czechoslovak civil decisions concerning Soviet troops. Nevertheless, the Czechs were given legal grounds on which to claim jurisdiction, and in the early months of the normalization they exercised these rights. Perhaps the best evidence of the difficulty in concluding this treaty is the nature of the treaty itself. The document is very different from the bland, amorphous statements of purpose that usually serve as "treaties" between Soviet allied states. This treaty is detailed and was thoroughly reported in 163

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the Soviet and Czechoslovak press. More importantly, the treaty allowed for further negotiation on substantive matters. 23 The fact is that the parties were not able to agree upon all the necessary provisions. Negotiations on supplementary accords were carried out for almost four months. During this time, the Czechoslovak leadership was candid about the negotiations. The Czechoslovak military plenipotentiary, Major General Korbela, said that the negotiations took place in an "atmosphere that was especially frank and businesslike."24 Even after the negotiation of the accords, Korbela admitted that not all issues had been decided: "The supplementary accords so far concluded cover all the problems concerning specific separate parts of the basic agreement. However, it is possible that in the future, when the agreement is being put into practice, it may prove necessary to conclude the remaining supplementary accords to cover practical needs." 25 Korbela thus left open the possibility of further negotiation. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE OCCUPATION

After the conclusion of the treaty, the CLA leadership assumed primary responsibility for mediating between Soviet troops and the Czechoslovak population. There were two problems in this regard: monitoring and controlling the many actual and rumored clashes between Soviet troops and the population, and managing the considerable dislocation of CLA personnel that the sudden presence of the occupying divisions caused. Major General Korbela and other members of the military elite constantly pleaded with the population to observe the treaty: "The incidents between Czechoslovak citizens and members of the Soviet armed forces are, unfortunately, created mostly by our own citizens and this definitely does not contribute to the consolidation of conditions in our country or to the normalization of relations between the USSR and Czechoslovakia."26 Apparently, the provocations were not all on the part of the Czechoslovak population. Several reports of Soviet troop 164

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abuses surfaced and Korbela himself admitted that there had been Soviet violations of the treaty. Particularly difficult were reports, substantiated by Korbela, that citizens were dragged off to Soviet headquarters on the flimsiest pretense and, in some cases, punished. Korbela stated flatly that these were things of the past and would not happen again.27 Rumored Soviet abuses continued to plague the normalization, however. In February, a nasty rumor surfaced in connection with the suicide attempt of a young student, Jan Zajic. It was said that Zajic's home had been burglarized by uniformed Soviet soldiers a few days before his attempt. 28 Though unsubstantiated, these rumors, given popular sympathy for Zajic, fueled anti-Soviet sentiment. Additionally, there were repeated stories of unwarranted searches and burglaries involving Soviet personnel. 29 There is even evidence that as a consequence of these activities, conflicts arose between Czechoslovak officials and Soviet commanders over jurisdiction. When two Czechoslovak students were robbed and then beaten by Soviet soldiers, an investigation was launched by Czechoslovak military authorities. A few days later, however, military prosecutor Lieutenant Colonel Benes reported that the investigation had been stopped and referred to higher authorities.30 Perhaps the Czechoslovaks finally retreated from their jurisdictional battle with the Soviet command, but there were several major shifts of Soviet soldiers and in many cases the original occupying soldiers were replaced. These shifts attempted to alleviate the tensions by removing soldiers who were accused of unacceptable behavior in the early stages of the invasion.31 There were also a few incidents between Soviet soldiers and members of the CLA. The occupying forces were often in close contact with the CLA units, sharing training facilities and proving grounds. Though reports of incidents were muted, it was admitted that a few unpleasant matters had come to Korbela's attention and that most of the incidents involving the forces were "in connection with alcohol. "32 A press campaign was, in fact, undertaken to pressure CLA soldiers into sobriety. Long litanies of confessions by "drunken CLA per165

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sonnel" were repeated in which soldiers confessed to crimes against the population and lamented, "I would not have done this except for my drunkenness.' ,33 Since the incidents involving the occupying forces and CLA soldiers were attributed to alcohol, these confessions may have been aimed at problems between the forces rather than abuses against the population by Czechoslovak soldiers. The incidents between members of the CLA and Soviet forces were relatively few in number and not very serious. There were, however, more serious tensions as a result of the severe displacement and relocation of CLA personnel. Army Inspector General SmoldaS listed as one of the two primary tasks for the CLA leadership "the consolidation of the activities of units forced to relocate to new garrisons."34 Reportedly, there were massive displacements, though the CLA leadership attempted to play down the size of the relocation effort. Major General Korbela, for instance, denied that units of the Soviet army were being moved into all of the army barracks in the capital, saying that one individual building was being turned over to the Soviet commander and his staff. Occasionally, CLA soldiers would just refuse to move, and order and discipline were seriously threatened by the relocation.35 CLA morale and discipline were so bad that temporary facilities were hastily constructed, months ahead of schedule, in order to alleviate the tensions. Moreover, CLA personnel, primarily officers, complained that the Soviet soldiers were buying scarce consumer goods and that supplies were depleted in occupied towns. In order to ease the situation, vojentorgs (army shops) were set up so that troops could purchase goods on military installations.36 A final set of problems related to the occupation involved misinformation concerning the purpose of the Soviet troops. As stated, the treaty gave as the rationale the defense of the western frontier. The Czechoslovak press remained unconvinced and bluntly asked why the troops were deployed on the eastern front if they were protecting the western border. 37 Korbela evaded the question, saying that modern 166

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transport made it simple to redeploy troops in the event of a NATO attack.38 There were wild rumors about the partition of the Czech and Slovak lands. There were rumors that the CLA would be disbanded. And there were rumors that there would be no further conscription. "The new recruits in uniform on Rud4 Prdvo's front page dispel this rumor," one Soviet commentator stated.39 There was even a rumor that Czechoslovak forces were being dispatched to the Chinese border. 40 The rumors were constantly denied, but claims that there were forces of counterrevolution were not made. The CLA leadership simply repeated the fragile explanation that the troops were guarding the western border. In sum, in the initial aftermath of the invasion, the CLA elite acted responsibly, trying to uphold Czechoslovak interests. Perhaps Korbela, in his role as liaison, was too responsible. His duties were usurped by the reactionary General Rytif after the normalization was accelerated in the summer of 1969. Rytif was appointed commissioner for relations with Soviet troops, a position that subsumed Korbela's functions. Korbela was given another important position, but perhaps the Soviets preferred to deal with the more pliable Rytif. ATTEMPTS TO SALVAGE THE N E W POLITICAL-MILITARY SYSTEM

Management of the difficult adjustment to the occupation was just one problem for the leadership. The other was more difficult, namely, trying to salvage some of the gains of the liberalization in this early period. The CLA leadership refused in those early days to disavow the liberalization. The statements of Minister of Defense Dzur typified elite sentiment: "Since August, the government is endeavoring to expand gradually the scope for realizing the positive features of the post-January period. In the pursuit of this goal, the Ministry adopted an Action Program for the Czechoslovak People's Army."41 The program was actually based on the draft for the aborted Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress. Dzur 167

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admitted excesses during 1968, but recognized that it was necessary to find new solutions to the real deformations that had existed in the CLA. In January 1969, Dziir summarized the new program: The situation in our country, through which we are passing in this period, is rightly described as a complicated one. The army is very closely linked with the entire society. It is not only part of it, but also mirrors it. . . . Some events of the past year affected the army in a more sensitive way than other strata of our society. In the past, our army suffered in such a sensitive sphere as moral-political unity. Dogmatism and deformations up to the January plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party . . . as well as the impact of the wave of overwhelmingly justifiable criticism, which was, however, also marked by some extremities . . . all of this was corroding the fighting ability of the army.42 Dzur goes on to defend the liberalization course and to claim that "during the summer months [before August], the Czechoslovak People's Army was on the whole on a favorable level, and was a firm link in the Warsaw Pact and prepared to fulfill its alliance obligations. "*3 Finally, Dzur defends the liberalization's efforts, saying that it had substantially strengthened the CLA's moral-political unity. "We succeeded in working out an action program, which was received in the army with approval, and we do not need to change it substantially even today."44 Therefore, while dutifully praising socialist internationalism and the Warsaw Pact, Dziir essentially defended the proposals that had come about as a result of the armed forces dialogue. In particular, he cited the more active participation of military personnel in solving problems that confronted the CLA.45 Dzur's comments were prefaced with a pledge to support fully the commander in chief of the armed forces (the Czechoslovak president), the government, and the Communist party in whatever policies they adopted. In some ways the most pervasive characteristic of Dzur's speech is the care that he took to avoid criticism of the process that had 168

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taken place. The most remarkable characteristic is the omission of any reference to the need to copy the experience of the Soviet armed forces and the distinctly national flavor of the remarks.46 Though it is unclear which elements of the liberalization the leadership wanted to salvage, Dzur's comments about active participation mean that the political involvement of the CLA in the 1968 dialogue was valued. Furthermore, it seems that the rehabilitation effort begun before the invasion also survived. In December 1968, four months after the invasion, Gen. Helidor Pika, executed in 1949 as a Western spy, was exonerated.47 Pika was a well-known anticommunist and proWestern general. Apparendy, the pension reform and the dual staffing provisions of the nationality reform also survived. In fact, the nationality problems of the CLA have been diminished somewhat by the reforms that were undertaken in 1968. For example, Slovaks now occupy high positions in the military leadership, including the Ministry. More surprising was the continuing interest in a Czechoslovak national military doctrine. When asked about the possibility of going ahead with the evolution of Czechoslovak military doctrine, Inspector General Smoldas stated, "Each nation must have its own national doctrine; Czechoslovakia is to have it also. It emanates from the military necessity; therefore, we are continuing to work out a Czechoslovak military doctrine." 48 The rejection of the idea of a national doctrine was so slow that when Pravda accused the Gottwald Academy staff of proposing withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact,49 the Main Committee of the academy refuted the charges in a November 1968 edition ofObrana Lidu.50 Another achievement of the liberalization that CLA leaders wanted to retain was the avowed right of professional officers to direct the military. Early in 1969, the political-military leadership reaffirmed the minister of defense as the responsible official. Gen. Vaclav Dvorak, the newly appointed state secretary for military aflairs, when questioned about this stated, "Everyone should do that which he understands best and for which he has years of training. In the army, matters must 169

INVASION AND NORMALIZATION, AUGUST 1968-1975 remain in the province of the comrade minister, his commanders, and his staff. "51 In the confusing period following the invasion and the rise of the conservatives, a few reforms actually became law. At times, it was as if the process of reform continued on its own while the political struggle for control of the normalization was waged between the radical right and the moderate leadership. For example, the promised Council of Defense of the State was formed, giving legal recognition to the role of the Federal Assembly, government, and president in matters of defense. The tasks of the council were distinctly national in character and Articles 6 and 7 came close to affirming the principle of a national defense doctrine. According to the charter, the council should 1. set down the basic conception of the establishment of a system of defense for Czechoslovakia and in it especially the establishment of the armed forces; 2. approve the basic measures for civil defense and preparation of state organs and economy in the event of war; 3. propose to the government, after consultation with the competent central organs, the basic proportion of economic means to be voted to defense and see that these means are well used; 4. approve the basic concept of the operational defense plan of Czechoslovakia; 5. propose to competent constitutional organs measures necessary for the administration of the state in case of war; 6. draw conclusions for a military-political evaluation of international relations and, on the basis of this, propose to the competent constitutional organs internationally legal security measures in the interests of the defense of Czechoslovakia as well as measures growing out of the international obligations of the country; 7. in case of threat to Czechoslovakia from an external enemy, take measures to increase the defensive prepar170

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edness of the state and this even before proclamation of a state of war or a declaration of war; and 8. in wartime decide on measures related to prosecution of the war.52 The council's membership was originally a group numbering between six and ten, including the minister of defense, the chief of the General Staff, Czech and Slovak premiers, and the minister of the interior. Though the council was subordinate to the government, an apparent compromise was made and the council was to be headed by the first secretary of the Communist party. One interesting question for speculation is what the nature of this council might have been had there been no invasion. Modeled after the Soviet Council for Defense, the Czech council affirmed domestic government jurisdiction over matters that had been previously decided secretly and capriciously by the party leadership. Particularly noteworthy is the provision for competence in defense spending. Because of the invasion, however, the point is moot. Apparently the council never adopted the legal powers entrusted to it and became instead a forum for discussing decisions made in the Political Consultative Committee and Defense Minister's Council of the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, the conservatives took organizational steps to check the power of the council. The Federal Assembly's Committee on Security and Military Affairs was retained, but the Central Committee's Eighth Department, the center of controversy in the early months of the 1968 crisis, was reestablished. It was the official view that abolition of the Eighth Department had deprived the party apparatus of the ability to assert influence in the military and had "anesthetized the army."53

CONSERVATIVE DEMANDS FOR THE "NORMALIZATION" O F

CLA The delicate course of carrying on reform under the specter of occupation could not be maintained. Increasingly, the CLA 171

INVASION AND NORMALIZATION, AUGUST 1968-1975 leadership came under tremendous pressure from the radical right, particularly the new conservative leadership of MPA chief Bedfich. Very early in the postinvasion period, Bedfich took issue with several positions of the Ministry leadership. Most importantly, he disagreed about the nature and progress of the normalization of relations with the occupying troops. Unlike Korbela, Bedfich denied that there had been provocations between CLA and Soviet troops. "Very businesslike contacts have been established between the armies of Czechoslovakia and the other allied countries. . . . The CLA remains firmly in the Warsaw Pact and can thus not behave in an unfriendly way toward personnel of the other armies." 54 Bedfich began to intensify his attack on the "right" (the liberal wing of the party) in the months that followed and openly disagreed with the professional elite on the nature of the threat. Finding no merit in the events of 1968, Bedfich stated, "Last year, the right wing and antisocialist forces tried to discredit the power instruments of the Communist party and to eliminate them from the political arena. . . . These attempts were partially successful. . . . The army was relatively screened from the eyes of the public . . . but advantage was taken of anti-Soviet sentiment and the position of our army within the framework of the Warsaw Pact was attacked."55 Bedfich goes on to remove any doubt about the source of the problem: "The attack was launched against the army from within the army, directed at discrediting the leading role of the party in the CLA."56 Stating that Prchh'k and the MPA had to bear responsibility for this situation, Bedfich proposed a thorough purge of those who did not hold firm and rigid adherence to Marx-Leninist principles of party control. Finally, the MPA chief rejected the very basis of Dziir's defense of the liberalization, and denied that the army reflected the society and that the liberalization had been motivated by deformations. Democracy had no place in the armed forces: The army is a highly organized instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and an instrument of power of the socialist state. . . . It must act quickly. Therefore it is not 172

INVASION AND NORMALIZATION, AUGUST 1968-1975 possible to equate democracy in the army with democracy in the society, where it is possible to discuss problems and take a stand on them . . . this does not apply to the army. With all due respect to the development of democracy in the state, we must strengthen the elements of the indivisible power of command in the army. . . . We must teach soldiers to act only on reflex and this requires perfect control over his personal qualities [emphasis added]. 57 Bedfich's position found support among other hard-line generals, most of whom had been isolated during the 1968 debate. In an article entitled "We Shall Give a Marx-Leninist Answer to Our Problems," Otakar Rytif later echoed this position and called for a return to strict party rule. 58 The most important element in these conservative attacks was the insistence that the 1968 crisis was a product of anti-Soviet, counterrevolutionary activity within Czechoslovakia. In the army this argument took the form of serious charges that "anticlass" elements in the CLA were collaborating with Western revanchist forces. Unlike the moderates, the radical conservatives insisted that members of the CLA who participated in the events of 1968 were not simply mistaken; rather they were enemies of the state and the party. The positions of these hard-line elements were buttressed by political events in the spring of 1969. The political normalization was continually rocked by incidents of resistance and defiance on the part of the population. The most serious of these was the so-called ice hockey riot of April 3, 1969. Following the victory of the Czechoslovak national hockey team over the Soviet Red Army team in the World Championships, there was an outpouring of nationalism in which the victory was proclaimed a symbolic conquest of David over Goliath. Riots ensued in which Soviet Aeroflot offices were damaged. It has been charged that right-wing security forces provoked the riots as a pretext for a crackdown on residual liberal forces.59 Whatever the origin of the riots, they did in fact cause demands for an accelerated normalization. In addition, they seriously undermined the efforts of moderates to 173

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salvage elements of the liberalization. As Dziir had stated earlier, the moderates needed "a calm atmosphere, discipline, order, and trust" in order to pursue the moderate course. 60 The "ice hockey" riots effectively ended this hope. By this time, however, the radical right was sufficiently influential that members of the Czechoslovak armed forces, in uniform, participated in quelling the riots. The split in the armed forces is evident in the fact that other CLA members joined the rioters. 61 In conjunction with these events, the "internal" function of the CLA was explicitly resurrected and officially proclaimed for the first time since the rout of the conservatives in April 1968. Following the "ice hockey" disturbances, the Military Council of the Ministry of Defense published a rather weak statement that "disruptions were intolerable violations of the policy aims of the party and the government." 62 Denouncing members of the CLA who "thoughtlessly participated," the statement concludes, "The army command doesn't intend to stand by watching the anti-Soviet tendencies that have been displayed. . . . We intend to defend the political and class interests of socialism."63 The "internal" function of the CLA became a popular element in discussions about the revitalization of the military instrument. On the other hand, explicitly defending the internal use of the military, Bedfich stated, "In facing an internal enemy . . . units may be called in (for instance, the participation of soldiers in quelling the counterrevolutionary actions by reactionary forces) and may serve as a serious warning to those who might want to turn back the wheel of history. "m Clearly, those who blamed the crisis on "internal counterrevolution" and who promoted the "internal" function of the military were beginning to emerge. The criticism of those who had participated in the events of 1968 was also accelerated after April and the tenet that some were just "misled" or "negligent" was roundly attacked. One commentator stated, "The failure of ideological preparedness has become an apologia for 1968, a bandage for any wound." 65 The radical conservatives began to recount numer174

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ous cases of outrageous anti-Soviet, antiparty behavior. Maj. Jaroslav Krejci's testimony was typical. In reporting about an army officers' meeting, he claimed that one Colonel Pazdra said, "If someone tried to take away my 'socialism with a human face,' I would line up my artillery and start shooting. "m Another officer shouted, "I would prefer to serve in the Bundeswehr," while a major declared, "I have always hated the Russians."67 Krejci goes on to relate that there was mass listening to Radio Free Europe in the army and that an officer, second in command of a unit, had a framed copy of the "TwoThousand Words Manifesto" hanging on his wall.68 Through Krejci's comments we are afforded a glance of the depth of the divisions within the CLA below the elite level. A commander, we are told, returned to his home to find "A traitor lives here" written on his house. Moreover, commanders were often so afraid of their men that they sent their families away to safety.69 One of the most revealing statements was that those who did not favor the liberalization were branded traitors to Czechoslovakia. Nationalism and the liberalization did become closely linked. When a resolution supporting the April decisions was circulated, one commander reportedly said, "People who do not want to sign this resolution don't belong in the army. . . . If war comes, they will not know on which side they are." 70 Krejci concludes with a demand for a thorough purge of "anti-Soviet, antiparty elements. You have paved the way for the activity of anti-Sovietism. . . . Our army must be the clenched fist of the working class, a component of the Warsaw Pact. . . . It must overtly take up class and internationalist positions. . . . Every professional soldier ought to realize this and if not, he ought to quit the professional service. "71

T H E PURGE OF THE MILITARY'S LIBERAL LEADERSHIP AND CONSERVATIVE RESURGENCE

The most immediate casualties of the conservative deluge were members of the military intelligentsia and Prchlik and 175

INVASION AND NORMALIZATION, AUGUST 1968-1975 the MPA leadership. At a September meeting in 1969, the new MPA leaders unreservedly condemned the authors of the Gottwald Memorandum. The memorandum was attacked on two counts, for its "anticlass" element and its "anti-Warsaw Pact" nature. Quoting the section of the memorandum that rejected the notion of class analysis, the attack called the memorandum a revocation of twenty years of military doctrine. 72 Interpreting sections of the memorandum to suggest that military policy was "dictated by the interests of the USSR"—though this was never stated in the memorandum— the authors were accused of belittling the military threat from the West. The attack admitted that the memorandum suggested continued Warsaw Pact participation, but claimed that it was by its nature "antialliance." This attack concluded with the admonition that "the authors of the memorandum should not remain in the armed forces. Therefore, party proceedings have been initiated against them as communists."73 Attacks were also launched against the idea of the formation of national doctrine. A commentator claimed that he heard a demand that Czechoslovakia leave the Warsaw Pact and declare its neutrality on Czechoslovak Radio. Furthermore, he said, "People were reflecting on 'alternatives' for the development of security systems in the coming ten to fifteen years."74 This was perhaps in reference to the memorandum's suggestion that bilateral arrangements might be fruitful under certain circumstances. "Why were the documents not based on the Communist party's Action Program, which affirmed the fundamental principles of foreign political orientation and our participation in the coalition defense system of the Warsaw Pact?"75 Dismissing the need for reform, the commentator remarked that the authors underestimated the importance of the USSR in Czechoslovakia's defense: "The coalition system, expressed in the Warsaw Pact and based on the nuclear missile potential of the USSR, is the foundation of the defensive system of the individual socialist states in Europe. "76 The attacks of the new MPA leadership were not limited to the members of the military intelligentsia. Rather, the 176

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leadership took this opportunity to condemn the previous MPA elite. Claiming that the MPA under Pepich was more interested in the memorandum than in the party's Action Program, the attackers stated that the political-military leadership sanctioned this "express denial and absolute omission of the class principle in military doctrine." 77 The condemnation declared that "the General Staff opposed the document, but the MPA did not."78 Nevertheless, the entire military leadership was accused of leniency in the matter. The official denial of the Ministry of Defense was condemned as weak and vacillating, having been accompanied by a statement that "scientific teams had the right to propose alternative solutions to problems." 79 Moreover, Prchlik was accused of using his position in the Eighth Department to select the most objectionable members of the military to fill the MPA staff. "Oftentimes, members of the right opposition were his closest collaborators," the commentator noted. "The MPA itself proposed a revision of the political system in the army. . . . The party was to be deprived of any decisive influence in the army's political organization and in its political life. ' ,80 The conclusion of the MPA's conclave was that these "elements" had to be permanently separated from the MPA. In fact, this separation had already begun. The purge of the central figures in the 1968 crisis and the promotion of conservatives were begun in earnest after the April "ice hockey" riots. On May 30, 1969, a commission was established to investigate Prchlik and in September he was expelled from the party. 81 On October 16, 1969, his parliamentary immunity was lifted. Prchlik was sentenced by a Higher Military Court in March 1971 to three years in prison. He was charged with a violation of the 1961 Penal Code, which sentences from six months to five years "any individual who violates or fails to carry out an important duty . . . if the act results in serious disorder."82 Sanctions were imposed at the same time on the authors of the memorandum. They were investigated by army tribunals, deprived of their party membership, and dishonorably discharged from the army. Moreover, the Gottwald 177

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Academy was closed by order of the president of the Republic. The functions of the academy were transferred to the faculty of the Zapotocky Academy in Bratislava.83 A few faculty members were transferred, but most were released from their teaching duties. Concurrent with the growth of reactionary influence, changes took place in the command structure as well. By 1970, most major commands including both military districts (Generals Kodaj and Valo), the Prague garrison (Killian), the Bratislava garrison (Figura), and the air and air defense forces (Cincar) had been changed. The personnel directorate was taken over by Martin Korbela. Furthermore, Otakar Rytif was finally given a position of responsibility. He had held no office since his dismissal as chief of the General Staff in April 1968. Rytif was appointed plenipotentiary for matters concerned with the stationing of Soviet troops. The last remnants of resistance to the reaction were fading, and after the summer of 1969 Martin Dzur finally turned to a harder, more pro-Soviet line. In a speech prominently displayed in Krasnaia zvezda, Dzur publicly praised the Soviet invasion. "In the effort at the timely prevention of open action by the counterrevolution . . . we consider the assistance of the five fraternal socialist armies of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and their people . . . as a case of international assistance to the people of Czechoslovakia," he said.84 By the end of 1969, the Czechoslovak military leadership had finally moved to the right. The fact is that the moderates in the leadership had faced opposition not only from internal forces but also increasingly from the elites of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact allies. Shortly after the invasion, Marshal Konev reminded the Czechoslovaks of the military friendship with the Soviet Union, which had been cemented by the Soviet's role in the liberation of the Czechoslovak homeland. He also recalled the inglorious exploits of some Czechs and Slovaks in the collaboration with Germany. "The notorious Bata had provided boots for the German army and Krupp built his deadly cannons in Czechoslovakia, but we believed in our comrades in arms, 178

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because we knew that there were classes, there was a struggle, and there was a Czechoslovak Communist party. " M Then ostensibly praising Svoboda, Konev delivered a thinly veiled warning: "Svoboda was a brave . . . officer . . . and he received promotions thanks to his oustanding military abilities and to an understanding of where his friends were and where his enemies were."86 Konev goes on to recall the fighting spirit of Dubcek and Husak, who were partisans, and to name the Czechoslovak recipients of the Hero of the Soviet Union citation. The Czechs reciprocated, dutifully praising the SovietCzechoslovak military friendship. But the slow pace of the normalization in the CLA clearly worried the Soviet leadership. In the months after the invasion, the Soviet military elite constantly visited Czechoslovakia, presumably for fact finding and as a means of applying pressure to the CLA and KSC elites. The visits were especially frequent before March 1969, but continued at a heavy pace throughout the year. Yepishev of the MPA, Warsaw Pact commander Iakubovskii, and Minister of Defense Grechko were all guests of the CLA during the period. Yepishev was especially visible, presumably overseeing the restructuring of the Czechoslovak MPA. One such visit was for the expressed purpose of strengthening further the Czechoslovak People's Army's combat cooperation with the Soviet army and the armies of the socialist community and expanding the international education of the personnel. Moreover, Dzur, Rusov, and Bedfich were obliged to visit Moscow, and did so at least twice in the two-month period between January and March. Indicative of public concern with this kind of pressure, Dzur and others were frequently questioned about the purpose of these visits. Czechoslovak leaders always answered that the visits were routine, Dzur once saying that he had not visited Moscow—except in August—since becoming minister of defense.87 On one occasion, however, when asked about MPA visits to East Germany and other socialist countries, General Dvorak, the state secretary for defense, described them as working visits primarily for consultation. "These are not offi179

INVASION AND NORMALIZATION, AUGUST 1968-1975 cial visits of the CLA. "** In a not particularly well-disguised barb, Dvorak said that there is always much to learn from the other armies, but specific state, national, and historic circumstances "are fully respected here" (in Czechoslovakia). "This," he said, "was a source of enlightenment for the other allied armies." 89 Gradually, the combined pressure of external forces, the archconservative domestic lobby, and popular resistance to the normalization succeeded in turning the military normalization to the far right. There is circumstantial evidence that radical reactionary domestic forces actually considered military intervention when it was believed that the normalization was not proceeding with sufficient rapidity. In the days following the "ice hockey" riots, there were widespread rumors that the military was being readied to take political action. In an attempt to dispel the rumors, Ministry of Defense press secretary Kundra described the stories as "an attempt to undermine relations between the army and the state" and called the so-called coup a fabrication.90 Kundra admitted that there were visible troop movements on March 28 and 29, but claimed that these were unscheduled spring 1969 maneuvers of the troops of the USSR, Poland, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia.91 Many believed, nevertheless, that the "coup" was to take place after the "ice hockey" riots had created a breakdown in law and order. As previously stated, some claimed that the riots were initiated by the right wing. The proponents of this claim also believed that the Soviets were planning to use the CLA to put pressure on or as an alternative to the government, since the normalization was proceeding so slowly.92 The frequent visits of Soviet military personnel and the acceleration of these visits in the first days of April are taken as evidence of Soviet involvement. One set of meetings took place between Grechko, Rytif, Bedfich, and Rusov. Dziir was conspicuously absent, supposedly reviewing troops on the outskirts of the city. According to one general theory, the Soviets called off the "coup" when the normalization was accelerated after the "ice hockey" riots. The radical right was then iso180

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lated and eventually liquidated by the Czechoslovak leadership. There is simply not enough evidence to support or reject this thesis. Certainly, those who were unhappy with the pace of normalization, including Bedfich and Rytif, might have plotted such a move. Soviet involvement is even more difficult to establish, since visits by military leaders were not at all unusual at the time. Whatever the case, subsequent events suggest that there was some kind of challenge from the radical reactionary wing and that in the fall of 1969 steps were taken to bring the military back to center. FrantiSek Bedfich was dismissed in November 1969. He was replaced by Vaclav Horacek, a relatively young career political officer and a graduate of the Gottwald Academy; Horacek was also a recent graduate of the General Staff Academy in the USSR. Otakar Rytif was purged less than a year later. This purge of the most radical and outspoken officers of the conservative wing probably did represent, at the least, an effort to bring the military back to center and to neutralize it politically. A few months before Rytif's dismissal, Svoboda urged caution in rectifying the army's mistakes in 1968.M Speaking of a struggle on two fronts, he warned against the expulsion of good communists whose hesitation in 1968 was "merely an episode." Gustav Husak echoed this concern, urging that the normalization not "turn to the 1950's methods, which relied on authoritarianism instead of persuasion and education."94 Though Husak turned out to be a force for the conservative side, emergence of a really radical right in the military would have complicated the process of normalization and too swift a crackdown might have made governing impossible. Once the normalization—including the purge of both liberals and reactionaries—was completed, the leadership turned to the task of rebuilding the shattered armed forces. The first step was to affirm the political character of the army and to reestablish quickly the primacy of the party. At the Party Congress in September 1969, the party flatly rejected the notion that "any body, organ, or agency has the right to direct 181

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military affairs. This is reserved to the party." 95 This statement was a direct reference to the Council of Defense and the Federal Assembly's Committee for Defense and Security Affairs. Saying that the reformers had allowed the consideration of "professionalism" as a substitute for a political army, the MPA leadership insisted that the Ministry of Defense disavow this idea. According to an MPA spokesman, "The denial of the political army led to such outrageous ideas as the participation of other political parties in direct control of the army. "^ Quoting Lenin's tenet that the army cannot and should not maintain neutrality in politics, the commentator contended, "It is indisputable that the fulfilling of these and other demands of the time would have resulted in a situation in which the army would have ceased to serve as an arm of the working class of the people and would have lost its class and internationalist character. "97 In accordance with these concerns, the party presidium and the Federal Assembly jointly adopted a resolution aimed at raising the political level of the C L A . Commenting on the resolution, MPA chief Horadek promised to use the Soviet model and to steadfastly follow Leninist principles.98 The extent to which the party lost control as a result of the 1968 crisis is reflected in the fact that the MPA insisted on the revocation of 1,115 separate decisions on military-political matters. 99 CONSOLIDATION O F THE CLA: T H E ISSUE O F POLITICAL LOYALTY AGAIN

The promise to reestablish party control was carried out immediately. The first step in the process was the massive purge of residual elements of the liberalization and of officers of questionable loyalty. An exchange of party cards, under the supervision of the MPA, was begun early in 1970. Entire party organizations were expelled from the army for "gross antisocialist activity and gross infringement of military orders." 100 The CLA lost perhaps as many as eleven thousand 182

INVASION AND NORMALIZATION, AUGUST 1968-1975 officers and over thirty thousand NCOs as a result of the purge. 101 This startling number does not include the "voluntary retirements." In addition to those officers who were purged, many careerists were demoted to reserve duty. It may be recalled that this tactic was employed in the coalition period in order to isolate officers of dubious loyalty in a period of political crisis. When the leadership turned to the development of an efficient officer corps a few years later, these officers were brought back to active duty. The fate of the officers demoted to reserve status in 1970 is still unknown. With the political neutralization of the military accomplished and the completion of the extensive purges of 1970 and 1971, the period of normalization officially ended and the first steps toward consolidation were taken. There were two elements in the effort to consolidate the CLA: the reeducation, repoliticization, and socialization of personnel who remained in the military, and a massive effort to attract new officers to the military to replace those lost in the purges and to voluntary retirement. Thus, the Czechoslovak leadership once again undertook the task of building a military that was red and expert. The emphasis was heavily upon the first quality. The ideological effort was launched with two purposes in mind. First, it was necessary to make the CLA a "political school." One MPA officer declared, "One important function of our army is to educate the soldier along Marx-Leninist class lines and internationalist lines. . . . The army attempts to restore the moral qualities of a man as a citizen and defender of the fatherland and the socialist order." 102 The second purpose of the ideological effort was to make CLA soldiers loyal fighting men: "We are only beginning to engage in systematic indoctrination of soldiers, which will ensure loyalty toward the Warsaw Pact, principled resolve to defend it . . . and military friendship with the Soviet Union, which is of utmost importance in political activity."103 This second part of the ideological campaign concentrated heavily upon education in 183

INVASION AND NORMALIZATION, AUGUST 1968-1975 the "hatred of the enemy and of imperialism." The new program tried to make certain that CLA members were able to recognize the enemy and to understand the relationship between capitalism and socialism. "Education in the hatred of the enemy has an important place in the theory of communist education. . . . It must be closely coordinated with the education of soldiers who are trained to accept as their own the ideas of socialism and proletarian internationalism."104 Among the steps recommended in this development of hatred for the enemy was the use of books on American atrocities in Vietnam, in order to show the "true character of bourgeois armies."105 Clearly, these programs were aimed not only at those who would remain in the military but also at those who would return to the general population. In this sense, the army was to become an institution for the resocialization of all youth. "We in the army are fully aware of our responsibility to the party and to society to see that young men who leave the army have grasped the nature of the revolutionary process."106 The MPA promised to "consistently maintain revolutionary vigilance and safeguard high moral, political, and technical preparedness of soldiers and their close ties to the CLA."107 The task of political education proved to be much more difficult than the proclamations of purpose presumed. Though Martin Dztir stated in October 1970 that the Czechoslovak army had become a consolidated instrument of state power against internal and external enemies of socialism, it appears that the consolidation was in fact proceeding very slowly.108 Members of the political-military elite disagreed openly with Dziir. MPA chief Horacek and his deputy, General Brabec, stated that the struggle to eliminate forces "impeding the consolidation in the army is very complicated."109 Horacek stated, "The consolidation is not proceeding at the same pace as in the party. There is still . . . no long-range program and many problems remain. . . . Moral-political unity is not yet achieved."110 Here there seems to have been tension between the still moderate Ministry leadership and the MPA. 184

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In this regard, Dziir and others responsible for the effectiveness of the CLA might have been concerned about the deleterious effects of constant purge and ideological work on the military itself. Unlike the leaders Prchlik and Pepich, the new MPA leaders were taking on a role that was bound to produce conflict, insisting upon ideological preparedness, even at the expense of military concerns. The tensions between the MPA and the professional military are reflected in reports that professional officers did not undertake the political-ideological work with enthusiasm. In a 1972 commentary, a political officer stated, "There are commanders who are not interested in political work and who fail to cooperate with the political organs and party organizations."111 Another commentator assailed "commanders who dump unpleasant work on the party workers."112 In fact, the pervasiveness of ideological and political concerns is noteworthy. Enormous resources were expended on ideological training and numerous all-army conferences and working groups were held to discuss ideological topics. Typical of these meetings was a 1971 conference at which Leninist teachings on defense of socialist countries was the theme.113 A second army conference was held just three months later. According to Major General Horacek, ideological preparedness was the number one priority of the CLA, though combat readiness was also important.114 Considerable attention was devoted to the consolidation of the Czechoslovak military by the Soviets as well. Joint ideological conferences between the CLA and the Soviet army were quite common and reports on the CLA in the Soviet press tended to center upon ideological work.11S The ideological campaign was not limited to enlisted men and junior officers. Several short-term political courses and seminars were held for army leaders and high-ranking career officers.116 Political work was stressed at all levels. In fact, the ideological effort was even accelerated in premilitary education and, of course, new, more extensive programs were initiated in military academies and advanced military schools.117 There is even evidence that political considerations were 185

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once again outstripping military concerns in the selection of officers for promotion. Vaclav Horacek stated in 1972, "There has been a distinct increase in the level of ideological and political qualifications of our officer corps. It is now a matter of routine that officers address themselves to political concerns." 118 Furthermore, many of the new training programs that were launched were open only to students of workingclass background. Candidates for these positions were to be chosen according to "participation in political life and general attitude." 119 Two of the primary requirements for officer candidacy were listed as "class steadfastness and good health. "120 Martin Korbela, now head of the personnel administration, echoed this political concern: "The influx of young blood for the army and also for units of the Ministry of the Interior should come from the most conscientious members of our young generation, who fully proved themselves even in the recent complicated critical period and who are prepared to fight for the interests of the socialist society. "121 But the massive effort was not satisfactory for the MPA, now clearly on the offensive. The MPA chief warned that the few gains should not mask the real difficulties still facing ideological work in the CLA. "Still, members of our armed forces do not always appeal to political awareness in the training of troops. . . . There are some objectivist tendencies among some soldiers on their initial tour of duty and these sometimes remain after they [soldiers] have chosen a military career."122 Perhaps there was cause for concern over the progress of political education. A survey on political readiness was conducted in 1971 and only 53 percent of the young officers polled expressed any interest in political problems. Seventy-five percent of the officers saw no need to restore full ties with the USSR and 56 percent saw no immediate danger from West Germany and NATO.123 An MPA officer remarked, "This shows what happens when there are constant inconsistencies in our own military propaganda."124 The MPA leadership thus constantiy asked for accelerated ideological work and for commitment to the cause on the part of the professional officer corps. 186

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Quite apart from the recalcitrance of professional officers, there were other fundamental reasons that the political education effort was failing. The most important constraint, in this regard, was a lack of qualified and trustworthy political officers. In conjunction with the ideological campaign, several political officers were to be attached to every unit of the CLA.12S The shortage of officers made political agitation difficult, however. The fact that reportedly one-half of all party activists lacked requisite education in 1973 is indicative of the extent of the problem in recruiting political officers.126 The report is substantiated by the admission that many "volunteers" were being pressed into service as political officers.127 Even professional officers who had held the conservative line in 1968 and members of the militia were used as activists. "It has been found that in addition to theoretically well-versed communists . . . comrades with experience should also be drawn into this activity. . . . This is especially true of individuals who participated in the suppression of counterrevolutionary actions in Prague. . . . They have had a very good influence on the educational work in the army and security forces."128 The pressure on the meager resources of the political apparatus was immense. Efforts were launched to educate political officers rapidly, but strict attention was paid to political loyalty. The task of educating political officers was turned over to the Military-Political Faculty of the Bratislava Zapotocky School (it became an academy in 1979). The faculty was divided into two sections: the military-political faculty for the training of deputy commanders for political affairs and the military pedagogical faculty for professional officers of the future (officer candidates). Reportedly 71 percent of these political activists were Communist party members and another 10 percent were members of socialist youth organizations. Eighty-six percent were said to have a working-class or collective farm background.129 The haste with which these officers were being educated is reflected in several crash programs for political-military degrees. One of the more curious schemes was a kind of correspondence course for political of187

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ficers, leading to a Doctor of Philosophy in Military Studies. The degree was to be completed by oral examination, but the courses could be completed extramurally.130 Crash efforts were also begun in order to train military scientists. This was presumably the beginning of an effort to replace the devastated military intelligentsia. It is believed that about 50 percent of all graduate students in military academies resigned after 1968. m Through the purges and resignations, the military intelligentsia had been practically liquidated. This is further substantiated by the admission that in 1971 one-half of all teachers in the military-political academies were actually graduate students. 132 T H E PROBLEM O F OFFICER RECRUITMENT: RED VERSUS EXPERT AGAIN

The political concerns exacerbated an already intolerable shortage of qualified military personnel. The shortage was especially chronic in the junior officer grades, where the CLA lost an incredible 57.8 percent of all officers under the age of thirty. 133 The air force was particularly hard hit and at one time reported officer shortages of 20 percent. The motorized infantry lacked 10 percent of the needed personnel. 134 In fact, personnel shortages were so severe in 1969 that one journal reported that performance evaluations of professional soldiers had been postponed because of a lack of qualified personnel. The mass exodus of officers was most marked in the early readjustment years. In 1967, 88.2 percent of all officers interviewed said that they intended to stay in the army until retirement. In 1969, a similar survey found that 74 percent of the officers said they would not have even enlisted if "they knew what they know now." The commentator concluded, "If all those who disliked certain things were to leave the army, we would have no army today."135 The problems did not cease after 1969. In 1973, Lidovd Armada reported that there was such a critical shortage of qualified personnel at the Ministry of Defense that "there were serious problems even in the 188

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implementation of policy . . . and the security forces [of the military] are so decimated that observance of secrecy is questionable."136 Extensive emergency officer recruitment programs were undertaken. These efforts were begun for the purpose of "resolving the chronic junior officer shortage and the crisis-like atmosphere in military academies."137 Included in the recruitment campaign were extensive incentive programs. Pay bonuses (including five to six months' pay after leaving the military) were offered to those who committed themselves to three to six years of service.138 Higher grants were offered to graduates of secondary and university-level schools. This provision points out that the (SLA was even willing to accept men with less than secondary education into the professional military. Students of university-level schools who had completed at least four semesters and decided upon a military career received monthly stipends until they finished school and then a commission—and other advantages—upon entering the military.139 Additionally, immense resources were spent on upgrading military academies and schools. Five new advanced schools were opened, which, in addition to officer training, provided opportunities for earning advanced civilian degrees. New classrooms, with extensively publicized new facilities, were built and tours were arranged for secondary students to see the new academies.140 In addition to these positive steps, however, some measures were taken that sacrificed quality in order to simply fill the ranks. Mirroring the crash programs for political officers, programs for professional officers enticed them with a variety of quick commission schemes. Most noteworthy among these was a reduction in basic military service—from two years to one—for those who agreed to enlist for officer candidacy.141 The second year was spent in officer-training school. The educational requirements for officer candidates were often lowered, and in 1971, 15 percent of officers and 65 percent of warrant officers had not completed high school.142 This is par189

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ticularly startling given the CLA's prior reputation for high educational and technical merit. A final, long-range effort to alleviate the severe officer shortage was the creation of an extensive network of premilitary education and training. This effort had several purposes, including socialization of the general population and the eventual attraction of young men to military service. The latter seems to have been the most important concern, and the training emphasized military and technical competence. Military training was separated from physical education and was taught as an independent subject, mandatory for all male students.143 The program involved about twenty-four to twentyfive hours of training and students were given academic credit for their work. This decision reversed an earlier statute, adopted in 1966, that lessened the military aspects of secondary education. Additionally, a kind of ROTC program for students who had completed nine-year schools was begun. Students in these programs were prepared primarily for technical functions and after four years of study, completed by a "maturity examination," they were eligible for service status as career warrant officers. Finally, the rejuvenation of SVAZARM (the Union for Cooperation with the Army) was begun. SVAZARM had been under the jurisdiction of a civilian during the reform. It was returned to the supervision of a career officer (the demoted Otakar Rytff) and grew substantially after 1970. By 1972, it boasted five hundred thousand members. SVAZARM was allowed to usurp all responsibility for organized games (swim clubs, for example) and was thus able to attract many young people. 144

T H E E F F E C T S OF THE "NORMALIZATION" ON THE

CLA

In spite of these efforts to rejuvenate the CLA and to rebuild the officer corps, the consolidation did not fully succeed. Martin Dztir almost apologetically stated in 1974, "The preconditions for a successful continuation of the implementation of the tasks set forth by the party have finally been 190

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achieved."145 But even this cautious statement may have been too optimistic. The CLA continued to suffer dislocation and did not regain the confidence of the leadership and the Soviet Union. After 1971, the border guard and the military counterintelligence service were transferred to the Interior Ministry. 146 They had not been returned even in 1983. There were also extensive efforts to strengthen and enhance the role of the militia, efforts that were begun in 1970. The growth of the militia, both qualitatively and quantitatively, is noteworthy. At the time of the invasion, the militia numbered about seventy thousand. In 1972, it had been increased to 120,000 and in 1978 it numbered about 140,000, just 40,000 men shy of the size of the CLA itself.147 Moreover, the militia, equipped primarily with light arms in the past, began using much heavier weaponry, including light tanks. Specialized units, among them antitank and air defense units, and large territorial units were developed after 1971.148 This historical counterweight to the CLA was constantly praised by the Soviet Union during the 1968 crisis, when the CLA was considered unreliable, and the militia's leadership and revitalization may have indicated a concern with the CLA's continuing problems of consolidation. One final indication of possible concern about the effectiveness and loyalty of the CLA deserves attention. In an era when the Soviet Union began to heavily involve allies in the Third World, Czechoslovak military personnel were conspicuously absent. As the Soviet Union's junior ally, the CLA was at one time heavily involved in military tutoring and training of Third World personnel on Czechoslovak soil. Then in 19741975, when the Soviet role in the Third World was expanding, the Czechoslovaks were not a visible part of that effort. The role of junior 1 ally was entrusted to the East Germans instead. The reasons for this were numerous, including Czechoslovak economic difficulties and a reluctance to become involved after suffering heavy losses in the SovietEgyptian fiasco. Moreover, the East Germans were eager and willing to usurp that role. Nonetheless, one must consider 191

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that the internal difficulties of the CLA and the resultant decreased effectiveness and reliability were also behind Czechoslovakia's military retrenchment in this era of expanding Soviet allied activity in the Third World. A final set of facts about the CLA is worth noting in the assessment of the success of the consolidation. The real size of the armed forces declined by about twenty thousand after 1968.149 Factors such as Czechoslovakia's declining youth population are important in explaining this decline. But given the growth in the size of the militia, it is also possible that the CLA was reduced because of a lack of reliability. It is perhaps more instructive to note that Czechoslovakia's real defense spending—measured in percentage of GNP—increased in 1969, declined in 1971, and did not rise again in the period covered.150 Many argue that the Czechoslovak armed forces, once the best of the Soviet bloc, are now a poor third behind the East Germans and the Poles. As a result of the events of 1968, the Czechoslovak People's Army once again faced the mammoth task of creating a military and a professional officer corps that would be both efficient and properly indoctrinated. Many of the gains of the twenty-five years of communist rule were unraveled by the events of 1968, the subsequent invasion, and the massive purges that followed. The leadership once again concentrated on building a military that was loyal first, with efficiency a secondary concern. In addition to the renewed emphasis on political loyalty at the expense of military efficiency, there was a concurrent return to overt Soviet interference and pressure. Just as the domestic context resembled the pre-1956 era, so did the position of the Soviet Union in Czechoslovak military politics. T H E REASSERTION OF SOVIET DOMINANCE: T H E USE OF OVERT AND COERCIVE INSTRUMENTS

The most obvious manifestation of the reassertion of Soviet power was the stationing of five divisions on Czechoslovak 192

INVASION AND NORMALIZATION, AUGUST 1968-1975 soil. The impressive show offeree had three functions. First, the troops reminded the population and the leadership that the Soviet Union is the final guarantor of communist power, and they created tremendous pressure for adherence to the Soviet line. Second, the troops reminded the CLA and the military elite that the Soviet line is the only acceptable course for militaries of the Warsaw Pact. The troops and their accompanying entourage of advisers and officers allowed direct contact and supervision of the CLA, which had earlier been absent in Czechoslovakia. Members of the Soviet military elite had expressed concern about the absence of the Soviet presence, but now direct Soviet supervision and influence were established. Third and perhaps most importantly, the Soviet troops reinforced the weakened CLA. Czechoslovakia is an important country strategically and the presence of Soviet army troops ensured the viability of defense on the western border. The Soviet presence was reasserted in other overt ways as well. It is reported that a kind of Soviet "shadow general staff," approximating the one in East Germany, was instituted in Czechoslovakia.151 And certainly not since the Stalin era have there been so many Soviet officers on Czechoslovak soil. This shadow general staff is said to hold responsibility for many staff functions within the CLA. The nature of these activities, as well as reported Soviet representation at the company level, cannot be determined, however. Soviet pressure through visits of high-level military delegations, so prevalent in the immediate postinvasion period, continued throughout the period of consolidation. High-level delegations were particularly prevalent in 1970, 1971, and 1972. There was also considerable East German involvement in "tutoring" the CLA leadership. East German visits and return Czechoslovak journeys to the GDR were, throughout 1974, almost as frequent as similar exchanges between the USSR and the CLA. The Polish military elite played a similar, but less pervasive role in the period of consolidation. Joint exercises between the CLA and the rapidly entrenching Cen193

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tral Group of Soviet Forces also became a part of the landscape and were carried out annually until 1972. One positive ramification of the crisis was the adoption of organizational changes in the Warsaw Pact. Some of the "rejuvenation" for which the Czechs lobbied was realized. Most important in this regard was the creation of the Joint Technical Committee to decide matters of military-technological innovation. A Council of Defense Ministers was also installed. The defense ministers had met irregularly since 1961, but this institution regularized those meetings. The group was apparently given wide competence in at least discussions of matters of military command and control and of problems of Warsaw Pact infrastructure. The new organs were created in an effort to allow greater contact between and access to the East European national governments. For example, decisions of the Joint Technical Committee or the Defense Ministers Council had to be approved by national governments before they could be adopted. One Polish source noted, "The 1969 reorganization enhanced both 'consultation' and operational direction of the Joint Armed Forces."152 Apparently reflecting sensitivity to Czechoslovak charges of inequality, the new Warsaw Pact statutes require a deputy minister of defense, not the minister, to serve as deputy commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact. This in effect removed the stigma of inequality from having the East European defense ministers directly subordinate to the Soviet Warsaw Pact commander. Another new organ created after the 1968 crisis was the Military Council. It is apparently a consultative organ for the very senior officers of the Warsaw Pact. In addition to these positive gains for the East Europeans, however, the Soviet Union exerted pressure for Warsaw Pact changes that would limit the national decision-making role. In this regard, the institution of the Joint Technical Committee, which in conjunction with COMECON's Military-Industrial Committee was to decide military research and development, may have given the East Europeans a greater voice, but it also gave the Soviet Union more control over weapons 194

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acquisition and technological innovation. Other more concrete steps, like greater standardization of weapons production and increased integration of commands, failed to pass, largely because of the objections of Romania and the less vocal opposition of other states. The Czechoslovaks accepted the new restrictions on domestic military development and returned, after 1970, to unreserved support of Soviet initiatives and to rhetorical praise of Soviet assistance and the alliance. Most notably, the CLA leadership finally profusely praised the Soviet intervention, thanking the USSR for their assistance when "the Czechoslovak socialist state was threatened by external and internal enemies." 153 One Czechoslovak city actually awarded an occupying general honorary citizenship.154 After 1970, praise of Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship was prevalent and there was not even a hint of dissatisfaction with relations in the Warsaw Pact or with coalition doctrine. In fact, every effort was made to condemn the discussions that had taken place on those matters. The CLA leadership condemned the development of "Czechoslovak national doctrine," proclaiming the attempts of 1968 to create a national strategy anti-Soviet and antisocialist. Just as the Husak government became one of the Soviet Union's two staunchest supporters, the CLA leadership became one of the most outspoken defenders of socialist internationalism and the Soviet alliance. It would be certainly overstating the case to say that the events of 1968 were disruptive enough to destroy the progress of twenty years of military development. In 1968, the Czechoslovak armed forces were not the unreliable, inefficient shell over which Svoboda presided in 1948. Nonetheless, the events of 1968 did place the Czechoslovak leadership in the difficult position of once again developing a military and, in particular, an officer corps that was both efficient and loyal. As in the early period, the former was sacrificed in favor of the latter. Class background and "steadfastness in 1968" were the most important criteria for selection to the officer ranks. Additionally, in trying to fill the decimated jun195

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ior grades, the Czechoslovaks initiated some programs that called into question the efficiency of the officer corps that was created. The state with the best reputation for a sophisticated and educated population turned to men lacking the requisite education to fill the officer ranks. In 1975, in spite of massive efforts to alleviate the problem, the shortages were still acute. The fact is that the prestige of the Czechoslovak domestic military establishment suffered so badly because of the events of 1968 and the failure to resist the invasion, that the military profession became unacceptable to many young men. The invasion took its toll on the CLA, and though the normalization and consolidation officially came to an end in 1975, the process of trying to rebuild the CLA was far from done.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

The Czechoslovak People's Army since 1975 In 1973, MPA chief Horacek stated categorically that the normalization (the removal of suspect elements) and the consolidation of the Czechoslovak armed forces were complete. 1 Later, in 1974, a Czechoslovak-Soviet volume contended that Czechoslovakia's armed forces had been purged of all alien elements and were ready to resume their role as staunch defenders of the socialist world order. 2 The "normalization" and outward calm surrounding the CLA, however, masked then, and continues to mask in 1983, problems arising from the events of 1968 and the reimposition of the dual control system. MAKING THE ARMY RED AND EXPERT AGAIN

Since 1975 the relationship between Communist party and military leaders has been one in which the party focuses on control and direction. All vestiges of the idea that the socialist army and party had reached a "new stage" are gone, and Prchlfk's suggestion that the MPA play an administrative and educational function rather than one of direction has been thoroughly discredited. Resolutions by the party promising greater allocation of resources to the CLA in order to make it "a modern and reliable arm of the Warsaw Pact" are now routine. But interestingly, the greatest concern is the "moral-political unity of the CLA." There are two elements to moral-political unity: the correct relationship of the party to the army and the relationship of the army to the people. The most prominent concern is the first of these, and great attention is devoted to the 197

THE ARMY SINCE 1975 leading role of the party in the armed forces, both in guidance for military preparedness and for political strength. After the Sixteenth Party Congress, in 1976 the party daily, Rude Prdvo, declared, "Thanks to the systematic attention of the Central Committee and the Czechoslovak government, the CLA has developed as a modern army in all respects. Effective weapons and equipment . . . and their ideological conviction and loyalty to the party and the people are the main factors in its preparedness. . . . The ideological, organizational, and action unity of the army party organization has been strengthened also, and its Marx-Leninist character enhanced." 3 The underlying assumption of these statements is that it was the party's abdication of responsibility for direct leadership of the armed forces that caused the 1968 disintegration of the CLA, and that further lapses can only be avoided through the direct influence and management of military affairs by the party. Discussing the tasks before the CLA, for example, the new chief of the Main Political Administration, Brabec, stated, "The prime condition for the consistent implementation of the CLA's tasks is the consolidation of the KSC's leading role both in the army and in other spheres of the society. Thanks to the tireless concern of the KSC, ideological work, aimed at forming communist awareness, strengthening patriotism and internationalism in the servicemen, and forming in them a conscious socialist attitude toward their military duty is constantly being improved in the CLA."4 The renewed importance of the party's role in the armed forces was formally acknowledged by a new defense law in 1979. The new law emphasized the "principle of the leading role of the KSC as the basis of political firmness and the high combat readiness and preparedness of the armed forces." The most important elements of military training were said to be training soldiers in the communist world outlook and in high moral, political, and combat qualities. 5 Though the principle of the commanders' "inalienable" authority was reaffirmed, commanders were warned to exercise that authority only on 198

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party foundations and to take seriously the proper ideopolitical education of those under their command. The concern for the political unity of the CLA is also manifested in the constant admonitions to political workers and commanders to take greater interest in the political education of officers and enlisted men. While praising political workers for the results achieved after the Fourteenth Party Congress, Defense Minister Dzur suggested that greater development of political activities was still needed. 6 One concrete manifestation of the greater emphasis on political education is the renewed interest in the role of the armed forces as a vehicle of socialization for the new generation. As Communist party chief Gustav Husak stated, "The CLA shoulders great responsibility for bringing up the young generation." 7 This, according to Husak, is especially important, since the youth are the target of imperialist propaganda. Still another manifestion of the concern with making the CLA "red" again is the party's massive drive to enlist officers and NCOs in the party. Martin Dzur, reporting on the army's implementation of the Fourteenth Party Congress demands, stated that the army enlisted thirty thousand new party candidate members, of whom about 60 percent were young workers. 8 This interest in young men of workers' blood, which began in the "normalization" phase, clearly remains one of the key elements of the drive to properly politicize the CLA. But even this remarkable infusion of army members into the party did not undo the damage of the purge following 1968. Dzur was able to report in 1976—the last year for which membership figures are available—that almost 75 percent of the officers of the CLA are party members. 9 About 90 percent of the officers were party members prior to 1968. Concurrent with the effort to properly politicize both the officers and enlisted men of the CLA, the party has increasingly expanded the role of the army in the economic activity of the country. The CLA is involved in an ever-increasing list of bridge building, highway construction, mining, and even farming activity. The list of activities includes completion of 199

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a highway between Prague and Brno, construction of major civil airports in Brno, Ostrava, and Poprad, production of over one million cubic meters of wood products and nine thousand tons of grain, cutting hay, and other "useful" activities.10 The CLA also plays an active part in disaster relief. The activities are undertaken apparently for three reasons. First, the leadership is acutely aware of the image that has haunted the CLA since 1968: It is viewed as useless, expensive, and alien. Therefore, the brigade activity allows the soldiers and their commanders to be out among the people, engaged in useful economic activity. The substantial aid the CLA gives to the economic progress of the country has been hailed on numerous occasions by both political and military leaders. 11 Second, the Czechoslovak economy is apparently in need of this aid because of bottlenecks and shortages of personnel in certain sectors of the economy. Martin Dzur acknowledged that the discipline and organization of branches of the armed forces like the Military Construction Troops allows soldiers to perform tasks more efficiently than civilians.12 Dzur admits, however, that even the army could make more effective use of resources. Finally, there are numerous, not very thinly veiled suggestions that this is one means by which the CLA can "earn its keep" in a society strapped for economic resources. Moreover, the army has apparently been ordered to undertake this activity under its own budget, without substantial aid from other sectors. And the CLA, "on the basis of a resolution of the Czechoslovak government," has been ordered to undertake and pay completely for its own capital investment projects.13 The decision was taken with particular reference to the construction of numerous military schools and training academies that the leadership of the CLA requested. Even though some of these projects have military value, there are indications that not all has gone smoothly with the intensification of brigade activity for the CLA. The dissatisfaction of commanders with the time that such activity takes from military training is acknowledged. In fact, the dissatisfaction of the minister of defense is barely disguised in his 200

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comment that "one must recognize that this aid is a considerable burden for the army. It places huge demands on and affects the organization of the educational training activities, since the hours and days of training must be made up, even at the cost of free time." Dzur concludes, though, "We provide this help knowing that it contributes to the fulfillment of a dual task: the building of and defense of the socialist motherland . . . and the indivisible unity of the army and the working people." 14 Nor are the members of the CLA particularly thrilled with the brigade activity or with the sacrifice of free time that it entails. Dzur remarked that it is understandable that labor assistance cannot be a matter of "free choice" but must be governed by decisions approved by the government of Czechoslovakia or other organs. As often as possible, however, brigade activity during free time is voluntary and can sometimes be exchanged for military service. For example, soldiers were asked on one occasion to consider eighteen months' work in the coal mines of the Ostrava-Karvina region in exchange for the opportunity to cut their twentyfour-month term of service by five months. 15 One final manifestation of the CLA's concern with its image in the society is the attempt to establish a link between military research and science and the growth of the technological base of the economy. The "spin-off argument" is quite prominent. Civilian uses of everything from computers to chemicals developed by the military are heralded time and again. Noting that Czechoslovak military scientists have a good reputation around the world, one commentary stated, "Our major industrial plants are confidently turning to them for help to solve important economic tasks. Military research and scientific work places are solving partial and sometimes comprehensive tasks related to the power industry, communications, machine building, and electronics."16 It is difficult to judge the success or failure of the effort to restore "moral-political" unity to the CLA. Criticism of the party and of the government has all but disappeared from the military press. Although a few former officers, including Vaclav 201

THE ARMY SINCE 1975 Prchlik, signed the human rights protest, the Charter of 77, such occurrences are rare. Moreover, party control and the leading role of the party in the armed forces have not been openly questioned by either the military leadership or the military intelligentsia. The more visible role of the MPA in conducting conferences and seminars for military personnel suggests that the military leadership has resigned itself to the reimposition of these tenets. Nevertheless, the party has continued the policy begun in 1969 of upgrading the other power instruments and training and equipping them for military duties. For example, the militia, now over 170,000 strong, exercises with light infantry fighting vehicles on a regular basis. Paramilitary training is also stressed among the 367,000 members of the SVAZARM paramilitary organization. The police and border guards are also being upgraded. One indication of the strength of the commitment to police training is evident in the opening of a new academy for officers of the National Security Corps and Border Guards and their training in sophisticated military maneuvers. Interestingly, the political education and training of most of these groups seems to fall under the jurisdiction of the Main Political Administration of the army, though each group maintains a separate staff.17 The mission of these upgraded, more heavily armed paramilitary units is unclear. Presumably they are not expected to fight in an external conflict, but are most certainly being trained for internal missions, missions for which the party has reason to doubt the reliability of the CLA. Whatever the party's assessment of the "moral-political unity" of the CLA, the problem of reestablishing respect for the CLA within society continues to be the paramount concern. A lack of respect for the officers' profession and low regard for the armed forces are still manifested in severe problems of recruitment and retention of quality young men in the officer corps. While the goal of making the armed forces red again proceeds on one front, the effort to also make the CLA expert is a constant struggle. The pursuit of the two goals simultaneously has made the maintenance of qualified per202

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sonnel the single most debilitating problem for the CLA in the post-1975 period. An overwhelming proportion of the discussion in the military press and popular magazines is devoted to the demands of staffing the officer corps of the CLA. A number of steps have been taken since 1975 to address the "problems associated with meeting the demands for qualified personnel to lead the CLA.' 18 It is a difficult task, leaders admit, because "certain citizens do not realize or do not want to realize that the danger of a new war has not been eliminated."19 The initiatives are characterized by an emphasis on the young and military education, a system of rewards and incentives for the adoption of the officers' profession, and a corresponding set of disincentives for leaving prior to the completion of a full term of service. Moreover, the leadership is attempting to be more selective in promotion to higher grades by weeding out and releasing from service older, less effective officers so that promotion will be possible for bright young prospects who might otherwise leave the armed forces.20 The leadership of Czechoslovakia seems to be convinced that the inculcation of military values must start with the young if the army is to overcome both the dislocation of the 1968 crisis and Czechoslovakia's own "pacifist" tradition. There has been, therefore, a renewed emphasis on premilitary training beginning with the primary grades. All secondary schools, in addition to weekly military activities that are part of the physical education curriculum, now conduct intensive, five-day camps, where pupils study military-political subjects, make visits to military units, and inspect combat equipment. The express purpose of the program is "not only to provide ideological education but also an orientation in the military profession."21 A number of other premilitary games, including one called "Always Prepared," are carried out in conjunction wjth the Pioneer Organization, the Komsomol, and the militia. "Always Prepared" is for children between the ages of eight and fifteen, who are taught and tested on small-arms competition (for older children) and political subjects, includ203

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ing the history of the army and its relationship with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact (for all ages).22 In spite of these and countless other premilitary activities, all are not satisfied with the achievements of the program. One commentator remarked that "a great deal has been done in the field of premilitary education, especially by introducing it as a mandatory school subject, but much will have to be done to make up for its neglect in the past." He further points to the fact that more children are likely to be found in cinemas or in front of television sets than outside engaging in physical activity. Finally, he noted that in joint summer camp games between the "pioneers" from the CSSR and the GDR, "the children of the GDR achieved far superior results." 23 But if the very young are the long-term target of the leadership, the immediate focus is upon young men between the ages of fourteen and twenty-three. The Czechoslovak citizen has been bombarded with a campaign to encourage young men to go to military high schools and colleges rather than to civilian schools.24 Students who choose, between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, to attend military high school are expected to go on to study in military colleges. Studies are based on the high school curricula adopted by the Ministry of Education, but include military training. Students may also go to military-specialized secondary schools that prepare NCOs in various branches and specialties. The benefits of studying in the military high schools are extensive, including room and board, clothing, and a monthly allowance of fifty korunas, although students who attain an excellent grade receive seventy-five korunas during the next school year. Families of the students collect allowances and "income-tax" exemptions. During the first three years and first semester of the fourth year, students in military high schools are civilians, but during the last five months, they serve in substitute military service. This, should they go on to military colleges or NCO service, is in lieu of their military obligation under universal conscription. The effort to convince students that military high schools 204

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are an attractive form of secondary education has had mixed results. Enough students apparently apply to enable the leadership to claim that military schools are much more selective than other secondary institutions.25 On the other hand, the advertising campaign tries quite earnestly to debunk "myths" that life in military schools is dreary and arduous. "It would be misleading not to point out that a course of study at military high schools is demanding," states one commentator. "The system of discipline and order, as well as the schedule, is often understood as a difficult limitation of the freedom of youth, however, and this is simply erroneous." 26 He goes on to say that there is plenty of time for hobbies, free time, and cultural activities. Finally, the advertising campaign tries to convince students that the more demanding curriculum will make them better prepared for civilian careers upon the completion of military service or in case they should be declared "unfit" for military colleges or NCO status. The successful graduate of military high schools or any "fit" young man who has passed the maturita (high school diploma) is eligible for study at one of several military colleges. These colleges offer university-level education with specialties in military-political, medical, or military engineering (branch specific) training. All programs require four to five years for the completion of the degree. Upon the completion of five months of service during the first year, the student applies to become a professional soldier and attains the rank of master sergeant. Monthly pay is between nine hundred and thirteen hundred korunas during the first four years and over fifteen hundred after that. The graduate of the military college becomes a second lieutenant and is assigned to duty with the CLA. Release from the obligation to serve is extremely strict, including requirement of repayment of all costs to the state if a soldier does not serve five years.27 As is the case with the high school recruitment campaign, considerable effort is expended to show that study in military schools is advantageous. Additionally, the leadership has undertaken the construction of modern campuses and facilities 205

THE ARMY SINCE 1975 for the military colleges in order to combat the image of military education as taking place in "barracks" while civilian education is pursued in modern, well-equipped buildings. Glossy advertisements and special tours of facilities are provided for potential candidates, who are promised generous allowances for travel to visit family twice a year during vacations.28 In addition to the recruitment of youth on this basis, there are special programs to encourage workers and working-class children to enter military schools. Special one-year courses for workers or farmers who did not finish secondary school have been maintained. Students enroll in one-year courses and obtain both military and secondary education. After graduation they are able to transfer to military colleges. There are also special two-year courses leading to master sergeant rank. These benefits are available to workers until the age of twentythree. 29 These special programs, it should be remembered, were begun in an effort to bring workers, en masse, into the armed forces after the 1968 crisis. There was discussion of disbanding the programs because they were no longer needed and because the attempt to rapidly upgrade the educational level of workers and place them in officers' positions requiring technical skills had mixed results. The army command decided in 1979 that the program should be maintained, though there is no indication that the programs were expanded. Though political attitude is consistently reaffirmed as an extremely important criterion for advancement through the various educational institutions, merit and technical examinations are now emphasized to a greater degree. 30 Perhaps it is hoped that in building the next generation of officers, a divorce between red and expert will not develop. On the other hand, there is at least one case in which blatantly political criteria are used for admissions. Preference in admission to the Air Force College is given to secondary school graduates who underwent training in the SVAZARM (the Union for Cooperation with the Army) flying clubs.31 The military press openly admits that this is because "only persons of political conviction who have the necessary moral and character 206

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traits can become members of the flying clubs." Apparently, suspicion of the loyalties of the air force, which dates back to 1948 and resurfaced in 1968 with the purge of that branch of the CLA, has not disappeared. In addition to the concentration on youth, the Czechoslovak leadership has undertaken a number of reforms in the higher military schools and academies. The number of schools has been reduced as they have been consolidated so that resources can be spent more efficiently on a few facilities. Most prominently mentioned among the schools to be modernized is the Klement Gottwald Military-Political Academy in Bratislava. Under the direction of Maj. Gen. Jifi Reindl, an officer who led the prosecution and purge of the MPA in 1969, the Gottwald Academy now trains political officers for both the CLA and the Ministry of the Interior. The academy conducts, in addition to its regular curriculum, short-term specialized refresher courses for political officers.32 The consolidation of the other faculties into two major higher military schools and the tightening of requirements for both entrance and graduation are indicative of the new emphasis on merit, in spite of the continuing concern with political attitudes. The tightening is also a part of a larger effort to maintain control over the technical and professional skills of those who have been in the services for some time. It will be remembered that the Czechoslovak army suffered in the mid1960s from an age hump. The upper grades were occupied by aging officers who were afraid to leave the armed forces and compete in the civilian sector; the upper grades were thus closed to promotion for younger officers. Many good young officers therefore left the forces. A new defense law on service was passed in 1978 that attempted to address the problem from both sides; it stiffened the conditions for releasing professional soldiers from service at their own request and confirmed that reaching the age limit constituted a reason for release. 33 In order to ease the transition for those older officers asked to leave, efforts to place them in civilian agencies and jobs are undertaken by the army command. In accordance with the reform, even the political apparatus 207

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is taking on a youthful, new look. Recruitment is being promoted through basic study courses for members of the Union of Socialist Youth or members and candidate members of the Communist party. The plan includes the release of political officers, many of whom had been in service since 1948, in order to provide opportunities for the young.34 Closer attention is also being given to the educational level of political officers. The level of education dropped steeply after the purge of the MPA in 1968. In 1972, only one in four teachers was certain to have secondary education.35 By 1979 about two-thirds of the teachers were doctoral candidates and 98 percent of all political officers had a secondary or university-level education.36 Obviously, the Czechoslovak leadership has been very active since 1975 in trying to create a new technically qualified and politically loyal officer corps. The variety of initiatives that are being pursued and the intensity with which they are being carried out suggest that this is perhaps the major area of concern of the leadership at this time. Many leaders, including Jiff Reindl, the chief of the Gottwald Academy, admit that it has not been easy. "Recent events," he said, "have been hard on the people, but they have learned a lot . . . though the tasks are not finished."37 The task is clear. The Czechoslovak leadership has apparently decided to cast its lot for an army both red and expert with the young. Education in military values and in respect for the officers' profession, as well as in communist ideology and proletarian internationalism, is pressed among ever more youthful citizens. This is a long-term strategy, designed both to change centuries old Czechoslovak attitudes and to rewrite the more recent past for those who are too young to bear its scars. Many years will pass before it is possible to judge the success of the gamble. REESTABLISHING SOVIET CONTROL

Of course the "red and expert" problem is not the only issue in reestablishing the "moral-political" unity of the CLA. 208

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Since 1975, increasingly strict attention has been devoted to repair of the networks of Soviet influence and control that unraveled so badly in 1968. The normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak army was begun in 1969 with the stationing of five Soviet divisions on Czechoslovak soil. The period since 1975 has been characterized by attempts to create, using primarily the Central Group of the Soviet Forces (CGSF), a set of permanent institutions of control and management of the Czechoslovak People's Army. The underlying assumption is that the best way to ensure Soviet control is by direct means rather than by the indirect methods that evolved after the death of Stalin. The Soviets are no longer leaving Soviet dominance of the Czechoslovak armed forces to chance. There has been a quantitative and qualitative upgrading of three instruments of direction and control since 1975: (1) military "science" (doctrine and history); (2) political education activities; and (3) integrated training down to the unit level. The entire system is, in effect, a wedge that isolates the Communist party and the various subinstitutions of the Czechoslovak armed forces from each other and ties them firmly to their Soviet counterparts. The first element of this system is the coordination of military science and doctrine. The search for a Czechoslovak national doctrine had been a major catalyst for the deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak People's Army. From 1969 to 1974, the Czechoslovak military intelligentsia was purged of all who held divergent views and the leadership officially denounced the need for national doctrine. But in the post-1975 period, steps have been taken to make certain that this "correct line" holds. There has been a remarkable proliferation of joint works on military history, the history of the Warsaw Pact, and coalition doctrine. According to Soviet sources, "Along with exchanging experience in schools of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries jointly work out the important questions of MarxistLeninist teaching on war and the military . . . and on the 209

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origins, character, and content of modern war."38 The late I. I. Iakubovskii, former commander of the Warsaw Pact, explained that broad exchanges of opinions take place at regular scientific conferences and symposiums. "These conferences," he stated, are a chance for "beneficial exchange of opinions and new contributions to the development of military science." 39 In addition to frequent special conferences, there are scholarly exchanges between the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR and the Military History Institute in Prague and exchanges of teachers, who lecture for short periods of time. 40 The primary reason for this extensive coordination of work on military doctrine and history is, of course, the problems of the 1960s. Nevertheless, there are other benefits to this system. First, the East Europeans, especially the Czechoslovaks were adamant in demanding a greater role in the joint formulation of doctrine and strategy. Whether that role has increased in fact is difficult to say. But the more intensive joint activity does give the East Europeans an opportunity to make their views known and to participate in the discussion, if not in the formulation, of Warsaw Pact doctrine. In any case, it is better from the Soviet point of view to have them involved jointly than pursuing these issues in isolation. Second, these contacts are apparently used to work out theoretical answers to some of the operational problems of coordination between the armed forces. Iakubovskii mentions two areas in particular: the application of military theory to the actual problems of training and the discussion of problems in military scientific coordination.41 This is not to suggest that the Soviets do not enjoy dominance in decision making on these issues. Rather, it is to suggest, that the concern of their allies must be taken into account and that these "collective" efforts provide a political clearinghouse for the coordination of diverse views. The Czechoslovaks emphasize this latter function and claim that the activities that support military operations are worked out in the exchange of these "scientific workers."42 210

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The second element of increased Soviet participation in the political education of the CLA has been pursued vigorously as well. As might be expected, there is a heavy emphasis in political education on the role of the Soviet Union as the first socialist state, the experience of the Soviet army, and friendship with the Soviet Union and its people. The Czechoslovaks are consistently reminded of the joint liberation of Prague, the victory at Dukla Pass, and other historical examples of Soviet and Czechoslovak military friendship.43 Additionally, there is also greater emphasis on systematic contacts between the political workers of the Central Group of Soviet Forces in Czechoslovakia and in the CLA. There is "systematic exchange of party-political workers" between the units, and joint visits of political workers from both armies to factories and collectives are encouraged. Moreover, political workers from the CLA and the CGSF are involved in joint political activities during the many bilateral and multilateral training exercises that take place. The Czechoslovak MPA chief, Brabec, proclaimed that contacts between political workers of the two forces are frequent and useful, but are still being increased.44 Finally, the practice begun in the 1960s of exchange of students and lecturers between the V. I. Lenin Military-Political Academy and the Gottwald Academy continues. The qualitative and quantitative difference in the system of exchanges and contacts in the post-1975 period can be traced to the presence of Soviet forces on Czechoslovak territory, which allows contacts to be more systematic, regularized, and frequent. (See Chart 7.1.) The two primary goals of such activity are well articulated by Brabec, who notes that they "promote friendship and coordination between the two political administrations."45 Gradually, the system of frequent activities between the Central Group of Soviet Forces and the CLA has expanded into the arena of actual military training. Now, in addition to the regular multilateral and bilateral exercises of the Warsaw Pact, bilateral training maneuvers, short of full-scale exer211

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cises, between the CGSF and the CLA are carried out. It will be remembered that bilateral exercises were carried out annually from 1969 to 1972. Since 1975, full-scale bilateral exercises involving whole branches of the armed forces are less frequent. They have been held every three years since 1972. There have been, however, an increasing number of military exercises between functional units of the CLA and CGSF. In 1978 a Czechoslovak commentator explained, "The closest cooperation . . . has expanded in the last two years. . . . In the recent summer period, a new form was added to the existing ones: the mutual exchange of whole units between motorized riflemen and other formations of our fraternal armies. For many days these units fulfill all tasks set by the combat and political training plans, as part of the formation they join and in closest unity with the Soviets." The account goes on to proclaim that the new form has proven itself, allowing the Soviet commanders and soldiers to get to know the CLA soldiers and enabling both sides to draw closer to each other. "This is far more effective than brief conversations or short meetings." 46 This practice of exchange between whole functional units also takes place during full-scale multilateral and bilateral exercises. For example, chemical units of Soviet and Czechoslovak forces practiced together during Druzhba 1979, though they did not practice with their respective national forces.47 Soviet soldiers practiced decontaminating Czechoslovak soldiers and vice versa. During Druzhba 1982, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Soviet bridge-laying units practiced together. These activities would, of course, lead to maximum integration and even interoperability of personnel under combat conditions. This exchange of units also provides, in peacetime, further low-level contact with and coordination between the Central Group of Soviet Forces and the CLA. In all of this activity, the strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the personnel of the CLA and the CGSF is emphasized. But there seems to be another concern and that is with the "image" of the CGSF with Czechoslovak sol212

THE ARMY SINCE 1975 Chart 7.1 Links between the Soviet Armed Forces and the Czechoslovak People's Army after 1975 PROFESSIONAL ARMED FORCES BILATERAL SOVIET F O R C E S - C L A

BETWEEN THE CLA AND CGSF

Joint Exercises 1. Full-scale CLA-CGSF (annually until 1972, triennially thereafter) 2. Stafl/command exercises 3. Unit-level exchanges (since 1978/frequently?) Sports competitions (annually) Cultural activities (frequent but irregular) Activities between Carpathian District units and units of the Eastern Military District WARSAW PACT

Senior representative of the commander in chief of the joint forces of the Warsaw Pact to the Czechoslovak People's Army1 Note: The representative prior to 1976 was referred to as representative of the commander in chief of the joint forces of the Warsaw Pact to Czechoslovakia At least two other representatives below the senior level have been identified2 Soviet representative to the Joint Supreme Command of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia3 Joint exercises and maneuvers (at least annually) under Warsaw Pact auspices OTHER

Military attache at the Soviet Embassy4 Air Force attache at the Soviet Embassy5 MAIN POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION ACTIVITIES BILATERAL C L A - S O V I E T ARMED FORCES

Activities of educational institutions Guest instructors in teaching academies, Gottwald-Lenin Academy "exchanges" 213

THE ARMY SINCE 1975 Chart 7.1 (cont.) Students from Gottwald Academy to Lenin Academy Joint conferences on military science and doctrine workshops, seminars, lectures, authorship of volumes Soviet adviser(s?) to the commandant of the Gottwald Academy6 Bilateral meetings of leadership of MPA-CLA and MPA-Soviet armed forces BILATERAL CLA-CGSF

Meetings between chief and deputies of the Main Political Administration of the CLA and chiefs of Main Political Administration of CGSF Conferences, seminars, lectures, between political officers of the CGSF and CLA Cultural and sports activities between political officers of CGSFCLA Activities of political workers of CGSF and regular units of CLA Joint meetings of political workers of CGSF and CLA with party organizations of regular armed forces Activities between Trade Union Organizations of CGSF and CLA T H E CLA MILITARY ELITE IS PAIRED W I T H SOVIET COUNTERPARTS WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER

Minister of defense7 Chief of staff of CLA8 Deputy minister of defense5 Chief of the air force10 Chief of the army11 Commander of CLA/West12 Commander of CLA/East13 Deputy minister of defense for armament Chief of the Main Political Administration of CLA

214

Soviet adviser; senior rep. to Joint Command of the Warsaw Pact Soviet adviser Soviet rep. to Joint Command in Czechoslovakia Soviet adviser Soviet adviser Commander of CGSF Commander of Carpathian District Representative of the Joint Technical Committee Chief of MPA of CGSF: rep. of MPA to Warsaw Pact

THE ARMY SINCE 1 9 7 5 Chart 7 1 (cont) Commandant of Gottwald Academy 14

Soviet adviser to commandant

O T H E R PERSONNEL

Military attache at Soviet Embassy Air force attache at Soviet Embassy NOTE The activities listed are those that could be identified as regularized The numerous special receptions, holiday celebrations, and occasional visits are not listed 1 Identified in Prague Domestic News Service Report, June 30, 1979 2 Prague Domestic News Service Report, May 14, 1976 3 Prague Domestic News Service Report, June 30, 1979 4 Prague Domestic News Service Report, May 14, 1976 5 Ibid 6 Pravda (Bratislava), August 4, 1976 7 CETERA International News Service, February 23, 1979 8 Ibid 9 Ibid 10 Prague Domestic News Service Report, May 14, 1976 11 Ibid 12 Prague Domestic News Service Report, February 23, 1976 13 Pravda (Bratislava), July 9, 1975 14 Pravda (Bratislava), August 4, 1976

diers and citizens. To project a positive image, Soviet soldiers participate in visits to collectives and factories, athletic competitions, and cultural events in the towns near their installations.48 The goal almost seems to be making the CGSF a regular part of Czechoslovak life. Soviet personnel and officers are invited with equal frequency to village celebrations and high-level regional political receptions. And anecdotes like the following appear regularly on the pages of the newspapers and popular journals during joint exercises: "While driving . . . we came across an icy road. In order to complete our journey, we wanted to put chains on the tires. . . Suddenly a cross-country vehicle appeared before us, and a smil215

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ing Soviet general jumped out, offering to help us. . . . It does not happen very often that a general gives a helping hand to a journalist to enable him to fulfill his assignment. "49 The lack of subtlety in methods of control and direction of the CLA shows that the Soviet leadership does not intend to repeat the mistakes that led to the deterioration of the dual control system in the 1960s. Prior to 1968, the Soviets did not enjoy the most direct means of influence over the Czechoslovak armed forces—the presence of Soviet troops. But now that the troops are there, the Soviets are taking full advantage of them as a means of control. The systems employed are more overt and pervasive and suggest that, at least in the Soviet view, the form and nature of the instruments matter a great deal. The only way, after all, to make certain that there is no tension in clientage is to make certain that the client is absolutely clear about the terms of the relationship. The post1975 system leaves little doubt that "moral-political unity" for the CLA means being red, expert, and thoroughly subordinate to the Soviet command. The key question, though, is whether this reimposition of blatant Soviet influence resolves or contributes to the tension inherent in clientage. Clearly, the Soviets, in the short term, are able to exert influence and to watch the development of every component of the Czechoslovak armed forces. Additionally, Czechoslovakia is now a "forward base" of operations for Soviet forces, allowing for enhanced military capability against the West. Moreover, with a pliant professional military, military intelligentsia, MPA, and party leadership tied more closely to the USSR than to each other, the Soviets need not worry about an outbreak of party-military rapprochement and liberalization similar to that of the 1960s. They might even look forward to a day when less direct methods, including Soviet troops, are not needed to prevent such a disease. But ultimately, the tensions of clientage have not really been resolved. The seeds of conflict are still present. It is still arbitrary and difficult to separate military development from 216

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the rest of society. Economic difficulty and potential reform still conflict with the expense of maintaining a modern professional Czechoslovak army. The room for maneuver for the leadership of the CLA is limited in trying to dispel the resentment that others in the party leadership and the government must feel as they try to balance the concerns of the anemic economy with the heavy demands of military preparedness. The tension is barely disguised in the demands made upon the military leadership to make the CLA useful in the economy and to make it pay for its own institutions of higher education. Further, the CLA pays a heavy price for its image as alien, expensive, Soviet-dominated, and thoroughly unreliable after the failure to defend the reforms of 1968. This image is still an albatross around the necks of the leadership as they try to man a professional, qualified officer corps. Nor is it unreasonable to suggest that the troubles that haunt the CLA in its relations with the society and the party have been exacerbated by events out of its control. The usurpation of power by the Polish armed forces must rekindle in the minds of the people and, more importantly, the party, the Sejna affair and the memories of a time when the armed forces were perilously close to being used to put down the reform. The Czechoslovak Communist party leadership—especially the one that will succeed Husak—must look over its shoulder in another direction and wonder about the loyalties and intentions of military leaders so thoroughly intertwined with their Soviet sponsor. This, in addition to the other tensions between the Czechoslovak party and military, is an added incentive to the KSC to make certain that there really is a leading role for the party in the CLA. The tensions of clientage that burst to the surface in 1968 have not disappeared, though they have surely been submerged. The armed forces, which during the Prague Spring took a first step toward full partnership in a new socialist epoch in Czechoslovakia, have returned to a state of clientage deeper than before.

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CHAPTER E I G H T

Party-Military Relations in Eastern Europe: The Impact of Soviet Power The armed forces of Eastern Europe are at once national forces and members of a socialist world order thoroughly dominated by the Soviet Union. This fact of their existence must be treated systematically in examination of the party-military systems of the region, because there is no reason to assume that the two identities are consonant. At the domestic level, the task of finding the balance between political control and military autonomy and the search for a professional elite, both loyal and efficient, are central concerns. Any number of factors, including the historical role and subsequent development of the militaries, are important in determining the nature of the interaction between military and political leaders and the attitudes of the society toward the armed forces. But the domestic interaction is conditioned, and can be fundamentally altered, by the behavior and influence of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's influence is so significant that it is not enough to treat the Soviets as an external factor. The word external suggests that it is not intrinsic or essential and this is not the case here. Soviet power in Eastern Europe is such that the lines of influence for the Soviets are well developed at every conceivable level, from the multilateral Warsaw Pact to personal contacts with East European officers. The Soviets must be treated as actors in the domestic context, indeed as an ever-present wedge between the domestic Communist party and its own armed forces. There have been over the almost four decades of communist rule in East Europe, significant changes in the functioning of these two-dimensional party-military systems. The 218

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changes were set in motion by the decision of Soviet leaders after the death of Stalin to place the Soviet-East European relationship on a different footing. The Stalinist imperial system was replaced with a massive scheme that ultimately made the East Europeans prohibitively dependent on Moscow, but allowed the process of national integration to begin. The Communist parties assumed responsibility, within limits, for decisions in the domestic environments. Leaders in the Kremlin realized that East Europe was a heterogeneous region and that the problems there demanded flexibility and responsiveness to national circumstances. There was from the very beginning, though, great tension built into this system, which required a delicate balance between national demands and the interests of the Soviet-led socialist bloc. Nowhere else was the system more delicately balanced than in the military sphere. On the one hand, renationahzation of the armed forces propelled them toward integration into the nation, and on the other, socialist integration pulled them toward the USSR. There was, after all, a tacit understanding that military decisions were primarily within the competence of the USSR. The tug and pull that resulted produced a very taut rope ready to break under pressure, and it was this legacy that threw the Czechoslovak armed forces into turmoil in 1968. Radical breaks like that of 1968 are not daily occurrences, though, and presumably the system works most of the time. This study set forth a framework that monitors Soviet policy and the changing relationship between party and army. The primary task of this research was to show that time is critical and to provide a basis for comparison with other cases. This can be done best by providing a picture of the system as it functioned in the five periods examined. These are, of course, merely snapshots that try to capture the nature of the policy instruments at the time, the major issues in party-army relations, and the relative balance between Soviet power and national party responsibility for the armed forces. (See Tables 8.1-8.11.) The following hypotheses should be kept in mind: 219

THE IMPACT OF SOVIET POWER Chart 8.1 Coercive Policy Instruments (Party) 4853 Execution Demotion (liberals) Activity of secret police Political officers (explicit control function) Paramilitary counterweights Promotion explicitly tied to political considerations

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Chart 8.2 Utilitarian Policy Instruments (Party)

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THE IMPACT OF SOVIET POWER Chart 8 3 Normative Policy Instruments (Party)

Primacy of political education over military training Primacy of military training over political education Brigade activity (use in the civilian sectoi) Special programs for Slovak nationals Rehabilitation of purge victims Membership m the Central Committee Membership on Politburo (minister of defense) Membership in the Communist Party

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x Strong, active policy + Weaker policy Over time, Soviet influence is increasingly based on utilitarian and normative rather than coercive instruments. The domestic Communist party relies increasingly on utilitarian and normative rather than coercive means. The party-military hnk strengthens as a result of the party's increasing role in national policy decisions and the military's own search for a place in the national environment. This strengthened hnk is at the expense of Soviet power and influence. 221

THE IMPACT OF SOVIET POWER Chart 8.4 Issues in the Relationship of the Party to the Armed Forces

Leading role of the party (direct control function for the MPA) Administrative MPA (no direct control) Professionalization Political loyalty Workers' army Internal function of the armed forces Discussion of defense burden National defense doctrine Czechoslovak military tradition

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X Strong, active policy + Weaker policy In the Stalinist years the interaction resembled an imperial system, with the East European political leadership acting as the agent of Moscow. Loyalty to the Soviet Union and loyalty to the Communist party were synonymous. But when Stalin's imperial rule was broken, hidden tensions in the dual identity of the Czechoslovak party-military system began to surface. Over time, Khrushchev's decision that limited diversity would be tolerated in the bloc had unexpected repercussions in the armed forces. The renationalization of the armed forces may have been intended as window dressing, but policies like the reestablishment of national commands, oaths, and traditions in reality strengthened the national identities of the armed forces. More importantly, the artificial separation of the military from the rest of the society was difficult to maintain. As 222

THE IMPACT OF SOVIET POWER Chart 8.5 Coercive Instruments of Policy (Soviet) 4853 Soviet troops Soviet security officers (overt as matter of policy) Soviet advisers Direct Soviet role in purges Soviet nationals in military elite

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Chart 8.6 Normative and Utilitarian Instruments of Policy (Soviet)

Political education (identification with USSR) Russian language Education of officers in Soviet Union Activities for East European officers Awards for satellite officers Force modernization

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THE IMPACT OF SOVIET POWER Chart 8.7. Issues in the Soviet Relationship with the Czechoslovak Armed Forces 4853 Integration Joint maneuvers (multi.) Joint maneuvers (bilat.) Unit level Military doctrine Soviet role East European role Defense planning and resource allocation Soviet role East European role

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x Strong, active policy + Weaker policy Czechoslovakia turned to economic and social liberalization, the armed forces became targets of criticism for their continuing allegiance to a foreign system and for their extremely large share of national economic resources. Gradually, often to the chagrin of the party, the military-political leadership saw great opportunity for reform and seized it to make the CLA an organization more appropriate for the "new stage of socialism." As CLA leaders were fond of saying in 1968, the armed forces were a part of society, mirroring it and being influenced by domestic changes. This change in the attitude of the military elite toward the reform sounded the death knell for the separation of the military from the larger society. The party tried to stay well behind the threshold at which Soviet interests were threatened, constantly stating that the military and the alliance were not issues of the reform. But the balance was upset, as forces within the Main Political Administration launched reform. The new interest in reform 224

THE IMPACT OF SOVIET POWER Chart 8.8 The Relative Balance of Power in Party-Military Relationship (1948-1953) Soviet Party

Soviet Police

Soviet Army

Czechoslovak Armed Forces -*::==::=I=:=;====I=== Czechoslovak Party Strong, decision-making authority (or conduit of decisionmaking authority Weak, no decision-making authority Weak, indirect decision-making authority

Chart 8.9 The Relative Balance of Power in Party-Military Relationship (1953-1967) Soviet Party

-*- Czechoslovak Party

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Strong, decision-making authority (or conduit of decisionmaking authority Weak, no decision-making authority Weak, indirect decision-making authority

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T H E IMPACT O F SOVIET POWER Chart 8.10 The Relative Balance of Power in Party-Military Relationship (1968: with reforms)

Strong, decision-making authority (or conduit of decisionmaking authority Weak, no decision-making authority Weak, indirect decision-making authority

Chart 8.11 The Relative Balance of Power in Party-Military Relationship (1969-1983)

Strong, decision-making authority (or conduit of decisionmaking authority Weak, no decision-making authority Weak, indirect decision-making authority

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fueled the dormant conflict between those wedded to the old ways and those who wanted to recast the system. This split was exacerbated by the fact that the consideration of the proper relationship between the party and military eventually opened a Pandora's box of questions on the proper role of the national military. Generally, those who stood to lose a great deal from this open reconsideration of the alliance—professional senior officers—were hesitant. But even members of the senior officer corps in Czechoslovakia joined the debate, and those who would not were quickly isolated from the military-political process. The whole period in which national lines of communication between the party and military were being reestablished was one of learning how to best exploit the relationship. Slowly, the KSC learned that it was impossible to separate the national military from the reform and there was a gradual acceptance of responsibility for the democratization of the armed forces. The new military leadership, inadvertently forced into the reformation, began to exploit the valuable new links with the party. National solutions to peculiar Czechoslovak problems, like nationality discrimination, rehabilitation, and incentive, were undertaken. Moreover, the political and military leaderships found considerable accommodation on the question of political control. The political-military leadership voluntarily reduced direct party interference in military affairs and declared a new stage in the relationship between the national armed forces and the party. This rapprochement set the party and military leadership on a collision course with the Soviet Union. Only when it was clear that the military leadership was paralyzed by the crisis and could not or would not defend the "honor" of the alliance did the Soviets abandon the CLA elite and demand reversal of the military-political course. The crisis within the CLA was, after all, a period of learning for the Soviet sponsor as well. The Soviet leadership also had to learn that the military could not be separated from the crisis and that the CLA elite could not be counted upon to 227

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turn against the domestic rejuvenation that was taking place. The failure of the CLA elite to act with sufficient rapidity and resolve in condemning the liberalization and Prchlik's outspoken comments about the Warsaw Pact taught the Soviets that the modus vivendi—separating military and domestic reform—had failed. Assuming that the outcome of rapprochement would be untenable, the Soviets moved even prior to the invasion to reverse it. Never were the contradictions of military clientage clearer, however, than when the Soviet Union reversed the course of the liberalization by force. If the Czechoslovaks entertained resistance, it was—in keeping with historical precedent—eschewed. The military remained confined to barracks while Czechoslovak lands were occupied by "fraternal troops." The stereotypes of the Czechoslovak armed forces were reinforced. Although it was the decision of the party to reject resistance, the CLA was considered passive and held to have failed to defend the state; finally in capitulation, the military leadership welcomed the invaders and returned to absolute adherence to the Soviet line. The CLA paid a tremendous price for its return to the Soviet fold. Widespread disillusion resulted and continues to plague a demoralized Czechoslovak army. Obviously the pressures on a national military to resist even fraternal invasion are very great. The Communist party of Czechoslovakia made the task easier when, like its predecessors, it refused to resist. Before the order was given, some claim that members of the military elite suggested resistance. Nevertheless, as great as the pressures must have been to resist, there were equally potent pressures for the opposite course. The same fear of Soviet ire that prevented the CLA elite from supporting Prchlik was presumably stronger in the face of invasion. The military High Command in East Europe that dares to order resistance is courting the specter of personal and professional liquidation. The overwhelming might of the Soviet Union makes the result of resistance a foregone conclusion. The client militaries can certainly raise the stakes 228

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and make the invasion costlier. But in personal terms, the commander has committed professional suicide. Perhaps resistance would, in itself, create considerable conflict for senior officers who have undergone years of socialization and association with the Soviet Union. But the motives are not entirely selfish. The East European armed forces gained a modicum of independence and national control in 1956; one result of resistance would be the loss of even that measure of autonomy. The CLA paid the price anyway. It would have perhaps been much higher had resistance been tried and failed. The circumstance of dual service is the most important factor in three unique features of the professional military elites of the region: lack of cohesion, suspect loyalty, and political isolation. The rapid polarization of the most senior officers in the crisis was primarily a result of serving two masters. All military elites are subject to factionalism. But the wide split between old and new was a schism not only between conservatives and liberals but also between "nationalists" and "Muscovites." The second feature, suspect loyalty, also stems directly from the dual service. The statement of one young Czechoslovak officer in 1968 that "people who do not want to sign this resolution don't belong in the army. . . . If war comes, they will not know on which side they are" effectively states the problem. 1 The most important determinants of loyalty in a given situation would undoubtedly be the nature of the conflict and the relationship between the Soviet Union and the party. But the ambivalence concerning clientage that surfaced in Czechoslovakia in 1967 should not be overlooked as a source of concern for the Soviet Union and for the domestic party. Neither can really count on the military in a conflict between them. And even if the party and the Soviet Union are united in a conflict against an external enemy, low morale and confused loyalties of military clients must be cause for concern. Certainly, in a protracted defensive action in which the armed forces are finally called upon to defend the state the problem might be lessened. Generally, the issue of persuasion and 229

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dissuasion, raised earlier in this study, is applicable. The Soviets must be aware that the kinds of actions for which they can depend upon these armed forces are limited. The final factor, the political isolation of the professional military, is also understandable only in terms of dual service. As noted, the party—in periods of divergence from the Soviet Union—has reason to suspect the military and to isolate it politically. This adds a new element to already deep fears about military Bonapartism. On the other hand, the military's desire to join the political process is probably lessened by the knowledge that the Soviet Union is the ultimate guarantor of military modernization, expenditure, and a host of other favors. The armed forces elite and the political leadership thus remain isolated from one another by the very nature of military affairs in the region. But when the party begins to address issues of interest to the military, the elite does show interest in the process. The Czechoslovak example is instructive, since the Soviet Union was temporarily isolated—albeit present in spirit—from the interaction, and suggests that the inactivity of the military elite is artificially maintained by the sponsor's influence. The most poignant lesson in the study of the CLA is that military clientage is rife with contradictions. The centrifugal forces at work in relations between the party and military and in their relationships with the Soviet Union are tremendous. Nevertheless, the armed forces of the region and the Warsaw Pact continue to survive. One factor may be that in spite of the contradictions, the relationship is beneficial, for East European armed forces are modern, well-equipped, and enjoy a modicum of international respect through association with the Warsaw Pact, even if their clientage undermines their prestige at home. Less loyal militaries, like that of Romania, are more independent, but less advanced. Moreover, the socialization process probably helps to soothe the dissonance of clientage. But most importantly, Soviet clientage is the only alternative, and it is here that the nature of the Soviet presence does matter. After the diminution of coercive and overt 230

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control, the Soviets still had direct means at their disposal. But in spite of the massive attempts to harmonize East European and Soviet interests, the CLA splintered anyway and was unable to behave satisfactorily for the Soviet Union. Vacillation and ultimately neutrality were the best that the Soviet's elaborate network of influence could produce. The reinstitution of a more direct, overt, and coercive Soviet presence within the CLA after the invasion suggests that the Soviets, too, believe that coercion makes a difference. The fact is that the kind of unreserved loyalty that the Soviets demand of East European military elites—unlike the diversity they allow in other spheres—can only be successfully engendered by overt means. The overt presence is to ensure that dual loyalty is not a problem for the professional officers of the region. Clearly, the examination of the development of the Czechoslovak armed forces along external and internal dimensions is fruitful and helps to explain unique features of this military under communism and clientage. The party-military interaction and their relationship to the sponsor are much clearer when they are examined with the problem of dual service and dual loyalty in mind. One must resist the temptation to extrapolate freely to other East European cases. National and cultural differences and variations in the relationship to the Soviet Union are important factors to consider. The value of the approach followed here is that it can take these differences into consideration. For example, the most interesting use of the framework might be in the Romanian case. The Romanian armed forces developed similarly to the Czechoslovak armed forces until 1964, when the Romanian Communist party deliberately began a drive for autonomy from the Soviet Union. The Romanian case differs from the Czech example by virtue of the conscious usurpation of military decisions. Romania's participation in the Warsaw Pact is minimal, and it seems that the party is assured of primary responsibility for decisions of interest to the military. Because the Romanian military has never 231

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been very advanced, it can be argued that the pressures for modernization and expenditure are less than in front-line states, accustomed to highly visible, modern militaries. Students of Romania argue that the lack of prestige in this area is more than ameliorated by the country's independence and the return to the armed forces of responsibility for the defense of the state. 2 The Romanian choice of the "people's defense" doctrine rather than "coalition defense" doctrine, which is standard in the Warsaw Pact, is said to be a source of great pride for the Romanian military elite. During the drive for party-military rapprochement, there have been reductions in party influence and interference as well. These do not seem to be similar to the ones that the Czechoslovaks entertained, however. The tight and coercive control of the Romanian party within the state—unmitigated by democratic tendencies—is reflected in the military as well, where there is no sentiment for nonparty or multiparty influence. Thus, the diminution of party control in the military does not threaten to return nonMarxist elements. Romania's internally repressive Communist party is in no danger of losing control of either the military or the society. Consequently, whatever the Soviets face in rapprochement between the party and military, they will be dealing with a Communist, almost Stalinist, party leadership. One of the most interesting aspects of the Romanian deviation is that in forging symbiosis with the armed forces, the Romanian Communist party has found it necessary to desovietize the officer corps and to remove, as much as possible, potential pillars of Soviet influence. Consequently, Romanian officers no longer study in the Soviet Union, and a budding relationship with France on matters of training and equipping the forces is emerging. 3 The Romanians have also pursued, quite gingerly, military contacts with the Yugoslavs. But it is clear that the unraveling of clientage is not achieved without a price. The already relatively backward forces are finding it difficult to forge military contacts with other states. This 232

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problem may eventually damage the budding rapprochement. Finally, it should be noted that the Romanians have carefully observed the parameters of divergence, remaining in the Pact and generally confining challenges to intra-Pact policy. The Romanians are aware that although the costs would be high, the Soviets can reverse the trends if necessary. There is, then, a standoff between the Soviets and the Romanians in which neither has yet crossed the point of no return. The Romanian party-military relationship can teach us a great deal about the politics of military clientage. Another case that might be fruitfully examined in this fashion is that of Poland. It is already clear that the implications for party-military relations in East Europe—indeed, communist states in general—are immense. More significantly, the pervasive influence of the Soviet Union seems to be an important factor in understanding what happened to the separation of civilian and military rule in the Polish crisis. Careful study would be necessary to determine whether the twodimensional approach is useful, but Poland is potentially an important case. As in all East European systems, there are features of the Polish party-military interaction that are unique. One particularly important one is the nationalism of Poland itself and the strategy pursued by the armed forces command to reconcile that nationalism with membership in the Soviet bloc. Just like Czechoslovak "pacifism," Polish "nationalism" is noted by most scholars and assumed to be both deeply ingrained and fully operative. 4 Several historical incidents have been cited to support this position. Quite apart from heroic Polish resistance against numerous invaders throughout history, there are examples of "nationalistic" behavior after the imposition of communist rule. One of the most heralded incidents was the apparent "threat" of the Polish High Command to resist Soviet invasion in 1956, a threat that some scholars credit with having forestalled Soviet intervention just weeks before military action was taken in Hungary. Clearly, other factors 233

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were operative: the limited scope of the reforms of Wladyslaw Gomulka, the ability of Gomulka, for the most part, to preserve order, and his ability to separate foreign and military policy from domestic reform. But the specter of a united Polish army, party, and people resisting invasion may have indeed deterred Moscow. The reforms of 1956 that grew out of Khrushchev's vision of a less imperial Soviet relationship with Eastern Europe were of great consequence for the armed forces. Clearly, the deSovietization of the armed forces in Poland after de-Stalinization was of greater actual significance in Poland than in Czechoslovakia.5 The removal of the hated Soviet expatriate Rokossovsky, the selection of a Polish defense minister, and the creation of a Polish command made up largely of Polish nationals—albeit with strong Soviet ties—were advances well worth protecting. The deSovietization did bring about the conflict between national and pro-Soviet identification, characteristic of the Czechoslovak armed forces in 1966-1968. A strong "nationalist" faction grew up within the Polish armed forces, experimenting briefly with national solutions to problems of the political-military system and even more briefly with variations on military doctrine. The nationalist phase in the Polish armed forces never reached the proportions that it did in Czechoslovakia, and the most ardent nationalists were rather quickly isolated.6 In Poland, the major difference was that this phase did not take place concurrently with a general national reform movement. The atmosphere for the open examination of the conflict between nationalism and clientage was simply not present. After this flirtation with national military divergence, the Polish military elite seemingly worked within the Warsaw Pact for increased East European participation, but followed the Soviet doctrinal and organizational lead. Subtle variations in the organizational structure of the Polish party-military system seemed on the surface to have little effect on the interaction either with the party or with the Soviet Union.7 The Polish armed forces became the larg234

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est, most efficient, and best equipped of the East European forces and, especially after the Czechoslovaks' fall from grace, the most crucial in the Soviet security system. 8 Though the movement toward national integration did not take the same path as that in Czechoslovakia, the armed forces command did pursue a position of relative political autonomy and professionalization, and fostered a distinctly national image. In fact, under Jaruzelski, the armed forces gained an enviable and growing reputation as the only viable Polish institution. The military's nationalist image was actually at the expense of a party that failed, at many junctures, to lead the movement toward national reform. The military thus stood in juxtaposition to the party, with the army as a good model and the party as a bad model of governmental authority. By 1970, the party's legitimacy and efficacy were once again seriously in doubt. By way of contrast, the Polish armed forces were a symbol of Spartan efficiency in a state governed by a corrupt, extravagant, and inefficient party. The minister of defense, Wojciech Jaruzelski, earned a reputation as a patriot who succeeded in diminishing corruption in the armed forces. By the time of the crisis of 1981, the Polish army was the only communist institution respected by the population. The image was bolstered by the apparent refusal of Jaruzelski to order the Polish armed forces to put down the workers' riots in 1976. This incident had often been cited as testimony to Jaruzelski's patriotism. It should also be noted, though, that in defying the party, Jaruzelski set himself and the military apart from the party and violated the major tenet of military submission to civilian control: that the armed forces will obey civilian orders, whether asked to resist invasion, defend the internal stability of the regime, or lay down their arms. At great cost to the carefully manicured image of the Polish armed forces, Jaruzelski reluctantly plunged the military into a political role. There was no Polish alternative. Obviously, this radical break with communist civil-military tradition is testimony to the gravity of the crisis in Poland. Military lead235

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ership was an answer to a particular kind of crisis Eastern Europe had not seen before. On the surface, this failure of civilian control looks frighteningly like the situation preceding military coups in other, noncommunist states in crisis, like Greece or Turkey. But the impact of Soviet influence and the two dimensions of the Polish political-military system on the decision to impose martial law arguably set this case apart from other military coups. While it is difficult to unravel the events that led to the imposition of martial law, a number of scholars have begun to recount these events in detail.9 That exercise cannot and need not be repeated here, though several points are worth noting. First, the involvement of the armed forces in the political crisis was gradual and steady, Jaruzelski himself ascending first to the premiership and some six months later to the party secretaryship. At various intervals, generals assumed prominent governmental posts. Jaruzelski's assumption of the secretaryship gave him a solid political base from which to take power if necessary, so the Polish communists were apparently sensitive to the image and symbolism of Jaruzelski's party, rather than military, connection, perhaps holding out the possibility of a political settlement. But Jaruzelski himself did not obscure the military connection, and when martial law was declared, it was very clearly military. He began the declaration with the words "I turn to you as a soldier and as head of the Polish government. "10 Jaruzelski, like all high-ranking military leaders, is a member of the Communist party. But obviously he did not wish to be thought of as a politician in uniform, but as a soldier in politics. After all, there is no reason that Jaruzelski could not have given up the post of minister of defense when he assumed the secretaryship. Clearly, he did not wish to make that separation. Moreover, after the imposition of martial law, the Council of National Salvation, led by military men and including a number of civilians, made no effort to hide the military nature of the takeover. Broadcasts by men in military dress (even some broadcasters wore the uniform of the Polish reserves) domi236

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nated Polish television. The government made a point, then, of the military connection rather than trying to conceal it. It was clearly the image and prestige of the military they sought to draw upon. The only feasible explanation is that the military took power, not in name, but in fact. The unthinkable in party-military relations happened. The military leadership did take control, having decided that the civilian party leadership was incapable of governing, and used the relative prestige and respect that the military enjoyed to try to stabilize the country. Whether it was a transfer of power (willingly from the party) or an actual takeover, the military held power on December 13, 1981. The most pressing issue is of course the role of the Soviet Union in the military takeover. Though a scenario that excludes Soviet participation could be constructed, it would be hard to imagine. The visit of jaruzelski to Moscow and the visits of Soviet leaders, including Marshal Kulikov, commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact, prior to the imposition of martial law would suggest that the Soviets participated in the decision. Indeed, it is very difficult to imagine a decision of such gravity being taken without Soviet consent, even encouragement. A second plausible scenario is that the decision was taken by the party leadership and armed forces and presented to the Soviets as an "alternative" to more violent action (including, of course, Soviet invasion). On the other hand, the party leadership, weak and festering, could have been isolated completely, and the action decided between the Soviet leadership (with Kulikov acting as the conduit) and the Polish military elite. In this case, the impetus could have come from either the Poles or the Soviets, but the basis would have been agreement that the party could not rule. There is just not enough evidence to settle the issue conclusively, but collusion between the Soviet leadership (through the Soviet military) and the Polish military elite is a feasible explanation. It is hard to imagine the party willingly initiating its own fall from power, and the isolation of all but a few party 237

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members from the visible leadership is instructive. Furthermore, the military council is taking the remarkable course of purging the party—a complete reversal of civilian and military roles. It does not matter that the generals are members of the party—that is true of all communist High Commands. What matters is that the identification of these "party members" is distinctly military and that it is an image and identification that Jaruzelski has cultivated. The party may have been betrayed by the army and the army's sponsor. The consequence of the Soviet role in the party-army relationship that is of special interest here is the aid that external sponsorship provided. Nationalism, so often cited as the key to the Polish party-military relationship, was hardly a factor here. Jaruzelski may have seized power to make action by the Soviets unnecessary, but he also did so in defense of communist rule and as a surrogate for the failing party. The ally he needed in that action was not the weak and ineffectual Communist party of Poland but the USSR. The behavior of the Polish military elite and the Soviet leadership in 1981 points out major differences between the nature of the crisis in 1981 in Poland and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and the implications of those differences for party-military relations. The crisis in Czechoslovakia was not a threat to communist rule, but rather an attempt by the Communist party leadership to institute reforms and pursue the "revolution" on its own terms. The Soviets declared this a threat to communist rule, but it was really a threat to Soviet-style communist rule. The disagreement between the KSC and the USSR, therefore, was really one between two national entities. The Soviets quickly found that under the rubric of national reform the political-military leadership of Czechoslovakia was rapidly (actually too rapidly for the Dubcek government) reforming the armed forces and purging those who resisted or who were too openly pro-Soviet. It would have been a difficult matter for the Soviets to find a Czechoslovak military leader with even a modicum of power who offered a legitimate "internal alternative." In short, the options were few and clearly de238

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fined: The Soviets had to rely on their own resources to establish a party leadership in Czechoslovakia committed to Soviet-style communist rule. In Poland, the crisis was not only more serious but of a very different nature, and in retrospect, Western expectations of a Soviet invasion may have been premature. First, there were a number of reasons why the Soviets wanted to avoid an invasion. Fear of West European reaction, the specter of passive and active Polish resistance, and the possibility of involvement simultaneously in Afghanistan and Poland were three important constraining factors. There was another factor though. The goal of this high-cost option was not very clear. In contrast to the problems in Czechoslovakia, Poland's problems ran deeper than a renegade party leadership. Invasion would not solve the economic difficulties, crush Solidarity, or give communist rule in Poland popular legitimacy. The chances were that all these difficulties would be exacerbated by intervention. Ironically, within the problem lay the solution for the USSR. In Poland an "internal" solution was not precluded, as it was in Czechoslovakia or even in Nagy's Hungary. A new party leadership was not the answer, but the military leadership was, and given the clear threat to communist rule at the time of the Solidarity Congress on December 11, the military leadership and Jaruzelski had a stake in halting the incipient, "counterrevolution." After all, from Jaruzelski's vantage point, Solidarity's "threat" to take power was a call for counterrevolution. The fact is that there was in this rare case confluence of interest between the USSR and the Polish communist High Command. Whatever conflict existed between the Soviets and Jaruzelski prior to the political action of Solidarity, it must have disappeared when it became clear that Solidarity might wish to seize power. With the party isolated and with Soviet agreement, the way was paved for the military action that broke precedent with communist tradition, but forestalled foreign intervention. The implications of this precedent for the future stability 239

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of civilian rule in Poland have understandably been overshadowed by the ongoing crisis. Needless to say, though, the impositipn of martial law is likely to haunt civilian leaders in Poland for some time to come. One can only imagine the embarrassment and resentment of the civilian communists, who are victims of a dubious "first" in communist history. And once military rulers have taken power, military interventions have a way of recurring, and even upon return to civilian rule, the military option will always exist in the background for the Soviet Union and the Polish armed forces. The circumstance of military rule in Poland cannot help being unsettling for Moscow, even if the military solution seemed appropriate at the time. Ruling has been an undesirable distraction from Poland's military responsibilities, and Jaruzelski's assumption of the role of head of state will complicate future Soviet authority over the party-military relations in Poland. There will also be a pressing need, if civilian authority is reestablished, to work out new mechanisms of control over the Polish armed forces to forestall "independent" action in other political crises. A defense minister who has been head of the party and government is potentially a more difficult client than are his peers in the rest of Eastern Europe. Nor must Moscow and the other parties of the region forget the implications of the precedent for the rest of a troubled Eastern Europe. The carefully sculptured military order, based on Soviet control of armed forces that exist as national entities, may be seriously endangered by the decision of December 13, 1981. Finally, the Soviet political leadership must wonder what the rejection of the separation of military and civilian roles in Poland means for the balance of power between those two elites in the USSR itself. It is hard to imagine the Soviet armed forces seizing power and replacing the Communist party as governors, even under the most critical circumstances. The two primary conditions that aided the Polish military do not exist at present in the USSR: a strong, prestigious military with few ties to a weak and illegitimate party, and the presence of an outside civilian bene240

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factor who can sanction and encourage the takeover. Nonetheless, since there will be a major succession after Chernenko's rule, bringing with it the potential for domestic upheaval, the Soviet political leadership must be certain that the first communist military takeover does not become an "acceptable" option for its own generals who helped to plan it. For all of these reasons, the Soviets have considerable interest in limiting Jaruzelski's tenure and in encouraging the return of party rule. Martial law has already been formally lifted. But the Kremlin may be ultimately in a game it cannot win. If Jaruzelski fails, the last "internal" option will have failed, and the Soviets might have to consider the risky option of intervention, which they have until now skillfully avoided. On the other hand, should Jaruzelski succeed and somehow find accommodation with Solidarity, the Catholic Church, and the Polish people, the Soviets will face another kind of dilemma. Obviously, the range of solutions to Poland's national problems that is acceptable both to the USSR and the Polish people is very small. If Jaruzelski adopts an option and embarks upon reforms the Soviets do not like, the Polish crisis could progress to the stage the Czechoslovak crisis reached in August 1968. Forced to confront the decision to remove Jaruzelski by force, the Soviets would face a difficult situation, because it is unclear what a military leader who is head of the government would do under those circumstances. Then the Soviets might really have to worry about resistance—resistance from a united Polish people and army. The long-term stakes are very high. Whatever the outcome of the imposition of military rule, the potential impact upon the delicately balanced two-dimensional system is great. Whether martial law in Poland will act as a transforming episode for the East European party-military system, further complicating the already difficult problem of relations between civilian and military leaders in these client states, remains to be seen. A case in which the two-dimensional approach seems less viable, at least on the surface, is the German Democratic 241

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Republic.11 The already anational character of the GDR would seem to make the concept of nation and the conflict within clientage less important. Politicization efforts in the GDR concentrate on building a sense of nationhood, and there has been no substantial diminution of party control and political education. The problem is to forge a sense of belonging for the National People's Army (NVA). But this attempt to find a national identity does not seem to be in conflict with the GDR's role in the socialist bloc. In fact, nationhood for the GDR is inextricably linked to socialism, and the political and military elites are dependent on Moscow for their very survival. Moreover, the NVA is thoroughly integrated into the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Warsaw Pact command. But as inextricable as the links are, there is a potential danger. The link of nationhood to the armed forces and the search for prestige through far-flung military missions in the Third World is disconcerting for some. The "militarization" of East Germany has led to the unexpected consequence of East Europe's first home-grown, Church-backed peace movement. 12 The growth of the importance of the NVA has not gone unnoticed in West Germany either. National integration in this case holds a set of dangers that are beyond the scope of this discussion. Finally, the validity of the two-dimensional approach outside Eastern Europe is a matter for investigation. The developing armed forces of other Soviet clients, like Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and certainly Afghanistan, would be interesting cases. The impact of Soviet influence upon a toughened and experienced officer corps with a strong sense of nation, like the officers in Vietnam, might be more like the early Soviet relationship with China. But the massive defections and constantly rumored "coups" in Afghanistan certainly recall the early days of development in Eastern Europe. The study of party-military relations in other cases should always be balanced by attention to specifically national factors and to more general socialist factors. The impact of outside factors on the domestic relationship in East Europe is clear. 242

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But the existence of such cases calls to mind the sparse attention paid to the impact of external factors by students of the civil-military relationship. As Samuel Huntington has so eloquently said, the military exists at once in two worlds: internal politics and the international environment. 13 Yet the fact that the impact of the international environment may condition and in some cases radically alter the domestic-level interaction is largely ignored. Tradition, history, and political and economic development continue to dominate discussions of the nature of civil-military systems, but there are many cases that might further our understanding of the link between international circumstances and the nature of the partymilitary system. Cases like Japan and West Germany, where radical breaks with the old took place and new civil-military systems were imposed after World War II, should provide interesting insights into the impact of cataclysmic events in the international environment on domestic institutional development. In Japan, for example, the Peace Constitution's postwar civil-military system seems, on the surface, to bear a greater resemblance to American notions of civilian control than to any antecedent in Japanese tradition. This raises interesting questions of how military systems imposed, for whatever reason, from without come to terms with national traditions. The civil-military systems of states that are locked in highly asymmetrical power relations with states other than the Soviet Union should also provide interesting insights. There have been attempts to examine the impact of American power on militaries in Latin America. One would expect numerous potential bases of influence at the institutional level. Whether they are fully developed and employed is a matter for careful study. But certainly the impact of power relations in the international system on domestic military development is worth examination in a world where power asymmetries are great and states increasingly interdependent. Such investigations are clearly hampered by the difficulty that social scientists encounter in trying to understand and 243

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study power and influence in political relations. Why is the more powerful actor able to dictate the behavior of the less powerful in one situation and yet completely powerless in another situation to influence the course of events? One necessary tool is a much more sophisticated understanding of what constitutes a viable power instrument under a given set of circumstances. This means that more careful attention must be devoted to the available instruments and to the successes and failures of the attempts of the more powerful states to use them. Examination of the impact of power asymmetries on the development of the nature of domestic institutions may ultimately help us to understand the concepts of power and influence themselves. THE EXAMINATION of Czechoslovak party-military relations along both dimensions shows quite clearly why models developed in the study of other communist states are inadequate to explain this case. The Czechoslovak party-military apparatus, which closely resembles that of the Soviet Union, does not produce the same pattern of interaction. It is not enough to blame the differences on political culture or history, though these factors play a role. The problem is that being "red and expert" does not mean gaining the trust of the domestic Communist party. The military is not an ally in the pursuit of national goals because, given the problem of dual loyalty, the military elite is not fully trusted. Only when the party and military realize that their interaction can be beneficial does the military join the political process. This happened in Czechoslovakia from 1967 to 1968. But even this modicum of rapprochement was difficult to achieve and impossible to maintain. The Czechoslovak military was supposed to be loyal to two masters: the USSR and the domestic Communist party. This tenuous position was predicated on the notion that in military affairs there can be no conflict between the two. Nevertheless, the increasing distance between Moscow and Prague strained the delicate balance. Czechoslovakia learned that dual control and loyalty 244

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are the natural products of this condition of deep military clientage. Only if this problem is taken into account is the failure to progress from the conflictual stage to rapprochement comprehensible. Rapprochement has failed to occur not simply because of the professionalization debate or the tensions of political control. It failed to occur in Czechoslovakia because the Soviet Union asserted its right to be an ever-present wedge between the domestic party and the military. As long as the Soviet Union maintains this power asymmetry in the region, there will be a wedge between the domestic party and the military. The Czechoslovak party and military were not "born of the revolution" together, and there was thus no natural symbiosis. The one attempt to build harmony was broken by the wedge between them. As a result, thirty-five years after its creation, the Czechoslovak People's Army stands suspended between the Czechoslovak nation and the socialist world order.

245

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. See for example Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). 2. This is noted in Timothy Colton's seminal work Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). CHAPTER ONE. PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE

1. There are numerous Soviet works that explore the role of the party in the military and the ideological justification for the Main Political Administration. Two very useful works are A. A. Yepishev, The Party and the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), and M. P. Skirdo, Narod, Armiia, Polkovodets (Moscow: Nauka, 1970). 2. The concern was that only a "workers' army" could be truly trustworthy in the socialist state. Moreover, as the new source of power, the workers would have to be heavily represented in the officer corps. The case for the workers' army is made in A. V. Antosiak, Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii stran uchastnits Varshavskogo dogovora (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo, 1975). 3. There are a few useful accounts of the armed forces of Eastern Europe. Among the best are Dale Herspring's East German CivilMilitary Relations: The Impact of Technology and Modernization (New York: Praeger, 1973), and a brief study by Alexander Alexiev, Party-Military Relations in Romania (Santa Monica: Rand, 1977). A collected work by A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier (Santa Monica: Rand, 1980), is also useful. Most of the studies treat the Soviet factor implicitly. Only Alexiev's study on Romania and a stimulating volume by Christopher Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1979), discuss explicitly and consistently the impact of the Soviet Union. Brief case 247

NOTES studies of several East European armed forces can be found in Jonathan Adelman, Communist Armies in Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981). 4. The students of East European economics have been far ahead of others in the examination of institutional development and the impact of socialist integration. The landmark book by Michael Kaser is an example of this. Michael Kaser, COMECON: Integration Problems of the Planned Economy (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). 5. David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies," World Politics, January 1979, p. 177. 6. This is particularly true of older works like Hubert Ripka's Czechoslovakia Enslaved (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949) and newer works like Richard Staar's Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1967). Two volumes on the process of political change in the region that do address the question of change in the relationship are the outstanding collected volume by Karen Dawisha and Philip Hanson, Soviet-East European Dilemmas: Coercion, Competition and Consent (New York: Holmea and Meier, 1981), which explores many of the themes central to this work, and Jan Triska, Political Development and Political Change in Eastern Europe (Denver: University of Denver Monograph Series, 1975). A useful volume that implicitly adopts the imperialism model is Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Communism in Eastern Europe (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979). Ironically, these imperialism theses bear a strong resemblance to the claims of Marxist theorists about the role of the West in developing societies and the nature of Western imperialism. V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 1975). There is also a strong resemblance to some of the "dependencia" arguments on Latin America. See a review essay by Robert Packenham, "Trends in Brazilian National Dependence since 1964," in Riordan Roett, ed., Brazil in the Seventies (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976). 7. A helpful collection on patron-client relations is Steffen W. Schmidt, Laura Gausti, Carl H. Lande, and James C. Scott, Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974). A paper by Carl Walter, "To248

NOTES ward a Typology of Patron-Client Dyads" (Stanford University, 1978, Typescript), is also very useful. 8. The East European armed forces are referred to as clients in most works on the Warsaw Pact. The term client itself expresses a sense of mutual benefit that is often underestimated in subsequent discussion. 9. The students of COMECON have been very forceful in describing the impact of socialist economic integration on institutions. An example of this kind of analysis is Michael Kaser's COMECON. There are numerous books on the Warsaw Pact. Among the more recent are Robert W. Clawson and Lawrence S. Kaplan, eds., The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1982), and Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments. 10. Important discussions of the problems of the measurement of power and the problem of fungibility can be found in Jack H. Nagel, The Descriptive Analysis of Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), and Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science, vol. 2 (June 1957), pp. 201-215. General theories of dependence and the impact of power asymmetries are very well developed, and though they are used primarily in the study of economic relations, the tenets of the work have greatly influenced this study. A representative sample of the arguments can be found in Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972). 11. Thomas A. Schelling, Arms and Influence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). 12. This study makes no attempt to measure Soviet power and control within the East European militaries. In the absence of the ability to predict the efficacy of Soviet power in particular situations, the study explores potential Soviet power bases, changes in the use of specific instruments, and the impact of those changes upon the domestic interaction. 13. Economic divergence is the most notable trend in the postStalin era. Hungary has gone quite far, allowing some mix of market and plan and even some private investment. There is also considerable divergence in cultural policy. The most obvious example is Poland's attempt to reach accommodation with the Catholic Church. 14. Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority, p. 1. 249

NOTES CHAPTER TWO. THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTY AND MILITARY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1. The rise and development of the Polish forces is discussed in Ithiel de Sola Pool's pioneering study Satellite Generals (Stanford: Standford University Press, 1955). 2. The composition of the Romanian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian forces is discussed in de Sola Pool, Satellite Generals. 3. A number of sources address BeneS's wartime policy. One very good source, which contains letters and other memoir material, is Compton Mackenzie's Dr. BeneS (London: George C. Harrap and Co., 1946). BeneS's policy is put into the context of the history of Czechoslovak foreign policy in Josef Korbel, Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia: The Meaning of Its History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). 4. Mackenzie, Dr. BeneS, p. 195. 5. "Program nove 6eskoslovensk6 vlady Narodni fronty Cechfl a SlovaJcfi: KoSice 5. dubna 1945," in Pavol Dfska et al., eds., KSC o ozbrojenfich sildch (Prague: Nase vojsko, 1976), pp. 193-213. 6. Ibid., pp. 194-195. 7. Ibid., p. 213. 8. Kolektiv sestavovateB, Ke vzniku a vyvoji deskoslovenskS lidove' arm&dy (Prague: Nase vojsko, 1959). This is also addressed in Bohuslav LaStoviCka, "Vznik a vyznam koSickeho vl&dniho programu," Ceskoslovensky dasopis historicky, July 1960, pp. 31-56. 9. Prague Embassy to United States Department of State, Telegram, December 31, 1946, 860 f. 223/12-3146. 10. Several Western sources are useful. For example, see Josef Korbel, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938-1948: The Failure of Coexistence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), or Josef Letterich, A History of Modern Slovakia (New York: Praeger, 1955). 11. Korbel, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia. 12. P. A. Zhilin (USSR) and E. Gerfurt (CSSR), Na vechnye vremena (Moscow: Voenizdat; Prague: Nase vojsko, 1975). Critical comments can be found in a communist source: Bohuslav Lausman, Pravda a lo£ o slovenskom narodnom povstani (Petrovec: Bratistvo-Jednota, 1951), p. 34. 250

NOTES 13. Zhilin and Gerfurt, Na vechnye vremena. A fuller account of Soviet aid is offered in A. V. Antosiak, Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii stran uchastnits Varshavskogo dogovora (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo, 1975). 14. "Program nove ceskoslovensk6 vlacly," p. 200. 15. Antosiak, Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii, p. 40. 16. Ibid. 17. Ludvik Svoboda, "Z Buzuluku do Prahy," Mladd Fronta, June 1960. 18. Antosiak, Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii, p. 42. This story of the brigade's formation is largely corroborated by the account in Ithiel de Sola Pool's Satellite Generals. There are minor variations in the numbers of soldiers. 19. Antosiak, Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii, p. 42. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 23. De Sola Pool, Satellite Generals. 24. Antosiak, Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii, p. 45. 25. Ibid., p. 46. 26. Ibid., p. 50. 27. M. E. Monin, "Internatsionalizm v destvi," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, August 1967, pp. 36-58. This account is corroborated by U.S. intelligence, which often expressed surprise at the small contingent of Soviet advisers several months after the coup. "The contingent has not been increased since 1946," the report stated. See "Czechoslovak Postwar Relations with Other East European Countries," Department of State Research and Analysis Report No. 445, August 19, 1948, pp. 28-29. 28. Monin, "Internatsionalizm v destvi." 29. Antosiak, Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii, p. 40. 30. Ibid. 31. Ithiel de Sola Pool's Satellite Generals provides a systematic analysis of the Western officer corps. Communist sources readily admit that most of the experienced officers of the "Munich heritage" fled to London. See for example Zhilin and Gerfurt, Na vechnye vremena. 32. "Program nov6 6eskoslovenske vlacly." 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 251

NOTES 35. London Embassy to the United States Department of State, Memo, April 28, 1945, 860F. 2014-2845. Later, in the 1968 press, groups of veterans who had fought in the Middle East lamented the lack of respect shown them because they had not participated in the liberation of Prague. "How Long Shall We Have to Wait for Recognition?" Zivot Strany, December 9, 1968, p. 1. 36. Korbel, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, p. 70. 37. Antosiak, Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii, p. 35. An interesting account of partisan activity is found in a Russian translation of a work by the current party secretary of Czechoslovakia. G. Hus&k, Svidetel'stvo o slovatskom natsional'nom vosstanii (Moscow: Nauka, 1960). 38. Jaromir Navrdtil, "K otazce boje o politick^ character armacly v pfediinorov6m," Historie a Vojenstvi, May 1958, p. 30. Slightly smaller numbers are given in Zhilin and Gerfurt, Na vechnye vremena, p. 50. 39. Antosiak, Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii. 40. Navrdtil, "K otazce boje o politicky character armady v pfedunorovem." 41. Ibid., p. 31. 42. Ibid., p. 33. 43. Antosiak, Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii, p. 83. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Prague Embassy to the United States Department of State, Telegram, June 28, 1945, 860F. 2016-2845. 47. Antosiak, Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii, p. 84. 48. Zhilin and Gerfurt, Na vechnye vremena, p. 51. 49. Ibid., p. 52. 50. "Z projevu Ludvika Svobody na zarijovem plenu UV KSC," Svidectvi (Paris), May 1970, pp. 293-294. Svoboda claimed that he played a role in forcing Benes to accept the solution to the crisis of February and was asked by Gottwald to remain outside of the party until the revolution. 51. There are several accounts of the formation and exploits of the Czechoslovak Legion. Edvard BeneS's Memoirs: From Munich to the New War and New Victory (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1928) contains an interesting and detailed account. Secondary sources on the Legion include Edward Palmer Hoyt, Army without a Country (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1967), and Frederich Agather, BeneS and the Army: His Policy (New York: Praeger, 1962). One publica252

NOTES tion of the Bene§ government is also noteworthy: Ministerstvo zahranicni politiky, Boj o mir a bezpednost stdtu (Prague: Orbis, 1934). Many communist histories, including Ministerstvo narodni obrany, Ke vzniku a vyvoji c'eskoslovenske' lidove armddy, discuss the formation of the Legion. All information on the formation of the Legion is taken from Edward Palmer Hoyt, Army without a Country, unless otherwise noted. 52. Ludvik Svoboda claims this heritage, for example, in Z Buzuluku do Prahy (Prague: Nase vojsko, 1970). 53. The Times (London), August 12, 1918, p. 6. 54. "Program nov6 6eskoslovenske vl&dy," p. 211. For a fuller discussion of the role of political education in the coalition period, see Jan Liptak, "KSC a osvetovy aparat v CSLA v letech 1945-58, Historie a Vojenstvi, November 1975. 55. "Vecerni vfistnik Ministerstva narodni obrany, dne 10. zari, 1945," in Jaroslav Zizka, Volby a ozbrojene sily CSSR (Prague: Nase vojsko, 1976), p. 34. 56. Ibid. 57. Rude Prdvo, August 28, 1945. Discussed in the telegram sent by the Prague Embassy to the United States Department of State, August 29, 1945, 860F.0018-2945. 58. 860F.0018-2945. 59. Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments, p. 135. See also estimates of the Office of Strategic Services to the Department of State, August 1, 1945, 860F.2360. 60. Report of the Joint Intelligence Committee for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 091 Russia 1949, No. 30-2 Box No. 554. 61. Prague Embassy to the United States Department of State, Telegram, September 19, 1947, 860F. 2019-1047. 62. The General Staff supported the coalition position, stating that while it wanted cooperation with the Soviets, such cooperation should not be at the expense of quality of Czechoslovak arms. Prague Embassy to the United States Department of State, Telegram, April 22, 1947, 860 20/4-2247. 63. Ibid. 64. Prague Embassy to the United States Department of State, Report, September 17, 1945, 860F. 20/9-1745. 65. Letter from Ludvik Svoboda to the United States Department of State, November 22, 1945, 860F. 20/11-2245. 66. Ibid. 253

NOTES 67. Internal memorandums, United States Department of State, January 1, 1945, through December 31, 1946, 860F.24/1-145; 860F. 12/3146. 68. The Czechoslovaks also apparently failed to inform the United States of the resale of some lend-lease equipment earlier. Prague Embassy to the United States Department of State, 860F. 10/2946. 69. Internal memorandum concerning telegram from Prague Embassy to the United States Department of State, November 21, 1945, 860F.20/11-2145. 70. Internal memorandums of Department of State, May 28, 1946, to October 23, 1946, 860F.24/5-2846 and 860F.24/10-2346. 71. Letter from the Royal Air Force Headquarters to the United States Department of State, September 19, 1945, 860F. 24/9-1945. 72. See n. 69. 73. Secretary of State to Royal Air Force Headquarters, November 13, 1946, 860F.24/11-1346. 74. Hubert Ripka through the Prague Embassy to the United States Department of State, September 30, 1946, 860F. 24/9-3046. 75. See references to the early group in the report of the formation of a factory guard in 1948. Prague Embassy to the United States Department of State, March 18, 1948, 860F. 20/3-1848. 76. Strategic Services Unit to the Department of State, May 21, 1946, 860F. 20200/5-2146. 77. Svoboda's concern about the strength of the police force is discussed in a War Department memorandum to the Department of State, "Svoboda and Generals versus Reicin and Prochazka," 860F.20200/9-1646. 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid. 80. Antosiak, Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii, p. 88. 81. Ibid. 82. Ke vzniku a vyvoji deskoslovenskS lidovi armddy, p. 86. 83. Antosiak, Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii, p. 89. 84. Ibid. 85. Ibid., p. 90. 86. This was supposedly in response to BeneS's query on whether the army would stand by him. Tad Szulc, Czechoslovakia since World War II (New York: Macmillan, 1972). 254

NOTES 87. "Z projevu Ludvika Svobody na zarijov6m pl6nu UV KSC," p. 293. 88. Krasnaia zvezda, February 25, 1973, p. 5; cited in Antosiak, Zarozhdenie narodnyhh armii, p. 90. CHAPTER THREE. THE FORMATION OF THE ARMY OF A SOCIALIST TYPE, 1948-1956 1. Prague Embassy to the United States Department of State, Telegram, January 14, 1949, Debriefing of General Dastich, 860F.00/ 1-1449. 2. Ibid. 3. According to a report of the CETEKA International News Service, April 6, 1968 (cited in Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments, p. 157). No figures are available from the intelligence reports of the time, though there is recognition of massive dismissal of officers in several reports. One such report can be found in a Prague Embassy telegram to the United States Department of State, February 2, 1949, 860.00/2-2149. 4. Rude Prdvo, June 21, 1949. 5. CETEKA International News Service, April 6, 1968. 6. Karel Kaplan, "Thoughts on the Political Trials," Nova Mysl, July 6, 1968. The fabrications are also discussed in some detail in Jifi Pelikan, The Czechoslovak Political Trials (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1970). 7. Kaplan, "Thoughts on the Political Trials." 8. Ibid. 9. Prague Embassy to the United States Department of State, Telegram, April 8, 1949, 860F.00(W)/4-849. These files contain a good deal of information about the activities of Reicin. Also described in Pelikan, The Czechoslovak Political Trials. 10. Telegram from the political adviser for Germany to the United States Department of State, May 26, 1949, 860F. 00/5-2649. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. This may be the status to which A. V. Antosiak refers in discussions of the release of officers in Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii. 13. Political adviser for Germany to the United States Department of State, 860F. 00/5-2649. Earlier reports of suspicion of Kult255

NOTES vasr can be found in a Prague Embassy telegram to the Department of State, March 22, 1949, 860F. 00/3-2249. 14. 860F.00/5-2649. 15. Ibid. Interestingly, Hruska was a member of the Novotny rehabilitation review commission, but did not serve on the Dubtek commission's review. 16. Ibid. 17. The news of the exoneration was reported in a brief story in Rud6 Prdvo, May 4, 1966. 18. Prague Embassy to the United States Department of State, Report, August 17, 1949, 860F.00B/8-1749. In fact the entire party was in disarray during the eighteen months following the February takeover. Recruitment of party members was slowed and 4.7 percent were expelled, since it was believed that opportunists had joined the party and too few of them were workers. See the reports of the Prague Embassy to the United States Department of State, September 26, 1949, 860F.OOB/9-2649. 19. Rude Prdvo, May 1949. 20. Pelikan, The Czechoslovak Political Trials, p. 53. 21. Prague Embassy to United States Department of State, Telegram, May 31, 1949, 860F.OOB/5-3149. Slanskys pronouncements about the armed forces are discussed in Pelikan, The Czechoslovak Political Trials, p. 50. 22. Pelikan, The Czechoslovak Political Trials, p. 46. 23. According to American intelligence reports, there were deep splits in the party about the efficacy and desirability of purges and trials. The party, in reacting to the Cominform resolution, tried to "convince the Soviets of loyalty without show trials. The efforts border on idolatry for Stalin and the USSR." Prague Embassy to the United States Department of State, Telegram, December 22, 1949, 860F.00B/12-2249. These efforts to convince the Soviets were undermined by continuing sabotage at armament factories under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense. Prague Embassy to the United States Department of State, Telegram, October 14, 1949, 860F.00B/ 10-1449. Czechoslovakia's uncomfortable position in Cominform, especially with the Hungarians, is detailed in a Prague Embassy report to the Department of State, January 4, 1949, 860F. 001-149. 24. Pelikan, The Czechoslovak Political Trials, p. 15. 25. Ibid. 256

NOTES 26. Ibid., p. 76. The Czechoslovak security services had been under criticism since 1946, when they were said to be too close to the British model. Strategic Services Unit Report to the War Department, May 21, 1946, 860F. 20200/5-2146. 27. Pelikan, The Czechoslovak Political Trials, p. 48. 28. Ibid., p. 47. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. The New York Times, April 26, 1950, p. 15. 32. Tvorba, May 12, 1950. Discussion of the deepening involvement of the Soviets can be found in a State Department Office of Intelligence Research report of October 1950. Research Report No. 4800.22. 33. Rud6 Prdvo, May 27, 1950. Also reported in The New York Times, May 28, 1950. 34. Rude Prdvo, May 31, 1950. 35. See Pelikan, The Czechoslovak Political Trials, for a description of the "Sling conspiracy" (p. 96). The numbers are quoted in Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments, p. 157. 36. Pelikan, The Czechoslovak Political Trials, p. 118. 37. Ibid., p. 272. In fact the report goes to some length to exonerate Cepicka, saying that he actually undid some of the gross infringements that Reicin had instituted, closing the "cottage" and the forced labor camp at Mirov. 38. Ibid. 39. The New York Times, May 24, 1950. 40. Pelikan, The Czechoslovak Political Trials. 41. Ibid. 42. Gottwald and Slansky apparently held different views on the construction of socialism in Czechoslovakia. Gottwald felt that Czechoslovakia's party was strong and could garner popular support using somewhat Stalinist tactics. Slansky was less inclined toward this view. Over the years, however, Gottwald, along with Cepi6ka, began increasingly to give in to pressure for purges in the party. In doing so he ingratiated himself with the Soviets and moved, albeit reluctantly, to accelerate the process of purge. Intelligence reports on the party struggle noted Stalin's increasing trust of Gottwald against Slansky. Slansky had tried unsuccessfully to rely primarily on reed257

NOTES ucation rather than mass expulsion. Two intelligence reports are particularly useful. Prague Embassy to the United States Department of State, Report, September 26, 1949, 860F.00B/9-2649, and Prague Embassy to the United States Department of State, Telegram, December 22, 1949, 860F.00B/12-2249. 43. Pelikan, The Czechoslovak Political Trials, p. 123. 44. Ibid. 45. Rudi Prdvo, August 9, 1949. 46. Lidov6 Noviny, July 27, 1949.

47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53. Peter Gosztony, ed., Paramilitarische Organisational in Soujetblock (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Hohwact Verlag, 1977), p. 78. 54. Antosiak, Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii, p. 89. 55. Ibid. 56. Tvorba, March 17, 1955. 57. Obrana Lidu, July 13, 1950. The regulations were not actually published, but they were summarized and the rationale for them provided. 58. Ibid. 59. Rud6 Prdvo, July 8, 1949. 60. "Z organizacmho faclu pfijat^ho IX. sjezdem KSC," in Pavol Drska et al., eds., KSC o ozbrojenych sildch, p. 263. 61. Ibid. 62. Rudi Prdvo, August 20, 1950. 63. Ibid. 64. Obrana Lidu, September 13, 1950. 65. The New York Times, October 7, 1950. 66. Rovnost, September 13, 1950. 67. Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments, p. 135. 68. Report of the Department of State Office of Intelligence Research, October 1950. Research Report No. 4800.22. 69. Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments, p. 22. 258

NOTES

70. Rude Prdvo, March 24, 1949. 71. Ibid. 72. Reports of the strength of the armed detachments of Czechoslovakia can be found in the Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, undated, found in August 17, 1954, Reports—Files 1949. Reports of the size of the regular forces are also found in Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments, p. 135. 73. Pelikan, The Czechoslovak Political Trials, p. 43. 74. Budgetary figures are taken from The United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1945-1957 (New York: United Nations Publications, 1945-1957). An additional report calling for further outlays is available in Rudd Prdvo, April 17, 1953. 75. Rud4 Prdvo, October 14, 1952. 76. "USSR's Second Largest Trading Partner," Czechoslovak Life, November 1967, pp. 10-14. 77. Ibid., p. 14. 78. The New York Times, May 7, 1949, p. 15. 79. "USSR's Second Largest Trading Partner." 80. Ibid. 81. The New York Times, October 4, 1950, p. 20. This is supported by the Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 82. Ibid. 83. Ibid. 84. Rude Prdvo, May 30, 1978. 85. A-Revue, July 12, 1968. 86. Ibid. 87. "Z organizacniho Mdu pfijat6ho IX. sjezdem KSC," in Dfska et al., eds., KSC o ozbrojenych sildch, p. 271. 88. Thomas Wolfe discusses the Soviet power offensive in Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970). 89. Rudi Prdvo, August 25, 1955. CHAPTER FOUR. THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE'S ARMY AFTER DE-STALINIZATION, 1 9 5 6 - 1 9 6 7

1. Pravda, October 31, 1956. 2. FrantiSek Bedfich, "The Army, the Party, and Patriotism," Tvorba, October 8, 1969. 3. Ibid. 259

NOTES 4. Ibid. 5. Cepicka made a self-critical statement on Radio Bratislava on June 15, 1956. This speech and the announcement of his dismissal were reported in Pravda, June 27, 1956. 6. There are numerous discussions of the excellent state of the interwar forces in Czechoslovakia. One particularly detailed assessment is offered in S. A. Tulin, ed. and trans., Rozhdenie Chekhoslovatskoi narodnoi armii (Moscow: Nauka, 1959). 7. These offerings are typified by the essay by Gen. Bohumir Lomsky, "The Twentieth Anniversary of the Czechoslovak National Army," Voennaia Mysl', October 1965. 8. I. I. Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo bratskykh narodov i armii (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975). 9. Pravda, July 9, 1964. 10. Almost every speech by Czechoslovak officers contained this element, including, for example, the speech by Bohumir Lomsky, "The Twentieth Anniversary of the Czechoslovak National Army." 11. Izvestiia, May 3, 1955. 12. Khrushchev to the Political Consultative Committee. Cited in Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-1970, p. 151. 13. A. S. Bakhov, Organizatsiia Varshavskogo dogovora (Moscow: Nauka, 1971). 14. Regular meetings were agreed upon only in 1969. 15. Khrushchev's grandiose ideas about the division of labor were formulated within the context of economic policy. A full discussion of the economic division of labor is contained in Kaser, COMECON. 16. This traditional view of Stalin's failure to realize the importance of the atomic age is supported by Soviet criticism. See for example Major Generals S. N. Kozlov and M. V. Smirnov and Colonels I. S. Baz and P. A. Sidorov, O sovetskoi voennoi nauke (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964). Stalin's policies did include efforts to build the bomb, though he may never have fully understood its significance. See David HoUoway's balanced assessment of Stalin's nuclear policies in The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 15-28. 17. An excellent discussion of Khrushchev's military policies is found in Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-1970, pp. 144-159. A more recent account is offered in David HoUoway's The Soviet Union and the Arms Race. 260

NOTES 18 V D Sokolovsky, Military Strategy, 3d ed , trans by Harriet Fast Scott (New York Crane, Russak and Co , 1975), p 166 19 Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970, p 150 20 A A Grechko, "The Patriotic and International Duty of the USSR's Armed Forces," Krasnaia zvezda, October 6, 1961 21 Ibid 22 Marshal A A Grechko, "The Military Alliance of Fraternal Nations," Voenno-tstoricheskn zhurnal, May 1965, p 24 Also cited in Kommunist vooruzhnnykh sil, July 1965, p 24 23 Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970, p 150 24 Fnednch Wiener and William J Lewis, The Warsaw Pact Armies (Vienna Carl Ueberreuter Press, 1977), p 79 25 Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970, p 150 26 Marshal V D Sokolovsky was one of the most influential strategists and his group discussed combined-arms operations doctrine Sokolovsky, Military Strategy 27 Ibid , p 14 28 Ibid 29 Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970, p 150 30 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London IISS, 1965) 31 Pravda, July 10, 1957 32 Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments, p 137 33 Sokolovsky, Military Strategy, p 261 34 In all three editions of Sokolovsky's work, the references to the probability of escalation are actually much more numerous than discussions of limited war and it is difficult to tell precisely what provoked the Czechs There are, nonetheless, a few references to protracted war The third edition, first released in 1968, gives more attention to different kinds of wars, including "local wars" fought outside the central European theater There are several scenarios given for the outbreak of war, and these differ substantially from the notion of immediate escalation to world war It should be remembered that this was a period of open examination of military doctrine The Soviets began to reject the notion of "one-variant war" and to examine a number of variants, including nonnuclear operations Some discussions actually predate the 1968 edition of the Sokolovsky volume For example, Lt Col V M Bondarenko, "Military-Technical Superiority The Most Important Factor in the Reliable 261

NOTES Defense of the Country," Kommunist vooruzhnnykh sti., September 1966, p. 10. Several Western scholars have argued that around this time, the Soviets actually decided to prepare themselves for options short of all-out war in Europe. See Coit Dennis Blacker, "Military Forces," in Robert F. Byrnes, ed., After Brezhnev: Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1980s (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983). 35. Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments, p. 137. 36. Josef Hodic, "Military-Political Views Prevalent in the Czechoslovak Army: 1948-1968," in ZdenSk Mlynar, ed., The Experience of the Prague Spring (Vienna: Karz, 1979), p. 13. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid., p. 14. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid., p. 16. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid., p. 18. 43. Ibid. Hodic is somewhat confusing on whether Soviet troops were to receive warheads in the event of war or whether the warheads were to be prepositioned. On the one hand he implies that the issue was stationing Soviet troops so that warheads could be transported in case of crisis. On the other, there is the Soviet claim that warheads could not be transported on such a scale without warning NATO and inviting attack. This latter statement would suggest that the Soviets considered placing the troops in East Europe and prepositioning warheads. This is certainly possible, since Khrushchev was less restrictive about warhead basing (he was preparing to put them in Cuba and ammunition dumps were apparently being built) than his successors have been. At the time, technical limitations in Soviet long-range delivery would have made the prospect of operational short-range missiles in Europe more attractive. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid., p. 19. 47. Ibid. 48. John Erickson in V. V. Kusin, ed., The Czechoslovak Reform Movement: 1968 (London: International Research Documents, 1973), pp. 34-35. Also noted in Jiff Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czech262

NOTES oslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979). 49. Ibid. 50. Hodid, "Military-Political Views," p. 19. 51. Obrana Lidu, May 6, 1966. 52. "Unity in Military Alliances," Mezindrodni Politika, September 1967, p. 15. 53. Rudi Prdvo, March 6, 1968. 54. "Unity in Military Alliances," p. 16. 55. "Cooperation with Socialist Countries," Zivot Strany, January 1, 1968. 56. Zivot Strany, December 24, 1966. 57. Rude Prdvo, December 21, 1966, and December 23, 1966. 58. Ota §ik, Plan and Market under Socialism (Prague: Orbis, 1967). 59. Obrana Lidu, May 15, 1966. 60. Ibid., May 4, 1966.

61. Rude Prdvo, June 5, 1966. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. Pravda (Bratislava), December 5, 1966. 65. Rude Prdvo, August 22, 1963. 66. Pravda (Bratislava), August 23, 1963, quoting CETEKA International News Service release of the same date. 67. According to Ceskoslovensky Vojdk, June 1965. 68. A-Revue reported this on June 12, 1968; see also Obrana Lidu, July 27, 1968. 69. Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments, p. 151. 70. Vaclav Prchlik in iivot Strany, December 24, 1963. 71. Ibid. 72. This is discussed in chapter 6 of this study. See the attack of Frantisek Bedfich on the MPA in "The Army, the Party, and Patriotism." 73. Ibid. 74. Radio Free Europe Situation Report/Cjxchoslovakia: September 9, 1966 (Munich: Radio Free Europe, 1966). 75. Obrana Lidu, September 9, 1966. The founding of the Republic usually passed without fanfare. 76. Rud6 Prdvo, May 10, 1966. 263

NOTES CHAPTER FIVE. THE MILITARY IN THE PERIOD OF LIBERALIZATION, JANUARY TO AUGUST 1968

1. Janko's friends tried to clear his name after his suicide. Though Janko left no letter, passages from his diary denying complicity in the affair were released. The commentator pleads for the restoration of Janko's honor and respect for his military skills, which were recognized even by the Western press. Rude Prdvo, March 14, 1970. 2. "Chronology of Events in the Czechoslovak Crisis," Radio Free Europe Background Report/Czechoslovakia: January 1, 1969 (Munich: Radio Free Europe, 1969). Egyd Pepich, the new MPA chief, "confirmed" the attempts to interject the armed forces in "We Need Not Keep Anything from the People's Knowledge," Obrana Lidu, February 24, 1968, p. 1. 3. Pepich, "We Need Not Keep Anything from the People's Knowledge," p. 5. 4. Interview with Martin Dzur, "What about You, Comrade Minister?" A-Revue, June 28, 1968, p. 62. See also Dzur in A-Revue, June 10, 1968. 5. Jifi Reindl in A-Revue, April 3, 1969. He made it clear throughout the crisis that some forces were ready to intervene. 6. Lidovd Demokracie, June 5, 1968, p. 1. 7. Pravda, June 11, 1968, p. 1. The statement also reports that the Ministry of Defense of Czechoslovakia denied the accusation. • 8. Jaroslav KokoSka, "How It Was in the Army," A-Revue, March 1968 (No. 19), p. 22. 9. A-Revue, May 1968 (No. 14), p. 38. 10. Lomsky appeared on television to issue his denial. Radio Free Europe Situation ReportlCzechoslovakia: March 13, 1968 (Munich: Radio Free Europe, 1968), p. 1. 11. Jiff Valenta related a number of anecdotes of the reaction of the Czechoslovak population to the Sejna affair. Discussions with Valenta, October 1980, at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Even General Janko's diary mentions the slander heaped upon the military. Rude Prdvo, March 14, 1970. 12. The "internal" function is flatly diavowed by Egyd Pepich in "The Army Serves the People," Pravda (Bratislava), March 3, 1968. 13. Otakar Rytif, "We Shall Give a Marx-Leninist Answer to Our Problems," iivot Strany, November 11, 1969. 264

NOTES 14. "The Strange Words of General Kodaj," A-Revue, July 8, 1968. The manifesto is considered by many to be a turning point in the Prague Spring, since it showed to the Soviets and others how far the reform had gone and suggested that events were out of the hands of the Dubcek leadership. For a full and thoroughly documented discussion of the manifesto and its ramifications, see H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 15. A-Revue, July 12, 1968. The article reports rumors that the Ministry demanded, unsuccessfully, that Obrana Lidu withhold certain interviews. 16. Ibid. 17. The Action Program of the KSC actually said little about military affairs, choosing to reconfirm Czechoslovak commitment to the socialist alliance. Rudi Prdvo, April 10, 1968. Therefore, attention to military affairs gravitated downward and became quite decentralized. 18. Pepich, "We Need Not Keep Anything from the People's Knowledge," p. 3. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. A-Revue, July 12, 1968. 22. Martin Dzur, "Speech at the All Army Conference of the KSC," Obrana Lidu, July 27, 1968, p. 1. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Transcript of an interview with General Prchlik on CETEKA International News Service, April 21, 1968, p. 1. 26. Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments, p. 148. 27. Interview with Martin Dzur in A-Revue, June 28, 1968. Dzur makes rather vague references to this in his "Speech at the All Army Conference of the KSC." 28. Pepich, "The Army Serves the People," p. 4. 29. Dzur, "Speech at the All Army Conference of the KSC." 30. A-Revue, June 6, 1968. 31. Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments, p. 149. 32. Milan Holub, A-Revue, July 17, 1968. 265

NOTES 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Pravda (Bratislava), May 19, 1968, p. 1. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Kaplan, "Thoughts on the Political Trials," p. 14. 40. "Personnel, Age Hump, and Other Problems," Obrana Lidu, July 27, 1968, p. 2. 41. See the discussion of the jurisdiction of the Defense Council and the Federal Assembly's Defense and Security Committee in chapter 6. 42. V. Pekarek, "Uranium: Our Source of Wealth," Svoboda, June 25, 1968. 43. "Have We an Excessively Expensive Army?" A-Revue, July 8, 1968. 44. A-Revue, July 12, 1968. 45. "Have We an Excessively Expensive Army?" 46. This was announced by Martin Dzur. Prague Domestic News Service, August 7, 1968. 47. Pravda (Bratislava), May 19, 1968, p. 1. 48. Obrana Lidu, March 21, 1968, p. 1. 49. "The Action Programme of the KSC," in Robin A. Remington, Winter in Prague (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969). 50. The Ministry's Action Program is referred to in a number of press reports. Some of the requirements for the program are put forth in Martin Dzur's "Speech at the All Army Conference of the KSC." The Ministry upheld the validity of the program until 1969 (see next section). Josef Hodi6, in "Military-Political Views," p. 21, discusses the link between the Action Program and the Gottwald Memorandum. 51. The memorandum was apparently a draft for presenting questions and issues that would be included in the Action Program of the Ministry of Defense. It was released in "How Czechoslovak State Interests in the Military Are to Be Formulated," Lidovd Armada, July 2, 1968. 52 "How Czechoslovak State Interests in the Military Are to Be Formulated." 53. Ibid. 266

NOTES 54. Ibid. There was no indication that the authors intended to propose withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, but alternatives to multilateral action were entertained. 55. "Foreign Policy Balance Sheet and Prospects, Pfedvoj, April 11, 1968. 56. "How Czechoslovak State Interests in the Military Are to Be Formulated." The authors made it clear that Czechoslovakia would have no hope of "surviving" a nuclear exchange. 57. Ibid. 58. A-Revue, August 6, 1968. Later, in the postinvasion period, the military leadership would be taken to task for failing to denounce the memorandum. See chapter 6, below. 59. Pepich, "The Army Serves the People." 60. Ibid. 61. Dzur, "Speech at the All Army Conference of the KSC. 62. Izvestiia, June 28, 1968, contains one of the many reports of Dzur's comments about the Warsaw Pact. 63. Rude Prdvo, July 1, 1968. 64. Pravda, July 12, 1968. 65. CETEKA International News Service, July 17, 1968. 66. Ludvik Svoboda, "The CSSR Is Not Going to Commit Suicide," Obrana Lidu, July 17, 1968. 67. Prague Domestic News Service, May 5, 1968. 68. Prague Domestic News Service, July 15, 1968. There were accounts of the Prchlik press conference in Obrana Lidu the next day, July 16, 1968. 69. Obrana Lidu, July 16, 1968. 70. Ibid. 71. Ibid. 72. Dzur, "Speech at the All Army Conference of the KSC. 73. Kusin, ed., The Czechoslovak Reform Movement: 1968, p. 55. 74. "Chronology of Events in the Czechoslovak Crisis" (see n. 2, above). 75. Krasnaia zvezda, April 28, 1968. 76. Pravda (Bratislava), May 11, 1968. 77. Prague Domestic News Service, May 13, 1968. 78. Ibid., May 19, 1968. 79. Krasnaia zvezda, May 15, 1968. 80. Pravda, June 1, 1968. 267

NOTES 81. Michel Tatu, "Arrivee des premieres troupes sovi6tiques qui devient participer aux 'exercises du pacte de Varsovie,' " he Monde, May 31, 1968 (cited in Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe, p. 115). 82. Tatu, "Arrivee." 83. Pravda, June 21, 1968. Other letters were published in Pravda, June 25 and 26, 1968. The appeal to the militia is curious, since it began to liberalize during the Prague Spring. See Kusin, ed., The Czechoslovak Reform Movement: 1968, p. 48. 84. Krasnaia zvezda, July 20, 1968. 85. "Whose Favor Is General V. Prchlik Currying?" Krasnaia zvezda, July 28, 1968. 86. Ibid. Attacks were launched against Obrana Lidu in the same issue. The commentator expressed horror that this renegade paper, produced by the Ministry of Defense, would be allowed to slander the socialist brotherhood. Obrana Lidu was accused of planning to establish a Radio Free Europe office in Czechoslovakia. 87. CETEKA Foreign Press Service, July 23, 1968. 88. Rud6 Pravo, August 7, 1968. 89. CETEKA International News Service, August 15, 1968. 90. Jifi Valenta argues this position in Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968. 91. Ibid., p. 109. 92. Ibid. 93. Ibid. 94. Radio East Berlin, July 30, 1968 (reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service/German Democratic Republic, August 7, 1968). 95. Krasnaia zvezda, August 14, 1968. 96. Prague Domestic News Service, August 7, 1968. 97. "Whom Red Star Helped," Prdce, July 25, 1968. Support for Prchlik was forthcoming from university groups, trade union organizations, cultural workers, and the staff of the defense journal. He was nominated to the Central Committee. Dzur has been accused of outright duplicity by Zdenek Mlynaf in Nightfrost in Prague: The End of Humane Socialism (New York: Karz, 1980), p. 148. According to Mlynaf, Dziir gave the Soviets a pretext for invasion in a private conversation with Marshal Iakubovskii. He is said to have declared the Czechoslovak forces unfit, to which Iakubovskii re268

NOTES

plied, "A friend has understood a friend." It is difficult to reconcile this with Dzur's open support for elements of the liberalization up until the autumn of 1969. Only Martin Dziir really knows whether he was acting in bad faith, of course, but one possible explanation is that Dziir made a distinction between positive aspects of the reform and those elements that allowed outright criticism of the Soviet Union. 98. In addition to Pepich's "promotion" out of the armed forces on July 17 and the extension of Kodaj's jurisdiction, Prchlik's Eighth Department was abolished. Dzur denied that this was in response to pressure from the USSR, since the Action Program called for the abolition of the department, but it was certainly timed in response to Prchlik's comments. Prdce, July 25, 1968. CHAPTER SIX. INVASION AND NORMALIZATION, AUGUST 1968

TO 1975 1. Pravda and Izvestiia, August 22, 1968, p. 1. 2. Presumably this report is based on interviews conducted with former CLA officers. Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments, p. 142. H. Gordon Skilling, however, contends in Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution that the forces were not disarmed. There is, of course, the possibility that some units were disarmed and others were not. 3. Karel Kaplan, "The Secret Prague," Panorama, July 11, 1978, p. 15. 4. Ibid. 5. The Observer, August 20, 1978, p. 1. 6. Kaplan, "The Secret Prague," p. 15. 7. Ibid. 8. Pravda, August 22, 1968, p. 1. 9. Ibid., p. 4. 10. S. Borzenko, "To the Aid of Brothers," Pravda, August 22, 1968, p. 4. 11. Pravda (Bratislava), August 23, 1968. This was first discussed by Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution. 12. Kaplan, "The Secret Prague." 13. Obrana Lidu, August 26, 1968, p. 1. 14. Martin Dziir, "Order of the Day to the Czechoslovak People's Army," Izvestiia, November 7, 1968, p. 3. 269

NOTES 15. Pravda (Bratislava), December 10, 1968, p. 2. Interview with the inspector general of the army, Col. Gen. Miroslav SmoldaS, and the press secretary for the Ministry of Defense, Lt. Col. Frantisek Kundra. 16. Lidovd Armdda, July 5, 1974. 17. Ibid. 18. The agreement on the temporary stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia was reported in Pravda and Izvestiia, October 19, 1968, and in Rude Prdvo, October 19, 1968. 19. Rud4 Prdvo, October 19, 1968. 20. Pravda, August 22, 1968; Izvestiia, August 22, 1968. 21. A particularly virulent attack is found in S. Kovalev, "On Peaceful and Nonpeaceful Counterrevolution," Pravda, September 11, 1968, p. 4. 22. "Treaty on the Temporary Stationing of Soviet Troops in Czechoslovakia," Pravda, October 19, 1968. 23. Interview with Major General Korbela in Rude Prdvo, February 11, 1969. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Interview with Major General Korbela in Smina, March 24, 1969. 27. Ibid. 28. "Rumor or Fact?" Mladd Fronta, March 19, 1968. 29. Ibid. 30. CETEKA International News Service, January 8, 1969 (reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report for Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia, January 9, 1969). 31. Press conference by Major General Korbela, January 10, 1969 (reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report for Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia, January 13, 1969). 32. A-Revue, June 1969 (No. 5), pp. 12-13. 33. Ibid. 34. "Relocation Hardships Affect Officers' Morale," Lidovd Armdda, January 20, 1969. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Press conference with Major General Korbela, January 10, 270

NOTES 1969 (reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report for Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia, January 13, 1969). 38. Ibid. 39. Krasnaia zvezda, August 11, 1969, p. 2. 40. Prague Diplomatic Information Service, March 24, 1969. 41. Col. Gen. Martin Dzur, "Our Army in 1969: We Will Continue the Implementation of the Action Program of the Czechoslovak People's Army," RuM Prdvo, January 3, 1969.

42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. This show of national unity in the face of invasion has been noted by students of the Prague Spring; see Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution. It is remarkable that this display of unity could also be observed between the party and the army. 47. Pravda (Bratislava), December 10, 1968. 48. Ibid. 49. Pravda, September 27, 1968, p. 2. 50. Obrana Lidu, November 2, 1968, p. 1. 51. Prague Domestic News Service, January 17, 1969. 52. "Ostavni zdkon obrany statu," Sbirka zdkonb, February 10, 1969. 53. Rudte Prdvo, June 12, 1969. 54. Bedfich, "The Army, the Party, and Patriotism."

55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Otakar Rytif, "We Shall Give a Marx-Leninist Answer to Our Problems," Zivot Strany, November 11, 1969. 59. "The Coup That Never Was," Radio Free Europe Background Report/Czechoslovakia, June 6, 1969 (Munich: Radio Free Europe, 1969), p. 3. 60. Rude Prdvo, January 23, 1969. 61. Ibid., April 4, 1969. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. Lidovd Armdda, May 23, 1969, p. 3. 271

NOTES 65. Jaroslav Krejcf, "We Have Had Our Cross to Bear," Tribuna, August 20, 1969, p. 2.

66. Ibid. 67. Ibid. 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid. 70. Ibid. Jiff Reindl was noted as the author of the report of the meeting, although the editorial was unsigned. Reindl eventually became commandant of the Gottwald Military-Political Academy. 71. Ibid. 72. "The So-Called Memorandum: What It Was and the Purpose It Served," Zivot Strany, November 18, 1969. Jiff Reindl was the author of the report of the meeting.

73. Ibid. 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid. 77. Ibid. 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid. 80. Ibid. 81. Radio Free Europe Background Report/Czechoslovakia, March 17, 1970 (Munich: Radio Free Europe, 1970), p. 15. 82. Czechoslovak Ministry of Justice, Penal Code of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (Prague: Ministerstvo Spravedlnosti, 1969), Section 2, Paragraph 169. 83. M. Benek, "The Party and the State Enforcement Agencies," Zivot Strany, March 9, 1969. 84. Krasnaia zvezda, October 6, 1969. 85. "A Word to Friends," Izvestiia, September 3, 1968. 86. Ibid. 87. "Dzur Interviewed at Airport," Prague Domestic Television Service (reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report for Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia, February 24, 1969). 88. Obrana Lidu, March 11, 1969. 89. Ibid. 90. "The Coup That Never Was." 91. Obrana Lidu, November 21, 1969. 92. "The Coup That Never Was." Hus&k benefited considerably from the conservatives' call for law and order after the riots. 272

NOTES 93. Obrana Lidu, November 21, 1969. 94. Rude Prdvo, September 12, 1969. 95. "The Forming of a Steadfast Builder and Defender of the Socialist Homeland," Nova Musi, May 6, 1970, p. 5. 96. Miroslav Bromsky, "The People's Army," Rude Prdvo, May 6, 1970. 97. Ibid. 98. ILivot Strany, December 10, 1970. 99. Lidovd Armada, June 1, 1971. 100. "Lessons from the Crisis Developments in the Party and Society after the Thirteenth Party Congress," Rudi Prdvo, January 14, 1971. 101. Die Welt, April 2, 1979. 102. "The Forming of a Steadfast Builder." 103. Ibid. 104. Josef Sedlar, "Education in the Hatred of the Enemy," Lidovd Armada, November 13, 1970. 105. Ibid. 106. Ibid. 107. "The Forming of a Steadfast Builder." 108. Obrana Lidu, October 6, 1970. 109. Rude Prdvo, January 8, 1971. 110. Ibid. 111. Lidovd Arm&da, January 5, 1972. 112. Lidovd Armada, January 16, 1972. 113. Prdce, September 17, 1971. 114. Lidovd Armada, April 3, 1972. 115. An example of this is "The Education of Internationalist Soldiers," Krasnaia zvezda, April 28, 1973. 116. There was, for example, a conference for "chiefs of political departments, commanders, and their staff," Rude Prdvo, April, 22, 1970. 117. Lidovd Armada, November 17, 1972. 118. Lidovd Armada, April 3, 1972. 119. "An Infusion of Workers' Blood into the Army," Prdce, July 29, 1971, p. 5. 120. "Two-Year Officer Training Schools Begin," Zivot Strany, October 4, 1971. 121. "An Infusion of Workers' Blood into the Army." 122. Lidovd Arm&da, April 3, 1972. 273

NOTES 123. "Soldiers' Views," Tribuna, July 28, 1970. 124. Ibid. 125. Lidovd Armada, June 3, 1972. 126. Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments, p. 160. 127. "The Party and the State Enforcement Agencies." 128. Ibid. 129. "The Forming of a Steadfast Builder." 130. Interview with the deputy minister of defense Jan 2izka in Zdpisnik 73, November 30, 1974. 131. A-Revue, June 10, 1969. 132. Lidovd Armada, July 24, 1972. 133. Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments, p. 161. The officer shortage was acknowledged in a signed editorial in Rude Prdvo, June 12, 1970. 134. Die Welt, April 2, 1979. 135. A-Revue, June 10, 1969. 136. Lidovd Armada, November 28, 1973. 137. Rudi Prdvo, June 12, 1970. 138. Ibid. 139. Ibid. 140. Obrana Lidu, March 23, 1974. See also Albin Pikancik and Frantisek Scu6ka, New Training Equipment in the Antonin Zdpotocky Military Academy (Prague: Nase vojsko, 1972). 141. Zdpisnik 73, November 30, 1972. 142. Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo bratskykh narodov i armii, p. 201. Substantial progress in raising the eductional level had been made by 1974, however. 143. "Military Training Programs in the Schools," VSstnik, September 16, 1969. 144. Rud6 Prdvo, November 27, 1973. 145. Obrana Lidu, October 2, 1974. 146. Defense Intelligence Agency, Area Handbook for Czechoslovakia (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 45. 147. Novd Svoboda (London), January 25, 1975. 148. Ibid. 149. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: LLSS, 1970), p. 14. 274

NOTES

150. Ibid. 151. Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments, p. 152. 152. Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, May 1970. The Joint Technical Committee was suggested by Martin Dzur in 1968. See his "Speech at the All Army Conference of the KSC. 153. Rudi Prdvo, September 6, 1972. 154. Veiernik, February 2, 1970. CHAPTER SEVEN. THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLES ARMY SINCE

1975 1. Lidovd Armada, March 13, 1973. 2. Zhilin and Gerfurt, Na vechnye vremena. 3. Rudi Prdvo, April 15, 1976. 4. Krasnaia zvezda, October 3, 1979. 5. "Basic Regulations of the CSSR's Armed Forces," Obrana Lidu, February 8, 1979. 6. Prague Domestic News Service, October 27, 1978. 7. Reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report for Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia, October 11, 1979. 8. Martin Dzur in Rudi Prdvo, April 15, 1976. Iakubovskii gives slightly higher figures for party membership: "Over 80 percent of the officer corps and 70 percent of the ensigns are members of the KSC." Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo bratskykh narodov i armii, p. 215. 9. Rudi Prdvo, April 15, 1969. 10. Hospoddfski Noviny, January 11, 1980. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Joint Publications Research Service, Eastern Europe: Military, Political, and Sociological Affairs/70953 (Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information Service, 1978), p. 29. 16. Pravda (Bratislava), May 7, 1976. 17. See the discussion of the role of the MPA in training security corps in Pravda (Bratislava), August 28, 1976. 18. See for example the article "Service in the Czechoslovak 275

NOTES People's Army Is a Most Honorable Duty," Letectvi a Kosmonautika, March 16, 1981 (Vol. 57, No. 25). 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Obrana Lidu, May 27, 1978. 22. Ibid. 23. Rude Prdvo, August 17, 1976. 24. "Service in the Czechoslovak People's Army." 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Benefits are discussed in "The Gallery of Military Schools," Letectvi a Kosmonautika, March 9, 1982 (Vol. 58, No. 9). 28. Ibid. 29. "Military Schools," Smina, November 14, 1981. 30. "Service in the Czechoslovak People's Army." 31. "The Gallery of Military Schools." 32. Zapisnik, February 4, 1980. 33. "New Defense Law Passed," Rude Prdvo, May 23, 1978. 34. Zdpisnik, February 4, 1980. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. A number of sources address the problems of coordination of doctrine. Two important works are Zhilin and Gerfurt, Na vechnye vremena, and P. I. Efimov, Boevoe bratskii souiz (Moscow: Nauka, 1974). 39. Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo bratskykh narodov i armii. 40. These are reported frequently in the Czechoslovak press. An example is the reportage on an ideological conference in Obrana Lidu, March 7, 1975. 41. Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo bratskykh narodov i armii. 42. Zhilin and Gerfurt, Na vechnye vremena, p. 303. 43. About 60 percent of each volume produced either jointly with the Soviets or by the Czechoslovaks alone is devoted to the history of Czechoslovak-Soviet cooperation during World War II. 44. Obrana Lidu, July 10, 1980. 45. Ibid. 46. Jiff HeSko, "They Are Fulfilling the Commitments They Adopted: The Soldiers Are Celebrating Their Holiday with New Successes," Rudi Prdvo, October 5, 1978. 276

NOTES

47. Rude Prdvo, February 10, 1979. 48. Prague Domestic News Service (reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report for Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia, February 6, 1979). 49. Rude Prdvo, April 18, 1982. CHAPTER EIGHT. PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE: THE IMPACT OF SOVIET POWER

1. Krejci, "We Have Had Our Cross to Bear." See chap. 6, n. 65. 2. Discussion of the Romanian case should include Alexander Alexiev's Party-Military Relations in Romania (Santa Monica: Rand, 1977), which addresses the Soviet factor; Walter Bacon, "Party-Military Relations in Romania," in Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, eds., Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978); and the useful discussion of the Romanian divergence in Christopher Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1979). 3. There are fairly extensive agreements for cooperation in aeronautical production between the two countries. See Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 3 and 10, 1983. 4. Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments, p. 20.

5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. For example, the comments of Edwina Moreton, correspondent for The Economist (May 1981 to June 1983) and a student of East European affairs, should be noted. The work of A. Ross Johnson of the Rand Corporation should be included as well; see in particular Johnson's Poland in Crisis (Santa Monica: Rand, 1982). 10. I am grateful to Robin Remington for pointing this out at a meeting at Cornell University, May 12, 1982. Reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report for Eastern Europe: Poland, December 14, 1982. 11. A useful analysis of the impact of "anationalism" on the East German armed forces is put forth in Robert Dean's chapter on the NVA in Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments. The most thorough analysis of professionalization and political control is Dale Herspring's pioneering study East German 277

NOTES Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology and Modernization. 12. The demonstration of two thousand churchmen in Dresden was remarkable. The New York Times, July 15, 1982. 13. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Two Worlds of Military Policy," in Frank Horton, Anthony C. Rogerson, and Edward L. Warner, eds., Comparative Defense Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).

278

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Pukancik, Albin, and S6ucka, Frantisek. New Training Equipment in the Antonin Zdpotocky Military Academy. Prague: Nase vojsko, 1972. Ressel, A. Po dorogam voiny. Prague: Voinezdat, 1978. Rodinov, N. N. et al. Organizatsiia Varshavskogo dogovora 1955-1975. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literaturi, 1975. Rychtarik, Karl. Socidlni sv8t armddy. Prague: Nase vojsko, 1967. Sekera, Jiff. The Economy. Prague: Orbis, 1966. Sik, Ota. Plan and Market under Socialism. Prague: Orbis, 1967. Sin, Zbynek. Prdvni historie obranni funkce statu v letech, 1945-48. Prague: Nase vojsko, 1977. Sokolovsky, V. D. Military Strategy. 3d ed. Translated by Harriet Fast Scott. New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1975. Spicka, Milan. Dejiny Ceskoslovenske lidove armddy. Prague Nase vojsko, 1978. . Ke vzniku stranicko-politickeho apardtu £SLA. Prague Nase vojsko, 1977. Spicka, Milan, and Liptak, Jan. Vqjenskd politika KSC v udobx urychlene" vystavby armddy socialistickeho typu. Prague Nase vojsko, 1980. Tulin, S. A. Rozhdenie Chekhoslovatskoi narodnoi armii. Moscow: Nauka, 1959. Voses, V. Sprdva obrany zemS. Prague: Nase vojsko, 1970. Yepishev, A. A. Nekotorie voprosi partiiu-politicheskoi raboti. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo, 1970. Zalcik, Hynek. Prdvo a obrana stdtu. Prague: Nase vojsko, 1966. Zizka, Jaroslav. Volby a ozbrojene sily CSSR (pracovnici archivni sprdvy). Prague: Nase vojsko, 1976. Principal Journal and Newspaper Articles Bedfich, Frantisek. "The Army, the Party, and Patriotism." Tvorba, October 8, 1969. 282

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. "As General Rytif Sees It." A-Revue, June 10, 1969. Bencik, M. "The Party and the State Enforcement Agencies." iivot Strany, March 9, 1969. Brabec, Jaroslav. "Neutrality: Can We Afford It?" Pfedvoj, April 16, 1968. Bromsky, Miroslav. "The People's Army." Rude Prdvo, May 6, 1970. "Cooperation with Socialist Countries." Zivot Strany, January 1, 1968. Domansky, Josef. "Ngkolik poznamek k otazce politickeho zapasu o KSC vojenskou doktrinu." Historie a Vojenstvi, March 1965. Dzur, Martin. "Speech at the All Army Conference of the KSC." Obrana Lidu, July 27, 1968. . "What about You, Comrade Minister?" A-Revue, June 28, 1968. "The Education of Internationalist Soldiers." Krasnaia zvezda, April 28, 1973. "The Forming of a Steadfast Builder and Defender of the Socialist Homeland." Nova Mysl, May 6, 1970. Grechko, S. S. "The Patriotic and International Duty of the USSR Armed Forces." Krasnaia zvezda, October 6, 1961. "Have We an Excessively Expensive Army?" A-Revue, July 8, 1968. Hrabe, J. "Critique of One Bourgeois Military-Sociological Construction." Sociologicky casopis, March 1977. "An Infusion of Workers' Blood into the Army." Prdce, July 29, 1971. Kaplan, Karel. "Thoughts on the Political Trials." Nova Mysl, July 6, 1968. Kolder, Jan. "Nationality Problems in the CLA." A-Revue, July 12, 1968. Kopecky, Ladislav. "Unity in Military Alliance." Mezindrodni Politika, September 1967. Krejci, Jaroslav. "We Have Had Our Cross to Bear." Tribuna, August 20, 1969. "Lessons from the Crisis Developments in the Party and So283

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ciety after the Thirteenth Party Congress." Rude Prdvo, January 14, 1971. Liptak, Jan. "KSC a osvetovy aparat v CSLA v letech 194558." Historie a Vojenstvi, November 1975. Lomsky, Bohumir. "The Twentieth Anniversary of the Czechoslovak National Army." Voennaia Mysl', October 1964. "Military Training Programs in the Schools." Vestnik, September 16, 1969. Monin, M. E. "Internatsionalizm v destvi." Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, August 1967. Navratil, Jaromir. "K otazce boje o politicky character armady v pfedunorovem." Historie a Vojenstvi, May 1958. Pepich, Egyd. "The Army Serves the People." Pravda (Bratislava), March 3, 1968. . "We Need Not Keep Anything from the People's Knowledge." Obrana Lidu, February 24, 1968. "Personnel, Age Hump, and Other Problems." Obrana Lidu, July 27, 1968. "Relocation Hardships Affect Officers' Morale." Lidovd Armdda, January 20, 1969. Rotter, K. "The Development of Socialism in the CSSR under the Conditions of the Coexistence of Socialism and Imperialism." O economica, October 4, 1971. Rytif, Otakar. "We Shall Give a Marx-Leninist Answer to Our Problems." iivot Strany, November 11, 1969. Sedlar, Josef. "Education in the Hatred of the Enemy." Lidovd Armada, November 13, 1970. Sin, ZbynSk. "Pravni historie obranne funkce (statu v letech 1945-45)." Historie a Vojenstvi, January 1975. "The So-Called Memorandum: What It Was and the Purpose It Served." iivot Strany, November 18, 1969. Spicka, Milan. "Dej'iny Ceskoslovenske Lidova Armady." Historie a Vojenstvi, July 1975. Spicka, Milan, and Liptak, Jan. "Vojenska politika KSC v lidobi urychlene" vystabvy armady socialistick^ho typu." Ceskoslovensky dasopis, May 1977. 284

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"The Strange Words of General Kodaj." A-Revue, July 8, 1968. Svoboda, Ludvik. "Z Buzuluku do Prahy." Mladd Fronta, June 30, 1960. "Two-Year Officer Training Schools Begin." iivot Strany, October 4, 1971. "Whom Red Star Helped." Prdce, July 25, 1968. "Whose Favor Is General V. Prchlik Currying?" Krasnaia zvezda, July 28, 1968. "A Word to Friends." Izvestiia, September 3, 1868.

Newspapers and Journals: Czechoslovak A-Revue (Prague—Publication of the military political academies) Ceskoslovensky Vojdk (Prague—"Czechoslovak Soldier"— Monthly journal pictorial of the Czechoslovak armed forces) Lidovd Armdda (Prague—"People's Army"—Theoretical journal of the Czechoslovak armed forces) Obrana Lidu (Prague—"Defense of the People"—Daily of the Ministry of Defense of Czechoslovakia) Pravda (Bratislava—"Truth"—Daily of the Slovak Communist party) Rude Prdvo (Prague—"Red Right"—Daily of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia) Vedernik ("Evening Paper"—Weekly of the Czechoslovak government)

Newspapers and Journals: Soviet Union Izvestiia (Moscow—"News"—Daily of the Council of Ministers of the USSR) Kommunist vooruzhnykh siV (Moscow—"Communist Armed Forces") Krasnaia zvezda (Moscow—"Red Star"—Daily of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR) 285

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Pravda (Moscow—"Truth"—Daily of the Communist party oi the USSR) Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Moscow—"Military-Historical Journal") Voennaia Mysl' (Moscow—"Military Thought"—Theoretical journal of the Soviet armed forces) Newspapers and Journals: Other East European Countries Scinteia (Romania) Sprawy Miedzynarodowe (Poland) News Services TASS (USSR) Prague Domestic News Service (Czechoslovakia) CETEKA International News Service (Czechoslovakia) CETEKA Foreign Press Service (Czechoslovakia) Agerpres (Romania) Translation Services Radio Free Europe/Czechoslovak Press Survey/Munich Foreign Broadcast Information Service/Springfield, Virginia Joint Publications Research Service/Washington, D.C. Current Digest of the Soviet Press/New York

AMERICAN AND WEST EUROPEAN SOURCES

Books Adelman, Jonathan. The Revolutionary Armies. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. Bautz, Rudolph. National Security in Czechoslovakia. Washington, D . C : National Committee for a Free Europe, 1953. 286

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Benes, Edvard. Memoirs: From Munich to the New War and New Victory. London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1928. Bromke, Adam. Eastern Europe in a Depolarized World. New York: Baxter, 1965. Brown, J. F. Relations between the Soviet Union and Its Eastern European Allies. Santa Monica: Rand, 1975. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Political Controls in the Soviet Army. New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1954. . The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Campbell, Robert W. The Soviet-Type Economies. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973. Colton, Timothy. Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979. Czerwinski, Edward. The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia. New York: Praeger, 1972. Deane, Michael. Political Control of the Soviet Armed Forces. New York: Crane, Rusak and Co., 1977. Erickson, John. The Soviet High Command. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962. Ermarth, Fritz. Internationalism, Security, and Legitimacy: The Challenge to Soviet Interests in East Europe: 1964— 1969. Santa Monica: 1969. Finer, Samuel Edward. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. New York: Praeger, 1962. Frank, Andre Gunder, and Johnson, Dale L. Dependence and Underdevelopment in Latin America's Political Economy. Garden City, N.Y.: Cockcroft, 1972. Golan, Golia. The Czechoslovak Reform Movement: Communism in Crisis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. . Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubcek Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Gosztony, Peter, ed. Paramilitarische Organisationen in Sowjetblock. Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Hohwact Verlag, 1977. Herspring, Dale. East German Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology and Modernization. New York: Praeger, 1973. 287

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Holsti, Ole; Hopmann, Terrence; and Sullivan, John D. Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973. Huntington, Samuel B. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. . The Soldier and the State. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. Jain, J. P. Documentary Study of the Warsaw Pact. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1973. Jancar, Barbara Wolfe. Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power: A Study of Political Communist Systems. New York: Praeger, 1974. Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1960. . The Military in Political Development and New Nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. Johnson, A. Ross; Dean, Robert W.; and Alexiev, Alexander. East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pad Northern Tier. Santa Monica: Rand, 1980. Johnson, Chalmers. Change in Communist Systems. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Jones, Christopher. Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe. New York: Praeger, 1979. Kalwitter, Karol. Army of Revenge: Ulbricht's Occupation Forces in Czechoslovakia. Cologne: Markus Verlag, 1968. Kaser, Michael. COMECON: Integration Problems of the Planned Economy. London: Oxford University Press, 1965. Keegan, John. Who's Who in Military History. London: Morrow, 1976. Kelleher, Catherine M. Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives. Beverly Hills: Sage Research Publications, 1974. Kolkowicz, Roman. The Soviet Military and the Communist Party. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. Korbel, Josef. The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938-1948: The Failure of Coexistence. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. 288

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. Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia: The Meaning of Its History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. Kuhn, Hendrich, and Boss, Otto. Biographisches Handbuch Der Tschechoslowakei. Munich: Verlag Robert Lerche, 1961. Kusin, V. V., ed. The Czechoslovak Reform Movement: 1968. London: International Research Documents, 1973. Letterich, Josef. A History of Modern Slovakia. New York: Praeger, 1955. Mackenzie, Compton. Dr. Benes. London: George C. Harrap and Co., 1946. Mackintosh, Malcolm. The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact. London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969. Mayer, Milton Sanford. The Art of the Impossible: A Study of the Czech Resistance. Santa Barbara: Center for Democratic Institutions, 1969. Meissner, Boris. The Brezhnev Doctrine. Kansas City: Park College Government Research Bureau, 1970. Mlynaf, Zdenek. Nightfrost in Prague: The End of Humane Socialism. New York: Karz, 1980. Nagel, Jack H. The Descriptive Analysis of Power. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975. Pelikan, Jifi. The Czechoslovak Political Trials. Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1970. Remington, Robin A. The Changing Soviet Perception of the Warsaw Pact. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967. . Winter in Prague. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969. Schelling, Thomas A. Arms and Influence. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Schmidt, Steffen W.; Gausti, Laura; Lande, Carl H.; and Scott, James C. Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. Skilling, H. Gordon. Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Sprout, Harold, and Sprout, Margaret. Man-Milieu Relationship Hypothesis in the Context of International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956. 289

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Svitak, Ivan. The Czechoslovak Experiment: 1968-1969. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. Szent-Miklosky, Istavan. Political Trends in the Hungarian Army. Santa Monica: Rand, 1957. Valenta, Jiff. Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. Wolfe, Thomas. Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-1970. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970.

Principal Journal and Newspaper Articles Beck, Carl, and Rawling, Karen. "The Military as a Channel of Entry into Positions of Leadership in Communist Party Systems." Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1977. Dean, Robert W. "The Political Consolidation of the Czechoslovak Army." In Radio Free Europe Background Research. Munich: Radio Free Europe, 1976. Galtung, Johan. "A Structural Theory of Imperialism." African Review, April 1972. Herspring, Dale. "Civil-Military Relations in Poland." In Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, eds., Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978. Herspring, Dale, and Volgyes, Ivan. "The Military as an Agent of Political Socialization in Eastern Europe: A Comparative Framework." Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1977. . "Political Reliability in the East European Warsaw Pact Armies." Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1980. Hodic, Josef. "Military-Political Views Prevalent in the Czechoslovak Army: 1948-1968." In Zdenek Mlynaf, ed., The Experience of the Prague Spring. Vienna: Karz, 1979. . "The Warsaw Pact: Military Exercises and Military Interventions." Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1968. Lall, Sanjaya. "Is 'Dependence' a Useful Concept in Analyz290

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ing Underdevelopment?" World Development, Vol. 3, No. 11 (1975). "Recent Studies on Czechoslovak Arms and Armament Works." East Central Europe, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1977). Skilling, H. Gordon. "The Formation of a Communist Party in Czechoslovakia." American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 (1955). Smororzewski, K. M. "Soviet Satellite Armies in Europe." Fortnightly, September 1951. Documents of the United States Government Files of the United States Department of State from Prague Embassy—DS860. OOF (DIP Branch)/Czechoslovakia Files of the United States Department of State from Political Adviser for Germany—860F. 105/Czechoslovakia, USSR Files of the United States Department of State from the Joint Intelligence Committee—860F. 113/Czechoslovakia Files of United States Department of State from the Strategic Services Unit—860F.241/Czechoslovakia Files of Joint Chiefs of Staff (Modern Military Branch) 554/ 091.31/USSR Publications of the United States Government Central Intelligence Agency. Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973. . Directory of Officials of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. Defense Intelligence Agency. Area Handbook for Czechoslovakia. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.

291

INDEX

Action Program, 133, 265 n 17, 260 nn 50, 51, and Eighth Department, 269 n 98, and national military doctrine, 133, 146, 176, during normalization, 161, 167168, 176, 177 advisers, Soviet, 38, 78, 90 Afghanistan, 242 age hump, in CLA, 129, 207 air force, British, 40, 59, Czechoslovak, 39, 40, 42, 59-60, 78, 188, 207 Air Force College, 206-207 alliance relationship, 13, 16, 19-20, 136-139 See also COMECON, Warsaw Pact aluminum imports, 80, 81 "Always Prepared," 203-204 anti-Semitism, 64 Arab-Israeli conflict, 99 A-Revue, 113, 117, 146 armament industries, 49-52, 65, 8182, 83-84, 96, 104 arms, nuclear, see nuclear weapons/ strategy bargaining power, Soviet-East European, 15-16 Bedfich, FrantiSek, and invasion, 158-159, and liberalization, 145, 154, 161, 172-173, 174, and normalization, 161, 172-173, 174, 179, 180, 181 BeneS, Edvard, 32-33, 39, 43, 48, 141, 162, and February 1948 "Revolution," 4, 54-59 passim, 252 n 50, and Russian revolu-

tion, 44, 45, in World War II, 4, 32-33, 36, 40, 42 Bena, Lavrenti Pavlovich, 70, 85 Bocek, Bohumir, 43, 58-59 Bohemia, 41, 127 Bolsheviks, 45-47 Bonapartism, 115, 230 border guards, 79, 202 bourgeois nationalism, 63, 64 bourgeois officer corps, 41-42 Brabec, Antonin, 184, 198, 211 Brezhnev, L I , 136 brigade activity, 106, 199-201 British, see Great Britain budget, see spending, military Bulgaria, 31, 32, 38, 101, 150 case study approach, 26-28 Central Committee, KSC, 62, 75, 76, 111-112, 117, 268 n 97 See also Eighth Department, Main Political Administration Central Group of Soviet Forces (CGSF), 193-194, 209, 211-216, 242 Cepi6ka, Alexej, 65-75 passim, 79, 89, 114-115, 257 n 37, 260 n 5 Cepicky, Josef, 131 Chernenko, K V , 241 China, 242 Cierna conference, 152 class, 62 See also working class class analysis, Gottwald Academy memorandum and, 135-136, 176, 177 clientage, 13-20 passim, 109-110, 147, 228-231, 245, 249 n 8, hb293

INDEX clientage (cont) eralization and, 30, 143-144, 153154, 155, 156, since 1975, 216217, Romanian, 233 Club of Committed Nonparty Persons, 126 coercive instruments, domestic party, 10, 25, 220, 221, of Soviet power, 13, 14, 16, 23, 25, 29, 192-196, 221, 223, 231 colleges, military, 205-207 Colton, Timothy, 26 combined-arms operations, 96-97, 261 n 26 COMECON, 16, 18, 86, 94,

194,

Committee on Defense and Security Affairs (National Assembly), 122-123, 129, 171, 182 Communist parties, East European, 7-28, 218-245, Bulgarian, 31, Hungarian, 31, 87, 88, Polish, 6, 31, 87, 88, 235, 236, 237-238, Romanian, 31, 231, 232, Yugoslav, 63 See also KSC (Communist party of Czechoslovakia), under Soviet Union concentration camps, 62, 68, 70, 257 n 37 congresses, Party, 62, 104-105, 133, 167-168, 181-182 conscription, military, 62, 78 conservatives, 30, 109-122 passim, 127, 146-147, 160, 171-182, 272 n 92 See also radical right consolidation, of CLA, 30, 161, 182-193, 196, 197 conspiratorial centers, purges of, 63, 67-69 control, KSC, 4, 106-109, 122-127, 132, 146, 155, 172, 182, 197, 202, Romanian Communist party, 232, Soviet, 21, 208-217, 249 n 12 conventional capability, 94-95, 9697 294

copper imports, 80, 81 "cottage," 68, 70, 89, 257 n 37 Council of Defense, Czechoslovak, 129, 149, 170-171, 182 Council of Defense Ministers, Warsaw Pact, 194 counterrevolution, Czechoslovak, 152, 163, 167, 173, 174, 178, Hungarian, 88, Polish, 239 coup plans, 1948-1949, 22, 60-62, 1968, 112-115, 120, 1969, 180181 coup situations, Poland and, 236 crisis of 1948 (Czechoslovak), see "Revolution" of February 1948 crisis of 1968 (Czechoslovak), 3-5, 28, 29-30, 109, 111, 219, 227228, and KSC control, 4, 108, 109, 122, 182, Obranu Ltdu readership during, 117, officer corps and, 129, 195, and Polish crisis, compared, 238-239, 241, and rehabilitation, 108, and Warsaw Pact, 101, 228 See also liberalization, military crisis of 1981 (Polish), 6, 235-241 passim Cuban missile crisis, 96, 99 cult of personality, 86, 88-89, 114 culture, Czechoslovak, 4-5, 105106, in East Europe, 14, Soviet, 22, 29, 76-79, 90, 92, 234 Czech partisans, for officer corps, 40-41 Defense and Security Affairs Committee, National Assembly, 122123, 129, 171, 182 Defense and Security Committee, KSC, 64, 76 See also Eighth Department Defense Brigade, Czechoslovak, 3940 Defense Council, Czechoslovak, 129, 149, 170-171, 182

INDEX defense spending, see spending, military democracy, 27, 28, 38, 172-173, 227 dependence, 16-17, 81, 219 discrimination, against Slovaks, 127128 Drgac, Serge, 66, 69 Drnec, Karel, 65, 66, 69 Dubcek, Alexander, 112, 122, 158, 179, 256 n 15, and 1968 crisis/ liberalization, 3-5, 113, 116, 132, 143, 146, 155, 265 n 14 Dukla Pass battle, 34-35, 37 Dvorak, Vaclav, 169-170, 179-180 Dziir, Martin, 74, 108, 116, 199, on brigade activity, 200, 201, and invasion, 157, 158-159, 161, 268269 n 97, and liberalization, 113, 121-127 passim, 138-154 passim, 167-169, 172, 174, 269 n 97, during normalization, 162, 167169, 172, 174, 178, 179, 180, 184-185, 190-191 Eastern Europe, 7-30, 133, 218245 See also Communist parties, East European, Militaries, East European, Warsaw Pact Eastern Military District, Czechoslovak, 154, 157, 161 East Germany (GDR), 99-100, 191, 192, 204, 241-242, and Czechoslovak consolidation, 193, and Czechoslovak liberalization, 136, 150, 152, nuclear weapons in, 93, 100 economy, Czechoslovak, 37, 79-82, 83, 88, 104, 129-131, 199-201, 217 See also industries, spending, military Hungarian, 249 n 13, Khrushchev and, 83, 260 n 15, Polish, 86, West German, 99 education, military, 79 See also training

educational level, of officer corps, 72-73, 108, 189-190, 196, 208 Egypt, 83-84 Eighth Department (of KSC Central Committee), 118, 119, 122, 151, 171, 177, 269 n 98 embargo (1950), 80 equality issue, Warsaw Pact, 138139, 141-142, 150, 153-154, 194 equalization, Soviet-East European military relations, 91, 93 expenditures, see spending, military expert qualities (professionahzation), 6, 11-12, 244, 1948-1956, 29, 73-74, 82, 1956-1967, 103, 105-106, 108, during 1968 liberalization, 155, 1968-1975, 182, 183, since 1975, 202-208 exploitation, 13, 14, 15 exports, 80 fabricated cases, for purges, 60 Fascism, 38 First Army Corps, Czechoslovak, 35-42 passim, 56, 59, 62 flexible response, 98 France, 40, 44-45, 80, 232 GDR, see East Germany General Staff, 76, 253 n 62, 19481956 purges of, 58-59, 65-67, 7374, 1968 liberalization and, 116, 118, 121-122, 127, 154, 177 geographical position, of Czechoslovakia, 27-28 Germany, in World War I, 45, m World War II, 4, 31-40 passim, 80, 81, 178-179 See also East Germany, West Germany Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 86-87, 234 Gottwald, Klement, 43, 89, 141, death of, 70, 88, and 1948 crisis, 55, 252 n 50, and purges, 63, 65, 69, 107, 257 n 42, and training programs, 37, 42 295

INDEX Gottwald Military-Political Academy, 99, 153, 177-178, 207, 211, 272 n 70, memorandum of, 133138, 144, 169, 176, 177-178 Great Britain, 40, 45, 51-52, 59, 257 n 26 See also London group Grechko, A A , 110, 148, 151, 179, 180 Ground Forces Command, 95, 101, 148 hatred of the enemy, education in, 184 heavy industry, 80-81, 83 High Command, 65-67, 73-74 See also General Staff high schools, 190, 203-205 HIS (Mam Information Administration), 68 history, Czechoslovak precommunist, 27, 31-54, 110, East European differences in, 14 Hodid, Josef, 99, 100, 262 n 43 Hoflman, Heinz, 100, 152 Horacek, Vaclav, 181, 182, 184, 185, 186, 197 Hruska, Genek, 61, 74, 256 n 15 HruSka, Josef, 60, 61 human rights protest (Charter of 77), 202 Hungary, 31, 62-64, 67, 85-89 passim, 101, Czechoslovak invasion of 1919 by, 46, economy of, 249 n 13, Soviet invasion of, 24, 87, 88, 160, in World War II, 32, 38 Huntington, Samuel, 243 Husak, Gustav, 179, 181, 195, 199, 272 n 92 Iakubovskn, I I , 146, 147-148, 151, 179, 210, 268-269 n 97, 275 n 8 "ice hockey" riots, 161, 173-174, 177, 180 296

imperialism, 13-14, 20, 87, Stalinist, 23, 24, 86, 93-94, 219, 222 imports, 80-81 incentives, for officer recruitment, 73, 105, 189 Indochina, 99, 103, 242 industries, 49-52, 65, 80-82, 83-84, 96, 104, 129-130 inequality, see equality issue, Warsaw Pact Ingr, Sergei, 43, 44 institutional level, of Soviet power, 18-24 "internal" function, CLA, 174, 264 n 12 International Brigade, 62 invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968), 3, 4-5, 28, 30, 101, 157-178 passim, 271 n 46, clientage and, 228, Dzur and, 157, 158-159, 161, 268-269 n 97, officer corps shortage and, 196 invasions, Soviet, of Hungary, 24, 87, 88, 160, of Poland (threatened), 233-234, 239 See also invasion of Czechoslovakia, "Revolution" of February 1948 iron ore imports, 80, 81 iron triangle, 136 Israel, 64-65, 99 Italy, 44 Izvesttta, 162-163

Janko, Vladimir, 112, 115, 116, 121, 264 nn 1, 11 Janousek, Karel, 40, 43, 59 Japan, 243 Jamzelski, Wojciech, 235-236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241 Joint Command, Warsaw Pact, 93 Joint Secretariat, Warsaw Pact, 93 Joint Technical Committee, Warsaw Pact, 194-195

INDEX Kaplan, Karel, 157-158 Katyn Forest massacre, 31, 39 KGB, 70, 85, 159 Khrushchev, N S , 29, 85-86, 90, 222, 234, and economics, 83, 260 n 15, and national authority, 2324, 25, and nuclear weapons/ strategy, 94-95, 96, 97, 98, 262 n 43 Khvorninov, Nikolai, 81 Klapek, Karel, 43-44 Kodaj, Samuel, 117, 154-161 passim, 178, 269 n 98 Konev, I S , 148, 178-179 Kopecky, Ladislav, 101-103 Kopold, Bedhch, 68, 69 Korbela, Martin, 164-165, 166-167, 178, 186 KoSice Accord, 33-50 passim Krasnaia zvezda, 150, 178 Kratochvil, Vaclav, 36, 73, 74 Krejcf, Jaroslav, 175 Krupp Armament Work, 81, 178 KSC (Communist party of Czechoslovakia), 22, 29, 31-57, 244-245, 1948-1956, 58-73 passim, 81, 8283, 256 nn 18, 23, 257 n 42, 1956-1967, 88-89, 104-105, 106109, 110, in 1968 cnsis/liberalization, 3, 28, 29, 108-127 passim, 132, 137, 138, 142, 144, 146, 150, 155, 171, 172-173, 177, 224, 227, 228, 238, 265 n 17, 271 n 46,1968-1975, 171, 172-173, 177, 181-188, since 1975, 197-202, 209, 217, 275 n 8 See also Central Committee, KSC, red qualities Kuhkov, V G , 237 KultvaSr, Karel, 60, 61, 62, 128, 255-256 n 13 Kundra, Frantisek, 128, 180 labor camps, 62, 68, 70, 257 n 37

Lastovicka, Bohuslav, 65, 73, 75 laws, for military, conscription, 78, pohticization, 47-48, 198-199, purge, 62, retirement, 207 leadership, CLA, 9, 76-78 See also Ministry of Defense, officer corps Legion, Czechoslovak, 44-46, 66, 131 Lend-Lease, 51-52, 254 n 68 Lenin, V I , 46, 182 Lenin Military-Political Academy, 211 Lenin works, 81-82 liberalization, military, 29-30, 107156, 217, 224-228, 271 n 46, Dzur and, 113, 121-127 passim, 138-154 passim, 167-169, 172, 174, 269 n 97, militia and, 149, 268 n 83, normalization period and, 160-161, 162, 167-169, 172176, "Two-Thousand Words Manifesto" and, 117, 265 n 14 liberation, Czechoslovak, 34-35, 37, 39, 252 n 35 Ltdovd Armada, 146, 188-189 Ltdovd Demokracte, 113 limited war, 97-98, 102 Liska, Alois, 43, 58 Lomsky, Bohumfr, 89, 101, 106, and liberalization, 114, 116, 122, 127, 138, 146, 264 n 10 London group (Czechoslovak military), 36, 39, 40, 43, 58-59, 251 n 31 See also Westerners loyalty, 19, 26, 182-188, 229-231, 244-245, 256 n 23 See also red qualities machinery exports, 80 Main Department of Enlightenment and Education, 47 Main Information Administration (HIS), 68 Main Political Administration 297

INDEX Main Political Administration (cont) (MPA), 37, 47, 73-76 passim, 92, 202, 224, and liberalization, 108109, 116-127 passim, 146-154 passim, 172, 176-177, 197, during normalization and consolidation, 161, 176-177, 179, 182, 184-185, 186, 197, 198 Malenkov, G M , 70, 83, 85-86 Mamula, Miroslav, 112, 114, 116, 118, 146 martial law, in Poland, 236-237, 240, 241 Masaryk, Jan, 45-46 May Day parades, 110, 131 Militaries, East European, 7-28, 31, 90-91, 218-245, 249 n 12, Bulgarian, 32, East German (National Volksarmee), 242, Hungarian, 32, 67, Polish, 6, 19, 31-32, 67, 217, 234-238, 239-241, Romanian, 32, 231-232, Warsaw Pact, 193-194, 209, 211-216, 242 See also invasion of Czechoslovakia See also Soviet military military assistance, to Third World, 84 Military Council, Czechoslovak, 151, 174, Warsaw Pact, 194 Military Industrial Committee, COMECON, 194

military institutions, Czechoslovak, 9, 76-79 military press, Czechoslovak, 110, 188-189, 201-202, 206-207, and liberalization, 113, 117, 118, 123, 125, 127, 131, 140, 146-147, 153 See also Obrana Ltdu military science and doctrine, 209210 Military Strategy, 132-133 militia, 11, 53, 247 n 2, m 1948 crisis, 53, 55, 1948-1956, 68, 79, in 1968 crisis, 149, 268 n 83, 1968-1975, 191, since 1975, 202 298

Ministry of Defense, budget of, see spending, military, and 1949 purge, 60, 61, 1950 organization of, 76, and 1968 crisis, 108, 117138 passim, 149, 151, 153, 266 nn 50, 51, 268 n 86, and 19681975 normalization, 161, 167-168, 169-170, 174, 177, 182 See also General Staff, Main Political Administration Ministry of the Interior, 53, 55, 61, 68, 191, 207 Mlynaf, Zdenek, 268-269 n 97 Moderates, 156, 170, 173-174, 178179 "moral-political unity," of CLA, 168, 197-202, 208-209, 216 Moravia, 41 Moscow-trained officers (1940s), 42, 59, 62 MPA, see Main Political Administration multilateral level, of Soviet power, 18, 24, 93-94 See also alliance relationship Nagy, Imre, 87 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 83 National/Federal Assembly, Czechoslovak, 64, 78, 122-123, 170, 171, 182 national integration, 24, 25, 219, 235, 242 nationalism, East European, 19, 64, Czechoslovak, 173, 175, Hungarian, 63, Polish, 19, 233-235, 238 nationality issues, see Slovaks nationalization, 87, 110 See also renationalization national level, of Soviet power, 1819, 20, 23-24 national military doctrine, 133-138, 146, 169, 176, 195, 209 National Socialists, Czechoslovak, 54,55

INDEX national solutions to national problems, 14, 24, 87, 125, 227, 234 national unity, 271 n 46 nationhood, GDR, 242 NATO, 92-93, 96, 103, 135, 136, 167 Neumann, Bedrich, 44 neutralism, Hungarian, 87 neutrality, Czechoslovak military, 131, 138, 161, 182, 183 New York Times, 113 normalization, post invasion, 30, 160-199 passim, 209 normative instruments, domestic party, 10, 25, 221, of Soviet power, 23, 25, 221, 223 Novotny, Antom'n, 88-89, 103, 106107, 110, 146, rehabilitation commissions and, 70, 88, 106-107, 256 n 15, and Sejna, 109, 112, 116, 121, and Soviet troop stationing, 101, 141 nuclear weapons/strategy, 93-102 passim, 137, 260 n 16, 261 n 34, 262 n 43, 267 n 56

Ohrana Lidu, 117, 140, 169, 265 n 15, 268 n 86 OBZ (Obranne Bezpecnostni Zpravodajsvi), 53-54 officer corps, 11-12, 227, 242, 19451948, 38-48, in 1948 revolution, 56, 58-60, 1948-1956, 58-76, 82, 1956-1967, 105-106, 108, 1968 liberalization and, 129, 195, 19681975, 182-183, 188-190, 192, 195196, since 1975, 203-206, 208, 217, 275 n 8, Polish, 31-32, 3839, Romanian, 232 See also training Officers School of the New Generation, 72 oil imports, 80, 81 "On Friendship and Cooperation

between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States," 87 Organization, CLA, 76-79, Warsaw Pact, 93, 194-195 overt presence, Soviet, 22, 149, 192-196, 231 pacifism, 105-106, 110 parades, May Day, 110, 131 Party Collective of Communists, 118-121, 122 passivity, Czechoslovak, 4-5 patron-client relationship, 13, 1416, 19-20, 143, 231 See also clientage peaceful coexistence, 134 pensions, officer, 129 People's Militia, 53, 55 See also militia Pepich, Egyd, 108, 116, 124, 125, 146, 177, 264 n 2, and "internal" function, 264 n 12, "promotion" of, 149-150, 154, 269 n 98, and Sejna activities, 112-113, 118120, 121, and Warsaw Pact, 138139, 142 Permanent Committee for Recommendations of Foreign Political Questions, Warsaw Pact, 93 personal networks, of Soviet power, 18-19 personnel authonty, military, 123, 124, 149 persuasion and dissuasion, 19, 229230 Pfka, Hehdor, 58, 60, 169 Poland, 6, 24, 62-63, 78, 85-88 passim, 192, 217, 233-241, anti-Semltism in, 64, and Catholic Church, 249 n 13, and Czechoslovak military consolidation, 193, and Czechoslovak military liberalization, 150, 152, nationalism m, 19, 233-235, 238, nuclear weapons in, 93, 100, officer corps in, 299

INDEX Poland (cont) 31-32, 38-39, renationalization in, 67, 90, Rokossovsky recall from, 89, 234, Svoboda in, 43, Warsaw Pact and, 93, 101, 136, 234, during World War II, 33, 38-39 police, 52-57, 68, 70, 75, 89, 202 See also secret police Political Consultative Committee, Warsaw Pact, 93, 95 political education, 1944-1948, 37, 47-48, 1948-1956, 74-75, 76, 1956-1967, 106, 120, 1968-1975, 183-188, since 1975, 199, 202, 209, 211 political leadership, see Communist parties, East European political solutions, 4-5, 57, 160 political trials, see purges pohticization, see red qualities population, Czechoslovak military, 37,49, 78-79,188-196 passim, 202 power relationship, Soviet-East Europe, 12-26, 192-196, 208-217, 218-245, 249 n 12 Prague Spring, 29-30, 217, 265 n 14, 268 n 83, 271 n 46 See also crisis of 1968 Pravda, 139, 148, 149, 159, 162163, 169 Prchh'k, Vaclav, 103-125 passim, 172, 197, CLA elite reaction to, 150-151, 153, 156, 228, condemnation and punishment of, 175176, 177, human rights protest signed by, 201-202, Soviet reaction to, 143-144, 145, 149, 150, 269 n 98, on Soviet troop presence, 139-140, 162, support for, 153, 156, 268 n 97, on Warsaw Pact, 138, 141-142, 143-144, 153154, 228 premihtary training, 190, 203-204, 208

300

press, Czechoslovak, 139-140, 151, 163-164, 165-166 See also military press, Czechoslovak, Rude Prdvo Western, 150 See also Soviet press Prochazka, Jaroslav, 53-54, 65, 67, 73, and political education, 37, 47, 48, 75 professionalization, see expert qualities purges, 1948-1956, 58-60, 62-74, 87-88, 89, 107, 1968-1975, 121, 122, 172, 175-178, 181, 182-183, 188, 209, 257 n 42 radical right, 158-159, 161, 170, 172-175, 180-181 Rajk, Laszlo, 63, 85 Rakosi, Matyas, 63, 85 raw material imports, 80-81 reciprocity, patron-client, 15 recruitment, officer, 42, 71-73, 105, 189-190, 203-206, 208 Red Army, see Soviet military red qualities (pohticization), 6, 1112, 244, 1945-1948, 47-48,19481956, 29, 76, 82, in 1968 liberalization period, 155, 1968-1975, 183-187, since 1975, 197-202, 206, 207-208 See also political education rehabilitation, 68, 70, 74, 88, 106107, 128, 169 Reicin, Bedhch, 53-54, 60, 65, 68, 257 n 37, purge of, 69, 73, 78 Reindl, Jiff, 113, 207, 208, 272 n 70 relations between Soviet and CLA forces (1968), 165-166 relocations, CLA postinvasion, 166 renationalization, 67, 90-92, 127, 219, 222 reserves, military, 60, 79 resistance, "antisocialist," 63, to So-

INDEX viet power, 4, 60, 67, 160, 161, 178, 228-229, 241 resistance fighters, in 1945 officer corps, 40-41 retirement, officer, 129, 207 Reuters, 150 revolution, Russian, 44-47 "Revolution" of February 1948 (Czechoslovak), 4, 22, 28-29, 5456, 252 n 50, 256 n 18, militia, 53, 55, purges after, 58-60, rehabilitation commissions and, 128 "Rightists," 86, 88, 109 Ripka, Hubert, 52 Rokossovsky, Konstantin, 89, 234 Romania, 24, 31, 64, 101, 231-233, and Warsaw Pact, 195, 230, 231, 232, 233, in World War II, 32, 38 Royal Air Force (RAF), British, 40, 59 Rude Prdvo, 55, 75, 139, 149, 167, 198 Rusov, Karel, 116, 121, 158-159, 179, 180 Russian revolution, 44-47 Rytif, Otakar, 116, 145, 147, 154, during normalization, 167, 173, 178, 180, purge of, 181, and Sejna collective, 121, on SVAZARM,

190

Schmidt, Helmut, 99 schools, military, 42, 72, 189, 204207 See also training secret police (StB), 53, 79, 159 See also KGB "secret speech," condemning Stalin, 86, 89 security forces, 55, 64, 68, 75, 82 See also police Sejna, Jan, 109, 112-122 passim, 144, 146, 217, 264 n 11

shortages, of CLA personnel, 188190, 196 Shtemenko, S M , 151, 152 Sik, Ota, 104 Skilhng, H Gordon, 269 n 2 Skoda, 81-82 Slansky, Rudolf, 62-74 passim, 107, 257-258 n 42 Sling, Otto, 67-68 Slovakia, 38, 41, 42, 68, Hunganans in, 46, resistance to Soviets in, 60, 161, Soviet troops in, 37, uprising in, 35, 41 Slovak National Council, 35, 154 Slovaks, 38, 40-41, 122, 169, discrimination against, 127-128, 1944 upnsing of, 35, 41, purges of, 65, 68, 106, and rehabilitation, 107-108 Smoldas, Miroslav, 116, 166, 169 SNB, 55, 75 Sokolovsky, V D , 96-98, 132-133, 261 nn 26, 34 Solidarity Congress, Polish, 239 sovereignty, Czechoslovak, 139-143 passim, 151, 154 Sovietization, 22, 29, 76-79, 90, 92, 234 Soviet military, 21, 22, 45-46, 136, 262 n 43, and Communist party of the Soviet Union, 5-6, 7-8, 11, 125, 1941-1945, 31-38 passim, 49, 50-51, 1948-1956, 63, 1956-1967, 100-101, during 1968 liberalization, 139-141, 148-150, 151-152, 1968-1975, 161-167, 172, 185, 192-193, 209, since i975, 209-217 passim See also invasions, Soviet Soviet press, 185, on Czechoslovak liberalization, 139, 143-144, 147, 148, 149, 150, 169, on 1968 invasion, 159, 162-164, 178, Warsaw Pact affairs in, 91, 150 Soviet Union, 44-47, Communist 301

INDEX Soviet Union (cont) party of, 5-6, 7-8, 11, 21-22, 125, 132, and 1968 cnsis/liberalization, 3-4, 28, 129-139 passim, 143-154, 155-156, 175, 176, 268-269 nn 97, 98, 1968-1975, 30, 161-164, 173-174, 178-181, 191-196, power relationships of, 12-26, 192-196, 208-217, 218-245, 249 n 12 See also Khrushchev, Nilata, Soviet military, Soviet press, Stalin, Josef Spanish Civil War, 62 spending, military, 1949-1956, 68, 79, 83, 1966, 103-105, 1968, 129131, 136, 146, 149, 1968-1975, 192 Stalin, I V , 22-23, 33, 79, 83-89 passim, 134, imperialism of, 23, 24, 86, 93-94, 219, 222, and nuclear weapons, 94-95, 260 n 16, and purges, 66, 70, 107, 257 n 42, and Slovak uprising, 35, 41 Strategic Rocket Forces Command, 101, 152 SUMAVA exercise, 149 SVAZAHM (Union for Cooperation with the Army), 190, 202, 206207 Svoboda, Ludvik, 42, 43, 51, 54, 71, in 1948 "revolution," 56, 252 n 50, 1950s purge of, 65-66, 67, and 1968 crisis, 4-5, 140, 159, 179, 181, during World War II, 36 Third World, 83-84, 191-192, 242 Tiso, Josef, 35, 41 Tito/Titoism, 63, 64, 87 training of Czechoslovak military, 36-37, 42, 49, 71-72, 190, 198, 203-212 passim, of Third World officers, 84, 191, Warsaw Pact,

302

21, 96 See also expert qualities, political education Treaty on the Temporary Stationing of Soviet Troops, 162-165 "Two-Thousand Words Manifesto," 117, 265 n 14 Ulbncht, Walter, 99-100 United States, 51-52, 61, 99, 113, 254n 68 uranium industry, 80, 129-130 utilitarian instruments, domestic party, 10, 25, 220, 221, of Soviet power, 23, 25, 221, 223 Valenta, Jiff, 264 n 11 Vietnam, 103, 242 VLTAVA exercises, 110, 148

Voennaia mysl', 91 Vojentorgs (army shops), 166 Volenik, Vojetech, 81 wages, officer, 73 Warsaw letter, 140 Warsaw Pact, 16, 18, 21, 28, 210, 230, 249 n 8, Central Group of Soviet Forces in, 193-194, 209, 211-216, 242, and Czechoslovak (1968) crisis, 3, 129-154 passim, 228, 267 n 54, and Czechoslovak normalization and consolidation, 161, 168, 169, 172, 176, 179, 193-195, formation of, 29, 86, 90, 92-94, Hungary and, 87, 101, and nuclear weapons/strategy, 93, 9596, 101-102, 137, Poland and, 93, 101, 136, 234, renationalization and, 90-92, Romania and, 195, 230, 231, 232, 233 Warsaw Treaty, 92-93 Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), see Warsaw Pact "We Shall Give a Marx-Leninist

INDEX Answer to Our Problems," 173 Westerners (Czechoslovak military), 36-43 passim, 58-62 passim, 66, 251 n 31 West Germany (FRG), 82-83, 99100, 103, 162, 242, 243, Warsaw Pact and, 92, 134, 136 women, in military, 78 working class, 56, 71-73, 105, 186, militia from, 11, 247 n 2, in military schools, 42, 72, 206 World War I, 44-45, 66

World War II, 4, 31-42 passim, 80, 81, 128, 178-179 Yepishev, A A , 148, 151-152, 179 Yugoslavia, 63, 64, 86, 87, 123, 125, 232 Zajic, Jan, 165 Zapotocky, A E , 70, 88-89 Zapotocky Military-Political Academy, 134, 178, 187 Zionism, 64-65

303

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBLICATION DATA

Rice, Condoleezza, 1954The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak army, 1948-1983. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Czechoslovakia—Armed Forces—History. 2. Soviet Union— Military relations—Czechoslovakia. 3. Czechoslovakia—Military relations—Soviet Union. 4. Civil-military relations—Czechoslovakia— History—20th century. 5. Komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska— History. I. Title. UA829.C9R53 1984 322'.5'09437 84-42566 ISBN 0-691-06921-2 (alk. paper)